SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

COLLECTION

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22 BOOKS

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Thomas Aquinas, O.P., was an Italian Dominican friar, Catholic priest, and Doctor of the Church. He was an immensely influential philosopher, theologian, and jurist in the tradition of scholasticism, within which he is also known as the Doctor Angelicus and the Doctor Communis. The name Aquinas identifies his ancestral origins in the county of Aquino in present-day Lazio, where his family held land until 1137. He was the foremost classical proponent of natural theology and the father of Thomism. His influence on Western thought is considerable, and much of modern philosophy developed or opposed his ideas, particularly in the areas of ethics, natural law, metaphysics, and political theory. Unlike many currents in the Church of the time, Thomas embraced several ideas put forward by Aristotle—whom he called "the Philosopher"—and attempted to synthesize Aristotelian philosophy with the principles of Christianity. The works for which he is best known are the Summa Theologiae and the Summa contra Gentiles. His commentaries on Sacred Scripture and on Aristotle form an important part of his body of work. Furthermore, Thomas is distinguished for his eucharistic hymns, which form a part of the Church's liturgy.

AN APOLOGY FOR THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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AN APOLOGY FOR THE RELIGIOUS ORDERS

PROLOGUE

Lo, your enemies have made a noise: and those who hate you have lifted up the head. They have taken malicious counsel against your people, and have consulted against your Saints. They have said: “Come, and let us destroy them, so that they be not a nation; and let the name of Israel be remembered no more” (Ps. lxxxii.).

Almighty God, the Lover of mankind, makes use of us, as St. Augustine says (I De doctrina christiana), both for the sake of His own goodness, and for our advantage. He makes use of us for His own goodness, that man may glorify Him. “Every one who calls upon My name, I have created him for My glory” (Isa. xliii 3). He likewise makes use of us for our own advantage, in order that He may give salvation to all. “Who wishes all men to be saved” (1 Tim. ii. 4). At the birth of Our Lord, an angel proclaimed this harmony between God and man, saying, “Glory to God in the highest, and peace on earth to men of good will” (Luke ii. 14).

But, although God, who is Almighty, could, of Himself alone, have caused man to glorify Him, and to obtain salvation, He has willed that a certain order should. be preserved in this work of salvation. Consequently He has appointed ministers, by whose labours the twofold end of man’s creation is to be accomplished. These ministers are rightly spoken of as God’s coadjutors” (1 Cor. iii. 9). But Satan strives, in his jealousy, to hinder both the Divine glory and the salvation of mankind. He, in like manner, endeavours to effect his purpose by means of his ministers, whom he incites to persecute the servants of God, The emissaries of Satan show clearly that they are the enemies both of God, whose glory they endeavour to frustrate, and, of man, against whose salvation they wage war. More especially do they show themselves hostile to the ministers of God, whom they persecute. “They, have persecuted us; and they do not please God; they are adversaries to all men (1 Thes, ii, 15). On this account, the Psalmist, in the verse which we have quoted, enumerates three points.

First he mentions the hatred borne by the ministers of Satan to God. “Lo, your, enemies have made a noise,” i.e. they who formerly spoke secretly against You, do not fear now to oppose You publicly. The Gloss tells us, that these words refer to the days of Antichrist, when, the enemies of the Lord, being no longer subdued by fear, will cry out, against Him aloud. And, as their clamour will be an unreasoning tumult, it is spoken of as a noise, rather than a voice. They will not, however, manifest their hatred of God by sound only, but also by deeds. “Those who hate you have lifted up, their head,” ie., Antichrist, as the Gloss says. And not only Antichrist, the head himself, but likewise his members, who we heads under his head, and being governed by him as their head, are able so much the more efficaciously to persecute the saints of God.

Secondly, the Psalmist points out how Antichrist and his ministers wage war against the whole human race. Hence he adds, “They having taken malicious counsel against your people”; or, according to another version: “They have devised crafty things, that they may deceive them.” This reading agrees with the words of Isaiah (iii. 12), “O my people, those who call you blessed, the same deceive you.” They deceive, as the Gloss adds, “with flattering words.”

Thirdly, David shows how the ministers of Satan persecute the servants of God. For, he continues, “They have consulted against your saints,” “not” (as the Gloss points out) “against men of moderate virtue, but even against heavenly men.” Hence St. Gregory (Lib. Moral. XIII), expounding the words of Job (xvi. 11) “they have opened their mouths against me; they have reproached me,” etc. says: “The reprobate, chiefly, persecute those men in the Holy Church whom, they judge likely to be of service to many.” The Saint further adds, “These enemies of God deem themselves to have performed a great deed, if they can destroy the life of the preachers of the Gospel.” They nourish two designs against the Saints. First, they wish to sweep them from the face of the earth. “Our enemies resolve to destroy us, and extinguish your inheritance” (Esth. xiii. 15). Secondly, the ministers of Satan desire, if they cannot succeed in slaying the preachers of the Gospel, at least to ruin their good name among men, so that their words way produce no fruit. Do not the rich oppress you by might? Do they not blaspheme the good name that is invoked upon you? (James ii. 6). Now the Psalmist alludes to the first of these wicked designs in these words: “Come” (for, thus, as the Gloss says, these reprobates summon their accomplices), “let us destroy them” (i.e., the Saints”), “so that they be not a nation.” These words the Gloss understands to mean, “Let us destroy them, that they be not among the nations: i.e., let us destroy them from the world. This is the persecution of Antichrist.” David makes allusion to this second design of Satan against the preachers of the Gospel, in the words, “Let the name of Israel be remembered no more,” meaning by this, as the Gloss explains, let their name be held in no esteem by such as consider themselves the true children of Israel.

In former days, tyrants sought to rid the world of the Saints by violence. St. Paul writes that he saw the literal accomplishment of the verse of the Psalm, “for your sake we are put to death all the day long: we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter” (Rom. viii. 36). But in our day, the enemies of God’s work aim at this indeed, but rather by cunning counsels, devised especially against religious, who, by word and example, may spread throughout the world the perfection which they profess. Their persecutors refuse to furnish them with certain necessities of life. They, further, withdraw from them spiritual solace. They impose on them again, bodily hardship, in the hopes, that their condition may thus be rendered burdensome and ignominious, and that they may, finally, cease to exist.

First, their enemies endeavour, as far as they can, to deprive religious of the means of study and of becoming learned, in order that they may be unable either to confute the adversaxies of the truth, or to draw spiritual consolation from the Scriptures. This was the cunning practised by the Philistines. “The Philistines had taken this precaution; lest the Hebrews should make them swords or spears” (1 Sam xiii. 19). The Gloss interprets this passage as signifying the prohibition to study. This mode of persecution was first practised against the Christians by Julian the Apostate, as we read in Ecclesiastical history.

Secondly, the enemies of religious seek to prevent their consorting with learned men, in order that, thus, their life may fall into disrepute. “And that no man might buy or sell, but he that has the character or the name of the beast” (Apoc. xiii. 17), by consenting, that is, to their malice.

Thirdly, these same malicious men seek to hinder religious from preaching, and from hearing Confessions, by which means they might effect much good to souls. “Prohibiting us to speak to the Gentiles, that they may be saved” (1 Thes. ii. 16).

Fourthly, they seek to oblige religious to labour with their hands, that so they may become weary of, and be disgusted with, their state of life; and that they, may be impeded in the discharge of their spiritual functions. They were anticipated in this device by that King Pharaoh, who said, “See, the people of the children of Israel are numerous and stronger than we. Come let us wisely oppress them...” “Therefore,” it is added, “he set over them masters of the works “ (Exod. i. 9). According to the Gloss, “ Pharaoh means Zabulum who imposes a heavy yoke of earth, signifying the labour of tilling the soil.”

Fifthly, the enemies of religious malign them, and blaspheme against their perfection, i.e. the poverty of the Mendicant Orders. “Many shall follow their luxuries; through whom the way of truth shall be evilly spoken of” (2 Peter ii, 2). The Gloss understands by “the way of truth,” good works.

Sixthly, as far as they are able, they try to deprive religious of alms, and of all other means of subsistence. “And as if these things were not enough for him,” writes St. John, “neither does he himself receive the brethren; and those who receive them he forbids (3 Jn). The Gloss thus comments on, these words, “And, as if these things were not enough for him,” i.e., as if it did not suffice him to dissuade others from exercising hospitality, “neither does he himself receive the brethren,” ie. the indigent, “and those who receive them he forbids,” i.e., he forbids them to give assistance to those in want.

Seventhly, the ministers of Satan endeavour to tarnish the reputation of the Saints; and that, not only by word, but by letters, sent to all parts of the world. “From the prophets of Jerusalem, corruption is gone forth into all the land” (Jer. xxiii. 13). St. Jerome, expounding this text, says, “These words are our testimony against those who send forth into the world letters full of lies and deceit and perjury, wherewith to pollute the ears of those who hear them.” For it is not enough for the servants of the devil to nourish themselves with their own malice, or to injure those at hand, but they must strive to defame their enemies, and spread their blasphemies against them over the entire globe.

In our attempt to cheek the calumnies of these foul tongues, we shall proceed in the following order.

First, as their malice seems entirely directed against religious, we shall show what the religious life is, and wherein its perfection consists (ch. 1).

Secondly, we shall demonstrate the worthlessness and folly of the reasons which their enemies adduce against the religious (chs. 2-7).

Thirdly, we shall point out that the accusations brought against religious are calumnious (chs 8-28).

PART 1

What is Meant by Religion? What Does its Perfection Consist In?

IN order to understand the meaning of religion, we must know the etymology of the word. St. Augustine, in his book De vera religione considers it to be derived from re-ligare (to re-bind). One thing is bound to another, when it is so joined to it, that it cannot separate from it, and unite itself to anything else. The word re-binding, however, implies that one thing, though united to another, has begun, in some degree, to disconnect itself from that other. Now every creature existed, originally, rather in God than in itself. By creation, however, it came forth from God, and, in a certain measure, it began, in its essence, to have an existence apart from Him. Hence every rational creature ought to be reunited to God, to whom it was united before it existed apart from Him, even as "unto the place whence the rivers come, they return to flow again" (Ecclesiast. i.). Therefore, St. Augustine says, (De vera religione), " Religion reunites us to the one Almighty God." We find the same idea expressed in the commentary of the Gloss, on the words, "for of Him, and by Him" (Rom. xi. 36).

The first bond whereby man is united to God, is that of Faith. For, " he who comes to God must believe" (Heb. xi. 6). Latria, which is the worship of God as the Beginning of all things, is the duty of man in this life. Hence religion, primarily and chiefly, signifies latria, which renders worship to God by the expression of the true Faith. St. Augustine makes the same observation in his De civitate Dei (book 10), where he says, "Religion signifies not worship of any kind, but the worship of God." Cicero in his ancient Rhetoric gives almost the same definition of religion. He says that

“Religion is that which presents certain homage and ceremonies to a higher nature, which men call the Divine Nature.” Hence all that belongs to the true Faith, and the homage of latria which we owe to God, are the primary and chief elements of religion. But, religion is affected, in a secondary manner, by everything by which we manifest our service to God. For, as St. Augustine says in his Enchiridion, “God is worshipped not only by faith, but likewise by hope and charity. Hence all offices of charity may be called works of religion. In in this sense St. James says (i. 27), “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the orphans and the widow in their tribulation,” etc.

Religion then bears a twofold meaning. its first signification is that re-binding, which the word implies, whereby a man unites himself to God, by faith and fitting worship. Every Christian, at his Baptism, when he renounces Satan and all his pomps, is made partaker of the true religion. The second meaning of religion is the obligation whereby a man binds himself to serve God in a peculiar manner, by specified works of charity, and by renunciation of the world. It is in this sense that we intend to use the word religion at, present. By charity, befitting homage is rendered to God. This homage may be paid to Him by the exercise of either te active or the contemplative life. Homage is paid to Him by the various duties of the active life, whereby works of charity are performed towards our neighbour. Therefore, some religious orders, such as the monastic and hermetical, are instituted for the worship of God by contemplation. Others have been established to serve God in His members, by action. Such are the Orders wherein the brethren devote themselves to assisting the sick, redeeming captives, and to similar works of mercy. There is no work of mercy for the performance of which a religious order may not be instituted; even though one be not as yet established for that specific purpose.

As by Baptism man is re-united to God by the religion of faith, and dies to sin; so, by the vows of the religious life, he dies, not only to sin, but also to the world, in order to live solely for God in that work in which he has dedicated himself to the Divine service. As the life of the soul is destroyed by sin; so likewise the service of Christ is hindered by worldly occupations. For, as St, Paul says (2 Tim. ii. 4), “No man being a soldier to God, entangles himself with secular businesses.” It is on this account, that, by the vows of religion, sacrifice is made of all those things in which the heart of man is wont to be especially absorbed, and which are, consequently, his chief obstacles in the service of God.

That which, first and chiefly, engrosses man is marriage. Hence St. Paul writes (1 Cor. vii. 23). “I would have you to be without solicitude. He who is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he who is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided.”

The second thing that fills man’s heart, is the possession of earthly riches. “The care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches chokes the word, and he becomes fruitless” (Mat xiii. 22). Hence the Gloss, commenting on the words of Luke (viii.), “But that which fell among thorns,” etc., says, “Riches, although men seem to take pleasure in them, become as thorns to their possessors. They pierce the hearts of such as covetously desire, and avariciously hoard them.”

The third thing on which man is inclined to centre his heart, is his own will. He who is his own master has the care of directing his life. Therefore, we are counselled to commit the disposal of ourselves to Divine Providence, “casting all your care upon Him, for He has care of you” (1 Peter v. 7). “Have confidence in the Lord with all your heart, and lean not upon, your own prudence” (Prov. iii. 5).

Hence perfect religion is consecrated to God by a three-fold vow: by the vow of chastity whereby marriage is renounced, by the vow of poverty, whereby riches are sacrificed, and by the vow of obedience, whereby self-will is immolated. By these three vows man offers to God the sacrifice of all that he possesses. By the vow of chastity, he offers his body, according, to the words of St. Paul, “Present your bodies a living sacrifice” (Rom. xii. 1). By the vow of poverty, he makes an offering to God of all his external possessions, as did St. Paul, who says, “that the oblation of my service may be acceptable in Jerusalem to the Saints” (Rom. xv. 31). By the vow of obedience, he offers to God that sacrifice of the spirit of which David says, “the sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit” etc. (Ps. l. 19).

But these three vows are, in the sight of God, not a sacrifice only, but also a holocaust. This, in the Old Law, was the most acceptable form of sacrifice. St. Gregory says (8 Homil. II. part. on Ezech.), “When a man vows to God one part only of his possessions, he offers a sacrifice. When, however, he offers all that he has, all that he loves, and his entire life to the

Almighty, he presents to Him a holocaust.” Hence religion, understood in its secondary sense, in so far as it presents a sacrifice to God, imitates religion taken in its primary sense. There are some who renounce a part of the things which are sacrificed by the religious vows; but this partial renunciation is not perfect religion. The observances customary in religious orders are intended to be helps, either to the avoidance of what has been renounced by the vows, or to the accomplishment of the promises which religious make to God.

Hence we see that in a certain sense (secundum quid) one religious Order may be judged more perfect than another. The complete perfection of anything consists in its prosecution of the end to which it is ordained. The perfection of a religious Order depends, chiefly, upon two things. First, it depends upon the purpose for which the Order was instituted. That Order is the most perfect which is destined to the noblest work. Thus a comparison may be made between the active and contemplative Orders, according to the comparative utility and dignity of the active and contemplative life. Secondly, a religious Order is more or less perfect in proportion as it fulfils the end whereto it was instituted. It is not enough for an order to be established for a specific purpose, unless its customs and observances be adapted to the attainment of that purpose. It two Orders be founded for the sake of contemplation, that one in which contemplation is chiefly facilitated, must be considered the more perfect of the two. But because, in the words of St. Augustine, “ None can begin a new life, unless he repent of his old life,” any religious Order, in which a man begins to lead a new life, must be a state of penance, whereby he may be purged of his old life.

For this reason, a third comparison may be made between religious Orders. That one being reputed the most perfect, wherein the most austerities and penitential exercises, such as fasts and poverty, are practised. But the first points which we have mentioned are the most essential to religious life. A conclusion as to the perfection of an Order, must, therefore, be based upon the perfection with which these points are observed. For perfection of religious life depends more upon interior justice, than upon external abstinence.

We see then what is the nature of religion; or the religious life, and in what religious perfection consists. Our next task will be to repeat the arguments adduced by the adversaries of Religion, and then to refute them.

We shall proceed, therefore, in the following order. We shall enquire:

1. Whether it be lawful for a religious to teach.
2. Whether a religious may lawfully belong to a college of secular teachers.
3. Whether a religious, not charged with the care of souls, may lawfully preach and hear Confessions.
4. Whether a religious be bound to manual labour.
5. Whether a religious may lawfully renounce all that he possesses, retaining no property, either private or common.
6. Whether a religious, especially one belonging to a Mendicant Order, may, lawfully, live on alms.

PART 2

CHAPTER 1

Is it Lawful for A Religious to Teach?

CONSTANT efforts have been made to hinder religious from becoming learned, and thereby, to ensure their inability to teach. The words of our Lord, “But be not ‘you called, Rabbi” (Matt. xxiii. 8), have been quoted in defence of these measures. It has been maintained, that, as, these words are a counsel to be observed by the perfect, Religious, as professors of perfection, ought in deference to them, to abstain from, teaching. St. Jerome, likewise has been brought forward as an advocate against the propriety of teaching being undertaken by religious. This saint, in his epistle to Riparius and Desiderius against Vigilantius (and the words are quoted in Gratian, xvi. Quaest. I), writes thus: “The office of a monk is to mourn, not to teach.” Again, in VII. Quaest. I, cap. Hoc nequaquam, it is said, “The life of monks is one of subjection and discipline, not of teaching, nor ruling, nor of being pastors over others.” And as canons regular and other religious are classed as monks (as it is stated in Extra de postulando, ex parte, and Quod Dei timor), it follows that no religious way lawfully teach.

It is further argued, that teaching is contrary to the vow of a religious, whereby he renounces the world. “For all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life,” by which we understand riches, pleasures, and honour. Now teaching is considered to be an honour; and this theory is thought to be supported by the Gloss upon the words of St, Matthew (iv. 5), “He set Him upon the pinnacle.” “In Palestine,” says the Gloss, “ the roofs were flat, and the Doctors sat thereon, and spoke to the people. The devil seduced many of them with vainglory. For they were puffed up by the honour of teaching.” On these words is based the conclusion that teaching is contrary to the vow of religious.

Again, it is urged, that, Religious are bound as stringently, to practise perfect humility, as they are obliged to observe perfect poverty. As their vow of poverty forbids them to possess anything of their own, so the humility, to which they are bound, does not permit them to enjoy any honour. Teaching is, as has been proved, an honour. It is not lawful, consequently, for religious to teach.

A passage from Dionysius (V. cap. Eccles. hierarch), is quoted as a proof that religious ought not to teach. This writer divides the hierarchy into three classes, those who perform sacred functions; those who share in these functions; and those who merely, receive the benefit of them. In the same chapter, he divides these functions likewise into three classes, viz., that of cleansing, which is the office of deacons; that of enlightening, which is, the office of priests; and that of making others perfect, which is the office of bishops. Those that receive the benefit of these sacred functions are also, again, divided into three classes, Of these, the first consists of the unclean, who are purified by the deacons; the second is composed of the holy people of God who are enlightened by priests ; and, the third class is formed by monks, who are of a higher rank than the other classes), and these are perfected by bishops. Hence the function of monks is to receive holiness, not to impart it to others. And as they who teach must instruct their pupils in sacred science, teaching is not the lawful work of monks.

Again, the scholastic office is more remote from the monastic life than is the ecclesiastical. But we find (XVI, quaest. I), that “no one can exercise the priestly functions, and persevere in the due observance of monastic rules.” Much less then can a monk devote himself to the scholastic office, by teaching or listening.

It is likewise supposed to be contrary to the doctrine of the Apostles for religious to teach. For St. Paul says (2 Cor. x. 13), “We will not glory beyond our measure, but according to the measure of the rule which, God has measured to us.” On these words, the Gloss thus comments: “We use power in-so-far as it has been given to us by the Author of our being: but we do not go beyond the limit, or measure, of our power.” The argument, drawn from these words, is that any religious, overstepping the measure of power assigned by the author of his rule, contravenes ths Apostolic doctrine. An no religious order originally included teachers, no monk ought to be promoted to the scholastic office.

Some enemies of religion, however, failing in their attempt to completely prevent religious from teaching, try to prove, that no religious community ought to have many teachers. In support of this theory they quote the words of St. James (iii. 1), “Let not many of you become teachers, my brethren.” These words the Gloss explains to mean, “Do not desire to have many teachers in the Church.” Now one community of religious is one Church. Hence there ought not to be many masters in a religious community. St. Jerome writes thus to Rusticus—and the words are quoted in VII. quaest. 1.—”Bees have one queen. Cranes follow one leader. There is one captain to a vessel. And one lord in a house.” Hence in one community of religious, it is argued, there ought to be only one master.

Furthermore, it must be remembered that there are many religious communities. If each college has more than one teacher, there will be so many religions teachers, that secular masters will, from dearth of pupils, be altogether shut out from the profession. There ought, also, to be a definite number of teachers for every branch of learning; but this great multiplicity of religious professors will cause sacred science to be held in low esteem.

These advocates of half measures, commit, in reality, as great an error, as those who desire to see religious totally excluded from the office of teaching. For, all who go astray and cannot keep on the beaten track of truth, fall, in their efforts to avoid one mistake, into the opposite error. Thus, Sabellius, as St. Augustine remarks, striving to keep clear of the Arian heresy of the division of the Divine Essence, fell into the error of confusing the Divine Persons. Boethius also observes that Eutyches, although avoiding the Nestorian heresy of dividing the Person of Christ, fell into the error of teaching that in Him there is unity of nature. The same observation applies to Pelagius, to Manichaeus and to other heretics. On this account St. Paul speaks (2 Tim iii. 8) of “men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith.” On which text the Gloss enlarges, by saying, that such men “do not stay in the faith, but walk round about it, never remaining on the mean line.”

The, passages quoted from the Decretals and the writings of the Fathers against the right of religious to teach owe their origin to the following fact. There existed, formerly, among certain presumptuous monks a mistaken idea, that, because they were monks, they, had a right to usurp the office of teachers. This assumption of authority, on their part, gave rise to considerable disturbance to the Church. We find this fact stated in XVI quaest. I, “Certain monks, bearing no commission from their own bishop, come to Constantinople, and cause confusion to arise in the church of that city.” This statement is fully corroborated in ecclesiastical history. The Fathers used every effort, both by arguments and decrees, to suppress these presumptuous monks.

But certain men of our own day, being “unlearned and unstable, wrest” these decrees, “as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction” (2 Peter iii. 16). They, thus, fall into an opposite error to that which the Fathers strove to rectify. For, it is now asserted by the enemies of religion, that no religions has any right to exercise, or to undertake, the function of teaching; and that such an office. ought not to be open to religious orders. We will produce proofs that such a conclusion is utterly unfounded. We will then proceed to confute the arguments adduced in its support.

First, we quote the authority of St. Jerome, who writes thus to Rusticus (the words are cited in XVI, quaest. I), “Lead such a life in your monastery, that you may deserve to become a cleric. Learn, for a long time, that which, hereafter, you may teach,” Again he continues in the following, chapter, “If the desire for the priesthood attract you, learn what you can teach.” From these words it is plain that monks may accept the office of teaching. The same fact is proved by the example of the Saints, who taught while living in religious orders. We read in the History of the Church, that St. Gregory of Nazianzen, a monk, was sent to Constantinople, in order to teach Holy Scripture. St. Damasus, likewise a monk; instructed his scholars, not only in Scripture, but in liberal arts, We have proof of this in the book De miraculis beatae Virginis. St. Jerome, also, although a monk, promises, in his prologue to the Bible, to instruct Paulinus, (also a monk), in Holy Scripture, and he exhorts him to its study. St. Augustine, knew, we are told, after he had founded the monastery in which he lived by the rule drawn up by the Apostles, wrote books and instructed the unlearned. In fact, some of the greatest Doctors of the Church—such as Sts. Gregory, Basil, Chrysostom, and many others—were religious.

Our Lord Himself has set the same example. For, as we read (Acts i. 1), “Jesus began to do and to teach.” The Gloss thus comments on these words, “Christ, by beginning to do and to teach, shows that a good teacher must do what he teaches.” The Gospels contain not only doctrine, but likewise counsels. Therefore, he who not only instructs others in the Evangelical precepts, but likewise himself observes the counsels (as do religious) are the most fit exponents of the Scriptures.

Again, when a man dies, he passes away from the works belonging to the life which he quits. When he begins a new life, those works best beseem him which belong to the life on which he enters. Dionysius (2 cap. Eccles. Hierarch.)shows that before Baptism, whereby man receives Divine life, he is incapable of any Divine operation; for life must precede work. In like manner a religious, by his vows, dies to, the world in order to live to God. Hence he is excluded from any share in secular business, such as commerce; but he is not forbidden to perform those Divine functions which require for their exercise life in God. Among such offices, is that of giving praise to God, which is only rightly done by those who have knowledge of sacred things. “The dead shall not praise you, O Lord... But we who live” (Ps. cxiii. 17).

Another office from which religious are not excluded by their vows is that of teaching. On the contrary, being rendered by contemplation capable of understanding Divine things, they are certainly the most fit to impart them to others. Hence St. Gregory says (6, Moral.), “Those who contemplate with undistracted mind, drink in that knowledge, which they afterwards, when they are busied in speech, communicate to others.” Now religious are chiefly set apart for contemplation. Thus then we see, that religious become, by their vocation, more, rather than less, fit for teaching.

It is ridiculous to assert, that a man is rendered incapable of teaching, because he has adopted a life which gives him more quiet and greater facility for study and learning. It would be as reasonable to say that a person is debarred from running, because he avoids the obstacles on his course. Now religious, as we have already seen, renounce by their vows all those things that chiefly disquiet the human heart. They, therefore, are the men beat adapted for study and for teaching. “Write wisdom (i.e., Divine wisdom, according to the Gloss) upon the tables of your heart” (Prov. vii. 3). “The wisdom of a scribe, comes by his time of leisure and he who is less in action, shall receive wisdom (Eccli. xxxviii. 25).

St. Jerome teaches, that the poor of Christ have a special claim to the knowledge of the Scripture. They know,” he says, (in prol. Hebraicarum quaestionum, super Gen.), “that we are poor and lowly, and do not own property nor accept alms. They know likewise that none can possess the treasure of Christ, i.e., the knowledge of the Scriptures, together with the riches of the world.” But it behoves those to teach, who have knowledge of the Scripture. Hence religious, who profess poverty, are peculiarly fitted to teach.

We have already pointed out that religious Orders may be founded for the prosecution of any work of charity. Now teaching is numbered amongst the spiritual works of mercy. Therefore a religious Order may be instituted for the purpose of teaching.

Certain religious Orders exist in the Church for the purpose of defending her against her enemies by force of arms, although there is no dearth of secular princes who are her official champions. Surely, warfare with sword and shield, must appear less consonant with a religious life, than is that spiritual combat waged against heresy by sacred writings, and suchlike intellectual weapons against heresy. It is of this spiritual armour that St. Paul says, “the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God,” etc. (2 Cor. x. 4). Why then may not Orders be lawfully founded for the purpose of teaching, and thus of defending the Church against her enemies, although she has other defenders who are not religious?

We must remember, once more, that he who is fit for a greater thing in which a lesser is included ought to be accounted fit for the lesser, included in the greater one. Now a religious, even if he does not belong to an order founded for teaching, may, as we know (De monachis, cap. XVI. quaest. I), be promoted to the office of a prelate. As, therefore, the office of prelate is greater than that of a doctor (which is exercised by the masters who hold professorships in the schools), and, as a prelate is bound to be versed in sacred learning, it ought not to appear unseemly for a monk, by permission of lawful authority, to undertake the function of teaching.

“Lesser goods may be sacrificed for greater ones,” the Gloss remarks on the words, “Go, and preach the kingdom of God” (Luke ix. 60); but the common welfare must always be preferred to any private advantage. Now while a monk is observing his rule in his cloister, he is working only for his personal advantage, i.e., for his own salvation. When, however, he is instructing many, his efforts redound to the profit of the whole Church.

Hence it is not unseemly for a religious to live outside his monastery, in order, by permission of lawful authority, to exercise the office of teaching.

Neither is it a valid objection to urge, that monks ought not to act thus at present, while there is no dearth of secular teachers. For, the common welfare ought not to be sought by any means that may offer, but by the surest means possible. Now a plurality of teachers is greatly to the public advantage; for one will be well versed in subjects of which another is ignorant. Hence we read in Wisdom vi., 26, “The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the whole world.” “O that all the people might prophesy,” Moses cried out in his zeal for knowledge (Numb. xi. 29). The Gloss remarks upon his words, that, “a faithful preacher would have all men utter the truth, which he himself does not suffice to declare.” And, in another place, the Gloss continues, in the same strain, “He” (i.e., Moses) “wished all men to prophesy; for he was not jealous of the gift bestowed upon him.”

It matters little whether teaching be conveyed by the word of a master who is present, or by the writing of one who is absent. To quote St. Paul (2 Cor. x. 11), “Such as we are in word by epistles when absent; such we will be in deed when present.” Now no one has seen the libraries of books, composed by monks, for the instruction of the Church, doubts that they can teach by writing, when absent. Therefore, it is lawful for them to teach by word, when present.

We will now proceed to the easy task of confuting the objections brought against the right of religious to teach.

The first argument, namely, that Our Lord gave a counsel to His disciples not to be masters, is, for several reasons, misleading. First, because the works of supererogation, concerning which the counsels are given, are rewarded by a peculiar recompense. “Whatever you spend over and above, I, at my return, will repay you” (Luke x. 33). These words are applied by the Gloss to works of supererogation. Hence it cannot be a counsel to abstain from works that are to be specially rewarded. Now teachers, like virgins, are promised a peculiar recompense. For we read in Daniel xii. 3, “Those who instruct” (ie., by word and example, as the Gloss explains) “many to justice, (shall shine) as stars for all eternity.” Hence there is no better ground for saying that it is a counsel to refrain from the function of teaching, than there is for maintaining that it is a matter of counsel to abstain from virginity, or from martyrdom.

Again, there cannot be a counsel which is contradictory either by another counsel, or by a precept. But teaching is a matter both of precept and of counsel. For our Lord said: “ Go, therefore, teach all nations” (Matt. viii. 19). St. Paul also writes: “You, who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness” (Gal. vi. 1). Hence there can be no counsel forbidding us to teach.

Again, our Lord willed that His Apostles, should themselves put, His counsels in practice, in order that by their example, others should be led to their observance. Hence St. Paul, giving the counsel of virginity, says, (1 Cor. vii. 7), “I wish all were as I myself am.” But the Apostles certainly did not observe the so-called counsel not to teach. For they themselves were sent forth to teach over the whole world. Thus, there can be no counsel against teaching.

It is unreasonable to say that it is a counsel to abstain from those things that embrace the dignity of teaching. Solemnities pertaining to an office are not a cause of personal elation. Otherwise all men would be bound to shun them; since it is the duty of all to avoid pride. External insignia merely demonstrate the exalted character of an office. Hence as it is not imperfect for a priest to sit above a deacon, or to wear costly vestments, it can certainly be no imperfection to make use of the insignia pertaining to the scholastic office. Our Lord said of the Pharisees, “They love the first places at feasts” (Matt. iii. 6); but “He did not” (as the Gloss remarks) “forbid masters to occupy the first seats; he merely reproved the desire to have or not to have them.” It is truly absurd to say that, though it be not a counsel to refrain from teaching, it is a counsel to refuse the name of master. There cannot be a counsel or a precept regarding what is not in ourselves but in another. To teach or not to teach is our own concern, and we have shown that it is not a matter of counsel. But the fact that we are called master or doctor, is no affair of ours. It regards those who give us these names. Therefore, to refrain from being called master, cannot be a counsel.

Further, as names are used to mean certain things, it is foolish to say that a name is forbidden, while the thing signified by it is allowed. Likewise, the observance of the Counsels was primarily the duty of the Apostles. It is only through their instrumentality that they are observed by any other persons. Now the name of Master cannot be forbidden by any counsel, since the Apostles called themselves both masters and teachers. “I am appointed a preacher and an apostle—I say the truth and do not lie—a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth" (1 Tim. ii. 7). "In which I am appointed a preacher and an apostle, and a teacher of the Gentiles" (2 Tim. i. 11).

It remains to be considered that our Lord's words: "Do not be called Rabbi" are not a counsel but a precept, by which all men are bound. He did not wish to forbid the office of teaching, but the sin of ambition. Neither, when He added, " nor masters," did He forbid us to teach, nor yet to bear the name of master. What His words signify, according to the Gloss, is: "Do not desire to be called masters." He forbids the desire of place. He does not forbid all such desire, but only such as is inordinate, and therefore unlawful. This has been proved both by a foregoing quotation from the Gloss, and also by Christ's words about the Pharisees, "They love the first places," etc. Nevertheless, these words, may (says the Gloss) bear another interpretation. If our Lord forbids us to be called by the name of master and teacher, He equally prohibits our bearing the name of Father; for we have one Father who is in Heaven and one Master Christ. "For God" (as the Gloss says) "is by nature both our Father and our Master." A man may be called father to signify his tenderness; and master to denote the authority which he exercises. That which our Lord forbids is that to any man should be attributed either right over physical or spiritual life, or plenitude of wisdom. Hence the commentary of the Gloss on this prohibition of Christ is as follows: "Do not be called masters, as assuming to yourselves what is due to God. Do not you call others Rabbi, as paying to man Divine homage." And in another place we find the following commentary on the same passage: "A man may be called father, as a mark of respect to his age, but not to denote that he is the author of life." In the same way, a man may be addressed as master, meaning that he is united to the true master, and that we reverence Him whose commission he holds. But, if our Lord had absolutely forbidden, either by counsel or precept, the name of master to be given to men, the Fathers of the Church would certainly not have allowed monastic superiors to be called Abbots, a word equivalent to father. If the name father were forbidden, how could the Vicar of Christ, who ought to set an example of perfection, be called Pope or father? Again, both St. Augustine and St. Jerome frequently addressed bishops as popes or fathers.

Hence it is the height of folly to pretend that the words, “Do not be called Rabbi,” are to be understood as a counsel.

But, even granted that these words were intended by our Lord as a counsel, it does not follow that all such as are perfect would be bound to observe it. For, those who make profession of the state of perfection are not under an obligation to obey all the counsels, but only such as they, by their vows, are bound to observe. Were it otherwise, the Apostles, who were in the state of perfection, would have been bound to perform the work of supererogation which St. Paul practised in taking no stipend from the churches in which he preached; and they would have sinned had they acted otherwise (1 Cor ix.). Were all religious equally bound to observe every counsel, and to perform every work of supererogation, great confusion would ensue, and the distinctions which now differentiate the various Orders would be abolished. Those who are in a state of perfection are not bound to observe all the Counsels, but only those to which their vows oblige them.

The argument; that the office of a religious is not to teach, but to mourn, carries no weight. St. Jerome meant, by the words quoted, that the chief duty of a monk, as a monk, is to do penance, not to teach. He thereby shows that a monk is not, by virtue of his profession, bound to teach; and he rebukes the presumption of those religious who claimed the function of teaching as their special prerogative. He writes in the same sense in his epistle to Vigilantius. But it does not, by any means, follow that, although a monk has not the office of teaching, it may not at some future time be imposed upon him. It is not the duty of a subdeacon to read the Gospel, but that does not prove that this office will never fall to his share, as Gratian points out (XVI quaest. I, Superiori). St. Jerome wished to emphasise the distinction between the person of a monk and that of a cleric, and to show, that certain duties were peculiar to the office of each. One function belongs to a monk, as a monk; another to an ecclesiastic as an ecclesiastic. The duty peculiar to a monk, by reason of his state of life, is to mourn for his own sins and those of others. The task especially allotted to an ecclesiastic is that of preaching to and instructing the people. This distinction appears still more clearly in another chapter of Gratian, in which be treats of the teaching conveyed by preaching, which is the, special duty of prelates, not of scholastic teaching in which they are not specially well practised. Hence in raising this objection against the right of religious to teach, our adversaries are begging the question.

But, even supposing that it be not lawful for a monk to teach, that does not prove that it is not right for Canons regular to teach; since these are counted as ecclesiastics. St. Augustine, in his sermon De communi vita clericorm (quoted XII quaest. I, Nemo), says, speaking of Canons regular: “He who possesses, or desires to possess private property and to live on his own means, virtually renounces his life with me, and is not a cleric.” This passage shows that those who lived under the rule of this Saint, in the practice of poverty, were recognised as clerics. Although St. Augustine withdrew the assertion that no one was a cleric who retained private property, he never contradicted his words, that those who lived under him without possessing anything of their own, were clerics (see cap. Certe ego sum, quaest. eadem).

When canons regular and monks are said to be equally counted as religious, it is to be understood, that they are equal in observance of the points common to all religious Orders, i.e., the renunciation of private property, abstention from commerce or from legal business, and the like. Unless this be made clear, it might be thought, that canons regular were bound to certain observances, e.g. the disuse of wearing linen apparel, to which monks are bound. Even if it be not lawful for monks to teach, this function is certainly permissible to religious belonging to Orders instituted for the purpose; just as it is lawful for the Knights Templar to bear arms, although the use of armour is forbidden to monks.

The objection, that the exercise of the teaching office is contrary to the religious vows, is, on several accounts, ill-founded. Religious do not renounce the world in the sense that they can make no use of secular things. They renounce a worldly life, i.e. they are not allowed, by their vows, to be employed in secular affairs. Even among men, living in the world, there are some who are not of the world, ie. who are disengaged from temporal interests. But religious do not act contrary to their vows, by making use of the riches or even, at times, of the pleasures of the world. Otherwise occasional feasting would for them be a mortal sin. Which is, of course, out of the question. If it be not against the religious vows to make use of secular riches or pleasure, why should it be contrary to these vows, to make use of worldly honour?

Not only religious, but all men are, in one sense, bound to renounce the world, as we learn from the words of St. John already quoted (1 Jn. ii. 15), "If any man love the world the charity of the Father is not in him, for all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life." The Gloss says that "lovers of the world have nothing except these three things, viz. the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, from which sources spring every vice." Hence we see, that it is not riches or pleasure simply, which are said to belong to the world, but the inordinate desire for them; and that not honour, but ambition, is forbidden, not to religious alone, but to all mankind. "The pride of life," says the Gloss, "signifies worldly ambition." But, even if honour be simply understood as belonging to the world, this would not be true of every kind of honour, but only of such as consists of worldly things. The honour of the priesthood cannot be said to belong to the world. Neither can the honour given to a teacher, when the teaching which is honoured concerns spiritual things. Thus, if religious do not, by their vows, renounce the priesthood, they need not renounce the office of teaching. Again, it is untrue to say that the act of teaching is an honour. It is the teacher's office which is honourable. And, even if religious renounce all honours, they cannot renounce all honourable functions; otherwise they would renounce all those works of mercy which are most deserving of honour. "Honour," to quote Aristotle, "is the reward of virtue" (I Ethic.). That the devil deceives some do men and fills them with pride on account of their office as teachers, is no more reason for refusing the work of teaching than it is for declining to do any virtuous actions. For, as St. Augustine says, "Pride insinuates itself into good works, to make them worthless."

The assertion, that, religious profess perfect humility is absolutely untrue. They make no vow of humility. Their vow is of obedience. Neither humility, nor any other virtue, is a matter of vow. Acts of virtue, being a matter of precept, are a necessity. Vows are only concerned with that which is voluntary. Again, no one can make a vow of perfect humility, or of perfect charity. For perfection is a gift of God; it does not depend upon our will.

Granted, however, that religious were bound to perfect humility, that would not hinder their receiving certain honours. The possession of property is certainly contrary to perfect poverty, but the acceptance of honours is not contrary to humility. For pride consists not in possessing honours, but in being unduly elated by them. Hence St. Bernard says (in Libro de consideratione), “Even in the time of the Sovereign Pontiff there is no jewel brighter than humility! He who is in a more exalted position than others, becomes, by humility, superior to himself.” And in the book of Sirach iii. 20 we read: “The greater you are, the more you should humble yourself in all things.” Who would dare to say that St. Gregory became less humble by being promoted to the highest ecclesiastical honour? Moreover, as we have said, the function of teaching is not an honour. Therefore, objections brought against it, on that ground, are, worthless.

Another argument brought against the right of religious to teach is that Dionysius distinguishes monks as apart from deacons, priests, and bishops. We know from ecclesiastical history that the monks of the primitive Church, until the time of Eusebius, Zozimus, and Siricius, were not clerics (XVI, quaest I, Superiori). Therefore, as it is of these monks that Dionysius speaks, we cannot, from his words, come to any conclusion about the monks who were bishops, prieds, or deacons. Any difficulty on the point, arises from misunderstanding of the words of Dionysius. This author calls the Sacraments of the Church sacred actions. Baptism he terms cleansing and illumination. Confirmation and the Blessed Eucharist he names perfecting (IV cap. Eccl. hierarch.). Now it is not lawful for any, save bishops, priests or deacons, to perform these sacred functions. Teaching in the schools, however, is not one of the holy rites, or sacred actions, whereof he speaks; otherwise it could be undertaken by none save by a priest, or a deacon. Again, ordained monks can consecrate the Body of our Lord, a power pertaining to none but priests. Why then should they not exercise the function of teaching, for which no Orders are required?

It is further urged, that, as no monk can be employed in ecclesiastical duties, and yet keep his monastic rule aright, much less can he combine the work of teaching with regular observance. Our answer is that, as we have already shown, this objection does not hold good with regard to the essentials of religious life. For these can be practised by those who hold ecclesiastical office. As for such religious observances as silence, vigils, and the like, it is shown in another chapter, that, “he who is obliged to serve daily in the ministry of the Church, practises the strictness of his monastic life.” But it is not unseemly if anyone neglect regular observance for the sake of performing an action such as teaching, which is for the common good. Thus religious who are called to the office of prelates, sometimes while they are still in their monastery, accept a dispensation for such reason. There are also religious living in their cloister in strict observance, who exercise the function of teaching, because it is enjoined by their rule.

The seventh objection to the right of a religious to teach is, that by so doing, be oversteps his measure, or, as the Gloss says, goes further than is permitted to him. Now when we say that a thing is permitted, we mean that it is not forbidden by any law. Hence if a religious do something not prohibited by his rule, even though the thing be not mentioned in the Rule, he does not overstep his measure. Otherwise, religious who live under a mitigated rule, would have no right to undertake the customs and usages of a more perfect life. Such a prohibition would be opposed to the sentiments of St. Paul (Philipp. iii.), who says that, forgetting the things that were behind, he stretched forth himself to those that were before. We must further remember that some religious are, by the rule of their Order, destined for teaching. To them, of course, the foregoing objection cannot apply.

The suggestion, that in one community of religious there ought not to be two teachers is manifestly unfair. Religious, as we have shown, are not less humble than are seculars; and their position in the office of teaching ought not to be worse than that of seculars. But, if the suggestion, to which we have alluded, were carried out in practice, religious would have far less chance of success in the profession of teaching, than would be the case with seculars. For a whole multitude of religious would have no more opportunity of promotion to a professorship than any individual layman would have who studied alone. Hence the progress of religious would be seriously impeded. We may compare their position to that of wrestlers, whose spirit in their match would be damped, if the prize for which they strove were withdrawn. For, as Aristotle says (III Ethics), “The bravest in the fight are those who despise cowardice, and honour courage.” In like manner, it is a hindrance to a student if the chance of a professorship, the prize for which he is working, be denied him. It would be regarded as a penalty for some offence if a man who, by his learning, had gained a right to some scholastic post, were not allowed to occupy it; and in the same way, a religious would be punished for being a religious, were obstacles placed in the way of his gaining a professorship. Nothing could be more unjust, than thus to punish a man for leading a meritorious life.

The authority of St. James, “be ye not many masters my brethren,” brought forward in support of this suggestion, applies as much to laymen as to religious. For, in the New Testament, all Christians are called brethren; and the Church is called a society of Christians. Neither is a multitude of religious teachers more stringently forbidden by the authority cited than is a multiplicity of secular teachers. For, as St. Augustine says, “by many teachers is meant teachers teaching contrary doctrines. Many who teach alike are but as one teacher.” Hence St. James’ prohibition is directed against divergence of doctrine, not against plurality of masters. His words may also be understood in their literal sense, as meaning that discrimination must be exercised in the choice of teachers; that only such men must be chosen for this office as are discreet and well versed in the Scriptures. But, as the Gloss remarks, there are not many such to be found. In another passage, the Gloss says that “they who are not learned in the word of faith should not be allowed to teach; lest true preachers be hindered in their work.” Or, again, the words of St. James which have been quoted may apply to masters in the sense of prelates of the Church. For it is forbidden for one bishop to govern several churches; or for several bishops to rule over one church. Hence the Gloss says, “Do not desire to be masters, i.e. prelates (who alone are ecclesiastical masters) in many churches; or to have many masters in one church.” For, he who teaches in a community is not a master of a church, although the community to which he belongs may be called a church.

We can answer the second argument of our adversaries by saying that, although there be several masters in one community, they do not rule, as a captain guides a ship, or a queen-bee reigns in a hive. Each master presides over his own school. Hence the words of St. Jerome (“among bees there is one queen”) cannot be understood in the sense in which our opponents use them. They only mean, that there should not be many masters in the same school.

To the third argument brought against a multiplicity of religious teachers, we reply, that the fact that there may be several religious houses, each containing many masters, does not debar laymen from the profession of teaching. There are not always in a community of religious enough men capable of teaching. Again, the fact that in any diocese there may be a sufficiency of teachers does not exclude seculars from this function. Religious and laymen ought to be judged on the same lines; and the most capable masters, be they secular or religious, ought to be selected without distinction of person. We need not fear that the Holy Scriptures will fall into contempt on account of a multiplicity of teachers to expound them. There is more danger of this being the case when the professors of Scripture are few in number. Hence there is no reason why the number of teachers should be limited; or why, through fear of their being too many, men capable of teahing should be excluded from that office.

CHAPTER 2

Can A Religious Lawfully Belong to A College of Secular Teachers?

THOSE who are hostile to religious make a malicious effort to prove that they ought not, in anything pertaining to study, to have dealings with seculars. Their object in thus acting, is to place obstacles in the path of such religious as are employed in teaching, if they cannot entirely hinder them in the exercise of that function. They adduce several authorities in support of their principles.

First they quote the following words of xvii, cap. vii, In nova actione: “Those engaged in the same work, ought not to differ in profession. This was forbidden by the law of Moses, “You shall not plough with an ox and an ass together” (Deut. xxii), which means “You shall not associate in one office men of different professions.” The reason given is, “they whose aims and, desires are dissimilar, cannot unite nor coalesce.” Since then laymen and religious differ in profession, they ought not to be joined in the teaching office. Again, St. Augustine says, that every man ought to adhere to such a manner of life as befits him. Now it does not appear seemly, that the same man should, belong at one and the same time to a secular and to a religious establishment. For, the members of one institute cannot imitate the usages of the other. Hence a religious, belonging to his own community, should not be a member of a secular college.

Again, a legal statute has ruled that, without a dispensation, the same man shall not belong to two lay associations. Much less then ought a religious, belonging to his own community, to be a member of a secular establishment. Again, all who belong to any society are bound to obey its rules. Now religious cannot conform to regulations drawn up for lay professors and scholars; nor can they promise to abide by those ordinances which laymen bind themselves to observe; nor to take the oaths which seculars take, for religious are not their own masters, but live under authority. Hence they cannot belong to secular societies.

But, the malicious enemies of religious, in their desire to exclude them from any intercourse with seculars, strive, in default of legitimate arguments, to accomplish their purpose by calumny. They maintain that religious are a source of offence and scandal to the world; and they exhort their fellows to avoid all communion with them. They quote the words of St. Paul (Rom. xvi. 17), “Now I beseech you, brethren, to, mark them who cause dissensions and offences, contrary to the doctrine which you have learned, and to avoid them.” Religious are accused of living in, idleness. Therefore, according to the words of St. Paul (2 Thes. iii. 6) they ought to be shunned by good men. For, the Apostle says: “We charge you, brethren, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, that you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly, and not according to the tradition which they have received of us.” St. Paul goes on to speak of the manual labour practised by the Apostles. He then continues, “For you yourselves know how you ought to imitate us.” He concludes his exhortation by the following command: “If any man obey not our word,” (i.e. our injunction to manual labour), “by this epistle, note that man; and do not keep company with him, that he may be ashamed.”

Religious are further denounced by their enemies as being the source of all the evils which are to flood the world in the latter days. Hence they must be shunned by all men. For, St. Paul, writing to Timothy, (2 Tim. iii), gives a most emphatic order on this head. “Know,” he says, that in the last days there shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves, covetous, haughty, etc., having an appearance indeed, of goodness (or of religion, as the Gloss says), but denying the power thereof. Now these avoid.” But, as in the same chapter St. Paul says, “Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse, erring and driving into error,” so these defamers of religious, not satisfied with calumny, try to make void the authority of the Apostle, saying that, not even at his bidding, are they bound to admit religious to their society. For, according to civil law, there is no obligation which can compel them to permit religious to associate with them, since society is established on the basis of free will. Hence the

Apostolic authority is limited to ecclesiastical affairs. St. Paul himself said (2 Cor. x. 13), “We will not glory beyond our measure, but according to the measure of the rule which God has measured to us.” Now ecclesiastical affairs include the collation of benefices, the administration of the Sacraments, and the like, but not association in studies. Hence secular students are not, by Apostolic authority, bound to admit, religious to their society.

Again, power is committed to the ministers of the church, not “unto destruction, but unto edification” (2, Cor. xiii. 10). Hence as the enemies of religious consider that they have proofs that union between religious and seculars would be “unto destruction,” they hold, that the authority of the Apostles cannot compel them to form such an union.

This opinion, however, is censurable, mistaken and ill-founded. It deserves censure inasmuch as it detracts from that unity in the Church which, as St. Paul says (Rom. xii. 5), is based on the fact that “We, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.” The Gloss interprets these words as meaning, that “we are members one of another, since we are of service to each other, and are in need of the assistance of one another.” This is true of all men alike; neither the greater, nor the lesser amongst us being excluded. Hence whosoever hinders one man from serving another, as far as he be able, impairs the unity of the Church. Now the work of teaching is one adapted to religious. St. Paul mentions this, saying, “he who teaches in doctrine.” Thereby the apostle means, says the Gloss, “He who has the gift of teaching, should, by his instruction, prove himself a member of another.” Hence it is a violation of ecclesiastical unity to hinder religious either from teaching others or from learning from them. It is likewise an infraction of charity. For, as Aristotle says (Ethics viii. and x.), “friendship is based on intercourse and by it is fostered.” These words are borne out by the saying of Solomon, “A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother” (Prov. xviii. 24). Anyone, therefore, who hinders intercourse, in scholastic matters between laymen and religious weakens charity and sows the seed of quarrels and dissensions.

Again, obstacles thrown in the way of such intercourse, will tend to impede the progress made by students. In all social matters, the companionship of others is of great advantage. “A brother that is helped by his brother is like a strong city” says Solomon (Prov. xviii. 19). “It is better, therefore, that two should be together than one: for they have the advantage of their society” (Eccles. iv. 9). But Wis, especially, in study, that society is of use; for among many students some will know or understand that, of which others are ignorant. Hence Aristotle (I Caeli et Mundi) says “that the ancient philosophers, at divers meetings, investigated the truth concerning the heavenly bodies.” The exclusion then any class of men from the society of other students is a manifest injury to the studies of all. This applies, especially, to the exclusion of religious, who are peculiarly well adapted to make progress in learning, since, by their state of life, they are not distracted by worldly anxieties. “He who is less in action, shall receive wisdom” (Eecles. xxxviii. 25).

By excluding religious from studying in common with laymen, an injury is committed against the community of faith, which is called Catholic because it ought to be one. Those who do not associate with each other by agreeing on religious matters, may easily end by teaching different, and even contradictory doctrines. St Paul says of himself (Gal. ii, 1), “Then, after fourteen years, I went up I again to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking Titus also with me. And I went up according to revelation, and communicated with them the Gospel which I preach among the Gentiles, but apart to them who seemed to be something: lest perhaps I should run, or had run, in vain.” We learn from the Decretals (distinct. XV.cap. canones), that Councils began to be convoked in the time of Constantine. Before that period, there was, on account of frequent and violent persecutions, very little facility for the instruction of the faithful; and, as bishops had no opportunity for meeting to debate together, the Christian religion was torn by many heresies. This fact proves, that there is great danger of schism in matters of doctrine, when the preachers of the faith are not able to assemble for purposes of discussion. Hence any attempt to exclude religious from intercourse with other teachers and students is highly to be condemned.

The reason given for such an exclusion, is likewise ill-founded, being opposed to Apostolic doctrine which cannot err. St, Peter (1 Pet. iv. 10), writes in these terms: “As every man has received grace, minister the same one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.” The Gloss thus comments on this passage: “The Apostle signifies by the word “grace” any gift of the Holy Spirit which may be used for the assistance of others, in things either temporal or spiritual. He exemplifies his meaning by the words which follow. “If any man speak, let him speak as the words of God.” The Gloss adds, “If any man knows how to speak, let him attribute his knowledge not to himself, but to God.” Let him stand in fear, lest he teach anything contrary to the will of God, the authority of Scripture, or the good of his brethren; or, lest he be silent, when he ought to speak.” Hence the assertion that Religious and laymen ought not mutually to communicate their gift of knowledge is patently, opposed to the teaching of the Apostles.

Again, we read in Ecclesiast. xxxiii. 18, “See that I have not laboured for myself only, but for all that seek discipline.” These words, as the Gloss observes, apply to the teachers of the Church, who, by their writings and instruction, profit not themselves alone, but others also. The wise man, in the text that we have quoted, says, that he has laboured for all men, without exception. Therefore, both religious and secular teachers, ought, by their teaching, to labour for the benefit of all their brethren, whether laymen or religious.

As the body is composed of several members, so in the Church there exist divers offices. This comparison we find in the first Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (xii.). Now as in the physical body there are eyes, so in the mystical body of the Church there are teachers. Hence the Gloss understands the text in the Gospel of St. Matthew (xviii. 9): “If your eye scandalises you” etc., to refer to ecclesiastical doctors and counsellors. Physical eyesight is useful to the whole body alike, and one limb subserves another in its functions. For, as St. Paul says (1 Cor. xii. 21), “the eye cannot say to the hand: I need not your help; nor again the head to the feet: I have no need of you.” Therefore, everyone who undertakes the office of teaching must perform it for the benefit of all men, of whatsoever condition they may be. Thus religious must assist laymen; and laymen must help religious.

Again, any person who is competent to perform some special function has a right to be admitted to the society of those who are selected for the exercise of that function. For, an association means the union of men, gathered together for the accomplishment of some specific work. Thus, all soldiers have a right to associate with one another in the same army; for an army is nothing but a society of men, banded together for the purpose of fighting. Hence religious of a military order do not exclude from their society secular soldiers, and vice versa. Now an association of study is a society established with the object of teaching and of learning; and as not only laymen, but also religious, have a right to teach and to learn, there can be no doubt that both these classes may lawfully unite in one society.

The objection made to intercourse between seculars and religious, on matters bearing on study and teaching, are altogether frivolous. They are based on wholly untenable grounds; and they only serve to show the ignorance of their authors. For, as we have already said, a society means a union of men, assembled together for one and the same purpose. Hence as everything ought to be judged with regard to the end for which it is ordained, the different societies which exist ought to be distinguished and judged according to the purpose for which they are formed. Aristotle, (VIII Ethics) classifies different "communications". By this term he means associations formed for divers objects, wherein the members hold communication one with the other. The Philosopher distinguishes friendships according to these communications. He refers to the friendship of those brought up together, or that based on commercial transactions, or the friendship of men engaged in the same business, Hence arises the distinction between public and private societies. A public society is that wherein men assemble for purposes connected with the commonweal. Thus fellow citizens or compatriots form a public society and become one city or one kingdom. A private society is one established by a few persons for some private end. Thus two or three enter into partnership in a mercantile negotiation. Now each of these classes of society may be either temporary or perpetual. Sometimes a number of men, or only two or three individuals, band together in a perpetual society. This, is the case with those, who, when they become citizens of some city, form an association, choosing that city for their dwelling-place for ever. They thus establish a political society. Again, there may be a perpetual private society, formed between husband and wife, or master and slave, based upon the durable nature of the tie binding together the members of such a society. This is called an economical society. But, when men associate in order to engage in some temporary business, as, for example, to hold a fair, they form a temporary and public society. Or, when two friends are engaged in the management of the same inn, the society which they establish is private, and at at the same time temporary.

Now these various classes of association, must be judged by different standards. To apply the name of association or society indiscriminately to all is to prove one’s own ignorance. For this, reason, we shall have no difficulty in answering the objections brought at the association of seculars and religious.

We are told, first of all, that “men of different professions ought not to be associated in the same offices.” Then words are quoted, “you shall not join together men of different professions.” This objection is perfectly true if it be understood to mean that men of different professions should not be associated in matters upon which they differ. Hence laymen and clerics should not be associated in ecclesiastical matters. Therefore the following words are found before the words just quoted: “A bishop ought not to have a lay vicar; and the clergy ought not to be judged in lay courts of justice.” For the same reason, religious cannot associate with laymen in commercial and mercantile transactions, in which religious are forbidden to take part. “No man being a soldier of God entangleth himself with secular businesses” (2 Tim. ii. 4). But, as we have seen, the exercise of teaching and of learning concerns both seculars and religious. Hence there is no reason against religious being associated with laymen in scholastic, affairs. For, men of different conditions, who, agree in unity of faith, form the body of the Church. “There is neither Jew nor Greek: there is neither bond nor free: there is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. iii. 28). It is objected that, although in an association of laymen and religious there are some points common, to both classes there are likewise some on which they differ. Thus, there may be a purely secular society, formed of members whose interests are limited to secular affairs. Or, there may be an exclusively religious institute, of which the system is directed towards the formation of the religious life. There is, however, one, point which is common both to laymen sad to religious. For, religious and seculars have this in common, viz., that. they belong to the society of the one Church of Christ, by that agreement in one faith whereby the unity of the Church is made perfect. Hence as teaching and learning are functions pertaining alike to seculars and religious, an association of study ought not to be known as exclusively either a lay or a religious college; but, rather, as a college including both seculars and religious.

The objection that no one can belong to two associations is, for three reasons, untenable. First, because a part cannot be numerically accounted as opposed to the whole. A private society is part of a public society, as a house is part of a city. The fact that a man forms part of a family causes him to form part of a city, which is composed of many families. Nevertheless, he does not, on this account, belong to two distinct associations. Now as an association of studies is a public association, a man who forms part of a private society (be it secular or religious), wherein a few students meet together for the purposes of study, belongs on this very account to a general scholastic association. But he does not, for this reason, belong to two associations. Again, there is no law to prohibit a man from belonging to some public, perpetual association, and at the same time from forming part of a public or private temporary society. Thus, a man who belongs to some civic society may likewise form part of a military association; and the member of a family, may be associated with others in an inn. Now an institute of studies is a temporary, not a perpetual, association. For men attend it, not as a permanent residence, but they go and come at their own convenience. Hence there is no reason why a man belonging to a perpetual society, such as a religious, order, should not also attend a scholastic establishment. The third reason which stultifies the objection to the admission of religious to secular colleges is that this objection applies the particular to the general. The assertion, that a man cannot, belong to two associations was originally formulated about ecclesiastical societies. Thus, a man cannot be a canon in two churches, without a dispensation or a legitimate reason. We read (XXI quaest. I), “From this date, no cleric shall be attached to two churches.” But this rule does not apply to other associations. For, the same man can be a citizen of two cities. Therefore, as a scholastic association is not an ecclesiastical society, there is no reason why a man belonging to a religious or secular association, should not also be a member of a scholastic society.

The fourth reasoin given for the exclusion of religious from association with secular students is that religious cannot either teach or study without the authorisation and permission of their superiors, who have the power to absolve their subjects from their oaths and other engagements in order to enable them to belong to such an association. Now we must remember that, as the perfection of a whole consists in the union of its parts, a whole cannot exist unless its parts agree. Hence any decrees drawn up for the welfare of a state and city ought to be formulated with a view to the advantage of all its members. Any statutes which would hinder the unity of a commonwealth ought to be abolished. For laws are established in order to preserve the concord of a state and not to promote internal dissension. In the same way, there ought not to exist in any scholastic association statutes which do not suit all students alike. The words of the Apostle, (Rom. xvi. 17), "Now I beseech you, brethren," etc., quoted by our opponents in support of their objections, are no argument on their side. First because the words of St. Paul do not apply to religious, but to heretics, and to schismatics. This is clearly shown in the text, wherein St. Paul warns the Romans to avoid such as cause dissensions "contrary to the doctrine which they had learned," learned that is, as the Gloss explains, "from the true Apostles." Those against whom St. Paul gave this warning, were men who strove to impose the Jewish law upon the Gentiles. Again the words (2 Thes. iii. 6), "We charge you, brethren," etc., were not uttered against religious, but against men who passed their time in idleness and misdeeds. Of these St. Paul says, "we have heard there are some among you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling," or as, the Gloss says, "providing for their necessities by iniquitous means." Again the words (2 Tim. iii. 1), "Know also this," etc., were written not to religious, but to heretics, "blasphemers" as St. Paul calls them, "who by their heresy blaspheme God" (Gloss). "As Jannes and Manbres resisted Moses so these also (i.e. heretics) resist the truth," continues the Apostle, " men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith." It is true that he says, that the heretics of whom he speaks, had an appearance indeed of godliness," ie., of religion; but religion in this passage signifies latria, which makes a profession of faith. In this sense, it is, as St. Augustine says, (X De civitate Dei), equivalent to piety.

But even granted that all or some religious were as infamous as certain men consider them to be, that would be ho reason for excluding them from intercourse with others. The Gloss, referring to the passage of St. Paul (1 Cor. v.,), concerning the man guilty of. incest, wherein he bids the Corinthians not so much as to eat with such an one, observes that, "the Apostle's words, 'if anyone that is named a brother,' show that men are not to condemn each other rashly and carelessly, but that it is only after judgment has been pronounced that any sinner is to be excluded from communion with the Church. If such a sinner cannot be judicially excommunicated, he must be tolerated.” We have no right to exclude any man from the society of his fellows, unless he be, by his own confession, found guilty of some crime, or be denounced and convicted by some secular or ecclesiastical tribunal. Hence a man may not be condemned on suspicion, or by someone usurping the office of judge. He must be tried, accused and convicted according to the law of God, interpreted by the Church. Hence even were religious as reprobate as they are said to be, they ought not to be excluded from intercourse with the laity, unless they have been brought to judgment, and have been condemned.

The attempt to derogate from the authority of the Apostles, is not only based on false premises, but is closely akin to heresy. For we find in the Decretals (dist. XXII. cap. Omnes) the following passage: “Whoever endeavours to wrest from the Roman Church the privilege bequeathed to her by the supreme head of all the churches is undoubtedly guilty of heresy.” And again, “ He acts contrary to faith, who acts against her who is the Mother of the Faith.” Now Christ granted to the Roman Church the privilege of being obeyed by all, as He Himself is obeyed, in order, as says St. Cyril, bishop of Alexandria (II Thesaurorum), “that we may continue to be members under our Head, the Roman Pontiff, seated on the throne of the Apostles. From him must we learn what we are to believe and uphold. We are bound to revere him, and to entreat him for all things. To him alone does it belong to rebuke and to correct and to unloose, in the place of Him who has established him. To none other has this power been given, but to him alone, before whom all men do, by the divine command, abase their heads, and who is, by all the princes of the world, obeyed as if he were our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.” Hence it is clear that anyone who maintains that the Pope need not be obeyed is a heretic.

The objection that, according to law, no one can be forced to join an association against his will, applies only to a private society, established by two or three members. But a man can be compelled to form part of a public association, which cannot exist without the consent of authority. Thus, a prince may force the inhabitants of a certain city to accept an individual as their fellow-citizen; and an ecclesiastical society can be compelled to accept a man as a canon, or a brother. Hence as any general scholastic association is, in a certain sense, a society, any man may be obliged, by the authority of a superior, to belong to it.

The assertion that the Apostolic authority is limited to ecclesiastical affairs, is false. The president of a republic is bound to provide food for those over whom he rules, and to undertake the proper education and training of the young (X Ethic). He is likewise obliged to supervise the legislation of his republic, and to establish rules for the well-being of the citizens (I Ethic). Thus we see that the legislation concerning education is one of the duties of the president of a republic. It must, therefore, come under the authority of the Apostolic See, by which the whole Church is governed.

The last objection is founded on an absolute falsehood. The association of religious with the laity in matters concerning education is not intended for the destruction, but rather for the advancement, of learning. Hence there can be no possible doubt that, by the authority of the Apostolic See, seculirs may be compelled to admit religious into their scholastic societies.

CHAPTER 3

Is it Lawful for A Religious, Who Has Not the Care of Souls, to Preach and Hear Confessions?

THE enemies of religious, not content with trying to hinder them from producing fruit in the Church by teaching and expounding the Holy Scriptures, endeavour to do still further and greater harm, by preventing them from preaching and hearing confessions, in the hopes that thus they may be rendered unable either to encourage the faithful in virtue, or to eradicate vice. Those who act in this manner, clearly show themselves to be those persecutors of the Church, who, as St. Gregory says (20 Moral, on the words Quasi caputio tunicae), “make a special effort to hinder the word of preaching.”

These enemies of religion adduce several arguments in support of their persecution. First, they quote the words which occur XVI, quaest. I, “The office of a monk is one thing, that of a cleric is another. Clerics feed their sheep: I (being a monk) am fed.” Again in VII, quaest. I, cap. Nequaquam, the following words are found: “The duty of the monastic life is not to teach nor to preside nor to feed others with the word of God, but to be subject.” To preach is to feed with the Divine Word, as is seen in John xxi. 17. The Gloss on the words “feed my sheep,” says, that “to feed the sheep of Christ is to strengthen the faithful lest they fall away.” Hence monks, and religious who are counted as monks, cannot preach. This is more clearly laid down in XVI, quaest. I, cap. adjicimus, in which the following passage occurs: “We declare that, with the exception of the priests of the Lord, no one has license to preach, be he layman or monk, no matter how great a reputation for learning he may enjoy.” Again, in cap. Juxta we read as follows: “ We ordain that monks shall cease entirely from preaching to the people.” St. Bernard likewise says in his work on the Canticles: “Preaching does not beseem a monk; it is not expedient for a novice; it is not permitted to anyone who is not sent to preach.”

Again, it is, argued that they who nourish the people with the word of God ought also to minister to their temporal necessities. For, as the Gloss says, “to feed the sheep of Christ, means to strengthen the faithful lest they fall away; and, if necessary, to provide for their temporal needs.” As religious are, by their profession of poverty, unable to supply the people with material necessities, they cannot feed them, by preaching the word of God.

The prophet Ezekiel asks: “Should not the flocks be fed by, the shepherds?” (xxxiv. 2). By “shepherds,” says the Gloss, are signified bishops, priests, and deacons, to, whom the flock is committed. Hence religious, being neither bishops, priests nor deacons, and having no charge of the flock, may not preach.

Again, we read, (Ron. x. 15), “How shall they preach, unless they be sent? “ But, our Lord has sent none but the twelve Apostles (Luke ix), and the seventy-two disciples (Luke x). The “twelve Apostles,” says the Gloss, represent bishops, and the “seventy-two disciples” the priests of the second rank, or parish priests. St. Paul likewise (1 Cor. xii.) speaks of it “helps,” meaning those who assist their superiors, as Titus helped St. Paul, or as archdeacons help bishops. Religious, therefore, being neither bishops, parish priests, nor archdeacons, have no right to preach.

We read in the Decretals (dist. LXVIII), “Chorepiscopi” are strictly forbidden both to this Holy See and to all bishoprics throughout the entire world. This institution is an abuse and corruption.” The reason of the prohibition is given in these words, “For, our Lord only, as we know, established two orders: the twelve Apostles, and the seventy-two disciples. Whence this order arose, we do not know, but, as there is no reason for its existence, it must be abolished.” Preaching religious (our adversaries add), being neither bishops (i.e. successors of the Apostles), nor parish priests (i.e., successors to the seventy-two disciples), ought likewise to be suppressed.

Dionysius (VI Ecclesiast. hierarch.), says that the monastic Order ought not to be in a position of superiority to others,” or, according to another version, “is not instituted for the purpose of guiding other men.” Now men are led to God by teaching and preaching. Hence neither monks, nor other religious, ought to preach, or to teach.

The hierarchy of the Church is modelled on the celestial hierarchy, according to the words (Exod. xxv, 40), “Look, and make it according to the pattern that was shown you in the mount.” Now in Heaven angels of an inferior rank never exercise the functiona proper to those of a superior degree. Since then the monastic order is counted among the lesser orders of the Church, monks and other religious ought not to perform the office of preaching, which belongs to bishops and other prelates of a higher rank (Dionyslus, VI Ecclesiast. hierarch.).

Again, when a religious preaches, he does so either with power or without power. If he preaches without power, he is a false apostle. If he preaches with power, he has a right to demand the means of subsistence. Our Lord, when sending forth His Apostles to preach, told them to take nothing with them on the way save only a staff (Mark vi.). This staff signifies, (according to the Gloss), the power of accepting the necessities of life from those subject to them. Now it does not seem fitting that religious should demand the means of support. Therefore, they ought not to preach.

Bishops have more right to preach than have religious, who are, not entrusted with the cure of souls. But, a bishop cannot preach outside his diocese, unless he be requested to do so by other bishops or priests. For it is clearly laid down (IX, quaest. III), “Let no Primate or Metropolitan presume to judge the church or parish or anyone belonging to the parish of another diocese”; and the same rule is given in several other chapters. Therefore, religious, who have neither diocese nor parishes, may not preach, unless specially invited to do so.

A preacher ought not to build upon another man’s foundation, nor to glory in another man’s converts. He ought, rather, to imitate St. Paul who says (Rom. xv. 20), “1 have so preached this gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man’s foundation.” And, again, the same Apostle says (2 Cor. x. 15), “Not glorying beyond measure in other men’s labours,” which words the Gloss explains as meaning “not glorying where another has laid the foundation of faith, which would be to glory beyond measure.” In the same chapter, St. Paul uses the expression, “not to glory in another man’s rule,” which the Gloss interprets as signifying not to glory in those who are under the government of another.” Therefore, those who have not the care of souls ought not to preach to such of the faithful as are entrusted to others. They ought, rather, to lay the foundation of the faith among unbelievers.

The adversaries of religious, not content with these efforts to prevent them from preaching, endeavour likewise to prove that they have no right to hear confessions. In support of this opinion, they quote from XVI, quaest. I, cap. Placuit: “We positively and irrevocably decree that no monk shall administer penance to anyone.” And in another chapter we find the words: “ Let no monk presume to administer penance, to receive a child to baptism, to visit or anoint the sick, to bury the dead, or to meddle with any office of the kind.” Again (Cap. Interdicimus), the following words occur: “We forbid abbots and monks to impose public penance, or to visit or anoint the sick.” From all these passages it appears evident, that monks and religious, (who are included under the same laws), have no right to hear confessions.

Further, in the book of Proverbs (xxvii. 23) the following exhortation is addressed to priests in charge of, churches: “Be diligent to know the countenance of your cattle.” The Gloss thus comments on these words: “The Pastor of a church is bidden to take diligent care of those committed to him. He must know their doings, and he must remember to correct the vices which he may observe among them.” But how is the pastor of a church to know the actions and failings of those under him, save by confession? Hence the faithful should not confess to any except to their own parish priest.

We further find that the following words were pronounced by Pope Innocent in a general council (extra de paenitentiis et remissis): “Every one of the faithful, of both sexes, shall, on reaching years of discretion, confess all his sins privately at least once a year to his own priest. He who is thus absolved of his sins, need not confess them again.” Hence it follows that if any, save a parish priest, had the right to hear confessions and to give absolution, the faithful would not be bound once in the year to make their confession to their own parish priest. Now as religious are not parish priests, and have not charge of the faithful, they ought not to hear confessions nor to absolve penitents.

The faithful are likewise bound, according to the same decretal, to receive the sacraments from their own priests. None but those in due dispositions ought to receive the sacraments. As a priest can only by means of confession judge of the state of soul of him to whom he administers the sacraments, it follows that only parish priests can be empowered to hear confessions and to give absolution.

It is necessary that the Church should avoid not only sin, but the risk of sin, “that I may cut off the occasion from them,” as St. Paul says (2 Cor. xi. 12). Now if the faithful are at liberty to confess to others besides to their own priests, many may say that they have been to confession, and yet approach the sacraments without confession. The parish priest would be powerless to hinder this abuse. Therefore, Religious ought not to be allowed to hear confessions, as they are not parish priests.

The power to absolve sinners, belongs only to him, whose duty it is to correct them. Dionysius, in his epistle to Demophylus the monk, expressly says that correction is the office, not of monks, but of priests. Hence religious ought not to administer absolution to penitents. As religious have no defined province or diocese or parish, they may, if they be allowed to preach or hear confessions at all, do so anywhere. Their power therefore exceeds that of bishops, primates or patriarchs, who are not universal rulers. Even the Pope has forbidden himself to be called Bishop of the Universe. And in the Decretals (dist. XCIX) it is distinctly laid down that “no Patriarch shall ever make use of the name “Universal.” The same prohibition is repeated in the next chapter.

Arguments are further brought forward to prove that religious cannot, by authority of bishops, preach or hear confessions. It is objected, that a man no longer possesses what he gives away; and, therefore, if bishops commit the charge of parishes to parish priests, the care of those parishes belongs no longer to the bishops themselves, but to the parish priests. Hence they cannot give to religious faculties to preach and hear confessions without the consent of the parish priests. Again, it is urged that, by laying on a priest the care of a parish, the bishop frees himself from its responsibility, which rests on the priest to whom the charge is committed: “Keep this man; if he slips away, your life shall be for his life” (1 Kings xx. 39). If a bishop were answerable for all the parishes in his diocese, his responsibility and burthen would be intolerable. The care of each parish belongs to the priest appointed to take charge of it; and the bishop should not interfere with it further.

It is further maintained, that, as a bishop is subject to his archbishop, so are priests subject to their bishops. But archbishops cannot meddle with the subjects of a bishop, unless he be proved guilty of negligence. “Let archbishops do nothing in matters concerning the affairs of the bishops without taking counsel with them” (IX, quaest. III). On the same grounds, bishops must not meddle with the affairs of parish priests, without their consent; unless a priest be proved guilty of negligence or fault. Each parish priest is the bridegroom of the church entrusted to him. But, if other clergy, besides those commissioned by the bishops, exercise in parish churches the ministry of preaching or hearing confessions, the Church win have many bridegrooms. This state of affairs would clearly be opposed ,to the decree (VII quaest. I), ordaining that “as it is unlawful for a wife to commit adultery, or to be judged or disposed of during the lifetime of her husband without his permission; so the spouse of a bishop (i.e., his church or parish) may not during his lifetime be, without his will and consent, judged or disposed of; neither is it lawful to exercise ministry in such a church or parish.” And this prohibition, as Gratian says, applies not only to bishops, but to all ministers of the Church.

Our opponents, also, endeavour to prove that religious are not, even by the permission of the Apostolic See, allowed to preach or hear confessions. For not even the authority of the Pope can establish any custom, or make any law opposed to the statutes of the Fathers. This is clearly expressed XXV, quaest. I, cap. Contra statuta: “If it be against the statutes of the early Fathers that any should preach or hear confessions, save only the priests of the Lord, permission so to do can be given to no one, even as a privilege granted by the Pope” (Cf also XVI. quaest. I). We also find in XXV, quaest. I, cap. Sunt quidam, the following words: “If, which God forbid, the Roman Pontiff should try to overthrow the teaching of the Apostles and Prophets, he would be convicted, not of giving an opinion, but of falling into error.” If then there be an Apostolic ordinance “not to glory in another man’s rule” (2 Cor. x.), the Pope, were he to confer the privilege just mentioned upon any man, would commit an error.

It is a law that, when a sovereign grants permission to a man to erect a building in a public place, it is understood that he to whom this privilege is conceded may only use it in so far as it be not to the prejudice of anyone. (See Ne quid in loco publico aedificare, lib. I. Si quis a principe) And in XXV, quaest. II. cap. de ecclesiasticis, St. Gregory says: “As we defend our own property, so let each one of us be jealous for the rights of his own church. I will not, through partiality, concede to any man more than he deserves; nor shall any cunning cause me to refuse to anyone that which is his right.” But if a man preach or hear confessions in a church uninvited, he is doing an injustice to the parish priest. Hence no permission for the exercise of these functions ought to be granted, without the consent of the clergy of the parish.

Again, if a sovereign grants any individual freedom to make a will, he does not thereby give him permission to do more than to draw up an ordinary and legitimate will. It is not conceivable that a Roman governor, the protector of law, should desire by one word to prevent the observance of the statutes concerning wills which have been framed with such laborious care. (De inoffic. testament. lib. Si quando) In like manner, if the Pope should grant to any persons the privilege of preaching or hearing confessions, the permission ought to be understood in its usual sense, i.e., subject to the wishes of parish priests.

A monk receiving priestly Orders has not the faculties for performing the functions attached to the sacerdotal office (e.g. the administration of the Sacraments), unless he be canonically appointed to the care of a parish. We further find it laid down (XVI, quaest. I, cap. Adjicimus Monachi autem): “If the office of preaching be, by, a Papal privilege, committed to any man, he cannot exercise it when souls have not been entrusted to him.”

Moreover, neither the Pope nor any other mortal man can overturn or alter the eccesiastical hierarchy which has been divinely instituted. For this power has been given to no one “unto destruction, but unto edification” (2 Cor. x). But, in the order of the Church, monks are among those who are to be made perfect (see cap. VI. Ecclesiast. hierarch.). Nothing, therefore, can so alter this order as to place monks among those whose office it is to make others perfect.

Those who argue in this manner strive further to prove that religious have no right to seek permission from bishops or parish priests to preach or hear confessions. If they do so, they are actuated by an ambitious desire of usurping the ecclesiastical office. In VIII, quaest. I, cap. Sciendum, we meet with the following words: “When a command is laid upon a man to assume an exalted position, he who obeys the order loses the merit of obedience, if he ambitiously aspires to the post.” Now preaching and hearing confessions are duties of the ecclesiastical state and, therefore, confer dignity and power. Hence religious cannot, without notable ambition, ask for permission to preach and hear confessions. They can only do so when required. Here then is the source from which the error mentioned before has arisen. For as Boethius says, the road of faith runs between two heresies; just as virtue keeps on the centre line between vice. For virtue consists in preserving the due balance of things, and by doing too much or too little man falls from virtue. In the same way, he who holds either more or less than the truth, falls into error; but truth is the centre line of faith. Now it must be remembered that there have been certain heretics, and some now exist, who consider that the power of the ecclesiastical ministry depends upon sanctity of life, and that he who is not holy loses this power, and that this power is increased in proportion to a man’s holiness.

This opinion does not concern our point; but let us, for the moment presume it to be erroneous. From this error has arisen the presumption of certain men, especially of monks, who, elated by their holiness, have, at their own pleasure, usurped the functions of ecclesiastics—preaching, and giving absolution, without any episcopal commission. We find their audacity rebuked (XVI, quaest. I, Pervenit ad nos), in the following terms: “We are astonished that in your parish, certain monks, and abbots, have, contrary to the decrees of the holy Fathers, arrogated to themselves the rights and functions of bishops. They administer penance and remission of sins, bring about reconciliations, and dispose of tithes and churches. They ought not to presume to act thus, without license from the bishop, or authority of the Apostolic See,” Now in their condemnation of the presumption of these monks, certain men have fallen into the error of rashly saying that religious are unfitted to perform the duties just enumerated, even though they be appointed thereto by the authority of the Bishop. This error is thus mentioned (XVII, quaest. I), “There are certain men, filled rather with bitter jealousy than with love of truth, who, without any grounds for their assertion, have the presumption to state that monks, who have died to the world in order to live to God, are unworthy of exercising the priestly office, and are incapable of administering penance, of teaching Christianity, or of giving absolution, in spite of the power divinely committed to them at their ordination. But this is a complete error.” Other men, again, are led by their audacity into another mistake. They assert that religious are not merely precluded, by their state of life, from exercising the sacerdotal functions, but that, bishops cannot, without the consent of the parish priests, grant them faculties for their performance. Nay, the Pope himself, they say, cannot qualify religious to act as priests. Thus, this error leads to the same result as that which we have previously mentioned. For while one error detracts from the ecclesiastical power, the other asserts that the power of the church depends upon sanctity of life.

Our next task will be to refute this error, and we shall proceed in the following order:

First, we shall show that bishops and superior prelates can preach and absolve those who are under the care of priests, without needing the permission of those priests.

Secondly, we shall prove that they can empower others to act in like manner.

Thirdly, we shall make clear that religious are, when commissioned by a bishop, capable of exercising these functions.

Fourthly, we shall demonstrate that it is expedient for the welfare of souls that others, besides parish priests, should be allowed to preach, and hear confessions.

Fifthly, it will be shown that a religious order may advantageously be founded for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions, with license from the bishops.

Sixthly, we shall reply to the objections of our adversaries.

1. The fact that a bishop has, in any parish of his diocese, all the powers of a priest, is proved by these words from X, quaest. I, cap. Sic quidam: “All that has been established in the Church, by her ancient constitution, belongs to the office and power of a bishop.” Again, in the next chapter, the same is laid down. Now the temporal things of the Church exist for the sake of that which is spiritual. Hence with far greater reason, the spiritual concerns of parishes are committed to the bishops. Again, in the same question it is said that “every parish is to be administered under the care and supervision of the bishop, by the priest or the other clerics whom he shall appoint, in the fear of God.” In the following chapter, we likewise read that,

“a church must be governed and conducted according to the judgment and power of the bishop, who is charged with the souls of his whole flock.”

Again, a priest in charge of a parish can do nothing in it, without a general or particular permission from his bishop. Hence XVI, quaest. I, cap. Cunctis fidelibus, we find the following passage: “All priests, deacons, and other ecclesiastics must, above all things, bear in mind that they may do nothing without license from their respective bishop. Without this license, a priest cannot in his own parish say Mass, baptise, or perform any other office.” Hence a bishop has more power in each parish of his diocese than have the priests of those parishes. For they can do nothing without the Bishop’s leave.

The Gloss commenting on the words (1 Cor. i.), “in every place of theirs and ours,” says: “These words signify in every place originally committed to me,” and the Apostle was speaking of suffragan churches, i.e. churches subject to the Church of Corinth. If then bishops are the successors of the Apostles and retain their office, as appears from the commentary in the Gloss on Luke x., the chief power in a parish belongs rather to the bishop than to the parish priest. For the words, “in every place of theirs and ours,” cannot mean that the church was first entrusted to St. Paul, and then taken from him and given to another, else it would have ceased to be his.

Apollo was a priest, ministering to the Corinthians, as we know from the words (1 Cor. iii. 6), “Apollo watered,” i.e., “by baptism,” (Gloss). Nevertheless, St, Paul regulated the affairs of the Church of Corinth, as we learn from his own words, “The rest I will set in order, when I come” (2 Cor. ii. 34). And again, “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sake have I done it in the person of Christ” (2 Cor. ii. 10). And, again, he writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor. iv. 21): “What do you want? Shall I come to you with a rod? or in the spirit of meekness and charity?” Again, “according to the measure of the rule which God has measured to us, a measure to reach even to you” (2 Cor. x. 18). In another chapter, he says “Therefore, I write these things being absent, that being present, I may not deal more severely according to the power which the Lord has given me” (2 Cor. xiii. 10). This “power,” as the Gloss says, was that of “binding and loosing.” Hence we clearly see that a bishop retains full jurisdiction over the people entrusted to priests.

Again, priests are said to be successors of the seventytwo disciples, and bishops successors of the twelve Apostles (cf. Gloss on Luke x). Now it would be absurd to maintain that the apostles had no power of binding or loosing and of performing other spiritual works without permission from the seventy-two disciples. This argument holds good in like manner, with regard to the relations between bishops and priests.

Dionysius, furthermore, says (V Eccl. Hier.) that “although the duty of the episcopate is to perfect others, that of the priesthood to enlighten them, and that of the diaconate to cleanse them, nevertheless, bishops are bound not only to perfect but likewise to enlighten and to purify their people. In like manner, it is the office of priests not only to enlighten, but likewise to purify their flocks.” He gives the following reason for his assertion: “Inferior powers cannot become capable of the higher works; and it would be unjust were they to aspire to such a dignity. But the more divine powers are able to perform inferior operations, as we see by the words of Maximus.”

It is plain then that if a priest can do the work of a deacon, a bishop can accomplish all and more than that is done by a priest. A priest can, without permission from his deacon, read the gospel in his church. Therefore a bishop can, without license from the parish priest, absolve and administer the other Sacraments in any parish church of his diocese. What a man does through the agency of another he can do himself ; but when priests give absolution it is their bishop who is said to absolve by their instrumentality. Hence Dionysius (VI, cap. Eccles. Hiear.) writes: “He who, according to us, is the high priest does, by means of priests, his ministers, cleanse and illuminate us. It is he who is said to exercise these functions; because he entrusts others with the power of performing these sacred actions in his stead.” Hence a bishop may, in his own person, give absolution or preach.

Again, the inferior clergy owe obedience to their prelates, in all that regards their care of souls. Thus St. Paul says (Hebr. xiii. 17), “Obey your prelates and be subject to them. For they watch (i.e., they are solicitous for you in preaching) as being to render an account of your souls.” A parishioner is more stringently bound to obey his bishop than his parish priest. For, as the Gloss says in the commentary on the words Rom. xiii., obedience must be paid rather to the higher than to the lower power; thus a proconsul must be obeyed rather than a governor, and an Emperor rather than a proconsul. For, obedience must be proportioned to rank. This maxim applies to spiritual far more strongly than to temporal affairs. Hence bishops, who are invested with power superior to that of parish priests, are at the same time more fully responsible for the people. The words of the book of Proverbs (xxvii. 25): “Be diligent to know the countenance of your cattle,” refer to the care of souls, and are chiefly carried out by hearing confessions. Therefore, it beseems bishops, even more than parish priests, to hear the confessions of the faithful.

As the seventy-two elders, of whom we read (Nun. vi.), were given to Moses as assistants; so priests are appointed as coadjutors to bishops, who could not bear their burdens unaided. Hence at the ordination of a priest, the bishop makes use of the following, and other similar words: “The weaker we are, the more do we stand in need of assistance.” But the fact that a bishop has a coadjutor does not deprive him of his own powers; for he still continues to “be their primary agent, and priests are his ministers. Hence bishops have as good, yes a better right, than priests to perform every sacerdotal office without the permission of any priest.

Further, bishops hold, in the Church, the place of our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore Dionysius says (V Eccles. Hier.), “The Pontifical order is the first of divine ordinances, and supreme in the hierarchy of the Church. In it all degrees of the ecclesiastical hierarchy are consummated, and made perfect. As we behold the universal hierarchy summed up in Jesus, so each particular hierarchy attains its fulness in its own chief priest, i,e., its bishop. St Peter (1 Pet. ii. 25) says of Christ, “be converted to the pastor and bishop of your souls.” These words also apply, chiefly, to the Roman Pontiff, “before whom,” as St. Cyril remarks, “every head must, by divine right, bow, and whom all must obey, as they would obey our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.” St. Chrysostom says, commenting on the text of St. John, “Feed my lambs”: “These words are equivalent to saying, “Be, in my place, head and master of your brethren.” Hence it is absurd and almost blasphemous, to say that a bishop, who represents Christ, cannot exercise the power of the keys over any person in his diocese.

In order to give absolution, it is necessary to have the power of the keys, and jurisdiction, over every soul in a diocese. By this the matter is determined; and for the administration of penance as for the other Sacraments, all that is necessary is the power of Orders and the matter, together with the appointed form and due intention. Now a bishop being a priest has the keys. He has jurisdiction over every member of his diocese, otherwise he could not summon them to appear before him. Hence without the permission of any priest, he can give absolution to anyone in his diocese.

It is argued that it is necessary for parish priests to hear confessions, because they have the duty of administering the Blessed Eucharist, which noone should receive who is in mortal sin. But, Confirmation and Holy Orders likewise require a state of grace ‘m, their recipients; and these Sacraments can be given by bishops only. Hence a bishop is entitled to hear the confession of every person in his diocese.

Further, no one can reserve to himself what is not within his own power. Now by a common usage, bishops reserve to themselves certain cases for absolution. But, in order to act thus, they must have power to absolve. Hence they must likewise have power to absolve in all other cases in which they desire to do so.

Dionysius remarks that, in our hierarchy the episcopal power is universal, the power of priests and other ministers particular (I, V, Eccl. Hier.). But, as we know by philosophy, universal power acts more efficaciously on that which is subject to a particular power than does that particular power itself. Hence a bishop exercises the power of the keys more efficaciously on those who are subject to priests, than do priests themselves.

Further, it is plain that no man can give to another anything that he does not himself possess. It is the office of a bishop to give authority to priests. But, by imparting authority, a bishop does not deprive himself of it, for spiritual gifts are only bestowed by the action of the giver on the recipient. But as an agent does not, by acting, lose the power of acting, a bishop retains all that power which he gives to parish priests.

2. Our next task will be to prove that certain men can be commissioned by bishops to preach and hear confessions in the parishes entrusted to priests. For, as it is stated (de officio judic. ordin. cap. Inter caetera), “a bishop may, with expediency, choose out certain men fit for the holy office of preaching.” And again, “we enjoin that, both in cathedrals and in conventual churches, bishops should appoint certain coadjutors and fellow-workers, who shall assist, not only in the duty of preaching, but in that of hearing confessions, imposing penance, and other such offices as may

pertain to the welfare of souls.” From these words, it is plain that the clerics of monastic churches, who are not parish priests, may, by the authority of the bishop, preach and hear confessions.

Again, in Extra de haereticis, cap. excommunicavimus, quia vero, it is laid down that, “all such as have been forbidden to preach, or who have not received, publicly or privately, license to preach from the Apostolic See, or from the Catholic bishop of a place, and shall yet usurp the office of preaching, do so under pain of excommunication.” Hence we see that the Pope, or a bishop, can give to any priest authority to preach.

Further, it is certain that the Apostles, of whom bishops are the successors, ordained certain priests in cities and villages to dwell continually among their people. But they likewise sent forth others to preach and to perform other offices, for the good of souls. Thus St. Paul writes (1 Cor. iv. 17), “I have sent you Timothy, who is my dearest son and faithful in the Lord, who will put you in mind, of my ways in Christ Jesus.” Again (2 Cor. xii. 18), “I desired Titus, and I send with him a brother,” i.e. Barnabas or Luke. The Apostle also writes to Titus (i. 5), “For this cause I left you in Crete that you might correct what was wanting, and that you might appoint priests, as I appointed to you,” Hence other priests, besides those in charge of parishes, may preach and hear confessions, with license from a bishop.

The offices of preaching, and of hearing confessions pertain both to jurisdiction and to Orders. But offices pertaining to jurisdiction can only be exercised by those who have received Orders. Hence if a bishop without asking permission of the parish priest, can preach or hear confessions in any parish church within his diocese; another priest may, by the commission of the bishop, act in the same manner.

This proposition is likewise proved, by the fact that persons seeking admission into the Church, receive from the papal penitentiaries letters empowering them to make their confession to any priest whatsoever. And the papal legates and penitentiaries preach everywhere, and hear confessions without asking any permission from parish priests, but solely by the authority of the Pope. This proves that commission can be given to certain priests both for preaching end for hearing confessions, without any necessity for a further license from parish priests.

It now remains to be proved that religious are fit to perform the functions, of preaching and hearing confessions. For in XVI, quaest. I, cap. Pervenit it is stated that “without the license of their own bishop monks and abbots may not presume to administer penance.” Whence it follows that religious, when authorised by the Pope or by a bishop may lawfully hear confessions. Again, in the same chapter the following words occur: “ We, in our Apostolic discretion and tenderness, decree that it is lawful for monks who are priests and who represent the Apostles to preach, baptise, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin.”

In the next chapter, Sunt tamen nonnulli, Pope Boniface speaks thus: “We believe that, by the operation of God, the office of binding and loosing may be worthily accomplished by monks in priestly Orders, if they have been deservedly exalted to this rank. We further ordain that for the future, those shall be reprimanded who contend that priests of the monastic profession are excluded from the exercise of the sacerdotal functions. For the higher a man’s rank the greater is his power.”

Again, bishops are bound, as far as possible, to imitate the divine judgments. St. Paul says (1 Cor. ii, 1), “ Be imitators of me, as I also am of Christ.” But God has judged some monks worthy to preach without any human authorisation. This was the case with the monk Equitius, as St. Gregory relates (Dialog.) and also with St. Benedict. Hence bishops may rightly esteem certain religious to be fit to preach.

Further, everything that is lawful to secular priests is lawful likewise to religious, with the exception of any points forbidden by their rule. In Arg. xvi, quaest. I Sunt tamen nonnulli, it is laid down “that it is right for monks to absolve and to perform similar functions. St. Benedict, the gentle guide of monks, has not forbidden such offices to be undertaken by religious.” Secular priests, when authorised by a bishop, may preach and hear confessions. Hence as there is no rule forbidding monks to perform these duties, they may preach and hear confessions in like manner.

It is a greater dignity for a man to preach by his own authority, than by the commission of another. Now religious are always liable to be raised to the episcopate, in which rank they have a right to preach and do other work expedient for the welfare of souls at their own discretion. Why then should they be deemed unfit to preach by the permission of a bishop? The fact that a man is in a state of perfection does not incapacitate him from preaching.

On the contrary, preaching is a ministry peculiarly befitting the perfect state professed by religious. Hence the Gloss, commenting on the words of Esdras (1 Esdras 4), "all the rest" etc., says: "All those who have been chosen and delivered from the powers of darkness belong to the liberty of the glory of the children of God; and they all rejoice at being declared to belong to the society of the holy city (i.e., the Church); but it is the prerogative of the perfect alone to labour at building up the Church by preaching to others." The fact that these words apply to the perfection of religious, is proved by the following words: The more earnestly preachers instruct their hearers to love heavenly things, the lea will they care about earthly goods. They will even abandon what they already possess, in the hope of obtaining an eternal heritage." This interpretation further appears in the interlinear commentary, which says, "all the rest" i.e., "the rich who cannot preach." Hence religious are not less fit than others to preach, and, with the commission of a bishop, have aa much right to hear confessions and to preach as have parish priests.

On the words, "then we set forward from the river," (1 Esdras viii. 31), the Gloss comments: "Let us likewise call to our assistance the religious army of brethren by whose help we may carry the souls of the faithful to the society of the elect, and to the fortress of a more perfect life, as we should carry holy vessels to the temple of the Lord."

The right of religious to preach and hear confessions is proved by the common custom of the Eastern Church, in which almost all the monks are confessors.

Again, a greater responsibility attaches to the office of legate, and to the work of confirming bishops, and setting them over churches, than to the office of preachers or confessors. But, as we know that the first and more onerous duties are entrusted to religious, there is no reason why they should not perform the less important ones.

Again, the work of hearing lawsuits has less connection with the religious life, than have the tasks of preaching or absolving. But, as religious are employed in the former office, they may, with far greater reason, be entrusted with the latter functions.

It now remains for us to show that it is expedient for the salvation of souls that others, besides parish priests, should preach and hear confessions.

Our first proof is taken from the words of our Lord (Matt. ix. 37), “The harvest indeed is great”—or as the Gloss explains, “There is a vast multitude capable of receiving the word and of bearing fruit”—” but the labourers are few,” i.e. (according to the Gloss), “the preachers who shall gather together the church of the elect.” “Pray, therefore, the Lord of the harvest, that He send labourers into his harvest.” These words show that it is salutary for the Church that the word of God should be announced to the faithful by many preachers, with an ever increasing number of believers.

Again, it is written in the Book of Wisdom (vi, 26), “In a multitude of counsellors, there is wisdom.” These words are interpreted by the interlinear commentary to signify “A multitude of preachers brings health to the whole world.”

St. Paul says (2 Tim. ii. 2), “The things which you heard of me by many witnesses, the same commend to faithful men,” i.e., “men of sound faith” (Gloss) “who shall be fit,” ie., “fitted by their good life, their learning and eloquence” (Gloss), “to teach others.” In other words, “the office of preaching ought to be committed to those capable of fulfilling it” (Gloss).

Again, the Gloss has the following comment on the words of Esdras (1 Esd. iii.), “all that were come from captivity to Jerusalem”: “Not only is it the duty of, bishops and priests to build up the house of God, whereby is signified His faithful people; but the people themselves, who are called out of captivity into Jerusalem, the vision of peace, ought likewise to require ministry of the Word from those who know how to preach.”

St. Gregory (XIX Moral.) remarks on the passage in Job xxix., “when I washed my feet with butter”: “What shall we bishops say, who care not to impart the Word entrusted to us, when we see this married man who does not suffer himself to be hindered from preaching, either by his worldly garb, or his pressing occupations?” By these words we see that others besides prelates and parish priests may rightfully exercise the office of preaching.

We learn the same lesson from many other passages of the Old Testament. David is praised for having extended the worship of God, and for having established twenty-four priests for the benefit of the people (1 Chron. xxiii and xxiv). The same thing is related of Hezechiah (2 Chron. xxx. 6): “The posts went with letters, by commandment of the King and his princes, to all Israel and Judah, proclaiming, according to the King’s orders: ‘Children of Israel, turn again to the Lord God,’” etc. Assuerus, again, as we are told in the book of Esther (vii.), sent swift messages through the provinces to announce the deliverance of the people of God. With much greater reason then may others, besides parish priests, be commissioned to preach and to perform such like offices for the salvation of souls.

St. Gregory, in a homily (V, Part I on Ezekiel), says : "The pastors of souls and they who have undertaken the responsibility of feeding the flock of Christ ought very seldom, if ever, to change their dwelling. But those who, for love of God, take journeys for the sake of preaching may be compared to wheels of fire. For the zeal which devours them, and wherewith they inflame others, causes them to travel swiftly from place to place." This is another proof that the office of preaching should be committed not only to parish priests, but to others who can, by travelling from one place to another, spread the knowledge of the truth.

Again, it behoves a preacher of the Word to be free from any other occupation; whereas parish priests are constantly engaged in good work and in ecclesiastical business. The Apostles said, "It is not fit that we should leave the word of God and serve tables." (Acts vi. 2). On this account, it is right that those who are in charge of parishes should be assisted by others not thus occupied.

The necessity for priests devoted to the ministry of preaching is, furthermore, shown by the great ignorance prevailing in some places amongst many of the clergy, some of whom know not even how to speak in Latin. It is rare to find any who are conversant with the Scriptures. Yet a knowledge of the holy writings is essential to those who would preach the word of God. Hence if preaching be entrusted solely to parish priests, the faithful will be greatly the losers. The ignorance which prevails among the clergy is also most detrimental in the duty of hearing confissions. For, as St. Augustine says (De Penitentia), "If any man desires to confess his sins, let him seek out a priest who knows how to bind and to loose. For if he be negligent in the matter, he may be neglected by Him who incites him and moves him to seek for mercy; and so both may fall into the ditch which, in his folly, he strove not to avoid."

Additional priests, deputed to preach, and to act as confessors, are likewise called for, on account of the great multitude of souls often committed to the care of one pastor. For, were some parish priests to devote their whole lives to the task, they would scarcely be able to hear the confessions of all their flock. It happens likewise that some of the faithful, having no opportunity of confessing to any save to their parish priest, will abstain altogether from confession. For they are ashamed to acknowledge their sins to those whom they see every day. Sometimes, again, they fancy that the priest is unfriendly to them, and the like. Hence bishops act very judiciously in providing them with other confessors, and thus preserving them from despair,

5. The foregoing reflections naturally lead us to consider the expediency of a religious order being instituted for the express purpose of assisting parish priests in preaching and hearing confessions. Episcopal permission would, of course, be needed to authorise the brethren of such an order to undertake their duties.

Every religious order is based on the model of the Apostolic life. We are told that the Apostles practised community of life: “all things were common to them “ (Acts iv). The Gloss says that “the word ‘common’ is, in Greek, rendered by caena, or common meal, whence come the words cenobites, i.e. dwellers in common, and cenobia, i.e. common dwelling places.” The Apostles practised this mode of life, in order that leaving all things, they might be at liberty to preach the Gospel throughout the world. For the same reason, they prescribed this common life to their successors. Hence a religious order is peculiarly well adapted to the office of preaching.

St. James says, “Religion pure and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the orphan and the widow in their tribulation.” The most necessary form of visiting those in affliction, is that which is practised by such as labour for the salvation of souls. A religious order may then with great advantage, be instituted with this object in view that its members may seek out such as are in trouble, and encourage them to have patience, and to hope in, the promises of Scripture.

In the interlinear commentary we find, on the words, “It is not fit that we should leave the word of God and serve tables (Acts vi. 2), the following observation: “Food for the soul is better than banquets for the body.” Now certain orders have already been instituted for the purpose of assisting men in their corporeal needs; it is still more fitting that another order should be established, to minister to their spiritual wants.” St, Augustine says: “It is better to nourish the soul that will live for ever with the Lord, than the body which must decay in death. The health of the body depends upon the condition of the soul; but the soul’s health does not depend upon bodily constitution.”

It is more seemly for a religious to fight with spiritual weapons, than with sword and shield. But there are already in existence several military orders. It is therefore expedient that an order should be founded for the purposes of spiritual warfare. The religious of such an order ought, principally to preach the gospel, according to the exhortation of St, Paul, “Labour like a good soldier of Christ” (2 Tim ii. 3), “by preaching the gospel against the enemies of the Faith,” as the Gloss explains.

It is essential that they who labour for the salvation of souls should be remarkable both for learning, and for sanctity of life. It is not easy to find enough priests with such a reputation to take charge of all the parishes throughout the world: neither is it possible, among secular priests, to carry out the statute of the Council of Lateran, which enjoins that there should be teachers of theology in every metropolitan church. This desire of the Church is, however, through the mercy of God, being carried out through the instrumentality of religious. In the words of Isaiah (xi. 9), “The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord.” Thus, it is highly expedient that a religious order should be founded, in which the brethren are learned and addicted to study, and at the same time have leisure to help secular priests who are not so well adapted to teach theology.

The advantage of such orders is further proved by the beneficial results produced by their labours. For in many parts of the world, heresy has been destroyed; many infidels have been converted; careless Christians have been instructed in the law of God; and many have been brought to penance by the efforts of religious. Hence anyone who condemns such orders as useless is clearly sinning against the Holy Spirit, by envy of the grace whereby God co-operates in the labours of these men.

Again, in XXV. quaest. I, we read the following words: “No one can, either safely or rightly, pass rash judgments either on the Divine constitutions or on the decrees of the Holy See.” Since, therefore, certain religious Orders, as is proved by their very name (for, as St. Augustine puts it in his book The Christian Life, “no one is called by a name without a cause”), have been established, by the Apostolic See for the purposes of which we have spoken, anyone who condemns them does, by so doing, himself incur condemnation.

6. We must now proceed to our final task that of answering the objections of our opponents.

Their first argument is that the duty of monks is, “not to feed a flock, but to be fed.” This saying is to be understood as meaning that monks have not, by right of their monastic profession, the office of instructing the faithful. It was directed against the mistaken notion that sanctity of life alone is sufficient qualification for the ecclesiastical state. But it is equally true that it is not the duty of a secular priest to feed a flock, unless he has the care of souls, or unless he bears a commission from those holding such a charge. Religious are as fitted as are the secular clergy for the office of preaching. The only difference between them is that religious require a double license, viz. the authorisation of a bishop, and permission from the superior of their order, without which they may not act. The second objection must be answered in exactly the same way. For the words, “Let none, save the priests of the Lord, dare to preach,” is true, if we understand them to mean that no one may preach without a commission to do so.

In like manner, the prohibition to monks to preach, which is quoted against us, is to be understood to mean that monks may not, merely because they are monks, arrogate to themselves the office of preaching. And, in the same way, when it is said that “it does not beseem a monk to preach,” the words mean that the monastic state does not, of itself, confer a right to preach.

When it is objected that they who feed the people with the word of God, ought likewise to supply their material necessities, we reply that this is perfectly true in cases where such charity is possible. For, as St, John says (1 Jn. iii. 17), “He who has the substance of this world and sees his brother in need, and closes the bowels of his mercy against him, how does the charity of God abide in him?” But, almsgiving is not always the necessary accompaniment to preaching; otherwise the Apostles would not have preached, for they possessed nothing to give. “Silver and gold have I none” (Acts iii. 6). Nevertheless, religious, who themselves are poor, are able, at times, to provide for the wants of the poor out of the donations made to them by the wealthy. St. Paul tells us that when he was sent to preach to the Gentiles, he was careful to remember the poor (Gal. ii.). To the objection that pastors are bound to feed their flocks, we reply that they cannot feed them entirely by their own efforts; they must be assisted by others, to whom they entrust the task. For he, by whose authority a deed is accomplished, is held responsible for its performance.

When it is urged that none have a right to preach, save those who are sent, and that we only read of our Lord's sending the twelve Apostles and the seventy-two disciples, our answer is that they who ore sent by God have power to send forth others. St. Paul sent Timothy to preach: "Therefore have I sent to you Timothy" (1 Cor. iv. 17). Thus likewise other men may be sent forth to preach at the bidding of bishops and priests. But all thus sent must be regarded as the emissaries of the Lord, because it is by His power that they receive their commission. And all who are thus authorised to preach must, although not archdeacons, be regarded as the coadjutors of the bishops, because they are rendering them important assistance, such indeed "as Titus gave to St, Paul, or as archdeacons afford to their bishops" (Gloss). Hence it by no means follows that none save archdeacons can assist bishops in their labours. For, when any priest bearing the commission of a bishop preaches or hears confessions, these functions are accounted as having been performed by the bishop himself. Although it may be true that only two orders were instituted by our Lord for the purpose of preaching; the Church, or the Pope to whom is confided all ecclesiastical power, could found a third order of preachers. For, as we are reminded by the Master of the Sentences, there were in the early Church two degrees only in Holy Orders: priests and deacons; but in course of time other grades were established.

Our answer to the next objection which follows is that the decree to which it refers regards a certain order of men called chorepiscopi, who were ordained not in cities but in hamlets and villages, and who were invested with certain faculties not granted to ordinary priests, such, for instance, as that of conferring minor orders. For some time, these chorepiscopi were recognised in the Church as invested with ordinary powers, but they were finally suppressed, (as is related in the same distinction) on account of their usurpation of the episcopal functions. Thus the decree mentioned in this objection bears no reference to those religious, who, not having ordinary faculties, act as confessors by commission form a bishop. Such an order of religious does not exist in opposition to the number of orders established by our Lord, since, as it has been instituted by His authority, it is rightly regarded as having been ordained by Himself (see the words of Dionysius quoted above). The only conclusion concerning monks that can be drawn from his passage of Dionysius, is that monks have not, on account of their profession, the status of prelates, or of those whose duty it is to guide other to God. There is, however, no reason why a monk should not receive ordinary power or a commission to guide others, especially as the decree quoted merely sys that the monastic orders are not instituted in order to be in command of others or to guide. It does not say that the members of these orders cannot or ought not hold such a position. This is evident from the authority of Dionysius quoted above.

The argument that the ecclesiastical hierarchy is a copy of the heavenly hierarchy is only partially true. In the heavenly, but not in the earthly hierarchy, there is a distinction of gratuitous gifts, according to the distinction of orders. Hence as the angelic nature is immutable, the angels of an inferior rank cannot be transferred to a superior grade, as is the case with mortals in the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Nevertheless, in the celestial hierarchy, angels of an inferior order can remain in their own rank, and yet can perform the functions pertaining to a higher grade. Thus Dionysius (XIII, celest. hierarch.) says, "The angel that cleansed Isaiah is called a Seraph, because he fulfilled the office of the Seraphim." And St. Gregory, in his homily on the hundred sheep, says that "the spirits who are sent forth bear names denoting the order of their ministry." Hence it is not unseemly, if in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, a man belonging to one of the inferior orders be commissioned to perform duties specially pertaining to a higher rank.

To the objection that religious preach "either with power or without power," we reply that they preach not with ordinary power, but by that conferred by special commission. It does not, therefore, follow that they have the right of demanding means of support; for this power has not been granted them. They could, however, exercise this power, were it conferred on them by hose to whom it belongs.

It is untrue to say that if religious have faculties to preach, they possess powers superior to those of bishops or patriarchs. For bishops and patriarchs can, by their ordinary power, preach in any place, but religious, who have not the care of souls, can never preach by ordinary power. They can preach, not by ordinary power, but only by special commission; just as the bishop can exercise episcopal functions in a diocese belonging to another, with the permission of the bishop of the diocese in which he is staying.

It is urged that no man ought to build on a foundation laid by another. This statement is untrue, and is against the teaching of St. Paul, who says (1 Cor. iii. 10), “As a wise architect I have laid the foundation, and another builds thereon.” This “building” is explained by the Gloss and by St. Ambrose to signify “preaching and teaching.” When the Apostle says: “I have so preached this Gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man’s foundation” (Rom. xv. 20), his word must be understood to signify, not that it would have been unlawful for St. Paul to have built upon another man’s foundation, but that he did not, at that moment, consider it expedient to do so. Hence the Gloss, commenting on these words, says: “lest I should build upon another man’s foundation, i.e., lest I should preach to those converted by other men. Not that St. Paul would not have so acted had such a course appeared to him desirable; but that he preferred to lay the foundations of the faith in some spot wherein it had not as yet been preached.” Were it unlawful to preach where another has already taught the Word of God, St. John the Evangelist would not have preached at Ephesus, in which city St. Paul had planted the Faith; nor would St. Paul have preached at Rome, where St. Peter had already been. But what will our opponents say if it should so happen that the religious whom they so bitterly denounce, be divided in such a manner that some go forth, to preach the Word to unbelievers, and, others remain among the faithful to assist the bishops? But this objection has really no connection with the point in question. For to build on another man’s foundation and to preach to another man’s converts are not the same thing. Otherwise, every priest when preaching in his own parish would be building on another man’s foundation, for his parishioners would, probably, be the converts of former priests of the parish.

The words of St. Paul, (2 Cor. x), “not glorying beyond measure in other men’s labour,” are, by those who are averse to the preaching of religious, interpreted to mean that to labour where another man has laid the foundations of the faith is to glory beyond measure. The Gloss does not explain these words as signifying that if St. Paul had laboured where another had already preached, he would have been glorying beyond measure. It understands the text to mean that, had St. Paul taken to himself the glory of having laid the foundations of the faith in such a place, he would have gloried beyond measure.

The objection to the preaching of religious, founded on the words, “not to glory in another man’s rule,” is due to a misinterpretation of the commentary of the Gloss on this passage. The Gloss is quoted as saying, “not to glory in another man’s rule, i.e., in those who are under the government of another.” This is a mis-quotation. The passage of the Gloss referred to runs as follows: “Our rule, i.e., our ministry, which is imposed upon us by God, is to preach the Gospel freelyi not only in a few places, but in those (places) which are beyond your present dwelling. But we hope not to glory in another man’s rule; for those who are at a distance from you are not under any man’s, government.” If the passage in the Gloss really stood as it is represented by our adversaries, it would be difficult to understand, how one Apostle could preach in a province evangelised by another. St. Paul preached at Rome and at Antioch, which were subject to St. Peter; but he did not glory in those churches, as if they were committed to him; he, therefore, did not glory in another man’s rule. And, further, religious who are commissioned by bishops to preach, do so in no diocese save in that one for which they have faculties. Thus, they do not preach to another man’s flock. They are the coadjutors of the bishop, whose commission they hold.

It is easy to answer the objections to the propriety of religious hearing confessions. The decree quoted as opposed to it only forbids religious to act as confessors on itheir own authority. It does not prohibit their doing so at the bidding of the Pope or of a bishop. This is clearly shown XVI, quaest. I, Pervenit. Neither are religious less fit than are secular priests for this duty (XVI, quaest. I, Sunt tamen nonnulli).

To the next objection, viz. that parish priests, pastors of souls, ought to study the faces of flock, which they cannot do except by hearing confessions, we answer that confession is not the only means whereby we may know whether a man be good or bad. For, we can draw a conclusion from the judg ment passed upon him by his superior. Hence if a bishop absolves one of his flock, either by his own act, or through the agency of another commissioned. by him, his parish priest ought to be as satisfied that he knows such a man, as if he himself had been his confessor. He knows that his parishioner has been approved by the judgment of a superior, whom he himself has no right to criticise. And further, if according to the decretal he hear the confessions of his parishioners once a year, it gives him sufficient opportunity for knowing them.

To the objection that everyone is bound, once in the year to confess his sins to his own priest, we reply that the expression “his own priest” applies not only to the parish priest, but to the bishop of the diocese and to the Pope, who have, in a more extended sense than parish priests, the care of souls. The expression “his own priest” is used, not in contradistinction to the bishop, or Pope, who is the common priest, but in contradistinction to a stranger. Hence he who has made his confession to his bishop, or to a vicegerent appointed by him, has confessed to his own priest. And further, anyone who confesses once a year to his own parish priest, and makes himself intelligible to him, is not forbidden to make his confession at other times to any other priest who has faculty to give absolution.

The objection that, unless a priest hears a man’s confession, he cannot know whether he is in a fit state to receive the Blessed Eucharist, is based upon an error. For a priest can know the state of a communicant’s soul by the judgement of the superior who has given him absolution, and whom he ought to trust as he would trust himself.

The argument, that the permission to confess to a priest other than the parish priest, affords opportunity for concealment of sins, is fallacious. For, a priest ought to believe what a penitent says, whether it be for or against himself. Therefore, if the penitent says that he has made his confession, it ought to be taken for granted that he is speaking the truth. Even if the parish priest were to act as his confessor, he might be deceived; for the penitent might confess his more venial offences, and conceal his grievous sins. And it must likewise be remembered that, though the facility for confessing to different priests may be abused, it is nevertheless, as we have already shown, a safeguard against far greater evils.

The argument, that, a monk, having no power to correct others, cannot absolve them, is only true in a very limited sense. For, though monks have not this power in an ordinary way, they are able, by the commission of a bishop, both to correct and to absolve. The Demophilus to whom Dionysius wrote the words quoted was not a priest, nor even a deacon. This is clear from the Epistle quoted by our adversaries.

The same answer must be returned to the objection that, if religious can hear confessions anywhere, they can do so everywhere, and thus they become rulers of the Universal Church. Monks, on their own authority, can hear confessions nowhere. They can act as confessors only where they are commissioned to do so; and if the Head of the Church give them permission to hear confessions everywhere, they can do so everywhere. This, however, does not constitute them governors of the Church, since they absolve sinners, not by their own power, but by the authority delegated to them. The Pope is not styled universal Bishop, not because he does not possess complete and direct power over every diocese in the Church, but because he does not rule any particular diocese as its peculiar and special pastor. Were he to do so, the powers of the other bishops would lapse. This reason is given in the chapter quoted.

The arguments brought as proofs that religious cannot, even with episcopal permission, preach or bear confessions, are easily answered. The proposition, that what a man gives away he does not still possess, does not hold good in things spiritual. These are communicated, not like physical things, by the transference of some dominion over them, but rather by an emanation of an effect from its cause. When one man communicates knowledge to another, he does not, on this account, deprive himself of this knowledge; for it remains in his power. In the same way, he that confers some power upon another, does not, by doing so, deprive himself of that power. A bishop does not, by conferring on a priest the power to consecrate the Body of the Lord, cease to be able himself to do so. St. Augustine, treating of the communication of spiritual things, says (I De Doctrina Christiana) “Everything that is not lessened by being imparted. is not, if it be possessed without being communicated, possessed as it ought to be possessed.” In like manner, when a bishop confers upon a priest the power of absolving, he does not himself lose that power, unless the power of a priest in his parish is considered similar to that of a soldier in his town. This idea is, of course, ridiculous; for priests are not masters, but servants. “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ,” St. Paul writes (1 Cor. iv. 1). Our Lord, also, said to His Apostles, “The Kings of the Gentiles lord it, over them: but you not so: but 1e that is the greater among you, let him become as the least: and he who is the leader, as he who serves” Luke xxii, 25).

The statement that a bishop, by committing the care of a parish to a priest, relieves himself of all responsibility connected with it, is untrue. For, a bishop is still answerable for the care of all the souls in his diocese (Quaest. I, Cap. Quaecumque). Hence St. Paul, after speaking of all his labours, concludes by saying, “Besides those things that are without: my daily instance, the care of all the churches “ (2 Cor. xi. 28). His burden, however, is rendered supportable to a bishop, because he has assistants of an inferior rank. But, even granted that a bishop, by committing a parish to a priest, relieves himself of its responsibility, it would not, on that account, follow that he would abrogate his power in that parish. For, the ministers of Christ are able to labour for the salvation of the faithful, not only by freeing themselves from responsibility, but likewise by increasing their own merit, and producing greater fruit among souls. Thus St. Paul undertook much work for the salvation of the elect, which he might, without any danger to his salvation, have omitted.

The argument that a priest is subject to a bishop, just as, a bishop is under an archbishop, is not quite correct. For an archbishop has not immediate jurisdiction over an episcopal diocese, except in matters specially referred to him. Thus an archbishop cannot summon before him, or excommunicate, one who is the subject of a bishop. A bishop, on the other hand, has immediate jurisdiction over his parochial clergy; he can cite any of them to appear before him; and he has power to excommunicate them. The reason of this distinction is that the power of a priest is imperfect compared to that of a bishop; priests are by divine right subject to bishops, as Dionysius proves. The subjection of a bishop to an archbishop depends only on an ecclesiastical ordinance and is limited by it. But a priest, being by divine right subject to a bishop, is subject to him in all things. The jurisdiction of a bishop over his priests resembles in kind that of the Sovereign Pontiff over all Christendom. For the Roman Church has not been given supremacy over other churches by the decrees of any synod, but by the words of our Lord and Saviour Himself (In Drcretis, Distinct. XXI, Cap. Quamvis).

To the argument that parish priests are the bridegrooms of the churches committed to them, we answer that strictly speaking, the Spouse of the Church is Christ, of whom are spoken the words, “He who has the bride is the bridegroom” (John iii. 29). He, by His Church, begets children to bear His name. The other so-called spouses are in reality the servants of the Bridegroom, who co-operate with him exteriorly in this work of spiritual generation, but who do not beget spiritual children for themselves.

Although they are but ministers, they are termed spouses, because they take the place of the true Spouse. Hence the Pope, who is the vicegerent of Christ throughout the entire Church, is called the spouse of the universal Church. In like manner a bishop is termed the spouse of his diocese, and a priest of his parish. But at the same time the Pope is the spouse of every diocese and the bishop is the spouse of all parishes within his see. But it does not follow from these words that there is in one church a plurality of spouses. For priests assist their bishop in his work, and bishops cooperate with the Pope; he finally is the direct minister to Christ. Thus, Christ, the Pope, the bishops, and the priests are but the one spouse of the Church. Hence the fact that the Pope or the bishop hear the confessions of the faithful of a parish, or commit this office to another, is not proof that one church possesses a plurality of spouses. True plurality would consist in the appointment of two ecclesiastics of the same rank to the same office. Hence were there two bishops in one diocese, or two parish priests in one parish, there would be the plurality forbidden by the canons.

We must next answer the proposition that not even Papal permission can authorise religious to preach or to hear confessions.

The first reason on which this assertion is grounded, that the authority of the Roman See cannot alter saything established by the statutes of the Fathers or institute anything contrary to these statutes. This is true with regard to those decrees which, in the judgment of the Saints, are of divine right, e.g., the articles of the faith formulated by Councils. But those matters which the Holy Fathers have declared to be of positive right are left to the judgment of the Pope to be altered or abolished by him, according to the requirements of the times. For, the holy Fathers assembled in councils cannot promulgate any decree save by the authorisation of the Sovereign Pontiff, without whose permission no council is allowed even to meet. Again, if the Pope sees fit to act otherwise than in the manner established by the holy Fathers, he does not act counter to their statutes. For, although, in such a case, the words of the statutes are not obeyed, the intention of those who have drawn up the statutes (to wit the welfare, of the Church) is fulfilled. For in matters which are of positive right, it may be impossible, at all times and under every circumstance, to adhere to the letter of a statute; although the intention with which it was framed is respected. One statute will necessarily be abrogated by a subsequent one. But the fact that certain religious, being neither bishops nor parish priests, exercise the functions of preaching, and hearing confessions, is not contrary to the statutes of the Holy Fathers, unless such religious act thus on their own initiative, unauthorised by the Pope or by a bishop.

In answer to the second objection, the Pope, as we have already shown, does not, by giving to religious the privilege of preaching or hearing confessions, act contrary to St. Paul's admonition; for these religious do not preach to another man's people. It is not true to say that the Pope cannot alter any Apostolic decree; for the penalties pronounced against bigamy and against fornication among the clergy, are, by authority of the Holy See, sometimes in abeyance. The power of the Pope is limited only in so far that he cannot alter the canonical scriptures of the Apostles and Prophets, which are fundamental to the faith of the Church.

To the objection that the privileges granted by sovereigns are to be understood in the sense that they are only granted in so far as they be not prejudicial to any other, we reply that an injustice is done to another when something is withdrawn from him which has been established for his gratification or advantage. Hence Ezechiel says (xxxiv. 2), "Woe to the shepherds of Israel that feed themselves. Should not the flocks be fed by the shepherds?" But it is nowise prejudicial to a parish priest, if one of his parishioners be withdrawn from his authority. In the same manner an abbot may, by the Pope, be withdrawn from the authority of a bishop, and a bishop from that of an archbishop, without injustice to either. In fact, if such a course tend to the salvation of their parishioners, far from being prejudicial, it is most beneficial to all pastors who seek the things of Christ, and not such as are their own. St. Gregory commenting on the words in the eleventh chapter of the Book of Numbers (11:29), "Are you jealous for my sake?" says: "A spiritual pastor who seeks not his own honour, but the glory of his Creator, desires to be helped in his actions by all men." A faithful preacher would wish that were it possible, the lips of all mankind should proclaim the truth which he alone is incompetent to utter.

The argument that when a sovereign grants to a subject permission to make a will, it is with the understanding that such a will is only to be made in an ordinary and legal manner, holds good with regard to the Pope. When the sovereign Pontiff commissions anyone to preach and hear confessions, he only allows him to do so in a legitimate way; his preaching must be unto edification. But, if a man hold a commission from the Pope to preach, he need not, in order to preach lawfully, seek a license from any other superior. Such a course would stultify the authority of the Pope. A man who has obtained permission from his Sovereign to make a will, need not have another license from anyone else. All that is required of him is, to make his will in due form. A preacher licensed by the Pope requires no other authorisation. He need only observe the proper rules of preaching, such as that of using one style in addressing the poor, and another in speaking to the rich, and such other points as are mentioned by St. Gregory in Pastorale.

When it is urged that a monk does not, at his ordination, receive power to exercise his priestly office unless he be placed in charge of souls, we reply, by reminding those who make this objection that the priesthood is instituted for two ends. Its first and principal end is the true consecration of the Body of Christ. Power to accomplish this end is conferred at ordination, unless there be some defect in the administration or in the recipient of this Sacrament. The second end for which the Priesthood is instituted is for the welfare of the mystical body of Christ, by the keys of the Church entrusted to the priest. Power to accomplish this end is not conferred at ordination, unless the priest ordained be placed in charge of souls or unless this power be given him by the authority of someone who has the care of souls. But the power of the priesthood is never given in vain; for every priest has power to fulfil the principal purpose of his ordination. But the power of preaching is bestowed for no end, save for that of preaching. Hence as a privilege conferred by a sovereign, cannot be useless to him on whom it is bestowed; so, when the Pope gives to any priest a commission to preach, he has power to execute such a commission. Nevertheless, the Pope, by so acting, does not give to a religious the office of preaching, but rather the power to exercise such an office. For religious do not, as we have said, make use of their own power in preaching; they use the power entrusted to them by another.

The words quoted from I, quaest. de Doctrina were written by Dionysius of lay monks, i.e., of monks who are neither bishops, priests nor deacons, But, even if they be applied to all religious, the Pope, by sending monks to preach, would not be disturbing the order of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. For, as we have said before, he who is of an inferior rank can exercise an office belonging to a higher grade, thus imitating the action of the celestial hierarchy. Furthermore, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy those of a lower order can be promoted to a higher rank. This cannot take place in the heavenly hierarchy. Hence Pope Innocent III, before a General council, sent some Cistercian monks to preach at Toulouse.

The last objection, brought against religious who preach, is that it is ambition on their part to seek permission to exercise this office. This is untrue , for a desire to preach inspired by charity is on the contrary praiseworthy. Isaiah (vi. 8) offered himself to the Lord, saying: “Lo: here I am: send me.” This function may likewise be meritoriously declined out of humility. Thus Jeremiah said (i. 6): “Ah, ah, ah, Lord God, I cannot speak, for I am a child.” This is evident from the Gloss of St. Gregory. The same view is found in VIII, quaest. I, cap. In scripturis. We must remember that ecclesiastical offices are accompanied both by dignity and by labour. Therefore, they may, on account of their dignity, be declined; and they may be desired, for the sake of the work. “ If a man desire the office of bishop, he desires a good thing,” says St. Paul (1 Tim. iii, 1). On these words St. Augustine says (XIX De civitate Dei), “The Apostle desired to explain what is meant by the episcopate and how far it may be desired, for the name implies labour not glory “ (cf. VIII quaest. I, qui episcopatum, also the Gloss on the same text). Hence if the labours of the episcopate be distinguished from its attendant dignity, it may laudably and without danger of ambition be desired. In like manner, a religious who seeks from a parish priest or a bishop permission to preach shows not that he is inspired by ambition, but that he is filled with the love of God and of his neighbour.

CHAPTER 4

Are Religious Bound to Manual Labour?

As no sufficient reasons can be found for excluding religious from apostolic labours, their enemies try to impede their work by representing that they are bound to labour with their hands; and that they are thus unable to prosecute the studies which would fit them for preaching or hearing confessions. The malice which inspires these efforts against the labours of religious is typified by the words of the enemies of Nehemiah, who said, “Come and let us make a league together” (2 Esdras vii.). The Gloss has the following commentary on this passage: “As the enemies of the holy City begged Nehemiah to come down to the plain, and there to form a league with them; so do heretics and bad Catholics desire to make friends with the faithful, not in order that they themselves may ascend to the heights of the Catholic faith and of good works, but in order to induce those that they know to be living virtuously to descend to sin and to false doctrine.”

Those who desire to see religious obliged to labour with their hands adduce several arguments in support of their wishes. First they quote the words of St. Paul (1 Thes. iv. 11), “Work with your own hands, as we commanded you,” alleging that as religious are, above all men, bound to obeythe apostolic precepts, they ought to consider manual labour as a duty. And again we read (2 Thes. 10), “If any man will not work, neither shall he eat.” The Gloss contains the following commentary on this passage: “Some persons pretend that the Apostle, in thus speaking, was alluding not to physical labour, such as that of agriculture or handicraft, but to spiritual works.” It adds later on, “Thus they blind both themselves and others to the true meaning of this charitable admonition, and they not only refuse to obey it, but even to understand its meaning.” Again the Gloss continues, “St. Paul would have the faithful earn their living by bodily labour, although certain religious are specially set apart for the worship of God." Hence according to this Apostolic precept, religious ought to work.

St. Paul again says (Ephes. iv. 28), "Let him labour, working with his hands what is good; that he may have something to give to him who suffers need." "Not merely in order to gain a livelihood" (Gloss). Hence religious, having no other means of assisting the poor, ought to labour with their hands. Again, the Gloss, commenting on the words in St. Luke x, ii, "Sell what you possess," observes: "Do not merely give food to the poor, but also sell your possessions, in order that despising all things for the love of Christ, you may work with your hands, either in order to live, or to have something to give in alms." Therefore, religious who abandon all their own possessions should live and bestow charity by the work of their hands.

Further, as Religious make profession of perfection, they are bound to imitate the Apostolic mode of life. Now we have several proofs that the Apostles worked with their hands. For instance, St. Paul writes (1 Cor., iv. 12), "We labour, working with our own hands." In the Acts of the Apostles (xx. 34), we read, "Such things as were needful for me, and for those who are with me, these hands have furnished." In this they may be imitated by others. "Neither did we eat any man's bread for nothing, but in labour and in toil we worked night and day, lest we should be chargeable to any of you" (2 Thes. iii. 8). Religious ought, therefore, imitate the example of the Apostles by manual labour.

Religious likewise are more bound than are secular ecclesiastics, to the performance of lowly work. Yet, in the Decretals (dist. XCIX), we find these words: "Let a cleric, in so far as he can do so without injury to his office, maintain himself either by handicraft or by husbandry." Again, "Let every cleric instructed in the words of God gain his livelihood by industry." Further, "All ecclesiastics, whose health will permit it, must study and must acquire some handicraft." How much more then are religious obliged to work!

Again, in the Acts of the Apostles (xx. 34) we read: Such things as were needful for me, or for those who are with me, these hands have furnished." Manual labour, therefore, is a mark distinguishing the bishops of the flock from wolves. Now if religious, by preaching, exercise an episcopal office, they are, certainly, bound to work with their hands.

St. Jerome, writing to Rusticus, says: “It is the custom in the Egyptian monasteries, to receive no brother who will not work. This rule is made not so much for the sake of self-support as for spiritual advantage and to prevent the mind from being employed in dangerous thoughts.” For this same reason, manual labour is incumbent on religious.

Again, religious ought to be always eager to make spiritual progress. As St. Paul expresses it, they ought to be “zealous for the better gifts” (1 Cor. xii. 31). Now St. Augustine, in his book, De opere monachorum, says that “religious who labour with their hands are preferable to those who do not work.” And, in the commentary on the words (Acts xx.): “It is more blessed to give than to receive,” the Gloss observes: “They receive the greatest glory who, having abandoned all that they possessed, labour in order to be able to supply the necessities of those in want.” Therefore, all religious ought to endeavour to work with their hands.

St. Augustine, in the book already quoted, calls those monks who will not work, “contumacious.” He adds: “Who can bear to hear those who contumaciously resist the Apostolic precept not merely excused on account of infirmity, but praised for their holiness? “Contumacy is a mortal sin; else the Church would not visit it with excommunication. Hence no religious, can, without risk of sinning mortally, exempt himself from the duty of manual labour.

Further, if religious be dispensed from work, the dispensation ought to be granted in order to give them opportunity for sacred psalmody, for prayer, for preaching, and for reading. But, it is not for these reasons that religious are exempted from labour. Therefore, they are bound to work. St. Augustine, in his book De opere monachorum, proves this obligation in the following words: “How do they employ themselves who will not labour with their hands? Gladly would I know what they do? They say that they devote themselves to psalmody, to prayer, to reading and to the Word of God.” The author then proceeds to examine each of these excuses. Speaking of prayer, he says: “One prayer from the lips of an obedient man will be heard more speedily than ten made by one that is scornful.” He, thus insinuates that he who will not work with his hands is proud and unworthy of being listened to by God. Next, speaking of those who say that instead of labouring they are singing sacred canticles, he says: “It is easy to chant and to work at the same time.” He then asks, “What is to prevent a servant of

God, while employed in labour, from meditating on the law of the ‘Lord, and singing to the name of the Most High?” Thirdly, referring to reading, he says: “Do not they who say that they devote their time to reading find in the Scriptures the Apostolic precept to work? How great is their perversity! These men wish to read, but will not heed what is written. They desire to prolong the time for reading what is virtuous, but they will not accomplish the good works of which they read. Who does not know that he makes the most profit by his reading who is the swiftest to put it into practice?” Fourthly, the saint remarks about preaching: “Although one monk may have to preach, and therefore may not have time for work, all the brethren in the monastery cannot preach. If then they cannot all preach, why, on the pretext of preaching, should they all leave their work? But, even supposing that they can all preach, they ought to do so in turn, both in order that some may be left to do the necessary work, and because one speaker suffices to many listeners.”

It is noticeable that on this point those who have once forsaken the beaten track of truth have, in their efforts to avoid one error, fallen into a contrary mistake. There was once among certain monks an erroneous idea that manual labour was detrimental to religious perfection, because it hindered religious from casting all their care upon God and thus from fulfilling our Lord’s behest: “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat, nor for your body, what you shall put on” (Matt. vi. 25). But they who hold this opinion must, for the sake of consistency, deny that the Apostles laboured with their hands. They must interpret the words of St. Paul, “ if any man will not work, neither shall he eat,” as referring not to physical, but to spiritual labours. Otherwise the Apostolic precept would be opposed to the evangelical command. St. Augustine in his book De opere monacorum, which was written to confute this error (as he tells us in his book of Retractations), clearly proves that it is contraxy to the teaching of Holy Scripture. On the strength of this verdict, other captious men have diaseminated an error of a precisely contrary nature, teaching that religious are, unless engaged in manual labour, living in a state of damnation. The Gloss terms the upholders of this opinion friends and sup porters of Pharaoh, who said: “Why do you, Moses and Aaron, draw off the people from their works?” (Exod. v. 4). It makes the following commentary on the text: “If, today Moses and Aaron, by whom is signified the word of a prophet or a preacher, should stir up men’s hearts to leave the world and to renounce all that they possess in order to devote themselves to the service of God, and to the study of His law and word, the friends of Pharaoh would immediately exclaim: “See how men are led away, and youths persuaded to forsake work and military service and everything useful, in order to spend their time in idleness and folly. For what is their service to God? A pretext for idleness? Such were the words of Pharaoh, and thus do his friends still speak.”

In order to defend the servants of God from persecution of this nature, we shall now prove that religious are not, except perhaps occasionally, bound to manual labour; moreover, those who do not work with their hands are in a state of salvation.

In the first place, the Gloss, commenting on the words: “Behold the birds of the air” (Matt. vi. 26), says: “The saints are deservedly compared to birds; for they seek Heaven, and they are so far removed from the world that they do no work on earth. They do not labour, but by contemplation dwell in Heaven. Of such may it truly be said: ‘Who are these that fly like clouds?’”

St, Gregory, in the second part of his second homily (super Ezech.), speaks thus: “He who leads a contemplative life, turns his whole mind to the love of God and of his neighbour. He ceases from external work, and is engrossed by a desire for his Creator, which leaves him capable of, no other activity. He forgets all other cares, and yearns only to behold God face to face.” Hence perfectly contemplative souls withdraw themselves from exterior occupations.

Again, the Gloss thus comments on the words (Luke x.): “Lord, have you no care that my sister has left me alone to serve?” “Such” (says the Gloss) “are the words of those who, understanding nothing of the nature of true contemplation, consider that charity to our neighbour is the only work pleasing to God.” Those who hold that religious are bound to labour with their hands, consider that this is an obligation imposed on them by brotherly love, in order that by their work they may have something to bestow in alms. They quote the words of St.Paul (Ephes. iv.28), “Let him labour with his hands that he may have something to give to him who suffers need.” They, therefore, who desire to see religious obliged to work, join in the murmur of Martha. But the Lord made excuse for the idleness of Mary.

We can prove our point by the following example. St. Benedict, as we are told by St. Gregory (II Dial.), lived for three years in a cave, not working with his hands, and unknown to any save to the monk Romanus who brought him food. But who will dare to say that he was not in a state of salvation, when the Lord spoke of him to a certain priest, saying: “My servant in such a place is dying of hunger”? Both in the Dialogue and in the lives of the Fathers we find many other examples of saints who passed their lives without working with their hands.

Manual labour is either a precept or a counsel. If it is a counsel, no one is bound to observe it, unless obliged thereto by vow. Hence manual labour is no duty for religious whose rule does not prescribe it, If, on the other hand, manual labour is a precept, it is incumbent alike on seculars and on religious, since both laymen and religious are equally bound to obey the Divine and Apostolic precepts. Hence if a layman, before his entrance into religion, was free to live in the world without work, he would, on becoming a religious, be equally exempt from the necessity of labour.

At the time at which St. Paul said: “If any man will not work, neither shall he eat,” religious were not distinguished from seculars; and the rule of labour was established for all Christians alike. All were equally called brethren, as we see from the words: “Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly” (2 Thes. iii. 10). Again: “if any brother has an unbelieving wife” etc. (1 Cor. vii. 12). On these words, the Gloss interprets the word “brother” to mean any one of the faithful. If then on account of the admonition of St. Paul, religious are bound to manual labour, the same duty is equally incumbent upon the laity.

St. Augustine, in his book De opere monachorum, says: “Credit must be given to, and allowances made for, the delicate health of those who, in the world, were able to live without working; and who, on their conversion to God, have distributed all that they had to the poor. Men of this class are not generally equal to physical toil.” Hence we see that those who have lived in the world without labour are not bound, when they go into religion, to work with their hands.

This point is further proved by another passage of the same book. In this, St. Augustine, speaking in praise of a certain wealthy man who had given all his goods to a monastery, says: “He has done well to set others an example by working with his own hands. For, had he been unwilling to labour, who would have dared to constrain him to do so? Neither is it of any consequence that he gave his possessions to a monastery instead of dividing them otherwise. For all Christians unite in one commonwealth.”

When a precept is only given under certain conditions or circumstances, it is only binding in the event of such conditions or circumstances arising to necessitate its observance. St. Paul gave the command to labour only in particular cases, as a safeguard against sin. When such sin can be otherwise avoided, manual labour is not a duty. The only three cases in which the Apostle enjoins it are: first in Ephes. iv. 28, “He who stole, let him now steal no more, but rather let him labour, working with his hands.” Here he proposes work as a remedy against theft, to such as preferred to steal rather than to earn their living. Secondly, he prescribes labour in 1 Thes. iv. 11, saying: Go, work with your own hands, as we commanded you, and conduct yourselves properly towards outsiders, and be dependent on nobody.” In this passage, labour is enjoined as a preventive against covetousness, which is theft by desire. , Thirdly, St. Paul, in 2 Thess. iii. 11, again enjoins labour in these words: “For also, when we were with you, we declared to you that if any man will not work neither let him eat. For we have heard there are some among you who walk disorderly, not working at all, but curiously meddling,” “making a living by unjustifiable means” (Gloss). “Now we charge those who are such, and beseech them, by the Lord Jesus Christ that working with silence, they would eat their own bread.” In these verses, St. Paul enjoins labour on those, who, instead of working for a livelihood, procured it by illicit means. Hence we see that there is no duty of manual labour incumbent on either laymen or religious who can maintain themselves without either theft, covetousness or dishonesty. Neither does St. Augustine say that work is a precept to be obeyed by all. If we examine his words, we shall see that he only urges the fulfilment of the Apostolic precept. Hence religious are only bound to manual labour under certain circumstances.

Those who do not depend upon their work for subsistence are not obliged to labour. Otherwise, all rich men, both seculars and ecclesiastics, who live without working, would be in a state of damnation; which is, of course, an absurd hypothesis. Now there are some religious who have an assured livelihood, either from the alms of benefactors, or because the ministry of preaching is committed to them, and “the Lord has ordained that those who preach the Gospel shall live by the Gospel” (1 Cor. ix. 14). The Gloss says that “God has made this provision for preachers, in order that they may be the more swift to proclaim His word.” Therefore, these words cannot be understood as referring only to prelates, for, though bishops have, in their own right, authority to preach, yet not only they, but all such as have a commission to preach, must be diligent in the exercise of this duty. Religious, as we have already proved, are included in this category. There are likewise certain religious who assist in the Divine Office in the Church. They have a right to live by this means; for St. Paul says that “they who serve the altar partake also with the altar” (1 Cor. ix. 13). St. Augustine says, in his book De opere monachorum: “If religious are evangelists, I grant that they have a right to live on the alms of the faithful. If they minister at the altar, they can claim the same right, for it is their due, and it is not an unjust demand.”

The same remarks apply to those religious who devote themselves to the study of the Holy Scripture. St. Jerome writes, in his epistle to Vigilantius: “The custom prevailed in Judeea, and is still extant in our time, that those who possessed nothing on earth, whose only portion was the Lord, and who meditated day and night on His law, were maintained by the synagogues, and by the good offices of all mankind.” Hence we see that there is no obligation to labour incumbent on all religious.

Spiritual profit is always to be preferred to temporal advantage. Now those who minister to the public welfare by the preservation of temporal peace are justly paid a stipend which enables them to live. St. Paul says (Rom. xiii. 6), “This is why you pay tribute. For they are the ministers of God, serving unto this purpose” (“by fighting for their country” says the Gloss). Hence they who minister to the spiritual necessities of the state, either by preaching or expounding the Scriptures or assisting in the public prayers of the Church, have a far better right to be supported by the contributions of the faithful. They are, therefore, not bound to manual labour.

St. Augustine observes, again, in his book De opere monachorum that St. Paul worked with his hands in those places (of which one was Corinth) in which he was accustomed to preach to the Jews only on the Sabbath day. But when he was at Athens and preached daily, he lived not by his labour, but by the alms brought to him by the brethren from Macedonia. Hence we see that the function of preaching is not to be set aside for the sake of manual labour. Those men, therefore, who whether by commission from a superior or of their own right, are able to preach daily or otherwise to minister to souls, ought to abstain from manual work.

Further, works of mercy are preferable to physical labour. St. Paul says, (1 Tim. iv. 8), “ For bodily exercise is profitable to little; but godliness is profitable to all things.” But, even works of fraternal charity must give place to the exercise of preaching. “It is not fit that we should leave the word of God to serve at tables” (Acts vi. 2). “Leave the dead to bury their dead, but you go and preach the Kingdom of God” (Luke ix. 60). On this the Gloss observes: “The Lord teaches us to forego lesser advantages for the sake greater ones. It is more profitable to raise souls, by preacching, from the death of sin than to bury dead bodies in the earth.” Hence manual labour may lawfully be neglected for the sake of preaching.

It is impossible, at the same time, both to gain a livelihood by work and to carry on a systematic study of Holy Scripture. St. Gregory, expounding Exod. xxv., “The bars shall be always in the rings,” says: “It is above all necessary that they who are destined for preaching should be unremitting in their studies, so that although they are not always preaching, they may always be prepared to preach.” Hence those whose duty it is to preach, whether by their own authority, as is the case with bishops, or by the commission of prelates, ought to set aside manual labour for the sake of study.

There are some words in the prologue of St. Jerome’s commentary on the book of Job, which show clearly that religious are justified in neglecting bodily labour for the sake of studying Holy Scripture: “Were I to spend my time in weaving baskets or plaiting palm branches in order to eat my bread in the sweat of my brow, no one would reproach me for my anxiety to supply my material wants. Now however that, in obedience to the admonition of Our Saviour, I labour for a meat that doth not perish, and strive to clear the sacred volume from the errors that have accumulated therein, I am reproached with having committed a double fault.” Later on he adds, “Therefore, my brethren, please accept these spiritual and durable gifts in lieu of fans, baskets and other little monastic presents.” Thus, we see that the monk St. Jerome was rebuked by envious tongues for preferring the study of Holy Scripture to manual labour. His example may profitably be followed by religious, in spite of the complaints uttered against them by their detractors.

St, Augustine further says in his book De opere monachorum: “They who have renounced all their possessions and distributed their fortune, whatever it may be, among the needy, and with pious humility desire, to be enrolled among the poor of Christ, can perform a work of mercy even greater than that of dividing their substance among those in want. For, if they are not hindered by ecclesiastical labours and have sufficient strength to work, by manual labour they will set a good example to the idle.” Hence we see that religious are dispensed from the duty of bodily toil, either by infirm health or by ecclesiastical business. Now of all clerical duties, preaching is the noblest and most useful. “Let the priests who rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour, especially those who labour in the word and doctrine” (1 Tim v. 11). Therefore, religious who are engaged in preaching ought not to be employed in bodily labour.

It only, now, remains for us to answer the arguments brought forward in favour of the contrary opinion. The first argument brought against us is that manual labour is an Apostolic precept. To this objection we reply that it is a precept not of positive right, but of the natural law. This is clear from the words of St. Paul (2 Thes. iii. 6), “Withdraw yourselves from every brother living disorderly,” which the Gloss interprets to mean, “who lives not according to the law of nature.” The Apostle is speaking of such as will not work. Now the very constitution of our bodies teaches us that nature intends us to labour. We are not provided with raiment, as other animals are furnished with hides. Neither has nature given us weapons, like the horns which she has bestowed on cattle; nor the claws wherewith lions defend themselves. Nor is any food, save milk, supplied naturally to us, as Avicenna remarks. In lieu of the gifts bestowed upon other animals, man is endowed with reason, which teaches him to supply his needs, and with hands wherewith he can carry out the dictates of reason, as Aristotle says (XIV De animal.). As the precepts of the natural law regard all men without distinction, the law of manual labour does not apply more to religious than to others. Nevertheless, it is not true that all men ere bound to work with their hands. There are certain laws of nature which, in their observance, are of profit to none save to the one who obeys them. Such is the law obliging man to eat. These laws must be obeyed by every individual man. Other natural laws, e.g. that of reproduction, regard not only the man who obeys them, but are advantageous to the whole human race. It is not necessary that all these laws should be obeyed by every individual; for no single man is competent to perform all the activities which are needed for the continuation of the human race. One individual would not suffice for the different works of reproduction, of invention, of architecture, of agriculture, or for the other functions which must be exercised for the continuance of the human race. To supply the needs common to all mankind one individual must assist another, just as in the body one limb is subserved by another. It is in allusion to this mutual service which men are bound to render to each other that St. Paul says: "We are each members of one another" (Rom. 'xii. 5). The differences existing among men, and enabling them to devote themselves to different occupations, are to be attributed primarily to Divine Providence, and secondarily to natural causes, whereby certain men are disposed to the performauce of certain functions in preference to others.

Hence we see that no man is bound to any particuar work, unless necessity obliges him to it, and unless no one else will accomplish it for him. For example, if a man be constrained by necessity to dwell in a house which no one will build for him, he must build it for himself. With regard, therefore, to manual labour, I maintain that it is not incumbent upon anyone unless he be in want of something which must be produced by such labour, and which he cannot, without sin, procure from any other man. For we are said to be able to do anything when we can lawfully do it. This appears from the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. iv. 12). "We labour, working with our own hands," "because " (comments the Gloss) "no one will supply our necessities." Hence the Apostle does not enjoin manual labour as a precept on any, save on those who choose to gain their living by sin, rather than by work. Nor can it be proved that anyone, be he layman or religious, is bound to manual labour, except to save himself from death by starvation, or to avoid a sinful mode of gaining a livelihood.

To the second objection, which is based on the commentary of the Gloss on the words, "If any man will not work, neither let him eat," we answer that this saying must be understood as referring to physical, as distinguished from spiritual work. It was directed against those who interpreted this passage as signifying spiritual labours only, and as forbidding the servants of God to work. The Gloss corrects this interpretation. St. Augustine likewise finds fault with it, in his book De opere monachorum. But even if the verse, “If anyone will not work neither let him eat” is understood as referring to manual labour, it does not prove that everyone who desires to eat, is bound to work with his hands. Were such a precept of labour universally imposed, it would contradict the words of St. Paul, “we worked day and night; not as if we had not power,” etc. As the Apostle had power to eat without working, the words: “If anyone will not work, neither let him eat” cannot be understood as implying an obligation to work imposed on all mankind. The class of men to whom St. Paul refers becomes quite evident from some other words of his in the same chapter (2 Thes. iii.): “For we have heard there are some among you who walk disorderly, not working at all, but curiously meddling” or, as the Gloss says, “providing themselves with the necessities of life by illicit means.” St. Paul continues, “Such people we instruct and urge to work with silence and eat their own bread.” For one accustomed to gain his living in an unlawful manner ought not to eat if he will not work. The words of the Gloss which follow: “that they may not be compelled by want to beg,” show that labour is not to be imposed upon the servants of God as a necessity, but that it is proposed to them as means of avoiding the evil of compulsory mendicancy. For, it is better for a man to work with his hands than to be reduced, against his will, to beggary. Nor does, it follow that they who profess poverty and who, out of humility, are content to beg, are bound to work with their hands.

To the third objection, we reply that the Apostle has given no absolute precept concerning manual work. He speaks of it as being preferable to theft: “He who stole, let him now steal no more, but rather let him labour with his hands,” etc. Hence as religious can live without stealing, there is no reason why they should be bound to work.

To the fourth objection, our answer is that they who, in obedience to the counsel of our Lord, have sold all things, ought to follow Him. Therefore Peter said: “See, we have left all things and have followed You” etc. (Matt. xix. 27). Now men can follow Christ either by a life of contemplation or by one of action. They are equally His followers who leave all things in order to devote themselves to contemplation, or in order to give material alms, or to bestow spiritual assistance by preaching or teaching. The passage quoted from the Gloss, while it mentions one mode whereby the counsels of our Lord are observed, does not, thereby, intend to exclude the other way, else it would contradict the gospel. For Luke (ix. 59) tells us how our Lord said to a certain man, “Follow Me.” But he to whom He spoke, asked for time to bury his father. Christ answered him: “Let the dead bury their dead; but you go and preach the Kingdom of God.” Thus, it was our Lord’s will that some men, when they had left all things, should follow Him to proclaim the word of God. We can also say that this text, together with all that is contained about it in the Gloss, is a counsel. It is therefore binding only on such who are vowed to its observance.

Our answer to the fifth objection, is that the manual labour of the Apostles was sometimes a matter of necessity, and at other times a work of supererogation. When no one would supply the Apostles with food, they were obliged to work (cf. Gloss on 1 Cor. iv.). But we see in 1 Cor. ix. that at other times manual labour was for them a matter of supererogation. Now there are three reasons for which the Apostles chose to do work that was not a necessity. It was, first, in order to take from those false apostles, who preached only for the sake of temporal gain, the occasion of preaching: “But what I do that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them,” etc. (2 Cor. xi. 12). Secondly, the Apostles, at times, resorted to manual labour, lest they to whom they preached should, in their avarice, find it a burden to provide for the material needs of those from whom they received spiritual benefits, and lest they should so fall away from the faith. “For what is there that you have had less than the other churches, but that I myself was not burdensome to you” (2 Cor. xii. 13). Thirdly, the Apostles laboured in order to set an example of industry. “We worked night and day, lest we should be chargeable to any of you” (2 Thes. iii. 8). But St. Paul did not work in cities, such as Athens, where he had facilities for preaching daily (see St. Augustine, Do opere momachorum). Hence it is not a matter of salvation for religious to imitate his manual labour, since all works of supererogation are not binding upon them. The other Apostles did not work with their hands except when they were obliged to do so in order to obtain food.

To the sixth objection, we reply that the decree quoted by it refers only to those clerics who are not sufficiently endowed with ecclesiastical revenues, or assisted by the alms of the faithful, to be able to live without working.

We reply to the seventh objection that St. Paul gives to bishops the example of manual labour in those cases in which he himself had recourse to it, e.g., when such labour would not be an obstacle to the performance of their ecclesiastical duties, or when it would cause scandal to recent converts were they to be asked for material assistance.

Our answer to the eighth objection, is that manual labour, according to the authority of St. Jerome, is performed not only to earn a livelihood, but, likewise to repress dangerous thoughts arising from idleness and self-indulgence. But sloth and the desires of the flesh are overcome not only by bodily toil, but likewise by spiritual exercises. Hence St. Jerome writes: “Love the knowledge of the Scripture, and you will not love the vices of the flesh.” There is no precept enjoining manual labour, if idleness can be avoided by means of spiritual exercises, and if the body is subdued by means of other austerities such as watching, fasting and the like, among which penitential practices St. Paul mentions labour, saying “ in labours, in watching; in fasting” (2 Cor. vi.). The Gloss adds, “in manual labour,” the reason being, “because the Apostle worked with his hands.”

We reply to the ninth objection that at times it is advisable to work with the hands, and at other times it is better not to work in this manner. When manual labour does not call a man away from some more useful occupation, it is very praiseworthy, as a means both of self-support, and of charity to those in need. It is especially to be counselled, in cases wherein those weak in faith or but recently converted would be scandalised if preachers, instead of earning their own livelihood, were to live on the alms of the faithful. It was on such occasions (as the Gloss remarks) that St. Paul had recourse to manual labour (1 Cor. ix.). When, however, such labour hinders a man from engaging in more useful occupation, it is better to set it aside. This lesson is given us by the commentary of the Gloss on the words, “Leave the dead to bury their dead” (Luke ix), and also by the example of St. Paul, who ceased to work when he had an opportunity of preaching. Manual labour is naturally a greater hindrance to modern preachers than to those of the Apostolic age. For the Apostles were taught by the immediate inspiration of the Holy Spirit, whereas in our time preachers must prepare themselves for their office by constant study, as is evidenced by St. Gregory in the words already given.

To the tenth objection, we reply that the monks whom St, Augustine condemns as contumacious, belong to the class which, according to the Apostolic precept, is bound to work, and which St. Paul says is worthy of excommunication (2 Thes. iii.). Men of this description refuse to work, because they prefer to live in sloth, and to get their living by illicit means. That St. Augustine clearly refers to this class of person, appears in the words wherein he assigns a reason why those who leave an agricultural life in order to enter religion, ought to employ themselves in physical labour. He says that such men should work with their hands, because it is difficult to tell whether they become religious for the purpose of serving God, or in order to escape from a toilsome and penurious condition to a state, wherein they may be clothed and fed, living in idleness and honoured by those who, hitherto, have despised them and considered them nothing. Such men, evidently, belong to the class denounced by the Apostle as slothful, and urged by him to work in silence and eat their own bread." St. Augustine accuses them of contumacy, chiefly because, perverting the words of St. Paul, they maintain that it is not lawful for the servants of God to work with their hands.

Our answer to the eleventh objection, is that by the spiritual works to which this objection refers, may be understood either the spiritual exercises that are for the common good, or such as are profitable to individuals. A man may either join in the prayers and psalmody of the Divine Office, and thus perform a work destined for the public edification of the Church, or he may, as do many laymen, occupy himself in private devotions. It is of the latter class that St. Augustine is speaking in the passage quoted in this objection. He is not alluding to those engaged in the public functions of the Church. This is clear from the words which follow. They can, he says, at the same time sing sacred canticles and work with their hands, after the example of craftsmen, who tell each other stories and listen with great attention, yet without ceasing to work. This conduct would not be permissible to such as are reciting the canonical hours. Again, reading may be, for some religious, a public duty, for they may have either to teach or to attend lectures in the schools as masters and scholars, either religious or secular. It may, on the other hand, be a private occupation, as is the study of the Scriptures prosecuted by monks in the cloister for their own consolation. St. Augustine recognises this distinction, and in the passage quoted as an objection, he speaks not of monks engaged in teaching or lecturing, but of such as "say that they devote their time to reading."

In like manner, preaching may be a public duty; and it is so, for such as are bound to proclaim the Word of God to the people. At other times, it is a private exercise; as is the case, when, in a community, one of the religious gives a spiritual exhortation, or when the Fathers of the Desert used to address words of edification to the brethren who came to visit them. It is clear that St. Augustine refers to this private mode of instruction. For he says: “Can all the religious of a monastery speak spiritual words to the brethren who come to them?” Hence it is plain that his words are to be applied not to preachers, but to such as speak unto edification. For, as the Gloss says (1 Cor. ii.), “Speaking is a private exercise, preaching a public function.” They therefore who are employed publicly in the various spiritual exercises which we have mentioned are justified in accepting the means of livelihood from the faithful to whom they minister. But those who devote themselves to such works for their private edification, to the neglect of manual labour, do certainly transgress against the Apostolic precept. They belong to the category of those whom St. Paul rebukes, and whom he bids to “work in silence,” and to “eat their own bread,” It is of such men that St. Augustine speaks. This is made clear by his words: “Why should we not devote a part of our time to the observance of the Apostolic precepts?” Again he says: “One prayer from the mouth of an obedient man will be heard more speedily than ten that proceed from scomful lips.” Once more, “How great is their perversity! They will not obey what they read.”

All these passages prove that St. Augustine denounces only those religious who apply themselves to spiritual exercises, in such a manner as to transgress the Apostolic precept. But those only, as we have before observed, can disobey this precept who are bound to fulfil it. They do not transgress it who neglect manual labour for the sake of public duties. Neither do they obey it who, instead of working with their hand, devote themselves to the exercise of contemplation. For (as has already been said), they are not impelled by sloth to escape from labour and to lead an idle life. They are, on the contrary, filled with such an abundance of divine love as to render them oblivious of every earthly care.”

CHAPTER 5

Is it Lawful For a Religious to Leave All That He Has, Reserving for Himself No Property, Either Private Or Common?

THE enemies of truth are not satisfied with the many false assertions which we have hitherto employed ourselves in disproving. They proceed still further. They, endeavour to overthrow the very basis of all religious life, namely, the practice of poverty established by our Lord. They affirm that it is unlawful for religious to abandon all their possessions, in order to enter a religious order, owning neither property nor income. The only reason, they say, which can justify such a step is the intention of doing manual work. They quote as an authority for this assertion the words of Prov. xxx. 8, “Give me neither beggary, nor riches; give me only the necessities of life; lest perhaps being filled, I should be tempted to deny; or, being compelled by poverty, I should steal, and forswear the name of God.” Those who leave all things, and enter a religious order which is destitute of all possessions abandon their means of subsistence and expose themselves to beggary. This is particularly the case with those who have not the intention of working with their hands. They, therefore, who act thus are liable to be tempted to steal and to abjure the name of God.

In Eccles. vii. 12 we read again, “Wisdom with riches is more profitable,” i,e., than wisdom alone. Hence it is reprehensible to choose wisdom without riches by abandoning the means of support, in order to gain wisdom. Again we are told that “through poverty many have sinned” (Sirach xxvii. 1). The Gloss interprets these words, as meaning poverty of heart and of work. Now if every occasion of sin is to be avoided, no man ought to reduce himself to poverty by parting with all his goods.

St. Paul gives to the Corinthians the following rule concerning almsgiving: “If eagerness is there, it is acceptable according to what a man has, not according to what he does no have. I do no mean that others should be eased, and you burdened” (2 Cor. viii. 12). The Gloss interprets this text to mean that a man must keep for himself the necessities of life, and that if he bring on himself poverty, he is giving beyond his means. Hence those who abandon all their possessions are giving alms inordinately, and in a manner contrary to the Apostolic rule.

The Gloss has the following comment on the words of St. Paul (1 Thess. v. 12), “We beseech you brethren to respect” etc.: “ Riches beget carelessness about salvation. Penury also causes men to forsake justice in their efforts to acquire wealth.” Now they who give up all that they possess in order to become religious reduce themselves to excessive poverty. Thus they lay themselves open to a temptation to depart from justice. Again on the words of the same Apostle, “but having food and wherewith to be covered” (1 Tim. vi. 8), the Gloss says: “Although we have brought nothing into the world, and shall take nothing out of it, temporal possessions are not to be entirely rejected.” Therefore, he who casts aside all material wealth in order to go into religion acts inordinately.

On the words of Jesus Christ,” he who has two coats, let him give to him that has none” (Luke iii, 11), the Gloss says: “We are commanded to divide two cloaks; for if one were divided it would clothe no one. Hence we see that charity must be proportioned to the capability of our human condition, and that no one should render himself entirely destitute, but that he should rather divide what he has with the poor.” Hence to give away everything in alms, and to keep nothing for ourselves, is unreasonable and inordinate conduct. It is, therefore, sinful.

In Luke (xii. 29), we read, “Do not seek for what you shall eat.” The Gloss remarks: “Our Lord does not forbid us to reserve money for our own necessities; for He Himself had a purse. Unless such provision for ourselves were right, it would be forbidden, and Christ would have kept nothing for Himself.” Hence it must be virtuous and fitting to retain some portion of our property, instead of renouncing the whole.

It is an act of prodigality to give away both what ought and what ought not to be given. He who gives away everything gives what ought not to be given, but ought to be retained. Thus he sins by prodigality.

In his epistle to the Romans (xii. 1), St. Paul speaks of “your reasonable service.” The Gloss says that reasonable service consists “in the avoidance of extremes.” But, to give away everything is to give too much, and therefore it is to exceed the medium of liberality, which consists in “giving enough, and keeping enough.” Hence he who gives up everything to go into religion, does not offer a reasonable service to God.

God has given us this commandment (Exod. xx. 13), “You shall not kill,” i.e., says the Gloss, “by depriving another of the means of life which you dost owe him.” Now as temporal possessions are “the means of life,” and as we “owe” the means of subsistence, in the first place, to ourselves, he who deprives himself of all material possessions sins against the commandment, “You shall not kill,” by depriving himself of the means of living.

It was better with those who were slain by the sword, than with those who died with hunger “ (Lam. iv. 9). Hence it is more iniquitous to expose ourselves to death by starvation than to destruction by violence. “It is not lawful for a man to act thus when he can, without sin, act otherwise,” says St. Augustine. Much less then is it, permitted to us to expose ourselves through starvation, by parting with all that we possess, and retaining nothing.

Again, a man is more bound to preserve his own life, than to care for another. Now it would be sinful, to deprive another man of all means of subsistence, and thus to cause him to perish. “The bread of the needy is the life of the poor: he who defrauds them of it is a man of blood” (Eccles. xxxiv. 25). Therefore, he who gives away his all and retires into a religious order which has no common property sins by suicide.

The life of Christ is the example of perfection. But, we read that our Lord had a purse (John vii), and again that His disciples went into a city to buy bread (John iv.). Hence the entire renunciation of all property cannot be perfect.

Further, the observances of the religious orders originated in the Apostolic mode of life. For, as St. Jerome says in his book De illustribus viris, all Christians of the primitive Church resembled the most perfect religious of our day. We are informed of the same fact by the book In collationibus Patrum, and also by the Gloss on the words (Acts iv.), “the multitude of those who believed.” But this same chapter of the Acts also states that in the Apostolic times the faithful had all things in common, and that there was no one needy among them. They, therefore, who relinquish their possessions and, having no common property, are bound to be destitute, lead not a religious, but a superstitious life.

When our Lord sent His disciples to preach, He gave them two commands. He told them, first, to take nothing with them on the way (Matt. x., Mark vi., Luke ix.). Secondly, He told them not to go into the way of the Gentiles (Matt. x.). When the time of His Passion was at hand, He rescinded His first command, saying, “But now he who has a purse let him take it and also a bag” (Luke xxii. 36). He would seem likewise to have revoked His second command in the words, “Go therefore and teach all nations” (Matt. xxviii. 19), and “going into the whole world,” etc. (Mark xvi. 15). Since the second order has been rescinded, it need no longer be observed; but, on the contrary, the Gospel must be preached to the Gentiles. In the same way, the first of these two precepts is not now to be put in practice. Therefore, men need not entirely deprive themselves of the means of subsistence.

In XII quaest. I we read: “It is right to possess the property belonging to the Church, and to despise our own possessions,” And again: “It is manifest that while, for the sake of perfection, men ought to renounce what belongs to them, they may, without any imperfection, possess the property of the Church, which belongs to all. Therefore, it stands to reason that if any man abandon his own possessions to go into religion, he ought to choose an order holding some common property. Again, in the same question, cap. Videntes, it is laid down that “the Sovereign Pontiffs have ordained that property should be conferred on the Church, in order that there should be no destitution among those leading a common life.” Hence those who despise common property and prefer to live in want, sin by acting counter to the ordinances of the Holy Fathers.

The Gloss, on the words: “If you be the Son of God, cast yourself down” (Matt. iv.), has the following commentary: “No one ought to tempt God, when human reason teaches him how to act.” And again, “A man, when his human reason is at a loss, ought to, commend himself to God, not tempting Him, but devoutly confessing to Him.” Now he who has the means of procuring the necessaries of life, that is, food, and clothing, is taught by human reason how to act. If then he refuses to make use of these means, and yet expects his life to be preserved, he sins by tempting God as much as a man would sin who, seeing a bear approach him, should throw down his weapon of self-defence and yet expect God to save him.

Again, we ought not to reject that which we daily pray for. Now each day we beg of God to supply our bodily wants, saying, “Give us this day our daily, bread.” Therefore, we ought not to expose ourselves to poverty by casting aside all our temporal possessions. We read in Decr. de consecr., dist. I cap. Nemo that “a church ought not to be built, before he who desires to build it, has provided a sum sufficient for the maintenance of the priest who is to take charge of such a church.” They, therefore, who possess no property live in opposition to the statutes of the Holy Fathers.

The mode of religious life wherein common property is enjoyed is approved by the ancient Fathers, Sts. Augustine, Basil, Benedict, and many others. It appears rash, therefore, to introduce another form of religious life.

In the New Testament our Lord enjoins His followers to assist the poor in their necessities. But this precept cannot be carried out by those who have neither private, nor common property. Therefore, entire renunciation of all possessions is not praiseworthy.

As things may at times be best understood by trarcing them to their source, we will now examine the origin of these propositions; and we will investigate the mode of their development. In the early days of Christianity there flourished at Rome a heretic, confuted in the writings of St. Jerome, whose name was Jovinian. He taught that all who preserved their baptismal innocence, would receive, in Heaven, an equal reward. He further taught that virgins, married persons and widows were, if baptised, all of equal merit in the sight of God, provided that there was no discrepancy between them with regard to their works. He said that as there is no difference between abstinence from food and eating with giving of thanks, so there is no inequality between virginity and marriage. By this teaching, he, of course, stultified both the counsel given by our Lord as to celibacy in His words, “Not all men take this word,” i.e., remain, single, “but they to whom it is given” (Matt. xix. 2), and the advice of St. Paul on the same subject, “Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel” (1 Cor. vii. 25). The opinions of Jovinian have, St. Augustine tells us, been condemned as heretical.

The errors of Jovinian were, however, revived by Vigilantius, who impugned the faith, hated continence, and, in the midst of riotous feasting, declaimed against the fasting practised by holy men (see St. Jerome's epistle Contra Vigilantium). But Vigilantius was not contented with imitating Jovinian in rejecting the counsel of virginity; he proceeded further to condemn the practice of poverty. St. Jerome, speaking of the errors of Vigilantius, says: "He maintains that it is better to distribute our goods among the poor by degrees than to sell them altogether and give away the price. Let him accept his answer not from me, but from God, who has said, "If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have" etc. (Matt. xix.). The error of Vigilantius has been handed down by a succession of heretical teachers to our days. It is still perpetuated by the sect of the Cathari, and is expounded in a treatise written by a certain heresiarch of Lombardy named Desiderius, who, amongst other heretical propositions, condemns the conduct of those who sell all that they may live in poverty with Christ.

More recently, however, the old heresies concerning virginity and poverty have been revived by men who, while pretending to defend the truth, have gone from bad to worse, and who, not content with teaching, like Jovinian that a condition of wealth is as meritorious as voluntary poverty, or with preferring riches to poverty, as did Vigilantius, hold that poverty is to be absolutely condemned; and that it is not lawful for a man to leave all things for Christ, unless he enter an Order which possesses some common property, or can support itself by means of manual labour. They further assert that the poverty commended by the Scriptures is not that actual poverty whereby a man strips himself of all temporal possessions, but that habitual poverty which causes him to despise those earthly goods which he actually owns. We will now proceed to refute this mistaken opinion.

(1st) We will prove that for evangelical perfection, not only habitual poverty is required, but, likewise that actual poverty which consists in the renunciation of material possessions.

(2nd) We shall show that perfection is attained, even by those who own no common property.

(3rd) We shall make it evident that manual labour is not essential to perfection, even where men possess nothing.

(4th) We shall refute the arguments whereby our adversaries seek to maintain their errors.

1. In order to prove that evangelical poverty requires, not only habitual, but likewise actual poverty, we will remind our readers of the words: “If you would be perfect, go, sell all” etc. (Matt xix. 21). Now he who sells all that he has and distributes it to the poor practises not merely habitual, but likewise actual poverty. Hence actual poverty is needed for evangelical perfection. Again, evangelical perfection consists in the imitation of Christ, who was poor not only in desire, but in fact. The Gloss, on the words, “Go to the sea” (Matt. xvii.) says, “So great was the poverty of the Lord that he had not wherewith to pay the tribute money.” Again, on the words, “the foxes have holes” etc. (Luke ix.), the Gloss says: “our Lord meant to say that His poverty was so extreme that He had no shelter, and no roof to call His own.” We might adduce many other proofs that actual poverty pertains to evangelical perfection.

The Apostles were mirrors of evangelical perfection. They practised actual poverty, renouncing all that they possessed. “Behold” (said St. Peter) “we have left all things” (Matt. xix. 27). Hence St. Jerome writes to Hebidia: “ Would you be perfect and attain to the highest dignity? Do as the Apostles did. Sell all that you have and give to the poor, and follow our Saviour. Alone, and stripped of all things, follow only the Cross in its bare poverty.” Hence actual poverty forms part of evangelical perfection.

The Gloss on the words “How hard is for those who have riches” etc. (Mark x. 23), has the following comment: “It is one thing to have money, another to love it. Many possess it without loving it; many love it without possessing it.” Thus, while some men own wealth and love it; others congratulate themselves on neither owning nor loving it, for this is the safer course. Such men can say with the Apostle, “the world is crucified to me, and I to the world.” Hence it is evident that habitual poverty, in conjunction with actual poverty, is preferable to habitual poverty alone. This same remark may be made with reference to the words in Matt. xix. 23, “How hard it is for a rich man enter the Kingdom of Heaven.” The Gloss here observes, “It is safest neither to possess nor to love riches.” “Has not God chosen the poor in this world?” asks St. James (ii. 5). “Those who are poor, in temporal possessions” is the interpretation of these word given by the Gloss. Hence it is those who are actually poor who are chosen by God.

The Gloss on the words, “every one of you who does not renounce everything that he possesses,” observes that “there is a difference between renouncing everything and leaving everything. All who make lawful use of their material possessions renounce them, in so far as their aspirations tend towards such things as are eternal. But those who leave all things act with greater perfection, for they set aside what is temporal in order to seek only what is eternal.” Hence abandonment of all things by actual poverty is a point of evangelical perfection; renunciation of all things by habitual poverty is necessary for salvation.

St. Jerome, in his epistle against Vigilantius, says: “The Lord speaks to him who desires to be perfect and, with the Apostle, leaves father, ship and net. The one you praise is in the second or third rank; for he desires only to give the income of his possessions to the poor. We accept such a one, although we know that the first degree of virtue is preferable to the second or third degree.” From these words, it is plain that they who give all that they possess to the poor, are to be preferred before such as give alms only of their income.

St. Jerome, again, says, in his epistle to the Monk Rusticus: “If you have possessions, sell them and give to the poor. If you do not have them, you are free from a great burden. Therefore, being stripped of all things, you follow Christ in His poverty. This is a hard and painful undertaking; but it is rewarded with a glorious recompense.” For the sake of brevity, we omit many other passages from St. Jerome, all of whic must be understood as referring to actual poverty.

St. Augustine (Gennadius) likewise says in his book De eccles. Dogmaibus: “Though it be a good thing to distribute our riches by degrees among the poor, it is, a better to give all away at once with the intention of following our Lord, in order that free from anxiety, we may share His poverty.”

St. Ambrose, in like manner, says in his book, De Offic.: “Riches will not give us the slightest assistance in attaining to a life of blessedness. This is clearly pointed out by our Lord’s words, “Blessed are you poor, for yours is the Kingdom of God.” And again, he says that “poverty, hunger, pain, and suchlike evils that are borne as evils, are not merely no obstacle to blessedness, but they are clearly pronounced to be aids towards attaining to it.” Now these words cannot be understood as referring to habitual poverty, whereby a man is merely detached from riches; for, riches have never been held by any to be obstacles to happiness. They must, therefore, be understood to refer to actual poverty, whereby all possessions are given up.

St. Gregory says (in the eighth homily of the second part on Ezech.), " When a man consecrates to God one thing, but not another, he offers a sacrifice. But, when he gives to God his whole life, with all that he has and all that he loves, he offers a holocaust, which is the most acceptable form of sacrifice." Hence it is the most perfect work to abandon all that we have for the love of God. St. Gregory likewise says (prolog. Moral.), "While I was still constrained to serve the world in appearance, many temporal anxieties rose up around me and claimed all my attention. At length, escaping from them, I sought the gate of the monastery and, forsaking the things of this world, which I then regarded as vanities, I escaped from them, as a mariner from a shipwreck." Hence we see that it is dangerous to possess material goods; for they occupy the mind to a perilous degree. It is better, therefore, to relinquish the possession of earthly things by actual poverty, that so, the mind may be freed from solicitude concerning them.

St. Chrysostom asks in his book Quod neno laeditur nisi a se ipso, "What harm did material poverty do to the Apostles? Did they not live in hunger and thirst and nakedness? and were they not, on this account, more renowned and glorious? and did not their poverty increase their trust in God? " Hence we see that actual poverty, which consists in privation of all things, forms part of Apostolical perfection.

St, Bernard writes to the Archbishop of Sens: "Blessed is he who keeps for himself nothing of what he possesses. Blessed is he who has not a den like the wolves, nor a nest like the birds, nor a purse like Judas, nor a house, but who, like Mary, finds no room even in an inn, and thus imitates Him who had not whereon to lay His head." Entire destitution of all earthly possessions, therefore, pertains to Christian perfection.

In I quaest. II. cap. Si quis, we read: "He who strips himself of everything, or who, possessing nothing, desires nothing, is more perfect than he who out of his abundance gives something to the Church." These words are another proof that actual poverty is a point of Christian perfection.

They who devote themselves to the contemplation of divine things ought to be more disengaged from temporal anxiety than they who apply themselves to the study of philosophy. But philosophers, in order to be able to give their whole attention to study, used to relinquish all their worldly possessions. St. Jerome says to the priest Paulinus (de instil. monach.), “Socrates, the Theban, a very wealthy man, when he went to study philosophy at Athens, cut away a large quantity of gold, judging that he could not, at the same time, possess both virtue and riches.” It is far more praiseworthy then to relinquish all worldly goods, for the sake of divine contemplation. The interlinear Gloss on the words, “ if you would be perfect,” etc. (Matt. xix) says: “Behold the life of contemplation taught by the Gospel.”

A great reward is only given for great merit. Now a great reward, i.e. judicial power, is due to actual poverty. This appears from the words of our Lord (Matt. xix.), “You who have left all things” etc. The Gloss commenting on this text says, “They who have left all things and have followed the Lord shall be judges; but they who have lawfully retained and used their goods, shall be judged.” Therefore, the higher merit is due to actual poverty.

St. Paul (1 Cor. vii.), in counselling virginity, gives as the reason of his counsel that they may be without solicitude. The renunciation of riches frees a man from solicitude. For riches engender many anxieties in their possessors. Hence our Lord (Luke x.) speaks of them as “thorns” which, by their care, choke the Word of God in the hearts of the hearers. Therefore, even as virginity, so poverty belongs to evangelical perfection.

2. We shall prove, in conclusion that the perfection which consists in the entire sacrifice of private property does not necessitate the possession of common property.

The foundation of all perfection was laid by Christ and by the Apostles. We do not, however read that when they left all that they had, they possessed property in common. On the contrary, we are told that they had no house wherein to dwell. Hence common property is not an essential of perfect poverty.

St. Augustine tells us (3 De doctrina Christ.) that in the primitive church, the Jews who converted to Christianity, “being constantly in close contact with spiritual things, were so receptive of the influence of the Holy Spirit that they sold all that they had, and laid the price at the feet of the Apostles, to be distributed among the poor.” He further observes that “this fact is not narrated of any Gentile church; for they who had for gods idols made by hands were not so open to the Holy Spirit.” Hence we see that St. Augustine considers the perfection of the early Jewish church to have been superior to that of the Gentile churches. For, while the Gentile converts sold all that they had to give to the poor, the Jews sold their possessions so absolutely as to reserve to themselves no common property whatsoever. Hence poverty, without common property, is more perfect than that which retains property in common.

St. Jerome, writing to Hellodorus, on the death of Nepotiau, says in derision, “Men are richer as monks than they were as seculars. With the poverty of Christ, they possess wealth that they had not when they were subject to the devil; and the Church mourns over the riches of those, whom the world despised as beggars.” These words may often be verified in religious orders that maintain common property. They can never be true of such religious as possess nothing. Hence it is more meritorious for religious to have nothing than to possess property. St. Jerome, again, writes to Lucinus Beticus: “As long as we are engaged in things of the world, and our mind is occupied about our possessions and revenues, we cannot think freely of God.” Hence it is better for religious to be without property and revenues, than to possess them.

St. Gregory (3 Dialog.) says, speaking of Isaac a servant of God, “When, as frequently happened, his disciples pressed him to accept for the use of the monastery the things that were offered to him, Isaac, vigilant in his care for poverty, was wont to make use of these strong words: ‘The monk who seeks possessions on earth, is no monk.’ For he feared to lose his poverty as a miser fears to be robbed of his gold.” This example proves that it is safest for religious not to possess common property.

The monks of Egypt, of whom we read in the lives of the Fathers, deemed those religious to be the most perfect, who lived in the desert, possessing nothing. Hence common property is not an essential of evangelical poverty.

Religious can be deprived of common property by tyrants. If then men are not to leave all that they possess unless they go into an Order holding property in common, tyrants would have it in their power to hinder the practice of evangelical poverty. This idea is, of course, an absurd one.

The intention of our Lord in giving the counsel of poverty, was, to enable men to disengage their minds from anxiety about temporal things. Now common property cannot be possessed without much solicitude concerning its preservation and improvement. Hence those who possess no common property, practise the counsel of poverty in the most perfect manner.

3. We shall finally show that actual poverty does not necessarily involve manual labour. St. Augustine says (in De opere monachorum): “They who in the world possessed the means of living without work and who, on their conversion to God, have parted with all that they had, should not be forced to labour with their hands. It is praiseworthy in them to embrace voluntary poverty for the love of Christ, even if they possess no common property.” In the primitive church of Jerusalem there were, as we know by the testimony of St. Augustine, many men of this description. Hence those who embrace voluntary poverty are not bound to manual labour, even though they possess no common property.

No one is bound by precept to work with his hands, unless he can by no other lawful means procure a livelihood. Manual labour is not, therefore, a duty for those who possess nothing, unless they be obliged thereto by vow. Hence it is not true that they are bound absolutely to manual labour. They are only obliged to perform it, when it is their only means of subsistence; and, in such a case, everyone would be obliged to work with his hands, even if no vow imposed such labour on him as a duty.

The counsel of poverty was given by Oar Lord, in order to facilitate contemplation. This is pointed out by the Gloss on the words of Matt. xix., “If you would be perfect.” “Behold,” says the Gloss, “ the contemplative life ordained by the Gospel.” They, however, who are forced to gain their livelihood by the work of their hands, are greatly distracted from contemplation. If then those who, for the love of Christ, choose a life of poverty, be bound to manual labour, the very purpose for which the counsel of poverty was given will be frustrated. The counsel, therefore, will have been given to no purpose. This line of argument is, of course, absurd.

If they who leave all things for the love of Christ, be bound to have the intention of working with their hands, they must form this intention for one of the three following reasons. They must intend to perform manual labour either for its own sake or to provide means of subsistence, or in order to procure money which can be given in alms. Now it is absurd to say that the spiritual perfection of poverty can consist in manual labour undertaken for its own sake. For, were such the case the work of the body, would be preferred before the perfection of the soul. Again, it is not reasonable to say that a man ought to leave all things with the intention of going to earn his own living. For, if he had stayed in the world he could have lived by the possessions, which he has forsaken; and further the manual labour of the poor of Christ who devote themselves to prayer and other spiritual exercises barely suffices to maintain them. They must therefore, as St. Augustine says in his book De opere monachorum, be assisted by the faithful. Thirdly, it cannot be maintained that manual labour ought to be undertaken in order to procure means for almsgiving. For they who enter religion could have given much more abundantly to the poor of the goods which they possessed in the world. Thus, they would act unreasonably in leaving all things, in order to do manual work for the sake of giving alms. They, therefore, who, having left all things enter a religious order which has no common property are not, as we have already shown, bound to have the intention of performing manual labour.

4. It only remains for us now to reply to the objections of our opponents.

(1.) With regard to the text from the Book of Proverbs concerning “beggary and riches,” we answer that as there is no evil in riches themselves, but in the abuse of them, so beggary or poverty is not, in itself an evil. The only evil of poverty is its abuse, when there is impatience or reluctance in bearing the suffering resulting from it, or when there arises a covetous desire of the goods of others. “Those who would become rich fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil” (1 Tim. vi. 9). St. Chrysostom likewise says on St. Matthew, “Listen, you who are poor, and still more carefully you who desire to be rich. It is not a bad thing to be poor; the real evil is to be unwilling to be poor.” It is therefore evident that poverty which is a necessity is accompanied by certain dangers, from which voluntary poverty is free. For they who become poor by their own act do not desire to be rich. Hence the prayer of Solomon concerning beggary and riches refers to involuntary poverty. This is clear from the context, “being compelled by poverty,” etc. The Gloss likewise says on this text of Proverbs, “The man who walks with God, prays that he may not, either through abundance or scarcity of material goods, fall into forgetfulness of such as are eternal.” Hence we see that Solomon teaches us that it is not poverty or riches themselves which are to be avoided, but the misuse of either of these conditions.

(2.) The words of Solomon, “ wisdom with riches is more profitable,” etc., must be explained according to the rule laid down by Aristotle (I Ethic), viz. that “the greatest good, such as happiness, joined to a lesser good, is preferable to that lesser good.” Hence wisdom, which is amongst the greatest goods, is preferable to riches, which are an inferior good. But, according to this rule, the greatest good joined to another very great good is of more worth than if it be joined to a lesser good, or if it be considered by itself. Hence wisdom joined to evangelical perfection, which consists in poverty, and is one of the greatest goods, is worth more than wisdom considered by itself, or joined to riches.

(3.) The words, “through poverty many have sinned refers to compulsory poverty, which is necessarily accompanied by a desire for riches. We see this by the context, “He who seeks to be rich, turns away his eye.” As the Gloss explains, “He turns away the eye of his soul from the fear of the Lord.”

(4.) The passage of the Gloss, quoted as a fourth objection, is mutilated and misinterpreted. This becomes clear, if we subjoin its context, “He does not say that it is not better to give everything; but, out of consideration to those who are weak in virtue, he recommends them to give in such a manner that they shall not suffer want.”

(5.) The warning that “poverty diminishes friendship,” is to be understood of involuntary poverty, which causes covetousness. This is plain by the words that follow, “while he seeks to be filled.” Satiety implies that superabundance, which they desire who are not satisfied with a little, nor are of the number of those of whom St. Paul says (1 Tim. vi. 8), “having food and wherewithal to be covered, with these we are content.” He gives the following reason for this contentment with a little, “Those who will become rich, fall into temptation and the snare of the devil”; for the desire of great wealth often causes men to fall away from justice.

(6.) The words of the Gloss that “temporal possessions are not to be entirely rejected,” are to be interpreted to mean that we are to use our temporal means to procure food and clothing. This appears clearly from St. Paul’s words, “having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.” The Gloss does not mean that man can ignore all provision for temporal needs.

(7.) To the seventh objection, we reply that some temporal things, such as food and clothing, are absolutely necessary for the support of life. If I have more of such things than I need, I ought to assist the destitute, but I ought not to deprive myself of necessary food or raiment. It is of such things as are acquired for our present needs that the Gloss speaks in the passage quoted in the seventh objection. But there are temporal things, such as money and property which, though not needed at present, may in the future be necessary to our support. There is no reason why perfect men should not distribute these things to the poor; for, before they are needed, God may supply the lack of them in some other way; and we are commanded in the Scriptures to trust that He will do so.

(8.) To the eighth objection, we reply that although it be not a matter of precept to reserve money for our necessities, it is nevertheless a matter of counsel. Our Lord carried a purse, not because He was unable otherwise to supply His needs, but for the sake of His weaker members, and in order that they might understand that it was lawful for them to do what they saw done by Christ. Hence the Gloss, on the words “ having the purse” (John xii), says: “He to whom the angels ministered, carried a purse out of condescension to our weakness and for the assistance of the poor.” Again, on the, verse in Psalm ciii., “bringing forth grass for cattle,” the Gloss says: “The Lord had a purse for the use of those who were with Him, and because in His own person He carried the infirmity of the weak, as when He said: ‘My soul is sorrowful’.” He was followed by pious women who ministered to Him of their substance. For He foresaw that in the future many of His followers would be weak and would seek material assistance. He did not fill his purse with His own property, but with alms given Him by devout and faithful men.

(9.) Our answer to the ninth objection, is the rule laid down in II Ethic, viz. that “the medium in virtue does not signify the distance from extremes, but the due proportion of circumstances, ordered by well balanced reason.” Hence the medium of virtue does not consist in preserving the right balance between superfluity and scarcity in any circumstance considered in itself, but in a circumstance considered in comparison with other circumstances. Thus, the medium of virtue may vary according to the variability of circumstances. In sobriety, for instance, the circumstance who is varied according to the variety of the circumstance what. An amount of food which would be a moderate quantity for one person, would be too much for another, and too little for a third. Thus, again, some virtue, such as magnanimity, existing in its highest degree, may be moderate in proportion to some other circumstance. “The magnanimous man,” says Aristotle (IV Ethic), “confers the greatest dignity on himself.” He who exceeds the virtue of magnanimity by superfluity, does not thereby acquire greater dignity, but oversteps the limits of virtue; and those things which were moderation in him as a magnanimous man, are now superfluous. Hence we see that the medium of virtue is not destroyed because one circumstance is in its highest degree, so long as that circumstance be proportioned to other circumstances. Thus, in a case of liberality, if we consider the quantity to be given, and if we attend only to the circumstance that in certain cases it is superfluous to give everything, we shall find the vice of prodigality. On the other hand, with a certain change of circumstances, this prodigality will become perfect liberality. For instance, if a man gives all that he possesses to save his country from danger, he will be an example of perfect liberality. In the same way, he who gives away all that he has in order to fulfil the counsel of our Lord, acts not with prodigality, but with perfect virtue. If, however, such a man were to spend his all upon some unfitting object, or with some unseemly circumstances, he would be prodigal. We may say the same of virginity and of all other virtues wherein there appears to be excess when the common mean of virtue is overstepped. Hence we see that to give everything for the love of Christ means not to give both what ought and ought not to be given, but to give only that which ought to be given. For, although all things are not in every case to be given, yet all things are to be given up for Christ.

(10.) Our reply to the tenth objection, is that grace is the perfection of nature. Therefore, it cannot be its destruction. There are certain things, such as food and sleep, which pertain immediately to the preservation of nature. In connection with these things, virtue does not exceed the limits of the preservation of nature. Hence if anyone deprive himself of that which nature demands for its support, it is a vicious and unreasonable act. It is such conduct that is rebuked, both by St, Paul, and by the Gloss. The Gloss says: “Let the service which you offer by the maceration of the flesh, be reasonable, i.e. tempered by discretion, and not excessive. Chastise your body with moderation, so that it be not destroyed.” But nature can be preserved without luxury. Hence if a man abstain from sensual pleasure, he is not performing a superfluous act, unless, by such abstention, he should fall into sin. For this reason, virginity is praiseworthy. Again, life can be preserved without material possessions, if we trust that Divine Providence will assist us in many ways. Hence a man does nothing superfluous, in giving up for Christ, all that he possesses, consequently, voluntary poverty, practised for the love of Christ, is no departure from the medium which ought to be observed in virtue.

(11.) To the next objection, we reply that although he who leaves all things for the love of Christ, does, to a certain extent, deprive himself of the means of existence; yet, he can always count on the assistance of Divine Providence, which will never fail him; he can also reckon on the charity of the faithful. St. Augustine, in his book, On Almsdeeds, thus expresses himself on this subject: “Do you think that anything wil be lacking to a Christian, to a servant of God, to one devoted to good works, and to one precious in the sight of his Master? Shall he who feeds Christ not likewise be fed by Him? Shall earthly things be wanting to him, on whom divine and heavenly gifts are bestowed? Where do such unbelief and such impious and sacrilegious ideas spring from? How then can any be found in the house of God with so little confidence in Him? Does he who does not trust Christ absolutely deserve to be called a Christian? No, rather such a one should be named a Pharisee. For, as we read in the Gospel, the Pharisees, hearing our Lord teach the duty of giving alms and of making to ourselves friends of earthly goods, derided Him in their avarice. And even now we behold in the Church men who resemble the Pharisees, whose ears are closed and whose eyes are blinded, so that they can perceive no ray of the light of spiritual and salutary teaching. We have no reason then to wonder that such men hold the servants of God in contempt, when we know that the Lord Himself was despised.” These words point out, clearly that it is sacrilegious to say that they who abandon all things for the love of Christ, expose themselves to the risk of suicide.

(12.) Our answer to the twelfth objection, is that he who leaves all things for God does not incur any danger of dying of hunger. For Divine Providence will never abandon him: “I will not leave you, neither will I forsake you” (Hebr. xiii.). The Gloss thus comments on these words: “But in case any should say: ‘What are we to do if necessary help should fail us?’

the consoling words from the book of Joshua are added, ‘I will not fail you nor forsake you.’ A man who should die of hunger would certainly be forsaken; but, as this will never happen, let no one be covetous. For God speaks these words to every man that trusts in Him, as well as to Joshua.” He makes this promise to us on condition that we place our trust in Him. His words are not spoken to the avaricious nor to the covetous, but to “such as trust in God. It is not true to say that it is not lawful for a man to expose himself to danger; for a man may meritoriously expose himself to death for the name of Christ, even if it be possible for him to act otherwise. Thus, we read of many martyrs who, in the time of persecution, offered themselves to death by confessing their faith. If it were unlawful to expose oneself to peril, soldiers would not be justified in crossing the sea and incurring risks for the glory of God.

(13) To the thirteenth objection, we reply that a man is a master of his own, not of his neighbour’s property. He, therefore, injures another if he deprives him of what belong to him; but he does no injury to himself by sacrificing his own possessions. Hence Aristotle says (V Ethic) that “a man cannot, strictly speaking, commit an injustice against himself.” Furthermore, he who deprives his neighbour of what belongs to him, reduces him to involuntary poverty, which is dangerous. He who abandons his own possessions, accepts voluntary poverty which, if it is embraced for the love of God, is meritorious.

(14.) Our answer to the next objection is that our Lord reserved a certain sum of money for necessary uses out of condescension to the weak; just as, out of condesconsion to human infirmity, he willed to eat and to drink wine with the Pharisees. It must not then be reputed as superstition in the holy fathers in the desert, if they refused to keep money for their own use, or if they chose to abstain from wine or from delicate fare. The money which our Lord reserved was not his own private property; it had been given to Him as alms. For, we are told (Luke viii) that “certain women... ministered to Him out of their resources.

(15.) To the fifteenth objection, we likewise reply that, although the Apostles reserved certain sums for themselves and to distribute among those holy men who had made themselves poor for Christ, that money was not their own, but was given them by the faithful in charity. When we are told that there was none needy among them, we are not to conclude that the

Apostles and Christians of the early Church did not endure much poverty for the love of Christ. For, St. Paul says, (1 Cor. iv. 11), “Even to this hour we both hunger and thirst.” And again (2 Cor. vi. 4) “in much patience, in tribulations, in necessities” or, as the Gloss says, “want of food and clothing.” We must understand by these texts that the Apostles, in so far as they were able, supplied the poorer members of the community with such things as were needful to them.

(16.) To the sixteenth objection we reply that the prohibition given by our Lord to His disciples, “not to go into the way of the Gentiles,” was absolutely rescinded by Him after the resurrection; because it then became necessary for the Jews to preach the word of God to the Gentiles (Acts xiii.). But Christ did not, at the last supper, absolutely revoke His precept to the disciples to take nothing with them on the way. He only gave them a different order, which was to be obeyed during the time of persecution, when they would not have been able to procure the necessities of life. Hence the Gloss says on the text of St. Luke, xxii. 35), “When I sent you,” etc.: “The Apostles are not told to observe the same rule in time of persecution as in time of peace. For, when they were sent to preach, our Lord told them take nothing with them, for it was His will that those who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel. But, when His death was imminent, and the hour drew near when both the pastors and the flock should be exposed to persecution, He instituted a rule befitting the circumstances; and so He permitted His disciples to carry with them the means of sustenance till such time as the fury of their persecutors should have abated, and a fitting season for preaching the Gospel should have arrived.” “Thus,” the Gloss continues, “does Christ teach us that under certain circumstances, we are justified in relaxing the rigour of our rule.” We may, for example, when preaching in a hostile country, carry with us larger supplies than we should have at home. But the heretics who make the objection which it is our duty to combat, do not accept the Gloss. We shall, therefore, show by the text of the Scriptures that when the faithful increased in number, the disciples of Christ did not carry with them the means of support We read (3 John i. 5), “Dearly beloved, it is a loyal thing you do when you render any service to the brethren, especially to strangers.” Again, “ Because, for His name, they went out, taking nothing of the Gentiles, we therefore ought to receive such.” Now if the Apostles had carried supplies with them, it would not have been necessary for them to have been assisted by the faithful, even though the Gentiles had refused them any help. This is made still more clear by the words of the Gloss, “because for His name they went forth, forsaking their own possessions.”

(17.) The seventeenth objection is answered by the fact that the Church supports many that are sick; and that she could not do so without the possession of some material wealth. Hence it is right for a man to give up his own property and to hold that of the Church; and he should act this way, on account of the poor. But, it does not follow that it is not expedient for perfect men, who have sacrificed all that belongs to them, to lead a religious life in an order which possesses no common property. Apostolic perfection is not wanting to those who have possessions in common; but it appears more manifestly in those who relinquish their private property and have no property in common.

(18.) We reply to the eighteenth objection that the decree quoted by it does not forbid the choice of a life of poverty for the love of Christ. It is simply a precept commanding bishops and all in possession of ecclesiastical property, which belongs to the poor, to provide for the poor, as far as they can, and to assist them in their needs. This will be easily perceived by anyone who studies the context of the chapter.

(19.) Our answer to the nineteenth objection is that they who have relinquished all things for Christ, in the trust that He will provide for them, neither sin by presumption, nor do they tempt God. For, to have due confidence in God is not presumptuous nor is it tempting Him. Now the poor of Christ, especially the preachers of the truth, are bound to cherish this confidence in God. The Gloss says on the words in St. Luke (chap. x.), “Carry neither purse,” etc., “A preacher ought to have such trust in God that, even though he is not supplied with means to support him in this present life, he ought to be quite certain that necessary things will not be wanting to him, lest in his anxiety about temporal things, he fail to preach eternal truths.” Yes, unless he has this confidence in Providence, he is tempting God. On the words of 1 Cor. x, “neither let us tempt Him,” the Gloss says, “Let us not ask: ‘can God prepare a table in the desert?’” But we must distinguish between the cases in which this implicit confidence does or does not tempt God. There are certain dangers from which a man cannot be rescued save by miracle; and if he exposes himself to such perils he is tempting God. A person would tempt God if, in hopes of Divine protection, he should fling himself from a wall, unless, indeed, he had been miraculously forewarned that it was the will of God to save him from death. Such foreknowledge was givem to St, Peter when, at the command of Jesus, he walked upon the sea; to Blessed Martin, when he said, “Under your protection, not of helmet nor of shield, but of the sign of the Cross, I shall safely make my way through the ranks of the enemy”; to St. John the Evangelist when he courageously swallowed the poisoned draught; to St. Agatha, who said, “Carnal medicine for the body I have never taken; but I possess the Lord Jesus Christ who, by His word alone, restores all things.” There are other cases wherein a remedy is attainable by inferior means; and a man does not tempt God if, under such circumstances, he trusts Him entirely. Thus a soldier does not tempt God by going to battle, although he is uncertain as to the issue of the fight. Neither does someone tempt God who renounces for His sake all that he possesses, trusting both in Divine Providence and in the charity of the faithful for the supply of his necessities. Rather, he resembles a man who, seeing a bear approach, resigns, for some reasonable motive, his weapon of self-defence to armed, men whose duty and desire it is to defend him.

(20.) The answer to the twentieth objection, is that we are instructed to beg of God, to supply our temporal necessities, and that we ought not reject temporal assistance until we are provided with the food and clothing that we need.

(21.) The statute, quoted in the twenty-first objection, was drawn up in favour of the ministers of the Church. But, if any choose, as a work of supererogation, to serve the Church without stipend, they are so much the more praiseworthy in that they resemble St. Paul, who preached the Gospel without reward; he was a preacher ordained by God (1 Cor. ix.).

(22.) We reply to the twenty-second objection that although the holy Fathers have commended one course, they have not blamed the other. Therefore, it is not presumptuous, to follow this other course; else, it would not be lawful to introduce into the Church any new ordinance. Nevertheless, the mode of life of which we speak cannot be called new, as it was approved by many Saints, even in the primitive Church.

Our answer to the twenty-third objection, is that it is a duty for rich men to assist the needy. For, as St, John says, (1 Jn. iii.), “He who has the substance of this world, and sees his brother in need, and shuts up his bowels from him: how does the charity of God abide in him?” But it is even more praiseworthy if a man, besides sacrificing all his possessions, consecrates himself to God. This is truly Apostolic perfection. For, as St., Jerome says; “To offer oneself to God is a truly Christian act and worthy of the Apostles, who, having renounced all they had, offered themselves to the Lord “ (ad Lucinum Beticum).

CHAPTER 6

Is it Lawful for Religious to Live on Alms?

THE adversaries of Christian poverty strive to prevent its practice not only by raising objections against it, but by trying, indirectly, to abolish it entirely. They endeavour to deprive the poor of Christ of the means of subsistence, by teaching that it is not lawful for them to live on alms. They thus come under the category of those of whom the Preacher speaks, (Sirach xxxiv. 21), “The bread of the needy is the life of the poor; he who defrauds them of it is a man of blood.” They try to uphold their opinion by various arguments.

1. They quote the words of Deuteronomy (xvi. 19): “Do not show partiality or accept gifts [bribes]; for a gift blinds the eyes of the wise, and changes the words of the just.” Now alms are a species of gift; and as religious, above all other men, ought to have the eyes of the soul enlightened, they are not justified in living on alms.

2. “The borrower is servant to the one who lends” (Prov. xxii. 7). Much more then is he who accepts a gift the servant of him who gives it. Now it religious should be free from the bondage of the world, for they are called unto liberty of spirit. The Gloss, on the words (2 Thes. iii.), “That we might give ourselves a pattern for you,” observes: “Our religion calls men to freedom.” Therefore, religious ought not to live on alms.

3. Religious make profession of a state of perfection. Now it is a more perfect thing to give than to receive alms. Hence in the Acts of the Apostles (xx. 35) it is said: “It is a more blessed thing to give than to receive.” Therefore, religious ought, rather, to work with their hands, so that they may be able to give to the needy, instead of receiving from others alms, upon which they are to live.

4. St. Paul, writing to Timothy (1 Tim. v.), ordains that widows who have other means of subsistence, are not to live on the charity of the Church, lest they become a burden to her, and so make it difficult for her to support such as are widows indeed. Therefore, strong, able-bodied men ought to work for their living, and not to deprive the poor of the alms on which they depend for support. St. Jerome says (I, q. II cap. Clericos), “They who are able to live either on their patrimony or by means of their work, and yet accept alms, commit a sacrilege; and by their abuse of charity they eat and drink judgment to themselves.” Hence anyone who has other means of subsistence, and chooses to live on alms, must be reputed as guilty of sacrilege.

5. The Gloss commenting on the text of 2 Thes., “that we might give ourselves a pattern” etc., says: “ He who, in his indolence, constantly eats at the table of another must necessarily flatter his host.” Now they who live on charity often eat at the expense of their neighbour; they are, therefore, sure to become flatterers. It is sinful in them, therefore, to reduce themselves to a condition which obliges them to live on alms.

6. The acceptance of gifts cannot be an act of any virtue save of liberality, which is the mean between giving and receiving. But a liberal man only accepts in order to give, as Aristotle says (V. Ethic). Hence they who spend their lives in accepting live in a reprehensible manner. St. Augustine in his book De opere monachorum thus rebukes certain monks who wished to live on alms, instead of by work: “These brethren, rashly, in my opinion, assume that they have the right to live by the Gospel, instead of by the labour of their hands.” Yet, those whom he thus reproaches, as we know by St. Augustine’s own testimony, had renounced all things for the love of Christ, and devoted themselves to spiritual exercises, such as prayer, psalmody, reading and the Word of God. Hence they who leave all things for Christ, even if they be entirely occupied in spiritual concerns, ought not to live on alms.

7. We are told in St. Mark’s Gospel that “He commanded them that they should take nothing for the way but a staff only” (vi. 8). The Gloss remarks, “by a staff is signified the power of accepting necessary things from inferiors. But none but prelates have inferiors.” Hence those religious who are not prelates have no right to accept alms from the faithful.

8. Only those who labour have a right to the privileges of labour. Now the privilege granted by our Lord to those that preach the Gospel is that they shall live by the Gospel. This is confirmed by St. Paul (1 Cor. ix. and 2 Tim. ii.), “The farmer who labours ought first to partake of the fruits.” Therefore, those that do not preach the Gospel ought not to live on the charity of the faithful.

9. St. Paul refused to accept alms from the Corinthians, in order to take away occasion from false prophets (2 Cor. ii.). But there are still certain men who shamefully choose to live on charity; therefore, if only to set them a better example, religious ought not to accept alms. Hence St. Augustine in De operibus monachorum says, “You have the same grounds as had the Apostles to remove the occasion from those who seek occasion.”

10. St. Paul refused to accept charity from the Gentiles, in order to avoid giving them any scandal. Hence the Gloss says, on the words in Luke viii., “And many other women ministered to them”: “It was in those days customary among the Jews, and was not esteemed any fault, for women, of their own resources, to supply teachers with food and clothing. But, as the Gentiles might have taken scandal at this custom, St. Paul notes that for this reason he had abstained from accepting alms from them (1 Cor. ix.).” But many seculars nowadays are scandalized at the sight of religious who wish to live without manual labour. On this account, it is the duty of religions to refrain from receiving charity. St. Augustine, in De opere monachorum, says: “In your meditation let your fire flame forth that you may pursue their evil works by your own good deeds; so that you may take from them the occasion of riotous merrymaking, wherein your reputation suffers and scandal is given to those weak in the faith. Have pity, therefore, and compassion on other men; and show them that you do not eat the bread of idleness, but that you seek the Kingdom of God by a narrow and toilsome road.”

11. If religious who are well and strong may lawfully live on alms without manual labour, other men are justified in doing the same. But, if everyone pursue the same course, the human race will come to an end; for no one will be found to prepare what is necessary for the support of life. Hence it can by no means be counted lawful for strong and healthy religious to live on alms.

Our adversaries, seek likewise to prove that although religious may live on the alms offered to them, they have no right to beg.

1. We read in Deut. xv. 4, “There shall be no poor nor beggar among you.” Hence it is forbidden for anyone to beg, who can get his living by other means.

2. In Psalm xxxvi. 25, it is written: “I have not seen the just forsaken, nor his seed seeking bread.” Therefore, beggars are not the seed of the just man, i.e., of Christ.

3. A curse is not uttered in Holy Scripture against the just. But in Psalm cviii. 10 mendicity is accounted a curse: “Let his children be carried about vagabonds and beg.” Hence mendicity is not a state befitting perfect men.

4. St. Paul exhorts the Thessalonians (1 Thes. iv. 11), in the following terms: “Work with your own hands, at we commanded you: ...walk honestly towards those who are without; ...be dependent on nobody.” The Gloss adds: “Therefore should you work, and not live in idleness. This is honourable, and is as a light to unbelievers. You should not desire another man’s goods, you should neither ask for them, nor take them.” Hence it is plain that manual labour is preferable to begging.

5. St. Augustine thus comments on the words: “if amy man will not work,” etc.: “The servants of God ought to do some work, whereby they may earn a livelihood; so that they may not be compelled by necessity to beg.” Thus, we see that they are bound to manual labour rather than to mendicancy.

6. St. Jerome writes to Nepotian: “Let us never ask, and but rarely accept when we are pressed to do so. For it is more blessed to give than to receive.” The servants of God ought then neither to beg for, nor to accept the necessities of life.

7. The more severe the penalty inflicted, the more heinous, evidently, is the offence committed. This is laid down XXIV. q, I, “Let us not use unequal scales.” According to civil law, a sturdy beggar, if discovered, is sorely punished. For if he is of a servile condition, he is given over to be the slave of his accuser; if he is a freeman, he is condemned to be his perpetual servant (De mendicant. valid., lib. unica). Religious in robust health, therefore, sin by begging.

8. St. Augustine, in De opere monachorum, speaks thus of mendicant religious: “Our crafty enemy sends out hypocrites who, in the monastic

habit, roam from province to province. They bear no commission. They settle nowhere, and are never at rest. They beg for everything. They exact all things, either as the requirements of their lucrative poverty, or as the reward of their pretended sanctity."

9. That which naturally causes shame in man, is intrinsically disgraceful. For, as St. John Damascene says, we only blush for what is shameful. Now men are instinctively ashamed of begging; and the nobler a mans's nature, the more acutely he feels the disgrace of mendicancy. Thus St. Ambrose says (lib. de offic.) that shame at begging proves the nobility of a man. And Aristotle (V Ethics) says that a freeman is "not prone to beg." Mendicity then is in itself disgraceful; and no one ought to resort to it who can live by any other means.

10. The Gloss, on the words: "God loves a cheerful giver" (2 Cor. ix.), runs as follows: "He who gives in order to rid himself of the importunity of a beggar rather than to relieve the need of a poor man loses the merit of his alms. But charity is often thus bestowed on beggars; for they weary men by their persistence."

Our opponents likewise try to prove that even religious who preach ought not to beg nor to live on alms.

1. St. Paul says (1 Thess. ii.), "Neither have we used at any time the speech of flattery, as you know." Now preachers who beg and live on alms are obliged to flatter those whose charity they receive. The Gloss on the words, "and leaving them, he went out" (Matt. xxi) says: "For as He was poor and flattered none, He received hospitality from no one in the city, save from Lazarus." And yet, for this very cause, the preaching of our Lord was all the more powerful. For, as Luke tells us (xxi. 38), "the people came early in the morning to him in the temple, to hear him."

2. Again, St. Paul says (1 Cor. iv. 11), "Even to this hour we both hunger and thirst and are naked." On these words the Gloss makes the following comment: "Those who preach, the truth with sincerity and without flattery, and who reprove the vices of mankind are not favourably heard." Therefore, preachers ought not to ask for alms.

3. St, Paul says: (1 Thess. ii. 5), "Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness. God knows." Gloss observes hereon, "The Apostle does not say: 'I have not been covetous,' but 'I have neither said nor done anything that can be an occasion of covetousness.'" Preachers ought to be able to

speak in like manner. Those, however, who beg become, on the contrary, an occasion of covetousness to others.

4. Again, (2 Cor. xii. 14), St. Paul says, “ I will not be burdensome unto you. I do not seek the things that are yours, but you.” Likewise (Philip. iv. 17) he writes: “Not that I seek the gift, but I seek the fruit.” The Gloss says: “By the gift is meant the things given, such as money, food and the like; the fruit signifies the good works, and the upright intention of the giver.” True preachers then ought not to seek temporal gifts from their hearers. For this reason, the ought not to live by begging.

On the words: “the farmer who labours” etc. (2 Tim. ii.), the Gloss says: “The Apostle desires the evangelist to understand that he may accept that which is needful from them for whom he labours in God, whom he cultivates as a vinedresser tends his vine, and whom he feeds as a shepherd feeds his flock For to act thus is a right; it is not beggary.” Hence we see that those who preach the Gospel have a claim to live by it; and that they are not mendicants when they do so. But this right belongs only to prelates , and, therefore, other preachers ought not to live by the Gospel.

6. St. Paul (1 Cor. ix.), wishing to show that it was lawful for him to accept alms from the faithful, first proves that he is an Apostle. Those who are not Apostles, have no right to live by the charity of the faithful. Preaching religious, not being prelates, are not Apostles; therefore they do not have this right.

7. The Gloss, commenting on the words of 1 These. ii, “whereas we might have been burthensome to you as the Apostles of Christ,” says: “St. Paul points out the hypocrisy of the false prophets, by refusing to ask for the support which he might justly have claimed, in order to rebuke those who, although they had no right to ask for assistance, blushed not to do so. He speaks of this Apostolic claim to the alms of the faithful as “a burden,” in allusion to the false prophets who unlawfully usurped the right of asking for charity, and importunately urged their pretended claims.” It thus becomes plain that they who require the faithful to support them must, as they are not Apostles, be accounted to be false prophets. Therefore, preachers who are not prelates, ought not to beg.

8. Preachers who are not prelates either have, or have not, a right to be maintained by those to whom they preach. If they possess this right, they can enforce it by coercion. This idea is, of course, absurd. If they have no

right to such support, they are begging unlawfully and unjustly; and they ought, as we have just shown from the Gloss, to be counted as false prophets.

9. Prelates who receive from the laity tithes and offerings are bound to provide for their spiritual needs. Hence if others be commissioned by bishops to minister to the faithful and to receive alms from them, it is unfair to the people. For it is the bishops, and not the people, who ought to provide for the wants of those whom they send.

10. Prelates who commission others to preach are bound to supply their necessities (Extra de offic., ord. Inter caetera). If then the preachers demand offerings from their bearers, they are doing them an injustice; for they ought not to accept remuneration from them.

11. Our Lord says to the Pharisees (Matt. xxiii 14), "Woe to you scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, who devour the houses of widows, praying loug prayers." Those are equally reprehensible who beg for alms, under the pretext of praying, or preaching, or of any other act of the like nature.

12. Christ, when He sent forth His disciples to preach, said to them: "Into whatever city or town you shall enter, enquire who in it is worthy " (Matt. x. 11). The Gloss says on this verse, "We must choose our host by the testimony of his neighbours, lest his bad life should cause our preaching to be neglected." Again, "He is worthy to entertain us, who understands that thereby he receives, rather than confers, a favour." Hence it is highly reprehensible for preachers to condescend to wealthy sinners, and to those who do not esteem their abode with them to be a favour.

13. He who barters a spiritual for a temporal good commits the sin of simony, whether, like Giezi, he asks for a gift, or whether a gift be offered to him, like that which Elisha refused to accept from Naaman (4 Kings v.). The sin is equal, whether it be before or after the work that the gift is accepted (I, q. I. cap. Eos). Now he who preaches to the people exercises a spiritual ministry towards them. Hence a preacher should not accept their temporal gifts, whether he asks for them, or whether they offer them without being asked.

14. St. Paul says: "From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves" (1 Thes. v. 22). The Gloss adds: "If something appears to be wrong, although it be not actually wrong, do not do it impulsively." Now it has a bad appearance for a preacher to seek material assistance from those to whom

he preaches. Hence St. Paul said: “I seek not those things which are yours, but you” (2 Cor. xii). For, as the Gloss observes, “ the Apostle, lest he might seem to sell the Gospel, desired not gifts, but fruit.” In like manner, preachers ought not to beg for a livelihood from those to whom they preach.

Our opponents, also, attempt to prove that alms ought not to be given to religious.

1. They, quote the words from Luke (xiv. 13), “When you make a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame and the blind.” “From whom,” as the Gloss says, “there is nothing to be expected.” But you might gain something from strong and healthy beggars, who are often the parasites of rich men. Therefore, we ought not to give to the latter class of mendicant.

2. St. Augustine writes to Vincent the Donatist that “it is better to deprive a hungry man of food, than to give bread to one who, being sure of a livelihood, will forsake justice. For by succouring such a one, we connive at his evildoing.” Now he who will not work for his living when he is able, or he who can get food in a lawful manner without begging and yet prefers to beg, acts unjustly. Hence alms should not be bestowed upon him.

3. The Gloss on the words, “ Give to every one who asks of you,” (Luke vi.) says, “Give him what he wants or a reproof.” Again, on the words, “Give to him who asks you” (Matt. v.), the Gloss says: “Give in such a way as to injure neither yourself nor another. For justice should be balanced. Thus, you should give to every one who asks you, if not what he asks for, then some better thing, namely, a rebuke for asking wrongfully.” Now as we have shown, he who prefers begging to manual labour begs unjustly; and he deserves reproof rather than alms.

4. St. Augustine, in his letter to the Donatist Vincent, says, “The evil have often persecuted the good, and the good have persecuted the evil. The evil persecuted the good by injustice; and the good persecute the bad by correction.” Hence for the sake of correction, the good may persecute the bad; and to deprive them of food is a species of correction. Now sturdy beggars sin, even though they preach; and therefore, they ought to be deprived of food.

6. St. Ambrose (I De offic.) says: “In giving charity, we must take into consideration the age of the one who asks of us, his health and the boldness with which he begs. For shame in asking for alms often betrays the nobility of him who asks. We must give more abundantly to the aged, who cannot

gain a living by the labour of their hands. The sick, likewise should be promptly relieved; and those who have fallen form wealth into poverty, not by their own fault, but through robbery or proscription or calumny.” Now robust beggars are neither infirm in health nor shamefaced; neither have they lost their property through robbery or proscription. Therefore they should not be helped by charity.

6. Alms should be given for the purpose of relieving indigence; and the greater the distress, the greater should be our liberality. But those who cannot work for their living and cannot get support by any other means are in much greater straits than are they who are able to obtain a livelihood. As long, therefore, as we find indigent persons belonging to hte first category, we should not give to those belonging to the second.

7. Alms-giving is a work of mercy. Therefore it is to be performed only in behalf of those in need. Now those who voluntarily reduce themselves to beggary are not in need. It is only those that are compelled to suffer penury who can be said to be in want. Aristotle says (III Ethics): “What is involuntary deserves forgiveness.” Hence alms are not to be bestowed on voluntary mendicants.

8. St. Augustine says (I De doctr. Christ.): “As you cannot assist all, you should help those who are most closely bound to you by time or place or by some other circumstance.” Now our closest ties are to our neighbours and our kinsfolk. Therefore, as long as any of our friends are in need, we must not give alms to strangers.

The errors which we have noted are no novelty. They appeared in the very early days of the Church. In 3 John iii we read, “Diotrephes, who loves to have pre-eminence among them, does not receive us.” Again, “and as if these things were not enough for him, neither does he himself receive the brethren,” i.e., “the needy,” as the Gloss explains. “And those who do receive them he banishes and casts out of the church,” i.e., “for fear that they should help the needy he does not let them go to their usual place of meeting” (Gloss). Another commentary on the same text says “You ought to persevere in almsgiving, for it is a work so profitable that I would have written in its praise not only to you, but to the whole Church. But this desire I was constrained to leave unfulfilled; for Diotrephes cares not for our authority.”

Diotrephes, a heresiarch of the primitive times of the Church, taught, as we see from the text and the Gloss, that humanity has no claim on our care, and that we should not assist pilgrims who have left their own possessions. Vigilantius revived this heresy, as we learn from the Epistle of St. Jerome to Riparius and Desiderius against Vigilantius. In this Epistle he writes: “Further, I am informed, by the same epistles that contrary to the authority of the Apostle Paul, also of Peter, and of John and James, who held out to Paul and Barnabas the right hand of communication and commanded them to be mindful of the poor, that you forbid any sums to be sent to Jerusalem, for the benefit of the needy.”

In combating these errors we shall proceed in the following manner:

1. We shall prove that those who are poor because they have given up everything for God may live on alms.

2. We shall show that preachers, even though they be not prelates, may, when commissioned by bishops to preach, accept the charity of the faithful to whom they preach.

3. That, even though they are in robust health, they may beg.

4. That they have a special right to the alms of the faithful.

5. We shall confute the arguments brought in support of the contrary propositions.

1. The fact that those who are poor because they have renounced all things for Christ have a right to live on alms is proved by the example of St. Benedict. He, as St. Gregory tells us (2 Diolog.), lived for three years in a cave after he left his parents’ house, dependent on the ministry of the monk Romanus. He was in sound health, but we do not read that he worked for his living.

2. In I. q. II. Cap. Sacerdos, it is laid down that “he who has either renounced all his property in favour of his kinsfolk, or has distributed it to the poor, or given it to the Church, and has thus, for love of poverty, made himself poor, is not only free from the guilt of covetousness if he accept assistance from the faithful; but that he may laudably do so, in order thereby to assist the poor, while he himself lives in voluntary poverty.” It is thus evident that a man who has renounced all things for Christ, may live on the charity of the faithful.

3. A man is bound rather to sacrifice some good, which he may relinquish without sin, than to commit sim If then they who are in robust health sin by

taking alms, they ought to relinquish every other occupation, however good, rather than accept charity. This proposition is false, as we see by the words of St. Augustine in De opere monachorum. The Saint says that “those servants of God who work with their hands ought to have some time set apart in which to rest from labour, and to commit to memory what they ought to know. They ought, he says, to be assisted by the good offices of the faithful, in order that at the times devoted to learning, they may dot be depressed by want.” St. Augustine thus shows that, in his opinion, monks ought not to be entirely dependent on labour for their daily bread; otherwise no opportunity would be afforded them for spiritual exercises.

4. In the same work, St. Augustine, referring to a certain rich man who had given all his wealth to a monastery, says that “he performed a good work by labouring with his hands, in order to give an example; although, by the benefit which he had conferred on the community, he had a right to be supported by it. For, had he been unwilling to work, who would have dared to urge him to do so?” Hence we see that he who bestows his substance on a monastery, has a right to live in that monastery without manual labour. But the Saint further remarks that as all Christians form one republic, it is of no consequence to which section of the commonwealth each one gives his money, nor from whom he derives support. Hence they who have left all things for Christ may accept the necessities of life from anyone.

6. The intention of refraining from a deed, bad in itself, does not diminish the intrinsic evil of the deed, though it may lessen the sin committed. If, therefore, it is in itself sinful for a man who is able to work to live on alms, those who, although in good health, intend to live for a time on charity, intending at other times to live by other means, cannot be excused from sin. Pilgrims, therefore, who beg on their pilgrimages, commit sin. Sin is likewise committed by those who enjoin pilgrimages. This supposition is of course absurd.

6. It is more meritorious in a man to devote himself to divine contemplation than to the study of philosophy. Some men, however, do, without sin, live for a time on charity in order to pursue such study. Therefore, it is permissible for others to live for a time on alms, in order to devote themselves to divine contemplation. But, it is more praiseworthy in a man to consecrate himself perpetually to contemplation than temporarily to

study. Consequently it is lawful for men to set aside manual labour and to live, absorbed in contemplation, on the alms of the faithful.

7. Christian charity forms a closer bond than does political friendship. Now if anyone makes me a present, I am justified in making any use of it that I choose. It is then even more permissible for me to live by the things that are given me, for the love of Christ.

8. If it be lawful to accept what is greater, it is still more allowable to receive that which isless. But religious are permitted to receive a certain income (mille marcharum) and to live on it without manual labour. Were such not the case, many communities that are in possession of large properties would be in a state of damnation. For the same reason, many of the secular clergy who have no care of souls, live on ecclesiastical possessions, which are the gifts of the faithful. Hence it is absurd to say that poor religious may not accept small alms and live thereby, without manual labour.

9. The poor who are unable to work are more grossly defrauded, if what is their due is given to others, than if those others receive what they have a claim to. Now the income of ecclesiastical property is intended be given to the poor (XII, quaest. I, cap. Videntes). Hence it is laid down (I, quaest. II, cap. Clericus & cap. Si quis) that “clerics who can live on their own patrimony cannot, without sin, live on the goods of the Church, which are destined for the support of the poor.” Hence a greater injustice is committed against the poor, if those who, although in good health, do no manual labour, and yet live on ecclesiastical property, than if the poor of Christ live by the private offerings of the faithful, which are not the right of the poor. If those in the first category do not defraud the poor, those who are in the second most certainly do not do so. In our treatise on manual labour will be found many other arguments in proof of the same point.

Our next task will be to show that preachers, although, they be not prelates, may accept for their maintenance alms from those to whom they preach.

1. St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor. ix. 7), “Who ever serves as a soldier at his own charges? Who plants a vineyard and does not eat of its fruit? Who feeds the flock and does not eat of the milk of the flock?” St. Paul alleges these examples (as the Gloss remarks) in order to prove that the Apostles did not claim more than was their due if, according to the precept

of our Lord, they who preached the Gospel lived by it, and likewise freely accepted the charity of those to whom they freely ministered. Now it is quite certain that a soldier, and a vinedresser, and a herdsman, ought to live by the fruit of their toil. Therefore, as not only prelates, but all preachers, labour to announce the Gospel, they have a right to accept the means of subsistence from those among whom they labour.

St. Paul likewise maintains that the Apostles has a right to accept temporal assistance from those to whom they ministered spiritual good. For it is not out of order for him who gives great things to receive small things in exchange. To quote St. Paul's own words, "If we have sown for you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things? (1 Cor. ix. 2). "Now the spiritual truths taught by prelates are proclaimed, equally by all preachers bearing an episcopal commission. There is therefore no reason why they, as well as prelates, should not accept material means of support.

3. In the first Chapter of the Epistle just quoted, St. Paul likewise says: "The Lord has ordained that they who preach the Gospel should also live by the Gospel." The Gloss observes: "The reason why this command was given was to render preachers more diligent in their office. "Now all (not only prelates) whose duty it is to preach ought to be zealous in so doing. Therefore, the rule laid down by our Lord applies not only to prelates, but to all who preach the word of God. This is plain by the very words of St. Paul. He does not say, "all who have ordinary authority to preach," but, "those who preach the Gospel."

4. When our Lord sent forth His disciples to preach, He said: "Remain in the same house, eating and drinking such things as they have. For the labourer is worthy of his hire." This passage proves that preachers earn their living, as payment due to them, from those to whom they preach The following observation from, the Gloss renders this proposition still more clear. "A preacher is entitled to two rewards for his one work. One reward he receives on earth, in the support afforded to him in his labour; the other reward awaits him in heaven, in a glorious resurrection." Now reward is due not to power, nor to authority, nor to habit, but to deed; for deeds alone are meritorious. Aristotle says (I Ethic.): "As in the Olympian games, the crown was given not to the strongest nor to the noblest, but to those who fought most strenuously and who, therefore, were victorious; so they are rightly deemed the most illustrious who in life have done the best and

bravest deeds.” St, Paul again says: “he... is not crowned, unless he strives lawfully.” They, therefore, whether prelates or not, who legitimately preach the Gospel, may lawfully live by it (2 Tim. 11. 5).

5. They who are sent by bishops to preach, labour more than do the others of the order from which they are sent, or than they who, at the bidding of a bishop, send them. But it is lawful for the rest of an order to live on the alms given to its preachers, even though those preachers be not prelates. This is proved by the following words: “It has pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a contribution for the poor saints that are in Jerusalem. For it has pleased them, and they are their debtors. For, if the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things” (i.e., according to the Gloss, “partakers of the spiritual advantages of the Jews who had sent them preachers from Jerusalem”), “they ought also in carnal things to minister to them” (Rom xv. 26). Now by the “poor” of whom St. Paul here speaks, we cannot understand the Apostles. For, as they were only twelve in number, and were content with little, they did not need a collection to be made for them in all the Churches, especially as we know that they were supported by those to whom they preached (1 Cor. ix). Hence all preachers, even though they are not bishops, but are sent by bishops, have a right to live by the Gospel.

6. They who, by episcopal commission, are employed in preaching are of far greater use to bishops in spreading the word of God, than are they who are engaged in other functions of the ministry. Now prelates who preach may accept alms, not only for themselves, but for their households. More justly then may they who preach by episcopal commission, accept from the faithful the means of subsistence.

7. He who gives to another gratis what he is not obliged to give, has as good a right to take a reward as he who does merely what he is obliged to do. Now it is a bounden duty for bishops to minister to their flocks in spiritual matters. For, as St. Paul says: “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for an obligation lies on me; for woe to me if I do not preach the Gospel” (1 Cor. ix, 16). They therefore who are not prelates, and have not the responsibility of a flock, are justified in accepting material assistance from those to whom they preach.

8. St. Augustine says in De opere monachorum: “ If they (i.e., religious) are preachers of the Gospel, I admit their right,” i.e. to live on the alms of

the faithful. But these words apply not only to prelates, but to all who can preach, even to deacons. Hence St. Paul says (Eph. iv. 11): “He gave some Apostles, and some prophets, and some evangelists, and some others pastors and doctors.” The Apostle thus draws a distinction between Evangelists and Pastors and Apostles, by which term we are to understand prelates. Hence all preachers, be they prelates or not, may live by the Gospel.

9. Preaching is the noblest of all ecclesiastical functions.”Our Lord declared that this was the purpose of His coming into the world. “For this was I sent” (Luke iv. 43). Isaiah also, speaking in the person of Christ, says: “He sent me to preach to the meek” (Isa. lxi. 1). St. Paul likewise says: “Christ sent me not to baptise, but to preach the Gospel” (1 Cor. i. 17). Now they who are engaged in the business of the Church ought not to work with their hands, but to live on the property of the Church, as St. Augustine says (De opere Monach.), speaking of himself. This rule applies much more forcibly to those engaged in preaching, who have every right to live by the Gospel, instead of by manual labour.

10. The office of a preacher is more useful to the community than is that of a lawyer. But lawyers may, from the legitimate exercise of their profession, earn a livelihood. Therefore, preachers, may, if their preaching be authorised, live by means of it, whether they be prelates or not.

11. Although alms cannot be given out of money made by usury, preachers may, nevertheless, accept alms from money thus gained, provided they cannot, without so doing, remain in a place inhabited by usurers. The reason for this concession is that preachers, by inducing usurers to restore their illgotten gains, are directing the affairs of those to whom this money is due. This is distinctly established in the decretal Extra de sent. excom., cap. cum voluntate. But preachers are, in like manner, occupied with the affairs of all men, both rich and poor, when they urge the rich to give alms to the poor and to perform other salutary works. Hence they are justified in accepting alms from those to whom they preach.

12. We see that in mechanical trades, it is not they only who work with their hands who live by the trade, but the architect who directs their labour profits by it likewise. Now the man who teaches morals is, so to speak, the architect of all human duties (I Ethic.). Therefore, preachers have a right to live by their preaching, even though they do not work with their hands.

13. Health of soul is to be preferred before health of body. Physicians live without manual labour by giving advice to their patients. Therefore those who are engaged about the spiritual welfare of others have a right to accept alms for their maintenance, even though they do not labour with their hands.

Our next task will be to show that preachers may not only live by alms freely offered to them, but that they may likewise beg for charity.

1. This is proved by the example of Christ, speaking in whose person the Psalmist says: “But I am a beggar and poor” (Ps. xxxix. 18). The Gloss remarks on this text: “Christ speaks thus of Himself in the form of a servant.” Again: “A beggar is one who asks from another; a poor man one who has not enough for himself.”

2. In Ps. lxix. 6, we find the words: “But I am needy and poor.” On which the Gloss says: “I am needy”; i.e., begging, and poor, i.e., “I do not have te means to support myself.” He who speaks thus owns no material wealth; and, having spiritual riches, he ever desires more, craves for it, and receives it.

3. In Ps. lviii. 6 we read: “He persecutes the poor man and the beggar,” i.e. “ Christ,” as the Gloss expounds it. Another commentary says: “It is pure malice to persecute the poor. Rich men may sometimes suffer persecution on account of their position or wealth.” Both these commentaries show that the words of the Psalm are understood as being an allusion to material poverty.

4. St. Paul says (2 Cor. viii. 9): You know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ that, being rich, He became poor for your sakes,” i.e., “in the world” (Gloss). That the poverty of Christ ought to be imitated is proved by the Gloss in the following words: “Let no one despise himself. He who inhabits a poor dwelling is rich in conscience, and he sleeps more peacefully on the ground, than the wealthy man can rest amidst his gold and purple. Fear not then in your misery, to approach Him who has put on our poverty.”

5. our Lord asked for hospitality. We know this by His words to Zacchaeus: “ Come down quickly; for today I must abide in your house” (Luke xix. 5). The Gloss says: “He offers Himself, although He has not been invited. For He knew the disposition of Zacchaeus’ heart, although he had uttered no word of invitation.

6. We read in St. Mark xi. “Having viewed all things round about, when now the eventide was come.” The Gloss understands these words to mean: “ having looked all around Him to see if any would offer Him hospitality. For He was so poor and so carefully avoided flattering any man that He found none to shelter Him in all that large city.” Hence we see that the poverty of our Lord was so extreme that He possessed nothing with which to hire a lodging, but sought and hoped for hospitality from others. It is, therefore, blasphemous to say that it is unlawful to beg.

7. The same lesson is taught by the example of the Apostles. They were instructed by our Lord not to take with them on their way what they needed for their journey (Matt. x, Mark vi, Luke ix). They could not have taken what they needed as a right; they must, therefore, have begged for it.

8. Again, the same fact is made evident by the conduct of the Apostles after the resurrection of Christ. St. John says (3 Eph. v. 7.): “For his name, they went out” (“away,” as the Gloss expresses it), “taking nothing from the Gentiles.” Hence they went forth without the necessities of life. These, therefore, they must have gained by begging,

9. A man is more strictly bound to provide for himself than for others. Now the Apostles asked for alms for “the poor of the saints who were in Jerusalem.” If then it be lawful to beg for our brethren, it is equally right to do so for ourselves.

10. The example of St. Alexis shows that mendicancy is permissible. This Saint, having renounced all things for the love of Christ, lived not by work, but by begging. He asked for alms even from the servants whom his father sent to seek him; and he thanked God that he received chanty from them. His sanctity was made known by a voice from Heaven. This voice was heard by the Pope, by the Emperors Arcadius and Honorius, and by the people of Rome assembled in the basilica of St. Peter. The voice announced that the preservation of Rome was due to the merits of Alexis. After the death of the Saint, his fame was spread by means of many miracles; and he was canonised. His feast is solemnly observed by the whole Roman Church.

11. St. Jerome, writing to Oceanus in praise of Fabiola, says of her that “she desired to sacrifice her riches and to live on charity.” Had this wish been sinful on her part, she could not have been commended for it.

12. What is unlawful cannot be imposed by this Church as a penance. But for certain grave offences, a sinner may be enjoined to make a pilgrimage

and to beg his way. Hence mendicancy is not sinful, but may be a penitential exercise. It may, therefore, be practised, together with other works of penance, for the love of God, and as a means to perfection.

13. As vigils, fasting and suchlike macerations of the flesh are employed as means to combat concupiscence, so everything that tends towards humiliation diminishes pride, which is as much to be avoided as lust, since, as St. Gregory says, spiritual sins are the more heinous. Now no penitential exercise can be more humiliating than mendicancy, for man is naturally ashamed of begging. Hence as fasting and watching, regarded in the light of bridles to concupiscence, pertain to the state of perfection; mendicancy likewise, embraced for the love of Christ and for the sake of humility, pertains to the same state.

14. Again, the charity of Christ is more liberal than is the friendship of the world. Now even in human friendship, friends make no difficulty about asking each other for what they need, particularly in cases where some return can be made for what is given. The form in which such return is made is of no consequence, as the philosopher says (V Ethic.). Hence it is permissible for a man, even though he be in good health, to ask for the love of God for what he needs, especially as he can make a return to the donor by prayers and spiritual works.

15. It is lawful to ask another for a favour, if, by so doing, we give him a chance of improving his condition. Now by giving alms, a man betters his condition by meriting eternal life. Hence it cannot be unlawful to ask for charity.

16. The needs of the poor cannot be relieved unless they be known; and they cannot be known unless they be revealed. Hence if it is right for any to be in a state of destitution, it is right for them to beg for what they need. But, as we have already proved, it is lawful for men to reduce themselves to such poverty for the love of God that even (as St. Augustine says in De opere monachorum) their manual labour does not suffice to support them. It is, therefore, justifiable in them to beg.

We shall now prove that it is right to give alms to mendicant religious.

1. St. John says (3 John), “Dearly beloved, do faithfully whatever you do for the brethrens and for strangers.” He immediately points out to whom he refers by saying: “For his name they went out” (i.e., “ leaving their own possessions,” Gloas). And again, “We, therefore, ought to receive such.”

The Gloss here remarks: “John had renounced all things, but he speaks of himself as belonging to the number of the rich, in order to make those whom he addresses more prompt and more ready in helping the needy.” Hence it is praiseworthy to give alms to those who, for the love of Christ, live without possessions of their own.

2. We read in Matt. x. 41, “He who receives a just man in the name of a just man shall receive the reward of a just man.” The Gloss remarks that “on this account he is called just.” The Gloss also adds, “Someone may therefore say: ‘We shall thus receive false prophets, and the traitor Judas.’ But the Lord, foreseeing this objection, says not that persons are to be received but their names; and that he who receives another shall not be deprived of a reward on account of the unworthiness of the object of his charity.” Hence we must conclude that alms are to be given to those who bear, even though unjustly, the name of sanctity.

3. St. Paul (Rom. xv.) praises the faithful of Macedonia and Achaia for their resolution to make a collection for the poor among the saints. The Gloss remarks hereon: “These men devoted themselves wholly to the Divine service, heeding no worldly matters, and caring only to set an example of holy living to those who believed.” The Achaians and Macedonians had made a collection for these good men; and St. Paul invites the Romans to do the same. Hence we see that alms may be given to the poor of Christ.

4. The Gloss says, commenting on the words (2 Cor. vii), “let your abundance supply their want,” i.e., “the want of those who have renounced all earthly things.” These words are a further confirmation of the opinion which we have already expressed.

5. Again, on the words, “But you, brethren, be not weary of well doing” (1 Thes. iii. 14), the Gloss observes that “‘well doing’ here signifies doing good to the poor.” Another commentary says: “Because, although they work, they are still in need of certain things. Thus, St. Paul warns the faithful that if they have the means of supplying the necessities of the servants of God, they should not be remiss in so doing.” A man cannot be blamed for generosity; he, only, deserves a rebuke who, while able to work, prefers to lead an idle life. Hence it is praiseworthy to give alms to the servants of God, whether they work or not, even though they may be to. blame for not working.

6. St. Jerome says, when writing against Vigilantius: “We do not deny that if anyone is able to do so and is generously minded, he may give alms to all poor men, even to Samaritans and Jews. The Apostle teaches that charity is to be given to all men, but chiefly to those who are of the household of the Faith. It is of such that our Lord says: ‘Make friends with the mammon of iniquity, who will receive you into everlasting dwellings.’ But can these poor persons, whose physical degradation corresponds with their mental depravity, receive us into everlasting dwellings, when they possess no home at the present time and have no hope of any habitation in the future? It is not simply the poor, but the poor in spirit, that are called ‘blessed.’ And it is of such that the Psalmist writes: ‘Blessed is the man who understands concerning the needy and the poor’ (Ps. xi.). In order to succour the ordinary poor, alms are necessary, not understanding. In order to assist the holy poor mentioned in the beatitude, there must be intelligence, in order that alms may be given to him who is grieved and ashamed to accept them, and who, reaping material advantage, sows spiritual good.” Hence we see that it is better to give alms to the poor who are holy than to any others.

7. On the words, “he has dispersed abroad, he has given to the poor,” (2 Cor. ix.), the Gloss thus comments: “If the reward of him who gives to the poor is great, how much greater shall be the prize awarded to him who ministers to the saints? For anyone may be poor, even though he be wicked.” This is a further argument, in favour of the opinion that we have just expressed.

8. St. Jerome comments thus on the words: “Let him who is instructed in the word communicate to him who instructs him” (Gal. vi. 6): “St. Paul commands that were infirm disciples and carnal men, to contribute to the material needs of the masters from whom they have received spiritual instruction, and who, being entirely devoted to study, lack the necessities of life.” Hence we see that alms are to be given not to such as work with their hands, but to those that are engaged in the study of the Scripture.

9. St. Jerome likewise writes to Paulinus : “He is rather to be considered a courtier than a monk, who always, or often, talks of money, and who takes no heed of the alms which belong to all.” From which words it is evident that alms are to be given to monks and to all others, and that monks have a right to speak of asking for charity.

10. We read in decret. dist. xlii: “If any man contemn those who faithfully prepare the agapes, or banquets of the poor, and call the brethren together for the glory of God, and despises the work they do, let such an one be anathema.” It is, therefore, a crime worthy of excommunication, to condemn the practice of almsgiving.

11. We read in Prov. xxi. 13: “He who stops his ear against the cry of the poor shall also cry himself, and he shall not be heard.” The Gloss observes: “These words refer to the poor considered generally, not only to the sick or destitute. For he who prefers to judge his neighbour, rather than to pity his sinfulness, shows that he himself is not free from guilt, nor worthy to be beard by the Divine mercy.” Alms then are to be given to all who are poor, even though they are in robust health.

12. On the words of Ps. ciii: “Bringing forth grass for cattle, and herbs for the service of men,” the Gloss says: “The, earth, being fertile, was able to provide grass (i.e., material subsistence) for cattle (i.e., for Preachers), in order that they who preach the Gospel may live by the Gospel. If the earth does not bring forth this temporal support for preachers it is barren. If it produces these material good things it is bearing fruit.” And again: “Preachers have a right to material assistance, since they impart spiritual gifts. It is of these that it is written: ‘Blessed is he who anticipates the voice of him who asks.’ You should not act towards the ox that treads the grain as you act towards the beggar who passes by. You give to the one who asks, for you have read, ‘Give to him who asks of you!’ But you should likewise give to him who does not ask.” Again, the Gloss says: “Give to every one who asks, whoever he may be, recognising in his person Him to Whom you give. But, much more, give to the servant of God, the soldier of Christ, who does not ask.” Hence we see that if we are to bestow alms on all the poor, even on those who do not beg for them, preachers ought in an especial manner to be assisted by those who hear them.

13. In St. Luke xvi. 9 we read: “Make yourselves friends with the mammon of iniquity.” Here the Gloss remarks : “This text does not refer to the poor indiscriminately, but to those who can receive us unto everlasting dwellings.” Now the poor of Christ, beyond all others, can receive us into everlasting dwellings, for they, together with Christ, will be our judges. Therefore, it is especially to these that we should give alms.

We must now reply to the objections of our opponents.

1. To the argument that “temporal possessions blind the eyes of the wise,” we reply that temporal possessions may be understood in a twofold sense. First they may be considered as hoarded up. Now to accept them in order thus to treasure them is an act of covetousness which blinds the eyes of the soul and causes it to decline from justice. But temporal things may also be accepted in order to supply necessary food and clothing; and to accept them for this reason is not cupidity and does not blind the eyes of the soul. This distinction is grounded on the words of St. Paul (1 Tim. vi. 8): “Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.” The Gloss remarks: “He who goes beyond that finds what is evil.” Hence it is added: “For those who would become rich fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil.”

2. There are two kinds of slavery, namely, the slavery of fear and the slavery of love. He who accepts gifts from cupidity is enslaved by fear; for the things acquired by cupidity are possessed in fear. Now we ought to be free from this servitude and we ought to be the servants of Christ. For, as St. Paul says (Rom. viii. 15), “You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear.” They who accept gifts in charity are the bondsmen of love, and the servants of Christ are not free from this bondage. Hence St. Paul says (2 Cor. iv. 5), “We preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ our Lord, and ourselves your servants, through Jesus.” Hence he who, in order to fulfil the duties of charity, accepts alms for his bodily sustenance, incurs not a bondage unworthy of the servants of Christ, but only such as befits the servants of the Lord.

S. The act of giving is, in itself, more meritorious than that of receiving. Hence Aristotle says (IV Ethic.), “The act of liberality is greater in giving than in receiving, although a liberal man may both give and receive. There is nothing, however, to prevent the act of receiving from being, at times, from some special circumstance, the more commendable. It would then although exceptionally, be more praiseworthy than that of giving.” If then nothing is considered in a poor man, save the fact that he accepts charity, the rich man who gives the alms, is more blessed than the poor man who receives it, But circumstances may render the recipient of charity more meritorious, than the giver. Thus a man who, for the love of Christ, has made himself voluntarily poor and accepts alms is more blessed than the rich man who bestows the gift. Hence the Gloss remarks: “The Lord does not prefer rich men who give alms to the poor who have renounced all for His sake; but He gives the greatest glory to those who, after forsaking all their possessions, labour with their hands in order to have something to give to those in need.” Now this conduct is certainly very commendable in those who are not engaged in more important occupations. And, it would be most perfect, if religious, without detriment to such occupation could, as we have before said, perform some manual labour and give their earnings in charity. But religious are not bound to do everything that is perfect; they are only bound to accomplish what their vows oblige them to.

4. It is no burden to the Church if religious live on alms, seeing that although they produce great fruits in the Church, their wants are very small. In fact, such religious do, in reality, lighten the expenses of the Church; for they perform at very small cost labour for which others, who are not satisfied with so little, would require much larger sums. Neither do mendicant orders deprive the poor of their rights; for, by their counsel and influence, much larger sums are given to the poor than they themselves receive. And further, these religious before entering their monastery, gave away all their goods to the poor, who have thus received far more than the alms bestowed on mendicant orders.

5. The decree cited in this objection is misquoted. This is evident by the words of Gratian, given in the next chapter. These authorities forbid the Church to receive not such as were originally rich but left all things, as did Peter, Matthew and Paul, or who, like Zwehaeus, distributed their goods to the poor, or presented them to the Church, as did the early Christians who sold all that they had, and laid the price at the feet of the Apostles. What is forbidden to the Church is to receive those who, while living in the house of their parents, or refusing to sacrifice their patrimony, desire at the mine time to enjoy ecclesiastical benefices.

6. St. Augustine speaks of those religious who live idle lives and, being of no use to those who maintain them, are forced to gain their bread by flattery. For no one will support a useless person unless his favour be secured by adulation. But those religious to whom charity is extended for the love of Christ and who, in exchange for material assistance, confer spiritual benefits, have no need to flatter their benefactors. For those who relieve them do so for the love of Christ, who has said, “he who receives you, receives Me” (Matt. x. 40). Now as the Gloss says, “nothing is

received in the Apostles save what is in Christ.” Hence they who, for the love of God, become poor, and beg and live on alms need not resort to flattery. Those who are really driven to servility and adulation are wealthy sycophants who, in order to preserve and increase their riches, are obliged to flatter the sovereigns on whom, they depend. Thus St. Chrysostom writes, (super Matth.): “Princes and soldiers and subjects are obliged to flatter, and to stand in need of many things. They are reduced to ignominious servility; they live in fear; hence they are exposed to the suspicion and calumny of those that envy them. Far other is the lot of the poor.”

7. It is true that to receive is not an act of liberality (excepting in so far as receiving stands in relation to giving). But, in those who, for the love of Christ, have made themselves poor, it is an act of humility to accept as alms the necessities of life; and humility is a greater virtue than liberality.

8. St. Augustine, in the place quoted in the objection, had two reasons for rebuking monks who desired to live on alms. First, he reproved them for failing into the error of believing manual labour to be contrary to the evangelical precept: “Be not solicitous for your body” (Matt. vi. 25). Secondly, he reproached them for the sloth which caused them to desire to escape from the laborious lives which they had led in the world. He says that it by no means suits artisans to be idle in a life where senators work hard. He does not, however, forbid those who in the world lived on their own income, or those occupied in ecclesiastical offices, to live on alms after the example of the early Christians of the Church of Jerusalem. This is plain to anyone who will read his words with care. Religious are not forbidden to live like poor men on alms, even though they cannot, by preaching, claim a right to do so. For charity is given with a different intention to the preacher and to the mendicant, as the Gloss observes on the words in Ps. cxiii., “bringing forth grass for cattle.”

9. Prelates who preach the Gospel have, as we have said, a right to accept the necessities of life from their subjects. For recompense is due not to power or authority, but to labour. Likewise, when religious preach by episcopal authority, it stands to reason that they must be assisted by those to whom they minister. But there are other reasons which make it fitting that religious should have their wants supplied by the charity of the faithful. They have left all things for Christ. They minister at the altar, and the Holy

sacrifice profits all men. They also devote themselves to the study of Holy Scripture, to prayer, to contemplation, and to other spiritual exercises which are all beneficial to the whole Church.

10. There is nothing inconsistent in the fact that one man accepts assistance as his due, and that another receives it as a favour and charity. The alms given to a preacher are but the just return for his labour; but assistance may be rendered to all poor men, not as their due recompense, but out of a spirit of charity.

11. More harm was done in the Church by the teaching of the false prophets, from whom St. Paul, by labouring with his hands, took away the occasion of living on the charity of the faithful, than was done by the Apostle’s supporting himself by his own labour. Now on the contrary, the Church derives profit from the example of humility set by the mendicant orders who live on alms and devote themselves to the salvation of souls instead of to manual labour. This advantage outweighs the harm done by a few men who live on charity as an excuse for their sloth. There is, therefore, no reason why the poor of the Church should cease to receive alms, in order to take away the occasion of those who make bad use of them.

12. It was the custom amongst the Jews that their teachers should be maintained by the people. At the preaching of the Gospel, this custom became general among the faithful. When the Gentiles were first converted, the Apostles refused to ask or accept assistance from them, fearing lest they might take scandal. There is now, however, no reason to fear such scandal. Indeed, the example of moderation in food and clothing set by religious, is a subject rather of edification than of scandal. They who profess to be scandalized at the sight of religious accepting alms are like the Pharisee who, as we are told in St. Matt. xv., took scandal at our Lord, and whom He told His disciples to ignore. The case would be very different were religious to accept alms, not in order to provide for themselves the necessities of life, but for the sake of amassing wealth or of indulging in riotous living.

13. To the thirteenth objection, we may reply, as St. Jerome replied to Vigilantius that according to the same reasoning virginity is not a good thing, “for if all were virgins, the human race would cease.” Again, “virtue is rare and desired by few; it would be wonderful if all men resembled those few of whom it is said: ‘many indeed are called but few are chosen.’” This is the answer to the thirteenth objection. The works of perfection are so

difficult that but very few attempt to accomplish them. There is, therefore, no grounds for fearing that the world will cease to exist on account of the perfection of its inhabitants.

We must now proceed to answer the arguments of those who maintain that it is not lawful to seek alms by begging.

1. The words: " There shall be no poor man and no beggar amongst you," do not forbid persons to embrace the condition of poverty and mendicity. These words prohibit men to leave their neighbours in a condition of misery, which forces them to beg. This is proved by the words. occurring in the same chapter of Deuteronomy: "of your countrymen and neighbour you shall not have power to demand it again." On these words, the Gloss observes: "Although all men be our neighbours, we are chiefly bound to show mercy to those who, together with ourselves, are the members of Christ." Hence although charity is enjoined, mendicity is not forbidden.

2. The Gloss interprets the words, " I have not seen tho,just man forsaken by God," to mean: "I have not seen the seed of the just man perishing for want of spiritual food, i.e. the Word of God; for the Word of God is always with him." But, if this text be understood to refer to material bread, it means that the just are not reduced to beggary by necessity, or because God has deserted them; since it is said: "I will not leave you nor forsake you" (Hebr. xvi. 5). The words do not mean that just men may not, for love of God, embrace poverty, although they did not do so in the days of the Psalmist. For such works of perfection were reserved for the time of Grace.

3. It is not unfitting that what indicted on one man as a penalty may be, in another, a self-imposed work of justice. Criminals have their goods confiscated as a legal punishment; but this is no reason why other men may not despoil themselves of their possessions for the love of God. Again, beggary may fall upon sinners as a Divine chastisement; but this is no reason why mendicity, voluntarily embraced for Christ, should not be a work of justice.

4. The Gloss understands the text quoted in the fourth objection to mean that men are not to beg avariciously. Otherwise the commentary would not be in harmony with the text. The text says: "that you want nothing of any man's." Now they beg avariciously who seek, not merely necessary food and clothing, but who further desire to amass riches. This, as has been already pointed out, is made clear by the words in 1 Tim. vi. quoted above.

15. There are two kinds of mendicity, namely, voluntary and compulsory. Those reduced to beggary against their will, are liable to be tempted to impatience. Voluntary mendicity, which does not proceed from avarice, has the merit of humility. Hence St. Augustine does not forbid voluntary mendicity. He simply teaches that the occasion of compulsory beggary should be avoided by the poor of Christ by means of manual labour. This is evident by his words: “that they may not be compelled by need etc.

6. The sixth objection is quite irrelevant to the matter in hand. For the words of St. Jerome refer to the habit of asking for and accepting superfluities. This is evident by what he says in his letter to the priest Nepotian.

7. The law referred to, applies to sturdy beggars who were useless to the state and who, living idle lives, defrauded other poor people of their rights. The law in question speaks of them as slothful men. Of this class are gluttons who beg for food which they may eat in idleness. Religious cannot, except in malice, be held to belong to this class. It need not always be a heinous sin which is punished severely; for chastisement is inflicted not merely as a penalty for guilt, but also as a warning to the offender or to others. Hence at times a heavy penalty is awarded to an offence which, though not heinous in itself, is habitual. This is done in order that it may act as a deterrent to the criminal. The chapter quoted in the objection refers only to punishment inflicted to avenge sin.

8. Those of whom St. Augustine speaks begged not merely for necessities, but for superfluities. Their holiness, therefore, was not true, but hypocritical. This is made clear by the fact that he speaks of their “desiring luxurious poverty,” or “the recompense of feigned sanctity.” In thus acting they were, of course, reprehensible.

9. Shame results from a base action: baseness is opposed to beauty. Hence baseness, and the shame consequent upon it, must be distinguished according to the kind of beauty to which it is opposed. Beauty may be either spiritual or physical. Spiritual beauty consists in a well ordered soul, and in abundance of spiritual gifts. Hence all that arises from a deficiency of spiritual good, or which points to spiritual disorder, is base. Physical beauty consists in symmetry of body and in the due proportion of such things as pertain to corporeal perfection. Bodily deformity or deficiency is, in a certain sense, base. And as both spiritual and physical beauty are loved and

desired, spiritual and physical deformity cause a certain shame. Thus, a man is ashamed of being poor or unsightly or ignorant or awkward. Since spiritual deformity is always reprehensible, all that produces the shame of such deformity ought to be avoided. We speak not of the confession of sins, for the shiner is ashamed, not of his confession, but of the guilt which he acknowledges. But holy men think little of physical defect or deformity. In fact, they embrace it willingly for the love of Christ and for the sake of perfection. Hence the ignominy that accompanies such physical deformity is not always an object of contempt. Sometimes, indeed, it is worthy of high praise, as when it is assumed for the sake of humility. Now beggary is shameful, inasmuch as it is a disgrace attached to a material deficiency. For a beggar acknowledges that he is poor and is often subject to the one to whom he appeals for the relief of his needs. But beggary undertaken for the sake of Christ deserves honour rather than contempt.

10. A man who is asked for charity ought not to be wearied, if the petition is properly made. And if he is wearied, the fault lies in him for giving alms in order to free himself from importunity, rather than with him who asks in a becoming manner, for the relief of his needs. But, if the petition is not rightly made, the fault lies with the petitioner.

We shall next undertake to answer, in their proper order, the arguments of those who hold that religious who preach may not live on charity, or beg for alms.

1. It by no means follows that because preachers live on alms, they must necessarily be flatterers. When they preach without flattery, they often find but small favour among wicked and carnal-minded men, although they are approved of by the good; in face, sometimes they have to suffer at the hands of those whose favour they could not win without adulation. At other times they are well received by good men who do not wish to be flattered. They thus resemble Lord who, at times, had no roof to shelter Him, and at other times was entertained by many and who received the ministry of women who followed Him, as we read in Luke (viii.). Thus likewise the Apostles sometimes endured great distress; and at other times they were well supplied, behaving with discretion under both circumstances. “I know,” says St. Paul (Phil. iv. 12), “ how to abound and how to suffer want.” Vicissitudes of this description are the common experience of poor preachers in our own days.

2. Preachers, by asking for charity, do nothing that can be an occasion of avarice. Avarice is an inordinate love of possessing. It is not inordinate to wish to have necessary food and clothing. “Having what to eat, and wherewith to be clothed, with these we are content” (1 Tim. vi. 8). Hence poor men are not, by begging for the necessities of life, exposed to any danger of avarice.

3. Prewhers ought not to desire material assistance as their primary end or object. They may, however ask for such temporal goods as a secondary end, or as the means whereby they may be enabled to achieve their primary end, which is the preaching of the Gospel. Commenting on the words, “Seek first the Kingdom of God and His justice” (Matt. vi. 36), the Gloss says: “By these words, our Lord shows us that we are not to desire temporal things as our chief and most necessary good. We are to seek the Kingdom of Heaven, and to set it before us as our end, and do all things for the attainment of that end. Let us then eat in order to preach, but not preach in order to eat.”

4. The stipend which preachers receive is due to them for their work. They have a twofold right to the alms which they accept. A debt may be due by a double right. Some have a right to payment as a debt of legal justice due to them. Such a debt is the one resulting from the compact made between a workman and his employer, whereby the labourer can sue his employer for his wages. Others can likewise claim a reward as a debt of friendly justice. For when one man does a service to another, it is only fair that the other should make the best return within his power, although his friend cannot legally compel him to make any return. Aristotle speaks of this twofold sort of justice in VIII Ethics. I maintain, therefore, that when a prelate is set over the people, they have a right to demand spiritual ministrations from him; and he has a right to claim material assistance from them. But the people cannot claim spiritual service from any save prelates. Neither on the other hand, even though they preach by the permission of prelates, can any of the clergy who are not prelates, claim material assistance from the laity. They can only do so if they are appointed to be, in all things, the vicars of prelates. Hence we see that the poor who render no service whatsoever stand on a different footing in the matter of accepting alms, to religious who preach by permission of prelates, and are not themselves prelates, and to prelates themselves. For the poor accept

everything gratis; and thus are mere mendicants. But preachers who are not prelates accept charity as a recompense due to them, although they cannot enforce its payment. Bishops, however, have compulsory power and can exact payment as a right. Nevertheless, if he who has the right to demand something does not assert this right, but begs for what he needs as if it were a free gift, he does no harm to anyone; but by his example he shows the beauty of humility.

The fifth objection is answered by saying that St. Paul wished to show that he had as good a right as the other Apostles to receive the donations of the faithful. And in order to make good this point, he began by proving that he was an Apostle just like the other Apostles.

6. The false apostles were unjust usurpers when they accepted the contributions of the faithful. Three reasons prove this. First, they taught a doctrine that was false and contrary to the Gospel. For, as the Gloss observes, on the words "we likewise beseech you, brethren" (Rom. xvi.), " they forced believers to follow Jewish rites." Secondly, they preached without any commission from the true Apostles. Therefore St. Paul says that they "came in privately." Thirdly, they behaved as if they possessed the authority of Apostles. Now as the objection ignores these three points, the reasoning contained in it is worthless.

17. Preaching religious beg for what is, according to the second mode of justice, due to them; for a debt is a matter of justice. But they are the more to be commended, in as much as they ask for that which is their due as though it were a free gift.

8. Prelates who receive tithes and offerings from their people, and who duly minister to them, may elect certain coadjutors to assist them more efficiently in so doing. Such conduct is not unfair to the faithful. For if the laity give more temporal alms than is agreed upon, they receive, in return, more spiritual assistance than the prelates are obliged to give. Furthermore, their alms are not taken as a right, but are accepted thankfully and humbly.

9. Everyone may renounce what is owing to him. Thus, although bishops are bound to support those whom they send to preach, the preachers may renounce their claim to such support. They do not, for this reason, become a burden on the people to whom they are sent. For they ask nothing from them but necessary food; and this they do not claim as a right but beg for as

alms, according as each one of their hearers may have determined in his heart. They thus imitate the example of St. Paul (2 Cor. viii-ix).

10. Hypocrites were rebuked by our Lord for seeking gain by means of prayer and of superstitious practices. The Gloss says: “Woe to you Scribes and Pharisees, for by your superstitions you aim at nothing save at despoiling those who listen to you.” But it is rash to pass this judgment on anyone, for his private motive is the secret of each man’s own heart.

11. Preachers have no right to consort with persons of bad character, if there is danger that the vices of such persons may be attributed to them also, and if their preaching may, for this reason, fall into discredit. St. Gregory says: “If a man’s conduct is despised, his preaching will be contemned.” The Gloss speaks in like manner. If, however, preachers, without losing their own reputation, make friends with men of bad character in order to reform them, it is a praiseworthy act. It is done in imitation of our Lord. For we read in Matt. ix. 11, “The scribes and Pharisees said to his disciples: why does your Master eat with publicans and sinners? “The Gloss observes that Christ, by so doing, “gave His disciples an example of mercy.” But if sinners do not esteem it a favour that the preachers of the Gospel should consort with them, the fault lies with them, not with the preachers,

12. If those who preach the Word accept from their hearers the necessities of life, they do not sell the Gospel. For, as we have already said, material gain is not their primary motive in preaching. The Gloss, on the words: “let the priests that rule well” (1 Tim. v.), remarks: “Good and faithful dispensers of the Word ought not to attain heavenly glory only, but likewise earthly honour that so they may not have cause for sadness.” Again, “Alms are given from charity, and accepted through necessity. Nevertheless the Gospel is not venal. It is not preached in exchange for earthly goods. They who proclaim it do so for the sake of eternal happiness. For, were they to sell so great a treasure, they would show that they held it in contempt. Let preachers then, accept from the people as a necessity the means of existence, and let them receive from the Lord the reward of their labours. For they do not regard the alms of the faithful as a recompense or a motive for their work. Their ministry is one of love. They accept what is given them as a stipend whereby they may procure the supplies which are necessary to enable them to continue their labours.”

13. Although there might have been some appearance of evil in the conduct of the Apostles if they had taken alms from the Gentiles to whom they preached the Faith, and if they had thereby introduced a new custom, it cannot now be considered disedifying if preachers accept alms from the faithful. For this custom is sanctioned by the Gospel; and those to whom charity is given need it not for superfluities, but for the necessities of life. It is evident also that religious do not preach for the sake of gain; for the alms that they receive are far inferior in amount to the worldly possessions which they renounced for the love of Christ.

We will next reply, one by one, to the arguments brought to show that alms ought not to be given to religious:

1. The words "call the poor, from whom you have at present nothing to expect," mean only that in giving alms the intention of receiving a reward must not be present to the mind, though they may receive it in the future. For there is no one so poor that he may not, in some case of emergency, be of use to us. This is made clear by the following words of the Gloss: "If you invite others in order to be invited yourself, you may deceive yourself." Neither are we to understand that there will be no eternal reward for those who call together rich men or their own kinsfolk, for such an invitation may proceed from charity, and may be given for the love of God. Hence the Gloss says: "Those who invite the poor expect a future recompense; those who call together their friends and brethren, or wealthy people, have their reward now. But if, like the sons of Job, they entertain rich persons for the love of God, then He who commands us to practise brotherly love will reward such hospitality equally with other works of charity." But we are not to conclude that it is a sin to entertain our kinsfolk, even from mere natural affection, but only that such hospitality does not deserve an everlasting recompense. The Gloss remarks: "Our Lord does not forbid us to call together our wealthy friends, and our kinsmen, as if it were criminal to do so. He only tells us that such an invitation, will not be rewarded with eternal life."

2. The saying of St. Augustine, adduced in the second, objection, is to be understood in the same sense as that of Sirach (xii. 4), "Give to the merciful, and uphold not the sinners." The Gloss observes on this text: "Do not encourage sinners in their sinful ways; do not hold communication with them, as they do who entertain actors, and suffer the poor of Christ to

hunger.” But he who gives to a sinner who is in want, not in order to encourage him to sin, but because he recognises him as a man, assists not a sinner but a just man, because he loves not the sinner but human nature. It is better, however, to withhold an alms, than to give it to a man because he is a sinner, or in order to cause him to sin. But it does not follow that we may not bestow charity on the poor of Christ who do no manual work. For, as we have already shown, they commit no sin by omitting to perform such labour. And even were their omission criminal, we would not be assisting them because they are sinners, but because they are in distress.

3. He who asks in an unbecoming manner should not obtain what he demands; he should rather be corrected. But he who begs befittingly should, if possible, receive what he asks for. Hence St. Gregory, XXL Moral., says on the words of Job: “ If I have denied to the poor what they desired,” that “the holy man, in this saying, bears testimony to himself that he not only assisted the poor in their needs, but condescended to their desires. But what is to be done when the poor ask for things that are not expedient for them to have? Or, since in Holy Scripture, the poor are spoken of as being humble, are we to consider that they ought to have only those things for which they ask with humility? It is certain that we ought to give them those things that they beg humbly for, i.e. that they ask for out of necessity, not out of covetousness. For it would be great pride if they were to beg for what is unsuited to their condition of poverty.” We should, therefore, unhesitatingly, assist the poor in their necessities, and we should. rebuke those who ask for superfluities.

4. As it is said in the fourth objection, we must refuse alms when, by giving them, we would encourage the recipients to commit injustice; but we should not refuse such assistance in cases of extreme necessity. But as mendicant religious ask for alms not for criminal purposes, but for the furtherance of their sacred labours, this proposition does not apply to them.

5. St. Ambrose does not say, in the words referred to, that infirmity of health or the shame experienced by those who beg are to be considered as reasons for giving alms. We give alms on account of the need of those who ask for them. What St. Ambrose says is that we should give more abundantly to those who are sick and to those who are ashamed of begging. He does not say that we are not to give to those who are in good health, and to those who are not ashamed to beg; but that, other things being equal, the

sick and retiring are especially deserving of our charity. But sickness and reluctance to beg are not the only conditions which should, excite our charity. We must also consider the reputation of the one who asks us, his claims upon us, his needs, etc. It is not only those who have lost their fortune by accident who feel ashamed to beg. Religious, who have voluntarily renounced all things for the love of God, experience the reluctance. For they often belong to noble families; and shame at begging is therefore natural to them. But in religious this natural shame, like other passions, is perhaps more fully subject to reason than is the case with laymen.

6. Although there may be many reasons for giving more abundant alms to one man than to another, we cannot conclude for any one reason that one man always deserves more assistance than others. Thus the fact that a man is in greater need than are others is not always a reason why he should be helped more than others. For a man in less distressed circumstances might be able to show cause why he should receive more assistance from us than a neighbour poorer than he. Aristotle teaches (Ethics IX) that the preponderating reason for relieving another is his claim upon us. For, except under very peculiar circumstances, we are more strictly bound to pay a debt than to give a favour. Now as we owe preachers the necessities of life as a stipend for their labours, we are bound in a special manner to bestow our alms upon them, especially when they are in distress. This is a debt of justice. This, therefore, we ought to pay, unless there are many grave reasons to prevent our so doing.

7. In reply to the seventh difficulty we must say that ‘there are two sorts of happiness, spiritual and material. There are likewise two kinds of misery, spiritual and material. Religious, who have made themselves voluntarily poor have not to suffer spiritual misery, which is absolute misery. Rather, our Lord calls them “blessed” (Matt. v.; Luke vi.). They are, however, subject to physical distress, and are therefore worthy objects of material relief.

8. Kinship is one reason for giving alms more abundantly in some cases than in others. It is not, however, the only standard whereby our charity is to be proportioned. Therefore, it does not follow, as we have already said, that we are always to give most assistance to those most nearly related to us.

PART 3

PROLOGUE

How Religious Are Attacked by Their Enemies for Many Frivolous Reasons

WE will now proceed to refute the malicious accusations brought against religious. These are inspired by the presumption of their enemies. We may, in this connection, aptly quote the words of St. Gregory (V Moral.), “No one would presume to correct the faults of the Saints, unless he entertained a better opinion of himself than of them.” St. Jerome likewise says to Sabinianus: “Lest you should find yourself solitary in evildoing, you pretend that the servants of God have also committed crimes. You do not know that you are speaking iniquity against another and are opening open your mouth against Heaven. It is no wonder that some servants of God are blasphemed by you, since your ancestors have called their father Beelzebub.” The calumniators of religious, being determined that nothing shall be wanting to fill the measure of their malice, pervert their judgment in a twofold manner. They pass unjust condemnation both on persons and on things. This double perversity of judgment is recognised by the Gloss in the commentary on the text, “Judge not before the time” (1 Cor. iv). On these words the Gloss says: “We must beware lest we be deceived by a false opinion. We cannot know the consciences of men, nor have true and certain knowledge of this affair; nor can we be sure whether such or such a man is moral or immoral, whether he is just or unjust. Let us ourselves abhor immorality and injustice and love justice and morality. We know, in the truth of God, that some things are to be desired and that others avoided. Let us then desire those things that we ought to desire, and avoid those things that we ought to avoid; in order that we may be forgiven if, at times or even often, we do not pass a true judgment upon men.” But as, according to the

Gloss, it is worse to entertain a false opinion about things than about men, let us attack the greater evil in the first place, and consider how the enemies of religious pervert their judgment as to facts. We will then consider their false opinions about persons.

The assailants of religious pervert their judgment about facts in two ways. They first of all declare that the good manifestly wrought by religious is evil. Thus they fulfil the words of Sirach (xi. 33), “he lies in wait, and turns good into evil; and on the elect he will lay a blot.” Then they pretend that the indifferent actions of religious are wrong. Now by condemning the good works of religious as evil, they pass judgment on themselves, and they prove that those whom they blame are highly to be commended. They condemn religious because their virtuous lives are offensive to them. St. Gregory, speaking of men of this description, says (VI Moral.), “The wicked man detracts from the reputation of the just, and he never ceases to condemn and to blame the good actions which he himself neglects to perform.” Detractors of religious, by blaming them, give the best proof of their innocence. They imitate the princes of Daniel, who said in their malice against that prophet, “We shall not find any occasion against this Daniel, unless perhaps concerning the law of his God.” On these words, the Gloss observes: “O spotless life, wherein his enemies could detect no guilt, save in the law which he observes.” Now the only ground of detraction which they can find against religious, and the only reason for holding them up to contempt, is the law of God to which they are faithful.

1. They blame them on account of the poor habit which they wear.
2. They condemn them for their charity to others and for compassionately assisting their neighbours in the management of their affairs.
3. They complain that religious, who have here no abiding city, wander from city to city to preach the Word of God.
4. They find fault with them for studying.
5. They blame them for preaching in a systematic and fluent style.

Now by thus condemning religious, their assailants show that they despise their poverty, their mendicancy, and their teaching, and that they are opposed to the good fruit which, by episcopal permission, they are enabled to produce in souls.

CHAPTER 1

The Poverty of the Religious Habit is the First Point on Which They Are Assailed

They bring up many arguments against the religious custom of wearing a poor habit:

1. They quote the words of our Lord, “Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep” etc. (Matt. vii, 15). This warning they apply to those who wear poor clothing; and, Hence they seek to Prove that religious ought to be suspected of being fibe prophets.

2. The Gloss, on the words “Behold a pale horse (Rev. vi.), comments as follows: “The devil, finding that he cannot further his schemes against the Church either by persecution or by open heresy, sends forth false brethren who, under the disguise of the religious habit, possess the nature of roan and black horses and pervert the faith.”

3. It is said again that in the early days of the Church an order was sent from Rome to the Bishops of Gaul, commanding them to rebuke those who, under a pretext of humility, chose to wear contemptible garments unlike the ordinary dress of the time. This decree is said to be preserved in the register of the Roman Church, although there are no traces of it in the body of the decretals. This alleged Papal command is held to be a proof that men, at least those who live in the world, are not justified in wearing garments unfitted to their station.

4. St. Augustine says (III De doctrina Christiana), “Whoever makes a more limited use of temporal things than is customary with those among whom he lives, is guilty either of superstition or of indiscretion.” Hence he who wears clothing, meaner than that worn by those around him, is deserving of blame.

5. St. Jerome, writing to Nepotianus, says: “Wear neither sad-coloured, nor white garments. Sumptuous apparel and slovenly dress are equally to be avoided. For the one denotes luxury, and the other vain glory.” Hence we see the error of dressing in a beggarly fashion.

6. St. Paul says (Rom. xiv. 17), “The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink.” On these words, the Gloss observes: “It matters little of what quality our food may be, or what quantity we may consume, so long as our nourishment is adapted to the condition of those with whom we live and of our own, and to the requirements of our health.” For the same reason, the fashion of a man’s clothing has no connection with virtue, provided that he wear what is becoming to his condition. Hence it is no mark of a truly religious man to wear a mean dress as a sign of contempt of the world.

7. Hypocrisy would seem to be the worst of all sins. For, our Lord inveighed more forcibly against hypocrites than against any other class of sinner. St. Gregory says (Pastoral.), “ None do more harm in the Church than sinners who have a reputation for, or appearance of, sanctity.” Hypocrisy lurks under shabby clothing, just as costliness of attire betokens luxury or stimulates men to pride. It is more sinful, therefore, to exceed the limits of discretion by poverty of attire than by gaudiness of apparel.

8. Our Lord Jesus Christ gave us an example of the perfection of holiness and of religion. But, he wore a precious garment, namely, a coat woven throughout (John xix. 23). Such clothes are normally sewn with silk and gold. The fact that the soldiers would not divide it, but cast lots for it, is a proof that it must have been costly. Hence wearing mean clothing can be no part of religion.

9. The Sovereign Pontiff wears costly silken robes; the kings of old were clad in scarlet; and it would not have been praiseworthy in them had they worn contemptible garments. For the same reason, it is not meritorious on the part of anyone, to wear garments unbecoming his station; rather, the shabbiness of his clothing brings humility into disrepute.

We will now expose the fallacy contained in the foregoing arguments.

1. We read (XXI, quaest. IX), “All extravagance or ornateness of attire is unbecoming Holy Orders. Therefore, it behoves all bishops or ecclesiastics who attire themselves in costly or showy garments to amend; for if they persist in so doing, a penalty will be laid upon them.” It is added later on, “And if any should be, found to ridicule those who wear poor and religious

garments, let him do penance.” In the early ages of the Church, every man consecrated to God wore coarse and common clothing. For, as St. Basil says, all that is worn not out of necessity but for the sake of adornment is accounted as pride. Hence plainness of attire is to be encouraged; all ostentation is to be avoided; and they who speak ill of men who wear poor garments are to be severely punished.

2. We are confirmed in this by the example of St. John, who wore a garment made of camel’s hair (Matt. ii). The Gloss, hereon, observes, that “he who preached penance, wore a garment of penance, and that such poverty of apparel was as praiseworthy in him, as it would have been unseemly in a wealthy man. Another commentary says that, “a servant of God ought to use clothing not for pleasure or adornment, but for the purpose of necessary covering.” The Gloss also observes, on St. Mark. i, that the Baptist’s garment of camel’s hair was the raiment befitting preachers. Hence we learn that the servants of God, especially such as preach penance, ought to wear the garb of humility.

3. We are told once more (Heb. xi.) that the prophets of old, such as Elijah and others, wandered about in sheep’s skins, in goat skins.” The word melota is used indiscriminately for undressed sheep skin, or goat skin, and it signifies consequently a very rough and harsh covering for the body. The Gloss says that the same word is used for camel’s hair.

4. We are told of Sts. Hilarion, Arsenius, and of other Fathers of the desert, that they wore the very coarsest clothing.

5. We read the following words in Revelation (xi. 3): “I will give to my two witnesses, and they shall prophesy a thousand two hundred sixty days, clothed in sackcloth.” This, the Gloss interprets to mean: “They shall preach penance both by word and example.” Another commentary remarks on the same text, “You ought, in preaching, to follow their example.” From this we must understand that they who preach penance ought to wear a penitential garment.

6. St. Gregory, in his homily on the text, “There was a certain rich man,” strongly inculcates the lesson, that poverty of clothing is as much to be commended, as extravagance of apparel is to be condemned. We quote his words: “Some men consider, that there is no sin in excessive daintiness and magnificence of attire. But, if such were the case, the Word of God would not expressly tell us that the rich man who was tormented in hell had worn

purple and fine linen. No one dresses in an ostentatious manner save for the sake of vainglory, and in order to outdo others in splendour. For the very fact that a man does not deck himself out when there is none to see him, proves that he wears his fine garments from motives of vainglory. We shall see more clearly the fault committed by extravagance of dress, if we compare it with the virtue of humility displayed in mean apparel. For, were it not a virtue to wear contemptible garments, the Evangelist would not have expressly told us that the clothing of St. John the Baptist was of camel's hair."

7. On the words of St. Peter (1 Pet. iii. 3), "Whose adorning let it not be outward plaiting of the hair" etc., the Gloss makes the following commentary: "As St. Cyprian says, they who are clad in silk and scarlet cannot put on Christ. They who are adorned with gold and pearls, and suchlike gauds, have lost the ornament of heart and of body. If the women whom St. Peter admonishes in the text we have quoted were married women, who might have alleged their husbands as an excuse for their vanity in dress, how much more ought virgins, who have no such excuse, to take to heart the warning of the Apostle? "It is clear therefore that in ecclesiastics, sumptuousness of apparel is far more to be deprecated than it is in women.

8. An outward act which reveals the virtue of the heart is, even though liable to abuse, very commendable. Poverty of clothing comes into this category. Thus, St. Jerome, writing to the monk Rustieus, says: "A lowly garb betokens a noble mind. A coarse tunic denotes contempt of the world, provided that the soul of one thus clad is not puffed up with pride, and that his words are not inconsistent with his garment." Hence the habit of wearing coarse clothes is, in itself, one to be adopted, if at the same time pride is banished from the heart.

9. That which wins the Divine mercy, cannot be wrong. Now many, even great, sinners have, by assuming a garb of penance, gained the mercy of heaven. We are told of the impious Ahab (1 Kings xxi. 27) that "when he, had heard these words (i.e. of Elijah) he rent his garments and put haircloth upon his flesh and fasted and slept in sackcloth. And the word of the Lord came to Elijah the Thesbite, saying: Have you not seen Ahab humbled before me? Therefore, because he has humbled himself for my sake, I will not bring the evil in his days." Nevertheless, the humility of Ahab was not,

as the Gloss says, true humility of heart. Again, in the third chapter of the book of Jonah we read: “The word came to the king of Niniveh, and he rose up out of his throne and cast away his robe from him and put on sackcloth and sat in ashes.” He also ordered all his subjects to do likewise. Hence we see that humility of clothing is acceptable to God.

10. Aristotle (X Ethic.) proves that “virtue consists not only in interior, but likewise in exterior acts. He is here speaking of the moral virtues. Now humility is, in a certain sense, a moral virtue; for it belongs neither to the intellectual nor to the theological virtues. Hence it consists not merely in interior but likewise in exterior acts. As self-contempt pertains to humility, it follows that it is consistent with humility for a man to render himself exteriorly contemptible.

11. Evil is never disguised, save under an appearance of good. Now hypocrites cloak their malice under a guise of humility. Hence a humble garb has in itself an appearance of good, and therefore in itself it is commendable, although it is liable to abuse.

12. As fasting and almsdeeds are praiseworthy exercises of penance, so the habit of wearing a contemptible dress is likewise a commendable custom, although some may make a bad use of it. From all that we have said, while admitting the possibility of its abuse, we maintain that in itself the wearing of a humble dress is praiseworthy, as being an act of penitence and humility practised by some who, by their station in life, have a right to costly clothing; just as many have the laudable habit of fasting and abstaining who might, according to their condition, make use of flesh meat. But both fasting and wearing a contemptible clothing may, for some exceptional reason, be evil, if for instance it is practised in a manner annoying to those with whom we live, or if it is done from motives of vainglory. The same remark applies to prayer and to almsdeeds, as our Lord himself teaches (Matt. vi).

We will now reply to the other objections, alleged against the religious habit.

1. The fact that false prophets make use of sheep’s clothing to deceive the faithful is rather in favour of the habit of wearing poor clothing than against it. For hypocrites would not thus disguise their malice, unless a contemptible garb carried with it an appearance of good. Otherwise the Scriptures which, as we are told (2 Pet. iii.), that heretics abuse, ought to be

reprobated. The same might be said of piety, which heretics often pretend (2 Tim. iii.). Hence the Gloss says, on St. Matt. vii, that false prophets are recognised not by their garments, but by their works. Again, the Gloss adds that sheep should not lay aside their clothing, even though, at times wolves may assume it as a disguise.

2. The devil would not clothe his emissaries in a religious habit if this habit were not, in itself a token of goodness. But this is no reason why virtuous persons should not wear the religious habit; nor is it a reason why all who wear it should be accounted wicked (Gloss on Matt, vii). Hence St. Jerome asks in his book against Helvidius, “Does the fact that it is sinful to pretend to be a virgin, make virginity itself a crime?”

3. The prohibition, quoted in this objection was not published because poverty of clothing is in itself reprehensible, but because it is assumed by some men or the purposes of deception.

4. The quotation of St. Augustine, cited in this objection, applies, only, to such rigour of life as causes dissension amongst those with whom we have to live. For, if it be understood absolutely, everyone who fasts when others do not fast would deserve blame. This idea is, of course, absurd.

5. The words here quoted from St. Jerome apply not to the use, but to the abuse, of a poor and lowly garb. He utters a warning against the vainglory which may arise from such a custom. In his epistles to the monk Rusticus, and to the nobleman Pammachius, he commends poverty and humility of clothing. This is evident from his epistle to Pammachius on the death of Paulina.

6. The use of exterior things may be regarded from a double point of view. Their use is indifferent if we consider the nature of the things themselves. If, however, we regard the end for which we use them, their use is commendable in proportion to the excellence of that end. For example, fasting practised as a means of overcoming lust is more commendable than the eating of ordinary food with giving of thanks. Jovinian denied this proposition; but he was refuted in this and in his other errors by St. Jerome. Hence poverty of clothing, when it is intended as humiliation for the soul and as a conquest over the body, is in itself more to be commended than ordinary clothing. Consequently, as religion is evidenced by fasting, so, on the same grounds, is it seen in humility of attire.

7. The fact that the assumption of poor garments for hypocritical purposes is a great sin does not prove that poverty of apparel is itself more sinful than extravagance of attire. For poverty of clothing is not as closely connected with hypocrisy as splendour of attire is related to pride and luxury. Ostentation in dress leads of itself and directly to pride and luxury. It is therefore in itself culpable. But meanness of attire does not of itself directly tend to hypocrisy. Hypocrisy results from the abuse of a humble fashion of dress, just as it may result from the abuse of any other good work. Now the more excellent a work is, the more reprehensible is its abuse. Therefore the heinousness of hypocrisy is a testimony in favour of poverty of apparel and of the other external penitential works of which hypocrisy is the abuse. We do not mean, however, that hypocrisy is absolutely speaking the greatest of sins. For unbelief, whereby a man lies against God, is a more heinous crime than dissimulation, whereby he lies against himself.

8. It is not credible that our Lord Jesus Christ should have been clad in costly clothing. For He commended St. John in that he was not clothed soft garments. The Pharisees laid great stress on exterior sanctity. They accused Christ Himself of being a glutton, a wine bibber, and a friend of publicans; so would they have accused the Baptist had he worn soft garments. Thesoldiers who mocked our Lord would not have clothed Him in a purple garment as a mark of sovereignty, if His own tunic had been woven with silk and gold. The soldiers who cast lots for His seamless coat did so, not because it was of costly material, but for the sake of their own profit. For, had it been divided, it would have been of no use to any of them. This alone suffices to prove that His garment was not valuable. Had it been of rich material, they would have divided it. But, as the Gloss says, our Lord’s seamless coat was a figure of the unity of the Church.

9. Certain stations in life have a dress proper to them, just as each religious order has its own habit. The robes of the kings of old, and of the Sovereign Pontiff at the present time must be considered as the insignia of their office. And, just as a religious has no right to wear a meaner habit than the one belonging to his order, (though it is praiseworthy in him to wear the poorest allowed by the statutes of his rule), so neither would it have been lawful for monarchs of former days, nor for the Sovereign Pontiff in these times, to wear apparel unbecoming their dignity. But the case is different

with regard to princes and other men, who have no fixed robes of state. It is not reprehensible in them if they wear the poorest garments compatible with their station. Michal cried out in mockery of David, (2 Sam. vi. 20), “How glorious was the King of Israel today, uncovering himself before the handmaids of his servants, and he was naked as if one of the buffoons should be naked.

And David answered: I will both play, and will make myself meaner than I have done; and I will be little in my own eyes.” Again, Esther, speaking to the Almighty, said (Esther xiv. 16), “You know my necessity that I abominate the sign of my pride and glory which is upon my head in the days of my public appearance; and I do not wear it in the days of my silence.” Hence we see that it is praiseworthy, even in kings and princes if, when they can do so without scandal or without detriment to their authority, they are content with humble apparel.

CHAPTER 2

The Attacks Brought Against Religious on Account of Their Works of Charity

As religious are charged with meddling in other people's concerns, we will now consider the grounds on which these accusations are based.

1. The following words of St. Paul are quoted that you use your endeavour to be quiet, and that you do your own business" (1 Thes. iv. 11). They also cite the commentary of the Gloss, "leaving the affairs of other people alone, as is profitable for the amendment of your own life."

2. St. Paul says, "We have heard that there are some among you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling" (2 Thes. iii. 11). On this passage the Gloss remarks, "Do men who act thus, contrary to the law of the Lord, deserve to be supported by the alms of others?"

13. "No man being a soldier to God, entangles himself with secular business" (2 Tim. ii.) "of any kind whatsoever," adds the Gloss. Now as the affairs of other people are frequently of a worldly nature, it is maintained that religious ought never to concern themselves with the business of their neighbours.

This opinion is directly opposed to the teaching of St. James, who says: "Now religion pure and undefiled, before God and the Father, is this: to visit the orphans and the widow in their tribulation" (Jam. i. 22), i.e. "to help those who are in distress and have no other assistance," as the Gloss explains.

"I commend to you Phoebe, our sister, that you assist her in whatever business she shall have need of you" (Ron. xvi. 1). The Gloss says that the Apostle here speaks of a woman who had gone to Rome on some business. He commends her to the care of the Romans. "Bear ye one another's burdens, for so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” St. Paul also writes to the Galatians (vi. 2).

These words, all prove that it is commendable in a man to be as anxious about his neighbour’s interests as if they were his own. Nevertheless, two faults are to be avoided in the exercise of this fraternal charity. We must beware of being so occupied about other people’s affairs as to neglect our own. St. Paul warns us against this error, saying, “Endeavour to be quiet,” i.e. free from curiosity (Gloss), and “do your own business,” (1 Thes. iv.), “leaving other people’s alone” (Gloss). We are here commanded to mind our own concerns, rather than those of our neighbours. St. Paul also warns us (2 Thess. iii.) against helping others in any illicit proceedings, or assisting them from an unlawful motive. Hence the Gloss says on the words “curiously meddling”: Do men who thus act contrary to the law of the Lord deserve to be supported by the alms of others? For their God is their belly, and with unworthy solicitude they seek to provide themselves with the necessities of life.” Their iniquitous motive is proved by the fact that they desire only their own material advantage. That they seek, with reprehensible anxiety, to procure such advantage proves that they are engaged in some unlawful business. This is our answer to the two first accusations brought against religious who assist their neighbour.

To the third charge we answer that according to the explanation of the Gloss, those occupations are to be called secular, in which men are engaged in making money, but not by manual labour. To this class belong all mercantile pursuits. Religious are forbidden to involve themselves in any business of this description. They may not, for instance, trade in another man’s interest. There is no reason, however, against their performing charitable offices for their neighbours, such as giving him advice, or interceding for him.

CHAPTER 3

How Religious Are Attacked on Account of the Journeys Which They Undertake for the Salvation of Souls

WE will in this chapter, consider the charges brought against religious on account of their journeying.

1. St. Paul says (2 Thess. iii. 11), “We have heard that there are some among you that walk disorderly.” On account of this text, religious who travel, are called by their enemies wanderers (gyrovagi).

2. The following words of St. Augustine are likewise, quoted against them, “Some monks,” he says, “bear no commission; yet they are never quiet, never settled, never at rest” (De opere Monachorum).

3. On the words, “Whichever house you enter, there abide” (Mark vi. 10), the Gloss says: “It is not becoming in a preacher, to run from house to house and to change the place wherein he enjoys hospitality.”

4. The following words of Isaiah, (xxx. 7), are quoted in the same sense: “Therefore, have I cried concerning this: It is pride; only sit still [Vulgate],” i.e., “abide in your own land “ (Gloss).

5. Again, we read in the Prophet Jeremias (xiv. 10): These people have loved to move their feet, they have not rested and have not pleased the Lord.”

This accusation of restlessness, brought against preachers, is nothing new. For Dionysius, in his letter to Apolophanius, says that when he was still a Gentile, he used to call St. Paul a wanderer round the world, because he obeyed the command of our Lord. “Go therefore into the whole world and preach the Gospel to every creature” (Mark xvi. 15).

1. In the Gospel of St. John (xv. 16), we, also, read that Christ said to His disciples: “I have chosen you that you should go, and should bring forth fruit.”

2. The journeyings of preachers are symbolised by the words in Job, (xxxvii, 11), “ The clouds spread their light; they go round about, whithersoever the Will of Him who governs them leads them, to whatever he commands them on the face of the whole earth.” The Gloss hereon observes: “The clouds that spread their light typify holy preachers who by word and deed propagate the example of a good life and who illuminate all around them, because by their preaching they enlighten the ends of the earth.

3. Again the words in Job (xxxviii. 25), “Who gave a course to violent showers?” is interpreted, by the Gloss and by St. Gregory (Moral.) of the journeys of preachers.

4. We read (Zech. vi, 7), “The strong horse came out, eager to patrol the earth.” The Gloss again understands these words to refer to the Apostles and to other preachers.

5. St. Paul says (Rom. xvi.), “Salute those who are of Narcissus’ household.” The Gloss remarks that this Narcissus is said, in other codices, to have been a priest who journeyed about in order to confirm the brethren in the faith.

6. “When they shall rush in to Jacob” (i.e., “ to preach,” says the Gloss), “they shall fill the face of the world with seed” (Isa. xxvii. 6), i.e. the seed of preaching” (Gloss).

7. In the Book of Proverbs (vi. 3) we find the words: “Run about, make haste, stir up your friend” (i.e. “from the sleep of sin,” Gloss). Now sinners are awakened by preaching. Therefore, journeys undertaken by preachers for the salvation of souls are praiseworthy.

8. “This was the vision running to and fro in the midst of the living creatures” (Ezek. i. 13). St. Gregory writes (homil. V, I part super Ezech.): “Pastors of souls, who have undertaken the duty of feeding their flock, ought but rarely to change their place of abode. But, they who journey abroad to preach are as wheels of fire, which move from place to place by the force of the flame of that holy desire which both consumes the preacher and inflames his hearers.” This passage teaches us two lessons, viz. that it is

permissible for others, besides prelates, to preach; and that preachers ought to move from place to place, instead of remaining always in one spot.

9. St. Gregory, in the same homily, commenting on the words of Ezek. i., “When they walked, it was like the voice of a multitude, like the noise of an army,” says, “The camps of preachers move from one place to another, labouring for the salvation of souls.” We see, therefore, from all the passages that have been cited that the journeys undertaken by preachers in their zeal for souls are highly to be commended.

But, we must note that the Holy Scripture blames three classes of men who wander about. The first class consists of those whose restless and changeable class disposition causes them to roam hither and thither, and whose journeys produce no fruit. The second class is composed of those who travel about in hopes of material profit. The third class is formed of those whose journeys are undertaken from some evil motive, and to accomplish some sinful end. Of all these three orders of men, St. Jude writes: “Woe unto them, for they have gone in the way of Cain, and after the error of Balaam, they have for reward poured out themselves. These are spots in their banquets, feasting together without fear, feeding themselves, clouds without water which are carried about by winds, trees of the autumn, unfruitful” (Epist. i. 11). By these words is typified the unfruitfulness of journeys which are undertaken through frivolous motives. The Apostle blames the men of whom we have been speaking for the levity, or inordinate desires, which cause them to travel abroad. The Gloss says that the words of St. Jude refer to those who seek food by unworthy means or inquisitive disquiet.

2. St. Augustine, when he speaks of monks, who, although they bear no commission, are never settled, never quiet, means that their journeys are undertaken from frivolous or avaricious motives. This is clear by the context, wherein he blames them for running about,in quest of lucre.

3. The words quoted from St. Mark vi and Luke x. plainly allude to men whose inordinate desires induce them to run from house to house in hopes of being supplied more abundantly with food by one family than by another.

4. The text of Isaiah (xxx.) warns us against that inconstancy of mind, which tempts the man whose soul does not rest in God, to flit from one object to another, finding rest in none. The words, in their literal sense, refer to the Jews who, not satisfied with the Divine assistance accorded to them,

desired to go down into Egypt to seek protection from the Egyptians. The words quoted from Jeremias are likewise a warning against that love of wandering about which arises from lightness of mind. This appears by the context, “These people have loved to move their feet.” For, they who move easily, delight in motion. And the Gloss, on this passage, explains the movement of the feet to mean movement of the affections.

CHAPTER 4

Attacks Made on Religious Because They Study

WE now proceed to consider the objections brought against the studious life led by religious.

1. We find (2 Tim. iii. 7) certain persons, who were a danger to the Church, accused of “ever learning and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth.” For this reason, it is considered a suspicious circumstance when religious are fond of study.

2. St. Gregory makes the following remarks on the words of Job xvi., “My enemy has looked at me with terrible eyes”: “The Incarnate Truth,” he writes (XIII Moral.), “chose for His preachers such as were poor, simple, and unlearned. But, on the other hand, the astute and double-tongued man, filled with the knowledge of this world, whom at the end of time the Apostate Angel will elect to propagate his falsehood, will be damned.” Hence religious, because they exercise the office of preaching in a learned manner, are regarded as the forerunners of Antichrist.

3. “I saw another beast coming up out of the earth, and he had two horns like a lamb” (Rev. xiii. 11). On these words of the Apocalypse the Gloss remarks: “The description of the tribulation which will be caused by Antichrist and his princes is followed by a narrative of the evils which will befall the Church, by means of the apostles of Antichrist, who will travel throughout the entire world.” Again, “coming up out of the earth” signifies “ going forth to preach” (Gloss). On the words “it had two horns” the Gloss remarks: “These preachers are said to have two horns, because they will profess to imitate the innocent and spotless life of our Lord, to work miracles resembling His, and to preach His doctrine; or else because they

will usurp to themselves the two Testaments.” Hence it would appear that they who go forth to preach, with the knowledge of the two Testaments, and with an appearance of sanctity, are the apostles of Antichrist.

4. “Knowledge puffs up, but charity edifies (1 Cor. viii. 1). Now as religious are in a peculiar manner bound to the practice of humility, they ought to abstain from knowledge.

5. Of St. Benedict, patriarch of religious, we are told that “he withdrew from the study of literature, and that his learning was unlearned and his wisdom untaught” (St. Greg, II Moral.). Hence after his example, religious should desist from study.

6. St. Paul (2 Thes. iii.), reproves those who neglected manual labour, and indulged themselves in curiosity and sloth. As then the acquisition of knowledge is curiosity, religious ought not to abandon manual labour for the sake of study.

Now those who have been quoted above are not the originators of the error we are refuting. Julian the Apostate was the first to conceive this idea. He, as we are told in ecclesiastical history, forcibly prevented Christians from acquiring knowledge. Those therefore who imitate him, by forbidding religious to study, act in a manner opposed to the precepts of Scripture. We read, for instance, in Isaiah (v. 13): “Therefore is my people led away captive, because they had not knowledge.” “Because,” remarks the Gloss, “they would not have knowledge.” Now voluntary ignorance could not deserve punishment, were not knowledge praiseworthy.

2. In the Prophet Hosea (iv. 5) we read: “In the night I have made your mother to be silent. My people have been silent, because they had no knowledge; because you rejected knowledge, I will reject you that you shall not do the office of priesthood to me.” This text clearly shows how severely ignorance will be punished.

3. In Ps. cxviii. 66, we read: “Teach me goodness and discipline and knowledge.” On these words, the Gloss says: “Teach me goodness, i.e. inspire me, with charity; teach me discipline, i.e. give me patience; teach me knowledge, i.e. enlighten my mind. For that knowledge is useful, whereby a man becomes known to himself.”

4. St. Jerome writes to the monk Rusticus: “Let a book be never absent from your eyes or hand.” Again, “Love the knowledge of the Scriptures, and you will not love the vices of the flesh.” The same saint likewise writes

to the monk Paulinus: “Holy ignorance is only profitable to itself, and inasmuch as when accompanied by the example of a good life it edifies the Church of Christ. It is harmful, when it is powerless against those who impugn her doctrine.” Hence the learning of the saints is preferable to the holiness of the unlearned. In the same epistle, after enumerating the books of holy Scripture, St. Jerome continues: “I beseech you, brother, let these books be the companions of your life and the subject of your meditation. I know nothing but these, and seek no other thing. Don’t you see that in this way you may on earth enjoy the Kingdom of heaven?” A heavenly life then consists in the, constant study of Holy Scripture.

5. St. Paul points out that knowledge of the Scriptures is essential to preachers. For, he says (1 Tim. iv. 13), “Till I come attend unto reading, to exhortation, and to doctrine.” It is evident from this that a knowledge of what they are to teach, is necessary for those whose duty it is to preach and to exhort.

6. St. Jerome writes to the monk Rusticus: “Spend much time in learning what you must later on teach.” Once more he writes to the same, “If you desire to enter the clerical state, study, in order that you may teach.”

7. St. Gregory says, in his Pastorale: “It is eminently necessary that they who accept the office of preachers should not desist from sacred study.”

8. The life of religious is established primarily for contemplation; but, as Hugh of St. Victor says, reading is part of contemplation. Hence religious have a right to apply themselves to study.

9. They are best capable of prosecuting their studies with success, who are least embarrassed by earthly ties. We read in Isaiah (xxviii. 9), “Whom shall he teach knowledge? and whom shall he make to understand the hearing? Those who are weaned from the milk, who are drawn away from the breasts.” The Commentary says, (in VII Physic.) that chastity and the other virtues, whereby the desires of the flesh are curbed, are special aids to the acquisition of speculative knowledge. Now as religious consecrate themselves to a life of continence and abstinence, they are peculiarly fitted for study.

10. St. Jerome proves, moreover, in a letter Pammachius the monk that it is commendable in religious to devote themselves, not only to sacred learning, but to secular study. “If,” he says, “you are enamoured of the spouse knowledge, whom you have taken captive (that is to say if your

heart is enthralled by the beauty of secular knowledge), cut off the tresses of this maiden, and remove the ornaments from her head, whereby I mean, heed not, when you study, the meretricious charms of language. Bathe your spouse, learning, in the salt of prophetic wisdom; and then, resting with her, speak saying: ‘Her left hand is under my head, and with her right hand she will embrace me.’ Then, shall this captive raise up around you a numerous offspring, and this Moabitess shall become an Israelite in truth.” Hence we may understand that it is permissible for religious to occupy themselves with secular branches of learning if, according to the rule of Holy Scripture, they avoid all that may be reprehensible.

11. St. Augustine (II De doctrina christiana) says: “Those philosophers, especially of the Platonic School, whose teaching is true and consistent with the Faith, are not to be feared. On the contrary, we may make use of them, as we may despoil those who are in unjust possession of our property.”

12. On the words, “Daniel purposed in his heart” (Dan. i.), the Gloss says: “He who would not eat at the king’s table, lest he should thereby be defiled; he would never have studied the science of the Egyptians, had he considered it to be sinful. He studied it, however, not in order to follow it, but to judge and confute it. Now if a man, ignorant of mathematics, undertakes to argue with a mathematician, or if one who knows nothing of philosophy enter the lists against philosophers, what does he do, save expose himself to ridicule?”

From all that has been said, we see then that it is advisable for religious, and especially for preachers, to be learned, and that above all things they ought to have a good knowledge of Holy Scripture.

We will now proceed to answer the arguments brought forward by those who condemn learning in religious.

1. The words (2 Tim. iii.), “Ever learning, and never attaining to a knowledge of the truth,” are a rebuke, not to such as are ever learning, but to those whose study withdraws them from the Faith, and who, therefore, never attain to the knowledge of the truth. Such men are “ reprobates at heart and blinded to the faith.”

2. When St. Gregory says that the preachers of Antichrist are learned in the knowledge of this world, he refers to those preachers who make use of earthly learning to draw their hearers to sin and to worldly desires. For, in the context to the words we have quoted, he cites the following verse of

Isaiah (xviii. 1): “Woe to the land, the winged cymbal that sends ambassadors by the sea, and in vessels of bulrushes upon the waters.” Upon these words, St. Gregory makes this comment: “Paper is made from the reed papyrus. What then shall we understand by the bulrushes, or reeds, of which the prophet is speaking, save earthly learning? The vessels of bulrushes then ate the hearts of worldly men; and to send ambassadors upon the waters in vessels of bulrushes, is to base our preaching on the arguments of carnal wisdom, and to attract our hearers to sin.”

3. The words of the Gloss, quoted in the third objection, refer (as may be plainly seen by comparing this passage with many others) to preachers whom Antichrist will, at his coming into the world, send forth. Neither is the fact that the knowledge of the Old and the New Testament may be abused an argument against religious possessing such knowledge; unless we likewise say that because they may make a hypocritical display of innocence and purity of life, these virtues are therefore to be reprobated.

4. To the objection that “science puffs up,” we reply that it certainly does so, unless it is accompanied by charity. Thus, the Gloss says: “Knowledge alone puffs up, and again: “Add charity to your knowledge, and your knowledge will be useful.” Hence to those who practise works of mercy, learning will not be very dangerous. But if we are to avoid knowledge because it leads to pride, we ought, on the same grounds, to desist from any good work. For, St. Augustine says, “Pride insinuates itself into good actions, in order to render them worthless.”

5. To the argument, founded on the example of St. Benedict, we reply that this Saint did not forego study from a dread of learning, but from fear of the effects of a worldly life and society. Thus, St. Gregory tells us that “being in Rome, St. Benedict applied himself to liberal studies, and to literature; but perceiving that many of those around him fell into sin, he withdrew the foot with which he had stepped out into the world, fearing lest, if he attained to worldly learning, he might likewise fall into the abyss of sin.” Therefore, they are worthy of all praise who abandon the life of worldly students and retire into a monastery, where they may prosecute their studies.

6. To the last objection proposed, we reply that idle and inordinate curiosity is a danger attendant not only on study, but on all other mental occupation; and that superfluous anxiety, which is engendered by curiosity,

is reprehensible. But in the words of St. Paul (2 Tim. iii,), quoted as an argument against religious, the Apostle, as the Gloss points out, rebukes those who, from an undue desire for material gain, entangle themselves in their neighbours’ concerns. To speak of study of Holy Scripture as a life of idleness is flatly to contradict the Gloss. For, on the words of Ps. cxviii, “My eyes have fainted,” the commentary says: “As he is not idle who only studies the word of God, neither can he who performs manual labour be more justly accused of sloth, than he who is occupied with the study of divinity. Such learning is the greatest of all work; and Mary, who listened to our Lord, is preferred before Martha, who ministered to Him.”

CHAPTER 5

Attacks Brought Against Religious on Account of Their Systematic Method of Preaching

WE Will now proceed to examine the objections brought against religious, on the score of their methodical and carefully prepared manner of preaching.

St. Paul says, “not in wisdom of speech, lest the cross of Christ should be made void” (1 Cor. i. 17). This the Gloss understands to mean, “not with eloquence or tropes of language. For the preaching of Christ does not need pompous words, lest it should proceed rather from the cunning of human wisdom than from truth.” It is, therefore, alleged that because religious preach with fluency and eloquence, they must be false apostles.

2. We read in the same Epistle to the Corinthians (ii, 1), “When I came to you, I came not in loftiness of speech,” i.e., says the Gloss, “I did not reason with you, nor use logical arguments. I displayed no wisdom. Neither did I, in my preaching, treat of the speculations of physical science.” St. Paul continues, “My speech and preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom.” The Gloss adds, “even though my words were convincing, their power was not, like those of false Apostles, due to human wisdom.” Hence we are to conclude that religious who preach learnedly, must be false apostles.

3. St. Paul again, writes: “ For although I be rude in speech, yet not in knowledge” (2 Cor. xi. 6). The Gloss remarks upon this passage that the Apostle called himself “rude in speech,” because he did not use flowery language. The commentary further adds, “The words, ‘rude of speech,’

apply not to the Apostles, who were not eloquent, but to the false Apostles who knew how to combine choice phrases. But on account of the accuracy of their language, the Corinthians preferred the impostors to the preachers of the truth. For in religious matters, a power which convinces is needed, not a string of words."

4. We read in the Second Book of Esdra (xiv.25): "Their children spoke half in the speech of Azotus... they spoke according to the language of this and that people. And I chided them and laid my curse on them." The Gloss understands by " the language of Azotus," a rhetorical style of speech. Therefore, they who mingle rhetoric or philosophy with the words of Scripture are worthy of excommunication.

5. Isaiah says (i. 22): "Your wine is mingled with water. Now wine signifies the teaching of Holy Scripture. They, therefore, who mingle with this doctrine the water of human wisdom, are exceedingly reprehensible.

6. On the words of Isaiah (xv. 1): "In the night, Ar of Moab is laid waste," the Gloss understands by "Ar of Moab," the "adversary of God, viz., human wisdom, whose walls are built up by means of reasoning, and which in the night is laid waste and put to silence." From this comparison we may see how much they are to be blamed who, in instruction on sacred subjects, employ earthly wisdom or eloquence.

7. We find in Proverbs vii., the following words: "I have covered my bed with painted tapestry brought from Egypt." The Gloss comments: "The painted tapestry from Egypt is symbolic of flowery eloquence, or of cunning reasoning, derived from heathen sources. Heresy glories in adorning its pernicious doctrines with language of this description." Hence we are to understand how criminal a thing it is to use eloquence and earthly learning in expounding the faith.

8. St. Paulsays to Timothy (1Tim. iii. 7): "He (i.e, a bishop) must have a good testimony of those who are without, lest he fall into reproach," "or," as the Gloss says, "lest he be despised, both by believers and by infidels." Now if certain religious preach in a learned and eloquent style, bishops who cannot equal them will be contemned by their people. Hence learned and eloquent preaching, practised among religious, is a danger to the Church.

1. The foregoing arguments may be answered by the following words of St. Jerome addressed to the great orator of Rome. "What cause do you have to wonder" (the Saint asks) "that at times we, in our little writings, adduce

examples drawn from the literature of the world? or that we sully the whiteness of the Church by the defilement of heathen authors? You would stop marvelling at our acting thus were you not wholly possessed by Tully, and ignorant of the Scripture and of their Commentators, Volcatius excepted. Who does not know that Moses and the prophets quote from the books of the Gentiles? and that Solomon makes use of the philosophers, citing some of their opinions, and refuting others?" St. Jerome then proceeds to show that from the time of the Apostles, the canonical writers and their exponents, have mingled human wisdom and eloquence with Holy Scripture. When he has enumerated a long list of writers who have thus acted, he concludes by saying: "All these have so filled their books with the sayings of the philosophers that it is difficult to know which most to admire in them, their secular learning or their knowledge of Scripture." At the end of his Epistle, St. Jerome adds: "I beg you, therefore, to remind him who finds fault with us, on this score that it is unwise for a toothless man to envy the teeth of those who eat, or for a mole to grudge eyes to a goat." Hence it follows that it is commendable to make use of human eloquence and wisdom in the Divine service, and that they who blame others for so doing resemble blind men who envy those who can see, and ignorant men who blaspheme against what they cannot understand, as we read in the Epistle of St. Jude.

2. St. Augustine (IV De doctrina christiana) says: "If any man wish to speak not only learnedly but eloquently, it will profit him to read, hear and try to imitate those who are eloquent." Hence they whose duty it is to expound the Holy Scripture must be careful to speak eloquently and fluently, for the greater advantage of those who hear them.

3. In the same book, St. Augustine continues: Someone may here enquire, whether they who have by their profitable authority compiled the canon for us, are to be called learned only, or eloquent also." He goes on to prove that these authors are eloquent, and that they have adorned their style with rhetoric. He then concludes as follows: "Let us acknowledge then that our canonical writers are not merely learned, but likewise eloquent, making use of an elegance of style befitting them."

4. In the book before quoted, St. Augustine says: An eloquent preacher must, in order to induce his hearers to do what is right, not merely instruct and delight them, but he must likewise convince them." He shows, by

eloquent passages taken from the Fathers, how those holy men instructed, charmed and convinced their hearers. Hence it becomes plain that he who has to preach or to expound the scriptures must make use both of eloquence and secular learning. The same lesson is taught by St. Gregory and St. Ambrose, who are both remarkable for elegance of diction. St. Augustine likewise Dionysius and St. Basil have interspersed their works with many passages culled from secular authors. Even St. Paul himself makes use of a heathen authority in his preaching, as may be seen in the eighteenth chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, and in the first chapter of the Epistle to Titus.

5. St. Gregory, commenting on the words in Job ix., “who makes Arcturus and Orion” etc., observes: “These names were given to the stars by devotees of earthly wisdom. As they who are wise with the wisdom of God make use, in Holy Scripture, of the wisdom of the world, so God Himself, the Creator of mankind, uses for the benefit of mankind our human language.” This passage is a further proof that the teachers of Holy Scripture may lawfully employ human eloquence and learning.

But, we must remember that although an elegant style of preaching is at times commendable, it is likewise under certain circumstances reprehensible. It is reprehensible when it is used from motives of vainglory, or when beauty of language or a show of learning are esteemed as the chief essentials in preaching, and lead to the neglect or denial of the articles of faith which, being beyond the ken of human reason, are esteemed but lightly by earthly science. Again, they who consider eloquence and fluency of speech to be the chief essentials of preaching, strive to attract attention to themselves, rather than to the truths they utter. It was for preaching in this manner that the false Apostle incurred the reproach of St. Paul (2 Cor. xi. 6).

The Gloss, in the comment on the words, “not in the persuasive words of human wisdom” (1 Cor. i.), remarks: “The false apostles, fearing lest they should be considered ignorant by the wise men of the world, preached Christ deceitfully by their human wisdom, for they studied human eloquence, and they avoided all that the world accounts foolish.” But it is praiseworthy to make use in preaching of a harmonious and learned style, provided this is done, not from ostentatious motives, but in order to instruct our hearers and to convince our opponents.

It is commendable to use eloquence and learning ia preaching when the primary motive in so doing is not elegance of diction, but the more profitable teaching of Holy Scripture, in whose service eloquence is used. When we act thus, we fulfil the words of St. Paul, “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ” (1 Cor. x., 5). It was in this manner that the Apostle himself made use eloquence. Hence St. Augustine says (IV De doctrina christiana) that in “the Apostolic preaching, wisdom led the way and eloquence followed in its wake; but wisdom did not despise its follower eloquence.” The teachers of the Church, in later times have, for the same reason made a greater use of learning and eloquence; for the first chosen to preach the Gospel were not philosophers, but fishermen and peasants. These, in their turn, converted orators and philosophers. Thus our Faith consists not in human wisdom, but in the power of God, “that no flesh should glory in his eight” (1 Cor. i. 29). (See likewise the Gloss on the verse, “For see your vocation, brethren.”)

This explanation is our answer to the two first objections against religious preaching in an eloquent and learned style. To the third argument, we will reply in the words of St. Augustine (IV De doctr. christ.). When commenting on the words, “although I be rude in speech, yet not in knowledge,” he observes that St. Paul spoke thus, in condescension to his detractors, but that he does not acknowledge that he was ignorant. This is a proof that in a teacher learning is more profitable than eloquence. St. Angustine continues that the Apostle “did not hesitate to declare that he possessed learning, without which he could not have been the doctor of the Gentiles.” But even if we understand this text as an affirmation, we cannot assume that St. Paul made no use of eloquence in preaching. All that we can conclude is that he did not, like rhetoricians, make fluency and elegance of style his main object in preaching, or else that he had some defect in his speech. The Gloss understands the words, “although I be rude in speech,” to mean, “although I do not use ornamental language” or “although I have an impediment in my speech.” Now the false Apostles considered eloquence to be the essential part of preaching. They were, therefore, preferred by the Corinthians to St. Paul.

To the fourth argument we reply that when one substance is wholly transformed into another, there no longer exists a mixture. In a true mixture, one of two substances is converted into a third. Hence when a preacher, in expounding Holy Scripture, makes use of human learning subject to the truths of faith, the wine of Holy Scripture is not adulterated; it remains pure. Adulteration of the Scripture would consist in adding something to it which would destroy its truth. The Gloss observes: “He who, instead of correcting his hearers by means of the Scriptures, makes the Scriptural precepts subservient to their auditors does, by his teaching, adulterate the wine of truth.” These Words are a reply also to the fifth objection.

The passage from the Gloss quoted in the sixth argument refers to that human wisdom which is hostile to God. Now human wisdom is always set up in opposition to the Divine wisdom when men consider human learning to be paramount in importance, and when they endeavour to make the truths of faith subservient to the teaching of human science. This error is the origin of all heresy. The Gloss gives the same explanation of the text which was quoted from Proverbs in the seventh objection.

To the eighth argument we reply that good men ought not to be prevented from doing good for fear that others, who do not equally well, should be despised. It is, rather, those who make themselves contemptible who ought to be suppressed. Thus, the fact that certain prelates, from their worldly mode of life, are disedifying, when compared to religious, is no reason why religious should desist from a life of perfection. Again, the eloquence of religious is not to be blamed because the preaching of certain prelates is, on account of its lack of eloquence, but lightly esteemed.

PART 4

PROLOGUE

Accusations Levelled Against Religious, on the Grounds That They Recommend Themselves and the Orders to Which They Belong

AS we have before said, religious are calumniated for performing actions which, in themselves are perfectly indifferent. We will now, therefore, enquire into the grounds on which these false charges are based. Religious are accused:

1. Of commending themselves and their order, and of procuring from others letters of recommendation.
2. Of refuting, instead of bearing with, the detractions of their enemies.
3. Of going to law.
4. Of causing their persecutors to be punished.

S., Of desiring to please men.

S. Of rejoicing in the good which God wonderfully does through them.

7. Of frequenting the courts of kings and princes.

CHAPTER 1

Accusations That Religious Procure Letters of Recommendation

1. The enemies of religious try to prove that they ought not to commend themselves, by quoting the verse of St. Paul (Rom. xvi.), “by pleasing speeches and good words,” together with the following commentary on this passage, taken from the Gloss: “False Apostles commend their tradition by fair words, which deceive the simple-minded.” Hence when religious commend their order and thus attract others to join it, they prove themselves to be false apostles. They resemble the Pharisees, to whom our Lord said: “Woe to you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites, because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte” (Matt. xxiii. 15).

2. We read (2 Cor. iii. 1), “Do we begin again to commerhd ourselves?” As if, says the Gloss, “we were obliged by another to do so. Far be this from us.” Hence religious have no right to commend themselves.

3. In the same chapter we read: “Do we need (as some do) letters of commendation to you, or from you? The men here referred to,” says the Gloss, are false apostles, who have no virtue to commend them.” Hence we see that to require letters of recommendation is to be a false apostle.

4. Again, St. Paul says: “by manifestation of the truth commending ourselves” (2 Cor. iv.); “without,” as the Gloss says, “comparing ourselves with our adversaries.” Hence religious who commend their own order in preference to others are not true Apostles.

5. In the same chapter (2 Cor. iv. 5) the Apostle likewise says: “For we preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ.” They who commend themselves preach themselves and are therefore no true imitators of the Apostles.

6. In the Second Epistle to the Corinthians (x. 12) we read the following words: “We dare not match or compare ourselves with some who commend themselves,” i.e., says the Gloss, “who commend themselves falsely.” Hence they who commend themselves would appear to be false apostles.

7. Again, we read (2 Cor. x. 18), “Not he who commends himself is approved, but he whom God commends.” “Therefore, those who commend themselves are not commended by God.

8. Again, “let another praise you, and not your own mouth; a stranger and not your own lips” (Prov. xxvii. 2). “He who boasts and puffs himself up stirs up quarrel” (Prov. xxviii. 25). These two verses point out the unrighteousness of self-commendation.

9. Our Lord says, (John viii. 54), “If I glorify myself, my glory is nothing.” Hence men who commend themselves, do most convincingly prove their own nothingness.

These are the chief arguments brought in support of the dictum that no one is justified in commending either himself or his order. We shall now proceed to show, from the Old and New Testaments that certain holy men have not hesitated to praise themselves.

1. In the Second Book of Esdras (v. 18), Nehemiah ays, in commendation of his own conduct, “Yet I did not require my yearly allowance as governor; for the people were very much impoverished. Remember me, O my God, for good, according to all that I have done.”

2. Job says, (xxxi. 1), “I made a covenant with my eyes that I would not so much as think upon a virgin.” Again (xxiv. 14), “ I was clad with justice; and I clothed myself with my judgment as with a robe.” In both the chapters cited, the patriarch says many other things to his own praise.

3. St. Paul says: “I venture not to speak of anything but what Christ has done through me” (Rom. xv.), and again in the same chapter, “From Jerusalem round about, as far as to Illyricum, I have replenished the Gospel of Christ,”

4. The same Apostle likewise says, “ I have laboured more abundantly than all of them” (1 Cor. xv. 10); and “If any man dare... I dare also” (2 Cor. xxi. 21). In the same epistle he writes many other things to his own commendation.

5. Writing to the Galatians (i. 16), he says, “I did not condescended to flesh and blood.” In this and the following chapter we find many similar

utterances. We also see that St. Paul commended his state of life. For (2 Cor. iii. 6) he says: “Who also has made us fit ministers of the New Testament, not in the letter but in the spirit.” In this chapter again, he adds many other expressions in praise of the Apostolic dignity. Hence a religious is justified in extolling his order and in thus attracting others to enter it.

6. St. Paul commends the perfection of virginity, and exhorts others to this state in which he himself lived, saying: “I would that all men were like myself “ (1 Cor. vii. 7). Hence it is permissible for religious, living in a state of perfection, to commend their mode of life. Self-commendation, therefore, though at times reprehensible, is likewise, on certain occasions, praiseworthy. St. Gregory in, his Homily upon Ezekiel (ix, part I), writes as follows: “Just and perfect men do at times extol their own virtues, and make known the favours which they have received. They are not inspired to act thus by motives of ostentation, but from a desire to draw those to whom they preach to a more perfect life by means of their own example. Thus, St. Paul, in order to divert the attention of the Corinthians from false preachers, tells them how he was rapt to Paradise. When perfect men speak of their own virtues, they imitate Almighty God who extols His own magnificence to men, in order to make Himself known to them.” St. Gregory proceeds to note the circumstances in which men are justified in commending themselves. Then, in the following words, he warns his readers against rash and ill-considered self-praise. “We must remember,” he says, “that perfect men never disclose their own good deeds, unless urged to do so by necessity, or by desire of their neighbour’s profit. Thus St. Paul, after narrating his virtues to the Corinthians, concludes by saying: ‘I have become foolish; you have compelled me.’ At times good men are obliged to speak of themselves, if not for their neighbours’ sake, at least for their own. Thus, holy Job, under the pressure of physical pain, and reproached by his friends for impiety, violence to his neighbour and oppression, was driven to the verge of despair. Then, in self-defence, he called to memory his good deeds, saying: ‘I was an eye to the blind,’ etc. He did not enumerate his virtues from desire of praise, but, merely, to reanimate his confidence in God.”

It is clear then from what has already been said, that men are justified in commending themselves not from motives of vanity, but for the sake of their own spiritual advantage, or that of their neighbour. The most cogent reason which should induce a perfect man to commend his state of perfection, is, the wish to enkindle in others, a desire for the same perfection. Thus, it is permissible for a Christian to commend Christianity to infidels, in order to convert them to the Faith, and in proportion to the sanctity of men, we see them possessed with this zeal for souls. Thus St. Paul said (Acts xxvi. 29), “Little or much, I wish before God that not only you but all who are listening to me today would come to be as I am.”

We now proceed to reply to the objections adduced against religious.

1. The words quoted from the Gloss on Rom. xvi, about those who falsely commend their traditions refer, as we see by the context, to the traditions of false preachers who endeavoured to induce the Gentiles to follow Hebrew customs, and tried by their fluent language to commend these rites to the ignorant heathens. The word “tradition” is not applied to any state of true religion, but to false doctrine and heresy.

2. Our Lord rebuked the Pharisees (Matt. xxiii.) not for their anxiety to make proselytes, but for imbuing their converts with erroneous ideas, or for setting them so bad an example that at the sight of their vices, their proselytes relapsed into paganism. For this cause, the Pharisees deserved greater condemnation (see Gloss on Matt. xxiii.). The words quoted ‘from 2 Cor. iii, “Do we begin to commend ourselves,” mean that the Apostles extolled themselves, not from vainglory, but inspired by the motives mentioned by St. Gregory above.

3. To the third argument we reply that St. Paul did not prohibit the use of letters of recommendation. He merely showed that they were not needful for true Apostles, as they were for false teachers who had no virtues to commend them as the Gloss explains. At times, however, holy men do need letters of commendation. They want them, not on their own account, but for the sake of others, who know neither their virtue nor their authority. Thus, St. Paul commended Timothy, saying: “Now if Timothy comes, see that he be with you without fear. For he works the work of the Lord” (1 Cor. xvi. 10). Again, in the second chapter of the Epistle to the Philippians (19), he says, “I hope in the Lord Jesus to send Timothy to you shortly... for I have no man so of the same mind.” Again, in the Epistle to the Colossians (iv. 10), he writes, “Mark, the cousin of Barnabas, touching whom you have received commandments.” And writing to the Romans (xvi. 1) he says: “I commend to you Phoebe, our sister” etc. Thus we see that in the Apostolic

times, it was customary to provide teachers or other persons who must be sent to distant churches with testimonials, or letters of recommendation.

4. To the fourth argument, we answer that as holy men do not commend themselves, for the sake of their own glory, but for the advantage of others, so they likewise sometimes prefer themselves to others. Thus just men prefer themselves to sinners, in order that sinners may be avoided and justice imitated. Thus St. Paul says (2 Cor. ii. 23), “They are the ministers of Christ (I speak as one less wise) I am more.” Sometimes, also, good men commend themselves in order that they may be held in credit by men; for if they are despised by those to whom they preach, they cannot influence them. We know that St. Paul preferred himself, in one point, to the other apostles, though they were true apostles. For he says (1 Cor. “His grace in me has not been void; but I have laboured more abundantly than all they.” Now they are the less reprehensible who prefer their state to one less perfect, in proportion as such a comparison is divested of anything that savours of vainglory. In this manner, St. Paul (2 Cor. iii.) compares the ministers of the New Testament to those of the Old Law; and he prefers the status of Doctor, to which he belonged, to the other ranks in the Church. On this point he says (1 Tim. v. 17), “Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honour, especially those who labour in the word and doctrine.” It may be said that the Gloss, on this passage, as quoted above, is misinterpreted. For St. Paul speaks of the recommendation, not of words, but of deeds; whereby the Apostles commended themselves to the conscience of men. He shows likewise that the true Apostles proved themselves by their works to be better than the false Apostles. Hence when the Gloss says, “without comparing them to their adversaries,” the signification is that the Apostles did incomparably more than their adversaries. Hence the true meaning of the Gloss, is the exact contrary of that assigned to it.

5. The answer to the fifth objection is given in the following words of the Gloss. “We preach not ourselves, i.e., our preaching is directed not to our own honour or advantage, but to the glory of Christ.” Now the Saints at times commend themselves; but they do so not for their own glory, but to the praise of God, and for the spiritual benefit of their neighbour.

6.-7. The sixth argument is answered by the following words from the Gloss. “We do not communicate with certain other men (i.e., false apostles), who are not sent by God nor approved by Him, but who commend themselves by certain actions.” From these words, we cannot conclude that they who are sent by the prelates of the Church, may not commend themselves, when God commends them so munificently by bestowing the gifts of grace upon them. This is likewise the answer to the seventh objection.

8.-9. To the eighth and ninth objections we reply that the authors cited in them, speak of the self-praise whereby some men commend themselves inspired by motives of vain glory.

10. The tenth objection is answered by the following passage from the interlinear commentary on the words, “If I glorify only myself,” etc. The glory of those who glorify themselves is nothing. But the case is far otherwise with those whom God glorifies by the bestowal of His heavenly favours.

CHAPTER 2

The Charges That Religious Resist Their Detractors

WE will next consider the arguments, whereby, the assailants of religious try to prove that they are not justified in offering any resistance to such as detract them.

1. The Gloss on the words (1 Cor. xii.), “ No one can say the Lord Jesus,” etc., has the following passage: “ Christians ought to be humble and to bear reproach and not to desire to be flattered.” Therefore, religious who do not endure reproach prove that they are not true Christians.

2. In 2 Cor. xii. 12, St. Paul says: “The signs of my Apostleship have been wrought on you in all patience.” On which text the Gloss observes: “The Apostle makes special mention of patience, as being an essential of virtue.” Hence they who perform the apostolic function of preaching ought to be remarkable for their patience, according to the words of the Psalmist (xci. 15), “They will be very patient, so that they can proclaim” [Vulgate]. They ought to bear with the malice of their detractors and to offer no resistance to it.

3. “Have I then become your enemy, because I tell you the truth?” asks St. Paul (Gal. iv. 16). The comment of the Gloss on this verse is: “The carnal-minded man will not suffer himself to be reproved as though he were in the wrong.” Hence they who will not bear rebuke show that they live according to the flesh. Again, on the words in Phil. iii., “Beware of dogs,” the Gloss says: “Understand that such men are dogs, not because they lack reason, but because they are used to barking at truth to which they are unaccustomed.” Again “as dogs,” says the Gloss, “obey habit rather than reason, so false apostles bark at truth in an irrational manner and rend it.”

They therefore who rage against those who reprove them for their vices, hereby prove that they are false Apostles.

4. St. Gregory says, in his Pastorals: “He who is bent upon wrong doing, and desires that others should conceal his sin, shows that he loves himself better than truth. For, he will not suffer truth to be defended at his own cost.” “God is truth” (John xiv.). They, therefore, who will not allow themselves to be corrected, show that they love themselves better than God. They are, consequently, in a state of damnation.

5. What has been already said on the subject is further confirmed by the words of the Book of Proverbs (ix. 8), “Do no rebuke a scorner, lest he hate you. Rebuke a wise man, and he will love you.” It is likewise supported by the following passages from the Old and New Testament.

“He who hates to be reproved, walks in the steps of a sinner” (Sirach xxi. 6). “Bless those who persecute you; bless and curse not” (Rom. xii. 14). “Bless those who curse you; pray for those who calumniate you” (Luke vi. 28). “We are reviled and we bless; we are persecuted and we suffer it” (1 Cor. iv. 12). All the texts which we have cited seem to prove that it is the duty of perfect men, and especially of preachers of the Gospel, not to resist those that speak ill of them.

It can however be shown that at times apostolic men are justified in opposing their calumniators, as we shall now see.

1. “We do not say,” says St. Paul (Rom. iii. 8), “as we are slandered and as some affirm that we say, let us do evil that there may come good. Their damnation is just.” The commentary of the Gloss on this passage, runs as follows: “ Certain perverse men, who misunderstand us and who are inclined to blame us, assert that this is our teaching. Their damnation is just.” In these words, the Apostle infers that no credit is be given to his detractors; and thus he resists them.

2. In his 3rd Epistle (x.), St. John writes: “If I come, I will advertise the works which he does, with malicious words prating against us.” On this verse, the Gloss comments in the following terms. “We ought not, by our own fault, to stir up detraction against ourselves, lest we cause our slanderers to perish. If our enemies, animated by their own malignity, revile us, we ought to endure such treatment patiently, to the increase of our merit. It is right, however, at times to suppress their slanders, lest by propagating

evil reports against us they gain the ears and harden the hearts of those who would otherwise have listened to our preaching."

3. In the following words St. Paul shows (2 Cor. x. 10) that he thought it right to resist those who slandered him. "For his epistles, indeed, say they are weighty and strong, but his bodily presence is weak and his speech is contemptible. Let such a one think this that such as we are in word, by epistles when absent, so also we will be in deed when present." The Apostle thus treats those who speak ill of him.

4. St. Gregory in his Homily upon Ezekiel (ix. Part 1) says, "They who occupy so conspicuous a position that their lives are regarded as an example for imitation, ought, if they can do so, to silence the detractions propagated against them. For these slanders may reach the ears of those who would otherwise have listened to their preaching. They may cause them to refuse to hear their words, and thus become hardened in their sins." Now they who practise a life of perfection are regarded by all men as a model for imitation. It is, therefore, their duty to suppress the calumnies set afoot against them.

5. St. Augustine (II de Trinit.) writes: "Modest and gracious charity gladly admits the kisses of the dove; but chaste and cautious humility avoids the dog's bite; solid truth likewise repels it." Hence we see that detraction is, at times, to be avoided, and, at times, is to be combatted.

6. We learn the same lesson from the example of a multitude of Saints. Thus Saints Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome, Bernard, and many others wrote apologies and epistles defending themselves against the attacks of their enemies.

In the matter of reproof, we must draw a distinction between those who rebuke others in a legitimate manner and with a desire for their correction, and those who bring false charges against their neighbour. Men of the first class should be not only tolerated, but loved. Those of the second category must be patiently endured, when their calumnies do not cause much scandal or produce much injury amongst those who hear them. At other times, however, they must, if possible, be suppressed, not on account of the personal reputation of their victims, but for the sake of the public welfare. But if such detractions cannot be silenced, they must be borne with patience. Thus St. Gregory says, in the Homily before quoted, "As just men may at times, without arrogance, acknowledge the good that they do; so they can, without undue solicitude for their personal reputation, silence the tongues of those that speak against them. But, when their slanderers cannot be silenced, they must be patiently endured. Calumny in itself is not to be feared. We must only be on our guard, lest the dread of being slandered should cause us to desist from doing right.”

We will now examine, and refute, the arguments of our opponents.

1. True Christians bear reproof, when administered to them for the sake of correction. They resist, however, accusations brought against them in order to overthrow their work. More especially do they resist, when such charges are blasphemies, directed not only against their person, but against the truth which they preach.

2. Apostolic men ought certainly to practise patience. When they resist detraction, they do so not out of impatience, but from love of truth.

3. Carnal-minded men hate those who rebuke them in charity. It is not, however, carnal minded to oppose those who calumniate the truth.

4. The passage of the Gloss quoted in the fourth argument refers to men who unreasonably slander the truth and injure its preaching. They who, under pretext of patience, permit falsehoods about the truth to be disseminated are like the “dumb dogs, not able to bark, of which Isaiah speaks (lvi. 10).

5. If they who will not suffer the truth to be defended at their own expense show that they love themselves more than the truth, they equally love themselves better than the truth who, rather than suffer their own peace to be disturbed, leave the assailants of truth unanswered. Hence it is love of truth which inspires holy men to resist its detractors.

6. The following reply will serve as an answer to all the remaining objections. The authors quoted in these objections counsel us to love those who correct us justly, and they forbid us to pursue, with hatred or impatience, those that malign us. They advise us, on the contrary, to love and pray for our detractors. Holy men amply fulfil this duty; even while they refute the charges brought against them by their enemies.

CHAPTER 3

Religious Are Condemned for Going to Law

WE will now consider the arguments brought forward to prove that religious ought not to go to law, nor to allow themselves to be defended by force of arms.

1. In the First Epistle to the Corinthians (vi. 7), we find the following passage: “There is plainly a fault among you that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?” On these words, the Gloss observes: “Perfect men should simply to ask for what belongs to them, avoiding contention or legal proceedings.” Hence as religious are in a state of perfection, they ought not to contend with anyone.

2. our Lord says, (Matt. v. 40): “ If a man will contend with you in judgment and take away your coat, let go your cloak also unto him.” “These three precepts,” remarks the Gloss, “embody the perfection of justice.” Hence religious, who profess to lead a life of perfection, ought not to go to law; they ought rather to suffer themselves to be despoiled of their goods.

3. Again, we read, (Luke vi. 29), “Do not stop him who takes away your cloak... If someone takes away your goods, do not ask for them back.” The Gloss says: “This rule respecting our garments applies likewise to our other possessions.” Religious, therefore, who are specially bound to the observance of these precepts, ought neither to prevent others from robbing them, nor to ask for their property to be returned.

4. Our Lord gave the following order to His Apostles: Whoever does not receive you, nor hear your words, go forth from that house or city, shake off the dust from your feet” (Matt. x. 14). The same precept is recorded by Luke (ix. 5). From these words we see that Apostles, and Apostolic and

perfect men, ought not to litigate if they are not received into a town, or hamlet or a society.

5. “If any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom nor the church of God” (1 Cor. xi. 16). They, therefore, who institute legal proceedings depart from the Apostolic rule of perfection.

6. Charity does not seek her own,” the Apostle writes (1 Cor. xiii. 5), or as the Gloss explains, “requires not that her own property should be returned to her.” Therefore men who go to law to secure the restitution of their goods, have not charity.

7. St. Gregory (XIII Moral.) says: “He that for the sake of some earthly possession disagrees with another, shows that he loves a material good better than his neighbour. This is contrary to the order of charity.” They then who disturb their neighbour’s peace in order to recover their own property, sin against charity.

8. St. Jerome gives the following rule: “As long as threefold truth [cf. Summa theologiae, I, q. 16, a. 1, ad 1] be preserved, anything should be done or left undone to avoid scandal.” Now a man can, without any injury to the threefold truth, suffer himself to be despoiled of his goods; ando if he, in order to recover them, institutes a lawsuit, to the disturbance and scandal of his neighbour, he is acting against charity. Food is essential for the maintenance of life; but we may abstain from food, in order to avoid scandalising our neighbour. “If meat scandalizes my brother I will never eat flesh” (1 Cor. viii. 13). If then in order to avoid giving scandal, we are to refrain from so necessary a thing as food, we ought, with far greater reason, to renounce any other temporal good rather than disturb or scandalize our neighbour.

On the other hand, we can adduce proofs that holy men are at times justified in availing themselves of the protection of the law.

1. St. Paul, when in danger of being delivered to the Jews, appealed to the hearing of Augustus (Acts xxv) i.e., he appealed to the Roman law. An appeal is to go to a higher judgment. Therefore, perfect men may go to law.

2. We know, by the example of the same saint that it is at times lawful for apostolic men to be defendedby armed force. For in the Acts of the Apostles (xxiii.) we read that St. Paul procured his rescue from the snares of his enemies by means of an army.

3. We know further that it is permissible for holy men sometimes to defend themselves, especially in the case of an ecclesiastical judgment. For, when Paul and Barnabas were at Antioch, no small contest arose between them and those who taught the brethren that they must be circumcised. Then Paul and Barnabas went up to the Apostles in Jerusalem about this question. St. Paul, alluding to this discussion, speaks of the " false brethren, smuggled in, who came in privately to spy our liberty which we have in Christ Jesus, that they might bring us into servitude. We did not submit to them even for a moment" (Gal. ii. 4). Hence religious and perfect men may appeal to an ecclesiastical court in defence of their liberty.

4. St. Gregory expressly says (XXXI Moral.) "that religious may defend their property by legal means" On the words of Job (chap. x. 16), "he has laboured in vain," St. Gregory says: "When the care of our material property imposes upon us the necessity for travelling, we must, if we are despoiled of our possessions, at times endure our loss. At other times we must, while taking every pains to preserve charity, prevent such robbery. We should act thus not only to secure our own property, but, still more to prevent those who would pillage us from losing their souls. Hence in defending our possessions against rapine, our chief care ought to be not so much to guard ourselves against loss, as to save our enemies from committing sin."

5. St.Gregory likewise commenting on the words of Job (xxiv. 26), "he goeth forward to meet armed men," says, "we are generally left in peace and quiet if we care not to confront the wicked for the sake of justice. But, if our heart is inflamed with desire for eternal life and our mind is truly enlightened, we shall, as far as circumstances permit or the cause require, throw ourselves into the breach in defence of righteousness. We shall go forth to intercept the wicked in their misdeeds, even though they do not seek us out. For, when unjust men aim their blows at the virtue that we love in others, they wound us also, even though they may seem to venerate our person." Hence we see that it is the duty of perfect men to defend others who may be attacked, even though they themselves are not provoked.

6. It is a charitable office to deliver the oppressed from their oppressors. "I broke the jaws of the wicked man, and out of his teeth I took away the prey " (Job xxix. 17). "Deliver those who are being led to death" (Prov. xxiv. 11). "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the

sinner” (Ps. lxxxi. 4). Now we are bound to perform charitable offices, primarily towards those most closely connected with us. Hence, as religious are most closely bound to their religious brethren, they ought in charity to oppose those who oppress their order. By this and by all the preceding arguments, we learn that religious not only may, but ought to resist the violence and artifices of their enemies.

We must remember that the assailants of religious orders attack them, sometimes in spiritual and sometimes in temporal matters. When religious are oppressed in what concerns their spiritual rights, they ought to resist their oppressors with all their might, especially when the questions involved affect not only themselves, but others. For religious embrace the religious life solely in order to be free to devote themselves to spiritual interests. If their spiritual liberty is curtailed, their object in becoming religious is frustrated. Consequently, as it is a point of perfection for them to carry out their object, it is likewise a point of perfection for them to resist all the obstacles which may be placed in the way of its attainment.

If religious are attacked as to their material interests, perfection demands that so long as their injury be of a private and personal nature, they should bear it patiently, as St. Gregory reminds us, lest by resistance they incite their enemies to violence. If, however, the damage inflicted on them affects not only their own, but the common welfare (even in temporal matters), they ought, as far as possible, to resist their oppressors. It is not perfection but indolence and cowardice to endure such oppression when it might be resisted. For, as we have just said, everyone is bound in charity to defend his neighbour from injury as far as he is able to do so, according to the words of the Book of Proverbs (xxiv. 11): “Deliver those who are being led to death” etc.

We will now proceed to examine the objections brought against our proposition.

1. By the words of St. Paul, quoted in the first objection, some things are forbidden to all men; others are forbidden to the perfect only. All men, as we know by the Gloss, are forbidden to plead a cause before a heathen tribunal, or to assert their rights by contention or by fraud. Perfect men are forbidden to go to law in order to obtain the restoration of their property. This rule applies, however, as Gratian tells us (XIX, quaest. I, cap. Episcopus) to the restoration of private property. It is as lawful for them to

recover common possessions, as it is for them to hold them. For their common property belongs not to themselves, but to the Church. Therefore, when they sue for its restitution, they are seeking to recover what they hold for the Church. This Gloss is not authentic but magisterial. It is taken from St. Augustine, who holds that it is allowable and pardonable for imperfect men to go to law, but that such a course is not becoming in the perfect. But, if it be not lawful for those in a state of perfection to appeal to a legal tribunal, such a course cannot be permissible for bishops, since the episcopal state is one of higher perfection than is the religious. Otherwise, an appointment to a bishopric would not be promotion for a religious.

The fact that a man has embraced a state of perfection does not render things unlawful for him which before were lawful, unless by vow he has bound himself to refrain from them. Hence it is no more unlawful for a man to go to law after he has become a religious than it was before he embraced the religious state, unless indeed, by instituting legal proceedings, he should violate his vow of poverty or should occasion scandal. Litigation would be an infraction of the vow of poverty, were a religious to contend for some private property, since by his vow the possession of such property is interdicted to him. It may be added, and perhaps with truth, that the words of the Gloss to which reference has been made do not apply to a state of perfection, such as is the religious state. For religions have no personal possessions; and hence the Gloss could not say absolutely that they might claim their own property. The words of the Gloss must, rather, be understood to refer to the perfect in charity, i.e., to those who possess perfect charity, in whatsoever state of life they may be. Although they do not sin by making a legal claim to their property, they nevertheless, by so doing, diminish the perfection of their charity. Hence the Gloss does not say that it is forbidden for perfect men to go to law, but that it is unbecoming in them to do so. But in certain cases it is not even unbecoming in them to institute legal proceedings.

(a) The first of such cases, is, when a dispute has arisen concerning a spiritual matter. Thus, we read in the Acts that when dissension arose at Antioch on the question of circumcision, Paul and Barnabas went to Jerusalem to submit the point to the Apostles (Acts xv). Again, St. Paul speaks of “false brethren smuggled in” (Gal. ii. 4).

(b) The second case is that in which contention arises on some matter (even though it be a temporal concern) which may be a cause of spiritual harm. St. Paul, although he longed “to be dissolved and to be with Christ” (Phi. i.), appealed to the Roman law for release when he saw that his death or imprisonment would be an obstacle to the spreading of the Gospel.

(c) The third case is that in which material loss may accrue to another, especially to the poor. We defraud others if, through our negligence, we suffer them to be robbed. If they are under our charge, our fault becomes more grievous. By such negligence, we do not offer to God a perfect sacrifice. For “he who offers sacrifice of the goods of the poor is like one who sacrifices a son in the presence of his father” (Sirach xxxiv. 24).

(d) The fourth case is when the contention involves our neighbour’s spiritual welfare, in as much as he would lose his soul were he to keep the property of another. Hence St. Gregory, on the words of Job (xxxix. 16), “he has laboured in vain,” says: “At times it is our duty to bear with patience the robbery our goods; at other times we must charitably resist those who cheat us. This we do, not from self interest, but lest, through their dishonesty, they should lose their souls” (XXXI Moral.).

(e) The fifth case is when the example of dishonesty would deprave many: “Because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear” (Sirah viii. 11).

2 and 3. We answer the second and third objections that, as the Gloss says, “the perfection of justice is established in three precepts.” First, “if one shall strike you on the right cheek, offer him the other.” Secondly, “if anyone will contend with you in judgment and take your coat from you, let your cloak go also.” Thirdly, “whoever would force you to go one mile, go with him another mile.” The third precept is not to be understood literally, for we do not read that it was so interpreted, either by Christ or by His disciples: “If anyone force us one mile, we must be prepared, if need be, to go another with him.” Again, St. Augustine, speaking of the first of these three precepts, says in his book De mendacio, that it is to be understood to signify that a man must be prepared, for the sake of truth, to suffer not only buffets, but any torments in a spirit of charity to those that inflict them. Literal obedience to the precept is not enjoined; since neither our Lord nor St. Paul turned the other cheek. The third precept must be understood in the same sense, namely, that a man must be ready to endure any material loss in

the cause of righteousness and charity. But, as we have said before, cases arise in which, without any prejudice either to charity or truth, we are justified in legally asserting our claims to property.

4. Our Lord ordered His Apostles to shake the dust from their feet as a witness against those who refused to receive them. “Shake off the dust from your feet, as a testimony to them” (Matt. x. 14). The Gloss, commenting on the words, “shake off the dust,” says: “Do so, as a witness of the travail which you have fruitlessly endured on their behalf.” This shall be an appeal to to Divine judgment. That this is what our Lord meant, we know by His words: “Amen, I say to you, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah on the day of judgment than for that city” (Matt., x 15). By these words, our Lord instructs His disciples, to depart from those that will not receive them. For they, like infidels, are reserved for the final judgment of God. St. Paul says of unbelievers: “Those who are without, God will judge” (1 Cor. v. 13). Those that are within are committed to the judgment of the Church. Hence if any man desire to be received into the Church, and those who belong to the fold refuse to communicate with him, he should appeal not to the judgment of God, but to the tribunal of the Church.

5. Contention is forbidden to all those who are weak in faith. The words of St. Paul (1 Cor. vi.), “Already indeed there is plainly a fault,” are thus explained by the Gloss: “The audacious clamour of contention wars against the truth.” The same explanation is given of the words in the Epistle to the Romans (i. 29), “murder, contention.” Hence they who appeal for justice, without noisy assertion of their claim, are not contentious.

6. It is not true that none can, without a violation of charity, demand the restitution of their goods. What is true is that when avarice leads a man to demand such restitution, he is not acting in charity. On the words, “charity seeks not her own,” the Gloss says: “Charity seeks not her own, for she does not love money.” However, as we have seen from a passage of St. Gregory, already quoted, zeal for fraternal correction may at times stimulate a man to demand the restoration of his property.

7. If a man go to law, he need not necessarily be in discord with his neighbour. Although peace of heart should not be lost for the sake of any earthly gain, it does not follow that it is never permissible to make a legal claim to our property. Peace of mind may be preserved in a law court, as on a battle field. Otherwise, war would be always unlawful.

8. A man who justly claims the restitution of his goods does not actively give scandal. If scandal is taken at his action, he is merely the passive cause of such scandal. There are two kinds of scandal. There is a Pharisaical scandal, by which men, out of malice, take scandal at their neighbour and cause scandal to him. When our Lord was told that the Pharisees were scandalized at Him, He said: " Let them alone; they are blind and leaders of the blind" (Matt. xv. 14). There is likewise the scandal taken by weak and ignorant persons. When possible, we must avoid giving this scandal; but we must not do anything wrong out of fear of occasioning it. Now it is wrong to suffer the property of the Church to be pillaged; and, even at the risk of giving scandal, we must resist such injustice. Thus St. Thomas of Canterbury defended the rights of the Church, at the sacrifice of his life, making no account of the scandal taken by the King of England. Even if he could, without sin, have suffered the Church to be robbed, the fear of being a passive cause of scandal, would not have been sufficient cause to justify him in permitting such pillage to take place. It is also possible to obviate giving scandal to weaker brethren by speaking to them gently and pointing out that it is really more to our neighbour's advantage to check him in a course of injustice than it would be to suffer him, by indulgence, to fall into a habit of dishonesty. Furthermore, a man is more strictly bound to preserve himself from taking scandal than to avoid scandalizing others. Therefore, if he knows that unless he reclaims his own possessions, he will himself be scandalized, it is his duty to demand them.

9. Though it be true that food is essential to the preservation of life, this proposition does not apply to every kind of food. A man may abstain from one dish, and live on another. Hence it may be better, for the sake of avoiding scandal, to refrain from one kind of food, rather than to abandon certain temporal possessions. For, by not requiring their restitution, we may, as has been said, occasion sin.

CHAPTER 4

Religious Are Blamed for Causing Their Persecutors to Be Punished

WE must next expose the grounds on which religious, are expected to allow their enemies to persecute them with impunity.

1. We read in the Gospel of St. Matthew (v. 44): “Do good to those who hate you; pray for those who persecute and calumniate you.” Again, in Luke (vi) the same precept is given. If we are to do good to our persecutors, we certainly ought not to cause evil to befall them.

2. “Behold I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves” (Matt. v. , 16). On this passage, the Gloss comments in the following words: “He who undertakes the office of preacher, ought not to inflict evil, but to’ suffer it.” Hence preachers who procure the punishment of their persecutors, prove themselves, thereby, to be false preachers.

3. “To no man rendering evil for evil” (Rom. xii., 17). Again in the same chapter it is written: “Revenge not yourselves, my dearly beloved.” Hence those who cause their adversaries to be punished, act in disobedience to St. Paul.

4. We read in the Legends of Saints Simon and Jude that when the general of the King of Persia wished to punish the heathen priests who had persecuted these Saints, the Apostles cast themselves at his feet and implored the pardon of their enemies. For, they said, they did not wish to be the cause of death to any of those to whom they came to preach salvation. Hence, they who cause their assailants to be punished are not true, but false apostles.

5. “As then he who was born according to the flesh persecuted him that was after the Spirit, so also it is now” (Gal. iv. 29). St. Augustine observes,

on this passage: “Who are those who are born according to the flesh?—The lovers of the world. Who are those who are after the Spirit?—The lovers of heaven and of Christ,” They, therefore, who cause others to be persecuted, must, seemingly, be lovers of the world.

4. “ Let us not be made desirous of vainglory” (Gal. v. 26). The Gloss says that “vain glory is the desire for victory, where no reward is gained.” Now those who wish to see their enemies worsted are desirous of victory. Hence it is by no means permissible for holy men to wish to see persecution arise against their opponents.

7. When St, Luke and St. John said to our Lord: “Lord, do you want us to command fire to come down from Heaven and consume them?” He rebuked them, saying, “You do not know of what spirit you are.” They, therefore, who are filled with the Holy Spirit ought no to cause others to be punished.

On the other hand, examples can be adduced, proving that holy men have inflicted chastisement, or caused it to be inflicted.

1. Our Lord “drove the buyers and sellers out of the temple; their money He poured out and their tables He overthrew” (John ii. 14).

2. St. Peter condemned Ananias and Saphira to death, in punishment of their deceit (Acts v.).

3. St. Peter, filled with the Holy Spirit, looked upon Elymas the Magician, and said: “O full of all guile and of all deceit, child of the devil, enemy of all justice, you never stop perverting the right ways of the Lord. And now, behold, the hand of the Lord is upon you; you shall be blind, not seeing the sun for a time” (Acts xiii. 10). Here we have an example of an Apostle, both rebuking and punishing a sinner.

4. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians (v. 3), we read the following words: “I have already judged, as though I were present, him that has done so. In the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, you, being gathered together with my spirit, with the power of our Lord Jesus deliver such an person to Satan, for the destruction of his flesh.” The meaning of this, is, says the Gloss, “that Satan may inflict on him bodily torments.” Here, we have another proof of chastisement, inflicted by an Apostle on an evildoer.

5. In the Canticle of Canticles (ii. 15) we read: “Catch us the little foxes.” By which words the Gloss understands, “Pursue and overcome schismatics and heretics.” “For (as another Gloss explains) it will not suffice for us to

spend our lives in preaching and setting a good example, unless we correct those that are in error, and preserve the weak from their snares."

6. Dionysius says (IV De Div. Nom.) "that the angels are not wicked, although they punish wicked men. Now the ecclesiastical hierarchy is modelled on the heavenly. Hence a man may, without any malice, punish evildoers, or procure their punishment.

7. We read (23 Qaest. cap. Qui potest), " To neglect to check evil is to encourage it; and he who fails to put down public crime may legitimately be suspected of secret connivance at it." Hence not only is it lawful to resist and punish offenders, but it is sinful not to do so.

8. Job (xxxix. 21) says of the horse, by which preachers are typified, "He goes to meet armed men", because, says the Gloss, "a preacher opposes injustice in defence of the truth, even when this duty is not imposed upon him." Thus we see that holy preachers must wrestle with impiety, even when impious men do not attack them. But, the Saints act this way not out of hatred, but out of love. Thus, St. Paul, as the Gloss observes, when he delivered, "such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh" (1 Cor. V. 3), did so that the Spirit might be saved; whereby we see that his act was inspired not by malice, but by charity. The Gloss further adds: "Elijah and other good men also punished certain sinners by death. By so doing, they inspired the living with a salutary fear, and diminished the number of sins which might have been committed by those whom they condemned to death." Hence the chastisement inflicted by holy men on sinners cannot strictly be called persecution. For they do not punish them for the sake of making them suffer, but in order either to correct or check them in their sins, or else in order to deliver others from their oppression, or to restrain others from crime by fear of punishment. Sometimes, however, this chastisement may metaphorically be called persecution. Thus, St. Augustine writing to the Count Boniface (23, quaest. 4, cap. Si ecclesia) says "that the persecution inflicted by the wicked on the Church of Christ is unjust, and that inflicted by the Church on sinners is just."

9. David says (Ps. xvii. 38), "I will pursue after my enemies... till they are consumed." Again, "The man that detracted his neighbour in private, I persecuted." (Ps. c. 5).

We will now proceed to answer the arguments used by the enemies of religious, to prove that they are acting unlawfully in causing their persecutors to be punished.

1. It has already been proved that when holy men cause punishment to be inflicted on their enemies, they act not out of malice, but out of love. Hence they do their enemies good, rather than harm.

2. Preachers ought not, in causing their adversaries to be punished, to make their discomfiture their chief object. Their aim in chastising their enemies ought to be their conversion, or the benefit of others.

3. He who, out of zeal for virtue, causes another to be punished, does not return "evil for evil," but rather good for evil; since the punishment inflicted is of benefit to him who suffers it. Punitive measures are at times remedial, says Aristotle (2 Ethic). And Dionysius observes (IV De Div. Nom.): "It is not an evil thing to be punished, but to deserve punishment." The prohibition against returning blow for blow means that we must not strike another out of malice or from revenge.

4. The Saints, as we have said, never punish others, nor cause, them to be punished, save out of desire for their amendment, or for the public welfare. If men are suffered to commit crime with impunity, they wax bold and become hardened in sin. "Because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear" (Eccl. viii. 11). Therefore, the Saints inflict penalties on evildoers; but, when they see that indulgence would be more profitable to them, they remit the punishment Web is due. The Gloss remarks on the words, "You know not of what spirit you are" (Luke ix.), "It is not well always to take vengeance on the guilty, for at times mercy will avail more in bringing them to patience, and the fallen to amendment." For this reason, Simon and Jude averted punishment from their enemies.

5. The lovers of this world unjustly, as St. Augustine says, persecute those who love God; and they, in turn, are justly persecuted by them.

6, The saints, as we have already said, do not cause others to be punished, save in the hope of causing them to amend. The benefit of their neighbour they count as their reward. Hence they cannot be said to incur the stigma of vain glory.

7. The seventh objection is answered by the Gloss. The Apostles, it explains, were untutored men at the time they spoke thus; they were ignorant of the way in which they might cause others to amend. Therefore, they spoke, not out of zeal for their neighbour's correction; nor out of desire

to check vice; but from aspirit of revenge. our Lord reproved them for their ignorance. At a later time, however, when he had instructed them in a spirit of true charity, he gave thom authority to punish sinners. Such power they exercised towards Ananias and Saphira, whose death was profitable both in inspiring the living with awe, and in preventing the guilty man and woman from adding to their crimes. The same comment is made by the Gloss on the words in 1 Cor. v. 3, “to hand over such a one to Satan.” Or we may say that our Lord forbade the disciples to call down fire on the Samaritans, because He knew that they would be more easily converted by mercy. The Gloss also accepts this view: “The Samaritans who, in this place, were saved from fire, believed with greater firmness.”

CHAPTER 5

Religious Are Accused of Seeking to Find Favour with Men

WE will, in this chapter, examine the arguments brought forward to prove that religious ought not to seek to please men.

1. We read in Ps. lii. 6, “God has scattered the bones of those who please men; they have been confounded, because God has despised them.”

2. St. Paul says (Gal. i. 10): “If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.” Hence religious, who profess to be the servants of Christ, ought not to seek to please men.

3 . We read in 1 Cor. iv. the following words: “Even to this hour we both hunger and thirst.” On this passage, the Gloss says, “The Apostles, by preaching fearlessly and without flattery and by reproving the evildoers, won no favour with men.” Hence religious, who are bound to preach the truth freely, ought not to seek to please men.

4. “He who is charged with the gifts of the bridegroom and seeks to find favour with the bride, commits adultery in his heart,” says St. Gregory (Pastoral.). Now the bride is the Church, the bridegroom being God’s minister. Therefore, religious who, although ministers of God, seek the friendship of men, are guilty of spiritual adultery.

5. The desire to win human favour is the outcome of self-love; and, as St. Gregory remarks (Pastoral.), “love of self renders a man indifferent to his Creator.” Hence, in so far as a man strives to render himself popular with his fellow-men, he becomes estranged from God.

6. Religious ought to beware of anything savouring of vice; and, as popularity may render a man suspected of vice, as Aristotle says (IV Ethic.), religious ought not to desire to be popular.

These are the chief arguments brought forward by those who seek to prove that religious ought, under no circumstances, to desire to win human favour. It will now be our duty to expose the fallacy which underlies these objections.

1. St. Paul says (Rom. xv. 2), “ Let every one of you please, his neighbour to good, unto edification.”

2. He likewise says, “Be without offence to the Jews and to the Gentiles and to the church of God, as I also in all things please all men” (1 Cor. x. 32).

3. St. Paul likewise says (Rom. xii. 17), “providing good things, not only in the sight of God, but also in sight of all men.” Now this exhortation would be meaningless if it were wrong for men to consider how they may please their neighbours. Therefore, everyone ought to take thought how he may please others.

4. We read in St. Matt (v. 16), “So let your light shine before men that they may see your good works, and may glorify your Father who is in heaven.” Now men will not be moved to glorify God by the sight of good works which do not please them. Hence it is the duty of everyone to take care that his works may be such as will please his neighbour.

We must, however, remember that three circumstances may make it unlawful in us to seek to please men. First, desire of human approbation must not be the primary motive of our actions. We ought to seek to please men for the sake of their salvation and for the glory of God. This is what is meant by the words in the Pastorale of St. Gregory: “Good priests should seek to please men, not in order to be loved by them, but in order that by winning their esteem, they may draw them to the desire of truth. They ought to wish to gain the hearts of their hearers in order to lead them to the love of God. For it is very difficult for an unpopular preacher to gain an audience.” He adds, “St. Paul points out this lesson in the words: ‘I please all men in all things.’” St. Paul likewise says: “If I should please men, I should not be the servant of Christ.” Hence St. Paul did please men, and did not please them. For when he wished to please them, he desired to win their favour not for himself, but for the truth.

Secondly, we may not displease God in order to please men. This is the interpretation given by St. Jerome to the words in Galatians, “if I should please men,” etc. “If” he says, “we can please both God and men, we must please men. But if we cannot please men without displeasing God, we ought to please God rather than men."

Thirdly, it happens at times that a man does all that in him lies, and yet he is rashly judged by others. If he does his best, and yet is misjudged by men, he ought to be content that his conscience assures him that he is approved by God, without distressing himself on account of the false judgments of men. The Gloss makes the following comments on the words, "if I should please men" etc. (Gal. i.): "Some men are false judges, backbiter, and fault-finders. They try to cast suspicion on what they do not see, and to asperse deeds on which no suspicion has alighted. Against such as these, the testimony of our own conscience is our best defence."

We shall have no difficulty in refuting the remaining objections.

1 and 2. " God has scattered the bones of those who please men," is to be understood, as applying to those who make the favour of men the chief object of their ambition, and who, in order to please mortals, are ready to offend God. The words of Gal. i., "If I should please men," are to be understood in the same sense.

3. Although preachers of the truth may be hated by sinners who are unwilling to amend their lives, they gain the favour of those who desire instruction. "Rebuke a wise man and he will love you" (Prov. ix 8).

4. The words of St. Gregory, quoted as an objection to our proposition, refer to those who make it their sole ambition to find favour with men, and who desire to be loved with a love due to God alone, even though they do not commit any overt offence against Him. That this is the sense of the passage is clearly shown by its context, which runs as follows: "He is an enemy to our Redeemer, who desires, for the sake of his good works, to be loved by the Church."

5. The words of St. Gregory, quoted in the fifth objection, are to be understood, as referring to that inordinate self love which causes men to seek, merely for their own sake, to please their neighbour.

6. The word to seek popularity (esse placidum) used in the sixth objection, means not simply one who seeks to please men, but one who desires to an excessive degree to please them, and who is willing to do wrong for the sake of pleasing them. He who merely seeks to please others in an ordinate manner ought to be called a friend, and is so called by the Philosopher.

CHAPTER 6

Objections Brought Against Religious, Because They Rejoice At the Good Works Which God Effects Through Their Instrumentality

THE following arguments are the chief of those adduced to prove that religious ought not to rejoice at the good works, which God effects by means of them.

1. It is written in the Gospel of Luke (x. 20), “Rejoice not in this that spirits are subject unto you.” Religious ought not, therefore, to rejoice on account of any of the other great works which God effects by means of them.

2. Job says (xxxi. 25): “If I have rejoiced over my great riches, and because my hand had gotten much– If I beheld the sun when it shined, and the moon going in brightness, and my heart in secret rejoiced– “ “May evil befall me,” is the conclusion to be understood, though it is not expressed. St. Gregory (22 Moral.) makes the following commentary on this passage: “Knowledge had not puffed up this holy man; therefore he scorned to exult at his wealth. The greatness of his work had not elated him; therefore, he did not look at the brightness of the sun. He did not covet renown; therefore he took no heed to the moon, sailing in her radiance through the heaven:” Hence it is clear that no one ought to rejoice on account of knowledge or fame, or mighty works.

3. The degree in which men glory in anything, is proportionate to the joy they take in it. Now man should not glory in his possessions. “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his

strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches” (Jer. ix. 23). From this text we learn likewise that no man should glory in the good effected by him. Our adversaries strive from it to prove that religious have no right to glory in the great works which God accomplishes by means of them.

1. The fallacy of this argument is shown by the words which we read in the Acts of the Apostles (ii. 22). We are told that at the preaching of some of the faithful, “a great number, believing, were converted to the Lord. And the tidings came to the ears of the Church that was at Jerusalem touching these things; and they sent Barnabas as far as Antioch. When he came saw the grace of God, he rejoiced.” Here, we see how the Apostles were filled with joy, at the good work done in the Church, by their brethren and fellow-labourers.

2. We, further, read (Acts xv. 3) that “Paul and Barnabas being brought on their way by the Church, passed through Phenice and Samaria, relating the conversion of the Gentiles; and they caused great joy to all the brethren.”

3. St. Paul again addresses the Philippians (iv. 1): “ Dearly beloved brethren, and most desired, my joy, and my crown.” He evidently and openly rejoiced in those whom he had converted to Christ. Why then may not religious and other men rejoice at the great works which God effects by, their means, and especially at the conversion of others?

4. We return thanks only for what we consider to be a favour granted to us. Now no one receives a favour without rejoicing at it. If then it is not permissible to rejoice at great deeds which God does by means of us, we have no reason to thank Him for them. This proposition is, of course, absurd.

5. Aristotle says (I Ethic.): “No one is just who does not rejoice at works of justice.” This sentiment agrees with the verse of the Psalm (xcix. 2): “ Serve the Lord with gladness.” No work of the Lord is so magnificent as is the work of justice, whereby He is served, Therefore, holy men ought to rejoice that God effects this great work by their instrumentality.

We must bear in mind that joy appertains only to what is good, and that it ought to be proportioned to the degree of goodness existent in the things at which we rejoice. Hence we ought to find our greatest joy in the highest good. We may rejoice in other things, but we ought not to find perfect joy in them. This is to be sought for only in the highest good. Now he who rejoices at the good which God effects by his means rejoices rightly, if he places his joy in God, i.e., if he rejoices because the good wrought through his instrumentality tends to the glory of God, and to his own and his neighbour’s salvation. But if he rejoices in any other spirit, he rejoices in his own works and commits sin. Hence St. Gregory, explaining the words of Job already quoted, says (22 Moral.): “At times holy men rejoice on account of the good repute in which they are held. But as they only desire to be esteemed for the sake of doing more good amongst those to whom they preach, they rejoice when they are thought well of, not for the sake of their own honour, but for the profit of others. It is one thing to seek human favour, and another to rejoice at the improvement which we effect in our neighbour?’

The remaining objections will easily be answered.

1. The words, “rejoice not in this, that spirits are subject to you” (Luke x. 20), are to be understood as an order to the Apostles to rejoice, not on account of their victory over evil spirits, but on account of the glory of God. The Gloss says: “They are forbidden to rejoice at the abasement of the devil, who fell through pride; they are rather to exult at the honour given to God.” Or else we may understand that the Apostles were commanded not to rejoice at the fall of Satan as if that were the highest good. For he might have been overcome without any merit on their part. Their chief joy was to be, as our Lord told them, that their names were “written in Heaven: (Luke x. 20).

2. The words quoted from Job (xxxi. 25) are to be understood of the joy which produces elation of spirit. For it is pride for a man to rejoice in the works wrought by God through his agency as if they were a subject for vain glory.

3. He who refers the glory of his works to God, rejoices not in himself, but in God, to whom he refers all that can be a cause for glory.

CHAPTER 7

Religious Are Blamed for Frequenting the Courts of Sovereigns

Wit will now examine the grounds, on which, it is alleged that religious ought not to be intimate with the families of royal, or noble, personages.

1. In the Gospel of St. Matthew (xi. 8) we read: “Behold those who are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings.” Now “soft garments” are not fitting for religious, who profess to lead a life of penance. Therefore, religious ought not to frequent the houses of kings and princes. The Gloss says (on this text): “Preaching and austerity of life are not compatible with the dwellings of those that live in luxury, and are haunted by flatterers, clothed in soft garments.”

2. He spoke with them concerning the Kingdom of God (Luke ix.). On these words the Gloss says: “Christ imparted the nourishment of heavenly grace not to those who dwelt in idleness in the synagogues, i.e, the abodes of earthly dignity, but to those who sought Him in desert places.” If then the religious Weis ordained as a means of acquiring grace, religious ought not to dwell among those who are in the high places of this world.

3. St. Jerome writesin the following terms to Paulinus the priest: “Shun assemblies of men, exalted offices, honourable salutations, banquets, and all such pleasures which, as chains, bind you to the earth.” Now it is at the courts of princes that assemblies and banquets are chiefly held. Therefore, religious ought not to frequent courts.

4. Boethius says in his book De Consolatione that they who glory in power, seek either to reign themselves or to become attached to reigning sovereigns.” Now, as it is highly reprehensible in religious who have chosen

a life of humility to glory in power, they ought not to frequent the households of kings.

5. Honour leads to pride of life, which is one of the three things most to be reprobated. Religious who have renounced the world, ought to avoid all that pertains to honour. Now, as preaching at the courts of kings or princes or before a large concourse of people is an honourable function, religious ought not to undertake it, nor should they frequent the company of royal personages.

This proposition is manifestly false, as is proved by the example of many holy men who have dwelt among kings and princes. Joseph lived at the court of Pharaoh, who “made him master of his house, and ruler of all his possessions” (Ps. civ. 21). Moses was reared by the daughter of another Pharaoh, and was instructed in Egyptian lore (Acts vii.). Nathan the prophet was numbered among the confidants of David and of Solomon. Daniel dwelt in the court of the king of Babylon, who made him governor of all his provinces and, at his desire, set Sidrach, Misach, and Abednego over public works. Commenting on the text, “Daniel himself was in the king’s palace” (Dan. ii. 49), the Gloss says that “he dwelt at the king’s side, and was honoured by him, and was familiar with him.” Nehemiah was the cup-bearer of the Persian King (Nehem., i.). Mardochai became ruler in the court of Assuerus (Esther viii.).

In the New Testament we likewise find examples of holy men who dwelt with royal personages. Thus St. Paul writes: “All the saints salute you, especially those that are of Caesar’s household” (Phil. iv.). We read that St. Sebastian was one of the first favourites at the court of Diocletian. St. John and St. Paul, in like manner, were attached to the household of Constantine Augustus. St. Gregory likewise says in the Prologue to his Morals that “he dwelt in an earthly palace, to which many of his monastic brethren had, inspired by fraternal charity, followed him.” It is not, therefore, unlawful for religious or perfect men to dwell in the courts of Kings.

In order to establish this controversy on a solid basis, we must remark that holy men seek certain things for their own sake, and certain other things for the sake of their neighbours. For their own sake, they would prefer to adhere to Christ by contemplation, either in this world, in so far as human infirmity will permit them so to do, or in the next world, where contemplation is made perfect. For the sake of others, however, charity urges them at times to interrupt their much-loved contemplation, and to expose themselves to the stress of active life. Hence while by desire they enjoy the quiet of contemplation, for the sake of their neighbour's salvation they patiently endure the toil of action. Thus St. Paul says (Phil. i. 23): "I am straitened between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ... but to abide still in the flesh is needful for you." St, Gregory says (Homil. XLII. part 1 super Ezech.): "One sole consolation remains to the soul enamoured of the heavenly Bridegroom, but not yet admitted to His presence. She delights in working for the salvation of her neighbour, and in enkindling in the souls of others the fire of Divine love." This is the reason why the saints at times mingle with men, and seek the favour and friendship of the great. They are led to do so, not from desire of popularity or advancement, but in order to lead others to salvation. For as St. Augustine says (8 Confess.): "They who are well known are in a position to assist many in this work of their salvation; and they are followed by many." The Saint adds: "The enemy is most surely defeated in him whom he has held most securely, and by whose example he holds many others." Now many proud men are held by the reputation of nobility, and many others by that of authority. Hence the saints, inspired by charity, seek the friendship of those who are noble and powerful, in order, by their means, to become an instrument of salvation to many. Did they act thus for any other motive, their conduct would be reprehensible. St. Gregory says (Pastorale), "He who desires to be useful to others, gives an example to all, since the only begotten Son of God left the bosom of the Father for the salvation of all men."

With this preface, we shall be able, easily, to refute all the objections made by our opponents.

1. The words quoted from St. Matthew (xi.), "They who are clothed in soft garments," apply manifestly to those who frequent the houses of kings for the sake of luxury. The words of the Gloss, quoted in the same objection, refer to those who dwell idly in cities, or indolently enjoy high offices. But the saints repose only in God; they find their rest in Him alone. To be obliged to consort with a number of men, or to accept posts of honour is to them weariness, rather than an enjoyment.

2. St. Jorome's advice to Paulinus, is a warning against leading a public life, for the sake of pleasure, instead of for utility. He shows this plainly by

speaking of banquets and all such pleasures. He makes this evident by the words which are subjoined: “You should flee from these as from the chains of pleasure.”

S. The words of Boethius contain a great truth. But it does not follow, because they who glory in power seek the company of the powerful, that therefore everyone who frequents the society of the powerful must necessarily glory in power. For, as we have already shown, the saints seek the company of men in high station, from a very different motive.

4. Again, though it be an honourable function to preach to a great concourse of men, the Saints do so not from desire of celebrity, but for the glory of God, imitating Him who said: I seek not my own glory but that of Him who sent me” (John vii. 18).

PART 5

PROLOGUE

The Enemies of Religious Seek, in Every Way, to Defame Them

WE have hitherto spoken of the false judgments passed by the enemies of religious about things. We will next consider the falsehoods uttered by them about persons.

It may perhaps appear that detraction uttered against persons ought to be borne by them without refutation. St. Gregory says, “ The blame of wicked men is a testimony to the innocence of our life. For if we are offensive to those who displease God, it is a proof that our life must be upright” (IX Homil. part 1, super Ezech.). Again, we read (John xv. 18), “If the world hates you, know that it has first hated Me.” St. Paul likewise teaches us that the judgments of men are to be lightly esteemed, saying (1 Cor. iv. 3): “To me it is a very small thing to be judged by you, or by man’s day.” We can especially afford to despise human opinion when we have the testimony of a good conscience, and when we can say with Job: “My witness is in heaven” (xvi. 20).

On further consideration, we shall, however, see that it is more prudent for religious to silence the tongues of their detractors. This is evident for three reasons:

1. First, when religious are defames, it is not the reputation of one man, or even of two or three that suffers. The calumny affects the whole body of religious. Hence their defamers ought to be manfully resisted, or else the whole flock of Christ may be torn by the teeth of wolves. Our Lord says: “The hireling sees the wolf coming, and leaves the sheep and flees” (John x. 12). The Gloss remarks that by the “wolf,” is meant either, “they who ravage the Church by violence, or the devil who, spiritually, scatters the

faithful.” The cowardly pastors whom Christ calls hirelings, are thus reproved by Ezekiel (xiii. 5): “You have not gone up to face the enemy, nor have you set up a wall for the house of Israel.”

2.”Religious ought to resist their detractors, because they not only require a good conscience for their own sake, they likewise need fair reputation in order to carry weight with those to whom they preach. The Gloss, speaking of detraction, says on the words of St. Paul (Gal. iv.), “Cast out the handmaid,” etc., “All who seek for earthly happiness in the Church, belong still to Ishmael. These are they who wage war against spiritual men and defame them, and whose lips utter evil things, and whose tongues are full of guile.” Therefore religious ought to resist those who thus detract them. St. Gregory likewise observes, in the homily already quoted: “They who occupy a position in which they are looked up to as an example, ought, if possible, to silence the voice of their detractors, lest the faithful, believing these calumnies, refuse to listen to preaching and become hardened in a sinful life.” St. John, writing to Gaius (Ep. iii), says of Diotrephes: “If I come, I will advertise the works which he does with malicious words prating against us.” And St. Paul writes in like manner (2 Cor. x, 10), “His epistles, indeed, they say they weighty and strong, but his bodily presence is weak, and his speech is contemptible.”

3. Religious ought to resist their detractors because they strive not only to defame religious life, but to abolish it entirely. They strive to induce bishops to cause all men to avoid religious, and to refuse to assist them in their needs. This policy is represented by the following words from Isaiah (vii. 5), “Syria has taken counsel against you, unto the evil of Ephraim and the sons of Romelia, saying, ‘Let us go up to Judah and rouse it up, and draw it away to us,’ but the Lord God says: ‘It shall not stand, and this shall not be.’” The same description of plot is mentioned in Jeremiah (ii. 19): “They devised counsels against me, saying: ‘Let us... cut him off from the land of the living, and let his name be remembered no more.’” But, as Jacob said, “let not my soul go into their counsel” (Gen. xlix, 6). The cruelty of such detraction ought not to be tolerated; for religious may say with Esther (vii. 4), “We are given up, I and my people, to be destroyed, to be slain and to perish. And, it would be better we were sold as bondsmen and bondswomen. That evil might be borne with, and I would have mourned in

silence.” In Sirach (iv. 26) we find this exhortation: “Accept no person against your own person, nor against your soul a lie.”

In order that religious may effectually resist their detractors, we will note the four forms which detraction generally takes. If any evil exists among good men, (1) that evil will be exaggerated. (2) Doubtful facts will be given to the world as certainties. (3) Falsehoods will be invented. (4) Good deeds will be travestied to wear a bad appearance.

CHAPTER 1

First of All by Exaggerating Any Evil That May Exist Among Them

Now any evil which may exist among religious can be exaggerated in three ways.

Firstly, in order of time. Thus, a crime committed by a religious before his conversion may be recalled to the public mind, in order to put him to shame. The words, “Men shall be lovers of themselves” (2 Tim. iii.) are applied to religious. They are accused of coming from a life of crime into a religious order, which their enemies call “creeping into houses.” St. Gregory exposes the falsity of this accusation. Commenting on the words, “Iron is taken out of the earth” (Job xxviii.), he says (18 Moral.): “Iron shall be taken out of the earth when the champion of the Church is delivered from the earthly bonds that have held him captive.” A man ought not to be despised for what he formerly was, after he has begun to lead a new life. St. Paul, after enumerating the vices of the Corinthians, concludes by saying (1 Cor. vi. 11): “Such some of you were, but you are washed, you are sanctified, you are justified.” Hence the interpretation given by the opponents of religious to the text is contrary to the meaning of St. Paul. For the Apostle did not intend to say that those to whom he wrote had led sinful lives, and afterwards begun to creep into houses. Creeping into houses is one of the vices for which he rebukes them.

Secondly, if any evil prevails among religious, their enemies exaggerate it with regard to persons. Thus the faults committed by two or three individuals are attributed to all religious. Thus it may be said that in certain cases some men are not content with the food set before them, but seek better living elsewhere. Even should this accusation is occasionally true of certain individuals, that is no reason why it should be levelled at all religious in general. Hence St. Augustine, writing to Vincent the Donatist, says (23 Quaest. VI, cap. Quicumque): “If any man, not justly, but avariciously, retains the goods of the poor which you held in the name of the Church, the fact is displeasing to us. You, however, will have some difficulty in proving it. We bear with some men whom we are not able to correct or to punish. We cannot forsake the granary of the Lord on account of the chaff contained therein; nor can we break His nets, because of the worthless fish that they have caught.” For the fact that certain men among religious commit crimes is no reason for defaming the whole religious body. Otherwise, the treachery of Judas ought to have been attributed to the whole College of the Apostles on account of the words, “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?” (John vi. 71). St. Gregory, commenting on the words of Cant. (ii. 2), “As a lily among thorns, so is my beloved among the daughters,” says: “There cannot be bad men without good, nor good without bad.” Of the bad we may use the words of St. John (1 Epist. ii. 19): “They went out from us; but they were not of us.”

Thirdly, the enemies of religious exaggerate the degree of any evil that may prevail among them. Thus, the venial offences of religious are represented to the world as heinous crimes. St. John tells us that no one can live in the world without sin. “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves “ (1 John, i. 8). But the men of whom we have been speaking magnify the slight faults observable even in the perfect, and speak of them as though they were serious crimes. Thereby they disobey the exhortation of the Book of Proverbs (xxiv. 15): “ Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just,” They call religious false apostles, because they say that they seek hospitality the houses of the wealthy, where they will be best fed; because they assist others in their affairs in order to be entertained by them; because they accept material assistance from those to whom they preach; and on other grounds of the like nature. Now though such actions be faulty, they cannot be called grave crimes, nor ought those guilty of them to be on that account named sinners or false apostles. The Gloss, commenting on the verse in Gal. ii., “We, by nature, are Jews and not of the Gentiles, sinners,” This epithet (i.e. sinner), is not used in the Scriptures of those who, although they live upright and praiseworthy lives, are not wholly free from sin.” This observation applies to those who see the mote in their brother’s eye, but not the beam in their own (Matt. iii. 3). The Gloss further remarks that “many, laden with grave sins, are so filled with envy, hatred and malice that they would rather blame and condemn their neighbour for his lesser offences, than strive to correct him.” In short, those who venomously attack religious for small faults, and remain unconscious of their own serious defects, are precisely those of whom our Lord said that they strain a gnat and swallow a camel (Mat. xxxiii. 24).

CHAPTER 2

The Enemies of Religious Spread Abroad Against Them Reports of Which the Truth is Doubtful, for Instance, They Accuse Religious of Seeking Popularity and of Desiring to Gain Glory for Themselves, Instead of Labouring for the Glory of God

WE will next consider how the enemies of religious propagate against them accusations, of which the truth is doubtful.

Doubt exists about future events, and also about the workings of a man’s heart. Nevertheless, the enemies of the religious life do not hesitate to assert that religious will eventually become both immoral and unbelieving. They also profess to be able to read the hearts of religious, and accuse them of desiring popularity, of seeking their own glory instead of the glory of God, and of many other things of like nature. Such accusations convict their authors of rash judgment. “Let us not therefore judge one another, any more,” says St. Paul (Rom. xiv. 13). The Gloss hereon observes: “We judge rashly, if we pass sentence on the secret things of another man’s heart, or if we foretell what a man, who now seems either good or bad, will be in the future.” Such judgments proceed either from pride or envy; and the authors of them prefer rather to blame and to backbite other men, than to correct or improve them. They likewise lay claim to the power of Almighty God, to whom alone it belongs to read the future and the secrets of man’s heart. Isaiah says (xli. 23), “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods.” Jeremiah likewise says (xvii. 9): “The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart.” St. Paul writes (1 Cor. iv. 5), “Judge not before the time.” The Gloss remarks on these words: “It is an insult to the judge, if his slave presume to anticipate him in pronouncing sentence.” These words apply to those who pass judgment on causes which the Lord reserves to Himself.

CHAPTER 3

The Enemies of Religious Propagate Distinct Falsehoods Concerning Them, Affirming, for Instance That Religious Are False Apostles, False Prophets, and False Christs

WE have still to consider the falsehoods propagated against religious by their enemies.

The opponents of religious are not content with calumniating their victims; they strive likewise to cast upon them suspicion of being guilty of heinous crimes. They assert that religious are worthy of detestation, and that they are unfit society for other men. They fill up the measure of their detraction by declaring religious to be responsible for all the evils which have ever come upon the Church, or which ever shall assail her; and they declare that religious are likewise accountable for every trouble under which the Church at present labours. They are further accused of being the false apostles who disturbed the primitive Church, and also of being the thieves, robbers and “creepers into houses” against which the Church has for all time been warned; and they are also said to be those heralds of Antichrist who, in the latter days of the Church, are to bring danger upon her.

We will in due order refute these calumnies. Religious are accused of being false apostles. In order to show how untruly this epithet is applied to religious, we must first examine what is meant by false apostles. In the Holy Scripture we find other expressions of the same kind, such as false prophets, and false Christs. The following words of St. Peter (2 Pet. ii, 1), “But there were also false prophets among the people, even as there shall be lying teachers among you” apply to all these disseminators of falsehood. For the office of a preacher and an apostle, is to be a mediator between the Lord and His people, by preaching the Word of God. Thus St. Paul says (2 Cor. v. 20): For Christ, therefore, we are ambassadors, God as it were, exhorting by us.” Now a man may be a false apostle or a false prophet for one of two reasons. First, he may not be sent by God: “I did not send prophets, yet they ran; I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied” (Jer. xxiii. 21). Secondly, a false apostle or prophet will proclaim not the Word of God, but his own inventions: “Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart and not out of the mouth of the Lord” (Jer. xxiii. 16). Both these two accusations are brought against false prophets and apostles in the following words of Ezechiel (xiii, 6): “They see vain things, and they foretell lies, saying: ‘The Lord says’; whereas the Lord has not sent them” Alluding to the pertinacity of such false teachors, the Prophet adds: “They have persisted to confirm what they have said.” When Jeremiah was condemned as a false prophet, he hastened to exculpate himself from both these charges. He said: “In truth the Lord sent me to you.” This refers to the first accusation. He adds: “to speak all these words in your hearing.” This is his defence against the second charge (Jer. xxvi. 15).

The false apostles of the New Testament were recognisable likewise by these two characteristics, viz., first that they were not sent by God, and secondly that they propagated false doctrine. Now preachers bearing a commission from the bishops of the Church are sent by God. St. Augustine, in his Epistle to Orosius, interprets the word apostle as signifying send. “There are,” he says, “four kinds of Apostles. Those sent by God, those sent by God by means of man, those sent by man alone, those who are sent by their own inclination. Moses was sent by God, Joshua by God and man. They who in our times are raised by public favour to the priesthood are sent by man alone. False prophets are sent by none; they go forth at their own desire.” The Saint adds: “He should be considered as sent by God, who is not chosen out by human praise or flattery, but who is recommended by the excellence of his life and by the wishes of apostolic priests.” Those who preached heretical doctrine were likewise called false apostles. This we know by the testimony both of St. Paul and of the Gloss, on his words. When the Apostle writes (Gal. i. 16): “Only there are some that trouble you and would pervert the gospel of Christ,” the Gloss comments: “These were the false apostles who said that the Gospel was opposed to the law of Moses.”

Again, on the words, “There shall arise false Christs and false prophets” (Mark xiii. 22), the Gloss says: This verse is to be understood as referring the heretics who attacked the Church, declaring that they were Christs. The first of these impostors was Simon Magus; the last will be Antichrist.” He who preaches without, any commission to do so, or teaches false doctrine, does so inspired by some bad motive, either of covetousness, or pride, or vain glory. Such men are deprived of the grace of God; and consequently commit sins, more or less heinous. But everyone who preaches for the sake of gain or popularity is not, necessarily a false apostle or false prophet; otherwise there would be no distinction between a hireling and a false apostle. They who preach for the sake of anything save of the glory of God and the good of souls are hirelings; let their preaching be true or false, authorised or unauthorised. But such men cannot be called false prophets, unless they either bear no commission, or teach false doctrine. In the same way, every sinner who administers the sacraments, or preaches the Word of God, is not necessarily a false apostle or a false prophet. For true prelates are true apostles; although at times they may be sinful.

Thus, the detractors of religious who call them false prophets or false apostles are, by their own words, convicted of folly or malice. For the fact that religious may be guilty of sins more or less heinous, such as seeking their own glorification, taking vengeance on their enemies, and the like, cannot make them false prophets or false apostles, provided that they bear a commission to preach, and that they teach true doctrine, The enemies of religious do not presume to question the orthodoxy of their preaching. To the arguments against the right of religious to preach, we have already fully replied. It remains then for us to say that those who accuse religious of being false apostles or false prophets are themselves guilty of falsehood. They may, with the same deceitfulness, accuse others of the same crime. The fact that false apostles have done many things which other sinners and even just men have done, is no reason for calling those other men false apostles also. We have, however, already shown the fallacy of such an argument.

CHAPTER 4

The Enemies of Religious Impute to Them All the Evils From Which the Church Has Ever Suffered. They Also Accuse Them of Being Wolves and Robbers and of Creeping Into Houses

WE must now examine the grounds on which religious are accounted responsible for all the evils which have ever overtaken the Church.

The enemies of religious accuse them of being wolves and robbers, because, they say, they enter the fold (ie. by preaching, and hearing confessions) by a door which is not the legitimate one. By this assertion, they prove their own folly. For, as the Gloss reminds us, Christ is the door. No prelate is the door; for, as the Gloss adds, Christ has reserved this office to Himself. Hence they who do not enter the fold by the door are Jews, Gentiles, philosophers, Pharisees and heretics, who enter not by Christ; not those who do not enter by means of a bishop.

Religious are called thieves, because they are accused of stealing what is not their own, by converting the sheep of Christ not to His doctrine, but to their own tenets. They are called robbers, because they are accused of slaying the sheep which they steal. The words of the Gloss are, interpreted in this sense. But, granted that it be justifiable to say that those who preach Christ truly, but without permission from a bishop, are thieves and robbers, this accusation cannot, as we have already shown, be made with regard to religious, unless we hold that a bishop or the Pope is not the immediate superior of anyone under the jurisdiction of a parish priest.

Religious are likewise termed ravening wolves; because they are said to minister to the spiritual needs of the faithful, in order to fatten on their material goods, just as wolves devour sheep. In this, they are clearly deceived. Our Lord draws a distinction between a wolf and a hireling. The vices which the enemies of religious attribute to wolves, the Gloss attributes to a hireling: “A hireling is one who seeks what belongs to Christ, and who serves God, not for His own sake, but in the hope of a reward.” Hence they, whose sole crime is to preach for the sake of temporal gain are hirelings. They who physically ill-treat the faithful, as do tyrants, or who spiritually scatter them, as do the devil and heretics, his ministers, are wolves. This is made dear by the words in the Acts of the Apostles (xx. 29), “I know that after my departure, ravening wolves will enter in among you.” On this text the Gloss says: “These wolves signify heretics, who are insidious, cruel and strong in controversy.” Again, the words in the Gospel of St. Matthew (vii. 15), “Within they are ravening wolves,” are specially applied by the Gloss to heretics, who, “in the malice of their hearts and in their desire to injure souls, resemble wolves, whether they pursue the faithful by exterior persecution, or deprave them by false teaching.” We have already pointed out that it is a rash judgment to assert that a man’s chief motive in ministering spiritually to his neighbour is the hope of reaping material advantage.

Religious are accused of creeping into houses because they are said to hear confessions without permission from the parish priests. Thus they creep into men’s consciences. Those who accuse them of so doing quote, in support of their opinion, the following words from the Gloss (on 2 Tim. iii.): “They creep into houses, i.e., they investigate the qualities of men, and lead captive those whom they judge fitting disciples.” Now priests cannot know the characteristics of men, save by confession.

As these words of the Gloss are considered, by the enemies of religious, conclusive evidence in support of their accusations, we will examine what is the true meaning of this passage. St. Paul foretold that “the latter days of the Church would be times of peril, and that there would be men, lovers of themselves” etc. “The term latter days,” writes St. Augustine to Hesychius, “is sometimes used of the Apostolic times.” Thus we read in the prophet Joel (ii. 28): “In the latter days I will pour out my spirit.” St. Peter said that this prophecy was fulfilled on the day of Pentecost (Acts ii. 16). Sometimes, however, the latter days are understood as meaning the Last Day, “I will raise him no at the last day” (John vi. 55). In the passage to which reference has been made, however, the latter days must be taken to mean the time nearest to the Last Day. For the Apostle speaks of the future, when he says: “In the last days shall come dangerous times.” These words agree with those that we find in the Gospel of St. Matthew (xxiv. 12), “Because iniquity has abounded, the charity of many shall grow cold.” The Gloss reminds us of the words of St. Paul, “Men shall be lovers of themselves.” These are not to be understood as meaning that the vice of self-love or any other vice has at any time been absent from the world, but that it will increase in proportion as malice increases. There were in the primitive Church some men tainted with these vices; otherwise St. Paul would not have told Timothy avoid them. And, as if Timothy had asked him, how he was to avoid what did not exist, says the Apostle by way of answer. “Of this sort are they who creep into houses” (2 Tim. iii.). The vices which he mentions in the first place were to exist in years to come; but that of creeping into houses was an evil of his own time. He speaks of “they who creep,” not of they who will creep, and of “they who lead captive,” not of they who “will lead captive.” We are not to suppose that although using the present tense, he can have intended his words to be taken in the future tense. For, as St. Augustine says, in the same Epistle, “there were in the early Church men distinguished by creeping into houses.” The words signify men, ensnared by the vices which will flourish in the latter days.

This is more expressly shown by the words in the Epistle to Titus (i. 10): “There are also many disobedient, vain talkers, and seducers; especially they who are of the circumcision, who must be reproved, who subvert whole houses, teaching things which they ought not, for filthy lucre’s sake.” By those then who creep into houses,” are meant men who cunningly introduce themselves into families and propagate false doctrine, or those who insinuate themselves into the consciences of men and bind them with the chains of error. Such men St. Paul calls “men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith” (2 Tim. iii).

The expression “reprobate concerning the faith” cannot be understood of men who are to appear in the future. St. Paul does not say: “They who now creep into houses, will be reprobate concerning the faith.” He speaks in the present tense, just as when he says, “these resist the truth.” Their folly shall be manifest to all men. The Gloss says, “that they shall be made manifest by means of the good,” and it reminds us that “these words were verified, especially by St. John, who overcame the heretics of the East.” Thus, it is plain that the words of St. Paul apply to heretics. Hence even were it true that religious hear confessions without any licence from their bishops, the foregoing passage from St. Paul would not be applicable to them, unless they can be proved to teach heretical doctrine. Hence the whole fabric which has been built upon to prove that religious who hear confeasions are responsible for the evils which will hereafter come upon the Church, falls to the ground.

We have already proved the right of religious to hear confessions; and we have seen, also, the benefit which results from their so doing.

CHAPTER 5

The Enemies of Religious Attribute to Them the Evils Which Will Befall the Church in the Latter Days. They Try to Prove That the Times of Antichrist Are At Hand

WE will now consider how the enemies of religious attribute to them all the evils which will befall the Church in her latter days, by declaring that they are the forerunners of Antichrist. They adduce two arguments, in support of this proposition. (1) They say that the days of Antichrist are at hand. (2) They say that religious are the emissaries of Antichrist, because they preach and hear confessions.

1. They try to prove that the latter days of the world are at hand, by the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. x. 11), "These things are written for our correction upon whom the ends of the world are come." They also quote the words of St. John (1John. ii. 18), "Little children, it is the last hour." St. Paul writes again (Heb. x. 37): "For yet a little and a very little while, and he who is to come will come, and will make no delay." In the Epistle of St. James (v. 9) we read: "Behold the Judge standeth before the door." Those who quote these texts in support of their arguments maintain that as so long a time has elapsed since the apostolic times, the advent of Antichrist must be imminent.

We may, of course, gather from these passages that the time of Antichrist is at hand. For Holy Scripture always speaks of time as being very short in comparison to eternity. Thus, in St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians (vii 29), we read: "The time is short." In this sense, the interpretation given to these words by our opponents is not reprehensible. Nevertheless, the texts which they quote cannot be considered as a confirmation of their opinion that the days which are to be dreaded in the days of Antichrist are immediately imminent, and that they are caused by the religious of our day, into whose conduct (they say) it the bishops should make enquiries. It is presumption to conclude, from the texts just quoted, that Antichrist is to come within some definite period of time, be it seven years, or a hundred, or a thousand years. Our Lord said to His disciples, when they asked Him: “It is not for you to know” (Acts ii. 7) As St. Augustine writes to Hesychius: “If it was not for the disciples to know, much less is it for any others.” Again, we read (Matt. xxiv. 36): “Of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven.” And in the 2nd Epistle to the Thessalonians (ii, 2) we read: “We beseech you, brethren... that you not be easily moved from your sense... as if the day ofthe Lord were at hand.”

St. Augustine says (Epist. ad Hesychium): “You say the Gospel tells us that no man knows that day or hour. I tell you, as far as my understanding will suffice, that no man can know the month nor the year of the coming of the Lord. This seems as if the words had been understood to mean that, though none can say in what year the Lord will come, it is possible to know in what septet or decade of years his coming may be expected.” St. Augustine further says: “Although we cannot understand this, I would ask you whether we can know the time of the coming of the Lord, so far as to be able to say: He will come within the next fifty, or hundred years, or within some period more or less extended?” And again: “If you say that you cannot understand, I agree with you.”

2. Certain men were condemned in the early days of the Church for teaching, as men teach now, that the coming of the Lord was imminent. We have this on the authority of St. Jerome (De illustr. viris), and of Eusebius, (Ecclesiast. Histor.). No period, either long or short, can be determined, in which is to be expected the end of the world, or the coming of Christ or of Antichrist. It is for this reason that we are told that “the day of the Lord shall come as a thief” (1 Thes. v. 2), and that as “in the days of Noah they knew not till the flood came and took them all away, so also shall the coming of the Son of man be” (Matt. xxiv). St. Augustine, in his Epistle to Hesychius, speaks of three classes of men who made assertions respecting the coming of our Lord. One class expects Him soon; another later; and the third declares its ignorance of the time of His coming. This last opinion

meets with the approbation of St. Augustine, and he censures the presumption of the others.

Those who say that the second advent is at hand, try to establish the following argument. The last age begins with the coming of Christ. Foregoing ages have not lasted longer than a thousand years. As then much more than a thousand years have elapsed since the coming of Christ, His second coming must be shortly expected. This argument is answered by St. Augustine (83 Quaest. LX) as follows: “Age is supposed to include a time equal to the aggregate of all the periods that have elapsed.” He compares this latter time to old age. Then he concludes by saying: “It is thus uncertain by what generations the final period of time, which begins with the coming of our Lord and is to end with the end of the world, is to be counted.” God has chosen, for some wise purpose, to keep this hidden. So it is written in the Gospel. St. Paul also declares that “the day of the Lord is to come like a thief in the night.”

3. Those who believe in the speedy coming of Antichrist, say that his appearance is heralded by eight signs.

(1) They quote the words of Daniel (vii. 25) concerning Antichrist : “He shall think himself able to change times.” That is to say, according to the Gloss, “ His pride is so excessive that he strives to alter laws and ceremonies.” On account of these words the days of Antichrist are said to be at hand, because certain men try to alter the Gospel of Christ into another gospel, which they call “eternal.” The Gospel of which they speak is a certain Introduction to the books of Joachim, which is condemned by the Church. Or else it is the doctrine of Joachim, whereby they say the Gospel of Christ is altered. But granted that this hypothesis were true, it would be no token of the approach of Antichrist. For even in the days of the Apostles, certain men tried to alter the Gospel of Christ. Thus St. Paul says (Gal. i. 6): “I wonder that you are soon removed from him who called you into the grace of Christ, to another Gospel.”

(2) The second sign of the coming of Antichrist is supposed to be found in the words of the Psalmist (ix. 21): “Appoint, O Lord, a lawgiver over them.” This the Gloss interprets to mean “the Antichrist, the giver of an evil law.” As the doctrine which we have already mentioned, which they call the law of Antichrist, was promulgated at Paris, it is thought to be a sign that Antichrist is at hand. But it is not true to say that the doctrine of Joachim, or

that which is contained in the Introduction to the Gospel of Joachim, however reprehensible it may be, is the doctrine which will be preached by Antichrist. For Antichrist will proclaim himself to be God. St. Paul says expressly (2 Thes. ii. 4), “So that he sits in the temple of God, showing himself as if he were God.” For if, by the teaching of Antichrist, all false doctrine is to be understood, just as all heretics are called Antichrists; then, the alleged proof of the speedy coming of Antichrist is no proof at all. For from the earliest days of the Church there has never been a time in which heretical teaching has not been disseminated. “Even now there are many Antichrists” (1 John ii. 18). On these words, the Gloss remarks: “All heretics are Antichrists.”

(3) The third supposed sign of the coming of Antichrist is found in the Book of Daniel (v) and in Isaiah (xxi). We read there the account of the hand that wrote Mane, Thecel, Phares on the wall of Babylon. Those who believe that Antichrist is at hand, maintain that the same prediction which formerly was written up in Babylon is now written in the Church. Mane was interpreted to mean, “God has numbered your Kingdom and has finished it”; and the Kingdom of Christ is now numbered, for it has been foretold that it its to endure a thousand two hundred and seventy years. Thecel signified, “You art weighed in the balance and found wanting”; and the “Eternal Gospel” is preferred to the Gospel of Christ. Phares meant your Kingdom is divided, and is given to the Medes and Persians”; and the Kingdom of the Church is now finished and given to others. Thus, the writing on the wall signified both the destruction of the Church and the ruin of Babylon.

This, however, seems a very foolish idea. St. Augustine tells us (18 de Civ. Dei) that certain men said that Christianity was to last for three hundred and sixty-five years, and that at the end of that time it was to cease to exist. Thus, it is no new thing to assign a limit for the duration of Christianity, since this was done even before the time of Augustine. Hence this is no reason for believing Antichrist to be at hand. St. Augustine says likewise (ibid.) that in his time some men estimated that four hundred years, others that five hundred, were to elapse between the Ascension of Christ and His second coming. Others, again, reckoned that this period was to embrace a thousand years. But the words of our Lord, “It is not yours to know the times or the moments” etc. (Acts i. 7), expose the folly of all such suppositions. St. Augustine, furthermore, blames the kind of arguments used in such conjectures. He compares them to the hypothesis of some that as there were ten plagues of Egypt, so there were to be ten persecutions of the Church. He says that such opinions are mere human conjectures, established on no foundation of truth. Those who interpret the handwriting on the wall as prophetic of the speedy coming of Antichrist, show their agreement with the Scripture that they reprobate; because, like the Scripture, they say that the beloved Babylon is soon to be destroyed. But there is no real similitude. For the handwriting in Babylon was divinely displayed, and it was therefore a proof of the truth; but the writing, of which these would-be prophets speak, is a figment of error, on which no argument can be founded.

They take their other five signs from the signs of which our Lord speaks in the Gospel of St. Matthew as portents of His coming.

(4) The fourth sign is taken from the words recorded in the Gospel of St. Matthew (xxiv. 29): “Then shall they put you to death, and you shall be hated by all nations for my name’s sake.” This sign is said to be now fulfilled. For, as men will not endure correction, they persecute those holy ones who reprove them, by hatred, by manifold tribulations, and even by death. But, this is no argument at all. For this sort of persecution befell the Apostles and the martyrs, as our Lord foretold. Hence the fact that the Church suffers persecution at present, is no more proof that the second advent is at hand than it was in the Apostolic age.

(5) The fifth sign is taken from the following words: “Then shall many be scandalised.” This prediction is supposed to be fulfilled, because religious are calumniated and men take scandal at that. But this interpretation of the text is opposed to that of the Gloss which says: “Men shall be scandalised, i.e., they shall fall from the faith, through fear of the greatness of the torments inflicted on believers.” Thus this prediction was fulfilled at the time of the martyrs. It is nothing new for holy men to be spoken ill of by the impious. Even the Apostles were told (Matt. v. 11): “ Blessed are you when men revile you, and speak all that is evil against you untruly.” We also read in ecclesiastical history how tyrants caused faithful Christians to be accused of the blackest crimes.

(6) The sixth sign is taken from the words: “Many false prophets shall arise and shall seduce many.” We are told that this sign is now manifested,

because certain religious appear who are called false prophets, because they commend themselves and for other reasons of the same kind. But this interpretation will be seen to be erroneous if we compare it with the Gloss on the passage in the Gospel of St. Mark (xiii), where false prophets are understood to mean heretics, or those who, after the Passion of our Lord and before the destruction of Jerusalem, seduced the Jewish nation. We have also already spoken at length on the subject of false prophets.

(7) The seventh sign is taken from the words: "Because iniquity has abounded, the charity of many shall grow cold." It is maintained that we now see the accomplishment of this prediction; inasmuch as those who seem to be the most zealous defenders of the Church, forsake the Gospel of Christ, and adhere to the "Eternal Gospel", whereby they show that the love which they owe to Christ has grown cold. But this statement is untrue. For those about whom it is made have not abandoned the Gospel of Christ, and do not profess to believe in any other Gospel. But, granted that the accusation were true, there have been in all ages men in the Church who appeared perfect, and yet originated heresies. We may mention Pelagius, Nestorius, and Eutyches. There have also been many others of the same description. But they did not, therefore, prove that their charity had grown cold. For, although they did not follow the teaching of the Gospel, they did not persecute it. There is no need of persecution, where there is no defender of the truth. Such a persecution would revive extinct errors; and, under pretext of refuting them, would teach them to the people; and this is the greatest of dangers. Hence St. Gregory says (14 Moral.) that after Eutyches had died leaving no followers, he would not labour to exterminate his errors, lest he should again fan them into flame.

(8) The eighth sign is taken from the words: This gospel of 'the Kingdom, shall be preached in the whole world." These words are said to be fulfilled in themselves, because they proclaim the signs and dangers which they wish all men to avoid, according to the words of St. Paul (2 Tim. iv. 2): "Preach the word, be instant in season, out of season." We are told that those who do not preach these signs are false apostles, who have not, like the animals mentioned in the fourth chapter of the Apocalypse, "eyes before and behind," to know both the future and the past. But this sign is worth nothing. Even in the early ages of the Church, there were, as ecclesiastical history relates, many who proclaimed similar prophecies, and

who were on this account reproved by other Catholics of weight. The Gloss on the words, “Many shall come in my name” (Mark xiii) says: “Many, at a time when ruin was imminent, came, proclaiming themselves to be Christs and falsely declaring that freedom was at hand. And many in the Church, even in the Apostolic ages, threatened the faithful with the speedy coming of the Lord.” Hence they who foretell these signs are not numbered among those who proclaim the Gospel, but among those who seduce many. Consequently, when our Lord said, “this Gospel of the Kingdom shall be preached,” He referred not to the preaching of these vain signs, but to the teaching of the Christian faith which, before His second advent, will be disseminated throughout the whole world. Hence as St. Augustine proves, in his letter to Hesychius, the day of the Lord could not in his time be at hand, since there still existed nations to which the Gospel had not, as yet, been preached. Those who proclaim this sign, themselves fall into the snare which they have prepared for others. For they call a certain new doctrine, “the Gospel of the Kingdom,” and affirm themselves to be the signs which announce the Gospel of the Kingdom. St. Augustine sums up the folly and worthlessness of these five last signs, in the following words: “Perchance, if we diligently compare and examine all that the three Evangelists have said of the coming of Christ, we shall find that it points to His daily advent in His body the Church, of which coming He said: ‘A little while and you shall see the Son of man coming, or sitting’.” (Epist. ad Hesych.).

CHAPTER 6

The Opponents of Religious Life Strive to Prove That Religious Are Antichrists

As the enemies of religious speak much about the dangers which will befall the Church in her latter days, by the instrumentality of those whom they call the emissaries of Antichrist, we will now examine what means they use in order to ascertain who these emissaries of Antichrist will be. They assert that these seducers will be neither barbarians, nor Jews, nor Gentiles. But this opinion is contrary to the prophecy of the Apocalypse: “Satan... shall seduce the nations which are over the four quarters of the Earth, Gog and Magog” (Rev. xx. 7). On these words, the Gloss says: “Satan will first seduce these two nations; he will then proceed to deceive others.” Or, according to another interpretation, by Magog is understood all persecutors who proceeded, at first by secret, and afterwards, by open persecution. Hence barbarians are not excluded from the persecution of Antichrist, as they would persuade us.

But those who affirm that the emissaries of Antichrist will be neither Jews, nor Gentiles, are of opinion that they will be Christians, on account of the words of St. Paul: “Having an appearance indeed of godliness” (2 Tim. iii. 5), i.e., as the Gloss explains, “of the Christian religion.” They hold that the words of the Apostle apply to those by whose instrumentality evil is to befall the Church in the latter days. But, in this assumption they make a great mistake. For St. Paul did not mean that the same men would be guilty of all the vices which he enumerates, but that some of his words would apply to some men, and that other parts of his reproof would be true of other persons. Hence it is not necessary that all those who are likely to endanger the Church should present an appearance of piety. It is merely implied that some of them will do so. In like manner, the early Church suffered persecution from believers and unbelievers alike. “In perils from the Gentiles... in perils from false brethren” (2 Cor. xi. 26).

The emissaries of Antichrist, we are next told, will not be found among the manifestly wicked. This opinion is, however, clearly opposed to the 82nd Psalm. The Gloss explains that the whole of that Psalm treats of the persecution of Antichrist. It adds that among his other emissaries, the “ Philistines “ signify those who are drunk with worldly luxury. St. Gregory likewise (20 Moral.), expounding the words of Job xxx., “Now I am turned into their song,” says: “These are the words of the Church in her latter days, when oppressed by her enemies.” Job says in the same chapter: “The strength of whose hands was to me as nothing, and they were thought unworthy of life.” St. Gregory interprets the passages which follow of those who led manifestly evil and carnal lives.

It is maintained that the ministers of Antichrist will be found among those who seem to be good men. The proof of this assertion is supposed to exist in the words of Our Lord: “Take heed of false prophets” (Mat. vii. 14) and by other texts of the same nature. But, although some of the emissaries of Antichrist may wear an appearance of piety, it is not necessary that they shall all seem godly. Christians of the early Church were persecuted both by the impious and by the apparently pious.

The argument that no one can lead another astray unless he wear an appearance of virtue is untrue. For many more are misled by the pleasures of this world and by fear of its sufferings, than by any seeming godliness.

We are further told that the ministers of Satan will be found among those who devote themselves to study. The proof of this opinion is said to lie in the words of St. Paul, “ever learning and never coming to a knowledge of the truth” (2 Tim. iii, 7). The inapplicability of this passage to the point in question is shown by the fact that St. Paul was referring not to men who seduce others, but to silly women who suffer themselves to be led astray. Granted, however that the words apply to men who mislead others, they can only refer to those who, in their studies, depart from the way of truth. Hence the text is often interpreted of heretics. Those who hold a contrary opinion, however, quote in support of it the following words of St. Gregory (13 Moral.) on Job xvi.: “My enemy has looked at me with terrible eyes.” “The incarnate Truth,” says St. Gregory, “chose for His preachers poor and simple men. But Antichrist will send as his Apostles men who are cunning and double-tongued and imbued with the wisdom of the world.”

St. Gregory explains in another passage, who will be the learned men whom Antichrist will send. Commenting on the words of Isaiah (xviii. 2), “who sends ambassadors upon the sea, and in vessels of bulrushes upon the waters,” St. Gregory says: “He sends his ambassadors upon the sea, for he scatters his preachers throughout the world. The ‘vessels of bulrushes’ signify the hearts of those who are wise in this world’s wisdom. Hence he who sends ambassadors in vessels of bulrushes upon the waters makes his preachers depend upon the wisdom of the world, and lead their vacillating hearers into sin.” Therefore, the true preachers of Antichrist are learned men, who lead worldly lives and attract men to vice. But even if Antichrist were going to ruin the Church by means of learned men, it would not be by their agency alone.

We are further told that the envoys of Antichrist will be found among those learned men whose opinion is esteemed as peculiarly weighty and valuable. “As if a man should consult God,” it is said of Ahitophel (2 Sam xvi.). The seducers who will appear in the latter days of the Church are supposed to be typified by Ahitophel. For, as Ahitophel adhered first to David, and then to Absalom, so they will take part first with Christ, and then with Antichrist. St. Paul says of them, first that they will have an appearance of godliness, and then that they will be “men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith” (2 Tim iii. 5). Stress is also laid on the words, “they came forth from us” (1 John ii. 19), which means, as the Gloss says, “they shared with us in the Sacraments.” But this quotation is no argument. For St. Paul does not say of the men to whom he refers that at first they wore an appearance of piety, and that then, laying it aside, they became infidels. What he means is that while these men had a superficial semblance of godliness, they were at the same time infidels at heart. There are many heretics who agree with the Church about the Sacraments; and there are some who receive the Sacraments, at least exteriorly. Even if, on this account, they are typified by Ahitophel, that would not make it necessary for them to resemble Ahitophel in the astuteness of his counsels. This comparison is purely a figment of the imagination; just as the correspondence between the plagues of Egypt and the persecutions of the Church, is imaginary.

It is likewise maintained that the Apostles of Antichrist will be found among those who have vowed to obey the counsels. The ground for this opinion is supposed to exist in the following passage of St. Gregory. Commenting on the words of Job (xxx) “at the right hand of my rising,” St. Gregory says: “Calamities shall arise at the right hand of my rising. For those who were believed to be chosen members of Christ now come forward to persecute the Church.” These words do not, however, apply, in any special manner, to those who are under an obligation to keep the counsels; for, by the right hand, or the chosen members of Christ, all good men are signified. This we know by the following passage of St. Gregory (ibid.): “All the faithful of Holy Church are spoken of under the name of the right hand.” Even, however, though perfect men be understood by the expression “ right hand,” this is no proof that the passage we have quoted is especially applicable to religious. For men may be perfect in the order of charity, even though they be married. Prelates, in like manner, are in state of perfection. Hence it is not only religious who are meant by the chosen members of Christ. The fallacy contained in this argument makes it easy for us to see what underlies the ensuing one. The enemies of religious assert that religious are the future emissaries of Antichrist, on account of the words: “It will come to pass that Herod will seek the child to destroy, him” (Matt. ii. 13). The Gloss comments on this passage thus: “As soon as Christ came into the world, persecution arose against Him—a type of the future persecution of the Saints.” From this it is argued that, as at the coming of our Lord He was opposed by those who seemed to be the most wise and holy among men, (i.e. the Scribes and Pharisees), so at the end of the world, the faithful of Christ will be attacked by those who will seem to be the best and wisest, viz., by leaxned and religious men. This argument, however, carries no weight. For, not only the Scribes and Pharisees, but the High priests, Annas and Caiphas, and the civil rulers, Herod and Pilate, persecuted our Lord. Neither were all those who persecuted Him Scribes; for some were only Pharisees. Hence this argument does not prove that the future persecutors of the Church are to be learned rather than illiterate religious, or religious rather than bishops, or religious rather than secular sovereigns and dignitaries.

From all the foregoing arguments then they conclude that the heralds of Antichrist will be Christians, apparently virtuous, devoted to study, strong in giving advice, religious men, bound to the observance of the counsels. Thus, although names are not mentioned, the victims of this infamous charge are as clearly designated as if they were named. If Socrates be the son of Sophroniscus, we mean the same person, whether we speak of him as Socrates, or as the son of Sophroniscus. The mode in which the accusation is brought against religious is inexcusable; and it proves that a personal attack is intended.

We will now refute the calumny point by point:

1. The first error lies in defining the heralds of Antichrist as one race of men, when, as we know by the Gloss on Ps. lxxxii, Antichrists will spring from all classes of men.

2. The second error lies in the fact that though diverse authorities may be quoted in support of individual points, no class of men furnishes all the necessary conditions. The emissaries of Satan who will mislead men may, perhaps, exist in great numbers; of which some may be religious, some astute in counsel, some learned etc. But perhaps, among all the number, not one will be found possessing all these qualifications.

3. Even were some such men found amongst religious, other such might likewise be found among men who are not religious. Hence this argument does not tell more against religious than against seculars.

4. If some religious are to be emissaries of Antichrist, all religious will not be his adherents. Perhaps very few religious will join Antichrist, as he is to recruit his ranks from all classes of men.

5 It is praiseworthy to be a Christian, a learned man, a prudent counsellor, and a religious. These

attributes, therefore, are no reason for concluding that their possessor is to be a forerunner of Antichrist. Rather, if we are to believe our Lord’s teaching that “every tree is known by its fruits,” we ought to expect good works from good men, and evil deeds from wicked men. Guided by this rule, we should look for the future emissaries of Satan among bad men.

CHAPTER 7

The Enemies of Religious Endeavour to Cast Suspicion Upon Such of Their Works As Are Clearly Good: E.g., Prayer and Fasting

WE will now examine how, although the opponents of religious cannot affirm that certain works performed by them, such as prayer, fasting, and miracles, are evil, they try nevertheless to represent them in a false light, and to make them appear suspicious.

1. Their first contention is that certain bad men, mentioned in the Old and in the New Testament, practised these works, in order to disguise their wickedness. “Thus it is said that false prophets will come in sheep’s clothing” (Matt. vii. 15), “which means,” (says the Gloss), “that in the sight of men they will, by their prayers, fastings and almsdeeds, resemble the ministers of justice. But their works will avail them nothing, but will rather be imputed to them as sin.” Again, on the words: “Many will say to me,” the Gloss comments: “We must beware of those who work miracles in the name of Christ. Our Lord certainly worked them for the sake of unbelievers, but He warned them not to be deceived, nor to think that a visible miracle is necessarily visible wisdom.” From these words, the enemies of religious conclude that men are not to be accepted on account either of their virtues or of their miracles.

It is, however, easy to see that this opinion is unsound, because it is opposed to the words of our Lord (quoted in Matt. v. 16): “Let men see your good works, and glorify your Father” etc. Again (Matt. xii) He says that “a tree is known by its fruits,” a good tree by its good, and a bad tree by its bad fruits. St. Peter likewise says (1 Pet. ii. 12): “Having your conversation good among the Gentiles, that whereas they speak against you as evil doers, they may, by the good works which they shall see in you, glorify God in the day of visitation.” From these words we see that good works ought to render a man acceptable to his neighbour. In the same way, a man’s miracles render him and his teaching commendable. For our Lord says: “For the works which the Father gave me to accomplish... give testimony to me” (John v. 36). St. Mark likewise says that the Apostles “preached everywhere, the Lord cooperating, with them and confirming the word with signs that followed” (Mark xvi. 20). These signs were a testimony both to the men and to their doctrine.

We do not, of course, say that bad men may not give signs of virtue; we speak only of such things as we are capable of judging. Hence if a man show signs of goodness, we naturally conclude that he is good, unless he give proofs of wickedness, to show us that the good which he has manifested did not proceed from him. The Gloss, commenting on the words, “by their fruits you shall know them,” says: “Judge of men not by their clothing but by their works.” And again, on the words, “he who eats” (Rom. xiv.), the Gloss remarks: “There are certain things, such as blasphemy, theft, and the like, which cannot proceed from a virtuous soul. It is permissible for us to judge of such matters as these; for they come under the category of which Christ spoke saying: ‘By their fruits you shall know them.’ But in doubtful matters, let us put the most favourable construction on our neighbour’s doings.” Thus the authors quoted would have us not to be so deceived by good appearances, as to be led away by them into evil or error. But, if anyone who does not seek to seduce others into vice or error, he should be judged on account of his acts to be a good man. Even if he is in reality wicked, this deception is not a dangerous one, for it does not belong to man to judge the secrets of the heart. On the words, “Satan himself transforms himself into an angel of light” (2 Cor. xi. 14), the Gloss says: “If Satan feigns to do or to say something befitting the good angels, and we even believe him to be himself a good angel, our error will not be harmful or even dangerous. But if the devil begins to tempt us by works not his own, we have need of great watchfulness, lest we be led astray.”

The enemies of religious proceed still further in their malice, and declare that the manifest good works done by religious are hypocrisy. Thus, they say, religious commit a heinous crime. But, they themselves herein resemble the Pharisees, who said to our Lord when He was casting out a devil: “By Beelzabub, the prince of devils, He casts out devils” (Matt. xii.; Luke xi. 15). They act like the Pharisees who, as soon as they see another do a good work, ascribe it to hypocrisy. It was to rebuke such judgments that Christ said (Matt. xii. 33): “By their fruits you shall know them.”

Itis easy to see how much harm such assertions may do. For, if the opinion that a man is to be esteemed a hypocrite on account of his good works is generally accepted, persons will be withheld from performing any acts of virtue; and the same will be the case if everyone is called a hypocrite who embraces a state of perfection after committing great sins. St. Gregory (31 Moral.) combats this idea. For, commenting on the words “she has laboured. in vain, no fear constraining her” (Job xxxix.), he writes: “We must remember that our mother the Church nurses certain souls in her tender bosom until she brings them to spiritual maturity. But, such souls have not as yet acquired the habit of holiness, nor are they as yet strong enough to follow the path of perfection.” “But,” he continues, “we have no right to call such men hypocrites; for weakness is one thing, and malice another.” Thus, according to the teaching of St. Gregory, they only deserve to be called hypocrites who undertake to perform works of perfection in order thereby to cloak their wickedness, and to be able the more easily to injure others. Those who, through weakness, may chance to fall into sin, even after embracing a life of perfection, are not hypocrites.

EPILOGUE

Now that by the Divine assistance, we have refuted the calumnies of malicious men, it becomes evident that there is no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus who walk, not according to the flesh, but who carry the cross of the Lord, repressing earthly desires. Much might still be said in confutation of the detractors of religious. But we will leave them to the Divine judgment, since the malice of their heart is clearly revealed by the speech that falls from their lips. To quote the words of Christ (Matt. xii. 34): “How can you speak good things, whereas you are evil? Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks.” But if, as St. Paul says (2 Tim. ii. 21), “anyone cleanses himself from these” (i.e. by not consenting to, these malicious judgments), “he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and profitable to the Lord, prepared for every good work” (2 Tim. ii.).

Those, however, who adopt the opinions of these enemies of religious will blindly follow the blind, and with them will fall into the ditch. But the words which we have spoken will suffice to preserve us from such a fate, if they are sanctified by the blessing of God, to whom be honour and giving of thanks for ever and ever. Amen.

ARISTOTLE ON INTERPRETATION

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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ARISTOTLE ON INTERPRETATION

INTRODUCTION

There is a twofold operation of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in III De anima [6: 430a 26]. One is the understanding of simple objects, that is, the operation by which the intellect apprebends just the essence of a thing alone; the other is the operation of composing and dividing. There is also a third operation, that of reasoning, by which reason proceeds from what is known to the investigation of things that are unknown. The first of these operations is ordered to the second, for there cannot be composition and division unless things have already been apprehended simply. The second, in turn, is ordered to the third, for clearly we must proceed from some known truth to which the intellect assents in order to have certitude about something not yet known.

2. Since logic is called rational science it must direct its consideration to the things that belong to the three operations of reason we have mentioned. Accordingly, Aristotle treats those belonging to the first operation of the intellect, i.e., those conceived by simple understanding, in the book Praedicamentorum; those belonging to the second operation, i.e., affirmative and negative enunciation, in the book Perihermeneias; those belonging to the third operation in the book Priorum and the books following it in which he treats the syllogism absolutely, the different kinds of syllogism, and the species of argumentation by which reason proceeds from one thing to another. And since the three operations of reason are ordered to each other so are the books: the Praedicamenta to the Perihermeneias and the Perihermeneias to the Priora and the books following it.

3. The one we are now examining is named Perihermeneias, that is, On Interpretation. Interpretation, according to Boethius, is “significant vocal sound—whether complex or incomplex—which signifies something by itself.” Conjunctions, then, and prepositions and other words of this kind are not called interpretations since they do not signify anything by

themselves. Nor can sounds signifying naturally but not from purpose or in connection with a mental image of signifying something—such as the sounds of brute animals—be called interpretations, for one who in terprets intends to explain something. Therefore only names and verbs and speech are called interpretations and these Aristotle treats in this book.

The name and verb, however, seem to be principles of interpretation rather than interpretations, for one who interprets seems to explain something as either true or false. Therefore, only enunciative speech in which truth or falsity is found is called interpretation. Other kinds of speech, such as optatives and imperatives, are ordered rather to expressing volition than to interpreting what is in the intellect. This book, then, is entitled On Interpretation, that is to say, On Enunciative Speech in which truth or falsity is found. The name and verb are treated only insofar as they are parts of the enunciation; for it is proper to a science to treat the parts of its subject as well as its properties.

It is clear, then, to which part of philosophy this book belongs, what its necessity is, and what its place is among the books on logic.

BOOK I

LESSON 1

16a 1 First we must establish what a name is and what a verb is; then what negation is and affirmation, and the enunciation and speech.

4. The Philosopher begins this work with an introduction in which he points out one by one the things that are to be treated. For, since every science begins with a treatment of the principles, and the principles of composite things are their parts, one who intends to treat enunciation must begin with its parts, Therefore Aristotle begins by saying: First we must determine, i.e., define, what a name is and what a verb is. In the Greek text it is First we must posit, which signifies the same thing, for demonstrations presuppose definitions, from which they conclude, and hence definitions are rightly called “positions.” This is the reason he only points out here the definitions of the things to be treated; for from definitions other things are known.

5. It might be asked why it is necessary to treat simple things again, i.e., the name and the verb, for they were treated in the book Praedicamentorum. In answer to this we should say that simple words can be considered in three ways: first, as they signify simple intellection absolutely, which is the consideration proper to the book Praedicamentorum; secondly, according to their function as parts of the enunciation, which is the way they are considered in this book. Hence, they are treated here under the formality of the name and the verb, and under this formality they signify something with time or without time and other things of the kind that belong to the formality of words as they are components of an enunciation. Finally, simple words may be considered as they are components of a syllogistic ordering. They are treated then under the formality of terms and this Aristotle does in the book Priorum. It might be asked why he treats only the name and verb and omits the other parts of speech. The reason could be that Aristotle intends to establish rules about the simple enunciation and for this

it is sufficient to consider only the parts of the enunciation that are necessary for simple speech. A simple enunciation can be formed from just a name and a verb, but it cannot be formed from other parts of speech without these. Therefore, it is sufficient to treat these two.

On the other hand, the reason could be that names and verbs are the principal parts of speech. Pronouns, which do not name a nature but determine a person-and therefore are put in place of names-are comprehended under names. The participle-althougb it has similarities with the name-signifies with time and is therefore comprehended under the verb. The others are things that unite the parts of speech. They signify relations of one part to another rather than as parts of speech; as nails and other parts of this kind are not parts of a ship, but connect the parts of a ship.

7. After he has proposed these parts [the name and the verb] as principles, Aristotle states what he principally intends to establish:... then what negation is and affirmation. These, too, are parts of the enunciation, not integral parts however, as are the name and the verb—otherwise every enunciation would have to be formed from an affirmation and negation—but subjective parts, i.e., species. This is supposed here but will be proved later.

8. Since enunciation is divided into categorical and hypothetical, it might be asked why he does not list these as well as affirmation and negation. In reply to this we could say that Aristotle has not added these because the hypothetical enunciation is composed of many categorical propositions and hence categorical and hypothetical only differ according to the difference of one and many.

Or we could say—and this would be a better reason—that the hypothetical enunciation does not contain absolute truth, the knowledge of which is required in demonstration, to which this book is principally ordered; rather, it signifies something as true by supposition, which does not suffice for demonstrative sciences unless it is confirmed by the absolute truth of the simple enunciation. This is the reason Aristotle does not treat either hypothetical enunciations or syllogisms.

He adds, and the enunciation, which is the genus of negation and affirmation; and speech, which is the genus of enunciation.

9. If it should be asked why, besides these, he does not mention vocal sound, it is because vocal sound is something natural and therefore belongs

to the consideration of natural philosophy, as is evident in II De Anima [8: 420b 5-421a 6] and at the end of De generatione animalium [ch. 8]. Also, since it is something natural, vocal sound is not properly the genus of speech but is presupposed for the forming of speech, as natural things are presupposed for the formation of artificial things.

10. In this introduction, however, Aristotle seems to have inverted the order of the enunciation, for affirmation is naturally prior to negation and enunciation prior to these as a genus; and consequently, speech to enunciation. We could say in reply to this that he began to enumerate from the parts and consequently he proceeds from the parts to the whole. He puts negation, which contains division, before affirmation, which consists of composition, for the same reason: division is closer to the parts, composition closer to the whole.

Or we could say, as some do, that he puts negation first because in those things that can be and not be, non-being, which negation signifies, is prior to being, which affirmation signifies.

Aristotle, however, does not refer to the fact that one of them is placed before the other, for they are species equally dividing a genus and are therefore simultaneous according to nature.

LESSON 2

The Signification of Vocal Sound

16a 3 Now those that are in vocal sound are signs” of passions in the soul, and those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound.

16a 5 And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same;

16a 6 but the passions of the soul, of which vocal sounds are the first signs are the same for all; and the things of which passions of the soul are likenesses are also the same.

16a 8 This has been discussed, however, in our study of the soul for it belongs to another subject of inquiry.

1. After his introduction the Philosopher begins to investigate the things he has proposed. Since the things he promised to speak of are either complex or incomplex significant vocal sounds, he prefaces this with a treatment of the signification of vocal sounds; then he takes up the significant vocal sounds he proposed in the introduction where he says, A name, then, is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, etc. In regard to the signification of vocal sounds he first determines what kind of signification vocal sound has and then shows the difference between the signification of complex and incomplex vocal sounds where he says, As sometimes there is thought in the soul, etc. With respect to the first point, he presents the order of the signification of vocal sounds and then shows what kind of signification vocal sound has, i.e., whether it is from nature or by imposition. This he does where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men, etc.

2. Apropos of the order of signification of vocal sounds he proposes three things, from one of which a fourth is understood. He proposes writing, vocal sounds, and passions of the soul; things is understood from the latter, for passion is from the impression of something acting, and hence passions of the soul have their origin from things.

Now if man were by nature a solitary animal the passions of the soul by which he was conformed to things so as to have knowledge of them would be sufficient for him; but since he is by nature a political and social animal it was necessary that his conceptions be made known to others. This he does through vocal sound. Therefore there had to be significant vocal sounds in order that men might live together. Whence those who speak different languages find it difficult to live together in social unity.

Again, if man had only sensitive cognition, which is of the here and now, such significant vocal sounds as the other animals use to manifest their conceptions to each other would be sufficient for him to live with others. But man also has the advantage of intellectual cognition, which abstracts from the here and now, and as a consequence, is concerned with things distant in place and future in time as well as things present according to time and place. Hence the use of writing was necessary so that he might manifest his conceptions to those who are distant according to place and to those who will come in future time.

3. However, since logic is ordered to obtaining knowledge about things, the signification of vocal sounds, which is immediate to the conceptions of the intellect, is its principal consideration. The signification of written signs, being more remote, belongs to the consideration of the grammarian rather than the logician. Aristotle therefore begins his explanation of the order of signification from vocal sounds, not written signs. First he explains the signification of vocal sounds: Therefore those that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul. He says “therefore” as if concluding from premises, because he has already said that we must establish what a name is, and a verb and the other things he mentioned; but these are significant vocal sounds; therefore, signification of vocal sounds must be explained.

4. When he says “Those that are in vocal sound,” and not “vocal sounds,” his mode of speaking implies a continuity with what he has just been saying, namely, we must define the name and the verb, etc. Now these have being in three ways: in the conception of the intellect, in the utterance of the

voice, and in the writing of letters. He could therefore mean when he says “Those that are in vocal sound,” etc., names and verbs and the other things we are going to define, insofar as they are in vocal sound, are signs.

On the other hand, he may be speaking in this way because not all vocal sounds are significant, and of those that are, some are significant naturally and hence are different in nature from the name and the verb and the other things to be defined. Therefore, to adapt what he has said to the things of which he intends to speak he says, “Those that are in vocal sound,” i.e., that are contained under vocal sound as parts under a whole.

There could be still another reason for his mode of speaking. Vocal sound is something natural. The name and verb, on the other hand, signify by human institution, that is, the signification is added to the natural thing as a form to matter, as the form of a bed is added to wood. Therefore, to designate names and verbs and the other things he is going to define he says, “Those that are in vocal sound,” in the same way he would say of a bed, “that which is in wood.”

5. When he speaks of passions in the soul we are apt to think of the affections of the sensitive appetite, such as anger, joy, and the other passions that are customarily and commonly called passions of the soul, as is the case in II Ethicorum [5: 1105b 21]. It is true that some of the vocal sounds man makes signify passions of this kind naturally, such as the groans of the sick and the sounds of other animals, as is said in I Politicae [2: 1253a 10-14]. But here Aristotle is speaking of vocal sounds that are significant by human institution. Therefore “passions in the soul” must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions of the intellect immediately according to the teaching of Aristotle. They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying, for the name “man” signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. The Platonists for this reason held that it signified the separated idea of man. But because in Aristotle’s teaching man in the abstract does not really subsist, but is only in the mind, it was necessary for Aristotle to say that vocal sounds signify the conceptions of the intellect immediately and things by means of them.

6. Since Aristotle did not customarily speak of conceptions of the intellect as passions, Andronicus took the position that this book was not

Aristotle’s. In I De anima, however, it is obvious that he calls all of the operations of the soul “passions” of the soul. Whence even the conception of the intellect can be called a passion and this either because we do not understand without a phantasm, which requires corporeal passion (for which reason the Philosopher calls the imaginative power the passive intellect) [De Anima III, 5: 430a 25]; or because by extending the name “passion” to every reception, the understanding of the possible intellect is also a kind of undergoing, as is said in III De anima [4: 429b 29].

Aristotle uses the name “passion,” rather than “understanding,” however, for two reasons: first, because man wills to signify an interior conception to another through vocal sound as a result of some passion of the soul, such as love or hate; secondly, because the signification of vocal sound is referred to the conception of the intellect inasmuch as the conception arises from things by way of a kind of impression or passion.

7. When he says, and those that are written are signs of those in vocal sound, he treats of the signification of writing. According to Alexander he introduces this to make the preceding clause evident by means of a similitude; and the meaning is: those that are in vocal sound are signs of the passions of the soul in the way in which letters are of vocal sound; then he goes On to manifest this point where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same—by introducing this as a sign of the preceding. For when he says in effect, just as there are diverse vocal sounds among diverse peoples so there are diverse letters, he is signifying that letters signify vocal. sounds. And according to this exposition Aristotle said those that are written are signs... and not, letters are signs of those that are in vocal sound, because they are called letters in both speech and writing, alt bough they are more properly called letters in writing; in speech they are called elements of vocal sound.

Aristotle, however, does not say, just as those that are written, but continues with his account. Therefore it is better to say as Porphyry does, that Aristotle adds this to complete the order of signification; for after he says that names and verbs in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, he adds—in continuity with this—that names and verbs that are written are sians of the names and verbs that are in vocal sound.

8. Then where he says, And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal sounds the same, he shows that the foresaid things differ

as signified and signifying inasmuch as they are either according to nature or not. He makes three points here. He first posits a sign to show that neither vocal sounds nor letters signify naturally; things that signify naturally are the same among all men; but the signification of letters and vocal sounds, which is the point at issue here, is not the same among all men. There has never been any question about this in regard to letters, for their character of signifying is from imposition and their very formation is through art. Vocal sounds, however, are formed naturally and hence there is a question as to whether they signify naturally. Aristotle determines this by comparison with letters: these are not the same among all men, and so neither are vocal sounds the same. Consequently, like letters, vocal sounds do not signify naturally but by human institution. The vocal sounds that do signify naturally, such as groans of the sick and others of this kind, are the same among all men.

9. Secondly, when he says, but the passions of the soul, of which vocal sounds are the first signs, are the same for all, he shows that passions of the soul exist naturally, just as things exist naturally, for they are the same among all men. For, he says, but the passions of the soul, i.e., just as the passions of the soul are the same for all men; of which first, i.e., of which passions, being first, these, namely, vocal sounds, are tokens," i.e., signs" (for passions of the soul are compared to vocal sounds as first to second since vocal sounds are produced only to express interior passions of the soul), so also the things... are the same, i.e., are the same among all, of which, i.e., of which things, passions of the soul are likenesses.

Notice he says here that letters are signs, i.e., signs of vocal sounds, and similarly vocal sounds are signs of passions of the soul, but that passions of the soul are likenesses of things. This is because a thing is not known by the soul unless there is some likeness of the thing existing either in the sense or in the intellect. Now letters are signs of vocal sounds and vocal sounds of passions in such a way that we do not attend to any idea of likeness in regard to them but only one of institution, as is the case in regard to many other signs, for example, the trumpet as a sign of war. But in the passions of the soul we have to take into account the idea of a likeness to the things represented, since passions of the soul designate things naturally, not by institution.

10. There are some who object to Aristotle's position that passions of the soul, which vocal sounds signify, are the same for all men. Their argument against it is as follows: different men have different opinions about things; therefore, passions of the soul do not seem to be the same among all men.

Boethius in reply to this objection says that here Aristotle is using "passions of the soul" to denote conceptions of the intellect, and since the intellect is never deceived, conceptions of the intellect must be the same among all men; for if someone is at variance with what is true, in this instance he does not understand.

However, since what is false can also be in the intellect, not as it knows what a thing is, i.e., the essence of a thing, but as it composes and divides, as is said in III De anima [6: 430a 26]. Aristotle's statement should be referred to the simple conceptions of the intellect—that are signified by the incomplex vocal sounds—which are the same among all men; for if someone truly understands what man is, whatever else than man he apprehends he does not understand as man. Simple conceptions of the intellect, which vocal sounds first signify, are of this kind. This is why Aristotle says in IV Metaphysicae [IV, 4: 1006b 4] that the notion which the name signifies is the definition." And this is the reason he expressly says, "of which first [passions] these are signs," i.e., so that this will be referred to the first conceptions first signified by vocal sounds.

11. The equivocal name is given as another objection to this position, for in the case of an equivocal name the same vocal sound does not signify the same passion among all men. Porphyry answers this by pointing out that a man who utters a vocal sound intends it to signify one conception of the intellect. If the person to whom he is speaking understands something else by it, the one who is speaking, by explaining himself, will make the one to whom he is speaking refer his understanding to the same thing.

However it is better to say that it is not Aristotle's intention to maintain an identity of the conception of the soul in relation to a vocal sound such that there is one conception in relation to one vocal sound, for vocal sounds are different among different peoples; rather, he intends to maintain an identity of the conceptions of the soul in relation to things, which things he also says are the same.

12. Thirdly when he says, This has been discussed, however, in our study of the soul, etc., he excuses himself from a further consideration of these

things, for the nature of the passions of the soul and the way in which they are likenesses of things does not pertain to logic but to philosophy of nature and has already been treated in the book De anima [III, 4-8].

LESSON 3

The Diverse Signification of Vocal Sound

16a 9 As sometimes there is thought in the soul without its being true or false, but sometimes it must be one or the other, so it is in vocal sound;

16a 12 for in composition and division there is truth and falsity.

16a 13 Names and verbs, then, are like thought without composition or division, for example, “man” and “white” when nothing is added; for neither is yet true or false.

16a 16 A sign of this is that “goatstag” signifies something but is neither true nor false unless “to be” or “not to be” is added either absolutely or according to time.

1. After the Philosopher has treated the order of the signification of vocal sounds, he goes on to discuss a diversity in the signification of vocal sounds, i.e., some of them signify the true or the false, others do not. He first states the difference and then manifests it where he says, for in composition and division there is truth and falsity. Now because in the order of nature conceptions of the intellect precede vocal sounds, which are uttered to express them, he assigns the difference in respect to the significations of vocal sounds from a likeness to the difference in intellection. Thus the manifestation is from a likeness and at the same time from the cause which the effects imitate.

2. The operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said in the beginning, and as is explained in III De anima [6: 430a 26]. Now truth and falsity is found in one of these operations but not in the other. This is what Aristotle says at the beginning of this portion of the text, i.e., that in the soul

sometimes there is thought without truth and falsity, but sometimes of necessity it has one or the other of these. And since significant vocal sounds are formed to express these conceptions of the intellect, it is necessary that some significant vocal sounds signify without truth and falsity, others with truth and falsity—in order that the sign be conformed to what is signified.

3. Then when he says, for in composition and division there is truth and falsity, he manifests what he has just said: first with respect to what he has said about thought; secondly, with respect to what he has said about the likeness of vocal sounds to thought, where he says Names and verbs, then are like understanding without composition or division, etc.

To show that sometimes there is thought without truth or falsity and sometimes it is accompanied by one of these, he says first that truth and falsity concern composition and division. To understand this we must note again that one of the two operations of the intellect is the understanding of what is indivisible. This the intellect does when it understands the quiddity or essence of a thing absolutely, for instance, what man is or what white is or what something else of this kind is. The other operation is the one in which it composes and divides simple concepts of this kind. He says that in this second operation of the intellect, i.e., composing and dividing, truth and falsity is found; the conclusion being that it is not found in the first, as he also says in III De anima [6: 430a 26].

4. There seems to be a difficulty about this point, for division is made by resolution to what is indivisible, or simple, and therefore it seems that just as truth and falsity is not in simple things, so neither is it in division.

To answer this it should be pointed out that the conceptions of the intellect are likenesses of things and therefore the things that are in the intellect can be considered and named in two ways: according to themselves, and according to the nature of the things of which they are the likenesses. For just as a statue—say of Hercules—in itself is called and is bronze but as it is a likeness of Hercules is named man, so if we consider the things that are in the intellect in themselves, there is always composition where there is truth and falsity, for they are never found in the intellect except as it compares one simple concept with another. But if the composition is referred to reality, it is sometimes called composition, sometimes division: composition when the intellect compares one concept to another as though apprehending a conjunction or identity of the things of which they are conceptions; division, when it so compares one concept with another that it apprehends the things to be diverse. In vocal sound, therefore, affirmation is called composition inasmuch as it signifies a conjunction on the part of the thing and negation is called division inasmuch as it signifies the separation of things.

5. There is still another objection in relation to this point. It seems that truth is not in composition and division alone, for a thing is also said to be true or false. For instance, gold is said to be true gold or false gold.

Furthermore, being and true are said to be convertible. It seems, therefore, that the simple conception of the intellect, which is a likeness of the thing, also has truth and falsity.

Again, the Philosopher says in his book De anima [II, 6: 418a 15], that the sensation of proper sensibles is always true. But the sense does not compose or divide. Therefore, truth is not in composition and division exclusively.

Moreover, in the divine intellect there is no composition, as is proved in XII Metaphysicae [9: 1074b 15–1075a 11]. But the first and highest truth is in the divine intellect. Therefore, truth is not in composition and division exclusively.

6. To answer these difficulties the following considerations are necessary. Truth is found in something in two ways: as it is in that which is true, and as it is in the one speaking or knowing truth. Truth as it is in that which is true is found in both simple things and composite things, but truth in the one speaking or knowing truth is found only according to composition and division. This will become clear in what follows.

7. Truth, as the Philosopher says in VI Ethicorum [2: 1139a 28-30], is the good of the intellect. Hence, anything that is said to be true is such by reference to intellect. Now vocal sounds are related to thought as signs, but things are related to thought as that of which thoughts are likenesses. It must be noted, however, that a thing is related to thought in two ways: in one way as the measure to the measured, and this is the way natural things are related to the human speculative intellect. Whence thought is said to be true insofar as it is conformed to the thing, but false insofar as it is not in conformity with the thing.

However, a natural thing is not said to be true in relation to our thought in the way it was taught by certain ancient natural philosophers who supposed the truth of things to be only in what they seemed to be. According to this view it would follow that contradictories could be at once true, since the opinions of different men can be contradictory. Nevertheless, some things are said to be true or false in relation to our thought—not essentially or formally, but effectively—insofar as they are so constituted naturally as to cause a true or false estimation of themselves. It is in this way that gold is said to be true or false.

In another way, things are compared to thought as measured to the measure, as is evident in the practical intellect, which is a cause of things. In this way, the work of an artisan is said to be true insofar as it achieves the conception in the mind of the artist, and false insofar as it falls short of that conception.

8. Now all natural things are related to the divine intellect as artifacts to art and therefore a thing is said to be true insofar as it has its own form, according to which it represents divine art; false gold, for example, is true copper. It is in terms of this that being and true are converted, since any natural thing is conformed to divine art through its form. For this reason the Philosopher in I Physicae [9: 192a 17] says that form is something divine.

9. And just as a thing is said to be true by comparison to its measure, so also is sensation or thought, whose measure is the thing outside of the soul. Accordingly, sensation is said to be true when the sense through its form is in conformity with the thing existing outside of the a soul. It is in this way that the sensation of proper sensibles is true, and the intellect apprehending what a thing is apart from composition and division is always true, as is said in III De anima [3: 427b 12; 428a 11; 6: 43a 26].

It should be noted, however, that although the sensation of the proper object is true the sense does not perceive the sensation to be true, for it cannot know its relationship of conformity with the thing but only apprehends the thing. The intellect, on the other hand, can know its relationship of conformity and therefore only the intellect can know truth. This is the reason the Philosopher says in VI Metaphysicae [4: 1027b 26] that truth is only in the mind, that is to say, in one knowing truth.

To know this relationship of conformity is to judge that a thing is such or is not, which is to compose and divide; therefore, the intellect does not know truth except by composing and dividing through its judgment. If the judgment is in accordance with things it will be true, i.e., when the intellect judges a thing to be what it is or not to be what it is not. The judgment will be false when it is not in accordance with the thing, i.e., when it judges that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. It is evident from this that truth and falsity as it is in the one knowing and speaking is had only in composition and division.

This is what the Philosopher is speaking of here. And since vocal sounds are signs of thought, that vocal sound will be true which signifies true thought, false which signifies false thought, although vocal sound insofar as it is a real thing is said to be true in the same way other things are. Thus the vocal sound "Man is an ass" is truly vocal sound and truly a sign, but because it is a sign of something false it is said to be false.

10. It should be noted that the Philosopher is speaking of truth here as it relates to the human intellect, which judges of the conformity of things and thought by composing and dividing. However, the judgment of the divine intellect concerning this is without composition and division, for just as our intellect understands material things immaterially, so the divine intellect knows composition and division simply."

11. When he says, Names and verbs, then, are like thought without composition or division, he manifests what he has said about the likeness of vocal sounds to thought. Next he proves it by a sign when he says, A sign of this is that "goatstag" signifies something but is neither true nor false, etc.

Here he concludes from what has been said that since there is truth and falsity in the intellect only when there is composition or division, it follows that names and verbs, taken separately, are like thought which is without composition and division; as when we say "man" or "white," and nothing else is added. For these are neither true nor false at this point, but when "to be" or "not to be" is added they be come true or false.

12. Although one might think so, the case of someone giving a,, single name as a true response to a question is not an instance that can be raised against this position; for example, suppose someone asks, "What swims in the sea?" and the answer is "Fish"; this is not opposed to the position Aristotle is taking here, for the verb that was posited in the question is understood. And just as the name said by itself does not signify truth or falsity, so neither does the verb said by itself. The verbs of the first and second person and the intransitive verb" are not instances opposed to this

position either, for in these a particular and determined nominative is understood. Consequently there is implicit composition, though not explicit.

13. Then he says, A sign of this is that “goatstag” signifies something but is neither true nor false unless “to be or “not to be” is added either absolutely or according to time. Here he introduces as a sign the composite name “goatstag,” from “goat” and “stag.” In Greek the word is “tragelaphos,” from “tragos” meaning goat and “elaphos” meaning stag. Now names of this kind signify something, namely, certain simple concepts (although the things they signify are composite), and therefore are not true or false unless “to be” or “not to be” is added, by which a judgment of the intellect is expressed. The “to be” or “not to be” can be added either according to present time, which is to be or not to be in act and for this reason is to be simply; or according to past or future time, which is to be relatively, not simply; as when we say that something has been or will be.

Notice that Aristotle expressly uses as an example here a name signifying something that does not exist in reality, in which fictiveness is immediately evident, and which cannot be true or false without composition and division.

LESSON 4

The Name

16a 19 A name, then, is a vocal sound significant by convention, without time, no part of which is significant separately;

16a 21 for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell,” as such signifies nothing, although in the expression “camp bell” it does.

16a 22 However the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names; for in the former the part is in no way significant, but in the latter the part has meaning but of nothing apart from the word, as “fast” in “breakfast.”

16a 26 “By convention” is added because nothing is by nature a name, but it is a name when it is made a sign; for unlettered sounds, such as those of the brutes, designate but none of them is a name.

16a 29 “Non-man,” however, is not a name. No name has been imposed to designate this—for it is neither speech nor a negation—but let us call it an infinite name.

16a 32 “Of Philo” and “to Philo” and all such expressions are not names but modes of names.

16b 1 The definition of these is the same in all other respects as that of the name itself, but in conjunction with “is” or “has been” or “will be” they are not true or false, whereas if one of these is added to a name there is always truth or falsity; for example, “of Philo is,” or “of Philo is not” are neither true nor false.

1. Having determined the order of the signification of vocal sounds, the Philosopher begins here to establish the definitions of the significant vocal sounds. His principal intention is to establish what an enunciation is—which is the subject of this book—but since in any science the principles of the subject must be known first, he begins with the principles of the enunciation and then establishes what an enunciation is where he says, All speech is not enunciative, etc.” With respect to the principles of the enunciation he first determines the nature of the quasi material principles, i.e., its integral parts, and secondly the formal principle, i.e., speech, which is the genus of the enunciation, where he says, Speech is significant vocal sound, etc.” Apropos of the quasi material principles of the enunciation he first establishes that a name signifies the substance of a thing and then that the verb signifies action or passion proceeding from a thing, where he says The verb is that which signifies with time, etc.” In relation to this first point, he first defines the name, and then explains the definition where he says, for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell,” as such, signifies nothing, etc., and finally excludes certain things—those that do not have the definition of the name perfectly—where he says, “Non-man,” however, is not a name, etc.

2. It should be noted in relation to defining the name, that a definition is said to be a limit because it includes a thing totally, i.e., such that nothing of the thing is outside of the definition, that is, there is nothing of the thing to which the definition does not belong; nor is any other thing under the definition, that is, the definition belongs to no other thing.

3. Aristotle posits five parts in the definition of the name. Vocal sound is given first, as the genus. This distinguishes the name from all sounds that are not vocal; for vocal sound is sound produced from the mouth of an animal and involves a certain kind of mental image, as is said in II De anima [8: 420b 30-34]. The second part is the first difference, i.e., significant, which differentiates the name from any non-significant vocal sound, whether lettered and articulated, such as “biltris,” or non-lettered and non-articulated, as a hissing for no reason. Now since he has already determined the signification of vocal sounds, he concludes from what has been established that a name is a significant vocal sound.

4. But vocal sound is a natural thing, whereas a name is not natural but instituted by men; it seems, therefore, that Aristotle should have taken sign, which is from institution, as the genus of the name, rather than vocal sound,

which is from nature. Then the definition would be: a name is a vocal sign, etc., just as a salver would be more suitably defined as a wooden dish than as wood formed into a dish.

5. It should be noted, however, that while it is true that artificial things are in the genus of substance on the part of matter, they are in the genus of accident on the part of form, since the forms of artificial things are accidents. A name, therefore, signifies an accidental form made concrete in a subject. Now the subject must be posited in the definition of every accident; hence, when names signify an accident in the abstract the accident has to be posited directly (i.e., in the nominative case) as a quasi-genus in their definition and the subject posited obliquely (i.e., in an oblique case such as the genitive, dative, or accusative) as a quasi-difference; as for example, when we define snubness as curvedness of the nose. But when names signify an accident ill the concrete, the matter or subject has to be posited in their definition as a quasi-genus and the accident as a quasi-difference, as when we say that a snub nose is a curved nose. Accordingly, if the names of artificial things signify accidental forms as made concrete in natural subjects, then it is more appropriate to posit the natural thing in their definition as a quasi-genus. We would say, therefore, that a salver is shaped wood, and likewise, that a name is a significant vocal sound. It would be another matter if names of artificial things were taken as signifying artificial forms in the abstract.

6. The third part is the second difference, i.e., by convention, namely, according to human institution deriving from the will of man. This differentiates names from vocal sounds signifying naturally, such as the groans of the sick and the vocal sounds of brute animals.

7. The fourth part is the third difference, i.e., without time, which differentiates the name from the verb.

This, however, seems to be false, for the name “day” or “year” signifies time.

But there are three things that can be considered with respect to time; first, time itself, as it is a certain kind of thing or reality, and then it can be signified by a name just like any other thing; secondly, that which is measured by time, insofar as it is measured by time. Motion, which consists of action and passion, is what is measured first and principally by time, and therefore the verb, which signifies action and passion, signifies with time.

Substance considered in itself, which a name or a pronoun signify, is not as such measured by time, but only insofar as it is subjected to motion, and this the participle signifies. The verb and the participle, therefore, signify with time, but not the name and pronoun. The third thing that can be considered is the very relationship of time as it measures. This is signified by adverbs of time such as “tomorrow,” “yesterday,” and others of this kind.

8. The fifth part is the fourth difference, no part of which is significant separately, that is, separated from the whole name; but it is related to the signification of the name according as it is in the whole. The reason for this is that signification is a quasi-form of the name. But no separated part has the form of the whole; just as the hand separated from the man does not have the human form. This difference distinguishes the name from speech, some parts of which signify separately, as for example in “just man.”

9. When he says, for in the name “Campbell” the part “bell” as such signifies nothing, etc., he explains the definition. First he explains the last part of the definition; secondly, the third part, by convention. The first two parts were explained in what preceded, and the fourth part, without time, will be explained later in the section on the verb. And first he explains the last part by means of a composite name; then he shows what the difference is between simple and composite names where he says, However the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names, etc.

First, then, he shows that a part separated from a name signifies nothing. To do this he uses a composite name because the point is more striking there. For in the name “Campbell” the part “bell” per se signifies nothing, although it does signify something in the phrase “camp bell.” The reason for this is that one name is imposed to signify one simple conception; but that from which a name is imposed to signify is different from that which a name signifies. For example, the name “pedigree”, is imposed from pedis and grus [crane’s foot] which it does not signify, to signify the concept of a certain thing. Hence, a part of the composite name—which composite name is imposed to signify a simple concept—does not signify a part of the composite conception from which the name is imposed to signify. Speech, on the other hand, does signify a composite conception. Hence, a part of speech signifies a part of the composite conception.

10. When he says, However, the case is not exactly the same in simple names and composite names, etc., he shows that there is a difference

between simple and composite names in regard to their parts not signifying separately. Simple names are not the same as composite names in this respect because in simple names a part is in no way significant, either according to truth or according to appearance, but in composite names the part has meaning, i.e., has the appearance of signifying; yet a part of it signifies nothing, as is said of the name "breakfast." The reason for this difference is that the simple name is imposed to signify a simple concept and is also imposed from a simple concept; but the composite name is imposed from a composite conception, and hence has the appearance that a part of it signifies.

11. Then he says, "By convention" is added because nothing is by nature a name, etc. Here Aristotle explains the third part of the definition. The reason it is said that the name signifies by convention, he says, is that no name exists naturally. For it is a name because it signifies; it does not signify naturally however, but by institution. This he adds when he says, but it is a name when it is made a sign, i.e., when it is imposed to signify. For that which signifies naturally is not made a sign, but is a sign naturally. he explains this when he says: for unlettered sounds, such as those of the brutes designate, etc., i.e., since they cannot be signified by letters. He says sounds rather than vocal sounds because some animals—those without lungs—do not have vocal sounds. Such animals signify proper passions by some kind of non-vocal sound which signifies naturally. But none of these sounds of the brutes is a name. We are given to understand from this that a name does not signify naturally.

12. However, there were diverse opinions about this. Some men said that names in no way signify naturally and that it makes no difference which things are signified by which names. Others said that names signify naturally in every way, as if names were natural likenesses of things. Still others said names do not signify naturally, i.e., insofar as their signification is not from nature, as Aristotle maintains here, but that names do signify naturally in the sense that their signification corresponds to the natures of things, as Plato held.

The fact that one thing is signified by many names is not in opposition to Aristotle's position here, for there can be many likenesses of one thing; and similarly, from diverse properties many diverse names can be imposed on one thing. When Aristotle says, but none of them is a name, he does not mean that the sounds of animals are not named, for we do have names for them; “roaring,” for example, is said of the sound made by a lion, and “lowing” of that of a cow. What he means is that no such sound is a name.

13. When he says, “Non-man,” however, is not a name, etc., he points out that certain things do not have the nature of a name. First he excludes the infinite name; then the cases of the name where he says, “Of Philo” and “to Philo,” etc.

He says that “non-man” is not a name because every name signifies some determinate nature, for example, “man,” or a determinate person in the case of the pronoun, or both determinately, as in “Socrates.” But when we say “non-man” it signifies neither a determinate nature nor a determinate person, because it is imposed from the negation of man, which negation is predicated equally of being and non-being. Consequently, “non-man” can be said indifferently both of that which does not exist in reality, as in “A chimera is non-man,” and of that which does exist in reality, as in “A horse is non-man.”

Now if the infinite name were imposed from a privation it would require at least an existing subject, but since it is imposed from a negation, it can be predicated of being and nonbeing, as Boethius and Ammonius say. However, since it signifies in the mode of a name, and can therefore be subjected and predicated, a suppositum is required at least in apprehension.

In the time of Aristotle there was no name for words of this kind. They are not speech since a part of such a word does not signify something separately, just as a part of a composite name does not signify separately; and they are not negations, i.e., negative speech, for speech of this kind adds negation to affirmation, which is not the case here. Therefore he imposes a new name for words of this kind, the “infinite name,” because of the indetermination of signification, as has been said.

14. When he says, “Of Philo” and “to Philo” and all such expressions are not names but modes of names, he excludes the cases of names from the nature of the name. The nominative is the one that is said to be a name principally, for the imposition of the name to signify something was made through it. Oblique expressions of the kind cited are called cases of the name because they fall away from the nominative as a kind of source of their declension. On the other hand, the nominative, because it does not fall away, is said to be erect. The Stoics held that even the nominatives were

cases (with which the grammarians agree), because they fall, i.e., proceed from the interior conception of the mind; and they said they were also called erect because nothing prevents a thing from falling in such a way that it stands erect, as when a pen falls and is fixed in wood.

15. Then he says, The definition of these is the same in all other respects as that of the name itself, etc. Here Aristotle shows how oblique cases are related to the name. The definition, as it signifies the name, is the same in the others, namely, in the cases of the name. But they differ in this respect: the name joined to the verb “is” or “will be” or “has been” always signifies the true or false; in oblique cases this is not so. It is significant that the substantive verb is the one he uses as an example, for there are other verbs, i.e., impersonal verbs, that do signify the true or false when joined with a name in an oblique case, as in “It grieves Socrates,” because the act of the verb is understood to be carried over to the oblique cases, as though what were said were, “Grief possesses Socrates.”

16. However, an objection could be made against Aristotle’s position in this portion of his text. If the infinite name and the cases of the name are not names, then the definition of the name (which belongs to these) is not consistently presented.

There are two ways of answering this objection. We could say, as Ammonius does, that Aristotle defines the name broadly, and afterward limits the signification of the name by subtracting these from it. Or, we could say that the definition Aristotle has given does not belong to these absolutely, since the infinite name signifies nothing determinate, and the cases of the name do not signify according to the first intent of the one instituting the name, as has been said.

LESSON 5

On the Nature of the Verb and Its Conformity with the Name

16b 5 The verb is that which signifies with time; no part of it signifies separately, and it is a sign of something said of something else.

16b 8 1 mean by “signifies with time” that “maturity,” for example, is a name, but “matures” is a verb, for it connotes the present existence of maturity.

16b 10 Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something, i.e., of something present in a subject.

16b 12 “Non-matures” and “non-declines” I do not call verbs. They signify with time and always belong to something but they differ from the verb and no name has been established for the difference. Let us call them infinite verbs, since they belong equally to anything whatever, to both what is and what is not.

16b 16 Likewise, “has matured” and “will mature” are not verbs but modes of the verb.55 They differ from the verb in that the verb signifies with present time, whereas the modes signify time outside of the present.

16b 19 Verbs in themselves, said alone, are names, and signify something

16b 20 —for in tittering a verb the one speaking informs the mind of the one hearing it and sets it at rest—but they do not yet signify whether a thing is or is not, for the verb is not a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing. Nor would it be a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing if you were to say alone, for it is nothing; it signifies with a composition which cannot be conceived apart from the things composing it.

1. After determining the nature of the name the Philosopher now determines the nature of the verb. First he defines the verb; secondly, he excludes certain forms of verbs from the definition, where he says, “Non-matures” and “non-declines” I do not call verbs, etc.; finally, he shows in what the verb and name agree where he says, Verbs in themselves, said alone, are names, etc. First, then, he defines the verb and immediately begins to explain the definition where he says, I mean by “signifies with time,” etc.

2. In order to be brief, Aristotle does not give what is common to the name and the verb in the definition of the verb, but leaves this for the reader to understand from the definition of the name.

He posits three elements in the definition of the verb. The first of these distinguishes the verb from the name, for the verb signifies with time, the name without time, as was stated in its definition. The second element, no part of which signifies separately, distinguishes the verb from speech.

3. This second element was also given in the definition of the name and therefore it seems that this second element along with vocal sound significant by convention, should have been omitted.

Ammonius says in reply to this that Aristotle posited this in the definition of the name to distinguish it from speech which is composed of names, as in “Man is an animal”; but speech may also be composed of verbs, as in “To walk is to move”; therefore, this also bad to be repeated in the definition of the verb to distinguish it from speech.

We might also say that since the verb introduces the composition which brings about speech signifying truth or falsity, the verb seems to be more like speech (being a certain formal part of it) than the name which is a material and subjective part of it; therefore this had to be repeated.

4. The third element distinguishes the verb not only from the name, but also from the participle, which also signifies with time. He makes this distinction when he says, and it is a sign of something said of something else, i.e., names and participles can be posited on the part of the subject and the predicate, but the verb is always posited on the part of the predicate.

5. But it seems that verbs are used as subjects. The verb in the infinitive mode is an instance of this, as in the example, “To walk is to be moving.”

Verbs of the infinitive mode, however, have the force of names when they are used as subjects. (Hence in both Greek and ordinary Latin usage articles are added to them as in the case of names.) The reason for this is that it is proper to the name to signify something as existing per se, but proper to the verb to signify action or passion. Now there are three ways of signifying action or passion. It can be signified per se, as a certain thing in the abstract and is thus signified by a name such as “action,” “passion,” “walking,” “running,” and so on. It can also be signified in the mode of an action, i.e., as proceeding from a substance and inhering in it as in a subject; in this way action or passion is signified by the verbs of the different modes attributed to predicates. Finally—and this is the third way in which action or passion can be signified—the very process or inherence of action can be apprehended by the intellect and signified as a thing. Verbs of the infinitive mode signify such inherence of action in a subject and hence can be taken as verbs by reason of concretion, and as names inasmuch as they signify as things.

6. On this point the objection may also be raised that verbs of other modes sometimes seem to be posited as subjects; for example when we say, “‘Matures’is a verb.”

In such a statement, however, the verb “matures” is not taken formally according as its signification is referred to a thing, but as it signifies the vocal sound itself materially, which vocal sound is taken as a thing. When posited in this way, i.e., materially, verbs and all parts of speech are taken with the force of names.

7. Then he says, I mean by “signifies with time” that “maturity,” for example, is a name, but “matures” is a verb, etc.”‘ With this he begins to explain the definition of the verb: first in regard to signifies with time; secondly, in regard to the verb being a sign of something said of something else. He does not explain the second part, no part of which signifies separately, because an explanation of it has already been made in connection with the name.

First, he shows by an example that the verb signifies with time. “Maturity,” for example, because it signifies action, not in the mode of action but. in the mode of a thing existing per se, does not signify with time, for it is a name. But “matures,” since it is a verb signifying action, signifies with time, because to be measured by time is proper to motion; moreover, actions are known by us in time. We have already mentioned that to signify with time is to signify something measured in time. Hence it is one thing to signify time principally, as a thing, which is appropriate to the name; however, it is another thing to signify with time, which is not proper to the name but to the verb.

8. Then he says, Moreover, a verb is always a sign of something that belongs to something, i.e., of something present in a subject. Here he explains the last part of the definition of the verb. It should be noted first that the subject of an enunciation signifies as that in which something inheres. Hence, when the verb signifies action through the mode of action (the nature of which is to inhere) it is always posited on the part of the predicate and never on the part of the subject—unless it is taken with the force of a name, as was said. The verb, therefore, is always said to be a sign of something said of another, and this not only because the verb always signifies that which is predicated but also because there must be a verb in every predication, for the verb introduces the composition by which the predicate is united with the subject.

9. The last phrase of this portion of the text presents a difficulty, namely, “of something belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject.” For it seems that something is said of a subject when it is predicated essentially, as in “Man is an animal”; but in a subject, when it is an accident that is predicated of a subject, as in “Man is white.” But if verbs signify action or passion (which are accidents), it follows that they always signify what is in a subject. It is useless, therefore, to say “belonging to [i.e., of] a subject or in a subject.”

In answer to this Boethius says that both pertain to the same thing, for an accident is predicated of a subject and is also in a subject.

Aristotle, however, uses a disjunction, which seems to indicate that he means something different by each. Therefore it could be said in reply to this that when Aristotle says the verb is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another” it is not to be understood as though the things signified by verbs are predicated. For predication seems to pertain more properly to composition; therefore, the verbs themselves are what are predicated, rather than signify predicates.” The verb, then, is always a sign that something is being predicated because all predication is made through the verb by reason of the composition introduced, whether what is being predicated is predicated essentially or accidentally.

10. When he says, “Non-matures” and “non-declines” I do not call verbs, etc., he excludes certain forms of verbs from the definition of the verb. And first he excludes the infinite verb, then the verbs of past and future time. “Non-matures” and “non-declines” cannot strictly speaking be called verbs for it is proper to the verb to signify something in the mode of action or passion. But these words remove action or passion rather than signify a determinate action or passion. Now while they cannot properly be called verbs, all the parts of the definition of the verb apply to them. First of all the verb signifies time, because it signifies to act or to be acted upon; and since these are in time so are their privations; whence rest, too, is measured by time, as is said in VI Physicorum [3:234a 24–234b 9; & 8: 238a 23–239b 41]. Again, the infinite verb is always posited on the part of the predicate just as the verb is; the reason is that negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation. Hence, just as the verb, which signifies action or passion, signifies something as existing in another, so the foresaid words signify the remotion of action or passion.

11. Now someone might object that if the definition of the verb applies to the above words, then they are verbs. In answer to this it should be pointed out that the definition which has been given of the verb is the definition of it taken commonly. Insofar as these words fall short of the perfect notion of the verb, they are not called verbs. Before Aristotle’s time a name bad not been imposed for a word that differs from verbs as these do. He calls them infinite verbs because such words agree in some things with verbs and yet fall short of the determinate notion of the verb. The reason for the name, he says, is that an infinite verb can be said indifferently of what is or what is not; for the adjoined negation is taken, not with the force of privation, but with the force of simple negation since privation supposes a determinate subject. Infinite verbs do differ from negative verbs, however, for infinite verbs are taken with the force of one word, negative verbs with the force of two.

12. When he says, Likewise, “has matured” and “will mature” are not verbs, but modes of verbs, etc., he excludes verbs of past and future time from the definition. For just as infinite verbs are not verbs absolutely, so

“will mature,” which is of future time, and “has matured,” of past time, are not verbs. They are cases of the verb and differ from the verb—which signifies with present time—by signifying time before and after the present. Aristotle expressly says “present time” and not just “present” because he does not mean here the indivisible present which is the instant; for in the instant there is neither movement, nor action, nor passion. Present time is to be taken as the time that measures action which has begun and has not yet been terminated in act. Accordingly, verbs that signify with past or future time are not verbs in the proper sense of the term, for the verb is that which signifies to act or to be acted upon and therefore strictly speaking signifies to act or to be acted upon in act, which is to act or to be acted upon simply, whereas to act or to be acted upon in past or future time is relative.

13. It is with reason that verbs of past or future time are called cases of the verb signifying with present time, for past or future are said with respect to the present, the past being that which was present, the future, that which will be present.

14. Although the inflection of the verb is varied by mode, time, number, and person, the variations that are made in number and person do not constitute cases of the verb, the reason being that such variation is on the part of the subject, not on the part of the action. But variation in mode and time refers to the action itself and hence both of these constitute cases of the verb. For verbs of the imperative or optative modes are called cases as well as verbs of past or future time. Verbs of the indicative mode in present time, however, are not called cases, whatever their person and number.

15. He points out the conformity between verbs and names where he says, Verbs in themselves, said alone, are names. He proposes this first and then manifests it.

He says then, first, that verbs said by themselves are names. Some have taken this to mean the verbs that are taken with the force of names, either verbs of the infinitive mode, as in “To run is to be moving,” or verbs of another mode, as in “‘Matures’ is a verb.”

But this does not seem to be what Aristotle means, for it does not correspond to what he says next. Therefore “name” must be taken in another way here, i.e., as it commonly signifies any word whatever that is imposed to signify a thing. Now, since to act or to be acted upon is also a certain thing, verbs themselves as they name, i.e., as they signify to act or to be acted upon, are comprehended under names taken commonly. The name as distinguished from the verb signifies the thing under a determinate mode, i.e., according as the thing can be understood as existing per se. This is the reason names can be subjected and predicated.

16. He proves the point he has just made when he says, and signify something, etc., first by showing that verbs, like names, signify something; then by showing that, like names, they do not signify truth or falsity when he says, for the verb is not a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing.

He says first that verbs have been said to be names only insofar as they signify a thing. Then he proves this: it has already been said that significant vocal sound signifies thought; hence it is proper to significant vocal sound to produce something understood in the mind of the one who hears it. To show, then, that a verb is significant vocal sound he assumes that the one who utters a verb brings about understanding in the mind of the one who bears it. The evidence he introduces for this is that the mind of the one who bears it is set at rest.

17. But what Aristotle says here seems to be false, for it is only perfect speech that makes the intellect rest. The name or the verb, if said by themselves, do not do this. For example, if I say “man,” the mind of the hearer is left in suspense as to what I wish to say about mail; and if I say “runs,” the bearer’s mind is left in suspense as to whom I am speaking of.

It should be said in answer to this objection that the operation of the intellect is twofold, as was said above, and therefore the one who utters a name or a verb by itself, determines the intellect with respect to the first operation, which is the simple conception of something. It is in relation to this that the one hearing, whose mind was undetermined before the name or the verb was being uttered and its utterance terminated, is set at rest. Neither the name nor the verb said by itself, however, determines the intellect in respect to the second operation, which is the operation of the intellect composing and dividing; nor do the verb or the name said alone set the hearer’s mind at rest in respect to this operation.

18. Aristotle therefore immediately adds, but they do not yet signify whether a thing is or is not, i.e., they do not yet signify something by way of composition and division, or by way of truth or falsity. This is the second thing he intends to prove, and he proves it by the verbs that especially seem to signify truth or falsity, namely the verb to be and the infinite verb to non-

be, neither of which, said by itself, signifies real truth or falsity; much less so any other verbs.

This could also be understood in a more general way, i.e., that here he is speaking of all verbs; for he says that the verb does not signify whether a thing is or is not; he manifests this further, therefore, by saying that no verb is significative of a thing's being or non-being, i.e., that a thing is or is not. For although every finite verb implies being, for "to run" is "to be running," and every infinite verb implies nonbeing, for "to non-run" is "to be non-running," nevertheless no verb signifies the whole, i.e., a thing is or a thing is not.

19. He proves this point from something in which it will be clearer when he adds, Nor would it be a sign of the being or nonbeing of a thing if you were to say "is" alone, for it is nothing. It should be noted that the Greek text has the word "being" in place of "is" here.

In order to prove that verbs do not signify that a thing is or is not, he takes the source and origin of to be [esse], i.e., being [ens] itself, of which he says, it is nothing. Alexander explains this passage in the following way: Aristotle says being itself is nothing because "being" [ens] is said equivocally of the ten predicaments; now an equivocal name used by itself signifies nothing unless something is added to determine its signification; hence, "is" [est] said by itself does not signify what is or is not.

But this explanation is not appropriate for this text. In the first place "being" is not, strictly speaking, said equivocally but according to the prior and posterior. Consequently, said absolutely, it is understood of that of which it is said primarily. Secondly, an equivocal word does not signify nothing, but many things, sometimes being taken for one, sometimes for another. Thirdly, such an explanation does not have much application here.

Porphyry explains this passage in another way. He says that "being" [ens] itself does not signify the nature of a thing as the name "man" or "wise" do, but only designates a certain conjunction and this is why Aristotle adds, it signifies with a composition, which cannot be conceived apart from the things composing it.

This explanation does not seem to be consistent with the text either, for if "being" itself does not signify a thing, but only a conjunction, it, like prepositions and conjunctions, is neither a name nor a verb.

Therefore Ammonius thought this should be explained in another way. He says “being itself is nothing” means that it does not signify truth or falsity. And the reason for this is given when Aristotle says, it signifies with a composition. The “signifies with,” according to Ammonius, does not mean what it does when it is said that the verb signifies with time; “signifies with,” means here signifies with something, i.e., joined to another it signifies composition, which cannot be understood without the extremes of the composition. But this explanation does not seem to be in accordance with the intention of Aristotle, for it is common to all names and verbs not to signify truth or falsity, whereas Aristotle takes “being” here as though it were something special.

20. Therefore in order to understand what Aristotle is saying we should note that he has just said that the verb does not signify that a thing exists or does not exist [rem esse vel non esse]; nor does “being” [ens] signify that a thing exists or does not exist. This is what he means when he says, it is nothing, i.e., it does not signify that a thing exists. This is indeed most clearly seen in saying “being” [ens], because being is nothing other than that which is. And thus we see that it signifies both a thing, when I say “that which,” and existence [esse] when I say “is” [est]. If the word “being” [ens] as signifying a thing having existence were to signify existence [esse] principally, without a doubt it would signify that a thing exists. But the word “being” [ens] does not principally signify the composition that is implied in saying “is” [est]; rather, it signifies with composition inasmuch as it signifies the thing having existence. Such signifying with composition is not sufficient for truth or falsity; for the composition in which truth and falsity consists cannot be understood unless it connects the extremes of a composition.

21. If in place of what Aristotle says we say nor would “to be” itself [nec ipsum esse], as it is in our texts, the meaning is clearer. For Aristotle proves through the verb “is” [est] that no verb signifies that a thing exists or does not exist, since “is” said by itself does not signify that a thing exists, although it signifies existence. And because to be itself seems to be a kind of composition, so also the verb “is” [est], which signifies to be, can seem to signify the composition in which there is truth or falsity. To exclude this Aristotle adds that the composition which the verb “is” signifies cannot be understood without the composing things. The reason for this is that an

understanding of the composition which “is” signifies depends on the extremes, and unless they are added, understanding of the composition is not complete and hence cannot be true or false.

22. Therefore he says that the verb “is” signifies with composition; for it does not signify composition principally but consequently. it primarily signifies that which is perceived in the mode of actuality absolutely; for “is” said simply, signifies to be in act, and therefore signifies in the mode of a verb. However, the actuality which the verb “is” principally signifies is the actuality of every form commonly, whether substantial or accidental. Hence, when we wish to signify that any form or act is actually in some subject we signify it through the verb “is,” either absolutely or relatively; absolutely, according to present time, relatively, according to other times; and for this reason the verb “is” signifies composition, not principally, but consequently.

LESSON 6

On Speech, the Formal Principle of the Enunciation

16b 26 Speech” is significant vocal sound, some parts of which are significant separately, i.e., as words but not as an affirmation.

16b 28 Let me explain. The word “animal” signifies something, but it does not signify that it is or that it is not; it will be an affirmation or negation, however, if something is added.

16b 30 But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything; similarly, in the word “fowl,” “owl” does not signify anything in itself, but is only a vocal sound. In composite names, however, the part does signify something, but not in itself, as has been said.

16b 34 But all speech [i.e., words put together to express thought] is significant—not just as an instrument, however, but by convention, as has been said.

1. Having established and explained the definition of the name and the verb, which are the material principles of the enunciation inasmuch as they are its parts, the Philosopher now determines and explains what speech is, which is the formal principle of the enunciation inasmuch as it is its genus. First he proposes the definition of speech; then he explains it where he says, Let me explain. The word “animal” signifies something, etc.; finally, he excludes an error where he says, But all speech is significant—not just as an instrument, however, etc.

2. In defining speech the Philosopher first states what it has in common with the name and verb where he says, Speech is significant vocal sound.

This was posited in the definition of the name but not repeated in the case of the verb, because it was supposed from the definition of the name. This was done for the sake of brevity and to avoid repetition; but subsequently he did prove that the verb signifies something. He repeats this, however, in the definition of speech because the signification of speech differs from that of the name and the verb; for the name and the verb signify simple thought, whereas speech signifies composite thought.

3. Secondly, he posits what differentiates speech from the name and verb when he says, of which some of the parts are significant separately; for a part of a name taken separately does not signify anything per se, except in the case of a name composed of two parts, as he said above. Note that he says, of which some of the parts are significant, and not, a part of which is significant separately; this is to exclude negations and the other words used to unite categorical words, which do not in themselves signify something absolutely, but only the relationship of one thing to another. Then because the signification of vocal sound is twofold, one being referred to composite thought, the other to simple thought (the first belonging to speech, the second, not to speech but to a part of speech), he adds, as words but not as an affirmation. What he means is that a part of speech signifies in the way a word signifies, a name or a verb, for instance; it does not signify in the way an affirmation signifies, which is composed of a name and a verb. He only mentions affirmation because negation adds something to affirmation as far as vocal sound is concerned for if a part of speech, since it is simple, does not signify as an affirmation, it will not signify as a negation.

4. Aspasius objects to this definition because it does not seem to belong to all parts of speech. There is a kind of speech he says, in which some of the parts signify as an affirmation; for instance, “If the sun shines over the earth, it is day,” and so in many other examples.

Porphyry says in reply to this objection that in whatever genus there is something prior and posterior, it is the prior thing that has to be defined. For example, when we give the definition of a species—say, of man—the definition is understood of that which is in act, not of that which is in potency. Since, then, in the genus of speech, simple speech is prior, Aristotle defines it first.

Or, we can answer the objection in the way Alexander and Ammonious do. They say that speech is defined here commonly. Hence what is common to simple and composite speech ought to be stated in the definition. Now to have parts signifying something as an affirmation belongs only to composite speech, but to have parts signifying something in the mode of a word and not in the mode of an affirmation is common to simple and composite speech. Therefore this had to be posited in the definition of speech. We should not conclude, however, that it is of the nature of speech that its part not be an affirmation, but rather that it is of the nature of speech that its parts be something that signify in the manner of words and not in the manner of an affirmation.

Porphyry’s solution reduces to the same thing as far as meaning is concerned, although it is a little different verbally. Aristotle frequently uses “to say” for “to affirm,” and hence to prevent “word” from being taken as “affirmation” when he says that a part of speech signifies as a word, he immediately adds, not as an affirmation, meaning—according to Porphyry’s view—”word” is not taken here in the sense in which it is the same as “affirmation.”

A philosopher called John the Grammarian thought that this definition could only apply to perfect speech because there only seem to be parts in the case of something perfect, or complete; for example, a house to which all of the parts are referred. Therefore only perfect speech has significant parts.

He was in error on this point, however, for while it is true that all the parts are referred principally to the perfect, or complete whole, some parts are referred to it immediately, for example, the walls and roof to a house and organic members to an animal; others, however, are referred to it through the principal parts of which they are parts; stones, for example, to the house by the mediate wall, and nerves and bones to the animal by the mediate organic members like the hand and the foot, etc. In the case of speech, therefore, all of the parts are principally referred to perfect speech, a part of which is imperfect speech, which also has significant parts. Hence this definition belongs both to perfect and to imperfect speech.

5. When he says, Let me explain. The word “animal” signifies something, etc., he elucidates the definition. First he shows that what he says is true; secondly, he excludes a false understanding of it where he says, But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything, etc.

He explains that when he says some parts of speech are significant, he means that some of the parts signify something in the way the name “animal,” which is a part of speech, signifies something and yet does not signify as an affirmation or negation, because it does not signify to be or not to be. By this I mean it does not signify affirmation or negation in act, but only in potency; for it is possible to add something that will make it an affirmation or negation, i.e., a verb.

6. He excludes a false understanding of what has been said by his next statement. But one syllable of “animal” does not signify anything. This could be referred to what has just been said and the meaning would be that the name will be an affirmation or negation if something is added to it, but not if what is added is one syllable of a name. However, what he says next is not compatible with this meaning and therefore these words should be referred to what was stated earlier in defining speech, namely, to some parts of which are significant separately. Now, since what is properly called a part of a whole is that which contributes immediately to the formation of the whole, and not that which is a part of a part, “some parts” should be understood as the parts from which speech is immediately formed, i.e., the name and verb, and not as parts of the name or verb, which are syllables or letters. Hence, what is being said here is that a part of speech is significant separately but not such a part as the syllable of a name.

He manifests this by means of syllables that sometimes can be words signifying per se. “Owl,” for example, is sometimes one word signifying per se. When taken as a syllable of the name “fowl,” however, it does not signify something per se but is only a vocal sound. For a word is composed of many vocal sounds, but it has simplicity in signifying insofar as it signifies simple thought. Hence, a word inasmuch as it is a composite vocal sound can have a part which is a vocal sound, but inasmuch as it is simple in signifying it cannot have a signifying part. Whence syllables are indeed vocal sounds, but they are not vocal sounds signifying per se.

In contrast to this it should be noted that in composite names, which are imposed to signify a simple thing from some composite understanding, the parts appear to signify something, although according to truth they do not. For this reason he adds that in compound words, i.e., composite names, the syllables may be words contributing to the composition of a name, and therefore signify something, namely, in the composite, and according as they are words; but as parts of this kind of name they do not signify something per se, but in the way that has already been explained.

7. Then he says, But all speech is significant—not just as an instrument, however, etc. Here he excludes the error of those who said that speech and its parts signify naturally rather than by convention. To prove their point they used the following argument. The instruments of a natural power must themselves be natural, for nature does not fail in regard to what is necessary; but the interpretive power is natural to man; therefore, its instruments are natural. Now the instrument of the interpretive power is speech since it is through speech that expression is given to the conception of the mind; for we mean by an instrument that by which an agent operates. Therefore, speech is something natural, signifying, not from human institution, but naturally.

8. Aristotle refutes this argument, which is said to be that of Plato in the Cratylus, when he says that all speech is significant, but not as an instrument of a power, that is, of a natural power; for the natural instruments of the interpretive power are the throat and lungs, by which vocal sound is formed, and the tongue, teeth and lips by which letters and articulate sounds are formulated. Rather, speech and its parts are effects of the interpretative power through the aforesaid instruments. For just as the motive power uses natural instruments such as arms and hands to make an artificial work, so the interpretative power uses the throat and other natural instruments to make speech. Hence, speech and its parts are not natural things, but certain artificial effects. This is the reason Aristotle adds here that speech signifies by convention, i.e., according to the ordinance of human will and reason.

It should be noted, however, that if we do not attribute the interpretative power to a motive power, but to reason, then it is not a natural power but is beyond every corporeal nature, since thought is not an act of the body, as is proved in III De anima [4: 429a 10]. Moreover, it is reason itself that moves the corporeal motive power to make artificial works, which reason then uses as instruments; and thus artificial works are not instruments of a corporeal power. Reason can also use speech and its parts in this way, i.e., as instruments, although they do not signify naturally.

LESSON 7

The Definition of Enunciation

17a 2 Yet not all speech is enunciative; but only speech in which there is truth or falsity.

17a 4 Truth and falsity is not present in all speech, however; a prayer, for example, is speech but it is neither true nor false.

17a 5 Let us therefore consider enunciative speech, which belongs to our present inquiry, and omit the other kinds, for the study of these belongs rather to rhetoric and poetics.

1. Having defined the principles of the enunciation, the Philosopher now begins to treat the enunciation itself. This is divided into two parts. In the first he examines the enunciation absolutely; in the second the diversity of enunciations resulting from an addition to the simple enunciation. The latter is treated in the second book, where he says, Since an affirmation signifies something about a subject, etc.”‘ The first part, on the enunciation absolutely, is divided into three parts. In the first he defines enunciation; in the second he divides it where he says, First affirmation, then negation, is enunciative speech that is one, etc.;” in the third he treats of the opposition of its parts to each other, where he says, Since it is possible to enunciate that what belongs to a subject does not belong to it, etc. In the portion of the text treated in this lesson, which is concerned with the definition of enunciation, he first states the definition, then shows that this definition differentiates the enunciation from other species of speech, where he says, Truth and falsity is not present in all speech however, etc., and finally indicates that only the enunciation is to be treated in this book where he says, Let us therefore consider enunciative speech, etc.

2. The point has just been made that speech, although it is not an instrument of a power operating naturally, is nevertheless an instrument of reason. Now every instrument is defined by its end, which is the use of the instrument. The use of speech, as of every significant vocal sound, is to signify a conception of the intellect. But there are two operations of the intellect. In one truth and falsity is found, in the other not. Aristotle therefore defines enunciative speech by the signification of the true and false: Yet not all speech is enunciative; but only speech in which there is truth or falsity. Note with what remarkable brevity he signifies the division of speech by Yet not all speech is enunciative, and the definition by, but only speech in which there is truth or falsity. This, then, is to be understood as the definition of the enunciation: speech in which there is truth and falsity.

3. True or false is said to be in the enunciation as in a sign of true or false thought; but true or false is in the mind as in a subject (as is said in VI Metaphysicae [1027b 17–1028a 5]), and in the thing as in a cause (as is said in the book Predicamentorum [5: 4a 35–4b 9])—for it is from the facts of the case, i.e., from a thing's being so or not being so, that speech is true or false.

4. Next he shows that this definition differentiates the enunciation from other speech, when he says, Truth or falsity is not present in all speech however, etc. In the case of imperfect or incomplete speech it is clear that it does not signify the true or false, since it does not make complete sense to the mind of the hearer and therefore does not completely express a judgment of reason in which the true or false consists. Having made this point, however, it must be noted that there are five species of perfect speech that are complete in meaning: enunciative, deprecative, imperative, interrogative, and vocative. (Apropos of the latter it should be noted that a name alone in the vocative case is not vocative speech, for some of the parts must signify something separately, as was said above. So, although the mind of the hearer is provoked or aroused to attention by a name in the vocative case, there is not vocative speech, unless many words are joined together, as in "O good Peter!") Of these species of speech the enunciative is the only one in which there is truth or falsity, for it alone signifies the conception of the intellect absolutely and it is in this that there is truth or falsity.

5. But the intellect, or reason, does not just conceive the truth of a thing. It also belongs to its office to direct and order others in accordance with what it conceives. Therefore, besides enunciative speech, which signifies the concept of the mind, there had to be other kinds of speech to signify the order of reason by which others are directed. Now, one man is directed by the reason of another in regard to three things: first, to attend with his mind, and vocative speech relates to this; second, to respond with his voice, and interrogative speech relates to this; third, to execute a work, and in relation to this, imperative speech is used with regard to inferiors, deprecative with regard to superiors. Optative speech is reduced to the latter, for a man does not have the power to move a superior except by the expression of his desire.

These four species of speech do not signify the conception of the intellect in which there is truth or falsity, but a certain order following upon this. Consequently truth or falsity is not found in any of them, but only in enunciative speech, which signifies what the mind conceives from things. It follows that all the modes of speech in which the true or false is found are contained under the enunciation, which some call indicative or suppositive. The dubitative, it should be noted, is reduced to the interrogative, as the optative is to the deprecative.

6. Then Aristotle says, Let us therefore consider enunciative speech, etc. Here he points out that only enunciative speech is to be treated; the other four species must be omitted as far as the present intention is concerned, because their investigation belongs rather to the sciences of rhetoric or poetics. Enunciative speech belongs to the present consideration and for the following reason: this book is ordered directly to demonstrative science, in which the mind of man is led by an act of reasoning to assent to truth from those things that are proper to the thing; to this end the demonstrator uses only enunciative speech, which signifies things according as truth about them is in the mind. The rhetorician and the poet, on the other hand, induce assent to what they intend not only through what is proper to the thing but also through the dispositions of the hearer. Hence, rhetoricians and poets for the most part strive to move their auditors by arousing certain passions in them, as the Philosopher says in his Rhetorica [I, 2: 1356a 2, 1356a 14; III, 1: 1403b 12]. This kind of speech, therefore, which is concerned with the ordination of the hearer toward something, belongs to the consideration of

rhetoric or poetics by reason of its intent, but to the consideration of the grammarian as regards a suitable construction of the vocal sounds.

LESSON 8

The Division of Enunciation into Simple and Composite, Affirmative and Negative

17a 8 First affirmation, then negation, is enunciative speech that is one; the others are one by conjunction.

17a 9 Every enunciative speech, however, must contain a verb or a mode of the verb; for the definition of man, if “is” or “was” or “will be” or something of the kind is not added, is not yet enunciative speech;

17a 13 (but then the question arises as to why the definition “terrestrial biped animal” is something one and not many—for clearly it will not be one by reason of the words being said in juxtaposition—but this belongs to another subject of inquiry).

17a 15 Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing or is one by conjunction; but it is many when it signifies many things and not one, or many things not joined together.

17a 17 Let us call the name or the verb a word only, since to speak in this way is not to signify something with the voice so as to enunciate, either in reply to someone asking a question or by one’s own choice.

17a 20 Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, i.e., something affirmed of something or something denied of something; the other kind is composite, i.e., speech composed of these simple enunciations.

17a 23 A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject according to the divisions of time.

17a 25 Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something; negation the enunciation of something separated from something.

1. Having defined the enunciation the Philosopher now divides it. First he gives the division, and then manifests it where he says, Every enunciative speech however, must contain a verb, etc.

2. It should be noted that Aristotle in his concise way gives two divisions of the enunciation. The first is the division into one simply and one by conjunction. This parallels things outside of the soul where there is also something one simply, for instance the indivisible or the continuum, and something one either by aggregation or composition or order. In fact, since being and one are convertible, every enunciation must in some way be one, just as every thing is.

3. The other is a subdivision of the enunciation: the division of it as it is one into affirmative and negative.

The affirmative enunciation is prior to the negative for three reasons, which are related to three things already stated. It was said that vocal sound is a sign of thought and thought a sign of the thing. Accordingly, with respect to vocal sound, affirmative enunciation is prior to negative because it is simpler, for the negative enunciation adds a negative particle to the affirmative. With respect to thought, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies composition by the intellect, is prior to the negative, which signifies division, for division is posterior by nature to composition since division is only of composite things—just as corruption is only of generated things. With respect to the thing, the affirmative enunciation, which signifies to be is prior to the negative, which signifies not to be, as the having of something is naturally prior to the privation of it.

4. What he says, then, is this: Affirmation, i.e., affirmative enunciation, is one and the first enunciative speech. And in opposition to first he adds, then negation, i.e., negative speech, for it is posterior to affirmative, as we have said. In Opposition to one, i.e., one simply, he adds, certain others are one, not simply, but one by conjunction.

5. From what Aristotle says here Alexander argues that the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation is Dot a division of a genus into species, but a division of a multiple name into its meanings; for a genus is not predicated according to the prior and posterior, but is predicated

univocally of its species; this is the reason Aristotle would not grant that being is a common genus of all things, for it is predicated first of substance, and then of the nine genera of accidents.

6. However, in the division of that which is common, one of the dividing members can be prior to another in two ways: according to the proper notions” or natures of the dividing members, or according to the participation of that common notion that is divided in them. The first of these does not destroy the univocity of a genus, as is evident in numbers. Twoness, according to its proper notion, is naturally prior to threeness, yet they equally participate in the notion of their genus, i.e., number; for both a multitude consisting of three and a multitude consisting of two is measured by one. The second, however, does impede the univocity of a genus. This is why being cannot be the genus of substance and accident, for in the very notion of being, substance, which is being per se, has priority in respect to accident, which is being through another and in another.

Applying this distinction to the matter at hand, we see that affirmation is prior to negation in the first way, i.e., according to its notion, yet they equally participate in the definition Aristotle has given of the enunciation, i.e., speech in which there is truth or falsity.

7. Where he says, Every enunciative speech, however, must contain a verb or a mode of the verb, etc., he explains the divisions. He gives two explanations, one of the division of enunciation into one simply and one by conjunction, the second of the division of the enunciation which is one simply into affirmative or negative. The latter explanation begins where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, etc. Before he explains the first division, i.e., into one simply and one by conjunction, he states certain things that are necessary for the evidence of the explanation, and then explains the division where he says, Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing, etc.

8. He states the first thing that is necessary for his explanation when he says that every enunciative speech must contain a verb in present time, or a case of the verb, i.e., in past or future time. (The infinite verb is not mentioned because it has the same function in the enunciation as the negative verb.) To manifest this he shows that one name, without a verb, does not even constitute imperfect enunciative speech, let alone perfect

speech. Definition, he points out, is a certain kind of speech, and yet if the verb “is” or modes of the verb such as “was” or “has been” or something of the kind, is not added to the notion of man, i.e., to the definition, it is not enunciative speech.

9. But, one might ask, why mention the verb and not the name, for the enunciation consists of a name and a verb?

This can be answered in three ways. First of all because enunciative speech is not attained without a verb or a mode of the verb, but it is without a name, for instance, when infinitive forms of the verb are used in place of names, as in “To run is to be moving.”

A second and better reason for speaking only of the verb is that the verb is a sign of what is predicated of another. Now the predicate is the principal part of the enunciation because it is the formal part and completes it. This is the reason the Greeks called the enunciation a categorical, i.e., predicative, proposition. It should also be noted that denomination is made from the form which gives species to the thing. He speaks of the verb, then, but not the name, because it is the more principal and formal part of the enunciation. A sign of this is that the categorical enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative solely by reason of the verb being affirmed or denied, and the conditional enunciation is said to be affirmative or negative by reason of the conjunction by which it is denominated being affirmed or denied.

A third and even better reason is that Aristotle did not intend to show that the name or verb is not sufficient for a complete enunciation, for he explained this earlier. Rather, he is excluding a misunderstanding that might arise from his saying that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction. Some might think this means that the kind that is one simply, lacks all composition. But he excludes this by saying that there must be a verb in every enunciation; for the verb implies composition and composition cannot be understood apart from the things composed, as he said earlier.” The name, on the other hand, does not imply composition and therefore did not have to be mentioned.

10. The other, point necessary for the evidence of the first division is made where he says, but then the question arises as to why the definition “terrestrial biped animal” is something one, etc. He indicates by this that “terrestrial biped animal,” which is a definition of man, is one and not

many. The reason it is one is the same as in the case of all definitions but, he says, to assign the reason belongs to another subject of inquiry. It belongs, in fact, to metaphysics and he assigns the reason in VII and VIII Metaphysicae [VII, 12: 1037b 7; VIII, 6: 1045a 6] which is this: the difference does not accrue to the genus accidentally but per se and is determinative of it in the way in which form determines matter; for the genus is taken from matter, the difference from form. Whence, just as one thing—not many—comes to be from form and matter, so one thing comes to be from the genus and difference.

11. The reason for the unity of this definition might be supposed by some to be only that of juxtaposition of the parts, i.e., that "terrestrial biped animal" is said to be one only because the parts are side by side without conjunction or pause. But he excludes such a notion of its unity.

Now it is true that non-interruption of locution is necessary for the unity of a definition, for if a conjunction were put between the parts the second part would not determine the first immediately and the many in locution would consequently signify many in act. The pause used by rhetoricians in place of a conjunction would do the same thing. Whence it is a requirement for the unity of a definition that its parts be uttered without conjunction and interpolation, the reason being that in the natural thing, whose definition it is, nothing mediates between matter and form.

However, non-interruption of locution is not the only thing that is needed for unity of the definition, for there can be continuity of utterance in regard to things that are not one simply, but are accidentally, as in white musical man." Aristotle has therefore manifested very subtly that absolute unity of the enunciation is not impeded either by the composition which the verb implies or by the multitude of names from which a definition is established. And the reason is the same in both cases, i.e., the predicate is related to the subject as form to matter, as is the difference to a genus; but from form and matter a thing that is one simply comes into existence.

12. He begins to explain the division when he says, Enunciative speech is one when it signifies one thing, etc. First he makes the common thing that is divided evident, i.e., the enunciation as it is one; secondly, he makes the parts of the division evident according to their own proper notions, where he says, Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, etc. After he has made the division of the common thing evident, i.e.,

enunciation, he then concludes that the name and the verb are excluded from each member of the division where he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, etc.

Now plurality is opposed to unity. Therefore he is going to manifest the unity of the enunciation through the modes of plurality.

13. He begins his explanation by saying that enunciation is either one absolutely, i.e., it signifies one thing said of one thing, or one relatively, i.e., it is one by conjunction. In opposition to these are the enunciations that are many, either because they signify not one but many things, which is opposed to the first mode of unity or because they are uttered without a connecting particle, which is opposed to the second mode of unity.

14. Boethius interprets this passage in the following way. “Unity” and “plurality” of speech refers to what is signified, whereas “simple” and “composite” is related to the vocal sounds. Accordingly, an enunciation is sometimes one and simple, namely, when one thing is signified by the composition of name and verb, as in “Man is white.” Sometimes it is one and composite. In this case it signifies one thing, but is composed either from many terms, as in “A mortal rational animal is running,” or from many enunciations, as in conditionals that signify one thing and not many. On the other hand, sometimes there is plurality along with simplicity, namely, when a name signifying many things is used, as in “The dog barks,” in which case the enunciation is many because it signifies many things [i.e., it signifies equivocally], but it is simple as far as vocal sound is concerned. But sometimes there is plurality and composition, namely, when many things are posited on the part of the subject or predicate from which one thing does not result, whether a conjunction intervenes or not, as in “The musical white man is arguing.” This is also the case if there are many enunciations joined together, with or without connecting particles as in “Socrates runs, Plato discusses. According to this exposition the meaning of the passage in question is this: an enunciation is one when it signifies one thing said of one thing, and this is the case whether the enunciation is one simply or is one by conjunction; an enunciation is many when it signifies not one but many things, and this not only when a conjunction is inserted between either the names or verbs or between the enunciations themselves, but even if there are many things that are not conjoined. In the latter case they signify many things either because an equivocal name is used or

because many names signifying many things from which one thing does not result are used without conjunctions, as in “The white grammatical logical man is running.”

15. However, this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had in mind. First of all the disjunction he inserts seems to indicate that he is distinguishing between speech signifying one thing and speech which is one by conjunction. In the second place, he has just said that terrestrial biped animal is something one and not many. Moreover, what is one by conjunction is not one, and not many, but one from many. Hence it seems better to say that since he has already said that one kind of enunciation is one simply and another kind is one by conjunction be is showing here what one enunciation is.

Having said, then, that many names joined together are something one as in the example “terrestrial biped animal,” he goes on to say that an enunciation is to be judged as one, not from the unity of the name but from the unity of what is signified, even if there are many names signifying the one thing; and if an enunciation which signifies many things is one, it will not be one simply, but one by conjunction. Hence, the enunciation “A terrestrial biped animal is risible,” is not one in the sense of one by conjunction as the first exposition would have it, but because it signifies one thing.

16. Then—because an opposite is manifested through an opposite—he goes on to show which enunciations are many, and he posits two modes of plurality. Enunciations are said to be many which signify many things. Many things may be signified in some one common thing however; when I say, for example, “An animal is a sentient being,” many things are contained under the one common thing, animal, but such an enunciation is still one, not many. Therefore Aristotle adds, and not one. It would be better to say, however, that the and not one is added because of definition, which signifies many things that are one.

The mode of plurality he has spoken of thus far is opposed to the first mode of unity. The second mode of plurality covers enunciations that not only signify many things but many that are in no way joined together. This mode is opposed to the second mode of unity. Thus it is evident that the second mode of unity is not opposed to the first mode of plurality. Now those things that are not opposed can be together. Therefore, the enunciation that is one by conjunction is also many many insofar as it signifies many and not one.

According to this understanding of the text there are three modes of the enunciation: the enunciation that is one simply inasmuch as it signifies one thing; the enunciation that is many simply inasmuch as it signifies many things, but is one relatively inasmuch as it is one by conjunction; finally, the enunciations that are many simply—those that do not signify one thing and are not united by any conjunction.

Aristotle posits four kinds of enunciation rather than three, for an enunciation is sometimes many because it signifies many things, and yet is not one by conjunction; a case in point would be an enunciation in which a name signifying many things is used.

17. Where he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, etc., he excludes the name and the verb from the unity of speech. His reason for making this point is that his statement, “an enunciation is one inasmuch as it signifies one thing,” might be taken to mean that an enunciation signifies one thing in the same way the name or verb signify one thing. To prevent such a misunderstanding he says, Let us call the name or the verb a word only, i.e., a locution which is not an enunciation. From his mode of speaking it would seem that Aristotle himself imposed the name “phasis” [word] to signify such parts of the enunciation.

Then he shows that a name or verb is only a word by pointing out that we do not say that a person is enunciating when be signifies something in vocal sound in the way in which a name or verb signifies. To manifest this he suggests two ways of using the enunciation. Sometimes we use it to reply to questions; for example if someone asks “Who is it who discusses,” we answer “The teacher.” At other times we use the enunciation, not in reply to a question, but of our own accord, as when we say “Peter is running.”

What Aristotle is saying, then, is that the person who signifies something one by a name or a verb is not enunciating in the way in which either the person who replies to a question or who utters an enunciation of his own accord is enunciating. He introduces this point because the simple name or verb, when used in reply to a question seems to signify truth or falsity and truth or falsity is what is proper to the enunciation. Truth and falsity is not proper, however, to the name or verb unless it is understood as joined to another part proposed in a question; if someone should ask, for example, “Who reads in the schools,” we would answer, “The teacher,” understanding also, “reads there.” If, then, something expressed by a name or verb is not an enunciation, it is evident that the enunciation does not signify one thing in the same way as the name or verb signify one thing. Aristotle draws this by way of a conclusion from, Every enunciative speech must contain a verb or a mode of the verb, which was stated earlier.

Then when he says, Of enunciations that are one, simple enunciation is one kind, etc., he manifests the division of enunciation by the natures of the parts. He has said that the enunciation is one when it signifies one thing or is one by conjunction. The basis of this division is the nature of one, which is such that it can be divided into simple and composite. Hence, Aristotle says, Of these, i.e., enunciations into which one is divided, which are said to be one either because the enunciation signifies one thing simply or because it is one by conjunction, simple enunciation is one kind, i.e., the enunciation that signifies one thing. And to exclude the understanding of this as signifying one thing in the same way as the name or the verb signifies one thing he adds, something affirmed of something, i.e., by way of composition, or something denied of something, i.e., by way of division. The other kind—the enunciation that is said to be one by conjunction—is composite, i.e., speech composed of these simple enunciations. In other words, he is saying that the unity of the enunciation is divided into simple and composite, just as one is divided into simple and composite.

19. He manifests the second division of the enunciation where he says, A simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, i.e., the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation. This is a division that belongs primarily to the simple enunciation and consequently to the composite enunciation; therefore, in order to suggest the basis of the division he says that a simple enunciation is vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which pertains to affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which pertains to negation. And to make it clear that this is not to be understood only of present time he adds, according to the divisions of time, i.e., this holds for other times as well as the present.

20. Alexander thought that Aristotle was defining the enunciation here and because he seems to put affirmation and negation in the “definition” he took this to mean that enunciation is not the genus of affirmation and

negation, for the species is never posited in the definition of the genus. Now what is not predicated univocally of many (namely, because it does not signify something one that is common to many) cannot be made known except through the many that are signified. “One” is not said equivocally of the simple and composite, but primarily and consequently, and hence Aristotle always used both “simple” and “composite” in the preceding reasoning to make the unity of the enunciation known. Now, here he seems to use affirmation and negation to make the enunciation known; therefore, Alexander took this to mean that enunciation is not said of affirmation and negation univocally as a genus of its species.

21. But the contrary appears to be the case, for the Philosopher subsequently uses the name “enunciation” as a genus when in defining affirmation and negation he says, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something, i.e., by way of composition; negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, i.e., by way of division.

Moreover, it is not customary to use an equivocal name to make known the things it signifies. Boethius for this reason says that Aristotle with his customary brevity is using both the definition and its division at once. Therefore when he says that something belongs or does not belong to a subject he is not referring to the definition of enunciation but to its division.

However, since the differences dividing a genus do not fall in its definition and since vocal sound signifying is not a sufficient definition of the enunciation, Porphyry thought it would be better to say that the whole expression, vocal sound signifying that something belongs or does not belong to a subject, is the definition of the enunciation. According to his exposition this is not affirmation and negation that is posited in the definition, but capacity for affirmation and negation, i.e., what the enunciation is a sign of, which is to be or not to be, which is prior in nature to the enunciation. Then immediately following this he defines affirmation and negation in terms of themselves when he says, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something; negation the enunciation of something separated from something.

But just as the species should not be stated in the definition of the genus, so neither should the properties of the species. Now to signify to be is the property of the affirmation, and to signify not to be the property of the negation. Therefore Ammonius thought it would be better to say that the enunciation was not defined here, but only divided. For the definition was posited above when it was said that the enunciation is speech in which there is truth or falsity—in which definition no mention is made of either affirmation or negation.

It should be noticed, however, that Aristotle proceeds very skillfully here, for he divides the genus, not into species, but into specific differences. He does not say that the enunciation is an affirmation or negation, but vocal sound signifying that something belongs to a subject, which is the specific difference of affirmation, or does not belong to a subject, which is the specific difference of negation. Then when he adds, Affirmation is the enunciation of something about something which signifies to be, and negation is the enunciation of something separated from something, which signifies not to be, he establishes the definition of the species by joining the differences to the genus.

LESSON 9

The Opposition of Affirmation and Negation Absolutely

17a 26 Since it is possible to enunciate that what belongs to a subject does not belong to it and what does not, does, and that what does belong to it, does, and what does not, does not, and to enunciate these in regard to those times outside of the present as well as of the present, it would be possible to deny whatever someone affirms and to affirm what he denies. It is evident, therefore, that there is a negation opposed to every affirmation and an affirmation opposed to every negation.

17a 33 We will call this opposed affirmation and negation “contradiction.”

17a 34 I mean by “opposed” the enunciation of the same thing of the same subject—not equivocally however, nor in any of the other ways that we have distinguished in reference to the specious difficulties of the sophists.

1. Having made the division of the enunciation, Aristotle now deals with the opposition of the parts of the enunciation, i.e., the opposition of affirmation and negation. He has already said that the enunciation is speech in which there is truth or falsity; therefore, he first shows how enunciations are opposed to each other; secondly, he raises a doubt about some things previously determined and then resolves it where he says, In enunciations about that which is or has taken place, etc. He not only shows how one enunciation is opposed to another, but that only one is opposed to one, where he says, It is evident also that there is one negation of one affirmation. In showing how one enunciation is opposed to another, he first treats of the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely, and then

shows in what way opposition of this kind is diversified on the part of the subject where he says, Since some of the things we are concerned with are universal and others singular, etc. With respect to the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely, he first shows that there is a negation opposed to every affirmation and vice versa, and then where he says, We will call this opposed affirmation and negation "contradiction," he explains the opposition of affirmation and negation absolutely.

2. In relation to the first point, that there is a negation opposed to every affirmation and vice versa, the Philosopher assumes a twofold diversity of enunciation. The first arises from the very form or mode of enunciating. According to this diversity, enunciation is either affirmative—in which it is enunciated that something is—or negative—in which it is signified that something is not.

The second is the diversity that arises by comparison to reality. Truth and falsity of thought and of the enunciation depend upon this comparison, for when it is enunciated that something is or is not, if there is agreement with reality, there is true speech; otherwise there is false speech.

3. The enunciation can therefore be varied in four ways according to a combination of these two divisions: in the first way, what is in reality is enunciated to be as it is in reality. This is characteristic of true affirmation. For example, when Socrates runs, we say, "Socrates is running." In the second way, it is enunciated that something is not what in reality it is not. This is characteristic of true negation, as when we say, "An Ethiopian is not white." In the third way, it is enunciated that something is what in reality it is not. This is characteristic of a false affirmation, as in "The raven is white." In the fourth way, it is enunciated that something is not what it is in reality. This is characteristic of a false negation, as in "Snow is not white."

In order to proceed from the weaker to the stronger the Philosopher puts the false before the true, and among these he states the negative before the affirmative. He begins, then, with the false negative; it is possible to enunciate, that what is, namely, in reality, is not. Secondly, he posits the false affirmative, and that what is not, namely, in reality, is. Thirdly, he posits the true affirmative—which is opposed to the false negative he gave first—and that what is, namely, in reality, is. Fourthly, he posits the true negative—which is opposed to the false affirmative—and that what is not, namely, in reality, is not.

4. In saying what is and what is not, Aristotle is not referring only to the existence or nonexistence of a subject. What he is saying is that the reality signified by the predicate is in or is not in the reality signified by the subject. For what is signified in saying, “The raven is white,” is that what is not, is, although the raven itself is an existing thing.

5. These four differences of enunciations are found in propositions in which there is a verb of present time and also in enunciations in which there are verbs of past or future time. He said earlier that every enunciative speech must contain a verb or a mode of the verb. Here he makes this point in relation to the four differences of enunciations: similarly it is possible to enunciate these, i.e., that the enunciation be varied in diverse ways in regard to those times outside of the present, i.e., with respect to the past or future, which are in a certain way extrinsic in respect to the present, since the present is between the past and the future.

6. Since there are these four differences of enunciation in past and future time as well as in present time, it is possible to deny everything that is affirmed and to affirm everything that is denied. This is evident from the premises, for it is only possible to affirm either that which is in reality according to past, present, or future time, or that which is not; and it is possible to deny all of this. It is clear, then, that everything that is affirmed can be denied or vice versa.

Now, since affirmation and negation are per se opposed, i.e., in an opposition of contradiction, it follows that any affirmation would have a negation opposed to it, and conversely. The contrary of this could happen only if an affirmation could affirm something that the negation could not deny.

7. When he says, We will call this opposed affirmation and negation “contradiction,” he explains what absolute opposition of affirmation and negation is. He does this first through the name; secondly, through the definition where he says, I mean by “opposed” the enunciation of the same thing of the same subject, etc.

“Contradiction,” he says, is the name imposed for the kind of opposition in which a negation is opposed to an affirmation and conversely. By saying We will call this “contradiction,” we are given to understand—as Ammonius points out—that he has himself imposed the name “contradiction” for the opposition of affirmation and negation.

8. Then he defines contradiction when he says, I mean by “opposed” the enunciation of the same thing of the same subject, etc. Since contradiction is the opposition of affirmation and negation, as he has said, whatever is required for the opposition of affirmation and negation is required for contradiction. Now, opposites must be about the same thing and since the enunciation is made up of a subject and predicate the first requirement for contradiction is affirmation and negation of the same predicate, for if we say “Plato runs” and “Plato does not discuss,” there is no contradiction. The second is that the affirmation and negation be of the same subject, for if we say “Socrates runs” and “Plato does not run,” there is no contradiction. The third requirement is identity of subject and predicate not only according to name but according to the thing and the name at once; for clearly, if the same name is not used there is not one and the same enunciation; similarly there must be identity of the thing, for as was said above, the enunciation is one when it signifies one thing said of one thing.”‘ This is why he adds, not equivocally however, for identity of name with diversity of the thing—which is equivocation—is not sufficient for contradiction.

9. There are also certain other things that must be observed with respect to contradiction in order that all diversity be destroyed except the diversity of affirmation and negation, for if the negation does not deny in every way the same thing that the affirmation affirms there will not be opposition. Inquiry can be made about this diversity in respect to four things: first, are there diverse parts of the subject, for if we say “An Ethiopian is white as to teeth” and “An Ethiopian is not white as to foot,” there is no contradiction; secondly, is there a diverse mode on the part of the predicate, for there is no contradiction if we say “Socrates runs slowly” and “Socrates is not moving swiftly,” or “An egg is an animal in potency” and “An egg is not an animal in act”; thirdly, is there diversity on the part of measure, for instance, of place or time, for there is no contradiction if we say “It is raining in Gaul” and “It is not raining in Italy,” or “It rained yesterday” and “It did not rain today”; fourthly, is there diversity from a relationship to something extrinsic, as when we say “Ten men are many in respect to a house, but not in respect to a court house.”

Aristotle designates all of these when he adds, nor in any of the other ways that we have distinguished, i.e., that it is usual to determine in disputations against the specious difficulties of the sophists, i.e., against the fallacious and quarrelsome objections of the sophists, which he mentions more fully in I Elenchorum [5: 166b 28–167a 36].

LESSON 10

The Division of the Proposition on the Part of the Subject and the Opposition of Affirmation and Negation in Universal and in Indefinite Propositions

17a 38 Since some of the things we are concerned with are universal and others singular”—by “universal” I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many, and by “singular” that which is not; for example “man” is universal, “Callias” singular—

17b I we have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular that something belongs or does not belong to it.

17b 3 If, then, it is universally enunciated of a universal that something belongs or does not belong to it, the enunciations will be contraries. By universally enunciated of a universal” I mean such enunciations as “Every man is white,” “No man is white.”

4 17b 7 On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, they are not contraries, although it is possible for the things signified to be contraries.

17b 8 1 mean by “enunciated of a universal but not universally” such enunciations as “Man is white... Man is not white.” For, while “man” is a universal, it is not used as universal in the enunciation; for “every” does not signify the universal but signifies that it is taken universally.

17b 12 But as regards the predicate the universal universally predicated is not true; for no affirmation will be true in which a universal predicate is predicated universally, for example, “Every man is every animal.”

1. The Philosopher has just said that contradiction is the opposition of the affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same subject. Following upon this he distinguishes the diverse oppositions of affirmation and negation, the purpose being to know what true contradiction is. He first states a division of enunciation which is necessary in order to assign the difference of these oppositions; then he begins to manifest the different oppositions where he says, If, then, it is universally enunciated of a universal that something belongs or does not belong to it, etc. The division he gives is taken from the difference of the subject and therefore he divides the subject of enunciations first; then he concludes with the division of enunciation, where he says, we have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular, etc.

2. Now the subject of an enunciation is a name or something taken in place of a Dame. A name is a vocal sound significant by convention of simple thought, which, in turn, is a likeness of the thing. Hence, Aristotle distinguishes the subject of enunciation by a division of things; and he says that of things, some are universals, others singulars. He then explains the members of this division in two ways. First he defines them. Then he manifests them by example when he says, “man” is universal, “Plato” singular.

3. There is a difficulty about this division, for the Philosopher proves in VII Metaphysicae [14: 1039a 23] that the universal is not something existing outside of the thing; and in the Predicamenta [5: 2a 11] he says that second substances are only in first substances, i.e., singulars. Therefore, the division of things into universals and singulars does not seem to be consistent, since according to him there are no things that are universal; on the contrary, all things are singular.

4. The things divided here, however, are things as signified by names—which names are subjects of enunciations. Now, Aristotle has already said that names signify things only through the mediation of the intellect; therefore, this division must be taken as a division of things as apprehended by the intellect. Now in fact, whatever is joined together in things can be

distinguished by the intellect when one of them does not belong to the notion of the other. In any singular thing, we can consider what is proper to the thing insofar as it is this thing, for instance, what is proper to Socrates or to Plato insofar as he is this man. We can also consider that in which it agrees with certain other things, as, that Socrates is an animal, or man, or rational, or risible, or white. Accordingly, when a thing is denominated from what belongs only to this thing insofar as it is this thing, the name is said to signify a singular. When a thing is denominated from what is common to it and to many others, the name is said to signify a universal since it signifies a nature or some disposition which is common to many.

Immediately after giving this division of things, then—not of things absolutely as they are outside of the soul, but as they are referred to the intellect—Aristotle defines the universal and the singular through the act of the intellective soul, as that which is such as to be predicated of many or of only one, and not according to anything that pertains to the thing, that is, as if he were affirming such a universal outside of the soul, an opinion relating to Plato's teaching.

5. There is a further point we should consider in relation to this portion of the text. The intellect apprehends the thing—understood according to the thing's essence or definition. This is the reason Aristotle says in III De anima [4:429b 10] that the proper object of the intellect is what the thing essentially is. Now, sometimes the proper nature of some understood form is not repugnant to being in many but is impeded by something else, either by something occurring accidentally (for instance if all men but one were to die) or because of the condition of matter; the sun, for instance, is only one, not because it is repugnant to the notion of the sun to be in many according to the condition of its form, but because there is no other matter capable of receiving such a form. This is the reason Aristotle did not say that the universal is that which is predicated of many, but that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many.

6. Now, since every form which is so constituted as to be received in matter is communicable to many matters, there are two ways in which what is signified by a name may not be of such a nature as to be predicated of many: in one way, because a name signifies a form as terminated in this matter, as in the case of the name "Socrates" or "Plato," which signifies human nature as it is in this matter; in another way, because a name

signifies a form which is not constituted to be received in matter and consequently must remain per se one and singular. Whiteness, for example, would be only one if it were a form not a existing in matter, and consequently singular. This is the reason the Philosopher says in VII Metaphysicae [6: 1045a 36–1045b 7] that if there were separated species of things, as Plato held, they would be individuals.

7. It could be objected that the name "Socrates" or "Plato" is of such a kind as to be predicated of many, since there is nothing to prevent their being applied to many. The response to this objection is evident if we consider Aristotle's words. Notice that he divides things into universal and particular, not names. It should be understood from this that what is said to be universal not only has a name that can be predicated of many but what is signified by the name is of such a nature as to be found in many. Now this is not the case in the above-mentioned names, for the name "Socrates" or "Plato" signifies human nature as it is in this matter. If one of these names is imposed on another man it will signify human nature in other matter and thus another signification of it. Consequently, it will be equivocal, not universal.

8. When he says, we have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular that something belongs or does not belong to it, he infers the division of the enunciation. Since something is always enunciated of some thing, and of things some are universals and some singulars, it follows that sometimes it will be enunciated that something belongs or does not belong to something universal, sometimes to something singular.

The construction of the sentence was interrupted by the explanation of universal and singular but now we can see the meaning: Since some of the things we are concerned with are universal and others singular... we have to enunciate either of a universal or of a singular that something belongs or does not belong to it.

9. In relation to the point being made here we have to consider the four ways in which something is enunciated of the universal. On the one band, the universal can be considered as though separated from singulars, whether subsisting per se as Plato held or according to the being it has in the intellect as Aristotle held; considered thus, something can be attributed to it in two ways. Sometimes we attribute something to it which pertains only to the operation of the intellect; for example when we say, "Man," whether the

universal or the species, “is predicable” of many. For the intellect forms intentions of this kind, attributing them to the nature understood according as it compares the nature to the things outside of the mind. But sometimes we attribute something to the universal thus considered (i.e., as it is apprehended by the intellect as one) which does not belong to the act of the intellect but to the being that the nature apprehended has in things outside of the soul; for example, when we say “Man is the noblest of creatures.” For this truly belongs to human nature as it is in singulars, since any single man is more noble than all irrational creatures; yet all singular men are not one man outside of the mind, but only in the apprehension of the intellect; and the predicate is attributed to it in this way, i.e., as to one thing.

On the other hand, we attribute something to the universal as in singulars in another way, and this is twofold: sometimes it is in view of the universal nature itself; for instance, when we attribute something to it that belongs to its essence, or follows upon the essential principles, as in “Man is an animal,” or “Man is risible.” Sometimes it is in view of the singular in which the universal is found; for instance, when we attribute something to the universal that pertains to the action of the individual, as in “Man walks.

Moreover, something is attributed to the singular in three ways: in one way, as it is subject to the intellect, as when we say “Socrates is a singular,” or “predicable of only one”; in another way, by reason of the common nature, as when we say “Socrates is an animal”; in the third way, by reason of itself, as when we say “Socrates is walking.”

The negations are varied in the same number of ways, since everything that can be affirmed can also be denied, as was said above.

10. This is the third division the Philosopher has given of the enunciation. The first was the division of the enunciation into one simply and one by conjunction. This is an analogous division into those things of which one is predicated primarily and consequently, for one is divided according to the prior and posterior into simple and composite.

The second was the division of enunciation into affirmation and negation. This is a division of genus into species, for it is taken from the difference of the predicate to which a negation is added. The predicate is the formal part of the enunciation and hence such a division is said to pertain to the quality of the enunciation. By “quality” I mean essential quality, for in this case the difference signifies the quality of the essence.

The third division is based upon the difference of the subject as predicated of many or of only one, and is therefore a division that pertains to the quantity of the enunciation, for quantity follows upon matter.

11. Aristotle shows next how enunciations are opposed in diverse ways according to the diversity of the subject when he says, If, then, it is universally enunciated of a universal that something belongs or does not belong to it, etc. He first distinguishes the diverse modes of opposition in enunciations; secondly, he shows how these diverse oppositions are related in different ways to truth and falsity where he says, Hence in the case of the latter it is impossible that both be at once true, etc.

12. First, then, he distinguishes the diverse modes of opposition and since these depend upon a diversity in the subject we must first consider the latter diversity. Now the universal can be considered either in abstraction from singulars or as it is in singulars, and by reason of this something is attributed in diverse modes to the universal, as we have already said. To designate diverse modes of attribution certain words have been conceived which may be called determinations or signs and which designate that something is predicated in this or that mode.

But first we should note that since it is not commonly apprehended by all men that universals subsist outside of singulars there is no word in common speech to designate the mode of predicating in which something is said of a universal thus in abstraction from singulars. Plato, who held that universals subsist outside of singulars, did, however, invent certain determinations to designate the way in which something is attributed to the universal as it is outside of singulars. With respect to the species man he called the separated universal subsisting outside of singulars “man per se”‘or “man itself,” and he designated other such universals in like manner.

The universal as it is in singulars, however, does fall within the common apprehension of men and accordingly certain words have been conceived to signify the mode of attributing something to the universal taken in this way.

13. As was said above, sometimes something is attributed to the universal in view of the universal nature itself; for this reason it is said to be predicated of the universal universally, i.e., that it belongs to the universal according to the whole multitude in which it is found. The word “every” has been devised to designate this in affirmative predications. It designates that the predicate is attributed to the universal subject with respect to the

whole of what is contained under the subject. In negative predications the word “no” has been devised to signify that the predicate is removed from the universal subject according to the whole of what is contained under it. Hence, saying nullus in Latin is like saying non ullus [not any] and in Greek ουδεις [none] is like ουδε εις [not one], for not a single one is understood under the universal subject from which the predicate is not removed.

Sometimes something is either attributed to or removed from the universal in view of the particular. To designate this in affirmative enunciations, the word “some,” or “a certain one,” has been devised. We designate by this that the predicate is attributed to the universal subject by reason of the particular. “Some,” or “a certain one,” however, does not signify the form of any singular determinately, rather, it designates the singular under a certain indetermination. The singular so designated is therefore called the vague individual. In negative enunciations there is no designated word, but “not all” can be used. just as “no,” then, removes universally, for it signifies the same thing as if we were to say “not any,” (i.e., “not some”) so also “not all” removes particularly inasmuch as it excludes universal affirmation.

14. There are, therefore, three kinds of affirmations in which something is predicated of a universal: in one, something is predicated of the universal universally, as in “Every man is an animal”; in another, something is predicated of the universal particularly, as in “Some man is white.” The third is the affirmation in which something is predicated of the universal without a determination of universality or particularity. Enunciations of this kind are customarily called indefinite. There are the same number of opposed negations.

15. In the case of the singular, although something is predicated of it in a different respect, as was said above, nevertheless the whole is referred to its singularity because the universal nature is individuated in the singular; therefore it makes no difference as far as the nature of singularity is concerned whether something is predicated of the singular by reason of the universal nature, as in “Socrates is a man,” or belongs to it by reason of its singularity.

16. If we add the singular to the three already mentioned there will be four modes of enunciation pertaining to quantity: universal singular, indefinite, and particular.

17. Aristotle assigns the diverse oppositions of enunciations according to these differences. The first opposition is based on the difference of universals and indefinites; the second bn the difference of universals and particulars, the latter being treated where he says, Affirmation is opposed to negation in the way I call contradictory, etc. With respect to the first opposition, the one between universals and indefinites, the opposition of universal propositions to each other is treated first, and then the opposition of indefinite enunciations where he says, On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, etc. Finally he precludes a possible question where he says, In the predicate, however, the universal universally predicated is not true, etc.

18. He says first, then, that if someone enunciates universally of a universal subject, i.e., according to the content of its universality, that it is, i.e., affirmatively, or is not, i.e., negatively, these enunciations will be contrary; as when we say, “Every man is white,” “No man is white.” And the reason is that the things that are most distant from each other are said to be contraries. For a thing is not said to be black only because it is not white but because over and beyond not being white—which signifies the remotion of white commonly—it is, in addition, black, the extreme in distance from white. What is affirmed by the enunciation “Every man is white” then, is removed by the negation “Not every man is white”; the negation, therefore, removes the mode in which the predicate is said of the subject which the word “every” designates. But over and beyond this remotion, the enunciation “No man is white” which is most distant from “Every man is white,” adds total remotion, and this belongs to the notion of contrariety. He therefore appropriately calls this opposition contrariety.

19. When he says, On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, etc., he shows what kind of opposition there is between affirmation and negation in indefinite enunciations. First he states the point; he then manifests it by an example when he says, I mean by “enunciated of a universal but not universally,” etc. Finally he gives the reason for this when he says, For while “man” is a universal, it is not used as universal, etc.

He says first, then, that when something is affirmed or denied of a universal subject, but not universally, the enunciations are not contrary but the things that are signified may be contraries. He clarifies this with examples where he says, I mean by “enunciated of a universal but not universally,” etc. Note in relation to this that what he said just before this was “when... of universals but not universally enunciated” and not, “when... of universals particularly,” the reason being that he only intends to speak of indefinite enunciations, not of particulars. This he manifests by the examples he gives. When we say “Man is white” and “Man is not white,” the universal subjects do not make them universal enunciations. He gives as the reason for this, that although man, which stands as the subject, is universal, the predicate is not predicated of it universally because the word “every” is not added, which does not itself signify the universal, but the mode of universality, i.e., that the predicate is said universally of the subject. Therefore when “every” is added to the universal subject it always signifies that something is said of it universally.

This whole exposition relates to his saying, On the other hand, when the enunciations are of a universal but not universally enunciated, they are not contraries.

20. Immediately after this he adds, although it is possible for the things signified to be contraries, and in spite of the fact that this is obscure he does not explain it. It has therefore been interpreted in different ways.

Some related it to the contrariety of truth and falsity proper to enunciations of this kind, For such enunciations may be simultaneously true, as in “Man is white” and “Man is not white,” and thus not be contraries, for contraries mutually destroy each other. On the other hand, one may be true and the other false, as in “Man is an animal” and “Man is not an animal,” and thus by reason of what is signified seem to have a certain kind of contrariety.

But this does not seem to be related to what Aristotle has said: first, because the Philosopher has not yet taken up the point of truth and falsity of enunciations; secondly, because this very thing can also be said of particular enunciations.

21. Others, following Porphyry, relate this to the contrariety of the predicate. For sometimes the predicate may be denied of the subject because of the presence of the contrary in it, as when we say, “Man is not white” because he is black; thus it could be the contrary that is signified by “is not white.”

This is not always the case, however, for we remove something from a subject even when it is not a contrary that is present in it but some mean between contraries, as in saying, “So-and-so is not white” because he is pale; or when there is a privation of act or habit or potency, as in saying, “So-and-so is non-seeing” because he lacks the power of sight or has an impediment so that he cannot see, or even because something is not of such a nature as to see, as in saying, “A stone does not see.” It is therefore possible for the things signified to be contraries, but the enunciations themselves not to be; for as is said near the end of this book, opinions that are about contraries are not contrary,”‘ for example, an opinion that something is good and an opinion that something is evil.

22. This does not seem to relate to what Aristotle has proposed either, for he is not treating here of contrariety of things or opinions, but of contrariety of enunciations. For this reason it seems better here to follow the exposition of Alexander.

According to his exposition, in indefinite enunciations it is not determined whether the predicate is attributed to the subject universally (which would constitute contrariety of enunciations), or particularly (which would not constitute contrariety of enunciations). Accordingly, enunciations of this kind are not contrary in mode of expression. However, sometimes they have contrariety by reason of what is signified, i.e., when something is attributed to a universal in virtue of the universal nature although the universal sign is not added, as in “Man is an animal” and “Man is not an animal,” for in virtue of what is signified these enunciations have the same force as “Every man is an animal” and “No man is an animal.”

23. When he says, But as regards the predicate the universal universally predicated is not true, etc., he precludes a certain difficulty. He has already stated that there is a diversity in the opposition of enunciations because of the universal being taken either universally or not universally on the part of the subject. Someone might think, as a consequence, that a similar diversity would arise on the part of the predicate, i.e., that the universal could be predicated both universally and not universally. To exclude this he says that in the case in which a universal is predicated it is not true that the universal is predicated universally.

There are two reasons for this. The first is that such a mode of predicating seems to be repugnant to the predicate in relation to its status in the enunciation; for, as has been said, the predicate is a quasi-formal part of the enunciation, while the subject is a material part of it. Now when a universal is asserted universally the universal itself is taken according to the relationship it has to the singulars contained under it, and when it is asserted particularly the universal is taken according to the relationship it has to some one of what is contained under it. Thus both pertain to the material determination of the universal. This is why it is not appropriate to add either the universal or particular sign to the predicate, but rather to the subject; for it is more appropriate to say, “No man is an ass” than “Every man is no ass”; andlikewise, to say, “Some man is white” than, “Man is some white.”

However, sometimes philosophers put the particular sign next to the predicate to indicate that the predicate is in more than the subject, and this especially when they have a genus in mind and are investigating the differences which complete the species. There is an instance of this in II De anima [1:412a 22] where Aristotle says that the soul is a certain act.”‘

The other reason is related to the truth of enunciations. This has a special place in affirmations, which would be false if the predicate were predicated universally. Hence to manifest what he has stated, he adds, for there is no affirmation in which, i.e., truly, a universal predicate will be predicated universally, i.e., in which a universal predicate is used to predicate universally, for example, “Every man is every animal.” If this could be done, the predicate “animal” according to the singulars contained under it would have to be predicated of the singulars contained under “man”; but such predication could not be true, whether the predicate is in more than the subject or is convertible with the subject; for then any one man would have to be all animals or all risible beings, which is repugnant to the notion of the singular, which is taken tinder the universal.

The truth of the enunciation “Every man is susceptible of every discipline” is not an instance that can be used as an objection to this position, for it is not “discipline” that is predicated of man but “susceptible of discipline.” It would be repugnant to truth if it were said that “Every man is everything susceptible of discipline.”

24. On the other hand, although the negative universal sign or the particular affirmative sign are more appropriately posited on the part of the subject, it is not repugnant to truth if they are posited on the part of the predicate, for such enunciations may be true in some matter. The

enunciation “Every man is no stone,” for example, is true, and so is “Every man is some animal.” But the enunciation “Every man is every animal,” in whatever matter it occurs, is false. There are other enunciations of this kind that are always false, such as, “Some man is every animal” (which is false for the same reason as “Every man is every animal” is false). And if there are any others like these, they are always false; and the reason is the same in every case. And, therefore, in rejecting the enunciation “Every man is every animal,” the Philosopher meant it to be understood that all similar enunciations are to be rejected.

LESSON 11

The Opposition of Universal and Particular Enunciations and the Relation of an Opposed Affirmation and Negation to Truth and Falsity

17b 16 Affirmation is opposed to negation in the way I call contradictory when the one signifying universally is opposed to the same one not signifying universally, as in “Every man is white” and “Not every man is white”; “No man is white” and “Some man is white.”

l7b 20 They are opposed contrarily when the universal affirmation is opposed to the universal negation; as in “Every man is just” and “No man is just.”

l7b 22 Hence in the case of the latter it is impossible that both be at once true, but it is possible for the contradictories of these contraries to be at once true with respect to the same subject, as in “Not every man is white” and “Some man is white.”

l7b 26 Whenever there are contradictions with respect to universals signifying universally, one must be true, the other false; this is also the case when there are contradictions with respect to singulars, as in “Socrates is white” and “Socrates is not white.”

17b 29 But when the contradictions are of universals not signifying universally, one is not always true and the other false; for it is at once true to say that man is white and man is not white, and man is beautiful and man is not beautiful.

17b 33 For if he is ugly, he is not beautiful; and if he is becoming something, he is not yet it.

17b 34 At first sight this might seem paradoxical, because “Man is not white” seems to signify the same tbing as “No man is white”; but it neither signifies this, nor are they at once true necessarily.

1. Now that he has determined the opposition of enunciations by comparing universal enunciations with indefinite enunciations, Aristotle determines the opposition of enunciations by comparing universals to particulars. It should be noted that there is a twofold opposition in these enunciations, one of universal to particular, and he touches upon this first; the other is the opposition of universal to universal, and this he takes up next, where he says, They are opposed contrarily when the universal affirmation is opposed to the universal negation, etc.

2. The particular affirmative and particular negative do not have opposition properly speaking, because opposition is concerned with the same subject. But the subject of a particular enunciation is the universal taken particularly, not for a determinate singular but indeterminately for any singular. For this reason, when something is affirmed or denied of the universal particularly taken, the mode of enunciating is not such that the affirmation and negation are of the same thing; hence what is required for the opposition of affirmation and negation is lacking.

3. First he says that the enunciation that signifies the universal, i.e., universally, is opposed contradictorily to the one that does not signify universally but particularly, if one of them is affirmative and the other negative (whether the universal is affirmative and the particular negative or conversely), as in “Every man is white,” “Not every man is white.” For, the “not every” is used in place of the particular negative sign; consequently, “Not every man is white” is equivalent to “Some man is not white.” In a parallel way “no,” which signifies the same thing as “not any” or “not some,” is the universal negative sign; consequently, the two enunciations, “Some man is white,” which is the particular affirmative, and “No man is white,” which is the universal negative, are contradictories.

4. The reason for this is that contradiction consists in the mere removal of the affirmation by a negation. Now the universal affirmative is removed by

merely the negation of the particular and nothing else is required of necessity; but the particular affirmative can only be removed by the universal negative because, as has already been said, the particular negative is not properly opposed to the particular affirmative. Consequently, the particular negative is opposed contradictorily to the universal affirmative and the universal negative to the particular affirmative.

5. When he says, They are opposed contrarily when the universal affirmation is opposed to the universal negation, etc., he touches on the opposition of universal enunciations. The universal affirmative and universal negative, he says, are contraries, as in “Every man is just... No man is just”; for the universal negative not only removes the universal affirmative but also designates an extreme of distance between them inasmuch as it denies the whole that the affirmation posits; and this belongs to the notion of contrariety. The particular affirmative and particular negative, for this reason, are related as a mean between contraries.

6. He shows how the opposed affirmation and negation are related to truth and falsity when he says, Hence in the case of the latter it is impossible that both be at once true, etc. He shows this first in regard to contraries; secondly, in regard to contradictories, where he says, Whenever there are contradictions with respect to universal signifying universally, etc.; thirdly, in regard to those that seem contradictory but are not, where he says, But when the contradictions are of universals not signifying universally, etc.

First, he says that because the universal affirmative and universal negative are contraries, it is impossible for them to be simultaneously true, for contraries mutually remove each other. However, the particular enunciations that are contradictorily opposed to the universal contraries, can be verified at the same time in the same thing, for example, “Not every man is white” (which is opposed contradictorily to “Every man is white”) and “Some man is white” (which is opposed contradictorily to “No man is white”) .

A parallel to this is found in the contrariety of things, for white and black can never be in the same thing at the same time; but the remotion of white and black can be in the same thing at the same time, for a thing may be neither white nor black, as is evident in something yellow. In a similar way, contrary enunciations cannot be at once true, but their contradictories, by which they are removed, can be true simultaneously.

7. Then he says, Whenever there are contradictions with respect to universals signifying universally, one must be true and the other false, etc. Here he shows how truth and falsity are related in contradictories. As was said above, in contradictories the negation does no more than remove the affirmation, and this in two ways: in one way when one of them is universal, the other particular; in another way when each is singular. In the case of the singular, the negation is necessarily referred to the same thing—which is not the case in particulars and indefinites—and cannot extend to more than removing the affirmation. Accordingly, the singular affirmative is always contradictory to the singular negative, the identity of subject and predicate being supposed.

Aristotle says, therefore, that whether we take the contradiction of universals universally (i.e., one of the universals being taken universally) or the contradiction of singular enunciations, one of them must always be true and the other false. It is not possible for them to be at once true or at once false because to be true is nothing other than to say of what is, that it is, or of what is not that it is not; to be false, to say of what is not, that it is, or of what is, that it is not, as is evident in IV Metaphysicorum [7: 1011b 25].

8. When he says, But when the contradictions are of universals not signifying universally, etc., he shows how truth and falsity are related to enunciations that seem to be contradictory, but are not. First he proposes how they are related; then he proves it where he says, For if he is ugly, he is not beautiful, etc.; finally, he excludes a possible difficulty where he says, At first sight this might seem paradoxical, etc.

With respect to the first point we should note that affirmation and negation in indefinite propositions seem to be opposed contradictorily because there is one subject in both of them and it is not determined by a particular sign. Hence, the affirmation and negation seem to be about the same thing. To exclude this, the Philosopher says that in the case of affirmative and negative enunciations of universals not taken universally, one need not always be true and the other false, but they can be at once true. For it is true to say both that “Man is white” and that “Man is not white,” and that “Man is honorable” and “Man is not honorable.

9. On this point, as Ammonius reports, some men, maintaining that the indefinite negative is always to be taken for the universal negative, have taken a position contradictory to Aristotle's. They argued their position in the following way. The indefinite, since it is indeterminate, partakes of the nature of matter; but matter considered in itself is regarded as what is less worthy. Now the universal affirmative is more worthy than the particular affirmative and therefore they said that the indefinite affirmative was to be taken for the particular affirmative. But, they said, the universal negative, which destroys the whole, is less worthy than the particular negative, which destroys the part (just as universal corruption is worse than particular corruption); therefore, they said that the indefinite negative was to be taken for the universal negative.

They went on to say in support of their position that philosophers, and even Aristotle himself, used indefinite negatives as universals. Thus, in the book Physicorum [III, 1: 200b 32] Aristotle says that there is not movement apart from the thing; and in the book De anima [III, 1: 424b 20], that there are not more than five senses.

However, these reasons are not cogent. What they say about matter—that considered in itself it is taken for what is less worthy—is true according to the opinion of Plato, who did not distinguish privation from matter; however, it is not true according to Aristotle, who says in I Physicae [9: 192a 3 & 192a 22], that the evil and ugly and other things of this kind pertaining to defect, are said of matter only accidentally. Therefore the indefinite need not stand always for the more ignoble.

Even supposing it is necessary that the indefinite be taken for the less worthy, it ought not to be taken for the universal negative; for just as the universal affirmative is more powerful than the particular in the genus of affirmation, as containing the particular affirmative, so also the universal negative is more powerful in the genus of negations. Now in each genus one must consider what is more powerful in that genus, not what is more powerful simply.

Further, if we took the position that the particular negative is more powerful than all other modes, the reasoning still would not follow, for the indefinite affirmative is not taken for the particular affirmative because it is less worthy, but because something can be affirmed of the universal by reason of itself, or by reason of the part contained under it; whence it suffices for the truth of the particular affirmative that the predicate belongs to one part (which is designated by the particular sign); for this reason the truth of the particular affirmative suffices for the truth of the indefinite affirmative. For a similar reason the truth of the particular negative suffices for the truth of the indefinite negative, because in like manner, something can be denied of a universal either by reason of itself, or by reason of its part.

Apropos of the examples cited for their argument, it should be noted that philosophers sometimes use indefinite negatives for universals in the case of things that are per se removed from universals; and they use indefinite affirmatives for universals in the case of things that are per se predicated of universals.

10. When he says, For if he is ugly, he is not beautiful, etc., he proves what he has proposed by something conceded by everyone, namely, that the indefinite affirmative is verified if the particular affirmative is true. We may take two indefinite affirmatives, one of which includes the negation of the other, as for example when they have opposed predicates. Now this opposition can happen in two ways. It can be according to perfect contrariety, as shameful (i.e., dishonorable) is opposed to worthy (i.e., honorable) and ugly (i.e., deformed in body) is opposed to beautiful. But the reasoning by which the affirmative enunciation, “Man is worthy,” is true, i.e., by some worthy man existing, is the same as the reasoning by which “Man is shameful” is true, i.e., by a shameful man existing. Therefore these two enunciations are at once true, “Man is worthy” and “Man is shameful.” But the enunciation, “Man is not worthy,” follows upon “Man is shameful.” Therefore the two enunciations, “ Man is worthy,” and “Man is not worthy,” are at once true; and by the same reasoning these two, “Man is beautiful” and “Man is not beautiful.”

The other opposition is according to the complete and incomplete, as to be in movement is opposed to to have been moved, and becoming to to have become. Whence the non-being of that which is coming to be in permanent things, whose being is complete, follows upon the becoming but this is not so in successive things, whose being is incomplete. Thus, “Man is white” is true by the fact that a white man exists; by the same reasoning, because a man is becoming white, the enunciation “Man is becoming white” is true, upon which follows, “Man is not white.” Therefore, the two enunciations, “Man is white” and “Man is not white” are at once true.

11. Then when he says, At first sight this might seem paradoxical, etc., he excludes what might present a difficulty in relation to what has been said. At first sight, he says, what has been stated seems to be inconsistent; for “Man is not white” seems to signify the same thing as “No man is white.” But he rejects this when he says that they neither signify the same thing, nor are they at once true necessarily, as is evident from what has been said.

LESSON 12

There Is Only One Negation Opposed to One Affirmation

17b 37 It is evident also that there is one negation of one affirmation;

17b 39 for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirms, and of the same subject, either something singular, or something universal, and either universally or not universally.

18a 2 For example, the negation of “Socrates is white” is “Socrates is not white.” (If something else is said of the same subject or the same thing of a different subject, it will not be opposed to it but different from it.) The negation opposed to “Every man is white” is “Not every man is white”; to “Some man is white,” “No man is white”; to “Man is white,” “Man is not white.”

18a 7 We have said that there is one negation opposed contradictorily to one affirmation, and what these are; and that the others are contraries, and what these are; and that in every contradiction one is not always true and the other false, and what the reason is for this, and when it is the case that one is true and the other false.

18a 12 Affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one thing, whether the subject is universal and is taken universally or not; as in “Every man is white” and “Not every man is white”; “Man is white” and “Man is not white”; “No man is white” and “Some man is white”; provided the “white” signifies one thing.

18a 18 But if one name is imposed for two things, from which there is not one thing, the affirmation is not one. For example, if someone were to impose the name “cloak” on horse and man, the enunciation “Cloak is white” would not be one affirmation, nor would “Cloak is not white” be one negation.

18a 21 For this is no different from saying “Horse and man is white,” and this no different from saying, “Horse is white” and “Man is white.” If, then, these signify many things and are many, it is evident that the first enunciation [“Cloak is white”] signifies many things—or nothing, for there is not such a thing as a horse-man.

18a 26 Consequently, in such enunciations it is not necessary that one contradictory be true and the other false.

1. Having distinguished the diverse modes of opposition in enunciations, the Philosopher now proposes to show that there is one negation opposed to one affirmation. First he shows that there is one negation opposed to one affirmation; then he manifests what one affirmation and negation are, where he says, Affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one thing, etc. With respect to what he intends to do he first proposes the point; then he manifests it where he says, for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirms, etc. Finally, he gives a summary of what has been said, where he says, We have said that there is one negation opposed contradictorily to one affirmation, etc.

2. He says, then, that it is evident that there is only one negation of one affirmation. It is necessary to make this point here because he has posited many kinds of opposition and it might appear that two negations are opposed to one affirmation. Thus it might seem that the negative enunciations, “No man is white” and “Some man is not white” are both opposed to the affirmative enunciation, “Every man is white.” But if one carefully examines what has been said it will be evident that the only negative opposed to “Every man is white” is “Some man is not white,” which merely removes it, as is clear from its equivalent, “Not every man is white.” It is true that the negation of the universal affirmative is included in the understanding of the universal negative inasmuch as the universal negative includes the particular negative, but the universal negative adds

something over and beyond this inasmuch as it not only brings about the removal of universality but removes every part of it. Thus it is evident that there is only one negation of a universal affirmation, and the same thing is evident in the others.

3. When he says, for the negation must deny the same thing that the affirmation affirms, etc., he manifests what he has said: first, from reason; secondly, by example.

The reasoning is taken from what has already been said, namely, that negation is opposed to affirmation when the enunciations are of the same thing of the same subject. Here he says that the negation must deny the same predicate the affirmation affirms, and of the same subject, whether that subject he something singular or something universal, either taken universally or not taken universally. But this can only be done in one way, i.e., when the negation denies what the affirmation posits, and nothing else. Therefore there is only one negation opposed to one affirmation.

4. In manifesting this by example, where he says, For example, the negation of "Socrates is white," etc., he first takes examples of singulars. Thus, "Socrates is not white" is the proper negation opposed to "Socrates is white." If there were another predicate or another subject, it would not be the opposed negation, but wholly different. For example, "Socrates is not musical" is not opposed to "Socrates is white," nor is "Plato is white" opposed to "Socrates is not white."

Then he manifests the same thing in an affirmation with a universal universally taken as the subject. Thus, "Not every man is white," which is equivalent to the particular negative, is the proper negation opposed to the affirmation, "Every man is white."

Thirdly, he gives an example in which the subject of the affirmation is a universal taken particularly. The proper negation opposed to the affirmation "Some man is white" is "No man is white," for to say "no" is to say "not any," i.e., "not some."

Finally, he gives as an example enunciations in which the subject of the affirmation is the universal taken indefinitely; "Man is not white" is the proper negation opposed to the affirmation "Man is white."

5. The last example used to manifest his point seems to be contrary to what he has already said, namely, that the indefinite negative and the indefinite affirmative can be simultaneously verified; but a negation and its

opposite affirmation cannot be simultaneously verified, since it is not possible to affirm and deny of the same subject.

But what Aristotle is saying here must be understood of the negation when it is referred to the same thing the affirmation contained, and this is possible in two ways: in one way, when something is affirmed to belong to man by reason of what he is (which is per se to be predicated of the same thing), and this very thing the negation denies; secondly, when something is affirmed of the universal by reason of its singular, and the same thing is denied of it.

6. He concludes by summarizing what has been said: We have said that there is one negation opposed contradictorily to one affirmation, etc. He considers it evident from what has been said that one negation is opposed to one affirmation; and that of opposite affirmations and negations, one kind are contraries, the other contradictories; and that what each kind is has been stated. He does not speak of subcontraries because it is not accurate to say that they are opposites, as was said above. He also says here that it has been shown that not every contradiction is true or false, “contradiction” being taken here broadly for any kind of opposition of affirmation and negation; for in enunciations that are truly contradictory one is always true and the other false. The reason why this may not be verified in some kinds of opposites has already been stated, namely, because some are not contradictories but contraries, and these can be false at the same time. It is also possible for affirmation and negation not to be properly opposed and consequently to be true at the same time. It has been stated, however, when one is always true and the other false, namely, in those that are truly contradictories.

7. The Philosopher explains what one affirmation or negation is where he says, Affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one thing, etc. He did in fact state this earlier when he said that an enunciation is one when it signifies one thing, but because the enunciation in which something is predicated of a universal, either universally or not universally, contains under it many things, he is going to show here that unity of enunciation is not impeded by this.

First he shows that unity of enunciation is not impeded by the multitude contained under the universal, whose notion is one. Then he shows that unity of enunciation is impeded by the multitude contained under the unity of a name only, where he says, But if one name is imposed for two things, etc.

He says, then, that an affirmation or negation is one when one thing is signified of one thing, whether the one thing that is subjected be a universal taken universally, or not, i.e., it may be a universal taken particularly or indefinitely, or even a singular. He gives examples of the differ6nt kinds: such as, the universal affirmative “Every man is white” and the particular negative, which is its negation, “Not every man is white,” each of which is one. There are other examples which are evident. At the end he states a condition that is required for any of them to be one, i.e., provided the “white,” which is the predicate, signifies one thing; for a multiple predicate with a subject signifying one thing would also impede the unity of an enunciation. The universal proposition is therefore one, even though it comprehends a multitude of singulars under it, for the predicate is not attributed to many singulars according as each is divided from the other, but according as they are united in one common thing.

8. When he says, But if one name is imposed for two things, he shows that unity of name alone does not suffice for unity of an enunciation. He first makes the point; secondly, he gives an example, where he says, if someone were to impose the name “cloak” on horse and man, etc.; thirdly, he proves it where he says, For this is no different from saying “Horse and man is white,” etc.; finally, he infers a corollary from what has been said, where he says, Consequently, in such enunciations, it is not necessary, etc.

If one name is imposed for two things, he says, from which one thing is not formed, there is not one affirmation. The from which one thing is not formed can be understood in two ways. It can be understood as excluding the many that are contained under one universal, as man and horse under animal, for the name “animal” signifies both,.not as they are many and different from each other but as they are united in the nature of the genus. It can also be understood—and this would be more accurate—as excluding the many parts from which something one is formed, whether the parts of the notion as known, as the genus and the difference, which are parts of the definition, or the integral parts of some composite, as the stones and wood from which a house is made. If, then, there is such a predicate which is attributed to a thing, the many that are signified must concur in one thing according to some of the modes mentioned in order that there be one enunciation; unity of vocal sound alone would not suffice. However, if there is such a predicate which is referred to vocal sound, unity of vocal sound would suffice, as in "'Dog'is a name."

9. He gives an example of what he means where he says, For example, if someone were to impose the name "cloak," etc. That is, if someone were to impose the name "cloak" to signify man and horse and then said, "Cloak is white," there would not be one affirmation, nor would there be one negation.

He proves this where he says, For this is no different from saying, etc. His argument is as follows. If "cloak" signifies man and horse there is no difference between saying "Cloak is white" and saying, "Man is white, and, Horse is white." But "Man is white, and, horse is white" signify many and are many enunciations. Therefore, the enunciation, "Cloak is white," signifies many things. This is the case if "cloak" signifies man and horse as diverse things; but if it signifies man and horse as one thing, it signifies nothing, for there is not any thing composed of man and horse.

When Aristotle says that there is no difference between saying "Cloak is white" and, "Man is white, and, horse is white," it is not to be understood with respect to truth and falsity. For the copulative enunciation "Man is white and horse is white" cannot be true unless each part is true; but the enunciation "Cloak is white," under the condition given, can be true even when one is false; otherwise it would not be necessary to distinguish multiple propositions to solve sophistic arguments. Rather, it is to be understood with respect to unity and multiplicity, for just as in "Man is white and horse is white" there is not some one thing to which the predicate is attributed, so also in "Cloak is white."

10. When he says, Consequently, it is not necessary in such enunciations, etc., he concludes from what has been said that in affirmations and negations that use an equivocal subject, one need not always be true and the other false since the negation may deny something other than the affirmation affirms.

LESSON 13

Truth and Falsity in Opposed Singular Propositions About the Future in Contingent Matter

18a 28 In enunciations about that which is or has taken place, the affirmation or the negation must be true or false. And in enunciations of universals as universal, one is always true and the other false, and also in enunciations of singulars, as has been said; but in enunciations of universals not taken universally, it is not necessary that one be true and the other false. We have already spoken of these.

However, in enunciations about future singular things the case is not the same.

18a 34 For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, then everything belongs or does not belong to a thing necessarily;

18a 35 for if one person says a thing will be such, and another says it will not be this very thing, clearly one of them must be speaking the truth if every affirmation is true or false. For it will not both belong and not belong to the thing simultaneously in such cases.

18a 39 For if it is true to say that a thing is white or is not white, it must necessarily be white or not white. And if it is white or not white, it was true to affirm or deny it. And if it does not belong to it, it is false to say that it does, and if it is false to say that it does, then it does not belong to it. Consequently, it is necessary that either the affirmation or negation be true. If this is so, then nothing either is, or takes place fortuitously or indeterminately in relation to two alternatives, or will be or will not be; but everything takes place of necessity and is not indeterminate to either of two alternatives (for the supposition is that either the one who affirms it or the one who denies it is speaking the truth). Whereas if everything does not take place of necessity, it could take place or not take place as well, for what is indeterminate to either of two alternatives happens or will happen no more in this way than not.

18b 9 Furthermore, on such a supposition, if something is now white, it was true to say formerly that it will be white; therefore it was always true to say of anything that has taken place that it will be. But if it was always true to say that it is or will be, it is not possible for this not to be, nor that it will not be; and when a thing cannot not take place, it is impossible that it not take place, and when it is impossible that it not take place, it is necessary that it take place; all things that will be, then, must necessarily take place. Therefore, nothing will be indeterminate to either of two alternatives, nor fortuitous; for if it were fortuitous it would not take place of necessity.

18b 17 But still it is not possible to say that neither is true; that is, to say that a thing neither will take place nor will not take place.

18b 18 In the first place, though the affirmation be false, the negation will not be true, and though the negation be false, the affirmation will not be true.

18b 20 Secondly, if it is true to say that a thing is white and large, both necessarily belong to it; and if they will belong to it the next day, they will necessarily belong to it the next day. But if a thing neither will be nor will not be tomorrow, it would not be indeterminate to either of two alternatives. For example, in the case of a naval battle, it would be necessary that the naval battle neither take place nor not take place tomorrow.

1. Now that he, has treated opposition of enunciations and has shown the way in which opposed enunciations divide truth and falsity, the Philosopher inquires about a question that might arise, namely, whether what has been said is found to be so in all enunciations or not. And first he proposes a dissimilarity in enunciations with regard to dividing truth and falsity, then

proves it where he says, For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, etc.

2. In relation to the dissimilarity which he intends to prove we should recall that the Philosopher has given three divisions of the enunciation. The first was in relation to the unity of enunciation, and according to this it is divided into one simply and one by conjunction; the second was in relation to quality, and according to this it is divided into affirmative and negative; the third was in relation to quantity, and according to this it is either universal, particular, indefinite, or singular.

3. Here he treats of a fourth division of enunciation, a division according to time. Some enunciations are about the present, some about the past, some about the future. This division could be seen in what Aristotle has already said, namely, that every enunciation must have a verb or a mode of a verb, the verb being that which signifies the present time, the modes with past or future time.

In addition, a fifth division of the enunciation can be made, a division in regard to matter. It is taken from the relationship of the predicate to the subject. If the predicate is per se in the subject, it will be said to be an enunciation in necessary or natural matter. Examples of this are “Man is an animal” and “Man is risible.” If the predicate is per se repugnant to the subject, as excluding the notion of it, it is said to be an enunciation in impossible or remote matter; for example, the enunciation “Man is an ass.” If the predicate is related to the subject in a way midway between these two, being neither per se repugnant to the subject nor per se in it, the enunciation is said to be in possible or contingent matter.

4. Given these differences of enunciations, the judgment of truth and falsity is not alike in all. Accordingly, the Philosopher says, as a conclusion from what has been established: In enunciations about that which is, i.e., in propositions about the present, or has taken place, i.e., in enunciations about the past, the affirmation or the negation must be determinately true or false. However, this differs according to the different quantity of the enunciations. In enunciations in which something is universally predicated of universal subjects, one must always be true, either the affirmative or negative, and the other false, i.e., the one opposed to it. For as was said above, the negation of a universal enunciation in which something is predicated universally, is not the universal negative, but the particular negative, and conversely, the

universal negative is not directly the negation of the universal affirmative, but the particular negative. According to the foregoing, then, one of these must always be true and the other false in any matter whatever. And the same is the case in singular enunciations, which are also opposed contradictorily. However, in enunciations in which something is predicated of a universal but not universally, it is not necessary that one always be true and the other false, for both could be at once true.

5. The case as it was just stated has to do with propositions about the past or the present. Enunciations about the future that are of universals taken either universally or not universally are also related in the same way in regard to oppositions. In necessary matter all affirmative enunciations are determinately true; this holds for enunciations in future time as well as in past and present time; and negative enunciations are determinately false. In impossible matter the contrary is the case. In contingent matter, however, universal enunciations are false and particular enunciations true. This is the case in enunciations about the future as well as those of the past and present. In indefinite enunciations, both are at once true in future enunciations as well as in those of the present or the past.

6. In singular future enunciations, however, there is a difference. In past and present singular enunciations, one of the opposites must be determinately true and the other false in any matter whatsoever, but in singulars that are about the future, it is not necessary that one be determinately true and the other false. This holds with respect to contingent matter; with respect to necessary and impossible matter the rule is the same as in enunciations about the present and the past.

Aristotle has not mentioned contingent matter until now because those things that take place contingently pertain exclusively to singulars, whereas those that per se belong or are repugnant are attributed to singulars according to the notions of their universals.

Aristotle is therefore wholly concerned here with this question: whether in singular enunciations about the future in contingent matter it is necessary that one of the opposites be determinately true and the other determinately false.

7. He proves that there is a difference between these opposites and the others where he says, For if every affirmation or negation is true or false, etc. First he proves it by showing that the opposite position leads to what is

unlikely; secondly, he shows that what follows from this position is impossible, where he says, These absurd consequences and others like them, etc. In his proof he first shows that in enunciations about future singulars, truth cannot always be determinately attributed to one of the opposites, and then he shows that both cannot lack truth, where he says, But still it is not possible to say that neither is true, etc. He gives two arguments with respect to the first point. In the first of these he states a certain consequence, namely, that if every affirmation or negation is determinately true or false, in future singulars as in the others, it follows that all things must determinately be or not be. He proves this consequence where he says, wherefore, if one person says, etc.,or as it is in the Greek, for if one person says something will be, etc.”‘ Let us suppose, he argues, that there are two men, one of whom says something will take place in the future, for instance, that Socrates will run, and the other says this same thing will not take place. If the foregoing position is supposed—that in singular future enunciations one of them will be true, either the affirmative or the negative it would follow that only one of them is saying what is true, because in singular future propositions both cannot be at once true, that is, both the affirmative and the negative. This occurs only in indefinite propositions. Moreover, from the fact that one of them must be speaking the truth, it follows that it must determinately be or not be. Then he proves this from the fact that these two follow upon each other convertibly, namely, truth is that which is said and which is so in reality. And this

is what he manifests when he says that, if it is true to say that a thing is white, it necessarily follows that it is so in reality; and if it is true to deny it, it necessarily follows that it is not so. And conversely, for if it is so in reality, or is not, it necessarily follows that it is true to affirm or deny it. The same convertibility is also evident in what is false, for if someone lies, saying what is false, it necessarily follows that in reality it is not as he affirms or denies it to be; and conversely, if it is not in reality as he affirms or denies it to be, it follows that in affirming or denying it he lies.

8. The process of Aristotle’s reasoning is as follows. If it is necessary that every affirmation or negation about future singulars is true or false, it is necessary that everyone who affirms or denies, determinately says what is true or false. From this it follows that it is necessary that everything be or not be. Therefore, if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, it is

necessary that everything determinately be or not be. From this he concludes further that all things are of necessity. This would exclude the three kinds of contingent things,

9. The three kinds of contingent things are these: some, the ones that happen by chance or fortune, happen infrequently; others are in determinate to either of two alternatives because they are not inclined more to one part than to another, and these proceed from choice; still others occur for the most part, for example, men becoming gray in old age, which is caused by nature. If, however, everything took place of necessity, there would be none of these kinds of contingent things. Therefore, Aristotle says, nothing is with respect to the very permanence of those things that are contingently permanent; or takes place with respect to those that are caused contingently; by chance with respect to those that take place for the least part, or infrequently; or is indeterminate to either of two alternatives with respect to those that are related equally to either of two, i.e., to being or to nonbeing, and are determined to neither of these, which he signifies when he adds, or will be, or will not be.

For of that which is more determined to one part we can truly and determinately say that it will be or will not be, as for example, the physician truly says of the convalescent, “He will be restored to health,” although perchance by some accident his cure may be impeded. The Philosopher makes this same point when he says in II De generatione [11: 337b 7], “A man about to walk might not walk.” For it can be truly said of someone who has the determined intention to walk that he will walk, although by some accident his walking might be impeded. But in the case of that which is indeterminate to either of two, it cannot determinately be said of it either that it will be or that it will not be, for it is proper to it not to be determined more to one than to another.

Then he manifests how it follows from the foregoing hypothesis that nothing is indeterminate to either of two when he adds that if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, then either the one who affirms or the one who denies must be speaking the truth. That which is indeterminate to either of two is therefore destroyed, for if there is something indeterminate to either of two, it would be related alike to taking place or not taking place, and no more to one than to the other.

It should be, noted that the Philosopher is not expressly excluding the contingent that is for the most part. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, this kind of contingency still excludes the determinate truth of one of the opposite enunciations and the falsity of the other, as has been said. Secondly, when the contingent that is infrequent, i.e., that which takes place by chance, is removed, the contingent that is for the most part is removed as a consequence, for there is no difference between that which is for the most part and that which is infrequent except that the former fails for the least part.

10. When he says, Furthermore, on such a supposition, if something is now white, it was true to say formerly that it will be white, etc., he gives a second argument to show the dissimilarity of enunciations about future singulars. This argument is by reduction to the impossible. If truth and falsity. are related in like manner in present and in future enunciations, it follows that whatever is true of the present was also true of the future, in the way in which it is true of the present. But it is now determinately true to say of some singular that it is white; therefore formerly, i.e., before it became white, it was true to say that this will be white. Now the same reasoning seems to hold for the proximate and the remote. Therefore, if yesterday it was true to say that this will be white, it follows that it was always true to say of anything that has taken place that it will be. And if it is always true to say of the present that it is, or of the future that it will be, it is not possible that this not be, or, that it will not be. The reason for this consequence is evident, for these two cannot stand together, that something truly be said to be, and that it not be; for this is included in the signification of the true, that that which is said, is. If therefore that which is said concerning the present or the future is posited to be true, it is not possible that this not be in the present or future. But that which cannot not take place signifies the same thing as that which is impossible not to take place. And that which is impossible not to take place signifies the same thing as that which necessarily takes place, as will be explained more fully in the second book. It follows, therefore, that all things that are future must necessarily take place. From this it follows further, that there is nothing that is indeterminate to either of two or that takes place by chance, for what happens by chance does not take place of necessity but happens infrequently. But this is

unlikely. Therefore the first proposition is false, i.e., that of everything of which it is true that it is, it was determinately true to say that it would be.

11. For clarification of this point, we must consider the following. Since “true” signifies that something is said to be what it is, something is true in the manner in which it has being. Now, when something is in the present it exists in itself, and hence it can be truly said of it that it is. But as long as something is future, it does not yet exist in itself, but it is in a certain way in its cause, and this in a threefold way. It may be in its cause in such a way that it comes from it necessarily. In this case it has being determinately in its cause, and therefore it can be determinately said of it that it will be. In another way, something is in its cause as it has an inclination to its effect but can be impeded. This, then, is determined in its cause, but changeably, and hence it can be truly a said of it that it will be but not with complete certainty. Thirdly, something is in its cause purely in potency. This is the case in which the cause is as yet not determined more to one thing than to another, and consequently it cannot in any way be said determinately of these that it is going to be, but that it is or is not going to be.

12. Then Aristotle says, But still it is not possible to say that neither is true, etc. Here he shows that truth is not altogether lacking to both of the opposites in singular future enunciations. First he says that just as it is not true to say that in such enunciations one of the opposites is determinately true, so it is not true to say that neither is true; as if we could say that a thing neither will take place nor will not take place.

Then when he says, In the first place, though the affirmation be false, etc., he gives two arguments to prove his point. The first is as follows. Affirmation and negation divide the true and the false. This is evident from the definition of true and false, for to be true is to be what in fact is, or not to be what in fact is not; and to be false is to be what in fact is not, or not to be what in fact is. Consequently, if the affirmation is false, the negation must be true, and conversely. But if the position is taken that neither is true, the affirmation, “This will be” is false, yet the negation is not true; likewise the negation will be false and the affirmation not be true. Therefore, the aforesaid position is impossible, i.e., that truth is lacking to both of the opposites.

The second argument begins where he says, Secondly, if it is true to say that a thing is white and large, etc. The argument is as follows. If it is true to say something, it follows that it is. For example, if it is true to say that something is large and white, it follows that it is both. And this is so of the future as of the present, for if it is true to say that it will be tomorrow, it follows that it will be tomorrow. Therefore, if the position that it neither will be or not be tomorrow is true, it will be necessary that it neither happen nor not happen, which is contrary to the nature of that which is indeterminate to either of two, for that which is indeterminate to either of two is related to either; for example, a naval battle will take place tomorrow, or will not. The same unlikely things follow, then, from this as from the first argument.

LESSON 14

Contingency in Things and the Roots of Contingency in Relation to Singular Propositions About the Future in Contingent Matter

18b 26 These absurd consequences and others like them result if of every affirmation and negation, whether in regard to universals taken universally or in regard to singulars, one of the opposites must be true and the other false: that nothing is indeterminate to either of two in things that come about but all are and take place of necessity; consequently, there will be no need to deliberate nor to take pains about something, as though if we were to do this, such a thing would follow and if we were not to do this, it would not follow.

18b 33 For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years and another person saying it will not; and on the aforesaid supposition, whichever of these was truly said at that time will take place of necessity.

18b 36 Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not; for it is evident that things either will take place or will not even if one person has riot affirmed and the other denied it. For it is not because of the affirming or denying that it will be or will not be, whether in ten thousand years or any other space of time.

Therefore, if throughout all time it was the case that one thing or the other was truly said, it would be necessary that this take place; and of every one of the things that takes place it was always the case that it would necessarily take place. For what anyone truly says will be, cannot not take place; and of that which takes place, it was always true to say that it would be.

19a 6 But these things appear to be impossible; for we see that both our deliberation about doing something and our action are principles of future events;

19a 9 and that universally in the things not always in act there is a potentiality to be and not to be. In these there is the possibility either of being or not being, and so they may either take place or not take place.

19a 12 We can point to many clear instances of this. For example, this cloak could be cut in half, and yet might not be but wear out first; likewise it is possible that it not be cut in half, for it could not wear out first if it were not possible that it not be cut.

19a 16 So it is, too, in other things that are said to take place according to this kind of potentiality.

19a 18 It is evident, then, that not all things are or take place of necessity, but some are indeterminate to either of two, in which case the affirmation is no more true than the negation; others take place more in one way than another, as in that which takes place for the most part, and yet it is possible for the other one to take place and the more frequent one not.

1. The Philosopher has shown—by leading the opposite position to what is unlikely—that in singular future enunciations truth or falsity is not determinately in one of the opposites, as it is in other enunciations. Now he is going to show that the unlikely things to which it has led are impossibilities. First he shows that the things that followed are impossibilities; then he concludes what the truth is, where he says, Now that which is, when it is, necessarily is, etc.

2. With respect to the impossibilities that follow he first states the unlikely things that follow from the opposite position, then shows that these follow from the aforesaid position, where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc. Finally he

shows that these are impossibilities where he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc.

He says, then, concluding from the preceding reasoning, that these unlikely things follow—if the position is taken that of opposed enunciations one of the two must be determinately true and the other false in the same way in singular as in universal enunciations—namely, that in things that come about nothing is indeterminate to either of two, but all things are and take place of necessity. From this he infers two other unlikely things that follow. First, it will not be necessary to deliberate about anything; whereas he proved in III Ethicorum [3: 1112a 19] that counsel is not concerned with things that take place necessarily but only with contingent things, i.e., things which can be or not be.

Secondly, all human actions that are for the sake of some end (for example, a business transaction to acquire riches) will be superfluous, because what we intend will take place whether we take pains to bring it about or not—if all things come about of necessity. This, however, is in opposition to the intention of men, for they seem to deliberate and to transact business with the intention that if they do this there will be such a result, but if they do something else, there will be another result.

3. Where he says, For nothing prevents one person from saying that this will be so in ten thousand years, etc., he proves that the said unlikely things follow from the said position. First he shows that the unlikely things follow from the positing of a certain possibility; then he shows that the same unlikely things follow even if that possibility is not posited, where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc.

He says, then, that it is not impossible that a thousand years before, when men neither knew nor ordained any of the things that are taking place now, a man said, “This will be,” for example, that such a state would be overthrown, and another man said, “This will not be.” But if every affirmation or negation is determinately true, one of them must have spoken the truth. Therefore one of them had to take place of necessity; and this same reasoning holds for all other things. Therefore everything takes place of necessity.

4. Then he shows that the same thing follows if this possibility is not posited where he says, Moreover, it makes no difference whether people

have actually made the contradictory statements or not, etc. It makes no difference in relation to the existence or outcome of things whether a person denies that this is going to take place when it is affirmed, or not; for as was previously said, the event will either take place or not whether the affirmation and denial have been made or not. That something is or is not does not result from a change in the course of things to correspond to our affirmation or denial, for the truth of our enunciation is not the cause of the existence of things, but rather the converse. Nor does it make any difference to the outcome of what is now being done whether it was affirmed or denied a thousand years before, or at any other time before. Therefore, if in all past time, the truth of enunciations was such that one of the opposites had to have been truly said and if upon the necessity of something being truly said it follows that this must be or take place, it will follow that everything that takes place is such that it takes place of necessity. The reason he assigns for this consequence is the following. If it is posited that someone truly says this will be, it is not possible that it will not be, just as having supposed that man is, he cannot not be a rational mortal animal. For to be truly said means that it is such as is said. Moreover, the relationship of what is said. now to what will be is the same as the relationship of what was said previously to what is in the present or the past. Therefore, all things have necessarily happened, and they are necessarily happening, and they will necessarily happen, for of what is accomplished now, as existing in the present or in the past, it was always true to say that it would be.

5. When he says, But these things appear to be impossible, etc., he shows that what has been said is impossible. He shows this first by reason, secondly by sensible examples, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc.

First he argues that the position taken is impossible in relation to human affairs, for clearly man seems to be the principle of the future things that he does insofar as he is the master of his own actions and has the power to act or not to act. Indeed, to reject this principle would be to do away with the whole order of human association and all the principles of moral philosophy. For men are attracted to good and withdrawn from evil by persuasion and threat, and by punishment and reward; but rejection of this principle would make these useless and thus nullify the whole of civil science.

Here the Philosopher accepts it as an evident principle that man is the principle of future things. However, he is not the principle of future things unless he deliberates about a thing and then does it. In those things that men do without deliberation they do not have dominion over their acts, i.e., they do not judge freely about things to be done, but are moved to act by a kind of natural instinct such as is evident in the case of brute animals. Hence, the conclusion that it is not necessary for us to take pains about something or to deliberate is impossible; likewise what it followed from is impossible, i.e., that all things take place of necessity.

6. Then he shows that this is also the case in other things where he says, and that universally in the things not always in act, there is a potentiality to be and not to be, etc. In natural things, too, it is evident that there are some things not always in act; it is therefore possible for them to be or not be, otherwise they would either always be or always not be. Now that which is not begins to be something by becoming it; as for example, that which is not white begins to be white by becoming white. But if it does not become white it continues not to be white. Therefore, in things that have the possibility of being and not being, there is also the possibility of becoming and not becoming. Such things neither are nor come to be of necessity but there is in them the kind of possibility which disposes them to becoming and not becoming, to being and not being.

7. Next he shows the impossibility of what was said by examples perceptible to the senses, where he says, We can point to many clear instances of this, etc. Take a new garment for example. It is evident that it is possible to cut it, for nothing stands in the way of cutting it either on the part of the agent or the patient. He proves it is at once possible that it be cut and that it not be cut in the same way he has already proved that two opposed indefinite enunciations are at once true, i.e., by the assumption of contraries. just as it is possible that the garment be cut, so it is possible that it wear out, i.e., be corrupted in the course of time. But if it wears out it is not cut. Therefore both are possible, i.e., that it be cut and that it not be cut. From this he concludes universally in regard to other future things which are not always in act, but are in potency, that not all are or take place of necessity; some are indeterminate to either of two, and therefore are not related any more to affirmation than to negation; there are others in which one possibility happens for the most part, although it is possible, but for the

least part, that the other part be true, and not the part which happens for the most part.

8. With regard to this question about the possible and the necessary, there have been different opinions, as Boethius says in his Commentary, and these will have to be considered. Some who distinguished them according to result—for example, Diodorus—said that the impossible is that which never will be, the necessary, that which always will be, and the possible, that which sometimes will be, sometimes not.

The Stoics distinguished them according to exterior restraints. They said the necessary was that which could not be prevented from being true, the impossible, that which is always prevented from being true, and the possible, that which can be prevented or not be prevented.

However, the distinctions in both of those cases seem to be inadequate. The first distinctions are a posteriori, for something is not necessary because it always will be, but rather, it always will be because it is necessary; this holds for the possible as well as the impossible. The second designation is taken from what is external and accidental, for something is not necessary because it does not have an impediment, but it does not have an impediment because it is necessary.

Others distinguished these better by basing their distinction on the nature of things. They said that the necessary is that which in its nature is determined only to being, the impossible, that which is determined only to nonbeing, and the possible, that which is not altogether determined to either, whether related more to one than to another or related equally to both. The latter is known as that which is indeterminate to either of two.

Boethius attributes these distinctions to Philo. However, this is clearly the opinion of Aristotle here, for he gives as the reason for the possibility and contingency in the things we do the fact that we deliberate, and in other things the fact that matter is in potency to either it of two opposites.

9. But this reasoning does not seem to be adequate either. While it is true that in corruptible bodies matter is in potency to being and nonbeing, and in celestial bodies there is potency to diverse location; nevertheless nothing happens contingently in celestial bodies, but only of necessity. Consequently, we have to say that the potentiality of matter to either of two, if we are speaking generally, does not suffice as a reason for contingency unless we add on the part of the active potency that it is not wholly

determined to one; for if it is so determined to one that it cannot be impeded, it follows that it necessarily reduces into act the passive potency in the same mode.

10. Considering this, some maintained that the very potency which is in natural things receives necessity from some cause determined to one. This cause they called fate. The Stoics, for example, held that fate was to be found in a series or interconnection of causes on the assumption that everything that happens has a cause; but when a cause has been posited the effect is posited of necessity, and if one per se cause does not suffice, many causes concurring for this take on the nature of one sufficient cause; so, they concluded, everything happens of necessity.

11. Aristotle refutes this reasoning in VI Metaphysicae [2: 1026a 33] by destroying each of the assumed propositions. He says there that not everything that takes place has a cause, but only what is per se has a cause. What is accidental does not have a cause, for it is not properly being but is more like nonbeing, as Plato also held. Whence, to be musical has a cause and likewise to be white, but to be musical white does not have a cause; and the same is the case with all others of this kind.

It is also false that when a cause has been posited—even a sufficient one—the effect must be posited, for not every cause (even if it is sufficient) is such that its effect cannot be impeded. For example, fire is a sufficient cause of the combustion of wood, but if water is poured on it the combustion is impeded.

12. However, if both of the aforesaid propositions were true, it would follow infallibly that everything happens necessarily. For if every effect has a cause, then it would be possible to reduce an effect (which is going to take place in five days or whatever time) to some prior cause, and so on until it reaches a cause which is now in the present or already has been in the past. Moreover, if when the cause is posited it is necessary that the effect be posited, the necessity would reach through an order of causes all the way to the ultimate effect. For instance, if someone eats salty food, he will be thirsty; if he is thirsty, he will go outside to drink; if he goes outside to drink, he will be killed by robbers. Therefore, once he has eaten salty food, it is necessary that he be killed. To exclude this position, Aristotle shows that both of these propositions are false.

13. However, some persons object to this on the grounds that everything accidental is reduced to something per se and therefore an effect that is accidental must be reduced to a per se cause.

Those who argue in this way fail to take into account that the accidental is reduced to the per se inasmuch as it is accidental to that which is per se; for example, musical is accidental to Socrates, and every accident to some subject existing per se. Similarly, everything accidental in some effect is considered in relation to some per se effect, which effect, in relation to that which is per se, has a per se cause, but in relation to what is in it accidentally does not have a per se cause but an accidental one. The reason for this is that the effect must be proportionately referred to its cause, as is said in II Physicorum [3: 195b 25-28] and in V Metaphysicae [2: 1013b 28].

14. Some, however, not considering the difference between accidental and per se effects, tried to reduce all the effects that come about in this world to some per se cause. They posited as this cause the power of the heavenly bodies and assumed fate to be dependent on this power—fate being, according to them, nothing else but the power of the position of the constellations.

But such a cause cannot bring about necessity in all the things accomplished in this world, since many things come about from intellect and will, which are not subject per se and directly to the power of the heavenly bodies. For the intellect, or reason, and the will which is in reason, are not acts of a corporeal organ (as is proved in the treatise De anima [III, 4: 429a 18]) and consequently cannot be directly subject to the power of the heavenly bodies, since a corporeal force, of itself, can only act on a corporeal thing. The sensitive powers, on the other hand, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, are accidentally subject to the action of the heavenly bodies. Hence, the Philosopher in his book De anima [III, 3: 427a 21] ascribes the opinion that the will of man is subject to the movement of the heavens to those who hold the position that the intellect does not differ from sense. The power of the heavenly bodies, however, does indirectly redound to the intellect and will inasmuch as the aq intellect and will use the sensitive powers. But clearly the passions of the sensitive powers do not induce necessity of reason and will, for the continent man has wrong desires but is not seduced by them, as is shown in VII Ethicorum [3: 1146a 5].

Therefore, we may conclude that the power of the heavenly bodies does not bring about necessity in the things done through reason and will.

This is also the case in other corporeal effects of corruptible things, in which many things happen accidentally. What is accidental cannot be reduced to a per se cause in a natural power because the power of nature is directed to some one thing; but what is accidental is not one; whence it was said above that the enunciation "Socrates is a white musical being" is not one because it does not signify one thing. This is the reason the Philosopher says in the book De somno et vigilia that many things of which the signs pre-exist in the heavenly bodies—for example in storm clouds and tempests—do not take place because they are accidentally impeded. And although this impediment considered as such is reduced to some celestial cause, the concurrence of these, since it is accidental, cannot be reduced to a cause acting naturally.

15. However, what is accidental can be taken as one by the intellect. For example, "the white is musical," which as such is not one, the intellect takes as one, i.e., insofar as it forms one enunciation by composing. And in accordance with this it is possible to reduce what in itself happens accidentally and fortuitously to a preordaining intellect For example, the meeting of two servants at a certain place may be accidental and fortuitous with respect to them, since neither knew the other would be there, but be per se intended by their master who sent each of them to encounter the other in a certain place.

16. Accordingly, some have maintained that everything whatever that is effected in this world—even the things that seem fortuitous and casual—is reduced to the order of divine providence on which they said fate depends. Other foolish men have denied this, judging of the Divine Intellect in the mode of our intellect which does not know singulars. But the position of the latter is false, for His divine thinking and willing is His very being. Hence, just as His being by its power comprehends all that is in any way (i.e., inasmuch as it is through participation of Him) so also His thinking and what He thinks comprehend all knowing and everything knowable, and His willing and what He wills comprehend all desiring and every desirable good; in other words, whatever is knowable falls under His knowledge and whatever is good falls under His will, just as whatever is falls under His

active power, which He comprehends perfectly, since He acts by His intellect.

17. It may be objected, however, that if Divine Providence is the per se cause of everything that happens in this world, at least of good things, it would look as though everything takes place of necessity: first on the part of His knowledge, for His knowledge cannot be fallible, and so it would seem that what He knows happens necessarily; secondly, on the part of the will, for the will of God cannot be inefficacious; it would seem, therefore, that everything He wills happens of necessity.

18. These objections arise from judging of the cognition of the divine intellect and the operation of the divine will in the way in which these are in us, when in fact they are very dissimilar.

19. On the part of cognition or knowledge it should be noted that in knowing things that take place according to the order of time, the cognitive power that is contained in any way under the order of time is related to them in another way than the cognitive power that is totally outside of the order of time. The order of place provides a suitable example of this. According to the Philosopher in IV Physicorum [11:219a 14], before and after in movement, and consequently in time, corresponds to before and after in magnitude. Therefore, if there arc many men passing along some road, any one of those in the ranks has knowledge of those preceding and following as preceding and following, which pertains to the order of place. Hence any one of them sees those who are next to him and some of those who precede him; but he cannot see those who follow behind him. If, however, there were someone outside of the whole order of those passing along the road, for instance, stationed in some high tower where he could see the whole road, he would at once see all those who were on the road—not under the formality of preceding and subsequent (i.e., in relation to his view) but all at the same time and how one precedes another.

Now, our cognition falls under the order of time, either per se or accidentally; whence the soul in composing and dividing necessarily includes time, as is said in III De anima [6: 430a 32]. Consequently, things are subject to our cognition under the aspect of present, past, and future. Hence the soul knows present things as existing in act and perceptible by sense in some way; past things it knows as remembered; future things are not known in themselves because they do not yet exist, but can be known in their causes—with certitude if they are totally determined in their causes so that they will take place of necessity; by conjecture if they are not so determined that they cannot be impeded, as in the case of those things that are for the most part; in no way if in their causes they are wholly in potency, i.e., not more determined to one than to another, as in the case of those that are indeterminate to either of two. The reason for this is that a thing is not knowable according as it is in potency, but only according as it is in act, as the Philosopher shows in IX Metaphysicae [9: 1051a 22].

20. God, however, is wholly outside the order of time, stationed as it were at the summit of eternity, which is wholly simultaneous, and to Him the whole course of time is subjected in one simple intuition. For this reason, He sees in one glance everything that is effected in the evolution of time, and each thing as it is in itself, and it is not future to Him in relation to His view as it is in the order of its causes alone (although He also sees the very order of the causes), but each of the things that are in whatever time is seen wholly eternally as the human eye sees Socrates sitting, not in its causes but in itself.

21. Now from the fact that man sees Socrates sitting, the contingency of his sitting which concerns the order of cause to effect, is not destroyed; yet the eye of man most certainly and infallibly sees Socrates sitting while he is sitting, since each thing as it is in itself is already determined. Hence it follows that God knows all things that take place in time most certainly and infallibly, and yet the things that happen in time neither are nor take place of necessity, but contingently.

22. There is likewise a difference to be noted on the part of the divine Will, for the divine will must be understood as existing outside of the order of beings, as a cause producing the whole of being and all its differences. Now the possible and the necessary are differences of being, an(] therefore necessity and contingency in things and the distinction of each according to the nature of their proximate causes originate from the divine will itself, for He disposes necessary causes for the effects that He wills to be necessary, and He ordains causes acting contingently (i.e., able to fail) for the effects that He wills to be contingent. And according to the condition of these causes, effects are called either necessary or contingent, although all depend on the divine will as on a first cause, which transcends the order of necessity and contingency.

This, however, cannot be said of the human will, nor of any other cause, for every other cause already falls under the order of necessity or contingency; hence, either the cause itself must be able to fail or, if not, its effect is not contingent, but necessary. The divine will, on the other hand, is unfailing; yet not all its effects are necessary, but some are contingent.

23. Some men, in their desire to show that the will in choosing is necessarily moved by the desirable, argued in such a way as to destroy the other root of contingency the Philosopher posits here, based on our deliberation. Since the good is the object of the will, they argue, it cannot (as is evident) be diverted so as not to seek that which seems good to it; as also it is not possible to divert reason so that it does not assent to that which seems true to it. So it seems that choice, which follows upon deliberation, always takes place of necessity; thus all things of which we are the principle through deliberation and choice, will take place of necessity.

24. In regard to this point there is a similar diversity with respect to the good and with respect to the true that must be noted. There are some truths that are known per se, such as the first indemonstrable principles; these the intellect assents to of necessity. There are others, however, which are not known per se, but through other truths. The condition of these is twofold. Some follow necessarily from the principles, i.e., so that they cannot be false when the principles are true. This is the case with all the conclusions of demonstrations, and the intellect assents necessarily to truths of this kind after it has perceived their order to the principles, but not before. There are others that do not follow necessarily from the principles, and these can be false even though the principles be true. This is the case with things about which there can be opinion. To these the intellect does not assent necessarily, although it may be inclined by some motive more to one side than another.

Similarly, there is a good that is desirable for its own sake, such as happiness, which has the nature of an ultimate end. The will necessarily adheres to a good of this kind, for all men seek to be happy by a certain kind of natural necessity. There are other good things that are desirable for the sake of the end. These are related to the end as conclusions are to principles. The Philosopher makes this point clear in II Physicorum [7: 198a 35]. If, then, there were some good things without the existence of which one could not be happy, these would be desirable of necessity, and especially by the person who perceives such an order. Perhaps to be, to live, and to think, and other similar things, if there are any, are of this kind. However, particular good things with which human acts are concerned are not of this kind nor are they apprehended as bein,r such that without tbeni happiness is impossible, for instance, to eat this food or that, or abstain from it. Such things, nevertheless, do have in them that whereby they move the appetite according to some good considered in them. The will, therefore, is not induced to choose these of necessity. And on this account the Philosopher expressly designates the root of the contingency of things effected by us on the part of deliberation—which is concerned with those things that are for the end and yet are not determined. In those things in which the means are determined there is no need for deliberation, as is said in III Ethicorum [3: 1112a 30–1113a 14].

These things have been stated to save the roots of contingency that Aristotle posits here, although they may seem to exceed the mode of logical matter.

LESSON 15

It Is Concluded that Propositions Are True as They Correspond to the Way in Which Things Are in Reality

19a 23 Now that which is, when it is, necessarily is, and that which is not, when it is not, necessarily is not. But it is not necessary for everything that is, to be, nor is it necessary for that which is not, not to be. For these are not the same: that everything be necessarily when it is and to be simply from necessity. And the case is similar with respect to that which is not.

19a 27 And this is also the case with respect to contradiction. It is necessary that everything be or not be; and that it will be or will not be; however, taking them separately, it is not possible to say one of the two is necessary. For example, it is necessary that there will or will not be a naval battle tomorrow; however, it is not necessary that a naval battle take place tomorrow, nor is it necessary that it not take place. Yet it is necessary that it either take place or not take place.

19a 32 And so, since speech is true as it corresponds to things, it is clear that when things are such that they are indeterminate to either of two, and opposites are possible, the corresponding contradiction must be similar. This is the case iii those things that do not always exist or always not exist. Of these it is necessary that one part of the contradiction be true or false, riot however this or that part, but either of the two indeterminately. One may be more likely to be true, but it is riot yet actually true or false.

19a 39 Therefore it is clear that it is riot necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites, one is true and one false. For the case is riot the same in regard to those things that are and those that are riot but could be or not be. It is as we have just stated.

1. Now that the Philosopher has shown the impossibilities that follow from the foresaid arguments, he concludes what the truth is on this point. In arguing to the impossibility of the position, he proceeded from enunciations to things, and has already rejected the unlikely consequences in respect to things. Now, in the converse order, he first shows the way in which there is truth about things; secondly, the way in which there is truth in enunciations, where he says, And so, since speech is true as it corresponds to things, etc. With respect to truth about things be first shows the way in which there is truth and necessity about things absolutely considered; secondly, the way in which there is truth and necessity about things through a comparing of their opposites, where he says, And this is also the case with respect to contradiction, etc.

2. He begins, then, as though concluding from premises: if the foresaid things are unlikely (namely, that all things take place of necessity), then the case with respect to things must be this: everything that is must be when it is, and everything that is not, necessarily not be when it is not. This necessity is founded on the principle that it is impossible at once to be and not be; for if something is, it is impossible that it at the same time not be; therefore it is necessary that it be at that time. For “impossible not to be” signifies the same thing as “necessary to be,” as Aristotle says in the second book.

Similarly, if something is not, it is impossible that it at the same time be. Therefore it is necessary that it not be, for they also signify the same thing. Clearly it is true, then, that everything that is must be when it is, and everything that is not must not be when it is not.

This is not absolute necessity, but necessity by supposition. Consequently, it cannot be said absolutely and simply that everything that is must be, and that everything that is not must not be. For “every being, when it is, necessarily is” does not signify the same thing as “every being necessarily is, simply. The first signifies necessity by supposition, the second, absolute necessity.

What has been said about to be must be understood to apply also to not to be, for “necessarily not to be simply” and “necessarily not to be when it is not” are also different.

By this Aristotle seems to exclude what was said above, namely, that if in those things that are, one of the two is determinately true, then even before it takes place one of the two would determinately be going to be.

3. He shows how truth and necessity is had about things through the comparing of their opposites where he says, This is also the case with respect to contradiction, etc. The reasoning is the same, he says, in respect to contradiction and in respect to supposition. For just as that which is not absolutely necessary becomes necessary by supposition of the same (for it must be when it is), so also what in itself is not necessary absolutely, becomes necessary through the disjunction of the opposite, for of each thing it is necessary that it is or is not, and that it will or will not be in the future, and this under disjunction. This necessity is founded upon the principle that it is impossible for contradictories to be at once true and false. Accordingly, it is impossible that a thing neither be nor not be; therefore it is necessary that it either be or not be. However if one of these is taken separately [i.e., divisively], it is not necessary that that one be absolutely. This he manifests by example: it is necessary that there will be or will not be a naval battle tomorrow; but it is not necessary that a naval battle will take place tomorrow, nor is it necessary that it will not take place, for this pertains to absolute necessity. It is necessary, however, that it will take place or will not take place tomorrow. This pertains to the necessity which is under disjunction.

4. Then when he says, And so, since speech is true as it corresponds to things, etc., he shows how truth in speech corresponds to the way things are. First he shows in what way truth of speech conforms to the being and nonbeing of things; secondly, and finally, he arrives at the truth of the whole question, where he says, Therefore it is clear that it is not necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites, one is true and one false, etc.

He says, then, that enunciative speech is related to truth in the way the thing is to being or nonbeing (for from the fact that a thing is or is not, speech is true or false). It follows, therefore, that when things are such as to be indeterminate to either of two, and when they are such that their contradictories could happen in whichever way, whether equally or one for the most part, the contradiction of enunciations must also be such.

He explains next what the things are in which contradictories can happen. They are those that neither always are (i.e., the necessary), nor always are not (i.e., the impossible), but sometimes are and some times are not. He shows further how this is maintained in contradictory enunciations. In those enunciations that are about contingent things, one part of the contradiction must be true or false tinder disjunction; but it is related to either, not to this or that determinately. If it should turn out that one part of the contradiction is more true, as happens in contingents that are for the most part, it is nevertheless not necessary on this account that one of them is determinately true or false.

5. Then he says, Therefore, it is clear that it is not necessary that of every affirmation and negation of opposites, one is true and one, false, etc. This is the conclusion he principally intended. It is evident from what has been said that it is not necessary in every genus of affirmation and negation of opposites that one is determinately true and the other false, for truth and falsity is not had in the same way in regard to things that are already in the present and those that are not but which could be or not be. The position in regard to each has been explained. In those that are, it is necessary that one of them be determinately true and the other false; in things that are future, which could be or not be, the case is not the same. The first book ends with this.

BOOK II

LESSON 1

The Distinction and Order of Simple Enunciations in Which the Finite or the Infinite Name Is Posited Only on the Part of the Subject

19b 5 Since an affirmation signifies something about something, and the subject is either the name or that which has no name, and one thing must be signified about one thing in an affirmation

19b 7 (we have already stated what a name is and that which has no name: I do not call “non-man” a name but an infinite name—for an infinite name also signifies one thing in a certain way—nor “non-matures” a verb, but an infinite verb),

19b 10 every affirmation will be made up of a name and a verb or an infinite name and a verb.

19b 12 There can be no affirmation or negation without a verb; for according to what has been established, “is,” or “will be,” or “was,” or “becomes,” or any others such as these are verbs since they signify with time.

19b 14 Therefore the primary affirmation and negation is “Man is... Man is not”; then, “Non-man is,” “Non-man is not”; and then “Every man is,” “Not every man is”; “Every non-man is... Not every non-man is”; and there are similar affirmations and negations with regard to times outside of the present.

1. In the first book, the Philosopher has dealt with the enunciation considered simply. Now he is going to treat of the enunciation as it is diversified by the addition of something to it.

There are three things that can be considered in the enunciation: first, the words that are predicated or subjected, which he has already distinguished into names and verbs; secondly, the composition, according to which there is truth or falsity in the affirmative or negative enunciation; finally, the opposition of one enunciation to another.

This book is divided into three parts which are related to these three things in the enunciation. In the first, he shows what happens to the enunciation when something is added to the words posited as the subject or predicate; in the second, what happens when something is added to determine the truth or falsity of the composition. He begins this where he says, Having determined these things, we must consider in what way negations and affirmations of the possible and not possible, etc. In the third part he solves a question that arises about the oppositions of enunciations in which something is added to the simple enunciation. This he takes up where he says, There is a question as to whether the contrary of an affirmation is a negation, or whether the contrary of an affirmation is another affirmation, etc.

With respect to additions made to the words used in the enunciation, it should be noted that an addition made to the predicate or the subject sometimes destroys the unity of the enunciation, and sometimes not, the latter being the case in which the addition is a negative making a word infinite. Consequently, he first shows what happens to the enunciation when the added negation makes a word infinite. Secondly, he shows what happens when an addition destroys the unity of the enunciation where he says, Neither the affirmation nor the negation which affirms or denies one predicate of many subjects or many predicates of one subject is one, unless something one is constituted from the many, etc.

In relation to the first point he first investigates the simplest of enunciations, in which a finite or infinite name is posited only on the part of the subject. Then he considers the enunciation in which a finite or infinite name is posited not only on the part of the subject, but also on the part of the predicate, where he says, But when “is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, etc. Apropos of these simple enunciations, he proposes certain grounds for distinguishing such enunciations and then gives their distinction and order where he says, Therefore the primary affirmation and negation is “Man is,” “Man is not,” etc. And first he gives the grounds for distinguishing enunciations on the part of the name; secondly, he shows that there are not the same grounds for a distinction on the part of the verb, where he says, There can be no affirmation or negation without a verb, etc. First, then, he proposes the grounds for distinguishing these enunciations; secondly, he explains this where he says, we have already stated what a name is, etc.; finally, he arrives at the conclusion he intended where he says, every affirmation will be made up of a name and a verb, or an infinite name and a verb.

2. First of all, he goes back to what was said above in defining affirmation, namely, that affirmation is an enunciation signifying something about something; and, since it is peculiar to the verb to be a sign of what is predicated of another, it follows that that about which something is said pertains to the name; but the name is either finite or infinite; therefore, as if drawing a conclusion, he says that since affirmation signifies something about something it follows that that about which something is signified, i.e., the subject of an affirmation, is either a finite name (which is properly called a name), or unnamed, i.e., an infinite name. It is called “unnamed” because it does not name something with a determinate form but removes the determination of form. And lest anyone think that what is subjected in an affirmation is at once a name and unnamed, he adds, and one thing must be signified about one thing in an affirmation, i.e., in the enunciation, of which we are speaking now; and hence the subject of such an affirmation must be either the name or the infinite name.

3. When he says, we have already stated what a name is, etc., he relates what he has previously said. We have already stated, he says, what a name is and what that which is unnamed is, i.e., the infinite name. “Non-man” is not a name but an infinite name, and “non-runs” is not a verb but an infinite verb. Then he interposes a point that is useful for the preclusion of a difficulty, i.e., that an infinite name in a certain way does signify one thing. It does not signify one thing simply as the finite name does, which signifies one form of a genus or species, or even of an individual; rather it signifies one thing insofar as it signifies the negation of a form, in which negation many things are united, as in something one according to reason. For

something is said to be one in the same way it is said to be a being. Hence, just as nonbeing is said to be being, not simply, but according to something, i.e., according to reason, as is evident in IV Metaphysicae [21: 1003b 6], so also a negation is one according to something, i.e., according to reason. Aristotle introduces this point so that no one will say that an affirmation in which an infinite name is the subject does not signify one thing about one subject on the grounds that an infinite name does not signify something one.

4. When he says, every affirmation will be made up of a name and a verb or an infinite name and a verb, he concludes that the mode of affirmation is twofold. One consists of a name and a verb, the other of an infinite name and a verb. This follows from what has been said, namely, that that about which an affirmation signifies something is either a name or unnamed. The same difference can be taken on the part of negation, for of whatever something can be affirmed it can be denied, as was said in the first book.

5. When he says, There can be no affirmation or negation without a verb, etc., he intends to show that enunciations cannot be differentiated on the part of the verb. He made the point earlier that there is no affirmation or negation without a verb. However there can be an affirmation or negation without a name, i.e., when an infinite name is posited in place of a name." An infinite verb, on the other hand, cannot be posited in an enunciation in place of a verb, and this for two reasons. First of all, the infinite verb is constituted by the addition of an infinite particle which, when added to a verb said by itself (i.e., posited outside of the enunciation), removes it absolutely, just as it removes the form of the name absolutely when added to it. Therefore, outside of the enunciation, the infinite verb, as well as the infinite name, can be taken in the mode of one word. But when a negation is added to the verb in an enunciation it removes the verb from something and thus makes the enunciation negative, which is not the case with respect to the name. For an enunciation is made negative by denying the composition which the verb introduces; hence, an infinite verb posited in the enunciation becomes a negative verb. Secondly, whichever way we use the negative particle, whether as making the verb infinite or as making a negative enunciation, the truth of the enunciation is not changed. The negative particle, therefore, is always taken in the more absolute sense, as being clearer. This, then, is why Aristotle does not diversify the affirmation as

made up of a verb or infinite verb, but as made up of a name or an infinite name.

It should also be noted that besides the difference of finite and infinite there is the difference of nominative and oblique cases. The cases of names even with a verb added do not constitute an enunciation signifying truth or falsity, as was said in the first book, for the nominative is not included in an oblique name. The verb of present time, however, is included in the cases of the verb, for the past and future, which the cases of the verb signify, are said with respect to the present. Whence, ‘if we say, “This will be,” it is the same as if we were to say, “This is future”; and “This has been” the same as “This is past.” A name, then, and a case of the verb do constitute an enunciation. Therefore Aristotle adds that “is,” or “will be,” or “was,” or any other verb of this kind that we use are of the number of the foresaid verbs without which an enunciation cannot be made, since they all signify with time and past and future time are said with respect to the present.

6. When he says, Therefore the primary affirmation and negation is, etc., he infers from the premises the distinction of enunciations in which the finite and infinite name is posited only on the part of the subject. Among these there is a threefold difference to be noted: the first, according to affirmation and negation; the second, according to finite and infinite subject; the third, according as the subject is posited universally or not universally. Now the finite name is prior in notion to the infinite name just as affirmation is prior to negation. Accordingly, he posits “Man is” as the first affirmation and “Man is not” as the first negation. Then he posits the second affirmation, “Non-man is,” and the second negation, “Non-man is not.” Finally he posits the enunciations in which the subject is universally posited. These are four, as are those in which the subject is not universally posited.

The reason he does not give examples of the enunciation with a singular subject, such as “Socrates is” and “Socrates is not,” is that no sign is added to singular names, and hence not every difference can be found in them. Nor does he give examples of the enunciation in which the subject is taken particularly, for such a subject in a certain way has the same force as a universal subject not universally taken.

He does not posit any difference on the part of the verb according to its cases because, as he himself says, affirmations and negations in regard to extrinsic times, i.e., past and future time which surround the prcsent, are similar to these, as has already been said.

LESSON 2

The Number and Relationship of Simple Enunciations in Which the Verb “Is” Is Predicated As a Third Element and the Subject Is the Finite Name Not Universally Taken

19b 19 But when “is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, there are two oppositions.

19b 20 I mean by this that in an enunciation such as “Man is just,” the “is” is a third name or verb contained in the affirmation.

19b 22 In this case, therefore, there will be four enunciations, two of which will correspond in their sequence, in respect of affirmation and negation, with the privations but two will not.

19b 24 1 mean that the “is” will be added either to “just” or to “non-just”; and so also in the case of the negative. Thus there will be four.

1. After distinguishing enunciations in which either a finite or an infinite name is posited only on the part of the subject, the Philosopher begins here to distinguish enunciations in which either a finite or an infinite name is posited as the subject and as the predicate. First he distinguishes these enunciations, and then he manifests certain things that might be doubtful in relation to them where he says, Since the negation contrary to “Every animal is just,” is the one signifying “No animal is just,” etc. With respect to their distinction he first deals with enunciations in which the name is

predicated with the verb “is”; secondly, with those in which other verbs are used, where he says, In enunciations in which “is” does not join the predicate to the subject, for example, when the verb “matures” or “walks” is used, etc.”

He distinguishes these enunciations as he did the primary enunciations, according to a threefold difference on the part of the subject, first treating those in which the subject is a finite name not taken universally, secondly, those in which the subject is a finite name taken universally where he says, The same is the case when the affirmation is of a name taken universally, etc.” Thirdly, he treats those in which an infinite name is the subject, where he says, and there are two other pairs, if something is added to non-man” as a subject, etc. With respect to the first enunciations [in which the subject is a finite name not taken universally] he proposes a diversity of oppositions and then concludes as to their number and states their relationship, where he says, In this case, therefore, there will be four enunciations, etc. Finally, he exemplifies this with a table.

2. In relation to the first point two things have to be understood. First, what is meant by “is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation. To clarify this we must note that the verb “is” itself is sometimes predicated in an enunciation, as in “Socrates is.” By this we intend to signify that Socrates really is. Sometimes, however, “is” is not predicated as the principal predicate, but is joined to the principal predicate to connect it to the subject, as in “Socrates is white.” Here the intention is not to assert that Socrates really is, but to attribute whiteness to him by means of the verb “is.” Hence, in such enunciations “is” is predicated as added to the principal predicate. It is said to be third, not because it is a third predicate, but because it is a third word posited in the enunciation, which together with the name predicated makes one predicate. The enunciation is thus divided into two parts and not three.

3. Secondly, we must consider what he means by when “is” is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, in the mode in which we have explained, there are two oppositions. In the enunciations already treated, in which the name is posited only on the part of the subject, there was one opposition in relation to any subject. For example, if the subject was a finite name not taken universally there was only one opposition, “Man is,” “Man is not.” But when “is” is predicated in addition there are two oppositions

with regard to the same subject corresponding to the difference of the predicate name, which can be finite or infinite. There is the opposition of "Man is just," "Man is not just," and the opposition, "Man is non-just," "Man is not non-just." For the negation is effected by applying the negative particle to the verb "is," which is a sign of a predication.

4. When he says, I mean by this that in an enunciation such as"Man is just," etc., he explains what he means by when "is" is predicated as a third element in the enunciation. When we say "Man is just," the verb "is" is added to the predicate as a third name or verb in the affirmation. Now "is," like any other word, may be called a name, and thus it is a third name, i.e., word. But because, according to common usage, a word signifying time is called a verb rather than a name Aristotle adds here, or verb, as if to say that with respect to the fact that it is a third thing, it does not matter whether it is called a name or a verb.

5. He goes on to say, In this case, therefore, there will be four enunciations, etc. Here he concludes to the number of the enunciations, first giving the number, and then their relationship where he says, two of which will correspond in their sequence, in respect of affirmation and negation, with the privations but two will not. Finally, he explains the reason for the number where he says, I mean that the "is" will be added either to "just" or to "non-just," etc.

He says first, then, that since there are two oppositions when "is" is predicated as a third element in the enunciation, and since every opposition is between two enunciations, it follows that there are four enunciations in which "is" is predicated as a third element when the subject is finite and is not taken universally. When he says, two of which will correspond in their sequence, etc., he shows their relationship. Two of these enunciations are related to affirmation and negation according to consequence (or according to correlation or proportion, as it is in the Greek) like privations; the other two are not. Because this is said so briefly and obscurely, it has been explained in diverse ways.

6. Before we take up the various explanations of this passage there is a general point in relation to it that needs to be clarified. In this kind of enunciation a name can be predicated in three ways. We can predicate a finite name and by this we obtain two enunciations, one affirmative and one negative, "Man is just" and "Man is not just." These are called simple

enunciations. Or, we can predicate an infinite name and by this we obtain two other enunciations, “Man is non-just” and “Man is not non-just,” These are called infinite enunciations. Finally, we can predicate a privative name and again we will have two, “Man is unjust” and “Man is not unjust.” These are called privative.

7. Now the passage in question has been explained by some in the following way. Two of the enunciations he has given, those with an infinite predicate, are related to the affirmation and negation of the finite predicate according to consequence or analogy, as are privations, i.e., as those with a privative predicate. For the two with an infinite predicate are related according to consequence to those with a finite predicate but in a transposed way, namely, affirmation to negation and negation to affirmation. That is, “Man is non-just,” the affirmation of the infinite predicate, corresponds according to consequence to the negative of the finite predicate, i.e., to “Man is not just”; the negative of the infinite predicate, “Man is not non-just,” corresponds to the affirmative of the finite predicate, i.e., to “Man is just.” Theophrastus for this reason called those with the infinite predicate, “transposed.”

The affirmative with a privative predicate also corresponds according to consequence to the negative with a finite predicate, i.e., “Man is unjust” to “Man is not just”; and the negative of the privative predicate to the affirmative of the finite predicate, “Man is not unjust” to “Man is just

This makes it clear that two, those with the infinite predicate, are related to the affirmation and negation of the finite predicate in the way privations are, i.e., as those that have a privative predicate.

It is also evident that there are two others that do not have a similar consequence, i.e., those with an infinite subject, “Non-man is just” and “Non-man is not just.” This is the way Herminus explained the words but two will not, i.e., by referring it to enunciations with an infinite subject. This, however, is clearly contrary to the words of Aristotle, for after giving the four enunciations, two with a finite predicate and two with an infinite predicate, he adds two of which... but two will not, as though he were subdividing them, which can only mean that both pairs are comprised in what he is saying. He does not include among these the ones with an infinite subject but will mention them later. It is clear, then, that he is not speaking of these here.

8. Since this exposition is not consonant with Aristotle’s words, others, Ammonius says, have explained this in another way. According to them, two of the four propositions, those of the infinite predicate, are related to affirmation and negation, i.e., to the species itself of affirmation and negation, as privations, that is, as privative affirmations and negations. For the affirmation, “Man is non-just,” is not an affirmation simply, but relatively, as though according to privation; as a dead man is not a man simply, but according to privation. The same thing applies to the negative enunciation with an infinite predicate. However, the two enunciations having finite predicates are not related to the species of affirmation and negation according to privation, but simply, for the enunciation “Man is just” is simply affirmative and “Man is not just” is simply negative.

But this meaning does not correspond to the words of Aristotle either, for he says further on: This, then, is the way these are arranged, as we have said in the Analytics, but there is nothing in that text pertaining to this meaning. Ammonius, therefore, interprets this differently and in accordance with what is said at the end of I Priorum [46: 51b 5] about propositions having a finite or infinite or privative predicate.

9. To make Ammonius’ explanation clear, it must be noted that, as Aristotle himself says, the enunciation, by some power, is related to that of which the whole of what is signified in the enunciation can be truly predicated. The enunciation, “Man is just,” for example, is related to all those of which in any way “is a just man” can be truly said. So, too, the enunciation “Man is not just” is related to all those of which in any way “is not a just man” can be truly said.

According to this mode of speaking it is evident, then, that the simple negative is wider than the infinite affirmative which corresponds to it. Thus, “is a non-just man” can truly be said of any man who does not have the habit of justice; but “is not a just man” can be said not only of a man not having the habit of justice, but also of what is not a man at all. For example, it is true to say “Wood is not a just man,” but false to say, “Wood is a non-just man.” The simple negative, then, is wider than the infinite affirmative-just as animal is wider than man, since it is verified of more.

For a similar reason the simple negative is wider than the privative affirmative, for “is an unjust man” cannot be said of what is not man. But the infinite affirmative is wider than the private affirmative, for “is a non-just man” can be truly said of a boy or of any man not yet having a habit of virtue or vice, but “is an unjust man” cannot. And the simple affirmative is narrower than the infinite negative, for “is not a non-just man” can be said not only of a just man, but also of what is not man at all. Similarly, the privative negative is wider than the infinite negative. For “is not an unjust man” can be said not only of a man having the habit of justice and of what is not man at all—of which “is not a non-just man” can be said—but over and beyond this can be said about all men who neither have the habit of justice nor the habit of injustice.

10. With these points in mind it is easy to explain the present sentence in Aristotle. Two of which, i.e., the infinites, will be related to the simple affirmation and negation according to consequence, i.e., in their mode of following upon the two simple enunciations, the infinitives will be related as are privations, i.e., as the two privative enunciations. For just as the infinite negative follows upon the simple affirmative, and.is not convertible with it (because the infinite negative is wider), so also the privative negative which is wider follows upon the simple affirmative and is not convertible. But just as the simple negative follows upon the infinite affirmative, which is narrower and is not convertible with it, so also the simple negative follows upon the privative affirmative, which is narrower and is not convertible. From this it is clear that there is the same relationship, with respect to consequence, of infinites to simple enunciations as there is of privatives.

11. He goes on to say, but two, i.e., the simple entinciations that are left after the two infinite enunciations have been taken care of, will not, i.e., are not related to infinites according to consequence as privatives are related to them, because, on the one hand, the simple affirmative is narrower than the infinite negative, and the privative negative wider than the infinite negative; and on the other hand, the simple negative is wider than the infinite affirmative, and the privative affirmative narrower than the infinite affirmative. Thus it is clear that simple entinciations are riot related to infinites in respect to consequence as privatives are related to infinites.

12. But although this explains the words of the Philosopher in a subtle manner the explanation appears a bit forced. For the words of the Philosopher seem to say that diverse relationships will not apply in respect to diverse things; however, in the exposition we have just seen, first there is

an explanation of a similitude of relationship to simple enunciations and then an explanation of a dissimilitude of relationship in respect to infinites. The simpler exposition of this passage of Aristotle by Porphyry, which Boethius gives, is therefore more apposite. According to Porphyry's explanation there is similitude and dissimilitude according to consequence of affirmatives and negatives. Thus Aristotle is saying: Of which, i.e., the four enunciations we are discussing, two, i.e., affirmatives, one simple and the other infinite, will be related according to consequence in regard to affirmation and negation, i.e., so that upon one affirmative follows the other negative, for the infinite negative follows upon the simple affirmative and the simple negative upon the infinite affirmative. But two, i.e., the negatives, will not, i.e., are not so related to affirmatives, i.e., so that affirmatives follow from negatives. And with respect to both, privatives are related in the same way as the infinites.

13. Then Aristotle says, I mean that the "is" will be added either to "just" or to "non-just," etc. Here he shows how, under these circumstances, we get four enunciations. We are speaking now of enunciations in which the verb "is" is predicated as added to some finite or infinite name, for instance as it adjoins "just" in "Man is just," or "non-just" in "Man is non-just." Now since the negation is not applied to the verb in either of these, each is affirmative. However, there is a negation opposed to every affirmation as was shown in the first book. Therefore, two negatives correspond to the two foresaid affirmative enunciations, making four simple enunciations.

14. Then he says, The following diagram will make this clear. Here he manifests what he has said by a diagrammatic description; for, as he says, what has been stated can be understood from the following diagram. Take a four-sided figure and in one corner write the enunciation "Man is just." Opposite it write its negation "Man is not just," and under these the two infinite enunciations, "Man is non-just," "Man is not non-just."

15. Finally, he concludes that these enunciations are disposed aaccording to an order of consequence that he has stated in the Analytics, i.e., in I Priorum [46: 51b 5].

There is a variant reading of a previous portion of this text, namely, I mean that "is" will be added either to "man" or to non-man," and in the diagram "is" is added to "man" and "non-man. This cannot be understood to mean that "man" and "non-man" are taken on the part of the subject; for

Aristotle is not treating here of enunciations with an infinite subject and hence “man” and “non-man” must be taken on the part of the predicate. This variant text seemed to Alexander to be corrupt, for the Philosopher has been explicating enunciations in which “just” and “non-just” are posited on the part of the predicate. Others think it can be sustained and that Aristotle has intentionally varied the names to show that it makes no difference what names are used in the examples.

LESSON 3

The Number and Relationship of Enunciations in Which the Verb “Is” Is Predicated and the Subject Is the Finite Name Taken Universally, or the Infinite Name, and of Those in Which the Adjective Verb is Predicated

19b 32 The same is the case when the affirmation is of a name taken universally, as in the following:

Every man is just

(Affirmation)

Not every man is just

(Negation)   Not every man is non-just

(Negation)

Every man is non-just

(Affirmation)

19b 35 But it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that those on the diagonal both be true; it is sometimes possible, however.

19b 36 These two pairs, then, are opposed; and there are two other pairs if something is added to “non-man” as a subject. Thus:

Non-man is just

(Affirmation)

Non-man is not just

(Negation) Non-man is not non-just

(Negation)

Non-man is non-just

(Affirmation)

20a 1 There will be no more opposites than these.

20a 1 The latter, however, are separate from the former and distinct from them because of the use of “non-man” as a name.

20a 3 In enuriciations in which “is” does not join the predicate to the subject, for example when the verb “matures” or “walks” is used, the same scheme applies, and they are arranged in the same way as when “is” was added. For example:

Every man matures

(Affirmation)

Not every man matures

(Negation) Not every non-man matures

(Negation)

Every non-man matures

(Affirmation)

20a 7 We must not say “non-every man” but must add the negation to “man”; for the “every” does not signify a universal but that a universal is taken universally.

20a 10 This is evident from the following: “Man matures,” “Man does not mature”; “Non-man matures,” “Non-man does not mature.” For these differ from the former in that they are not taken universally; the “every” and the “no,” then, only signify that the affirmation or negation is of a name universally.

20a 14 All else in enunciations in which “is” does not join the predicate to the subject will be the same as in the case in which “is” is the second element.

COMMENTARY BY CARDINAL CAJETAN

1. Having distinguished enunciations in which the subject is an infinite name not taken universally, Aristotle now distinguishes enunciations in which the subject is a finite name taken universally. He first proposes a similarity between these enunciations and the infinite enunciations already discussed, and then shows their difference where he says, But it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that those on the diagonal both be true, etc. Finally, he concludes with the number of oppositions there are between these enunciations where he says, These two pairs, then, are opposed, etc.

He says first, then, that enunciations in which the affirmation is of a name taken universally are similar to those already discussed.

2. It is to be noted in relation to Aristotle’s first point that in indefinite enunciations there were two oppositions and four enunciations, the affirmatives inferring the negatives and not being inferred by them, as is clear in the exposition of Ammonius as well as of Porphyry. In enunciations in which the finite name universally taken is the subject there are also two oppositions and four eminciations, the affirmatives inferring the negatives and not the contrary. Hence, enunciations are related in a similar way if the affirmation is made universally of the name taken as the subject. For again, four enunciations will be made, two with a finite predicate-”Every man is just,” and its negation, “Not every man is just”-and two with an infinite predicate-”Every man is non-just” and its negation, “Not every man is non-just.” And since any affirmation together with its negation makes one whole opposition, two oppositions are made, as was also said of indefinite enunciations. There might seem to be an objection to his use of particulars when speaking of universal enunciations, but this cannot be objected to, for just as in dealing with indefinite enunciations he spoke of their negations,

so now in dealing with universal affirmatives be is forced to speak of their negations. The negation of the universal affirmative, however, is not the do universal but the particular negative as was stated in the first book.

3. A table will make it evident that the consequence is similar in these and in indefinite eminciations. And lest what is clear be made obscure by prolixity let us first make a diagram of the indefinites posited in the last lesson, based upon the exposition of Porphyry.

Place the finite affirmative on one side and under it the infinite negative, and under this the privative negative. On the other side put the finite negative first, under it the infinite affirmative, and under this the privative affirmative. Then under this diagram make another similar to it but of universals. On one side put the universal affirmative of the finite predicate, under it the particular negative of the infinite predicate, and to complete the parallel put the particular negative of the privative predicate under this. On the other side, first put the particular negative of the infinite predicate, under it the universal affirmative of the finite predicate,” and under this the universal affirmative of the privative predicate

In this disposition of enunciations, the consequence always follows in the second diagram just as it followed in regard to indefinites in the first diagram. This is true if we follow the exposition of Ammonius in which infinites are related to finites as privatives are related to the same finites, and the finites not related to the infinite middle enunciatious as privatives are related to those infinites. It is equally true if we follow the exposition of Porphyry, in which affirmatives infer negatives and not vice versa. That the tables serve both expositions will be clear to one studying them. These universal eminciations, therefore, are related in like manner to indefinite entinciations in three things: the number of propositions, the number of oppositions, and the mode of consequence.

4. When he says, But it is not possible, in the same way as in the former case, that those on the diagonal both be true, etc., he proposes a difference between the universals and the indefinites, i.e., that it is not possible for the diagonals to be true in the case of universals. First we will explain these words according to the exposition we believe Aristotle had in mind, then according to the opinion of others.

Aristotle means by diagonal eminciations those that are diametrically opposed in the diagram above, i.e., the finite affirmative in one corner and the infinite affirmative or the privative in the other; and the finite negative in one corner and the, infinite negative or privative in the other.

5. Enunciations that are similar in quality, and called diagonal because diametrically distant, are dissimilar in truth, tben, in the case of indefinites and universals. The indefinites on the corners, both oil the diagonal of affirmations and the diagonal of negations can be simultaneously true, as is evident in the table of the indefinite entinciations. This is to be understood in regard to contingent matter. But diagonals of universals are not so related, for angtilars on the diagonal of affirmations cannot be simultaneously true in any matter. Those on the diagonal of negations, however, can sometimes be true simultaneously, i.e., when they are in contingerlt matter. In necessary and rernote matter it is impossible for both of these to be true. This is the exposition of Boethitis, which we believe to be the true one.

6. Herminus, however, according to Boethius, explains this in another way. He takes the oppositions in one way in universals and in another in indefinites, although he holds that there is a likeness between universals and indefinites with respect to the n timber of enunciations and of oppositions. He arrives at the oppositions of indefinites we have, i.e., one between the affirmative and negative finites, and the other between the affirmative and negative infinites. But he disposes the oppositions of universals in another way, taking one between the finite universal affirmative and finite particular negative, “Every man is just” and “Not every man is just,” and the other between the same finite universal affirmative and the infinite universal affirmative, “Every man is just” and “Every man is non-just.” Between the latter there is contrariety, between the former contradiction.

He also proposes the dissimilarity between universals and indefinites in another way. He does not base the dissimilarity between diagonals of universals and indefinites on the difference between affirinative and negative diagonals of universals, as we do, but on the difference between the diagonals of universals on both sides among themselves. Hence he forms his diagram in this way: under the finite universal affirmative be places the infinite universal affirmative, and on the other side, under the finite particular negative the infinite particular negative. Thus the diagonals are of different quality

With enunciations disposed in this way he says their difference is this: that in indefinite enunciations, one on the diagonal is true as a necessary consequence of the truth of the other, so that the truth of one enunciation infers the truth of its diagonal from wherever you begin * But there is no such mutual necessary consequence in universals—from the truth of one on a diagonal to the other—since the necessity of inference fails in part. If you begin from any of the universals and proceed to its diagonal, the truth of the universal cannot be simultaneous with the truth of its diagonal so as to compel it to truth. For if the universal is true its universal contrary will be false, since they cannot be at once true; and if this universal contrary is false, its particular contradictory, which is the diagonal of the first universal assumed, will necessarily be true, since it is impossible for contradictories to be at once false; but if, conversely, you begin with a particular enunciation and proceed to its diagonal, the truth of the particular can so stand with the truth of its diagonal that it does not infer its truth necessarily. For this follows: the particular is true, therefore its universal contradictory is false. But this does not follow: this universal contradictory is false, therefore its universal contrary, which is the diagonal of the particular assumed, is true. For contraries can be at once false.

7. But the way in which oppositions are taken in this exposition does not seem to be what Aristotle had in mind. He did not intend to speak here of the opposition between finites and infinites, but of the opposition between finites themselves and infinites themselves. For if we meant to explain each mode of opposition, there would not be two but three oppositions: first, between finites; second, between infinites; and third, the one Herminus states between finite and infinite. Even the diagram Herminus makes is not like the one Aristotle makes at the end of I Priorum, to which Aristotle himself referred us in the last lesson when he said, This, then, is the way these are arranged, as we have said in the Analytics; for in Aristotle’s diagram affirmatives are diagonal to affirmatives and negatives to negatives.

8. Then Aristotle says, These two pairs, then, are opposed, etc. Here he concludes to the number of propositions. What he says here can be interpreted in two ways. In the first way, “these” designates universals, and thus the meaning is that the finite and infinite universals have two oppositions, which we have explained above. In the second, “these”

designates enunciations which are finite and infinite with respect to the predicate, whether universal or indefinite, and then the meaning is that these enunciations have two oppositions, one between the finite affirmation and its negation and the other between the infinite affirmation and its negation. The second exposition seems more satisfactory to me, for the brevity for which, Aristotle strove allows for no repetition; hence, in terminating his treatment of the enunciations he had enumerated—those with a finite and infinite predicate according to diverse quantities—he meant to reduce all the oppositions to two.

9. When he says, and there, are two other pairs if something is added to “non-man” as a subject, etc., he shows the diversity of enunciations when “is” is added as a third element and the subject is an infinite name. First, he proposes and distinguishes them; secondly, he shows that there are no more opposites than these where he says, There will be no more opposites than these; thirdly, he shows the relationship of these to the others where he says, The latter, however, are separate from the former and distinct from them, etc.

With respect to the first point, it should be noted that there are three species of absolute [de inesse] enunciations in which the verb “is” is posited explicitly. Some have nothing added to the subject—which can be either finite or infinite—beyond the verb, as in “Man is,” “Non-man is.” Some have, besides the verb, something either finite or infinite added to a finite subject, as in “Man is just,” “Man is non-just.” Finally, some have, besides the verb, something either finite or infinite added to an infinite subject, as in “Non-man is just,” “Non-man is non-just.” He has already treated the first two and now intends to take tip the last ones. And there are two other pairs, he says, that have something, namely a predicate. added beside the verb “is” to “non-man” as if to a subject, i.e., to an infinite subject. He says “as if” because the infinite name falls short of the notion of a subject insofar as it falls short of the notion of a name. Indeed, the signification of an infinite name is not properly submitted to composition with the predicate, which “is,” the third element added, introduces.

Aristotle enumerates four enunciations and two oppositions in this order as he did in the former. In addition he distinguishes these from the former finiteness and infinity. First, he posits the opposition between affirmative and negative enunciations with an infinite subject and a finite predicate, “Non-man is just,” “Non-man is not just.” Then he posits another opposition between those with an infinite subject and an infinite predicate, “Non-man is non-just,” “Non-man is not non-just.

10. Then he says, There will be no more opposites than these. Here he points out that there are no more oppositions of enunciations than the ones be has already given. We should note, then, that simple [or absolute] enunciations—of which we have been speaking—in which the verb “is” is explicitly posited whether it is the second or third element added, cannot be more than the twelve posited. Consequently, their oppositions according to affirmation and negation are only six. For enunciations are divided into three orders: those with the second element added, those with the third element added to a finite subject, and those with the third element added to an infinite subject; and in any order there are four enunciations. And since their subject in any order can be quantified in four ways, i.e., by universality, particularity, singularity, and indefiniteness, these twelve will be increased to fortyeight (four twelves being forty-eight). Nor is it possible to imagine more than these.

Aristotle has only expressed twenty of these, eight in the first order, eight in the second, and four in the third, but through them be intended the rest to be understood. They are to be enumerated and disposed according to each order so that the primary negation is placed opposite an affirmation in order to make the relation of opposition more evident. Thus, the universal negative should not be ordered as opposite to the universal affirmative, but the particular negative, which is its negation. Conversely, the particular negative should not be ordered as opposite to the particular affirmative, but the universal negative, which is its negation. For a clearer look at their number all those of similar quantity should be co-ordered in a straight line and in the three distinct orders given above.

It is evident that there are no more than these, for the subject and the predicate cannot be varied in any other way with respect to finite and infinite. Nor can the finite and infinite subject be varied in any other way, for the enunciation with a second adjoining element cannot be varied with a finite and infinite predicate but only in respect to the subject. This is clear enough. But enunciations with a third adjoining element can be varied in four ways: they may have either a finite subject and predicate, or an infinite subject and predicate, or a finite subject and infinite predicate, or an infinite subject and finite predicate. These variations are all evident in the above table.

11. Then when he says, The latter, however, are separate from the former and distinct from them, etc., he shows the relationship of those we have put in the third order to those in the second order. The former, he says, are distinct from the latter because they do not follow upon the latter, nor conversely. He assigns the reason when he adds: because of the use of "non-man" as a name, i.e., the former are separate from the latter because the former use an infinite name in place of a name, since they all have an infinite subject. It should be noted that he says enunciations of an infinite subject use an infinite name as a name; for to be subjected in an enunciation is proper to a name, to be predicated common to a name and a verb, and therefore every subject of an enunciation is subjected as a name.

12. Next he takes up enunciations in which adjective verbs are posited, when he says, In enunciations in which "is" does not join the predicate to the subject, etc. First, he distinguishes these adjective verbs; secondly, he answers an implied question where he says, We must not say "non-every man," etc.; thirdly, he concludes with their conditions where he says, All else in the enunciations in which "is" does not join the predicate to the subject will be the same, etc.

It is necessary to note here that there is a difference between enunciations in which "is" is posited as a second adjoining element and those in which it is posited as a third element. In those with "is" as a second element oppositions are simple, i.e., varied only on the part of the subject by finite and infinite. In those having "is" as a third element oppositions are made in two ways—on the part of the predicate and on the part of the subject—for both can be varied by finite and infinite. Hence we made only one order of enunciations with "is" as the second element. It had four enunciations quantified in diverse ways, and two oppositions. But enunciations with "is" as a third element must be divided into two orders, because in them there are four oppositions and eight enunciations, as we said above. Enunciations with adjective verbs are made equivalent in signification to enunciations with "is" as the third element by resolving the adjective verb into its proper participle and "is," which may always be done because a substantive verb is contained in every adjective verb. For example, "Every man runs" signifies the same thing as "Every man is running." Because of this Boethius calls enunciations having an adjective verb “eminciations of the second adjoining element according to vocal sound, but of the third adjoining element according to power.” He designates them in this manner because they can be resolved into enunciations with a third adjoining element to which they are equivalent.

With respect to the number and oppositions of enunciations, those with an adjective verb, formally taken, are not equivalent to those with a third adjoining element but to those in which “is” is posited as the second element. For oppositions cannot be made in two ways in adjectival enunciations as they are in the case of substantival enunciations with a third adjoining element, namely, on the part of the subject and predicate, because the verb which is predicated in adjectival enunciations cannot be made infinite. Hence oppositions of adjectival enunciations are made simply, i.e., only by the subject quantified in diverse ways being varied by finite and infinite, as was done above in substantival enunciations with a second adjoining element, and for the same reason, i.e., there can be no affirmation or negation without a verb but there can be without a name.

Since the present treatment is not of significations but of the number of enunciations and oppositions, Aristotle determines that adjectival enunciations are to be diversified according to the mode in which enunciations with “is” as the second adjoining element are distinguished. And he says that in enunciations in which the verb “is” is not posited formally, but some other verb, such as “matures” or “walks,” i.e., in adjectival enunciations, the name and verb form the same scheme with respect to the number of oppositions and enunciations as when is as a second adjoining element is added to the name as a subject. For these adjectival enunciations, like the ones in which “is” is posited, have only two oppositions, one between the finites, as in “Every man runs,” “Not every man runs,” the other between the infinites with respect to subject, as in “Every non-man runs,” “Not every non-man runs.”

13. Then he answers an implied question when he says, We, must not say “non-every man” but must add the negation to man, etc. First he states the solution of the question, then he proves it where he says, This is evident from the following, etc.

The question is this: Why is the negation that makes a word infinite never added to the universal or particular sign? For example, when we wish to make “Every man runs” infinite, why do we do it in this way “Every non-man runs,” and not in this, “Non-every man runs.”

He answers the question by saying that to be capable of being made infinite a name has to signify something universal or singular. “Every” and similar signs, however, do not signify something universal or singular, but that something is taken universally or particularly. Therefore, we should not say “non-every man” if we wish to infinitize (although it may be used if we wish to deny the quantity of an enunciation), but must add the infinitizing negation to “man,” which signifies something universal, and say “every non-man.”

14. Where he says, This is evident from the following, etc., he proves that “every” and similar words do not signify a universal but that a universal is taken universally. His argument is the following: That by which enunciations having or not having the “every” differ is not the universal; rather, they differ in that the universal is taken universally. But that by which enunciations having and not having the “every” differ is signified by the “every.” Therefore, that which is signified by the “every” is not a universal but that the universal is taken universally. The minor of the argument is evident, though not explicitly given in the text: that in which the having of some term differs from the not having of it, other things being equal, is the signification of that term. The major is made evident by examples. The enunciations “Man matures” and “Every man matures” differ precisely by the fact that in one there is an “every,” in the other not. However, they do not differ in such a way by this that one is universal, the other not universal, for both have the universal subject, “man”; they differ because in the one in which “every” is posited, the enunciation is of the subject universally, but in the other not universally. For when I say, “Man matures,” I attribute maturing to “man” as universal or common but not to man as to the whole human race; when I say, “Every man matures,” however, I signify maturing to be present to man according to all the inferiors. This is evident, too, in the three other examples of enunciations in Aristotle’s text. For example, “Non-man matures” when its universal is taken universally becomes “Every non-man matures,” and so of the others. It follows, therefore, that “every” and “no” and similar signs do not signify a universal but only signify that they affirm or deny of man universally.

15. Two things should be noted here: first, that Aristotle does not say "every" and "no" signify universally, but that the universal is taken universally; secondly, that he adds, they affirm or deny of man. The reason for the first is that the distributive sign does not signify the mode of universality or of particularity absolutely, but the mode applied to a distributed term. When I say, "every man" the "every" denotes that universality is applied to the term "man." Hence, when Aristotle says "every" signifies that a universal is taken universally, by the "that" he conveys the application in actual exercise of the universality denoted by the "every," just as in I Posteriorum [2: 71b 10] in the definition of "to know," namely, To know scientifically is to know a thing through its cause and that this is its cause, he signifies by the word "that" the application of the cause.

The reason for the second is to imply the difference between categorematic and syneategorematic terms. The former apply what is signified to the terms absolutely; the latter apply what they signify to the terms in relation to the predicates. For example, in "white man" the "white" denominates man in himself apart from any regard to something to be added; but in "every man," although the "every" distributes man," the distribution does not confirm the intellect unless it is under stood in relation to some predicate. A sign of this is that when we say "Every man runs" we do not intend to distribute "man" in its whole universality absolutely, but only in relation to "running." When we say "White man runs," on the other hand, we designate man in himself as "white" and not in relation to "running."

Therefore, since "every" and "no" and the other syncategorematic terms do nothing except determine the subject in relation to the predicate in the enunciation, and this cannot be done without affirmation and negation, Aristotle says that they only signify that the affirmation or negation is of a name, i.e., of a subject, universally, i.e., they prescribe the affirmation or negation that is being formed, and by this he separates them from categorematic terms. They affirm, or deny can also be referred to the signs themselves i.e., "every" and "no," one of which distributes positively, the other distributes by removing.

16. When he says All else in enunciations in which "is"does not join the predicate to the subject, etc., he concludes the treatment of the conditions of adjectival enunciations. He has already stated that adjectival enunciations

are the same with respect to the number of oppositions as substantival enunciations with “is” as the second element, and has clarified this by a table showing the number of oppositions. Now, since upon this conformity follows conformity both with respect to finiteness of predicates and with respect to the diverse quantity of subjects, and also-if any enunciations of this kind are enumerated—their multiplication in sets of four, he concludes, Therefore also the other things, which are to be observed in them, are to be considered the same, i.e., similar to these.

LESSON 4

Some Doubts About What Has Been Said Are Presented and Solved

20a 16 Since the negation contrary to “Every animal is just,” is the one signifying “No animal is just,” it is evident that these will never be at once true, or in reference to the same thing, but the opposites of these will sometimes be true, i.e., “Not every animal is just” and “Some animal is just.”

20a 20 Now the enunciation “No man is just” follows upon the enunciation “Every man is non-just”; and “Not every man is non-just,” which is its opposite, follows upon “Some man is just,” for its opposite [i.e. the opposite of “every man”] must be “some man.”

20a 23 And it is also clear with respect to the singular that if a question is asked and a negative answer is the true one, there is also a true affirmation. Take the example, “Is Socrates wise?” and the answer, “No”; then, “Socrates is non-wise.” But in the case of universals , the affirmative inference is not true, but the negation is true. For example, in the question, “Is every man wise?” and the true answer, “No,” the inference “Then every man is non-wise” is clearly false, but “Not every man is wise” is true. The latter is the opposite, the former the contrary.

20a 31 The antitheses in infinite names and verbs, as in “non-man” and “non-just,” might seem to be negations without a name or a verb; they are not, however. For the negation must always be either true or false; but the person who says “non-man” says nothing more than one who says “man,” and be is even further from saying something true or false if something is not added.

20a 37 Moreover, “Every non-man is just” does not signify the same thing as any of the other enunciations, nor does the opposite of this, “Not every non-man is just.”

20a 39 But “Every non-man is non-just” signifies the same thing as “No non-man is just.”

20b 1 When the names and verbs, are transposed, the enunciations signify the same thing; for example, “Man is white” and “White is man.”

20b 3 For if this is not the case there will be more than one negation of the same enunciation; but it has been shown that there is only one negation of one affirmation, for the negation of “Man is white” is “Man is not white,” and if “White is man” is not the same as “Man is white,” the negation of it [“White is man”] will be “White is not non-man” and “White is not man.” The former, however, is the negation of “White is non-man”; the latter of “Man is white.” Therefore, there will be two [negations] of one [affirmation]. It is clear, therefore, that when the name and the verb are transposed the signification of the affirmation and negation is the same.

1. Having treated the diversity of enunciations Aristotle now answers certain questions about them. He takes up six points related to the number of difficulties. These will become evident as we come to them.

Since he has said that in universal enunciations the diagonals in one case cannot be at once true but can be in another, for the diagonal affirmatives cannot be at once true but the negatives can,” someone might raise a question as to the cause of this diversity. Therefore, it is his intention now to assign the cause of this: namely, that the diagonal affirmatives are contrary to each other, and contraries cannot be at once true in any matter; but the diagonal negatives are subcontraries opposed to these and can be at once true.

In relation to this he first states the conditions for contraries and subcontraries. Then he shows that diagonal affirmatives are contraries and that diagonal negatives are subcontraries where he says, Now the enunciation “No man is just” follows upon the enunciation “Every man is nonjust,” etc.

By way of resumé, therefore, he says that in the first book it was said that the negative enunciation contrary to the universal affirmative “Every animal is just” is “No animal is just.” It is evident that these cannot be at once true, i.e., at the same time, nor of the same thing, i.e., of the same subject. But the opposites of these, i.e., the subcontraries, can sometimes be at once true, i.e., in contingent matter, as in “Some animal is just” and “Not every animal is just.”

2. When he says, Now the enunciation, “No man is just” follows upon the enunciation “Every man is nonjust,” etc., he shows that the diagonal affirmatives previously posited are contraries, the negatives subcontraries. First he manifests this from the fact that the infinite universal affirmative and the simple universal negative are equal in meaning, and consequently each of them is contrary to the simple universal affirmative, which is the other diagonal. Hence, he says that the infinite universal affirmative “Every man is non-just” follows upon the finite universal negative “No man is just,” equivalently.

Secondly he shows this from the fact that the finite particular affirmative and the infinite particular negative are equal in meaning, and consequently each of these is subcontrary to the simple particular negative, which is the other diagonal. This you can see in the previous diagram. He says, then, that the opposite “Not every man is non-just” follows upon the finite particular “Some man is just” equivalently (understand “the opposite” not of this particular but of the infinite universal affirmative, for this is its contradictory).

In order to see clearly how these enunciations are equivalent, make a four-sided figure, putting the finite universal negative in one corner and under it the contradictory, the finite particular affirmative. On the other side, put the infinite universal affirmative and under it the contradictory, the infinite particular negative

This arrangement makes the mutual consequence of the universals in truth and falsity evident, for if one of them is true, its diagonal contradictory is false; and if this is false, its collateral contradictory, which is the other universal, will be true. With respect to the falsity of the particulars the procedure is the same. Their mutual consequence is made evident in the same way, for if one of them is true, its diagonal contradictory is false, and if this is false, its contradictory collateral, which is the other particular, will be true; the procedure is the same with respect to falsity.

3. However, a question arises with respect to this. At the end of I Priorum [46: 51b 5], Aristotle determines from what he has proposed that the judgment of the universal negative and the infinite universal affirmative is

not the same. Furthermore, in the second book of the present work, in relation to the phrase Of which two are related according to consequence, two are not. Ammonius, Porphyry, Boethius, and St. Thomas say that the simple negative follows upon the infinite affirmative and not conversely.”

Albert answers this latter difficulty by pointing out that the infinite affirmative follows upon the finite negative when the subject is constant, but the simple negative follows upon the affirmative absolutely. Hence both positions are verified, for with a constant subject there is a mutual consequence between them, but there is not a mutual consequence between them absolutely.

We could also answer this difficulty in this way. In Book II, Lesson 2 we were speaking of the infinite enunciation with the whole of what it signified reduced to the form of the predicate, and according to this there was not a mutual consequence, since the finite negative is superior to the infinite affirmative. But here we are speaking of the infinite itself formally taken. Hence St. Thomas, when he introduced the exposition of Ammonius in his commentary on the above passage, said that according to this mode of speaking the simple negative is wider than the infinite affirmative.

In the above mentioned text in I Priorum [46: 52a 36], Aristotle is speaking of finite and infinite enunciations in relation to the syllogism. It is evident, however, that the universal affirmative, whether finite or infinite is only inferred in the first mode of the first figure, while any universal negative whatever is inferred in the second mode of the first figure and in the first and second modes of the second figure.

4. When he says, And it is also clear with respect to the singular that if a question is asked and a negative answer is the true one, there is also a true affirmation, etc., he presents a difficulty relating to the varying position of the negation, i.e., whether there is a difference as to truth and falsity when the negation is a part of the predicate or a part of the verb. This difficulty arises from what he has just said, namely, that it is of no consequence as to truth or falsity whether you say, “Every man is non-just” or “Every man is not just”; yet in one case the negation is a part of the predicate, in the other part of the copula, and this makes a great deal of difference with respect to affirmation and negation.

To solve this problem Aristotle makes a distinction: in singular enunciations, the singular negation and infinite affirmation of the same subject are of the same truth, but in universals this is not so. For if the negation of the universal is true it is not necessary that the infinite affirmation of the universal is true. The negation of the universal is the contradictory particular, but if it is true [i.e., the contradictory particular] it is not necessary that the subaltern, which is the contrary of the contradictory, be true, for two contraries can be at once false. Hence he says that in singular enunciations it is evident that if it is true to deny the thing asked, i.e., if the negation of a singular enunciation, which has been made into an interrogation, is true, there will also be a true affirmation, i.e., the infinite affirmation of the same singular will be true. For example, if the question "Do you think Socrates is wise?" has "No" as a true response, then "Socrates is non-wise," i.e., the infinite affirmation "Socrates is non-wise" will be true.

But in the case of universals the affirmative inference is not true, i.e., from the truth of a negation to a universal affirmative question, the truth of the infinite universal affirmative (which is similar in quantity and quality to the enunciation asked) does not follow. But the negation is true, i.e., from the truth of the negative response it follows that its negation is true, i.e., the negation of the universal asked, which is the particular negative. Consider, for example, the question "Do you think every man is wise?" If the response "No" is true, one would be tempted to infer the affirmative similar to the question asked, i.e., then "Every man is non-wise." This, however, does not follow from the negation, for this is false as it follows from that response. Rather, what must be inferred is "Then not every man is wise." And the reason for both is that the particular enunciation inferred last is the opposite, i.e., the contradictory of the universal question, which, being falsified by the negative response, makes the contradictory of the universal affirmative true, for of contradictories, if one is false the other is true.

The infinite universal affirmative first inferred, however, is contrary to the same universal question. Should it not also be true? No, because it is not necessary in the case of universals that if one is false the other is true.

The cause of the diversity between singulars and universals is now clear. In singulars the varying position of the negation does not vary the quantity of the enunciation ‘ but in universals it does. Therefore there is not the same truth in enunciations denying a universal when in one the negation is a part of the predicate and in the other a part of the verb.

5. Then he says, The antitheses in infinite names and verbs, as in “ non-man” and “nonjust,” might seem to be negations without a name or a verb, etc. Here he raises the third difficulty, i.e., whether infinite names or verbs are negations. This question arises from his having said that the negative and infinite are equivalent and from having just said that in singular enunciations it makes no difference whether the negative is a part of the predicate or a part of the verb. For if the infinite name is a negation, then the enunciation having an infinite subject or predicate will be negative and not affirmative.

He resolves this question by an interpretation which proves that neither infinite names nor verbs are negations although they seem to be. First he proposes the solution saying, The antitheses in infinite names and verbs, i.e., words contraposed, e.g., “non-man,” and “non-just man” and “just man”; or this may be read as, Those (namely, words) corresponding to infinites, i.e., corresponding to the nature of infinites, placed in opposition to names or verbs (namely, removing what the names and verbs signify, as in “non-man,” “non-just,” and “non-runs,” which are opposed to “man,” “just” and “runs”), would seem at first sight to be quasi-negations without Dame and verb, because, as related to the names and verbs before which they are placed, they remove them; they are not truly negations however. He says without a name or a verb because the infinite name lacks the nature of a name and the infinite verb does not have the nature of a verb. He says quasi because the infinite name does not fall short of the notion of the name in every way, nor the infinite verb of the nature of the verb. Hence, if it is thought that they are negations, they will be regarded as without a name or a verb, not in every way but as though they were without a name or a verb.

He proves that infinitizing signs of separation are not negations by pointing out that it is always necessary for the negation to be true or false since a negation is an enunciation of something separated from something. The infinite name, however, does not assert what is true or false. Therefore the infinite word is not a negation. He manifests the minor when he says that the one who says “non-man” says nothing more of man than the one who says “man.” Clearly this is so with respect to what is signified, for “non-man” adds nothing beyond “man”; rather, it removes “man.” Moreover, with respect to a conception of truth or falsity, it is of no more use to say “non-man” than to say “man” if something else is not added;

rather, it is less true or false, i.e., one who says non-man is more removed from truth and falsity than one who says man," for both truth and falsity depend on composition, and the finite word which posits something is closer to composition than the infinite word, which neither posits nor composes, i.e., it implies neither positing nor composition.

6. When he says, Moreover, "Every non-man is just does not signify the same thing as any of the other enunciations, etc., he answers a fourth difficulty, i.e., how the earlier statement concerning enunciations having an infinite subject is to be understood. The statement was that these stand by themselves and are distinct from the former [in consequence of using the name "non-man"]. This is to be understood not just with respect to the enunciations themselves formally, but with respect to the consequence of what is signified. Hence, giving two examples of enunciations with an infinite subject, the universal affirmative and universal negative," he says that neither of these signifies the same thing as any of those, namely of those having a finite subject. The universal affirmative "Every non-man is just" does not signify the same thing as any of the enunciations with a finite subject; for it does not signify "Every man is just" nor "Every man is non-just." Nor do the opposite negation, or the universal negative having an infinite subject which is contrarily opposed to the universal affirmative, signify the same thing as enunciations with a finite subject; i.e., "Not every non-man is just" and "No non-man is just," do not signify the same thing as any of those with a finite subject. This is evident from the diversity of subject in the latter and the former.

7. When he says, But "Every non-man is non-just" signifies the same thing as "No non-man is just," he answers a fifth difficulty, i.e., is there a consequence among enunciations with an infinite subject? This question arises from the fact that consequences were assigned among them earlier." He says, therefore, that there is a consequence even among these, for the universal affirmative with an infinite subject and predicate and the universal negative with an infinite subject but a finite predicate are equivalent, i.e., "Every non-man is non-just" signifies the same thing as "No non-man is just." This is also the case in particular infinites and singulars which are similar to the foresaid, for no matter what their quantity, the affirmative with both extremes infinite and the negative with an infinite subject and a finite predicate are always equivalent, as may be easily seen by examples.

Hence, Aristotle in giving the universals intends the others to be understood from these.

8. When he says, When the names and verbs are transposed, the enunciations signify the same thing, etc., he resolves a sixth difficulty: whether the signification of the enunciation is varied because of the transposition of names or verbs. This question arises from his having shown that the transposition of the negation varies the signification of the enunciation. “Every man is non-just,” he said, does not signify the same thing as “Not every man is just.” This raises the question as to whether a similar thing happens when we transpose names. Would this vary the enunciation as the transposed negation does?

First he states the solution, saying that transposed names and verbs signify the same thing, e.g., “Man is white” signifies the same thing as “White is man.” Transposed verbs also signify the same thing, as in “Man is white” and “Man white is.”

9. Then he proves the solution from the number of contradictory negations when he says, For if this is not the case there will be more than one negation of the same enunciation, etc. He does this by a reduction to the impossible and his reasoning is as follows. If this is not so, i.e., if transposed names diversify enunciations, there will be two negations of the same affirmation. But in the first book it was shown that there is only one negation of one affirmation. Going, then, from the destruction of the consequent to the destruction of the antecedent, transposed names do not vary the enunciation.

To clarify the proof of the consequent, make a figure in which both of the affirmations posited above, with the names transposed are located on one side. Put the two negatives similar to them in respect to terms and position on the opposite side. Then leaving a little space, under the affirmatives put the affirmation with an infinite subject and under the negatives the negation of it. Mark the contradiction between the first affirmation and the first two negations and between the second affirmation and all three negations, but in the latter case mark the contradiction between it and the lowest negation as not true but imaginary. Mark, also, the contradiction between the third affirmation and negation.

(1) Man is white ————contradictories———— Man is not white

(2) White is man ————contradictories———— White is not man

(3) Non-man is white ————contradictories———— Non-man is not white

Now we can see how Aristotle proves the consequent. The negation of the affirmation "Man is white" is "Man is not white." But if the second affirmation, "White is man," is not the same as "Man is white," because of the transposition of the names, its negation, [i.e., of "White is man"] will be either of these two: "Non-man is not white," or "White is not man." But each of these has another opposed affirmation than that assigned, namely, than "White is man." For one of the negations, namely, "Non-man is not white," is the negation of "Non-man is white"; the other, "White is not man" is the negation of the affirmation "Man is white," which was the first affirmation. Therefore whatever negation is given as contradictory to the middle enunciation, it follows that there are two of one, i.e., two affirmations of one negation, and two negations of one affirmation, which is impossible. And this, as has been said, follows upon an erroneously set up hypothesis, i.e., that these affirmations are diverse because of the transposition of names.

Notice first that Aristotle through these two negations, "Non-man is not white" and "White is not man," taken under disjunction to find the negation of the affirmation "Man is white," has comprehended other things. It is as though he said: The negation which will be taken will either be the true negation of such an affirmation or some extraneous negation; and whichever is taken, it always follows, given the hypothesis, that there are many negations of one affirmation—one which is the contradictory of it, having equal truth with the one having its name transposed, and the other which you accept as distinct, or you imagine falsely. And conversely, there is a single negation of many affirmations, as is clear in the diagram. Hence, from whichever of these four you begin, you see two opposed to it. It is significant, therefore, that Aristotle concludes indeterminately: Therefore, there will be two [negations] of one [affirmation].

11. Note secondly that Aristotle does not consider it important to prove that the contradictory of the first affirmation is the contradictory of the second, and similarly that the contradictory of the second affirmation is the

contradictory of the first. This he accepts as self-evident since they can neither be true at the same time nor false at the same time. This is manifestly clear when a singular term is placed first, for “Socrates is a white man” and “Socrates is not a white man” cannot be maintained at the same time in any mode. You should not be disturbed by the fact that he does not propose these singulars here, for he was undoubtedly aware that he had already stated in the first book which affirmation and negation are contradictories and which not and for this reason felt that a careful elaboration of the examples was not necessary here.

It is therefore evident that since negations of affirmations with transposed names are not diverse the affirmations themselves are not diverse, and hence transposed names and verbs signify the same thing.

12. A doubt does arise, however, about the point Aristotle is making here, for it does not seem true that with transposed names the affirmation is the same. This, for example, is not valid: “Every man is an animal”; therefore, “Every animal is a man.” Nor is the following example with a transposed verb valid: “Man is a rational animal and (taking “is” as the second element), therefore “Man animal rational is”; for although it is nugatory as a whole combination, nevertheless it does not follow upon the first.

The answer to this is as follows. just as there is a twofold transmutation in natural things, i.e., local, from place to place, and formal, from form to form, so in enunciations there is a twofold transmutation: a positional transmutation when a term placed before is placed after, and conversely, and a formal transmutation when a term that was a predicate is made a subject, and conversely, or in whatever mode, simply, etc. And just as in natural things sometimes a purely local transmutation is made (for instance, when a thing is transferred from place to place, with no other variation made) and sometimes a transmutation is made according to place—not simply but with a formal variation (as when a thing passes from a cold place to a hot place), so in enunciations a transmutation is sometimes made which is purely positional, i.e., when the name and verb are varied only in vocal position, and sometimes a transmutation is made which is at once formal and positional, as when the predicate becomes the subject, or the verb which is the third element added becomes the second.

Aristotle’s purpose here was to treat of the purely positional transmutation of names and verbs, as the vocabulary of the transposition indicates; when he says, then, that transposed names and verbs signify the same thing, he intends to imply that if nothing other than the transposition of name and verb takes place in the enunciation, what is said remains the same. Hence, the response to the present objection is clear, for in both examples there is not only a transposition but a transmutation of subject to predicate in one case, and from an enunciation with a third element to one with a second element in the other. The response to similar questions is evident from this.

LESSON 5

Ways in Which An Enunciation May Be Many Rather than One

20b 12 Neither the affirmation nor the negation which affirms or denies one predicate of many subjects or many predicates of one subject is one, unless something one is constituted from the many. I do not use “one” of those things which, although one name may be imposed, do not constitute something one. For example, man probably is animal and biped and civilized, but there is also something one formed from these; whereas from “white” and “man” and “walking” there is not. Consequently, if someone affirms something one of these latter there will not be one affirmation, except in vocal sound; on the contrary, there will be many affirmations. Nor will there be one affirmation if someone affirms these of one subject; in this case too there will be many.

20b 22 In fact, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, i.e., either for the admission of a premise or one part of a contradiction-and a premise is a part of one contradiction—there would not be one answer in reference to the above predicates. There would not be one answer even if there is a true answer, for there would not be a single question.

20b 26 But we have spoken about these things in the Topics [VIII, 7].

At the same time it is clear that the question “What is it?” is not a dialectical one. For the dialectical interrogation must provide for choosing whichever part of a contradiction one wishes to enunciate. For this the interrogator must specifically word the question so that the parts of the contradiction are clear; for example, by asking whether man is this or not.

1. After the Philosopher has treated the diversity in an enunciation arising from the addition of the infinite negation, he explains what happens to an

enunciation when something is added to the subject or predicate which takes away its unity. He first determines their diversity, and then proves that all the enunciations are many where he says, In fact, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc. Secondly, he determines their consequences, where he says, Some things predicated separately are such that they unite to form one predicate, etc.

He begins by taking up something he said in the first book: there is not one affirmative enunciation nor one negative enunciation when one thing is affirmed or denied of many or many of one, if one thing is not constituted from the many. Then he explains what he means by the subject or predicate having to be one where he says, I do not use "one" of those things which, although one name may be imposed, do not constitute something one, i.e., a subject or predicate is one, not from the unity of the name, but from the unity of what is signified. For when many things are brought together under one name in such a way that what is signified by that name is not one, then the unity is only one of vocal sound. But when one name has been imposed for many, whether for subjective or for integral parts, so that it encloses them in the same signification, then there is unity both of vocal sound and what is signified. In the latter case, unity of the enunciation is not impeded.

2. Then he adds, For example, man probably is an animal and biped and civilized. This, however, is obscure, for it can be understood as all example of the opposite, as if he were saying, "I do not mean by 'one' such a 'one' as the unity of the name imposed upon many from which one thing is not constituted, for instance, 'man' as 'one' from the parts of the definition, animal and civilized and biped." And to prevent anyone from thinking these are true parts of the definition of the name he interposes perhaps.

Porphyry, however, referred to with approval by Boethius, separates these parts of the text. He says Aristotle first states that that enunciation is many in which many are subjected to one, or many are predicated of one, when one thing is not constituted from these. And when he says, For example, man perhaps is, etc., he intends to show that an enunciation is many when many from which one thing is constituted are subjected or predicated, as in the example "Man is an animal and civilized and biped," with copulas interjected or a pause such as orators make. He added perhaps, they say, to imply that this could happen, but it need not.

3. While agreeing with the opinion of Porphyry, Boethius, and Albert, we think a more subtle construction can be made of the text. According to it Aristotle makes four points here. First, he reviews what an enunciation is in general when he says, The enunciation is many in which one is enunciated of many or many of one, unless from the many something one is constituted... as he stated and explained in the first book.

Secondly, he clarifies the term “one,” when he says, I do not use “one” of those things, etc., i.e., I call a name one, not by reason of the unity of vocal sound, but of signification, as was said above. Thirdly, he manifests (by dividing) and divides (by manifesting) the number of ways in which one name may be imposed on many things from which one thing is not constituted. From this he implies the diversity of the multiple enunciation. And he posits two ways in which one name may be imposed on many things from which one thing is not constituted: first, when one name is imposed upon many things from which one thing is constituted but not as one thing is constituted from them. In this case, materially and accidentally speaking, the name is imposed on many from which one thing is constituted, but it is formally and per se imposed on many from which one thing is not constituted; for it is not imposed upon them in the respect in which they constitute one thing; as perhaps the name “man” is imposed to signify animal and civilized and biped (i.e., parts of its definition) not as they are united in the one nature of man in the mode of act and potency, but as they are themselves distinct actualities. Aristotle implies that he is taking these parts of the definition as distinct by the conjunctions and by also adding adversatively, but if there is something one formed from these, as if to say, “when however it holds that one thing is constituted from these.”

He adds perhaps because the name “man” is not imposed to signify its definitive parts as they are distinct. But if it had been so imposed or were imposed, it would be one name imposed on many things from which no one thing is constituted. And since the judgment with respect to such a name and those many things is the same, the many definitive parts can also be taken in two ways: first, in the mode of the actual and possible, and thus they constitute one thing, and formally speaking are called many from which one thing is constituted, and they are to be pronounced in continuous speech and they make one enunciation, for example, “A mortal rational animal is running.” For this is one enunciation, just as is “Man is running.”

In the second way, the foresaid parts of the definition are taken as they are distinct actualities, and thus they do not constitute one thing, for one thing is not constituted from two acts as such, as Aristotle says in VII Metaphysicae [13: 1039a 5]. In this case they constitute many enunciations and are pronounced either with conjunctions interposed or with a pause in the rhetorical manner, for example, “Man is an animal and civilized and biped” or “Man is an animal–civilized–biped.” Each of these is a multiple enunciation. And so is the enunciation, “Socrates is a man” if “man” is imposed to signify animal, civilized, and biped as they are distinct actualities.

Aristotle takes up the second way in which one name is imposed on many from which one thing is not constituted where he says, whereas from “white” and “man” and “walking” there is not [something one formed]. Since in no way can any one nature be constituted from “man,” white,” and “walking” (as there can be from the definitive parts), it is evident that if a name were imposed on these it would be a name that does not signify one thing, as was said in the first book of the name “cloak” imposed for man and horse.

4. We have, therefore, two modes of the many (i.e., the multiple enunciation) and since both are constituted in two ways, there will be four modes: first, when one name imposed on many from which one thing is constituted is subjected or predicated as though the name stands for many; the second, when the many from one which one thing is constituted are subjected or predicated as distinct actualities; the third, when one name is imposed for a many from which nothing one is constituted; the fourth, when many which do not constitute one thing are subjected or predicated. Note that the enunciation, according to the members of the division by which it has been divided into one and many, can be varied in four ways, i.e., one is predicated of one, one of many, many of one, and many of many. Aristotle has not spoken of the last one, either because its plurality is clear enough or because, as Albert says, he only intends to treat of the enunciation which is one in some way.

Finally [fourthly], he concludes with this summary: Consequently, if someone affirms something one of these latter there will not be one affirmation according to the thing: vocally it will be one; significatively, it will not be one, but many. And conversely, if the many are affirmed of one subject, there will not be one affirmation. For example, “Man is white, walking, and musical” implies three affirmations, i.e., “Man is white” and “is walking” and “is musical,” as is clear from its contradiction, for a threefold negation is opposed to it, corresponding to the threefold affirmation.

5. Then when he says, In fact, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc., he proves a posteriori that the foresaid enunciations are many. First he states an argument to prove this by way of the consequent; then he proves the antecedent of the given consequent where he says, But we have spoken about these things in the Topics, etc.

Now if dialectical questioning is a request for an answer, either a proposition or one part of a contradiction, none of the foresaid enunciations, put in the form of a question, will have one answer. Therefore, the question is not one, but many. Aristotle first states the antecedent of the argument, if dialectical interrogation is a request for an answer, etc. To understand this it should be noted that an enunciation, a question, and an answer sound the same. For when we say, “The region of heaven is animated,” we call it an enunciation inasmuch as it enunciates a predicate of a subject, but when it is proposed to obtain an answer we call it an interrogation, and as applied to what was asked we call it a response. Therefore, to prove that there is not one response or one question or one enunciation will be the same thing.

It should also be noted that interrogation is twofold. One proposes either of the two parts of a contradiction to choose from. This is called dialectical interrogation because the dialectician knows the way to prove either part of a contradiction from probable positions. The other kind of interrogation seeks one determinate response. This is the demonstrative interrogation, for the demonstrator proceeds determinately toward a single alternative.

Note, finally, that it is possible to reply to a dialectical question in two ways. We may consent to the question, either affirmatively or negatively; for example, when someone asks, “Is the region of heaven animated,” we may respond, “It is,” or to the question “Is not God moved,” we may say, “No.” Such a response is called a proposition.

The second way of replying is by destroying; for example, when someone asks “Is the region of heaven animated?” and we respond, “No,” or to the question, “Is not God moved?” we respond, “He is moved.” Such a response is called the other part of a contradiction, because a negation is given to an affirmation and an affirmation to a negation.

Dialectical interrogation, then, according to the exposition just given, which is that of Boethius, is a request for the admission of a response which is a proposition, or which is one part of a contradiction.

6. He adds the proof of the consequent when he says, and a proposition is a part of one contradiction. In relation to this it should be noted that if a dialectical response could be many, it would not follow that a response to a multiple enunciation would not be dialectical. However, if the dialectical response can only be one enunciation then it follows that a response to a plural enunciation is not a dialectical response, for it is one [i.e., it inclines to one part of a contradiction at a time].

It should also be noted that if an enunciation is a part of many contradictions, it is thereby proven not to be one, for one contradicts only one. But if an enunciation is a part of only one contradiction, it is one by the same reasoning, i.e., because there is only one negation of one affirmation, and conversely.

Hence Aristotle proves the consequent from the fact that the proposition, i.e., the dialectical response, is a part of one contradiction, i.e., it is one affirmative or one negative enunciation. It follows from this, as has been said, that there is no dialectical response of a multiple enunciation, and consequently not one response.

It should not be overlooked that when he designates a proposition or one part of a contradiction as the response to a dialectical interrogation, it is only of the proposition that he adds that it is one, because the very wording shows the unity of the other. For when you hear one part of a contradiction, you immediately understand one affirmation or negation.

He puts the “therefore” with the antecedent, either implying that this is taken from another place and he will explain in particular afterward, or having changed the structure, he places the sign of the consequent, which should be between the antecedent and consequent before the antecedent, as when one says, “Therefore if Socrates runs, he is moved,” for “If Socrates runs, therefore he is moved.”

Then the consequent follows: there will not be one answer to this, etc.; and the inference of the principal conclusion, for there would not be a single question. For if the response cannot be one, the question will not be one.

7. He adds, even if there is a true answer, because someone might think that although one response cannot be given to a plural interrogation when the question concerns something that cannot be affirmed or denied of all of the many (for example, when someone asks, “Is a dog an animal?” no one response can be given, for we cannot truly say of every dog that it is an animal because of the star by that name; nor can we truly say of every dog that it is not an animal, because of the barking dog), nevertheless one response could be given when that which falls tinder the interrogation can be truly said of all. For example, when someone asks, “Is a dog a substance?” a single response can be given because it can truly he said of every dog that it is a substance, for to be a substance belongs to all dogs. Aristotle adds the phrase, even if there is a true answer, to remove such an erroneous judgment. For even if the response to the multiple enunciation is verified of all, it is nonetheless not one, since it does not signify one thing, nor is it a part of one contradiction. Rather, as is evident, this response has many contradictories.

8. Where he says, But we have spoken about these things in the Topics, etc., he proves the antecedent in two ways. First, he proves it on the basis of what was said in the Topics; secondly, by a sign.

The sign is given first where he says, Similarly it is clear that the question “What is it?” is not a dialectical one, etc. That is, given the doctrine in the Topics, it is clear (i.e., assuming the antecedent that the dialectical interrogation is a request for an affirmative or negative response) that the question “What is it?” is not a dialectical interrogation, e.g., when someone asks, “What is an animal?” he does not interrogate dialectically.

Secondly, he gives the proof of what was assumed, namely, that the question “What is it?” is not a dialectical question. He states that a dialectical interrogation must offer to the one responding the option of whichever part of the contradiction he wishes. The question “What is it?” does not offer such liberty, for in saying “What is an animal?” the one responding is forced to assign a definition, and a definition is not only determined to one but is also entirely devoid of contradiction, since it affirms neither being nor non-being. Therefore, the question “What is it?” is not a dialectical interrogation. Whence he says, For the dialectical interrogation must provide, i.e., from the proposed dialectical interrogation the one responding must be able to choose whichever part of the contradiction he wishes, which parts of the contradiction the interrogator must specify, i.e., he must propose the question in this way: “Is this animal man or not?” wherein the wording of the question clearly offers an option to the one answering. Therefore, you have as a sign that a dialectical question is seeking a response of a proposition or of one part of a contradiction, the setting apart of the question “What is it?” from dialectical questions.

LESSON 6

Some Predicates Said Divisively of a Subject Can Be Said Conjointly, Others Not

20b 31 Some things predicated separately are such that they unite to form one predicate; others, however, do not. What, then, is the difference? For it is true to say separately of man that he is an animal and that he is biped, and it is also true to say these as one. It is also true to say “man” and “white” separately of him and to say these as one. But if a man is a shoemaker and also good, it is not true to say that he is a good shoemaker.

20b 36 For if we hold that whenever each is truly said of a subject, both together must also be true, many absurdities will follow. For example, it is true to say of man that he is man and that he is white; therefore these two taken together can also be truly said of him; again, if it is true to say that he is white and that he is also the two combined predicates above, he will be white white man; and so to infinity. Or, again, “musical,” “white,” and “walking” may be truly said of man; and these combined many times. Furthermore, if Socrates is Socrates and a man, Socrates is a Socrates man; and if he is man and biped, he is a biped man.

It is clear, therefore, that if anyone says these combinations can always be made simply, many absurd things follow. Now we will state how this must be resolved.

21a 7 Those things that are predicated—taken in relation to that to which they are joined in predication—which are said accidentally, either of the same subject or one another, will not be one. For example, man is white and musical; but whiteness and being musical are not one, for both are accidental to the same thing. Even if it were true to say that whatever is white is musical, musical and white will not be one thing, for that which is musical is white accidentally; consequently, that which is white will not be musical.

21a 14 This is the reason “good” and “shoemaker” cannot be combined simply; but “biped” and “animal” can, for these are not accidental.

21a 16 Furthermore, predicates that are present in one another cannot be combined simply. This is the reason we cannot combine “white” many times, nor is “man” an “animal-man,” or a “biped-man,” for the notion man includes both biped and animal.

1. Having explained the diversity of the multiple enunciation Aristotle now proposes to determine the consequences of this. He treats this in relation to two questions which he solves. The second begins where he says, On the other hand, it is also true to say predicates of something singly, etc.

With respect to the other question, first he proposes it, then he shows that the question is a reasonable one where he says, For if we hold that whenever each is truly said of a subject, both together must also be true, many absurdities will follow, etc. Finally, he solves it where he says, Those things that are predicated—taken in relation to that to which they are joined in predication, etc.

The first question is this: Why is it that from some things predicated divisively of a subject an enunciation follows in which they are predicated of the same subject unitedly, and from others not? What is the reason for this diversity? For example, from “Socrates is an animal and he is biped” follows, “Therefore, Socrates is a biped animal”; and similarly, from “Socrates is a man and he is white” follows, “Therefore, Socrates is a white man.” But from “Socrates is good and he is a lute player,” the enunciation, “Therefore, he is a good lute player” does not follow. Hence in proposing the question Aristotle says, Some things, i.e., predicates, are so predicated when combined, that there is one predicate from what is predicated separately, i.e., from some things that are predicated separately, a united predication is made but from others this is riot so. What is the difference between these; whence does such a diversity arise?

He adds the examples which we have already cited and applied to the question. Of these examples, the first contains predicates from which something one per se is formed, i.e., “animal” and “biped,” a genus and difference; the second contains predicates from which something accidentally one is formed, namely, “white man”; the third contains predicates from which neither one per se nor one accidentally is formed, “lute player” and “good,” as will be explained.

2. When he says, For if we hold that whenever each is truly said of a subject, both together must also be true, etc., he shows that there truly is such a diversity among predicates and in so doing renders the question reasonable, for if there were not such a diversity among predicates the question would be pointless. He shows this by reasoning lead-ing to an absurdity, i.e., to something nugatory.

Now, something nugatory is effected in two ways, explicitly and implicitly. Therefore, he first makes a deduction to the explicitly nugatory, secondly to the implicitly, where he says, Furthermore, if Socrates is Socrates and a man, Socrates is a Socrates man, etc.

If, he says, there is no difference between predicates, and it is supposed of any of them indifferently that because both are said separately both may he said conjointly, many absurdities will follow. For of some man, say Socrates, it is true to say separately that he is a man and he is white; therefore both -together, i.e., we may also say conjointly, “Socrates is a white man.” Again, of the same Socrates we can say separately that he is a white man and that he is white, and both together, i.e., therefore conjointly, “Socrates is a white white man.” Here the nugatory expression is evident. Further, if of the same Socrates that you again say separately is a white white man it will be true and consistent to say that he is white, and according to this, if again repeating this separately, you will not deviate from a similar truth, and this will follow to infinity, then Socrates is a white white white man to infinity.

The same thing can be shown by another example, If someone says of Socrates that he is musical, white, and walking, since it is also possible to say separately that he is musical, and that he is white, and that he is walking, it will follow that Socrates is musical, white, walking, musical, white, walking. And since these can be enunciated many times separately, yet at the same time, the nugatory statement proceeds without end.

Then he makes a deduction to the implicitly nugatory. Since it can be truly said of Socrates separately that he is man and that he is biped, it will follow that Socrates is a biped man, if it is licit to infer conjointly. This is implicitly nugatory because the “biped,” which indirectly expresses the difference of man in act and in understanding, is included in the notion of man. Hence, if we posit the definition of man in place of “man” (which it is licit to do, as Aristotle teaches in II Topicorum [2: 110a 5]) the nugatory character of the enunciation will be evident, for when we say “Socrates is a biped man,” we are saying “Socrates is a biped biped animal.” From what has been said it is evident that many absurdities follow if anyone proposes that combinations, i.e., unions of predicates, be made simply, i.e., without any distinction.

Now, i.e., in what follows, we will state how this must be settled. This particular text is not uniformly worded in the manuscripts, but since no discrepancy of thought is involved one may read it as he wishes.

3. When he says, Those things that are predicated—taken in relation to that to which they are joined in predication, etc., he solves the proposed question. First he makes an answer with respect to the instances cited in proposing the question; secondly, he solves the problem as related to the instances posited in his proof where he says, Furthermore, predicates that are present in one another cannot be combined simply. In relation to the first answer, he states the true position first and then applies it to the instances where he says, This is the reason “good” and “shoemaker” cannot be combined simply, etc.

He settles the question with this distinction: there are two kinds of multiple predicates and subjects. Some are accidental, some per se. If they are accidental this occurs in two ways, either because both are said accidentally of a third thing or because they are predicated of each other accidentally. Now when the many predicated divisively are in any way accidental, a conjoined predicate does not follow from them; but when they are per se, a conjoined predicate does follow from them. In answering the question, therefore, Aristotle connects what he is saying with what has gone before: Of those things that are predicated and those of which they are predicated, i.e., subjects, whichever are said accidentally (by which he intimates the opposite member, i.e., per se), either of the same subject, i.e., they unite accidentally for the denomination of one third thing, or of one another, i.e., they denominate each other accidentally (and by this he posits the members of a two-fold division), these (i.e., these many accidentally) will not be one, i.e., do not produce a conjoined predication.

4. He explains both of these by examples. First, the many said accidentally of a third; for example, man is white and musical divisively. But they are not the same, i.e., it does not follow unitedly that “Man is musical white” for both are accidental to the same third thing.

Then he explains the second member by an example. In it the many are predicated only of one another. Even if it were true to say white is musical, i.e., even if these are predicated accidentally of each other by reason of the subject in which they are united, so that we may say “Man is white and he is musical, and white is musical,” it still does not follow that “musical white” is predicated as a unity when we say, “Therefore, man is musical white.” He gives as the cause of this that “white” is said of “musical” accidentally and conversely.

5. It must be noted here that although he has enumerated two accidental members, he explains both members by this single example so as to imply that the distinction is not one of different accidental predicates, but of the same predicates compared in different ways. “White” and “musical” compared to “man” fall under the first member, but compared with each other, under the second. Hence he has provided diversity of comparison by the plurality of the members, but identity of predicates by the unity of the example.

6. To make this division evident it must also be noted that accidentally can be taken in two ways.

It may be taken as it is distinguished from “posterioristic perseity.” This is not the way it is taken here, for “many predicates accidentally” would then mean that the “accidentally” determines a conjunction between predicates, and thus the rule would clearly be false, for the first predicates he gave as examples are predicated accidentally in this way, namely, “biped animal,” or “rational animal” (for a difference is not predicated of a genus in any mode of perseity, and yet Aristotle says in the text that these are not predicated accidentally, and has asserted that “He is an animal and biped, therefore he is a biped animal” is a good inference). Or it would mean that the “accidentally” determines a conjunction of the predicates with the subject, and thus also the rule would be false, for it is valid to say, “The wall is colored and it is visible,” yet visible colored is not per se in the wall.

Accidentally” taken in the second way is distinguished from what I call “on its own account,” i.e., not because of something else; “accidentally” then means “through another.” This is the way it is taken here, for whatever are of such a nature that they are joined because of something else, and not on their own account, do not admit of conjoined inference, because a conjoined inference subjects one to the other, and denotes the things united on their own account as potency and act.

Therefore, the sense of the division is this: of many predicates, some are accidental, some per se, i.e., some are united among themselves on their own account, some on account of another. Those that are per se united infer conjointly; those that are united on account of another do not infer conjointly in any way.

7. When he says, This is the reason “good” and “shoemaker” cannot be combined simply, etc., he applies the truth he has stated to the parts of the question. He applies it first to the second part, i.e., why this does not follow: “He is good and he is a shoemaker, therefore he is a good shoemaker.” Then he applies it to the other part of the question, i.e., why this follows: “He is an animal and he is biped, therefore he is a biped animal.” He adds the reason in the case of the latter: “biped” and “animal” are not predicates accidentally conjoined among themselves, nor in a third thing, but per se. This also explains the other member of the first division which has not yet been explicitly posited.

Notice that he maintains the same judgment is to be made about lute player and good, and musical and white. He has concluded that “white” and “musical” do not infer a conjoined predicate; hence neither do “lute player” and “good” infer “good lute player” simply, i.e., conjointly. There is a reason for saying this. For although there is a difference between musical and white, and goodness and the art of luteplaying, they are also similar. Let us consider their difference first. Goodness is of such a nature that it denominates both a third subject, namely, man, and the art of lute-playing. This is the reason the falsity is clearly discernible when we say “He is good and a lute player, therefore he is a good lute player.” Musical and whiteness, on the other band, are of such a nature that they denominate only a third subject, and not each other, and hence, the error is less obvious in “He is white and be is musical, therefore he is musical white.” Now it is this difference that makes Aristotle’s process of reasoning appear somewhat inconclusive. However, they are similar. For if identity of predicates is kept in every way that is required for the same things divided to be inferred conjointly, then, just as “musical” does not denominate “whiteness,” nor the contrary, so neither does “goodness,” of which we are speaking when we say “Man is good,” denominate the art of lute-playing,,nor conversely. For “good” is equivocal—by choice though—and therefore is said of the perfection of the lute player by means of one notion and of the perfection of man by means of another. For example, when we say, “Socrates is good” we understand moral goodness, which is the goodness of man absolutely (for the analogous term posited simply, stands for what is mainly so); but when good lute player is inferred, it is not the goodness of morality that is predicated but the goodness of art; whence identity of the terms is not saved. Therefore, Aristotle has adequately and subtly expressed the same judgment about both, i.e., “white” and “musical,” and “good” and “lute player,” for the reason here is the same as there.

8. There is another point that must be mentioned. Aristotle in proposing the question draws three consequences: “He is an animal and biped, therefore he is a biped animal” and “He is a man and white, therefore he is a white man” and “He is a lute player and good, therefore he is a good lute player.” Then he states that the first two consequences are good, the third not. His intention was to inquire into the cause of this diversity, but in solving the question he mentions only the first and third consequences, leaving the goodness or badness of the second consequence undiscussed. Why is this? I would say in answer to this that in these few words he has also implied the nature of the second consequence, for there is a more profound meaning to the statement in the text that whiteness and being musical is not one. It is a meaning that not only indicates what has already been explained but also its cause, and from this the nature of the second consequence is apparent. For the reason “white” and “musical” do not infer a conjoined predication is that in conjoined predication one part must be subjected to the other as potency to act such that in some way one thing is formed from them and one is denominated from the other (for the force of the conjoined predication requires this, as we have said above concerning the parts of the definition). “White” and “musical,” however, do not in themselves form one thing per se, as is evident, nor do they form one thing accidentally. For while it is true that as united in a subject they are one in subject accidentally, nevertheless things that are united in one third subject do not form one thing accidentally among themselves: first, because neither

informs the other (which is required for accidental unity of things among themselves, although not in a third thing); secondly, because, considered apart from the unity of a subject, which is outside of their notions, there is no cause of unity between them. Therefore, when Aristotle says that whiteness and being musical are not one, i.e., among themselves, in some measure he expresses the reason why a predicate is not conjointly inferred from them. And since the same discipline extends to opposites, the goodness of the second consequence is implied by these words. That is, man and white are related as potency and act (and so, on its own account whiteness informs, denominates, and forms one thing with ‘man’); therefore from these taken divisively a conjoined predication can be inferred, i.e., “He is man and white, therefore be is a white man”; just as, in the opposite case, it was said that “musical” and “white” do not infer a conjoined predicate because neither informs the other.

9. There is no opposition between the position just stated and the fact that white forms an accidental unity with man. For we did not say that accidental unity of certain things impedes inferring a conjunction from divided things,” but that accidental unity of certain things only by reason of a third thing is the one that impedes. Things that are one accidentally only by reason of a third thing have no unity among them selves; and for this reason a conjunction, which implies unity, cannot be inferred, as we have said. But things that are one accidentally on their own account, i.e., among themselves, as for example, “white man,” when taken conjointly, have the necessary unity because they have unity among themselves. Notice that I have added “only.” The reason is that if any two C are one accidentally, namely, by reason of a third subject, and they not only have unity from this but also on their own account (because one informs the other), then from these taken divisively a conjoined inference can be made. For example, we can infer, “It is a quantity and it is colored, therefore it is a colored quantity,” because color informs quantity.

10. You can hold as true that this second consequence is good even though Aristotle has not explicitly confirmed it by returning to it, both from the fact that in proposing the question he has claimed it as good and also because there is no instance opposed to it. Moreover, Aristotle has implied that it is only such unity that impedes the conjoined inference where he says: which are said accidentally, either of the same subject or of one

another. By accidentally of the same subject, he posits their unity to be only from union in a third thing (for only these are predicated accidentally of the same subject, as was said). When he adds, or of one another—positing mutual accidentality—no unity at all is left between them. Therefore, both kinds of accidental predicates, namely, in a third thing or in one another, that impede a conjoined inference have unity only in a third thing.

11. Then when he says, Furthermore, predicates that are present in one another cannot be combined simply, etc., he gives the solution for the instances (both the explicitly nugatory and the implicitly nugatory) cited in the proof. It is not only not licit, he says, to infer a union from divided predicates when these are accidental, but it is not licit when the predicates are present in one another. That is, it is not licit to infer a conjoined predicate from divided predicates when the predicates include one another in such a way that one is included in the formal signification of another intrinsically, or explicitly, as “white” in white,” or implicitly, as “animal” and “biped” in “man.” Therefore, white” said repeatedly and divisively does not infer a conjoined predication, nor does “man” divisively enunciated from “animal” or “biped” infer “biped” or “animal” conjoined with man, such that we could say, “Therefore, Socrates is a biped-man” or “animal-man.” For animal and biped are included in the notion of man in act and in understanding, although implicitly.

The solution of the question, then, is this: the inferring of a conjunction from divided predicates is impeded when there is unity of the many accidentally only in a third thing and when there is a nugatory result. Consequently, where neither of these is found it will be licit to infer a conjunction from divided predicates. It is to be understood that this applies when the divided predicates are at once true of the same subject.

LESSON 7

Whether from an Enunciation Having Many Conjoined Predicates It Is Licit to Infer an Enunciation Contains the Same Predicates Divisively

21a 18 On the other hand, it is also true to say predicates of something singly; for example, it is true to say that some man is a man, or that some white man is white. However, this is not always the case.

21a 21 When something opposed is present in the adjunct, from which a contradiction follows, it will not be true to predicate them singly, but false e.g., to say that a dead man is a man. When something opposed is not present in the adjunct, however, it is true to predicate them singly.

21a 24 Or, rather, when something opposed is present in it, it is never true; but when something opposed is not present, it is not always true. For example, Homer is something, say, a poet. Is it therefore true to say also that Homer is, or not?

21a26 The “is” here is predicated accidentally of Homer, for the “is” is predicated of him with regard to the fact that he is a poet, not in itself.

21a 29 Therefore, in whatever predications no contrariety is present when definitions are put in place of the names, and wherein predicates are predicated per se and not accidentally, it will also be true to predicate each one singly.

21a 32 In the case of non-being, however, it is not true to say that because it is a matter of opinion it is something; for the opinion of it is not that it is, but that it is not.

1. Aristotle now takes up the second question in relation to multiple enunciations. He first presents it, and then solves it where he says, When something opposed is present in the adjunct, from which a contradiction follows, it will not be true to predicate them singly, but false, etc. Finally, he excludes an error where he says, In the case of non-being, however, it is not true to say that because it is a matter of opinion, it is something, etc.

The second question is this: Is it licit to infer from an enunciation having a conjoined predication, enunciations dividing that conjunction? This question is the contrary of the first question. The first asked whether a conjoined predicate could be inferred from divided predicates; the present one asks whether divided predicates follow from conjoined predicates.

When he presents the question he says, on the other hand, it is also true to say predicates of something singly, i.e., what was previously said conjointly may be said divisively; for example, that some white man is a man, or that some white man is white. That is, from "Socrates is a white man," follows divisively, "Therefore Socrates is a man," "There fore Socrates is white." However, this is not always the case, i.e., some times it is not possible to infer divisively from conjoined predicates, for this does not follow: "Socrates is a good lute player, therefore he is good." Hence, sometimes it is licit, sometimes not. Note that in inferring each part divisively he takes as an ex ample "white man." This is significant, for by it he means to imply that his intention is to investigate when each part can be inferred divisively from a conjoined predicate, and not when only one of the two can be inferred.

2. When he says, When something opposed is present in the adjunct, etc., he solves the question, first by responding to the negative part of the question, i.e., when it is not licit; secondly, to the affirmative part, i.e., when it is licit, where he says, Therefore, in whatever predications no contrariety is present when definitions are put in place of the names, and wherein predicates are predicated per se and not accidentally, etc.

It should be noted, in relation to the negative part of the question, that a conjoined predicate may be formed in two ways: from opposites and from non-opposites. Therefore, he shows first that the parts in a conjoined predicate of opposites can never be inferred divisively. Secondly, he shows that this is not licit universally in a conjoined predicate of non-opposites, where he says, Or, rather, when something opposed is present in it, it is never true; but when something opposed is not present, it is not always true.

Aristotle says, then, that when something that is an opposite is contained in the adjacent term, which results in a contradiction between the terms themselves, it is not true, namely, to infer divisively, but false. For example, when we say, “Caesar is a dead man,” it does not follow, “Therefore he is a man,” because the contradiction between 11 man” and “dead” which results from adding the “dead” to “man” is opposed to man, for if he is a man he is not dead, because he is not an inanimate body; and if he is dead he is not a man, because as dead he is an inanimate body.

When something opposed is not present, i.e., there is no such opposition, it is true, i.e., it is true to infer divisively. The reason a divided inference does not follow when there is opposition in the added term is that in a conjoined enunciation the other term is destroyed by the opposition of the added term. But that which has been destroyed is not inferred apart from the destruction, which is what the divided inference would signify.

3. Two questions arise at this point. The first concerns something assumed here: how can it ever be true to make such a statement as “Caesar is a dead man,” since an enunciation cannot be true in which two contradictories are predicated at the same time of something (for this is a first principle). But “man” and “dead,” as is said in the text, include contradictory opposition, for in man is included life, and in dead, non-life.

The second question concerns the consequent that Aristotle rejects, which appears to be good. The enunciation given as an example predicates terms that are opposed contradictorily. But from an enunciation predicating two contradictory terms, either both can be inferred (because it is equivalent to a copulative enunciation), or neither (because it destroys itself); therefore both parts seem to follow, since it is false that neither follows.

4. These two questions can be answered simultaneously. It is one thing to speak of two terms in themselves, and another to speak of them as one stands under the determination of another. Taken in the first way, “man” and “dead” have a contradiction between them and it is impossible that they be found in the same thing at the same time. In the second way, however, “man” and “dead” are not opposed, since “man,” changed by the destructive element introduced by “dead,” no longer stands for what it signifies as such, but as determined by the term added, by which what is signified is removed.

Aristotle, in order to imply both, says two things: that they have the opposition upon which contradiction follows if you regard what they signify in themselves; and, that one true enunciation is formed from them as in “Socrates is a dead man,” if you regard their conjunction as destructive of one of them.

Accordingly, the answer to the two questions is evident. In a case such as this two contradictories are not enunciated of the same thing at the same time, but one term as it stands under dissolution or transmutation from the other, to which by itself it would be contradictory.

5. There is also a question about something else that Aristotle says, namely, something opposed is present... from which a contradiction follows. The phrase from which a contradiction follows seems to be superfluous, for contradiction follows upon all opposites, as is evident in discoursing about singulars; for a father is not a son, and white is not black, and one seeing is not blind, etc.

Opposites, however, can be taken in two ways: formally, i.e., according to what they signify, and denominatively, or subjectively. For example, father and son can be taken for paternity and filiation, or they can be taken for the one who is denominated a father or a son. But, again, since every distinction is made by some opposition, as is said in X Metaphysicae [3: 1054a 20], it could be supposed that opposites are wholly distinct.

It must be pointed out, therefore, that although contradiction follows between all opposites or distinct things formally taken, nevertheless, contradiction does not follow upon all opposites denominatively taken. Father and son formally taken infer a mutual negation of one another, for paternity is not filiation and filiation is not paternity, but in respect to what is denominated they do not necessarily infer a contradiction. It does not follow, for example, that “Socrates is a father; therefore he is not a son,” nor conversely. Aristotle, therefore, in order to establish that not all combined opposites prevent a divided inference (since those having a contradiction applying only formally do not prevent a divided inference, but those having a contradiction both formally and according to the thing denominated do prevent a divided inference) adds, from which a contradiction follows, namely, in the third thing denominated. And appropriately enough he uses the word follows, for the contradiction in “ the third thing denominated is in a certain way outside of the opposites themselves.

6. When he says, Or, rather, when something opposed is present in it, it is never true, etc., he explains that the parts cannot universally be inferred divisively in the case of a conjoined predicate in which there is a non-opposite as the third thing denominated. He proposes this—Or, rather, when something opposed is contained in it, i.e., opposition between the terms conjoined—as if amending what he has just said, namely, it is always false, i.e., to infer divisively. What he is saying, then, is this: I have said that when there is inherent opposition it is not true but false to infer divisively; but when there is not such opposition it is true to infer divisively; or, even better, when there is opposition it is always false but when there is not such opposition it is not always true. That is, he modifies what he first said by the addition of "always" and "not always."

Then he adds an example to show that division does not always follow from non-opposites: For example, Homer is something, say, a poet. Is it therefore true to say also that Homer "is," or not? From the conjoined predicate, is a poet, enunciated of Homer, one part, Therefore Homer is, does not follow; yet it is evident that these two conjoined parts, "is" and "poet," do not have the opposition upon which contradiction follows. Therefore, in the case of conjoined non-opposites a divided inference does not always hold.

7. When he says, The "is" here is predicated accidentally of Homer, he proves what he has said. One part of this composite, namely, "is," is predicated of Homer in the antecedent conjunction accidentally, i.e., by reason of another, namely, with regard to the "poet" which is predicated of Homer; it is not predicated as such of Homer. Nevertheless, this is what is inferred when one concludes "Therefore Homer is."

To validate his negative conclusion, namely, that it is not always true to infer divisively from conjoined non-opposites, it was sufficient to give one instance of the opposite of the universal affirmative. To do this Aristotle introduces that genus of enunciation in which one part of the conjunction is something pertaining to an act of the mind (for we are speaking only of Homer living in his poems in the minds of men). In such enunciations the parts conjoined are not opposed in the third thing denominated; nevertheless it is not licit to infer each part divisively, for the fallacy of going from the relative to the absolute will be committed. For example, it is not valid to say, “Caesar is praiseworthy, therefore he is,” which is a parallel case, i.e., of an effect whose existence requires maintenance.

Aristotle will explain in the following sections of the text how the reasoning in the above text is to be understood.

8. When he says, Therefore, in whatever predications no contrariety is present when definitions are put in place of the names, etc., he replies to the affirmative part of the question, i.e., when it is licit to infer divisively from conjoined predicates. He maintains that two conditions—opposed to what has been said earlier in this portion of the text—must combine in one enunciation in order that such a consequence be effected: there must be no opposition between the parts conjoined, and they must be predicated per se.

He says, then, inferring from what has been said: Therefore, in whatever predicaments, i.e., predicates joined in a certain order, no contrariety, in virtue of which contradiction is posited in the third thing denominated (for contraries mutually remove each other from the same thing), is present, or universally, no opposition is present, i.e., upon which a contradiction follows in the third thing denominated, when definitions are taken in place of the names.... He says this because it may be the case that the opposition is not apparent from the names alone, as in “dead man,” and again it may be, as in “living dead,” but whether apparent or not it will be evident that we are putting together opposites if we posit the definitions of the names in place of the names. For example, in the case of “dead man,” if we replace “man” and “dead,” with their definitions, the contradiction will be evident, for what we are saying is “rational animate body, irrational inanimate body.”

In whatever conjoined predicates, then, there is no opposition, and wherein predicates are predicated per se and not accidentally, in these it will also be true to predicate them singly, i.e., say divisively what had been enunciated conjointly.

9. In order to make this second condition clear, it should be noted that “per se” can be taken in two ways: positively, and thus it refers to “perseity” of the first, of the second, and of the fourth mode universally; or negatively, and thus it means the same as not through something else.

It should also be noted that when Aristotle says of a conjoined predicate that it is predicated “per se,” the “per se” can be referred to three things: to the parts of the conjunction among themselves, to the whole conjunction with respect to the subject, and to the parts of the conjoined predicate with respect to the subject. Now if “per se” is taken positively, although it will not be false, nevertheless in reference to any of these three the meaning will be found to be foreign to the mind of Aristotle. For, although these are valid: “He is a risible man, therefore he is man and he is risible” and “He is a rational animal, therefore he is animal and he is rational,” nevertheless the opposite kind of predication infers consequences in a similar way. For example, there is no 11 perseity” in “He is a white musician, therefore he is white and he is a musician”; rather, there is an accidental conjunction, not only between the parts among themselves and between the whole and the subject, but even between the parts and the subject. It is evident, therefore, that Aristotle is not taking “per se” positively, for an addition that does not differentiate this kind of predication from the opposed kind of predication would be useless. Why add “per se and not accidentally,” if both those that are per se in the way explained and those that are conjoined accidentally infer divisively?

If “per se” is taken negatively, i.e., as not through another, and is referred to the parts of the conjoined predicate among themselves, the rule is found to be false. It is not licit, for example, to say, “He is a good lute player, therefore he is good and a lute player”; yet the art of lute-playing and its goodness are conjoined without anything as a medium. And the case is the same if it is referred to the whole conjoined predicate with respect to the subject, as is clear in the same example, for the whole, “good lute player,” does not belong to man on account of another, and yet it does not infer the division, as has already been said. Therefore, “per se” is referred to the parts of the conjoined predicate with respect to the subject and the meaning is: when the predicates are conjointly predicated per se, i.e., not through another, i.e., each part is predicated of the subject, not on account of another but on account of itself and the subject, then a divided predication is inferred from the conjoined predication.

10. This is the way in which Averroes and Boethius explain this and, explained in this way, a true rule is found, as can easily be manifested inductively; moreover, the reasoning is compelling. For, if the parts of some conjoined predicate so inhere in the subject that neither is in it on account of another, their separation produces nothing that could impede the truth of the divided predicates. And this meaning is consonant with the words of

Aristotle, for by this he also distinguishes between enunciations in which the conjoined predicate infers a divided predicate, and those in which this consequence is not inherent. For besides the predicates having opposition in the additional determining element, there are those with a conjoined predicate wherein one part is a determination of the other in such a way that only through it does it regard the subject, as is evident in Aristotle's example, "Homer is a poet." The "is" does not regard Homer by reason of Homer himself, but precisely by reason of the poetry he left. Hence it is not licit to infer, "Therefore Homer is." The same is true with respect to negative enunciations of this type, for it is not licit to infer from "Socrates is not a wall," "Therefore Socrates is not." And the reason is the same: "to be" is not denied of Socrates, but of "wallness" in Socrates.

11. Accordingly, it is evident how the reasoning in the text above is to be understood. "Per se" is taken negatively in the way explained here, and "accidentally" as "on account of another." The "accidentally" is used with the same signification in solving this and the preceding question. In both he understands "accidentally" to mean conjoined on account of another, but it is referred to diverse things. In the preceding question "accidentally" determines the way in which two predicates are conjoined among themselves; in the latter question it determines the way in which the part of the conjoined predicate is ordered to the subject. Hence, in the former, "white" and "musician" are numbered among the things that are accidental, but in the latter they are not.

12. This exposition seems a bit dubious, however. For if it is not licit to infer divisively from a conjoined predicate because one part of the conjoined predicate does not regard the subject on account of itself but on account of another part (as Aristotle says of the enunciation, "Homer is a poet"), it will follow that there will never be a good consequence from the third determinant to the second, since in every enunciation with a third determinant, "is" regards the subject on account of the predicate and not on account of itself.

13. To make this difficulty clear, we must first note a distinction. It is one thing to treat of the rule when inferring a second determinant from a third determinant, and when not; it is quite another thing when a divided inference is made from a conjoined predicate, and when not. The former is an additional point; the latter is the question we have been inquiring about.

The former is compatible with variety of the terms, the latter not. For if one of the terms which is one part of a conjoined predicate will be varied according to signification, or supposition when taken separately, it is not inferred divisively from the conjoined predicate, but the other is.

Secondly, note this proposition: when a second determinant is inferred from a third, identity of the terms is not kept. This is evident with respect to the term “is.” Indeed, St. Thomas said above that “is” as the second determinant implies one thing and “is” as the third determinant another. The former implies the act of being simply, the latter implies the relationship of inherence, or identity of the predicate with the subject. Therefore, when the second determinant is inferred from the third, one term is varied and consequently an inference is not made of the divided from the conjoined.

Accordingly, the response to the objection is clear, for although the second determinant can sometimes be inferred from the third, it is never licit for the second to be inferred from the third as divided from conjoined, because you cannot infer divisively when one part is destroyed by that very division. Therefore, let the consequence of the objection be denied and for proof let it be said that the conclusion that such an inference is illicit under the limits of inferences which induce division from a conjoined predicate-is good, for this is what Aristotle is speaking of here.

14. But the objection is raised against this that in the case of “Socrates is white, therefore be is,” a divided inference can be made as from a conjoined predicate, in virtue of the argument that we can go from what is in the mode of part to its whole as long as the terms remain the same.

The answer to this is as follows. It is true that white man is a part in the mode of man (because white diminishes nothing of the notion of man but posits man simply); is white, however, is not a part in the mode of is, because a part in the mode of its whole is a universal, the condition not diminishing the positing of it simply. But it is evident that white diminishes the notion of is, and does not posit it simply, for it contracts it to relative being. Whence when something becomes white, philosophers do not say that it is generated, but generated relatively.

15. In accordance with this, the objection is raised that in saying “It is an animal, therefore it is,” a divided inference is made in virtue of the same argument; for animal does not diminish the notion of is itself.

The answer to this is that if the is asserts the truth of a proposition, the fallacy is committed of going from the relative to the absolute; if the is asserts the act of being, the inference is good, but it is of the second determinant, not of the third.

16. There is another doubt, this time about the principle in the exposition; for this follows, “It is a colored quantity, therefore it is a quantity and it is colored”; but “colored” regards the subject through the medium of quantity; therefore the exposition given above does not seem to be correct.

The answer to this and to similar objections is that “colored” is not so present in a subject by means of quantity that it is its determination, and by reason of such a determination denominates the subject; as goodness,” for instance, determines the art of lute-playing when we say “He is a good lute player.” Rather, the subject itself is first denominated “colored” and quantity is called “colored” secondarily, although color is received through the medium of quantity. Hence, we made a point of saying earlier that one part of a conjoined predicate is predicated accidentally when it denominates the subject precisely because it denominates the other part.93 This is not the case here nor in similar instances.

17. When he says, In the case of non-being, however, it is not true to say that it is something, etc., he excludes the error of those who were satisfied to conclude that what is not, is. This is the syllogism they use: “That which is, is ‘opinionable’; that which is not, is ‘opinionable’; therefore what is not, is.” Aristotle destroys this process of reasoning by destroying the first proposition, which predicates divisively a part of what is conjoined in the subject, as if it said “It is ‘opinionable,’ therefore it is.” Hence, assuming the subject of their conclusion, he says, In the case of that which is not, however; and he adds their middle term, because it is a matter of opinion; then he adds the major extreme, it is not true to say that it is something. He then assigns the cause: it is not because it is but rather because it is not, that there is such opinion.

LESSON 8

Modal Propositions and Their Opposition

21a 34 Having determined these things, we must consider in what way negations and affirmations of the possible and not possible, contingent and not contingent, and of the impossible and necessary are related to each other—a question of considerable difficulty.

21a 38 Let us grant that of mutually related enunciations, contradictories are those opposed to each other by being related in a certain way according to “to be” and “not to be”; for example, the negation of “Man is” is “Man is not” and not, “Non-man is,” and of “Man is white,” “Man is not white,” and not, “Man is non-white.” For if this is not so, it will be true to say that “wood” is nonwhite man since of anything either the affirmation or the negation is true. Now in those in which “to be” is not the determining word added, that which is said in place of “to be” will effect the same thing; for example, the negation of “Man walks” will be “Man does not walk” and not, “Non-man walks.” The reason, of course, is that there is no difference between “Man walks” and “Man is walking.” And if this is always the case, then the negation of “possible to be” will be “possible not to be” and not, “not possible to be.”

21b 12 However, it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be; for everything that has the possibility to be cut or to walk has the possibility not to be cut and not to walk; and the reason is that everything that is possible in this way is not always in act, and so the negation will also be inherent in it; for that which could walk could also not walk, and that which could be seen, not be seen. But it is impossible that opposed assertions in respect to the same thing be true. Therefore, the negation of “possible to be” is not, “possible not to be.”

21b 19 For it follows from what we have said, either that the same thing is asserted and denied at once of the same subject or that assertions and denials of modals are not made by the addition of “to be” or “not to be” respectively. If the former alternative is impossible, the latter must obtain.

1. Now that he has treated enunciations in which something added to the parts leaves the unity intact on the one hand, and varies it on the other, Aristotle begins to explain what happens to the enunciation when something is added, not to its parts, but to its composition. First, he explains their opposition; secondly, he treats of the consequences of their opposition where he says, Logical sequences result from modals ordered thus, etc. With respect to the first point, he proposes the question he intends to consider and then begins his consideration where he says, Let us grant that of mutually related enunciations, contradictories are those opposed to each other, etc.

He proposes that we must now investigate the way in which affirmations and negations of the possible and not possible are related. He gives the reason when he adds, for the question has many special difficulties.

However, before we proceed with the consideration of enunciations that are called modal, we must first see that there are such things as modal enunciations, and which and how many modes render propositions modal; we must also know what their subject is and their predicate, what the modal enunciation itself is, what the order is between modal enunciations and the enunciations already treated, and finally, why a special treatment of them is necessary.

2. We can speak about things in two ways: in one, composing one thing with another; in the other, declaring the kind of composition that exists between the two things. To signify these two ways of speaking about things we form two kinds of enunciations. One kind enunciates that something belongs or does not belong to something. These are called absolute [de inesse] enunciations; these we have already discussed. The other enunciates the mode of composition of the predicate with the subject. These are called modal, from their principal part, the mode. For when we say, “That Socrates run is possible,” it is not the running of Socrates that is enunciated but the kind of composition there is between running and Socrates-in this case, possible. I have said “mode of composition” expressly, for there are two kinds of mode posited in the enunciation. One modifies the verb, either with

respect to what it signifies, as in “Socrates runs swiftly,” or with respect to the time signified along with the verb, as in “Socrates runs today.” The other kind modifies the very composition of the predicate with the subject, as in the example, “That Socrates run is possible.” The former determines how or when running is in Socrates; the latter determines the kind of conjunction there is between running and Socrates. The former, which affects the actuality of the verb, does not make a modal enunciation. Only the modes that affect the composition make a modal enunciation, the reason being that the composition, as the form of the whole, contains the whole enunciation.

3. This kind of mode, properly speaking, is fourfold: possible, impossible, necessary, and contingent. True and false are not included because, strictly speaking, they do not seem to modify the composition even though they fall upon the composition itself, as is evident in “That Socrates runs is true,” and “That man is four-footed is false.” For something is said to be modified in the proper sense of the term when it is caused to be in a certain way, not when it comes to be according to its substance. Now, when a composition is said to be true it is not proposed that it is in a certain way, but that it is. To say, “That Socrates runs is true,” for example, is to say that the composition of running with Socrates is. The case is similar when it is false, for what is said is that it is not; for example, to say, “That Socrates runs is false” is to say that the composition of running with Socrates is not. On the other hand, when the composition is said to be possible or contingent, we are not saying that it is but that it is in a certain way. For example, when we say, “That Socrates run is possible,” we do not make the composition of running with Socrates substantial, but we qualify it, asserting that it is possible.

Consequently, Aristotle in proposing the modes, does not mention the true and false at all, although later on he infers the true and the not true, and assigns the reason for it where he does this.

4. Since the modal enunciation contains two compositions, one between the parts of what is said, the other between what is said and the mode, it must be understood that it is the former composition that is modified, i.e., the composition between the parts of what is said, not the composition between what is said and the mode. This can be seen in an example. In the modal enunciation, “That Socrates be white is possible,” there are two

parts: one, “That Socrates be white,” the other, “is possible.” The first is called the dictum because it is that which is asserted by the indicative, namely, “Socrates is white”; for in saying “Socrates is white” we are simply saying, “That Socrates be white.” The second part is called the mode because it is the addition of a restriction.

The first part of the modal enunciation consists of a certain composition of Socrates and white; the second part, opposed to the first, 4 indicates a composition from the composition of dictum and mode. Again, the first part, although it has all the properties of an enunciation—subject, predicate, copula, and composition—is, in its entirety, the subject of the modal enunciation; the second part, the mode, is the predicate. In a modal enunciation, therefore, the composition of the dictum is subjected and modified; for when we say, “That Socrates be white is possible,” it does not signify the kind of conjunction of possibility there is with the dictum “That Socrates be white,” but it implies the kind of composition there is of the parts of the dictum among themselves, i.e., of white with Socrates, namely, that it is a possible composition. The modal enunciation, therefore, does not say that something is present in or not present in a subject, but rather, it enunciates a mode of the dictum. Nor properly speaking does it compose according to what is signified, since it is not a composition of the composition; rather, it adds a mode to the composition of the things. Hence the modal enunciation is simply an enunciation in which the dictum is modified.

5. Because the modal enunciation has everything duplicated, it must not on that account be thought to be many. It enunciates one mode of only one composition, although there are many parts of that composition. The many concurring for the composition of the dictum are like the many that concur to make one subject, of which it was said above that it does not impede the unity of the enunciation.” The enunciation, “The house is white,” is also a case in point, for it is not multiple, although a house is built of many parts.

6. Modal enunciations are rightly treated after the absolute enunciation, for parts are naturally prior to the whole, and knowledge of the whole depends on knowledge of the parts. Moreover, a special discussion of them was necessary because the modal enunciation has its own peculiar difficulties.

Aristotle indicates in his text many of the things we have taken up here: the order of modal enunciations, when he says, Having determined these things, etc.; what and how many modes there are when he expresses and lists them, the variation of the same mode by affirmation and negation when he says, the possible and not possible, contingent and not contingent; the necessity of treating them, when he adds, for they have many difficulties of their own.

7. Then he investigates the opposition of modal enunciations, where he says, Let us grant that of those things that are combined, contradictories are those opposed to each other by being related in a certain way according to “to be” and “not to be,” etc. First, he presents the question and in so doing gives arguments for the parts; secondly, he determines the truth, where he says, For it follows from what we have said, either that the same thing is asserted and denied at once of the same subject, etc.

The question with respect to the opposition of modals is this: Is a contradiction made in modal enunciations by a negation added to the verb of the dictum, which expresses what is; or is it not, but rather by a negation added to the mode which qualifies? Aristotle first argues for the affirmative part, that the negation must be added to the verb; then he argues for the negative part, that the negation must not be added to the verb, where he says, However it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be, etc.

8. His first argument is this. If of combined things, contradictions are those related according to “to be” and “not to be” (as is clear inductively in substantive enunciations with a second determinant, in those with a third determinant, and in adjectival enunciations) and all contradictions must be obtained in this way, the contradictory of “possible to be” will be “possible not to be,” and not, “not possible to be.” Consequently, the negation must be added to the verb to get opposition in modal enunciations.

The consequence is clear, for when we say “possible to be” and possible not to be” the negation falls on “to be.” Accordingly, he says, Let us grant that of those things that are combined, i.e., of complex things, contradictions are those opposed to each other which are disposed according to “to be” and “not to be,” i.e., in one of which “to be” is affirmed and in the other denied.

9. He goes on to give an induction, beginning with an enunciation having a second determinant. The negation of "Man is," is, "Man is not," in which the verb is negated. The negation of "Man is," is not, "Non-man is," for this is not the negative but the affirmative of the infinite subject, which is true at the same time as the first enunciation, "Man is."

10. He continues the induction with substantive enunciations having a third determinant. The negation of the enunciation "Man is white" is "Man is not white," in which the verb is negated. The negation is not "Man is nonwhite," for this is not the negative, but the affirmative of the infinite predicate.

Now it might be thought that the affirmatives of the finite and infinite predicates are contradictories since they cannot be verified of the same thing because of their opposed predicates. To obviate this error, Aristotle interposes an argument proving that these two are not contradictories. The nature of contradictories, he reasons, is such that either the assertion, i.e., the affirmation, or the negation, is verified of anything, for between contradictories no middle is possible. Now the two enunciations, that something "is white man" and "is nonwhite man" are per se contradictories. Therefore, they are of such a nature that one of them is verified of anything. For example, it is false to say "is white man" of wood; hence "is nonwhite man" will be true to say of it, namely of wood, i.e., "Wood is nonwhite man." This is manifestly false, for wood is neither white man nor nonwhite man. Consequently, there is not a contradiction in the case in which each is at once false of the same subject. Therefore, contradiction is effected when the negation is added to the verb.

11. He continues his induction with enunciations having an adjective verb: Now if the case is as we have stated it, i.e., contradiction is taken as said above, then in enunciations in which "to be" is not the determining word added (explicitly), that which is said in place of "to be" will effect the same thing with respect to the opposition obtained (i.e., the adjective verb that occupies the place of "to be," inasmuch as the truth of "to be" is included in it, effects the function of the copula). For example, the negation of the enunciation "Man walks" is not, "Non-man walks" (for this is the affirmative of the infinite subject) but "Man is not walking." In this case, as in that of the substantive verb, the negation must be added to the verb, for

there is no difference between using the adjective verb, as in “Man walks,” and using the substantive verb, as in “Man is walking.”

12. Then he posits the second part of the induction: And if this is always the case, i.e., that contradiction must be gotten by adding the negation to “to be,” we must conclude that the negation of the enunciation that asserts “Possible to be” is “possible not to be,” and not, “not possible to be.” The consequent of the conclusion is evident, for in “possible not to be” the negation is added to the verb, in “not possible to be,” it is not.

At the beginning of this argument, Aristotle said, Of those things that are combined, i.e., complex things, the contradictions are effected according to “to be” and “not to be.” He said this in reference to the difference between complex and incomplex things, for opposition in the latter is not made by the negation expressing “not to be,” but by adding the negative to the incomplex thing itself, as in “man” and “non-man,” “reads” and “non-reads.”

13. When he says, However, it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be, etc., he argues for the negative part of the question, namely, to get a contradiction in modals the negation should not be added to the verb. His reasoning is the following: It is impossible for two contradictories to be true at once of the same subject; but “possible to be” and “possible not to be” are verified at once of the same thing; therefore, these are not contradictories. Consequently, contradiction of the modals is not obtained by negation of the verb.

In this reasoning, the minor is posited first, with its proof; secondly, the major; finally, the conclusion. The minor is: However, it seems that the same thing is possible to be and possible not to be. For instance, everything that has the possibility of being divided also has the possibility of not being divided, and that which has the possibility of walking also has the possibility of not walking. The proof of this minor is that everything that is possible in this way (as are possible to walk and to be divided) is not always in act; for he who is able to walk is not always actually walking, nor is that which can be divided always divided. And so the negation of the possible will also be inherent in it, i.e., therefore not only is the affirmation possible but also the negation.

Notice that since the possible is manifold, as will be said further on, Aristotle explicitly adds “in this way” when he assumes here that that which is possible is not always in act. For it is not true to say of every possible that it is not always in act, but only of some, namely, those that are possible in the way in which to walk and to be divided are possible.

Note also that “possible in this way” has two conditions: that it is able to be in act, and that it is not always in act. It follows necessarily, then, that it is true to say of it simultaneously that it is both possible to be and possible not to be. From the fact that it can be in act it follows that it is possible to be; from the fact that it is not always in act it follows that it is possible not to be, for that which not always is, is able not to be. Aristotle, then, rightly infers from these two: and so the negation of the possible will also be inherent in it; and not just the affirmation, for that which could walk could also not walk and that which could be seen not be seen.

The major is: But it is impossible that contradictions in respect to the same thing be true. The final conclusion inferred is: Therefore, the negation of “possible to be” is not, “possible not to be” because they are true at once of the same thing.

In relation to this part of the text, be careful not to suppose that possible as it is a mode, is always to be taken for possible to either of two alternatives, for this will be shown to be false later on. If you consider the matter carefully you will see that it was enough for his intention to give as an instance one modal contained under the modals of the possible in order to show that contradiction in modals is not obtained by negation of the verb.

14. Aristotle establishes the truth with respect to this difficulty where he says, For it follows from what we have said, either that the same thing is asserted and denied at once of the same subject, etc. Since he is investigating two things, i.e., whether contradiction of modals is made by the negation of the verb or not; and, whether it is not rather by negation of the mode, he first determines the truth in relation to the first question, namely, that contradiction of modals is not made by negation of the verb; then he determines the truth in relation to the second, namely, that contradiction of modals is made by negation of the mode, where he says, Therefore, the negation of “possible to be” is “not possible to be,” etc.

Hence he says that because of the foresaid reasoning one of these two follows: first, that either the same thing, i.e., one and the same thing is said, i.e., is asserted and denied at once of the same subject, i.e., either two contradictories are verified at once of the same thing, as the first argument concluded; or secondly, that assertions and denials of modals, which are opposed contradictorily are not made by the addition of “to be” or “not to be,” i.e., contradiction of modals is not made by the negation of the verb, as the second argument concluded. If the former alternative is impossible, namely, that two contradictories can be true of the same thing at once, the latter, that contradiction of modals is not made according to negation of the verb, must obtain, for impossible things must always be avoided. His mode of speaking here indicates that there is some obstacle to each alternative. But since in the first the obstacle is an impossibility that cannot be accepted, while in the second the only obstacle is that the negation must fall upon the copula of the enunciation if a negative enunciation is to be formed, and this can be done otherwise than by denying the verb of the dictum, as will be shown later on, then the second alternative must be chosen, i.e., that the contradiction of modals is not made according to negation of the verb, and the first alternative is to be rejected.

LESSON 9

In Contradictions of Modal Propositions the Negation Must Be Added to the Modes, Not to the Verb

21b 23 Therefore, the negation of “possible to be” is “not possible to be.” The reasoning is the same in regard to “contingent to be,” for its negation is “not contingent to be.” So, too, in the others, that is, the necessary and the impossible.

21b 26 For just as “to be” and “not to be” are the determining additions in the former [i.e., absolute enunciations] and the things subjected are “white” and “man,” so here “to be” is as the subject and “is possible” and “is contingent” are determining additions; and just as “to be” and “not to be” determine the true [and the false] in the former, in like manner these determine the true [and the false] in regard to what is possible and not possible.

21b 33 The negation, then, of “possible not to be” is “not possible not to be.” Wherefore “possible to be” and “possible not to be” would appear to be consequent to each other; for the same thing is “possible to be” and “possible not to be,” since these are not contradictory to each other. But “possible to be” and “not possible to be” are never true at once of the same subject, for they are opposed. Nor are “possible not to be” and “not possible not to be” ever true at once of the same subject.

The case is the same with respect to the necessary. The negation of necessary to be” is not, “necessary not to be” but, “not necessary to be”; and the negation of “necessary not to be,” “not necessary not to be.”

Likewise, the negation of “impossible to be” is not, “impossible not to be” but, “not impossible to be”; and of “impossible not to be,” “not impossible not to be.”

22a 8 And universally, as has been said, “to be” and “not to be” must be posited as the subject, and those that produce affirmation and negation [i.e., possible, not possible, contingent, not contingent, etc.] must be joined to “to be” and “not to be

1. Aristotle now determines where the negation must be placed in order to obtain contradiction in modals. He first determines the truth summarily; secondly, he presents the argument for the truth of the position, which is also the answer to the reasoning induced for the opposite position, where he says, For just as “to be” and “not to be” are the determining additions in the former, and the things subjected are “white” and “man,” etc.; thirdly, he makes this truth evident in all the modals, where he says, The negation, then, of “possible not to be” is “not possible not to be,” etc.; fourthly, he arrives at a universal rule where he says, And universally, as has been said, “to be” and “not to be must be posited as the subject, etc.

Since the negation must be added either to the verb or to the mode and it was shown above in virtue of an argument from division that it is not to be added to the verb, he concludes: Therefore, the negation of “possible to be” is “not possible to be”, that is, the mode is negated. The reasoning is the same with respect to enunciations of the contingent, for the negation of “contingent to be” is “not contingent to be.” And the judgment is the same in the others, i.e., the necessary and the impossible.

2. When he says, For just as “to be” and “not to be” are the determining additions in the former, and the things subjected are “white” and “man,” etc., he gives the argument for the truth of his position. To obtain contradiction among any enunciations the negation must be applied to the determining addition, i.e., to the word that joins the predicate with the subject; but in modals the determining additions are the modes; therefore, to get a contradiction in modals, the negation must be added to the mode.

The major of the argument is subsumed; the minor is stated in Aristotle’s wording by a further similitude to absolute enunciations. In absolute enunciations the determining additions, i.e., the predications, are “to be” and “not to be,” i.e., the verb signifying “to be” or “not to be” (for the verb is always a sign of those things that are predicated of another). The things subjected to the determining additions, i.e., to which to be" and "not to be" are applied, are "white," in "White is, "or man," in "Man is." This happens in modals in the same way but in a manner appropriate to them. "To be" is as the subject, i.e., the dictum signifying "to be" or "not to be" holds the place of the subject; "is possible" and "is contingent," i.e., the modes, are the predicates. And just as in absolute enunciations we determine truth or falsity with "to be" and "not to be," so in modals with the modes. He makes this point when he says, determining additions, i.e., these modes effect truth just as "to be" and "not to be" determine truth and falsity in the others.

3. Thus the response to the argument for the opposite position, which he gave first, is evident. That argument concluded that the negation should be added to the verb as it is in absolute enunciations. But since the modal enunciates a mode of a dictum—as the absolute enunciation enunciates "to be" or "not to be" such, for instance, "to be white" of a subject—the mode holds the same place here that the verb does there. Consequently, the negation falls upon the same thing proportionally here and there, for the proportion of mode to dictum is the same as the proportion of verb to subject.

Again, since truth and falsity follow upon affirmation and negation, the affirmation and negation of an enunciation and its truth and falsity must be controlled by the same thing. In absolute enunciations truth and falsity follow upon "to be" or "not to be," hence in the modals they follow upon the mode; for that modal is true which modifies the dictum as the composition of the dictum permits, just as that absolute enunciation is true which signifies that something is as it is. Therefore, negation is added here to the mode just as it is added there to the verb, since the power of each is the same with respect to the truth and falsity of an enunciation.

Notice that he calls the modes "determining additions," i.e., predications—as "to be" is in absolute enunciations—understanding by the mode the whole predicate of the modal enunciation, for example, "is possible." As a sign of this he expresses the modes themselves verbally when he says, "is possible" and "is contingent" are determining additions. For "is contingent" and "is possible" comprise the whole predicate of the modal enunciation.

4. When he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be" is [not, "not possible to be" but] "not possible not to be," etc., he makes this truth evident in all the modals, i.e., the possible, the necessary, and the

impossible (the contingent being convertible with the possible). And since any mode makes two modal affirmatives, one having an affirmed dictum and the other having a negated dictum, he shows what the negation of each affirmation is in each mode. First he takes those of the possible. The negation of the first affirmative of the possible (the one with an affirmed dictum), i.e., "possible to be," was assigned as "not possible to be." Hence, going on to the remaining affirmative of the possible he says, The negation, then, of "possible not to be" [wherein the dictum is negated] is, "not possible not to be." Then he a proves this. The contradictory of "possible not to be" is either "Possible to be" or "not possible not to be." But the former, i.e., "possible to be," is not the contradictory of "possible not to be," for they can be at once true. Hence they are also thought to follow upon each other, for, as was said above, the same thing is possible to be and not to be. Consequently, just as "possible not to be" follows upon "possible to be," so conversely "possible to be" follows upon "possible not to be." But the contradictory of "possible to be," which cannot be true at the same time, is "not possible to be," for these, as has been said, are opposed. Therefore, the negation of "possible not to be" is, "not possible not to be," for these are never at once true or false.

Note that he says, Wherefore "possible to be" and "possible not to be" would appear to be consequent to each other, and not that they do follow upon each other, for it is not true that they follow upon each other universally, but only particularly (as will be said later); this is the reason they appear to follow upon each other simply.

Then he manifests the same thing in the modals of the necessary, and first in the affirmative with an affirmed dictum: The case is the same with respect to the necessary. The negation of "necessary to be" is not, "necessary not to be" (in which the mode is not negated) but, "not necessary to be." Next he adds the affirmative of the necessary with a negated dictum: and the negation of "necessary not to be is "not necessary not to be."

Next, he takes up the impossible, keeping the same order. The negation of "impossible to be" is not, "impossible not to be" but, "not impossible to be," in which the mode is negated. The negation of the other affirmative, "impossible not to be" is "not impossible not to be." The negation, therefore, is always added to the mode.

5. Then he says, And universally, as has been said, “to be”and “not to be” must be posited as the subject, and those that produce affirmation and negation must be joined to “to be” and “not to be,” etc. Here he concludes with the universal rule. As has been said, the dictums denoting “to be” and “not to be” must be posited in the modals as subjects, and the one making this an affirmation and negation, i.e., the opposition of contradiction, must be added only to the selfsame mode, not to diverse modes, for the selfsame mode which was previously affirmed must be denied if there is to be a contradiction. He gives examples of how this is to be done when he adds, And these are the words that are to be considered opposed, i.e., affirmations and negations in modals, possible–not possible, contingent–not contingent.

Moreover, when he said elsewhere but in another way that the negation must be applied only to the mode, he did not exclude the copula of the mode, but the copula of the dictum. For it is unique to modals that the same opposition is made by adding a negation to the mode and to its verb. The contradictory of “is possible to be,” for instance, is not only “is not possible to be,” but also “not is possible to be.” There are two reasons, however, for his mentioning the mode rather than the verb: first, for the reason we have just given, namely, so as to imply that the negation placed after the verb of the mode, the mode having been put first, accomplishes the same thing as if it were placed before the modal verb; and secondly, because the modal enunciation is never without a mode; hence the negation can always be put on the mode. However, it cannot always be put on the verb of a mode, for the modal enunciation may lack the verb of a mode as for example in “Socrates runs necessarily,” in which case the negation can always be adapted to the verb.

In adding “true” and “not true” at the end he implies that besides the four modes mentioned previously there are others that also determine the composition of the enunciation, for example, “true” and “not true,” “false” and “not false”; nevertheless he did not posit these among the modes first given because, as was shown, they do not properly modify.

LESSON 10

The Logical Consequents of the Modals

22a 14 Logical sequences result from modals ordered thus. From “possible to be” follows “contingent to be” and the latter is convertible with the former; “not impossible to be” and “not necessary to be” also follow from “possible to be.” From “possible not to be” follows “contingent not to be,” “not necessary not to be,” and “not impossible not to be.” From “not possible to be” and “not contingent to be” follows “necessary not to be” and “impossible to be.” From “not possible not to be” and “not contingent not to be” follows “necessary to be” and “impossible not to be.” Let us consider these with the help of a table.

22a24 possible to be	not possible to be
contingent to be	not contingent to be
not impossible to be	impossible to be
not necessary to be	necessary not to be
possible not to be	not possible not to be
contingent not to be	not contingent not to be
not impossible not to be	impossible not to be
not necessary not to be	necessary to be

22a 32 Now the impossible and the not impossible follow contradictorily upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, but inversely. The negation of “impossible to be” follows upon “possible to be” and the affirmation of the former follows upon the negation of the latter, i.e., “impossible to be” follows upon “not possible to be”; for “impossible to be” is an affirmation, “not impossible to be” a negation.

22a 38 Now we must consider how enunciations predicating necessity are related to these. It is evident that the case here is not the same, for the contraries follow, but their contradictories are separated.

22a 39 For the negation of “necessary not to be” is not “not necessary to be,” since both may be true of the same subject, for the necessary not to be is not necessary to be.

22b 3 Now the reason why enunciations predicating necessity do not follow in the same way as the others is that the impossible expresses contrarily the same thing as the necessary. For if it is impossible that this be, it is necessary, not that it be, but necessary that it not be; and if it is impossible that it not be, it is necessary that it be. So, if the impossible and not impossible follow in like manner from the possible and not possible, the necessary and not necessary follow contrarily, since the necessary and the impossible signify the same thing, but as has been said, inversely.

22b 10 Or is it impossible to arrange the contradictions of enunciations predicating necessity in this way? For what is necessary to be, is possible to be (for if not, the negation will follow, since it is necessary either to affirm or deny; and if it is not possible to be, it is impossible to be; therefore, that which is necessary to be is impossible to be, which is absurd). But from “possible to be” “not impossible to be” follows, and from this, “not necessary to be”; and thus what is necessary to be is not necessary to be, which is absurd.

22b 17 But in fact neither “necessary to be” nor “necessary not to be” follow upon “possible to be”; for “to be possible” admits of two possibilities, whereas if either “necessary to be” or “necessary not to be” is true both possibilities will no longer be true. For a thing is at once possible to be and not to be, but if it is necessary to be or not to be, the two alternatives will not be possible. It remains, therefore, that “not necessary not to be” follows upon “possible to be”;

22b 23 for this is true also with respect to “necessary to be.” For “not necessary not to be” is the contradictory of what follows upon “not possible to be,” for “not possible to be” is followed by “impossible to be” and by “necessary not to be,” and the negation of this is “not necessary not to be.”

22b 26 Thus, these contradictions also follow in the way indicated, and nothing impossible follows when they are thus arranged..

1. Having established the opposition of modals, Aristotle now intends to determine their consequents. He first presents the true doctrine; then, he raises a difficulty where he says, But it may be questioned whether “Possible to be follows upon “necessary to be,” etc. In presenting the true

doctrine, he first posits the consequents of the opposition of modals according to the opinion of others; secondly, he determines the truth by examining and correcting their opinion, where he says, Now the impossible and the not impossible follow contradictorily upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, but inversely, etc.

2. Before we consider these consequents according to the opinion of others, we must first note that since any mode makes two affirmations and there are two negations opposed to these, there will be four enunciations according to any one mode, two affirmatives and two negatives. And since there are four modes, there will be sixteen modals. Among these sixteen, anyone of each mode, from wherever you begin, has only one of each mode following upon it. Hence, to assign the consequents of the modals, we have to take one from each mode and arrange them among themselves to form an order of consequents.

3. The modals were ordered in this way by the ancients. They disposed them in four orders placing together in each order those that were a consequent to each other. Aristotle speaks of this order when he says, Logical consequents follow according to the order in the table below, which is the way in which the ancients posited them.

Henceforth, however, to avoid confusion let us call the affirmative of dictum and mode in any one mode, the simple affirmative, as it is by Averroes, among others; affirmative of mode and negative of dictum, the declined affirmative; negative of mode and not of dictum, the simple negative; negative of both mode and dictum, the declined negative. Hence, simplicity of mode designates affirmation or negation, and so, too, does declination of dictum.

The ancients said, then, that simple affirmation of the contingent, i.e., “contingent to be” follows upon simple affirmation of the possible, i.e., “Possible to be” (for the contingent is converted with the possible); the simple negative of the impossible also follows upon this, i.e., “not impossible to be”; and the simple negative of the necessary, i.e., “not necessary to be.” This is the first order of modal consequents.

In the second order they said that the declined negatives of the necessary and impossible, i.e., “not necessary not to be” and “not impossible not to be,” follow upon the declined affirmative of the possible and the contingent, i.e., “possible not to be” and “contingent not to be.”

In the third order, according to them, the declined affirmative of the necessary, i.e., “necessary not to be,” and the simple affirmative of of the impossible, i.e., “impossible to be,” follow upon the simple negatives of the possible and the contingent, i.e., “not possible to be” and not contingent to be.”

Finally, in the fourth order, the simple affirmative of the necessary, i.e., “necessary to be,” and the declined affirmative of the impossible, i.e., “impossible not to be,” follow upon the declined negatives of the possible and the contingent, i.e., “not possible not to be” and “not contingent not to be.”

5. When he says, Now the impossible and the not impossible follow contradictorily upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, but inversely, etc., he determines the truth by examining the foresaid opinion. First, he examines the consequents of enunciations predicating impossibility; secondly, those predicating necessity, where he says, Now we must consider how enunciations predicating necessity are related to these, etc.

From the opinion advanced, then, he concludes with approval that the impossible and the not impossible follow upon the contingent and the possible and the not contingent and the not possible, contradictorily, i.e., the contradictories of the impossible follow upon the contradictories of the possible and the contingent, but inversely, i.e., not so that affirmation follows upon affirmation and negation upon negation, but inversely, i.e., negation follows upon affirmation and affirmation upon negation.

He explains this when he says, The negation of “impossible to be” follows upon “possible to be,” i.e., the negation of the impossible, i.e., “not impossible to be,” follows upon the affirmation of the possible, and the affirmation of the impossible follows upon the negation of the possible. For the affirmation, “impossible to be” follows upon the negation, “not possible to be.” In the latter the mode is negated, in the former it is not. Therefore, the ancients were right in saying that in any order, the consequences of enunciations predicating impossibility are as follows: from affirmation of the possible, negation of the impossible is inferred; and from negation of the possible, affirmation of the impossible is inferred. This is apparent in the diagram.

6. When he says, Now we must consider how enunciations predicating necessity are related to these, etc., he proposes an examination of the consequents of enunciations predicating necessity in order to determine the truth about them. First he examines what was said by the ancients; secondly, he determines the truth, where he says, But in fact neither “ necessary to be” nor “necessary not to be” follow upon “possible to be,” etc. In his examination of the ancients, Aristotle makes four points. First, he shows what was well said by the ancients and what was badly said.

It must be noted in regard to this that, as we have said, there are four enunciations predicating necessity, which differ among themselves in quantity and quality, and hence they make up a diagram of opposition in the manner of the absolute enunciations. Two of them are contrary to each other, and two are contradictory to these contraries, as is clear in the diagram below.

necessary to be contraries necessary not to be
not necessary not to be subcontraries not necessary to be

Now the ancients correctly inferred the universal contraries from the possibles, contingents, and impossibles, but incorrectly inferred their contradictories, namely, particulars. This is the reason Aristotle says that it remains to be considered how enunciations predicating necessity are related consequentially to the possible and not possible. From what Aristotle says, it is clear that those predicating necessity do not follow upon the possibles in the same way as those predicating impossibility follow upon the possibles, for all of the enunciations predicating impossibility were correctly inferred by the ancients, but those predicating necessity were not. Two of them, the contraries, “necessary to be” and “necessary not to be,” follow, i.e., correct consequents were deduced by the ancients in the third and fourth orders; the remaining two, “not necessary not to be” and “not necessary to be,” which are contradictories of the contraries, are outside of the consequents of these, i.e., in the second and first orders. Hence, the ancients represented everything correctly in the third and fourth orders, but in the first and second they erred, not with respect to all things, but only with respect to enunciations predicating necessity.

7. Secondly, he says, For the negation of “necessary not to be” is not “not necessary to be,” since both may be true of the same subject, etc. Here he replies to a tacit objection. This reply could be used to defend the

consequent of the enunciation of the necessary made by the ancients in the first order. The tacit objection is this: “not possible to be” and “necessary not to be” follow convertibly in the third order which has already been shown to be correct; therefore, “possible to be” and “not necessary to be” ought to follow upon each other in the first order. The consequent holds; for the contradictories of two that convertibly follow upon each other, mutually follow upon each other; but those two follow upon each other convertibly in the third order and these two in the first order are their contradictories; therefore, those of the first order, i.e., “possible to be” and “not necessary to be,” mutually follow upon each other.

Aristotle replies here to this objection by destroying what was assumed in the minor, i.e., that the necessary of the first order and the necessary of the third order are contradictories. He says, For the negation of “necessary not to be” (which is in the third order) is not “not necessary to be” (which has been placed in the first order). He also gives the reason: it is possible for both to be true at once of the same subject, which is repugnant to contradictories. For the same thing which is necessary not to be, is not necessary to be; for example, it is necessary that man not be wood and it is not necessary that man be wood. Notice, as will be clear later, that these two which the ancients posited in the first and third orders, are subalterns and therefore are at once true, whereas they should be contradictories; hence the ancients were in error.

8. Boethius and Averroes read both this and the preceding part of the text, not reprovingly, but as explanatorily joined together. They say Aristotle explains the quality of the above table with respect to the consequents of enunciations predicating necessity after he has explained in what way those predicating impossibility are related. What Aristotle is saying, then, is that those of the necessary do not follow those of the possible in the same way as those of the impossible follow upon the possible. For contradictories of the impossible follow upon contradictories of the possible, although inversely; but contradictories of the necessary are not said to follow the contradictories of the possible, but rather the contraries of the necessary follow upon them. It is not the contraries among themselves that follow, but contraries in this way: the negation of the necessary is said to follow upon the affirmation of the possible; but what follows on the negation of this possible is not the affirmation of the necessary contradictory to that

negative of the necessary following upon the possible, but the contrary of such an affirmation of the necessary. That this is the case is evident in the first and third orders. The sources are negation and affirmation of the possible, and the extremes are “not necessary to be” and “necessary not to be.” But these are not contradictories, for the negation of “necessary not to be” is not “not necessary to be,” for it is possible for them to be at once true of the same thing. “Necessary not to be” is the contrary of the contradictory of “not necessary to be,” which contradictory is “necessary to be.”

In my judgment, however, the first exposition should be accepted and this portion of the text taken as a reproof of the ancients, because the contraries seem to be explained in a forced way by others, whereas our introduction is more in accord with what follows in the next part of the text; in addition, it agrees with Albert’s interpretation.

9. Thirdly, he says, Now the reason why enunciations predicating necessity do not follow in the same way as the others, etc. Here Aristotle shows why enunciations predicating impossibility and necessity do not follow in a similar way upon those predicating possibility. This was the error made by the ancients in both the first and second orders, for in the first order they posited the simple negative of the impossible, and in a similar way the simple negative of the necessary, and in the second order their declined negatives, the reason being that they inferred those predicating impossibility and necessity in a similar way. The cause of this error, then, and the reason why enunciations predicating necessity do not follow the possible in the same way, i.e., in a similar mode, as the others, i.e., as the impossibles, is that the impossible expresses the same meaning as the necessary, i.e., is equivalent to the necessary, contrarily, i.e., taken in a contrary mode, and not in the same mode. For if something is impossible to be, we do not infer, therefore it is necessary to be, but it is necessary not to be. Since, therefore, the impossible and necessary mutually follow each other when their dictums are taken in a contrary mode—and not when their dictums are taken in a similar mode—it follows that the impossible and necessary are not related in the same way to the possible, but in a contrary way. For the negated dictum of the necessary follows upon that possible which follows the affirmed dictum of the impossible, and contrarily. Why this is so will be explained later. Therefore, the ancients erred when they

located similar enunciations of the impossible and necessary in the first and in the second orders.

Hence it appears that our exposition is more in conformity with Aristotle. For he introduced this text to manifest these words: It is evident that the case here is not the same, etc. By taking this meaning, then, these words are made clear through the cause. Moreover, it is evident that here the cause is given of a true dissimilitude between necessaries and impossibles in following the possibles, and not of a dissimilitude falsely held by the ancients, for from a true cause only the truth is concluded. Therefore in reproving the ancients it must be understood that a true dissimilitude between the necessary and impossible in following the possible, which they did not beed, has been proposed, and now has been made manifest. It will be clear from what will be said later that the dissimilitude posited by the ancients between the necessary and impossible is falsely posited, for it will be shown that contradictories of the necessary follow contradictories of the possible inversely, and that in this they do not differ from enunciations predicating impossibility. They do differ, however, in the way we have indicated, i.e., the dictum of the possibles and of the impossibles following on them is similar, but the dictum of the possibles and of the necessaries following on them is contrary, as will be seen clearly later.

11. Fourthly, when he says, Or is it impossible to arrange the contradictions of enunciations predicating necessity in this way? he manifests another point he had proposed, namely, that contradictories of enunciations predicating necessity were badly placed according to consequence by the ancients when they ordered them thus: the contradictory negation to “necessary to be,” i.e., “not necessary to be,” in the first order, and the contradictory negation to “necessary not to be,” i.e., “not necessary not to be,” in the second.

Aristotle only proves that this mode of consequence is incorrect in the first order, for when this is known the mistake in the second order is readily seen. He does this by an argument leading to an impossibility. “Possible to be” follows upon “necessary to be”; otherwise “not possible to be” would follow, which it manifestly implies. “Not impossible to be” follows upon “possible to be” as is evident, and, according to the ancients, in the first order, “not necessary to be” follows upon “not impossible to be.” Therefore, from first to last, “not necessary to be” follows upon “necessary to be,” which is inadmissible because there is an obvious implication of contradiction. Therefore, it is erroneous to say that “not necessary to be” follows in the first order.

He says, then, that in fact it is impossible to posit contradictions of the necessary according to consequence as the ancients posited them, i.e., in the first order the contradictory negation of “necessary to be,” i.e., “not necessary to be” and in the second the contradictory negation of “necessary not to be,” i.e., “not necessary not to be.” For “possible to be” follows upon “necessary to be”; if not, i.e., if you deny this consequence, the negation of the possible follows upon “necessary to be,” since the possible must either be asserted of the necessary or denied, the reason being that of anything there is a true affirmation or a true negation. Therefore, if you say that “possible to be” does not follow upon “necessary to be,” but “not possible to be” does follow, then, since the latter is equivalent to the former, i.e., “not possible to be” to “impossible to be,” “impossible to be” follows upon “necessary to be” and the same thing will be “necessary to be” and “impossible to be,” which cannot be admitted. Consequently, the first inference was good, i.e., “It is necessary to be, therefore it is possible to be.”

But again, “possible to be” follows upon “not impossible to be,” as is evident in the first order, and according to the ancients, “not necessary to be” follows upon “not impossible to be” in the same first order. Therefore, from first to last we arrive at this: “not necessary to be” follows upon “necessary to be,” which is unlikely, not to say impossible.

12. There is a doubt about this, for in I Priorum [13: 32a 28 and 32b 15], it is said that the not necessary follows upon the possible, while here the opposite is said.

The possible, however, is taken in two ways: commonly, and thus it is superior to the necessary and the contingent to either of two alternatives, as is the case with animal in relation to man and cow; taken in this way, the not necessary does not follow upon the possible, just as not-man does not follow upon animal. In another way the possible is taken for one part of the possible commonly, i.e., for the possible or contingent to either of two alternatives, namely, for what can be and not be. The not necessary follows upon the possible taken in this way, for what can be and not be is not necessary to be, and likewise is not necessary not to be.

In the Prior Analytics, then, Aristotle is speaking of the possible in particular; here of the possible commonly.

13. When he says, But in fact neither "necessary to be" nor "necessary not to be" follow upon "possible to be," etc., he determines the truth. First he determines which enunciation of the necessary follows upon the possible; secondly, he orders the consequents of all of the modals, where he says, Thus, these contradictions also follow in the way indicated, etc.

Aristotle has reproved the ancients in two ways; on the basis of these two he now proves which enunciation of the necessary follows upon the possible. What he intends to show is that "not necessary not to be" follows upon "possible to be." The first argument is taken from a locus of division. "Not necessary to be" does not follow upon possible to be" (as has been proved), but neither does "necessary to be" nor "necessary not to be." Therefore, "not necessary not to be" follows upon "possible to be," since there are no more enunciations of the necessary.

He first proposes the remaining two members that are to be excluded from this common division: But in fact neither "necessary to be" nor "necessary not to be" follow upon "possible to be." Then he proves this: no formal consequent diminishes its antecedent, for if it did, the opposite of the consequent would stand with the antecedent; but both of these, namely, "necessary to be" and "necessary not to be," diminish possible to be"; therefore, etc.

The major is therefore implied and he gives the proof of the minor when he says that "possible to be" admits of two possibilities, namely, "to be" and "not to be"; but of these, namely, "necessary to be" and "necessary not to be" (whichever should be true), these two, "to be" and "not to be," will not be true at the same time in potency. He explains the first point thus: when I say "possible to be" it is at once possible to be and not to be. With respect to the second, he adds: if you should say, "necessary to be" or "necessary not to be," both do not remain, i.e., possible to be and not to be do not remain, for if a thing is necessary to be, possibility not to be is excluded, and if it is necessary not to be, possibility to be is removed. Both of these, then, diminish the antecedent, possible to be, for it is extended to "to be" and "not to be," etc.

Thirdly, he concludes: it remains, therefore, that "not necessary not to be" accompanies "possible to be," and consequently will have to be placed in the first order.

14. A difficulty arises at this point with respect to his saying that the necessary does not follow upon the possible, since he has also said that the not necessary does not follow upon it. For the necessary and the not necessary are opposed contradictorily, and since of anything there is a true affirmation or negation, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that either the necessary or the not necessary follows upon the possible; and since the necessary does not follow, the not necessary must follow, as the ancients said. Furthermore, the difficulty is augmented by the fact that Aristotle just used such a mode of argumentation when, to prove that the possible follows upon the necessary, he said, for if not, the negation will follow; for it is necessary either to affirm or deny.

15. In order to resolve this, we must recall the relationship between the possible and the necessary, namely, that the possible is superior to the necessary. Now the superior potentially contains its own inferior and the opposite of it in such a way that neither of them is actually appropriated by the superior, but each is possible to it; as in the case of man and not-man in relation to animal. We must also consider that the proportion of the superior as related to the affirmation and negation of one inferior is the same (which is the proportion of some subject to the affirmative and negative of a future contingent), for it is had by neither of the two, and the potency to either is kept. Accordingly, as in future contingents neither the affirmation nor the negation is determinately true, but under disjunction one is necessarily true (as was concluded at the end of the first book), so neither the affirmation nor negation of the inferior follows upon the affirmation or negation of the superior determinately, but under disjunction one follows necessarily. This, for instance, is not valid: “It is animal, therefore it is man,” nor is “therefore it is not man” valid, but, “therefore it is man or it is not man.”

Since, then, the possible is superior to the necessary, Aristotle has correctly determined that neither part of the contradiction of the necessary determinately follows upon the possible. However, he has not said that under disjunction neither follows; for this would be opposed to the first principle, that of anything there is a true or false affirmation.

The response to what was added, beginning with “Furthermore, the difficulty is augmented,” etc., is based upon the same point. Since the necessary is inferior to the possible, and the inferior does not include its superior in potency but in act, the superior must follow determinately upon the inferior; otherwise the contradiction of it would follow determinately. Hence, because of the dissimilar relationship between the necessary and the possible and not possible on the one hand, and between the possible and the necessary and not necessary on the other, the movement of the earlier argument to one part of the contradiction determinately was quite right, and the movement here to neither determinately was quite right.

16. There is another slight difficulty, for it seems that Aristotle takes the possible in a different way in the preceding text and in this. There he takes it commonly as it follows upon the necessary; here he seems to take it specifically for the possible that is indifferent to alternatives, since he says that the possible is at once possible to be and not to be.

But in fact Aristotle has used the possible uniformly. Nor are his words at variance, for it is also true to say of the possible as common that it admits of both possibilities, i.e., of “to be” and “not to be”; first, because whatever is verified of its inferior is verified also of its superior, although not in the same mode; secondly, because the possible as common determines neither part of the contradiction to itself and consequently admits of either happening, although it does not affirm a potency to each part, as does the possible to either of two alternatives.

17. The second grounds for proving the same thing corresponds to the tacit objection of the ancients he excluded above: For this, he says, is true also with respect to “necessary to be,” etc. It should be noted here that Aristotle subsumes under the major cited as a proof for the position of the ancients (namely, contradictories of consequences convertibly following each other mutually follow upon each other) this minor: but the contradictories of those following upon each other convertibly in the third order (i.e., of “not possible to be” and “necessary not to be”) are “possible to be” and “not necessary not to be” (for they are opposed to them by negation of mode); therefore, these two (i.e., “possible to be” and “not necessary not to be”) follow upon each other and are to be placed in the first order.

Hence, with respect to the basis of the above argument, he says, For this, i.e., what has been said, is true, i.e., is shown to be true, also with respect to “necessary not to be,” i.e., of the opposite of “not necessary not to be,” i.e., “necessary not to be.” Or, For this, namely, not necessary not to be,” is true, namely, is the true contradictory of necessary not to be.” He gives the minor when he says, For “not necessary not to be” is the contradictory of what follows upon “not possible to be.”

Then he states this explicitly: for “not possible to be,” which is the source of the third order is followed by this impossible, namely, “impossible to be,” and by this one of the necessary, namely, “necessary not to be,” of which the negation or contradictory is “not necessary not to be.” And since, other things being equal, the mode is negated, and, “possible to be” is (it is understood) the contradictory of “not possible to be,” therefore, these two mutually follow upon each other, namely, “possible to be” and “not necessary not to be,” as contradictories of the two mutually following upon each other.

18. When he says, Thus, these contradictions also follow in the way indicated, etc., he orders all of the consequents of modals according to his own opinion. He says, then, that these contradictions, namely, of the necessary, follow those of the possible, according to the foresaid and approved mode of those of the impossible. For just as contradictories of the impossible follow upon contradictories of the possible, although inversely, so contradictories of the necessary follow contradictories of the possible inversely. In the latter, however, as has been said, there is a dissimilarity in that the dictum of the contradictories of the possible and impossible is similar, but the dictum of the contradictories of the possible and necessary is contrary. This can be seen in the following table.

LESSON 11

Whether “Possible To Be” Follows Upon “Necessary To Be”

22b 29 But it may be questioned whether “possible to be” follows upon “necessary to be.” Yet if not, the contradictory, “not possible to be,” would have to follow; or if someone should say that this is not the contradictory, then “possible not to be.” But both of these are false in regard to that which is necessary to be.

22b 33 On the other band, it seems possible for the same thing to be cut and not to be cut, and to be and not to be, and thus it would follow that what is necessary to be is possible not to be, which is false.

22b 36 It is evident by now that not every possibility of being or walking is one that admits of opposites. There are those of which this is not true. First of all, this is not true of potentialities which are not according to reason, as fire, which has an irrational potentiality, the power to heat. Potentialities that are in conjunction with reason are capable of more than one and of contraries; but not all irrational potentialities are capable of contraries; as has been said, fire does not have the potentiality to heat and not to heat, nor does anything that always acts have this potentiality; however, even some of the irrational potencies are simultaneously capable of opposites. We have spoken of this in order to show that not every potentiality is a potentiality to opposites, not even all those that are called potentialities according to the same notion.

1. Now that he has explained the consequents of modals, Aristotle raises a question about one of the points that has already been determined, namely, that the possible follows upon the necessary. He first raises the question and then settles it where he says, It is evident by now that not

every possibility of being or walking is one that admits of opposites, etc. Secondly, he establishes another order of the same consequents from the determination of the present question, where he says Indeed the necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of all that is or is not, etc.

First, then, he raises the question: But it may be questioned whether “Possible to be follows upon “necessary to be.” Secondly, he argues to the affirmative part: Yet if not, the contradictory, “not possible to be,” would have to follow, as was deduced earlier, for either the affirmation or the negation is true of anything. And if someone should say “not possible to be” is not the contradictory of “possible to be,” because he wants to avoid the conclusion by saying that neither of these follows upon “necessary to be,” this may be conceded, although what he says is false. But then he will have to say that the contradictory of “possible to be” is “possible not to be,” for the contradictory of “possible to be” has to be either “not possible to be” or “possible not to be.” But if he says this, he will fall into another error, for it is false to say it is not possible to be of that which is necessary to be, and it is false to say it is possible not to be. Consequently, neither follows upon it, for no enunciation follows upon an enunciation whose truth it destroys. Therefore, “possible to be” follows upon “necessary to be.”

2. Thirdly, he argues to the negative part where he says, On the other hand, it seems possible for the same thing to be cut and not to be cut, etc. His argument is as follows: If “possible to be” follows upon “necessary to be,” then, since “possible not to be” follows upon the possible (through conversion to the opposite quality, as is said in I Priorum [13: 32a 31], for the same thing is possible to be and not to be), from first to last it will follow that the necessary is possible not to be, which is clearly false.

In this argument, Aristotle supplies a hypothesis opposed to the position that possible to be follows upon necessary to be: On the other hand, it seems possible for the same thing to be cut and not to be cut, for instance a garment, and to be and not to be, for instance a house. Therefore, from first to last, necessary to be will be possible not to be. But this is false. Therefore, the hypothesis that the possible follows upon the necessary is false.

3. When he says, It is evident by now that not every possibility of being or walking, etc., he answers the question he proposed. First, he manifests

the truth simply, then applies it to the question where he says, So it is not true to say the latter possible of what is necessary simply, etc.

First, then, he proposes the truth he is going to explain: It is evident by now that not every possibility of being or walking, i.e., of operating; that is, not everything possible according to first or second act admits of opposites, i.e., has access to opposites; there are some possibles of which it is not true to say that they are capable of opposites.

Then, since the possible arises from potency, he manifests how potency is related to opposites; for it will be clear from this bow the possible is related to opposites. First he manifests this in potencies having the same notion; secondly, in those that are called potencies equivocally where he says, But some are called potentialities equivocally, etc. With respect to the way in which potencies of the same specific notion are related to opposites, he does three things. First of all he manifests how an irrational potency is related to opposites; an irrational potency, he says, is not a potency that is capable of opposites.

4. It must be noted in this connection that active potency, since it is the principle by which we act on something else, is divided into rational and irrational potency, as is said in IX Metaphysicae [2: 1046a 36]. Rational potency operates in connection with reason and choice; for example, the art of medicine by which the physician, knowing and willing what is expedient in healing an illness, applies a remedy. Irrational potency operates according to its own natural disposition, not according to reason and liberty; for example, the heat of fire is an irrational potency, because it heats, not as it knows and wills, but as its nature requires.

In the Metaphysics, a twofold difference between these potencies is assigned which is relevant here. The first is that an irrational active potency is not capable of two opposites, but is determined to one opposite, whether "opposite" is taken contradictorily or contrarily; e.g., heat cannot heat and not heat, which are opposed contradictorily; nor can it heat and cool, which are contraries, but is deter mined to heating. Understand this per se, for heat can cool accidentally, either by destroying the matter of heat, namely, the humid, or through alternation of the contrary. It also has the potentiality not to heat accidentally, if that which can be heated is lacking. A rational potency, on the other hand, is capable of opposites, both contradictorily and contrarily; for by the art of medicine the physician can employ a remedy and not employ it, which are contradictories, and employ healing and harmful remedies, which are contraries.

The second difference is that an irrational active potency necessarily operates when a subject is present and impediments are with drawn; for heat necessarily heats when a subject that can be heated is present, and nothing impedes it. A rational potency, however, does not necessarily operate when a subject is present; e.g., when a sick man is present the physician is not forced to employ a remedy.

5. The reasons for these differences are given in the Metaphysics, but let us return to the text. Explaining bow an irrational potency is related to opposites, he says, First of all, this is not true, i.e., it is not true to say that there is a potency to opposites in those which are not according to reason, i.e., whose power is through irrational potencies; as fire which is calefactive, i.e., capable of heating, has this power, i.e., this irrational potentiality, since it is not able to cool, nor is it in its power 4 to heat and not to heat.

Note that he speaks here of a first kind. This is in relation to a second genus of the possible which he will speak of later, in which there is not a potency to opposites either.

6. Secondly, he shows how a rational potency is related to opposites, i.e., it is capable of opposites: Therefore potentialities that are in conjunction with reason, i.e., rational potencies, are capable of contraries, not only of two, but even of many; for example, a physician by the art of medicine can employ many pairs of contraries and he can abstain from doing or not doing many things.

He begins with “therefore” so as to imply that this follows from what has been said.”‘ The argument would be: properties of opposites are opposites; an irrational potency, because it is irrational, does not extend itself to opposites; therefore a rational potency, because it is rational, has access to opposites.

7. Thirdly, he explains what he has said about irrational potencies. He will assign the reason for doing this later. He makes the point that what he has said about irrational potentiality, i.e., that it is not capable of opposites, is not true universally, but particularly.

It should be noted here that irrational potency is divided into active potency, which is the principle of acting, and passive potency, which is the principle of being acted upon; e.g., potency to heat is divided into potentiality to heat and potentiality to be heated.

Now it is true that active irrational potencies are not capable of opposites, as was explained. This is not true, however, of passive potencies, for what can be heated can also be cooled, because the mat ter is the same, i.e., the passive potency of contraries, as is said in II De caelo et mundo [7: 286a 23]. It can also not be heated, since the subject of privation and of form is the same, as is said in I Physic [7: 189b 32].

Therefore, in explaining about irrational potencies, he says, But not all irrational potentialities should be understood to be excluded from the capacity of opposites. Those like the potentiality of fire to heat are to be excluded (for it is evident that fire cannot not heat) I and universally, whatever others are potencies of such a kind that they always act, i.e., the ones that of themselves cannot not act, but are necessitated by their form always to act. All active irrational potencies are of this kind, as we have explained. There are others, however, of such a condition that even though they are irrational potencies (i.e., passive) are simultaneously capable of certain opposites; for example, air can be heated and cooled.

“Simultaneously” modifies “are capable” and not “opposites.” What he means is that the thing simultaneously has a passive potency to each opposite, and not that it has a passive potency to have both opposites simultaneously, for it is impossible to have opposites at one and the same time. Hence it is customary and correct to say that in these there is simultaneity of potency, not potency of simultaneity. Therefore, irrational potency is excluded from the capacity of opposites, not completely, but according to its part, namely, according to active potencies.

8. Because it might seem superfluous to have added the differences between active and passive irrational potencies, since enough had already been said to show that not every potency is of opposites, Aristotle gives the reason for this. It was not only to make it known that not every potency is of opposites, speaking of potency most commonly, but also that not all that are called potencies according to the same species are capable of opposites. For all irrational potencies are included under one species of irrational potency, and yet not all are capable of opposites, but only the passive potencies. It was not superfluous, therefore, to point out the difference between passive and active irrational potencies, since this was necessary in

order to show that not all potencies of the same species are capable of opposites.

“ This” in the phrase “this has been said” could designate each difference, the one between rational and irrational potencies, and the one between active and passive irrational potencies. The meaning is, then, that we have said this to show that not every potentiality which is said according to the same notion of physical power—namely, because it can be in something as rational and irrational—not even every potentiality which is contained under the same species, as active and passive under the species irrational, is capable of opposites.

LESSON 12

The Explanation of Potencies that Are Called Such Equivocally and the Determination, Through the Notion of the Impossible, of the Possible that Follows Upon the Necessary

23a 6 But some are called potentialities equivocally, for “possible” has more than one meaning. On the one hand, it is that which is true of a thing because it is in act, as walking is possible to someone because he is actually walking, and, in general, possible is said of that which is possible to be because it is already actualized. On the other hand, possible is said of that which can be actualized, as walking is possible to someone because he could walk.

23a 11 This latter potentiality is only in that which is movable, but the former is also in the immovable. Now it is true to say, both of that which is walking already and is actual, and of that which could walk, that it is not impossible that it walk or be.

23a 15 So it is not true to say the latter possible [i.e., the possible which could be] of what is necessary simply, but it is true to say the former of it. Therefore, since the universal follows upon the part, possible to be follows upon that which necessarily is, though not every kind of possible does.

23a 18 Indeed the necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of all that is or is not and the others must be regarded as consequent to these.

23a 21 It is evident, then, from what has been said that that which necessarily is, actually, is; and, if eternal things are prior, that actuality is prior to potentiality.

23a 23 Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, the primary substances. Others are actualities with potentiality—those that are prior in nature, but posterior in time. And some never are actualities but are only potentialities.

1. Aristotle now proposes to show in what way potencies that are called equivocal are related to opposites. He first explains the nature of this kind of potency, and then gives the difference and agreement all between these and the foresaid, where he says, This latter potentiality is only in that which is movable, but the former is also in the immovable, etc.

In V and IX Metaphysicae [V, 12: 1019a 15; 12, 1: 1046a 4], Aristotle divides potency into those that are called potencies for the same reason, and those that have the name potency for another reason than the aforesaid potencies. The latter are named “potencies” equivocally. Under the first member are included all active and passive, rational and irrational potencies, for whatever are said to be possible through the active or passive potency they have, are potencies for the same reason, i.e., because there is in them the originative force of something active or passive.

Mathematical and logical potencies are included under the second member of this division. That by which a line can lead to a square we call a mathematical potency, for a line constitutes a square when protracted back to itself. That by which two terms can be joined in an enunciation without contradiction is a logical potency. Logical potency also comprises that which is called “potency” because it is. The latter [mathematical and logical potencies] are named from the former equivocally because they predicate no active or passive capacity; and what is said to be possible in these ways is not termed possible in virtue of having the capacity to do or undergo as in the first case. Hence, since the potencies related to opposites are active or passive, the ones that are called potentialities equivocally are not related to opposites.

These, then, are the potencies he speaks of when he says But some are called potentialities equivocally, and therefore they are not related to opposites.

2. To clarify the kind of potency that is called equivocal, he gives the usual division of the possible through which this is known. “Possible,” he says, is not said in one way, but in two. Something is said to be possible because it is true as in act, i.e., inasmuch as it actually is; for example, it is

possible to walk when one is already walking, and in gene eral, i.e., universally, that is said to be possible which is possible to be because it is already in act. Something is said to be possible in the second way, not because it actually is, but because it is about to act, i.e., because it can act; for instance, it is possible for someone to walk because be is about to walk.

Notice here that by this two-membered division of the possible he makes the division of potency posited above evident a posteriori, for the possible is named from potency. Under the first member of the possible he signifies potencies equivocally; under the second, potencies univocally, i.e., active and passive potencies. He means to show, then, that since possible is said in two ways, potentiality is also twofold. He explains equivocal potentialities in terms of only one member, namely, those that are called possible because they are, since this was sufficient for his purpose.

3. When he says, This latter potentiality is only in that which is movable, but the former is also in the immovable, etc., he specifies the difference between each potency. This last potency, he says, [possible because it can be] which is called physical potency, is only in things that are movable; but the former is in movable and immovable things. The possible that is named from the potency which can act, but is not yet acting, cannot be found without the mutability of that which is said to be possible in this way. For if that which can act now and is not acting, should act, it is necessary that it be changed from rest to operation. On the other hand, that which is called possible because it is, requires no mutability in that which is said to be possible in this way, for to be in act, which is the basis of such a possibility, is found in necessary things, in immutable things, and in mobile things. Therefore, the possible which is called logical, is more common than the one we customarily call physical.

4. Then he shows that there is a correspondence between these possibles when he adds that not impossible to be is true of both of these potentialities and possibles, e.g., to walk is not impossible for that which is already walking in act, i.e., acting, and it is not impossible for that which could now walk; that is, they agree in that not impossible is verified of both—of either what is said to be possible from the fact that it is in act or of what is said to be possible from the fact that it could be. Consequently, the necessary is verified as possible, for possible follows upon not impossible.

The possible that is already in act is the second genus of the possible in which access is not found to both opposites, of which Aristotle spoke when he said, First of all this is not true of the potentialities which are not according to reason, etc. For that which is said to be possible because it is already in act is already determined, since it is supposed as being in act. Therefore, not every possible is the possible of alternatives, whether we speak of the physical possible or the logical.

5. When he says, So it is not true to say the latter possible of what is necessary simply, etc., he applies the truth he has determined to what has been proposed. First, by way of a conclusion from what has been said, he shows the relationship of each possible to the necessary. So, he says, it is not true to say and predicate this possible, namely physical, which is only in mobile things, of the necessary simply, because what is necessary simply cannot be otherwise. The physical possible, however, can be thus and otherwise, as has been said.

He adds “simply” because the necessary is manifold. There is the necessary for well-being and there is also the necessary from supposition, but it is not our business to treat these, only to indicate them. In order, then, to avoid the modes of the necessary that do not have the notion of the necessary perfectly and in every way, he adds “simply.” Now the physical possible is not verified of this kind of necessary [i.e., of the necessary simply], but it is true to enunciate the logical possible, the one found in immovable things, of the necessary, since it takes away nothing of the necessity.

The argument introduced for the negative part of this question”‘ is destroyed by this. The error in that argument was the inference—by way of conversion into the opposite quality—of the possible to both alternatives from the necessary.

6. Then he replies to the question formally. He states that the affirmative part of the question must be held, namely, that the possible follows upon the necessary. Next, he assigns the cause. The whole universal follows constructively upon its subjective part; but the necessary is a subjective part of the possible, because the possible is divided into logical and physical and under the logical is comprehended the necessary; therefore, the possible follows upon the necessary. Hence he says, Therefore, since the universal follows upon the part, i.e., since the whole universal follows upon its

subjective part, to be possible to be, i.e., possible, as the whole universal, follows upon that which necessarily is, i.e., necessary, as a subjective part. He adds: though not every kind of possible does, i.e., not every species of the possible follows; just as animal follows upon man, but not in every way, i.e., it does not follow upon man according to all its subjective parts, for it is not valid to say, “He is a man, therefore he is an irrational animal.”

By this proof of the validity of the affirmative part, Aristotle has explicitly destroyed the reasoning adduced for the negative part, which, as is evident, erred according to the fallacy of the consequent in inferring the possible from the necessary by descending to one species of the possible.

7. When he says, Indeed the necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of all that is or is not, etc., he disposes the same consequences of modals in another arrangement, placing the necessary before all the other modes. First he proposes the order of modals and then assigns the cause of the order where he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said that that which necessarily is, actually is, etc.

Indeed, he says, the necessary and not necessary may well be the principle of the “to be” or “not to be” of all modal enunciations, i.e., the necessary and not necessary is the principle of affirmatives or negatives. And the others, i.e., the possible, contingent, and impossible to be must be considered as consequent to these, i.e., to the necessary and not necessary.

8. When he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said that that which necessarily is, actually is, etc., he gives the cause of this order. First he gives the reason for placing the necessary before the possible: the sempiternal is prior to the temporal; but “necessary” signifies sempiternal (because it signifies “to be in act,” excluding all mutability and consequently temporality, which is not imaginable without movement) and the possible signifies temporality (since it does not exclude the possibility of being and not being); therefore, the necessary is rightly placed before the possible.

He proposes the minor of this argument when he says, It is evident, then, from what has been said in treating the necessary, that that which necessarily is, is totally in act, since it excludes all mutability and potency to the opposite—for if it could be changed into the opposite in any way, then it would not be necessary. Next he gives the major, which is in the mode of an antecedent conditional: and if eternal things are prior to temporal, etc. Finally, he posits the conclusion: those that are wholly in act in every way, namely necessary, are prior to the potential, i.e., to possibles, which do not have being in act wholly although they are compatible with it.

9. Then he says, Some things are actualities without potentiality, namely, the primary substances, etc. Here he assigns the cause of the whole order established among modals. The grades of the universe are threefold. Some things are in act without potentiality, i.e., not combined with potency. These are the primary substances—not those we have called "first" in the present work because they principally and especially sustain—but those that are first because they are the causes of all things, namely, the Intelligences. In others, act is accompanied with possibility, as is the case with all mobile things, which, according to what they have of act, are prior in nature to themselves according to what they have of potency, although the contrary is the case in regard to the order of time. According to what they have of potency they are prior in time to themselves according to what they have of act. For example, according to time, Socrates first was able to be a philosopher, then he actually was a philosopher. In Socrates therefore, potency precedes act according to the order of time. The converse is the case, however, in the order of nature, perfection, and dignity, for when he actually was a philosopher, Socrates was regarded as prior according to dignity, i.e., more worthy and more perfect than when he was potentially a philosopher. Hence, when we consider each order, i.e., nature and time, in one and the same thing, the order of potency and act is reversed.

Others never are in act but are only in potency, e.g., motion, time, the infinite division of magnitude, and the infinite augmentation of number. These, as is said in IX Metaphysicae [6: 1048b 9-17], never terminate in act, for it is repugnant to their nature. None of them is ever such that something of it is not expected, and consequently they can only be in potency. These, however, must be treated in another place.

10. This has been said so that once the order of the universe has been seen it should appear that we were imitating it in our present ordering. The necessary, which signifies "to be in act" without potentiality or mutability, has been placed first, in imitation of the first grade of the universe. We have put the possible and contingent, both of which signify act with possibility, in second place in conformity with the second grade of the universe. The possible has been Placed before the contingent because the possible relates

to act whereas the contingent, as the force of the name suggests, relates to the defect of a cause-which pertains to potency, for defect follows upon potency. The order of these is similar to the order in the second part of the universe, where act is prior to potency according to nature, though not according to time.

We have reserved the last place for the impossible because it signifies what never will be, just as the last part of the universe is said to be that which is never in act. Thus, a beautifully proportioned order is established when the divine is observed.

11. Since the consequents of modals, i.e., those placed under each other, are their equivalents in meaning, and these are produced by the varying position of the negation changing the quality or quantity or both, a few things must be said about their quality and quantity to complete our knowledge of them.

The nature of the whole arises from the parts, and therefore we should note the following things about the parts of the modal enunciation. The subject of the modal enunciation asserts to be or not to be, and is a singular dictum, and contains in itself the subject of the dictum. The predicate of a modal enunciation, namely, the mode, is the total predicate (since it explicitly or implicitly contains the verb, which is always a sign of something predicated of another, for which reason Aristotle says that the mode is a determining addition) and contains in itself distributive force according to the parts of time. The necessary and impossible distribute in all time either simply or in a limited way; the possible and contingent distribute according to some time commonly.

12. As a consequence of these five conditions there is a twofold quality and a threefold quantity in any modal. The twofold quality results from the fact that both the subject and the predicate of a modal have a verb in them. One of these is called the quality of the dictum, the other the quality of the mode. This is why it was said above that there is an enunciation which is affirmative of mode and not of dictum, and conversely.

Of the threefold quantity of a modal enunciation, one arises from the fact that the subject of the modal contains in it the subject of the dictum. This is called the quantity of the subject of the dictum, and is distinguished into universal, particular, and singular, as in the case of the quantity of an absolute enunciation. For we can say: “That ‘Socrates,’ ‘some man,’ ‘every man,”‘ or “‘no man,’ run is possible’ “

The second quantity is that of the dictum, which arises from the fact that the subject of one modal is one dictum. This is a unique singularity, for every dictum of a modal is the singular of that universal, i.e.,dictum. “That man be white is possible” means “This dictum, ‘that man be white,’ is possible.” “This dictum” is singular in quantity, just as “this man” is. Hence, every modal is singular with respect to dictum, although with respect to the subject of the dictum it is universal or particular.

The third quantity is that of the mode, or modal quantity, which arises from the fact that the predicate of the modal, i.e., the mode, has distributive force. This is distinguished into universal and particular.

13. Now, there are two things about modal enunciations that must be carefully noted. The first—which is peculiar to modals—is that the predicate quantifies the modal proposition simply, as it also qualifies it simply. For just as the modal enunciation in which the mode is affirmed is affirmative simply, and negative when the mode is negated, so the modal enunciation in which the mode is universal is universal simply and particular in which the mode is particular. The reason for this is that the modal follows the nature of the mode.

The second thing to be noted (which is the cause of the first) is that the predicate of a modal, i.e., the mode, not only has the relationship of a predicate to its subject (i.e., to “to be” and “not to be”), but also has the relationship to the subject, of a distributive syncategorematic term, which has the effect of distributing the subject, not according to the quantity of its subjective parts, but according to the quantity of the parts of its time. And rightly so, for just as the proper quantity of the subject of an absolute enunciation varies according to the division or lack of division of its subject (since the subject is a name which signifies in the mode of substance, whose quantity is from the division of the continuous, and therefore the quantifying sign distributes according to the subjective parts), so, because the proper quantity of the subject of a modal enunciation is time (since the subject is a verb, which signifies in the mode of movement, whose proper quantity is time), the quantifying mode distributes the subject, i.e., “to be” or “not to be” according to the parts of time. Hence, we arrive at the subtle point that the quantity of the modal is the quantity of the proper subject of the modal enunciation, namely, of “to be” or “not to be.” Therefore, a modal enunciation is universal simply when the proper subject is distributed throughout all time, either simply, as in “That man is an animal is necessary or impossible,” or taken in a limited way, as in “That man is running today,” or “while he is running, is necessary or impossible.”

A modal enunciation is particular in which “to be” or “not to be” is distributed, not throughout all time, but commonly throughout some time, as in “That man is an animal is possible or contingent.”

This modal quantity is therefore also a property of its subject (in that, universally, quantity comes from the matter) but is derived from the mode, not insofar as it is a predicate (because, as such, it is understood formally), but insofar as it performs a syncategorematic function, which it has in virtue of the fact that it is properly a mode.

14. Therefore, with respect to their proper quantity, some modals are universal affirmatives, i.e., those of the necessary because they distribute “to be” to all time. Others are universal negatives, i.e., those of the impossible because they distribute “to be” to no time. Still others are particular affirmatives, i.e., those signifying the possible and contingent, for both of these distribute “to be” to some time. Finally, there are particular negatives, i.e., those of the not necessary and not impossible, for they distribute “not to be” to some time. This is similar to the diversity in absolute enunciations from the use of “every,” “no” “some,” not all,” and “not none.”

Now, since this quantity belongs to modals insofar as they are modals, as has been said, and since Aristotle is now considering them in this particular respect, the modal enunciations that are equivalent, i.e., their consequents, are ordered by the different location of the negation, as is the case with absolute enunciations that are equivalent. A negative placed before the mode makes an enunciation equivalent to its contradictory; placed after the mode, i.e., with the verb of the dictum, makes it equivalent to its contrary; placed before and after the mode makes it equivalent to its subaltern, as you can see in the last table of consequents given by Aristotle. In that table of oppositions, you see all the mutual consequents, according to one of the three rules for making enunciations equivalent. Consequently, the whole first order of equivalent enunciations is contrary to the second, contradictory to the third, and the fourth is subalternated to it.

LESSON 13

Contrariety of Opinions in the Mind Is Constituted by an Opposition of the True and the False

23a 27 There is a question as to whether the contrary of an affirmation is a negation, or whether the contrary of an affirmation is another affirmation; and in the case of speech whether the one saying that no man is just is contrary to the one saying that every man is just, or is the one saying that every man is unjust contrary to the one saying that every man is just. For example, which of these are contraries: “Callias is just,” “Callias is not just,” “Callias is unjust”?

23a 32 For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect, and if in the intellect that opinion is contrary which is about a contrary, for instance, the contrary of “Every man is just” is “Every man is unjust,” the case must be the same with respect to spoken affirmations. But if in the intellect the contrary opinion is not one which is about a contrary, then in speech the affirmation will not be contrary to the affirmation, but the negation will be. We must therefore consider which false opinion is contrary to a true opinion, whether it is a negation of the true opinion or the opinion affirming a contrary.

What I mean is this: there is a true opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and a false opinion, that it is not good, and another kind, that it is evil; of the latter two which one is contrary to the true opinion; and if they are one and the same, which one is the contrary?

23b 2 It is false, of course, to suppose that opinions are to be defined as contrary because they are about contraries; for the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is evil, that it is evil, are probably the same, and, whether they are many or one are true. Yet good and evil are contraries. However, opinions are not contraries because they are about contraries; rather, they are contrary because they are related contrarily.

23b 7 Now if there is the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and the opinion that it is not good, and there are other opinions that something that does not belong and could not possibly belong to the good belongs to the good, none of the latter should be posited as the contrary, neither those purporting that what does not belong to the good belongs to it nor those purporting that what belongs to the good does not belong to it, for the opinions that that belongs which does not belong and the opinions that that does not belong which does, are infinite.

1. Now that he has treated the enunciation as it is diversified by an addition made to the terms and by an addition made to its composition (which is the division of the text made by St. Thomas at the beginning of the second book), Aristotle takes up another question about oppositions of enunciations. This question concerns the oppositions that result from something added to the simple enunciation. First he asks the question; secondly, he shows that this question depends upon another, which must be treated first, where he says, For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect, etc.; third, he settles the latter question where he says, It is false, course, to suppose that opinions are to be defined as contrary because they are about contraries, etc.; finally, he replies to the first question where he says, If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, etc.

The first question he raises is this: is the contrary of an affirmative enunciation the negation of the same predicate or the affirmation of a contrary or privative predicate? Hence he says, There is a question as to whether the contrary of an affirmation is the contradictory negation, and universally, whether affirmative speech is contrary to negative speech. For instance, is affirmative speech which says “Every man is just,” contrary to negative speech which says “No man is just,” or to the affirmative of the privative predicate, “Every man is unjust”? And similarly, is the affirmation “Callias is just” contrary to the contradictory negation, “Callias is not just” or is it contrary to “Callias is unjust,” the affirmative of the privative predicate?

2. Since this question has not been discussed by others, we must begin by noting that there are two things in an enunciation, namely, the enunciation itself, i.e., the signification, and the mode of enunciating or signifying. Hence, a twofold opposition can be made between enunciations, one by reason of the enunciation itself, the other by reason of the mode of enunciating.

If we consider the modes of enunciating, we find two species of opposition among enunciations, namely, contrariety and contradiction. This point was made earlier when opposed enunciations were divided into contraries and contradictories. There is contradiction by reason of mode of enunciating when the same thing is predicated of the same subject in a contradictory mode; so that just as one of a pair of contradictories posits nothing but only destroys the other, so one enunciation 4 asserts nothing, but only destroys what the other was enunciating. All enunciations that are called contradictories are of this kind; e.g., “Every man is just,” “Not every man is just”; “Socrates is just,” “Socrates is not just.” It follows from this that they cannot be at once true or false, just as two contradictories cannot be at once.

There is contrariety between enunciations by reason of mode of enunciating when the same thing is predicated of the same subject in a contrary mode of enunciating; so that just as one of a pair of contraries posits matter common to itself and to the other which is at the extreme distance under that genus—as is evident for instance in white and black—so one enunciation posits a subject common to itself and its opposite at the extreme distance under that predicate. All the enunciations in the diagram that are called contrary are of this kind, for example, “Every man is just,” “No man is just.” These make the subject “man” distant to the greatest degree possible under justice, one enunciating justice to be in man, not in any way, but universally, the other enunciating justice to be absent from man, not in any way, but universally. For no distance can be greater than the distance between the total number of things having something and none of the total number of things having that thing. It follows that contrary enunciations cannot be at once true, just as contraries cannot be in the same thing at once. They can, however, be false at the same time, just as it is possible that contraries not be in the same thing at the same time.

If we consider the enunciation itself (viz., its signification) according to only one species of opposition, we will find in the whole range of enunciations an opposition of contrariety, i.e., an opposition according to truth and falsity. The reason for this is that the significations of two enunciations are positive, and accordingly cannot be opposed either contradictorily or privatively because the other extreme of both of these oppositions is formally non-being. And since significations are not opposed relatively, as is evident, the only way they can be opposed is contrarily.

3. The contrariety spoken of here consists in this: of two enunciations one is not compatible with the other either in truth or falsity—presupposing always the conditions for contraries, that they are about the same thing and at once. It can be shown that such opposition is contrariety from the nature of the conceptions of the soul when composing and dividing, each of which is an enunciation. Adequate conceptions of the soul are opposed to inadequate conceptions only contrarily, and inadequate conceptions, if each cancels the other, are also called contraries. It is from this that St. Thomas proves, in [Summa theologiae] part I, question 17, that the true and false are contrarily opposed. Therefore, as in the conceptions of the soul, so in enunciations, adequate significations are contrarily opposed to inadequate, i.e., true to false; and the inadequate, i.e., the false, are also contrarily opposed among themselves if it happens that they are not compatible, supposing always the conditions for contraries.

There is, therefore, in enunciations a twofold contrariety, one by reason of mode, the other by reason of signification, and only one contradiction, that by reason of mode. To avoid confusion, let us call the first contrariety modal and the second formal. We may call contradiction modal—not to avoid confusion since it is unique—but for propriety of expression.

Formal contrariety is found between all contradictory enunciations, since one contradictory always excludes the other. It is also found between all modally contrary enunciations in regard to truth, since they cannot be at once true. However it is not found between the latter in regard to falsity, since they can be at once false.

4. Aristotle in this question is speaking of the contrariety of enunciations that extends to contraries modally and to contradictories. This is evident

from what he says in the beginning and at the end of the question. In the beginning, he proposes both contradictories when he says, an affirmation... to a negation, etc.; and contraries modally, when he says, and in the case of speech whether the one saying... is opposed to the one saying... etc. It is evident, too, from the examples immediately added. At the end, he explicitly divides what he has concluded to be contrary to a true universal affirmative, into the modally contrary universal negative and the contradictory. It is clear at once that this division would be false unless it comprised the contrary formally.

Since he takes contrariety in this way the question must be understood with respect to formal contrariety of enunciations. This is a very subtle question and one that has to be treated and has not been thus far.

The question, therefore, is this: whether the formal contrary of the true affirmative is the false negative of the same predicate or the false affirmative of the privative predicate, i.e., of the contrary. The meaning of the question is now clear, and it is evident why he does not ask about any other oppositions of enunciations-no other opposition is found in them formally. It is also evident that he is taking contrariety properly and strictly, notwithstanding the fact that such contrariety is found among contradictories modally and contraries modally.

St. Thomas has already pointed out that this question arises from the fact that something is added to the simple enunciation, for as it far as simple enunciations are concerned, i.e., those with only a second determinant, there is no occasion for the question. When, however, something is added, namely a predicate, to the simple enunciation, i.e., to the subject and the substantive verb, the question arises as to whether what ought to be added in contrary enunciations is the selfsame predicate with a negation added to the verb or a contrary, i.e., privative, predicate without a negation added to the verb.

5. When Aristotle says, For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect, etc.; he shows where we have to begin in order to settle this question. First he shows that the question depends on another question, namely, whether a true opinion (i.e., a conception of the soul in the second operation of the intellect) is contrary to a false negative opinion of the same predicate, or to a false affirmative of the contrary, i.e., privative, predicate. Then he gives the reason why the former question

depends on this. Vocal enunciations follow upon mental as adequate effects upon proper causes and as the signified upon adequate signs. So, in this the nature of each is similar.

He begins, then, with the reason for this dependence: For if those things that are in vocal sound are determined by those in the intellect (as was said in the beginning of the first book) and if in the soul, those opinions are contrary which affirm contrary predicates about the same subject, (for example, the mental enunciations, “Every man is just, “Every man is unjust”), then in affirmations that are in vocal sound, the case must be the same. The contraries will be two affirmatives about the same subject with contrary predicates. But if in the soul this is not the case, i.e., that opinions with contrary predicates constitute contrariety in mental enunciations, then the contrary of a vocal affirmation will not be a vocal affirmation with a contrary predicate. Rather, the contrary of an affirmation will be the negation of the same predicate.

6. The first question, then, depends on this question as an effect upon its cause. For this reason, and by way of a conclusion to what he has just been saying, he adds the second question, which must be treated first so that once the cause is known the effect will be known: We must therefore consider to which false opinion the true opinion is contrary, whether it is to the false negation or to the false affirmation that it is to be judged contrary. Then in order to propose the question by examples he says: what I mean is this; there are three opinions of a good, for instance, of life. One is a true opinion, that it is good, for instance, that life is good. The other is a false negative, that it is not good, for instance, that life is not good. Still another, likewise false, is the affirmative of the contrary, that it is evil, for instance, that life is evil. The question is, then, which of these false opinions is contrary to the true one.

7. Then he adds, the question, and if there is one, is either one the contrary. This passage can be read in three ways. It can be read inquiringly so that it is a part of the question, and then the meaning is: which of these false opinions is contrary to the true opinion, and, is there one of these by which the contrary to the true one is effected? For since one is contrary to one other, as is said in X Metaphysicae [1: 1055a 19], in asking which of these is the contrary we are also asking whether one of them is the contrary.

This can also be read adversatively, and then the meaning is: which of these is the contrary, given that we know it is not both but one by which the contrariety is effected?

This can be read in a third way by dividing the first clause, “and if it is one” from the second clause, “is either one the contrary.” The first part is then read assertively, the second inquiringly, and the meaning is: which of these two false opinions is contrary to the true opinion if the two false opinions differ as to consequence, and also if both are one, i.e., united to each other indivisibly?

Boethius explains this passage in the last way. He says that Aristotle adds these words because of immediate contraries in which the contrary does not differ from the privative. For the difference between mediate and immediate contraries is that in the former the contrary is not inferred from the privative. For example, this is not valid: “A colored body is not white, therefore it is black”—for it could be red. In immediate contraries, on the other hand, it is valid to infer the contrary from the privative; e.g., “An animal is not healthy, therefore it is number is not even, therefore it is odd.” Therefore, Aristotle intends to show here that when we ask which of these false opinions, i.e., negative and affirmative contraries, is contrary to the true affirmative, we are asking universally whether these two false opinions follow each other indivisibly or not.

8. When he says, It is false, of course, to suppose that opinions are to be defined as contrary because they are about contraries, etc., he proceeds with the second question. First he shows that contrariety of opinions is not determined by the contrariety of the matter involved, but rather by the opposition of true and false; secondly, he shows that there is not contrariety of opinions in just any opposites according to truth and falsity, where he says, Now if there is the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and the opinion that it is not good, etc.; third, he determines that contrariety of opinions is concerned with the per se first opposites; according to truth and falsity, for three reasons, where he says, Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions, etc.; finally, he shows that this determination is true of all, where he says, It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, for the universal negation will be the contrary, etc.

Aristotle says, then, proposing the conclusion he intends to prove, that it is false to suppose that opinions are to be defined or determined as contrary because they are about contrary objects. He gives two arguments for this. Contrary opinions are not the same opinion; but opinions about contraries are probably the same opinion; therefore, opinions are not contrary from the fact that they are about contraries. And, contrary opinions are not simultaneously true; but opinions about contraries, whether many or one, are sometimes true simultaneously; therefore, opinions are not contraries because they are about contraries.

Having supposed the majors of these arguments, he posits a manifestation of each minor at the same time. In relation to the first argument, he says, for the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is evil, that it is evil are probably the same. In relation to the second argument he adds: and, whether many or one, are true. He uses "probably," an adverb expressing doubt and disjunction, because this is not the place to determine whether the opinion of contraries is the same opinion, and, because in some way the opinion is the same and in some way not. In the case of habitual opinion, the opinion of contraries is the same, but in the case of an actual opinion it is not. One mental composition is actually made in conceiving that a good is good and another in conceiving that an evil is evil, although we know both by the same habit, the former per se and first, the latter secondarily, as is said in IX Metaphysicae [4: 1051a 4].

Then he adds that good and evil—which are used for the manifestation of the minor—are contraries even when the contrariety is taken strictly in moral matters; and so in using this our exposition is apposite.

Finally, he draws the conclusion: however, opinions are not contraries because they are about contraries, but rather because they are contraries, i.e., opinions are to be considered as contrary from the fact that they enunciate contrarily, adverbially, i.e., in a contrary mode, i.e., they enunciate truly and falsely. Thus the first argument is clear.

9. When he says, Now, if there is the opinion of that which is good, that it is good, and the opinion that it is not good, etc., he takes up the second point. Since he has just said that contrariety of opinions is taken according to their opposition of truth and falsity, he goes on to show that not just any opposites according to truth and falsity are contraries. This is his argument. Four opinions can be held about a good, for instance justice: that justice is

good, that it is not good, that it is avoidable, that it is not desirable. Of these, the first is true, the rest false. The three false ones are diverse. The first denies the same predicate the true one affirmed; the second affirms something which does not belong to the good; the third denies what belongs to the good, but something other than the true one affirmed. Now if all opinions opposed as to truth and falsity are contraries, then not only are there many contraries to one true opinion, but an infinite number. But this is impossible, for one is contrary to one other. The consequence holds because infinite false opinions about one thing, similar to those cited, can be imagined; such opinions would affirm of it what does not belong to it and deny what is joined to it in some way. Both kinds are indeterminate and without number. We can think, for instance, that justice is a quantity, that it is a relation, that it is this and that; and likewise we can think that it is not a quality, is not desirable, is not a habit.

Hence, from what was said above in proposing the question, Aristotle infers a plurality of false opinions opposed to one true opinion: Now if there is the opinion of that which is good, for instance justice, that it is good, and there is a false opinion denying the same thing, namely, that it is not good, and besides these a third opinion, false also, affirming that some other thing belongs to justice that does not belong and cannot belong to it (for instance, that justice is avoidable, that it is illicit) and a fourth opinion, also false, that denies something other than the true opinion affirms, something, however, which does belong to justice (for instance, that it is not a quality, that it is not a virtue), none of these other false enunciations are to be posited as the contrary of the true opinion. To explain what he is designating by “of these others,” he adds, neither those purporting that what is not, is, as opinions of the third order do, nor those purporting that what is, is not, as opinions of the fourth order signify. Then he adds the reason these cannot be posited as the contrary of the true opinion: for both the opinions that that is which is not, and that which is not, is, are infinite, as was shown above. Therefore, not just any opinions opposed according to truth and falsity are contraries. Thus the second argument is clear.

LESSON 14

The Opposition of True and False that Constitutes Contrariety of Opinions Is Opposition According to Affirmation and Negation of the Same Predicate of the Same Subject

23b 13 Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions. Now the things from which fallacies arise are the things from which generations arise; but generations are from opposites, therefore also fallacies.

23b 15 Now if that which is good is both good and not evil, the former per so, the latter accidentally (for it is accidental to that which is good not to be evil), and the true opinion which is a per se opinion of a thing is more true, then the false opinion which is a per se opinion is also more false. But the opinion that that which is good is not good is a false opinion about what belongs per se to a good and the opinion that it is evil, a false opinion concerning what belongs to it accidentally. Therefore the opinion of the negation of the good will be more false than the opinion affirming a contrary. Now the one who holds the contrary opinion about each thing is most mistaken; for contraries are those that differ most with respect to the same thing. If, then, of two opinions one is the contrary, but the opinion of the negation is more contrary, it is evident that it must be the contrary. The opinion that that which is good is evil, however, is implicative; for probably along with this opinion one must understand that the good is not good.

23b 27 Further, if this necessarily holds in a similar way in all other cases, it would seem that what we have said is correct; for the opposition of contradiction either holds everywhere or nowhere. Now in the case where there is no contrary, that opinion is false which is the opposite of the true opinion; for instance, he who thinks man is not man thinks falsely. If then these are contraries, the others in which there is contradiction are also contraries.

23b 33 Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel; so also are the opinions of that which is good, that it is not good, and of that which is not good, that it is good. What, then, would be the contrary of a true opinion that that which is not good is not good? It is not the opinion saying that it is evil. This might be at the same time true and a true opinion is never contrary to a true opinion; for some things that are not good are evil and therefore it is possible for both opinions to be true. Nor is the opinion that it is not evil the contrary, for this too might be true, since something could be at one and the same time not good and not evil. It remains, therefore, that the contrary of an opinion that that which is not good is not good, is the false opinion that that which is not good is good; for the former is true. Therefore, also, the opinion that that which is good is not good is contrary to the opinion that that which is good is good.

24a 3 It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, for the universal negation will be the contrary. For instance, the contrary of the opinion that everything that is good is good, is that nothing that is good is good. For the opinion that that which is good is good, if the good is taken universally, is the same as the opinion that whatever is good is good; and this is no different from the opinion that everything that is good is good. And the same is the case with respect to the not good.

24b 1 If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, it is evident that the contrary of the affirmation is the negation of the same subject universally. For example, the contrary of the enunciation “Everything good is good” is “Nothing good is good,” or of “Every man is good..... No man is good.” The contradictories, on the other hand, are “Not everything good is good,” and “Not every man is good.”

24b 6 It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction. For contraries are about opposites, and while it is possible for the same thing to be said truly about contraries, it is not possible for contraries to belong at once to the same subject.

1. Aristotle has just completed a subtle investigation in which he has shown that contrariety of matter does not constitute contrariety of opinion, nor does just any kind of opposition of true and false, but some opposition of true and false does. Now he intends to determine what kind of opposition of true and false it is that constitutes contrariety of opinions, for this will answer the question directly.

He maintains that only opposition of opinions according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing, etc., constitutes their contrariety. Accordingly, as the response to the question, he intends to prove the following conclusion: opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing are contraries; and consequently, opinions opposed according to affirmation of contrary predicates of the same subject are not contraries, for if these were contraries, the true affirmative would have two contraries, which is impossible, since one is contrary to one other.

2. Aristotle uses three arguments to prove this conclusion. The first one is as follows: Those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries. Opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same predicate of the same subject are those in which there is fallacy first. Therefore, these are contraries.

The sense of the major is this: Opinions which first in the order of nature are the limits of fallacy, i.e., of deception or error, are contraries; for when someone is deceived or errs, there are two limits, the one from which he turns away and the one toward which he turns.

In the text the major of the argument is posited first: Rather, those opinions in which there is fallacy must be posited as contrary to true opinions. By uniting this part of the text adversatively with what was said previously, Aristotle implies that not just any of the number of opinions enumerated are contraries, but those in which there is fallacy first in the manner we have explained. Then he gives this proof of the minor: those things from which generations are and from which fallacies are, are the same proportionally; generations are from opposites according to affirmation and negation; therefore fallacies, too, are from opposites according to affirmation and negation (which was assumed in the minor). Hence he posits the major of this prosyllogism: Now the things from which fallacies arise, namely, limits, are the things from which generations arise—proportionally however. Under it he posits the minor: but generations are from opposites, i.e., according to affirmation and negation. Finally, he concludes, therefore also fallacies, i.e., they are from opposites according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing.

3. This proof will be more evident from the following: Knowledge and fallacy, or error, bring about the same thing in the intellect's progression as generation and corruption do in nature's progression. For just as natural perfections are acquired by generations and perish by corruptions, so intellectual perfections are acquired by knowledge and lost by errors or deceptions. Accordingly, just as generation and corruption are between affirmation and negation as proper terms, as is said in V Physicae [1:224b 35] so both to know something and to be deceived about it is between affirmation and negation as proper terms. Consequently, what one who knows attains first in the second operation of the intellect is affirmation of the truth, and what he rejects per se and first is the negation of it. In like manner, what he who is deceived loses per se and first is affirmation of the truth, and acquires first is negation of the truth. Therefore Aristotle is correct in maintaining that the terms between which there is generation first and between which there is fallacy first are the same, because with respect to both, the terms are affirmation and negation.

4. When he says, Now, if that which is good is both good and not evil, the former per se, the latter accidentally, etc., he intends to prove the major of the principal argument. He has already shown that the opinions in which there is fallacy first are affirmation and negation, and therefore in place of the major to be proved (i.e., opinions in which it there is fallacy first are contraries) he uses his conclusion—which has already been shown to be equivalent—that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries. Thus with his customary brevity he at once proves the major, responds directly to the question, and applies it to what he has proposed.

In place of the major, then, he proves the conclusion principally intended, i.e., that opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries, and not those opposed according to affirmation of contraries about the same thing. His argument is as follows: A true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it are contrary opinions, but opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are the true opinion and the opinion that is more false in respect to it; therefore, opinions opposed according to affirmation and negation are contraries. The major is proved thus: those things that are most distant in respect to the same thing are contraries; but the true and the more false are most distant in respect to the same thing, as is clear. The proof of the minor is that the opposite according to negation of the same thing of the same thing is per se false in relation to the true affirmation of it. But a per se false opinion is more false than any other, since each thing that is per se such is more such than anything that is such by reason of something else.

5. Accordingly, returning to the opinions already given in proposing the question so as to show his intention more clearly by example, he begins with the proof of the minor. There are four opinions, of which two are true, “A good is good,” “A good is not evil”; two are false, “A good is not good” and “A good is evil.” It is evident that the first is true by reason of itself, the second accidentally, i.e., by reason of another, for not to be evil is added to that which is good. Hence, “A good is not evil” is true because a good is good, and not contrarily. Therefore, the first of these opinions, which is per se true, is more true than the second, for in each genus that which per se is true is more true. The two false opinions are to be judged in the same way. The more false is the one that is per se false. The first of them, the negative, “A good is not good,” in relation to the affirmative, “A good is good,” is per se false, not false by reason of another. The second, the affirmative of the contrary, “A good is evil,” in relation to the same opinion, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another (for “A good is evil” is not immediately falsified by the true opinion, “A good is good,” but mediately through the other false opinion “A good is not good”). Therefore, the negation of the same thing is more false in respect to a trite affirmation than the affirmation of a contrary. This was assumed in the minor.

6. As was pointed out above, Aristotle returns to the opinions already posited, and infers the first two true opinions: Now if that which is good is both good and not evil, and if what the first opinion says is true per se, i.e., by reason of itself, and what the second opinion says is trite accidentally

(since it is accidental to it, i.e., added to it, that is, to the good, not to be evil) and if in each order that which is per se true is more true, then that which is per se false is more false, since, as has been shown, the true also is of this nature, namely, that the more true is that which per se is true.

Therefore, of the two false opinions proposed in the question, namely, “A good is not good,” and “A good is evil,” the one saying that what is good is not good, namely, the negative, is an opinion positing what is per se false, i.e., by reason of itself it contains falsity in it. The other false opinion, the one saying it is evil, namely, the affirmative contrary in respect to it, i.e., in respect to the affirmation saying that a good is good, is false accidentally, i.e., by reason of another.

Then he gives the minor: Therefore, the opinion of the negation of the good will be more false than the opinion affirming a contrary. Next, he posits the major, the one who holds the contrary judgment about each thing is most mistaken, i.e., in relation to the true judgment the contrary is more false. This was assumed in the major. He gives as the proof of this, for contraries are those that differ most with respect to the same thing, for nothing differs more from a true opinion than the more false opinion in respect to it.

7. Finally, he directly approaches the question. If (for “since”), then, of two opinions (namely, false opinions—the negation of the same thing and the affirmation of a contrary), one is the contrary of the true affirmation, and, the contradictory opinion, i.e., the negation of the same thing of the same thing, is more contrary according to falsity, i.e., is more false, it is evident that the false opinion of negation will be contrary to the true affirmation, and conversely. The opinion saying that what is good is evil, i.e., the affirmation of a contrary, is not the contrary but implies it, i.e., it implies in itself the opinion contrary to the true opinion, i.e., “A good is not good.” The reason for this is that the one conceiving the affirmation of a contrary must conceive that the same thing of which he affirms the contrary, is not good. If, for example, someone conceives that life is evil, he must conceive that life is not good, for the former necessarily follows upon the latter and not conversely. Hence, affirmation of a contrary is said to be implicative, but negation of the same thing of the same thing is not implicative. This concludes the first argument.

8. The general rule about the contrariety of opinions that Aristotle has given here (namely, that contrary opinions are those opposed according to affirmation and negation of the same thing of the same thing) is accurate both in itself and in the propositions assumed for its proof. Many questions may arise, however, as a consequence of this doctrine and its proof. First of all, all philosophers hold that opposition according to affirmation and negation constitutes contradiction, not contrariety. How, then, can Aristotle maintain that opinions opposed in this way are contraries? The difficulty is augmented by the fact that he has said that those opinions in which there is fallacy first are contraries, yet he adds that they are opposed as the terms of generation are, which he establishes to be opposed contradictorily. In addition, there is a difficulty as to the way in which the assertion of St. Thomas, which we used above, is true, namely, that no two opinions are opposed contradictorily, since here it is explicitly said that some are opposed according to affirmation and negation.

The second uestion involves his assumption that the contrary of each true opinion is per se false. This does not seem to be true, for according to what was determined previously, the contrary of the true opinion “Socrates is white” is “Socrates is not white.” But this is not per se false, for the opposed affirmation is true accidentally, and hence its negation is false accidentally. Falsity is accidental to such an enunciation because, being in contingent matter, it can be changed into a true one.

A third difficulty arises from the fact that Aristotle says the contradictory opinion is nwre contrary. He seems to be proposing, according to this, that both the opinion of the negation and of a contrary are contrary to a true affirmation. Consequently, he is either positing two opinions contrary to one or he is not taking contrariety strictly, although we showed above that he was taking contrariety properly and strictly.

9. In order to answer all of the difficulties in regard to the first argument it must be noted that opinions, or intellectual conceptions in the second operation, can be taken in three ways: (1) according to what they are absolutely; (2) according to the things they represent absolutely, (3) according to the things they represent, as they are in opinions. We will omit the first since it does not belong to the present consideration. If they are taken in the second way, i.e., according to the things represented, there can be opposition of contradiction, of privation, and of contrariety among them.

The mental enunciation “Socrates sees,” according to what it represents, is opposed contradictorily to. Socrates does not see”; privatively to “Socrates is blind”; contrarily to “Socrates is purblind.” Aristotle points out the reason for this in the Postpredicamenta [Categ. 10: 12a 35]: not only is blindness privation of sight but to be blind is also a privation of to be seeing, and so of others.

Opinions taken in the third way, i.e., as the things represented through opinions are in the opinions, have no opposition except contrariety; for opposites as they are in opinions, whether represented contradictorily or privatively or contrarily, only admit of the opposition that can be found between two real beings, for opinions are real beings. The rule is that whatever belongs to something according to the being which it has in another, belongs to it according to the mode and nature of that in which it is, and not according to what its own nature would require. Now, between real beings only contrariety is found formally. (I am omitting here the consideration of relative opposition.) Therefore, opinions taken in this mode, if they are opposed, represent contrariety, although not all are contraries properly. Only those differing most in respect to truth and falsity about the same thing are contraries properly. Now Aristotle proved that these are - judgments affirming and denying the same thing of the same thing. Therefore, these are the true contraries. The rest are called contraries by reduction to these.

10. From this the answer to the objections is clear. We grant that affirmation and negation in themselves constitute contradiction. In actual judgments,”‘ affirmation and negation cause contrariety between opinions because of the extreme distance they posit between real beings, namely, true opinion and false opinion in respect to the same thing. And these two stand at the same time: those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as the terms of generation are and yet they are contraries by the use of the foresaid distinction—for they are opposed contradictorily as terms of generation according to the things represented, but they are contraries insofar as they have in themselves those contradictories and hence differ most.

It is also evident that there is no disagreement between Aristotle and St. Thomas, for we have shown that it is true that some opinions are opposed according to affirmation and negation if we consider the things represented, as is said here.

11. It will be noted, however, by those of you who are more penetrating and advanced in your thinking, that between opposite opinions there is something of true motion when a change is made from the affirmed to the affirmed; but according to the order of representation there is a certain similitude to generation and corruption so long as the change is bounded by affirmation and negation. Consequently, fallacy or error may be regarded in different ways. Sometimes it has the aspect of both movement and change. This is the case when someone changes his opinion from a true one to one that is per se false, or conversely. Sometimes change alone is imitated. This happens when someone arrives at a false opinion apart from a former true opinion. Sometimes, however, there is movement in every respect. This is the case when reason passes from the true affirmation to the false affirmation of a contrary about the same thing.

However, since the first root of being in error is the opposition of affirmation and negation, Aristotle is correct in saying that those in which there is fallacy first are opposed as are the terms of generation.

12. With respect to the second question, I say that there is an equivocation of the term “per se false” and “per se true” in the objection. Opinion, as well as enunciation, can be called per se true or false in two ways. It can be called per se true in itself. This is the case in respect to all opinions and enunciations that are in accordance with the modes of perseity enumerated in I Posteriorum [4: 73a; 34–73b 15]. Similarly, they can be said to be per se false according to the same modes. An example of this would be “Man is not an animal.” Per se true or false is not taken in this mode in the rule about contrariety of opinions and enunciations, as the objection concludes. For if this were needed for contrariety of opinions there could not be contrary opinions in contingent matter, which is false.

Secondly, an opinion or enunciation can be said to be per se true or false in respect to its opposite: per se true with respect to its opposite false opinion, and per se false with respect to its opposite true opinion. Accordingly, to say that an opinion is per se true in respect to its opposite is to say that on its own account and not on account of another it is verified by the falsity of its opposite. Similarly, to say that an opinion is per se false in respect to its opposite means that on its own account and not on account of another it is falsified by the truth of the opposite. For example, the opinion that is per se false in respect to the true opinion “Socrates is running “is not, “Socrates is sitting,” since the falsity of the latter does not immediately follow from the former, but mediately from the false opinion, “Socrates is not running.” It is the latter opinion that is per se false in relation to “Socrates is running,” since it is falsified on its own account by the truth of the opinion “Socrates is running,” and not through an intermediary. Similarly, the per se true opinion in respect to the false opinion “Socrates is four-footed” is not, “Socrates is two-footed,” for the truth of the latter does not by itself make the former false; rather, it is through “Socrates is not four-footed” as a medium, which is per se true in respect to “Socrates is four-footed”; for “Socrates is not four-footed” is verified on its own account by the falsity of “Socrates is four-footed,” as is evident.

We are using “per se true” and “per se false” in this second mode in propounding the rule concerning contrariety of opinions and enunciations. Thus the rule that the true opinion and the per se false opinion in relation to it and the false opinion and the per se true in relation to it are contraries, is universally true in all matter. Consequently, the response to the objection is clear, for it results from taking “per se true” and “per se false” in the first mode.

13. The answer to the third difficulty is the following. Since there is no other opposition but contrariety between opinions pertaining to each other, Aristotle (since he chose to use limited terms) has been forced to say that one is more contrary than another, which implies that both have opposition of contrariety in respect to a true opinion. However, he determines immediately that only one of them, the negative opinion, is contrary to a true affirmation, when he adds, it is evident that it must be the contrary.

What he says, then, is that each, i.e., both negation of the same thing and affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to a true affirmation, and that only one of them, i.e., the negation, is contrary. Both of these statements are true, for both contrarieties are caused by an opposition contrary to the affirmation, as was said, but not uniformly. The opinion of negation is contrary first and per se, the opinion of affirmation of a contrary, secondarily and accidentally, i.e., through another, namely, by reason of the negative opinion, as has already been shown. There is a parallel to this in natural things: both black and red are contrary to white, the former first, the latter reductively, i.e., inasmuch as red is reduced to black in a motion from white to red, as is said in V Physicorum [5: 229b 15].

However, the second statement, i.e., that only one of them, the negation, is contrary, is true simply, for the most distant extremes of one extent are contraries absolutely. Nov,, there are only two extremes of one distance and since between opinions pertaining to each other true affirmation is at one extreme, the remaining extreme must be granted to only one false opinion, i.e., to the one that is most distant from the true opinion. This has been proved to be the negative opinion. Only this one, then, is contrary to that absolutely speaking. Other opposites are contrary by reason of this one, as was said of those in between.

Therefore, Aristotle has not posited many opinions contrary to one, nor used contrariety in a broad sense, both of which were maintained by the objector.

14. When Aristotle says, Further, if this necessarily holds in a similar way in till other cases it would seen that what we have said is correct, etc., he gives the second argument to prove that the negation of the same thing is contrary to the affirmation, and not the affirmation of a contrary. If opinions are necessarily related in a similar way, i.e., in the same way, in other matter, that is, in such a way that affirmation and negation of the same thing are contraries in other matter, it would seem that what we have said about the opinions of that which is good and that which is evil is correct, i.e., that the contrary of the affirmation of that which is good is not the affirmation of evil but the negation of good. He proves this consequence when he adds: for the opposition of contradiction either holds everywhere or nowhere, i.e., in every matter one part of a contradiction must be judged contrary to its affirmation—or never, i.e., in no matter. For if there is a general art which deals with contrary opinions, contrary Opinions must be taken everywhere and in every matter in one and the same mode. Consequently, if in any matter, negation of the same thing of the same thin- is the contrary of the affirmation, then in all matter negation of the same thing of the same thing will be the contrary of the affirmation.

Since he intends in his proof to conclude from the position of the antecedent, Aristotle affirms the antecedent through its cause: in matter in which there is not a contrary, such as substance and quantity, which have no contraries, as is said in the Predicamcnta [Categ. 5: 3b 24; 6: 5b 10], the one contradictorily opposed to the true opinion is per se false. For example, he who thinks that man, for instance Socrates, is not man, is per se mistaken with regard to one who thinks that Socrates is man. Then he affirms the antecedent formally and concludes directly from the position of the antecedent to the position of the consequent. If then these, namely, affirmation and negation in matter which lacks a contrary, are contraries, all other contradictions must be judged to be contraries.

15. Then he says, Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. This begins the third argument to prove the same thing.

The two opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and that it is not good, are related in the same way as the two opinions of that which is not good, that it is not good and that it is good; i.e., the opposition of contradiction is kept in both. The first opinion of each combination is true, the second false. Hence with respect to the first true opinions of each combination he proposes this major: Again, the opinions of that which is good, that it is good, and of that which is not good, that it is not good, are parallel. With respect to the second false judgment of each combination he adds: so also are the opinions of that which is good, that it is not good, and of that which is not good, that it is good. This is the major. But the contrary of the true opinion of that which is not good, namely, the true opinion "That which is not good is not good," is not, "That which is not good is evil," nor "That which is not good is not evil," which have a contrary predicate, but the opinion that that which is not good is good, which is its contradictory. Therefore, the contrary of the true opinion of that which is good, namely, the true opinion "That which is good is good," will also be its contradictory, "That which is good is not good," and not the affirmation of the contrary "That which is good is evil." Hence he adds the minor which we have already stated: What, then, would be the contrary of the true opinion asserting that that which is not good is not good? The contrary of it is not the opinion which asserts the contrary predicate affirmatively, "That which is not good is evil," because these two are sometimes at once true. But a true opinion is never contrary to a true opinion. That these two are sometimes at once true is evident from the fact that some things that are not good are evil. Take injustice; it is something not good, and it is evil. Therefore, contraries would be true at one and the same time, which is impossible. But neither is the contrary of the above true opinion the one asserting the contrary predicate negatively, "That which is not good is not evil," and for the same reason. These will also be true at the same time. For example, a chimera is something not good, and it is true to say of it simultaneously that it is not good and that it is not evil.

There remains the third part of the minor: the contrary of the true opinion that that which is not good is not good is the opinion that it is good, which is the contradictory of it. Then he concludes as he intended: the opinion that a good is not good is contrary to the opinion that a good is good, i.e., its contradictory. Therefore, it must be judged that contradictions are contraries in every matter.

16. He then says, It is evident that it will make no difference if we posit the affirmation universally, etc. Here he shows that the truth he has determined is extended to opinions of every quantity. The case has already been stated in respect to indefinites, particulars, and singulars. On this point their status is alike, for indefinites and particulars, unless they stand for the same thing, as is the case in singulars, are not opposed by way of affirmation and negation, since they are at once true. Therefore he turns his attention to those of universal quantity. It is evident, he says, that it will make no difference with respect to the proposed question if we posit the affirmations universally, for the contrary of the universal affirmative is the universal negative, and not the universal affirmation of a contrary. For example, the contrary of the opinion that everything that is good is good is the opinion that nothing that is good (i.e., no good) is good. He manifests this by the nominal definition of universal affirmative: for the opinion that that which is good is good, if the good is universal, i.e., the universal opinion "Every good is good," is the same, i.e., is equivalent to the opinion that whatever is good is good. Consequently, its negation is the contrary I have stated, "Nothing which is good is good," i.e., "No good is good."

The case is similar with respect to the not good. The universal negation of the not good is opposed to the universal affirmation of the not good, as we have stated with respect to the good.

7. Then he says, If, therefore, this is the case with respect to opinion, and. affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of those in the soul, etc. With this he returns to the question first advanced, to reply to it, for he has now completed the second on which the first depends. He first replies to the question, then manifests a point in the solution of a preceding difficulty

where he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc.

First, then, he replies directly to the question: If, therefore, contrariety is such in the case of opinions, and affirmations and negations in vocal sound are signs of affirmations and negations in the soul, it is evident that the contrary of the affirmation, i.e., of the affirmative, enunciation, is the negation of the same subject. In other words, the negative enunciation of the same predicate of the same subject will be the contrary, and not the affirmative enunciation of a contrary. Thus the response to the first question—whether the contrary of the affirmative enunciation is its negative or the contrary affirmative—is clear. The answer is that the negative is the contrary.

Next, he divides negation as it is contrary to affirmation, i.e., into the universal negation, and the contradictory: The universal, i.e., negation, is contrary to the affirmation, etc. In order to state this division by way of example he relates one enunciation to one enunciation: the contrary of the universal affirmative enunciation "Every good is' good" or "Every man is good," is the universal negative "No good is good" or "No man is good." Again, relating one to one, he says that the contradictory negation contrary to the universal affirmation is "Not every man is good" or "Not everything good is good." Thus he posits both members of the division and makes the division evident.

18. A difficulty arises at this point which we cannot disregard. If the contrary of the universal affirmative is a twofold negation, namely, the universal and the contradictory, either there are two contraries to one affirmation or Aristotle is using contrariety in a broad sense, although we showed that this was not the case apropos of an earlier passage of the text. The difficulty is augmented by the fact that Aristotle said in the passage immediately preceding that it makes no difference if we take the universal negation as contrary to the universal affirmation, i.e., as one of its negations. Hence, the conclusion cannot be avoided that in the mode in which Aristotle speaks of contrariety here, there are two contrary negations to the universal affirmative.

19. To clear up this difficulty we must note that it is one thing to speak of the contrariety there is between the negation of some universal affirmative in relation to the affirmation of a contrary, and another to speak of that same

universal negative in relation to the negation contradictory to the same affirmative. For example, the four enunciations of which we are now speaking are the universal affirmative, the contradictory, the universal negative, and the universal affirmation of a contrary: “Every man is just,” “Not every man is just,” “No man is just,” “Every man is unjust.” Notice that although all the rest are contrary to the first in some way, there is a great difference between the contrariety of each to the first. The last one, the affirmation of a contrary, is contrary to the first by reason of the preceding universal negation, for it is false, not per se but by reason of that negation, i.e., it is implicative, as Aristotle has already proved. The third, the universal negation, is not per se contrary to the first either. It is contrary by reason of the second, the contradictory negation, and for the same reason, i.e., it is not per se false in respect to the truth of the affirmation but is implicative, for it contains the contradictory negation “Not every man is just,” by means of which it is made false in respect to the truth of the affirmation. The reason for this is that the falsity of the contradictory negation is prior absolutely to the falsity of the universal negation, for the whole is more composite and posterior as compared to its parts. There is, therefore, an order among these three false enunciations. Only the contradictory negation is simply contrary to the true affirmation, for it is per se false simply in respect to the affirmation; the affirmative of the contrary is per accidens contrary, since it is per accidens false; the universal negation, which is a medium partaking of the nature of each extreme, is per se contrary and per se false as related to the affirmation of a contrary, but is per accidens false and per accidens contrary as related to the contradictory negation; just as red in a motion from red to black takes the place of white, and in a motion from red to white takes the place of black, as is said in V Physicorum [5: 229b 15].

Therefore, it is one thing to speak of the universal negation in relation to affirmation of a contrary and another to speak of it in relation to the contradictory negation. If we are speaking of it in the first way, the universal negation is per se contrary and per se false; if in the second, it is not per se false or contrary to the affirmation.

20. Since Aristotle is now treating the question as to which is the contrary of a true affirmation, affirmation of a contrary or the negation, and not the question as to which of the negations is contrary to a true affirmation—as is

clear in the whole progression of the question—bis answer is that both negations are contrary to the true affirmation without distinction, and that affirmation of a contrary is not. His intention is to manifest the diversity between the negation, and the affirmation of a contrary, inasmuch as they are contrary to a true affirmation. He does not intend to say that both negations are contrary simply, for this is not the difficulty in question here, but the former is.

With respect to his saying that it makes no difference if we posit the universal negation, the same point applies, for in regard to showing that affirmation of a contrary is not contrary to a true affirmation, which is the question at issue here, it makes no difference which negation is posited. It would make a great deal of difference, however, if we wished to discuss which negation was contrary to a true affirmation.

It is evident, then, that Aristotle's discussion of the true contrariety of enunciations is very subtle, for he has posited one to one contraries in every matter and quantity, and affirmed that contradictions are contraries simply.

21. When he says, It is evident, too, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, etc., he returns to a statement he has already made in order to prove it. It is evident, too, from what has been said, that true cannot be contrary to true, either in opinion or in contradiction, i.e., in vocal enunciation. He gives as the cause of this that contraries are opposites about the same thing; consequently, true enunciations and opinions about diverse things cannot be contraries. However, it is possible for all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing to be verified at the same time, inasmuch as the things signified or represented by them belong to the same thing at the same time; otherwise they are not true. Consequently, not all true enunciations and opinions about the same thing are contraries, for it is not possible for contraries to be in the same thing at the same time. Therefore, no true opinion or enunciation, whether it is about the same thing or is about another is contrary to another.

CATENA AUREA

COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS

VOLUMES 1 TO 4

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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CATENA AUREA COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS, COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS BY S. THOMAS AQUINAS

ST. MATTHEW OXFORD, JOHN HENRY PARKER; J. G. F. AND J. RIVINGTON, LONDON. MDCCCXLI

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CATENA AUREA: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS: VOLUMES 1 TO 4

CATENA AUREA: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS: VOL. I. PART 1, 2 AND 3, ST. MATTHEW

ADVERTISEMENT

THE. following Compilation not being admissible into the Library of the Fathers from the date of some few of the authors introduced into it, the Editors of the latter work have been led to publish it in a separate form, being assured that those who have subscribed to their translations of the entire Treatises of the ancient Catholic divines, will not feel less interest, or find less benefit, in the use of so very judicious and beautiful a selection from them. The Editors refer to the Preface which follows for some account of the nature and characteristic excellences of the work, which will be found as useful in the private study of the Gospels, as it is well adapted for family reading, and full of thought for those who are engaged in religious instruction.

Oxford, May 6, 1841.

PREFACE

BY. a CATENA PATRUM. is meant a string or series of passages selected from the writings of various Fathers, and arranged for the elucidation of some portion of Scripture, as the Psalms or the Gospels. Catenas seem to have originated in the short scholia or glosses which it was customary in MSS. of the Scriptures to introduce between the lines or on the margin, perhaps in imitation of the scholiasts on the profane authors. These, as time went on, were gradually expanded, and passages from the Homilies or Sermons of the Fathers upon the same Scriptures added to them.

The earliest commentaries on Scripture had been of this discursive nature, being addresses by word of mouth to the people, which were taken down by secretaries, and so preserved. While the traditionary teaching of the Church still preserved the vigour and vividness of its Apostolical origin, and spoke with an exactness and cogency which impressed an adequate image of it upon the mind of the Christian Expositor, he was able to allow himself free range in handling the sacred text, and to admit into the comment his own particular character of mind, and his spontaneous and individual ideas, in the full security, that, however he might follow the leadings of his own thoughts in unfolding the words of Scripture, his own deeply fixed views of Catholic truth would bring him safe home, without overstepping the limits of truth and sobriety. Accordingly, while the early Fathers manifest a most remarkable agreement in the principles and the substance of their interpretation, they have at the same time a distinctive spirit and manner, by which each may be known from the rest. About the vith or viith century this originality disappears; the oral or traditionary teaching, which allowed scope to the individual teacher, became hardened into a written tradition, and henceforward there is a uniform invariable character as well as substance of Scripture interpretation. Perhaps we should not err in putting Gregory the Great as the last of the original Commentators; for though very numerous commentaries on every book of

Scripture continued to be written by the most eminent doctors in their own names, probably not one interpretation of any importance would be found in them which could not be traced to some older source. So that all later comments are in fact Catenas or selections from the earlier Fathers, whether they present themselves expressly in the form of citations from their volumes, or are lections upon the Lesson or Gospel for the day, extempore indeed in form, but as to their materials drawn from the previous studies and stores of the expositor. The latter would be better adapted for the general reader, the former for the purposes of the theologian.

Commentaries of both classes are very numerous. Fabriciusa speaks of several hundred MS. Catenas in the Royal Library of France. According to Wolf and Cramerb the earliest compiler of a Greek Catena was Œcumenius, in the ixth or xth century; for the claims of Olympiodorus in the vith to be the author of the Catena on Job, have been disproved by Patricius Junius, in his edition. (Lond. 1637.) But though this may be the first regular Catena, the practice of compiling commentaries had been in use much earlier. In the East, Eustathius of Antioch in the ivth, and Procopius of Gaza in the beginning of the vith, collected “the interpretations of the ancients;” and in the West, the Commentaries on the Gospels which go under the name of Bede, (A.D. 700,) are but a summary of the authorized interpretations chiefly drawn from S. Augustine, S. Leo, &c., and even S. Jerome describes his Commentary on Galatians as a compendium of former writers, chiefly Origen.

It may be added, that the same change took place in dogmatic teaching, as in the exposition of Scripture. This indeed was still more to be expected, for the issue of controversies and the decrees of Councils had given to the doctrinal statements of the Fathers an authority, or rather prerogative, which was never claimed for their commentaries. Accordingly, S. John Damascene’s work on the Orthodox Faith in the viiith century is scarcely more than a careful selection and combination of sentences and phrases from the great theologians who preceded him, principally S. Gregory Nazianzen. A comment or scholia by the same author upon S. Paul’s Epistles have come down to us, which are mainly taken from S. Chrysostom, but with some use of other expositors.

All such commentaries have more or less merit and usefulness, but they are very inferior to the ‘Catena Aurea,’ which is now presented to the

English reader; being all of them partial and capricious, dilating on one passage, and passing unnoticed another of equal or greater difficulty; arbitrary in their selection from the Fathers, and as compilations crude and indigested. But it is impossible to read the Catena of S. Thomas, without being struck with the masterly and architectonic skill with which it is put together. A learning of the highest kind,—not a mere literary book-knowledge, which might have supplied the place of indexes and tables in ages destitute of those helps, and when every thing was to be read in unarranged and fragmentary MSS.—but a thorough acquaintance with the whole range of ecclesiastical antiquity, so as to be able to bring the substance of all that had been written on any point to bear upon the text which involved it—a familiarity with the style of each writer, so as to compress into few words the pith of a whole page, and a power of clear and orderly arrangement in this mass of knowledge, are qualities which make this Catena perhaps nearly perfect as a conspectus of Patristic interpretation. Other compilations exhibit research, industry, learning; but this, though a mere compilation, evinces a masterly command over the whole subject of Theology.

The Catena is so contrived that it reads as a running commentary, the several extracts being dovetailed together by the compiler. And it consists wholly of extracts, the compiler introducing nothing of his own but the few connecting particles which link one extract to the next. There are also a few quotations headed ‘Glossa,’ which none of the editors have been able to find in any author, and which from their character, being briefly introductory of a new chapter or a new subject, may be probably assigned to the compiler; though even this is dispensed with whenever it is possible: when a Father will furnish the words for such transition or connection, they are dexterously introduced. In the Gospel of S. Matthew there are only a few other passages which seem to belong to S. Thomas. These are mostly short explanations or notes upon something that seemed to need explanation in some passage quoted, and which in a modern book would have been thrown into the form of a foot note. An instance of this may be seen in p. 405. The only important passages of this kind are some Glosses on chap. 26:26. which will be noticed in their place.

This continuity is expressed in the title which the Author gives his work in his dedication to Pope Urban IV. ‘expositio continua;’ the term Catena was not used till after his death. De Rubeis the Venetian editor speaks of a MS. of the xivth century in which it is so entitled, but the earlier editions have either ‘Glossa Continua,’ or ‘Continuum.’ The sacred text is broken into paragraphs longer or shorter; the shortest less than a verse, the longest twenty verses, and the exposition of each portion follows this order:—First, the transition from the last paragraph to that under review; if they are events, the harmony with the chronology of the other Evangelists is shewn, S. Augustine (de Consensu Evangelistarum) being the authority used for this: then comes the literal, or, what is called, the historical exposition. Where different Fathers have given different explanations, they are introduced generally in the order of the most obvious and literal first, and so proceeding to the most recondite, by the words ‘Vel aliter.’ Then if any important doctrine hinges upon any part of the passage or comma, selections are given from the most approved treatises on the subject; e. g. on chap. 5:17, a lengthened summary of the arguments against the Manicheans from Aug. cont. Faust.; on chap. 11:21. long extracts from Aug. de Bono Perseverantiæ; on 8:2. a short passage from Damascenus de Fid. Orth. as if for the purpose of referring the reader to a treatise which contains a full discussion of the doctrine implied in the words, ‘And he stretched forth his hand, and touched him;’ on 13:29. on the question of toleration, Aug. ep. ad Vincentium is quoted. And the comment on the portion is wound up with what is variously called the mystical, moral, allegorical, tropical, tropological, or spiritual sense. The peculiar exposition of Origen, which seems to hold a mean place between the historical and the authorized mystical interpretation, is accordingly often inserted between these.

The quotations do not profess to be made with scrupulous adherence to the words of the original. But they are not (a very few excepted) abridgments in the words of the compiler, but condensations in their own language. How admirably this is done may be seen by any one who will take the trouble of collating a few pages of some of the more diffuse writers, e. g. S. Chrysostom or Origen, with the Catena. For instances particularly in which a sentence is made up of clauses gathered from distant pages, see the summary of the Sermon on the Mount, chap. 7 in fin., and a quotation from Chrysostom on chap. 23:26.

Nor is it the case with this Catena as it seems to be with every other, that some one commentary has been taken as a nucleus or basis, into which other extracts have been inserted. Dr. Cramer says, that Chrysostom is the staple of all the Greek Catenas on S. Matthew; but though S. Thomas held Chrysostom in such esteem that he is reported to have said ‘malle se uti Chrysostomi libris in Matthæum quam possidere fruique Lutetia Parisiorum,’ (præf. Ben.) and though he has drawn upon the Homilies very largely, it is no more than he has done upon nearly all the principal commentaries. If any book might be supposed to have been his guide more than another it would be Rabanus Maurus; though we should not say that he quoted any other writers mediately through Rabanus, yet this compiler seems often to have guided him to quotations in S. Augustine, Gregory, and the general treatises of the Latin Fathers.

With respect to the fidelity of the references, putting aside the connective Glossæ which may probably be assigned to S. Thomas himself, there are very few (as far as the translation has hitherto proceeded) which it has not been possible to find. Of these, some are quoted from S. Augustine’s Sermons, and among the multitude of doubtful and spurious compositions of this class, it is probable that the extracts to which they belong may be found, though it was scarcely worth while to spend much time in the search of a few unimportant passages. But there are two passages of serious moment, one on Matt. 16:18. the other on Luke 22:19. quoted from S. Cyril, which require a remark. The first affirming the supremacy of the successors of S. Peter is quoted from ‘Cyril. in lib. Thes.’ but occurs no where in S. Cyril’s writings. Accordingly it has been made the groundwork of an old charge against S. Thomas (lately revived by a German writer, see Ellendorf Hist. Blätter) of forgery, which however has been amply refuted by Guyart and Nicolai. In the dedication to another of his works, ‘Opusculum contra errores Græcorum’ addressed to Pope Urban IV. he says, Libellum ab excellentia vestra mihi exhibitum diligenter perlegi, in quo inveni quamplurima ad nostræ fidei assertionem utilia. Consideravi autem quod ejus fructus posset apud plurimos impediri propter quædam in auctoritatibus SS. Patrum contenta, quæ dubia esse videntur. The other passage is affirmatory of Transubstantiation, and quoted from S. Cyril without any specification of place; on this Father Simon (Hist. Crit. c. 33.) observes, that S. Cyril’s commentaries on the New Testament have come down to us imperfect, and this very passage occurs quoted under the name of Cyril in the second part of the Greek Catena of Possinus. (in Matt. 27:28.) The words ‘imo quem bibas quem manduces,’ on chap. 5:27. are not in the earlier editions of the Catena, but were inserted (perhaps by the Louvain Editor) from the original text of S. Augustine.

Of the authors cited, the Catena contains nearly all that is material in S. Chrysostom’s Homilies on S. Matthew, S. Jerome’s Commentary, S. Hilary’s Canons, and the Glossa Ordinaria all through the Gospel. The Latin commentary of Pseudo-Chrysostom is cited fully till about the middle of chap. 8 after which it is cited more rarely. At this place the Benedictine editor notes a hiatus in some of the MSS. of Chrysostom. S. Augustine de Cons. Ev. and In Sermonem Domini in Mont. are nearly incorporated into the Catena, and from ch. 16 to the end, Origen’s Commentaries on S. Matthew.

It is generally supposed that Aquinas was ignorant of Greek, and that therefore he must have quoted the Greek authors in Translations; but his own words in his dedication to Pope Urban seem to imply otherwise. ‘Interdum etiam sensum posui, verba dimisi, præcipue in Homiliario Chrysostomi propter hoc quod est translatio vitiosa.’ That for Chrysostom he used neither the version of Anianus, (as the Benedictine editor of Chrys. supposed,) nor the current Latin version, is evident on the slightest comparison with his quotations. However this may be, he has in several instances quite missed the sense of the Greek.

The Catena begins to quote Origen’s Commentary on S. Matt. at chap. 16 though our fragment of it begins as early as chap. 13 It uses the Old Interpretation, which Huet conjectures to have been the work of Bellator, or of some contemporary of Cassiodorus. This version will be found in the Ben. Ed. of Origen, and is according to Huet barbarous and full of errors.

Great accidental value is given to many of the inedited Greek Catenas by the extracts which they contain from lost works; in this on S. Matt. are quoted two writers, whose works do not seem to have been printed. The first is Remigius, which is frequently cited throughout. The commentary on S. Matthew of Remigius, a Monk of Auxerre in the ixth century, is extant in MS. in several libraries, but the only part of it which has ever been printed is the Preface, in Fontani Novæ Eruditorum Deliciæ, Florence 1793. One short passage concerning the dates of the Gospels, which is quoted in S. Thomas’s Proem, is not found in this Preface, but a passage in S. Thomas’s Proem to S. Mark quoted from Remigius super Matt. occurs in it. This would be proof enough of the identity of the Remigius of the Catena with the inedited Commentary described by Fontani. But he has also printed in the same volume several homilies of Remigius, which he says are only extracts or abridgments (apocopæ) of the Commentary. On comparing these with the quotations in the Catena, they answer exactly to that description, the substance is the same, the words only a little different.

Haymo is much more rarely quoted. The quotations do not correspond with the ‘Homilies on the Gospels’ printed with his name at Paris, 1545, but there is much the same kind of resemblance between them, as between the quotations and the Homilies of Remigius. It may perhaps be conjectured, that he also may have written a commentary of which the Homilies were abridgments.

Rabanus Maurus, who as well as Haymo was a scholar of Alcuin, wrote one of the most full and valuable commentaries on S. Matthew extant. It contains copious extracts from the Latin Fathers, such, he says, ‘quantum mihi præ innumeris monasticæ servitutis retinaculis licuit, et pro nutrimento parvulorum quod non parvam nobis ingerit molestiam et lectionis facit injuriam,’ (he seems from this to have been Abbot at the time he wrote,) but interwoven with the extracts is much original matter of his own, ‘nonnulla quæ mihi Author lucis aperire dignatus estc,’ which he distinguishes by the note ‘Maurus’ on the margin. In the only printed edition of his works, there is a hiatus of several pages in chap. 23 and 24 and another in chap. 28 ‘quæ inter excudendum a militibus omnia vastantibus deperdita sunt.’

S. Jerome speaks of his own commentary on S. Matthew (in the preface to Eusebius), as having been written off very hastily in the short space of a fortnight—and as being entirely his own, if for no other reason, from his want of leisure to read the numerous commentators even then existing on the Gospels. He names Origen’s twenty-five volumes, and as many homilies on S. Matthew only; Theophilus Antioch., Hippolytus Martyr, Theodorus, Apollinaris, Didymus, Hilary, Victorinus, Fortunatianus. He says also, ‘historicam interpretationem digessi breviter, et interdum spiritualis intelligentiæ flores miscui, perfectum opus reservam in posterum.’

The Enarrationes in Matthæum printed as the work of the Archbishop Anselm (Cologne, 1612) are ascribed by Cave to Anselm Laudunensis, and by others to William of Paris who died in 1249. This is partly a compilation and partly original. It does not seem used in the Catena, but it has been referred to in this translation as containing many passages cited in the Catena, under the title Gloss., and which appeared to have been drawn by both authors from some common source.

The Glossa Ordinaria seems to have been a brief Catena, compiled from the Fathers by Strabus, a Monk of Fulda, a pupil and amanuensis of Rabanus Maurus. Among the extracts, he seems to have inserted short observations of his own, distinguishing them by the title of ‘Glossa’. Even of these the substance seems to have been drawn from the Fathers, or rather from that received mode of interpreting Scripture and Fathers which was traditionally preserved in the Schools. These portions (in whatever degree original) got the name of Glossa Ordinaria say the editors, (Douay, 1617,) “quia illam posteri omnes tanquam officinam ecclesiasticorum sensuum consulere solebant.” It is sometimes cited under the title of ‘auctoritas.’

The Glossa Interlinearis is ascribed to Anselm Laudunensis early in the xiith century, and was intended to accompany the common editions of the Bible written in a small hand in the vacant spaces between the lines.

A few passages are quoted from Bede. Of these some are from his Homilies on the Gospels, some from his Commentary on Luke. There is among Bede’s works a Commentary on S. Matthew, and in one or two instances this is referred to by Nicolai, but on looking at the quotations in older editions of the Catena, it is merely ‘Bed. in Hom.’ To many quotations of Remigius and Rabanus, which agreed in sense with this Commentary on Matthew, the mark ‘e Beda’ has been added, because he was the earliest author in which the translator found them; but an inspection of this Commentary will make it very doubtful whether it is Bede’s. First, he does not mention it in the catalogue which he gives of his own works at the end of the Hist. Eccl. (p. 222. ed. Smith.) Secondly, those on Mark and Luke (which he does mention there) are introduced by Epistles to Acca, Bishop of Hexham. Thirdly, The style of these is different, being full and copious, that on Matthew short, and ‘per saltus.’ Fourthly, Comparing Rabanus’ numerous quotations from Bede, they seem to be all taken from the comments on the parallel passages of Mark and Luke. But a great deal of what is given as original in Rabanus coincides with the Commentary on S. Matth. in question. Is it an abridgment of Rabanus, or did they only both draw upon their recollections of the Fathers? The Commentary on S. Paul’s

Epistles printed among Bede’s Works, and which is a compilation chiefly from S. Augustine, seems to have been proved by Mabillon to be the work of Florus the Deacon, (Mab. Vet. Analecta, i. 12.) The following extracts from Bede’s Preface to S. Luke illustrate the manner of compiling such Commentaries then in fashion. Bede excused himself from the task because it had been so fully performed by Ambrose. Acca answers that there were many things in Ambrose so eloquent and high, that they could only be understood by Doctors, and something weaker was wanted for the unlearned; that S. Gregory had not been afraid to rifle all the Fathers for his homilies on the Gospels, and in short it might be said of every thing with the comic poet, ‘Nihil sit dictum quod non sit dictum prius.’ Bede then describes the method he had pursued; “Having gathered around me the works of the Fathers, truly the most worthy to be employed in such a task, I set myself diligently to look out what S. Ambrose, what Augustine, what Gregory most keen-eyed, (as his name signifies,) the Apostle of our nation, what the Translator of the Sacred Story Jerome, and what the other Fathers have thought upon the words of Luke. This I forthwith committed to paper either in the very words of the author, or where abridgment was needed in my own. To save the labour of inserting a reference to the author in each case in my text, I have marked the first letters of his name in the margin, being anxious that none should take me for a plagiarist, endeavouring to pass off as my own the words of greater men.” Vol. v. p. 215. ed. Col.

The Translation has been made from the Venetian edition of 1775, which professes to give the original text of the Catena without the alterations of Nicolai. For by the repeated reprints—and no book went through more during the two first centuries after the invention of printing—the text had become so corrupt—“tam frequentes in eam irrepserant et tam enormes corruptelæ, tot depravatæ voces, tot involutæ constructiones, tot perturbatæ phrases, tot præsertim ex Græcis autoribus autoritates adulteratæ, tot vitiosæ versiones, tot mutilati textus, tot indices omissi vel præpostere annotati, tot hiantes et imperfecti sensus occurrebant ut eas mirer tam impense laudari potuisse quæ tam turpiter aberrassent.” (Præf. Nicol.) Nicolai therefore in 1657 undertook a recension of the text, for which he employed, not MSS. or early editions of the Catena, (the Venetian editor thinks it probable that he used only two editions, one a Parisian, the other an Antwerp,) but had recourse to the authorities themselves; his aim being, not so much to give it as it came from S. Thomas, but to improve the usefulness of the work, as what it is indeed, a complete syllabus of Catholic theology. But as the Venetian edition is wretchedly printed, it has been corrected throughout by a reference to Nicolai, (ed. Lugd. 1686,) and the references have all been verified afresh and adapted to the best editions of the Fathers. No reference has been given to any passage which the translator has not verified for himself substantially in its own original place; but in those places only in which there was any doubt or difficulty about the meaning, or where an important doctrine was involved, or any important variety of reading between the two editions of the Catena, has he attentively collated the passage of the Catena with the original; in a very few has he introduced any alteration or addition from the originals, and that has been sometimes noticed in the note. Where a reference could not be found, it has been marked 'non occurrit;' of these the majority are those Glossæ which are most probably to be ascribed to S. Thomas: of the rest, some had escaped the diligence of Nicolai, only one or two which Nic. had marked as found, the present translator has not been able to find.

Where no note of reference is put, it is to be understood that the passage is in each case in the author's commentary on that chapter and verse of S. Matt.; as the only note of reference to which must have been 'in locum,' it was thought a perpetual repetition of that note was needless. To aid in referring to S. Chrys. the number of the Homily has been given at the first place where each is referred to.

The references to Scripture have been verified anew, (those in the Psalms conformed to the numeration of the English Bible,) and many more given which the previous editions omit. The text of the Gospel commented upon is given from the E. V.; but all passages quoted in the body of the comment are translated from the Latin as there given, which is often important when the remarks are upon words which have no equivalent in our version, e. g. 'supersubstantialis' in c. 6:11. There is no uniformity in the editions in the mode of printing the sacred text. The MSS. and earlier editions do not contain it, so that it is probable that it was so published by Aquinas, especially as nearly the whole is worked into the series of comment; the next class of editions have the sacred text, occupying a small space in the centre of the upper part of the page, and the Catena arranged around it; and at last the commata or paragraphs, which it was clearly S. Thomas's intention to make, were divided, and in some editions the portion of text was inserted between them, in others each chapter was printed at the head of its own comment, divided into the same paragraphs, with letters referring to the paragraphs of the Catena.

It only remains to add, that the Editors are indebted for the Translation of St. Matthew, as well as for the above introductory remarks, to the Rev. MARK PATTISON. M. A. Fellow of Lincoln College.

J. H. N.

LIST OF AUTHORS

USED IN THE CATENA ON ST. MATTHEW,

With the Editions of their Works referred to in the Translation.

Origen, Presbyter of Alexandria, A.D. 230. Ed. Ben. Par. 1753.
Pseudo-Origen Homiliæ sex ex diversis locis collectæ. Merlin, Par. 1512.
S. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, A.D. 248. Oxford Translation, 1839.
Eusebius, Archbishop of Cæsarea, A.D. 315. Oxford, 1838.
S. Athanasius, Archbishop of Alexandria, A.D. 326. Ed. Ben. Par. 1698.
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, A.D. 340–530. Paris, 1615.
S. Hilary, Bishop of Poictiers, A.D. 354. Ed. Ben. Par. 1693.
S. Gregory of Nazianzus, Abp. of Constantinople, A.D. 370. Col. 1680.
S. Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa, A.D. 370. Paris, 1615.
S. Ambrose, Archbishop of Milan, A.D. 374. Ed. Ben. Par. 1686.
S. Jerome, Presbyter and Monk of Bethlehem, A.D. 378. Verona, 1735.
Nemesius, A.D. 380. Apud Bibl. Patr. Græc. Paris, 1624.
S. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, A.D. 396. Ed. Ben. Par. 1679–1700.
S. John Chrysostom, Abp. of Constantinople, A.D. 398. Ed. Ben Par. 1718–38.
S. Cyril, Archbishop of Alexandria, A.D. 412. Paris, 1638.
S. Maximus, Bishop of Turin, A.D. 422. Paris, 1614.
Cassian, Presbyter and Monk of Marseilles, A.D. 424. Bibl. Patr.
S. Peter Chrysologus, Archbishop of Ravenna, A.D. 433. Col. 1618.
Council of Ephesus, Canons of, A.D. 431. ap. Labbe Concilia, Par. 1671.
Theodotus of Ancyra, A.D. 431. ap. Labbe Concilia, Par. 1671.
S. Leo I. Pope, A.D. 440. Venice, 1783.
Gennadius, Presbyter of Marseilles, A.D. 495. Hamb. 1614.
S. Gregory I. Pope, A.D. 590. Ed. Ben. Paris, 1705.
S. Isidore, Archbishop of Seville, A.D. 595. Col. 1617.
Bede, Venerable, Presbyter and Monk of Yarrow, A.D. 700. Col. 1612.
S. John, Presbyter of Damascus, A.D. 730. Paris, 1712.

Rabanus Maurus, Archbishop of Mayence, A.D. 847. Col. 1626.
Ilaymo, Bishop of Halberstadt, A.D. 853. Works not printed.
Remigius, Presbyter and Monk of Anxerre, A.D. 880. Works not printed.
Glossa Ordinaria, in ninth century. Lugd. 1589.
Paschasius Radbertus, A.D. 850. Bibl. Patr.
Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, A.D. 1080. Bibl. Patr.
S. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, A.D. 1093. Col. 1612.
Glossa Interlinearis, in twelfth century. Lugd. 1589.

PREFACE TO THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MATTHEW

ISAIAH. 40:9

Go up to the top of the mountain, thou that preachest glad tidings in Sion; lift up thy voice with might, thou that preachest in Jerusalem: cry aloud, fear not: say to the cities of Judah, Behold your God! Lo, the Lord God shall come with power, and His arm shall have dominion; Lo, His reward is with Him.

THE. Prophet Isaiah, a manifest preacher of the Gospel, briefly expressing the loftiness, the name, and the substance of the Gospel doctrine, addresses the evangelic teacher in the person of the Lord, saying, Go up to the top of the mountain, &c.

But to make our beginning with the title, The Gospel.

AUGUSTINE. (contra Faust. ii. 2.) The word ‘Evangelium,’ (Gospel,) is rendered in Latin ‘bonus nuntius,’ or ‘bona annuntiatio,’ (good news.) It may indeed be used on all occasions whenever any good is announced; but it has come to be appropriated to the announcement of the Saviour.

GLOSS. Those who have related the birth, deeds, words, and sufferings of the Lord Jesus Christ, are properly styled Evangelists.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Homil. in Matt. i. 2.) For what is there that can equal these good tidings? God on earth, man in heaven; that long war ceased, reconciliation made between God and our nature, the devil overthrown, death abolished, paradise opened. These things, so far beyond our merits, are given us with all fulness; not for our own toil or labour, but because we are beloved of God.

AUGUSTINE. (de vera relig. c. 16.) Whereas God in many ways heals the souls of men, according to the times and the seasons which are ordained by His marvellous wisdom, yet has He in no way more beneficently provided for the human race, than when the Very Wisdom of God, the Only

Son of one substance and coeternal with the Father, stooped to take upon Him perfect man, and the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. Hereby He made manifest how high a place among creatures had human nature, in that He appeared to men as Very Man.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Serm. de Nativ. Serm. ix.) God was made man, that man might be made God.

GLOSS. This part of the glad tidings that should be preached, the Prophet foretells saying, Behold, your God, &c.

LEO. (Epist. ad Flavian. xxviii. 3.) Pope; For this emptying of himself, by which the Invisible made Himself Visible, and the Creator and Lord of all things chose to become one of us mortal creatures, was a stooping of His mercy, not a failing of His power.

GLOSS. Therefore that the Lord should not be supposed to be present in such a way as that there should be any thing lost of His power, the Prophet adds, The Lord shall come with power.

AUGUSTINE. (de doct. Christ. i. 12.) Come, not by passing through the regions of space, but by shewing Himself to men in the flesh.

LEO. (Serm. in Nativ. s. xix. 3.) By the unspeakable power of God, it was wrought, that while very Man was in the inviolable God, and very God in passible flesh, there was bestowed upon man, glory through shame, immortality through punishment, life through death.

AUGUSTINE. (de Peccatorum Meritis, ii. 30.) For blood that was without sin being shed, the bond of all men’s sins was done away, by which men were before held captive by the Devil.

GLOSS. Therefore because men, having been delivered from sin by virtue of Christ suffering, became the servants of God, it follows, And His arm shall have dominion.

LEO. (Ubi sup.) In Christ then was given us this wonderful deliverance, that on our passible nature the condition of death should not abide, which His impassible essence had admitted, and that by that which could not die, that which was dead might be brought to life.

GLOSS. And thus through Christ is opened to us the entrance of immortal glory, concerning which it follows, Lo, His reward is with Him; that, namely, of which Himself speaks, Your reward is abundant in heaven. (Matt. 5:12.)

AUGUSTINE. (contra Faust. iv. 2.) The promise of eternal life, and the kingdom of heaven belongs to the New Testament; in the Old Testament are contained promises of temporal things.

GLOSS. So then evangelic teaching delivers to us four things concerning Christ; the Divinity that takes upon it, the Humanity that is taken upon it, His Death by which we are delivered from bondage, His Resurrection by which the entrance of a glorious life is opened to us. On this account it is represented in Ezekiel under the figure of the four animals.

GREGORY. (in Ezek. Hom. iv.) The Only-begotten Son of God was Himself verily made Man; Himself condescended to die as the sacrifice of our redemption as a Calf; He rose again through the power of His might, as a Lion; and as an Eagle He ascended aloft into heaven.

GLOSS. In which ascension He shewed manifestly His Divinity; Matthew then is denoted by the Man, because he dwells chiefly on the humanity of Christ; Mark by the Lion, because he treats of His Resurrection; Luke by the Calf, because he insists on His Priesthood; John by the Eagle, because he describes the sacraments of His Divinity.

AMBROSE. (Comm. in Luc. pref.) And it has happened well that we set out with delivering the opinion that the Gospel according to Matthew is of a moral kind, for morals are the peculiar province of man. The figure of a Lion is ascribed to Mark, because he begins with an assertion of His Divine power, saying, The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God. The figure of the Eagle is given to John, because he has described the miracles of the Divine Resurrection.

GREGORY. (Ubi sup.) These things the commencement of each of the Gospel books testifies. Because he opens with Christ's human generation, Matthew is rightly designated by a Man; Mark by a Lion, because he begins with the crying in the desert; Luke by a Calf, because he begins with a sacrifice; because he takes his beginning from the divinity of the Word, John is worthily signified by an Eagle.

AUGUSTINE. (de Consensu Evang. i. 6.) Or, Matthew who has chiefly represented the regal character of Christ, is designated by a Lion; Luke by a Calf, because of the Priest's victim; Mark, who chose neither to relate the royal nor the priestly lineagea, and yet is clearly busied about His human nature, is designated by the figure of a Man. These three animals, the Lion, the Man, the Calf, walk on the earth, whence these three Evangelists are mostly employed about those things which Christ wrought in the flesh. But John, as the Eagle, soars on high, and with most keen eyes of the heart beholds the light of unchangeable Truth. From which we may understand, that the other three Evangelists are occupied about the active, and John about the contemplative, life. The Greek Doctors by the Man understood Matthew, because he has deduced the Lord's lineage according to the flesh; by the Lion, John, because as the lion, strikes terror into the other beasts by his roaring, so John struck terror into all heretics; by the Calf, they understood Luke, because the calf was the victim of the Priests, and he is much employed concerning the Temple and the Priesthood; and by the Eagle they understood Mark, because the eagle in the Divine Scripture is used to denote the Holy Spirit, who spake by the mouths of the Prophets; and Mark begins with a citation from the Prophets.

JEROME. (Prolog. in Evan. Matt. ad Euseb.) Concerning the number of the Evangelists, it should be known, that there were many who had written Gospels, as the Evangelist Luke witnesses, saying, Forasmuch as many have taken in hand, &c. (Luke 1:1.) and as books remaining to the present time declare which divers authors have set forth, therein laying the foundation of many heresies; such as the Gospel according to the Egyptians, according to Thomas, Matthias, and Bartholomewb; that of the twelve Apostles, and Basilides, and Apelles, and others whom it would be long to reckon up. But the Church, which is founded by the Lord's word upon the rock, sending forth, like Paradise, its four streams, has four corners and four rings, by which as the ark of the covenant, and the guardian of the Law of the Lord, it is carried about on moveablec staves.

AUGUSTINE. (de cons. Evan. i. 2.) Or, Because there are four quarters of the world, through the whole of which Christ's Church is extended. In learning and preaching they had a different order from that they had in writing. In learning and preaching they ranked first who followed the Lord present in the flesh, heard Him teaching, saw Him acting, and by His mouth were sent to preach the Gospel; but in penning the Gospel, an order which we must suppose to have been fixed by Heaven, the first place, and the last place were filled out of the number of those whom the Lord chose before His passion, the first by Matthew, the last by John; so that the other two, who were not of that number, but who yet followed Christ speaking in them, were embraced as sons, and placed in the middle between the other two, so as to be supported by them on both sides.

REMIGIUS. Matthew wrote in Judæa in the time of the Emperor Caius Caligula; Mark in Italy, at Rome, in the time of Nero or Claudius, according to Rabanus; Luke in the parts of Achaia and Bæotia, at the request of Theophilus; John at Ephesus, in Asia Minor, under Nerva.

BEDE. But though there were four Evangelists, yet what they wrote is not so much four Gospels, as one true harmony of four books. (non occ.) For as two verses having the same substance, but different words and different metre, yet contain one and the same matter, so the books of the Evangelists, though four in number, yet contain one Gospel, teaching one doctrine of the Catholic faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Ubi sup.) It had indeed been enough that one Evangelist should have written all; but whereas four speak all things as with one mouth, and that neither from the same place nor at the same time, nor having met and discoursed together, these things are the greatest test of truth. It is also a mark of truth, that in some small matters they seem to disagree. For had their agreement been complete throughout, adversaries might have supposed that it was by a human collusion that this was brought about. Indeed in essentials which pertain to direction of life, and preaching the faith, they do not differ in the least thing. And if in their accounts of miracles, one tells it in one way, another in another, let not this disturb you; but think that if one had told all, the other three would have been a needless superfluity; had they all written different things, there would have been no room for proof of their harmony. And if their account differs in times or modes, this does not hinder the truth of the facts themselves which they relate, as shall be shewn below.

AUGUSTINE. (Ubi sup.) Though each seems to have followed an order of narration of his own, yet we do not find any one of them writing as if in ignorance of his predecessor, or that he left out some things which he did not know, which another was to supply; but as each had inspiration, he gave accordingly the cooperation of his own not unnecessary labour.

GLOSS. (Ubi sup.) But the sublimity of the Gospel doctrine consists, first, in its preeminent authority.

AUGUSTINE. For among all the Divine instruments which are contained in Holy Writ, the Gospel has justly the most excellent place; its first preachers were the Apostles who had seen the Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ present in the flesh; and some of them, that is, Matthew and John, published each a book of such things as seemed good to be published concerning Him. And that it should not be supposed, that, as far as relates to receiving and preaching the Gospel, it makes any difference whether it is announced by those who followed Him during His sojourn in the flesh, or by those who faithfully believed what they heard from others, it is provided by Divine Providence through the Holy Spiritd, that a commission, as well of writing as of preaching the Gospel, should be bestowed on some out of the number of those that followed the first Apostles.

GLOSS. And thus it is clear that the sublimity of the authority of the Gospel is derived from Christ; this is proved by the words of the Prophet cited above, Go up to the top of the mountain. For Christ is that Mountain of whom the same Isaiah speaks, And there shall be in the last days a mountain prepared, the house of the Lord in the top of the mountains; that is, upon all the saints who from Christ the Mountain are also called mountains; (Is. 2:2.) for of His fulness have we all received. And rightly is that, Go thou up upon a high mountain, addressed to Matthew, who, as had been foretold, in his own person saw the deeds of Christ, and heard His doctrine.

AUGUSTINE. (de cons. Evan. i. 7.) This should be considered which to many presents a great difficulty, why the Lord Himself wrote nothing, so that we are obliged to give our belief to others who wrote of Him.

GLOSS. But we ought not to say that He wrote nothing, seeing His members have written those things which they learned by the dictation of their Head. For whatever He would have us to read concerning His actions or His words, that He enjoined upon them to write as His own hands.

GLOSS. Secondly, the Evangelic doctrine has sublimity of strength; whence the Apostle says, The Gospel is the power of God to the salvation of all that believe. (Rom. 1:16.) The Prophet also shews this in the foregoing words, Lift up thy voice with might; which further marks out the manner of evangelic teaching, by that raising the voice which gives clearness to the doctrine.

AUGUSTINE. (ad Volus. Ep. 3.) For the mode in which Holy Scripture is put together, is one accessible to all, but thoroughly entered into by few. The things it shews openly, it doth as a familiar friend without guile speaking to the heart of the unlearned, as the learned. The things it veils in mysteries, it does not deck out in lofty speech, to which a slow and unlearned soul would not dare to approach, as a poor man would not to a rich; but in lowly phrase it invites all, whom it not only feeds with plain truth, but exercises in hidden knowledge; for it has matter of both. But that its plain things might not be despised, these very same things it again withholds; being withheld they become as new; and thus become new they are again pleasingly expressed. Thus all tempers have here what is meet for them; the bad are corrected, the weak are strengthened, the strong are gratified.

GLOSS. But because the voice when raised on high is heard further off, by the raising of the voice may be denoted the publication of the Gospel doctrine; because it is given to be preached not to one nation only, but to all nations. The Lord speaks, Preach the Gospel to every creature.

GREGORY. (Matt. 16:15. Homil. in Evan. 28.) By every creature may be meant the Gentiles.

GLOSS. The Evangelic doctrine has, thirdly, the loftiness of liberty.

AUGUSTINE. (con. Adver. Legis et Proph. i. 17.) Under the Old Testament because of the promise of temporal goods and the threatening of temporal evils, the temporal Jerusalem begets slaves; but under the New Testament, where faith requires love, by which the Law can be fulfilled not more through fear of punishment, than from love of righteousness, the eternal Jerusalem begets freemen.

GLOSS. This excellence of the Gospel doctrine the Prophet describes when he says, Cry aloud, fear not.

It remains to see to whom, and for what purpose, this Gospel was written.

JEROME. (Prolog. ad Euseb.) Matthew published his Gospel in Judæa, in the Hebrew tongue, for the sake of those of the Jews who believed in Jerusalem.

GLOSS. (Ordinaria.) For having first preached the Gospel in Judæa, being minded to pass to the Gentiles, he first put in writing a Gospel in Hebrew, and left it as a memorial to those brethren from whom he was departing. For as it was necessary that the Gospel should be preached for confirmation of the faith, so was it necessary that it should be written to oppose heretics.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Comm. in Matt. Prolog.) Matthew has arranged his narrative in a regular series of events. First, the birth, secondly, the baptism, thirdly, the temptation, fourthly, the teachings, fifthly, the miracles, sixthly, the passion, seventhly, the resurrection, and lastly, the ascension of Christ; desiring by this not only to set forth the history of Christ, but to teach the order of evangelic life. It is nought that we are born of our parents, if we be not reborn again of God by water and the Spirit. After baptism we must resist the Devil. Then being as it were superior to all temptation, he is made fit to teach, and if he be a priest let him teach, and commend his teaching, as it were, by the miracles of a good life; if he be lay, let him teach faith by his works. In the end we must take our departure from the stage of this world, and there remains that the reward of resurrection and glory follow the victory over temptation.

GLOSS. From what has been said then, we understand the title Gospel, the substance of the Gospel doctrine, the emblems of the writers of the Gospel, their number, their time, language, discrepancy and arrangement; the sublimity of the Gospel doctrine; to whom this Gospel is addressed, and the method of its arrangement.

COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MATTHEW

CHAPTER 1

1:1

Ver. 1. The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of Abraham.

JEROME. (Prolog. in Comm. in Matt.) ‘The face of a man’ (in Ezekiel’s vision [Ez. 1:5]) signifies Matthew, who accordingly opens his Gospel with the human genealogy of Christ.

RABANUS. By this exordium he shews that it is the birth of Christ according to the flesh that he has undertaken to narrate.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Homil. in Matt. Hom. i.) Matthew wrote for the Jews, and in Hebrewa; to them it was unnecessary to explain the divinity which they recognized; but necessary to unfold the mystery of the Incarnation. John wrote in Greek for the Gentiles who knew nothing of a Son of God. They required therefore to be told first, that the Son of God was God, then that this Deity was incarnate.

RABANUS. Though the genealogy occupies only a small part of the volume, he yet begins thus, The book of the generation. For it is the manner of the Hebrews to name their books from that with which they open; as Genesis.

GLOSS. (Ordinaria.) The full expression would be This is the book of the generation; but this is a usual ellipse; e. g. The vision of Isaiah, for, ‘This is the vision.’ Generation, he says in the singular number, though there be many here given in succession, as it is for the sake of the one generation of Christ that the rest are here introduced.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. Hom. ii.) Or he therefore entitles it, The book of the generation, because this is the sum of the whole dispensation, the root of all its blessings; viz. that God became man; for this once effected, all other things followed of course.

RABANUS. He says, The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, because he knew it was written, ‘The book of the generation of Adam.’ He begins thus then, that he may oppose book to book, the new Adam to the old Adam, for by the one were all things restored which had been corrupted by the other.

JEROME. (Comm. in Matt. ch. 1.) We read in Isaiah, Who shall declare His generation? (Is. 53:8.) But it does not follow that the Evangelist contradicts the Prophet, or undertakes what he declares impossible; for Isaiah is speaking of the generation of the Divine nature; St. Matthew of the incarnation of the human.

CHRYSOSTOM. And do not consider this genealogy a small thing to hear: for truly it is a marvellous thing that God should descend to be born of a woman, and to have as His ancestors David and Abraham.

REMIGIUS. Though any affirm that the prophet (Isaiah) does speak of His human generation, we need not answer to his enquiry, Who shall declare it? “No man;” but, “Very few;” because Matthew and Luke have.

RABANUS. By saying, of Jesus Christ, he expresses both the kingly and priestly office to be in Him, for Jesus, who first bore this name, was after Moses, the first who was leader of the children of Israel; and Aaron, anointed by the mystical ointment, was the first priest under the Law.

HILARY. (Quæst. Nov. et Vet. Test. q. 49.) What God conferred on those, who, by the anointing of oil were consecrated as kings or priests, this the Holy Spirit conferred on the Man Christ; adding moreover a purification. The Holy Spirit cleansed that which taken of the Virgin Mary was exalted into the Body of the Saviour, and this is that anointing of the Body of the Saviour’s flesh whence He was called Christb. Because the impious craft of the Jews denied that Jesus was born of the seed of David, he adds, The son of David, the son of Abraham.

CHRYSOSTOM. But why would it not have been enough to name one of them, David alone, or Abraham alone? Because the promise had been made to both of Christ to be born of their seed. To Abraham, And in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth he blessed. (Gen. 22:18.) To David, Of the fruit of thy body will I set upon thy seat. (Ps. 132:11.) He therefore calls Christ the Son of both, to shew that in Him was fulfilled the promise to both. Also because Christ was to have three dignities; King, Prophet, Priest; but Abraham was prophet and priest; priest, as God says to him in Genesis, Take an heifer; (Gen. 15:9.) Prophet, as the Lord said to Abimelech concerning him, He is a prophet, and shall pray for thee. (Gen. 20:7.) David was king and prophet, but not priest. Thus He is expressly called the son of both, that the threefold dignity of His forefathers might be recognized by hereditary right in Christ.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. c. iii.) He therefore names specially two authors of His birth—one who received the promise concerning the kindreds of the people, the other who obtained the oracle concerning the generation of Christ; and though he is later in order of succession is yet first named, inasmuch as it is greater to have received the promise concerning Christ than concerning the Church, which is through Christ; for greater is He who saves than that which is saved.

JEROME. The order of the names is inverted, but of necessity; for had he written Abraham first, and David afterwards, he would have to repeat Abraham again to preserve the series of the genealogy.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Another reason is that royal dignity is above natural, though Abraham was first in time, yet David in honour.

GLOSS. But since from this title it appears that the whole book is concerning Jesus Christ, it is necessary first to know what we must think concerning Him; for so shall be better explained what this book relates of Him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Hær. 8, et 10.) Cerinthus then and Ebion made Jesus Christ only man; Paul of Samosata, following them, asserted Christ not to have had an existence from eternity, but to have begun to be from His birth of the Virgin Mary; he also thought Him nothing more than man. This heresy was afterwards confirmed by Photinus.

PSEUDO-ATHANASIUS. (Vigil. Tapsens. [Athan. Ed. Ben. vol. ii. p. 646.]) The Apostle John, seeing long before by the Holy Spirit this man’s madness, rouses him from his deep sleep of error by the preaching of his voice, saying, In the beginning was the Word. (John 1:1.) He therefore, who in the beginning was with God, could not in this last time take the beginning of His being from man. He says further, (let Photinus hear his words,) Father, glorify Me with that glory which I had with Thee before the world was. (John 17:5.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Hæres. 19.) The error of Nestorius was, that he taught that a man only was born of the Blessed Virgin Mary, whom the Word of God received not into Unity of person and inseparable fellowship; a doctrine which Catholic ears could not endure.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Ep. i. ad Monachos Egypti.) Saith the Apostle of the Only-begotten, Who being in the form of God, thought it no robbery to be equal with God (Phil. 2:6). Who then is this who is in the form of God? or how emptied He Himself, and humbled Himself to the likeness of man? If the above-mentioned heretics dividing Christ into two parts, i. e. the Man and the Word, affirm that it was the Man that was emptied of glory, they must first shew what form and equality with the Father are understood to be, and did exist, which might suffer any manner of emptying. But there is no creature, in its own proper nature, equal with the Father; how then can any creature be said to be emptied? or from what eminence to descend to become man? Or how can he be understood to have taken upon Him, as though He had not at first, the form of a servant? But, they say, the Word being equal with the Father dwelt in Man born of a woman, and this is the emptying. I hear the Son truly saying to the Holy Apostles, If any man love Me, he will keep My saying; and My Father will lore him, and We will come unto him, and make Our abode with him. (John 14:23.) Hear how He saith that He and the Father will dwell in them that love Him. Do you then suppose that we shall grant that He is there emptied of His glory, and has taken upon Him the form of a servant, when He makes His abode in the hearts of them that love Him? Or the Holy Spirit, does He fulfil an assumption of human flesh, when He dwells in our hearts?

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (Epist. lib. iv. 166.) But not to mention all arguments, let us bring forward that one to which all arguments point, that, for one who was God to assume a lowly guise both has an obvious use, and is an adaptation and in nothing contradicts the course of nature. But for one who is man to speak things divine and supernatural is the highest presumption; for though a king may humble himself a common soldier may not take on him the state of an emperor. So, if He were God made man, all lowly things have place; but if mere man, high things have none.

AUGUSTINE. (de Hæres. 41.) Sabellius they say was a disciple of Noetus, who taught that the same Christ was one and the same Father and Holy Spirit.

PSEUDO-ATHANASIUS. (Vigil. Tapsens. [ibid. p. 644.]) The audaciousness of this most insane error I will curb by the authority of the heavenly testimonies, and demonstrate the distinct personality of the proper substance, of the Son. I shall not produce things which are liable to be, explained away as agreeable to the assumption of human; nature; but shall offer such passages as all will allow to be decisive in proof of His divine nature. In Genesis we find God saying, Let Us make man in Our own Image. By this plural number shewing, that there was some other person to whom He spoke. Had He been one, He would have been said to have made Him in His own Image, but there is another; and He is said to have made man in the Image of that other.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Others denied the reality of Christ's human nature. Valentinus said, that Christ sent from the Father, carried about a spiritual or celestial body, and took nothing of the Virgin, but passed through her as through a channel, taking nothing of her flesh. But we do not therefore believe Him to have been born of the Virgin, because by no other means He could have truly lived in the flesh, and appeared among men; but because it is so written in the Scripture, which if we believe not we cannot either be Christians, or be saved. But even a body taken of spiritual, or ethereal, or clayey substance, had He willed to change into the true and very quality of human flesh, who will deny His power to do this? The Manichæans said that the Lord Jesus Christ was a phantasm, and could not be born of the womb of a woman. But if the body of Christ was a phantasm, He was a deceiver, and if a deceiver, then He was not the truth. But Christ is the Truth; therefore His Body was not a phantasm.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And as the opening both of this Gospel, and of that according to Luke, manifestly proves Christ's birth of a woman, and hence His real humanity, they reject the beginning of both these Gospels.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. ii. 1.) Faustus affirms, that "the Gospel both begins, and begins to be so called, from the preaching of Christc, in which He no where affirms Himself to have been born of men. Nay, so far is this genealogy from being part of the Gospel, that the writer does not venture so to entitle it; beginning, 'The book of the generation,' not 'The book of the Gospel.' Mark again, who cared not to write of the generation, but only of the preaching of the Son of God, which is properly The Gospel, begins thus accordingly, The Gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God. Thus then, all that we read in Matthew before the words, Jesus began to preach the Gospel of the kingdom, (Matt. 4:17.) is a part of the genealogy, not of the Gospel. I therefore betook myself to Mark and John, with whose prefaces I had good reason to be satisfied, as they introduce neither David, nor Mary, nor

Joseph.” To which Augustine replies, What will he say then to the Apostle’s words, Remember the resurrection of Jesus Christ of the seed of David according to my Gospel. (2 Tim. 2:8.) But the Gospel of the Apostle Paul was likewise that of the other Apostles, and of all the faithful, as he says, Whether I, or they, thus have we preached the Gospel.

AUGUSTINE. (de Hær. 49.) The Arians will not have the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, to be of one and the same substance, nature, and existence; but that the Son is a creature of the Father, and the Holy Spirit a creature of a creature, i. e. created by the Son; further, they think that Christ took the flesh without a soul.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. 6.) But John declares the Son to be not only God, but even of the same substance as the Father; for when he had said, The Word was God, he added, all things were made by Him; whence it is clear that He was not made by Whom all things were made; and if not made, then not created; and therefore of one substance with the Father, for all that is not of one substance with the Father is creature.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Fel. 13.) I know not what benefit the person of the Mediator has conferred upon us, if He redeemed not our better part, but took upon Him our flesh only, which without the soul cannot have consciousness of the benefit. But if Christ came to save that which had perished, the whole man had perished, and therefore needs a Saviour; Christ then in coming saves the whole man, taking on Him both soul and body.

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. 83. Quæst. q. 80.) How too do they answer innumerable objections from the Gospel Scriptures, in which the Lord speaks so many things manifestly contrary to them? as is that, My soul is sorrowful even unto death, (Matt. 26:38.) and, I have power to lay down My life; (John 10:18.) and many more things of the like kind. Should they say that He spoke thus in parables, we have at hand proofs from the Evangelists themselves, who in relating His actions, bear witness as to the reality of His body, so of His soul, by mention of passions which cannot be without a soul; as when they say, Jesus wondered, was angry, and others of like kind.

AUGUSTINE. (de Hæres. 55.) The Apollinarians also as the Arians affirmed that Christ had taken the human flesh without the soul. But overthrown on this point by the weight of Scripture proof, they then said that that part which is the rational soul of man was wanting to the soul of

Christ, and that its place was filled by the Word itself. But if it be so, then we must believe that the Word of God took on Him the nature of some brute with a human shape and appearance. But even concerning the nature of Christ's body, there are some who have so far swerved from the right faith, as to say, that the flesh and the Word were of one and the same substance, most perversely insisting on that expression, The Word was made flesh; which they interpret that some portion of the Word was changed into flesh, not that He took to Him flesh of the flesh of the Virgind.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Ep. ad Joan. Antioch. tom. 6. Ep. 107.) We account those persons mad who have suspected that so much as the shadow of change could take place in the nature of the Divine Word; it abides what it ever was, neither is nor can be changed.

LEO. (Epist. 59. ad Const. Id. Ep. 83. ad Palest.) We do not speak of Christ as man in such a sort as to allow that any thing was wanting to Him, which it is certain pertains to human nature, whether soul, or rational mind, or flesh, and flesh such as was taken of the Woman, not gained by a change or conversion of the Word into flesh. These three several errors, that thrice false heresy of the Apollinarists has brought forward. Eutyches also chose out this third dogma of Apollinaris, which denying the verity of the human body and soul, maintained that our Lord Jesus Christ was wholly and entirely of one nature, as though the Divine Word had changed itself into flesh and soul, and as though the conception, birth, growth, and such like, had been undergone by that Divine Essence, which was incapable of any such changes with the very and true flesh; for such as is the nature of the Only-begotten, such is the nature of the Father, and such is the nature of the Holy Ghost, both impassible and eternal. But if to avoid being driven to the conclusion that the Godhead could feel suffering and death, he departs from the corruption of Apollinaris, and should still dare to affirm the nature of the incarnate Word, that is of the Word and the flesh, to be the same, he clearly falls into the insane notions of Manichæus and Marcion, and believes that the Lord Jesus Christ did all His actions with a false appearance, that His body was not a human body, but a phantasm, which imposed on the eyes of the beholders.

LEO. (Ep. 35. ad Julian.) But what Eutyches ventured to pronounce as an episcopal decision, that in Christ before His incarnation were two natures, but after His incarnation only one, it behoved that he should have been urgently pressed to give the reason of this his belief. I suppose that in using such language he supposed the soul which the Saviour took, to have had its abode in heaven before it was born of the Virgin Marye. This Catholic hearts and ears endure not, for that the Lord when He came down from heaven shewed nothing of the condition of human nature, nor did He take on Him any soul that had existed before, nor any flesh that was not taken of the flesh of His mother. Thus what was justly condemned in Origenf, must needs be rebuked in Eutyches, to wit, that our souls before they were placed in our bodies had actions not only wonderful but various.

REMIGIUS. These heresies therefore the Apostles overthrow in the opening of their Gospels, as Matthew in relating how He derived His descent from the kings of the Jews proves Him to have been truly man and to have had true flesh. Likewise Luke, when he describes the priestly stock and person; Mark when he says, The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ the Son of God; and John when lie says, In the beginning was the Word; both shew Him to have been before all ages God, with God the Father.

1:2

2. Abraham begat Isaac; and Isaac begat Jacob; and Jacob begat Judas and his brethren.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Evan. ii. 1.) Matthew, by beginning with Christ’s genealogy, shews that he has undertaken to relate Christ’s birth according to the flesh. But Luke, as rather describing Him as a Priest for the atonement of sin, gives Christ’s genealogy not in the beginning of his Gospel, but at His baptism, when John bare that testimony, Lo, He that taketh away the sins of the world. (John 1:29.) In the genealogy of Matthew is figured to us the taking on Him of our sins by the Lord Christ; in the genealogy of Luke, the taking away of our sins by the same; hence Matthew gives them in a descending, Luke in an ascending, series. But Matthew, describing Christ’s human generation in descending order, begins his enumeration with Abraham.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. cap. 3. lib. iii. n. 7, 8.) For Abraham was the first who deserved the witness of faith; He believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness. It behoved therefore that he should be set forth as the first in the line of descent, who was the first to deserve the promise of the restoration of the Church, In thee shall all the nations of the earth be blessed. And it is again brought to a period in David, for that Jesus should be called his Son; hence to him is preserved the privilege, that from him should come the beginning of the Lord’s genealogy.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii.) Matthew then, desiring to preserve in memory the lineage of the Lord’s humanity through the succession of His parents, begins with Abraham, saying, Abraham begat Isaac. Why does he not mention lsmael, his first-born? And again, Isaac begat Jacob; why does he not speak of Esau his first-born? Because through them he could not have come down to David.

GLOSS. Yet he names all the brethren of Judah with him in the lineage. lsmael and Esau had not remained in the worship of the true God; but the brethren of Judah were reckoned in God’s people.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii.) Or, he names all the twelve Patriarchs that he may lower that pride which is drawn from a line of noble ancestry. For many of these were born of maidservants, and yet were Patriarchs and heads of tribes.

GLOSS. But Judah is the only one mentioned by name, and that because the Lord was descended from him only. But in each of the Patriarchs we must note not their history only, but the allegorical and moral meaning to be drawn from them; allegory, in seeing whom each of the Fathers foreshewed; moral instruction in that through each one of the Fathers some virtue may be edified in us either through the signification of his name, or through his exampleg. Abraham is in many respects a figure of Christ, and chiefly in his name, which is interpreted the Father of many nations, and Christ is Father of many believers. Abraham moreover went out from his own kindred, and abode in a strange land; in like manner Christ, leaving the Jewish nation, went by His preachers throughout the Gentiles.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Isaac is interpreted ‘laughter,’ but the laughter of the saints is not the foolish convulsion of the lips, but the rational joy of the heart, which was the mystery of Christ. For as he was granted to his parents in their extreme age to their great joy, that it might be known that he was not the child of nature, but of grace, thus Christ also in this last time came of a Jewish mother to be the joy of the whole earth; the one of a virgin, the other of a woman past the age, both contrary to the expectation of nature.

REMIGIUS. Jacob is interpreted ‘supplanter,’ and it is said of Christ, Thou hast cast down beneath Me them that rose up against Me. (Ps. 18:43.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Our Jacob in like manner begot the twelve Apostles in the Spirit, not in the flesh; in word, not in blood. Judah is interpreted ‘confessor,’ for he was a type of Christ who was to be the confessor of His Father, as He spake, I confess to Thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth.

GLOSS. Morally; Abraham signifies to us the virtue of faith in Christ, as an example himself, as it is said of him, Abraham believed God, and it was accounted unto Him for righteousness. Isaac may represent hope; for Isaac is interpreted ‘laughter,’ as he was the joy of his parents; and hope is our joy, making us to hope for eternal blessings and to joy in them. Abraham begat Isaac, and faith begets hope. Jacob signifies ‘love,’ for love embraces two lives; active in the love of our neighbour, contemplative in the love of God; the active is signified by Leah, the contemplative by Rachel. For Leah is interpreted. ‘labouringh,’ for she is active in labour; Racheli ‘having seen the beginning,’ because by the contemplative, the beginning, that is God, is seen. Jacob is born of two parents, as love is born of faith and hope; for what we believe, we both hope for and love.

1:3–6

3–6. And Judas begat Phares and Zara of Thamar; and Phares begat Esrom; and Esrom begat Aram; and Aram begat Aminadab; and Aminadab begat Naasson; and Naasson begat Salmon; and Salmon begat Booz of Rachab; and Booz begat Obed of Ruth; and Obed begat Jesse; and Jesse begat David the king.

GLOSS. Passing over the other sons of Jacob, the Evangelist follows the family of Judah, saying, But Judah begat Phares and Zara of Thamar.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xv. 15.) Neither was Judah himself a first-born, nor of these two sons was either his first-born; he had already had three before them. So that he keeps in that line of descent, by which he shall arrive at David, and from him whither he purposed.

JEROME. It should be noted, that none of the holy women are taken into the Saviour's genealogy, but rather such as Scripture has condemned, that He who came for sinners being born of sinners might so put away the sins of all; thus Ruth the Moabitess follows among the rest.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. c. 3.) But Luke has avoided the mention of these, that he might set forth the series of the priestly race immaculate. But the plan of St. Matthew did not exclude the righteousness of natural reason; for when he wrote in his Gospel, that He who should take on Him the sins of all, was born in the flesh, was subject to wrongs and pain, he did not think it any detraction from His holiness that He did not refuse the further humiliation of a sinful parentage. Nor, again, would it shame the Church to be gathered from among sinners, when the Lord Himself was born of sinners; and, lastly, that the benefits of redemption might have their beginning with His own forefathers: and that none might imagine that a stain in their blood was any hindrance to virtue, nor again any pride themselves insolently on nobility of birth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Besides this, it shews that all are equally liable to sin; for here is Thamar accusing Judah of incest, and David begat Solomon with a woman with whom he had committed adultery. But if the Law was not fulfilled by these great ones, neither could it be by their less great posterity, and so all have sinned, and the presence of Christ is become necessary.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) Observe that Matthew does not name both without a meaning; for though the object of his writing only required the mention of Phares, yet in the twins a mystery is signified; namely, the double life of the nations, one by the Law, the other by Faith.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. By Zarah is denoted the people of the Jews, which first appeared in the light of faith, coming out of the dark womb of the world, and was therefore marked with the scarlet thread of the circumciser, for all supposed that they were to be God's people; but the Law was set before their face as it had been a wall or hedge. Thus the Jews were hindered by the Law, but in the times of Christ's coming the hedge of the Law was broken down that was between Jews and Gentiles, as the Apostle speaks, Breaking down the middle wall of partition; (Eph. 2:14.) and thus it fell out that the Gentiles, who were signified by Phares, as soon as the Law was broken through by Christ's commandments, first entered into the faith, and after followed the Jews.

GLOSS. Judah begat Phares and Zarah before he went into Egypt, whither they both accompanied their father. In Egypt, Phares begat Esrom; and Esrom begat Aram; Aram begat Aminadab; Aminadab begat Naasson; and then Moses led them out of Egypt. Naasson was head of the tribe of Judah under Moses in the desert, where he begat Salmon; and this Salmon it was who, as prince of the tribe of Judah, entered the land of promise with Joshua.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But as we believe that the names of these Fathers were given for some special reason under the providence of God, it follows, but Naasson begat Salmon. This Salmon after his father’s death entered the promised land with Joshua as prince of the tribe of Judah. He took a wife of the name of Rahab. This Rahab is said to have been that Rahab the harlot of Jericho who entertained the spies of the children of Israel, and hid them safely. For Salmon being noble among the children of Israel, inasmuch as he was of the tribe of Judah, and son of the prince thereof, beheld Rahab so ennobled through her great faith, that she was worthy whom he should take to wife. Salmon is interpreted ‘receive a vesselk,’ perhaps as if invited in God’s providence by his very name to receive Rahab a vessel of election.

GLOSS. This Salmon in the promised land begat Booz of this Rahab. Booz begat Obeth of Ruth.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. How Booz took to wife a Moabitess whose name was Ruth, I thought it needless to tell, seeing the Scripture concerning them is open to all. We need but say thus much, that Ruth married Booz for the reward of her faith, for that she had cast off the gods of her forefathers, and had chosen the living God. And Booz received her to wife for reward of his faith, that from such sanctified wedlock might be descended a kingly race.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) But how did Ruth who was an alien marry a man that was a Jew? and wherefore in Christ’s genealogy did His Evangelist so much as mention a union, which in the eye of the law was bastard? Thus the Saviour’s birth of a parentage not admitted by the law appears to us monstrous, until we attend to that declaration of the Apostle, The Law was not given for the righteous, but for the unrighteous. (1 Tim. 1:9.) For this woman who was an alien, a Moabitess, a nation with whom the Mosaic Law forbad all intermarriage, and shut them totally out of the Church, how did she enter into the Church, unless that she were holy and unstained in her life above the Law? Therefore she was exempt from this restriction of the Law, and deserved to be numbered in the Lord's lineage, chosen from the kindred of her mind, not of her body. To us she is a great example, for that in her was prefigured the entrance into the Lord's Church of all of us who are gathered out of the Gentiles.

JEROME. Ruth the Moabitess fulfils the prophecy of Isaiah, Send forth, O Lord, the Lamb that shall rule over the earth, out of the rock of the desert to the mount of the daughter of Sion. (Is. 16:1.)

GLOSS. Jesse, the father of David, has two names, being more frequently called Isai. But the Prophet says, There shall come a rod from the stem of Jesse; (Is. 11:1.) therefore to shew that this prophecy was fulfilled in Mary and Christ, the Evangelist puts Jesse.

REMIGIUS. It is asked, why this epithet King is thus given by the holy Evangelist to David alone? Because he was the first king in the tribe of Judah. Christ Himself is Phares 'the divider,' as it is written, Thou shalt divide the sheep from the goats; (Mat. 25:33.) He is Zaraml, 'the east,' Lo the man, the east is His name; (Zech. 6:12.) He is Esromm, 'an arrow,' He hath set me as a polished shaft. (Is. 49:2.)

RABANUS. Or following another interpretation, according to the abundance of grace, and the width of love. He isn Aram the chosen, according to that, Behold my Servant whom I have chosen. (Is. 42:1.) He is Aminadab, that is 'willingo,' in that He says, I will freely sacrifice to Thee. (Is. 54:6.) Also He is Naassonp, i. e. 'augury,' as He knows the past, the present, and the future; or, 'like a serpent,' according to that, Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness. (John 3:14.) He isq Salmon, i. e. 'that feeleth,'as He said, I feel that power is gone forth out of me. (Luke 8:46.)

GLOSS. Christ Himself espouses Rahab, i. e. the Gentile Church; for Rahabr is interpreted either 'hunger,' or 'breadth,' or 'might;' for the Church of the Gentiles hungers and thirsts after righteousness, and converts philosophers and kings by the might of her doctrine. Ruth is interpreted either 'seeing' or 'hastenings' and denotes the Church which in purity of heart sees God, and hastens to the prize of the heavenly call.

REMIGIUS. Christ is also Boozt, because He is strength, for, When I am lifted up, I will draw all men unto Me. (John 12:32.) He is Obeth. 'a servantu,' for, the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister. (Mat. 20:28.) He is Jesse, or ‘burntx,’ for, I am come to send fire on earth. (Luke 12:49.) He is Davidy, ‘mighty in arm,’ for, the Lord is great and powerful; (Ps. 24:8.) ‘desirable,’ for, He shall come, the Desire of all nations; (Hag. 2:7.) ‘beautiful to behold,’ according to that, Beautiful in form before the sons of men. (Ps. 45:3.)

GLOSS. Let us now see what virtues they be which these fathers edify in us; for faith, hope, and charity are the foundation of all virtues; those that follow are like additions over and above them. Judah is interpreted ‘confession,’ of which there are two kinds, confession of faith, and of sin. If then, after we be endowed with the three forementioned virtues, we sin, confession not of faith only but of sin is needful for us. Phares is interpreted ‘division,’ Zamar ‘the east,’ and Thamar ‘bitternessz.’ Thus confession begets separation from vice, the rise of virtue, and the bitterness of repentance. After Phares follows Esron, ‘an arrow,’ for when one is separated from vice and secular pursuits, he should become a dart wherewith to slay by preaching the vices of others. Aram is interpreted ‘elect’ or ‘loftya,’ for as soon as one is detached from this world, and profiteth for another, he must needs be held to be elect of God, famous amongst men, high in virtue. Naasson is ‘augury,’ but this augury is of heaven, not of earth. It is that of which Joseph boasted when he said, Ye have taken away the cup of my Lord, where with He is wont to divine. (Gen. 44:5.) The cup is the divine Scripture wherein is the draught of wisdom; by this the wise man divines, since in it he sees things future, that is, heavenly things. Next is Salomonb, ‘that perceiveth,’ for he who studies divine Scripture becomes perceiving, that is, he discerns by the taste of reason, good from bad, sweet from bitter. Next is Booz, that is ‘brave,’ for who is well taught in Scripture becomes brave to endure all adversity.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This brave one is the son of Rahab, that is, of the Church; for Rahab signifies ‘breadth’ or ‘spread out,’ for because the Church of the Gentiles was called from all quarters of the earth, it is called ‘breadth.’

GLOSS. Then follows Obeth, i. e. ‘servitude,’ for which none is fit but he who is strong; and this servitude is begotten of Ruth, that is ‘haste,’ for it behoves a slave to be quick, not slow.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. They who look to wealth and not temper, to beauty and not faith, and require in a wife such endowments as are required in harlots, will not beget sons obedient to their parents or to God, but rebellious to both; that their children may be punishment of their ungodly wedlock. Obeth begat Jesse, that is ‘refreshment,’ for whoever is subject to God and his parents, begets such children as prove his ‘refreshment.’

GLOSS. Or Jesse may be interpreted ‘incensec.’ For it we serve God in love and fear, there will be a devotion in the heart, which in the heat and desire of the heart offers the sweetest incense to God. But when one is become a fit servant, and a sacrifice of incense to God, it follows that he becomes David, (i. e. ‘of a strong hand,’) who fought mightily against his enemies, and made the Idumeans tributary. In like manner ought he to subdue carnal men to God by teaching and example.

1:6–8

6–8. David the king begat Solomon of her that had been the wife of Urias; and Solomon begat Roboam; and Roboam begat Abia; and Abia begat Asa; and Asa begat Josaphat.

The Evangelist has now finished the first fourteen generations, and is come to the second, which consists of royal personages, and therefore beginning with David, who was the first king in the tribe of Judah, he calls him David the king.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 4.) Since in Matthew’s genealogy is shewed forth the taking on Him by Christ of our sins, therefore he descends from David to Solomon, in whose mother David had sinned. Luke ascends to David through Nathan, for through Nathan the prophet God punished David’s sin; because Luke’s genealogy is to shew the putting away of our sins.

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. Retract. ii. 16.) That is it, must be said, through a prophet of the same name, for it was not Nathan the son of David who reproved him, but a prophet of the same name.

REMIGIUS. Let us enquire why Matthew does not mention Bathsheba by name as he does the other women. Because the others, though deserving of much blame, were yet commendable for many virtues. But Bathsheba was not only consenting in the adultery, but in the murder of her husband, hence her name is not introduced in the Lord’s genealogy.

GLOSS. Besides, he does not name Bathsheba, that, by naming Urias, he may recal to memory that great wickedness which she was guilty of towards him.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) But the holy David is the more excellent in this, that he confessed himself to be but man, and neglected not to wash out with the tears of repentance the sin of which he had been guilty, in so taking away Urias' wife. Herein shewing us that none ought to trust in his own strength, for we have a mighty adversary whom we cannot overcome without God's aid. And you will commonly observe very heavy sins befalling to the share of illustrious men, that they may not from their other excellent virtues be thought more than men, but that you may see that as men they yield to temptation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Solomon is interpreted 'peacemaker,' because having subdued all the nations round about, and made them tributary, he had a peaceful reign. Roboam is interpreted 'by a multitude of people,' for multitude is the mother of sedition; for where many are joined in a crime, that is commonly unpunishable. But a limit in numbers is the mistress of good order.

1:8–11

8–11. And Josaphat begat Joram; and Joram begat Ozias; and Ozias begat Joatham; and Joatham begat Achaz; and Achaz begat Ezekias; and Ezekias begat Manasses; and Manasses begat Amon; and Amon begat Josias; and Josias begat Jechonias and his brethren, about the time they were carried away to Babylon.

JEROME. In the fourth book of Kings we read, that Ochozias was the son of Joram. On his death, Josabeth, sister of Ochozias and daughter of Joram, took Joash, her brother's son, and preserved him from the slaughter of the royal seed by Athalias. To Joash succeeded his son Amasias; after him his son Azarias, who is called Ozias; after him his son Joatham. Thus you see according to historical truth there were three intervening kings, who are omitted by the Evangelist. Joram, moreover, begot not Ozias, but Ochozias, and the rest as we have related. But because it was the purpose of the Evangelist to make each of the three periods consist of fourteen generations, and because Joram had connected himself with Jezebel's most impious race, therefore his posterity to the third generation is omitted in tracing the lineage of the holy birth.

HILARY. Thus the stain of the Gentile alliance being purged, the royal race is again taken up in the fourth following generation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. What the Holy Spirit testified through the Prophet, saying, that He would cut off every male from the house of Ahab, and Jezebel, that Jehu the son of Nausi fulfilled, and received the promise that his children to the fourth generation should sit on the throne of Israel. As great a blessing then as was given upon the house of Ahab, so great a curse was given on the house of Joram, because of the wicked daughter of Ahab and Jezebel, that his sons to the fourth generation should be cut out of the number of the Kings. Thus his sin descended on his posterity as it had been written, I will visit the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation. (Exod. 20:5.) Thus see how dangerous it is to marry with the seed of the ungodly.

AUGUSTINE. (Hilar. Amast. V. et N. Test. q. 85.) Or, Ochozias, Joash, and Amasias, were excluded from the number, because their wickedness was continuous and without interval. For Solomon was suffered to hold the kingdom for his father’s deserts, Roboam for his son’s. But these three doing evil successively were excluded. This then is an example how a race is cut off when wickedness is shewn therein in perpetual succession. And Ozias begat Joatham; and Joatham begat Achaz; and Achaz begat Ezekias.

GLOSS. This Ezekias was he to whom, when he had no children, it was said, Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die. (Is. 38:1.) He wept, not from desire of longer life, for he knew that Solomon had thereby pleased God, that he had not asked length of days; but he wept, for he feared that God’s promise should not be fulfilled, when himself, being in the line of David of whom Christ should come, was without children. And Ezekias begat Manasses; and Manasses begat Amon; and Amon begat Josias.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But the order in the Book of Kings (2 Kings 23.) is different, thus namely; Josias begot Eliakim, afterwards called Joakim; Joakim begot Jechonias. But Joakim is not reckoned among the Kings in the genealogy, because God’s people had not set him on the throne, but Pharaoh by his might. For if it were just that only for their intermixture with the race of Ahab, three kings should be shut out of the number in the genealogy, was it not just that Joakim should be likewise shut out, whom Pharaoh had set up as king by hostile force? And thus Jechonias, who is the son of Joakim, and the grandson of Josiah, is reckoned among the kings as the son of Josiah, in place of his father who is omitted.

JEROME. Otherwise, we may consider the first Jeconias to be the same as Joakim, and the second to be the son not the father, the one being spelt with k and m, the second by ch and n. This distinction has been confounded both by Greeks and Latins, by the fault of writers and the lapse of time.

AMBROSE. (In Luc. cap. 2.) That there were two kings of the name of Joakim, is clear from the Book of Kings. And Joakim slept with his fathers, and Joachin his son reigned, in his stead. (2 Kings 24:6.) This son is the same whom Jeremiah calls Jeconias. And rightly did St. Matthew purpose to differ from the Prophet, because he sought to shew therein the great abundance of the Lord’s mercies. For the Lord did not seek among men nobility of race, but suitably chose to be born of captives and of sinners, as He came to preach remission of sin to the captives. The Evangelist therefore did not conceal either of these; but rather shewed them both, inasmuch as both were called Jeconias.

REMIGIUS. But it may be asked, why the Evangelist says they were born in the carrying away, when they were born before the carrying away. He says this because they were born for this purpose, that they should be led captive, from the dominion of the whole nation, for their own and others’ sins. And because God foreknew that they were to be carried away captive, therefore he says, they were born in the carrying away to Babylon. But of those whom the holy Evangelist places together in the Lord’s genealogy, it should be known, that they were alike in good or ill fame. Judas and his brethren were notable for good, in like manner Phares and Zara, Jechonias and his brethren, were notable for evil.

GLOSS. Mystically, David is Christ, who overcame Golias, that is, the Devil. Urias, i. e. God is my light, is the Devil who says, I will be like the Highest. (Is. 14:14.) To Him the Church was married, when Christ on the Throne of the majesty of His Father loved her, and having made her beautiful, united her to Himself in wedlock. Or Urias is the Jewish nation who through the Law boasted of their light. From them Christ took away the Law, having taught it to speak of Himself. Bersabee is ‘the well of satiety,’ that is, the abundance of spiritual grace.

REMIGIUS. Bersabee is interpreted ‘the seventh well,’ or ‘the well of the oathc;’ by which is signified the grant of baptism, in which is given the gift of the sevenfold Spirit, and the oath against the Devil is made. Christ is also Solomon, i. e. the peaceful, according to that of the Apostle, He is our peace. (Eph. 2:14.) Roboamd is, ‘the breadth of the people,’ according to that, Many shall come from the East and from the West.

RABANUS. Or; ‘the might of the people,’ because he quickly converts the people to the faith.

REMIGIUS. He is also Abias, that is, ‘the Lord Father,’ according to that, One is your Father who is in heaven. (Mat. 23:9.) And again, Ye call me Master and Lord. (John 13:13.) He is also Asae, that is, ‘lifting up,’ according to that, Who taketh away the sins of the world. (John 1:29.) He is also Josaphat, that is, ‘judging,’ for, The Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son. (John 5:22.) He is also Joram, that is, ‘lofty,’ according to that, No man hath ascended up to heaven, but He that came down from heaven. (John 3:13.) He is also Ozias, that is, ‘the Lord’s strength,’ for The Lord is my strength and my praise. (Ps. 118:14.) He is also Jothamf, that is, ‘completed,’ or ‘perfected,’ for Christ is the end of the Law. (Rom. 10:4.) He is also Ahazg, that is, ‘turning,’ according to that, Be ye turned to Me. (Zech. 1:3.)

RABANUS. Or, ‘embracing,’ because None knoweth the Father but the Son. (Matt. 11:27.)

REMIGIUS. He is also Ezekias, that is, ‘the strong Lord,’ or, ‘the Lord shall comfort;’ according to that, Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world. (John 16:33.) He is also Manasses, that is, ‘forgetful,’ or, ‘forgotten,’ according to that, I will not remember your sins any more. (Ezek. 28.) He is also Aaronh, that is,’ faithful,’ according to that, The Lord is faithful in all His words. (Ps. 145:17.) He is also Josias, that is, ‘the incense of the Lordi,’ as, And being in an agony, He prayed more earnestly. (Luke 22:44.)

RABANUS. And that incense signifies prayer, the Psalmist witnesses, saying, Let my prayer come up as incense before Thee. (Ps. 141:2.) Or, ‘The salvation of the Lord,’ according to that, My salvation is for ever. (Is. 55.)

REMIGIUS. He is Jechoniask, that is, ‘preparing,’ or ‘the Lord’s preparation,’ according to that, If I shall depart, I will also prepare a place for you. (John 14:3.)

GLOSS. Morally; After David follows Solomon, which is interpreted, ‘peaceful.’ For one then becomes peaceful, when unlawful motions being composed, and being as it were already set in the everlasting rest, he serves God, and turns others to Him. Then follows Roboam, that is ‘the breadth of the people.’ For when there is no longer any thing to overcome within himself, it behoves a man to look abroad to others, and to draw with him the people of God to heavenly things. Next is Abias, that is, ‘the Lord Father,’ for these things premised, He may proclaim Himself the Son of God, and then He will be Asa, that is, ‘raising up,’ and will ascend to His Father from virtue to virtue: and He will become Josaphat, that is, ‘judging,’ for He will judge others, and will be judged of none. Thus he becomes Joram, that is, ‘lofty,’ as it were dwelling on high; and is made Oziah, that is, ‘the strong One of the Lord,’ as attributing all his strength to God, and persevering in his path. Then follows Jotham, that is, ‘perfect,’ for he groweth daily to greater perfection. And thus he becomes Ahaz, that is, ‘embracing,’ for by obedience knowledge is increased according to that, They have proclaimed the worship of the Lord, and have understood His doings. Then follows Ezekias, that is, ‘the Lord is strong,’ because he understands that God is strong, and so turning to His love, he becomes Manasses, ‘forgetful,’ because he gives up as forgotten all worldly things; and is made thereby Amon, that is, ‘faithful,’ for whoso despises all temporal things, defrauds no man of his goods. Thus he is made Josias, that is, ‘in certain hope of the Lord’s salvation;’ for Josias is interpreted ‘the salvation of the Lord.’

1:12–15

12–15. And after they were brought to Babylon, Jechonias begat Salathiel; and Salathiel begat Zorobabel; and Zorobabel begat Abiud; and Abiud begat Eliakim; and Eliakim begat Azor; and Azor begat Sadoc; and Sadoc begat Achim; and Achim begat Eliud; and Eliud begat Eleazar; and Eleazar begat Matthan; and Matthan begat Jacob.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) After the carrying away, he sets Jeconiah again, as now become a private person.

AMBROSE. Of whom Jeremiah speaks. Write this man dethroned; for there shall not spring of his seed one sitting on the throne of David. (Jer. 22:30.) How is this said of the Prophet, that none of the seed of Jeconias should reign? For if Christ reigned, and Christ was of the seed of Jeconiah, then has the Prophet spoken falsely. But it is not there declared that there shall be none of the seed of Jeconiah, and so Christ is of his seed; and that Christ did reign, is not in contradiction to the prophecy; for He did not reign with worldly honours, as He said, My kingdom is not of this world. (John 18:36.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Concerning Salathiell, we have read nothing either good or bad, but we suppose him to have been a holy man, and in the captivity to have constantly besought God in behalf of afflicted Israel, and that hence he was named Salathiel, 'the petition of Godm.' Salathiel begot Zorobabel, which is interpreted, 'flowing postponed,' or, 'of the confusion,' or here, 'the doctor of Babylonn.' I have read, but know not whether it be true, that both the priestly line and the royal line were united in Zorobabel; and that it was through him that the children of Israel returned into their own country. For that in a disputation held between three, of whom Zorobabel was one, each defending his own opinion, Zorobabel's sentence, that Truth was the strongest thing, prevailed; and that for this Darius granted him that the children of Israel should return to their country; and therefore after this providence of God, he was rightly called Zorobabel, 'the doctor of Babylon.' For what doctrine greater than to shew that Truth is the mistress of all things?

GLOSS. But this seems to contradict the genealogy which is read in Chronicles (1 Chron. 3:17.). For there it is said, that Jeconias begot Salathiel and Phadaias, and Phadaias begot Zorobabel, and Zorobabel Mosollah, Ananias, and Salomith their sister. But we know that many parts of the Chronicles have been corrupted by time, and error of transcribers. Hence come many and controverted questions of genealogies which the Apostle bids us avoid (1 Tim. 1:4.). Or it may be said, that Salathiel and Phadaias are the same man under two different names. Or that Salathiel and Phadaias were brothers, and both had sons of the same name, and that the writer of the history followed the genealogy of Zorobabel, the son of Salathiel. From Abiud down to Joseph, no history is found in the Chronicles; but we read that the Hebrews had many other annals, which were called the Words of the Days, of which much was burned by Herod, who was a foreigner, in order to confound the descent of the royal line. And perhaps Joseph had read in them the names of his ancestors, or knew them from some other source. And thus the Evangelist could learn the succession of this genealogy. It should be noted, that the first Jeconiah is called the resurrection of the Lord, the second, the preparation of the Lord. Both are very applicable to the Lord Christ, who declares, I am the resurrection, and the life; (John 11:25.) and, I go to prepare a place for you. (John 14:2.) Salathiel, i. e. 'the Lord is my petition,' is suitable to Him who said, Holy Father, keep them whom Thou hast given Me. (John 17:11.)

REMIGIUS. He is also Zorobabel, that is, 'the master of confusion,' according to that, Your Master eateth with publicans and sinners. (Matt. 9:11.) He is Abiud, that is, 'He is my Father,' according to that, I and the Father are One. (John 10:30.) He is also Eliacimo, that is, 'God the Reviver,' according to that, I will revive him again in the last day. (John 6:54.) He is also Azor, that is, 'aided,' according to that, He who sent Me is with Me. (John 8:29.) He is also Sadoch, that is, 'the just,' or, 'the justified,' according to that, He was delivered, the just for the unjust. (1 Pet. 3:18.) He is also Achim, that is, 'my brother is He,' according to that, Whoso doeth the will of My Father, he is My brother. (Matt. 12:50.) He is also Eliud, that is, 'He is my God,' according to that, My Lord, and my God. (John 20:28.)

GLOSS. He is also Eleazar, i. e. 'God is my helper,' as in the seventeenth Psalm, My God, my helper. He is also Mathan, that is, 'giving,' or, 'given,' for, He gave gifts for men; (Eph. 4:8.) and, God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son. (John 3:16.)

REMIGIUS. He is also Jacob, 'that supplanteth,' for not only hath He supplanted the Devil, but hath given His power to His faithful people; as, Behold I have given you power to tread upon serpents. (Luke 10:19.) He is also Joseph, that is, 'adding,' according to that, I came that they might have life, and that they might have it abundantly. (John 10:10.)

RABANUS. But let us see what moral signification these names contain. After Jeconias, which means 'the preparation of the Lord,' follows Salathiel, i. e. 'God is my petition,' for he who is rightly prepared, prays not but of God. Again, he becomes Zorobabel, 'the master of Babylon,' that is, of the men of the earth, whom he makes to know concerning God, that He is their Father, which is signified in Abiud. Then that people rise again from their vices, whence follows Eliacim, 'the resurrection;' and thence rise to good works, which is Azor, and becomes Sadoch, i. e. 'righteous;' and then they are taught the love of their neighbour. He is my brother, which is signified in Achim; and through love to God he says of Him, ‘My God,’ which Eliud signifies. Then follows Eleazar, i. e. ‘God is my helper;’ he recognizes God as his helper. But whereto he tends is shewn in Matthan, which is interpreted ‘gift,’ or ‘giving;’ for he looks to God as his benefactor; and as he wrestled with and overcame his vices in the beginning, so he does in the end of life, which belongs to Jacob, and thus he reaches Joseph, that is, ‘The increase of virtues.’

1:16

16. And Jacob begat Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ.

GLOSS. In the last place, after all the patriarchs, he sets down Joseph the husband of Mary, for whose sake all the rest are introduced, saying, But Jacob begot Joseph.

JEROME. This passage is objected to us by the Emperor Julian in his Discrepancy of the Evangelists. Matthew calls Joseph the son of Jacob, Luke makes him the son of Heli. He did not know the Scripture manner, one was his father by nature, the other by law. For we know that God commanded by Moses, that if a brother or near kinsman died without children, another should take his wife, to raise up seed to his brother or kinsman. (Deut. 25.) But of this matter Africanus the chronologistp, and Eusebius of Cæsarca, have disputed more fully.

EUSEBIUS. (Hist. Eccles. 1.7.) For Matthan and Melchi at different periods had each a son by one and the same wife Jesca. Matthan, who traced through Solomon, first had her, and died leaving one son, Jacob by name. As the Law forbade not a widow, either dismissed from her husband, or after the death of her husband, to be married to another, so Melchi, who traced through Matthan, being of the same tribe but of another race, took this widow to his wife, and begat Heli his son. Thus shall we find Jacob and Heli, though of a different race, yet by the same mother, to have been brethren. One of whom, namely Jacob, after Heli his brother was deceased without issue, married his wife, and begat on her the third, Joseph, by nature indeed and reason his own son; whereupon also it is written, And Jacob begat Joseph. But by the Law, he was the son of Heli; for Jacob, being his brother, raised up seed to him. Thus the genealogy, both as recited by Matthew, and by Luke, stands right and true; Matthew saying, And Jacob begot Joseph; Luke saying, Which was the son, as it was supposed, (for he adds this withal,) of Joseph, which was the son of Heli, which was the son of Melchi. Nor could he have more significantly or properly expressed that way of generation according to the Law, which was made by a certain adoption that had respect to the dead, carefully leaving out the word begetting throughout even to the end.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Evang. ii. 2.) He is more properly called his son, by whom he was adopted, than had he been said to have been begotten of him of whose flesh he was not born. Wherefore Matthew, in saying Abraham begot Isaac, and continuing the same phrase throughout down to Jacob begot Joseph, sufficiently declares that he gives the father according to the order of nature, so as that we must hold Joseph to have been begotten, not adopted, by Jacob. Though even if Luke had used the word begotten, we need not have thought it any serious objection; for it is not absurd to say of an adopted son that he is begotten, not after the flesh, but by affection.

EUSEBIUS. (ubi sup.) Neither does this lack good authority; nor has it been suddenly devised by us for this purpose. For the kinsmen of our Saviour according to the flesh, either out of desire to shew forth this their so great nobility of stock, or simply for the truth’s sake, have delivered it unto us.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Evang. ii. 4.) And suitably does Luke, who relates Christ’s ancestry not in the opening of his Gospel, but at his baptism, follow the line of adoption, as thus more clearly pointing Him out as the Priest that should make atonement for sin. For by adoption we are made the sons of God, by believing in the Son of God. But by the descent according to the flesh which Matthew follows, we rather see that the Son of God was for us made man. Luke sufficiently shews that he called Joseph the son of Heli, because he was adopted by Heli, by his calling Adam the son of God, which he was by grace, as he was set in Paradise, though he lost it afterwards by sinning.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iv.) Having gone through all the ancestry, and ended in Joseph, he adds, The husband of Mary, thereby declaring that it was for her sake that he was included in the genealogy.

JEROME. When you hear this word husband, do not straight bethink you of wedlock, but remember the Scripture manner, which calls persons only betrothed husband and wife.

GENNADIUS. (De Eccles. Dog. 2.) The Son of God was born of human flesh, that is of Mary, and not by man after the way of nature, as Ebion says; and accordingly it is significantly added, Of her Jesus was born.

AUGUSTINE. (De Hæres. ii.) This is said against Valentinus, who taught that Christ took nothing of the Virgin Mary, but passed through her as through a channel or pipe.

AUGUSTINE. Wherefore it pleased Him to take flesh of the womb of a woman, is known in His own secret counsels; whether that He might confer honour on both sexes alike, by taking the form of a man, and being born of a woman, or from some other reason which I would not hastily pronounce on.

HILARY. (Quæst. Nov. et Vet. Test. q. 49.) What God conveyed by the anointing of oil to those who were anointed to be kings, this the Holy Spirit conveyed upon the man Christ, adding thereto the expiation; wherefore when born He was called Christ; and thus it proceeds, who is called Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Evang. ii. 1.) It was not lawful that he should think to separate himself from Mary for this, that she brought forth Christ as yet a Virgin. And herein may the faithful gather, that if they be married, and preserve strict continence on both sides, yet may their wedlock hold with union of love only, without carnal; for here they see that it is possible that a son be born without carnal embrace.

AUGUSTINE. (De Nupt. et Concup. i. 11.) In Christ’s parents was accomplished every good benefit of marriage, fidelity, progeny, and a sacrament. The progeny we see in the Lord Himself; fidelity, for there was no adultery; sacrament, for there was no divorce.

JEROME. The attentive reader may ask, Seeing Joseph was not the father of the Lord and Saviour, how does his genealogy traced down to him in order pertain to the Lord? We will answer, first, that it is not the practice of Scripture to follow the female line in its genealogies; secondly, that Joseph and Mary were of the same tribe, and that he was thence compelled to take her to wife as a kinsman, and they were enrolled together at Bethlehem, as being come of one stock.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Also, the line of descent ought to be brought down to Joseph, that in wedlock no wrong might be done to the male sex, as the more worthy, provided only nothing was taken away from the truth; because Mary was of the seed of David.

AUGUSTINE. (Id. non occ.) Hence then we believe that Mary was in the line of David; namely, because we believe the Scripture which affirms two things, both that Christ was of the seed of David according to the flesh, and that He should be conceived of Mary not by knowledge of man, but as yet a virgin.

THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS. Herein we must beware of the error of Nestorius, who thus speaks; "When Divine Scripture is to speak either of the birth of Christ which is of the Virgin Mary, or His death, it is never seen to put God, but either, Christ, or Son, or Lord; since these three are significative of the two natures, sometimes of this, sometimes of that, and sometimes of both this and that together. And here is a testimony to this, Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ. For God the Word needed not a second birth of a woman."

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Vigil. Cont. Fel. 12. ap. Aug. t. 8. p. 45.) But not one was the Son of God, and another the son of a man; but the same Christ was the Son of both God and man. And as in one man, the soul is one and the body is another, so in the mediator between God and man, the Son of God was one, and the son of man another; yet of both together was one Christ the Lord. Two in distinction of substance, one in unity of Person. But the heretic objects; "how can you teach Him to have been born in time whom you say was before coeternal with His Father? For birth is as it were a motion of a thing not in being, before it be born, bringing about this, that by benefit of birth it come into being. Whence it is concluded, that He who was in being cannot be born; if He could be born He was not in being." (To this it is replied by Augustine;) Let us imagine, as many will have it, that the universe has a general soul, which by some unspeakable motion gives life to all seeds, so as that itself is not mixed up with the things it produces. When this then passes forth into the womb to form passible matter to its own uses, it makes one with itself the person of that thing which it is clear has not the same substance. And thus, the soul being active and the matter passive, of two substances is made one man, the soul and the flesh being distinct; thus it is that our confession is, that that soul is born of the womb which in coming to the womb we say conferred life on the thing conceived. He, I say, is said to be born of His mother, who shaped to Himself a body out of her, in which He might be born; not as though before He was born, His mother might, as far as pertained to Him, not have been in being. In like manner, yea in a manner yet more incomprehensible and sublime, the Son of God was born, by taking on Him perfect manhood of his Mother. He who by his singular almighty power is the cause of their being born to all things that are born.

1:17

17. So all the generations from Abraham to David are fourteen generations; and from David until the carrying away into Babylon are fourteen generations; and from the carrying away into Babylon unto Christ are fourteen generations.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Having enumerated the generations from Abraham to Christ, he divides them into three divisions of fourteen generations, because three times at the end of fourteen generations the state of the people of the Jews was changed. From Abraham to David they were under Judges; from David to the carrying away into Babylon under Kings; from the carrying away to Christ under the High Priests. What he would shew then is this; like as ever at the end of fourteen generations the state of men has changed, so there being fourteen generations completed from the carrying away to Christ, it must needs be that the state of men be changed by Christ. And so since Christ all the Gentiles have been made under one Christ Judge, King, and Priest. And for that Judges, Kings, and Priests prefigured Christ’s dignity, their beginnings were always in a type of Christ; the first of the Judges was Joshua the son of Nave; the first of the Kings, David; the first of the Priests, Jesus son of Josedech. That this was typical of Christ none doubts.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or he divided the whole genealogy into three parts, to shew that not even by the change of their government were they made better, but under Judges, Kings, High Priests, and Priests, held the same evil course. For which cause also he mentions the captivity in Babylon, shewing that neither by this were they corrected. But the going down into Egypt is not mentioned, because they were not still in terror of the Egyptians as they were of the Assyrians or Parthians; and because that was a remote, but this a recent event; and because they had not been carried thither for sin as they had to Babylon.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. c. 3.) Let us not think this is to be overlooked, that though there were seventeen Kings of Judæa between David and Jeconiah, Matthew only recounts fourteen. We must observe that there might be many more successions to the throne than generations of men; for some may live longer and beget children later; or might be altogether without seed; thence the number of Kings and of generations would not coincide.

GLOSS. Or we may say, that there are three Kings overlooked, as was said above.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) Again, from Jeconiah to Joseph are computed twelve generations; yet he afterwards calls these also fourteen. But if you look attentively, you will be able to discover the method by which fourteen are reckoned here. Twelve are reckoned including Joseph, and Christ is the thirteenth; and history declares that there were two Joakims, that is two Jeconiahs, father and son. The Evangelist has not passed over either of these, but has named them both. Thus, adding the younger Jeconiah, fourteen generations are computed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, the same Jeconiah is counted twice in the Gospel, once before the carrying away, and again after the carrying away. For this Jeconiah being one person had two different conditions; before the carrying away he was King, as being made King by the people of God; but he became a private man at the carrying away; hence he is reckoned once among the Kings before the carrying away; and after the carrying away once among private men.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 4.) Or, one of Christ’s forefathers is counted twice, because in him, Jeconiah to wit, there was made a passing off to strange nations since he was carried to Babylon. Wherever a series turns out of the right line to go in any other direction there is an angle made, and that part that is in the angle is reckoned twice. Thus here is a figure of Christ, who passes from the circumcision to the uncircumcision, and is made a cornerstone.

REMIGIUS. He made fourteen generations, because the ten denotes the decalogue, and the four the four books of the Gospel; whence this shews the agreement of the Law and the Gospel. And he put the fourteen three times over, that he might shew that the perfection of law, prophecy, and grace, consists in the faith of the Holy Trinity.

GLOSS. Or in this number is signified the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit. The number is made up of seven, doubled, to shew that the grace of the Holy Spirit is needed both for soul and body to salvation. Also the genealogy is divided into three portions of fourteen thus. The first from Abraham to David, so as that David is included in it; the second from David to the carrying away, in which David is not included, but the carrying away is included; the third is from the carrying away to Christ, in which if we say that Jeconiah is included, then the carrying away is included. In the first are denoted the men before the Law, in which you will find some of the men of the Law of nature, such as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, all as far as Solomon. In the second are denoted the men under the Law; for all who are included in it were under the Law. In the third are found the men of grace; for it is finished in Christ, who was the giver of grace; and because in it was the deliverance from Babylon, signifying the deliverance from captivity that was made by Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) After having divided the whole into three periods of fourteen generations, he does not sum them all up and say, The sum of the whole is forty and two; because one of those fathers, that is Jeconiah, is reckoned twice; so that they do not amount to forty-two, as three times fourteen does, but because one is reckoned twice over, there are only forty-one generations. Matthew therefore, whose purpose was to draw out Christ’s kingly character, counts forty successions in the genealogy exclusive of Christ. This number denotes the time for which we must be governed by Christ in this world, according to that painful discipline which is signified by the iron rod of which it is written in the Psalms, Thou shall rule them with a rod of iron. That this number should denote this our temporal life, a reason offers at hand, in this, that the seasons of the year are four, and that the world itself is bounded by four sides, the east, and west, the north, and the south. But forty contains ten four times. Moreover, ten itself is made up by a number proceeding from one to four.

GLOSS. Or, the ten refers to the decalogue, the four to this life present, which passes through four seasons; or by the ten is meant the Old Testament, by the four the New.

REMIGIUS. But if any, maintaining that it is not the same Jeconiah, but two different persons, make the number forty and two, we then shall say that the Holy Church is signified; for this number is the product of seven, and six; (for six times seven make forty-two;) the six denotes labour, and the seven rest.

1:18

18. Now the birth of Jesus Christ was on this wise: When as His mother Mary was espoused to Joseph, before they came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Having said above, And Jacob begat Joseph, to whom Mary being espoused bare Jesus; that none who heard should suppose that His birth was as that of any of the forementioned fathers, he cuts off the thread of his narrative, saying, But Christ's generation was thus. As though he were to say, The generation of all these fathers was as I have related it; but Christ's was not so, but as follows, His mother Mary being espoused.

CHRYSOSTOM. He announces that he is to relate the manner of the generation, shewing therein that he is about to speak some new thing; that you may not suppose when you hear mention of Mary's husband, that Christ was born by the law of nature.

REMIGIUS. Yet it might be referred to the foregoing in this way, The generation of Christ was, as I have related, thus, Abraham begat Isaac.

JEROME. But why is He conceived not of a Virgin merely, but of a Virgin espoused? First, that by the descent of Joseph, Mary's family might be made known; secondly, that she might not be stoned by the Jews as an adulteress; thirdly, that in her flight into Egypt she might have the comfort of a husband. The Martyr Ignatius (vid. Ign. ad Eph. 19.) adds yet a fourth reason, namely, that his birth might be hid from the Devil, looking for Him to be born of a wife and not of a virgin.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Therefore both espoused and yet remaining at home; for as in her who should conceive in the house of her husband, is understood natural conception; so in her who conceives before she be taken to her husband, there is suspicion of infidelity.

JEROME. (cont. Helvid. in princ.) It is to be known, that Helvidius, a certain turbulent man, having got matter of disputation, takes in hand to blaspheme against the Mother of God. His first proposition was, Matthew begins thus, When she was espoused. Behold, he says, you have her espoused, but, as ye say, not yet committed; but surely not espoused for any other reason than as being to be married.

ORIGEN. (non occ.) She was indeed espoused to Joseph, but not united in wedlock; that is to say, His mother immaculate, His mother incorrupt, His mother pure. His mother! Whose mother? The mother of God, of the Only-begotten, of the Lord, of the King, of the Maker of all things, and the Redeemer of all.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Epist. ad Monach. Egypt. [Ep. p. 7.]) What will any one see in the Blessed Virgin more than in other mothers, if she be not the mother of God, but of Christ, or the Lord, as Nestorius says? For it would not be absurd should any one please to name the mother of any anointed person, the mother of Christ. Yet she alone and more than they is called the Holy Virgin, and the mother of Christ. For she bare not a simple man as ye say, but rather the Word incarnate, and made man of God the Father. But perhaps you say, Tell me, do you think the Virgin was made the mother of His divinity? To this also we say, that the Word was born of the very substance of God Himself, and without beginning of time always coexisted with the Father. But in these last times when He was made flesh, that is united to flesh, having a rational soul, He is said to be born of a woman after the flesh. Yet is this sacrament in a manner brought out like to birth among us; for the mothers of earthly children impart to their nature that flesh that is to be perfected by degrees in the human form; but God sends the life into the animal. But though these are mothers only of the earthly bodies, yet when they bear children, they are said to bear the whole animal, and not a part of it only. Such do we see to have been done in the birth of Emmanuel; the Word of God was born of the substance of His Father; but because He took on Him flesh, making it His own, it is necessary to confess that He was born of a woman according to the flesh. Where seeing He is truly God, how shall any one doubt to call the Holy Virgin the Mother of God?

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 148.) If you are not confounded when you hear of the birth of God, let not His conception disturb you, seeing the pure virginity of the mother removes all that might shock human reverence. And what offence against our awe and reverence is there, when the Deity entered into union with purity that was always dear to Him, where an Angel is mediator, faith is bridemaid, where chastity is the giving away, virtue the gift, conscience the judge, God the cause; where the conception is inviolateness, the birth virginity, and the mother a virginq.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Epist. ad Joan Antioch [Ep. p. 107.]) But if we were to say that the holy Body of Christ came down from heaven, and was not made of His mother, as Valentinus does, in what sense could Mary be the Mother of God?

GLOSS. The name of His Mother is added, Mary.

BEDE. (in Luc. c. 3.) Mary is interpreted, 'Star of the Sea,' after the Hebrew; 'Mistress,' after the Syriac; as she bare into the world the Light of salvation, and the Lordr.

GLOSS. And to whom she was betrothed is shewn, Joseph.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Mary was therefore betrothed to a carpenter, because Christ the Spouse of the Church was to work the salvation of all men through the wood of the Cross.

CHRYSOSTOM. What follows, Before they came together, does not mean before she was brought to the bridegroom's house, for she was already within. For it was a frequent custom among the ancients to have their betrothed wives home to their house before marriage; as we see done now also, and as the sons-in-law of Lot were with him in the house.

GLOSS. But the words denote carnal knowledge.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That He should not be born of passion, of flesh and blood, who was therefore born that He might take away all passion of flesh and blood.

AUGUSTINE. (De Nupt. et Concup. i. 12.) There was no carnal knowledge in this wedlock, because in sinful flesh this could not be without carnal desire which came of sin, and which He would be without, who was to be without sin; and that hence He might teach us that all flesh which is born of sexual union is sinful flesh, seeing that Flesh alone was without sin, which was not so born.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (in App. 122 et al.) Christ was also born of a pure virgin, because it was not holy that virtue should be born of pleasure, chastity of self-indulgence, incorruption of corruption. Nor could He come from heaven but after some new manner, who came to destroy the ancient empire of death. Therefore she received the crown of virginity who bare the King of chastity. Farther, our Lord sought out for Himself a virgin abode, wherein to be received, that He might shew us that God ought to be borne in a chaste body. Therefore He that wrote on tables of stone without an iron pen, the same wrought in Mary by the Holy Spirit; She was found with child of the Holy Ghost.

JEROME. And found by none other than by Joseph, who knew all, as being her espoused husband.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For, as a not incredible account relates, Joseph was absent when the things were done which Luke writes. For it is not easy to suppose that the Angel came to Mary and said those words, and Mary made her answer when Joseph was present. And even if we suppose thus much to have been possible, yet it could not be that she should have gone into the hill country, and abode there three months when Joseph was present, because he must needs have enquired the causes of her departure and long stay. And so when after so many months he returned from abroad, he found her manifestly with child.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says exactly was found, for so we use to say of things not thought of. And that you should not molest the Evangelist by asking in what way was this birth of a virgin, he clears himself shortly, saying, Of the Holy Ghost. As much as to say, it was the Holy Ghost that wrought this miracle. For neither Gabriel nor Matthew could say any further.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Therefore the words, Is of the Holy Ghost, were set down by the Evangelist, to the end, that when it was said that she was with child, all wrong suspicion should be removed from the minds of the hearers.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 236. in App.) But not, as some impiously think, are we to suppose, that the Holy Spirit was as seed, but we say that He wrought with the power and might of a Creators.

AMBROSE. (De Spir. Sanct. ii. 5.) That which is of any thing is either of the substance or the power of that thing; of the substance, as the Son who is of the Father; of the power, as all things are of God, even as Mary was with child of the Holy Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir c. 40.) Furthermore, this manner in which Christ was born of the Holy Spirit suggests to us the grace of God, by which man without any previous merits, in the very beginning of his nature, was united with the Word of God into so great unity of person, that he was also made son of God. (c. 38.). But inasmuch as the whole Trinity wrought to make this creature which was conceived of the Virgin, though pertaining only to the person of the Son, (for the works of the Trinity are indivisible,) why is the Holy Spirit only named in this work? Must we always, when one of the Three is named in any work, understand that the whole Trinity worked in that?

JEROME. (Cont. Helvid. in princip.) But says Helvidius; Neither would the Evangelist have said Before they came together, if they were not to come together afterwards; as none would say, Before dinner, where there was to be no dinner. As if one should say, Before I dined in harbour, I set sail for Africa, would this have no meaning in it, unless he were at some time or other to dine in the harbour? Surely we must either understand it thus,—that before, though it often implies something to follow, yet often is said of things that follow only in thought; and it is not necessary that the things so thought of should take place, for that something else has happened to prevent them from taking place.

JEROME. Therefore it by no means follows that they did come together afterwards; Scripture however shews not what did happen.

REMIGIUS. Or the word come together may not mean carnal knowledge, but may refer to the time of the nuptials, when she who was betrothed begins to be wife. Thus, before they came together, may mean before they solemnly celebrated the nuptial rites.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Evang. ii. 5.) How this was done Matthew omits to write, but Luke relates after the conception of John, In the sixth month the Angel was sent; and again, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee. This is what Matthew relates in these words, She was found with child of the Holy Ghost. And it is no contradiction that Luke has described what Matthew omits; or again that Matthew relates what Luke has omitted; that namely which follows, from Now Joseph her husband being a just man, to that place where it is said of the Magi, that They returned into their own country another way. If one desired to digest into one narrative the two accounts of Christ's birth, he would arrange thus; beginning with Matthew's words, Now the birth of Christ was on this wise; (Luke 1:5.) then taking up with Luke, from There was in the days of Herod, to, Mary abode with her three months, and returned to her house; then taking up again Matthew, add, She was found with child of the Holy Ghost. (Mat. 1:10.)

1:19

19. Then Joseph her husband, being a just man, and not willing to make her a public example, was minded to put her away privily.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Evangelist having said that she was found with child of the Holy Ghost, and without knowledge of man, that you should not herein suspect Christ's disciple of inventing wonders in honour of his Master, brings forward Joseph confirming the history by his own share in it; Now Joseph her husband, being a just man.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in App. s. 195.) Joseph, understanding that Mary was with child, is perplexed that it should be thus with her whom he had received from the temple of the Lord, and had not yet known, and resolved within himself, saying, What shall I do? Shall I proclaim it, or shall I overlook it? If I proclaim it, I am indeed not consenting to the adultery; but I am running into the guilt of cruelty, for by Moses' law she must be stoned. If I overlook it, I am consenting to the crime, and take my portion with the adulterers. Since then it is an evil to overlook the thing, and worse to proclaim the adultery, I will put her away from being my wife.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. ii. 5.) St. Matthew has beautifully taught how a righteous man ought to act, who has detected his wife's disgrace; so as at once to keep himself guiltless of her blood, and yet pure from her defilements; therefore it is he says, Being a just man. Thus is preserved throughout in Joseph the gracious character of a righteous man, that his testimony may be the more approved; for, the tongue of the just speaketh the judgment of truth.

JEROME. But how is Joseph thus called just, when he is ready to hide his wife's sin? For the Law enacts, that not only the doers of evil, but they who are privy to any evil done, shall be held to be guilty.

CHRYSOSTOM. But it should be known, that just here is used to denote one who is in all things virtuous. For there is a particular justice, namely, the being free from covetousness; and another universal virtue, in which sense Scripture generally uses the word justice. Therefore being just, that is kind, merciful, he was minded to put away privily her who according to the Law was liable not only to dismissal, but to death. But Joseph remitted both, as though living above the Law. For as the sun lightens up the world, before he shews his rays, so Christ before He was born caused many wonders to be seen.

AUGUSTINE. Otherwise; if you alone have knowledge of a sin that any has committed against you, and desire to accuse him thereof before men, you do not herein correct, but rather betray him. But Joseph, being a just man, with great mercy spared his wife, in this great crime of which he suspected her. The seeming certainty of her unchastity tormented him, and yet because he alone knew of it, he was willing not to publish it, but to send her away privily; seeking rather the benefit than the punishment of the sinner.

JEROME. Or this may be considered a testimony to Mary, that Joseph, confident in her purity, and wondering at what had happened, covered in silence that mystery which he could not explain.

RABANUS. He beheld her to be with child, whom he knew to be chaste; and because he had read, There shall come a Rod out of the stem of Jesse, (Is. 11:1.) of which he knew that Mary was comes, and had also read, Behold, a virgin shall conceive, (Is. 7:14.) he did not doubt that this prophecy should be fulfilled in her.

ORIGEN. But if he had no suspicion of her, how could he be a just man, and yet seek to put her away, being immaculate? He sought, to put her away, because he saw in her a great sacrament, to approach which he thought himself unworthy.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or, in seeking to put her away, he was just; in that he sought it privily, is shewn his mercy, defending her from disgrace; Being a just man, he was minded to put her away; and being unwilling to expose her in public, and so to disgrace her, he sought to do it privily.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. ii. 1.) But as no one puts away what he has not received; in that he was minded to put her away, he admits to have received her.

GLOSS. (part ap. Anselm. part in Ord.) Or, being unwilling to bring her home to his house to live with him for ever, he was minded to put her away privily; that is, to change the time of their marriage. For that is true virtue, when neither mercy is observed without justice, nor justice without mercy; both which vanish when severed one from the other. Or he was just because of his faith, in that he believed that Christ should be born of a virgin; wherefore he wished to humble himself before so great a favour.

1:20

20. But while he thought on these things, behold, the angel of the Lord appeared unto him in a dream, saying, Joseph, thou son of David, fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife: for that which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.

REMIGIUS. Because Joseph was minded, as has been said, to put Mary away privily, which if he had done, there would have been few who would not rather have thought her a harlot than a virgin, therefore this purpose of Joseph was changed by Divine revelation, whence it is said, While he thought on these things.

GLOSS. (ap. Ans.) In this is to be noted the wise soul that desires to undertake nothing rashly.

CHRYSOSTOM. Also observe the mercifulness of Joseph, that he imparted his suspicions to none, not even to her whom he suspected, but kept them within himself.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in App. 195.) Yet though Joseph think on these things, let not Mary the daughter of David be troubled; as the word of the Prophet brought pardon to David, so the Angel of the Saviour delivers Mary. Behold, again appears Gabriel the bridesman of this Virgin; as it follows, Behold the Angel of the Lord appeared to Joseph.

AMBROSE. In this word appeared is conveyed the power of Him that did appear, allowing Himself to be seen where and how He pleases.

RABANUS. How the Angel appeared to Joseph is declared in the words, In his sleep; that is, as Jacob saw the ladder offered by a kind of imagining to the eyes of his heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. He did not appear so openly to Joseph as to the Shepherds, because he was faithful; the shepherds needed it, because they were ignorant. The Virgin also needed it, as she had first to be instructed in these mighty wonders. In like manner Zacharias needed the wonderful vision before the conception of his son.

GLOSS. (part Int. part Anselm.) The Angel appearing calls him by name, and adds his descent, in order to banish fear, Joseph, son of David; Joseph, as though he were known to him by name and his familiar friend.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. By addressing him as son of David, he sought to recal to his memory the promise of God to David, that of his seed should Christ be born.

CHRYSOSTOM. But by saying, Be not afraid, he shews him to be in fear that he had offended God, by having an adulteress; for only as such would he have ever thought of putting her away.

CHRYSOLOGUS. As her betrothed husband also he is admonished not to be afraid; for the mind that compassionates has most fear; as though he were to say, Here is no cause of death, but of life; she that brings forth life, does not deserve death.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Also by the words, Fear not, he desired to shew that he knew the heart; that by this he might have the more faith in those good things to come, which he was about to speak concerning Christ.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. ii. 5.) Be not troubled that he calls her his wife; for she is not herein robbed of her virginity, but her wedlock is witnessed to, and the celebration of her marriage is declared.

JEROME. But we are not to think that she ceased to be betrothed, because she is here called wife, since we know that this is the Scripture manner to call the man and woman, when espoused, husband and wife; and this is confirmed by that text in Deuteronomy, If one find a virgin that is betrothed to a man in the field, and offer violence to her, and lie with her, he shall die, because he hath humbled his neighbour’s wife. (Deut. 22:23.)

CHRYSOSTOM. He says, Fear not to take unto thee; that is, to keep at home; for in thought she was already dismissed.

RABANUS. Or, to take her, that is, in marriage union and continual converse.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. There were three reasons why the Angel appeared to Joseph with this message. First, that a just man might not be led into an unjust action, with just intentions. Secondly, for the honour of the mother herself, for had she been put away, she could not have been free from evil suspicion among the unbelievers. Thirdly, that Joseph, understanding the holy conception, might keep himself from her with more care than before He did not appear to Joseph before the conception, that he should not think those things that Zacharias thought, nor suffer what he suffered in falling into the sin of unbelief concerning the conception of his wife in her old age. For it was yet more incredible that a virgin should conceive, than that a woman past the age should conceive.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, The Angel appeared to Joseph when he was in this perplexity, that his wisdom might be apparent to Joseph, and that this might be a proof to him of those things that he spoke. For when lie heard out of the mouth of the Angel those very things that he thought within himself, this was an undoubted proof, that he was a messenger from God, who alone knows the secrets of the heart. Also the account of the Evangelist is beyond suspicion, as he describes Joseph feeling all that a husband was likely to feel. The Virgin also by this was more removed from suspicion, in that her husband had felt jealousy, yet took her home, and kept her with him after her conception. She had not told Joseph the things that the Angel had said to her, because she did not suppose that she should be believed by her husband, especially as he had begun to have suspicions concerning her. But to the Virgin the Angel announced her conception before it took place, lest if he should defer it till afterwards she should be in straits. And it behoved that Mother who was to receive the Maker of all things to be kept free from all trouble. Not only does the Angel vindicate the Virgin from all impurity, but shews that the conception was supernatural, not removing his fears only, but adding matter of joy; saying, That which is born in her is of the Holy Spirit.

GLOSS. (ord.) To be born in her, and born of her, are two different things; to be born of her is to come into the world; to be born in her, is the same as to be conceived. Or the word born is used according to the foreknowledge of the Angel which he has of God, to whom the future is as the past.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Hil. Quæst. N. et V. Test. qu. 52.) But if Christ was born by the agency of the Holy Ghost, how is that said, Wisdom hath built herself an house? (Prov. 9:1.) That house may be taken in two meanings. First, the house of Christ is the Church, which He built with His own blood; and secondly, His body may be called His house, as it is called His temple. But the work of the Holy Spirit, is also the work of the Son of God, because of the unity of their nature and their will; for whether it be the

Father, or the Son, or the Holy Spirit, that doeth it, it is the Trinity that works, and what the Three do, is of One God.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 38.) But shall we therefore say that the Holy Spirit is the Father of the man Christ, that as God the Father begot the Word, so the Holy Spirit begot the man? This is such an absurdity, that the ears of the faithful cannot bear it.

How then do we say that Christ was born by the Holy Spirit, if the Holy Spirit did not beget Him? Did He create Him? For so far as He is man He was created, as the Apostle speaks; He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh. (Rom. 1:3.) For though God made the world, yet is it not right to say that it is the Son of God, or born by Him, but that it was made, or created, or formed by Him. But seeing that we confess Christ to have been born by the Holy Spirit, and of the Virgin Mary, how is He not the Son of the Holy Spirit, and is the Son of the Virgin? It does not follow, that whatever is born by any thing, is therefore to be called the son of that thing; for, not to say that of man is born in one sense a son, in another a hair, or vermin, or a worm, none of which are his son, certainly those that are born of water and the Spirit none would call sons of water; but sons of God their Father, and their Mother the Church. Thus Christ was born of the Holy Spirit, and yet is the Son of God the Father, not of the Holy Spirit.

1:21

21. And she shall bring forth a Son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus: for He shall save His people from their sins.

CHRYSOSTOM. What the Angel thus told Joseph, was beyond human thought, and the law of nature, therefore he confirms his speech not only by revealing to him what was past, but also what was to come; She shall bring forth a Son.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) That Joseph should not suppose that he was no longer needed in this wedlock, seeing the conception had taken place without his intervention, the Angel declares to him, that though there had been no need of him in the conception, yet there was need of his guardianship; for the Virgin should bear a Son, and then he would be necessary both to the Mother and her Son; to the Mother to screen her from disgrace, to the Son to bring Him up and to circumcise Him. The circumcision is meant when he says, And thou, shalt call His name Jesus; for it was usual to give the name in circumcision.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He said not, Shall bear thee a Son, as to Zacharias, Behold, Elisabeth thy wife shall bear thee a son. For the woman who conceives of her husband, bears the son to her husband, because he is more of him than of herself; but she who had not conceived of man, did not bear the Son to her husband, but to herself.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, he left it unappropriated, to shew that she bare Him to the whole world.

RABANUS. Thou shalt call His name, he says, and not, “shalt give Him a name,” for His name had been given from all eternity.

CHRYSOSTOM. This further shews that this birth should be wonderful, because it is God that sends down His name from above by His Angel; and that not any name, but one which is a treasure of infinite good. Therefore also the Angel interprets it, suggesting good hope, and by this induces him to believe what was spoken. For we lean more easily to prosperous things, and yield our belief more readily to good fortune.

JEROME. Jesus is a Hebrew word, meaning Saviour. He points to the etymology of the name, saying, For He shall save His people from their sins.

REMIGIUS. He shews the same man to be the Saviour of the whole world, and the Author of our salvation. He saves indeed not the unbelieving, but His people; that is, He saves those that believe on Him, not so much from visible as from invisible enemies; that is, from their sins, not by fighting with arms, but by remitting their sins.

CHRYSOLOGUS. Let them approach to hear this, who ask, Who is He that Mary bare? He shall save His people; not any other man’s people; from what? from their sins. That it is God that forgives sins, if you do not believe the Christians so affirming, believe the infidels, or the Jews who say, None can forgive sins but God only. (Luke 5:1.)

1:22–23

22. Now all this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying,

23. Behold, a Virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a Son, and they shall call His Name Emmanuel, which being interpreted is, God with us.

REMIGIUS. It is the custom of the Evangelist to confirm what he says out of the Old Testament, for the sake of those Jews who believed on Christ, that they might recognize as fulfilled in the grace of the Gospel, the things that were foretold in the Old Testament; therefore he adds, Now all this was done.

Here we must enquire why he should say all this was done, when above he has only related the conception. It should be known that he says this to shew, that in the presence of God all this was done before it was done among men. Or he says, all this was done, because he is relating past events; for when he wrote, it was all done.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or, he says, all this was done, meaning, the Virgin was betrothed, she was kept chaste, she was found with child, the revelation was made by the Angel, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken. For that the Virgin should conceive and should bring forth would never have been fulfilled, had she not been espoused that she should not be stoned; and had not her secret been disclosed by the Angel, and so Joseph taken her unto him, that she was not dismissed to disgrace and to perish by stoning. So had she perished before the birth, that prophecy would have been made void which says, She shall bring forth a Son. (Isa. 7:14.)

GLOSS. (non occ.) Or it may be said, that the word that does not here denote the cause; for the prophecy was not fulfilled merely because it was to be fulfilled. But it is put consecutively, as in Genesis, He hung the other on the gallows, that the truth of the interpreter might be proved; (Gen. 40:22.) since by the weighing of one, truth is established. So also in this place we must understand it as if it were, that which was foretold being done, the prophecy was accomplished.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; the Angel seeing the depths of the Divine mercy, the laws of nature broken through and reconciliation made, He who was above all made lower than all; all these wonders, all this he comprises in that one saying, Now all this hath happened; as though he had said, Do not suppose that this is newly devised of God, it was determined of old. And he rightly cites the Prophet not to the Virgin, who as a maiden was untaught in such things, but to Joseph, as to one much versed in the

Prophets. And at first he had spoken of Mary as thy wife, but now in the words of the Prophet he brings in the word “Virgin,” that he might hear this from the Prophet, as a thing long before determined. Therefore to confirm what he had said, he introduces Isaiah, or rather God; for he does not say, Which was spoken by Isaiah, but, Which was spoken of the Lord by the Prophet.

JEROME. (In Is. 7:14.) Since it is introduced in the Prophet by the words, The Lord Himself shall give you a sign, it ought to be something new and wonderful. But if it be, as the Jews will have it, a young woman, or a girl shall bring forth, and not a virgin, what wonder is this, since these are words signifying age and not purity? Indeed the Hebrew word signifying Virgin (Bethula) is not used in this place, but instead the word ‘Halmaa,’ which except the LXX all render ‘girl.’ But the word ‘Halma’ has a twofold meaning; it signifies both ‘girl,’ and ‘hidden;’ therefore ‘Halma’ denotes not only ‘maiden’ or ‘virgin,’ but ‘hidden,’ ‘secret;’ that is, one never exposed to the gaze of men, but kept under close custody by her parents. In the Punic tongue also, which is said to be derived from Hebrew sources, a virgin is properly called ‘Halma.’ In our tongue also ‘Halma’ means holy; and the Hebrews use words of nearly all languages; and as far as my memory will serve me, I do not think I ever met with Halma used of a married woman, but of her that is a virgin, and such that she be not merely a virgin, but in the age of youth; for it is possible for an old woman to be a maid. But this was a virgin in years of youth, or at least a virgin, and not a child too young for marriage.

JEROME. (In loc.) For that which Matthew the Evangelist says, Shall have in her womb, the Prophet who is foretelling something future, writes, shall receive. The Evangelist, not foretelling the future but describing the past, changes shall receive, into shall have; but he who has, cannot after receive that he has. He says, Lo, a Virgin shall hare in her womb, and shall bear a Son.

LEO. (Serm. xxiii. 1.) The conception was by the Holy Spirit within the womb of the Virgin; who, as she conceived in perfect chastity, in like manner brought forth her Son.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (in App. s. 123.) He, who by a touch could heal the severed limbs of others, how much more could He, in His own birth, preserve whole that which He found whole? In this parturition, soundness of the Mother’s body was rather strengthened than weakened, and her virginity rather confirmed than lost.

THEODOTUS. (Hom. 1 and 2. in Conc. Eph. ap. Hard. t. i. pp. 1643. 1655.) Inasmuch as Photinus affirms that He that was now born was mere man, not allowing the divine birth, and maintains that He who now issued from the womb was the man separate from the God; let him shew how it was possible that human nature, born of the Virgin’s womb, should have preserved the virginity of that womb uncorrupted; for the mother of no man ever yet remained a virgin. But forasmuch as it was God the Word who was now born in the flesh, He shewed Himself to be the Word, in that He preserved His mother’s virginity. For as our word when it is begot does not destroy the mind, so neither does God the Word in choosing His birth destroy the virginity.

CHRYSOSTOM. As it is the manner of Scripture to convey a knowledge of events under the form of a name, so here, They shall call His name Emmanuel, means nothing else than, They shall see God among men. Whence he says not, ‘Thou shalt call,’ but, They shall call.

RABANUS. First, Angels hymning, secondly, Apostles preaching, then Holy Martyrs, and lastly, all believers.

JEROME. (in Is. 7:14.) The LXX and three others translate, ‘Thou shalt call,’ instead of which we have here, They shall call, which is not so in the Hebrew; for the word ‘Charathib,’ which all render Thou shalt call, may mean, ‘And she shall call,’ that is, The Virgin that shall conceive and shall bear Christ, shall call His name Emmanuel, which is interpreted, ‘God with us.’

REMIGIUS. It is a question, who interpreted this name? The Prophet, or the Evangelist, or some translator? It should be known then, that the Prophet did not interpret it; and what need had the Holy Evangelist to do so, seeing he wrote in the Hebrew tongue? Perhaps that was a difficult and rare word in Hebrew, and therefore needed interpretation. It is more probable that some translator interpreted it, that the Latins might not be perplexed by an unintelligible word. In this name are conveyed at once the two substances, the Divinity and Humanity in the one Person of the Lord Jesus Christ. He who before all time was begot in an unspeakable manner by God the Father, the same in the end of time was made Emmanuel, that is, God with us, of a Virgin Mother. This God with us may be understood in this way. He was made with us, passible, mortal, and in all things like unto us without sin; or because our frail substance which He took on Him, He joined in one Person to His Divine substance.

JEROME. (ubi sup.) It should be known, that the Hebrews believe this prophecy to refer to Ezekias the son of Ahaz, because in his reign Samaria was taken; but this cannot be established. Ahaz son of Jotham reigned over Judæa and Jerusalem sixteen years, and was succeeded by his son Ezekias, who was twenty-three years old, and reigned over Judæa and Jerusalem twenty-nine years; how then can a prophecy prophesied in the first year of Ahaz refer to the conception and birth of Ezekias, when he was already nine years of age? Unless perhaps the sixth year of the reign of Ezekias, in which Samaria was taken, they think is here called his infancy, that is, the infancy of his reign, not of his age; which even a fool must see to be hard and forced. A certain one of our interpreters contends, that the Prophet Isaiah had two sons, Jashub and Emmanuel; and that Emmanuel was born of his wife the Prophetess as a type of the Lord and Saviour. But this is a fabulous tale.

PETRUS ALFONSUS. (Dial. tit. 7.) For we know not that any man of that day was called Emmanuel. But the Hebrew objects, How can it be that this was said on account of Christ and Mary, when many centuries intervened between Ahaz and Mary? But though the Prophet was speaking to Ahaz, the prophecy was yet not spoken to him only or of his time only; for it is introduced, Hear, O house of David; (Isa. 7:13.) not, ‘Hear, O Ahaz.’ Again, The Lord Himself shall give you a sign; meaning He, and none other; from which we may understand that the Lord Himself should be the sign. And that he says to you, (plur.) and not ‘to thee,’ shews that this was not spoken to Ahaz, or on his account only.

JEROME. (ubi sup.) What is spoken to Ahaz then is to be thus understood. This Child, that shall be born of a Virgin of the house of David, shall now be called Emmanuel, that is, God with us, because the events (perhaps delivery from the two hostile kings) will make it appear that you have God present with you. But after He shall be called Jesus, that is, Saviour, because He shall save the whole human race. Wonder not, therefore, O house of David, at the newness of this thing, that a Virgin should bring forth a God, seeing He has so great might that though yet to be born after a long while, He delivers you now when you call upon Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Cont. Faust. 12. 45, and 13. 7.) Who so mad as to say with Manichæus, that it is a weak faith not to believe in Christ without a witness; whereas the Apostle says, How shall they believe on Him of whom they have not heard? Or how shall they hear without a preacher? (Rom. 10:14.) That those things which were preached by the Apostles might not be contemned, nor thought to be fables, they are proved to have been foretold by the Prophets. For though attested by miracles, yet there would not have been wanting men to ascribe them all to magical power, had not such suggestions been overcome by the additional testimony of prophecy. For none could suppose that long before He was born, He had raised up by magic prophets to prophesy of Him. For if we say to a Gentile, Believe on Christ that He is God, and he should answer, Whence is it that I should believe on Him? we might allege the authority of the Prophets. Should he refuse assent to this, we establish their credit from their having foretold things to come, and those things having truly come to pass. I suppose he could not but know how great persecutions the Christian religion has formerly suffered from the Kings of this world; let him now behold those very Kings submitting to the kingdom of Christ, and all nations serving the same; all which things the Prophets foretold. He then hearing these things out of the Scriptures of the Prophets, and beholding them accomplished throughout the whole earth, would be moved to faith.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) This error then is barred by the Evangelist saying, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the Prophet. Now one kind of prophecy is by the preordination of God, and must needs be fulfilled, and that without any free choice on our part. Such is that of which we now speak; wherefore he says, Lo, to shew the certainty of prophecy. There is another kind of prophecy which is by the foreknowledge of God, and with this our free will is mixed up; wherein by grace working with us we obtain reward, or if justly deserted by it, torment. Another is not of foreknowledge, but is a kind of threat made after the manner of men; as that, Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be overthrown: (Jonah 3.) understanding, unless the Ninevites amend themselves.

1:24–25

24. Then Joseph being raised from sleep did as the angel of the Lord had bidden him, and took unto him his wife:

25. And knew her not till she had brought forth her first-born Son: and he called his name JESUS.

REMIGIUS. Life returned by the same entrance through which death had entered in. By Adam’s disobedience we were ruined, by Joseph’s obedience we all begin to be recalled to our former condition; for in these words is commended to us the great virtue of obedience, when it is said, And Joseph rising from sleep, did as the Angel of the Lord had commanded him.

GLOSS. (ord. et ap. Anselm ex Beda cit.) He not only did what the Angel commanded, but as he commanded it. Let each one who is warned of God, in like manner, break off all delays, rise from sleep, and do that which is commanded him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Took unto him, not took home to him; for he had not sent her away; he had put her away in thought only, and now took her again in thought.

REMIGIUS. Or, Took her so far, as that the nuptial rites being complete, she was called his wife; but not so far as to lie with her, as it follows, And knew her not.

JEROME. (Cont. Helvid. c. 5.) Helvidius is at much superfluous trouble to make this word know refer to carnal knowledge rather than to acquaintance, as though any had ever denied that; or as if the follies to which he replies had ever occurred to any person of common understanding. He then goes on to say, that the adverb ‘until’ denotes a fixed time when that should take place, which had not taken place before; so that here from the words, He knew her not until she had brought forth her first-born Son, it is clear, he says, that after that he did know her. And in proof of this he heaps together many instances from Scripture. To all this we answer, that the word ‘until’ is to be understood in two senses in Scripture. And concerning the expression, knew her not, he has himself shewn, that it must be referred to carnal knowledge, none doubting that it is often used of acquaintance, as in that, The child Jesus tarried behind in Jerusalem, and His parents knew not of it. (Luke 2:43.) In like manner ‘until’ often denotes in Scripture, as he has shewn, a fixed period, but often also an infinite time, as in that, Even to your old age I am He. (Isa. 46:4.) Will God then cease to be when they are grown old? Also the Saviour in the

Gospel, Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of this world. (Mat. 28:20.) Will He then leave His disciples at the end of the world? Again, the Apostle says, He must reign till He has put His enemies under His feel. (1 Cor. 15:25.) Be it understood then, that that which if it had not been written might have been doubted of, is expressly declared to us; other things are left to our own understandingc. So here the Evangelist informs us, in that wherein there might have been room for error, that she was not known by her husband until the birth of her Son, that we might thence infer that much less was she known afterwards.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As one might say, ‘He told it not so long as he lived;’ would this imply that he told it after his death? Impossible. So it were credible that Joseph might have known her before the birth, while he was yet ignorant of the great mystery; but after that he understood how she had been made a temple of the Only-begotten of God, how could he occupy that? The followers of Eunomius think, as they have dared to assert this, that Joseph also dared to do it, just as the insane think all men equally mad with themselves.

JEROME. (cont. Helvid. 8.) Lastly, I would ask, Why then did Joseph abstain at all up to the day of birth? He will surely answer, Because of the Angel’s words, That which is born in her, &c. He then who gave so much heed to a vision as not to dare to touch his wife, would he, after he had heard the shepherds, seen the Magi, and known so many miracles, dare to approach the temple of God, the seat of the Holy Ghost, the Mother of his Lord?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. It may be said, that know here signifies simply, to understand; that whereas before he had not understood how great her dignity, after the birth he then knew that she had been made more honourable and worthy than the whole world, who had carried in her womb Him whom the whole world could not contain.

GLOSS. Otherwise; On account of the glorification of the most holy Mary, she could not be known by Joseph until the birth; for she who had the Lord of glory in her womb, how should she be known? If the face of Moses talking with God was made glorious, so that the children of Israel could not look thereon, how much more could not Mary be known, or even looked upon, who bare the Lord of glory in her womb? After the birth she was known of Joseph to the beholding of her face, but not to be approached carnally.

JEROME. From the words, her firstborn Son, some most erroneously suspect that Mary had other sons, saying that first-born can only be said of one that has brethren. But this is the manner of Scripture, to call the first-born not only one who is followed by brethren, but the first-birth of the mother.

JEROME. (Cont. Helvid. 10.) For if he only was first-born who was followed by other brethren, then no first-birth could be due to the Priests, till such time as the second birth took place.

GLOSS. (Ord.) Or; He is first-born among the elect by grace; but by nature the Only-begotten of God the Father, the only Son of Mary. And called His name Jesus, on the eighth day on which the circumcision took place, and the Name was given.

REMIGIUS. It is clear that this Name was well known to the Holy Fathers and the Prophets of God, but to him above all, who spake, My soul fainted for Thy salvation; (Ps. 119:81.) and, My soul hath rejoiced in Thy salvation. Also to him who spake, I will joy in God my Saviour. (Ps. 13:5. Hab. 3:18.)

CHAPTER 2

2:1–2

1. Now when Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judæa in the days of Herod the king, behold, there came wise men from the east to Jerusalem,

2. Saying, Where is He that is born King of the Jews? for we have seen His star in the east, and are come to worship Him.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) After the miraculous Virgin-birth, a God-man having by Divine power proceeded from a virgin womb; in the obscure shelter of such a cradle, a narrow stall, wherein lay Infinite Majesty in a body more narrow, a God was suckled and suffered the wrapping of vile rags—amidst all this, on a sudden a new star shone in the sky upon the earth, and driving away the darkness of the world, changed night into day; that the day-star should not be hidden by the night. Hence it is that the Evangelist says, Now when Jesus was born in Bethlehem.

REMIGIUS. In the beginning of this passage of the Gospel he puts three several things; the person, When Jesus was born, the place, in Bethlehem of Judæa, and the time, in the days of Herod the king. These three circumstances verify his words.

JEROME. We think the Evangelist first wrote, as we read in the Hebrew, ‘Judah,’ not ‘Judæa.’ For in what other country is there a Bethlehem, that this needs to be distinguished as in ‘Judæa?’ But ‘Judah’ is written, because there is another Bethlehem in Galilee.

GLOSS. (ord. Josh. 19:15.) There are two Bethlehems; one in the tribe of Zabulon, the other in the tribe of Judah, which was before called Ephrata.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Evang. 2. 15.) Concerning the place, Bethlehem, Matthew and Luke agree; but the cause and manner of their being there, Luke relates, Matthew omits. Luke again omits the account of the Magi, which Matthew gives.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Let us see to what serves this designation of time. In the days of Herod the king. It shews the fulfilment of Daniel’s prophecy, wherein he spake that Christ should be born after seventy weeks of years. For from the time of the prophecy to the reign of Herod, the years of seventy weeks were accomplished. Or again, as long as Judæa was ruled by Jewish princes, though sinners, so long prophets were sent for its amendment; but now, whereas God’s law was held under the power of an unrighteous king, and the righteousness of God enslaved by the Roman rule, Christ is born; the more desperate sickness required the better physician.

RABANUS. Otherwise, he mentions the foreign king to shew the fulfilment of the prophecy. The Sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a Lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come. (Gen. 49:10.)

AMBROSE. (in Luc. iii. 41.) It is said, that some Idumæan robbers coming to Ascalon, brought with them among other prisoners Antipatera. He was instructed in the law and customs of the Jews, and acquired the friendship of Hyrcanus, king of Judæa, who sent him as his deputy to Pompey. He succeeded so well in the object of his mission, that he laid claim to a share of the throne. He was put to death, but his son Herod was under Antony appointed king of Judæa, by a decree of the Senate; so it is clear that Herod sought the throne of Judæa without any connection or claim of birth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Herod the king, mentioning his dignity, because there was another Herod who put John to death.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When He was born … behold wise men, that is, immediately on His birth, shewing that a great God existed in a little one of man.

RABANUS. The Magi are men who enquire into the nature of things philosophically, but common speech uses Magi for wizards. In their own country, however, they are held in other repute, being the philosophers of the Chaldæans, in whose lore kings and princes of that nation are taught, and by which themselves knew the birth of the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 202.) What were these Magi but the first fruits of the Gentiles? Israelitish shepherds, gentile Magians, one from far, the other from near, hastened to the one Corner-stone.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 200.) Jesus then was manifested neither to the learned nor the righteous; for ignorance belonged to the shepherds, impiety to the idolatrous Magi. Yet does that Corner-stone attract them both to

Itself, seeing He came to choose the foolish things of this world to confound the wise, and not to call the righteous, but sinners; that nothing great should exalt himself, none weak should despair.

GLOSS. These Magi were kings, and though their gifts were three, it is not to be thence inferred that themselves were only three in number, but in them was prefigured the coming to the faith of the nations sprung from the three sons of Noah. Or, the princes were only three, but each brought a large company with him. They came not after a year's end, for He would then have been found in Egypt, not in the manger, but on the thirteenth day. To shew whence they came it is said, from the East.

REMIGIUS. It should be known, that opinions vary respecting the Magi. Some say they were Chaldæans, who are known to have worshipped a star as God; thus their fictitious Deity shewed them the way to the true God. Others think that they were Persians; others again, that they came from the utmost ends of the earth. Another and more probable opinion is, that they were descendants of Balaam, who having his prophecy, There shall rise a Star out of Jacob, (Numb. 24:17.) as soon as they saw the star, would know that a King was born.

JEROME. They knew that such a star would rise by the prophecy of Balaam, whose successors they were. But whether they were Chaldæans, or Persians, or came from the utmost ends of the earth, how in so short a space of time could they arrive at Jerusalem?

REMIGIUS. Some used to answer, 'No marvel if that boy who was then born could draw them so speedily, though it were from the ends of the earth.'

GLOSS. Or, they had dromedaries and Arabian horses, whose great swiftness brought them to Bethlehem in thirteen days.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, they had set out two years before the Saviour's birth, and though they travelled all that time, neither meat nor drink failed in their scrips.

REMIGIUS. Or, if they were the descendants of Balaam, their kings are not far distant from the land of promise, and might easily come to Jerusalem in that so short time. But why does he write from the East? Because surely they came from a country eastward of Judæa. But there is also great beauty in this, They came out of the East, seeing all who come to the Lord, come from Him and through Him; as it is said in Zechariah, Behold the Man whose name is the East. (Zech. 6:12.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, whence the day springs, thence came the first-fruits of the faith; for faith is the light of the soul. Therefore they came from the East, but to Jerusalem.

REMIGIUS. Yet was not the Lord born there; thus they knew the time but not the place of His birth. Jerusalem being the royal city, they believed that such a child could not be born in any other. Or it was to fulfil that Scripture, The Law shall go out of Sion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. (Isa. 2:3.) And there Christ was first preached. Or it was to condemn the backwardness of the Jews.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Append. Serm. 132.) Many kings of Judæa had been born and died before, yet had Magi ever sought out any of them for adoration? No, for they had not been taught that any of these spoke from heaven. To no ordinary King of Judæa had these men, aliens from the land of Judæa, ever thought such honour due. But they had been taught that this Child was one, in worshipping whom they would certainly secure that salvation which is of God. Neither His age was such as attracts men’s flattery; His limbs not robed in purple, His brow not crowned with a diamond, no pompous train, no awful army, no glorious fame of battles, attracted these men to Him from the remotest countries, with such earnestness of supplication. There lay in a manger a Boy, newly born, of infantine size, of pitiable poverty. But in that small Infant lay hid something great, which these men, the first-fruits of the Gentiles, had learned not of earth but of heaven; as it follows, We have seen His star in the east. They announce the vision and ask, they believe and enquire, as signifying those who walk by faith and desire sight.

GREGORY. (in Evang. i. 10. n. 4.) It should be known that the Priscillianists, heretics who believe every man to be born under the aspect of some planet, cite this text in support of their error; the new star which appeared at the Lord’s birth they consider to have been his fate.

AUGUSTINE. (vid. contr. Faust. ii. 1.) And, according, to Faustus this introduction of the account of the star would lead us rather to call this part of the history, ‘The Nativity,’ than ‘The Gospel.’

GREGORY. (Sup. 2.) But far be it from the hearts of the faithful to call any thing, ‘fate.’

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, v. 1.) For by the word ‘fate,’ in common acceptation, is meant the disposition of the stars at the moment of a person’s birth or conception; to which some assign a power independent of the will of God. These must be kept at a distance from the ears of all who desire to be worshippers of Gods of any sort. But others think the stars have this virtue committed to them by the great God; wherein they greatly wrong the skies, in that they impute to their splendent host the decreeing of crimes, such as should any earthly people decree, their city should in the judgment of mankind deserve to be utterly destroyed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. If then any should become an adulterer or homicide through means of the planets, how great is the evil and wickedness of those stars, or rather of Him who made them? For as God knows things to come, and what evils are to spring from those stars; if He would not hinder it, He is not good; if He would but could not, He is weak. Again, if it be of the star that we are either good or bad, we have neither merit nor demerit, as being involuntary agents; and why should I be punished for sin which I have done not wilfully, but by necessity? The very commands of God against sin, and exhortations to righteousness, overthrow such folly. For where a man has not power to do, or where he has not power to forbear, who would command him either to do or to forbear?

GREGORY OF NYSSA. How vain moreover is prayer for those who live by fate; Divine Providence is banished from the world together with piety, and man is made the mere instrument of the sidereal motions. For these they say move to action, not only the bodily members, but the thoughts of the mind. In a word, they who teach this, take away all that is in us, and the very nature of a contingency; which is nothing less than to overturn all things. For where will there be free will? but that which is in us must be free.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, v. 6.) It cannot be said to be utterly absurd to suppose that sidereal afflatus should influence the state of the body, when we see that it is by the approach and departure of the sun that the seasons of the year are varied, and that many things, as shells and the wonderful tides of the Ocean, increase or decrease as the moon waxes or wanes. But not so, to say that the dispositions of the mind are subject to sidereal impulse. Do they say that the stars rather foreshew than effect these results? how then do they explain, that in the life of twins, in their actions, their successes, professions, honours, and all other circumstances of life, there will often be so great diversity, that men of different countries are often more alike in their lives than twins, between whose birth there was only a moment's, and between whose conception in the womb there was not a moment's, interval. And the small interval between their births is not enough to account for the great difference between their fates. Some give the name of fate not only to the constitution of the stars, but to all series of causes, at the same time subjecting all to the will and power of God. This sort of subjection of human affairs and fate is a confusion of language which should be corrected, for fate is strictly the constitution of the stars. The will of God we do not call 'fate,' unless indeed we will derive the word from 'speaking;' as in the Psalms, God hath spoken once, twice have I heard the same. (Ps. 62:11.) There is then no need of much contention about what is merely a verbal controversy.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. ii. 5.) But if we will not subject the nativity of any man to the influence of the stars, in order that we may vindicate the freedom of the will from any chain of necessity; how much less must we suppose sidereal influences to have ruled at His temporal birth, who is eternal Creator and Lord of the universe? The star which the Magi saw, at Christ s birth according to the flesh, did not rule His fate, but ministered as a testimony to Him. Further, this was not of the number of those stars, which from the beginning of the creation observe their paths of motion according to the law of their Maker; but a star that first appeared at the birth, ministering to the Magi who sought Christ, by going before them till it brought them to the place where the infant God the Word was. According to some astrologers such is the connexion of human fate with the stars, that on the birth of some men stars have been known to leave their courses, and go directly to the new-born. The fortune indeed of him that is born they suppose to be bound up with the course of the stars, not that the course of the stars is changed after the day of any man's birth. If then this star were of the number of those that fulfil their courses in the heavens, how could it determine what Christ should do, when it was commanded at His birth only to leave its own course? If, as is more probable, it was first created at His birth, Christ was not therefore born because it arose, but the reverse; so that if we must have fate connected with the stars, this star did not rule Christ's fate, but Christ the stars.

CHRYSOSTOM. The object of astrology is not to learn from the stars the fact of one's birth; but from the hour of their nativity to forecast the fate of those that are born. But these men knew not the time of the nativity to have forecast the future from it, but the converse.

GLOSS. (interlin.) 'His star,' i. e. the star He created for a witness of Himself.

GLOSS. (ord.) To the Shepherds, Angels, and the Magians, a star points out Christ; to both speaks the tongue of Heaven, since the tongue of the Prophets was mute. The Angels dwell in the heavens, the stars adorn it, to both therefore the heavens declare the glory of God.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. Lib. i. Hom. 10.) To the Jews who used their reason, a rational creature, i. e. an Angel, ought to preach. But the Gentiles who knew not to use their reason are brought to the knowledge of the Lord, not by words, but by signs; to the one prophecy, as to the faithful; to the other signs, as to the unbelievers. One and the same Christ is preached, when of perfect age, by Apostles; when an infant, and not yet able to speak, is announced by a star to the Gentiles; for so the order of reason required; speaking preachers proclaimed a speaking Lord, mute signs proclaimed a mute infant.

LEO. (Serm. xxxiii. 2.) Christ Himself, the expectation of the nations, that innumerable posterity once promised to the most blessed patriarch Abraham, but to be born not after the flesh, but by the Spirit; therefore likened to the stars for multitude, that from the father of all nations, not an earthly but an heavenly progeny might be looked for. Thus the heirs of that promised posterity, marked out in the stars, are roused to the faith by the rise of a new star, and where the heavens had been at first called in to witness, the aid of Heaven is continued.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was manifestly not one of the common stars of Heaven. First, because none of the stars moves in this way, from east to south, and such is the situation of Palestine with respect to Persia. Secondly, from the time of its appearance, not in the night only, but during the day. Thirdly, from its being visible and then again invisible; when they entered Jerusalem it hid itself, and then appeared again when they left Herod. Further, it had no stated motion, but when the Magi were to go on, it went before them; when to stop, it stopped like the pillar of cloud in the desert. Fourthly, it signified the Virgin's delivery, not by being fixed aloft, but by descending to earth, shewing herein like an invisible virtue formed into the visible appearance of a star.

REMIGIUS. Some affirm this star to have been the Holy Spirit; He who descended on the baptized Lord as a dove, appearing to the Magi as a star. Others say it was an Angel, the same who appeared to the shepherds.

GLOSS. (ord.) In the east. It seems doubtful whether this refers to the place of the star, or of those that saw it; it might have risen in the east, and gone before them to Jerusalem.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 374. 1.) Will you ask, from whom had they learned that such an appearance as a star was to signify the birth of Christ? I answer from Angels, by the warning of some revelation. Do you ask, was it from good or ill Angels? Truly even wicked spirits, namely the dæmons, confessed Christ to be the Son of God. But why should they not have heard it from good Angels, since in this their adoration of Christ their salvation was sought, not their wickedness condemned? The Angels might say to them, ‘The Star which ye have seen is the Christ. Go ye, worship Him, where He is now born, and see how great is He that is born.’

LEO. (Serm. xxxiv. 3.) Besides that star thus seen with the bodily eye, a yet brighter ray of truth pierced their hearts; they were enlightened by the illumination of the true faith.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Hill. Quæst. V. and N. Test. q. 63.) They might think that a king of Judæa was born, since the birth of temporal princes is sometimes attended by a star. These Chaldean Magi inspected the stars, not with malevolence, but with the true desire of knowledge; following, it may be supposed, the tradition from Balaam; so that when they saw this new and singular star, they understood it to be that of which Balaam had prophesied, as marking the birth of a King of Judæa.

LEO. (ubi sup.) What they knew and believed might have been sufficient for themselves, that they needed not to seek to see with the bodily eye, what they saw so clearly with the spiritual. But their earnestness and perseverance to see the Babe was for our profit. It profited us that Thomas, after the Lord’s resurrection, touched and felt the marks of his wounds, and so for our profit the Magians’ eyes looked on the Lord in His cradle.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Were they then ignorant that Herod reigned in Jerusalem? Or that it is a capital treason to proclaim another King while one yet lives? But while they thought on the King to come, they feared not the king that was; while as yet they had not seen Christ, they were ready to die for Him. O blessed Magi! who before the face of a most cruel king, and before having beheld Christ, were made His confessors.

2:3–6

3. When Herod the king had heard these things, he was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him.

4. And when he had gathered all the Chief Priests and Scribes of the people together, he demanded of them where Christ should be born.

5. And they said unto him, In Bethlehem of Judæa: for thus it is written by the prophet,

6. And thou Bethlehem, in the land of Juda, art not the least among the princes of Juda: for out of thee shall come a Governor, that shall rule my people Israel.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) As the Magi seek a Redeemer, so Herod fears a successor.

GLOSS. (ord.) The King, he is called, though in comparison with him whom they are seeking he is an alien and a foreigner.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Herod was troubled when he heard that a King was born of Jewish lineage, lest, himself being an Idumæan, the kingdom should return again to native princes, and himself be expelled, and his seed after him. Great station is ever obnoxious to great fears, as the boughs of trees planted in high ground move when never so little wind blows, so high men are troubled with little rumours; while the lowly, like trees in the valley, remain at peace.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 200. 2.) If His birth as an infant makes proud kings tremble, what will His tribunal as a Judge do? Let princes fear Him sitting at the right hand of His Father, whom this impious king feared while He hanged yet on His mother’s breast.

LEO. (ubi sup.) Thou art troubled, Herod, without cause. Thy nature cannot contain Christ, nor is the Lord of the world content with the narrow bounds of thy dominion. He, whom thou wouldest not should reign in Judæa, reigns every where.

GLOSS. (ord.) Perhaps he was troubled not on his own account, but for fear of the displeasure of the Romans. They would not allow the title of

King or of God to any without their permission.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. i. 10.) At the birth of a King of Heaven, a king of earth is troubled; surely, earthly greatness is confounded, when heavenly greatness shews itself.

LEO. (Serm. xxxvi. 2.) Herod represents the Devil; who as he then instigated him, so now he unweariedly imitates him. For he is grieved by the calling of the Gentiles, and by the daily ruin of his power.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Both have their own causes of jealousy, both fear a successor in their kingdom; Herod an earthly successor, the Devil a spiritual. Even Jerusalem is troubled, which should have rejoiced at that news, when a Jewish King was said to be risen up. But they were troubled, for the wicked cannot rejoice at the coming of the good. Or perhaps it was in fear that Herod should wreak his wrath against a Jewish King on his race.

GLOSS. (ord.) Jerusalem was troubled with him, as willing to favour him whom it feared; the vulgar always pay undue honour to one who tyrannizes over it. Observe the diligence of his enquiry. If he should find him, he would do to him as he shewed afterwards his disposition; if he should not, he would at least be excused to the Romans.

REMIGIUS. They are called Scribes, not from the employment of writing, but from the interpretation of the Scriptures, for they were doctors of the law. Observe, he does not enquire where Christ is born, but where He should be born; the subtle purpose of this was to see if they would shew pleasure at the birth of their King. He calls Him Christ, because he knew that the King of the Jews was anointed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Why does Herod make this enquiry, seeing he believed not the Scriptures? Or if he did believe, how could he hope to be able to kill Him whom the Scriptures declared should be King? The Devil instigated him, who believed that Scripture lies not; such is the faith of devils, who are not permitted to have perfect belief, even of that which they do believe. That they do believe, it is the force of truth constrains them; that they do not believe, it is that they are blinded by the enemy. If they had perfect faith, they would live as about to depart from this world soon, not as to possess it for ever.

LEO. (Serm. xxxi. 2.) The Magi, judging as men, sought in the royal city for Him, whom they had been told was born a King. But He who took the form of a servant, and came not to judge but to be judged, chose Bethlehem for His birth, Jerusalem for His death.

THEODOTUS. (Serm. 1. ap. Conc. Eph.) Had He chosen the mighty city of Rome, it might have been thought that this change of the world had been wrought by the might of her citizens; had He been the son of the emperor, his power might have aided Him. But what was His choice? All that was mean, all that was in low esteem, that in this transformation of the world, divinity might at once be recognized. Therefore He chose a poor woman for His mother, a poor country for His native country; He has no money, and this stable is His cradle.

GREGORY. (Hom. in. Evang. viii. 1.) Rightly is He born in Bethlehem, which signifies the house of bread, who said, am the living bread, who came down from heaven.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When they should have kept secret the mystery of the King appointed of God, especially before a foreign king, straightway they became not preachers of the word of God, but revealers of His mystery. And they not only display the mystery, but cite the passage of the prophet, viz. Micah.

GLOSS. (ord.) He quotes this prophecy as they quote who give the sense and not the words.

JEROME. (Epist. 57.) The Jews are here blamed for ignorance; for whereas the prophecy says, Thou Bethlehem Ephrata; they said, ‘Bethlehem in the land of Judah.’

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. By cutting short the prophecy, they became the cause of the murder of the Innocents. For the prophecy proceeds, From thee shall go forth a King who shall feed My people Israel, and His day shall be from everlasting. Had they cited the whole prophecy, Herod would not have raged so madly, considering that it could not be an earthly King whose days were spoken of as from everlasting.

JEROME. (in Mich. v. 2.) The following is the sense of the prophecy. Thou, Bethlehem, of the land of Judah, or Ephrata, (which is added to distinguish it from another Bethlehem in Galilee,) though thou art a small village among the thousand cities of Judah, yet out of thee shall be born Christ, who shall be the Ruler of Israel, who according to the flesh is of the seed of David, but was born of Me before the worlds; and therefore it is written, His goings forth are of old. In the beginning was the Word.

GLOSS. (non occ.) This latter half of the prophecy the Jews dropped; and other parts they altered, either through ignorance, (as was said above,) or for perspicuity, that Herod who was a foreigner might better understand the prophecy; thus for Ephrata, they said, land of Judah; and for little among the thousands of Judah, which expresses its smallness contrasted with the multitude of the people, they said, not the least among the princes, willing to shew the high dignity that would come from the birth of the Prince. As if they had said, Thou art great among cities from which princes have come.

REMIGIUS. Or the sense is; though little among cities that have dominion, yet art thou not the least, for out of thee shall come the Ruler, who shall rule My people Israel; this Ruler is Christ, who rules and guides His faithful people.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe the exactness of the prophecy; it is not He shall be in Bethlehem, but shall come out of Bethlehem; shewing that He should be only born there. What reason is there for applying this to Zorobabel, as some do? For his goings forth were not from everlasting; nor did he go forth from Bethlehem, but was born in Babylonia. The expression, art not the least, is a further proof, for none but Christ could make the town where He was born illustrious. And after that birth, there came men from the utmost ends of the earth to see the stable and manger. He calls Him not ‘the Son of God,’ but (he Ruler who shall govern My people Israel; for thus He ought to condescend at the first, that they should not be scandalized, but should preach such things as more pertained to salvation, that they might be gained. Who shall rule My people Israel, is said mystically, for those of the Jews who believed; for if Christ ruled not all the Jews, theirs is the blame. Meanwhile he is silent respecting the Gentiles, that the Jews might not be scandalized. Mark this wonderful ordinance; Jews and Magi mutually instruct each other; the Jews learn of the Magi that a star had proclaimed Christ in the east, the Magi from the Jews that the Prophets had spoken of Him of old. Thus confirmed by a twofold testimony, they would look with more ardent faith for One whom the brightness of the star and the voice of the Prophets equally proclaimed.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 374. 2. 373. 4.) The star that guided the Magi to the spot where was the Infant God with His Virgin Mother, might have conducted them straight to the town; but it vanished, and shewed not itself again to them till the Jews themselves had told them the place where Christ should be born; Bethlehem of Judæa. Like in this to those who built the ark for Noah, providing others with a refuge, themselves perished in the flood; or like to the stones by the road that shew the miles, but themselves are not able to move. The enquirers heard and departed; the teachers spake and remained still. Even now the Jews shew us something similar; for some Pagans, when clear passages of Scripture are shewn them, which prophesy of Christ, suspecting them to be forged by the Christians, have recourse to Jewish copies. Thus they leave the Jews to read unprofitably, and go on themselves to believe faithfully.

2:7–9

7. Then Herod, when he had privily called the wise men, enquired of them diligently what time the star appeared.

8. And he sent them to Bethlehem, and said, Go and search diligently for the young Child; and when ye have found Him, bring me word again, that I may come and worship Him also.

9. When they had heard the king, they departed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As soon as Herod had heard the answer, though doubly authenticated, both by the authority of the Priests, and the passage from the Prophets, he yet turned not to worship the King that was to be born, but sought how he might put Him to death by subtilty. He saw that the Magi were neither to be won by flattery, nor awed by threats, nor bribed by gifts, to consent to this murder; he sought therefore to deceive them; he privily called the wise men; that the Jews, whom he suspected, might not know of it. For he thought they would incline the rather to a King of theirown nation.

REMIGIUS. Diligently enquired; craftily, for he feared they would not return to him, and then he should know how he should do to put the young Child to death.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in App. 131. 3.) The star had been seen, and with great wonder, nearly two years before. We are to understand that it was signified to them whose the star was, which was visible all that time till He, whom it signified, was born. Then as soon as Christ was made known to them they set out, and came and worshipped Him in thirteen days from the easta.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, the star appeared to them long time before, because the journey would take up some time, and they were to stand before Him immediately on His birth, that seeing Him in swaddling clothes, He might seem the more wonderful.

GLOSS. (non occ.) According to others, the star was first seen on the day of the nativity, and having accomplished its end, ceased to be. Thus Fulgentius says, “The Boy at His birth created a new star.” (Serm. de Epiph.) Though they now knew both time and place, he still would not have them ignorant of the person of the Child, Go, he says, and enquire diligently of the young Child; a commission they would have executed even if he had not commanded it.

CHRYSOSTOM. Concerning the young Child, he says, not ‘of the King;’ he envics Him the regal title.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. To induce them to do this, he put on the colour of devotion, beneath which he whetted the sword, hiding the malice of his heart under colour of humility. Such is the manner of the malicious, when they would hurt any one in secret, they feign meekness and affection.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. i. 10. 3.) He feigns a wish of worshipping Him only that he may discover Him, and put Him to death.

REMIGIUS. The Magi obeyed the King so far as to seek the Lord, but not to return to Herod. Like in this to good hearers; the good they hear from wicked preachers, that they do; but do not imitate their evil lives.

2:9

9. And, lo, the star, which they saw in the east, went before them, till it came and stood over where the young Child was.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This passage shews, that when the star had brought the Magi nearly to Jerusalem, it was hidden from them, and so they were compelled to ask in Jerusalem, where Christ should be born? and thus to manifest Him to them; on two accounts, first, to put to confusion the Jews, inasmuch as the Gentiles instructed only by sight of a star sought Christ through strange lands, while the Jews who had read the Prophets from their youth did not receive Him, though born in their country. Secondly, that the Priests, when asked where Christ should be born, might answer to their now condemnation, and while they instructed Herod, they were themselves ignorant of Him. The star went before them, to shew them the greatness of the King.

AUGUSTINE. To perform its due service to the Lord, it advanced slowly, leading them to the spot. It was ministering to Him, and not ruling His fate; its light shewed the suppliants and filled the inn, shed over the walls and roof that covered the birth; and thus it disappeared.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. What wonder that a divine star should minister to the Sun of righteousness about to rise. It stood over the Child’s head, as it were, saying, ‘This is He;’ proving by its place what it had no voice to utter.

GLOSS. (Anselm.) It is evident that the star must have been in the air, and close above the house where the Child was, else it would not have pointed out the exact house.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. ii. 45.) The star is the way, and the way is Christ; and according to the mystery of the incarnation, Christ is a star. He is a blazing and a morning-star. Thus where Herod is, the star is not seen; where Christ is, there it is again seen, and points out the way.

REMIGIUS. Or, the star figures the grace of God, and Herod the Devil. He, who by sin puts himself in the Devil’s power, loses that grace; but if he return by repentance, he soon finds that grace again which leaves him not till it have brought him to the young Child’s house, i. e. the Church.

GLOSS. (ord.) Or, the star is the illumination of faith, which leads him to the nearest aid; while they turn aside to the Jews, the Magi lose it; so those who seek counsel of the bad, lose the true light.

2:10–11

10. When they saw the star, they rejoiced with exceeding great joy.

11. And when they were come into the house, they saw the young Child with Mary His mother, and fell down, and worshipped Him: and when they had opened their treasures, they presented unto Him gifts; gold, and frankincense, and myrrh.

GLOSS. This service of the star is followed by the rejoicing of the Magi.

REMIGIUS. And it was not enough to say, They rejoiced, but they rejoiced with exceeding great joy.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. They rejoiced, because their hopes were not falsified but confirmed, and because the toil of so great travel had not been undertaken in vain.

GLOSS. (ord.) He rejoices indeed who rejoices on God’s account, who is the true joy. With great joy, he says, for they had great cause.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. By the mystery of this star they understood that the dignity of the King then born exceeded the measure of all worldly kings.

REMIGIUS. He adds greatly, shewing that men rejoice more over what they have lost than over what they possess.

LEO. (Serm. in Epiph. s. 4. 3.) Though in stature a babe, needing the aid of others, unable to speak, and different in nothing from other infants, yet such faithful witnesses, shewing the unseen Divine Majesty which was in Him, ought to have proved most certainly that that was the Eternal Essence of the Son of God that had taken upon Him the true human nature.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Mary His mother, not crowned with a diadem or laying on a golden couch; but with barely one garment, not for ornament but for covering, and that such as the wife of a carpenter when abroad might have. Had they therefore come to seek an earthly king, they would have been more confounded than rejoiced, deeming their pains thrown away. But now they looked for a heavenly King; so that though they saw nought of regal state, that star’s witness sufficed them, and their eyes rejoiced to behold a despised Boy, the Spirit shewing Him to their hearts in all His wonderful power, they fell down and worshipped, seeing the man, they acknowledged the God.

RABANUS. Joseph was absent by Divine command, that no wrong suspicions might occur to the Gentiles.

GLOSS. (Anselm.) In these offerings we observe their national customs, gold, frankincense, and various spices abounding among the Arabians; yet they intended thereby to signify something in mystery.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. i. 106.) Gold, as to a King; frankincense, as sacrifice to God; myrrh, as embalming the body of the dead.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) Gold, as paid to a mighty King; frankincense, as offered to God; myrrh, as to one who is to die for the sins of all.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And though it were not then understood what these several gifts mystically signified, that is no difficulty; the same grace that instigated them to the deed, ordained the whole.

REMIGIUS. And it is to be known that each did not offer a different gift, but each one the three things, each one thus proclaiming the King, the God, and the man.

CHRYSOSTOM. Let Marcion and Paul of Samosata then blush, who will not see what the Magi saw, those progenitors of the Church adoring God in the flesh. That He was truly in the flesh, the swaddling clothes and the stall prove; yet that they worshipped Him not as mere man, but as God, the gifts prove which it was becoming to offer to a God. Let the Jews also be ashamed, seeing the Magi coming before them, and themselves not even earnest to tread in their path.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Something further may yet be meant here. Wisdom is typified by gold; as Solomon saith in the Proverbs, A treasure to be desired is in the mouth of the wise. (Prov. 21:20.) By frankincense, which is burnt before God, the power of prayer is intended, as in the Psalms, Let my speech come before thee as incense. (Ps. 141:2.) In myrrh is figured mortification of the flesh. To a king at his birth we offer gold, if we shine in his sight with the light of wisdom; we offer frankincense, if we have power before God by the sweet savour of our prayers; we offer myrrh, when we mortify by abstinence the lusts of the flesh.

GLOSS. (Anselm.) The three men who offer, signify the nations who come from the three quarters of the earth. They open their treasures, i. e. manifest the faith of their hearts by confession. Rightly in the house, teaching that we should not vain-gloriously display the treasure of a good conscience. They bring three (vid. sup. note g, p. 18.) gifts, i. e. the faith in the Holy Trinity. Or opening the stores of Scripture, they offer its threefold sense, historical, moral, and allegorical; or Logic, Physic, and Ethics, making them all serve the faith.

2:12

12. And being warned of God in a dream that they should not return to Herod, they departed into their own country another way.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) The wicked Herod, now made cruel by fear, will needs do a deed of horror. But how could he ensnare him who had come to cut off all fraud? His fraud is escaped as it follows, And being warned.

JEROME. They had offered gifts to the Lord, and receive a warning corresponding to it. This warning (in the Greek ‘having received a response’) is given not by an Angel, but by the Lord Himself, to shew the high privilege granted to the merit of Joseph.

GLOSS. (ord.) This warning is given by the Lord Himself; it is none other that now teaches these Magi the way they should return, but He who said, I am the way. (John 14.) Not that the Infant actually speaks to them, that His divinity may not be revealed before the time, and His human nature may be thought real. But he says, having received an answer, for as Moses prayed silently, so they with pious spirit had asked what the Divine will bade. By another way, for they were not to be mixed up with the unbelieving Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. viii.) See the faith of the Magi; they were not offended, nor said within themselves, What need now of flight? or of secret return, if this Boy be really some great one? Such is true faith; it asks not the reason of any command, but obeys.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Had the Magi sought Christ as an earthly King, they would have remained with Him when they had found Him; but they only worship, and go their way. After their return, they continued in the worship of God more stedfast than before, and taught many by their preaching. And when afterwards Thomas reached their country, they joined themselves to him, and were baptized, and did according to his preachingb.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. i. 10. 7.) We may learn much from this return of the Magi another way. Our country is Paradise, to which, after we have come to the knowledge of Christ we are forbidden to return the way we came. We have left this country by pride, disobedience, following things of sight, tasting forbidden food; and we must return to it by repentance, obedience, by contemning things of sight, and overcoming carnal appetite.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. It was impossible that they, who left Herod to go to Christ, should return to Herod. They who have by sin left Christ and passed to the devil, often return to Christ; for the innocent, who knows not what is evil, is easily deceived, but having once tasted the evil he has taken up, and remembering the good he has left, he returns in penitence to God. He who has forsaken the devil and come to Christ, hardly returns to the devil; for rejoicing in the good he has found, and remembering the evil he has escaped, with difficulty returns to that evil.

2:13–15

13. And when they were departed, behold, the angel of the Lord appeareth to Joseph in a dream, saying, Arise, and take the young Child and His mother, and flee into Egypt, and be thou there until I bring thee word; for Herod will seek the young Child to destroy Him.

14. When he arose, he took the young Child and His mother by night, and departed into Egypt:

15. And was there until the death of Herod: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken of the Lord by the prophet, saying, Out of Egypt have I called my Son.

RABANUS. Here Matthew omits the day of purification when the first-born must be presented in the Temple with a lamb, or a pair of turtle doves, or pigeons. Their fear of Herod did not make them bold to transgress the Law, that they should not present the Child in the temple. As soon then as the rumour concerning the Child begins to be spread abroad, the Angel is sent to bid Joseph carry Him into Egypt.

REMIGIUS. By this that the Angel appears always to Joseph in sleep, is mystically signified that they who rest from mundane cares and secular pursuits, deserve angelic visitations.

HILARY. The first time when he would teach Joseph that she was lawfully espoused, the Angel called the Virgin his espoused wife; but after the birth she is only spoken of as the Mother of Jesus. As wedlock was rightfully imputed to her in her virginity, so virginity is esteemed venerable in her as the mother of Jesus.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He says not, ‘the Mother and her young Child,’ but, the young Child and His mother; for the Child was not born for the mother, but the mother prepared for the Child. How is this that the Son of God flies from the face of man? or who shall deliver from the enemy’s hand, if He Himself fears His enemies? First; He ought to observe, even in this, the law of that human nature which He took on Him; and human nature and infancy must flee before threatening power. Next, that Christians when persecution makes it necessary should not be ashamed to fly. But why into

Egypt? The Lord, who keepeth not His anger for ever, remembered the woes He had brought upon Egypt, and therefore sent His Son thither, and gives it this sign of great reconciliation, that with this one remedy He might heal the ten plagues of Egypt, and the nation that had been the persecutor of this first-born people, might be the guardian of His first-born Son. As formerly they had cruelly tyrannized, now they might devoutly serve; nor go to the Red Sea to be drowned, but be called to the waters of baptism to receive life.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 218. App.) Hear the sacrament of a great mystery. Moses before had shut up the light of day from the traitors the Egyptians; Christ by going down thither brought back light to them that sate in darkness. He fled that he might enlighten them, not that he might escape his foes.

AUGUSTINE. The miserable tyrant supposed that by the Saviour’s coming he should be thrust from his royal throne. But it was not so; Christ came not to hurt others’ dignity, but to bestow His own on others.

HILARY. Egypt full of idols; for after this enquiry for Him among the Jews, Christ leaving Judæa goes to be cherished among nations given to the vainest superstitions.

JEROME. When he takes the Child and His mother to go into Egypt, it is in the night and darkness, when to return into Judæa, the Gospel speaks of no light, no darkness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The straitness of every persecution may be called night—the relief from it in like manner, day.

RABANUS. For when the true light withdraws, they who hate the light are in darkness, when it returns they are again enlightened.

CHRYSOSTOM. See how immediately on His birth the tyrant is furious against Him, and the mother with her Child is driven into foreign lands. So should you in the beginning of your spiritual career seem to have tribulation, you need not to be discouraged, but bear all things manfully, having this example.

BEDE. (Hom. in. Nat. Innocent.) The flight into Egypt signifies that the elect are often by the wickedness of the bad driven from their homes, or sentenced to banishment. Thus He, who, we shall see below, gave the command to His own, When they shall persecute you in one city, flee ye to another, first practised what He enjoined, as a man flying before the face of man on earth. He whom but a little before a star had proclaimed to the Magi to be worshipped as from heaven.

REMIGIUS. Isaiah had foretold this flight into Egypt. Lo! the Lord shall ascend on a light cloud, and shall come into Egypt, and shall scatter the idols of Egypt. (Is. 19:1.) It is the practice of this Evangelist to confirm all he says; and that because he is writing to the Jews, therefore he adds, that it might be fulfilled, &c.

JEROME. (Epist. 57.7.) This is not in the LXX; but in Osee according to the genuine Hebrew text we read; Israel is my child, and I have loved him, and, from Egypt have I called my Son; where the LXX render, Israel is my child, and I have loved him, and called my sons out of Egypt.

JEROME. (In Osee 11:2.) The Evangelist cites this text, because it refers to Christ typically. For it is to be observed, that in this Prophet and in others, the coming of Christ and the call of the Gentiles are foreshewn in such a manner, that the thread of history is never broken.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is a law of prophecy, that in a thousand places many things are said of some and fulfilled of others. As it is said of Simeon and Levi, I will divide them in Jacob, and scatter them in Israel; (Gen. 49:7.) which was fulfilled not in themselves, but in their descendants. So here Christ is by nature the Son of God, and so the prophecy is fulfilled in Him.

JEROME. Let those who deny the authenticity of the Hebrew copies, shew us this passage in the LXX, and when they have failed to find it, we will shew it them in the Hebrew. We may also explain it in another way, by considering it as quoted from Numbers, God brought him out of Egypt; his glory is as it were that of a unicorn. (Num. 23:22.)

REMIGIUS. In Joseph is figured the order of preachers, in Mary Holy Scripture; by the Child the knowledge of the Saviour; by the cruelty of Herod the persecution which the Church suffered in Jerusalem; by Joseph’s flight into Egypt the passing of the preachers to the unbelieving Gentiles, (for Egypt signifies darkness;) by the time that he abode in Egypt the space of time between the ascension of the Lord and the coming of Anti Christ; by Herod’s death the extinction of jealousy in the hearts of the Jews.

2:16

16. Then Herod, when he saw that he was mocked of the wise men, was exceeding wroth, and sent forth, and slew all the children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the coasts thereof, from two years old and under, according to the time which he had diligently enquired of the wise men.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When the infant Jesus had subdued the Magi, not by the might of His flesh, but the grace of His Spirit, Herod was exceeding wrath, that they whom he sitting on his throne had no power to move, were obedient to an Infant lying in a manger. Then by their contempt of him the Magi gave further cause of wrath. For when kings' wrath is stirred by fear for their crowns, it is a great and inextinguishable wrath. But what did he? He sent and slew all the children. As a wounded beast rends whatsoever meeteth it as if the cause of its smart, so he mocked by the Magi spent his fury on children. He said to himself in his fury, 'Surely the Magi have found the Child whom they said should be King;' for a king in fear for his crown fears all things, suspects all. Then he sent and slew all those infants, that he might secure one among so many.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) And while he thus persecutes Christ, he furnished an army (of martyrs) clothed in white robes of the same age as the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 220. App.) Behold how this unrighteous enemy never could have so much profited these infants by his love, as he did by his hate; for as much as iniquity abounded against them, so much did the grace of blessing abound on them.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 373. 3.) O blessed infants! He only will doubt of your crown in this your passion for Christ, who doubts that the baptism of Christ has a benefit for infants. He who at His birth had Angels to proclaim Him, the heavens to testify, and Magi to worship Him, could surely have prevented that these should not have died for Him, had He not known that they died not in that death, but rather lived in higher bliss. Far be the thought, that Christ who came to set men free, did nothing to reward those who died in His behalf, when hanging on the cross He prayed for those who put Him to death.

RABANUS. He is not satisfied with the massacre at Bethlehem, but extends it to the adjacent villages; sparing no age from the child of one night old, to that of two years.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 132. App.) The Magi had seen this unknown star in the heavens, not a few days, but two years before, as they had informed Herod when he enquired. This caused him to fix two years old and under; as it follows, according to the time he had enquired of the Magi.

AUGUSTINE. (Gloss. ord.) Or because he feared that the Child to whom even stars ministered, might transform His appearance to greater or under that of His own age, or might conceal all those of that age: hence it seems to be that he slew all from one day to two years old.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 11.) Or, disturbed by pressure of still more imminent dangers, Herod’s thoughts are drawn to other thoughts than the slaughter of children, he might suppose that the Magi, unable to find Him whom they had supposed born, were ashamed to return to him. So the days of purification being accomplished, they might go up in safety to Jerusalem. And who does not see that that one day they may have escaped the attention of a King occupied with so many cares, and that afterwards when the things done in the Temple came to be spread abroad, then Herod discovered that he had been deceived by the Magi, and then sent and slew the children.

BEDE. (Hom. in Nat. Innocent.) In this death of the children the precious death of all Christ’s martyrs is figured; that they were infants signifies, that by the merit of humility alone can we come to the glory of martyrdom; that they were slain in Bethlehem and the coasts thereof, that the persecution shall be both in Jerusalem whence the Church originated, and throughout the world; in those of two years old are figured the perfect in doctrine and works; those under that age the neophytes; that they were slain while Christ escaped, signifies that the bodies of the martyrs may be destroyed by the wicked, but that Christ cannot be taken from them.

2:17–18

17. Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet, saying,

18. In Rama was there a voice heard, lamentation, and weeping, and great mourning, Rachel weeping for her children, and would not be comforted, because they are not.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. ix.) The Evangelist by this history of so bloody a massacre, having filled the reader with horror, now again sooths his feelings, shewing that these things were not done because God could not hinder, or knew not of them; but as the Prophet had foretold.

JEROME. (In Hierem. 31:15.) This passage of Jeremiah has been quoted by Matthew neither according to the Hebrew nor the LXX version. This shews that the Evangelists and Apostles did not follow any one's translation, but according to the Hebrew manner expressed in their own words what they had read in Hebrew.

JEROME. By Ramah we need not suppose that the town of that name near Gibeah is meant; but take it as signifying 'high.' A voice was heard 'aloft,' that is, spread far and wide.'

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, it was heard on high, because uttered for the death of the innocent, according to that, The voice of the poor entereth into the heavens. (Ecclus. 35:21.) The 'weeping' means the cries of the children; 'lamentation,' refers to the mothers. In the infants themselves their death ends their cries, in the mothers it is continually renewed by the remembrance of their loss.

JEROME. Rachel's son was Benjamin, in which tribe Bethlehem is not situated. How then does Rachel weep for the children of Judah as if they were her own? We answer briefly. She was buried near Bethlehem in Ephrata, and was regarded as the mother, because her body was there entertained. Or, as the two tribes of Judah and Benjamin were contiguous, and Herod's command extended to the coasts of Bethlehem as well as to the town itself, we may suppose that many were slain in Benjamin.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Hil. Quæst. N. and V. Test. 9. 62.) Or, The sons of Benjamin, who were akin to Rachel, were formerly cut off by the other tribes, and so extinct both then and ever after. (see Judg. 20.) Then therefore Rachel began to mourn her sons, when she saw those of her sister cut off in such a cause, that they should be heirs of eternal life; for he who has experienced any misfortune, is made more sensible of his losses by the good fortune of a neighbour.

REMIGIUS. The sacred Evangelist adds, to shew the greatness of the mourning, that even the dead Rachel was roused to mourn her sons, and would not be comforted because they were not.

JEROME. This may be understood in two ways; either she thought them dead for all eternity, so that no consolation could comfort her; or, she desired not to receive any comfort for those who she knew had gone into life eternal.

HILARY. It could not be that they were not who seemed now dead, but by glorious martyrdom they were advanced to eternal life; and consolation is for those who have suffered loss, not for those who have reaped a gain. Rachel affords a type of the Church long barren now at length fruitful. She is heard weeping for her children, not because she mourned them dead, but because they were slaughtered by those whom she would have retained as her first-born sons.

RABANUS. Or, The Church weeps the removal of the saints from this earth, but wishes not to be comforted as though they should return again to the struggles of life, for they are not to be recalled into life.

GLOSS. (ord.) She will not be comforted in this present life, for that they are not, but transfers all her hope and comfort to the life to come.

RABANUS. Rachel is well set for a type of the Church, as the word signifies ‘a sheep’ or ‘seeing;’ (vid. note i, p. 19.) her whole thought being to fix her eye in contemplation of God; and she is the hundredth sheep that the shepherd layeth on his shoulder.

2:19–20

19. But when Herod was dead, behold, an Angel of the Lord appeareth in a dream to Joseph in Egypt,

20. Saying, Arise, and take the young Child and His mother, and go into the land of Israel; for they are dead which sought the young Child’s life.

EUSEBIUS. (Eccles. Hist. i. 8.) For the sacrilege which Herod had committed against the Saviour, and his wicked slaughter of the infants of the same age, the Divine vengeance hastened his end; and his body, as Josephus relates, was attacked by a strange disease; so that the prophets declared that they were not human ailments, but visitations of Divine vengeance. Filled with mad fury, he gives command to seize and imprison the heads and nobles out of all parts of Judæa; ordering that as soon as ever he should breathe his last, they should be all put to death, that so Judæa though unwillingly might mourn at his decease. Just before he died he murdered his son Antipater, (besides two boys put to death before, Alexander and Aristobulus.) Such was the end of Herod, noticed in those words of the Evangelist, when Herod was dead, and such the punishment inflicted.

JEROME. Many here err from ignorance of history, supposing the Herod who mocked our Lord on the day of His passion, and the Herod whose death is here related, were the same. But the Herod who was then made friends with Pilate was son of this Herod and brother to Archelaus; for Archelaus was banished to Lyons in Gaul, and his father Herod made king in his room, as we read in Josephus.

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. (De Cæl. Hierarch. 4.) See how Jesus Himself, though far above all celestial beings, and coming unchanged to our nature, shunned not that ordinance of humanity which He had taken on Him, but was obedient to the dispositions of His Father made known by Angels. For even by Angels is declared to Joseph the retreat of the Son into Egypt, so ordained of the Father, and His return again to Judæa.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. See how Joseph was set for ministering to Mary; when she went into Egypt and returned, who would have fulfilled to her this so needful ministry, had she not been betrothed? For to outward view Mary nourished and Joseph defended the Child; but in truth the Child supported His mother and protected Joseph. Return into the land of Israel; for He went down into Egypt as a physician, not to abide there, but to succour it sick with error. But the reason of the return is given in the words, They are dead, &c.

JEROME. From this we see that not Herod only, but also the Priests and Scribes had sought the Lord’s death at that time.

REMIGIUS. But if they were many who sought his destruction, how came they all to have died in so short a time? As we have related above, all the great men among the Jews were slain at Herod’s death.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And that is said to have been done by the counsel of God for their conspiring with Herod against the Lord; as it is said, Herod was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him.

REMIGIUS. Or the Evangelist uses a figure of speech, by which the plural is used for the singular. These words, the Child’s life, (or soul, i. e. the Apollinarians.) overthrow those heretics who taught that Christ did not take a soul, but had His Divinity in place of a soul.

BEDE. (Hom. in Nat. Innoc.) This slaughter of the infants for the Lord's sake, the death of Herod soon after, and Joseph's return with the Lord and his mother to the land of Israel, is a figure shewing that all the persecutions moved against the Church will be avenged by the death of the persecutor, peace restored to the Church, and the saints who had concealed themselves return to their own places. Or the return of Jesus to the land of Israel on the death of Herod shews, that, at the preaching of Enoch and Elijahc, the Jews, when the fire of modern jealousy shall be extinguished, shall receive the true faith.

2:21–23

21. And he arose, and took the young Child and His mother, and came into the land of Israel.

22. But when he heard that Archelaus did reign in Judæa in the room of his father Herod, he was afraid to go thither: notwithstanding, being warned of God in a dream, he turned aside into the parts of Galilee:

23. And he came and dwelt in a city called Nazareth: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophets, He shall be called a Nazarene.

GLOSS. Joseph was not disobedient to the angelic warning, but he arose, and took the young Child and his mother, and came into the land of Israel. The Angel had not fixed the particular place, so that while Joseph hesitates, the Angel returns, and by the often visiting him confirms his obedience.

JOSEPHUS. Herod had nine wives, by seven of whom he had a numerous issue. By Josida, his first born Antipater—by Mariamine, Alexander and Aristobulus—by Mathuca, a Samaritan woman, Archelaus—by Cleopatra of Jerusalem, Herod, who was afterwards tetrarch, and Philip. The three first were put to death by Herod; and after his death, Archelaus seized the throne by occasion of his father's will, and the question of the succession was carried before Augustus Cæsar. After some delay, he made a distribution of the whole of Herod's dominions in accordance with the Senate's advice. To Archelaus he assigned one half, consisting of Idumæa and Judæa, with the title of tetrarch, and a promise of that of king if he shewed himself deserving of it. The rest he divided into two tetrarchates, giving Galilee to Herod the tetrarch, Ituræa and Trachonitis to Philip. Thus

Archelaus was after his father's death a duarch, which kind of sovereignty is here called a kingdom.

AUGUSTINE. (De Con. Evan. ii. 10.) Here it may be asked, How then could his parents go up every year of Christ's childhood to Jerusalem, as Luke relates, if fear of Archelaus now prevented them from approaching it? This difficulty is easily solved. At the festival they might escape notice in the crowd, and by returning soon, where in ordinary times they might be afraid to live. So they neither became irreligious by neglecting the festival, nor notorious by dwelling continually in Jerusalem. Or it is open to us to understand Luke when he says, they went up every year, as speaking of a time when they had nothing to fear from Archelaus, who, as Josephus relates, reigned only nine years. There is yet a difficulty in what follows; Being warned in a dream, he turned aside into the parts of Galilee. If Joseph was afraid to go into Judæa because one of Herod's sons, Archelaus, reigned there, how could he go into Galilee, where another of his sons Herod was tetrarch, as Luke tells us? As if the times of which Luke is speaking were times in which there was any longer need to fear for the Child, when even in Judæa things were so changed, that Archelaus no longer ruled there, but Pilate was governor.

GLOSS. (ord.) But then we might ask, why was he not afraid to go into Galilee, seeing Archelaus ruled there also? He could be better concealed in Nazareth than in Jerusalem, which was the capital of the kingdom, and where Archelaus was constantly resident.

CHRYSOSTOM. And when he had once left the country of His birth, all the occurrences passed out of mind; the rage of persecution had been spent in Bethlehem and its neighbourhood. By choosing Nazareth therefore, Joseph both avoided danger, and returned to his country.

AUGUSTINE. (De Con. Evan. ii. 9.) This may perhaps occur to some, that Matthew says His parents went with the Child Jesus to Galilee because they feared Archelaus, when it should seem most probable that they chose Galilee because Nazareth was their own city, as Luke has not forgot to mention. We must understand, that when the Angel in the vision in Egypt said to Joseph, Go into the land of Israel, Joseph understood the command to be that he should go straight into Judæa, that being properly the land of Israel. But finding Archelaus ruling there, he would not court the danger, as the land of Israel might be interpreted to extend to Galilee, which was inhabited by children of Israel. Or we may suppose His parents supposed that Christ should dwell no where but in Jerusalem, where was the temple of the Lord, and would have gone thither had not the fear of Archelaus hindered them. And they had not been commanded from God to dwell positively in Judæa, or Jerusalem, so as that they should have despised the fear of Archelaus, but only in the land of Israel generally, which they might understand of Galilee.

HILARY. But the figurative interpretation holds good any way. Joseph represents the Apostles, to whom Christ is entrusted to be borne about. These, as though Herod were dead, that is, his people being destroyed in the Lord's passion, are commanded to preach the Gospel to the Jews; they are sent to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. But finding the seed of their hereditary unbelief still abiding, they fear and withdraw; admonished by a vision, to wit, seeing the Holy Ghost poured upon the Gentiles, they carry Christ to them.

RABANUS. Or, we may apply it to the last times of the Jewish Church, when many Jews having turned to the preaching of Enoch and Elijah, the rest filled with the spirit of Antichrist shall fight against the faith. So that part of Judæa where Archelaus rules, signifies the followers of Antichrist; Nazareth of Galilee, whither Christ is conveyed, that part of the nation that shall embrace the faith. Galilee means 'removal;' Nazareth, 'the flower of virtues;' for the Church the more zealously she removes from the earthly to the heavenly, the more she abounds in the flower and fruit of virtues.

GLOSS. To this he adds the Prophet's testimony, saying, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophets, &c.

JEROME. Had he meant to quote a particular text, he would not have written 'Prophets,' but 'the Prophet.' By thus using the plural he evidently does not take the words of any one passage in Scripture, but the sense of the whole. Nazarene is interpreted 'Holyd,' and that the Lord would be Holy, all Scripture testifies. Otherwise we may explain that it is found in Isaiah (c. 11:1.) rendered to the strict letter of the Hebrew. There shall come a Rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Nazarene shall grow out of His rootse.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. They might have read this in some Prophets who are not in our canon, as Nathan or Esdras. That there was some prophecy to this purport is clear from what Philip says to Nathanael. Him of whom Moses in the Law and the Prophets did write, Jesus of Nazareth.

(John 1:15.) Hence the Christians were at first called Nazarenes, at Antioch their name was changed to that of ‘Christians.’

AUGUSTINE. (De Con. Evan. ii. 5.) The whole of this history, from the account of the Magi inclusively, Luke omits. Let it be here noticed once for all, that each of the Evangelists writes as if he were giving a full and complete history, which omits nothing; where he really passes over any thing, he continues his thread of history as if he had told all. Yet by a diligent comparison of their several narratives, we can be at no loss to know where to insert any particular that is mentioned by one and not by the other.

CHAPTER 3

3:1–3

1. In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness of Judæa,

2. And saying, Repent ye: for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.

3. For this is he that was spoken of by the Prophet Esaias, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make His paths straight.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Sun as he approaches the horizon, and before he is yet visible, sends out his rays and makes the eastern sky to glow with light, that Aurora going before may herald the coming day. Thus the Lord at His birth in this earth, and before He shews Himself, enlightens John by the rays of His Spirit’s teaching, that he might go before and announce the Saviour that was to come. Therefore after having related the birth of Christ, before proceeding to His teaching and baptism, (wherein he received such testimony,) he first premises somewhat of the Baptist and forerunner of the Lord. In those days, &c.

REMIGIUS. In these words (ver. 1.) we have not only time, place, and person, respecting St. John, but also his office and employment. First the time, generally; In those days.

AUGUSTINE. (De Con. Evan. ii. 6.) Luke describes the time by the reigning sovereigns. (Luke 3:1.) But Matthew must be understood to speak of a wider space of time by the phrase ‘those days,’ than the fifteenth year of Tiberius. Having related Christ’s return from Egypt, which must be placed in early boyhood or even infancy, to make it agree with what Luke has told of His being in the temple at twelve years old, he adds directly, In those days, not intending thereby only the days of His childhood, but all the days from His birth to the preaching of John.

REMIGIUS. The man is mentioned in the words came John, that is, shewed himself, having abode so long in obscurity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) But why must John thus go before Christ with a witness of deeds preaching Him? First; that we might hence learn Christ’s dignity, that He also, as the Father has, has prophets, in the words of Zacharias, And thou, Child, shalt be called the Prophet of the Highest. (Luke 1:76.) Secondly; That the Jews might have no cause for offence; as He declared, John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil. The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a gluttonous man. (Luke 7:33.) It needeth moreover that the things concerning Christ should be told by some other first, and not by Himself; or what would the Jews have said, who after the witness of John made complaint, Thou bearest witness of thyself, thy witness is not true. (John 8:13.)

REMIGIUS. (ap. Anselm.) His office; the Baptist; in this he prepared the way of the Lord, for had not men been used to be baptized, they would have shunned Christ’s baptism. His employment; Preaching;

RABANUS. For because Christ was to preach, as soon as it seemed the fit time, that is, about thirty years of age, he began by his preaching to make ready the way for the Lord.

REMIGIUS. The place; the desert of Judæa.

MAXIMUS. (Hom. in Joan. Bap. nat. 1.) Where neither a noisy mob would interrupt his preaching, and whither no unbelieving hearer would retire; but those only would hear, who sought to his preaching from motives of divine worship.

JEROME. (In. Is. 40:3.) Consider how the salvation of God, and the glory of the Lord, is preached not in Jerusalem, but in the solitude of the Church, in the wilderness to multitudes.

HILARY. Or, he came to Judæa, desert by the absence of God, not of population, that the place of preaching might witness the few to whom the preaching was sent.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The desert typically means a life removed from the temptations of the world, such as befits the penitent.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm.) Unless one repent him of his former life, he cannot begin a new life.

HILARY. He therefore preaches repentance when the Kingdom of Heaven approaches; by which we return from error, we escape from sin, and after shame for our faults, we make profession of forsaking them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. In the very commencement he shews himself the messenger of a merciful Prince; he comes not with threats to the offender, but with offers of mercy. It is a custom with kings to proclaim a general pardon on the birth of a son, but first they send throughout their kingdom officers to exact severe fines. But God willing at the birth of His Son to give pardon of sins, first sends His officer proclaiming, Repent ye. O exaction which leaves none poor, but makes many rich! For even when we pay our just debt of righteousness we do God no service, but only gain our own salvation. Repentance cleanses the heart, enlightens the sense, and prepares the human soul for the reception of Christ, as he immediately adds, For the Kingdom of Hearen is at hand.

JEROME. John Baptist is the first to preach the Kingdom of Heaven, that the forerunner of the Lord may have this honourable privilege.

CHRYSOSTOM. And he preaches what the Jews had never heard, not even from the Prophets, Heaven, namely, and the Kingdom that is there, and of the kingdoms of the earth he says nothing. Thus by the novelty of those things of which he speaks, he gains their attention to Him whom he preaches.

REMIGIUS. The Kingdom of Heaven has a fourfold meaning. It is said, of Christ, as The Kingdom of God is within you. (Luke 17:21.) Of Holy Scripture, as, The Kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and shall be given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof. (Mat. 21:43.) Of the Holy Church, as, The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto ten virgins. (Mat. 25.) Of the abode above, as, Many shall come from the East and the West, and shall sit down in the Kingdom of Heaven. (Mat. 8:11.) And all these significations may be here understood.

GLOSS. (ord.) The Kingdom of Heaven shall come nigh you; for if it approached not, none would be able to gain it; for weak and blind they had not the way, which was Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 12.) The other Evangelists omit these words of John. What follows, This is He, &c. it is not clear whether the Evangelist speaks them in his own person, or whether they are part of John’s preaching, and the whole from Repent ye, to Esaias the prophet, is to be assigned to John. It is of no importance that he says, This is he, and not, I am he; for Matthew speaking of himself says, He found a man sitting at the toll-office; (Mat. 9:9.) not He found me. Though when asked what he said of himself, he answered, as is related by John the Evangelist, I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. i. 7. 2.) It is well known that the Only-begotten Son is called the Word of the Father; as in John, In the beginning was the Word. (John 1:1.) But it is by our own speech that we are known; the voice sounds that the words may be heard. Thus John the forerunner of the Lord’s coming is called, The voice, because by his ministry the voice of the Father is heard by men.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The voice is a confused sound, discovering no secret of the heart, only signifying that he who utters it desires to say somewhat; it is the word that is the speech that openeth the mystery of the heart. Voice is common to men and other animals, word peculiar to man. John then is called the voice and not the word, because God did not discover His counsels through him, but only signified that He was about to do something among men; but afterwards by His Son he fully opened the mystery of his will.

RABANUS. He is rightly called, The voice of one crying, on account of the loud sound of his preaching. Three things cause a man to speak loud; when the person he speaks to is at a distance, or is deaf, or if the speaker be angry; and all these three were then found in the human race.

GLOSS. (ord.) John then is, as it were, the voice of the word crying. The word is heard by the voice, that is, Christ by John.

BEDE. (Gloss. ord. in cap. iv. 1.) In like manner has He cried from the beginning through the voice of all who have spoken aught by inspiration. And yet is John only called, The voice; because that Word which others shewed afar off, he declares as nigh.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. i. 7. 2.) Crying in the desert, because he shews to deserted and forlorn Judæa the approaching consolation of her Redeemer.

REMIGIUS. Though as far as historical fact is concerned, he chose the desert, to be removed from the crowds of people. What the purport of his cry was is insinuated, when he adds, Make ready the way of the Lord.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As a great King going on a progress is preceded by couriers to cleanse what is foul, repair what is broken down; so John preceded the Lord to cleanse the human heart from the filth of sin, by the besom of repentance, and to gather by an ordinance of spiritual precepts those things which had been scattered abroad.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. i. 20. 3.) Every one who preacheth right faith and good works, prepares the Lord’s way to the hearts of the hearers, and makes His paths straight, in cleansing the thoughts by the word of good preaching.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Or, faith is the way by which the word reaches the heart; when the life is amended the paths are made straight.

3:4

Ver. 4. And the same John had his raiment of camel’s hair, and a leathern girdle about his loins; and his meat was locusts and wild honey.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Having said that he is the voice of one crying in the desert, the Evangelist well adds, John had his clothing of camel’s hair; thus shewing what his life was; for he indeed testified of Christ, but his life testified of himself. No one is fit to be another’s witness till he has first been his own.

HILARY. For the preaching of John no place more suitable, no clothing more useful, no food more fitted.

JEROME. His raiment of camel’s hair, not of wool—the one the mark of austerity in dress, the other of a delicate luxury.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. It becomes the servants of God to use a dress not for elegant appearance, or for cherishing of the body, but for a covering of the nakedness. Thus John wears a garment not soft and delicate, but hairy, heavy, rough, rather wounding the skin than cherishing it, that even the very clothing of his body told of the virtue of his mind. It was the custom of the Jews to wear girdles of wool; so he desiring something less indulgent wore one of skin.

JEROME. Food moreover suited to a dweller in the desert, no choice viands, but such as satisfied the necessities of the body.

RABANUS. Content with poor fare; to wit, small insects and honey gathered from the trunks of trees. In the sayings of Arnulphusa, Bishop of Gaul, we find that there was a very small kind of locust in the deserts of Judæa, with bodies about the thickness of a finger and short; they are easily taken among the grass, and when cooked in oil form a poor kind of food. He also relates, that in the same desert there is a kind of tree, with a large round leaf, of the colour of milk and taste of honey, so friable as to rub to powder in the hand, and this is what is intended by wild honey.

REMIGIUS. In this clothing and this poor food, he shews that he sorrows for the sins of the whole human race.

RABANUS. His dress and diet express the quality of his inward conversation. His garment was of an austere quality, because he rebuked the sinner’s life.

JEROME. His girdle of skin, which Elias also bare, is the mark of mortification.

RABANUS. He ate locusts and honey, because his preaching was sweet to the multitude, but was of short continuance; and honey has sweetness, locusts a swift flight but soon fall to the ground.

REMIGIUS. In John (which name is interpreted ‘the grace of God,’) is figured Christ who brought grace into the world; in his clothing, the Gentile Church.

HILARY. The preacher of Christ is clad in the skins of unclean beasts, to which the Gentiles are compared, and so by the Prophets’ dress is sanctified whatever in them was useless or unclean. The girdle is a thing of much efficacy to every good work, that we may be girt for every ministry of Christ. For his food are chosen locusts, which fly the face of man, and escape from every approach, signifying ourselves who were borne away from every word or speech of good by a spontaneous motion of the body, weak in will, barren in works, fretful in speech, foreign in abode, are now become the food of the Saints, chosen to fill the Prophets’ desire, furnishing our most sweet food not from the hives of the law, but from the trunks of wild trees.

3:5–6

5. Then went out to him Jerusalem, and all Judæa, and all the region round about Jordan,

6. And were baptized of him in Jordan, confessing their sins.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Having described the preaching of John, he goes on to say, There went out to him, for his severe life preached yet more loudly in the desert than the voice of his crying.

CHRYSOSTOM. For it was wonderful to see such fortitude in a human body; this it was that chiefly attracted the Jews, seeing in him the great Elias. It also contributed to fill them with wonder that the grace of Prophecy had long failed among them, and now seemed to have at length revived. Also the manner of his preaching being other than that of the old prophets had much effect; for now they heard not such things as they were wont to hear, such as wars, and conquests of the king of Babylon, or of Persia; but of Heaven and the Kingdom there, and the punishment of hell.

GLOSS. (interlin.) This baptism was only a forerunning of that to come, and did not forgive sinsd.

REMIGIUS. The baptism of John bare a figure of the catechumens. As children are only catechized that they may become meet for the sacrament of Baptism; so John baptized, that they who were thus baptized might afterwards by a holy life become worthy of coming to Christ’s baptism. He baptized in Jordan, that the door of the Kingdom of Heaven might be there opened, where an entrance had been given to the children of Israel into the earthly kingdom of promise.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Compared with the holiness of John, who is there that can think himself righteous? As a white garment if placed near snow would seem foul by the contrast; so compared with John every man would seem impure; therefore they confessed their sins. Confession of sin is the testimony of a conscience fearing God. And perfect fear takes away all shame. But there is seen the shame of confession where there is no fear of the judgment to come. But as shame itself is a heavy punishment, God therefore bids us confess our sins that we may suffer this shame as punishment; for that itself is a part of the judgment.

RABANUS. Rightly are they who are to be baptized said to go out to the Prophet; for unless one depart from sin, and renounce the pomp of the Devil, and the temptations of the world, he cannot receive a healing baptism. Rightly also in Jordan, which means their descent, because they descended from the pride of life to the humility of an honest confession. Thus early was an example given to them that are to be baptized of confessing their sins and professing amendment.

3:7–10

7. But when he saw many of the Pharisees and Sadducees come to his baptism, he said unto them, O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?

8. Bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance:

9. And think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.

10. And now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees: therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire.

GREGORY. (De Cur. Past. iii. in prol.) The words of the teachers should be fitted to the quality of the hearers, that in each particular it should agree with itself and yet never depart from the fortress of general edification.

GLOSS. (non occ.) It was necessary that after the teaching which he used to the common people, the Evangelist should give an example of the doctrine he delivered to the more advanced; therefore he says, Seeing many of the Pharisees, &c.

ISIDORE. (Orig. viii. 4.) The Pharisees and Sadducees opposed to one another; Pharisee in the Hebrew signifies ‘divided;’ because choosing the justification of traditions and observances they were ‘divided’ or ‘separated’ from the people by this righteousness. Sadducee in the Hebrew means ‘just;’ for these laid claim to be what they were not, denied the resurrection of the body, and taught that the soul perished with the body; they only received the Pentateuch, and rejected the Prophets.

GLOSS. (non occ.) When John saw those who seemed to be of great consideration among the Jews come to his baptism, he said to them, O generation of vipers, &c.

REMIGIUS. The manner of Scripture is to give names from the imitation of deeds, according to that of Ezekiel, Thy father was an Amorite; (Ezek. 16:3.) so these from following vipers are called generation of vipers.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As a skilful physician from the colour of the skin infers the sick man’s disease, so John understood the evil thoughts of the Pharisees who came to him. They thought perhaps, We go, and confess our sins; he imposes no burden on us, we will be baptized, and get indulgence for sin. Fools! if ye have eaten of impurity, must ye not needs take physic? So after confession and baptism, a man needs much diligence to heal the wound of sin; therefore he says, Generation of vipers. It is the nature of the viper as soon as it has bit a man to fly to the water, which, if it cannot find, it straightway dies; so this progeny of vipers, after having committed deadly sin, ran to baptism, that, like vipers, they might escape death by means of water. Moreover it is the nature of vipers to burst the insides of their mothers, and so to be born. The Jews then are therefore called progeny of vipers, because by continual persecution of the prophets they had corrupted their mother the Synagogue. Also vipers have a beautiful and speckled outside, but are filled with poison within. So these men's countenances wore a holy appearance.

REMIGIUS. When then he asks, who will shew you to flee from the wrath to come,—'except God' must be understood.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or who hath shewed you? Was it Esaias? Surely no; had he taught you, you would not put your trust in water only, but also in good works; he thus speaks, Wash you, and be clean; put your wickedness away from your souls, learn to do well. (Is. 1:16.) Was it then David? who says, Thou shall wash me, and I shall he whiter than snow; (Ps. 51:7.) surely not, for he adds immediately, The sacrifice of God is a broken spirit. If then ye had been the disciples of David, ye would have come to baptism with mournings.

REMIGIUS. But if we read, shall shew, in the future, this is the meaning, 'What teacher, what preacher, shall be able to give you such counsel, as that ye may escape the wrath of everlasting damnation?'

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, ix. 5.) God is described in Scripture, from some likeness of effects, not from being subject to such weakness, as being angry, and yet is He never moved by any passion. The word 'wrath' is applied to the effects of his vengeance, not that God suffers any disturbing affection.

GLOSS. If then ye would escape this wrath, Bring forth fruits meet for repentance.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xx. 8.) Observe, he says not merely fruits of repentance, but fruits meet for repentance. For he who has never fallen into things unlawful, is of right allowed the use of all things lawful; but if any hath fallen into sin, he ought so far to put away from him even things lawful, as far as he is conscious of having used unlawful things. It is left then to such man's conscience to seek so much the greater gains of good works by repentance, the greater loss he has brought on himself by sin. The

Jews who gloried in their race, would not own themselves sinners because they were Abraham’s seed. Say not among yourselves we are Abraham’s seed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xi.) He does not forbid them to say they are his, but to trust in that, neglecting virtues of the soul.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. What avails noble birth to him whose life is disgraceful? Or, on the other hand, what hurt is a low origin to him who has the lustre of virtue? It is fitter that the parents of such a son should rejoice over him, than he over his parents. So do not you pride yourselves on having Abraham for your father, rather blush that you inherit his blood, but not his holiness. He who has no resemblance to his father is possibly the offspring of adultery. These words then only exclude boasting on account of birth.

RABANUS. Because as a preacher of truth he wished to stir them up, to bring forth fruit meet for repentance, he invites them to humility, without which no one can repent.

REMIGIUS. There is a tradition, that John preached at that place of the Jordan, where the twelve stones taken from the bed of the river had been set up by command of God. He might then be pointing to these, when he said, Of these stones.

JEROME. He intimates God’s great power, who, as he made all things out of nothing, can make men out of the hardest stone.

GLOSS. (ord.) It is faith’s first lesson to believe that God is able to do whatever He will.

CHRYSOSTOM. That men should be made out of stones, is like Isaac coming from Sarah’s womb; Look into the rock, says Isaiah, whence ye were hewn. Reminding them thus of this prophecy, he shews that it is possible that the like might even now happen.

RABANUS. Otherwise; the Gentiles may be meant who worshipped stones.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Stone is hard to work, but when wrought to some shape, it loses it not; so the Gentiles were hardly brought to the faith, but once brought they abide in it for ever.

JEROME. These stones signify the Gentiles because of their hardness of heart. See Ezekiel, I will take away from you the heart of stone, and give you the heart of flesh. Stone is emblematic of hardness, flesh of softness.

RABANUS. Of stones there were sons raised up to Abraham; forasmuch as the Gentiles by believing in Christ, who is Abraham's seed, became his sons to whose seed they were united.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The axe is that most sharp fury of the consummation of all things, that is to hew down the whole world. But if it be already laid, how hath it not yet cut down? Because these trees have reason and free power to do good, or leave undone; so that when they see the axe laid to their root, they may fear and bring forth fruit. This denunciation of wrath then, which is meant by the laying of the axe to the root, though it have no effect on the bad, yet will sever the good from the bad.

JEROME. Or, the preaching of the Gospel is meant, as the Prophet Jeremiah also compares the Word of the Lord to an axe cleaving the rock. (Jer. 23:29.)

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xx. 9.) Or, the axe signifies the Redeemer, who as an axe of haft and blade, so consisting of the Divine and human nature, is held by His human, but cuts by His Divine nature. And though this axe be laid at the root of the tree waiting in patience, it is yet seen what it will do; for each obstinate sinner who here neglects the fruit of good works, finds the fire of hell ready for him. Observe, the axe is laid to the root, not to the branches; for that when the children of wickedness are removed, the branches only of the unfruitful tree are cut away. But when the whole offspring with their parent is carried off, the unfruitful tree is cut down by the root, that there remain not whence the evil shoots should spring up again.

CHRYSOSTOM. By saying Every, he cuts off all privilege of nobility: as much as to say, Though thou be the son of Abraham, if thou abide fruitless thou shalt suffer the punishment.

RABANUS. There are four sorts of trees; the first totally withered, to which the Pagans may be likened; the second, green but unfruitful, as the hypocrites; the third, green and fruitful, but poisonous, such are heretics; the fourth, green and bringing forth good fruit, to which are like the good Catholics.

GREGORY. Therefore every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and cast into the fire, because he who here neglects to bring forth the fruit of good works finds a fire in hell prepared for him.

11. I indeed baptize you with water unto repentance: but He that cometh after me is mightier than I, Whose shoes I am not worthy to bear: He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire:

12. Whose fan is in His hand, and He will throughly purge His floor, and gather His wheat into the garner; but He will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.

GLOSS. (non occ.) As in the preceding words John had explained more at length what he had shortly preached in the words, Repent ye, so now follows a more full enlargement of the words, The kingdom of heaven is at hand.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. vii. 3.) John baptizes not with the Spirit but with water, because he had no power to forgive sins; he washes the body with water, but not at the same time the soul with pardon of sin.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. x. 1.) For while as yet the sacrifice had not been offered, nor remission of sin sent, nor the Spirit had descended on the water, how could sin be forgiven? But since the Jews never perceived their own sin, and this was the cause of all their evils, John came to bring them to a sense of them by calling them to repentance.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Why then does he baptize who could not remit sin, but that he may preserve in all things the office of forerunner? As his birth had preceded Christ’s birth, so his baptism should precede the Lord’s baptism.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, John was sent to baptize, that to such as came to his baptism he might announce the presence among them of the Lord in the flesh, as himself testifies in another place, That He might be manifested to Israel, therefore am I come to baptise with water. (John 1:31.)

AUGUSTINE. (in Joann. Tract. v. 5.) Or, he baptizes, because it behoved Christ to be baptized. But if indeed John was sent only to baptize Christ, why was not He alone baptized by John? Because had the Lord alone been baptized by John, there would not have lacked who should insist that John’s baptism was greater than Christ’s, inasmuch as Christ alone had the merit to be baptized by it.

RABANUS. Or, by this sign of baptism he separates the penitent from the impenitent, and directs them to the baptism of Christ.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Because then he baptized on account of Christ, therefore to them who came to him for baptism he preached that Christ should come, signifying the eminence of His power in the words, He who cometh after me is mightier than I.

REMIGIUS. There are five points in which Christ comes after John, His birth, preaching, baptism, death, and descent into hell. A beautiful expression is that, mightier than I, because he is mere man, the other is God and man.

RABANUS. As though he had said, I indeed am mighty to invite to repentance, He to forgive sins; I to preach the kingdom of heaven, He to bestow it; I to baptize with water, He with the Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. When you hear for He is mightier than I, do not suppose this to be said by way of comparison, for I am not worthy to be numbered among his servants, that I might undertake the lowest office.

HILARY. Leaving to the Apostles the glory of bearing about the Gospel, to whose beautiful feet was due the carrying the tidings of God's peace.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, by the feet of Christ we may understand Christians, especially the Apostles, and other preachers, among whom was John Baptist; and the shoes are the infirmities with which he loads the preachers. These shoes all Christ's preachers wear; and John also wore them; but declares himself unworthy, that he might shew the grace of Christ, and be greater than his deserts.

JEROME. In the other Gospels it is, whose shoe latchet I am not worthy to loose. Here his humility, there his ministry is intended; Christ is the Bridegroom, and John is not worthy to loose the Bridegroom's shoe, that his house be not called according to the Law of Moses and the example of Ruth, The house of him that hath his shoe loosed. (Deut. 25:10.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But since no one can give a benefit more worthy than he himself is, nor to make another what himself is not, he adds, He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire. John who is carnal cannot give spiritual baptism; he baptizes with water, which is matter; so that he baptizes matter with matter. Christ is Spirit, because He is God; the Holy Ghost is Spirit, the soul is spirit; so that Spirit with Spirit baptizes our spirit. The baptism of the Spirit profits as the Spirit enters and embraces the mind, and surrounds it as it were with an impregnable wall, not suffering fleshly lusts to prevail against it. It does not indeed prevail that the flesh should not lust, but holds the will that it should not consent with it. And as Christ is Judge, He baptizes in fire, i. e. temptation; mere man cannot baptize in fire. He alone is free to tempt, who is strong to reward. This baptism of tribulation burns up the flesh that it does not generate lust, for the flesh does not fear spiritual punishment, but only such as is carnal. The Lord therefore sends carnal tribulation on his servants, that the flesh fearing its own pains, may not lust after evil. See then how the Spirit drives away lust, and suffers it not to prevail, and the fire burns up its very roots.

JEROME. Either the Holy Ghost Himself is a fire, as we learn from the Acts, when there sat as it were fire on the tongues of the believers; and thus the word of the Lord was fulfilled who said, I am come to send fire on the earth, I will that it burn. (Luke 12:49.) Or, we are baptized now with the Spirit, hereafter with fire; as the Apostle speaks, Fire shall try every man's work, of what sort it ise. (1 Cor. 3:13.)

CHRYSOSTOM. He does not say, shall give you the Holy Ghost, but shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost, shewing in metaphor the abundance of the grace. fThis further shews, that even under the faith there is need of the will alone for justification, not of labours and toilings; and even as easy a thing as it is to be baptized, even so easy a thing it is to be changed and made better. By fire he signifies the strength of grace which cannot be overcome, and that it may be understood that He makes His own people at once like to the great and old prophets, most of the prophetic visions were by fire.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. It is plain then that the baptismg of Christ does not undo the baptism of John, but includes it in itself; he who is baptized in Christ's name hath both baptisms, that of water and that of the Spirit. For Christ is Spirit, and hath taken to Him the body that He might give both bodily and spiritual baptism. John's baptism does not include in it the baptism of Christ, because the less cannot include the greater. Thus the Apostle having found certain Ephesians baptized with John's baptism, baptized them again in the name of Christ, because they had not been baptized in the Spirit: thus Christ baptized a second time those who had been baptized by John, as John himself declared he should, I baptize you with water; but He shall baptize you with the Spirit. And yet they were not baptized twice but once; for as the baptism of Christ was more than that of John, it was a new one given, not the same repeated.

HILARY. He marks the time of our salvation and judgment in the Lord; those who are baptized in the Holy Ghost it remains that they be consummated by the fire of judgment.

RABANUS. By the fan is signified the separation of a just trial; that it is in the Lord’s hand, means, ‘in His power,’ as it is written, The Father hath committed all judgment to the Son.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The floor, is the Church, the barn, is the kingdom of heaven, the field, is the world. The Lord sends forth His Apostles and other teachers, as reapers to reap all nations of the earth, and gather them into the floor of the Church. Here we must be threshed and winnowed, for all men are delighted in carnal things as grain delights in the husk. But whoever is faithful and has the marrow of a good heart, as soon as he has a light tribulation, neglecting carnal things runs to the Lord; but if his faith be feeble, hardly with heavy sorrow; and he who is altogether void of faith, however he may be troubled, passes not over to God. The wheat when first thrashed lies in one heap with chaff and straw, and is after winnowed to separate it; so the faithful are mixed up in one Church with the unfaithful; but persecution comes as a wind, that, tossed by Christ’s fan, they whose hearts were separate before, may be also now separated in place. He shall not merely cleanse, but throughly cleanse; therefore the Church must needs be tried in many ways till this be accomplished. And first the Jews winnowed it, then the Gentiles, now the heretics, and after a time shall Antichrist throughly winnow it. For as when the blast is gentle, only the lighter chaff is carried off, but the heavier remains; so a slight wind of temptation carries off the worst characters only; but should a greater storm arise, even those who seem stedfast will depart. There is need then of heavier persecution that the Church should be cleansed.

REMIGIUS. This His floor, to wit, the Church, the Lord cleanses in this life, both when by the sentence of the Priests the bad are put out of the Church, and when they are cut off by death.

RABANUS. The cleansing of the floor will then be finally accomplished, when the Son of Man shall send His Angels, and shall gather all offences out of His kingdom.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxiv. 5.) After the threshing is finished in this life, in which the grain now groans under the burden of the chaff, the fan of the last judgment shall so separate between them, that neither shall any chaff pass into the granary, nor shall the grain fall into the fire which consumes the chaff.

HILARY. The wheat, i. e. the full and perfect fruit of the believer, he declares, shall be laid up in heavenly barns; by the chaff he means the emptiness of the unfruitful.

RABANUS. There is this difference between the chaff and the tares, that the chaff is produced of the same seed as the wheat, but the tares from one of another kind. The chaff therefore are those who enjoy the sacraments of the faith, but are not solid; the tares are those who in profession as well as in works are separated from the lot of the good.

REMIGIUS. The unquenchable fire is the punishment of eternal damnation; either because it never totally destroys or consumes those it has once seized on, but torments them eternally; or to distinguish it from purgatorial fire which is kindled for a time and again extinguished.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 12.) If any asks which were the actual words spoken by John, whether those reported by Matthew, or by Luke, or by Mark, it may be shewn, that there is no difficulty here to him who rightly understands that the sense is essential to our knowledge of the truth, but the words indifferent. And it is clear we ought not to deem any testimony false, because the same fact is related by several persons who were present in different words and different ways. Whoever thinks that the Evangelists might have been so inspired by the Holy Ghost that they should have differed among themselves neither in the choice, nor the number, nor the order of their words, he does not see that by how much the authority of the Evangelists is preeminent, so much the more is to be by them established the veracity of other men in the same circumstances. But the discrepancy may seem to be in the thing, and not only in words, between, I am not worthy to bear His shoes, and, to loose His shoe-latchet. Which of these two expressions did John use? He who has reported the very words will seem to have spoken truth; he who has given other words, though he have not hid, or been forgetful, yet has he said one thing for another. But the Evangelists should be clear of every kind of falseness, not only that of lying, but also that of forgetfulness. If then this discrepancy be important, we may suppose John to have used both expressions, either at different times, or both at the same time. But if he only meant to express the Lord’s greatness and his own humility, whether he used one or the other the sense is preserved, though any one should in his own words repeat the same profession of humility using the figure of the shoes; their will and intention does not differ. This then is a useful rule and one to be remembered, that it is no lie, when one fairly represents his meaning whose speech one is recounting, though one uses other words; if only one shews our meaning to be the same with his. Thus understood it is a wholesome direction, that we are to enquire only after the meaning of the speaker.

3:13–15

13. Then cometh Jesus from Galilee to Jordan unto John, to be baptized of him.

14. But John forbad Him, saying, I have need to be baptized of Thee, and comest Thou to me?

15. And Jesus answering said unto him, Suffer it to be so now: for thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness. Then he suffered Him.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Christ having been proclaimed to the world by the preaching of His forerunner, now after long obscurity will manifest Himself to men.

REMIGIUS. In this verse is contained person, place, time, and office. Time, in the word Then.

RABANUS. That is, when He was thirty years old, shewing that none should be ordained priest, or even to preach till He be of full age. Joseph at thirty years was made governor of Egypt; David began to reign, and Ezekiel his prophesying at the same age.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. x. 1.) Because after His baptism Christ was to put an end to the Law, He therefore came to be baptized at this age, that having so kept the Law, it might not be said that He cancelled it, because He could not observe it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Then, that is when John preached, that He might confirm his preaching, and Himself receive his witness. But as when the morning-star has risen, the sun does not wait for that star to set, but rising as it goes forward, gradually obscures its brightness; so Christ waited not for John to finish his course, but appeared while he yet taught.

REMIGIUS. The Persons are described in the words, came Jesus to John; that is, God to man, the Lord to His servant, the King to His soldier, the

Light to the lamp. The Place, from Galilee to Jordan. Galilee means ‘transmigration.’ Whoso then will be baptized, must pass from vice to virtue, and humble himself in coming to baptism, for Jordan means ‘descent.’

AMBROSE. (Ambrosiaster. Serm. x. 5.) Scripture tells of many wonders wrought at various times in this river; as that, among others, in the Psalms, Jordan, was driven backwards; (Ps. 114:3.) before the water was driven back, now sins are turned back in its current; as Elijah divided the waters of old, so Christ the Lord wrought in the same Jordan the separation of sin.

REMIGIUS. The office to be performed; that He might be baptized of him; not baptism to the remission of sins, but to leave the water sanctified for those after to be baptized.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ. cf. Ambrosiast. Serm. xii. 4.) The Saviour willed to be baptized not that He might Himself be cleansed, but to cleanse the water for ush. From the time that Himself was dipped in the water, from that time has He washed away all our sins in water. And let none wonder that water, itself corporeal substance, is said to be effectual to the purification of the soul; it is so effectual, reaching to and searching out the hidden recesses of the conscience. Subtle and penetrating in its own nature, made yet more so by Christ’s blessing, it touches the hidden springs of life, the secret places of the soul, by virtue of its all-pervading dew. The course of blessing is even yet more penetrating than the flow of waters. Thus the blessing which like a spiritual river flows on from the Saviour’s baptism, hath filled the basins of all pools, and the courses of all fountains.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He comes to baptism, that He who has taken upon Him human nature, may be found to have fulfilled the whole mystery of that nature; not that He is Himself a sinner, but He has taken on Him a nature that is sinful. And therefore though He needed not baptism Himself, yet the carnal nature in others needed it.

AMBROSE. (Ambrosiaster. Serm. xii. 1.) Also like a wise master inculcating His doctrines as much by His own practice, as by word of mouth, He did that which He commanded all His disciples to do.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joann. Tract. v. 3.) He deigned to be baptized of John that the servants might see with what readiness they ought to run to the baptism of the Lord, when He did not refuse to be baptized of His servant.

JEROME. Also that by being Himself baptized, He might sanction the baptism of John.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xii.) But since John's baptism was to repentance, and therefore shewed the presence of sin, that none might suppose Christ's coming to the Jordan to have been on this account, John cried to Him, I have need to be baptized of Thee, and comest Thou to me? As if he had said,

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That Thou shouldest baptize me there is good cause, that I may be made righteous and worthy of heaven; but that I should baptize Thee, what cause is there? Every good gift comes down from heaven upon earth, not ascends from earth to heaven.

HILARY. John rejects Him from baptism as God; He teaches him, that it ought to be performed on Him as man.

JEROME. Beautifully said is that now, to shew that as Christ was baptized with water by John, so John must be baptized by Christ with the Spirit. Or, suffer now that I who have taken the form of a servant should fulfil all that low estate; otherwise know that in the day of judgment thou must be baptized with my baptism. Or, the Lord says, 'Suffer this now; I have also another baptism wherewithal I must be baptized; thou baptizest Me with water, that I may baptize thee for Me with thy own blood.'

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. In this he shews that Christ after this baptized John; which is expressly told in some apocryphal booksi. Suffer now that I fulfil the righteousness of baptism in deed, and not only in word; first submitting to it, and then preaching it; for so it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness. Not that by being baptized He fulfils all righteousness, but so, in the same manner, that is, as He first fulfilled the righteousness of baptism by His deeds, and after preached it, so He might all other righteousness, according to that of the Acts, All things that Jesus began both to do and to teach. (Acts 1:1.) Or thus, all righteousness, according to the ordinance of human nature; as He had before fulfilled the righteousness of birth, growth, and the like.

HILARY. For by Him must all righteousness have been fulfilled, by whom alone the Law could be fulfilled.

JEROME. Righteousness; but he adds neither 'of the Law;' nor 'of nature,' that we may understand it of both.

REMIGIUS. Or thus; It becometh us to fulfil all righteousness, that is, to give an example of perfect justification in baptism, without which the gate of the kingdom of heaven is not opened. Hence let the proud take an example of humility, and not scorn to be baptized by My humble members when they see Me baptized by John My servant. That is true humility which obedience accompanies; as it continues, then he suffered Him, that is, at last consented to baptize Him.

3:16

16. And Jesus, when He was baptized, went up straightway out of the water: and, lo, the heavens were opened unto Him, and He saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove, and lighting upon Him.

AMBROSE. (Ambrosiaster. Serm. xii. 4.) For, as we have said, when the Saviour was washed, then the water was cleansed for our baptism, that a laver might be ministered to the people who were to come. Moreover, it behoved that in Christ's baptism should be signified those things which the faithful obtain by baptism.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This action of Christ's has a figurative meaning pertaining to all who were after Him to be baptized; and therefore he says, straightway He ascended, and not simply He ascended, for all who are worthily baptized in Christ, straightway ascend from the water; that is, make progress in virtues, and are carried on towards a heavenly dignity. They who had gone down to the water carnal and sinful sons of Adam, straightway ascend from the water spiritual sons of God. But if some by their own faults make no progress after baptism, what is that to the baptism?

RABANUS. As by the immersion of His body He dedicated the laver of baptism, He has shewn that to us also after baptism received the entrance to heaven is open, and the Holy Spirit is given, as it follows, and the heavens were opened.

JEROME. Not by an actual cleaving of the visible element, but to the spiritual eye, as Ezekiel also in the beginning of his book relates that he saw them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For had the actual creation of the heavens been opened, he would not have said were opened to Him, for a physical opening would have been open to all. But some one will say, What, are the heavens then closed to the eye of the Son of God, who even when on earth is present in heaven? But it must be known, that as He was baptized according to the ordinance of humanity that He had taken on Him, so the heavens were opened to His sight as to His human nature, though as to His divine He was in heaven.

REMIGIUS. But was this then the first time that the heavens were opened to Him according to His human nature? The faith of the Church both believes and holds that the heavens were no less open to Him before than after. It is therefore said here, that the heavens were opened, because to all them who are born again the door of the kingdom of heaven is opened.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Perhaps there were before some unseen obstacles which hindered the souls of the dead from entering the skies. I suppose that since Adam's sin no soul had mounted the skies, but the heavens were continually closed. When, lo! on Christ's baptism they were again opened; after He had overcome by the Cross the great tyrant death, henceforward the heaven, never more to be closed, needed not gates, so that the Angels say not, 'Open ye gates,' for they were open, but take away the gates. (Ps. 24:7.) Or the heavens are opened to the baptized, and they see those things which are in heaven, not by seeing them with the bodily eye, but by believing with the spiritual eye of faith. Or thus; The heavens are the divine Scriptures, which all read but all do not understand, except they who have been so baptized as to receive the Holy Spirit. Thus the Scriptures of the Prophets were at the first sealed to the Apostles, but after they had received the Holy Spirit, all Scripture was opened to them. However, in whatever way we interpret, the heavens were opened to Him, that is to all, on His account; as if the Emperor were to say to any one preferring a petition for another, This boon I grant not to him but to you; that is, to him, for your sake.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Or, so bright a glory shone round about Christ, that the blue concave seemed to be actually cloven.

CHRYSOSTOM. But though you see it not, be not therefore unbelieving, for in the beginnings of spiritual matters sensible visions are always offered, for their sakes who can form no idea of things that have no body; which if they occur not in later times, yet faith may be established by those wonders once wrought.

REMIGIUS. As to all those who by baptism are born again, the door of the kingdom of heaven is opened, so all in baptism receive the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (App. Serm. 135. 1.) Christ after He had been once born among men, is born a second time in the sacraments, that as we adore Him then born of a pure mother, so we may now receive Him immersed in pure water. His mother brought forth her Son, and is yet virgin; the wave washed Christ, and is holy. Lastly, that Holy Spirit which was present to Him in the womb, now shone round Him in the water, He who then made Mary pure, now sanctifies the waters.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Holy Ghost took the likeness of a dove, as being more than other animals susceptible of love. All other forms of righteousness which the servants of God have in truth and verity, the servants of the Devil have in spurious imitation; the love of the Holy Spirit alone an unclean spirit cannot imitate. And the Holy Ghost has therefore reserved to Himself this special manifestation of love, because by no testimony is it so clearly seen where He dwells as by the grace of love.

RABANUS. (ap. Anselm.) Seven excellencies in the baptized are figured by the dove. The dove has her abode near the rivers, that when the hawk is seen, she may dive under water and escape; she chooses the better grains of corn; she feeds the young of other birds; she does not tear with her beak; she lacks a gall; she has her rest in the caverns of the rocks; for her song she has a plaint. Thus the saints dwell beside the streams of Divine Scripture, that they may escape the assaults of the Devil; they choose wholesome doctrine, and not heretical for their food; they nourish by teaching and example, men who have been the children of the Devil, i. e. the imitators; they do not pervert good doctrine by tearing it to pieces as the heretics do; they are without hate irreconcileable; they build their nest in the wounds of Christ’s death, which is to them a firm rock, that is their refuge and hope; as others delight in song, so do they in groaning for their sin.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is moreover an allusion to ancient history; for in the deluge this creature appeared bearing an olive-branch, and tidings of rest to the world. All which things were a type of things to come. For now also a dove appears pointing out to us our liberator, and for an olive-branch bringing the adoption of the human race.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. ii. 5.) It is easy to understand how the Holy Ghost should be said to be sent, when as it were a dove in visible shape descended on the Lord; that is, there was created a certain appearance for the time in which the Holy Spirit might be visibly shewn. And this operation thus made visible and offered to mortal view, is called the mission of the Holy Spirit, not that His invisible substance was seen, but that the hearts of men might be roused by the external appearance to contemplate the unseen eternity. Yet this creature in the shape of which the Spirit appeared, was not taken into unity of person, as was that human shape taken of the Virgin. For neither did the Spirit bless the dove, nor unite it with Himself for all eternity, in unity of person. Further, though that dove is called the Spirit, so far as to shew that in this dove was a manifestation of the Spirit, yet can we not say of the Holy Spirit that He is God and dove, as we say of the Son that He is God and man; and yet it is not as we say of the Son that He is the Lamb of God, as not only has John Baptist declared, but as John the Evangelist saw the vision of the Lamb slain in the Apocalypse. For this was a prophetic vision, not put before the bodily eyes in bodily shape, but seen in the Spirit in spiritual images. But concerning this dove none ever doubted that it was seen with the bodily eye; not that we say the Spirit is a dove as we say Christ is a Rock; (for that Rock was Christ.) (1 Cor. 10:4.) For that Rock already existed as a creature, and from the resemblance of its operation was called by the name of Christ, (whom it figured;) not so this dove, which was created at the moment for this single purpose. It seems to me to be more like the flame which appeared to Moses in the bush, or that which the people followed in the wilderness, or to the thunderings and lightnings which were when the Law was given from the mount. For all these were visible objects intended to signify something, and then to pass away. For that such forms have been from time to time seen, the Holy Spirit is said to have been sent; but these bodily forms appeared for the time to shew what was required, and then ceased to be.

JEROME. It sate on the head of Jesus, that none might suppose the voice of the Father spoken to John, and not to the Lord.

3:17

17. And lo a voice from heaven, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) Not as before by Moses and the Prophets, neither in type or figure did the Father teach that the Son should come, but openly shewed Him to be already come, This is my Son.

HILARY. Or, that from these things thus fulfilled upon Christ, we might learn that after the washing of water the Holy Spirit also descends on us from the heavenly gates, on us also is shed an unction of heavenly glory, and an adoption to be the sons of God, pronounced by the Father's voice.

JEROME. The mystery of the Trinity is shewn in this baptism. The Lord is baptized; the Spirit descends in shape of a dove; the voice of the Father is heard giving testimony to the Son.

AMBROSE. (Ambrosiaster. Serm. x. 1.) And no wonder that the mystery of the Trinity is not wanting to the Lord's laver, when even our laver contains the sacrament of the Trinity. The Lord willed to shew in His own case what He was after to ordain for men.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Fulgent. de Fide ad Petrum. c. 9.) Though Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one nature, yet do thou hold most firmly that They be Three Persons; that it is the Father alone who said, This is my beloved Son; the Son alone over whom that voice of the Father was heard; and the Holy Ghost alone who in the likeness of a dove descended on Christ at His baptism.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. iv. 21.) Here are deeds of the whole Trinity. In their own substance indeed Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are One without interval of either place or time; but in my mouth they are three separate words, and cannot be pronounced at the same time, and in written letters they fill each their several places. By this comparison may be understood how the Trinity in Itself indivisible may be manifested dividedly in the likeness of a visible creation. That the voice is that of the Father only is manifest from the words, This is my Son.

HILARY. (de Trin. iii. 11.) He witnesses that He is His Son not in name merely, but in very kindred. Sons of God are we many of us; but not as He is a Son, a proper and true Son, in verity, not in estimation, by birth, not adoption.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joann. tr. 14. 11.) The Father loves the Son, but as a father should, not as a master may love a servant; and that as an own Son, not an adopted; therefore He adds, in whom I am well-pleased.

REMIGIUS. Or if it be referred to the human nature of Christ, the sense is, I am pleased in Him, whom alone I have found without sin. Or according to another reading, It hath pleased me to appoint Him, by whom to perform those things I would perform, i. e. the redemption of the human race.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 14.) These words Mark and Luke give in the same way; in the words of the voice that came from Heaven, their expression varies though the sense is the same. For both the words as Matthew gives them, This is my beloved Son, and as the other two, Thou art my beloved Son, express the same sense in the speaker; (and the heavenly voice, no doubt, uttered one of these,) but one shews an intention of addressing the testimony thus borne to the Son to those who stood by; the other of addressing it to Himself, as if speaking to Christ He had said, This is my Son. Not that Christ was taught what He knew before, but they who stood by heard it, for whose sake the voice came. Again, when one says, in whom I am well-pleased; another, in thee it hath pleased me, if you ask which of these was actually pronounced by that voice; take which you will, only remembering that those who have not related the same words as were spoken have related the same sense. That God is well-pleased with His Son is signified in the first; that the Father is by the Son pleased with men is conveyed in the second form, in thee it hath well-pleased me. Or you may understand this to have been the one meaning of all the Evangelists, In Thee have I put My good pleasure, i. e. to fulfil all My purpose.

CHAPTER 4

4:1–2

1. Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted of the Devil.

2. And when He had fasted forty days and forty nights, He was afterward an hungred.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord being baptized by John with water, is led by the Spirit into the wilderness to be baptized by the fire of temptation. ‘Then,’ i. e. when the voice of the Father had been given from heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xiii.) Whoever thou art then that after thy baptism sufferest grievous trials, be not troubled thereat; for this thou receivedst arms, to fight, not to sit idle. God does not hold all trial from us; first, that we may feel that we are become stronger; secondly, that we may not be puffed up by the greatness of the gifts we have received; thirdly, that the Devil may have experience that we have entirely renounced him; fourthly, that by it we may be made stronger; fifthly, that we may receive a sign of the treasure entrusted to us; for the Devil would not come upon us to tempt us, did he not see us advanced to greater honours.

HILARY. The Devil’s snares are chiefly spread for the sanctified, because a victory over the saints is more desired than over others.

GREGORY. (Hom. in. Ev. 16.1.) Some doubt what Spirit it was that led Jesus into the desert, for that it is said after, The Devil took him into the holy city. But true and without question agreeable to the context is the received opinion, that it was the Holy Spirit; that His own Spirit should lead Him thither where the evil spirit should find Him to try Him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. iv. 13.) Why did He offer Himself to temptation? That He might be our mediator in vanquishing temptation not by aid only, but by example.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He was led by the Holy Spirit, not as an inferior at the bidding of a greater. For we say led, not only of him who is constrained by a stronger than he, but also of him who is induced by reasonable persuasion; as Andrew found his brother Simon, and brought him to Jesus.

JEROME. Led, not against His will, or as a prisoner, but as by a desire for the conflict.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Devil comes against men to tempt them, but since He could not come against Christ, therefore Christ came against the Devil.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) We should know that there are three modes of temptation; suggestion, delight, and consent; and we when we are tempted commonly fall into delight or consent, because being born of the sin of the flesh, we bear with us whence we afford strength for the contest; but God who incarnate in the Virgin's womb came into the world without sin, carried within Him nothing of a contrary nature. He could then be tempted by suggestion; but the delight of sin never gnawed His soul, and therefore all that temptation of the Devil was without not within Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Devil is wont to be most urgent with temptation, when he sees us solitary; thus it was in the beginning he tempted the woman when he found her without the man, and now too the occasion is offered to the Devil, by the Saviour's being led into the desert.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) This desert is that between Jerusalem and Jericho, where the robbers used to resort. It is called Hammaim, i. e. 'of blood,' from the bloodshed which these robbers caused there; hence the man was said (in the parable) to have fallen among robbers as he went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, bearing a figure of Adam, who was overcome by dæmons. It was therefore fit that the place where Christ overcame the Devil, should be the same in which the Devil in the parable overcomes man.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Not Christ only is led into the desert by the Spirit, but also all the sons of God who have the Holy Spirit. For they are not content to sit idle, but the Holy Spirit stirs them to take up some great work, i. e. to go out into the desert where they shall meet with the Devil; for there is no unrighteousness wherewith the Devil is pleased. For all good is without the flesh and the world, because it is not according to the will of the flesh and the world. To such a desert then all the sons of God go out that they may be tempted. For example if you are unmarried, the Holy Spirit has in that led you into the desert, that is, beyond the limits of the flesh and the world, that you may be tempted by lust. But he who is married is unmoved by such temptation. Let us learn that the sons of God are not tempted but when they have gone forth into the desert, but the children of the Devil whose life is in the flesh and the world are then overcome and obey; the good man, having a wife is content; the bad, though he have a wife is not therewith content, and so in all other things. The children of the Devil go not out to the Devil that they may be tempted. For what need that he should seek the strife who desires not victory? But the sons of God having more confidence and desirous of victory, go forth against him beyond the boundaries of the flesh. For this cause then Christ also went out to the Devil, that He might be tempted of him.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that you may learn how great a good is fasting, and what a mighty shield against the Devil, and that after baptism you ought to give attention to fasting and not to lusts, therefore Christ fasted, not Himself needing it, but teaching us by His example.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And to fix the measure of our quadragesimal fast, he fasted forty days and forty nights.

CHRYSOSTOM. But He exceeded not the measure of Moses and Elias, lest it should bring into doubt the reality of His assumption of the flesh.

GREGORY. (Hom. in. Ev. 16. 5.) The Creator of all things took no food whatever during forty days. We also, at the season of Lent as much as in us lies afflict our flesh by abstinence. The number forty is preserved, because the virtue of the decalogue is fulfilled in the books of the holy Gospel; and ten taken four times amounts to forty. Or, because in this mortal body we consist of four elements by the delights of which we go against the Lord’s precepts received by the decalogue. And as we transgress the decalogue through the lusts of this flesh, it is fitting that we afflict the flesh forty-fold. Or, as by the Law we offer the tenth of our goods, so we strive to offer the tenth of our time. And from the first Sunday of Lent to the rejoicing of the paschal festival is a space of six weeks, or forty-two days, subtracting from which the six Sundays which are not kept there remain thirty-six. Now as the year consists of three hundred and sixty-five, by the affliction of these thirty-six we give the tenth of our year to God.

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. 83. Quest. q. 81.) Otherwise; The sum of all wisdom is to be acquainted with the Creator and the creature. The Creator is the Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; the creature is partly invisible,—as the soul to which we assign a threefold nature, (as in the command to love God with the whole heart, mind, and soul,)—partly visible as the body, which we divide into four elements; the hot, the cold, the liquid, the solid. The number ten then, which stands for the whole law of life, taken four times, that is, multiplied by that number which we assign for the body, because by the body the law is obeyed or disobeyed, makes the number forty. All the aliquot parts in this number, viz. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 20, taken together make up the number 50. Hence the time of our sorrow and affliction is fixed at forty days; the state of blessed joy which shall be hereafter is figured in the quinquagesimal festival, i. e. the fifty days from Easter to Pentecost.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 210. 2.) Not however because Christ fasted immediately after having received baptism, are we to suppose that He established a rule to be observed, that we should fast immediately after His baptism. But when the conflict with the tempter is sore, then we ought to fast, that the body may fulfil its warfare by chastisement, and the soul obtain victory by humiliation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord knew the thoughts of the Devil, that he sought to tempt Him; he had heard that Christ had been born into this world with the preaching of Angels, the witness of shepherds, the inquiry of the Magi, and the testimony of John. Thus the Lord proceeded against him, not as God, but as man, or rather both as God and man. For in forty days of fasting not to have been an hungred was not as man; to be ever an hungred was not as God. He was an hungred then that the God might not be certainly manifested, and so the hopes of the Devil in tempting Him be extinguished, and His own victory hindered.

HILARY. He was an hungred, not during the forty days, but after them. Therefore when the Lord hungred, it was not that the effects of abstinence then first came upon Him, but that His humanity was left to its own strength. For the Devil was to be overcome, not by the God, but by the flesh. By this was figured, that after those forty days which He was to tarry on earth after His passion were accomplished, He should hunger for the salvation of man, at which time He carried back again to God His Father the expected gift, the humanity which He had taken on Him.

4:3–4

3. And when the Tempter came to Him, he said, If Thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread.

4. But He answered and said, It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Devil who had begun to despair when he saw that Christ fasted forty days, now again began to hope when he saw that he was an hungred; and then the tempter came to him. If then you shall have fasted and after been tempted, say not, I have lost the fruit of my fast; for though it have not availed to hinder temptation, it will avail to hinder you from being overcome by temptation.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) If we observe the successive steps of the temptation, we shall be able to estimate by how much we are freed from temptation. The old enemy tempted the first man through his belly, when he persuaded him to eat of the forbidden fruit; through ambition when he said, Ye shall be as gods; through covetousness when he said, Knowing good and evil; for there is a covetousness not only of money, but of greatness, when a high estate above our measure is sought. By the same method in which he had overcome the first Adam, in that same was he overcome when he tempted the second Adam. He tempted through the belly when he said, Command that these stones become loaves; through ambition when he said, If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down from hence; through covetousness of lofty condition in the words, All these things will I give thee.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. c. iv. 3.) He begins with that which had once been the means of his victory, the palate; If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones become loaves. What means such a beginning as this, but that he knew that the Son of God was to come, yet believed not that He was come on account of His fleshly infirmity. His speech is in part that of an enquirer, in part that of a tempter; he professes to believe Him God, he strives to deceive Him as man.

HILARY. And therefore in the temptation he makes a proposal of such a double kind by which His divinity would be made known by the miracle of the transformation, the weakness of the man deceived by the delight of food.

JEROME. But thou art caught, O Enemy, in a dilemma. If these stones can be made bread at His word, your temptation is vain against one so mighty. If He cannot make them bread, your suspicions that this is the Son of God must be vain.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But as the Devil blinds all men, so is he now invisibly made blind by Christ. He found Him an hungred at the end of forty days, and knew not that He had continued through those forty without being hungry. When he suspected Him not to be the Son of God, he considered not that the mighty Champion can descend to things that be weak, but the weak cannot ascend to things that are high. We may more readily infer from His not being an hungred for so many days that He is God, than from His being an hungred after that time that He is man. But it may be said, Moses and Elias fasted forty days, and were men. But they hungred and endured, He for the space of forty days hungred not, but afterwards. To be hungry and yet refuse food is within the endurance of man; not be hungry belongs to the Divine nature only.

JEROME. Christ’s purpose was to vanquish by humility;

LEO. (Serm. 39. 3.) hence he opposed the adversary rather by testimonies out of the Law, than by miraculous powers; thus at the same time giving more honour to man, and more disgrace to the adversary, when the enemy of the human race thus seemed to be overcome by man rather than by God.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) So the Lord when tempted by the Devil answered only with precepts of Holy Writ, and He who could have drowned His tempter in the abyss, displayed not the might of His power; giving us an example, that when we suffer any thing at the hands of evil men, we should be stirred up to learning rather than to revenge.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He said not, ‘I live not,’ but, Man doth not live by bread alone, that the Devil might still ask, If thou be the Son of God. If He be God, it is as though He shunned to display what He had power to do; if man, it is a crafty will that His want of power should not be detected.

RABANUS. This verse is quoted from Deuteronomy (c. 8:3). Whoso then feeds not on the Word of God, he lives not; as the body of man cannot live without earthly food, so cannot his soul without God’s word. This word is said to proceed out of the mouth of God, where he reveals His will by Scripture testimonies.

4:5–7

5. Then the Devil taketh Him up into the holy city, and setteth Him on a pinnacle of the temple,

6. And saith unto Him, If Thou be the Son of God, cast Thyself down; for it is written, He shall give His Angels charge concerning Thee: and in their hands they shall bear Thee up, lest at any time Thou dash Thy foot against a stone.

7. Jesus said unto Him, It is written again, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. From this first answer of Christ, the Devil could learn nothing certain whether He were God or man; he therefore betook him to another temptation, saying within himself; This man who is not sensible of the appetite of hunger, if not the Son of God, is yet a holy man; and such do attain strength not to be overcome by hunger; but when they have subdued every necessity of the flesh, they often fall by desire of empty glory. Therefore he began to tempt Him by this empty glory.

JEROME. Took him, not because the Lord was weak, but the enemy proud; he imputed to a necessity what the Saviour did willingly.

RABANUS. Jerusalem was called the Holy City, for in it was the Temple of God, the Holy of holies, and the worship of the one God according to the law of Moses.

REMIGIUS. This shews that the Devil lies in wait for Christ’s faithful people even in the sacred places.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Behold when it is said that this God was taken by the Devil into the holy city, pious ears tremble to hear, and yet the Devil is head and chief among the wicked; what wonder that He suffered Himself to be led up a mountain by the wicked one himself, who suffered Himself to be crucified by his members.

GLOSS. (ord.) The Devil places us on high places by exalting with pride, that he may dash us to the ground again.

REMIGIUS. The pinnacle is the seat of the doctors; for the temple had not a pointed roof like our houses, but was flat on the top after the manner of the country of Palestine, and in the temple were three stories. It should be known, that the pinnacle was on the floor, and in each story was one pinnacle. Whether then he placed Him on the pinnacle in the first story, or that in the second, or the third, he placed Him whence a fall was possible.

GLOSS. (ord.) Observe here that all these things were done with bodily sense, and by careful comparison of the context it seems probable that the Devil appeared in human form.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Perhaps you may say, How could he in the sight of all place Him bodily upon the temple? Perhaps the Devil so took Him as though He were visible to all, while He, without the Devil being aware of it, made Himself invisible.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) He set Him on a pinnacle of the temple when he would tempt Him through ambition, because in this seat of the doctors he had before taken many through the same temptation, and therefore thought that when set in the same seat, He might in like manner be puffed up with vain pride.

JEROME. In the several temptations the single aim of the Devil is to find if He be the Son of God, but he is so answered as at last to depart in doubt; He says, Cast thyself, because the voice of the Devil, which is always calling men downwards, has power to persuade them, but may not compel them to fall.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. How does he expect to discover by this proposition whether He be the Son of God or not? For to fly through the air is not proper to the Divine nature, for it is not useful to any. If then any were to attempt to fly when challenged to it, he would be acting from ostentation, and would so belong rather to the Devil than to God. If it is enough to a wise man to be what he is, and he has no wish to seem what he is not, how much more should the Son of God hold it not necessary to shew what He is; He of whom none can know so much as He is in Himself?

AMBROSE. But as Satan transfigures himself into an Angel of light, and spreads a snare for the faithful, even from the divine Scriptures, so now he uses its texts, not to instruct but to receive.

JEROME. This verse we read in the ninetieth Psalm (Ps. 91:11.), but that is a prophecy not of Christ, but of some holy man, so the Devil interprets

Scripture amiss.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For the Son of God in truth is not borne of Angels, but Himself bears them, or if He be borne in their arms, it is not from weakness, lest He dash His foot against a stone, but for the honour. O thou Devil, thou hast read that the Son of God is borne in Angels' arms, hast thou not also read that He shall tread upon the asp and basilisk? But the one text he brings forward as proud, the other he omits as crafty.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe that Scripture is brought forward by the Lord only with an apt meaning, but by the Devil irreverently; for that where it is written, He shall give his Angels charge over thee, is not an exhortation to cast Himself headlong.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) We must explain thus; Scripture says of any good man, that He has given it in charge to His Angels, that is to His ministering spirits, to bear him in their hands, i. e. by their aid to guard him that he dash not his foot against a stone, i. e. keep his heart that it stumble not at the old law written in tables of stone. Or by the stone may be understood every occasion of sin and error.

RABANUS. It should be noted, that though our Saviour suffered Himself to be placed by the Devil on a pinnacle of the temple, yet refused to come down also at his command, giving us an example, that whosoever bids us ascend the strait way of truth we should obey. But if he would again cast us down from the height of truth and virtue to the depth of error we should not hearken to him.

JEROME. The false Scripture darts of the Devil He brands with the true shield of Scripture.

HILARY. Thus beating down the efforts of the Devil, He professes Himself both God and Lord.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Yet He says not, Thou shalt not tempt me thy Lord God; but, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God; which every man of God when tempted by the Devil might say; for whoso tempts a man of God, tempts God.

RABANUS. Otherwise, it was a suggestion to Him, as man, that He should seek by requiring some miracle to know the greatness of God's power.

AUGUSTINE. (con. Faust. 22. 36.) It is a part of sound doctrine, that when man has any other means, he should not tempt the Lord his God.

THEODOTUS. (non occ.) And it is to tempt God, in any thing to expose one's self to danger without cause.

JEROME. It should be noted, that the required texts are taken from the book of Deuteronomy only, that He might shew the sacraments of the second Law.

4:8–11

8. Again, the Devil taketh Him up into an exceeding high mountain, and sheweth Him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them;

9. And saith unto Him, All these things will I give Thee, if Thou wilt fall down and worship me.

10. Then saith Jesus unto him, Get thee hence, Satan: for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve.

11. Then the Devil leaveth Him, and, behold, Angels came and ministered unto Him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Devil, left in uncertainty by this second reply, passes to a third temptation. Christ had broken the nets of appetite, had passed over those of ambition, he now spreads for Him those of covetousness; He taketh him up into a very high mountain, such as in going round about the earth he had noticed rising above the rest. The higher the mountain, the wider the view from it. He shews Him not so as that they truly saw the very kingdoms, cities, nations, their silver and their gold; but the quarters of the earth where each kingdom and city lay. As suppose from some high ground I were to point out to you, see there lies Rome, there Alexandria; you are not supposed to see the towns themselves, but the quarter in which they lie. Thus the Devil might point out the several quarters with his finger, and recount in words the greatness of each kingdom and its condition; for that is said to be shewn whch is in any way presented to the understanding.

ORIGEN. (in Luc. Hom. 30.) We are not to suppose that when he shewed Him the kingdoms of the world, he presented before Him the kingdom of Persia, for instance, or India; but he shewed his own kingdom, how he reigns in the world, that is, how some are governed by fornication, some by avarice.

REMIGIUS. By their glory, is meant, their gold and silver, precious stones and temporal goods.

RABANUS. The Devil shews all this to the Lord, not as though he had power to extend his vision or shew Him any thing unknown. But setting forth in speech as excellent and pleasant, that vain worldly pomp wherein himself delighted, he thought by suggestion of it, to create in Christ a love of it.

GLOSS. (ord.) He saw not, as we see, with the eye of lust, but as a physician looks on disease without receiving any hurt.

JEROME. An arrogant and vain vaunt; for he hath not the power to bestow all kingdoms, since many of the saints have, we know, been made kings by God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But such things as are gotten by iniquity in this world, as riches, for instance, gained by fraud or perjury, these the Devil bestows. The Devil therefore cannot give riches to whom he will, but to those only who are willing to receive them of him.

REMIGIUS. Wonderful infatuation in the Devil! To promise earthly kingdoms to Him who gives heavenly kingdoms to His faithful people, and the glory of earth to Him who is Lord of the glory of heaven!

AMBROSE. (in Luc. c. iv. 11.) Ambition has its dangers at home; that it may govern, it is first others’ slave; it bows in flattery that it may rule in honour; and while it would be exalted, it is made to stoop.

GLOSS. (non occ.) See the Devil’s pride as of old. In the beginning he sought to make himself equal with God, now he seeks to usurp the honours due to God, saying, If thou wilt fall down and worship me. Who then worships the Devil must first fall down.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. With these words He puts an end to the temptations of the Devil, that they should proceed no further.

JEROME. The Devil and Peter are not, as many suppose, condemned to the same sentence. To Peter it is said, Get thee behind me, Satan; i. e. follow thou behind Me who art contrary to My will. But here it is, Go, Satan, and is not added ‘behind Me,’ that we may understand into the fire prepared for thee and thy angels.

REMIGIUS. Other copies read, Get thee behind me; i. e. remember thee in what glory thou wast created, and into what misery thou hast fallen.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how Christ when Himself suffered wrong at the hands of the Devil, being tempted of him, saying, If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down, yet was not moved to chide the Devil. But now when the Devil usurps the honour of God, he is wroth, and drives him away, saying, Go thy way, Satan; that we may learn by His example to bear injuries to ourselves with magnanimity, but wrongs to God, to endure not so much as to hear; for to be patient under our own wrongs is praiseworthy, to dissemble when God is wronged is impiety.

JEROME. When the Devil says to the Saviour, If thou wilt fall down and worship me, he is answered by the contrary declaration, that it more becomes him to worship Jesus as his Lord and God.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Serm. Arian. 29.) The one Lord our God is the Holy Trinity, to which alone we justly owe the service of piety.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, x. 1.) By service is to be understood the honour due to God; as our version renders the Greek word ‘latria,’ wherever it occurs in Scripture, by ‘service’ (servitus), but that service which is due to men (as where the Apostle bids slaves be subject to their masters) is in Greek called ‘dulia;’ while ‘latria,’ always, or so often that we say always, is used of that worship which belongs to God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Devil, we may fairly suppose, did not depart in obedience to the command, but the Divine nature of Christ, and the Holy Spirit which was in Him drove him thence, and then the Devil left him. Which also serves for our consolation, to see that the Devil does not tempt the men of God so long as he wills, but so long as Christ suffers. And though He may suffer him to tempt for a short time, yet in the end He drives him away because of the weakness of our nature.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, ix. 21.) After the temptation the Holy Angels, to be dreaded of all unclean spirits, ministered to the Lord, by which it was made yet more manifest to the dæmons how great was His power.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He says not ‘Angels descended from heaven,’ that it may be known that they were ever on the earth to minister to Him, but had now by the Lord’s command departed from Him, to give opportunity for the Devil to approach, who perhaps when he saw Him surrounded by Angels would not have come near Him. But in what matters they ministered to Him, we cannot know, whether in the healing diseases, or purifying souls, or casting out dæmons; for all these things He does by the ministration of Angels, so that what they do, Himself appears to do. However it is manifest, that they did not now minister to Him because His weakness needed it, but for the honour of His power; for it is not said that they 'succoured Him,' but that they ministered to Him.

GREGORY. (non occ. vid. in Ezek. 1:8. n. 24. in 1 Reg. 1:1. n. 1. 2.) In these things is shewn the twofold nature in one person; it is the man whom the Devil tempts; the same is God to whom Angels minister.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Now let us shortly review what is signified by Christ's temptations. The fasting is abstinence from things evil, hunger is the desire of evil, bread is the gratification of the desire. He who indulges himself in any evil thing, turns stones into bread. Let him answer to the Devil's persuasions that man does not live by the indulgence of desire alone, but by keeping the commands of God. When any is puffed up as though he were holy he is led to the temple, and when he esteems himself to have reached the summit of holiness he is set on a pinnacle of the temple. And this temptation follows the first, because victory over temptation begets conceit. But observe that Christ had voluntarily undertaken the fasting; but was led to the temple by the Devil; therefore do you voluntarily use praiseworthy abstinence, but suffer yourself not to be exalted to the summit of sanctity; fly high-mindedness, and you will not suffer a fall. The ascent of the mountain is the going forward to great riches, and the glory of this world which springs from pride of heart. When you desire to become rich, that is, to ascend the mountain, you begin to think of the ways of gaining wealth and honours, then the prince of this world is shewing you the glory of his kingdom. In the third place He provides you reasons, that if you seek to obtain all these things, you should serve him, and neglect the righteousness of God.

HILARY. When we have overcome the Devil and bruised his head, we see that Angels' ministry and the offices of heavenly virtues will not be wanting to us.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 16.) Luke has not given the temptations in the same order as Matthew; so that we do not know whether the pinnacle of the temple, or the ascent of the mountain, was first in the action; but it is of no importance, so long as it is only clear that all of them were truly done.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Though Luke’s order seems the more historical; Matthew relates the temptations as they were done to Adam.

4:12–16

12. Now when Jesus had heard that John was cast into prison, He departed into Galilee;

13. And leaving Nazareth, He came and dwelt in Capernaum, which is upon the sea coast, in the borders of Zabulon and Nephthalim:

14. That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying,

15. The land of Zabulon, and the land of Nephthalim, by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan, Galilee of the Gentiles;

16. The people which sat in darkness saw great light; and to them which sat in the region and shadow of death light is sprung up.

RABANUS. Matthew having related the forty days’ fast, the temptation of Christ, and the ministry of Angels, proceeds, Jesus having heard that John was cast into prison.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. By God without doubt, for none can effect any thing against a holy man, unless God deliver him up. He withdrew into Galilee, that is, out of Judæa; both that He might reserve His passion to the fit time, and that He might set us an example of flying from danger.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xiv.) It is not blameworthy not to throw one’s self into peril, but when one has fallen into it, not to endure manfully. He departed from Judæa both to soften Jewish animosity, and to fulfil a prophecy, seeking moreover to fish for those masters of the world who dwelt in Galilee. Note also how when He would depart to the Gentiles, He received good cause from the Jews; His forerunner was thrown into prison, which compelled Jesus to pass into Galilee of the Gentiles.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) He came as Luke writes to Nazareth, where He had been brought up, and there entering into the synagogue, He read and spoke many things, for which they sought to throw Him down from the rock, and thence He went to Capernaum; for which Matthew has only, And leaving the town of Nazareth, He came and dwelt at Capernaum.

GLOSS. (ord.) Nazareth is a village in Galilee near Mount Tabor; Capernaum a town in Galilee of the Gentiles near the Lake of Gennesaret;

and this is the meaning of the word, on the sea coast. He adds further in the borders of Zabulon and Naphtali, where was the first captivity of the Jews by the Assyrians. Thus where the Law was first forgotten, there the Gospel was first preached; and from a place as it were between the two it was spread both to Jews and Gentiles.

REMIGIUS. He left one, viz. Nazareth, that He might enlighten more by His preaching and miracles. Thus leaving an example to all preachers that they should preach at a time and in places where they may do good, to as many as possible. In the prophecy, the words are these, At that first time the land of Zabulon and the land of Naphtali was lightened, and at the last time was increased the way of the sea beyond Jordan, Galilee of the Gentiles. (Is. 9:1.)

JEROME. (in Esai. c. 9. 1.) They are said at the first time to be lightened from the burden of sin, because in the country of these two tribes, the Saviour first preached the Gospel; at the last time their faith was increased, most of the Jews remaining in error. By the sea here is meant the Lake of Gennesaret, a lake formed by the waters of the Jordan, on its shores are the towns of Capernaum, Tiberias, Bethsaida, and Corozaim, in which district principally Christ preached. Or, according to the interpretation of those Hebrews who believe in Christ, the two tribes Zabulon and Naphtali were taken captive by the Assyrians, and Galilee was left desert; and the prophet therefore says that it was lightened, because it had before suffered the sins of the people; but afterwards the remaining tribes who dwelt beyond Jordan and in Samaria were led into captivity; and Scripture here means that the region which had been the first to suffer captivity, now was the first to see the light of Christ’s preaching. The Nazarenes again interpret that this was the first part of the country that, on the coming of Christ, was freed from the errors of the Pharisees, and after by the Gospel of the Apostle Paul, the preaching was increased or multiplied throughout all the countries of the Gentiles.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) But Matthew here so quotes the passage as to make them all nominative cases referring to one verb. The land of Zabulon, and the land of Naphtali, which is the way of the sea, and which is beyond Jordan, viz. the people of Galilee of the Gentiles, the people which walked in darkness.

GLOSS. (ord.) Note that there are two Galilees; one of the Jews, the other of the Gentiles. This division of Galilee had existed from Solomon's time, who gave twenty cities in Galilee to Hyram, King of Tyre; this part was afterwards called Galilee of the Gentiles; the remainder, of the Jews.

JEROME. (ubi sup.) Or we must read, beyond Jordan, of Galilee of the Gentiles; so, I mean, that the people who either sat, or walked in darkness, have seen light and that not a faint light, as the light of the Prophets, but a great light, as of Him who in the Gospel speaks thus, I am the light, of the world. Between death and the shadow of death I suppose this difference; death is said of such as have gone down to the grave with the works of death; the shadow of such as live in sin, and have not yet departed from this world; these may, if they will, yet turn to repentance.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise, the Gentiles who worshipped idols, and dæmons, were they who sat in the region of the shadow of death; the Jews, who did the works of the Law, were in darkness, because the righteousness of God was not yet manifested to them.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that you may learn that he speaks not of natural day and night, he calls the light, a great light, which is in other places called the true light; and he adds, the shadow of death, to explain what he means by darkness. The words arose, and shined, shew, that they found it not of their own seeking, but God Himself appeared to them, they did not first run to the light; for men were in the greatest miseries before Christ's coming; they did not walk but sate in darkness; which was a sign that they hoped for deliverance; for as not knowing what way they should go, shut in by darkness they sate down, having now no power to stand. By darkness he means here, error and ungodliness.

RABANUS. (ap. Anserm.) In allegory, John and the rest of the Prophets were the voice going before the Word. When prophecy ceased and was fettered, then came the Word, fulfilling what the Prophet had spoken of it, He departed into Galilee, i. e. from figure to verity. Or, into the Church, which is a passing from vice to virtue. Nazareth is interpreted 'a flower,' Capernaum, 'the beautiful village;' He left therefore the flower of figure, (in which was mystically intended the fruit of the Gospel,) and came into the Church, which was beautiful with Christ's virtues. It is by the sea-coast, because placed near the waves of this world, it is daily beaten by the storms of persecution. It is situated between Zabulon and Naphtali, i. e. common to

Jews and Gentiles. Zabulon is interpreted, ‘the abode of strength;’ because the Apostles, who were chosen from Judæa, were strong. Nephtali, ‘extension,’ because the Church of the Gentiles was extended through the world.

AUGUSTINE. (de cons. Ev. ii. 17.) John relates in his Gospel the calling of Peter, Andrew, and Nathanael, and the miracle in Cana, before Jesus’ departure into Galilee; all these things the other Evangelists have omitted, carrying on the thread of their narrative with Jesus’ return into Galilee. We must understand then that some days intervened, during which the things took place concerning the calling of the disciples which John relates.

REMIGIUS. But this should be considered with more care, viz. that John says that the Lord went into Galilee, before John the Baptist was thrown into prison. According to John’s Gospel after the water turned into wine, and his going down to Capernaum, and after his going up to Jerusalem, he returned into Judæa and baptized, and John was not yet cast into prison. But here it is after John’s imprisonment that He retires into Galilee, and with this Mark agrees. But we need not suppose any contradiction here. John speaks of the Lord’s first coming into Galilee, which was before the imprisonment of John. (John 4:3.) He speaks in another place of His second coming, into Galilee, and the other Evangelists mention only this second coming into Galilee which was after John’s imprisonment.

EUSEBIUS. (H. E. iii. 24.) It is related that John preached the Gospel almost up to the close of his life without setting forth any thing in writing, and at length came to write for this reason. The three first written Gospels having come to his knowledge, he confirmed the truth of their history by his own testimony; but there were yet some things wanting, especially an account of what the Lord had done at the first beginning of His preaching. And it is true that the other three Gospels seem to contain only those things which were done in that year in which John the Baptist was put into prison, or executed. For Matthew, after the temptation, proceeds immediately, Hearing that John was delivered up; and Mark in like manner. Luke again, even before relating one of Christ’s actions, tells that Herod had shut up John in prison. The Apostle John then was requested to put into writing what the preceding Evangelists had left out before the imprisonment of John; hence he says in his Gospel, this beginning of miracles did Jesus.

17. From that time Jesus began to preach, and to say, Repent: for the kingdom of Heaven is at hand.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Christ’s Gospel should be preached by him who can control his appetites, who contemns the goods of this life, and desires not empty honours. From this time began Jesus to preach, that is, after having been tempted, He had overcome hunger in the desert, despised covetousness on the mountain, rejected ambitious desires in the temple. Or from the time that John was delivered up; for had He begun to preach while John was yet preaching, He would have made John be lightly accounted of, and John’s preaching would have been thought superfluous by the side of Christ’s teaching; as when the sun rises at the same time with the morning star, the star’s brightness is hid.

CHRYSOSTOM. For another cause also He did not preach till John was in prison, that the multitude might not be split into two parties; or as John did no miracle, all men would have been drawn to Christ by His miracles.

RABANUS. In this He further teaches that none should despise the words of a person inferior to Him; as also the Apostle, If any thing be revealed to him that sits, let the first hold his peace. (1 Cor. 14:30.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He did wisely in making now the beginning of His preaching, that He should not trample upon John’s teaching, but that He might the rather confirm it and demonstrate him to have been a true witness.

JEROME. Shewing also thereby that He was Son of that same God whose prophet John was; and therefore He says, Repent ye.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He does not straightway preach righteousness which all knew, but repentance, which all needed. Who then dared to say, ‘I desire to be good, but am not able?’ For repentance corrects the will; and if ye will not repent through fear of evil, at least ye may for the pleasure of good things; hence He says, the kingdom of heaven is at hand; that is, the blessings of the heavenly kingdom. As if He had said, Prepare yourselves by repentance, for the time of eternal reward is at hand.

REMIGIUS. And note, He does not say the kingdom of the Canaanite, or the Jebusite, is at hand; but the kingdom of heaven. The law promised worldly goods, but the Lord heavenly kingdoms.

CHRYSOSTOM. Also observe how that in this His first address He says nothing of Himself openly; and that very suitably to the case, for they had yet no right opinion concerning Him. In this commencement moreover He speaks nothing severe, nothing burdensome, as John had concerning the axe laid to the root of the condemned tree, and the like; but he puts first things merciful, preaching the glad tidings of the kingdom of heaven.

JEROME. Mystically interpreted, Christ begins to preach as soon as John was delivered to prison, because when the Law ceased, the Gospel commenced.

4:18–22

18. And Jesus, walking by the sea of Galilee, saw two brethren, Simon called Peter, and Andrew his brother, casting a net into the sea: for they were fishers.

19. And He saith unto them, Follow Me, and I will make you fishers of men.

20. And they straightway left their nets, and followed Him.

21. And going on from thence, he saw other two brethren, James the son of Zebedee, and John his brother, in a ship with Zebedee their father, mending their nets; and He called them.

22. And they immediately left the ship and their father, and followed Him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Before He spoke or did any thing, Christ called Apostles, that neither word nor deed of His should be hid from their knowledge, so that they may afterwards say with confidence, What we have seen and heard, that we cannot but speak. (Acts 4:20.)

RABANUS. The sea of Galilee, the lake of Gennesareth, the sea of Tiberias, and the salt lake, are one and the same.

GLOSS. (ord.) He rightly goes to fishing places, when about to fish for fishermen.

REMIGIUS. Saw, that is, not so much with the bodily eye, as spiritually viewing their hearts.

CHRYSOSTOM. He calls them while actually working at their employment, to shew that to follow Him ought to be preferred to all occupations. They were just then casting a net into the sea, which agreed with their future office.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 197. 2.) He chose not kings, senators, philosophers, or orators, but he chose common, poor, and untaught fishermen.

AUGUSTINE. (Aug. Tract. in Joann. vii. 17.) Had one learned been chosen, he might have attributed the choice to the merit of his learning. But our Lord Jesus Christ, willing to bow the necks of the proud, sought not to gain fishermen by orators, but gained an Emperor by a fisherman. Great was Cyprian the pleader, but Peter the fisherman was before him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The operations of their secular craft were a prophecy of their future dignity. As he who casts his net into the water knows not what fishes he shall take, so the teacher casts the net of the divine word upon the people, not knowing who among them will come to God. Those whom God shall stir abide in his doctrine.

REMIGIUS. Of these fishermen the Lord speaks by Jeremiah. I will send my fishers among you, and they shall catch you. (Jer. 16:16.)

GLOSS. (interlin.) Follow me, not so much with your feet as in your hearts and your life.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Fishers of men, that is, teachers, that with the net of God’s word you may catch men out of this world of storm and danger, in which men do not walk but are rather borne along, the Devil by pleasure drawing them into sin where men devour one another as the stronger fishes do the weaker, withdrawn from hence they may live upon the land, being made members of Christ’s body.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evan. v. 1.) Peter and Andrew had seen Christ work no miracle, had heard from him no word of the promise of the eternal reward, yet at this single bidding of the Lord they forgot all that they had seemed to possess, and straightway left their nets, and followed Him. In which deed we ought rather to consider their wills than the amount of their property. He leaves much who keeps nothing for himself, he parts with much, who with his possessions renounces his lusts. Those who followed Christ gave up enough to be coveted by those who did not follow. Our outward goods, however small, are enough for the Lord; He does not weigh the sacrifice by how much is offered, but out of how much it is offered. The kingdom of God is not to be valued at a certain price, but whatever a man has, much or little, is equally available.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. These disciples did not follow Christ from desire of the honour of a doctor, but because they coveted the labour itself; they knew how precious is the soul of man, how pleasant to God is his salvation, and how great its reward.

CHRYSOSTOM. To so great a promise they trusted, and believed that they should catch others by those same words by which themselves had been caught.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. These were their desires, for which they left all and followed; teaching us thereby that none can possess earthly things and perfectly attain to heavenly things.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) These last disciples were an example to such as leave their property for the love of Christ; now follows an example of others who postponed earthly affection to God. Observe how He calls them two and two, as He afterwards sent them two and two to preach.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ex. 17:1.) Hereby we are also silently admonished, that he who wants affection towards others, ought not to take on him the office of preaching. The precepts of charity are two, and between less than two there can be no love.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Rightly did He thus build the foundations of the brotherhood of the Church on love, that from such roots a copious sap of love might flow to the branches; and that too on natural or human love, that nature as well as grace might bind their love more firmly. They were moreover brothers; and so did God in the Old Testament lay the foundations of His building on Moses and Aaron, brothers. But as the grace of the New Testament is more abundant than that of the Old, therefore the first people were built upon one pair of brethren, but the new people upon two. They were washing their nets, a proof of the extremest indigence; they repaired the old because they had not whence they should buy new. And what shews their great filial piety, in this their great poverty they deserted not their father, but carried him with them in their vessel, not that he might aid in their labour, but have the enjoyment of his sons’ presence.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is no small sign of goodness, to bear poverty easily, to live by honest labour, to be bound together by virtue of affection, to keep their poor father with them, and to toil in his service.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. We may not dare to consider the former disciples as more quick to preach, because they were casting their nets; and these latter as less active, because they were yet making ready only; for it is Christ alone that may know their differences. But perhaps we may say that the first were casting their nets, because Peter preached the Gospel, but committed it not to paper—the others were making ready their nets, because John composed a Gospel. He called them together, for by their abode they were fellow-townsmen, in affection attached, in profession agreed, and united by brotherly tenderness. He called them then at once, that united by so many common blessings they might not be separated by a separate call.

CHRYSOSTOM. He made no promise to them when He called them, as He had to the former, for the obedience of the first had made the way plain for them. Besides, they had heard many things concerning Him, as being friends and townsmen of the others.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. There are three things which we must leave who would come to Christ; carnal actions, which are signified in the fishing nets; worldly substance, in the ship; parents, which are signified in their father. They left their own vessel, that they might become governors of the vessel of the Church; they left their nets, as having no longer to draw out fishes on to the earthly shore, but men to the heavenly; they left their father, that they might become the spiritual fathers of all.

HILARY. By this that they left their occupation and their father’s house we are taught, that when we would follow Christ we should not be holden of the cares of secular life, or of the society of the paternal mansion.

REMIGIUS. Mystically, by the sea is figured this world, because of its bitterness and its tossing waves. Galilee is interpreted, ‘rolling’ or ‘a wheel,’ and shews the changeableness of the world. Jesus walked by the sea when He came to us by incarnation, for He took on Him of the Virgin not the flesh of sin, but the likeness of the flesh of sin. By the two brothers, two people are signified born of one God their Father; He saw them when He looked on them in His mercy. In Peter, (which is interpreted ‘owning,’) who is called Simon, (i. e. obedient,) is signified the Jewish nation, who acknowledged God in the Law, and obeyed His commandments; Andrew, which is interpreted ‘manly’ or ‘graceful,’ signifies the Gentiles, who after they had come to the knowledge of God, manfully abode in the faith. He called us His people when He sent the preachers into the world, saying, Follow me; that is, leave the deceiver, follow your Creator. Of both people there were made fishers of men, that is, preachers. Leaving their ships, that is, carnal desires, and their nets, that is, love of the world, they followed Christ. By James is understood the Jewish nation, which through their knowledge of God overthrew the Devil; by John the Gentile world, which was saved of grace alone. Zebedee whom they leave, (the name is interpreted flying or falling,) signifies the world which passes away, and the Devil who fell from Heaven. By Peter and Andrew casting their net into the sea, are meant those who in their early youth are called by the Lord, while from the vessel of their body they cast the nets of carnal concupiscence into the sea of this world. By James and John mending their nets are signified those who after sin before adversity come to Christ recovering what they had lost.

RABANUS. The two vessels signify the two Churches; the one was called out of the circumcision, the other out of the uncircumcision. Any one who believes becomes Simon, i, e. obedient to God; Peter by acknowledging his sin, Andrew by enduring labours manfully, James by overcoming vices,

GLOSS. (ap Anselm.) and John that he may ascribe the whole to God’s grace. The calling of four only is mentioned, as those preachers by whom God will call the four quarters of the world.

HILARY. Or, the number that was to be of the Evangelists is figured.

REMIGIUS. Also, the four principal virtues are here designed; Prudence, in Peter, from his confession of God; Justice, we may refer to Andrew for his manful deeds; Fortitude, to James, for his overthrow of the Devil; Temperance, to John, for the working in him of divine grace.

AUGUSTINE. (Ev. ii. 17.) It might move enquiry, why John relates that near Jordan, not in Galilee, Andrew followed the Lord with another whose name he does not mention; and again, that Peter received that name from the Lord. Whereas the other three Evangelists write that they were call d rom their fishing, sufficiently agreeing with one another, especially Matthew and Mark; Luke not naming Andrew, who is however understood to have been in the same vessel with him. There is a further seeming discrepancy, that in Luke it is to Peter only that it is said, Henceforth thou shalt catch men; Matthew and Mark write that it was said to both. As to the different account in John, it should be carefully considered, and it will be found that it is a different time, place, and calling that is there spoken of. For Peter and Andrew had not so seen Jesus at the Jordan that they adhered inseparably ever after, but so as only to have known who He was, and wondering at Him to have gone their way. Perhaps he is returning back to something he had omitted, for he proceeds without marking any difference of time, As he walked by the sea of Galilee. It may be further asked, how Matthew and Mark relate that He called them separately two and two, when Luke relates that James and John being partners of Peter were called as it were to aid him, and bringing their barks to land followed Christ. We may then understand that the narrative of Luke relates to a prior time, after which they returned to their fishing as usual. For it had not been said to Peter that he should no more catch fishes, as he did do so again after the resurrection, but that he should catch men. Again, at a time after this happened that call of which Matthew and Mark speak; for they draw their ships to land to follow Him, not as careful to return again, but only anxious to follow Him when He bids them.

4:23–25

23. And Jesus went about all Galilee, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of sickness and all manner of disease among the people.

24. And His fame went throughout all Syria: and they brought unto Him all sick people that were taken with divers diseases and torments, and those which were possessed with devils, and those which were lunatick, and those that had the palsy; and He healed them.

25. And there followed Him great multitudes of people from Galilee, and from Decapolis, and from Jerusalem, and from Judæa, and from beyond Jordan.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Kings, when about to go to war with their enemies, first gather an army, and so go out to battle; thus the Lord when about to war against the Devil, first collected Apostles, and then began to preach the Gospel.

REMIGIUS. An example of life for doctors; that they should not be inactive, they are instructed in these words, And Jesus went about.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Because they being weak could not come to their physician, He as a zealous Physician went about to visit those who had any grievous sickness. The Lord went round the several regions, and after His example the pastors of each region ought to go round to study the several dispositions of their people, that for the remedy of each disease some medicine may be found in the Church.

REMIGIUS. That they should not be acceptors of persons the preachers are instructed in what follows, the whole of Galilee. That they should not go about empty, by the word teaching. That they should seek to benefit not few but many, in what follows, in their synagogues.

CHRYSOSTOM.a By which too He shewed the Jews that He came not as an enemy of God, or a seducer of souls, but as consenting with his Father.

REMIGIUS. That they should not preach error nor fable, but sound doctrine, is inculcated in the words, preaching the Gospel of the kingdom. ‘Teaching’ and ‘preaching’ differ; teaching refers to things present, preaching to things to come; He taught present commandments and preached future promises.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He taught natural righteousness, those things which natural reason teaches, as chastity, humility, and the like, which all men of themselves see to be goods. Such things are necessary to be taught not so much for the sake of making them known as for stirring the heart. For beneath the prevalence of carnal delights the knowledge of natural righteousness sleeps forgotten. When then a teacher begins to denounce carnal sins, his teaching does not bring up a new knowledge, but recalls to memory one that had been forgotten. But He preached the Gospel, in telling of good things which the ancients had manifestly not heard of, as the happiness of heaven, the resurrection of the dead, and the like. Or, He taught by interpreting the prophecies concerning Himself; He preached by declaring the benefits that were to come from Himself.

REMIGIUS. That the teacher should study to commend his teaching by his own virtuous conduct is conveyed in those words, healing every sort of disease and malady among the people; maladies of the body, diseases of the soul.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, by disease we may understand any passion of the mind, as avarice, lust, and such like, by malady unbelief, that is, weakness of faith. Or, the diseases are the more grievous pains of the body, the maladies the slighter. As He cured the bodily pains by virtue of His divine power, so He cured the spiritual by the word of His mercy. He first teaches, and then performs the cures, for two reasons. First, that what is needed most may come first; for it is the word of holy instruction, and not miracles, that edify the soul. Secondly, because teaching is commended by miracles, not the converse.

CHRYSOSTOM. We must consider that when some great change is being wrought, as the introduction of a new polity, God is wont to work miracles, giving pledges of His power to those who are to receive His laws. Thus when He would make man, He first created a world, and then at length gave man in paradise a law. When He would dispense a law to the holy Noah, he shewed truly great wonders; and again when He was about to ordain the Law for the Jews, He first shewed great prodigies, and then at length gave them the commandments. So now when about to introduce a sublime discipline of life, He first provided a sanction to His instructions by mighty signs, because the eternal kingdom He preached was not seen, by the things which did appear, He made sure that which as yet did not appear.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Because preachers should have good testimony from those who are without, lest if their life is open to censure, their preaching be contemned, he adds, And the fame of him went abroad through all Syria.

RABANUS. Syria here is all the region from Euphrates to the Great sea, from Cappadocia to Egypt, in which is the country of Palestine, inhabited by Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe the reserve of the Evangelist; he does not give an account of any one of the various cases of healing, but passes in one brief phrase an abundance of miracles, they brought to him all their sick.

REMIGIUS. By these he would have us understand various but slighter diseases; but when he says, seized with divers sicknesses and torments, he would have those understood, of whom it is subjoined, and who had dæmons.

GLOSS. ‘Sickness’ means a lasting ailment; ‘torment’ is an acute pain, as pleurisy, and such like; they who had dæmons are they who were tormented by the dæmons.

REMIGIUS. ‘Lunatics’ are so called from the moon; for as it waxes in its monthly seasons they are tormented.

JEROME. Not really smitten by the moon, but who were believed to be so through the subtlety of the dæmons, who by observing the seasons of the moon, sought to bring an evil report against the creature, that it might redound to the blasphemy of the Creator.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xxi. 6.) Dæmons are enticed to take up their abode in many creatures, (created not by themselves but God,) by delights adapted to their various natures; not that they are animals, drawn by meats; but spirits attracted by signs which agree with each one’s taste.

RABANUS. Paralytics are those whose bodies have their nerves slackened or resolved from a Greek word, signifying this.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. In some places it is, He cured many; but here, He cured them, meaning ‘all;’ as a new physician first entering a town cures all who come to him. to beget a good opinion concerning himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. He requires no direct profession of faith from them, both because He had not yet given them any proofs of His miraculous power, and because in bringing their sick from far they had shewn no small faith.

RABANUS. crowds that followed Him consisted of four sorts of men, some followed for the heavenly teaching as disciples, some for the curing of their diseases, some from the reports concerning Him alone, and curiosity to find whether they were true; others from envy, wishing to catch Him in some matter that they might accuse Him. Mystically, Syria is interpreted ‘lofty,’ Galilee, ‘turning:’ or ‘a wheel;’ that is, the Devil and the world; the Devil is both proud and always turned round to the bottom; the world in which the fame of Christ went abroad through preaching: the dæmoniacs are the idolaters; the lunatics, the unstable; the paralytics, the slow and careless.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The crowds that follow the Lord, are they of the Church, which is spiritually designated by Galilee, passing to virtuousness; Decapolis is he who keeps the Ten Commandments; Jerusalem and Judæa, he who is enlightened by the vision of peace and confession; and beyond Jordan, he who having passed the waters of Baptism enters the land of promise.

REMIGIUS. Or, they follow the Lord from Galilee, that is, from the unstable world; from Decapolis, (the country of ten towns,) signifying those who break the Ten Commandments; and from Jerusalem, because before it was preserved unhurt in peace; and from Jordan, that is, from the confession of the Devil; and from beyond Jordan, they who were first planted in paganism, but passing the water of Baptism came to Christ.

CHAPTER 5

5:1–3

1. And seeing the multitudes, He went up into a mountain: and when He was set, His disciples came unto Him.

2. And He opened His mouth, and taught them, saying,

3. Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Every man in his own trade or profession rejoices when he sees an opportunity of exercising it; the carpenter if he sees a goodly tree desires to have it to cut down to employ his skill on, and the Priest when he sees a full Church, his heart rejoices, he is glad of the occasion to teach. So the Lord seeing a great congregation of people was stirred to teach them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 19.) Or He may be thought to have sought to shun the thickest crowd, and to have ascended the mountain that He might speak to His disciples alone.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xv.) By not choosing His seat in the city, and the market place, but on a mountain in a desert, He has taught us to do nothing with ostentation, and to depart from crowds, above all when we are to be employed in philosophy, or in speaking of serious things.

REMIGIUS. This should be known, that the Lord had three places of retirement that we read of, the ship, the mountain, and the desert; to one of these He was wont to withdraw whenever He was pressed by the multitude.

JEROME. Some of the less learned brethren suppose the Lord to have spoken what follows from the Mount of Olives, which is by no means the case; what went before and what follows fixes the place in Galilee. aMount Tabor. we may suppose, or any other high mountain.

CHRYSOSTOM. He ascended a mountain, first, that He might fulfil the prophecy of Esaias, Get thee up into a mountain; (Is. 40:9.) secondly, to shew that as well he who teaches, as he who hears the righteousness of God should stand on an high ground of spiritual virtues; for none can abide in the valley and speak from a mountain. If thou stand on the earth, speak of the earth; if thou speak of heaven, stand in heaven. Or, He ascended into the mountain to shew that all who would learn the mysteries of the truth should go up into the Mount of the Church of which the Prophet speaks, The hill of God is a hill of fatness. (Ps. 68:15.)

HILARY. Or, He ascends the mountain, because it is placed in the loftiness of His Father's Majesty that He gives the commands of heavenly life.

AUGUSTINE. (de Serm. Dom. in Mont. i. 1.) Or, He ascends the mountain to shew that the precepts of righteousness given by God through the Prophets to the Jews, who were yet under the bondage of fear, were the lesser commandments; but that by His own Son were given the greater commandments to a people which He had determined to deliver by love.

JEROME. He spoke to them sitting and not standing, for they could not have understood Him had He appeared in His own Majesty.

AUGUSTINE. Or, to teach sitting is the prerogative of the Master. His disciples came to him, that they who in spirit approached more nearly to keeping His commandments, should also approach Him nearest with their bodily presence.

RABANUS. Mystically, this sitting down of Christ is His incarnation; had He not taken flesh on Him, mankind could not have come unto Him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 19.) It causes a thought how it is that Matthew relates this sermon to have been delivered by the Lord sitting on the mountain; Luke, as He stood in the plain. This diversity in their accounts would lead us to think that the occasions were different. Why should not Christ repeat once more what He said before, or do once more what He had done before? Although another method of reconciling the two may occur to us; namely, that our Lord was first with His disciples alone on some more lofty peak of the mountain when He chose the twelve; that He then descended with them not from the mountain entirely, but from the top to some expanse of level ground in the side, capable of holding a great number of people; that He stood there while the crowd was gathering around Him, and after when He had sate down, then His disciples came near to Him, and so to them and in the presence of the rest of the multitude He spoke the same sermon which Matthew and Luke give, in a different manner, but with equal truth of facts.

GREGORY. (Moral. iv. 1.) When the Lord on the mountain is about to utter His sublime precepts, it is said, Opening his month he taught them, He who had before opened the mouth of the Prophets.

REMIGIUS. Wherever it is said that the Lord opened His mouth, we may know how great things are to follow.

AUGUSTINE. (de Serm. in Mont. i. 1.) Or, the phrase is introductory of an address longer than ordinary.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, that we may understand that He sometimes teaches by opening His mouth in speech, sometimes by that voice which resounds from His works.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Whoever will take the trouble to examine with a pious and sober spirit, will find in this sermon a perfect code of the Christian life as far as relates to the conduct of daily life. Accordingly the Lord concludes it with the words, Every man who heareth these words of mine and doeth them, I will liken him to a wise man, & c.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xix. 1.) The chief good is the only motive of philosophical enquiry; but whatever confers blessedness, that is the chief good; therefore He begins, Blessed are the poor in spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (Id. de Serm. in Mont. i. 1.) Augmentation of ‘spirit’ generally implies insolence and pride. For in common speech the proud are said to have a great spirit, and rightly—for wind is a spirit, and who does not know that we say of proud men that they are ‘swollen,’ ‘puffed up.’ Here therefore by poor in spirit are rightly understood ‘lowly,’ ‘fearing God,’ not having a puffed up spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He here calls all loftiness of soul and temper spirit; for as there are many humble against their will, constrained by their outward condition, they have no praise; the blessing is on those who humble themselves by their own choice. Thus He begins at once at the root, pulling up pride which is the root and source of all evil, setting up as its opposite humility as a firm foundation. If this be well laid, other virtues may be firmly built thereon; if that be sapped, whatever good yon gather upon it perishes.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Blessed are the poor in spirita, or, according to the literal rendering of the Greek, ‘they who beg,’ that the humble may learn that they should be ever begging at God’s almshouse. For there are many naturally humble and not of faith, who do not knock at God's almshouse; but they alone are humble who are so of faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, the poor in spirit may be those who fear and tremble at God's commandments, whom the Lord by the Prophet Isaiah commends. Though why more than simply humble? Of the humble there may be in this place but few, in that again an abundance.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The proud seek an earthly kingdom, of the humble only is the kingdom of Heaven.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For as all other vices, but chiefly pride, casts down to hell; so all other virtues, but chiefly humility, conduct to Heaven; it is proper that he that humbles himself should be exalted.

JEROME. The poor in spirit are those who embrace a voluntary poverty for the sake of the Holy Spirit.

AMBROSE. (De Officiis i. 16.) In the eye of Heaven blessedness begins there where misery begins in human estimation.

GLOSS. (interlin.) The riches of Heaven are suitably promised to those who at this present are in poverty.

5:5

5. bBlessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. c. v. 20.) When I have learned contentment in poverty, the next lesson is to govern my heart and temper. For what good is it to me to be without worldly things, unless I have besides a meek spirit? It suitably follows therefore, Blessed are the meek.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 2.) The meek are they who resist not wrongs, and give way to evil; but overcome evil of good.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) Soften therefore your temper that you be not angry, at least that you be angry, and sin not. It is a noble thing to govern passion by reason; nor is it a less virtue to check anger, than to be entirely without anger, since one is esteemed the sign of a weak, the other of a strong, mind.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Let the unyielding then wrangle and quarrel about earthly and temporal things, the meek are blessed, for they shall inherit the earth, and not be rooted out of it; that earth of which it is said in the Psalms, Thy lot is in the land of the living, (Ps. 142:5.) meaning the fixedness of a perpetual inheritance, in which the soul that hath good dispositions rests as in its own place, as the body does in an earthly possession, it is fed by its own food, as the body by the earth; such is the rest and the life of the saints.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This earth as some interpret, so long as it is in its present condition is the land of the dead, seeing it is subject to vanity; but when it is freed from corruption it becomes the land of the living, that the mortal may inherit an immortal country. I have read another exposition of it, as if the heaven in which the saints are to dwell is meant by the land of the living, because compared with the regions of death it is heaven, compared with the heaven above it is earth. Others again say, that this body as long as it is subject to death is the land of the dead, when it shall b made like unto Christ's glorious body, it will be the land of the living.

HILARY. Or, the Lord promises the inheritance of the earth to the meek, meaning of that Body, which Himself took on Him as His tabernacle; and as by the gentleness of our minds Christ dwells in us, we also shall be clothed with the glory of His renewed body.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; Christ here has mixed things sensible with things spiritual. Because it is commonly supposed that he who is meek loses all that he possesses, Christ here gives a contrary promise, that he who is not forward shall possess his own in security, but that he of a contrary disposition many times loses his soul and his paternal inheritance. But because the Prophet had said, The meek shall inherit the earth, (Ps. 36:11.) He used these well-known words in conveying His meaning.

GLOSS. (ord.) The meek, who have possessed themselves, shall possess hereafter the inheritance of the Father; to possess is more than to have, for we have many things which we lose immediately.

5:4

4. Blessed are they that mourn; for they shall be comforted.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) When yon have done thus much, attained both poverty and meekness, remember that you are a sinner, mourn your sins, as He proceeds, Blessed are they that mourn. And it is suitable that the third blessing should be of those that mourn for sin, for it is the Trinity that forgives sin.

HILARY. Those that mourn, that is, not loss of kindred, affronts, or losses, but who weep for past sins.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And they who weep for their own sins are blessed, but much more so who weep for others’ sins; so should all teachers do.

JEROME. For the mourning here meant is not for the dead by common course of nature, but for the dead in sins, and vices. Thus Samuel mourned for Saul, thus the Apostle Paul mourned for those who had not performed penance after uncleanness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The comfort of mourners is the ceasing of their mourning; they then who mourn their own sins shall be consoled when they have received remittance thereof.

CHRYSOSTOM. And though it were enough for such to receive pardon, yet He rests not His mercy only there, but makes them partakers of many comforts both here and hereafter. God’s mercies are always greater than our troubles.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But they also who mourn for others’ sins shall be comforted, inasmuch as they shall own God’s providence in that worldly generation, understanding that they who had perished were not of God, out of whose hand none can snatch. For these leaving to mourn, they shall be comforted in their own blessedness.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 2.) Otherwise; mourning is sorrow for the loss of what is dear; but those that are turned to God lose the things that they held dear in this world; and as they have now no longer any joy in such things as before they had joy in, their sorrow may not be healed till there is formed within them a love of eternal things. They shall then be comforted by the Holy Spirit, who is therefore chiefly called, The Paraclete, that is, ‘Comforter;’ so that for the loss of their temporal joys, they shall gain eternal joys.

GLOSS. (ap Anselm.) Or, by mourning, two kinds of sorrow are intended; one for the miseries of this world, one for lack of heavenly things; so Caleb’s daughter asked both the upper and the lower springs. This kind of mourning none have but the poor and the meek, who as not loving the world acknowledge themselves miserable, and therefore desire heaven. Suitably, therefore, consolation is promised to them that mourn, that he who has sorrow at this present may have joy hereafter. But the reward of the mourner is greater that that of the poor or the meek, for to rejoice in the kingdom is more than to have it, or to possess it; for many things we possess in sorrow.

CHRYSOSTOM. We may remark that this blessing is given not simply, but with great force and emphasis; it is not simply, ‘who have grief,’ but who mourn. And indeed this command is the sum of all philosophy. For if they who mourn for the death of children or kinsfolk, throughout all that season of their sorrow, are touched with no other desires, as of money, or honour, burn not with envy, feel not wrongs, nor are open to any other vicious passion, but are solely given up to their grief; much more ought they, who mourn their own sins in such manner as they ought to mourn for them, to shew this higher philosophy.

5:6

6. Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) As soon as I have wept for my sins, I begin to hunger and thirst after righteousness. He who is afflicted with any sore disease, hath no hunger.

JEROME. It is not enough that we desire righteousness, unless we also suffer hunger for it, by which expression we may understand that we are never righteous enough, but always hunger after works of righteousness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. All good which men do not from love of the good itself is unpleasing before God. He hungers after righteousness who desires to walk according to the righteousness of God; he thirsts after righteousness who desires to get the knowledge thereof.

CHRYSOSTOM. He may mean either general righteousness, or that particular virtue which is the opposite of covetousness. (ἡ καθόλου ἀρετή.) As He was going on to speak of mercy, He shews beforehand of what kind our mercy should be, that it should not be of the gains of plunder or covetousness, hence He ascribes to righteousness that which is peculiar to avarice, namely, to hunger and thirst.

HILARY. The blessedness which He appropriates to those who hunger and thirst after righteousness shews that the deep longing of the saints for the doctrine of God shall receive perfect replenishment in heaven; then they shall be filled.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Such is the bounty of a rewarding God, that His gifts are greater than the desires of the saints.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or He speaks of food with which they shall be filled at this present; to wit, that food of which the Lord spake, My food is to do the will of my Father, that is, righteousness, and that water of which whoever drinks it shall be in him a well of water springing up to life eternal.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, this is again a promise of a temporal reward; for as covetousness is thought to make many rich, He affirms on the contrary that righteousness rather makes rich, for He who loves righteousness possesses all things in safety.

5:7

7. Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy.

GLOSS. (ord.) Justice and mercy are so united, that the one ought to be mingled with the other; justice without mercy is cruelty; mercy without justice, profusion—hence He goes on to the one from the other.

REMIGIUS. The merciful (misericors) is he who has a sad heart; he counts others' misery his own, and is sad at their grief as at his own.

JEROME. Mercy here is not said only of alms, but is in every sin of a brother, if we bear one another's burdens.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) He pronounces those blessed who succour the wretched, because they are rewarded in being themselves delivered from all misery; as it follows, for they shall obtain mercy.

HILARY. So greatly is God pleased with our feelings of benevolence towards all men, that He will bestow His own mercy only on the merciful.

CHRYSOSTOM. The reward here seems at first to be only an equal return; but indeed it is much more; for human mercy and divine mercy are not to be put on an equality.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Justly is mercy dealt out to the merciful, that they should receive more than they had deserved; and as he who has more than enough receives more than he who has only enough, so the glory of mercy is greater than of the things hitherto mentioned.

5:8

8. Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. vi. 22.) The merciful loses the benefit of his mercy, unless he shews it from a pure heart; for if he seeks to have whereof to boast, he loses the fruit of his deeds; the next that follows therefore is, Blessed are the pure in heart.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Purity of heart comes properly in the sixth place, because on the sixth day man was created in the image of God, which image was shronded by sin, but is formed anew in pure hearts by grace. It follows rightly the beforementioned graces, because if they be not there, a clean heart is not created in a man.

CHRYSOSTOM. By the pure are here meant those who possess a perfect goodness, conscious to themselves of no evil thoughts, or again those who live in such temperance as is mostly necessary to seeing God according to that of St. Paul, Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God. For as there are many merciful, yet unchaste, to shew that mercy alone is not enough, he adds this concerning purity.

JEROME. The pure is known by purity of heart, for the temple of God cannot be impure.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He who in thought and deed fulfils all righteousness, sees God in his heart, for righteousness is an image of God, for God is righteousness. So far as any one has rescued himself from evil, and works things that are good, so far does he see God, either hardly, or fully, or sometimes, or always, according to the capabilities of human nature. But in that world to come the pure in heart shall see God face to face, not in a glass, and in enigma as here.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 2.) They are foolish who seek to see God with the bodily eye, seeing He is seen only by the heart, as it is elsewhere written, In singleness of heart seek ye Him; (Wisd. 1:1.) the single heart is the same as is here called the pure heart.

AUGUSTINE. (Civ. Dei, xxii 29.) But if spiritual eyes in the spiritual body shall be able only to see so much as they we now have can see, undoubtedly God will not be able to be seen of them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. 8.) This seeing God is the reward of faith; to which end our hearts are made pure by faith, as it is written, cleansing their hearts by faith; (Acts 15:9.) but the present verse proves this still more strongly.

AUGUSTINE. (de Genesi ad Literam. xii. 26.) No one seeing God can be alive with the life men have on earth, or with these our bodily senses. Unless one die altogether out of this life, either by totally departing from the body, or so alienated from earnal lusts that he may truly say with the Apostle, whether in the body or out of the body, I cannot tell, he is not translated that he should see this vision.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The reward of these is greater than the reward of the first; being not merely to dine in the King's court, but further to see His face.

5:9

9. Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God.

AMBROSE. (ubi sup.) When you have made your inward parts clean from every spot of sin, that dissentions and contentious may not proceed from your temper, begin peace within yourself, that so you may extend it to others.

AUGUSTINE. (Civ. Dei, xix. 13.) Peace is the fixedness of order; by order, I mean an arrangement of things like and unlike giving to each its own place. And as there is no man who would not willingly have joy, so is there no man who would not have peace; since even those who go to war desire nothing more than by war to come to a glorious peace.

JEROME. The peacemakers (pacifici) are pronounced blessed, they namely who make peace first within their own hearts, then between brethren at variance. For what avails it to make peace between others, while in your own heart are wars of rebellious vices.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 2.) The peacemakers within themselves are they who having stilled all disturbances of their spirits, having subjected them to reason, have overcome their carnal desires, and become the kingdom of God. There all things are so disposed, that that which is most chief and excellent in man, governs those parts which we have in common with the brutes, though they struggle against it; nay even that in man which is excellent is subjected to a yet greater, namely, the very Truth, the Son of God. For it would not be able to govern what is inferior to it, if it were not subject to what is above it. And this is the peace which is given on earth to men of good will.

AUGUSTINE. (Retract. i. 19.) No man can attain in this life that there be not in his members a law resisting the law of his mind. But the peacemakers attain thus far by overcoming the lusts of the flesh, that in time they come to a most perfect peace.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The peacemakers with others are not only those who reconcile enemies, but those who unmindful of wrongs cultivate peace. That peace only is blessed which is lodged in the heart, and does not consist only in words. And they who love peace, they are the sons of peace.

HILARY. The blessedness of the peacemakers is the reward of adoption, they shall be called the sons of God. For God is our common parent, and no other way can we pass into His family than by living in brotherly love together.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, if the peacemakers are they who do not contend one with another, but reconcile those that are at strife, they are rightly called the sons of God, seeing this was the chief employment of the Only-begotten Son, to reconcile things separated, to give peace to things at war.

AUGUSTINE. Or, because peace is then perfect when there is no where any opposition, the peacemakers are called the sons of God, because nothing resists God, and the children ought to bear the likeness of their Father.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The peacemakers have thus the place of highest honour, inasmuch as he who is called the king’s son, is the highest in the king’s house. This beatitude is placed the seventh in order, because in the sabbath shall be given the repose of true peace, the six ages being passed away.

5:10

10. Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. Blessed are they who suffer persecution for righteousness’ sake, that is for virtue, for defending others, for piety, for all these things are spoken of under the title of righteousness. This follows the beatitude upon the peacemakers, that we may not be led to suppose that it is good to seek peace at all times.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 2.) When peace is once firmly established within, whatever persecutions he who has been cast without raises, or carries on, he increases that glory which is in the sight of God.

JEROME. For righteousness’ sake He adds expressly, for many suffer persecution for their sins, and are not therefore righteous. Likewise consider how the eighth beatitude of the true circumcision is terminated by martyrdom.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (vid. Phil. 3:2:3.) He said not, Blessed are they who suffer persecution of the Gentiles; that we may not suppose the blessing pronounced on those only who are persecuted for refusing to sacrifice to idols; yea, whoever suffers persecution of heretics because he will not forsake the truth is likewise blessed, seeing he suffers for righteousness. Moreover, if any of the great ones, who seem to be Christians, being corrected by you on account of his sins, shall persecute you, you are blessed with John the Baptist. For if the Prophets are truly martyrs when they are killed by their own countrymen, without doubt he who suffers in the cause of God has the reward of martyrdom though he suffers from his own people. Scripture therefore does not mention the persons of the persecutors, but only the cause of persecution, that you may learn to look, not by whom, but why you suffer.

HILARY. Thus, lastly, He includes those in the beatitude whose will is ready to suffer all things for Christ, who is our righteousness. For these then also is the kingdom preserved, for they are in the contempt of this world poor in spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, the eighth beatitude, as it were, returns to the commencement, because it shews the perfect complete character. In the first then and the eighth, the kingdom of heaven is named, for the seven go to make the perfect man, the eighth manifests and proves his perfectness, that all may be conducted to perfection by these steps.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. vi. 23.) Otherwise; the first kingdom of heaven was promised to the Saints, in deliverance from the body; the second, that after the resurrection they should be with Christ. For after your resurrection you shall begin to possess the earth delivered from death, and in that possession shall find comfort. Pleasure follows comfort, and Divine mercy pleasure.

But on whom God has mercy, him He calls, and he whom He calls, beholds Him that called him. He who beholds God is adopted into the rights of divine birth, and then at length as the son of God is delighted with the riches of the heavenly kingdom. The first then begins, the last is perfected.

CHRYSOSTOM. Wonder not if you do not hear 'the kingdom' mentioned under each beatitude; for in saying shall be comforted, shall find mercy, and the rest, in all these the kingdom of heaven is tacitly understood, so that you must not look for any of the things of sense. For indeed he would not be blessed who was to be crowned with those things which depart with this life.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The number of these sentences should be carefully attended to; to these seven degrees of blessedness agree the operation of that seven-form Holy Spirit which Isaiah described. But as He began from the highest, so here He begins from the lowest; for there we are taught that the Son of God will descend to the lowest; here that man will ascend from the lowest to the likeness of God. Here the first place is given to fear, which is suitable for the humble, of whom it is said, Blessed are the poor in spirit, that is, those who think not high things, but who fear. The second is piety, which belongs to the meek; for he who seeks piously, reverences, does not find fault, does not resist; and this is to become meek. The third is knowledge, which belongs to those that mourn, who have learned to what evils they are enslaved which they once pursued as goods. The fourth, which is fortitude, rightly belongs to those who hunger and thirst, who seeking joy in true goods, labour to turn away from earthly lusts. The fifth, counsel, is appropriate for the merciful, for there is one remedy to deliver from so great evils, viz. to give and to distribute to others. The sixth is understanding, and belongs to the pure in heart, who with purged eye can see what eye seeth not. The seventh is wisdom, and may be assigned to the peacemakers, in whom is no rebellious motion, but they obey the Spirit. Thus the one reward, the kingdom of heaven, is put forth under various names. In the first, as was right, is placed the kingdom of heaven, which is the beginning of perfect wisdom; as if it should be said, The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom. To the meek, an inheritance, as to those who with piety seek the execution of a father's will. To those that mourn, comfort, as to persons who know what they had lost, and in what they were immersed. To the hungry, plenty, as a refreshment to those who labour for salvation. To the merciful, mercy, that to those who have followed the best counsel, that may be shewed which they have shewed to others. To the pure in heart the faculty of seeing God, as to men bearing a pure eye to understand the things of eternity. To the peacemakers, the likeness of God. And all these things we believe may be attained in this life, as we believe they were fulfilled in the Apostles; for as to the things after this life they cannot be expressed in any words.

5:11–12

11. Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for My sake.

12. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you.

RABANUS. The preceding blessings were general; He now begins to address His discourse to them that were present, foretelling them the persecutions which they should suffer for His name.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It may be asked, what difference there is between ‘they shall revile you,’ and ‘shall speak all manner of evil of you;’ to revile, it may be said, being but to speak evil of. But a reproach thrown with insult in the face of one present is a different thing from a slander cast on the character of the absent. To persecute includes both open violence and secret snares.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But if it be true that he who offers a cup of water does not lose his reward, consequently he who has been wronged but by a single word of calumny, shall not be without a reward. But that the reviled may have a claim to this blessing, two things are necessary, it must be false, and it must be for God’s sake; otherwise he has not the reward of this blessing; therefore He adds, falsely for my sake.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont i. 5.) This I suppose was added because of those who wish to boast of persecutions and evil reports of their shame, and therefore claim to belong to Christ because many evil things are said of them; but either these are true, or when false yet they are not for Christ’s sake.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ezech. i. 9. 17.) What hurt can you receive when men detract from you, though you have no defence but only your own conscience? But as we ought not to stir up wilfully the tongues of slanderers, lest they perish for their slander, yet when their own malice has instigated them, we should endure it with equanimity, that our merit may be added to. Rejoice, He says, and exult, for your reward is abundant in heaven.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Rejoice, that is, in mind, exult with the body, for your reward is not great only but abundant in heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 5.) Do not suppose that by heaven here is meant the upper regions of the sky of this visible world, for your reward is not to be placed in things that are seen, but by in heaven understand the spiritual firmament, where everlasting righteousness dwells. Those then whose joy is in things spiritual will even here have some foretaste of that reward; but it will be made perfect in every part when this mortal shall have put on immortality.

JEROME. This it is in the power of any one of us to attain, that when our good character is injured by calumny, we rejoice in the Lord. He only who seeks after empty glory cannot attain this. Let us then rejoice and exult, that our reward may be prepared for us in heaven.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For by how much any is pleased with the praise of men, by so much is he grieved with their evil speaking. But if you seek your glory in heaven, you will not fear any slanders on earth.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ezech. i. 9. 17.) Yet ought we sometimes to check our defamers, lest by spreading evil reports of us, they corrupt the innocent hearts of those who might hear good from us.

GLOSS. (non occ.) He invites them to patience not only by the prospect of reward, but by example, when He adds, for so persecuted they the Prophets who were before you.

REMIGIUS. For a man in sorrow receives great comfort from the recollection of the sufferings of others, who are set before him as an example of patience; as if He had said, Remember that ye are His Apostles, of whom also they were Prophets.

CHRYSOSTOM. At the same time He signifies His equality in honour with His Father, as if He had said, As they suffered for my Father, so shall ye suffer for me. And in saying, The Prophets who were before you, He teaches that they themselves are already become Prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Persecuted He says generally, comprehending both reproaches and defamation of character.

5:13

13. Ye are the salt of the earth: but if the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be salted? it is thenceforth good for nothing, but to be cast out, and to be trodden under foot of men.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He had delivered to His Apostles such sublime precepts, so much greater than the precepts of the Law, that they might not be dismayed and say, How shall we be able to fulfil these things? He sooths their fears by mingling praises with His instructions, saying, Ye are the salt of the earth. This shews them how necessary were these precepts for them. Not for your own salvation merely, or for a single nation, but for the whole world is this doctrine committed to you. It is not for you then to flatter and deal smoothly with men, but, on the contrary, to be rough and biting as salt is. When for thus offending men by reproving them ye are reviled, rejoice; for this is the proper effect of salt to be harsh and grating to the depraved palate. Thus the evil-speaking of others will bring you no inconvenience, but will rather be a testimony of your firmness.

HILARY. There may be here seen a propriety in our Lord’s language which may be gathered by considering the Apostles’ office, and the nature of salt. This, used as it is by men for almost every purpose, preserves from decay those bodies which are sprinkled with it; and in this, as well as in every sense of its flavour as a condiment, the parallel is most exact. The Apostles are preachers of heavenly things, and thus, as it were, salters with eternity; rightly called the salt of the earth, as by the virtue of their teaching, they, as it were, salt and preserve bodies for eternity.

REMIGIUS. Moreover, salt is changed into another kind of substance by three means, water, the heat of the sun, and the breath of the wind. Thus Apostolical men also were changed into spiritual regeneration by the water of baptism, the heat of love, and the breath of the Holy Spirit. That heavenly wisdom also, which the Apostles preached, dries up the humours of carnal works, removes the foulness and putrefaction of evil conversation, kills the work of lustful thoughts, and also that worm of which it is said their worm dieth not. (Is. 66:24.)

REMIGIUS. The Apostles are the salt of the earth, that is, of worldly men who are called the earth, because they love this earth.

JEROME. Or, because by the Apostles the whole human race is seasoned.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. A doctor when he is adorned with all the preceding virtues, then is like good salt, and his whole people are salted by seeing and hearing him.

REMIGIUS. It should be known, that in the Old Testament no sacrifice was offered to God unless it were first sprinkled with salt, for none can present an acceptable sacrifice to God without the flavour of heavenly wisdom.

HILARY. And because man is ever liable to change, He therefore warns the Apostles, who have been entitled the salt of the earth, to continue stedfast in the might of the power committed to them, when He adds, If the salt have lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted?

JEROME. That is, if the doctor have erred, by what other doctor shall he be corrected?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 6.) If you by whom the nations are to be salted shall lose the kingdom of heaven through fear of temporal persecution, who are they by whom your error shall be corrected. Another copy has, If the salt have lost all sense, shewing that they must be esteemed to have lost their sense, who cither pursuing abundance, or fearing lack of temporal goods, lose those which are eternal, and which men can neither give nor take away.

HILARY. But if the doctors having become senseless, and having lost all the savour they once enjoyed, are unable to restore soundness to things corrupt, they are become useless; and are thenceforth fit only to be cast out and trodden by men.

JEROME. The illustration is taken from husbandry. Salt, though it be necessary for seasoning of meats and preserving flesh, has no further use. Indeed we read in Scripture of vanquished cities sown with salt by the victors, that nothing should thenceforth grow there.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) When then they who are the heads have fallen away, they are fit for no use but to be cast out from the office of teacher.

HILARY. Or even cast out from the Church’s store rooms to be trodden under foot by those that walk.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Not he that suffers persecution is trodden under foot of men, but he who through fear of persecution falls away. For we can tread only on what is below us; but he is no way below us, who however much he may suffer in the body, yet has his heart fixed in heaven.

5:14

14. Ye are the light of the world. A city that is set on an hill cannot be hid.

GLOSS. As the doctors by their good conversation are the salt with which the people is salted; so by their word of doctrine they are the light by which the ignorant are enlightened.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But to live well must go before to teach well; hence after He had called the Apostles the salt, He goes on to call them the light of the world. Or, for that salt preserves a thing in its present state that it should not change for the worse, but that light brings it into a better state by enlightening it; therefore the Apostles were first called salt with respect to the Jews and that Christian body which had the knowledge of God, and which they keep in that knowledge; and now light with respect to the Gentiles whom they bring to the light of that knowledge.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) By the world here we must not understand heaven and earth, but the men who are in the world; or those who love the world for whose enlightenment the Apostles were sent.

HILARY. It is the nature of a light to emit its rays whithersoever it is carried about, and when brought into a house to dispel the darkness of that house. Thus the world, placed beyond the pale of the knowledge of God, was held in the darkness of ignorance, till the light of knowledge was brought to it by the Apostles, and thenceforward the knowledge of God shone bright, and from their small bodies, whithersoever they went about, light is ministered to the darkness.

REMIGIUS. For as the sun sends forth his beams, so the Lord, the Sun of righteousness, sent forth his Apostles to dispel the night of the human race.

CHRYSOSTOM. Mark how great His promise to them, men who were scarce known in their own country that the fame of them should reach to the ends of the earth. The persecutions which He had foretold, were not able to dim their light, yea they made it but more conspicuous.

JEROME. He instructs them what should be the boldness of their preaching, that as Apostles they should not be hidden through fear, like lamps under a corn-measure, but should stand forth with all confidence, and what they have heard in the secret chambers, that declare upon the house tops.

CHRYSOSTOM. Thus shewing them that they ought to be careful of their own walk and conversation, seeing they were set in the eyes of all, like a city on a hill, or a lamp on a stand.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This city is the Church of which it is said, Glorious things are spoken of thee, thou city of God. (Ps. 87:3.) Its citizens are all the faithful, of whom the Apostle speaks, Ye are fellow-citizens of the saints. (Eph. 2:19.) It is built upon Christ the hill, of whom Daniel thus, A stone hewed without hands (Dan. 2:34.) became a great mountain.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, the mountain is the great righteousness, which is signified by the mountain from which the Lord is now teaching.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. A city set on a hill cannot be hidden though it would; the mountain which bears makes it to be seen of all men; so the Apostles and Priests who are founded on Christ cannot be hidden even though they would, because Christ makes them manifest.

HILARY. Or, the city signifies the flesh which He had taken on Him; because that in Him by this assumption of human nature, there was as it were a collection of the human race, and we by partaking in His flesh become inhabitants of that city. He cannot therefore be hid, because being set in the height of God’s power, He is offered to be contemplated of all men in admiration of his works.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. How Christ manifests His saints, suffering them not to be hid, He shews by another comparison, adding, Neither do men light a lamp to put it under a corn-measure, but on a stand.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, in the illustration of the city, He signified His own power, by the lamp He exhorts the Apostles to preach with boldness; as though He said, ‘I indeed have lighted the lamp, but that it continue to burn will be your care, not for your own sakes only, but both for others who shall receive its light and for God’s glory.’

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The lamp is the Divine word, of which it is said, Thy word is a lamp unto my feet. (Ps. 119:105.) They who light this lamp are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) With what meaning do we suppose the words, to put it under a corn-measure, were said? To express concealment simply, or that the corn-measure has a special signification? The putting the lamp under the corn-measure means the preferring bodily ease and enjoyment to the duty of preaching the Gospel, and hiding the light of good teaching under temporal gratification. The corn-measure aptly denotes the things of the body, whether because our reward shall be measured out to us, as each one shall receive the things done in the body; (2 Cor. 5:10.) or because worldly goods which pertain to the body come and go within a certain measure of time, which is signified by the corn-measure, whereas things eternal and spiritual are contained within no such limit. He places his lamp upon a stand, who subdues his body to the ministry of the word, setting the preaching of the truth highest, and subjecting the body beneath it. For the body itself serves to make doctrine shine more clear, while the voice and other motions of the body in good works serve to recommend it to them that learn.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, men of the world may be figured in the corn-measure as these are empty above, but full beneath, so worldly men are foolish in spiritual things, but wise in earthly things, and therefore like a corn-measure they keep the word of God hid, whenever for any worldly cause he had not dared to proclaim the word openly, and the truth of the faith. The stand for the lamp is the Church which bears the word of life, and all ecclesiastical persons. (vid. Phil. 2:15.)

HILARY. Or, the Lord likened the Synagogue to a corn-measure, which only receiving within itself such fruit as was raised, contained a certain measure of limited obedience.

AMBROSE. (non occ.) And therefore let none shut up his faith within the measure of the Law, but have recourse to the Church in which the grace of the sevenfold Spirit shines forth.

BEDE. (in loc. quoad sens.) Or, Christ Himself has lighted this lamp, when He filled the earthen vessel of human nature with the fire of His Divinity, which He would not either hide from them that believe, nor put under a bushel that is shut up under the measure of the Law, or confine within the limits of any one oration. The lampstand is the Church, on which He set the lamp, when He affixed to our foreheads the faith of His incarnation.

HILARY. Or, the lamp, i. e. Christ Himself, is set on its stand when He was suspended on the Cross in His passion, to give light for ever to those that dwell in the Church; to give light, He says, to all that are in the house.

AUGUSTINE. For it is not absurd if any one will understand the house to be the Church. Or, the house may be the world itself, according to what He said above, Ye are the light of the world.

HILARY. He instructs the Apostles to shine with such a light, that in the admiration of their work God may be praised, Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That is, teaching with so pure a light, that men may not only hear your words, but see your works, that those whom as lamps ye have enlightened by the word, as salt ye may season by your example. For by those teachers who do as well as teach, God is magnified; for the discipline of the master is seen in the behaviour of the family. And therefore it follows, and they shall glorify your Father which is in heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 7.) Had He only said, That they may see your good works, He would have seemed to have set up as an end to be sought the praises of men, which the hypocrites desire; but by adding, and glorify your Father, he teaches that we should not seek as an end to please men with our good works, but referring all to the glory of God, therefore seek to please men, that in that God may be glorified.

HILARY. He means not that we should seek glory of men, but that though we conceal it, our work may shine forth in honour of God to those among whom we live.

5:17–19

17. Think not that I am come to destroy the Law, or the Prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.

18. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled.

19. Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven: but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven.

GLOSS. (ord.) Having now exhorted His hearers to undergo all things for righteousness' sake, and also not to hide what they should receive, but to learn more for others' sake, that they may teach others, He now goes on to tell them what they should teach, as though He had been asked, 'What is this which you would not have hid, and for which you would have all things endured? Are you about to speak any thing beyond what is written in the Law and the Prophets;' hence it is He says, Think not that I am come to subvert the Law or the Prophets.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And that for two reasons. First, that by these words He might admonish His disciples, that as He fulfilled the Law, so they should strive to fulfil it. Secondly, because the Jews would falsely accuse them as subverting the Law, therefore he answers the calumny beforehand, but in such a manner as that He should not be thought to come simply to preach the Law as the Prophets had done.

REMIGIUS. He here asserts two things; He denies that He was come to subvert the Law, and affirms that He was come to fulfil it.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 8.) In this last sentence again there is a double sense; to fulfil the Law, either by adding something which it had not, or by doing what it commands.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvi.) Christ then fulfilled the Prophets by accomplishing what was therein foretold concerning Himself—and the Law, first, by transgressing none of its precepts; secondly, by justifying by faith, which the Law could not do by the letter.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 7. et seq.) And lastly, because even for them who were under grace, it was hard in this mortal life to fulfil that of the Law, Thou shalt not lust, He being made a Priest by the sacrifice of His flesh, obtained for us this indulgence, even in this fulfilling the Law, that where through our infirmity we could not, we should be strengthened through His perfection, of whom as our head we all are members. For so I think must be taken these words, to fulfil the Law, by adding to it, that is, such things as either contribute to the explanation of the old glosses, or to enable to keep them. For the Lord has shewed us that even a wicked motion of the thoughts to the wrong of a brother is to be accounted a kind of murder. The Lord also teaches us, that it is better to keep near to the truth without swearing, than with a true oath to come near to blasphemy.

AUGUSTINE. But how, ye Manichæans, do you not receive the Law and the Prophets, seeing Christ here says, that He is come not to subvert but to fulfil them? To this the heretic Faustusa replies, Whose testimony is there that Christ spoke this? That of Matthew. How was it then that John does not give this saying, who was with Him in the mount, but only Matthew, who did not follow Jesus till after He had come down from the mount? To this Augustine replies, If none can speak truth concerning Christ, but who saw and heard Him, there is no one at this day who speaks truth concerning Him. Why then could not Matthew hear from John's mouth the truth as Christ had spoken, as well as we who are born so long after can speak the truth out of John's book? In the same manner also it is, that not Matthew's Gospel, but also these of Luke and Mark are received by us, and on no inferior authority. Add, that the Lord Himself might have told Matthew the things He had done before He called him. But speak out and say that you do not believe the Gospel, for they who believe nothing in the Gospel but what they wish to believe, believe themselves rather than the Gospel. To this Faustus rejoins, We will prove that this was not written by Matthew, but by some other hand, unknown, in his name. For below he says, Jesus saw a man sitting at the toll-office, Matthew by name. (Mat. 9:9.) Who writing of himself says, 'saw a man,' and not rather 'saw me?' Augustine; Matthew does no more than John does, when he says, Peter turning round saw that other disciple whom Jesus loved; and it is well known that this is the common manner of Scripture writers, when writing their own actions. Faustus again, But what say you to this, that the very assurance that He was not come to destroy the Law and the Prophets, was the direct way to rouse their suspicions that He was? For He had yet done nothing that could lead the Jews to think that this was His object. Augustine; This is a very weak objection, for we do not deny that to the Jews who had no understanding, Christ might have appeared as threatening the destruction of the Law and the Prophets. Faustus; But what if the Law and the Prophets do not accept this fulfilment, according to that in Deuteronomy, These commandments that I give unto thee, thou shalt keep, thou shalt not add any thing to them, nor take away. Augustine; Here Faustus does not understand what it is to fulfil the Law, when he supposes that it must be taken of adding words to it. The fulfilment of the Law is love, which the Lord hath given in sending His Holy Spirit. The Law is fulfilled either when the things there commanded are done, or when the things there prophesied come to pass. Faustus; But in that we confess that Jesus was author of a New Testament, what else is it than to confess that He has done away with the Old? Augustine; In the Old Testament were figures of things to come, which, when the things themselves were brought in by Christ, ought to have been taken away, that in that very taking away the Law and the Prophets might be fulfilled wherein it was written that God gave a New Testament. Faustus; Therefore if Christ did say this thing, He either said it with some other meaning, or He spoke falsely, (which God forbid,) or we must take the other alternative, He did not speak it at all. But that Jesus spoke falsely none will aver, therefore He either spoke it with another meaning, or He spake it not at all. For myself I am rescued from the necessity of this alternative by the Manichæan belief, which from the first taught me not to believe all those things which are read in Jesus' name as having been spoken by Him; for that there be many tares which to corrupt the good seed some nightly sower has scattered up and down through nearly the whole of Scripture. Augustine; Manichæus taught an impious error, that you should receive only so much of the Gospel as does not conflict with your heresy, and not receive whatever does conflict with it. We have learned of the Apostle that religious caution, Whoever preaches unto you another Gospel than that we have preached, let him be accursed. (Gal. 1:8.) The Lord also has explained what the tares signify, not things false mixed with the true Scriptures, as you interpret, but men who are children of the wicked one. Faustus; Should a Jew then enquire of you why you do not keep the precepts of the Law and the Prophets which Christ here declares He came not to destroy but to fulfil, you will be driven either to accept an empty superstition, or to repudiate this chapter as false, or to deny that you are Christ's disciple. Augustine; The Catholics are not in any difficulty on account of this chapter as though they did not observe the Law and the Prophets; for they do cherish love to God and their neighbour, on which hang all the Law and the Prophets. And whatever in the Law and the Prophets was foreshown, whether in things done, in the celebration of sacramental rites, or in forms of speech, all these they know to be fulfilled in Christ and the Church. Wherefore we neither submit to a false superstition, nor reject the chapter, nor deny ourselves to be Christ's disciples. He then who says, that unless Christ had destroyed the Law and the Prophets, the Mosaic rites would have continued along with the Christian ordinances, may further affirm, that unless Christ had destroyed the Law and the Prophets, He would yet be only promised as to be born, to suffer, to rise again. But inasmuch as He did not destroy, but rather fulfil them, His birth, passion, and resurrection, are now no more promised as things future, which were signified by the Sacraments of the Law; but He is preached as already born, crucified, and risen, which are signified by the Sacraments now celebrated by Christians. It is clear then how great is the error of those who suppose, that when the signs or sacraments are changed, the things themselves are different, whereas the same things which the Prophetic ordinance had held forth as promises, the Evangelic ordinance points to as completed. Faustus; Supposing these to be Christ's genuine words, we should enquire what was His motive for speaking thus, whether to soften the blind hostility of the Jews, who when they saw their holy things trodden under foot by Him, would not have so much as given Him a hearing; or whether He really said them to instruct us, who of the Gentiles should believe, to submit to the yoke of the Law. If this last were not His design, then the first must have been; nor was there any deceit or fraud in such purpose. For of laws there be three sorts. The first that of the Hebrews, called the law of sin and death, (Rom. 8:2.) by Paul; the second that of the Gentiles, which he calls the law of nature, saying, By nature the Gentiles do the deeds of the law; (Rom. 2:14.) the third, the law of truth, which he names, The law of the Spirit of life. Also there are Prophets some of the Jews, such as are well known; others of the Gentiles as Paul speaks, A prophet of their own hath said; (Tit. 1:12.) and others of the truth, of whom Jesus speaks, I send unto you wise men and prophets. (Mat. 23:34.) Now had Jesus in the following part of this Sermon brought forward any of the Hebrew observances to shew how he had fulfilled them, no one would have doubted that it was of the Jewish Law and Prophets that He was now speaking; but when He brings forward in this way only those more ancient precepts, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, which were promulged of old to Enoch, Seth, and the other righteous men, who does not see that He is here speaking of the Law and Prophets of truth? Wherever He has occasion to speak of any thing merely Jewish, He plucks it up by the very roots, giving precepts directly the contrary; for example, in the case of that precept, An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Augustine; Which was the Law and which the Prophets, that Christ came not to subvert but to fulfil, is manifest, to wit, the Law given by Moses. And the distinction which Faustus draws between the precepts of the righteous men before Moses, and the Mosaic Law, affirming that Christ fulfilled the one but annulled the other, is not so. We affirm that the Law of Moses was both well suited to its temporary purpose, and was now not subverted, but fulfilled by Christ, as will be seen in each particular. This was not understood by those who continued in such obstinate error, that they compelled the Gentiles to Judaize—those heretics, I mean, who were called Nazarenes.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But since all things which should befal from the very beginning of the world to the end of it, were in type and figure foreshewn in the Law, that God may not be thought to be ignorant of any of those things that take place, He therefore here declares, that heaven and earth should not pass till all things thus foreshewn in the Law should have their actual accomplishment.

REMIGIUS. Amen is a Hebrew word, and may be rendered in Latin, ‘vere,’ ‘fidenter,’ or ‘fiat;’ that is, ‘truly,’ ‘faithfully,’ or ‘so be it.’ The Lord uses it either because of the hardness of heart of those who were slow to believe, or to attract more particularly the attention of those that did believe.

HILARY. From the expression here used pass, we may suppose that the constituting elements of heaven and earth shall not be annihilatedb.

REMIGIUS. But shall abide in their essence, but pass through renewal.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 8.) By the words, one iota or one point shall not pass from the Law, we must understand only a strong metaphor of completeness, drawn from the letters of writing, iota being the least of the letters, made with one stroke of the pen, and a point being a slight dot at the end of the same letter. The words there shew that the Law shall be completed to the very least matter.

RABANUS. He fitly mentions the Greek iota, and not the Hebrew jod, because the iota stands in Greek for the number ten, and so there is an allusion to the Decalogue of which the Gospel is the point and perfection.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. If even an honourable man blushes to be found in a falsehood, and a wise man lets not fall empty any word he has once spoken, how could it be that the words of heaven should fall to the ground empty? Hence He concludes, Whoso shall break the least of these commandments, &c. And, I suppose, the Lord goes on to reply Himself to the question, Which are the least commandments? Namely, these which I am now about to speak.

CHRYSOSTOM. He speaks not this of the old laws, but of those which He was now going to enact, of which he says, the least, though they were all great. For as He so oft spoke humbly of Himself, so does He now speak humbly of His precepts.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; the precepts of Moses are easy to obey; Thou shall not kill. Thou shall not commit adultery. The very greatness of the crime is a check upon the desire of committing it; therefore the reward of observance is small, the sin of transgression great. But Christ's precepts, Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not lust, are hard to obey, and therefore in their reward they are great, in their transgression, 'least.' It is thus He speaks of these precepts of Christ, such as Thou shall not be angry, Thou shalt not lust, as 'the least;' and they who commit these lesser sins, are the least in the kingdom of God; that is, he who has been angry and not sinned grievously is secure from the punishment of eternal damnation; yet he does not attain that glory which they attain who fulfil even these least.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, the precepts of the Law are called 'the least,' as opposed to Christ's precepts which are great. The least commandments are signified by the iota and the point. He, therefore, who breaks them, and teaches men so, that is, to do as he does, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven. Hence we may perhaps conclude, that it is not true that there shall none be there except they be great.

GLOSS. (ord.) By 'break,' is meant, the not doing what one understands rightly, or the not understanding what one has corrupted, or the destroying the perfectness of Christ's additions.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, when you hear the words, least in the kingdom of heaven, imagine nothing less than the punishment of hell. For He oft uses the word 'kingdom,' not only of the joys of heaven, but of the time of the resurrection, and of the terrible coming of Christ.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xii. 1.) Or, by the kingdom of heaven is to be understood the Church, in which that teacher who breaks a commandment is called least, because he whose life is despised, it remains that his preaching be also despised.

HILARY. Or, He calls the passion, and the cross, the least, which if one shall not confess openly, but be ashamed of them, he shall be least, that is, last, and as it were no man; but to him that confesses it He promises the great glory of a heavenly calling.

JEROME. This head is closely connected with the preceding. It is directed against the Pharisees, who, despising the commandments of God, set up traditions of their own, and means that their teaching the people would not avail themselves, if they destroyed the very least commandment in the Law. We may take it in another sense. The learning of the master if joined with sin however small, loses him the highest place, nor does it avail any to teach righteousness, if he destroys it in his life. Perfect bliss is for him who fulfils in deed what he teaches in word.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Otherwise; he who breaks the least of these commandments, that is, of Moses' Law, and teaches men so, shall be called the least; but he who shall do (these least), and so teach, shall not indeed be esteemed great, yet not so little as he who breaks them. That he should be great, he ought to do and to teach the things which Christ now teaches.

5:20–22

20. For I say unto you, That except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven.

21. Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill; and whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment:

22. But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council: but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.

HILARY. Beautiful entrance He here makes to a teaching beyond the works of the Law, declaring to the Apostles that they should have no admission to the kingdom of heaven without a righteousness beyond that of Pharisees.

CHRYSOSTOM. By righteousness is here meant universal virtue. But observe the superior power of grace, in that He requires of His disciples who were yet uninstructed to be better than those who were masters under the Old Testament. Thus He does not call the Scribes and Pharisees unrighteous, but speaks of their righteousness. And see how even herein He confirms the Old Testament that He compares it with the New, for the greater and the less are always of the same kind.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees are the commandments of Moses; but the commandments of Christ are the fulfilment of that Law. This then is His meaning; Whosoever in addition to the commandments of the Law shall not fulfil My commandments, shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. For those indeed save from the punishment due to transgressors of the Law, but do not bring into the kingdom; but My commandments both deliver from punishment, and bring into the kingdom. But seeing that to break the least commandments and not to keep them are one and the same, why does He say above of him that breaks the commandments, that he shall be the least in the kingdom of heaven, and here of him who keeps them not, that he shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven? See how to be the least in the kingdom is the same with not entering into the kingdom. For a man to be in the kingdom is not to reign with Christ, but only to be numbered among Christ’s people; what He says then of him that breaks the commandments is, that he shall indeed be reckoned among Christians, yet the least of them. But he who enters into the kingdom, becomes partaker of His kingdom with Christ. Therefore he who does not enter into the kingdom of heaven, shall not indeed have a part of Christ’s glory, yet shall he be in the kingdom of heaven, that is, in the number of those over whom Christ reigns as King of heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xx. 9.) Otherwise, unless your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, that is, exceed that of those who break what themselves teach, as it is elsewhere said of them, They say, and do not; (Mat. 23:3.) just as if He had said, Unless your righteousness exceed in this way that ye do what ye teach, you shall not enter the kingdom of heaven. We must therefore understand something other than usual by the kingdom of heaven here, in which are to be both he who breaks what he teaches, and he who does it, but the one least, the other great; this kingdom of heaven is the present Church. In another sense is the kingdom of heaven spoken of that place where none enters but he who does what he teaches, and this is the Church as it shall be hereafter.

AUGUSTINE. (Id. cont. Faust. xix. 31.) This expression, the kingdom of heaven, so often used by our Lord, I know not whether any one would find in the books of the Old Testament. It belongs properly to the New Testament revelation, kept for His mouth whom the Old Testament figured as a King that should come to reign over His servants. This end, to which its precepts were to be referred, was hidden in the Old Testament, though even that had its saints who looked forward to the revelation that should be made.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Or, we may explain by referring to the way in which the Scribes and Pharisees understood the Law, not to the actual contents of the Law.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 30.) For almost all the precepts which the Lord gave, saying, But I say unto you, are found in those ancient books. But because they knew not of any murder, besides the destruction of the body, the Lord shews them that every evil thought to the hurt of a brother is to be held for a kind of murder.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Christ willing to shew that He is the same God who spoke of old in the Law, and who now gives commandments in grace, now puts first of all his commandments (vid. Mat. 19:18.), that one which was the first in the Law, first, at least, of all those that forbade injury to our neighbour.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, i. 20.) We do not, because we have heard that, Thou shall not kill, deem it therefore unlawful to pluck a twig, according to the error of the Manichees, nor consider it to extend to irrational brutes; by the most righteous ordinance of the Creator their life and death is subservient to our needs. There remains, therefore, only man of whom we can understand it, and that not any other man, nor you only; for he who kills himself does nothing else but kill a man. Yet have not they in any way done contrary to this commandment who have waged wars under God’s authority, or they who charged with the administration of civil power have by most just and reasonable orders inflicted death upon criminals. Also Abraham was not charged with cruelty, but even received the praise of piety, for that he was willing to obey God in slaying his son. Those are to be excepted from this command whom God commands to be put to death, either by a general law given, or by particular admonition at any special time. For he is not the slayer who ministers to the command, like a hilt to one smiting with a sword, nor is Samson otherwise to be acquitted for destroying himself along with his enemies, than because he was so instructed privily of the Holy Spirit, who through him wrought the miracles.

CHRYSOSTOM. This, it was said by them of old time, shews that it was long ago that they had received this precept. He says this that He might rouse His sluggish hearers to proceed to more sublime precepts, as a teacher might say to an indolent boy, Know you not how long time you have spent already in merely learning to spell? In that, I say unto you, mark the authority of the legislator, none of the old Prophets spoke thus; but rather, Thus saith the Lord. They as servants repeated the commands of their Lord; He as a Son declared the will of His Father, which was also His own. They preached to their fellow servants; Ha as master ordained a law for his slaves.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, ix. 4.) There are two different opinions among philosophers concerning the passions of the mind: the Stoics do not allow that any passion is incident to the wise man; the Peripatetics affirm that they are incident to the wise man but in a moderate degree and subject to reason; as, for example, when mercy is shewn in such a manner that justice is preserved. But in the Christian rule we do not enquire whether the mind is first affected with anger or with sorrow, but whence.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He who is angry without cause shall be judged; but he who is angry with cause shall not be judged. For if there were no anger, neither teaching would profit, nor judgments hold, nor crimes be controlled. So that he who on just cause is not angry, is in sin; for an unreasonable patience sows vices, breeds carelessness, and invites the good as well as the bad to do evil.

JEROME. Some copies add here the words, without cause; but by the true readingc the precept is made unconditional, and anger altogether forbidden. For when we are told to pray for them that persecute us, all occasion of anger is taken away. The words without cause then must be erased, for the wrath of man worketh not the righteousness of God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Yet that anger which arises from just cause is indeed not anger, but a sentence of judgment. For anger properly means a feeling of passion; but he whose anger arises from just cause does not suffer any passion, and is rightly said to sentence, not to be angry with.

AUGUSTINE. (Retract. i. 19.) This also we affirm should be taken into consideration, what is being angry with a brother; for he is not angry with a brother who is angry at his offence. He then it is who is angry without cause, who is angry with his brother, and not with the offence.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xiv. 9.) But to be angry with a brother to the end that he may be corrected, there is no man of sound mind who forbids. Such sort of motions as come of love of good and of holy charity, are not to be called vices when they follow right reason.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But I think that Christ does not speak of anger of the flesh, but anger of the heart; for the flesh cannot be so disciplined as not to feel the passion. When then a man is angry but refrains from doing what his anger prompts him, his flesh is angry, but his heart is free from anger.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 9.) And there is this same distinction between the first case here put by the Saviour and the second: in the first case there is one thing, the passion; in the second two, anger and speech following thereupon, He who saith to his brother, Raca, is in danger of the council. Some seek the interpretation of this word in the Greek, and think that Raca means ragged, from the Greek ῥάκος, a rag. But more probably it is not a word of any meaning, but a mere sound expressing the passion of the mind, which grammarians call an interjection, such as the cry of pain, ‘heu.’

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, Racha is a word signifying contempt, and worthlessness. For where we in speaking to servants or children say, Go thou, or, Tell thou him; in Syriac they would say Racha for ‘thou.’ For the Lord descends to the smallest trifles even of our behaviour, and bids us treat one another with mutual respect.

JEROME. Or, Racha is a Hebrew word signifying, ‘empty,’ ‘vain;’ as we might say in the common phrase of reproach, ‘empty-pate.’ Observe that He says brother; for who is our brother, but he who has the same Father as ourselves?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And it were an unworthy reproach to him who has in him the Holy Spirit to call him ‘empty.’

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) In the third case are three things; anger, the voice expressive of anger, and a word of reproach, Thou fool. Thus here are three different degrees of sin; in the first when one is angry, but keeps the passion in his heart without giving any sign of it. If again he suffers any sound expressive of the passion to escape him, it is more than had he silently suppressed the rising anger; and if he speaks a word which conveys a direct reproach, it is a yet greater sin.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But as none is empty who has the Holy Spirit, so none is a fool who has the knowledge of Christ; and if Racha signifies ‘empty,’ it is one and the same thing, as far as the meaning of the word goes, to say Racha, or ‘thou fool.’ But there is a difference in the meaning of the speaker; for Racha was a word in common use among the Jews, not expressing wrath or hate, but rather in a light careless way expressing confident familiarity, not anger. But you will perhaps say, if Racha is not an expression of wrath, how is it then a sin? Because it is said for contention, not for edification; and if we ought not to speak even good words but for the sake of edification, how much more not such as are in themselves bad?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Here we have three arraignments, the judgment, the council, and hell-fire, being different stages ascending from the lesser to the greater. For in the judgment there is yet opportunity for defence; to the council belongs the respite of the sentence, what time the judges confer among themselves what sentence ought to be inflicted; in the third, hell-fire, condemnation is certain, and the punishment fixed. Hence is seen what a difference is between the righteousness of the Pharisees and Christ; in the first, murder subjects a man to judgment; in the second, anger alone, which is the least of the three degrees of sin.

RABANUS. The Saviour here names the torments of hell, Gehenna, a name thought to be derived from a valley consecrate to idols near Jerusalem, and filled of old with dead bodies, and defiled by Josiah, as we read in the Book of Kings.

CHRYSOSTOM. This is the first mention of hell, though the kingdom of Heaven had been mentioned some time before, which shews that the gifts of the one comes of His love, the condemnation of the other of our sloth. Many thinking this a punishment too severe for a mere word, say that this was said figuratively. But I fear that if we thus cheat ourselves with words here, we shall suffer punishment in deed there. Think not then this too heavy a punishment, when so many sufferings and sins have their beginning in a word; a little word has often begotten a murder, and overturned whole cities. And yet it is not to be thought a little word that denies a brother reason and understanding by which we are men, and differ from the brutes.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. In danger of the council; that is, (according to the interpretation given by the Apostles in their Constitutions,) in danger of being one of that Council which condemned Christe.

HILARY. Or, he who reproaches with emptiness one full of the Holy Spirit, will he arraigned in the assembly of the Saints, and by their sentence will be punished for an affront against that Holy Spirit Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Should any ask what greater punishment is reserved for murder, if evil-speaking is visited with hell-fire? This obliges us to understand, that there are degrees in hell.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, the judgment and the council denote punishment in this word; hell-fire future punishment. He denounces punishment against anger, yet does not mention any special punishment, shewing therein that it is not possible that a man should be altogether free from the passion. The Council here means the Jewish senate, for He would not seem to be always superseding all their established institutions, and introducing foreignf.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) In all these three sentences there are some words understood. In the first indeed, as many copies read without cause, there is nothing to be supplied. In the second, He who saith to his brother, Racha, we must supply the words, without cause; and again, in He who says, Thou fool, two things are understood, to his brother, and, without cause. And this forms the defence of the Apostle, when he calls the Galatians fools, though he considers them his brethren; for he did it not without cause.

5:23–24

23. Therefore if thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath ought against thee;

24. Leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way; first be reconciled to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 10.) If it be not lawful to be angry with a brother, or to say to him Racha, or Thou fool, much less is it lawful to keep in the memory any thing which might convert anger into hate.

JEROME. It is not, If thou hast ought against thy brother; but, If thy brother has ought against thee, that the necessity of reconciliation may be more imperative.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) And he has somewhat against us when we have wronged him; and we have somewhat against him when he has wronged us, in which case there were no need to go to be reconciled to him, seeing we had only to forgive him, as we desire the Lord to forgive us.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But if it is he that hath done you the wrong, and yet you be the first to seek reconciliation, you shall have a great reward.

CHRYSOSTOM. If love alone is not enough to induce us to be reconciled to our neighbour, the desire that our work should not remain imperfect, and especially in the holy place, should induce us.

GREGORY. (Hom. 1. in Ezech. viii. 9.) Lo He is not willing to accept sacrifice at the hands of those who are at variance. Hence then consider how great an evil is strife, which throws away what should be the means of remission of sin.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. See the mercy of God, that He thinks rather of man’s benefit than of His own honour; He loves concord in the faithful more than offerings at His altar; for so long as there are dissensions among the faithful, their gift is not looked upon, their prayer is not heard. For no one can be a true friend at the same time to two who are enemies to each other. In like manner, we do not keep our fealty to God, if we do not love His friends and hate His enemies. But such as was the offence, such should also be the reconciliation. If you have offended in thought, be reconciled in thought; if in words, be reconciled in words; if in deeds, in deeds be reconciled. For so it is in every sin, in whatsoever kind it was committed, in that kind is the penance done.

HILARY. He bids us when peace with our fellow-men is restored, then to return to peace with God, passing from the love of men to the love of God; then go and offer thy gift.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) If this direction be taken literally, it might lead some to suppose that this ought indeed to be so done if our brother is present, for that no long time can be meant when we are bid to leave our offering there before the altar. For if he be absent, or possibly beyond sea, it is absurd to suppose that the offering must be left before the altar; to be offered after we have gone over land and sea to seek him. Wherefore we must embrace an inward, spiritual sense of the whole, if we would understand it without involving any absurdity. The gift which we offer to God, whether learning, or speech, or whatever it be, cannot be accepted of God unless it be supported by faith. If then we have in aught harmed a brother, we must go and be reconciled with him, not with the bodily feet, but in thoughts of the heart, when in humble contrition you may cast yourself at your brother's feet in sight of Him whose offering you are about to offer. For thus in the same manner as though He were present, you may with unfeigned heart seek His forgiveness; and returning thence, that is, bringing back again your thoughts to what you had first begun to do, may make your offering.

5:25–26

25. Agree with thine adversary quickly, whiles thou art in the way with him; lest at any time the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and thou be cast into prison.

26. Verily I say unto thee, Thou shalt by no means come out thence, till thou hast paid the uttermost farthing.

HILARY. The Lord suffers us at no time to be wanting in peaceableness of temper, and therefore bids us be reconciled to our adversary quickly, while on the road of life, lest we be cast into the season of death before peace be joined between us.

JEROME. The word here in our Latin books is 'consentiens,' in Greek, εὐνοῶν, which means, 'kind,' 'benevolent.'

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 11.) Let us see who this adversary is to whom we are bid to be benevolent, It may then be either the Devil, or man, or the flesh, or God, or His commandments. But I do not see how we can be bid be benevolent, or agreeing with the Devil; for where there is good will, there is friendship, and no one will say that friendship should be made with the Devil, or that it is well to agree with him, having once proclaimed war against him when we renounced him; nor ought we to consent with him, with whom had we never consented, we had never come into such circumstances,

JEROME. Some, from that verse of Peter, Your adversary the Devil, &c. (1 Pet. 5:8.) will have the Saviour's command to be, that we should be merciful to the Devil, not causing him to endure punishment for our sakes. For as he puts in our way the incentives to vice, if we yield to his suggestions, he will be tormented for our sakes. Some follow a more forced interpretation, that in baptism we have each of us made a compact with the Devil by renouncing him. If we observe this compact, then we are agreeing with our adversary, and shall not be cast into prison.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) I do not see again how it can be understood of man. For how can man be said to deliver us to the Judge, when we know only Christ as the Judge, before whose tribunal all must be sisted. How then can he deliver to the Judge, who has himself to appear before Him? Moreover if any has sinned against any by killing him, he has no opportunity of agreeing with him in the way, that is in this life; and yet that hinders not but that he may be rescued from judgment by repentance. Much less do I see how we can be bid be agreeing with the flesh; for they are sinners rather who agree with it; but they who bring it into subjection, do not agree with it, but compel it to agree with them.

JEROME. And how can the body be cast into prison if it agree not with the spirit, seeing soul and body must go together, and that the flesh can do nothing but what the soul shall command?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Perhaps then it is God with whom we are here enjoined to agree. He may be said to be our adversary, because we have departed from Him by sin, and He resisteth the proud. Whosoever then shall not have been reconciled in this life with God through the death of His Son, shall be by Him delivered to the Judge, that is, the Son, to whom He has committed all judgment. And man may be said to be in the way with God, because He is every where. But if we like not to say that the wicked are with God, who is every where present, as we do not say that the blind are with that light which is every where around them, there only remains the law of God which we can understand by our adversary. For this law is an adversary to such as love to sin, and is given us for this life that it may be with us in the way. To this we ought to agree quickly, by reading, hearing, and bestowing on it the summit of authority, and that when we understand it, we hate it not because it opposes our sins, but rather love it because it corrects them; and when it is obscure, pray that we may understand it.

JEROME. But from the context the sense is manifest; the Lord is exhorting us to peace and concord with our neighbour; as it was said above, Go, be reconciled to thy brother.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord is urgent with us to hasten to make friends with our enemies while we are yet in this life, knowing how dangerous for us that one of our enemies should die before peace is made with us. For if death bring us while yet at enmity to the Judge, he will deliver us to Christ, proving us guilty by his judgment. Our adversary also delivers us to the Judge, when he is the first to seek reconciliation; for he who first submits to his enemy, brings him in guilty before God.

HILARY. Or, the adversary delivers you to the Judge, when the abiding of your wrath towards him convicts you.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) By the Judge I understand Christ, for, the Father hath committed all judgment to the Son; (John 5:22.) and by the officer, or minister, an Angel, for, Angels came and ministered unto Him; and we believe that He will come with his Angels to judge.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The officer, that is, the ministering Angel of punishment, and he shall cast you into the prison of hell.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) By the prison I understand the punishment of the darkness. And that none should despise that punishment, He adds, Verily I say unto thee, thou shalt not come out thence till thou hast paid the very last farthing.

JEROME. A farthing is a coin containing two mites. What He says then is, ‘Thou shalt not go forth thence till thou hast paid for the smallest sins.’

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or it is an expression to denote that there is nothing that shall go unpunished; as we say ‘To the dregs,’ when we are speaking of any thing so emptied that nothing is left in it. Or by the last farthing (quadrans.) may be denoted earthly sins. For the fourth and last element of this world is earth. Paid, that is in eternal punishment; and until used in the same sense as in that, Sit thou on my right hand until I make thy enemies thy footstool; (Ps. 110:1.) for He does not cease to reign when His enemies are put under His feet. So here, until thou hast paid, is as much as to say, thou shalt never come out thence, for that he is always paying the very last farthing while he is enduring the everlasting punishment of earthly sins.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, If you will make your peace yet in this world, you may receive pardon of even the heaviest offences; but if once damned and cast, into the prison of hell, punishment will be exacted of you not for grievous sins only, but for each idle word, which may be denoted by the very last farthing.

HILARY. For because charity covereth a multitude of sins, we shall therefore pay the last farthing of punishment, unless by the expense of charity we redeem the fault of our sin.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, the prison is worldly misfortune which God often sends upon sinners.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He here speaks of the judges of this world, of the way which leads to this judgment, and of human prisons; thus not only employing future but present inducements, as those things which are before the eyes affect us most, as St. Paul also declares, If thou doest evil fear the power, for he beareth not the sword in vain. (Rom. 13:4.)

5:27–28

27. Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery:

28. But I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii.) The Lord having explained how much is contained in the first commandment, namely, Thou shalt not kill, proceeds in regular order to the second.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. ix. 3 and 10.) Thou shalt not commit adultery, that is, Thou shalt go no where but to thy lawful wife. For if you exact this of your wife, you ought to do the same, for the husband ought to go before the wife in virtue. It is a shame for the husband to say that this is impossible. Why not the husband as well as the wife? And let not him that is unmarried suppose that he does not break this commandment by fornication; you know the price wherewith you have been bought, you know what you eat and what you drinkg, therefore keep yourself from fornications. Forasmuch as all such acts of lust pollute and destroy God’s image, (which you are,) the Lord who knows what is good for you, gives you this precept that you may not pull down His temple which you have begun to be.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 23.) He then goes on to correct the error of the Pharisees, declaring, Whoso looketh upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery already with her in his heart. For the commandment of the Law, Thou shall not lust after thy neighbour’s wife, (Exod. 20:17.) the Jews understood of taking her away, not of committing adultery with her.

JEROME. Between πάθος and προπάθεια, that is between actual passion and the first spontaneous movement of the mind, there is this difference: passion is at once a sin; the spontaneous movement of the mind, though it partakes of the evil of sin, is yet not held for an offence committedh. When then one looks upon a woman, and his mind is therewith smitten, there is propassion; if he yields to this he passes from propassion to passion, and then it is no longer the will but the opportunity to sin that is wanting. Whosoever, then, looketh on a woman to lust after her, that is, so looks on her as to lust, and cast about to obtain, he is rightly said to commit adultery with her in his heart.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 12.) For there are three things which make up a sin; suggestion either through the memory, or the present sense; if the thought of the pleasure of indulgence follows, that is an unlawful thought, and to be restrained; if you consent then, the sin is complete. For prior to the first consent, the pleasure is either none or very slight, the consenting to which makes the sin. But if consent proceeds on into overt act, then desire seems to be satiated and quenched. And when suggestion is again repeated, the contemplated pleasure is greater, which previous to habit formed was but small, but now more difficult to overcome.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxi. 2.) But whoso casts his eyes about without caution will often be taken with the pleasure of sin, and ensnared by desires begins to wish for what he would not. Great is the strength of the flesh to draw us downwards, and the charm of beauty once admitted to the heart through the eye, is hardly banished by endeavour. We must therefore take heed at the first, we ought not to look upon what it is unlawful to desire. For that the heart may be kept pure in thought, the eyes, as being on the watch to hurry us to sin, should be averted from wanton looks.

CHRYSOSTOM. If you permit yourself to gaze often on fair countenances you will assuredly be taken, even though you may be able to command your mind twice or thrice. For you are not exalted above nature and the strength of humanity. She too who dresses and adorns herself for the purpose of attracting men’s eyes to her, though her endeavour should fail, yet shall she be punished hereafter; seeing she mixed the poison and offered the cup, though none was found who would drink thereof. For what the Lord seems to speak only to the man, is of equal application to the woman; inasmuch as when He speaks to the head, the warning is meant for the whole body.

5:29–30

29. And if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.

30. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee that one of thy members should perish, and not that thy whole body should be cast into hell.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Because we ought not only to avoid actual sin, but even put away every occasion of sin, therefore having taught that adultery is to be avoided not in deed only, but in heart, He next teaches us to cut off the occasions of sin.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But if according to that of the Prophet, there is no whole part in our body, (Ps. 38:3.) it is needful that we cut off every limb that we have that the punishment may be equal to the depravity of the flesh. Is it then possible to understand this of the bodily eye or hand? As the whole man when he is turned to God is dead to sin, so likewise the eye when it has ceased to look evil is cut off from sin. But this explanation will not suit the whole; for when He says, thy right eye offends thee, what does the left eye? Does it contradict the right eye, and it is preserved innocent?

JEROME. Therefore by the right eye and the right hand we must understand the love of brethren, husbands and wives, parents and kinsfolk; which if we find to hinder our view of the true light, we ought to sever from us.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 13.) As the eye denotes contemplation, so the hand aptly denotes action. By the eye we must understand our most cherished friend, as they are wont to say who would express ardent affection, ‘I love him as my own eye.’ And a friend too who gives counsel, as the eye shews us our way. The right eye, perhaps, only means to express a higher degree of affection, for it is the one which men most fear to lose. Or, by the right eye may be understood one who counsels us in heavenly matters, and by the left one who counsels in earthly matters. And this will be the sense; Whatever that is which you love as you would your own right eye, if it offend you, that is, if it be an hindrance to your true happiness, cut it off and cast it from you. For if the right eye was not to be spared, it was superfluous to speak of the left. The right hand also is to be taken of a beloved assistant in divine actions, the left hand in earthly actions.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; Christ would have us careful not only of our own sin, but likewise that even they who pertain to us should keep themselves from evil. Have you any friend who looks to your matters as your own eye, or manages them as your own hand, if you know of any scandalous or base action that he has done, cast him from you, he is an offence; for we shall give account not only of our own sins, but also of such of those of our neighbours as it is in our power to hinder.

HILARY. Thus a more lofty step of innocence is appointed us, in that we are admonished to keep free, not only from sin ourselves, but from such as might touch as from without.

JEROME. Otherwise; As above He had placed lust in the looking on a woman, so now the thought and sense straying hither and thither He calls ‘the eye.’ By the right hand and the other parts of the body, He means the initial movements of desire and affection.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The eye of flesh is the mirror of the inward eye. The body also has its own sense, that is, the left eye, and its own appetite, that is, the left hand. But the parts of the soul are called right, for the soul was created both with free-will and under the law of righteousness, that it might both see and do rightly. But the members of the body being not with free-will, but under the law of sin, are called the left. Yet He does not bid us cut off the sense or appetite of the flesh; we may retain the desires of the flesh, and yet not do thereafter, but we cannot cut off the having the desires. But when we wilfully purpose and think of evil, then our right desires and right will offend us, and therefore He bids us cut them off. And these we can cut off, because our will is free. Or otherwise; Every thing, however good in itself that offends ourselves or others, we ought to cut off from us. For example, to visit a woman with religious purposes, this good intent towards her may be called a right eye, but if often visiting her I have fallen into the net of desire, or if any looking on are offended, then the right eye, that is, something in itself good, offends me. For the right eye is good intention, the right hand is good desire.

GLOSS. (ord.) Or; the right eye is the contemplative life which offends by being the cause of indolence or self-conceit, or in our weakness that we are not able to support it unmixed. The right hand is good works, or the active life, which offends us when we are ensnared by society and the business of life. If then any one is unable to sustain the contemplative life, let him not slothfully rest from all action; or on the other hand while he is taken up with action, dry up the fountain of sweet contemplation.

REMIGIUS. The reason why the right eye and the right hand are to be cast away is subjoined in that, For it is better, &c.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For as we are every one members one of another, it is better that we should be saved without some one of these members, than that we perish together with them. Or, it is better that we should be saved without one good purpose, or one good work, than that while we seek to perform all good works we perish together with all.

5:31–32

31. It hath been said, Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a writing of divorcement:

32. But I say unto you, That whosoever shall put away his wife, saving for the cause of fornication, causeth her to commit adultery: and whosoever shall marry her that is divorced committeth adultery.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord had taught us above that our neighbour’s wife was not to be coveted, He now proceeds to teach that our own wife is not to be put away.

JEROME. For touching Moses’s allowance of divorce, the Lord and Saviour more fully explains in conclusion, that it was because of the hardness of the hearts of the husbands, not so much sanctioning discord, as checking bloodshed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For when Moses brought the children of Israel out of Egypt, they were indeed Hebrews in race, but Egyptians in manners. And it was caused by the Gentile manners that the husband hated the wife; and if he was not permitted to put her away, he was ready either to kill her or ill-treat her. Moses therefore suffered the bill of divorcement, not because it was a good practice in itself, but was the prevention of a worse evil.

HILARY. But the Lord who brought peace and goodwill on earth, would have it reign especially in the matrimonial bond.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Fasust. xix. 26.) The Lord's command here that a wife is not to be put away, is not contrary to the command in the Law, as Manichæus affirmed. Had the Law allowed any who would to put away his wife, to allow none to put away were indeed the very opposite of that. But the difficulty which Moses is careful to put in the way, shews that he was no good friend to the practice at all. For he required a bill of divorcement, the delay and difficulty of drawing out which would often cool headlong rage and disagreement, especially as by the Hebrew custom, it was the Scribes alone who were permitted to use the Hebrew letters, in which they professed a singular skill. To these then the law would send him whom it bid to give a writing of divorcement, when he would put away his wife, who mediating between him and his wife, might set them at one again, unless in minds too wayward to be moved by counsels of peace. Thus then He neither completed, by adding words to it, the law of them of old time, nor did He destroy the Law given by Moses by enacting things contrary to it, as Manichæus affirmed; but rather repeated and approved all that the Hebrew Law contained, so that whatever He spoke in His own person more than it had, had in view either explanation, which in divers obscure places of the Law was greatly needed, or the more punctual observance of its enactments.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 14.) By interposing this delay in the mode of putting away, the lawgiver shewed as clearly as it could be shewn to hard hearts, that he hated strife and disagreement. The Lord then so confirms this backwardness in the Law, as to except only one case, the cause of fornication; every other inconvenience which may have place, He bids us bear with patience in consideration of the plighted troth of wedlock.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. If we ought to bear the burdens of strangers, in obedience to that of the Apostle, Bear ye one another's burdens, (Gal. 6:2.) how much more that of our wives and husbands? The Christian husband ought not only to keep himself from any defilement, but to be careful not to give others occasion of defilement; for so is their sin imputed to him who gave the occasion. Whoso then by putting away his wife gives another man occasion of committing adultery, is condemned for that crime himself.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Yea more, He declares the man who marries her who is put away an adulterer.

CHRYSOSTOM. Say not here, It is enough her husband has put her away; for even after she is put away she continues the wife of him that put her away.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The Apostle has fixed the limit here, requiring her to abstain from a fresh marriage as long as her husband lives. After his death he allows her to marry. But if the woman may not marry while her former husband is alive, much less may she yield herself to unlawful indulgences. But this command of the Lord, forbidding to put away a wife, is not broken by him who lives with her not carnally but spiritually, in that more blessed wedlock of those that keep themselves chaste. A question also here arises as to what is that fornication which the Lord allows as a cause of divorce; whether carnal sin, or, according to the Scripture use of the word, any unlawful passion, as idolatry, avarice, in short all transgression of the Law by forbidden desires. For if the Apostle permits the divorce of a wife if she be unbelieving, (though indeed it is better not to put her away,) and the Lord forbids any divorce but for the cause of fornication, unbelief even must be fornication. And if unbelief be fornication, and idolatry unbelief, and covetousness idolatry, it is not to be doubted that covetousness is fornication. And if covetousness be fornication, who may say of any kind of unlawful desire that it is not a kind of fornication?

AUGUSTINE. (Retract. i. 19. 6.) Yet I would not have the reader think this disputation of ours sufficient in a matter so arduous; for not every sin is spiritual fornication, nor does God destroy every sinner, for He hears His saints daily crying to Him, Forgive us our debts; but every man who goes a whoring and forsakes Him, him He destroys. Whether this be the fornication for which divorce is allowed is a most knotty question—for it is no question at all that it is allowed for the fornication by earnal sin.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. 83. Quæst. q. ult.) If any affirm that the only fornication for which the Lord allows divorce is that of earnal sin, he may say that the Lord has spoken of believing husbands and wives, forbidding either to leave the other except for fornication.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 16.) Not only does He permit to put away a wife who commits fornication, but whoso puts away a wife by whom he is driven to commit fornication, puts her away for the cause of fornication, both for his own sake and hers.

AUGUSTINE. (de Fid. et Op. 16.) He also rightly puts away his wife to whom she shall say, I will not be your wife unless you get me money by robbery; or should require any other crime to be done by him. If the husband here be truly penitent, he will cut off the limb that offends him.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 16.) Nothing can be more unjust than to put away a wife for fornication, and yourself to be guilty of that sin, for then is that happened, Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself. (Rom. 2:1.) When He says, And he who marrieth her who is put away, committeth adultery, a question arises, does the woman also in this case commit adultery? For the Apostle directs either that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband. There is this difference in the separation, namely, which of them was the cause of it. If the wife put away the husband and marry another, she appears to have left her first husband with the desire of change, which is an adulterous thought. But if she have been put away by her husband, yet he who marries her commits adultery, how can she be quit of the same guilt? And further, if he who marries her commits adultery, she is the cause of his committing adultery, which is what the Lord is here forbidding.

5:33–37

33. Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths:

34. But I say unto you, Swear not at all; neither by Heaven; for it is God’s throne;

35. Nor by the earth; for it is His footstool: neither by Jerusalem; for it is the city of the great King.

36. Neither shalt thou swear by thy head, because thou canst not make one hair white or black.

37. But let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord has hitherto taught to abstain from injuring our neighbour, forbidding anger with murder, lust with adultery, and the putting away a wife with a bill of divorce. He now proceeds to teach to abstain from injury to God, forbidding not only perjury as an evil in itself, but even all oaths as the cause of evil, saying, Ye have heard it said by them of old, Thou shall not forswear thyself. It is written in Leviticus, Thou shalt not forswear thyself in my name; (c. 19:12.) and that they should not make gods of the creature, they are commanded to render to God their oaths, and not to swear by any creature, Render to the Lord thy oaths; that is, if you shall have occasion to swear, you shall swear by the Creator and not by the creature. As it is written in Deuteronomy, Thou shall fear the Lord thy God, and shall swear by his name. (c. 6:13.)

JEROME. This was allowed under the Law, as to children; as they offered sacrifice to God, that they might not do it to idols, so they were permitted to swear by God; not that the thing was right, but that it were better done to God than to dæmons.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For no man can swear often, but he must sometimes forswear himself; as he who has a custom of much speaking will sometimes speak foolishly.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 23.) Inasmuch as the sin of perjury is a grievous sin, he must be further removed from it who uses no oath, than he who is ready to swear on every occasion, and the Lord would rather that we should not swear and keep close to the truth, than that swearing we should come near to perjury.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 17.) This precept also confirms the righteousness of the Pharisees, not to forswear; inasmuch as he who swears not at all cannot forswear himself. But as to call God to witness is to swear, does not the Apostle break this commandment when he says several times to the Galatians, The things which I write unto you, behold, before God, I lie not. (Gal. 1:20.) So the Romans, God is my witness, whom I serve in my spirit. (Rom. 1:9) Unless perhaps some one may say, it is no oath unless I use the form of swearing by some object; and that the Apostle did not swear in saying, God is my witness. It is ridiculous to make such a distinction; yet the Apostle has used even this form, I die daily, by your boasting. (1 Cor. 15:31.) That this does not mean, your boasting has caused my dying daily, but is an oath, is clear from the Greek, which is νὴ τὴν ὑμετέραν καύχησιν.

AUGUSTINE. (de Mendac. 15.) But what we could not understand by mere words, from the conduct of the saints we may gather in what sense should be understood what might easily be drawn the contrary way, unless explained by example. The Apostle has used oaths in his Epistles, and by this shews us how that ought to be taken, I say unto you, Swear not at all, namely, lest by allowing ourselves to swear at all we come to readiness in swearing, from readiness we come to a habit of swearing, and from a habit of swearing we fall into perjury. And so the Apostle is not found to have used an oath but only in writing, the greater thought and caution which that requires not allowing of slip of the tongue. Yet is the Lord's command so universal, Swear not at all, that He would seem to have forbidden it even in writing. But since it would be an impiety to accuse Paul of having violated this precept, especially in his Epistles, we must understand the word at all as implying that, as far as lays in your power, you should not make a practice of swearing, not aim at it as a good thing in which you should take delight.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 23.) Therefore in his writings, as writing allows of greater circumspection, the Apostle is found to have used an oath in several places, that none might suppose that there is any direct sin in swearing what is true; but only that our weak hearts are better preserved from perjury by abstaining from all swearing whatever.

JEROME. Lastly, consider that the Saviour does not here forbid to swear by God, but by the Heaven, the Earth, by Jerusalem, by a man's head. For this evil practice of swearing by the elements the Jews had always, and are thereof often accused in the prophetic writing's. For he who swears, shews either reverence or love for that by which he swears. Thus when the Jews swore by the Angels, by the city of Jerusalem, by the temple and the elements, they paid to the creature the honour and worship belonging to God; for it is commanded in the Law that we should not swear but by the Lord our God.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 17.) Or; It is added, By the Heaven, &c. because the Jews did not consider themselves bound when they swore by such things. As if He had said, When you swear by the Heaven and the Earth, think not that you do not owe your oath to the Lord your God, for you are proved to have sworn by Him whose throne the heaven is, and the earth His footstool; which is not meant as though God had such limbs set upon the heaven and the earth, after the manner of a man who is sitting; but that seat signifies God’s judgment of us. And since in the whole extent of this universe it is the heaven that has the highest beauty, God is said to sit upon the heavens as shewing divine power to be more excellent than the most surpassing show of beauty; and He is said to stand upon the earth, as putting to lowest use a lesser beauty. Spiritually by the heavens are denoted holy souls, by the earth the sinful, seeing He that is spiritual judgeth all things. (1 Cor. 2:15.) But to the sinner it is said, Earth thou art, and unto earth thou shalt return. (Gen. 3:19.) And he who would abide under a law, is put under a law, and therefore He adds, it is the footstool of His feet. Neither by Jerusalem, for it is the city of the Great King; this is better said than ‘it is mine;’ though it is understood to mean the same. And because He is also truly Lord, whoso swears by Jerusalem, owes his oath to the Lord. Neither by thy head. What could any think more entirely his own property than his own head? But how is it ours when we have not power to make one hair black or white? Whoso then swears by his own head also owes his vows to the Lord; and by this the rest may be understood.

CHRYSOSTOM. Note how He exalts the elements of the world, not from their own nature, but from the respect which they have to God, so that there is opened no occasion of idolatry.

RABANUS. Having forbidden swearing, He instructs us how we ought to speak, Let your speech be yea, yea; nay, nay. That is, to affirm any thing it is sufficient to say, ‘It is so:’ to deny, to say, ‘It is not so.’ Or, yea, yea; nay, nay, are therefore twice repeated, that what you affirm with the mouth you should prove in deed, and what you deny in word, you should not establish by your conduct.

HILARY. Otherwise; They who live in the simplicity of the faith have not need to swear, with them ever, what is is, what is not is not; by this their life and their conversation are ever preserved in truth.

JEROME. Therefore Evangelic verity does not admit an oath, since the whole discourse of the faithful is instead of an oath.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) And he who has learned that an oath is to be reckoned not among things good, but among things necessary, will restrain himself as much as he may, not to use an oath without necessity, unless he sees men loth to believe what it is for their good they should believe, without the confirmation of an oath. This then is good and to be desired, that our conversation be only, yea, yea; nay, nay; for what is more than this cometh of evil. That is, if you are compelled to swear, you know that it is by the necessity of their weakness to whom you would persuade any thing; which weakness is surely an evil. What is more than this is thus evil; not that you do evil in this just use of an oath to persuade another to something beneficial for him; but it is an evil in him whose weakness thus obliges you to use an oath.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; of evil, that is, from their weakness to whom the Law permitted the use of an oath. Not that by this the old Law is signified to be from the Devil, but He leads us from the old imperfection to the new abundance.

5:38–42

38. Ye have heard that it hath been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth:

39. But I say unto you, That ye resist not evil: but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also.

40. And if any man will sue thee at the law, and take away thy coat, let him have thy cloak also.

41. And whosoever shall compel thee to go a mile, go with him twain.

42. Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord having taught that we are not to offer injury to our neighbour, or irreverence to the Lord, now proceeds to shew how the Christian should demean himself to those that injure him.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 25.) This law, Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, was enacted to repress the flames of mutual hate, and to be a check on their undisciplined spirits. For who when he would take revenge, was ever content to return just so much harm as he had received? Do we not see men who have suffered some trifling hurt, straightway plot murder, thirst for blood, and hardly find evil enough that they can do to their enemies for the satisfying their rage? To this immeasured and cruel fury the Law puts bounds when it enacts a lex talionis; that is, that whatever wrong or hurt any man has done to another, he should suffer just the same in return. This is not to encourage but to check rage; for it does not rekindle what was extinguished, but hinders the flames already kindled from further spread. It enacts a just retaliation, properly due to him who has suffered the wrong. But that mercy forgives any debt, does not make it unjust that payment had been sought. Since then he sins who seeks an unmeasured vengeance, but he does not sin who desires only a just one; he is therefore further from sin who seeks no retribution at all. I might state it yet thus; It was said to them of old time, Thou shalt not take unequal retaliation; But I say unto you. Ye shall not retaliate; this is a completion of the Law, if in these words something is added to the Law which was wanting to it; yea, rather that which the Law sought to do, namely, to put an end to unequal revenge, is more safely secured when there is no revenge at all.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For without this command, the commands of the Law could not stand. For if according to the Law we begin all of us to render evil for evil, we shall all become evil, since they that do hurt abound. But if according to Christ we resist not evil, though they that are evil be not amended, yet they that are good remain good.

JEROME. Thus our Lord by doing away all retaliation, cuts off the beginnings of sin. So the Law corrects faults, the Gospel removes their occasions.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Or it may be said that the Lord said this, adding somewhat to the righteousness of the old Law.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 19.) For the righteousness of the Pharisees is a less righteousness, not to transgress the measure of equal retribution; and this is the beginning of peace; but perfect peace is to refuse all such retribution. Between that first manner then, which was not according to the Law, to wit, that a greater evil should be returned for a less, and this which the Lord enjoins to make His disciples perfect, to wit, that no evil should be returned for evil, a middle place is held by this, that an equal evil should be returned, which was thus the passage from extremest discord to extremest peace. Whoso then first does evil to another departs furthest from righteousness; and who does not first do any wrong, but when wronged repays with a heavier wrong, has departed somewhat from extreme injustice; he who repays only what he has received, gives up yet something more, for it were but strict right that he who is the first aggressor should receive a greater hurt than he inflicted. This righteousness thus partly begun, He perfects, who is come to fulfil the Law. The two steps that intervene He leaves to be understood; for there is who does not repay so much, but less; and there is yet above him, he who repays not at all; yet this seems too little to the Lord, if you be not also ready to suffer wrong. Therefore He says not, Render not evil for evil, but, Resist not against evil, not only repay not what is offered to you, but do not resist that it should not be done to you. For thus accordingly He explains that saying, If any man smite thee on thy right cheek, offer to him the left also. Which as being a high part of mercy, is known to those who serve such as they love much; from whom, being morose, or insane, they endure many things, and if it be for their health they offer themselves to endure more. The Lord then, the Physician of souls, teaches His disciples to endure with patience the sicknesses of those for whose spiritual health they should provide. For all wickedness comes of a sickness of the mind; nothing is more innocent than he who is sound and of perfect health in virtue.

AUGUSTINE. (de Mendac. 15.) The things which are done by the Saints in the New Testament profit for examples of understanding those Scriptures which are modelled into the form of precepts. Thus we read in Luke; Whoso smiteth thee on the one cheek, turn to him the other also. (Luke 6:29.) Now there is no example of patience more perfect than that of the Lord; yet He, when He was smitten, said not, ‘Behold the other cheek,’ but, If I have spoken amiss, accuse me wherein it is amiss; but if well, why smitest thou me? (John 18:23.) hereby shewing us that that turning of the other cheek should be in the heart.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm in Mont. i. 19.) For the Lord was ready not only to be smitten on the other cheek for the salvation of men, but to be crucified with His whole body. It may be asked, What does the right cheek expressly signify? As the face is that whereby any man is known, to be smitten on the face is according to the Apostle to be contemned and despised. But as we cannot say ‘right face,’ and ‘left face,’ and yet we have a name twofold, one before God, and one before the world, it is distributed as it were into the right cheek, and left cheek, that whoever of Christ’s disciples is despised for that he is a Christian, may be ready to be yet more despised for any of this world’s honours that he may have. All things wherein we suffer any wrong are divided into two kinds, of which one is what cannot he restored, the other what may be restored. In that kind which cannot be restored, we are wont to seek the solace of revenge. For what does it boot if when smitten you smite again, is the hurt done to your body thereby repaid to you? But the mind swollen with rage seeks such assuagements.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or has your return blow at all restrained him from striking you again? It has rather roused him to another blow. For anger is not checked by meeting anger, but is only more irritated.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 20.) Whence the Lord judges that others' weakness should rather be borne with compassion, than that our own should be soothed by others' pain. For that retribution which tends to correction is not here forbidden, for such is indeed a part of mercy; nor does such intention hinder that he, who seeks to correct another, is not at the same time ready himself to take more at his hands. But it is required that he should inflict the punishment to whom the power is given by the course of things, and with such a mind as the father has to a child in correcting him whom it is impossible he should hate. And holy men have punished some sins with death, in order that a wholesome fear might be struck into the living, and so that not his death, but the likelihood of increase of his sin had he lived, was the hurt of the criminal. Thus Elias punished many with death, and when the disciples would take example from him they were rebuked by the Lord, who did not censure this example of the Prophet, but their ignorant use of it, seeing them to desire the punishment not for correction's sake, but from angry hate. But after He had inculcated love of their neighbour, and had given them the Holy Spirit, there wanted not instances of such vengeance; as Ananias and his wife who fell down dead at the words of Peter, and the Apostle Paul delivered some to Satan for the destruction of the flesh. Yet do some, with a kind of blind opposition, rage against the temporal punishments of the Old Testament, not knowing with what mind they were inflicted.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 185. 5.) But who that is of sober mind would say to kings, It is nothing of your concern who will live religiously, or who profanely? It cannot even be said to them, that it is not their concern who will live chastely, or who unchastely. It is indeed better that men should be led to serve God by right teaching than by penalties; yet has it benefitted many, as experience has approved to us, to be first coerced by pain and fear, that they might be taught after, or to be made to conform in deed to what they had learned in words. The better men indeed are led of love, but the more part of men are wrought on by fear. Let them learn in the case of the Apostle Paul, how Christ first constrained, and after taught him.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 20.) Therefore in this kind of injuries which are wont to rouse vengeance Christians will observe such a mean, that hate shall not be caused by the injuries they may receive, and yet wholesome correction be not foregone by Him who has right of either counsel or power.

JEROME. Mystically interpreted; When we are smitten on the right cheek, He said not, offer to him thy left, but the other; for the righteous has not a left. That is, if a heretic has smitten us in disputation, and would wound us in a right hand doctrine, let him be met with another testimony from Scripture.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The other kind of injuries are those in which full restitution can be made, of which there are two kinds; one relates to money, the other to work; of the first of these it is He speaks when He continues, Whoso will sue thee for thy coat, let him have thy cloak likewise. As by the cheek are denoted such injuries of the wicked as admit of no restitution but revenge, so by this similitude of the garments is denoted such injury as admits restitution. And this, as the former, is rightly taken of preparation of the heart, not of the show of the outward action. And what is commanded respecting our garments, is to be observed in all things that by any right we call our own in worldly property. For if the command be expressed in these necessary articles of life, how much more does it hold in the case of superfluities and luxuries? And when He says, He who will sue thee, He clearly intends to include every thing for which it is possible that we should be sued. It may be made a question whether it is to be understood of slaves, for a Christian ought not to possess his slave on the same footing as his horse; though it might be that the horse was worth the more money. And if your slave have a milder master in you than he would have in him who seeks to take him from you, I do not know that he ought to be given up as lightly as your coat.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For it were an unworthy thing that a believer should stand in his cause before an unbelieving judge. Or if one who is a believer, though (as he must be) a worldly man, though he should have reverenced you for the worthiness of the faith, sues you because the cause is a necessary one, you will lose the worthiness of Christ for the business of the world. Further, every lawsuit irritates the heart and excites bad thoughts; for when you see dishonesty or bribery employed against you, you hasten to support your own cause by like means, though originally you might have intended nothing of the sort.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 78.) The Lord here forbids his disciples to have lawsuits with others for worldly property. Yet as the Apostle allows such kind of causes to be decided between brethren, and before arbiters who are brethren, but utterly disallows them without the Church, it is manifest what is conceded to infirmity as pardonable.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxi. 13.) There are, who are so far to be endured, as they rob us of our worldly goods; but there are whom we ought to hinder, and that without breaking the law of charity, not only that we may not be robbed of what is ours, but lest they by robbing others destroy themselves. We ought to fear much more for the men who rob us, than to be eager to save the inanimate things they take from us. When peace with our neighbour is banished the heart on the matter of worldly possessions, it is plain that our estate is more loved than our neighbour.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 19.) The third kind of wrongs, which is in the matter of labour, consists of both such as admit restitution, and such as do not—or with or without revenge—for he who forcibly presses a man’s service, and makes him give him aid against his will, can either be punished for his crime, or return the labour. In this kind of wrongs then, the Lord teaches that the Christian mind is most patient, and prepared to endure yet more than is offered; If a man constrain thee to go with him a mile, go with him yet other two. This likewise is meant not so much of actual service with your feet, as of readiness of mind.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii.) The word here used signifies to drag unjustly, without cause, and with insult.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Let us suppose it therefore said, Go with him other two that the number three might be completed; by which number perfection is signified; that whoever does this might remember that he is fulfilling perfect righteousness. For which reason he conveys this precept under three examples, and in this third example, he adds a twofold measure to the one single measure, that the threefold number may be complete. Or we may so consider as though in enforcing this duty, He had begun with what was easiest to bear, and had advanced gradually. For first He commanded that when the right cheek was smitten we should turn the other also; therein shewing ourselves ready to endure another wrong less than that you have already received. Secondly, to him that would take your coat, he bids you part with your cloak, (or garment, as some copies read,) which is either just as great a loss, or perhaps a little greater. In the third He doubles the additional wrong which He would have us ready to endure. And seeing it is a small thing not to hurt unless you further shew kindnesses, He adds, To him that asketh of thee, give.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Because wealth is not ours but God's; God would have us stewards of His wealth, and not lords.

JEROME. If we understand this only of alms, it cannot stand with the estate of the most part of men who are poor; even the rich if they have been always giving, will not be able to continue always to give.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Therefore, He says not, 'Give all things to him that asks;' but, Give to every one that asketh; that you should only give what you can give honestly and rightly. For what if one ask for money to employ in oppressing the innocent man? What if he ask your consent to unclean sin? We must give then only what will hurt neither ourselves or others, as far as man can judge; and when you have refused an inadmissible request, that you may not send away empty him that asked, shew the righteousness of your refusal; and such correction of the unlawful petitioner will often be a better gift than the granting his suit.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 93. 2.) For with more benefit is food taken from the hungry, if certainty of provision causes him to neglect righteousness, than that food should be supplied to him that he may consent to a deed of violence and wrong.

JEROME. But it maybe understood of the wealth of doctrine: wealth which never fails but the more of it is given away, the more it abounds.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 20.) That He commands, And from him that would borrow of thee, turn not away, must be referred to the mind; for God loveth a cheerful giver. (2 Cor. 9:7.) And every one that receives, indeed borrows, though it is not he that shall pay, but God, who restores to the merciful many fold. Or, if you like to understand by borrowing, only taking with promise to repay, we must understand the Lord's command as embracing both these kinds of affording aid; whether we give outright, or lend to receive again. And of this last kind of shewing mercy it is well said, Turn not away, that is, do not be therefore backward to lend, as though, because man shall repay you, therefore God shall not; for what you do by God's command cannot be without fruit.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Christ bids us lend but not on usury; for he who gives on such terms does not bestow his own, but takes of another; he looses from one chain to bind with many, and gives not for God's righteousness sake, but for his own gain. For money taken on usury is like the bite of an asp; as the asp's poison secretly consumes the limbs, so usury turns all our possessions into debt.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 138. 2.) Some object that this command of Christ is altogether inconsistent with civil life in Commonwealths; Who, say they, would suffer, when he could hinder it, the pillage of his estate by an enemy; or would not repay the evil suffered by a plundered province of Rome on the plunderers according to the rights of war? But these precepts of patience are to be observed in readiness of the heart, and that mercy, not to return evil for evil, must be always fulfilled by the will. Yet must we often use a merciful sharpness in dealing with the headstrong. And in this way, if the earthly commonwealth will keep the Christian commandments, even war will not be waged without good charities, to the establishing among the vanquished peaceful harmony of godliness and righteousness. For that victory is beneficial to him from whom it snatches licence to sin; since nothing is more unfortunate for sinners, than the good fortune of their sins, which nourishes an impunity that brings punishment after it, and an evil will is strengthened, as it were some internal enemy.

5:43–48

43.Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thine enemy.

44. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you;

45. That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven: for He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust.

46. For if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? do not even the Publicans the same?

47. And if ye salute your brethren only, what do ye more than others? do not even the Publicans so?

48. Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord has taught above that we must not resist one who offers any injury, but must be ready even to suffer more; He now further requires us to shew to them that do us wrong both love and its effects. And as the things that have gone before pertain to the completion of the righteousness of the Law, in like manner this last precept is to be referred to the completion of the law of love, which, according to the Apostle, is the fulfilling of the Law.

AUGUSTINE. (de Doctr. Christ. i. 30.) That by the command, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, all mankind were intended, the Lord shewed in the parable of the man who was left half dead, which teaches us that our neighbour is every one who may happen at any time to stand in need of our offices of mercy; and this who does not see must be denied to none, when the Lord says, Do good to them that hate you.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 21.) That there were degrees in the righteousness of the Pharisees which was under the old Law is seen herein, that many hated even those by whom they were loved. He therefore who loves his neighbour, has ascended one degree, though as yet he hate his enemy; which is expressed in that, and shalt hate his enemy; which is not to be understood as a command to the justified, but a concession to the weak.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 24.) I ask the Manichæans why they would have this peculiar to the Mosaic Law, that was said by them of old time, thou shall hate thy enemy? Has not Paul said of certain men that they were hateful to God? We must enquire then how we may understand that, after the example of God, to whom the Apostle here affirms some men to be hateful, our enemies are to be hated; and again after the same pattern of Him who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good, our enemies are to be loved. Here then is the rule by which we may at once hate our enemy for the evil's sake that is in him, that is, his iniquity, and love him for the good's sake that is in him, that is, his rational part. This then, thus uttered by them of old, being heard, but not understood, hurried men on to the hatred of man, when they should have hated nothing but vice. Such the Lord corrects as He proceeds, saying, I say unto you, Love your enemies. Lie who had just declared that He came not to subvert the Law, bat to fulfil it, by bidding us love our enemies, brought us to the understanding of how we may at once hate the same man for his sins whom we love for his human nature.

GLOSS. (ord.) But it should be known, that in the whole body of the Law it is no where written, Thou shalt hate thy enemy. But it is to be referred to the tradition of the Scribes, who thought good to add this to the Law, because the Lord bade the children of Israel pursue their enemies, and destroy Amalek from under heaven.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As that, Thou shalt not lust, was not spoken to the flesh, but to the spirit, so in this the flesh indeed is not able to love its enemy, but the spirit is able; for the love and hate of the flesh is in the sense, but of the spirit is in the understanding. If then we feel hate to one who has wronged us, and yet will not to act upon that feeling, know that our flesh hates our enemy, but our soul loves him.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxii. 11.) Love to an enemy is then observed when we are not sorrowful at his success, or rejoice in his fall. We hate him whom we wish not to be bettered, and pursue with ill-wishes the prosperity of the man in whose fall we rejoice. Yet it may often happen that without any sacrifice of charity, the fall of an enemy may gladden us, and again his exaltation make us sorrowful without any suspicion of envy; when, namely, by his fall any deserving man is raised up, or by his success any undeservedly depressed. But herein a strict measure of discernment must be observed, lest in following out our own hates, we hide it from ourselves under the specious pretence of others’ benefit. We should balance how much we owe to the fall of the sinner, how much to the justice of the Judge. For when the Almighty has struck any hardened sinner, we must at once magnify His justice as Judge, and feel with the other’s suffering who perishes.

GLOSS. (ord.) They who stand against the Church oppose her in three ways; with hate, with words, and with bodily tortures. The Church on the other hand loves them, as it is here, Love your enemies; does good to them, as it is, Do good to them that hate you; and prays for them, as it is, Pray for them that persecute you and accuse you falsely.

JEROME. Many measuring the commandments of God by their own weakness, not by the strength of the saints, hold these commands for impossible, and say that it is virtue enough not to hate our enemies; but to love them is a command beyond human nature to obey. But it must be understood that Christ enjoins not impossibilities but perfection. Such was the temper of David towards Saul and Absalom; the Martyr Stephen also prayed for his enemies while they stoned him, and Paul wished himself anathema for the sake of his persecutors. (Rom. 9:3.) Jesus both taught and did the same, saying, Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do. (Luke 23:34.)

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 73.) These indeed are examples of the perfect sons of God; yet to this should every believer aim, and seek by prayer to God, and struggles with himself to raise his human spirit to this temper. Yet this so great blessing is not given to all those multitudes which we believe are heard when they pray, Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 21.) Here arises a question, that this commandment of the Lord, by which He bids us pray for our enemies, seems opposed by many other parts of Scripture. In the Prophets are found many imprecations upon enemies; such as that in the 108th Psalm, Let his children be orphans. (Ps. 109:9.) But it should be known, that the Prophets are wont to foretel things to come in the form of a prayer or wish. This has more weight as a difficulty that John says, There is a sin unto death, I sag not that he shall pray for it; (1 John 5:16.) plainly shewing, that there are some brethren for whom he docs not bid us pray; for what went before was, If any know his brother sin a sin, &c. Yet the Lord bids us pray for our persecutors. This question can only be resolved, if we admit that there are some sins in brethren more grievous than the sin of persecution in our enemies. For thus Stephen prays for those that stoned him, because they had not yet believed on Christ; but the Apostle Paul (2 Tim. 4:14.) does not pray for Alexander though he was a brother, but had sinned by attacking the brotherhood through jealousy. But for whom you pray not, you do not therein pray against him. What must we say then of those against whom we know that the saints have prayed, and that not that they should be corrected, (for that would be rather to have prayed for them), but for their eternal damnation; not as that prayer of the Prophet against the Lord’s betrayer, for that is a prophecy of the future, not an imprecation of punishment; but as when we read in the Apocalypse the Martyrs’ prayer that they may be avenged. (Rev. 6:10.) But we ought not to let this affect us. For who may dare to affirm that they prayed against those persons themselves, and not against the kingdom of sin? For that would be both a just and a merciful avenging of the Martyrs, to overthrow that kingdom of sin, under the continuance of which they endured all those evils. And it is overthrown by correction of some, and damnation of such as abide in sin. Does not Paul seem to you to have avenged Stephen on his own body, as he speaks, (1 Cor. 9:27.) I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Hil. Quæst. V. and N. Test. q. 68.) And the souls of them that are slain cry out to be avenged; as the blood of Abel cried out of the ground not with a voice, but in spirit1. As the work is said to laud the workman, when he delights himself in the view thereof; for the saints are not so impatient as to urge on what they know will come to pass at the appointed time.

CHRYSOSTOM. Note through what steps we have now ascended hither, and how He has set us on the very pinnacle of virtue. The first step is, not to begin to do wrong to any; the second, that in avenging a wrong done to us we be content with retaliating equal; the third, to return nothing of what we have suffered; the fourth, to offer one’s self to the endurance of evil; the fifth, to be ready to suffer even more evil than the oppressor desires to inflict; the sixth, not to hate him of whom we suffer such things; the seventh, to love him; the eighth, to do him good; the ninth, to pray for him. And because the command is great, the reward proposed is also great, namely, to be made like unto God, Ye shall be the sons of your Father which is in heaven.

JEROME. For whoso keeps the commandments of God is thereby made the son of God; he then of whom he here speaks is not by nature His son, but by his own will.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. i. 23.) After that rule we must here understand of which John speaks, He gave them power to be made the sons of God. One is His Son by nature; we are made sons by the power which we have received; that is, so far as we fulfil those things that we are commanded. So He says not, Do these things because ye are sons; but, do these things that ye may become sons. In calling us to this then, He calls us to His likeness, for He saith, He maketh His sun to rise on the righteous and the unrighteous. By the sun we may understand not this visible, but that of which it is said, To you that fear the name of the Lord, the Sun of righteousness shall arise; (Mal. 4:2.) and by the rain, the water of the doctrine of truth; for Christ was seen, and was preached to good as well as bad.

HILARY. Or, the sun and rain have reference to the baptism with water and Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or we may take it of this visible sun, and of the rain by which the fruits are nourished, as the wicked mourn in the book of Wisdom, The Sun has not risen for us. (Wisd. 5:6.) And of the rain it is said, I will command the clouds that they rain not on it. (Is. 5:6.) But whether it be this or that, it is of the great goodness of God, which is set forth for our imitation. lie says not, ‘the sun,’ but, His sun, that is, the sun which Himself has made, that hence we may be admonished with how great liberality we ought to supply those things that we have not created, but have received as a boon from Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 93. 2.) But as we laud Him for His gifts, let us also consider how He chastises those whom He loves. For not every one who spares is a friend, nor every one who chastises an enemy; it is better to love with severity, than to use lenity wherewith to deceive. (vid. Prov. 27:6.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He was careful to say, On the righteous and the unrighteous, and not ‘on the unrighteous as on the righteous;’ for God gives all good gifts not for men’s sake, but for the saints’ sake, as likewise chastisements for the sake of sinners. In bestowing His good gifts, He does not separate the sinners from the righteous, that they should not despair; so in His inflictions, not the righteous from sinners that they should be made proud; and that the more, since the wicked are not profited by the good things they receive, but turn them to their hurt by their evil lives; nor are the good hurt by the evil things, but rather profit to increase of righteousness.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, i. 8.) For the good man is not puffed up by worldly goods, nor broken by worldly calamity. But the bad man is punished in temporal losses, because he is corrupted by temporal gains. Or for another reason He would have good and evil common to both sorts of men, that good things might not be sought with vehement desire, when they were enjoyed even by the wicked; nor the evil things shamefully avoided, when even the righteous are afflicted by them.

GLOSS. (non occ.) To love one that loves us is of nature, but to love our enemy of charity. If ye love them who love you, what reward have ye? to wit, in heaven. None truly, for of such it is said, Ye have received your reward. But these things we ought to do, and not leave the other undone.

RABANUS. If then sinners be led by nature to shew kindness to those that love them, with how much greater shew of affection ought you not to embrace even those that do not love you? For it follows, Do not even the publicans so? The publicans are those who collect the public imposts; or perhaps those who pursue the public business or the gain of this world.

GLOSS. (non occ.) But if you only pray for them that are your kinsfolk, what more has your benevolence than that of the unbelieving? Salutation is a kind of prayer.

RABANUS. Ethnici, that is, the Gentiles, for the Greek word ἔθνος is translated ‘gens’ in Latin; those, that is, who abide such as they were born, to wit, under sin.

REMIGIUS. Because the utmost perfection of love cannot go beyond the love of enemies, therefore as soon as the Lord has bid us love our enemies, He proceeds, Be ye then perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect. He indeed is perfect, as being omnipotent; man, as being aided by the Omnipotent. For the word ‘as’ is used in Scripture, sometimes for identity, and equality, as in that, As I was with Moses, so will I be with thee; (Josh. 1:5.) sometimes to express likeness only as here.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For as our sons after the flesh resemble their fathers in some part of their bodily shape, so do spiritual sons resemble their father God, in holiness.

CHAPTER 6

6:1

1. Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them: otherwise ye have no reward of your Father which is in Heaven.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Christ having now fulfilled the Law in respect of commandments, begins to fulfil it in respect of promises, that we may do God’s commandments for heavenly wages, not for the earthly which the Law held out. All earthly things are reduced to two main heads, viz. human glory, and abundance of earthly goods, both of which seem to be promised in the Law. Concerning the first is that spoken in Deuteronomy, The Lord shall make thee higher than all the nations who dwell on the face of the earth. (c. 28:1.) And in the same place it is added of earthly wealth, The Lord shall make thee abound in all good things. Therefore the Lord now forbids these two things, glory and wealth, to the attention of believers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xix.) Yet be it known that the desire of fame is near a kin to virtue.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For when any thing truly glorious is done, there ostentation has its readiest occasion; so the Lord first shuts out all intention of seeking glory; as He knows that this is of all fleshly vices the most dangerous to man. The servants of the Devil are tormented by all kinds of vices; but it is the desire of empty glory that torments the servants of the Lord more than the servants of the Devil.

AUGUSTINE. (Prosper. Lib. Sentent. 318.) How great strength the love of human glory has, none feels, but he who has proclaimed war against it. For though it is easy for any not to wish for praise when it is denied him, it is difficult not to be pleased with it when it is offered.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how He has begun as it were describing some beast hard to be discerned, and ready to steal upon him who is not greatly on his guard against it; it enters in secretly, and carries off insensibly all those things that are within.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And therefore he enjoins this to be more carefully avoided, Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men. It is our heart we must watch, for it is an invisible serpent that we have to guard against, which secretly enters in and seduces; but if the heart be pure into which the enemy has succeeded in entering in, the righteous man soon feels that he is prompted by a strange spirit; but if his heart were full of wickednesses, he does not readily perceive the suggestion of the Devil, and therefore He first taught us, Be not angry, Lust not, for that he who is under the yoke of these evils cannot attend to his own heart. But how can it be that we should not do our alms before men. Or if this may be, how can they be so done that we should not know of it. For if a poor man come before us in the presence of any one, how shall we be able to give him alms in secret? If we lead him aside, it must be seen that we shall give him. Observe then that He said not simply, Do not before men, but added, to be seen of them. He then who does righteousness not from this motive, even if he does it before the eyes of men, is not to be thought to be herein condemned; for he who does any thing for God's sake, sees nothing in his heart but God, for whose sake he does it; as a workman has always before his eyes him who has entrusted him with the work to do.

GREGORY. (Mor. viii. 48.) If then we seek the fame of giving, we make even our public deeds to be hidden in His sight; for if herein we seek our own glory, then they are already cast out of His sight, even though there be many by whom they are yet unknown. It belongs only to the thoroughly perfect, to suffer their deeds to be seen, and to receive the praise of doing them in such sort that they are lifted up with no secret exultation; whereas they that are weak, because they cannot attain to this perfect contempt of their own fame, must needs hide those good deeds that they do.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 1.) In saying only, That ye be seen of men, without any addition, He seems to have forbidden that we should make that the end of our actions. For the Apostle who declared, If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ; (Gal. 1:10.) says in another place, I please all men in all things. (1 Cor. 10:33.) This he did not that he might please men, but God, to the love of whom he desires to turn the hearts of men by pleasing them. As we should not think that he spoke absurdly, who should say. In this my pains in seeking a ship, it is not the ship I seek, but my country.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 54. 2.) He says this, that ye be seen of men, because there are some who so do their righteousness before men that themselves may not be seen, but that the works themselves may be seen, and their Father who is in heaven may be glorified; for they reckon not their own righteousness, but His, in the faith of whom they live.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 1.) That He adds, Otherwise ye shall not have your reward before your Father who is in heaven, signifies no more than that we ought to take heed that we seek not praise of men in reward of our works.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. What shall you receive from God, who have given God nothing? What is done for God's sake is given to God, and received by Him; but what is done because of men is cast to the winds. But what wisdom is it, to bestow our goods, to reap empty words, and to have despised the reward of God? Nay you deceive the very man for whose good word you look; for he thinks you do it for God's sake, otherwise he would rather reproach than commend you. Yet must we think him only to have done his work because of men, who does it with his whole will and intention governed by the thought of them. But if an idle thought, seeking to be seen of men, mount up in any one's heart, but is resisted by the understanding spirit, he is not thereupon to be condemned of man-pleasing; for that the thought came to him was the passion of the flesh, what he chose was the judgment of his soul.

6:2–4

2. Therefore when thou doest thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and in the streets, that they may have glory of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward.

3. But when thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth:

4. That thine alms may be in secret: and thy Father which seeth in secret Himself shall reward thee openly.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 2.) Above the Lord had spoken of righteousness in general. He now pursues it through its different parts.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xv.) He opposes three chief virtues, alms, prayer, and fasting, to three evil things against which the Lord undertook the war of temptation. For He fought for us in the wilderness against gluttony; against covetousness on the mount; against false glory on the temple. It is alms that scatter abroad against covetousness which heaps up; fasting against gluttony which is its contrary; prayer against false glory, seeing that all other evil things come out of evil, this alone comes out of good; and therefore it is not overthrown but rather nourished of good, and has no remedy that may avail against it but prayer only.

AMBROSIASTER. (Comm. in Tim. 4, 8.) The sum of all Christian discipline is comprehended in mercy and piety, for which reason He begins with almsgiving.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The trumpet stands for every act or word that tends to a display of our works; for instance, to do alms if we know that some other person is looking on, or at the request of another, or to a person of such condition that he may make us return; and unless in such cases not to do them. Yea, even if in some secret place they are done with intent to be thought praiseworthy, then is the trumpet sounded.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Thus what He says, Do not sound a trumpet before thee, refers to what He had said above, Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men.

JEROME. He who sounds a trumpet before him when he does alms is a hypocrite. Whence he adds, as the hypocrites do.

ISIDORE. (Etym. x. ex Aug. Serm.) The name ‘hypocrite’ is derived from the appearance of those who in the shows are disguised in masks, variously coloured according to the character they represent, sometimes male, sometimes female, to impose on the spectators while they act in the games.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) As then the hypocrites, (a word meaning ‘one who feigns,’) as personating the characters of other men, act parts which are not naturally their own—for he who personates Agamemnon, is not really Agamemnon, but feigns to be so—so likewise in the Churches, whosoever in his whole conduct desires to seem what he is not, is a hypocrite; he feigns himself righteous and is not really so, seeing his only motive is praise of men.

GLOSS. (non occ.) In the words, in the streets and villages, he marks the public places which they selected; and in those, that they may receive honour of men, he marks their motive.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxi. 13.) It should be known, that there are some who wear the dress of sanctity, and are not able to work out the merit of perfection, yet who must in no wise be numbered among the hypocrites, because it is one thing to sin from weakness, another from crafty affectation.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 2.) And such sinners receive from God the Scarcher of hearts none other reward than punishment of their deceitfulness; Verily I say unto you, they have their reward,

JEROME. A reward not of God, but of themselves, for they receive praise of men, for the sake of which it was that they practised their virtues.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) This refers to what He had said above, Otherwise ye shall have no reward of your Father which is in heaven; and He goes on to shew them that they should not do their alms as the hypocrites, but teaches them how they should do them.

CHRYSOSTOM. Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth, is said as an extreme expression, as much as to say, If it were possible, that you should not know yourself, and that your very hands should be hid from your sight, that is what you should most strive after.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Apostles in the book of the Constitutions, interpret thus; The right hand is the Christian people which is at Christ’s right hand; the left hand is all the people who are on His left hand. He means then, that when a Christian does alms, the unbeliever should not see it.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But according to this interpretation, it will be no fault to have a respect to pleasing the faithful; and yet we are forbidden to propose as the end of any good work the pleasing of any kind of men. Yet if you would have men to imitate your actions which may be pleasing to them, they must be done before unbelievers as well as believers. If again, according to another interpretation, we take the left hand to mean our enemy, and that our enemy should not know when we do our alms, why did the Lord Himself mercifully heal men when the Jews were standing round Him? And how too must we deal with our enemy himself according to that precept, If thy enemy hunger, feed him. (Prov. 25:21.) A third interpretation is ridiculous; that the left hand signifies the wife, and that because women are wont to be more close in the matter of expense out of the family purse, therefore the charities of the husband should be secret from the wife, for the avoiding of domestic strife. But this command is addressed to women as well as to men, what then is the left hand, from which women are bid to conceal their alms? Is the husband also the left hand of the wife? And when it is commanded such that they enrich each other with good works, it is clear that they ought not to hide their good deeds; nor is a theft to be committed to do God service. But if in any case something must needs be done covertly, from respect to the weakness of the other, though it is not unlawful, yet that we cannot suppose the wife to be intended by the left hand here is clear from the purport of the whole paragraph; no, not even such an one as he might well call left. But that which is blamed in hypocrites, namely, that they seek praise of men, this you are forbid to do; the left hand therefore seems to signify the delight in men's praise; the right hand denotes the purpose of fulfilling the divine commands. Whenever then a desire to gain honour from men mingles itself with the conscience of him that does alms, it is then the left hand knowing what the right hand, the right conscience, does. Let not the left hand know, therefore, what the right hand doeth, means, let not the desire of men's praise mingle with your conscience. But our Lord does yet more strongly forbid the left hand alone to work in us, than its mingling in the works of the right hand. The intent with which He said all this is shewn in that He adds, that your alms may be in secret; that is, in that your good conscience only, which human eye cannot see, nor words discover, though many things are said falsely of many. But your good conscience itself is enough for you towards deserving your reward, if you look for your reward from Him who alone can see your conscience. This is that He adds, And your Father which seeth in secret shall reward you. Many Latin copies have, openlya.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For it is impossible that God should leave in obscurity any good work of man; but He makes it manifest in this world, and glorifies it in the next world, because it is the glory of God; as likewise the Devil manifests evil, in which is shewn the strength of his great wickedness. But God properly makes public every good deed only in that world the goods of which are not common to the righteous and the wicked; therefore to whomsoever God shall there shew favour, it will be manifest that it was as reward of his righteousness. But the reward of virtue is not manifested in this world, in which both bad and good are alike in their fortunes.

AUGUSTINE. But in the Greek copies, which are earlier, we have not the word openly.

CHRYSOSTOM. If therefore you desire spectators of your good deeds, behold you have not merely Angels and Archangels, but the God of the universe.

6:5–6

5. And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the hypocrites are; for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward.

6. But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee openly.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Solomon says, Before prayer, prepare thy soul. (Ecclus. 18:23.) This he does who comes to prayer doing alms; for good works stir up the faith of the heart, and give the soul confidence in prayer to God. Alms then are a preparation for prayer, and therefore the Lord after speaking of alms proceeds accordingly to instruct us concerning prayer.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 3.) He does not now bid us pray, but instructs us how we should pray; as above He did not command us to do alms, but shewed the manner of doing them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Prayer is as it were a spiritual tribute which the soul offers of its own bowels. Wherefore the more glorious it is, the more watchfully ought we to guard that it is not made vile by being done to be seen of men.

CHRYSOSTOM. He calls them hypocrites, because feigning that they are praying to God, they are looking round to men; and, He adds, they love to pray in the synagogues.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But I suppose that it is not the place that the Lord here refers to, but the motive of him that prays; for it is praiseworthy to pray in the congregation of the faithful, as it is said, In your Churches bless ye God. (Ps. 68:26.) Whoever then so prays as to be seen of men does not look to God but to man, and so far as his purpose is concerned he prays in the synagogue. But he, whose mind in prayer is wholly fixed on God, though he pray in the synagogue, yet seems to pray with himself in secret. In the corners of the streets, namely, that they may seem to be praying retiredly; and thus earn a twofold praise, both that they pray, and that they pray in retirement.

GLOSS. (ord.) Or, the corners of the streets, are the places where one way crosses another, and makes four cross-ways.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He forbids us to pray in an assembly with the intent of being seen of that assembly, as He adds, that they may be seen of men. He that prays therefore should do nothing singular that might attract notice; as crying out, striking his breast, or reaching forth his hands.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Not that the mere being seen of men is an impiety, but the doing this, in order to be seen of men.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is a good thing to be drawn away from the thought of empty glory, but especially in prayer. For our thoughts are apt to stray of themselves; if then we address ourselves to prayer with this disease upon us, how shall we understand those things that are said by us?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The privity of other men is to be so far shunned by us, as it leads us to do any thing with this mind that we look for the fruit of their applause.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Verily I say unto you, they have received their reward, for every man where he sows there he reaps, therefore they who pray because of men, not because of God, receive praise of men, not of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says, have received, because God was ready to give them that reward which comes from Himself, but they prefer rather that which comes from men. He then goes on to teach how we should pray.

JEROME. This if taken in its plain sense teaches the hearer to shun all desire of vain honour in praying.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That none should be there present save he only who is praying, for a witness impedes rather than forwards prayer.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 2.) The Lord has bid us in His instructions to pray secretly in remote and withdrawn places, as best suited to faith; that we may be assured that God who is present every where hears and sees all, and in the fulness of His Majesty penetrates even hidden places.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. We may also understand by the door of the chamber, the mouth of the body; so that we should not pray to God with loudness of tone, but with silent heart, for three reasons. First, because God is not to be gained by vehement crying, but by a right conscience, seeing He is a hearer of the heart; secondly, because none but thyself and God should be privy to your secret prayers; thirdly, because if you pray aloud, you hinder any other from praying near you.

CASSIAN. (Collat. ix. 35.) Also we should observe close silence in our prayers, that our enemies, who are ever most watchful to ensnare us at that time, may not know the purport of our petition.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, by our chambers are to be understood our hearts, of which it is spoken in the fourth Psalm; (Ps 4:4.) What things ye utter in your hearts, and wherewith ye are pricked in your chambers. The door is the bodily senses; without are all worldly things, which, enter into our thoughts through the senses, and that crowd of vain imaginings which beset us in prayer.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 20.) What insensibility is it to be snatched wandering off by light and profane imaginings, when you are presenting your entreaty to the Lord, as if there were aught else you ought rather to consider than that your converse is with God! How can you claim of God to attend to you, when you do not attend to yourself? This is altogether to make no provision against the enemy; this is when praying to God, to offend God’s Majesty by the neglectfulness of your prayer.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The door then must be shut, that is, we must resist the bodily sense, that we may address our Father in such spiritual prayer as is made in the inmost spirit, where we pray to Him truly in secret.

REMIGIUS. Let it be enough for you that He alone know your petitions, who knows the secrets of all hearts; for He Who sees all things, the same shall listen to you.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not ‘shall freely give thee,’ but, shall reward thee; thus He constitutes Himself your debtor.

6:7–8

7. But when ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the heathen do: for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking.

8. Be ye not therefore like unto them: for your Father knoweth what things ye have need of, before ye ask Him.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) As the hypocrites use to set themselves so as to be seen in their prayers, whose reward is to be acceptable to men; so the Ethnici (that is, the Gentiles) use to think that they shall be heard for their much speaking; therefore He adds, When ye pray, do not ye use many words.

CASSIAN. (Collat. ix. 36.) We should indeed pray often, but in short form, lest if we be long in our prayers, the enemy that lies in wait for us, might suggest something for our thoughts.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130, 10.) Yet to continue long in prayer is not, as some think, what is here meant, by using many words. For much speaking is one thing, and an enduring fervency another. For of the Lord Himself it is written, that He continued a whole night in prayer, and prayed at great length, setting an example to us. The brethren in Egypt are said to use frequent prayers, but those very short, and as it were hasty ejaculations, lest that fervency of spirit, which is most behoveful for us in prayer, should by longer continuance be violently broken off. Herein themselves sufficiently shew, that this fervency of spirit, as it is not to be forced if it cannot last, so if it has lasted is not to be violently broken off. Let prayer then be without much speaking, but not without much entreaty, if this fervent spirit can be supported; for much speaking in prayer is to use in a necessary matter more words than necessary. But to entreat much, is to importune with enduring warmth of heart Him to whom our entreaty is made; for often is this business effected more by groans than words, by weeping more than speech.

CHRYSOSTOM. Hereby He dissuades from empty speaking in prayer; as, for example, when we ask of God things improper, as dominions, fame, overcoming of our enemies, or abundance of wealth. He commands then that our prayers should not be long; long, that is, not in time, but in multitude of words. For it is right that those who ask should persevere in their asking; being instant in prayer, as the Apostle instructs; but does not thereby enjoin us to compose a prayer of ten thousand verses, and speak it all; which He secretly hints at, when He says, Do not ye use many words.

GLOSS. (ord.) What He condemns is many words in praying that come of want of faith; as the Gentiles do. For a multitude of words were needful for the Gentiles, seeing the dæmons could not know for what they petitioned, until instructed by them; they think they shall be heard for their much speaking.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) And truly all superfluity of discourse has come from the Gentiles, who labour rather to practise their tongues than to cleanse their hearts, and introduce this art of rhetoric into that wherein they need to persuade God.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxiii. 23.) True prayer consists rather in the bitter groans of repentance, than in the repetition of set forms of words.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For we use many words then when we have to instruct one who is in ignorance, what need of them to Him who is Creator of all things; Your heavenly Father knoweth what ye have need of before you ask Him.

JEROME. On this there starts up a heresy of certain Philosophers who taught the mistaken dogma, that If God knows for what we shall pray, and, before we ask, knows what we need, our prayer is needlessly made to one who has such knowledge. (Epicureans.) To such we shortly reply, That in our prayers we do not instruct, but entreat; it is one thing to inform the ignorant, another to beg of the understanding: the first were to teach; the latter is to perform a service of duty.

CHRYSOSTOM. You do not then pray in order to teach God your wants, but to move Him, that you may become His friend by the importunity of your applications to Him, that you may be humbled, that you may be reminded of your sins.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Nor ought we to use words in seeking to obtain of God what we would, but to seek with intense and fervent application of mind, with pure love, and suppliant spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130, 9.) But even with words we ought at certain periods to make prayer to God, that by these signs of things we may keep ourselves in mind, and may know what progress we have made in such desire, and may stir up ourselves more actively to increase this desire, that after it have begun to wax warm, it may not be chilled and utterly frozen up by divers cares, without our continual care to keep it alive. Words therefore are needful for us that we should be moved by them, that we should understand clearly what it is we ask, not that we should think that by them the Lord is either instructed or persuaded.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 3.) Still it may be asked, what is the use of prayer at all, whether made in words or in meditation of things, if God knows already what is necessary for us. The mental posture of prayer calms and purifies the soul, and makes it of more capacity to receive the divine gifts which are poured into it. For God does not hear us for the prevailing force of our pleadings; He is at all times ready to give us His light, but we are not ready to receive it, but prone to other things. There is then in prayer a turning of the body to God, and a purging of the inward eye, whilst those worldly things which we desired are shut out, that the eye of the mind made single might be able to bear the single light, and in it abide with that joy with which a happy life is perfected.

6:9

9. After this manner therefore pray ye: Our Father which art in Heaven, Hallowed be thy name.

GLOSS. (e. Cypr.) Amongst His other saving instructions and divine lessons, wherewith He counsels believers, He has set forth for us a form of prayer in few words; thus giving us confidence that that will be quickly granted, for which He would have us pray so shortly.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 1.) He who gave to us to live, taught us also to pray, to the end, that speaking to the Father in the prayer which the Son hath taught, we may receive a readier hearing. It is praying like friends and familiars to offer up to God of His own. Let the Father recognize the Son’s words when we offer up our prayer; and seeing we have Him when we sin for an Advocate with the Father, let us put forward the words of our Advocate, when as sinners we make petition for our offences.

GLOSS. (ord.) Yet we do not confine ourselves wholly to these words, but use others also conceived in the same sense, with which our heart is kindled.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 4.) Since in every entreaty we have first to propitiate the good favour of Him whom we entreat, and after that mention what we entreat for; and this we commonly do by saying something in praise of Him whom we entreat, and place it in the front of our petition; in this the Lord bids us say no more than only, Our Father which art in Heaven. Many things were said of them to the praise of God, yet do we never find it taught to the children of Israel to address God as ‘Our Father;’ He is rather set before them as a Lord over slaves. But of Christ’s people the Apostle says, We have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father, (Rom. 8:15.) and that not of our deservings, but of grace. This then we express in the prayer when we say, Father; which name also stirs up love. For what can be dearer than sons are to a father? And a suppliant spirit, in that men should say to God Our Father. And a certain presumption that we shall obtain; for what will He not give to His sons when they ask of Him, who has given them that first that they should be sons? Lastly, how great anxiety possesses his mind, that having called God his Father, he should not be unworthy of such a Father. By this the rich and the noble are admonished when they have become Christians not to be haughty towards the poor or truly born, who like themselves may address God as Our Father; and they therefore cannot truly or piously say this unless they acknowledge such for brethren.

CHRYSOSTOM. For what hurt does such kindred with those beneath us, when we are all alike kin to One above us? For who calls God Father, in that one title confesses at once the forgiveness of sins, the adoption, the heirship, the brotherhood, which he has with the Only-begotten, and the gift of the Spirit. For none can call God Father, but he who has obtained all these blessings. In a two-fold manner, therefore, he moves the feeling of them that pray, both by the dignity of Him who is prayed to, and the greatness of those benefits which we gain by prayer.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 4.) We say not My Father, but Our Father, for the teacher of peace and master of unity would not have men pray singly and severally, since when any prays, he is not to pray for himself only. Our prayer is general and for all, and when we pray, we pray not for one person but for us all, because we all are one. So also He willed that one should pray for all, according as Himself in one did bear us all.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. To pray for ourselves it is our necessity compels us, to pray for others brotherly charity instigates.

GLOSS. (ord.) Also because He is a common Father of all, we say, Our Father; not My Father which is appropriate to Christ alone, who is His Son by nature.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Which art in heaven, is added, that we may know that we have a heavenly Father, and may blush to immerse ourselves wholly in earthly things when we have a Father in heaven.

CASSIAN. (Collat. ix. 18.) And that we should speed with strong desire thitherward where our Father dwells.

CHRYSOSTOM. In heaven, not confining God's presence to that, but withdrawing the thoughts of the petitioner from earth and fixing them on things above.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 5.) Or; in heaven is among the saints and the righteous men; for God is not contained in space. For the heavens literally are the upper parts of the universe, and if God be thought to be in them, then are the birds of more desert than men, seeing they must have their habitation nearer to God. But, God is nigh, (Ps. 34:18.) it is not said to the men of lofty stature, or to the inhabitants of the mountain tops; but, to the broken in heart. But as the sinner is called 'earth,' as earth thou art, and unto earth thou must return, (Gen. 3:19.) so might the righteous on the other hand be called 'the heaven.' Thus then it would be rightly said Who art in heaven, for there would seem to be as much difference spiritually between the righteous and sinners, as locally, between heaven and earth. With the intent of signifying which thing it is, that we turn our faces in prayer to the east, not as though God was there only, deserting all other parts of the earth; but that the mind may be reminded to turn itself to that nature which is more excellent, that is to God, when his body, which is of earth, is turned to the more excellent body which is of heaven. For it is desirable that all, both small and great, should have right conceptions of God, and therefore for such as cannot fix their thoughts on spiritual natures, it is better that they should think of God as being in heaven than in earth.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Having named Him to whom prayer is made and where He dwells, let us now see what things they are for which we ought to pray. But the first of all the things that are prayed for is, Hallowed be thy name, not implying that the name of God is not holy, but that it may be held sacred of men; that is, that God may be so known that nothing may be esteemed more holy.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; He bids us in praying beg that God may be glorified in our life; as if we were to say, Make us to live so that all things may glorify Thee through us. For hallowed signifies the same as glorified. It is a petition worthy to be made by man to God, to ask nothing before the glory of the Father, but to postpone all things to His praise.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 7.) Otherwise, we say this not as wishing for God to be made holy by our prayers, but asking of Him for His name to be kept holy in us. For seeing He Himself has said, Be ye holy, for I also am holy, (Lev. 20:7.) it is this that we ask and request that we who have been sanctified in Baptism, may persevere such as we have begun.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 2.) But why is this perseverance asked of God, if, as the Pelagians say, it is not given by God? Is it not a mocking petition to ask of God what we know is not given by Him, but is in the power of man himself to attain?

CYPRIAN. (ubi sup.) For this we daily make petition, since we need a daily sanctification, in order that we who sin day by day, may cleanse afresh our offences by a continual sanctification.

6:10

10. Thy kingdom come.

GLOSS. (ord.) It follows suitably, that after our adoption as sons, we should ask a kingdom which is due to sons.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 6.) This is not so said as though God did not now reign on earth, or had not reigned over it always. Come, must therefore be taken for be manifested to men. For none shall then be ignorant of His kingdom, when His Only-begotten not in understanding only, but in visible shape shall come to judge the quick and dead. This day of judgment the Lord teaches shall then come, when the Gospel shall have been preached to all nations; which thing pertains to the hallowing of God’s name.

JEROME. Either it is a general prayer for the kingdom of the whole world that the reign of the Devil may cease; or for the kingdom in each of us that God may reign there, and that sin may not reign in our mortal body.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 8.) Or; it is that kingdom which was promised to us by God, and bought with Christ’s blood; that we who before in the world have been servants, may afterwards reign under the dominion of Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130, 11.) For the kingdom of God will come whether we desire it or not. But herein we kindle our desires towards that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may reign in it.

CASSIAN. (Collat. ix. 19.) Or; because the Saint knows by the witness of his conscience, that when the kingdom of God shall appear, he shall be partaker therein.

JEROME. But be it noted, that it comes of high confidence, and of an unblemished conscience only, to pray for the kingdom of God, and not to fear the judgment.

CYPRIAN. (ubi sup.) The kingdom of God may stand for Christ Himself, whom we day by day wish to come, and for whose advent we pray that it may be quickly manifested to us. As He is our resurrection, because in Him we rise again, so may He be called the kingdom of God, because we are to reign in Him. Rightly we ask for God's kingdom, that is, for the heavenly, because there is a kingdom of this earth beside. He, however, who has renounced the world, is superior to its honours and to its kingdom; and hence he who dedicates himself to God and to Christ, longs not for the kingdom of earth, but for the kingdom of Heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 2.) When they pray, Let thy kingdom come, what else do they pray for who are already holy, but that they may persevere in that holiness they now have given unto them? For no otherwise will the kingdom of God come, than as it is certain it will come to those that persevere unto the end.

Thy will be done in earth as it is in Heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 6.) In that kingdom of blessedness the happy life will be made perfect in the Saints as it now is in the heavenly Angels; and therefore after the petition, Thy kingdom come, follows, Thy will he done as in heaven, so in earth. That is, as by the Angels who are in Heaven Thy will is done so as that they have fruition of Thee, no error clouding their knowledge, no pain marring their blessedness; so may it be done by Thy Saints who are on earth, and who, as to their bodies, are made of earth. So that, Thy will be done, is rightly understood as, 'Thy commands be obeyed;' as in heaven, so in earth, that is, as by Angels, so by men; not that they do what God would have them do, but they do because He would have them do it; that is, they do after His will.

CHRYSOSTOM. See how excellently this follows; having taught us to desire heavenly things by that which He said, Thy kingdom come, before we come to Heaven He bids us make this earth into Heaven, in that saying, Thy will he done as in heaven, so in earth.

JEROME. Let them be put to shame by this text who falsely affirm that there are daily falls (ruinas) in Heavenb.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or; as by the righteous, so by sinners; as if He had said, As the righteous do Thy will, so also may sinners; either by turning to Thee, or in receiving every man his just reward, which shall be in the last judgment. Or, by the heaven and the earth we may understand the spirit and the flesh. As the Apostle says, In my mind I obey the law of God, (Rom. 7:25.) we see the will of God done in the spirit, But in that change which is promised to the righteous there, Let thy will he done as in heaven, so in earth; that is, as the spirit does not resist God, so let the body not resist the spirit. Or; as in heaven, so in earth, as in Christ Jesus Himself, so in His Church; as in the Man who did His Father's will, so in the woman who is espoused of Him. And heaven and earth may be suitably understood as husband and wife, seeing it is of the heaven that the earth brings forth her fruits.

CYPRIAN. (ubi sup.) We ask not that God may do His own will, but that we may be enabled to do what He wills should be done by us; and that it may be done in us we stand in need of that will, that is, of God's aid and protection; for no man is strong by his own strength, but is safe in the indulgence and pity of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. For virtue is not of our own efforts, but of grace from above. Here again is enjoined on each one of us prayer for the whole world, inasmuch as we are not to say, Thy will be done in me, or in us; but throughout the earth, that error may cease, truth be planted, malice be banished, and virtue return, and thus the earth not differ from heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 3.) From this passage is clearly shewn against the Pelagians that the beginning of faith is God's gift, when Holy Church prays for unbelievers that they may begin to have faith. Moreover, seeing it is done already in the Saints, why do they yet pray that it may be done, but that they pray that they may persevere in that they have begun to be?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. These words, As in heaven so in earth, must be taken as common to all three preceding petitions. Observe also how carefully it is worded; He said not, Father, hallow Thy name in us, Let Thy kingdom come on us, Do Thy will in us. Nor again; Let us hallow Thy name, Let us enter into Thy kingdom, Let us do Thy will; that it should not seem to be either God's doing only, or man's doing only. But He used a middle form of speech, and the impersonal verb; for as man can do nothing good without God's aid, so neither does God work good in man unless man wills it.

6:11

11. Give us this day our daily bread.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 115.) These three things therefore which have been asked in the foregoing petitions, are begun here on earth, and according to our proficiency are increased in us; but in another life, as we hope, they shall be everlastingly possessed in perfection. In the four remaining petitions we ask for temporal blessings which are necessary to obtaining the eternal; the bread, which is accordingly the next petition in order, is a necessary.

JEROME. The Greek word here which we render 'supersubstantialis,' is ἐπιούσιος. The LXX often make use of the word περιούσιος, by which we find, on reference to the Hebrew, they always render the word sogolac. Symmachus translates it ἐξαίρετος, that is, 'chief,' or 'excellent,' though in one place he has interpreted 'peculiar.' When then we pray God to give us our 'peculiar' or 'chief' bread, we mean Him who says in the Gospel, I am the living bread which came down from heaven. (John 6:51.)

CYPRIAN. (ubi sup.) For Christ is the bread of life, and this bread belongs not to all men, but to us. This bread we pray that it be given day by day, lest we who are in Christ, and who daily receive the Eucharist for food of salvation, should by the admission of any grievous crime, and our being therefore forbidden the heavenly bread, be separated from the body of Christ. Hence then we pray, that we who abide in Christ, may not draw back from His sanctification and His body.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 4.) Here then the saints ask for perseverance of God, when they pray that they may not be separated from the body of Christ, but may abide in that holiness, committing no crime.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM.d. Or by 'supersubstantialis' may be intended 'daily.'

CASSIAN. (Coll. ix. 21.) In that He says, this day, He shews that it is to be daily taken, and that this prayer should be offered at all seasons, seeing there is no day on which we have not need, by the receiving of this bread, to confirm the heart of e inward man.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 7.) There is here a difficulty created by the circumstance of there being many in the East, who do not daily communicate in the Lord’s Supper. And they defend their practice on the ground of ecclesiastical authority, that they do this without offence, and are not forbidden by those who preside over the Churches. But not to pronounce any thing concerning them in either way, this ought certainly to occur to our thoughts, that we have here received of the Lord a rule for prayer which we ought not to transgress. Who then will dare to affirm that we ought to use this prayer only once? Or if twice or thrice, yet only up to that hour at which we communicate on the Lord’s body? For after that we cannot say, Give us this day that which we have already received. Or will any one on this account be able to compel us to celebrate this sacrament at the close of the day?

CASSIAN. (ubi sup.) Though the expression to-day may be understood of this present life; thus, Give us this bread while we abide in this world.

JEROME. We may also interpret the word ‘supersubstantialis’ otherwise, as that which is above all other substances, and more excellent than all creatures, to wit, the body of the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or by daily we may understand spiritual, namely, the divine precepts which we ought to meditate and work.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxiv. 7.) We call it our bread, yet pray that it may be given us, for it is God’s to give, and is made ours by our receiving it.

JEROME. Others understand it literally according to that saying of the Apostle, Having food and raiment, let us therewith be content, that the saints should have care only of present food; as it follows, Take no thought for the morrow.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130. 11.) So that herein we ask for a sufficiency of all things necessary under the one name of bread.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. We pray, Give us this day our daily bread, not only that we may have what to eat, which is common to both righteous and sinners; but that what we eat we may receive at the hand of God, which belongs only to the saints. For to him God giveth bread who earns it by righteous means; but to him who earns it by sin, the Devil it is that gives. Or that inasmuch as it is given by God, it is received sanctified; and therefore He adds our, that is, such bread as we have prepared for us, that do Thou give us, that by Thy giving it may be sanctified. Like as the Priest taking bread of the laic, sanctifies it, and then offers it to him; the bread indeed is his that brought it in offering, but that it is sanctified is the benefit from the Priest. He says Our for two reasons. First, because all things that God gives us He gives through us to others, that of what we receive of Him we may impart to the helpless. Whoso then of what he gains by his own toil bestows nothing on others, eats not his own bread only, but others' bread also. Secondly, he who eats bread got righteously, eats his own bread; but he who eats bread got with sin, eats others' bread.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 7.) Some one may perhaps find a difficulty in our here praying that we may obtain necessaries of this life, such as food and raiment, when the Lord has instructed us, Be not ye careful what ye shall eat, or wherewithal ye shall be clothed. But it is impossible not to be careful about that for the obtaining which we pray.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130. 6.) But to wish for the necessaries of life and no more, is not improper; for such sufficiency is not sought for its own sake, but for the health of the body, and for such garb and appliances of the person, as may make us to be not disagreeable to those with whom we have to live in all good reputation. For these things we may pray that they may be had when we are in want of them, that they may be kept when we have them.

CHRYSOSTOM. It should be thought upon how when He had delivered to us this petition, Thy will be done as in heaven so in earth, then because He spake to men in the flesh, and not like angelic natures without passion or appetite, He now descends to the needs of our bodies. And He teaches us to pray not for money or the gratification of lust, but for daily bread; and as yet further restriction, He adds, this day, that we should not trouble ourselves with thought for the coming day.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And these words at first sight might seem to forbid our having it prepared for the morrow, or after the morrow. If this were so, this prayer could only suit a few; such as the Apostles who travelled hither and thither teaching—or perhaps none among us. Yet ought we so to adapt Christ's doctrine, that all men may profit in it.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 14.) Justly therefore does the disciple of Christ make petition for to-day's provision, without indulging excessive longings in his prayer. It were a self-contradicting and incompatible thing for us who pray that the kingdom of God may quickly come, to be looking unto long life in the world below.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; He adds, daily, that a man may eat so much only as natural reason requires, not as the lust of the flesh urges. For if you expend on one banquet as much as would suffice you for a hundred days, you are not eating to-day's provision, but that of many days.

JEROME. In the Gospel, entitled The Gospel according to the Hebrews, 'supersubstantialis' is rendered 'mohar,' that is 'to-morrow's;' so that the sense would be, Give us today to-morrow's bread; i. e. for the time to come.

6:12

12. And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 15.) After supply of food, next pardon of sin is asked for, that he who is fed of God may live in God, and not only the present and passing life be provided for, but the eternal also; whereunto we may come, if we receive the pardon of our sins, to which the Lord gives the name of debts, as he speaks further on, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me. (Mat. 18:32.) How well is it for our need, how provident and saving a thing, to be reminded that we are sinners compelled to make petition for our offences, so that in claiming God's indulgence, the mind is recalled to a recollection of its guilt. That no man may plume himself with the pretence of innocency, and perish more wretchedly through self-exaltation, he is instructed that he commits sin every day by being commanded to pray for his sins.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 5.) With this weapon the Pelagian heretics received their deathblow, who dare to say that a righteous man is free altogether from sin in this life, and that of such is at this present time composed a Church, having neither spot nor wrinkle.

CHRYSOSTOM. That this prayer is meant for the faithful, both the laws of the Church teach, and the beginning of the prayer which instructs us to call God Father. In thus bidding the faithful pray for forgiveness of sin, He shews that even after baptism sin can be remitted (against the Novatians.)

CYPRIAN. (ubi sup.) He then who taught us to pray for our sins, has promised us that His fatherly mercy and pardon shall ensue. But He has added a rule besides, binding us under the fixed condition and responsibility, that we are to ask for our sins to be forgiven in such sort as we forgive them that are in debt to us.

GREGORY. (Mor. x. 15.) That good which in our penitence we ask of God, we should first turn and bestow on our neighbour.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 8.) This is not said of debts of money only, but of all things in which any sins against us, and among these also of money, because that he sins against you, who does not return money due to you, when he has whence he can return it. Unless you forgive this sin you cannot say, Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. With what hope then does he pray, who cherishes hatred against another by whom he has been wronged? As he prays with a falsehood on his lips, when he says, I forgive, and does not forgive, so he asks indulgence of God, but no indulgence is granted him. There are many who, being unwilling to forgive those that trespass against them, will not use this prayer. How foolish! First, because he who does not pray in the manner Christ taught, is not Christ’s disciple; and secondly, because the Father does not readily hear any prayer which the Son has not dictated; for the Father knows the intention and the words of the Son, nor will He entertain such petitions as human presumption has suggested, but only those which Christ’s wisdom has set forth.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 73.) Forasmuch as this so great goodness, namely, to forgive debts, and to love our enemies, cannot be possessed by so great a number as we suppose to be heard in the use of this prayer; without doubt the terms of this stipulation are fulfilled, though one have not attained to such proficiency as to love his enemy; yet if when he is requested by one, who has trespassed against him, that he would forgive him, he do forgive him from his heart; for he himself desires to be forgiven then at least when he asks forgiveness. And if one have been moved by a sense of his sin to ask forgiveness of him against whom he has sinned, he is no more to be thought on as an enemy, that there should be any thing hard in loving him, as there was when he was in active enmity.

6:13

13. And lead us not into temptation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As He had above put many high things into men's mouths, teaching them to call God their Father, to pray that His kingdom might come; so now He adds a lesson of humility, when He says, and lead us not into temptation.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 9.) Some copies read, Carry us not1, an equivalent word, both being a translation of one Greek word, εἰσενέγκης. Many in interpreting say, 'Suffer us not to be led into temptation,' as being what is implied in the word lead. For God does not of Himself lead a man, but suffer him to be led from whom He has withdrawn His aid.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 17.) Herein it is shewn that the adversary can nothing avail against us, unless God first permit him; so that all our fear and devotion ought to be addressed to God.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But it is one thing to be led into temptation, another to be tempted; for without temptation none can be approved, either to himself or to another; but every man is fully known to God before all trial. Therefore we do not here pray that we may not be tempted, but that we may not be led into temptation. As if one who was to be burnt alive should pray not that he should not be touched by fire, but that he should not be burnt. For we are then led into temptation when such temptations befal us as we are not able to resist.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130, 11.) When then we say, Lead us not into temptation, what we ask is, that we may not, deserted by His aid, either consent through the subtle snares, or yield to the forcible might, of any temptation.

CYPRIAN. (ubi sup.) And in so praying we are cautioned of our own infirmity and weakness, lest any presumptuously exalt himself; that while a humble and submissive confession comes first, and all is referred to God, whatever we suppliantly apply for may by His gracious favour be supplied.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 5.) When the Saints pray, Lead us not into temptation, what else do they pray for than that they may persevere in their sanctity. This once granted—and that it is God's gift this, that of Him we ask it, shews-none of the Saints but holds to the end his abiding holiness; for none ceases to hold on his Christian profession, till he be first overtaken of temptation. Therefore we seek not to be led into temptation that this may not happen to us; and if it does not happen, it is God that does not permit it to happen; for there is nothing done, but what He either does, or suffers to be done. He is therefore able to turn our wills from evil to good, to raise the fallen and to direct him into the way that is pleasing to Himself, to whom not in vain we plead, Lead us not into temptation. For whoso is not led into temptation of his own evil will, is free of all temptation; for, each man is tempted of his own lust. (James 1:14.) God would have us pray to Him that we may not be led into temptation, though He could have granted it without our prayer, that we might be kept in mind who it is from whom we receive all benefits. Let the Church therefore observe her daily prayers; she prays that the unbelieving may believe, therefore it is God that turns men to the faith; she prays that the believers may persevere; God gives them perseverance even unto the end.

But deliver us from evil. Amen.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) We ought to pray not only that we may not be led into evil from which we are at present free; but further that we may be set free from that into which we have already been led. Therefore it follows, Deliver us from evil.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 18.) After all these preceding petitions at the conclusion of the prayer comes a sentence, comprising shortly and collectively the whole of our petitions and desires. For there remains nothing beyond for us to ask for, after petition made for God’s protection from evil; for that gained, we stand secure and safe against all things that the Devil and the world work against us. What fear hath he from this life, who has God through life for his guardian?

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130, 11.) This petition with which the Lord’s Prayer concludes is of such extent, that a Christian man in whatever tribulation cast, will in this petition utter groans, in this shed tears, here begin and here end his prayer. And therefore follows Amen, by which is expressed the strong desire of him that prays.

JEROME. Amen, which appears here at the close, is the seal of the Lord’s Prayer. Aquila rendered ‘faithfully’—we may perhaps ‘truly.’

CYPRIAN. (ubi sup.) We need not wonder, dearest brethren, that this is God’s prayer, seeing how His instruction comprises all our petitioning, in one saving sentence. This had already been prophesied by Isaiah the Prophet, A short word will God make in the whole earth. (Is. 10:22.) For when our Lord Jesus Christ came unto all, and gathering together the learned alike and the unlearned, did to every sex and age set forth the precepts of salvation, He made a full compendium of His instructions, that the memory of the scholars might not labour in the heavenly discipline, but accept with readiness whatsoever was necessary into a simple faith.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 130, 12.) And whatever other words we may use, either introductory to quicken the affections, or in conclusion to add to them, we say nothing more than is contained in the Lord's Prayer if we pray rightly and connectedly. For he who says, Glorify thyself in all nations, as thou art glorified among as, (Ecclus. 36:4.) what else does he say than, Hallowed be thy name? (Ps. 80:3.) He who prays, Shew thy face and we shall be safe, what is it but to say, Let thy kingdom come? (Ps. 119:133.) To say, Direct my steps according to thy word, what is it more than, Thy will be done? (Prov. 30:8.) To say, Give me neither poverty nor riches, what else is it than, Give us this day our daily bread? Lord, remember David and all his mercifulness! (Ps. 131:1.) and, If I have returned evil for evil, (Ps. 7:4.) what else but, Forgive us our debts even as we forgive our debtors? He who says, Remove far from me all greediness of belly, what else does he say, but Lead us not into temptation? (Ps. 59:1.) He who says, Save me, O my God, from my enemies, what else does he say but Deliver us from evil? And if you thus go through all the words of the holy prayers, you will find nothing that is not contained in the Lord's Prayer. Whoever then speaks such words as have no relation to this evangelic prayer, prays carnally; and such prayer I know not why we should not pronounce unlawful, seeing the Lord instructs those who are born again only to pray spiritually. But whoso in prayer says, Lord, increase my riches, add to my honours; and that from desire of such things, not with a view to doing men service after God's will by such things; I think that he finds nothing in the Lord's Prayer on which he may build such petitions. Let such an one then be withheld by shame from praying for, if not from desiring, such things. But if he have shame at the desire, yet desire overcomes, he will do better to pray for deliverance from the evil of desire to Him to whom we say, Deliver us from evil.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 11.) This number of petitions seems to answer to the seven-fold number of the beatitudes. If it is the fear of God by which are made blessed the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven, let us ask that the name of God be hallowed among men, a reverent fear abiding for ever and ever. If it be piety by which the meek are blessed, let us pray that His kingdom may come, that we may become meek, and not resist Him. If it be knowledge by which they that mourn are blessed, let us pray that His will may be done as in heaven so in earth; for if the body consent with the spirit as does earth with heaven, we shall not mourn. If fortitude be that by which they that hunger are blessed, let us pray that our daily bread be this day given us, by which we may come to full saturity. If it is counsel by which blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy, let us forgive debts, that our debts may be forgiven us. If it be understanding by which they of pure heart are blessed, let us pray that we be not led into temptation, lest we have a double heart in the pursuit of temporal and earthly things which are for our probation. If it be wisdom by which blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of God, let us pray to be delivered from evil; for that very deliverance will make us free as sons of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having made us anxious by the mention of our enemy, in this that He has said Deliver us from evil, He again restores confidence by that which is added in some copies, For thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, since if His be the kingdom, none need fear, since even he who fights against us, must be His subject. But since His power and glory are infinite, He can not only deliver from evil, but also make glorious.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This is also connected with the foregoing. Thine is the kingdom has reference to Thy kingdom come, that none should therefore say, God has no kingdom on earth. The power, answers to Thy will be done, as in earth so in heaven, that none should say thereon that God cannot perform whatever He would. And the glory, answers to all that follows, in which God’s glory is shewn forth.

6:14–15

14. For if ye forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you:

15. But if ye forgive not men their trespasses, neither will your Father forgive your trespasses.

RABANUS. By the word Amen, He shews that without doubt the Lord will bestow all things that are rightly asked, and by those that do not fail in observing the annexed condition, For if ye forgive men their sins, your heavenly Father will also forgive you your sins.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 11.) Here we should not overlook that of all the petitions enjoined by the Lord, He judged that most worthy of further enforcement, which relates to forgiveness of sins, in which He would have us merciful; which is the only means of escaping misery.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He does not say that God will first forgive us, and that we should after forgive our debtors. For God knows how treacherous the heart of man is, and that though they should have received forgiveness themselves, yet they do not forgive their debtors; therefore He instructs us first to forgive, and we shall be forgiven after.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 74.) Whoever does not forgive him that in true sorrow seeks forgiveness, let him not suppose that his sins are by any means forgiven of the Lord.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii. 16.) For no excuse will abide you in the day of judgment, when you will be judged by your own sentence, and as you have dealt towards others, will be dealt with yourself.

JEROME. But if that which is written, I said, Ye are gods, but ye shall die like men, (Ps. 83:6, 7.) is said to those who for their sins deserve to become men instead of gods, then they to whom sins are forgiven are rightly called men.

CHRYSOSTOM. He mentions heaven and the Father to claim our attention, for nothing so likens you to God, as to forgive him who has injured you. And it were indeed unmeet should the son of such a Father become a slave, and should one who has a heavenly vocation live as of this earth, and of this life only.

6:16

16. Moreover when ye fast, be not, as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance: for they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast. Verily I say unto you, They have their reward.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Forasmuch as that prayer which is offered in a humble spirit and contrite heart, shews a mind already strong and disciplined; whereas he who is sunk in self-indulgence cannot have a humble spirit and contrite heart; it is plain that without fasting prayer must be faint and feeble; therefore, when any would pray for any need in which they might be, they joined fasting with prayer, because it is an aid thereof. Accordingly the Lord, after His doctrine respecting prayer, adds doctrine concerning fasting, saying, When ye fast, be not ye as the hypocrites, of sad countenance. The Lord knew that vanity may spring from every good thing, and therefore bids us root out the bramble of vain-gloriousness which springs in the good soil, that it choke not the fruit of fasting. For though it cannot be that fasting should not be discovered in any one, yet is it better that fasting should shew you, than that you should shew your fasting. But it is impossible that any in fasting should be gay, therefore He said not, Be not sad, but Be not made sad; for they who discover themselves by any false displays of their affliction, they are not sad, but make themselves; but he who is naturally sad in consequence of continued fasting, does not make himself sad, but is so.

JEROME. The word exterminare, so often used in the ecclesiastical Scriptures through a blunder of the translators, has a quite different meaning from that in which it is commonly understood. It is properly said of exiles who are sent beyond the boundary of their country. Instead of this word, it would seem better to use the word demoliri, ‘to destroy,’ in translating the Greek ἀφανίζειν. The hypocrite destroys his face, in order that he may feign sorrow, and with a heart full of joy wears sorrow in his countenance.

GREGORY. (Mor. viii. 44.) For by the pale countenance, the trembling limbs, and the bursting sighs, and by all so great toil and trouble, nothing is in the mind but the esteem of men.

LEO. (Serm. in Epiph. iv. 5.) But that fasting is not pure, that comes not of reasons of continence, but of the arts of deceit.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. If then he who fasts, and makes himself of sad countenance, is a hypocrite, how much more wicked is he who does not fast, yet assumes a fictitious paleness of face as a token of fasting.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 12.) On this paragraph it is to be specially noted, that not only in outward splendor and pomp, but even in the dress of sorrow and mourning, is there room for display, and that the more dangerous, inasmuch as it deceives under the name of God’s services. For he who by inordinate pains taken with his person, or his apparel, or by the glitter of his other equipage, is distinguished, is easily proved by these very circumstances to be a follower of the pomps of this world, and no man is deceived by any semblance of a feigned sanctity in him. But when any one in the profession of Christianity draws men's eyes upon him by unwonted beggary and slovenliness in dress, if this be voluntary and not compulsory, then by his other conduct may be seen whether he does this to be seen of men, or from contempt of the refinements of dress.

REMIGIUS. The reward of the hypocrites' fast is shewn, when it is added, That they may seem to men to fast; verily I say unto you, They have their reward; that is, that reward for which they looked.

6:17–18

17. But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thine head, and wash thy face;

18. That thou appear not unto men to fast, but unto thy Father which is in secret: and thy Father, which seeth in secret, shall reward thee openly.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The Lord having taught us what we ought not to do, now proceeds to teach us what we ought to do, saying, When thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy face.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) A question is here wont to be raised; for none surely would literally enjoin, that, as we wash our faces from daily habit, so we should have our heads anointed when we fast; a thing which all allow to be most disgraceful.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Also if He bade us not to be of sad countenance that we might not seem to men to fast, yet if anointing of the head and washing of the face are always observed in fasting, they will become tokens of fasting.

JEROME. But He speaks in accordance with the manners of the province of Palestine, where it is the custom on festival days to anoint the head. What He enjoins then is, that when we are fasting we should wear the appearance of joy and gladness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Therefore the simple interpretation of this is, that is added as an hyperbolical explanation of the command; as though He had said, Yea, so far should ye be from any display of your fasting, that if it might be (which yet it may not be) so done, ye should even do such things as are tokens of luxury and feasting.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx.) In almsgiving indeed, He did not say simply, 'Do not your alms before men,' but added, 'to be seen of them.' But in fasting and prayer He added nothing of this sort; because alms cannot be so done as to be altogether hid, fasting and prayer can be so done. The contempt of men’s praise is no small fruit, for thereby we are freed from the heavy slavery of human opinion, and become properly workers of virtue, loving it for itself and not for others. For as we esteem it an affront if we are loved not for ourselves but for others’ sake, so ought we not to follow virtue on the account of these men, nor to obey God for men’s sake but for His own. Therefore it follows here, But to thy Father which seeth in secret.

GLOSS. (ord.) That is, to thy heavenly Father, who is unseen, or who dwells in the heart through faith. He fasts to God who affliets himself for the love of God, and bestows on others what he denies himself.

REMIGIUS. For it is enough for you that He who sees your conscience should be your rewarder.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Spiritually interpreted—the face may be understood to mean the mental conscience. And as in the eyes of man a fair face has grace, so in the eyes of God a pure conscience has favour. This face the hypocrites, fasting on man’s account, disfigure, seeking thereby to cheat both God and man; for the conscience of the sinner is always wounded. If then you have cast out all wickedness from your heart, you have washed your conscience, and fast well.

LEO. (Serm. in Quadr. vi. 2.) Fasting ought to be fulfilled not in abstinence of food only, but much more in cutting off vices. For when we submit ourselves to that discipline in order to withdraw that which is the nurse of carnal desires, there is no sort of good conscience more to be sought than that we should keep ourselves sober from unjust will, and abstinent from dishonourable action. This is an act of religion from which the sick are not excluded, seeing integrity of heart may be found in an infirm body.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Spiritually again, thy head denotes Christ. Give the thirsty drink and feed the hungry, and therein you have anointed your head, that is, Christ, who cries out in the Gospel, In that ye have done this to one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it to me. (Mat. 25:40.)

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xvi. 6.) For God approves that fasting, which before His eyes opens the hands of alms. This then that you deny yourself, bestow on another, that wherein your flesh is afflicted, that of your needy neighbour may be refreshed.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or; by the head we rightly understand the reason, because it is preeminent in the soul, and rules the other members of the man. Now anointing the head has some reference to rejoicing. Let him therefore joy within himself because of his fasting, who in fasting turns himself from doing the will of the world, that he may be subject to Christ.

GLOSS. (ord.) Behold how every thing in the New Testament is not to be taken literally. It were ridiculous to be smeared with oil when fasting; but it is behoveful for the mind to be anointed with the spirit of His love, in whose sufferings we ought to partake by afflicting ourselves.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And truly we ought to wash our face, but to anoint, and not to wash, our head. For as long as we are in the body, our conscience is foul with sin. But Christ who is our head has done no sin.

6:19–21

19. Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal:

20. But lay up for yourselves treasures in Heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal:

21. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He has driven away the disease of vanity, He does well to bring in speech of contempt of riches. For there is no greater cause of desire of money than love of praise; for this men desire troops of slaves, horses accoutred in gold, and tables of silver, not for use or pleasure, but that they may be seen of many; therefore He says, Lay not up for yourselves treasure on earth.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 13.) For if any does a work with the mind of gaining thereby an earthly good, how will his heart be pure while it is thus walking on earth? For any thing that is mingled with an inferior nature is polluted therewith, though that inferior be in its kind pure. Thus gold is alloyed when mixed with pure silver; and in like manner our mind is defiled by lust of earthly things, though earth is in its own kind pure.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; As the Lord had above taught nothing concerning alms, or prayer, or fasting, but had only checked a pretence of them, He now proceeds to deliver a doctrine of three portions, according to the division which He had before made, in this order. First, a counsel that alms should be done; second, to shew the benefit of almsgiving; third, that the fear of poverty should be no hindrance to our purpose of almsgiving.

CHRYSOSTOM. Saying, Lay not up for yourselves treasure on earth, He adds, where rust and moth destroy, in order to shew the insecurity of that treasure that is here, and the advantage of that which is in Heaven, both from the place, and from those things which harm. As though He had said; Why fear you that your wealth should be consumed, if you should give alms? Yea rather give alms, and they shall receive increase, for those treasures that are in Heaven shall be added to them, which treasures perish if ye do not give alms. He said not, You leave them to others, for that is pleasant to men.

RABANUS. (ap. Anselm.) Here are three precepts according to the three different kinds of wealth. Metals are destroyed by rust, clothes by moth; but as there are other things which fear neither rust nor moth, as precious stones, He therefore names a common damage, that by thieves, who may rob wealth of all kinds. a

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Another reading is, Where moth and banqueting consume. For a threefold destruction awaits all the goods of this life. They either decay and are eaten of moths as cloth; or are consumed by their master’s luxurious living; or are plundered by strangers, either by violence, or pilfering, or false accusation, or some other unjust doing. For all may be called thieves who hasten by any unlawful means to make other men’s goods their own. But you will say, Do all who have these things, perforce lose them? I would answer by the way, that if all do not, yet many do. But ill-hoarded wealth, you have lost spiritually if not actually, because it profits you not to your salvation.

RABANUS. Allegorically; Rust denotes pride which obscures the brightness of virtue. Moth which privily eats out garments, is jealousy which frets into good intention, and destroys the bond of unity. Thieves denote heretics and demons, who are ever on the watch to rob men of their spiritual treasure.

HILARY. But the praise of Heaven is eternal, and cannot be carried off by invading thief, nor consumed by the moth and rust of envy.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont, ii. 13.) By heaven in this place I understand not the material heavens, for every thing that has a body is earthly. But it behoves that the whole world be despised by him who lays up his treasure in that Heaven, of which it is said, The heaven of heavens is the Lord's, (Ps. 115:16.) that is, in the spiritual firmament. For heaven and earth shall pass away; (Mat. 24:35.) but we ought not to place our treasure in that which passes away, but in that which abides for ever.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Which then is better? To place it on earth where its security is doubtful, or in Heaven where it will be certainly preserved? What folly to leave it in this place whence you must soon depart, and not to send it before you thither, whither you are to go? Therefore place your substance there where your country is.

CHRYSOSTOM. But forasmuch as not every earthly treasure is destroyed by rust or moth, or carried away by thieves, He therefore brings in another motive, For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also. As much as to say; Though none of these former losses should befal you, you will yet sustain no small loss by attaching your affections to things beneath, and becoming a slave to them, and in falling from Heaven, and being unable to think of any lofty thing.

JEROME. This must be understood not of money only, but of all our possessions. The god of a glutton is his belly; of a lover his lust; and so every man serves that to which he is in bondage; and has his heart there where his treasure is.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; He now teaches the benefit of almsgiving. He who places his treasure on earth has nothing to look for in Heaven; for why should he look up to Heaven where he has nothing laid up for himself? Thus he doubly sins; first, because he gathers together things evil; secondly, because he has his heart in earth; and so on the contrary he does right in a twofold manner who lays up his treasure in Heaven.

6:22–23

22. The light of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light.

23. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!

CHRYSOSTOM. Having spoken of the bringing the understanding into captivity because it was not easy to be understood of many, He transfers it to a sensible instance, saying, The light of thy body is thy eye. As though He had said, If you do not know what is meant by the loss of the understanding, learn a parable of the bodily members; for what the eye is to the body, that the understanding is to the soul. As by the loss of the eyes we lose much of the use of the other limbs, so when the understanding is corrupted, your life is filled with many evils.

JEROME. This is an illustration drawn from the senses. As the whole body is in darkness, where the eye is not single, so if the soul has lost her original brightness, every sense, or that whole part of the soul to which sensation belongs, will abide in darkness. Wherefore He says, If then the light which is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness! that is, if the senses which are the soul’s light be darkened by vice, in how great darkness do you suppose the darkness itself will be wrapped?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. It seems that He is not here speaking of the bodily eye, or of the outward body that is seen, or He would have said, If thine eye be sound, or weak; but He says, single, and, evil. But if one have a benign yet diseased eye, is his body therefore in light? Or if an evil yet a sound, is his body therefore in darkness?

JEROME. Those who have thick eye-sight see the lights multiplied; but the single and clear eye sees them single and clear.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; The eye He speaks of is not the external but the internal eye. The light is the understanding, through which the soul sees God. He whose heart is turned to God, has an eye full of light; that is, his understanding is pure, not distorted by the influence of worldly lusts. The darkness in us is our bodily senses, which always desire the things that pertain to darkness. Whoso then has a pure eye, that is, a spiritual understanding, preserves his body in light, that is, without sin; for though the flesh desires evil, yet by the might of divine fear the soul resists it. But whoever has an eye, that is, an understanding, either darkened by the influence of the malignant passions, or fouled by evil lusts, possesses his body in darkness; he does not resist the flesh when it lusts after evil things, because he has no hope in Heaven, which hope alone gives us the strength to resist desire.

HILARY. Otherwise; from the office of the light of the eye, He calls it the light of the heart; which if it continue single and brilliant, will confer on the body the brightness of the eternal light, and pour again into the corrupted flesh the splendor of its origin, that is, in the resurrection. But if it be obscured by sin, and evil in will, the bodily nature will yet abide subject to all the evils of the understanding.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Otherwise; by the eye here we may understand our purpose; if that be pure and right, all our works which we work according thereto are good. These He here calls the body, as the Apostle speaks of certain works as members; Mortify your members, fornication and uncleanness. (Col. 3:5.) We should look then, not to what a person does, but with what mind he does it. For this is the light within us, because by this we see that we do with good intention what we do. For all which doth make manifest is light. (Eph. 5:13.) But the deeds themselves, which go forth to men's society, have a result to us uncertain, and therefore He calls them darkness; as when I give money to one in need, I know not what he will do with it. If then the purport of your heart, which you can know, is defiled with the lust of temporal things, much more is the act itself, of which the issue is uncertain, defiled. For even though one should reap good of what you do with a purport not good; it will be imputed to you as you did it, not as it resulted to him. If however our works are done with a single purport, that is with the aim of charity, then are they pure and pleasing in God's sight.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Mendac. 7.) But acts which are known to be in themselves sins, are not to be done as with a good purpose; but such works only as are either good or bad, according as the motives from which they are done are either good or bad, and are not in themselves sins; as to give food to the poor is good if it be done from merciful motives, but evil if it be done from ostentation. But such works as are in themselves sins, who will say that they are to be done with good motives, or that they are not sins? Who would say, Let us rob the rich, that we may have to give to the poor?

GREGORY. (Mor. xxviii. 11.) Otherwise; if the light that is in thee, that is, if what we have begun to do well, we overcloud with evil purpose, when we do things which we know to be in themselves evil, how great is the darkness!

REMIGIUS. (ap. Gloss. ord.) Otherwise; faith is likened to a light, because by it the goings of the inner man, that is, action, are lightened, that he should not stumble according to that, Thy word is a light to my feet. (Ps. 119:105.) If that then be pure and single, the whole body is light; but if defiled, the whole body will be dark. Yet otherwise; by the light may be understood the ruler of the Church, who may be well called the eye, as he it is that ought to see that wholesome things be provided for the people under him, which are understood by the body. If then the ruler of the Church err, how much more will the people subject to him err?

6:24

24. No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had said above, that he that has a spiritual mind is able to keep his body free from sin; and that he who has not, is not able. Of this He here gives the reason, saying, No man can serve two masters.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Otherwise; it had been declared above, that good things become evil, when done with a worldly purpose. It might therefore have been said by some one, I will do good works from worldly and heavenly motives at once. Against this the Lord says, No man can serve two masters.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxi.) Or otherwise; in what had gone before He had restrained the tyranny of avarice by many and weighty motives, but He now adds yet more. Riches do not only harm us in that they arm robbers against us, and that they cloud our understanding, but they moreover turn us away from God’s service. This He proves from familiar notions, saying, No man can serve two masters; two, He means, whose orders are contrary; for concord makes one of many. This is proved by what follows, for either he will hate the one. He mentions two, that we may see that change for the better is easy. For if one were to give himself up in despair as having been made a slave to riches, namely, by loving them, he may hence learn, that it is possible for him to change into a better service, namely, by not submitting to such slavery, but by despising it.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Or; He seems to allude to two different kinds of servants; one kind who serve freely for love, another who serve servilely from fear. If then one serve two masters of contrary character from love, it must be that he hate the one; if from fear, while he trembles before the one, he must despise the other. But as the world or God predominate in a man's heart, he must be drawn contrary ways; for God draws him who serves Him to things above; the earth draws to things beneath; therefore He concludes, Ye cannot serve God and mammon.

JEROME. Mammon—riches are so termed in Syriac. Let the covetous man who is called by the Christian name, hear this, that he cannot serve both Christ and riches. Yet He said not, he who has riches, but, he who is the servant of riches. For he who is the slave of money, guards his money as a slave; but he who has thrown off the yoke of his slavery, dispenses them as a master.

GLOSS. (ord.) By mammon is meant the Devil, who is the lord of money, not that he can bestow them unless where God wills, but because by means of them he deceives men.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 14.) Whoso serves mammon, (that is, riches,) verily serves him, who, being for desert of his perversity set over these things of earth, is called by the Lord, The prince of this world. Or otherwise; who the two masters are He shews when He says, Ye cannot serve God and mammon, that is to say, God and the Devil. Either then man will hate the one, and love the other, namely God; or, he will endure the one and despise the other. For he who is mammon's servant endures a hard master; for ensnared by his own lust he has been made subject to the Devil, and loves him not. As one whose passions have connected him with another man's handmaid, suffers a hard slavery, yet loves not him whose handmaid he loves. But He said, will despise, and not will hate, the other, for none can with a right conscience hate God. But he despises, that is, fears Him not, as being certain of His goodness.

6:25

25. Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 15.) The Lord had taught above, that whoso desires to love God, and to take heed not to offend, should not think that he can serve two masters; lest though perhaps he may not look for superfluities, yet his heart may become double for the sake of very necessaries, and his thoughts bent to obtain them. Therefore I say unto you, Be not ye careful for your 1life what ye shall eat, or for your body what ye shall put on.

CHRYSOSTOM. He does not hereby mean that the 1spirit needs food, for it is incorporeal, but He speaks according to common usage, for the soul cannot remain in the body unless the body be fed.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or we may understand the soul in this place to be put for the animal life.

JEROME. Some MSS. add here, nor what ye shall drinkb. That which belongs naturally to all animals alike, to brutes and beasts of burden as well as to man, from all thought of this we are not freed. But we are bid not to be anxious what we should eat, for in the sweat of our face we earn our bread; the toil is to be undergone, the anxiety put away. This Be not careful, is to be taken of bodily food and clothing; for the food and clothing of the spirit it becomes us to be always careful.

AUGUSTINE. (De Hæres. 57.) There are certain heretics called Euchitæc, who hold that a monk may not do any work even for his support; who embrace this profession that they may be freed from necessity of daily labour.

AUGUSTINE. (De Op. Monach. 1) For they say the Apostle did not speak of personal labour, such as that of husbandmen or craftsmen, when he said, Who will not work, neither let him eat. (et seq. 2 Thess. 3:10.) For he could not be so contrary to the Gospel where it is said, Therefore I say unto you, Be not careful. Therefore in that saying of the Apostle we are to understand spiritual works, of which it is elsewhere said, I have planted, Apollos watereth. (1 Cor. 3:6.) And thus they think themselves obedient to the Apostolic precept, interpreting the Gospel to speak of not taking care for the needs of the body, and the Apostle to speak of spiritual labour and food. First let us prove that the Apostle meant that the servants of God should labour with the body. He had said, Ye yourselves know how ye ought to imitate us in that we were not troublesome among you, nor did we eat any man’s bread for nought; but travailing in labour and weariness day and night, that we might not be burdensome to any of you. Not that we have not power, but that we might offer ourselves as a pattern to you which ye should imitate. For when we were among you, this we taught among you, that if a man would not work, neither should he eat. What shall we say to this, since he taught by his example what he delivered in precept, in that he himself wrought with his own hands. This is proved from the Acts, where it is said, that he abode with Aquila and his wife Priscilla, labouring with them, for they were tent-makers. (Acts 18:3.) And yet to the Apostle, as a preacher of the Gospel, a soldier of Christ, a planter of the vineyard, a shepherd of his flock, the Lord had appointed that he should live of the Gospel, but he refused that payment which was justly his due, that he might present himself an example to those who exacted what was not due to them. Let those hear this who have not that power which he had; namely, of eating bread for nought, and only labouring with spiritual labour. If indeed they be Evangelists, if ministers of the Altar, if dispensers of the Sacraments, they have this power. Or if they had had in this world possessions, whereby they might without labour have supported themselves, and had on their turning to God distributed this to the needy, then were their infirmity to be believed and to be borne with. And it would not import whatever place it was in which he made the distribution, seeing there is but one commonwealth of all Christians. But they who enter the profession of God’s service from the country life, from the workman’s craft, or the common labour, if they work not, are not to be excused. For it is by no means fitting that in that life in which senators become labourers, there should labouring men become idle; or that where lords of farms come having given up their luxuries, there should rustic slaves come to find luxury. But when the Lord says, Be not ye careful, He does not mean that they should not procure such things as they have need of, wherever they may honestly, but that they should not look to these things, and should not for their sake do what they are commanded to do in preaching the Gospel; for this intention He had a little before called the eye.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or we may connect the context otherwise; When the Lord had inculcated contempt of money, that none might say, How then shall we be able to live when we have given up our all? He adds, Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life.

GLOSS. (interlin.) That is, Be not withdrawn by temporal cares from things eternal.

JEROME. The command is therefore, not to be anxious what we shall eat. For it is also commanded, that in the sweat of our face we must eat bread. Toil therefore is enjoined, carking forbidden,

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Bread may not be gained by carefulness of spirit, but by toil of body; and to them that will labour it abounds, God bestowing it as a reward of their industry; and is lacking to the idle, God withdrawing it as punishment of their sloth. The Lord also confirms our hope, and descending first from the greater to the less, says, Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?

JEROME. He who has given the greater, will He not also give the less?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For had He not willed that that which was should be preserved, He had not created it; but what He so created that it should be preserved by food, it is necessary that He give it food, as long as He would have it to be preserved.

HILARY. Otherwise; Because the thoughts of the unbelievers were ill-employed respecting care of things future, cavilling concerning what is to be the appearance of our bodies in the resurrection, what the food in the eternal life, therefore He continues, Is not the life more than food? He will not endure that our hope should hang in care for the meat and drink and clothing that is to be in the resurrection, lest there should be affront given to Him who has given us the more precious things, in our being anxious that He should also give us the lesser.

6:26–27

26. Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?

27. Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Having confirmed our hope by this arguing from the greater to the less, He next confirms it by an argument from less to greater, Behold the fowls of the air, they sow not, neither do they reap.

AUGUSTINE. (De Op. Monach. 23.) Some argue that they ought not to labour, because the fowls of the air neither sow nor reap. Why then do they not attend to that which follows, neither gather into barns? Why do they seek to have their hands idle, and their storehouses full? Why indeed do they grind corn, and dress it? For this do not the birds. Or even if they find men whom they can persuade to supply them day by day with victuals ready prepared, at least they draw water from the spring, and set on table for themselves, which the birds do not. But if neither are they driven to fill themselves vessels with water, then have they gone one new step of righteousness beyond those who were at that time at Jerusalem, (vid. Acts 11:29.) who of corn sent to them of free gift, made, or caused to be made, loaves, which the birds do not. But not to lay up any thing for the morrow cannot be observed by those, who for many days together withdrawn from the sight of men, and suffering none to approach to them, shut themselves up, to live in much fervency of prayer. What? will you say that the more holy men become, the more unlike the birds of the air in this respect they become? What He says respecting the birds of the air, He says to this end, that none of His servants should think that God has no thought of their wants, when they see Him so provide even for these inferior creatures. Neither is it not God that feeds those that earn their bread by their own labour; neither because God hath said, Call upon me in the day of trouble, and I will deliver thee, (Ps. 50:15.) ought the Apostle therefore not to have fled, but to have remained still to have been seized, that God might save him as He did the Three Children out of the midst of the fire. Should any object in this sort to the saints in their flight from persecution, they would answer that they ought not to tempt God, and that God, if He pleased, would so do to deliver them as He had done Daniel from the lions, Peter from prison, then when they could no longer help themselves; but that in having made flight possible to them, should they be saved by flight, it was by God that they were saved. In like manner, such of God’s servants as have strength to earn their food by the labour of their hands, would easily answer any who should object to them this out of the Gospel concerning the birds of the air, that they neither sow nor reap; and would say, If we by sickness or any other hindrance are not able to work, He will feed us as He feeds the birds, that work not. But when we can work, we ought not to tempt God, seeing that even this our ability is His gift; and that we live here we live of His goodness that has made us able to live; He feeds us by whom the birds of the air are fed; as He says, Your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not ye of much greater value?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 15.) Ye are of more value, because a rational animal, such as man is, is higher in the scale of nature than an irrational, such as are the birds of the air.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xi. 16.) Indeed a higher price is often given for a horse than a slave, for a jewel than for a waiting maid, but this not from reasonable valuation, but from the need of the person requiring, or rather from his pleasure desiring it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For God created all animals for man, but man for himself; therefore by how much the more precious is the creation of man, so much the greater is God's care for him. If then the birds without toiling find food, shall man not find, to whom God has given both knowledge of labour and hope of fruitfulness?

JEROME. There be some who, seeking to go beyond the limits of their fathers, and to soar into the air, sink into the deep and are drowned. These will have the birds of the air to mean the Angels, and the other powers in the ministry of God, who without any care of their own are fed by God's providence. But if this be indeed as they would have it, how follows it, said to men, Are not ye of more worth than they? It must be taken then in the plain sense; If birds that to-day are, and to-morrow are not, be nourished by God's providence, without thought or toil of their own, how much more men to whom eternity is promised!

HILARY. It may be said, that under the name of birds, He exhorts us by the example of the unclean spirits, to whom, without any trouble of their own in seeking and collecting it, provision of life is given by the power of the Eternal Wisdom. And to lead us to refer this to the unclean spirits, He suitably adds, Are not ye of much more value than they? Thus shewing the great interval between piety and wickedness.

GLOSS. (non occ.) He teaches us not only by the instance of the birds, but adds a further proof, that to our being and life our own care is not enough, but Divine Providence therein works; saying, Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For it is God who day by day works the growth of your body, yourself not feeling it. If then the Providence of God works thus daily in your very body, how shall that same Providence withhold from working in necessaries of life? And if by taking thought you cannot add the smallest part to your body, how shall you by taking thought be altogether saved?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 15.) Or it may be connected with what follows it; as though He should say, It was not by our care that our body was brought to its present stature; so that we may know that if we desired to add one cubit to it, we should not be able. Leave then the care of clothing that body to Him who made it to grow to its present stature.

HILARY. Otherwise; As by the example of the spirits He had fixed our faith in the supply of food for our lives, so now by a decision of common understanding He cuts off all anxiety about supply of clothing. Seeing that He it is who shall raise in one perfect man every various kind of body that ever drew breath, and is alone able to add one or two or three cubits to each man's stature; surely in being anxious concerning clothing, that is, concerning the appearance of our bodies, we offer affront to Him who will add so much to each man's stature as shall bring all to an equality.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xxii. 15.) But if Christ rose again with the same stature with which He died, it is impious to say that when the time of the resurrection of all shall come, there shall be added to His body a bigness that it had not at His own resurrection, (for He appeared to His disciples with that body in which He had been known among them,) such that He shall be equalled to the tallest among men. If again we say that all men's bodies, whether tall or short, shall be alike brought to the size and stature of the Lord's body, then much will perish from many bodies, though He has declared that not a hair shall fall. It remains therefore that each be raised in his own stature—that stature which he had in youth, if he died in old age; if in childhood that stature to which he would have attained had he lived. For the Apostle says not, 'To the measure of the stature,' but, To the measure of the full age of Christ. (Eph. 4:13.) For the bodies of the dead shall rise in youth and maturity to which we know that Christ attainedd.

6:28–30

28. And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin:

29. And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.

30. Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to day is, and to morrow is cast into the oven, shall He not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxii.) Having shewn that it is not right to be anxious about food, He passes to that which is less; (for raiment is not so necessary as food;) and asks, And why are ye careful wherewith ye shall be clothed? He uses not here the instance of the birds, when He might have drawn some to the point, as the peacock, or the swan, but brings forward the lilies, saying, Consider the lilies of the field. He would prove in two things the abundant goodness of God; to wit, the richness of the beauty with which they are clothed, and the mean value of the things so clothed with it.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 15.) The things instanced are not to be allegorized so that we enquire what is denoted by the birds of the air, or the lilies of the field; they are only examples to prove God’s care for the greater from His care for the less.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For lilies within a fixed time are formed into branches, clothed in whiteness, and endowed with sweet odour, God conveying by an unseen operation, what the earth had not given to the root. But in all the same perfectness is observed, that they may not be thought to have been formed by chance, but may be known to be ordered by God’s providence. When He says, They toil not, He speaks for the comfort of men; Neither do they spin, for the women.

CHRYSOSTOM. He forbids not labour but carefulness, both here and above when He spoke of sowing.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And for the greater exaltation of God’s providence in those things that are beyond human industry, He adds, I say unto you, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.

JEROME. For, in sooth, what regal purple, what silk, what web of divers colours from the loom, may vie with flowers? What work of man has the red blush of the rose? the pure white of the lily? How the Tyrian dye yields to the violet, sight alone and not words can express.

CHRYSOSTOM. As widely as truth differs from falsehood, so widely do our clothes differ from flowers. If then Solomon, who was more eminent than all other kings, was yet surpassed by flowers, how shall you exceed the beauty of flowers by your garments? And Solomon was exceeded by the flowers not once only, or twice, but throughout his whole reign; and this is that He says, In all his glory; for no one day was he arrayed as are the flowers.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or the meaning may be, that Solomon though he toiled not for his own raiment, yet he gave command for the making of it. But where command is, there is often found both offence of them that minister, and wrath of him that commands. When then any are without these things, then they are arrayed as are the lilies.

HILARY. Or; By the lilies are to be understood the eminences of the heavenly Angels, to whom a surpassing radiance of whiteness is communicated by God. They toil not, neither do they spin, because the angelic powers received in the very first allotment of their existence such a nature, that as they were made so they should ever continue to be; and when in the resurrection men shall be like unto Angels, He would have them look for a covering of angelic glory by this example of angelic excellence.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. If God then thus provides for the flowers of the earth which only spring up, that they may be seen and die, shall He overlook men whom He has created not to be seen for a time, but that they should be for ever?

JEROME. To-morrow in Scripture is put for time future in general. Jacob says, So shall my righteousness answer for me to-morrow. (Gen. 30:33.) And in the phantasm of Samuel, the Pythoness says to Saul, To-morrow shalt thou be with me. 1 Sam. 28:19.)

GLOSS. Some copies have into the fire, or, into an heap, which has the appearance of an oven.

CHRYSOSTOM. He calls them no more lilies, but the grass of the field, to shew their small worth; and adds moreover another cause of their small value; which to-day is. And He said not, and to-morrow is not, but what is yet greater fall, is cast into the oven. In that He says How much more you, is implicitly conveyed the dignity of the human race, as though He had said, You to whom He has given a soul, for whom He has contrived a body, to whom He has sent Prophets and gave His Only-begotten Son.

GLOSS. He says, of little faith, for that faith is little which is not sure of even the least things.

HILARY. Or, under the signification of grass the Gentiles are pointed to. If then an eternal existence is only therefore granted to the Gentiles, that they may soon be handed over to the judgment fires; how impious it is that the saints should doubt of attaining to eternal glory, when the wicked have eternity bestowed on them for their punishment.

REMIGIUS. Spiritually, by the birds of the air are meant the Saints who are born again in the water of holy Baptisme; and by devotion raise themselves above the earth and seek the skies. The Apostles are said to be of more value than these, because they are the heads of the Saints. By the lilies also may be understood the Saints, who without the toil of legal ceremonies pleased God by faith alone; of whom it is said, My Beloved, who feedeth among the lilies. (Cant. 2:16.) Holy Church also is understood by the lilies, because of the whiteness of its faith, and the odour of its good conversation, of which it is said in the same place, As the lily among the thorns. By the grass are denoted the unbelievers, of whom it is said, The grass hath dried up, and the flowers thereof faded. (Is. 40:7.) By the oven eternal damnation; so that the sense be, If God bestows temporal goods on the unbelievers, how much more shall He bestow on you eternal goods!

6:31–33

31. Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall we be clothed?

32. (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things.

33. But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having thus expressly cut off all anxiety concerning food and raiment, by an argument drawn from observation of the inferior creation, He follows it up by a further prohibition; Be not ye therefore careful, saying, What shall we eat, what shall we drink, or wherewithal shall we be clothed?

REMIGIUS. The Lord repeated this, that He might shew how highly necessary this precept is, and that He might inculcate it more strongly on our hearts.

RABANUS. It should be observed that He does not say, Do not ye seek, or be thoughful for, food, drink, and raiment, but what ye shall eat, what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye shall be clothed. Wherein they seem to me to be convicted, who, using themselves the usual food and clothing, require of those with whom they live either greater sumptuousness, or greater austerity in both.

GLOSS. (non occ.) There is also a further needless solicitude wherein men sin, when they lay by of produce or money more than necessity requires, and leaving spiritual things, are intent on these things, as though despairing of the goodness of God; this is what is forbidden; for after all these things do the Gentiles seek.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Since their belief is that it is Fortune and not Providence that has place in human affairs, and think not that their lives are directed by God's counsel, but follow the uncertain chance, they accordingly fear and despair, as having none to guide them. But he who believes that he is guided by God's counsel, entrusts his provision of food to God's hand; as it follows, for your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not 'God knoweth,' but, Your Father knoweth, in order to lead them to higher hope; for if He be their Father, He will not endure to forget his children, since not even human fathers could do so. He says, That ye have need of all these things, in order that for that very reason, because they are necessary, ye may the more lay aside all anxiety. For he who denies his son bare necessaries, after what fashion is he a father? But for superfluities they have no right to look with the like confidence.

AUGUSTINE. (De Trin. xv. 13.) God did not gain this knowledge at any certain time, but before all time, without beginning of knowledge, foreknew that the things of the world would be, and among others, both what and when we should ask of Him.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xii. 18.) As to what some say that these things are so many that they cannot be compassed by the knowledge of God; they ought with like reason to maintain further that God cannot know all numbers which are certainly infinite. But infinity of number is not beyond the compass of His understanding, who is Himself infinite. Therefore if whatever is compassed by knowledge, is bounded by the compass of him that has the knowledge, then is all infinity in a certain unspeakable way bounded by God, because it is not incomprehensible by His knowledge.

NEMESIUS. (De Nat. Hom. 42.) That there is a Providence, is shewn by such signs as the following; The continuance of all things, of those things especially which are in a state of decay and reproduction, and the place and order of all things that exist is ever preserved in one and the same state; and how could this be done unless by some presiding power? But some affirm that God does indeed care for the general continuance of all things in the universe, and provides for this, but that all particular events depend on contingency. Now there are but three reasons that can be alleged for God exercising no providence of particular events; either God is ignorant that it is good to have knowledge of particular things; or He is unwilling; or He is unable. But ignorance is altogether alien from blessed substance; for how shall God not know what every wise man knows, that if particulars were destroyed, the whole would be destroyed? But nothing prevents all individuals from perishing; when no power watches over them. If, again, He be unwilling, this must be from one of two reasons; inactivity, or the meanness of the occupation. But inactivity is produced by two things; either we are drawn aside by some pleasure, or hindered by some fear, neither of which can be piously supposed of God. If they affirm that it would be unbecoming, for that it is beneath such blessedness to stoop to things so trifling, how is it not inconsistent that a workman overseeing the whole of any machine, leaves no part however insignificant without attention, knowing the whole is but made up of the parts, and thus pronounce God the Creator of all things to be less wise than craftsmen? But if it be that He is unable, then is He unable to bestow benefits on us. But if we are unable to comprehend the manner of special Providence, we have not therefore any right to deny its operation; we might as well say that, because we did not know the number of mankind, therefore there were no men.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Thus then let him who believes himself to be under the rule of God’s counsel, commit his provision into God’s hand; but let him meditate of good and evil, which if he do not, he will neither shun the evil, nor lay hold of the good. Therefore it is added, Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness. The kingdom of God is the reward of good works; His righteousness is the way of piety by which we go to that kingdom. If then you consider how great is the glory of the Saints, you will either through fear of punishment depart from evil, or through desire of glory hasten to good. And if you consider what is the righteousness of God, what He loves, and what He hates, the righteousness itself will shew you His ways, as it attends on those that love it. And the account we shall have to render is not whether we have been poor or rich, but whether we have done well or ill, which is in our own power.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Or, He says his righteousness, as though He were to say, ‘Ye are made righteous through Him, and not through yourselves.’

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The earth for man’s sin is accursed that it should not put forth fruit, according to that in Genesis, Cursed is the ground in thy works; but when we do well, then it is blessed. (Gen. 3:17.) Seek righteousness therefore, and thou shalt not lack food. Wherefore it follows, and all these things shall be added unto you.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 16.) To wit, these temporal goods which are thus manifestly shewn not to be such goods as those goods of ours for the sake of which we ought to do well; and yet they are necessary. The kingdom of God and His righteousness is our good which we ought to make our end. But since in order to attain this end we are militant in this life, which may not be lived without supply of these necessaries, He promises, These things shall be added unto you. That He says, First, implies that these are to be sought second not in time, but in value; the one is our good, the other necessary to us. For example, we ought not to preach that we may eat, for so we should hold the Gospel as of less value than our food; but we should therefore eat that we may preach the Gospel. But if we seek first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, that is, set this before all other things, and seek other things for the sake of this, we ought not to be anxious lest we should lack necessaries; and therefore He says, All these things shall be added unto you; that is, of course, without being an hindrance to you: that you may not in seeking them be turned away from the other, and thus set two ends before you.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He said not, Shall be given, but, Shall be added, that you may learn that the things that are now, are nought to the greatness of the things that shall be.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 17.) But when we read that the Apostle suffered hunger and thirst, let us not think that God’s promises failed him;

for these things are rather aids. That Physician to whom we have entirely entrusted ourselves, knows when He will give and when He will withhold, as He judges most for our advantage. So that should these things ever be lacking to us, (as God to exercise us often permits,) it will not weaken our fixed purpose, but rather confirm it when wavering.

6:34

34. Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Having forbid anxiety for the things of the day, He now forbids anxiety for future things, such a fruitless care as proceeds from the fault of men, in these words, Be not ye anxious about the morrow.

JEROME. To-morrow in Scripture signifies time future, as Jacob in Genesis says, To-morrow shall my righteousness hear me. (Gen. 30:33.) And in the phantasm of Samuel the Pythoness says to Saul, To-morrow shalt thou be with me. (1 Sam. 28:19.) He yields therefore unto them that they should care for things present, though He forbids them to take thought for things to come. For sufficient for us is the thought of time present; let us leave to God the future which is uncertain. And this is that He says, The morrow shall he anxious for itself; that is, it shall bring its own anxiety with it. For sufficient for the day is the evil thereof. By evil He means here not that which is contrary to virtue, but toil, and affliction, and the hardships of life.

CHRYSOSTOM. Nothing brings so much pain to the spirit as anxiety and cark. That He says, The morrow shall he anxious for itself, comes of desire to make more plain what He speaks; to that end employing a prosopopeia of time, after the practice of many in speaking to the rude populace; to impress them the more, He brings in the day itself complaining of its too heavy cares. Has not every day a burden enough of its own, in its own cares? why then do you add to them by laying on those that belong to another day?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; By to-day are signified such things as are needful for us in this present life; To-morrow denotes those things that are superfluous. Be not ye therefore anxious for the morrow, thus means, Seek not to have aught beyond that which is necessary for your daily life, for that which is over and above, i. e. To-morrow, shall care for itself. To-morrow shall he anxious for itself, is as much as to say, when you have heaped up superfluities, they shall care for themselves, you shall not enjoy them, but they shall find many lords who shall care for them. Why then should you be anxious about those things, the property of which you must part with? Sufficient for the day is its own evil, as much as to say, The toil you undergo for necessaries is enough, do not toil for things superfluous.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or otherwise; To-morrow is said only of time where future succeeds to past. When then we work any good work, we think not of earthly but of heavenly things. The morrow shall be anxious for itself, that is, Take food and the like, when you ought to take it, that is when necessity begins to call for it. For sufficient for the day is its own evil, that is, it is enough that necessity shall compel to take these things; He calls it evil, because it is penal, inasmuch as it pertains to our mortality, which we earned by sinning. To this necessity then of worldly punishment, add no further weight, that you may not only fulfil it, but may even so fulfil it as to shew yourself God’s soldier. But herein we must be careful, that, when we see any servant of God endeavouring to provide necessaries either for himself, or those committed to his care, we do not straight judge him to sin against this command of the Lord in being anxious for the morrow. For the Lord Himself, to whom Angels ministered, thought good to carry a bag for example sake. And in the Acts of the Apostles it is written, that food necessary for life was provided for future time, at a time when famine threatened. What the Lord condemns therefore, is not the provision of these things after the manner of men, but if a man because of these things does not fight as God’s soldier.

HILARY. This is further comprehended under the full meaning of the Divine words. We are commanded not to be careful about the future, because sufficient for our life is the evil of the days wherein we live, that is to say, the sins, that all our thought and pains be occupied in cleansing this away. And if our care be slack, yet will the future be careful for itself, in that there is held out to us a harvest of eternal love to be provided by God.

CHAPTER 7

7:1–2

1. Judge not, that ye be not judged.

2. For with what judgment ye judge, ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Since when these temporal things are provided beforehand against the future, it is uncertain with what purpose it is done, as it may be with a single or double mind, He opportunely subjoins, Judge not.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; He has drawn out thus far the consequences of his injunctions of almsgiving; He now takes up those respecting prayer. And this doctrine is in a sort a continuation of that of the prayer; as though it should run, Forgive us our debts, and then should follow, Judge not, that ye be not judged.

JEROME. But if He forbids us to judge, how then does Paul judge the Corinthian who had committed uncleanness? Or Peter convict Ananias and Sapphira of falsehood?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But some explain this place after a sense, as though the Lord did not herein forbid Christians to reprove others out of good will, but only intended that Christians should not despise Christians by making a show of their own righteousness, hating others often on suspicion alone, condemning them, and pursuing private grudges under the show of piety.

CHRYSOSTOM. Wherefore He does not say, ‘Do not cause a sinner to cease,’ but do not judge; that is, be not a bitter judge; correct him indeed, but not as an enemy seeking revenge, but as a physician applying a remedy.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But that not even thus should Christians correct Christians is shewn by that expression, Judge not. But if they do not thus correct, shall they therefore obtain forgiveness of their sins, because it is said, and ye shall not be judged? For who obtains forgiveness of a former sin, by not adding another thereto? This we have said, desiring to shew that this is not here spoken concerning not judging our neighbour who shall sin against God, but who may sin against ourselves. For whoso does not judge his neighbour who has sinned against him, him shall not God judge for his sin, but will forgive him his debt even as he forgave.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; He does not forbid us to judge all sin absolutely, but lays this prohibition on such as are themselves full of great evils, and judge others for very small evils. In like manner Paul does not absolutely forbid to judge those that sin, but finds fault with disciples that judged their teacher, and instructs us not to judge those that are above us.

HILARY. Otherwise; He forbids us to judge God touching His promises; for as judgments among men are founded on things uncertain, so this judgment against God is drawn from somewhat that is doubtful. And He therefore would have us put away the custom from us altogether; for it is not here as in other cases where it is sin to have given a false judgment; but here we have begun to sin if we have pronounced any judgment at all.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 18.) I suppose the command here to be no other than that we should always put the best interpretation on such actions as seem doubtful with what mind they were done. But concerning such as cannot be done with good purpose, as adulteries, blasphemies, and the like, He permits us to judge; but of indifferent actions which admit of being done with either good or bad purpose, it is rash to judge, but especially so to condemn. There are two cases in which we should be particularly on our guard against hasty judgments, when it does not appear with what mind the action was done; and when it does not yet appear, what sort of man any one may turn out, who now seems either good or bad. Wherefore we should neither blame those things of which we know with what mind they are done, nor so blame those things which are manifest, as though we despaired of recovery. Here one may think there is difficulty in what follows, With what judgment ye judge ye shall be judged. If we judge a hasty judgment, will God also judge us with the like? Or if we have measured with a false measure, is there with God a false measure whence it may be measured to us again? For by measure I suppose is here meant judgment. Surely this is only said, that the haste in which you punish another shall be itself your punishment. For injustice often does no harm to him who suffers the wrong; but must always hurt him who does the wrong.

AUGUSTINE. (De. Civ. Dei, xxi. 11.) Some say, How is it true that Christ says, And with what measure ye shall mete it shall be measured to you again, if temporal sin is to be punished by eternal suffering? They do not observe that it is not said the same measure, because of the equal space of time, but because of the equal retribution—namely, that he who has done evil should suffer evil, though even in that sense it might be said of that of which the Lord spoke here, namely of judgments and condemnations. Accordingly, he that judges and condemns unjustly, if he is judged and condemned, justly receives in the same measure though not the same thing that he gave; by judgment he did what was unjust, by judgment he suffers what is just.

7:3–5

3. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the beam that is in thine own eye?

4. Or how wilt thou say to thy brother, Let me pull out the mote out of thine eye; and, behold, a beam is in thine own eye?

5. Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam out of thine own eye; and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 18.) The Lord having admonished us concerning hasty and unjust judgment; and because that they are most given to rash judgment, who judge concerning things uncertain; and they most readily find fault, who love rather to speak evil and to condemn than to cure and to correct; a fault that springs either from pride or jealousy—therefore He subjoins, Why seest thou the mote in thy brother's eye, and seest not the beam in thy own eye?

JEROME. He speaks of such as though themselves guilty of mortal sin, do not forgive a trivial fault in their brother.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) As if he perhaps have sinned in anger, and you correct him with settled hate. For as great as is the difference between a beam and a mote, so great is the difference between anger and hatred. For hatred is anger become inveterate. It may be if you are angry with a man that you would have him amend, not so if you hate him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Many do this, if they see a Monk having a superfluous garment, or a plentiful meal, they break out into bitter accusation, though themselves daily seize and devour, and suffer from excess of drinking.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; This is spoken to the doctors. For every sin is either a great or a small sin according to the character of the sinner. If he is a laie, it is small and a mote in comparison of the sin of a priest, which is the beam.

HILARY. Otherwise; The sin against the Holy Spirit is to take from God power which has influences, and from Christ substance which is of eternity, through whom as God came to man, so shall man likewise1 come to God. As much greater then as is the beam than the mote, so much greater is the sin against the Holy Spirit than all other sins. As when unbelievers object to others carnal sins, and secrete in themselves the burden of that sin, to wit, that they trust not the promises of God, their minds being blinded as their eye might be by a beam.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That is, with what face can you charge your brother with sin, when yourself are living in the same or a yet greater sin?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 19.) When then we are brought under the necessity of finding fault with any, let us first consider whether the sin be such as we have never had; secondly that we are yet men, and may fall into it; then, whether it be one that we have had, and are now without, and then let our common frailty come into our mind, that pity and not hate may go before correction. Should we find ourselves in the same fault, let us not reprove, but groan with the offender, and invite him to struggle with us. Seldom indeed and in cases of great necessity is reproof to be employed; and then only that the Lord may be served and not ourselves.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; How sayest thou to thy brother; that is, with what purpose? From charity, that you may save your neighbour? Surely not, for you would first save yourself. You desire therefore not to heal others, but by good doctrine to cover bad life, and to gain praise of learning from men, not the reward of edifying from God, and you are a hypocrite; as it follows, Thou hypocrite, cast first the beam out of thine own eye.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 19.) For to reprove sin is the duty of the good, which when the bad do, they act a part, dissembling their own character, and assuming one that does not belong to them.

CHRYSOSTOM. And it is to be noted, that whenever He intends to denounce any great sin, He begins with an epithet of reproach, as below, Thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt; (Mat. 18:32.) and so here, Thou hypocrite, cast out first. For each one knows better the things of himself than the things of others, and sees more the things that be great, than the things that be lesser, and loves himself more than his neighbour. Therefore He bids him who is chargeable with many sins, not to be a harsh judge of another's faults, especially if they be small. Herein not forbidding to arraign and correct; but forbidding to make light of our own sins, and magnify those of others. For it behoves you first diligently to examine how great may be your own sins, and then try those of your neighbour; whence it follows, and then shalt thou see clearly to cast the mote out of thy brother's eye.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For having removed from our own eye the beam of envy, of malice, or hypocrisy, we shall see clearly to cast the beam out of our brother's eye.

7:6

6. Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Because the simplicity to which He had been directing in the foregoing precepts might lead some wrongly to conclude that it was equally wrong to hide the truth as to utter what was false, He well adds, Give not that which is holy to the dogs, and cast not your pearls before swine.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; The Lord had commanded us to love our enemies, and to do good to those that sin against us. That from this Priests might not think themselves obliged to communicate also the things of God to such, He checked any such thought saying, Give not that which is holy to the dogs; as much as to say, I have bid you love your enemies, and do them good out of your temporal goods, but not out of My spiritual goods, without distinction. For they are your brethren by nature but not by faith, and God gives the good things of this life equally to the worthy and the unworthy, but not so spiritual graces.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 20.) Let us see now what is the holy thing, what are the dogs, what the pearls, what the swine? The holy thing is all that it were impiety to corrupt; a sin which may be committed by the will, though the thing itself be undone. The pearls are all spiritual things that are to be highly esteemed. Thus though one and the same thing may be called both the holy thing and a pearl, yet it is called holy because it is not to be corrupted; and called a pearl because it is not to be contemned.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; That which is holy denotes baptism, the grace of Christ’s body, and the like; but the mysteries of the truth are intended by the pearls. For as pearls are inclosed in shells, and such in the deeps of the sea, so the divine mysteries inclosed in words are lodged in the deep meaning of Holy Scripture.

CHRYSOSTOM. And to those that are right-minded and have understanding, when revealed they appear good; but to those without understanding, they seem to be more deserving reverence because they are not understood.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The dogs are those that assault the truth; the swine we may not unsuitably take for those that despise the truth. Therefore because dogs leap forth to rend in pieces, and what they rend, suffer not to continue whole, He said, Give not that which is holy to the dogs; because they strive to the utmost of their power to destroy the truth. The swine though they do not assault by biting as dogs, yet do they defile by trampling upon, and therefore He said, Cast not your pearls before swine.

RABANUS. Or; The dogs are returned to their vomit; the swine not yet returned, but wallowing in the mire of vices.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; The dog and the swine are unclean animals; the dog indeed in every respect, as he neither chews the cud, nor divides the hoof; but swine in one respect only, seeing they divide the hoof, though they do not chew the cud. Hence I think that we are to understand by the dog, the Gentiles who are altogether unclean, both in their life, and in their faith; but by the swine are to be understood heretics, because they seem to call upon the name of the Lord. Give not therefore that which is holy to the dogs, for that baptism and the other sacraments are not to be given but to them that have the faith. In like manner the mysteries of the truth, that is, the pearls, are not to be given but to such as desire the truth and live with human reason. If then you cast them to the swine, that is, to such as are grovelling in impurity of life, they do not understand their preciousness, but value them like to other worldly fables, and tread them under foot with their carnal life.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) That which is despised is said to be trodden under foot: hence it is said, Lest perchance they tread them under foot.

GLOSS. (interlin.) He says, Lest perchance, because it may be that they will wisely turn from their uncleannessa.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) That which follows, Turn again and rend you, He means not the pearls themselves, for these they tread under foot, and when they turn again that they may hear something further, then they rend him by whom the pearls on which they had trode had been cast. For you will not easily find what will please him who has despised things got by great toil. Whoever then undertake to teach such, I see not how they shall not be trode upon and rent by those they teach.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; The swine not only trample upon the pearls by their carnal life, but after a little they turn, and by disobedience rend those who offend them. Yea often when offended they bring false accusation against them as sowers of new dogmas. The dogs also having trode upon holy things by their impure actions, by their disputings rend the preacher of truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Well is that said, Lest they turn; for they feign meekness that they may learn; and when they have learned, they attack.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. With good reason He forbade pearls to be given to swine. For if they are not to be set before swine that are the less unclean, how much more are they to be withheld from dogs that are so much more unclean. But respecting the giving that which is holy, we cannot hold the same opinion; seeing we often give the benediction to Christians who live as the brutes; and that not because they deserve to receive it, but lest perchance being more grievously offended they should perish utterly.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) We must be careful therefore not to explain ought to him who does not receive it; for men the rather seek that which is hidden than that which is opened. He either attacks from ferocity as a dog, or overlooks from stupidity as swine. But it does not follow that if the truth be kept hid, falsehood is uttered. The Lord Himself who never spoke falsely, yet sometimes concealed the truth, as in that, I have yet many things to say unto you, the which ye are not now able to bear. (John 16:12.) But if any is unable to receive these things because of his filthiness, we must first cleanse him as far as lays in our power either by word or deed. But in that the Lord is found to have said some things which many who heard Him did not receive, but either rejected or contemned them, we are not to think that therein He gave the holy thing to the dogs, or cast His pearls before swine. He gave to those who were able to receive, and who were in the company, whom it was not fit should be neglected for the uncleanness of the rest. And though those who tempted Him might perish in those answers which He gave to them, yet those who could receive them by occasion of these inquiries heard many useful things. He therefore who knows what should be answered ought to make answer, for their sakes at least who might fall into despair should they think that the question proposed is one that cannot be answered. But this only in the case of such matters as pertain to instruction of salvation; of things superfluous or harmful nothing should be said; but it should then be explained for what reason we ought not to make answer in such points to the enquirer.

7:7–8

7. Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you:

8. For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened.

JEROME. Having before forbidden us to pray for things of the flesh, He now shews what we ought to ask, saying, Ask, and it shall be given you.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Otherwise; when He commanded not to give the holy thing to dogs, and not to cast pearls before swine, the hearer conscious of his own ignorance might say, Why do you thus bid me not give the holy thing to dogs, when as yet I see not that I have any holy thing? He therefore adds in good season, Ask, and ye shall receive.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; Having given them some commands for the sanctification of prayer, saying, Judge not, He adds accordingly, Ask, and it shall be given unto you, as though He were to say, If ye observe this mercy towards your enemies, whatever seems to you shut, knock, and it shall be opened to you. Ask therefore in prayer, praying day and night; seek with care and toil; for neither by toiling only in the Scriptures do we gain knowledge without God’s grace, nor do we attain to grace without study, lest the gift of God should be bestowed on the careless. But knock with prayer, and fasting, and alms. For as one who knocks at a door, not only cries out with his voice, but strikes with his hand, so he who does good works, knocks with his works. But you will say, this is what I pray that I may know and do, how then can I do it, before I receive? Do what you can that you may become able to do more, and keep what you know that you may come to know more. Or otherwise; having above commanded all men to love their enemies, and after enjoined that we should not under pretext of love give holy things to dogs; He here gives good counsel, that they should pray God for them, and it shall be granted them; let them seek out those that are lost in sins, and they shall find them; let them knock at those who are shut up in errors, and God shall open to them that their word may have access to their souls. Or otherwise; Since the precepts given above were beyond the reach of human virtue, He sends them to God to whose grace nothing is impossible, saying, Ask, and it shall be given you, that what cannot be performed by men may be fulfilled through the grace of God. For when God furnished the other animals with swift foot, or swift wing, with claws, teeth, or horns, He so made man that He Himself should be man's only1 strength, that forced by reason of his own weakness, he might always have need of his Lord.

GLOSS. (ord.) We ask with faith, we seek with hope, we knock with love. You must first ask that you may have; after that seek that you may find; and lastly, observe what you have found that you may enter in.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 21.) Asking, is that we may get healthiness of soul that we may be able to fulfil the things commanded us; seeking, pertains to the discovery of the truth. But when any has found the true way, he will then come into actual possession, which however is only opened to him that knocks.

AUGUSTINE. (Retract. i. 19.) How these three differ from one another, I have thought good to unfold with this travail; but it were better to refer them all to instant prayer; wherefore He afterwards concludes, saving, He will give good things to them that ask him.

CHRYSOSTOM. And in that He adds seek, and knock, He bids us ask with much importunateness and strength. For one who seeks, casts forth all other things from his mind, and is turned to that thing singly which he seeks; and he that knocks comes with vehemence and warm soul.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He had said, Ask, and ye shall receive; which sinners hearing might perchance say, The Lord herein exhorts them that are worthy, but we are unworthy. Therefore He repeats it that He may commend the mercy of God to the righteous as well as to sinners; and therefore declares that every one that asketh receiveth; that is, whether he be righteous or a sinner, let him not hesitate to ask; that it may be fully seen that none is neglected but he who hesitates to ask of God. For it is not credible that God should enjoin on men that work of piety which is displayed in doing good to our enemies, and should not Himself (being good) act so.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. in Joan. 44. 13.) Wherefore God hears sinners; for if He do not hear sinners, the Publican said in vain, Lord, be merciful to me a sinner; (Luke 18:13.) and by that confession merited justification.

AUGUSTINE. (Prosper, Sent. 212.) He who in faith offers supplication to God for the necessities of this life is heard mercifully, and not heard mercifully. For the physician knows better than the sick man what is good for his sickness. But if he asks that which God both promises and commands, his prayer shall be granted, for love shall receive what truth provides.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 31. 1.) But the Lord is good, who often gives us not what we would, that He may give us what we should rather prefer.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 21.) There is need moreover of perseverance, that we may receive what we ask for.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 61. 5.) In that God sometimes delays His gifts, He but recommends, and does not deny them. For that which is long looked for is sweeter when obtained; but that is held cheap, which comes at once. Ask then and seek things righteous. For by asking and seeking grows the appetite of taking. God reserves for you those things which He is not willing to give you at once, that you may learn greatly to desire great things. Therefore we ought always to pray and not to fail.

7:9–11

9. Or what man is there of you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone?

10. Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent?

11. If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 21.) As above He had cited the birds of the air and the lilies of the field, that our hopes may rise from the less to the greater; so also does He in this place, when He says, Or what man among you?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Lest perchance any one considering how great is the difference between God and man, and weighing his own sins should despair of obtaining, and so never take in hand to ask; therefore He proposes a comparison of the relation between father and son; that should we despair because of our sins, we may hope because of God's fatherly goodness.

CHRYSOSTOM. There are two things behoveful for one that prays; that he ask earnestly; and that he ask such things as he ought to ask. And those are spiritual things; as Solomon, because he asked such things as were right, received speedily.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And what are the things that we ought to ask, he shews under the likeness of a loaf, and a fish. The loaf is the word concerning the knowledge of God the Father. The stone is all falsehood that has a stumbling-block of offence to the soul.

REMIGIUS. By the fish we may understand the word concerning Christ, by the serpent the Devil himself. Or by the loaf may be understood spiritual doctrine; by the stone ignorance; by the fish the water of Holy Baptism; by the serpent the wiles of the Devil, or unbelief.

RABANUS. Or; bread which is the common food signifies charity, without which the other virtues are of no avail. The fish signifies faith, which is born of the water of baptism, is tossed in the midst of the waves of this life and yet lives. Luke adds a third thing, an egg, (Luke 11:12.) which signifies hope; for an egg is the hope of the animal. To charity, He opposes a stone, that is, the hardness of hatred; to faith, a serpent, that is, the venom of treachery; to hope, a scorpion, that is, despair, which stings backward, as the scorpion.

REMIGIUS. The sense therefore is; we need not fear that should we ask of God our Father bread, that is doctrine or love, He will give us a stone; that is, that He will suffer our heart to be contracted either by the frost of hatred or by hardness of soul; or that when we ask for faith, He will suffer us to die of the poison of unbelief. Thence it follows, If then ye being evil.

CHRYSOSTOM. This He said not detracting from human nature, nor confessing the whole human race to be evil; but He calls paternal love evil when compared with His own goodness. Such is the superabundance of His love towards men.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Because in comparison of God who is preeminently good, all men seem to be evil, as all light shews dark when compared with the sun.

JEROME. Or perhaps he called the Apostles evil, in their person condemning the whole human race, whose heart is set to evil from his infancy, as we read in Genesis. Nor is it any wonder that He should call this generation evil, (Gen. 8:22.) as the Apostle also speaks, Seeing the days are evil.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or; He calls evil (Eph. 5:16.) those who are lovers of this age; whence also the good things which they give are to be called good according to their sense who esteem them as good; nay, even in the nature of things they are goods, that is, temporal goods, and such as pertain to this weak life.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 61, 3.) For that good thing which makes men good is God. Gold and silver are good things not as making you good, but as with them you may do good. If then we be evil, yet as having a Father who is good let us not remain ever evil.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 21.) If then we being evil, know how to give that which is asked of us, how much more is it to be hoped that God will give us good things when we ask Him?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He says good things, because God does not give all things to them that ask Him, but only good things.

GLOSS. (ord.) For from God we receive only such things as are good, of what kind soever they may seem to us when we receive them; for all things work together for good to His beloved.

REMIGIUS. And be it known that where Matthew says, He shall give good things, Luke has, shall give his Holy Spirit. (Luke 11:13.) But this ought not to seem contrary, because all the good things which man receives from God, are given by the grace of the Holy Spirit.

12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Firmness and strength of walking by the way of wisdom in good habits is thus set before us, by which men are brought to purity and simplicity of heart; concerning which having spoken a long time, He thus concludes, All things whatsoever ye would, &c. For there is no man who would that another should act towards him with a double heart.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; He had above commanded us in order to sanctify our prayers that men should not judge those who sin against them. Then breaking the thread of his discourse He had introduced various other matters, wherefore now when He returns to the command with which He had begun, He says, All things whatsoever ye would, &c. That is; I not only command that ye judge not, but All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye unto them; and then you will be able to pray so as to obtain.

GLOSS. (ord.) Otherwise; The Holy Spirit is the distributor of all spiritual goods, that the deeds of charity may be fulfilled; whence He adds, All things therefore &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; The Lord desires to teach that men ought to seek aid from above, but at the same time to contribute what lays in their power; wherefore when He had said, Ask, seek, and knock, He proceeds to teach openly that men should be at pains for themselves, adding, Whatsoever ye would &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 61. 7.) Otherwise; The Lord had promised that He would give good things to them that ask Him. But that He may own his petitioners, let us also own ours. For they that beg are in every thing, save having of substance, equal to those of whom they beg. What face can you have of making request to your God, when you do not acknowledge your equal? This is that is said in Proverbs, Whoso stoppeth his ear to the cry of the poor, he shall cry and shall not be heard. (Prov. 21:13.) What we ought to bestow on our neighbour when he asks of us, that we ourselves may be heard of God, we may judge by what we would have others bestow upon us; therefore He says, All things whatsoever ye would.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says not, All things whatsoever, simply, but All things therefore, as though He should say, If ye will be heard, besides those things which I have now said to you, do this also. And He said not, Whatsoever you would have done for you by God, do that for your neighbour; lest you should say, But how can I? but He says, Whatsoever you would have done to you by your fellow-servant, do that also to your neighbour.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 22.) Some Latin copies add here, good thingsb, which I suppose was inserted to make the sense more plain. For it occurred that one might desire some crime to be committed for his advantage, and should so construe this place, that he ought first to do the like to him by whom he would have it done to him. It were absurd to think that this man had fulfilled this command. Yet the thought is perfect, even though this be not added. For the words, All things whatsoever ye would, are not to be taken in their ordinary and loose signification, but in their exact and proper sense. For there is no will but only in the good; (but vid. Retract. i. 9. n. 4.) in the wicked it is rather named desire, and not will. Not that the Scriptures always observe this propriety; but where need is, there they retain the proper word so that none other need be understood.

CYPRIAN. (Tr. vii.) Since the Word of God, the Lord Jesus Christ came to all men, He summed up all his commands in one precept, Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them; and adds, for this is the Law and the Prophets.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For whatsoever ever the Law and the Prophets contain up and down through the whole Scriptures, is embraced in this one compendious precept, as the innumerable branches of a tree spring from one root.

GREGORY. (Mor. x. 6.) He that thinks he ought to do to another as he expects that others will do to him, considers verily how he may return good things for bad, and better things for good.

CHRYSOSTOM. Whence what we ought to do is clear, as in our own cases we all know what is proper, and so we cannot take refuge in our ignorance.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 22.) This precept seems to refer to the love of our neighbour, not of God, as in another place He says, there are two commandments on which hang the Law and the Prophets. But as He says not here, The whole Law, as He speaks there, He reserves a place for the other commandment respecting the love of God.

AUGUSTINE. (De Trin. viii. 7.) Otherwise; Scripture does not mention the love of God, where it says, All things whatsoever ye would; because he who loves his neighbour must consequently love Love itself above all things; but God is Love; therefore he loves God above all things.

7:13–14

13. Enter ye in at the strait gate: for wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat:

14. Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 22.) The Lord had warned us above to have a heart single and pure with which to seek God; but as this belongs to but few, He begins to speak of finding out wisdom. For the searching out and contemplation whereof there has been formed through all the foregoing such an eye as may discern the narrow way and strait gate; whence He adds, Enter ye in at the strait gate.

GLOSS. (ord.) Though it be hard to do to another what you would have done to yourself; yet so must we do, that we may enter the strait gate.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; This third precept again is connected with the right method of fasting, and the order of discourse will be this; But thou when thou fastest anoint thy head; and after comes, Enter ye in at the strait gate. For there are three chief passions in our nature, that are most adhering to the flesh; the desire of food and drink; the love of the man towards the woman; and thirdly, sleep. These it is harder to cut off from the fleshly nature than the other passions. And therefore abstinence from no other passion so sanctifies the body as that a man should be chaste, abstinent, and continuing in watchings. On account therefore of all these righteousnesses, but above all on account of the most toilsome fasting, it is that He says, Enter ye in at the strait gate. The gate of perdition is the Devil, through whom we enter into hell; the gate of life is Christ, through whom we enter into the kingdom of Heaven. The Devil is said to be a wide gate, not extended by the mightiness of his power, but made broad by the license of his unbridled pride. Christ is said to be a strait gate not with respect to smallness of power, but to His humility; for He whom the whole world contains not, shut Himself within the limits of the Virgin's womb. The way of perdition is sin of any kind It is said to be broad, because it is not contained within the rule of any discipline, but they that walk therein follow whatever pleases them. The way of life is all righteousness, and is called narrow for the contrary reasons. It must be considered that unless one walk in the way, he cannot arrive at the gate; so they that walk not in the way of righteousness, it is impossible that they should truly know Christ. Likewise neither does he run into the hands of the Devil, unless he walks in the way of sinners.

GLOSS. (ord.) Though love be wide, yet it leads men from the earth through difficult and steep ways. It is sufficiently difficult to cast aside all other things, and to love One only, not to aim at prosperity, not to fear adversity.

CHRYSOSTOM. But seeing He declares below, My yoke is pleasant, and my burden light, how is it that He says here that the way is strait and narrow? Even here He teaches that it is light and pleasant; for here is a way and a gate as that other, which is called the wide and broad, has also a way and a gate. Of these nothing is to remain; but all pass away. But to pass through toil and sweat, and to arrive at a good end, namely life, is sufficient solace to those who undergo these struggles. For if sailors can make light of storms and soldiers of wounds in hope of perishable rewards, much more when Heaven lies before, and rewards immortal, will none look to the impending dangers. Moreover the very circumstance that He calls it strait contributes to make it easy; by this He warned them to be always watching; this the Lord speaks to rouse our desires. He who strives in a combat, if he sees the prince admiring the efforts of the combatants, gets greater heart. Let us not therefore be sad when many sorrows befal us here, for the way is strait, but not the city; therefore neither need we look for rest here, nor expect any thing of sorrow there. When He says, Few there be that find it, He points to the sluggishness of the many, and instructs His hearers not to look to the prosperity of the many, but to the toils of the few.

JEROME. Attend to the words, for they have an especial force, many walk in the broad way—few find the narrow way. For the broad way needs no search, and is not found, but presents itself readily; it is the way of all who go astray. Whereas the narrow way neither do all find, nor when they have found, do they straightway walk therein. Many, after they have found the way of truth, caught by the pleasures of the world, desert midway.

7:15–20

15. Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep's clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.

16. Ye shall know them by their fruits. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?

17. Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit.

18. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.

19. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire.

20. Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had before commanded His Apostles, that they should not do their alms, prayers, and fastings before men, as the hypocrites; and that they might know that all these things may be done in hypocrisy, He speaks saying, Take heed of false prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 23.) When the Lord had said that there were few that find the strait gate and narrow way, that heretics, who often commend themselves because of the smallness of their numbers, might not here intrude themselves, He straightway subjoins, Take heed of false prophets.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having taught that the gate is strait, because there are many that pervert the way that leads to it, He proceeds, Take heed of false prophets. In the which that they might be the more careful, He reminds them of the things that were done among their fathers, calling them false prophets; for even in that day the like things fell out.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. What is written below that the Law and the Prophets were until John, (Mat. 11:13.) is said, because there should be no prophecy concerning Christ after He was come. Prophets indeed there have been and are, but not prophesying of Christ, rather interpreting the things which had been prophesied of Christ by the ancients, that is by the doctors of the Churches. For no man can unfold prophetic meaning, but the Spirit of prophecy. The Lord then knowing that there should be false teachers, warns them of divers heresies, saying, Take heed of false prophets. And forasmuch as they would not be manifest Gentiles, but lurk under the Christian name, He said not ‘See ye,’ but, Take heed. For a thing that is certain is simply seen, or looked upon; but when it is uncertain it is watched or narrowly considered. Also He says Take heed, because it is a sure precaution of security to know him whom you avoid. But this form of warning, Take heed, does not imply that the Devil will introduce heresies against God’s will, but by His permission only; but because He would not choose servants without trial, therefore He sends them temptation; and because He would not have them perish through ignorance, He therefore warns them beforehand. Also that no heretical teacher might maintain that He spoke here of Gentile and Jewish teachers and not of them, He adds, who come to yon in sheep’s clothing. Christians are called sheep, and the sheep’s clothing is a form of Christianity and of feigned religion. And nothing so casts out all good as hypocrisy; for evil that puts on the semblance of good, cannot be provided against, because it is unknown. Again, that the heretic might not allege that He here speaks of the true teachers which were yet sinners, He adds, But inwardly they are ravening wolves. But Catholic teachers should they indeed have been sinners, are spoken of as servants of the flesh, yet not as ravening wolves, because it is not their purpose to destroy Christians. Clearly then it is of heretical teachers that He speaks; for they put on the guise of Christians, to the end they may tear in pieces the Christian with the wicked fangs of seduction. Concerning, such the Apostle speaks, I know that after my departure there will enter among you grievous wolves, not sparing the flock. (Acts 20:29.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet He may seem here to have aimed under the title of false prophets, not so much at the heretic, as at those who, while their life is corrupt, yet wear an outward face of virtuousness; whence it is said, By their fruits ye shall know them. For among heretics it is possible many times to find a good life, but among those I have named never.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 24.) Wherefore it is justly asked, what fruits then He would have us look to? For many esteem among fruits some things which pertain to the sheep’s clothing, and in this manner are deceived concerning wolves. For they practise fasting, almsgiving, or praying, which they display before men, seeking to please those to whom these things seem difficult. These then are not the fruits by which He teaches us to discern them. Those deeds which are done with good intention, are the proper fleece of the sheep itself, such as are done with bad intention, or in error, are nothing else than a clothing of wolves; but the sheep ought not to hate their own clothing because it is often used to hide wolves. What then are the fruits by which we may know an evil tree? The Apostle says, The works of the flesh are manifest, which are, fornication, uncleanness, &c. (Gal. 5:19.) And which are they by which we may know a good tree? The same Apostle teaches, saying, The fruits of the Spirit are love, joy, peace.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The fruits of a man are the confession of his faith and the works of his life; for he who utters according to God the words of humility and a true confession, is the sheep; but he who against the truth howls forth blasphemies against God, is the wolf.

JEROME. What is here spoken of false prophets we may apply to all whose dress and speech promise one thing, and their actions exhibit another. But it is specially to be understood of heretics, who by observing temperance, chastity, and fasting, surround themselves as it were with a garment of sanctity, but inasmuch as their hearts within them are poisoned, they deceive the souls of the more simple brethren.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) But from their actions we may conjecture whether this their outward appearance is put on for display. For when by any temptations those things are withdrawn or denied them which they had either attained or sought to attain by this evil, then needs must that it appear whether they be the wolf in sheep’s clothing, or the sheep in his own.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxi. 14.) Also the hypocrite is restrained by peaceful times of Holy Church, and therefore appears clothed with godliness; but let any trial of faith ensue, straight the wolf ravenous at heart strips himself of his sheep’s skin, and shews by persecuting how great his rage against the good.

CHRYSOSTOM. And a hypocrite is easily discerned; for the way they are commanded to walk is a hard way, and the hypocrite is loth to toil. And that you may not say that you are unable to find out them that are such, He again enforces what He had said by example from men, saying, Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The grape has in it a mystery of Christ. As the bunch sustains many grapes held together by the woody stem, so likewise Christ holds many believers joined to Him by the wood of the Cross. The fig again is the Church which binds many faithful by a sweet embrace of charity, as the fig contains many seeds inclosed in one skin. The fig then has these significations, namely, love in its sweetness, unity in the close adhesion of its seeds. In the grape is shewn patience, in that it is cast into the wine-press—joy, because wine maketh glad the heart of man—purity, because it is not mixed with water—and sweetness, in that it delighteth. The thorns and thistles are the heretics. And as a thorn or a thistle has sharp pricks on every part, so the Devil's servants, on whatsoever side you look at them, are full of wickedness. Thorns and thistles then of this sort cannot bear the fruits of the Church. And having instanced in particular trees, as the fig, the vine, the thorn, and the thistle, He proceeds to shew that this is universally true, saying, Thus every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, but an evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 25.) In this place we must guard against the error of such as imagine that the two trees refer to two different natures; the one of God, the other not. But we affirm that they derive no countenance from these two trees; (Manichees, vid. infr.) as it will be evident to any who will read the context that He is speaking here of men.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, 12. 4.) These men of whom we have spoken are offended with these two natures, not considering them according to their true usefulness; whereas it is not by our advantage or disadvantage, but in itself considered, that nature gives glory to her Framer. All natures then that are, because they are, have their own manner, their own appearance, and as it were their own1 harmony, and are altogether good.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that none should say, An evil tree brings forth indeed evil fruit, but it brings forth also good, and so it becomes hard to discern, as it has a two-fold produce; on this account He adds, A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 25.) From this speech the Manichees suppose that neither can a soul that is evil be possibly changed for better, nor one that is good into worse. As though it had been, A good tree cannot become bad, nor a bad tree become good; whereas it is thus said, A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor the reverse. The tree is the soul, that is, the man himself; the fruit is the man's works. An evil man therefore cannot work good works, nor a good man evil works. Therefore if an evil man would work good things, let him first become good. But as long as he continues evil, he cannot bring forth good fruits. Like as it is indeed possible that what was once snow, should cease to be so; but it cannot be that snow should be warm; so it is possible that he who has been evil should be so no longer; but it is impossible that an evil man should do good. For though he may sometimes be useful, it is not he that does it, but it comes of Divine Providence superintending.

RABANUS. And man is denominated a good tree, or a bad, after his will, as it is good or bad. His fruit is his works, which can neither be good when the will is evil, nor evil when it is good.

AUGUSTINE. (vid. Op. Imp. in. Jul. v. 40. &c. et alibi.) But as it is manifest that all evil works proceed from an evil will, as its fruits from an evil tree; so of this evil will itself whence will you say that it has sprung, except that the evil will of an angel sprung from an angel, of man from man? And what were these two before those evils arose in them, but the good work of God, a good and praiseworthy nature. See then out of good arises evil; nor was there any thing at all out of which it might arise but what was good. I mean the evil will itself, since there was no evil before it, no evil works, which could not come but from evil will as fruit from an evil tree. Nor can it be said that it sprung out of good in this way, because it was made good by a good God; for it was made of nothing, and not of God.

JEROME. We would ask those heretics who affirm that there are two natures directly opposed to each other, if they admit that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, how it was possible for Moses, a good tree, to sin as he did at the water of contradiction? Or for Peter to deny his Lord in the Passion, saying, I know not the man? Or how, on the other hand, could Moses' father-in-law, an evil tree, inasmuch as he believed not in the God of Israel, give good counsel?

CHRYSOSTOM. He had not enjoined them to punish the false prophets, and therefore shews them the terrors of that punishment that is of God, saying, Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be hewn down, and cast into the fire. In these words He seems to aim also at the Jews, and thus calls to mind the word of John the Baptist, denouncing punishment against them in the very same words. For he had thus spoken to the Jews, warning them of the axe impending, the tree that should be cut down, and the fire that could not be extinguished. But if one will examine somewhat closely, here are two punishments, to be cut down, and to be burned; and he that is burned is also altogether cut out of the kingdom; which is the harder punishment. Many indeed fear no more than hell; but I say that the fall of that glory is a far more bitter punishment, than the pains of hell itself. For what evil great or small would not a father undergo, that he might see and enjoy a most dear son? Let us then think the same of that glory; for there is no son so dear to his father as is the rest of the good, to be deceased and to be with Christ. The pain of hell is indeed intolerable, yet are ten thousand hells nothing to falling from that blessed glory, and being held in hate by Christ.

GLOSS. (non occ.) From the foregoing similitude He draws the conclusion to what He had said before, as being now manifest, saying, Therefore by their fruits ye shall know them.

7:21–23

21. Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven.

22. Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works?

23. And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity.

JEROME. As He had said above that those who have the robe of a good life are yet not to be received because of the impiety of their doctrines; so now on the other hand, He forbids us to participate the faith with those who while they are strong in sound doctrine, destroy it with evil works. For it behoves the servants of God that both their work should be approved by their teaching and their teaching by their works. And therefore He says, Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, enters into the kingdom of heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv.) Wherein He seems to touch the Jews chiefly who placed every thing in dogmas; as Paul accuses them, If thou art called a Jew, and restest in the Law. (Rom. 2:17.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; Having taught that the false prophets and the true are to be discerned by their fruits, He now goes on to teach more plainly what are the fruits by which we are to discern the godly from the ungodly teachers.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 24.) For even in the very name of Christ we must be on our guard against heretics, and all that understand amiss and love this world, that we may not be deceived, and therefore He says, Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord. But it may fairly create a difficulty how this is to be reconciled with that of the Apostle, No man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost. (1 Cor. 12:3.) For we cannot say that those who are not to enter into the kingdom of heaven have the Holy Spirit. But the Apostle uses the word ‘say,’ to express the will and understanding of him that says it. He only properly says a thing, who by the sound of his voice expresses his will and purpose. But the Lord uses the word in its ordinary sense, for he seems to say who neither wishes nor understands what he says.

JEROME. For Scripture uses to take words for deeds; according to which the Apostle declares, They make confession that they know God, but in works deny him. (Tit. 1:16.)

AMBROSIASTER. (Comm. in 1 Cor. 12:3.) For all truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) Let us not therefore think that this belongs to those fruits of which He had spoken above, when one says to our Lord, Lord, Lord; and thence seems to us to be a good tree; the true fruit spoken of is to do the will of God; whence it follows, But who doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of heaven.

HILARY. For obeying God’s will and not calling on His name, shall find the way to the heavenly kingdom.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And what the will of God is the Lord Himself teaches, This is, (John 6:40.) He says, the will of him that sent me, that every man that seeth the Son and believeth on him should have eternal life. The word believe has reference both to confession and conduct. He then who does not confess Christ, or does not walk according to His word, shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not he that doth My will, but the will of my Father, for it was fit so to adapt it in the mean while to their weakness. But the one secretly implied the other, seeing the will of the Son is no other than the will of the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 25.) Hereto it also pertains that we be not deceived by the name of Christ not only in such as bear the name and do not the deeds, but yet more by certain works and miracles, such as the Lord wrought because of the unbelieving, but yet warned us that we should not be deceived by such to suppose that there was invisible wisdom where was a visible miracle; wherefore He adds, saying, Many shall say to me in that day.

CHRYSOSTOM. See how He thus secretly brings in Himself. Here in the end of His Sermon He shews Himself as the Judge. The punishment that awaits sinners He had shewn before, but now only reveals who He is that shall punish, saying, Many shall say to me in that day.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When, namely, He shall come in the majesty of His Father; when none shall any more dare with strife of many words either to defend a lie, or to speak against the truth, when each man’s work shall speak, and his mouth be silent, when none shall come forward for another, but each shall fear for himself. For in that judgment the witnesses shall not be flattering men, but Angels speaking the truth, and the Judge is the righteous Lord; whence He closely images the cry of men fearful, and in straits, saying, Lord, Lord. For to call once is not enough for him who is under the necessity of terror.

HILARY. They even assure themselves of glory for their prophesying in teaching, for their casting out dæmons, for their mighty works; and hence promise themselves the kingdom of heaven, saying, Have we not prophesied in thy name?

CHRYSOSTOM. But there are that say that they spoke this falsely, and therefore were not saved. But they would not have dared to say this to the Judge in His presence. But the very answer and question prove that it was in His presence that they spoke thus. For having been here wondered at by all for the miracles which they wrought, and there seeing themselves punished, they say in wonderment, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? Others again say, that they did sinful deeds not while they thus were working miracles, but at a time later. But if this be so, that very thing which the Lord desired to prove would not be established, namely, that neither faith nor miracles avail ought where there is not a good life; as Paul also declares, If I have faith that I may remove mountains, but have not charity, I am nothing. (1 Cor. 13:2.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But note that He says, in my name, not in My Spirit; for they prophesy in the name of Christ, but with the spirit of the Devil; such are the diviners. But they may be known by this, that the Devil sometimes speaks falsely, the Holy Spirit never. Howbeit it is permitted to the Devil sometimes to speak the truth, that he may commend his lying by this his rare truth. Yet they cast out dæmons in the name of Christ, though they have the spirit of his enemy; or rather, they do not cast them out, but seem only to cast them out, the dæmons acting in concert with them. Also they do mighty works, that is, miracles, not such as are useful and necessary, but useless and fruitless.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Read also what things the Magi did in Egypt in withstanding Moses.

JEROME. Otherwise; To prophesy, to work wonders, to cast out dæmons by divine power, is often not of his deserts who performs the works, but either the invocation of Christ’s name has this force; or it is suffered for the condemnation of those that invoke, or for the benefit of those that see and hear, that however they despise the men who work the wonders, they may give honour to God. So Saul and Balaam and Caiaphas prophesied; the sons of Seæva in the Acts of the Apostles were seen to cast out dæmons; and Judas with the soul of a traitor is related to have wrought many signs among the other Apostles.

CHRYSOSTOM. For all are not alike fit for all things; these are of pure life, but have not so great faith; those again have the reverse. Therefore God converted these by the means of those to the shewing forth much faith; and those that had faith He called by this unspeakable gift of miracles to a better life; and to that end gave them this grace in great richness. And they say, We have done many mighty works. But because they were ungrateful towards those who thus honoured them, it follows rightly, Then will I confess unto you, I never knew you.

JEROME. Emphatically, Then will I confess, for for long time He had forebore to say it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For great wrath ought to be preceded by great forbearance, that the sentence of God may be made more just, and the death of the sinners more merited. God does not know sinners because they are not worthy that they should be known of God; not that He altogether is ignorant concerning them, but because He knows them not for His own. For God knows all men according to nature, but He seems not to know them for that He loves them not, as they seem not to know God who do not serve Him worthily.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says to them, I never knew you, as it were, not at the day of judgment only, but not even then when ye were working miracles. For there are many whom He has now in abhorrence, and yet turns away His wrath before their punishment.

JEROME. Note that He says, I never knew you, as being against some that say that all men have always been among rational creatures.a

GREGORY. (Mor. xx. 7.) By this sentence it is given to us to learn, that among men charity and humility, and not mighty works, are to be esteemed. Whence also now the Holy Church, if there be any miracles of heretics, despises them, because she knows that they have not the mark of holiness. And the proof of holiness is not to work miracles, but to love our neighbour as ourselves, to think truly of God, and of our neighbour better than of ourselves.

AUGUSTINE. (Cont. Adv. Leg. ii. 4.) But never let it be said as the Manichees say, that the Lord spoke these things concerning the holy Prophets; He spoke of those who after the preaching of His Gospel seem to themselves to speak in His name not knowing what they speak.

HILARY. But thus the hypocrites boasted, as though they spoke somewhat of themselves, and as though the power of God did not work all these things, being invoked; but reading has brought them the knowledge of His doctrine, and the name of Christ casts out the dæmons. Out of our own selves then is that blessed eternity to be earned, and out of ourselves must be put forth something that we may will that which is good, that we may avoid all evil, and may rather do what He would have us do, than boast of that to which He enables us. These then He disowns and banishes for their evil works, saying, Depart from me, ye that work iniquity.

JEROME. He says not, Who have worked, but, who work iniquity, that He should not seem to take away repentance. Ye, that is, who up to the present hour when the judgment is come, though ye have not the opportunity, yet retain the desire of sinning.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For death separates the soul from the body, but changes not the purpose of the heart.

7:24–27

24. Therefore whosoever heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them, I will liken him unto a wise man, which built his house upon a rock:

25. And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell not: for it was founded upon a rock.

26. And every one that heareth these sayings of mine, and doeth them not, shall be likened unto a foolish man, which built his house upon the sand:

27. And the rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon that house; and it fell: and great was the fall of it.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because there would be some who would admire the things that were said by the Lord, but would not add that shewing forth of them which is in action, He threatens them before, saying, Every man that hears these words of mine, and does them, shall be likened to a wise man.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He said not, I will account him that hears and does, as wise; but, He shall be likened to a wise man. He then that is likened is a man; but to whom is he likened? To Christ; but Christ is the wise man who has built His house, that is, the Church, upon a rock, that is, upon the strength of the faith. The foolish man is the Devil, who has built his house, that is, all the ungodly, upon the sand, that is, the insecurity of unbelief, or upon the carnal, who are called the sand on account of their barrenness; both because they do not cleave together, but are scattered through the diversity of their opinions, and because they are innumerable. The rain is the doctrine that waters a man, the clouds are those from which the rain falls. Some are raised by the Holy Spirit, as the Apostles and Prophets, and some by the spirit of the Devil, as are the heretics. The good winds are the spirits of the different virtues, or the Angels who work invisibly in the senses of men, and lead them to good. The bad winds are the unclean spirits. The good floods are the Evangelists and teachers of the people; the evil floods are men full of an unclean spirit, and overflowing with many words; such are philosophers and the other professors of worldly wisdom, out of whose belly come rivers of dead water. The Church then which Christ has founded, neither the rain of false doctrine shall sap, nor the blast of the Devil overturn, nor the rush of mighty floods remove. Nor does it contradict this, that certain of the Church do fall; for not all that are called Christians, are Christ's, but, The Lord knows them that are his. (2 Tim. 2:19.) But against that house that the Devil has built comes down the rain of true doctrine, the winds, that is, the graces of the Spirit, or the Angels; the floods, that is, the four Evangelists and the rest of the wise; and so the house falls, that is, the Gentile world, that Christ may rise; and the ruin of that house was great, its errors broken up, its falsehoods laid open, its idols throughout the whole world broken down. He then is like unto Christ, who hears Christ's words, and does them; for he builds on a rock, that is, upon Christ, who is all good, so that on whatsoever kind of good any one shall build, he may seem to have built upon Christ. But as the Church built by Christ cannot be thrown down, so any such Christian who has built himself upon Christ, no adversity can overthrow, according to that, Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? (Rom. 8:35.) Like to the Devil is he that hears the words of Christ, and does them not. For words that are heard, and are not done, are likened to sand, they are dispersed and shed abroad. For the sand signifies all evil, or even worldly goods. For as the Devil's house is overthrown, so such as are built upon the sand are destroyed and fall. And great is that ruin if he have suffered any thing to fail of the foundation of faith; but not if he have committed fornication, or homicide, because he has whence he may arise through penitence, as David.

RABANUS. Or the great ruin is to be understood that with which the Lord will say to them that hear and do not, Go ye into everlasting fire. (Mat. 25:41.)

JEROME. Or otherwise; On sand which is loose and cannot be bound into one mass, all the doctrine of heretics is built so as to fall.

HILARY. Otherwise; By the showers He signifies the allurements of smooth and gently invading pleasures, with which the faith is at first watered as with spreading rills, afterwards comes down the rush of torrent floods, that is, the motions of fiercer desire, and lastly, the whole force of the driving tempests rages against it, that is, the universal spirits of the Devil's reign attack it.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. in fin.) Otherwise; Rain, when it is put to denote any evil, is understood as the darkness of superstition; rumours of men are compared to winds; the flood signifies the lust of the flesh, as it were flowing over the land, and because what is brought on by prosperity is broken off by adversity. None of these things does he fear who has his house founded upon a rock, that is, who not only hears the command of the Lord, but who also does it. And in all these he submits himself to danger, who hears and does not. For no man confirms in himself what the Lord commands, or himself hears, but by doing it. But it should be noted, that when he said, He that heareth these words of mine, He shews plainly enough that this sermon is made complete by all those precepts by which the Christian life is formed, so that with good reason they that desire to live according to them, may be compared to one that builds on a rock.

7:28–29

28. And it came to pass, when Jesus had ended these sayings, the people were astonished at his doctrine:

29. For he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having related Christ's teaching, he shews its effects on the multitude, saying, And it came to pass, when Jesus had ended these words, the multitude wondered at his doctrine.

RABANUS. This ending pertains both to the finishing the words, and the completeness of the doctrines. That it is said that the multitude wondered, either signifies the unbelieving in the crowd, who were astonished because they did not believe the Saviour's words; or is said of them all, in that they reverenced in Him the excellence of so great wisdom.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The mind of man when satisfied reasonably brings forth praise, but when overcome, wonder. For whatever we are not able to praise worthily, we admire. Yet their admiration pertained rather to Christ's glory than to their faith, for had they believed on Christ, they would not have wondered. For wonder is raised by whatever surpasses the appearance of the speaker or actor; and thence we do not wonder at what is done or said by God, because all things are less than God's power. But it was the multitude that wondered, that is the common people, not the chief among the people, who are not wont to hear with the desire of learning; but the simple folk heard in simplicity; had others been present they would have broken up their silence by contradicting, for where the greater knowledge is, there is the stronger malice. For he that is in haste to be first, is not content to be second.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 19.) From that which is here said, He seems to have left the crowd of disciples—those out of whom He chose twelve, whom He called Apostles—but Matthew omits to mention it. For to His disciples only, Jesus seems to have held this Sermon, which Matthew recounts, Luke omits. That after descending into a plain He held another like discourse, which Luke records, and Matthew omits. Still it may be supposed, that, as was said above, He delivered one and the same Sermon to the Apostles, and the rest of the multitude present, which has been recorded by Matthew and Luke, in different words, but with the same truth of substance; and this explains what is here said of the multitude wondering.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxv.) He adds the cause of their wonderment, saying, He taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes and Pharisees. But if the Scribes drove Him from them, seeing His power shewn in works, how would they not have been offended when words only manifested His power? But this was not so with the multitude; for being of benevolent temper, it is easily persuaded by the word of truth. Such however was the power wherewith He taught them, that it drew many of them to Him, and caused them to wonder; and for their delight in those things which were spoken they did not leave Him even when He had done speaking; but followed Him as He came down from the mount. They were mostly astonished at His power, in that He spoke not referring to any other as the Prophets and Moses had spoken, but every where shewing that He Himself had authority; for in delivering each law, He prefaced it with, But I say unto you.

JEROME. For as the God and Lord of Moses himself, He of His own free will either added such things as seemed omitted in the Law, or even changed some; as above we read, It was said by them of old.… But I say unto you. But the Scribes only taught the people what was written in Moses and the Prophets.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxiii. 13.) Or, Christ spoke with especial power, because He did no evil from weakness, but we who are weak, in our weakness consider by what method in teaching we may best consult for our weak brethren.

HILARY. Or; They measure the efficacy of His power, by the might of His words.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. ii. 25. i. 10, et seq.) This is what is signified in the eleventh Psalm, I will deal mightily with him; the words of the Lord are pure words, silver tried in the fire, purified of earth, purged seven times. (Ps. 12:5, 6.) The mention of this number admonishes me here to refer all these precepts to those seven sentences that He placed in the beginning of this Sermon; those, I mean, concerning the beatitudes. For one to be angry with his brother, without cause, or to say to him, Racha, or call him fool, is a sin of extreme pride, against which is one remedy, that with a suppliant spirit he should seek pardon, and not be puffed up with a spirit of boasting. Blessed, then, are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. He is consenting to his adversary, that is, in shewing reverence to the word of God, who goes to the opening His Father's will, not with contentiousness of law, but with meekness of religion, therefore, Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. Also whosoever feels carnal delight rebel against his right will, will cry out, O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? (Rom. 7:24.) And in thus mourning he will implore the aid of the consoler; whence, Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. What is there that can be thought of more toilsome than in overcoming an evil practice to cut off those members within us that hinder the kingdom of heaven, and not be broken down with the pain of so doing? To endure in faithful wedlock all things even the most grievous, and yet to avoid all accusation of fornication. To speak the truth, and approve it not by frequent oaths, but by probity of life. But who would be bold to endure such toils, unless he burned with the love of righteousness as with a hunger and thirst? Blessed, therefore, are they that hunger and thirst, for they shall be filled. Who can be ready to take wrong from the weak, to offer himself to any that asks him, to love his enemies, to do good to them that hate him, to pray for them that persecute him, except he that is perfectly merciful? Therefore, Blessed are the merciful, for they shall find mercy. He keeps the eye of his heart pure, who places the end of his good actions not in pleasing men, nor in getting those things that are necessary to this life, and who does not rashly condemn any man's heart, and whatever he gives to another gives with that intention with which he would have others give to him. Blessed, therefore, are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. It must needs be moreover, that by a pure heart should be found out the narrow way of wisdom, to which the guile of corrupt men is an obstacle; Blessed are the peaceful, for they shall he called the sons of God. But whether we take this arrangement, or any other, those things which we have heard from the Lord must be done, if we would build upon the rock.

CHAPTER 8

8:1–4

1. When he was come down from the mountain, great multitudes followed him.

2. And, behold, there came a leper and worshipped him, saying, Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.

3. And Jesus put forth his hand, and touched him, saying, I will; be thou clean. And immediately his leprosy was cleansed.

4. And Jesus said unto him, See thou tell no man; but go thy way, shew thyself to the Priest, and offer the gift that Moses commanded, for a testimony unto them.

JEROME. After the preaching and teaching, is offered an occasion of working miracles, that by mighty works following, the preceding doctrine might be confirmed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (quoad sens.) Because He taught them as one having authority, that He might not thence be supposed to use this method of teaching from ostentation, He does the same in works, as one having power to cure; and therefore, When Jesus descended from the mountain, great multitudes followed him.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (Hom. in Liv. 5.) While the Lord taught on the mount, the disciples were with Him, for to them it was given to know the secret things of the heavenly doctrine; but now as He came down from the mount the crowds followed Him, who had been altogether unable to ascend into the mount. They that are bowed by the burden of sin cannot climb to the sublime mysteries. But when the Lord came down from the mount, that is, stooped to the infirmity, and helplessness of the rest, in pity to their imperfections, great multitudes followed Him, some for renown, most for His doctrine, some for cures, or having their wants administered to.

HAYMO. Otherwise; By the mount on which the Lord sate is figured the Heaven, as it is written, Heaven is my throne. (Is. 66:1.) But when the Lord sits on the mount, only the disciples come to Him; because before He took on Him the frailty of our human nature, God was known only in Judæa; (Ps. 76:1.) but when He came down from the height of his Divinity, and took upon Him the frailty of our human nature, a great multitude of the nations followed Him. Herein it is shewn to them that teach that their speech should be so regulated, that as they see each man is able to receive, they should so speak the word of God. For the doctors ascend the mountain, when they shew the more excellent precepts to the perfect; they come down from the mount, in shewing the lesser precepts to the weak.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Among others who were not able to ascend into the mount was the leper, as bearing the burden of sin; for the sin of our souls is a leprosy. And the Lord came down from the height of heaven, as from a mountain, that He might purge the leprousness of our sin; and so the leper as already prepared meets Him as He came down.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) He works the cures below, and does none in the mount; for there is a time for all things under heaven, a time for teaching, and a time for healing. On the mount He taught, He cured souls, He healed hearts; which being finished, as He came down from the heavenly heights to heal bodies, there came to Him a leper and made adoration to Him; before he made his suit, he began to adore, shewing his great reverence.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He did not ask it of Him as of a human physician, but adored Him as God. For faith and confession make a perfect prayer; so that the leprous man in adoring fulfilled the work of faith, and the work of confession in words, he made adoration to him, saying;

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Lord, by Thee all things were made, Thou therefore, if thou will, canst make me clean. Thy will is the work, and all works are subject to Thy will. Thou of old cleansedst Naaman the Syrian of his leprosy by the hand of Elisha, and now, if thou will, thou canst make me clean.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not, If Thou wilt ask of God, or, If Thou wilt make adoration to God; but, If thou wilt. Nor did he say, Lord, cleanse me; but left all to Him, thereby making Him Lord, and attributing to Him the power over all.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And thus he rewarded a spiritual Physician with a spiritual reward; for as physicians are gained by money, so He with prayer. We offer to God nothing more worthy than faithful prayer. In that he says, If thou wilt, there is no doubt that Christ's will is ready to every good work; but only doubt whether that cure would be expedient for him, because soundness of body is not good for all. If thou wilt then is as much as to say, I believe that Thou wiliest whatever is good, but I know not if this that I desire for myself is good.

CHRYSOSTOM. He was able, to cleanse by a word, or even by mere will, but He put out His hand, He stretched forth his hand and touched him, to shew that He was not subject to the Law, and that to the pure nothing is impure. Elisha truly kept the Law in all strictness, and did not go out and touch Naaman, but sends him to wash in Jordan. But the Lord shews that He does not heal as a servant, but as Lord heals and touches; His hand was not made unclean by the leprosy, but the leprous body was made pure by the holy hand. For He came not only to heal bodies, but to lead the soul to the true wisdom. As then He did not forbid to eat with unwashen hands, so here He teaches us that it is the leprosy of the soul we ought only to dread, which is sin, but that the leprosy of the body is no impediment to virtue.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But though He transgressed the letter of the Law, He did not transgress its meaning. For the Law forbade to touch leprosy, because it could not hinder that the touch should not defile; therefore it meant not that lepers should not be healed, but that they that touched should not be polluted. So He was not polluted by touching the leprosy, but purified the leprosy by touching it.

DAMASCENE. (De Fid. Orth. iii. 15.) For He was not only God, but man also, whence He wrought Divine wonders by touch and word; for as by an instrument so by His body the Divine acts were done.

CHRYSOSTOM. But for touching the leprous man there is none that accuses Him, because His hearers were not yet seized with envy against Him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Had He healed him without speaking, who would know by whose power he had been healed? So the will to heal was for the sake of the leprous man; the word was for the sake of them that beheld, therefore He said, I will, be thou clean.

JEROME. It is not to be read, as most of the Latins think, 'I will to cleanse thee;' but separately, He first answers, I will, and then follows the command, be thou clean. The leper has said, If thou wilt; the Lord answers, I will; he first said, Thou canst make me clean; the Lord spake, Be thou clean.

CHRYSOSTOM. No where else do we see Him using this word though He be working ever so signal a miracle; but He here adds, I will, to confirm the opinion of the people and the leprous man concerning His power. Nature obeyed the word of the Purifier with proper speed, whence it follows, and straight his leprosy was cleansed. But even this word straightway is too slow to express the speed with which the deed was done.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Because he was not slow to believe, his cure is not delayed; he did not linger in his confession, Christ did not linger in His cure.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 19.) Luke has mentioned the cleansing of this leper, though not in the same order of events, but as his manner is to recollect things omitted, and to put first things that were done later, as they were divinely suggested; so that what they had known before, they afterwards set down in writing when they were recalled to their minds.

CHRYSOSTOM. Jesus when healing his body bids him tell no man; Jesus saith unto him, See thou tell no man. Some say that He gave this command that they might not through malice distrust his cure. But this is said foolishly, for He did not so cure him as that his purity should be called in question; but He bids him tell no man, to teach that He does not love ostentation and glory. How is it then that to another to whom He had healed He gives command to go and tell it? What He taught in that was only that we should have a thankful heart; for He does not command that it should be published abroad, but that glory should be given to God. (Mark 5:19.) He teaches us then through this leper not to be desirous of empty honour; by the other, not to be ungrateful, but to refer all things to the praise of God.

JEROME. And in truth what need was there that he should proclaim with his mouth what was evidently shewed in his body?

HILARY. Or that this healing might be sought rather than offered, therefore silence is enjoined.

JEROME. He sends him to the Priests, first, because of His humility that He may seem to defer to the Priests; secondly, that when they saw the leper cleansed they might be saved, if they would believe on the Saviour, or if not that they might be without excuse; and, lastly, that He might not seem, as He was often charged, to be infringing the Law.

CHRYSOSTOM. He neither every where broke, nor every where observed, the Law, but sometimes the one, sometimes the other. The one was preparing the way for the wisdom that was to come, (ἡ μέλλουσα φιλοσοφία.) the other was silencing the irreverent tongue of the Jews, and condescending to their weakness. Whence the Apostles also are seen sometimes observing, sometimes neglecting, the Law.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Or, He sends him to the Priests that they might know that he was not cleansed according to the manner of the Law, but by the operation of grace.

JEROME. It was ordained in the Law, that those that had been cleansed of a leprosy should offer gifts to the Priests; as it follows, And offer thy gift as Moses commanded for a testimony to them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Which is not to be understood, Moses commanded it for a testimony to them; but, Go thou and offer for a testimony.

CHRYSOSTOM. For Christ, knowing beforehand that they would not profit by this, said not, ‘for their amendment,’ but, for a testimony to them; that is, for an accusation of them, and in attestation that all things that should have been done by Me, have been done. But though He thus knew that they would not profit by it, yet He did not omit any thing that behoved to be done; but they remained in their former ill-will. Also He said not, ‘The gift that I command,’ but, that Moses commanded, that in the meantime He might hand them over to the Law, and close the mouths of the unjust. That they might not say that He usurped the honour of the Priests, He fulfilled the work of the Law, and made a trial of them.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Or; offer thy gift, that all who see may believe the miracle.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; He commands the oblation, that should they afterwards seek to put him out, he might be able to say, You have received gifts on my cleansing, how do ye now cast me out as a leper?

HILARY. Or we may read, Which Moses commanded for a testimony; inasmuch as what Moses commanded in the Law is a testimony, not an effect.

BEDE. (Hom. in Dom. 3 Epiph.) Should any be perplexed how, when the Lord seems here to approve Moses’ offering, the Church does not receive it, let him remember, that Christ had not yet offered His body for a holocaust.

And it behoved that the typical sacrifices should not be taken away, before that which they typified was established by the testimony of the Apostles' preaching, and by the faith of the people believing. By this man was figured the whole human race, for he was not only leprous, but, according to the Gospel of Luke, is described as full of leprosy. For all have sinned, and need glory of God; (Rom. 3:23.) to wit, that glory, that the hand of the Saviour being stretched out, (that is, the Word being made flesh,) and touching human nature, they might be cleansed from the vanity of their former ways; and that they that had been long abominable, and cast out from the camp of God's people, might be restored to the temple and the priest, and be able to offer their bodies a living sacrifice to Him to whom it is said, Thou art a Priest for ever. (Ps. 110:4.)

REMIGIUS. Morally; by the leper is signified the sinner; for sin makes an unclean and impure soul; he falls down before Christ when he is confounded concerning his former sins; yet he ought to confess, and to seek the remedy of penitence; so the leper shews his disease, and asks a cure. The Lord stretches out His hand when He affords the aid of Divine mercy; whereupon follows immediately remission of sin; nor ought the Church to be reconciled to the same, but on the sentence of the Priest.

8:5–9

5. And when Jesus was entered into Capernaum, there came unto him a centurion, beseeching him,

6. And saying, Lord, my servant lieth at home sick of the palsy, grievously tormented.

7. And Jesus saith unto him, I will come and heal him.

8. The centurion answered and said, Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my roof: but speak the word only, and my servant shall be healed.

9. For I am a man under authority, having soldiers under me: and I say to this man, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh; and to my servant, Do this, and he doeth it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord having taught His disciples on the mount, and healed the leper at the foot of the mount, came to Capharnaum.

This is a mystery, signifying that after the purification of the Jews He went to the Gentiles.

HAYMO. For Capharnaum, which is interpreted, The town of fatness, or, The field of consolation, signifies the Church, which was gathered out of the Gentiles, which is replenished with spiritual fatness, according to that, That my soul may be filled with marrow and fatness, (Ps. 63:5.) and under the troubles of the world is comforted concerning heavenly things, according to that, Thy consolations hare rejoiced my soul. (Ps. 94:19.) Hence it is said, When he had entered into Capharnaum the centurion came to him.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 62, 4.) This centurion was of the Gentiles, for Judæa had already soldiers of the Roman empire.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This centurion was the first-fruits of the Gentiles, and in comparison of his faith, all the faith of the Jews was unbelief; he neither heard Christ teaching, nor saw the leper when he was cleansed, but from hearing only that he had been healed, he believed more than he heard; and so he mystically typified the Gentiles that should come, who had neither read the Law nor the Prophets concerning Christ, nor had seen Christ Himself work His miracles. He came to Him and besought Him, saying, Lord, my servant lieth at home sick of the palsy, and is grievously afflicted. Mark the goodness of the centurion, who for the health of his servant was in so great haste and anxiety, as though by his death he should suffer loss, not of money, but of his well being. For he reckoned no difference between the servant and the master; their place in this world may be different, but their nature is one. Mark also his faith, in that he said not, Come and heal him, because that Christ who stood there was present in every place; and his wisdom, in that he said not, Heal him here on this spot, for he knew that He was mighty to do, wise to understand, and merciful to hearken, therefore he did but declare the sickness, leaving it to the Lord, by His merciful power to heal. And he is grievously afflicted; this shews how he loved him, for when any that we love is pained or tormented, though it be but slightly, yet we think him more afflicted than he really is.

RABANUS. All these things he recounts with grief, that he is sick, that it is with palsy; that he is grievously afflicted therewith, the more to shew the sorrow of his own heart, and to move the Lord to have mercy. In like manner ought all to feel for their servants, and to take thought for them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvi.) But some say that he says these things in excuse of himself, as reasons why he did not bring the sick man himself. For it was impossible to bring one in a palsy, in great torment, and at the point to die. But I rather think it a mark of his great faith; inasmuch as he knew that a word alone was enough to restore the sick man, he deemed it superfluous to bring him.

HILARY. Spiritually interpreted, the Gentiles are the sick in this world, and afflicted with the diseases of sin, all their limbs being altogether unnerved, and unfit for their duties of standing and walking. The sacrament of their salvation is fulfilled in this centurion's servant, of whom it is sufficiently declared that he was the head of the Gentiles that should believe. What sort of head this is, the song of Moses in Deuteronomy teaches, He set the bounds of the people according to the number of the Angels. (Deut. 32:8.)

REMIGIUS. Or, in the centurion are figured those of the Gentiles who first believed, and were perfect in virtue. For a centurion is one who commands a hundred soldiers; and a hundred is a perfect number. Rightly, therefore, the centurion prays for his servant, because the first-fruits of the Gentiles prayed to God for the salvation of the whole Gentile world.

JEROME. The Lord seeing the centurion's faith, humbleness, and thoughtfulness, straightway promises to go and heal him; Jesus saith unto him, I will come and heal him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Jesus here does what He never did; He always follows the wish of the supplicant, but here He goes before it, and not only promises to heal him, but to go to his house. This He does, that we may learn the worthiness of the centurion.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Had not He said, I will come and heal him, the other would never have answered, I am not worthy. It was because it was a servant for whom he made petition, that Christ promised to go, in order to teach us not to have respect to the great, and overlook the little, but to honour poor and rich alike.

JEROME. As we commend the centurion's faith in that he believed that the Saviour was able to heal the paralytic; so his humility is seen in his professing himself unworthy that the Lord should come under his roof; as it follows, And the centurion answered and said into him, Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my roof.

RABANUS. (e Beda.) Conscious of his gentile life, he thought he should be more burdened than profited by this act of condescension from Him with whose faith he was indeed endued, but with whose sacraments he was not yet initiated.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) By declaring himself unworthy, he shewed himself worthy, not indeed into whose house, but into whose heart, Christ the Word of God should enter. Nor could he have said this with so much faith and humility, had he not borne in his heart Him whom he feared to have in his house. And indeed it would have been no great blessedness that Jesus should enter within his walls, if He had not already entered into his heart.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 102.) Mystically, his house was the body which contained his soul, which contains within it the freedom of the mind by a heavenly vision. But God disdains neither to inhabit flesh, nor to enter the roof of our body.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (Hom. in div. 5.) And now also when the heads of Churches, holy men and acceptable to God, enter your roof, then in them the Lord also enters, and do you think of yourself as receiving the Lord. And when you eat and drink the Lord’s Bodya, then the Lord enters under your roof, and you then should humble yourself, saying, Lord, I am not worthy. For where He enters unworthily, there He enters to the condemnation of him who receives Him.

JEROME. The thoughtfulness of the centurion appears herein, that he saw the Divinity hidden beneath the covering of body; wherefore he adds, But speak the word only, and my servant will be healed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He knew that Angels stood by unseen to minister to Him, who turn every word of his into act; yea and should Angels fail, yet diseases are healed by His life-giving command.

HILARY. Also he therefore says that it needed only a word to heal his son, because all the salvation of the Gentiles is of faith, and the life of them all is in the precepts of the Lord; therefore he continues saying, For I am a man set under authority, having soldiers under me; and I say to this man, Go, and he goeth; to another, Come, and he cometh; and to my servant, Do this, and he doeth it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He has here developed the mystery of the Father and the Son, by the secret suggestion of the Holy Spirit; as much as to say, Though I am under the command of another, yet have I power to command those who are under me; so also Thou, though under the command of the Father, in so far as Thou art Man, yet hast Thou power over the Angels. But Sabellius perhaps affirms, seeking to prove that the Son is the same as the Father, that it is to be understood thus; ‘If I who am set under authority have yet power to command, how much more Thou who art under the authority of none.’ But the words will not bear this exposition; for he said not, ‘If I being a man under authority,’ but, ‘For I also am a man set under authority;’ clearly not drawing a distinction, but pointing to a resemblance in this respect between himself and Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) If I who am under command have yet power to command others, how much more Thou whom all powers serve!

GLOSS. (ord.) Thou art able without Thy bodily presence, by the ministry of Thy Angels, to say to this disease, Go, and it will leave him; and to say to health, Come, and it shall come to him.

HAYMO. Or, we may understand by those that are set under the centurion, the natural virtues in which many of the Gentiles were mighty, or even thoughts good and bad. Let us say to the bad, Depart, and they will depart; let us call the good, and they shall come; and our servant, that is, our body, let us bid that it submit itself to the Divine will.

AUGUSTINE. (Cons. Evan. ii. 20.) What is here said seems to disagree with Luke’s account, When the centurion heard concerning Jesus, he sent unto him elders of the Jews, beseeching him that he would come and heal his servant. (Luke 7:3.) And again, When he was come nigh to the house, the centurion sent friends unto him, saying, Lord, trouble not thyself, for I am not worthy that thou shouldest enter under my roof.

CHRYSOSTOM. But some say that these are two different occurrences; an opinion which has much to support it. Of Him in Luke it is said, He loveth our nation, and has built us a synagogue; but of this one Jesus says, I have not found so great faith in Israel; whence it might seem that the other was a Jew. But in my opinion they are both the same person. What Luke relates that he sent to Jesus to come to him, betrays the friendly services of the Jews. We may suppose that when the centurion sought to go to Jesus, he was prevented by the Jews, who offered to go themselves for the purpose of bringing him. But as soon as he was delivered from their importunity, then he sent to say, Do not think that it was from want of respect that I did not come, but because I thought myself unworthy to receive you into my house. When then Matthew relates, that he spoke thus not through friends, but in his own person, it does not contradict Luke's account; for both have only represented the centurion's anxiety, and that he had a right opinion of Christ. And we may suppose that he first sent this message to Him by friends as He approached, and after, when He was come thither, repeated it Himself. But if they are relating different stories, then they do not contradict each other, but supply mutual deficiencies.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Matthew therefore intended to state summarily all that passed between the centurion and the Lord, which was indeed done through others, with the view of commending his faith; as the Lord spoke, I have not found so great faith in Israel. Luke, on the other hand, has narrated the whole as it was done, that so we might be obliged to understand in what sense Matthew, who could not err, meant that the centurion himself came to Christ, namely, in a figurative sense through faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. For indeed there is no necessary contradiction between Luke's statement, that he had built a synagogue, and this, that he was not an Israelite; for it was quite possible, that one who was not a Jew should have built a synagogue, and should love the nation.

8:10–13

10. When Jesus heard it, he marvelled, and said to them that followed, Verily I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel.

11. And I say unto you, That many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of Heaven.

12. But the children of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

13. And Jesus said unto the centurion, Go thy way; and as thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee. And his servant was healed in the selfsame hour.

CHRYSOSTOM. As what the leper had affirmed concerning Christ's power, If thou will, thou canst cleanse me, was confirmed by the mouth of Christ, saying, I will, be thou clean; so here He did not blame the centurion for bearing testimony to Christ's authority, but even commended him. Nay more; it is something greater than commendation that the Evangelist signifies in the words, But Jesus hearing marvelled.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (Hom. in Div. 5.) Observe how great and what that is at which God the Only-begotten marvels! Gold, riches, principalities, are in His sight as the shadow or the flower that fadeth; in the sight of God none of these things is wonderful, as though it were great or precious, but faith only; this He wonders at, and pays honour to, this He esteems acceptable to Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (super Gen. c. Man. i. 8.) But who was He that had created this faith in him, but only He who now marvelled at it? But even had it come from any other, how should He marvel who knew all things future? When the Lord marvels, it is only to teach us what we ought to wonder at; for all these emotions in Him are not signs of passion, but examples of a teacher.

CHRYSOSTOM. Wherefore He is said to have thus wondered in the presence of all the people, giving them an example that they also should wonder at Him; for it follows, And he said to them that followed, I have not found so great faith in Israel.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xxii. 74.) He praises his faith, but gives no command to quit his profession of a soldier.

JEROME. This He speaks of the present generation, not of all the Patriarchs and Prophets of past ages.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Andrew believed, but it was after John had said, Behold the Lamb of God; (John 1:36.) Peter believed, but it was at the preaching of Andrew; Philip believed, but it was by reading the Scriptures; and Nathanael first received a proof of His Divinity, and then spoke forth his confession of faith.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Jairus a prince in Israel, making request for his daughter, said not, ‘speak the word,’ but, ‘Come quickly.’ Nicodemus, hearing of the sacrament of faith, asks, How can these things be? (John 3:9.) Mary and Martha say, Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died; (John 11:21.) as though distrusting that God’s power could be in all places at the same time.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, if we would supposeb that his faith was greater than even that of the Apostles, Christ’s testimony to it must be understood as though every good in a man should be commended relatively to his character; as it were a great thing in a countryman to speak with wisdom, but in a philosopher the same would be nothing wonderful. In this way it may be said of the centurion, In none other have I found so great faith in Israel.

CHRYSOSTOM. For it is a different thing for a Jew to believe and for a Gentile.

JEROME. Or perhaps in the person of the centurion the faith of the Gentiles is preferred to that of Israel; whence He proceeds, But I say unto you, Many shall come from the east and from the west.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 62. 3.) He says, not ‘all,’ I but many; yet these from the east and west; for by these two quarters the whole world is intended.

HAYMO. Or; From the east shall come they, who pass into the kingdom as soon as they are enlightened; from the west they who have suffered persecution for the faith even unto death. Or, he comes from the east, who has served God from a child; he from the west who in decrepit age has turned to God.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) How then does He say in another place, that the chosen are few? Because in each generation there are few that are chosen, but when all are gathered together in the day of visitation they shall be found many. They shall sit down, not the bodily posture, but the spiritual rest, not with human food, but with an eternal feast, teeth Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven, where is light, joy, glory, and eternal length of days.

JEROME. Because the God of Abraham, the Maker of heaven, is the Father of Christ, therefore also is Abraham in the kingdom of heaven, and with him will sit down the nations who have believed in Christ the Son of the Creator.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) As we see Christians called to the heavenly feast, where is the bread of righteousness, the drink of wisdom; so we see the Jews in reprobation. The children of the kingdom shall be cast into outer darkness, that is, the Jews, who have received the Law, who observe the types of all things that were to be, yet did not acknowledge the realities when present.

JEROME. Or the Jews may be called the children of the kingdom, because God reigned among them heretofore.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He calls them the children of the kingdom, because the kingdom was prepared for them, which was the greater grief to them.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xvi. 24.) Moses set before the people of Israel no other God than the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and Christ sets forth the very same God. So that so far was He from seeking to turn that people away from their own God, that He therefore threatened them with the outer darkness, because He saw them turned away from their own God. And in this kingdom He tells them the Gentiles shall sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, for no other reason than that they held the faith of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. To these Fathers Christ gives His testimony, not as though they had been converted after death, or had received justification after His passion.

JEROME. It is called outer darkness, because he whom the Lord casts out leaves the light.

HAYMO. What they should suffer there, He shews when He adds, There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Thus in metaphor He describes the sufferings of the tormented limbs; the eyes shed tears when filled with smoke, and the teeth chatter together from cold. This shews that the wicked in hell shall endure both extreme cold and extreme heat: according to that in Job, They shall pass from rivers of snow to the scorching heat. (Job 24:19.)

JEROME. Weeping and gnashing of teeth are a proof of bones and body; truly then is there a resurrection of the same limbs, that sank into the grave.

RABANUS. Or; The gnashing of teeth expresses the passion of remorse; repentance coming too late and self-accusation that he has sinned with such obstinate wickedness.

REMIGIUS. Otherwise; By outer darkness, He means foreign nations; for these words of the Lord are a historical prediction of the destruction of the Jews, that they were to be led into captivity for their unbelief, and to be scattered over the earth; for tears are usually caused by heat, gnashing of teeth by cold. Weeping then is ascribed to those who should be dispersed into the warmer climates of India and Ethiopia, gnashing of teeth to those who should dwell in the colder regions, as Hyrcania and Seythia.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that none might suppose that these were nothing more than fair words, He makes them credible by the miracles following, And Jesus said to the centurion, Go, and be it done to thee as thou hast believed.

RABANUS. As though He had said, According to the measure of thy faith, so be thy grace. For the merit of the Lord may be communicated even to servants not only through the merit of their faith, but through their obedience to rule. It follows, And his servant was healed in the self-same hour.

CHRYSOSTOM. Wherein admire the speediness, shewing Christ’s power, not only to heal, but to do it in a moment of time.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 62. 2.) As the Lord did not enter the centurion’s house with His body, but healed the servant, present in majesty, but absent in body; so He went among the Jews only in the body, but among other nations He was neither born of a Virgin, nor suffered, nor endured human sufferings, nor did divine wonders; and yet was fulfilled that which was spoken, A people that I have not known hath served me, and hath obeyed me by the hearing of the ear. (Ps. 18:43.) The Jews beheld, yet crucified Him; the world heard, and believed.

8:14–15

14. And when Jesus was come into Peter’s house, he saw his wife’s mother laid, and sick of a fever.

15. And he touched her hand, and the fever left her: and she arose, and ministered unto them.

ANSELM. Matthew having in the leper shewn the healing of the whole human race, and in the centurion’s servant that of the Gentiles, now figures the healing of the synagogue in Peter’s mother-in-law. He relates the case of the servant, first, because it was the greater miracle, and the grace was greater in the conversion of the Gentile; or because the synagogue should not be fully converted till the end of the age when the fulness of the Gentiles should have entered in. Peter’s house was in Bethsaida.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii.) Why did He enter into Peter’s house? I think to take food; for it follows, And she arose, and ministered to them. For He abode with His disciples to do them honour, and to make them more zealous. Observe Peter’s reverence towards Christ; though his mother-in-law lay at home sick of a fever, yet he did not force Him thither at once, but waited till His teaching should be completed, and others healed. For from the beginning he was instructed to prefer others to himself. Wherefore he did not even bring Him thither, but Christ went in of Himself; purposing, because the centurion had said, I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my roof, to shew what He granted to a disciple. And He did not scorn to enter the humble hut of a fisherman, instructing us in every thing to trample upon human pride. Sometimes He heals by a word, sometimes He reaches forth His hand; as here, He touched her hand, and the fever left her. For He would not always work miracles with display of surpassing power, but would sometimes be hid. By touching her body He not only banished the fever, but restored her to perfect health. Because her sickness was such as art could cure, He shewed his power to heal, in doing what medicine could not do, giving her back perfect health and strength at once; which is intimated in what the Evangelist adds, And she arose, and ministered to them.

JEROME. For naturally the greatest weakness follows fever, and the evils of sickness begin to be felt as the patient begins to recover; but that health which is given by the Lord's power is complete at once.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And it is not enough that she is cured, but strength is given her besides, for she arose and ministered unto them.

CHRYSOSTOM. This, she arose and ministered unto them, shews at once the Lord's power, and the woman's feeling towards Christ.

BEDE. (in loc.) Figuratively; Peter's house is the Law, or the circumcision, his mother-in-law the synagogue, which is as it were the mother of the Church committed to Peter. She is in a fever, that is, she is sick of zealous hate, and persecutes the Church. The Lord touches her hand, when He turns her carnal works to spiritual uses.

REMIGIUS. Or by Peter's mother-in-law may be understood the Law, which according to the Apostle was made weak through the flesh, i. e. the carnal understanding. But when the Lord through the mystery of the Incarnation appeared visibly in the synagogue, and fulfilled the Law in action, and taught that it was to be understood spiritually; straightway it thus allied with the grace of the Gospel received such strength, that what had been the minister of death and punishment, became the minister of life and glory.

RABANUS. (e Bed.) Or, every soul that struggles with fleshly lusts is sick of a fever, but touched with the hand of Divine mercy, it recovers health, and restrains the concupiscence of the flesh by the bridle of continence, and with those limbs with which it had served uncleanness, it now ministers to righteousness.

HILARY. Or; In Peter's wife's mother is shewn the sickly condition of infidelity, to which freedom of will is near akin, being united by the bonds as it were of wedlock. By the Lord's entrance into Peter's house, that is into the body, unbelief is cured, which was before sick of the fever of sin, and ministers in duties of righteousness to the Saviour.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 21.) When this miracle was done, that is, after what, or before what, Matthew has not said. For we need not understand that it took place just after that which it follows in the relation; he may be returning here to what he had omitted above. For Mark relates this after the cleansing of the leper, (Mark 1:30.) which should seem to follow the sermon on the mount, concerning which Mark is silent. Luke also follows the same order in relating this concerning Peter's mother-in-law as Mark; also inserting it before that long sermon which seems to be the same with Matthew's sermon on the mount. But what matters it in what order the events are told, whether something omitted before is brought in after, or what was done after is told earlier, so long as in the same story he does not contradict either another or himself? For as it is in no man's power to choose in what order he shall recollect the things he has once known, it is likely enough that each of the Evangelists thought himself obliged to relate all in that order in which it pleased God to bring to his memory the various events. Therefore when the order of time is not clear, it cannot import to us what order of relation any one of them may have followed.

8:16–17

16. When the even was come, they brought unto him many that were possessed with devils: and he cast out the spirits with his word, and healed all that were sick:

17. That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities, and bare our sicknesses.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because the multitude of believers was now very great, they would not depart from Christ, though time pressed; but in the evening they bring unto Him the sick. When it was evening, they brought unto him many that had dœmons.

AUGUSTINE. (Cons. Ev. ii. 22.) The words, Now when it was evening, shew that the evening of the same day is meant. This would not have been implied, had it been only when it was evening.

REMIGIUS. Christ the Son of God, the Author of human salvation, the fount and source of all goodness, furnished heavenly medicine, He cast out the spirits with a word, and healed all that were sick. Dæmons and diseases He sent away with a word, that by these signs, and mighty works, He might shew that He was come for the salvation of the human race.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how great a multitude of cured the Evangelist here runs through, not relating the case of each, but in one word introducing an innumerable flood of miracles. That the greatness of the miracle should not raise unbelief that so much people and so various diseases could be healed in so short a space, he brings forward the Prophet to bear witness to the things that were done, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the Prophet, saying, Himself took our infirmities.

RABANUS. Took them not that He should have them Himself, but that He should take them away from us; and bare our sicknesses, in that what we were too weak to bear. He should bear for us.

REMIGIUS. He took the infirmity of human nature so as to make us strong who had before been weak.

HILARY. And by the passion of His body, according to the words of the Prophet, He absorbed all the infirmities of human weakness.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Prophet seems to have meant this of sins; how then does the Evangelist explain it of bodily diseases? It should be understood, that either he cites the text literally, or he intends to inculcate that most of our bodily diseases have their origin in sins of the soul; for death itself has its root in sin.

JEROME. It should be noted, that all the sick were healed not in the morning nor at noon, but rather about sunset; as a corn of wheat dies in the ground that it may bring forth much fruit.

RABANUS. Sunset shadows forth the passion and death of Him Who said, While I am in the world, I am the light of the world. (John 9:5.) Who while He lived temporally in the flesh, taught only a few of the Jews; but having trodden under foot the kingdom of death, promised the gifts of faith to all the Gentiles throughout the world.

8:18–22

18. Now when Jesus saw great multitudes about him, he gave commandment to depart unto the other side.

19. And a certain Scribe came, and said unto him, Master, I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest.

20. And Jesus saith unto him, The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.

21. And another of his disciples said unto him, Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father.

22. But Jesus said unto him, Follow me; and let the dead bury their dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because Christ not only healed the body, but purified the soul also, He desired to shew forth true wisdom, not only by curing diseases, but by doing nothing with ostentation; and therefore it is said, Now when Jesus saw great multitudes about him, he commanded his disciples to cross over to the other side. This He did at once teaching us to be lowly, softening the ill-will of the Jews, and teaching us to do nothing with ostentation.

REMIGIUS. Or; He did this as one desiring to shun the thronging of the multitude. But they hung upon Him in admiration, crowding to see Him. For who would depart from one who did such miracles? Who would not wish to look upon His open face, to see His mouth that spoke such things? For if Moses' countenance was made glorious, and Stephen's as that of an Angel, gather from this how it was to have been supposed that their common Lord must have then appeared; of whom the Prophet speaks, Thy form is fair above the sons of men. (Ps. 45:2.)

HILARY. The name disciples is not to be supposed to be confined to the twelve Apostles; for we read of many disciples besides the twelve.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It is clear that this day on which they went over the lake was another day, and not that which followed the one on which Peter's mother-in-law was healed, on which day Mark and Luke relate that He went out into the desert.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe that He does not dismiss the multitudes, that He may not offend them. He did say to them, Depart ye, but bade His disciples go away from thence, thus the crowds might hope to be able to follow.

REMIGIUS. What happened between the command of the Lord given, and their crossing over, the Evangelist purposes to relate in what follows; And one of the Scribes came to him and said, Master, I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest.

JEROME. This Scribe of the Law who knew but the perishing letter, would not have been turned away had his address been, ‘Lord, I will follow Thee.’ But because he esteemed the Saviour only as one of many masters, and was a [1]man of the letter (which is better expressed in Greek, γραμματεὺς) not a spiritual hearer, therefore he had no place where Jesus might lay His head. It is suggested to us that he sought to follow the Lord, because of His great miracles, for the sake of the gain to be derived from them; and was therefore rejected; seeking the same thing as did Simon Magus when he would have given Peter money.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe also how great his pride; approaching and speaking as though he disdained to be considered as one of the multitude; desiring to shew that he was above the rest.

HILARY. Otherwise; This Scribe being one of the doctors of the Law, asks if he shall follow Him, as though it were not contained in the Law that this is He whom it were gain to follow. Therefore He discovers the feeling of unbelief under the diffidence of his enquiry. For the taking up of the faith is not by question but by following.

CHRYSOSTOM. So Christ answers him not so much to what he had said, but to the obvious purpose of his mind. Jesus saith unto him, The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head; as though He had said;

JEROME. Why do you seek to follow Me for the sake of the riches and gain of this world, when My poverty is such that I have neither lodging nor home of My own?

CHRYSOSTOM. This was not to send him away, but rather to convict him of evil intentions; at the same time permitting him if he would to follow Christ with the expectation of poverty.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 100. 1.) Otherwise; The Son of man hath not where to lay his head; that is, in your faith. The foxes have holes, in your heart, because you are deceitful. The birds of the air have nests, in your heart, because you are proud. Deceitful and proud follow Me not; for how should guile follow sincerity?

GREGORY. (Mor. xix. 1.) Otherwise; The fox is a crafty animal, lying hid in ditches and dens, and when it comes abroad never going in a straight path, but in crooked windings; birds raise themselves in the air. By the foxes then are meant the subtle and deceitful dæmons, by the birds the proud dæmons; as though He had said; Deceitful and proud dæmons have their abode in your heart; but my lowliness finds no rest in a proud spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 5.) He was moved to follow Christ because of the miracles; this vain desire of glory is signified by the birds; but he assumed the submissiveness of a disciple, which deceit is signified by the foxes.

RABANUS. Heretics confiding in their art are signified by the foxes, the evil spirits by the birds of the air, who have their holes and their nests, that is, their abodes in the heart of the Jewish people. Another of his disciples saith unto him, Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father.

JEROME. In what one thing is this disciple like the Scribe? The one called Him Master, the other confesses Him as his Lord. The one from filial piety asks permission to go and bury his father; the other offers to follow, not seeking a master, but by means of his master seeking gain for himself.

HILARY. The disciple does not ask whether he shall follow Him; for he already believed that he ought to follow, but prays to be suffered first to bury his father.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 100. 1.) The Lord when He prepares men for the Gospel will not have any excuse of this fleshly and temporal attachment to interfere, therefore it follows; Jesus said unto him, Follow me, and, leave the dead to bury their dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. This saying does not condemn natural affection to our parents, but shews that nothing ought to be more binding on us than the business of heaven; that to this we ought to apply ourselves with all our endeavours, and not to be slack, however necessary or urgent are the things that draw us aside. For what could be more necessary than to bury a father? What more easy? For it could not need much time. But in this the Lord rescued him from much evil, weeping, and mourning, and from the pains of expectation. For after the funeral there must come examination of the will, division of the inheritance, and other things of the same sort; and thus trouble following trouble, like the waves, would have borne him far from the port of truth. But if you are not yet satisfied, reflect further that oftentimes the weak are not permitted to know the time, or to follow to the grave; even though the dead be father, mother, or son; yet are they not charged with cruelty that hinder them; it is rather the reverse of cruelty. And it is a much greater evil to draw one away from spiritual discourse; especially when there were who should perform the rites; as here, Leave the dead to bury their dead.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) As much as to say; Thy father is dead; but there are also other dead who shall bury their dead, because they are in unbelief.

CHRYSOSTOM. This moreover shews that this dead man was not his; for, I suppose, he that was dead was of the unbelieving. If you wonder at the young man, that in a matter so necessary he should have asked Jesus, and not have gone away of his own accord, wonder much more that he abode with Jesus after he was forbidden to depart; which was not from lack of affection, but that he might not interrupt a business yet more necessary.

HILARY. Also, because we are taught in the beginning of the Lord’s prayer, first to say, Our Father, which art in heaven; and since this disciple represents the believing people; he is here reminded that he has one only Father in heaven (Mat. 23:9.), and that between a believing son and an unbelieving Father the filial relation does not hold good. We are also admonished that the unbelieving dead are not to be mingled with the memories of the saints, and that they are also dead who live out of God; and the dead are buried by the dead, because by the faith of God it behoves the living to cleave to the living (God.)

JEROME. But if the dead shall bury the dead, we ought not to be careful for the dead but for the living, lest while we are anxious for the dead, we ourselves should be counted dead.

GREGORY. (Mor. iv. 27.) The dead also bury the dead, when sinners protect sinners. They who exalt sinners with their praises, hide the dead under a pile of words.

RABANUS. From this we may also take occasion to observe, that lesser goods are to be sometimes forfeited for the sake of securing greater.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 23.) Matthew relates that this was done when He gave them commandment that they should go over the lake, Luke, that it happened as they walked by the way; which is no contradiction, for they must have walked by the way that they might come to the lake.

8:23–27

23. And when he was entered into a ship, his disciples followed him.

24. And, behold, there arose a great tempest in the sea, insomuch that the ship was covered with the waves: but he was asleep.

25. And his disciples came to him, and awoke him, saying, Lord, save us: we perish.

26. And he saith unto them, Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith? Then he arose, and rebuked the winds and the sea; and there was a great calm.

27. But the men marvelled, saying, What manner of man is this, that even the winds and the sea obey him!

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (Hom. in div. vii.) Christ having performed many great and wonderful things on the land, passes to the sea, that there also He might shew forth His excellent power, presenting Himself before all men as the Lord of both earth and sea. And when he was entered into a boat, his disciples followed him, not being weak but strong and established in the faith. Thus they followed Him not so much treading in His footsteps, as accompanying Him in holiness of spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii.) He took His disciples with Him, and in a boat, that they might learn two lessons; first, not to be confounded in dangers, secondly, to think lowly of themselves in honour. That they should not think great things of themselves because He kept them while He sent the rest away, He suffers them to be tossed by the waves. Where miracles were to be shewn, He suffers the people to be present; where temptations and fears were to be stilled, there He takes with Him only the victors of the world, whom He would prepare for strife.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Therefore, having entered into the boat He caused the sea to rise; And, lo, there arose a great tempest in the sea, so that the boat was covered by the waves. This tempest did not arise of itself, but in obedience to the power of Him Who gave commandment, who brings the winds out of his treasures. (Jer. 10:13.) There arose a great tempest, that a great work might be wrought; because by how much the more the waves rushed into the boat, so much the more were the disciples troubled, and sought to be delivered by the wonderful power of the Saviour.

CHRYSOSTOM. They had seen others made partakers of Christ’s mercies, but forasmuch as no man has so strong a sense of those things that are done in the person of another as of what is done to himself, it behoved that in their own bodies they should feel Christ's mercies. Therefore He willed that this tempest should arise, that in their deliverance they might have a more lively sense of His goodness. This tossing of the sea was a type of their future trials of which Paul speaks, I would not have you ignorant, brethren, how that we were troubled beyond our strength. (2 Cor. 1:8.) But that there might be time for their fear to arise, it follows, But he was asleep. For if the storm had arisen while He was awake, they would either not have feared, or not have prayed Him, or would not have believed that He had the power to still it.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Wonderful, stupendous event! He that never slumbereth nor sleepeth, is said to be asleep. He slept with His body, but was awake in His Deity, shewing that He bare a truly human body which He had taken on Him, corruptible. He slept with the body that He might cause the Apostles to watch, and that we all should never sleep with our mind. With so great fear were the disciples seized, and almost beside themselves, that they rushed to Him, and did not modestly or gently rouse Him, but violently awakened Him, His disciples came to him, and awoke him, saying, Lord, save us, we perish.

JEROME. Of this miracle we have a type in Jonah, who while all are in danger is himself unconcerned, sleeps, and is awakened.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) O ye true disciples! ye have the Saviour with you, and do ye fear danger? Life itself is among you, and are ye afraid of death? They would answer, We are yet children, and weak, and are therefore afraid; whence it follows, Jesus saith unto them, Why are ye afraid, O ye of little faith? As though He had said, If ye have known me mighty upon earth, why believe ye not that I am also mighty upon the sea? And even though death were threatening you, ought ye not to support it with constancy? He who believes a little will be reasoned with; he who believes not at all will be neglected.

CHRYSOSTOM. If any should say, that this was a sign of no small faith to go and rouse Jesus; it is rather a sign that they had not a right opinion concerning Him. They knew that when wakened He could rebuke the waves, but they did not yet know that He could do it while sleeping. For this cause He did not do this wonder in the presence of the multitudes, that they should not be charged with their little faith; but He takes His disciples apart to correct them, and first stills the raging of the waters. Then he arose, and rebuked the winds and the sea, and there was a great calm.

JEROME. From this passage we understand, that all creation is conscious of its Creator; for what may be rebuked and commanded is conscious of the mind commanding. I do not mean as some heretics hold, that the whole creation is animatec—but by the power of the Maker things which to us have no consciousness have to Him.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Therefore He gave commandment to the winds and the sea, and from a great storm it became a great calm. For it behoves Him that is great to do great things; therefore He who first greatly stirred the depths of the sea, now again commands a great calm, that the disciples who had been too much troubled might have great rejoicing.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe also that the storm is stilled at once entirely, and no trace of disturbance appears; which is beyond nature; for when a storm ceases in the course of nature, yet the water is wont to be agitated for some time longer, but here all is tranquillity at once. Thus what is said of the Father, He spake, and the storm of wind ceased, (Ps. 107:25.) this Christ fulfilled in deed; for by His word and bidding only He stayed and checked the waters. For from His appearance, from His sleeping, and His using a boat, they that were present supposed Him a man only, and on this account they fell into admiration of Him; And the men marvelled, saying, What manner of man is this, for the winds and the sea obey him?

GLOSS. (non occ.) Chrysostom explains thus, What manner of man is this? His sleeping and His appearance shewed the man; the sea and the calm pointed out the God.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) But who were the men that marvelled? You must not think that the Apostles are here meant, for we never find the Lord’s disciples mentioned with disrespect; they are always called either the Disciples or the Apostles. They marvelled then who sailed with Him, whose was the boat.

JEROME. But if any shall contend that it was the disciples who wondered, we shall answer they are rightly spoken of as ‘the men,’ seeing they had not yet learnt the power of the Saviour.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) This is not a question, What manner of man is this? but an affirmation that He is one whom the winds and the sea obey. What manner of man then is this? that is, how powerful, how mighty, how great! He commands every creature, and they transgress not His law; men alone disobey, and are therefore condemned by His judgment. Figuratively; We are all embarked in the vessel of the Holy Church, and voyaging through this stormy world with the Lord. The Lord Himself sleeps a merciful sleep while we suffer, and awaits the repentance of the wicked.

HILARY. Or; He sleeps, because by our sloth He is cast asleep in us. This is done that we may hope aid from God in fear of danger; and that hope though late may be confident that it shall escape danger by the might of Christ watching within.

PSEUDO-ORIGEN. Let us therefore come to Him with joy, saying with the Prophet, Arise, O Lord, why sleepest thou? (Ps. 44:23.) And He will command the winds, that is, the dæmons, who raise the waves, that is, the rulers of the world, to persecute the saints, and He shall make a great calm around both body and spirit, peace for the Church, stillness for the world.

RABANUS. Otherwise; The sea is the turmoil of the world; the boat in which Christ is embarked is to be understood the tree of the cross, by the aid of which the faithful having passed the waves of the world, arrive in their heavenly country, as on a safe shore, whither Christ goes with His own; whence He says below, He that will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. (Mat. 16:24.) When then Christ was fixed on the cross, a great commotion was raised, the minds of His disciples being troubled at His passion, and the boat was covered by the waves. For the whole strength of persecution was around the cross of Christ, on which He died; as it is here, But he was asleep. His sleep is death. The disciples awaken the Lord, when troubled at His death; they seek His resurrection with earnest prayers, saying, Save us, by rising again; we perish, by our trouble at Thy death. He rises again, and rebukes the hardness of their hearts, as we read in other places. He commands the winds, in that He overthrew the power of the Devil; He commanded the sea, in that He disappointed the malice of the Jews; and there was a great calm, because the minds of the disciples were calmed when they beheld His resurrection.

BEDE. (in loc.) Or; The boat is the present Church, in which Christ passes over the sea of this world with His own, and stills the waves of persecution. Wherefore we may wonder, and give thanks.

28. And when he was come to the other side into the country of the Gergesenes, there met him two possessed with devils, coming out of the tombs, exceeding fierce, so that no man might pass by that way.

29. And, behold, they cried out, saying, What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God? art thou come hither to torment us before the time?

30. And there was a good way off from them an herd of many swine feeding.

31. So the devils besought him, saying, If thou cast us out, suffer us to go away into the herd of swine.

32. And he said unto them, Go. And when they were come out, they went into the herd of swine: and, behold, the whole herd of swine ran violently down a steep place into the sea, and perished in the waters.

33. And they that kept them fled, and went their ways into the city, and told every thing, and what was befallen to the possessed of the devils.

34. And, behold, the whole city came out to meet Jesus: and when they saw him, they besought him that he would depart out of their coasts.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because there were who thought Christ to be a man, therefore the dæmons came to proclaim His divinity, that they who had not seen the sea raging and again still, might hear the dæmons crying; And when he was come to the other side in the country of the Gergesenes, there met him two men having dæmons.

RABANUS. Gerasa is a town of Arabia beyond Jordan, close to Mount Gilead, which was in the possession of the tribe of Manasseh, not far from the lake of Tiberias, into which the swine were precipitated.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 24.) Whereas Matthew relates that there were two who were afflicted with dæmons, but Mark and Luke mention only one, you must understand that one of them was a person of note, for whom all that country was in grief, and about whose recovery there was much care, whence the fame of this miracle was the more noised abroad.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; Luke and Mark chose to speak of one who was more grievously afflicted; whence also they add a further description of his calamity; Luke saying that he brake his bonds and was driven into the desert; Mark telling that he ofttimes cut himself with stones. But they neither of them say that there was only one, which would be to contradict

Matthew. What is added respecting them that they came from among the tombs, alludes to a mischievous opinion, that the souls of the dead become dæmons. Thus many soothsayers use to kill children, that they may have their souls to cooperate with them; and dæmoniacs also often cry out, I am the spirit of such an one. But it is not the soul of the dead man that then cries out, the dæmon assumes his voice to deceive the hearers. For if the soul of a dead man has power to enter the body of another, much more might it enter its own. And it is more unreasonable to suppose that a soul that has suffered cruelty should cooperate with him that injured it, or that a man should have power to change an incorporeal being into a different kind of substance, such as a human soul into the substance of a dæmon. For even in material body, this is beyond human power; as, for example, no man can change the body of a man into that of an ass. And it is not reasonable to think that a disembodied spirit should wander to and fro on the earth. The souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, (Wisd. 3:1.) therefore those of young children must be so, seeing they are not evil. And the souls of sinners are at once conveyed away from hence, as is clear from Lazarus, and the rich man. Because none dared to bring them to Christ because of their fierceness, therefore Christ goes to them. This their fierceness is intimated when it is added, Exceeding fierce, so that no man might pass that way. So they who hindered all others from passing that way, found one now standing in their way. For they were tortured in an unseen manner, suffering intolerable things from the mere presence of Christ. And, lo, they cried out, saying, What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of David?

JEROME. This is no voluntary confession followed up by a reward to the utterer, but one extorted by the compulsion of necessity. A runaway slave, when after long time he first beholds his master, straight thinks only of deprecating the scourge; so the dæmons, seeing the Lord suddenly moving upon the earth, thought He was come to judge them. Some absurdly suppose, that these dæmons knew the Son of God, while the Devil knew Him not, because their wickedness was less than his. But all the knowledge of the disciple must be supposed in the Master.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, ix. 21.) God was so far known to them as it was His pleasure to be known; and He pleased to be known so far as it was needful. He was known to them therefore not as He is Life eternal, and the Light which enlightens the good, but by certain temporal effects of His excellence, and signs of His hidden presence, which are visible to angelic spirits though evil, rather than to the infirmity of human nature.

JEROME. But both the Devil and the dæmons may be said to have rather suspected, than known, Jesus to be the Son of God.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Hil. Quæst. V. et N. T. 9, 66.) When the dæmons cry out, What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God? (1 Cor. 2:8.) we must suppose them to have spoken from suspicion rather than knowledge. For had they known him, they never would have suffered the Lord of glory to be crucified.

REMIGIUS. But as often as they were tortured by His excellent power, and saw Him working signs and miracles, they supposed Him to be the Son of God; when they saw Him hungry and thirsty, and suffering such things, they doubted, and thought Him mere man. It should be considered that even the unbelieving Jews when they said that Christ cast out dæmons in Beelzebub, and the Arians who said that He was a creature, deserve condemnation not only on God’s sentence, but on the confession of the dæmons, who declare Christ to be the Son of God. Rightly do they say, What have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God? that is, our malice and Thy grace have nothing in common, according to that the Apostle speaks, There is no fellowship of light with darkness. (2 Cor. 6:14.)

CHRYSOSTOM. That this should not be thought to be flattery, they cry out what they were experiencing, Art thou come to torment us before the time?

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, viii. 23.) Either because that came upon them unexpectedly, which they looked for indeed, but supposed more distant; or because they thought their perdition consisted in this, that when known they would be despised; or because this was before the day of judgment, when they should be punished with eternal damnation.

JEROME. For the presence of the Saviour is the torment of dæmons.

CHRYSOSTOM. They could not say they had not sinned, because Christ had found them doing evil, and marring the workmanship of God; whence they supposed that for their more abundant wickedness the time of the last punishment which shall be at the day of judgment should not be tarried for to punish them.

AUGUSTINE. (De. Cons. Ev. ii. 24.) Though the words of the dæmons are variously reported by the three Evangelists, yet this is no difficulty; for they either all convey the same sense, or may be supposed to have been all spoken. Nor again because in Matthew they speak in the plural, in the others in the singular number; because even the other two Evangelists relate that when asked his name, he answered, Legion, shewing that the dæmons were many. Now there was not far from thence a herd of many swine feeding; and the dæmons prayed him, saying, If thou cast us out hence, send us into the swine.

GREGORY. (Mor. ii. 10.) For the Devil knows that of himself he has no power to do any thing, because it is not of himself that he exists as a spirit.

REMIGIUS. They did not ask to be sent into men, because they saw Him by whose excellence they were tortured existing in human shape. Nor did they ask to be sent into sheep, because sheep are by God's institution clean animals, and were then offered in the temple of God. But they requested to be sent into the swine rather than into any of the other unclean animals, because this is of all animals the most unclean; whence also it has its name 'porcus,' as being 'spurcus,' filthy, and delighting in filthiness; and dæmons also delight in the filthiness of sin. They did not pray that they might be sent into the air, because of their eager desire of hurting men. And he saith unto them, Go.

CHRYSOSTOM. Jesus did not say this, as though persuaded by the dæmons, but with many designs1 therein. One, that He might shew the mighty power to hurt of these dæmons, who were in possession of the two men; another, that all might see that they had no power against the swine unless by His sufferance; thirdly, to shew that they would have done more grievous hurt to the men, had they not even in their calamities been aided by Divine Providence, for they hate men more than irrational animals. By this it is manifest that there is no man who is not supported by Divine Providence; and if all are not equally supported by it, neither after one manner, this is the highest characteristic of Providence, that it is extended to each man according to his need. Besides the above-mentioned things, we learn also that He cares not only for the whole together, but for each one in particular; which one may see clearly in these dæmoniacs, who would have been long before choked in the deep, had not Divine care preserved them. He also permitted them to go into the herd of swine, that they that dwelt in those parts might know His power. For where He was known to none, there

He makes His miracles to shine forth, that He may bring them to a confession of His divinity.

JEROME. The Saviour bade them go, not as yielding to their request, but that by the death of the swine, an occasion of man’s salvation might be offered. But they went out, (to wit, out of the men,) and went into the swine; and, lo, the whole herd rushed violently headlong into the sea, and perished in the waters. Let Manichæus blush; if the souls of men and of beasts be of one substance, and one origin, how should two thousand swine have perished for the sake of the salvation of two men?

CHRYSOSTOM. The dæmons destroyed the swine because they are ever striving to bring men into distress, and rejoice in destruction. The greatness of the loss also added to the fame of that which was done; for it was published by many persons; namely, by the men that were healed, by the owners of the swine, and by those that fed them; as it follows, But they that fed them fled, and went into the town, and told all, and concerning them that had the dæmons; and, behold, the whole town went out to meet Jesus. But when they should have adored Him, and wondered at His excellent power, they cast Him from them, as it follows, And when they saw him, they besought him that he would depart out of their coasts. Observe the clemency of Christ next to His excellent power; when those who had received favours from Him would drive Him away, He resisted not, but departed, and left those who thus pronounced themselves unworthy of His teaching, giving them as teachers those who had been delivered from the dæmons, and the feeders of the swine.

JEROME. Otherwise; This request may have proceeded from humility as well as pride; like Peter, they may have held themselves unworthy of the Lord’s presence, Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord. (Luke 5:8.)

RABANUS. Gerasa is interpreted ‘casting out the dweller,’ or, ‘a stranger approaching;’ this is the Gentile world which cast out the Devil from it; and which was first far off, but now made near, after the resurrection being visited by Christ through His preachers.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 8. 30.) The two dæmoniacs are also a type of the Gentile world; for Noah having three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet, Shem’s posterity alone was taken into the inheritance of God, while from the other two sprang the nations of the Gentiles.

HILARY. Thus the dæmons held the two men among the tombs without the town, that is, without the synagogue of the Law and the Prophets; that is, they infested the original seats of the two nations, the abodes of the dead, making the way of this present life dangerous to the passers by.

RABANUS. It is not without cause that he speaks of them as dwelling among the tombs; for what else are the bodies of the faithless but sepulchres of the dead, in which the word of God dwells not, but there is enclosed the soul dead in sins. He says, So that no man might pass through that way, because before the coming of the Saviour the Gentile world was inaccessible. Or, by the two, understand both Jews and Gentiles, who did not abide in the house, that is, did not rest in their conscience. But they abode in tombs, that is, delighted themselves in dead works, and suffered no man to pass by the way of faith, which way the Jews obstructed.

HILARY. By their coming forth to meet Him is signified the willingness of men flocking to the faith. The dæmons seeing that there is no longer any place left for them among the Gentiles, pray that they may be suffered to dwell among the heretics; these, seized by them, are drowned in the sea, that is, in worldly desires, by the instigations of the dæmons, and perish in the unbelief of the rest of the Gentiles.

BEDE. (in Luc. 8.) Or; The swine are they that delight in filthy manners; for unless one live as a swine, the devils do not receive power over him; or at most, only to try him, not to destroy him. That the swine were sent headlong into the lake, signifies, that when the people of the Gentiles are delivered from the condemnation of the dæmons, yet still they who would not believe in Christ, perform their profane rites in secret, drowned in a blind and deep curiosity. That they that fed the swine, fled and told what was done, signifies that even the leaders of the wicked though they shun the law of Christianity, yet cease not to proclaim the wonderful power of Christ. When struck with terror, they entreat Him to depart from them, they signify a great number who, well satisfied with their ancient life, shew themselves willing to honour the Christian law, while they declare themselves unable to perform it.

HILARY. Or; The town is a type of the Jewish nation, which having heard of Christ’s works goes forth to meet its Lord, to forbid Him to approach their country and town; for they have not received the Gospel.

CHAPTER 9

9:1–8

1. And he entered into a ship, and passed over, and came into his own city.

2. And, behold, they brought to him a man sick of the palsy, lying on a bed: and Jesus seeing their faith said unto the sick of the palsy, Son, be of good cheer; thy sins be forgiven thee.

3. And, behold, certain of the Scribes said within themselves, This man blasphemeth.

4. And Jesus knowing their thoughts said, Wherefore think ye evil in your hearts?

5. For whether is easier, to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee; or to say, Arise, and walk?

6. But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins, (then saith he to the sick of the palsy,) Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house.

7. And he arose, and departed to his house.

8. But when the multitude saw it, they marvelled, and glorified God, which had given such power unto men.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix.) Christ had above shewn His excellent power by teaching, when he taught them as one having authority; in the leper, when He said, I will, be thou clean; by the centurion, who said to Him, Speak the word, and my servant shall be healed; by the sea which He calmed by a word; by the dæmons who confessed Him; now again, in another and greater way, He compels His enemies to confess the equality of His honour with the Father; to this end it proceeds, And Jesus entered into a ship, and passed over, and came into his own city. He entered a boat to cross over, who could have crossed the sea on foot; for He would not be always working miracles, that He might not take away the reality of His incarnation.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 50.) The Creator of all things, the Lord of the world, when He had for our sakes straitened Himself in the bonds of our flesh, began to have His own country as a man, began to be a citizen of Judæa, and to have parents, though Himself the parent of all, that affection might attach those whom fear had separated.

CHRYSOSTOM. By his own city is here meant Capharnaum. For one town, to wit, Bethlehem, had received Him to be born there; another had brought Him up, to wit, Nazareth; and a third received Him to dwell there continually, namely, Capharnaum.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 25.) That Matthew here speaks of his own city, and Mark calls it Capharnaum, would be more difficult to be reconciled if Matthew had expressed it Nazareth. But as it is, all Galilee might be called Christ's city, because Nazareth was in Galilee; just as all the Roman empire, divided into many states, was still called the Roman city1. Who can doubt then that the Lord in coming to Galilee is rightly said to come into his own city, whatever was the town in which He abode, especially since Capharnaum was exalted into the metropolis of Galilee?

JEROME. Or; This city may be no other than Nazareth, whence He was called a Nazarene.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) And if we adopt this supposition, we must say that Matthew has omitted all that was done from the time that Jesus entered into His own city till He came to Capharnaum, and has proceeded on at once to the healing of the paralytic; as in many other places they pass over things that intervened, and carry on the thread of the narrative, without noticing any interval of time, to something else; so here, And, lo, they bring unto him a paralytic laying on a bed.

CHRYSOSTOM. This paralytic is not the same as he in John. For he lay by the pool, this in Capharnaum; he had none to assist him, this was borne on a bed.

JEROME. On a bed, because he could not walk.

CHRYSOSTOM. He does not universally demand faith of the sick, as, for example, when they are mad, or from any other sore sickness are not in possession of their minds; as it is here, seeing their faith;

JEROME. not the sick man's, but theirs that bare him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Seeing then that they shewed so great faith, He also shews His excellent power; with full power forgiving sin, as it follows, He said to the paralytic, Be of good courage, son, thy sins are forgiven thee.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) Of how great power with God must a man's own faith be, when that of others here availed to heal a man both within and without. The paralytic hears his pardon pronounced, in silence uttering no thanks, for he was more anxious for the cure of his body than his soul. Christ therefore with good reason accepts the faith of those that bare him, rather than his own hardness of heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, we may suppose even the sick man to have had faith; otherwise he would not have suffered himself to be let down through the roof as the other Evangelist relates.

JEROME. O wonderful humility! This man feeble and despised, crippled in every limb, He addresses as son. The Jewish Priests did not deign to touch him. Even therefore His son, because his sins were forgiven him. Hence we may learn that diseases are often the punishment of sin; and therefore perhaps his sins are forgiven him, that when the cause of his disease has been first removed, health may be restored.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Scribes in their desire to spread an ill report of Him, against their will made that which was done be more widely known; Christ using their envy to make known the miracle. For this is of His surpassing wisdom to manifest His deeds through His enemies; whence it follows, Behold, some of the Scribes said among themselves, This man blasphemeth.

JEROME. We read in prophecy, I am he that blolleth out thy transgressions; (Is. 43:25.) so the Scribes regarding Him as a man, and not understanding the words of God, charged Him with blasphemy. But He seeing their thoughts thus shewed Himself to be God, Who alone knoweth the heart; and thus, as it were, said, By the same power and prerogative by which I see your thoughts, I can forgive men their sins. Learn from your own experience what the paralytic has obtained. When Jesus perceived their thoughts, he said, Why think ye evil in your hearts?

CHRYSOSTOM. He did not indeed contradict their suspicions so far as they had supposed Him to have spoken as God. For had He not been equal to God the Father, it would have behoved Him to say, I am far from this power, that of forgiving sin. But He confirms the contrary of this, by His words and His miracle; Whether is it easier to say, Thy sins are forgiven thee, or to say, Arise, and walk? By how much the soul is better than the body, by so much is it a greater thing to forgive sin than to heal the body. But forasmuch as the one may be seen with the eyes, but the other is not sensibly perceived, He does the lesser miracle which is the more evident, to be a proof of the greater miracle which is imperceptible.

JEROME. Whether or no his sins were forgiven He alone could know who forgave; but whether he could rise and walk, not only himself but they that looked on could judge of; but the power that heals, whether soul or body, is the same. And as there is a great difference between saying and doing, the outward sign is given that the spiritual effect may be proved; But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins.

CHRYSOSTOM. Above, He said to the paralytic, Thy sins are forgiven thee, not, I forgive thee thy sins; but now when the Scribes made resistance, He shews the greatness of His power by saying, The Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins. And to shew that He was equal to the Father, He said not that the Son of Man needed any to forgive sins, but that He hath power.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) These words That ye may know, may be either Christ’s words, or the Evangelist’s words. As though the Evangelist had said, They doubted whether He could remit sins, But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath the power to remit sins, he saith to the paralytic. If they are the words of Christ, the connexion will be as follows; You doubt that I have power to remit sins, But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power to remit sins—the sentence is imperfect, but the action supplies the place of the consequent clause, he saith to the paralytic, Rise, take up thy bed.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) That that which had been proof of his sickness, should now become proof of his recovered health. And go to thy house, that having been healed by Christian faith, you may not die in the faithlessness of the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. This command He added, that it might be seen there was no delusion in the miracle; so it follows to establish the reality of the cure, And he arose, and went away to his own house. But they that stood by yet grovel on the earth, whence it follows, But the multitude seeing it were afraid, and glorified God, who had bestowed such power among men. For had they rightly considered among themselves, they would have acknowledged Him to be the Son of God. Meanwhile it was no little matter to esteem Him as one greater than men, and to have come from God.

HILARY. Mystically; When driven out of Judæa, He returns into His own city; the city of God is the people of the faithful; into this He entered by a boat, that is, the Church.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) Christ has no need of the vessel, but the vessel of Christ; for without heavenly pilotage the bark of the Church cannot pass over the sea of the world to the heavenly harbour.

HILARY. In this paralytic the whole Gentile world is offered for healing, he is therefore brought by the ministration of Angels; he is called Son, because he is God’s work; the sins of his soul which the Law could not remit are remitted him; for faith only justifies. Lastly, he shews the power of the resurrection, by taking up his bed, teaching that all sickness shall then be no more found in the body.

JEROME. Figuratively; the soul sick in the body, its powers palsied, is brought by the perfect doctor to the Lord to be healed. For every one when sick, ought to engage some to pray for his recovery, through whom the halting footsteps of our acts may be reformed by the healing power of the heavenly word. These are mental monitors, who raise the soul of the hearer to higher things, although sick and weak in the outward body.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) The Lord requires not in this world the will of those who are without understanding, but looks to the faith of others; as the physician does not consult the wishes of the patient, when his malady requires other things.

RABANUS. His rising up is the drawing off the soul from carnal lusts; his taking up his bed is the raising the flesh from earthly desires to spiritual pleasures; his going to his house is his returning to Paradise, or to internal watchfulness of himself against sin.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxiii. 24.) Or by the bed is denoted the pleasure of the body. He is commanded now he is made whole to bear that on which he had lain when sick, because every man who still takes pleasure in vice is laid as sick in carnal delights; but when made whole he bears this because he now endures the wantonness of that flesh in whose desires he had before reposed.

HILARY. It is a very fearful thing to be seized by death while the sins are yet unforgiven by Christ; for there is no way to the heavenly house for him whose sins have not been forgiven. But when this fear is removed, honour is rendered to God, who by His word has in this way given power to men, of forgiveness of sins, of resurrection of the body, and of return to Heaven.

9:9–13

9. And as Jesus passed forth from thence, he saw a man, named Matthew, sitting at the receipt of custom: and he saith unto him, Follow me. And he arose, and followed him.

10. And it came to pass, as Jesus sat at meat in the house, behold, many Publicans and sinners came and sat down with him and his disciples.

11. And when the Pharisees saw it, they said unto his disciples, Why eateth your Master with Publicans and sinners?

12. But when Jesus heard that, he said unto them, They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.

13. But go ye and learn what that meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice: for I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx.) Having wrought this miracle, Christ would not abide in the same place, lest He should rouse the envy of the Jews. Let us also do thus, not obstinately opposing those who lay in wait for us. And as Jesus departed thence, (namely from the place in which He had done this miracle,) he saw a man sitting at the receipt of custom, Matthew by name.

JEROME. The other Evangelists from respect to Matthew have not called him by his common name, but say here, Levi, for he had both names. Matthew himself, according to that Solomon says. The righteous man accuses himself, (Prov. 18:17.) calls himself both Matthew and Publican, to shew the readers that none need despair of salvation who turn to better things, seeing he from a Publican became an Apostle.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) He says, sitting at the receipt of custom, that is, in the place where the tolls were collected. He was named Telonarius, from a Greek word signifying taxes.

CHRYSOSTOM. Herein he shews the excellent power of Him that called him; while engaged in this dangerous office He rescued him from the midst of evil, as also Paul while he was yet mad against the Church. He saith unto him, Follow me. As you have seen the power of Him that calleth, so learn the obedience of him that is called; he neither refuses, nor requests to go home and inform his friends.

REMIGIUS. He esteems lightly human dangers which might accrue to him from his masters for leaving his accounts in disorder, but, he arose, and followed him. And because he relinquished earthly gain, therefore of right was he made the dispenser of the Lord’s talents.

JEROME. Porphyry and the Emperor Julian insist from this account, that either the historian is to be charged with falsehood, or those who so readily followed the Saviour with haste and temerity; as if He called any without reason. They forget also the signs and wonders which had preceded, and which no doubt the Apostles had seen before they believed. Yea the brightness of effulgence of the hidden Godhead which beamed from His human countenance might attract them at first view. For if the loadstone can, as it is said, attract iron, how much more can the Lord of all creation draw to Himself whom He will!

CHRYSOSTOM. But why did He not call him at the same time with Peter and John and the others? Because he was then still in a hardened state, but after many miracles, and great fame of Christ, when He who knows the inmost secrets of the heart, perceived him more disposed to obedience, then He called him.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 26.) Or, perhaps it is more probable that Matthew here turns back to relate something that he had omitted; and we may suppose Matthew to have been called before the sermon on the mount; for on the mount, as Luke relates, the twelve, whom He also named Apostles, were chosen.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Matthew places his calling among the miracles; for a great miracle it was, a Publican becoming an Apostle.

CHRYSOSTOM. Why is it then that nothing is said of the rest of the Apostles how or when they were called, but only of Peter, Andrew, James, John, and Matthew? Because these were in the most alien and lowly stations, for nothing can be more disreputable than the office of Publican, nothing more abject than that of fisherman.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) As a meet return for the heavenly mercy, Matthew prepared a great feast for Christ in his house, bestowing his temporal goods on Him of whom he looked to receive everlasting goods. It follows, And it came to pass as he sat at meat in the house.

AUGUSTINE. (De. Cons. Ev. ii. 27.) Matthew has not said in whose house Jesus sat at meat (on this occasion), from which we might suppose, that this was not told in its proper order, but that what took place at some other time is inserted here as it happened to come into his mind; did not Mark and Luke who relate the same shew that it was in Levi's, that is, in Matthew's house.

CHRYSOSTOM. Matthew being honoured by the entrance of Jesus into his house, called together all that followed the same calling with himself; Behold many Publicans and sinners came and sat down with Jesus, and with his disciples.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The Publicans were they who were engaged in public business, which seldom or never can be carried on without sin. And a beautiful omen of the future, that he that was to be an Apostle and doctor of the Gentiles, at his first conversion draws after him a great multitude of sinners to salvation, already performing by his example what he was shortly to perform by word.

GLOSS. (ord.) Tertullian says that these must have been Gentiles, because Scripture says, There shall be no payer of tribute in Israel, as if Matthew were not a Jew. But the Lord did not sit down to meat with Gentiles, being more especially careful not to break the Law, as also He gave commandment to His disciples below, Go not into the way of the Gentiles.

JEROME. But they had seen the Publican turning from sins to better things, and finding place of repentance, and on this account they do not despair of salvation.

CHRYSOSTOM. Thus they came near to our Redeemer, and that not only to converse with Him, but to sit at meat with Him; for so not only by disputing, or healing, or convincing His enemies, but by eating with them, He oftentimes healed such as were ill-disposed, by this teaching us, that all times, and all actions, may be made means to our advantage. When the Pharisees saw this they were indignant; And the Pharisees beholding said to his disciples, Why eateth your Master with Publicans and sinners? It should be observed, that when the disciples seemed to be doing what was sinful, these same addressed Christ, Behold, thy disciples are doing what it is not allowed to do on the Sabbath. (Mat. 12:2.) Here they speak against Christ to

His disciples, both being the part of malicious persons, seeking to detach the hearts of the disciple from the Master.

RABANUS. (e Beda.) They are here in a twofold error; first, they esteemed themselves righteous, though in their pride they had departed far from righteousness; secondly, they charged with unrighteousness those who by recovering themselves from sin were drawing near to righteousness.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Luke seems to have related this a little differently; according to him the Pharisees say to the disciples, Why do ye eat and drink with Publicans and sinners? (Luke 5:30.) not unwilling that their Master should be understood to be involved in the same charge; insinuating it at once against Himself and His disciples. Therefore Matthew and Mark have related it as said to the disciples, because so it was as much an objection against their Master whom they followed and imitated. The sense therefore is one in all, and so much the better conveyed, as the words are changed while the substance continues the same.

JEROME. For they do not come to Jesus while they remain in their original condition of sin, as the Pharisees and Scribes complain, but in penitence, as what follows proves; But Jesus hearing said, They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick.

RABANUS. He calls Himself a physician, because by a wonderful kind of medicine He was wounded for our iniquities that He might heal the wound of our sin. By the whole, He means those who seeking to establish their own righteousness have not submitted to the true righteousness of God. By the sick, (Rom. 10:3.) He means those who, tied by the consciousness of their frailty, and seeing that they are not justified by the Law, submit themselves in penitence to the grace of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having first spoken in accordance with common opinion, He now addresses them out of Scripture, saying, Go ye, and learn what that meaneth, I will have mercy and not sacrifice.

JEROME. This text from Osee (Hosea 6:6.) is directed against the Scribes and Pharisees, who, deeming themselves righteous, refused to keep company with Publicans and sinners.

CHRYSOSTOM. As much as to say; How do you accuse me for reforming sinners? Therefore in this you accuse God the Father also. For as He wills the amendment of sinners, even so also do I. And He shews that this that they blamed was not only not forbidden, but was even by the Law set above sacrifice; for He said not, I will have mercy as well as sacrifice, but chooses the one and rejects the other.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Yet does not God contemn sacrifice, but sacrifice without mercy. But the Pharisees often offered sacrifices in the temple that they might seem to men to be righteous, but did not practise the deeds of mercy by which true righteousness is proved.

RABANUS. He therefore warns them, that by deeds of mercy they should seek for themselves the rewards of the mercy that is above, and, not overlooking the necessities of the poor, trust to please God by offering sacrifice. Wherefore, He says, Go; that is, from the rashness of foolish fault-finding to a more careful meditation of Holy Scripture, which highly commends mercy, and proposes to them as a guide His own example of mercy, saying, I came not to call the righteous but sinners.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Luke adds to repentance, which explains the sense; that none should suppose that sinners are loved by Christ because they are sinners; and this comparison of the sick shews what God means by calling sinners, as a physician does the sick to be saved from their iniquity as from a sickness: which is done by penitence.

HILARY. Christ came for all; how is it then that He says He came not for the righteous? Were there those for whom it needed not that He should come? But no man is righteous by the law. He shews how empty their boast of justification, sacrifices being inadequate to salvation, mercy was necessary for all who were set under the Law.

CHRYSOSTOM. Whence we may suppose that He is speaking ironically, as when it is said, Behold now Adam is become as one of us. (Gen. 3:22.) For that there is none righteous on earth Paul shews, All have sinned, and need glory of God. (Rom. 3:23.) By this saying He also consoled those who were called; as though He had said, So far am I from abhorring sinners, that for their sakes only did I come.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or; Those who were righteous, as Nathanael and John the Baptist, were not to be invited to repentance. Or. I came not to call the righteous, that is, the feignedly righteous, those who boasted of their righteousness as the Pharisees, but those that owned themselves sinners.

RABANUS. In the call of Matthew and the Publicans is figured the faith of the Gentiles who first gaped after the gain of the world, and are now spiritually refreshed by the Lord; in the pride of the Pharisees, the jealousy of the Jews at the salvation of the Gentiles. Or, Matthew signifies the man intent on temporal gain; Jesus sees him, when He looks on him with the eyes of mercy. For Matthew is interpreted ‘given,’ Levi ‘taken,’ the penitent is taken out of the mass of the perishing, and by God’s grace given to the Church. And Jesus saith unto him, Follow me, either by preaching, or by the admonition of Scripture, or by internal illumination.

9:14–17

14. Then came to him the disciples of John, saying, Why do we and the Pharisees fast oft, but thy disciples fast not?

15. And Jesus said unto them, Can the children of the bridechamber mourn, as long as the bridegroom is with them? but the days will come, when the bridegroom shall be taken from them, and then shall they fast.

16. No man putteth a piece of new cloth unto an old garment, for that which is put in to fill it up taketh from the garment, and the rent is made worse.

17. Neither do men put new wine into old bottles; else the bottles break, and the wine runneth out, and the bottles perish: but they put new wine into new bottles, and both are preserved.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) When He had replied to them respecting eating and converse with sinners, they next assault Him on the matter of food; Then came to him the disciples of John, saying, Why do we and the Pharisees fast often, but thy disciples fast not?

JEROME. O boastful enquiry and ostentation of fasting much to be blamed, nor can John’s disciples be excused for their taking part with the Pharisees who they knew had been condemned by John, and for bringing a false accusation against Him whom they knew their master had preached.

CHRYSOSTOM. What they say comes to this, Be it that you do this as Physician of souls, but why do your disciples neglect fasting and approach such tables? And to augment the weight of their charge by comparison, they put themselves first, and then the Pharisees. They fasted as they learnt out of the Law, as the Pharisee spoke, I fast twice in the week; (Luke 18:12.) the others learnt it of John.

RABANUS. For John drank neither wine, nor strong drink, increasing his merit by abstinence, because he had no power over nature. But the Lord who has power to forgive sins, why should He shun sinners that eat, since He has power to make them more righteous than those that eat not? Yet doth Christ fast, that you should not avoid the command; but He eats with sinners that you may know His grace and power.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Though Matthew mentions only the disciples of John as having made this enquiry, the words of Mark rather seem to imply that some other persons spoke of others, that is, the guests spoke concerning the disciples of John and the Pharisees—this is still more evident from Luke; why then does Matthew here say, Then came unto him the disciples of John, (Luck 5:33.) unless that they were there among other guests, all of whom with one consent put this objection to Him?

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; Luke relates that the Pharisees, but Matthew that the disciples of John, said thus, because the Pharisees had taken them with them to ask the question, as they afterwards did the Herodians. Observe how when strangers, as before the Publicans, were to be defended, He accuses heavily those that blamed them; but when they brought a charge against His disciples, He makes answer with mildness. And Jesus saith unto them, Can the children of the bridegroom mourn as long as the bridegroom is with them? Before He had styled Himself Physician, now Bridegroom, calling to mind the words of John which he had said, He that hath the bride is the bridegroom. (John 3:29.)

JEROME. Christ is the Bridegroom and the Church the Bride. Of this spiritual union the Apostles were born; they cannot mourn so long as they see the Bridegroom in the chamber with the Bride. But when the nuptials are past, and the time of passion and resurrection is come, then shall the children of the Bridegroom fast. The days shall come when the bridegroom shall be taken from them, and then shall they fast.

CHRYSOSTOM. He means this; The present is a time of joy and rejoicing; sorrow is therefore not to be now brought forward; and fasting is naturally grievous, and to all those that are yet weak; for to those that seek to contemplate wisdom, it is pleasant; He therefore speaks here according to the former opinion. He also shews that this they did was not of gluttony, but of a certain dispensation.

JEROME. Hence some think that a fast ought to follow the forty days of Passion, although the day of Pentecost and the coming of the Holy Spirit immediately bring back our joy and festival. From this text accordingly, Montanus, Prisca, and Maximilla enjoin a forty days' abstinence after Pentecost, but it is the use of the Church to come to the Lord's passion and resurrection through humiliation of the flesh, that by carnal abstinence we may better be prepared for spiritual fulness.

CHRYSOSTOM. Here again He confirms what He has said by examples of common things; No man putteth a patch of undressed cloth into an old garment; for it taketh away its wholeness from, the garment, and the rent is made worse; which is to say, My disciples are not yet become strong, but have need of much consideration; they are not yet renewed by the Spirit. On men in such a state it is not behoveful to lay a burden of precepts. Herein He establishes a rule for His disciples, that they should receive with leniency disciples from out of the whole world.

REMIGIUS. By the old garment He means His disciples, who had not yet been renewed in all things. The patch of undressed, that is, of new cloth, means the new grace, that is, the Gospel doctrine, of which fasting is a portion; and it was not meet that the stricter ordinances of fasting should be entrusted to them, lest they should be broken down by their severity, and forfeit that faith which they had; as He adds, It taketh its wholeness from the garment, and the rent is made worse.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) As much as to say, An undressed patch, that is, a new one, ought not to be put into an old garment, because it often takes away from the garment its wholeness, that is, its perfection, and then the rent is made worse. For a heavy burden laid on one that is untrained often destroys that good which was in him before.

REMIGIUS. After two comparisons made, that of the wedding, and that of the undressed cloth, He adds a third concerning wine skins; Neither do men put new wine into old skins. By the old skins He means His disciples, who were not yet perfectly renewed. The new wine is the fulness of the Holy Spirit, and the depths of the heavenly mysteries, which His disciples could not then bear; but after the resurrection they became as new skins, and were filled with new wine when they received the Holy Spirit into their hearts. Whence also some said, These men are full of new wine. (Acts 2:13.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Herein He also shews us the cause of those condescending words which He often addressed to them because of their weakness.

JEROME. Otherwise; By the old garment, and old skins, we must understand the Scribes and Pharisees; and by the piece of new cloth, and new wine, the Gospel precepts, which the Jews were not able to bear; so the rent was made worse. Something such the Galatians sought to do, to mix the precepts of the Law with the Gospel, and to put new wine into old skins. The word of the Gospel is therefore to be poured into the Apostles, rather than into the Scribes and Pharisees, who, corrupted by the traditions of the elders, were unable to preserve the purity of Christ's precepts.

GLOSS. (non occ.) This shews that the Apostles being hereafter to be replenished with newness of grace, ought not now to be bound to the old observances.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 210. 3.) Otherwise; Every one who rightly fasts, either humbles his soul in the groaning of prayer, and bodily chastisement, or suspends the motion of carnal desire by the joys of spiritual meditation. And the Lord here makes answer respecting both kinds of fasting; concerning the first, which is in humiliation of soul, He says, The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn. Of the other which has a feast of the Spirit, He next speaks, where He says, No man putteth a patch of undressed cloth. Then we must mourn because the Bridegroom is taken away from us. And we rightly mourn if we burn with desire of Him. Blessed they to whom it was granted before His passion to have Him present with them, to enquire of Him what they would, to hear what they ought to hear. Those days the fathers before His coming sought to see, and saw them not, because they were placed in another dispensation, one in which He was proclaimed as coming, not one in which He was heard as present. For in us was fulfilled that He speaks of, The days shall come when ye shall desire to see one of these days, and shall not be able. (Luke 17:22.) Who then will not mourn this? Who will not say, My tears have been my meat day and night, while they daily say unto me, Where is now thy God? (Ps. 42:3.) With reason then did the Apostle seek to die and to be with Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 27.) That Matthew writes here mourn, where Mark and Luke write fast, shews that the Lord spake of that kind of fasting which pertains to humbling one's self in chastisement; as in the following comparisons He may be supposed to have spoken of the other kind which pertains to the joy of a mind wrapt in spiritual thoughts, and therefore averted from the food of the body; shewing that those who are occupied about the body, and owing to this retain their former desires, are not fit for this kind of fasting.

HILARY. Figuratively; This His answer, that while the Bridegroom was present with them, His disciples needed not to fast, teaches us the joy of His presence, and the sacrament of the holy food, which none shall lack, while He is present, that is, while one keeps Christ in the eye of the mind. He says, they shall fast when He is taken away from them, because all who do not believe that Christ is risen, shall not have the food of life. For in the faith of the resurrection the sacrament of the heavenly bread is received.

JEROME. Or; When He has departed from us for our sins, then is a fast to be proclaimed, then is mourning to be put on.

HILARY. By these examples He shews that neither our souls nor bodies, being so weakened by inveteracy of sin, are capable of the sacraments of the new grace.

RABANUS. The different comparisons all refer to the same thing, and yet are they different; the garment by which we are covered abroad signifies our good works, which we perform when we are abroad; the wine with which we are refreshed within is the fervor of faith and charity, which creates us anew within.

9:18–22

18. While he spake these things unto them, behold, there came a certain ruler, and worshipped him, saying, My daughter is even now dead: but come and lay thy hand upon her, and she shall live.

19. And Jesus arose, and followed him, and so did his disciples.

20. And, behold, a woman, which was diseased with an issue of blood twelve years, came behind him, and touched the hem of his garment:

21. For she said within herself, If I may but touch his garment, I shall be whole.

22. But Jesus turned him about, and when he saw her, he said, Daughter, be of good comfort; thy faith hath made thee whole. And the woman was made whole from that hour.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi.) After His instructions He adds a miracle, which should mightily discomfit the Pharisees, because he who came to beg this miracle, was a ruler of the synagogue, and the mourning was great, for she was his only child, and of the age of twelve years, that is, when the flower of youth begins; While he spake these things unto them, behold, there came one of their chief men unto him.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 28.) This narrative is given both by Mark and Luke, but in a quite different order; namely, when after the casting out of the dæmons and their entrance into the swine, he had returned across the lake from the country of the Gerasenes. Now Mark does indeed tell us that this happened after He had recrossed the lake, but how long after he does not determine. Unless there had been some interval of time, that could not have taken place that Matthew relates concerning the feast in his house. After this, immediately follows that concerning the ruler of the synagogue's daughter. If the ruler came to Him while He was yet speaking that of the new patch, and the new wine, then no other act of speech of his intervened. And in Mark's account, the place where these things might come in, is evident. In like manner, Luke does not contradict Matthew; for what he adds, And behold a man, whose name was Jairus, (Luke 8:41.) is not to be taken as though it followed instantly what had been related before, but after that feast with the Publicans, as Matthew relates. While he spake these things unto them, behold, one of their chief men, namely, Jairus, the ruler of the synagogue, came to him, and worshipped him, saying, Lord, my daughter is even now dead. It should be observed, lest there should seem to be some discrepancy, that the other two Evangelists represent her as at the point of death, but yet not dead, but so as afterwards to say that there came afterwards some saying, She is dead, trouble not the Master, for Matthew for the sake of shortness represents the Lord as having been asked at first to do that which it is manifest He did do, namely, raise the dead. He looks not at the words of the father respecting his daughter, but rather his mind. For he had so far despaired of her life, that he made his request rather for her to be called to life again, thinking it impossible that she, whom he had left dying, should be found yet alive. The other two then have given Jairus' words; Matthew has put what he wished and thought. Indeed had either of them related that it was the father himself that said that Jesus should not be troubled for she was now dead, in that case the words that Matthew has given would not have corresponded with the thoughts of the ruler. But we do not read that he agreed with the messengers. Hence we learn a thing of the highest necessity, that we should look at nothing in any man's words, but his meaning to which his words ought to be subservient; and no man gives a false account when he repeats a man’s meaning in words other than those actually used.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; The ruler says, she is dead, exaggerating his calamity. As it is the manner of those that prefer a petition to magnify their distresses, and to represent them as something more than they really are, in order to gain the compassion of those to whom they make supplication; whence he adds, But come and lay thy hand upon her, and she shall live. See his dullness. He begs two things of Christ, to come, and to lay His hand upon her. This was what Naaman the Syrian required of the Prophet. For they who are constituted thus hard of heart have need of sight and things sensible.

REMIGIUS. We ought to admire and at the same time to imitate the humility and mercifulness of the Lord; as soon as ever He was asked, He rose to follow him that asked; And Jesus rose, and followed him. Here is instruction both for such as are in command, and such as are in subjection. To these He has left an example of obedience; to those who are set over others He shews how earnest and watchful they should be in teaching; whenever they hear of any being dead in spirit, they should hasten to Him; And his disciples went with him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Mark and Luke say that He took with Him three disciples only, namely, Peter, James, and John; He took not Matthew, to quicken his desires, and because he was yet not perfectly minded1; and for this reason He honours these three, that others may become like-minded. It was enough meanwhile for Matthew to see the things that were done respecting her that had the issue of blood, concerning whom it follows; And, behold, a woman who had suffered an issue of blood twelve years, came behind and touched the hem of his garment.

JEROME. This woman that had the flux came to the Lord not in the house, nor in the town, for she was excluded from them by the Law, but by the way as He walked; thus as He goes to heal one woman, another is cured.

CHRYSOSTOM. She came not to Christ with an open address through shame concerning this her disease, believing herself unclean; for in the Law this disease was esteemed highly unclean. For this reason she hides herself.

REMIGIUS. In which her humility must be praised, that she came not before His face, but behind, and judged herself unworthy to touch the

Lord’s feet, yea, she touched not His whole garment, but the hem only; for the Lord wore a hem according to the command of the Law. So the Pharisees also wore hems which they made large, and in some they inserted thorns. But the Lord’s hem was not made to wound, but to heal, and therefore it follows, For she said within herself, If I can but touch his garment, I shall be made whole. How wonderful her faith, that though she despaired of health from the physicians, on whom notwithstanding she had exhausted her living, she perceived that a heavenly Physician was at hand, and therefore bent her whole soul on Him; whence she deserved to be healed; But Jesus turning and seeing her, said, Be of good cheer, daughter, thy faith hath made thee whole.

RABANUS. What is this that He bids her, Be of good cheer, seeing if she had not had faith, she would not have sought healing of Him? He requires of her strength and perseverance, that she may come to a sure and certain salvation.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or because the woman was fearful, therefore He said, Be of good cheer. He calls her daughter, for her faith had made her such.

JEROME. He said not, Thy faith shall make thee whole, but, hath made thee whole; for in that thou hast believed, thou art already made whole.

CHRYSOSTOM. She had not yet a perfect mind respecting Christ, or she would not have supposed that she could be hid from Him; but Christ would not suffer her to go away unobserved, not that He sought fame, but for many reasons. First, He relieves the woman’s fear, that she should not be pricked in her conscience as though she had stolen this boon; secondly, He corrects her error in supposing she could be hid from Him; thirdly, He displays her faith to all for their imitation; and fourthly, He did a miracle, in that He shewed He knew all things, no less than in drying the fountain of her blood. It follows, And the woman was made whole from that hour.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) This must be understood as the time in which she touched the hem of His garment, not in which Jesus turned to her; for she was already healed, as the other Evangelists testify, and as may be inferred from the Lord’s words.

HILARY. Herein is to be observed the marvellous virtue of the Lord, that the power that dwelt in His body should give healing to things perishable, and the heavenly energy extended even through the hems of His garments; for God is not comprehensible that He should be shut in by a body. For His taking a body unto Him did not confine His power, but His power took upon it a frail body for our redemption. Figuratively, this ruler is to be understood as the Law, which prays the Lord that He would restore life to the dead multitude which it had brought up for Christ, preaching that His coming was to be looked for.

RABANUS. (part. e Beda.) Or; The ruler of the synagogue signifies Moses; he is named Jairus, ‘illuminating,’ or, ‘that shall illuminate,’ because he received the words of life to give to us, and by them enlightens all, being himself enlightened by the Holy Spirit. The daughter of the ruler, that is, the synagogue itself, being as it were in the twelfth year of its age, that is, in the season of puberty, when it should have borne spiritual progeny to God, fell into the sickness of error. While then the Word of God is hastening to this ruler’s daughter to make whole the sons of Israel, a holy Church is gathered from among the Gentiles, which while it was perishing by inward corruption, received by faith that healing that was prepared for others. It should be noted, that the ruler’s daughter was twelve years old, and this woman had been twelve years afflicted; thus she had begun to be diseased at the very time the other was born; so in one and the same age the synagogue had its birth among the Patriarchs, and the nations without began to be polluted with the pest of idolatry. For the issue of blood may be taken in two ways, either for the pollution of idolatry, or for obedience to the pleasures of flesh and blood. Thus as long as the synagogue flourished, the Church languished; the falling away of the first was made the salvation of the Gentiles. Also the Church draws nigh and touches the Lord, when it approaches Him in faith. She believed, spake her belief, and touched, for by these three things, faith, word, and deed, all salvation is gained. She came behind Him, as He spake, If any one serve me, let him follow me; (John 12:26.) or because, not having seen the Lord present in the flesh, when the sacraments of His incarnation were fulfilled, she came at length to the grace of the knowledge of Him. Thus also she touched the hem of His garment, because the Gentiles, though they had not seen Christ in the flesh, received the tidings of His incarnation. The garment of Christ is put for the mystery of His incarnation, wherewith His Deity is clothed; the hem of His garment are the words that hang upon His incarnation. She touches not the garment, but the hem thereof; because she saw not the Lord in the flesh, but received the word of the incarnation through the Apostles. Blessed is he that touches but the uttermost part of the word by faith. She is healed while the Lord is not in the city, but while He is yet on the way; as the Apostles cried, Because ye judge yourselves unworthy of eternal life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles. (Acts 13:46.) And from the time of the Lord’s coming the Gentiles began to be healed.

9:23–26

23. And when Jesus came into the ruler’s house, and saw the minstrels and the people making a noise,

24. He said unto them, Give place: for the maid is not dead, but sleepeth. And they laughed him to scorn.

25. But when the people were put forth, he went in, and took her by the hand, and the maid arose.

26. And the fame hereof went abroad into all that land.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After the healing of the woman with the issue of blood, follows the raising of the dead; And when Jesus was come into the ruler’s house.

CHRYSOSTOM. We may suppose that He proceeded slowly, and spake longer to the woman whom He had healed, that He might suffer the maid to die, and thus an evident miracle of restoring to life might be wrought. In the case of Lazarus also He waited till the third day. And when he saw the minstrels and the people making a noise; this was a proof of her death.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 8. 52.) For by the ancient custom minstrels were engaged to make lamentation for the dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. But Christ put forth all the pipers, but took in the parents, that it might not be said that He had healed her by any other means; and before the restoring to life He excites their expectations by His words, And he said, Give place: for the maid is not dead, but sleepeth.

BEDE. (in Luc.) As though He had said, To you she is dead, but to God who has power to give life, she sleeps only both in soul and body.

CHRYSOSTOM. By this saying, He soothes the minds of those that were present, and shews that it is easy to Him to raise the dead; the like He did in the case of Lazarus, Our friend Lazarus sleepeth. (John 11:11.) This was also a lesson to them not to be afraid of death; forasmuch as He Himself also should die, He made His disciples learn in the persons of others confidence and patient endurance of death. For when He was near, death was but as sleep. When He had said this, They mocked him. And He did not rebuke their mocking; that this mocking, and the pipes and all other things, might be a proof of her death. For ofttimes at His miracles when men would not believe, He convicted them by their own answers; as in the case of Lazarus, when He said, Where have ye laid him? so that they that answered, Come and see, and, He stinketh, for he hath now been dead four days, could no longer disbelieve that He had raised a dead man.

JEROME. They that had mocked the Reviver were not worthy to behold the mystery of the revival; and therefore it follows, And when the multitude was put forth, he entered, and took her by the hand, and the maid arose.

CHRYSOSTOM. He restored her to life not by bringing in another soul, but by recalling that which had departed, and as it were raising it from sleep, and through this sight preparing the way for belief of the resurrection. And He not only restores her to life, but commands food to be given her, as the other Evangelists relate, that that which was done might be seen to be no delusion. And the fame of him went abroad into all that country.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The fame, namely, of the greatness and novelty of the miracle, and its established truth; so that it could not be supposed to be a forgery.

HILARY. Mystically; The Lord enters the ruler’s house, that is, the synagogue, throughout which there resounded in the songs of the Law a strain of wailing.

JEROME. To this day the damsel lays dead in the ruler’s house; and they that seem to be teachers are but minstrels singing funeral dirges. The Jews also are not the crowd of believers, but of people making a noise. But when the fulness of the Gentiles shall come in, then all Israel shall be saved.

HILARY. But that the number of the elect might be known to be but few out of the whole body of believers, the multitude is put forth; the Lord indeed would that they should be saved, but they mocked at His sayings and actions, and so were not worthy to be made partakers of His resurrection.

JEROME. He took her by the hand, and the maid arose; because if the hands of the Jews which are defiled with blood be not first cleansed, their synagogue which is dead shall not revive.

HILARY. His fame went about into all that country; that is, the salvation of the elect, the gift and works of Christ are preached.

RABANUS. Morally; The damsel dead in the house is the soul dead in thought. He says that she is asleep, because they that are now asleep in sin may yet be roused by penitence. The minstrels are flatterers who cherish the dead.

GREGORY. (Mor. xviii. 43.) The multitude are put forth that the damsel may be raised; for unless the multitude of worldly cares is first banished from the secrets of the heart, the soul which is laid dead within, cannot rise again.

RABANUS. The maiden is raised in the house with few to witness, the young man without the gate, and Lazarus in the presence of many; for a public scandal requires a public expiation; a less notorious, a lesser remedy; and secret sins may be done away by penitence.

9:27–31

27. And when Jesus departed thence, two blind men followed him, crying, and saying, Thou Son of David, have mercy on us.

28. And when he was come into the house, the blind men came to him: and Jesus saith unto them, Believe ye that I am able to do this? They said unto him, Yea, Lord.

29. Then touched he their eyes, saying, According to your faith be it unto you.

30. And their eyes were opened: and Jesus straitly charged them, saying, See that no man know it.

31. But they, when they were departed, spread abroad his fame in all that country.

JEROME. The miracles that had gone before of the ruler’s daughter, and the woman with the issue of blood, are now followed by that of two blind men, that what death and disease had there witnessed, that blindness might now witness. And as Jesus passed thence, that is, from the ruler’s house, there followed him two blind men, crying, and saying, Have mercy on us, thou Son of David.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii.) Here is no small charge against the Jews, that these men, having lost their sight, yet believe by means of their heaving only; while they who had sight, would not believe the miracles that were done. Observe their eagerness; they do not simply come to Him, but with crying, and asking for nothing but mercy; they call Him Son of David, because that seemed to be a name of honour.

REMIGIUS. Rightly they call Him Son of David, because the Virgin Mary was of the line of David.

JEROME. Let Marcion and Manichæus, and the other heretics who mangle the Old Testament, hear this, and learn that the Saviour is called the Son of David; for if He was not born in the flesh, how is He the Son of David?

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe that the Lord oftentimes desired to be asked to heal, that none should think that He was eager to seize an occasion of display.

JEROME. Yet were they not healed by the way-side and in passing as they had thought to be; but when He was entered into the house, they come unto Him; and first their faith is made proof of, that so they may receive the light of the true faith. And when he was come into the house, the blind men came unto him; and Jesus said unto them, Believe ye that I am able to do this?

CHRYSOSTOM. Here again He teaches us to exclude the desire of fame; because there was a house hard by, He takes them there to heal them apart.

REMIGIUS. He who was able to give sight to the blind, was not ignorant whether they believed; but He asked them, in order that the faith which they bare in their hearts, being confessed by their mouth might be made deserving of a higher reward, according to that of the Apostle, By the mouth confession is made unto salvation. (Rom. 10:10.)

CHRYSOSTOM. And not for this reason only, but that He might make manifest that they were worthy of healing, and that none might object, that if mercy alone saved, then ought all to be saved. Therefore also He requires faith of them, that He may thereby raise their thoughts higher; they had called Him the Son of David, therefore He instructs them that they should think higher things of Him. Thus He does not say to them, Believe ye that I can ask the Father? But, Believe ye that I am able to do this? They say unto him, Yea, Lord. They call Him no more Son of David, but exalt Him higher, and confess His dominion. Then He lays His hand upon them; as it follows, Then he touched their eyes, saying, According to your faith be it unto you. This He says confirming their faith, and testifying that what they had said were not words of flattery. Then follows the cure, And their eyes were opened. And after this, His injunction that they should tell it to no man; and this not a simple command, but with much earnestness, And Jesus straitly charged them, saying, See that no man know it; but they went forth, and spread abroad the fame of him through the whole country.

JEROME. The Lord from humility shunning the fame of His glorious works, gave them this charge, and they from gratitude cannot be silent respecting so great benefit.

CHRYSOSTOM. That He said to another man, Go, and proclaim the glory of God, (Luke 8:39.) is not contrary to this; for what He would teach is, that we should hinder those that would commend us for ourselves. But when it is the Lord's glory that is to be praised, we ought not to forbid, but to promote it ourselves.

HILARY. Or He enjoins silence on the blind men, because to preach was the Apostles' office.

GREGORY. (Mor. xix. 23.) We must enquire how this is that the Almighty, whose will and power are coextensive, should have here willed that His excellent works should be hid in silence, and is yet preached against His will, as it were, by these men who have received their sight. It is only that He herein has left an example to His servants who follow Him, that they should desire their own good deeds to be hid, and that notwithstanding they should be made known against their will, that others may profit by their example. They should then be hid by design, and published of compulsion; their concealment is by our own watchfulness, their betrayal is for others' profit.

REMIGIUS. Allegorically; By these two blind men are denoted the two nations of Jews and Gentiles, or the two nations of the Jewish race; for in the time of Roboam his kingdom was Split into two parts. Out of both nations such as believed on Him Christ gave sight to in the house, by which is understood the Church; for without the unity of the Church no man can be saved. And they of the Jews who had believed the Lord's coming spread the knowledge thereof throughout the whole earth.

RABANUS. The house of the ruler is the Synagogue which was ruled by Moses; the house of Jesus is the heavenly Jerusalem. As the Lord passed through this world and was returning to His own house, two blind men followed Him; that is, when the Gospel was preached by the Apostles, many of the Jews and Gentiles began to follow Him. But when He ascended into Heaven, then He entered His house, that is, into the confession of one faith which is in the Catholic Church, and in that they were enlightened.

9:32–35

32. As they went out, behold, they brought to him a dumb man possessed with a devil.

33. And when the devil was east out, the dumb spake: and the multitudes marvelled, saying, It was never so seen in Israel.

34. But the Pharisees said, He casteth out devils through the prince of the devils.

35. And Jesus went about all the cities and villages, teaching in their synagogues, and preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, and healing every sickness and every disease among the people.

REMIGIUS. Observe the beautiful order of His miracles; how after He had given sight to the blind, He restored speech to the dumb, and healed the possessed of the dæmon; by which He shews Himself the Lord of power, and the author of the heavenly medicine. For it was said by Isaiah, Then shall the eyes of the blind be opened, the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped, and the tongue of the dumb loosed. (Is. 35:6.) Whence it is said, When they were gone forth, they brought unto him a man dumb, and possessed with a dæmon.

JEROME. The Greek word here (κωφὸς) is more frequent in common speech in the sense of ‘deaf,’ but it is the manner of Scripture to use it indifferently as either.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was not a mere natural defect; but was from the malignity of the dæmon; and therefore he needed to be brought of others, for he could not ask any thing of others as living without voice, and the dæmon chaining his spirit together with his tongue. Therefore Christ does not require faith of him, but immediately healed his disorder; as it follows, And when the dæmon was cast out, the dumb spake.

HILARY. The natural order of things is here preserved; the dæmon is first cast out, and there the functions of the members proceed. And the multitude marvelled, saying, It was never so seen in Israel.

CHRYSOSTOM. They set Him thus above others, because He not only healed, but with such ease, and quickness; and cured diseases both infinite in number, and in quality incurable. This most grieved the Pharisees, that they set Him before all others, not only those that then lived, but all who had lived before, on which account it follows, But the Pharisees said, He casteth out dæmons through the Prince of dæmons.

REMIGIUS. Thus the Scribes and Pharisees denied such of the Lord’s miracles as they could deny; and such as they could not they explained by an evil interpretation, according to that, In the multitude of thy excellency thy enemies shall lie unto thee. (Ps. 66:3.)

CHRYSOSTOM. What can be more foolish than this speech of theirs? For it cannot be pretended that one dæmon would cast out another; for they are wont to consent to one another’s deeds, and not to be at variance among themselves. But Christ not only cast out dæmons, but healed the lepers, raised the dead, forgave sins, preached the kingdom of God, and brought men to the Father, which a dæmon neither could nor would do.

RABANUS. Figuratively; As in the two blind men were denoted both nations, Jews and Gentiles, so in the man dumb and afflicted with the dæmon is denoted the whole human race.

HILARY. Or; By the dumb and deaf, and dæmoniae, is signified the Gentile world, needing health in every part; for sunk in evil of every kind, they are afflicted with disease of every part of the body.

REMIGIUS. For the Gentiles were dumb; not being able to open their mouth in the confession of the true faith, and the praises of the Creator, or because in paying worship to dumb idols they were made like unto them. They were afflicted with a dæmon, because by dying in unbelief they were made subject to the power of the Devil.

HILARY. But by the knowledge of God the frenzy of superstition being chased away, the sight, the hearing, and the word of salvation is brought in to them.

JEROME. As the blind receive light, so the tongue of the dumb is loosed, that he may confess Him whom before he denied. The wonder of the multitude is the confession of the nations. The scoff of the Pharisees is the unbelief of the Jews, which is to this day.

HILARY. The wonder of the multitude is followed up by the confession, It was never so seen in Israel; because he, for whom there was no help under the Law, is saved by the power of the Word.

REMIGIUS. They who brought the dumb to be healed by the Lord, signify the Apostles and preachers, who brought the Gentile people to be saved before the face of divine mercy.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 29.) This account of the two blind men and the dumb dæmon is read in Matthew only. The two blind men of whom the others speak are not the same as these, though something similar was done with them. So that even if Matthew had not also recorded their cure, we might have seen that this present narrative was of a different transaction. And this we ought diligently to remember, that many actions of our Lord are very much like one another, but are proved not to be the same action, by being both related at different times by the same Evangelist. So that when we find cases in which one is recorded by one Evangelist, and another by another, and some difference which we cannot reconcile between their accounts, we should suppose that they are like, but not the same, events.

9:36–38

36. But when he saw the multitudes, he was moved with compassion on them, because they fainted, and were scattered abroad, as sheep having no shepherd.

37. Then saith he unto his disciples, The harvest truly is plenteous, but the labourers are few;

38. Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he will send forth labourers into his harvest.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord would refute by actions the charge of the Pharisees, who said, He casteth out dæmons by the Prince of the dæmons; for a dæmon having suffered rebuke, does not return good but evil to those who have not shewn him honour. But the Lord on the other hand, when He has suffered blasphemy and contumely, not only does not punish, but does not utter a hard speech, yea He shews kindness to them that did it, as it here follows, And Jesus went about all their towns and villages. Herein He teaches us not to return accusations to them that accuse us, but kindness. For he that ceases to do good because of accusation, shews that his good has been done because of men. But if for God’s sake you do good to your fellow-servants, you will not cease from doing good whatever they do, that your reward may be greater.

JEROME. Observe how equally in villages, cities, and towns, that is to great as well as small, He preaches the Gospel, not respecting the might of the noble, but the salvation of those that believe. It follows, Teaching in their synagogues; this was His meat, going about to do the will of His Father, and saving by His teaching such as yet believed not.

GLOSS. (non occ.) He taught in their synagogues the Gospel of the Kingdom, as it follows, Preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom.

REMIGIUS. Understand, ‘of God;’ for though temporal blessings are also proclaimed, yet they are not called The Gospel. Hence the Law was not called a Gospel, because to such as kept it, it held out not heavenly, but earthly, goods.

JEROME. He first preached and taught, and then proceeded to heal sicknesses, that the works might convince those who would not believe the words. Hence it follows, Healing every sickness and every disease, for to Him alone nothing is impossible.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) By disease we may understand complaints of long standing, by sickness any lesser infirmity.

REMIGIUS. It should be known that those whom He healed outwardly in their bodies, He also healed inwardly in their souls. Others cannot do this of their own power, but can by God’s grace.

CHRYSOSTOM. Nor does Christ’s goodness rest here, but He manifests His care for them, opening the bowels of His mercy towards them; whence it follows, And seeing the multitudes, he had compassion upon them.

REMIGIUS. Herein Christ shews in Himself the disposition of the good shepherd and not that of the hireling. Why He pitied them is added, Because they were troubled1, and sick1 as sheep that have no shepherd—troubled either by dæmons, or by divers sicknesses and infirmities.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or, troubled by dæmons, and sick, that is, benumbed and unable to rise; and though they had shepherds, yet they were as though they had them not.

CHRYSOSTOM. This is an accusation against the rulers of the Jews, that being shepherds they appeared like wolves; not only not improving the multitude, but hindering their progress. For when the multitude marvelled and said, It was never so seen in Israel, these opposed themselves, saying, He casteth out dæmons by the prince of the dæmons. (vid. Ps. 102:19.)

REMIGIUS. But when the Son of God looked down from heaven upon the earth, to hear the groans of the captives, straight a great harvest began to ripen; for the multitude of the human race would never have come near to the faith, had not the Author of human salvation looked down from heaven; and it follows, Then said he unto his disciples, The harvest truly is great, but the labourers are few.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The harvest are those men who can be reaped by the preachers, and separated from the number of the damned, as grain is beaten out from the chaff that it may be laid up in granaries.

JEROME. The great harvest denotes the multitude of the people; the few labourers, the want of instructors.

REMIGIUS. For the number of the Apostles was small in comparison of so great crops to be reaped. The Lord exhorts His preachers, that is, the Apostles and their followers, that they should daily desire an increase of their number; Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he would send forth labourers into his harvest.

CHRYSOSTOM. He privately insinuates Himself to be the Lord; for it is He Himself who is Lord of the harvest. For if He sent the Apostles to reap what they had not sown, it is manifest that He sent them not to reap the things of others, but what He had sown by the Prophets. But since the twelve Apostles are the labourers, He said, Pray ye the Lord of the harvest, that he would send labourers into his harvest; and notwithstanding He added none to their number, but rather He multiplied those twelve many times, not by increasing their numbers, but by giving them more abundant grace.

REMIGIUS. Or, He then increased their number when He chose the seventy and two, and then when many preachers were made what time the Holy Spirit descended upon the believers.

CHRYSOSTOM. He shews us that it is a great gift that one should have the power of rightly preaching, in that He tells them that they ought to pray for it. Also we are here reminded of the words of John concerning the threshing-floor, and the fan, the chaff, and the wheat.

HILARY. Figuratively; When salvation was given to the Gentiles, then all cities and towns were enlightened by the power and entrance of Christ, and escaped every former sickness and infirmity. The Lord pities the people troubled with the violence of the unclean Spirit, and sick under the burden of the Law, and having no shepherd at hand to bestow on them the guardianship of the Holy Spirit. But of that gift there was a most abundant fruit, whose plenty far exceeded the multitude of those that drank thereof; how many soever take of it, yet an inexhaustible supply remains; and because it is profitable that there should be many to minister it, He bids us ask the Lord of the harvest, that God would provide a supply of reapers for the ministration of that gift of the Holy Spirit which was made ready; for by prayer this gift is poured out upon us from God.

CHAPTER 10

10:1–4

1. And when he had called unto him his twelve disciples, he gave them power against unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of sickness and all manner of disease.

2. Now the names of the twelve apostles are these; The first, Simon, who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother; James the son of Zebedee, and John his brother;

3. Philip, and Bartholomew; Thomas, and Matthew the Publican; James the son of Alphæus, and Lebbæus, whose surname was Thaddæus;

4. Simon the Canaanite, and Judas Iscariot, who also betrayed him.

GLOSS. (ord.) From the healing of Peter’s wife’s mother to this place there has been a continued succession of miracles; and they were done before the Sermon upon the Mount, as we know for certain from Matthew’s call, which is placed among them; for he was one of the twelve chosen to the Apostleship upon the mount. He here returns to the order of events, taking it up again at the healing of the centurion’s servant; saying, And calling to him his twelve disciples.

REMIGIUS. The Evangelist had related above that the Lord exhorted His disciples to pray the Lord of the harvest to send labourers into His vineyard; and He now seems to be fulfilling what He had exhorted them to. For the number twelve is a perfect number, being made up of the number six, which has perfection because it is formed of its own parts, one, two, three, multiplied into one another; and the number six when doubled amounts to twelve.

GLOSS. (vid. Greg. Hom. in Ev. xvii. 1.) And this doubling seems to have some reference to the two precepts of charity, or to the two Testaments.

BEDE. For the number twelve, which is made up of three into four, denotes that through the four quarters of the world they were to preach the faith of the holy Trinity.

RABANUS. (cf. Tertull. cont. Marc. iv. 13.) This number is typified by many things in the Old Testament; by the twelve sons of Jacob, by the twelve princes of the children of Israel, by the twelve running springs in Helim, by the twelve stones in Aaron’s breastplate, by the twelve loaves of the shew-bread, by the twelve spies sent by Moses, by the twelve stones of which the altar was made, by the twelve stones taken out of Jordan, by the twelve oxen which bare the brazen sea. Also in the New Testament, by the twelve stars in the bride’s crown, by the twelve foundations of Jerusalem which John saw, and her twelve gates.

CHRYSOSTOM. He makes them confident not only by calling their ministry a sending forth to the harvest, but by giving them strength for the ministry; whence it follows, He gave them power over all unclean spirits to cast them out, and to heal every sickness and every disease.

REMIGIUS. Wherein is openly shewed that the multitude were troubled not with one single kind of affliction, but with many, and this was His pity for the multitude, to give His disciples power to heal and cleanse them.

JEROME. A kind and merciful Lord and Master does not envy His servants and disciples a share in His powers. As Himself had cured every sickness and disease, He imparted the same power to His Apostles. But there is a wide difference between having and imparting, between giving and receiving. Whatever He does He does with the power of a master, whatever they do it is with confession of their own weakness, as they speak, In the name of Jesus rise and walk. (Acts 3:6.) A catalogue of the names of the Apostles is given, that all false Apostles might be excluded. The names of the twelve Apostles are these; First, Simon who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother. To arrange them in order according to their merit is His alone who searches the secrets of all hearts. But Simon is placed first, having the surname of Peter given to distinguish him from the other Simon surnamed Chananæus, from the village of Chana in Galilee where the Lord turned the water into wine.

RABANUS. (e Beda.) The Greek or Latin ‘Petrus’ is the same as the Syriac Cephas, in both tongues the word is derived from a rock; undoubtedly that of which Paul speaks, And that rock was Christ. (1 Cor. 10:4.)

REMIGIUS. (ap. Raban.) There have been some who in this name Peter, which is Greek and Latin, have sought a Hebrew interpretation, and would have it to signify, ‘Taking off the shoe,’ ‘or unloosing,’ or ‘acknowledging.’ But those that say this are contradicted by two facts. First, that the Hebrew has no letter P, but uses PH instead. Thus Pilate they call Philate. Secondly, that one of the Evangelists has used the word as an interpretation of Cephas; The Lord said, Thou shalt be called Cephas, (John 1:42.) on which the Evangelist adds, which being interpreted is Petrus. Simon is interpreted ‘obedient,’ for he obeyed the words of Andrew, and with him came to Christ, or because he obeyed the divine commands, and at one word of bidding followed the Lord. Or as some will have it, it is to be interpreted, ‘Laying aside grief,’ and, ‘hearing painful things;’ for that on the Lord’s resurrection he laid aside the grief he had for His death; and he heard sorrowful things when the Lord said to him, Another shall gird thee, and shall carry thee whither thou wouldest not. (John 21:18.)

And Andrew his brother.

CHRYSOSTOM. This is no small honour (done to Peter), He places Peter from his merit, Andrew from the nobility he had in being the brother of Peter. Mark names Andrew next after the two heads, namely, Peter and John; but this one not so; for Mark has arranged them in order of dignity.

REMIGIUS. Andrew is interpreted ‘manly;’ for as in Latin ‘virilis’ is derived from ‘vir,’ so in Greek Andrew is derived from ἀνὴρ. Rightly is he called manly, who left all and followed Christ, and manfully persevered in His commands.

JEROME. The Evangelist couples the names throughout in pairs. So he puts together Peter and Andrew, brothers not so much according to the flesh as in spirit; James and John who left their father after the flesh to follow their true Father; James the son of Zebedee and John his brother. He calls him the son of Zebedee, to distinguish him from the other James the son of Alphæus.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe that he does not place them according to their dignity; for to me John would seem to be greater not than others only, but even than his brother.

REMIGIUS. (e Beda.) James is interpreted ‘The supplanter,’ or ‘that supplanteth;’ for he not only supplanted the vices of the flesh, but even contemned the same flesh when Herod put him to death. John is interpreted

‘The grace of God,’ because he deserved before all to be loved by the Lord; whence also in the favour of His especial love, he leaned at supper in the Lord’s bosom.

Philip and Bartholomew. (e Beda.) Philip is interpreted, ‘The mouth of a lamp,’ or ‘of lamps,’ because when he had been enlightened by the Lord, he straightway sought to communicate the light to his brother by the means of his mouth. Bartholomew is a Syriac, not a Hebrew, name, and is interpreted ‘The son of him that raiseth water[a],’ that is, of Christ, who raises the hearts of His preachers from earthly to heavenly things, and hangs them there, that the more they penetrate heavenly things, the more they should steep and inebriate the hearts of their hearers with the droppings of holy preaching.

Thomas, and Matthew the Publican.

JEROME. The other Evangelists in this pair of names put Matthew before Thomas; and do not add, the Publican, that they should not seem to throw scorn upon the Evangelist by bringing to mind his former life. But writing of himself he both puts Thomas first in the pair, and styles himself the Publican; because, where sin hath abounded, there grace shall much more abound. (Rom. 5:20.)

REMIGIUS. (e Beda.) Thomas is interpreted ‘an abyss,’ or ‘a twin,’ which in Greek is Didymus. Rightly is Didymus interpreted an abyss, for the longer he doubted the more deeply did he believe the effect of the Lord’s passion, and the mystery of His Divinity, which forced him to cry, My Lord and my God. (John 20:28.) Matthew is interpreted ‘given,’ because by the Lord’s bounty he was made an Evangelist of a Publican.

James the son of Alphæus, and Thaddæus.

RABANUS. (e Beda.) This James is he who in the Gospels, and also in the Epistle to the Galatians, is called the Lord’s brother. For Mary the wife of Alphæus was the sister of Mary the mother of the Lord; John the Evangelist calls her Mary the wife of Cleophas, probably because Cleophas and Alphæus were the same person. Or Mary herself on the death of Alphæus after the birth of James married Cleophas.

REMIGIUS. It is well said, the son of Alphæus, that is, ‘of the just,’ or ‘the learned;’ for he not only overthrew the vices of the flesh, but also despised all care of the same. And of what he was worthy the Apostles are witness, who ordained him Bishop of the Church of Jerusalem[b]. And ecclesiastical history (Hegesippus. ap. Euseb. ii. 23.) among other things tells of him, that he never ate flesh, drunk neither wine nor strong drink, abstained from the bath and linen garments, and night and day prayed on his bended knees. And so great was his merit, that he was called by all men, ‘The just.’ Thaddæus is the same whom Luke calls Jude of James, (that is, the brother of James,) whose Epistle is read in the Church, in which he calls himself the brother of James.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 30.) Some copies have Lebbæus; but whoever prevented the same man from having two, or even three different names?

REMIGIUS. Jude is interpreted ‘having confessed,’ because he confessed the Son of God.

RABANUS. Thaddæus or Lebbæus is interpreted ‘a little heart,’ that is, a heart-worshipper.

Simon Chananæus, and Judas Scarioth, who also betrayed him.

JEROME. Simon Chananæus is the same who in the other Evangelist is called Zelotes. Chana signifies ‘Zeal.’ Judas is named Scarioth, either from the town in which he was born, or from the tribe of Issachar, a prophetic omen of his sin; for Issachar means ‘a booty,’ thus signifying the reward of the betrayer.

REMIGIUS. Scarioth is interpreted ‘The memory of the Lord,’ because he followed the Lord; or ‘The memorial of death,’ because he plotted in his heart how he might betray the Lord to death; or ‘strangling,’ because he went and hanged himself. It should be known that there are two disciples of this name, who are types of all Christians; Jude the brother of James, of such as persevere in the confession of the faith; Jude Scarioth of such as leave the faith; and turn back again.

GLOSS. (non occ.) They are named two and two to express their union as yoke-fellows.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xviii. 49.) These therefore He chose for His disciples, whom also He named Apostles, humbly born without honour, without learning, that whatever they should do that was great, it was He that should be in them and should do it. He had among them one that was evil, whom He should use in the accomplishment of His Passion, and who should be an example to His Church of suffering evil men.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 6.) He was not chosen among the Apostles unwittingly; for that truth is great, which cannot be harmed even by having an adversary in one of its own ministers.

RABANUS. Also He willed to be betrayed by a disciple, that you when betrayed by your intimate might bear patiently that your judgment has erred, that your favours have been thrown away.

10:5–8

5. These twelve Jesus sent forth, and commanded them, saying, Go not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not:

6. But go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.

7. And as ye go, preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand.

8. Heal the sick, cleanse the lepers, raise the dead, cast out devils: freely ye have received, freely give.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Because the manifestation of the Spirit, as the Apostle speaks, is given for the profit of the Church, after bestowing His power on the Apostles, He sends them that they may exercise this power for the good of others; These twelve Jesus sent forth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe the propriety of the time in which they are sent. After they had seen the dead raised, the sea rebuked, and other like wonders, and had had both in word and deed sufficient proof of His excellent power, then He sends them.

GLOSS. (non occ.) When He sends them, He teaches them whither they should go, what they should preach, and what they should do. And first, whither they should go; Giving them commandment, and saying, Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles, and into any city of the Samaritans enter ye not; hut go ye rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.

JEROME. This passage does not contradict the command which He gave afterwards, Go and teach all nations; for this was before His resurrection, that was after. And it behoved the coming of Christ to be preached to the Jews first, that they might not have any just plea, or say that they were rejected of the Lord, who sent the Apostles to the Gentiles and Samaritans.

CHRYSOSTOM. Also they were sent to the Jews first, in order that being trained in Judæa, as in a palæstra, they might enter on the arena of the world to contend; thus He taught them like weak nestlings to fly.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. iv. 1.) Or He would be first preached to Judæa and afterwards to the Gentiles, in order that the preaching of the Redeemer should seem to seek out foreign lands only because it had been rejected in His own. There were also at that time some among the Jews who should be called, and among the Gentiles some who were not to be called, as being unworthy of being renewed to life, and yet not deserving of the aggravated punishment which would ensue upon their rejection of the Apostles' preaching.

HILARY. The promulgation of the Law deserved also the first preaching of the Gospel; and Israel was to have less excuse for its crime, as it had experienced more care in being warned.

CHRYSOSTOM. Also that they should not suppose that they were hated of Christ because they had reviled Him, and branded Him as demoniac, He sought first their cure, and withholding His disciples from all other nations, He sent this people physicians and teachers; and not only forbid them to preach to any others before the Jews, but would not that they should so much as approach the way that led to the Gentiles; Go not into the way of the Gentiles. And because the Samaritans, though more readily disposed to be converted to the faith, were yet at enmity with the Jews, He would not suffer the Samaritans to be preached to before the Jews.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The Samaritans were Gentiles who had been settled in the land of Israel by the king of Assyria after the captivity which he made. They had been driven by many terrors to turn to Judaism, and had received circumcision and the five books of Moses, but renouncing every thing else; hence there was no communication between the Jews and the Samaritans.

CHRYSOSTOM. From these then He diverts his disciples, and sends them to the children of Israel, whom He calls perishing sheep, not straying; in every way contriving an apology for them, and drawing them to Himself.

HILARY. Though they are here called sheep, yet they raged against Christ with the tongues and throats of wolves and vipers.

JEROME. Figuratively; Herein we who bear the name of Christ are commanded not to walk in the way of the Gentiles, or the error of the heretics, but as we are separate in religion, that we be also separate in our life.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having told them to whom they should go, He now introduces what they should preach; Go and preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand.

RABANUS. The kingdom of heaven is here said to draw nigh by the faith in the unseen Creator which is bestowed upon us, not by any movement of the visible elements. The saints are rightly denoted by the heavens, because they contain God by faith, and love Him with affection.

CHRYSOSTOM. Behold the greatness of their ministry, behold the dignity of the Apostles. They are not to preach of any thing that can be an object of sense, as Moses and the Prophets did; but things new and unlooked for; those preached earthly goods, but these the kingdom of heaven and all the goods that are there.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Miracles also were granted to the holy preachers, that the power they should shew might be a pledge of the truth of their words, and they who preached new things should also do new things; wherefore it follows, Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out dæmons.

JEROME. Lest peasants untaught and illiterate, without the graces of speech, should obtain credit with none when they announced the kingdom of heaven, He gives them power to do the things above mentioned, that the greatness of the miracles might approve the greatness of their promises.

HILARY. The exercise of the Lord’s power is wholly entrusted to the Apostles, that they who were formed in the image of Adam, and the likeness of God, should now obtain the perfect image of Christ; and whatever evil Satan had introduced into the body of Adam, this they should now repair by communion with the Lord’s power.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxix. 4.) These signs were necessary in the beginning of the Church; the faith of the believers must be fed with miracles, that it might grow.

CHRYSOSTOM. But afterwards they ceased when a reverence for the faith was universally established. Or, if they were continued at all, they were few and seldom; for it is usual with God to do such things when evil is increased, then He shews forth His power.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The Holy Church daily doth spiritually, what it then did materially by the Apostles; yea, things far greater, inasmuch as she raises and cures souls and not bodies.

REMIGIUS. The sick are the slothful who have not strength to live well; the lepers are the unclean in sin and carnal delights; the dæmoniacs are they that are given up under the power of the Devil.

JEROME. And because spiritual gifts are more lightly esteemed when money is made the means of obtaining them, He adds a condemnation of avarice; Freely ye have received, freely give; I your Master and Lord have imparted these to you without price, do you therefore give them to others in like manner, that the free grace of the Gospel be not corrupted.

GLOSS. (non occ.) This He says, that Judas who had the bag might not use the above power for getting money; a plain condemnation of the abomination of the simoniacal heresy.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. iv. 4.) For He knew before that there would be some that would turn the gift of the Spirit which they had received into merchandize, and pervert the power of miracles into an instrument of their covetousness.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how He is as careful that they should be upright in moral virtue, as that they should have the miraculous powers, shewing that miracles without these are nought. Freely ye have received, seems a check upon their pride; freely give, a command to keep themselves pure from filthy lucre. Or, that what they should do might not be thought to be their own benevolence, He says, Freely ye have received; as much as to say; Ye bestow nothing of your own on those ye relieve; for ye have not received these things for money, nor for wages of labour; as ye have received them, so give to others; for indeed it is not possible to receive a price equal to their value.

10:9–10

9. Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor brass in your purses,

10. Nor scrip for your journey, neither two coats, neither shoes, nor yet staves: for the workman is worthy of his meat.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord having forbidden to make merchandize of spiritual things, proceeds to pull up the root of all evil, saying, Possess neither gold, nor silver.

JEROME. For if they preach without receiving reward for it, the possession of gold and silver and wealth was unnecessary. For had they had such, they would have been thought to be preaching, not for the sake of men’s salvation, but their own gain.

CHRYSOSTOM. This precept then first frees the Apostles from all suspicions; secondly, from all care, so that they may give up their whole time to preaching the word; thirdly, teaches them their excellence. This is what He said to them afterwards, Was any thing lacking to you, when I sent you without bag or scrip?

JEROME. As He had cut off riches, which are meant by gold and silver, He now almost cuts off necessaries of life; that the Apostles, teachers of the true religion, who taught men that all things are directed by God's providence, might shew themselves to be without thought for the morrow.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Whence He adds, Neither money in your purses. For there are two kinds of things necessary; one is the means of buying necessaries, which is signified by the money in their purses; the other the necessaries themselves, which are signified by the scrip.

JEROME. In forbidding the scrip, neither scrip for your journey,He aimed at those philosophers commonly called Bactroperatæ (vid. Cotel. not. in Herm. Past. ii. 1.), who being despisers of this world, and esteeming all things as nothing, yet carry a bag about with them. Nor two coats. By the two coats He seems to mean a change of raiment; not to bid us be content with a single tunic in the snow and frosts of Scythia, but that they should not carry about a change with them, wearing one, and carrying about the other as provision for the future. Nor shoes. It is a precept of Plato, that the two extremities of the body should be left unprotected, and that we should not accustom ourselves to tender care of the head and feet; for if these parts be hardy, it will follow that the rest of the body will be vigorous and healthy. Nor staff; for having the protection of the Lord, why need we seek the aid of a staff?

REMIGIUS. The Lord shews by these words that the holy preachers were reinstated in the dignity of the first man, who as long as he possessed the heavenly treasures, did not desire other; but having lost those by sinning, he straightway began to desire the other.

CHRYSOSTOM. A happy exchange! In place of gold and silver, and the like, they received power to heal the sick, to raise the dead. For He had not commanded them from the beginning, Possess neither gold nor silver; but only then when He said at the same time, Cleanse the lepers, cast out dæmons. Whence it is clear that He made them Angels more than men, freeing them from all anxiety of this life, that they might have but one care, that of teaching; and even of that He in a manner takes away the burden, saying, Be not careful what ye shall speak. Thus what seemed hard and burdensome, He shews them to be light and easy. For nothing is so pleasant as to be delivered from all care and anxiety, more especially when it is possible, being delivered from this, to lack nothing, God being present, and being to us instead of all things.

JEROME. As He had sent the Apostles forth unprovided and unencumbered on their mission, and the condition of the teachers seemed a hard one, He tempered the severity of the rules by this maxim, The labourer is worthy of his hire, i. e. Receive what you need for your food and clothing. Whence the Apostle says, Having food and raiment, let us therewith be content. (1 Tim. 6:8. Gal. 6:6.) And again, Let him that is catechized communicate unto him that catechizeth in all good things; that they whose disciples reap spiritual things, should make them partakers of their carnal things, not for the gratification of covetousness, but for the supply of wants.

CHRYSOSTOM. It behoved the Apostles to be supported by their disciples, that neither they should be haughty towards those whom they taught, as though they gave all, and received nothing; and that the others, on their part, should not fall away, as overlooked by them. Also that the Apostles might not cry, He bids us lead the life of beggars, and should be ashamed thereat, He shews that this is their due, calling them labourers, and that which is given their hire. For they were not to suppose that because what they gave was only words, therefore they were to esteem it but a small benefit that they conferred; therefore He says, The labourer is worthy of his meat. This He said not to signify that the labours of the Apostles were only worth so much, but laying down a rule for the Apostles, and persuading those that gave, that what they gave was only what was due.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 46.) The Gospel therefore is not for sale, that it should be preached for reward. For if they so sell it, they sell a great thing for a small price. Let preachers then receive their necessary support from the people, and from God the reward of their employment. For the people do not give pay to those that minister to them in the love of the Gospel, but as it were a stipend that may support them to enable them to work.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 30.) Otherwise; When the Lord said to the Apostles, Possess not gold, He added immediately, The labourer is worthy of his hire, to shew why He would not have them possess and carry about these things; not that these things were not needed for the support of this life, but that He sent them in such a way as to shew that these things were due to them from those to whom they preached the Gospel, as pay to soldiers. It is clear that this precept of the Lord does not at all imply that they ought not according to the Gospel to live by any other means, than by the contributions of those to whom they preached; otherwise Paul transgressed this precept when he lived by the labour of his own hands. But He gave the Apostles authority that these things were due to them from the house in which they abode. But when the Lord has issued a command, if it be not performed, it is the sin of disobedience; when He bestows a privilege, it is in any one's power not to use it, and as it were to refrain from claiming his right. The Lord then having sanctioned this maxim, that they who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel, He spoke these things to the Apostles, that being confident they should not possess nor carry about with them the necessaries of life, neither things great nor things small. Therefore He adds, Nor a staff, to shew that from His people all things are due to His ministers, and they require no superfluities. This authority He signifies by the staff, saying in Mark, Take nothing but a staff only. (Mark 6:18.) And when He forbids them (in Matthew) to take with them shoes, He forbids that carefulness and thought which would be anxious to carry them lest they should be wanting. Thus also we must understand concerning the two coats, that none should think it necessary to carry another besides that which he wore, supposing that he should have need of it; for it would be in his power to obtain one by this authority which the Lord gave. Further that we read in Mark that they should be shod with sandals, seems to imply that this kind of shoe has a mystic meaning in it, that the foot should neither be covered above, nor yet bare beneath, that is, that the Gospel should not be hid, nor yet rest itself on earthly advantage. Also when He forbids them to carry two coats, He warned them not to walk deceitfully, but in simplicity. So we cannot doubt that all these things were said by the Lord, partly in a direct, partly in a figurative sense; and that of the two Evangelists one inserted some things, the other other things, in his narrative. If any one should think that the Lord could not in one speech speak some things in a direct, and some things in a mystic sense, let him look at any other of His sayings, and he will see how hasty and unlearned his opinion is. When the

Lord commands that the left hand should not know what the right hand doeth, does he think that almsgiving, and the rest of His precepts in that place are to be taken figuratively?

JEROME. Thus far we have expounded by the letter; but metaphorically, as we often find gold put for the sense, silver for the words, brass for the voice—all these we may say we are not to receive from others, but to have them given by the Lord. We are not to take up the teaching of heretics, of philosophers, and of corrupt doctrine.

HILARY. The girdle is the making ready for the ministry, the girding up that we may be active in duty; we may suppose that the forbidding money in the girdle is to warn us from suffering any thing in the ministry to be bought and sold. We are not to have a scrip by the way, that is, we are to leave all care of our worldly substance; for all treasure on earth is hurtful to the heart, which will be there where the treasure is. Not two coats, for it is enough to have once put on Christ, nor after true knowledge of Him ought we to be clothed with any other garment of heresy or law. Not shoes, because standing on holy ground as was said to Moses not covered with the thorns and prickles of sin, we are admonished to have no other preparation of our walk than that we have received from Christ.

JEROME. Or; The Lord herein teaches us that our feet are not to be bound with the chains of death, but to be bare as we tread on the holy ground. We are not to carry a staff which may be turned into a serpent, nor to trust in any arm of flesh; for all such is a reed on which if a man lean ever so lightly, it will break and go into his hand and pierce him.

HILARY. Neither a staff; that is, We are not to seek rights of extraneous power, having a rod from the root of Jesse.

10:11–15

11. And into whatsoever city or town ye shall enter, enquire who in it is worthy; and there abide till ye go thence.

12. And when ye come into an house, salute it.

13. And if the house be worthy, let your peace come upon it: but if it be not worthy, let your peace return to you.

14. And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet.

15. Verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had said above, The workman is worthy of his meat; that they should not hence suppose that He would open all doors to them, He here commands them to use much circumspection in the choice of a host, saying, Into what city or town ye enter, enquire who in it is worthy.

JEROME. The Apostles, on entering a strange town, could not know of each inhabitant what sort of man he was; they were to choose their host therefore by the report of the people, and opinion of the neighbours, that the worthiness of the preacher might not be disgraced by the ill character of his entertainer.

CHRYSOSTOM. How then did Christ Himself abide with the publican? Because he was made worthy by his conversion; for this command that he should be worthy, had respect not to their rank, but to their furnishing food. For if he be worthy he will provide them with food, especially when they need no more than bare necessaries. Observe how though He stripped them of all property, He supplied all their wants, suffering them to abide in the houses of those whom they taught. For so they were both themselves set free from care, and convinced men that it was for their salvation only that they had come, seeing they carried nothing about with them, and desired nothing beyond necessaries. And they did not lodge at all places indiscriminately, for He would not have them known only by their miracles, but much more by their virtues. But nothing is a greater mark of virtue, than to discard superfluities.

JEROME. One host is chosen who does not so much confer a favour upon him who is to abide with him, as receive one. For it is said, Who in it is worthy, that he may know that he rather receives than does a favour.

CHRYSOSTOM. Also observe that He has not yet endowed them with all gifts; for He has not given them power to discern who is worthy, but bids them seek out; and not only to find out who is worthy, but also not to pass from house to house, saying, And there remain until ye depart out of that city; so they would neither make their entertainer sorrowful, nor themselves incur suspicion of lightness or gluttony.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 9:5.) The Apostles are not to choose carelessly the house into which they enter, that they may have no cause for changing their lodging; the same caution is not enforced upon the entertainer, lest in choosing his guests, his hospitality should be diminished. When ye enter a house, salute it, saying, Peace be to this house.

GLOSS. (interlin.) As much as to say, Pray ye for peace upon the master of the house, that all resistance to the truth may be pacified.

JEROME. Here is a latent allusion to the form of salutation in Hebrew and Syriac; they say Salemalach or Salamalach, for the Greek χαῖρε, or Latin Ave; that is, 'Peace be with you.' The command then is, that on entering any house they should pray for peace for their host; and, as far as they may be able, to still all discords, so that if any quarrel should arise, they, who had prayed for peace should have it—others should have the discord; as it follows, And if that house be worthy, your peace shall rest upon it; but if it be not worthy, your peace shall return to you again.

REMIGIUS. (ap. Raban.) Thus either the hearer, being predestined to eternal life, will follow the heavenly word when he hears it; or if there be none who will hear it, the preacher himself shall not be without fruit; for his peace returns to him when he receives of the Lord recompense for all his labour.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord instructs them, that though they were teachers, yet they should not look to be first saluted by others; but that they should honour others by first saluting them. And then He shews them that they should give not a salutation only, but a benediction, when He says, If that house be worthy, your peace shall rest upon it.

REMIGIUS. The Lord therefore taught his disciples to offer peace on their entering into a house, that by means of their salutation their choice might be directed to a worthy house and host. As though He had said, Offer peace to all, they will shew themselves either worthy by accepting, or unworthy by not accepting it; for though you have chosen a host that is worthy by the character he bears among his neighbours, yet ought you to salute him, that the preacher may seem rather to enter by invitation, than to intrude himself. This salutation of peace in few words may indeed be referred to the trial of the worthiness of the house or master.

HILARY. The Apostles salute the house with the prayer of peace; yet so as that peace seems rather spoken than given. For their own peace which was the bowels of their pity ought not to rest upon the house if it were not worthy; then the sacrament of heavenly peace could be kept within the

Apostles own bosom. Upon such as rejected the precepts of the heavenly kingdom an eternal curse is left by the departure of the Apostles, and the dust shaken from their feet; And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye go out of that house, or that town, cast the dust off your feet. For he that lives in any place seems to have a kind of fellowship with that place. By the casting the dust off the feet therefore all that belonged to that house is left behind, and nothing of healing or soundness is borrowed from the footsteps of the Apostles having trod their soil.

JEROME. Also they shake off the dust as a testimony of the Apostles' toil, that in preaching the Gospel they had come even so far, or as a token that from those that rejected the Gospel they would accept nothing, not even the necessaries of life.

RABANUS. Otherwise; The feet of the disciples signify the labour and progress of preaching. The dust which covers them is the lightness of earthly thoughts, from which even the greatest doctors cannot be free; their anxiety for their hearers involves them in cares for their prosperity, and in passing through the ways of this world, they gather the dust of the earth they tread upon. They then who have despised the teaching of these doctors, turn upon themselves all the toils and dangers and anxieties of the Apostles as a witness to their damnation. And lest it should seem a slight thing not to receive the Apostles, He adds, Verily I say unto you, it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment, than for that city.

JEROME. Because to the men of Sodom and Gomorrah no man had ever preached; but this city had been preached to and had rejected the Gospel.

REMIGIUS. (ap. Raban.) Or because the men of Sodom and Gomorrah were hospitable among their sensuality, but they had never entertained such strangers as the Apostles.

JEROME. But if it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom than for that city, hence we may learn that there is difference of degree in the punishment of sinners.

REMIGIUS. Sodom and Gomorrah are especially mentioned, to shew that those sins which are against nature are particularly hateful to God, for which the world was drowned with the waters of the deluge, four towns were overthrown, and the world is daily afflicted with manifold evils.

HILARY. Figuratively, The Lord teaches us not to enter the houses or to mix in the acquaintance of those who persecute Christ, or who are ignorant of Him; and in each town to enquire who among them is worthy, i. e. where there is a Church wherein Christ dwells; and not to pass to another, because this house is worthy, this host is our right host. But there would be many of the Jews who would be so well disposed to the Law, that though they believed in Christ because they admired His works, yet they would abide in the works of the Law; and others again who, desiring to make trial of that liberty which is in Christ, would feign themselves ready to forsake the Law for the Gospel; many also would be drawn aside into heresy by perverse understanding. And since all these would falsely maintain that with them only was Catholic verity, therefore we must with great caution seek out the house, i. e. the Church.

10:16–18

16. Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves.

17. But beware of men: for they will deliver you up to the councils, and they will scourge you in their synagogues;

18. And ye shall be brought before governors and kings for my sake, for a testimony against them and the Gentiles.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii.) Having removed all care and anxiety from the Apostles, and armed them with the miraculous powers, He proceeds to foretell the evils which should befal them. First, that they might know his knowledge of the future; secondly, that they should not think that these things befel them because of the want of power in their Master; thirdly, that they might not be amazed if these things had come upon them unexpectedly; fourthly, that after hearing these things, they might not be dismayed in the season of His cross; and lastly, that they might learn a new method of warfare. He sends them unprovided, bidding them look to those who should receive them for support; but rests not in that, but shews his power still further, Lo, I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves. Where observe that He does not say merely ‘to wolves,’ but in the midst of wolves, to shew His excellent might therein, that the sheep would overcome the wolves though they were in the midst of them; and though they received many bites from them, yet were they not destroyed, but rather convert them. And it is a much greater and a more wonderful power that can change their hearts than that can kill them. Among wolves He teaches them to shew the meekness of sheep.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xvii. 4.) For he who undertakes the office of preacher ought not to do evil, but to suffer it, and by his meekness to mollify the wrath of the angry, and by his wounds to heal the wounds of sinners in their affliction. And even should the zeal of right-doing ever require that He should be severe to those that are placed under Him, His very severity will be of love and not of cruelty, outwardly maintaining the rights of discipline, and inwardly loving those whom He corrects. Too many, when they are entrusted with the reins of government, burn to make the subjects feel them, display the terrors of authority, and forgetting that they are fathers, rather desire to be thought lords, changing a station of lowliness into that of lofty dominion, if they ever seem outwardly to fawn on any one, they inwardly hate him; of such He spoke above; They come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. (Mat. 7:15.) For prevention whereof we ought to consider that we are sent as sheep among wolves, whose innocence we ought to preserve, not having the tooth of malice.

JEROME. He calls the Scribes and Pharisees who are the clergy of the Jews, wolves.

HILARY. The wolves indeed are all such as should pursue the Apostles with mad fury.

CHRYSOSTOM. Their consolation under their hardships was the excellent power of Him who sent them; wherefore He puts that before all, Lo, I send you. Be not dismayed, though you be sent into the midst of wolves; for I am able to bring it to pass that you suffer no hurt, and that ye should not only prevail over the wolves, but be made more terrible than lions. But it is good that it should be thus; hereby your virtue is made brighter, and My power is more manifested. Also that somewhat should proceed from themselves, that they should not think themselves to be crowned without reason, He adds, Be ye therefore wise as serpents, simple as doves.

JEROME. Wise, that they might escape snares; simple, that they might not do evil to others. The craft of the serpent is set before them as an example, for he hides his head with all the rest of his body, that he may protect the part in which life is. So ought we to expose our whole body, that we may guard our head which is Christ; that is, that we study to keep the faith whole and uncorrupt.

RABANUS. The serpent moreover seeks out narrow chinks through which it crawls to draw off its old skin; so the preacher passing through the narrow way lays aside the old man.

REMIGIUS. Beautifully the Lord bids the preacher have the wisdom of the serpent; because the first man was beguiled by a serpent; as though He had said, The foe is subtle to deceive, be ye therefore wise to rescue; he commended the tree, do ye also commend the tree of the Cross.

HILARY. He first attempted the softer sex, allured her by hope, and promised a share of immortality. Do you in like manner seize every opportunity, look well into each man's nature and inclination, use wisdom of speech, reveal hope of good things to come; that what he promised falsely we may preach truly according to God's promise, that they that believe shall be like to the Angels.

CHRYSOSTOM. But as we ought to have the wisdom of the serpent, that we should not be hurt in any deadly part, so also we should have the simplicity of the dove, not to retaliate when we are hurt, nor to avenge ourselves on those who have designed aught against us.

REMIGIUS. The Lord unites these two things; because simplicity without wisdom might be easily deceived, and wisdom is dangerous unless it be tempered with simplicity that does no man hurt.

JEROME. The harmlessness of doves is shewn by the assumption of that form by the Holy Spirit; as the Apostle speaks, In malice be ye children.

CHRYSOSTOM. What is harder than these commands? It is not enough that we suffer ill, but we must not be angry thereat, as is the dove's nature, for anger is extinguished not by anger, but by meekness.

RABANUS. That by the wolves above He intended men, He shews when He adds, Take heed of men.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Ye have indeed need to be wise as serpents, for, as they are wont to do, they will deliver you to councils, forbidding you to preach in My name; then if ye be not corrected, they will scourge you, and at length ye shall be brought before kings and governors.

HILARY. Who will endeavour to extort from you either to be silent or to temporize.

CHRYSOSTOM. How wonderful that men who had never been beyond the lake in which they fished, did not straightway depart from Him on hearing these things. It was not only of their goodness, but of the wisdom of their Teacher. For to each evil He attaches somewhat of alleviation; as here He adds, for my sake; for it is no light consolation to suffer for Christ’s sake, for they did not suffer as evil or wrong doers. Again He adds, for a testimony against them.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxv. 2.) Either that they had persecuted to the death, or that they had seen and were not changed. For the death of the saints is to the good an aid, to the bad a testimony; that thus the wicked may perish without excuse in that from which the elect take example and live.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was matter of consolation to them, not that they sought the punishment of others, but that they were confident that in all things they had One present with them, and all-knowing.

HILARY. And by this their testimony not only was all excuse of ignorance of His divinity taken away from their persecutors, but also to the Gentiles was opened the way of believing on Christ, who was thus devotedly preached by the voices of the confessors among the flames of persecution; and this is that He adds, and the Gentiles.

10:19–20

19. But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak.

20. For it is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you.

CHRYSOSTOM. To the foregoing topics of consolation, He adds another not a little one; that they should not say, How shall we be able to persuade such men as these, when they shall persecute us? He bids them be of good courage respecting their answer, saying, When they shall deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak.

REMIGIUS. How or what, one refers to the substance, the other to the expression in words. And because both of these would be supplied by Him, there was no need for the holy preachers to be anxious about either.

JEROME. When then we are brought before judges for Christ's sake, we ought to offer only our will for Christ. But Christ who dwelleth in us speaks for Himself, and the grace of the Holy Spirit will minister in our answer.

HILARY. For our faith, observing all the precepts of the Divine will, will be instructed with an answer according to knowledge, after the example of Abraham, to whom when he had given up Isaac, there was not wanting a ram for a victim. For it is not ye who speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you.

REMIGIUS. (ap. Raban.) Meaning, Ye indeed go out to the battle, but it is I who fight; you utter the words, but it is I who speak. Hence Paul speaks, Seek ye a proof of Christ who speaketh in me? (2 Cor. 13:3.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Thus He raises them to the dignity of the Prophets, who have spoken by the Spirit of God. He who says here, Take no thought what ye shall speak, (1 Pet. 3:15.) has said in another place, Be ye always ready to give an answer to him that demandeth a reason of the hope that is in you. When it is a dispute among friends, we are commanded to be ready; but before the awful judgment, and the raging people, aid is ministered by Christ, that they may speak boldly and not be dismayed.

10:21–22

21. And the brother shall deliver up the brother to death, and the father the child; and the children shall rise up against their parents, and cause them to be put to death.

22. And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake: but he that endureth to the end shall be saved.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Having placed the comfort first, He adds the more alarming perils; Brother shall deliver up brother to death, and the father the son; children shall rise against parents, to put them to death.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxv. 3.) Wrongs which we suffer from strangers, pain us less than those we suffer from men on whose affections we had counted; for besides the bodily affliction, there is then the pain of lost affection.

JEROME. This we see often happen in persecutions, nor is there any true affection between those whose faith is different.

CHRYSOSTOM. What follows is yet more dreadful, Ye shall be hated of all men; they sought to exterminate them as common enemies of all the world. To this again is added the consolation, For my name’s sake; and yet further to cheer them, Whosoever shall endure to the end, he shall be saved. For many are hot and zealous in the beginning, but afterwards grow cool, for these, He says, I look at the end. For where is the profit of seeds that only sprout at first? wherefore He requires a sufficient endurance from them.

JEROME. For virtue is not to begin but to complete.

REMIGIUS. And the reward is not for those that begin, but for those that bring to an end.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that no man should say, that Christ wrought all things in His Apostles, and therefore it is nothing wonderful that they were made such as they were, since they did not bear the burden of these things, therefore He says, that perseverance was their work. For though they were rescued from their first perils; they are preserved for still harder trials, which again shall be followed by others, and they shall be in danger of snares as long as they live. This He covertly intimates when he says, Whosoever shall endure to the end, he shall be saved.

REMIGIUS. That is, He who shall not let go the commands of the faith, nor fall away in persecution, shall be saved; he shall receive the reward of the heavenly kingdom for his earthly persecutions. And note that ‘the end’ does not always mean destruction, but sometimes perfection, as in that, Christ is the end of the Law. (Rom. 10:4.) So the sense here may be, Whosoever shall endure to the end, that is, in Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xxi. 25.) To endure in Christ, is to abide in His faith which worketh by love.

10:23

23. But when they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another: for verily I say unto you, Ye shall not have gone over the cities of Israel, till the Son of man be come.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv.) Having foretold the fearful things which should come upon them after His Cross, resurrection, and ascension, He leads them to gentler prospects; He does not bid them presumptuously to offer themselves for persecution, but to fly from it; When they persecute you in this city, flee ye to another. For because this was the first beginning of their conversion, He adapts His words to their state.

JEROME. This must be referred to the time when the Apostles were sent to preach, when it was said to them, Go not into the way of the Gentiles; they should not fear, but may shun persecution. This we see the believers did in the beginning, when on a persecution arising in Jerusalem they were scattered throughout all Judea, and thus the season of tribulation was made the seedtime of the Gospel.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xxii. 36.) Not that the Saviour was unable to protect His disciples, does He here bid them fly, and Himself give them an example of it, but He instructed man’s weakness, that he should not presume to tempt God, when he has any thing that he can do for himself, but should shun all evils.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, i. 22.) He might have suffered them to lay violent hands upon themselves, that they might not fall into the hands of their persecutors. Therefore if He neither commanded nor allowed this mode of departure from this world to His own, for whom He Himself had promised that He would prepare an eternal mansion; whatever instances may be brought by the Gentiles who know not God, it is clear that this is not lawful for those who believe one true God.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that they should not say, What then if we fly from persecution, and again they cast us out thence whither we have fled? To remove this fear, He says, Verily I say unto you, ye shall not have completed, &c. that is, ye shall not have made the circuit of Palestine and return to Me, before I shall take you to Me.

RABANUS. Or; He foretels that they shall not have brought all the cities of Israel to the faith by their preaching, before the Lord’s resurrection be accomplished, and a commission given them to preach the Gospel throughout the world.

HILARY. Otherwise; He exhorts to fly from place to place; for His preaching driven from Judæa, first passed into Greece; then, wearied with divers sufferings of the Apostles up and down the cities of Greece, it takes an abiding refuge in the rest of the Gentile world. But to shew that the Gentiles would believe the preaching of the Apostles, but that the remnant of Israel should only believe at His second coming, He adds, Ye shall not have completed the cities of Israel; i. e. After the fulness of the Gentiles is brought in, that which remains of Israel to fill up the number of the Saints shall be called into the Church in Christ’s future coming to glory.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 228.) Let the servants of Christ then do as He commanded, or permitted them; as He fled into Egypt, let them fly from city to city, whenever any one of them is marked out for persecution; that the Church be not deserted, it will be filled by those who are not so sought after; and let these give sustenance to their fellow-servants whom they know cannot live by any other means. But when the threatening danger is common to all, Bishops, clergy, and laity, let not those who have need of aid be deserted by those whose aid they require. Either therefore let them all pass to some stronghold, or let those who are obliged to remain, not be deserted by those whose province it is to supply their ecclesiastical needs; that they may either all live, or all suffer whatever their Master will have them to suffer.

REMIGIUS. Be it known moreover, that as this precept respecting endurance under persecution specially belongs to the Apostles and their successors, men of fortitude, so the permission to fly is sufficiently proper for the weak in the faith, to whom the tender Master condescends, lest if they should offer themselves for martyrdom, under the pain they should deny the faith; and the sin of flight is lighter than that of denial. But though by their flight they shewed that they had not the constancy of perfect faith, yet their desert was great, seeing they were ready to leave all for Christ. So that if He had not given them permission to fly, some would have said that they were aliens from the glory of the heavenly kingdom.

JEROME. Spiritually we may say; When they shall persecute you in one book or one passage of Scripture, let us flee to other volumes, for however contentious the adversary may be, protection will come from the Saviour before the victory is yielded to the enemy.

10:24–25

24. The disciple is not above his master, nor the servant above his lord.

25. It is enough for the disciple that he be as his master, and the servant as his lord. If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more shall they call them of his household?

CHRYSOSTOM. Because it should come to pass that His disciples among their other persecutions should suffer loss of character, which to many is the most grievous of all calamities, He consoles them from His own example, and those things that were spoken of Him; a comfort to which no other can be compared.

HILARY. For the Lord, the Light eternal, the Captain of the faithful, the Parent of immortality, set before His disciples this solace of the sufferings that should come upon them, that we should embrace it as our glory when we are made like to our Lord in suffering; whence He says, The disciple is not above his master, nor the slave above his lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. Understand, so long as he is a disciple or servant, he is not above his master or lord by the nature of honour. And do not here object to me such cases as rarely happen, but receive this according to the common course of things.

REMIGIUS. He calls Himself master and lord; by disciple and servant He denotes His Apostles.

GLOSS. (ord.) As much as to say, Be not indignant that ye suffer things, which I also suffer, because I am your lord, who do what I will, and your master, who teach you what I know to be profitable for you.

REMIGIUS. And because this sentence seemed not to agree with the foregoing words, He shews what they mean by adding, If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household?

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not here ‘slaves,’ but those of his household, to shew how dear they were to Him; as elsewhere He said, I will not call you slaves, but my friends. (John 15:15.)

REMIGIUS. As much as to say, Ye therefore will not seek worldly honours and human glory, while you see me pursuing the redemption of mankind through mocking and contumely.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He says not only, If they have reviled the master of the house, but expresses the very words of railing, for they had called Him Beelzebub.

JEROME. Beelzebub is the idol of Accaron who is called in the book of Kings, the God of flies; ‘Bel,’ signifying idol; (2 Kings 1:3.) ‘zebub,’ a fly. The Prince of the dæmons He calls by the name of the foulest of idols, which is so called because of the uncleanness of the fly, which destroys the sweetness of ointment.

26. Fear them not therefore: for there is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed; and hid, that shall not be known.

27. What I tell you in darkness, that speak ye in light: and what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops.

28. And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.

REMIGIUS. To the foregoing consolation He adds another no less, saying, Fear ye not them, namely, the persecutors. And why they were not to fear, He adds, For there is nothing hid which shall not be revealed, nothing secret which shall not be known.

JEROME. How is it then that in the present world, the sins of so many are unknown? It is of the time to come that this is said; the time when God shall judge the hidden things of men, shall enlighten the hidden places of darkness, and shall make manifest the secrets of hearts. The sense is, Fear not the cruelty of the persecutor, or the rage of the blasphemer, for there shall come a day of judgment in which your virtue and their wickedness will be made known.

HILARY. Therefore neither threatening, nor evil speaking, nor power of their enemies should move them, seeing the judgment-day will disclose how empty, how nought all these were.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; It might seem that what is here said should be applied generally; but it is by no means intended as a general maxim, but is spoken solely with reference to what had gone before with this meaning; If you are grieved when men revile you, think that in a little time you will be delivered from this evil. They call you indeed impostors, sorcerers, seducers, but have a little patience, and all men shall call you the saviours of the world, when in the course of things you shall be found to have been their benefactors, for men will not judge by their words but by the truth of things.

REMIGIUS. Some indeed think that these words convey a promise from our Lord to His disciples, that through them all hidden mysteries should be revealed, which lay beneath the veil of the letter of the Law; whence the Apostle speaks, When they have turned to Christ, then the veil shall be taken away. (2 Cor 3:16.) So the sense would be, Ought you to fear your persecutors, when you are thought worthy that by you the hidden mysteries of the Law and the Prophets should be made manifest?

CHRYSOSTOM. Then having delivered them from all fear, and set them above all calumny, He follows this up appropriately with commanding that their preaching should be free and unreserved; What I say to you in darkness, that speak ye in the light; what ye hear in the ear, that preach ye upon the housetops.

JEROME. We do not read that the Lord was wont to discourse to them by night, or to deliver his doctrine in the dark; but He said this because all His discourse is dark to the carnal, and His word night to the unbelieving. What had been spoken by Him they were to deliver again with the confidence of faith and confession.

REMIGIUS. The meaning therefore is, What I say to you in darkness, that is, among the unbelieving Jews, that speak ye in the light, that is, preach it to the believing; what ye hear in the ear, that is, what I say unto you secretly, that preach ye upon the housetops, that is, openly before all men. It is a common phrase, To speak in one's ear, that is, to speak to him privately.

RABANUS. And what He says, Preach ye upon the housetops, is spoken after the manner of the province of Palestine, where they use to sit upon the roofs of the houses, which are not pointed but flat. That then may be said to be preached upon the housetops which is spoken in the hearing of all men.

GLOSS. (ord.) Otherwise; What I say unto you while you are yet held under carnal fear, that speak ye in the confidence of truth, after ye shall be enlightened by the Holy Spirit; what you have only heard, that preach by doing the same, being raised above your bodies, which are the dwellings of your souls.

JEROME. Otherwise; What you hear in mystery, that teach in plainness of speech; what I have taught you in a corner of Judæa, that proclaim boldly in all quarters of the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. As He said, He that believeth on me, the works that I do he shall do also, and greater things than these shall he do; (John 14:12.) so here He shews that He works all things through them more than through Himself; as though He had said, I have made a beginning, but what is beyond, that I will to complete through your means. So that this is not a command but a prediction, shewing them that they shall overcome all things.

HILARY. Therefore they ought to inculcate constantly the knowledge of God, and the profound secret of evangelic doctrine, to be revealed by the light of preaching; having no fear of those who have power only over the body, but cannot reach the soul; Fear not those that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how He sets them above all others, encouraging them to set at nought cares, reproaches, perils, yea even the most terrible of all things, death itself, in comparison of the fear of God. But rather fear him, who can destroy both soul and body in hell.

JEROME. This word is not found in the Old Scriptures, but it is first used by the Saviour. Let us enquire then into its origin. We read in more than one place that the idol Baal was near Jerusalem, at the foot of Mount Moriah, by which the brook Siloc flows. This valley and a small level plain was watered and woody, a delightful spot, and a grove in it was consecrated to the idol. To so great folly and madness had the people of Israel come, that, forsaking the neighbourhood of the Temple, they offered their sacrifices there, and concealing an austere ritual under a voluptuous life, they burned their sons in honour of a dæmon. This place was called Gehennom, that is, The valley of the children of Hinnom. These things are fully described in Kings and Chronicles, and the Prophet Jeremiah. (2 Kings 23:10. 2 Chron. 28:3. Jer. 7:32; 32:35.) God threatens that He will fill the place with the carcases of the dead, that it be no more called Tophet and Baal, but Polyandrion, i. e. The tomb of the dead. Hence the torments and eternal pains with which sinners shall be punished are signified by this word.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xiii. 2.) This cannot be before the soul is so joined to the body, that nothing may sever them. Yet it is rightly called the death of the soul, because it does not live of God; and the death of the body, because though man does not cease to feel, yet because this his feeling has neither pleasure, nor health, but is a pain and a punishment, it is better named death than life.

CHRYSOSTOM. Note also, that He does not hold out to them deliverance from death, but encourages them to despise it; which is a much greater thing than to be rescued from death; also this discourse aids in fixing in their minds the doctrine of immortality.

29. Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father.

30. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.

31. Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having set aside fear of death, that the Apostles should not think that if they were put to death they were deserted by God, He passes to discourse of God's providence, saying, Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing, and one of them does not fall to the ground without your Father?

JEROME. If these little creations fall not without God's superintendence and providence, and if things made to perish, perish not without God's will, you who are immortal ought not to fear that you live without His providence.

HILARY. Figuratively; That which is sold is our soul and body, and that to which it is sold, is sin. They then who sell two sparrows for a farthing, are they who sell themselves for the smallest sin, born for flight, and for reaching heaven with spiritual wings. (vid. Ps. 124:7.) Caught by the bait of present pleasures, and sold to the enjoyment of the world, they barter away their whole selves in such a market. It is of the will of God that one of them rather soar aloft; but the law proceeding according to God's appointment decrees that one of them should fall. In like manner as, if they soared aloft they would become one spiritual body; so, when sold under sin, the soul gathers earthly matter from the pollution of vice, and there is made of them one body which is committed to earth.

JEROME. That He says, The hairs of your head are all numbered, shews the boundless providence of God towards man, and a care unspeakable that nothing of ours is hid from God.

HILARY. For when any thing is numbered it is carefully watched over.

CHRYSOSTOM. Not that God reckons our hairs, but to shew His diligent knowledge, and great carefulness over us.

JEROME. Those who deny the resurrection of the flesh ridicule the sense of the Church on this place, as if we affirmed that every hair that has ever been cut off by the razor rises again, when the Saviour says, Every hair of your head—not is saved, but—is numbered. Where there is number, knowledge of that number is implied, but not preservation of the same hairs.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xxii. 19.) Though we may fairly enquire concerning our hair, whether all that has ever been shorn from us will return; for who would not dread such disfigurement. When it is once understood that nothing of our body shall be lost, so as that the form and perfectness of all the parts should be preserved, we at the same time understand that all that would have disfigured our body is to be united or taken up by the whole mass, not affixed to particular parts so as to destroy the frame of the limbs; just as a vessel made of clay, and again reduced to clay, is once more reformed into a vessel, it needs not that that portion of clay which had formed the handle should again form it, or that which had composed the bottom, should again go to the bottom, so long as the whole was remoulded into the whole, the whole clay into the whole vessel, no part being lost. Wherefore if the hair so often shorn away would be a deformity if restored to the place it had been taken from, it will not be restored to that place, but all the materials of the old body will be revived in the new, whatever place they may occupy so as to preserve the mutual fitness of parts. Though what is said in Luke, Not a hair of your head shall fall to the ground, (Luke 21:18.) may be taken of the number, not the length of the hairs, as here also it is said, The hairs of your head are all numbered.

HILARY. For it is an unworthy task to number things that are to perish. Therefore that we should know that nothing of us should perish, we are told that our very hairs are numbered. No accident then that can befal our bodies is to be feared; thus He adds, Fear not, ye are better than many sparrows.

JEROME. This expresses still more clearly the sense as it was above explained, that they should not fear those who can kill the body, for if the least animal falls not without God’s knowledge, how much less a man who is dignified with the Apostolic rank?

HILARY. Or this, ye are better than many sparrows, teaches that the elect faithful are better than the multitude of the unbelieving, for the one fall to earth, the other fly to heaven.

REMIGIUS. Figuratively; Christ is the head, the Apostles the hairs, who are well said to be numbered, because the names of the saints are written in heaven.

10:32–33

32. Whosoever therefore shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in heaven.

33. But whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord having banished that fear which haunted the minds of His disciples, adds further comfort in what follows, not only casting out fear, but by hope of greater rewards encouraging them to a free proclamation of the truth, saying, Every man who shall confess me before men, I also will confess him before my Father which is in heaven. And it is not properly shall confess me, but as it is in the Greek, shall confess in me, shewing that it is not by your own strength but by grace from above, that you confess Him whom you do confess.

HILARY. This He says in conclusion, because it behoves them after being confirmed by such teaching, to have a confident freedom in confessing God.

REMIGIUS. Here is to be understood that confession of which the Apostle speaks, With the heart men believe unto justification, with the month confession is made unto salvation. (Rom. 10:10.) That none therefore might suppose that he could be saved without confession of the mouth, He says not only, He that shall confess me, but adds, before men; and again, He that shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven.

HILARY. This teaches us, that in what measure we have borne witness to Him upon earth, in the same shall we have Him to bear witness to us in heaven before the face of God the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. Here observe that the punishment is manifold more than the evil done, and the reward more than the good done. As much as to say, your deed was more abundant in confessing or denying Me here; so shall My deed to you-ward be more abundant in confessing or denying you there. Wherefore if you have done any good thing, and have not received retribution, be not troubled, for a manifold reward awaits you in the time to come. And if you have done any evil, and have not paid the punishment thereof, do not think that you have escaped, for punishment will overtake you, unless you are changed and become better.

RABANUS. It should be known that not even Pagans can deny the existence of God, but the infidels may deny that the Son as well as the Father is God. The Son confesses men before the Father, because by the Son we have access to the Father, and because the Son saith, Come, ye blessed of my Father. (Mat. 25:34.)

REMIGIUS. And thus He will deny the man that hath denied Him, in that he shall not have access to the Father through Him, and shall be banished from seeing either the Son or the Father in their divine nature.

CHRYSOSTOM. He not only requires faith which is of the mind, but confession which is by the mouth, that He may exalt us higher, and raise us to a more open utterance, and a larger measure of love. For this is spoken not to the Apostles only, but to all; He gives strength not to them only, but to their disciples. And he that observes this precept will not only teach with free utterance, but will easily convince all; for the observance of this command drew many to the Apostles.

RABANUS. Or, He confesses Jesus who by that faith that worketh by love, obediently fulfils His commands; he denies Him who is disobedient.

10:34–36

34. Think not that I am come to send peace on earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword.

35. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father, and the daughter against her. mother, and the daughter in law against her mother in law.

36. And a man’s foes shall be they of his own household.

JEROME. He had before said, What I say to you in darkness, that speak ye in the light; He now tells them what will follow upon that preaching, saying, Think not that I am come to send peace upon earth; I am not come to send peace, but a sword.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Or connect it with what has gone before, As the fear of death ought not to draw you away, so neither ought carnal affection.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv.) How then did He enjoin them, that when they should entor any house they should say, Peace be to this house, as also the Angels sung, Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace to men. (Luke 2:14.) That is the most perfect peace when that which is diseased is lopped off, when that which introduces strife is taken away, for so only is it possible that heaven should be joined to earth. For so does the physician save the rest of the body, namely by cutting off that which cannot be healed. So it came to pass at the tower of Babel; a happy discord broke up their bad union. So also Paul divided those who were conspired together against him. For concord is not in all cases good; for there is honour among thieves. And this combat is not of His setting before them, but of the plots of the world.

JEROME. For in the matter of belief in Christ, the whole world was divided against itself; each house had its believers and its unbelievers; and therefore was this holy war sent, that an unholy peace might be broken through.

CHRYSOSTOM. This He said as it were comforting His disciples, as much as to say, Be not troubled as though these things fell upon you unexpectedly; for, for this cause I came that I might send war upon the earth—nay He says not ‘war,’ but what is yet harder, a sword. For He sought by sharpness of speech so to rouse their attention, that they should not fall off in time of trial and difficulty, or say that He had told them smooth things, and had hid the difficulties. For it is better to meet with softness in deeds than in words; and therefore He stayed not in words, but shewing them the nature of their warfare, He taught them that it was more perilous than a civil war; saying, I am come to set a man against his father, and daughter against her mother, and daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. So this warfare will be between not acquaintances merely, but the nearest and dearest kindred; and this shews Christ’s very great power; that His disciples after having heard this, yet undertook the mission, and brought over others. Yet was it not Christ who made this division, but the evil nature of the parties; when He says that it is He that does it, He speaks according to the manner of Scripture. As it is written, God hath given them eyes that they should not see. (Is. 6:10.) Here is also a great proof that the Old Testament is like the New. For among the Jews a man was to put his neighbour to death if he found him making a calf, or sacrificing to Baalphegor; so here to shew that it was the same God who ordained both that and these precepts, He reminds them of the prophecy, A man’s foes are they of his household. For this same thing happened among the Jews; there were Prophets, and false Prophets; there the multitude was divided, and houses were set against themselves; there some believed one part, and some another.

JEROME. These are almost the words of the Prophet Micah. (Mic. 7:6.) We should always take note when a passage is cited out of the Old Testament, whether the sense only, or the very words are given.

HILARY. Mystically; A sword is the sharpest of all weapons, and thence it is the emblem of the right of authority, the impartiality of justice, the correction of offenders. The word of God, we may remember, is likened to a sword; (Eph. 6:17. Heb. 4:12.) so here the sword that is sent upon the earth is His preaching poured into the heart of man. The five inhabiting one house, whom He divides three against two, and two against three, we may explain thus; The three are the three parts of man, the body, the soul, and the will; for as the soul is bestowed in the body, so the will has power of using both in any way it chooses; and thence when a law is given it is given to the will. But this is only found in those who were first formed by God. By the sin and unbelief of the first parent, all the generations of men since have had sin for the father of their body, and unbelief for the mother of their soul. And as each man has his will within him, there are thus five in one house. When then we are renewed in the laver of baptism, by virtue of the word we are set apart from our original guilt, and severed, as it were, by the sword of God, from the lusts of this our father and mother, and thus there is great discord made in one house; the new man finding his foes within, he seeks with joy to live in newness of spirit; they which are derived from the old stock, lust to remain in their old pleasures.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 3.) Otherwise; I am come to set a man against his father; for he renounces the Devil, who was his son; the daughter against her mother, that is, the people of God against the city of the world, that is, the wicked society of mankind, which is spoken of in Scripture under the names of Babylon, Egypt, Sodom, and other names. The daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law, that is, the Church against the Synagogue, which according to the flesh, brought forth Christ the spouse of the Church. They are severed by the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God. And a man’s foes are they of his household, those, that is, with whom he before lived as intimates.

RABANUS. For no other mutual rights can be preserved between those who are at war in their creeds.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Otherwise; He means, I am not come among men to strengthen their carnal affections, but to cut them off with the sword of the

Spirit; whence it is rightly added, And a man's foes are they of his household.

GREGORY. (Mor. iii. 8.) For the subtle enemy when he sees himself driven out of the hearts of the good, seeks out those who most love them, and speaking by the mouth of those who are dearest, endeavours while the heart is penetrated by love, that the sword of conviction may pierce to the inmost bulwarks of virtue.

10:37–39

37. He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.

38. And he that taketh not his cross, and followeth after me, is not worthy of me.

39. He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it.

JEROME. Because of what He had said, I am not come to send peace but a sword, &c. that none might suppose that family affection was banished from His religion, He now adds, He that loves father or mother more than me is not worthy of me. So in the Song of Songs we read, Order love in me. (c. 2:4.) For this order is needed in every affection; after God love thy father, thy mother, and thy children; but if a necessity should occur that the love of parents and children comes into competition with the love of God, and where both cannot be preserved, remember that hatred of our kindred becomes then love to God. He forbids not to love parent or child, but adds emphatically, more than me.

HILARY. For they who have esteemed domestic affection of relations higher than God, are unworthy to inherit good things to come.

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet when Paul bids us obey our parents in all things, we are not to marvel; for we are only to obey in such things as are not hurtful to our piety to God. It is holy to render them every other honour, but when they demand more than is due, we ought not to yield. This is likewise agreeable to the Old Testament; in it the Lord commands that all who worshipped idols, should not only be held in abhorrence, but should be stoned. And in Deuteronomy it is said, He who saith to his father and his mother, I know you not; and to his brethren, Ye are strangers; he hath kept thy saying. (Deut. 33:9.)

GLOSS. (non occ.) It seems to happen in many cases that the parents love the children more than the children love the parents; therefore having taught that His love is to be preferred to the love of parents, as in an ascending scale, He next teaches that it is to be preferred to the love of children, saying, And whoso loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me.

RABANUS. He is unworthy of the divine communion who prefers the carnal affection of kindred to the spiritual love of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then that those to whom the love of God is preferred should not be offended thereat, He leads them to a higher doctrine. Nothing is nearer to a man than his soul, and yet He enjoins that this should not only be hated, but that a man should be ready to deliver it up to death, and blood; not to death only, but to a violent and most disgraceful death, namely, the death of the cross; therefore it follows, And whoso taketh not up his cross and followeth me, is not worthy of me. He had as yet said nothing to them respecting his own sufferings, but instructs them in the meanwhile in these things, that they may the more readily receive His words concerning His passion.

HILARY. Or; They that are Christ’s have crucified the body with its vices and lusts. (Gal. 5:24.) And he is unworthy of Christ who does not take up His cross, in which we suffer with Him, die with Him, are buried and rise again with Him, and follow his Lord, purposing to live in newness of spirit in this sacrament of the faith.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxii. 3.) The cross is so called from 1torment; and there are two ways in which we bear the Lord’s cross; either when we afflict the flesh by abstinence; or when in compassion for our neighbour we make his afflictions our own. But it should be known that there are some who make a shew of abstinence not for God, but for ostentation; and some there are who shew compassion to their neighbour, not spiritually but carnally, not that they may encourage him in virtue, but rather countenancing him in faults. These indeed seem to bear their cross, but do not follow the Lord; therefore He adds, And followeth me

CHRYSOSTOM. Because these commands seemed burdensome, He proceeds to shew their great use and benefit, saying, He that findeth his life shall lose it. As much as to say, Not only do these things that I have inculcated do no harm, but they are of great advantage to a man; and the contrary thereof shall do him great hurt—and this is His manner every where. He uses those things which men's affections are set upon as a means of bringing them to their duty. Thus: Why are you loath to contemn your life? Because you love it? For that very reason contemn it, and you will do it the highest service.

REMIGIUS. The life in this place is not to be understood as the substance, (the soul,) but as this present state of being; and the sense is, He who findeth his life, i. e. this present life, he who so loves this light, its joys and pleasures, as to desire that he may always find them; he shall lose that which he wishes always to keep, and prepare his soul for eternal damnation.

RABANUS. Otherwise; He who seeks an immortal life, does not hesitate to lose his life, that is, to offer it to death. But either sense suits equally well with that which follows, And whoso shall lose his life for my sake shall find it.

REMIGIUS. That is, he who in confession of My name in time of persecution despises this temporal world, its joys, and pleasures, shall find eternal salvation for his soul.

HILARY. Thus the gain of life brings death, the loss of life brings salvation; for by the sacrifice of this short life we gain the reward of immortality.

10:40–42

40. He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me.

41. He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall receive a prophet's reward; and he that receiveth a righteous man in the name of a righteous man shall receive a righteous man's reward.

42. And whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward.

JEROME. The Lord when He sends forth His disciples to preach, teaches them that dangers are not to be feared, that natural affection is to be postponed to religion—gold He had above taken from them, brass He had shaken out of their purses—hard then surely the condition of the preachers! Whence their living? Whence their food and necessaries? Therefore He tempers the rigour of His precepts by the following promises, that in entertaining the Apostles each believer may consider that he entertains the Lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. Enough had been said above to persuade those who should have to entertain the Apostles. For who would not with all willingness take in to his house men who were so courageous, that they despised all dangers that others might be saved? Above He had threatened punishment to those who should not receive them, He now promises reward to such as should receive them. And first He holds out to those who should entertain them the honour, that in so doing they were entertaining Christ, and even the Father; He who receiveth me, receiveth him that sent me. What honour to be compared to this of receiving the Father and the Son?

HILARY. These words shew that He has a Mediator's office, and since He came from God, when He is received by us, through Him God is transfused into us; and by this disposition of grace to have received the Apostles is no other than to have received God; for Christ dwells in them, and God in Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. A further reward also He promises, saying, He who receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet, shall receive a prophet's reward. He said not merely, Whoso receiveth a prophet, or a righteous man, but in the name of a prophet, and in the name of a righteous man; that is, not for any greatness in this life, or other temporal account, but because he is a prophet, or a righteous man.

JEROME. Otherwise; To this His exhortation to the disciple to entertain his teacher, there might a secret objection arise among the faithful; then shall we have to support the false prophets, or Judas the traitor. To this end it is that the Lord instructs them in these words, that it is not the person but the office that they should look to; and that the entertainer loses not his reward, though he whom he entertains be unworthy.

CHRYSOSTOM. A prophet's reward, and a righteous man's reward, are such rewards as it is fitting he should have who entertains a prophet, or a righteous man: or, such a reward as a prophet or righteous man should have.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xx. 12.) He says not, a reward from a prophet, or righteous man, but the reward of a prophet or righteous man. For the prophet is perhaps a righteous man, and the less he possesses in this world, the greater confidence has he in speaking in behalf of righteousness. He who hath of this world's goods, in supporting such a man, makes himself a free partaker in his righteousness, and shall receive the reward of righteousness together with him whom he has aided by supporting him. He is full of the spirit of prophecy, but he lacks bodily sustenance, and if the body be not supported, it is certain that the voice will fail. Whoso then gives a prophet food, gives him strength for speaking, therefore together with the prophet he shall receive the prophet's reward, when he shews before the face of God what bounty he shewed him.

JEROME. Mystically; He who receives a prophet as a prophet, and understands him speaking of things to come, he shall receive reward of that prophet. The Jews therefore, who understand the prophets carnally, do not receive the prophet's reward.

REMIGIUS. Some understand by the prophet here, the Lord Jesus Christ, of whom Moses says, A Prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you; (Deut. 18:18.) and the same also by the righteous man, because he is beyond comparison righteous. He then who shall receive a prophet or righteous man in the name of the prophet or righteous man, i. e. of Christ, shall receive reward from Him for love of whom he received Him.

JEROME. That none should say, I am poor and therefore cannot be hospitable, He takes away even this plea by the instance of a cup of cold water, given with good will. He says cold water, because in hot, poverty and lack of fuel might be pleaded. And whosoever shall give to drink to one of the least of these a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward.

REMIGIUS. The least of these, that is, not a prophet, or a righteous man, but one of these least.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Note, that God looks more to the pious mind of the giver, than to the abundance of the thing given.

GLOSS. (ord.) Or, the least are they who have nothing at all in this world, and shall be judges with Christ.

HILARY. Or; Seeing beforehand that there would be many who would only glory in the name of Apostleship, but in their whole life and walk would be unworthy of it, He does not therefore deprive of its reward that service which might be rendered to them in belief of their religious life. For though they were the very least, that is, the greatest of sinners, yet even small offices of mercy shewn them, such as are denoted by the cup of cold water, should not be shewn in vain. For the honour is not done to a man that is a sinner, but to his title of disciple.

CHAPTER 11

11:1–6

1. And it came to pass, when Jesus had made an end of commanding his twelve disciples, he departed thence to teach and to preach in their cities.

RABANUS. The Lord having sent out His disciples to preach with the foregoing instructions, Himself now fulfils in action what He had taught in words, offering His preaching first to the Jews; And it came to pass when Jesus had ended all these sayings, he passed thence.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvi.) Having sent them forth, He withdrew Himself, giving them opportunity and time to do the things that He had enjoined; for while He was present and ready to heal, no man would come to His disciples.

REMIGIUS. He well passes from the special teaching which He had delivered to His disciples, to the general which He preached in the cities; passing therein as it were from heaven to earth, that He might give light to all. By this deed of the Lord, all holy preachers are admonished that they should study to benefit all.

2. Now when John had heard in the prison the works of Christ, he sent two of his disciples,

3. And said unto him, Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?

4. Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again those things which ye do hear and see:

5. The blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the Gospel preached to them.

6. And blessed is he, whosoever shall not he offended in me.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist had shewn above how by Christ’s miracles and teaching, both His disciples and the multitudes had been instructed; he now shews how this instruction had reached even to John’s disciples, so that they seemed to have some jealousy towards Christ; John, when he had heard in his bonds the works of Christ, sent two of his disciples to say unto him, Art thou he that should come, or look we for another?

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. vi. 1.) We must enquire how John, who is a prophet and more than a prophet, who made known the Lord when He came to be baptized, saying, Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the world!—why, when he was afterwards cast into prison, he should send his disciples to ask, Art thou he that should come, or look we for another? Did he not know Him whom he had pointed out to others; or was he uncertain whether this was He, whom by foretelling, by baptizing, and by making known, he had proclaimed to be He?

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 7. 19.) Some understand it thus; That it was a great thing that John should be so far a prophet, as to acknowledge Christ, and to preach remission of sin; but that like a pious prophet, he could not think that He whom he had believed to be He that should come, was to suffer death; he doubted therefore though not in faith, yet in love. So Peter also doubted, saying, This be far from thee, Lord; this shall not be unto thee. (Mat. 16:22.)

CHRYSOSTOM. But this seems hardly reasonable. For John was not in ignorance of His death, but was the first to preach it, saying, Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the world. For thus calling Him the Lamb, he plainly shews forth the Cross; and no otherwise than by the Cross did He take away the sins of the world. Also how is he a greater prophet than these, if he knew not those things which all the prophets knew, for Isaiah says, He was led as a sheep to the slaughter. (Is. 53:7.)

GREGORY. (Aug, ubi sup) But this question may be answered in a better way if we attend to the order of time. At the waters of Jordan he had affirmed that this was the Redeemer of the world after he was thrown into prison, he enquires if this was He that should come—not that he doubted that this was the Redeemer of the world, but he asks that he may know whether He who in His own person had come into the world, would in His own person descend also to the world below.

JEROME. Hence he frames his question thus, Art thou he that is to come? Not, Art Thou he that hast come? And the sense is, Direct me, since I am about to go down into the lower parts of the earth, whether I shall announce Thee to the spirits beneath also; or whether Thou as the Son of God may not taste death, but will send another to this sacrament?

CHRYSOSTOM. But is this a more reasonable explanation than the other? for why then did he not say, Art Thou Ho that is coming to the world beneath? and not simply, Art thou he that is to come? And the reason of his seeking to know, namely, that he might preach Him there, is even ridiculous. For the present life is the time of grace, and after death the judgment and punishment; therefore there was no need of a forerunner thither. Again, if the unbelievers who should believe after death should be saved, then none would perish; all would then repent and worship; for every knee shall bow, both of things in heaven, and things on earth, and things under the earth. (Phil. 2:10)

GLOSS. (non occ.) But it ought to be observed, that Jerome and Gregory did not say that John was to proclaim Christ’s coming to the world beneath, to the end that the unbelievers there might be converted to the faith, but that the righteous who abode in expectation of Christ, should be comforted by His near approach.

HILARY. It is indeed certain, that he who as forerunner proclaimed Christ’s coming, as prophet knew Him when He stood before him, and worshipped Him as Confessor when He came to him, could not fall into error from such abundant knowledge. Nor can it be believed that the grace of the Holy Spirit failed him when thrown into prison, seeing He should hereafter minister the light of His power to the Apostles when they were in prison.

JEROME. Therefore he does not ask as being himself ignorant. But as the Saviour asks where Lazarus is buried (John 11:34.), in order that they who shewed. Him the sepulchre might be so far prepared for faith, and believe that the dead was verily raised again—so John, about to be put to death by Herod, sends his disciples to Christ, that by this opportunity of seeing His signs and wonders they might believe on Him, and so might learn through their master’s enquiry. But John’s disciples had somewhat of bitterness and jealousy towards the Lord, as their former enquiry shewed, Why do we and the Pharisees fast oft, but thy disciples fast not?

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet whilst John was with them he held them rightly convinced concerning Christ. But when he was going to die, he was more concerned on their behalf. For he feared that he might leave his disciples a prey to some pernicious doctrine, and that they should remain separate from Christ, to whom it had been his care to bring all his followers from the beginning. Had he said to them, Depart from me, for He is better than me, he would not have prevailed with them, as they would have supposed that he spoke this in humility, which opinion would have drawn them more closely to him. What then does he? He waits to hear through them that Christ works miracles. Nor did he send all, but two only, (whom perhaps he chose as more ready to believe than the rest,) that the reason of his enquiry might be unsuspected, and that from the things themselves which they should see they might understand the difference between him and Jesus.

HILARY. John then is providing not for his own, but his disciples' ignorance; that they might know that it was no other whom he had proclaimed, he sent them to see His works, that the works might establish what John had spoken; and that they should not look for any other Christ, than Him to whom His works had borne testimony.

CHRYSOSTOM. So also Christ as knowing the mind of John, said not, I am He; for thus He would have put an obstacle in the way of those that heard Him, who would have at least thought within themselves, if they did not say, what the Jews did say to Christ, Thou bearest witness of thyself. (John 8:13.) Therefore He would have them learn from His miracles, and so presented His doctrine to them more clear, and without suspicion. For the testimony of deeds is stronger than the testimony of words. Therefore He straightway healed a number of blind, and lame, and many other, for the sake not of John who had knowledge, but of others who doubted; as it follows, And Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and tell John what ye have heard and seen; The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, the poor have the Gospel preached to them.

JEROME. This last is no less than the first. And understand it as if it had been said, Even the poor; that so between noble and mean, rich and poor, there may be no difference in preaching. This approves the strictness of the master, this the truth of the teacher, that in His sight every one who can be saved is equal.

CHRYSOSTOM. And blessed is he who shall not be offended in me, is directed against the messengers; they were offended in Him. But He not publishing their doubts, and leaving it to their conscience alone, thus privately introduced a refutation of them.

HILARY. This saying, that they were blessed from whom there should be no offence in Him, shewed them what it was that John had provided against in sending them. For John, through fear of this very thing, had sent his disciples that they might hear Christ.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. vi. 1.) Otherwise; The mind of unbelievers was greatly offended concerning Christ, because after many miracles done, they saw Him at length put to death; whence Paul speaks, We preach Christ crucified, to the Jews a stumbling-block. (1 Cor. 1:23.) What then does that mean, Blessed is he who shall not be offended in me, but a direct allusion to the humiliation of His death; as much as to say, I do indeed wonderful works, but do not disdain to suffer humble things. Because then I follow you in death, men must be careful not to despise in Me My death, while they reverence My wonderful works.

HILARY. In these things which were done concerning John, there is a deep store of mystic meaning. The very condition and circumstances of a prophet are themselves a prophecy. John signifies the Law; for the Law proclaimed Christ, preaching remission of sins, and giving promise of the kingdom of heaven. Also when the Law was on the point of expiring, (having been, through the sins of the people, which hindered them from understanding what it spake of Christ, as it were shut up in bonds and in prison,) it sends men to the contemplation of the Gospel, that unbelief might see the truth of its words established by deeds.

AMBROSE. And perhaps the two disciples sent are the two people; those of the Jews, and those of the Gentiles who believed.

11:7–10

7. And as they departed, Jesus began to say unto the multitudes concerning John, What went ye out into the wilderness to see? A reed shaken with the wind?

8. But what went ye out for to see? A man clothed in soft raiment? behold, they that wear soft clothing are in kings’ houses.

9. But what went ye out for to see? A prophet? yea, I say unto you, and more than a prophet.

10. For this is he, of whom it is written, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvii.) Sufficient had been now done for John’s disciples; they returned certified concerning Christ by the wonderful works which they had seen. But it behoved that the multitude also should be corrected, which had conceived many things amiss from the question of John’s disciples, not knowing the purpose of John in sending them. They might say, He who bare such witness to Christ, is now of another mind, and doubts whether this be He. Doth he this because he hath jealousy against Jesus? Has the prison taken away his courage? Or spake he before but empty and untrue words?

HILARY. Therefore that this might not lead them to think of John as though he were offended concerning Christ, it continues, When they had gone away, Jesus began to speak to the multitudes concerning John.

CHRYSOSTOM. As they departed, that He should not seem to speak flattery of the man; and in correcting the error of the multitude, He does not openly expose, their secret suspicions, but by framing his words against what was in their hearts, He shews that He knows hidden things. But He said not as to the Jews, Why think ye evil in your hearts? though indeed it was evil that they had thought; yet it proceeded not from wickedness, but from ignorance; therefore He spake not to them harshly, but answered for John, shewing that he had not fallen from his former opinion. This He teaches them, not by His word only, but by their own witness, the witness of their own actions, as well as their own words. What went ye out into the wilderness to see? As much as to say, Why did ye leave the towns and go out into the wilderness? So great multitudes would not have gone with such haste into the desert, if they had not thought that they should see one great, and wonderful, one more stable than the rock.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (in loc.) They had not gone out at this time into the desert to see John, for he was not now in the desert, but in prison; but He speaks of the past time while John was yet in the desert, and the people flocked to him.

CHRYSOSTOM. And note that making no mention of any other fault, He clears John of fickleness, which the multitude had suspected him of, saying, A reed shaken by the wind?

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. vi. 2.) This He proposes, not to assert, but to deny. For if but a breath of air touch a reed, it bends it one way or other; a type of the carnal mind, which leans to either side, according as the breath of praise or detraction reaches it. A reed shaken by the wind John was not, for no variety of circumstance bent him from his uprightness. The Lord's meaning then is,

JEROME. Was it for this ye went out into the desert to see a man like unto a reed, and carried about by every wind, so that in lightness of mind he doubts concerning Him whom once he preached? Or it may be he is roused against Me by the sting of envy, and he seeks empty honour by his preaching, that he may thereof make gain. Why should he covet wealth? that he may have dainty fare? But his food is locusts and wild honey. That he may wear soft raiment? But his clothing is camel's hair. This is that He adds, But what went ye out for to see? A man clothed in soft raiment?

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; That John is not as a waving reed, yourselves have shewn by going out unto the desert to him. Nor can any say that John was once firm, but has since become wilful and wavering; for as some are prone to anger by natural disposition, others become so by long weakness and indulgence, so in inconstancy, some are by nature inconstant, some become so by yielding to their own humour and self-indulgence. But John was neither inconstant by natural disposition, this he means by saying, What went ye out for to see, a reed shaken by the wind? Neither had he corrupted an excellent nature by self-indulgence, for that he had not served the flesh is shewn by his raiment, his abode in the desert, his prison. Had he sought soft raiment, he would not have dwelt in the desert, but in kings' houses; Lo they that are clothed in soft raiment, are in kings' houses.

JEROME. This teaches that an austere life and strict preaching ought to shun kings' courts and the palaces of the rich and luxurious.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. vi. 3.) Let no one suppose that there is nothing sinful in luxury and rich dress; if pursuit of such things had been blameless, the Lord would not have thus commended John for the coarseness of his raiment, nor would Peter have checked the desire of fine clothes in women as he does, Not in costly raiment. (1 Pet. 3:3)

AUGUSTINE. (Doctr. Christ. iii. 12.) In all such things we blame not the use of the things, but the lust of those that use them. For whoever uses the good things in his reach more sparingly than are the habits of those with whom he lives, is either temperate or superstitious. Whoever again uses them in a measure exceeding the practice of the good among whom he lives, either has some1 meaning therein, or else is dissolute.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having described his habits of life from his dwelling-place, his dress, and the concourse of men to hear him, He now brings in that he is also a prophet, But what went ye out for to see? A prophet? yea, I say unto you, and more than a prophet.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. vi. 5.) The office of a prophet is to foretel things to come, not to shew them present. John therefore is more than a prophet, because Him whom he had foretold by going before Him, the same he shewed as present by pointing Him out.

JEROME. In this he is also greater than the other prophets, that to his prophetic privilege is added the reward of the Baptist that he should baptize his Lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then he shews in what respect He is greater, saying, This is he of whom it is written, Behold, I send my angel before thy face.

JEROME. To add to this great worthiness of John, He brings a passage from Malachias, in which he is spoken of as an Angel. (Mal. 3:1)) We must suppose that John is here called an Angel, not as partaking the Angelic nature, but from the dignity of his office as a forerunner of the Lord.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For the Greek word Angel, is in Latin Nuntius, ‘a messenger.’ He therefore who came to bear a heavenly message is rightly called an Angel, that he may preserve in his title the dignity which he performs in his office.

CHRYSOSTOM. He shews wherein it is that John is greater than the Prophets, namely, in that he is nigh unto Christ, as he says, I send before thy face, that is, near Thee, as those that walk next to the king’s chariot are more illustrious than others, so likewise is John because of his nearness to Christ.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Also the other Prophets were sent to announce Christ’s coming, but John to prepare His way, as it follows, who shall make ready thy way before thee;

GLOSS. (interlin.) That is, shall open the hearts of Thy hearers by preaching repentance and baptizing.

JEROME. Mystically; The desert is that which is deserted of the Holy Spirit, where there is no habitation of God; in the reed is signified a man who in outward show lives a pious life, but lacks all real fruit within himself, fair outside, within hollow, moved with every breath of wind, that is, with every impulse of unclean spirits, having no firmness to remain still, devoid of the marrow of the soul; by the garment wherewith his body is clothed is his mind shewn, that it is lost in luxury and self-indulgence. The kings are the fallen angels; they are they who are powerful in this life, and the lords of this world. Thus, They that are clothed in soft raiment are in kings' houses; that is, those whose bodies are enervated and destroyed by luxury, it is clear are possessed by dæmons.

GREGORY. (ubi. sup.) Also John was not clothed in soft raiment, that is, he did not encourage sinners in their sinful life by speaking smooth things, but rebuked them with sharpness and rigour, saying, Generation of vipers, &c. (Mat. 3:7)

11:11–15

11. Verily I say unto you, Among them that are born of women there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist: notwithstanding he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having first delivered the Prophet's testimony in praise of John, He rested not there, but added His own decision respecting him, saying, Among them that are born of women there has not arisen a greater than John the Baptist.

RABANUS. As much as to say; What need to recount one by one the praises of John the Baptist; I say verily unto you, Among them that are born of women, &c. He says women, not virgins. If the same word mulier, which denotes a married person, is any where in the Gospels applied to Mary, it should be known that the translator has there used 'mulier' for 'femina;' as in that, Woman, behold thy son! (John 19:26)

JEROME. He is then set before all those that are born in wedlock, and not before Him who was born of the Virgin and the Holy Spirit; yet these words, there has not arisen a greater than John the Baptist, do not imply that John is to be set above the Prophets and Patriarchs and all others, but only makes him equal to the rest; for it does not follow that because others are not greater than him, that therefore he is greater than others.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But seeing that righteousness has so great deepness that none can be perfect therein but God only, I suppose that all the saints tried by the keenness of the divine judgment, rank in a fixed order, some lower, some before other. Whence we understand that He that hath none greater than Himself, is greater than all.

CHRYSOSTOM. That the abundance of this praise might not beget a wrong inclination in the Jews to set John above Christ, he corrects this, saying, He that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.

AUGUSTINE. (Cont. Adv. Leg. et Proph. ii. 5.) The heretic1 argues from this verse to prove, that since John did not belong to the kingdom of heaven, therefore much less did the other Prophets of that people, than whom John is greater. But these words of the Lord may be understood in two ways. Either the kingdom of heaven is something which we have not yet received, that, namely, of, which He speaks, Come, ye blessed of my Father, receive the kingdom, (Mat. 25:34) because they in it are Angels, therefore the least among them is greater than a righteous man who has a corruptible body. Or if we must understand the kingdom of heaven of the Church, whose children are all the righteous men from the beginning of the world until now, then the Lord speaks this of Himself, who was after John in the time of His birth, but greater in respect of His divine nature and supreme power. According then to the first interpretation it will be pointed, He who is least in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he; according to the second, He who is less than he, is in the kingdom of heaven greater than he.

CHRYSOSTOM. The kingdom of heaven, that is, in the spiritual world, and all relating thereto. But some say that Christ spoke this of the Apostles.

JEROME. We understand it simply, that every saint who is already with the Lord is greater than he who yet stands in the battle; for it is one thing to have gained the crown of victory, another to be yet fighting in the field.

12. And from the days of John the Baptist until now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force.

13. For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John.

14. And if ye will receive it, this is Elias, which was for to come.

15. He that hath ears to ear, let him hear.

GLOSS. (non occ.) That what He had last said should not lead any to suppose that John was an alien from the kingdom of heaven, He corrects this by adding, From the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xx. 14.) By the kingdom of heaven is meant the heavenly throne, whither when sinners defiled with any evil deed return in penitence, and amend themselves, they enter as sinners into the place of another, and take by violence the kingdom of heaven.

JEROME. Because John the Baptist was the first who preached repentance to the people, saying, Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand: rightly therefore from that day forth it may be said, that the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force. For great indeed is the violence, when we who are born of earth, seek an abode in heaven, and obtain by excellence what we have not by nature.

HILARY. Otherwise; The Lord bade His Apostles go to the lost sheep of Israel, but all their preaching conveyed profit to the publicans and sinners. Therefore the kingdom suffers violence, and the violent take it by force, for the glory of Israel, due to the Fathers, foretold by the Prophets, offered by Christ, is entered and held by force by the might of the Gentiles.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; All who come thereto with haste take by force the kingdom of God through the faith of Christ; whence He says, from, the days of John until now, and thus He brings them in haste to His faith, and at the same time adds support to those things which had been spoken by John. For if all things were fulfilled until John, then is Jesus He that should come; wherefore He adds, All the Prophets and the Law prophesied until John.

JEROME. Not that He cuts off all Prophets after John; for we read in the Acts of the Apostles that Agabus prophesied, and also four virgins daughters of Philip; but He means that the Law and the Prophets whom we have written, whatever they have prophesied, they have prophesied of the Lord. That He says, Prophesied until John, shews that this was now the time of Christ’s coming; and that whom they had foretold should come, Him John shewed to be already come.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then He adds another token of him, saying, And if ye will receive it, this is Elias who was to come. (Mal. 4:5) The Lord speaks in Malachias, I will send you Elias the Tishbite; and of the same again, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face.

JEROME. John then is said to be Elias, not according to the foolish philosophers, and certain heretics who bring forward their metempsychosis, or passing of the soul from one body to another; but because (as it is in another passage of the Gospel) he came in the spirit and power of Elias, and had the same grace and measure of the Holy Spirit. But in austerity of life, and fortitude of spirit, Elias and John were alike; they both dwelt in the desert, both were girded with a girdle of skins; because he reproved Ahab and Jezebel for their wickedness, Elias was compelled to fly; because he condemned the unlawful union of Herod and Herodias, John is beheaded.

CHRYSOSTOM. If ye will receive it, shewing their freedom, and requiring of them a willing mind. John the Baptist is Elias, and Elias is John, because both were forerunners of Christ.

JEROME. That He says, This is Elias, is figurative, and needs to be explained, as what follows, shews; He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

REMIGIUS. As much as to say, Whoso has ears of the heart to hear, that is, to understand, let him understand; for He did not say that John was Elias in person, but in the Spirit.

11:16–19

16. But whereunto shall I liken this generation? It is like unto children sitting in the markets, and calling unto their fellows,

17. And saying, We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; we have mourned unto you, and ye have not lamented.

18. For John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil.

19. The Son of man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a man gluttonous, and a winebibber, a friend of Publicans and sinners. But wisdom is justified of her children.

HILARY. The whole of this speech is a reproach of unbelief, and arises out of the foregoing complaint; that the stiff-necked people had not learned by two different modes of teaching.

CHRYSOSTOM. Whence He puts this question, shewing that nothing had been omitted that ought to be done for their salvation, saying, To whom shall I liken this generation?

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) By this generation He means the Jews together with Himself and John. As though He had said; John is thus great; but ye would believe neither him nor Me, and therefore to whom shall I liken you?

REMIGIUS. And straightway He answers Himself, saying, It is like unto children sitting in the market-place, crying unto their fellows, and saying, We have played music to you, and ye have not danced; we have mourned, and ye have not lamented.

HILARY. By the children are meant the Prophets, who preached as children in singleness of meaning, and in the midst of the synagogue, that is in the market-place, reprove them, that when they played to those to whom they had devoted the service of their body, they had not obeyed their words, as the movement of the dancers are regulated by the measures of the music. For the Prophets invited them to make confession by song to God, as it is contained in the song of Moses, of Isaiah, or of David.

JEROME. They say therefore, We have flayed music to you, and ye have not danced; i. e. We have called on you to work good works to our songs, and ye would not. We have lamented and called you to repentance, and this ye would not, rejecting both preaching, as well of exhortation to virtue, as of repentance for sin.

REMIGIUS. What is that He says, To their fellows? Were the unbelieving Jews then fellows of the Prophets? He speaks thus only because they were sprung of one stock.

JEROME. The children are they of whom Isaiah speaks, Behold I, and the children whom the Lord has given me. (Is. 8:18) These children then sit in the market-place, where are many things for sale, and say,

CHRYSOSTOM. We have played music to you, and ye have not danced; that is, I have shewed you an unrestricted life, and ye are not convinced; We have mourned unto you, and ye have not lamented; that is, John lived a hard life, and ye heeded him not. Yet does not he speak one thing, and I another, but both speak the same thing, because both have one and the same object. For John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a dæmon. The Son of man came &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Cont. Faust. xvi. 31.) I would that the Manichæans would tell me what Christ ate and drank, who here speaks of Himself as eating and drinking in comparison of John, who did neither. Not indeed that John drank nothing at all, but that he drank neither wine nor strong drink—but water only. Not that he dispensed altogether with food, but that he ate only locusts and wild honey. Whence then is it said of him that he came neither eating nor drinking, except that he used not that food which the

Jews used? Unless therefore the Lord had used this food, He would not have been said to have been, in comparison of John, eating and drinking. It would be strange that he who ate locusts and honey, should be said to come neither eating nor drinking, and that he who ate only bread and herbs, should be said to come eating and drinking.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says therefore, Jesus came, as much as to say, I and John came opposite ways, to do the same thing; as two hunters chasing the same animal from opposite sides, so that it might fall into the hands of one of them. But all mankind admire fasting and severity of life; and for this reason it was ordained from his infancy that John should be so brought up, that the things that he should say should receive credit. The Lord also walked in this way when He fasted forty days; but He had other means of teaching men to have confidence in Him; for it was a much greater thing that John who had walked in this way should bear witness to Him, than that He Himself should walk in that way. Again, John had nothing to shew besides his life, and his righteousness; whereas Christ had also the witness of His miracles. Leaving therefore to John the representation of fasting, He Himself walked in a contrary way, entering to the table of the publicans, and eating and drinking with them.

JEROME. If fasting then pleases you, why were you not satisfied with John? If fulness, why not with the Son of man? Yet one of these ye said had a dæmon, the other ye called a gluttonous man, and drunkard.

CHRYSOSTOM. What excuse then shall be given for them? Therefore He adds, And wisdom is justified of her children; that is, though ye were not convinced, yet have ye nothing whereof to accuse me, as also of the Father the Prophet speaks, That thou mightest be justified in thy sayings. (Ps. 51:4.) For though nought be effected in you by that goodness which is extended to you, yet He fulfils all His part that you may not have the shadow of excuse for your ungrateful doubt.

JEROME. Wisdom is justified of her children, i. e. The dispensation or doctrine of God, or Christ Himself who is the power and wisdom of God, is proved by the Apostles, who are His children, to have done righteously.

HILARY. He is wisdom itself not by His acts, but by His nature. Many indeed evade that saying of the Apostle’s, Christ is the wisdom and power of God, (1 Cor. 1:24) by saying, that truly in creating Him of a Virgin the Wisdom and Power of God were shewn mightily. (e.g. Paul of Samosata,

&c.) Therefore that this might not be so explained, He calls Himself the Wisdom of God, shewing that it was verily He, and not the deeds relating to Him, of whom this was meant. For the power itself, and the effect of that power, are not the same thing; the efficient is known from the act.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. ii. 11.) Or, Wisdom is justified of her children, because the holy Apostles understood that the kingdom of God was not in meat and drink, but in patient enduring; such persons neither does abundance lift up, nor want cast down, but as Paul spoke, I know how to abound, and to suffer want. (Phil. 4:12)

JEROME. Some copies read, Wisdom is justified of her works, for wisdom does not seek the witness of words, but of works.

CHRYSOSTOM. You should not be surprised at His using trite instances, such as that respecting the children; for He spoke to the weakness of His hearers; as Ezekiel spoke many things adapted to the Jews, but unworthy of the greatness of God.

HILARY. Mystically; Neither did the preaching of John bend the Jews, to whom the law seemed burdensome in prescribing meats and drinks, difficult and grievous, having in it sin which He calls having a dæmon—for from the difficulty of keeping it they must sin under the Law. Nor again did the preaching of the Gospel with freedom of life in Christ please them—by which the hardships and burdens of the Law were remitted, and publicans and sinners only believed in it. Thus, then, so many and so great warnings of all kinds having been offered them in vain, they are neither justified by the Law, and they are cast off from grace; Wisdom, therefore, is justified of her children, by those, that is, who seize the kingdom of heaven by the justification of faith, confessing the work of wisdom to be just, that it has transferred its gift from the rebellious to the faithful.

11:20–24

20. Then began he to upbraid the cities wherein most of his mighty works were done, because they repented not:

21. Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works, which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.

22. But I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the day of judgment, than for you.

23. And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell: for if the mighty works, which have been done in thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained until this day.

24. But I say unto you, That it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Thus far He had brought His accusation against the Jews in common; now against certain towns by name, in which he had specially preached, and yet they would not be converted; whence it is said, Then began he to upbraid the cities in which most of his mighty works were done, because they had not repented.

JEROME. His upbraiding of the towns of Corozaim, Bethsaida, and Capharnaum, is set forth in this chapter, because He therefore upbraided them, because after He had such mighty works and wonders in them they had not done penitence. Whence He adds, Wo for thee, Corozaim! wo for thee, Bethsaida!

CHRYSOSTOM. That you should not say that they were by nature evil, He names Bethsaida, a town from which the Apostles had come, namely, Philip, and two pair of the chief of the Apostles, Peter and Andrew, James and John.

JEROME. In this word Wo, these towns of Galilee are mourned for by the Saviour, that after so many signs and mighty works, they had not done penitence.

RABANUS. Corozaim, which is interpreted ‘my mystery,’ and Bethsaida, ‘the house of fruits’ or, ‘the house of hunters,’ are towns of Galilee situated on the shore of the sea of Galilee. The Lord therefore mourns for towns which once had the mystery of God, and which ought to have brought forth the fruit of virtues, and into which spiritual hunters had been sent.

JEROME. And to these are preferred Tyre and Sidon, cities given up to idolatry and vices; For if the mighty works which have been done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have long ago done penitence in sackcloth and ashes.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxv. 6.) In sackcloth is the roughness which denotes the pricking of the conscience for sin, ashes denote the dust of the dead; and both are wont to be employed in penitence, that the pricking of the sackcloth may remind us of our sins, and the dust of the ash may cause us to reflect what we have become by judgment.

RABANUS. Tyre and Sidon axe cities of Phœnicia. Tyre is interpreted ‘narrowness,’ and Sidon ‘hunting;’ and denote the Gentiles whom the Devil as a hunter drives into the straits of sin; but Jesus the Saviour sets them free by the Gospel.

JEROME. We ask where it is written that the Lord did wonders in Corozaim and Bethsaida? We read above, And he went about the towns and villages, healing all sicknesses, &c. (ch., 9:35.) among the rest, therefore, we may suppose that He wrought signs in Corozaim and Bethsaida.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 9.) It is not then true that His Gospel was not preached in those times and places, in which He foreknew that all would be such, as were many in His actual presence, who would not even believe on Him when He raised men from the dead. For the Lord Himself bears witness that they of Tyre and Sidon would have done penitence in great humility, had the wonders of the Divine power been done in them. Moreover, if the dead are judged according to those deeds which they would have done had they lived, then because these would have believed had the Gospel been preached to them with so great miracles, surely they should not be punished at all, and yet in the day of judgment they shall be punished; for it follows, But I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon in the day of judgment, than for you. Those then shall be punished with more, these with less severity.

JEROME. This is because Tyre and Sidon had trodden under foot the law of nature only, but these towns after they had transgressed the natural and the written Law, also made light of those wonders which had been wrought among them.

RABANUS. We at this day see the words of the Saviour fulfilled; Corozaim and Bethsaida would not believe when the Lord came to them in person; but Tyre and Sidon have afterwards believed on the preaching of the Apostles.

REMIGIUS. Capharnaum was the metropolis of Galilee, and a noted town of that province, and therefore the Lord mentions it particularly, saying, And thou, Capharnaum, shalt thou indeed be exalted to heaven. Thou shalt go down even to hell.

JEROME. In other copies we find, And thou, Capharnaum, that art exalted to heaven, shalt be brought down to hell; and it may be understood in two different ways. Either, thou shalt go down to hell because thou hast proudly resisted my preaching; or, thou that hast been exalted to heaven by entertaining me, and having my mighty wonders done in thee, shalt be visited with the heavier punishment, because thou wouldest not believe even these.

REMIGIUS. And they have made the sins not of Sodom only and Gomorrah, but of Tyre and Sidon light in comparison, and therefore it follows, For if the mighty works which have been done in thee had been done in Sodom, it would perhaps have remained unto this day.

CHRYSOSTOM. This makes the accusation heavier, for it is a proof of extreme wickedness, that they are worse, not only than any then living, but than the wickedest of all past time.

JEROME. In Capharnaum, which is interpreted ‘the most fair town,’ Jerusalem is condemned, to which it is said by Ezekiel, Sodom is justified by thee. (Ezek. 16:52)

REMIGIUS. The Lord, who knows all things, here uses a word expressing uncertainty—perhaps, to shew that freedom of choice is left to men. But I say unto you, it shall be easier for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment than for you. And be it known, that in speaking of the city or country, the Lord does not chide with the buildings and walls, but with the men that inhabit there, by the figure metonymy, putting the thing containing for the thing contained. The words, It shall be easier in the day of judgment, clearly prove that there are divers punishments in hell, as there are divers mansions in the kingdom of heaven.

JEROME. The careful reader will hesitate here; If Tyre and Sidon could have done penitence at the preaching of the Saviour, and His miracles, they are not in fault that they believed not; the sin is his who would not preach to bring them to penitence. To this there is a ready answer, that we know not God’s judgments, and are ignorant of the sacraments of His peculiar dispensations. It was determined by the Lord not to pass the borders of Judæa, that He might not give the Pharisees and Priests a just occasion of persecuting Him, as also He gave commandment to the Apostles, Go not into the way of the Gentiles. Corozaim and Bethsaida are condemned because they would not believe, though Christ Himself was among them—

Tyre and Sidon are justified, because they believed His Apostles. You should not enquire into times when you see the salvation of those that believe.

REMIGIUS. We may also answer in another way. There were many in Corozaim and Bethsaida who would believe, and many in Tyre and Sidon who would not believe, and therefore were not worthy of the Gospel. The Lord therefore preached to the dwellers in Corozaim and Bethsaida, that they who were to believe, might be able; and preached not in Tyre and Sidon, lest perhaps they who were not to believe, being made worse by contempt of the Gospel, should be punished more heavily.

AUGUSTINE. (De Don. Pers. 10.) A certain Catholic disputant of some note expounded this place of the Gospel in the following way; That the Lord foreknew that they of Tyre and Sidon would fall from the faith after they had believed the miracles done among them; and that therefore in mercy He did not His miracles there; because they would have incurred the heavier penalty had they lapsed from the faith after having held it, than if they had never held it at all. Or otherwise, The Lord surely foreknew His mercies with which He deigns to deliver us. And this is the predestination of the saints, namely, the foreknowledge and making ready the mercies of God, by which they are most certainly saved, whosoever are saved. The rest are left to the just judgment of God in the general body of the condemned, where they of Tyre and Sidon are left, who might have believed had they seen Christ’s many miracles; but since it was not given them that they should believe, therefore that through which they might have believed was also withheld. From which it appears, that there are certain who have in their dispositions by nature a divine gift of understanding by which they would be moved to faith, if they should either hear words or see signs adapted to their minds. But if they be not by the high sentence of God set apart from the mass of perdition through the predestination of grace, then neither words nor works are set before them by God, which yet, could they have seen or heard them, would have stirred them to believe. In this general mass of perdition are the Jews also left, who could not believe so great and manifest wonders wrought before their eyes. And the cause wherefore they could not believe, the Gospel hath not hidden, speaking thus; Though he did so great miracles before them, yet could they not believe, as Esaias said, I have blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart. (John 12:37) Not in this way then were the eyes of they of Tyre and Sidon blinded, or their heart hardened, for they would have believed had they seen such wonders as these saw. But it profited those not that they could have believed, for that they were not predestinated; neither would it have been any hindrance to these that they had not power to believe, had they been so predestined that God should have enlightened their blindness, and taken away the heart of stone from within them.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 32.) Luke also gives this as spoken in continuation of some other of the Lord’s discourses; from which it appears that he has rather followed the actual order of events; Matthew to have followed his recollection. Or the words of Matthew, Then began he to upbraid the towns, must be taken, as some think, as expressing some particular time by the word then, but not referring generally to that time in which the many other things here told were done and said. Whoever, therefore, thinks thus must suppose that this was spoken twice. And when we find in the same Evangelist some things spoken by the Lord at two different times—like that in Luke concerning the not taking a scrip for their journey,—what wonder is it if any thing else, which was twice spoken, is found once severally in two several Gospels in the actual connexion in which it was spoken, which connexion is different, because they are two different occasions on which it is related to have been spoken?

11:25–26

25. At that time Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.

26. Even so, Father: for so it seemed good in thy sight.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Because the Lord knew that many would doubt respecting the foregoing matter, namely, that the Jews would not receive Christ whom the Gentile world has so willingly received, He here makes answer to their thoughts; And Jesus answered and said, I confess unto thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth.

GLOSS. (ord.) That is, Who makest of heaven, or leavest in earthliness, whom Thou wilt. Or literally, AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 67. 1.) If Christ, from whom all sin is far, said, I confess, confession is not proper for the sinner only, but sometimes also for him that gives thanks. We may confess either by praising God, or by accusing ourselves. When He said, I confess unto thee, it is, I praise Thee, not I accuse Myself.

JEROME. Let those hear who falsely argue, that the Saviour was not born but created, how He calls His Father Lord of heaven and earth. For if He be a creature, and the creature can call its Maker Father, it was surely foolish here to address Him as Lord of heaven and earth, and not of Him (Christ) likewise. He gives thanks that His coming has opened to the Apostles sacraments, which the Scribes and Pharisees knew not, who seemed to themselves wise, and understanding in their own eyes; That thou hast hid these things from the wise and understanding, and hast revealed them unto babes.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 67. 5.) That the wise and understanding are to be taken as the proud, Himself opens to us when He says, and hast revealed them unto babes; for who are babes but the humble?

GREGORY. (Mor. xxvii. 13.) He says not' to the foolish,' but to babes, shewing that He condemns pride, not understanding.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Horn. xxxviii.) Or when He says, The wise, He does not speak of true wisdom, but of that which the Scribes and Pharisees seemed to have by their speech. Wherefore He said not, 'And hast revealed them to the foolish,' but, to babes, that is, uneducated, or simple; teaching us in all things to keep ourselves from pride, and to seek humility.

HILARY. The hidden things of heavenly words and their power are hid from the wise, and revealed to the babes; babes, that is, in malice, not in understanding; hid from the wise because of their presumption of their own wisdom, not because of their wisdom.

CHRYSOSTOM. That it is revealed to the one is matter of joy, that it is hid from the other not of joy, but of sorrow; He does not therefore joy on this account, but He joys that these have known what the wise have not known.

HILARY. The justice of this the Lord confirms by the sentence of the Father's will, that they who disdain to be made babes in God, should become fools in their own wisdom; and therefore He adds, Even so, Father; for so it seemed good before thee.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxv. 14.) In which words we have a lesson of humility, that we should not rashly presume to discuss the counsels of heaven concerning the calling of some, and the rejection of others shewing that that cannot be unrighteous which is willed by Him that is righteous.

JEROME. In these words moreover He speaks to the Father with the desire of one petitioning, that His mercy begun in the Apostles might be completed in them.

CHRYSOSTOM. These things which the Lord spoke to His disciples, made them more zealous. As afterwards they thought great things of themselves, because they cast out dæmons, therefore He here reproves them; for what they had, was by revelation, not by their own efforts. The Scribes who esteemed themselves wise and understanding were excluded because of them-pride, and therefore He says, Since on this account the mysteries of God were hid from them, fear ye, and abide as babes, for this it is that has made you partakers in the revelation. But as when Paul says, God gave them, over to a reprobate mind, (Rom. 1:28), he does not mean that God did this, but they who gave Him cause, so here, Thou hast hid these things from the wise and understanding. And wherefore were they hid from them? Hear Paul speaking, Seeking to set up their own righteousness, they were not subject to the righteousness of God (Rom. 10:3.)

11:27

27. All things are delivered unto me of my Father: and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because He had said, I confess unto thee, Father, because thou hast hid these things from the wise, that you should not suppose that He thus thanks the Father as though He Himself was excluded from this power, He adds, All things are committed to me by my Father. Hearing the words are committed, do not admit suspicion of any thing human, for He uses this word that you may not think there be two gods unbegotten. For at the time that He was begotten He was Lord of all.

JEROME. For if we conceive of this thing according to our weakness, when he who receives begins to have, he who gives begins to be without. Or when He says, All things are committed to him, He may mean, not the heaven and earth and the elements, and the rest of the things which He created and made, but those who through the Son have access to the Father.

HILARY. Or that we may not think that there is any thing less in Him than in God, therefore He says this.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Maximin. ii. 12.) For if He has aught less in His power than the Father has, then all that the Father has, are not His; for by begetting Him the Father gave power to the Son, as by begetting Him He gave all things which He has in His substance to Him whom He begot of His substance.

HILARY. And also in the mutual knowledge between the Father and the Son, He teaches us that there is nothing in the Son beyond what was in the Father, for it follows, And none knoweth the Son but the Father, nor does any man know the Father but the Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. By this that He only knows the Father, He shews covertly that He is of one substance with the Father. As though He had said, What wonder if I be Lord of all, when I have somewhat yet greater, namely to know the Father and to be of the same substance with Him?

HILARY. For this mutual knowledge proclaims that they are of one substance, since He that should know the Son, should know the Father also in the Son, since all things were delivered to Him by the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He says, Neither does any know the Father but the Son, He does not mean that all men are altogether ignorant of Him; but that none knows Him with that knowledge wherewith He knows Him; which may also be said of the Son. For it is not said of some unknown God (i. e. who was not the Creator.) as Marcion declares.

AUGUSTINE. (De Trin. i. 8.) And because their substance is inseparable, it is enough sometimes to name the Father, sometimes the Son, nor is it possible to separate from either His Spirit, who is especially called the Spirit of truth.

JEROME. Let the heretic Eunomius therefore blush hereat who claims to himself such a knowledge of the Father and the Son, as they have one of anothera. But if he argues from what follows, and props up his madness by that, And he to whom the Son will reveal him, it is one thing to know what you know by equality with God, another to know it by His vouchsafing to reveal it.

AUGUSTINE. (De Trin. vii. 3.) The Father is revealed by the Son, that is, by His Word. For if the temporal and transitory word which we utter both shews itself, and what we wish to convey, how much more the Word of God by which all things were made, which so shews the Father as He is Father, because itself is the same and in the same manner as the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 1.) When He said, None knoweth the Son but the Father, He did not add, And he to whom the Father will reveal the Son. But when He said, None knoweth the Father but the Son, He added, And he to whom the Son will reveal him. But this must not be so understood as though the Son could be known by none but by the Father only; while the Father may be known not only by the Son, but also by those to whom the Son shall reveal Him. But it is rather expressed thus, that we may understand that both the Father and the Son Himself are revealed by the Son, inasmuch as He is the light of our mind; and what is afterwards added, And he to whom the Son will reveal, is to be understood as spoken of the Son as well as the Father, and to refer to the whole of what had been said. For the Father declares Himself by His Word, but the Word declares not only that which is intended to be declared by it, but in declaring this declares itself.

CHRYSOSTOM. If then He reveals the Father, He reveals Himself also. But the one he omits as a thing manifest, but mentions the other because there might be a doubt concerning it. Herein also He instructs us that He is so one with the Father, that it is not possible for any to come to the Father, but through the Son. For this had above all things given offence, that He seemed to be against God, and therefore He strove by all means to overthrow this notion.

11:28–30

28. Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.

29. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls.

30. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.

CHRYSOSTOM. By what He had said, He brought His disciples to have a desire towards Him, shewing them His unspeakable excellence; and now

He invites them to Him, saying, Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 69. 1.) Whence do we all thus labour, but that we are mortal men, bearing vessels of clay which cause us much difficulty. But if the vessels of flesh are straitened, the regions of love will be enlarged. To what end then does He say, Come unto me, all ye that labour, but that ye should not labour?

HILARY. He calls to Him those that were labouring under the hardships of the Law, and those who are burdened with the sins of this world.

JEROME. That the burden of sin is heavy the Prophet Zachariah bears witness, saying, that wickedness sitteth upon a talent of lead. (Zech. 5:7.) And the Psalmist fills it up, Thy iniquities are grown heavy upon me. (Ps. 38:4)

GREGORY. (Mor. xxx. 15.) For a cruel yoke and hard weight of servitude it is to be subject to the things of time, to be ambitious of the things of earth, to cling to falling things, to seek to stand in things that stand not, to desire things that pass away, but to be unwilling to pass away with them. For while all things fly away against our wish, those things which had first harassed the mind in desire of gaining them, now oppress it with fear of losing them.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not, Come ye, this man and that man, but All whosoever are in trouble, in sorrow, or in sin, not that I may exact punishment of you, but that I may remit your sins. Come ye, not that I have need of your glory, but that I seek your salvation. And I will refresh you; not, I will save you, only; but that is much greater, I will refresh you, that is, I will set you in all quietness.

RABANUS. (non occ.) I will not only take from you your burden, but will satisfy you with inward refreshment.

REMIGIUS. Come, He says, not with the feet, but with the life, not in the body, but in faith. For that is a spiritual approach by which any man approaches God; and therefore it follows, Take my yoke upon you.

RABANUS. The yoke of Christ is Christ’s Gospel, which joins and yokes together Jews and Gentiles in the unity of the faith. This we are commanded to take upon us, that is, to have in honour; lest perchance setting it beneath us, that is wrongly despising it, we should trample upon it with the miry feet of unholiness; wherefore He adds, Learn of me.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 69. 1.) Not to create a world, or to do miracles in that world; but that I am meek and lowly in heart. Wouldest thou be great? Begin with the least. Wouldest thou build up a mighty fabric of greatness? First think of the foundation of humility; for the mightier building any seeks to raise, the deeper let him dig for his foundation. Whither is the summit of our building to rise? To the sight of God.

RABANUS. We must learn then from our Saviour to be meek in temper, and lowly in mind; let us hurt none, let us despise none, and the virtues which we have shewn in deed let us retain in our heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. And therefore in beginning the Divine Law He begins with humility, and sets before us a great reward, saying, And ye shall find rest for your souls. This is the highest reward, you shall not only be made useful to others, but shall make yourself to have peace; and He gives you the promise of it before it comes, but when it is come, you shall rejoice in perpetual rest. And that they might not be afraid because He had spoken of a burden, therefore He adds, For my yoke is pleasant, and my burden light.

HILARY. He holds forth the inducements of a pleasant yoke, and a light burden, that to them that believe He may afford the knowledge of that good which He alone knoweth in the Father.

GREGORY. (Mor. iv. 33.) What burden is it to put upon the neck of our mind that He bids us shun all desire that disturbs, and turn from the toilsome paths of this world?

HILARY. And what is more pleasant than that yoke, what lighter than that burden? To be made better, to abstain from wickedness, to choose the good, and refuse the evil, to love all men, to hate none, to gain eternal things, not to be taken with things present, to be unwilling to do that to another which yourself would be pained to suffer.

RABANUS. But how is Christ’s yoke pleasant, seeing it was said above, Narrow is the way which leadeth unto life? (Mat. 7:14.) That which is entered upon by a narrow entrance is in process of time made broad by the unspeakable sweetness of love.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 70. 1.) So then they who with unfearing neck have submitted to the yoke of the Lord endure such hardships and dangers, that they seem to be called not from labour to rest, but from rest to labour. But the Holy Spirit was there who, as the outward man decayed, renewed the inward man day by day, and giving a foretaste of spiritual rest in the rich pleasures of God in the hope of blessedness to come, smoothed all that seemed rough, lightened all that was heavy. Men suffer amputations and burnings, that at the price of sharper pain they may be delivered from torments less but more lasting, as boils or swellings. What storms and dangers will not merchants undergo that they may acquire perishing riches? Even those who love not riches endure the same hardships; but those that love them endure the same, but to them they are not hardships. For love makes right easy, and almost nought all things however dreadful and monstrous. How much more easily then does love do that for true happiness, which avarice does for misery as far as it can?

JEROME. And how is the Gospel lighter than the Law, seeing in the Law murder and adultery, but under the Gospel anger and concupiscence also, are punished? Because by the Law many things are commanded which the Apostle fully teaches us cannot be fulfilled; by the Law works are required, by the Gospel the will is sought for, which even if it goes not into act, yet does not lose its reward. The Gospel commands what we can do, as that we lust not; this is in our own power; the Law punishes not the will but the act, as adultery. Suppose a virgin to have been violated in time of persecution; as here was not the will she is held as a virgin under the Gospel; under the Law she is cast out as defiled.

CHAPTER 12

12:1–8

1. At that time Jesus went on the sabbath day through the corn; and his disciples were an hungred, and began to pluck the ears of corn, and to eat.

2. But when the Pharisees saw it, they said unto him, Behold, thy disciples do that which is not lawful to do upon the sabbath day.

3. But he said unto them, Have ye not read what David did, when he was an hungred, and they that were with him;

4. How he entered into the house of God, and did eat the shewbread, which was not lawful for him to eat, neither for them which were with him, but only for the Priests?

5. Or have ye not read in the law, how that on the sabbath days the Priests in the temple profane the sabbath, and are blameless?

6. But I say unto you, That in this place is one greater than the temple.

7. But if ye had known what this meaneth, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice, ye would not have condemned the guiltless.

8. For the Son of man is Lord even of the sabbath day.

GLOSS. (ord.) Having related the preaching together with the miracles of one year before John's enquiry, He passes to those of another year, namely after the death of John, when Jesus is already in all things spoken against, and hence it is said, At that time Jesus passed through the corn fields on the sabbath day.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 34.) This which here follows is related both by Mark and Luke, without any question of discrepancy; indeed they do not say, At that time, so that Matthew has here perhaps preserved the order of time, they that of their recollection; unless we take the words in a wider sense, At that time, that is, the time in which these many and divers things were done, whence we may conceive that all these things happened after the death of John. For he is believed to have been beheaded a little after he sent his disciples to Christ. So that when he says at that time, he may mean only an indefinite time.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hon. xxxix.) Why then did He lead them through the corn fields on the sabbath, seeing He knew all things, unless He desired to break the sabbath? This he desired indeed, but not absolutely, therefore He broke it not without cause, but furnished a sufficient reason; so that He both caused the Law to cease, and yet offended not against it. Thus in order to soften the Jews, He here introduces a natural necessity; this is what is said, And his disciples being an hungred, began to pluck the ears of corn, and to eat. Although in things which are manifestly sinful, there can be no excuse, he who kills another cannot plead rage, nor he who commits adultery, lust, or any other cause; yet here saying that the disciples were hungry, He delivers them from all accusation.

JEROME. As we read in another Evangelist, they had no opportunity of taking food because of the thronging of the multitude, and therefore they hungred as men. That they rub the ears of corn in their hands, and with them satisfy themselves, is a proof of an austere life, and of men who needed not prepared meats, but sought only simple food.

CHRYSOSTOM. Here admire the disciples, who are so limited in their desires, that they have no care of the things of the body, but despise the support of the flesh; they are assailed by hunger, and yet they go not away from Christ; for had not they been hard pressed by hunger, they would not have done thus. What the Pharisees said to this is added, The Pharisees seeing it said unto Him, Behold, thy disciples do what is not lawful to do on the sabbath.

AUGUSTINE. (De Op. Monach. 23.) The Jews rather charged the Lord’s disciples with the breach of the sabbath than with theft; because it was commanded the people of Israel in the Law (Deut. 23:25.), that they should not lay hold of any as a thief in their fields, unless he sought to carry ought away with him; but if any touched only what he needed to eat, him they suffered to depart with impunity free.

JEROME. Observe, that the first Apostles of the Saviour broke the letter of the sabbath, contrary to the opinion of the Ebionitesa, who receive the other Apostles, but reject Paul as a transgressor of the Law. Then it proceeds to their excuse; But he said unto them, Have ye not read what David did, when he was an hungred? To refute the false accusation of the

Pharisees, He calls to mind the ancient history, that David flying from Saul came to Nobba, and being entertained by Achimelech the Priest, asked for food; (1 Sam. 21.) he having no common bread, gave him the consecrated loaves, which it was not lawful for any to eat, but the Priests only and Levites; esteeming it a better action to deliver men from the danger of famine than to offer sacrifice to God; for the preservation of man is a sacrifice acceptable to God. Thus then the Lord meets their objection, saying, If David be a holy man, and if you blame not the high-priest Achimelech, but consider their excuse for their transgression of the Law to be valid, and that was hunger; how do ye not approve in the Apostles the same plea which you approve in others? Though even here there is much difference. These rub ears of corn in their hands on the sabbath, those ate the Levitical bread, and over and above the solemn sabbath it was the season of new moon, during which when sought for at the banquet he fled from the royal palace.

CHRYSOSTOM. To clear His disciples, He brings forward the instance of David, whose glory as a Prophet was great among the Jews. Yet they could not here answer that this was lawful for him, because he was a Prophet; for it was not Prophets, but Priests only who might eat. And the greater was he who did this, the greater is the defence of the disciples; yet though David was a Prophet, they that were with him were not.

JEROME. Observe that neither David nor his servants received the loaves of shew-bread, before they had made answer that they were pure from women.

CHRYSOSTOM. But some one will say, How is this instance applicable to the question in hand? For David did not transgress the sabbath. Herein is shewn the wisdom of Christ, that He brings forward an instance stronger than the sabbath. For it is by no means the same thing to violate the sabbath, and to touch that sacred table, which is lawful for none. And again, He adds yet another answer, saying, Or have ye not read in the Law, that on the sabbath days the Priests in the temple profane the sabbath, and are blameless?

JEROME. As though He had said, Ye bring complaints against my disciples, that on the sabbath they rub ears of corn in their hands, under stress of hunger, and ye yourselves profane the sabbath, slaying victims in the temple, killing bulls, burning holocausts on piles of wood; also, on the testimony of another Gospel (John 7:23.), ye circumcise infants on the sabbath; so that in keeping one law, ye break that concerning the sabbath. But the laws of God are never contrary one to another; wisely therefore, wherein His disciples might be accused of having transgressed them, He shews that therein they followed the examples of Achimelech and David; and this their pretended charge of breaking the sabbath He retorts truly, and not having the plea of necessity, upon those who had brought the accusation.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that you should not say to me, that to find an instance of another's sin is not to excuse our own—indeed where the thing done and not the doer of it is accused, we excuse the thing done. But this is not enough, He said what is yet more, that they are blameless. But see how great things He brings in; first, the place, in the Temple; secondly, the time, on the sabbath; the setting aside the Law, in the word profane, not merely break; and that they are not only free from punishment but from blame; and are blameless. And this second instance is not like the first which He gave respecting David; for that was done but once, by David who was not a Priest, and was a case of necessity; but this second is done every sabbath, and by the Priests, and according to the Law. So that not only by indulgence, as the first case would establish, but by the strict law the disciples are to be held blameless. But are the disciples Priests? yea, they are yet greater than Priests, forasmuch as He was there who is the Lord of the Temple, who is the reality and not the type; and therefore it is added, But I say unto you, one greater than the Temple is here.

JEROME. The word Hic is not a pronoun, but an adverb of place here, for that place is greater than the Temple which contains the Lord of the Temple.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 10.) It should be observed, that one example is taken from royal persons, as David, the other from priestly, as those who profane the sabbath for the service of the Temple, so that much less can the charge concerning the rubbing the ears of corn attach to Him who is indeed King and Priest.

CHRYSOSTOM. And because what He had said seemed hard to those that heard it, He again exhorts to mercy, introducing His discourse with emphasis, saying, But had ye known what that meaneth, I will have mercy and not sacrifice, ye would never have condemned the innocent.

JEROME. What I will have mercy, and not sacrifice, signifies, we have explained above. The words, Ye mould never have condemned the innocent, are to be referred to the Apostles, and the meaning is, If ye allow the mercy of Achimelech, in that he refreshed David when in danger of famishing, why do ye condemn My disciples?

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe again how in leading the discourse towards an apology for them, He shews His disciples to be above the need of any apology, and to be indeed blameless, as He had said above of the Priests. And He adds yet another plea which clears them of blame, For the Son of Man is Lord also of the sabbath.

REMIGIUS. He calls Himself the Son of Man, and the meaning is, He whom ye suppose a mere man is God, the Lord of all creatures, and also of the sabbath, and He has therefore power to change the law after His pleasure, because He made it.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xvi. 28.) He did not forbid His disciples to pluck the ears of corn on the sabbath, that so He might convict both the Jews who then were, and the Manichæans who were to come, who will not pluck up a herb lest they should be committing a murder.

HILARY. Figuratively; First consider that this discourse was held at that time, namely, when He had given thanks to the Father for giving salvation to the Gentiles. The field is the world, the sabbath is rest, the corn the ripening of them that believe for the harvest; thus His passing through the corn field on the sabbath, is the coming of the Lord into the world in the rest of the Law; the hunger of the disciples is their desire for the salvation of men.

RABANUS. They pluck the ears of corn when they withdraw men from devotion to the world; they rub them in their hands when they tear away their hearts from the lusts of the flesh; they eat the grain when they transfer such as are amended into the body of the Church.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 2.) But no man passes into the body of Christ, until he has been stripped of his fleshly raiment; according to that of the Apostle, Put ye off the old man. (Eph. 4:22.)

RABANUS. This they do on the sabbath, that is in the hope of eternal rest, to which they invite others. Also they walk through the corn fields with the Lord, who have delight in meditating on the Scriptures; they are hungry while they desire to find the bread of life, that is the love of God, in them;

they pluck the ears of corn and rub them in their hands, while they examine the testimonies to discover what lies hid under the letter, and this on the sabbath, that is, while they are free from disquieting thoughts.

HILARY. The Pharisees, who thought that the key of the kingdom of heaven was in their hands, accused the disciples of doing what was not lawful to do; whereon the Lord reminded them of deeds in which, under the guise of facts, a prophecy was concealed; and that He might shew the power of all things, He further added, that it contained the form of that work which was to be, Had ye known what that meaneth, I will have mercy; for the work of our salvation is not in the sacrifice of the Law, but in mercy; and the Law having ceased, we are saved by the mercy of God. Which gift if they had understood they would not have condemned the innocent, that is His Apostles, whom in their jealousy they were to accuse of having transgressed the Law, where the old sacrifices having ceased, the new dispensation of mercy came through them to the aid of all.

12:9–13

9. And when he was departed thence, he went into their synagogue:

10. And, behold, there was a man which had his hand withered. And they asked him, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath days? that they might accuse him.

11. And he said unto them, What man shall there be among you, that shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit on the sabbath day, will he not lay hold on it, and lift it out?

12. How much then is a man better than a sheep? Wherefore it is lawful to do well on the sabbath days.

13. Then saith he to the man, Stretch forth thine hand. And he stretched it forth; and it was restored whole, like as the other.

JEROME. Because by fair instances He had vindicated His disciples from the charge of breaking the sabbath, the Pharisees seek to bring false accusation against Himself; whence it is said, And passing thence, he came into their synagogue.

HILARY. For the things that had gone before were said and done in the open air, and after this He entered the synagogue.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 35.) It might have been supposed that the matter of the ears of corn, and this cure following, had been done on the same day, for it is mentioned to have been the sabbath day in both cases, had not Luke shewn us that they were on different days. So that what Matthew says, And when he had passed thence, he came into their synagogue, is to be taken as that He did not enter into the synagogue till He had passed thence; but whether several days intervened or He went thither straight is not expressed in this Gospel, so that place is given to the relation of Luke, who tells of the healing of this kind of palsy on another sabbath.

HILARY. When He was entered into the synagogue, they bring a man of a withered hand, asking Him whether it was lawful to heal on the sabbath day, seeking an occasion of convicting Him out of His answer; as it follows, And they brought him a man haring a withered hand, and asked him, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath day?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl.) They do not ask that they may learn, but that they may accuse Him; as it follows, that they might accuse him. Though the action itself would have been enough, yet they sought occasion against Him in His words also, thus providing for themselves greater matter of complaint.

JEROME. And they ask Him whether it is lawful to heal on the sabbath day, that if He should refuse, they might charge Him with cruelty, or want of power; if He should heal him, they might charge Him with transgressing the Law.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 35.) But it may raise enquiry how Matthew can say that they asked the Lord, Whether it were lawful to heal on the sabbath, seeing Mark and Luke relate that it was the Lord who asked them, Whether it is lawful on the sabbath day to do good or to do evil? (Luke 6:9) It is to be understood then that they first asked the Lord, Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath day? Then understanding their thoughts that they sought an occasion to accuse Him, He placed in the midst him whom He was about to heal, and put to them the question which Mark and Luke say that He did ask; and when they remained silent, He made the comparison respecting the sheep, and concluded that they might do good on the sabbath day; as it follows, But he said unto them, What man shall there be among you, that shall have one sheep, and if it fall into a pit on the sabbath day, will he not lay hold on it, and lift it out?

JEROME. Thus He answers their question in such a way as to convict the questioners of covetousness. If ye on the sabbath, saith He, would hasten to lift out a sheep or any other animal that might have fallen into a pit, not for the sake of the animal, but to preserve your own property, how much more ought I to deliver a man who is so much better than a sheep?

GLOSS. (ord.) Thus He answers their question with a suitable example, so as to shew that they profane the sabbath by works of covetousness who were charging Him with profaning it by works of charity; evil interpreters of the Law, who say that on the sabbath we ought to rest from good deeds, when it is only evil deeds from which we ought to rest. As it is said, Ye shall do no servile work therein, (Lev. 23:3) that is, no sin. Thus in the everlasting rest, we shall rest only from evil, and not from good.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 35.) After this comparison concerning the sheep, He concludes that it is lawful to do good on the sabbath day, saying, Therefore it is lawful to do good on the sabbath.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how He shews many reasons for this breaking of the sabbath. But forasmuch as the man was incurably sick, He proceeds straightway to the work, as it follows, Then saith he to the man, Reach forth thy hand: and he reached it forth, and it was restored whole as the other.

JEROME. In the Gospel which the Nazarenes and Ebionites use, (vid. note, p. 433.) and which we have lately translated into Greek out of the Hebrew, and which many regard as the genuine Matthew, this man who has the withered hand is described as a builder, and he makes his prayer in these words, ‘I was a builder, and gained my living by the labour of my hands; I pray thee, Jesus, to restore me to health, that I may not disgracefully beg my bread.’

RABANUS. Jesus teaches and works chiefly on the sabbath, not only on account of the spiritual sabbath, but on account of the gathering together of the people, seeking that all should be saved.

HILARY. Figuratively After their departure from the corn field, from which the Apostles had received the fruits of their sowing, He came to the Synagogue, there also to make ready the work of His harvest; for there were afterwards many with the Apostles who were healed.

JEROME. Until the coming of the Lord the Saviour, there was the withered hand in the Synagogue of the Jews, and the works of the Lord were not done in it; but when He came upon earth, the right hand was restored in the Apostles who believed, and given back to its former occupation.

HILARY. All healing is done by the word; and the hand is restored as the other; that is, made like to the ministry of the Apostles in the business of bestowing salvation; and it teaches the Pharisees that they should not be displeased that the work of human salvation is done by the Apostles, seeing that if they would believe, their own hand would be made able to the ministry of the same duty.

RABANUS. Otherwise; The man who had the withered hand denotes the human race in its barrenness of good works dried up by the hand which was stretched out to the fruit; (Gen. 3:6.) this was healed by the stretching out of the innocent hand on the Cross. And well is this withered hand said to have been in the Synagogue, for where the gift of knowledge is greater, there is the greater danger of an irrecoverable infliction. The withered hand when it is to be healed is first bid to be stretched out, because the weakness of a barren mind is healed by no means better than by liberality of almsgiving. A man's right hand is affected when he is remiss in giving alms, his left whole when he is attentive to his own interests. But when the Lord comes, the right hand is restored whole as the left, because what he had got together greedily, that he distributes freely.

12:14–21

14. Then the Pharisees went out, and held a council against him, how they might destroy him.

15. But when Jesus knew it, he withdrew himself from thence: and great multitudes followed him, and he healed them all;

16. And charged them that they should not make him known:

17. That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the prophet, saying,

18. Behold my servant, whom I have chosen; my beloved, in whom my soul is well pleased: I will put my spirit upon him, and he shall shew judgment to the Gentiles.

19. He shall not strive, nor cry; neither shall any man hear his voice in the streets.

20. A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench, till he send forth judgment unto victory.

21. And in his name shall the Gentiles trust.

HILARY. The Pharisees are moved with jealousy at what had been done; because beholding the outward body of a man, they did not recognize the God in His works; The Pharisees went out and sought counsel against him, how they might destroy him.

RABANUS. He says, went out because their mind was alien from the Lord. They took counsel how they might destroy life, not how themselves might find life.

HILARY. And He knowing their plots withdrew, that He might be far from the counsels of the evil hearted, as it follows, Jesus knowing it departed thence.

JEROME. Knowing, that is, their designs against Him withdrew Himself, that He might remove from the Pharisees all opportunity of sin.

REMIGIUS. Or, He withdrew from thence as avoiding the designs of His own when they persecuted Him; or because that was not the time or place for Him to suffer, for It cannot he that a Prophet should perish out of Jerusalem, (Luke 13:33) as He Himself spake. The Lord also shunned those who persecuted Him through hatred, and went thither where He found many who were attached to Him from affection, whence it follows, And there followed him many. Him whom the Pharisees with one consent plotted against to destroy, the untaught multitude with one consent love and follow; whence they soon received the fulfilment of their desires, for it follows, And he healed them all.

HILARY. On those whom He healed He enjoined silence, whence it follows, And he charged them that they should not make him known. For his restored health was a witness to each man. And by commanding them to hold their peace, He avoids all ostentation of Himself, and at the same time notwithstanding affords a knowledge of Himself in that very admonition to hold their peace; for the observance of silence proceeds from that very thing which is to be kept silent.

RABANUS. In this also He instructs us, that when we have done any thing great we are not to seek praise abroad.

REMIGIUS. And He also gives them command that they should not make Him known, that they might not by persecuting Him be put into a worse state.

CHRYSOSTOM. And that you may not be troubled at those things which are done, and at the incredible madness of the Pharisees, He introduces the Prophet’s words. For such was the carefulness of the Prophets, that they had not omitted even this, but had noted all His ways and movements, and the meaning with which He did this; that you might learn that He spoke all things by the Holy Spirit, for if it be impossible to know the thoughts of men, much more to know the meaning of Christ, unless the Holy Spirit revealed it. Therefore it follows, That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by Esaias the Prophet, saying, Behold my servant whom I have chosen.

REMIGIUS. The Lord Jesus Christ is called the servant of the Almighty Godb, not in respect of His divinity, but in respect of the dispensation of the flesh which He took upon Him, because by the cooperation of the Holy Spirit He took flesh of the Virgin without stain of sin. Some books have, Elect, whom I have chosen, for He was chosen by God the Father, that is, predestinated that He should be the Son of God, proper, not adopted.

RABANUS. Whom I have chosen, he says, for a work which none else has done, that He should redeem the human race, and make peace between God and the world. It follows, My beloved, in whom my soul is well pleased, for He alone is the Lamb without spot of sin, of whom the Father speaks, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased. (Mat. 17:5)

REMIGIUS. That he says, My soul, is not to be understood as though God the Father had a soul, but by way of adaptation, shewing how God is disposed towards Him. And it is no wonder that a soul is ascribed to God in this manner, seeing that all other members of the body are likewise.

CHRYSOSTOM. This the Prophet puts in the beginning, that you might learn that that which is here said was according to the counsel of the Father. For he that is beloved does according to his will who loveth him. And again, he that is chosen, does not as an enemy break the law, nor as one being an adversary of the legislator, but as one in agreement with Him. Because therefore He is beloved, I will put my Spirit upon him.

REMIGIUS. Then also God the Father put His Spirit upon Him, when by the working of the Holy Spirit He took flesh of the Virgin; and as soon as He became man, He took the fulness of the Holy Spirit.

JEROME. But the Holy Spirit is put, not on the Word of God, but on the Only-Begotten, who came forth from the bosom of the Father; on Him, that is, of whom it is said, Behold my servant. And what He will do by Him He adds, And he shall declare judgment to the Gentiles.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xx. 30.) Seeing He preached the judgment to come which was hidden from the Gentiles.

CHRYSOSTOM. Further, to shew His lowliness, He says, He shall not strive; and so He was offered up as the Father had willed, and gave Himself willingly into the hands of His persecutors. Neither shall he cry; so He was dumb as a lamb before his shearer. Nor shall any hear voice in the streets.

JEROME. For the way is broad and wide which leads to destruction, and many walk in it; and being many, they will not hear the voice of the Saviour, because they are not in the narrow but in the broad way.

REMIGIUS. The Greek πλατεῖα, is in Latin called ‘latitudo.’ No one therefore has heard His voice in the streets, because He has not promised pleasant things in this world to those that love Him, but hardships.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord sought to heal the Jews by this mildness. But though they rejected Him, yet He did not resist them by destroying them; whence the Prophet, displaying His power and their weakness, says, A bruised reed he shall not break, and a smoking flax he shall not quench.

JEROME. He that holds not out his hand to a sinner, nor bears his brother’s burden, he breaks a bruised reed; and he who despises a weak spark of faith in a little one, he quenches a smoking flax.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup) So He neither bruised nor quenched the Jewish persecutors, who are here likened to a bruised reed which has lost its wholeness, and to a smoking flax which has lost its flame; but He spared them because He was not come to judge them, but to be judged by them.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 3.) In the smoking flax it is observed, that when the flame is out it causes a stink.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or this, He shall not break a bruised reed, shews that it was as easy for Him to break them all, as to break a reed, and that a bruised reed. And, He shall not quench a smoking flax, shews that their rage was fired, and that the power of Christ was strong to quench such rage with all readiness; hence in this is shewn the great mercy of Christ.

HILARY. Or, he means this bruised reed that is not broken, to shew that the perishing and bruised bodies of the Gentiles, are not to be broken, but are rather reserved for salvation. He shall not quench a smoking flax, shews the feebleness of that spark which though not quenched, only moulders in the flax, and that among the remnants of that ancient grace, the Spirit is yet not quite taken away from Israel, but power still remains to them of resuming the whole flame thereof in a day of penitence.

JEROME. (Ep. 121.2.) Or, the reverse, He calls the Jews a bruised reed, whom tossed by the wind and shaken from one another, the Lord did not immediately condemn, but patiently endured; and the smoking flax He calls the people gathered out of the Gentiles, who, having extinguished the light of the natural law, were involved in the wandering mazes of thick darkness of smoke, bitter and hurtful to the eyes; this He not only did not extinguish, by reducing them to ashes, but on the contrary from a small spark and one almost dead He raised a mighty flame.

CHRYSOSTOM. But one might say, What then, shall these things be always thus? Will He endure for ever those who thus lay snares, and are mad against Him? Far from it; when His own work shall be all complete, then shall He work these things also. And. this He signifies, saying, Until he shall send forth judgment to victory; as much as to say, When He shall have accomplished all things which are of Himself, then shall He bring in perfect vengeance; then shall they receive punishment when He has made his victory illustrious, that there be not left to them any irreverent opportunity of contradiction,

HILARY. Or, Until he shall send forth judgment to victory, that is, Until He shall take away the power of death, and bring in judgment and the return of His splendour.

RABANUS. Or, Until that judgment which was being done in Him should come forth to victory. For after that by His resurrection He had overcome death, and driven forth the prince of this world, He returned as conqueror to His kingdom to sit on the right hand of the Father, until He shall put all His enemies under His feet.

CHRYSOSTOM. But the things of this dispensation will not rest in this only, that they who have not believed should be punished, but He will also draw the world to Him; whence it follows, And in his name shall the Gentiles hope.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xx. 30.) This last we now see fulfilled; and thus this which cannot be denied establishes the truth of that which some have denied through ignorance, the last judgment namely, which He will hold upon earth, when he Himself shall come from heaven. For who could have expected that the Gentiles would have hope in Christ's name, when He was in the hands of His enemies, when He was bound, scourged, set at nought, and crucified; when even His disciples had lost that hope which they had begun to have in Him? That which one thief hardly hoped on the cross, the nations scattered far and wide now hope. And that they may not die for ever, they are marked with that very cross on which he died. Let none then doubt that the last judgment will be by Christ Himself.

REMIGIUS. And it should be known, that the meaning not only of this passage, but of many others also, is supported by this testimony from the Prophet. The words, Behold my servant, may be referred to the place in which the Father had said above, This is my Son. (Mat. 3:17.) The words, I will put my Spirit upon him, is referred to the descent of the Holy Spirit upon the Lord at His baptism; He shall declare judgment to the Gentiles, to that which He says below, When the Son of Man shall sit in the seat of his Majesty. (Mat. 25:31) What he adds, He shall not strive nor cry, refers to the Lord how He answered but little to the Chief Priests, and to Pilate, but to Herod nothing at all. He shall not break the bruised reed, refers to His shunning His persecutors that they might not be made worse; and that In his name shall the Gentiles hope, refers to what Himself says below, Go ye, and teach all nations. (Mat. 28:19)

12:22–24

22. Then was brought unto him one possessed with a devil, blind and dumb: and he healed him, insomuch that the blind and dumb both spake and saw.

23. And all the people were amazed, and said, Is not this the Son of David?

24. But when the Pharisees heard it, they said, This fellow doth not cast out devils, but by Beelzebub the prince of the devils.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord had refuted the Pharisees above, when they brought false charges against the miracles of Christ, as if He had broken the sabbath in doing them. But inasmuch as with a yet greater wickedness they perversely attributed the miracles of Christ done by divine power to an unclean spirit, therefore the Evangelist places first the miracle from which they had taken occasion to blaspheme, saying, Then was brought to him one that had a dæmon, blind and dumb.

REMIGIUS. The word Then refers to that above, where having healed the man who had the withered hand, He went out of the synagogue. Or it may be taken of a more extended time; Then, namely, when these things were being done or said.

CHRYSOSTOM. We may wonder at the wickedness of the dæmon; he had obstructed both inlets by which he could believe, namely, hearing and sight. But Christ opened both, whence it follows, And he healed him., insomuch that the blind and dumb both spake and saw.

JEROME. Three miracles were wrought in one and the same person at the same time; the blind sees, the dumb speaks, the possessed is delivered from the dæmon. This was at that time done in the flesh, but is now daily being fulfilled in the conversion of them that believe; the dæmon is cast out when they first behold the light of the faith, and then their mouths which had before been stopped are opened to utter the praises of God.

HILARY. Not without reason, after having mentioned that all the multitude was healed together, does he bring in the cure of this man separately who was dæmoniac, blind and dumb. For after the man of the withered hand had been brought before Him, and been healed in the Synagogue, it behoved that the salvation of the Gentiles should be represented in the person of some other afflicted man; he who had been the habitation of a dæmon, and blind and dumb, should be made meet to receive God, should contain God in Christ, and by confession of God should give praise to the works of Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 4.) For he that believes not, is truly dæmoniac, blind, and dumb; and he that has not understanding of the faith, nor confesses, nor gives praise to God, is subject to the devil.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 37) This narrative is given by Luke, not in this place, but after many other things intervening, and speaks of him as dumb only, and not blind. But he is not to be thought to be speaking of another man, because he is silent respecting this one particular; for in what follows he agrees exactly with Matthew.

HILARY. All the multitude were astonished at this which was done, but the jealousy of the Pharisees grew thereupon, And all the multitude were astonished and said, Is not this the Son of David?

GLOSS. (ap. Raban.) Because of His mercy and His goodness to them they proclaim Him the Son of David.

RABANUS. (e Beda in Luc.) The multitude who seemed less learned, always wondered at the works of the Lord; they, on the other hand, either denied these things, or what they could not deny laboured to pervert by an ill interpretation, as though they were wrought not by a Deity, but by an unclean spirit, namely, Beelzebub, who was the God of Acharon: The Pharisees when they heard it said, This man does not cast out dæmons but by Beelzebub, the prince of the dæmons.

REMIGIUS. Beelzebub is the same as Beel or Baal, or Beelphegor. Beel was father of Ninus king of Assyria; Baal was so called because he was worshipped on high; he was called Beelphegor from the mountain Phegor; Zebub was the servant of Abimelech the son of Gedeon, who, having slain his seventy brothers, built a temple to Baal, and set him up as Priest therein, to drive away the flies which were collected there by the abundant blood of the victims; for Zebub means, a fly. Beelzebub therefore is interpreted, The man of flies, wherefore from this most unclean worship they called him the Prince of the dæmons. Having therefore nothing more mean to cast upon the Lord, they said that He cast out dæmons by Beelzebub. And it should be known that this word is not to be read with d or t at the end, as some corrupt copies have, but with b.

12:25–26

25. And Jesus knew their thoughts, and said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand;

26. And if Satan east out Satan, he is divided against himself; how shall then his kingdom stand?

JEROME. The Pharisees ascribed the works of God to the Prince of the dæmons; and the Lord makes answer not to what they said, but to what they thought, that even thus they might be compelled to believe His power, Who saw the secrets of the heart; Jesus, knowing their thoughts, said unto them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli.) Above they had accused Christ of having cast out dæmons by Beelzebub; but then He did not reprove them, suffering them, if they would, to acknowledge Him from further miracles, and to learn His greatness from His doctrine. But because they continued to maintain the same things, He now rebukes them, although their accusation had been very unreasonable. But jealousy recks not what it says, so that only it say somewhat. Yet does not Christ contemn them, but answers with a gracious mildness, teaching us to be gentle to our enemies, and not to be troubled, even though they should speak such things against us, as we neither acknowledge in us, nor have any reasonableness in themselves. Therein also He proves that the things which they had said against Him were false, for it is not of one having a dæmon to shew such mercy, and to know the thoughts. Moreover, because this their accusation was very unreasonable, and they feared the multitude, they did not dare to proclaim it openly, but kept it in their thoughts; wherefore he says, Knowing their thoughts. He does not repeat their thoughts in His answer, not to divulge their wickedness; but He brings forward an answer; it was His object to do good to the sinners, not to proclaim their sin. He does not answer them out of the Scriptures, because they would not hearken to Him as they explained them differently, but He refutes them from common opinions. For assaults from without are not so destructive as quarrels within; and this is so in bodies and in all other things. But in the mean while He draws instances from matters more known, saying, Every kingdom divided against itself shall be brought to desolation; for there is nothing on earth more powerful than a kingdom, and yet that is destroyed by contention. What then must we say concerning a city or a family, that whether it be great or small, it is destroyed when it is at discord within itself.

HILARY. For a city or family is analogous to a kingdom, as it follows, And every city or house divided against itself shall not stand.

JEROME. For as small things grow by concord, so the greatest fall to pieces through dissensions.

HILARY. But the word of God is rich, and whether taken simply, or examined inwardly, it is needful for our advancement. Leaving therefore what belongs to the plain understanding thereof, let us dwell on some of the more secret reasons. The Lord is about to make answer to that which they had said concerning Beelzebub, and He casts upon those to whom He made answer a condition of their answering. Thus; The Law was from God and the promise of the kingdom to Israel was by the Law, but if the kingdom of the Law be divided in itself, it must needs be destroyed; and thus Israel lost the Law, when the nation whose was the Law, rejected the fulfilment of the Law in Christ. The city here spoken of is Jerusalem, which when it raged with the madness of its people against the Lord, and drove out His Apostles with the multitude of them that believed, after this division shall not stand; and thus (which soon happened in consequence of this division) the destruction of that city is declared. Again He puts another case, And if Satan cast out Satan, he is divided against himself; how then shall his kingdom stand?

JEROME. As much as to say, If Satan fight against himself, and dæmon be an enemy to dæmon, then must the end of the world be at hand, that these hostile powers should have no place there, whose mutual war is peace for men.

GLOSS. (ord.) He holds them therefore in this dilemma. For Christ casts out dæmons either by the power of God, or by the Prince of the dæmons. If by the power of God, their accusations are malicious; if by the Prince of the dæmons, his kingdom is divided, and will not stand, and therefore let them depart out of his kingdom. And this alternative He intimates that they had chosen for themselves, when they refused to believe in Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or thus; If he is divided, he is made weak, and perishes; but if he perishes, how can he cast out another?

HILARY. Otherwise; If the dæmon was driven to this division to the end that he should thus afflict the dæmons, even thus must we attribute higher power to Him who made the division than to those who are thus divided; thus the kingdom of the Devil, after this division made, is destroyed by Christ.

JEROME. But if ye think, ye Scribes and Pharisees, that the dæmons depart out of the possessed in obedience to their Prince, that men may be imposed upon by a concerted fraud, what can ye say to the healing of diseases which the Lord also wrought? It is something more if ye assign to the dæmons even bodily infirmities, and the signs of spiritual virtues.

12:27–28

27. And if I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children east them out? therefore they shall be your judges.

28. But if I cast out devils by the Spirit of God, then the kingdom of God is come unto you.

CHRYSOSTOM. After the first answer, He comes to a second more plain than the first, saying, And if I by Beelzebub cast out dæmons, by whom do your sons cast them out? Therefore shall they be your judges.

JEROME. He alludes, as is His manner, under the name children of the Jews, either to the exorcists of that race, or to the Apostles who are by race of that nation. If He means the exorcists who by the invocation of God cast out dæmons, He thus constrains the Pharisees by a wise enquiry to confess that their work was of the Holy Spirit. If, He would say, the casting out of the dæmons by your children is imputed to God, and not to dæmons, why should the same work wrought by Me not have the same cause? Therefore shall they be your judges, not by authority but by comparison, they ascribe the casting out of the dæmons to God, you to the Prince of the dæmons. But if it is of the Apostles also that this is said, (and so we should rather take it,) then they shall be their judges, for they shall sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

HILARY. And they are worthily appointed judges over them, to whom Christ is found to have given that power over the dæmons, which it was denied that He had.

RABANUS. Or, because the Apostles well knew within their own conscience that they had learnt no evil art from Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet He said not, My disciples, or Apostles, but your children; that if they chose to return again to their own privileges, they might take occasion hence; but if they should be ungrateful, they might not have even an impudent excuse. And the Apostles cast out dæmons by virtue of power which they had from Him, and yet the Pharisees made no such charge against them; for it was not the actions themselves, but the person of Christ to which they were opposed. Desiring then to shew that the things which were said against Him were only jealous suspicions, He brings forward the Apostles. And also He leads them to a knowledge of Himself, shewing how they stood in the way of their own good, and resisted their own salvation; whereas they ought to be joyful because He had come to bestow great goods upon them; If I by the Spirit of God cast out dæmons, then is the kingdom of God come upon you. This also shews that it is a matter of great power to cast out dæmons, and not an ordinary grace. And thus it is He reasons, Therefore is the kingdom of God come upon you, as much as to say, If this indeed be so, then is the Son of God come upon you. But this He hints darkly, that it may not seem hard to them. Also to draw their attention, He said not merely, The kingdom hath come, but, upon you; that is to say, These good things are coming for you; why do you oppose your own salvation; for this is the very sign given by the Prophets of the presence of the Son of God, that such works as these should be wrought by Divine power.

JEROME. For the kingdom of God denotes Himself, of whom it is written in another place, The kingdom of God is among you; (Luke 17:21) and, There standeth one in the midst of you whom ye know not. (John 1:26) Or surely that kingdom which both John and the Lord Himself had preached above, Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. (Mat. 3:2 4:17.) There is also a third kingdom of the Holy Scripture which shall be taken from the Jews, and be given to a nation that brings forth the fruit thereof.

HILARY. If then the disciples work by Christ, and Christ by the Spirit of God, already is the kingdom of God transferred to the Apostles through the office of the Mediator.

GLOSS. (ap Anselm.) For the weakening of the kingdom of the Devil is the increase of the kingdom of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 5.) Whence the sense might be this, If I by Beelzebub vast out dæmons, then, according to your own opinion, the kingdom of God is come upon you, for the kingdom of the Devil, being thus divided against itself, cannot stand. Thus calling that the kingdom of God, in which the wicked are condemned, and are separated from the faithful, who are now doing penitence for their sins.

12:29

29. Or else how can one enter into a strong man’s house, and spoil his goods, except he first bind the strong man? and then he will spoil his house.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having concluded the second answer, He brings forward yet a third, saying, Or how can any enter into a strong man’s house? For that Satan cannot cast out Satan is clear from what has been said; and that no other can cast him out, till he have first overcome him, is plain to all. Thus the same as before is established yet more abundantly; for He says, So far am I from having the Devil for my ally, that I rather am at war with him, and bind him; and in that I cast out after this sort, I therein spoil his goods. Thus He proves the very contrary of that they strove to establish. They would shew that He did not cast out dæmons of His own power; He proves that not only dæmons, yea but the prince also of the dæmons He hath bound, as is shewn by that which He hath wrought. For if their Prince were not overcome, how were the dæmons who are His subjects thus spoiled. This speech seems also to me to be a prophecy; inasmuch as He not only casts out dæmons, but will take away all error out of the world, and dissolve the craft of the Devil; and He says not rob, but spoil, shewing that He will do it with power.

JEROME. His house is this world, which is set in evil, not by the majesty of the Creator, but by the greatness of the sinner. The strong man is bound and chained in tartarus, bruised by the Lord’s foot. Yet ought we not therefore to be careless; for here the conqueror Himself pronounces our adversary to be strong.

CHRYSOSTOM. He calls him strong, shewing therein his old reign, which arose out of our sloth.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For he held us, that we should not by our own strength be able to free ourselves from him, but by the grace of God. By his goods, he means all the unbelievers. He has bound the strong man, in that He has taken away from him all power of hindering the faithful from following Christ, and gaining the kingdom of heaven.

RABANUS. Therefore He has spoiled his house, in that them whom He foresaw should be His own, He set free from the snares of the Devil, and has joined to the Church. Or in that He has divided the whole world among His Apostles and their successors to be converted. By this plain parable therefore He shews that He does not join in a deceitful working with the dæmons as they falsely accused Him, but by the might of His divinity He frees men from the dæmons.

12:30

30. He that is not with me is against me; and he that gathereth not with me scattereth abroad.

CHRYSOSTOM. After that third reply, here follows a fourth, He that is not with me is against me.

HILARY. Wherein He shews how far He is from having borrowed any power from the Devil; teaching us how great the danger to think amiss of Him, not to be with Whom, is the same as to be against Him.

JEROME. But let none think that this is said of heretics and schismatics; though we may apply it besides to such; but it is shewn by the context to refer to the Devil; in that the works of the Saviour cannot be compared with the works of Beelzebub. He seeks to hold men's souls in captivity, the Lord to set them free; he preaches idols, the Lord the knowledge of the true God; he draws men to sin, the Lord calls them back to virtues. How then can these have agreement together, whose works are so opposite?

CHRYSOSTOM. Therefore whoso gathereth not with me, nor is with me, may not be compared together with me, that with me he should cast out dæmons, but rather seeks to scatter what is mine. But tell me; If you were to have fought together with some one, and he should not be willing to come to your aid, is he not therefore against you? The Lord also Himself said in another place, He that is not against you is for you. (Luke 9:50) To which that which is here said is not contrary. For here He is speaking of the Devil who is our adversary—there of some man who was on their side, of whom it is said, We saw one casting out dæmons in thy name. Here He seems to allude to the Jews, classing them with the Devil; for they were against Him, and scattered what He would gather. But it is fair to allow that He spoke this of Himself; for He was against the Devil, and scattered abroad the things of the Devil.

12:31–32

31. Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men.

32. And whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had refuted the Pharisees by explaining His own actions, and He now proceeds to terrify them. For this is no small part of correction, to threaten punishment, as well as to set right false accusation.

HILARY. He condemns by a most rigorous sentence this opinion of the Pharisees, and of such as thought with them, promising pardon for all sins, but refusing it to blasphemy against the Spirit; Wherefore I say unto you, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men.

REMIGIUS. But it should be known that they are not forgiven to all men universally, but to such only as have performed due penitence for their guiltinesses. So by these words is overthrown the error of Novatian, who said that the faithful could not rise by penitence after a fall, nor merit pardon of their sins, especially they who in persecution deniedb.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 71. 13.) For what difference does it make to the purpose, whether it be said, The spirit of blasphemy shall not be forgiven, or, Whose shall blaspheme against the Holy Spirit it shall not be forgiven him. (Luke 12:10) as Luke speaks; except that the same sense is expressed more clearly in the one place than in the other, the one Evangelist not overthrowing but explaining the other? The spirit of blasphemy it is said shortly, not expressing what spirit; to make which clear it is added, And whoso shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him. After having said the same of all manner of blasphemy, He would in a more particular way speak of that blasphemy which is against the Son of Man, and which in the Gospel according to John He shews to be very heavy, where He says concerning the Holy Ghost, He shall convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment; of sin, because they believe not on me. That then which here follows, He who shall speak a word against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in that which is to come, is not said because the Holy Spirit is in the Trinity greater than the Son, which no heretic ever affirmed.

HILARY. And what is so beyond all pardon as to deny that in Christ which is of God, and to take away the substance of the Father’s Spirit which is in Him, seeing that He performs every work in the Spirit of God, and in Him God is reconciling the world unto Himself.

JEROME. Or the passage may be thus understood; Whoso speaks a word against the Son of Man, as stumbling at My flesh, and thinking of Me as no more than man, such opinion and blasphemy though it is not free from the sin of heresy, yet finds pardon because of the little worth of the body. But whoso plainly perceiving the works of God, and being unable to deny the power of God, speaks falsely against them prompted by jealousy, and calls Christ who is the Word of God, and the works of the Holy Ghost, Beelzebub, to him it shall not be forgiven, neither in this world, nor in the world to come.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But if this were said in such manner, then every other kind of blasphemy is omitted, and that only which is spoken against the Son of Man, as when He is pronounced to be mere man, is to be forgiven. That then that is said, All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men, without doubt blasphemy spoken against the Father is included in its largeness; though here again that alone is declared irremissible which is spoken against the Holy Ghost. What then, hath the Father also taken upon Him the form of a servant, that the Holy Ghost is thus as it were spoken of as greater? For who could not be convicted of having spoken a word against the Holy Spirit, before He become a Christian or a Catholic? First, the Pagans themselves when they say that Christ wrought miracles by magic arts, are they not like those who said that He cast out dæmons by the Prince of the dæmons? Likewise the Jews and all such heretics as confess the Holy Spirit, but deny that He is in the body of Christ, which is the Church Catholic, are like the Pharisees, who denied that the Holy Spirit was in Christ. Some heretics even contend that the Holy Spirit Himself is either a creature, as the Arians, Eunomians, and Macedonians, or deny Him at least in such sort that they may deny the Trinity in the Godhead; others assert that the Father alone is God, and the same is sometimes spoken of as the Son, sometimes as the Holy Spirit, as the Sabellians. The Photinians also say, that the Father only is God, and that the Son is nothing more than a man, and deny altogether that there is any third Person, the Holy Spirit. It is clear then that the Holy Spirit is blasphemed, both by Pagans, Jews, and heretics. Are all such then to be left out, and looked upon as having no hope? For if the word they have spoken against the Holy Spirit is not forgiven them, then in vain is the promise made to them, that in Baptism or in the Church, they should receive the forgiveness of their sins. For it is not said, ‘It shall not be forgiven him in Baptism;’ but, Neither in this world, nor in the world to come; and so they alone are to be supposed clear of the guilt of this most heavy sin who have been Catholics from their infancy. Some again think that they only sin against the Holy Ghost, who having been washed in the laver of regeneration in the Church, do afterwards, as though ungrateful for such a gift of the Saviour, plunge themselves into some deadly sin, such as adultery, murder, or quitting the Christian name, or the Church Catholic. But whence this meaning can be proved, I know not; since place for penitence of sins however great was never denied in the Church, and even heretics are exhorted to embrace it by the Apostle. If God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth. (2 Tim. 2:25.) Lastly, the Lord says not, ‘If any Catholic believer,’ but, Whoso shall speak a word, that is, whosoever, it shall not be forgiven him neither in this world, nor in the world to come.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. in Mont. 1.22.) Otherwise, The Apostle John says, There is a sin unto death; I do not say that he shall pray for it. This sin of the brother unto death I judge to be, when any one having come to the knowledge of God, through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, opposes Himself against the brotherhood, or is roused by the fury of jealousy against that grace by which he was reconciled to God. (1 John 5:16) The stain of this sin is so great, that it may not submit to the humility of prayer, even when the sinful conscience is driven to acknowledge and proclaim its own sin. Which state of mind because of the greatness of their sin we must suppose some may be brought to; and this perhaps may be to sin against the Holy Ghost, that is through malice and jealousy to assail brotherly charity after having received the grace of the Holy Spirit; and this sin the Lord declares shall be forgiven neither in this world, nor in that to come. Whence it may be enquired whether the Jews sinned this sin against the Holy Ghost when they said that the Lord cast out dæmons by Beelzebub the Prince of the dæmons. Are we to suppose this spoken of our Lord Himself, because He said in another place, If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household? (Mat. 10:24) Seeing they thus spoke out of jealousy, ungrateful for so great present benefits, are they, though not Christians, to be supposed by the very greatness of that jealousy to have sinned the sin against the Holy Spirit? This cannot be gathered from the Lord’s words. Yet He may seem to have warned them that they should come to grace, and that after that grace received they should not sin as they now sinned. For now their evil word had been spoken against the Son of Man, but it might be forgiven them, if they should be converted, and believe on Him. But if after they had received the Holy Spirit, they should be jealous against the brotherhood, and should fight against that grace which they had received, it should not be forgiven them neither in this world, nor in the world to come. For if He had there condemned them in such sort that no hope remained for them, He would not have added an admonition, Either make the tree good, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Retract. i. 19.) But I do not affirm this for certain, by saying that I think thus; yet thus much might have been added; If he should close this life in this impious hardness of heart, yet since we may not utterly despair of any however evil, so long as he is in this life, so neither is it unreasonable to pray for him of whom we do not despair.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 71. 8.) Yet is this enquiry very mysterious. Let us then seek the light of exposition from the Lord. I say unto you, beloved, that in all Holy Scripture there is not perhaps so great or so difficult a question as this. First then I request you to note that the Lord said not, Every blasphemy against the Spirit shall not be forgiven, nor, Whoso shall speak any word against—but, Whoso shall speak the word. Wherefore it is not necessary to think that every blasphemy and every word spoken against the Holy Spirit shall be without pardon; it is only necessary that there be some word which if spoken against the Holy Spirit shall be without pardon. For such is the manner of Scripture, that when any thing is so declared in it as that it is not declared whether it is said of the whole, or a part, it is not necessary that because it can apply to the whole, it therefore is not to be understood of the part. As when the Lord said to the Jews, If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin, (John 15:22) this does not mean that the Jews would have been altogether without sin, but that there was a sin they would not have had, if Christ had not come. What then is this manner of speaking against the Holy Ghost, comes now to be explained. Now in the Father is represented to us the Author of all things, in the Son birth, in the Holy Spirit community of the Father and the Son. What then is common to the Father and the Son, through that they would have us have communion among ourselves and with them; The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which he hath given us, (Rom. 5:5) and because by our sins we were alienated, from the possession of true goods, Charity shall cover the multitude of sins. (1 Pet. 4:8) And for that Christ forgives sins through the Holy Spirit, hence may be understood how, when He said to his disciples, Receive ye the Holy Spirit, (John 20:22) He subjoined straight, Whosesoever sins ye forgive, they shall be forgiven them. The first benefit therefore of them that believe is forgiveness of sins in the Holy Spirit. Against this gift of free grace the impenitent heart speaks; impenitence itself therefore is the blasphemy against the Spirit which shall not be forgiven, neither in this world, nor in that to come. For indeed he speaks the evil word against the Holy Spirit either in his thought, or with his tongue, who by his hard and impenitent heart treasures up for himself wrath against the day of wrath. Such impenitence truly has no forgiveness, neither in this world nor in the world to come, for penitence obtains forgiveness in this world which shall hold in the world to come. But that impenitence as long as any lives in the flesh may not be judged, for we must despair of none so long as the patience of God leads to repentance. For what if those whom you discover in any manner of sin, and condemn as most desperate, should before they close this life betake themselves to penitence, and find true life in the world to come? But this kind of blasphemy though it be long, and comprised in many words, yet the Scripture is wont to speak of many words as one word. It was more than a single word which the Lord spoke with the prophet, and yet we read, The word which came unto this or that prophet. Here perhaps some may enquire whether the Holy Spirit only forgives sins, or the Father and the Son likewise. We answer the Father and the Son likewise; for the Son Himself saith of the Father, Your Father shall forgive you your sins, (Mat. 6:14) and He saith of Himself, The Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins. (Mat. 9:6) Why then is that impenitence which is never forgiven, spoken of as blasphemy against the Holy Spirit only? Forasmuch as he who falls under this sin of impenitence seems to resist the gift of the Holy Spirit, because in that gift is conveyed remission of sin. But sins, because they are not remitted out of the Church, must be remitted in that Spirit by which the Church is gathered into one. Thus this remission of sins which is given by the whole Trinity is said to be the proper office of the Holy Spirit alone, for it is He, The Spirit of adoption, in which we cry, Abba Father, (Rom. 8:15) so that to Him we may pray, Forgive us our sins; And hereby we know, speaks John, that Christ abideth in us, by the Holy Spirit which He hath given unto us. (1 John 4:13) For to Him belongs that bond by which we are made one body of the only-begotten Son of God; for the Holy Spirit

Himself is in a manner the bond of the Father and the Son. Whosoever then shall be found guilty of impenitence against the Holy Spirit, in whom the Church is gathered together in unity and one bond of communion, it is never remitted to him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise according to the first exposition. The Jews were indeed ignorant of Christ, but of the Holy Ghost they had had a sufficient communication, for the Prophets spake by Him. What He here saith then is this; Be it that ye have stumbled at Me because of the flesh which is around Me; but can ye in the same manner say of the Holy Spirit, We know Him not? Wherefore this blasphemy cannot be forgiven you, and ye shall be punished both here and hereafter, for since to cast out dæmons and to heal diseases are of the Holy Spirit, you do not speak evil against Me only, but also against Him; and so your condemnation is inevitable both here and hereafter. For there are who are punished in this life only; as they who among the Corinthians were unworthy partakers of the mysteries; others who are punished only in the life to come, as the rich man in hell; but those here spoken of are to be punished both in this world, and in the world to come, as were the Jews, who suffered horrible things in the taking of Jerusalem, and shall there undergo most heavy punishment.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm. vid. infra in cap. 25. 46.) This passage destroys that heresy of Origen, who asserted that after many ages all sinners should obtain pardon; for it is here said, this shall not be forgiven either in this world, or in the world to come.

GREGORY. (Dial. iv. 39.) Hence we may gather that there are some sins that are remitted in this world, and some in the world to come; for what is denied of one sin, must be supposed to be admitted of others. And this may be believed in the case of trifling faults; such as much idle discourse, immoderate laughter, or the sin of carefulness in our worldly affairs, which indeed can hardly be managed without sin even by one who knows how he ought to avoid sin; or sins through ignorance (if they be lesser sins) which burden us even after death, if they have not been remitted to us while yet in this life. But it should be known that none will there obtain any purgation even of the least sin, but he who by good actions has merited the same in this life.

12:33–35

33. Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his fruit.

34. O generation of vipers, how can ye, being evil, speak good things? for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.

35. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii.) After his former answers He here again refutes them in another manner. This He does not in order to do away their charges against Himself, but desiring to amend them, saying, Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt. As much as to say, None of you has said that it is an evil thing for a man to be delivered from dæmons. But because they did not speak evil of the works, but said that it was the Devil that wrought them, He shews that this charge is contrary to the common sense of things, and human conceptions. And to invent such charges can only proceed from unbounded impudence.

JEROME. Thus He holds them in a syllogism which the Greeks call ‘Aphycton,’ the unavoidable; which shuts in the person questioned on both sides, and presses him with either horn. If, He saith, the Devil be evil, he cannot do good works; so that if the works you see be good, it follows that the Devil was not the agent thereof. For it cannot be that good should come of evil, or evil of good.

CHRYSOSTOM. For the discerning of a tree is done by its fruits, not the fruits by the tree. A tree is known by its fruits. For though the tree is the cause of the fruit, yet the fruit is the evidence of the tree. But ye do the very contrary, having no fault to allege against the works, ye pass a sentence of evil against the tree, saying that I have a dæmon.

HILARY. Thus did He at that present refute the Jews, who seeing Christ’s works to be of power more than human, would notwithstanding not allow the hand of God. And at the same time He convicts all future errors of the faith, such as that of those who taking away from the Lord His divinity, and communion of the Father’s substance, have fallen into divers heresies; having their habitation neither under the plea of ignorance as the Gentiles, nor yet within the knowledge of the truth. He figures Himself as a tree set in the body, seeing that through the inward fruitfulness of His power sprung forth abundant richness of fruit. Therefore either must be made a good tree with good fruits, or an evil tree with evil fruits; not that a good tree is to be made a bad tree, or the reverse; but that in this metaphor we may understand that Christ is either to be left in fruitlessness, or to be retained in the fruitfulness of good works. But to hold one's self neuter, to attribute some things to Christ, but to deny Him those things that are highest, to worship Him as God, and yet to deny Him a common substance with the Father, is blasphemy against the Spirit. In admiration of His so great works you dare not take away the name of God, yet through malevolence of soul you debase His high nature by denying His participation of the Father's substance.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 72. 1.) Or this is an admonition to ourselves that we should be good trees that we may be able to bring forth good fruit; Make the tree good, and its fruit good, is a precept of health to which obedience is necessary. But what He says, Make the tree corrupt, and its fruit corrupt, is not a command to do, but a warning to take heed, spoken against those who being evil thought that they could speak good things, or have good works; this the Lord declares is impossible. The man must be changed first, that his works may be changed; for if the man remains in that wherein he is evil, he cannot have good works; if he remains in that wherein he is good, he cannot have evil works. Christ found us all corrupt trees, but gave power to become sons of God to them that believe on His name.

CHRYSOSTOM. But as speaking not for Himself but for the Holy Spirit, He accordingly rebukes them, saying, Generation of vipers, how can ye being evil speak good things? This is both a rebuke of them, and a proof in their own characters of those things which had been said. As though He had said, So ye being corrupt trees cannot bring forth good fruit. I do not wonder then that you thus speak, for you are ill nourished of ill parentage, and have an evil mind. And observe He said not, How can ye speak good things, seeing ye are a generation of vipers? for these two are not connected together; but He said, How can ye being evil speak good things? He calls them generation of vipers, because they made boast of their forefathers; in order therefore to cut off this their pride, He shuts them out of the race of Abraham, assigning them a parentage corresponding to their characters.

RABANUS. Or the words, Generation of vipers, may be taken as signifying children, or imitators of the Devil, because they had wilfully spoken against good works, which is of the Devil, and thence follows, Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. That man speaks out of the abundance of the heart who is not ignorant with what intention his words are uttered; and to declare his meaning more openly He adds, A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth good things. The treasure of the heart is the intention of the thoughts, by which the Judge judges that work which is produced, so that sometimes though the outward work that is shewn seem great, yet because of the carelessness of a cold heart, they receive a little reward from the Lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. Herein also He shews His Godhead as knowing the hidden things of the heart; for not for words only, yea but for evil thoughts also they shall receive punishment. For it is the order of nature that the store of the wickedness which abounds within should be poured forth in words through the mouth. Thus when you shall hear any speaking evil, you must infer that his wickedness is more than what his words express; for what is uttered without is but the overflowing of that within; which was a sharp rebuke to them. For if that which was spoken by them were so evil, consider how evil must be the root from whence it sprung. And this happens naturally; for oftentimes the hesitating tongue does not suddenly pour forth all its evil, while the heart, to which none other is privy, begets whatsoever evil it will, without fear; for it has little fear of God. But when the multitude of the evils which are within is increased, the things which had been hidden then burst forth through the mouth. This is that He says, Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.

JEROME. What He says, The good man out of the good treasure of his heart, & c. is either pointed against the Jews, that seeing they blasphemed God, what treasure in their heart must that be out of which such blasphemy proceeded; or it is connected with what had gone before, that like as a good man cannot bring forth evil things, nor an evil man good things, so Christ cannot do evil works, nor the Devil good works.

12:36–37

36. But I say unto you, That every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment.

37. For by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord follows up what He had said before by moving their fears, shewing that they that have thus sinned shall receive the most extreme punishment, I say unto you, that every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give an account thereof in the day of judgment.

JEROME. And the meaning is; If every idle word which does not edify the hearers is not without danger to him that speaks it, and if each man shall render an account of his words in the day of judgment, how much more shall you, who have spoken falsely against the works of the Holy Spirit, saying that I cast out dæmons through Beelzebub, render an account of your false charge?

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not ‘which ye have spoken,’ but makes His teaching of universal application to the whole race of mankind, and at the same time His words less grievous to them that heard them. By an idle word is meant one that is false, that accuses any falsely. Some indeed say that it includes all light talk, all such as stirs immoderate laughter, or shameful and immodest words.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. vi.) Or such as lacks either rightness in itself, or reasons of just necessity;

JEROME. being spoken without the profit of either the speaker or hearer; as if laying aside weighty matters we should speak of frivolous trifles, or relate old fables. For he that deals in buffoon jests to create laughter, or brings forth any thing shameful, he will be held guilty not of an idle, but of a sinful word.

REMIGIUS. The words which here follow depend on those that went before; By thy words thou shat be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned. There is no doubt but that every man shall be condemned for his evil words which he speaks; but none shall be justified for his good words, unless they proceed from his inmost heart, and from a entire purpose.

CHRYSOSTOM. See that this sentence is not a burdensome one. The Judge will pass sentence not according to what any other has said concerning you, but according to what you have yourself spoken. They that are accused then have no need to fear, but they that accuse; for those are not charged of those evil things that have been spoken of them, but these of those evil things that they have spoken.

38. Then certain of the Scribes and of the Pharisees answered, saying, Master, we would see a sign from thee.

39. But he answered and said unto them, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given to it, but the sign of the prophet Jonas:

40. For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale’s belly: so shall the Son of man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliii.) Because the Lord had so oft repressed the shameless tongue of the Pharisees by His sayings, they now turn to His works, whereat the Evangelist wondering, says, Then certain of the Scribes and Pharisees answered, saying, Master, we would see a sign of thee; and that at a time when they should have been moved, when they should have wondered, and been dumb with astonishment; yet even at such time they desist not from their malice. For they say, We would see a sign of thee, that they may take Him as in a snare.

JEROME. They require a sign of Him, as though what they had seen were not signs; and in another Evangelist what they required is more fully expressed, We would see of thee a sign from heaven. Either they would have fire from heaven as Elias did; or after the example of Samuel they would that in summer-time, contrary to the nature of the climate, thunder should be heard, lightnings gleam, and rain descend; as though they could not have spoken falsely even against such miracles, and said that they befel by reason of divers hidden motions in the air. For if thou cavillest against what thou not only beholdest with thine eyes, but feelest with thine hand, and reapest the benefit of, what wilt thou do in those things which come down from heaven. You might make answer, that in Egypt the magi also had given many signs from heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. But their words are full of hypocrisy and irony. But now they were railing against Him, saying that He had a dæmon; now they fawn upon Him, calling Him, Master. Wherefore the Lord rebukes them severely; He answered and said unto them, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign. When they railed on Him, He had answered them mildly; now they approached Him with smooth and deceitful words, He rebukes them sharply; shewing that He was above either affection, and was neither moved to anger by evil speaking, nor was to be gained by flattery. What He says is this; What wonder that ye do thus to Me who am unknown to you, when you have done the same to the Father, of whom ye have had such large knowledge, in that, despising Him ye went after dæmons? He calls them an evil generation, because they have ever been ungrateful to their benefactors, and were made worse when they received benefits, which is the extreme of wickedness.

JEROME. Excellently is that said, and adulterous, seeing she has put away her husband, and, according to Ezekiel, has joined herself to many lovers.

CHRYSOSTOM. Which also proves Him to be equal to the Father, if not to believe in Him makes them adulterous.

RABANUS. Then He begins to answer them, giving them a sign not from heaven, which they were unworthy to see, but giving it them from the deep beneath. But to His own disciples He gave a sign from heaven, to whom He shewed the glory of His blessed eternity both in a figure on the mount, and after in verity when He was taken up into heaven. Wherefore it follows, And there shall no sign he given it, but the sign of the Prophet Jonas.

CHRYSOSTOM. For the signs He wrought were not in order to move them, for He knew that they were hard as stone, but for the profit of others. Or because they had not received it when He had given them a sign such as they now desired. And a sign was given them, when by their own punishment they learned His power. This He alludes to when He says, No sign shall he given it. As much as to say; I have shewn you many mercies; yet none of these has brought you to honour My power, which you will then know when you shall behold your city thrown down upon the ground in punishment. In the mean time He brings in a saying concerning the Resurrection which they should after understand by those things that they should suffer; saying, Except the sign of the Prophet Jonas. For verily His Cross would not have been believed, unless it had had signs to testify to it. But if that were not believed, truly the Resurrection would not have been believed. For this reason also He calls this a sign, and brings forward a figure thereof, that the verity itself may be believed. It follows, As Jonas was three days and three nights in the belly of the whale, RABANUS. He shews that the Jews were as criminal as the Ninevites, and that unless they repented they would be destroyed. But like as punishment was denounced against the Ninevites, and at the same time a remedy was set before them, so neither should the Jews despair of pardon, if at least after Christ's resurrection they should do penitence. For Jonas, that is The Dove, or The mourner, is a sign of Him on whom the Holy Spirit descended in the form of a Dove, and who bare our sorrows. (Is. 53:4) The fish which swallowed Jonas in the sea, shews forth the death which Christ suffered in the world. Three days and nights was the one in the whale's belly, the other in the tomb; the one was cast up on dry land, the other arose in glory.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. iii. 24.) Some, not knowing the Scripture manner of speaking, would interpret as one night those three hours of darkness when the sun was darkened from the sixth to the ninth hour; and as a day in like manner those other three hours in which it was again restored to the world, from the ninth hour till sunset. Then follows the night preceding the sabbath, which if we reckon with its own day we shall have thus two days and two nights. Then after the sabbath follows the night of the sabbath prime, that is of the dawning of the Lord's day on which the Lord arose. Thus we shall only get two nights and two days, with this one night to be added if we might understand the whole of it, and it could not be shewn that that dawn was indeed the latter part of the night. So that not even by taking in those six hours, three of darkness, and three of restored light, can we establish the computation of three days and three nights. It remains therefore that we find the explanation in that usual manner of Scripture of putting a part for the whole.

JEROME. Not that He remained three whole days and three nights in hell, but that this be understood to imply a part of the preparation day, and of the Lord's day, and the whole sabbath day.

AUGUSTINE. (De Trin. iv. 6.) For that the three days were not three full and entire days, Scripture witnesses; the first day is reckoned because the latter end of it comes in; and the third day is likewise reckoned, because the first part of it is included; while the day between, that is the second day, appears in all its twenty-four hours, twelve of the night and twelve of the day. For the succeeding night up to the dawn when the Lord's resurrection was made known, belongs to the third day. For as the first days of creation were, because of man’s coming fall, computed from morning to night; so these days are because of man’s restoration computed from night to morning.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not openly that He should rise again, because they would have derided him, but hints it distantly that even they might believe that He foreknew it. He said not in the earth, but in the heart of the earth, therein declaring His tomb, and that none might suspect that there was only the semblance of death. Therefore also He spake of three days, that it should be believed that He was dead. But the sign itself proves the truth of it; for Jonas was in the whale’s belly not in figure but in deed; and surely the sign did not happen in very deed, if the thing signified happened only in figure. Wherefore it is manifest that they are children of the Devil who follow Marcion asserting that the passion of Christ was only a phantasy. And that He should suffer for them also, though they would not profit by it, is shewn by that which He speaks, that to this generation should be given the sign of Jonas the Prophet.

12:41–42

41. The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: because they repented at the preaching of Jonas; and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here.

42. The queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: for she came from the uttermost parts of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon; and, behold, a greater than Solomon is here.

CHRYSOSTOM. That none should think that the same things would come to pass now among the Jews, as had of old been among the Ninevites; that as Jonas converted them and their city was delivered out of danger, so the Jews should be converted after the resurrection, the Lord now shews the contrary, that they should have no fruit of the benefit of the passion, but should suffer moreover grievous things, as He signifies below in the example of the dæmon. But now He first shews what just punishment they shall suffer, saying, The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation.

REMIGIUS. The Lord shews in these words that there shall be one resurrection of the good and the bad against certain heretics, who said that there should be two, one of the good, another of the bad. These words likewise overthrow that fable of the Jews, who use to say that the Resurrection shall be held a thousand years before the Judgment; these words clearly proving that the Judgment shall ensue straight upon the Resurrection. And shall condemn it.

JEROME. Not by a sentence of judgment, but by the comparison of their example; as He adds, For they repented at the preaching of Jonas; and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here. This word ‘hic’ is to be taken as an adverb of place, not as a pronoun. Jonas (according to the LXX) preached for three days, (Jonah 3:4 ἔτι τρδῖς ἡμέδαι) I for this so long time; he to the Assyrians an unbelieving nation, I to God’s own people the Jews; he preached with his voice only, doing no miracles, I, doing so many wonders, am falsely accused as Beelzebub.

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet does not the Lord stay here, but adds another denunciation, saying, The queen of the south shall rise in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it, for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon. This was yet more than that first. Jonas went to them; the queen of the south waited not for Solomon to come to her, but herself sought him. Both a woman and a barbarian, and dwelling so far away, she was not afraid of death in her desire to hear his wise words. This woman went to Solomon, I came hither; she rose up from the ends of the earth, I go round about your towns and villages; he spake of trees and wood, I of unspeakable mysteries.

JEROME. So the queen of the south will condemn the Jews in the same manner as the men of Nineveh will condemn unbelieving Israel. This is the queen of Saba, of whom we read in the book of Kings and Chronicles, who leaving her nation and kingdom came through so many difficulties to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and brought him many gifts. Also in these instances of Nineveh and the queen of Saba, the faith of the Gentiles is significantly set above that of Israel.

RABANUS. The Ninevites typify those who cease from sin—the queen those that know not to sin; for penitence puts away sin, wisdom shuns it.

REMIGIUS. Beautifully is the Church gathered out of the Gentiles spoken of as a queen who knows how to rule her ways. Of her the Psalmist speaks; The queen stood on thy right hand. (Ps. 45:9.) She is the queen of the south because she abounds in the fervour of the Holy Spirit. Solomon, interpreted ‘peaceful,’ signifies Him of whom it is said, He is our peace. (Eph. 2:14.)

12:43–45

43. When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest, and findeth none.

44. Then he saith, I will return into my house from whence I came out; and when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished.

45. Then goeth he, and taketh with himself seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state of that man is worse than the first. Even so shall it be also unto this wicked generation.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had said to the Jews, The men of Nineveh shall rise in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it; that they should not therefore be careless, He tells them that not only in the world to come but here also they should suffer grievous things; setting forth in a sort of riddle the punishment that should fall upon them; whence He says, When the unclean spirit has gone out of a man.

JEROME. Some suppose that this place is spoken of heretics, because the unclean spirit who dwelt in them before when they were Gentiles, is cast out before the confession of the true faith; when after they went over to heresy, and garnished their house with feigned virtues, then it is that the Devil, having taken to him other seven evil spirits, returns and dwells in them; and their last state becomes worse than their first. And indeed heretics are in a much worse condition than the Gentiles; for in the heretics was a hope of faith, in the Gentiles a war of discord. Yet though this exposition has a plausibility and a shew of learning, I am doubtful of its truth. For by the concluding words of this, whether it be parable or example, Titus shall it he to this evil generation, we are compelled to refer it, not to heretics, or to men in general, but to the Jewish people. So the context of the passage may not shift about loosely and vaguely, and be like unmeaning speeches, but may be consistent with itself from first to last. The unclean spirit then went out from the Jews when they received the Law; and being cast out of the Jews, he walked through the wilderness of the Gentiles; as it follows, He walketh through dry places seeking rest.

REMIGIUS. He calls the hearts of the Gentiles, dry places, as lacking all the moisture of wholesome waters, that is of the holy Scriptures, and of spiritual gifts, and strangers to the pouring in of the Holy Spirit.

RABANUS. Or, the dry places are the hearts of the faithful, which after they have been purged from the weakness of loose thoughts, the crafty lier-in-wait tries if by any means he may fix his footsteps there; but flying from the chaste spirit, the Devil finds no resting-place to his mind but in the heart of the wicked; as it follows, and findeth none.

REMIGIUS. The Devil supposed he should have rest for ever among the Gentiles, but it is added, and findeth none, because when the Son of God appeared in the mystery of His incarnation, the Gentiles believed.

JEROME. And when they believed on the Lord, the Devil, finding no place among the nations, said, I will return into my house whence I came out; I have the Jews from whom I formerly departed. And when he is come, he findeth it empty, swept, and garnished. For the temple of the Jews was empty, and had not Christ to dwell therein, He having said, Arise, let us go hence. (John 14:31) Seeing then they had not the protection of Angels, and were burdened with the useless observances of the Law, and the traditions of the Pharisees, the Devil returns to his former dwelling, and, taking to him seven other dæmons, inhabits it as before. And the last state of that nation is worse than the first, for they are now possessed by a larger number of dæmons in blaspheming Jesus Christ in their synagogues, than they were possessed with in Egypt before they had knowledge of the Law; for it is one thing to have no belief that He should come, another not to receive Him when He is come. A number seven-fold is joined with the Devil, either because of the sabbath, or from the number of the Holy Spirit; (Is. 11:2) that as in Isaiah upon the bud which comes from the root of Jesse, seven spirits of virtues are related to have descended; so on the other hand an equal number of vices should be poured forth upon the Devil. Beautifully then are seven spirits said to be taken to him, either because of the breaking of the sabbath, or because of the heinous sins which are contrary to the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, herein He may be shewing forth their punishment. As when dæmoniacs have been loosed from their infirmity, if they after become remiss, they draw upon themselves more grievous illusions, so shall it be among you—before ye were possessed by a dæmons, when you worshipped idols, and slew your sons to dæmon yet I forsook you not, but cast out that dæmon by the Prophets, and afterwards came Myself seeking to purify you altogether. Since then ye would not hearken to me, but have fallen into more heinous crime, (as it is greater wickedness to slay Christ than to slay the Prophets,) therefore ye shall suffer more heavy calamities. For what befel them under Vespasian and Titus, were much more grievous than they had suffered in Egypt, in Babylon, and under Antiochus. And this indeed is not all He shews concerning them, but also that since they were destitute of every virtue, they were more fit for the habitation of dæmons than before. It is reasonable to suppose that these things were said not to them only, but also to us. If after being enlightened and delivered from our former evils, we are again possessed by the same wickedness, the punishment of these latter sins will be greater than of the first; as Christ spake to the paralytic, Behold, thou art made whole, sin not, lest a worse thing come upon thee. (John 5:14)

RABANUS. For when any one is converted to the faith, the Devil is cast out of him in Baptism, who driven thence wanders up and down through the dry places, that is, the hearts of the faithful.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxiii. 3.) The dry places where no water is are the hearts of the righteous, which by the power of discipline are dried from all humours of carnal lust. The wet places are the minds of worldly men, which the humour of carnal lust fills, and makes watery; in such the Devil imprints his footsteps the more deeply, inasmuch as in his wanderings he comes down upon such hearts as upon low and marshy ground.

RABANUS. And returning to his house whence he had gone out, he findeth it empty, of good works through slothfulness, swept, that is, of its old vices by Baptism, and garnished with feigned virtues through hypocrisy.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 8.) So that in these words the Lord signifies that some shall so believe, as not to have strength for the work of continence, and shall return to the world. He taketh unto him other seven, is to be understood that when any has fallen from righteousness, he shall also have hypocrisy. For the lust of the flesh being cast out of its wonted works by penitence, when it finds not any delights in which it may rest, returns the more greedily, and again takes possession of the soul, if carelessness has ensued, and there has not been introduced as the dweller in the cleansed abode the word of God in sound doctrine. And as he will not only have the seven vices which are the contraries of the spiritual virtues, but will hypocritically feign that he has the virtues, therefore his old lust, taking to itself seven other worse, that is, this seven-fold hypocrisy, returns to him so as to make the last state of that man worse than the former.

GREGORY. (Mor. vii. 17.) For it often happens that the soul in the commencement of its progress is lifted up, and prides itself on its virtues, that it opens an entrance to the adversary who is raging against it, and who shews himself the more violent in breaking into it, by how much he was grieved at being cast out, though but for a short space.

12:46–50

46. While he yet talked to the people, behold, his mother and his brethren stood without, desiring to speak with him.

47. Then one said unto him, Behold, thy mother and thy brethren stand without, desiring to speak with thee.

48. But he answered and said unto him that told him, Who is my mother? and who are my brethren?

49. And he stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, Behold my mother and my brethren!

50. For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother.

HILARY. Because He had spoken all the aforesaid things in the power of His Father’s majesty, therefore the Evangelist proceeds to tell what answer He made to one that told Him that His mother and His brethren waited for Him without; While he yet spake unto the people, his mother and his brethren stood without desiring to see him.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 40.) We are to understand without doubt that this happened close upon the foregoing; for he begins to tell it with the words, And while he yet spake. What can that yet mean but that it was at the very time He spake the foregoing things? Mark also follows up that which He had said concerning blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, by saying, And there came his mother and his brethren. (Mark 3:31) Luke has not observed the order of action here, but has placed this earlier as he happened to recollect it.

JEROME. (cont. Helvid. 14, et seq.) From this is taken one of Helvidius's propositions, on the ground that mention is made in the Gospel of the brethren of the Lord. How, says he, are they called brethren of the Lord, if they were not his brethren? But now it should be known that in divine Scripture men are said to be brethren in four different ways, by nature, by nation, by kindred, and by affection. By nature, as Esau and Jacob. By nation, as all Jews are called brethren, as in Deuteronomy, Thou shalt not set over thee a foreigner who is not thy brother. (Deut. 17:15) They are called brethren by kindred who are of one family, as in Genesis, Abraham said unto Lot, Let there not be strife between thee and me, for we are brethren. (Gen. 13:8) Also men are called brethren by affection, which is of two kinds, special and general. Special, as all Christians are called brethren, as the Saviour says, Go tell my brethren. General, inasmuch as all men are born of one father, we are bound together by a tie of consanguinity, as in that, Say unto them that hate you, Ye are our brethren. (Is. 66:5 sec. LXX.) I ask then, after which manner these are called the Lord's brethren in the Gospel? According to nature? But Scripture saith not, neither calling them sons of Mary nor of Joseph. By nation? But it is absurd that some few out of all the Jews should be called brethren, seeing that all the Jews who were there might have thus been called brethren. By affection, either of a human sort, or of the Spirit? If that be true, yet how were they more His brethren than the Apostles, whom He instructed in the inmost mysteries. Or if because they were men, and all men are brethren, it was foolish to say of them in particular, Behold, thy brethren seek thee. It only remains then that they should be His brethren by kindred, not by affection, not by privilege of nation, not by nature.

JEROME. (in loc.) But some suspect the brethren of the Lord to be sons of Joseph by another wife, following the idle fancies of apocryphal writers, who have coined a certain woman called E sea. But we understand by the brethren of the Lord, not the sons of Joseph, but cousins of the Saviour, sons of a sister of Mary, an aunt of Our Lord, who is said to be the mother of James the Less, and Joseph, and Jude, whom in another place of the Gospel we find called the brethren of the Lord. (Mark 6:3) And that cousins are called brethren, appears from every part of Scripture.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv.) But mart the loftiness of His brethrena; when they should have come in and heartened with the crowd, or if they would not this, to have waited the end of His speech, and then to have approached Him—they on the contrary call Him out to them, and do this before the multitude, therein shewing their superabundant love of honour, and also, that with all authority they lay their commands upon Christ. This the Evangelist covertly hints when he says, While he yet spake; as much as to say, Was there no other time? But what did they seek to say? Was it aught of the dogmas of truth? then should they have brought it forth before all, that all might profit thereby. But if of other things that concerned themselves alone, they should not have called Him in such haste, whence it is plain that they did this out of vain glory.

AUGUSTINE. (De Nat. et Grat. 36.) But whatever may be decided concerning these brethren, yet concerning the holy Virgin Mary, (for the honour of Christ,) when sin in her is in question, I would not have it brought into doubt. For from this only we might know that more abundant grace was conferred upon her that she should overcome sin on all sides, because she merited to conceive and bring forth Him Who it is clear had no sin. It follows; Then said one unto him, Behold, thy mother and thy brethren stand without seeking thee.

JEROME. He that delivers this message, seems to me not to do it casually and without meaning, but as setting a snare for Him, whether He would prefer flesh and blood to the spiritual work; and thus the Lord refused to go out, not because He disowned His mother and His brethren, but that He might confound him that had laid this snare for Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. For He said not, Go and say unto her, She is not My mother, but continues His discourse to him that had brought Him word; as it follows; But he answered and said unto him that told him, Who is my mother? and who are my brethren?

HILARY. And He cannot be held to have thought meanly of His mother, seeing that in His passion He evinced the most extreme carefulness for her.

CHRYSOSTOM. But had He desired to disown His mother, He would have done it at the time when the Jews cast His birth in His teeth.

JEROME. He did not then, as Marcion and Manichæus say, disown His mother, so as to be thought to be born of a phantasm, but He preferred His

Apostles to His kindred, that we also in a comparison of our affections should set the spirit before the flesh.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 8:21.) Nor does He overthrow the duty of filial submission, which is conveyed in the command, Honour thy father and thy mother, (Ex. 20:12.) but shews that He owes more to the mysteries and relationship of His Father, than of His mother; as it follows, And stretching out his hand to his disciples, he said, Behold my mother and my brethren.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. iii. 2.) The Lord deigned to call faithful disciples His brethren, saying, Go, tell my brethren. Since then a man may be made a brother of the Lord by coming to the faith, it should be enquired how one may become also His mother. Be it known by us then, that he that by believing is made brother or sister of Christ, becomes His mother by preaching; for in pouring Him into the heart of the hearer, he may be said to beget the Lord; and he is made the Lord's mother, when by his word love of the Lord is begotten in the mind of his neighbour.

CHRYSOSTOM. And besides what has been said, He taught also somewhat more, namely, that we should not neglect virtue relying on any kindred. For if it profited His mother nothing that she was such, if she had not had virtue, who is there that shall be saved by his kindred? For there is one only nobility, to do the will of God, and therefore it follows, Whoso shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother. Many women have blessed that holy Virgin and her womb, and have desired to be made such mothers. What is it then that hinders? Behold, He hath set before you a broad way, and not women only, but men likewise, may become the mother of God.

JEROME. Let us also expound in another way. The Saviour is speaking to the multitude—that is, He teaches the Gentiles the inward mysteries; His mother and His brethren, that is the synagogue and the Jewish people, stand without.

HILARY. Although they had like the rest power to come in, yet they abstain from all approach to Him, for he came unto his own, and his own received him not. (John 1:11.)

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Thus also His mother is declared to stand without, as though she was not acknowledged, because the synagogue is therefore not acknowledged by its Author, because it held to the observance of the

Law, and having lost the spiritual discernment thereof, kept itself without to guard the letter.

JEROME. And when they shall have asked and enquired, and sent a messenger, they shall receive for answer, that their will is free, and that they can enter in, if they will believe.

CHAPTER 13

13:1–9

1. The same day went Jesus out of the house, and sat by the sea side.

2. And great multitudes were gathered together unto him, so that he went into a ship, and sat; and the whole multitude stood on the shore.

3. And he spake many things unto them in parables, saying, Behold, a sower went forth to sow;

4. And when he sowed, some seeds fell by the way side, and the fowls came and devoured them up:

5. Some fell upon stony places, where they had not much earth: and forthwith they sprung up, because they had no deepness of earth:

6. And when the sun was up, they were scorched; and because they had no root, they withered away.

7. And some fell among thorns; and the thorns sprung up, and choked them:

8. But other fell into good ground, and brought forth fruit, some an hundredfold, some sixtyfold, some thirtyfold.

9. Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He had rebuked him that told Him of His mother and His brethren, He then did according to their request; He departed out of the house, having first corrected His brethren for their weak desire of vainglory; He then paid the honour due to His mother, as it is said, The same day Jesus went forth out of the house, and sat down by the sea side.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 41.) By the words, The same day, he sufficiently shews that these things either followed immediately upon what had gone before, or that many things could not have intervened; unless indeed ‘day’ here after the Scripture manner signifies a period.

RABANUS. For not only the Lord’s words and actions, but His journeyings also, and the places in which He works His mighty works and preaches, are full of heavenly sacraments. After the discourse held in the house, wherein with wicked blasphemy He had been said to have a dæmon, He went out and taught by the sea, to signify that having left Judæa because of their sinful unbelief, He would pass to the salvation of the Gentiles. For the hearts of the Gentiles, long proud and unbelieving, are rightly likened to the swelling and bitter waves of the sea. And who knows not that Judæa was by faith the house of the Lord.

JEROME. For it must be considered, that the multitude could not enter into the house to Jesus, nor be there where the Apostles heard mysteries; therefore the Lord in mercy to them departed out of the house, and sat near the sea of this world, that great numbers might be gathered to Him, and that they might hear on the sea shore what they were not worthy to hear within; And great multitudes were gathered unto him, so that he went into a ship, and sat down, and all the people stood on the shore.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Evangelist did not relate this without a purpose, but that he might shew the Lord's will therein, who desired so to place the people that He should have none behind Him, but all should be before His face.

HILARY. There is moreover a reason in the subject of His discourse why the Lord should sit in the ship, and the multitude stand on the shore. For He was about to speak in parables, and by this action signifies that they who were without the Church could have no understanding of the Divine Word. The ship offers a type of the Church, within which the word of life is placed, and is preached to those without, and who as being barren sand cannot understand it.

JEROME. Jesus is in the midst of the waves; He is beaten to and fro by the waves, and, secure in His majesty, causes His vessel to come nigh the land, that the people not being in danger, not being surrounded by temptations which they could not endure, might stand on the shore with a firm step, to hear what was said.

RABANUS. Or, that He went into a ship and sat on the sea, signifies that Christ by faith should enter into the hearts of the Gentiles, and should gather together the Church in the sea, that is in the midst of the nations that spake against Him. And the crowd that stood on the sea shore, neither in the ship nor in the sea, offers a figure of those that receive the word of God, and are by faith separated from the sea, that is from the reprobate, but are not yet imbued with heavenly mysteries. It follows; And he spake many things unto them in parables.

CHRYSOSTOM. He had not done thus on the mount; He had not framed His discourse by parables. For there were the multitudes only, and a mixed crowd, but here the Scribes and Pharisees. But He speaks in parables not for this reason only, but to make His sayings plainer, and fix them more fully in the memory, by bringing things before the eyes.

JEROME. And it is to be noted, that He spake not all things to them in parables, but many things, for had He spoken all things in parables, the people would have departed without benefit. He mingles things plain with things dark, that by those things which they understand they may be incited to get knowledge of the things they understand not. The multitude also is not of one opinion, but of divers wills in divers matters, whence He speaks to them in many parables, that each according to their several dispositions may receive some portion of His teaching.

CHRYSOSTOM. He first sets forth a parable to make His hearers more attentive, and because He was about to speak enigmatically, He attracts the attention by this first parable, saying, Behold, a sower went forth to sow his seed.

JEROME. By this sower is typified the Son of God, who sows among the people the word of the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. Whence then went out He who is every where present, and how went He out? Not in place; but by His incarnation being brought nearer to us by the garb of the flesh. Forasmuch as we because of our sins could not enter in unto Him, He therefore came forth to us.

RABANUS. Or, He went forth, when having left Judea, He passed by the Apostles to the Gentiles.

JEROME. Or, He was within while He was yet in the house, and spake sacraments to His disciples. He went therefore forth from the house, that He might sow seed among the multitudes.

CHRYSOSTOM. When you hear the words, the sower went out to sow, do not suppose that is a tautology. For the sower goes out oftentimes for other ends; as, to break up the ground, to pluck up noxious weeds, to root up thorns, or perform any other species of industry, but this man went forth to sow. What then becomes of that seed? three parts of it perish, and one is preserved; but not all in the same manner, but with a certain difference, as it follows, And as he sowed, some fell by the wayside.

JEROME. This parable Valentinus lays hold of to establish his heresy, bringing in three different natures; the spiritual, the natural or the animal, and the earthly. But there are here four named, one by the wayside, one stony, one thorny, and a fourth the good ground.

CHRYSOSTOM. Next, how is it according to reason to sow seed among thorns, or on stony ground, or by the wayside? Indeed in the material seed and soil of this world it would not be reasonable; for it is impossible that rock should become soil, or that the way should not be the way, or that thorns should not be thorns. But with minds and doctrines it is otherwise; there it is possible that the rock be made rich soil, that the way should be no more trodden upon, and that the thorns should be extirpated. That the most part of the seed then perished, came not of him that sowed, but of the soil that received it, that is the mind. For He that sowed put no difference between rich and poor, wise or foolish, but spoke to all alike; filling up his own part, though foreseeing all things that should come to pass, so that He might say, What ought I to have done that I have not done? (Is. 5:4) He does not pronounce sentence upon them openly and say, this the indolent received and have lost it, this the rich and have choked it, this the careless and have lost it, because He would not harshly reprove them, that He might not alienate them altogether. By this parable also He instructs His disciples, that though the greater part of those that heard them were such as perished, yet that they should not therefore be remiss; for the Lord Himself who foresaw all things, did not on this account desist from sowing.

JEROME. Note that this is the first parable that has been given with its interpretation, and we must beware where the Lord expounds His own teachings, that we do not presume to understand any thing either more or less, or any way otherwise than as so expounded by Him.

RABANUS. But those things which He silently left to our understanding, should be shortly noticed. The wayside is the mind trodden and hardened by the continual passage of evil thoughts; the rock, the hardness of the self-willed mind; the good soil, the gentleness of the obedient mind, the sun, the heat of a raging persecution. The depth of soil, is the honesty of a mind trained by heavenly discipline. But in thus expounding them we should add, that the same things are not always put in one and the same allegorical signification.

JEROME. And we are excited to the understanding of His words, by the advice which follows, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

REMIGIUS. These ears to hear, are ears of the mind, to understand namely and do those things which are commanded.

13:10–17

10. And the disciples came, and said unto him, Why speakest thou unto them in parables?

11. He answered and said unto them, Because it is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given.

12. For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance: but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.

13. Therefore speak I to them in parables: because they seeing see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand.

14. And in them is fulfilled the prophecy of Esaias, which saith, By hearing ye shall hear, and shall not understand; and seeing ye shall see, and shall not perceive:

15. For this people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed: lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them.

16. But blessed are your eyes, for they see: and your ears, for they hear.

17. For verily I say unto you, That many prophets and righteous men have desired to see those things which ye see, and have not seen them; and to hear those things which ye hear, and have not heard them.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The disciples understanding that the things which were spoken by the Lord to the people were obscure, desired to hint to Him that He should not speak in parables to them. And his disciples came to him, and said, Why speakest thou to them in parables?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom, xlv.) Wherein it is worthy admiration, that the disciples who desire to learn of Him, know when they ought to ask Him, for they do not this before the multitude. This Matthew declares, when he says, And they came to him; (Mark 4:10) and Mark more expressly says, that they came to him when he was alone.

JEROME. We must enquire how they could come to Him at that time when Jesus was sitting in the ship; we may understand that they had at the first entered into the ship, and standing there, made this enquiry of Him.

REMIGIUS. The Evangelist therefore says, came to him, to express that they eagerly enquired of Him; or they might indeed approach Him bodily, though the space between them was small.

CHRYSOSTOM. And observe moreover their goodness, how great their thought for others, that they enquire about what concerns others, before what relates to themselves. For they say not, 'Why speakest thou to us in parables?' but to them. And he answered and said unto them, Because it is given to you to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven.

REMIGIUS. To you, I say, who adhere to Me, and believe in Me. By the mystery of the kingdom of heaven, He intends the Gospel doctrine. To them, that is, to them that are without, and who would not believe on Him, the Scribes namely and Pharisees, and to the rest who continue in unbelief, it is not given. Let us then, with the disciples, come unto the Lord with a pure heart, that He may think us worthy to interpret to us the evangelic teaching; according to that, They who draw near to his feet, shall receive of his doctrine. (Deut. 33:3)

CHRYSOSTOM. In saying this, He does not imply any necessity or fate, but shews at once, that they, to whom it is not given, are the cause of all their own miseries, and yet that the knowledge of the Divine mysteries is the gift of God, and a grace given from above. Yet this does not destroy free will, as is manifest from what follows, for to prevent that either these should despair, or those be remiss, when they hear that to you it is given, He shews that the beginning of all lays with ourselves, and then He adds, For whoso hath, to him shall be given, and he shall abound; and whoso hath not, from him shall be taken what he hath. As much as to say, Whoso has the desire and the zeal, to him shall be given all those things which are of God; but whoso lacketh these, and does not contribute that part that pertains to him, to him neither are the things which are of God given, but even those things that he hath are taken from him; not because God takes them away, but because he hath made himself unworthy of those that he has. Wherefore we also, if we see any hearkening carelessly, and having exhorted him to attend, he do not heed us, let us be silent; for should we persevere in urging him, his sloth-fulness will be the more charged against him. But him that is zealous to learn, we draw onwards, pouring forth many things. And He well said according to another Evangelist, That which he seemeth to have; (Luke 8:18.) for, in truth, he has not even that he has.

REMIGIUS. He that has a desire to read, shall have given to him power to understand, and whoso has not desire to read, that understanding which by the bounty of nature he seems to have, even that shall be taken from him. Or, whoso has charity, to him shall be given the other virtues also; and from him who has not charity, the other virtues likewise shall be taken away, for without charity there can be nothing good.

JEROME. Or, To the Apostles who believe in Christ there is given, but from the Jews who believed not on the Son of God there is taken away, even whatever good they might seem to have by nature. For they cannot understand any thing with wisdom, seeing they have not the head of wisdom.

HILARY. For the Jews not having faith, have lost also the Law which they had; and Gospel faith has the perfect gift, inasmuch as if received it enriches with new fruit, if rejected it subtracts from the riches of ancient possession.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that what He had said might be made more manifest He adds, Therefore speak I unto them in parables, because seeing they see not, and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand. Had this been a natural blindness, He ought to have opened their eyes; but forasmuch as it is voluntary, therefore He said not simply, ‘They see not,’ but, Seeing they see not. For they had seen the dæmons going out, and they said, He casts out dæmons by Beelzebub; they heard that He drew all men to God, and they say, This man is not of God. (John 9:16) Therefore because they spake the very contrary to what they saw and heard, to see and to hear is taken from them; for they profit nothing, but rather fall under judgment. For this reason He spake to them at first not in parables, but with much clearness; but because they perverted all they saw and heard, He now speaks in parables.

REMIGIUS. And it should be noted, that not only what He spake, but also what He did, were parables, that is, signs of things spiritual, which He clearly shews when He says, That seeing they may not see; but words are heard and not seen.

JEROME. This He says of those who were standing on the shore, and separated from Jesus, and who because of the dashing of the waves heard not distinctly what was said.

CHRYSOSTOM. And that they should not say, He slanders us as an enemy, He brings forward the Prophet declaring the same opinion, as it follows, That there might be fulfilled in them the prophecy of Isaiah, who said, With the hearing ye shall hear and shall not understand, and seeing ye shall see and shall not behold. (Is. 6:9)

GLOSS. (non occ.) That is; With the hearing ye shall hear words, but shall not understand the hidden meaning of those words; seeing ye shall see My flesh indeed, but shall not discern the divinity.

CHRYSOSTOM. This He said because they had taken away their own sight and hearing, shutting their eyes, and hardening their hearts. For not only did they not hear at all, but they heard obtusely, as it follows, The heart of this people is waxed gross, and they have heard hardly with their ears.

RABANUS. The heart of the Jews is made gross with the grossness of wickedness, and through the abundance of their sins they hear hardly the Lord’s words, because they have received them ungratefully.

JEROME. And that we should not suppose that this grossness of the heart and heaviness of the ears is of nature, and not of choice, He adds the fruit of their own wilfulness, For they have shut their eyes.

CHRYSOSTOM. Herein He points out how extreme their wickedness, how determined their aversion. Again to draw them towards Him, He adds, And be converted, and I should heal them; which shews that if they would be converted, they should be healed. As if one should say, If he would ask me I would immediately forgive him, this would point out how he might be reconciled; so here when He says, Lest they should he converted and I should heal them, He, shews that it was possible they should be converted, and having done penitence should be saved.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 14.) Otherwise; They have shut their eyes lest they should see with their eyes, that is, themselves were the cause that God shut their eyes. For another Evangelist says, We hath blinded their eyes. But is this to the end that they should never see? Or that they should not see so much as this, that becoming discontent with their own blindness and bewailing themselves, should so be humbled, and moved to confession of their sins and pious seeking after God. For Mark thus expresses the same thing, Lest they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them. From which we learn, that by their sins they deserved not to understand; and that yet this was allowed them in mercy that they should confess their sins, and should turn, and so merit to be forgiven. But when John relating this expresses it thus, Therefore they could not believe because Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes, and understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them, (John 12:39) this seems to be opposed to this interpretation, and to compel us to take what is here said, Lest they should see with their eyes, not as though they might come to see after this fashion, but that they should never see at all; for he says it plainly, That they should not see with their eyes. And that he says, Therefore they could not believe, sufficiently shows that the blindness was not inflicted, to the end that moved thereby, and grieving that they understood not, they should be converted through penitence; for that they could not, unless they had first believed, and by believing had been converted, and by conversion had been healed, and having been healed understood; but it rather shews that they were therefore blinded that they should not believe. For he speaks most clearly, Therefore they could not believe. But if it be so, who would not rise up in defence of the Jews, and pronounce them to be free from all blame for their unbelief? For, Therefore they could not believe, because he hath blinded their eyes. But because we must rather believe God to be without fault, we are driven to confess that by some other sins they had thus deserved to be blinded, and that indeed this blinding prevented them from believing; for the words of John are these, They could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes. It is in vain then to endeavour to understand it that they were therefore blinded that they should be converted; seeing they could not be converted because they believed not; and they could not believe because they were blinded. Or perhaps we should not say amiss thus—that some of the Jews were capable of being healed, but that being puffed up with so great swelling pride, it was good for them at first that they should not believe, that they might understand the Lord speaking in parables, which if they did not understand they would not believe; and thus not believing on Him, they together with the rest who were past hope crucified Him; and at length after His resurrection, they were converted, when humbled by the guilt of His death they loved Him the more because of the heavy guilt which had been forgiven them; for their so great pride needed such an humiliation to overcome it. This might indeed be thought an inconsistent explanation, did we not plainly read in the Acts of the Apostles that thus it was. This then that John says, Therefore they could not believe, because he hath blinded their eyes that they should not see, (Acts 2:37) is not repugnant to our holding that they were therefore blinded that they should be converted; that is to say, that the Lord’s meaning was therefore purposely clothed in the obscurities of parables, that after His resurrection they might turn them to wisdom with a more healthy penitence. For by reason of the darkness of His discourse, they being blinded did not understand the Lord’s sayings, and not understanding them, they did not believe on Him, and not believing on Him they crucified Him; thus after His resurrection, terrified by the miracles that were wrought in His name, they had the greater compunction for their great sin, and were more prostrated in penitence; and accordingly after indulgence granted they turned to obedience with a more ardent affection. Notwithstanding, some there were to whom this blinding profited not to conversion.

REMIGIUS. In all the clauses the word ‘not’ must be understood; thus; That they should not see with their eyes, and should not hear with their ears, and should not understand with their heart, and should not be converted, and I should heal them.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) so then the eyes of them that see, and will not believe, are miserable, but your eyes are blessed; whence it follows; Blessed are your eyes, for they see, and your ears, for they hear.

JEROME. If we had not read above that invitation to his hearers to understand, when the Saviour said, He that hath, ears to hear let him hear, we might here suppose that the eyes and ears which are now blessed are those of the body. But I think that those eyes are blessed which can discern Christ’s sacraments, and those ears of which Isaiah speaks, The Lord hath given me an ear. (Is. 50:4)

GLOSS. (ord.) The mind is called an eye, because it is intently directed upon what is set before it to understand it; and an ear, because it learns from the teaching of another.

HILARY. Or, He is speaking of the blessedness of the Apostolic times, to whose eyes and ears it was permitted to see and to hear the salvation of God, many Prophets and just men having desired to see and to hear that which was destined to be in the fulness of times; whence it follows; Verily I say unto you, that many Prophets and just men have desired to see the things that ye see, and to hear the things that ye hear, and have not heard them.

JEROME. This place seems to be contradicted by what is said elsewhere. Abraham rejoiced to see my day, and he saw it, and was glad. (John 8:56)

RABANUS. Also Isaiah and Micah, and many other Prophets, saw the glory of the Lord; and were thence called 'seers.'

JEROME. But He said not, 'The Prophets and the just men,' but many; for out of the whole number, it may be that some saw, and others saw not. But as this is a perilous interpretation, that we should seem to be making a distinction between the merits of the saints, at least as far as the degree of their faith in Christ, therefore we may suppose that Abraham saw in enigma, and not in substance. But ye have truly present with you, and hold, your Lord, enquiring of Him at your will, and eating with Him.1

CHRYSOSTOM. These things then which the Apostles saw and heard, are such as His presence, His voice, His teaching. And in this He sets them before not the evil only, but even before the good, pronouncing them more blessed than even the righteous men of old. For they saw not only what the Jews saw not, but also what the righteous men and Prophets desired to see, and had not seen. For they had beheld these things only by faith, but these by sight, and even yet more clearly. You see how He identifies the Old Testament with the New, for had the Prophets been the servants of any strange or hostile Deity, they would not have desired to see Christ.

13:18–23

18. Hear ye therefore the parable of the sower.

19. When any one heareth the word of the kingdom, and understandeth it not, then cometh the wicked one, and catcheth away that which was sown in his heart. This is he which received seed by the way side.

20. But he that received the seed into stony places, the same is he that heareth the word, and anon with joy receiveth it;

21. Yet hath he not root in himself, but dureth for a while: for when tribulation or persecution ariseth because of the word, by and by he is offended.

22. He also that received seed among the thorns is he that heareth the word; and the care of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choke the word, and he becometh unfruitful.

23. But he that received seed into the good ground is he that heareth the word, and understandeth it; which also beareth fruit, and bringeth forth, some an hundredfold, some sixty, some thirty.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) He had said above, that it was not given to the Jews to know the kingdom of God, but to the Apostles, and therefore He now concludes, saying, Hear ye therefore the parable of the sower, ye to whom are committed the mysteries of heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (De Gen. ad lit. viii. 4.) It is certain that the Lord spoke the things which the Evangelist has recorded; but what the Lord spake was a parable, in which it is never required that the things contained should have actually taken place.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) He proceeds then expounding the parable; Every man who hears the word of the kingdom, that is, My preaching which avails to the acquiring the kingdom of heaven, and understandeth it not; how he understands it not, is explained by, for the evil one—that is the Devil—cometh and taketh away that which is sown in his heart; every such man is that which is sown by the way side. And note that that which is sown, is taken in different senses; for the seed is that which is sown, and the field is that which is sown, both of which are found here. For where He says carrieth away that which is sown, we must understand it of the seed; that which follows, is sown by the way side, is to be understood not of the seed, but of the place of the seed, that is, of the man, who is as it were the field sown by the seed of the Divine word.

REMIGIUS. In these words the Lord explains what the seed is, to wit, the word of the kingdom, that is of the Gospel teaching. For there are some that receive the word of the Lord with no devotion of heart, and so that seed of God's word which is sown in their heart, is by dæmons straightway carried off, as it were the seed dropped by the way side. It follows, That which is sown upon the rock, is he that heareth the word, &c. For the seed or word of God, which is sown in the rock, that is, in the hard and untamed heart, can bring forth no fruit, inasmuch as its hardness is great, and its desire of heavenly things small; and because of this great hardness, it has no root in itself.

JEROME. Note that which is said, is straightway offended. There is then some difference between him who, by many tribulations and torments, is driven to deny Christ, and him who at the first persecution is offended, and falls away, of which He proceeds to speak, That which is sown among thorns. To me He seems here to express figuratively that which was said literally to Adam; Amidst briers and thorns thou shalt eat thy bread, (Gen. 3:18) that he that has given himself up to the delights and the cares of this world, eats heavenly bread and the true food among thorns.

RABANUS. Rightly are they called thorns, because they lacerate the soul by the prickings of thought, and do not suffer it to bring forth the spiritual fruit of virtue.

JEROME. And it is elegantly added, The deceitfulness of riches choke the word; for riches are treacherous, promising one thing and doing another. The tenure of them is slippery as they are borne hither and thither, and with uncertain step forsake those that have them, or revive those that have them not. Whence the Lord asserts, that rich men hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven, because their riches choke the word of God, and relax the strength of their virtues.

REMIGIUS. And it should be known, that in these three sorts of bad soil are comprehended all who can hear the word of God, and yet have not strength to bring it forth unto salvation. The Gentiles are excepted, who were not worthy even to hear it. It follows, That which is sown on the good ground. The good ground is the faithful conscience of the elect, or the spirit of the saints which receives the word of God with joy and desire and devotion of heart, and manfully retains it amid prosperous and adverse circumstances, and brings it forth in fruit; as it follows, And brings forth fruit, some a hundred-fold, some sixty-fold, some thirty-fold.

JEROME. And it is to be noted, that as in the bad ground there were three degrees of difference, to wit, that by the way side, the stony and the thorny ground; so in the good soil there is a three-fold difference, the hundred-fold, the sixty-fold, and the thirty-fold. And in this as in that, not the substance but the will is changed, and the hearts as well of the unbelieving as the believing receive seed; as in the first case He said, Then cometh the wicked one, and carrieth off that which is sown in the heart; and in the second and third case of the bad soil He said, This is he that heareth the word. So also in the exposition of the good soil, This is he that heareth the word. Therefore we ought first to hear, then to understand, and after understanding to bring forth the fruits of teaching, either an hundred-fold, or sixty, or thirty.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xxi. 27.) Some think that this is to be understood as though the saints according to the degree of their merits delivered some thirty, some sixty, some an hundred persons; and this they usually suppose will happen on the day of judgment, not after the judgment. But when this opinion was observed to encourage men in promising themselves impunity, because that by this means all might attain to deliverance, it was answered, that men ought the rather to live well, that each might be found among those who were to intercede for the liberation of others, lest these should be found to be I so few that they should soon have exhausted the number allotted to them, and thus there would remain many unrescued from torment, among whom might be found all such as in most vain rashness had promised themselves to reap the fruits of others.

REMIGIUS. The thirty-fold then is borne of him who teaches faith in the Holy Trinity; the sixty-fold of him who enforces the perfection of good works; (for in the number six this world was completed with all its equipments;) (Gen. 2:1) while he bears the hundred-fold who promises eternal life. For the number one hundred passes from the left hand to the right; and by the left hand the present life is denoted, by the right hand the life to come. Otherwise, the seed of the word of God brings forth fruit thirty-fold when it begets good thoughts, sixty-fold when good speech, and an hundred-fold when it brings to the fruit of good works.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 9.) Otherwise; There is fruit an hundred-fold of the martyrs because of their satiety of life or contempt of death; a sixty-fold fruit of virgins, because they rest not warring against the use of the flesh; for retirement is allowed to those of sixty years’ age after service in war or in public business; and there is a thirty-fold fruit of the wedded, because theirs is the age of warfare, and their struggle is the more arduous that they should not be vanquished by their lusts. Or otherwise; We must struggle with our love of temporal goods that reason may be master; it should either be so overcome and subject to us, that when it begins to rise it may be easily repressed, or so extinguished that it never arises in us at all. Whence it comes to pass, that death itself is despised for truth's sake, by some with brave endurance, by others with content, and by others with gladness—which three degrees are the three degrees of fruits of the earth—thirty-fold, sixty-fold, and an hundred-fold. And in one of these degrees must one be found at the time of his death, if any desires to depart well out of this life.

JEROME. (vid. Cyp. Tr. iv. 12.) Or, The hundred-fold fruit is to be ascribed to virgins, the sixty-fold to widows and continent persons, the thirty-fold to chaste wedlock.

JEROME. (Ep. 48. 2.) For the joining together of the hands, as it were in the soft embrace of a kiss, represents husband and wife. The sixty-fold refers to widows, who as being set in narrow circumstances and affliction are denoted by the depression of the finger; for by how much greater is the difficulty of abstaining from the allurements of pleasure once known, so much greater is the reward. The hundredth number passes from the left to the right, and by its turning round with the same fingers, not on the same hand, it expresses the crown of virginitya.

13:24–30

24. Another parable put he forth unto them, saying, The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man which sowed good seed in his field:

25. But while men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went his way.

26. But when the blade was sprung up, and brought forth fruit, then appeared the tares also.

27. So the servants of the householder came and said unto him, Sir, didst not thou sow good seed in thy field; from whence then hath it tares?

28. He said unto them, An enemy hath done this. The servants said unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up?

29. But he said, Nay; lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them.

30. Let both grow together until the harvest: and in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into my barn.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi.) In the foregoing parable the Lord spoke to such as do not receive the word of God; here of those who receive a corrupting seed. This is the contrivance of the Devil, ever to mix error with truth.

JEROME. He set forth also this other parable, as it were a rich householder refreshing his guests with various meats, that each one according to the nature of his stomach might find some food adapted to him. He said not ‘a second parable,’ but another; for had He said ‘a second,’ we could not have looked for a third; but another prepares us for many more.

REMIGIUS. Here He calls the Son of God Himself the kingdom of heaven; for He saith, The kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that sowed good seed in his field.

CHRYSOSTOM. He then points out the manner of the Devil’s snares, saying, While men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares in the midst of the wheat, and departed. He here shews that error arose after truth, as indeed the course of events testifies; for the false prophets came after the Prophets, the false apostles after the Apostles, and Antichrist after Christ. For unless the Devil sees somewhat to imitate, and some to lay in wait against, he does not attempt any thing. Therefore because he saw that this man bears fruit an hundred, this sixty, and this thirty-fold, and that he was not able to carry off or to choke that which had. taken root, he turns to other insidious practices, mixing up his own seed, which is a counterfeit of the true, and thereby imposes upon such as are prone to be deceived. So the parable speaks, not of another seed, but of tares which bear a great likeness to wheat com. Further, the malignity of the Devil is shewn in this, that he sowed when all else was completed, that he might do the greater hurt to the husbandman.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 11.) He says, While men slept, for while the heads of the Church were abiding in supineness, and after the Apostles had received the sleep of death, then came the Devil and sowed upon the rest those whom the Lord in His interpretation calls evil children. But we do well to enquire whether by such are meant heretics, or Catholics who lead evil lives. That He says, that they were sown among the wheat, seems to point out that they were all of one communion. But forasmuch as He interprets the field to mean not the Church, but the world, we may well understand it of the heretics, who in this world are mingled with the good; for they who live amiss in the same faith may better be taken of the chaff than of the tares, for the chaff has a stem and a root in common with the grain. While schismatics again may more fitly be likened to ears that have rotted, or to straws that are broken, crushed down, and cast forth of the field. Indeed it is not necessary that every heretic or schismatic should be corporally severed from the Church; for the Church bears many who do not so publicly defend their false opinions as to attract the attention of the multitude, which when they do, then are they expelled. When then the Devil had sown upon the true Church divers evil errors and false opinions; that is to say, where Christ's name had gone before, there he scattered errors, himself was the rather hidden and unknown; for He says, And went his way. Though indeed in this parable, as we learn from His own interpretation, the Lord may be understood to have signified under the name of tares all stumbling-blocks and such as work iniquity.

CHRYSOSTOM. In what follows He more particularly draws the picture of an heretic, in the words, When the blade grew, and put forth fruit, then appeared the tares also. For heretics at first keep themselves in the shade; but when they have had long license, and when men have held communication with them in discourse, then they pour forth their venom.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 12.) Or otherwise; When a man begins to be spiritual, discerning between things, then he begins to see errors; for he judges concerning whatsoever he hears or reads, whether it departs from the rule of truth; but until he is perfected in the same spiritual things, he might be disturbed at so many false heresies having existed under the Christian name, whence it follows, And the servants of the householder coming to him said unto him, Didst thou not sow good seed in thy field? whence then hath it tares? Are these servants then the same as those whom He afterwards calls reapers? Because in His exposition of the parable, He expounds the reapers to be the Angels, and none would dare to say that the Angels were ignorant who had sowed tares, we should the rather understand that the faithful are here intended by the servants. And no wonder if they are also signified by the good seed; for the same thing admits of different likenesses according to its different significations; as speaking of Himself He says that He is the door, he is the shepherd.

REMIGIUS. They came to the Lord not with the body, but with the heart and desire of the soul; and from Him they gather that this was done by the craft of the Devil, whence it follows, And he saith unto them, An enemy hath done this.

JEROME. The Devil is called a man that is an enemy because he has ceased to be God; and in the ninth Psalm it is written of him, Up, Lord, and let not man have the upper hand. (ver. 19) Wherefore let not him sleep that is set over the Church, lest through his carelessness the enemy should sow therein tares, that is, the dogmas of the heretics.

CHRYSOSTOM. He is called the enemy on account of the losses he inflicts on men; for the assaults of the Devil are made upon us, though their origin is not in his enmity towards us, but in his enmity towards God.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup) And when the servants of God knew that it was the Devil who had contrived this fraud, whereby when he found that he had no power in open warfare against a Master of such great name, he had introduced his fallacies under cover of that name itself, the desire might readily arise in them to remove such men from out of human affairs if opportunity should be given them; but they first appeal to God’s justice whether they should so do; The servants said, Wilt thou that we go and gather them out?

CHRYSOSTOM. Wherein observe the thoughtfulness and affection of the servants; they hasten to root up the tares, thus shewing their anxiety about the good seed; for this is all to which they look, not that any should be punished, but that that which is sown should not perish. The Lord’s answer follows, And he saith unto them, Nay.

JEROME. For room for repentance is left, and we are warned that we should not hastily cut off a brother, since one who is to-day corrupted with an erroneous dogma, may grow wiser tomorrow, and begin to defend the truth; wherefore it is added, Lest in gathering together the tares ye root out the wheat also.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 12.) Wherein He renders them more patient and tranquil. For this He says, because good men while yet weak, have need in some things of being mixed up with bad, either that they may be proved by their means, or that by comparison with them they may be greatly stimulated and drawn to a better course. Or perhaps the wheat is declared to be rooted up if the tares should be gathered out of it, on account of many who though at first tares would, after become wheat; yet they would never attain to this commendable change were they not patiently endured while they were evil. Thus were they rooted up, that wheat which they would become in time if spared, would be rooted up in them. It is then therefore He forbids that such should be taken away out of this life, lest in the endeavour to destroy the wicked, those of them should be destroyed among the rest who would turn out good; and lest also that benefit should be lost to the good which would accrue to them even against their will from mixing with the wicked. But this may be done seasonably when, in the end of all, there remains no more time for a change of life, or of advancing to the truth by taking opportunity and comparison of others' faults; therefore He adds, Let both grow together until the harvest, that is, until the judgment.

JEROME. But this seems to contradict that command, Put away the evil from among you. (1 Cor. 5:13) For if the rooting up be forbidden, and we are to abide in patience till the harvest-time, how are we to cast forth any from among us? But between wheat and tares (which in Latin we call 'lolium') so long as it is only in blade, before the stalk has put forth an ear, there is very great resemblance, and none or little difference to distinguish them by. The Lord then warns us not to pass a hasty sentence on an ambiguous word, but to reserve it for His judgment, that when the day of judgment shall come, He may cast forth from the assembly of the saints no longer on suspicion but on manifest guilt.

AUGUSTINE. (Cont. Ep. Parm. iii. 2.) For when any one of the number of Christians included in the Church is found in such sin as to incur an anathema, this is done, where danger of schism is not apprehended, with tenderness, not for his rooting out, but for his correction. But if he be not conscious of his sin, nor correct it by penitence, he will of his own choice go forth of the Church and be separated from her communion; whence when the Lord commanded, Suffer both to grow together till the harvest, He added the reason, saying, Lest when ye would gather out the tares ye root up the wheat also. This sufficiently shews, that when that fear has ceased, and when the safety of the crop is certain, that is, when the crime is known to all, and is acknowledged as so execrable as to have no defenders, or not such as might cause any fear of a schism, then severity of discipline does not sleep, and its correction of error is so much the more efficacious as the observance of love had been more careful. But when the same infection has spread to a large number at once, nothing remains but sorrow and groans. Therefore let a man gently reprove whatever is in his power; what is not so let him bear with patience, and mourn over with affection, until He from above shall correct and heal, and let him defer till harvest-time to root out the tares and winnow the chaff. But the multitude of the unrighteous is to be struck at with a general reproof, whenever there is opportunity of saying aught among the people; and above all when any scourge of the Lord from above gives opportunity, when they feel that they are scourged for their deserts; for then the calamity of the hearers opens their ears submissively to the words of their reprover, seeing the heart in affliction is ever more prone to the groans of confession than to the murmurs of resistance. And even when no tribulation lays upon them, should occasion serve, a word of reproof is usefully spent upon the multitude; for when separated it is wont to be fierce, when in a body it is wont to mourn.

CHRYSOSTOM. This the Lord spake to forbid any putting to death. For we ought not to kill an heretic, seeing that so a never-ending war would be introduced into the world; and therefore He says, Lest ye root out with them the wheat also; that is, if you draw the sword and put the heretic to death, it must needs be that many of the saints will fall with them. Hereby He does not indeed forbid all restraint upon heretics, that their freedom of speech should be cut off, that their synods and their confessions should be broken up—but only forbids that they should be put to death.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 93. 17.) This indeed was at first my own opinion, that no man was to be driven by force into the unity of Christ; but he was to be led by discourse, contended with in controversy, and overcome by argument, that we might not have men feigning themselves to be Catholics whom we knew to be declared heretics. But this opinion of mine was overcome not by the authority of those who contradicted me, but by the examples of those that shewed it in fact; for the tenor of those laws in enacting which Princes serve the Lord in fear, has had such good effect, that already some say, This we desired long ago; but now thanks be to God who has made the occasion for us, and has cut off our pleas of delay. Others say, This we have long known to be the truth; but we were held by a kind of old habit, thanks be to God who has broken our chains. Others again; We knew not that this was true, and had no desire to learn it, but fear has driven us to give our attention to it, thanks be to the Lord who has banished our carelessness by the spur of terror. Others, We were deterred from entering in by false rumours, which we should not have known to be false had we not entered in, and we should not have entered in had we not been compelled; thanks be to God who has broken up our preaching by the scourge of persecution, and has taught us by experience how empty and false things lying fame had reported concerning His Church. Others say, We thought indeed that it was of no importance in what place we held the faith of Christ; but thanks be to the Lord who has gathered us together out of our division, and has shewn us that it is consonant to the unity of God that He should be worshipped in unity. Let then the Kings of the earth shew themselves the servants of Christ by publishing laws in Christ's behalf.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 185. 32 et 22.) But who is there of you who has any wish that a heretic should perish, nay, that he should so much as lose aught? Yet could the house of David have had peace in no other way, but by the death of Absalom in that war which he waged against his father; notwithstanding his father gave strict commands to his servants that they should save him alive and unhurt, that on his repentance there might be room for fatherly affection to pardon; what then remained for him but to mourn over him when lost, and to console his domestic affliction by the peace which it had brought to his kingdom. Thus our Catholic mother the Church, when by the loss of a few she gains many, soothes the sorrow of her motherly heart, healing it by the deliverance of so much people. Where then is that which those are accustomed to cry out, That it is free to all to believe? Whom hath Christ done violence to? Whom hath He compelled? Let them take the Apostle Paul; let them acknowledge in him Christ first compelling and afterwards teaching, first smiting and afterwards comforting. And it is wonderful to see him who entered into the Gospel by the force of a bodily infliction labouring therein more than all those who are called by word only. (1 Cor. 15:10.) Why then should not the Church constrain her lost sons to return to her, when her lost sons constrained others to perish?

REMIGIUS. It follows, And in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them. The harvest is the season of reaping which here designates the day of judgment, in which the good are to be separated from the bad.

CHRYSOSTOM. But why does He say, Gather first the tares? That the good should hare no fears lest the wheat should be rooted up with them:

JEROME. In that He says that the bundles of tares are to be cast into the fire, and the wheat gathered into barns, it is clear that heretics also and hypocrites are to be consumed in the fires of hell, while the saints who are here represented by the wheat are received into the barns, that is into heavenly mansions.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 12.) It may be asked why He commands more than one bundle or heap of tares to be formed? Perhaps because of the variety of heretics differing not only from the wheat, but also among themselves, each several heresy, separated from communion with all the others, is designated as a bundle; and perhaps they may even then begin to be bound together for burning, when they first sever themselves from the Catholic communion, and begin to have their independent church, so that it is the burning and not the binding into bundles that will take place at the end of the world. But were this so, there would not be so many who would become wise again, and return from error into the Catholic Church. Wherefore we must understand the binding into bundles to be what shall come to pass in the end, that punishment should fall on them not promiscuously, but in due proportion to the obstinacy and wilfulness of each separate error.

RABANUS. And it should be noted that, when He says, Sowed good seed, He intends that good will which is in the elect; when He adds, An enemy came, He intimates that watch should be kept against him; when as the tares grow up, He suffers it patiently, saying, An enemy hath done this, He recommends to us patience; when He says, Lest haply in gathering the tares, &c. He sets us an example of discretion; when He says, Suffer both to grow together till the harvest, He teaches us long-suffering; and, lastly, He inculcates justice, when He says, Bind them into bundles to burn.

13:31–32

31. Another parable put he forth unto them, saying, The kingdom of heaven is like to a grain of mustard seed, which, a man took, and sowed in his field:

32. Which indeed is the least of all seeds: but when it is grown, it is the greatest among herbs, and becometh a tree, so that the birds of the air come

and lodge in the branches thereof.

CHRYSOSTOM. Seeing the Lord had said above that three parts of the seed perish, and one only is preserved, and of that one part there is much loss by reason of the tares that are sown upon it; that none might say, Who then and how many shall they be that believe; He removes this cause of fear by the parable of the mustard seed: therefore it is said, Another parable put he forth unto them, saying, The kingdom of heaven is like unto a grain of mustard seed.

JEROME. The kingdom of heaven is the preaching of the Gospel, and the knowledge of the Scriptures which leads to life, concerning which it is said to the Jews, The kingdom of God shall be taken from you. (Mat. 21:43.) It is the kingdom of heaven thus understood which is likened to a grain of mustard seed.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Ev. i. 11.) A grain of mustard seed may allude to the warmth of faith, or to its property as antidote to poison. It follows; Which a man took and sowed in his field.

JEROME. The man who sows is by most understood to be the Saviour, who sows the seed in the minds of believers; by others the man himself, who sows in his field, that is, in his own heart. Who indeed is he that soweth, but our own mind and understanding, which receiving the grain of preaching, and nurturing it by the dew of faith, makes it to spring up in the field of our own breast? Which is the least of all seeds. The Gospel preaching is the least of all the systems of the schools; at first view it has not even the appearance of truth, announcing a man as God, God put to death, and proclaiming the offence of the cross. Compare this teaching with the dogmas of the Philosophers, with their books, the splendour of their eloquence, the polish of their style, and you will see how the seed of the Gospel is the least of all seeds.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; The seed of the Gospel is the least of seeds, because the disciples were weaker than the whole of mankind; yet forasmuch as there was great might in them, their preaching spread throughout the whole world, and therefore it follows, But when it is grown it is the greatest among herbs, that is among dogmas.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Dogmas are the decisions of sects,1 the points, that is, that they have determined.

JEROME. For the dogmas of Philosophers when they have grown up, shew nothing of life or strength, but watery and insipid they grow into grasses and other greens, which quickly dry up and wither away. Brit the Gospel preaching; though it seem small in its beginning, when sown in the mind of the hearer, or upon the world, comes up not a garden herb, but a tree, so that the birds of the air (which we must suppose to be either the souls of believers or the Powers of God set free from slavery) come and abide in its branches. The branches of the Gospel tree which have grown of the grain of mustard seed, I suppose to signify the various dogmas in which each of the birds (as explained above) takes his rest. Let us then take the wings of the dove, that flying aloft we may dwell in the branches of this tree, and may make ourselves nests of doctrines, and soaring above earthly things may hasten towards heavenly. (Ps. 55:6.)

HILARY. Or; The Lord compares Himself to a grain of mustard seed, sharp to the taste, and the least of all seeds, whose strength is extracted by bruising.

GREGORY. (Mor. xix. 1.) Christ Himself is the grain of mustard seed, who, planted in the garden of the sepulchre, grew up a great tree; He was a grain of seed when He died, and a tree when He rose again; a grain of seed in the humiliation of the flesh, a tree in the power of His majesty.

HILARY. This grain then when sown in the field, that is, when seized by the people and delivered to death, and as it were buried in the ground by a sowing of the body, grew up beyond the size of all herbs, and exceeded all the glory of the Prophets. For the preaching of the Prophets was allowed as it were herbs to a sick man; but now the birds of the air lodge in the branches of the tree. By which we understand the Apostles, who put forth of Christ’s might, and overshadowing the world with their boughs, are a tree to which the Gentiles flee in hope of life, and having been long tossed by the winds, that is by the spirits of the Devil, may have rest in its branches.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The birds lodge in its branches, when holy souls that raise themselves aloft from thoughts of earth on the wings of the virtues, breathe again from the troubles of this life in their words and comfortings.

13:33

33. Another parable spake he unto them; The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took, and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened.

CHRYSOSTOM. The same thing the Lord sets forth in this parable of the leaven, as much as to say to His disciples, As leaven changes into its own kind much wheat-flour, so shall ye change the whole world. Note here the wisdom of the Saviour; He first brings instances from nature, proving that as the one is possible so is the other. And He says not simply ‘put,’ but hid; as much as to say, So ye, when ye shall be cast down by your enemies, then ye shall overcome them. And so leaven is kneaded in, without being destroyed, but gradually changes all things into its own nature; so shall it come to pass with your preaching. Fear ye not then because I said that many tribulations shall come upon you, for so shall ye shine forth, and shall overcome them all. He says, three measures, to signity a great abundance; that definite number standing for an indefinite quantity.

JEROME. The ‘satum’ is a kind of measure in use in Palestine containing one modius and a half.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 12.) Or, The leaven signifies love, because it causes activity and fermentation; by the woman He means wisdom. By the three measures He intends either those three things in man, with the whole heart, with the whole soul, with the whole mind; or the three degrees of fruitfulness, the hundred-fold, the sixty-fold, the thirty-fold, or those three kinds of men, Noe, Daniel, and Job.

RABANUS. He says, Until the whole was leavened, because that love implanted in our mind ought to grow until it changes the whole soul into its own perfection; which is begun here, but is completed hereafter.

JEROME. Or otherwise; The woman who takes the leaven and hides it, seems to me to be the Apostolic preaching, or the Church gathered out of divers nations. She takes the leaven, that is, the understanding of the Scriptures, and hides it in three measures of meal, that the three, spirit, soul, and body, may be brought into one, and may not differ among themselves. Or otherwise; We read in Plato that there are three parts in the soul, reason, anger, and desire; (R. P. iv. 439. λογιστιχὸν, ἐχιδνμπτιχὸυ, θνμοειδὲς) so we also if we have received the evangelic leaven of Holy Scripture, may possess in our reason prudence, in our anger hatred against vice, in our desire love of the virtues, and this will all come to pass by the Evangelic teaching which our mother Church has held out to us. I will further mention an interpretation of some; that the woman is the Church, who has mingled the faith of man in three measures of meal, namely, belief in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; which when it has fermented into one lump, brings us not to a threefold God, but to the knowledge of one Divinity. This is a pious interpretation; but parables and doubtful solutions of dark things, can never bestow authority on dogmas.

HILARY. Or otherwise; The Lord compares Himself to leaven; for leaven is produced from meal, and communicates the power that it has received to a heap of its own kind. The woman, that is the Synagogue, taking this leaven hides it, that is by the sentence of death; but it working in the three measures of meal, that is equally in the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospels, makes all one; so that what the Law ordains, that the Prophets announce, that is fulfilled in the developements of the Gospels. But many, as I remember, have thought that the three measures refer to the calling of the three nations, out of Shem, Ham, and Japhet. But I hardly think that the reason of the thing will allow this interpretation; for though these three nations have indeed been called, yet in them Christ is shewn and not hidden, and in so great a multitude of unbelievers the whole cannot be said to be leavened.

13:34–35

34. All these things spake Jesus unto the multitude in parables; and without a parable spake he not unto them.

35. That it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables; I will utter things which have been kept secret from the foundation of the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii.) After the foregoing parables, that none might think that Christ was bringing forward any thing new, the Evangelist quotes the Prophet, foretelling even this His manner of preaching: Mark’s words are, And with many such parables spake he the word unto them, as they were able to hear it. (Mark 4:33.) So marvel not that, in speaking of the kingdom, He uses the similitudes of a seed, and of leaven; for He was discoursing to common men, and who needed to be led forward by such aids.

REMIGIUS. The Greek word ‘Parable,’ is rendered in Latin ‘Similitude,’ by which truth is explained; and an image or representation of the reality is set forth.

JEROME. Yet He spoke not in parables to the disciples, but to the multitude; and even to this day the multitude hears in parables; and therefore it is said, And without a parable spake he not unto them.

CHRYSOSTOM. For though He had spoken many things not in parables, when not speaking before the multitudes, yet at this time spake He nothing without a parable.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 15.) Or, this is said, not that He uttered nothing in plain words; but that He concluded no one discourse without introducing a parable in the course of it, though the chief part of the discourse might consist of matter not figurative. And we may indeed find discourses of His parabolical throughout, but none direct throughout. And by a complete discourse, I mean, the whole of what He says on any topic that may be brought before Him by circumstances, before He leaves it, and passes to a new subject. For sometimes one Evangelist connects what another gives as spoken at different times; the writer having in such a case followed not the order of events, but the order of connexion in his own memory. The reason why He spake in parables the Evangelist subjoins, saying, That it might be fulfilled that was spoken by the Prophet, saying, I will open my mouth in parables, I will utter things kept secret from the foundation of the world. (Ps. 78:2.)

JEROME. This passage is taken from the seventy-seventh Psalm. I have seen copies which read, ‘by Esaias the Prophet,’ instead of what we have adopted, and what the common text has by the Prophet.

REMIGIUS. From which reading Porphyry took an objection to the believers; Such was your Evangelist’s ignorance, that he imputed to Isaiah what is indeed found in the Psalms.

JEROME. But because the text was not found in Isaiah, his name was, I suppose, therefore erased by such as had observed that. But it seems to me that it was first written thus, ‘As was written by Asaph the Prophet, saying;’ for the seventy-seventh Psalm out of which this text is taken is ascribed to Asaph the Prophet; and that the copyist not understanding Asaph, and imputing it to error in the transcription, substituted the better known name Isaiah. For it should be known that not David only, but those others also whose names are set before the Psalms, and hymns, and songs of God, are to be considered prophets, namely, Asaph, Idithum, and Heman the Esraite, and the rest who are named in Scripture. And so that which is spoken in the Lord's person, I will open my mouth in parables, if considered attentively, will be found to be a description of the departure of Israel out of Egypt, and a relation of all the wonders contained in the history of Exodus. By which we learn, that all that is there written may be taken in a figurative way, and contains hidden sacraments; for this is what the Saviour is there made to preface by the words, I will open my mouth in parables.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) As though He had said, I who spoke before by the Prophets, now in My own person will open My mouth in parables, and will bring forth out of My secret store mysteries which have been hidden ever since the foundation of the world.

13:36–43

36. Then Jesus sent the multitude away, and went into the house: and his disciples came unto him, saying, Declare unto us the parable of the tares of the field.

37. He answered and said unto them, He that soweth the good seed is the Son of man;

38. The field is the world; the good seed are the children of the kingdom; but the tares are the children of the wicked one;

39. The enemy that sowed them is the devil; the harvest is the end of the world; and the reapers are the angels.

40. As therefore the tares are gathered and burned in the fire; so shall it be in the end of this world.

41. The Son of man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity;

42. And shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth.

43. Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had spoken to the multitude in parables, that He might induce them to ask Him of their meaning; yet, though He had spoken so many things in parables, no man had yet asked Him aught, and therefore He sends them away; Then Jesus sent the multitude away, and went into the house. None of the Scribes followed Him here, from which it is clear that they followed Him for no other purpose than that they might catch Him in His discourse.

JEROME. The Lord sends away the multitude, and enters the house that His disciples might come to Him and ask Him privately of those things which the people neither deserved to hear, nor were able.

RABANUS. Figuratively; Having sent away the multitude of unquiet Jews, He enters the Church of the Gentiles, and there expounds to believers heavenly sacraments, whence it follows, And his disciples came to him, saying, Explain to us the parable of the tares of the field.

CHRYSOSTOM. Before, though desirous to learn, they had feared to ask; but now they ask freely and confidently because they had heard, To you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven; and therefore they ask when alone, not envying the multitude to whom it was not so given. They pass over the parables of the leaven and the mustard-seed as plain; and ask concerning the parable of the tares, which has some agreement with the foregoing parable concerning the seed, and shews somewhat more than that. And accordingly the Lord expounds it to them, as it follows, He answered and said unto them, He that sows the good seed is the Son of man.

REMIGIUS. The Lord styles Himself the Son of Man, that in that title He might set an example of humility; or perhaps because it was to come to pass that certain heretics would deny Him to be really man; or that through belief in His Humanity we might ascend to knowledge of His Divinity.

CHRYSOSTOM. The field is the world. Seeing it is He that sows His own field, it is plain that this present world is His. It follows, The good seed are the children of the kingdom.

REMIGIUS. That is, the saints, and elect men, who are counted as sons.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xviii. 7.) The tares the Lord expounds to mean, not as Manichæus interprets, certain spurious parts inserted among the true Scriptures, but all the children of the Evil one, that is, the imitators of the fraud of the Devil. As it follows, The tares are the children of the evil one, by whom He would have us understand all the wicked and impious.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 10.) For all weeds among corn are called tares. It follows, The enemy who sowed this is the Devil.

CHRYSOSTOM. For this is part of the wiles of the Devil, to be ever mixing up truth with error. The harvest is the end of the world. In another place He says, speaking of the Samaritans, Lift up your eyes, and consider the fields that they are already white for the harvest; (John 4:35.) and again, The harvest truly is great, but the labourers are few, (Luke 10:2.) in which words He speaks of the harvest as being already present. How then does He here speak of it as something yet to come? Because He has used the figure of the harvest in two significations as He says there that it is one that soweth, and another that reapeth; but here it is the same who both sows and reaps; indeed there He brings forward the Prophets, not to distinguish them from Himself, but from the Apostles, for Christ Himself by His Prophets sowed among the Jews and Samaritans. The figure of harvest is thus applied to two different things. Speaking of first conviction and turning to the faith, He calls that the harvest, as that in which the whole is accomplished; but when He enquires into the fruits ensuing upon the hearing the word of God, then He calls the end of the world the harvest, as here.

REMIGIUS. By the harvest is denoted the day of judgment, in which the good are to be separated from the evil; which will be done by the ministry of Angels, as it is said below, that the Son of Man shall come to judgment with His Angels. As then the tares are gathered and burned in the fire, so shall it be in the end of this world. The Son of man shall send forth his Angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all offences, and them which do iniquity.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei. xx. 9.) Out of that kingdom in which are no offences? The kingdom then is His kingdom which is here, namely, the Church.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 10.) That the tares are first separated, signifies that by tribulation the wicked shall be separated from the righteous; and this is understood to be performed by good Angels, because the good can discharge duties of punishment with a good spirit, as a judge, or as the Law, but the wicked cannot fulfil offices of mercy.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or we may understand it of the kingdom of the heavenly Church; and then there will be held out here a two-fold punishment; first that they fall from glory as that is said, And they shall gather out of his kingdom all offences, to the end, that no offences should be seen in His kingdom; and then that they are burned. And they shall cast them into a furnace of fire.

JEROME. The offences are to be referred to the tares.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The offences, and, them that do iniquity, are to be distinguished as heretics and schismatics; the offences referring to heretics; while by them that do iniquity are to be understood schismatics. Otherwise; By offences may be understood those that give their neighbour an occasion of falling, by those that do iniquity all other sinners.

RABANUS. Observe, He says, Those that do iniquity, not, those who have done; because not they who have turned to penitence, but they only that abide in their sins are to be delivered to eternal torments.

CHRYSOSTOM. Behold the unspeakable love of God towards men! He is ready to shew mercy, slow to punish; when He sows, He sows Himself; when He punishes, He punishes by others, sending His Angels to that. It follows, There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

REMIGIUS. In these words is shewn the reality of the resurrection of the body; and further, the twofold pains of hell, extreme heat, and extreme cold. And as the offences are referred to the tares, so the righteous are reckoned among the children of the kingdom; concerning whom it follows, Then the righteous shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. For in the present world the light of the saints shines before men, but after the consummation of all things, the righteous themselves shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. Not that they shall not shine with higher brightness, but because we know no degree of brightness that surpasses that of the sun, therefore He uses an example adapted to our understanding.

REMIGIUS. That He says, Then shall they shine, implies that they now shine for an example to others, but they shall then shine as the sun to the praise of God. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

RABANUS. That is, Let him understand who has understanding, because all these things are to be understood mystically, and not literally.

13:44

44. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like unto treasure hid in a field; the which when a man hath found, he hideth, and for joy thereof goeth and

selleth all that he hath, and buyeth that field.

CHRYSOSTOM. The foregoing parables of the leaven, and the grain of mustard-seed, are referred to the power of the Gospel preaching, which has subdued the whole world; in order to shew its value and splendour, He now puts forth parables concerning a pearl and a treasure, saying, The kingdom of heaven is like unto treasure hid in a field. For the Gospel preaching is hidden in this world; and if you do not sell your all you will not purchase it; and this you ought to do with joy; wherefore it follows, which when a man hath found, he hideth it.

HILARY. This treasure is indeed found without cost; for the Gospel preaching is open to all, but to use and possess the treasure with its field we may not without price, for heavenly riches are not obtained without the loss of this world.

JEROME. That he hides it, does not proceed of envy towards others, but as one that treasures up what he would not lose, he hides in his heart that which he prizes above his former possessions.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xi. 1.) Otherwise; The treasure hidden in the field is the desire of heaven; the field in which the treasure is hidden is the discipline of heavenly learning; this, when a man finds, he hides, in order that he may preserve it; for zeal and affections heavenward it is not enough that we protect from evil spirits, if we do not protect from human praises. For in this present life we are in the way which leads to our country, and evil spirits as robbers beset us in our journey. Those therefore who carry their treasure openly, they seek to plunder in the way. When I say this, I do not mean that our neighbours should not see our works, but that in what we do, we should not seek praise from without. The kingdom of heaven is therefore compared to things of earth, that the mind may rise from things familiar to things unknown, and may learn to love the unknown by that which it knows is loved when known. It follows, And for joy thereof he goeth and selleth all that he hath, and buyeth that field. He it is that selleth all he hath and buyeth the field, who, renouncing fleshly delights, tramples upon all his worldly desires in his anxiety for the heavenly discipline.

JEROME. Or, That treasure in which are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. 2:3.), is either God the Word, who seems hid in Christ’s flesh, or the Holy Scriptures, in which are laid up the knowledge of the Saviour.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Ev. i. 13.) Or, He speaks of the two testaments in the Church, which, when any hath attained to a partial understanding of, he perceives how great things lie hid there, and goeth and selleth all that he hath, and buyeth that; that is, by despising temporal things he purchases to himself peace, that he may be rich in the knowledge of God.

13:45–46

45. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like unto a merchant man, seeking goodly pearls:

46. Who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went and sold all that he had, and bought it.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Gospel preaching not only offers manifold gain as a treasure, but is precious as a pearl; wherefore after the parable concerning the treasure, He gives that concerning the pearl. And in preaching, two things are required, namely, to be detached from the business of this life, and to be watchful, which are denoted by this merchantman. Truth moreover is one, and not manifold, and for this reason it is one pearl that is said to be found. And as one who is possessed of a pearl, himself indeed knows of his wealth, but is not known to others, ofttimes concealing it in his hand because of its small bulk, so it is in the preaching of the Gospel; they who possess it know that they are rich, the unbelievers, not knowing of this treasure, know not of our wealth. Jerome; By the goodly pearls may be understood the Law and the Prophets. Hear then Marcion and Manichæus; the good pearls are the Law and the Prophets. One pearl, the most precious of all, is the knowledge of the Saviour and the sacrament of His passion and resurrection, which when the merchantman has found, like Paul the Apostle, he straightway despises all the mysteries of the Law and the Prophets and the old observances in which he had lived blameless, counting them as dung that he may win Christ. (Phil. 3:8.) Not that the finding of a new pearl is the condemnation of the old pearls, but that in omparison of that, all other pearls are worthless.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xi. 2.) Or by the pearl of price is to be understood the sweetness of the heavenly kingdom, which, he that hath found it, selleth all and buyeth. For he that, as far as is permitted, has had perfect knowledge of the sweetness of the heavenly life, readily leaves all things that he has loved on earth; all that once pleased him among earthly possessions now appears to have lost its beauty, for the splendour of that precious pearl is alone seen in his mind.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 13.) Or, A man seeking goodly pearls has found one pearl of great price; that is, he who is seeking good men with whom he may live profitably, finds one alone, Christ Jesus, without sin; or, seeking precepts of life, by aid of which he may dwell righteously among men, finds love of his neighbour, in which one rule, the Apostle says, (Rom. 13:9.) are comprehended all things; or, seeking good thoughts, he finds that Word in which all things are contained, In the beginning was the Word. (John 1:1.) which is lustrous with the light of truth, stedfast with the strength of eternity, and throughout like to itself with the beauty of divinity, and when we have penetrated the shell of the flesh, will be confessed as God. But whichever of these three it may be, or if there be any thing else that can occur to us, that can be signified under the figure of the one precious pearl, its preciousness is the possession of ourselves, who are not free to possess it unless we despise all things that can be possessed in this world. For having sold our possessions, we receive no other return greater than ourselves, (for while we were involved in such things we were not our own,) that we may again give ourselves for that pearl, not because we are of equal value to that, but because we cannot give any thing more.

13:47–50

47. Again, the kingdom of heaven is like unto a net, that was cast into the sea, and gathered of every kind:

48. Which, when it was full, they drew to shore, and sat down, and gathered the good into vessels, but cast the bad away.

49. So shall it be at the end of the world: the angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from the just,

50. And shall cast them into the furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth.

CHRYSOSTOM. In the foregoing parables He has commended the Gospel preaching; now, that we may not trust in preaching only, nor think that faith alone is sufficient for our salvation, He adds another fearful parable, saying, Again, the kingdom of heaven is like unto a net cast into the sea.

JEROME. In fulfilment of that prophecy of Hieremias, who said, I will send unto you many fishers, (Jer. 6:16.) when Peter and Andrew, James and John, heard the words, Follow me, I will make you fishers of men, they put together a net for themselves formed of the Old and New Testaments, and cast it into the sea of this world, and that remains spread until this day, taking up out of the salt and bitter and whirlpools whatever falls into it, that is good men and bad; and this is that He adds, And gathered of every kind.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xi. 4.) Or otherwise; The Holy Church is likened to a net, because it is given into the hands of fishers, and by it each man is drawn into the heavenly kingdom out of the waves of this present world, that he should not be drowned in the depth of eternal death. This net gathers of every kind of fishes, because the wise and the foolish, the free and the slave, the rich and the poor, the strong and the weak, are called to forgiveness of sin; it is then fully filled when in the end of all things the sum of the human race is completed; as it follows, Which, when it was filled, they drew out, and sitting down on the shore gathered the good into vessels, but the bad they cast away. For as the sea signifies the world, so the sea shore signifies the end of the world; and as the good are gathered into vessels, but the bad cast away, so each man is received into eternal abodes, while the reprobate having lost the light of the inward kingdom are cast forth into outer darkness. But now the net of faith holds good and bad mingled together in one; but the shore shall discover what the net of the Church has brought to land.

JEROME. For when the net shall be drawn to the shore, then shall be shewn the true test for separating the fishes.

CHRYSOSTOM. Wherein does this parable differ from the parable of the tares? There, as here, some perish and some are saved; but there, because of their heresy of evil dogmas; in the first parable of the sower, because of their not attending to what was spoken; here, because of their evil life, because of which, though drawn by the net, that is, enjoying the knowledge of God, they cannot be saved. And when you hear that the wicked are cast away, that you may not suppose that this punishment may be risked, He adds an exposition shewing its severity, saying, Thus shall it be in the end of the world; the angels shall come forth and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire, there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth. Though He elsewhere declares, that He shall separate them as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats; He here declares, that the Angels shall do it, as also in the parable of the tares.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) To fear becomes us here, rather than to expound for the torments of sinners are pronounced in plain terms, that none might plead his ignorance, should eternal punishment be threatened in obscure sayings.

JEROME. For when the end of the world shall be come, then shall be shewn the true test of separating the fishes, and as in a sheltered harbour the good shall be sent into the vessels of heavenly abodes, but the flame of hell shall seize the wicked to be dried up and withered.

13:51–52

51. Jesus saith unto them, Have ye understood all these things? They say unto him, Yea, Lord.

52. Then said he unto them, Therefore every Scribe which is instructed unto the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, which bringeth forth out of his treasure things new and old.

GLOSS. (non occ.) When the multitude had departed, the Lord spoke to His disciples in parables, by which they were instructed only so far as they understood them; wherefore He asks them, Have ye understood all these things? They say unto him, Yea, Lord.

JEROME. For this is spoken especially to the Apostles, whom He would have not to hear only as the multitude, but to understand as having to teach others.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then He praises them because they had understood; He saith unto them; Therefore every Scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven is like unto an householder who bringeth out of his treasure things new and old.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xx. 4.) He said not ‘old and new,’ as He surely would have said had He not preferred to preserve the order of value rather than of time. But the Manichæans while they think they should keep only the new promises of God, remain in the old man of the flesh, and put on newness of error.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 16.) By this conclusion, whether did He desire to shew whom He intended by the treasure hid in the field—in which case we might understand the Holy Scriptures to be here meant, the two Testaments by the things new and old—or did He intend that he should be held learned in the Church who understood that the Old Scriptures were expounded in parables, taking rules from these new Scriptures, seeing that in them also the Lord proclaimed many things in parables. If He then, in whom all those old Scriptures have their fulfilment and manifestation, yet speaks in parables until His passion shall rend the vail, when there is nothing hid that shall not be revealed; much more those things which were written of Him so long time before we see to have been clothed in parables; which the Jews took literally, being unwilling to be learned in the kingdom of heaven.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But if by things new and old in this passage we understand the two Testaments, we deny Abraham to have been learned, who although he knew indeed some deeds of the Old Testament, yet had not read the words. Neither Moses may we compare to a learned householder, for although he composed the Old Testament, yet had he not the words of the New. But what is here said may be understood as meant not of those who had been, but of such as might hereafter be in the Church, who then bring forth things new and old when they speak the preachings of both Testaments, in their words and in their lives.

HILARY. Speaking to His disciples, He calls them Scribes on account of their knowledge, because they understood the things that He brought forward, both new and old, that is from the Law and from the Gospels; both being of the same householder, and both treasures of the same owner. He compares them to Himself under the figure of a householder, because they had received doctrine of things both new and old out of His treasury of the Holy Spirit.

JEROME. Or the Apostles are called Scribes instructed, as being the Saviour's notaries who wrote His words and precepts on fleshly tables of the heart with the sacraments of the heavenly kingdom, and abounded in the wealth of a householder, bringing forth out of the stores of their doctrine things new and old; whatsoever they preached in the Gospels, that they proved by the words of the Law and the Prophets. Whence the Bride speaks in the Song of Songs; I have kept for thee my beloved the new with the old. (c. 7:13.)

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Otherwise; The things old are, that the human race for its sin should suffer in eternal punishment; the things new, that they should be converted and live in the kingdom. First, He brought forward a comparison of the kingdom to a treasure found and a pearl of price; and after that, narrated the punishment of hell in the burning of the wicked, and then concluded with Therefore every Scribe, &c. as if He had said, He is a learned preacher in the Church who knows to bring forth things new concerning the sweetness of the kingdom, and to speak things old concerning the terror of punishment; that at least punishment may deter those whom rewards do not excite.

13:53–58

53. And it came to pass, that when Jesus had finished these parables, he departed thence.

54. And when he was come into his own country, he taught them in their synagogue, insomuch that they were astonished, and said, Whence hath this man this wisdom, and these mighty works?

55. Is not this the carpenter’s son? is not his mother called Mary? and his brethren, James, and Joses, and Simon, and Judas?

56. And his sisters, are they not all with us? Whence then hath this man all these things?

57. And they were offended in him. But Jesus said unto them, A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country, and in his own house.

58. And he did not many mighty works there because of their unbelief.

JEROME. After the parables which the Lord spake to the people, and which the Apostles only understand, He goes over into His own country that He may teach there also.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 42.) From the foregoing discourse consisting of these parables, He passes to what follows without any very evident connexion between them. Besides which, Mark passes from these parables to a different event from what Matthew here gives; and Luke agrees with him, so continuing the thread of the story as to make it much more probable that that which they relate followed here, namely, about the ship in which Jesus slept, and the miracle of the demons cast out; which Matthew has introduced above.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii.) By his own country here, He means Nazareth; for it was not there but in Capharnaum that, as is said below, He wrought so many miracles; but to these He shews His doctrine, causing no less wonder than His miracles.

REMIGIUS. He taught in their synagogues where great numbers were met, because it was for the salvation of the multitude that He came from heaven upon earth. It follows; So that they marvelled, and said, Whence hath this man this wisdom, and these many mighty works? His wisdom is referred to His doctrine, His mighty works to His miracles.

JEROME. Wonderful folly of the Nazarenes! They wonder whence Wisdom itself has wisdom, whence Power has mighty works! But the source of their error is at hand, because they regard Him as the Son of a carpenter; as they say, Is not this the carpenter’s son?

CHRYSOSTOM. Therefore were they in all things insensate, seeing they lightly esteemed Him on account of him who was regarded as His father, notwithstanding the many instances in old times of sons illustrious sprung from ignoble fathers; as David was the son of a husbandman, Jesse; Amos the son of a shepherd, himself a shepherd. And they ought to have given Him more abundant honour, because, that coming of such parents, He spake after such manner; clearly shewing that it came not of human industry, but of divine grace.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (non occ. cf. Serm. 135. App.) For the Father of Christ is that Divine Workman who made all these works of nature, who set forth Noah’s ark, who ordained the tabernacle of Moses, and instituted the Ark of the covenant; that Workman who polishes the stubborn mind, and cuts down the proud thoughts.

HILARY. And this was the carpenter’s son who subdues iron by means of fire, who tries the virtue of this world in the judgment, and forms the rude mass to every work of human need; the figure of our bodies, for example, to the divers ministrations of the limbs, and all the actions of life eternal.

JEROME. And when they are mistaken in His Father, no wonder if they are also mistaken in His brethren. Whence it is added, Is not his mother Mary, and his brethren, James, and Joseph, and Simon, and Judas? And his sisters, are they not all with us?

JEROME. (in Helvid. 14.) Those who are here called the Lord’s brethren, are the sons of a Mary, His Mother’s sister; she is the mother of this James and Joseph, that is to say, Mary the wife of Cleophas, and this is the Mary who is called the mother of James the Less.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. in Matt. q. 17.) No wonder then that any kinsmen by the mother’s side should be called the Lord’s brethren, when even by their kindred to Joseph some are here called His brethren by those who thought Him the son of Joseph.

HILARY. Thus the Lord is held in no honour by His own; and though the wisdom of His teaching, and the power of His working raised their admiration, yet do they not believe that He did these things in the name of the Lord, and they cast His father’s trade in His teeth. Amid all the wonderful works which He did, they were moved with the contemplation of His Body, and hence they ask, Whence hath this man these things? And thus they were offended in him.

JEROME. This error of the Jews is our salvation, and the condemnation of the heretics, for they perceived Jesus Christ to be man so far as to think Him the son of a carpenter.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe Christ’s mercifulness; He is evil spoken of, yet He answers with mildness; Jesus said unto them, A prophet is not without honour, but in his own country, and in his own house.

REMIGIUS. He calls Himself a Prophet, as Moses also declares, when he says, A Prophet shall God raise up unto you of your brethren. (Deut. 18:18.) And it should be known, that not Christ only, who is the Head of all the Prophets, but Jeremiah, Daniel, and the other lesser Prophets, had more honour and regard among strangers than among their own citizens.

JEROME. For it is almost natural for citizens to be jealous towards one another; for they do not look to the present works of the man, but remember the frailties of his childhood; as if they themselves had not passed through the very same stages of age to their maturity.

HILARY. Further, He makes this answer, that a Prophet is without honour in his own country, because it was in Judæa that He was to be condemned to the sentence of the cross; and forasmuch as the power of God is for the faithful alone, He here abstained from works of divine power because of their unbelief; whence it follows, And he did not there many mighty works because of their unbelief.

JEROME. Not that because they did not believe He could not do His mighty works; but that He might not by doing them be condemning His fellow-citizens in their unbelief.

CHRYSOSTOM. But if His miracles raised their wonder, why did He not work many? Because He looked not to display of Himself, but to what would profit others; and when that did not result, He despised what pertained only to Himself that He might not increase their punishment. Why then did He even these few miracles? That they should not say, We should have believed had any miracles been done among us.

JEROME. Or we may understand it otherwise, that Jesus is despised in His own house and country, signifies in the Jewish people; and therefore He did among them few miracles, that they might not be altogether without excuse; but among the Gentiles He does daily greater miracles by His Apostles, not so much in healing their bodies, as in saving their souls.

CHAPTER 14

14:1–5

1. At that time Herod the tetrarch heard of the fame of Jesus.

2. And said unto his servants, This is John the Baptist; he is risen from the dead; and therefore mighty works do shew forth themselves in him.

3. For Herod had laid hold on John, and bound him, and put him in prison for Herodias’ sake, his brother Philip’s wife.

4. For John said unto him, It is not lawful for thee to have her.

5. And when he would have put him to death, he feared the multitude, because they counted him as a prophet.

GLOSS. (non occ.) THE. Evangelist had above shewn the Pharisees speaking falsely against Christ’s miracles, and just now His fellow-citizens wondering, yet despising Him; he now relates what opinion Herod had formed concerning Christ on hearing of His miracles, and says, At that time Herod the tetrarch heard the fame of Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is not without reason that the Evangelist here specifies the time, but that you may understand the pride and carelessness of the tyrant; inasmuch as he had not at the first made himself acquainted with the things concerning Christ, but now only after long time. Thus they, who in authority are fenced about with much pomp, learn these things slowly, because they do not much regard them.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 43.) Matthew says, At that time, not, On that day, or, In that same hour; for Mark relates the same circumstances, but not in the same order. He places this after the mission of the disciples to preach, though not implying that it necessarily follows there; any more than Luke, who follows the same order as Mark.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how great a thing is virtue; Herod fears John even after he is dead, and philosophizes concerning the resurrection; as it follows; And he saith to his servants, This is John the Baptist, he is risen from the dead, and therefore mighty works are wrought in him.

RABANUS. From this place we may learn how great the jealousy of the Jews was; that John could have risen from the dead, Herod, an alien-born, here declares, without any witness that he had risen: concerning Christ, whom the Prophets had foretold, the Jews preferred to believe, that He had not risen, but had been carried away by stealth. This intimates that the Gentile heart is more disposed to belief than that of the Jews.

JEROME. One of the Ecclesiastical interpreters asks what caused Herod to think that John was risen from the dead; as though we had to account for the errors of an alien, or as though the heresy of metempsychosis was at all supported by this place—a heresy which teaches that souls pass through various bodies after a long period of years—for the Lord was thirty years old when John was beheaded.

RABANUS. All men have well thought concerning the power of the resurrection, that the saints shall have greater power after they have risen from the dead, than they had while they were yet weighed down with the infirmity of the flesh; wherefore Herod says, Therefore mighty works are wrought in him.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Luke’s words are, John have I beheaded: who is he of whom I hear such things? (Luke 9:9.) As Luke has thus represented Herod as in doubt, we must understand rather that he was afterwards convinced of that which was commonly said—or we must take what he here says to his servants as expressing a doubt—for they admit of either of these acceptations.

REMIGIUS. Perhaps some one may ask how it can be here said, At that time Herod heard, seeing that we have long before read that Herod was dead, and that on that the Lord returned out of Egypt. This question is answered, if we remember that there were two Herods. On the death of the first Herod, his son Archelaus succeeded him, and after ten years was sent into exile to Vienne in Gaul. Then Cæsar Augustus gave command that the kingdom should be divided into tetrarchies, and gave three parts to the sons of Herod. This Herod then who beheaded John is the son of that greater Herod under whom the Lord was born; and this is confirmed by the Evangelist adding the tetrarch.

GLOSS. (ord.) Having mentioned this supposition of John’s resurrection, because he had never yet spoken of his death, he now returns, and narrates how it came to pass.

CHRYSOSTOM. And this relation is not set before us as a principal matter, because the Evangelist’s only object was to tell us concerning Christ, and nothing beyond, unless so far as it furthered this object. He says then, For Herod had seized John, and bound him.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 44.) Luke does not give this in the same order, but where he is speaking of the Lord’s baptism, so that he took beforehand an event which happened long afterwards. For after that saying of John’s concerning the Lord, that His fan is in His hand, he straightway adds this, which, as we may gather from John’s Gospel, did not follow immediately. For he relates that after Jesus was baptized, He went into Galilee, and thence returned into Judæa, and baptized there near to the Jordan before John was cast into prison. But neither Matthew nor Mark have placed John’s imprisonment in that order in which it appears from their own writings that it took place; for they also say that when John was delivered up, the Lord went into Galilee, and after many things there done, then by occasion of the fame of Christ reaching Herod they relate what took place in the imprisonment and beheading of John. The cause for which he had been cast into prison he shews when he says, On account of Herodias his brother’s wife. For John had said unto him, It is not lawful for thee to have her.

JEROME. The old history tells us, that Philip the son of Herod the greater, the brother of this Herod, had taken to wife Herodias daughter of Aretas, king of the Arabs; and that he, the father-in-law, having afterwards cause of quarrel with his son-in-law, took away his daughter, and to grieve her husband gave her in marriage to his enemy Herod. John the Baptist therefore, who came in the spirit and power of Elias, with the same authority that he had exerted over Ahab and Jezebel, rebuked Herod and Herodias, because that they had entered into unlawful wedlock; it being unlawful while the own brother yet lives to take his wife. He preferred to endanger himself with the King, than to be forgetful of the commandments of God in commending himself to him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet he speaks not to the woman but to the husband, as he was the chief person.

GLOSS. (ord.) And perhaps he observed the Jewish Law, according to which John forbade him this adultery. And desiring to kill him, he feared the people.

JEROME. He feared a disturbance among the people for John’s sake, for he knew that multitudes had been baptized by him in Jordan; but he was overcome by love of his wife, which had already made him neglect the commands of. God.

GLOSS. (ord.) The fear of God amends us, the fear of man torments us, but alters not our will; it rather renders us more impatient to sin as it has held us back for a time from our indulgence.

14:6–12

6. But when Herod’s birthday was kept, the daughter of Herodias danced before them, and pleased Herod.

7. Whereupon he promised with an oath to give her whatsoever she would ask.

8. And she, being before instructed of her mother, said, Give me here John Baptist’s head in a charger.

9. And the king was sorry: nevertheless for the oath’s sake, and them which sat with him at meat, he commanded it to be given her.

10. And he sent, and beheaded John in the prison.

11. And his head was brought in a charger, and given to the damsel: and she brought it to her mother.

12. And his disciples came, and took up the body, and buried it, and went and told Jesus.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist having related John’s imprisonment, proceeds to his putting to death, saying, But on Herod’s birthday, the daughter of Herodias danced in the midst.

JEROME. We find no others keeping their birthday besides Herod and Pharaoh, that they who were alike in their wickedness might be alike in their festivities.

REMIGIUS. It should be known that it is customary not for rich only but for poor mothers also, to educate their daughters so chastely, that they are scarce so much as seen by strangers. But this unchaste woman had so brought up her daughter after the same manner, that she had taught her not chastity but dancing. Nor is Herod to be less blamed who forgot that his was a royal palace, but this woman made it a theatre; And it pleased Herod, so that he swore with an oath that he would give her whatsoever she should ask of him.

JEROME. I do not excuse Herod that he committed this murder against his will by reason of his oath, for perhaps he took the oath for the very purpose of bringing about the murder. But if he says that he did it for his oath's sake, had she asked the death of her mother, or her father, would he have granted it or not? What then he would have refused in his own person, he ought to have rejected in that of the Prophet.

ISIDORE. (Lib. Syn. ii. 10.) In evil promises then break faith. That promise is impious which must be kept by crime; that oath is not to be observed by which we have unwittingly pledged ourselves to evil. It follows, And she being before instructed of her mother said, Give me here John Baptist's head in a charger.

JEROME. For Herodias, fearing that Herod might some time recover his senses, and be reconciled to his brother, and dissolve their unlawful union by a divorce, instructs her daughter to ask at once at the banquet the head of John, a reward of blood worthy of the deed of the dancing.

CHRYSOSTOM. Here is a twofold accusation against the damsel, that she danced, and that she chose to ask an execution as her reward. Observe how Herod is at once cruel and yielding; he obliges himself by an oath, and leaves her free to choose her request. Yet when he knew what evil was resulting from her request, he was grieved, And the king was sorry, for virtue gains praise and admiration even among the bad.

JEROME. Otherwise; It is the manner of Scripture to speak of events as they were commonly viewed at the time by all. So Joseph is called by Mary herself the father of Jesus; so here Herod is said to be sorry, because the guests believed that he was so. This dissembler of his own inclinations, this contriver of a murder displayed sorrow in his face, when he had joy in his mind. For his oath's sake, and them which sat with him at meat, he commanded it to be given. He excuses his crime by his oath, that his wickedness might be done under a pretence of piety. That he adds, and them that sat at meat with him, he would have them all sharers in his crime, that a bloody dish might be brought in in a luxurious feast.

CHRYSOSTOM. If he was afraid to have so many witnesses of his perjury, how much more ought he to have feared so many witnesses of a murder?

REMIGIUS. Here is a less sin done for the sake of another greater; he would not extinguish his lustful desires, and therefore he betakes him to luxurious living; he would not put any restraint on his luxury, and thus he passes to the guilt of murder; for, He sent and beheaded John in prison, and his head was brought in a charger.

JEROME. (Liv. xxxix. 43.) We read in Roman history, that Flaminius, a Roman general, sitting at supper with his mistress, on her saying that she had never seen a man beheaded, gave permission that a man under sentence for a capital crime should be brought in and beheaded during the entertainment. For this he was expelled the senate by the censors, because he had mingled feasting with blood, and had employed death, though of a criminal, for the amusement of another, causing murder and enjoyment to be joined together. How much more wicked Herod, and Herodias, and the damsel who danced; she asked as her bloody reward the head of a Prophet, that she might have in her power the tongue that reproved the unlawful nuptials.

GREGORY. (Mor. iii. 7.) But not without most deep wonder do I consider, that he who in his mother's womb was filled with the spirit of prophecy, than whom there arose not a greater among them that are born of women, is cast into prison by wicked men, and is beheaded because of the dancing of a girl, and that a man of such severe life dies for the sport of shameful men. Are we to think that there was any thing in his life which this so shameful death should wipe away? God thus oppresses His people in the least things, because He sees how He may reward them in the highest things. And hence may be gathered what they will suffer whom He casts away, if He thus tortures those He loves.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxix. 7.) And John is not sought out to suffer concerning the confession of Christ, but for the truth of righteousness. But because Christ is truth, he goes to death for Christ in going for truth. It follows, And his disciples came, and took up his body, and buried it.

JEROME. By which we may understand both the disciples of John himself, and of the Saviour.

RABANUS. (Antiq. xviii. 5 Machærus.) Josephus relates, that John was sent bound to the castle of Mecheron, and there beheaded; but ecclesiastical history relates that he was buried in Sebastia, a town of Palestine, which was formerly called Samaria.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix.) Observe how John’s disciples are henceforth more attached to Jesus; they it is who told Him what was done concerning John; And they came and told Jesus. For leaving all they take refuge with Him, and so by degrees after their calamity, and the answer given by Christ, they are set right.

HILARY. Mystically, John represents the Law; for the Law preached Christ, and John came of the Law, preaching Christ out of the Law. Herod is the Prince of the people, and the Prince of the people bears the name and the cause of the whole body put under him. John then warned Herod that he should not take to him his brother’s wife. For there are and there were two people, of the circumcision, and of the Gentiles; and these are brethren, children of the same parent of the human race, but the Law warned Israel that he should not take to him the works of the Gentiles and unbelief which was united to them as by the bond of conjugal love. On the birthday, that is amidst the enjoyments of the things of the body, the daughter of Herodias danced; for pleasure, as it were springing from unbelief, was carried in its alluring course throughout the whole of Israel, and the nation bound itself thereto as by an oath, for for sin and worldly pleasures the Israelites sold the gifts of eternal life. She (Pleasure), at the suggestion of her mother Unbelief, begged that there should be given her the head of John, that is, the glory of the Law; but the people knowing the good that was in the Law, yielded these terms to pleasure, not without sorrow for its own danger, conscious that it ought not to have given up so great glory of its teachers. But forced by its sins, as by the force of an oath, as well as overcome by the fear, and corrupted by the example of the neighbouring princes, it sorrowfully yields to the blandishments of pleasure. So among the other gratifications of a debauched people the head of John is brought in in a dish, that is by the loss of the Law, the pleasures of the body, and worldly luxury is increased. It is carried by the damsel to her mother; thus depraved Israel offered up the glory of the Law to pleasure and unbelief. The times of the Law being expired, and buried with John, his disciples declare what is done to the Lord, coming, that is, to the Gospels from the Law.

RABANUS. Otherwise; Even at this day we see that in the head of the Prophet John the Jews have lost Christ, who is the head of the Prophets.

JEROME. And the Prophet has lost among them both tongue and voice.

REMIGIUS. Otherwise; The beheading of John marks the increase of that fame which Christ has among the people, as the exaltation of the Lord upon the cross marks the progress of the faith; whence John had said, He must increase, but I must decrease. (John 3:30.)

14:13–14

13. When Jesus heard of it, he departed thence by ship into a desert place apart: and when the people had heard thereof, they followed him on foot out of the cities.

14. And Jesus went forth, and saw a great multitude, and was moved with compassion toward them, and he healed their sick.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The Saviour having heard the death of His Baptist, retired into the desert; as it follows, which when Jesus had heard, he departed thence by ship into a desert place.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 45.) This the Evangelist relates to have been done immediately after the passion of John, therefore after this were those things done that were spoken of above, and moved Herod to say, This is John. For we must suppose those things to have been after his death which report carried to Herod, and which moved him to doubt who he could be concerning whom he heard such things; for himself had put John to death.

JEROME. He did not retire into the desert through fear of death, as some suppose, but in mercy to His enemies, that they might not add murder to murder; putting off His death till the day of His passion; on which day the lamb is to be slain as the sacrament, and the posts of them that believe to be sprinkled with the blood. Or, He retired to leave us an example to shun that rashness which leads men to surrender themselves voluntarily, because not all persevere with like constancy under torture with the which they offered themselves to it. For this reason He says in another place, When they shall persecute you in one city, flee ye to another. Whence the Evangelist says not ‘fled,’ but elegantly, departed thence, (or, ‘withdrew,’) shewing that He shunned rather than feared persecution. Or for another reason He might have withdrawn into a desert place on hearing of John’s death, namely, to prove the faith of the believers.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; He did this because He desired to prolong the œconomy of His humanity, the time not being yet come for openly manifesting His deity; wherefore also He charged His disciples that they should tell no man that He was the Christ. But after His resurrection He would have this made manifest. Therefore although He knew of Himself what was done, yet before it was told Him He withdrew not, that He might shew the verity of His incarnation in all things; for He would that this should be assured not by sight only, but by His actions. And when He withdrew, He did not go into the city, but into the desert by ship that none might follow Him. Yet do not the multitudes leave Him even for this, but still follow after Him, not deterred by what had been done concerning John; whence it follows, And when the multitudes had heard thereof, they followed him on foot out of the cities.

JEROME. They followed on foot, not riding, or in carriages, but with the toil of their own legs, to shew the ardour of their mind.

CHRYSOSTOM. And they immediately reap the reward of this; for it follows, And he went out and saw a great multitude, and he had compassion upon them, and healed their sick. For though great was the affection of those who had left their cities, and sought Him carefully, yet the things that were done by Him surpassed the reward of any zeal. Therefore he assigns compassion as the cause of this healing. And it is great compassion to heal all, and not to require faith.

HILARY. Mystically; The Word of God, on the close of the Law, entered the ship, that is, the Church; and departed into the desert, that is, leaving to walk with Israel, He passes into breasts void of Divine knowledge. The multitude learning this, follows the Lord out of the city into the desert, going, that is, from the Synagogue to the Church. The Lord sees them, and has compassion upon them, and heals all sickness and infirmity, that is, He cleanses their obstructed minds, and unbelieving hearts for the understanding of the new preaching.

JEROME. It is to be observed moreover, that when the Lord came into the desert, great crowds followed Him; for before He went into the wilderness of the Gentiles, He was worshipped by only one people. They leave their cities, that is, their former conversation, and various dogmas. That Jesus went out, shews that the multitudes had the will to go, but not the strength to attain, therefore the Saviour departs out of His place and goes to meet them.

14:15–21

15. And when it was evening, his disciples came to him, saying, This is a desert place, and the time is now past; send the multitude away, that they may go into the villages, and buy themselves victuals.

16. But Jesus said unto them, They need not depart; give ye them to eat.

17. And they say unto him, We have here but five loaves, and two fishes.

18. He said, Bring them hither to me.

19. And he commanded the multitude to sit down on the grass, and took the five loaves, and the two fishes, and looking up to heaven, he blessed, and brake, and gave the loaves to his disciples, and the disciples to the multitude.

20. And they did all eat, and were filled: and they took up of the fragments that remained twelve baskets full.

21. And they that had eaten were about five thousand men, beside women and children.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is a proof of the faith of these multitudes that they endured hunger in waiting for the Lord even till evening; to which purpose it follows, And when it was evening, his disciples came unto him, saying, This is a desert place, and the time is now past. The Lord purposing to feed them waits to be asked, as always not stepping forward first to do miracles, but when called upon. None out of the crowd approached Him, both because they stood in great awe of Him, and because in their zeal of love they did not feel their hunger. But even the disciples do not come and say, Give them to eat; for the disciples were as yet in an imperfect condition; but they say, This is a desert place. So that what was proverbial among the Jews to express a miracle, as it is said, Can he spread a table in the wilderness? (Ps. 78:19.) this also He shews among his other works. For this cause also He leads them out into the desert, that the miracle might be clear of all suspicion, and that none might suppose that any thing was supplied towards the feast from any neighbouring town. But though the place be desert, yet is He there who feeds the world; and though the hour is, as they say, past, yet He who now commanded was not subjected to hours. And though the Lord had gone before His disciples in healing many sick, yet they were so imperfect that they could not judge what He would do concerning food for them, wherefore they add, Send the multitude away, that they may go into the towns, and buy themselves food. Observe the wisdom of the Master; He says not straightway to them, ‘I will give them to eat;’ for they would not easily have received this, but, Jesus said unto them, They need not depart, Give ye them to eat.

JEROME. Wherein He calls the Apostles to breaking of bread, that the greatness of the miracle might be more evident by their testimony that they had none.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 46.) It may perplex some how, if the Lord, according to the relation of John, asked Philip whence bread was to be found for them, that can be true which Matthew here relates, that the disciples first prayed the Lord to send the multitudes away, that they might buy food from the nearest towns. Suppose then that after these words the Lord looked upon the multitude and said what John relates, but Matthew and the others have omitted. And by such cases as this none ought to be perplexed, when one of the Evangelists relates what the rest have omitted.

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet not even by these words were the disciples set right, but speak yet to Him as to man; They answered unto Him, We have here but five loaves and two fishes. From this we learn the philosophy of the disciples, how far they despised food; they were twelve in number, yet they had but five loaves and two fishes; for things of the body were contemned by them, they were altogether possessed by spiritual things. But because the disciples were yet attracted to earth, the Lord begins to introduce the things that were of Himself; He saith unto them, Bring them hither to me. Wherefore does He not create out of nothing the bread to feed the multitude with? That He might put to silence the mouth of Marcion and Manichæus, who take away from God His creatures, (i. e. deny that God created the visible world.) and by His deeds might teach that all things that are seen are His works and creation, and that it is He that has given us the fruits of the earth, who said in the beginning, Let the earth bring forth the green herb; (Gen. 1:11.) for this is no less a deed than that. For of five loaves to make so many loaves, and fishes in like manner, is no less a thing than to bring fruits from the earth, reptiles and other living things from the waters; which shewed Him to be Lord both of land and sea. By the example of the disciples also we ought to be taught, that though we should have but little, we ought to give that to such as have need. For they when bid to bring their five loaves say not, Whence shall we satisfy our own hunger? but immediately obey; And He commanded the multitude to sit down on the grass, and took the five loaves and the two fishes, and looking up to heaven blessed them, and brake. Why did He look to heaven and bless? For it should be believed concerning Him that He is from the Father, and that He is equal with the Father. His equality He shews when He does all things with power. That He is from the Father He shews by referring to Him whatsoever He does, and calling upon Him on all occasions. To prove these two things therefore, He works His miracles at times with power, at other times with prayer. It should be considered also that in lesser things He looks to heaven, but in greater He does all with power. When He forgave sins, raised the dead, stilled the sea, opened the secrets of the heart, opened the eyes of him that was born blind, which were works only of God, He is not seen to pray; but when He multiplies the loaves, a work less than any of these, He looks up to heaven, that you may learn that even in little things He has no power but from His Father. And at the same time He teaches us not to touch our food, until we have returned thanks to Him who gives it us. For this reason also He looks up to heaven, because His disciples had examples of many other miracles, but none of this.

JEROME. While the Lord breaks there is a sowing of food; for had the loaves been whole and not broken into fragments, and thus divided into a manifold harvest, they could not have fed so great a multitude. The multitude receives the food from the Lord through the Apostles; as it follows, And he gave the loaves to his disciples, and the disciples to the multitude.

CHRYSOSTOM. In doing which He not only honoured them, but would that upon this miracle they should not be unbelieving, nor forget it when it was past, seeing their own hands had borne witness to it. Therefore also He suffers the multitudes first to feel the sense of hunger, and His disciples to come to Him, and to ask Him, and He took the loaves at their hands, that they might have many testimonies of that that was done, and many things to remind them of the miracle. From this that He gave them, nothing more than bread and fish, and that He set this equally before all, He taught them moderation, frugality, and that charity by which they should have all things in common. This He also taught them in the place, in making them sit down upon the grass; for He sought not to feed the body only, but to instruct the mind. But the bread and fish multiplied in the disciples’ hands; whence it follows, And they did all eat, and were filled. But the miracle ended not here; for He caused to abound not only whole loaves, but fragments also; to shew that the first loaves were not so much as what was left, and that they who were not present might learn what had been done, and that none might think that what had been done was a phantasy; And they took up fragments that were left, twelve baskets full.

JEROME. Each of the Apostles fills his basket of the fragments left by his Saviour, that these fragments might witness that they were true loaves that were multiplied.

CHRYSOSTOM. For this reason also He caused twelve baskets to remain over and above, that Judas might bear his basket. He took up the fragments, and gave them to the disciples and not to the multitudes, who were yet more imperfectly trained than the disciples.

JEROME. To the number of loaves, five, the number of the men that ate is apportioned, five thousand; And the number of them that had eaten was about five thousand men, besides women and children.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was to the very great credit of the people, that the women and the men stood up when these remnants still remained.

HILARY. The five loaves are not multiplied into more, but fragments succeed to fragments; the substance growing whether upon the tables, or in the hands that took them up, I know not.

RABANUS. When John is to describe this miracle, he first tells us that the passover is at hand; Matthew and Mark place it immediately after the execution of John. Hence we may gather, that he was beheaded when the paschal festival was near at hand, and that at the passover of the following year, the mystery of the Lord’s passion was accomplished.

JEROME. But all these things are full of mysteries; the Lord does these things not in the morning, nor at noon, but in the evening, when the Sun of righteousness was set.

REMIGIUS. By the evening the Lord’s death is denoted; and after He, the true Sun, was set on the altar of the cross, He filled the hungry. Or by evening is denoted the last age of this world, in which the Son of God came and refreshed the multitudes of those that believed on Him.

RABANUS. When the disciples ask the Lord to send away the multitudes that they might buy food in the towns, it signifies the pride of the Jews towards the multitudes of the Gentiles, whom they judged rather fit to seek for themselves food in the assemblies of the Pharisees than to use the pasture of the Divine books.

HILARY. But the Lord answered, They have no need to go, shewing that those whom He heals have no need of the food of mercenary doctrine, and have no necessity to return to Judæa to buy food; and He commands the Apostles that they give them food. Did He not know then that there was nothing to give them? But there was a complete series of types to be set forth; for as yet it was not given the Apostles to make and minister the heavenly bread, the food of eternal life; and their answer thus belongs to the chain of spiritual interpretation; they were as yet confined to the five loaves, that is, the five books of the Law, and the two fishes, that is, the preaching of the Prophets and of John.

RABANUS. Or, by the two fishes we may understand the Prophets, and the Psalms, for the whole of the Old Testament was comprehended in these three, the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms.

HILARY. These therefore the Apostles first set forth, because they were yet in these things; and from these things the preaching of the Gospel grows to its more abundant strength and virtue. Then the people is commanded to sit down upon the grass, as no longer lying upon the ground, but resting upon the Law, each one reposing upon the fruit of his own works as upon the grass of the earth.

JEROME. Or, they are bid to lie down on the grass, and that, according to another Evangelist, by fifties and by hundreds, that after they have trampled upon their flesh, and have subjugated the pleasures of the world as dried grass under them, then by the presencea of the number fifty, they ascend to the eminent perfection of a hundred. He looks up to heaven to teach us that our eyes are to be directed thither. The Law with the Prophets is broken, and in the midst of them are brought forward mysteries., that whereas they partook not of it whole, when broken into pieces it may be food for the multitude of the Gentiles.

HILARY. Then the loaves are given to the Apostles, because through them the gifts of divine grace were to be rendered. And the number of them that did eat is found to be the same as that of those who should believe; for we find in the book of Acts that out of the vast number of the people of Israel, five thousand men believed.

JEROME. There partook five thousand who had reached maturity; for women and children, the weaker sex, and the tender age, were unworthy of number; thus in the book of Numbers, slaves, women, children, and an undistinguished crowd, are passed over unnumbered.

RABANUS. The multitude being hungry, He creates no new viands, but having taken what the disciples had, He gave thanks. In like manner when He came in the flesh, He preached no other things than what had been foretold, but shewed that the writings of the Law and the Prophets were big with mysteries. That which, the multitude leave is taken up by the disciples, because the more secret mysteries which cannot be comprehended by the uninstructed, are not to be treated with neglect, but are to be diligently sought out by the twelve Apostles (who are represented by the twelve baskets) and their successors. For by baskets servile offices are performed, and God has chosen the weak things of the world to confound the strong. The five thousand for the five senses of the body are they who in a secular condition know how to use rightly things without.

14:22–33

22. And straightway Jesus constrained his disciples to get into a ship, and to go before him unto the other side, while he sent the multitudes away.

23. And when he had sent the multitudes away, he went up into a mountain apart to pray: and when the evening was come, he was there alone.

24. But the ship was now in the midst of the sea, tossed with waves: for the wind was contrary.

25. And in the fourth watch of the night Jesus went unto them, walking on the sea.

26. And when the disciples saw him walking on the sea, they were troubled, saying, It is a spirit; and they cried out for fear.

27. But straightway Jesus spake unto them, saying, Be of good cheer; it is I; be not afraid.

28. And Peter answered him and said, Lord, if it be thou, bid me come unto thee on the water.

29. And he said, Come. And when Peter was come down out of the ship, he walked on the water, to go to Jesus.

30. But when he saw the wind boisterous, he was afraid; and beginning to sink, he cried, saying, Lord, save me.

31. And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and caught him, and said unto him, O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?

32. And when they were come into the ship, the wind ceased.

33. Then they that were in the ship came and worshipped him, saying, Of a truth thou art the Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Desiring to occasion a diligent examination of the things that had been done, He commanded those who had beheld the foregoing sign to be separated from Him; for even if He had continued present it would have been said that He had wrought the miracle fantastically, and not in verity; but it would never be urged against Him that He had done it in His absence; and therefore it is said, And straightway Jesus compelled his disciples to get into a ship, and to go before him to the other side, while he sent the multitudes away.

JEROME. These words shew that they left the Lord unwillingly, not desiring through their love for their teacher to be separated from Him even for a moment.

CHRYSOSTOM. It should be observed, that when the Lord works a great miracle, He sends the multitudes away, teaching us thereby never to pursue the praise of the multitude, nor to attract them to us. Further, He teaches us that we should not be ever mixed with crowds, nor yet always shunning them; but that both may be done with profit; whence it follows, And when he had sent the multitude away, he went up into a mountain apart to pray; shewing us that solitude is good, when we have need to pray to God. For this also He goes into the desert, and there spends the night in prayer, to teach us that for prayer we should seek stillness both in time and place.

JEROME. That He withdraws to pray alone, you should refer not to Him who fed five thousand on five loaves, but to Him who on hearing of the death of John withdrew into the desert; not that we would separate the Lord’s person into two parts, but that His actions are divided between the God and the man.

AUGUSTINE. (De Cons. Ev. ii. 47.) This may seem contrary to that Matthew says, that having sent the multitudes away, He went up into a mountain that He might pray alone; and John again says, that it was on a mountain that He fed this same multitude. But since John himself says further, that after that miracle He retired to a mountain that He might not be held by the multitude, who sought to make Him a king, it is clear that He had come down from the mountain when He fed them. Nor do Matthew's words, He went up into a mountain alone to pray, disagree with this, though John says, When he knew that they would come to make him a king, he withdrew into a mountain himself alone. (John 6:15.) For the cause of His praying is not contrary to the cause of His retiring, for herein the Lord teaches us that we have great cause for prayer when we have cause for flight. Nor, again, is it contrary to this that Matthew says first, that He bade His disciples go into the boat, and then that He sent the multitudes away, and went into a mountain alone to pray; while John relates that He first withdrew to the mountain, and then, when it was late, his disciples went down to the sea, and when they had entered into a boat, &c. for who does not see that John is relating as afterwards done by His disciples what Jesus had commanded before He retired into the mountain?

JEROME. Rightly had the Apostles departed from the Lord as unwilling, and slow to leave Him, lest they should suffer shipwreck whilst He was not with them. For it follows, Now when it was evening he was there alone; that is, in the mountain; but the boat was in the middle of the sea tossed with the waves; for the wind was contrary.

CHRYSOSTOM. Again, the disciples suffer shipwreck, as they had done before; but then they had Him in the boat, but now they are alone. Thus gradually He leads them to higher things, and instructs them to endure all manfully.

JEROME. While the Lord tarries in the top of the mountain, straightway a wind arises contrary to them, and stirs up the sea, and the disciples are in imminent peril of shipwreck, which continues till Jesus comes.

CHRYSOSTOM. But He suffers them to be tossed the whole night, exciting their hearts by fear, and inspiring them with greater desire and more lasting recollection of Him; for this reason He did not stand by them immediately, but as it follows, in the fourth watch of the night he came to them walking upon the sea.

JEROME. The military guards and watches are divided into portions of three hours each. When then he says that the Lord came to them in the fourth watch, this shews that they had been in danger the whole night.

CHRYSOSTOM. Teaching them not to seek a speedy riddance of coming evil, but to bear manfully such things as befal them. But when they thought that they were delivered, then was their fear increased, whence it follows, And seeing him walking upon the sea, they were troubled, saying, It is a vision, and through fear they cried out. For this the Lord ever does; when He is to rescue from any evil, He brings in things terrible and difficult. For since it is impossible that our temptation should continue a long time, when the warfare of the righteous is to be finished, then He increases their conflicts, desiring to make greater gain of them; which He did also in Abraham, making his hot conflict his trial of the loss of his son.

JEROME. A confused noise and uncertain sound is the mark of great fear. But if, according to Marcion and Manichæus, our Lord was not born of a virgin, but was seen in a phantasm, how is it that the Apostles now fear that they have seen a phantasm (or vision)?

CHRYSOSTOM. Christ then did not reveal Himself to His disciples until they cried out; for the more intense their fear, the more did they rejoice in His presence; whence it follows, And immediately Jesus spoke to them, saying, Be of good cheer, it is J, be not afraid. This speech took away their fear, and prepared their confidence.

JEROME. Whereas He says, It is I, without saying who, either they might be able to understand Him speaking through the darkness of night; or they might know that it was He who had spoken to Moses, Say unto the children of Israel, He that is has sent me unto you. (Exod. 3:14.) On every occasion Peter is found to be the one of the most ardent faith. And with the same zeal as ever, so now, while the others are silent, he believes that by the will of his Master he will be able to do that which by nature he cannot do; whence it follows, Peter answered and said unto him, Lord, if it be thou, bid me come unto thee upon the water. As much as to say, Do thou command, and straightway it will become solid; and that body which is in itself heavy will become light.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 76. 5.) This I am not able by myself, but in Thee I am able. Peter confessed what he was in himself, and what he should receive from Him by whose will he believed he should be enabled to do that which no human infirmity was equal to.

CHRYSOSTOM. See how great his warmth, how great his faith. He said not, Pray and entreat for me; but Bid me; he believes not only that Christ can Himself walk on the sea, but that He can lead others also thereon; also he wishes to come to Him speedily, and this, so great a thing, he asks not from ostentation, but from love. For he said not, Bid me walk upon the waters, but, Bid me come unto thee. And it seems that having shewn in the first miracle that He has power over the sea, He now leads them to a more powerful sign; He saith unto him, Come. And Peter, going forth of the boat, walked on the sea, that he might go to Jesus.

JEROME. Let those who think that the Lord's body was not real, because He walked upon the yielding waters as a light æthereal substance, answer here how Peter walked, whom they by no means deny to be man.

RABANUS. Lastly, Theodorus wrote that the Lord had not bodily weight in respect of His flesh, but without weight walked on the sea. But the catholic faith preaches the contrary; for Dionysius says that He walked on the wave, without the feet, being immersed, having bodily weight, and the burden of matter.

CHRYSOSTOM. Peter overcame that which was greater, the waves, namely, of the sea, but is troubled by the lesser, the blowing wind, for it follows, But seeing the wind boisterous, he was afraid. Such is human nature, in great trials ofttimes holding itself aright, and in lesser falling into fault. This fear of Peter shewed the difference between Master and disciple, and thereby appeased the other disciples. For if they had indignation when the two brothers prayed to sit on the right and left hand, much more had they now. For they were not yet made spiritual; afterwards when they had been made spiritual, they every where yield the first place to Peter, and appoint him to lead in harangues to the people.

JEROME. Moreover he is left to temptation for a short season, that his faith may be increased, and that he may understand that he is saved not by his ability to ask, but by the power of the Lord. For faith burned at his heart, but human frailty drew him into the deep.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 76. 8.) Peter then presumed on the Lord, he tottered as man, but returned to the Lord, as it follows, And when he began to sink, he cried out, saying, Lord, save me. Does the Lord then desert him in his peril of failure whom he had hearkened to when he first called on Him? Immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and caught him.

CHRYSOSTOM. He bade not the winds to cease, but stretched forth His hand and caught him, because his faith was required. For when our own means fail, then those which are of God stand. Then to shew that not the strength of the tempest, but the smallness of his faith worked the danger, He saith unto him, O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt? which shews that not even the wind would have been able to hurt him, if his faith had been firm. But as the mother bears on her wings and brings back to the nest her chick which has left the nest before its time and has fallen, so did Christ. And when they were come into the boat, the wind ceased. Then they that were in the boat came and worshipped him, saying, Truly thou art the Son of God.

RABANUS. (Non occ.) This may be understood either of the sailors, or of the Apostles.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how He leads all gradually to that which is above them; He had before rebuked the sea, now He shews forth His power yet more by walking upon the sea, by bidding another to do the same, and by saving him in his peril; therefore they said unto Him, Truly thou art the Son of God, which they had not said above.

JEROME. If then upon this single miracle of stilling the sea, a thing which often happens by accident after even great tempests, the sailors and pilots confessed them to be truly the Son of God, how does Arrius preach in the Church itself that He is a creature?

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (App. Serm. 72. 1.) Mystically; The mountain is loftiness. But what is higher than the heavens in the world? And Who it was that ascended into heaven, that our faith knows. Why did He ascend alone into heaven? Because no man has ascended into heaven, but He that came down from heaven. For even when He shall come in the end, and shall have exalted us into heaven, He will yet ascend alone, inasmuch as the head with its body is One Christ, and now the head only is ascended. He went up to pray, because He is ascended to make intercession to His Father for us.

HILARY. Or, that He is alone in the evening, signifies His sorrow at the time of His passion, when the rest were scattered from Him in fear.

JEROME. Also He ascends into the mountain alone because the multitude cannot follow Him aloft, until He has instructed it by the shore of the sea.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But while Christ prays on high, the boat is tossed with great waves in the deep; and forasmuch as the waves rise, that boat can be tossed; but because Christ prays, it cannot be sunk. Think of that boat as the Church, and the stormy sea as this world.

HILARY. That He commands His disciples to enter the ship and to go across the sea, while He sends the multitudes away, and after that He goes up into the mountain to pray; He therein bids us to be within the Church, and to be in peril until such time as returning in His splendour He shall give salvation to all the people that shall be remaining of Israel, and shall for give their sins; and having dismissed them into His Father's kingdom, returning thanks to His Father, He shall sit down in His glory and majesty. Meanwhile the disciples are tossed by the wind and the waves; struggling against all the storms of this world, raised by the opposition of the unclean spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For when any of a wicked will and of great power, proclaims a persecution of the Church, then it is that a mighty wave rises against the boat of Christ.

RABANUS. Whence it is well said here, that the ship was in the middle of the sea, and He alone on the land, because the Church is sometimes oppressed with such persecution that her Lord may seem to have forsaken her for a season.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The Lord came to visit His disciples who are tossed on the sea in the fourth watch of the night—that is, at its close; for each watch consisting of three hours, the night has thus four watches.

HILARY. The first watch Was therefore of the Law, the second of the Prophets, the third His coming in the flesh, the fourth His return in glory.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Therefore in the fourth watch of the night, that is when the night is nearly ended, He shall come, in the end of the world, when the night of iniquity is past, to judge the quick and the dead. But His coming was with a wonder. The waves swelled, but they were trodden upon. Thus howsoever the powers of this world shall swell themselves, our Head shall crush their head.

HILARY. But Christ coming in the end shall find His Church wearied, and tossed by the spirit of Anti-Christ, and by the troubles of the world. And because by their long experience of Anti-Christ they will be troubled at every novelty of trial, they shall have fear even at the approach of the Lord, suspecting deceitful appearances. But the good Lord banishes their fear, saying, It is I; and by proof of His presence takes away their dread of impending shipwreck.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 15.) Or; That the disciples here say, It is a phantasm, figures those who yielding to the Devil shall doubt of the coming of Christ. That Peter cries to the Lord for help that he should not be drowned, signifies that He shall purge His Church with certain trials even after the last persecution; as Paul also notes, saying, He shall be saved, yet so as by fire. (1 Cor. 3:15.)

HILARY. Or; That Peter alone out of all the number of those that were in the vessel has courage to answer, and to pray that the Lord would bid him come to Him upon the waters, figures the frowardness of his will in the Lord's passion, when following after the Lord's steps he endeavoured to attain to despise death. But his fearfulness shews his weakness in his after trial, when through fear of death, he was driven to the necessity of denial. His crying out here is the groaning of his repentance there.

RABANUS. The Lord looked back upon him, and brought him to repentance; He stretched forth His hand, and forgave him, and thus the disciple found salvation, which is not of him that willeth or of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy. (Rom. 9:16.)

HILARY. That when Peter was seized with fear, the Lord gave him not power of coming to Him, but held him by the hand and sustained him, this is the signification thereof; that He who alone was to suffer for all alone forgave the sins of all; and no partner is admitted into that which was bestowed upon mankind by one.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 76.) For in one Apostle, namely Peter, first and chief in the order of Apostles in whom was figured the Church, both kinds were to be signified; that is, the strong, in his walking upon the waters; the weak, in that he doubted, for to each of us our lusts are as a tempest. Dost thou love God? Thou walkest on the sea; the fear of this world is under thy feet. Dost thou love the world? It swallows thee up. But when thy heart is tossed with desire, then that thou mayest overcome thy lust, call upon the divine person of Christ.

REMIGIUS. And the Lord will be with thee to help thee, when lulling to rest the perils of thy trials, He restores the confidence of His protection, and this towards the break of day; for when human frailty beset with difficulties considers the weakness of its own powers, it looks upon itself as in darkness; when it raises its view to the protection of heaven, it straightway beholds the rise of the morning star, which gives its light through the whole of the morning watch.

RABANUS. Nor should we wonder that the wind ceased when the Lord had entered into the boat; for in whatsoever heart the Lord is present by grace, there all wars cease.

HILARY. Also by this entrance of Christ into the boat, and the calm of the wind and sea thereupon, is pointed out the eternal peace of the Church, and that rest which shall be after His return in glory. And forasmuch as He shall then appear manifestly, rightly do they all cry out now in wonder, Truly thou art the Son of God. For there shall then be a free and public confession of all men that the son of God is come no longer in lowliness of body, but that He has given peace to the Church in heavenly glory.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 15.) For it is here conveyed to us that His glory will then be made manifest, seeing that now they who walk by faith see it in a figure.

14:34–36

34. And when they were gone over, they came into the land of Gennesaret.

35. And when the men of that place had knowledge of him, they sent out into all that country round about, and brought unto him all that were diseased;

36. And besought him that they might only touch the hem of his garment: and as many as touched were made perfectly whole.

REMIGIUS. The Evangelist had related above that the Lord had Commanded His disciples to enter the boat, and to go before Him across the strait; he now proceeds with the same intention to relate whither they arrived by their passage, And when they were gone over, they came into the land of Gennezareth.

RABANUS. The land of Gennezar, by the lake of Gennezareth, takes its name from a natural power which it is said to have of spontaneously modulating its waters so as to excite a breeze; the Greek words importing, ‘creating for itself the breeze.’

CHRYSOSTOM. But the Evangelist shews that it was now long time since Christ had come into these parts; for it follows, And when the men of that place knew him, they sent into all that region.

JEROME. They knew Him by fame, not by sight; although indeed by reason of the greatness of the signs which He did among the people, He was known by face to great numbers. And note how great the faith of the men of the land of Gennezareth, that they were not content with the healing of the men of that country only, but sent to all the towns round about.

CHRYSOSTOM. Nor do they now as before drag Him to their houses, and seek the touch of His hand, but they draw Him by their greater faith, for they brought unto him all them that were sick, and besought him that they might touch but the hem of his garment. For the woman who suffered under the issue of blood had taught them all this wisdom, namely, that by touching the hem only of Christ's garment they might be saved; therefore it follows, And as many as touched, were made whole.

JEROME. If we knew what the word Gennezareth would convey in our tongue, we might understand how under the type of the Apostles and the boat, Jesus guides to shore the Church when He has delivered it from the wreck of persecution, and makes it to rest in a most tranquil harbour.

RABANUS. Genezar is interpreted, 'rise', 'beginning.' For then will complete rest be given to us, when Christ shall have restored to us our inheritance of Paradise, and the joy of our first robe.

HILARY. Otherwise; When the times of the Law were ended, and five thousand out of Israel were entered within the Church, it was then that the people of believers met Him, then those that were saved out of the Law by faith set before the Lord the rest of their sick and weak; and they that were thus brought sought to touch the hem of His garment, because through their faith they would be healed. And as the virtue of the hem proceeded from the whole garment, so the virtue of the grace of the Holy Spirit went forth from our Lord Jesus Christ, and imparted to the Apostles, who proceeded as it were from the same body, administers salvation to such as desire to touch.

JEROME. Or, by the hem of the garment understand His least commandment, which whosoever transgresses, shall be called least in the kingdom of heaven; or, again, His assumption of the body, by which we come to the Word of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. But we have not a hem or a garment only of Christ, but have even His body, that we may eat thereof. If then they who touched the hem of His garment derived so much virtue therefrom, much more they that shall receive Himself whole.

CHAPTER 15

15:1–6

1. Then came to Jesus Scribes and Pharisees, which were of Jerusalem, saying,

2. Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders? for they wash not their hands when they eat bread.

3. But he answered and said unto them, Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God by your tradition?

4. For God commanded, saying, Honour thy father and mother: and, He that curseth father or mother, let him die the death.

5. But ye say, Whosoever shall say to his father or his mother, It is a gift, by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me;

6. And honour not his father or his mother, he shall be free. Thus have ye made the commandment of God of none effect by your tradition.

RABANUS. The men of Gennezareth and the less learned believe; but they who seem to be wise come to dispute with Him; according to that, Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Whence it is said, Then came to him from Jerusalem Scribes and Pharisees.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 49.) The Evangelist thus constructs the order of his narrative, Then came unto him, that, as appeared in the passage over the lake, the order of the events that followed that might be shewn.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li.) For this reason also the Evangelist marks the time that He may shew their iniquity overcome by nothing; for they came to Him at a time when He had wrought many miracles, when He had healed the sick by the touch of His hem. That the Scribes and Pharisees are here said to have come from Jerusalem, it should be known that they were dispersed through all the tribes, but those that dwelt in the Metropolis were worse than the others, their higher dignity inspiring them with a greater degree of pride.

REMIGIUS. They were faulty for two reasons; because they had come from Jerusalem, from the holy city, and because they were elders of the people, and doctors of the Law, and had not come to learn but to reprove the Lord, for it is added, Saying, Why do thy disciples transgress the tradition of the elders?

JEROME. Wonderful infatuation of the Pharisees and Scribes! They accuse the Son of God that He does not keep the traditions and commandments of men.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe, how they are taken in their own question. They say not, ‘Why do they transgress the Law of Moses?’ but, the tradition of the elders; whence it is manifest that the Priests had introduced many new things, although Moses had said, Ye shall not add ought to the word which I set before you this day, neither shall ye take ought away from it; (Deut. 4:2.) and when they ought to have been set free from observances, then they bound themselves by many more; fearing lest any should take away their rule and power, they sought to increase the awe in which they were held, by setting themselves forth as legislators.

REMIGIUS. Of what kind these traditions were, Mark shews when he says, The Pharisees and all the Jews, except they wash their hands oft, eat not. (Mark 7:3.) Here then also they find fault with the disciples, saying, For they wash not their hands when they eat bread.

BEDE. (in Marc. 7, 1.) Taking carnally those words of the Prophets, in which it is said, Wash, and he ye clean, they, observed it only in washing the body; (Is. 1:16.) hence they had laid it down that we ought not to eat with unwashen hands.

JEROME. But the hands that are to be washed are the acts not of the body, but of the mind; that the word of God may be done in them.

CHRYSOSTOM. But the disciples now did not eat with washen hands, because they already despised all things superfluous, and attended only to such as were necessary; thus they accepted neither washing nor not washing as a rule, but did either as it happened. For how should they who even neglected the food that was necessary for them, have any care about this rite?

REMIGIUS. Or the Pharisees found fault with the Lord’s disciples, not concerning that washing which we do from ordinary habit, and of necessity, but of that superfluous washing which was invented by the tradition of the elders.

CHRYSOSTOM. Christ made no excuse for them, but immediately brought a counter charge, shewing that he that sins in great things ought not to take offence at the slight sins of others. He answered and said unto them, Why do ye also transgress the commandment of God because of your tradition? He says not that they do well to transgress that He may not give room for calumny; nor on the other hand does He condemn what the Apostles had done, that He may not sanction their traditions; nor again does He bring any charge directly against them of old, that they might not put Him from them as a calumniator; but He points His reproof against those who had come to Him; thus at the same time touching the elders who had laid down such a tradition; saying,

JEROME. Since ye because of the tradition of men neglect the commandment of God, why do ye take upon you to reprove my disciples, for bestowing little regard upon the precepts of the elders, that they may observe the commands of God? For God hath said, Honour thy father and thy mother. Honour in the Scriptures is shewn not so much in salutations and courtesies as in alms and gifts. Honour, (1 Tim. 5:3.) says the Apostle, the widows who are widows indeed; here ‘honour’ signifies a gift. The Lord then having thought for the infirmity, the age, or the poverty of parents, commanded that sons should honour their parents in providing them with necessaries of life.

CHRYSOSTOM. He desired to shew the great honour that ought to be paid to parents, and therefore attached both a reward and a penalty. But in this occasion the Lord passes over the reward promised to such as did honour their parents, namely, that they should live long upon the earth, and brings forward the terrible part only, namely, the punishment, that He might strike these dumb and attract others; And he that curseth father and mother, let him die the death; thus He shews that they deserved even death. For if ho who dishonours his parent even in word is worthy of death, much more ye who dishonour him in deed; and ye not only dishonour your parents, but teach others to do so likewise. Ye then who do not deserve even to live, how accuse ye my disciples? But how they transgress the commandment of God is clear when He adds, But ye say, Whoso shall say to his father or his mother, If in a gift, whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me.

JEROME. For the Scribes and Pharisees desiring to overturn this foregoing most provident law of God, that they might bring in their impiety under the mask of piety, taught bad sons, that should any desire to devote to God, who is the true parent, those things which ought to be offered to parents, the offering to the Lord should he preferred to the offering them to parents.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) In this interpretation the sense will be, What I offer to God will profit both you and myself; and therefore you ought not to take of my goods for your own needs, but to suffer that I offer them to God.

JEROME. And thus the parents refusing what they saw thus dedicated to God, hat they might not incur the guilt of sacrilege, perished of want, and so it came to pass that what the children offered for the needs of the temple and the service of God, went to the gain of the Priests.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or the sense may be, Whosoever, that is, of you young men, shall say, that is, shall either be able to say, or shall say, to his father or mother, O father, the gift that is of me devoted to God, shall it profit thee? as it were an exclamation of surprise; you ought not to take it that you may not incur the guilt of sacrilege. Or, we may read it with this ellipsis, Whosoever shall say to his father, &c. he shall do the commandment of God, or shall fulfil the Law, or shall be worthy of life eternal.

JEROME. Or it may briefly have the following sense; Ye compel children to say to their parents, What gift soever I was purposing to offer to God, you take and consume upon your living, and so it profits you; as much as to say, Do not so.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) And thus through these arguments of your avarice, this youth shall Honour not his father or his mother. As if He had said; Ye have led sons into most evil deeds; so that it will come to pass that afterwards they shall not even honour their father and mother. And thus ye have made the commandment of God concerning the support of parents by their children vain through your traditions, obeying the dictates of avarice.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Adv. Leg. et Proph. ii. 1.) Christ here clearly shews both that that law which the heretic blasphemes is God’s law, and that the Jews had their traditions foreign to the prophetical and canonical books; such as the Apostle calls profane and vain fables.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xvi. 24.) The Lord here teaches us many things; That it was not He that turned the Jews from their God; that not only did He not infringe the commandments, but convicts them of infringing them; and that He had ordained no more than those by the hand of Moses.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 16.) Otherwise; The gift whatsoever thou offerest on my account, shall profit thee; that is to say, Whatsoever gift thou offerest on my account, shall henceforth remain with thee; the son signifying by these words that there is no longer need that parents should offer for him, as he is of age to offer for himself. And those who were of age to be able to say thus to their parents, the Pharisees denied that they were guilty, if they did not shew honour to their parents.

15:7–11

7. Ye hypocrites, well did Esaias prophesy of you, saying,

8. This people draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and honoureth me with their lips; but their heart is far from me.

9. But in vain they do worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.

10. And he called the multitude, and said unto them, Hear, and understand:

11. Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had shewn that the Pharisees were not worthy to accuse those who transgressed the commands of the elders, seeing they overthrew the law of God themselves; and He again proves this by the testimony of the Prophet; Hypocrites, well did Esaias prophesy of you, saying, This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.

REMIGIUS. Hypocrite signifies dissembler, one who feigns one thing in his outward act, and bears another thing in his heart. These then are well called hypocrites, because under cover of God’s honour they sought to heap up for themselves earthly gain.

RABANUS. Esaias saw before the hypocrisy of the Jews, that they would craftily oppose the Gospel, and therefore he said in the person of the Lord, This people honoureth me with their lips, &c.

REMIGIUS. For the Jewish nation seemed to draw near to God with their lips and mouth, inasmuch as they boasted that they held the worship of the One God; but in their hearts they departed from Him, because after they had seen His signs and miracles, they would neither acknowledge His divinity, nor receive Him.

RABANUS. Also, they honoured Him with their lips when they said, Master, we know that thou art true, (Mat. 22:16.) but their heart was far from Him when they sent spies to entangle Him in His talk.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or, They honoured Him in commending outward purity; but in that they lacked the inward which is the true purity, their heart was far from God, and such honour was of no avail to them; as it follows, But without, reason do they worship we, teaching doctrines and commandments of men.

RABANUS. Therefore they shall not have their reward with the true worshippers, because they teach doctrines and commandments of men to the contempt of the law of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having added weight to His accusation of the Pharisees by the testimony of the Prophet, and not having amended them, He now ceases to speak to them, and turns to the multitudes, And he called the multitude, and said unto them, Hear and understand. Because He was about to set before them a high dogma, and full of much philosophy, He does not utter it nakedly, but so frames His speech that it should be received by them. First, by exhibiting anxiety on their account, which the Evangelist expresses by the words, And he called the multitude to him. Secondly, the time He chooses recommends His speech; after the victory He has just gained over the Pharisees. And He not merely calls the multitude to Him, but rouses their attention by the words, Hear and understand; that is, Attend, and give your minds to what ye are to hear. But He said not unto them, The observance of meats is nought; nor, Moses bade you wrongly; but in the way of warning and advice, drawing His testimony from natural things, Not what entereth in at the mouth defileth a man, but what goeth forth of the mouth that defileth a man.

JEROME. The word herea ‘makes a man common’ is peculiar to Scripture, and is not hackneyed in common parlance. The Jewish nation, boasting themselves to be a part of God, call those meats common, of which all men partake; for example, swine’s flesh, shell fish, hares, and those species of animals that do not divide the hoof, and chew the cud, and among the fish such as have not scales. Hence in the Acts of the Apostles we read, What God hath cleansed, that call not thou common. (Acts 10:15.) Common then in this sense is that which is free to the rest of mankind, and as though not in part of God, is therefore called unclean.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. vi. 6.) This declaration of the Lord, Not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man, is not contrary to the Old Testament. As the Apostle also speaks, To the pure all things are pure; (Tit. 1:15.) and Every creature of God is good. Let the Manichæans understand, (1 Tim. 4:4.) if they can, that the Apostle said this of the very natures and qualities of things; while that letter (of the ritual law) declared certain animals unclean, not in their nature but typically, for certain figures which were needed for a time. Therefore to take an instance in the swine and the lamb, by nature both are clean, because naturally every creature of God is good; but in a certain typical meaning the lamb is clean, and the swine unclean. Take the two words, ‘fool,’ and ‘wise,’ in their own nature, as sounds, or letters, both of them are pure, but one of them because of the meaning attached to it, not because of any thing in its own nature, may be said to be impure. And perhaps what the swine are in typical representation, that among mankind is the fool; and the animal, and this word of two syllables (stultus) signify some one and the same thing. That animal is reckoned unclean in the law because it does not chew the cud; but this is not its fault but its nature. But the men of whom this animal is the emblem, are impure by their own fault, not by nature; they readily hear the words of wisdom, but never think upon them again. Whatever of profit you may hear, to summon this up from the internal region of the memory through the sweetness of recollection into the mouth of thought, what is this but spiritually to chew the cud? They who do not this are represented by this species of animal. Such resemblances as these in speech, or in ceremonies, having figurative signification, profitably and pleasantly move the rational mind; but by the former people, many such things were not only to be heard, but to be kept as precepts. For that was a time when it behoved not in words only, but in deeds, to prophesy those things which hereafter were to be revealed. When these had been revealed through Christ, and in Christ, the burdens of observances were not imposed on the faith of the Gentiles; but the authority of the prophecy was yet confirmed. But I ask of the

Manichæans, whether this declaration of the Lord, when He said that a man is not defiled by what enters into his mouth, is true or false? If false, why then does their doctor Adimantus bring it forward against the Old Testament? If true, why contrary to its tenor do they consider that they are thus defiled?

JEROME. The thoughtful reader may here object and say, If that which entereth into the mouth defileth not a man, why do we not feed on meats offered to idols? Be it known then that meats and every creature of God is in itself clean; but the invocation of idols and dæmons makes them unclean with those at least who with conscience of the idol eat that which is offered to idols, and their conscience being weak is polluted, as the Apostle says.

REMIGIUS. But if any one's faith be so strong that he understands that God's creature can in no way be defiled, let him eat what he will, after the food has been hallowed by the word of God and of prayer; yet so that this his liberty be not made an offence to the weak, as the Apostle speaks.

15:12–14

12. Then came his disciples, and said unto him, Knowest thou that the Pharisees were offended, after they heard this saying?

13. But he answered and said, Every plant, which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up.

14. Let them alone: they be blind leaders of the blind. And if the blind lead the blind, both shall fall into the ditch.

JEROME. In one of the Lord's discourses the whole superstition of Jewish observances had been cut down. They placed their whole religion in using or abstaining from certain meats.

CHRYSOSTOM. When the Pharisees heard the things that went before, they made no reply to them, because He had so mightily overthrown them, not only refuting their arguments, but detecting their fraud, but they, not the multitudes, were offended at them; Then came his disciples unto him and said, Knowest thou that the Pharisees were offended after they heard this saying?

JEROME. As this word 'scandalum' (offence or stumblingblock) is of such frequent use in ecclesiastical writings, we will shortly explain it. We might render it in Latin, 'offendiculum,' or 'ruina,' or 'impactio;' and so when we read, Whosoever shall scandalize, we understand, Whoso by word or deed has given an occasion of falling to any.

CHRYSOSTOM. Christ does not remove the stumblingblock out of the way of the Pharisees, but rather rebukes them; as it follows, But he answered and said, Every plant which my heavenly Father has not planted shall be rooted up. This Manichæus affirmed was spoken of the Law, but what has been already said is a sufficient refutation of this. For if He had said this of the Law, how would He have above contended for the Law, saying, Why transgress ye the commandment of God through your tradition? Or would He have cited the Prophet? Or how, if God said, Honour thy father and thy mother, is not this, being spoken in the Law, a plant of God?

HILARY. What He intends then by a plant not planted of His Father, is that tradition of men under cover of which the Law had been transgressed, this He instructs them must be rooted up.

REMIGIUS. Every false doctrine and superstitious observance with the workers thereof cannot endure; and because it is not from God the Father, it shall be rooted up with the same. And that only shall endure which is of God.

JEROME. Shall that plant also be rooted up of which the Apostle says, I planted, Apollos watered? (1 Cor. 3:6.) The question is answered by what follows, but God gave the increase. He says also, Ye are God’s husbandry, a building of God; and in another place, We are workers together of God. And if when Paul plants, and Apollos waters, they are in so doing workers together with God, then God plants and waters together with them. This passage is abused by some who apply it at once to two different kinds of men; they say, ‘If every plant, which the Father hath not planted shall be rooted up, then that which He has planted cannot be rooted up.’ But let them hear these words of Jeremiah, I had planted thee a true vine, wholly a right seed, how then art thou turned into the bitterness of a strange vine? (Jer. 2:21.) God indeed has planted it, and none may root up His planting. But since that planting was through the disposition of the will of him which was planted, none other can root it up unless its own will consents thereto.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Or, the plant here spoken of may be the doctors of the Law with their followers, who had not Christ for their foundation. Why they are to be rooted up, He adds, Let them alone; they are blind, leaders of the blind.

RABANUS. They are blind, that is, they want the light of God’s commandments; and they are leaders of the blind, inasmuch as they draw others headlong, erring, and leading into error; whence it is added, If the blind lead the blind, they both fall into the ditch.

JEROME. This is also the same as that Apostolic injunction, A heretic after the first and second admonition reject, knowing that such a one is perverse. (Tit. 3:10, 11.) To the same end the Saviour commands evil teachers to be left to their own will, knowing that it is hardly that they can be brought to the truth.

15:15–20

15. Then answered Peter and said unto him, Declare unto us this parable.

16. And Jesus said, Are ye also yet without understanding?

17. Do not ye yet understand, that whatsoever entereth in at the mouth goeth into the belly,, and is cast out into the draught?

18. But those things which proceed out of the mouth come forth from the heart; and they defile the man.

19. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies:

20. These are the things which defile a man: but to eat with unwashen hands defileth not a man.

REMIGIUS. The Lord was used to speak in parables, so that Peter when he heard, That which entereth into the mouth defileth not a man, thought it was spoken as a parable, and asked, as it follows; Then answered Peter, and said unto him, Declare unto us this parable. And because he asked this on behalf of the rest, they are all included in the rebuke, But he said, Are ye also yet without understanding?

JEROME. He is reproved by the Lord, because He supposed that to be spoken parabolically, which was indeed spoken plainly. Which teaches us that that hearer is to be blamed who would take dark sayings as clear, or clear sayings as obscure.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, The Lord blames him, because it was not from any uncertainty that he asked this, but from offence which he had taken. The multitudes had not understood what had been said; but the disciples were offended at it, whence at the first they had desired to ask Him concerning the Pharisees, but had been stayed by that mighty declaration, Every plant, &c. But Peter, who is ever zealous, is not silent even so; therefore the Lord reproves him, adding a reason for His reproof, Do ye not understand, that whatsoever entereth in at the mouth goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the draught?

JEROME. Some cavil at this, that the Lord is ignorant of physical disputation in saying that all food goes into the belly, and is cast out into the draught; for that the food, as soon as it is taken, is distributed through the limbs, the veins, the marrow, and the nerves. But it should be known, that the lighter juices, and liquid food after it has been reduced and digested in the veins and vessels, passes into the lower parts through those passages which the Greeks call ‘pores,’ and so goes into the draught.

AUGUSTINE. (de Vera Relig. 40.) The nourishment of the body being first changed into corruption, that is, having lost its proper form, is absorbed into the substance of the limbs, and repairs their waste, passing through a medium into another form, and by the spontaneous motion of the parts is so separated, that such portions as are adapted for the purpose are taken up into the structure of this fair visible, while such as are unfit are rejected through their own passages. One part consisting of fæces is restored to earth to reappear again in new forms; another part goes off in perspiration, and another is taken up by the nervous system for the purposes of reproduction of the species.

CHRYSOSTOM. But the Lord in thus speaking answers His disciples after Jewish infirmity; He says that the food does not abide, but goes out; but if it did abide, yet would it not make a man unclean. But they could not yet hear these things. Thus Moses also pronounces that they continued unclean, so long as the food continued in them; for he bids them wash in the evening, and then they should be clean, calculating the time of digestion and egestion.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. xv. 10.) And the Lord includes herein man’s two mouths, one of the body, one of the heart. For when He says, Not all that goeth into the mouth defileth a man, He clearly speaks of the body’s mouth; but in that which follows, He alludes to the mouth of the heart, But those things which proceed out of the mouth, come forth from the heart, and they defile a man.

CHRYSOSTOM. For the things which are of the heart, remain within a man, and defile him in going out of him, as well as in abiding in him; yea, more in going out of him; wherefore He adds, Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts; He gives these the first place, because this was the very fault of the Jews, who laid snares for Him.

JEROME. The principle therefore of the soul is not according to Plato in the brain, but according to Christ in the heart, and by this passage we may refute those who think that evil thoughts are suggestions of the Devil, and do not spring from our proper will. The Devil may encourage and abet evil thoughts, but not originate them. And if he be able, being always on the watch, to blow into flame any small spark of thought in us, we should not thence conclude that he searches the hidden places of the heart, but that from our manner and motions he judges of what is passing within us. For instance, if he see us direct frequent looks towards a fair woman, he understands that our heart is wounded through the eye.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And from evil thoughts proceed evil deeds and evil words, which are forbidden by the law; whence He adds Murders, which are forbidden by that commandment of the Law, Thou shalt not kill; Adulteries, fornications, which are understood to be forbidden by that precept, Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thefts, forbidden by the command, Thou shalt not steal; False witness, by that, Thou shall not bear false witness against thy neighbour; Blasphemies, by that, Thou shalt not take the name of God in vain.

REMIGIUS. Having named the vices which are forbidden by the divine Law, the Lord beautifully adds, These are they that defile a man, that is, make him unclean and impure.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And because these words of the Lord had been occasioned by the iniquity of the Pharisees, who preferred their traditions to the commands of God, He hence concludes that there was no necessity for the foregoing tradition, But to eat with unwashen hands defileth not a man.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not that to eat the meats forbidden in the Law defiles not a man, that they might not have what to answer to Him again, but He concludes in that concerning which the disputation had been.

21. Then Jesus went thence, and departed into the coasts of Tyre and Sidon.

22. And, behold, a woman of Canaan came out of the same coasts, and cried unto him, saying, Have mercy on me, O Lord, thou Son of David; my daughter is grievously vexed with a devil.

23. But he answered her not a word. And his disciples came and besought him, saying, Send her away; for she crieth after us.

24. But he answered and said, I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel.

25. Then came she and worshipped him, saying, Lord, help me.

26. But he answered and said, It is not meet to take the children's bread, and to cast it to dogs.

27. And she said, Truth, Lord: yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from their masters' table.

28. Then Jesus answered and said unto her, O woman, great is thy faith: be it unto thee even as thou wilt. And her daughter was made whole from that very hour.

JEROME. Leaving the Scribes and Pharisees and those cavillers, He passes into the parts of Tyre and Sidon; that He may heal the Tyrians and Sidonians; And Jesus went thence, and departed into the coasts of Tyre and Sidon.

REMIGIUS. Tyre and Sidon were Gentile towns, for Tyre was the metropolis of the Chananæans, and Sidon the boundary of the Chananæans, towards the north.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii.) It should be observed, that when He delivered the Jews from the observance of meats, He then also opened the door to the Gentiles, as Peter was first bidden in the vision to break this law, and was afterwards sent to Cornelius. But if any should ask, how it is that He bade His disciples go not into the way of the Gentiles, and yet now Himself walks this way; we will answer, first, that that precept which He had given His disciples was not obligatory on Him; secondly, that He went not to preach, whence Mark even says, that He purposely concealed Himself.

REMIGIUS. He went that He might heal them of Tyre and Sidon; or that He might deliver this woman's daughter from the dæmon, and so through her faith might condemn the wickedness of the Scribes and Pharisees. Of this woman it proceeds; And, behold, a woman, a Chananite, came out from those parts.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Evangelist says that she was a Chananæan, to shew the power of Christ's presence. For this nation, which had been driven out that they might not corrupt the Jews, now shewed themselves wiser than the Jews, leaving their own borders that they might go to Christ. And when she came to Him, she asked only for mercy, as it follows, She cried unto Him, saying, Have mercy on me, Lord, thou Son of David.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The great faith of this Chananæan woman is herein shewed. She believes Him to be God, in that she calls Him Lord; and man, in that she calls Him Son of David. She claims nothing of her own desert, but craves only God's mercy. And she says not, Have mercy on my daughter, but Have mercy on me; because the affliction of the daughter is the affliction of the mother. And the more to excite His compassion, she declares to Him the whole of her grief, My daughter is sore vexed by a dœmon; thus unfolding to the Physician the wound, and the extent and nature of the disease; its extent, when she says is sore vexed; its nature, by a dæmon.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in quædam loca, xlvii.) Note the wisdom (ΦιλθσόΦιαν) of this woman, she went not to men who promised fair, she sought not useless bandages, but leaving all devilish charms, she came to the Lord. She asked not James, she did not pray John, or apply to Peter, but putting herself under the protection of penitence, she ran alone to the Lord. But, behold, a new trouble. She makes her petition, raising her voice into a shout, and God, the lover of mankind, answers not a word.

JEROME. Not from pharisaical pride, or the superciliousness of the Scribes, but that He might not seem to contravene His own decision, Go not into the way of the Gentiles. For He was unwilling to give occasion to their cavils, and reserved the complete salvation of the Gentiles for the season of His passion and resurrection.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) And by this delay in answering, He shews us the patience and perseverance of this woman. And He answered not for this reason also, that the disciples might petition for her; shewing herein that the prayers of the Saints are necessary in order to obtain any thing, as it follows, And his disciples came unto him, saying, Send her away, for she crieth after us.

JEROME. The disciples, as yet ignorant of the mysteries of God or moved by compassion, beg for this Chananæan woman; or perhaps seeking to be rid of her importunity.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 49.) A question of discrepancy is raised upon this, that Mark says the Lord was in the house when the woman came praying for her daughter. Indeed Matthew might have been understood to have omitted mention of the house, and yet to have been relating the same event; but when he says, that the disciples suggested to the Lord, Send her away, for she crieth after us, he seems to indicate clearly that the woman raised her voice in supplication, in following the Lord who was walking. We must understand then, that, as Mark writes, she entered in where Jesus was, that is, as he had noticed above, in the house; then, that as Matthew writes. He answered her not a word, and during this silence of both sides, Jesus left the house; and then the rest follows without any discordance.

CHRYSOSTOM. I judge that the disciples were sorry for the woman’s affliction, yet dared not say ‘Grant her this mercy,’ but only Send her away, as we, when we would persuade any one, oftentimes say the very contrary to what we wish. He answered and said, I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.

JEROME. He says that He is not sent to the Gentiles, but that He is sent first to Israel, so that when they would not receive the Gospel, the passing over to the Gentiles might have just cause.

REMIGIUS. In this way also He was sent specially to the Jews, because He taught them by His bodily presence.

JEROME. And He adds of the house of Israel, with this design, that we might rightly interpret by this place that other parable concerning the stray sheep.

CHRYSOSTOM. But when the woman saw that the Apostles had no power, she became bold with commendable boldness; for before she had not dared to come before His sight; but, as it is said, She crieth after us. But when it seemed that she must now retire without being relieved, she came nearer, But she came and worshipped him.

JEROME. Note how perseveringly this Chananæan woman calls Him first Son of David, then Lord, and lastly came and worshipped him, as God.

CHRYSOSTOM. And therefore she said not Ask, or Pray God for me, but Lord, help me. But the more the woman urged her petition, the more He strengthened His denial; for He calls the Jews now not sheep but sons, and the Gentiles dogs; He answered and said unto her, It is not meet to take the children's bread, and give it to dogs.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The Jews were born sons, and brought up by the Law in the worship of one God. The bread is the Gospel, its miracles and other things which pertain to our salvation. It is not then meet that these should be taken from the children and given to the Gentiles, who are dogs, till the Jews refuse them.

JEROME. The Gentiles are called dogs because of their idolatry; who, given to the eating of blood, and dead bodies, turn to madness.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe this woman's prudence; she does not dare to contradict Him, nor is she vexed with the commendation of the Jews, and the evil word applied to herself; But she said, Yea, Lord, yet the dogs eat of the crumbs which fall from their masters' table. He said, It is not good; she answers, 'Yet even so, Lord;' He calls the Jews children, she calls them masters; He called her a dog, she accepts the office of a dog; as if she had said, I cannot leave the table of my Lord.

JEROME. Wonderful are shewn the faith, patience, and humility of this woman; faith, that she believed that her daughter could be healed; patience, that so many times overlooked, she yet perseveres in her prayers; humility, that she compares herself not to the dogs, but to the whelps. I know, she says, that I do not deserve the children's bread, and that I cannot have whole meat, nor sit at the table with the master of the house, but I am content with that which is left for the whelps, that through humble fragments I may come to the amplitude of the perfect bread.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was the cause why Christ was so backward, that He knew what she would say, and would not have her so great excellence hid; whence it follows, Then Jesus answered and said unto her, O woman, great is thy faith, be it unto thee according to thy will. Observe how the woman herself had contributed not a little to her daughter's healing and therefore Christ said not unto her, 'Let thy daughter be healed,' but, Be it unto thee according to thy will; that you may perceive that she had spoken in sincerity, and that her words were not words of flattery, but of abundant faith. And this word of Christ is like that word which said, Let there be a firmament (Gen. 1:6.) and it was made; so here, And her daughter was made whole from that hour. Observe how she obtains what the Apostles could not obtain for her; so great a thing is the earnestness of prayer. He would rather that we should pray for our own offences ourselves, than that others should pray for us.

REMIGIUS. In these words is given us a pattern of catechizing and baptizing children; for the woman says not ‘Heal my daughter,’ or ‘Help her,’ but, Have mercy upon me, and help me. Thus there has come down in the Church the practice that the faithful are sponsors to God for their young children, before they have attained such age and reason that they can themselves make any pledge to God. So that as by this woman’s faith her daughter was healed, so by the faith of Catholics of mature age their sins might be forgiven to infants. Allegorically; This woman figures the Holy Church gathered out of the Gentiles. The Lord leaves the Scribes and Pharisees, and comes into the parts of Tyre and Sidon, this figures His leaving the Jews and going over to the Gentiles. This woman came out of her own country, because the Holy Church departed from former errors and sins.

JEROME. And the daughter of this Chananæan I suppose to be the souls of believers, who were sorely vexed by a dæmon, not knowing their Creator, and bowing down to stones.

REMIGIUS. Those of whom the Lord speaks as children are the Patriarchs and Prophets of that time. By the table is signified the Holy Scripture, by the fragments the best precepts, or inward mysteries on which Holy Church feeds; by the crumbs the carnal precepts which the Jews keep. The fragments are said to be eaten under the table, because the Church submits itself humbly to fulfilling the Divine commands.

RABANUS. But the whelps eat not the crust only, but the crumbs of the children’s bread, because the despised among the Gentiles on turning to the faith, seek out in Scripture not the outside of the letter, but the spiritual sense, by which they may be able to profit in good acts.

JEROME. Wonderful change of things! Once Israel the son, and we the dogs; the change in faith has led to a change in the order of our names. Concerning them is that said, Many dogs hare come about me; while to us is said, as to this woman, Thy faith hath made thee whole. (Ps. 22:16.)

RABANUS. Great indeed was her faith; for the Gentiles, neither trained in the Law, nor educated by the words of the Prophets, straightway on the preaching of the Apostles obeyed with the hearing of the ear, and therefore deserved to obtain salvation.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And if the Lord delays the salvation of a soul at the first tears of the supplicating Church, we ought not to despair, or to cease from our prayers, but rather continue them earnestly.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 18.) And that to heal the Centurion's servant, and the daughter of this Chananæan woman, He does not go to their houses, signifies that the Gentiles, among whom He Himself went not, should be saved by His word. That these are healed on the prayer of their parents, we must understand of the Church, which is at once mother and children; the whole body of those who make up the Church is the mother, and each individual of that body is a son of that mother.

HILARY. Or, This mother represents the proselytes, in that she leaves her own country, and forsakes the Gentiles for the name of another nation; she prays for her daughter, that is, the body of the Gentiles possessed with unclean spirits; and having learned the Lord by the Law, calls Him the Son of David.

RABANUS. Also whosoever has his conscience polluted with the defilement of any sin, has a daughter sorely vexed by a dæmon. Also whosoever has defiled any good that he has done by the plague of sin, has a daughter tossed by the furies of an unclean spirit, and has need to fly to prayers and tears, and to seek the intercessions and aids of the saints.

15:29–31

29. And Jesus departed from thence, and came nigh unto the sea of Galilee; and went up into a mountain, and sat down there.

30. And great multitudes came unto him, having with them those that were lame, blind, dumb, maimed, and many others, and cast them down at Jesus' feet; and he healed them:

31. Insomuch that the multitude wondered, when they saw the dumb to speak, the maimed to be whole, the lame to walk, and the blind to see: and they glorified the God of Israel.

JEROME. Having healed the daughter of this Chananæan, the Lord returns into Judæa, as it follows, And Jesus departed from thence, and came nigh unto the sea of Galilee.

REMIGIUS. This sea is called by various names; the sea of Galilee, because of its neighbourhood to Galilee; the sea of Tiberias, from the town of Tiberias. And going up into a mountain, he sat down there.

CHRYSOSTOM. It should be considered that sometimes the Lord goes about to heal the sick, sometimes He sits and waits for them to come; and accordingly here it is added, And there came great multitudes unto him, having with them those that were dumb, lame, blind, maimed, and many others.

JEROME. What the Latin translator calls ‘debiles’ (maimed), is in the Greek χυλλοὺς which is not a general term for a maimed person, but a peculiar species, as he that is lame in one foot is called ‘claudus,’ so he that is crippled in one hand is called χυλλός.

CHRYSOSTOM. These shewed their faith in two points especially, in that they went up the mountain, and in that they believed that they had need of nothing beyond but to cast themselves at Jesus’ feet; for they do not now touch the hem even of His garment, but have attained to a loftier faith; And cast them down at Jesus’ feet. The woman’s daughter He healed with great slackness, that He might shew her virtue; but to these He administers healing immediately, not because they were better than that woman, but that He might stop the mouths of the unbelieving Jews, as it follows, and he healed them all. But the multitude of those that were healed, and the ease with which it was done, struck them with astonishment. Insomuch that the multitude wondered when they saw the dumb to speak,

JEROME. He said nothing concerning the maimed, because there was no one word which was the opposite of thisa.

RABANUS. Mystically; Having in the daughter of this Chauanæan prefigured the salvation of the Gentiles, He came into Judæa; because, when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have entered in, then shall all Israel be saved. (Rom. 11:25.)

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The sea near to which Jesus came signifies the turbid swellings of this world; it is the sea of Galilee when men pass from virtue to vice.

JEROME. He goes up into the mountain, that as a bird He may entice the tender nestlings to fly.

RABANUS. Thus raising his hearers to meditate on heavenly things. He sat down there to shew that rest is not to be sought but in heavenly things. And as He sits on the mountain, that is, in the heavenly height, there come unto Him multitudes of the faithful, drawing near to Him with devoted mind, and bringing to Him the dumb, and the blind, & c. and cast them down at Jesus' feet; because they that confess their sins are brought to be healed by Him alone. These He so heals, that the multitudes marvel and magnify the God of Israel; because the faithful when they see those that have been spiritually sick richly endued with all manner of works of virtuousness, sing praise to God.

GLOSS. (ord.) The dumb are they that do not praise God; the blind, they who do not understand the paths of life; the deaf, they that obey not; the lame, they that walk not firmly through the difficult ways of good works; the maimed, they that are crippled in their good works.

15:32–38

32. Then Jesus called his disciples unto him, and said, I have compassion on the multitude, because they continue with me now three days, and have nothing to eat: and I will not send them away fasting, lest they faint in the way.

33. And his disciples say unto him, Whence should we have so much bread in the wilderness, as to fill so great a multitude?

34. And Jesus saith unto them, How many loaves have ye? And they said, Seven, and a few little fishes.

35. And he commanded the multitude to sit down on the ground.

36. And he took the seven loaves and the fishes, and gave thanks, and brake them, and gave to his disciples, and the disciples to the multitude.

37. And they did all eat, and were filled: and they took up of the broken meat that was left seven baskets full.

38. And they that did eat were four thousand men, beside women and children.

JEROME. Christ first took away the infirmities of the sick, and afterwards supplied food to them that had been healed. Also He calls His disciples to tell them what He is about to do; Then Jesus called his disciples unto him, and said, I have compassion on the multitude. This He does that He may give an example to masters of sharing their counsels with the young, and their disciples; or, that by this dialogue they might come to understand the greatness of the miracle.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii.) For the multitude when they came to be healed, had not dared to ask for food, but He that loveth man, and hath care of all creatures, gives it to them unasked; whence He says, I have compassion upon the multitude. That it should not be said that they had brought provision with them on their way, He says, Because they continue with me now three days, and have nothing to eat. For though when they came they had food, it was now consumed, and for this reason He did it not on the first or second day, but on the third, when all was consumed that they might have brought with them; and thus they having been first placed in need, might take the food that was now provided with keener appetite. That they had come from far, and that nothing was now left them, is shewn in what He says, And I will not send, them, away fasting, lest they faint by the way. Yet He does not immediately proceed to work the miracle, that He may rouse the disciples’ attention by this questioning, and that they may shew their faith by saying to Him, Create loaves. And though at the time of the former miracle Christ had done many things to the end that they should remember it, making them distribute the loaves, and divide the baskets among them, yet they were still imperfectly disposed, as appears from what follows; And his disciples say unto him, Whence should we have so much, bread in the wilderness as to fill so great a multitude? This they spoke out of the infirmity of their thoughts, yet thereby making the ensuing miracle to be beyond suspicion; for that none might suspect that the loaves had been got from a neighbouring village, this miracle is wrought in the wilderness far distant from villages. Then to arouse His disciples’ thoughts, He puts a question to them, which may call the foregone miracle to their minds; And Jesus saith unto them, How many loaves have ye? They said unto him, Seven, and a few little fishes. But they do not add, ‘But what are they among so many?’ as they had said before; for they had advanced somewhat, though they did not yet comprehend the whole. Admire in the Apostles their love of truth, though themselves are the writers, they do not conceal their own great faults; and it is no light self-accusation to have so soon forgotten so great a miracle. Observe also their wisdom in another respect, how they had overcome their appetite, taking so little care of their meals, that though they had been three days in the desert, yet they had with them only seven loaves. Some other things also He does like to what had been done before. He makes them to sit down on the ground, and the bread to grow in the hands of the disciples; as it follows, And he commanded the multitude to sit down on the ground.

JEROME. (Sup. c. 14:15.) As we have spoken of this above, it would be tedious to repeat what has been already said; we shall therefore only dwell on those particulars in which this differs from the former.

CHRYSOSTOM. The end of the two miracles is different; And they took up of the broken meat that was left seven baskets full. Now they that had eaten were four thousand men, besides children and women. Whence are the fragments fewer in this miracle than in the former, although they that ate were not so many? It is either that the basket1 in this miracle is of larger capacity than the basket2 in the former, or that by this point of difference they might remember the two separate miracles; for which reason also He then made the number of baskets equal to the number of the disciples, but now to the number of the loaves.

REMIGIUS. In this Gospel lection we must consider in Christ the work of His humanity, and of His divinity. In that He has compassion on the multitudes, He shews that He has feeling of human frailty; in the multiplication of the loaves, and the feeding the multitudes, is shewn the working of His divinity. So here is overthrown the error of Eutyches1, who said, that in Christ was one nature only.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 50.) Surely it will not be out of place to suggest upon this miracle, that if any of the Evangelists who had not given the miracle of the five loaves had related this of the seven loaves, he would have been supposed to have contradicted the rest. But because those who have related the one, have also related the other, no one is puzzled, but it is understood at once that they were two separate miracles. This we have said, that wherever any thing is found done by the Lord, wherein the accounts of any two Evangelists seem irreconcilable, we may understand them as two distinct occurrences, of which one is related by one Evangelist, and one by another.

GLOSS. (ap. Ans.) It should be noted, that the Lord first removes their sicknessess, and after that feeds them; because sin must be first wiped away, and then the soul fed with the words of God.

HILARY. As that first multitude which He fed answers to the people among the Jews that believed; so this is compared to the people of the Gentiles, the number of four thousand denoting an innumerable number of people out of the four quarters of the earth.

JEROME. For these are not five, but four thousand; the number four being one always used in a good sense, and a four-sided stone is firm and rocks not, for which reason the Gospels also have been sacredly bestowed in this number. Also in the former miracle, because the people were neighbours unto the five senseso, it is the disciples, and not the Lord, that calls to mind their condition; but here the Lord Himself says, that He has compassion upon them, because they continue now three days with Him, that is, they believed on the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

HILARY. Or, they spend the whole time of the Lord's passion with the Lord; either because when they should come to baptism, they would confess that they believed in His passion and resurrection; or, because through the whole time of the Lord's passion they are joined to the Lord by fasting in a kind of union of suffering with Him.

RABANUS. Or, this is said because in all time there have only been three periods when grace was given; the first, before the Law; the second, under the Law; the third, under grace; the fourth, is in heaven, to which as we journey we are refreshed by the way.

REMIGIUS. Or, because correcting by penitence the sins that they have committed, in thought, word, and deed, they turn to the Lord. These multitudes the Lord would not send away fasting, that they should not faint by the way; because sinners turning in penitence, perish in their passage through the world, if they are sent away without the nourishment of sacred teaching.

GLOSS. (ord.) The seven loaves are the Scripture of the New Testament, in which the grace of the Holy Spirit is revealed and given. And these are not as those former loaves, barley, because it is not with these, as in the Law, where the nutritious substance is wrapped in types, as in a very adhesive husk; here are not two fishes, as under the Law two only were anointed, the King, and the Priest, but a few, that is, the saints of the New

Testament, who, snatched from the waves of the world, sustain this tossing sea, and by their example refresh us lest we faint by the way.

HILARY. The multitudes sit down on the ground; for before they had not reposed on the works of the Law, but they had supported themselves on their own sins, as men standing on their feet.

GLOSS. Or, they sit down there1 on the grass, that the desires of the flesh may be controlled, here on the ground, because the earth itself is commanded to be left. Or, the mountain in which the Lord refreshes them is the height of Christ; there, therefore, is grass upon the ground, because there the height of Christ is covered with carnal hopes and desires, on account of the carnal; here, where all carnal lust is banished, the guests are solidly placed on the basis of an abiding hope; there, are five thousand, who are the carnal subjected to the five senses; here, four thousand, on account of the four virtues, by which they are spiritually fortified, temperance, prudence, fortitude, and justice; of which the first is the knowledge of things to be sought and avoided; the second, the restraining of desire from those things that give pleasure in the world; the third, strength against the pains of life; the fourth, which is spread over all the love of God and our neighbour. Both there, and here women and children are excepted, because in the Old and New Testament, none are admitted to the Lord who do not endure to the perfect man, whether through the infirmity of their strength, or the levity of their tempers. Both refreshings were performed upon a mountain, because the Scriptures of both Testaments commend the loftiness of the heavenly commands and rewards, and both preach the height of Christ. The higher mysteries which the multitudes cannot receive the Apostles discharge, and fill seven baskets, to wit, the hearts of the perfect which are enlightened to understand by the grace of the seven-fold Spirit. (Is. 11:2.) Baskets are usually woven of rushes, or palm leaves; these signify the saints, who fix the root of their hearts in the very fount of life, as a bulrush in the water, that they may not wither away, and retain in their hearts the palm of their eternal reward.

CHAPTER 16

15:39–16:4

15:39. And he sent away the multitude, and took ship, and came into the coasts of Magdala.

16:1. The Pharisees also with the Sadducees came, and tempting desired him that he would shew them a sign from heaven.

2. He answered and said unto them, When it is evening, ye say, It will be fair weather: for the sky is red.

3. And in the morning, It will be foul weather to-day: for the sky is red and lowring. O ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky; but can ye not discern the signs of the times?

4. A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and there shall no sign be given unto it, but the sign of the prophet Jonas. And he left them, and departed.

CHRYSOSTOM. As the Lord sent the multitudes away after the miracle of the five loaves, so also now, not on foot, but by boat, that the multitudes may not follow Him; And he sent away the multitude, and entered into a ship, and came into the coasts of Magedan.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 51.) Mark says Dal-manutha, no doubt the same place under a different name, for many copies of the Gospel according to Mark have Magedan.

RABANUS. This Magedan is the country opposite Gerasa, and is interpreted ‘fruits,’ or ‘a messenger.’ It signifies a garden, of which it is said, A garden enclosed, a fountain sealed, (Song of Sol. 4:12.) wherein the fruits of virtues grow, and where the name of the Lord is announced. It teaches us that preachers having ministered the word to the multitude ought to be refreshed themselves with the fruits of the virtues within the chamber of their own heart. It follows; And there come unto him Pharisees and Sadducees tempting him, and desired him to shew them a sign from heaven.

REMIGIUS. Wondrous blindness of the Pharisees and Sadducees! They asked a sign from heaven, as though the things they now saw were not signs. John shews what sign it was they desired; for he relates, that after the feeding with the five loaves, the multitudes came to the Lord and said, What sign doest thou, that we may see it and believe on thee? Our fathers did eat manna in the desert, as it is written, He gave them bread to eat from heaven. (John 6:30.) Therefore when they say here, Shew us a sign from heaven, they mean, Cause that it rain manna for one or two days, that the whole people may eat, as was done for a long time in the desert. He looking into their thoughts as God, and knowing that even if a sign from heaven should be shewed them they would not believe, would not give them the sign for which they asked, as it follows, But he answered and said unto them, When the evening is come, ye say, It will be fair weather; for the sky is red, &c.

JEROME. This is not found in most copies of the Greek textp. But the sense is clear, that fair and rainy days may be foretold by the condition and harmony of the elements. But the Scribes and Pharisees who seemed to be doctors of the Law could not discern the Saviour’s coming by the predictions of the Prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 20.) We might also understand this saying, When it is evening, ye say, It mill be fair weather, for the sky is red, in this way, By the blood of Christ’s passion at His first coming, indulgence of sin is given. And in the morning, It will be foul weather to-day, for the sky is red and lowring; that is, at His second coming He will come with fire before Him.

GLOSS. Otherwise; The sky is red and lowring; that is, the Apostles suffer after the resurrection, by which ye may know that I shall judge hereafter; for if I spare not the good who are mine from present suffering, I shall not spare others hereafter; Ye can therefore discern the face of the sky, but the signs of the times ye cannot.

RABANUS. The signs of the times He means of His own coming, or passion, to which the evening redness of the heavens may be likened; and the tribulation which shall be before His coming, to which the morning redness with the lowring sky may be compared.

CHRYSOSTOM. As then in the sky there is one sign of fair weather, and another of rain, so ought ye to think concerning me; now, in this My first coming, there is need of these signs which are done in the earth; but those which are done in heaven are reserved for the time of the second coming. Now I come as a physician, then as a judge; now I come in secret, then with much pomp, when the powers of the heavens shall be shaken. But now is not the time of these signs, now have I come to die, and to suffer humiliations; as it follows, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, and there shall no sign be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) This Matthew has already given; whence we may store up for our information, that the Lord spoke the same things many times, that where there are contradictions which cannot be explained, it may be understood that the same sayings were uttered on two different occasions.

GLOSS. (interlin.) He says, Evil and adulterous generation, that is, unbelieving, having carnal, and not spiritual understanding.

RABANUS. To this generation that thus tempted the Lord is not given a sign from heaven, such as they sought for, though many signs are given on the earth; but only to the generation of such as sought the Lord, in whose sight He ascended into heaven, and sent the Holy Spirit.

JEROME. But what is meant by the sign of Jonas has been explained above.

CHRYSOSTOM. And when the Pharisees heard this, they ought to have asked Him, What it was He meant? But they had not asked at first with any desire of learning, and therefore the Lord leaves them, as it follows, And he left them, and went his way.

JEROME. That is, leaving the evil generation of the Jews, He passed over the strait, and the people of the Gentiles followed Him.

HILARY. Observe, we do not read here as in other places, that He sent the multitudes away and departed; but because the error of unbelief held the minds of the presumptuous, it is said that He left them.

16:5–12

5. And when his disciples were come to the other side, they had forgotten to take bread.

6. Then Jesus said unto them, Take heed and beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees.

7. And they reasoned among themselves, saying, It is because we have taken no bread.

8. Which when Jesus perceived, he said unto them, O ye of little faith, why reason ye among yourselves, because ye have brought no bread?

9. Do ye not yet understand, neither remember the five loaves of the five thousand, and how many baskets ye took up?

10. Neither the seven loaves of the four thousand, and how many baskets ye took up?

11. How is it that ye do not understand that I spake it not to you concerning bread, that ye should beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees?

12. Then understood they how that he bade them not beware of the leaven of bread, but of the doctrine of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees.

GLOSS. (non occ.) As the Lord had left the Pharisees on account of their unbelief, so now He teaches His disciples to be on their guard against their doctrine; whence it follows, And when His disciples were come to the other side, they had forgotten to take bread.

REMIGIUS. They were bound to their Master with so great affection, that they were unwilling to part from Him for even a moment of time. And herein it should be observed how far they were from any longing for delicacies, when they took so small care for necessaries, that they had even forgotten to take bread, without which human weakness cannot support itself. He said unto them, Take heed and beware of the leaven of the Pharisees; and of the Sadducees.

HILARY. Herein the Apostles are admonished not to be partakers in the doctrine of the Jews; for the works of the Law were established to produce faith, and to prefigure the things that were to follow; and they on whose times truth itself had chanced should look for no further types of truth; lest the teaching of the Pharisees, which knew not of Christ, should stay the effect of Gospel truth.

JEROME. For he that takes heed of the leaven of the Pharisees and the Sadducees, does not observe the precepts of the Law and of the letter, and neglects the traditions of men that he may do the commandments of God. This is the leaven of which the Apostle speaks, A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump. (1 Cor. 5:6.) By every means also we should avoid that leaven which Marcion, Valentinus, and all the heretics had. For the nature of leaven is such, that when mixed with flour, that which seemed a little increases to a large quantity, and brings the whole mixture to its own flavour. Thus heretical doctrine if it have cast but a small spark into your breast, in a short time a mighty flame is raised, and drives the whole temper of the man along with it.

CHRYSOSTOM. Why did He not say plainly, Take heed of the doctrine of the Pharisees? Because He would remind them of those things that had been done in the multiplication of the loaves, knowing them to be forgetful. To have given them this charge at once bluntly would have seemed unreasonable; but to find fault with them on occasion furnished by themselves prepared the way for the charge; therefore it is that the Evangelist brings forward their thoughts; But they thought within themselves, saying, It is because we have taken no bread.

JEROME. How had they no bread, seeing that as soon as they had filled seven baskets they entered into the boat, and came into the parts of Magedan? There they hear that they ought to take heed of the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees. But the Scripture is witness that they had forgotten to take the baskets with them.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because the disciples still grovelled about Jewish observances, the Lord sharply rebukes them for the benefit of all; whence it follows, But Jesus knowing their thoughts said unto them, O ye of little faith, why consider ye among yourselves because ye have no bread?

GLOSS. (ord.) As much as to say; Why do ye think that I spake of earthly bread, for which ye ought not to have a thought, having beheld Me of so little make such abundant overplus?

CHRYSOSTOM. This He does that He may put away from them all care for food. But why did He not reprove them, when they said, Whence should we have so much bread in the wilderness? for that seemed a more fitting occasion. He did not blame them at that time that He might not seem to be by that urged on to do miracles, and He was unwilling to find fault with them before the people. Also there was more reason in the charge, when after two miracles of multiplication of loaves, they had anxiety about food. Observe with what mildness He rebukes them; He makes an excuse in answer Himself, saying, Do ye not yet understand, nor remember the five loaves?

GLOSS. (interlin.) As much as to say, Do ye not understand the mystery, nor remember the miracle?

CHRYSOSTOM. By this calling to mind what was past, and rousing their attention to what was to come.

JEROME. Thus He takes this occasion to instruct them what is meant by the five loaves and the seven loaves, the five thousand and the four thousand, who were fed in the desert. For if the leaven of the Pharisees and Sadducees signified not earthly food, but corrupt traditions and heretical dogmas, why should not the food with which the people of God is nourished signify the true and uncorrupt doctrine?

CHRYSOSTOM. But that you may learn what force Christ's reproof had upon His disciples, and how it roused their sluggish spirit, hear what says the Evangelist; Then they understood how that he bade them not beware of the leaven of bread, but of the doctrine of the Pharisees and the Sadducees; yet He had not interpreted this to them. This instruction of the Lord them drew them away from Jewish observances, and made them attentive instead of careless, and raised them out of their little faith, that whenever they should seem to have but little provision of bread they should have no fear about food, but should despise all those things.

16:13–19

13. When Jesus came into the coasts of Cæsarea Philippi, he asked his disciples, saying, Whom do men say that I the Son of man am?

14. And they said, Some say that thou art John the Baptist; some, Elias; and others, Jeremias, or one of the prophets.

15. He saith unto them, But whom say ye that I am?

16. And Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God.

17. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven.

18. And I say also unto thee, That thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church: and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

19. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and

whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

GLOSS. (non occ.) As soon as the Lord had taken His disciples out of the teaching of the Pharisees, He then suitably proceeds to lay deep the foundations of the Gospel doctrine; and to give this the greater solemnity, it is introduced by the name of the place, When Jesus came into the coasts of Cæsarea Philippi.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv.) He adds ‘of Philip,’ to distinguish it from the other Cæsarea, of Strato. And He asks this question in the former place, leading His disciples far out of the way of the Jews, that being set free from all fear, they might say freely what was in their mind.

JEROME. This Philip was the brother of Herod, the tetrarch of Ituræa, and the region of Trachonitis, who gave to the city, which is now called Panæas, the name of Cæsarea in honour of Tiberius Cæsar.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) When about to confirm the disciples in the faith, He would first take away from their minds the errors and opinions of others, whence it follows, And he asked his disciples, saying, Whom do men say that the Son of Man is?

ORIGEN. Christ puts this question to His disciples, that from their answer we may learn that there were at that time among the Jews various opinions concerning Christ; and to the end that we should always investigate what opinion men may form of us; that if any ill be said of us, we may cut off the occasions of it; or if any good, we may multiply the occasions of it.

GLOSS. (non occ.) So by this instance of the Apostles, the followers of the Bishops are instructed, that whatever opinions they may hear out of doors concerning their Bishops, they should tell them to them.

JEROME. Beautifully is the question put, Whom do men say that the Son of Man is? For they who speak of the Son of Man, are men: but they who understood His divine nature are called not men but Gods.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says not, Whom do the Scribes and Pharisees say that I am? but, Whom do men say that I am? searching into the minds of the common people, which were not perverted to evil. For though their opinion concerning Christ was much below what it ought to have been, yet it was free from wilful wickedness; but the opinion of the Pharisees concerning Christ was full of much malice.

HILARY. By asking, Whom do men say that the Son of Man is? He implied that something ought to be thought respecting Him beyond what appeared, for He was the Son of Man. And in thus enquiring after men's opinion respecting Himself, we are not to think that He made confession of Himself; for that which He asked for was something concealed, to which the faith of believers ought to extend itself. We must hold that form of confession, that we so mention the Son of God as not to forget the Son of Man, for the one without the other offers us no hope of salvation; and therefore He said emphatically, Whom do men say that the Son of Man is?

JEROME. He says not, Whom, do men say that I am? but, Whom do men say that the Son of Man is? that He should not seem to ask ostentatiously concerning Himself. Observe, that wherever the Old Testament has 'Son of Man,' the phrase in the Hebrew is 'Son of Adam,'

ORIGEN. Then the disciples recount the divers opinions of the Jews relating to Christ; And they said, Some say John the Baptist, following Herod's opinion; others Elias, (vid. Matt. 14:2.) supposing either that Elias had gone through a second birth, or that having continued alive in the body, He had at this time appeared; others Jeremias, whom the Lord had ordained to be Prophet among the Gentiles, not understanding that Jeremias was a type of Christ; or one of the Prophets, in a like way, because of those things which God spoke to them through the Prophets, yet they were not fulfilled in them, but in Christ.

JEROME. It was as easy for the multitudes to be wrong in supposing Him to be Elias and Jeremias, as Herod in supposing Him to be John the Baptist; whence I wonder that some interpreters should have sought for the causes of these several errors.

CHRYSOSTOM. The disciples having recounted the opinion of the common people, He then by a second question invites them to higher thoughts concerning Him, and therefore it follows, Jesus saith unto them, Whom say ye that I am? You who are with Me always, and have seen greater miracles than the multitudes, ought not to agree in the opinion of the multitudes. For this reason He did not put this question to them at the commencement of His preaching, but after He had done many signs; then also He spoke many things to them concerning His Deity.

JEROME. Observe how by this connexion of the discourse the Apostles are not styled men but Gods. For when He had said, Whom say ye that the

Son of Man is? Ho adds, Whom say ye that I am? as much as to say, They being men think of Me as man, ye who are Gods, whom do you think Me?

RABANUS. He enquires the opinions of His disciples and of those without, not because He was ignorant of them; His disciples He asks, that He may reward with due reward their confession of a right faith, and the opinions of those without He enquires, that having the wrong opinions first set forth, it might be proved that the disciples had received the truth of their confession not from common opinion, but out of the hidden treasure of the Lord's revelation.

CHRYSOSTOM. When the Lord enquires concerning the opinion of the multitudes, all the disciples answer; but when all the disciples are asked, Peter as the mouth and head1 of the Apostles answers for all, as it follows, Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God.

ORIGEN. Peter denied that Jesus was any of those things which the Jews supposed, by his confession, Thou art the Christ, which the Jews were ignorant of; but he added what was more, the Son of the living God, (Ezek. 33:11.) who had said by his Prophets, I live, saith the Lord. And therefore was He called the living Lord, but in a more especial manner as being eminent above all that had life; for He alone has immortality, and is the fount of life, wherefore He is rightly called God the Father; for He is life as it were flowing out of a fountain, who said, I am the life. (John 14:6.)

JEROME. He calls Him the living God, in comparison of those gods who are esteemed gods, but are dead; such, I mean, as Saturn, Jupiter, Venus, Hercules, and the other monsters of idols.

HILARY. This is the true and unalterable faith, that from God came forth God the Son, who has eternity out of the eternity of the Father. That this God took unto Him a body and was made man is a perfect confession. Thus He embraced all in that He here expresses both His nature and His name, in which is the sum of virtues.

RABANUS. And by a remarkable distinction it was that the Lord Himself puts forward the lowliness of the humanity which He had taken upon Him, while His disciple shews us the excellence of His divine eternity.

HILARY. This confession of Peter met a worthy reward, for that he had seen the Son of God in the man. Whence it follows, Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Barjonas, for flesh and blood has not revealed this unto thee, but my Father who is in heaven.

JEROME. This return Christ makes to the Apostle for the testimony which Peter had spoken concerning Him, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God. The Lord said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jonas? Why? Because flesh and blood has not revealed this unto thee, but My Father. That which flesh and blood could not reveal, was revealed by the grace of the Holy Spirit. By his confession then he obtains a title, which should signify that he had received a revelation from the Holy Spirit, whose son he shall also be called; for Barjonas in our tongue signifies The son of a dove. Others take it in the simple sense, that Peter is the son of Johnq, according to that question in another place, Simon, son of John, lovest thou me? (John 21:15.) affirming that it is an error of the copyists in writing here Barjonas for Barjoannas, dropping one syllable. Now Joanna is interpreted ‘The grace of God.’ But either name has its mystical interpretation; the dove signifies the Holy Spirit; and the grace of God signifies the spiritual gift.

CHRYSOSTOM. It would be without meaning to say, Thou art the son of Jonas, unless he intended to shew that Christ is as naturally the Son of God, as Peter is the son of Jonas, that is, of the same substance as him that begot him.

JEROME. Compare what is here said, flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, with the Apostolic declaration, Immediately I was not content with flesh and blood, (Gal. 1:16.) meaning there by this expression the Jews; so that here also the same thing is shewn in different words, that not by the teaching of the Pharisees, but by the grace of God, Christ was revealed to him the Son of God.

HILARY. Otherwise; He is blessed, because to have looked and to have seen beyond human sight is matter of praise, not beholding that which is of flesh and blood, but seeing the Son of God by the revelation of the heavenly Father; and he was held worthy to be the first to acknowledge the divinity which was in Christ.

ORIGEN. It must be enquired in this place whether, when they were first sent out, the disciples knew that He was the Christ. For this speech shews that Peter then first confessed Him to be the Son of the living God. And look whether you can solve a question of this sort, by saying that to believe Jesus to be the Christ is less than to know Him; and so suppose that when they were sent to preach they believed that Jesus was the Christ, and afterwards as they made progress they knew Him to be so. Or must we answer thus; That then the Apostles had the beginnings of a knowledge of Christ, and knew some little concerning Him; and that they made progress afterwards in the knowledge of Him, so that they were able to receive the knowledge of Christ revealed by the Father, as Peter, who is here blessed, not only for that he says, Thou art the Christ, but much more for that he adds, the Son of the living God.

CHRYSOSTOM. And truly if Peter had not confessed that Christ was in a peculiar sense born of the Father, there had been no need of revelation; nor would he have been worthy of this blessing for confessing Christ to be one of many adopted sons; for before this they who were with Him in the ship had said, Truly thou art the Son of God. (John 1:49.) Nathanael also said, Rabbi, thou art the Son of God. Yet were not these blessed because they did not confess such sonship as does Peter here, but thought Him one among many, not in the true sense a son; or, if chief above all, yet not the substance of the Father. But see how the Father reveals the Son, and the Son the Father; from none other comes it to confess the Son than of the Father, and from none other to confess the Father than of the Son; so that from this place even it is manifest that the Son is of the same substance, and to be worshipped together with the Father. Christ then proceeds to shew that many would hereafter believe what Peter had now confessed, whence He adds, And I say unto thee, that thou art Peter,

JEROME. As much as to say, You have said to me, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God, therefore I say unto thee, not in a mere speech, and that goes not on into operation; but I say unto thee, and for Me to speak is to make it sor, that thou art Peter. For as from Christ proceeded that light to the Apostles, whereby they were called the light of the world, and those other names which were imposed upon them by the Lord, so upon Simon who believed in Christ the Rock, He bestowed the name of Peter (Rock.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 53.) But let none suppose that Peter received that name here; he received it at no other time than where John relates that it was said unto him, Thou shalt be called Cephas, which is interpreted, Peter. (John 1:42.)

JEROME. And pursuing the metaphor of the rock, it is rightly said to him as follows: And upon this rock I will build my Church.

CHRYSOSTOM. That is, On this faith and confession I will build my Church. Herein shewing that many should believe what Peter had confessed, and raising his understanding, and making him His shepherd.

AUGUSTINE. (Retract. i. 21.) I have said in a certain place of the Apostle Peter, that it was on him, as on a rock, that the Church was built. But I know that since that I have often explained these words of the Lord, Thou art Peter, and on this rock will I build my Church, as meaning upon Him whom Peter had confessed in the words, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God; and so that Peter, taking his name from this rock, would represent the Church, which is built upon this rock. For it is not said to him, Thou art the rock, but, Thou art Peter. (1 Cor. 10:4.) But the rock was Christ, whom because Simon thus confessed, as the whole Church confesses Him, he was named Peter. Let the reader choose whether of these two opinions seems to him the more probable.

HILARY. But in this bestowing of a new name is a happy foundation of the Church, and a rock worthy of that building, which should break up the laws of hell, burst the gates of Tartarus, and all the shackles of death. And to shew the firmness of this Church thus built upon a rock, He adds, And the gates of hell shall not prevail against it.

GLOSS. (interlin.) That is, shall not separate it from the love and faith of Me.

JEROME. I suppose the gates of hell to mean vice and sin, or at least the doctrines of heretics by which men are ensnared and drawn into hell.

ORIGEN. But in heavenly things every spiritual sin is a gate of hell, to which are opposed the gates of righteousness.

RABANUS. The gates of hell are the torments and promises of the persecutors. Also, the evil works of the unbelievers, and vain conversation, are gates of hell, because they shew the path of destruction.

ORIGEN. He does not express what it is which they shall not prevail against, whether the rock on which He builds the Church, or the Church which He builds on the rock; but it is clear that neither against the rock nor against the Church will the gates of hell prevail.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA.s; According to this promise of the Lord, the Apostolic Church of Peter remains pure and spotless from all leading into error, or heretical fraud, above all Heads and Bishops, and Primates of Churches and people, with its own Pontiffs, with most abundant faith, and the authority of Peter. And while other Churches have to blush for the error of some of their members, this reigns alone immoveably established, enforcing silence, and stopping the mouths of all heretics; and wet, not drunken with the wine of pride, confess together with it the type of truth, and of the holy apostolic tradition.

JEROME. Let none think that this is said of death, implying that the Apostles should not be subject to the condition of death, when we see their martyrdoms so illustrious.

ORIGEN. Wherefore if we, by the revelation of our Father who is in heaven, shall confess that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, having also our conversation in heaven, to us also shall be said, Thou art Peter; for every one is a Rock who is an imitator of Christ. But against whomsoever the gates of hell prevail, he is neither to be called a rock upon which Christ builds His Church; neither a Church, or part of the Church, which Christ builds upon a rock.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then He speaks of another honour of Peter, when He adds, And I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; as much as to say, As the Father hath given thee to know Me, I also will give something unto thee, namely, the keys of the kingdom of heaven.

RABANUS. For as with a zeal beyond the others he had confessed the King of heaven, he is deservedly entrusted more than the others with the keys of the heavenly kingdom, that it might be clear to all, that without that confession and faith none ought to enter the kingdom of heaven. By the keys of the kingdom He means discernment1 and power; power, by which he binds and looses, discernment, by which he separates the worthy from the unworthy.

GLOSS. (interlin.) It follows, And whatsoever thou shalt bind; that is, whomsoever thou shalt judge unworthy of forgiveness while he lives, shall be judged unworthy with God; and whatsoever thou shalt loose, that is, whomsoever thou shalt judge worthy to be forgiven while he lives, shall obtain forgiveness of his sins from God.

ORIGEN. See how great power has that rock upon which the Church is built, that its sentences are to continue firm as though God gave sentence by it.

CHRYSOSTOM. See how Christ leads Peter to a high understanding concerning himself. These things that He here promises to give him, belong to God alone, namely to forgive sins, and to make the Church immoveable amidst the storms of so many persecutions and trials.

RABANUS. But this power of binding and loosing, though it seems given by the Lord to Peter alone, is indeed given also to the other Apostles, and is even now in the^ Bishops and Presbyters in every Church. (vid. Matt. 18:18.) But Peter received in a special manner the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and a supremacy of judicial power, that all the faithful throughout the world might understand that all who in any manner separate themselves from the unity of the faith, or from communion with him, such should neither be able to be loosed from the bonds of sin, nor to enter the gate of the heavenly kingdom.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) This power was committed specially to Peter, that we might thereby be invited to unity. For He therefore appointed him the head of the Apostles, that the Church might have one principal Vicar of Christ, to whom the different members of the Church should have recourse, if ever they should have dissensions among them. But if there were many heads in the Church, the bond of unity would be broken. Some say that the words upon earth denote that power was not given to men to bind and loose the dead, but the living; for he who should loose the dead would do this not upon earth, but after the earth.

SECOND COUNCIL OF CONSTANTINOPLE. (Concil. Con. ii. Collat. 8.) How is it that some do presume to say that these things are said only of the living? Know they not that the sentence of anathema is nothing else but separation? They are to be avoided who are held of grievous faults, whether they are among the living, or not. For it is always behoveful to fly from the wicked. Moreover there are divers letters read of Augustine of religious memory, who was of great renown among the African bishops, which affirmed that heretics ought to be anathematized even after death. (vid. Aug. Ep. 185. 4.) Such an ecclesiastical tradition other African Bishops also have preserved. And the Holy Roman Church also has anathematized some Bishops after death, although no accusation had been brought against their faith in their lifetimeu.

JEROME. Bishops and Presbyters; not understanding this passage, assume to themselves something of the lofty pretensions of the Pharisees, and suppose that they may either condemn the innocent, or absolve the guilty; whereas what will be enquired into before the Lord will be not the sentence of the Priests, but the life of him that is being judged. We read in Leviticus of the lepers, how they are commanded to shew themselves to the Priests, and if they have the leprosy, then they are made unclean by the Priest; not that the Priest makes them leprous and unclean, but that the Priest has knowledge of what is leprosy and what is not leprosy, and can discern who is clean, and who is unclean. In the same way then as there the Priest makes the leper unclean, here the Bishop or Presbyter binds or looses not those who are without sin, or guilt, but in discharge of his function when he has heard the varieties of their sins, he knows who is to be bound, and who loosed.

ORIGEN. Let him then be without blame who binds or looses another, that he may be found worthy to bind or loose in heaven. Moreover, to him who shall be able by his virtues to shut the gates of hell, are given in reward the keys of the kingdom of heaven. For every kind of virtue when any has begun to practise it, as it were opens itself before Him, the Lord, namely, opening it through His grace, so that the same virtue is found to be both the gate, and the key of the gate. But it may be that each virtue is itself the kingdom of heaven.

16:20–21

20. Then charged he his disciples that they should tell no man that he was Jesus the Christ.

21. From that time forth began Jesus to shew unto his disciples, how that he must go unto Jerusalem and suffer many things of the elders and Chief Priests and Scribes, and be killed, and be raised again the third day.

ORIGEN. Seeing Peter had confessed Him to be Christ the Son of the living God, because He would not have them preach this in the mean time, He adds, Then charged he his disciples that they should tell no man that he was Jesus the Christ.

JEROME. When then above He sends His disciples to preach, and commands them to proclaim His advent, this seems contrary to His command here, that they should not say that He is Jesus the Christ. To me it seems that it is one thing to preach Christ, and another to preach Jesus the Christ. Christ is a common title of dignity, Jesus the proper name of the Saviour.

ORIGEN. Or they then spake of Him in lowly words, as only a great and wonderful man, but as yet proclaimed Him not as the Christ. Yet if any will have it that He was even at the first proclaimed to be Christ, he may say that now He chose that first short announcement of His name to be left in silence and not repeated, that that little which they had heard concerning Christ might be digested into their minds. Or the difficulty may be solved thus: that the former relation concerning their preaching Christ does not belong to the time before His Resurrection, but to the time that should be after the Resurrection; and that the command now given is meant for the time present; for it were of no use to preach Him, and to be silent concerning His cross. Moreover, He commanded them that they should tell no man that He was the Christ, and prepared them that they should afterwards say that He was Christ who was crucified, and who rose again from the dead.

JEROME. But that none should suppose that this is only my explanation, and not an evangelic interpretation, what follows explains the reasons of His forbidding them to preach Him at that time; Then began Jesus to shew unto his disciples that he must needs go unto Jerusalem, and suffer many things of the elders and Scribes, and Chief Priests, and be put to death, and rise again the third day. The meaning is; Then preach Me when I shall have suffered these things, for it will be of no avail that Christ be preached publicly, and His Majesty spread abroad among the people, when after a little time they shall see Him scourged and crucified.

CHRYSOSTOM. For what having once had root has afterwards been torn up, if it is again planted, is with difficulty retained among the multitude; but what having been once rooted has continued ever after unmoved, is easily brought on to a further growth. He therefore dwells on these sorrowful things, and repeats His discourse upon them, that He may open the minds of His disciples.

ORIGEN. And observe that it is not said,’ He began to say,’ or ‘to teach,’ but to shew; for as things are said to be shewn to the sense, so the things which Christ spake are said to be shewn by Him. Nor indeed do I think, that to those who saw Him suffering many things in the flesh, were those things which they saw so shewn as this representation in words shewed to the disciples the mystery of the passion and resurrection of Christ. At that time, indeed, He only began to shew them, and afterwards when they were more able to receive it, He shewed them more fully; for all that Jesus began to do, that He accomplished. He must needs go to Jerusalem, to be put to death indeed in the Jerusalem which is below, but to rise again and reign in the heavenly Jerusalem. But when Christ rose again, and others were risen with Him, they no longer sought the Jerusalem which is beneath, or the house of prayer in it, but that which is above. He suffers many things from the elders of the earthly Jerusalem, that He may be glorified by those heavenly elders who receive His mercies. He rose again from the dead on the third day, that He may deliver from the evil one, and purchase for such as are so delivered this gift, that they be baptized in spirit, soul, and body, in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, who are three days perpetually present to those that through them have been made children of light.

16:22–23

22. Then Peter took him, and began to rebuke him, saying, Be it far from thee, Lord: this shall not be unto thee.

23. But he turned, and said unto Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan: thou art an offence unto me: for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men.

ORIGEN. While Christ was yet speaking the beginnings of the things which He was shewing unto them, Peter considered them unworthy of the Son of the living God. And forgetting that the Son of the living God does nothing, and acts in no way worthy of blame, he began to rebuke Him; and this is what is said, And Peter took him, and began to rebuke him.

JEROME. We have often said that Peter had too hot a zeal, and a very great affection towards the Lord the Saviour. Therefore after that his confession, and the reward of which he had heard from the Saviour, he would not have that his confession destroyed, and thought it impossible that the Son of God could be put to death, but takes Him to him affectionately, or takes Him aside that he may not seem to be rebuking his Master in the presence of his fellow disciples, and begins to chide Him with the feeling of one that loved Him, and to contradict Him, and say, Be it far from thee, Lord; or as it is better in the Greek, ἵλεώς σοι Κύριε, οὐ μὴ ἔσται σοι τοῦτο, that is, Be propitious to Thyself, Lord, this shall not be unto Thee.

ORIGEN. As though Christ Himself had needed a propitiation. His affection Christ allows, but charges him with ignorance; as it follows, He turned and said unto Peter, Get thee behind me, Satan, thou art an offence unto me.

HILARY. The Lord, knowing the suggestion of the craft of the devil, says to Peter, Get thee behind me; that is, that he should follow the example of His passion; but to him by whom this expression was suggested, He turns and says, Satan, thou art an offence unto me. For we cannot suppose that the name of Satan, and the sin of being an offence, would be imputed to Peter after those so great declarations of blessedness and power that had been granted him.

JEROME. But to me this error of the Apostle, proceeding from the warmth of his affection, will never seem a suggestion of the devil. Let the thoughtful reader consider that that blessedness of power was promised to Peter in time to come, not given him at the time present; had it been conveyed to him immediately, the error of a false confession would never have found place in him.

CHRYSOSTOM. For what wonder is it that this should befal Peter, who had never received a revelation concerning these things? For that you may learn that that confession which he made concerning Christ was not spoken of himself, observe how in these things which had not been revealed to him, he is at a loss. Estimating the things of Christ by human and earthly principles, he judged it mean and unworthy of Him that He should suffer. Therefore the Lord added, For thou savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men.

JEROME. As much as to say; It is of My will, and of the Father’s will, that I should die for the salvation of men; you considering only your own will would not that the grain of wheat should fall into the ground, that it may bring forth much fruit; therefore as you speak what is opposed to My will, you ought to be called My adversary. For Satan is interpreted ‘adverse’ or ‘contrary.’

ORIGEN. Yet the words in which Peter and those in which Satan are rebuked, are not, as is commonly thought, the same; to Peter it is said, Get thee behind me, Satan; that is, follow me, thou that art contrary to my will; to the Devil it is said, Go thy way, Satan, understanding not ‘behind me,’ but ‘into everlasting fire.’ He said therefore to Peter, Get thee behind me, as to one who through ignorance was ceasing to walk after Christ. And He called him Satan, as one, who through ignorance had somewhat contrary to God. But he is blessed to whom Christ turns, even though He turn in order to rebuke him. But why said He to Peter, Thou art an offence unto me, (Ps. 119:165.) when in the Psalm it is said, Great peace have they that love thy law, and there is no offence to them? It must be answered, that not only is Jesus not offended, but neither is any man who is perfect in the love of God; and yet he who does or speaks any thing of the nature of an offence, may be an offence even to one who is incapable of being offended. Or he may hold every disciple that sinneth as an offence, as Paul speaks, Who is offended, and I burn not?. (2 Cor. 11:29.)

16:24–25

24. Then said Jesus unto his disciples, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me.

25. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: and whosoever will lose his life for my sake shall find it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv.) Peter had said, Be it far from thee, Lord, this shall not be unto thee; and had been answered, Get thee behind me, Satan; but the Lord was not satisfied with this rebuke, but over and above desired to shew the impropriety of those things which Peter had said, and the fruit of His own passion; whence it is added, Then said Jesus to his disciples, If any man will to come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me; as much as to say, You say unto me, Be it far from thee; but I say unto you, that not only is it harmful for you to hinder Me from My Passion, but yourself will not be able to be saved unless you suffer and die, and renounce your life always. And note, that He does not speak of it as compulsory, for He does not say, Though ye will not yet must ye suffer this, but, If any man will. By saying this He rather attracted them; for he who leaves his auditor at liberty, attracts him the more; whereas he that uses violence oftentimes hinders him. And He proposes this doctrine, not to His disciples only, but in common to the whole world, saying, If any man will, that is, if woman, if man, if king, if free, if slave; there are three things mentioned; let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxii. 2.) For unless a man departs from himself, he does not draw near to Him who is above him. But if we leave ourselves, whither shall we go out of ourselves? Or if we have forsaken ourselves, who is it then that goes? Indeed, we are one thing when fallen by sin, another thing as we were made by nature. It is therefore then that we leave and deny ourselves, when we avoid that which we were of old, and strive towards that to which we are called in newness.

GREGORY. (in Ezech. Hom. i. 10.) He denies himself whosoever is changed for the better, and begins to be what he was not, and ceases to be what he was.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxiii. 6.) He also denies himself, who having trode under foot the risings of pride, shews himself in the eyes of God to be estranged from himself.

ORIGEN. But though a man may seem to keep from sin, yet if he does not believe in the cross of Christ, he cannot be said to be crucified with Christ; whence it follows, And take up his cross.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; He that disowns another, whether a brother, or a servant, or whosoever it be, he may see him beaten, or suffering aught else, and neither succours nor befriends him; thus it is he would have us deny our body, and whether it be beaten or afflicted in any other way, not to spare it. For this is to spare. So parents do then most spare their children when they hand them over to tutors, bidding them not to spare them. And that you should not think that this denial of self extends only to words or affronts, he shews to what degree we should deny ourselves, namely, to death the most shameful, even that of the cross; this He signifies when He says, And take up his cross, and follow me.

HILARY. We are to follow our Lord by taking up the cross of His passion; and if not in deed, yet in will, hear Him company.

CHRYSOSTOM. And because malefactors often suffer grievous things, that you should not suppose that simply to suffer evil is enough, He adds the reason of suffering, when He says, And follow me. For His sake you are to endure all, and to learn His other virtues; for this is to follow Christ aright, to be diligent in the practice of virtues, and to suffer all things for His sake.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxii. 3.) There are two ways of taking our cross; when the body is afflicted by abstinence, or when the heart is pained by compassion for another. Forasmuch as our very virtues are beset with faults, we must declare that vainglory sometimes attends abstinence of flesh, for the emaciated body and pale countenance betray this high virtue to the praise of the world. Compassion again is sometimes attended by a false affection, which is hereby led to be consenting unto sin; to shut out these, He adds, and follow me.

JEROME. Otherwise; He takes up his cross who is crucified to the world; and he to whom the world is crucified, follows his crucified Lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. And then because this seemed severe, He softens it by shewing the abundant rewards of our pains, and the punishment of evil, He that will save his life shall lose it.

ORIGEN. This may be understood in two ways. First thus; if any lover of this present life spares his life, fearing to die, and supposing that his life is ended with this death; he seeking in this way to save his life, shall lose it, estranging it from life eternal. But if any, despising the present life, shall contend for the truth unto death, he shall lose his life as far as this present life is concerned, but forasmuch as he loses it for Christ, he shall the more save it for life eternal. Otherwise thus; if any understand what is true salvation, and desire to obtain it for the salvation of his own life, he by denying himself loses his life as to the enjoyments of the flesh, but saves it by works of piety. He shews by saying. For he that will, that this passage must be connected in sense with that which went before. If then we understand the first, Let him deny himself, of the death of the body, we must take this that follows of death only; but if we understand the first of mortifying the propensities of the flesh, then, to lose his life, signifies to give up carnal pleasures.

16:26–28

26. For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?

27. For the Son of man shall come in the glory of his Father with his angels; and then he shall reward every man according to his works.

28. Verily I say unto you. There be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the Son of man coming in his kingdom.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because He had said, Whoso will save, shall lose, and whoso will lose shall save, opposing saving to losing, that none should hence conclude that there was any equality between the losing on one side, and the saving on the other, He adds, What does it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, but suffer the loss of his soul? As though He had said, Say not that he who escapes the dangers which threaten him for Christ's sake, saves his soul, that is, his temporal life; but add to his temporal life the whole world, and what of all these things will profit a man if his soul perishes for ever? Suppose you should see all your servants in joy, and yourself placed in the greatest evils, what profit would you reap from being their master? Think over this within your own soul, when by the indulgence of the flesh that soul looks for its own destruction,

ORIGEN. I suppose also that he gains the world who does not deny himself, nor loses Ms own life as to carnal pleasures, and thence suffers the loss of his soul. These two things being set before us, we must rather choose to lose the world, and gain our souls.

CHRYSOSTOM. But if you should reign over the whole world, you would not be able to buy your soul; whence it follows, Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? As much as to say, if you lose goods, you may have it in your power to give other goods to recover them; but if you lose your soul, you can neither give another soul, nor any thing else in ransom for it. And what marvel is it if this happen in the soul, when we see the same happen in the body; for if you should surround a body afflicted with an incurable disease with ten thousand diadems, they would not heal it.

ORIGEN. And at first sight indeed the ransom of the soul might be supposed to be in his substance, that a man should give his substance to the poor, and so should save his soul. But I suppose that a man has nothing that giving as a ransom for his soul he should deliver it from death. God gave the ransom for the souls of men, namely the precious blood of His Son.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxii. 4.) Or the connexion may be thus; The Holy Church has a period of persecution, and a period of peace; and our Redeemer accordingly distinguishes between these periods in His commands; in time of persecution the life is to be laid down; but in time of peace, those earthly lusts which might gain too great power over us are to be broken through; whence He says, What does it profit a man?

JEROME. Having thus called upon His disciples to deny themselves and take up their cross, the hearers were filled with great terror, therefore these severe tidings are followed by more joyful; For the Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father with the holy Angels. Dost thou fear death? Hear the glory of the triumph. Dost thou dread the cross? Hear the attendance of the Angels.

ORIGEN. As much as to say; The Son of Man is now come, but not in glory; for He ought not to have been ordained in His glory to bear our sins; but then He shall come in His glory, when He shall first have made ready His disciples, being made as they are, that He might make them as He is Himself, in the likeness of His glory.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said not in such glory as is that of the Father, that you might not suppose a difference of glory, but He says, The glory of the Father, that it might be shewn to be the same glory. But if the glory is one, it is evident that the substance is one. What then fearest thou, Peter, hearing of death? For then shalt thou see Me in glory. But if I be in glory, so also shall ye be. But in making mention of His glory, He mingleth therewith things terrible, bringing forward the judgment, as it follows, And then shall he render to each man according to his works.

JEROME. For there is no difference of Jew or Gentile, man or woman, poor or rich, whore not persons but works are accepted.

CHRYSOSTOM. This He said to call to their minds not only the punishment of sinners, but the prizes and crowns of the righteous.

JEROME. But the secret thought of the Apostles might have suffered an offence of this sort; The killings and deaths you speak of as to be now, but the promise of your coming in glory is put off to a long distant time. He that knows secret things therefore, seeing that they might object this, requites a present fear with a present reward, saying, Verily I say unto you, There be some of those standing here that shall not taste death until the Son of Man come in his kingdom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvi.) Willing to shew what is that glory in which He shall come hereafter, He revealed it to them in this present life, so far as it was possible for them to receive it, that they might not have sorrow in their Lord’s death.

REMIGIUS. What is here said, therefore, was fulfilled in the three disciples to whom the Lord, when transfigured in the mount, shewed the joys of the eternal inheritance; (vid. Bed. in Luc. 9:27.) these saw Him coming in His kingdom, that is, shining in His effulgent radiance, in which, after the judgment passed, He shall be beheld by all the saints.

CHRYSOSTOM. Therefore He does not reveal the names of those who should ascend into the mount, because the rest would be very desirous to accompany them whither they might look upon the pattern of His glory, and would be grieved as though they were passed over.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or, by the kingdom of God is meant the present Church, and because some of His disciples were to live so long in the body as to behold the Church of God built up and raised against the glory of this world, this comfortable promise is given them, There be some of them standing here.

ORIGEN. Morally; To those who are nearly brought to the faith, the Word of God wears the form of a servant; but to those that are perfect, He comes in the glory of the Father. His angels are the words of the Prophets, which it is not possible to comprehend spiritually, until the word of Christ has been first spiritually comprehended, and then will their words be seen in like majesty with His. Then will He give of His own glory to every man according to his deeds; for the better each man is in his deeds, so much the more spiritually does he understand Christ and His Prophets. They that stand where Jesus stands, are they that have the foundations of their souls rested upon Jesus; of whom such as stood firmest are said not to taste death till they see the Word of God; which comes in His kingdom when they see that excellence of God which they cannot see while they are involved in divers sins, which is to taste death, forasmuch as the soul that sinneth, dies. For as life, and the living bread, is He that came down from heaven, so His enemy death is the bread of death. And of these breads there are some that eat but a little, just tasting them, while some eat more abundantly. They that sin neither often, nor greatly, these only taste death; they that have partaken more perfectly of spiritual virtue do not taste it only, but feed ever on the living bread. That He says, Until they see, does not fix any time at which shall be done what had not been done before, but mentions just what is necessary; for he that once sees Him in His glory, shall after that by no means taste death.

RABANUS. (e Bed. in Luc. 9.) It is of the saints He speaks as tasting death, by whom the death of the body is tasted just as it were sipping, while the life of the soul is, held fast in possession.

CHAPTER 17

17:1–4

1. And after six days Jesus taketh Peter, James, and John his brother, and bringeth them up into an high mountain apart,

2. And was transfigured before them: and his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment was white as the light.

3. And, behold, there appeared unto them Moses and Elias talking with him.

4. Then answered Peter, and said unto Jesus, Lord, it is good for us to be here: if thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.

REMIGIUS. In this Transfiguration undergone on the mount, the Lord fulfilled within six days the promise made to His disciples, that they should have a sight of His glory; as it is said, And after six days he took Peter, and James, and John his brother.

JEROME. It is made a question how it could be after six days that He took them, when Luke says eight. (Luke 9:28.) The answer is easy, that here one reckoned only the intervening days, there the first and the last are also added.

CHRYSOSTOM. He does not take them up immediately upon the promise being made, but six days after, for this reason, that the other disciples might not be touched with any human passion, as a feeling of jealousy; or else that during these days’ space, those disciples who were to be taken up might become kindled with a more eager desire.

RABANUS. (e Bed.) Justly was it after six days that He shewed His glory, because after six ages is to be the resurrectiond.

ORIGEN. Or because in six days this whole visible world was made; so he who is above all the things of this world, may ascend into the high mountain, and there see the glory of the Word of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. He took these three because He set them before others. But observe how Matthew does not conceal who were preferred to himself; the like does John also when he records the preeminent praise given to Peter. For the company of Apostles was free from jealousy and vain glory.

HILARY. In the three thus taken up with Him, the election of people out of the three stocks of Sem, Cam, and Japhet is figured.

RABANUS. (e Bed.) Or; He took only three disciples with Him, because many are called but few chosen. Or because they who now hold in incorrupt mind the faith of the Holy Trinity, shall then joy in the everlasting beholding of it.

REMIGIUS. When the Lord was about to shew His disciples the glory of His brightness, He led them into the mountain, as it follows, And he took them up into a high mountain apart. Herein teaching, that it is necessary for all who seek to contemplate God, that they should not grovel in weak pleasures, but by love of things above should be ever raising themselves towards heavenly things; and to shew His disciples that they should not look for the glory of the divine brightness in the gulph of the present world, but in the kingdom of the heavenly blessedness. He leads them apart, because the saints are separated from the wicked by their whole soul and devotion of their faith, and shall be utterly separated in the future; or because many are called, but few chosen, It follows, And he was transfigured before them.

JEROME. Such as He is to be in the time of the Judgment, such was He now seen of the Apostles. Let none suppose that He lost His former form and lineaments, or laid aside His bodily reality, taking upon Him a spiritual or ethereal Body. How His transfiguration was accomplished, the Evangelist shews, saying, And his face did shine as the sun, and his raiment became white as snow, For that His face is said to shine, and His raiment described to become white, does not take away substance, but confer glory. In truth, the Lord was transformed into that glory in which He shall hereafter come in His Kingdom. The transformation enhanced the brightness, but did not destroy the countenance, although the body were spiritual; whence also His raiment was changed and became white to such a degree, as in the expression of another Evangelist, no fuller on earth can whiten them. But all this is the property of matter, and is the subject of the touch, not of spirit and ethereal, an illusion upon the sight only beheld in phantasm.

REMIGIUS. If then the face of the Lord shone as the sun, and the saints shall shine as the sun, are then the brightness of the Lord and the brightness of His servants to be equal? By no means. But forasmuch as nothing is known more bright than the sun, therefore to give some illustration of the future resurrection, it is expressed to us that the brightness of the Lord's countenance, and the brightness of the righteous, shall be as the sun.

ORIGEN. Mystically; When any one has passed the six days according as we have said, he beholds Jesus transfigured before the eyes of his heart. For the Word of God has various forms, appearing to each man according as He knows that it will be expedient for him; and He shews Himself to none in a manner beyond his capacity; whence he says not simply, He was transfigured, but, before them. For Jesus, in the Gospels, is merely understood by those who do not mount by means of exalting works and words upon the high mountain of wisdom; but to them that do mount up thus, He is no longer known according to the flesh, but is understood to be God the Word. Before these then Jesus is transfigured, and not before those who live sunk in worldly conversation. But these, before whom He is transfigured, have been made sons of God, and He is shewn to them as the Sun of righteousness. His raiment is made white as the light, that is, the words and sayings of the Gospels with which Jesus is clothed according to those things which were spoken of Him by the Apostles.

GLOSS. (e Bed. in Luc.) Or; the raiment of Christ shadows out the saints, of whom Esaias says, With all these shalt than clothe thee as with a garment; (Isa. 49:18.) and they are likened to snow because they shall be white with virtues, and all the heat of vices shall be put far away from them. It follows, And there appeared unto them Moses and Elias talking with them.

CHRYSOSTOM. There are many reasons why these should appear. The first it, this; because the multitudes said He was Elias, or Jeremias, or one of the Prophets, He here brings with Him the chief of the Prophets, that hence at least may be seen the difference between the servants and their Lord. Another reason is this; because the Jews were ever charging Jesus with being a transgressor of the Law and blasphemer, and usurping to Himself the glory of the Father, that He might prove Himself guiltless of both charges, He brings forward those who were eminent in both particulars; Moses, who gave the Law, and Elias, who was jealous for the glory of God. Another reason is, that they might learn that He has the power of life and death; by producing Moses, who was dead, and Elias, who had not yet experienced death. A further reason also the Evangelist discovers, that He might shew the glory of His cross, and thus soothe Peter, and the other disciples, who were fearing His death; for they talked, as another Evangelist declares, of His decease which He should accomplish at Jerusalem. Wherefore He brings forward those who had exposed themselves to death for God's pleasure, and for the people that believed; for both had willingly stood before tyrants, Moses before Pharaoh, Elias before Ahab. Lastly, also, He brings them forward, that the disciples should emulate their privileges, and be meek as Moses, and zealous as Elias.

HILARY. Also that Moses and Elias only out of the whole number of the saints stood with Christ, means, that Christ, in His kingdom, is between the Law and the Prophets; for He shall judge Israel in the presence of the same by whom He was preached to them.

ORIGEN. However, if any man discerns a spiritual sense in the Law agreeing with the teaching of Jesus, and in the Prophets finds the hidden wisdom of Christ, (1 Cor. 2:7.) he beholds Moses and Elias in the same glory with Jesus.

JEROME. It is to be remembered also, that when the Scribes and Pharisees asked signs from heaven, He would not give any; but now, to increase the Apostles' faith, He gives a sign; Elias descends from heaven, whither he was gone up, and Moses arises from hell; (Is. 7:10.) as Ahaz is bidden by Esaias to ask him a sign in the heaven above, or in the depth beneath.

CHRYSOSTOM. Hereupon follows what the warm Peter spake, Peter answered and said unto Jesus, Lord, it is good for us to be here. Because he had heard that He must go up to Jerusalem, he yet fears for Christ; but after his rebuke he dares not again say, Be propitious to thyself, Lord, but suggests the same covertly under other guise. For seeing in this place great quietness and solitude, he thought that this would be a fit place to take up their abode in, saying, Lord, it is good for us to be here. And he sought to remain here ever, therefore he proposes the tabernacles, If thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles. For he concluded if he should, do this, Christ would not go up to Jerusalem, and if He should not go up to Jerusalem, He should not die, for he knew that there the Scribes laid wait for Him.

REMIGIUS. Otherwise; At this view of the majesty of the Lord, and His two servants, Peter was so delighted, that, forgetting every thing else in the world, he would abide here for ever. But if Peter was then so fired with admiration, what ravishment will it not be to behold the King in His proper beauty, and to mingle in the choir of the Angels, and of all the saints? In that Peter says, Lord, if thou wilt, he shews the submission of a dutiful and obedient servant.

JEROME. Yet art thou wrong, Peter, and as another Evangelist says, knowest not what thou sayest. (Luke 9:33.) Think not. of three tabernacles, when there is but one tabernacle of the Gospel in which both Law and Prophets are to be repeated. But if thou wilt have three tabernacles, set not the servants equal with their Lord, but make three tabernacles, yea make one for the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, that They whose divinity is one, may have but one tabernacle, in thy bosom.

REMIGIUS. He was wrong moreover, in desiring that the kingdom of the elect should be set up on earth, when the Lord had promised to give it in heaven. He was wrong also in forgetting that himself and his fellow were mortal, and in desiring to come to eternal felicity without taste of death.

RABANUS. Also in supposing that tabernacles were to be built for conversation in heaven, in which houses are not needed, as it is written in the Apocalypse, I saw not any temple therein. (Rev. 21:22.)

17:5–9

5. While he yet spake, behold, a bright cloud overshadowed them: and behold a voice out of the cloud, which said, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased; hear ye him.

6. And when the disciples heard it, they fell on their face, and were sore afraid.

7. And Jesus came and touched them, and said, Arise, and be not afraid.

8. And when they had lifted up their eyes, they saw no man, save Jesus only.

9. And as they came down from the mountain, Jesus charged them, saying, Tell the vision to no man, until the Son of man be risen again from

the dead.

JEROME. While they thought only of an earthly tabernacle of boughs or tents, they are overshadowed by the covering of a bright cloud; While he yet spake, there came a bright cloud and overshadowed them. (Exod. 19:9, 16.)

CHRYSOSTOM. When the Lord threatens, He shews a dark cloud, as on Sinai; but here where He sought not to terrify but to teach, there appeared a bright cloud.

ORIGEN. The bright cloud overshadowing the Saints is the Power of the Father, or perhaps the Holy Spirit; or I may also venture to call the Saviour that bright cloud which overshadows the Gospel, the Law, and the Prophets, as they understand who can behold His light in all these three.

JEROME. Forasmuch as Peter had asked unwisely, he deserves not any answer; but the Father makes answer for the Son, that the Lord’s word might be fulfilled, He that sent me, he beareth witness of me. (John 5:37.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Neither Moses, nor Elias speak, but the Father greater than all sends a voice out of the cloud, that the disciples might believe that this voice was from God. For God has ordinarily shewn Himself in a cloud, as it is written, Clouds and darkness are round about Him; (Ps. 97:2.) and this is what is said, Behold, a voice out of the cloud.

JEROME. The voice of the Father is heard speaking from heaven, giving testimony to the Son, and teaching Peter the truth, taking away his error, and through Peter the other disciples also; whence he proceeds, This is my beloved Son. For Him make the tabernacle, Him obey; this is the Son, they are but servants; and they also ought as you to make ready a tabernacle for the Lord in the inmost parts of their heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. Fear not then, Peter; for if God is mighty, it is manifest that the Son is also mighty; wherefore if He is loved, fear not thou; for none forsakes Him whom He loves; nor dost thou love Him equally with the Father. Neither does He love Him merely because He begot Him, but because He is of one will with Himself; as it follows, In whom I am well pleased; which is to say, in whom I rest content, whom I accept, for all things of the Father He performs with care, and His will is one with the Father; so if He will to be crucified, do not then speak against it.

HILARY. This is the Son, this the Beloved, this the Accepted; and He it is who is to be heard, as the voice out of the cloud signifies, saying, Hear ye

Him. For He is a fit teacher of doing the things He has done, who has given the weight of His own example to the loss of the world, the joy of the cross, the death of the body, and after that the glory of the heavenly kingdom.

REMIGIUS. He says therefore, Hear ye Him, as much as to say, Let the shadow of the Law be past, and the types of the Prophets, and follow ye the one shining light of the Gospel. Or He says, Hear ye Him, to shew that it was He whom Moses had foretold, The Lord your God shall raise up a Prophet unto you of your brethren like unto me, Him shall ye hear. (Deut. 18:18.) Thus the Lord had witnesses on all sides; from heaven the voice of the Father, Elias out of Paradise, Moses out of Hades, the Apostles from among men, that at the name of Jesus every thing should bow the knee, of things in heaven, things on earth, and things beneath.

ORIGEN. The voice out of the cloud speaks either to Moses or Elias, who desired to see the Son of God, and to hear Him; or it is for the teaching of the Apostles.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) It is to be observed, that the mystery of the second regeneration, that, to wit, which shall be in the resurrection, when the flesh shall be raised again, agrees well with the mystery of the first which is in baptism, when the soul is raised again. For in the baptism of Christ is shewn the working of the whole Trinity; there was the Son incarnate, the Holy Ghost appealing in the figure of a dove, and the Father made known by the voice. In like manner in the transfiguration, which is the sacrament of the second regeneration, the whole Trinity appeared; the Father in the voice, the Son in the man, and the Holy Spirit in the cloud. It is made a question how the Holy Spirit was shewn there in the dove, here in the cloud. Because it is His manner to mark His gifts by specific outward forms. And the gift of baptism is innocence, which is denoted by the bird of purity. But as in the resurrection, He is to give splendour and refreshment, therefore in the cloud are denoted both the refreshment and the brightness of the rising bodies. It follows, And when the disciples heard it, they fell on their faces, and feared greatly.

JEROME. Their cause of terror is threefold. Because they knew that they had done amiss; or because the bright cloud had covered them; or because they had heard the voice of God the Father speaking; for human frailty cannot endure to look upon so great glory, and falls to the earth trembling through both soul and body. And by how much higher any one has aimed, by so much lower will be his fall, if he shall be ignorant of his own measure.

REMIGIUS. Whereas the holy Apostles fell upon their faces, that was a proof of their sanctity, for the saints are always described to fall upon their faces, but the wicked to fall backwardsa.

CHRYSOSTOM. But when before in Christ’s baptism, such a voice came from heaven, yet none of the multitude then present suffered any thing of this kind, how is it that the disciples on the mount fell prostrate? Because in sooth their solicitude was much, the height and loneliness of the spot great, and the transfiguration itself attended with terrors, the clear light and the spreading cloud; all these things together wrought to terrify them.

JEROME. And whereas they were laid down, and could not raise themselves again, He approaches them, touches them gently, that by His touch their fear might be banished, and their unnerved limbs gain strength; And Jesus drew near, and touched them. But He further added His word to His hand, And said unto them, Arise, fear not. He first banishes their fear, that He may after impart teaching. It follows, And when they lifted up their eyes, they saw no man, save Jesus only; which was done with good reason; for had Moses and Elias continued with the Lord, it might have seemed uncertain to which in particular the witness of the Father was borne. Also they see Jesus standing after the cloud has been removed, and Moses and Elias disappeared, because after the shadow of the Law and Prophets has departed, both are found in the Gospel. It follows; And as they came down from the mount, Jesus charged them, saying, Tell no man this vision, until the Son of Man shall rise from the dead. He will not be preached among the people, lest the marvel of the thing should seem incredible, and lest the cross following after so great glory should cause offence.

REMIGIUS. Or, because if His majesty should be published among the people, they should hinder the dispensation of His passion, by resistance to the chief Priests; and thus the redemption of the human race should suffer impediment.

HILARY. He enjoins silence respecting what they had seen, for this reason, that when they should be filled with the Holy Spirit, they should then become witnesses of these spiritual deeds.

17:10–13

10. And his disciples asked him, saying, Why then say the Scribes that Elias must first come?

11. And Jesus answered and said unto them, Elias truly shall first come, and restore all things.

12. But I say unto you, That Elias is come already, and they knew him not, but have done unto him whatsoever they listed. Likewise shall also the Son of man suffer of them.

13. Then the disciples understood that he spake unto them of John the Baptist.

JEROME. It was a tradition of the Pharisees following the Prophet Malachi, that Elias should come before the coming of the Saviour, and bring back the heart of the fathers to the children, and the children to the fathers, and restore all things to their ancient state. The disciples then consider that this transformation which they had seen in the mount was His coming in glory, and therefore it is said, And his disciples asked him, saying, How then say the Scribes that Elias must first come? As though they had said, If you have already come in glory, how is it that your forerunner appears not yet? And this they say chiefly because they see that Elias is departed again.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvii.) The disciples knew not of the coming of Elias out of the Scriptures; but the Scribes made it known to them; and this report was current among the ignorant multitude, as was that concerning Christ. Yet the Scribes did not explain the coming of Christ and of Elias, as they ought to have done. For the Scriptures speak of two comings of Christ; that which has taken place, and that which is yet to be. But the Scribes, blinding the people, spake to them only of His second coming, and said, If this be the Christ, then should Elias have come before Him. Christ thus resolves the difficulty, He answered and said, Elias truly shall come, and restore all things; but I say unto you, that Elias has already come. Think not that here is a contradiction in His speech, if He first say that Elias shall come, and then that he is come. For when He says that Elias shall come and restore all things, He speaks of Elias himself in his own proper person, who indeed shall restore all things, in that he shall correct the unbelief of the Jews, who shall then be to be found; and that is the turning the hearts of the fathers to the children, that is, the hearts of the Jews to the Apostles.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 21.) Or; He shall restore all things, that is those whom the persecution of Antichrist shall have overthrown; as He Himself should restore by His death those whom He ought.

CHRYSOSTOM. But if there shall so much good arise out of the presence of Elias, why did He not send him at that time? We shall say, Because they then held Christ to be Elias, and yet believed not on Him. But they shall hereafter believe Elias, because when he shall come after so great expectation announcing Jesus, they will more readily receive what shall be taught by Him. But when He says that Elias is come already, He calls John the Baptist Elias from the resemblance of their ministry; for as Elias shall be the forerunner of His second coming, so was John the forerunner of His first. And He calls John Elias, to shew that His first coming was agreeable to the Old Testament, and to prophecy.

JEROME. He then who at the Saviour’s second coming should come in the truth of His body, come now in John in power and spirit. It follows, And they knew him not, but did unto him whatsoever they would, that is, despised and beheaded him.

HILARY. As he announced the Lord’s coming, so he was also to foreshew His passion by the example of his own suffering and wrong? whence it follows, So also shall the Son of Man suffer of them.

CHRYSOSTOM. He takes the opportunity from the passion of John to refer to His own passion, thus giving them much comfort.

JEROME. It is enquired how, seeing that Herod and Herodias were they that killed John, it can be said that Jesus also was crucified by them, when we read that He was put to death by the Scribes and Pharisees? It must be answered briefly, that the party of the Pharisees consented to the death of John, and that in the Lord’s crucifixion Herod united his approval, when having mocked and set Him at nought, he sent Him back to Pilate, that he should crucify Him.

RABANUS. From the mention of His own passion which the Lord had often foretold to them, and from that of His forerunner, which they beheld already accomplished, the disciples perceived that John was set forth to them under the name of Elias; whence it follows; Then understood the disciples that he spake to them of John the Baptist.

ORIGEN. That He says of John, Elias is already come, is not to be understood of the soul of Elias, that we fall not into the doctrine of metempsychosis, which is foreign to the truth of Church doctrine, but, as the Angel had foretold, he came in the spirit and power of Elias.

17:14–18

14. And when they were come to the multitude, there came to him a certain man, kneeling down to him, and saying,

15. Lord, have mercy on my son: for he is lunatick, and sore vexed: for ofttimes he falleth into the fire, and oft into the water.

16. And I brought him to thy disciples, and they could not cure him.

17. Then Jesus answered and said, O faithless and perverse generation, how long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? bring him hither to me.

18. And Jesus rebuked the devil; and he departed out of him: and the child was cured from that very hour.

ORIGEN. Peter, anxious for such desirable life, and preferring his own benefit to that of many, had said, It is good for us to be here. But since charity seeks not her own, Jesus did not this which seemed good to Peter, but descended to the multitude, as it were from the high mount of His divinity, that He might be of use to such as could not ascend because of the weakness of their souls; whence it is said, And when he was come to the multitude; for if He had not gone to the multitude with His elect disciples, there would not have come near to Him the man of whom it is added, There came to him a man kneeling down, and saying, Lord, have mercy on my son. Consider here, that sometimes those that are themselves the sufferers believe and entreat for their own healing, sometimes others for them, as he who kneels before Him praying for his son, and sometimes the Saviour heals of Himself unasked by any. First, let us see what this means that follows, For he is lunatic, and sore vexed. Let the physicians talk as they list, for they think it no unclean spirit, but some bodily disorder, and say, that the humours in the head are governed in their motions by sympathy with the phases of the moon, whose light is of the nature of humours. But we who believe the Gospel say that it is an unclean spirit that works such disorders in men. The spirit observes the moon's changes, that it may cheat men into the belief that the moon is the cause of their sufferings, and so prove God's creation to be evil; as other dæmons lay wait for men following the times and courses of the stars, that they may speak wickedness in high places, calling some stars malignant, others benign; whereas no star was made by God that it should produce evil. In this that is added, For ofttimes he falls into the fire, and oft into the water,

CHRYSOSTOM. is to be noted, that were not man fortified here by Providence, he would long since have perished; for the dæmons who cast him into the fire, and into the water, would have killed him outright, had God not restrained him.

JEROME. In saying, And I brought him to thy disciples, and they could not heal him, he covertly accuses the Apostles, whereas that a cure is impossible is sometimes the effect not of want of power in those that undertake it, but of want of faith in those that are to be healed,

CHRYSOSTOM. See herein also his folly, in that before the multitude he appeals to Jesus against His disciples. But He clears them from shame, inputing their failure to the patient himself; for many things shew that he was weak in faith. But He addresses His reproof not to the man singly, that He may not trouble him, but to the Jews in general. For many of those present, it is likely, had improper thoughts concerning the disciples, and therefore it follows, Jesus answered and said, O faithless and perverse generation, how long shall I be with you, how long shall I suffer you? His How long shall I be with you? shews that death was desired by Him, and that He longed for His withdrawal.

REMIGIUS. It may be known also, that not now for the first time, but of a long time, the Lord had borne the Jews’ stubbornness, whence He says, How long shall I suffer you? because I have now a long while endured your iniquities, and ye are unworthy of My presence.

ORIGEN. Or; Because the disciples could not heal him as being weak in faith, He said to them, O faithless generation, adding perverse, to shew that their perverseness had introduced evil beyond their nature. But I suppose, that because of the perverseness of the whole human race, as it were oppressed with their evil nature, He said, How long shall I be with you?

JEROME. Not that we must think that He was overcome by weariness of them, and that The meek and gentle broke out into words of wrath, but as a physician who might see the sick man acting against his injunctions, would say, How long shall I frequent your chamber? How long throw away the exercise of my skill, while I prescribe one thing, and you do another? That it is the sin, and not the man with whom He is angry, and that in the person of this one man He convicts the Jews of unbelief, is clear from what He adds, Bring him to me.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He had vindicated His disciples, He leads the boy’s father to a cheering hope of believing that he shall be delivered out of this evil and that the father might be led to believe the miracle that was coming, seeing the dæmons was disturbed even when the child was only called;

JEROME. He rebuked him, that is, not the sufferer, but the dæmons.

REMIGIUS. In which deed He left an example to preachers to attack sins, but to assist men.

JEROME. Or, His reproof was to the child, because for his sins he had been seized on by the dæmons.

RABANUS. The lunatic is figuratively one who is hurried into fresh vices every hour, one while is cast into the fire, with which the hearts of the adulterers burn; or again into the waters of pleasures or lusts, which yet have not strength to quench love. (Hos. 7:4, 6.)

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 22.) Or the fire pertains to anger, which aims upwards, water to the lusts of the flesh.

ORIGEN. Of the changefulness of the sinner it is said, The fool changes as the moon. (Ecclus. 27:12.) We may see sometimes that an impulse towards good works comes over such, when, lo! again as by a sudden seizure of a spirit they are laid hold of by their passions, and fall from that good state in which they were supposed to stand. Perhaps his father stands for the Angel to whom was allotted the care of this lunatic, praying the Physician of souls, that He would set free his son, who could not be delivered from his suffering by the simple word of Christ’s disciples, because as a deaf person he cannot receive their instruction, and therefore he needs Christ’s word, that henceforth he may not act without reason.

17:19–21

19. Then came the disciples to Jesus apart, and said, Why could not we cast him out?

20. And Jesus said unto them, Because of your unbelief: for verily I say unto you, If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this

mountain, Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove; and nothing shall be impossible unto you.

21. Howbeit this kind goeth not out but by prayer and fasting.

CHRYSOSTOM. The disciples had received from the Lord the power over unclean spirits, and when they could not heal the dæmoniac thus brought to them, they seem to have had misgivings lest they had forfeited the grace once given to them; hence their question. And they ask it apart, not out of shame, but because of the unspeakable matter of which they were to ask. Jesus said unto them, Because of your unbelief.

HILARY. The Apostles had believed, yet their faith was imperfect; while the Lord tarried in the mount, and they abode below with the multitude, then faith had become stagnant.

CHRYSOSTOM. Whence it is plain that the disciples' faith was grown weak, yet not all, for those pillars were there, Peter, and James, and John.

JEROME. This is what the Lord says in another place, Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name believing, ye shall receive. (John 16:23.) Therefore when we receive not, it is not the weakness of Him that gives, but the fault of them that ask. Mat. 21:22.)

CHRYSOSTOM. But it is to be known, that, as ofttimes the faith of him that draweth near to receive supplies the miraculous virtue, so ofttimes the power of those that work the miracle is sufficient even without the faith of those who sought to receive. (Acts 10:4.) Cornelius and his household, by their faith, attracted to them the grace of the Holy Spirit; but the dead man who was cast into the sepulchre of Elisha, was revived solely by virtue of the holy body. (2 Kings 13:21.) It happened that the disciples were then weak in faith, for indeed they were but in an imperfect condition before the cross; wherefore He here tells them, that faith is the mean of miracles, Verily I say unto you, if ye shall have faith as a grain of mustard-seed, ye shall say to this mountain, Remove hence, and it shall remove.

JEROME. Some think that the faith that is compared to a grain of mustard-seed is a little faith, whereas the Apostle says, If I shall have such faith that I could remove mountains. (1 Cor. 13:2.) The faith therefore which is compared to a grain of mustard-seed is a great faith.

GREGORY. (Mor. pref. c. 2.) The mustard-seed, unless it be bruised, does not give out its qualities, so if persecution fall upon a holy man, straightway what had seemed weak and contemptible in him is roused into the heat and fervour of virtue.

ORIGEN. Or, all faith is likened to a grain of mustard-seed, because faith is looked on with contempt by men, and shews as something poor and mean; but when a seed of this kind lights upon a good heart as its soil, it becomes a great tree. The weakness of this lunatic’s faith is yet so great, and Christ is so strong to heal him amidst all his evils, that He likens it to a mountain which cannot be cast out but by the whole faith of him who desires to heal afflictions of this sort.

CHRYSOSTOM. So He not only promises the removal of mountains, but goes beyond, saying, And nothing shall be impossible to you.

RABANUS. For faith gives our minds such a capacity for the heavenly gifts, that whatsoever we will we may easily obtain from a faithful Master.

CHRYSOSTOM. If you shall ask, Where did the Apostles remove mountains? I answer, that they did greater things, bringing many dead to life. It is told also of some saints, who came after the Apostles, that they have in urgent necessity removed mountainsb. But if mountains were not removed in the. Apostles’ time, this was not because they could not, but because they would not, there being no pressing occasion. And the Lord said not that they should do this thing, but that they should have power to do it. Yet it is likely that they did do this, but that it is not written, for indeed not all the miracles that they wrought are written.

JEROME. Or; the mountain is not said of that which we see with the eyes of the body, but signified that spirit which was removed by the Lord out of the lunatic, who is said by the Prophet to be the corrupter of the whole earth,

GLOSS. (interlin.) So that the sense then is, Ye shall say to this mountain, that is to the proud devil, Remove hence, that is from the possessed body into the sea, that is into the depths of hell, and it shall remove, and nothing shall be impossible to you, that is, no sickness shall be incurable.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Otherwise; That the disciples in working their miracles should not be lifted up with pride, they are warned rather by the humbleness of their faith, as by a grain of mustard-seed, to take care that they remove all pride of earth, which is signified by the mountain in this place.

RABANUS. But while He teaches the Apostles how the dæmon ought to be cast out, He instructs all in regulation of life; that we may all know that all the heavier inflictions, whether of unclean spirits, or temptations of men, may be removed by fasts and prayers; and that the wrath also of the Lord may be appeased by this remedy alone; whence he adds, Howbeit this kind is not cast out but by prayer and fasting.

CHRYSOSTOM. And this He says not of lunatics in particular, but of the whole class of dæmons. For fast endues with great wisdom, makes a man as an Angel from heaven, and beats down the unseen powers of evil. But there is need of prayer as even still more important. And who prays as he ought, and fasts, had need of little more, and so is not covetous, but ready to almsgiving. For he who fasts, is light and active, and prays wakefully, and quenches his evil lusts, makes God propitious, and humbles his proud stomach. And he who prays with his fasting, has two wings, lighter than the winds themselves. For he is not heavy and wandering in his prayers, (as is the case with many,) but his zeal is as the warmth of fire, and his constancy as the firmness of the earth. Such an one is most able to contend with dæmons, for there is nothing more powerful than a man who prays properly. But if your health be too weak for strict fast, yet is it not for prayer, and if you cannot fast, you can abstain from indulgences. And this is not a little, and not very different from fast.

ORIGEN. If then we shall ever be required to be employed in the healing of those who are suffering any thing of this sort, we shall not adjure them, nor ask them questions, nor even speak, as though the unclean spirit could hear us, but by our fasting and our prayers drive away the evil spirits.

GLOSS. (ord.) Or; This class of dæmons, that is the variety of carnal pleasures, is not overcome unless the spirit be strengthened by prayer, and the flesh enfeebled by fast.

REMIGIUS. Or, fasting is here understood generally as abstinence not from food only, but from all carnal allurements, and sinful passions. In like manner prayer is to be understood in general as consisting in pious and good acts, concerning which the Apostle speaks, Pray without ceasing. (1 Thess. 5:17.)

17:22–23

22. And while they abode in Galilee, Jesus said unto them, The Son of man shall be betrayed into the hands of men.

23. And they shall kill him, and the third day he shall he raised again. And they were exceeding sorry.

REMIGIUS. The Lord often foretold to His disciples the mysteries of His passion, in order that when they come to pass, they might be the lighter to them from having been known beforehand.

ORIGEN. This seems to be so like a warning He had given above, that a man might easily say that the Lord now repeated what He had said before; yet is it not so; He had not before said that He must be betrayed, but we hear now not only that He must be betrayed, but that He must be betrayed into the hands of men. The Son of Man indeed was delivered up by God the Father according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:32.), but different powers gave him up into the hands of men.

JEROME. Thus does He ever mix the joyful and the grievous; if it grieves them that He is to be put to death, they ought to be gladdened when they hear, And shall rise again the third day.

CHRYSOSTOM. For this is no long time that He speaks of continuing in death, when He says that He shall rise again on the third day.

ORIGEN. By this announcement of the Lord the disciples were made very sorrowful, not attending to that He said, And shall rise again the third day, nor considering what He must be to whom the space of three days was enough to destroy death.

JEROME. That they were thus made exceeding sorrowful, came not of their lack of faith; but out of their love of their Master they could not endure to hear of any hurt or indignity for Him.

17:24–27

24. And when they were come to Capernaum, they that received tribute money came to Peter, and said, Doth not your master pay tribute?

25. He saith, Yes. And when he was come into the house, Jesus prevented him, saying, What thinkest thou, Simon? of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or tribute? of their own children, or of strangers?

26. Peter saith unto him, Of strangers. Jesus saith unto him, Then are the children free.

27. Notwithstanding, lest we should offend them, go thou to the sea, and cast an hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up; and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a piece of money: that take, and give unto them for me and thee.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The disciples were exceeding sorrowful when they heard of the Lord’s passion, and therefore that none might ascribe His suffering to compulsion, and not to a voluntary Submission, he adds an incident which instances Christ’s power, and is submission; And when they were come to Capernaum, there came to Peter those who received the didrachma, and said unto him, Doth not your Master pay the didrachma?

HILARY. The Lord is called upon to pay the didrachma, (that is, two denarii,) for this the Law had enjoined upon all Israel for the redemption of their body and soul, and the use of those that served in the temple.

CHRYSOSTOM. For when God slew the firstborn of Egypt, He then accepted the tribe of Levi for them. (Numb. 3:44.) But because the numbers of this tribe were less than the number of firstborn among the Jews, it was ordained that redemption money should be paid for the number that came short; and thence sprang the custom of paying this tax. Because then Christ was a firstborn son, and Peter seemed to be the first among the disciples, they came to him. And as it seems to me this was not demanded in every district, they come to Christ in Capernaum, because that was considered His native place.

JEROME. Or otherwise; From the time of Augustus Cæsar Judæa was made tributary, and all the inhabitants were registered, as Joseph with Mary his kinswoman gave in His name at Bethlehem. Again, because the Lord was brought up at Nazareth, which is a town of Galilee subject to Capernaum, it is there that the tribute is asked of Him; but for that His miracles were so great, those who collected it did not dare to ask Himself, but make up to the disciple.

CHRYSOSTOM. And him they address not with boldness, but courteously; for they do not arraign, but ask a question, Doth not your Master pay the didrachma?

JEROME. Or, They enquire with malicious purpose whether He pays tribute, or resists Caesar’s will.

CHRYSOSTOM. What then does Peter say? He saith, Yea. To these then he said that He did pay, but to Christ he said not so, blushing perhaps to speak of such matters.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Otherwise; Peter answered, Yea; meaning, yea, He does not pay. And Peter sought to acquaint the Lord that the Herodians had demanded tribute, but the Lord prevented him; as it follows, And when he had entered into the house, Jesus prevented him, saying, Of whom do the kings of the earth receive custom or tribute, (i. e. head-money,) of their children, or of strangers?

JEROME. Before any hint from Peter, the Lord puts the question to him, that His disciples might not be offended at the demand of tribute, when they, see that He knows even those things that are done in His absence. It follows, But he said, From strangers; Jesus said unto him, Then are the children free.

ORIGEN. This speech has a twofold meaning. First, that the children of the kings of the earth are free with the kings of the earth; but strangers, foreigners in the land, are not free, because of those that oppress them, as the Egyptians did the children of Israel. The second sense is; forasmuch as there be some who are strangers to the sons of the kings of the earth, and are yet sons of God, therefore it is they that abide in the words of Jesus; these are free, for they have known the truth, and the truth has set them free from the service of sin; but the sons of the kings of the earth are not free; for whoso doth sin, he is the servant of sin. (John 8:34.)

JEROME. But our Lord was the son of the king, both according to the flesh, and according to the Spirit; whether as sprung of the seed of David, or as the Word of the Almighty Father; therefore as the king’s son He owed no tribute.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 23.) For, saith He, in every kingdom the children are free, that is, not under tax. Much more therefore should they be free in any earthly kingdom, who are children of that very kingdom under which are all the kingdoms of the earth.

CHRYSOSTOM. But this instance were brought to no purpose if He were not a son. But some one may say, He is son indeed, but not an own son. But then He were a stranger; and so this instance would not apply; for He speaks only of own sons, distinct from whom He calls them strangers who are actually born of parents. Mark how here also Christ certifies that relationship which was revealed to Peter from God, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God.

JEROME. Howsoever free then He was, yet seeing He had taken to Him lowliness of the flesh, He ought to fulfil all righteousness; whence it follows, But that they should not be offended, go to the sea.

ORIGEN. We may hence gather as a consequence of this, that when any come with justice demanding our earthly goods, it is the kings of the earth that send them, to claim of us what is their own; and by His own example the Lord forbids any offence to be given even to these, whether that they should sin no more, or that they should be saved. For the Son of God, who did no servile work, yet as having the form of a slave, which He took on Him for man’s sake, gave custom and tribute.

JEROME. I am at a loss what first to admire in this passage; whether the foreknowledge, or the mighty power of the Saviour. His foreknowledge, in that He knew that a fish had a stater in its mouth, and that that fish should be the first taken; His mighty power, if the stater were created in the fish’s mouth at His word, and if by His command that which was to happen was ordered. Christ then, for His eminent love, endured the cross, and paid tribute; how wretched we who are called by the name of Christ, though we do nothing worthy of so great dignity, yet in respect of His majesty, pay no tribute, but are exempt from tax as the King’s sons. But even in its literal import it edifies the hearer to learn, that so great was the Lord’s poverty, that He had not whence to pay the tribute for Himself and His Apostle. Should any object that Judas bore money in a bag, we shall answer, Jesus held it a fraud to divert that which was the poor’s to His own use, and left us an example therein.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or He does not direct it to be paid out of that they had at hand, that He might shew that He was Lord also of the sea and the fish.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Or because Jesus had not any image of Cæsar, (for the prince of this world had nothing in Him,) therefore He furnished an image of Cæsar, not out of their own stock, but out of the sea. But He takes not the stater into His own possession, that there should never be found an image of Cæsar upon the Image of the invisible God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe also the wisdom of Christ; He neither refuses the tribute, nor merely commands that it be paid, but first proves that He is of right exempt, and then bids to give the money; the money was paid to avoid offence to the collectors; the vindication of His exemption was to avoid the offence to the disciples. Indeed in another place He disregards the offence of the Pharisees, in disputing of meats; teaching us herein to know the seasons in which we must attend to, and those in which we must slight the thoughts of, those who are like to be scandalized.

GREGORY. (in Ezech. 7. 4.) For we must cast about how, as far as we may without sin, to avoid giving scandal to our neighbours. But if offence is taken from truth, it is better that offence should come, though truth be forsaken.

CHRYSOSTOM. As you wonder at Christ's power, so admire Peter's faith, who was obedient in no easy matter. In reward of his faith he was joined with his Lord in the payment. An abundant honour! Thou shall find a stater, that take and give unto them for thee and for me.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) For by custom every several man paid a didrachma for himself; now a stater is equal to two didrachmas.

ORIGEN. Mystically; In the field of comfort, (for so is Capernaum expounded,) He comforts each one of His disciples, and pronounces him to be a son and free, and gives him the power of taking the first fish, that after His ascension Peter may have comfort over that which he has caught.

HILARY. When Peter is instructed to take the first fish, it is shewn therein that he shall catch more than one. The blessed first martyr Stephen was the first that came up, having in his mouth a stater, which contained the didrachma of the new preaching, divided as two denarii, for he preached as he beheld in his passion the glory of God, and Christ the Lord.

JEROME. Or; That fish which was first taken is the first Adam, who is set free by the second Adam; and that which is found in his mouth, that is, in his confession, is given for Peter and for the Lord.

ORIGEN. And when you see any miser rebuked by some Peter who takes the speech of his money out of his mouth, you may say that he is risen out of the sea of covetousness to the hook of reason, and is caught and saved by some Peter, who has taught him the truth, that he should change his stater for the image of God, that is for the oracles of God.

JEROME. And beautifully is this very stater given for the tribute; but it is divided; for Peter as for a sinner a ransom is to be paid, but the Lord had not sin. Yet herein is shewn the likeness of their flesh, when the Lord and His servants are redeemed with the same price.

CHAPTER 18

18:1–6

1. At the same time came the disciples unto Jesus, saying, Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven?

2. And Jesus called a little child unto him, and set him in the midst of them,

3. And said, Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.

4. Whosoever therefore shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven.

5. And whoso shall receive one such little child in my name receiveth me.

6. But whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea.

JEROME. The disciples seeing one piece of money paid both for Peter and the Lord, conceived from this equality of ransom that Peter was preferred before all the rest of the Apostles.

CHRYSOSTOM. Thus they suffered a human passion, which the Evangelist denotes by saying, At the same time come the disciples to Jesus, saying, Who, we pray thee, is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? Ashamed to shew the feeling which was working within, they do not say openly, Why have you honoured Peter above us? but they ask in general, Who is the greatest? When in the transfiguration they saw three distinguished, namely, Peter, James, and John, they had no such feeling, but now that one is singled out for especial honour, then they are grieved. But do you remember, first, that it was nothing in this world that they sought; and, secondly, that they afterwards laid aside this feeling? Even their failings are above us, whose enquiry is not, Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? but, Who is greatest in the kingdom of the world?

ORIGEN. Herein we ought to be imitators of the disciples, that when any question of doubt arises among us, and we find not how to settle it, We should with one consent go to Jesus, Who is able to enlighten the hearts of men to the explication of every perplexity. We shall also consult some of the doctors, who are thought most eminent in the Churches. But in that they asked this question, the disciples knew that there was not an equality among the saints in the kingdom of heaven; what they yet sought to learn was, how they were so, and lived as greater and less. Or, from what the Lord had said above, they knew Who was the best and who was great; but out of many great, who was the greatest, this Was not clear to them.

JEROME. Jesus seeing their thoughts would heal their ambitious strivings, by arousing an emulation in lowliness; whence it follows, And Jesus calling a little child, set him in the midst of them.

CHRYSOSTOM. He chose, I suppose, quite an infant, devoid of any of the passions.

JEROME. One whose tender age should express to them the innocence which they should have. But truly He set Himself in the midst of them, a little one who had come not to be ministered unto, but to minister; (Mat. 20:28.) that He might be a pattern of holiness. Others interpret the little one of the Holy Spirit, whom He set in the hearts of His disciples, to change their pride into humility. (Vid. Origen. in loc.) And he said. Verily I say unto you, Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. He does not enjoin on the Apostles the age, but the innocence of infants, which they have by virtue of their years, but to which these might attain by striving; that they should be children in malice, not in understanding. As though He had said, As this child, whom I set before you as a pattern, is not obstinate in anger, when injured does not bear it in mind, has no emotion at the sight of a fair woman, does not think one thing while he speaks another; so ye, unless ye have the like innocence and purity of mind, shall not be able to enter into the kingdom of heaven.

HILARY. He calls infants all who believe through the hearing of faith; for such follow their father, love their mother, know not to will that which is evil, do not bear hate, or speak lies, trust what is told them, and believe what they hear to be true. But the letter is thus interpreted.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Except ye be converted from this ambition and jealousy in which you are at present, and become all of you as innocent and humble in disposition as you are weak, in your years, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven; and since there is none other road to enter in, whoso shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven; for by how much a man is humble now, by so much shall he be exalted in the kingdom of heaven.

REMIGIUS. In the understanding of grace, or in ecclesiastical dignity, or at least in everlasting blessedness.

JEROME. Or otherwise; Whoso shall humble himself as this little child, that is, whoso shall humble himself after My example, he shall enter into the kingdom of heaven. It follows, And whoso receiveth one such little one in my name, receiveth me.

CHRYSOSTOM. Not only if ye become such yourselves, but also if for My sake you shall pay honour to other such, ye receive reward; and as the return for the honour you pay them, I entail upon you the kingdom. He puts indeed what is far greater, Receiveth me.

JEROME. For whoever is such that he imitates Christ’s humility and innocence, Christ is received by him; and by way of caution, that the Apostles should not think, when such are come to them, that it is to themselves that the honour is paid, He adds, that they are to be received not for their own desert, but in honour of their Master.

CHRYSOSTOM. And to make this word the rather received. He subjoins a penalty in what follows, Whoso offendeth one of these little ones, & c. as though he had said, As those who for My sake honour one of these, have their reward, so they who dishonour shall undergo the extreme punishment. And marvel not that He calls an evil word an offence, for many of feeble spirit are offended by only being despised,

JEROME. Observe that he who is offended is a little one, for the greater hearts do not take offences. And though it may be a general declaration against all who scandalize any, yet from the connection of the discourse it may be said specially to the Apostles; for in asking who should be greatest in the kingdom of heaven, they seemed to be contending for preeminence among themselves; and if they had persisted in this fault, they might have scandalized those whom they called to the faith, seeing the Apostles contending among themselves for the preference.

ORIGEN. But how can he who has been converted, and become as a little child, be yet liable to be scandalized? This may be thus explained. Every one who believes on the Son of God, and walks after evangelic acts, is converted and walks as a little child; but he who is not converted that he may become as a child, it is impossible that he should enter into the kingdom of heaven. But in every congregation of believers, there are some only newly converted that they may become as little children, but not yet made such; these are the little ones in Christ, and these are they that receive offence.

JEROME. When it is said, It is better for him that a mill-stone be hanged about his neck, He speaks according to the custom of the province; for among the Jews this was the punishment of the greater criminals, to drown them by a stone tied to them. It is better for him, because it is far better to receive a brief punishment for a fault, than to be reserved for eternal torments.

CHRYSOSTOM. To correspond with the foregoing, He should have said here, Receiveth not Me, which were bitterer than any punishment; but because they were dull, and the before-named punishment did not move them, by a familiar instance He shews that punishment awaited them; for He therefore says, it were better for him, because another more grievous punishment awaits him.

HILARY. Mystically; The work of the mill is a toil of blindness, for the beasts having their eyes closed are driven round in a circle, and under the type of an ass we often find the Gentiles figured, who are held in the ignorance of blind labour; while the Jews have the path of knowledge set before them in the Law, who if they offend Christ’s Apostles it were better for them, that having their necks made fast to a mill-stone, they should be drowned in the sea, that is, kept under labour and in the depths of ignorance, as the Gentiles; for it were better for them that they should have never known Christ, than not to have received the Lord of the Prophets.

GREGORY. (Mor. vi. 37.) Otherwise; What is denoted by the sea, but the world, and what by the mill-stone, but earthly action? which, when it binds the neck in the yoke of vain desires, sends it to a dull round of toil. There arc some who leave earthly action, and bond themselves to aims of contemplation beyond the reach of intellect, laying aside humility, and so not only throw themselves into error, but also cast many weak ones out of the bosom of truth. Whoso then offends one of the least of mine, it were better for him that a mill-stone be tied about his neck, and he be cast into the sea; that is, it were better for a perverted heart to be entirely occupied with worldly business, than to be at leisure for contemplative studies to the hurt of many.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 24) Otherwise; Whoso offendeth one of these little ones, that is so humble as He would have his disciples to be, by not obeying, or by opposing, (as the Apostle says of Alexander,) it were better for him, that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and he be drowned in the depths of the sea, (2 Tim. 4:15.) that is, it were better for him that desire of the things of the world, to which the blind and foolish are tied down, should sink him by its load to destruction.

18:7–9

7. Woe unto the world because of offences! for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh.

8. Wherefore if thy hand or thy foot offend thee, cut them off, and cast them from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life halt or maimed, rather than having two hands or two feet to be cast into everlasting fire.

9. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out, and cast it from thee: it is better for thee to enter into life with one eye, rather than having two eyes to be east into hell fire.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord had said, that it is better for him who gives offence, that a mill-stone be hanged about his neck, of which He now subjoins the reason, Woe unto the world from offences! i. e. because of offences.

ORIGEN. This we may understand not of the material elements of the world; but here the men who are in the world, are called the worlda. But Christ’s disciples are not of this world, whence there cannot be woe to them from offences; for though there be many offences, they do not touch him who is not of this world. But if he be yet of this world in loving the world, and the things in it, as many offences will seize him as those by which he was encompassed in the world. It follows, For it must needs be that offences come.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix.) This does not subvert the liberty of the will, or impose a necessity of any act, but foreshews what must come to pass. Offences are hindrances in the right way. But Christ’s prophecy does not bring in the offences, for it is not done because He foretold it, but He foretold it because it was certainly to come to pass. But some one will say, If all men are recovered, and if there be none to bring the offences, will not His speech be convicted of falsehood? By no means; for seeing that men were incurable, He therefore said, It must needs he that offences come; that is, they surely will come; which He never would have said, if all men might be amended.

GLOSS. (interlin. 1 Cor. 11:19.) Or they must needs come because they are necessary, that is, useful, that by this mean they that are approved may be made manifest.

CHRYSOSTOM. For offences rouse men, and make them more attentive; and he who falls by them speedily rises again, and is more careful.

HILARY. Or; The lowliness of His passion is the scandal of the world, which refused to receive the Lord of eternal glory under the disgrace of the Cross. And what more dangerous for the world than to have rejected Christ? And He says that offences must needs come, forasmuch as in the sacrament of restoring to us eternal life, all lowliness of suffering was to be fulfilled in Him.

ORIGEN. Or; The scandals that are to come are the Angels of Satan. But do not look that these offences should shew themselves in a substantial or natural shape, for in some the freedom of the will has been the origin of offence, not liking to undergo toil for virtue’s sake. But there cannot be real good, without the opposition of evil. It must needs be then that offences come, as it must needs be that we encounter the evil assaults of spiritual powers; whose hatred is the more stirred up, as Christ’s word invading men drives out the evil influences from them. And they seek instruments by whom the offences may the rather work; and to such instruments is more woe; for him who gives, it shall be worse than for him who takes, the offence, as it follows, But woe unto that man by whom the offence cometh.

JEROME. As much as to say, Woe to that man through whose fault it comes to pass, that offences must needs be in the world. And under this general declaration, Judas is particularly condemned, who had made ready his soul for the act of betrayal.

HILARY. Or; By the man is denoted the Jewish people, as the introducers of all this offence that is about Christ’s passion; for they brought upon the world all the danger of denying Christ in His passion, of whom the Law and the Prophets had preached that He should suffer.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that you may learn that there is no absolute necessity for offences, hear what follows, If thy hand or thy foot offend thee, & c. This is not said of the limbs of the body, but of friends whom we esteem as limbs necessary to us; for nothing is so hurtful as evil communications.

RABANUS. Scandal (offence) is a Greek word, which we may call a stumbling-block, or a fall, or hitting of the foot. He then scandalizes his brother, who by word or deed amiss gives him occasion of falling.

JEROME. So all affection, our whole kindred, are severed from us; lest under cover of duty any believer should be exposed to offence. If, He says, he be united to thee as close as is thy hand, or foot, or eye, and is useful to thee, anxious and quick to discern, and yet causes thee offence, and is by the unmeetness of his behaviour drawing thee into hell; it is better for thee that thou lack his kindred, and his profitableness to thee, than that whilst thou seekest to gain thy kindred or friends, thou shouldest have cause of fallings. For every believer knows what is doing him harm, what troubles and tempts him, for it is better to lead a solitary life, than to lose eternal life, in order to have the things necessary for this present life.

ORIGEN. Or, The priests may with good reason be called the eyes of the Church, since they are considered her watchmen, but the deacons and the rest her hands, for by them spiritual deeds are wrought; the people are the feet of the body, the Church; and all these it behoves not to spare, if they become an offence to the Church. Or, by the offending hand is understood an act of the mind; a motion of the mind is the offending foot, and a vision of the mind is the sinning eye, which we ought to cut off if they give offence, for thus the acts of the limbs are often put in Scripture for the limbs themselves.

18:10–14

10. Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones; for I say unto you, That in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven.

11. For the Son of man is come to save that which was lost.

12. How think ye? if a man have an hundred sheep, and one of them be gone astray, doth he not leave the ninety and nine, and goeth into the mountains, and seeketh that which is gone astray?

13. And if so be that he find it, verily I say unto you, he rejoiceth more of that sheep, than of the ninety and nine which went not astray.

14. Even so it is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish.

JEROME. The Lord had said, under the type of hand, foot, and eye, that all kin and connection which could afford scandal must be cut off. The harshness of this declaration He accordingly tempers with the following precept, saying, Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones; i. e. As far as you may avoid despising them, but next to your own salvation seek also to heal them. But if ye see that they hold to their sins, it is better that ye be saved, than that ye perish in much company.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise; As to shun the evil, so to honour the good, has great recompense. Above then He had bid them to cut off the friendships of those that gave offence, here He teaches them to shew honour and service to the saints.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or otherwise; Because so great evils come of brethren being scandalized, Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones.

ORIGEN. The little ones are those that are but lately born in Christ, or those who abide without advance, as though lately born. But Christ judged it needless to give command concerning not despising the more perfect believers, but concerning the little ones, as He had said above, If any man shall offend one of these little ones. A man may perhaps say that a little one here means a perfect Christian, according to that He says elsewhere, Whoso is least among you, he shall be great. (Luke 9:48.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Or because the perfect are esteemed of many as little ones, as poor, namely, and despicable.

ORIGEN. But this exposition does not seem to agree with that which was said, If any one scandalizes one of these little ones; for the perfect man is not scandalized, nor does he perish. But he who thinks this the true exposition, says, that the mind of a righteous man is variable, and is sometimes offended, but not easily.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Therefore are they not to be despised for that they are so dear to God, that Angels are deputed to be their guardians; For I say unto you, that in heaven their Angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven.

ORIGEN. Some will have it that an Angel is given as an attendant minister from the time when in the laver of regeneration the infant is born in Christ; for, say they, it is incredible that a holy Angel watches over those who are unbelieving and in error, but in his time of unbelief and sin man is under the Angels of Satan. Others will have it, that those who are foreknown of God, have straightway from their very birth a guardian Angel.

JEROME. High dignity of souls, that each from its birth has an Angel set in charge over it!

CHRYSOSTOM. Here He is speaking not of any Angels, but of the higher sort; for when He says, Behold the face of my Father, He shews that their presence before God is free and open, and their honour great.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. 34. 12) But Dionysius says, that it is from the ranks of the lesser Angels that these are sent to perform this ministry, either visibly or invisibly, for that those higher ranks have not the employment of an outward ministry.

GREGORY. (Mor. ii. 3.) And therefore the Angels always behold the face of the Father, and yet they come to us, for by a spiritual presence they come forth to us, and yet by internal contemplation keep themselves there whence they come forth; for they come not so forth from the divine vision, as to hinder the joys of inward contemplation.

HILARY. The Angels offer daily to God the prayers of those that are to be saved by Christ; it is therefore perilous to despise him whose desires and requests are conveyed to the eternal and invisible God, by the service and ministry of Angels.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xxii. 29.) Or; They are called our Angels who are indeed the Angels of God. they are Gods because they have not forsaken Him; they are ours because they have begun to have us for their fellow-citizens. As they now behold God, so shall we also behold Him face to face, of which vision John speaks, We shall see him as he is. (1 John 3:2.) For by the face of God is to be understood the manifestation of Himself, not a member or feature of the body, such as we call by that name.

CHRYSOSTOM. He gives yet another reason weightier than the foregoing, why the little ones are not to be despised, For the Son of Man is come to save that which was lost.

REMIGIUS. As much as to say, Despise not little ones, for I also for men condescended to become man. By that which was lost, understand the human race; for all the elements have kept their place, but man was lost, because he has broken his ordained place.

CHRYSOSTOM. And to this reasoning He adds a parable, in which He sets forth the Father as seeking the salvation of men, and saying, What think you, If a man have a hundred sheep.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxiv. 3.) This refers to the Creator of man Himself; for a hundred is a perfect number, and He had a hundred sheep when He created the substance of Angels and men.

HILARY. But by the one sheep is to be understood one man, and under this one man is comprehended the whole human race. He that seeks man is Christ, and the ninety and nine are the host of the heavenly glory which He left.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The Evangelist says they were left on the mountains, to signify that the sheep which were not lost abode on high.

BEDE. (ap. Anselm.) The Lord found the sheep when He restored man, and over that sheep that is found there is more joy in heaven than over the ninety and nine, because there is a greater matter for thanksgiving to God in the restoration of man than in the creation of the Angels. Wonderfully are the Angels made, but more wonderfully man restored.

RABANUS. Note, that nine wants only one to make it ten, and ninety and nine the same to be a hundred. Thus members which want one only to be perfect, may be larger or smaller, but yet the unit remaining invariable, when it is added makes the rest perfect. And that the number of sheep might be made up perfect in heaven, lost man was sought on earth.

JEROME. Others think that by the ninety and nine sheep are understood the number of the righteous, and by the one sheep the sinners, according to that said in another place, I am not come to call the righteous but sinners to repentance. (Matt. 9:13.)

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) We must consider whence it is that the Lord declares that He has joy rather over the converted sinners, than over the righteous that stand. Because these last are often slothful and slack to practise the greater good works, as being very secure within themselves, for that they have committed none of the heavier sins. While on the other hand those who have their wicked deeds to remember, do often through the compunction of sorrow glow with the more heat in their love of God, and when they think how they have strayed from Him, they replace their former losses by gains following. So the general in a battle loves best that soldier who turns in his flight and courageously presses the enemy, than him who never turned his back, yet never did any valorous deed. Yet there be some righteous over whom is joy so great, that no penitent can be preferred before them, those, who though not conscious to themselves of sins, yet reject things lawful, and humble themselves in all things. How great is the joy when the righteous mourns, and humbles himself, if there be joy when the unrighteous condemns himself wherein he has done amiss?

BEDE. (ap. Anselm.)f; Or, By the ninety-nine sheep, which He left on the mountains, are signified the proud to whom a unit is still wanting for perfection. When then He has found the sinner, He rejoices over him, that is, He makes his own to rejoice over him, rather than over the false righteous.

JEROME. What follows, Even so it is not the will, &c. is to be referred to what was said above, Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones; and so He shews that this parable was set forth to enforce that same saying. Also in saying, It is not the will of my Father which is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish, He shews that so oft as one of these little ones does perish, it is not by the Father’s will that it perishes.

18:15–17

15. Moreover if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother.

16. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established.

17. And if he shall neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church: but if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a Publican.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx.) Having above given a severe sentence against those who were the cause of offence, making them to fear on all sides; so now that they to whom the offence is offered should not fall into the opposite fault of supineness and indifference, seeking to spare themselves in all things, and so be puffed up; the Lord here checks such a tendency, commanding that they be reproved, saying, If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go, tell him his fault between thee and him alone.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 82. 1.) Our Lord admonishes us not to overlook one another's faults, yet not so as seeking for matter of blame, but watching what you may amend. For our rebuke should be in love, not eager to wound, but anxious to amend. If you pass it by, you are become worse than he. He by doing you a wrong hath done himself a great hurt; you slight your brother's wound, and are more to blame for your silence than he for his ill words to you.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, i. 9.) For often we wrongly shun to teach and admonish, or to rebuke and check the wicked, either because the task is irksome, or because we would escape their enmity, lest they should harm or obstruct us in temporal things, whether in gaining objects we desire, or in holding what our frailty fears to love. But if any one spares reproof of evil doers, because he seeks fitter occasion, or fears to make them worse, or that they may be an impediment to the good and pious living of other weak ones, or may grieve them, or turn them from the faith; herein there is seen no considerations of covetousness, but the prudence of charity. And much weightier reason have they who are set over the churches, to the end they should not spare to rebuke sin; though not even he is free from this blame, who, though not in authority, wots of many things in them to whom he is bound by the ties of this life, which should be touched by admonition or correction, but neglects to do so; shunning their displeasure on account of things which he does not unduly use in this life, but wherewith he is unduly delighted.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is to be noted, that onewhile the Lord brings the offender to him whom he has offended; as when he says, If thou remember that thy brother has might against thee, go, be reconciled to thy brother: (Mat. 5:23.) otherwhiles He bids him that has suffered the wrong to forgive his neighbour; as where he says, Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. (Mat. 6:12.) Here He has devised yet another method, for He brings him who has been grieved to him that grieved him, and therefore says, If thy brother sin against thee; for because he that did the wrong would not readily come to make amends, because of his shame, He draws to him him that has suffered the wrong; and not only draws him there, but with the very purpose of correcting what was done amiss; whence He says, Go and tell hint his fault.

RABANUS. He does not command us to forgive indiscriminately, but him only that will hearken and be obedient, and do penitence; that neither should forgiveness be unattainable, nor sufferance be too far relaxed.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He says not, Accuse him, nor, Chide with him, nor, Demand redress,—but, Tell him of his fault; that is, remind him of his sin, tell him what things you have suffered from him. For he is held down by anger or by shame, stupefied as one in a deep slumber. Wherefore it behoves you who are in your right senses to go to him who is in a disease.

JEROME. If then your brother have sinned against you, or hurt you in any matter, you have power, indeed must needs forgive him, for we are charged to forgive our debtors their debts. But if a man sin against God, it is no longer in our decision. But we do all tho contrary of this; where God is wronged we are merciful, where the affront is to ourselves we prosecute the quarrel.

CHRYSOSTOM. We are to tell his fault to the man himself who did it, and not to another, because the party takes it with the more patience from him, and above all when they are together alone. For when he who had a right to demand reparation, shews rather a carefulness to heal the sore, this has great power to propitiate.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 82, 7.) When any one therefore offends against us, let us be very careful, not for ourselves, for it is glorious to forget an injury; forget therefore your own wrong, but not the wound your brother has sustained; and tell him of his fault between him and you alone, seeking his amendment and sparing his shame. For it may be that out of shame he will seek to defend his fault, and thus you will only harden, while you sought to do him good.

JEROME. Thy brother is to be reproved in private, lest if once he has lost a sense of shame, he should continue in sin.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But the Apostle says, Them that sin ‘rebuke before all, that others may fear to do the like. (1 Tim 5:20.) Sometimes therefore your brother is to be spoken to between thee and him alone, sometimes to be rebuked before all. What you must do first, attend and learn; If thy brother, says He, sin against thee, tell him of his fault between thee and him alone. Why? Because he has sinned against you? What is it that he has sinned against you? You know that he has sinned, and therefore since his sin was in private, let your rebuke be in private too. For if you alone know of his trespass, and proceed to rebuke him before all, you do not correct but betray him. Your brother has sinned against you; if you alone know thereof, then he has sinned against you only; but if he did you a wrong in the presence of many, then he has sinned against those also who were witnesses of his fault. Those faults then are to be rebuked before all, that are committed before all; those which are done in private, are to be rebuked in private. Discern times, and the Scriptures are consistent. But why do you correct your neighbour? Because his trespass has hurt yourself? Far be it from thee. If you do it from self-love, you do nought; if you do it from love of him, you do most rightly. Lastly, in what you shall say to him, keep in view for whose sake it is that you ought to do it, for your own or for his, for it follows, If he hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother; do it therefore for his sake, that you may gain him. And do you confess that by your sin against man you were lost; for if you were not lost, how has he gained you? Let none then make light of it when he sins against his brother.

CHRYSOSTOM. In this it is made plain that enmities are a loss to both sides; for he said not, he has gained himself, but, you have gained him; which shews that both of you had suffered loss by your disagreement.

JEROME. For in saving another, salvation is gained for ourselves also. Chrys What you should do if he does not yield is added, If he will not hear thee, take with thee one or two. For the more shameless and stubborn he shews himself, the more studious should we be of applying the medicine, and not turn to wrath and hate. As the physician, if he see that the disease does not abate, he does not slack, but redoubles his efforts to heal. And observe how this reproof is not for revenge, but for correction, seeing his command is not to take two with him at first, but when he would not amend; and even then he does not send a multitude to him, but one or two, alleging the law, That in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may stand. (Deut. 19:15.) This is that you may have witnesses that you have done all your part.

JEROME. Or it is to be understood in this way; If he will not hear thee, take with thee one brother only; if he yet will not hear, take a third, either from your zeal for his amendment, that shame or admonition may move him; or for the purpose of meeting before witnesses.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or, that if he affirm that it is no trespass, that they may prove to him that it is a trespass.

JEROME. If yet he will not hear them, then it must be told to many, that he may be held in abhorrence; so that he who could not be saved by his own sense of shame, may be saved by public disgrace; whence it follows, If he will not hear them, tell it to the Church.

CHRYSOSTOM. That is, to those that are over the Church.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Or, tell it to the whole Church, that his infamy may be the greater. After all these things follows excommunication, which ought to be inflicted by the mouth of the Church, that is, by the Priest, and when he excommunicates, the whole Church works with him; as it follows, And if he will not hear the Church, let him by unto thee as an heathen, and a publican.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 82, 7.) That is, regard him no longer in the number of thy brethren. Though even thus we are not to neglect his salvation; for the heathens themselves, that is, the gentiles and pagans, we do not indeed regard in the number of our brethren, yet we ever seek their salvation.

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet the Lord enjoins nothing of this sort to be observed towards those who are without the Church, such as He does in reproving a brother. Of those that are without He says. If any smite thee on the one cheek, offer to him the other also. (Mat. 5:39.) as Paul speaks, What have I to do to judge them that are without? (1 Cor. 5:12.) But brethren he bids us reprove, and turn away from.

JEROME. That He says, As a heathen and a publican, shews that he is to be more abhorred, who under the name of a believer does the deeds of an unbeliever, than those that are openly gentiles. Those He calls publicans, who pursue worldly gain, and levy contributions by trading, cheating, and villainous frauds, and perjuries.

ORIGEN. Let us look well whether this precept extends to all sin; for what if any one sin any of those sins which are unto death, such as unnatural crimes, adultery, homicide, or effeminacy, it cannot be meant that such as these are to be admonished privately, and if he hear you, forthwith to say that you have gained him. And not rather first put him out of the Church, or only when remaining obstinate after monition before witnesses, and by the Church? One man, looking at the infinite mercy of Christ, will say, that since the words of Christ make no distinction of sins, it is to go against Christ's mercy to limit His words only to little sins. Another, on the other hand, considering the words carefully, will aver, that they are not spoken of every sin; for that he that is guilty of those great sins is not a brother, but is called a brother, with whom, according to the Apostle, we ought not so much as to eat. But as they who expound this as referring to every sin give encouragement to the careless to sin; so, on the other hand, he, who teaches that one having sinned in little sins and such as are not deadly, is, when he has spurned the admonition of the witnesses and the Church, to be held as a heathen and a publican, seems to introduce too great severity. For whether he finally perishes, we are not able to decide. First, because he who has been thrice told of his fault and not hearkened, may hearken the fourth time; secondly, because sometimes a man does not receive according to his deeds, but beyond his trespass, which is good for him in this world; lastly, because He said not alone, Let him be as a heathen, but Let him be to thee. Whosoever then when reproved three times in a light trespass, does not amend, him we ought to hold for a heathen and a publican, avoiding him, that he may be brought to confusion. But whether he is esteemed of God also as a heathen and a publican, is not ours to decide, but is in the judgment of God.

18:18–20

18. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.

19. Again I say unto you, That if two of you shall agree on earth as touching any thing that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven.

20. For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.

JEROME. Because He had said, If he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as a heathen, and a publican, whereupon the brother so contemned might answer, or think within himself, If you despise me, I also will despise you; if you condemn me, you shall be condemned by my sentence. He therefore confers powers upon the Apostles, that they may be assured that when any are condemned after this manner, the sentence of man is ratified by the sentence of God. Verily I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever ye shall loose upon the earth shall be loosed in heaven.

ORIGEN. He said not in the heavens (in cœlis), as when He spoke to Peter, but in heaven (in cœlo), for they are not yet attained to the like perfection with Peter.

HILARY. To hold out a great and terrible fear, by which all men should be reached in this present life, He pronounces that the judgment of the Apostles should be ratified, so that whosoever they bound on earth, i. e. left entangled in the noose of sin, and whosoever they loosed, i. e. accorded the pardon of God’s mercy to their salvation, that these should be bound and loosed in heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. And be it noted, that He said not to the Primate1 of the Church, Bind such a man; but, If ye shall bind him, the bonds shall be indissoluble; leaving the other to his discretion. And see how He has set the incorrigible person under the yoke of a twofold necessity; to wit, the punishment that is here, namely, the casting forth out of the Church, when He said, Let him be to thee as a heathen; and the future punishment, saying, that he shall be bound in heaven; thus by the weight of his penalties lessening his brother’s wrath against him.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Otherwise; When you begin to hold your brother as a publican you bind him on earth, but take heed that you bind him with just cause; for an unjust cause breaks rightful bonds. But when you have corrected him, and agreed with him, you have loosed him upon earth, and when you have loosed him upon earth, he shall be loosed also in heaven. You confer a great boon not on yourself, but on him, as he had done the hurt not to you but to himself.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) But He holds out a ratification not only of sentences of excommunication, but of every petition which is offered by men holding together in the unity of the Church; for He adds, Again I say unto you, that if two of you shall agree upon earth, whether in admitting a penitent, or casting out a forward person, touching any thing which they shall ask, any thing, that is, that is not against the unity of the Church, it shall be done for them by my Father which is in heaven. By saying, which is in heaven, He points Him out as above all, and therefore able to fulfil all that shall be asked of Him. Or, He is in the heavens, that is, with saints, proof enough that whatever worthy thing they shall ask shall be done unto them, because they have with them Him of whom they ask. For this cause is the sentence of those that agree together ratified, because God dwells in them, For where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, because He had said, It shall be done unto them by My Father; therefore, to shew that He is the Giver together with His Father, He adds this, where two or three, &c.

ORIGEN. And He said not, I will be, but I am in the midst of them; because straightway, as soon as they have agreed together, Christ is found among them.

HILARY. For He who is peace and charity, will set His place and habitation in good and peaceable dispositions.

JEROME. Or otherwise; All His foregoing discourse had invited us to union; now to make us embrace peace more anxiously, He holds out a reward, promising to be in the midst of two or three.

CHRYSOSTOM. Yet He said not barely, Where they are gathered together, but added, in my name, as much as to say, If any man look upon Me as the chief motive of his love to his neighbour, I will be with him, though he is virtue be shewn towards other men. How is it then that those who thus agree together do not obtain what they ask for? First, because they ask things not expedient, and because they do not bring on their parts that which they ought to contribute; wherefore He says, If two of you, that is, who shew an evangelic conversation. Thirdly, because they pray seeking vengeance against those who have grieved them. And fourthly, because they seek mercy for sinners who have not repented.

ORIGEN. And this also is the reason why our prayers are not granted, because we do not agree together in all things upon earth, neither in doctrine, nor in conversation. For as in music, unless the voices are in time there is no pleasure to the hearer, so in the Church, unless they are united God is not. pleased therein, nor does He hear their words.

JEROME. (vid. Origen. in loc.) We may also understand this spiritually; where our spirit, soul, and body are in agreement, and have not within them conflicting wills, they shall obtain from My Father every thing they shall ask; for none can doubt that that demand is good, where the body wills the same thing as the spirit.

ORIGEN. Or, In whatever the two testaments are in agreement, for this every prayer is found acceptable to God.

18:21–22

21. Then came Peter to him, and said, Lord, how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? till seven times?

22. Jesus saith unto him, I say not unto thee, Until seven times: but, Until seventy times seven.

JEROME. The Lord had said above, See that ye despise not one of these little ones, and had added, If thy brother sin against thee, &c. making also a promise, If two of you, & c. by which the Apostle Peter was led to ask, Lord, how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? And to his question he adds an opinion, Until seven times?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi.) Peter thought that he had made a large allowance; but what answers Christ the Lover of men? it follows, Jesus saith unto him, I say not unto thee, Until seven times, but, Until seventy times seven.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 83. 3.) I am bold to say, that if he shall sin seventy-eight times, thou shouldest forgive him; yea, and if a hundred; and how oft soever he sin against thee, forgive him. For if Christ found a thousand sins, yet forgave them all, do not you withdraw your forgiveness. For the Apostle says, Forgiving one another, if any man hath a quarrel against any, even as God in Christ forgave you. (Col. 3:13.)

CHRYSOSTOM. When He says, Until seventy times seven, He does not limit a definite number within which forgiveness must be kept; but He signifies thereby something endless and ever enduring.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Yet not without reason did the Lord say, Seventy times seven; for the Law is set forth in ten precepts; and the Law is signified by the number ten, sin by eleven, because it is passing the denary line. Seven is used to be put for a whole, because time goes round in seven days. Take eleven seven times, and you have seventy. He would therefore have all trespasses forgiven, for this is what He signifies by the number seventy-seven.

ORIGEN. Or, because the number six seems to denote toil and labour, and the number seven repose, He says that forgiveness should be given to all brethren who live in this world, and sin in the things of this world. But if any commit transgressions beyond these things, he shall then have no further forgiveness.

JEROME. Or understand it of four hundred and ninety times, that He bids us forgive our brother so oft.

RABANUS. It is one thing to give pardon to a brother when he seeks it, that he may live with us in social charity, as Joseph to his brethren; and another to a hostile foe, that we may wish him good, and if we can do him good, as David mourning for Saul.

18:23–35

23. Therefore is the kingdom of heaven likened unto a certain king, which would take account of his servants.

24. And when he had begun to reckon, one was brought unto him, which owed him ten thousand talents.

25. But forasmuch as he had not to pay, his lord commanded him to be sold, and his wife, and children, and all that he had, and payment to be made.

26. The servant therefore fell down, and worshipped him, saying, Lord, have patience with me, and I will pay thee all.

27. Then the lord of that servant was moved with compassion, and loosed him, and forgave him the debt.

28. But the same servant went out, and found one of his fellow-servants, which owed him an hundred pence: and he laid hands on him, and took him by the throat, saying, Pay me that thou owest.

29. And his fellowservant fell down at his feet, and besought him, saying, Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all.

30. And he would not: but went and cast him into prison, till he should pay the debt.

31. So when his fellowservants saw what was done, they were very sorry, and came and told unto their lord all that was done.

32. Then his lord, after that he had called him, said unto him, O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me:

33. Shouldest not thou also have had compassion on thy fellowservant, even as I had pity on thee?

34. And his lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due unto him.

35. So likewise shall my heavenly Father do also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses.

CHRYSOSTOM. That none should think that the Lord had enjoined something great and burdensome in saying that we must forgive till seventy times seven, He adds a parable.

JEROME. For it is customary with the Syrians, especially they of Palestine, to add a parable to what they speak; that what their hearers might not retain simply, and in itself, the instance and similitude may be the means of retaining.

ORIGEN. The Son of God, as He is wisdom, righteousness, and truth (vid. 1 Cor. 1:30.), so is He a kingdom; not indeed any of those which are beneath, but all those which are above, reigning over those in whose senses reigns justice and the other virtues; these are made of heaven because they bear the image of the heavenly. This kingdom of heaven then, i. e. the Son of God, when He was made in the likeness of sinful flesh, was then like to a king, in uniting man to himself.

REMIGIUS. Or, by the kingdom of heaven is reasonably understood the holy Church, in which the Lord works what He speaks of in this parable. By the man is sometimes represented the Father, as in that, The kingdom of heaven is like to a king, who made a marriage for his son; and sometimes the Son; but here we may take it for both, the Father and the Son, who are one God. God is called a King, inasmuch as He created and governs all things.

ORIGEN. The servants, in these parables, are only they who are employed in dispensing the word, and to whom this business is committed.

REMIGIUS. Or, by the servants of this King are signified all mankind whom He has created for His own praise, and to whom He gave the law of nature; He takes account with them, when He would look into each man’s manners, life, and deeds, that He may render to each according to that He has done; as it follows, And when He had begun to reckon, one was brought unto Him which owed Him ten, thousand talents.

ORIGEN. The King takes account of our, whole life then, when we must all be presented before the judgment-seat of Christ. (2 Cor. 5:10.) We mean not this so as that any should think that the business itself must needs require a long time. For God, when He will scrutinize the minds of all, will by some undescribable power cause every thing that every man has done to pass speedily before the mind of each. He says, And when he began to take account, because the beginning of the judgment is that it begin from the house of God. (1 Pet. 4:17.) At His beginning to take account there is brought unto Him one who owes Him many talents; one, that is, who had wrought great evils; one on whom much had been enjoined, and had yet brought no gain; who perhaps had destroyed as many men as he owed talents; one who was therefore become a debtor of many talents, because he had followed the woman sitting upon a talent of lead, whose name is Iniquity. (Zech. 5:7.)

JEROME. I know that some interpret the man who owed the ten thousand talents to be the devil, and by his wife and children who were to be sold when he persevered in his wickedness, understand foolishness, and hurtful thoughts. For as wisdom is called the wife of the righteous man, so the wife of the unrighteous and the sinner is called foolishness. But how the Lord remits to the devil ten thousand talents, and how he would not remit ten denarii to us his fellow-servants, of this there is no ecclesiastical interpretation, nor is it to be admitted by thoughtful men.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 83, 6.) Therefore let us say, that because the Law is set forth in ten precepts, the ten thousand talents which he owed denote all sins which can be done under the Law.

REMIGIUS. Man who sinned of his own will and choice, has no power to rise again by his own endeavour, and has not wherewith to pay, because he finds nothing in himself by which he may loose himself from his sins; whence it follows, And when he had not to pay, his lord commanded him to be sold, and his wife and children, and all that he had, and payment to be made. The fool’s wife is folly, and the pleasure or lust of the flesh.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 25.) This signifies that the transgressor of the decalogue deserves punishment for his lusts and evil deeds; and that is his price; for the price for which they sell is the punishment of him that is damned.

CHRYSOSTOM. This command issued not of cruelty, but of unspeakable tenderness. For he seeks by these terrors to bring him to plead that he be not sold, which fell out, as he shews when he adds, The servant therefore fell down and besought him, saying, Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all.

REMIGIUS. That he says, falling down, shews how the sinner humbled himself, and offered amends. Have patience with me, expresses the sinner's prayer, begging respite, and space to correct his error. Abundant is the bounty of God, and His clemency to sinners converted, seeing He is ever ready to forgive sins by baptism or penitence, as it follows, But the lord of that servant had mercy upon him, and loosed him, and forgave him the debt.

CHRYSOSTOM. See the exuberance of heavenly love! The servant asked only a brief respite, but he gives him more than he had asked, a full remittance and cancelling of the whole debt. He was minded to have forgiven him from the very first, but he would not have it to be of his own mere motion, but also of the other's suit, that he might not depart without a gift. But he did not remit the debt till he had taken account, because he would have him know how great debts he set him free of, that by this he should at the least be made more merciful to his fellow servants. And indeed as far as what has gone he was worthy to be accepted; for he made confession, and promised that he would pay the debt, and fell down and begged, and confessed the greatness of his debt. But his after deeds were unworthy of the former, for it follows, But the same servant went out, and found one of his fellow-servants which owed him a hundred denarii.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 83. 6.) That He says he owed him a hundred denarii is taken from the same number, ten, the number of the Law. For a hundred times a hundred are ten thousand, and ten times ten are a hundred; and those ten thousand talents and these hundred denarii are still keeping to the number of the Law; in both of them you find sins. Both are debtors, both are suitors for remission; so every man is himself a debtor to God, and has his brother his debtor.

CHRYSOSTOM. But there is as great difference between sins committed against men, and sins committed against God, as between ten thousand talents and a hundred denarii; yea rather there is still greater difference.

This appears from the difference of the persons, and from the fewness of the offenders. For when we are seen of man we withhold and are loath to sin, but we cease not daily though God see us, but act and speak all things fearlessly. Not by this only are our sins against God shewn to be more heinous, but also by reason of the benefits which we have received from Him; He gave us being, and has done all things in our behalf, has breathed into us a rational soul, has sent His Son, has opened heaven to us, and made us His sons. If then we should every day die for Him, could we make Him any worthy return? By no means; it should rather redound again to our advantage. But, on the contrary, we offend against His laws.

REMIGIUS. So by him who owed ten thousand talents are represented those that commit the greater crimes; by the debtor of a hundred denarii those who commit the lesser.

JEROME. That this may be made plainer, let us speak it in instances. If any one of you shall have committed an adultery, a homicide, or a sacrilege, these greater sins of ton thousand talents shall be remitted when you beg for it, if you also shall remit lesser offences to those that trespass against you.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But this unworthy, unjust servant would not render that which had been rendered to him, for it follows, And he laid hands on him, and held him by the throat, saying, Pay me that thou, owest.

REMIGIUS. That is, he pressed him hardly, that he might exact vengeance from him.

ORIGEN. He therefore, as I suppose, took him by the throat, because he had come forth from the king; for he would not have so handled his fellow servant, if he had not gone forth from the king.

CHRYSOSTOM. By saying, as he went out, He shews that it was not after long time, but immediately, while the favour he had received still sounded in his ears, he abused to wickedness the liberty his lord had accorded him. What the other did is added, And his fellow-servant fell down, and besought him, saying, Have patience with me, and I will pay thee all,

ORIGEN. Observe the exactness of Scripture; the servant who owed many talents fell down, and worshipped the king; he who owed the hundred denarii falling down, did not worship, but besought his fellow servant, saying, Have patience. But the ungrateful servant did not even respect the very words which had saved himself, for it follows, but he would not.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 25.) That is, he nourished such thoughts towards him that he sought his punishment. But he went his way.

REMIGIUS. That is, his wrath was the rather inflamed, to exact vengeance of him; And he cast him into prison, until he should pay the debt; that is, he seized his brother, and exacted vengeance of him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe the Lord’s tenderness, and the servant’s cruelty; the one for ten thousand talents, the other for ten denarii; the one a suitor to his fellow, the other to his lord; the one obtained entire remission, the other sought only respite, but he got it not. They who owed nought grieved with him; his fellow-servants, seeing what was done, were very sorry.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 25.) By the fellow-servants is understood the Church, which binds one and looses another.

REMIGIUS. Or perhaps they represent the Angels, or the preachers of the holy Church, or any of the faithful, who when they see a brother whose sins are forgiven refusing to forgive his fellow-servant, they are sorrowful over his perdition. And they came, and told their lord, what was done. They came not in body, but in spirit. To tell their Lord, is to shew the woe and sorrow of the heart in their carriage. It follows, Then his lord called him. He called him by the sentence of death, and bade him pass out of this world, and said unto him, Thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou prayedst me.

CHRYSOSTOM. When he owed him ten thousand talents, he did not call him wicked, nor did he at all chide him, but had mercy on him; but now when he had been ungenerous to his fellow-servant, then he says to him, Thou wicked servant; and this is what is said, Oughtest thou not to have had mercy upon thy fellow-servant.

REMIGIUS. And it is to be known, that we read no answer made by that servant to his lord; by which it is shewn us, that in the day of judgment, and altogether after this life, all excusing of ourselves shall be out off,

CHRYSOSTOM. Because kindness had not mended him, it remains that he be corrected by punishment; whence it follows, And the lord of that servant was angry, and delivered him to the torturers until he should pay the whole debt. He said not merely, Delivered him, but was angry, this he had not said before; when his Lord commanded that he should be sold; for that was not in wrath, but in love, for his correction; now this is a sentence of penalty and punishment,

REMIGIUS. For God is said then to be wroth, when he takes vengeance on sinners. Torturers are intended for the dæmons, who are always ready to take up lost souls, and torture them in the pangs of eternal punishment. Will any who is once sunk into everlasting condemnation ever come to find season of repentance, and a way to escape? Never; that until is put for infinity; and the meaning is, He shall be ever paying, and shall never quit the debt, but shall be ever under punishment,

CHRYSOSTOM. By this is shewn that his punishment shall be increasing and eternal, and that he shall never pay. And however irrevocable are the graces and callings of God, yet wickedness has that force, that it seems to break even this law.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 83, 7.) or God says, Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven; (Luke 6:37.) I have first forgiven, forgive you then after Me; for if you forgive not, I will call you back, and will require again all that I had remitted to you. For Christ neither deceives nor is deceived; and He adds here, Thus will my heavenly Father do unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses. It is better that you should cry out with your mouth, and forgive in your heart, than that you should speak smoothly, and be unrelenting in your heart For the Lord adds, From your hearts, to the end that though, out of affection you put him to discipline, yet gentleness should not depart out of your heart. What is more beneficial than the knife of the surgeon? He is rough with the sore that the man may be healed; should he be tender with the sore, the man were lost.

JEROME. Also this, from your hearts, is added to take away all feigned reconciliations. Therefore the Lord’s command to Peter under this similitude of the king and his servant who owed him ten thousand talents, and was forgiven by his lord upon his entreaty, is, that he also should forgive his fellow-servants their lesser trespasses.

ORIGEN. He seeks to instruct us, that we should be ready to shew clemency to those who have done us harm, especially if they offer amends, and plead to have forgiveness.

RABANUS. Allegorically; The servant here who owed the ten thousand talents, is the Jewish people bound to the Ten Commandments in the Law. These the Lord oft forgave their trespasses, when being in difficulties they besought His mercy; but when they were set free, they exacted the utmost with great severity from all their debtors; and of the gentile people which they hated, they required circumcision and the ceremonies of the Law; yea, the Prophets and Apostles they barbarously put to death. For all this the Lord gave them over into the hands of the Romans as to evil spirits, who should punish them with eternal tortures.

CHAPTER 19

19:1–8

1. And it came to pass, that when Jesus had finished these sayings, he departed from Galilee, and came into the coasts of Judæa beyond Jordan;

2. And great multitudes followed him; and he healed them there.

3. The Pharisees also came unto him, tempting him, and saying unto him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?

4. And he answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female,

5. And said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall be one flesh?

6. Wherefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

7. They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away?

8. He said unto them, Moses because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii.) The Lord had before left Judæa because of their jealousy, but now He keeps Himself more to it, because His passion was near at hand. Yet does He not go up to Judæa itself, but into the borders of Judæa; whence it is said, And it came to pass when Jesus had ended all these sayings, he departed from Galilee.

RABANUS. Here then He begins to relate what He did, taught, or suffered in Judæa. At first beyond Jordan eastward, afterwards on this side Jordan when He came to Jericho, Bethphage, and Jerusalem; whence it follows, And He came into the coasts of Judæa beyond Jordan.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM.e. As the righteous Lord of all, who loves these servants so as not to despise those.

RABANUS. It should be known, that the whole territory of the Israelites was called Judæa, to distinguish it from other nations. But its southern portion, inhabited by the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, was called Judæa proper, to distinguish it from other districts in the same province as Samaria, Galilee, Decapolis, and the rest. It follows, And great multitudes followed him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. They were conducting Him forth, as the young children of a father going on a far journey. And He setting forth as a father, left them as pledges of His love the healing of their diseases, as it is said, And he healed them.

CHRYSOSTOM. It should be also observed, that the Lord is not either ever delivering doctrine, or ever working miracles, but one while does this, and again turns to that; that by His miracles faith might be given to what He said, and by His teaching might be shewed the profit of those things which He wrought.

ORIGEN. The Lord healed the multitudes beyond Jordan, where baptism was given. For all are truly healed from spiritual sickness in baptism; and many follow Christ as did these multitudes, but not rising up as Matthew, who arose and followed the Lord,

HILARY. Also He cures the Galileans on the borders of Judæa, that He might admit the sins of the Gentiles to that pardon which was prepared for the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. For indeed Christ so healed men, as to do good both to themselves, and through them to many other. For these men’s healing was to others the occasion of their knowledge of God; but not to the Pharisees, who were only hardened by the miracles; whence it follows; And the Pharisees came to him, tempting him,, and saying, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife for every cause?

JEROME. That they might have Him as it were between the horns of a syllogism, so that, whatever answer He should make, it would lie open to cavil. Should He allow a wife to be put away for any cause, and the marriage of another, he would seem to contradict Himself as a preacher of chastity. Should He answer that she may not be put away for any cause whatsoever, He will be judged to have spoken impiously, and to make against the teaching of Moses and of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe their wickedness even in the way of putting their question. The Lord had above disputed concerning thus law, but they now ask Him as though He had spoken nothing thereof, supposing He had forgot what He had before delivered in this matter.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But, as when you see one much pursuing the acquaintance of physicians, you know that he is sick, so, when you see either man or woman enquiring concerning divorce, know that that man is lustful and that woman unchaste. For chastity has pleasure in wedlock, but desire is tormented as though under a slavish bondage therein. And knowing that they had no sufficient cause to allege for their putting away their wives, save their own lewdness, they feigned many divers causes. They feared to ask Him for what cause, lest they should be tied down within the limits of fixed and certain causes; and therefore they asked if it were lawful for every cause; for they knew that appetite knows no limits, and cannot hold itself within the bounds of one marriage, but the more it is indulged the more it is kindled.

ORIGEN. Seeing the Lord thus tempted, let none of His disciples who is set to teach think it hard if he also be by some tempted. Howbeit, He replies to His tempters with the doctrines of piety.

JEROME. But He so frames His answer as to evade their snare. He brings in the testimony of Holy Writ, and the law of nature, and opposing God’s first sentence to this second, He answered and said unto them, Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning made them male and female? This is written in the beginning of Genesis. This teaches that second marriages are to be avoided, for He said not male and females, which was what was sought by the putting away of the first, but, male and female, implying only one tie of wedlock.

RABANUS. For by the wholesome design of God it was ordained that a man should have in the woman a part of his own body, and should not look upon as separate from himself that which he knew was formed out of himself.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. If then God created the male and female out of one, to this end that they should be one, why then henceforth were not they born man and wife at one birth, as it is with certain insects? Because God created male and female for the continuance of the species, yet is He ever a lover of chastity, and promoter of continence. Therefore did He not follow this pattern in all kinds, to the end that, if any man choose to marry, he may know what is, according to the first disposition of the creation, the condition of man and wife; but if he choose not to marry, he shall not be under necessity to marry by the circumstances of his birth, lest he should by his continence be the destruction of the other who was not willing to be continent; for which same cause God forbids that after being joined in wedlock one should separate if the other be unwilling.

CHRYSOSTOM. But not by the law of creation only, but also by the practice of the law, He shews that they ought to be joined one and one, and never put asunder, And he said, For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife.

JEROME. In like manner He says his wife, and not wives, and adds expressly, and they twain shall be one flesh. For it is the reward of marriage that one flesh, namely in the offspring, is made of two.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Or, one flesh, that is in carnal connexion.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. If then because the wife is made of the man, and both one of one flesh, a man shall leave his father and his mother, then there should be yet greater affection between brothers and sisters, for these come of the same parents, but man and wife of different. But this is saying too much, because the ordinance of God is of more force than the law of nature. For God’s precepts are not subject to the law of nature, but nature bends to the precepts of God. Also brethren are born of one, that they should seek out different roads; but the man and the wife are born of different persons, that they should coalesce in one. The order of nature also follows the appointment of God. For as is the sap in trees, so is affection in man. The sap ascends from the roots into the leaves, and passes forth into the seed. Therefore parents love their children, but are not so loved of them, for the desire of a man is not towards his parents, but towards the sons whom he has begot; and this is what is said, Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife.

CHRYSOSTOM. See the wisdom of the Teacher. Being asked, Is it lawful, He said not straight, It is not lawful, lest they should be troubled, but establishes it through a proof. For God made them from the beginning male and female, and not merely joined them together, but bade them quit father and mother; and not bade the husband merely approach his wife, but be joined to her, shewing by this manner of speaking the inseparable bond. He even added a still closer union, saying, And they twain shall be one flesh.

AUGUSTINE. (Gen. ad lit. ix. 19.) Whereas Scripture witnesses that these words were said by the first man, and the Lord here declares that God spake them, hence we should understand that by reason of the ecstasy which had passed upon Adam, he was enabled to speak this as a prophecy.

REMIGIUS. The Apostle says that this is a mystery in Christ and the Church (Eph. 5:32.); for the Lord Jesus Christ left His Father when He came down from heaven to earth; and He left His mother, that is, the synagogue, because of its unbelief, and clave unto His wife, that is, the Holy Church, and they two are one flesh, that is, Christ and the Church are one body.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He had brought forward the words and facts of the old law, He then interprets it with authority, and lays down a law, saying, Therefore they are no more twain, but one flesh. For as those who love one another spiritually are said to be one soul, And all they that believed had one heart and one soul, (Acts 4:32.) so husband and wife who love each other after the flesh, are said to be one flesh. And as it is a wretched thing to cut the flesh, so is it an unjust thing to put away a wife.

AUGUSTINE. (Civ. Dei, xiv. 22.) For they are called one, either from their union, or from the derivation of the woman, who was taken out of the side of the man.

CHRYSOSTOM. He brings in God yet again, saying, What God has joined, let no man put asunder, shewing that it is against both nature and God’s law to put away a wife; against nature, because one flesh is therein divided; against law, because God has joined and forbidden to sunder them.

JEROME. God has joined by making man and woman one flesh; this then man may not put asunder, but God only. Man puts asunder, when from desire of a second wife the first is put away; God puts asunder, who also had joined, when by consent for the service of God we so have our wives as though we had them not. (1 Cor. 7:29.)

AUGUSTINE. (Cont. Faust. xix. 29.) Behold now out of the books of Moses it is proved to the Jews that a wife may not be put away. For they thought that they were doing according to the purport of Moses’ law when they did put them away. This also we learn hence by the testimony of Christ Himself, that it was God who made it thus, and joined them male and female; which when the Manichæans deny, they are condemned, resisting the Gospel of Christ.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This sentence of chastity seemed hard to these adulterers; but they could not make answer to the argument. Howbeit, they will not submit to the truth, but betake themselves for shelter to Moses, as men having a bad cause fly to some powerful personage, that where justice is not, his countenance may prevail; They say unto him, Why did Moses then command to give a writing of divorcement, and to put her away?

JEROME. Here they reveal the cavil which they had prepared; albeit the Lord had not given sentence of Himself, but had recalled to their minds ancient history, and the commands of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Had the Lord been opposed to the Old Testament, He would not thus have contended in Moses' behalf, nor have gone about to shew that what was his was in agreement with the things of old. But the unspeakable wisdom of Christ made answer and excuse for these in this manner, He saith unto them, Moses for the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives. By this He clears Moses from their charge, and retorts it all upon their own head.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For how great was that hardness! When not even the intervention of a bill of divorce, which gave room for just and prudent men to endeavour to dissuade, could move them to renew the conjugal affection. And with what wit do the Manichæans blame Moses, as severing wedlock by a bill of divorce, and commend Christ as, on the contrary, confirming its force? Whereas according to their impious science they should have praised Moses for putting asunder what the devil had joined, and found fault with Christ who riveted the bonds of the devil.

CHRYSOSTOM. At last, because what He had said was severe, He goes back to the old law, saying, From the beginning it was not so.

JEROME. What He says is to this purpose. Is it possible that God should so contradict Himself, as to command one thing at first, and after defeat His own ordinance by a new statute? Think not so; but, whereas Moses saw that through desire of second wives who should be richer, younger, or fairer, that the first were put to death, or treated ill, he chose rather to suffer separation, than the continuance of hatred and assassination. Observe moreover that He said not God suffered you, but, Moses; shewing that it was, as the Apostle speaks, a counsel of man, not a command of God. (1 Cor. 7:12.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Therefore said He well, Moses suffered, not commanded. For what we command, that we ever wish; but when we suffer, we yield against our will, because we have not the power to put full restraint upon the evil wills of men. He therefore suffered you to do evil that you might not do worse; thus in suffering this he was not enforcing the righteousness of God, but taking away its sinfulness from a sin; that while you did it according to His law, your sin should not appear sin.

19:9

9. And I say unto you, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another, committeth adultery: and whoso marrieth her which is put away doth commit adultery.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having stopped their mouths, He now set forth the Law with authority, saying, But I say unto you, that whosoever shall put away his wife, except for fornication, and marrieth another, committeth adultery.

ORIGEN. Perhaps some one will say, that Jesus in thus speaking, suffered wives to be put away for the same cause that Moses suffered them, which He says was for the hardness of the hearts of the Jews. But to this it is to be answered, that if by the Law an adulteress is stoned, that sin is not to be understood as the shameful thing for which Moses suffers a writing of divorcement; (Deut. 24:1.) for in a cause of adultery it was not lawful to give a writing of divorcement. But Moses perhaps calls every sin in a woman a shameful thing, which if it be found in her, a bill of divorcement is written against her. But we should enquire, If it is lawful to put away a wife for the cause of fornication only, what is it if a woman be not an adulteress, but have done any other heinous crime; have been found a poisoner, or to have murdered her children? The Lord has explained this matter in another place, saying, Whoso putteth her away, except for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery, (Mat. 5:32.) giving her an opportunity of a second marriage.

JEROME. It is fornication alone which destroys the relationship of the wife; for when she has divided one flesh into two, and has separated herself by fornication from her husband, she is not to be retained, lest she should bring her husband also under the curse, which Scripture has spoken, He that keepeth an adulteress is a fool and wicked. (Prov. 18:23.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For as he is cruel and unjust that puts away a chaste wife, so is he a fool and unjust that retains an unchaste; for in that he hides the guilt of his wife, he is an encourager of foulness.

AUGUSTINE. (De Conjug. Adult. ii. 9.) For a reunion of the wedlock, even after actual commission of adultery, is neither shameful nor difficult, where there is an undoubted remission of sin through the keys of the kingdom of heaven; not that after being divorced from her husband an adulteress should be called back again, but that after her union with Christ she should no longer be called an adulteress.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For every thing by whatsoever causes it is created, by the same is it destroyed. It is not matrimony but the will that makes the union; and therefore it is not a separation of bodies but a separation of wills that dissolves it. He then who puts away his wife and does not take another is still her husband; for though their bodies be not united, their wills are united. But when he takes another, then he manifestly puts his wife away; wherefore the Lord says not, Whoso putteth away his wife, but, Whoso marrieth another, committeth adultery.

RABANUS. There is then but one carnal cause why a wife should be put away, that is, fornication, and but one spiritual, that is, the fear of God. But there is no cause why while she who has been put away is alive, another should be married.

JEROME. For it might be that a man might falsely charge an innocent wife, and for the sake of another woman might fasten an accusation upon her. Therefore it is commanded so to put away the first, that a second be not married while the first is yet alive. Also because it might happen that by the same law a wife would divorce her husband, it is also provided that she take not another husband; and because one who had become an adulteress would have no further fear of disgrace, it is commanded that she many not another husband. But if she do marry another, she is in the guilt of adultery; wherefore it follows, And whoso marrieth her that is put away, committeth adultery.

GLOSS. (ord.) He says this to the terror of him that would take her to wife, for the adulteress would have no fear of disgrace.

19:10–12

10. His disciples say unto him, If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry.

11. But he said unto them, All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given.

12. For there are some eunuchs, which were so born from their mother's womb: and there are some eunuchs, which were made eunuchs of men: and there be eunuchs, which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it.

JEROME. A wife is a grievous burden, if it is not permitted to put her away except for the cause of fornication. For what if she be a drunkard, an evil temper, or of evil habits, is she to be kept? The Apostles, perceiving this burden someness, express what they feel; His disciples say unto him, If the case of the man be so with his wife, it is not good to marry.

CHRYSOSTOM. For it is a lighter thing to contend with himself, and his own lust, than with an evil woman.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And the Lord said not, It is good, but rather assented that it is not good. However, He considered the weakness of the flesh; But he said unto them, All cannot receive this saying; that is, All are not able to do this.

JEROME. But let none think, that wherein He adds, save they to whom it is given, that either fate or fortune is implied, as though they were virgins only whom chance has led to such a fortune. For that is given to those who have sought it of God, who have longed for it, who have striven that they might obtain it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But all cannot obtain it, because all do not desire to obtain it. The prize is before them; he who desires the honour will not consider the toil. None would ever vanquish, if all shunned the struggle. Because then some have fallen from their purpose of continence, we ought not therefore to faint from that virtue; for they that fall in the battle do not slay the rest. That He says therefore, Save they to whom it is given, shews that unless we receive the aid of grace, we have not strength. But this aid of grace is not denied to such as seek it, for the Lord says above, Ask, and ye shall receive.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then to shew that this is possible, He says, For there are some eunuchs, which were made eunuchs of men; as much as to say, Consider, had you been so made of others, you would have lost the pleasure without gaining the reward.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For as the deed without the will does not constitute a sin; so a righteous act is not in the deed unless the will go with it. That therefore is honourable continence, not which mutilation of body of necessity enforces, but which the will of holy purpose embraces.

JEROME. He speaks of three kinds of eunuchs, of whom two are carnal, and one spiritual. One, those who are so born of their mother's womb; another, those whom enemies or courtly luxury has made so; a third, those who have made themselves so for the kingdom of heaven, and who might have been men, but become eunuchs for Christ. To them the reward is promised, for to the others whose continence was involuntary, nothing is due.

HILARY. The cause in one item he assigns nature; in the next violence, and in the last his own choice, in him, namely, that determined to be so from hope of the kingdom of heaven.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For they are born such, just as others are born having six or four fingers. For if God according as He formed our bodies in the beginning, had continued the same order unchangeably, the working of God would have been brought into oblivion among men. The order of nature is therefore changed at times from its nature, that God the framer of nature may be had in remembrance.

JEROME. (cf. Orig. in loc.) Or we may say otherwise. The eunuchs from their mothers' wombs are they whose nature is colder, and not prone to lust. And they that are made so of men are they whom physicians made so, or they whom worship of idols has made effeminate, or who from the influence of heretical teaching pretend to chastity, that they may thereupon claim truth for their tenets. But none of them obtain the kingdom of heaven, save he only who has become a eunuch for Christ's sake. Whence it follows, He that is able to receive it, let him receive it; let each calculate his own strength, whether he is able to fulfil the rules of virginity and abstinence. For in itself continence is sweet and alluring, but each man must consider his strength, that he only that is able may receive it. This is the voice of the Lord exhorting and encouraging on His soldiers to the reward of chastity, that he who can fight might fight and conquer and triumph.

CHRYSOSTOM. When he says, Who have made themselves eunuchs, He does not mean cutting off of members, but a putting away of evil thoughts. For he that cuts off a limb is under a curse, for such an one undertakes the deeds of murderers, and opens a door to Manicheans who depreciate the creature, and cut off the same members as do the Gentiles. For to cut off members is of the temptation of dæmons. But by the means of which we have spoken desire is not diminished but made more urgent; for it has its source elsewhere, and chiefly in a weak purpose and an unguarded heart, For if the heart be well governed, there is no danger from the natural motions; nor does the amputation of a member bring such peacefulness and immunity from temptation as does a bridle upon the thoughts.

19:13–15

13. Then were there brought unto him little children, that he should put his hands on them, and pray: and the disciples rebuked them.

14. But Jesus said, Suffer little children, and forbid them not, to come unto me: for of such is the kingdom of heaven.

15. And he laid his hands on them, and departed thence.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had been holding discourse of chastity; and some of His hearers now brought unto Him infants, who in respect of chastity are the purest; for they supposed that it was the pure in body only whom He had approved; and this is that which is said, Then were brought unto him little children, that he should put his hands on them, and pray.

ORIGEN. For they now understood from His previous mighty works, that by laying on of His hands and by prayer evils were obviated. They bring therefore children to Him, judging that it were impossible that after the Lord had by His touch conveyed divine virtue into them, harm or any demon should come nigh them.

REMIGIUS. For it was a custom among the ancients that little children should be brought to aged persons, to receive benediction by their hand or tongue, and according to this custom little children are now brought to the Lord.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The flesh as it delights not in good, if it hear any good readily forgets it; but the evil that it has it retains ever. But a little while before Christ took a little child and said, Except ye become as this child, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven, (Matt. 18:3.) yet His disciples, presently forgetting this innocence of children, now forbid children, as unworthy to come to Christ.

JEROME. Not because they liked not that they should have benediction of the Saviour's hand and mouth; but forasmuch as their faith was not yet perfect, they thought that He like other men would be wearied by the applications of those that brought them.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or the disciples would have thrust them away, from respect to Christ's dignity1. But the Lord teaching them holy thoughts, and to subdue the pride of this world, took the children into His arms, and promised to such the kingdom of heaven; But Jesus saith unto them, Suffer little children and forbid them not to come unto me, for of such is the kingdom of heaven.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For who were worthy to come to Christ, if simple infancy were thrust away? Therefore he said, Forbid them not. For if they shall turn out saints, why hinder ye the sons from coming to their Father? And if sinners, why do ye pronounce a sentence of condemnation, before you see any fault in them?

JEROME. And He said distinctly, Of such is the kingdom of heaven, not Of these, to shew that it was not years, but disposition that determined His judgment, and that the reward was promised to such as had like innocence and simplicity.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The present passage instructs all parents to bring their children to the priests, for it is not the priest who lays his hands on them, but Christ, in whose name hands are laid. For if he that offers his food in prayer to God eats it sanctified, for it is sanctified by the word of God, and by prayer, as the Apostle speaks, how much rather ought children to be offered to God, and sanctified? (1 Tim. 4:5.) And this is the reason of blessing of food, Because the whole world lieth in wickedness; (1 John 5:19.) so that all things that have body, which are a great part of the world, lie in wickedness. Consequently infants when born, are as respects their flesh lying in wickedness.

ORIGEN. Mystically; We call them children who are yet carnal in Christ, having need of milk. They who bring the babes to the Saviour, are they who profess to have knowledge of the word, but are still simple, and have for their food children’s lessons, being yet novices. They who seem more perfect, and are therefore the disciples of Jesus, before they have learnt the way of righteousness which is for children, rebuke those who by simple doctrine bring to Christ children and babes, that is, such as are less learned. But the Lord exhorting His disciples now become men to condescend to the needs of babes, to be babes to babes, that they may gain babes, says, For of such is the kingdom of heaven. For He Himself also, when He was in the form of God, was made a babe. These things we should attend to, lest in esteeming that more excellent wisdom, and spiritual advancement, as though we were become great we should despise the little ones of the Church, forbidding children to be brought to Jesus. But since children cannot follow all things that are commanded them, Jesus laid His hands upon them, and leaving virtue in them by His touch, went away from them, seeing they were not able to follow Him, like the other more perfect disciples.

REMIGIUS. Also laying His hands upon them, He blessed them, to signify that the lowly in spirit are worthy His grace and blessing.

GLOSS. (non occ.) He laid His hands upon them while men held them, to signify that the grace of His aid was necessary.

HILARY. The infants are a type of the Gentiles, to whom salvation is rendered by faith and hearing. But the disciples, in their first zeal for the salvation of Israel, forbid them to approach, but the Lord declares that they are not to be forbidden. For the gift of the Holy Ghost was to be conferred upon the Gentiles by laying on of hands, as soon as the Law had ceased.

19:16–22

16. And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life?

17. And he said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.

18. He saith unto him, Which? Jesus said, Thou shalt do no murder, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not bear false witness,

19. Honour thy father and thy mother: and, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

20. The young man saith unto him, All these things have I kept from my youth up: what lack I yet?

21. Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me.

22. But when the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions.

RABANUS. (e Bed. in Luc. Mat. 18:3.) This man had, it may be, heard of the Lord, that only they who were like to little children were worthy to enter into the heavenly kingdom; but desiring to know more certainly, he asks to have it declared to him not in parables, but expressly, by what merits he might attain eternal life. Therefore it is said And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?

JEROME. He that asks this question is both young, rich, and proud, and he asks not as one that desires to learn, but as tempting Him. This we can prove by this, that when the Lord had said unto him, If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments, he further insidiously asks, which are the commandments? as if he could not read them for himself, or as if the Lord could command any thing contrary to them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii.) But I for my part, though I deny not that he was a lover of money, because Christ convicts him as such, cannot consider him to have been a hypocrite, because it is unsafe to decide in uncertain cases, and especially in making charges against any. Moreover Mark removes all suspicion of this kind, for he says that he came to Him, and knelt before Him; (Mark 10:17.) and that Jesus when He looked on him, loved him. And if he had come to tempt Him, the Evangelist would have signified as much, as he has done in other places. Or if he had said nothing thereof, Christ would not have suffered him to be hid, but would either have convicted him openly, or have covertly suggested it. But He does not this; for it follows, He saith unto him, Why askest thou me concerning good?

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 63.) This may seem a discrepancy, that Matthew here gives it, Why askest thou me concerning good? whereas

Mark and Luke have, Why callest thou me good? For this, Why askest thou me concerning good? may seem rather to be referred to his question, What good thing shall I do? for in that he both mentioned good, and asked a question. But this, Good Master, is not yet a question. Either sentence may be understood thus very appropriately to the passage.

JEROME. But because he had styled Him Good Master, and had not confessed Him as God, or as the Son of God, He tells him, that in comparison of God there is no saint to be called good, of whom it is said, Confess unto the Lord, for he is good; (Ps. 118:1.) and therefore He says, There is one good, that is, God. But that none should suppose that by this the Son of God is excluded from being good, we read in another place, The good Shepherd layeth down his life for his sheep. (John 10:11.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. 13.) Or, because he sought eternal life, (and eternal life consists in such contemplation in which God is beheld not for punishment, but for everlasting joy,) and knew not with whom he spake, but thought Him only a Son of Man, therefore He says, Why askest thou me concerning good, calling me in respect of what you see in me, Good Master? This form of the Son of Man shall appear in the judgment, not to the righteous only, but to the wicked, and the very sight shall be to them an evil, and their punishment. But there is a sight of My form, in which I am equal to God. That one God therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is alone good, because none see Him to mourning and sorrow, but only to salvation and true joy.

JEROME. For Our Saviour does not reject this witness to His goodness, but corrected the error of calling Him Good Master apart from God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Wherein then was the profit that He answered thus? He leads him by degrees, and teaches him to lay aside false flattery, and rising above the things which are upon earth to cleave to God, to seek things to come, and to know Him that is truly good, the root and source of every good.

ORIGEN. Christ also answers thus, because of that He said, What good thing shall I do? For when we depart from evil and do good, that which we do is called good by comparison with what other men do. But when compared with absolute good, in the sense in which it is here said, There is one good, our good is not good. But some one may say, that because the Lord knew that the purpose of him who thus asked Him was not even to do such good as man can do, that therefore He said, Why askest thou me concerning good? as much as to say, Why do you ask me concerning good, seeing you are not prepared to do what is good. But after this He says, If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. Where note, that He speaks to him as yet standing without life; for that man is in one sense without life, who is without Him who said, I am the life. Otherwise, every man upon earth may be, not in life itself, but only in its shadow, while he is clad in a body of death. But any man shall enter into life, if he keep himself from dead works, and seek living works. But there are dead words and living words, also dead thoughts and living thoughts, and therefore He says, If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 84, 1.) And He said not, If thou desirest life eternal; but, If thou wilt enter into life, calling that simply life, which shall be everlasting. Here we should consider how eternal life should be loved, when this miserable and finite life is so loved.

REMIGIUS. These words prove that the Law gave to such as kept it not only temporal promises, but also life eternal. And because the hearing these things made him thoughtful, He saith unto him, Which?

CHRYSOSTOM. This he said not to tempt Him, but because he supposed that they were other than the commandments of the Law, which should be the means of life to him.

REMIGIUS. And Jesus, condescending as to a weak one, most graciously set out to him the precepts of the Law; Jesus said, Thou shalt do no murder; and of all these precepts follows the exposition, And thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. For the Apostle says, Whoso loveth his neighbour has fulfilled the Law? (Prov. 13:10.) But it should be enquired, why the Lord has enumerated only the precepts of the Second Table? Perhaps because this young man was zealous in the love of God, or because love of our neighbour is the step by which we ascend to the love of God.

ORIGEN. Or perhaps these precepts are enough to introduce one, if I may say so, to the entrance of life; but neither these, nor any like them, are enough to conduct one to the more inward parts of life. But whoso transgresses one of these commandments, shall not even come to the entrance in unto life.

CHRYSOSTOM. But because all the commandments that the Lord had recounted were contained in the Law, The young man saith unto him. All these have I kept from my youth up. And did not even rest there, but asked further, What lack I yet? which alone is a mark of his intense desire.

REMIGIUS. But to those who would be perfect in grace, He shews how they may come to perfection, Jesus saith unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go, and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor. Mark the words; He said not, Go, and consume all thou hast; but Go, and sell; and not some, as did Ananias and Sapphira, but All. And well He added, that thou hast, for what we have are our lawful possessions. Those therefore that he justly possessed were to be sold; what had been gained unjustly were to be restored to those from whom they had been taken. And He said not, Give to thy neighbours, nor to the rich, but to the poor.

AUGUSTINE. (de. Op. Monach. 25.) Nor need it be made a scruple in what monasteries, or to the indigent brethren of what place, any one gives those things that he has, for there is but one commonwealth of all Christians. Therefore wheresoever any Christian has laid out his goods, in all places alike he shall receive what is necessary for himself, shall receive it of that which is Christ's.

RABANUS. See two kinds of life which we have heard set before men; the Active, to which pertains, Thou shalt not kill, and the rest of the Law; and the Contemplative, to which pertains this, If thou wilt be perfect. The active pertains to the Law, the contemplative to the Gospel; for as the Old Testament went before the New, so good action goes before contemplation.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. v. 9.) Nor are such only partakers in the kingdom of heaven, who, to the end they may be perfect, sell or part with all that they have; but in these Christian ranks are numbered by reason of a certain communication of their charity a multitude of hired troops; those to whom it shall be said in the end, I was hungry, and ye gave me to eat; (Mat. 25:35.) whom be it far from us to consider excluded from life eternal, as they who obey not the commands of the Gospel.

JEROME. (cont. Vigilant. 15.) That Vigilantius asserts that they who retain the use of their property, and from time to time divide their incomes among the poor, do better than they who sell their possessions and lavish them in one act of charity, to him, not I, but God shall make answer, If thou wilt be perfect, Go and sell. That which you so extol, is but the second or third grade; which we indeed admit, only remembering that what is first is to be set before what is third or second.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Gennadius, de Eccles. Dogm. 36.) It is good to distribute with discrimination to the poor; it is better, with resolve of following the Lord, to strip one's self of all at once, and freed from anxiety to suffer want with Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. And because He spake of riches warning us to strip ourselves of them, He promises to repay things greater, by how much heaven is greater than earth, and therefore He says, And thou shalt have treasure in heaven. By the word treasure He denotes the abundance and endurance of the reward.

ORIGEN. If every commandment is fulfilled in this one word, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, and if he is perfect who has fulfilled every command, how is it that the Lord said to the young man, If thou wilt be perfect, when he had declared, All these have I kept from my youth up. Perhaps that he says, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, was not said by the Lord, but added by some one, for neither Mark nor Luke have given it in this place. Or otherwise; It is written in the Gospela according to the Hebrews, that, when the Lord said, Go, and sell all that thou hast, the rich man began to scratch his head, being displeased with the saying. Then the Lord said unto him, How sayest thou, I have kept the Law, and the Prophets, since it is written in the Law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself? For how many of thy brethren sons of Abraham, clothed in filth, perish for hunger? Thy house is full of many good things, and nothing goes thereout to them. The Lord then, desiring to convict this rich man, says to him, If thou will be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor; for so it will be seen if thou dost indeed love thy neighbour as thyself. But if he is perfect who has all the virtues, how does he become perfect who sells all that he has and gives to the poor? For suppose one to have done this, will he thereby become forthwith free from anger, desire, having every virtue, and abandoning all vice? Perhaps wisdom may suggest, that he that has given his goods to the poor, is aided by their prayers, receiving of their spiritual abundance to his want, and is made in this way perfect, though he may have some human passions. Or thus; He that thus exchanged his riches for poverty, in order that he might become perfect, shall have assistance to become wise in Christ, just, chaste also, and devoid of all passion; but not so as that in the moment when he gave up all his goods, he should forthwith become perfect; but only that from that day forward the contemplation of God will begin to bring him to all virtues. Or again, it will pass into a moral exposition, and say, that the possessions of a man are the acts of his mind. Christ then bids a man to sell all his evil possessions, and as it were to give them over to the virtues which should work the same, which were poor in all that is good. For as the peace of the Apostles returns to them again, (Mat. 10:13.) unless there be a son of peace, so all sins return upon their actors, when one will no longer indulge his evil propensities; and thus there can be no doubt that he will straightway become perfect who in this sense sells all his possessions. It is manifest that he that does these things, has treasure in heaven, and is himself become of heaven; and he will have in heaven treasure of God's glory, and riches in all God's wisdom. Such an one will be able to follow Christ, for he has no evil possession to draw him off from so following

JEROME. For many who leave their riches do not therefore follow the Lord; and it is not sufficient for perfection that they despise money, unless they also follow the Saviour, that unless having forsaken evil, they also do what is good. For it is easier to contemn the hoard than quit the propensityb; therefore it follows, And come and follow me; for he follows the Lord who is his imitator, and who walks in his steps. It follows, And when the young man had heard these words, he went away sorrowful. This is the sorrow that leads to death. And the cause of his sorrow is added, for he had great possessions, thorns, that is, and briars, which choked the holy leaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. For they that have little, and they that abound, are not in like measure encumbered. For the acquisition of riches raises a greater flame, and desire is more violently kindled.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 31, 5.) I know not how, but in the love of worldly superfluities, it is what we have already got, rather than what we desire to get, that most strictly enthrals us. For whence went this young man away sorrowful, but that he had great possessions? It is one thing to lay aside thoughts of further acquisition, and another to strip ourselves of what we have already made our own; one is only rejecting what is not ours, the other is like parting with one of our own limbs.

ORIGEN. But historically, the young man is to be praised for that he did not kill, did not commit adultery; but is to be blamed for that he sorrowed at Christ's words calling him to perfection. He was young indeed in soul, and therefore leaving Christ, he went his way.

23. Then said Jesus unto his disciples, Verily I say unto you, That a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven.

24. And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.

25. When his disciples heard it, they were exceedingly amazed, saying, Who then can be saved?

26. But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The Lord took occasion from this rich man to hold discourse concerning the covetous; Then said Jesus unto his disciples, Verily I say unto you, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. What He spoke was not condemning riches in themselves, but those who were enslaved by them; also encouraging His disciples that being poor they should not be ashamed by reason of their poverty.

HILARY. To have riches is no sin; but moderation is to be observed in our havings. For how shall we communicate to the necessities of the saints, if we have not out of what we may communicate?

RABANUS. But though there be a difference between having and loving riches, yet it is safer neither to have nor to love them.

REMIGIUS. Whence in Mark the Lord expounding the meaning of this saying, speaks thus, It is hard for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of heaven (Mark 10:24.) They trust in riches, who build all their hopes on them.

JEROME. Because riches once gained are hard to be despised, He saith not it is impossible, but it is hard. Difficulty does not imply the impossibility, but points out the infrequency of the occurrence.

HILARY. It is a dangerous toil to become rich; and guiltlessness occupied in increasing its wealth has taken upon itself a sore burden; the servant of God gains not the things of the world, clear of the sins of the world. Hence is the difficulty of entering the kingdom of heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having said that it was hard for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven, He now proceeds to shew that it is impossible, And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven, (Is. 60:6.)

JEROME. According to this, no rich man can be saved. But if we read Isaiah, how the camels of Midian and Ephah came to Jerusalem with gifts and presents, and they who once were crooked and bowed down by the weight of their sins, enter the gates of Jerusalem, we shall see how these camels, to which the rich are likened when they have laid aside the heavy load of sins, and the distortion of their whole bodies, may then enter by that narrow and strait way that leads to life.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Gentile souls are likened to the deformed body of the camel, in which is seen the humpback of idolatry; for the knowledge of God is the exaltation of the soul. The needle is the Son of God, the fine point of which is His divinity, and the thicker part what He is according to His incarnation. But it is altogether straight and without turning; and through the womb of His passion, the Gentiles have entered into life eternal. By this needle is sewn the robe of immortality; it is this needle that has sewn the flesh to the spirit, that has joined together the Jews and the Gentiles, and coupled man in friendship with angels. It is easier therefore for the Gentiles to pass through the needle's eye, than for the rich Jews to enter into the kingdom of heaven. For if the Gentiles are with such difficulty withdrawn from the irrational worship of idols, how much more hardly shall the Jews be withdrawn from the reasonable service of God?

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) It is explained otherwise; That at Jerusalem there was a certain gate, called, The needle's eye, through which a camel could not pass, but on its bended knees, and after its burden had been taken off; and so the rich should not be able to pass along the narrow way that leads to life, till he had put off the burden of sin, and of riches, that is, by ceasing to love them.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxv. 16.) Or, by the rich man He intends any one who is proud, by the camel he denotes the right humility. The camel passed through the needle's eye, when our Redeemer through the narrow way of suffering entered in to the taking upon Him death; for that passion was as a needle which pricked the body with pain. But the camel enters the needle's eye easier than the rich man enters the kingdom of heaven; because if He had not first shewn us by His passion the form of His humility, our proud stiffness would never have bent itself to His lowliness.

CHRYSOSTOM. The disciples though poor are troubled for the salvation of others, beginning even now to have the bowels of doctors.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. 1, 26.) Whereas the rich are few in comparison of the multitude of the poor, we must suppose that the disciples understood all who wish for riches, as included in the number of the rich.

CHRYSOSTOM. This therefore He proceeds to shew is the work of God, there needing much grace to guide a man in the midst of riches; But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible. By the word beheld them, the Evangelist conveys that He soothed their troubled soul by His merciful eye.

REMIGIUS. This must not be so understood as though it were possible for God to cause that the rich, the covetous, the avaricious, and the proud should enter into the kingdom of heaven; but to cause him to be converted, and so enter.

CHRYSOSTOM. And this is not said that you should sit supinely, and let alone what may seem impossibilities; but considering the greatness of righteousness, you should strive to enter in with entreaty to God.

19:27–30

27. Then answered Peter and said unto him, Behold, we have forsaken all, and followed thee; what shall we have therefore?

28. And Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, That ye which have followed me, in the regeneration when the Son of man shall sit in the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

29. And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name’s sake, shall receive an hundred fold, and shall inherit everlasting life.

30. But many that are first shall be last; and the last shall be first.

ORIGEN. Peter had heard the word of Christ when He said, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast. Then he observed that the young man had departed sorrowful, and considered the difficulty of riches entering into the kingdom of heaven; and thereupon he put this question confidently as one who had achieved no easy matter. For though what he with his brother had left behind them were but little things, yet were they not esteemed as little with God, who considered that out of the fulness of their love they had so forsaken those least things, as they would have forsaken the greatest things if they had had them. So Peter, thinking rather of his will than of the intrinsic value of the sacrifice, asked Him confidently, Behold, we have left all.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv.) What was this all, O blessed Peter? The reeds, your net, and boat. But this he says, not to call to mind his own magnanimity, but in order to propose the case of the multitude of poor. A poor man might have said, If I have nought, I cannot become perfect. Peter therefore puts this question that you, poor man, may learn that you are in nothing behind. For he had already received the kingdom of heaven, and therefore secure of what was already there, he now asks for the whole world. And see how carefully he frames his question after Christ's requirements: Christ required two things of a rich man, to give what he had to the poor, and to follow Him; wherefore he adds, and have followed thee.

ORIGEN. It may be said, In all things which the Father revealed to Peter that the Son was, righteousness, sanctification, and the like, in all we have followed Thee. Therefore as a victorious athlete, he now asks what are the prizes of his contest.

JEROME. Because to forsake is not enough, he adds that which makes perfection, and have followed thee. We have done what thou commandedst us, what reward wilt thou then give us? What shall we have?

JEROME. He said not only, Ye who have left all, for this did the philosopher Cratesh, and many other who have despised riches, but added, and have followed me, which is peculiar to the Apostles and believers.

HILARY. The disciples had followed Christ in the regeneration, that is, in the laver of baptism, in the sanctification of faith, for this is that regeneration which the Apostles followed, and which the Law could not bestow.

JEROME. Or it may be constructed thus, Ye which have followed me, shall in the regeneration sit, &c.; that is, when the dead shall rise from corruption incorrupt, you also shall sit on thrones of judges, condemning the twelve tribes of Israel, for that they would not believe when you believed.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xx. 5.) Thus our flesh will be regenerated by incorruption, as our soul also shall be regenerated by faith.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For it would come to pass, that in the day of judgment the Jews would allege, Lord, we knew Thee not to be the Son of God when Thou wast in the flesh. For who can discern a treasure buried in the ground, or the sun when obscured by a cloud? The disciples therefore will then answer, We also were men, and peasants, obscure among the multitude, but you priests and scribes; but in us a right will became as it were a lamp of our ignorance, but your evil will became to you a blinding of your science.

CHRYSOSTOM. He therefore said not the Gentiles and the whole world, but, the tribes of Israel, because the Apostles and the Jews had been brought up under the same laws and customs. So that when the Jews should plead that they could not believe in Christ, because they were hindered by their Law, the disciples will be brought forward, who had the same Law. But some one may say, What great thing is this, when both the Ninevites and the Queen of the South will have the same? He had before and will again promise them the highest rewards; and even now He tacitly conveys something of the same. For of those others He had only said, that they shall sit, and shall condemn this generation; but He now says to the disciples, When the Son of Man shall sit, ye also shall sit. It is clear then that they shall reign with Him, and shall share in that glory; for it is such honour and glory unspeakable that He intends by the thrones. How is this promise fulfilled? Shall Judas sit among them? By no means. For the law was thus ordained of the Lord by Jeremiah the Prophet, I will speak it upon my people, and upon the kingdom, that I may build, and plant it. Bui if it do evil in my sight, then will I repent we of the good which I said I would do to them; (Jer. 18:9.) as much as to say, If they make themselves unworthy of the promise, I will no more perform that I promised. But Judas shewed himself unworthy of the preeminence; wherefore when He gave this promise to His disciples, He did not promise it absolutely, for He said not, Ye shall sit, but, Ye which, have followed me shall sit; at once excluding Judas, and admitting such as should be in after time; for neither was the promise confined to them only, nor yet did it include Judas who had already shewn himself undeserving.

HILARY. Their following Christ in thus exalting the Apostles to twelve thrones to judge the twelve tribes of Israel, associated them in the glory of the twelve Patriarchs.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) From this passage we learn that Jesus will judge with His disciples; whence He says in another place to the Jews, Therefore shall they be your judges. (Mat. 12:27.) And whereas He says they shall sit upon twelve thrones, we need not think that twelve persons only shall judge with Him. For by the number twelve is signified the whole number of those that shall judge; and that because the number seven which generally represents completeness contains the two numbers four and three, which multiplied together make twelve. For if it were not so, as Matthias was elected into the place of the traitor Judas, the Apostle Paul who laboured more than they all should not have place to sit to judge; but he shews that he with the rest of the saints pertains to the number of judges, when he says, Know ye not that we shall judge Angels? (1 Cor. 6:3.)

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 351. 8.) In the number of judges therefore are included all that have left their all and followed the Lord;

GREGORY. (Mor. x. 31.) For whosoever, urged by the spur of divine lore, shall forsake what he possesses here, shall without doubt gain there the eminence of judicial authority; and shall appear as judge with the Judge, for that he now in consideration of the judgment chastens himself by a voluntary poverty.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xx. 5.) The same holds good, by reason of this number twelve, of those that are to be judged. For when it is said, Judging the twelve tribes, yet is not the tribe of Levi, which is the thirteenth, to be exempt from being judged by them; nor shall they judge this nation alone, and not also other nations.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, by that, In the regeneration, Christ designs the period of Christianity that should be after His ascension, in which men were regenerated by baptism; and that is the time in which Christ sate on the throne of His glory. And hereby you may see that He spake not of the time of the judgment to come, but of the calling of the Gentiles, in that He said not, When the Son of Man shall come sitting upon the throne of his majesty; but only, In the regeneration when he shall sit, which was from the time that the Gentiles began to believe on Christ; according to that, God shall reign over the heathen; God sitteth upon his holy throne. (Ps. 47:8.) From that time also the Apostles have sat upon twelve thrones, that is, over all Christians; for every Christian who receives the word of Peter, becomes Peter’s throne, and so of the rest of the

Apostles. On these thrones then the Apostles sit, parcelled into twelve divisions, after the variety of minds and hearts, known to God only. For as the Jewish nation was split into twelve tribes, so is the whole Christian people divided into twelve, so as that some souls are numbered with the tribe of Reuben, and so of the rest, according to their several qualities. For all have not all graces alike, one is excellent in this, another in that. And so the Apostles will judge the twelve tribes of Israel, that is, all the Jews, by this, that the Gentiles received the Apostles' word. The whole body of Christians are indeed twelve thrones for the Apostles, but one throne for Christ. For all excellencies are but one throne for Christ, for He alone is equally perfect in all virtues. But of the Apostles each one is more perfect in some one particuar excellence, as Peter in faith; so Peter tests upon his faith, John on his innocence, and so of the rest. And that Christ spake of reward to be given to the Apostles in this world, is shewn by what follows, And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, &c. For if these shall receive an hundred fold in this life, without doubt to the Apostles also was promised a reward in this present life.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or; He holds out rewards in the future life to the Apostles, because they were already looking above, and desired nothing of things present; but to others. He promises things present.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; Whosoever shall leave all and follow Christ, he also shall receive those things that were promised to Peter. But if he has not left all, but only those things in special here enumerated, he shall receive manifold, and shall possess eternal life.

JEROME. There are that take occasion from this passage to bring forward the thousand years after the resurrection, and say that then we shall have a hundred fold of the things we have given up, and moreover life eternal. But though the promise be in other things worthy, in the matter of wives it seems to have somewhat shameful, if he who has forsaken one wife for the Lord's sake, shall receive a hundred in the world to come. The meaning is therefore, that he that has forsaken earnal things for the Saviour's sake, shall receive spiritual things, which in a comparison of value are as a hundred to a small number.

ORIGEN. And in this world, because for his brethren after the flesh he shall find many brethren in the faith; for parents, all the Bishops and Presbyters; for sons, all that have the age of sons. The Angels also are brethren, and all they are sisters that have offered themselves chaste virgins to Christ, as well they that still continue on earth, as they that now live in heaven. The houses and lands manifold more suppose in the repose of Paradise, and the city of God. And besides all these things they shall possess eternal life.

AUGUSTINE. (De Civ. Dei, xx. 7.) That He says, An hundred fold, is explained by the Apostle, when he says, As having nothing, and yet possessing all things. (2 Cor. 6:10.) For a hundred is sometimes put for the whole universe.

JEROME. And that, And every one that hath forsaken brethren, agrees with that He had said before, I am come to set a man at variance with his father. (Mat. 10:35.) For they who for the faith of Christ and the preaching of the Gospel shall despise all the ties, the riches, and pleasures of this world, they shall receive an hundred fold, and shall possess eternal life.

CHRYSOSTOM. But when He says, He that has forsaken wife, it is not to be taken of actual severing of the marriage tie, but that we should hold the ties of the faith dearer than any other. And here is, I think, a covert allusion to times of persecution; for because there should be many who would draw away their sons to heathenism, when that should happen, they should be held neither as fathers, nor husbands.

RABANUS. But because many with what zeal they take up the pursuit of virtue, do not with the same complete it; but either grow cool, or fall away rapidly; it follows, But many that are first shall be last, and the last first.

ORIGEN. By this He exhorts those that come late to the heavenly word, to haste to ascend to perfection before many whom they see to have grown old in the faith. This sense may also overthrow those that boast to have been educated in Christianity by Christian parents, especially if those parents have filled the Episcopal see, or the office of Priests or Deacons in the Church; and hinder them from desponding who have entertained the Christian doctrines more newly. It has also another meaning, the first, are the Israelites, who become last because of their unbelief; and the Gentiles who were last become first. He is careful to say, Many; for not all who are first shall be last, nor all last first. For before this have many of mankind, who by nature are the last, been made by an angelic life above the Angels; and some Angels who were first have been made last through their sin.

REMIGIUS. It may also be referred in particular to the rich man, who seemed to be first, by his fulfilment of the precepts of the Law, but was made last by his preferring his worldly substance to God. The holy Apostles seemed to be last, but by leaving all they were made first by the grace of humility. There are many who having entered upon good works, fall therefrom, and from having been first, become last.

CHAPTER 20

20:1–16

1. For the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that is an housholder, which went out early in the morning to hire labourers into his vineyard.

2. And when he had agreed with the labourers for a penny a day, he sent them into his vineyard.

3. And he went out about the third hour, and saw others standing idle in the market-place,

4. And said unto them; Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatsoever is right I will give you. And they went their way.

5. Again he went out about the sixth and ninth hour, and did likewise.

6. And about the eleventh hour he went out, and found others standing idle, and saith unto them, Why stand ye here all the day idle?

7. They say unto him, Because no man hath hired us. He saith unto them, Go ye also into the vineyard; and whatsoever is right, that shall ye receive.

8. So when even was come, the lord of the vineyard saith unto his steward, Call the labourers, and give them their hire, beginning from the last unto the first.

9. And when they came that were hired about the eleventh hour, they received every man a penny.

10. But when the first came, they supposed that they should have received more; and they likewise received every man a penny.

11. And when they had received it, they murmured against the goodman of the house,

12. Saying, These last have wrought but one hour, and thou hast made them equal unto us, which have borne the burden and heat of the day.

13. But he answered one of them, and said, Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me for a penny?

14. Take that thine is, and go thy way: I will give unto this last, even as unto thee.

15. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? Is thine eye evil, because I am good?

16. So the last shall be first, and the first last: for many be called, but few chosen.

REMIGIUS. To establish the truth of this saying, There are many first that shall be last, and last first, the Lord subjoins a similitude.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Master of the household is Christ, whose house are the heavens and the earth; and the creatures of the heavens, and the earth, and beneath the earth, His family. His vineyard is righteousness, in which are set divers sorts of righteousness as vines, as meekness, chastity, patience, and the other virtues; all of which are called by one common name righteousness. Men are the cultivators of this vineyard, whence it is said, Who went out early in the morning to hire labourers into his vineyard. For God placed His righteousness in our senses, not for His own but for our benefit. Know then that we are the hired labourers. But as no man gives wages to a labourer, to the end he should do nothing save only to eat, so likewise we were not thereto called by Christ, that we should labour such things only as pertain to our own good, but to the glory of God. And like as the hired labourer looks first to his task, and after to his daily food, so ought we to mind first those things which concern the glory of God, then those which concern our own profit. Also as the hired labourer occupies the whole day in his Lord’s work, and takes but a single hour for his own meal; so ought we to occupy our whole life in the glory of God, taking but a very small portion of it for the uses of this world. And as the hired labourer when he has done no work is ashamed that day to enter the house, and ask his food; how should not you be ashamed to enter the church, and stand before the face of God, when you have done nothing good in the sight of God?

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xix, 1.) Or; The Master of the household, that is, our Maker, has a vineyard, that is, the Church universal, which has borne so many stocks, as many saints as it has put forth from righteous Abel to the very last saint who shall be born in the end of the world. To instruct this His people as for the dressing of a vineyard, the Lord has never ceased to send out His labourers; first by the Patriarchs, next by the teachers of the Law, then by the Prophets, and at the last by the Apostles, He has toiled in the cultivation of His vineyard; though every man, in whatsoever measure or degree he has joined good action with right faith, has been a labourer in the vineyard.

ORIGEN. For the whole of this present life may be called one day, long to us, short compared to the existence of God.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The morning is that age of the world which was from Adam and Noah, and therefore it is said, Who went out early in the morning to hire labourers into his vineyard. The terms of their hiring He adds, And when he had agreed with the labourers for a denarius a day.

ORIGEN. The denarius I suppose here to mean salvation.

REMIGIUS. A denarius was a coin anciently equal to ten sesterces, and bearing the king’s image. Well therefore does the denarius represent the reward of the keeping of the decalogue. And that, Having agreed with them for a denarius a day, is well said, to shew that every man labours in the field of the holy Church in hope of the future reward.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The third hour is the period from Noah to Abraham; of which it is said, And he went out about the third hour; and saw others standing in the market-placeidle.

ORIGEN. The market-place is all that is without the vineyard, that is, without the Church of Christ.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For in this world men live by buying and selling, and gain their support by defrauding each other.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) He that lives to himself, and feeds on the delights of the flesh, is rightly accused as idle, forasmuch as he does not seek the fruit of godly labour.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; The idle are not sinners, for they are called dead. But he is idle who works not the work of God. Do you desire to be not idle? Take not that which is another’s; and give of that which is your own, and you have laboured in the Lord’s vineyard, cultivating the vine of mercy. It follows, And he said unto them, Go ye also into my vineyard. Observe that it is with the first alone that He agrees upon the sum to be given, a denarius; the others are hired on no express stipulation, but What is right I will give you. For the Lord knowing that Adam would fall, and that all should hereafter perish in the deluge, made conditions for him, that he should never say that he therefore neglected righteousness, because he knew not what reward he should have. But with the rest He made no contract, seeing He was prepared to give more than the labourers could hope.

ORIGEN. Or, He did not call upon the labourers of the third hour for a complete task, but left to their own choice, how much they should work. For they might perform in the vineyard work equal to that of those who had wrought since the morning, if they chose to put forth upon their task an operative energy, such as had not yet been exerted.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The sixth hour is that from Abraham to Moses, the ninth that from Moses to the coming of the Lord.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. These two hours are coupled together, because in the sixth and ninth it was that He called the generation of the Jews, and multiplied to publish His testaments among men, whereas the appointed time of salvation now drew nigh.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The eleventh hour is that from the coming of the Lord to the end of the world. The labourer in the morning, at the third, sixth, and ninth hours, denotes the ancient Hebrew people, which in its elect from the very beginning of the world, while it zealously and with right faith served the Lord, ceased not to labour in the husbandry of the vineyard. But at the eleventh the Gentiles are called. For they who through so many ages of the world had neglected to labour for their living, were they who had stood the whole day idle. But consider their answer; They say unto him, Because no man hath hired us; for neither Patriarch nor Prophet had come to them. And what is it to say, No man hath hired us, but to say, None has preached to us the way of life,

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For what is our hiring, and the wages of that hiring? The promise of eternal life; for the Gentiles knew neither God, nor God’s promises.

HILARY. These then are sent into the vineyard, Go ye also into my vineyard.

RABANUS. But when they had rendered their day’s task, at the fitting time for payment, When even was come, that is, when the day of this world was drawing to its close.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Consider, He gives the reward not the next morning, but in the evening. Thus the judgment shall take place while this world is still standing, and each man shall receive that which is due to him. This is on two accounts. First, because the happiness of the world to come is to be itself the reward of righteousness; so the award is made before, and not in that world. Secondly, that sinners may not behold the blessedness of that day, The Lord saith unto his steward, that is, the Son to the Holy Spirit.

GLOSS. (non occ. sed vid. Raban.) Or, if you choose, the Father saith unto the Son; for the Father wrought by the Son, and the Son by the Holy Spirit, not that there is any difference of substance, or majesty.

ORIGEN. Or; The Lord said to his steward, that is, to one of the Angels who was set over the payment of the labourers; or to one of those many guardians, according to what is written, that The heir as long as he is a child is under tutors and governors. (Gal. 4:2.)

REMIGIUS. Or, the Lord Jesus Christ Himself is the master of the household, and also the steward, like as He is the door, and also the keeper of the door. For He Himself will come to judgment, to render to each man according to that he has done. He therefore calls His labourers, and renders to them their wages, so that when they shall be gathered together in the judgment, each man shall receive according to his works.

ORIGEN. But the first labourers having the witness through faith have not received the promise of God, the lord of the household providing some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect. (Heb. 11:40.) And because we have obtained mercy, we hope to receive the reward first, we, that is, who are Christ’s, and after us they that wrought before us; wherefore it is said, Call the labourers, and give them their hire, beginning from the last unto the first.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For we always give more willingly, where we give without return, seeing it is for our own honour that we give. Therefore God in giving reward to all the saints shews himself just; in giving to us, merciful; as the Apostle speaks, That the Gentiles might glorify God for his mercy; (Rom. 16:9.) and thence it is said, Beginning from the last even unto the first. Or surely that God may shew His inestimable mercy, He first rewards the last and more unworthy, and afterwards the first; for of His great mercy He regarded not order of merit.

AUGUSTINE. (de Spir. et Lit. 24.) Or; The lesser are therefore taken as first, because the lesser are to be made rich.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) They get alike a denarius who have wrought since the eleventh hour, (for they sought it with their whole soul,) and who have wrought since the first. They, that is, who were called from the beginning of the world have alike received the reward of eternal happiness, with those who come to the Lord in the end of the world.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And this not with injustice. For he who was born in the first period of the world, lived no longer than the determined time of his life, and what harm was it to him, though the world continued after his leaving it? And they that shall be born towards its close will not live less than the days that are numbered to them. And how does it cut then labour shorter, that the world is speedily ended, when they have accomplished their thread of life before? Moreover it is not of man to be born sooner or later, but of the power of God. Therefore he that is born first cannot claim to himself a higher place, nor ought he to be held in contempt that was born later. And when they had received it, they murmured against the goodman of the house, saying. But if this we have said be true, that both first and last have lived their own time, and neither more nor less; and that each man's death is his consummation, what means this that they say, We have borne the burden and heat of the day? Because to know that the end of the world is at hand is of great force to make us do righteousness. Wherefore Christ in His love to us said, The kingdom of heaven shall draw nigh. (Matt. 4:2.) Whereas it was a weakening of them to know that the duration of the world was to be yet long. So that though they did not indeed live through the whole of time, they seem in a manner to have borne its weight. Or, by the burden of the day is meant the burdensome precepts of the Law; and the heat may be that consuming temptation to error which evil spirits contrived for them, stirring them to imitate the Gentiles; from all which things the Gentiles were exempt, believing on Christ, and by compendiousness of grace being saved completely.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or; To bear the burden and heat of the day, is to be wearied through a life of long duration with the heats of the flesh. But it may be asked, How can they be said to murmur, when they are called to the kingdom of heaven? For none who murmurs shall receive the kingdom, and none who receives that can murmur.

CHRYSOSTOM. But we ought not to pursue through every particular the circumstances of a parable, but enter into its general scope, and seek nothing further. This then is not introduced in order to represent some as moved with envy, but to exhibit the honour that shall be given us as so great as that it might stir the jealousy of others.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or because the old fathers down to the Lord's coming, notwithstanding their righteous lives, were not brought to the kingdom, this murmur is theirs. But we who have come at the eleventh hour, do not murmur after our labours, forasmuch as having come into this world after the coming of the Mediator, we are brought to the kingdom as soon as ever we depart out of the body.

JEROME. Or, all that were called of old envy the Gentiles, and are pained at the grace of the Gospel.

HILARY. And this murmur of the labourers corresponds with the frowardness of this nation, which even in the time of Moses were stiff-necked.

REMIGIUS. By this one to whom his answer is given, may be understood all the believing Jews, whom he calls friends because of their faith.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Their complaint was not that they were defrauded of their rightful recompense, but that the others had received more than they deserved. For the envious have as much pain at others' success as at their own loss. From which it is clear, that envy flows from vain glory. A man is grieved to be second, because he wishes to be first. He removes this feeling of envy by saying, Didst thou not agree with me for a denarius?

JEROME. A denarius bears the figure of the king. You have therefore received the reward which I promised you, that is, my image and likeness; what desirest thou more? And yet it is not that thou shouldest have more, but that another should have less that thou seekest. Take that is thine, and go thy way.

REMIGIUS. That is, take thy reward, and enter into glory. I will give to this last, that is, to the gentile people, according to their deserts, as to thee.

ORIGEN. Perhaps it is to Adam He says, Friend, I do thee no wrong; didst thou not agree with me for a denarius? Take that thine is, and go thy way. Salvation is thine, that is, the denarius. I will give unto this last also as unto thee. A person might not improbably suppose, that this last was the Apostle Paul, who wrought but one hour, and was made equal with all who had been before him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Sanc. Virg. 26.) Because that life eternal shall be equal to all the saints, a denarius is given to all; but forasmuch as in that life eternal the light of merits shall shine diversely, there are with the Father many mansions; so that under this same denarius bestowed unequally one shall not live longer than another, but in the many mansions one shall shine with more splendour than another.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) And because the attainment of this kingdom is of the goodness of His will, it is added, Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own? For it is a foolish complaint of man to murmur against the goodness of God. For complaint is not when a man gives not what he is not bound to give, but if he gives not what he is bound to give; whence it is added, Is thine eye evil because I am good?

REMIGIUS. By the eye is understood his purpose. The Jews had an evil eye, that is, an evil purpose, seeing they were grieved at the salvation of the Gentiles. Whereto this parable pointed, He shews by adding, So the first shall be last, and the last first; and so the Jews of the head are become the tail, and we of the tail are become the head.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; He says the first shall be last, and the last first, not that the last are to be exalted before the first, but that they should be put on an equality, so that the difference of time should make no difference in their station. That He says, For many are called, but few chosen, is not to be taken of the elder saints, but of the Gentiles; for of the Gentiles who were called being many, but few were chosen.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) There be very many come to the faith, yet but few arrive at the heavenly kingdom; many follow God in words, but shun Him in their lives. Whereof spring two things to be thought upon. The first, that none should presume ought concerning himself; for though he be called to the faith, he knows not whether he shall be chosen to the kingdom. Secondly, that none should despair of his neighbour, even though he see him lying in vices; because he knows not the riches of the Divine mercy.

Or otherwise. The morning is our childhood; the third hour may be understood as our youth, the sun as it were mounting to his height is the advance of the heat of age; the sixth hour is manhood, when the sun is steady in his meridian height, representing as it were the maturity of strength; by the ninth is understood old age, in which the sun descends from his vertical height, as our age falls away from the fervour of youth; the eleventh hour is that age which is called decrepit, and doting.

CHRYSOSTOM. That He called not all of them at once, but some in the morning, some at the third hour, and so forth, proceeded from the difference of their minds1. He then called them when they would obey; as He also called the thief when he would obey. Whereas they say, Because no man hath hired us, we ought not to force a sense out of every particular in a parable. Further, it is the labourers and not the Lord who speak thus; for that He, as far as it pertains to Him, calls all men from their earliest years, is shewn in this, He went out early in the morning to hire labourers.

GREGORY. They then who have neglected till extreme old age to live unto God, have stood idle to the eleventh hour, yet even these the master of the household calls, and oftentimes gives them their reward before other, inasmuch as they depart out of the body into the kingdom before those that seemed to be called in their childhood.

ORIGEN. But this, Why stand ye here all the day idle? is not said to such as having begun in the spirit (Gal. 3:3) have been made perfect by the flesh, as inviting them to return again, and to live in the Spirit. This we speak not to dissuade prodigal sons, who have consumed their substance of evangelic doctrine in riotous living, from returning to their father's house; but because they are not like those who sinned in their youth, before they had learnt the things of the faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He says, The first shall be last, and the last first, He alludes secretly to such as were at the first eminent, and afterwards set at nought virtue; and to others who have been reclaimed from wickedness, and have surpassed many. So that this parable was made to quicken the zeal of those who are converted in extreme old age, that they should not suppose that they shall have less than others.

20:17–19

17. And Jesus going up to Jerusalem took the twelve disciples apart in the way, and said unto them,

18. Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man shall be betrayed unto the Chief Priests and unto the Scribes, and they shall condemn him to death,

19. And shall deliver him to the Gentiles to mock, and to scourge, and to crucify him: and the third day he shall rise again.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv.) The Lord leaving Galilee, did not go up straightway to Jerusalem, but first wrought miracles, refuted the pharisees, and taught the disciples concerning perfection of life, and its reward; now when about to go up to Jerusalem, He again speaks to them of His passion.

ORIGEN. Judas was yet among the twelve; for he was perhaps still worthy to hear in private along with the rest the things which his Master should suffer.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For the salvation of men entirely rests upon Christ's death; nor is there any thing for which we are more bound to render thanks to God, than for His death. He imparted the mystery of His death to His disciples for this reason, namely, because the more precious treasure is ever committed to the more worthy vessels. Had the rest heard of the passion of Christ, the men might have been troubled because of the weakness of their faith, and the women because of the tenderness of their nature, which such matters do commonly move to tears.

CHRYSOSTOM. He had indeed told it, and to many, but obscurely, as in that, Destroy this temple; (John 2:19.) and again, There shall no sign be given it but the sign of Jonas the Prophet. (Mat. 12:39.) But now He imparted it clearly to His disciples.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That word Behold, is a word of stress, to bid them lay up in their hearts the memory of this present. He says, We go up; as much as to say, Ye see that I go of My free-will to death. "When then ye shall see Me hang upon the cross, deem not that I am no more than man; for though to be able to die is human; yet to be willing to die is more than human.

ORIGEN. Meditating then of this, we ought to know that often even when there is certain trial to be undergone, we ought to offer ourselves to it. But forasmuch as it was said above, When they persecute you in one city, flee ye to another, (Mat. 10:23.), it belongs to the wise in Christ to judge when the season requires that he shun, and when that he go to meet dangers.

JEROME. He had often told His disciples of His passion, but because it might have slipped out of their recollection by reason of the many things they had heard in the mean while, now when He is going to Jerusalem, and going to take His disciples with Him, He fortifies them against the trial, that they should not be scandalized when the persecution and shame of the Cross should come.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For when sorrow comes at a time we are looking for it, it is found lighter than it would have been, had it taken us by surprise.

CHRYSOSTOM. He forewarns them also in order that they should learn that He comes to His passion wittingly, and willingly. And at the first He had foretold only His death, but now that they are more disciplined, He brings forth yet more, as, They shall deliver him to the Gentiles.

RABANUS. For Judas delivered the Lord to the Jews, and they delivered Him to the Gentiles, that is to Pilate, and the Roman power. To this end the Lord refused to be prosperous in this world, but rather chose to suffer affliction, that He might shew us, who have yielded to delights, through how great bitterness we must needs return; whence it follows, To mock, and to scourge, and to crucify.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xviii. 49.) In His Passion we see what we ought to suffer for the truth, and in His resurrection what we ought to hope in eternity; whence it is said, And shall rise again the third day.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was added, that when they should see the sufferings, they should look for the resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. iv. 3.) For one death, that namely of the Saviour according to the body, was to us a salvation from two deaths, both of soul and body, and His one resurrection gained for us two resurrections. This ratio of two to one springs out of the number three; for one and two are three.

ORIGEN. There is no mention that the disciples either said or did any thing upon hearing of these sufferings that should thus come upon Christ; remembering what the Lord had said to Peter, they were afraid they should have had the like or worse addressed to themselves. And yet there be scribes who suppose that they know the divine writings, who condemn Jesus to death, scourge Him with their tongues, and crucify Him herein, that they seek to take away His doctrine; but He, vanishing for a season, again rises to appear to those who received His word that it could be so.

20:20–23

20. Then came to him the mother of Zebedee’s children with her sons, worshipping him, and desiring a certain thing of him.

21. And he said unto her, What wilt thou? She saith unto him, Grant that these my two sons may sit, the one on thy right hand, and the other on the left, in thy kingdom.

22. But Jesus answered and said, Ye know not what ye ask. Are ye able to drink of the cup that I shall drink of, and to be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with? They say unto him, We are able.

23. And he saith unto them, Ye shall drink indeed of my cup, and be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with: but to sit on my right hand, and on my left, is not mine to give, but it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared of my Father.

JEROME. The Lord having concluded by saying, And shall rise again the third day; the woman thought that after His resurrection He should forthwith reign, and with womanish eagerness grasps at what is present, forgetful of the future.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This mother of the sons of Zebedee is Salome, as her name is given by another Evangelist (Mark 15:40; 16:1.), herself truly peaceful, and the mother of sons of peace. From this place we learn the eminent merit of this woman; not only had her sons left their father, but she had left her husband, and had followed Christ; for He could live without her, but she could not be saved without Christ. Except any will say that between the time of the Apostle’s calling, and the suffering of Christ, Zebedee was dead, and that thus her sex helpless, her age advanced, she was following Christ’s steps; for faith never grows old, and religion feels never weary. Her maternal affection made her bold to ask, whence it is said, She worshipped Him, and desired a certain thing of Him; i. e. she did Him reverence, requesting that what she should ask, should be granted her. It follows, He said unto her, What wouldest thou? He asks not because He knows not, but that by its very statement, the unreasonableness of her petition might be shewn, She saith unto him, Grant that these my two sons may sit.

AUGUSTINE. (Cons. Ev. ii. 64.) What Matthew has here represented as being said by the mother, Mark (Mark 10:35) relates that the two sons of Zebedee spake themselves, when she had presented their wish before the Lord; so that from Mark’s brief notice it should rather seem, that they, and not she, had said that which was said.

CHRYSOSTOM. They saw the disciples honoured before others, and had heard that ye shall sit upon twelve thrones, (Mat. 19:28.) whereupon they sought to have the primacy of that seat. And that others were in greater honour with Christ they knew, and they feared that Peter was preferred before them; wherefore (as is mentioned by another Evangelist) because they were now near to Jerusalem, they thought that the kingdom of God was at the door, that is, was something to be perceived by sense. Whence it is clear that they sought nothing spiritual, and had no conception of a kingdom above.

ORIGEN. For if in an earthly kingdom they are thought to be in honour who sit with the king, no wonder if a woman with womanish simplicity or want of experience conceived that she might ask such things, and that the brethren themselves being not perfect, and having no more lofty thoughts concerning Christ's kingdom, conceived such things concerning those who shall sit with Jesus.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise. We affirm not that this woman's request was a lawful one; but this we affirm, that it was not earthly things, but heavenly things that she asked for her sons. For she felt not as ordinary mothers, whose affection is to the bodies of their children, while they neglect their minds; they desire that they should prosper in this world, not caring what they shall suffer in the next, thereby shewing themselves to be mothers of their bodies only, but not of their souls. And I imagine that these brethren, having heard the Lord prophesying of His passion and resurrection, began to say among themselves, seeing they believed; Behold, the King of heaven is going down to the realms of Tartarus, that He may destroy the king of death. But when the victory shall be completed, what remains but that the glory of the kingdom shall follow?

ORIGEN. For when sin is destroyed, which reigned in men's mortal bodies, with the entire dynasty of malignant powers, Christ shall receive exaltation of His kingdom among men; that is, His sitting on the throne of His glory. That God disposes all things both on His right hand and on His left, this is that there shall be then no more evil in His presence. They that are the more excellent among such as draw near to Christ, are they on His right hand; they that are inferior, are they on His left hand. Or by Christ's right hand look if you may understand the invisible creation; by His left hand the visible and bodily. For of those who are brought nigh to Christ, some obtain a place on His right hand, as the intelligent, some on His left hand, as the sentient creation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He that gave Himself to man, how shall He not give them the fellowship of His kingdom? The supineness of the petitioner is in fault, where the graciousness of the giver is undoubted. But if we ourselves ask our master, perchance we wound the hearts of the rest of our brethren, who though they can no longer be overcome by the flesh, seeing they are now spiritual, may yet be wounded as carnal. Let us therefore put forward our mother, that she may make her petition for us in her own person. For though she be to be blamed therein, yet she will readily obtain forgiveness, her sex pleading for her. For the Lord Himself, who has filled the souls of mothers with affection to their offspring, will more readily listen to their desires. Then the Lord, who knows secrets, makes answer not to the words of the mother’s petition, but to the design of the sons who suggested it. Their wish was commendable, but their request inconsiderate; therefore, though it was not right that it should be granted to them, yet the simplicity of their petition did not deserve a harsh rebuke, forasmuch as it proceeded of love of the Lord. Wherefore it is their ignorance that the Lord finds fault with; Jesus answered and said unto them, Ye know not what ye ask.

JEROME. And no wonder, if she is convicted of inexperience, seeing it is said of Peter, Not knowing what he said. (Luke 9:33.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For ofttimes the Lord suffers His disciples either to do or to think somewhat amiss, that from their error He may take occasion to set forth a rule of piety; knowing that their fault harms not when the Master is present, while His doctrine edifies them not for the present only, but for the future.

CHRYSOSTOM. This He says to shew either that they sought nothing spiritual, or that had they known for what they asked, they would not have asked that which was so far beyond their faculties.

HILARY. They know not what they ask, because there was no doubt of the future glory of the Apostles; His former discourse had assured them that they should judge the world.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, Ye know not what ye ask; as much as to say, I have called you to My right hand away from My left, and now you wilfully desire to be on My left. Hence perhaps they did this through the mother. For the devil betook him to his well-known tool the woman, that as he made prey of Adam by his wife, so he should sever these by their mother. But now that the salvation of all had proceeded from a woman, destruction could no longer enter in among the saints by a woman. Or He says, Ye know not what ye ask, seeing we ought not only to consider the glory to which we may attain, but how we may escape the ruin of sin. For so in secular war, he who is ever thinking of the plunder, hardly wins the fight; they should have asked, Give us the aid of Thy grace, that we may overcome all evil.

RABANUS. They knew not what they asked, for they were asking of the Lord a seat in glory, which they had not yet merited. The honourable eminence liked them well, but they had first to practise the laborious path thereto; Can ye drink of the cup that, I shall drink of?

JEROME. By the cup in the divine Scriptures we understand suffering, as in the Psalm, I will take the cup of salvation; (Ps. 116:13, 15.) and straightway He proceeds to shew what is the cup, Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord knew that they were able to follow His passion, but He puts the question to them that we may all hear, that no man can reign with Christ, unless he is conformed to Christ in His passion, for that which is precious is only to be purchased at a costly price. The Lord’s passion we may call not only the persecution of the Gentiles, but all the hardships we go through in struggling against our sins.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says therefore, Can ye drink it? as much as to say, You ask me of honours and crowns, but I speak to you of labour and travail, for this is no time for rewards. He draws their attention by the manner of His question, for He says not, Are ye able to shed your blood? but, Are ye able to drink of the cup? then He adds, which I shall drink of?

REMIGIUS. That by such partaking they may burn with the more zeal towards Him. But they, already sharing the readiness and constancy of martyrdom, promise that they would drink of it; whence it follows, They say unto him, We are able.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, they say this not so much out of reliance on their own fortitude, as out of ignorance; for to the inexperienced the trial of suffering and death appears slight.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or they offer this in the eagerness of their desire, expecting that for their thus speaking they should have what they desired. But He foretels great blessings for them, to wit, that they should be made worthy of martyrdom. He saith unto them, Ye shall indeed drink of my cup.

ORIGEN. Christ does not say, Ye are able to drink of My cup, but looking to their future perfection He said, Ye shall indeed drink of my cup.

JEROME. It is made a question how the sons of Zebedee, James, and John, did drink the cup of martyrdom, seeing Scripture relates that James only was beheaded by Herod, (Acts 12:2.) while John ended his life by a peaceful death. But when we read in ecclesiastical history that John himself was thrown into a cauldron of boiling oil with intent to martyr him, and that he was banished to the isle of Patmos, we shall see that he lacked not the will for martyrdom, and that John had drunk the cup of confession, the which also the Three Children in the fiery furnace did drink of, albeit the persecutor did not shed their blood.

HILARY. The Lord therefore commends their faith, in that He says that they are able to suffer martyrdom together with Him; but, To sit on my right hand and on my left is not mine to give, but for whom it is prepared of my Father, Though indeed, as far as we can judge, that honour is so set apart for others, as that the Apostles shall not be strangers to it, who shall sit on the throne of the Twelve Patriarchs to judge Israel; also, as may be collected out of the Gospels themselves, Moses and Elias shall sit with them in the kingdom of heaven, seeing that it was in their company that He appeared on the mount in His apparel of splendour.

JEROME. But to me this seems not so. Rather the names of them that shall sit in the kingdom of heaven are not named, lest that, if some few were named, the rest should think themselves shut out; for the kingdom of heaven is not of him that gives it, but of him that receives it. Not that there is respect of persons with God, but whosoever shall shew himself such as to be worthy of the kingdom of heaven, shall receive it, for it is prepared not for condition, but for conduct. Therefore if you shall be found to be such as to be fit for that kingdom of heaven which My Father has made ready for the conquerors, ye shall receive the same. He said not, Ye shall not sit there, that He might not discourage the two brethren; while He said not, Ye shall sit there, that He might not stir the others to envy.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise. That seat seems to be unapproachable to all, not only men, but Angels also; for so Paul assigns it peculiarly to the Only-Begotten, saying, To which of the Angels said he at any time, Sit thou on my right hand? (Heb. 1:13.) The Lord therefore makes answer, not as though in verity there were any that should sit there, but as condescending to the apprehensions of the petitioners. They asked but this one grant, to be before others near Him; but the Lord answers, Ye shall die for My sake, yet is not that sufficient to make you obtain the first rank. For if there shall come another with martyrdom, and having virtue greater than yours, I will not, because I love you, put him out, and give you precedence. But that they should not suppose that he lacked power, He said not absolutely, It is not Mine to give, but, It is not mine to give to you, but to those for whom it is prepared; that is, to those who are made illustrious by their deeds.

REMIGIUS. Or otherwise; It is not mine to give to you, that is, to proud men such as you are, but to the lowly in heart, for whom it is prepared of my Father.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin i. 12.) Or otherwise; The Lord makes answer to His disciples in His character of servant; though whatever is prepared by the Father is also prepared by the Son, for He and the Father are one.

20:24–28

24. And when the ten heard it, they were moved with indignation againt the two brethren.

25. But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them.

26. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister;

27. And whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant:

28. Even as the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.

CHRYSOSTOM. So long as the judgment of Christ upon this request was in suspense, the other disciples were not indignant; but when they heard Him rebuke them, they were sorrowful; whence it is said, And when the ten heard it, they had indignation against the two brethren.

JEROME. They do not lay it upon the forwardness of the mother who spoke the request, but upon her sons, who, not knowing their measure, burned with so immoderate desires.

CHRYSOSTOM. For when the Lord rebuked them, then they perceived that this request was from the disciples. For though they were grieved in their hearts when they saw them so especially honoured in the transfiguration, they yet dared not so express themselves, out of respect to their teacher.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But as the two had asked carnally, so now the ten are grieved carnally. For as to seek to be above all is blame-worthy, so to have another above us is mortifying to our vanity.

JEROME. But the meek and lowly Master neither charges the two with ambition, nor rebukes the ten for their spleen and jealousy; but, Jesus called them unto him.

CHRYSOSTOM. By thus calling them to Him, and speaking to them face to face, he sooths them in their discomposure; for the two had been speaking with the Lord apart by themselves. But not now as before does He it by bringing forward a child, but He proves it to them by reasoning from contraries; Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them.

ORIGEN. That is, not content merely to rule over their subjects, they are severe and oppressive. But among you who are Mine these things shall not be so; for as all carnal things are done by compulsion, but spiritual things by free-will, so those rulers who are spiritual ought to rest their power in the love of their subjects, not in their fears.

CHRYSOSTOM. He shews here that it is of the Gentiles to desire preeminence; and by this comparison of the Gentiles He calms their troubled souls.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Indeed, to desire a good work is good, for it is within our will, and ours is the reward; but to desire a primacy of honour is vanity. For when we attain this we are judged of God, because we know not whether in our precedence of honour we deserve the reward of righteousness. For not even an Apostle will have praise with God, because he is an Apostle, but if he has well fulfilled the duties of his Apostleship; nor was an Apostle placed in honour as an Apostle, for any previous merit of his; but was judged meet for that ministry, on account of the disposition of his mind. For high place courts him who flies from it, and shuns him who courts it. A better life then, and not a more worthy degree, should be our object. The Lord therefore, willing to check the ambition of the two sons of Zebedee, and the indignation of the others, points out this distinction between the chief men of the world, and those of the Church, shewing that the primacy in Christ is neither to be sought by him who has it not, nor envied by him who has it. For men become masters in this world that they may exercise domination over their inferiors, and reduce them to slavery, and rob them, and employ them even to death for their own profit and glory. But men become governors in the Church, that they may serve those who are under them, and minister to them whatever they have received of Christ, that they may postpone their own convenience, and mind that of others, and not refuse even to die for the sake of those beneath them. To seek therefore a command in the Church is neither righteous, nor profitable. No prudent man will voluntarily subject himself to slavery, nor to stand in such peril wherein he will have to render account for the whole Church; unless it be one perchance who fears not God's judgment, who abuses His ecclesiastical primacy to a secular end, so that He converts it into a secular primacy.

JEROME. Lastly, He sets before them His own example, that so should they little weigh His words, His deeds might shame them, whence He adds, As also the Son of Man cometh not to be ministered unto, but to minister.

ORIGEN. For though the Angels and Martha ministered to Him, (Mat. 4:11), yet did He not come to be ministered unto, but to minister (John 12:2); yea, His ministry extended so far, that He fulfilled even what follows, And to give his life a ransom for many, they, that is, who believed on Him; and gave it, i. e. to death. But since He was alone free among the dead, and mightier than the power of death, He has set free from death all who were willing to follow Him. The heads of the Church ought therefore to imitate Christ in being affable, adapting Himself to women, laying His hands on children, and washing His disciples' feet, that they also should do the same to their brethren. But we are such, that we seem to go beyond the pride even of the great ones of this world; as to the command of Christ, either not understanding it, or setting it at nought. Like princes we seek hosts to go before us, we make ourselves awful and difficult of access, especially to the poor, neither approaching them, nor suffering them to approach us.

CHRYSOSTOM. How much soever you humble yourself, you cannot descend so far as did your Lord.

20:29–34

29. And as they departed from Jericho, a great multitude followed him.

30. And, behold, two blind men sitting by the way side, when they heard that Jesus passed by, cried out, saying, Have mercy on us, O Lord, thou Son of David.

31. And the multitude rebuked them, because they should hold their peace: but they cried the more, saying, Have mercy on us, O Lord, thou Son of David.

32. And Jesus stood still, and called them, and said, What will ye that I shall do unto you?

33. They say unto him, Lord, that our eyes may be opened.

34. So Jesus had compassion on them, and touched their eyes: and immediately their eyes received sight, and they followed him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As the proof of the husbandman’s industry lies in the abundance of his crop, so the fulness of the Church is the evidence of an industrious teacher; so it is here said, And as they departed from Jericho, a great multitude followed him. No one was deterred by the toilsomeness of the journey, for spiritual love feels no fatigue; no one was kept away by the thought of sufferings, for they were going into possession of the kingdom of heaven. For he who has in very deed tasted the reality of heavenly good, has nothing to attach him to earth. In good season these blind men come before Christ, that having their eyes opened, they may go up with Him to Jerusalem as witnesses to His power. They heard the sound of the passers by, but saw not their persons, and having nothing free about them but their voice, because they could not follow Him with their feet, they pursued Him with their voice; When they heard that Jesus passed by, they cried out, saying, Have mercy on us, O Lord, thou Son of David.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 65.) Mark relates this miracle, but speaks of only one blind man. This difficulty is thus explained; of the two blind men whom Matthew has introduced, one was well known in that city, as appears by Mark’s mentioning both his name, and that of his father. (Mark 10:46.) Bartimæus the son of Timæus was well known as having sunk from great affluence, and now sitting not only blind, but a beggar. For this reason then it is that Mark chose to mention him alone, because the restoration of his sight procured fame to the miracle, in proportion to the notoriety of the fact of his blindness. Though what Luke relates was done after the same manner, yet his account is to be taken of another though similar miracle. (Luke 18:35.) That which he gives was done as they drew near to Jericho; this in the other two as they came out of Jericho. And the multitude rebuked them that they should hold their peace.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For they saw how mean their clothes, and considered not how pure their consciences. See the foolish wisdom of men! They think great men are hurt when they receive the homage of the poor. What poor man dare salute a rich man in public?

HILARY. Or, They bid them hold their peace, not from reverence for Christ, but because they were grieved to hear from the blind what they denied, namely, that the Lord was the Son of David.

ORIGEN. Or; Those that believed rebuked them that they should not dishonour Him by styling Him merely Son of David, but should rather say, Son of God, have mercy on us.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. They were rather encouraged than repelled by this rebuke. For so faith is quickened by being prohibited; and hence is secure in dangers, and in security is endangered; whence it follows, But they cried out the more, saying, Have mercy upon us, Son of David. They cried out at the first because they were blind, now they rather cried out because they were forbidden to come to the Light.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi.) Christ suffered them to be forbidden, that their desire might be the more evidenced. Hence learn that though we be repulsed, yet if we come to God with earnestness, of ourselves, we shall obtain that we ask. It follows, And Jesus stood still, and called them, and said, What will ye that I should do unto you?

JEROME. Jesus stood still, because they being blind could not see their way. About Jericho were many pits, crags, and abrupt precipices; there fore the Lord stands still, that they might come to Him.

ORIGEN. Or; Jesus does not pass on, but stands still, that by His standing His goodness may not pass by, but as from an abiding fount mercy may flow forth upon them.

JEROME. He commands that they be called to Him that the multitude may not withhold them; and He asks them what they would, that by their answer, their necessity may be made apparent, and His power be shewn in their healing.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; He asks them on account of their faith, that whereas they who were blind confess Christ to be the Son of God, those who had their sight might be put to shame for their esteeming Him only man. They had indeed called Christ Lord, and they had spoken true; but by calling Him the Son of David, they obliterated this their good confession. For indeed by a misuse of words men are called Lords, but none is truly Lord, but God only. When therefore they say, O Lord, thou Son of David, they thus misapply the term to Christ, as esteeming Him man; had they only called Him Lord, they would have confessed His Godhead. When then He asks them, What would ye? they no longer style Him Son of David, but only Lord; They say unto Him, Lord, that our eyes may be opened. For the Son of David cannot open the eyes of the blind, but the Son of God can. So long then as they cried, O Lord, thou Son of David, their cure was delayed; as soon as they said, Lord, only, healing was shed upon them; for it follows, And Jesus had compassion upon them, and touched their eyes, and straightway they saw. He touched them carnally as man, He healed them as God.

JEROME. The Creator bestows what nature had not given; or at least mercy accords what weakness had withheld.

CHRYSOSTOM. But as before this bounty they had been persevering, so after the receiving it they were not ungrateful.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. On being healed they rendered a high service to Christ; for it follows, And they followed him. For this the Lord requires of thee, according to the Prophet, that thou be careful to walk with the Lord thy God. (Mic. 6:8).

JEROME. They then who had sat shut up in Jericho, and knew only to cry with their voice, afterwards follow Jesus, not so much with their feet as in their virtues.

RABANUS. But Jericho, which is interpreted ‘the moon,’ denotes the infirmity of our changefulness.

ORIGEN. Figuratively, Jericho is taken to be the world, into which Christ came down. They who are in Jericho, know not how to escape from the wisdom of the world, unless they see not Jesus only coming out of Jericho, but also His disciples. This when they saw, great multitudes followed Him, despising the world and all worldly things, that under His guidance they may go up to the heavenly Jerusalem. The two blind men we may call Judah and Israel, who before the coming of Christ were blind, not seeing the true word which was in the Law and the Prophets, yet sitting by the wayside of the Law and the Prophets, and understanding Him only as after the flesh, they cried to Him who was made of the seed of David according to the flesh.

JEROME. By the two blind men are generally understood the Pharisees and Sadducees.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 28.) Otherwise; The two blind men sitting by the wayside, denote certain of both nations already by faith coming in to that temporal dispensation, according to which Christ is the way, and seeking to be enlightened, that is, to know something concerning the eternity of the Word. This they desired to obtain from the Lord as He passed by, for the merit of that faith by which He is believed to be the Son of God, to have been born man, and to have suffered for us; for in this dispensation, Jesus, as it were, passes by, for all action is of this world. Also it behoved that they should cry out so loud as to overpower the din of the multitude that withstood them; that is, so to fortify their minds by perseverance and prayer, and mortifying continually the usage of fleshly lusts, (which as a crowd ever beset one that is endeavouring to come to the sight of eternal truth,) and by the straitest painfulness to get the better of the multitude of carnal men who hinder spiritual aspirations.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 88, 13.) For bad or lukewarm Christians are an hindrance to good Christians, who seek to perform the commandments of God. Notwithstanding these cry and faint not; for every Christian at his first setting about to live well and to despise the world, has to endure at the first the censures of cold Christians; but if he persevere, they will soon comply, who but now withstood him.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. ii. 28.) Jesus therefore, the same who said, To him that knocketh it shall be opened, hearing them, stands still, touches them, and gives them light. Faith in His temporal incarnation prepares us for the understanding of things eternal. By the passing by of Jesus they are admonished that they should be enlightened, and when He stands still they are enlightened; for things temporal pass by, but things eternal stand still.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Some interpret that the two blind men are the Gentiles; one sprung from Cham, the other from Japhet; they sat by the way-side, that is, they walked hard by the truth, but they could not find it out; or they were placed in reason, not having yet received knowledge of the Word.

RABANUS. But recognizing the rumour of Christ, they desired to be made partakers of Him. Many spake against them; first the Jews, as we read in the Acts; then the Gentiles harassed them by persecution; but yet they might not deprive those who were preordained to life of salvation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Accordingly Jesus touched the eyes of the Gentile mind, giving them the grace of the Holy Spirit, and when enlightened they followed Him with good works.

ORIGEN. We also now sitting by the wayside of the Scriptures, and understanding wherein we are blind, if we ask with desire, He will touch the eyes of our souls, and the gloom of ignorance shall depart from our minds, that in the light of knowledge we may follow Him, who gave us power to see to no other end than that we should follow Him.

CHAPTER 21

21:1–9

1. And when they drew nigh unto Jerusalem, and were come to Bethphage, unto the mount of Olives, then sent Jesus two disciples,

2. Saying unto them, Go into the village over against you, and straightway ye shall find an ass tied, and a colt with her: loose them, and bring them unto me.

3. And if any man say ought unto you, ye shall say, The Lord hath need of them; and straightway he will send them.

4. And this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, saying,

5. Tell ye the daughter of Sion, Behold, thy King cometh unto thee, meek, and sitting upon an ass, and a colt the foal of an ass.

6. And the disciples went, and did as Jesus commanded them,

7. And brought the ass, and the colt, and put on them their clothes, and they set him thereon.

8. And a very great multitude spread their garments in the way; others cut down branches from the trees, and strawed them in the way.

9. And the multitudes that went before, and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna to the Son of David: Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord; Hosanna in the highest.

REMIGIUS. The Evangelist related above that the Lord departed from Galilee, and began to go up to Jerusalem. Being now occupied with telling what He did by the way, he proceeds in his purpose, saying, And when they drew nigh to Jerusalem, and were come to Bethphage. Bethphage was a small village of the priests, situated on the declivity of Mount Olivet, one mile distant from Jerusalem. For the priests who ministered in the temple their apportioned time, when their office of ministration was discharged, withdrew to this village to abide; as also did they who were to take their place. Because it was commanded by their Law that none should travel on the Sabbath more than a mile.

ORIGEN. Whence Bethphage is interpreted, The house of the Shoulder; for the shoulder was the priest’s portion in the Law. It follows, Then Jesus sent two of his disciples.,

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He said not to His disciples, Say, Thy Lord, or Your Lord, hath need of them; that they may understand, that He is Lord alone, not of the beasts only, but of all men; for even sinners are by the law of nature His, though by their own will they are the Devil’s.

CHRYSOSTOM. And think not this a little thing which was now done, for who was it that wrought with the owners of the beasts that they refused not, but yielded them? By this also He instructs His disciples that He could have restrained the Jews, but would not; and further teaches them that they should grant whatever is asked of them; for if they who knew not Christ, now granted this, much more it becomes His disciples to give unto all. For that which is said, But will straightway let them go,

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. it is to be understood, that after He had entered into Jerusalem, the beast was returned by Christ to its owner.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm) Or, The owner of the beasts will straightway send them to be engaged for Christ’s service. Hereto is added the testimony of the Prophet, that it may be shewn that the Lord fulfilled all things which were written of Him, but that the Scribes and Pharisees, blinded by envy, would not understand the things that they read; All this was done, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet; (Zech. 9:9.) to wit, Zacharias.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For the Prophet knowing the malice of the Jews, that they would speak against Christ when He went up to the Temple, gave them this sign beforehand, whereby they might know their King, Say ye to the daughter of Sion.

RABANUS. In history, Daughter of Sion is the name given to the city of Jerusalem, which stands on mount Sion. But mystically, it is the Church of the faithful pertaining to the Jerusalem which is above.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Behold, is a word used in pointing out any thing; look, that is, not with the bodily eye, but with the spiritual understanding, at the works of His power. Also aforetimes He oft said, Behold, that He might shew that He of whom He spake before He was born was even then thy King. When then ye shall see Him, say not, We have no King but Cæsar. He cometh to thee, (John 19:15.) if thou wilt apprehend Him, that He may save thee; if thou wilt not apprehend Him, He cometh against thee; Meek, so that He is not to be feared for His power, but loved for His meekness; wherefore He sitteth not on a golden car, refulgent in costly purple, nor is mounted on a mettled steed, rejoicing in strife and battle, but upon a she-ass, that loves peace and quiet.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 66.) In this quotation from the Prophet, there is some variety in the different Gospels. Matthew quotes it as if the Prophet had expressly mentioned the she-ass; but it is not so quoted by John, nor in the Church-copies of the translation in common use. (John 12:15) This seems to me to be accounted for by the account, that Matthew wrote his Gospel in the Hebrew language. And it is clear that the translation called the LXX, has some things different from what are found in the Hebrew, by those who know that tongue, and who have rendered the same books out of the Hebrew. If the reason of this discrepancy be asked, I consider nothing more likely than that the LXX interpreted with the selfsame spirit with which the original was written, which is confirmed by that wonderful agreement among them of which we are told. By thus varying the expression, while they did not depart from the meaning of that God whose words they were, they convey to us the very same thing as we gather from this agreement, with slight variety, among the Evangelists. This shews us that it is no lie, when one relates any thing with such diversities in detail, as that he does not depart from his intention with whom he ought to agree. To know this is useful in morals in avoiding lies; and for faith itself, that we should not suppose that the truth is secured in sacred sounds, as though God imparted to us not the matter only, but the words in which the matter is conveyed. Rather the matter is in such sort conveyed in words, that we ought not to want words at all, if it were possible that the matter could be known by us without words, as God and His Angels know it. It follows, But the disciples went and did as Jesus commanded them, and brought the ass, and the colt. The other Evangelists say nothing of the ass. And if Matthew had not mentioned the colt, as they do not mention the ass, the reader ought not to have been surprised. How much less then should it move him, when one has so mentioned the ass which the others have omitted, as not to forget the colt which they have mentioned. For there is no discrepancy where both circumstances may have occurred, though one only related one, and another another; how much less then where one mentions both, though another mentions only one? It follows, And they put on them their clothes, and set him thereon.

JEROME. But it seems that the Lord could not in so short a distance have sate upon both animals; seeing then that the history has either an impossibility or a meanness, we are sent to higher things, that is, to the figurative sense.

REMIGIUS. Notwithstanding, it was possible that the Lord might have sate upon both animals.

CHRYSOSTOM. To me it seems that He was mounted upon the ass, not only because of the mystery, but to give us a lesson of wisdom, teaching us therein that it needs not to be mounted on horses, but that it is sufficient to employ an ass, and be content with that which is necessary. But enquire of the Jews, what King has entered Jerusalem mounted upon an ass? They can name none other, but this one only.

JEROME. The multitudes that came out of Jericho, and followed the Saviour, cast down their garments, and strewed the way with branches of trees; and therefore it follows, But the multitudes spread their garments in the way; that is, beneath the feet of the ass, that it should not stumble against a stone, nor tread upon a thorn, nor fall into a ditch. Others cut down branches from the trees, and strewed them in the way; from the fruit-trees, that is, with which mount Olivet was clothed. And when all that could be done was done, they added also the tribute of the tongue, as it follows, And the multitudes that went before, and that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna to the Son of David. I shall shortly examine what is the meaning of this word Hosanna. In the hundred and seventeenth Psalm, which is clearly written of the Saviour’s coming, we read this among other things; Save me now, O Lord; O Lord, send now prosperity. Blessed art thou that art to come in the name of the Lord. (Ps. 118:25.), For that which the LXX give Ω Κύριε σῶσον δὴ, Save now, O Lord; we read in the Hebrew, ‘Anna, adonai osianna,’ which Symmachus renders more plainly, I pray thee, O Lord, save, I pray thee. Let none think that it is a word made up of two words, one. Greek and one Hebrew, for it is pure Hebrew.

REMIGIUS. And it is confounded of one perfect and one imperfect word. For ‘Hosi’ signifies ‘save;’ ‘anna’ is an interjection used in entreating.

JEROME. For it signifies that the coming of Christ is the salvation of the world, whence it follows, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. Which same thing the Saviour in the Gospel confirms, I am come in my Father’s name. (John 5:43.)

REMIGIUS. Because, namely, in all His good actions, He sought not His own but His Father’s glory.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) And the meaning is, Blessed, that is, Glorious, is He that cometh, that is, is incarnate; in the name of the Lord; that is, of the Father, by glorifying Him. Again they repeat, Hosanna, that is, Save, I pray thee, and define whither they would bo saved, in the highest, that is in the heavenly, not in the earthly places.

JEROME. Or by that which is added, Hosanna, that is, Salvation, in the highest, it is clearly shewn that the coming of Christ is not the salvation of man only, but of the whole world, joining earthly things to things heavenly.

ORIGEN. Or when they say, Hosanna to the Son of David; Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord, it is the dispensation of Christ’s humanity that they set forth; but His restoration to the holy places when then say, Hosanna in the highest.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Hosanna, some interpret ‘glory,’ some ‘redemption;’ and glory is His due, and redemption belongs to Him who has redeemed all men.

HILARY. The words of their song of praise, express His power of redemption; in calling Him the Son of David, they acknowledge His hereditary title to the kingdom.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Never before had the Lord employed the services of beasts, nor surrounded Himself with the ornaments of green boughs, till now when He is going up to Jerusalem to suffer. He moved them that beheld to do that which they had before desired to do; so it was opportunity that was now given them, not their purpose that was changed.

JEROME. Mystically; The Lord draws near to Jerusalem departing from Jericho, and taking great multitudes with Him, because great and laden with great wares, that is, the salvation of believers that has been entrusted to Him, He seeks to enter the city of peace, the place of the beholding of God. And He comes to Bethphage, that is, to The house of the jawbones; He bare also the type of confession; and halted on Mount Olivet, where is the light of knowledge, and the repose from toils and pains. By the village over against the Apostles is denoted this world; for that was against the Apostles, and was not willing to receive the light of their teaching.

REMIGIUS. The Lord therefore sent His disciples from mount Olivet to the village, when He guided the preachers forth from the primitive Church into the world. He sent two, because there were two orders of preachers, as the Apostle shews, saying, He that wrought in Peter to the Apostleship of circumcision, the same was mighty in me towards the Gentiles; (Gal. 2:8.) or, because the precepts of charity are two; or, because there are two testaments; or, because there is letter and spirit.

JEROME. Or, because there is theory and practice, that is, knowledge and works. By the ass which had been under the yoke, and was broken, the synagogue is understood. By the ass's colt wild and unbroken, the Gentile people; for the Jewish nation is towards God the mother of the Gentiles.

RABANUS. Whence Matthew, who wrote his Gospel to the Jews, is the only one who mentions that the ass was brought to the Lord, to shew that this same Hebrew nation, if it repent, need not despair of salvation,

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Men are likened to animals, from some resemblance they bear in their not recognising the Son of God. And this animal is unclean, and beyond all other brutes incapable of reasoning, a stupid, helpless, ignoble drudge. Such were men before the coming of Christ, unclean with divers passions; unreasoning, that is lacking the reason of the Word, stupid, in their disregard of God; weak in soul, ignoble, because forgetting their heavenly birth they became slaves of their passions, and of the dæmons; drudges, because they toiled under the load of error laid upon them by the dæmons, or the Pharisees. The ass was tied, that is, bound in the chain of diabolic error, so that it had not liberty to go whither it would; for before we do any sin we have free will to follow, or not, the will of the Devil, but if once by sinning we have bound ourselves to do his works, we are no longer able to escape by our own strength, but, like a vessel that has lost its rudder is tossed at the mercy of the storm, so man, when by sin he has forfeited the aid of Divine grace, no longer acts as he wills, but as the Devil wills. And if God, by the mighty arm of His mercy, do not loose him, he will abide till death in the chain of his sins. Therefore He saith to His disciples, Loose them, that is, by your teaching and miracles, for all the Jews and Gentiles were loosed by the Apostles; and bring them to me, that is, convert them to My glory.

ORIGEN. Whence also, when He ascended into heaven, He gave command to His disciples that they should loose sinners, for which also He gave them the Holy Spirit. But being loosed, and making progress, and being nourished by the Divinity of the Word, they are held worthy to be sent back to the place whence they were taken, but no more to their former labours, but to preach to them the Son of God, and this is what He signifies when He says, And straightway He will send them.

HILARY. Or by the ass and the colt is shewn the twofold calling from among the Gentiles. For the Samaritans did serve after a certain fashion of obedience, and they are signified by the ass; but the other Gentiles wild and unbroken are signified by the colt. Therefore two are sent to loose them that are bound by the chains of error; Samaria believed through Philip, and Cornelius as the first-fruits of the Gentiles was brought by Peter to Christ.

REMIGIUS. But as it was then said to the Apostles, If any man sag ought to you, say ye, The Lord hath need of them; so now it is commanded to the preachers, that though any opposition be made to them, they should not slack to preach.

JEROME. The Apostles clothes which are laid upon the beasts may be understood either as the teaching of virtues, or discernment of Scriptures, or verities of ecclesiastical dogmas, with which, unless the soul be furnished and instructed, it deserves not to have the Lord take His seat there.

REMIGIUS. The Lord sitting upon the ass goes towards Jerusalem, because presiding over the Holy Church, or the faithful soul, He both guides it in this life, and after this life leads it to the view of the heavenly country. But the Apostles and other teachers set their garments upon the ass, when they gave to the Gentiles the glory which they had received from Christ. The multitudes spread their garments in the way, when they of the circumcision who believed, despised the glory which they had by the Law. They cut down branches from the trees, because out of the Prophets they had heard of the green Branch as an emblem of Christ. (Is. 11:1. Jer. 23:5.) Or, the multitudes who spread their garments in the way, are the martyrs who gave to martyrdom for Christ their bodies, which are the clothing of their minds. Or, they are signified, who subdue their bodies by abstinence. They who cut down the branches of the trees, are they who seek out the sayings and examples of the holy fathers for their own or their children’s salvation.

JEROME. When He says, The multitudes that went before and that followed, He shews that both people, those who before the Gospel, and those who after the Gospel, believed on the Lord, praise Jesus with the harmonious voice of confession.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Those prophesying spoke of Christ who was to come; these speak in praise of the coming of Christ already fulfilled.

21:10–16

10. And when he was come into Jerusalem, all the city was moved, saying, Who is this?

11. And the multitude said, This is Jesus the prophet of Nazareth of Galilee.

12. And Jesus went into the temple of God, and cast out all them that sold and bought in the temple, and overthrew the tables of the moneychangers, and the seats of them that sold doves,

13. And said unto them, It is written, My house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves.

14. And the blind and the lame came to him in the temple; and he healed them.

15. And when the Chief Priests and Scribes saw the wonderful things that he did, and the children crying in the temple, and saying, Hosanna to the Son of David; they were sore displeased,

16. And said unto him, Hearest thou what these say? And Jesus saith unto them, Yea; have ye never read, Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings thou hast perfected praise?

JEROME. When Jesus entered with the multitudes, the whole city of Jerusalem was moved, wondering at the crowds, and not knowing the power.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. With good reason were they moved at sight of a thing so to be wondered at. Man was praised as God, but it was the God that was praised in the man. But, I suppose, that neither they who praised knew what they praised, but the Spirit that suddenly inspired them poured forth the words of truth.

ORIGEN. Moreover, when Jesus entered the true Jerusalem, they cried out, wondering at His heavenly virtues, and said, Who is this King of glory?

JEROME. While others were in doubt or enquiring, the worthless multitude confessed Him; But the people said, This is Jesus the Prophet from Nazareth in Galilee. (Ps. 24:8.) They begin with the lesser that they may come to the greater. They hail Him as that Prophet whom Moses had said should come like to himself, (Deut. 15:18.) which is rightly written in Greek with the testimony of the article, (ὁ προφήτες.) From Nazareth of Galilee, for there He had been brought up, that the flower of the field might be nourished with the flower of all excellencies.

RABANUS. But it is to be noted, that this entry of His into Jerusalem was five days before the passover. For John relates, that six days before the Passover He came to Bethany, and on the morrow sitting on the ass entered Jerusalem. (John 12:1.) In this observe the correspondence between the Old and New Testaments, not only in things but in seasons. For on the tenth day of the first month, the lamb that was to be sacrificed for the passover was to be taken into the house, (Exod. 12:3.) because on the same day of the same month, that is, five days before the passover, the Lord was to enter the city in which He was to suffer.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And Jesus entered into the temple of God. This was the part of a good Son to haste to His Father’s house, and do Him honour; so you then becoming an imitator of Christ as soon as you enter into any city, first run to the Church. Further, it was the part of a good physician, that having entered to heal the sick city, he should first apply himself to the source of the sickness; for as every thing good cometh out of the temple, so also doth every evil. For when the priesthood is sound, the whole Church flourishes, but if it is corrupt, faith is impaired; and as when you see a tree whose leaves are pale-coloured you know that it is diseased at its root, so when you see an undisciplined people conclude without hesitation that their priesthood is unsound.

JEROME. And he cast out all them that sold and bought. It should be known that in obedience to the Law, in the Temple of the Lord venerated throughout the whole world, and resorted to by Jews out of every quarter, innumerable victims were sacrificed, especially on festival days, bulls, rams, goats; the poor offering young pigeons and turtle-doves, that they might not omit all sacrifice. But it would happen that those who came from a distance would have no victim. The Priests therefore contrived a plan for making a gain out of the people, selling to such as had no victim the animals which they had need of for sacrifice, and themselves receiving them back again as soon as sold. But this fraudulent practice was often defeated by the poverty of the visitors, who lacking means had neither victims, nor whence to purchase them. They therefore appointed bankers who might lend to them under a bond. But because the Law forbade usury, and money lent without interest was profitless, besides sometimes a loss of the principal, they bethought themselves of another scheme; instead of bankers they appointed ‘collybistæa,’ a word for which the Latin has no equivalent. Sweetmeats and other trifling presents they called ‘collyba,’ such, for example, as parched pulse, raisins, and apples of divers sorts. As then they could not take usury, they accepted, the value in kind, taking things that ore bought with money, as if this was not what Ezekiel preached of, saying, Ye shall not receive usury nor increase. (Ezek. 18:17.) This kind of traffic, or cheating rather, the Lord seeing in His Father’s house, and moved thereat with spiritual zeal, cast out of the Temple this great multitude of men.

ORIGEN. For in that they ought neither to sell nor to buy, but to give their time to prayer, being assembled in a house of prayer, whence it follows, And he saith unto them, It is written, My house shall be called a house of prayer. (Is. 56:7.)

AUGUSTINE. (Regula ad Serv. Dei, 3.) Let no one therefore do ought in the oratory, but that for which it was made and whence it got its name. It follows, But ye have made if a den of thieves.

JEROME. For he is indeed a thief, and turns the temple of God into a den of thieves, who makes a gain of his religion. Among all the miracles wrought by our Lord, this seems to me the most wonderful, that one man, and He at that time mean to such a degree that He was afterwards crucified, and while the Scribes and Pharisees were exasperated against Him seeing their gains thus cut off, was able by the blows of one scourge to cast out so great a multitude. Surely a flame and starry ray darted from his eyes, and the majesty of the Godhead was radiant in his countenance.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 68.) It is manifest that the Lord did this thing not once but twice; the first time is told by John, this second occasion by the other three.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii.) Which aggravates the fault of the Jews, who after He had done the same thing twice, yet persisted in their hardness.

ORIGEN. Mystically; The Temple of God is the Church of Christ, wherein are many, who live not, as they ought, spiritually, but after the flesh; and that house of prayer which is built of living stones they make by their actions to be a den of thieves. But if we must express more closely the three kinds of men cast out of the Temple, we may say thus. Whosoever among a Christian people spend their time in nothing else but buying and selling, continuing but little in prayers or in other right actions, these are the buyers and sellers in the Temple of God. Deacons who do not lay out well the funds of their Churches, but grow rich out of the poor man's portion, these are the money-changers whose tables Christ overturns. But that the deacons preside over the tables of Church money, we learn from the Act of the Apostles (Acts 6:2.) Bishops who commit Churches to those they ought not, are they that sell the doves, that is, the grace of the Holy Spirit, whose seats Christ overturns.

JEROME. But, according to the plain sense; the doves were not in seats, but in cages; unless indeed the sellers of the doves were sitting in seats, but that were absurd, for the seat denotes the dignity of the teacher, which is brought down to nothing when it is mixed with covetousness. Mark also, that through the avarice of the Priests, the altars of God are called tables of money-changers. What we have spoken of Churches let each man understand of himself, for the Apostle says, Ye are the temple of God (2 Cor. 6:16.) Let there not be therefore in the abode of your breast the spirit of bargaining, nor the desire of gifts, lest Jesus, entering in anger and sternness, should purify His temple not without scourging, that from a den of thieves He should make it a house of prayers.

ORIGEN. Or, in His second coming He shall cast forth and overturn those whom He shall find unworthy in God's temple.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For this reason also He overturns the tables of the money-changers, to signify that in the temple of God ought to be no coin save spiritual, such as bears the image of God, not an earthly image. He overturns the seats of those that sold doves, saying by that deed, What make in My temple so many doves for sale, since that one Dove descended of free gift upon the temple of My Body? What the multitude had proclaimed by their shouts, the Lord shews in deeds; whence it follows, And the blind and the lame came to him in the temple, and he healed them.

ORIGEN. For in the temple of God, that is in the Church, all have not eyesight, nor do all walk uprightly, but only they who understand that there is need of Christ and of none other to heal them; they coming to the Word of God are healed.

REMIGIUS. That they are healed in the Temple signifies, that men cannot be healed but in the Church, to which is given the power of binding and loosing.

JEROME. For had He not overthrown the tables of the money-changers and the seats of them that sold doves, the blind and the lame would not have deserved that their wonted sight and power of motion should be restored to them in the temple.

CHRYSOSTOM. But not even thus were the Chief Priests convinced, but at His miracles and the shouts of the children they had indignation.

JEROME. For, not daring to lay hands on Him, the Priests defame his works, and the testimony of the children who cried, Hosanna to the Son of David, blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord, as though this might be said to none but to the Son of God only. Let then Bishops and all holy men take heed how they suffer these things to be said to them, if this is charged as a fault in Him who is truly Lord to whom this was said, because the faith of the believers was not yet confirmed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For as a pillar a little out of the perpendicular, if more weight be laid upon it, is driven to lean still more to one side; so also the heart of man when once turned aside, is only stirred the more with jealousy by seeing or hearing deeds of some righteous man. In this way the Priests were stirred up against Christ, and said, Hearest thou what these say?

JEROME. But the answer of Christ was cautions. He spake not what the Scribes would fain have heard, The children do well that they bear witness to me; nor on the other hand, They do what is wrong, they are but children, you ought to be indulgent to their tender years. But He brings a quotation from the eighth Psalm, that though the Lord were silent, the testimony of Scripture might defend the words of the children (Ps. 8:2) as it follows, But Jesus said unto them, Yea, have ye never read, &c.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As though He had said, Be it so, it is My fault that these cry thus. But is it My fault that so many thousand years before the Prophet foretold that so it should be? But babes and sucklings cannot know or praise any one. Therefore they are called babes, not in age, but in guilelessness of heart; sucklings, because they cried out being moved by their joy at the wonderful things they beheld, as by the sweetness of milk. Miraculous works are called milk, because the beholding of miracles is no toil, but rather excites wonder, and gently invites to the faith. Bread is the doctrine of perfect righteousness, which none can receive but they who have their senses exercised about spiritual things.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was at once a type of the Gentiles, and no small comfort to the Apostles; for that they might not be perplexed, contriving how having no education for the purpose they should preach the Gospel, these children going before them did away that fear; for He who made these to sing His praises, shall give speech to those. This miracle also shews that Christ was the Framer of nature; seeing the children spoke things full of meaning, and agreeing with the Prophets, whereas the men uttered things meaningless, and full of frenzy.

21:17–22

17. And he left them, and went out of the city into Bethany; and he lodged there.

18. Now in the morning as he returned into the city, he hungered.

19. And when he saw a fig tree in the way, he came to it, and found nothing thereon, but leaves only, and said unto it, Let no fruit grow on thee henceforward for ever. And presently the fig tree withered away.

20. And when the disciples saw it, they marvelled, saying, How soon is the fig tree withered away!

21. Jesus answered and said unto them, Verily I say unto you, If ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only do this which is done to the fig tree, but also if ye shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; it shall be done.

22. And all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer believing, ye shall receive.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. A bad man is better overcome by giving way to him than by replying to him; for wickedness is not instructed but stimulated by reproof. The Lord accordingly sought by withdrawing

Himself to check those whom His words could not check; whence it is said, And He left them, and went out of the city into Bethany.

JEROME. Hence it is to be understood that the Lord was in so great poverty, and so far from having courted any one, that He had found in all that city neither entertainer, nor abode, but He made His home in a little village, in the house of Lazarus and his sisters; for their village was Bethany; and it follows, and He lodged there.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Seeking surely to lodge in the body where His spirit also reposed; for so it is with all holy men, they love to be not where sumptuous banquets are, but where holiness flourishes.

JEROME. When the shades of night were dispersed, and He was returning to the city, the Lord was an hungred, thus shewing the reality of His human body.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) For in permitting His flesh to suffer that which properly pertains to flesh, He fore-shews His passion. Mark the earnest zeal of the active labourer, Who is said to have gone early into the city to preach, and to gain some to His Father.

JEROME. The Lord about to suffer among the nations, and to take upon Him the offence of the Cross, sought to strengthen the minds of His disciples by a previous miracle; whence it follows, And seeing a fig-tree by the wayside, He came to it, and found nothing thereon, but leaves only.

CHRYSOSTOM. He came not because He was an hungred, but for His disciples' sake; for because He ever did good and inflicted suffering on none, it behoved that He should set forth an example of His power of punishment; and this He would not exert upon man, but upon a plant.

HILARY. Herein also we find proof of the Lord's goodness; where He was minded to shew forth an instance of the salvation procured by His means, He exerted the power of His might on the persons of men; by healing their present sicknesses, encouraging them to hope for the future, and to look for the healing of their soul. But now when He would exhibit a type of His judgments on the rebellious, He represents the future by the destruction of a tree; Let no fruit grow on thee henceforward for ever.

JEROME. For ever, (in sempiternum,) or, To the end of the world, (in sæculum,) for the Greek word αἰῶγ signifies both.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was only a supposition of the disciples that it was cursed because it had not fruit; for another Evangelist says that it was not yet the season. Why then was it cursed? For the disciples' sake, that they might learn that He had power to wither up those who crucified Him. And He worked this miracle in that which of all plants is the most juicy, that the greatness of the miracle might be more apparent. And when aught of this kind is done to brutes or vegetables, ask not whether the fig were with justice withered up, seeing it was not the season for its fruit; for to enquire thus were extreme madness, for in such creatures there can be neither fault nor punishment; but consider the miracle, and admire the Worker of it.

GLOSS. (ord.) The Creator does no wrong to the owner, but His creature at His will is converted to the profit of others.

CHRYSOSTOM. And that you may learn that this was done for their sakes, to the end, namely, that they should be stirred up to confidence, hear what is said further. Jesus answered and said unto them, Verily I say unto you, if ye shall have faith.

JEROME. The Gentile dogs bark against us, affirming that the Apostles had not faith, because they were not able to remove mountains. To whom we answer, that many wonders were done by the Lord which are not written; and therefore we believe the Apostles to have done some not written; and that they were therefore not written, that the unbelieving might not have in them larger room for cavilling. For let us ask them, do they believe the miracles which are written, or do they not? And when they look incredulous, we can then establish that they who believe not the lesser would not have believed the greater.

CHRYSOSTOM. This that the Lord speaks of He ascribes to prayer and faith; whence He continues, And all things whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer believing ye shall receive.

ORIGEN. For Christ's disciples pray for nothing that they ought not, and as confiding in their Master they pray only for things great and heavenly.

RABANUS. But whenever we are not heard when we pray, it is either because we ask something adverse to the means of our salvation; or because the perverseness of those for whom we ask hinders its being granted to them; or because the performance of our request is put off to a future time, that our desires may wax stronger, and so may have more perfect capacity for the joys they seek after.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 68.) It must be considered that Mark relates the wonder of the disciples at the withering of the tree, and the answer of the Lord concerning faith, to have been not on the day following the cursing of the tree, but on the third day after; and that on the second day Mark relates the casting of the merchants out of the Temple, which he had omitted on the first day. On the second day then he says that He went forth out of the city in the evening, and that as they passed by in the morning, the disciples then saw that the fig tree was withered. But Matthew speaks as though all this had been done on the day following. This must be so taken as that when Matthew, having related that the fig tree was dried up, adds immediately, omitting all the events of the second day, And when the disciples saw if, they marvelled, he yet meant that it was on another day that they marvelled. For the tree must be supposed to have withered at the time it was cursed, not at the time they saw it. For they did not see it withering, but when it was withered, and by that they understood that it had withered immediately upon the Lord’s words.

ORIGEN. Mystically; the Lord leaving the Chief Priests and Scribes withdrew without the earthly Jerusalem, which therefore fell. He came to Bethany to ‘The house of obedience,’ that is, to the Church, where when He had taken rest after the first erecting of the Church, He returned to the city which He had left a little while before, and returning, He was an hungred.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For had His hunger been as man for carnal food, He would not have hungred in the morning; he truly hungers in the morning who hungers after the salvation of others.

JEROME. The tree which He saw by the wayside we understand as the synagogue, which was nigh to the way inasmuch as it had the Law, but yet believed not on the way, that is, on Christ.

HILARY. And that is compared to a fig tree, because the Apostles being the first believers out of Israel, like green figs shall in the glory, and the time, of their resurrection, be before the rest.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Also the fig in respect of the multitude of seeds under one skin is as it were an assembly of the faithful. But He finds nothing on it but leaves only, that is, pharisaical traditions, an outward shew of the Law without the fruits of truth.

ORIGEN. And because this plant was figuratively a living creature, having a soul, He speaks to it as though it heard. Let no fruit grow on thee henceforward for ever. Therefore is the Jewish synagogue barren, and shall continue so until the end of the world, when the multitude of the Gentiles shall come in; and the fig tree withered while Christ was yet sojourning in this life; and the disciples seeing by their spiritual discernment the mystery of the withered faith, wondered; and having faith, and not doubting, they bare it, and so it withers when their lifegiving virtue passes to the Gentiles; and by each one who is brought to the faith, that mountain Satan is lifted up and cast into the sea, that is, into the abyss.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; Into the sea, that is, into the world where the waters are salt, i. e. the people are wicked.

RABANUS. And he avenges his exclusion from the elect by more cruel treatment of the reprobate.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 29.) Or, this is to be said by each servant of God in his own case respecting the mountain of pride, to cast it from him. Or, because by Jews the Gospel was preached, the Lord Himself, who is called the mount, is by the Jews cast among the Gentiles as into a sea.

ORIGEN. For every man who is obedient to the word of God is Bethany, and Christ abides in him; but the wicked and the sinners He leaves. And when He has been with the righteous, He goes to other righteous after them, and accompanied by them; for it is not said that He left Bethany and went into the city. The Lord ever is an hungred among the righteous, desiring to eat among them the fruit of the Holy Spirit, which are love, joy, peace. But this fig tree which had leaves only without fruit, grew by the wayside.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That is, nigh to the world; for if a man lives nigh to the world, he cannot preserve in himself the fruit of righteousness.

ORIGEN. But if the Lord come seeking fruit with temptations, and one be found having nought of righteousness but only a profession of faith, which is leaves without fruit, he is soon withered, losing even his seeming faith; and every disciple makes this fig tree to wither, by making it be seen that he is void of Christ, as Peter said to Simon, Thy heart is not right in the sight of God (Acts 8:21.) For it is better that a deceitful fig tree which is thought to be alive, yet brings forth no fruit, should be withered up at the word of Christ's disciples, than that by an imposture it should steal aawy innocent hearts. Also there is in every unbeliever a mountain great in proportion to his unbelief, which is removed by the words of Christ's disciples.

21:23–27

23. And when he was come into the temple, the Chief Priests and the elders of the people came unto him as he was teaching, and said, By what authority doest thou these things? and who gave thee this authority?

24. And Jesus answered and said unto them, I also will ask you one thing, which if ye tell me, I in like wise will tell you by what authority I do these things.

25. The baptism of John, whence was it? from heaven, or of men? And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say unto us, Why did ye not then believe him?

26. But if we shall say, Of men; we fear the people; for all hold John as a prophet.

27. And they answered Jesus, and said, We cannot tell. And he said unto them, Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Priests were tormented with jealousy, because they had seen Christ entering the Temple in great glory. And not being able to master the fire of jealousy which burnt in their breasts, they break forth in speech.

CHRYSOSTOM. Forasmuch as they could not detract from His miracles, they bring matter of blame from His forbidding to sell in the Temple. As though they had said, Hast Thou assumed the seat of authority? Hast Thou been anointed Priest, that Thou exertest this power?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. By that they add, Or who gave thee this authority? they shew that there be many persons who give power to men, whether corporal or spiritual! as though they had said, Thou art not come of a priestly family; the Senate has not conferred on Thee this power, neither has Cæsar granted it. But had they believed that all power is from God, they would never have asked, Who gave thee this authority? For every man judges of others by himself. The fornicator thinks that none are chaste; the chaste does not readily suspect any of fornication; he who is not a Priest of God, thinks no man’s Priesthood to be of God.

JEROME. Or in these words they urge the same cavil as above, when they said, He casteth out demons through Beelzebub the Prince of the demons. (Mat. 12:24.) For when they say, By what authority doest thou these things? they doubt concerning the power of God, and would have it understood that the things He does are of the Devil. But when they add, Who gave thee this authority? they most clearly deny the Son of God, whom they suppose to work miracles, not by His own, but by others' strength. The Lord could have confuted the calumny of His tempters by a simple answer, but He put a question to them of such skilful contrivance, that they must be condemned either by their silence or their knowledge; Jesus answered and said unto them, I also will ask you one question.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Not that they should answer it, and thereupon hear of Christ the answer to their question, but that being puzzled they should ask Him no farther; according to that precept He had given above, Give not that which is holy to the dogs. (Mat. 7:6.) For even if He had told them, it would have profited nothing, because the darkened will cannot perceive the things that are of the light. For him that enquires we ought to instruct, but him that tempts, to overthrow by a stroke of reasoning, but not to publish to him the power of the mystery. The Lord thus sets before them in His question a dilemma; and that they might not escape Him, says, Which if ye tell me, I in like wise will tell you by what authority I do these things. His question is this; The baptism of John whence was it? from heaven, or of men?

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. v. 4.) John received his authority to baptize from Him, whom he afterwards baptized; and that baptism which was committed to him is here called the baptism of John. He alone received such a gift; no righteous man before or after him was entrusted with a baptism to be called from himself. For John came to baptize in the water of repentance, to prepare the way for the Lord, not to give inward cleansing, which mere man cannot do.

JEROME. What the Priests revolved in their malice is shewn when he adds, But they reasoned with themselves. For had they replied that it was from heaven, the question was inevitable, Why then were ye not baptized by John? But should they reply that it was an invention of human device, and had in it nothing divine, they feared a tumult among the people. For all the assembled multitudes had received John's baptism, and held him accordingly for a Prophet. This godless party therefore make answer, and by a seeming humility of speech confessing that they know not, turned to hide their insidious designs. And they answered Jesus, and said, We know not. In saying that they knew not, they lied; and it might have followed upon their answering thus, that the Lord also should say, I know not; but truth cannot lie, and therefore it follows, And he said unto them, Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things. This shews that they knew, but would not answer, and that He also knew, but would not answer, because they would not speak what they knew.

ORIGEN. But some one will say in opposition to this, that it was absurd to ask by what authority Jesus did these things. For that it could not be that He would answer, that He did these by the Devil's authority; and He would not tell them as it truly was, that He did them by His own power. If it should be said, that the rulers put this question to Him in order to deter Him from His proceedings; as when we say to one who is dealing with what is ours in a way which we do not like, we say to him, Who bade thee do this? meaning to deter him from what he is so doing;—if it is to be taken so, what means Christ's answer, Do you tell Me this, and I will tell you by what authority I do these things. Perhaps therefore, the place should be understood as follows. There are in the general two opposite powers, one on the side of God, the other on the side of the Devil; but of particular powers there are many; for it was not one and the same power that wrought in all the Prophets to enable them to do miracles, but one in these, another in those; and, it may be, for lesser things a lesser power, for greater things a greater power. The Chief Priests had seen Jesus working many miracles, whereupon they desired to know the special degree and properties of that power which wrought in Him. For others who have wrought miracles wrought them at first in one power, and afterwards when more advanced in another and greater power; but the Saviour wrought all in one power, that which He received of the Father. But because they were not worthy to hear such mysteries, therefore He gives them no answer, but on the contrary put a question to them.

RABANUS. There are two reasons why the knowledge of truth should be kept back from those who ask; either when he who asks is unfit to receive, or from his hatred or contempt of the truth is unworthy to have that which he asks opened to him.

21:28–32

28. But what think ye? A certain man had two sons; and he came to the first, and said, Son, go work to day in my vineyard.

29. He answered and said, I will not: but afterward he repented, and went.

30. And he came to the second, and said likewise. And he answered and said, I go, sir: and went not.

31. Whether of them twain did the will of his father? They say unto him, The first. Jesus saith unto them, Verily I say unto you, That the Publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of God before you.

32. For John came unto you in the way of righteousness, and ye believed him not: but the Publicans and the harlots believed him: and ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterward, that ye might believe him.

JEROME. Thus much prefaced, the Lord brings forward a parable, to convict them of their irreligion, and shew them that the kingdom of God should be transferred to the Gentiles.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Those who are to be judged in this cause, He applies to as judges, that condemning themselves they might be shewn to be unworthy to be acquitted by any other. It is high confidence of the justness of a cause, that will entrust it to the decision of an adversary. But He veils the allusion to them in a parable, that they might not perceive that they were passing sentence upon themselves; A certain man had two sons. Who is he but God, who created all men, who being by nature Lord of all, yet would rather be loved as a father, than feared as a Lord. The elder son was the Gentile people, the younger the Jews, since from the time of Noah there had been Gentiles. And he came to the first, and said, Son, go work to day in my vineyard. To day, i. e. during this age. He spoke with him, not face to face as man, but to his heart as God, instilling understanding through the senses. To work in the vineyard is to do righteousness; for to cultivate the whole thereof, I know not that any one man is sufficient.

JEROME. He speaks to the Gentile people first, through their knowledge of the law of nature; Go and work in my vineyard; i. e. What you would not have done to you, that do not you to others. (Tobit 4:16.) He answers haughtily, I will not.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For the Gentiles from the beginning leaving God and his righteousness, and going over to idols and sins, seem to make answer in their thoughts, We will not do the righteousness of God.

JEROME. But when, at the coming of the Saviour, the Gentile people, having done penitence, laboured in God’s vineyard, and atoned by their labour for the obstinacy of their refusal, this is what is said, But afterward he repented, and went. The second son is the Jewish people who made answer to Moses, All that the Lord hath said unto us we will do. (Exod. 24:3.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But afterwards turning their backs, they lied unto God, according to that in the Psalms, The sons of the strangers have lied unto me. (Ps. 18:44.) This is what is said, But he went not. The Lord accordingly asks which of them twain did the will of his father? They say unto him, The first. See how they have first sentence upon themselves, saying, that the elder son, that is, the Gentile people, did the will of his father. For it is better not to promise righteousness before God, and to do it, than to promise, and to fail.

ORIGEN. Whence we may gather, that in this parable the Lord spoke to such as promise little or nothing, but in their works shine forth; and against those who promise great things but do none of these things that they have promised.

JEROME. It should be known that in the correct copies it is read not The last, but The first, that they might be condemned by their own sentence. But should we prefer to read, as some have it, The last, the explanation is obvious, to say that the Jews understood the truth, but dissembled, and would not say what they thought; just as though they knew that the baptism of John was from heaven, they would not say so.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord abundantly confirms their decision, whence it follows, Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, that the publicans and harlots shall go before you in the kingdom of God; as much as to say, Not only the Gentiles are before you, but even the publicans and the harlots.

RABANUS. Yet the kingdom of God may be understood of the Gentiles, or of the present Church, in which the Gentiles go before the Jews, because they were more ready to believe.

ORIGEN. Notwithstanding, the Jews are not shut out that they should never enter into the kingdom of God; but, when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have entered in, then all Israel shall be saved. (Rom. 11:25.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. I suppose that the publicans here are to represent all sinful men, and the harlots all sinful women; because avarice is found the most prevailing vice among men, and fornication among women. For a woman's life is passed in idleness and seclusion, which are great temptations to that sin, while a man, constantly occupied in various active duties, falls readily into the snare of covetousness, and not so commonly into fornication, as the anxieties of manly cares preclude thoughts of pleasure, which engage rather the young and idle. Then follows the reason of what He had said, For John came unto you in the way of righteousness, and ye believed him not.

RABANUS. John came preaching the way of righteousness, because he pointed to Christ, who is the fulfilling of the Law.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, because his venerable conversation smote the hearts of sinners, as it follows, But the Publicans and harlots believed on him. Mark how the good life of the preacher gives its force to his preaching, so as to subdue unsubdued hearts. And ye, when ye had seen it, repented not afterward, that ye might believe him; as much as to say, They have done that which is more by believing on Him, ye have not even repented, which is less. But in this exposition which we have set forth according to the mind of many interpreters, there seems to me something inconsistent. For if by the two sons are to be understood the Jews and Gentiles, as soon as the Priests had answered that it was the first son that did his father’s will, then Christ should have concluded His parable with these words, Verily I say unto you, that the Gentiles shall go into the kingdom of God before you. But He says, The Publicans and harlots, a class rather of Jews than of Gentiles. Unless this is to be taken as was said above; So much rather the Gentile people please God than you, that even the Publicans and harlots are more acceptable to Him than you.

JEROME. Whence others think that the parable does not relate to Gentiles and Jews, but simply to the righteous and to sinners. These by their evil deeds had rejected God’s service, but after received from John the baptism of repentance; while the Pharisees who made a shew of righteousness, and boasted that they did the law of God, despising John’s baptism, did not follow his precepts.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This He brings in because the Priests had asked not in order to learn, but to tempt Him. But of the common folk many had believed; and for that reason He brings forward the parable of the two sons, shewing them therein that the common sort, who from the first professed secular lives, were better than the Priests who from the first professed the service of God, inasmuch as the people at length turned repentant to God, but the Priests impenitent, never left off to sin against

God. And the elder son represents the people; because the people is not for the sake of the Priests, but the Priests are for the sake of the people.

21:33–44

33. Hear another parable: There was a certain housholder, which planted a vineyard, and hedged it round about, and digged a winepress in it, and built a tower, and let it out to husbandmen, and went into a far country:

34. And when the time of the fruit drew near, he sent his servants to the husbandmen, that they might receive the fruits of it.

35. And the husbandmen took his servants, and beat one, and killed another, and stoned another.

36. Again, he sent other servants more than the first: and they did unto them likewise.

37. But last of all he sent unto them his son, saying, They will reverence my son.

38. But when the husbandmen saw the son, they said among themselves, This is the heir; come, let us kill him, and let us seize on his inheritance.

39. And they caught him, and cast him out of the vineyard, and slew him.

40. When the lord therefore of the vineyard cometh, what will he do unto those husbandmen?

41. They say unto him, He will miserably destroy those wicked men, and will let out his vineyard unto other husbandmen, which shall render him the fruits in their seasons.

42. Jesus saith unto them, Did ye never read in the Scriptures, The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner: this is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes?

43. Therefore say I unto you, The kingdom of God shall be taken from you. and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof.

44. And whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken: but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii.) The design of this further parable is to shew that their guilt was heinous, and unworthy to be forgiven.

ORIGEN. The householder is God, who in some parables is represented as a man. As it were a father condescending to the infant lisp of his little child, in order to instruct him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He is called man, by title, not by nature; in a kind of likeness, not in verity. For the Son knowing that by occasion of His human name He himself should be blasphemed as though he were mere man, spoke therefore of the Invisible God the Father as man; He who by nature is Lord of Angels and men, but by goodness their Father.

JEROME. He hath planted a vine of which Isaiah speaks, The vine of the Lord of Hosts is the house of Israel. (Isa. 5:7.) And hedged it round about; i. e. either the wall of the city, or the guardianship of Angels.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, by the hedge understand the protection of the holy fathers, who were set as a wall round the people of Israel.

ORIGEN. Or, the hedge which God set round his people was His own Providence; and the winepress was the place of offerings.

JEROME. A winepress, that is to say, An altar; or those winepresses after which the three Psalms, the 8th, the 80th, and the 83d are entitleda, that is to say, the martyrs.

HILARY. Or, He set forth the Prophets as it were winepresses, into which an abundant measure of the Holy Spirit, as of new wine, might flow in a teeming stream.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, the winepress is the word of God, which tortures man when it contradicts his fleshly nature.

JEROME. And built a tower therein, that is, the Temple, of which it is said by Micah, And thou, O cloudy tower of the daughter of Sion. (Mic. 4:8.)

HILARY. Or, The tower is the eminence of the Law, which ascended from earth to heaven, and from which, as from a watch-tower, the coming of Christ might be spied. And let it out to husbandmen.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When, that is, Priests and Levites were constituted by the Law, and undertook the direction of the people. And as an husbandman, though he offer to his Lord of his own stock, does not please him so much as by giving him the fruit of his own vineyard; so the Priest does not so much please God by his own righteousness, as by teaching the people of God holiness; for his own righteousness is but one, but that of the people manifold. And went into a far country.

JEROME. Not a change of place, for God, by whom all things are filled, cannot be absent from any place; but He seems to be absent from the vineyard, that He may leave the vine-dressers a freedom of acting.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, it applies to His long-suffering, in that He did not always bring down immediate punishment on their sins.

ORIGEN. Or, because God who had been with them in the cloud by day, and in the pillar of fire by night, (Exod. 13:21.) never after shewed Himself to them in like manner. In Isaiah (Is. 5:7.) the people of the Jews is called the vineyard, and the threats of the householder are against the vineyard; but in the Gospel not the vineyard but the husbandmen are blamed. For perchance in the Gospel the vineyard is the kingdom of God, that is, the doctrine which is contained in holy Scripture; and a man's blameless life is the fruit of the vineyard. And the letter of Scripture is the hedge set round the vineyard, that the fruits which are hid in it should not be seen by those who are without. The depth of the oracles of God is the winepress of the vineyard, into which such as have profited in the oracles of God pour out their studies like fruit. The tower built therein is the word concerning God Himself, and concerning Christ's dispensations. This vineyard He committed to husbandmen, that is, to the people that was before us, both priests and laity, and went into a far country, by His departure giving opportunity to the husbandmen. The time of the vintage drawing near may be taken of individuals, and of nations. The first season of life is in infancy, when the vineyard has nought to shew, but that it has in it the vital power. As soon as it comes to be able to speak, then is the time of putting forth buds. And as the child's soul progresses, so also does the vineyard, that is, the word of God; and after such progress the vineyard brings forth the ripe fruit of love, joy, peace, and the like. Moreover to the nation who received the Law by Moses, the time of fruit draweth near.

RABANUS. The season of fruit, He says, not of rent-paying, because this stiff-necked nation brings forth no fruit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ. ap. Chrys.) He calls the Prophets servants, who as the Lord's Priests offer the fruits of the people, and the proofs of their obedience in their works. But they shewed their wickedness not only in refusing the fruits, but in having indignation against those that come to them, as it follows, And the husbandmen took his servants, and beat one, and killed another, and stoned another.

JEROME. Beat them, as Jeremiah, killed them, as Isaiah, stoned them, as Naboth and Zacharias, whom they slew between the temple and the altar.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. At each step of their wickedness the mercy of God was increased, and at each step of the Divine mercy the wickedness of the Jews increased; thus there was a strife between human wickedness and Divine goodness.

HILARY. These more than the first who were sent, denote that time, when, after the preaching of single Prophets, a great number was sent forth together.

RABANUS. Or, the first servants who were sent were the Lawgiver Moses himself, and Aaron the first Priest of God; whom, having beaten them with the scourge of their tongue, they sent away empty; by the other servants understand the company of the Prophets.

HILARY. By the Son sent at last, is denoted the advent of our Lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. Wherefore then did He not send Him immediately? That from what they had done to the others they might accuse themselves, and putting away their madness they might reverence His Son when He came.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He sent Him not as the bearer of a sentence of punishment against the guilty, but of an offer of repentance; He sent Him to put them to shame, not to punish them.

JEROME. But when He says, They will reverence my Son, He does not speak as in ignorance. For what is there that this householder (by whom in this place God is intended) knows not? But God is thus spoken of as being uncertain, in order that free-will may be reserved for man.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or He speaks as declaring what ought to be; they ought to reverence Him; thus shewing that their sin was great, and void of all excuse.

ORIGEN. Or we may suppose this fulfilled in the case of those Jews who, knowing Christ, believed in Him. But what follows, But when the husbandmen saw the son, they said among themselves, This is the heir, come let us kill him, and let us seize on the inheritance, was fulfilled in those who saw Christ, and knew Him to be the Son of God, yet crucified Him.

JEROME. Let us enquire of Arrius and Eunomius. See here the Father is said not to know somewhat. Whatever answer they make for the Father, let them understand the same of the Son, when He says that He knows not the day of the consummation of all things. (Mat. 22:36.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But some say, that it was after His incarnation, that Christ was called a Son in right of His baptism like the other saints, whom the Lord refutes by this place, saying, I will send my Son. Therefore when He thus meditated sending His Son after the Prophets, He must have been already His Son. Further, if He had been His Son in the same way as all the saints to whom the word of God was sent, He ought to have called the Prophets also His sons, as He calls Christ, or to call Christ His servant, as He calls the Prophets.

RABANUS. By what they say, This is the Son, He manifestly proves that the rulers of the Jews crucified the Son of God, not through ignorance, but through jealousy. For they understood that it was He to whom the Father speaks by the Prophet, Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance (Ps. 2:8.) The inheritance given to the Son is the holy Church; an inheritance not left Him by His Father when dying, but wonderfully purchased by His own death.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. After His entry into the Temple, and having cast out those who sold the animals for the sacrifices, then they took counsel to kill Him, Come, let us kill him. For they reasoned among themselves, It will happen that the people hereby shall disuse the practice of sacrificing, which pertains to our gain, and shall be content to offer the sacrifice of righteousness, which pertains to the glory of God; and so the nation shall no more be our possession, but shall become God’s. But if we shall kill Him, then there being none to seek the fruit of righteousness from the people, the practice of offering sacrifice shall continue, and so this people shall become our possession; as it follows, And the inheritance shall be ours. These are the usual thoughts of all worldly Priests, who take no thought how the people shall live without sin, but look to how much is offered in the Church, and esteem that the profit of their ministry.

RABANUS. Or, The Jews endeavoured by putting Him to death to seize upon the inheritance, when they strove to overthrow the faith which is through Him, and to substitute their own righteousness which is by the Law, and therewith to imbue the Gentiles. It follows, And they caught him, and cast him out of the vineyard, and slew him.

HILARY. Christ was cast out of Jerusalem, as out of the vineyard, to His sentence of punishment.

ORIGEN. Or, what He says, And cast him out of the vineyard, seems to me to be this; As far as they were concerned they judged Him a stranger both to the vineyard, and the husbandmen. When therefore the Lord of the vineyard cometh, what will he do unto those husbandmen?

JEROME. The Lord asks them not as though He did not know what they would answer, but that they might be condemned by their own answer.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That their answer is true, comes not of any righteous judgment in them, but from the case itself; truth constrained them.

ORIGEN. Like Caiaphas (John 11:49) so did they, not from themselves, prophesy against themselves, that the oracles of God were to he taken from them, and given to the Gentiles, who could bring forth fruit in due season.

GLOSS. (ord.) Or, the Lord whom they killed, came immediately rising from the dead, and brought to an evil end those wicked husbandmen, and gave up His vineyard to other husbandmen, that is, to the Apostles.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 70.) Mark does not give this as their answer, but relates that the Lord after His question put to them, made this answer to Himself. But it may be easily explained, that their words are subjoined in such a way as to shew that they spoke them, without putting in ‘And they answered.’ Or this answer is attributed to the Lord, because, what they said being true, might well be said to have been spoken by Him who is truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or there is no contradiction, because both are right; they first made answer in these words, and then the Lord repeated them.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) This troubles us more, how it is that Luke not only does not relate this to have been their answer, but attributes to them a contrary answer. His words are, And when they heard it they said, God forbid. (Luke 20:16.) The only way that remains for understanding this is, therefore, that of the listening multitudes some answered as Matthew relates, and some as Luke. And let it perplex no one that Matthew says that the Chief Priests and elders of the people came to the Lord, and that he connects the whole of this discourse in one down to this parable of the vineyard, without interposing any other speaker. For it may be supposed that He spoke all these things with the Chief Priests, but that Matthew for brevity’s sake omitted what Luke mentions, namely, that this parable was spoken not to those only who asked Him concerning His authority, but to the populace, among whom were some who said, He shall destroy them, and give the vineyard to others. And at the same time this saying is rightly thought to have been the Lord’s, either for its truth, or for the unity of His members with their head. And there were also those who said, God forbid, those namely, who perceived that He spoke this parable against them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise: Luke has given the answer of their lips, Matthew that of their hearts. For some made answer openly contradicting Him, and saying, God forbid, but their consciences took it up with He shall miserably destroy these wicked men. For so when a man is detected in any wickedness, he excuses himself in words, but his conscience within pleads guilty.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise: the Lord proposed this parable to them with this intent, that not understanding it they should give sentence against themselves; as was done by Nathan to David. Again, when they perceived the meaning of the things that had been said against them, they said, God forbid.

RABANUS. Morally; a vineyard has been let out to each of us to dress, when the mystery of baptism was given us, to be cultivated by action. Servants one, two, and three are sent us when Law, Psalm, and Prophecy are read, after whose instructions we are to work well. He that is sent is beaten and cast out when the word is contemned, or, which is worse, is blasphemed. He kills (as far as in him lies) the heir, who tramples under foot the Son, and does despite to the Spirit of grace. The wicked husbandman is destroyed, and the vineyard is given to another, when the gift of grace which the proud has contemned is given to the lowly.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When they seemed discontent, He brings forward Scripture testimony; as much as to say, If ye understood not My parable, at least acknowledge this Scripture.

JEROME. The same things are treated under various figures; whom above He called labourers and husbandmen, He now calls builders.

CHRYSOSTOM. Christ is the stone, the builders are the Jewish teachers who rejected Christ, saying, This man is not of God. (John 9:16.)

RABANUS. But despite of their displeasure, the same stone furnished the head stone of the corner, for out of both nations He has joined by faith in Him as many as He would.

HILARY. He is become the head of the corner, because He is the union of both sides between the Law and the Gentiles.

CHRYSOSTOM. And that they might know that nothing that had been done was against God’s will, He adds, It is the Lord’s doing.

ORIGEN. That is, the stone is the gift of God to the whole building, and is wonderful in our eyes, who can discern it with the eyes of the mind.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As much as to say, How do ye not understand in what building that stone is to be set, not in yours, seeing it is rejected, but in another; but if the building is to be other, your building will be rejected.

ORIGEN. By the kingdom of God, He means the mysteries of the kingdom of God, that is, the divine Scriptures, which the Lord committed, first to that former people who had the oracles of God, but secondly to the Gentiles who brought forth fruit. For the word of God is given to none but to him who brings fruit thereof, and the kingdom of God is given to none in whom sin reigns. Whence came it then that it was given to them from whom it was afterwards taken away? Remember that whatever is given is given of free gift. To whom then He let out the vineyard, He let it out not as to elect already and believing; but to whom He gave it, He gave it with a sentence of election.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Christ is called A Stone, not only because of His strength, but because He mightily crushes His enemies; whence it follows, And whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken, and on whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder.

JEROME. Whoso sinneth, yet believeth on Him, falls indeed upon a stone and is broken, yet is not altogether crushed, but is preserved to salvation through endurance. But on whomsoever it shall fall, that is, whomsoever this stone shall itself assault, and whosoever shall utterly deny Christ, it shall so crush him, that not a bone of him shall be left in which a drop of water could be taken up.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. It is one thing to be broken, and another to be ground to powder. Of what is broken there remains something; but what is ground to powder is as it were converted into dust. And what falls upon a stone is not broken by any power of the stone, but because it fell heavily, either by reason of its weight, or of its fall from a great height. So a Christian in sinning, perishes, but not to the utmost that Christ can destroy; but only so far as he destroys himself, either by the greatness of his sin, or by his exalted rank. But the unbelievers perish to the utmost that Christ can destroy them.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He here points out their twofold destruction; first in their stumbling and being offended at Him, signified in that, Whosoever shall fall upon this stone; the other in the captivity that should come upon them, signified by that, But upon whomsoever it shall fall.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 30.) Or, Those that fall upon Him, are those that despise and afflict Him. These do not perish utterly, but are broken so that they walk not upright. But upon these He shall fall when He shall come from above in judgment with a punishment of destruction, and thence He says, Shall grind them to powder, because the wicked are like the dust which the wind scattereth abroad on the face of the earth. (Ps. 1:4.).

21:45–46

45. And when the Chief Priests and Pharisees had heard his parables, they perceived that he spake of them.

46. But when they sought to lay hands on him, they feared the multitude, because they took him for a prophet.

JEROME. Hard as were the hearts of the Jews in unbelief, they yet perceived that the Lord’s sentence was directed against themselves.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (in fin. Hom. xxxix.) Here is the difference between good and bad men. The good man when taken in a sin has sorrow because he has sinned, the bad man is grieved not because he has sinned, but because he is found out in his sin; and he not only does not repent, but is indignant with him that reproved him. Thus they being taken in their sins were stirred up to still greater wickedness; And they sought to lay hands on him, but feared the multitude, because they took him for a Prophet.

ORIGEN. One thing they know which is true concerning Him; they esteemed Him a Prophet, though not understanding His greatness in respect of His being the Son of God. But the rulers feared the multitude who thought thus of Him, and were ready to fight for Him; for they could not attain to the understanding which the multitude had, seeing they thought nothing worthy concerning Him. Further, know that there are two different kinds of desires to lay hands on Jesus. The desire of the rulers and Pharisees was one kind; another that of the Bride, I held him, and would not let him go; (Song of Sol. 3:4. ch. 7:8.) intending to try Him still further, as she saith, I will get me up into the palm tree, I will lay hold of its height. All who think not rightly concerning His divinity, seek to lay hands on Jesus in order to put Him to death. Other words indeed excepting the word of Christ it is possible to seize and to hold, but the word of truth none can seize, that is, understand; none can hold it, that is, convict; nor separate it from the conviction of those that believe; nor do it to death, that is, destroy it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Every wicked man also, as far as his will is concerned, lays hands on God, and puts Him to death. For whoso tramples upon God’s commandments, or murmurs against God, or raises a sullen look to heaven, would not he, if he had the power, lay hands on God, and kill Him, that he might sin without restraint?

RABANUS. This, that they are afraid to lay hands on Jesus because of the multitudes, is daily acted in the Church, when any who is a brother only in name, is ashamed or afraid to assail the unity of faith and peace which he does not love, because of the good men with whom he lives.

CHAPTER 22

22:1–14

1. And Jesus answered and spake unto them again by parables, and said,

2. The kingdom of heaven is like unto a certain king, which made a marriage for his son,

3. And sent forth his servants to call them that were bidden to the wedding: and they would not come.

4. Again, he sent forth other servants, saying, Tell them which are bidden, Behold, I have prepared my dinner: my oxen and my fatlings are killed, and all things are ready: come unto the marriage.

5. But they made light of it, and went their ways, one to his farm, another to his merchandise:

6. And the remnant took his servants, and entreated them spitefully, and slew them.

7. But when the king heard thereof, he was wroth: and he sent forth his armies, and destroyed those murderers, and burned up their city.

8. Then saith he to his servants, The wedding is ready, but they which were bidden were not worthy.

9. Go ye therefore into the highways, and as many as ye shall find, bid to the marriage.

10. So those servants went out into the highways, and gathered together all as many as they found, both bad and good: and the wedding was furnished with guests.

11. And when the king came in to see the guests, he saw there a man which had not on a wedding garment:

12. And he saith unto him, Friend, how camest thou in hither not having a wedding garment? And he was speechless.

13. Then said the king to the servants, Bind him hand and foot, and take him away, and cast him into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

14. For many are called, but few are chosen.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxix.) Forasmuch as He had said, And it shall be given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof, He now proceeds to shew what nation that is.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Answered, that is, meeting their evil thoughts of putting Him to death.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 71.) This parable is related only by Matthew. Luke gives one like it, but it is not the same, as the order shews.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxviii. 2.) Here, by the wedding-feast is denoted the present Church; there, by the supper, the last and eternal feast. For into this enter some who shall perish; into that whosoever has once entered in shall never be put forth. But if any should maintain that these are the same lessons, we may perhaps explain that that part concerning the guest who had come in without a wedding garment, which Luke has not mentioned, Matthew has related. That the one calls it supper, the other dinner, makes no difference; for with the ancients the dinner was at the ninth hour, and was therefore often called supper.

ORIGEN. The kingdom of heaven, in respect of Him who reigns there, is like a king; in respect of Him who shares the kingdom, it is like a king’s son; in respect of those things which are in the kingdom, it is like servants and guests, and among them the king’s armies. It is specified, A man that is a king, that what is spoken may be as by a man to men, and that a man may regulate men unwilling to be regulated by God. But the kingdom of heaven will then cease to be like a man, when zeal and contention and all other passions and sins having ceased, we shall cease to walk after men, and shall see Him as He is. For now we see Him not as He is, but as He has been made for us in our dispensation.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) G marriage feast for God the Son, when He joined Him to human nature in the womb of the Virgin. But far be it from us to conclude, that because marriage takes place between two separate persons, that therefore the person of our Redeemer was made up of two separate persons. We say indeed that He exists of two natures, and in two natures, but we hold it unlawful to believe that He was compounded of two persons. It is safer therefore to say, that the marriage feast was made by the King the Father for the King the Son when He joined to Him the Holy Church in the mystery of His incarnation. The womb of the Virgin Mother was the bride-chamber of this Bridegroom.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; When the resurrection of the saints shall be, then the life, which is Christ, shall revive man, swallowing up his mortality in its own immortality. For now we receive the Holy Spirit as a pledge of the future union, but then we shall have Christ Himself more fully in us.

ORIGEN. Or, by the marriage of Bridegroom with Bride, that is, of Christ with the soul, understand the Assumption of the Word, the produce whereof is good works.

HILARY. Rightly has the Father already made this wedding, because this eternal union and espousal of the new body is already perfect in Christ.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When the servants were sent to call them, they must have been invited before. Men have been invited from the time of Abraham, to whom was promised Christ’s incarnation.

JEROME. He sent his servant, without doubt Moses, by whom I le gave the Law, to those who had been invited. But if you read servants as most copies have, it must be referred to the Prophets, by whom they were invited, but neglected to come. By the servants who were sent the second time, we may better understand the Prophets than the Apostles; that is to say, if servant is read in the first place; but if ‘servants,’ then by the second servants are to be understood the Apostles;

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. whom He sent when He said unto them, Go not into the way of the Gentiles, but rather go to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. (Mat. 10:5.)

ORIGEN. Or; The servants who were first sent to call them that were bidden to the wedding, are to be taken as the Prophets converting the people by their prophecy to the festival of the restoration of the Church to Christ. They who would not come at the first message are they who refused to hear the words of the Prophets. The others who were sent a second time were another assembly of Prophets.

HILARY. Or; The servants who were first sent to call them that were bidden, are the Apostles; they who, being before bidden, are now invited to come in, are the people of Israel, who had before been bidden through the Law to the glories of eternity. To the Apostles therefore it belonged to remind those whom the Prophets had invited. Those sent with the second injunction are the Apostolic men their successors.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But because these who were first invited would not come to the feast, the second summons says, Behold, I have prepared my dinner.

JEROME. The dinner that is prepared, the oxen and the fatlings that are killed, is either a description of regal magnificence by the way of metaphor, that by carnal things spiritual may be understood; or the greatness of the doctrines, and the manifold teaching of God in His law, may be understood.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When therefore the Lord bade the Apostles, Go ye and preach, saying, The kingdom of heaven is at hand, it was the same message as is here given, I have prepared my dinner; i. e. I have set out the table of Scripture out of the Law and the Prophets.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) By the oxen are signified the Fathers of the Old Testament; who by sufferance of the Law gored their enemies with the horn of bodily strength. By fatlings are meant fatted animals, for from ‘alere’, comes ‘altilia,’ as it were ‘alitilia’ or ‘alita.’ By the fatlings are intended the Fathers of the New Testament; who while they receive sweet grace of inward fattening, are raised by the wing of contemplation from earthly desires to things above. He says therefore, My oxen and my fallings are killed; as much as to say, Look to the deaths of the Fathers who have been before you, and desire some amendment of your lives.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; He says oxen and fatlings, not as though the oxen were not fatted, but because all the oxen were not fat. Therefore the fatlings denote the Prophets who were filled with the Holy Spirit; the oxen those who were both Priests and Prophets, as Jeremiah and Ezekiel; for as the oxen are the leaders of the herd, so also the Priests are leaders of the people.

HILARY. Or otherwise; The oxen are the glorious army of Martyrs, offered, like choice victims, for the confession of God; the fatlings are spiritual men, as birds fed for flight upon heavenly food, that they may fill others with the abundance of the food they have eaten.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) It is to be observed, that in the first invitation nothing was said of the oxen or fatlings, but in the second it is announced that they are already killed, because Almighty God when we will not hear His words gives examples, that what we suppose impossible may become easy to us to surmount, when we hear that others have passed through it before us.

ORIGEN. Or; The dinner which is prepared is the oracle of God; and so the more mighty of the oracles of God are the oxen; the sweet and pleasant are the fatlings. For if any one bring forward feeble words, without power, and not having strong force of reason, these are the lean things; the fatlings are when to the establishment of each proposition many examples are brought forward backed by reasonable proofs. For example, supposing one holding discourse of chastity, it might well be represented by the turtle-dove; but should he bring forward the same holy discourse full of reasonable proof out of Scripture, so as to delight and strengthen the mind of his hearer, then he brings the dove fatted.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That He says, And all things are now ready, means, that all that is required to salvation is already filled up in the Scriptures; there the ignorant may find instruction; the self-willed may read of terrors; he who is in difficulty may there find promises to rouse him to activity.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Or, All things are now ready, i. e. The entrance into the kingdom, which had been hitherto closed, is now ready through faith in My incarnation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ. sed vid. Gloss. ord.) Or He says, All things are now ready which belong to the mystery of the Lord’s Passion, and our redemption. He says, Come to the marriage, not with your feet, but with faith, and good conduct. But they made light of it; why they did so He shews when He adds, And they went their way, one to his farm, another to his merchandize.

CHRYSOSTOM. These occupations seem to be entirely reasonable; but we learn hence, that however necessary the things that take up our time, we ought to prefer spiritual things to every thing beside. But it seems to me that they only pretended these engagements as a cloak for their disregard of the invitation.

HILARY. For men are taken up with worldly ambition as with a farm; and many through covetousness are engrossed with trafficking.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise; When we work with the labour of our hands, for example, cultivating our field or our vineyard, or any manufacture of wood or iron, we seem to be occupied with our farm;

any other mode of getting money unattended with manual labour is here called merchandize. O most miserable world! and miserable ye that follow it! The pursuits of this world have ever shut men out of life.

GREGORY. Whosoever then intent upon earthly business, or devoted to the actions of this world, feigns to be meditating upon the mystery of the Lord’s Passion, and to be living accordingly, is he that refuses to come to the King’s wedding on pretext of going to his farm or his merchandize. Nay often, which is worse, some who are called not only reject the grace, but become persecutors, And the remnant took his servants, and entreated them despitefully, and slew them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, by the business of a farm, He denotes the Jewish populace, whom the delights of this world separated from-Christ; by the excuse of merchandize, the Priests and other ministers of the Temple, who, coming to the service of the Law and the Temple through greediness of gain, have been shut out of the faith by covetousness. Of these He said not, ‘They were filled with envy,’ but They made light of it. For they who through hate and spite crucified Christ, are they who were filled with envy; but they who being entangled in business did not believe on Him, are not said to have been filled with envy, but to have made light of it. The Lord is silent respecting His own death, because He had spoken of it in the foregoing parable, but He shews forth the death of His disciples, whom after His ascension the Jews put to death, stoning Stephen and executing James the son of Alphæus, for which things Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans. And it is to be observed, that anger is attributed to God figuratively and not properly; He is then said to be angry when He punishes.

JEROME. When He was doing works of mercy, and bidding to His marriage-feast, He was called a man; (homini regi) now when He comes to vengeance, the man is dropped, and He is called only a King.

ORIGEN. Let those who sin against the God of the Law, and the Prophets, and the whole creation, declare whether He who is here called man, and is said to be angry, is indeed the Father Himself. If they allow this, they will be forced to own that many things are said of Him applicable to the passible nature of man; not for that He has passions, but because He is represented to us after the manner of passible human nature. In this way we take God’s anger, repentance, and the other things of the like sort in the Prophets.

JEROME. By His armies we understand the Romans under Vespasian and Titus, who having slaughtered the inhabitants of Judæa, laid in ashes the faithless city.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Roman army is called God’s army; because The earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof; (Ps. 24:1.) nor would the Romans have come to Jerusalem, had not the Lord stirred them thither.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or, The armies of our King are the legions of His Angels. He is said therefore to have sent His armies, and to have destroyed those murderers, because all judgment is executed upon men by the Angels. He destroys those murderers, when He cuts off persecutors; and burns up their city, because not only their souls, but the body of flesh they had tenanted, is tormented in the everlasting fire of hell.

ORIGEN. Or, the city of those wicked men is in each doctrine the assembly of those who meet in the wisdom of the rulers of this world; which the King sets fire to and destroys, as consisting of evil buildings.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But when He sees that His invitation is spurned at, He will not have His Son’s marriage-feast empty; the word of God will find where it may stay itself.

ORIGEN. He saith to His servants, that is, to the Apostles; or to the Angels, who were set over the calling of the Gentiles, The wedding is ready.

REMIGIUS. That is, the whole sacrament of the human dispensation is completed and closed. But they which, were bidden, (Rom. 10:3.) that is, the Jews, were not worthy, because, ignorant of the righteousness of God, and going about to establish their own righteousness, they have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God. The Jewish nation then being rejected, the Gentile people were taken in to the marriage-feast; whence it follows, Go ye out into the crossings of the streets, and as many as ye shall find, bid to the wedding.

JEROME. For the Gentile nation was not in the streets, but in the crossings of the streets.

REMIGIUS. These are the errors of the Gentiles.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or; The streets are all the professions of this world, as philosophy, soldiery, and the like. And therefore He says, Go out into the crossings of the streets, that they may call to the faith men of every condition. Moreover, as chastity is the way that leads to God, so fornication is the way that leads to the Devil; and so it is in the other virtues and vices. Thus He bids them invite to the faith men of every profession or condition.

HILARY. By the street also is to be understood the time of this world, and they are therefore bid to go to the crossings of the streets, because the past is remitted to all.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or otherwise; In holy Scripture, way is taken to mean actions; so that the crossings of the ways we understand as failure in action, for they usually come to God readily, who have had little prosperity in worldly actions.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; I suppose this first bidding to the wedding to have been a bidding of some of the more noble minds. For God would have those before all come to the feast of the divine oracles who are of the more ready wit to understand them; and forasmuch as they who are such are loth to come to that kind of summons, other servants are sent to move them to come, and to promise that they shall find the dinner prepared. For as in the things of the body, one is the bride, others the inviters to the feast, and they that are bidden are others again; so God knows the various ranks of souls, and their powers, and the reasons why these are taken into the condition of the Bride, others in the rank of the servants that call, and others among the number of those that are bidden as guests. But they who had been thus especially invited contemned the first inviters as poor in understanding, and went their way, following their own devices, as more delighting in them than in those things which the King by his servants promised. Yet are these more venial than they who ill-treat and put to death the servants sent unto them; those, that is, who daringly assail with weapons of contentious words the servants sent, who are unequal to solve their subtle difficulties, and those are illtreated or put to death by them. The servants going forth are either Christ’s Apostles going from Judæa and Jerusalem, or the Holy Angels from the inner worlds, and going to the various ways of various manners, gathered together whomsoever they found, not caring whether before their calling they had been good or bad. By the good here we may understand simply the more humble and upright of those who come to the worship of God, to whom agreed what the Apostle says, When the Gentiles which have not the Law do by nature the things contained in the Law, they are a law unto themselves. (Rom. 2:14.)

JEROME. For there is an infinite difference among the Gentiles themselves; some are more prone to vice, others are endowed with more incorrupt and virtuous manners.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or; He means that in this present Church there cannot be bad without good, nor good without bad. He is not good who refuses to endure the bad.

ORIGEN. The marriage-feast of Christ and the Church is filled, when they who were found by the Apostles, being restored to God, sat down to the feast. But since it behoved that both bad and good should be called, not that the bad should continue bad, but that they should put off the garments unmeet for the wedding, and should put on the marriage garments, to wit, bowels of mercy and kindness, for this cause the King goes out, that He may see them set down before the supper is set before them, that they may be detained who have the wedding garment in which He is delighted, and that he may condemn the opposite.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The King came in to see the guests; not as though there was any place where He is not; but where He will look to give judgment, there He is said to be present; where He will not, there He seems to be absent. The day of His coming to behold is the day of judgment, when He will visit Christians seated at the board of the Scriptures.

ORIGEN. But when He was come in, He found there one who had not put off his old behaviour; He saw there a man which had not on a wedding garment. He speaks of one only, because all, who after faith continue to serve that wickedness which they had before the faith, are but of one kind.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) What ought we to understand by the wedding garment, but charity? For this the Lord had upon Him, when He came to espouse the Church to Himself. He then enters in to the wedding feast, but without the wedding garment, who has faith in the Church, but not charity.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xxii. 19.) Or, he goes to the feast without a garment, who goes seeking his own, and not the Bridegroom’s honour.

HILARY. Or; The wedding garment is the grace of the Holy Spirit, and the purity of that heavenly temper, which taken up on the confession of a good enquiry is to be preserved pure and unspotted for the company of the kingdom of heaven.

JEROME. Or; The marriage garment is the commandments of the Lord, and the works which are done under the Law and the Gospel, and form the clothing of the new man. Whoso among the Christian body shall be found in the day of judgment not to have these, is straightway condemned. He saith unto him, Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having a wedding garment? He calls him friend, because he was invited to the wedding as being a friend by faith; but He charges him with want of manners in polluting by his filthy dress the elegance of the wedding entertainment.

ORIGEN. And forasmuch as he who is in sin, and puts not on the Lord Jesus Christ, has no excuse, it follows, But he was speechless.

JEROME. For in that day there will be no room for blustering manner1, nor power of denial, when all the Angels and the world itself are witnesses against the sinner.

ORIGEN. He who has thus insulted the marriage feast is not only cast out therefrom, but besides by the King’s officers, who are set over his prisons, is chained up from that power of walking which he employed not to walk to any good thing, and that power of reaching forth his hand, wherewith he had fulfilled no work for any good; and is sentenced to a place whence all light is banished, which is called outer darkness.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The hands and feet are then bound by a severe sentence of judgment, which before refused to be bound from wicked actions by amendment of life. Or punishment binds them, whom sin had before bound from good works.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. xi. 6.) The bonds of wicked and depraved desires are the chains which bind him who deserves to be cast out into outer darkness.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) By inward darkness we express blindness, of heart; outer darkness signifies the everlasting night of damnation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, it points to the difference of punishment inflicted on sinners. Outer darkness being the deepest, inward darkness the lesser, as it were the outskirts of the place.

JEROME. By a metaphor taken from the body, there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, is shewn the greatness of the torments. The binding of the hands and feet also, and the weeping of eyes, and the gnashing of teeth, understand as proving the truth of the resurrection of the body.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) There shall gnash those teeth which here delighted in gluttony; there shall weep those eyes which here roamed in illicit desire; every member shall there have its peculiar punishment, which here was a slave to its peculiar vice.

JEROME. And because in the marriage and supper the chief thing is the end and not the beginning, therefore He adds, For many are called, but few chosen.

HILARY. For to invite all without exception is a courtesy of public benevolence; but out of the invited or called, the election will be of worth, by distinction of merit.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For some never begin a good course, and some never continue in that good course which they have begun. Let each one's care about himself be in proportion to his ignorance of what is yet to come.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise; Whenever God will try His Church, He enters into it that He may see the guests; and if He finds any one not having on the wedding garment, He enquires of him, How then were you made a Christian, if you neglect these works? Such a one Christ gives over to His ministers, that is, to seducing leaders, who bind his hands, that is, his works, and his feet, that is, the motions of his mind, and cast him into darkness, that is, into the errors of the Gentiles or the Jews, or into heresy. The nigher darkness is that of the Gentiles, for they have never heard the truth which they despise; the outer darkness is that of the Jews, who have heard but do not believe; the outermost is that of the heretics, who have heard and have learned.

22:15–22

15. Then went the Pharisees, and took counsel how they might entangle him in his talk.

16. And they sent out unto him their disciples with the Herodians, saying, Master, we know that thou art true, and teachest the way of God in truth, neither carest thou for any man: for thou regardest not the person of men.

17. Tell us therefore, What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cæsar, or not?

18. But Jesus perceived their wickedness, and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites?

19. Shew me the tribute money. And they brought unto him a penny.

20. And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription?

21. They say unto him, Cæsar’s. Then saith he unto them, Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.

22. When they had heard these words, they marvelled, and left him, and went their way.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As when one seeks to dam a stream of running water, as soon as one outlet is stopped up it makes another channel for itself; so the malevolence of the Jews, foiled on one hand, seeks itself out another course. Then went the Pharisees; went to the Herodians. Such as the plan was, such were the planners; They send unto Him their disciples with the Herodians.

GLOSS. (ord.) Who as unknown to Him, were more likely to ensnare Him, and so through them they might take Him, which they feared to do of themselves because of the populace.

JEROME. Lately under Cæsar Augustus, Judæa, which was subject to the Romans, had been made tributary when the census was held of the whole world; and there was a great division among the people, some saying that tribute ought to be paid to the Romans in return for the security and quiet which their arms maintained for all. The Pharisees on the other hand, self-satisfied in their own righteousness, contended that the people of God who paid tithes and gave first-fruits, and did all the other things which are written in the Law, ought not to be subject to human laws. But Augustus had given the Jews as king, Herod, son of Antipater, a foreigner and proselyte; he was to exact the tribute, yet to be subject to the Roman dominion. The Pharisees therefore send their disciples with the Herodians, that is, with Herod’s soldiers, or those whom the Pharisees in mockery called Herodians, because they paid tribute to the Romans, and were not devoted to the worship of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx.) They send their disciples and Herod’s soldiers together, that whatever opinion the might give might be found fault with. Yet would they rather have had Him say somewhat against the Herodians; for being themselves afraid to lay hands on Him because of the populace, they sought to bring Him into danger through His liability to pay tribute.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This is the commonest act of hypocrites, to commend those they would ruin. Thus, these break out into praises of Him, saying, Master, we know that Thou art true. They call Him Master, that, deceived by this shew of honour and respect, He might in simplicity open all His heart to them, as seeking to gain them for disciples.

GLOSS. (non occ.) There are three ways in which it is possible for one not to teach the truth. First, on the side of the teacher, who may either not know, or not love the truth; guarding against this, they say, We know that Thou art true. Secondly, on the side of God, there are some who, putting aside all fear of Him, do not utter honestly the truth which they know respecting Him; to exclude this they say, And teachest the way of God in truth. Thirdly, on the side of our neighbour, when through fear or affection any one withholds the truth; to exclude this they say, And carest for no man, for Thou regardest not the person of man.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was a covert allusion to Herod and Cæsar.

JEROME. This smooth and treacherous enquiry was a kind of challenge to the answerer to fear God rather than Cæsar, and immediately they say, Tell us therefore, what thinkest Thou? Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar or not? Should He say tribute should not be paid, the Herodians would immediately accuse Him as a person disaffected to the Emperor.

CHRYSOSTOM. They knew that certain had before suffered death for this very thing, as plotting a rebellion against the Romans, therefore they sought by such discourse to bring Him into the same suspicion.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He makes an answer not corresponding to the smooth tone of their address, but harsh, suitable to their cruel thoughts; for God answers men’s hearts, and not their words.

JEROME. This is the first excellence of the answerer, that He discerns the thoughts of His examiners, and calls them not disciples but tempters. A hypocrite is he who is one thing, and feigns himself another.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He therefore calls them hypocrites, that seeing Him to be a discerner of human hearts, they might not be hardy enough to carry through their design. Observe thus how the Pharisees spoke fair that they might destroy Him, but Jesus put them to shame that He might save them; for God’s wrath is more profitable to man, than man’s favour.

JEROME. Wisdom does ever wisely, and so the tempters are best confuted out of their own words; therefore it follows, Shew me the tribute money; and they brought unto Him a denarius. This was a coin reckoned equivalent to ten sesterces, and bore the image of Cæsar. Let those who think that the Saviour asks because He is ignorant, learn from the present place that it is not so, for at all events Jesus must have known whose image was on the coin. They say unto Him, Cæsar's; not Augustus, but Tiberius, under whom also the Lord suffered. All the Roman Emperors were called Cæsar, from Caius Cæsar who first seized the chief power. Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's; i. e. the coin, tribute, or money.

HILARY. For if there remain with us nothing that is Cæsar's, we shall not be bound by the condition of rendering to him the things that are his; but if we lean upon what is his, if we avail ourselves of the lawful protection of his power, we cannot complain of it as any wrong if we are required to render to Cæsar the things of Cæsar.

CHRYSOSTOM. But when you hear this command to render to Cæsar the things of Cæsar, know that such things only are intended which in nothing are opposed to religion; if such there be, it is no longer Cæsar's but the Devil's tribute. And moreover, that they might not say that He was subjecting them to man, He adds, And unto God the things that, are God's.

JEROME. That is, tithes, first-fruits, oblation, and victims; as the Lord Himself rendered to Cæsar tribute, both for Himself and for Peter; and also rendered unto God the things that are God's in doing the will of His Father.

HILARY. It behoves us also to render unto God the things that are His, namely, body, soul, and will. For Cæsar's coin is in the gold, in which His image was pourtrayed, that is, God's coin, on which the Divine image is stamped; give therefore your money to Cæsar, but preserve a conscience void of offence for God.

ORIGEN. From this place we learn by the Saviour's example not to be allured by those things which have many voices for them, and thence seem famous, but to incline rather to those things which are spoken according to some method of reason. But we may also understand this place morally, that we ought to give some things to the body as a tribute to Cæsar, that is to say, necessaries. And such things as are congenial to our souls' nature, that is, such things as lead to virtue, those we ought to offer to God. They then who without any moderation inculcate the law of God, and command us to have no care for the things required by the body, are the Pharisees, who forbad to give tribute to Cæsar, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, which God hath created. (1 Tim. 4:3.) They, on the other hand, who allow too much indulgence to the body are the Herodians. But our Saviour would neither that virtue should be enfeebled by immoderate devotedness to the flesh; nor that our fleshly nature should be oppressed by our unremitting efforts after virtue. Or the prince of this world, that is, the Devil, is called Cæsar; and we cannot render to God the things that are God's, unless we have first rendered to this prince all that is his, that is, have cast off all wickedness. This moreover let us learn from this place, that to those who tempt us we should neither be totally silent, nor yet answer openly, but with caution, to cut off all occasion from those who seek occasion in us, and teach without blame the things which may save those who are willing to be saved.

JEROME. They who ought to have believed did but wonder at His great wisdom, that their craft had found no means for ensnaring Him: whence it follows, When they had heard these words, they marvelled, and left Him, and went their way, carrying away their unbelief and wonder together.

22:23–33

23. The same day came to him the Sadducees, which say that there is no resurrection, and asked him,

24. Saying, Master, Moses said, If a man die, having no children, his brother shall marry his wife, and raise up seed unto his brother.

25. Now there were with us seven brethren: and the first, when he had married a wife, deceased, and, having no issue, left his wife unto his brother:

26. Likewise the second also, and the third, unto the seventh.

27. And last of all the woman died also.

28. Therefore in the resurrection whose wife shall she be of the seven? for they all had her.

29. Jesus answered and said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God.

30. For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven.

31. But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying,

32. I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living.

33. And when the multitude heard this, they were astonished at his doctrine.

CHRYSOSTOM. The disciples of the Pharisees with the Herodians being thus confuted, the Sadducees next offer themselves, whereas the overthrow of those before them ought to have kept them back. But presumption is shameless, stubborn, and ready to attempt things impossible. So the Evangelist, wondering at their folly, expresses this, saying, The same day came to him the Sadducees.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As soon as the Pharisees were gone, came the Sadducees; perhaps with like intent, for there was a strife among them who should be the first to seize Him. Or if by argument they should not be able to overcome Him, they might at least by perseverance wear out His understanding.

JEROME. There were two sects among the Jews, the Pharisees and the Sadducees; the Pharisees pretended to the righteousness of traditions and observances, whence they were called by the people ‘separate.’ The Sadducees (the word is interpreted ‘righteous’) also passed themselves for what they were not; and whereas the first believed the resurrection of body and soul, and confessed both Angel and spirit, these, according to the Acts of the Apostles, denied them all, as it is here also said, Who say that there is no resurrection. (Acts 23:8.)

ORIGEN. They not only denied the resurrection of the body, but took away the immortality of the soul.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For the Devil finding himself unable to crush utterly the religion of God, brought in the sect of the Sadducees denying the resurrection of the dead, thus breaking down all purpose of a righteous life, for who is there would endure a daily struggle against himself, unless he looked to the hope of the resurrection?

GREGORY. (Mor. xiv. 55.) But there are who observing that the spirit is loosed from the body, that the flesh is turned to corruption, that the corruption is reduced to dust, and that the dust again is resolved into the elements, so as to be unseen by human eyes, despair of the possibility of a resurrection, and while they look upon the dry bones, doubt that they can be clothed with flesh, and be quickened anew to life.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 88.) But that earthy matter of which the flesh of men is made perishes not before God; but into whatsoever dust or ashes reduced, into whatsoever gases or vapours dispersed, into whatsoever other bodies incorporated, though resolved into the elements, though become the food or part of the flesh of animals or men, yet is it in a moment of time restored to that human soul, which at the first quickened it that it became man, lived and grew.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But the Sadducees thought they had now discovered a most convincing argument in favour of their error.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) For because death to the Jews, who did all things for the present life, seemed an unmixed evil, Moses ordered that the wife of one who died without sons should be given to his brother, that a son might be born to the dead man by his brother, and his name should not perish, which was some alleviation of death. And none other but a brother or relation was commanded to take the wife of the dead; otherwise the child born would not have been considered the son of the dead; and also because a stranger could have no concern in establishing the house of him that was dead, as a brother whose kindred obliged him thereto.

JEROME. As they disbelieved the resurrection of the body, and supposed that the soul perished with the body, they accordingly invent a fable to display the fondness of the belief of a resurrection. Thus they put forward a base fiction to overthrow the verity of the resurrection, and conclude with asking, in the resurrection whose shall she be? Though it might be that such an instance might really occur in their nation.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i, 32.) Mystically; by these seven brethren are understood the wicked, who could not bring forth the fruit of righteousness in the earth through all the seven ages of the world, during which this earth has being, for afterwards this earth also shall pass away, through which all those seven passed away unfruitful.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Wisely does He first convict them of folly, in that they did not read; and afterwards of ignorance, in that they did not know God. For of diligence in reading springs knowledge of God, but ignorance is the offspring of neglect.

JEROME. They therefore err because they know not the Scriptures; and because they know not the power of God.

ORIGEN. Two (1 Cor. 1:24.) things there are which He says they know not, the Scriptures and the power of God, by which is brought to pass the resurrection, and the new life in it. Or by the power of God, which the Lord here convicts the Sadducees that they knew not, He intends Himself, who was the power of God; and Him they knew not, as not knowing the Scriptures which spoke of Him; and thence also they believed not the resurrection, which He should effect. But it is asked when the Saviour says, Ye do err not knowing the Scriptures, if He means that this text, They neither marry, nor are given in marriage, is in some Scripture, though it is not read in the Old Testament? We say that these very words are indeed not found, but that the truth is in a mystery implied in the moral sense of Scripture; the Law, which is a shadow of good things to come, whenever it speaks of husbands and wives, speaks chiefly of spiritual wedlock. But neither this do I find any where spoken in Scripture that the Saints shall be after their departure as the Angels of God, unless one will understand this also to be inferred morally; as where it is said, And thou shalt go to thy fathers, (Gen. 15:15.) and He was gathered to his people. (Gen. 25:8.) Or one may say; He blamed them that they read not the other Scriptures which are besides the Law, and therefore they erred. Another says, That they knew not the Scriptures of the Mosaic Law, for this reason, that they did not sift their divine sense.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, when He says, In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, He referred to what He had said, Ye know not the power of God; but when the proceeded, I am the God of Abraham, &c. to that Ye know not the Scriptures. And thus ought we to do; to cavillers first to set forth Scripture authority on any question, and then to shew the grounds of reason; but to those who ask out of ignorance to shew first the reason, and then the authority. For cavillers ought to be refuted, enquirers taught. To these then who put their question in ignorance, the first shews the reason, saying, In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage.

JEROME. In these words the Latin language cannot follow the Greek idiom. For the Latin word ‘nubere’ is correctly said only of the woman. But we must take it so as to understand marry of men, to be given in marriage of women.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. In this life that we may die, therefore are we born; and we marry to the end that that which death consumes, birth may replenish; therefore where the law of death is taken away, the cause of birth is taken away likewise.

HILARY. It had been enough to have cut off this opinion of the Sadducees of sensual enjoyment, that where the function ceased, the empty pleasure of the body accompanying it ceased also; but He adds, But are as the Angels of God in heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. Which is an apt reply to their question. For their reason for judging that there would be no resurrection, was that they supposed that their condition when risen would be the same; this reason then He removes by shewing that their condition would be altered.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. It should be noted, that when He spoke of fasting, alms, and other spiritual virtues, He did not bring in the comparison of Angels, but only here where He speaks of the ceasing of marriage. For as all acts of the flesh are animal acts, but this of lust especially so; so all the virtues are angelic acts, but especially chastity, by which our nature is bound to the other virtues.

JEROME. This that is added, But areas the Angels of God in heaven, is an assurance that our conversation in heaven shall be spiritual.

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. (de Divin. Nom. i.) For then when we shall be incorruptible and immortal, by the visible presence of God Himself we shall be filled with most chaste contemplations, and shall share the gift of light to the understanding in our impassible and immaterial soul after the fashion of the exalted souls in heaven; on which account it is said that we shall be equal to the Angels.

HILARY. The same cavil that the Sadducees here offer respecting marriage is renewed by many who ask in what form the female sex shall rise again. But what the authority of Scripture leads us to think concerning the Angels, so must we suppose that it will be with women in the resurrection of our species.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xxii. 17.) To me they seem to think most justly, who doubt not that both sexes shall rise again. For there shall be no desire which is the cause of confusion, for before they had sinned they were naked; and that nature which they then had shall be preserved, which was quit both of conception and of child-birth. Also the members of the woman shall not be adapted to their former use, but framed for a new beauty, one by which the beholder is not allured to lust, which shall not then be, but God's wisdom and mercy shall be praised, which made that to be which was not, and delivered from corruption that which was made.

JEROME. For none could say of a stone and a tree or inanimate things, that they shall not marry nor be given in marriage, but of such things only as having capacity for marriage, shall yet in a sort not marry.

RABANUS. These things which are spoken concerning the conditions of the resurrection He spoke in answer to their enquiry, but of the resurrection itself He replies aptly against their unbelief.

CHRYSOSTOM. And because they had put forward Moses in their question, He confutes them by Moses, adding, But concerning the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read.

JEROME. In proof of the resurrection there were many plainer passages which He might have cited; among others that of Isaiah, The dead shall be raised; they that are in the tombs shall rise again: (Is. 26:19. juxta LXX.) and in another place, Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake. (Dan. 12:2.) It is enquired therefore why the Lord should have chosen this testimony which seems ambiguous, and not sufficiently belonging to the truth of the resurrection; and as if by this He had proved the point adds, He is not the God of the dead, but of the living. We have said above that the Sadducees confessed neither Angel, nor spirit, nor resurrection of the body, and taught also the death of the soul. But they also received only the five books of Moses, rejecting the Prophets. It would have been foolish therefore to have brought forward testimonies whose authority they did not admit. To prove the immortality of souls therefore, He brings forward an instance out of Moses, I am the God of Abraham, &c. and then straight subjoins, He is not the God of the dead, but of the living; so that having established that souls abide after death, (forasmuch as God could not be the God of those who had no existence any where,) there might fitly come in the resurrection of bodies which had together with their souls done good or evil.

CHRYSOSTOM. How then is it said in another place, Whether we live or die, we are the Lord's. (Rom. 14:8.) This which is said here differs from that. The dead are the Lord’s, those, that is, who are to live again, not those who have disappeared for ever, and shall not rise again.

HILARY. It should be further considered, that this was said to Moses at a time when those holy Patriarchs had gone to their rest. They therefore of whom He was the God were in being; for they could have had nothing, if they had not been in being; for in the nature of things that, of which somewhat else is, must have itself a being; so they who have a God must themselves be alive, since God is eternal, and it is not possible that that which is dead should have that which is eternal. How then shall it be affirmed that those do not, and shall not hereafter, exist, of whom Eternity itself has said that He is?

ORIGEN. God moreover is He who says, I am that I am; (Ex. 3:14.) so that it is impossible that He should be called the God of those who are not. And see that He said not, I am the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, but The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. But in another place He said thus, The God of the Hebrews hath sent me unto thee. (Exod. 7:16.) For they who in comparison of other men are most perfect before God, have God entirely in them, wherefore He is not said to be their God in common, but of each in particular. As when we say, That farm is theirs, we shew that each of them does not own the whole of it; but when we say, That farm is his, we mean that he is owner of the whole of it. When then it is said, The God of the Hebrews, this shews their imperfection, that each of them has some small portion in God. But it is said, The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, because each one of these possessed God entirely. And it is to the no small honour of the Patriarchs that they lived to God.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xvi. 24.) Seasonably may we confute the Manichæans by this same passage by which the Sadducees were then confuted, for they too though in another manner deny the resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. xi. 8.) God is therefore called in particular The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, because in these three are expressed all the modes of begetting the sons of God. For God begets most times of a good preacher a good son, and of a bad preacher a bad son. This is signified in Abraham, who of a free woman had a believing son, and of a bondslave an unbelieving son. Sometimes indeed of a good preacher He begets both good and bad sons, which is signified in

Isaac, who of the same free woman begot one good and the other bad. And sometimes He begets good sons both of good and bad preachers; which is signified in Jacob, who begot good sons both of free women and of bondmaids.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And see how the assault of the Jews against Christ becomes more faint. Their first challenge was in a threatening tone, By what authority doest thou these things, to oppose which firmness of spirit was needed. Their second was with guile, to meet which was needed wisdom. This last was with ignorant presumption which is easier to cope with than the others. For he that thinks he knows somewhat, when he knows nothing, is an easy conquest for one who has understanding. Thus the attacks of an enemy are vehement at first, but if one endure them with a courageous spirit, he will find them more feeble. And when the multitudes heard this, they were astonished at his doctrine.

REMIGIUS. Not the Sadducees but the multitudes were astonished. This is daily done in the Church; when by Divine inspiration the adversaries of the Church are overcome, the multitude of the faithful rejoice.

22:34–40

34. But when the Pharisees had heard that he had put the Sadducees to silence, they were gathered together.

35. Then one of them, which was a Lawyer, asked him a question, tempting him, and saying,

36. Master, which is the great commandment in the Law?

37. Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.

38. This is the first and great commandment.

39. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

40. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.

JEROME. The Pharisees having been themselves already confuted (in the matter of the denarius), and now seeing their adversaries also overthrown, should have taken warning to attempt no further deceit against Him; but hate and jealousy are the parents of impudence.

ORIGEN. Jesus had put the Sadducees to silence, to shew that the tongue of falsehood is silenced by the brightness of truth. For as it belongs to the righteous man to be silent when it is good to be silent, and to speak when it is good to speak, and not to hold his) peace; so it belongs to every teacher of a the Not indeed to be silent, but to be silent as far as any good purpose is concerned.

JEROME. The Pharisees and Sadducees, thus foes to one another, unite in one common purpose to tempt Jesus.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or the Pharisees meet together, that their numbers may silence Him whom their reasonings could not confute; thus, while they array numbers against Him, shewing that truth failed them; they said among themselves, Let one speak for all, and all speak, through one, so if He prevail, the victory may seem to belong to all; if He be overthrown, the defeat may rest with Him alone; so it follows, Then one of them, a teacher of the Law, asked him a question, tempting him.

ORIGEN. All who thus ask questions of any teacher to try him, and not to learn of him, we must regard as brethren of this Pharisee, according to what is said below, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of mine, ye have done it unto me. (Matt. 25:40.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 73.) Let no one find a difficulty in this, that Matthew speaks of this man as putting his question to tempt the Lord, whereas Mark does not mention this, but concludes with what the Lord said to him upon his answering wisely, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God. (Mark 12:34.) For it is possible that, though he came to tempt, yet the Lord’s answer may have wrought correction within him. Or, the tempting here meant need not be that of one designing to deceive an enemy, but rather the cautious approach of one making proof of a stranger. And that is not written in vain, Whoso believeth lightly, he is of a vain heart. (Ecclus. 19:4.)

ORIGEN. He said Master tempting Him, for none but a disciple would thus address Christ. Whoever then does not learn of the Word, nor yields himself wholly up to it, yet calls it Master, he is brother to this Pharisee thus tempting Christ. Perhaps while they read the Law before the Saviour’s coming, it was a question among them which was the great commandment in it; nor would the Pharisee have asked this, if it had not been long time enquired among themselves, but never found till Jesus came and declared it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He who now enquires for the greatest commandment had not observed the least. He only ought to seek for a higher righteousness who has fulfilled the lower.

JEROME. Or he enquires not for the sake of the commands, but which is the first and great commandment, that seeing all that God commands is great, he may have occasion to cavil whatever the answer be.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But the Lord so answers him, as at once to lay bare the dissimulation of his enquiry, Jesus saith unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. Thou shalt love, not ‘fear,’ for to love is more than to fear; to fear belongs to slaves, to love to sons; fear is in compulsion, love in freedom. Whoso serves God in fear escapes punishment, but has not the reward of righteousness because he did well unwillingly through fear. God does not desire to be served servilely by men as a master, but to be loved as a father, for that He has given the spirit of adoption to men. But to love God with the whole heart, is to have the heart inclined to the love of no one thing more than of God. To love God again with the whole soul is to have the mind stayed upon the truth, and to be firm in the faith. For the love of the heart and the love of the soul are different. The first is in a sort carnal, that we should love God even with our flesh, which we cannot do unless we first depart from the love of the things of this world. The love of the heart is felt in the heart, but the love of the soul is not felt, but is perceived because it consists in a judgment of the soul. For he who believes that all good is in God, and that without Him is no good, he loves God with his whole soul. But to love God with the whole mind, is to have all the faculties open and unoccupied for Him. He only loves God with his whole mind, whose intellect ministers to God, whose wisdom is employed about God, whose thoughts travail in the things of God, and whose memory holds the things which are good.

AUGUSTINE. (de Doctr. Christ. i. 22.) Or otherwise; You are commanded to love God with all thy heart, that your whole thoughts—with all thy soul, that your whole life—with all thy mind, that your whole understanding—may be given to Him from whom you have that you give. Thus He has left no part of our life which may justly be unfilled of Him, or give place to the desire after any other final good1; but if aught else present itself for the soul’s love, it should be absorbed into that channel in which the whole current of love runs. For man is then the most perfect when his whole life tends towards the life2 unchangeable, and clings to it with the whole purpose of his soul.

GLOSS. Or, with all thy heart, i. e. understanding; with all thy soul, i.e. thy will; with all thy mind, i.e. memory; so you shall think, will, remember nothing contrary to Him.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; With all thy heart, that is, in all recollection, act, thought; with all thy soul, to be ready, that is, to lay it down for God's religion; with all thy mind, bringing forth nothing but what is of God. And consider whether you cannot thus take the heart of the understanding, by which we contemplate things intellectual, and the mind of that by which we utter thoughts, walking as it were with the mind through each expression, and uttering it. If the Lord had given no answer to the Pharisee who thus tempted Him, we should have judged that there was no commandment greater than the rest. But when the Lord adds, This is the first and great commandment, we learn how we ought to think of the commandments, that there is a great one, and that there are less down to the least. And the Lord says not only that it is a great, but that it is the first commandment, not in order of Scripture, but in supremacy of value. They only take upon them the greatness and supremacy of this precept, who not only love the Lord their God, but add these three conditions. Nor did He only teach the first and great commandment, but added that there was a second like unto the first, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. But if Whoso loveth iniquity hath hated his own soul, (Ps. 11:5.) it is manifest that he does not love his neighbour as himself, when he does not love himself.

AUGUSTINE. (de Doctr. Christ. i. 30.) It is clear that every man is to be regarded as a neighbour, because evil is to be done to no man. Further, if every one to whom we are bound to shew service of mercy, (vid. Rom. 13:10.) or who is bound to shew it to us, be rightly called our neighbour, it is manifest that in this precept are comprehended the holy Angels who perform for us those services of which we may read in Scripture. Whence also our Lord Himself would be called our neighbour; for it was Himself whom He represents as the good Samaritan, who gave succour to the man who was left half-dead by the way.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. viii. 6.) He that loves men ought to love them either because they are righteous, or that they may be righteous; and so also ought he to love himself either for that he is, or that he may be righteous. And thus without peril he may love his neighbour as himself.

AUGUSTINE. (de Doctr. Christ, i. 22.) But if even yourself you ought not to love for your own sake, but because of Him in whom is the rightful end of your love, let not another man be displeased that you love even him for God’s sake. Whoso then rightly loves his neighbour, ought to endeavour with him that he also with his whole heart love God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But who loves man is as who loves God; for man is God’s image, wherein God is loved, as a King is honoured in his statue. For this cause this commandment is said to be like the first.

HILARY. Or otherwise; That the second command is like the first signifies that the obligation and merit of both are alike; for no love of God without Christ, or of Christ without God, can profit to salvation.

It follows, On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 33.) Hang, that is, refer thither as their end.

RABANUS. For to these two commandments belongs the whole decalogue; the commandments of the first table to the love of God, those of the second to the love of our neighbour.

ORIGEN. Or, because he that has fulfilled the things that are written concerning the love of God and our neighbour, is worthy to receive from God the great reward, that he should be enabled to understand the Law and the Prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. viii. 7.) Since there are two commandments, the love of God and the love of our neighbour, on which hang the Law and the Prophets, not without reason does Scripture put one for both; sometimes the love of God; as in that, We know that all tilings work together for good to them that love God; (Rom. 8:28.) and sometimes the love of our neighbour; as in that, All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself. (Gal. 5:14.) And that because if a man love his neighbour, it follows therefrom that he loves God also; for it is the selfsame affection by which we love God, and by which we love our neighbour, save that we love God for Himself, but ourselves and our neighbour for God’s sake.

AUGUSTINE. (De Doctr. Christ. i. 30. et 26.) But since the Divine substance is more excellent and higher than our nature, the command to love God is distinct from that to love our neighbour. But if by yourself, you understand your whole self, that is both your soul and your body, and in like manner of your neighbour, there is no sort of things to be loved omitted in these commands. The love of God goes first, and the rule thereof is so set out to us as to make all other loves center in that, so that nothing seems said of loving yourself. But then follows, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself, so that love of yourself is not omitted.

22:41–46

41. While the Pharisees were gathered together, Jesus asked them,

42. Saying, What think ye of Christ? whose son is he? They say unto him, The Son of David.

43. He saith unto them, How then doth David in spirit call him Lord, saying,

44. The Lord saith unto my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool?

45. If David then call him Lord, how is he his son?

46. And no man was able to answer him a word, neither durst any man from that day forth ask him any more questions.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The Jews tempted Christ, supposing Him to be mere man; had they believed Him to be the Son of God, they would not have tempted Him. Christ therefore, willing to shew that He knew the treachery of their hearts, and that He was God, yet would not declare this truth to them plainly, that they might not take occasion thence to charge Him with blasphemy, and yet would not totally conceal this truth; because to that end had He come that He should preach the truth; He therefore puts a question to them, such as should declare to them who He was; What think ye of Christ? whose Son is He?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxi.) He first asked His disciples what others said of Christ, and then what they themselves said; but not so to these. For they would have said that He was a deceiver, and wicked. They thought that Christ was to be mere man, and therefore they say unto Him, The Son of David. To reprove this, He brings forward the Prophet, witnessing His dominion, proper Sonship, and His joint honour with His Father.

JEROME. This passage is out of the 109th Psalm. Christ is therefore called David’s Lord, not in respect of His descent from him, but in respect of His eternal generation from the Father, wherein He was before His fleshly Father. And he calls Him Lord, not by a mere chance, nor of his own thought, but by the Holy Spirit.

REMIGIUS. That He says, Sit thou on my right hand, is not to be taken as though God had a body, and either a right hand or a left hand; but to sit on the right hand of God is to abide in the honour and equality of the Father’s majesty.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. I suppose that He formed this question, not only against the Pharisees, but also against the heretics; for according to the flesh He was truly David’s Son, but his Lord according to His Godhead.

CHRYSOSTOM. But He rests not with this, but that they may fear, He adds, Till I make thine enemies thy footstool; that at least by terror He might gain them.

ORIGEN. For God puts Christ’s enemies as a footstool beneath His feet, for their salvation as well as their destruction.

REMIGIUS. But till is used for indefinite time, that the meaning be, Sit Thou for ever, and for ever hold thine enemies beneath thy feet.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) That it is by the Father that the enemies are put under the Son, denotes not the Son’s weakness, but the union of His nature with His Father. For the Son also puts under Him the Father’s enemies, when He glorifies His name upon earth. He concludes from this authority, If David then call Him Lord, how is He his son?

JEROME. This question is still available for us against the Jews; for these who believe that Christ is yet to come, assert that He is a mere man, though a holy one, of the race of David. Let us then thus taught by the Lord ask them, If He be mere man, and only the Son of David, how does David call Him his Lord? To evade the truth of this question, the Jews invent many frivolous answers. They allege Abraham’s steward, he whose son was Eliezer of Damascus, and say that this Psalm was composed in his person, when after the overthrow of the five kings, the Lord God said to his lord Abraham, Sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool. Let us ask how Abraham could say the things that follow, and compel them to tell us how Abraham was born before Lucifer, and how he was a Priest after the order of Melchisedech, for whom Melchisedech brought bread and wine, and of whom he received tithes of the spoil?

CHRYSOSTOM. This conclusion He put to their questionings, as final, and sufficient to stop their mouth. Henceforward accordingly they held their peace, not by their own good-will, but from not having aught to say.

ORIGEN. For had their question sprung of desire to know, He would never have proposed to them such things as should have deterred them from asking further.

RABANUS. Hence we learn that the poison of jealousy may be overcome, but can hardly of itself rest at peace.

CHAPTER 23

23:1–4

1. Then spake Jesus to the multitude, and to his disciples,

2. Saying, The Scribes and the Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat:

3. All therefore whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do; but do not ye after their works: for they say, and do not.

4. For they bind heavy burdens and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men’s shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. When the Lord had overthrown the Priests by His answer, and shewn their condition to be irremediable, forasmuch as clergy, when they do wickedly, cannot be amended, but laymen who have gone wrong are easily set right, He turns His discourse to His Apostles and the people. For that is an unprofitable word which silences one, without conveying improvement to another.

ORIGEN. The disciples of Christ are better than the common herd; and you may find in the Church such as with more ardent affection come to the word of God; these are Christ’s disciples, the rest are only His people. And sometimes He speaks to His disciples alone, sometimes to the multitudes and His disciples together, as here. The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses’ seat, as professing his Law, and boasting that they can interpret it. Those that do not depart from the letter of the Law are the Scribes; those who make high professions, and separate themselves from the vulgar as better than they, are called Pharisees, which signifies ‘separate.’ Those who understand and expound Moses according to his spiritual meaning, these sit indeed on Moses’ seat, but are neither Scribes nor Pharisees, but better than either, Christ’s beloved disciples. Since His coming these have sat upon the seat of the Church, which is the seat of Christ.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But regard must be had to this, after what sort each man fills his seat; for not the seat makes the Priest, but the Priest the seat; the place does not consecrate the man, but the man the place. A wicked Priest derives guilt and not honour from his Priesthood.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii.) But that none should say, For this cause am I slack to practise, because my instructor is evil, He removes every such plea, saying, All therefore whatsoever they say unto you, that observe and do, for they speak not their own, but God’s, which things He taught through Moses in the Law. And look with how great honour He speaks of Moses, shewing again what harmony there is with the Old Testament.

ORIGEN. But if the Scribes and Pharisees who sit in Moses’ seat are the teachers of the Jews, teaching the commandments of the Law according to the letter, how is this that the Lord bids us do after all things which they say; but the Apostles in the Acts forbid the believers to do according to the letter of the Law. (Acts 15:19.) These indeed taught after the letter, not understanding the Law spiritually. Whatsoever they say to us out of the Law, with understanding of its sense, that we do and keep, not doing after their works, for they do not what the law enjoins, nor perceive the veil that is upon the letter of the Law. Or by all we are not to understand every thing in the Law, many things for example relating to the sacrifices, and the like, but such as concern our conduct. But why did He command this not of the Law of grace, but of the doctrine of Moses? Because truly it was not the time to publish the commandments of the New Law before the season of His passion. I think also that He had herein something further in view. He was about to bring many things against the Scribes and Pharisees in His discourse following, wherefore that vain men might not think that He coveted their place of authority, or spoke thus out of enmity to them, he first puts away from Himself this suspicion, and then begins to reprove them, that the people might not fall into their faults; and that, because they ought to hear them, they should not think that therefore they ought to imitate them in their works, He adds, But do ye not after their works. What can be more pitiable than such a teacher, whose life to imitate is ruin, to refuse to follow is salvation for his disciples?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But as gold is picked out of the dross, and the dross is left, so hearers may take doctrine and leave practice, for good doctrine oft comes from an evil man. But as Priests judge it better to teach the bad for the sake of the good, rather than to neglect the good for the sake of the bad; so also let those who are set under them pay respect to the bad

Priests for the sake of the good, that the good may not be despised because of the bad; for it is better to give the bad what is not their due, rather than to defraud the good of what is justly theirs.

CHRYSOSTOM. Look with what He begins His reproof of them, For they say, and do not. Every one who transgresses the Law is deserving of blame, but especially he who has the post of instruction. And this for a threefold cause; first, because he is a transgressor; secondly, because when he ought to set others right, be himself halts; thirdly, because, being in the rank of a teacher, his influence is more corrupting. Again, He brings a further charge against them, that they oppress those that are put under them; They bind heavy burdens; in this He shews a double evil in them; that they exacted without any allowance the utmost rigour of life from those that were put under them, while they allowed themselves large licence herein. But a good ruler should do the contrary of this, to be to himself a severe judge, to others a merciful one. Observe in what forcible words He utters His reproof; He says not they cannot, but they will not; and not, lift them, but touch them with one of their fingers.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And to the Scribes and Pharisees of whom He is now speaking, heavy burdens not to be borne are the commandments of the Law; as St. Peter speaks in the Acts, Why seek ye to put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples, which neither we nor our fathers were able to bear? (Acts 15:10.) For commending the burdens of the Law by fabulous proofs, they bound as it were the shoulders of the heart of their hearers with bands, that thus tied as though with proof of reason to them, they might not fling them off; but themselves did not in the least measure fulfil them, that is, not only did not wholly, but did not so much as attempt to.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Or, bind burdens, that is, gather traditions from all sides, not to aid, but to burden the conscience.

JEROME. But all these things, the shoulders, the finger, the burdens, and the bands with which they bind the burdens, have a spiritual meaning. Herein also the Lord speaks generally against all masters who enjoin high things, but do not even little things.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Such also are they who lay a heavy burden upon those who come to penitence, so that while men would avoid present punishment, they overlook that which is to come. For if you lay upon a boy's shoulders a burden more than he can bear, he must needs cither cast it off, or be broken down by it; so the man on whom you lay too grievous a burden of penance must either wholly refuse it, or if he submit himself to it will find himself unable to bear it, and so be offended, and sin worse. Also, if we should be wrong in imposing too light a penance, is it not better to have to answer for mercy than for severity? Where the master of the household is liberal, the steward should not be oppressive. If God be kind, should His Priest be harsh? Do you seek thereby the character of sanctity? Be strict in ordering your own life, in that of others lenient; let men hear of you as enjoining little, and performing much. The Priest who gives licence to himself, and exacts the utmost from others, is like a corrupt tax-gatherer in the state, who to ease himself taxes others heavily.

23:5–12

5. But all their works they do for to be seen of men: they make broad their phylacteries, and enlarge the borders of their garments,

6. And love the uppermost rooms at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogues,

7. And greetings in the markets, and to be called of men, Rabbi, Rabbi.

8. But be not ye called Rabbi: for one is your Master, even Christ; and all ye are brethren.

9. And call no man your father upon the earth: for one is your Father, which is in heaven.

10. Neither be ye called masters: for one is your Master, even Christ.

11. But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant.

12. And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had charged the Scribes and Pharisees with harshness and neglect; He now brings forward their vain-glory, which made them depart from God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Every substance breeds in itself that which destroys it, as wood the worm, and garments the moth; so the Devil strives to corrupt the ministry of the Priests, who are ordained for the edification of holiness, endeavouring that this good, while it is done to be seen of men, should be turned into evil. Take away this fault from the clergy, and you will have no further labour in their reform, for of this it comes that a clergyman who has sinned can hardly perform penance. Also the Lord here points out the cause why they could not believe in Christ, because nearly all they did was in order to be seen of men; for he whose desire is for earthly glory from men, cannot believe on Christ who preaches things heavenly. I have read one who interprets this place thus. In Moses' seat, that is, in the rank and degree instituted by Moses, the Scribes and Pharisees are seated unworthily, forasmuch as they preached to others the Law which foretold Christ's coming, but themselves did not receive Him when come. For this cause He exhorts the people to hear the Law which they preached, that is, to believe in Christ who was preached by the Law, but not to follow the Scribes and Pharisees in their disbelief of Him. And He shews the reason why they preached the coming of Christ out of the Law, yet did not believe on Him; namely, because they did not preach that Christ should come through any desire of His coming, but that they might be seen by men to be doctors of the Law.

ORIGEN. And their works likewise they do to be seen of men, using outward circumcision, taking away actual leaven out of their houses, and doing such like things. But Christ's disciples fulfil the Law in things secret, being Jews inwardly, as the Apostle speaks. (Rom. 2:29.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Note the intensive force of the words of His reproofs. He says not merely that they do their works to be seen of men, but added, all their works. And not only in great things but in some things trivial they were vainglorious, They make broad their phylacteries and enlarge the borders of their garments.

JEROME. For the Lord, when He had given the commandments of the Law through Moses, added at the end, And thou shalt bind them for a sign upon thine hand, and they shall be ever before thine eyes; (Deut. 6:8.) the meaning of which is, Let my precepts be in thine hand so as to be fulfilled in thy works; let them be before thine eyes so as that thou shalt meditate upon them day and night. This the Pharisees misinterpreting, wrote on parchments the Decalogue of Moses, that is, the Ten Commandments, and folding them up, tied them on their forehead, so making them a crown for their head, that they should be always before their eyes. Moses had in another place given command that they should make fringes of blue in the borders of their garments, to distinguish the people of Israel (Numb. 15:39.); that as in their bodies circumcision, so in their garments the fringe, might discriminate the Jewish nation. But these superstitious teachers, catching at popular favour, and making gain of silly women, made broad hems, and fastened them with sharp pins, that as they walked or sat they might be pricked, and by such monitors be recalled to the duties of God’s ministry. This embroidery then of the Decalogue they called phylacteries, that is, conservatories, because those who wore them, wore them for their own protection and security. So little did the Pharisees understand that they were to be worn on the heart and not on the body; for in equal degree may cases and chests be said to have books, which assuredly have not the knowledge of God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But after their example do many invent Hebrew names of Angels, and write them, and bind them on themselves, and they seem dreadful to such as are without understanding. Others again wear round their neck a portion of the Gospel written out. But is not the Gospel read every day in the Church, and heard by all? Those therefore who receive no profit from the Gospel sounded in their ears, how shall the having them hung about their neck save them? Further, wherein is the virtue of the Gospel? in the shape of its letters, or in the understanding its meaning? If in the characters, you do well to hang them round your neck; if in their meaning, they are of more profit when laid up in the heart, than hung round the neck. But others explain this place thus, That they made broad their teachings concerning special observances, as phylacteries, or preservatives of salvation, preaching them continually to the people. And the broad fringes of their garments they explain of the same undue stress upon such commandments.

JEROME. Seeing they thus make broad their phylacteries, and make them broad fringes, desiring to have glory of men, they are convicted also in other things; For they love the uppermost rooms at feasts, and the chief seats in the synagogues.

RABANUS. It should be noted, that He does not forbid those to whom this belongs by right of rank to be saluted in the forum, or to sit or recline in the highest room; but those who unduly desire these things, whether they obtain them or not, these He enjoins the believers to shun as wicked.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. For He rebukes not those who recline in the highest place, but those who love such places, blaming the will not the deed. For to no purpose does he humble himself in place who exalts himself in heart. For some vain men hearing that it was a commendable thing to seat himself in the lowest place, chooses so to do; and thus not only does not put away the vanity of his heart, but adds this additional vain ostentation of his humility, as one who would be thought righteous and humble. For many proud men take the lowest place in their bodies, but in haughtiness of heart think themselves to be seated among the highest; and there are many humble men who, placed among the highest, are inwardly in their own esteem among the lowest.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe where vain glory governed them, to wit, in the synagogues, whither they entered to guide others. It had been tolerable to have felt thus at feasts, notwithstanding that a doctor ought to be had in honour in all places alike, and not in the Churches only. But if it be blameworthy to love such things, how wrong is it to seek to attain them?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. They love the first salutations, first, that is, not in time only, before others; but in tone, that we should say with a loud voice, Hail, Rabbi; and in body that we should bow low our head; and in place, that the salutation should be in public.

RABANUS. And herein they are not without fault, that the same men should be concerned in the litigations of the forum, who in the synagogue in Moses’ seat, seek to be called Rabbi by men.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. That is, they wish to be called, not to be such; they desire the name, and neglect the duties.

ORIGEN. And in the Church of Christ are found some who take to themselves the uppermost places, that is, become deacons; next they aspire to the chief seats of those that are called presbyters; and some intrigue to be styled among men Bishop, that is, to be called Rabbi. But Christ’s disciple loves the uppermost place indeed, but at the spiritual banquet, where he may feed on the choicer morsels of spiritual food, for, with the Apostles who sit upon twelve thrones, he loves the chief seats, and hastes by his good works to render himself worthy of such seats; and he also loves salutations made in the heavenly market-place, that is, in the heavenly congregations of the primitive. But the righteous man would be called Rabbi, neither by man, nor by any other, because there is One Master of all men.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise; Of the foregoing things with which He had charged the Pharisees, He now passes over many as of no weight, and such as His disciples needed not to be instructed in; but that which was the cause of all evils, namely, ambition of the master's seat, that He insists upon to instruct His disciples.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Be not ye called Rabbi, that ye take not to yourselves what belongs to God. And call not others Rabbi, that ye pay not to men a divine honour. For One is the Master of all, who instructs all men by nature. For if man were taught by man, all men would learn that have teachers; but seeing it is not man that teaches, but God, many are taught, but few learn. Man cannot by teaching impart an understanding to man, but that understanding which is given by God man calls forth

HILARY. And that the disciples may ever remember that they are the children of one parent, and that by their new birth they have passed the limits of their earthly origin.

JEROME. (cont. Helvid. 15.) All men may be called brethren in affection, which is of two kinds, general and particular. Particular, by which all Christians are brethren; general, by which all men being born of one Father are bound together by like tie of kindred.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And call no man your Father upon earth; because in this world though man begets man, yet there is one Father who created all men. For we have not beginning of life from our parents, but we have our life transmitted through them.a

ORIGEN. But who calls no man father upon earth? He who in every action done as before God, says, Our Father, which art in Heaven.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Because it was clear who was the Father of all, by this which was said, Which art in Heaven, He would teach them who was the Master of all, and therefore repeats the same command concerning a master, Neither be ye called masters; for one is your Master, even Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. Not that when Christ is here said to be our Master, the Father is excluded, as neither when God is said to be our Father, is Christ excluded, Who is the Father of men.

JEROME. It is a difficulty that the Apostle against this command calls himself the teacher of the Gentiles; and that in monasteries in their common conversation, they call one another, Father. It is to be cleared thus. It is one thing to be father or master by nature, another by sufferance. Thus when we call any man our father, we do it to shew respect to his age, not as regarding him as the author of our being. We also call men 'Master,' from resemblance to a real master; and, not to use tedious repetition, as the One God and One Son, who are by nature, do not preclude us from calling others gods and sons by adoption, so the One Father and One Master, do not preclude us from speaking of other fathers and masters by an abuse of the terms.

CHRYSOSTOM. Not only does the Lord forbid us to seek supremacy, but would lead His hearer to the very opposite; He that is greatest among you shall be your servant.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; And if one minister the divine word, knowing that it is Christ that makes it to be fruitful, such a one professes himself a minister and not a master; whence it follows, He that is greatest among you, let him be your servant. As Christ Himself, who was in truth our Master, professed Himself a minister, saying, I am in the midst of you as one that ministers. (Luke 22:27.) And well does He conclude this prohibition of all vain-glory with the words, And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be abased; and he that shall humble himself shall be exalted.

REMIGIUS. Which means that every one who thinks highly of his own deserts, shall be humbled before God; and every one who humbles himself concerning his good deeds, shall be exalted with God.

23:13

13. But woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men: for ye neither go in yourselves, neither suffer ye them that are entering to go in.

ORIGEN. Christ is truly the Son of that God Who gave the Law; after the example of the blessings pronounced in the Law, did Himself pronounce the blessings of them that are saved; and also after the cursings of the Law, He now sets forth a woe against sinners; Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites. They who allow that it is compatible with goodness to utter these denunciations against sinners, should understand that the purpose of God is the same in the cursings of the Law. Both the cursing there and the woe here fall upon the sinner not from Him who denounces, but from themselves who commit the sins which are denounced, and worthily bring upon themselves the inflictions of God’s discipline, appointed for the turning of men to good. So a father rebuking a son utters words of cursing, but does not desire that he should become deserving of those curses, but rather that he should turn himself from them. He adds the cause of this woe, Ye shut up the kingdom of heaven against men; for ye neither go in yourselves, nor suffer them that are entering to go in. These two commandments are by nature inseparable; because not to suffer others to enter in, is of itself enough to keep the hinderer out.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. By the kingdom of heaven is meant the Scriptures, because in them the kingdom of heaven is lodged; the understanding of these is the door. Or the kingdom of heaven is the blessedness of heaven, and the door thereof Christ, by Whom men enter in. The door-keepers are the Priests, to whom is committed the word of teaching or interpreting Scripture, by which the door of truth is opened to men. The opening of this door is right interpretation. And observe that He said not, Woe unto you, for ye open, but, for ye shut up; the Scriptures then are not shut up, though they are obscure.

ORIGEN. The Pharisees and the Scribes then would neither enter in, nor hear Him who said, By me if any man enter in he shall be saved; (John 10:9.) nor would they suffer those to enter in, who were able to have believed through the things which had been spoken before by the Law and the Prophets concerning Christ, but shut up the door with every kind of device to deter men from entering. Also they detracted from His teaching, denied all prophecy concerning Him, and blasphemed every miracle as deceitful, or wrought by the Devil. All who in their evil conversation set an example of sinning to the people, and who commit injustice, offending the weak, seem to shut up the kingdom of heaven before men. And this sin is found among the people, and chiefly among the doctors, when they teach men what the Gospel righteousness requires of them, but do not what they teach. But those who both teach and live well open to men the kingdom of heaven, and both enter in themselves, and invite others to enter in. Many also will not suffer those who are willing to enter into the kingdom of heaven, when they without reason excommunicate out of jealousy others who are better than themselves; thus they refuse them entrance, but these of sober spirit, overcoming by their patience this tyranny, although forbidden, yet enter in and inherit the kingdom. Also they who with much rashness have set themselves to the profession of teaching before they have learned, and following Jewish fables, detract from those who search out the higher things of Scripture; these do, as far as in them lies, shut out men from the kingdom of heaven.

23:14

14. Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows' houses, and for a pretence make long prayer: therefore ye shall receive the greater damnation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii.) Next the Lord rebukes them for their gluttony, and what was the worst, that not from the rich but from widows they took wherewith to fill their bellies, thus burdening the poverty of those whom they should have relieved.

GLOSS. (interlin.) Devour widows' houses, that is, your superstitions have this only aim, namely, to make a gain of the people that is put under you.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The female sex is imprudent, as not contemplating with reason all that it sees or hears; and weak, as being easily turned either from bad to good, or from good to bad. The male sex is more prudent and hardy. And therefore pretenders to holiness practise most upon women, who are unable to see their hypocrisy, and are easily inclined to love them on the ground of religion. But widows they chiefly choose to attempt; first, because a woman who has her husband to advise her is not so readily deceived; and secondly, she has not the means of giving, being in the power of her husband. The Lord then, whilst He confounds the Jewish Priests, instructs the Christian that they should not frequent widows rather than others, for though their purpose may not be bad, it gives occasion to suspicions.

CHRYSOSTOM. The manner of this plundering is grievous, for they make long prayers. Every one who does evil deserves punishment; but he who takes occasion for his offence from religion, deserves more severe punishment; Therefore ye shall receive the greater damnation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. First, for that ye are wicked, and then because ye put on the cloak of sanctity. Your covetousness you dress up in the colour of religion, and use God's arms in the Devil's service, that iniquity may be loved while it is thought to be piety.

HILARY. Or, because their observance of the kingdom of heaven proceeds hence, that they may keep up their practice of going about to widows' houses, they shall therefore receive the heavier judgment, as having their own sin and the ignorance of others to answer for.

GLOSS. (interlin. Luke 12:47.) Or, because the servant that knew his Lord's will and did it not, shall he beaten with many stripes.

23:15

15. Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, you make him two fold more the child of hell than yourselves.

CHRYSOSTOM. This the next charge against them is, that they are unequal to the salvation of many, seeing they need so much labour to bring one to salvation; and not only are they slack in conversion, but destroy even those whom they do convert, by corrupting them by example of evil life.

HILARY. That they compass sea and land signifies that throughout the whole world they shall be enemies of Christ's Gospel, and shall bring men under the yoke of the Law against the justification of faith. There were proselytes made into the Synagogue from among the Gentiles, the small number of whom is here denoted by what is said one proselyte. For after the preaching of Christ there was no faith left in their doctrine, but whoever was gained to the faith of the Jews became a child of hell.

ORIGEN. For all who Judaize since the coming of the Saviour, are taught to follow the temper of those who cried at that time, Crucify, crucify him.

HILARY. And he becomes the child of a twofold punishment, because he has not obtained remission of his Gentile sins, and because he has joined the society of those who persecuted Christ.

JEROME. Or otherwise; The Scribes and Pharisees compassed the whole world to make proselytes of the Gentiles, that is, to mix the uncircumcised stranger with the people of God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. And that not of compassion from desire to save him whom they taught, but either from covetousness, that the greater number of worshippers might increase the number of offerings made in sacrifice, or out of vain glory. For he who sinks himself in a slough of sins, how should he be desirous to rescue another out of them? Will a man be more merciful to another than to himself? By a man’s actions therefore it may be known whether he seeks another’s conversion for God’s sake, or out of vain glory.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxi. 9.) But forasmuch as hypocrites though they do ever crooked things, yet cease not to speak right things, and thus by their good instructions beget sons, but are not able to bring them up by good life, but the more they give themselves up to worldly works, the more willingly do they suffer those whom they have begotten to work the same. And because their hearts are hardened, these very sons whom they have begotten they do not own by any sign of the affection due. Wherefore it is here said of the hypocrites, And when he is made, ye make him twofold more the child of hell than yourselves.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xvi. 29. et cf. cont. Adimant. 16.) This He said not because proselytes were circumcised, but because they imitated the lives of those from following whom He had prohibited His disciples, saying, Do ye not after their works. Two things are observable in this command; first, the honour shewn to Moses’ teaching, (Matt. 23:3.) that even wicked men when sitting in his seat are compelled to teach good things; and that the proselyte is made a child of hell, not by hearing the words of the Law, but by following their doings. And twofold more than they for this reason, that he neglects to fulfil what he had undertaken of his own choice, having been not born a Jew, but of free will become a Jew.

JEROME. Or, because before while he was a Gentile he erred in ignorance, and was only a child of hell; but seeing the vices of his masters, and understanding that they destroyed in their actions what they taught in words, he returns to his vomit, and becoming a Gentile, he is worthy of greater punishment as one that has deserted his cause.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, because while he was a worshipper of idols, he observed righteousness even because of men; but when he became a Jew, prompted by the example of evil teachers, he became worse than his teachers.

CHRYSOSTOM. For a disciple imitates a virtuous master, but goes beyond a vicious one.

JEROME. He is called a child of hell in the same way as one is said to be a child of perdition, and a child of this world; every man is called the son of him whose works he does.

ORIGEN. From this place we learn that there will be a difference of torment in hell, seeing one is here said to be singly a child of hell, another twofold. And we ought to consider here whether it is possible that a man should be generally a child of hell, as a Jew, suppose, or a Gentile, or whether specially so in consequence of some particular sins; that as a righteous man is increased in glory by the abundance of his righteousnesses, so a sinner's punishment is increased manifold by the number of his sins.

23:16–22

16. Woe unto you, ye blind guides, which say, Whosoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing; but whosoever shall swear by the gold of the temple, he is a debtor!

17. Ye fools and blind: for whether is greater, the gold, or the temple that sanctifieth the gold?

18. And, Whosoever shall swear by the altar, it is nothing; but whosoever sweareth by the gift that is upon it, he is guilty.

19. Ye fools and blind: for whether is greater, the gift, or the altar that sanctifieth the gift?

20. Whoso therefore shall swear by the altar, sweareth by it, and by all things thereon.

21. And whoso shall swear by the temple, sweareth by it, and by him that dwelleth therein.

22. And he that shall swear by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon.

JEROME. As by making broad phylacteries and fringes they sought after the reputation of sanctity, and made this again a means of gain, so now He charges them with being teachers of wickedness by their fraudulent pretence of tradition. For when in any dispute or quarrel, or ambiguous cause, one swore by the temple, and was afterwards convicted of falsehood, he was not held guilty. This is what is meant by that, Whosoever shall swear by the temple, it is nothing, that is, he owes nothing, But if he had sworn by the gold, or by the money which was offered to the Priests in the temple, he was immediately compelled to pay down that by which he had sworn.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The temple pertains to God’s glory, and to man’s spiritual salvation, but the gold of the temple though it pertains to the glory of God, yet does it more so to the delight of man, and the profit of the Priests. The Jews then pronounced the gold which delighted them, and the gifts which fed them, to be more holy than the temple, that they might make men more disposed to offer gifts, than to pour out prayers in the temple. Whence the Lord suitably reproves them in these words. Yet have some Christians at present an equally foolish notion. See, they say, in any suit if one swear by God, it seems nought; but if one swear by the Gospel, he seems to have done some great thing. To whom we shall say in like manner, Ye fools and blind! the Scriptures were written because of God, God is not because of the Scriptures. Greater therefore is God, than what is hallowed by Him.

JEROME. Again, if one swore by the altar, none held him guilty of perjury; but if he swore by the gift or the victims or the other things which are offered to God upon the altar, this they exacted most rigorously. And all this they did not out of fear of God, but out of covetousness. Thus the Lord charges them with both folly and fraud, inasmuch as the altar is much greater than the victims which are sanctified by the altar.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And lest their infatuation should go so far, that they should affirm that the gold was more holy than the temple, and the gift than the altar, He argues on another ground, that in the oath which is sworn by the temple and the altar is contained the oath by the gold or by the gift.

ORIGEN. In like manner the custom which the Jews had of swearing by the Heaven He reprobates. For they did not, as they supposed, avoid the danger of taking an oath by God, because, Whose sweareth by heaven, sweareth by the throne of God, and by him that sitteth thereon.

GLOSS. (ord.) For whoso swears by the creature that is subject, swears by the Divinity that rules over the creation.

ORIGEN. Now an oath is in confirmation of somewhat that has been spoken. The oath here then may signify testimony of Scripture which we produce in confirmation of that word which we speak. So that Divine Scripture is the temple of God, the gold is the meaning which it contains. As the gold which is outside the Temple is not sanctified, so all thoughts which are without divine Scripture, however admirable they may seem, are not hallowed. We ought not therefore to bring any speculations of our own for the confirmation of doctrine, unless such as we can shew are hallowed by being contained in divine Scripture. The altar is the human heart, which is the chief thing in man. The offerings and gifts that are hid upon the altar, are every thing which are done in the heart, as to pray, to sing, to do alms, to fast. Every offering of a man then is sanctified by his heart, by which the offering is made. There cannot therefore be a more honourable offering than the heart of man, out of which the offering proceeds. If then one's conscience does not smite him, he has confidence towards God, not by reason of his gifts, but so to speak because he has rightly ordered the altar of his heart. Thirdly, we may say that over the temple, that is over every Scripture, and over the altar, that is over every heart, there is a certain meaning which is called the Heaven, the throne of God Himself, in which we shall be able to see the things that are revealed face to face, when that which is perfect is come.

HILARY. For since Christ is come, reliance upon the Law is vain; for not Christ by the Law, but the Law by Christ, is sanctified, in whom it rests as on a seat or throne; so are they fools and blind, who, overlooking the sanctifier, pay honour to the things sanctified.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 34.) The temple and altar we may also understand of Christ Himself; the gold and the gifts, of the praise and sacrifice of prayer which we offer in Him and through Him. For not He by them, but they by Him, are sanctified.

23:23–24

23. Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the weighter matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.

24. Ye blind guides, which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord had said above that they bound heavy burdens upon others, which they themselves would not touch; He now again shews how they aimed at being correct in little things, but neglected weighty matters.

JEROME. The Lord had commanded, that for the maintenance of the Priests and Levites, whose portion was the Lord, tithes of every thing should be offered in the temple. Accordingly, the Pharisees (to dismiss mystical expositions) concerned themselves about this alone, that these trifling things should be paid in, but lightly esteemed other things which were weighty. He charges them then with covetousness in exacting carefully the tithes of worthless herbs, while they neglected justice in their transactions of business, mercy to the poor, and faith toward God, which are weighty things.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, because these covetous Priests, when any one did not bring his tithes of the smallest thing, made it a matter of grave reprehension; but when one injured his neighbour or sinned against God, they were at no pains to reprove him, careful only of their own profit, neglecting the glory of God, and the salvation of men. For to observe righteousness, to do mercy, and to have faith, these things God commanded for His own glory; but the payment of tithes He established for the support of the Priests, so that the Priests should minister to the people in spiritual things, and the people supply the Priests with carnal things. Thus is it at this time, when all are careful of their own honour, none of God's honour; they jealously protect their own rights, but will not bestow any pains in the service of the Church. If the people pay not their tithes duly, they murmur; but if they see the people in sin, they utter not a word against them. But because some of the Scribes and Pharisees, to whom He is now speaking, were of the people, it is not unsuitable to make a different interpretation; and 'to tithe' may be used as well of him who pays, as of him who receives, tithes. The Scribes then and Pharisees offered tithes of the very best things for the purpose of displaying their righteousness; but in their judgments they were unjust, without mercy for their brethren, without faith for the truth.

ORIGEN. But because it was possible that some, hearing the Lord speak thus, might thereupon neglect paying tithes of small things, He prudently adds, These things ought ye to have done, (i. e. justice, mercy, and faith,) and not to leave the others undone, i. e. the tithing of mint, anise, and cummin.

REMIGIUS. In these words the Lord shews that all the commandments of the Law, greatest and least, are to be fulfilled. They also are refuted who give alms of the fruits of the earth, supposing that thus they cannot sin, whereas their alms profit them nothing unless they are careful to keep themselves from sin.

HILARY. And because it was much less guilt to omit the tithing of herbs than a duty of benevolence, the Lord derides them, Ye blind guides, which strain out a gnat, and swallow a camel.

JEROME. The camel I suppose to mean the weighty precepts, judgment, mercy, and faith; the gnat, the tithing of mint, anise, and cummin, and other valueless herbs. The greater of God's commands we swallow and overlook, but shew our carelessness by a religious scrupulousness in little things which bring profit with them.

ORIGEN. Or, straining out a gnat, that is, putting from them small sins; swallowing a camel, that is, committing great sins, which He calls camels, from the size and distorted shape of that animal. Morally, The Scribes are those who think nothing else contained in Scripture than the bare letter exhibits; the Pharisees are all those who esteem themselves righteous, and separate themselves from others, saying, 'Come not nigh me, for I am clean.' Mint, anise, and cummin, are the seasoning, not the substantial part of food; as in our life and conversation there are some things necessary to justification, as judgment, mercy, and faith; and others which are like the seasoning of our actions, giving them a flavour and sweetness, as abstinence from laughter, fasting, bending the knee, and such like. How shall they not be judged blind who see not that it is of little avail to be a careful dispenser in the least things, if things of chief moment are neglected? These His present discourse overthrows; not forbidding to observe the little things, but bidding to keep more carefully the chief things.

GREGORY. (Mor. i. 15.) Or otherwise; The gnat stings while it hums; the camel bows its back to receive its load. The Jews then strained off the gnat, when they prayed to have the seditious robber released to them; and they swallowed the camel, when they sought with shouts the death of Him who had voluntarily taken on Him the burden of our mortality.

23:25–26

25. Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye make clean the outside of the cup and of the platter, but within they are full of extortion and excess.

26. Thou blind Pharisee, cleanse first that which is within the cup and platter, that the outside of them may be clean also.

JEROME. In different words, but to the same purport as before, He reproves the hypocrisy and dissimulation of the Pharisees, that they shewed one face to men abroad, but wore another at home. He means not here, that their scrupulousness respecting the cup and the platter was of any importance, but that they affected it to pass off their sanctity upon men; which is clear from His adding, but inwardly ye are full of ravening and uncleanness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He means that the Jews whenever they were to enter the temple or to offer sacrifice, or on any festivals, used to wash themselves, their clothes, and their vessels, but none cleansed himself from his sins; but God neither commends bodily cleanliness, nor condemns the contrary. But suppose foulness of person or of vessels were offensive to God, which must become foul by being used, how much more does He not abhor foulness of conscience, which we may, if we will, keep ever pure?

HILARY. He therefore is reproving those who, pursuing an ostentation of useless scrupulosity, neglected the discharge of useful morality. For it is the inside of the cup that is used; if that be foul, what profit is it to cleanse the outside? And therefore what is needed is purity of the inner conscience, that those things which are of the body may be clean without.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. This He speaks not of the cup and platter of sense, but of that of the understanding, which may be pure before God, though it have never touched water; but if it have sinned, then though the water of the whole ocean and of all rivers have washed it, it is foul and guilty before God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Note, that speaking of tithes He said, These things ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone: for tithes are a kind of alms, and what wrong is it to give alms? Yet said He it not to enforce a legal superstition. But here, discoursing of things clean and unclean, He does not add this, but distinguishes and shews that external purity of necessity follows internal; the outside of the cup and platter signifying the body, the inside the soul.

ORIGEN. This discourse instructs us that we should hasten to become righteous, not to seem so. For whoso seeks to be thought so, cleanses the outside, and has care of the things that are seen, but neglects the heart and conscience. But he who seeks to cleanse that which is within, that is, the thoughts, makes by that means the things without clean also. All professors of false doctrine are cups cleansed on the outside, because of that show of religion which they affect, but within they are full of extortion and guile, hurrying men into error. The cup is a vessel for liquids, the platter for meat. Every discourse then of which we spiritually drink, and all speech by which we are fed, are vessels for meat and drink. They who study to set forth well wrought discourse rather than such as is full of healthful meaning, are cups cleansed without; but within full of the defilement of vanity. Also the letter of the Law and the Prophets is a cup of spiritual drink, and a platter of necessary food. The Scribes and Pharisees seek to make plain the outward sense; Christ's disciples labour to exhibit the spiritual sense.

23:27–28

27. Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are like unto whited sepulchres, which indeed appear beautiful outward, but are within full of dead men's bones, and of all uncleanness.

28. Even so ye also outwardly appear righteous unto men, but within ye are full of hypocrisy and iniquity.

ORIGEN. As above they are said to be full of extortion and excess, so here they are full of hypocrisy and iniquity, and are likened to dead men's bones, and all uncleanness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Justly are the bodies of the righteous said to be temples, because in the body of the righteous the soul has dominion, as God in His temple; or because God Himself dwells in righteous bodies. But the bodies of sinners are called sepulchres of the dead, because the sinner's soul is dead in his body; for that cannot be deemed to be alive, which does no spiritual or living act.

JEROME. Sepulchres are whitened with lime without, and decorated with marble painted in gold and various colours, but within are full of dead men's bones. Thus crooked teachers who teach one thing and do another, affect purity in their dress, and humility in their speech, but within are full of all uncleanness, covetousness, and lust.

ORIGEN. For all feigned righteousness is dead, forasmuch as it is not done for God's sake; yea, rather it is no righteousness at all, any more than a dead man is a man, or an actor who represents any character is the man whom he represents. There is therefore within them so much of bones and uncleanness as are the good things that they wickedly pretend to. And they seem righteous outwardly, not in the eyes of such as the Scripture calls Gods, (Ps. 82:6.) but of such only as die like men.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxvi. 32.) But before their strict Judge they cannot have the plea of ignorance, for by assuming in the eyes of men every form of sanctity, they witness against themselves that they are not ignorant how to live well.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. But say, hypocrite, if it be good to be wicked, why do you not desire to seem that which you desire to be? For what it is shameful to seem, that it is more shameful to be; and what to seem is fair, that it is fairer to be. Either therefore be what you seem, or seem what you are.

23:29–31

29. Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous,

30. And say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets.

31. Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are the children of them which killed the prophets.

JEROME. By a most subtle syllogism He proves them to be the sons of murderers, while to gain good character and reputation with the people, they build the sepulchres of the Prophets whom their fathers put to death.

ORIGEN. Without just cause He seems to utter denunciations against those who build the sepulchres of the Prophets; for so far what they did was praiseworthy; how then do they deserve this woe?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv.) He does not blame them for building the sepulchres, but discovers the design with which they built them; which was not to honour the slain, but to erect to themselves a triumphal monument of the murder, as fearing that in process of time the memory of this their audacious wickedness should perish.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Or, they said within themselves, If we do good to the poor not many see it, and then but for a moment; were it not better to raise buildings which all may see, not only now, but in all time to come? O foolish man, what boots this posthumous memory, if, where you are, you are tortured, and where you are not there you are praised? While He corrects the Jews, He instructs the Christians; for had these things been spoken to the former only, they would have been spoken, but not written; but now they were spoken on their account, and written on ours. When one, besides other good deeds, raises sacred buildings, it is an addition to his good works; but if without any other good works, it is a passion for worldly renown. The martyrs joy not to be honoured with money which has caused the poor to weep. The Jews, moreover, have ever been adorers of saints of former times, and contemners, yea persecutors, of the living. Because they could not endure the reproaches of their own Prophets, they persecuted and killed them; but afterwards the succeeding generation perceived the error of their fathers, and thus in grief at the death of innocent Prophets, they built up monuments of them. But they themselves in like manner persecuted and put to death the Prophets of their own time, when they rebuked them for their sins. This is what is meant, And ye say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the Prophets.

JEROME. Though they speak not this in words, they proclaim it by their actions, in ambitious and magnificent structures to their memory.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. What they thought in their hearts, that they spoke by their deeds. Christ lays bare here the natural habit of all wicked men; each readily apprehends the other’s fault, but none his own; for in another’s case each man has an unprejudiced heart, but in his own case it is distorted. Therefore in the cause of others we can all easily be righteous judges. He only is the truly righteous and wise who is able to judge himself. It follows, Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that you are the children of them which killed the Prophets.

CHRYSOSTOM. What kind of accusation is this, to Call one the son of a murderer, who partakes not in his father’s disposition? Clearly there is no guilt in being so; wherefore this must be said in proof of their resemblance in wickedness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. The character of the parents is a witness to the sons; if the father be good and the mother bad, or the reverse, the children may follow sometimes one, sometimes the other. But when both are the same, it very rarely happens that bad sons spring of good parents, or the reverse, though it be so sometimes. This is as a man is sometimes born out of the rule of nature, having six fingers or no eyes.

ORIGEN. And in the prophetic writings, the historical sense is the body, the spiritual meaning is the soul; the sepulchres are the letter and books themselves of Scripture. They then who attend only to the historical meaning, honour the bodies of the Prophets, and set in the letter as in a sepulchre; and are called Pharisees, i. e. ‘cut off,’ as it were cutting off the soul of the Prophets from their body.

23:32–36

32. Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers.

33. Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell?

34. Wherefore, behold, I send unto you prophets, and wise men, and Scribes; and some of them ye shall kill and crucify; and some of them shall ye scourge in your synagogues, and persecute them from city to city:

35. That upon you may come all the righteous blood shed upon the earth, from the blood of righteous Abel unto the blood of Zacharias son of Barachias, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar.

36. Verily I say unto you, All these things shall come upon this generation.

CHRYSOSTOM. He had said against the Scribes and Pharisees, that they were the children of those who killed the Prophets; now therefore He shews that they were like them in wickedness, and that that was false that they said, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the Prophets. Wherefore He now says, Fill ye up the measure of your fathers. This is not a command, but a prophecy of what is to be.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He foretels, that as their fathers killed the Prophets, so they also should kill Christ, and the Apostles, and other holy men. As suppose you had a quarrel with some one, you might say to your adversary, Do to me what you are about to do; but you do not therein bid him do it, but shew him that you are aware of his manæuvres. And in fact they went beyond the measure of their fathers; for they put to death only men, these crucified God. But because He stooped to death of His own free choice, He does not lay on them the sin of His death, but only the death of the Apostles and other holy men. Whence also He said, Fill up, and not Fill over; for a just and merciful Judge overlooks his own wrongs, and only punishes those done to others.

ORIGEN. They fill up the measure of their fathers’ sins by their not believing in Christ. And the cause of their unbelief was, that they looked only to the letter and the body, and would understand nothing spiritual in them.

HILARY. Because then they will fill up the measure of their fathers’ purposes, therefore are they serpents, and an offspring of vipers.

JEROME. The same had been said by John the Baptist. Wherefore as of vipers are born vipers, so of your fathers who were murderers are you born murderers.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. He calls them offspring of vipers, because the nature of vipers is such that the young burst the womb of their dam, and so come forth; and in like manner the Jews condemned their fathers, finding fault with their deeds. He says, How shall ye escape the damnation of hell? By building the tombs of the saints? But the first step of piety is to love holiness, the next, to love the saints; for it is not reasonable in him to honour the righteous, who despises righteousness. The saints cannot be friends to those to whom God is an enemy. Shall ye be saved by a mere name, because ye seem to be among God’s people! Forasmuch as an open enemy is better than a false friend, so is he more hateful to God, who calls himself the servant of God, and does the commands of the Devil. Indeed, before God he who has resolved to kill a worm is a murderer before the deed is done, for it is the will that is rewarded for good, or punished for evil. Deeds are evidence of the will. God then does not require deeds on His own account that He may know how to judge, but for the sake of other men, that they may perceive that God is righteous. And God affords the opportunity of sin to the wicked, not to make them sin, but to manifest the sinner; and also to the good He gives opportunity to shew the purpose of their will. In this way then He gave the Scribes and Pharisees opportunity of shewing their purposes, Behold, I send unto you Prophets, and wise men, and Scribes.

HILARY. That is, the Apostles, who, as foretelling things to come, are Prophets; as having knowledge of Christ, are wise men; as understanding the Law, are Scribes.

JEROME. Or, as the Apostle writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor. 12.) that there are various gifts among Christ's disciples; some Prophets, who foretel things to come; some wise men, who know when they ought to speak; others Scribes taught in the Law; of whom Stephen was stoned, Paul killed, Peter crucified, and the disciples of the Apostles beaten, in the Acts; and they persecuted them from city to city, driving them out of Judæa, that they might go to the Gentiles.

ORIGEN. Or the Scribes who are sent by Christ, are Scribes according to the Gospel, whom the spirit quickens and the letter does not kill, as did the letter of the Law, which whoso followed ran into vain superstitions. The simple words of the Gospel are sufficient for salvation. But the Scribes of the Law do yet scourge the Scribes of the New Testament, by detracting from them in their synagogues; and the heretics also, who are spiritual Pharisees, with their tongues murder the Christians, and persecute them from city to city, sometimes in the body, sometimes also in the spirit, seeking to drive them from their own city of the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospel, into another Gospel.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then to shew them that they should not do this without punishment, He holds out an unspeakable terror over them, That upon you may come all the righteous blood.

RABANUS. That is, all the vengeance due for the shedding of the blood of the righteous.

JEROME. Concerning the Abel here spoken of, there is no doubt that it is he whom his brother Cain murdered. He is proved to have been righteous, not only by this judgment of the Lord, but by the passage in Genesis, which says that his offerings were accepted by God. But we must enquire who is this Zacharias, son of Barachias, because we read of many Zachariases; and that we might not mistake, here it is added, whom ye slew between the temple and the altar. Some say that it is that Zacharias who is the eleventh among the twelve Prophets, and his father's name agrees to this, but when he was slain between the temple and the altar, Scripture does not mention; but above all, in his time there were scarce ‘even the ruins of the temple. Others will have it to be Zacharias the father of John.

ORIGEN. A tradition has come down to us, that there was one place in the temple in which virgins were allowed to worship God, married women being forbidden to stand there. And Mary, after the Saviour’s birth, going into the temple, stood to pray in this place of the virgins. And when they who knew that she had borne a Son were hindering her, Zacharias said, that forasmuch as she was still a virgin, she was worthy of the place of the virgins. Whereupon, as though he manifestly were contravening the Law, he was slain there between the temple and the altar by the men of that generation; and thus this word of Christ is true which He spake to those who were standing there, whom ye slew.a

JEROME. But as this has no Scripture authority, it is as readily despised as offered. Others will have it to be that Zacharias who was killed by Joas, king of Judah, between the temple and the altar, that is, in the court of the temple. (2 Chron. 24:21.) But that Zacharias was not the son of Barachias, but of Jehoiada the Priest. But Barachias in our language is interpreted ‘Blessed of the Lord,’ so that the righteousness of Joiada the Priest is expressed by this Hebrew word. But in the Gospel which the Nazarenes use, we find written ‘son of Joiada’ instead of son of Barachias.

REMIGIUS. It should be enquired too how He says, to the blood of Zacharias, since the blood of many more saints was afterwards shed. This is thus explained. Abel a keeper of sheep was killed in the field, Zacharias a priest was slain in the court of the temple. The Lord therefore names these two, because by these all holy martyrs are denoted, both of lay and priestly order.

CHRYSOSTOM. Moreover, He names Abel, to shew that it would be out of envy that they would kill Christ and His disciples. He names Zacharias, because there was a twofold resemblance in his case, the sacred place, as well as the sacred person.

ORIGEN. Zacharias is interpreted ‘The memory of God.’ Whosoever then hastes to obliterate the memory of God, seems to those to whom he gives offence to shed the blood of Zacharias the son of Barachias. For it is by the blessing of God that we retain the memory of God. Also the memory of God is slain by the wicked, when the Temple of God is polluted by the lustful, and His altar defiled by the carelessness of prayers. Abel is interpreted ‘mourning.’ He then who does not receive that, Blessed are they that mourn, sheds the blood of Abel, that is, puts away the truth of wholesome mourning. Some also shed, as it were, the blood of the Scriptures by putting aside their truth, for all Scripture, if it is not understood according to its truth, is dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. And to take away all excuse from them that they might not say, Because you sent them to the Gentiles thereat were we offended, He foretels that His disciples should be sent to them, and it is of their punishment that He adds, Verily I say unto you, all these things shall come upon this generation.

GLOSS. (ord.) He means not only those there present, but the whole generation before and after, for all were one city and one body of the Devil.

JEROME. The rule of the Scriptures is only to know two generations, one of good the other of bad. Of the generation of the good it is said, The generation of the righteous shall be blessed. (Ps. 112:2.) And of the bad it is said in the present passage, Generation of vipers. These then, because they did against the Apostles like things as Cain and Joas, are described as of one generation.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; Because He delayed the punishment of hell which He had threatened them with, He pronounces against them threats of present evil, saying, All these things shall come upon this generation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As all the good things which had been merited by all the saints in each generation since the foundation of the world were bestowed upon that last generation which received Christ; so all the evil that all the wicked in every generation from the foundation of the world had deserved to suffer, came upon that last generation of the Jews which rejected Christ. Or thus; Assail the righteous of former saints, yea, of all the saints, could not merit that so great grace as was given to men in Christ; so the sins of all the wicked could not deserve so much evil as came upon the Jews, that they should suffer such things as these suffered from the Romans, and that in after time every generation of them to the end of the world should be cast off from God, and be made a mock by all the Gentiles. For what is there worse than to reject and in such sort to put to death the Son coming in mercy and lowliness! Or thus; Nations and states when they sin are not thereupon immediately punished by God, but He waits for many generations; but when He sees fit to destroy that state or nation, He then seems to visit upon them the sins of all former generations, and one generation suffers the accumulation of all that former generations have deserved. Thus this generation of the Jews seems to have been punished for their fathers; but in truth they suffered not for others, but on their own account.

CHRYSOSTOM. For he who having seen many sinning yet remains uncorrected, but rather does the same or worse, is obnoxious to heavier punishment.

23:37–39

37. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!

38. Behold, your house is left unto you desolate.

39. For I say unto you, Ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord next turns to address the city, desiring to instruct His hearers thereby. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem: this repetition of the name is a mark of compassion and intense love.

JEROME. By Jerusalem He means not the stones and buildings, but the dwellers there, over whom He laments with the feeling of a Father.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Foreseeing the destruction of the city, and the blow it would receive from the Romans, He called to mind the blood of the saints which had been, and should yet be, shed in it. Thou killedst Esaias who was sent unto thee, and stonedst my servant Jeremias; thou dashedst out the brains of Ezechiel by dragging him over stones; how shalt thou be saved, which wilt not suffer a physician to come nigh thee? And He said not, Didst kill and stone; but, Killest, and Stonest; that is, This is a common and natural practice with thee to kill and stone the saints. She did to the Apostles the same things which she had once done to the Prophets.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having thus addressed her, and spoken of her cruel murders, He said, as justifying Himself, How often would I have gathered thy children together? as much as to say, Notwithstanding, these thy murders have not alienated Me from thee, but I would have taken thee to Me, not once or twice, but many times. The strength of His affection He shews by the comparison of a hen.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 36.) This species has the greatest affection for its brood, insomuch that when they are sick the mother sickens also; and what you will hardly find in any other animal, it will fight against the kite, protecting its young with its wings. In like manner our mother, the Wisdom of God, sickened as it were in the putting on the flesh, according to that of the Apostle, The weakness of God is stronger than men, (1 Cor. 1:25.) protects our weakness, and resists the Devil that he should not make us his prey.

ORIGEN. He calls them children of Jerusalem, just as we call each generation of citizens the sons of the preceding generation. And He says, How often, though it is well known that once only did He teach the Jews in the body, because Christ was ever present in Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Angels, ministering to human salvation in every generation. Whosoever shall not have been gathered in by Him shall be judged, as though he had refused to be gathered in.

RABANUS. (non occ.) Let heretics then cease to assign to Christ a beginning from the Virgin; let them leave off to preach one God of the Law and another of the Prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (Ench. 97.) Where is that omnipotence, by the which He did whatsoever pleased Him both in heaven and in earth, if He would have gathered the children of Jerusalem and did not? Was it not that she would not that her children should be gathered by Him, and yet He did, notwithstanding, gather those of her children whom He would?

CHRYSOSTOM. Then He threatens the punishment of which they were ever in fear, to wit, the overthrow of the city and temple, saying, Behold, your house is left unto you desolate.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. As the body, when the spirit departs, first becomes cold, and then decays and decomposes; so also your temple, when God’s Spirit shall have withdrawn, shall be first filled with strife and anarchy, and after shall come to ruin.

ORIGEN. In like manner to all such as would not be gathered under His wings Christ speaks this threat; Behold, your house is left unto you desolate; i. e. your soul and your body. But if any one of you will not be gathered under the wings of Christ, from the very time when he shall have refused to be so gathered, (by a mental rather than a bodily act,) he shall no more see the beauty of the word, till repenting of his evil purpose he shall say, Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord. And the word of the Lord then comes with a blessing upon a man’s heart, when one is turned to God.

JEROME. I say unto you, Ye shall not see Me, &c. That is to say, Unless ye shall do penitence, and shall confess that I am He of whom the Prophets have spoken, the Son of the Almighty Father, ye shall not see My face. Thus the Jews have a time allowed for their repentance. Let them confess Him blessed who cometh in the name of the Lord, and they shall then behold Christ’s face.

CHRYSOSTOM. Otherwise; In this He covertly alludes to His second coming, when surely they shall worship Him. Henceforth, means from the time of His crucifixion.

CHAPTER 24

24:1–2

1. AND. Jesus went out, and departed from the temple: and his disciples came to him for to shew him the buildings of the temple.

2. And Jesus said unto them, See ye not all these things? verily I say unto you, There shall not be left here one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down.

ORIGEN. Christ, when He had foretold all that should come upon Jerusalem, went forth out of the temple, He, who while He was in it, had upheld the temple that it should not fall. And so each man, being the temple of God by reason of the Spirit of God dwelling in him, is himself the cause of his being deserted, that Christ should depart from him. It is worthy of note how they shew Him the buildings of the temple, as though He had never seen them. We reply, that when Christ had foretold the destruction that should come upon the temple, His disciples were amazed at the thought that so magnificent buildings should be utterly ruined, and therefore they shew them to Him to move Him to pity, that He would not do what He had threatened. And because the constitution of human nature is wonderful, being made the temple of God, the disciples and the rest of the saints confessing the wonderful working of God in respect of the forming of men, intercede before the face of Christ, that He would not forsake the human race for their sins.

RABANUS. The historical sense is clear, that in the forty-second year after the Lord’s passion, the city and temple were overthrown under the Roman Emperors Vespasian and Titus.

REMIGIUS. So it was ordained of God, that as soon as the light of grace was revealed, the temple with its ceremonies should be taken out of the way, lest any weakling in the faith, beholding all the things instituted of the Lord and hallowed by the Prophets yet abiding, might be gradually drawn away from the purity of the faith to a carnal Judaism.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. Ixxv.) How means He this, that one stone shall not be left upon another? Either as conveying the notion of its utter overthrow; or with respect to the place in which it stood, for its parts were broken up to its very foundations. But I would add, that, after the fate it underwent, the most captious might be satisfied that its very fragments have perished.

JEROME. Figuratively; When the Lord departed from the temple, all the buildings of the Law and the structure of the Commandments were so overthrown, that none of them could be fulfilled by the Jews, but, the Head being taken away, all the parts were at war among themselves.

ORIGEN. Every man also, who, by taking into him the word of God, is become a temple, if after sinning he yet retains in part the traces of faith and religion, his temple is in part destroyed, and in part standing. But he who after sin has no regard for himself is gradually alienated, until he has altogether forsaken the living God, and so one stone is not left upon another of God's commandments, which he has not thrown down.

24:3–5

3. And as he sat upon the mount of Olives, the disciples came unto him privately, saying, Tell us, when shall these things be? and what shall be the sign of thy coming, and of the end of the world?

4. And Jesus answered and said unto them, Take heed that no man deceive you.

5. For many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and shall deceive many.

REMIGIUS. The Lord continuing His walk arrives at Mount Olivet, having by the way foretold the destruction of the temple to those disciples who had shewn and commended the buildings. When they had reached the Mount they came to Him, asking Him further of this.

CHRYSOSTOM. They asked Him in private, because they were great things about which they were going to ask Him. They wished to know the day of His coming, for the vehement desire they had to see His glory.

JEROME. They ask Him three things. First, The time of the destruction of Jerusalem, saying, Tell us when shall these things be? Secondly, The time of Christ's coming, saying, And what shall be the sign of Thy coming?

Thirdly, The time of the consummation of this world, saying, And of the end of the world?

CHRYSOSTOM. Luke speaks of one enquiry, that concerning Jerusalem, as though the disciples supposed that Christ’s coming should be then, and the end of the world should be when Jerusalem should be destroyed. Whereas Mark does not state them all to have asked concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, but Peter, James, John, and Andrew, as having more bold and free speech with Christ.

ORIGEN. I think Mount Olivet to be a mystery of the Church out of the Gentiles.

REMIGIUS. For Mount Olivet has no unfruitful trees, but olives, which supply light to dispel darkness, which give rest to the weary, health to the sick. And sitting on Mount Olivet over against the temple, the Lord discourses of its destruction, and the destruction of the Jewish nation, that even by His choice of a situation He might shew, that abiding still in the Church He condemns the pride of the wicked.

ORIGEN. For the husbandman dwelling on Mount Olivet is the word of God confirmed in the Church, that is, Christ, who ever grafts the branches of the wild olive on the good olive tree of the Fathers. They who have confidence before Christ, seek to learn the sign of the coming of Christ, and of the consummation of this world. And the coming of the Word into the soul is of two sorts. The first is that foolish preaching concerning Christ, when we preach that Christ was born and crucified; the second its coming in perfect men, concerning which it is said, We speak wisdom among them that are perfect; (1 Cor. 2:6.) and to this second coming is added the end of the world in the perfect man to whom the world is crucified.

HILARY. And because the questions of the disciples are threefold, they are separated by different times and meanings. That concerning the destruction of the city is first answered, and is then confirmed by truth of doctrine, that no seducer might prevail with the ignorant.

CHRYSOSTOM. His first answer is neither concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, nor concerning His second coming, but concerning the evils which were to be immediately encountered.

JEROME. One of them of whom The speaks was Simon of Samaria, of whom we read in the Acts of the Apostles, that he gave himself out to be the great Power, leaving these things written in his worksa among others, I am the Word of God, I am the Almighty, I am all things of God. The Apostle John also in his Epistle, Ye have heard that Antichrist shall come; even now there are many Antichrists. (1 John 2:18.) I suppose all heresiarchs to be Antichrists, and under the name of Christ to teach those things which are contrary to Christ. No wonder if we see some led away by such teachers, when the Lord has said, And shall deceive many.

ORIGEN. They that are deceived are many, because wide is the gate that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat. (Mat. 7:13.) This one thing is enough to detect the Antichrists and seducers that they shall say, I am Christ, which Christ Himself is no where read to have said: for the works of God, and the word which He taught, and His power, were enough to produce belief that He is Christ. For every discourse which professes to expound Scripture faithfully, and has not the truth, is Antichrist. For the truth is Christ, that which feigns itself to be the truth is Antichrist. So also all virtues are Christ, all that feigns itself to be virtue is Antichrist; for Christ has in Himself in truth all manner of good for the edification of men, but the devil has forged resemblances of the same for the deceiving of the saints. We have need therefore of God to help us, that none deceive us, neither word nor power. It is a bad thing to find any one erring in his course of life; but I esteem it much worse not to think according to the most true rule of Scripture.

24:6–8

6. And ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars: see that ye be not troubled: for all these things must come to pass, but the end is not yet.

7. For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom:and there shall be famines, and pestilences, and earthquakes, in divers places.

8. All these are the beginning of sorrows.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199. 25.) To this enquiry of the disciples the Lord makes answer, declaring all things which were to come to pass from that time forwards, whether relating to the destruction of Jerusalem, which had given occasion to their enquiry; or to His coming through the Church, in which He ceases not to come to the end of time; for He is acknowledged as coming among His own, while new members are daily born to Him; or relating to the end itself when He shall appear to judge the quick and the dead. When then He describes the signs which shall attend these three events, we must carefully consider which signs belong to which events, lest perchance we refer to one that which belongs to another.

CHRYSOSTOM. Here He speaks of the battles which should be fought at Jerusalem; when He says, Ye shall hear wars, and rumours of wars.

ORIGEN. To hear the shouts raised in the battles, is to hear wars; to hear rumours of wars, is to hear accounts of wars waged afar off.

CHRYSOSTOM. And because this might alarm the disciples, He continues, See that ye be not troubled. And because they supposed that the end of the world would follow immediately after the war in which Jerusalem should be destroyed, He corrects their suspicions concerning this, These things must come to pass, but the end is not yet.

JEROME. That is, Think not that the day of judgment is at hand, but that it is reserved against another time; the sign of which is plainly put in what follows, For nation shall rise against-nation, and kingdom against kingdom.

RABANUS.b Or, this is a warning to the Apostles not to flee from Jerusalem and Judæa in terror of these things, when they should begin to come upon them; because the end was not immediately, but the desolation of the province, and the destruction of the city and temple should not come till the fortieth year. And we know that most grievous woes, which spread over the whole province, fell out to the very letter.

CHRYSOSTOM. And to shew that He also should fight against the Jews, He tells them not only of wars, but of calamities inflicted by Providence, And there shall be pestilences, and famines, and earthquakes in divers places.

RABANUS. Nation shall rise against nation, shews the disquietude of men’s minds; pestilences, the affliction of their bodies; famines, the barrenness of the soil; earthquakes in dicers places, wrath from heaven above.

CHRYSOSTOM. And these things shall not happen according to the order of nature before established among men, but shall come of wrath from heaven, and therefore He said not that they should come only, or come suddenly, but adds significantly, These all are the beginnings of troubles, that is, of the Jewish troubles.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; As the body sickens before the death of the man, so it must needs be that before the consummation of this world the earth should be shaken, as though it were palsied, with frequent earthquakes, the air should gather a deadly quality and become pestilential, and that the vital energy of the soil should fail, and its fruits wither. And by consequence of this scarcity, men are stirred up to robbery and war. But because war and strife arise sometimes from covctousness, and sometimes from desire of power and empty glory, of these which shall happen before the end of the world a yet deeper cause shall be assignable. For as Christ's coming brought through His divine power peace to divers nations, so it shall be on the other hand, that when iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold, and God and His Christ shall desert them; wars shall be again when actions which beget wars are not hindered by holiness; and hostile powers when they are not restrained by the Saints and by Christ shall work unchecked in the hearts of men, stirring up nation against nation, and kingdom against kingdom. But if, as some will have it, famine and pestilence are from the Angels of Satan, these shall then gather might from opposite powers, when the salt of the earth, and the lights of the world, Christ's disciples, shall be no longer, destroying those things which the malice of dæmons hatches. Ofttimes in Israel famines and pestilences were caused by sin, and removed by the prayers of the Saints. (1 Kings 17:1. Jer. 14. James 5:17, 18.) Well is that said, In divers places, for God will not destroy the whole race of men at once, but judging them in portions, He gives opportunity of repentance. But if some stop be not put to these evils in their commencement, they will progress to worse, as it follows, These all are the beginnings of sorrows, that is, sorrows common to the whole world, and those which are to come upon the wicked who shall be tormented in most sharp pains.

JEROME. Figuratively; Kingdom rising against kingdom and pestilence of that discourse which spreadeth as a plague-spot, and hunger of hearing the word of God, and commotion throughout the earth, and separation from the true faith, my be rather understood of the heretics, who fighting among themselves give the victory to the Church.

ORIGEN. This must come to pass before we can see the perfection of that wisdom which is in Christ; but not yet shall be that end which we seek, for a peaceful end is far from those men.

JEROME. These all are the beginnings of sorrows, is better understood of pains of labour, as it were the conception of the coming of Antichrist, and not of the birth.

24:9–14

9. Then shall they deliver you up to be afflicted, and shall kill you: and ye shall be hated of all nations for my name’s sake.

10. And then shall many be offended, and shall betray one another, and shall hate one another.

11. And many false prophets shall rise, and shall deceive many.

12. And because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold.

13. But he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved.

14. And this Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations; and then shall the end come.

RABANUS. For what desert so many evils are to be brought upon Jerusalem, and the whole Jewish province the Lord shews, when He adds, Then shall they deliver you up,&c.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise; The disciples when they heard these things which were spoken of Jerusalem might suppose that they should be beyond reach of harm, as though what they now heard was the sufferings of others, while they themselves should meet with nothing but prosperous times, He therefore announces the grievous things which should befal them, putting them in fear for themselves. First He had bid them be on their guard against the arts of false teachers, He now foretels to them the violence of tyrants. In good season He thus introduces their own woes, as here they will receive consolation from the common calamities; and He held out to them not this comfort only, but also that of the cause for which they should suffer, shewing that it was for His name’s sake, And ye shall be hated of all men for my name’s sake.

ORIGEN. But how should the people of Christ be hated by the nations who dwelt in the uttermost parts of the earth? But one may perhaps say, that in this place all is put hyperbolically for many. But this that He says, Then shall they deliver you, presents some difficulty; for before these things the Christians were delivered to tribulation. To this it may be answered, that at that time the Christians shall be more delivered to tribulation than ever. And persons in any misfortune love to examine into the origin of them, and to talk about them. Hence when the worship of the Gods shall be almost deserted by reason of the multitude of Christians, it will be said that that is the cause of the wars, and famines, and pestilences; and of the earthquakes also they will say that the Christians are the cause, whence the persecution of the Churches.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having named two sources of opposition, that from seducers, and that from enemies, He adds a third, that from false brethren; And then shall many be offended, and shall betray one another, and shall hate one another. See Paul bewailing these same things, Without were fightings, within were fears; (2 Cor. 7:5. 2 Cor. 11:26. v. 13.) and in another place; In perils among false brethren, of whom he says, Such are false Apostles, deceitful workers.

REMIGIUS. As the capture of Jerusalem approached, many rose up, calling themselves Christians, and deceived many; such Paul calls false brethren, John Antichrists.

HILARY. Such was Nicolaus, one of the seven deacons, who led astray many by his pretences. And Simon Magus who, armed with diabolic works and words, perverted many by false miracles.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He adds, what is still more cruel, that such false Prophets shall have no alleviation in charity; Because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold.

REMIGIUS. That is, true love towards God and our neighbour, in proportion as each surrenders himself to iniquity, in that proportion will the flame of charity in his heart be extinguished.

JEROME. Observe, He says, the love of many, (Rom. 8:35.) not ‘of all,’ for in the Apostles, and those like them, love would continue, as Paul speaks, Who shall separate us from the love of Christ?

REMIGIUS. Whoso shall endure unto the end, i. e. to the end of his life; for whoso to the end of his life shall persevere in the confession of the name of Christ, and in love, he shall be saved.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then that they should not say, How then shall we live among so many evils? He promises not only that they should live, but that they should teach every where. And this Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world.

REMIGIUS. For the Lord knew that the hearts of the disciples would be made sad by the destruction of Jerusalem, and overthrow of their nation, and He therefore comforts them with a promise that more of the Gentiles should believe than of the Jews should perish.

CHRYSOSTOM. That before the taking of Jerusalem the Gospel was preached every where, hear what Paul says, Their sound is gone out into all the earth; (Rom. 10:18.) and see himself travelling from Jerusalem into Spain. And if one had so large a province, think how much all must have done. Whence writing to certain, he says of the Gospel, It bears fruit, and increases in every creature under heaven. (Col. 1:6.) And this is the strongest proof of Christ’s power, that in thirty years or a little more, the word of the Gospel filled the ends of the world. Though the Gospel was preached every where, yet all did not believe, whence He adds, For a witness unto all nations, in accusation, that is, of such as believe not, they who have believed bearing witness against them that believed not, and condemning them. And in fit season did Jerusalem fall, namely, after the Gospel had been preached throughout the world; as it follows, And then shall the consummation come, i. e. the end of Jerusalem. For they who have seen Christ’s power shining forth every where, and in brief space spread over the whole world, what mercy did they deserve when they continued still in ingratitude?

REMIGIUS. But the whole passage might be referred to the end of the world. For then shall many be offended, and depart from the faith, when they see the numbers and wealth of the wicked, and the miracles of Antichrist, and they shall persecute their brethren; and Antichrist shall send false Prophets, who shall deceive many; iniquity shall abound, because the number of the wicked shall be increased; and love shall wax cold, because the number of the good shall diminish.

JEROME. And the sign of the Lord’s second coming is, that the Gospel shall be preached in all the world, so that all may be without excuse.

ORIGEN. And that, Ye shall be hated of all men for my name’s sake, might be then applied thus; That indeed at this time all nations are conspired together against the Christians, but that when the things foretold by Christ shall have come to pass, then there shall be persecutions, not as before in places, but every where against the people of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199, 46.) But that this preaching the Gospel of the kingdom in all the world was accomplished by the Apostles, we have not any certain evidence, to prove. There are numberless barbarous nations in

Africa, among whom the Gospel is not even yet preached, as it is easy to learn from the prisoners who are brought from thence. But it cannot be said that these have no part in the promise of God. For God promised with an oath not the Romans only, but all nations to the seed of Abraham. But in whatever nation there is yet no Church established, it must needs be that there should be one, not that all the people should believe; for how then should that be fulfilled, Ye shall be hated of all nations for my name’s sake, unless there be in all nations those who hate and those; who are hated? That preaching therefore was not accomplished by the Apostles, while as yet there were nations among whom it had not begun to be fulfilled. The words of the Apostle also, Their sound hath gone out into all the world, though expressed as of time past, are meant to apply to something future, not yet completed; as the Prophet, whose words he quotes, said that the Gospel bore fruit and grew in the whole world (Ps. 19:4.), to shew thereby to what extent its growth should come. If then we know not when it shall be that the whole world shall be filled with the Gospel, undoubtedly we know not when the end shall be; but it shall not be before such time.

ORIGEN. When every nation shall have heard the preaching of the Gospel, then shall come the end of the world. For at this time there are many nations, not of barbarians only, but of our own, who have not yet heard the word of Christianity.

GLOSS. (non occ.)c. But it is possible to maintain both applications of the passage, if only we will take this diffusion of Gospel preaching in a double sense. If we understand it of fruit produced by the preaching, and the foundation in every nation of a Church of believers in Christ, as Augustine (in the passage above quoted) expounds it, then it is a sign which ought to precede the end of the world, and which did not precede the destruction of Jerusalem. But if we understand it of the fame of their preaching, then it was accomplished before the destruction of Jerusalem, when Christ’s disciples had been dispersed over the four quarters of the earth. Whence Jerome says, (Hieron. in loc.) I do not suppose that there remained any nation which knew not the name of Christ; for where preacher had never been, some notion of the faith must have been communicated by neighbouring nations.

ORIGEN. Morally; He who shall see that glorious second coming of the word of God into his soul, must needs suffer in proportion to the measure of his proficiency assaults of opposing influences, and Christ in him must be hated by all, not only by the nations literally understood, but by the nations of spiritual vices. And in such enquiries there will be few who shall reach the truth with any fulness, the more part shall be offended and fall therefrom, betraying and accusing one another because of their disagreement respecting doctrines, which shall give rise to a mutual hatred. Also there shall be many setting forth unsound words concerning things to come, and interpreting the Prophets in a manner in which they ought not; these are the false Prophets who shall deceive many, and who shall cause to wax cold that fervour of love which was before in the simplicity of the faith. But he who can abide firmly in the Apostolic tradition, he shall be saved; and the Gospel being preached to the minds of all shall be for a testimony to all nations, that is, to all the unbelieving thoughts of the soul.

24:15–22

15. When ye therefore shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, stand in the holy place, (whoso readeth, let him understand:)

16. Then let them which be in Judæa flee into the mountains:

17. Let him which is on the housetop not come down to take any thing out of his house.

18. Neither let him which is in the field return back to take his clothes.

19. And woe unto them that are with child, and to them that give suck in those days!

20. But pray ye that your flight be not in the winter, neither on the sabbath day:

21. For then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time, no, nor ever shall be.

22. And except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh be saved: but for the elect’s sake those days shall be shortened.

CHRYSOSTOM. As above He had obscurely intimated the end of Jerusalem; He now proceeds to a more plain announcement of it, citing a prophecy which should make them believe it.

JEROME. That, Let him that readeth understand, is said to call us to the mystic understanding of the place. What we read in Daniel is this; And in the midst of the week the sacrifice and the oblation shall be taken away, and in the temple shall be the abomination of desolations until the consummation of the time, and consummation shall be given upon the desolate. (Dan. 9:27. sec. LXX.)

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199. 31.) Luke, in order to shew that the abomination of desolation foretold by Daniel had reference to the time of the siege of Jerusalem, repeats these words of our Lord, When ye shall see Jerusalem encompassed by armies, then know ye that its desolation draweth nigh. (Luke 21:20.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. Whence I think that by the abomination of desolation, He means the army by which the city of the holy Jerusalem was desolated.

JEROME. Or it may be understood of the statue of Cæsar, which Pilate set up in the temple; or of the equestrian statue of Adrian, which stood to the present time in the very Holy of Holies. For, according to the Old Scripture, an idol is called ‘abomination;’ of desolation is added, because the idol was set up in the desolated and deserted temple.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or because he who desolated the city and the temple placed his statue there. He says, When ye shall see, because these things were to happen while some of them were yet alive. Wherein admire Christ’s power, and the courage of the disciples, who preached through those times in which all things Jewish were the object of attack. The Apostles, being Jews, introduced new laws in opposition to the Roman authority. The Romans conquered countless thousands of Jews, but could not overcome twelve unarmed unprotected men.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi.) But because it had often happened to the Jews to be recovered in very desperate circumstances, as in the times of Sennacherib and Antiochus, that no man might look for any such event now, He gave command to His disciples to fly, saying, Then let them which are in Judæa flee to the mountains.

REMIGIUS. And this we know was so done when the fall of Jerusalem drew near; for on the approach of the Roman army, all the Christians in the province, warned, as ecclesiastical history tells us (Euseb. H.E. iii. 5.), miraculously from heaven, withdrew, and passing the Jordan, took refuge in the city of Pella; and under the protection of that King Agrippa, of whom we read in the Acts of the Apostles, they continued some time; but Agrippa himself, with the Jews whom he governed, was subjected to the dominion of the Romans.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then to shew how inevitable the evils that should come upon the Jews, and how infinite their calamity, He adds, And let him which is on the housetop, not come down to take any thing out of his house, for it was better to be saved, and to lose his clothes, than to put on a garment and perish; and of him who is in the field He says the same. For if those who are in the city fly from it, little need is there for those who are abroad to return to the city. But it is easy to despise money, and not hard to provide other raiment; but how can one avoid natural circumstances? How can a woman with child be made active for flight, or how can she that gives suck desert the child she has brought forth? Woe, therefore, to them that are with child, and to them that give suck in those days; to the one, because they are encumbered, and cannot easily fly, bearing about the burden of the womb; to the other, because they are held by compassion for their children, and cannot save with them those whom they are suckling.

ORIGEN. Or because that will not be a time of shewing pity, neither upon them who are with child, nor upon them who are suckling, nor upon their infants. And as speaking to Jews who thought they might travel no more upon the sabbath than a sabbath-day's journey, He adds, But pray ye that your flight be not in the winter, neither on the sabbath.

JEROME. Because in the one the severity of the cold prevents your flight to the deserts, and your lurking in mountains and wilds; in the other, you must either transgress the Law, if you will fly, or encounter instant death if you will stay.

CHRYSOSTOM. Note how this speech is directed against the Jews; for when these things were done by Vespasian, the Apostles could neither observe the Sabbath nor fly, seeing most of them were already dead, and those who survived were living in distant countries. And why they should pray for this He adds a reason, For then shall be great tribulation, such as was not since the beginning of the world to this time, no, nor shall be.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199. 30.) In Luke it is thus read, There shall be great distress upon the earth, and wrath upon this people, and they shall fall by the edge of the sword, and shall be led away captive into all nations. (Luke 21:23.) And so Josephus, who wrote the Jewish History, (B. J. vii.) relates evils so great happening to this people as to seem hardly credible. Whence it was not unreasonably said, that such tribulation had never been from the beginning of creation, nor should be; for though in the lime of Antichrist shall be such, or perhaps greater; yet to the Jews, of whom we must understand this, such shall never more befal. For if they shall be the first and the chief to receive Antichrist, they will then rather inflict than suffer tribulation.

CHRYSOSTOM. I ask the Jews, whence came upon them so grievous wrath from heaven more woful than all that had come upon them before? Plainly it was because of the desperate crime1 and the denial of the Cross. But He shews that they deserved still heavier punishment than they received, when He adds, And except those days should be shortened, there should no flesh he saved; that is, If the siege by the Romans should be continued longer, all the Jews would perish; for by all flesh, He means all the Jewish nation, those within and those without; for the Romans were at war not only with those in Judæa, but with the whole race wherever dispersed.

AUGUSTINE. Indeed some persons seem to me not unfitly to understand by these days the evils themselves, as in other places of divine Scripture evil days are spoken of; not that the days themselves are evil, but the things that are done on them. And they are said to be shortened, because they are less felt, God giving us endurance; so that even though grievous, they are felt as short.

CHRYSOSTOM. But that the Jews should not say that these evils came because of the preaching and the disciples of Christ, He shews them that had it not been for His disciples, they would have totally perished, but for the elect’s sake those days shall be shortened.

AUGUSTINE. For we ought not to doubt that when Jerusalem was overthrown, there were among that people elect of God who had believed out of the circumcision, or would have believed, elect before the foundation of the world, for whose sake those days should be shortened, and their evils made endurable. Some there are who suppose that the days will be shortened by a more rapid motion of the sun, as the day was made longer on the prayer of Jesus Naue.

JEROME. Not remembering that which is written. The day continues according to thy ordinances. (Ps. 119:91.) We must understand it of their being shortened not in measure, but in number, lest the faith of believers should be shaken by lengthened affliction.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For let us not suppose that the computation of Daniel’s weeks was interfered with by this shortening of those days, or that they were not already at that time complete, but had to be completed afterwards in the end of all things, for Luke most plainly testifies that the prophecy of Daniel was accomplished at the time when Jerusalem was overthrown.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe this economy of the Holy Spirit in this, that John wrote nothing of all this, that he might not seem to be writing a history after the event; for he survived sometime the taking of Jerusalem. But these who died before it, and saw nothing of it, these write it, that the power of prophecy may shine manifestly forth.

HILARY. Or otherwise; It is a sign of His future coming that the Lord gives, when He says, When ye shall see the abomination. For the Prophet spoke this of the times of Antichrist; and he calls abomination that which coming against God claims to itself the honour of God. It is the abomination of desolation, because it will desolate the earth with wars and slaughter; and it is admitted by the Jews, and set up in the holy place, that where God had been invoked by the prayers of the saints, into that same place admitted by the unbelievers it might be adored with the worship of God. And because this error will be peculiar to the Jews, that having rejected the truth they should adopt a lie, He warns them to leave Judæa, and flee to the mountains, that no pollution or infection might be gathered by admixture with a people who should believe on Antichrist. That He says, Let him which is on the housetop not come down to take ang thing out of his house, is thus understood. The roof is the highest part of the house, the summit and perfection of the whole building. He then who stands on the top of his house, i. e. in the perfection of his heart, aloft in the regeneration of a new spirit, ought not to come down to the lower desire of things of the world. Neither let him which is in the field return back to take his coat; i. e. He that has attained to obedience to the command, let him not return back to his former cares, to take on him again the coat of his former sins in which he once was clothed.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For in tribulations we must beware of coming down from the spiritual heights, and yielding ourselves to the carnal life; or of failing and looking behind us, after having made some progress forwards.

HILARY. That which is said, Woe unto them that are with child, and to them that give suck, is not to be taken literally as an admonition to women pregnant, but as a description of souls burdened with the weight of sin, that neither in the house, nor in the field, may escape the storm of the wrath that is in store for them. Woe also to those that are being suckled; the weak souls, that is, who are being brought to the knowledge of God as by milk, to whom it shall be woe, because they are too laden to fly, and too inexperienced to resist Antichrist, having neither escaped sin, nor partaken of the food of true bread.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Aug. Serm. App. 75. 2.) Or, They that are with child, are they who covet what belongs to others; they that give suck, are they who have already forcibly taken that which they coveted; to them shall be woe in the day of judgment. Pray ye that your flight be not in the winter, or on the sabbath day; that is,

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. I. 37.) That no one be found in that day in either joy or sorrow for temporal things.

HILARY. Or; That we be not taken in the frost of sins, or in discontinuance of good works, because of the soreness of the affliction; notwithstanding that for the sake of God’s elect, those days shall be shortened, that the abridgment of the time may disarm the force of the calamities.

ORIGEN. Mystically; In the holy place of the Scriptures, both Old and New Testament, Antichrist, that is, false word, has often stood; let those who see this flee from the Judæa of the letter to the high mountains of truth. And whoso has been found to have gone up to the house-top of the word, and to be standing upon its summit, let him not come down thence as though he would fetch any thing out of his house. And if he be in the field in which the treasure is hid, and return thence to his house, he will run into the temptation of a false word; but especially if he have stripped off his old garment, that is, the old man, and should have returned again to take it up. Then the soul, as it were with child by the word, not having yet brought forth, is liable to a woe; for it casts that which it had conceived, and loses that hope which is in the acts of truth; and the same also if the word has been brought forth perfect and entire, but not having yet attained sufficient growth. Let them that flee to the mountains pray that their flight be not in the winter or on the sabbath-day, because in the serenity of a settled spirit they may reach the way of salvation, but if the winter overtake them they fall amongst those whom they would fly from. And there be some who rest from evil works, but do not good works; be your flight then not on such sabbath when a man rests from good works, for no man is easily overcome in times of peril from false doctrines, except he is unprovided with good works. But what sorer affliction is there than to see our brethren deceived, and to feel one's self shaken and terrified? Those days mean the precepts and dogmas of truth; and all interpretations coming of science falsely so called (1 Tim. 6:20.) are so many additions to those days, which God shortens by those whom He wills.

24:23–28

23. Then if any man shall say unto you, Lo, here is Christ, or there; believe it not.

24. For there shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.

25. Behold, I have told you before.

26. Wherefore if they shall say unto you, Behold, he is in the desert; go not forth: behold, he is in the secret chambers; believe it not.

27. For as the lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto the west; so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.

28. For wheresoever the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together.

CHRYSOSTOM. When the Lord had finished all that related to Jerusalem, He came in the rest to His own coming, and gives them signs thereof, useful not for them only, but for us and for all who shall be after us. As above, the Evangelist said, In those days came John the Baptist, (Mat. 3:1.) not implying immediately after what had gone before, but thirty years after; so here, when He says Then, He passes over the whole interval of time between the taking of Jerusalem and the beginnings of the consummation of the world. Among the signs which He gives of His second coming He certifies them concerning the place, and the deceivers. For it shall not be then as at His former coming, when He appeared in Bethlehem, in a corner of the world, unknown of any; but He shall come openly so as not to need any to announce His approach, wherefore, If any man shall say unto you, Lo, here is Christ, or there, believe not.

JEROME. Wherein He shews that His second coming shall be not in lowliness as His first, but in glory; and therefore it is folly to seek in places little and obscure for Him who is the Light of the whole world. (John 8:12.)

HILARY. Notwithstanding, by reason of the great tribulation in which men shall be cast, false prophets promising to shew aid present from Christ, will falsely affirm that Christ is present in divers places, that they may draw into the service of Antichrist men discouraged and distracted.

CHRYSOSTOM. He speaks here of Antichrist, and of certain his ministers, whom He calls false Christs and false prophets, such as were many in the time of the Apostles; but before Christ's second coming there shall come others more bitter than the former, And they shall shew great signs and wonders. (cf. 2 Thes. 2:8.)

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. 83 Quæst. q. 79.) Here the Lord forewarns us that even wicked men shall do some miracles which the saints cannot do, yet are they not therefore to be thought to have a higher place in the sight of God. For the Egyptian magi were not more acceptable to God than the people of Israel, because they could do what the Israelites could not; yet did Moses, by the power of God, work greater things. This gift is not bestowed on all the saints, lest the weak should be led astray by a most destructive error, supposing such powers to be higher gifts than those works of righteousness by which eternal life is secured. And though magi do the same miracles that the saints do, yet are they done with a different end, and through a different authority; for the one do them seeking the glory of God, the others seeking their own glory; these do them by some special compact or privilege1 granted to the Powers, within their sphere, those by the public dispensation and the command of Him to whom all creation is subject.f For it is one thing for the owner of a horse to be compelled to give it up to a soldier, another for him to hand it over to a purchaser, or to give or lend it to a friend; and as those evil soldiers, who are condemned by the imperial discipline, employ the imperial ensigns to terrify the owners of any property, and to extort from them what is not required by the public service; so some evil Christians, by means of the name of Christ, or by words or sacraments Christian, compel somewhat from the Powers; yet these, when thus at the bidding of evil men, they depart from their purpose, they depart in order to deceive men in whose wanderings they rejoice. It is one way then in which magi, another in which good Christians, another in which bad Christians, work miracles; the magi by a private compact, good Christians by the public righteousness, evil Christians by the signs of public righteousness. 1And we ought not to wonder at this when we believe not unreasonably that all that we see happen is wrought by the agency of the inferior powers of this air.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. iii. 8.) Yet are we not therefore to think that this visible material world attends the nod of the disobedient angels, but rather the power is given them of God. Nor are we to suppose that such evil angels have creative power, but by their spirituality they know the seeds of things which are hidden from us, and these they secretly scatter by suitable adaptations of the elements, and so they give occasion both to the whole being, and the more rapid increase of substances. For so there are many men who know what sort of creatures use to be generated out of certain herbs, meats, juices and humours, bruised and mingled together in a certain fashion; save only that it is harder for men to do these things, inasmuch as they lack that subtlety of sense, and penetrativeness of body in their limbs dull and of earthly mould.

GREGORY. (Mor. xv. 61.) When then Antichrist shall have wrought wonderful prodigies before the eyes of the carnal, he shall draw men after him, all such as delight in present goods, surrendering themselves irrevocably to his sway, Insomuch that if it were possible the very elect should be led astray.

ORIGEN. That, If it were possible, is spoken hyperbolically; not that the elect can be led astray, but He wishes to shew that the discourse of heretics is often so persuasive, as to have force to prevail even with those who act2 wisely.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxv. i.) Or, because the heart of the elect is assailed with fearful thoughts, yet their faithfulness is not shaken, the Lord comprehends both under the same sentence, for to waver in thought is to err. He adds, If it were possible, because it is not possible that the elect should be taken in error

RABANUS. He says not this because it is possible for the divine election to be defeated, but because they, who to men’s judgment seemed elect, shall be led into error.

GREGORY. And as darts, when foreseen, are less likely to hit, He adds, Lo, I have told you. Our Lord announces the woes which are to precede the destruction of the world, that when they come they may alarm the less from having been foreknown.

HILARY. The false prophets, of whom He had spoken above, shall say of Christ one while, Lo, He is in the desert, in order that they may cause men to wander astray; another while, Lo, He is in the secret chambers, that they may enthral men under the dominion of Antichrist. But the Lord declares Himself to be neither lurking in a remote corner, nor shut up to be visited singly, but that He shall be exhibited to the view of all, and in every place, As the lightning cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto the west, so shall the coming of the Son of Man be.

CHRYSOSTOM. As He had above described in what guise Antichrist should come, so here He describes how He Himself shall come. For as the lightning needeth none to herald or announce it, but is in an instant of time visible throughout the whole world, even to those that are sitting in their chambers, so the coming of Christ shall be seen every where at once, because of the brightness of His glory. Another sign He adds of His coming, Wheresoever the body is, thither will the eagles be gathered together. The eagles denote the company of the Angels, Martyrs, and Saints.

JEROME. By an instance from nature, which we daily see, we are instructed in a sacrament of Christ. Eagles and vultures are said to scent dead bodies even beyond sea, and to flock to feed upon them. If then birds, not having the gift of reason, by instinct alone find out where lays a dead body, separated by so great space of country, how much more ought the whole multitude of believers to hasten to Christ, whose lightning goeth forth out of the east, and shines even to the west? We may understand by the carcase here, or corpse1, which in the Latin is more expressively ‘cadaver,’ an allusion to the passion of Christ’s death.

HILARY. That we might not be ignorant of the place in which He should come, He adds this, Wheresoever the carcase, &c. He calls the Saints eagles, from the spiritual flight of their bodies, and shews that their gathering shall be to the place of His passion, the Angels guiding them thither; and rightly should we look for His coming in glory there, where He wrought for us eternal glory by the suffering of His bodily humiliation.

ORIGEN. And observe, He says not vultures or crows, but eagles, shewing the lordliness and royalty of all who have believed in the Lord’s passion.

JEROME. They are called eagles whose youth is renewed as the eagle’s, and who take to themselves wings that they may come to Christ’s passion. (Ps. 103:5. Is. 40:31.)

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxi. 53.) We may understand this, Wheresoever the carcase is, as meaning, I who incarnate sit on the throne of heaven, as soon as I shall have loosed the souls of the elect from the flesh, will exalt them to heavenly places.

JEROME. Or otherwise; This may be understood of the false prophets. At the time of the Jewish captivity, there were many leaders who declared themselves to be Christs, (Joseph B.J. v. 1) so that while the Romans were actually besieging them, there were three factions within. But it is better taken as we expounded it above, of the end of the world. Thirdly, it may be understood of the warfare of the heretics against the Church, and of those Antichrists, who under pretext of false science, fight against Christ.

ORIGEN. The genus of Antichrist is one, the species many, just as all lies are of one sort. As all the holy Prophets were Prophets of the true Christ, so understand that each false Christ shall have his own false Prophets, who shall preach as true the false teachings of some Antichrist. When then one shall say, Lo, here is Christ, or lo, there, we need not look abroad out of the Scriptures, for out of the Law, the Prophets, and the Apostles, they bring the things which seem to favour their lie. Or by this, Lo, here is Christ, or lo, there, they shew that it was not Christ, but some impostor under the same title, such for example as Marcion, or Valentinus, or Basilides taught.

JEROME. If then any one assert to you that Christ tarries in the desert of the Gentiles, or in the teaching of the Philosophers, or in the secret chambers of the heretics, who promise the hidden things of God, believe Him not, but believe that the Catholic Faith shines from east to west in the Churches.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 38.) By the east and west, He signifies the whole world, throughout which the Church should be. In the same way as He said below, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven, (Mat. 26:64.) so now He likens His coming to lightning, which uses to flash out of the clouds. When then the authority of the Church is set up clear and manifest throughout the whole world, He suitably warns His disciples that they should not believe schismatics and heretics. Each schism and heresy holds its own place, either occupying some important position in the earth, or ensnaring men’s curiosity in obscure and remote conventicles. Lo, here is Christ, or lo, there, refers to some district or province of the earth; the secret chambers, or the desert, signify the obscure and lurking conventicles of heretics.

JEROME. Or by this, in the desert, or in the secret chambers, He means that in times of persecution and distress, the false Prophets always find place for deceiving.

ORIGEN. Or, when they allege secret and before unpublished Scriptures, in proof of their lie, they seem to say, Lo, the word of truth is in the desert. But when they produce canonical Scripture in which all Christians agree, they seem to say, Lo, the word of truth is in the chambers. Or wishing to point out such discourses as are altogether without Scripture, He said, If they shall say to you, Lo, he is in the secret chambers, believe it not. Truth is like the lightning that cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto the west. Or this may mean, that truth can be supported out of every passage of Scripture. The lightning of truth comes out of the east, that is, from the first beginnings of Christ, and shines throughout even to His passion, which is His setting; or from the very beginning of creation, to the last Scripture of the Apostles. Or, the east is the Law, the west is the end of the Law, and of John’s prophecy. The Church alone neither takes away word or meaning from this lightning, nor adds aught to its prophecy. Or He means that we should give no heed to those who say, Lo, here is Christ, but shew Him not in the Church, in which alone is the coming or the Son of Man, who said, Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world. (Mat. 28:20.)

JEROME. We are invited to flock to Christ’s passion wheresoever in Scripture it is read of, that through it we may be able to come to God’s word.

24:29–30

29. Immediately after the tribulation of those days shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens shall be shaken:

30. And then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven: and then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn.

GLOSS. (non occ.) As soon as the Lord has fortified the believers against the arts of Antichrist and his ministers, by shewing that His coming would be public, He proceeds to shew the order and method of His coming.

CHRYSOSTOM. By the tribulation, He means the times of Antichrist and the false Prophets; for when there are so many deceivers, the tribulation will be great. But it shall not extend through any great length of time. For if for the elect's sake the Jewish war is shortened, much more shall this tribulation be shortened for their sakes; for which reason He said not After, but Immediately after, for He shall come immediately after.

HILARY. The darkening of the sun, the failing of the moon, and the fall of the stars, indicate the glories of His coming.

ORIGEN. One will say, As at the breaking out of great conflagrations, great darkness is at the first caused by the smoke, so when the world shall be consumed by fire, which shall be kindled, even the great luminaries shall be darkened; and when the light of the stars is decayed, the rest of their substance, incapable of exaltation, shall fall from heaven into what it was, when it was first raised aloft by the light. When this shall have taken place, it follows that the rational heavenly powers shall suffer dismay and derangement, and shall be suspended from their functions. And then shall appear the sign of the Son of Man in heaven, that sign by which the heavenly things were made, that is, the power which the Son wrought when He hung upon the cross. And the sign shall appear in heaven, that men of all tribes who before had not believed Christianity when preached, then by that sign, acknowledging it as made plain, shall grieve and mourn for their ignorance and sins. Others will think otherwise, that as the light of a lamp dies away by degrees, so when the supply of the heavenly luminaries shall fail, the sun shall be darkened, and the moon and the light of the stars shall grow dim, and that which in their composition is earthy shall fall from heaven. But how can it be said of the sun that its light shall be darkened, when Esaias the Prophet (Is. 30:26.) declares, that in the end of the world, there shall be light proceeding forth from the sun? And of the moon he declares that it shall be as the sun. But concerning the stars, there are some that endeavour to convince us that all, or many of them, are larger than the whole earth. How then shall they fall from heaven, when this earth would not be large enough to contain them?

JEROME. These things, therefore, shall not come to pass by any diminution of light, for in another place we read that the light of the sun shall be sevenfold; but by comparison with real light, all things shall seem dim.

RABANUS. But nothing hinders our supposing that the sun and moon with the other stars shall for a time lose their light, as we know did the sun at the time of the Lord’s passion; as Joel also says, The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and manifest day of the Lord come. (Joel 2:31.) But when the day of judgment is passed, and the life of future glory shall dawn, and there shall be a new heaven and a new earth, then shall that come to pass of which Isaiah speaks, The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold. (Is. 30:26.) The stars shall fall from heaven, is expressed in Mark; There shall be stars falling from heaven, (Mark. 13:25.) that is, lacking their proper light.

JEROME. By the powers of heaven, we understand the bands of the Angels.

CHRYSOSTOM. Very fitly shall they be shaken and dismayed, seeing so mighty a change being wrought, their fellow-servants punished, and the universe standing before a terrible tribunal.

ORIGEN. But as, at the dispensation of the Cross, the sun was eclipsed, and darkness was spread over the earth; so when the sign of the Son of Man appears in heaven, the light of the sun, moon, and stars, shall fail, as though waning before the might of that sign. This we understand to be the sign of the cross, that the Jews may see, as Zacharias and John speak, Him whom they have pierced, (Zech. 12:10. John 19:37.) and the sign of victory.

CHRYSOSTOM. But because the sun will be darkened, the cross would not be seen, if it were not far brighter than the rays of the sun. That the disciples might not be ashamed, and grieve over the cross, He speaks of it as a sign, with a kind of distinction. The sign of the cross will appear to overthrow the shamelessness of the Jews, when Christ shall appear in the judgment, shewing not only His wounds, but His most ignominious death, And then all the tribes of the earth shall mourn. For when they shall see the cross, they shall bethink them how they have gained nought by His death, and that they have crucified Him whom they ought to have worshipped.

JEROME. Rightly does He say, the tribes of the earth, for they shall mourn who have no citizenship in heaven, but are written in earth. (Jer. 17:13.)

ORIGEN. Morally, one may say that the sun, which shall be darkened, is the Devil, who shall be convicted in the end of the world, that whereas he is darkness, he has feigned himself to be the sun; the moon, which seems to receive its light from this sun, is the Church of the wicked, which professes to have and to give light, but then convicted with its sinful dogmas, shall lose its brightness; and all those who, either by false teaching, or false virtues, promised truth to men, but led them astray by lies, these are fitly called stars falling from, so to say, their own heaven, where they were raised on high, exalting themselves against the knowledge of God. For illustration of this discourse, we may apply that place in Proverbs, which says, The light of the just is unquenchable, but the light of the wicked shall be quenched. (Prov. 4:18.) Then the brightness of God shall appear in every one who has borne the image of the heavenly; and they of heaven shall rejoice, but they of earth shall lament.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199, 39.) Or, the Church is the sun, moon, and stars, to which it is said, Fair as the moon, bright as the sun. Then shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light (Song of Solomon 6:10.), because in that ungoverned fury of wicked persecutors, the Church shall not be seen. Then shall the stars fall from heaven, and the powers of heaven shall be shaken, because many, who seemed to be shining in God’s grace, shall give way to their persecutors, and shall fall, and even the stoutest believers shall be shaken. And these things shall be after the tribulation of those days, not because they shall happen when the whole persecution is overpast, but because the tribulation shall be first, that the falling away may come after. And because it shall be so throughout all those days, it shall be after the tribulation of those days, yet on those very days.

And they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory.

CHRYSOSTOM. He adds this, that having heard of the cross, they should not now imagine a similar degradation.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199, 41.) The first and most apparent meaning of this is of that time when He shall come to judge the quick and the dead in His body—that body in which He sits at the right hand of the Father, in which He died and rose again and ascended into heaven. As we read in the Acts of the Apostles; He was taken up, and a cloud received Him out of their sight, (Acts 1:9.) upon which it was said by the Angels, He shall so come as ye hare seen Him go into heaven, we may reasonably believe that He will come again, not only in the same body, but also in a cloud.

ORIGEN. Therefore shall they see with the bodily eyes the Son of Man, coming in human shape, in the clouds of heaven, that is, on high. As at the transfiguration, a voice came out of the cloud, so when He shall come again transformed into His glorious appearance, it shall be not on one cloud, but upon many, which shall be His chariot. And if when the Son of God went up to Jerusalem, they who loved Him spread their garments in the way, not willing that even the ass that carried Him should tread upon the earth; what wonder, if the Father and God of all should spread the clouds of heaven under the body of the Son, when He comes to the work of the consummation? And one may say, that as in the creation of man, God took clay from the earth and made man; so to manifest the glory of Christ, the Lord taking of the heaven, and of its substance, gave it a body of a bright cloud in the Transfiguration, and of bright clouds at the Consummation; wherefore it is here said, in the clouds of heaven, as it was there said, of the clay of the ground. (Gen. 2:7.) And it behoves the Father to give all such admirable gifts to the Son, because He humbled Himself; and He has also exalted Him, not only spiritually, but bodily, that He should come upon such clouds; and perhaps upon rational clouds, that even the chariot of the glorified Son of Man should not be irrational. At the first, Jesus came with that power with which He wrought signs and wonders in the people; yet was that power little in comparison of that great power with which He shall come in the end; for that was the power of one emptying Himself of power. And also, it is fitting that He should be transformed into greater glory than at the transfiguration on the mount; for then He was transfigured for the sake of three only, but in the consummation of the whole world, He shall appear in great glory, that all may see Him in glory.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But because the Scriptures are to be searched, and we are not to content ourselves with the surface of them, let us look closely at what follows, When ye see all these things come to pass, know that he is near even at the door. We know then that He is near, when we see come to pass not any of the foregoing things, but all of them, among which is this that the Son of Man shall be seen coming. And he shall send his Angels, who from the four quarters of the world shall gather together His elect. All these things He does at the last hour (1 John 2:18.) coming in His members as in the clouds, or in the whole Church as in one great cloud, as now He ceases not to come. And with great power and glory, because His power and glory will seem greater in the Saints to whom He will give great power, that they may not be overcome of persecution.

ORIGEN. Or He comes every day with great power to the mind of the believer in the clouds of prophecy, that is, in the Scriptures of the Prophets and the Apostles, who utter the word of God with a meaning above human nature. Also we say that to those who understand He comes with great glory, and that this is the more seen in the second coming of the Word which is to the perfect. 1And so it may be, that all which the three Evangelists have said concerning Christ’s coming, if carefully compared together and thoroughly examined, would be found to apply to His continual daily coming in His body, which is the Church, of which coming He said in another place, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven, (Mat. 26:6.) excepting those places in which He promises that His last coming in His own person.

24:31

31. And he shall send his angels with a great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other.

ORIGEN. Because He had spoken of mourning, which shall be only that they may bear witness against themselves and condemn themselves, that none should suppose that that mourning will end their woes, He now adds, And he shall send his Angels with a trump and a loud voice.

REMIGIUS. Here we are not to think of a real trumpet, but of the voice of the archangel, which shall be so loud that at its sound all the dead shall rise out of the dust of the earth.

CHRYSOSTOM. The sound of the trump refers to the resurrection, and the rejoicing, and to represent the astonishment which shall be then, and the woe of those that shall be left, and shall not be snatched up into the clouds.

ORIGEN. It is written in Numbers (Numb. 10:3.), that the Priests shall summon by the sound of the trumpet from the four winds those who are of the camp of Israel, and it is in allusion to this that Christ speaks here of the Angels, And they shall gather together the elect from the four winds.

REMIGIUS. That is, from the four quarters of the world, north, south, east, and west.

ORIGEN. Some of little discernment think, that only those who shall then be found in the body shall be gathered together, but it is better to say that the Angels of Christ shall then gather together not only all who from the coming of Christ to the end of the world have been called and chosen, but all from the foundation of the world, who like Abraham have seen the day of Christ and rejoiced therein. (John 8:56.) And that He here means not only those that shall be found in the body, but those also who have quitted the body, the following words shew, from one end of heaven to the other, which cannot be meant of any one upon earth. Or, the heavens are the divine Scriptures and their authors1 in which God dwells. One end of heaven is the beginning of the Scriptures, the other end is their conclusion. The saints there are gathered together from one end of heaven, that is, from those that live in the beginning of the Scriptures to those who live in the ends of them. They shall be gathered together with a trump and a loud voice, that they who hear and attend may prepare themselves for that way of perfection which leads to the Son of God.

REMIGIUS. Or otherwise; Lest any one should suppose that they should be gathered only from the four quarters of the world, and not from the middle regions, The adds this, And from one end of heaven to the other. By the heights of heaven meaning the central regions of the earth, which are under the heights of heaven; and by the ends of heaven, meaning the extreme parts of the earth, where the land seems to join a very wide and distant horizon.

CHRYSOSTOM. That the Lord calls His elect by His Angels pertains to the honour of the elect; and Paul also says that they shall be caught into the clouds; (1 Thes. 4:17.) that is, the Angels shall gather together those that have risen, and when they are gathered together, the clouds shall receive them.

24:32–35

32. Now learn a parable of the fig tree; When his branch is yet tender, and putteth forth leaves, ye know that summer is nigh:

33. So likewise ye, when ye shall see all these things, know that it is near, even at the doors.

34. Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled.

35. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 77.) Because He had said that these things should come to pass immediately after the tribulation of those days, they might ask, How long time hence? He therefore gives them an instance in the fig

JEROME. As much as to say, When the tender shoots first shew themselves in the stem of the fig tree, and the bud bursts into flower, and the bark puts forth leaves, ye perceive the approach of summer and the season of spring and growth; so when ye shall see all these things that are written, do not suppose that the end of the world is immediate, but that certain monitory signs and precursors are shewing its approach.

CHRYSOSTOM. He shews that the interval of time shall not be great, but that the coming of Christ will be presently. By the comparison of the tree He signifies the spiritual summer and peace that the just shall enjoy after their winter, while sinners on the other hand shall have a winter after summer.

ORIGEN. As the fig has its vital powers torpid within it through the season of winter, but when that is past its branches become tender by those very powers and put forth leaves; so the world and all those who are saved had before Christ’s coming their vital energies dormant within them as in a season of winter. Christ’s Spirit breathing upon them makes the branches of their hearts soft and tender, and that which was dormant within burgeons into leaf, and makes shew of fruit. To such the summer and the coming of the glory of the Word of God is nigh at hand.

CHRYSOSTOM. This analogy also adds credit to His foregoing discourse; for wherever He speaks of what must by all means come to pass, Christ ever brings forward parallel physical laws.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199, 22.) That now from the Evangelic and Prophetic signs that we see come to pass, we ought to look that the Lord's coming should be nigh, who is there that denies? For daily it draws ever more and more near, but of the exact time it is said, It is not for you to know the times or the seasons. (Acts 1:7.) See how long ago the Apostle said, Now is our salvation nearer than when we believed. (Rom. 13:11.) What he spoke was not false, and yet how many years have elapsed, how much more may we not say that the Lord's coming is at hand now, that so great an accession of time has been made?

HILARY. Mystically; The Synagogue is likened to the fig treeg; its branch is Antichrist, the son of the Devil, the portion of sin, the maintainer of the law; when this shall begin to swell and to put forth leaves, then summer is nigh, i. e. the approach of the day of judgment shall be perceived.

REMIGIUS. Or, when this fig shall again bud, that is, when the synagogue shall receive the word of holy preaching, as the preaching of Enoch and Elias, then we ought to understand that the day of the consummation is at hand.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 39.) Or, by the fig tree understand the human race, by reason of the temptations of the flesh. When its branch is fender, i. e. when the sons of men through faith in Christ have progressed towards spiritual fruits, and the honour of their adoption to be the sons of God has shone forth in them.

HILARY. To give sure credit to the things which should come to pass He adds, Verily I say unto you, this generation shall not pass away until all these things be fulfilled. By saying Verily, He gives asseveration to the truth.

ORIGEN. The uninstructed refer the words to the destruction of Jerusalem, and suppose them to have been said of that generation which saw Christ's death, that it should not pass away before the city should be destroyed. But I doubt that they would succeed in thus expounding every word from that, one stone shall not be left upon another, to that, it is even at the door; in some perhaps they would succeed, in others not altogether.

CHRYSOSTOM. All these things therefore mean what was said of the end of Jerusalem, of the false prophets, and the false Christs, and all the rest which shall happen down to the time of Christ's coming. That He said, This generation, He meant not of the men then living, but of the generation of the faithful; for so Scripture uses to speak of generations, not of time only, but of place, life, and conversation; as it is said, This is the generation of them that seek the Lord. (Ps. 24:6.) Herein He teaches that Jerusalem shall perish, and the greater part of the Jews be destroyed, but that no trial shall overthrow the generation of the faithful.

ORIGEN. Yet shall the generation of the Church survive the whole of this world, that it may inherit the world to come, yet it shall not pass away until all these things have come to pass. But when all these shall have been fulfilled, then not the earth only but the heavens also shall pass away; that is, not only the men whose life is earthy, and who are therefore called the earth, but also they whose conversation is in heaven, and who are therefore called the heaven; these shall pass away to things to come, that they may come to better things. But the words spoken by the Saviour shall not pass away, because they effect and shall ever effect their purpose; but the perfect and they that admit no further improvement, passing through what they are, come to that which they are not; and this is that, My words shall not pass away. And perhaps the words of Moses and the Prophets have passed away, because all that they prophesied has been fulfilled; but the words of Christ are always complete, daily fulfilling and to be fulfilled in the saints. Or perhaps we ought not to say that the words of Moses and the Prophets are once for all fulfilled; seeing they also are the words of the Son of God, and are fulfilled continually.

JEROME. Or, by generation here He means the whole human race, and the Jews in particular. And He adds, Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away, to confirm their faith in what has gone before; as though He had said, it is easier to destroy things solid and immovable, than that aught should fail of my words.

HILARY. For heaven and earth have in their constitution no necessity of existence, but Christ's words derived from eternity have in them such virtue that they must needs abide.

JEROME. The heaven and the earth shall pass away by a change, not by annihilation; for how should the sun be darkened, and the moon not give her light, if earth and heaven in which these are should be no more?

RABANUS. The heaven which shall pass away is not the1 starry but the2 atmospheric heaven which of old was destroyed by the deluge.

CHRYSOSTOM. He brings forward the elements of the earth to shew that the Church is of more value than either heaven or earth, and that He is Maker of all things.

24:36–41

36. But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only.

37. But as the days of Noe were, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.

38. For as in the days that were before the flood they were eating and drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, until the day that Noe entered into the ark,

39. And knew not until the flood came, and took them all away; so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.

40. Then shall two be in the field; the one shall be taken, and the other left.

41. Two women shall be grinding at the mill; the one shall be taken, and the other left.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Lord having described all the tokens that shall precede His coming, and brought His discourse to the very doors, yet would not name the day; Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the Angels of heaven, but my Father only.

JEROME. In some Latin copies is added here, “neither the Son:” but in the Greek copies, and particularly those of Adamantius and Pierius, it is not foundh But because it is read in some, it seems to require our notice.

REMIGIUS. And Mark has the addition. (Mark 13:32.)

JEROME. Whereat Arius and Eunomius rejoice greatly; for say they, He who knows and He who is ignorant cannot be both equal. Against these we answer shortly; Seeing that Jesus, that is, The Word of God, made all times, (for By him all things were made, and without him was not any thing made that was made,) (John 1:3.) and that the day of judgment must be in all time, by what reasoning can He who knows the whole be shewn to be ignorant of a part? This we will further say; Which is the greater, the knowledge of the Father, or the knowledge of the judgment? If He knows the greater, how can He be ignorant of the less?

HILARY. And has indeed God the Father denied the knowledge of that day to the Son, when He has declared, All things are committed to me of my Father? (Luke 10:22.) but if any thing has been denied, all things are not committed to Him.

JEROME. Having then shewn that the Son of God cannot be ignorant of the day of the consummation, we must now shew a cause why He should be said to be ignorant. When after the resurrection He is demanded concerning this day by the Apostles, He answers more openly; It is not for you to know the times or the seasons which the Father has put in his own power. (Acts 1:7.) Wherein He shews that Himself knows, but that it was not expedient for the Apostles to know, that being in uncertainty of the coming of their Judge, they should live every day as though they were to be judged that day.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. 12.) When He says here, Knows not, He means,’ makes others not to know;’ i. e. He knew not then, so as to tell His disciples; as it was said to Abraham, Now I know that thou fearest God; (Gen. 22:19.) i. e. ‘Now have I caused that thou shouldest know,’ because by the temptation he came to know himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 97. 1.) He says that the Father knoweth, implies that in the Father the Son also knows. For what can there be in time which was not made by the Word, seeing that time itself was made by the Word!

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. 83 Quæst. q. 60.) That the Father alone knows maybe well understood in the above-mentioned manner of knowing, that He makes the Son to know; but the Son is said not to know, because he does not make men to know.

ORIGEN. Otherwise; So long as the Church which is Christ’s body knows not that day and hour, so long the Son Himself is said not to know that day and hour. The word know is used according to its proper usual meaning in Scripture. The Apostle speaks of Christ, as him who knew no sin, (2 Cor. 5:21.) i. e. sinned not. The knowledge of that day and hour the Son reserves in store for the fellow-heirs of the promise, that all may know at once, i. e. in the day when it shall come upon them, what things God hath prepared for them that love him. (1 Cor. 2:9.)

RABANUS. I have read also in some one’s book, that the Son here is not to be taken of the Only-begotten, but of the adopted, for that He would not have put the Angels before the Only-begotten Son, saying, Not the Angels of heaven, neither the Son.i

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199, 16.) The Gospel then says, Of that day and hour knoweth no man; but you say, That neither the month nor the year of His coming can be known. This exactness of yours up to this point seems as if you meant that the year could not be known, but that the week or the decade of years might be known, as though it was possible to fix or assign it to some seven, ten, or a hundred, or some number of years more or less. If you allow that you cannot so limit it, you think with me.

CHRYSOSTOM. That you may perceive that it is not owing to ignorance that He is silent of the day and hour of the judgment, He brings forward another token, As it the as in we days of Noe, so shall the coming of the Son of Man be. By this He means that He shall come sudden and unlooked for, and while men are taking their pleasure; of which Paul also speaks, When they shall say, Peace and safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them. (1 Thess. 5:3.)

RABANUS. Marriage and meats in themselves are not here condemned, as the error of Marcion and Manichæus teaches; for in the one the continuation of the species, in the other that of life, depends; but what is reproved is an unrestrained use of things lawful.

JEROME. It is asked here, how it was said above, Nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom, &c. when here only tokens of peace are spoken of as what shall be then? We must suppose, that after the wars and the other miseries which shall waste the human race, shall follow a short peace, offering rest and quiet to approve the faith of the believers.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, To such as are thoughtlessly disposed, it shall be a time of peace and enjoyment; as the Apostle said not, ‘When there shall be peace,’ but When they shall say, Peace and safety, shewing their insensibility to be such as was theirs in the days of Noe, when the wicked, and not the good, indulged themselves, but their end was sorrow and tribulation. This shews also, that when Antichrist shall come, those who are wicked, and despair of their salvation, shall ran into illicit pleasures; therefore He chooses an instance suitable. For while the ark was building, Noe preached among them, foretelling the evils that should come; but those wicked giving no heed to him, wantoned as though no evil should ever come; so now, because many would not believe things future, He makes credible what He says from what has happened. Another token He gives to shew how unexpectedly that day shall come, and that He is not ignorant of the day, Then two shall be in the field, one shall be taken and the other left. These words shew that masters and servants, they that work, and they that work not, shall be taken or left alike.

HILARY. Or, the two in the field, are the two people of believers and unbelievers, whom the day of the Lord shall overtake, as it were in the labours of this life. And they shall be separated, one being taken and the other left; this shews the separation that shall be between believers and unbelievers; when God’s wrath is kindled, the saints shall be gathered into His garner, and the unbelievers shall be left as fuel for the fire from heaven. The same is the account to be given of that, Two shall be grinding at the mill. The mill is the work of the Law, but as some of the Jews believed through the Apostles, so some shall believe through Elias, and be justified through faith; and one part shall be taken through this same faith of good works, the other part shall be left unfruitful in the work of the Law, grinding in vain, and never to produce the bread of heavenly food.

JEROME. Or, Two men in one field shall be found performing the same labour, sowing corn together, but not reaping the same fruit of their labour. The two grinding together we may understand either of the Synagogue and the Church, which seem to grind together in the Law, and to make of the same Scriptures meal of the commandments of God; or of other heresies, which out of both or one Testament, seem to grind meal of their own doctrines.

HILARY. The two in one bed are those who preach alike the Lord’s rest after His passion, about which heretics and catholics have the same confession; but because the Catholic Faith preaches the unity of the Godhead of the Father and the Son, and the false creed of the heretics impugns that, therefore shall the Divine judgment decide between the confession of these two by taking one and leaving the other.

REMIGIUS. Or, these words denote three orders in the Church. The two men in the field (prædicatores.) denote the order of preachers, to whom is committed the field of the Church; by the two grinding at the mill, (conjugati.) the order of the married priests, who while with a divided heart they are called first to one side, then to the other, do, as it were, ever turn round a mill; by the two in one bed, (continentes.) the order of the continent, whose repose is signified by the bed. But in all these orders are good and bad, righteous and unrighteous, so that some shall be taken, and some left.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; The body is laid as sick on the bed of carnal passions, the soul grinds in the mill of this world, and the bodily senses labour in the field of the world.

24:42–44

42. Watch therefore: for ye know not what hour your Lord doth come.

43. But know this, that if the goodman of the house had known in what watch the thief would come, he would have watched, and would not have suffered his house to be broken up.

44. Therefore be ye also ready: for in such an hour as ye think not the Son of Man cometh.

JEROME. Having declared that of that hour knoweth no man, but the Father only, He shews that it was not expedient for the Apostles to know, that being ignorant they might live in perpetual expectation of His coming, and thus concluding the whole, He says, Watch therefore, &c. And He does not say, ‘Because we know not,’ but Because ye know not, shewing that He Himself is not ignorant of the day of judgment.

CHRYSOSTOM. He would have them ever ready, and therefore He says, Watch.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ii, 3.) To watch is to keep the eyes open, and looking out for the true light, to do and to observe that which one believes, to cast away the darkness of sloth and negligence.

ORIGEN. Those of more plain understanding say, that He spoke this of His second coming; but others would say that it applies to an intellectual coming of the word into the understanding of the disciples, for as yet He was not in their understanding as He was to be.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199, 3.) He said this Watch, not to those only who heard Him speak at the time, but to those who came after them, and to us, and to all who shall be after us, until His second coming, for it touches all in a manner. That day comes to each one of us, when it comes to him to go out of the world, such as he shall be judged, and therefore ought every Christian to watch that the Lord’s coming may not find him unprepared; and he will be unprepared for the day of His coming, whom the last day of his life shall find unprepared.

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) Foolish are all they, who either profess to know the day of the end of the world, when it is to come, or even the end of their own life, which no one can know unless he is illuminated by the Holy Spirit.

JEROME. And by the instance of the master of the household, He teaches more plainly why He keeps secret the day of the consummation.

ORIGEN. The master of the household is the understanding, the house is the soul, the thief is the Devil. The thief is also every contrary doctrine which enters the soul of the unwary by other than the natural entrance, breaking into the house, and pulling down the soul’s natural fences, that is, the natural powers of understanding, it enters the breach, and spoils the soul. Sometimes one takes the thief in the act of breaking in, and seizing him, stabs him with a word, and slays him. And the thief comes not in the day-time, when the soul of the thoughtful man is illuminated with the Sun of righteousness, but in the night, that is, in the time of prevailing wickedness; in which, when one is plunged, it is possible, though he have not the power of the sun, that he may be illuminated by some rays from the Word, as from a lamp; continuing still in evil, yet having a better purpose, and watchfulness, that this his purpose should not be broken through. Or in time of temptation, or of any calamities, is the time when the thief is most found to come, seeking to break through the house of the soul.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xiii. 5.) Or, the thief breaks into the house through the neglect of the master of the house, when the spirit has slept upon its post of guard, and death has come in unawares into the dwelling house of our flesh, and finding the lord of the house sleeping, slays him; that is, the spirit, little providing for coming evils, is taken off unprepared, to punishment, by death. But if he had watched he would have been secure from the thief; that is, looking forward to the coming of the Judge, who takes our lives unawares, he would meet Him with penitence, and not perish impenitent. And the Lord would therefore have the last hour unknown, that it might always be in suspense, and that being unable to foresee it, we might never be unprepared for it.

CHRYSOSTOM. In this He rebukes such as have less care for their souls, than they have of guarding their money against an expected thief.

24:45–51

45. Who then is a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath made ruler over his houshold, to give them meat in due season?

46. Blessed is that servant, whom his lord when he cometh shall find so doing.

47. Verily I say unto you, That he shall make him ruler over all his goods.

48. But and if that evil servant shall say in his heart, My lord delayeth his coming;

49. And shall begin to smite his fellowservants, and to eat and drink with the drunken;

50. The lord of that servant shall come in a day when he looketh not for him, and in an hour that he is not aware of,

51. And shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with the hypocrites: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

HILARY. Though the Lord had given above a general exhortation to all in common to unwearied vigilance, yet He adds a special charge to the rulers of the people, that is, the Bishops, of watchfulness in looking for His coming. Such He calls a faithful servant, and wise master of the household, careful for the needs and interests of the people entrusted to Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. That He says, Whom think ye is that faithful and nine servant, does not imply ignorance, for even the Father we find asking a question, as that, Adam, where art thou? (Gen. 3:9.)

REMIGIUS. Nor yet does it imply the impossibility of attaining perfect virtue, but only the difficulty.

GLOSS. (ord.) For rare indeed is such faithful servant serving his Master for his Master’s sake, feeding Christ’s sheep not for lucre but for love of Christ, skilled to discern the abilities, the life, and the manner of those put under him, whom the Lord sets over, that is, who is called of God, and has not thrust himself in.

CHRYSOSTOM. He requires two things of such servant, fidelity and prudence; He calls him faithful, because he appropriates to himself none of his Lord’s goods, and wastes nought idly and unprofitably. He calls him prudent, as knowing on what he ought to lay out the things committed to him.

ORIGEN. Or, he that makes progress in the faith, though he is not yet perfect in it, is ordinarily called faithful, and he who has natural quickness of intellect is called prudent. And whoever observes will find many faithful, and zealous in their belief, but not at the same time prudent; for God hath chosen the foolish things of the world. (1 Cor. 1:27.) Others again he will see who are quick and prudent but of weak faith; for the union of faith and prudence in the same man is most rare. To give food in due season calls for prudence in a man; not to take away the food of the needy requires faithfulness. And this the literal sense obliges us to, that we be faithful in dispersing the revenues of the Church, that we devour not that which belongs to the widows, that we remember the poor, and that we do not take occasion from what is written, The Lord hath ordained, that they which preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel, (1 Cor. 9:14.) to seek more than plain food and necessary clothing, or to keep more for ourselves than we give to those who suffer want. And that we be prudent, to understand the cases of them that are in need, whence they come to be so, what has been the education and what are the necessities of each. It needs much prudence to distribute fairly the revenues of the Church. Also let the servant be faithful and prudent, that he lavish not the intellectual and spiritual food upon those whom he ought not, but dispense according as each has need; to one is more behoveful that word which shall edify his behaviour, and guide his practice, than that which sheds a ray of science; but to others who can pierce more deeply let him not fail to expound the deeper things, lest if he set before them common things only, he be despised by such as have naturally keener understandings, or have been sharpened by the discipline of worldly learning.

CHRYSOSTOM. This parable may be also fitted to the case of secular rulers; for each ought to employ the things he has to the common benefit, and not to the hurt of his fellow-servants, nor to his own ruin; whether it be wisdom or dominion, or whatever else he has.

RABANUS. The lord is Christ, the household over which He appoints is the Church Catholic. It is hard then to find one man who is both faithful and wise, but not impossible; for He would not pronounce a blessing on a character that could never be, as when He adds, Blessed is that servant whom his lord when he cometh shall find so doing.

HILARY. That is, obedient to his Lord's command, by the seasonableness of his teaching dispensing the word of life to a household which is to be nourished for the food of eternity.

REMIGIUS. It should be observed, that as there is great difference of desert between good preachers and good hearers, so is there great difference between their rewards. The good hearers, if He finds them watching He will make to sit down to meat, as Luke speaks; but the good preachers He will set over all His goods.

ORIGEN. That he may reign with Christ, to whom the Father has committed all that is His. And as the son of a good father set over all that is his, He shall communicate of His dignity and glory to His faithful and wise stewards, that they also may be above the whole creation.

RABANUS. Not that they only, but that they before others, shall be rewarded as well for their own lives as for their superintendence of the flock.

HILARY. Or, shall set him over all his goods, that is, shall place him in the glory of God, because beyond this is nothing better.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He instructs His hearer not only by the honour which awaits the good, but by the punishment which threatens the wicked, adding, If that evil servant shall say in his heart, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199. 1.) The temper of this servant is shewn in his behaviour, which is thus expressed by his good Master; his tyranny, and shall begin to beat his fellow servants, his sensuality, and to eat and drink with the drunken. So that when he said, My Lord delayeth His coming, he is not to be supposed to speak from desire to see the Lord, such as was that of him who said, My soul is athirst for the living God; when shall I come? (Ps. 42:2.) This shews that he was grieved at the delay, seeing that what was hastening towards him seemed to his longing desires to be coming slowly.

ORIGEN. And every Bishop, who ministers not as a fellow servant, but rules by might as a master, and often an harsh one, sins against God; also if he does not cherish the needy, but feasts with the drunken, and is continually slumbering because his Lord cometh not till after long time.

RABANUS. Typically, we may understand his beating his fellow servants, of offending the consciences of the weak by word, or by evil example.

JEROME. The Lord of that servant shall come in a day when he looketh not for Him, is to rouse the stewards to watchfulness and carefulness. He shall cut him in sunder, is not to be understood of execution by the sword, but that he shall sever him from the company of the saints.

ORIGEN. Or, He shall cut him in sunder, when his spirit, that is, his spiritual gift, shall return to God who gave it; but his soul shall go with his body into hell. But the righteous man is not cut in sunder, but his soul, with his spirit, that is, with his gift, spiritual enters into the kingdom of heaven. They that are cut in sunder have in the in thenceforth no part of that spiritual gift which was from God, but there remains to them that part which was their own, that is, their soul, which shall be punished with their body.

JEROME. And shall appoint him his portion with the hypocrites, with those, namely, that were in the field, and grinding at the mill, and were nevertheless left. For as we often say that the hypocrite is one who is one thing, and passes himself for another; so in the field and at the mill he seemed to be doing the same as others, but the event proved that his purpose was different.

RABANUS. Or, appoints him his portion with the hypocrites, that is, a twofold share of punishment, that of fire and frost; to the fire belongs the weeping, to the frost the gnashing of teethk.

ORIGEN. Or, there shall be weeping for such as have laughed amiss in this world, gnashing of teeth for those who have enjoyed an irrational peace. For being unwilling to suffer bodily pain, now the torture forces their teeth to chatter, with which they have eaten the bitterness of wickedness. From this we may learn that the Lord sets over His household not the faithful and wise only, but the wicked also; and that it will not save them to have been set over His household, but only if they have given them their food in due season, and have abstained from beating and drunkenness.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199 in fin.) Putting aside this wicked servant, who, there is no doubt, hates his Master’s coming, let us set before our eyes these good servants, who anxiously expect their Lord’s coming. One looks for His coming sooner, another later, the third confesses his ignorance of the matter. Let us see which is most agreeable to the Gospel. One says, Let us watch and pray, because the Lord will quickly come; another, Let us watch and pray, because this life is short and uncertain, though the Lord’s coming may be distant; and the third, Let us watch, because this life is short and uncertain, and we know not the time when the Lord will come. What else does this man say than what we hear the Gospel say, Watch, because ye know not the hour in which the Lord shall come? All indeed, through longing for the kingdom, desire that that should be true which the first thinks, and if it should so come to pass, the second and third would rejoice with him; but if it should not come to pass, it were to be feared that the belief of its supporters might be shaken by the delay, and they might begin to think that the Lord’s coming shall be, not remote, but never. He who believes with the second that the Lord’s coming is distant will not be shaken in faith, but will receive an unlooked for joy. He who confesses his ignorance which of these is true, wishes for the one, is resigned to the other, but errs in neither, because he neither affirms or denies either.

CHAPTER 25

25:1–13

1. Then shall the kingdom of heaven be likened unto ten virgins, which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom.

2. And five of them were wise, and five were foolish.

3. They that were foolish took their lamps, and took no oil with them:

4. But the wise took oil in their vessels with their lamps.

5. While the bridegroom tarried, they all slumbered and slept.

6. And at midnight there was a cry made, Behold, the bridegroom cometh; go ye out to meet him.

7. Then all those virgins arose, and trimmed their lamps.

8. And the foolish said unto the wise, Give us of your oil; for our lamps are gone out.

9. But the wise answered saying, Not so; lest there be not enough for us and you: but go ye rather to them that sell, and buy for yourselves.

10. And while they went to buy, the bridegroom came; and they that were ready went in with him to the marriage: and the door was shut.

11. Afterward came also the other virgins, saying, Lord, Lord, open to us.

12. But he answered and said, Verily I say unto you, I know you not.

13. Watch therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of man cometh.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii.) In the foregoing parable the Lord set forth the punishment of the man who beat, and was drunk, and wasted his Lord’s goods; in this He declares his punishment who profits not, and does not prepare for himself abundantly the things of which he has need; for the foolish virgins had oil, but not enough.

HILARY. Then, because all this discourse is concerning the great day of the Lord, concerning which He had been speaking before.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xii. 1.) By the kingdom of heaven is meant the present Church, as in that, The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend. (Matt. 13:41.)

JEROME. This parable of the ten foolish and the ten wise virgins, some interpret literally of virgins, of whom there are according to the Apostle some who are virgins both in body and in thought, (1 Cor. 7.) others who have preserved indeed their bodies virgin, but have not the other deeds of virgins, or have only been preserved by the guardianship of parents, but have wedded in their hearts. But from what has gone before, I think the meaning to be different, and that the parable has reference not to virgins only, but to the whole human race.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For in each of the five senses of the body `there is a double instrument, and the number five doubled makes ten. And because the company of the faithful is gathered out of both sexes, the Holy Church is described as being like to ten virgins, where as bad are mixed with good, and reprobate with elect, it is like a mixture of wise and foolish virgins.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He employs the character virgins in this parable to shew, that though virginity be a great thing, yet if it be not accompanied by works of mercy, it shall be cast out with the adulterers.

ORIGEN. Or, The understandings of all who have received the word of God are virgins. For such is the word of God, that of its purity it imparts to all, who by its teaching have departed from the worship of idols, and have through Christ drawn near to the worship of God; Which took their lamps, and went forth to meet the bridegroom and the bridea. They take their lamps, i. e. their natural faculties, and go forth out of the world and its errors, and go to meet the Saviour, who is ever ready to come to enter with them that are worthy to His blessed bride the Church.

HILARY. Or, The bridegroom and the bride represent our Lord God in the body, for the flesh is the bride of the spirit. The lamps are the light of bright souls which shine forth in the sacrament of baptismb.

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. 83 Quæst. q. 59.) Or, The lamps which they carry in their hands are their works, of which it was said above, Let your works shine before men. (Mat. 5:16.)

ORIGEN. They that believe rightly, and live righteously, are likened to the five wise; they that profess the faith of Jesus, but prepare themselves not by good works to salvation, are likened to the five foolish.

JEROME. For there are five senses which hasten towards heavenly things, and seek after things above. Of sight, hearing, and touch, it is specially said, That which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, and our hands have handled. (1 John 1:1.) Of taste, Taste and see that the Lord is good. (Ps. 34:8.) Of smell, Because of the savour of thy good ointments. (Sol. Song, 1:3.) There are also other five senses which gape after earthly husks.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, by the five virgins, is denoted a five-fold continence from the allurements of the flesh; for our appetite must be held from gratification of the eyes, ears, smell, taste, and touch. And as this continence may be done before God, to please Him in inward joy of the conscience, or before men only to gain applause of men, five are called wise, and five foolish. Both are virgins, because both these men exercise continence, though from different motives.

ORIGEN. And because the virtues are so linked together, that he who has one has all, so all the senses so follow one another, that all must be wise, or all foolish.

HILARY. Or, The five wise and five foolish are an absolute distinction between believers and unbelievers.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) It is to be observed, that all have lamps, but all have not oil.

HILARY. The oil is the fruit of good works, the vessels are the human bodies in whose inward parts the treasure of a good conscience is to be laid up.

JEROME. The virgins that have oil are they who, besides their faith, have the ornament of good works; they that have not oil, are they that seem to confess with like faith, but neglect the works of virtue.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, The oil denotes joy, according to that, God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness. (Ps. 45:7.) He then whose joy springs not from this that he is inwardly pleasing to God, has no oil with him; for they have no gladness in their continent lives, save in the praises of men. But the wise took oil with their lamps, that is, the gladness of good works, in their vessels, that is, they stored it in their heart and conscience, as the Apostle speaks, Let every man prove himself, and then shall he have rejoicing in himself, and not in another. (Gal. 6:4.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, The oil denotes charity, alms, and every aid rendered to the needy; the lamps denote the gifts of virginity; and He calls them foolish, because after having gone through the greater toil, they lost all for the sake of a less; for it is greater labour to overcome the desires of the flesh than of money.

ORIGEN. Or, The oil is the word of teaching, with which the vessels of souls are filled; for what gives so great content as moral discourse, which is called the oil of light. The wise took with them of this oil, as much as would suffice, though the Word should tarry long, and be slack to come to their consummation. The foolish took lamps, alight indeed at the first, but not supplied with so much oil as should suffice even to the end, being careless respecting the provision of doctrine which comforts faith, and enlightens the lamp of good deeds.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For there die of both kinds of men in this interval of time before the resurrection of the dead, and the Lord's coming shall be.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) To sleep is to die, to slumber before sleep is to faint from salvation before death, because, by the burden of sickness we come to the sleep of death.

JEROME. Or, They slumbered, i. e. they were dead. And then follows, And slept, because they were to be afterwards wakened. While the bridegroom tarried, shews that no little time intervened between the Lord's first and second coming.

ORIGEN. Or, Whilst the bridegroom tarried, and the Word comes not speedily to the consummation of this life, the senses suffer, slumbering and moving in the night of the world; and sleep, as energizing feebly, and with no quick sense. Yet did those wise virgins not quit their lamps, nor despair of hoarding their oil.

JEROME. The Jews have a tradition that Christ will come at midnight, in like manner as in that visitation of Egypt, when the Paschal feast is celebrated, and the destroyer comes, and the Lord passes over our dwellings, and the door posts of each man's countenance are hallowed by the blood of the Lamb. Hence, I suppose, has continued among us that apostolic tradition, that on the vigil of Easterc the people should not be dismissed before midnight, in expectation of Christ's coming; but when that hour has past over, they may celebrate the feast in security; whence also the Psalmist says, At midnight did I rise to praise thee. (Ps. 119:62.)

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, At midnight, that is, when none knew or looked for it.

JEROME. Suddenly thus, as on a stormy night, and when all think themselves secure, at the hour when sleep is the deepest, the coming of Christ shall be proclaimed by the shout of Angels, and the trumpets of the Powers that go before Him. This is meant when it says, Lo, the bridegroom cometh, go ye out to meet him.

HILARY. At the trumpet signal they go forth to meet the bridegroom alone, for then shall the two be one, that is, the flesh and God, when the lowliness of the flesh shall be transformed into spiritual glory.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, that the virgins go forth to meet the bridegroom alone, I think is to be understood that the virgins themselves constitute her who is called the bride; as we speak of the Christians flocking to the Church as children running to their mother, and yet this same mother consists only of the children who are gathered together. For now the Church is betrothed, and is to be led forth as a virgin to the marriage, which takes place then when all her mortal part having past away, she may be held in an eternal union.

ORIGEN. Or, At midnight, that is, at the time of their most abandoned carelessness, there was a great cry, of the Angels, I suppose, desiring to arouse all men, those ministering spirits crying within in the senses of all that sleep, Behold, the bridegroom cometh, go ye out to meet him. All heard this summons, and arose, but all were not able to trim their lamps fitly. The lamps of the senses are trimmed by evangelical and right use of them; and they that use their senses amiss have their lamps untrimmed.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or, All the virgins arose, that is, both elect and reprobate are roused from the sleep of death; they trimmed their lamps, that is, they reckon up to themselves their works for which they look to receive eternal blessedness.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) They trimmed their lamps, that is, prepared to give an account of their deeds.

HILARY. Or, the trimming their lamps is the return of their souls into their bodies, and their light is the consciousness of good works that shines forth, which is contained in the vessels of the body.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The lamps of the foolish virgins go out, because the works which appeared outwardly to men to be bright, are dimmed within at the coming of the Judge. That they then beg oil of the wise virgins, what is it but that at the coming of the Judge, when they find themselves empty within, they seek for witness from without? As though deceived by their own self-confidence, they say to their neighbours, Whereas ye see us rejected as living without works, do ye witness to our works that ye have seen.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) From habit, the mind seeks that which uses to give it pleasure. And these now seek from men, who see not the heart, witness to God, who sees the heart. But their lamps go out, because those, whose good works rest upon the testimony of others, when that is withdrawn, sink into nothing.

JEROME. Or, These virgins who complain that their lamps are gone out, shew that they are partially alight, yet have they not an unfailing light, nor enduring works. Whoso then has a virgin soul, and is a lover of chastity, ought not to rest content with such virtues as quickly fade, and are withered away when the heat comes upon them, but should follow after perfect virtues, that he may have an enduring light.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise; These virgins were foolish, not only because they departed hence, lacking store of mercy, but because they deemed to receive it from those of whom they importunately begged it. For though nothing could be more merciful than those wise virgins, who for this very mercifulness were approved, yet would they not grant the prayer of the foolish virgins. But the wise answered, saying, Not so, lest there be not enough for us and you; hence we lean that none of us shall be able in that day to stand forth as patron1 of those who are betrayed by their own works, not because he will not, but because he cannot.

JEROME. For these wise virgins do not answer thus out of covetousness, but out of fear. Wherefore, each man shall receive the recompense of his own works, and the virtues of one cannot atone for the vices of another in the day of judgment. The wise admonish them not to go to meet the bridegroom without oil, Go ye rather to them that sell, and buy for yourselves.

HILARY. They that sell are the poor, who, needing the alms of the faithful, made them that recompense which they desire, selling in return for the relief afforded to their wants, a consciousness of good works. This is the abundant fuel of an undying light which may be bought and stored up for the fruits of mercy.

CHRYSOSTOM. You see then how great merchants the poor are to us; but the poor are not there, but here, and therefore we must store up oil here, that we may have it to use there when occasion shall require.

JEROME. And this oil is sold, and at a high cost, nor is it to be got without much toil; so that we understand it not of alms only, but of all virtues and counsels of the teachers.

ORIGEN. Otherwise; Notwithstanding they were foolish, they yet understood that they must have light to go and meet the bridegroom, that all the lights of their senses might be burning. This also they discerned, that because they had little of the spiritual oil, their lamps would burn dim as darkness drew on. But the wise send the foolish to those that sell, seeing that they had not stored up so much oil, that is, word of doctrine, as would suffice both for themselves to live by, and to teach others, Go ye rather to them that sell, i. e. to the doctors, and buy, i. e. take of them; the price is perseverance, the love of learning, industry, and toil of all who are willing to learn.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or we may suppose it not meant as advice what they should do, but as an indirect allusion to their fault. For flatterers sell oil, who by praising things false, and things unknown, lead souls astray, recommending to them, as foolish, empty joys, and receiving in return some temporal benefit. Go ye rather to them that sell, and buy for yourselves, i. e. Let us now see what they can profit you who have used to sell you their praise. Lest there be not enough for us and you, because no man is profited in God’s sight by the testimony of others, because God sees the heart, and each man is scarce able to give testimony concerning his own conscience.

JEROME. But because the season for buying was now past, and the day of judgment was coming on, so that there was no room for penitence, they must not now lay up new works, but give an account of the old.

HILARY. The marriage is the putting on of immortality, and the joining together corruption and incorruption in a new union,

CHRYSOSTOM. That, While they went to buy, shews that even, if we should become merciful after death, it will avail us nothing to escape punishment, as it was no profit to the rich man, that he became merciful and careful about those who belonged to him.

ORIGEN. Or, He says, While they went to buy, because there are men to be found who have neglected to learn any thing useful, till when, in the very end of their life, when they set themselves to learn, they are overtaken by death.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or otherwise; While they went to buy, that is, while they turned themselves to things without, and sought to find pleasure in things they had been accustomed to, because they knew not inward joys, came He that judges; and they that were ready, i. e. they whose conscience bore witness to them before God, went in with him to the wedding, i. e. to where the pure soul is united prolific to the pure and perfect word of God.

JEROME. After the day of judgment, there is no more opportunity for good works, or for righteousness, and therefore it follows, And the door was shut.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) When they have been taken in who have been changed into angelic being (1 Cor. 15:51), all entrance into the kingdom of heaven is closed; after the judgment, there is no more place for prayers or merit.

HILARY. Yet though the season of repentance is now past, the foolish virgins come and beg that entrance may be granted to them.

JEROME. Their worthy confession calling Him, Lord, Lord, is a mark of faith. But what avails it to confess with the mouth Him whom you deny with your works?

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) Grief at their exclusion extorts from them a repetition of this title of Lord; they call not Him Father, whose mercy they despised in their lifetime.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It is not said that they bought any oil, and therefore we must suppose that all their delight in the praise of men being gone, they return in distress and affliction to implore God. But His severity, after judgment, is as great as His mercy was unspeakable before. But He answered and said, Verily I say unto you, I know you not; by that rule, namely, that the art of God, that is, His wisdom, does not admit that those should enter into His joy who have sought to do in any thing according to His commandments, not as before God, but that they may please men.

JEROME. For the Lord knoweth them that are his, (2 Tim. 2:19.) and he that knoweth not shall not be known, and though they be virgins in purity of body, or in confession of the true faith, yet forasmuch as they have no oil, they are unknown by the bridegroom. When He adds, Watch therefore, because ye know not the day nor the hour, He means that all that has been said points to this, namely, that seeing we know not the day of judgment, we should be careful in providing the light of good works.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For indeed we know the day and the hour neither of that future time when the Bridegroom will come, nor of our own falling asleep each of us; if then we be prepared for this latter, we shall also be prepared when that voice shall sound, which shall arouse us all.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 199. 45.) There have not been wanting those who would refer these ten virgins to that coming of Christ, which takes place now in the Church; but this is not to be hastily held out, lest any thing should occur contradictory of it.

25:14–30

14. For the kingdom of heaven is as a man travelling into a far country, who called his own servants, and delivered unto them his goods.

15. And unto one he gave rive talents, to another two, and to another one; to every man according to his several ability; and straightway took his journey.

16. Then he that had received the five talents went and traded with the same, and made them other five talents.

17. And likewise he that had received two, he also gained other two.

18. But he that had received one went and digged in the earth, and hid his lord’s money.

19. After a long time the lord of those servants cometh, and reckoneth with them.

20. And so he that had received five talents came and brought other five talents, saying, Lord, thou deliveredst unto me five talents: behold, I have gained beside them five talents more.

21. His lord said unto him, Well done, thou good and faithful servant: thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things: enter thou into the joy of thy lord.

22. He also that had received two talents came and said, Lord, thou deliveredst unto me two talents: behold, I have gained two other talents beside them.

23. His lord said unto him, Well done, good and faithful servant; thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many

things: enter thou into the joy of thy lord.

24. Then he which had received the one talent came and said, Lord, I knew thee that thou art an hard man, reaping where thou hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed:

25. And I was afraid, and went and hid thy talent in the earth: lo, there thou hast that is thine.

26. His lord answered and said unto him, Thou wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not strawed:

27. Thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have received my own with usury.

28. Take therefore the talent from him, and give it unto him which hath ten talents.

29. For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.

30. And cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.

GLOSS. (non occ.) In the foregoing parable is set forth the condemnation of such as have not prepared sufficient oil for themselves, whether by oil is meant the brightness of good works, or inward joy of conscience, or alms paid in money.

CHRYSOSTOM. This parable is delivered against those who will not assist their neighbours either with money, or words, or in any other way, but hide all that they have.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ix, l.) The man travelling into a far country is our Redeemer, who ascended into heaven in that flesh which He had taken upon Him. For the proper home of the flesh is the earth, and it, as it were, travels into a foreign country, when it is placed by the Redeemer in heaven.

ORIGEN. He travels, not according to His divine nature, but according to the dispensation of the flesh which He took upon Him. For He who says to His disciples, Lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world, (Mat. 28:20.) is the Only-Begotten God, who is not circumscribed by bodily form. By saying this, we do not disunite Jesus, but attribute its proper qualities to each constituent substance. We may also explain thus, that the Lord travels in a far country with all those who walk by faith and not by sight. And when we are absent from the body with the Lord, then will He also be with us. Observe that the turn of expression is not thus, I am like, or The Son of Man is like, a man travelling into a far country, because He is represented in the parable as travelling, not as the Son of God, but as man.

JEROME. Calling together the Apostles, He gave them the Gospel doctrine, to one more, to another less, not as of His own bounty or scanting, but as meeting the capacity of the receivers, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:2.), that he fed with milk those that were unable to take solid food. In the five, two, and one talent, we recognise the diversity of gifts wherewith we have been entrusted.

ORIGEN. Whenever you see of those who have received from Christ a dispensation of the oracles of God that some have more and some less; that some have not in comparison of the better sort half an understanding of things; that others have still less; you will perceive the difference of those who have all of them received from Christ oracles of God. They to whom five talents were given, and they to whom two, and they to whom one, have divers degrees of capacity, and one could not hold the measure of another; he who received but one having received no mean endowment, for one talent of such a master is a great thing. His proper servants are three, as there are three sorts of those that bear fruit. He that received five talents, is he that is able to raise all the meanings of the Scriptures to their more divine significations; he that has two is he that has been taught carnal doctrine, (for two seems to be a carnal number,) and to the less strong the Master of the household has given one talent.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Otherwise; The five talents denote the gift of the five senses, that is, the knowledge of things without; the two signify understanding and action, the one talent understanding only.

GLOSS. (ord.) And straightway took his journey, not changing his place, but leaving them to their own freewill and choice of action.

JEROME. He that had received five talents, that is, having received his bodily senses, he doubled his knowledge of heavenly things, from the creature understanding the Creator, from earthly unearthly, from temporal the eternal.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) There are also some who though they cannot pierce to things inward and mystical, yet for their measure of view of their heavenly country they teach rightly such things as they can, what they have gathered from things without, and while they keep themselves from wantonness of the flesh, and from ambition of earthly things, and from the delights of the things that are seen, they restrain others also from the same by their admonitions.

ORIGEN. Or, They that have their senses exercised by healthy conversation, both raising themselves to higher knowledge and zealous in teaching others, these have gained other five; because no one can easily have increase of any virtues that are not his own, and without he teaches others what he himself knows, and no more.

HILARY. Or, That servant who received five talents is the people of believers under the Law, who beginning with that, doubled their merit by the right obedience of an evangelic faith.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Again, there are some who by their understanding and their actions preach to others, and thence gain as it were a twofold profit in such merchandize. This their preaching bestowed upon both sexes is thus a talent doubled.

ORIGEN. Or, gained other two, that is, carnal instruction, and another yet a little higher.

HILARY. Or, the servant to whom two talents were committed is the people of the Gentiles justified by the faith and confession of the Son and of the Father, confessing our Lord Jesus Christ, to be both God and Man, both Spirit and Flesh. These are the two talents committed to this servant. But as the Jewish people doubled by its belief in the Gospel every Sacrament which it had learned in the Law, (i. e. its five talents,) so this people by its use of its two talents merited understanding and working.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) To hide one’s talent in the earth is to devote the ability we have received to worldly business.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; When you see one who has the power of teaching, and of benefitting souls, hiding this power, though he may have a certain religiousness of life, doubt not of such an one that he has received one talent and hides it in the earth.

HILARY. Or, This servant who has received one talent and hid it in the earth is the people that continue in the Law, who through jealousy of the salvation of the Gentiles hide the talent they have received in the earth. For to hide a talent in the earth is to hide the glory of the new preaching through offence at the Passion of His Body. His coming to reckon with them is the assize of the day of judgment.

ORIGEN. And note here that the servants do not come to the Lord to be judged, but the Lord shall come to them when the time shall be accomplished. After a long time, that is, when He has sent forth such as are fitted to bring about the salvation of souls, and perhaps for this reason it is not easy to find one who is quite fit to pass forthwith out of this life, as is manifest from this, that even the Apostles lived to old age; for example, it was said to Peter, When thou shalt be old, thou shall stretch forth thy hand; (John 21:18.) and Paul says to Philemon, Now as Paul the aged.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe also that the Lord does not require the reckoning immediately, that you may learn His long suffering. To me He seems to say this covertly, alluding to the resurrection.

JEROME. After a long time, because there is a long interval between the Saviour’s ascension and His second coming.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) This lesson from this Gospel warns us to consider whether those, who seem to have received more in this world than others, shall not be more severely judged by the Author of the world; the greater the gifts, the greater the reckoning for them. Therefore should every one be humble concerning his talents in proportion as he sees himself tied up with a greater responsibility.

ORIGEN. He who had received five talents comes first with boldness before his Lord.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ix. 2.) And bringing his talents doubled, he is commended by his Lord, and is sent into eternal happiness.

RABANUS. Well done is an interjection of joy; the Lord shewing us therein the joy with which He invites the servant who labours well to eternal bliss; of which the Prophet speaks, In thy presence is fulness of joy.

CHRYSOSTOM. Thou good servant, (Ps. 16:11.) this he means of that goodness which is shewn towards our neighbour.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Faithful, because he appropriated to himself none of those things which were his lord’s.

JEROME. He says, Thou wast faithful in a few things, because all that we have at present though they seem great and many, yet in comparison of the things to come are little and few.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The faithful servant is set over many things, when having overcome the afflictions of corruption, he joys with eternal joy in that heavenly seat. He is then fully admitted to the joy of his Lord, when taken in to that abiding country, and numbered among the companies of Angels, he has such inward joy for this gift, that there is no room for outward sorrow at his corruption.

JEROME. What greater thing can be given to a faithful servant than to be with his Lord, and to see his Lord's joy?

CHRYSOSTOM. By this word joy He expresses complete blessedness.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. 8.) This will be our perfect joy, than which is none greater, to have fruition of that Divine Trinity in whose image we were made.

JEROME. The servant who of five talents had made ten, and he who of two had made four, are received with equal favour by the Master of the household, who looks not to the largeness of their profit, but to the disposition of their will.

ORIGEN. That He says of both these servants that they came, we must understand of their passing out of this world to Him. And observe that the same was said to them both; he that had less capacity, but that which he had, he exercised after such manner as he ought, shall have no whit less with God than he who has a greater capacity; for all that is required is that whatever a man has from God, he should use it all to the glory of God.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ix. 3.) The servant who would not trade with his talent returns to his Lord with words of excuse.

JEROME. For truly that which is written, To offer excuses excusing sins (Ps. 141:4.) happened to this servant, so that to slothfulness and idleness was added also the sin of pride. For he who ought to have honestly acknowledged his fault, and to have entreated the Master of the household, on the contrary cavils against him, and avers that he did it with provident design, lest while he sought to make profit he should hazard the capital.

ORIGEN. This servant seems to me to have been one of those who believe, but do not act honestly, concealing their faith, and doing every thing that they may not be known to be Christians. They who are such seem to me to have a fear of God, and to regard Him as austere and implacable. We indeed understand how the Lord reaps where He sowed not, because the righteous man sows in the Spirit, whereof he shall reap life eternal. Also He reaps where He sowed not, and gathers where he scattered not, because He counts as bestowed upon Himself all that is sown among the poor.

JEROME. Also, by this which this servant dared to say, Thou, reapest where thou sowedst not, we understand that the Lord accepts the good life of the Gentiles and of the Philosophers.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But there are many within the Church of whom this servant is a type, who fear to set out on the path of a better life, and yet are not afraid to continue in carnal indolence; they esteem themselves sinners, and therefore tremble to take up the paths of holiness, but fearlessly remain in their own iniquities.

HILARY. Or, By this servant is understood the Jewish people which continues in the Law, and says I was afraid of thee, as through fear of the old commandments abstaining from the exercise of evangelical liberty; and it says, Lo, there is that is thine, as though it had continued in those things which the Lord commanded, when yet it knew that the fruits of righteousness should be reaped there, where the Law had not been sown, and that there should be gathered from among the Gentiles some who were not scattered of the seed of Abraham.

JEROME. But what he thought would be his excuse is turned into his condemnation. He calls him wicked servant, because he cavilled against his Lord; and slothful, because he would not double his talent; condemning his pride in the one, and his idleness in the other. If you knew me to be hard and austere, and to seek after other men’s goods, you should also have known that I exact with the more rigour that is mine own, and should have given my money to the bankers; for the Greek word here (ἀζγύριον) means money. The words of the Lord are pure words, silver tried in the fire. (Ps. 12:6.) The money, or silver, then are the preaching of the Gospel and the heavenly word; which ought to be given to the bankers, that is, either to the other doctors, which the Apostles did when they ordained Priests and Bishops throughout the cities; or to all the believers, who can double the sum and restore it with usury by fulfilling in act what they have learned in word.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ix. 4.) So then we see as well the peril of the teachers if they withhold the Lord’s money, as that of the hearers from whom is exacted with usury that they have heard, namely, that from what they have heard they should strive to understand that they have not heard.

ORIGEN. The Lord did not allow that He was a hard man as the servant supposed, but He assented to all his other words. But He is indeed hard to those who abuse the mercy of God to suffer themselves to become remiss, and use it not to be converted.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Let us hear now the sentence by which the Lord condemns the slothful servant, Take away from him the talent, and give it to him that hath ten talents.

ORIGEN. The Lord is able by the might of His divinity to take away his ability from the man who is slack to use it, and to give it to him who has improved his own.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ix. 5.) It might seem more seasonable to have given it rather to him who had two, than to him who had five. But as the five talents denote the knowledge of things without, the two understanding and action, he who had the two had more than he who had the five talents; this man with his five talents merited the administration of things without, but was yet without any understanding of things eternal. The one talent therefore, which we say signifies the intellect, ought to be given to him who had administered well the things without which he had received; the same we see happen every day in the Holy Church, that they who administer faithfully things without, are also mighty in the in ward understanding.

JEROME. Or, it is given to him who had gained five talents, that we may understand that though the Lord's joy over the labour of each be equal, of him who doubled the five as of him who doubled the two, yet is a greater reward due to him who laboured more in the Lord's money.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ix. 6.) Then follows a general sentence, For to every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance, but from him that hath not, even that which he seemeth to have shall be taken away. For whosoever has charity receives the other gifts also; but whosoever has not charity loses even the gifts which he seemed to have had.

CHRYSOSTOM. Also he who has the graces of eloquence and of teaching to profit withal, and uses it not, loses that grace; but he who does his endeavour in putting it to use acquires a larger share.

JEROME. Many also who are naturally clever and have sharp wit, if they become neglectful, and by disuse spoil that good they have by nature, these do, in comparison of him who being somewhat dull by nature compensates by industry and painstaking his backwardness, lose their natural gift, and see the reward promised them pass away to others. But it may also be understood thus; To him who has faith, and a right will in the Lord, even if he come in aught short in deed as being man, shall be given by the merciful Judge; but he who has not faith, shall lose even the other virtues which he seems to have naturally. And He says carefully, From him that hath not, shall be taken away even that which he seemeth to have, for whatsoever is without faith in Christ ought not to be imputed to him who uses it amiss, but to Him who gives the goods of nature even to a wicked servant.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or, Whoso has not charity, loses even those things which he seems to have received.

HILARY. And on those who have the privilege of the Gospels, the honour of the Law is also conferred, but from him who has not the faith of Christ is taken away even that honour which seemed to be his through the Law.

CHRYSOSTOM. The wicked servant is punished not only by loss of his talent, but by intolerable infliction, and a denunciation in accusation joined therewith.

ORIGEN. Into outer darkness, where is no light, perhaps not even physical light; and where God is not seen, but those who are condemned thereto are condemned as unworthy the contemplation of God. We have also read some one before us expounding this of the darkness of that abyss which is outside the world, as though unworthy of the world, they were cast out into that abyss, where is darkness with none to lighten it.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) And thus for punishment he shall be cast into outer darkness who has of his own free will fallen into inward darkness.

JEROME. What is weeping and gnashing of teeth we have said above.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe that not only he who robs others, or who works evil, is punished with extreme punishment, but he also who does not good works.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. ix. 7.) Let him then who has understanding look that he hold not his peace; let him who has affluence not be dead to mercy; let him who has the art of guiding life communicate its use with his neighbour; and him who has the faculty of eloquence intercede with the rich for the poor. For the very least endowment will be reckoned as a talent entrusted for use.

ORIGEN. If you are offended at this we have said, namely that a man shall be judged if he does not teach others, call to mind the Apostle’s words, Woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel. (1 Cor. 9:16.)

25:31–45

31. When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory:

32. And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats:

33. And he shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on the left.

34. Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world:

35. For I was an hungred, and ye gave me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me in:

36. Naked, and ye clothed me: I was sick, and ye visited me: I was in prison, and ye came unto me.

37. Then shall the righteous answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, and fed thee? or thirsty, and gave thee drink?

38. When saw we thee a stranger, and took thee in? or naked, and clothed thee?

39. Or when saw we thee sick, or in prison, and came unto thee

40. And the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.

41. Then shall he say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels:

42. For I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink:

43. I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not: sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not.

44. Then shall they also answer him, saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked, or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee?

45. Then shall he answer them, saying, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not to me.

RABANUS. After the parables concerning the end of the world the Lord proceeds to describe the manner of the judgment to come.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix.) To this most sweet section of Scripture which we cease not continually to ponder, let us now listen with all attention and compunction of spirit, for Christ does indeed clothe this discourse with more terrors and vividness. He does not accordingly say of this as of the others, The kingdom of heaven is like, but shews of Himself by direct revelation, saying, When the Son of man shall come in his majesty.

JEROME. He who was within two days to celebrate the passover, to be delivered to the cross, and mocked by men, fitly now holds out the glory of His triumph, that He may overbalance the offences that were to follow by the promise of reward. And it is to be noted, that He who shall be seen in majesty is the Son of Man.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. 21.) The wicked and they also who shall be set on His right hand shall see Him in human shape, for He shall appear in the judgment in that form which He took on Him from us; but it shall be afterwards that He shall be seen in the form of God, for which all the believers long.

REMIGIUS. These words overthrow the error of those who said that the Lord should not continue in the same form of a servant. By his majesty, He means His divinity, in which He is equal to the Father and the Holy Spirit.

ORIGEN. Or, He shall come again with glory, that His body may be such as when He was transfigured on the mount. His throne is either certain of the more perfect of the Saints, of whom it is written, For there are set thrones in judgment; (Ps. 122:5.) or certain Angelic Powers of whom it is said, Thrones or dominions. (Col. 1:16.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xx. 24.) He shall come down with the Angels whom He shall call from heavenly places to hold judgment.

CHRYSOSTOM. For all his Angels shall be with him to bear witness to the things wherein they have administered to men’s salvation at His bidding.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 351, 8.) Or, by Angels here He means men who shall judge with Christ; for Angels are messengers, and such we rightly understand all who have brought tidings of heavenly salvation to men.

REMIGIUS. And all nations shall be gathered before Him. These words prove that the resurrection of men shall be real.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xx. 24.) This gathering shall be executed by the ministry of Angels, as it is said in the Psalm, Gather to him his saints. (Ps. 50:5.)

ORIGEN. Or, we need not understand this of a local gathering together, but that the nations shall be no more dispersed in divers and false dogmas concerning Him. For Christ's divinity shall be manifested so that not even sinners shall any longer be ignorant of Him. He shall not then shew Himself as Son of God in one place and not in another; as He sought to express to us by the comparison of the lightning. So as long as the wicked know neither themselves nor Christ, or the righteous see through a glass darkly, (1 Cor. 13:12.) so long the good are not severed from the evil, but when by the manifestation of the Son of God all shall come to the knowledge of Him, then shall the Saviour sever the good from the evil; for then shall sinners see their sins, and the righteous shall see clearly to what end the seeds of righteousness in them have led. They that are saved are called sheep by reason of that mildness which they have learnt of Him who said, Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly, (Mat. 11:29.) and because they are ready to go even to death in imitation of Christ, who was led as a sheep to the slaughter. (Isa. 53:7.) The wicked, are called goats, because they climb rough and rugged rocks, and walk in dangerous places.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He calls the one sheep and the other goats, to denote the unprofitableness of the one, and the fruitfulness of the other, for sheep are greatly productive in fleece, milk, and lambs.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Under the figure of a sheep in Scripture is signified simplicity and innocence. Beautifully then in this place are the elect denoted by sheep.

JEROME. Also the goat is a salacious animal, and was the offering for sins in the Law; and He says not 'she goats' which can produce young, and come up shorn from the washing. (Song of Solomon 4:2.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Then He separates them in place.

ORIGEN. For the Saints who have wrought right works, shall receive in recompense of their right works the King's right hand, at which is rest and glory; but the wicked for their evil and sinister deeds have fallen to the left hand, that is, into the misery of torments. Then shall the King say to those who are on his right hand, Come, that in whatsoever they are behind they may make it up when they are more perfectly united to Christ. He adds, ye blessed of my Father, to shew how eminendy blessed they were, being of old blessed of the Lord, which made heaven and earth. (Ps. 115:15.)

RABANUS. Or, they are called blessed, to whom an eternal blessing is due for their good deserts. He calls it the kingdom of His Father, ascribing the dominion of the kingdom to Him by whom Himself the King was begotten. For by His royal power, with which He shall be exalted alone in that day, He shall pronounce the sentence of judgment, Then shall the King say.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe that He says not ‘Receive,’ but possess, or inherit, as duo to you from of old.

JEROME. This prepared for you from the foundation, of the world, is to be understood as of the foreknowledge of God, with whom things to come are as already done.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xx. 9.) Besides that kingdom of which He will say in the end, Inherit the kingdom prepared for you, though in a very inferior manner, the present Church is also called His kingdom, in the which we are yet in conflict with the enemy until we come to that kingdom of peace, where we shall reign without an enemy.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 351. 8.) But one will say, I desire not to reign, it is enough for me that I be saved. Wherein they are deceived, first, because there is no salvation for those whose iniquity abounds; and, secondly, because if there be any difference between those that reign, and those that do not reign, yet must all be within the same kingdom, lest they be esteemed for foes or aliens, and perish while the others reign. Thus all the Romans inherit the kingdom of Rome, though all do not reign in it.

CHRYSOSTOM. For what the Saints obtain the boon of this heavenly kingdom He shews when He adds, I was an hungred, and ye gave me to eat.

REMIGIUS. And it is to be noted, that the Lord here enumerates six works of mercy which whoso shall study to accomplish shall be entitled to the kingdom prepared for the chosen from the foundation of the world.

RABANUS. Mystically, He who with the bread of the word and the drink of wisdom refreshes the soul hungering and thirsting after righteousness, or admits into the home of our mother the Church him who is wandering in heresy or sin, or who strengthens the weak in faith, such an one discharges the obligations of true love.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxvi. 27.) These, to whom as they stand on His right hand the Judge at His coming shall say, I was an hungred &c. are they who are judged on the side of the elect, and who reign; who wash away the stains of their life with tears; who redeem former sins by good deeds following; who, whatever unlawful thing they have at any time done, have covered it from the Judge's eyes by a cloak of alms. Others indeed there are who are not judged, yet reign, who have gone even beyond the precepts of the Law in the perfection of their virtue.

ORIGEN. It is from humility that they declare themselves unworthy of any praise for their good deeds, not that they are forgetful of what they have done. But He shews them His close sympathy with His own.

RABANUS. Lord, when sate we thee &c. This they say not because they distrust the Lord's words, but they are in amaze at so great exaltation, and at the greatness of their own glory; or because the good which they have done will seem to them to be so small according to that of the Apostle, For the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared to the glory that shall be revealed in us. (Rom. 8:18.)

JEROME. It were indeed free to us to understand that it is Christ in every poor man whom we feed when he is hungry, or give drink to when he is thirsty, and so of other things; but when He says, In that ye have done it to one of the least of these my brethren, He seems tome not to speak of the poor generally, but of the poor in spirit, those to whom He pointed and said, Whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother. (Matt. 12:50.)

CHRYSOSTOM. But if they are His brethren, why does He call them the least? Because they are lowly, poor, and outcast. By these He means not only the monks who have retired to the mountains, but every believer though he should be secular, though an hungred, or the like, yet He would have him obtain merciful succours, for baptism and communication of the Divine mysteries makes him a brother.

ORIGEN. As He had said to the righteous, Come ye, so He says to the wicked, Depart ye, for they who keep God's commandment are near to the Word, and are called that they may be made more near; but they are far from it, though they may seem to stand hard by, who do not His commands;

therefore it is said to them, Depart ye, that those who seemed to be living before Him, might be no more seen. It should be remarked, that though He had said to the Saints, Ye blessed of my Father, He says not now, Ye cursed of my Father, because of all blessing the Father is the author, but each man is the origin of his own curse when he does the things that deserve the curse. They who depart from Jesus fall into eternal fire, which is of a very different kind from that fire which we use. For no fire which we have is eternal, nor even of any long continuance. And note, that He does not say, ‘the kingdom prepared for the Angels,’ as He does say everlasting fire prepared for the Devil and his Angels; because He did not, as far as in Him lay, create men to perdition, but sinners yoke themselves to the Devil, so that as they that are saved are made equal to the holy Angels, they that perish are made equal with the Devil’s Angels.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xxi. 10.) It is hence clear, that the same fire will be appropriated to the punishment of men and of dæmons. If then it inflicts pain by corporeal touch, so as to produce bodily torment, how will there be in it any punishment for the evil spirits, unless the dæmons have, as some have thought, bodies composed of gross and fluid air. But if any man asserts that the dæmons have no bodies, we would not pugnaciously contend the point. For why may we not say, that truly, though wonderfully, even incorporeal spirit can feel pain of corporeal fire? If the spirits of men, though themselves incorporeal, can be now inclosed in bodily limbs, they can then be inseparably attached to the bonds of body. The dæmons then will be united to a body of material fire, though themselves immaterial, drawing punishment from their body, not giving life to it. And that fire being material will torture such bodies as ours with their spirits; but the dæmons are spirits without bodies.

ORIGEN. Or it may be that fire is of such nature that it can but invisible substances, being itself invisible, as the Apostle speaks, The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal. (2 Cor. 4:18.) Wonder not when you hear that there is a fire which though unseen has power to torture, when you see that there is an internal fever which comes upon men, and pains them grievously. It follows, I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat. It is written to the believers, Ye are the body of Christ. (1 Cor. 12:27.) As then the soul dwelling in the body, though it hungers not in respect of its spiritual substance, yet hungers for the food of the body, because it is yoked to the body; so the Saviour suffers whatever His body the Church suffers, though He Himself be impassible. And observe how in speaking to the righteous He reckons up their good deeds under their several kinds, but to the unrighteous He cuts short the description under the one head, I was sick and in prison, and ye visited me not, because it was the part of a merciful Judge to enlarge and dwell upon men’s good deeds, but to pass lightly and cursorily over their evil deeds.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how they had failed in mercifulness, not in one or two respects only, but in all; not only did they not feed Him when He was hungry, but they did not even visit Him when He was sick, which was easier. And look how light things He enjoins; He said not, I was in prison, and ye did not set me free, but, and ye visited me not. Also His hunger required no costly dainties, but necessary food. Each of these counts then is enough for their punishment. First, the slightness of His prayer, viz. for bread; secondly, the destitution of Him who sought it, for He was poor; thirdly, the natural feelings of compassion, for He was a man; fourthly, the expectation of His promise, for He promised a kingdom; fifthly, the greatness of Him who received, for it is God who receives in the poor man; sixthly, the preeminent honour, in that He condescended to take of men; and, seventhly, the righteousness of so bestowing it, for what He takes from us is our own. But avarice blinds men to all these considerations.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) They to whom this is said are the wicked believers, who are judged and perish; others, being unbelievers, are not judged and perish; for there is no examination of the condition of such as appear before the face of an impartial Judge already condemned by their unbelief; but those who hold the profession of the faith, but have not the works of their profession, are convicted that they may be condemned. These at least hear the words of their Judge, because they have at least kept the words of His faith. The others hear no words of their Judge pronouncing sentence of condemnation, because they have not paid Him honour even in word. For a prince who governs an earthly kingdom punishes after a different manner the rebellion of a subject and the hostile attempts of an enemy; in the former case, he recurs to his prerogative; against an enemy he takes arms, and does not ask what penalty the law attaches to his crime.

CHRYSOSTOM. Thus convicted by the words of the Judge, they make answer submissively, Lord, when saw we thee &c.

ORIGEN. Mark how the righteous dwell upon each word, while the unrighteous answer summarily, and not going through the particular instances; for so it becomes the righteous out of humility to disclaim each individual generous action, when imputed to them publicly; whereas bad men excuse their sins, and endeavour to prove them few and venial. And Christ's answer conveys this. And to the righteous He says, In that ye did it to my brethren, to shew the greatness of their good deeds; to the sinners He says only, to one of the least of these, not aggravating their sin. For they are truly His brethren who are perfect; and a deed of mercy shewn to the more holy is more acceptable to God than one shewn to the less holy; and the sin of overlooking the less holy is less than of overlooking the more holy.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xx. 1.) He is now treating of the last judgment, when Christ shall come from heaven to judge the quick and dead. This day of the Divine judgment we call the Last Day, that is, the end of time; for we cannot tell through how many days that judgment will be prolonged; but day, as is the use of holy Scripture, is put for time. And we therefore call it the last or latest judgment, because He both now judges and has judged from the beginning of the human race, when He thrust forth the first man from the tree of life, and spared not the Angels that sinned. But in that final judgment both men and Angels shall be judged together, when the Divine power shall bring each man's good and evil deeds in review before his memory, and one intuitive glance shall present them to the perception, so that at once we shall be condemned or acquitted in our consciences.

25:46

46. And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal.

AUGUSTINE. (de Fid. et Op. 15.) Some deceive themselves, saying, that the fire indeed is called everlasting, but not the punishment. This the Lord foreseeing, sums up His sentence in these words.

ORIGEN. Observe that whereas He put first the invitation, Come, ye blessed, and after that, Depart, ye cursed, because it is the property of a merciful God to record the good deeds of the good, before the bad deeds of the bad; He now reverses the order, describing first the punishment of the wicked, and then the life of the good, that the terrors of the one may deter us from evil, and the honour of the other incite us to good.

GREGORY. (Mor. xv. 19.) If he who has not given to others is visited with so heavy a punishment, what shall he get who is convicted of having robbed others of their own.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xix. 11.) Eternal life is our chief good, and the end of the city of God, of which the Apostle speaks, And the end everlasting life. (Rom. 6:22.) But because eternal life might be understood by those who are not well versed in Holy Scripture, to mean also the life of the wicked, because of the immortality of their souls, or because of the endless torments of the wicked; therefore we must call the end of this City in which the chief good shall be attained, either peace in life eternal, or life eternal in peace, that it may be intelligible to all.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. 8.) That which the Lord spoke to His servant Moses, I am that I am, (Exod. 3:14.) this we shall contemplate when we shall live in eternity. For thus the Lord speaks, This is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God. (John 17:3.) This contemplation is promised to us as the end of all action, and the eternal perfection of our joys, of which John speaks, We shall see him as he is. (1 John 3:2.)

JEROME. Let the thoughtful reader observe that punishments are eternal, and that that continuing life has thenceforward no fear of fall.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxxiv. 19.) They say that He held out empty terrors to deter them from sin. We answer, if He threatened falsely to check unrighteousness, then He promised falsely to promote good conduct. Thus while they go out of the way to prove God merciful, they are not afraid to charge Him with fraud. But, they urge, finite sin ought not to be visited with infinite punishment; we answer, that this argument would be just, if the righteous Judge considered men’s actions, and not their hearts. Therefore it belongs to the righteousness of an impartial Judge, that those whose heart would never be without sin in this life, should never be without punishment.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xxi. 11.) And the justice of no law is concerned to provide that the duration of each man’s punishment should be the same with the sin which drew that punishment upon him. There never was any man, who held that the torment of him, who committed a murder or adultery, should be compressed within the same space of time as the commission of the act. And when for any enormous crime a man is punished with death, does the law estimate his punishment by the delay that takes place in putting him to death, and not rather by this, that they remove him for ever from the society of the living? And fines, disgrace, exile, slavery, when they are inflicted without any hopes of mercy, do they not seem like eternal punishments in proportion to the length of this life? They are only therefore not eternal, because the life which suffers them is not itself eternal. But they say, How then is that true which Christ says, With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you again, (Matt. 7:2.) if temporal sin is punished with eternal pain? They do not observe that this is said with a view, not to the equality of the period of time, but of the retribution of evil, i. e. that he that has done evil should suffer evil. Man was made worthy of everlasting evil, because he destroyed in himself that good which might have eternal.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But they say, no just man takes pleasure in cruelties, and the guilty servant was scourged to correct his fault. But when the wicked are given over to hell fire, to what purpose shall they burn there for ever? We reply, that Almighty God, seeing He is good, does not delight in the torments of the wretched; but forasmuch as He is righteous, He ceases not from taking vengeance on the wicked; yet do the wicked burn not without some purpose, namely, that the righteous may acknowledge how they are debtors for eternity to Divine grace, when they see the wicked suffering for eternity misery, which themselves have escaped only by the assistance of that Divine grace.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xxi. 3.) But, they assert, nobody can be at once capable of suffering pain, and incapable of death. It must be that one live in pain, but it need not be that pain kill him; for not even these mortal bodies die from every pain; but the reason that some pain causes their death is, that the connection between the soul and our present body is such that it gives way to extreme pain. But then the soul shall be united to such a body, and in such a way, that no pain shall be able to overcome the connection. There will not then be no death, but an everlasting death, the soul being unable to live, as being without God, and equally unable to rid itself of the pains of body by dying.

AUGUSTINE. (17.) Among these impugners of the eternity of punishment, Origen is the most merciful, who believed that the Devil himself and his Angels, after sufferings proportioned to their deserts, and a long endurance, should be delivered from those torments, and associated with the holy Angels. But for these and other things he was not undeservedly rebuked by the Church, because even his seeming mercy was thrown away, making for the saints real pains in which their sins were to be expiated, and fictitious blessedness, if the joys of the good were not to be secure and endless. In quite another way does the mercy of others err through their humane sympathies, who think that the sufferings of those men who are condemned by this sentence will be temporal, but that the happiness of those who are set free sooner or later will be eternal. Why does their charity extend to the whole race of man, but dries up when they come to the angelic race?

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But they say, How can they be called Saints, if they shall not pray for their enemies whom they see then burning? They do not indeed pray for their enemies, so long as there is any possibility of converting their hearts to a profitable penitence, but how shall they pray for them when any change from their wickedness is no longer possible?

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xxi. 19, 20. &c.) So some there are who hold out liberation from punishment not to all men, but to those only who have been washed in Christ’s Baptism, and have been partakers of His Body, let them have lived as they will; because of that which the Lord speaks, If any man eat of this bread, he shall not die eternally. (John 6:51.) Again, others promise this not to all who have Christ’s sacrament, but to Catholics only, however ill their lives, who have eaten Christ’s Body, not in sacrament only, but in verity, (inasmuch as they are set in the Church, which is His Body,) even though they should afterwards have fallen into heresy or idolatry of the Gentiles. And others again, because of what is written above, He that shall endure to the end, the same shall be saved, (Matt. 24:13.) promise this only to those who persevere in the Catholic Church, that by the worthiness of their foundation, that is, of their faith, they shall be saved by fire. All these the Apostle opposes when he says, The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, uncleanness, fornication, and the like; of which I tell you before, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God. (Gal. 5:19.) Whoever in his heart prefers temporal things to Christ, Christ is not his foundation, though he seem to have the faith of Christ. How much more then is he, who has committed things unlawful, convicted of not preferring Christ, but preferring other things to Him? I have also met with some who thought that only those would burn in eternal torments who neglected to give alms proportioned to their sins; and for this reason they think that the Judge Himself here mentions nothing else that He shall make enquiry of, but of the giving or not giving alms. But whoso gives alms worthily for his sins, first begins with himself; for it were unmeet that he should not do that to himself which he does to others when he has heard the words of God, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, (Matt. 22:39.) and hears likewise, Be merciful to thy soul in pleasing God? (Ecclus. 30:24.) He then who does not to his own soul this alms of pleasing God, how can he be said to give alms meet for his sins? Why we are to give alms then is only that when we pray for mercy for sins past, we may be heard; not that we may purchase thereby license for continuing in sin. And the Lord forewarns us that He will put alms done on the right hand, and on the left alms not done, to hew us how mighty are alms to do away former sins, not to give impunity to a continuance in sin.

ORIGEN. Or, It is not one kind of righteousness only that is rewarded, as many think. In whatsoever matters any one does Christ's commands, he gives Christ meat and drink, Who feeds ever upon the truth and righteousness of His faithful people. So do we weave raiment for Christ when cold, when taking wisdom's web, we inculcate upon others, and put upon them bowels of mercy. Also when we make ready with divers virtues our heart for receiving Him, or those who are His, we take Him in a stranger into the home of our bosom. Also when we visit a brother sick either in faith or in good works, with doctrine, reproof, or comfort, we visit Christ Himself. Moreover, all that is here, is the prison of Christ, and of them that are His, who live in this world, as though chained in the prison of natural necessity. When we do a good work to these; we visit them in prison, and Christ in them.

CHAPTER 26

26:1–2

1. And it came to pass, when Jesus had finished all these sayings, he said unto his disciples,

2. Ye know that after two days is the feast of the Passover, and the Son of man is betrayed to be crucified.

HILARY. After the discourse in which the Lord had declared that He should return in splendour, He announces to them His approaching Passion, that they might learn the close connection between the sacrament of the Cross, and the glory of eternity.

RABANUS. All these sayings, i. e. about the consummation of the world, and the day of judgment. Or, finished, because He had fulfilled in doing and preaching all things from the beginning of the Gospel to His Passion.

ORIGEN. Yet it is not all barely, but all these; for there were other sayings which He must speak before He should be delivered up.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 78.) We gather from John’s account, that six days before the Passover, Jesus came to Bethany, and thence entered Jerusalem sitting upon the ass, after which were done the things related to have been done at Jerusalem. We understand therefore that four days elapsed from His coming to Bethany, to make this two days before the Passover. (v. 17.) The difference between the Passover and the feast of unleavened bread is this; the name Passover is given to that one day on which the lamb was slain in the evening, that is, the fourteenth moon of the first month; and on the fifteenth moon, the day that the people came out of Egypt, followed the festival of unleavened bread. (vid. Acts 12:3.) But the Evangelists seem to use the terms indifferently.

JEROME. The Passover, called in Hebrew Phase, does not come as most think from πασχεῖν ‘to suffer,’ but from the Hebrew word signifying ‘to pass over;’ because the destroyer passed over when he saw the blood on the doors of the Israelites, and smote them not; or the Lord Himself walked on high, succouring His people.

REMIGIUS. Or, because by the help of the Lord the Israelitish people, freed from Egyptian bondage, passed forth into liberty.

ORIGEN. He said not, After two days will be, or will come, the feast of the Passover, but not meaning the ordinary annual Passover, but that Passover such as had never before been, the Passover will be offered1.

REMIGIUS. Mystically, that is called the Passover, because on that day Christ passed out of the world to His Father, from corruption to incorruption, from life to death, or because He redeemed the world by causing it savingly to pass from the slavery of the Devil.

JEROME. After the two days of the shining light of the Old and of the New Testament, the true Passover is slain for the world. Also our Passover is celebrated when we leave the things of earth, and hasten to the things of heaven.

ORIGEN. He foretels His crucifixion to His disciples, adding, And the Son of Man shall be delivered to be crucified; thus fortifying them against that shock of surprise, which the sight of their Master, led forth to crucifixion, would otherwise have occasioned them. And He expresses it impersonally shall be delivered, because God delivered Him up in mercy to the human race, Judas from covetousness, the Priest for envy, the Devil through fear that through His teaching the human race would be plucked out of His hand, little aware how much more that would be effected by His death, than either by His teaching or miracles.

26:3–5

3. Then assembled together the Chief Priests, and the Scribes, and the elders of the people, unto the palace of the High Priest, who was called Caiaphas,

4. And consulted that they might take Jesus by subtilty, and kill him.

5. But they said, Not on the feast day, lest there be an uproar among the people.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Then the Evangelist lays before us the hidden springs and machinery by which the Lord’s Passion was brought to pass.

REMIGIUS. This, then, is to be referred to the preceding words, and means before the Feast of the Passover.

ORIGEN. Not true Priests and elders, but Priests and elders of what seemed the people of God, but was indeed the people of Gomorrah; these, not knowing God's High Priest, laid a plot against Him, not recognising the firstborn of the whole creation, (Col. 1:15.) yea, even against Him that was elder than them all, did they take counsel.

CHRYSOSTOM. With such ill designs they came to the chief Priest, seeking a sanction whence a prohibition should have issued. There were at that time several Chief Priests, while the Law allowed but of one, whence it was manifest that the dissolution of the Jewish state was having its beginning. For Moses had commanded that there should be one Chief Priest, whose office should be filled up at death; but in process of time it grew to be annual. All those then who had been Chief Priests1, are here called Chief Priests.

REMIGIUS. They are condemned both because they were gathered together, and because they were the Chief Priests; for the more the numbers, and the higher the rank and station of those who band together for any villany, the greater the enormity of what they do, and the heavier the punishment stored up for them. To shew the Lord's innocence and openness, the Evangelist adds, that they might take Jesus by subtilty, and kill him.

CHRYSOSTOM. For what then did they conspire, to seize Him secretly, or put Him to death? For both; but they feared the people, and therefore waited till the feast was over, for they said, not on the feast-day. For the Devil would not that Christ should suffer at the Passover, that His Passion might not be notorious. The Chief Priests had no fear in respect of God, namely, that their guilt might be aggravated by the season, but took into account human things only, Lest there be an uproar among the people.

ORIGEN. By reason of the parties among the populace, those who favoured and those who hated Christ, those who believed and those who believed not.

LEO. (Serm. 58, 2.) This precaution of the Chief Priests arose not from reverence for the festival, but from care for the success of their plot; they feared an insurrection at that season, not because of the guilt the populace might thereby incur, but because they might rescue Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. But their fury set aside their caution, and finding a betrayer, they put Christ to death in the middle of the feast.

LEO. (Serm. 58, 1.) We recognise here a providential arrangement whereby the chief men of the Jews, who had often sought occasion of effecting their cruel purposes against Christ, could never yet succeed till the days of the paschal celebration. For it behoved that the things which had long been promised in symbol and mystery should be accomplished in manifest reality, that the typical lamb should be displaced by the true, and one sacrifice embrace the whole catalogue of the varied victims. That shadows should give way to substance, and copies to the presence of the original; victim is commuted for victim, blood is abolished by blood, and the festival of the Law is at once fulfilled and changed.

26:6–13

6. Now when Jesus was in Bethany, in the house of Simon the leper,

7. There came unto him a woman having an alabaster box of very precious ointment, and poured it on his head, as he sat at meat.

8. But when his disciples saw it, they had indignation, saying, To what purpose is this waste?

9. For this ointment might have been sold for much, and given to the poor.

10. When Jesus understood it, he said unto them, Why trouble ye the woman? for she hath wrought a good work upon me.

11. For ye have the poor always with you; but me ye have not always.

12. For in that she hath poured this ointment on my body, she did it for my burial.

13. Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever this Gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there shall also this, that this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having set before us the counsels of the chief of the Jews concerning the death of Christ, the Evangelist would proceed to follow out their execution, and to relate the bargain of Judas with the Jews to deliver Him up, but he first shews the cause of this betrayal. He was grieved that the ointment which the woman poured upon Christ’s head had not been sold that he might have carried off something out of the price it brought, and to make up this loss he was willing to betray his Master. And therefore he proceeds, Now when Jesus was in Bethany, in the house of Simon the leper.

JEROME. Not that he was a leper yet, but having been so, and having been healed by the Saviour, he retained the appellation to shew forth the power of Him who healed him.

RABANUS. Alabaster is a kind of marble, white but marked with veins of different colours, which was in use for vessels to hold ointment, because it was said to preserve it from corruption.

JEROME. Another Evangelist (John 12:3.) instead of ‘alabastrum’ has ‘nardum pisticam,’ that is, genuine, unadulterated.

RABANUS. From the Greek πίστις, faith, whence ‘pisticus,’ faithful. For this ointment was pure, unadulterated.

ORIGEN. Some one may perhaps think that there are four different women of whom the Evangelists have written, but I rather agree with those who think that they are only three; one of whom Matthew and Mark wrote, one of whom Luke, another of whom John.

JEROME. For let no one think that she who anointed His head and she who anointed His feet were one and the same; for the latter washed His feet with her tears, and wiped them with her hair, and is plainly said to have been a harlot. But of this woman nothing of this kind is recorded, and indeed a harlot could not have at once been made deserving of the Lord’s head.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 7, 37.) It is possible therefore that they were different persons, and so all appearance of contradiction between the Evangelists is removed. Or it is possible that it was the same woman at two different times and two different stages of desert; first while yet a sinner, afterwards more advanced.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxx.) And in this way it may be the same in the three Evangelists, Matthew, Mark, and Luke. And not without good reason does the Evangelist mention Simon’s leprosy, to shew what gave this woman confidence to come to Christ. The leprosy was an unclean disease; when then she saw that Jesus had healed the man with whom He now lodged, she trusted that He could also cleanse the uncleanness of her soul; and so whereas other women came to Christ to be healed in their bodies, she came only for the honour and the healing of her soul, having nothing diseased in her body; and for this she is worthy our highest admiration. But she in John is a different woman, the wonderful sister of Lazarus.

ORIGEN. Matthew and Mark relate that this was done in the house of Simon the leper; but John says that Jesus came to a house where Lazarus was; and that not Simon, but Mary and Martha served. Further, according to John, six days before the Passover, He came to Bethany where Mary and Martha made Him a supper. But here it is in the house of Simon the leper, and two days before the Passover. And in Matthew and Mark, it is the disciples that have indignation with a good intent; in John, Judas alone with intent to steal; in Luke, no one finds fault.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxxiii. 1.) Or, we may think that this is the same woman whom Luke calls a sinner, and John names Mary.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii, 79.) Though the action described in Luke is the same as that described here, and the name of him with whom the Lord supped is the same, for Luke also names Simon; yet because it is not contrary to either nature or custom for two men to bear the same name, it is more probable that this was another Simon, not the leper, in whose house in Bethany these things were done. I would only suppose that the woman who on that occasion came near to Jesus’ feet, and this woman, were not two different persons, but that the same Mary did this twice. The first time is that narrated by Luke; for John mentions it in praise of Mary before Christ’s coming to Bethany, It was that Mary who anointed the Lord with ointment, and wiped his feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus was sick. (John 11:2.) Mary therefore had done this before. That she did afterwards in Bethany is distinct from Luke’s account, but is the same event that is recorded by all three, John, Matthew, and Mark. That Matthew and Mark say it was the Lord’s head that she anointed, and John His feet, is reconciled by supposing that she anointed both. Against this one might raise a cavil from what Mark says, that she anointed His head by breaking the box over it, so that there could be none of the ointment left with which to anoint His feet also. Let such caviller understand, that His feet were first anointed before the box was broken, and there remained in it, yet whole, enough wherewith to anoint the head by breaking the box and shedding the contents.

AUGUSTINE. (de Doctr. Christ. iii, 12.) But let not any suppose that the Lord’s feet were by this woman bathed in ointment after the manner which the luxurious and debauched use. In all things of this nature, it is not the thing itself, but the mind of him who uses it, that is in fault. Whoso uses things after such sort as to pass the bounds observed by good men with whom he lives, either has some meaning1 in what he does, or is vicious. What then is vice in others, in a divine or prophetic person is a sign of some great thing. The good odour is the good report which one has gained by the works of a good life, and in following Christ's footsteps sheds a most precious odour on His feet.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 78.) Still there may seem to be some discrepancy between the narrative of Matthew and Mark, who say, that after two days is the feast of the Passover, and then bring Jesus to Bethany; and that of John, who, relating this history of the ointment, says Six days before the Passover. They who urge this do not understand that the events in Bethany are in Matthew and Mark inserted out of their place, a little later than the time of their occurrence. Neither of them, it is to be observed, introduce their account with 'afterwards.'

CHRYSOSTOM. The disciples had heard their Master say, I will have mercy, and not sacrifice, (Matt. 9:13.) wherefore they thought among themselves, If He accepts not burnt-offerings, much less will He the application of such ointment as this.

JEROME. I know that some raise a cavil here, because John says that Judas alone was grieved because he had the bag, and was a thief from the beginning; but Matthew, that all the disciples were sorrowful. These know not the figure syllepsis, by which one name is put for many, and many for one; as Paul in the Epistle to the Hebrews says, They were sawn asunder, when it is thought that one only, Esaias namely, was so. (Heb. 11:37.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 79.) We may however understand that the other disciples thought or said the same, or that they assented to what Judas said, and thus Matthew and Mark have described their common consent. But Judas said it because he was a thief, the others out of their care for the poor; and John desired to mention it only in the case of him whose thievish propensity he thought ought to be recorded.

CHRYSOSTOM. The disciples then thought thus, but Jesus, who saw the thoughts of the woman, suffered it. For her piety was great, and her ardour unspeakable, wherefore He condescended to suffer her to pour the ointment on His head. As the Father admitted the smoke and odour of the slain victim, so also Christ admitted this votive anointing of His head, though the disciples, who saw not her heart, murmured.

REMIGIUS. He clearly shews that the Apostles had uttered something harsh against her, when He says, Why trouble ye the woman? And beautifully He adds, She hath wrought a good work in me; as much as to say, It is not a waste of ointment, as ye say, but a good work, that is, a service of piety and devotion.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He says not merely, She hath wrought a good work, but says first, Why trouble ye the woman? to teach us that every good act that is wrought by any, even though it lack somewhat of exact propriety, yet we ought to receive, cherish, and cultivate it, and not to require strict correctness in a beginner. If He had been asked before this was done by the woman, He would not have directed its doing; but when it was done, the rebuke of the disciples had no longer any place, and He Himself to guard the woman from importunate attacks speaks these things for her comfort.

REMIGIUS. For the poor ye have ever with you. The Lord shews in these words as of set purpose, that they were not to be blamed who ministered of their substance to Him while He dwelt in a mortal body; forasmuch as the poor were ever in the Church, to whom the believers might do good whensoever they would, but He would abide in the body with them but a very short time; whence it follows, But me ye shall not have always.

JEROME. Here a question arises how the Lord should have said elsewhere to His disciples, Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world; but here, Me ye shall not have always. (Matt. 28:20.) I suppose that in this place He speaks of His bodily presence, which shall not be with them after the resurrection in daily intercourse and friendship, as it is now.

REMIGIUS. Or, it is to be explained by supposing this spoken to Judas only; and He said not, Ye have not, but Ye shall not have, because this was spoken in the person of Judas to all his followers. And He says, Not always, though they have it at no time, because the wicked seem to have Christ in this present world, while they mix among His members and approach His table, but they shall not always so have Him when He shall say to His elect, Come, ye blessed of my Father. (Matt. 25:34.) It was the custom among this people to embalm the bodies of (Matt. 25:34.) the dead with divers spices, to the end that they might be kept from corruption as long as possible. And as this woman was desirous of embalming the Lord's dead Body, and would not be able because she would be anticipated by His resurrection, it was therefore arranged by Divine Providence that she should anoint the Lord's living Body. This then is what He says, In that she hath poured, that is, By anointing My living Body she shews forth My death and burial.

CHRYSOSTOM. That this mention of His death and burial might not cause her to despond, He comforts her by what follows, Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever &c.

RABANUS. That is, To whatsoever place throughout the whole world the Church shall be propagated, there this also that she hath done shall be told. That also that is added signifies, that as Judas by his reproof of her has earned evil character of treachery, so has she also earned the glory of pious devotedness.

JEROME. Note His knowledge of things to come, how though about to suffer death within two days, He knows that His Gospel will be preached throughout the whole world.

CHRYSOSTOM. Behold the accomplishment of this saying; to whatsoever part of the world you go, you will find this woman famous, and this has been wrought by the power of Him who spake this word. How many victories of kings and captains have passed into oblivion; how many who built cities and enslaved many nations are now known neither by report nor by name; but the deed of this woman pouring forth ointment in the house of a leper in the presence of twelve men, this resoimds throughout the world, and though so much time has elapsed, the memory of that which was done is not effaced. But why promised He no spiritual gift to this woman, but everlasting remembrance only? Because this He did promise made her confident of receiving the other also; whereas she wrought a good work, it is clear that she shall receive an adequate reward.

JEROME. Mystically; The Lord, about to suffer for the whole world, sojourns in Bethany, in the house of obedience, which once was that of Simon the leper. Simon also is interpreted 'obedient,' or, according to another interpretation, 'the world,' in whose house the Church is healed.

ORIGEN. Oil is throughout Scripture put for the work of mercy, with which the lamp of the word is fed; or for doctrine, the hearing of which sustains the word of faith when once kindled. All with which men anoint is comprehensively called oil; and one kind of oil is unguent, and one kind of unguent is precious. So all righteous acts are called good works; and of good works there is one kind which we do for, or to, men; another which we do for, or to, God. And this likewise that we do for God, in part only advances the good of men, in part, the glory of God. For example, one does a kindness to a man out of feelings of natural righteousness, not for God’s sake, as the Gentiles sometime did; such a work is common oil of no fine savour, yet is it acceptable to God, forasmuch, as Peter says in Clement, the good works that the unbelievers do, profit them in this world, but avail not to gain them eternal life in another. They who do the same for God’s sake, profit thereby not in this world only but in the next also, and that they do is ointment of good savour. Another sort is that done for the good of men, as alms, and the like. He who does this to Christians, anoints the Lord’s feet, for they are the Lord’s feet; and this penitents are most found to do for remission of their sins. He who devotes himself to chastity, and continues in fastings and prayers, and other things which conduce to God’s glory only, this is the ointment which anoints the Lord’s head, and with whose odour the whole Church is filled; this is the work meet not for penitents, but for the perfect, or the doctrine which is necessary for men; but the acknowledgment of the faith which belongs to God alone, is the ointment with which the head of Christ is anointed, with which we are buried together with Christ by baptism into death. (Rom. 6:4.)

HILARY. In this woman is prefigured the people of the Gentiles, who gave glory to God in Christ’s passion; for she anointed His head, but the head of Christ is God, and ointment is the fruit of good works. But the disciples, anxious for the salvation of Israel, say that this ought to have been sold for the use of the poor; designating by a prophetic instinct the Jews, who lacked faith, by the name of the poor. The Lord answers that there is abundant time in which they may shew their care for the poor, but that salvation cannot be extended to the Gentiles but by obedience to His command, if, that is, by the pouring out of this woman’s ointment they are buried together with Him, because regeneration can only be given to those who are dead in the profession of baptism. And this her work shall be told wherever this Gospel is preached, because when Israel draws back, the glory of the Gospel is preached by the belief of the Gentiles.

26:14–16

14. Then one of the twelve, called Judas Iscariot, went unto the Chief Priests,

15. And said unto them, What will ye give me, and I will deliver him unto you? And they covenanted with him for thirty pieces of silver.

16. And from that time he sought opportunity to betray him.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having described the occasion of his treachery, the Evangelist proceeds to recount the manner of it.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then, when, that is, he heard that this Gospel should be preached every where; for that made him afraid, as it was indeed a mark of unspeakable power.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 78.) The order of the narrative is this. The Lord says, Ye know that after two days will be the feast of the Passover; … then assembled together the Chief Priests and Scribes; … then went one of the twelve. Thus the narrative of what took place at Bethany is inserted by way of digression, respecting an earlier time between that, Lest there be an uproar, and, Then one of the twelve.

ORIGEN. Went, against that one high priest, who was made a Priest for ever, to many high priests, to sell for a price Him who sought to redeem the whole world.

RABANUS. Went, he says, because he was neither compelled, nor invited, but of his own free will formed the wicked design.

CHRYSOSTOM. One of the twelve, as much as to say, of that first band who are elected for preeminent merit1.

GLOSS. (non occ.) He adds his distinctive appellation, Scarioth, for there was another Judas.

REMIGIUS. So called from the village Scariotha, from which he came.

LEO. (Serm. 60.4.) He did not out of any fear forsake Christ, but through lust of money cast Him off; for in comparison of the love of money all our affections are feeble; the soul athirst for gain fears not to die for a very little; there is no trace of righteousness in that heart in which covetousness has once taken up its abode. The traitor Judas, intoxicated with this bane, in his thirst for lucre was so foolishly hardened, as to sell his Lord and Master.

JEROME. The wretched Judas would fain replace, by the sale of his Master, that loss which he supposed he had incurred by the ointment. And he does not demand any fixed sum, lest his treachery should see in a gainful thing, but as though delivering up a worthless slave, he left it to those who bought, to determine how much they would give.

ORIGEN. The same do all who take any material or worldly things to cast out of their thoughts the Saviour and the word of truth which was in them. And they covenanted with him for thirty pieces of silver, as many pieces as the Saviour had dwelt years in the worlda.

JEROME.Joseph was not sold as many, following the LXX (Gen. 37:28.), think for twenty pieces of gold, but as the Hebrew text has for twenty pieces of silver, for it could not be that the servant should be more valuable than his Master.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 41) That the Lord was sold for thirty pieces of silver by Judas, denotes the unrighteous Jews, who pursuing things carnal and temporal, which belong to the five bodily senses, refuse to have Christ; and forasmuch as they did this in the sixth age of the world, their receiving five times six as the price of the Lord is thus signified; and because the Lord’s words are silver, but they understood even the Law carnally, they had, as it were, stamped on silver the image of that worldly dominion which they held to when they renounced the Lord.

ORIGEN. The opportunity which Judas sought is further explained by Luke, how he might betray him in the absence of the multitude; (Luke 22:6.) when the populace was not with Him, but He was withdrawn with His disciples. And this he did, delivering Him up after supper, when He was withdrawn to the garden of Gethsemane. And from that time forward, such has been the season sought for by those that would betray the word of God in time of persecution when the multitude of believers is not around the word of truth.

26:17–19

17. Now the first day of the feast of unleavened bread the disciples came to Jesus, saying unto him, Where wilt thou that we prepare for thee to eat the Passover?

18. And he said, Go into the city to such a man, and say unto him, The Master saith, My time is at hand; I will keep the Passover at thy house with my disciples.

19. And the disciples did as Jesus had appointed them; and they made ready the Passover.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist having gone through the events preliminary to the Passion, namely, the announcement of it, the counsel of the Chief Priests, and the covenant for His betrayal, prosecutes the history in the order of events, saying, On the first day of unleavened bread.

JEROME. The first day of unleavened bread is the fourteenth day of the first month, when the lamb is killed, the moon is at full, and leaven is put away.

REMIGIUS. And observe that with the Jews, the Passover is celebrated on the first day, and the following seven are called the days of unleavened bread; but here the first day of unleavened bread means the day of the Passover.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi.) Or, by the first day, he means the day before the days of unleavened bread. For the Jews always reckoned their day from the evening; and this day of which he speaks was that on the evening of which they were to kill the Passover, namely, the fifth day of the weekb.

REMIGIUS. But perhaps some one will say, If that typical lamb bore a type of this the true lamb, how did not Christ suffer on the night on which this was always killed? It is to be noted, that on this night, He committed to His disciples the mysteries of His flesh and blood to be celebrated, and then also being seized and bound by the Jews, He hallowed the commencement of His sacrifice, i. e. His Passion. The disciples came unto him; among these no doubt was the traitor Judas.

CHRYSOSTOM. Hence it is evident that He had neither house nor lodging. Nor, I conclude, had the disciples any, for they would surely have invited Him thither.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 80.) Go into the city to such a man, Him whom Mark and Luke call the good-man of the house, or the master of the house. And when Matthew says, to such a man, he is to be understood to say this as from himself for brevity’s sake; for every one knows that no man speaks thus, Go ye to such a man. And Matthew adds these words, to such a man, not that the Lord used the very expression, but to convey to us that the disciples were not sent to any one in the city, but to some certain person.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, we may say that this, to such a man, shews that He sent them to some person unknown to them, teaching them thereby that He was able to avoid His Passion. For He who prevailed with this man to entertain Him, how could He not have prevailed with those who crucified Him, had He chosen not to suffer? Indeed, I marvel not only that he entertained Him, being a stranger, but that he did it in contempt of the hatred of the multitude.

HILARY. Or, Matthew does not name the man in whose house Christ would celebrate the Passover, because the Christian name was not yet held in honour by the believers.

RABANUS. Or, he omits the name, that all who would fain celebrate the true Passover, and receive Christ within the dwelling place of their own minds, should understand that the opportunity is afforded them.

JEROME. In this also the New Scripture observes the practice of the Old, in which we frequently read, ‘He said unto him,’ and ‘In this or that place,’ without any name of person or place.

CHRYSOSTOM. My time is at hand, this He said, both by so manifold announcements of His Passion, fortifying His disciples against the event, and at the same time shewing that He undertook it voluntarily. I will keep the Passover at thy house, wherein we see, that to the very last day He was not disobedient to the Law. With my disciples, He adds, that there might be sufficient preparation made, and that he to whom He sent might not think that He desired to be concealed.

ORIGEN. Some one may argue, (e. g. The Ebionites) that because Jesus kept the Passover with Jewish observances, we ought to do the same as followers of Christ, not remembering that Jesus was made under the Law, though not that He should leave under the Law (Gal. 4:4.) those who were under it, but should lead them out of it; how much less fitting then is it, that those who before were without the Law, should afterwards enter in? We celebrate spiritually the things which were carnally celebrated in the Law, keeping the Passover in the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth, (1 Cor. 5:8. John 6:53.) according to the will of the Lamb, who said, Except ye eat my flesh and drink my blood, ye shall not have life in you.

26:20–25

20. Now when the even was come, he sat down with the twelve.

21. And as they did eat, he said, Verily I say unto you, that one of yon shall betray me.

22. And they were exceeding sorrowful, and began every one of them to say unto him, Lord, is it I?

23. And he answered and said, He that dippeth his hand with me in the dish, the same shall betray me.

24. The Son of man goeth as it is written of him: but woe unto that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! it had been good for that man if he had not been born.

25. Then Judas, which betrayed him, answered and said, Master, is it I? He said unto him, Thou hast said.

JEROME. The Lord had above foretold His Passion, He now foretels who is to be the traitor; thus giving him place of repentance, when he should see that his thoughts and the secret designs of his heart were known.

REMIGIUS. With the twelve, it is said, for Judas was personally among them, though he had ceased to be so in merit.

JEROME. Judas acts in every thing to remove all suspicion of his treachery.

REMIGIUS. And it is beautifully said, When even was come, because it was in the evening that the Lamb was wont to be slain.

RABANUS. For this reason also, because in Christ’s Passion, wherein the true sun hasted to his setting, eternal refreshment was made ready for all believers.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Evangelist relates how as they sat at meat, Jesus declares Judas’ treachery, that the wickedness of the betrayer may be more apparent from the season and the circumstances.

LEO. (Serm. 58.3.) He shews that the conscience of His betrayer was known to Him, not meeting his wickedness with a harsh and open rebuke, that penitence might find a readier way to one who had not been disgraced by public dismissal.

ORIGEN. Or, He spoke generally, to prove the nature of each of their hearts, and to evince the wickedness of Judas, who would not believe in One who knew his heart. I suppose that at first he supposed that the thing was hid from Him, deeming Him man, which was of unbelief; but when he saw that his heart was known, he embraced the concealment offered by this general way of speaking, which was shamelesness. This also shews the goodness of the disciples, that they believed Christ’s words more than their own consciences, for they began each to say, Lord, is it I? For they knew by what Jesus had taught them that human nature is readily turned to evil, and is in continual struggle with the niters of the darkness of this world; (Eph. 6:12.) whence they ask as in fear, for by reason of our weakness the future is an object of dread to us. When the Lord saw the disciples thus alarmed for themselves, He pointed out the traitor by the mark of the prophetic declaration, He that hath eaten bread with me hath wantonly overthrown me. (Ps. 41:9.)

JEROME. O wonderful endurance of the Lord, He had said before, One of you shall betray me. The traitor perseveres in his wickedness; He designates him more particularly, yet not by name. For Judas, while the rest were sorrowful, and withdrew their hands, and bid away the food from their mouths, with the same hardihood and recklessness which led him to betray Him, reached forth his hand into the dish with his Master, passing off his audacity as a good conscience.

CHRYSOSTOM. I rather think that Christ did this out of regard for him, and to bring him to a better mind.

RABANUS. What Matthew calls ‘paropsis,’ Mark calls ‘catinus.’ The ‘paropsis’ is a square dish for meat, ‘catinus,’ an earthen vessel for containing fluids; this then might be a square earthen vessel.

ORIGEN. Such is the wont of men of exceeding wickedness, to plot against those of whose bread and salt they have partaken, and especially those who have no enmity against them. But if we take it of the spiritual table, and the spiritual food, we shall see the more abundant and overflowing measure of this man’s wickedness, who called to mind neither his Master’s love in providing carnal goods, nor His teaching in things spiritual. Such are all in the Church who lay snares for their brethren whom they continually meet at the same table of Christ’s Body.

JEROME. Judas, not withheld by either the first or second warning, perseveres in his treachery; the Lord’s long-suffering nourishes his audacity. Now then his punishment is foretold, that denunciations of wrath may correct where good feeling has no power.

REMIGIUS. It belongs to human nature to come and go, Divine nature remains ever the same. So because His human nature could suffer and die, therefore of the Son of Man it is well said that he goeth. He says plainly, As it is written of him, for all that He suffered had been foretold by the Prophets.

CHRYSOSTOM. This He said to comfort His disciples, that they might not think that it was through weakness that He suffered; and at the same time for the correction of His betrayer. And notwithstanding His Passion had been foretold, Judas is still guilty; and not his betrayal wrought our salvation, but God’s providence, which used the sins of others to our profit.

ORIGEN. He said not, By whom the Son of Man is betrayed, but through whom, (John 13:2.) pointing out another, to with the Devil, as the author of His betrayal, Judas as the minister. But woe also to all betrayers of Christ! and such is every one who betrays a disciple of Christ.

REMIGIUS. Woe also to all who draw near to Christ’s table with an evil and defiled conscience! who though they do not deliver Christ to the Jews to be crucified, deliver Him to their own sinful members to be taken. He adds, to give more emphasis, Good were it for that man if he had never been born.

JEROME. We are not to infer from this that man has a being before birth; for it cannot be well with any man till he has a being; it simply implies that it is better not to be, than to be in evil.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 40.) And if it be contended that there is a life before this life, that will prove that not only not for Judas, but for none other is it good to have been born. Can it mean, that it were better for him not to have been born to the Devil, namely, for sin? Or does it mean that it had been good for him not to have been born to Christ at his calling, that he should now become apostate?

ORIGEN. After all the Apostles had asked, and after Christ had spoken of him, Judas at length enquired of himself, with the crafty design of concealing his treacherous purpose by asking the same question as the rest; for real sorrow brooks not suspense.

JEROME. His question feigns either great respect, or a hypocritical incredulousness. The rest who were not to betray Him, said only Lord; the actual traitor addresses Him as Master, as though it were some excuse that he denied Him as Lord, and betrayed a Master only.

ORIGEN. Or, out of sycophancy he calls Him Master, while he holds Him unworthy of the title.

CHRYSOSTOM. Though the Lord could have said, Hast thou covenanted to receive silver, and darest to ask Me this? But Jesus, most merciful, said nothing of all this, therein laying down for us rules and landmarks of endurance of evil. He saith unto him, Thou hast said.

REMIGIUS. Which may be understood thus; Thou sayest it, and thou sayest what is true; or, Thou hast said this, not I; leaving him room for repentance so long as his villainy was not publicly exposed.

RABANUS. This might have been so said by Judas, and answered by the Lord as not to be overheard by the rest.

26:26

26. And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed it, and brake it, and gave it to the disciples, and said, Take, eat; this is my body.

JEROME. When the typical Passover was concluded, and He had partaken of the Lamb with His Apostles, He comes to the true paschal sacrament; that, as Melchisedech, Priest of the most high God, had done in foreshadowing Christ, offering bread and wine (Gen. 14:18.), He also should offer the present verity of His Body and Bloodc.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. 54. 7.) And as they were eating, whereby it is clearly seen that at their first partaking of the Lord’s Body and Blood, the disciples did not partake fasting. But are we therefore to except against the practice of the whole Church, of receiving fasting? It has seemed good to the Holy Ghost, that for the better honour of so great a Sacrament, the Lord’s Body should enter the Christian’s mouth before other food. For to commend more mightily the depth of this mystery, the Saviour chose this as the last thing He would imprint on the hearts and memory of His disciples, from whom He was to depart to His Passion. But He did not direct in what order it should thenceforth be taken, that He might reserve that for the Apostles by whom He would regulate His Church.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Christ delivered to us His Flesh and Blood under another kind, and ordained them to be thenceforth so received, that faith might have its merit, which is of things that are not seen.

AMBROSE. (de Sacr. vi. 1.)d; And that we might not be shocked by the sight of blood, while it at the same time wrought the price of our redemption.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan Tr. 26. 17. cf. Serm. 227. 1.) The Lord committed His Body and Blood to substances which are formed a homogeneous compound out of many. Bread is made of many grains, wine is produced out of many berries. Herein the Lord Jesus Christ signified us, and hallowed in His own table the mystery of our peace and unity.

REMIGIUS. Fittingly also did He offer fruit of the earth, to shew there by that He came to take away the curse wherewith the earth was cursed for the sin of the first man. Also He bade be offered the produce of the earth, and the things for which men chiefly toil, that there might be no difficulty in procuring them, and that men might offer sacrifice to God of the work of their hands.

AMBROSE. (de Sacr. iv. 3.) Hence learn that the Christian mysteries were before the Jewish. Melchisedech offered bread and wine, being in all things like the Son of God, (Ps. 110:4.) to Whom it is said, Thou art a Priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech; and of Whom it is here said, Jesus took bread. (John 12:24.)

GLOSS. (non occ.) Thise we must understand to be wheat bread, for the Lord compared Himself to a grain of wheat, saying, Except a corn fall into the ground &c. Such bread also is suitable for the Sacrament, because it is in common use; bread of other kinds being only made when this fails. But for as much as Christ up to the very last day, to use the words of Chrysostom as above, (p. 886.) shewed that He did nothing contrary to the Law, and the Law commanded that unleavened bread should be eaten in the evening when the Passover was slain, and that all leavened should be put away, it is manifest that the bread which the Lord took and gave to His disciples was unleavened.

GREGORY. (non occ.) It has given trouble to divers persons, that in the Church some offer unleavened and others leavened bread. The Roman Church offers unleavened, because the Lord took flesh without any pollution1; other2 Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father took flesh upon Him, and is Very God, and Very Man; and so the leaven is mingled with the flour. But whether we receive leavened or unleavened, we are made one body of the Lord our Saviour.

AMBROSE. (de Sacr. iv. 4.) This bread before the sacramentary words, is the bread in common use; after consecration it is made of bread Christ’s flesh. And what are the words, or whose are the phrases of consecration, save those of the Lord Jesus? For if His word had power to make those things begin to be which were not, how much rather will it not be efficacious to cause them to remain what they are, while they are at the same time changed into somewhat else? For if the heavenly word has been effectual in other matters, is it ineffectual in heavenly sacraments? Therefore of the bread is made the Body of Christ, and the wine is made blood by the consecration of the heavenly word.f Dost thou enquire after the manner? Learn. The course of nature is, that a man is not born but of man and woman, but by God's will Christ was born of the Holy Spirit and a Virgin.

PASCHASIUS. As then real flesh was created by the Holy Spirit without sexual union, so by the same Holy Spirit the substance of bread and wine are consecrated into the Body and Blood of Christ. And because this consecration is made by the Lord's word, it is added, He blessed.g

REMIGIUS. Hereby He shewed also that He together with the Father and the Holy Spirit has filled human nature with the grace of His divine power, and enriched it with the boon of immortality. And to shew that His Body was not subject to passion but of His own will, it is added, And brake.

LANFRANC. When the host is broken, when the blood is poured from the cup into the mouth of the faithful, what else is denoted but the offering of the Lord's Body on the cross, and the shedding of His Blood out of His sideh?

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. (Eccl. Hier. 3. in fin.) In this is also shewn, that the one and uncompounded Word of God came to us compounded and visible by taking human nature upon Him, and drawing to Himself our society, made us partakers of the spiritual goods which He distributed, as it follows, And gave to his disciples.

LEO. (Serm. 58, 3.) Not excluding the traitor even from this mystery, that it might be made manifest that Judas was provoked by no wrong, but that he had been foreknown in voluntary impiety.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. 59.) Peter and Judas received of the same bread, but Peter to life, Judas to death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii.) And this John shews when he says, After the sop, Satan entered into him John 13:27. For his sin was aggravated in that he came near to these mysteries with such a heart, and that having come to them, he was made better neither by fear, kindness, nor honour. Christ hindered him not, though He knew all things, that you may learn that He omits nothing which serves for correction.

REMIGIUS. In so doing He left an example to the Church, that it should sever no one from its fellowship, or from the communion of the Body and Blood of the Lord, but for some notorious and public crime,

HILARY. Or, The Passover was concluded by the taking the cup and breaking the bread without Judas, for he was unworthy the communion of eternal sacraments. And that he had left them we learn from thence, that he returns with a multitude.

AUGUSTINE.i And said, Take, eat; The Lord invites His servants to set before them Himself for food. But who would dare to eat his Lord? This food when eaten refreshes, but fails not; He lives after being eaten, Who rose again after being put to death. Neither when we eat Him do we divide His substance; but thus it is in this Sacrament. The faithful know how they feed on Christ's flesh, each man receives a part for himself. He is divided into parts in the Sacrament, yet He remains whole; He is all in heaven, He is all in thy heart. They are called Sacraments, because in them what is seen is one thing, what is understood is another; what is seen has a material form, what is understood has spiritual fruit.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. 27. 11.) Let us not eat Christ's flesh only in the Sacrament, for that do many wicked men, but let us eat to spiritual participation, that we may abide as members in the Lord's body, that we may be quickened by His Spirit.

AMBROSE. (de Sacr. iv. 5.) Before consecration, it is bread; after Christ's words, This is my body, have been pronounced, it is Christ's Body.

26:27–29

27. And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it;

28. For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins.

29. But I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's kingdom.

REMIGIUS. The Lord having given His disciples His Body under the element of bread1, well gives the cup of His Blood to them likewise;

shewing what joy He has in our salvation, seeing He even shed His Blood for us.

CHRYSOSTOM. He gave thanks to instruct us after what manner we ought to celebrate this mystery, and shewed also thereby that He came not to His Passion against His will. Also He taught us to bear whatsoever we suffer with thanksgiving, and infused into us good hopes. For if the type of this sacrifice, to wit, the offering of the paschal lamb, became the deliverance of the people from Egyptian bondage, much more shall the reality thereof be the deliverance of the world. And gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it. That they should not be distressed at hearing this, He first drank His own blood to lead them without fear to the communion of these mysteries.

JEROME. (Ep. 120. ad Hedib.) Thus then the Lord Jesus was at once guest and feast, the eater and the things eaten.k

CHRYSOSTOM. This is my blood of the new testament; that is, the new promise, covenant, law; for this blood was promised from of old, and this guarantees the new covenant; for as the Old Testament had the blood of sheep and goats, so the New has the Lord’s Blood.

REMIGIUS. For thus it is read, Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you. (Exod. 24:8.)

CHRYSOSTOM. And in calling it blood, He foreshows His Passion, My blood … which shall be shed for many. Also the purpose for which He died, adding, For the remission of sins; as much as to say, The blood of the lamb was shed in Egypt for the salvation of the first born of the Israelites, this My Blood is shed for the remission of sins.

REMIGIUS. And it is to be noted, that He says not, For a few, nor, For all, but, For many; because He came not to redeem a single nation, but many out of all nations.

CHRYSOSTOM. Thus saying, He shews that His Passion is a mystery of the salvation of men, by which also He comforts His disciples. And as Moses said, This shall be an ordinance to thee for ever, (Ex. 12:24.) so Christ speaks as Luke relates, This do in remembrance of me. (Luke 22:19.)

REMIGIUS. And He taught us to offer not bread only, but wine also, to shew that they who hungered and thirsted after righteousness were to be refreshed by these mysteries.

GLOSS. (non occ.) As the refreshment of the body is wrought by means of meat and drink, so under the form of meat and drink the Lord has provided for us spiritual refreshment. And it was suitable that for the shewing forth the Lord’s Passion this Sacrament should be instituted under both kinds. For in His Passion He shed His Blood, and so His Blood was separated from His Body. It behoved therefore, that for representation of His Passion, bread and wine should be separately set forth, which are the Sacrament of the Body and Blood. But it should be known, that under both kinds the whole of Christ is contained; under the bread is contained the Blood, together with the Body; under the wine, the Body together with the Blood.

AMBROSIASTER. (in 1 Cor. 11:26.) And for this reason also do we celebrate under both kinds, because that which we receive avails for the preservation of both body and soul.

CYPRIAN. (Ep. 63, ad Cæcil.) The cup of the Lord is not water only, or wine only, but the two are mixed; so the Lord’s Body cannot be either flour only, or water only, but the two are combined.l

AMBROSE. (de Sacr. v. 1.) If Melchisedech offered bread and wine, what means this mixing of water? Hear the reason. Moses struck the rock, and the rock gave forth abundance of water, but that rock was Christ. Also one of the soldiers with his spear pierced Christ’s side, and out of His side flowed water and blood, the water to cleanse, the blood to redeem.m

REMIGIUS. For it should be known, that as John speaks, The many waters are nations and people. (Rev. 17:15.) And because we ought always to abide in Christ and Christ in us, wine mixed with water is offered, to shew that the head and the members, that is, Christ and the Church, are one body; or to shew that neither did Christ suffer without a love for our redemption, nor we can be saved without His Passion.

CHRYSOSTOM. And having spoken of His Passion and Cross, He proceeds to speak of His resurrection, I say unto you, I will not drink henceforth, &c. By the kingdom He means His resurrection. And He speaks this of His resurrection, because He would then drink with the Apostles, that none might suppose His resurrection a phantasy. Thus when they would convince any of His resurrection, they said, We did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead. (Acts 10:41.) This tells them that they shall see Him after He is risen, and that He will be again with them. That He says, New, is plainly to be understood, after a new manner, He no longer having a passible body, or needing food. For after His resurrection He did not eat as needing food, but to evidence the reality of the resurrection. And forasmuch as there are some heretics who use water instead of wine in the sacred mysteriesn, He shews in these words, that when He now gave them these holy mysteries, He gave them wine, and drank the like after He was risen; for He says, Of this fruit of the vine, but the vine produces wine, and not water.

JEROME. Or otherwise; From carnal things the Lord passes to spiritual. Holy Scripture speaks of the people of Israel as of a vine brought up out of Egypt; (Ps. 80:8.) of this vine it is then that the Lord says He will drink no more except in His Father’s kingdom. His Father’s kingdom I suppose to mean the faith of the believers. When then the Jews shall receive His Father’s kingdom, then the Lord will drink of their vine. Observe that He says, Of my Father Jer. 2:21, not, Of God, for to name the Father is to name the Son. As much as to say, When they shall have believed on God the Father, and He has brought them to the Son.

REMIGIUS. Or otherwise; I will not drink of the fruit of this vine, i. e. I will no longer take pleasure in the carnal oblations of the Synagogue, among which the immolation of the Paschal lamb held an eminent place. But the time of My resurrection is at hand, and the day in which exalted in the Father’s kingdom, that is, raised in immortal glory, I shall drink it new with you, i. e. I shall rejoice as with a new joy in the salvation of that people then renewed by the water of baptism.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 43.) Or otherwise; When He says, I shall drink it new with you, He gives us to understand that this is old. Seeing then that He took body of the race of Adam, who is called the old man, and was to give up to death that Body in His Passion, (whence also He gave us His Blood in the sacrament of wine,) what else can we understand by the new wine than the immortality of renewed bodies. In saying, I will drink it with you, He promises to them like wise a resurrection of their bodies for the putting on of immortality. With you is not to be understood of time, but of a like renewal, as the Apostle speaks, that we are risen with Christ, the hope of the future bringing a present joy. That that which He shall drink new shall also be of this fruit of the vine, signifies that the very same bodies shall rise after the heavenly renewal, which shall now die after the earthly decay.

HILARY. It seems from this that Judas had not drunk with Him, because He was not to drink hereafter in the kingdom; but He promises to all who partook at this time of this fruit of the vine that they should drink with Him hereafter.

GLOSS. (non occ.) But in support of the opinion of other saints, that Judas did receive the sacraments from Christ, it is to be said, that the words with you may refer to the greater part of them, and not necessarily to the whole.

26:30–35

30. And when they had sung an hymn, they went out into the mount of Olives.

31. Then saith Jesus unto them, All ye shall be offended because of me this night; for it is written, I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep of the flock shall be scattered abroad.

32. But after I am risen again, I will go before you into Galilee.

33. Peter answered and said unto him, Though all men shall be offended because of thee, yet will I never be offended.

34. Jesus said unto him, Verily I say unto thee, That this night, before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice.

35. Peter said unto him, Though I should die with thee, yet will I not deny thee. Likewise also said all the disciples.

ORIGEN. When the disciples had eaten the bread of blessing, and drunk of the cup of thanksgiving, the Lord instructs them in return for these things to sing a hymn to the Father. And they go to the Mount of Olives, that they may pass from height to height, because the believer can do nought in the valley. o[

BEDE. (in Luc. 22:39.) Beautifully after the disciples have been filled with the Sacraments of His Body and Blood, and, commended to the Father in a hymn of pious intercession, does He lead them into the mount of Olives; thus by type teaching us how we ought, by the working of His Sacraments, and the aid of His intercession, mount up to the higher gifts of the virtues and the graces of the Holy Spirit, with which we are anointed in our hearts.

RABANUS. This hymn may be that thanksgiving which in John, (c. 17.) Our Lord offers up to the Father, when He lifted up His eyes and prayed for His disciples, and those who should believe through their word. This is that of which the Psalm speaks, The poor shall eat and be filled, they shall praise the Lord.] (Ps. 22:26.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Let them hear this, who like swine with no thought but of eating rise from the table drunk, when they should have given thanks, and closed with a hymn. Let them hear who will not tarry for the final prayer in the sacred mysteries; for the last prayer of the mysteries represents that hymn. He gave thanks before He delivered the holy mysteries to the disciples, that we also might give thanks; He sung a hymn after He had delivered them, that we also should do the like.

JEROME. After this example of the Saviour, whosoever is filled and is drunken upon the bread and cup of Christ, may praise God and ascend the Mount of Olives, where is refreshment after toil, solace of grief, and knowledge of the true light.

HILARY. Hereby He shews that men confirmed by the powers of the Divine mysteries, are exalted to heavenly glory in a common joy and gladness.

ORIGEN. Suitably also was the mount of mercy chosen whence to declare the offence of His disciples’ weakness, by One even then prepared not to reject the disciples who forsook Him, but to receive them when they returned to Him.

JEROME. He foretels what they should suffer, that they might not after it had befallen them despair of salvation; but doing penitence might be set free.

CHRYSOSTOM. In this we see what the disciples were both before and after the cross. They who could not stand with Christ whilst He was crucified, became after the death of Christ harder than adamant. This flight and fear of the disciples is a demonstration of Christ’s death against those who are infected with the heresy of Marcion. If the had been neither bound nor crucified, whence arose the terror of Peter and the rest?

JEROME. And He adds emphatically this night, (1 These. 5:7.) because as they that are drunken are drunken by night, so they that are scandalized are scandalized by night, and in the dark.

HILARY. The credit of this prediction is supported by the authority of old prophecy; It is written, I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep of the flock shall he scattered abroad.

JEROME. This is found in Zacharias in words different; it is said to God in the person of the Prophet, Smite the shepherd, and the sheep will be scattered abroad. (Zech. 13:7.) The good Shepherd is smitten, that He may lay down His life for His sheep, and that of many flocks of divers errors should be made one flock, and one Shepherd.

CHRYSOSTOM. He produces this prophecy to teach them to attend to the things that are written, and to shew that His crucifixion was according to the counsel of God, and (as He does throughout) that He was not a stranger to the Old Testament, but that it prophesied of Him. But He did not suffer them to continue in sorrow, but announces glad tidings, saying, When I am risen again, I will go before you into Galilee. After His resurrection He does not appear to them immediately from heaven, nor depart into any far country, but in the very same nation in which He was crucified, almost in the very place, giving them thereby assurance, that He who was crucified was the same as He who rose again, thereby to cheer their cast-down countenances. He fixes upon Galilee, that, being delivered from fear of the Jews, they might believe what He spoke to them.

ORIGEN. Also He foretels this to them, that they who now were somewhat dispersed in consequence of the offence, should be after gathered together by Christ rising again, and going before them into Galilee of the Gentiles.

HILARY. But Peter was carried so far by his zeal and affection for Christ, that he regarded neither the weakness of his flesh nor the truth of the Lord’s words; as if what He spake must not come to pass, Peter answered and said unto him, Though all should be offended because of thee, yet will I never be offended.

CHRYSOSTOM. What sayest thou, Peter? The Prophet says, The sheep shall be scattered abroad, and Christ has confirmed it, yet thou sayest, Never. When He said, One of you shall betray me, thou fearedst for thyself, although thou wert not conscious of such a thought; now when He openly affirms, All ye shall be offended, you deny it. But because when he was relieved of the anxiety he had concerning the betrayal, he grew confident concerning the rest, he therefore says thus, I will never be offended.

JEROME. It is not wilfulness, not falsehood, but the Apostle's faith, and ardent attachment towards the Lord his Saviour.

REMIGIUS. What the One affirms by His power of foreknowledge, the other denies through love; whence we may take a practical lesson, that in proportion as we are confident of the warmth of our faith, we should be in fear of the weakness of our flesh. Peter seems culpable, first, because he contradicted the Lord's words; secondly, because he set himself before the rest; and thirdly, because he attributed every thing to himself as though he had power to persevere strenuously. His fall then was permitted to heal this in him; not that he was driven to deny, but left to himself, and so convinced of the frailty of his human nature.p

ORIGEN. Whence the other disciples were offended in Jesus, but Peter was not only offended, but what is much more, was suffered to deny Him thrice.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 4.) Perplexity may be occasioned to some by the great difference, not in words only, but in substance, of the speeches in which Peter is forewarned by Our Lord, and which occasion his presumptuous declaration of dying with or for the Lord. Some would oblige us to understand that he thrice expressed his confidence, and the Lord thrice answered him that he would deny Him thrice before cock-crowing; as after His resurrection He thrice asked him if he loved Him, and as often gave him command to feed His sheep. For what in language or matter has Matthew like the expressions of Peter in either Luke or John? Mark indeed relates it in nearly the same words as Matthew, only marking more precisely in the Lord's words the manner in which it should fall in, Verily I say unto thee, that this day, in the night, before the cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice. (Mark 14:30.) Whence some inattentive persons think that there is a discrepancy between Mark and the rest. For the sum of Peter's denials is three; if the first then had been after the first cock crowing, the other three Evangelists must be wrong when they make the Lord say that Peter should deny Him before the cock crow. But, on the other hand, if he had made all three denials before the cock began to crow, it would be superfluous in Mark to say, Before the cock crow twice. Forasmuch as this threefold denial was begun before the first cockcrow, the three Evangelists have marked, not when it was to be concluded, but how often it was to happen, and when to begin, that is, before cock-crow. Though indeed if we understand it of Peter's heart we may well say, that the whole denial was complete before the first cock-crow, seeing that "before that his mind was seized with that great fear which wrought upon him to the third denial. Much less therefore ought it to disquiet us, how the three-fold denial in three distinct speeches was begun, but not finished before cockcrow. Just as though one should say, Before cock-crow you will write me a letter, in which you will revile me three times; if the letter were begun before any cock-crow, but not finished till after the first, we should not therefore say that the prediction was false.

ORIGEN. But you will ask, whether it were possible that Peter should not have been offended, when once the Saviour had said, All ye shall be offended in me. To which one will answer, what is foretold by Jesus must of necessity come to pass; and another will say, that He who at the prayer of Ninevites turned away the wrath He had denounced by Jonas, might also have averted Peter's offence at his entreaty. But his presumptuous confidence, prompted by zeal indeed but not a cautious zeal, became the cause not only of offence but of a thrice repeated denial. And since He confirmed it with the sanction of an oath, some one will say that it was not possible that he should not have denied Him. For Christ would have spoken falsely when he said, Verily I say unto thee, if Peter's assertion, I will not deny thee, had been true. It seems to me that the other disciples having in view not that which was first said, All ye shall be offended, but that which was said to Peter, Verily I say unto thee, &c. made a like promise with Peter because they were not comprehended in the prophecy of denial. Peter said unto him, Though I should die with thee, yet will I not deny thee. Likewise also said all the disciples. Here again Peter knows not what he says; he could not die with Him who was to die for all mankind, who were all in sin, and had need of some one to die for them, not that they should die for others.

RABANUS. Peter understood the Lord to have foretold that he should deny Him under terror of death, and therefore he declares that though death were imminent, nothing could shake him from his faith; and the other Apostles in like manner in the warmth of their zeal, valued not the infliction of death, but human presumption is vain without Divine aid.

CHRYSOSTOM. [I suppose also that Peter fell into these words through ambition and boastfulness. And they had disputed at supper which of them should be greatest, whence we see that the love of empty glory disturbed them much. And so to deliver him from such passions, Christ withdrew His aid from him. Moreover observe how after the resurrection, taught by his fall he speaks to Christ more humbly, and does not any more resist His words. All this his fall wrought for him; for before he had attributed all to himself, when he ought rather to have said, I will not deny Thee if Thou succour me with Thy aid. But afterwards he shews that every thing is to be ascribed to God; Why look ye so earnestly upon us, as though by our own power and holiness we had made this man to walk?]q (Act 3:12.) Hence then we learn the great doctrine, that man’s wish is not enough, unless he enjoys Divine support.

26:36–38

36. Then cometh Jesus with them unto a place called Gethsemane, and saith unto the disciples, Sit ye here, while I go and pray yonder.

37. And he took with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, and began to be sorrowful and very heavy.

38. Then saith he unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death: tarry ye here, and watch with me.

REMIGIUS. The Evangelist had said a little above, that when they had sung an hymn they went out to the mount of Olives; to point out the part of the mount to which they took their way, he now adds, Then came Jesus with them to a garden called Gethsemane.

RABANUS. Luke says, To the mount of Olives, (Luke 22:39.) and John, Went forth over the brook Cedron, where was a garden, (John 18:1.) which is the same as this Gethsemane, and is a place where He prayed at the foot of mount Olivet, where is a garden, and a Church now builtr

JEROME. Gethsemane is interpreted, ‘The rich valley;’ and there He bade His disciples sit a little while, and wait His return whilst He prayed alone for all.

ORIGEN. For it was not fitting that He should be seized in the place where He had sate and eaten the Passover with His disciples. Also He must first pray, and choose a place pure for prayer.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. Ixxxiii.) He says, Sit ye here, while I go and pray yonder, because the disciples adhered inseparably to Christ; but it was His practice to pray apart from them, therein teaching us to study quiet and retirement for our prayers.

DAMASCENE. (de. Fid. Orth. iii. 24.) But seeing that prayer is the sending up the understanding to God, or the asking of God things fitting, how did the Lord pray? For His understanding needed not to be lifted up to God, having been once united hypostatically to God the Word. Neither could He need to ask of God things fitting, for the One Christ is both God and Man. But giving in Himself a pattern to us, He taught us to ask of God, and to lift up our minds to Him. As He took on Him our passions, that by triumphing over them Himself, He might give us also the victory over them, so now He prays to open to us the way to that lifting up to God, to fulfil for us all righteousness, to reconcile His Father to us, to pay honour to Him as the First Cause, and to shew that He is not against God.

RABANUS. When the Lord prayed in the mountain, He taught us to make supplication for heavenly things; when He prays in the garden, He teaches us to study humility in our prayer. And beautifully, as He draws near His Passion, does He pray in the ‘valley of fatness,’ shewing that through the valley of humility, and the richness of charity, He took upon Him death for our sakes. The practical instruction which we may also learn from this is, that we should not suffer our heart to dry up from the richness of charity.

REMIGIUS. He had accepted the disciples’ faith and the devotedness of their will, but He foresaw that they would be troubled and scattered abroad, and therefore bade them sit still in their places; for to sit belongs to one at ease, but they would be grievously troubled that they should have denied Him. In what fashion He went forward it describes, And taking with him Peter and the two sons of Zebedee, he began to be sorrowful and very heavy; the same to whom He had shewn His glory in the mount.

HILARY. These words, He began to be sorrowful and very heavy, are interpreted by heretics that fear of death assailed the Son of God, being (as they allege) neither begotten from eternity, nor existing in the Father’s infinite substance, but produced out of nothing by Him who created all things; and that hence He was liable to anguish of grief, and fear of death. And He who can fear death can also die; and He who can die, though He shall exist after death, yet is not eternal through Him who begot Him in past time. Had these faith to receive the Gospels, they would know that the Word was in the beginning God, and from the beginning with God, and that the eternity of Him who begets and Him who is begotten is one and the same. But if the assumption of flesh infected with its natural infirmity the virtue of that incorruptible substance, so that it became subject to pain, and shrinking from death, it would also become thereby liable to corruption, and thus its immortality being changed into fear, that which is in it is capable of at some time ceasing to be. But God ever is without measure of time, and such as He is, He continues to be eternally. Nothing then in God can die, nor can God have any fear springing out of Himself.

JEROME. (non. occ.) But we say that passible man was so taken by God the Son, that His Deity remained impassible. Indeed the Son of God suffered, not by imputation but actually, all that Scripture testifies, in respect of that part of Him which could suffer, viz. in respect of the substance that He had taken on Him.

HILARY. (de Trin. x. 10.) I suppose that there are some who offer here no other cause of His fear than His passion and death. I ask those who think thus, whether it stands with reason that He should have feared to die, who banished from the Apostles all fear of death, and exhorted them to the glory of martyrdom? How can we suppose Him to have felt pain and grief in the sacrament of death, who rewards with life those who die for Him? And what pangs of death could He fear, who came to death of the free choice of His own power? And if His Passion was to do Him honour, how could the fear of His Passion make Him sorrowful?

HILARY. (in loc.) Since then we read that the Lord was sorrowful, let us discover the causes of His agony. He had forewarned them all that they would be offended, and Peter that he would thrice deny his Lord; and taking him and James and John, He began to be sorrowful. Therefore He was not sorrowful till He took them, but all His fear began after He had taken them; so that His agony was not for Himself, but for them whom He had taken.

JEROME. The Lord therefore sorrowed not from fear of suffering, for for this cause He had come that He should suffer, and had rebuked Peter for his fearfulness; (Matt. 14:31.) but for the wretched Judas, for the offence of the rest of the Apostles, for the rejection and reprobation of the Jewish nation, and the overthrow of unhappy Jerusalem.

DAMASCENE. (Fid. Orth. iii. 23.) Or otherwise; All things which have not yet been brought into existence by their Maker have a natural desire of existence, and naturally shun non-existence. God the Word then, having been made Man, had this desire, through which He desired food, drink, and sleep, by which life is supported, and naturally used them, and contrariwise shunned the things that are destructive of life. Hence in the season of His Passion which He endured voluntarily, He had the natural fear and sorrow for death. For there is a natural fear wherewith the soul shrinks from separation from the body, by reason of that close sympathy implanted from the first by the Maker of all things.

JEROME. Our Lord therefore sorrowed to prove the reality of the Man which He had taken upon Him; but that passion might bear no sway in His mind, He began to be sorrowful by pro-passion;s for it is one thing to be sorrowful, and another to be very sorrowful.

REMIGIUS. By this place are overthrown the Manichæans, who said that He took an unreal body; and those also who said that He had not a real soul, but His Divinity in place of a soul1

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. 83. Quæst. q. 80.) We have the narratives of the Evangelists, by which we know that Christ was both born of the Blessed Virgin Mary, was seized by the Jews, scourged, crucified, put to death, and buried in a tomb, all which cannot be supposed to have taken place without a body, and not even the maddest will say that these things are to be understood figuratively, when they are told by men who wrote what they remembered to have happened. These then are witnesses that He had a body, as those affections which cannot be without mind prove Him to have had a mind, and which we read in the accounts of the same Evangelists, that Jesus wondered, was angry, was sorrowful.

AUGUSTINE. (de. Civ. Dei, xiv. 9.) Since then these things are related in the Evangelists, they are not surely false, but as when He willed He became Man, so likewise when He willed He took into His human soul these passions for the sake of adding assurance to the dispensation. We indeed have these passions by reason of the weakness of our human nature; not so the Lord Jesus, whose weakness was of power.

DAMASCENE. (Fid. Orth. iii. 20.) Wherefore the passions of our nature were in Christ both by nature and beyond nature. By nature, because He left His flesh to suffer the things incidental to it; beyond nature, because these natural emotions did not in Him precede the will. For in Christ nothing befel of compulsion, but all was voluntary; with His will He hungered, with His will He feared, or was sorrowful. Here His sorrow is declared, Then saith he unto them, My soul is sorrowful even unto death.

AMBROSE. (ill. Luc. 22:43.) He is sorrowful, yet not Himself, but His soul; not His Wisdom, not His divine Substance, but His soul, for He took upon Him my soul, and my body.

JEROME. He is sorrowful not because of death, but unto death, until He has set the Apostles free by His Passion. Let those who imagine Jesus to have taken an irrational soul, say how it is that He is thus sorrowful, and knows the season of His sorrow, for though the brute animals have sorrow, yet they know neither the causes of it, nor the time for which it must endure.

ORIGEN. Or otherwise; My soul is sorrowful even unto death; as much as to say, Sorrow is begun in me, but not to endure for ever, but only till the hour of death; that when I shall die for sin, I shall die also to all sorrow, whose beginnings only are in me. Tarry ye here, and watch with me; as much as to say, The rest I bade sit yonder as weak, removing them from this struggle; but you I have brought hither as being stronger, that ye may toil with me in watching and prayer. But abide you here, that every man may stay in his own rank and station; since all grace, however great, has its superior.

JEROME. Or the sleep which He would have them forego is not bodily rest, for which at this critical time there was no room, but mental torpor, the sleep of unbelief.

26:39–44

39. And he went a little farther, and fell on his face, and prayed, saying, O my Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me: nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt.

40. And he cometh unto the disciples, and findeth them asleep, and saith unto Peter, What, could ye not watch with me one hour?

41. Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation: the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.

42. He went away again the second time, and prayed, saying, O my Father, if this cup may not pass away from me, except I drink it, thy will be done.

43. And he came and found them asleep again: for their eyes were heavy.

44. And he left them, and went away again, and prayed the third time, saying the same words.

ORIGEN. He took with Him the self-confident Peter, and the others, that they might see Him falling on His face and praying, and might learn not to think great things, but little things of themselves, and not to be hasty in promising, but careful in prayer. And therefore, He went forward a little, not to go far from them, but that He might be near them in His prayer. Also, He who had said above, Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly in heart, now commendably humbling Himself, falls on His face. But He shews His devotion in His prayer, and as beloved and well-pleasing to His Father, He adds, Not as I will, but as thou wilt, teaching us that we should pray, not that our own will, but that God’s will, should be done. And as He began to have fear and sorrow, He prays accordingly that the cup of His Passion may pass from Him, yet not as He wills, but as His Father wills; wills, that is, not according to His Divine and impassible Substance, but according to His human and weak nature. For in taking upon Him the nature of human flesh, He fulfilled all the properties thereof, that it might be seen that He had flesh not in appearance only, but in-reality. The believer indeed must in the first instance be loth to incur pain, seeing it leads to death, and he is a man of flesh; but if it be God’s will, he acquiesces because he is a believer. For as we ought not to be too confident that we may not seem to make a boast of our own strength; so neither ought we to be distrustful, lest we should seem to charge God our helper with weakness. It is to be observed that Mark and Luke write the same, but John does not introduce this prayer of Jesus’, that this cup may pass from Him, because the first three are rather occupied about Him, according to His human nature, John according to His divine. Otherwise; Jesus makes this petition, because He sees what the Jews will suffer for requiring His death.

JEROME. Whence He says emphatically, This cup, that is, of this people of the Jews, who, if they shall put Me to death, can have no excuse for their ignorance, seeing they have the Law and the Prophets, who speak of Me.

ORIGEN. Then again considering the benefit that would accrue to the whole world from His Passion, He says, But not as I will, but as thou wilt; i. e. If it be possible for all these benefits which shall result from My Passion to be procured without it, let it pass from Me, and both the world be saved, and the Jews not be condemned in putting Me to death. But if the salvation of many cannot be procured without the destruction of a few, saving Thy justice, let it not pass away. Scripture, in many places, speaks of passion as a cup that is drained; and it is drained by him, who in testimony suffers whatever is inflicted upon him. He sheds it, on the contrary, who denies in order to avoid suffering.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 4.) And that none might think that He limited His Father's power, He said not, If thou canst do it, but If it may be, or, If it be possible; as much as to say, If thou wilt. For whatever God wills can be done, as Luke expresses more plainly; for he says not, If it be possible, but If thou wilt.

HILARY. Otherwise; He says not, Let this cup pass away from Me, for that would be the speech of one who feared it; but He prays that it may pass not so as that He should be passed over, but that when it has passed from Him, it may go to another. His whole fear then is for those who were to suffer, and therefore He prays for those who were to suffer after Him, saying, Let this cup pass from me, i. e. as it is drunk by Me, so let it be drunk by these, without mistrust, without sense of pain, without fear of death. He says, If it be possible, because flesh and blood shrink from these things, and it is hard for human bodies not to sink beneath their infliction. That He says, Not as I will, but as thou wilt, He would fain indeed that they should not suffer, lest their faith should fail in their sufferings, if indeed we might attain to the glory of our joint inheritance with Him without the hardship of sharing in His Passion. He says, Not as I will, but as thou wilt, because it is the Father's will that strength to drink of the cup should pass from Him to them, that the Devil might be vanquished not so much by Christ as by His disciples also.

AUGUSTINE. (in Ps. 32. enar. 2.) Christ thus as man shews a certain private human will, in which He who is our head figures both His own will and ours when He says, Let it pass from me. For this was His human will choosing something as apart for Himself. But because as man He would be righteous and guide Himself by God's will, He adds, Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt; as much as to say to us, Man, behold thyself in Me, that thou canst will somewhat apart of thyself, and though God’s will is other, this is permitted to human frailty.

LEO. (Serm. 58, 5.) This speech of the Head is the health of the whole body, this saying is instruction to the faithful, animates the confessor, crowns the martyr. For who could vanquish the hatred of the world, or the whirlwind of temptations, or the terrors of the persecutors, if Christ did not in all and for all say to the Father, Thy will be done. Let all the sons of the Church then utter this prayer, that when the pressure of some mighty temptation lies upon them, they may embrace endurance of the suffering, disregarding its terrors.

ORIGEN. And though Jesus went but a little forward, they could not watch one hour in His absence; let us therefore pray that Jesus may never depart even a little from us.

CHRYSOSTOM. He finds them sleeping, both because it was a late hour of the night, and their eyes were heavy with sorrow.

HILARY. When then He returned to His disciples and found them sleeping, He rebukes Peter, Could ye not watch one hour with me? He addresses Peter rather than the rest, because he had most loudly boasted that he would not be offended.

CHRYSOSTOM. But as they had all said the same, He charges them all with weakness; they had chosen to die with Christ, and yet could not even watch with Him.

ORIGEN. Finding them thus sleeping, He rouses them with a word to hearken, and commands them to watch; Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation; that first we should watch, and so watching pray. He watches who does good works, and is careful that He does not run into any dark doctrine, for so the prayer of the watchful is heard.

JEROME. It is impossible that the human mind should not be tempted, therefore He says not Watch and pray that ye be not tempted, but that ye enter not into temptation, that is, that temptation vanquish you not.

HILARY. And why He thus encouraged them to pray that they might not enter into temptation, He adds, For the spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak; this He says not of Himself, but addresses them.

JEROME. This is against those rash persons who think that whatever they believe they can perform. The more confident we are of our zeal, the more mistrustful should we be of the frailty of the flesh.

ORIGEN. Here it should be enquired, whether as all men’s flesh is weak, so all men’s spirit is willing, or whether only that of the saints; and whether in unbelievers the spirit is not also dull, as the flesh is weak. In another sense the flesh of those only is weak whose spirit is willing, and who with their willing spirit do mortify the deeds of the flesh. These then He would have watch and pray that they should not enter into temptation, for the more spiritual any one may be, the more careful should he be that his goodness should not suffer a great fall.

REMIGIUS. Otherwise; In these words He shews that He took real flesh of the Virgin, and had a real soul, saying that His spirit is willing to suffer, but His flesh weak in fearing the pain of Passion.

ORIGEN. There were, I conclude, two ways in which this cup of Passion might pass from the Lord. If He should drink it, it would pass away from Him, and afterwards from the whole race of mankind also; if He should not drink it, it would perhaps pass from Him, but from men it would not pass. He would fain therefore that it should so pass from Him as that He should not at all taste its bitterness, yet only if it were possible, saving the righteousness of God. If it were not possible, He was rather willing to drink it, that so it might pass from Him, and from the whole race of mankind rather than against His Father’s will shun the drinking thereof.

CHRYSOSTOM. That He prays for this a second and a third time, comes of the feelings belonging to human frailty, through which also He feared death, thus giving assurance that He was truly made man. For in Scripture when any thing is repeated a second and third time, that is the greatest proof of its truth and reality; as, for example, when Joseph says to Pharaoh, And for that thou sawedst it twice, it is proof of the thing being established by God. (Gen. 41:32.)

JEROME. Or otherwise; He prays a second time that if Nineveh, or the Gentile world, cannot be saved unless the gourd, i. e. the Jews, be withered, His Father’s will may be done, which is not contrary to the Son’s will, who Himself speaks by the Prophet, I am content to do thy will, O God. (Ps. 40:8.)

HILARY. Otherwise, He bare in His own body all the infirmities of us His disciples who should suffer, and nailed to His cross all wherein we are distressed; and therefore that cup cannot pass from Him, unless He drink it, because we cannot suffer, except by His passion.

JEROME. Christ singly prays for all, as He singly suffers for all. Their eyes were heavy, i. e. an oppression and stupefaction came on as their denial drew near.

ORIGEN. And I suppose that the eyes of their body were not so much affected as the eyes of their mind, because the Spirit was not yet given them. Wherefore He does not rebuke them, but goes again and prays, teaching us that we should not faint but should persevere in prayer, until we obtain what we have begun to ask.

JEROME. He prayed the third time, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word might be established.

RABANUS. Or, The Lord prayed thrice, to teach us to pray for pardon of sins past, defence against present evil, and provision against future perils, and that we should address every prayer to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and that our spirit, soul, and body should be kept in safety.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 47.) Nor is that an absurd interpretation which makes Our Lord pray thrice because of the threefold temptation of His Passion. To the temptation of curiosity is opposed the fear of death; for as the one is a yearning for the knowledge of things, so the other is the fear of losing such knowledge. To the desire of honour or applause is opposed the dread of disgrace and insult. To the desire of pleasure is opposed the fear of pain.

REMIGIUS. Or, He prays thrice for the Apostles, and for Peter in particular, who was to deny Him thrice.

26:45–46

45. Then cometh he to his disciples, and saith unto them, Sleep on now, and take your rest: behold, the hour is at hand, and the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners.

46. Rise, let us be going: behold, he is at hand that doth betray me.

HILARY. After His persevering prayer, after His departures and several returns, He takes away their fear, restores their confidence, and exhorts them to sleep on, and take their rest.

CHRYSOSTOM. Indeed it behoved them then to watch, but He said this to shew that the prospect of coming evils was more than they would bear, that He had no need of their aid, and that it must needs be that He should be delivered up.

HILARY. Or, He bids them sleep on, and take their rest, because He now confidently awaited His Father's will concerning the disciples, concerning which He had said, Thy will be done, and in obedience to which He drunk the cup that was to pass from Him to us, diverting upon Himself the weakness of our body, the terrors of dismay, and even the pains of death itself.

ORIGEN. Or, the sleep He now bids His disciples take is of a different sort from that which is related above to have befallen them. Then He found them sleeping, not taking repose, but because their eyes were heavy, but now they are not merely to sleep, but to take their rest, that this order may be rightly observed, namely, that we first watch with prayer that we enter not into temptation, and afterwards sleep and take our rest, when having found a place for the Lord, a tabernacle for the God of Jacob, (Ps. 132:3.) we may go up into our bed, and give sleep to our eyes. It may be also that the soul, unable to sustain a continual energy by reason of its union with the flesh, may blamelessly admit some relaxations, which may be the moral interpretation of slumbers, and then again after due time be quickened to new energy.

HILARY. And whereas, when He returned and found them sleeping, He rebukes them the first time, the second time says nothing, the third time bids them take their rest; the interpretation of this is, that at the first after His resurrection, when He finds them dispersed, distrustful, and timorous, He rebukes them; the second time, when their eyes were heavy to look upon the liberty of the Gospel, He visited them, sending them the Spirit, the Paraclete; for, held back by attachment to the Law, they slumbered in respect of faith; but the third time, when He shall come in His glory, He shall restore them to quietness and confidence.

ORIGEN. When He had roused them from sleep, seeing in the Spirit Judas drawing near to betray Him, though the disciples could not yet see him, He says, Behold, the hour is at hand, and the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners.

CHRYSOSTOM. The words, the hour is at hand, point out that all that has been done was by Divine interference; and that, into the hands of sinners, shew that this was the work of their wickedness, not that He was guilty of any crime.

ORIGEN. And even now Jesus is betrayed into the hands of sinners, when those who seem to believe in Jesus, continue to sin while they have Him in their hands. Also whenever a righteous man, who has Jesus in Him, is put into the power of sinners, Jesus is delivered into the hands of sinners.

JEROME. Having concluded His third prayer, and having obtained that the Apostles' terror should be corrected by subsequent penitence, He goes forth undaunted by the prospect of His own Passion to meet His pursuers, and offers Himself voluntarily to be sacrificed. Arise, let us be going; as much as to say, Let them not find you trembling, let us go forth willingly to death, that they may see us confident and rejoicing in suffering; Lo, he that shall betray me draweth near.

ORIGEN. He says not, Draws near to thee, for indeed the traitor was not near Him, but had removed himself far off through his sins.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 4.) This speech as Matthew has it seems self-contradictory. For how could He say, Sleep on, and take your rest, and immediately continue, Rise, let us be going. This contradiction some have endeavoured to reconcile by supposing the words, Sleep on, and take your rest, to be an ironical rebuke, and not a permission; it might be rightly so taken if need were. But as Mark records it, when He had said, Sleep on, and take your rest, He added, it is enough, and then continued, The hour is come, behold, the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners; (Mark 14:41.) we clearly understand the Lord to have been silent some time after He had said, Sleep on, to allow of their doing so, and then after some interval to have roused them with, Behold, the hour is at hand. And as Mark fills up the sense with, it is enough, that is, ye have had rest enough.

26:47–50

47. And while he yet spake, lo, Judas, one of the twelve, came, and with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from the Chief Priests and elders of the people.

48. Now he that betrayed him gave them a sign, saying, Whomsoever I shall kiss, that same is he: hold him fast.

49. And forthwith he came to Jesus, and said, Hail, Master; and kissed him.

50. And Jesus said unto him, Friend, wherefore art thou come? Then came they, and laid hands on Jesus, and took him.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having said above that the Lord offered Himself of His own accord to His pursuers, the Evangelist proceeds to relate how He was seized by them.

REMIGIUS. One of the twelve, by association of name, not of desert. This shews the monstrous wickedness of the man who from the dignity of the Apostleship became the traitor. To shew that it was out of envy that they seized Him, it is added, A great multitude sent by the Chief Priests and elders of the people.

ORIGEN. Some may say that a great multitude came, because of the great multitude of those who already believed, who, they feared, might rescue Him out of their hands; but I think there is another reason for this, and that is, that they who thought that He cast out dæmons through Beelzebub, supposed that by some magic He might escape the hands of those who sought to hold Him. Even now do many fight against Jesus with spiritual weapons, to wit, with divers and shifting dogmas concerning God. It deserves enquiry why, when He was known by face to all who dwelt in Judæa, he should have given them a sign, as though they were unacquainted with His person. But a tradition to this effect has come down to us, that not only had He two different forms, one under which He appeared to men, the other into which He was transfigured before His disciples in the mount, but also that He appeared to each man in such degree as the beholder was worthy; in like manner as we read of the manna, that it had a flavour adapted to every variety of use, and as the word of God shews not alike to all. They required therefore a sign by reason of this His transfiguration.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, because whenever they had hitherto attempted to seize Him, He had escaped them they knew not how; as also He might then have done had He been so minded.

RABANUS. The Lord suffered the traitor’s kiss, not to teach us to dissemble, but that He might not seem to shrink from His betrayal.

ORIGEN. If it be asked why Judas betrayed Jesus with a kiss, according to some it was because He desired to keep up the reverence due to his Master, and did not dare to make an open assault upon Him; according to others, it was out of fear that if he came as an avowed enemy, he might be the cause of His escape, which he believed Jesus had it in His power to effect. But I think that all betrayers of truth love to assume the guise of truth, and to use the sign of a kiss. Like Judas also, all heretics call Jesus Rabbi, and receive from Him mild answer. And Jesus said unto him, Friend, wherefore art thou come? He says, Friend, upbraiding his hypocrisy; for in Scripture we never find this term of address used to any of the good, but as above, Friend, how camest thou in hither? (Matt. 22:12.) and, Friend, I do thee no wrong. (Matt. 20:13.)

AUGUSTINE. (non occ.) He says, Wherefore art thou come? as much as to say, Thy kiss is a snare for Me; I know wherefore thou art come; thou feignest thyself My friend, being indeed My betrayer.

REMIGIUS. Or, after Friend, for what thou art come, that do, is understood. Then came they, and laid their hands on Jesus, and held him. Then, that is, when He suffered them, for ofttimes they would have done it, but were not able.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Serm. de Symb. ad Catech. 6.) Exult, Christian, you have gained by this bargain of your enemies; what Judas sold, and what the Jews bought, belongs to you.

26:51–54

51. And, behold, one of them which were with Jesus stretched out his hand, and drew his sword, and struck a servant of the High Priest’s, and smote off his ear.

52. Then said Jesus unto him, Put up again thy swdor into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword.

53. Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels?

54. But how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. Ixxxiv.) So Luke relates, the Lord had said to His disciples at supper, He that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip; and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one;

(Luke 22:36.) and the disciples answered, Lo, here are two swords. It was natural that there should be swords there for the paschal lamb which they had been eating. Hearing then that the pursuers were coming to apprehend Christ, when they went out from supper they took these swords, as though to fight in defence of their Master against His pursuers.

JEROME. In another Gospel, (John 18:10.) Peter is represented as having done this, and with his usual hastiness; and that the servant's name was Malchus, and that the ear was the right ear. In passing we may say, that Malchus, i. e. one who should have been king of the Jews, was made the slave of the ungodliness and the greediness of the Priests, and lost his right ear so that he might hear only the worthlessness of the letter in his left.

ORIGEN. For though they seem even now to hear the Law, yet is it only with the left ear that they hear the shadow of a tradition concerning the Law, and not the truth. The people of the Gentiles is signified by Peter; for by believing in Christ, they become the cause of cutting off the Jews' right ear.

RABANUS. Or, Peter does not take away the sense of understanding from them that hear, but opens to the careless that which by a divine sentence was taken away from them; but this same right ear is restored to its original function in those who out of this nation believed.

HILARY. Otherwise; The ear of the High Priest's servant is cut off by the Apostle, that is, Christ's disciple cuts off the disobedient hearing of a people which were the slaves of the Priesthood, the ear which had refused to hear is cut off so that it is no longer capable of hearing.

LEO. (Serm. 22.) The Lord of the zealous Apostle will not suffer his pious feeling to proceed further, Then saith Jesus unto him, Put up again thy sword into his place. For it was contrary to the sacrament of our redemption that He, who had come to die for all, should refuse to be apprehended. He gives therefore licence to their fury against Him, lest by putting off the triumph of His glorious Cross, the dominion of the Devil should be made longer, and the captivity of men more enduring.

RABANUS. It behoved also that the Author of grace should teach the faithful patience by His own example, and should rather train them to endure adversity with fortitude, than incite them to self-defence.

CHRYSOSTOM. To move the disciple to this, He adds a threat, saying, All they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xxvii. 70.) That is, every one who uses the sword. And he uses the sword, who, without the command or sanction of any superior, or legitimate authority, arms himself against man's life. For truly the Lord had given commandment to His disciples to take the sword, but not to smite with the sword. Was it then at all unbeseeming that Peter after this sin should become ruler of the Church, as Moses after smiting the Egyptian was made ruler and chief of the Synagogue? For both transgressed the rule not through hardened ferocity, but through a warmth of spirit capable of good; both through hatred of the injustice of others; both sinned through love, the one for his brother, the other for his Lord, though a carnal love.

HILARY. But all who use the sword do not perish by the sword; of those who have used the sword either judicially, or in self-defence against robbers, fever or accident carries off the greater part. Though if according to this every one who uses the sword shall perish by the sword, justly was the sword now drawn against those who were using the same for the promotion of crime.

JEROME. With what sword then shall he perish, that takes the sword? By that fiery sword which waves before the gate of paradise, and that sword of the Spirit which is described in the armour of God.

HILARY. The Lord then bids him return his sword into its sheath, because He would destroy them by no weapon of man, but by the sword of His mouth.

REMIGIUS. Otherwise; Every one who uses the sword to put man to death perishes first by the sword of his own wickedness.

CHRYSOSTOM. He not only soothed His disciples, by this declaration of punishment against His enemies, but convinced them that it was voluntarily that He suffered, Thinkest thou that I cannot pray to my Father, &c. Because He had shewn many qualities of human infirmity, He would have seemed to say what was incredible, if He had said that He had power to destroy them, therefore He says, Thinkest thou that I cannot now pray to my Father?

JEROME. That is to say, I need not the aid of the Apostles, though all the twelve should fight for me, seeing I could have twelve legions of the Angelic army. The complement of a legion among the ancients was six thousand men; twelve legions then are seventy-two thousand Angels, being as many as the divisions of the human race and languaget.

ORIGEN. This shews that the armies of heaven have divisions into legions like earthly armies, in the warfare of the Angels against the legions of the dæmons. This He said not as though He needed the aid of the Angels, but speaking in accordance with the supposition of Peter, who sought to give Him assistance. Truly the Angels have more need of the help of the Only-begotten Son of God, than He of theirs.

REMIGIUS. We might also understand by the Angels the Roman armies, for with Titus and Vespasian all languages had risen against Judæa, and that was fulfilled, The whole world shall fight for him against those foolish men. (Wisd. 5:21.)

CHRYSOSTOM. And He quiets their fears not thus only, but by reference to Scripture, How then shall the Scriptures he fulfilled that thus it must be?

JEROME. This speech shews a mind willing to suffer; vainly would the Prophets have prophesied truly, unless the Lord asserts their truth by His suffering.

26:55–58

55. In that same hour said Jesus to the multitudes, Are ye come out as against a thief with swords and staves for to take me? I sat daily with you in the temple, and ye laid no hold on me.

56. But all this was done, that the Scriptures of the prophets might be fulfilled. Then all the disciples forsook him, and fled.

57. And they that had laid hold on Jesus led him away to Caiaphas the High Priest, where the Scribes and the elders were assembled.

58. But Peter followed him afar off unto the High Priest’s palace, and went in, and sat with the servants, to see the end.

ORIGEN. Having commanded Peter to put up his sword, which was an instance of patience, and having (as another Evangelist writes [Luke 22:51.]) healed the ear that was cut off, which was an instance of the greatest mercy, and of Divine power, it now follows, In that hour said Jesus to the multitudes, to the end that if they could not remember His past goodness, they might at least confess His present,) Are ye come out as against a thief with swords and staves for to take me?

REMIGIUS. As much as to say, Robbers assault and study concealment; I have injured no one, but have healed many, and have ever taught in your synagogues.

JEROME. It is folly then to seek with swords and staves Him who offers Himself to your hands, and with a traitor to hunt out, as though lurking under cover of night, one who is daily teaching in the temple.

CHRYSOSTOM. They did not lay hands on Him in the temple because they feared the multitude, therefore also the Lord went forth that He might give them place and opportunity to take Him. This then teaches them, that if He had not suffered them of His own free choice, they would never have had strength to take Him. Then the Evangelist assigns the reason why the Lord was willing to be taken, adding, All this was done that the Scriptures of the Prophets might be fulfilled.

JEROME. They pierced my hands and my feet; (Ps. 22:16.) and in another place, He is led as a sheep to the slaughter; (Is. 53:7, 8.) and, By the iniquities of my people was He led to death.

REMIGIUS. For because all the Prophets had foretold Christ’s Passion, he does not cite any particular place, but says generally that the prophecies of all the Prophets were being fulfilled.

CHRYSOSTOM. The disciples who had remained when the Lord was apprehended, fled when He spoke these things to the multitudes, Then all the disciples forsook him and fled; for they then understood that He could not escape but rather gave Himself up voluntarily.

REMIGIUS. In this act is shewn the Apostles’ frailty; in the first ardour of their faith they had promised to die with Him, but in their fear they forgot their promise and fled. The same we may see in those who undertake to do great things for the love of God, but fail to fulfil what they undertake; they ought not to despair, but to rise again with the Apostles, and recover themselves by penitence.

RABANUS. Mystically, As Peter, who by tears washed away the sin of his denial, figures the recovery of those who lapse in time of martyrdom; so the flight of the other disciples suggests the precaution of flight to such as feel themselves unfit to endure torments.

AUGUSTINE. (Cons. Ev. iii. 6.) They that had laid hold on Jesus led Him away to Caiaphas the High Priest. But He was first taken to Annas, father-in-law to Caiaphas, as John relates. And He was taken bound, there being with that multitude a tribune and cohort, as John also records. (John 18:12.)

JEROME. But Josephus writesu, that this Caiaphas had purchased the priesthood of a single year, notwithstanding that Moses, at God's command, had directed that High Priests should succeed hereditarily, and that in the Priests likewise succession by birth should be followed up. No wonder then that an unrighteous High Priest should judge unrighteously.

RABANUS. And the action suits his name; Caiaphas, i. e. 'contriving,' or, 'politic,' to execute his villainy; or 'vomiting from his mouth,' because of his audacity in uttering a lie, and bringing about the murder. They took Jesus thither, that they might do all advisedly; as it follows, Where the Scribes and the Elders were assembled.

ORIGEN. Where Caiaphas the High Priest is, there are assembled the Scribes, that is, the men of the letter1, who preside over the letter that killeth; and Elders, not in truth, but in the obsolete ancientness of the letter. It follows, Peter followed Him afar off, He would neither keep close to Him, nor altogether leave Him, but followed afar off.

CHRYSOSTOM. Great was the zeal of Peter, who fled not when He saw the others fly, but remained, and entered in. For though John also went in, yet he was known to the Chief Priest. He followed afar off, because he was about to deny his Lord.

REMIGIUS. For had he kept close to his Lord's side, he could never have denied Him. This also shews that Peter should follow his Lord's Passion, that is, imitate it.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 46.) And also that the Church should follow, i. e. imitate, the Lord's Passion, but with great difference. For the Church suffers for itself, but Christ for the Church.

JEROME. He went in, either out of the attachment of a disciple, or natural curiosity, seeking to know what sentence the High Priest would pass, whether death, or scourging.

26:59–68

59. Now the Chief Priests, and elders, and all the council, sought false witness against Jesus, to put him to death;

60. But found none: yea, though many false witnesses came, yet found they none. At the last came two false witnesses,

61. And said, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the temple of God, and to build it in three days.

62. And the High Priest arose, and said unto him, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against thee?

63. But Jesus held his peace. And the High Priest answered and said unto him, I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us whether thou be the Christ, the Son of God.

64. Jesus saith unto him, Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Hereafter shall ye see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.

65. Then the High Priest rent his clothes, saying, He hath spoken blasphemy; what further need have we of witnesses? behold, now ye have heard his blasphemy.

66. What think ye? They answered and said, He is guilty of death.

67. Then did they spit in his face, and buffeted him; and others smote him with the palms of their hands,

68. Saying, Prophesy unto us, thou Christ, Who is he that smote thee?

CHRYSOSTOM. When the Chief Priests were thus assembled, this conventicle of ruffians sought to give their conspiracy the character of a legal trial. But it was entirely a scene of confusion and uproar, as what follows shews, Though many false witnesses came, yet found they none.

ORIGEN. False witnesses have place when there is any good colour for their testimony. But no pretext was found which could further their falsehoods against Jesus; notwithstanding there were many desirous to do a favour to the Chief Priests. This then is a great testimony in favour of Jesus, that He had lived and taught so irreproachably, that though they were many, and crafty, and wicked, they could find no semblance of fault in Him.

JEROME. At last came two false witnesses. How are they false witnesses, when they repeat only what we read that the Lord spoke? A false witness is one who takes what is said in a different sense from that in which it was said. Now this the Lord had spoken of the temple of His Body, and they cavil at His expressions, and by a slight change and addition produce a plausible charge. The Lord’s words were, Destroy this temple; (John 2:19.) this they make into, I can destroy the Temple of God. He said, Destroy, not ‘I will destroy,’ because it is unlawful to lay hands on ourselves. Also they phrased it, And build it again, making it apply to the temple of the Jews; but the Lord had said, And I will raise it up again, thus clearly pointing out a living and breathing temple. For to build again, and to raise again, are two different things.

CHRYSOSTOM. Why did they not bring forward now His breaking the Sabbath? Because He had so often confuted them on this point.

JEROME. Headlong and uncontrolled rage, unable to find even a false accusation, moves the High Priest from his throne, the motion of his body shewing the emotion of his mind. And the High Priest arose, and said unto him, Answerest thou nothing to the things which these witness against Thee?

CHRYSOSTOM. He said this with a design to draw from Him some indefensible answer which might be made a snare for Him. But Jesus held his peace, for defence had availed nothing when none would listen to it. For here was only a mockery of justice, it was in truth nothing more than the anarchy of a den of robbers.

ORIGEN. This place teaches us to contemn the clamours of slanderers and false witnesses, and not to consider those who speak unbeseeming things of us worthy of an answer; but then, above all, when it is greater to be manfully and resolutely silent, than to plead our cause in vain.

JEROME. For as God, He knew that whatever He said would be twisted into an accusation against Him. But at this His silence before false witnesses and ungodly Priests, the High Priest was exasperated, and summons Him to answer, that from anything He says he may raise a charge against Him.

ORIGEN. Under the Law, we do indeed find many instances of this adjuration (Numb. 5:19, 1 Kings 22:16.); but I judge that a man who would live according to the Gospel should not adjure another; for if we are not permitted to swear, surely not to adjure. But he that regards Jesus commanding the dæmons, and giving His disciples power over them, will say, that to address the dæmons by the power given by the Saviour, is not to adjure them. But the High Priest did sin in laying a snare for Jesus; imitating his father, who twice asked the Saviour, If thou be Christ the Son of God. (Matt. 4.) Hence one might rightly say, that to doubt concerning the Son of God, whether Christ be He, is the work of the Devil. It was not fit that the Lord should answer the High Priest's adjuration as though under compulsion, wherefore He neither denied nor confessed Himself to be the Son of God. For he was not worthy to be the object of Christ's teaching, therefore He does not instruct him, but taking up his own words retorts them upon him. This sitting of the Son of Man seems to me to denote a certain regal security; by the power of God, Who is the only power, is He securely seated to Whom is given by His Father all power in heaven as in earth. And there will come a time when the enemies shall see this establishment. Indeed this has begun to be fulfilled from the earliest time of the dispensation; for the disciples saw Him rising from the dead, and thereby saw Him seated on the right hand of power. Or, In respect of that eternity of duration which is with God, from the beginning of the world to the end of it is but one day; it is therefore no wonder that the Saviour here says, Shortly, signifying that there is but short time before the end come. He prophesies moreover, that they should not only see Him sitting at the right hand of power, but also coming in the clouds of heaven. These clouds are the Prophets and Apostles, whom He commands to rain when it is required, they are the clouds that pass not away, but bearing the image of the heavenly, (1 Cor. 15:49.) are worthy to be the throne of God, as heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ. (Rom. 8:17.)

JEROME. The same fury which drew the High Priest from his seat, impels him now to rend his clothes; for so it was customary with the Jews to do whenever they heard any blasphemy, or any thing against God.

CHRYSOSTOM. This He did to give weight to the accusation, and to confirm by deeds what He taught in words.

JEROME. And by this rending his garments, he shews that the Jews have lost the priestly glory, and that their High Priest's throne was vacant. For by rending his garment he rent the veil of the Law which covered him.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then, after rending his garment, he did not give sentence of himself, but asked of others, saying, What think ye? As was always done in undeniable cases of sin, and manifest blasphemy, and as by force driving them to a certain opinion, he anticipates the answer, What need we any further witnesses? Behold, now ye have heard his blasphemy. What was this blasphemy? For before He had interpreted to them as they were gathered together that text, The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, (Matt. 22:44.) and they had held their peace, and had not contradicted Him. How then do they call what He now says blasphemy? They answered and said, He is guilty of death, the same persons at once accusers, examiners, and sentencers.

ORIGEN. How great their error! to pronounce the principle of all men’s life to be guilty of death, and not to acknowledge by the testimony of the resurrection of so many, the Fount of life, from Whom life flows to all that rise again.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv.) As hunters who have started their game, so they exhibit a wild and drunken exultation.

JEROME. They spit in his face, and buffeted him, to fulfil the prophecy of Esaias, I gave my cheek to the smiters, and turned not away my face from shame and spitting. (Isa. 50:6.)

GLOSS. (ord) Prophesy unto us is said in ridicule of His claim to be held as a Prophet by the people.

JEROME. But it would have been foolish to have answered them that smote Him, and to have declared the smiter, seeing that in their madness they seem to have struck Him openly.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe how circumstantially the Evangelist recounts all those particulars even which seem most disgraceful, hiding or extenuating nothing, but thinking it the highest glory that the Lord of the earth should endure such things for us. This let us read continually, let us imprint in our minds, and in these things let us boast.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 44.) That, they did spit in his face, signifies those who reject His proffered grace. They likewise buffet Him who prefer their own honour to Him; and they smite Him on the face, who, blinded with unbelief, affirm that He is not yet come, disowning and rejecting His person.

26:69–75

69. Now Peter sat without in the palace: and a damsel came unto him, saying, Thou also wast with Jesus of Galilee.

70. But he denied before them all, saying, I know not what thou sayest.

71. And when he was gone out into the porch, another maid saw him, and said unto them that were there, This fellow was also with Jesus of Nazareth.

72. And again he denied with an oath, I do not know the man.

73. And after a while came unto him they that stood by, and said to Peter, Surely thou also art one of them; for thy speech bewrayeth thee.

74. Then began he to curse and to swear, saying, I know not the man. And immediately the cock crew.

75. And Peter remembered the word of Jesus, which said unto him, Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice. And he went out, and wept bitterly.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 6.) Among the other insults offered to our Lord was the threefold denial of Peter, which the several Evangelists relate in different order. Luke puts Peter's trial first, and the ill usage of the Lord after that; Matthew and Mark reverse the order.

JEROME. Peter sat without, that he might see the event, and not excite suspicion by any approach to Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. And he, who, when he saw his Master laid hands on, drew his sword and cut off the ear, now when he sees Him enduring such insults becomes a denier, and cannot withstand the taunts of a mean servant girl. A damsel came unto him, saying, Thou also wast with Jesus of Galilee.

RABANUS. What means this, that a handmaid is the first to tax him, when men would be more likely to recognise him, except that this sex might seem to sin somewhat in the Lord's death, that they might be redeemed by His passion? He denied before them all, because he was afraid to reveal himself; that he said, I know not, shews that he was not yet willing to die for the Saviour.

LEO. (Serm. 60, 4.) For this reason it should seem he was permitted to waver, that the remedy of penitence might be exhibited in the head of the Church, and that none should dare to trust in his own strength, when even the blessed Peter could not escape the danger of frailty.

CHRYSOSTOM. But not once, but twice and thrice did he deny within a short time.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) We understand that having gone out after his first denial, the cock crowed the first time as Mark relates.

CHRYSOSTOM. To shew that the sound did not keep him from denial, nor bring his promise to mind.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The second denial was not outside the door, but after he had returned to the fire; for the second maid did not see him after he had gone out, but as he was going out; his getting up to go out drew her attention, and she said to them that were there, that is, to those that were standing round the fire in the hall, Tins fellow also was with Jesus of Nazareth. He who had gone out, haying heard this returned, that he might by denial vindicate himself. Or, as is more likely, he did not hear what was said of him as he went out, but it was after he came back that the maid, and the other man whom Luke mentions, said to him, And thou also art one of them.

JEROME. And again he denied with an oath, I do not know the man. I know that some out of a feeling of piety towards the Apostle Peter have interpreted this place to signify that Peter denied the Man and not the God, as though he meant, ‘I do not know the Man, because I know the God.’x But the intelligent reader will see that this is trifling, for if he denied not, the Lord spoke falsely when He said, Thou shalt deny me thrice.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 22, 57.) I had rather that Peter deny, than that the Lord be made out false.

RABANUS. In this denial of Peter we affirm that Christ is denied not only by him who denies that He is Christ, but who denies himself to be a Christian.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Let us now come to the third denial; And after a while came they that stood by, and said to Peter, Surely thou also art one of them, (Luke’s words are, About the space of one hour after,) for thy speech bewrayeth thee. (Luke 22:59.)

JEROME. Not that Peter was of a different speech or nation, but a Hebrew as his accusers were; but every province and every district has its peculiarities, and he could not disguise his native pronunciation.

REMIGIUS. Observe how baneful are communications with evil men; they even drove Peter to deny the Lord whom he had before confessed to be the Son of God.

RABANUS. Observe, that he said the first time, I know not what thou sayest; the second time, He denied with an oath; the third time, He began to curse and to swear that he knew not the man. For to persevere in sinning increases sinfulness, and he who disregards light sins, falls into greater.

REMIGIUS. Spiritually; By Peter’s denial before the cock-crow, are denoted those who before Christ’s resurrection did not believe Him to be God, being perplexed by His death. In his denial after the first cock-crow, are denoted those who are in error concerning both Christ’s natures, His human and divine. By the first handmaid is signified desire; by the second, carnal delight; by them that stood by, the dæmons; for by them men are led to a denial of Christ.

ORIGEN. Or, By the first handmaid is understood the Synagogue of the Jews, which oft compelled the faithful to deny; by the second, the congregations of the Gentiles, who even persecuted the Christians; they that stood in the hall signify the ministers of divers heresies, who also compel men to deny the truth of Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. i. 45.) Also Peter thrice denied, because heretical error concerning Christ is limited to three kinds; they are in error respecting His divinity, His humanity, or both.

RABANUS. After the third denial comes the cock-crow; by which we may understand a Doctor of the Church who with chiding rouses the slumbering, saying, Awake, ye righteous, and sin not. (1 Cor. 15:14.) Thus Holy Scripture uses to denote the merit of divers cases1 by fixed periods, as Peter sinned at midnight and repented at cock-crow.

JEROME. In another Gospel we read, that after Peter’s denial and the cock-crow, the Saviour looked upon Peter, (Luke 22:61.) and by His look called forth those bitter tears; for it might not be that he on whom the Light of the world had looked should continue in the darkness of denial, wherefore, he went out, and wept bitterly. For he could not do penitence sitting in Caiaphas’ hall, but went forth from the assembly of the wicked, that he might wash away in bitter tears the pollution of his timid denial.

LEO. (Serm. 60. 4.) Blessed tears, O holy Apostle, which had the virtue of holy Baptism in washing off the sin of thy denial. The right hand of the Lord Jesus Christ was with thee to hold thee up before thou wast quite thrown down, and in the midst of thy perilous fall, thou receivedst strength to stand. The Rock quickly returned to its stability, recovering so great fortitude, that he who in Christ’s passion had quailed, should endure his own subsequent suffering with fearlessness and constancy.

CHAPTER 27

27:1–5

1. When the morning was come, all the Chief Priests and elders of the people took counsel against Jesus to put him to death:

2. And when they had bound him, they led him away, and delivered him to Pontius Pilate the governor.

3. Then Judas, which had betrayed him, when he saw that he was condemned, repented himself, and brought again the thirty pieces of silver to the Chief Priests and elders,

4. Saying, I have sinned in that I have betrayed the innocent blood. And they said, What is that to us? see thou to that.

5. And he cast down the pieces of silver in the temple, and departed, and went and hanged himself.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 7.) The Evangelist had above brought down his history, of what was done to the Lord as far as early morning; he then turned back to relate Peter’s denial, after which he returned to the morning to continue the course of events, When the morning was come, &c.

ORIGEN. They supposed that by His death they should crush His doctrine, and the belief in Him of those who believed Him to be the Son of God. With such purpose against Him they bound Jesus, Who looses them that are bound. (vid. Isa. 61:1.)

JEROME. Observe the evil zeal of the Chief Priests; they watched the whole night with a view to this murder. And they gave Him up to Pilate bound, for such was their practice to send bound to the judge any whom they had sentenced to death.

RABANUS. Though it should be observed that they did not now first bind Him, but before, when they first laid hands upon Him in the garden, as John relates. (John 18:12.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv.) They did not put Him to death in secret, because they sought to destroy His reputation, and the wonder with which

He was regarded by many. For this reason they were minded to put Him to death openly before all, and therefore they led Him to the governor.

JEROME. Judas, when he saw that the Lord was condemned to death, returned the money to the Priests, as though it had been in his power to change the minds of His persecutors.

ORIGEN. Let the propounders of those fables concerning intrinsically evil naturesa answer me here, whence Judas came to the acknowledgment of his sin, I have sinned in that I have betrayed righteous blood, except through the good mind originally implanted in him, and that seed of virtue which is sown in every rational soul? But Judas did not cherish this, and so fell into this sin. But if ever any man was made of a nature that was to perish, Judas was yet more of such a nature. If indeed he had done this after Christ's resurrection, it might have been said, that the power of the resurrection brought him to repentance. But he repented when he saw Christ delivered up to Pilate, perhaps remembering the things Jesus had so often spoken of His resurrection. (John 13:27.) Or, perhaps Satan who had entered into him continued with him till Jesus was given up to Pilate, and then, having accomplished his purpose, departed from him; whereupon he repented. But how could Judas know that He was condemned, for He had not yet been examined by Pilate? One may perhaps say, that he foreboded the event in his own mind from the very first, when he saw Him delivered up. Another may explain the words, when he saw that he was condemned, of Judas himself, that he then perceived his evil case, and saw that he himself was condemned.

LEO. (Serm. 52, 5.) When he says, I have sinned, in that I have betrayed innocent blood, he persists in his wicked treachery, seeing that amid the last struggles of death he believed not Jesus to be the Son of God, but merely man of our rank; for had he not thus denied His omnipotence, he would have obtained His mercy.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe that he repents only when his sin is finished and complete; for so the Devil suffers not those who are not watchful to see the evil before they bring it to an end.

REMIGIUS. But they said, What is that to us? that is to say, What is it to us that He is righteous? See thou to it, i. e. to thy own deed what will come of it. Though some would read these in one1, What must we think of you, when you confess that the man whom yourself have betrayed is innocent?

ORIGEN. But when the Devil leaves any one, he watches his time for return, and having taken it, he leads him into a second sin, and then watches for opportunity for a third deceit. (1 Cor. 5:1.) So the man who had married his father’s wife afterwards repented him of this sin, but again the Devil resolved so to augment this very sorrow of repentance, that his sorrow being made too abundant might swallow up the sorrower. Something like this took place in Judas, who after his repentance did not preserve his own heart, but received that more abundant sorrow supplied to him by the Devil, who sought to swallow him up, as it follows, And he went out, and hanged himself. But had he desired and looked for place and time for repentance, he would perhaps have found Him who has said, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked. (Ezek. 33:11.) Or, perhaps, he desired to die before his Master on His way to death, and to meet Him with a disembodied spirit, that by confession and deprecation he might obtain mercy; and did not see that it is not fitting that a servant of God should dismiss himself from life, but should wait God’s sentence.

RABANUS. He hung himself, to shew that he was hateful to both heaven and earth.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Hil. Quæst. V. et N. Test. q. 94.) Since the Chief Priests were employed about the murder of the Lord from the morning to the ninth hour, how is this proved that before the crucifixion Judas returned them the money he had received, and said to them in the temple, I have sinned, in that I have betrayed innocent blood? Whereas it is manifest that the Chief Priests and Elders were never in the temple before the Lord’s crucifixion, seeing that when He was hanging on the Cross they were there to insult Him. Nor indeed can this be proved hence, because it is related before the Lord’s Passion, for many things which were manifestly done before, are related after, that, and the reverse. It might have been done after the ninth hour, when Judas, seeing the Saviour dead and the veil of the temple rent, the earthquake, the bursting of the rocks, and the elements terrified, was seized with fear and sorrow thereupon. But after the ninth hour the Chief Priests and Elders were occupied, as I suppose, in the celebration of the Passover; and on the Sabbath, the Law would not have allowed him to bring money. Therefore it is to me as yet unproved on what day or at what time Judas ended his life by hanging.

6. And the Chief Priests took the silver pieces, and said, It is not lawful for to put them into the treasury, because it is the price of blood.

7. And they took counsel, and bought with them the potter’s field, to bury strangers in.

8. Wherefore that field was called, The field of blood, unto this day.

9. Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the prophet, saying, And they took the thirty pieces of silver, the price of him that was valued, whom they of the children of Israel did value;

10. And gave them for the potter’s field, as the Lord appointed me.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Chief Priests knowing that they had purchased a murder were condemned by their own conscience; they said, It is the price of blood.

JEROME. Truly straining out the gnat, and swallowing the camel; for if they would not put the money into the treasury, because it was the price of blood, why did they shed the blood at all?

ORIGEN. They thought it meet to spend upon the dead that money which was the price of blood. But as there are differences even in burial places, they used the price of Jesus’ blood in the purchase of some potter’s field, where foreigners might be buried, not as they desired in the sepulchres of their fathers.

AUGUSTINE. (App. Serm. 80. 1.) It was brought about, I conceive, by God’s providence, that the Saviour’s price should not minister means of excess to sinners, but repose to foreigners, that thence Christ might both redeem the living by the shedding of His blood, and harbour the dead by the price of His passion. Therefore with the price of the Lord’s blood the potter’s field is purchased. We read in Scripture that the salvation of the whole human race has been purchased by the Saviour’s blood. This field then is the whole world. The potter who is the Lord of the soil, is He who has formed of clay the vessels of our bodies. This potter’s field then was purchased by Christ’s blood, and to strangers who without country or home wander over the whole world, repose is provided by Christ’s blood. These foreigners are the more devout Christians, who have renounced the world, and have no possession in it, and so repose in Christ’s blood; for the burial of Christ is nothing but the repose of a Christian; for as the Apostle says, We are buried with him by baptism into death. (Rom. 6:4.) We are in this life then as foreigners.

JEROME. Also we, who were strangers to the Law and the Prophets, have profited by the perverse temper of the Jews to obtain salvation for ourselves.

ORIGEN. Or, the foreigners are they who to the end are aliens from God, for the righteous are buried with Christ in a new tomb hewn out in the rock. But they who are aliens from God, even to the end, are buried in the field of a potter, a worker in clay, which being bought by the price of blood, is called the field of blood.

GLOSS. (non occ.) To this day means to the time when the Evangelist was then writing. He then confirms the event by the testimony of the Prophet; Then was fulfilled that which was spoken by Jeremy the Prophet, &c.

JEROME. This is not found at all in Hieremias; but in Zacharias (Zech. 11:13.), who is the last but one of the twelve Prophets, something like it is told, and though the sense is not very different, yet the arrangement and the words are different.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 7.) But if any one thinks this lowers the historian’s credit, first let him know that not all the copies of the Gospels have the name Hieremias, but some simply by the Prophet. But I do not like this defence, because the more, and the more ancient, copies have Hieremias, and there could be no reason for adding the name, and thus making an error. But its erasure is well accounted for by the hardihood of ignorance having heard the foregoing objection urged. It might be then, that the name Hieremias occurred to the mind of Matthew as he wrote, instead of the name Zacharias, as so often happens; and that he would have straightway corrected it, when pointed out to him by such as read this while he yet lived in the flesh, had he not thought that his memory, being guided by the Holy Spirit, would not thus have called up to him one name instead of another, had not the Lord determined that it should thus be written. And why He should have so determined, the first reason is, that it would convey the wonderful consent of the Prophets, who all spake by one Spirit, which is much greater than if all the words of all the Prophets had been uttered through the mouth of one man; so that we receive without doubt whatever the Holy Spirit spake through them, each word belongs to all in common, and the whole is the utterance of each. Suppose it to happen at this day, that in repeating another's words one should mention not the speaker's name, but that of some other person, who however was the other's greater friend, and then immediately recollecting himself should correct himself, he might yet add, Yet am I right, if you only think of the close unanimity that exists between the two. How much more is this to be observed of the holy Prophets! There is a second reason why the name Hieremias should be suffered to remain in this quotation from Zacharias, or rather why it should have been suggested by the Holy Spirit. (Jer. 32:9.) It is said in Hieremias, that he bought a field of his brother's son, and gave him silver for it, though not indeed the sum stated in Zacharias, thirty pieces of silver. That the Evangelist has here adapted the thirty pieces of silver in Zacharias to this transaction in the Lord's history, is plain; but he may also wish to convey that what Hieremias speaks of the field is mystically alluded to here, and therefore he puts not the name of Zacharias who spoke of the thirty pieces of silver, but of Hieremias who spoke of the purchase of the field. So that in reading the Gospel and finding the name of Hieremias, but not finding there the passage respecting the thirty pieces of silver, but the account of the purchase of the field, the reader might be induced to compare the two together, and so extract from them the sense of the prophecy, how far it refers to what was now accomplished in the Lord. For what Matthew adds to the prophecy, Whom they of the children of Israel did value, and gave them for the potter's field, as the Lord appointed me, this, as the Lord appointed me, is found neither in Zacharias nor Hieremias. It must then be taken in the person of the Evangelist as inserted with a mystic meaning, that he had learned by revelation that the prophecy referred to this matter of the price for which Christ was betrayed.

JEROME. (ad Pam. Ep. lvii. 7.) Far be it then from a follower of Christ to suppose him guilty of falsehood, whereas his business was not to pry into words and syllables, but to lay down the staple of doctrine.

JEROME. (in loc.) I have lately read in a Hebrew book given me by a Hebrew of the Nazarene sect, an apocryphal Hieremias, in which I find the very words here quoted. After all, I am rather inclined to think that the passage was taken by Matthew out of Zacharias, in the usual manner of the Apostles and Evangelists when they quote from the Old Testament, neglecting the words, and attending only to the sense.

27:11–14

11. And Jesus stood before the governor: and the governor asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And Jesus said unto him, Thou sayest.

12. And when he was accused of the Chief Priests and elders, he answered nothing.

13. Then said Pilate unto him, Hearest thou not how many things they witness against thee?

14. And he answered him to never a word; insomuch that the governor marvelled greatly.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 7.) Matthew, having finished his digression concerning the traitor Judas, returns to the course of his narrative, saying, Jesus stood before the governor.

ORIGEN. Mark how He that is ordained by His Father to be the Judge of the whole creation, humbled Himself, and was content to stand before the judge of the land of Judæa, and to be asked by Pilate either in mockery or doubt, Art thou the King of the Jews?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. Ixxxvi.) Pilate asked Christ that which His enemies were continually casting in His teeth, for because they knew that Pilate cared not for matters of their Law, they had recourse to a public charge.

ORIGEN. Or, Pilate spoke this affirmatively, as he afterwards wrote in the inscription, The King of the Jews. By answering to the Chief Priest, Thou hast said, He indirectly reproved his doubts, but now He turns Pilate’s speech into an affirmative, Jesus saith unto him, Thou sayest it.

CHRYSOSTOM. He acknowledges Himself to be a King, but a heavenly one, as it is more expressly said in another Gospel, My kingdom is not of this world, (John 18:36.) so that neither the Jews nor Pilate were excusable for insisting on this accusation.

HILARY. Or, when asked by the High Priest whether He were Jesus the Christ, He answered, Thou hast said, because He had ever maintained out of the Law that Christ should come, but to Pilate who was ignorant of the Law, and asks if He were the King of the Jews, He answers, Thou sayest, because the salvation of the Gentiles is through faith of that present confession.

JEROME. But observe, that to Pilate who asked the question unwillingly He did answer somewhat; but to the Chief Priests and Priests He refused to answer, judging them unworthy of a word; And when he was accused by the Chief Priests and Elders, he answered nothing.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 8.) Luke explains what were the accusations alleged against Him, And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that he himself is Christ a King. (Luke 23:2.) But it is of no consequence to the truth in what order they relate the history, or that one omits what another inserts.

ORIGEN. Neither then nor now did Jesus make any reply to their accusations, for the word of God was not sent to them, as it was formerly to the Prophets. Neither was Pilate worthy of an answer, as he had no fixed or abiding opinion of Christ, but veered about to contradictory suppositions. Hearest thou not how many things they witness against thee?

JEROME. Thus though it is a Gentile who sentences Jesus, he lays the cause of His condemnation upon the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. He said this out of a wish to release Him, if He should justify Himself in His answer. But the Jews, though they had so many practical proofs of His power, His meekness and humbleness, were yet enraged against Him, and urged on by a perverted judgment. Wherefore He answers nothing, or if He makes any answer He says little, that total silence might not be construed into obstinacy.

JEROME. Or, Jesus would not make any answer, lest if He cleared Himself the governor should have let Him go, and the benefit of His cross should have been deferred.

ORIGEN. The governor marvelled at His endurance, as knowing that he had power to condemn Him, He yet continued in a peaceful, placid, and immovable prudence and gravity. He marvelled greatly, for it seemed to him a great miracle that Christ, produced before a criminal tribunal, stood thus fearless of death, which all men think so terrible.

27:15–26

15. Now at that feast the governor was wont to release unto the people a prisoner, whom they would.

16. And they had then a notable prisoner, called Barabbas.

17. Therefore when they were gathered together, Pilate said unto them, Whom will ye that I release unto you? Barabbas, or Jesus which is called Christ?

18. For he knew that for envy they had delivered him.

19. When he was set down on the judgment seat, his wife sent unto him, saying, Have thou nothing to do with that just man: for I have suffered many things this day in a dream because of him.

20. But the Chief Priests and elders persuaded the multitude that they should ask Barabbas, and destroy Jesus.

21. The governor answered and said unto them, Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you? They said, Barabbas.

22. Pilate saith unto them, What shall I do then with Jesus which is called Christ? They all say unto him, Let him be crucified.

23. And the governor said, Why, what evil hath he done? But they cried out the more, saying, Let him be crucified.

24. When Pilate saw that he could prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made, he took water, and washed his hands before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the blood of this just person; see ye to it.

25. Then answered all the people, and said, His blood be on us, and on our children.

26. Then released he Barabbas unto them: and when he had scourged Jesus, he delivered him to be crucified.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because Christ had answered nothing to the accusations of the Jews, by which Pilate could acquit Him of what was alleged against Him, he contrives other means of saving Him. Now on the feast day the governor we as wont to release unto the people a prisoner whom they would.

ORIGEN. Thus do the Gentiles shew favours to those whom they subject to themselves, until their yoke is riveted. Yet did this practice obtain also among the Jews, Saul did not put Jonathan to death, because all the people sought his life. (1 Sam. 14.)

CHRYSOSTOM. And he sought to rescue Christ by means of this practice, that the Jews might not have the shadow of an excuse left them. A convicted murderer is put in comparison with Christ, Barabbas, whom he calls not merely a robber, but a notable one, that is, renowned for crime.

JEROME. In the Gospel entitled ‘according to the Hebrews,’ Barabbas is interpreted, ‘The son of their master,’ who had been condemned for sedition and murder. Pilate gives them the choice between Jesus and the robber, not doubting but that Jesus would be the rather chosen.

CHRYSOSTOM. Whom will ye that I release unto you? &c. As much as to say, If ye will not let him go as innocent, at least, yield Him, as convicted, to this holy day. For if you would have released one of whose guilt there was no doubt, much more should you do so in doubtful cases. Observe how circumstances are reversed. It is the populace who are wont to petition for the condemned, and the prince to grant, but here it is the reverse, the prince asks of the people, and renders them thereby more violent.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist adds the reason why Pilate sought to deliver Christ, For he knew that for envy they had delivered him.

REMIGIUS. John explains what their envy was, when he says, Behold, the world is gone after him; (John 12:19.) and, If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him. (John 11:48.) Observe also that in place of what Matthew says, Jesus, who is called Christ, Mark says, Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews? (Mark 15:9.) For the kings of the Jews alone were anointed, and from that anointing were called Christs.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then is added something else which alone was enough to deter all from putting Him to death; When we he as set on the judgment seat, his wife sent unto him, saying, Have thou nothing to do with that just man. For joined with the proof afforded by the events themselves, a dream was no light confirmation.

RABANUS. It is to be noted, that the bench (tribunal) is the seat of the judge, the throne (solium) of the king, the chair (cathedra) of the master. In visions and dreams the wife of a Gentile understood what the Jews when awake would neither believe nor understand.

JEROME. Observe also that visions are often vouchsafed by God to the Gentiles, and that the confession of Pilate and his wife that the Lord was innocent is a testimony of the Gentile people.

CHRYSOSTOM. But why did Pilate himself not see this vision? Because his wife was more worthy; or because if Pilate had seen it, he would not have had equal credit, or perhaps would not have told it; wherefore it is provided by God that his wife should see it, and thus it be made manifest to all. And she not merely sees it, but suffers many things because of him, so that sympathy with his wife would make the husband more slack to put Him to death. And the time agreed well, for it was the same night that she saw it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii. in Cæn. Dom.) Thus then the judge is terrified through his wife, and that he might not consent in the judgment to the accusation of the Jews, himself endured judgment in the affliction of his wife; the judge is judged, and tortured before he tortures.

RABANUS. Or otherwise; The devil now at last understanding that he should lose his trophies through Christ, as he had at the first brought in death by a woman, so by a woman he would deliver Christ out of the hands of His enemies, lest through His death he should lose the sovereignty of death.

CHRYSOSTOM. But none of the foregoing things moved Christ's enemies, because envy had altogether blinded them, and of their own wickedness they corrupt the people, for they persuaded the people that they should ask Barabbas, and destroy Jesus.

ORIGEN. Thus it is plainly seen how the Jewish people is moved by its elders and the doctors of the Jewish system, and stirred up against Jesus to destroy Him.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Pilate is said to make this answer, Whether of the twain will ye that I release unto you? either to the message of his wife, or the petition of the people, with whom it was a custom to ask such release on the feast-day.

ORIGEN. But the populace, like wild beasts that rage the open plains, would have Barabbas released to them. For this people had seditions, murders, robberies, practised by some of their own nation in act, and nourished by all of them who believe not in Jesus, inwardly in their mind. Where Jesus is not, there are strifes and fightings; where He is, there is peace and all good things. All those who are like the Jews either in doctrine or life desire Barabbas to be loosed to them; for whoso does evil, Barabbas is loosed in his body, and Jesus bound; but he that does good has Christ loosed, and Barabbas bound. Pilate sought to strike them with shame for so great injustice, What shall I do then with Jesus that is called Christ? And not that only, but desiring to fill up the measure of their guilt. But neither do they blush that Pilate confessed Jesus to be the Christ, nor set any bounds to their impiety, They all say unto him, Let him be crucified. Thus they multiplied the sum of their wickedness, not only asking the life of a murderer, but the death of a righteous man, and that the shameful death of the cross.

RABANUS. Those who were crucified being suspended on a cross, by nails driven into the wood through their hands and feet, perished by a lingering death, and lived long on the cross, not that they sought longer life, but that death was deferred to prolong their sufferings. The Jews indeed contrived this as the worst of deaths, but it had been chosen by the Lord without their privity, thereafter to place upon the foreheads of the faithful the same cross as a trophy of His victory over the Devil.

JEROME. Yet even after this answer of theirs, Pilate did not at once assent, but in accordance with his wife's suggestion, Have thou nothing to do with that just man, he answered, Why, what evil hath he done? This speech of Pilate's acquits Jesus. But they cried out the more, saying, Let him be crucified; that it might be fulfilled which is said in the Psalm, Many dogs have compassed me, the congregation of the wicked hath inclosed me; (Ps. 22:16.) and also that of Hieremias, Mine heritage is unto me as a lion in the forest, they have given forth their voice against me. (Jer. 12:8.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 8.) Pilate many times pleaded with the Jews, desiring that Jesus might be released, which Matthew witnesses in very few words, when he says, Pilate seeing that he could prevail nothing, but that rather a tumult was made. He would not have spoken thus, if Pilate had not striven much, though how many efforts he made to release Jesus he does not mention.

REMIGIUS. It was customary among the ancients, when one would refuse to participate in any crime, to take water and wash his hands before the people.

JEROME. Pilate took water in accordance with that, I will wash my hands in innocency, (Ps. 26:6.) in a manner testifying and saying, I indeed have sought to deliver this innocent man, but since a tumult is rising, and the charge of treason to Cæsar is urged against me, I am innocent of the blood of this just man. The judge then who is thus compelled to give sentence against the Lord, does not convict the accused, but the accusers, pronouncing innocent Him who is to be crucified. See ye to it, as though he had said, I am the law's minister, it is your voice that has shed this blood. Then answered all the people and said, His blood be on us and on our children. This imprecation rests at the present day upon the Jews, the Lord’s blood is not removed from them.

CHRYSOSTOM. Observe here the infatuation of the Jews; their headlong haste, and destructive passions will not let them see what they ought to see, and they curse themselves, saying, His blood be upon us, and even entail the curse upon their children. Yet a merciful God did not ratify this sentence, but accepted such of them and of their children as repented; for Paul was of them, and many thousands of those who in Jerusalem believed.

LEO. (Serm. lix. 2.) The impiety of the Jews then exceeded the fault of Pilate; but he was not guiltless, seeing he resigned his own jurisdiction, and acquiesced in the injustice of others.

JEROME. It should be known that Pilate administered the Roman law, which enacted that every one who was crucified should first be scourged. Jesus then is given up to the soldiers to be beaten, and they tore with whips that most holy body and capacious bosom of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii. in Cæna Dom.) See the Lord is made ready for the scourge, see now it descends upon Him! That sacred skin is torn by the fury of the rods; the cruel might of repeated blows lacerates His shoulders. Ah me! God is stretched out before man, and He, in whom not one trace of sin can be discerned, suffers punishment as a malefactor.

JEROME. This was done that we might be delivered from those stripes of which it is said, Many stripes shall be to the wicked. (Ps. 32:10.) Also in the washing of Pilate’s hands all the works of the Gentiles are cleansed, and we are acquitted of all share in the impiety of the Jews.

HILARY. At the desire of the Priests the populace chose Barabbas, which is interpreted ‘the son of a Father,’ thus shadowing forth the unbelief to come when Antichrist the son of sin should be preferred to Christ.

RABANUS. Barabbas also, who headed a sedition among the people, is released to the Jews, that is the Devil, who to this day reigns among them, so that they cannot have peace.

27:27–30

27. Then the soldiers of the governor took Jesus into the common hall, and gathered unto him the whole band of soldiers.

28. And they stripped him, and put on him a scarlet robe.

29. And when they had platted a crown of thorns, they put it upon his head, and a reed in his right hand: and they bowed the knee before him, and mocked him, saying, Hail, king of the Jews!

30. And they spit upon him, and took the reed, and smote him on the head.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 9.) After the lord’s trial comes His Passion, which Matthew thus begins, Then the soldiers of the governor took Jesus into the common hall, &c.

JEROME. He had been styled King of the Jews, and the Scribes and Priests had brought this charge against Him, that He claimed sovereignty over the Jewish nation; hence this mockery of the soldiers, taking away His own garments, they put on Him a scarlet cloak to represent that purple fringe which kings of old used to wear, for the diadem they put on Him a crown of thorns, and for the regal sceptre give Him a reed, and perform adoration to Him as to a king.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Hence we understand what Mark means by clothed him with purple; (Mark 15:17.) instead of the royal purple, this scarlet cloak was used in mockery; and there is a shade of purple which is very like scarlet. Or it may be, that Mark spoke of the purple which the cloak contained, though its colour was scarlet.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii.) What should we henceforth care if any one insults us, after Christ has thus suffered? The utmost that cruel outrage could do was put in practice against Christ; and not one member only, but His whole body suffered injuries; His head from the crown, the reed, and the buffetings; His face which was spit upon; His cheeks which they smote with the palms of their hands; His whole body from the scourging, the stripping to put on the cloak, and the mockery of homage; His hands from the reed which they put into them in mimicry of a sceptre; as though they were afraid of omitting aught of indignity.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But Matthew seems to introduce this here as recollected from above, not that it was done at the time Pilate gave Him up for crucifixion. For John puts it before. He is given up by Pilate.

JEROME. All these things we may understand mystically. For as Caiaphas said that it is expedient that one man should die for the people, (John 11:50.) not knowing what he said, so these, in all they did, furnished sacraments to us who believe, though they did them with other intention. In the scarlet robe He bears the bloody works of the Gentiles; by the crown of thorns He takes away the ancient curse; with the reed He destroys poisonous animals; or He held the reed in His hand wherewith to write down the sacrilege of the Jews.

HILARY. Or otherwise; The Lord having taken upon Him all the infirmities of our body, is then covered with the scarlet coloured blood of all the martyrs, to whom is due the kingdom with Him; He is crowned with thorns, that is, with the sins of the Gentiles who once pierced Him, for there is a prick in thorns of which is woven the crown of victory for Christ. In the reed, He takes into His hand and supports the weakness and frailty of the Gentiles; and His head is smitten therewith that the weakness of the Gentiles sustained by Christ's hand may rest on God the Father, who is His head.

ORIGEN. Or, The reed was a mystery signifying that before we believed we trusted in that reed of Egypt, or Babylon, or of some other kingdom opposed to God, which He took that He might triumph over it with the wood of the cross. With this reed they smite the head of Christ, because this kingdom ever beats against God the Father, who is the head of the Saviour.

REMIGIUS. Or otherwise, By the scarlet robe is denoted the Lord's flesh, which is spoken of as red by reason of shedding of His blood; by the crown of thorns His taking upon Him our sins, because He appeared in the likeness of sinful flesh. (Rom. 8:3.)

RABANUS. They smite the head of Christ with a reed, who speak against His divinity, and endeavour to maintain their error by the authority of Holy Scripture, which is written by a reed. They spit upon His face who reject in abominable words the presence of His grace, and deny that Jesus is come in the flesh. And they mock Him with adoration who believe on Him, but despise Him with perverse works.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. ii. in fin.) That they took from off the Lord in His passion His own garment, and put on Him a coloured robe, denotes those heretics who said that He had a shadowy, and not a real body.

27:31–34

31. And after that they had mocked him, they took the robe off from him, and put his own raiment on him, and led him away to crucify him.

32. And as they came out, they found a man of Cyrene, Simon by name: him they compelled to bear his cross.

33. And when they were come unto a place called Golgotha, that is to say, a place of a skull,

34. They gave him vinegar to drink mingled with gall: and when he had tasted thereof, he would not drink.

GLOSS. (non occ. Aug. de Cons. Ev. iii. 9.) After the Evangelist had narrated what concerned the mocking of Christ, he proceeds to His crucifixion.

AUGUSTINE. This is to be understood to have been done at the end of all, when He was led off to crucifixion after Pilate had delivered Him up to the Jews.

JEROME. It is to be noted, that when Jesus is scourged and spit upon, He has not on His own garments, but those which He took for our sins; but when He is crucified, and the show of His mockery is completed, then He takes again His former garments, and His own dress, and immediately the elements are shaken, and the creature gives testimony to the Creator.

ORIGEN. Of the cloak it is mentioned that they took it off Him, but of the crown of thorns the Evangelists have not spoken, so that there are now no longer those ancient thorns of ours, since Jesus has taken them from us upon His revered head.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Cruc. et Lat. ii.) The Lord would not suffer under a roof, or in the Jewish Temple, that you should not suppose that He was offered for that people alone; but without the city, without the walls, that you might know that the sacrifice was common, that it was the offering of the whole earth, that the purification was general.

JEROME. Let none think that John’s narrative contradicts this place of the Evangelist. John says that the Lord went forth from the prætorium bearing His cross; Matthew tells, that they found a man of Cyrene upon whom they laid Jesus’ cross. We must suppose that as Jesus went out of the prætorium, He was bearing His cross, and that afterwards they met Simon, whom they compelled to bear it.

ORIGEN. Or, as they went out, they laid hold of Simon, but when they drew near to the place in which they would crucify Him, they laid the cross upon Him that He might bear it. Simon obtained not this office by chance, but was brought to the spot by God’s providence, that he might be found worthy of mention in the Scriptures of the Gospel, and of the ministry of the cross of Christ. And it was not only meet that the Saviour should carry His cross, but meet also that we should take part therein, filling a carriage so beneficial to us, ἀγγαρεία. Yet would it not have so profited us to take it on us, as we have profited by His taking it upon Himself.

JEROME. Figuratively, the nations take up the cross, and the foreigner by obedience bears the ignominy of the Saviour.

HILARY. For a Jew was not worthy to bear Christ’s cross, but it was reserved for the faith of the Gentiles both to take the cross, and to suffer with Him.

REMIGIUS. For this Simon was not a man of Jerusalem, but a foreigner, and denizen, being a Cyrenean; Cyrene is a town of Lybia. Simon is interpreted ‘obedient,’ and a Cyrenean ‘an heir;’ whence he well denotes the people of the Gentiles, which was strange to the testaments of God, but by believing became a fellow-citizen of the saints, of the household, and an heir of God.

GREGORY. (Hom. in. Ev. xxxii. 3.) Or otherwise; By Simon who bears the burden of the Lord’s cross are denoted those who are abstinent and proud; these by their abstinence afflict their flesh, but seek not within the fruit of abstinence. Thus Simon bears the cross, but does not die thereon, as these afflict the body, but in desire of vain-glory live to the world.

RABANUS. Golgotha is a Syriac word, and is interpreted Calvary.

JEROME. I have heard Calvary expoundedb as the spot in which Adam was buried, as though it had been so called from the head of the old man being buried there. A plausible interpretation, and agreeable to the ears of the people, yet not a true one. Without the city outside the gate are the places where criminals are executed, and these have got the name of Calvary, that is, of the beheaded. And Jesus was crucified there, that where the plot of criminals had been, there might be set up the flag of martyrdom. But Adam was buried near Ebron and Arbee, as we read in the volume of Jesus the son of Navec.

HILARY. Such is the place of the cross, set up in the centre of the earth, that it might be equally free to all nations to attain the knowledge of God.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 11.) And they gave him to drink wine mingled with gall. Mark says, mingled with myrrh. Matthew put gall (Mark 15:23.) to express bitterness, but wine mingled with myrrh is very bitter; though indeed it might be, that gall together with myrrh would make the most bitter.

JEROME. The bitter vine makes bitter wine; this they gave the Lord Jesus to drink, that that might be fulfilled which was written, They gave me also gall for my meat. (Ps. 69:21.) And God addresses Jerusalem, I had planted there a true vine, how art thou turned into the bitterness of a strange vine? (Jer. 2:21.)

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) And when he had tasted thereof, he would not drink. That Mark says, But he received it not, we understand to mean that He would not receive it to drink thereof. For that He tasted it Matthew bears witness; so that Matthew's, He could not drink thereof, means exactly the same as Mark's, He received it not; only Mark does not mention His tasting it.

That He tasted but would not drink of it, signifies that He tasted the bitterness of death for us, but rose again the third day.

HILARY. Or, He therefore refused the wine mingled with gall, because the bitterness of sin is not mingled with the incorruption of eternal glory.

27:35–38

35. And they crucified him, and parted his garments, casting lots: that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet, They parted my garments among them, and upon my vesture did they cast lots.

36. And sitting down they watched him there;

37. And set up over his head his accusation written, THIS IS JESUS THE KING OF THE JEWS.

38. Then were there two thieves crucified with him, one on the right hand, and another on the left.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having described how Christ was led to the scene of His Passion, the Evangelist proceeds to the Passion itself, describing the kind of death; And they crucified him.

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. 83. Quæst. q. 25.) The Wisdom of God took upon Him man, to give us an example how we might live rightly. It pertains to right life not to fear things that are not to be feared. But some men who do not fear death in itself, yet dread some kinds of death. That no sort of death is to be feared by the man who lives aright, was to be shewn by this Man’s cross. For of all the modes of death none was more horrible and fearful than this.

AUGUSTINE. (in Serm. non occ.) Let your holiness consider of what might is the power of the cross. Adam set at nought the commandment, taking the apple from the tree; but all that Adam lost, Christ found upon the cross. The ark of wood saved the human race from the deluge of waters; when God’s people came out of Egypt, Moses divided the sea with his rod, overwhelmed Pharaoh, and redeemed God’s people. The same Moses changed the bitter water into sweet by casting wood into it. By the rod the refreshing stream was drawn out of the rock; that Amalech might be overcome, Moses’ outstretched hands were supported upon his rod; the Law of God is entrusted to the wooden ark of the covenant, that thus, by these steps we may come at last to the wood of the cross.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Cruc. et Lat. ii.) He suffered on a lofty cross, and not under a roof, to the end that the nature of the air might be purified; the earth also partook a like benefit, being cleansed by the blood that dropped from His side.

GLOSS. (ap. Anselm.) The shape of the cross seems also to signify the Church spread through the four quarters of the earth.

RABANUS. Or, according to the practical exposition, the cross in respect of its broad transverse piece signifies the joy of him that works, for sorrow produces straitness; for the broad part of the cross is in the transverse beam to which the hands are fastened, and by the hands we understand works. By the upper part to which the head is fastened is denoted our looking for retribution from the supreme righteousness of God. The perpendicular part on which the body is stretched denotes endurance, whence the patient are called ‘long-suffering.’ (longamines) The point that is fixed into the ground shadows forth the invisible part of a sacrament.

HILARY. Thus on the tree of life the salvation and life of all is suspended.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 12.) Matthew shortly says, They parted his garments, casting lots; but John explains more fully how it was done. The soldiers, when they had crucified him, look his garments, and made four parts, to every soldier a part; and also his coat; now the coat was without seam. (John 19:23.)

CHRYSOSTOM. It is to be noted, that this is no small degradation of Christ. For they did this as to one utterly abject and worthless, yet for the thieves they did not the same. For they share the garments only in the case of condemned persons so mean and poor as to possess nothing more.

JEROME. This which was now done to Christ had been prophesied in the Psalm, They parted my garments among them, and cast lots upon my vesture. (Ps. 22:18.) It proceeds, And sitting down, they watched him there. This watchfulness of the soldiers and of the Priests has proved of use to us in making the power of His resurrection greater and more notorious. And they set up over his head his accusation written, This is Jesus, the King of the Jews. I cannot sufficiently wonder at the enormity of the thing, that having purchased false witnesses, and having stirred up the unhappy people to riot and uproar, they found no other plea for putting Him to death, than that He was King of the Jews; and this perhaps they set up in mockery.

REMIGIUS. It was divinely provided that this title should be set up over His head, that the Jews might learn that not even by putting Him to death could they avoid having Him for their King; for in the very instrument of His death He not only did not lose, but rather confirmed His sovereignty.

ORIGEN. The High Priest also in obedience to the letter of the Law wore on his head the writing, ‘Holiness to the Lord,’ but the true High Priest and King, Jesus, bears on His cross the title, This is the King of the Jews; when ascending to His Father, instead of His own name with its proper letters, He has the Father Himself.

RABANUS. For because He is at once King and Priest, when He would offer the sacrifice of His flesh on the altar of the cross, His title set forth His regal dignity. And it is set over and not beneath the cross, because though He suffered for us on the cross with the weakness of man, the majesty of the King was conspicuous above the cross; and this He did not lose, but rather confirmed, by the cross.

JEROME. (non occ.) As Christ was made for us a curse of the cross, so for the salvation of all He is crucified as guilty among the guilty.

LEO. (Serm. 55, 1.) Two thieves were crucified with him, one on the right hand and one on the left, that in the figure of His cross might be represented that separation of all mankind which shall be made in His judgment. The Passion then of Christ contains a sacrament of our salvation, and of that instrument which the wickedness of the Jews provided for His punishment, the power of the Redeemer made a step to glory.

HILARY. Or otherwise; Two thieves are set up on His right and left hand, to signify that the entire human race is called to the Sacrament of the Lord's Passion; but because there shall be a division of believers to the right, and unbelievers to the left, one of the two who is set on His right hand is saved by the justification of faith.

REMIGIUS. (ap. Gloss. ord.) Or, by the two thieves are denoted all those who strive after the continence of a strict life. They who do this with a single intention of pleasing God, are denoted by him who was crucified on the right hand; they who do it out of desire of human praise or any less worthy motive, are signified by him who was crucified on the left.

27:39–44

39. And they that passed by reviled him, wagging their heads,

40. And saying, Thou that destroyest the temple, and buildest it in three days, save thyself. If thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross.

41. Likewise also the Chief Priests mocking him, with the Scribes and elders, said,

42. He saved others; himself he cannot save. If he be the King of Israel, let him now come down from the cross, and we will believe him.

43. He trusted in God; let him deliver him now, if he will have him: for he said, I am the Son of God.

44. The thieves also, which were crucified with him, cast the same in his teeth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having stripped and crucified Christ, they go yet further, and seeing Him on the cross revile Him.

JEROME. They revile him because they passed by that way, and would not walk in the true way of the Scriptures. They wagged their heads, because they had just before shifted their feet, and stood not upon a rock. The foolish rabble cast the same taunt against Him that the false witnesses had invented, Aha! thou that destroyest the temple of God and rebuildest it in three days.

REMIGIUS. Aha! is an interjection of taunt and mockery.

HILARY. What forgiveness then for them, when by the resurrection of His body they shall see the temple of God rebuilt within three days?

CHRYSOSTOM. And as beginning to extenuate His former miracles, they add, Save thyself; if thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Cruc. et Latr. ii.) But He, on the contrary, does not come down from the cross, because He is the Son of God; for He therefore came that He might be crucified for us.

JEROME. Even the Scribes and Pharisees reluctantly confess that He saved others. Your own judgment then condemns you, for in that He saved others, He could if He would have saved Himself.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM.d But attend to this speech of these children of the Devil, how they imitate their father's speech. The Devil said, If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down; (Matt. 4:6.) and they say now, If thou be the Son of God, come down from the cross.

LEO. (Serm. 55. 2.) From what source of error, O Jews, have ye sucked in the poison of such blasphemies? What teacher delivered it to you? What learning moved you to think that the true King of Israel, that the veritable Son of God, would be He who would not suffer Himself to be crucified, and would set free His body from the fastenings of the nails? Not the hidden meaning of the Law, not the mouths of the Prophets. Had ye indeed ever read, I hid not my face from the shame of spitting; (Is. 50:6.) or that again, They pierced my hands and my feet, they told all my bones. (Ps. 22:16.) Where have ye ever read that the Lord came down from the cross? But ye have read, The Lord hath reigned from the tree.e

RABANUS. Had He then been prevailed on by their taunts to leave the cross, He would not have proved to us the power of endurance; but He waited enduring their mockery; and He who would not come down from the cross, rose again from the tomb.

JEROME. But unworthy of credit is that promise, And we will believe him. For which is greater, to come down while yet alive from the cross, or to rise from the tomb when dead? Yet this He did, and ye believed not; therefore neither would ye have believed if He had come down from the cross. It seems to me that this was a suggestion of the dæmons. For immediately when the Lord was crucified they felt the power of the cross, and perceived that their strength was broken, and therefore contrive this to move Him to come down from the cross. But the Lord, aware of the designs of His foes, remains on the cross that He may destroy the Devil.

CHRYSOSTOM. He trusted in God, let him now deliver him, if he will. O most foul! Were they therefore not Prophets or righteous men, because God did not deliver them out of their perils? But if He would not oppose their glory, which accrued to them out of the perils which you brought upon them, much more in this man ought you not to be offended because of what He suffers; what He has ever said ought to remove any such suspicion. When they add, Because he said, I am the Son of God, they desire to intimate that He suffered as an impostor and seducer, and as making high and false pretences. And not only the Jews and the soldiers from below, but from above likewise. The thieves, which were crucified with him, cast the same in his teeth.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 16.) It may seem that Luke contradicts this, when he describes one of the robbers as reviling Him, and as therefore rebuked by the other. But we may suppose that Matthew, shortly alluding to the circumstance, has used the plural for the singular, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews we have, Hare stopped the months of lions, (Heb. 11:33.) when Daniel only is spoken of. And what more common way of speaking than for one to say, See the country people insult me, when it is one only who has done so. If indeed Matthew had said that both the thieves had reviled the Lord, there would be some discrepancy; but when he says merely, The thieves, without adding ‘both,’ we must consider it as that common form of speech in which the singular is signified by the plural.

JEROME. Or it may be said that at first both reviled Him; but when the sun had withdrawn, the earth was shaken, the rocks were rent, and the darkness increased, one believed on Jesus, and repaired his former denial by a subsequent confession.

CHRYSOSTOM. At first both reviled Him, but afterwards not so. For that you should not suppose that the thing was arranged by any collusion, and that the thief was not a thief, he shews you by his wanton reproaches, that even after he was crucified he was a thief and a foe, but was afterwards totally changed.

HILARY. That both the thieves cast in His teeth the manner of His Passion, shews that the cross should be an offence to all mankind, even to the faithful.

JEROME. Or, in the two thieves both nations, Jews and Gentiles, at first blasphemed the Lord; afterwards the latter terrified by the multitude of signs did penitence, and thus rebukes the Jews, who blaspheme to this day.

ORIGEN. The thief who was saved may be a sign of those who after many sins have believed on Christ.

27:45–50

45. Now from the sixth hour there was darkness over all the land unto the ninth hour.

46. And about the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani? that is to say, My God, may God, why hast thou forsaken me?

47. Some of them that stood there, when they heard that, said, This man calleth for Elias.

48. And straightway one of them ran, and took a spunge, and filled it with vinegar, and put it on a reed, and gave him to drink.

49. The rest said, Let be, let us see whether Elias will come to save him.

50. Jesus, when he had cried again with a loud voice, yielded up the ghost.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Pseudo Chrys. in Hom. de Cruce et Latr. ubi sup.) Creation could not bear the outrage offered to the Creator; whence the sun withdrew his beams, that he might not look upon the crime of these impious men.

ORIGEN. Some take occasion from this text to cavil against the truth of the Gospel. For indeed from the beginning eclipses of the sun have happened in their proper seasons; but such an eclipse as would be brought about by the ordinary course of the seasons could only be at such time as the sun and moon come together, when the moon passing beneath intercepts the sun’s rays. But at the time of Christ’s passion it is clear that this was not the case, because it was the paschal feast, which it was customary to celebrate when the moon was full. Some believers, desiring to produce some answer to this objection, have said, that this eclipse in accordance with the other prodigies was an exception to the established laws of nature.

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. (ad Polycarp. Ep. 7.) When we were together at Heliopolis, we both observed such an interference of the moon with the sun quite unexpectedly, for it was not the season of their conjunction; and then from the ninth hour until evening, beyond the power of nature, continuing in a direct line between us and the sun. And this obscuration we saw begin from the east, and so pass to the extreme of the sun's orb, and again return back the same way, being thus the very reverse of an ordinary eclipse.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii.) This darkness lasted three hours, whereas an eclipse is transient, and not enduring, as they know who have studied the matter.

ORIGEN. Against this the children of this world urge, How is it that of the Greeks and Barbarians, who have made observations of these things, not one has recorded so remarkable a phenomenon as this? Phlegon indeed has recorded such an event as happening in the time of Tiberius Caesar, but he has not mentioned that it was at the full moon. I think therefore that, like the other miracles which took place at the Passion, the rending of the veil, and the earthquake, this also was confined to Jerusalem. Or, if any one chooses, it may be extended to the whole of Judæa; as in the book of Kings, Abdias said to Elias, As the Lord thy God liveth, there is no nation or kingdom whither my lord hath not sent to seek thee, (1 Kings 18:10.) meaning that he had been sought in the countries round about Judæa. Accordingly we might suppose many and dense clouds to have been brought together over Jerusalem and Judæa, enough to produce thick darkness from the sixth to the ninth hour. For we understand that there were two creatures created on the sixth day, the beasts before the sixth hour, man on the sixth; and therefore it was fitting that He who died for the salvation of man should be crucified at the sixth hour, and for this cause that darkness should be over the whole earth from the sixth to the ninth hour. And as by Moses stretching out his hands towards heaven darkness was brought upon the Egyptians who held the servants of God in bondage, so likewise when at the sixth hour Christ stretched out his hands on the cross to heaven, darkness came over all the people who had cried out, Crucify him, and they were deprived of all light as a sign of the darkness that should come, and that should envelop the whole people of the Jews. Further, under Moses there was darkness over the land of Egypt three days, but all the children of Israel had light; so under Christ there was darkness over all Judæa for three hours, because for their sins they were deprived of the light of God the Father, the splendour of Christ, and the illumination of the Holy Spirit. But over the rest of the earth there is light, which every where illumines the Church of God in Christ. And if to the ninth hour there was darkness over Judæa, it is manifest that light returned to them again after that; so, when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have entered in, then all Israel shall be saved. (Rom. 11:25.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Or otherwise; The wonder was in this, that the darkness was over the whole earth, which had never come to pass before, save only in Egypt what time the Passover was celebrated; for the things done then were a type of these. And consider the time when this is done; at mid-day, while over the whole world it was day, that all the dwellers on the earth might perceive it. This is the sign He promised to them that asked Him, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh a sign, and there shall no sign be given it save the sign of Jonas the Prophet, (Matt. 12:39.) alluding to His cross and resurrection. And it was a much greater marvel that this should come to pass when He was fastened to the cross, than when He was walking at large on the earth. Surely here was enough to convert them, not by the greatness of the miracle alone, but because it was done not till after all these instances of their frenzy, when their passion was past, when they had uttered all that they would, and were satiated with taunts and gibes. But how did they not all marvel and conclude Him to be God? Because the human race was at that time plunged in exceeding sluggishness and vice, and this wonder was but one, and quickly past away, and none cared to search out its cause, or perhaps they attributed it to eclipse, or some other physical consequence. And on this account He shortly afterwards lifts up His voice to shew that He yet lives, and Himself wrought this miracle; And about the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, &c.

JEROME. He employed the beginning of the twenty-first Psalm. (Ps. 22:1. Vulg.) That clause in the middle of the verse, Look upon me, is superfluous; for the Hebrew has only ‘Eli, Eli, lama sabachthani,’ that is, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? It is impiety therefore to think that this Psalm was spoken in the character of David or Esther or Mardocheus, when passages taken out of it by the Evangelist are understood of the Saviour; as, They parted my garments among them, and, They pierced my hands.

CHRYSOSTOM. He uttered this word of prophecy, that He might bear witness to the very last hour to the Old Testament, and that they might see that He honours the Father, and is not against God. And therefore too, He used the Hebrew tongue, that what He said might be intelligible to them.

ORIGEN. But it must be asked, What means this, that Christ is forsaken of God? Some, unable to explain how Christ could be forsaken of God, say that this was spoken out of humility. But you will be able clearly to comprehend His meaning if you make a comparison of the glory which He had with the Father with the shame which He despised when He endured the cross.

HILARY. (de Trin. x. 50 &c.) From these words heretical spirits contend either that God the Word was entirely absorbed into the soul at the time it discharged the function of a soul in quickening the body; or that Christ could not have been born man, because the Divine Word dwelt in Him after the manner of a prophetical spirit. As though Jesus Christ was a man of ordinary soul and body, having His beginning then when He began to be man, and thus now deserted upon the withdrawal of the protection of God’s word cries out, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? Or at least that the nature of the Word being transmuted into soul, Christ, who had depended in all things upon His Father’s support, now deserted and left to death, mourns over this desertion, and pleads with Him departing. But amidst these impious and feeble opinions, the faith of the Church imbued with Apostolic teaching does not sever Christ that He should be considered as Son of God and not as Son of Man. The complaint of His being deserted is the weakness of the dying man; the promise of Paradise is the kingdom of the living God. You have Him complaining that He is left to death, and thus He is Man; you have Him as He is dying declaring that He reigns in Paradise; and thus He is God. Wonder not then at the humility of these words, when you know the form of a servant, and see the offence of the cross.

GLOSS. (non occ.) God is said to have forsaken Him in death because He exposed Him to the power of His persecutors; He withdrew His protection, but did not break the union.

ORIGEN. When He saw darkness over the whole land of Judæa He said this, Father, why hast thou forsaken me? meaning, Why hast thou given Me over exhausted to such sufferings? that the people who were honoured by Thee may receive the things that they have dared against Me, and should be deprived of the light of Thy countenance. Also, Thou hast forsaken Me for the salvation of the Gentiles. But what good have they of the Gentiles who have believed done, that I should deliver them from the evil one by shedding My precious blood on the ground for them? Or will they, for whom I suffer these things, ever do aught worthy of them? Or foreseeing the sins of those for whom He suffered, He said, Why hast thou forsaken me? that I should become as one that, gathereth stubble in the harvest, and gleanings in the vintage. (Mic. 7:1.) But you must not imagine that the Saviour said this after the manner of men by reason of the misery which encompassed Him on the cross; for if you take it so you will not hear His loud voice and mighty words which point to something great hidden.

RABANUS. Or, The Saviour said this as bearing about with Him our feelings, who when placed in dangers think ourselves forsaken by God. Human nature was forsaken by God because of its sins, and the Son of God becoming our Advocate laments the misery of those whose guilt He took upon Himf; there in shewing how they who sin ought to mourn, when He who never sinned did thus mourn.

JEROME. It follows, Some of them that stood by, &c.; some, not all; whom I suppose to have been Roman soldiers, ignorant of Hebrew, but from the words Eli, Eli, thought that He called upon Elias. But if we prefer to suppose them Jews, they do it after their usual manner, that they may accuse the Lord of weakness in thus invoking Elias.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. vi. in Pass. [vol. iii. p. 733.]) Thus the Source of living water is made to drink vinegar, the Giver of honey is fed with gall; Forgiveness is scourged, Acquittance is condemned, Majesty is mocked, Virtue ridiculed, the Bestower of showers is repaid with spitting.

HILARY. Vinegar is wine, which has turned sour either from neglect, or the fault of the vessel. Wine is the honour of immortality, or virtue. When this then had been turned sour in Adam, He took and drunk it at the hands of the Gentiles. It is offered to Him on a reed and a spunge; that is, He took from the bodies of the Gentiles immortality spoiled and corrupted, and transfused in Himself into a mixture of immortality that in us which was spoiled.

REMIGIUS. Or otherwise; The Jews as degenerating from the wine of the Patriarchs and Prophets were vinegar; they had deceitful hearts, like to the winding holes and hollows in spunge. By the reed, Sacred Scripture is denoted, which was fulfilled in this action; for as we call that which the tongue utters, the Hebrew tongue, or the Greek tongue, for example; so the writing, or letters which the seed produces, we may call a reed.

ORIGEN. And perhaps all who know the ecclesiastical doctrine, but live amiss, have given them to drink wine mingled with gall; but they who attribute to Christ untrue opinions, these filling a sponge with vinegar, put it upon the reed of Scripture, and put it to His mouth.

RABANUS. The soldiers misunderstanding the sound of the Lord's words, foolishly looked for the coming of Elias. But God, whom the Saviour thus invoked in the Hebrew tongue, He had ever inseparably with Him.

AUGUSTINE. (in Serm. non occ.) When now nought of suffering remains to be endured, death still lingers, knowing that it has nothing there. The ancient foe suspected somewhat unusual. This man, first and only, he found having no sin, free from guilt, owing nothing to the laws of his jurisdiction. But leagued with Jewish madness, Death comes again to the assault, and desperately invades the Life-giver. And Jesus, when he had cried again with a loud voice, yielded up the ghost. Wherefore should we be offended that Christ came from the bosom of the Father to take upon Him our bondage, that He might confer on us His freedom; to take upon Him our death, that we might be set free by His death; by despising death He exalted us mortals into Gods, counted them of earth worthy of things in heaven? For seeing the Divine power shines forth so brilliant in the contemplation of its works, it is an argument of boundless love, that it suffers for its subjects, dies for its bondsmen. This then was the first cause of the Lord's Passion, that He would have it known how great God's love to man, Who desired rather to be loved than feared. The second was that He might abolish with yet more justice the sentence of death which He had with justice passed. For as the first man had by guilt incurred death through God's sentence, and handed down the same to his posterity, the second Man, who knew no sin, came from heaven that death might be condemned, which, when commissioned to seize the guilty, had presumed to touch the Author of sinlessness. And it is no wonder if for us He laid down what He had taken of us, His life, namely, when He has done other so great things for us, and bestowed so much on us.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Vigil. cont. Felicianum. 14.) Far be from the faithful any suspicion that Christ experienced our death in such sort that life (as far as it can) ceased to live. Had this been so, how could aught have been said to live during that three days, if the Fountain of Life itself was dried up? Therefore Christ's Godhead experienced death through its partaking of humanity or of human feeling, which it had voluntarily taken on it; but it lost not the properties of its nature by which it gives life to all things. For when we die, without doubt the loss of life by the body is not the destruction of the soul, but the soul quitting the body loses not its own properties, but only lets go what it had quickened, and as far as in it lays produces the death of somewhat else, but itself defies death. To speak now of the Saviour's soul; it might depart without being itself destroyed from His body for this three days' space, even by the common laws of death, and without taking into account the indwelling Godhead, and His singular righteousness. For I believe that the Son of God died not in punishment of unrighteousness which He had not at all, but according to the law of that nature which He took upon Him for the redemption of the human race.

DAMASCENE. (de Fid. Orth. iii. 27.) Although He died as man, and His holy soul was separated from His unstained body, yet His Godhead remained inseparate from either body or soul. Yet was not the one Person divided into two; for as both body and soul had from the beginning an existence in the Person of the Word, so also had they in death. For neither soul nor body had ever a Person of their own, besides the Person of the Word.

JEROME. It was a mark of Divine power in Him thus to dismiss the Spirit as Himself had said, No man can take my life from me, but I lay it down and take it again. (John 10:18.) For by the ghost in this place we understand the soul; so called either because it is that which makes the body quick or spiritual, or because the substance of the soul itself is spirit, according to that which is written, Thou takest away their breath, and they die. (Ps. 104:29.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Also for this reason He cried out with a loud voice to shew that this is done by His own power. For by crying out with a loud voice when dying, He shewed incontestably that He was the true God; because a man in dying can scarcely utter even a feeble sound.

AUGUSTINE. (Cons. Ev. iii. 18.) Luke mentions the words which He thus cries out, Father, into thy hands I commend my Spirit.

HILARY. Or, He gave up the ghost with a loud voice, in grief that He was not carrying the sins of all men.

27:51–56

51. And, behold, the veil of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom; and the earth did quake, and the rocks rent;

52. And the graves were opened; and many bodies of the saints which slept arose,

53. And came out of the graves after his resurrection, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many.

54. Now when the centurion, and they that were with him, watching Jesus, saw the earthquake, and those things that were done, they feared greatly, saying, Truly this was the Son of God.

55. And many women were there beholding afar off, which followed Jesus from Galilee, ministering unto him:

56. Among which was Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James and Joses, and the mother of Zebedee's children.

ORIGEN. Great things were done at the moment that Jesus cried with a great voice.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 19.) The wording sufficiently shews that the veil was rent just when He gave up the ghost. If he had not added, And, lo! but had merely said, And the veil of the temple we as rent, it would have been uncertain whether Matthew and Mark had not inserted it here out of its place as they recollected, and Luke had observed the right order, who having said, And the sun was darkened, adds, And the veil of the temple was rent in twain; (Luke 23:46.) or, on the contrary, Luke had returned to what they had inserted in its place.

ORIGEN. It is understood that there were two veils; one veiling the Holy of Holies, the other, the outer part of the tabernacle or temple. In the Passion then of our Lord and Saviour, it was the outer veil which was rent from the top to the bottom, that by the rending of the veil from the beginning to the end of the world, the mysteries might be published which had been hid with good reason until the Lord's coming. But when that which is perfect is come, (1 Cor. 13:10.) then the second veil also shall be taken away, that we may see the things that are hidden within, to wit, the true Ark of the Testament, and behold the Cherubim and the rest in their real nature.

HILARY. Or, The veil of the temple is rent, because from this time the nation was dispersed, and the honour of the veil is taken away with the guardianship of the protecting Angel.

LEO. (‘Leo, in Serm. de Pass.’ non occ.) The sudden commotion in the elements is a sufficient sign in witness of His venerable Passion, The earth quaked, and the rocks rent, and the graves were opened.

JEROME. It is not doubtful to any what these great signs signify according to the letter, namely, that heaven and earth and all things should bear witness to their crucified Lord.

HILARY. The earth quaked, because it was unequal to contain such a body; the rocks rent, for the Word of God that pierces all strong and mighty things, and the virtue of the eternal Power had penetrated them; the graves were opened, for the bands of death were loosed. And many bodies of the saints which slept arose, for illumining the darkness of death, and shedding light upon the gloom of Hades, He robbed the spirits of death.

CHRYSOSTOM. When He remained on the cross they had said tauntingly, He saved others, himself he cannot save. But what He would not do for Himself, that He did and more than that for the bodies of the Saints. For if it was a great thing to raise Lazarus after four days, much more was it that they who had long slept should now shew themselves alive; this is indeed a proof of the resurrection to come. But that it might not be thought that that which was done was an appearance merely, the Evangelist adds, And came out of the graves after his resurrection., and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many.

JEROME. As Lazarus rose from the dead, so also did many bodies of the Saints rise again to shew forth the Lord’s resurrection; yet notwithstanding that the graves were opened, they did not rise again before the Lord rose, that He might be the first-born of the resurrection from the dead. The holy city in which they were seen after they had risen may be understood to mean either the heavenly Jerusalem, or this earthly, which once had been holy. For the city of Jerusalem was called Holy on account of the Temple and the Holy of Holies, and to distinguish it from other cities in which idols were worshipped. When it is said, And appeared unto many, it is signified that this was not a general resurrection which all should see, but special, seen only by such as were worthy to see it.

REMIGIUS. But some one will ask, what became of those who rose again when the Lord rose. We must believe that they rose again to be witnesses of the Lord's resurrection. Some have said that they died again, and were turned to dust, as Lazarus and the rest whom the Lord raised. But we must by no means give credit to these men's sayings, since if they were to die again, it would be greater torment to them, than if they had not risen again. We ought therefore to believe without hesitation that they who rose from the dead at the Lord's resurrection, ascended also into heaven together with Him.

ORIGEN. These same mighty works are still done every day; the veil of the temple is rent for the Saints, in order to reveal the things that are contained within. The earth quakes, that is, all flesh because of the new word and new things of the New Testament. The rocks are rent, i. e. the mystery of the Prophets, that we may see the spiritual mysteries hid in their depths. The graves are the bodies of sinful souls, that is, souls dead to God; but when by God's grace these souls have been raised, their bodies which before were graves, become bodies of Saints, and appear to go out of themselves, and follow Him who rose again, and walk with Him in newness of life; and such as are worthy to have their conversation in heaven enter into the Holy City at divers times, and appear unto many who see their good works.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 20.) It is no contradiction here that Matthew says, that The centurion and they that were with him, watching Jesus, feared when they saw the earthquake, and the things that were done; while Luke says, that he wondered at the giving up the ghost with a loud voice. For when Matthew adds, the things that were done, this gives full scope for Luke's expression, that he wondered at the Lord's death, for this among the rest was wonderful.

JEROME. Observe, that in the very midst of the offence of His passion the Centurion acknowledges the Son of God, while Arius in the Church proclaims Him a creature.

RABANUS. Whence with good reason by the Centurion is denoted the faith of the Church, which, when the veil of heavenly mysteries had been rent by the Lord’s death, immediately asserts Jesus to be both very Man, and truly Son of God, while the Synagogue held its peace.

LEO. (Serm. 66. 3.) From this example then of the Centurion let the substance of the earth tremble in the punishment of its Redeemer, let the rocks of unbelieving minds be rent, and those who were pent up in these sepulchres of mortality leap forth, bursting the bonds that would detain them; and let them shew themselves in the Holy City, i. e. the Church of God, as signs of the Resurrection to come; and thus let that take place in the heart, which we must believe takes place in the body.

JEROME. It was a Jewish custom, and held no disgrace, according to the manners of the people of old, for women to minister of their substance, food, and clothing to their teachers. This Paul says, that he refused, because it might occasion scandal among the Gentiles. They ministered to the Lord of their substance, that He might reap their carnal things, of whom they reaped spiritual things. Not that the Lord needed food of the creature, but that He might set an example for the teacher, that He should be content to receive food and clothing from His disciples. But let us see what sort of attendants He had; Among whom was Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James and Joseph, and the mother of Zebedee’s children.

ORIGEN. In Mark the third is called Salome.

CHRYSOSTOM. These women thus watching the things that are done are the most compassionate, the most sorrowful. They had followed Him ministering, and remained by Him in danger, shewing the highest courage, for when the disciples fled they remained.

JEROME. (adv. Helvid.) ‘See,’ says Helvidius, ‘Jacob and Joseph are the sons of Mary the Lord’s mother, whom the Jews call the brethren of Christ. (Mark 6:3.) He is also called James the less, to distinguish him from James the greater, who was the son of Zebedee.’ And he urges that ‘it were impious to suppose that His mother Mary would be absent, when the other women were there; or that we should have to invent some other third unknown person of the name of Mary, and that too when John’s Gospel witnesses that His mother was present.’ O blind folly! O mind perverted to its own destruction! Hear what the Evangelist John says: There stood by the cross of Jesus, his mother, and his mother’s sister, Mary the wife of Cleophas, and Mary Magdalene. (John 19:25.) No one can doubt that there were two Apostles called James; the son of Zebedee, and the son of

Alpheus. This unknown James the less, whom Scripture mentions as the son of Mary, if he is an Apostle, is the son of Alpheus; if he is not an Apostle, but a third unknown James, how can he be supposed to be the Lord's brother, and why should he be styled 'The Less,' to distinguish him from 'The Greater?' For The Greater and The Less are epithets which distinguish two persons, but not three. And that the James, the Lord's brother, was an Apostle, is proved by Paul, Other of the Apostles saw I none, save James the Lord's brother. (Gal. 1:19.) But that you should not suppose this James to be the son of Zebedee, read the Acts, (Acts 12:1.) where he was put to death by Herod. The conclusion then remains, that this Mary, who is described as the mother of James the less (vid. sup. 13:55.), was wife of Alpheus, and sister of Mary the Lord's mother, called by John, Mary the wife of Cleophas. But should you incline to think them two different persons, because in one place she is called Mary the mother of James the less, and in another place Mary the wife of Cleophas, you will learn the Scripture custom of calling the same man by different names; as Raguel Moses' father-in-law is called Jethro. In like manner then, Mary the wife of Cleophas is called the wife of Alpheus, and the mother of James the less. For if she had been the Lord's mother, the Evangelist would here, as in all other places, have called her so, and not described her as the mother of James, when he meant to designate the mother of the Lord. But even if Mary the wife of Cleophas, and Mary the mother of James and Joses, were different persons, it is still certain, that Mary the mother of James and Joses was not the Lord's mother.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) We might have supposed that some of the women stood afar off, as three Evangelists say, and others near the cross, as John says, had not Matthew and Mark reckoned Mary Magdalen among those that stood afar off, while John puts her among those that stood near. This is reconciled if we understand the distance at which they were to be such that they might be said to be near, because they were in His sight; but far off in comparison of the crowd who stood nearer with the centurion and soldiers. We might also suppose that they who were there together with the Lord's mother, began to depart after He had commended her to the disciple, that they might extricate themselves from the crowd, and looked on from a distance at the other things which were done, so that the Evangelists, who speak of them after the Lord's death, speak of them as standing afar off.

57. When the even was come, there came a rich man of Arimathea, named Joseph, who also himself was Jesus' disciple:

58. He went to Pilate, and begged the body of Jesus. Then Pilate commanded the body to be delivered.

59. And when Joseph had taken the body, he wrapped it in a clean linen cloth,

60. And laid it in his own new tomb, which he had hewn out in the rock: and he rolled a great stone to the door of the sepulchre, and departed.

61. And there was Mary Magdalene, and the other Mary, sitting over against the sepulchre.

GLOSS. (non occ.) When the Evangelist had finished the order of the Lord's Passion and death, he treats of His burial.

REMIGIUS. Arimathea is the same as Ramatha, the city of Helcana and Samuel, and is situated in the Chananitic country near Diospolis. This Joseph was a man of great dignity in respect of worldly station, but has the praise of much higher merit in God's sight, seeing he is described as righteous. Indeed he that should have the burial of the Lord's body ought to have been such, that he might be deserving of that office by righteous merit.

JEROME. He is described as rich, not out of any ambition on the part of the writer to represent so noble and rich a man as Jesus' disciple, but to shew how he was able to obtain the body of Jesus from Pilate. For poor and unknown individuals would not have dared to approach Pilate, the representative of Roman power, and ask the body of a crucified malefactor. In another Gospel this Joseph is called a counsellor; and it is supposed that the first Psalm has reference to him, Blessed is the man that walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly. (Ps. 1:1.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Consider this man's courage; he risked his life, and took upon him many enmities in order to render this service; and not only dares to ask for Christ's body, but also to bury it.

JEROME. By this simple burial of the Lord is condemned the ostentation of the rich, who cannot dispense with lavish expense even in their tombs. But we may also consider in a spiritual sense, that the Lord's body was wrapped not in gold, jewels, or silk, but in clean linen; and that he who wrapped it, is he who embraces Jesus with a pure heart.

REMIGIUS. Or, otherwise; The linen is grown out of the ground, and is bleached to whiteness with great labour, and thus this signifies that His body which was taken of the earth, that is of a Virgin, through the toil of passion came to the whiteness of immortality.

RABANUS. From this also has prevailed in the Church the custom of celebrating the sacrifice of the altar not in silk, or in coloured robes, but in linen grown from the earth, as we read, was ordered by the Holy Pope Silvester.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Serm. App. 248. 4.) The Saviour was laid in a tomb belonging to another man, because He died for the salvation of others. For why should He who in Himself had no death, have been laid in His own tomb? Or He whose place was reserved for Him in heaven, have had a monument upon earth? He who remained but three days space in the tomb, not as dead, but as resting on His bed? A tomb is the necessary abode of death; Christ then, who is our life, could not have an abode of death; He that ever liveth had no need of the dwelling of the departed.

JEROME. He is laid in a new tomb, lest after His resurrection it should be pretended that it was some other who had risen when they saw the other bodies there remaining. The new tomb may also signify the virgin womb of Mary. And He was laid in a tomb hewn out of the rock, lest had it been one raised of many stones, it might have been said that He was stolen away by undermining the foundations of the pile.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (‘Aug. in Serm.’ non occ.) Had the tomb been in the earth, it might have been said they undermined the place, and so carried Him off. Had a small stone been laid thereon, they might have said, They carried Him off while we slept.

JEROME. That a great stone was rolled there, shews that the tomb could not have been reopened without the united strength of many.

HILARY. Mystically, Joseph affords a figure of the Apostles. He wraps the body in a clean linen cloth, in which same linen sheet were let down to Peter out of heaven all manner of living creatures; whence we understand, that under the representation of this linen cloth the Church is buried together with Christ. The Lord’s body moreover is laid in a chamber hewn out of rock, empty and new; that is, by the teaching of the Apostles, Christ is conveyed into the hard breast of the Gentiles hewn out by the toil of teaching, rude and new, hitherto unpenetrated by any fear of God. And for that besides Him ought nothing to enter our breasts, a stone is rolled to the mouth, that as before Him we had received no author of divine knowledge, so after Him we should admit none.

ORIGEN. This is no casual mention of the circumstances that the body was wrapped in clean linen, and laid in a new tomb, and a great stone rolled to the mouth, but that every thing touching the body of Jesus is clean, and new, and very great.

REMIGIUS. When the Lord's body was buried, and the rest returned to their own places, the women alone, who had loved Him more attachedly adhered to Him, and with anxious care noted the place where the Lord's body was laid, that at fit time they might perform the service of their devotion to him.

ORIGEN. The mother of the sons of Zebedee is not mentioned as having sat over against the sepulchre. And perhaps she was able to endure as far as the cross only, but these as stronger in love were not absent even from the things that were afterwards done.

JEROME. Or, when the rest left the Lord, the women continued in their attendance, looking for what Jesus had promised; and therefore they deserved to be the first to see the resurrection, because he that endureth to the end shall be saved. (Matt. 10:22.)

REMIGIUS. And to this day the holy women, that is, the lowly souls of the saints, do the like in this present world, and with pious assiduity wait while Christ's passion is being completed.

27:62–66

62. Now the next day, that followed the day of the preparation, the Chief Priests and Pharisees came together unto Pilate,

63. Saying, Sir, we remember that that deceiver said, while he was yet alive, After three days I will rise again.

64. Command therefore that the sepulchre be made sure until the third day, lest his disciples come by night, and steal him away, and say unto the people, He is risen from the dead: so the last error shall be worse than the first.

65. Pilate said unto them, Ye have a watch: go your way, make it as sure as ye can.

66. So they went and made the sepulchre sure, sealing the stone, and setting a watch.

JEROME. It was not enough for the Chief Priests to have crucified the Lord the Saviour, if they did not guard the sepulchre, and do their utmost to lay hands on Him as He rose from the dead.

RABANUS. By the Parasceve is meant ‘preparation;’ and they gave this name to the sixth day of the week, on which they made ready the things needed for the Sabbath, as was commanded respecting the manna, On the sixth day they gathered twice as much. (Exod. 16:22.) Because on the sixth day man was made, and on the seventh God rested; therefore on the sixth day Jesus died for man, and rested the Sabbath day in the tomb. The Chief Priests although in putting the Lord to death they had committed a heinous crime, yet were they not satisfied unless even after His death they carried on the venom of their malice once begun, traducing His character, and calling one, whom they knew to be guileless, a deceiver. (John 11:49.) But as Caiaphas prophesied without knowing it, that it is expedient that one man should die for the people, so now, Christ was a deceiver,1 not from truth into error, but leading men from error to truth, from vices to virtue, from death to life.

REMIGIUS. They say that He had declared, After three days I will rise again, in consequence of that He said above, As Jonas was three days and, three nights in the whale’s belly, &c. (Matt. 12:40.) But let us see in what way He can be said to have risen again after three days. Some would have the three hours of darkness understood as one night, and the light succeeding the darkness as a day, but these do not know the force of figurative language. The sixth day of the week on which He suffered comprehended the foregoing night; then follows the night of the Sabbath with its own day, and the night of the Lord’s day includes also its own day; and hence it is true that He rose again after three days.

AUGUSTINE. (‘Aug. in Serm.’ non occ.) He rose again after three days, to signify the consent of the whole Trinity in the passion of the Son; the three days’ space is read figuratively, because the Trinity which in the beginning made man, the same in the end restores man by the passion of Christ.

RABANUS. Command therefore that the sepulchre be made sure until the third day. For Christ’s disciples were spiritually thieves; stealing from the unthankful Jews the writings of the New and Old Testament, they bestowed them to be used by the Church; and while they slept, that is, while the Jews were sunk in the lethargy of unbelief, they carried off the promised Saviour, and gave Him to be believed on by the Gentiles.

HILARY. Their fear lest the body should be stolen, the setting a watch on the tomb, and sealing it, are marks of folly and unbelief, that they should have sought to seal up the tomb of One at whose bidding they had seen a dead man raised from the tomb.

RABANUS. When they say, And the last error will be worse than the first, they utter a truth unwittingly, for their contempt of penitence was worse for the Jews than was their error of ignorance.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxix.) Observe how against their will they concert to demonstrate the truth, for by their precautions irrefragable demonstration of the resurrection was attained. The sepulchre was watched, and so no fraud could have been practised; and if there was no collusion, it is certain that the Lord rose again.

RABANUS. Pilate’s answer to their request is as much as to say, Be it enough for you that ye have conspired the death of an innocent man, henceforth let your error remain with you.

CHRYSOSTOM. Pilate will not suffer that the soldiers alone should seal. But as though he had learnt the truth concerning Christ, he was no longer willing to be partner in their acts, and says, Seal it as ye will yourselves, that ye may not be able to accuse others. For had the soldiers alone sealed, they might have said that the soldiers had suffered the disciples to steal the body, and so given the disciples a handle to forge a tale concerning the resurrection; but this could they not say now, when they themselves had sealed the sepulchre.

CHAPTER 28

28:1–7

1. In the end of the sabbath, as it began to dawn toward the first day of the week, came Mary Magdalene and the other Mary to see the sepulchre.

2. And, behold, there was a great earthquake: for the angel of the Lord descended from heaven, and came and rolled back the stone from the door, and sat upon it.

3. His countenance was like lightning, and his raiment white as snow:

4. And for fear of him the keepers did shake, and became as dead men.

5. And the angel answered and said unto the women, Fear not ye: for I know that ye seek Jesus, which was crucified.

6. He is not here: for he is risen, as he said. Come, see the place where the Lord lay.

7. And go quickly and tell his disciples that he is risen from the dead; and, behold, he goeth before you into Galilee; there shall ye see him: lo, I have told you.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Resur. iii.) After the mockings and scourgings, after the mingled draughts of vinegar and gall, the pains of the cross, and the wounds, and finally after death itself and Hades, there rose again from the grave a renewed flesh, there returned from obstruction a hidden life, health chained up in death broke forth, with fresh beauty from its ruin.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 24.) Concerning the hour when the women came to the sepulchre there arises a question not to be overlooked. Matthew here says, On the evening of the Sabbath. What then means that of Mark, Very early in the morning, the first day of the week? (Mark 16:2.) Truly Matthew, by naming the first part of the night, to wit, the evening, denotes the whole night in the end of which they come to the sepulchre. But seeing the Sabbath hindered them from doing this before, he designates the whole night by the earliest portion of it in which it became lawful for them to do whatever, during some period of the night, they designed to do. Thus, On the evening of the sabbath, is just the same as if he had said, On the night of the sabbath, i. e. the night which follows the day of the sabbath, which is sufficiently proved by the words which follow, As it began to dawn towards the first day of the week. This could not be if we understood only the first portion of the night, its beginning, to be conveyed by the word, evening. For the evening or beginning of the night does not begin to dawn towards the first day of the week, but only the night which is concluded by the dawn. And this is the usual mode of speaking in Holy Scripture, to express the whole by a part. By evening therefore he implied the night, in the end of which they came to the sepulchre.

BEDE. (in loc.) Otherwise; It may be understood that they began to come in the evening, but that it was the dawn of the first day of the week when they reached the sepulchre; that is, that they prepared the spices for anointing the Lord’s body in the evening, but that they took them to the sepulchre in the morning. This has been so shortly described by Matthew, that it is not quite clear in his account, but the other Evangelists give the order more distinctly. The Lord was buried on the sixth day of the week, and the women returning from the sepulchre prepared spices and ointments as long as it was lawful to work; on the sabbath they rested, according to the commandment, as Luke plainly declares; and when the Sabbath was past and the evening was come, and the season of labour returned, with zealous devotion they proceeded to purchase such spices as they yet lacked, (this is implied in Mark’s words, when the sabbath was past, that they might go and anoint Jesus, for which purpose they come early in the morning to the sepulchre.

JEROME. Or, otherwise; This apparent discrepancy in the Evangelists as to the times of their visits is no mark of falsehood, as wicked men urge, but shews the sedulous duty and attention of the women, often going and coming, and not enduring to be long absent from the sepulchre of their Lord.

REMIGIUS. It is to be known that Matthew designs to hint to us a mystical meaning, of how great worthiness this most holy night drew from the noble conquest of death, and the Resurrection of Our Lord. With this purpose he says, On the evening of the Sabbath. For whereas according to the wonted succession of the hours of the day, evening does not dawn towards day, but on the contrary darkens towards night, these words shew that the Lord shed, by the light of His resurrection joy and brilliance over the whole of this night.

BEDE. (Hom. Æst. i.) For from the beginning of the creation of the world until now, the course of time has followed this arrangement, that the day should go before the night, because man, fallen by sin from the light of paradise, has sunk into the darkness and misery of this world. But now most fitly night goes before day, when, through faith in the resurrection, we are brought back from the darkness of sin and the shadow of death to the light of life, by the bounty of Christ.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 75.)g. Because the sabbath is illuminated, not taken away, by Christ, Who said, I am not come to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it. (Matt. 5:17.) It is illuminated that it may lighten into the Lord's day, and shine forth in the Church, when it had hitherto burnt dim, and been obscured by the Jews in the Synagogue.

It follows, Came Mary Magdalen, and the other Mary, &c. Late runs woman for pardon, who had run early to sin; in paradise she had taken up unbelief, from the sepulchre she hastes to take up faith; she now hastens to snatch life from death, who had before snatched death from life. And it is not, They come, but came, (in the singular,) for in mystery and not by accident, the two came under one name. She came, but altered; a woman, changed in life, not in name; in virtue, not in sex. The women go before the Apostles, bearing to the Lord's sepulchre a type of the Churches; the two Marys, to wit. For Mary is the name of Christ's mother; and one name is twice repeated for two women, because herein is figured the Church coming out of the two nations, the Gentiles and the Jews, and being yet one. Mary came to the sepulchre, as to the womb of the resurrection, that Christ might be the second time born out of the sepulchre of faith, who after the flesh had been born of her womb; and that as a virgin had borne Him into this life present, so a sealed sepulchre might bring Him forth into life eternal. It is proof of Deity to have left a womb virgin after birth, and no less to have come forth in the body from a closed sepulchre.

JEROME. And, behold, there was a great earthquake. Our Lord, Son at once of God and man, according to His twofold nature of Godhead and of flesh, gives a sign one while of His greatness, another while of His lowliness. Thus, though now it was man who was crucified, and man who was buried, yet the things that were done around shew the Son of God.

HILARY. The earthquake is the might of the resurrection, when the sting of death being blunted, and its darkness illuminated, there is stirred up a quaking of the powers beneath, as the Lord of the heavenly powers rises again.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or the earthquake was to rouse and waken the women, who had come to anoint the body; and as all these things were done in the night-time, it was probable that some of them had fallen asleep.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The earthquake at the Resurrection, as also at the Crucifixion, signifies that worldly hearts must be first moved to penitence by a health-giving fear through belief in His Passion and Resurrection.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 77 et 74.) If the earth thus quaked when the Lord rose again to the pardon of the Saints, how will it quake when He shall rise again to the punishment of the wicked? As the Prophet speaks, The earth trembled when the Lord rose again to judgment. (Ps. 76:8.) And how will it endure the Lord’s presence, when it was unable to endure the presence of His Angel? And the Angel of the Lord descended from heaven. For when Christ arose, death was destroyed, commerce with heaven is restored to things on the earth; and woman, who had of old held communication to death with the Devil, now holds communication to life with the Angel.

HILARY. This is an instance of the mercy of God the Father, to supply the ministry of heavenly power to the Son on His resurrection from the grave; and he is therefore the proclaimer of this first resurrection, that it may be heralded by some attendant token of the Father’s good pleasure.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Forasmuch as Christ is both God and man, therefore there lack not amidst the acts of His humanity the ministrations of Angels, due to Him as God. And came and rolled back the stone; not to open the door for the Lord to come forth, but to give evidence to men that He was already come forth. For He who as mortal had power to enter the world through the closed womb of a Virgin, He when become immortal, was able to depart out of the world by rising from a sealed sepulchre.

REMIGIUS. The rolling back of the stone signifies the opening of Christ’s sacraments, which were covered by the letter of the Law. For the Law having been writen on stones, is here denoted by the stone.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 74.) He said not ‘rolled,’ but rolled back; because the rolling to of the stone was a proof of death; the rolling it back asserted the resurrection. The order of things is changed; The Tomb devours death, and not the dead; the house of death becomes the mansion of life; a new law is imposed upon it, it receives a dead, and renders up a living, man. It follows, And sat thereon. He sat down, who was incapable of weariness; but sat as a teacher of the faith, a master of the Resurrection; upon the stone, that the firmness of his seat might assure the sted fastness of the believers; the Angel rested the foundations of the Faith upon that rock, on which Christ was to found His Church. Or, by the stone of the sepulchre may be denoted death, under which we all lay; and by the Angel sitting thereon, is shewn that Christ hath by His might subdued death.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And rightly did the Angel appear standing, who proclaimed the Lord’s coming into the world, to shew that the Lord should come to vanquish the prince of this world. But the Herald of the Resurrection is related to have been seated, to shew that now He had overcome him that had the power of death, He had mounted the throne of the everlasting kingdom. He sate upon the stone, now rolled back, wherewith the mouth of the sepulchre had been closed, to teach that He by His might had burst the bonds of the tomb.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 24.) It may disquiet some, how it is that according to Matthew the Angel sate upon the stone after it had been rolled back from the sepulchre, whereas Mark says that the women having gone into the sepulchre, saw a young man sitting on the right hand. Either we may suppose that they saw two, and that Matthew has not mentioned him whom they saw within, nor Mark him whom they saw without the sepulchre; but that they heard from each severally what the Angels said concerning Jesus. Or the words, entering into the sepulchre, (Mark 16:5.) may mean entering into some enclosed place, which probably there might be in front of the rock out of which the sepulchre was hewn; and thus it might be the same Angel whom they saw sitting on the right hand, whom Matthew describes as sitting on the stone which he had rolled back.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 75.) The splendour of his countenance is distinct from the shining of his raiment; his countenance is compared to lightning, his raiment to snow; for the lightning is in heaven, snow on the earth; as the Prophet saith, Praise the Lord from the earth; fire and hail, snow and vapours. (Ps. 148:7.) Thus in the Angel's countenance is preserved the splendour of his heavenly nature; in his raiment is shewn the grace of human communion. For the appearance of the Angel that talked with them is so ordered, that eyes of flesh might endure the still splendour of his robes, and by reason of his shining countenance they might tremble before the messenger of their Maker.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 77.) But what means this raiment where there is no need of a covering? The Angel figures our dress, our shape, our likeness in the Resurrection, when man is sufficiently clothed by the splendour of his own body.

JEROME. The Angel in white raiment signifies the glory of His triumph.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxi. 4.) Or otherwise; Lightning inspires terror; snow is an emblem of equity; and as the Almighty God is terrible to sinners and mild to the righteous, so this Angel is rightly a witness of His resurrection, and is exhibited with a countenance as lightning, and with raiment as snow, that by His presence He might terrify the wicked, and comfort the good; and so it follows, And for fear of him the keepers did shake.

RABANUS. These who had not the faith of love were shaken with a panic fear; and they who would not believe the truth of the resurrection become themselves as dead men.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 75.) For they kept watch over Him with a purpose of cruelty, not with the solicitude of affection. And no man can stand who is forsaken by his own conscience, or troubled with a sense of guilt. Hence the Angel confounds the wicked, and comforts the good.

JEROME. The guards lay like dead men in a trance of terror, but the Angel speaks comfort not to them, but to the women, saying, Fear not ye; as much as to say, Let them fear with whom unbelief abides; but do ye who seek the crucified Jesus hear that He has risen again, and has accomplished what He promised.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 77.) For their faith had been bowed by the cruel storm of His Passion, so that they sought Him yet as crucified and dead; I know that ye seek Jesus which was crucified; the weight of the trial had bent them to look for the Lord of heaven in the tomb, but, He is not here.

RABANUS. His fleshly presence, that is; for His spiritual presence is absent from no place. He is risen, as he said.

CHRYSOSTOM. As much as to say, If ye believe me not, remember His own words. And then follows further proof, when he adds, Come, see the place where the Lord lay.

JEROME. That if my words fail to convince you, the empty tomb may.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 76.) Thus the Angel first announces His name, declares His Cross, and confesses His Passion; but straightway proclaims Him risen and their Lord. An Angel after such sufferings, after the grave acknowledges Him Lord; how then shall man judge that the Godhead was diminished by the flesh, or that His Might failed in His Passion. He says, Which was crucified, and points out the place where the Lord was laid, that they should not think that it was another, and not the same, who had risen from the dead. And if the Lord reappears in the same flesh, and gives evidence of His resurrection, why should man suppose that he himself shall reappear in other flesh? Or why should a slave disdain his own flesh, seeing the Lord did not change ours?

RABANUS. And this glad tiding is given not to you alone for the secret comfort of your own hearts, but ye must extend it to all who love Him; Go quickly, and tell his disciples.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 77.) As much as to say, Woman, now thou art healed, return to the man, and persuade him! to faith, whom thou didst once persuade to treachery. Carry to man the proof of the Resurrection, to whom thou didst once carry counsel of destruction.

CHRYSOSTOM. And, behold, he shall go before you, that is, to save you from danger, lest fear should prevail over faith.

JEROME. Mystically; He shall go before you into Galilee, that is, into the wallowing stye1 of the Gentiles, where before was wandering and stumbling, and the foot had no firm and steady resting-place.

BEDE. (Hom. ubi sup.) The Lord is rightly seen by His disciples in Galilee, forasmuch as He had already passed from death to life, from corruption to incorruption; for such is the interpretation of Galilee, ‘Transmigration.’ Happy women! who merited to announce to the world the triumph of the Resurrection! More happy souls, who in the day of judgment, when the reprobate are smitten with terror, shall have merited to enter the joy of the blessed resurrection!

8. And they departed quickly from the sepulchre with fear and great joy; and did run to bring his disciples word.

9. And as they went to tell his disciples, behold, Jesus met them, saying, All hail. And they came and held him by the feet, and worshipped him.

10. Then said Jesus unto them, Be not afraid: go tell my brethren that they go into Galilee, and there shall they see me.

HILARY. The women having been comforted by the Angel, are straightway met by the Lord, that when they should proclaim His resurrection to the disciples, they should speak rather from Christ’s own mouth than from an Angel’s.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 23.) They departed forth of the tomb, that is, from that spot of the garden which was before the tomb hewn in the rock.

JEROME. A twofold feeling possessed the minds of the women, fear and joy; fear, at the greatness of the miracle; joy, in their desire of Him that was risen; but both added speed to their women’s steps, as it follows, And did run to bring his disciples word. They went to the Apostles, that through them might be spread abroad the seed of the faith. They who thus desired, and who thus ran, merited to have their rising Lord come to meet them; whence it follows, And, behold, Jesus met them, saying, All hail.

RABANUS. Hereby He shewed that He will meet with His help all those who begin the ways of virtue, and enable them to attain to everlasting salvation.

JEROME. The women ought first to hear this Hail, that the curse of the woman Eve may be removed in these women.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 76.) That in these women is contained a full figure of the Church is shewn hereby, that Christ convinces His disciples when in doubt concerning the Resurrection, and confirms them when in fear; and when He meets them He does not terrify them by His power, but prevents them with the ardour of love. And Christ in His Church salutes Himself, for He has taken it into His own Body.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) We conclude that they had speech of Angels twice at the sepulchre; when they saw one Angel, of whom Matthew and Mark speak; and again when they saw two Angels, as Luke and John relate.

And twice in like manner of the Lord; once at that time when Mary supposed Him to be the gardener, (John 20:15.) and now again when He met them in the way to confirm them by repetition, and to restore them from their faintness.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) Then Mary was not suffered to touch Him; now she has permission not only to touch, but to hold Him altogether; they came and held him by the feet, and worshipped him.

RABANUS. It was told above how He rose when the sepulchre was closed, to shew that that body which had been shut up therein dead, was now become immortal. He now offers His feet to be held by the women, to shew that He had real flesh, which can be touched by mortal creatures.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) They hold Christ's feet, who in the Church present the type of Evangelic preaching, and merit this privilege by their running to Him; and by faith so detain their Saviour's footsteps, that they may come to the honour of His perfect Godhead. She is deservedly bid to touch me not, who mourns her Lord upon earth, and so seeks Him dead in the tomb, as not to know that He reigns in heaven with the Father. This, that the same Mary, one while exalted to the summit of faith, touches Christ, and holds Him with entire and holy affection; and again, cast down in weakness of flesh, and womanly infirmity, doubts, undeserving to touch her Lord, causes us no difficulty. For that is of mystery, this of her sex; that is of divine grace, this of human nature. And so also we, when we have knowledge of divine things, live unto God; when we are wise in human things, we are blinded by our own selves.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 80.) They held His feet to shew that the head of Christ is the man, but that the woman is in Christ's feet, and that it was given to them through Christ, not to go before, but to follow the man. Christ also repeats what the Angel had said, that what an Angel had made sure, Christ might make yet more sure. It follows, Then saith Jesus unto them, Fear not.

JEROME. This may be always observed, both in the Old and New Testament, that when there is an appearance of any majestic person, the first thing done is to banish fear, that the mind being tranquillized may receive the things that are said.

HILARY. The same order as of old now followed in the reversal of our woe, that whereas death began from the female sex, the same should now first see the glory of the Resurrection, and be made the messenger thereof. Whence the Lord adds, Go tell my brethren that they go into Galilee, there shall they see me.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) He calls them brethren whom He has made akin to His own body; brethren whom the generous Heir has made His co-heirs; brethren, whom He has adopted to be sons of His own Father.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. ult.) That the Lord, both by His own mouth, and by the Angel, directs them to seek for Him, not in that place in which He was to shew Himself first, but in Galilee, makes every believer anxious to understand in what mystery it is spoken. Galilee is interpreted ‘transmigration,’ or ‘revelationa’. And according to the first interpretation what meaning offers itself, save this, that the grace of Christ was to pass from the people of Israel to the Gentiles, who would not believe when the Apostles should preach the Gospel to them, unless the Lord Himself should first make ready their way in the hearts of men. This is the signification of that, He shall go before you into Galilee. There shall ye see him, means, there shall ye find His members, there shall ye perceive His living Body in such as shall receive you. According to the other interpretation, ‘revelation,’ it is to be understood, ye shall see him no longer in the form of a servant, but in that in which He is equal with the Father. That revelation will be the true Galilee, when we shall be like him, and shall see him as he is. (1 John 3:2.) That will be the blessed passing from this world to that eternity.

28:11–15

11. Now when they were going, behold, some of the watch came into the city, and shewed unto the Chief Priests all the things that were done.

12. And when they were assembled with the elders, and had taken counsel, they gave large money unto the soldiers,

13. Saying, Say ye, His disciples came by night, and stole him away while we slept.

14. And if this come to the governor’s ears, we will persuade him, and secure you.

15. So they took the money, and did as they were taught: and this saying is commonly reported among the Jews until this day.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xc.) Of the signs which were shewn around Christ, some were common to the whole world, as the darkness; some peculiar to the watch, as the wonderful apparition of Angels, and the earthquake, which were wrought for the soldiers’ sake, that they might be stunned with amazement, and bear testimony to the truth. For when truth is proclaimed by its adversaries, it adds to its brightness. Which befel now; Some of the watch came into the city, and shewed unto the Chief Priests all the things that were done.

RABANUS. Simple minds, and unlearned country-folk, often make manifest without guile the truth of a matter, as the thing is; but on the other hand, a crafty wickedness studies how to recommend falsehood by glosing words.

JEROME. Thus the Chief Priests, who ought to have been by this turned to penitence, and to seek Jesus risen, persevere in their wickedness, and convert the money which was given for the use of the Temple to the purchase of a lie, as before they had given thirty pieces of silver to the traitor Judas.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) Not content to have put the Master to death, they plot how they may destroy the disciples, and make the Master’s power matter of charge against His disciples. The soldiers indeed lost Him, the Jews missed Him, but the disciples crimed Him away, not by theft, but by faith; by virtue, and not by fraud; by holiness, and not by wickedness; alive, and not dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. How should the disciples carry Him away by stealth, men poor, and of no station, and who scarcely dared to shew themselves? They fled when afterwards they saw Christ alive, how, when He was dead, would they not have feared so great a multitude of soldiers? How were they to remove the door of the sepulchre? One might have done it unperceived by the guard. But a large stone was rolled to the mouth requiring many hands. And was not the seal thereon? And why did they not attempt it the first night, when there was none at the sepulchre? For it was on the Sabbath that they begged the body of Jesus. Moreover, what mean these napkins which Peter sees laid here? Had the disciples stolen the Body, they would never have stripped it, both because it might so receive hurt, and cause unnecessary delay to themselves, and so expose them to be taken by the watch; especially since the Body and clothes were covered with myrrh, a glutinous spice, which would cause them to adhere. The allegation of the theft then is improbable. So that their endeavours to conceal the Resurrection do but make it more manifest. For when they say, His disciples stole the body, they confess that it is not in the sepulchre. And as they thus confess that they had not the Body, and as the watch, the sealing, and the fears of the disciples, make the theft improbable, there is seen evidence of the Resurrection not to be gainsaid.

REMIGIUS. But if the guards slept, how saw they the theft? And if they saw it not, how could they witness thereto? So that what they desire to shew, they cannot shew.

GLOSS. (non occ.) That the fear of the Governor might not restrain them from this lie, they promise them impunity.

CHRYSOSTOM. See how all are corrupted; Pilate persuaded; the people stirred up; the soldiers bribed; as it follows, And they look the money, and did as they were instructed. If money prevailed with a disciple so far as to make him become the betrayer of his Master, what wonder that the soldiers are overcome by it.

HILARY. The concealment of the Resurrection, and the false allegation of theft, is purchased by money; because by the honour of this world, which consists in money and desire, Christ’s glory is denied.

RABANUS. But as the guilt of His blood, which they imprecated upon themselves and their children, presses them down with a heavy weight of sin, so the purchase of the lie, by which they deny the truth of the Resurrection, charges this guilt upon them for ever; as it follows, And this saying is commonly reported among the Jews until this day.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (ubi sup.) Among the Jews, not among the Christians; what in Judæa the Jew concealed by his gold, is by faith blazed abroad throughout the world.

JEROME. All who abuse to other purposes the money of the Temple, and the contributions for the use of the Church, purchasing with them their own pleasure, are like the Scribes and Priests who bought this lie, and the blood of the Saviour.

28:16–20

16. Then the eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them.

17. And when they saw him, they worshipped him: but some doubted.

18. And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth.

19. Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost:

20. Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen.

BEDE. 'Beda, in Hom.' non occ.) When Saint Matthew has vindicated the Lord's Resurrection as declared by the Angel, he relates the vision of the Lord which the disciples had, Then the eleven disciples went into Galilee into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them. For when coming to His Passion the Lord had said to His disciples, After I am risen I will go before you into Galilee; (Matt. 26:32.) and the Angel said the same to the women. Therefore the disciples obey the command of their Master. Eleven only go, for one had already perished.

JEROME. After His Resurrection, Jesus is seen and worshipped in the mountain in Galilee; though some doubt, their doubting confirms our faith.

REMIGIUS. This is more fully told by Luke; how when the Lord after the Resurrection appeared to the disciples, in their terror they thought they saw a spirit.

BEDE. (Hom. Æst. in Fer. vi. Pasch.)b. The Lord appeared to them in the mountain to signify, that His Body which at His Birth He had taken of the common dust of the human race, He had by His Resurrection exalted above all earthly things; and to teach the faithful that if they desire there to see the height of His Resurrection, they must endeavour here to pass from low pleasures to high desires. And He goes before His disciples into Galilee, because Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that slept. (1 Cor. 15:20.) And they that are Christ's follow Him, and pass in their order from death to life, contemplating Him as He appears with His proper Divinity. And it agrees with this that Galilee is interpreted 'revelation.'

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. iii. 25.) But it is to be considered, how the Lord could be seen bodily in Galilee. For that it was not the day of the Resurrection is manifest; for He was seen that day in Jerusalem in the beginning of the night, as Luke and John evidently agree. Nor was it in the eight following days, after which John says that the Lord appeared to His disciples, and when Thomas first saw Him, who had not seen Him on the day of the Resurrection. For if within these eight days the eleven had seen Him on a mountain in Galilee, Thomas, who was one of the eleven, could not have seen Him first after the eight days. Unless it be said, that the eleven there spoken of were eleven out of the general body of the disciples, and not the eleven Apostles. But there is another difficulty. John having related that the Lord was seen not in the mountain, but at the sea of Tiberias, by seven who were fishing, adds, This is now the third time that Jesus shewed himself to his disciples after he was risen from the (John 21:14.) dead. (Mark 16:14.) So that if we understand the Lord to have been seen within those eight days by eleven of the disciples, this manifestation at the sea of Tiberias will be the fourth, and not the third, appearance. Indeed, to understand John's account at all it must be observed, that he computes not each appearance, but each day on which Jesus appeared, though He may have appeared more than once on the same day; as He did three times on the day of His Resurrection. We are then obliged to understand that this appearance to the eleven disciples on the mountain in Galilee took place last of all. In the four Evangelists we find in all ten distinct appearances of Our Lord after His Resurrection. 1. At the sepulchre to the women. 2. To the same women on their way back from the sepulchre. 3. To Peter. 4. To two disciples as they went into the country. 5. To many together in Jerusalem; 6. when Thomas was not with them. 7. At the sea of Tiberias. 8. At the mountain in Galilee, according to Matthew. 9. To the eleven as they sat at meat, because they should not again eat with Him upon earth, related by Mark. 10. On the day of His Ascension, no longer on the earth, but raised aloft in a cloud, as related by both Mark and Luke. But all is not written, as John confesses, for He had much conversation with them during forty days before His ascension, being seen of them, and speaking unto them of the things pertaining to the kingdom of God. (Acts 1:3.)

REMIGIUS. The disciples then, when they saw Him, knew the Lord; and worshipped Him, bowing their faces to the ground. And He their affectionate and merciful Master, that He might take away all doubtfulness from their hearts, coming to them, strengthened them in their belief; as it follows, And Jesus came and spake to them, saying, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth.

JEROME. Power is given to Him, Who but a little before was crucified, Who was buried, but Who afterwards rose again.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This He speaks not from the Deity coeternal with the Father, but from the Humanity which He took upon Him, according to which He was made a little lower than the Angels. (Heb. 2:9.)

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 80.) The Son of God conveyed to the Son of the Virgin, the God to the Man, the Deity to the Flesh, that which He had ever together with the Father.

JEROME. Power is given in heaven and in earth, that He who before reigned in heaven, should now reign on earth by the faith of the believers.

REMIGIUS. What the Psalmist says of the Lord at His rising again, Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands (Ps. 8:6.), this the Lord now says of Himself, All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. And here it is to be noted, that even before His resurrection the Angels knew that they were subjected to the man Christ. Christ then desiring that it should be also known to men that all power was committed to Him in heaven and in earth, sent preachers to make known the word of life to all nations; whence it follows, Go ye therefore, and teach all nations.

BEDE. (‘Beda; in Hom.’ non occ.) He who before His Passion had said, Go not into the way of the Gentiles, (Matt. 10:5.) now, when rising from the dead, says, Go and teach all nations. Hereby let the Jews be put to silence, who say that Christ’s coming is to be for their salvation only. Let the Donatists also blush, who, desiring to confine Christ to one place, have said that He is in Africa only, and not in other countries.

JEROME. They first then teach all nations, and when taught dip them in water. For it may not be that the body receive the sacrament of Baptism, unless the soul first receive the truth of the Faith. In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, that they whose Godhead is one should be conferred at once, to name this Trinity, being to name One God.

CHRYSOLOGUS. (Serm. 80.) Thus all nations are created a second time to salvation by that one and the same Power, which created them to being.

JEROME. (Didymi Lib. ii. de Spir. Sanct.) And though some one there may be of so averse a spirit as to undertake to baptize in such sort as to omit one of these names, therein contradicting Christ Who ordained this for a law, his baptism will effect nothing; those who are baptized by him will not be at all delivered from their sins. From these words we gather how undivided is the substance of the Trinity, that the Father is verily the Father of the Son, and the Son verily the Son of the Father, and the Holy Spirit the Spirit of both the Father and the Son, and also the Spirit of wisdom and of truth, that is, of the Son of God. This then is the salvation of them that believe, and in this Trinity is wrought the perfect communication of ecclesiastical discipline.

HILARY. (de Trin. ii. 1 &c.) For what part of the salvation of men is there that is not contained in this Sacrament? All things are full and perfect, as proceeding from Him who is full and perfect. The nature of His relation is expressed in the title Father; but He is nothing but Father; for not after the manner of men does He derive from somewhat else that He is Father, being Himself Unbegotten, Eternal, and having the source of His being in Himself, known to none, save the Son. The Son is the Offspring of the Unbegotten, One of the One, True of the True, Living of the Living, Perfect of the Perfect, Strength of Strength, Wisdom of Wisdom, Glory of Glory; the Image of the Unseen God, the Form of the Unbegotten Father. Neither can the Holy Spirit be separated from the confession of the Father and the Son. And this consolation of our longing desires is absent from no place. He is the pledge of our hope in the effects of His gifts, He is the light of our minds, He shines in our souls. These things as the heretics cannot change, they introduce into them their human explanations. As Sabellius who identifies the Father with the Son, thinking the distinction to be made rather in name than in person, and setting forth one and the same Person as both Father and Son. As Ebion, who deriving the beginning of His existence from Mary, makes Him not Man of God, but God of man. As the Arians, who derive the form, the power, and the wisdom of God out of nothing, and in time. What wonder then that men should have diverse opinions about the Holy Spirit, who thus rashly after their own pleasure create and change the Son, by whom that Spirit is bestowed?

JEROME. Observe the order of these injunctions. He bids the Apostles first to teach all nations, then to wash them with the sacrament of faith, and after faith and baptism then to teach them what things they ought to observe; Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.

RABANUS. For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also. (James 2:26.)

CHRYSOSTOM. And because what He had laid upon them was great, therefore to exalt their spirits He adds, And, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. As much as to say, Tell Me not of the difficulty of these things, seeing I am with you, Who can make all things easy. A like promise He often made to the Prophets in the Old Testament, to Jeremiah who pleaded his youth, to Moses, and to Ezekiel, when they would have shunned the office imposed upon them. And not with them only does He say that He will be, but with all who shall believe after them. For the Apostles were not to continue till the end of the world, but He says this to the faithful as to one body.

RABANUS. Hence we understand that to the end of the world shall not be wanting those who shall be worthy of the Divine indwelling.

CHRYSOSTOM. He brings before them the end of the world, that He may the more draw them on, and that they may not look merely to present inconveniences, but to the infinite goods to come. As much as to say, The grievous things which you shall undergo, terminate with this present life, seeing that even this world shall come to an end, but the good things which ye shall enjoy endure for ever.

BEDE. (‘Beda in Hom.’ non occ.) It is made a question how He says here, I am with you, John 16:5. when we read elsewhere that He said, I go unto him that sent me. What is said of His human nature is distinct from what is said of His divine nature. He is going to His Father in His human nature, He abides with His disciples in that form in which He is equal with the Father. When He says, to the end of the world, He expresses the infinite by the finite; for He who remains in this present world with His elect, protecting them, the same will continue with them after the end, rewarding them.

JEROME. He then who promises that He will be with His disciples to the end of the world, shews both that they shall live for ever, and that He will never depart from those that believe.

LEO. (Serm. 72. 3.) For by ascending into heaven He does not desert His adopted; but from above strengthens to endurance, those whom He invites upwards to glory.

Of which glory may Christ make us partakers,
Who is the King of glory,
God blessed for ever,

AMEN.

CATENA AUREA: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS: VOL. II, ST. MARK

ADVERTISEMENT

THE. following Compilation not being admissible into the Library of the Fathers from the date of some few of the authors introduced into it, the Editors of the latter work have been led to publish it in a separate form, being assured that those who have subscribed to their Translations of the entire Treatises of the ancient Catholic divines, will not feel less interest, or find less benefit, in the use of so very judicious and beautiful a selection from them. The Editors refer to the Preface for some account of the natural and characteristic excellences of the work, which will be found as useful in the private study of the Gospels, as it is well adapted for family reading, and full of thought for those who are engaged in religious instruction.

Oxford, May 6, 1841.

PREFACE

THE. Remarks prefixed to the first volume of this Translation of the Aurea Catena, apply in their substance to the following portion of it, which contains the Commentary on S. Mark. Wherever the variations from the original writers were such as to destroy the sense of the passage, the true reading has been followed, and has been placed in the margin. In other cases the text has been translated, as it is found in S. Thomas.

Many of the passages ascribed to S. Chrysostom are not found in the works of that Father. Most of these occur also in a Greek Catena on S. Mark, published by Possinus, from a MS. in the Library of the Archbishop of Tolouse, and still more of them in the Edition which has been recently printed by the Oxford University Press, from a MS. in the Bodleian. A Latin Version of this Catena or Commentary had previously been published by Peltanus, and is found in the Bibliotheca Patrum; and contains far the greater number of the same passages marked as S. Chrysostom’s in the Catena Aurea. It is commonly ascribed to Victor of Antioch; though by some, with little probability, to S. Cyril of Alexandria. A Commentary on a portion of S. Mark published by Wastel, who gives the authorship of it and of the Opus Imperfectum in Matthæum to John of Jerusalem, also contains a number of the same passages which S. Thomas ascribes to S. Chrysostom.

Some of the extracts marked “Cyril” are found in a Commentary of S. Cyril of Alexandria on S. Luke, lately published by Mai.

The passages ascribed to S. Jerome, are taken from a Commentary found among his works, but universally pronounced to be spurious. It has been ascribed to Pelagius, but with more probability to Philippus Presbyter, a friend and disciple of S. Jerome. It is entirely mystical, and is in many places hopelessly obscure.

For the translation of the Volume now presented to the reader, the Editors have to make their acknowledgments to JOHN DOBRÉE DALGAIRNS. M. A. of Exeter College.

J. H. N.

PREFACE TO THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MARK

ISAIAH. 49:5, 6.

My God shall be my strength. And he said, It is a light thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to restore the preserved of Israel: I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth.

THE. Prophet Isaiah foretells in a clear prophecy the calling of the Gentiles, and the cause of their salvation, saying, My God shall be my strength. And he said, &c.

JEROME. (Comm. in Esa.) In which words, it is shewn that Christ is called a servant, because He is formed from the womb. For, before these words it is said: Thus saith the Lord, that formed me from the womb to be his servant. It had indeed been the will of the Father, that the wicked tillers of the vineyard should receive the Son whom He had sent; wherefore Christ says of them to His disciples, Go not into the way of the Gentiles, but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. (Mat. 10:5, 6) Because then Israel was not brought back to God, for that reason the Son of God speaks to the unbelieving Jews, saying, My God shall be my strength, who also has consoled me on the casting away of my people. And he hath said to me, It is a small thing that thou shouldest be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, which have fallen by their own wickedness, and to restore the preserved, or remnant of Israel. For instead of them, I have given thee for a light to all the Gentiles, that thou shouldest illuminate the whole world, and shouldest cause my salvation, by which men are saved, to reach to the ends of the world.

GLOSS. (non occ.) From the words then, which have been quoted, we can infer two things; first, the divine virtue which was in Christ, by which He was able to lighten the Gentiles; for it is said, My God shall be my strength. (2 Cor. 5:19) God therefore was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself, as the Apostle says to the Corinthians; whence also the Gospel, by which believers are saved, is the power of God unto salvation, to every one who believeth, (Rom. 1:16) as the same Apostle says to the Romans. The second thing is, the enlightening of the Gentiles, and the salvation of the world, fulfilled by Christ, according to the will of the Father; for it is said, I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles. Wherefore the Lord after His resurrection, that He might fulfil the will of the Father, sent His disciples to preach, saying, Go ye, and teach all nations; some He sent to the Jews, some received the ministry of preaching to the Gentiles. But because it was right that the Gospel should not only be preached for those who then lived, but also be written for those who were to come, the same distinction is observed in the writers of the Gospel. For Matthew wrote the Gospel to the Jews in Hebrew, and Mark was the first to write a Gospel amongst the Gentiles.

EUSEBIUS. (Hist. Eccles. 2.15) For when the glorious light of the word of God had arisen over the city of Rome, the doctrine of truth and of light, which Peter was then preaching to them, so shone upon the minds of all, by their patience in listening, that they heard him daily without ever being weary. Whence also they were not content with hearing only, but they earnestly beg of Mark his disciple, to commit to writing those things which he preached by word of mouth, that they might have a perpetual memorial of them, and might continue both at home and abroad in meditations of this sort upon the word. And they did not leave off their importunities, till they obtained what they had requested. This then was the cause of the writing of the Gospel of Mark. But Peter, when by the Holy Ghost he discovered the pious theft which had been put upon him, was filled with joy, for he saw by this, their faith and devotion; and he gave his sanction to what was done, and handed down the writing to the Churches, to be read for ever.

PSEUDO-JEROME. (sup. Marc. in Præfat.) He begins at once with the announcement of the more perfect age of Christ, nor does he spend his labour on the birth of Christ as a little child, for he speaks of his perfection as the Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iv. in Matt) But he makes a compendious and brief beginning, in which he has imitated his master Peter, who was a lover of brevity.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Evan. i. 3) Matthew, who had undertaken to relate what concerned the kingly person of Christ, had Mark assigned to him for a companion and an abbreviator, who was to attend upon his steps. For it belongs to kings not to be without a train of attendants. Since again the priest used to enter alone into the Holy of Holies, Luke, whose design had regard to the priesthood of Christ, had no companion to follow his steps, and in a manner to abbreviate his narration.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 1) It is also to be observed, that the holy Evangelists have each fixed upon a different commencement for their narration, and each a different ending. For Matthew, setting out from the beginning of the preaching of the Gospel, has carried on the thread of his narrative up to the time of our Lord's resurrection. Mark, beginning with the first preaching of the Gospel, goes on to the ascension of the Lord, and the preaching of His disciples to all nations throughout the world. But Luke, commencing with the birth of the Forerunner, has ended with our Lord's ascension. John, taking his beginning from the eternity of the Word of God, reaches in his Gospel up to the time of the Lord's resurrection.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. in Præfat. v. vol. i. p. viii.) Because then Mark began with expressing the divine power, he is rightly represented under the figure of a lion.

REMIGIUS. Mark is signified by the lion; for as a lion sends forth his dreadful voice in the wilderness, so Mark begins with the voice in the wilderness, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Evan. i. 6) Although the figure might also be otherwise interpreted. For Mark did not wish to relate either his kingly race, as Matthew did, who for this is figured by a lion, or his priestly kindred, or consecration, as Luke, figured by a calf; yet he is shewn to have had for his subject the things which the man Christ did, and therefore appears to be signified by the figure of a man, in the four animals.

THEOPHYLACT. (in Marc. in Præfat.) Or, the eagle points out the Gospel according to Mark, for it begins with the prophecy of John; for prophecy views with acuteness things which are afar, as an eagle.

COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. MARK

CHAPTER 1

1:1

Ver. 1. The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.

JEROME. (in Prolog.) Mark the Evangelist, who served the priesthood in Israel, according to the flesh a Levite, having been converted to the Lord, wrote his Gospel in Italy, shewing in it how even his family benefited Christ. For, commencing his Gospel with the voice of the prophetic cry, he shews the order of the election of Levi, declaring that John the son of Zachariah was sent forth by the voice of an angel, and saying, The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, the Son of God.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The Greek word ‘Evangelium’ means good tidings, in Latin it is explained, ‘bona annunciatio,’ or, the good news; these terms properly belong to the kingdom of God and to the remission of sins; for the Gospel is that, by which comes the redemption of the faithful and the beatitude of the saints. But the four Gospels are one, and one Gospel is four. In Hebrew, His name is Jesus, in Greek, Soter, in Latin, Salvator; but men say Christus in Greek, Messias in Hebrew, Unctus in Latin, that is, King and Priest.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 1) The beginning of this Gospel should be compared with that of Matthew, in which it is said, The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the Son of David, the Son of Abraham. But here He is called the Son of God. Now from both we must understand one Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, and of man. And fitly the first Evangelist names Him Son of man, the second, Son of God, that from less things our sense may by degrees mount up to greater, and by faith and the sacraments of the human nature assumed, rise to the acknowledgment of His divine eternity. Fitly also did He, who was about to describe His human generation, begin with a son of man, namely, David or Abraham. Fitly again, he who was beginning his book with the first preaching of the Gospel, chose rather to call Jesus Christ, the Son of God; for it belonged to the human nature to take upon

Him the reality of our flesh, of the race of the patriarchs, and it was the work of Divine power to preach the Gospel to the world.

HILARY. (de Trin. iii. 11) He has testified, that Christ was the Son of God, not in name only, but by His own proper nature. We are the sons of God, but He is not a son as we are; for He is the very and proper Son, by origin, not by adoption; in truth, not in name; by birth, not by creation.

1:2–3

2. (Mal. 3:1) As it is written in the Prophets, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee.

3. The voice of one crying in the wilderness, (Isa. 40:3) Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Being about to write his Gospel, Mark rightly puts first the testimonies of the Prophets, that he might notify to all, that what he should write was to be received without scruple of doubt, in that he shewed that these things were beforehand foretold by the Prophets. At once, by one and the same beginning of his Gospel, he prepared the Jews, who had received the Law and the Prophets, for receiving the grace of the Gospel, and those sacraments, which their own prophecies had foretold; and he also calls upon the Gentiles, who came to the Lord by publishing of the Gospel, to receive and venerate the authority of the Law and the Prophets; whence he says, As it is written in the prophet Isaiah, Behold, &c.

JEROME. (ad Pammach. Epist. 57) But this is not written in Isaiah, but in Malachi, the last of the twelve prophets.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. c. Cat. in Marc.) But it may be said that it is a mistake of the writer. Otherwise it may be said, that he has compressed into one, two prophecies delivered in different places by two prophets; for in the prophet Isaiah it is written after the story of Hezekiah, The voice of one crying in the wilderness; but in Malachi, Behold, I send mine angel. The Evangelist therefore, taking parts of two prophecies, has put them down as spoken by Isaiah, and refers them here to one passage, without mentioning, however, by whom it is said, Behold, I send mine angel.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. nov. et vet. Test. lvii.) For knowing that all things are to be referred to their author, he has brought these sayings back to Isaiah, who was the first to intimate the sense. Lastly, after the words of Malachi, he immediately subjoins, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, in order to connect the words of each prophet, belonging as they do to one meaning, under the person of the elder prophet.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or otherwise, we must understand, that, although these words are not found in Isaiah, still the sense of them is found in many other places, and most clearly in this which he has subjoined, The voice of one crying in the wilderness. For that which Malachi has called, the angel to be sent before the face of the Lord, to prepare His way, is the same thing as Isaiah has said is to be heard, the voice of one crying in the wilderness, saying, Prepare ye the way of the Lord. But in each sentence alike, the way of the Lord to be prepared is proclaimed. It may be, too, that Isaiah occurred to the mind of Mark, in writing his Gospel, instead of Malachi, as often happens; which he would, however, without doubt correct, at least when reminded by other persons, who might read his work whilst he was yet in the flesh; unless he thought, that, since his memory was then ruled by the Holy Spirit, it was not without a purpose, that the name of one prophet had occurred to him instead of another. For thus whatsoever things the Holy Spirit spoke by the prophets, are implied each to have belonged to all, and all to each.

JEROME. By Malachi, therefore, the voice Πνεύμκτος Ἅγιου of the Holy Spirit resounds to the Father concerning the Son, who is the countenance of the Father by which He has been known.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But John is called an angel not by community of nature, according to the heresy of Origena, but by the dignity of his office; for angel in Greek is in Latin, nuntius, (messenger,) by which name that man is rightly called, who was sent by God, that he might bear witness of the light, and announce to the world the Lord, coming in the flesh: since it is evident that all who are priests may by their office of preaching the Gospel be called angels, as the prophet Malachi says, The lips of the priest keep knowledge, and they seek the law at his mouth, because he is the Angel of the Lord of hosts. (Mal. 2:7)

THEOPHYLACT. The Forerunner of Christ, therefore, is called an angel, on account of his angelic life and lofty reverence. Again, where he says, Before thy face, it is as if he said, Thy messenger is near thee: whence is shewn the intimate connection of the Forerunner with Christ; for those walk next to kings, who are their greatest friends. There follows, Who will prepare thy way before thee. For by baptism he prepared the minds of the Jews to receive Christ.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or, the way of the Lord, by which He comes into men, is penitence, by which God comes down to us, and we mount up to Him. And for this reason the beginning of John’s preaching was, Repent ye.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But as John might be called an angel, because he went before the face of the Lord by his preaching, so he might also be rightly called a voice, because, by his sound, he preceded the Word of the Lord. Wherefore there follows, The voice of one crying, &c. For it is an acknowledged thing that the Only-Begotten Son is called the Word of the Father, and even we, from having uttered words ourselves, know that the voice sounds first, in order that the word may afterwards be heard.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But it is called the voice of one crying, for we are wont to use a cry to deaf persons, and to those afar off, or when we are indignant, all which things we know applied to the Jews; for salvation is far from the wicked, and they stopped their ears like deaf adders, and deserved to hear indignation, and wrath, and tribulation from Christ.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e. Cat. in Marc.) But the prophecy, by saying, In the wilderness, plainly shews that the divine teaching was not in Jerusalem, but in the wilderness, which was fulfilled to the letter by John the Baptist in the wilderness of Jordan, preaching the healthful appearing of the Word of God. (non occ.). The word of prophecy also shews, that besides the wilderness, which was pointed out by Moses, where he made paths, there was another wilderness, in which it proclaimed that the salvation of Christ was present.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else the voice and the cry is in the desert, because they were deserted by the Spirit of God, as a house empty, and swept out; deserted also by prophet, priest, and king.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) What he cried is revealed, in that which is subjoined, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight. For whosoever preaches a right faith and good works, what else does he but prepare the way for the Lord’s coming to the hearts of His hearers, that the power of grace might penetrate these hearts, and the light of truth shine in them? And the paths he makes straight, when he forms pure thoughts in the soul by the word of preaching.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, that is, act out repentance and preach it; make his paths straight, that walking in the royal road, we may love our neighbours as ourselves, and ourselves as our neighbours. For he who loves himself, and loves not his neighbour, turns aside to the right; for many act well, and do not correct their neighbour well, as Eli. He, on the other hand, who, hating himself, loves his neighbour, turns aside to the left; for many, for instance, rebuke well, but act not well themselves, as did the Scribes and Pharisees. Paths are mentioned after the way, because moral commands are laid open after penitence.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, the way is the New Testament, and the paths are the Old, because it is a trodden path. For it was necessary to be prepared for the way, that is, for the New Testament; but it was right that the paths of the Old Testament should be straightened.

1:4–8

4. John did baptize in the wilderness, and preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins.

5. And there went out unto him all the land of Judæa, and they of Jerusalem, and were all baptized of him in the river of Jordan, confessing their sins.

6. And John was clothed with camel’s hair, and with a girdle of a skin about his loins; and he did eat locusts and wild honey;

7. And preached, saying, There cometh one mightier than I after me, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to stoop down and unloose.

8. I indeed have baptized you with water: but he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost.

PSEUDO-JEROME. According to the above-mentioned prophecy of Isaiah, the way of the Lord is prepared by John, through faith, baptism, and penitence; the paths are made straight by the rough marks of the hair-cloth garment, the girdle of skin, the feeding on locusts and wild honey, and the most lowly voice; whence it is said, John was in the wilderness. For John and Jesus seek what is lost in the wilderness; where the devil conquered, there he is conquered; where man fell, there he rises up. But the name John means the grace of God, and the narrative begins with grace. For it goes on to say, baptizing. For by baptism grace is given, seeing that by baptism sins are freely remitted. But what is brought to perfection by the bridegroom, is introduced by the friend of the bridegroom. Thus catechumens, (which word means persons instructed,) begin by the ministry of the priest, receive the chrismb from the bishop. And to shew this, it is subjoined, And preaching the baptism of repentance, &c.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 2) It is evident that John not only preached, but also gave to some the baptism of repentance; but he could not give baptism for the remission of sinsc. For remission of sins is only given to us by the baptism of Christ. It is therefore only said, Preaching the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins; for he preached a baptism which could remit sins, since he could not give it. Wherefore as he was the forerunner of the Incarnate Word of the Father, by the word of his preaching, so by his baptism, which could not remit sins, he preceded that baptism, of penitence, by which sins are remitted.

THEOPHYLACT. The baptism of John had not remission of sins, but only brought men to penitence. He preached therefore the baptism of repentance, that is, he preached that to which the baptism of penitence led, namely, remission of sins, that they who in penitence received Christ, might receive Him to the remission of their sins.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Now by John as by the bride-groom's friend, the bride is brought to Christ, as by a servant Rebecca was brought to Isaac; wherefore there follows, And there went out to him all, (Gen. 24:61) &c. For confession and beauty are in his presence, (Ps. 95:6. Vulg.) that is, the presence of the bridegroom. And the bride leaping down from her camel signifies the Church, who humbles herself on seeing her husband Isaac, that is, Christ. But the interpretation of Jordan, where sins are washed away, is 'an alien descent.' For we heretofore aliens to God by pride, are by the sign (symbolum) of Baptism made lowly, and thus exalted on highd.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) An example of confessing their sins and of promising to lead a new life, is held out to those who desire to be baptized, by those words which follow, confessing their sins.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because indeed John preached repentance, he wore the marks of repentance in his garment and in his food, wherefore there follows, And John was clothed in camel's hair.

BEDE. It says, clothed in a garment of hair, not in woollen clothes; the former is the mark of an austere garb, the latter of effeminate luxury. But the girdle of skins, with which he was girt, like Elias, is a mark of mortification. And this meat, locusts and wild honey, is suited to a dweller in the wilderness, so that his object in eating was not the deliciousness of meats, but the satisfying of the necessity of human flesh.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The dress of John, his food, and employment, signifies the austere life of preachers, and that future nations are to be joined to the grace of God, which is John, both in their minds and in externals. For by camel's hair, is meant the rich among the nations; and by the girdle of skin, the poor, dead to the world; and by the wandering locusts, the wise men of this world; who, leaving the dry stalks to the Jews, draw off with their legs the mystic grain, and in the warmth of their faith leap up towards heaven; and the faithful, being inspired by the wild honey, are full-fed from the untilled wood.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else; The garment of camel's hair was significative of grief, for John pointed out, that he who repented should mourn. For sackcloth signifies grief; but the girdle of skins shews the dead state of the Jewish people. The food also of John not only denotes abstinence, but also shews forth the intellectual food, which the people then were eating, without understanding any thing lofty, but continually raising themselves on high, and again sinking to the earth. For such is the nature of locusts, leaping on high and again falling. In the same way the people ate honey, which had come from bees, that is, from the prophets; it was not however domestic, but wild, for the Jews had the Scriptures, which are as honey, but did not rightly understand them.

GREGORY. (Moral. xxxi. 25) Or, by the kind itself of his food he pointed out the Lord, of whom he was the forerunner; for in that our Lord took to Himself the sweetness of the barren Gentiles, he ate wild honey. In that He in His own person partly converted the Jews, He received locusts for His food, which suddenly leaping up, at once fall to the ground. For the Jews leaped up when they promised to fulfil the precepts of the Lord; but they fell to the ground, when by their evil works they affirmed that they had not heard them. They made therefore a leap upwards in words, and fell down by their actions.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The dress and food of John may also express of what kind was his inward walk. For he used a dress more austere than was usual, because he did not encourage the life of sinners by flattery, but chid them by the vigour of his rough rebuke; he had a girdle of skin round his loins, for he was one, who crucified his flesh with the affections and lusts. (Gal. 5:24) He used to cat locusts and wild honey, because his preaching had some sweetness for the multitude, whilst the people debated whether he was the Christ himself or not; but this soon came to an end, when his hearers understood that he was not the Christ, but the forerunner and prophet of Christ. For in honey there is sweetness, in locusts swiftness of flight; whence there follows, And he preached, saying, there cometh one mightier than I after me.

GLOSS. (non occ.) He said this to do away with the opinion of the crowd, who thought that he was the Christ; but he announces that Christ is mightier than he, who was to remit sins, which he himself could not do.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Who again is mightier than the grace, by which sins are washed away, which John signifies? He who seven times and seventy times seven remits sin. Grace indeed comes first, but remits sins once only by baptism, but mercy reaches to the wretched from Adam up to Christ through seventy-seven generations, and up to one hundred and forty-four thousand. (Mat. 18:22)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But lest he should be thought to say this by way of comparing himself to Christ, he subjoins, Of whom I am not worthy, &c. It is not however the same thing to loose the shoe-latchet, which Mark here says, and to carry his shoes, which Matthew says. And indeed the Evangelists following the order of the narrative, and not able to err in any thing, say that John spoke each of these sayings in a different sense. But commentators on this passage have expounded each in a different way. For he means by the latchet, the tie of the shoe. (non occ.). He says this therefore to extol the excellence of the power of Christ, and the greatness of His divinity; as if he said, Not even in the station of his servant am I worthy to be reckoned. For it is a great thing to contemplate, as it were stooping down, those things which belong to the body of Christ, and to see from below the image of things above, and to untie each of those mysteries, about the Incarnation of Christ, which cannot be unravelled.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The shoe is in the extremity of the body; for in the end the Incarnate Saviour is coming for justice, whence it is said by the prophet, Over Edom will I cast out my shoe. (Ps. 60:9)

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evan. vii.) Shoes also are made from the skins of dead animals. The Lord, therefore, coming incarnate, appeared us it were with shoes on His feet, for He assumed in His divinity the dead skins of our corruption. Or else; it was a custom among the ancients, that if a man refused to take as his wife the woman whom he ought to take, he who offered himself as her husband by right of kindred took off that man's shoe. Rightly then does he proclaim himself unworthy to loose his shoe-latchet, as if he said openly, I cannot make bare the feet of the Redeemer, for I usurp not the name of the Bridegroom, a thing which is above my deserts.

THEOPHYLACT. Some persons also understand it thus; all who came to John, and were baptized, through penitence were loosed from the bands of their sins by believing in Christ. John then in this way loosed the shoe-latchet of all the others, that is, the bands of sin. But Christ's shoe-latchet he was not able to unloose, because he found no sin in Him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Thus then John proclaims the Lord not yet as God, or the Son of God, but only as a man mightier than himself. For his ignorant hearers were not yet capable of receiving the hidden things of so great a Sacrament, that the eternal Son of God, having taken upon Him the nature of man, had been lately born into the world of a virgin; but gradually by the acknowledgment of His glorified lowliness, they were to be introduced to the belief of His Divine Eternity. To these words, however, he subjoins, as if covertly declaring that he was the true God, I baptize you with water, but he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost. For who can doubt, that none other but God can give the grace of the Holy Ghost.

JEROME. For what is the difference between water and the Holy Ghost, who was borne over the face of the waters? Water is the ministry of man; but the Spirit is ministered by God.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now we are baptized by the Lord in the Holy Ghost, not only when in the day of our baptism, we are washed in the fount of life, to the remission of our sins, but also daily by the grace of the same Spirit we are inflamed, to do those things which please God.

1:9–11

9. And it came to pass in those days, that Jesus came from Nazareth of Galilee, and was baptized of John in Jordan.

10. And straightway coming up out of the water, he saw the heavens opened, and the Spirit like a dove descending upon him:

11. And there came a voice from heaven, saying, Thou art my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mark the Evangelist, like a hart, longing after the fountains of water, leaps forward over places, smooth and steep; and, as a bee laden with honey, he sips the tops of the flowers. Wherefore he hath shewn us in his narrative Jesus coming from Nazareth, saying, And it came to pass in those days, &c.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Forasmuch as He was ordaining a new baptism, He came to the baptism of John, which, in respect of His own baptism, was incomplete, but different from the Jewish baptism, as being between both. He did this that He might shew, by the nature of His baptism, that He was not baptized for the remission of sins, nor as wanting the reception of the Holy Ghost: for the baptism of John was destitute of both these. But He was baptized that He might be made known to all, that they might believe on Him and fulfil all righteousness, which is keeping of the commandments: for it had been commanded to men that they should submit to the Prophet’s baptism.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 4) He was baptized, that by being baptized Himself He might shew His approval of John’s baptisme, and that, by sanctifying the waters of Jordan through the descent of the dove, He might shew the coming of the Holy Ghost in the laver of believers; whence there follows, And straightway coming up out of the water, he saw the heavens opened, and the Holy Spirit like a dove descending, and resting upon him. But the heavens are opened, not by the unclosing of the elements, but to the eyes of the spirit, to which Ezekiel in the beginning of his book relates that they were opened; (Ezek. 1.) or this His seeing the heavens opened after baptism was done for our sakes, to whom the door of the kingdom of heaven is opened by the laver of regeneration.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, that from heaven sanctification might be given to men, and earthly things be joined to heavenly. But the Holy Spirit is said to have descended upon Him, not as if He then first came to Him, for He never had left Him; but that He might shew forth the Christ, Who was preached by John, and point Him out to all, as it were by the finger of faith.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This event also, in which the Holy Ghost was seen to come down upon baptism, was a sign of spiritual grace to be given to us in baptism.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But this is the anointing of Christ according to the flesh, namely, the Holy Ghost, of which anointing it is said, God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows. (Ps. 45:8)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Well indeed in the shape of a dove did the Holy Ghost come down, for it is an animal of great simplicity, and far removed from the malice of gall, that in a figure He might shew us that He looks out for simple hearts, and deigns not to dwell in the minds of the wicked.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, the Holy Ghost came down in the shape of a dove, because in the Canticles it is sung of the Church: (Cant. passim.) My bride, my love, my beloved, my dove. Bride in the Patriarchs, love in the Prophets, near of kin in Joseph and Mary, beloved in John the Baptist, dove in Christ and His Apostles: to whom it is said, Be ye wise as serpents, and harmless as doves. (Mat. 10:16)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now the Dove sat on the head of Jesus, lest any one should think that the voice of the Father was addressed to John and not to Christ. And well did he add, abiding on Him; for this is peculiar to Christ, that the Holy Ghost once filling Him should never leave Him. For sometimes to His faithful disciples the grace of the Spirit is conferred for signs of virtue, and for the working of miracles, sometimes it is taken away; though for the working of piety and righteousness, for the preservation of love to God and to one's neighbour, the grace of the Spirit is never absent. But the voice of the Father shewed, that He Himself, who came to John to be baptized with the others, was the very Son of God, willing to baptize with the Holy Spirit, whence there follows, And there came a voice from heaven, Thou art my beloved Son, in thee I am well pleased. Not that this informed the Son Himself of a thing of which He was ignorant, but it shews to us what we ought to believe.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ii. 14) Wherefore Matthew relates that the voice said, This is my beloved Son; for he wished to shew that the words, This is My Son, were in fact said, that thus the persons who heard it might know that He, and not another, was the Son of God. But, if you ask, which of these two sounded forth in that voice, take which you will, only remember, that the Evangelists, though not relating the same form of speaking, relate the same meaning. And that God delighted Himself in His Son, we are reminded in these words, In thee I am well pleased.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The same voice has taught us, that we also, by the water of cleansing, and by the Spirit of sanctification, may be made the sons of God. The mystery of the Trinity also is shewn forth in the baptism; the Son is baptized, the Spirit comes down in the shape of a dove, the voice of the Father bearing witness to the Son is heard.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Morally also it may be interpreted; we also, drawn aside from the fleeting world by the smell and purity of flowers, run with the young maidens after the bridegroom, (v. Cant. 1:2. 3.) and are washed in the sacrament of baptism, from the two fountains of the love of God, and of our neighbour, by the grace of remission, and mounting up by hope gaze upon heavenly mysteries with the eyes of a clean heart. Then we receive in a contrite and lowly spirit, with simplicity of heart, the Holy Spirit, who comes down to the meek, and abides in us, by a never-failing charity. And the voice of the Lord from heaven is directed to us the beloved of God; Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of God; (Matt. 5:9) and then the Father, with the Son and the Holy Spirit, is well-pleased with us, when we are made one spirit with God.

1:12–13

12. And immediately the spirit driveth him into the wilderness.

13. And he was there in the wilderness forty days, tempted of Satan; and was with the wild beasts; and the angels ministered unto him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom in Matt. xiii) Because all that Christ did and suffered was for our teaching, He began after His baptism to dwell in the wilderness, and fought against the devil, that every baptized person might patiently sustain greater temptations after His baptism, nor be troubled, as if this which happened to Him was contrary to His expectation, but might bear up against all things, and come off conqueror. For although God allows that we should be tempted for many other reasons, yet for this cause also He allows it, that we may know, that man when tempted is placed in a station of greater honour. For the Devil approaches not save where he has beheld one set in a place of greater honour; and therefore it is said, And immediately the Spirit drove him into the wilderness. And the reason why He does not simply say, that He went into the wilderness, but was driven, is, that thou mayest understand that it was done according to the word of Divine Providence. By which also He shews, that no man should thrust himself into temptation, but that those who from some other state are as it were driven into temptation, remain conquerors.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 5) And that no one might doubt, by what spirit he said that Christ was driven into the wilderness, Luke has on purpose premised, that Jesus being full of the Spirit returned from Jordan, (Luke 4:12) and then has added, and was led by the Spirit into the wilderness; lest the evil spirit should be thought to have any power over Him, who, being full of the Holy Spirit, departed whither He was willing to go, and did what He was willing to do.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Mat. Hom. xiii) But the Spirit drove Him into the wilderness, because He designed to provoke the devil to tempt Him, and thus gave Him an opportunity not only by hunger, but also by the place. For then most of all does the devil thrust himself in, when he sees men remaining solitary.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But He retires into the desert that He may teach us that, leaving the allurements of the world, and the company of the wicked, we should in all things obey the Divine commands. He is left alone and tempted by the devil, that He might teach us, that all that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution; (2 Tim. 3:12) whence it follows, And he was in the wilderness forty days and forty nights, and was tempted of Satan. But He was tempted forty days and forty nights, that He might shew us, that as long as we live here and serve God, whether prosperity smile upon us, which is meant by the day, or adversity smite us, which agrees with the figure of night, at all times our adversary is at hand, who ceases not to trouble our way by temptations. For the forty days and forty nights imply the whole time of this world, for the globe in which we are serving God is divided into four quarters. Again, there are Ten Commandments, by observing which we fight against our enemy, but four times ten are forty.

There follows, and he was with the wild beasts.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But He says this to shew of what nature was the wilderness, for it was impassable by man and full of wild beasts. It goes on; and angels ministered unto him. For after temptation, and a victory against the devil, He worked the salvation of man. And thus the Apostle says, Angels are sent to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation. (Heb. 1:14) We must also observe, that to those who conquer in temptation angels stand near and minister.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Consider also that Christ dwells among the wild beasts as man, but, as God, uses the ministry of Angels. Thus, when in the solitude of a holy life we bear with unpolluted mind the bestial manners of men, we merit to have the ministry of Angels, by whom, when freed from the body, we shall be transferred to everlasting happiness.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or, then the beasts dwell with us in peace, as in the ark clean animals with the unclean, when the flesh lusts not against the spirit. After this, ministering Angels are sent to us, that they may give answers and comforts to hearts that watch.

1:14–15

14. Now after that John was put in prison, Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the kingdom of God,

15. And saying, The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the Gospel.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. 1 Marc.) The Evangelist Mark follows Matthew in his order, and therefore after having said that Angels minister, he subjoins, But after that John was put into prison, Jesus came, &c. After the temptation and the ministry of Angels, He goes back into Galilee, teaching us not to resist the violence of evil men.

THEOPHYLACT. And to shew us that in persecutions we ought to retire, and not to await them; but when we fall into them, we must sustain them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He retired also that He might keep Himself for teaching and for healing, before He suffered, and after fulfilling all these things, might become obedient unto death.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) John being put in prison, fitly does the Lord begin to preach: wherefore there follows, Preaching the Gospel, &c. For when the

Law ceases, the Gospel arises in its steps.

PSEUDO-JEROME. When the shadow ceases, the truth comes on; first, John in prison, the Law in Judæa; then, Jesus in Galilee, Paul among the Gentiles preaching the Gospel of the kingdom. For to an earthly kingdom succeeds poverty, to the poverty of Christians is given an everlasting kingdom; but earthly honour is like the foam of water, or smoke, or sleep.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Let no one, however, suppose that the putting of John in prison took place immediately after the forty days' temptation and the fast of the Lord; for whosoever reads the Gospel of John will find, that the Lord taught many things before the putting of John in prison, and also did many miracles; for you have in his Gospel, This beginning of miracles did Jesus; (John 2:11) and afterwards, for John was not yet cast into prison. (John 3:24) Now it is said, that when John read the books of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, he approved indeed the text of the history, and affirmed that they had spoken truth, but said that they had composed the history of only one year after John was cast into prison, in which year also he suffered. Passing over then the year of which the transactions had been published by the three others, he related the events of the former period, before John was cast into prison. When therefore Mark had said that Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the kingdom, he subjoins, saying, Since the time is fulfilled, &c.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. Cat. in Marc.) Since then the time was fulfilled, when the fulness of time was come, and God sent his Son, it was fitting that the race of man should obtain the last dispensation of God. And therefore he says, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand. (Orig. in Matt. tom. x. 14. v. Orig. de Orat. 25, 26. in Matt. t. 12 14). But the kingdom of God is essentially the same as the kingdom of heaven, though they differ in idea. For by the kingdom of God is to be understood that in which God reigns; (non occ. v. Chrys, in Matt. Hom. 19. in c. 6:9.). and this in truth is in the region of the living, where, seeing God face to face, they will abide in the good things now promised to them; whether by this region one chooses to understand Love, or some other confirmatione of those who put on the likeness of things above, which are signified by the heavens. () For it is clear enough that the kingdom of God is confined neither by place nor by time.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, the Lord means that the time of the Law is completed; as if He said, Up to this time the Law was at work; from this time the kingdom of God will work, that is, a conversation according to the Gospel, which is with reason likened to the kingdom of heaven. For when you see a man clothed in flesh living according to the Gospel, do you not say that he has the kingdom of heaven, which is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost? (Rom. 14:17)

The next word is, Repent.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For he must repent, who would keep close to eternal good, that is, to the kingdom of God. For he who would have the kernel, breaks the shell; the sweetness of the apple makes up for the bitterness of its root; the hope of gain makes the dangers of the sea pleasant; the hope of health takes away from the painfulness of medicine. They are able worthily to proclaim the preaching of Christ who have deserved to attain to the reward of forgiveness; and therefore after He has said, Repent, He subjoins, and believe the Gospel. For unless ye have believed, ye shall not understand.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Repent, therefore, and believe; that is, renounce dead works; for of what use is believing without good works? The merit of good works does not, however, bring to faith, but faith begins, that good works may follow.

1:16–20

16. Now as he walked by the sea of Galilee, he saw Simon and Andrew his brother casting a net into the sea: for they were fishers.

17. And Jesus said unto them, Come ye after me, and I will make you to become fishers of men.

18. And straightway they forsook their nets, and followed him.

19. And when he had gone a little farther thence, he saw James the son of Zebedee, and John his brother, who also were in the ship mending their nets.

20. And straightway he called them: and they left their father Zebedee in the ship with the hired servants, and went after him.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist, having mentioned the preaching of Christ to the multitude, goes on to the calling of the disciples, whom he made ministers of his preaching, whence it follows, And passing along the sea of Galilee, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. As the Evangelist John relates, Peter and Andrew were disciples of the Forerunner, but seeing that John had borne witness to Jesus, they joined themselves to him; afterwards, grieving that John had been cast into prison, they returned to their trade. Wherefore there follows, casting nets into the sea, for they were fishers. Look then upon them, living on their own labours, not on the fruits of iniquity; for such men were worthy to become the first disciples of Christ; whence it is subjoined, And Jesus said unto them, Come ye after me. Now He calls them for the second time; for this is the second calling in respect of that, of which we read in John. But it is shewn to what they were called, when it is added, I will make you become fishers of men.

REMIGIUS. For by the net of holy preaching they drew fish, that is, men, from the depths of the sea, that is, of infidelity, to the light of faith. Wonderful indeed is this fishing! for fishes when they are caught, soon after die; when men are caught by the word of preaching, they rather are made alive.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 6) Now fishers and unlettered men are sent to preach, that the faith of believers might be thought to lie in the power of God, not in eloquence or in learning. It goes on to say, and immediately they left their nets, and followed him.

THEOPHYLACT. For we must not allow any time to lapse, but at once follow the Lord. After these again, He catches James and John, because they also, though poor, supported the old age of their father. Wherefore there follows, And when he had gone a little farther thence, he saw James the son of Zebedee, &c. But they left their father, because he would have hindered them in following Christ. Do thou, also, when thou art hindered by thy parents, leave them, and come to God. It is shewn by this that Zebedee was not a believer; but the mother of the Apostles believed, for she followed Christ, when Zebedee was dead.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) It may be asked, how he could call two fishers from each of the boats, (first, Peter and Andrew, then having gone a little further, the two others, sons of Zebedee,) when Luke says that James and John were called to help Peter and Andrew, and that it was to Peter only that Christ said, Fear not, from this time thou shalt catch men; (Luke 5:10) he also says, that at the same time, when they had brought their ships to land, they followed him. We must therefore understand that that transaction which Luke intimates happened first, and afterwards that they, as their custom was, had returned to their fishing. So that what Mark here relates happened afterwards; for in this case they followed the Lord, without drawing their boats ashore, (which they would have done had they meant to return,) and followed Him, as one calling them, and ordering them to follow.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Further, we are mystically carried away to heaven, like Elias, by this chariot, drawn by these fishers, as by four horses. On these four corner-stones the first Church is built; in these, as in the four Hebrew letters, (יהוה) we acknowledge the tetragrammaton, the name of the Lord, we who are commanded, after their example, to hear the voice of the Lord, and to forget (Ps. 45:11) the people of wickedness, and the house of our fathers' conversation, which is folly before God, and the spider's net, in the meshes of which we, like gnats, were all but fallen, and were confined by things vain as the air, which hangs on nothing; loathing also the ship of our former walk. For Adam, our forefather according to the flesh, is clothed with the skins of dead beasts; but now, having put off the old man, with his deeds, following the new man we are clothed with those skins of Solomon, with which the bride rejoices that she has been made beautiful. (Cant. 1:4. Vulg.) Again, Simon, means obedient; Andrew, manly; James, supplanter;f John, grace; by which four names, we are knit together into God's host;g by obedience, that we may listen; by manliness, that we do battle; by overthrowing, that we may persevere; by grace, that we may be preserved. (supplantatione) Which four virtues are called cardinal; for by prudence, we obey; by justice, we bear ourselves manfully; by temperance, we tread the serpent underfoot; by fortitude, we earn the grace of God.

THEOPHYLACT. We must know also, that action is first called, then contemplation; for Peter is the type of the active life, for he was more ardent than the others, just as the active life is the more bustling; but John is the type of the contemplative life, for he speaks more fully of divine things.

1:21–22

21. And they went into Capernaum; and straightway on the sabbath day he entered into the synagogue, and taught.

22. And they were astonished at his doctrine: for he taught them as one that had authority, and not as the Scribes.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mark, arranging the sayings of the Gospel as they were in his own mind, not in themselves, quits the order of the history, and follows the order of the mysteries. Wherefore he relates the first miracle on the sabbath day, saying, And they go into Capernaum.

THEOPHYLACT. Quitting Nazareth. Now on the sabbath day, when the Scribes were gathered together, he entered into a synagogue, and taught. Wherefore there follows, And straightway on the sabbath day, having entered into the synagogue, he taught them. For for this end the Law commanded them to give themselves up to rest on the sabbath day, that they might meet together to attend to sacred reading. Again, Christ taught them by rebuke, not by flattery as did the Pharisees; wherefore it says, And they were astonished at his doctrine; for he taught them as one having power, and not as the Scribes. He taught them also in power, transforming men to good, and He threatened punishment to those who did not believe on Him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Scribes themselves taught the people what was written in Moses and the Prophets: but Jesus as the God and Lord of Moses himself, by the freedom of His own will, either added those things which appeared wanting in the Law, or altered things as He preached to the people; as we read in Matthew, It was said to them of old time, but I say unto you. (Mat. 5:27)

1:23–28

23. And there was in their synagogue a man with an unclean spirit; and he cried out,

24. Saying, Let us alone; what have we to do with thee, thou Jesus of Nazareth? art thou come to destroy us? I know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God.

25. And Jesus rebuked him, saying, Hold thy peace, and come out of him.

26. And when the unclean spirit had torn him, and cried with a loud voice, he came out of him.

27. And they were all amazed, insomuch that they questioned among themselves, saying, What thing is this? what new doctrine is this? for with authority commandeth he even the unclean spirits, and they do obey him.

28. And immediately his fame spread abroad throughout all the region round about Galilee.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 7) Since by the envy of the devil death first entered into the world, it was right that the medicine of healing should first work against the author of death; and therefore it is said, And there was in their synagogue a man, &c.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The word Spirit is applied to an Angel, the air, the soul, and even the Holy Ghost. Lest therefore by the sameness of the name we should fall into error, he adds, unclean. And he is called unclean on account of his impiousness and far removal from God, and because he employs himself in all unclean and wicked works.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, ix. 21) Moreover, how great is the power which the lowliness of God, appearing in the form of a servant, has over the pride of devils, the devils themselves know so well, that they express it to the same Lord clothed in the weakness of flesh. For there follows, And he cried out, saying, What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth, &c. For it is evident in these words that there was in them knowledge, but there was not charity; and the reason was, that they feared their punishment from Him, and loved not the righteousness in Him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For the devils, seeing the Lord on the earth, thought that they were immediately to be judged.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else the devil so speaks, as if he said, ‘by taking away uncleanness, and giving to the souls of men divine knowledge, Thou allowest us no place in men.’

THEOPHYLACT. For to come out of man the devil considers as his own perdition; for devils are ruthless, thinking that they suffer some evil, so long as they are not troubling men. There follows, I know that thou art the Holy One of God.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) As if he said, Methinks that Thou art come; for he had not a firm and certain knowledge of the coming of God. But he calls Him holy not as one of many, for every prophet was also holy, but he proclaims that He was the One holy; by the article in Greek he shews Him to be the One, but by his fear he shews Him to be Lord of all.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For He was known to them in that degree in which He wished to be known; and He wished as much as was fitting. He was not known to them as to the holy Angels, who enjoy Him by partaking of His eternity according as He is the Word of God; but as He was to be made known in terror, to those beings from whose tyrannical power He was about to free the predestinate. He was known therefore to the devils, not in that He is eternal Life, but by some temporal effects of His Power, which might be more clear to the angelic senses of even bad spirits than to the weakness of men.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Further, the Truth did not wish to have the witness of unclean spirits; wherefore there follows, And Jesus threatened him, saying, &c. Whence a healthful precept is given to us; let us not believe devils, howsoever they may proclaim the truth. It goes on, And the unclean spirit tearing him, &c. For, because the man spoke as one in his senses and uttered his words with discretion, lest it should be thought that he put together his words not from the devil but out of his own heart, He permitted the man to be torn by the devil, that He might shew that it was the devil who spoke.

THEOPHYLACT. That they might know, when they saw it, from how great an evil the man was freed, and on account of the miracle might believe.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But it may appear to be a discrepancy, that he should have gone out of him, tearing him, or, as some copies have it, vexing him, when, according to Luke, he did not hurt him. But Luke himself says, When he had, cast him into the midst, he came out from him, without hurting him. (Luke 4:35) Wherefore it is inferred that Mark meant by vexing or tearing him, what Luke expresses, in the words, When he had cast him into the midst; so that what he goes on to say, And did not hurt him, may be understood to mean, that the tossing of his limbs and vexing, did not weaken him, as devils are wont to come out even with the cutting off and tearing away of limbs. But seeing the power of the miracle, they wonder at the newness of our Lord’s doctrine, and are roused to search into what they had heard by what they had seen. Wherefore there follows, And they all wondered &c. For miracles were done that they might more firmly believe the Gospel of the kingdom of God, which was being preached, since those who were promising heavenly joys to men on earth, were shewing forth heavenly things and divine works even on earth. For before (as the Evangelist says) He was teaching them as one who had power, and now, as the crowd witnesses, with power He commands the evil spirits, and they obey Him. (1 John 5:20. John 17:3) It goes on, And immediately His fame spread abroad, &c.

GLOSS. (non occ.) For those things which men wonder at they soon divulge, for out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. (Mat. 12:24)

PSEUDO-JEROME. Moreover, Capernaum is mystically interpreted the town of consolation, and the sabbath as rest. The man with an evil spirit is healed by rest and consolation, that the place and time may agree with his healing. This man with an unclean spirit is the human race, in which uncleanness reigned from Adam to Moses; for they sinned without law, and perished without law. (v. Rom. 5:14. 2:12) And he, knowing the Holy One of God, is ordered to hold his peace, for they knowing God did not glorify him as God, but rather served the creature than the Creator. (1:21.25) The spirit tearing the man came out of him. When salvation is near, temptation is at hand also. Pharaoh, when about to leti Israel go, pursues Israel; the devil, when despised, rises up to create scandals.

1:29–31

29. And forthwith, when they were come out of the synagogue, they entered into the house of Simon and Andrew, with James and John.

30. But Simon’s wife’s mother lay sick of a fever, and anon they tell him of her.

31. And he came and took her by the hand, and lifted her up; and immediately the fever left her, and she ministered unto them.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 7) First, it was right that the serpent’s tongue should be shut up, that it might not spread any more venom; then that the woman, who was first seduced, should be healed from the fever of carnal concupiscence. Wherefore it is said, And forthwith, when they were come out of the synagogue, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. He retired then as the custom was on the sabbath-day about evening to eat in His disciples’ house. But she who ought to have ministered was prevented by a fever. Wherefore it goes on, But Simon's wife's mother was lying sick of a fever.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (v. Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. c. 1:32) But the disciples, knowing that they were to receive a benefit by that means, without waiting for the evening prayed that Peter's mother should be healed. Wherefore there follows, who immediately tell him of her.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But in the Gospel of Luke it is written, that they besought him for her. (Luke 4:38.) For the Saviour sometimes after being asked, sometimes of His own accord, heals the sick, shewing that He always assents to the prayers of the faithful, when they pray also against bad passions, and some times gives them to understand things which they do not understand at all, or else, when they pray unto Him dutifully, forgives their want of understanding; as the Psalmist begs of God, Cleanse me, O Lord, from my secret faults. (Ps. 19:12) Wherefore He heals her at their request; for there follows, And he came and took her by the hand, and lifted her up.

THEOPHYLACT. By this it is signified, that God will heal a sick man, if he ministers to the Saints, through love to Christ.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 6, 8) But in that He gives most profusely His gifts of healing and doctrine on the sabbath day, He teaches, that He is not under the Law, but above the Law, and does not choose the Jewish sabbath, but the true sabbath, and our rest is pleasing to the Lord, if, in order to attend to the health of our souls, we abstain from slavish work, that is, from all unlawful things. It goes on, and immediately the fever left her, &c. The health which is conferred at the command of the Lord, returns at once entire, accompanied with such strength, that she is able to minister to those, of whose help she had before stood in need. Again, if we suppose that the man delivered from the devil means, in the moral way of interpretation, the soul purged from unclean thoughts, fitly does the woman cured of a fever by the command of God mean the flesh, restrained from the heat of its concupiscence by the precepts of continence.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For the fever means intemperance, from which, we the sons of the synagoguek, by the hand of discipline, and by the lifting up of our desires, are healed, and minister to the will of Him who heals us.

THEOPHYLACT. But he has a fever who is angry, and in the unruliness of his anger stretches forth his hands to do hurt; but if reason restrains his hands, he will arise, and so serve reason.

1:32–34

32. And at even, when the sun did set, they brought unto him all that were diseased, and them that were possessed with devils.

33. And all the city was gathered together at the door.

34. And he healed many that were sick of divers diseases, and cast out many devils; and suffered not the devils to speak, because they knew him.

THEOPHYLACT. Because the multitude thought that it was not lawful to heal on the sabbath day, they waited for the evening, to bring those who were to be healed to Jesus. Wherefore it is said, And at even, when the sun had set. There follows, and he healed many that were vexed with divers diseases.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Now in that he says many, all are to be understood according to the Scripture mode of expression.

THEOPHYLACT. Or he says many, because there were some faithless persons, who could not at all be cured on account of their unfaithfulness. Therefore He healed many of those who were brought, that is, all who had faith. It goes on, and cast out many devils.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Pseudo Aug. Quæst. e Vet. et Nov. Test. xvi.) For the devils knew that He was the Christ, who had been promised by the Law: for they saw in Him all the signs, which had been foretold by the Prophets; but they were ignorant of His divinity, as also were their princes, for if they had known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. (1 Cor. 2:8)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For, Him whom the devil had known as a man, wearied by His forty days’ fast, without being able by tempting Him to prove whether He was the Son of God, he now by the power of His miracles understood or rather suspected to be the Son of God. The reason therefore why he persuaded the Jews to crucify Him, was not because he did not think that He was the Son of God, but because he did not foresee that he himself was to be condemned by Christ’s death.

THEOPHYLACT. Furthermore, the reason that He forbade the devils to speak, was to teach us not to believe them, even if they say true. For if once they find persons to believe them, they mingle truth with falsehood.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) And Luke does not contradict this, when he says, that devils came out of many, crying out and saying, Thou art Christ the Son of God: (Luke 4:41) for he subjoins, And he rebuking them, suffered them not to speak; for Mark, who passes over many things for the sake of brevity, speaks about what happened subsequently to the abovementioned words.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, in a mystical sense, the setting of the sun signifies the passion of Him, who said, As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world. (John 9:5) And when the sun was going down, more demoniacs and sick persons were healed than before: because He who living in the flesh for a time taught a few Jews, has transmitted the gifts of faith and health to all the Gentiles throughout the world.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the door of the kingdom, morally, is repentance and faith, which works health for various diseases; for divers are the vices, with which the city of this world is sick.

1:35–39

35. And in the morning, rising up a great while before day, he went out, and departed into a solitary place, and there prayed.

36. And Simon and they that were with him followed after him.

37. And when they had found him, they said unto him, All men seek for thee.

38. And he said unto them, Let us go into the next towns, that I may preach there also: for therefore came I forth.

39. And he preached in their synagogues through out all Galilee, and cast out devils.

THEOPHYLACT. After that the Lord had cured the sick, He retired apart. Wherefore it is said, And rising very early in the morning, he went out and departed into a desert place. By which He taught us not to do any thing for the sake of appearance, but if we do any good, not to publish it openly. It goes on, and there prayed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Not that He required prayer; for it was He who Himself received the prayers of men; but

He did this by way of an economy, and became to us the model of good works.

THEOPHYLACT. For He shews to us that we ought to attribute to God whatever we do well, and to say to Him, Every good gift cometh down from above, (James 1:17) from Thee. It continues: And Simon followed him, and they that were with him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Luke however says, that crowds came to Christ, and spoke what Mark here relates that the Apostles said, adding, And when they came to him, they said to him, All seek thee. (Luke 4:42) But they do not contradict each other; for Christ received after the Apostles the multitude, breathlessly anxious to embrace His feet. He received them willingly, but chose to dismiss them, that the rest also might be partakers of His doctrine, as He was not to remain long in the world. And therefore there follows: And he said, Let us go into the neighbouring villages and towns, that there also I may preach.

THEOPHYLACT. For He passes on to them as being more in need, since it was not right to shut up doctrine in one place, but to throw out his rays every where. It goes on: For therefore am I come.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) In which word, He manifests the mystery of His emptying himself, (Phil. 2:7) that is, of His incarnation, and the sovereignty of His divine nature, in that He here asserts, that He came willingly into the world. Luke however says, To this end was I sent, proclaiming the Dispensation, and the good pleasure of God the Father concerning the incarnation of the Son. There follows: And he continued preaching in their synagogues, in all Galilee.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Evan. ii. 19) But by this preaching, which, he says, He continued in all Galilee, is also meant the sermon of the Lord delivered on the mount, which Matthew mentions, and Mark has entirely passed over, without giving any thing like it, save that he has repeated some sentences not in continuous order, but in scattered places, spoken by the Lord at other times.

THEOPHYLACT. He also mingled action with teaching, for whilst employed in preaching, He afterwards put to flight devils. For there follows: And casting out devils. For unless Christ shewed forth miracles, His teaching would not be believed; so do thou also, after teaching, work, that thy word be not fruitless in thyself.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again mystically if by the setting of the sun, the death of the Saviour is intended, why should not His resurrection be intended by the returning dawn? For by its clear light, He went far into the wilderness of the Gentiles, and there continued praying in the person of His faithful disciples, for He aroused their hearts by the grace of the Holy Spirit to the virtue of prayer.

1:40–45

40. And there came a leper to him, beseeching him, and kneeling down to him, and saying unto him, If thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.

41. And Jesus, moved with compassion, put forth his hand, and touched him, and saith unto him, I will; be thou clean.

42. And as soon as he had spoken, immediately the leprosy departed from him, and he was cleansed.

43. And he straitly charged him, and forthwith sent him away;

44. And saith unto him, See thou say nothing to any man: but go thy way, shew thyself to the Priest, and offer for thy cleansing those things which Moses commanded, for a testimony unto them.

45. But he went out, and began to publish it much, and to blaze abroad the matter, insomuch that Jesus could no more openly enter into the city, but was without in desert places: and they came to him from every quarter.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 7) After that the serpent-tongue of the devils was shut up, and the woman, who was first seduced, cured of a fever, in the third place, the man, who listened to the evil counsels of the woman, is cleansed from his leprosy, that the order of restoration in the Lord might be the same as was the order of the fall in our first parents; whence it goes on: And there came a leper to him, beseeching him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 19) Mark puts together circumstances, from which one may infer that he is the same as that one whom Matthew (Matt. 8:2) relates to have been cleansed, when the Lord came down from the mount, after the sermon.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 9) And because the Lord said that He came not to destroy the Law but to fulfill, (Matt. 5:17) he who was excluded by the Law, inferring that he was cleansed by the power of the Lord, shewed that that grace, which could wash away the stain of the leper, was not from the

Law, but over the Law. And truly, as in the Lord authoritative power, so in him the constancy of faith is shewn; for there follows, Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean. He falls on his face, which is at once a gesture of lowliness and of shame, to shew that every man should blush for the stains of his life. But his shame did not stifle confession; he shewed his wound, and begged for medicine, and the confession is full of devotion and of faith, for he refers the power to the will of the Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. For he said not, If thou wilt, pray unto God, but, If thou wilt, as thinking Him very God.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Moreover, he doubted of the will of the Lord, not as disbelieving His compassion, but, as conscious of his own filth, he did not presume. It goes on; But Jesus, moved with compassion, put forth his hand, and touched him, and saith unto him, I will, be thou clean. It is not, as many of the Latins think, to be taken to mean and read, I wish to cleanse thee, but that Christ should say separately, I will, and then command, be thou clean.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 25. in Matt) Further, the reason why He touches the leper, and did not confer health upon him by word alone, was, that it is said by Moses in the Law, that he who touches a leper, shall be unclean till the evening; that is, that he might shew, that this uncleanness is a natural one, that the Law was not laid down for Him, but on account of mere men. Furthermore, He shews that He Himself is the Lord of the Law; and the reason why He touched the leper, though the touch was not necessary to the working of the cure, was to shew that He gives health, not as a servant, but as the Lord.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Another reason why He touched him, was to prove that He could not be defiled, who freed others from pollution. At the same time it is remarkable, that He healed in the way in which He had been begged to heal. If thou will, says the leper, thou canst make me clean. I will, He answered, behold, thou hast My will, be clean; now thou hast at once the effect of My compassion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 25. in Matt) Moreover, by this, not only did He not take away the opinion of Him entertained by the leper, but He confirmed it; for He puts to flight the disease by a word, and what the leper had said in word, He filled up in deed; wherefore there follows, And when he had spoken, immediately, &c.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For there is no interval between the work of God and the command, because the work is in the command, for He commanded, and they were created. (Ps. 148:5) There follows: And he straitly charged him, and forthwith, &c. See thou tell no man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 25) As if He said, It is not yet time that My works should be preached, I require not thy preaching. By which He teaches us not to seek worldly honour as a reward for our works. It goes on: But go thy way, shew thyself to the chief of the priests. Our Saviour sent him to the priest for the trial of his cure, and that he might not be cast out of the temple, but still be numbered with the people in prayer. He sends him also, that he might fulfil all the parts of the Law, in order to stop the evil-speaking tongue of the Jews. He Himself indeed completed the work, leaving them to try it.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This He did in order that the priest might understand that the leper was not healed by the Law, but by the grace of God above the Law. There follows: And offer for thy cleansing what. Moses, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. He ordered him to offer the gift which they who were healed were accustomed to offer, as if for a testimony, that He was not against the Law, but rather confirmed the Law, inasmuch as He Himself worked out the precepts of the Law.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) If any one wonders, how the Lord seems to approve of the Jewish sacrifice, which the Church rejects, let him remember, that He had not yet offered His own holocaust in His passion. And it was not right that significative sacrifices should be taken away, before that which they signified was confirmed by the witness of the Apostles in their preaching, and by the faith of the believing people.

THEOPHYLACT. But the leper, although the Lord forbade him, disclosed the benefit, wherefore it goes on: But he having gone out, began to publish and to blaze abroad the tale; for the person benefited ought to be grateful, and to return thanks, even though his benefactor requires it not.

BEDE. (ubi sup. v. Greg. Moral. 19:22) Now it may well be asked, why our Lord ordered His action to be concealed, and yet it could not be kept hid for an hour? But it is to be observed, that the reason why, in doing a miracle, He ordered it to be kept secret, and yet for all that it was noised abroad, was, that His elect, following the example of His teaching, should wish indeed that in the great things which they do, they should remain concealed, but should nevertheless unwillingly be brought to light for the good of others. Not then that He wished any thing to be done, which He was not able to bring about, but, by the authority of His teaching, He gave an example of what His members ought to wish for, and of what should happen to them even against their will.

BEDE. Further, this perfect cure of one man brought large multitudes to the Lord; wherefore it is added, So that he could not any more openly enter into the city, but could only be without in desert places.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) For the leper every where proclaimed his wonderful cure, so that all ran to see and to believe on the Healer; thus the Lord could not preach the Gospel, but walked in desert places; wherefore there follows, And they came together to him from all places.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mystically, our leprosy is the sin of the first man, which began from the head, when he desired the kingdoms of the world. For covetousness is the root of all evil; wherefore Gehazi, engaged in an avaritious pursuit, is covered with leprosy.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But when the hand of the Saviour, that is, the Incarnate Word of God, is stretched out, and touches human nature, it is cleansed from the various parts of the old error.

PSEUDO-JEROME. This leprosy is cleansed on offering an oblation to the true Priest after the order of Melchisedec; for He tells us, Give alms of such things as ye have, and, behold, all things are clean unto you. (Luke 11:41) But in that Jesus could not openly enter into the city, it is meant to be conveyed, that Jesus is not manifested to those, who are enslaved to the love of praise in the broad highway, and to their own wills, but to those who with Peter go into the desert, which the Lord chose for prayer, and for refreshing His people; that is, those who quit the pleasures of the world, and all that they possess, that they may say, The Lord is my portion. But the glory of the Lord is manifested to those, who meet together on all sides, that is, through smooth ways and steep, whom nothing can separate from the love of Christ. (Rom. 8:35)

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 10) Even after working a miracle in that city, the Lord retires into the desert, to shew that He loves best a quiet life, and one far removed from the cares of the world, and that it is on account of this desire, He applied Himself to the healing of the body.

CHAPTER 2

2:1–12

1. And again he entered into Capernaum after some days; and it was noised that he was in the house.

2. And straightway many were gathered together, insomuch that there was no room to receive them, no, not so much as about the door: and he preached the word unto them.

3. And they came unto him, bringing one sick of the palsy, which was borne of four.

4. And when they could not come nigh unto him for the press, they uncovered the roof where he was: and when they had broken it up, they let down the bed wherein the sick of the palsy lay.

5. When Jesus saw their faith, he said unto the sick of the palsy, Son, thy sins be forgiven thee.

6. But there were certain of the Scribes sitting there, and reasoning in their hearts,

7. Why doth this man thus speak blasphemies? who can forgive sins but God only?

8. And immediately when Jesus perceived in his spirit that they so reasoned within themselves, he said unto them, Why reason ye these things in your hearts?

9. Whether is it easier to say to the sick of the palsy, Thy sins be forgiven thee; or to say, Arise, and take up thy bed, and walk?

10. But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins, (he saith to the sick of the palsy,)

11. I say unto thee, Arise, and take up thy bed, and go thy way into thine house.

12. And immediately he arose, took up the bed, and went forth before them all; insomuch that they were all amazed, and glorified God, saying, We never saw it on this fashion.

BEDE. (in Marc. 1. 10) Because the compassion of God deserts not even carnal persons, He accords to them the grace of His presence, by which even they may be made spiritual. After the desert, the Lord returns into the city; wherefore it is said, And again he entered into Capernaum, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 25) But Matthew writes this miracle as if it were done in the city of the Lord, whilst Mark places it in Capernaum, which would be more difficult of solution, if Matthew had also named Nazareth. But seeing that Galilee itself might be called the city of the Lord, who can doubt but that the Lord did these things in His own city, since He did them in Capernaum, a city of Galilee; particularly as Capernaum was of such importance in Galilee as to be called its metropolis? Or else, Matthew passed by the things which were done after He came into His own city, until He came to Capernaum, and so adds on the story of the paralytic healed, subjoining, And, behold, they presented to him a man sick of the palsy, after he had said that He came into His own city.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Aut. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, Matthew called Capernaum His city because He went there frequently, and there did many miracles. It goes on: And it was noised that he was in the house, &c. For the desire of hearing Him was stronger than the toil of approaching Him. After this, they introduce the paralytic, of whom Matthew and Luke speak; wherefore there follows: And they came unto him bearing one sick of the palsy, who was carried by four. Finding the door blocked up by the crowd, they could not by any means enter that way. Those who carried him, however, hoping that he could merit the grace of being healed, raising the bed with their burden, and uncovering the roof, lay him with his bed before the face of the Saviour. And this is that which is added: And when they could not lay him before him, &c. There follows: But when Jesus saw their faith, he said to the sick of the palsy, Son, thy sins be forgiven thee. He did not mean the faith of the sick man, but of his bearers; for it sometimes happens, that a man is healed by the faith of another.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) It may indeed be seen, how much each person’s own faith weighs with God, when that of another had such influence that the whole man at once rose up, healed body and soul, and by one man’s merit, another should have his sins forgiven him.

THEOPHYLACT. He saw the faith of the sick man himself, since he would not have allowed himself to be carried, unless he had had faith to be healed.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Moreover, the Lord being about to cure the man of the palsy, first loosed the chains of his sins, in order to shew that he was condemned to the loosening of his joints, because of the bonds of his sins, and could not be healed to the recovery of his limbs, unless these were first loosened. But Christ's wonderful humility calls this man, despised, weak, with all the joints of his limbs unstrung, a son, when the priests did not deign to touch him. Or at least, He therefore calls him a son, because his sins are forgiven him. It goes on: But there were certain of the scribes sitting there, and reasoning in their hearts, Why doth this man speak blasphemies?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA.a; Now they accuse Him of blasphemy, anticipating the sentence of His death: for there was a command in the Law, that whosoever blasphemed should be put to death. And this charge they laid upon Him, because He claimed for Himself the divine power of remitting sins: wherefore it is added, Who can forgive sin, save God only? For the Judge of all alone has power to forgive sin.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Who remits sin by those also to whom He has assigned the power of remitting, and therefore Christ is proved to be very God, for He is able to remit sins as God. The Jews then are in error, who although they hold the Christ both to be God, and to be able to remit sins, do not however believe that Jesus is the Christ. But the Arians err much more madly, who although overwhelmed with the words of the Evangelist, so that they cannot deny that Jesus is the Christ, and can remit sin, nevertheless fear not to deny that He is God. But He Himself, desiring to shame the traitors both by His knowledge of things hidden and by the virtue of His works, manifests Himself to be God. For there follows: And immediately when Jesus perceived in his spirit that they so reasoned, he said unto them, Why reason ye these things in your hearts? In which He shews Himself to be God, since He can know the hidden things of the heart; and in a manner though silent He speaks thus, With the same power and majesty, by which I look upon your thoughts, I can forgive the sins of men.

THEOPHYLACT. But though their thoughts were laid bare, still they remain insensible, refusing to believe that He who knew their hearts could forgive sins, wherefore the Lord proves to them the cure of the soul by that of the body, shewing the invisible by the visible, that which is more difficult by that which is easier, although they did not look upon it as such. For the Pharisees thought it more difficult to heal the body, as being more open to view; but the soul more easy to cure, because the cure is invisible; so that they reasoned thus, Lo, He does not now cure the body, but heals the unseen soul; if He had had more power, He would at once have cured the body, and not have fled for refuge to the unseen world. The Saviour, therefore, shewing that He can do both, says, Which is the easier? as if He said, I indeed by the healing of the body, which is in reality more easy, but appears to you more difficult, will prove to you the health of the soul, which is really more difficult.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) And because it is easier to say than to do, there was still manifestly something to say in opposition, for the work was not yet manifested; wherefore He subjoins, But that ye may know, &c. as if He said, Since ye doubt my word, I will bring on a work which will confirm what was unseen. But He says in a marked manner, On earth to forgive sins, that He might shew that He has joined the power of the divinity to the human nature by an inseparable union, because although He was made man, yet He remained the Word of God; and although by an economy He conversed on the earth with men, nevertheless He was not prevented from working miracles and from giving remission of sins. For His human nature did not in any thing take away from these things which essentially belonged to His Divinity, nor the Divinity hinder the Word of God from becoming on earth, according to the flesh, the Son of Man without change and in truth.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, He says, Take up thy bed, to prove the greater certainty of the miracle, shewing that it is not a mere illusion; and at the same time to shew that He not only healed, but gave strength; thus He not only turns away souls from sin, but gives them the power of working out the commandments.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) A carnal sign therefore is given, that the spiritual sign may be proved, although it belongs to the same power to do away with the distempers of both soul and body; whence it follows: And immediately he arose, took up the bed, and went forth before them all.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Further, He first healed by the remission of sins that which He had come to seek, that is, a soul, so that when they faithlessly doubted, then He might bring forward a work before them, and in this way His word might be confirmed by the work, and a hidden sign be proved by an open one, that is, the health of the soul by the healing of the body.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) We are also informed, that many sicknesses of body arise from sins, and therefore perhaps sins are first remitted, that the causes of sickness being taken away, health may be restored. For men are afflicted by fleshly troubles for five causes, in order to increase their merits, as Job and the Martyrs; or to preserve their lowliness, as Paul by the messenger of Satan; or that they may perceive and correct their sins, as Miriam, the sister of Moses, and this paralytic; or for the glory of God, as the man born blind and Lazarus; or as the beginnings of the pains of damnation, as Herod and Antiochus. But wonderful is the virtue of the Divine power, where without the least interval of time, by the command of the Saviour, a speedy health accompanies His words. Wherefore there follows: Insomuch that they were all amazed. Leaving the greater thing, that is, the remission of sins, they only wonder at that which is apparent, that is, the health of the body.

THEOPHYLACT. This is not however the paralytic, whose cure is related by John, (John 5) for he had no man with him, this one had four; he is cured in the pool of the sheep market, but this one in a house. It is the same man, however, whose cure is related by Matthew (Matt. 9) and Mark. But mystically, Christ is still in Capernaum, in the house of consolation.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Moreover, whilst the Lord is preaching in the house, there is not room for them, not even at the door, because whilst Christ is preaching in Judæa, the Gentiles are not yet able to enter to hear Him, to whom, however, though placed without, he directed the words of His doctrine by His preachers.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, the palsy is a type of the torpor, in which man lies slothful in the softness of the flesh, though desiring health.

THEOPHYLACT. If therefore I, having the powers of my mind unstrung, remain, whenever I attempt any thing good without strength, as a palsied man, and if I be raised on high by the four Evangelists, and be brought to Christ, and there hear myself called son, then also are my sins quitted by me; for a man is called the son of God because he works the commandments.

BEDE. Or else, because there are four virtues, by which a man is through an assured heart exalted so that he merits safety; which virtues some call prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice. Again, they desire to bring the palsied man to Christ, but they are impeded on every side by the crowd which is between them, because often the soul desires to be renewed by the medicine of Divine grace, but through the sluggishness of the grovelling body is held back by the hindrance of old custom. Oftentimes amidst the very sweetnesses of secret prayer, and, as it may be called, the pleasant converse with God, a crowd of thoughts, cutting off the clear vision of the mind, shuts out Christ from its sight. Let us not then remain in the lowest ground, where the crowds are bustling, but aim at the roof of the house, that is, the sublimity of the Holy Scripture, and meditate on the law of the Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. But how should I be borne to Christ, if the roof be not opened. For the roof is the intellect, which is set above all those things which are within us; here it has much earth about it in the tiles which are made of clay, I mean, earthly things: but if these be taken away, the virtue of the intellect within us is freed from its load. After this let it be let down, that is, humbled. For it does not teach us to be puffed up, because our intellect has its load cleared away, but to be humbled still more.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, the sick man is let down after the roof is opened, because, when the Scriptures are laid open to us, we arrive at the knowledge of Christ, that is, we descend to His lowliness, by the dutifulness of faith. But by the sick man being let down with his bed, it is meant that Christ should be known by man, whilst yet in the flesh. But by rising from the bed is meant the soul’s rousing itself from carnal desires, in which it was lying in sickness. To take up the bed is to bridle the flesh itself by the bands of continence, and to separate it from earthly pleasures, through the hope of heavenly rewards. But to take up the bed and to go home is to return to paradise. Or else the man, now healed, who had been sick carries back home his bed, when the soul, after receiving remission of sins, returns, even though encompassed with the body, to its internal watch over itself.

THEOPHYLACT. It is necessary to take up also one’s bed, that is the body, to the working of good. For then shall we be able to arrive at contemplation, so that our thoughts should say within us, never have we seen in this way before, that is never understood as we have done since we have been cured of the palsy; for he who is cleansed from sin, sees more purely.

13. And he went forth again by the sea side; and all the multitude resorted unto him, and he taught them.

14. And as he passed by, he saw Levi the son of Alphæus sitting at the receipt of custom, and said unto him, Follow me. And he arose and followed him.

15. And it came to pass, that as Jesus sat at meat in his house, many Publicans and sinners sat also together with Jesus and his disciples; for there were many, and they followed him.

16. And when the Scribes and Pharisees saw him eat with Publicans and sinners, they said unto his disciples, How is it that he eateth and drinketh with Publicans and sinners?

17. When Jesus heard it, he said unto them, They that are whole have no need of the physician, but they that are sick: I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) After that the Lord taught at Capernaum, He went to the sea, that He might not only set in order the life of men in towns, but also might preach the Gospel of the kingdom to those who dwelt near the sea, and might teach them to despise the restless motions of those things which pass away like the waves of the sea, and to overcome them by the firmness of faith; wherefore it is said, And he went forth again to the sea, and all the multitude, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, after the miracle, He goes to the sea, as if wishing to be alone, but the crowd runs to Him again, that thou mightest learn, that the more thou fliest from glory, the more she herself pursues thee; but if thou followest her, she will fly from thee. The Lord passing on from thence called Matthew; wherefore there follows, And as he passed by, he saw Levi the son of Alphæus sitting, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Now this is the same publican who is named by all the Evangelists; Matthew by Matthew; simply Levi by Luke; and Levi, the son of Alphæus, by Mark; for he was the son of Alphæus. And you may find persons with two names in other parts of Scripture; as Moses' father in law is sometimes called Jethro, sometimes Raguel.

BEDE. (i. 11. in Marc.) So also the same person is called Levi and Matthew; but Luke and Mark, on account of their reverence and the honour of the Evangelist, are unwilling to put the common name, while Matthew is a just accuser of himself, (Prov. 18. Vulg.) and calls himself Matthew and publican. He wishes to shew to his hearers that no one who is converted should despair of his salvation, since he himself was suddenly changed from a publican into an Apostle. But he says that he was sitting at the ‘teloneum,’ that is, the place where the customs are looked after and administered. For ‘telos’ in Greek is the same as ‘vectigal,’ customs, in Latin.

THEOPHYLACT. For he sat at the receipt of custom, either, as is often done, exacting from some, or making up accounts, (λογοπραγῶν apud Theo.) or doing some actions of that sort, which publicans are wont to do in their abodes, yea this man, who was raised on high from this state of life that he might leave all things and follow Christ. Wherefore it goes on, And he saith to him, Follow me, &c.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now to follow is to imitate, and therefore in order to imitate the poverty of Christ, in the feeling of his soul even more than in outward condition, he who used to rob his neighbour’s wealth, now leaves his own. And not only did he quit the gain of the customs, but he also despised the peril, which might come from the princes of this world, because he left the accounts of the customs imperfect and unsettled. For the Lord Himself, Who externally, by human language, called Him to follow, inflamed him inwardly by divine inspiration to follow Him the moment that He called him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Thus then Levi, which means Appointed, followed from the custom-house of human affairs, the Word, Who says, He who doth not quit all that he has, cannot be my disciple.

THEOPHYLACT. But he who used to plot against others becomes so benevolent, that he invites many persons to eat with him. Wherefore it goes on; And it came to pass, that as Jesus sat at meat in his house.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 12) The persons here called publicans are those who exact the public customs, or men who farm the customs of the exchequer or of republics; moreover, those also, who follow after the gain of this world by business, are called by the same name. They who had seen that the publican, converted from his sins to better things, had found a place of pardon, even for this reason themselves also do not despair of salvation. And they come to Jesus, not remaining in their former sins, as the Pharisees and Scribes complain, but in penitence, as the following words of the Evangelist shew, saying, For there were many who followed him. For the Lord went to the feasts of sinners, that he might have an opportunity of teaching them, and might set before his entertainers spiritual meats, which also is carried on in mystical figures. For he who receives Christ into his inward habitation is fed with the highest delights of overflowing pleasures. Therefore the Lord enters willingly, and takes up His abode in the affection of him who hath believed on Him; and this is the spiritual banquet of good works, which the rich cannot have, and on which the poor feast.

THEOPHYLACT. But the Pharisees blame this, making themselves pure. Whence there follows: And when the Scribes and Pharisees saw him eat, &c.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) If by the election of Matthew and calling of the publicans, the faith of the Gentiles is expressed, who formerly were intent on the gains of this world; certainly the haughtiness of the Scribes and Pharisees intimates the envy of the Jewish people, who are vexed at the salvation of the Gentiles. It goes on: When Jesus heard it, he saith unto them, They that are whole need not the physician, but they that are sick. He aims at the Scribes and Pharisees, who, thinking themselves righteous, refused to keep company with sinners. He calls Himself the physician, Who, by a strange mode of healing, was wounded on account of our iniquities, and by His wound we are healed. And He calls those whole and righteous, who, wishing to establish their own righteousness, are not subject to the righteousness of God. Moreover He calls those rich and sinners, who, overcome by the consciousness of their own frailty, and seeing that they cannot be justified by the Law, submit their necks to the grace of Christ by repentance. Wherefore it is added, For I came not to call the righteous, but sinners, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Not indeed that they should continue sinners, but be converted to that repentance.

2:18–22

18. And the disciples of John and of the Pharisees used to fast: and they come and say unto him, Why do the disciples of John and of the Pharisees fast, but thy disciples fast not?

19. And Jesus said unto them, Can the children of the bridechamber fast, while the bridegroom is with them? as long as they have the bridegroom with them, they cannot fast.

20. But the days will come, when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them, and then shall they fast in those days.

21. No man also seweth a piece of new cloth on an old garment: else the new piece that filled it up taketh away from the old, and the rent is made worse.

22. And no man putteth new wine into old bottles: else the new wine doth burst the bottles, and the wine is spilled, and the bottles will be marred: but new wine must be put into new bottles.

GLOSS. (non occ.) As above, the Master was accused to the disciples for keeping company with sinners in their feasts, so now, on the other hand, the disciples are complained of to the Master for their omission of fasts, that so matter for dissension might arise amongst them. Wherefore it is said, And the disciples of John and the Pharisees used to fast.

THEOPHYLACT. For the disciples of John being in an imperfect state, continued in Jewish customs.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 27) But it may be thought that He added Pharisees, because they joined with the disciples of John in saying this to the Lord, whilst Matthew relates that the disciples of John alone said it: but the words which follow rather shew that those who said it spoke not of themselves, but of others. For it goes on, And they come and say unto him, Why do the disciples, &c. For these words shew, that the guests who were there came to Jesus, and had said this same thing to the disciples, so that in the words which he uses, they came, he speaks not of those same persons, of whom he had said, And the disciples of John and the Pharisees were fasting. But as they were fasting, those persons who remembered it, come to him. Matthew then says this, And there came to him the disciples of John, saying, because the Apostles also were there, and all eagerly, as each could, objected these things.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) The disciples of John, therefore, and of the Pharisees, being jealous of Christ, ask Him, whether He alone of all men with His disciples could, without abstinence and toil, conquer in the fight of the passions.

BEDE. But John did not drink wine and strong drink, because he who has no power by nature, obtains more merit by abstinence. But why should the Lord, to whom it naturally belonged to forgive sins, shun those whom he could make more pure, than those who fast? But Christ also fasted, lest He should break the precept, He ate with sinners, that thou mightest see His grace, and acknowledge His power. It goes on; And Jesus said unto them, Can the children, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Mark here calls them children of the nuptials, whom Matthew calls children of the bridegroom; for we understand the children of the nuptials to be not only those of the bridegroom, but also of the bride.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He then calls Himself a bridegroom, as if about to be betrothed to the Church. For the betrothal is giving an earnest, namely, that of the grace of the Holy Ghost, by which the world believed.

THEOPHYLACT. He also calls Himself a bridegroom, not only as betrothing to Himself virgin minds, but because the time of His first coming is not a time of sorrow, nor of sadness to believers, neither does it bring with it toil, but rest. For it is without any works of the law, giving rest by baptism, by which we easily obtain salvation without toil. But the sons of the nuptials or of the Bridegroom are the Apostles; because they, by the grace of God, are made worthy of every heavenly blessing, by the grace of God, and partakers of every joy.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But intercourse with Him, He says, is far removed from all sorrow, when He adds, As long as they have the bridegroom with them, they cannot fast. He is sad, from whom some good is far removed; but he who has it present with him rejoices, and is not sad. But that He might destroy their elation of heart, and shew that He intended not His own disciples to be licentious, He adds, But the days will come when the bridegroom shall be taken, &c. as if He said, The time will come, when they will shew their firmness; for when the Bridegroom shall be taken from them, they will fast as longing for His coming, and in order to unite to Him their spirits, cleansed by bodily suffering. He shews also that there is no necessity for His disciples to fast, as having present with them the Bridegroom of human nature, Who every where executes the words of God, and Who gives the seed of life. The sons of the Bridegroom also cannot, because they are infants, be entirely conformed to their Father, the Bridegroom, Who, considering their infancy, deigns to allow them not to fast: but when the Bridegroom is gone, they will fast, through desire of Him; when they have been made perfect, they will be united to the Bridegroom in marriage, and will always feast at the king's banquet.

THEOPHYLACT. We must also understand, that every man whose works are good is the son of the Bridegroom; he has the Bridegroom with him, even Christ, and fasts not, that is, does no works of repentance, because he does not sin: but when the Bridegroom is taken away by the man's falling into sin, then he fasts and is penitent, that he may cure his sin.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But in a mystical sense, it may thus be expressed; that the disciples of John and the Pharisees fast, because every man who boasts of the works of the law without faith, who follows the traditions of men, and receives the preaching of Christ with his bodily ear, and not by the faith of the heart, keeps aloof from spiritual goods, and wastes away with a fasting soul. But he who is incorporated into the members of Christ by a faithful love cannot fast, because he feasts upon His Body and Blood. It goes on, No one seweth a piece of rough, that is, new, cloth on an old garment: else the new piece that filleth it up taketh away from the old, and the rent is made worse.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat in Marc.) As if He said, because these are preachers of the New Testament, it is not possible that they should serve old laws; but ye who follow old customs, fitly observe the fasts of Moses. But for these, who are about to hand down to men new and wonderful observances, it is not necessary to observe the old traditions, but to be virtuous in mind; some time or other however they will observe fasting with other virtues. But this fasting is different from the fasting of the law, for that was one of restraint, this of goodwill; on account of the fervour of the Spirit, Whom they cannot yet receive. Wherefore it goes on, And no one putteth new wine into old bottles: else the new wine doth burst the bottles, and the wine is spilled, and the bottles will be marred: but new wine must be put in new bottles.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For He compares His disciples to old bottles, who would burst at spiritual precepts, rather than be held in restraint by them. But they will be new bottles, when after the ascension of the Lord, they are renewed by desiring His consolation, and then new wine will come to the new bottles, that is, the fervour of the Holy Ghost will fill the hearts of spiritual men. A teacher must also take heed not to commit the hidden things of new mysteries to a soul, hardened in old wickedness.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else the disciples are likened to old garments on account of the infirmity of their minds, on which it was not fitting to impose the heavy command of fasting.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Neither was it fitting to sew on a, new piece; that is, a portion of doctrine which teaches a general fast from all the joy of temporal delights; for if this be done, the teaching is rent, and agrees not with the old part. But by a new garment is intended good works, which are done externally, and by the new wine, is expressed the fervour of faith, hope, and charity, by which we are reformed in our minds.

2:23–28

23. And it came to pass, that he went through the corn fields on the sabbath day; and his disciples began, as they went, to pluck the ears of corn.

24. And the Pharisees said unto him, Behold, why do they on the sabbath day that which is not lawful?

25. And he said unto them, Have ye never read what David did, when he had need, and was an hungred, he, and they that were with him?

26. How he went into the house of God, in the days of Abiathar the High Priest, and did eat the shewbread, which is not lawful to eat but for the priests, and gave also to them which were with him?

27. And he said unto them, The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath:

28. Therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the sabbath.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The disciples of Christ, freed from the figure, and united to the truth, do not keep the figurative feast of the sabbath, wherefore it is said, And it came to pass, that he went through the corn fields on the sabbath day; and his disciples began, as they went, to pluck the ears of corn.

BEDE. (in Marc. 1, 13) We read also in the following part, that they who came and went away were many, and that they had not time enough to take their food, wherefore, according to man’s nature, they were hungry.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ. sed v. Chrys. Hom. 39, in Matt) But being hungry, they ate simple food, not for pleasure, but on account of the necessity of nature. The Pharisees however, serving the figure and the shadow, accused the disciples of doing wrong. Wherefore there follows, But the Pharisees said unto him, Behold, why do they on the sabbath day that which is not lawful.

AUGUSTINE. (de Op. Monach. 23) For it was a precept in Israel, delivered by a written law, that no one should detain a thief found in his fields, unless he tried to take something away with him. For the man, who had touched nothing else but what he had eaten, they were commanded to allow to go away free and unpunished. Wherefore the Jews accused our Lord's disciples, who were plucking the ears of corn, of breaking the sabbath, rather than of theft.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But our Lord brings forward David, to whom it once happened to eat though it was forbidden by the law, when he touched the Priest's food, that by his example, he might do away with their accusation of the disciples. For there follows, Have ye never read, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For David, when flying from the face of Saul, went to the Chief Priest, and ate the shew-bread, and took away the sword of Goliath, which things had been offered to the Lord. (1 Sam. 21.) But a question has been raised how the Evangelist called Abiathar at this time High Priest, when the Book of Kings calls him Abimelech.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) There is, however, no discrepancy, for both were there, when David came to ask for bread, and received it: that is to say, Abimelech, the High Priest, and Abiathar his son; but Abimelech having been slain by Saul, Abiathar fled to David, and became the companion of all his exile afterwards. When he came to the throne, he himself also received the rank of High Priest, and the son became of much greater excellence than the father, and therefore was worthy to be mentioned as the High Priest, even during his fathers life-time. It goes on: And he said to them, The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath. For greater is the care to be taken of the health and life of a man, than the keeping of the sabbath. Therefore the sabbath was ordered to be observed in such a way, that, if there were a necessity, he should not be guilty, who broke the sabbath-day; therefore it was not forbidden to circumcise on the sabbath, because that was a necessary work. And the Maccabees, when necessity pressed on them, fought on the sabbath-day. Wherefore, His disciples being hungry, what was not allowed in the law became lawful through their necessity of hunger; as now, if a sick man break a fast, he is not held guilty in any way. It goes on: Therefore the Son of man is Lord, &c. As if he said, David the king is to be excused for feeding on the food of the Priests, how much more the Son of man, the true King and Priest, and Lord of the sabbath, is free from fault, for pulling ears of corn on the sabbath-day.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He calls himself properly, Lord of the sabbath, and Son of man, since being the Son of God, he deigned to be called Son of man, for the sake of men. Now the law has no authority over the Lawgiver and Lord, for more is allowed the king, than is appointed by the law. The law is given to the weak indeed, but not to the perfect and to those who work above what the law enjoins.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But in a mystical sense the disciples pass through the corn fields, when the holy doctors look with the care of a pious solicitude upon those whom they have initiated in the faith, and who, it is implied, are hungering for the best of all things, the salvation of men. But to pluck the ears of corn means to snatch men away from the eager desire of earthly things. And to rub with the hands is by examples of virtue to put from the purity of their minds the concupiscence of the flesh, as men do husks. To eat the grains is when a man, cleansed from the filth of vice by the mouths of preachers, is incorporated amongst the members of the Church. Again, fitly are the disciples related to have done this, walking before the face of the Lord, for it is necessary that the discourse of the doctor should come first, although the grace of visitation from on high, following it, must enlighten the heart of the hearer. And well, on the sabbath-day, for the doctors themselves in preaching labour for the hope of future rest, and teach their hearers to toil over their tasks for the sake of eternal repose.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, because when they hare rest from their passions, then are they made doctors to lead others to virtue, plucking away from them earthly things.

BEDE. (ubi sup) Again, they walk through the corn fields with the Lord, who rejoice in meditating upon His sacred words. They hunger, when they desire to find in them the bread of life; and they hunger on sabbath days, as soon as their minds are in a soothing rest, and they rejoice in freedom from troubled thoughts; they pluck the ears of corn, and by rubbing, cleanse them, till they come to what is fit to eat, when by meditation they take to themselves the witness of the Scriptures, to which they arrive by reading, and discuss them continually, until they find in them the marrow of love; this refreshment of the mind is truly unpleasing to fools, but is approved by the Lord.

CHAPTER 3

3:1–5

1. And he entered again into the synagogue; and there was a man there which had a withered hand.

2. And they watched him, whether he would heal him on the sabbath day; that they might accuse him.

3. And he saith unto the man which had the withered hand, Stand forth.

4. And he saith unto them, Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath days, or to do evil? to save life, or to kill? But they held their peace.

5. And when he had looked round about on them with anger, being grieved for the hardness of their hearts, he saith unto the man, Stretch forth thine hand. And he stretched it out: and his hand was restored whole as the other.

THEOPHYLACT. After confounding the Jews, who had blamed His disciples, for pulling the ears of corn on the sabbath day, by the example of David, the Lord now further bringing them to the truth, works a miracle on the sabbath; shewing that, if it is a pious deed to work miracles on the sabbath for the health of men, it is not wrong to do on the sabbath things necessary for the body: he says therefore, And he entered again into the synagogue; and there was a man there which had a withered hand. And they watched him, whether he would heal him on the sabbath-day; that they might accuse him.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 14) For, since He had defended the breaking of the sabbath, which they objected to His disciples, by an approved example, now they wish, by watching Him, to calumniate Himself, that they might accuse Him of a transgression, if He cured on the sabbath, of cruelty or of folly, if He refused. It goes on: And he saith unto the man which had the withered hand, Stand in the midst.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. v. Chrys. Hom. in Matt. 40) He placed him in the midst, that they might be frightened at the sight, and on seeing him compassionate him, and lay aside their malice.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And anticipating the calumny of the Jews, which they had prepared for Him, He accused them of violating the precepts of the law, by a wrong interpretation. Wherefore there follows: And he saith unto them, Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath-day, or to do evil? And this He asks, because they thought that on the sabbath they were to rest even from good works, whilst the law commands to abstain from bad, saying, Ye shall do no servile work therein; (Levit. 23:7) that is, sin: for Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. (John 8:34) What He first says, to do good on the sabbath-day or to do evil, is the same as what He afterwards adds, to save a life or to lose it; that is, to cure a man or not. Not that God, Who is in the highest degree good, can be the author of perdition to us, but that His not saving is in the language of Scripture to destroy. But if it be asked, wherefore the Lord, being about to cure the body, asked about the saving of the soul, let him understand either that in the common way of Scripture the soul is put for the man; as it is said, All the souls that came out of the loins of Jacob; (Exodus 1:5) or because he did those miracles for the saving of a soul, or because the healing itself of the hand signified the saving of the soul.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 35) But some one may wonder how Matthew could have said, that they themselves asked the Lord, if it was lawful to heal on the sabbath-day; when Mark rather relates that they were asked by our Lord, Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath-day, or to do evil? Therefore we must understand that they first asked the Lord, if it was lawful to heal on the sabbath-day, then that understanding their thoughts, and that they were seeking an opportunity to accuse Him, He placed in the middle him whom He was about to cure, and put those questions, which Mark and Luke relate. We must then suppose, that when they were silent, He propounded the parable of the sheep, and concluded, that it was lawful to do good on the sabbath-day. It goes on: But they were silent.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat, in Marc.) For they knew that He would certainly cure him. It goes on: And looking round about upon them with anger. His looking round upon them in anger, and being saddened at the blindness of their hearts, is fitting for His humanity, which He deigned to take upon Himself for us. He connects the working of the miracle with a word, which proves that the man is cured by His voice alone.

It follows therefore, And he stretched it out, and his hand was restored. Answering by all these things for His disciples, and at the same time shewing that His life is above the law.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But mystically, the man with a withered hand shews the human race, dried up as to its fruitfulness in good works, but now cured by the mercy of the Lord; the hand of man, which in our first parent had been dried up when he plucked the fruit of the forbidden tree, through the grace of the Redeemer, Who stretched His guiltless hands on the tree of the cross, has been restored to health by the juices of good works. Well too was it in the synagogue that the hand was withered; for where the gift of knowledge is greater, there also the danger of inexcusable guilt is greater.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else it means the avaricious, who, being able to give had rather receive, and love robbery rather than making gifts. And they are commanded to stretch forth their hands, that is, let him that stole steal no more, but rather let him labour, working with his hand the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth. (Eph. 4:28)

THEOPHYLACT. Or, he has his right hand withered, who does not the works which belong to the right side; for from the time that our hand is employed in forbidden deeds, from that time it is withered to the working of good. But it will be restored whenever it stands firm in virtue; wherefore Christ saith, Arise, that is, from sin, and stand in the midst; that thus it may stretch itself forth neither too little or too much.

3:6–12

6. And the Pharisees went forth, and straightway took counsel with the Herodians against him, how they might destroy him.

7. But Jesus withdrew himself with his disciples to the sea: and a great multitude from Galilee followed him, and from Judæa,

8. And from Jerusalem, and from Idumæa, and from beyond Jordan; and they about Tyre and Sidon, agr eat multitude, when they had heard what great things he did, came unto him.

9. And he spake to his disciples, that a small ship should wait on him, because of the multitude, lest they should throng him.

10. For he had healed many; insomuch that they pressed upon him for to touch him, as many as had plagues.

11. And unclean spirits, when they saw him, fell down before him, and cried, saying, Thou art the Son of God.

12. And he straitly charged them that they should not make him known.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 15) The Pharisees, thinking it a crime that at the word of the Lord the hand which was diseased was restored to a sound state, agreed to make a pretext of the words spoken by our Saviour; wherefore it is said, And the Pharisees went forth, and straightway took counsel with the Herodians against him, how they might destroy him. As if every one amongst them did not greater things on the sabbath day, carrying food, reaching forth a cup, and whatever else is necessary for meals. Neither could He, Who said and it was done, be convicted of toiling on the sabbath day.

THEOPHYLACT. But the soldiers of Herod the king are called Herodians, because a certain new heresy had sprung up, which asserted that Herod was the Christ. For the prophecy of Jacob intimated, that when the princes of Judah failed, then Christ should come; because therefore in the time of Herod none of the Jewish princes remained, and he, an alien, was the sole ruler, some thought that he was the Christ, and set on foot this heresy. These, therefore, were with the Pharisees trying to kill Christ.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else he calls Herodians the servants of Herod the Tetrarch, who on account of the hatred which their lord had for John, pursued with treachery and hate the Saviour also, Whom John preached. It goes on, But Jesus withdrew himself with his disciples to the sea; He fled from their treachery, because the hour of His passion had not yet come, and no place away from Jerusalem was proper for His Passion. By which also He gave an example to His disciples, when they suffer persecution in one city, to flee to another.

THEOPHYLACT. At the same time again, He goes away, that by quitting the ungrateful He might do good to more, for many followed him, and he healed them. For there follows, And a great multitude from Galilee, &c. Syrians and Sidonians, being foreigners, receive benefit from Christ; but His kindred the Jews persecute Him: thus there is no profit in relationship, if there be not a similarity in goodness.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For the strangers followed Him, because they saw the works of His powers, and in order to hear the words or His teaching. But the Jews, induced solely by their opinion of His powers, in a vast multitude come to hear Him, and to beg for His aiding health; wherefore there follows, And he spake to his disciples, that they should wait, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Consider then how He hid His glory, for He begs for a little ship, lest the crowd should hurt Him, so that entering into it, He might remain unharmed. It follows, As many as had scourges, &c. But he means by scourges, diseases, for God scourges us, as a father does His children.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Both therefore fell down before the Lord, those who had the plagues of bodily diseases, and those who were vexed by unclean spirits. The sick did this simply with the intention of obtaining health, but the demoniacs, or rather the devils within them, because under the mastery of a fear of God they were compelled not only to fall down before Him, but also to praise His majesty; wherefore it goes on, And they cried out, saying, Thou art the Son of God. And here we must wonder at the blindness of the Arians, who, after the glory of His resurrection, deny the Son of God, Whom the devils confess to be the Son of God, though still clothed with human flesh. There follows, And he straitly charged them, that they should not make him known. (Ps. 50:16) For God said to the sinner, Why dost thou preach my laws? A sinner is forbidden to preach the Lord, lest any one listening to his preaching should follow him in his error, for the devil is an evil master, who always mingles false things with true, that the semblance of truth may cover the witness of fraud. But not only devils, but persons healed by Christ, and even Apostles, are ordered to be silent concerning Him before the Passion, lest by the preaching of the majesty of His Divinity, the economy of His Passion should be retarded. But allegorically, in the Lord’s coming out of the synagogue, and then retiring to the sea, He prefigured the salvation of the Gentiles, to whom He deigned to come through their faith, having quitted the Jews on account of their perfidy. For the nations, driven about in divers by-paths of error, are fitly compared to the unstable sea. (v. Cyprian. Ep. lxiii. Aug. de Civ. Dei, 20, 16.) Again, a great crowd from various provinces followed Him, because He has received with kindness many nations, who came to Him through the preaching of the Apostles. But the ship waiting upon the Lord in the sea is the Church, collected from amongst the nations; and He goes into it lest the crowd should throng Him, because flying from the troubled minds of carnal persons, He delights to come to those who despise the glory of this world, and to dwell within them. Further, there is a difference between thronging the Lord, and touching Him; for they throng Him, when by carnal thoughts and deeds they trouble peace, in which truth dwells; but he touches Him, who by faith and love has received Him into his heart; wherefore those who touched Him are said to have been saved.

THEOPHYLACT. Morally again, the Herodians, that is, persons who love the lusts of the flesh, wish to slay Christ. For the meaning of Herod is, 'of skin.' (pelliceus. v. Hier. de Nom. Hebr) But those who quit their country, that is, a carnal mode of living, follow Christ, and their plagues are healed, that is, the sins which wound their conscience. But Jesus in us is our reason, which commands that our vessel, that is, our body, should serve Him, lest the troubles of worldly affairs should press upon our reason.

3:13–19

13. And he goeth up into a mountain, and calleth unto him whom he would: and they came unto him.

14. And he ordained twelve, that they should be with him, and that he might send them forth to preach,

15. And to have power to heal sicknesses, and to cast out devils:

16. And Simon he surnamed Peter;

17. And James the son of Zebedee, and John the brother of James; and he surnamed them Boanerges, which is, The sons of thunder:

18. And Andrew, and Philip, and Bartholomew, and Matthew, and Thomas, and James the son of Alphæus, and Thaddæus, and Simon the Canaanite,

19. And Judas Iscariot, which also betrayed him.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 16) After having forbidden the evil spirits to preach Him, He chose holy men, to cast out the unclean spirits, and to preach the Gospel; wherefore it is said, And he went up into a mountain, &c. (Luke 6)

THEOPHYLACT. Luke, however, says that He went up to pray, for after the shewing forth of miracles He prays, teaching us that we should give thanks, when we obtain any thing good, and refer it to Divine grace.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He also instructs the Prelates of the Church to pass the night in prayer before they ordain, that their office be not impeded. When therefore, according to Luke, it was day, He called whom He would; for there were many who followed Him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For it was not a matter of their choice and zeal, but of Divine condescension and grace, that they should be called to the Apostleship. The mount also in which the Lord chose His Apostles, shews the lofty righteousness in which they were to be instructed, and which they were about to preach to men.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or spiritually, Christ is the mount, from which living waters flow, and milk is procured for the health of infants; whence the spiritual feast of fat things is made known, and whatsoever is believed to be most highly good is established by the grace of that Mountain. Those therefore who are highly exalted in merits and in words are called up into a mountain, that the place may correspond to the loftiness of their merits. It goes on: And they came unto him, &c. For the Lord loved the beauty of Jacob, (Ps. 46 Vulg.) that they might sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel, (Matt. 19:28) who also in bands of threes and fours watch around the tabernacle of the Lord, and carry the holy words of the Lord, bearing them forward on their actions, as men do burdens on their shoulders.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For as a sacrament of this the children of Israel once used to encamp about the Tabernacle, so that on each of the four sides of the square three tribes were stationed. Now three times four are twelve, and in three bands of four the Apostles were sent to preach, that through the four quarters of the whole world they might baptize the nations in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. It goes on: And he gave them power, &c. That is, in order that the greatness of their deeds might bear witness to the greatness of their heavenly promises, and that they, who preached unheard-of things, might do unheard-of actions.

THEOPHYLACT. Further, He gives the names of the Apostles, that the true Apostles might be known, so that men might avoid the false. And therefore it continues: And Simon he surnamed Cephas.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 17) But let no one suppose that Simon now received his name and was called Peter, for thus he would make Mark contrary to John, who relates that it had been long before said unto him, Thou shalt be called Cephas. (John 1:42) But Mark gives this account by way of recapitulation; for as he wished to give the names of the twelve Apostles, and was obliged to call him Peter, his object was to intimate briefly, that he was not called this originally, but that the Lord gave him that name.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And the reason that the Lord willed that he should at first be called otherwise, was that from the change itself of the name, a mystery might be conveyed to us. Peter then in Latin or in Greek means the same thing as Cephas in Hebrew, and in each language the name is drawn from a stone. Nor can it be doubted that is the rock of which Paul spoke, And this rock was Christ. (1 Cor. 10:4) For as Christ was the true light, and allowed also that the Apostles should be called the light of the world, (Matt. 5:14.) so also to Simon, who believed on the rock Christ, He gave the name of Rock.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Thus from obedience, which Simon signifies, the ascent is made to knowledge, which is meant by Peter. It goes on: And James the son of Zebedee, and John his brother.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) We must connect this with what went before, He goeth up into a mountain, and calleth.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Namely, James who has supplanted all the desires of the flesh, and John, who received by grace what others held by labour. There follows: And he surnamed them, Boanerges. (Gen. 27:36. v. Aur. Cat. in Matt. 10:2)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He calls the sons of Zebedee by this name, because they were to spread over the world the mighty and illustrious decrees of the Godhead.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or by this the lofty merit of the three mentioned above is shewn, who merited to hear in the mountain the thunders of the Father, when he proclaimed in thunder through a cloud concerning the Son, This is my beloved Son; that they also through the cloud of the flesh and the fire of the word1, (Matt. 17:1) might as it were scatter the thunderbolts in rain on the earth, since the Lord turned the thunderbolts into rain, so that mercy extinguishes what judgment sets on fire. It goes on: And Andrew, who manfully does violence to perdition, so that he had ever ready within him his own death, to give as an answer, and his soul was ever in his hands. (1 Pet. 3:15. Ps. 119:109. Bede ubi sup.)

BEDE. For Andrew is a Greek name, which means ‘manly,’ from ἀνὴδ, that is, man, for he manfully adhered to the Lord. There follows, And Philip.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or, ‘the mouth of a lamp,’ that is, one who can throw light by his mouth upon what he has conceived in his heart, to whom the Lord gave the opening of a mouth, which diffused light. We know that this mode of speaking belongs to holy Scripture; for Hebrew names are put down in order to intimate a mystery. There follows: And Bartholomew, which means, the son of him who suspends the waters; of him, that is, who said, I will also command the clouds that they rain no rain upon it. (Is. 5:6) But the name of son of God is obtained by peace and loving one’s enemy; for, Blessed are the peacemakers, for they are the sons of God. (Matt. 5:9, 44, 45) And, Love your enemies, that ye may be the sons of God. There follows: And Matthew, that is, ‘given,’ to whom it is given by the Lord, not only to obtain remission of sins, but to be enrolled in the number of the Apostles. And Thomas, which means, ‘abyss;’ for men who have knowledge by the power of God, put forward many deep things. It goes on: And James the son of Alphæus, that is, of ‘the learned’ or ‘the thousandth,’ (Ps. 91:7) beside whom a thousand will fall. This other James is he, whose wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against spiritual wickedness. (Eph. 6:12) There follows, And Thaddæus, that is, ‘corculum,’ (qu. cordis cultor) which means ‘he who guards the heart,’ one who keeps his heart in all watchfulness.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But Thaddæus is the same person, as Luke calls in the Gospel and in the Acts, Jude of James, for he was the brother of James, the brother of the Lord, as he himself has written in his Epistle. There follows, And Simon the Canaanite, and Judas Iscariot, who betrayed him. He has added this by way of distinction from Simon Peter, and Jude the brother of James. Simon is called the Canaanite from Cana, a village in Galilee, and Judas, Scariotes, from the village from which he had his origin, or he is so called from the tribe of Issachar.

THEOPHYLACT. Whom he reckons amongst the Apostles, that we may learn that God does not repel any man for wickedness, which is future, but counts him worthy on account of his present virtue.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But Simon is interpreted, ‘laying aside sorrow;’ for blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted. (Matt. 5:4) And he is called Canaanite, that is, Zealot, because the zeal of the Lord ate him up. But Judas Iscariot is one who does not do away his sins by repentance. For Judas means ‘boaster,’ or vain-glorious. And Iscariot, ‘the memory of death.’ But many are the proud and vain-glorious confessors in the Church, as Simon Magus, and Arius, and other heretics, whose deathlike memory is celebrated in the Church, that it may be avoided.

3:19–22

19. —And they went into an house.

20. And the multitude cometh together again, so that they could not so much as eat bread.

21. And when his friends heard of it, they went out to lay hold on him: for they said, He is beside himself.

22. And the Scribes which came down from Jerusalem said, He hath Beelzebub, and by the prince of the devils casteth he out devils.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Lord leads the Apostles, when they were elected, into a house, as if admonishing them, that after having received the Apostleship, they should retire to look on their own consciences. Wherefore it is said, And they came into a house, and the multitude came together again, so that they could not eat bread.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Ungrateful indeed were the multitudes of princes, whom their pride hinders from knowledge, but the grateful multitude of the people came to Jesus.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And blessed indeed the concourse of the crowd, flocking together, whose anxiety to obtain salvation was so great, that they left not the Author of salvation even an hour free to take food. But Him, whom a crowd of strangers loves to follow, his relations hold in little esteem: for it goes on: And when his friends heard of it, they went out to lay hold upon him. For since they could not take in the depth of wisdom, which they heard, they thought that He was speaking in a senseless way, wherefore it continues, for they said, He is beside himself.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, He has a devil and is mad, and therefore they wished to lay hold upon Him, that they might shut Him up as one who had a devil. And even His friends wished to do this, that is, His relations, perchance His countrymen, or His brethren. 1But it was a silly insanity in them, to conceive that the Worker of such great miracles of Divine Wisdom had become mad.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now there is a great difference between those who do not understand the word of God from slowness of intellect, such as those, who are here spoken of, and those who purposely blaspheme, of whom it is added, And the Scribes which came down from Jerusalem, &c. For what they could not deny, they endeavour to pervert by a malicious interpretation, as if they were not the works of God, but of a most unclean spirit, that is, of Beelzebub, who was the God of Ekron. For 'Beel' means Baal himself, and 'zebub' a fly; the meaning of Beelzebub therefore is the man of flies, on account of the filth of the blood which was offered, from which most unclean rite, they call him prince of the devils, adding, and by the prince of the devils casteth he out devils.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But mystically, the house to which they came, is the early Church. The crowds which prevent their eating bread are sins and vices; for he who eateth unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself. (1 Cor. 11:29)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Scribes also coming down from Jerusalem blaspheme. But the multitude from Jerusalem, and from other regions of Judæa, or of the Gentiles, followed the Lord, because so it was to be at the time of His Passion, that a crowd of the people of the Jews should lead Him to Jerusalem with palms and praises, and the Gentiles should desire to see Him; but the Scribes and Pharisees should plot together for His death.

3:23–30

23. And he called them unto him, and said unto them in parables, How can Satan cast out Satan?

24. And if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand.

25. And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.

26. And if Satan rise up against himself, and be divided, he cannot stand, but hath an end.

27. No man can enter into a strong man's house, and spoil his goods, except he will first bind the strong man; and then he will spoil his house.

28. Verily I say unto you, All sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme:

29. But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation:

30. Because they said, He hath an unclean spirit.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The blasphemy of the Scribes having been detailed, our Lord shews that what they said was impossible, confirming His proof by an example. Wherefore it says, And having called them together unto him, he said unto them in parables. How can Satan cast out Satan? As if He had said, A kingdom divided against itself by civil war must be desolated, which is exemplified both in a house and in a city. Wherefore also if Satan's kingdom be divided against itself, so that Satan expels Satan from men, the desolation of the kingdom of the devils is at hand. But their kingdom consists in keeping men under their dominion. If therefore they are driven away from men, it amounts to nothing less than the dissolution of their kingdom. But if they still hold their power over men, it is manifest that the kingdom of evil is still standing, and Satan is not divided against himself.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And because He has already shewn by an example that a devil cannot cast out a devil, He shews how he can be expelled, saying, No man can enter into a strong man's house, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. The meaning of the example is this: The devil is the strong man; his goods are the men into whom he is received; unless therefore a man first conquers the devil, how can he deprive him of his goods, that is, of the men whom he has possessed? So also I who spoil his goods, that is, free men from suffering by his possession, first spoil the devils and vanquish them, and am their enemy. How then can ye say that I have Beelzebub, and that being the friend of the devils, I cast them out?

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 17) The Lord has also bound the strong man, that is, the devil: which means, He has restrained him from seducing the elect, and entering into his house, the world; He has spoiled his house, and his goods, that is men, because He has snatched them from the snares of the devil, and has united them to His Church. Or, He has spoiled his house, because the four parts of the world, over which the old enemy had sway, He has distributed to the Apostles and their successors, that they may convert the people to the way of life. But the Lord shews that they committed a great sin, in crying out that that which they knew to be of God, was of the devil, when He subjoins, Verily I say unto you, All sins are forgiven, &c. All sins and blasphemies are not indeed remitted to all men, but to those who have gone through a repentance in this life sufficient for their sins; thus neither is Novatusm right, who denied that any pardon should be granted to penitents, who had lapsed in time of martyrdom; nor Origen, who asserts that after the general judgment, after the revolution of ages, all sinners will receive pardon for their sins, which error the following words of the Lord condemn, when He adds, But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, &c.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He says indeed, that blasphemy concerning Himself was pardonable, because He then seemed to be a man despised and of the most lowly birth, but, that contumely against God has no remission. Now blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is against God, for the operation of the Holy Ghost is the kingdom of God; and for this reason, He says, that blasphemy against the Holy Ghost cannot be remitted. Instead, however, of what is here added, But will be in danger of eternal damnation, another Evangelist says, Neither in this world, nor in the world to come. By which is understood, the judgment which is according to the law, and that which is to come. For the law orders one who blasphemes God to be slain, and in the judgment of the second law he has no remission. nHowever, he who is baptized is taken out of this world; but the Jews were ignorant of the remission which takes place in baptism. He therefore who refers to the devil miracles, and the casting out of devils which belong to the Holy Ghost alone, has no room left him for remission of his blasphemy. Neither does it appear that such a blasphemy as this is remitted, since it is against the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he adds, explaining it, Because they said, He hath an unclean spirit.

THEOPHYLACT. We must however understand, that they will not obtain pardon unless they repent. But since it was at the flesh of Christ that they were offended, even though they did not repent, some excuse was allowed them, and they obtained some remission.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or this is meant; that he will not deserve to work out repentance, so as to be accepted, who, understanding who Christ was, declared that He was the prince of the devils.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Neither however are those, who do not believe the Holy Spirit to be God, guilty of an unpardonable blasphemy, because they were persuaded to do this by human ignorance, not by devilish malice.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 71, 12, 21) Or else impenitence itself is the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost which hath no remission. For either in his thought or by his tongue, he speaks a word against the Holy Ghost the forgiver of sins, who treasures up for himself an impenitent heart. But he subjoins, Because they said, He hath an unclean spirit, that he might shew that His reason for saying it, was their declaring that He cast out a devil by Beelzebub, not because there is a blasphemy, which cannot be remitted since even this might be remitted through a right repentance: but the cause why this sentence was put forth by the Lord, after mentioning the unclean spirit, (who as our Lord shews was divided against himself,) was, that the Holy Ghost even makes those whom He brings together undivided, by His remitting those sins, which divided them from Himself, which gift of remission is resisted by no one, but him who has the hardness of an impenitent heart. For in another place, the Jews said of the Lord, that He had a devil, (John 7:20.) without however His saying any thing there about the blasphemy against the Spirit; and the reason is, that they did not there cast in His teeth the unclean spirit, in such a way, that that spirit could by their own words be shewn to be divided against Himself, as Beelzebub was here shewn to be, by their saying, that it might be he who cast out devilso.

3:31–35

31. There came then his brethren and his mother, and, standing without, sent unto him, calling him.

32. And the multitude sat about him, and they said unto him, Behold, thy mother and thy brethren without seek for thee.

33. And he answered them, saying, Who is my mother, or my brethren?

34. And he looked round about on them which sat about him, and said, Behold my mother and my brethren!

35. For whosoever shall do the will of God, the same is my brother, and my sister, and mother.

THEOPHYLACT. Because the relations of the Lord had come to seize upon Him, as if beside Himself, His mother, urged by the sympathy of her love, came to Him; wherefore it is said, And there came unto him his mother, and, standing without, sent unto him, calling him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) From this it is manifest that His brethren and His mother were not always with Him; but because He was beloved by them, they come from reverence and affection, waiting without. Wherefore it goes on, And the multitude sat about him, &c.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The brothers of the Lord must not be thought to be the sons of the ever-virgin Mary, as Helvidius sayp, nor the sons of Joseph by a former marriage, as some think, but rather they must be understood to be His relations.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But another Evangelist says, that His brethren did not believe on Him. With which this agrees, which says, that they sought Him, waiting without, and with this meaning the Lord does not mention them as relations. Wherefore it follows, And he answered them, saying, Who is my mother or my brethren? (John 7:5) But He does not here mention His mother and His brethren altogether with reproof, but to shew that a man must honour his own soul above all earthly kindred; wherefore this is fitly said to those who called Him to speak with His mother and relations, as if it were a more useful task than the teaching of salvation.

BEDE. (Ambr in Luc. 6, 36. Bede ubi sup.) Being asked therefore by a message to go out, He declines, not as though He refused the dutiful service of His mother, but to shew that He owes more to His Father’s mysteries than to His mother’s feelings. Nor does He rudely despise His brothers, but, preferring His spiritual work to fleshly relationship, He teaches us that religion is the bond of the heart rather than that of the body. Wherefore it goes on, And looking round about on them which sat about him, he said, Behold my mother and my brethren.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) By this, the Lord shews that we should honour those who are relations by faith rather than those who are relations by blood. A man indeed is made the mother of Jesus by preaching Himq; for He, as it were, brings forth the Lord, when he pours Him into the heart of his hearers.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But let us be assured that we are His brethren and His sisters, if we do the will of the Father; that we may be joint-heirs with Him, for He discerns us not by sex but by our deeds. Wherefore it goes on: Whosoever shall do the will of God, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. He does not therefore say this, as denying His mother, but as shewing that He is worthy of honour, not only because she bore Christ, but on account of her possessing every other virtue.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But mystically, the mother and brother of Jesus means the synagogue, (from which according to the flesh He sprung,) and the Jewish people who, while the Saviour is teaching within, come to Him, and are not able to enter, because they cannot understand spiritual things. But the crowd eagerly enter, because when the Jews delayed, the Gentiles flocked to Christ; but His kindred, who stand without wishing to see the Lord, are the Jews who obstinately remained without, guarding the letter, and would rather compel the Lord to go forth to them to teach carnal things, than consent to enter in to learn spiritual things of Him. (Ambr in Luc. 6, 37.). If therefore not even His parents when standing without are acknowledged, how shall we be acknowledged, if we stand without? For the word is within and the light within.

CHAPTER 4

4:1–20

1. And he began again to teach by the sea side: and there was gathered unto him a great multitude, so that he entered into a ship, and sat in the sea; and the whole multitude was by the sea on the land.

2. And he taught them many things by parables, and said unto them in his doctrine,

3. Hearken; Behold, there went out a sower to sow:

4. And it came to pass, as he sowed, some fell by the way side, and the fowls of the air came and devoured it up.

5. And some fell on stony ground, where it had not much earth; and immediately it sprang up, because it had no depth of earth:

6. But when the sun was up, it was scorched; and because it had no root, it withered away.

7. And some fell among thorns, and the thorns grew up, and choked it, and it yielded no fruit.

8. And other fell on good ground, and did yield fruit that sprang up and increased; and brought forth, some thirty, and some sixty, and some an hundred.

9. And he said unto them, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

10. And when he was alone, they that were about him with the twelve asked of him the parable.

11. And he said unto them, Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God: but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables:

12. That seeing they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them.

13. And he said unto them, Know ye not this parable? and how then will ye know all parables?

14. The sower soweth the word.

15. And these are they by the way side, where the word is sown; but when they have heard, Satan cometh immediately, and taketh away the word that was sown in their hearts.

16. And these are they likewise which are sown on stony ground; who, when they have heard the word, immediately receive it with gladness;

17. And have no root in themselves, and so endure but for a time: afterward, when affliction or persecution ariseth for the word's sake, immediately they are offended.

18. And these are they which are sown among thorns; such as hear the word,

19. And the cares of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, and the lusts of other things entering in, choke the word, and it becometh unfruitful.

20. And these are they which are sown on good ground; such as hear the word, and receive it, and bring forth fruit, some thirty-fold, some sixty, and some an hundred.

THEOPHYLACT. Although the Lord appears in the transactions mentioned above to neglect His mother, nevertheless He honours her; since on her account He goes forth about the borders of the sea: wherefore it is said, And Jesus began to teach again by the sea-side, &c.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 18) For if we look into the Gospel of Matthew, it appears that this same teaching of the Lord at the sea, was delivered on the same day as the former. For after the conclusion of the first sermon, Matthew immediately subjoins, saying, The same day went Jesus out of the house, and sat by the sea-side.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But He began to teach at the sea, that the place of His teaching might point out the bitter feelings and instability of His hearers.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) After leaving the house also, He began to teach at the sea, because, quitting the synagogue, He came to gather together the multitude of the Gentile people by the Apostles. Wherefore it continues: And there was gathered unto him a great multitude, so that he entered into a ship, and sat in the sea.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 44) Which we must understand was not done without a purpose, but that He might not leave any one behind Him, but have all His hearers before His face.

BEDE. Now this ship shewed in a figure the Church, to be built in the midst of the nations, in which the Lord consecrates for Himself a beloved dwelling-place. It goes on: And he taught them many things by parables.

PSEUDO-JEROME. A parable is a comparison made between things discordant by nature, under some similitude. For parable is the Greek for a similitude, when we point out by some comparisons what we would have understood. In this way we say an iron man, when we desire that he should be understood to be hardy and strong; when to be swift, we compare him to winds and birds. But He speaks to the multitudes in parables, with His usual providence, that those who could not take in heavenly things, might conceive what they heard by an earthly similitude.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For He rouses the minds of His hearers by a parable, pointing out objects to the sight, to make His discourse more manifest.

THEOPHYLACT. And in order to rouse the attention of those who heard, the first parable that He proposes is concerning the seed, which is the word of God. Wherefore it goes on, And he said to them in his doctrine. Not in that of Moses, nor of the Prophets, because He preaches His own Gospel. Hearken: behold, there went out a sower to sow. Now the Sower is Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Not that He went out in space, Who is present in all space, and fills all, but in the form and economy by which He is made more near to us through the clothing of flesh. For since we were not able to go to Him, because sins impeded our path, He went out to us. But He went out, preaching in order to sow the word of piety, which He spake abundantly. Now He does not needlessly repeat the same word, when He says, A sower went out to sow, for sometimes a sower goes out that he may break up land for tillage, or to pull up weeds, or for some other work. But this one went out to sow.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 19) Or else, He went out to sow, when after calling to His faith the elect portion of the synagogue, He poured out the gifts of His grace in order to call the Gentiles also.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Further, as a sower does not make a distinction in the ground which is beneath him, but simply and without distinction puts in the seed, so also He Himself addresses all. And to signify this, He says, And as he sowed, some fell by the way-side.

THEOPHYLACT. Take notice, that He says not that He threw it in the way, but that it fell, for a sower, as far as he can, throws it into good ground, but if the ground be bad, it corrupts the seed. Now the way is Christ; but infidels are by the way-side, that is, out of Christ.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, the way is a mind which is a path for bad thoughts, preventing the seed of the word from growing in it. And therefore whatsoever good seed comes in contact with such a way, perishes, and is carried off by devils. Wherefore there follows, And the fowls of the air came and devoured it up. And well are the devils called fowls of the air, either because they are of a heavenly and spiritual origin, or because they dwell in the air. Or else, those who are about the way are negligent and slothful men. It goes on: And some fell on stony ground. He calls stone, the hardness of a wanton mind; He calls ground, the inconstancy of a soul in its obedience; and sun, the heat of a raging persecution. Therefore the depth of earth, which ought to have received the seed of God, is the honesty of a mind trained in heavenly discipline, and regularly brought up in obedience to the Divine words. But the stony places, which have no strength for fixing the root firmly, are those breasts which are delighted only with the sweetness of the word which they hear, and for a time with the heavenly promises, but in a season of temptation fall away, for there is too little of healthful desire in them to conceive the seed of life.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, the stony persons are those who adhering a little to the rock, that is, to Christ, up to a short time, receive the word, and afterwards, falling back, cast it away. It goes on: And some fell among thorns; by which are marked souls which care for many things. For thorns are cares.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But further He mentions good ground, saying, And other fell on good ground. For the difference of the fruits follows the quality of the ground. But great is the love of the Sower for men, for the first He commends, and rejects not the second, and gives a place to the third.

THEOPHYLACT. See also how the bad are the greatest number, and the few are those who are saved, for the fourth part of the ground is found to be saved.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) This, however, the greater portion of the seed is not lost through the fault of the owner, but of the earth, which received it, that is, of the soul, which hears. And indeed the real husbandman, if he sowed in this way, would be rightly blamed; for he is not ignorant that rock, or the road, or thorny ground, cannot become fertile. But in spiritual things it is not so; for there it is possible that stony ground may become fertile; and that the road should not be trodden down, and that the thorns may be destroyed, for if this could not take place, he would not have sown there. By this therefore He gives to us hope of repentance. It goes on, And he said unto them, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) As often as this is inserted in the Gospel or in the Apocalypse of John, that which is spoken is mystical, and is pointed out as healthful to be heard and learnt. For the ears by which they are heard belong to the heart, and the ears by which men obey and do what is commanded, are those of an interior sense. There follows, And when he was alone, the twelve that were with him asked of him the parable; and he said unto them, Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God, but to them that are without all things are done in parables.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. c Cat. in Marc.) As if He said unto them, You that are worthy to be taught all things which are fitted for teaching, shall learn the manifestation of parables; but I use parables with them who are unworthy to learn, because of their wickedness. For it was right that they who did not hold fast their obedience to that law which they had received, should not have any share in a new teaching, but should be estranged from both; for He shewed by the obedience of His disciples, that, on the other hand, the others were become unworthy of mystical doctrine. But afterwards, by bringing in a voice from prophecy, He confounds their wickedness, as having been long before reproved; wherefore it goes on, that seeing they might see, and not perceive, &c. (Isa. 6:9) as if He said, that the prophecy might be fulfilled which foretells these things.

THEOPHYLACT. For it was God Who made them to see, that is, to understand what is good. But they themselves see not, of their own will making themselves not to see, lest they should be converted and correct themselves, as if they were displeased at their own salvation. It goes on, Lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins be forgiven them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Thus, therefore, they see and they do not see, they hear and do not understand, for their seeing and hearing comes to them from God's grace, but their seeing and not understanding comes to them from their unwillingness to receive grace, and closing their eyes, and pretending that they could not see; neither do they acquiesce in what was said, and so are not changed as to their sins by hearing and seeing, but rather are made worse.

THEOPHYLACT. Or we may understand in a different way His speaking to the rest in parables, that seeing they might not perceive, and hearing, not understand. For God gives sight and understanding to men who seek for them, but the rest He blinds, lest it become a greater accusation against them, that though they understood, they did not choose to do what they ought. Wherefore it goes on, Lest at any time they should be, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. 14, in Matt.) Or else they deserved this, their not understanding, and yet this in itself was done in mercy to them, that they might know their sins, and, being converted, merit pardon.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) To those then who are without, all things are done in parables, that is, both the actions and the words of the Saviour, because neither in those miracles which He was working, nor in those mysteries which He preached, were they able to acknowledge Him as God. Therefore they are not able to attain to the remission of their sins.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But His speaking to them only in parables, and yet not leaving off speaking to them entirely, shews that to those who are placed near to what is good, though they may have no good in themselves, still good is shewn disguised. But when a man approaches it with reverence and a right heart, he wins for himself an abundant revelation of mysteries; when on the contrary his thoughts are not sound, he will be neither made worthy of those things which are easy to many men, nor even of hearing them. There follows, And he said unto them, Know ye not this parable, how then shall ye know all parables?

PSEUDO-JEROME. For it was necessary that they to whom He spoke in parables should ask for what they did not understand, and learn by the Apostle whom they despised, the mystery of the kingdom which they themselves had not.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And for this reason, the Lord in saying these things, shews that they ought to understand both this first, and all following miracles. Wherefore explaining it, He goes on, The sower soweth the word.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Matt. Hom. 44.) And indeed the prophet has compared the teaching of the people to the planting of a vine; (Isa. 5) in this place however it is compared to sowing, to shew that obedience is now shorter and more easy, and will sooner yield fruit.

BEDE. (ubi Sup.) But in this exposition of the Lord there is embraced the whole range of those who might hear the words of truth, but are unable to attain to salvation. For there are some to whom no faith, no intellect, nay no opportunity of trying its usefulness, can give a perception of the word which they hear; of whom He says, And these are by the wayside. For unclean spirits take away at once the word committed to their hearts, as birds carry away the seed of the trodden way. There are some who both experience its usefulness and feel a desire for it, but some of them the calamities of this world frighten, and others its prosperity allures, so that they do not attain to that which they approve. Of the first of whom He says, And these are they who fell on stony ground; of the latter, And these are they which are sown among thorns. But riches are called thorns, because they tear the soul with the piercing of its own thoughts, and after bringing it to sin, they, as one may say, make it bleed by inflicting a wound. Again He says, And the toil of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches; for the man who is deceived by an empty desire of riches must soon be afflicted by the toils of continual cares. He adds, And the lusts of other things; because, whosoever despises the commandments of God, and wanders away lustfully seeking other things, is unable to attain to the joy of beatitude. And concupiscences of this sort choke the word, because they do not allow a good desire to enter into the heart, and, as it were, stifle the entrance of vital breath. There are, however, excepted from these different classes of men, the Gentiles who do not even have grace to hear the words of life.

THEOPHYLACT. Further, of those who receive the seed as they ought there are three degrees. Wherefore it goes on, And these are they who are sown on good ground. Those who bear fruit an hundred-fold are those who lead a perfect and an obedient life, as virgins and hermits. Those who bear fruit sixty-fold are those who are in the mean as continent personsr and those who are living in convents. Those who bear thirty-fold are those who though weak indeed, bear fruit according to their own virtue, as laymen and married persons.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or he bears thirty-fold, who instills into the minds of the elect faith in the Holy Trinity; sixty-fold, who teaches the perfection of good works; a hundred-fold, who shews the rewards of the heavenly kingdom. For in counting a hundred, we pass on to the right hands; therefore that number is fitly made to signify everlasting happiness. But the good ground is the conscience of the elect, which does the contrary to all the former three, which both receives with willingness the seed of the word committed to it, and keeps it when received up to the season of fruit.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else the fruits of the earth are contained in thirty, sixty, and a hundred-fold, that is, in the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospel.

4:21–25

21. And he said unto them, Is a candle brought to be put under a bushel, or under a bed? and not to be set on a candlestick?

22. For there is nothing hid, which shall not be manifested; neither was any thing kept secret, but that it should come abroad.

23. If any man have ears to hear, let him hear.

24. And he saith unto them, Take heed what ye hear: with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you: and unto you that hear shall more be given.

25. For he that hath, to him shall be given: and he that hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he hath.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) After the question of the disciples concerning the parable, and its explanation, He well subjoins, And he said unto them, Is a candle brought, &c. As if he said, A parable is given, not that it should remain obscure, and hidden as if under a bed or a bushel, but that it should be manifested to those who are worthy. The candle within us is that of our intellectual nature, and it shines either clearly or obscurely according to the proportion of our illumination. For if meditations which feed the light, and the recollection with which such a light is kindled, are neglected, it is presently extinguished.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else the candle is the discourse concerning the three sorts of seed. The bushel or the bed is the hearing of the disobedient. The Apostles are the candlestick, whom the word of the Lord hath enlightened; wherefore it goes on, For there is nothing hidden, &c. The hidden and secret thing is the parable of the seed, which comes forth to light, when it is spoken of by the Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else the Lord warns His disciples to be as light, in their life and conversation; as if He said, As a candle is put so as to give light, so all will look to your life. Therefore be diligent to lead a good life; sit not in corners, but be ye a candle. For a candle gives light, not when placed under a bed, but on a candlestick; this light indeed must be placed on a candlestick, that is, on the eminence of a godly life, that it may be able to give light to others. Not under a bushel, that is, in things pertaining to the palate, nor under a bed, that is, in idleness. For no one who seeks after the delights of his palate and loves rest can be a light shining over all.

BEDE. (in Marc. i. 20) Or, because the time of our life is contained under a certain measurement of Divine Providence, it is rightly compared to a bushel. But the bed of the soul is the body, in which it dwells and reposes for a time. He therefore who hides the word of God under the love of this transitory life, and of carnal allurements, covers his candle with a bushel or a bed. But he puts his light on a candlestick, who employs his body in the ministry of the word of God; therefore under these words He typically teaches them a figure of preaching. Wherefore it goes on, For there is nothing hidden, which shall not be revealed, nor is there any thing made secret, which shall not come abroad. As if He said, Be not ashamed of the Gospel, but amidst the darkness of persecution raise the light of the word of God upon the candlestick of your body, keeping fixedly in your mind that day, when the Lord will throw light upon the hidden places of darkness, for then everlasting praise awaits you, and everlasting punishment your adversaries.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Matt. Hom. 15) Or else, There is nothing hid; as if He said, If ye conduct your life with care, accusation will not be able to obscure your light.

THEOPHYLACT. For each of us, whether he have done good or evil, is brought to light in this life, much more in that which is to come. For what can be more hidden than God, nevertheless He Himself is manifested in the flesh. It continues, If any man have ears to ear, let him hear.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) That is, if any man have a sense for understanding the word of God, let him not withdraw himself, let him not turn his ear to fables, but let him lend his ear to search those things which truth hath spoken, his hands for fulfilling them, his tongue for preaching them. There follows, And he said unto them, Take heed what ye hear.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, that none of those things which are said to you by me should escape you. With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you, that is, whatsoever degree of application ye bring, in that degree ye will receive profit.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, If ye diligently endeavour to do all the good which ye can, and to teach it to your neighbours, the mercy of God will come in, to give you both in the present life a sense to take in higher things, and a will to do better things, and will add for the future an everlasting reward. And therefore it is subjoined, And to you shall more be given.

PSEUDO-JEROME. According to the measure of his faith the understanding of mysteries is divided to every man, and the virtues of knowledge will also be added to them. It goes on: For he that hath, to him shall be given; that is, he who hath faith shall have virtue, and he who hath obedience to the word, shall also have the understanding of the mystery. Again, he who, on the other hand, has not faith, fails in virtue; and he who has not obedience to the word, shall not have the understanding of it; and if he does not understand, he might as well not have heard.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, He who has the desire and wish to hear and to seek, to him shall be given. But he who has not the desire of hearing divine things, even what he happens to have of the written law is taken from him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For sometimes a clever reader by neglecting his mind, deprives himself of wisdom, of which he tastes the sweetness, who, though slow in intellect, works more diligently.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Again it may be said, that he hath not, who has not truth. But our Lord says that he hath, because he has a lie, for every one whose understanding believes a lie, thinks that he has something.

4:26–29

26. And he said, So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground;

27. And should sleep, and rise night and day, and the seed should spring and grow up, he knoweth not how.

28. For the earth bringeth forth fruit of herself; first the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear.

29. But when the fruit is brought forth, immediately he putteth in the sickle, because the harvest is come.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) A parable occurred, a little above, about the three seeds which perished in various ways, and the one which was saved; in which last He also shews three differences, according to the proportion of faith and practice. Here, however, He puts forth a parable concerning those only who are saved. Wherefore it is said, And he said, So is the kingdom of God, as if a man should cast seed into the ground, &c.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The kingdom of God is the Church, which is ruled by God, and herself rules over men, and treads down the powers which are contrary to her, and all wickedness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else He calls by the name of kingdom of God, faith in Him, and in the economy of His Incarnation; which kingdom indeed is as if a man should throw seed. For He Himself being God and the Son of God, having without change been made man, has cast seed upon the earth, that is, He has enlightened the whole world by the word of divine knowledge.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For the seed is the word of life, the ground is the human heart, and the sleep of the man means the death of the Saviour. The seed springs up night and day, because after the sleep of Christ, the number of Christians, through calamity and prosperity, continued to flourish more and more in faith, and to wax greater in deed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or Christ Himself is the man who rises, for He sat waiting with patience, that they who received seed should bear fruit. He rises, that is, by the word of His love, He makes us grow to the bringing forth fruit, by the armour of righteousness on the right hand, by which is meant the day, and on the left, by which is meant the night of persecution; for by these the seed springs up, and does not wither. (2 Cor. 6:7)

THEOPHYLACT. Or else Christ sleeps, that is, ascends into heaven, where, though He seem to sleep, yet He rises by night, when through temptations He raises us up to the knowledge of Himself; and in the day time, when on account of our prayers, He sets in order our salvation.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But when He says, He knoweth not how, He is speaking in a figure; that is, He does not make known to us, who amongst us will produce fruit unto the end.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else He says, He knoweth not, that He may shew the free-will of those who receive the word, for He commits a work to our will, and does not work the whole Himself alone, lest the good should seem involuntary. For the earth brings forth fruits of its own accord, that is, she is brought to bear fruit without being compelled by a necessity contrary to her will. First the blade.

PSEUDO-JEROME. That is, fear. For the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom. Then the full corn in the ear; (Ps. 111:10. Rom. 13:8) that is, charity, for charity is the fulfilling of the Law.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or, first it produces the blade, in the law of nature, by degrees growing up to advancement; afterwards it brings forth the ears, which are to be collected into a bundle, and to be offered on an altar to the Lord, that is, in the law of Moses; afterwards the full-fruit, in the Gospel. Or because we must not only put forth leaves by obedience, but also learn prudence, and, like the stalk of corn, remain upright without minding the winds which blow us about. We must also take heed to our soul by a diligent recollection, that, like the ears, we may bear fruit, that is, shew forth the perfect operation of virtue.

THEOPHYLACT. For we put forth the blade, when we shew a principle of good; then the ear, when we can resist temptations; then comes the fruit, when a man works something perfect. It goes on: and when it has brought forth the fruit, immediately he sendeth the sickle, because the harvest is come.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The sickle is death or the judgment, which cuts down all things; the harvest is the end of the world.

GREGORY. (in Ezech. 2. Hom. 3) Or else; Man casts seed into the ground, when he places a good intention in his heart; and he sleeps, when he already rests in the hope which attends on a good work. But he rises night and day, because he advances amidst prosperity and adversity, though he knows it not, for he is as yet unable to measure his increase, and yet virtue, once conceived, goes on increasing. When therefore we conceive good desires, we put seed into the ground; when we begin to work rightly, we are the blade. When we increase to the perfection of good works, we arrive at the ear; when we are firmly fixed in the perfection of the same working, we already put forth the full corn in the ear.

30. And he said, Whereunto shall we liken the kingdom of God? or with what comparison shall we compare it?

31. It is like a grain of mustard seed, which, when it is sown in the earth, is less than all the seeds that be in the earth:

32. But when it is sown, it groweth up, and becometh greater than all herbs, and shooteth out great branches; so that the fowls of the air may lodge under the shadow of it.

33. And with many such parables spake he the word unto them, as they were able to hear it.

34. But without a parable spake he not unto them: and when they were alone, he expounded all things to his disciples.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After having narrated the parable concerning the coming forth of the fruit from the seed of the Gospel, he here subjoins another parable, to shew the excellence of the doctrine of the Gospel before all other doctrines. Wherefore it is said, And he said, Whereunto shall we liken the kingdom of God?

THEOPHYLACT. Most brief indeed is the word of faith; Believe in God, and thou shalt be saved. But the preaching of it has been spread far and wide over the earth, and increased so, that the birds of heaven, that is, contemplative men, sublime in understanding and knowledge, dwell under it. For how many wise men among the Gentiles, quitting their wisdom, have found rest in the preaching of the Gospel! Its preaching then is greater than all.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ. leg. ap. Possin. Cyril.) And also because the wisdom spoken amongst the perfect expands, to an extent greater than all other sayings, that which was told to men in short discourses, for there is nothing greater than this truth.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, it put forth great boughs, for the Apostles were divided off as the boughs of a tree, some to Rome, some to India, some to other parts of the world.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, that seed is very small in fear, but great when it has grown into charity, which is greater than all herbs; for God is love, (1 John 4:16) whilst all flesh is grass. (Isa. 40:6 But the boughs which it puts forth are those of mercy and compassion, since under its shade the poor of Christ, who are meant by the living creatures of the heavens, delight to dwell.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, the man who sows is by many taken to mean the Saviour Himself, by others, man himself sowing in his own heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ. sed v. Cat. in Marc.) Then after this, Mark, who delights in brevity, to shew the nature of the parables, subjoins, And with many such parables spake he the word unto them as they could hear him.

THEOPHYLACT. For since the multitude was unlearned, he instructs them from objects of food and familiar names, and for this reason he adds, But without a parable spake he not unto them, that is, in order that they might be induced to approach and to ask Him. It goes on; And when they were alone, he expounded all things to his disciples, that is, all things about which they were ignorant and asked Him, not simply all, whether obscure or not.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For they were worthy to hear mysteries apart, in the most secret haunt of wisdom, for they were men, who, removed from the crowds of evil thoughts, remained in the solitude of virtue; and wisdom is received in a time of quiet.

4:35–41

35. And the same day, when the even was come, he saith unto them, Let us pass over unto the other side.

36. And when they had sent away the multitude, they took him even as he was in the ship. And there were also with him other little ships.

37. And there arose a great storm of wind, and the waves beat into the ship, so that it was now full.

38. And he was in the hinder part of the ship, asleep on a pillow: and they awake him, and say unto him, Master, carest thou not that we perish?

39. And he arose, and rebuked the wind, and said unto the sea, Peace, be still. And the wind ceased, and there was a great calm.

40. And he said unto them, Why are ye so fearful? how is it that ye have no faith?

41. And they feared exceedingly, and said one to another, What manner of man is this, that even the wind and the sea obey him?

PSEUDO-JEROME. After His teaching, they come from that place to the sea, and are tossed by the waves. Wherefore it is said, And the same day, when the even was come, &c.

REMIGIUS. For the Lord is said to have had three places of refuge, namely, the ship, the mountain, and the desert. As often as He was pressed upon by the multitude, he used to fly to one of these. When therefore the Lord saw many crowds about Him, as man, He wished to avoid their importunity, and ordered His disciples to go over to the other side. There follows: And sending away the multitudes, they took him, &c,

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 28) The Lord took the disciples indeed, that they might be spectators of the miracle which was coming, but He took them alone, that no others might see that they were of such little faith. Wherefore, to shew that others went across separately, it is said, And there were also with him other ships. Lest again the disciples might be proud of being alone taken, He permits them to be in danger; and besides this, in order that they might learn to bear temptations manfully. Wherefore it goes on, And there arose a great storm of wind; and that He might impress upon them a greater sense of the miracle which was to be done, He gives time for their fear, by sleeping. Wherefore there follows, And he was himself in the hinder part of the ship, &c. For if He had been awake, they would either not have feared, nor have asked Him to save them when the storm arose, or they would not have thought that He could do any such things.

THEOPHYLACT. Therefore He allowed them to fall into the fear of danger, that they might experience His power in themselves, who saw others benefitted by Him. But He was sleeping upon the pillow of the ship, that is, on a wooden one.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 28) Shewing His humility, and thus teaching us many lessons of wisdom. But not yet did the disciples who remained about Him know His glory; they thought indeed that if He arose He could command the winds, but could by no means do so reposing or asleep. And therefore there follows, And they awake him, and say unto him, Master, carest thou not that we perish?

THEOPHYLACT. But He arising, rebukes first the wind, which was raising the tempest of the sea, and causing the waves to swell, and this is expressed in what follows, And he arose, and rebuked the wind; then He commands the sea; wherefore it goes on, And he said to the sea, Peace, be still.

GLOSS. (non occ.) For from the troubling of the sea there arises a certain sound, which appears to be its voice threatening danger, and therefore, by a sort of metaphor, He fitly commands tranquillity by a word signifying silence: just as in the restraining of the winds, which trouble the sea with their violence, He uses a rebuke. For men who are in power are accustomed to curb those, who rudely disturb the peace of mankind, by threatening to punish them; by this, therefore, we are given to understand, that, as a king can repress violent men by threats, and by his edicts sooth the murmurs of his people, so Christ, the King of all creatures, by His threats restrained the violence of the winds, and compelled the sea to be silent. And immediately the effect followed, for it continues, And the wind ceased, which He had threatened, and there arose a great calm, that is, in the sea, to which He had commanded silence.

THEOPHYLACT. He rebuked His disciples, for not having faith; for it goes on, And he said unto them, Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have not faith? For if they had had faith, they would have believed that even when sleeping, He could preserve them safe. There follows, And they feared with a great fear, and said one to another, &c. For they were in doubt about Him, for since He stilled the sea, not with a rod like Moses, nor with prayers as Elisha at the Jordan, nor with the ark as Joshua, the son of Nun, on this account they thought Him truly God, but since He was asleep, they thought Him a man.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mystically, however, the hinder part of the ship is the beginning of the Church, in which the Lord sleeps in the body only, for He never sleepeth who keepeth Israel; for the ship with its skins of dead animals keeps in the living, and keeps out the waves, and is bound together by wood, that is, by the cross and the death of the Lord the Church is saved. The pillow is the body of the Lord, on which His Divinity, which is as His head, has come down. But the wind and the sea are devils and persecutors, to whom He says Peace, when He restrains the edicts of impious kings, as He will. The great calm is the peace of the Church after oppression, or a contemplative after an active life.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else the ship into which He embarked, is taken to mean the tree of His passion, by which the faithful attain to the security of the safe shore. The other ships which are said to have been with the Lord, signify those, who are imbued with faith in the cross of Christ, and are not beaten about by the whirlwind of tribulation; or who, after the storms of temptation, are enjoying the serenity of peace. And whilst His disciples are sailing on, Christ is asleep, because the time of our Lord's Passion came on His faithful ones, when they were meditating on the rest of His future reign. Wherefore it is related, that it took place late, that not only the sleep of our Lord, but the hour itself of departing light, might signify the setting of the true Sun. Again, when He ascended the cross, of which the stern of the ship was a type, His blaspheming persecutors rose like the waves against Him, driven on by the storms of the devils, by which, however, His own patience is not disturbed, but His foolish disciples are struck with amazement. The disciples awake the Lord, because they sought, with most earnest wishes, the resurrection of Him whom they had seen die. Rising up, He threatened the wind, because when He had triumphed in His resurrection, He prostrated the pride of the devil. He ordered the sea to be still, that is, in rising again, He cast down the rage of the Jews. The disciples are blamed, because after His resurrection, He chid them for their unbelief. And we also when being marked with the sign of the Lord's cross, we determine to quit the world, embark in the ship with Christ; we attempt to cross the sea; but, He goes to sleep, as we are sailing amidst the roaring of the waters, when amidst the strivings of our virtues, or amidst the attacks of evil spirits, of wicked men, or of our own thoughts, the flame of our love grows cold. Amongst storms of this sort, let us diligently strive to awake Him; He will soon restrain the tempest, pour down peace upon us, give us the harbour of salvation.

CHAPTER 5

5:1–20

1. And they came over unto the other side of the sea, into the country of the Gadarenes.

2. And when he was come out of the ship, immediately there met him out of the tombs a man with an unclean spirit,

3. Who had his dwelling among the tombs; and no man could bind him, no, not with chains:

4. Because that he had been often bound with fetters and chains, and the chains had been plucked asunder by him, and the fetters broken in pieces: neither could any man tame him.

5. And always, night and day, he was in the mountains, and in the tombs, crying, and cutting himself with stones.

6. But when he saw Jesus afar off, he ran and worshipped him,

7. And cried with a loud voice, and said, What have I to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of the most high God? I adjure thee by God, that thou torment me not.

8. For he said unto him, Come out of the man, thou unclean spirit.

9. And he asked him, What is thy name? And he answered, saying, My name is Legion: for we are many.

10. And he besought him much that he would not send them away out of the country.

11. Now there was nigh unto the mountains a great herd of swine feeding.

12. And all the devils besought him, saying, Send us into the swine, that we may enter into them.

13. And forthwith Jesus gave them leave. And the unclean spirits went out, and entered into the swine: and the herd ran violently down a steep place into the sea, (they were about two thousand;) and were choked in the sea.

14. And they that fed the swine fled, and told it in the city, and in the country. And they went out to see what it was that was done.

15. And they come to Jesus, and see him that was possessed with the devil, and had the legion, sitting, and clothed, and in his right mind: and they were afraid.

16. And they that saw it told them how it befell to him that was possessed with the devil, and also concerning the swine.

17. And they began to pray him to depart out of their coasts.

18. And when he was come into the ship, he that had been possessed with the devil prayed him that he might be with him.

19. Howbeit Jesus suffered him not, but saith unto him, Go home to thy friends, and tell them how great things the Lord hath done for thee, and hath had compassion on thee.

20. And he departed, and began to publish in Decapolis how great things Jesus had done for him: and all men did marvel.

THEOPHYLACT. Those who were in the ship enquired among themselves, What manner of man is this? and now it is made known Who He is by the testimony of His enemies. For the demoniac came up confessing that He was the Son of God. Proceeding to which circumstance the Evangelist says, And they came over unto the other side, &c.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 21) Geraza is a noted town of Arabia, across the Jordan, near mount Galaad, which the tribe of Manasseh held, not far from the lake of Tiberias, into which the swine were precipitated.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Nevertheless the exact reading contains neither Gadarenes, nor Gerasines, but Gergesenes. For Gadara is a city of Judæa, which has no sea at all about it; and Geraza is a city of Arabia, having neither lake nor sea near it. And that the Evangelists may not be thought to have spoken so manifest a falsehood, well acquainted as they were with the parts around Judæa, Gergese, from which come the Gergesenes, was an ancient city, now called Tiberias, around which is situated a considerable laket. It continues, And when he was come out of the ship, immediately there met him, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2. 24) Though Matthew says that there were two, Mark and Luke mention one, that you may understand that one of them was a more illustrious person, concerning whose state that country was much afflicted.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. et v. Chrys. Hom. in Matt. 28) Or else, Mark and Luke relate what was most worthy of compassion, and for this reason they put down more at length what had happened to this man; for there follows, no man could bind him, no, not with chains. They therefore simply said, a man possessed of a devil, without taking heed to the number; or else, that he might shew the greater virtue in the Worker; for He who had cured one such, might cure many others. Nor is there any discrepancy shewn here, for they did not say that there was one alone, for then they would have contradicted Matthew. Now devils dwelt in tombs, wishing to convey a false opinion to many, that the souls of the dead were changed to devils.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) Now the assembly of the devils had prepared itself to resist the Divine power. But when He was approaching Who had power over all things, they proclaim aloud His eminent virtue. Wherefore there follows, But when he saw Jesus afar off, he ran and worshipped him, saying, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) See how the devil is divided between two passions, fear and audacity; he hangs back and prays, as if meditating a question; he wishes to know what he had to do with Jesus, as though he would say, Do you cast me out from men, who are mine?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And how great is the impiety of the Jews, to say that He cast out devils by the prince of the devils, when the very devils confess that they have nothing in common with Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. et v. Chrys. Hom. in Matt. 28) Then praying to Him, he subjoins, I adjure thee by God, that thou torment me not. For he considered being cast out to be a torment, or else he was also invisibly tortured. For however bad the devils are, they know that there awaits them at last a punishment for their sins; but that the time of their last punishment was not yet come, they full well knew, especially as they were permitted to mix among men. But because Christ had come upon them as they were doing such dreadful deeds, they thought that, such was the heinousness of their crimes, He would not wait for the last times, to punish them; for this reason they beg that they may not be tormented.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For it is a great torment for a devil to cease to hurt a man, and the more severely he possesses him, the more reluctantly he lets him go. For it goes on, For he said unto him, Come out of the man, thou unclean spirit.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) Consider the unconquerable power of Christ; He makes Satan shake, for to him the words of Christ are fire and flame; as the Psalmist says, The mountains melted at the presence of the Lord, (Ps. 97:5) that is, great and proud powers. There follows, And he asked him, What is thy name?

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord indeed asks, not that He Himself required to know, but that the rest might know that there was a multitude of devils dwelling in him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Lest he should not be believed, if He affirmed there were many, He wishes that they themselves should confess it; wherefore there follows, And he saith unto him, Legion, for we are many. He gives not a fixed number, but a multitude, for such accuracy in the number would not help us to understand it.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But by the public declaration of the scourge which the madman suffered, the virtue of the Healer appears more gracious. And even the priests of our time, who know how to cast out devils by the grace of exorcism, are wont to say that the sufferers cannot be cured at all, unless they in confession openly declare, as far as they are able to know, what they have suffered from the unclean spirits in sight, in hearing, in taste, in touch, or any other sense of body or soul, whether awake or asleep. It goes on, And he besought him much that he would not send them away out of the country.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Luke, however, says, into the abyss. (Luke 8:3.) For the abyss is the separation of this world, for devils deserve to be sent into outer darkness, prepared for the devil and his angels. This Christ might have done, but He allowed them to remain in this world, lest the absence of a tempter should deprive men of the crown of victory.

THEOPHYLACT. Also that by fighting with us, they may make us more expert. It goes on, Now there was there about the mountain a great herd of swine feeding.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 24) What Mark here says, that the herd was about the mountain, and what Luke calls on the mountain, are by no means inconsistent. For the herd of swine was so large, that some part were on the mountain, the rest around it. It goes on: And the devils besought him, saying, Send us into the swine, that we may enter into them.

REMIGIUS. (v. Aur. Cat. in Matt p. 327) The devils entered not into the swine of their own will, but their asking for this concession, was, that it might be shewn that they cannot hurt men without Divine permission. They did not ask to be sent into men, because they saw that He, by whose power they were tortured, bore a human form. Nor did they desire to be sent into the flocks, for they are clean animals offered up in the temple of God. But they desired to be sent into the swine, because no animal is more unclean than a hog, and devils always delight in filthiness. It goes on: And forthwith Jesus gave them leave.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And He gave them leave, that by the killing of the swine, the salvation of men might be furthered.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He wished to shew publicly the fury which devils entertain against men, and that they would inflict much worse things upon men, if they were not hindered by Divine power; because, again, His compassion would not allow this to be shewn on men, He permitted them to enter into the swine, that on them the fury and power of the devils might be made known. There follows: And the unclean spirits went out.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But the herdsmen also took to flight, lest they should perish with the swine, and spread the same fear amongst the inhabitants of the town. Wherefore there follows: And they that fed them, &c. The necessity of their loss, however, brought these men to the Saviour; for frequently when God makes men suffer loss in their possessions, he confers a benefit on their souls. Wherefore it goes on: And they came to Jesus, and see him that was tormented by the devil, &c. that is, at the feet of Him from whom he had obtained health; a man, whom before, not even chains could bind, clothed and in his right mind, though he used to be continually naked; and they were amazed; wherefore it says, And they were afraid. This miracle then they find out partly by sight, partly by words; wherefore there follows: And they that saw it told them.

THEOPHYLACT. But amazed at the miracle, which they had heard, they were afraid, and for this reason they beseech him to depart out of their borders; which is expressed in what follows: And they began to pray him to depart out of their coasts; for they feared lest some time or other they should suffer a like thing: for, saddened at the loss of their swine, they reject the presence of the Saviour.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, conscious of their own frailty, they judged themselves unworthy of the presence of the Lord. It goes on: And when he was going to the ship, he that had been tormented, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For he feared lest some time or other the devils should find him, and enter into him a second time. But the Lord sends him back to his house, intimating to him, that though He Himself was not present, yet His power would keep him; at the same time also that he might be of use in the healing of others; wherefore it goes on: And he did not suffer him, and saith unto him, Go home to thy friends, &c. See the humility of the Saviour. He said not, Proclaim all things which I have done to you, but, all that the Lord hath done; do thou also, when thou hast done any good thing, take it not to thyself, but refer it to God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) But although he bade others, whom he healed, to tell it to no one, he nevertheless fitly bids this one proclaim it, since all that region, being possessed by devils, remained without God.

THEOPHYLACT. (non occ.) He therefore began to proclaim it, and all wonder, which is that which follows: And he began to publish.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Mystically, however, Gerasa or Gergese, as some read it, is interpreted casting out a dweller or a stranger approaching, because the people of the Gentiles both expelled the enemy from the heart, and he who was afar off is made near.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Here again the demoniac is the people of the Gentiles, in a most hopeless case, bound neither by the law of nature, nor of God, nor by human fear.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Who dwelt in the tombs, because they delighted in dead works, that is, in sins; who were ever raging night and day, because whether in prosperity or in adversity, they were never free from the service of malignant spirits: again, by the foulness of their works, they lay as it were in the tombs, in their lofty pride, they wandered over the mountains, by words of most hardened infidelity, they as it were cut themselves with stones. But he said, My name is Legion, because the Gentile people were enslaved to divers idolatrous forms of worship. Again, that the unclean spirits going out from man enter into swine, which they cast headlong into the sea, implies that now that the people of the Gentiles are freed from the empire of demons, they who have not chosen to believe in Christ, work sacrilegious rites in hidden places.

THEOPHYLACT. Or by this it is signified that devils enter into those men, who live like swine, rolling themselves in the slough of pleasure; they drive them headlong into the sea down the precipice of perdition, into the sea of an evil life where they are choked.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or they are choked in hell without any touch of mercy by the rushing on of an early death; which evils many persons thus avoid, for by the scourging of the fool, the wise is made more prudent.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But that the Lord did not admit him, though he wished to be with Him, signifies, that every one after the remission of his sins should remember that he must work to obtain a good conscience, and serve the Gospel for the salvation of others, that at last he may rest in Christ.

GREGORY. (Mor. 6, 37) For when we have perceived ever so little of the Divine knowledge, we are at once unwilling to return to human affairs, and seek for the quiet of contemplation; but the Lord commands that the mind should first toil hard at its work, and afterwards should refresh itself with contemplation.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the man who is healed preached in Decapolis, where the Jews, who hang on the letter of the Decalogue, are being turned away from the Roman rule.

5:21–34

21. And when Jesus was passed over again by ship unto the other side, much people gathered unto him: and he was nigh unto the sea.

22. And, behold, there cometh one of the rulers of the synagogue, Jairus by name; and when he saw him, he fell at his feet,

23. And besought him greatly, saying, My little daughter lieth at the point of death: I pray thee, come and lay thy hands on her, that she may be healed; and she shall live.

24. And Jesus went with him; and much people followed him, and thronged him.

25. And a certain woman, which had an issue of blood twelve years,

26. And had suffered many things of many physicians, and had spent all that she had, and was nothing bettered, but rather grew worse,

27. When she had heard of Jesus, came in the press behind, and touched his garment.

28. For she said, If I may touch but his clothes, I shall be whole.

29. And straightway the fountain of her blood was dried up; and she felt in her body that she was healed of that plague.

30. And Jesus, immediately knowing in himself that virtue had gone out of him, turned him about in the press, and said, Who touched my clothes?

31. And his disciples said unto him, Thou seest the multitude thronging thee, and sayest thou, Who touched me?

32. And he looked round about to see her that had done this thing.

33. But the woman fearing and trembling, knowing what was done in her, came and fell down before him, and told him all the truth.

34. And he said unto her, Daughter, thy faith hath made thee whole; go in peace, and be whole of thy plague.

THEOPHYLACT. After the miracle of the demoniac, the Lord works another miracle, namely, in raising up the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue; the Evangelist, before narrating this miracle, says, And when Jesus was passed over again by ship unto the other side, much people gathered unto him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2. 28) But we must understand, that what is added of the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, took place when Jesus had again crossed the sea in a ship, though how long after does not appear; for if there were not an interval, there could be no time for the taking place of that which Matthew relates, concerning the feast at his own house; after which event, nothing follows immediately, except this concerning the daughter of the chief of the synagogue. For he has so put it together, that the transition itself shews that the narrative follows the order of time. It goes on, There cometh one of the rulers of the synagogue, &c.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He has recorded the name on account of the Jews of that time, that it might mark the miracle. It goes on, And when he saw him, he fell at his feet, and besought him greatly, &c. Matthew indeed relates that the chief of the synagogue reported that his daughter was dead, but Mark says that she was very sick, and that afterwards it was told to the ruler of the synagogue, when our Lord was about to go with him, that she was dead. The fact then, which Matthew implies, is the same, namely, that He raised her from the dead; and it is for the sake of brevity, that he says that she was dead, which was evident from her being raised.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For he attaches himself not to the words of the father, but to what is of most importance, his wishes; for he was in such despair, that his wish was that she should return to life, not thinking that she could be found alive, whom he had left dying.

THEOPHYLACT. Now this man was faithful in part, inasmuch as he fell at the feet of Jesus, but in that he begged of Him to come, he did not shew as much faith as he ought. For he ought to have said, Speak the word only, and my daughter shall be healed. There follows, And he went away with him, and much people followed him, and thronged him; and a woman, which had an issue of blood twelve years, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Mat. 31) This woman, who was celebrated and known to all, did not dare to approach the Saviour openly, nor to come to Him, because, according to the law, she was unclean; for this reason she touched Him behind, and not in front, for that she durst not do, but only ventured to touch the hem of His garment. It was not however the hem of the garment, but her frame of mind that made her whole. There follows, For she said, If I may but touch his clothes, I shall be whole.

THEOPHYLACT. Most faithful indeed is this woman, who hoped for healing from His garments. For which reason she obtains health; wherefore it goes on, And straightway the fountain of her blood was dried up, and she felt in her body that she was healed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Now the virtues of Christ are by His own will imparted to those men, who touch Him by faith. Wherefore there follows, And Jesus, immediately knowing in himself that virtue had gone out of him, turned him about in the press, and said, Who touched my clothes? The virtues indeed of the Saviour do not go out of Him locally or corporally, nor in any respect pass away from Him. For being incorporeal, they go forth to others and are given to others; they are not however separated from Him, from whom they are said to go forth, in the same way as sciences are given by the teacher to his pupils. Therefore it says, Jesus, knowing in himself the virtue which had gone out of him, to shew that with His knowledge, and not without His being aware of it, the woman was healed. But He asked, Who touched me? although He knew her who touched Him, that He might bring to light the woman, by her coming forward, and proclaim her faith, and lest the virtue of His miraculons work should be consigned to oblivion. It goes on, And his disciples said unto him, Thou seest the multitude thronging thee, and sayest thou, Who touched me? But the Lord asked, Who touched me, that is in thought and faith, for the crowds who throng Me cannot be said to touch Me, for they do not come near to Me in thought and in faith. There follows, And he looked round about to see her that had done this thing.

THEOPHYLACT. For the Lord wished to declare the woman, first to give His approbation to her faith, secondly to urge the chief of the synagogue to a confident hope that He could thus cure his child, and also to free the woman from fear. For the woman feared because she had stolen health; wherefore there follows, But the woman, fearing and trembling, &c.

BEDE. (in Marc. ii. 22) Observe that the object of His question was that the woman should confess the truth of her long 1want of faith, of her sudden belief and healing, and so herself be confirmed in faith, and afford an example to others. But he said to her, Daughter, thy faith hath made thee whole; go in peace, and be whole of thy plague. He said not, Thy faith is about to make thee whole, but has made thee whole, that is, in that thou hast believed, thou hast already been made whole.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Macr. v. Chrys. Hom. in Mat. 31.) He calls her daughter because she was saved by her faith; for faith in Christ makes us His children.

THEOPHYLACT. But He saith to her, Go in peace, that is, in rest, which means, go and have rest, for up to this time thou hast been in pains and torture.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else He says, Go in peace, sending her away into that which is the final good, for God dwells in peace, that thou mayest know, that she was not only healed in body, but also from the causes of bodily pain, that is, from her sins

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mystically, however, Jairus comes after the healing of the woman, because when the fulness of the Gentiles has come in, then shall Israel be saved. (v. Rom. 11) Jairus means either illuminating, or illuminated, that is, the Jewish people, having cast off the shadow of the letter, enlightened by the Spirit, and enlightening others, falling at the feet of the Word, that is, humbling itself before the Incarnation of Christ, prays for her daughter, for when a man lives himself, he makes others live also.

Thus Abraham, and Moses, and Samuel, intercede for the people who are dead, and Jesus comes upon their prayers.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, the Lord going to the child, who is to be healed, is thronged by the crowd, because though He gave healthful advice to the Jewish nation, he is oppressed by the wicked habits of that carnal people; but the woman with an issue of blood, cured by the Lord, is the Church gathered together from the nations, for the issue of blood may be either understood of the pollution of idolatry, or of those deeds, which are accompanied by pleasure to flesh and blood. But whilst the word of the Lord decreed salvation to Judæa, the people of the Gentiles by an assured hope seized upon the health, promised and prepared for others.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, by the woman, who had a bloody flux, understand human nature; for sin rushed in upon it, which since it killed the soul, might be said to spill its blood. It could not be cured by many physicians, that is, by the wise men of this world, and of the Law and the Prophets; but the moment that it touched the hem of Christ’s garment, that is, His flesh, it was healed, for whosoever believes the Son of man to be Incarnate is he who touches the hem of His garment.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Wherefore one believing woman touches the Lord, whilst the crowd throngs Him, because He, who is grieved by divers heresies, or by wicked habits, is worshipped faithfully with the heart of the Catholic Church alone. But the Church of the Gentiles came behind Him; because though it did not see the Lord present in the flesh, for the mysteries of His Incarnation had been gone through, yet it attained to the grace of His faith, and so when by partaking of His sacraments, it merited salvation from its sins, as it were the fountain of its blood was dried up by the touch of His garments. And the Lord looked round about to see her who had done this, because He judges that all who deserve to be saved are worthy of His look and of His pity.

5:35–43

35. While he yet spake, there came from the ruler of the synagogue’s house certain which said, Thy daughter is dead: why troublest thou the Master any further?

36. As soon as Jesus heard the word that was spoken, he saith unto the ruler of the synagogue, Be not afraid, only believe.

37. And he suffered no man to follow him, save Peter, and James, and John the brother of James.

38. And he cometh to the house of the ruler of the synagogue, and seeth the tumult, and them that wept and wailed greatly.

39. And when he was come in, he saith unto them, Why make ye this ado, and weep? the damsel is not dead, but sleepeth.

40. And they laughed him to scorn. But when he had put them all out, he taketh the father and the mother of the damsel, and them that were with him, and entereth in where the damsel was lying.

41. And he took the damsel by the hand, and said unto her, Talitha cumi; which is, being interpreted, Damsel, I say unto thee, arise.

42. And straightway the damsel arose, and walked; for she was of the age of twelve years. And they were astonished with a great astonishment.

43. And he charged them straitly that no man should know it; and commanded that something should be given her to eat.

THEOPHYLACT. Those who were about the ruler of the synagogue, thought that Christ was one of the prophets, and for this reason they thought that they should beg of Him to come and pray over the damsel. But because she had already expired, they thought that He ought not to be asked to do so. Therefore it is said, While he yet spake, there came messengers to the ruler of the synagogue, which said, Thy daughter is dead; why troublest thou the Master any further? But the Lord Himself persuades the father to have confidence. For it goes on, As soon as Jesus heard the word which was spoken, he saith to the ruler of the synagogue, Be not afraid; only believe.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It is not said that he assented to his friends who brought the tidings and wished to prevent the Master from coming, so that our Lord’s saying, Fear not, only believe, is not a rebuke for his want of faith, but was intended to strengthen the belief which he had already. But if the Evangelist had related, that the ruler of the synagogue joined the friends who came from his house, in saying that Jesus should not be troubled, the words which Matthew relates him to have said, namely, that the damsel was dead, would then have been contrary to what was in his mind. It goes on, And he suffered no man to follow him, save Peter, and James, and John the brother of James.

THEOPHYLACT. For Christ in His lowliness would not do any thing for display. It goes on, And he cometh to the house of the ruler of the synagogue, and seeth the tumult, and them that wept and wailed greatly.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But He Himself commands them not to wail, as if the damsel was not dead, but sleeping; wherefore it says, And when he was come in, he saith unto them, Why make ye this ado, and weep? the damsel is not dead, but sleepeth.

PSEUDO-JEROME. It was told the ruler of the synagogue, Thy daughter is dead. But Jesus said to him, She is not dead, but sleepeth. Both are true, for the meaning is, She is dead to you, but to Me she is asleep.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For to men she was dead, who were unable to raise her up; but to God she was asleep, in whose purpose both the soul was living, and the flesh was resting, to rise again. Whence it became a custom amongst Christians, that the dead, who, they doubt not, will rise again, should be said to sleep. It goes on, And they laughed him to scorn.

THEOPHYLACT. But they laugh at Him, as if unable to do any thing farther; and in this He convicts them of bearing witness involuntarily, that she was really dead whom He raised up, and therefore, that it would be a miracle if He raised her.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Because they chose rather to laugh at than to believe in this saying concerning her resurrection, they are deservedly excluded from the place, as unworthy to witness His power in raising her, and the mystery of her rising; wherefore it goes on, But when he had put them all out, he taketh the father and the mother of the damsel, and them that were with him, and entereth in where the damsel was lying.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Or else, to take away all display, He suffered not all to be with Him; that, however, He might leave behind Him witnesses of His divine power, He chose His three chief disciples and the father and mother of the damsel, as being necessary above all. And He restores life to the damsel both by His hand, and by word of mouth. Wherefore it says, And he took the damsel by the hand, and said unto her, Talitha cumi; which is, being interpreted, Damsel, I say unto thee, Arise. For the hand of Jesus, having a quickening power, quickens the dead body, and His voice raises her as she is lying; wherefore it follows, And straightway the damsel arose and walked.

JEROME. (ad Pam. Ep. 57) Some one may accuse the Evangelist of a falsehood in his explanation, in that he has added, I say unto thee, when in Hebrew, Talitha cumi only means, Damsel, arise; but He adds, I say unto thee, Arise, to express that His meaning was to call and command her. It goes on, For she was of the age of twelve years.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist added this, to shew that she was of an age to walk. By her walking, she is shewn to have been not only raised up, but also perfectly cured. It continues, And a they were astonished with a great astonishment.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Mat. 31) To shew that He had raised her really, and not only to the eye of fancy.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Mystically; the woman was cured of a bloody flux, and immediately after the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue is reported to be dead, because as soon as the Church of the Gentiles is washed from the stain of vice, and called daughter by the merits of her faith, at once the synagogue is broken up on account of its zealous treachery and envy; treachery, because it did not choose to believe in Christ; envy, because it was vexed at the faith of the Church. What the messengers told the ruler of the synagogue, Why troublest thou the Master any more, is said by those in this day who, seeing the state of the synagogue, deserted by God, believe that it cannot be restored, and therefore think that we are not to pray that it should be restored. But if the ruler of the synagogue, that is, the assembly of the teachers of the Law, determine to believe, the synagogue also, which is subjected to them, will be saved. Further, because the synagogue lost the joy of having Christ to dwell in it, as its faithlessness deserved, it lies dead as it were, amongst persons weeping and wailing. Again, our Lord raised the damsel by taking hold of her hand, because the hands of the Jews, which are full of blood, must first be cleansed, else the synagogue, which is dead, cannot rise again. But in the woman with the bloody flux, and the raising of the damsel, is shewn the salvation of the human race, which was so ordered by the Lord, that first some from Judæa, then the fulness of the Gentiles, might come in, and so all Israel might be saved. Again, the damsel was twelve years old, and the woman had suffered for twelve years, because the sinning of unbelievers was contemporary with the beginning of the faith of believers; wherefore it is said, Abraham believed on God, and it was counted to him for righteousnessu. (Gen. 15:6)

GREGORY. (Mor. 4, 27) Morally again, our Redeemer raised the damsel in the house, the young man without the gate, Lazarus in the tomb; he still lies dead in the house, whose sin is concealed; he is carried without the gate, whose sin has broken forth into the madness of an open deed; he lies crushed under the mound of the tomb, who in the commission of sin, lies powerless beneath the weight of habit.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And we may remark, that lighter and daily errors may be cured by the remedy of a lighter penance. Wherefore the Lord raises the damsel, lying in the inner chamber with a very easy cry, saying, Damsel, arise; but that he who had been four days dead might quit the prison of the tomb, He groaned in spirit, He was troubled, He shed tears. In proportion, then, as the death of the soul presses the more heavily, so much the more ardently must the fervour of the penitent press forward. But this too must be observed, that a public crime requires a public reparation; wherefore Lazarus, when called from the sepulchre, was placed before the eyes of the people: but slight sins require to be washed out by a secret penance, wherefore the damsel lying in the house is raised up before few witnesses, and those are desired to tell no man. The crowd also is cast out before the damsel is raised; for if a crowd of worldly thoughts be not first cast out from the hidden parts of the heart, the soul, which lies dead within, cannot rise. Well too did she arise and walk, for the soul, raised from sin, ought not only to rise from the filth of its crimes, but also to make advances in good works, and soon it is necessary that it should be filled with heavenly bread, that is, made partaker of the Divine Word, and of the Altar.

CHAPTER 6

6:1–6

1. And he went out from thence, and came into his own country; and his disciples follow him.

2. And when the sabbath day was come, he began to teach in the synagogue: and many hearing him were astonished, saying, From whence hath this man these things? and what wisdom is this which is given unto him, that even such mighty works are wrought by his hands?

3. Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary, the brother of James, and Joses, and of Juda, and Simon? and are not his sisters here with us? And they were offended at him.

4. But Jesus said unto them, A prophet is not without honour, but in his own country, and among his own kin, and in his own house.

5. And he could there do no mighty work, save that he laid his hands upon a few sick folk, and healed them.

6. And he marvelled because of their unbelief.

THEOPHYLACT. After the miracles which have been related, the Lord returns into His own country, not that He was ignorant that they would despise Him, but that they might have no reason to say, If Thou hadst come, we had believed Thee; wherefore it is said, And he went out from thence, and came into his own country.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 23) He means by His country, Nazareth, in which He was brought up. But how great the blindness of the Nazarenes! they despise Him, Who by His words and deeds they might know to be the Christ, solely on account of His kindred. It goes on, And when the sabbath day was come, he began to teach in the synagogue: and many hearing him were astonished, saying, From whence hath this man these things? and what wisdom is this which is given unto him, that even such mighty works are wrought by his hands? By wisdom is meant His doctrine, by powers, the cures and miracles which He did. It goes on, Is not this the carpenter, the son of Mary?

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 42) Matthew indeed says that He was called the son of a carpenter; nor are we to wonder, since both might have been said, for they believed Him to be a carpenter, because He was the son of a carpenter.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Jesus is called the son of a workman, of that one, however, whose work was the morning and the sun, that is, the first and second Church, as a figure of which the woman and the damsel are healed.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For although human things are not to be compared with divine, still the type is complete, because the Father of Christ works by fire and spirit. It goes on, The brother of James, and Joses, of Jude, and, of Simon. And are not his sisters here with us? They bear witness that His brothers and sisters were with Him, who nevertheless are not to be taken for the sons of Joseph or of Mary, as heretics say, but rather, as is usual in Scripture, we must understand them to be His relations, as Abraham and Lot are called brothers, though Lot was brother’s son to Abraham. And they were offended at him. The stumbling and the error of the Jews is our salvation, and the condemnation of heretics. For so much did they despise the Lord Jesus Christ, as to call Him a carpenter, and son of a carpenter. It goes on, And Jesus said unto them, A prophet is not without honour, but in his own country. Even Moses bears witness that the Lord is called a Prophet in the Scripture, for predicting His future Incarnation to the sons of Israel, he says, A Prophet shall the Lord raise up unto you of your brethren. (Acts 7:37) But not only He Himself, Who is Lord of prophets, but also Elias, Jeremiah, and the remaining lesser prophets, were worse received in their own country than in strange cities, for it is almost natural for men to envy their fellow-townsmen; for they do not consider the present works of the man, but they remember the weakness of His infancy.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Oftentimes also the origin of a man brings him contempt, as it is written, (1 Sam. 25:10. Ps. 138:6) Who is the son of Jesse? for the Lord hath respect unto the lowly; as to the proud, He beholdeth them afar off.

THEOPHYLACT. Or again, if the prophet has noble relations, his countrymen hate them, and on that account do not honour the prophet. There follows, And he could there do no mighty work, &c. What, however, is here expressed by He could not, we must take to mean, He did not choose, because it was not that He was weak, but that they were faithless;

He does not therefore work any miracles there, for he spared them, lest they should be worthy of greater blame, if they believed not, even with miracles before their eyes. Or else, for the working of miracles, not only the power of the Worker is necessary, but the faith of the recipient, which was wanting in this case: therefore Jesus did not choose to work any signs there. There follows, And he marvelled at their unbelief.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Not as if He Who knows all things before they are done, wonders at what He did not expect or look forward to, but knowing the hidden things of the heart, and wishing to intimate to men that it was wonderful, He openly shews that He wonders. And indeed the blindness of the Jews is wonderful, for they neither believed what their prophets said of Christ, nor would in their own persons believe on Christ, Who was born amongst them. Mystically again; Christ is despised in His own house and country, that is, amongst the people of the Jews, and therefore He worked few miracles there, lest they should become altogether inexcusable. But He performs greater miracles every day amongst the Gentiles, not so much in the healing of their bodies, as in the salvation of their souls.

6:6–13

6. —And he went round about the villages, teaching.

7. And he called unto him the twelve, and began to send them forth by two and two; and gave them power over unclean spirits;

8. And commanded them that they should take nothing for their journey, save a staff only; no scrip, no bread, no money in their purse:

9. But be shod with sandals; and not put on two coats.

10. And he said unto them, In what place soever ye enter into an house, there abide till ye depart from that place.

11. And whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear you, when ye depart thence, shake off the dust under your feet for a testimony against them. Verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city.

12. And they went out, and preached that men should repent.

13. And they cast out many devils, and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord not only preached in the cities, but also in villages, that we may learn not to despise little things, nor always to seek for great cities, but to sow the word of the Lord, in abandoned and lowly villages. Wherefore it is said, And he went round about the villages, teaching.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 24) Now our kind and merciful Lord and Master did not grudge His servants and their disciples His own virtues, and as He Himself had healed every sickness and every infirmity, so also He gave the same power to His disciples. Wherefore it goes on: And he called unto him the twelve, and began to send them forth by two and two; and gave them power over unclean spirits. Great is the difference between giving and receiving. Whatsoever He does, is done in His own power, as Lord; if they do any thing, they confess their own weakness and the power of the Lord, saying in the name of Jesus, Arise, and walk.

THEOPHYLACT. Again He sends the Apostles two and two that they, might become more active; for, as says the Preacher, Two are better than one. (Eccl. 4:9) But if He had sent more than two, there would not have been a sufficient number to allow of their being sent to many villages.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evan. 17) Further, the Lord sent the disciples to preach, two and two, because there are two precepts of charity, namely, the love of God, and of our neighbour; and charity cannot be between less than two; by this therefore He implies to us, that he who has not charity towards his neighbour, ought in no way to take upon himself the office of preaching. There follows, And he commanded them, that they should take nothing for their journey, save a staff only; no scrip, no bread, no money in their purse: but be shod with sandals; and not put on two coats.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For such should be the preacher’s trust in God, that, though he takes no thought for supplying his own wants in this present world, yet he should feel most certain that these will not be left unsatisfied, lest whilst his mind is taken up with temporal things, he should provide less of eternal things to others.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The Lord also gives them this command, that they might shew by their mode of life, how far removed they were from the desire of riches.

THEOPHYLACT. Instructing them also by this means not to be fond of receiving gifts, in order too that those, who saw them proclaim poverty, might be reconciled to it, when they saw that the Apostles themselves possessed nothing.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2, 30.) Or else; according to Matthew (Matt. 10:19), the Lord immediately subjoined, The workman is worthy of his meat, which sufficiently proves why He forbade their carrying or possessing such things; not because they were not necessary, but because He sent them in such a way as to shew, that they were due to them from the faithful, to whom they preached the Gospel. From this it is evident, that the Lord did not mean by this precept that the Evangelists ought to live only on the gifts of those to whom they preach the Gospel, else the Apostle transgressed this precept, when he procured his livelihood, by the labour of his own hands, but He meant that He had given them a power, in virtue of which, they might be assured, these things were due to them. It is also often asked, how it comes that Matthew and Luke have related that the Lord commanded His disciples not to carry even a staff, whilst Mark says, And he commanded them that they should take nothing for their journey, save a staff only. Which question is solved, by supposing that the word 'staff' has a meaning in Mark, who says that it ought to be carried, different from that which it bears in Matthew and Luke, who affirm the contrary. For in a concise way one might say, Take none of the necessaries of life with you, nay, not a staff, save a staff only; so that the saying, nay not a staff, may mean, nay not the smallest thing; but that which is added, save a staff only, may mean that, through the power received by them from the Lord, of which a rod is the ensign, nothing, even of those things which they do not carry, will be wanting to them. The Lord therefore said both, but because one Evangelist has not given both, men suppose, that he who has said that the staff, in one sense, should be taken, is contrary to him who again has declared, that, in another sense, it should be left behind: now however that a reason has been given, let no one think so. So also when Matthew declares that shoes are not to be worn on the journey, he forbids anxiety about them, for the reason why men are anxious about carrying them, is that they may not be without them. This is also to be understood of the two coats, that no man should be troubled about having only that with which he is clad, from anxiety lest he should need another, when he could always obtain one from the power given by the Lord. In like manner Mark, by saying that they are to be shod with sandals or soles, warns us that this mode of protecting the feet has a mystical signification, that the foot should neither be covered above nor be naked on the ground, that is, that the Gospel should neither be hid, nor rest upon earthly comforts; and in that He forbids their possessing or taking with them, or more expressly their wearing, two coats, He bids them walk simply, not with duplicity. But whosoever thinks that the Lord could not in the same discourse say some things figuratively, others in a literal sense, let him look into His other discourses, and he shall see, how rash and ignorant is his judgment.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, by the two tunics He seems to me to mean two sets of clothes; not that in places like Scythia, covered with the ice and snow, a man should be content with only one garment, but by coat, I think a suit of clothing is implied, that being clad with one, we should not keep another through anxiety as to what may happen.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, Matthew and Luke neither allow shoes nor staff, which is meant to point out the highest perfection. But Mark bids them take a staff and be shod with sandals, which (1 Cor. 7:6) is spoken by permission.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, allegorically; under the figure of a scrip is pointed out the burdens of this world, by bread is meant temporal delights, by money in the purse, the hiding of wisdom; because he who receives the office of a doctor, should neither be weighed down by the burden of worldly affairs, nor be made soft by carnal desires, nor hide the talent of the word committed to him under the ease of an inactive body. It goes on, And he said unto them, In what place soever ye enter into an house, there abide till ye depart from that place. Where He gives a general precept of constancy, that they should look to what is due to the tie of hospitality, adding, that it is inconsistent with the preaching of the kingdom of heaven to run about from house to house.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, lest they should be accused of gluttony in passing from one to another. It goes on, And whoever shall not receive you, &c. This the Lord commanded them, that they might shew that they had walked a long way for their sakes, and to no purpose. Or, because they received nothing from them, not even dust, which they shake off, that it might be a testimony against them, that is, by way of convicting themv.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, that it might be a witness of the toil of the way, which they sustained for them; or as if the dust of the sins of the preachers was turned against themselves. It goes on, And they went and preached that men should repent. And they cast out many devils, and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them. Mark alone mentions their anointing with oil. James however, in his canonical Epistle, says a thing similar. For oil both refreshes our labours, and gives us light and joy; but again, oil signifies the mercy of the unction of God, the healing of infirmity, and the enlightening of the heart, the whole of which is worked by prayer.

THEOPHYLACT. It also means, the grace of the Holy Ghost, by which we are eased from our labours, and receive light and spiritual joy.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Wherefore it is evident from the Apostles themselves, that it is an ancient custom of the holy Church that persons possessed or afflicted with any disease whatever, should be anointed with oil consecrated by priestly blessing.

6:14–16

14. And king Herod heard of him; (for his name was spread abroad:) and he said, That John the Baptist was risen from the dead, and therefore mighty works do shew forth themselves in him.

15. Others said, That it is Elias. And others said, That it is a prophet, or as one of the prophets.

16. But when Herod heard thereof, he said, It is John, whom I beheaded: he is risen from the dead.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After the preaching of the disciples of Christ, and the working of miracles, the Evangelist fitly subjoins an account of the report, which arose amongst the people; wherefore he says, And king Herod heard of him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) This Herod is the son of the first Herod, under whom Joseph had led Jesus into Egypt, But Matthew calls him Tetrarch, and Luke mentions him as ruling over one fourth of his father’s kingdom; for the Romans after the death of his father divided his kingdom into four parts. But Mark calls him a king, either after the title of his father, or because it was consonant to his own wish.

PSEUDO-JEROME. It goes on, For his name was spread abroad. For it is not right that a candle should be placed under a bushel. And they said, that is, some of the multitude, that John the Baptist was risen from the dead, and therefore mighty works do shew themselves forth in him.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 25) Here we are taught how great was the envy of the Jews. For, lo, they believe that John, of whom it was said that he did no miracle, could rise from the dead, and that, without the witness of any one. But Jesus, approved of God by miracles and signs, whose resurrection, Angels and Apostles, men and women, preached, they chose to believe was carried away by stealth, rather than suppose that He had risen again. And these men, in saying that John was risen from the dead, and that therefore mighty works were wrought in him, had just thoughts of the power of the resurrection, for men, when they shall have risen from the dead, shall have much greater power, than they possessed, when still weighed down by the weakness of the flesh. There follows, But others said, that it is Elias.

THEOPHYLACT. For John confuted many men, when he said, Ye generation of vipers. It goes on, But others said, that it is a prophet, or as one of the prophets.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) It seems to me that this prophet means that one of whom Moses said, God will raise up a prophet unto thee of thy brethren. (Deut. 8:15.) They were right indeed, but because they feared to say openly, This is the Christ, they used the voice of Moses, veiling their own surmise through fear of their rulers. There follows, But when Herod heard thereof, he said, It is John, whom I beheaded: he is risen from the dead. Herod expressly says, this in irony.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, Herod, knowing that he without a cause had slain John, who was a just man, thought that he had risen from the dead, and had received through his resurrection the power of working miracles.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 43) But in these words Luke bears witness to Mark, to this point at least, that others and not Herod said that John had risen; but Luke had represented Herod as hesitating, and has put down his words as if he said, John have I beheaded, but who is this of whom I hear such things? We must however suppose, that after this hesitation, he had confirmed in his own mind what others had said, for he says to his children, as Matthew relates, This is John the Baptist, he has risen from the dead. (Matt. 14:2) Or else these words are to be spoken, so as to indicate that he is still hesitating, particularly as Mark who had said above that others had declared that John had risen from the dead, afterwards however is not silent as to Herod’s plainly saying, It is John, whom I beheaded: he is risen from the dead. Which words also may be spoken in two ways, either they may be understood as those of a man affirming or doubling.

6:17–29

17. For Herod himself had sent forth and laid hold upon John, and bound him in prison for Herodias’ sake, his brother Philip’s wife: for he had married her.

18. For John had said unto Herod, It is not lawful for thee to have thy brother’s wife.

19. Therefore Herodias had a quarrel against him, and would have killed him; but she could not;

20. For Herod feared John, knowing that he was a just man and an holy, and observed him; and when he heard him, he did many things, and heard him gladly.

21. And when a convenient day was come, that Herod on his birthday made a supper to his lords, high captains, and chief estates of Galilee;

22. And when the daughter of the said Herodias came in, and danced, and pleased Herod and them that sat with him, the king said unto the damsel, Ask of me whatsoever thou wilt, and I will give it thee.

23. And he sware unto her, Whatsoever thou shalt ask of me, I will give it thee, unto the half of my kingdom.

24. And she went forth, and said unto her mother, What shall I ask? And she said, The head of John the Baptist.

25. And she came in straightway with haste unto the king, and asked, saying, I will that thou give me by and by in a charger the head of John the Baptist.

26. And the king was exceeding sorry; yet for his oath’s sake, and for their sakes which sat with him, he would not reject her.

27. And immediately the king sent an executioner, and commanded his head to be brought: and he went and beheaded him in the prison,

28. And brought his head in a charger, and gave it to the damsel: and the damsel gave it to her mother.

29. And when his disciples heard of it, they came and took up his corpse, and laid it in a tomb.

THEOPHYLACT. The Evangelist Mark, taking occasion from what went before, here relates the death of the Forerunner, saying, For Herod himself had sent forth and laid hold upon John, and bound him in prison for Herodias' sake, his brother Philip's wife: for he had married her.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Ancient history relates, that Philip, the son of Herod the great, under whom the Lord fled into Egypt, the brother of this Herod, under whom Christ suffered, married Herodias, the daughter of king Aretas; but afterwards, that his father-in-law, after certain disagreements had arisen with his son-in-law, had taken his daughter away, and, to the grief of her former husband, had given her in marriage to his enemy; therefore John the Baptist rebukes Herod and Herodias for contracting an unlawful union, and because it was not allowed for a man to marry his brother's wife during his lifetime.

THEOPHYLACT. The law also commanded a brother to marry his brother's wife, if he died without children; but in this case there was a daughter, which made the marriage criminal: there follows, Therefore Herodias had a quarrel against him, and would have killed him; but she could not.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For Herodias was afraid, lest Herod should repent at some time, or be reconciled to his brother Philip, and so the unlawful marriage be divorced. It goes on, For Herod feared John, knowing that he was a just man, and an holy.

GLOSS. (non occ.) He feared him, I say, because he revered him, for he knew him to be just in his dealings with men, and holy towards God, and he took care that Herodias should not slay him. And when he heard him, he did many things, for he thought that he spake by the Spirit of God, and heard him gladly, because he considered that what he said was profitable.

THEOPHYLACT. But see how great is the fury of lust, for though Herod had such an awe and fear of John, he forgets it all, that he may minister to his fornication.

REMIGIUS. For his lustful will drove him to lay hands on a man, whom he knew to be just and holy. And by this, we may see how a less fault became the cause to him of a greater; as it is said, (Rev. 22:11) He which is filthy, let him be filthy still. It goes on, And when a convenient day was come, that Herod on his birthday made a supper to his lords, high captains, and chief estates of Galilee.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The only men whom we read of, as celebrating their birthdays with festive joys are Herod and Pharaoh, but each, with an evil presage, stained his birthday with blood; Herod, however, with so much the greater wickedness, as he slew the holy and guiltless teacher of truth, and that, by the wish, and at the instance of a female dancer. For there follows. And when the daughter of the said Herodias came in, and danced, and pleased Herod and them that sat with him, the king said unto the damsel, Ask of me whatsoever thou wilt, and I will give it thee.

THEOPHYLACT. For during the banquet, Satan danced in the person of the damsel, and the wicked oath is completed. For it goes on, And he sware unto her, Whatsoever thou shalt ask of me, I will give it thee, unto the half of my kingdom.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) His oath does not excuse his murder, for perchance his reason for swearing was, that he might find an opportunity for slaying, and if she had demanded the death of his father and mother, he surely would not have granted it. It goes on, And she went forth, and said unto her mother, What shall I ask? And she said, The head of John the Baptist. Worthy is blood to be asked as the reward of such a deed as dancing. It goes on, And she came in straightway with haste, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. The malignant woman begs that the head of John be given to her immediately, that is, at once, in that very hour, for she feared lest Herod should repent. There follows, And the king was exceeding sorry.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) It is usual with Scripture, that the historian should relate events as they were then believed by all, thus Joseph is called the father of Jesus by Mary herself. So now also Herod is said to be exceeding sorry, for so the guests thought, since the hypocrite bore sadness on his face, when he had joy in his heart; and he excuses his wickedness by his oath, that he might be impious under pretence of piety. Wherefore there follows, For his oath’s sake, and for their sakes who sat with him, he would not reject her.

THEOPHYLACT. Herod not being his own master, but full of lust, fulfilled his oath, and slew the just man; it would have been better however to break his oath, than to commit so great a sin.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In that again which is added, And for their sakes who sat with him, he wishes to make all partakers in his guilt, that a bloody feast might be set before luxurious and impure guests. Wherefore it goes on, But sending an executioner, he commanded his head to be brought in a charger.

THEOPHYLACT. ‘Spiculator’ is the name for the public servant commissioned to put men to death.

BEDE. Now Herod was not ashamed to bring before his guests the head of a murdered man; but we do not read of such an act of madness in Pharaoh. From both examples, however, it is proved to be more useful, often to call to mind the coming day of our death, by fear and by living chastely, than to celebrate the day of our birth with luxury. For man is born in the world to toil, but the elect pass by death out of the world to repose. It goes on, And he beheaded him in prison, &c.

GREGORY. (Mor. 3, 7) I cannot, without the greatest wonder, reflect that he, who was filled even in his mother’s womb with the spirit of prophecy, and who was the greatest that had arisen amongst those born of women, is sent into prison by wicked men, is beheaded for the dancing of a girl, and though a man of so great austerity, meets death through such a foul instrument. Are we to suppose that there was something evil in his life, to be wiped away by so ignominious a death? When, however, could he commit a sin even in his eating, whose food was only locusts and wild honey? How could he offend in his conversation, who never quitted the wilderness? How is it that Almighty God so despises in this life those whom He has so sublimely chosen before all ages, if it be not for the reason, which is plain to the piety of the faithful, that He thus sinks them into the lowest place, because He sees how He is rewarding them in the highest, and outwardly He throws them down amongst things despised, because inwardly He draws them up even to incomprehensible things. Let each then infer from this what they shall suffer, whom He rejects, if He so grieves those whom he loves.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) There follows, And when his disciples heard of it, they came and took up his corpse, and laid it in a tomb. Josephus relates, that John was brought bound into the castle of Macheron, and there slain; and ecclesiastical history (Theodoret. Hist. Eccles. 3:3) says that he was buried in Sebaste, a city of Palestine, once called Samaria. But the beheading of John the Baptist signifies the lessening of that fame, by which he was thought to be Christ by the people, as the raising of our Saviour on the cross typifies the advance of the faith, in that He Himself, who was first looked upon as a prophet by the multitude, was recognised as the Son of God by all the faithful; wherefore John, who was destined to decrease, was born when the daylight begins to wax short; but the Lord at that season of the year in which the day begins to lengthen.

THEOPHYLACT. In a mystical way, however, Herod, whose name means, ‘of skin,’ is the people of the Jews, and the wife to whom he was wedded means vain glory, whose daughter even now encircles the Jews with her dance, namely, a false understanding of the Scriptures; they indeed beheaded John, that is, the word of prophecy, and hold to him without Christ, his head.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, The head of the law, which is Christ, is cut off from his own body, that is, the Jewish people, and is given to a Gentile damsel, that is, the Roman Church, and the damsel gives it to her adulterous mother, that is, to the synagogue, who in the end will believe. The body of John is buried, his head is put in a dish; thus the human Letter is covered over, the Spirit is honoured, and received on the altar.

6:30–34

30. And the apostles gathered themselves together unto Jesus, and told him all things, both what they had done, and what they had taught.

31. And he said unto them, Come ye yourselves apart into a desert place, and rest a while: for there were many coming and going, and they had no leisure so much as to eat.

32. And they departed into a desert place by ship privately.

33. And the people saw them departing, and many knew him, and ran afoot thither out of all cities, and outwent them, and came together unto him.

34. And Jesus, when he came out, saw much people, and was moved with compassion toward them, because they were as sheep not having a shepherd: and he began to teach them many things.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist, after relating the death of John, gives an account of those things which Christ did with His disciples after the death of John, saying, And the Apostles gathered themselves together unto

Jesus, and told him all things, both what they had done, and what they had taught.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For they return to the fountain-head whence the streams flow; those who are sent by God, always offer up thanks for those things which they have received.

THEOPHYLACT. Let us also learn, when we are sent on any mission, not to go far away, and not to overstep the bounds of the office committed, but to go often to him, who sends us, and report all that we have done and taught; for we must not only teach but act.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Not only do the Apostles tell the Lord what they themselves had done and taught, but also his own and John's disciples together tell Him what John had suffered, during the time that they were occupied in teaching, as Matthew relates. It goes on: And he said to them, Come ye yourselves apart, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2. 45) This is said to have taken place, after the passion of John, therefore what is first related took place last, for it was by these events that Herod was moved to say, This is John the Baptist, whom I beheaded.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, He goes into a desert place from His humility. But Christ makes His disciples rest, that men who are set over others may learn, that they who labour in any work or in the word deserve rest, and ought not to labour continually.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) How arose the necessity for giving rest to His disciples, He shews, when He adds, For there were many coming and going, and they had no leisure so much as to eat; we may then see how great was the happiness of that time, both from the toil of the teachers, and from the diligence of the learners. It goes on, And embarking in a ship, they departed into a desert place privately. The disciples did not enter into the ship alone, but taking up the Lord with them, they went to a desert place, as Matthew shews. (Matt. 14) Here He tries the faith of the multitude, and by seeking a desert place He would see whether they care to follow Him. And they follow Him, and that not on horseback, nor in carriages, but laboriously coming on foot, they shew how great is their anxiety for their salvation. There follows, And the people saw them departing, and many knew him, and ran afoot thither out of all cities, and outwent them. In saying that they outwent them on foot, it is proved that the disciples with the Lord did not reach the other bank of the sea, or of the Jordan, but they went to the nearest places of the same country, where the people of those parts could come to them on foot.

THEOPHYLACT. So do thou not wait for Christ till He Himself call you, but outrun Him, and come before Him. There follows, And Jesus when he came out saw much people, and was moved with compassion towards them, because they were as sheep having no shepherd. The Pharisees being ravening wolves did not feed the sheep, but devoured them; for which reason they gather themselves to Christ, the true Shepherd, who gave them spiritual food, that is, the word of God. Wherefore it goes on, And he began to teach them many things. For seeing that those who followed Him on account of His miracles were tired from the length of the way, He pitied them, and wished to satisfy their wish by teaching them.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 26) Matthew says that He healed their sick, for the real way of pitying the poor is to open to them the way of truth by teaching them, and to take away their bodily pains.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mystically, however, the Lord took apart those whom He chose, that though living amongst evil men, they might not apply their minds to evil things, as Lot in Sodom, Job in the land of Uz, and Obadiah in the house of Ahab.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 25) Leaving also Judæa, the holy preachers, in the desert of the Church, overwhelmed by the burden of their tribulations amongst the Jews, obtained rest by the imparting of the grace of faith to the Gentiles.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Little indeed is the rest of the saints here on earth, long is their labour, but afterwards, they are bidden to rest from their labours. But as in the ark of Noah, the animals that were within were sent forth, and they that were without rushed in, so is it in the Church, Judas went, the thief came to Christ. But as long as men go back from the faith, the Church can have no refuge from grief; for Rachel weeping for her children would not be comforted. Moreover, this world is not the banquet, in which the new wine is drank, when the new song will be sung by men made anew, when this mortal shall have put on immortality.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 26) But when Christ goes to the deserts of the Gentiles, many bauds of the faithful leaving the walls of their cities, that is their old manner of living, follow Him.

35. And when the day was now far spent, his disciples came unto him, and said, This is a desert place, and now the time is far passed:

36. Send them away, that they may go into the country round about, and into the villages, and buy themselves bread: for they have nothing to eat.

37. He answered and said unto them, Give ye them to eat. And they say unto him, Shall we go and buy two hundred pennyworth of bread, and give them to eat?

38. He saith unto them, How many loaves have ye? go and see. And when they knew, they say, Five, and two fishes.

39. And he commanded them to make all sit down by companies upon the green grass.

40. And they sat down in ranks, by hundreds, and by fifties.

41. And when he had taken the five loaves and the two fishes, he looked up to heaven, and blessed, and brake the loaves, and gave them to his disciples to set before them; and the two fishes divided he among them all.

42. And they did all eat, and were filled.

43. And they took up twelve baskets full of the fragments, and of the fishes.

44. And they that did eat of the loaves were about five thousand men.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord, placing before them, first, what is most profitable, that is, the food of the word of God, afterwards also gave the multitude food for their bodies; in beginning to relate which, the Evangelist says, And when the day was now far spent, his disciples came unto him, and said, This is a desert place.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The time being far spent, points out that it was evening. Wherefore Luke says, But the day had begun to decline.

THEOPHYLACT. See now, how those who are disciples of Christ grow in love to man, for they pity the multitudes, and come to Christ to intercede for them. But the Lord tried them, to see whether they would know that His power was great enough to feed them. Wherefore it goes on, He answered, and said unto them, Give ye them to eat.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By these words He calls on His Apostles, to break bread for the people, that they might be able to testify that they had no bread, and thus the greatness of the miracle might become more known.

THEOPHYLACT. But the disciples thought that He did not know what was necessary for the feeding of so large a multitude, for their answer shews that they were troubled. For it goes on, And they said unto him, Let us go and buy two hundred pennyworth, of bread, and give them to eat.

AUGUSTINE. (Con. Evan. 2. 46) This in the Gospel of John is the answer of Philip, but Mark gives it as the answer of the disciples, wishing it to be understood that Philip made this answer as a mouthpiece of the others; although he might put the plural number for the singular, as is usual. It goes on, And he saith unto them, How many loaves hare ye? go and see. The other Evangelists pass over this being done by the Lord. It goes on, And when they knew, they say, Five, and two fishes. This, which was suggested by Andrew, as we learn from John, the other Evangelists, using the plural for the singular, have put into the mouth of the disciples. It goes on, And he commanded them to wake all sit down by companies upon the green grass, and they sat down in ranks by hundreds and by fifties. But we need not be perplexed, though Luke says that they were ordered to sit down by fifties, and Mark by hundreds and fifties, for one has mentioned a part, the other the whole. Mark, who mentions the hundreds, fills up what the other has left out.

THEOPHYLACT. We are given to understand that they lay down in parties, separate from one another, for what is translated by companies, is repeated twice over in the Greek, as though it were by companies and companies. It goes on, And when he had taken the five loaves and the two fishes, he looked up to heaven, and blessed, and brake the loaves, and gave them to his disciples to set before them: and the two fishes divided he among them all.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. v. Chrys. Hom in Matt. 49) Now it was with fitness that He looked up to heaven, for the Jews, when receiving manna in the desert, presumed to say of God, Can he give bread? (Ps. 78:20) To prevent this therefore, before He performed the miracle, He referred to His Father what He was about to do.

THEOPHYLACT. He also looks up to heaven, that He may teach us to seek our food from God, and not from the devil, as they do who unjustly feed on other men’s labours. By this also He intimated to the crowd, that He could not be opposed to God, since He called upon God. And He gives the bread to His disciples to set before the multitude, that by handling the bread, they might see that it was an undoubted miracle. It goes on: And they did all eat, and were filled: and they took up twelve baskets full of the fragments. Twelve baskets of fragments remained over and above, that each of the Apostles, carrying a basket on his shoulder, might recognise the unspeakable wonder of the miracle. For it was a proof of overflowing power not only to feed so many men, but also to leave such a superabundance of fragments. Even though Moses gave manna, yet what was given to each was measured by his necessity, and what was over and above was overrun with worms. Elias also fed the woman, but gave her just what was enough for her; but Jesus, being the Lord, makes his gifts with superabundant profusion.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, in a mystical sense, the Saviour refreshes the hungry crowds at the day’s decline, because, either now that the end of the world approaches, or now that the Sun of justice has set in death for us, we are saved from wasting away in spiritual hunger. He calls the Apostles to Him at the breaking of bread, intimating that daily by them our hungry souls are fed, that is, by their letters and examples. By the five loaves are figured the Five Books of Moses, by the two fishes the Psalms and Prophets.

THEOPHYLACT. Or the two fishes are the discourses of fishermen, that is, their Epistles and Gospel.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) wThere are five senses in the outward man, which shews that by the five thousand men are meant those who, living in the world, know how to make a good use of external things.

GREGORY. (Mor. 16, 55) The different ranks in which those who ate lie down, mark out the divers churches which make up the one Catholicx. But the Jubilee rest is contained in the mystery of the number fifty, and fifty must be doubled before it reaches up to a hundred. As then the first step is to rest from doing evil, that afterwards the soul may rest more fully from evil thoughts, some lie down in parties of fifty, others of a hundred.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, those men lie down on grass and are fed by the food of the Lord, who have trodden under foot their concupiscences by continence, and apply themselves diligently to hear and fulfil the words of God.1 The Saviour, however, does not create a new sort of food; for when He came in the flesh He preached no other things than were predicted,1 but shewed how pregnant with mysteries of grace were the writings of the Law and the Prophets. He looks up to heaven, that He may teach us that there we must look for grace. He breaks and distributes to the disciples that they may place the bread before the multitudes, because He has opened the mysteries of prophecy to holy doctors, who are to preach them to the whole world. What is left by the crowd is taken up by the disciples, because the more sacred mysteries, which cannot be received by the foolish, are not to be passed by with negligence, but to be inquired into by the perfect. For by the twelve baskets, the Apostles and the following Doctors are typified, externally indeed despised by men, but inwardly full of healthful food. For all know that carrying baskets is a part of the work of slaves.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or, in the gathering of the twelve baskets full of fragments, is signified the time, when they shall sit on thrones, judging all who are left of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the twelve tribes of Israel, when the remnant of Israel shall be saved.

6:45–52

45. And straightway he constrained his disciples to get into the ship, and to go to the other side before unto Bethsaida, while he sent away the people.

46. And when he had sent them away, he departed into a mountain to pray.

47. And when even was come, the ship was in the midst of the sea, and he alone on the land.

48. And he saw them toiling in rowing; for the wind was contrary unto them: and about the fourth watch of the night he cometh unto them, walking upon the sea, and would have passed by them.

49. But when they saw him walking upon the sea, they supposed it had been a spirit, and cried out:

50. For they all saw him, and were troubled. And immediately he talked with them, and saith unto them, Be of good cheer: it is I; be not afraid.

51. And he went up unto them into the ship; and the wind ceased: and they were sore amazed in themselves beyond measure, and wondered.

52. For they considered not the miracle of the loaves: for their heart was hardened.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord indeed by the miracle of the loaves shewed that He is the Creator of the world: but now by walking on the waves He proved that He had a body free from the weight of all sin, and by appeasing the winds and by calming the rage of the waves, He declared Himself to be the Master of the elements. Wherefore it is said, And straightway he constrained his disciples to get into the ship, and to go to the other side before unto Bethsaida, while he sent away the people.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He dismisses indeed the people with His blessing and with some cures. But He constrained His disciples, because they could not without pain separate themselves from Him, and that, not only on account of the very great affection which they had for Him, but also because they were at a loss how He would join them.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 27) But it is with reason that we wonder how Mark says, that after the miracle of the loaves the disciples crossed the sea of Bethsaida, when Luke relates that the miracle was done in the parts of Bethsaida, unless we understand that Luke means by the desert which is Bethsaida not the country immediately around the town, but the desert places belonging to it. (Luke 9:10.) But when Mark says that they should go before unto Bethsaida, the town itself is meant. It goes on: And when he had sent them away, he departed into a mountain to pray.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) This we must understand of Christ, in that He is man; He does it also to teach us to be constant in prayer.

THEOPHYLACT. But when He had dismissed the crowd, He goes up to pray, for prayer requires rest and silence.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 28) Not every man, however, who prays goes up into a mountain, but he alone prays well, who seeks God in prayer. But he who prays for riches or worldly labour, or for the death of his enemy, sends up from the lowest depths his vile prayers to God. John says, When Jesus therefore perceived that they would come and take him by force and make him a king, he departed again into a mountain himself alone. (John 6:15) It goes on: And when even was come, the ship was in the midst of the sea, and he alone on the land.

THEOPHYLACT. Now the Lord permitted His disciples to be in danger, that they might learn patience; wherefore He did not immediately come to their aid, but allowed them to remain in danger all night, that He might teach them to wait patiently, and not to hope at once for help in tribulations.

For there follows, And he saw them toiling in rowing, for the wind was contrary unto them: and about the fourth watch of the night, he cometh unto them walking upon the sea.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Holy Scripture reckons four watches in the night, making each division three hours; wherefore by the fourth watch it means that which is after the ninth hour, that is, in the tenth or some following hour. There follows, And would have passed them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2. 47) But how could they understand this, except from His going a different way, wishing to pass them as strangers; for they were so far from recognising Him, as to take Him for a spirit. For it goes on: But when they saw him walking upon the sea, they supposed it had been a spirit, and cried out.

THEOPHYLACT. See again how Christ, though He was about to put an end to their dangers, puts them in greater fear. But He immediately reassured them by His voice, for it continues, And immediately he talked with them, and said unto them, It is I, be not afraid.

CHRYSOSTOM. (v. Chrys. Hom. in Matt. 50) As soon then as they knew Him by His voice, their fear left them.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) How then could He wish to pass them, whose fears He so reassures, if it were not that His wish to pass them would wring from them that cry, which called for His help?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Buty Theodorus, who was Bishop of Phanara, wrote that the Lord had no bodily weight in His flesh, and walked on the sea without weight; but the Catholic faith declares that He had weight according to the flesh. For Dionysius says, We know not how without plunging in His feet, which had bodily weight and the gravity of matter, He could walk on the wet and unstable subtance.

THEOPHYLACT. Then by entering into the ship, the Lord restrained the tempest. For it continues, And he went up unto them into the ship, and the wind ceased. Great indeed is the miracle of our Lord’s walking on the sea, but the tempest and the contrary wind were there as well, to make the miracle greater. For the Apostles, not understanding from the miracle of the five loaves the power of Christ, now more fully knew it from the miracle of the sea. Wherefore it goes on, And they were sore amazed in themselves. For they understood not concerning the loaves.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The disciples indeed, who were still carnal, were amazed at the greatness of His virtue, they could not yet however recognise in Him the truth of the Divine Majesty. Wherefore it goes on, For their hearts were hardened. But mystically, the toil of the disciples in rowing, and the contrary wind, mark out the labours of the Holy Church, who amidst the beating waves of the world, and the blasts of unclean spirits, strives to reach the repose of her celestial country. And well is it said that the ship was in the midst of the sea, and He alone on land, for sometimes the Church is afflicted by a pressure from the Gentiles so overwhelming, that her Redeemer seems to have entirely deserted her. But the Lord sees His own, toiling on the sea, for, lest they faint in tribulations, He strengthens them by the look of His love, and sometimes frees them by a visible assistance. Further, in the fourth watch He came to them as daylight approached, for when man lifts up his mind to the light of guidance from on high, the Lord will be with him, and the dangers of temptations will be laid asleep.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, the first watch means the time up to the deluge; the second, up to Moses; the third, up to the coming of the Lord; in the fourth the Lord came and spoke to His disciples.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Often then does the love of heaven seem to have deserted the faithful in tribulation, so that it may be thought that Jesus wishes to pass by His disciples, as it were, toiling in the sea. And still do heretics suppose that the Lord was a phantom, and did not take upon Him real flesh from the Virgin1.

PSEUDO-JEROME. And He says to them, Be of good cheer, it is I, because we shall see Him as He is. But the wind and the storm ceased when Jesus sat down, that is, reigned in the ship, which is the Catholic Church.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In whatsoever heart, also, He is present by the grace of His love, there soon all the strivings of vices, and of the adverse world, or of evil spirits, are kept under and put to rest.

6:53–56

53. And when they had passed over, they came into the land of Gennesaret, and drew to the shore.

54. And when they were come out of the ship, straightway they knew him,

55. And ran through that whole region round about, and began to carry about in beds those that were sick, where they heard he was.

56. And whithersoever he entered, into villages, or cities, or country, they laid the sick in the streets, and besought him that they might touch if it were but the border of his garment: and as many as touched him were made whole.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist, having shewn the danger which the disciples had sustained in their passage, and their deliverance from it, now shews the place to which they sailed, saying, And when they had passed over, they came into the land of Gennesaret, and drew to the shore.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord remained at the above-mentioned place for some time. Therefore the Evangelist subjoins, And when they had come out of the ship, straightway they knew him, that is, the inhabitants of the country.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But they knew Him by report, not by His features; or through the greatness of His miracles, even His person was known to some. See too how great was the faith of the men of the land of Gennesaret, so that they were not content with the healing of those who were present, but sent to other towns round about, that all might hasten to the Physician; wherefore there follows, And ran through the whole region round about, and began to carry about in beds those that were sick, where they heard he was.

THEOPHYLACT. For they did not call Him to their houses that He might heal them, but rather the sick themselves were brought to Him. Wherefore it also follows, And whithersoever he entered into villages, or cities, or country, &c. For the miracle which had been wrought on the woman with an issue of blood, had reached the ears of many, and caused in them that great faith, by which they were healed. It goes on, And as many as touched him were made whole.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, in a mystical sense, do thou understand by the hem of His garment the slightest of His commandments, for whosoever shall transgress it shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven, (Matt. 5:19) or else His assumption of our flesh, by which we have come to the Word of God, and afterwards, shall have the enjoyment of His majesty.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Furthermore that which is said, And as many as touched him were made whole, shall be fulfilled, when grief and mourning shall fly away.

CHAPTER 7

7:1–13

1. Then came together unto him the Pharisees, and certain of the Scribes, which came from Jerusalem.

2. And when they saw some of his disciples eat bread with defiled, that is to say, with unwashen, hands, they found fault.

3. For the Pharisees, and all the Jews, except they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the tradition of the elders.

4. And when they come from the market, except they wash, they eat not. And many other things there be, which they have received to hold, as the washing of cups, and pots, brasen vessels, and of tables.

5. Then the Pharisees and Scribes asked him, Why walk not thy disciples according to the tradition of the elders, but eat bread with unwashen hands?

6. He answered and said unto them, Well hath Esaias prophesied of you hypocrites, as it is written, This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.

7. Howbeit in vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.

8. For laying aside the commandment of God, ye hold the tradition of men, as the washing of pots and cups: and many other such like things ye do.

9. And he said unto them, Full well ye reject the commandment of God, that ye may keep your own tradition.

10. For Moses said, Honour thy father and thy mother; and, Whoso curseth father or mother, let him die the death:

11. But ye say, If a man shall say to his father or mother, It is Corban, that is to say, a gift, by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me; he shall be free.

12. And ye suffer him no more to do ought for his father or his mother;

13. Making the word of God of none effect through your tradition, which ye have delivered: and many such like things do ye.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 29) The people of the land of Gennesareth, who seemed to be unlearned men, not only come themselves, but also bring their sick to the Lord, that they may but succeed in touching the hem of His garment. But the Pharisees and Scribes, who ought to have been the teachers of the people, run together to the Lord, not to seek for healing, but to move captious questions; wherefore it is said, Then there came together unto him the Pharisees and cerlain of the Scribes, coming from Jerusalem; and when they saw some of his disciples eat bread with common, that is, with unwashen hands, they found fault.

THEOPHYLACT. For the disciples of the Lord, who were taught only the practice of virtue, used to eat in a simple way, without washing their hands; but the Pharisees, wishing to find an occasion of blame against them, took it up; they did not indeed blame them as transgressors of the law, but for transgressing the traditions of the elders. Wherefore it goes on: For the Pharisees and all the Jews, except they wash their hands oft, eat not, holding the tradition of the elders.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For taking the spiritual words of the Prophets in a carnal sense, they observed, by washing the body alone, commandments which concerned the chastening of the heart and deeds, saying Wash you, make you clean; (Isa. 1:16) and again, Be ye clean that bear the vessels of the Lord. (Isa. 52:11) It is therefore a superstitious human tradition, that men who are clean already, should wash oftener because they eat bread, and that they should not eat on leaving the market, without washing. But it is necessary for those who desire to partake of the bread which comes down from heaven, often to cleanse their evil deeds by alms, by tears, and the other fruits of righteousness. It is also necessary for a man to wash thoroughly away the pollutions which he has contracted from the cares of temporal business, by being afterwards intent on good thoughts and works. In vain, however, do the Jews wash their hands, and cleanse themselves after the market, so long as they refuse to be washed in the font of the Saviour; in vain do they observe the washing of their vessels, who neglect to wash away the filthy sins of their bodies and of their hearts. It goes on: Then the Scribes and Pharisees asked him, Why walk not thy disciples after the tradition of the elders, but eat bread with common hands?

JEROME. (in Matt. 15) Wonderful is the folly of the Pharisees and Scribes; they accuse the Son of God, because He keeps not the traditions and precepts of men. But common is here put for unclean; for the people of the Jews, boasting that they were the portion of God, called those meats common, which all made use of.

PSEUDO-JEROME. He beats back the vain words of the Pharisees with His arguments, as men drive back dogs with weapons, by interpreting Moses and Isaiah, that we too by the word of Scripture may conquer the heretics, who oppose us; wherefore it goes on: (Isa. 29:13) Well hath Esaias prophesied of you hypocrites; as it is written, This people honoureth me with their lips, but their heart is far from me.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) For since they unjustly accused the disciples not of transgressing the law, but the commands of the elders, He sharply confounds them, calling them hypocrites, as looking with reverence upon what was not worthy of it. He adds, however, the words of Isaiah the prophet, as spoken of them; as though He would say, As those men, of whom it is said, that they honour God with their lips, whilst their heart is far from him, in vain pretend to observe the dictates of piety, whilst they honour the doctrines of men, so ye also neglect your soul, of which ye should take care, and blame those who live justly.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But Pharisaical tradition, as to tables and vessels, is to be cut off, and cast away. For they often make the commands of God yield to the traditions of men; wherefore it continues, For laying aside the commandments of God, ye hold to the traditions of men, as the washing of pots and cups.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Moreover, to convict them of neglecting the reverence due to God, for the sake of the tradition of the elders, which was opposed to the Holy Scriptures, He subjoins, For Moses said, Honour thy father and thy mother; and, Whoso curseth father or mother, let him die the death. (Exod. 21:17.)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The sense of the word honour in Scripture is not so much the saluting and paying court to men, as alms-giving, and bestowing gifts; honour, says the Apostle, widows who are widows indeed. (1 Tim. 5:3.)

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Notwithstanding the existence of such a divine law, and the1 threats against such as break it, ye lightly transgress the commandment of God, observing the traditions of the Elders. Wherefore there follows, But ye say, If a man shall say to his father or mother, It is Corban, that is to say, a gift, by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me; understand, he will be freed from the observation of the foregoing command. Wherefore it continues, And ye suffer him no more to do ought for his father or his mother.

THEOPHYLACT. For the Pharisees, wishing to devour the offerings, instructed sons, when their parents asked for some of their property, to answer them, what thou hast asked of me is corban, that is, a gift, I have already offered it up to the Lord; thus the parents would not require it, as being offered up to the Lord,z (and in that way profitable for their own salvation). Thus they deceived the sons into neglecting their parents, whilst they themselves devoured the offerings; with this therefore the Lord reproaches them, as transgressing the law of God for the sake of gain. Wherefore it goes on, Making the word of God of none effect through your traditions, which ye have delivered: and many such like things do ye; transgressing, that is, the commands of God, that ye may observe the traditions of men.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else it may be said, that the Pharisees taught young persons, that if a man offered a gift in expiation of the injury done to his father or mother, he was free from sin, as having given to God the gifts which are owed to a parent; and in saying this, they did not allow parents to be honoured.

BEDE. (ubi sup. v. Hier. in Matt. 15. et Orig. in Matt. Tom. xi. 9) The passage may in a few words have this sense, Every gift which I have to make, will go to do you good; for ye compel children, it is meant, to say to their parents, that gift which I was going to offer to God, I expend on feeding you, and does you good, oh father and mother, speaking this ironically. Thus they would be afraid to accept what had been given into the hands of God, and might prefer a life of poverty to living on consecrated property.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mystically, again, the disciples eating with unwashed hands signifies the future fellowship of the Gentiles with the Apostles. The cleansing and washing of the Pharisees is barren; but the fellowship of the Apostles, though without washing, has stretched out its branches as far as the sea.

7:14–23

14. And when he had called all the people unto him, he said unto them, Hearken unto me every one of you, and understand:

15. There is nothing from without a man, that entering into him can defile him: but the things which come out of him, those are they that defile the man.

16. If any man have ears to hear, let him hear.

17. And when he was entered into the house from the people, his disciples asked him concerning the parable.

18. And he saith unto them, Are ye so without understanding also? Do ye not perceive, that whatsoever thing from without entereth into the man, it cannot defile him;

19. Because it entereth not into his heart, but into the belly, and goeth out into the draught, purging all meats?

20. And he said, That which cometh out of the man, that defileth the man.

21. For from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications, murders,

22. Thefts, covetousness, wickedness, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, blasphemy, pride, foolishness:

23. All these evil things come from within, and defile the man.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The Jews regard and murmur about only the bodily purification of the law; our Lord wishes to bring in the contrary. Wherefore it is said, And when he had called all the people unto him, he said unto them, Hearken unto me every one, and understand; there is nothing from without a man, that entering into him can defile him, but the things which come out of a man, those are they which defile a man; that is, which make him unclean. The things of Christ have relation to the inner man, but those which are of the law are visible and external, to which, as being bodily, the cross of Christ was shortly to put an end.

THEOPHYLACT. But the intention of the Lord in saying this was to teach men, that the observing of meats, which the law commands, should not be taken in a carnal sense, and from this He began to unfold to them the intent of the law.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Again He subjoins, If any man have ears to hear, let him hear. For He had not clearly shewn them, what those things are which proceed out of a man, and defile a man; and on account of this saying, the Apostles thought that the foregoing discourse of the Lord implied some other deep thing; wherefore there follows: And when he was entered into the house from the people, his disciples asked him concerning the parable; they called it parable, because it was not clear.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord begins by chiding them, wherefore there follows, Are ye so without understanding also?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For that man is a faulty hearer who considers what is obscure to be a clear speech, or what is clear to be obscurely spoken.

THEOPHYLACT. Then the Lord shews them what was hidden, saying, Do ye not perceive, that whatsoever thing from without entereth into the man, it cannot make him common?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For the Jews, boasting themselves to be the portion of God, call common those meats which all men use, as shellfish, hares, and animals of that sort. Not even however what is offered to idols is unclean, in as far as it is food and God’s creature; it is the invocation of devils which makes it unclean; and He adds the cause of it, saying, Because it entereth not into his heart. The principal seat of the soul according to Plato is the brain, but according to Christ, it is in the heart.

GLOSS.a It says therefore into his heart, that is, into his mind, which is the principal part of his soul, on which his whole life depends; wherefore it is necessary, that according to the state of his heart a man should be called clean or unclean, and thus whatsoever does not reach the soul, cannot bring pollution to the man. Meats therefore, since they do not reach the soul, cannot in their own nature defile a man; but an inordinate use of meats, which proceeds from a want of order in the mind, makes men unclean. But that meats cannot reach the mind, He shews by that which He adds, saying, But into the belly, and goeth out into the draught, purging all meats. This however He says, without referring to what remains from the food in the body, for that which is necessary for the nourishment and growth of the body remains. But that which is superfluous goes out, and thus as it were purges the nourishment, which remains.

AUGUSTINE. (Lib. oct. Quæs. 73) For some things are joined to others in such a way as both to change and be changed, just as food, losing its former appearance, is both itself turned into our body, and we too are changed, and our strength is refreshed by it.b Further, a most subtle liquid, after the food has been prepared and digested in our veins, and other arteries, by some hidden channels, called from a Greek word, pores, passes through us, and goes into the draught.

BEDE. Thus then it is not meat that makes men unclean, but wickedness, which works in us the passions which come from within; wherefore it goes on: And he said, That which cometh out of a man, that defileth a man.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The meaning of which He points out, when He subjoins, for from within, out of the heart of men, proceed evil thoughts. And thus it appears that evil thoughts belong to the mind, which is here called the heart, and according to which a man is called good or bad, clean or unclean.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) From this passage are condemned those men who suppose that thoughts are put into them by the devil, and do not arise from their own evil will. The devil may excite and help on evil thoughts, he cannot be their author.

GLOSS. (non in Gloss. sed v. de Lyra in loc.) From evil thoughts, however, evil actions proceed to greater lengths, concerning which it is added, adulteries, that is, acts which consist in the violation of another man’s bed; fornications, which are unlawful connexions between persons, not bound by marriage; murders, by which hurt is inflicted on the person of one’s neighbour; thefts, by which his goods are taken from him; covetousness, by which things are unjustly kept; wickedness, which consists in calumniating others; deceit, in overreaching them; lasciviousness, to which belongs any corruption of mind or body.

THEOPHYLACT. An evil eye, that is, hatred and flattery, for he who hates turns an evil and envious eye on him whom he hates, and a flatterer, looking askance at his neighbour’s goods, leads him into evil; blasphemies, that is, faults committed against God; pride, that is, contempt of God, when a man ascribes the good, which he does, not to God, but to his own virtue; foolishness, that is, an injury against one’s neighbour.

GLOSS. (non occ. sed v. Summa 2, 2. Qu. 46. 1. et 1, 2. Qu. 1, 1) Or, foolishness consists in wrong thoughts concerning God; for it is opposed to wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine things. It goes on, All these evil things come from within, and defile the man. For whatsoever is in the power of a man, is imputed to him as a fault, because all such things proceed from the interior will, by which man is master of his own actions.

7:24–30

24. And from thence he arose, and went into the borders of Tyre and Sidon, and entered in to an house, and would have no man know it: but he could not be hid.

25. For a certain woman, whose young daughter had an unclean spirit, heard of him, and came and fell at his feet:

26. The woman was a Greek, a Syrophenician by nation; and she besought him that he would cast forth the devil out of her daughter.

27. But Jesus said unto her, Let the children first be filled: for it is not meet to take the children’s bread, and to cast it unto the dogs.

28. And she answered and said unto him, Yes, Lord: yet the dogs under the table eat of the children’s crumbs.

29. And he said unto her, For this saying go thy way; the devil is gone out of thy daughter.

30. And when she was come to her house, she found the devil gone out, and her daughter laid upon the bed.

THEOPHYLACT. After that the Lord had finished His teaching concerning food, seeing that the Jews were incredulous, He enters into the country of the Gentiles, for the Jews being unfaithful, salvation turns itself to the Gentiles; wherefore it is said, And from thence he arose, and went into the borders of Tyre and Sidon.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Tyre and Sidon were places of the Canaanites, therefore the Lord comes to them, not as to His own, but as to men, who had nothing in common with the fathers to whom the promise was made. And therefore He comes in such a way, that His coming should not be known to the Tyrians and Sidonians. Wherefore it continues: And entered in to a house, and would have no man know it. For the time had not come for His dwelling with the Gentiles and bringing them to the faith, for this was not to be, till after His cross and resurrection.

THEOPHYLACT. (Pseudo-Aug. Quæst. e Vet. et Nov. Test. 77) Or else His reason for coming in secret was that the Jews should not find occasion of blame against Him, as if He had passed over to the unclean Gentiles. It goes on, But he could not be hid.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. But if He wished to do so and could not, it appears as if His will was impotent; it is not possible however that our Saviour's will should not be fulfilled, nor can He will a thing, which He knows ought not be. Therefore when a thing has taken place, it may be asserted that He has willed it. But we should observe that this happened amongst the Gentiles, to whom it was not time to preach; nevertheless not to receive them, when they came to the faith of their own accord, would have been to grudge them the faith. So then it came to pass that the Lord was not made known by His disciples; others, however, who had seen Him entering the house, recognised Him, and it began to be known that He was there. His will therefore was that He should not be proclaimed by His own disciples, but that others should come to seek Him, and so it took place.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 30) Having entered also into the house, He commanded His disciples not to betray who He was to any one in this unknown region, that they, on whom He had bestowed the grace of healing, might learn by His example, as far as they could, to shrink from the glory of human praise in the shewing forth of their miracles; yet they were not to cease from the pious work of virtue, when either the faith of the good justly deserved that miracles should be done, or the unfaithfulness of the wicked might necessarily compel them. For He Himself made known His entry into that place to the Gentile woman, and to whomsoever He would.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Lastly, the Canaanitish woman came in to Him, on hearing of Him; if she had not first submitted herself to the God of the Jews, she would not have obtained their benefit. Concerning her it continues: For a woman, whose daughter had an unclean spirit, as soon as she had heard of him, came in and fell at his feet.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Now by this the Lord wished to shew His disciples that He opened the door of faith even to the Gentiles, wherefore also the nation of the woman is described when it is added, The woman was a Gentile, a Syrophenician by nation, that is, from

Syria of Phænice. It goes on: And she besought him that he would cast forth the devil out of her daughter.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2, 49) It appears however that some question about a discrepancy may be raised, because it is said that the Lord was in the house when the woman came to her, asking about her daughter. When, however, Matthew says that His disciples had suggested to Him, Send her away, for she crieth after us, (Matt. 15:23) he appears to imply nothing less than that the woman uttered supplicating cries after the Lord, as He walked. How then do we infer that she was in the house, except by gathering it from Mark, who says that she came in to Jesus, after having before said that He was in the house? But Matthew in that he says, He answered her not a word, gave us to understand that He went out, during that silence, from the house; thus too the other events are connected together, so that they now in no way disagree. It continues; But he said unto her, Let the children be first filled.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The time will come when even you who are Gentiles will obtain salvation; but it is right that first the Jews who deservedly are wont to be called by the name of children of God’s ancient election, should be refreshed with heavenly bread, and that so at length, the food of life should be ministered to the Gentiles. There follows: For it is not meet to take the children’s bread, and to cast it to the dogs.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) These words He uttered not that there is in Him a deficiency of virtue, to prevent His ministering to all, but because His benefit, if ministered to both Jews and Gentiles who had no communication with each other, might be a cause of jealousy.

THEOPHYLACT. He calls the Gentiles dogs, as being thought wicked by the Jews; and He means by bread, the benefit which the Lord promised to the children, that is, to the Jews. The sense therefore is, that it is not right for the Gentiles first to be partakers of the benefit, promised principally to the Jews. The reason, therefore, why the Lord does not immediately hear, but delays His grace, is, that He may also shew that the faith of the woman was firm, and that we may learn not at once to grow weary in prayer, but to continue earnest till we obtain.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) In like manner also to shew the Jews that He did not confer healing on foreigners in the same degree as to them, and that by the discovery of the woman’s faith, the unfaithfulness of the Jews might be the more laid bare. For the woman did not take it ill, but with much reverence assented to what the Lord had said. Wherefore it goes on, And she answered and said unto him, Truth, Lord, but the dogs under the table eat of the children’s crumbs.

THEOPHYLACT. As if she had said, The Jews have the whole of that bread which comes down from heaven, and Thy benefits also; I ask for the crumbs, that is, a small portion of the benefit.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Her placing herself therefore in the rank of dogs is a mark of her reverence; as if she said, I hold it as a favour to be even in the position of a dog, and to eat not from another table, but from that of the Master himself.

THEOPHYLACT. Because therefore the woman answered with much wisdom, she obtained what she wanted; wherefore there follows, And he said unto her, &c. He said not, My virtue hath made thee whole, but for this saying, that is, for thy faith, which is shewn by this saying, go thy way, the devil is gone out of thy daughter. It goes on, And when she was come into her house, she found her daughter laid upon the bed, and the devil gone out.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) On account then of the humble and faithful saying of her mother, the devil left the daughter; here is given a precedent for catechising and baptizing infants, seeing that by the faith and the confession of the parents, infants are freed in baptism from the devil, though they can neither have knowledge in themselves, or do either good or evil.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mystically however the Gentile woman, who prays for her daughter, is our mother the Church of Rome. Her daughter afflicted with a devil, is the barbarian western race, which by faith hath been turned from a dog into a sheep. She desires to take the crumbs of spiritual understanding, not the unbroken bread of the letter.

THEOPHYLACT. The soul of each of us also, when he falls into sin, becomes a woman; and this soul has a daughter who is sick, that is, evil actions; this daughter again has a devil, for evil actions arise from devils. Again, sinners are called dogs, being filled with uncleanness. For which reason we are not worthy to receive the bread of God, or to be made partakers of the immaculate mysteries of God; if however in humility, knowing ourselves to be dogs, we confess our sins, then the daughter, that is, our evil life, shall be healed.

7:31–37

31. And again, departing from the coasts of Tyre and Sidon, he came unto the sea of Galilee, through the midst of the coasts of Decapolis.

32. And they bring unto him one that was deaf, and had an impediment in his speech; and they beseech him to put his hand upon him.

33. And he took him aside from the multitude, and put his fingers into his ears, and he spit, and touched his tongue;

34. And looking up to heaven, he sighed, and saith unto him, Ephphatha, that is, Be opened.

35. And straightway his ears were opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed, and he spake plain.

36. And he charged them that they should tell no man: but the more he charged them, so much the more a great deal they published it;

37. And were beyond measure astonished, saying, He hath done all things well: he maketh both the deaf to hear, and the dumb to speak.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord did not wish to stay in the parts of the Gentiles, lest He should give the Jews occasion to say, that they esteemed Him a transgressor of the law, because He held communion with the Gentiles, and therefore He immediately returns; wherefore it is said, And again departing from the coasts of Tyre, he came through Sidon, to the sea of Galilee, through the midst of the borders of Decapolis.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 31) Decapolis is a region of ten cities, across the Jordan, to the east, over against Galilee.c When therefore it is said that the Lord came to the sea of Galilee, through the midst of the borders of Decapolis, it does not mean that He entered the confines of Decapolis themselves; for He is not said to have crossed the sea, but rather to have come to the borders of the sea, and to have reached quite up to the place, which was opposite to the midst of the coasts of Decapolis, which were situated at a distance across the sea. It goes on, And they bring him one that was deaf and dumb, and they besought him to lay hands upon him.

THEOPHYLACT. Which is rightly placed after the deliverance of one possessed with a devil, for such an instance of suffering came from the devil. There follows, And he took him aside from the multitude, and put his fingers into his ears.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He takes the deaf and dumb man who was brought to Him apart from the crowd, that He might not do His divine miracles openly; teaching us to cast away vain glory and swelling of heart, for no one can work miracles as he can, who loves humility and is lowly in his conduct. But He puts His fingers into his ears, when He might have cured him with a word, to shew that His body, being united to Deity, was consecrated by Divine virtue, with all that He did. For since on account of the transgression of Adam, human nature had incurred much suffering and hurt in its members and senses, Christ coming into the world shewed the perfection of human nature in Himself, and on this account opened ears with His fingers, and gave the power of speech by His spittle. Wherefore it goes on, And spit, and touched his tongue.

THEOPHYLACT. That He might shew that all the members of His sacred body are divine and holy, even the spittle which loosed the string of the tongue. For the spittle is only the superfluous moisture of the body, but in the Lord all things are divine. It goes on, And looking up to heaven, he groaned, and saith unto him, Ephphatha, that is, Be opened.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He looked up to heaven, that He might teach us that thence is to be procured speech for the dumb, hearing for the deaf, health for all who are sick. And He sighed, not that it was necessary for Him to beg any thing from His Father with groaning, for He, together with the Father, gives all things to them who ask, but that He might give us an example of sighing, when for our own errors and those of our neighbours, we invoke the guardianship of the Divine mercy.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He at the same time also groaned, as taking our cause upon Himself, and pitying human nature, seeing the misery into which it had fallen.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But that which He says, Ephphatha, that is, Be opened, belongs properly to the ears, for the ears are to be opened for hearing, but the tongue to be loosed from the bonds of its impediment, that it may be able to speak. Wherefore it goes on, And straightway his ears were opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed, and he spake plain. Where each nature of one and the same Christ is manifestly distinct, looking up indeed into Heaven as man, praying unto God, He groaned, but presently with one word, as being strong in the Divine Majesty, He healed. It goes on, And he charged them that they should tell no man.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) By which He has taught us not to boast in our powers, but in the cross and humiliation. He also bade them conceal the miracle, lest He should excite the Jews by envy to kill Him before the time.

PSEUDO-JEROME. A city, however, placed on a hill cannot be hid, and lowliness always comes before glory. Wherefore it goes on, But the more he charged them, so much the more a great deal they published it.

THEOPHYLACT. By this we are taught, when we confer benefits on any, by no means to seek for applause and praise; but when we have received benefits, to proclaim and praise our benefactors, even though they be unwilling.

AUGUSTINE. (ap. Aug. non occ. sed ap. Bed. ubi sup.) If however He, as one Who knew the present and the future wills of men, knew that they would proclaim Him the more in proportion as He forbade them, why did He give them this command? If it were not that He wished to prove to men who are idle, how much more joyfully, with how much greater obedience, they whom He commands to proclaim Him should preach, when they who were forbidden could not hold their peace.

GLOSS. (non occ.) From the preaching however of those who were healed by Christ, the wonder of the multitude, and their praise of the benefits of Christ, increased. Wherefore it goes on, And they were beyond measure astonished, saying, He hath done all things well; he maketh the deaf to hear, and the dumb to speak.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mystically, Tyre is interpreted narrowness, and signifies Judæa, to which the Lord said, (v. Isa. 28:20) “For the bed is grown too narrow,” and from which he turns himself to the Gentiles. Sidon means ‘hunting,’ for our race is like an untamed beast, and ‘sea,’ which means a wavering inconstancy. Again, the Saviour comes to save the Gentiles in the midst of the coasts of Decapolis, which may be interpreted, as the commands of the Decalogue. Further, the human race throughout its many members is reckoned as one man, eaten up by varying pestilence, in the first created man; it is blinded, that is, its eye is evil; it becomes deaf, when it listens to, and dumb when it speaks, evil. And they prayed Him to lay His hand upon him, because many just men, and patriarchs, wished and longed for the time when the Lord should come in the flesh.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or he is deaf and dumb, who neither has ears to hear the words of God, nor opens his mouth to speak them, and such must be presented to the Lord for healing, by men who have already learned to hear and speak the divine oracles.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Further, he who obtains healing is always drawn aside from turbulent thoughts, disorderly actions, and incoherent speeches. And the fingers which are put into the ears are the words and the gifts of the Holy Ghost, of whom it is said, This is the finger of God. (Exod. 8:19) The spittle is heavenly wisdom, which loosens the sealed lips of the human race, so that it can say, I believe in God, the Father Almighty, and the rest of the Creed. And looking up to heaven, he groaned, (Cf. Mat. 12:20. Luke 11:20) that is, He taught us to groan, and to raise up the treasures of our hearts to the heavens; because by the groaning of hearty compunction, the silly joy of the flesh is purged away. But the ears are opened to hymns, and songs, and psalms; and He looses the tongue, that it may pour forth the good word, which neither threats nor stripes can restrain.

CHAPTER 8

8:1–9

1. In those days the multitude being very great, and having nothing to eat, Jesus called his disciples unto him, and saith unto them,

2. I have compassion on the multitude, because they have now been with me three days, and have nothing to eat:

3. And if I send them away fasting to their own houses, they will faint by the way: for divers of them came from far.

4. And his disciples answered him, From whence can a man satisfy these men with bread here in the wilderness.

5. And he asked them, How many loaves have ye? And they said, Seven.

6. And he commanded the people to sit down on the ground: and he took the seven loaves, and gave thanks, and brake, and gave to his disciples to set before them; and they did set them before the people.

7. And they had a few small fishes: and he blessed, and commanded to set them also before them.

8. So they did eat, and were filled: and they took up of the broken meat that was left seven baskets.

9. And they that had eaten were about four thousand: and he sent them away.

THEOPHYLACT. After the Lord had performed the former miracle concerning the multiplication of the loaves, now again, a fitting occasion presents itself, and He takes the opportunity of working a similar miracle; wherefore it is said, In those days, the multitude being very great, and having nothing to eat, Jesus called his disciples unto him, and, saith unto them, I have compassion on the multitude, because they have now been with me three days, and have nothing to eat. For He did not always work miracles concerning the feeding of the multitude, lest they should follow Him for the sake of food; now therefore He would not have performed this miracle, if He had not seen that the multitude was in danger. Wherefore it goes on: And if I send them away fasting to their own houses, they will faint by the way: for divers of them came from far.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 32) Why they who came from afar hold out for three days, Matthew says more fully: And he went up into a mountain, and sat down there, and great multitudes came unto him, having with them many sick persons, and cast them down at Jesus feet, and he healed them. (v. Matt. 15:29)

THEOPHYLACT. The disciples did not yet understand, nor did they believe in His virtue, notwithstanding former miracles; wherefore it continues, And his disciples said unto him, From whence can a man satisfy these men with bread here in the wilderness? But the Lord Himself does not blame them, teaching us that we should not be grievously angry with ignorant men and those who do not understand, but bear with their ignorance. After this it continues, And he asked them, How many loaves have ye? and they answered, Seven.

REMIGIUS. Ignorance was not His reason for asking them, but that from their answering seven, the miracle might be noised abroad, and become more known in proportion to the smallness of the number. It goes on: And he commanded the people to sit down on the ground. In the former feeding they lay down on grass, in this one on the ground. It continues, And he took the seven loaves, and gave thanks, and brake. In giving thanks, He has left us an example, that for all gifts conferred on us from heaven we should return thanks to Him. And it is to be remarked, that our Lord did not give the bread to the people, but to His disciples, and the disciples to the people; for it goes on, and gave to his disciples to set before them; and they did set them before the people. And not only the bread, but the fish also He blessed, and ordered to be set before them. For there comes after, And they had a few small fishes: and he blessed, and commanded to set them also before them.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In this passage then we should notice, in one and the same, our Redeemer, a distinct operation of Divinity and of Manhood; thus the error of Eutyches1, who presumes to lay down the doctrine of one only operation in Christ, is to be cast out far from the Christian pale. For who does not here see that the pity of our Lord for the multitude is the feeling and sympathy of humanity; and that at the same time His satisfying four thousand men with seven loaves and a few fishes, is a work of Divine virtue? It goes on, And they took up of the broken meat that was left seven baskets.

THEOPHYLACT. The multitudes who ate and were filled did not take with them the remains of the loaves, but the disciples took them up, as they did before the baskets. In which we learn according to the narration, that we should be content with what is sufficient, and not look for any thing beyond. The number of those who ate is put down, when it is said, And they that had eaten were about four thousand: and he sent them away; where we may see that Christ sends no one away fasting, for He wishes all to be nourished by His grace.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The typical difference between this feeding and the other of the five loaves and two fishes, is, that there the letter of the Old Testament, full of spiritual grace, is signified, but here the truth and grace of the New Testament, which is to be ministered to all the faithful, is pointed out. Now the multitude remains three days, waiting for the Lord to heal their sick, as Matthew relates, when the elect, in the faith of the Holy Trinity, supplicate for sins, with persevering earnestness; or because they turn themselves to the Lord in deed, in word, and in thought.

THEOPHYLACT. Or by those who wait for three days, He means the baptized; for baptism is called illumination, and is performed by trine immersion.

GREGORY. (Mor. 1, 19) He does not however wish to dismiss them fasting, lest they should faint by the way; for it is necessary that men should find in what is preached the word of consolation, lest hungering through want of the food of truth, they sink under the toil of this life.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 6:73) The good Lord indeed whilst He requires diligence, gives strength; nor will He dismiss them fasting, lest they faint by the way, that is, either in the course of this life, or before they have reached the fountainhead head of life, that is, the Father, and have learnt that Christ is of the Father, lest haply, after receiving that He is born of a virgin, they begin to esteem His virtue not that of God, but of a man. Therefore the Lord Jesus divides the food, and His will indeed is to give to all, to deny none; He is the Dispenser of all things, but if thou refusest to stretch forth thy hand to receive the food, thou wilt faint by the way, nor canst thou find fault with Him, who pities and divides.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But they who return to repentance after the crimes of the flesh, after thefts, violence, and murders, come to the Lord from afar; for in proportion as a man has wandered farther in evil working, so he has wandered farther from Almighty God. The believers amongst the Gentiles came from afar to Christ, but the Jews from near, for they had been taught concerning Him by the letter of the law and the prophets. In the former case, however, of the feeding with five loaves, the multitude lay upon the green grass; here, however, upon the ground, because by the writing of the law, we are ordered to keep under the desires of the flesh, but in the New Testament we are ordered to leave even the earth itself and our temporal goods.

THEOPHYLACT. Further, the seven loaves are spiritual discourses, for seven is the number, which points out the Holy Ghost, who perfects all things; for our life is perfected in the number of seven days’d.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, the seven loaves are the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the fragments of the loaves are the mystical understanding of the1 first week.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For our Lord’s breaking the bread means the opening of mysteries; His giving of thanks shews how great a joy He feels in the salvation of the human race; His giving the loaves to His disciples that they might set them before the people, signifies that He assigns the spiritual gifts of knowledge to the Apostles, and that it was His will that by their ministry the food of life should be distributed to the Church.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The small fishes blessed are the books of the New Testament, for our Lord when risen asks for a piece of broiled fish;1 or else in these little fishes, we receive the saints, seeing that in the Scriptures of the New Testament are contained the faith, life, and sufferings of them who, snatched away from the troubled waves of this world, have given us by their example spiritual refreshment.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, what was over and above, after the multitude was refreshed, the Apostles take up, because the higher precepts of perfection, to which the multitude cannot attain, belong to those whose life transcends that of the generality of the people of God; nevertheless, the multitude is said to have been satisfied, because though they cannot leave all that they possess, nor come up to that which is spoken of virgins, yet by listening to the commands of the law of God, they attain to everlasting life.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, the seven baskets are the seven Churches. By the four thousand is meant the year of the new dispensation, with its four seasons. Fitly also are there four thousand, that in the number itself it might be taught us that they were filled with the food of the Gospel.

THEOPHYLACT. Or there are four thousand, that is, men perfect in the four virtues; and for this reason, as being more advanced, they ate more, and left fewer fragments. For in this miracle, seven baskets full remain, but in the miracle of the five loaves, twelve, for there were five thousand men, which means men enslaved to the five senses, and for this reason they could not eat, but were satisfied with little, and many remains of the fragments were over and above.

8:10–21

10. And straightway he entered into a ship with his disciples, and came into the parts of Dalmanutha.

11. And the Pharisees came forth, and began to question with him, seeking of him a sign from heaven, tempting him.

12. And he sighed deeply in his spirit, and saith, Why doth this generation seek after a sign? verily I say unto you, There shall no sign be given unto this generation.

13. And he left them, and entering into the ship again departed to the other side.

14. Now the disciples had forgotten to take bread, neither had they in the ship with them more than one loaf.

15. And he charged them, saying, Take heed, beware of the leaven of the Pharisees, and of the leaven of Herod.

16. And they reasoned among themselves, saying, It is because we have no bread.

17. And when Jesus knew it, he saith unto them, Why reason ye, because ye have no bread? perceive ye not yet, neither understand? have ye your heart yet hardened?

18. Having eyes, see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not? and do ye not remember?

19. When I brake the five loaves among five thousand, how many baskets full of fragments took ye up? They say unto him, Twelve.

20. And when the seven among four thousand, how many baskets full of fragments took ye up? And they said, Seven.

21. And he said unto them, How is it that ye do not understand?

THEOPHYLACT. After that our Lord had worked the miracle of the loaves, He immediately retires into another spot, lest on account of the miracle, the multitudes should take Him to make Him a king; wherefore it is said, And straightway he entered into a ship with his disciples, and came into the parts of Dalmanutha.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2. 51) Now in Matthew we read that He entered into the parts of Magdala1. But we cannot doubt that it is the same place under another name; for several manuscripts even of St. Mark have only Magdala. It goes on, And the Pharisees came forth, and began to question with him, seeking of him a sign from heaven, tempting him.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 33) The Pharisees, then, seek a sign from heaven, that He, Who had for the second time fed many thousands of men with a few loaves of bread, should now, after the example of Moses, refresh the whole nation in the last time with manna sent down from heaven, and dispersed amongst them all.

THEOPHYLACT. Or they seek for a sign from heaven, that is, they wish Him to make the sun and moon stand still, to bring down hail, and change the atmosphere; for they thought that He could not perform miracles from heaven, but could only in Beelzebub perform a sign on earth.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) When, as related above, He was about to refresh the believing multitude, He gave thanks, so now, on account of the foolish petition of the Pharisees, He groans; because, bearing about with Him the feelings of human nature, as He rejoices over the salvation of men, so He grieves over their errors. Wherefore it goes on, And he groaned in spirit, and saith, Why doth this generation seek after a sign? Verily I say unto you, If a sign shall be given to this generation. That is, no sign shall be given; as it is written in the Psalms, (Ps. 89:36) I have sworn once by my holiness, if I shall fail David, that is, I will not fail David.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Let no one, however, be perplexed that the answer which Mark says was given to them, when they sought a sign from heaven, is not the same as that which Matthew relates, namely, that concerning Jonah. He says that the Lord's answer was, that no sign should be given to it; by which we must understand such an one as they asked for, that is, one from heaven; but he has omitted to say, what Matthew has related.

THEOPHYLACT. Now the reason why the Lord did not listen to them was, that the time of signs from heaven had not arrived, that is, the time of the second Advent, when the powers of the heaven shall be shaken, and the moon shall not give her light. But in the time of the first Advent, all things are full of mercy, and such things do not take place.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For a sign from heaven was not to be given to a generation of men, who tempted the Lord; but to a generation of men seeking the Lord, He shews a sign from heaven, when in the sight of the Apostles He ascended into heaven. It goes on, And he left them, and entering into a ship again, he departed to the other side.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord indeed quits the Pharisees, as men uncorrected; for where there is a hope of correction, there it is right to remain; but where the evil is incorrigible, we should go away. There follows: Now they had forgotten to take bread, neither had they in the ship with them more than one loaf.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Some may ask, how they had no bread, when they had filled seven baskets just before they embarked in the ship. But Scripture relates that they had forgotten to take them with them, which is a proof how little care they had for the flesh in other things, since in their eagerness to follow the Lord, even the necessity of refreshing their bodies had escaped from their mind.

THEOPHYLACT. By a special providence1 also the disciples forgot to take bread, that they might be blamed by Christ, and thus become better, and arrive at a knowledge of Christ’s power. For it goes on, And he charged them, saying, Take heed, and beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the leaven of Herod.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Matthew says, of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the Sadducees; Luke, however, of the Pharisees only. All three, therefore, name the Pharisees, as being the most important of them, but Matthew and Mark have each mentioned one of the secondary sects; and fitly has Mark added of Herod, as a supplement to Matthew’s narrative, in which they were left out. But in saying this, He by degrees brings the disciples to understanding and faith.

THEOPHYLACT. He means by leaven their hurtful and corrupt doctrine, full of the old malice, for the Herodians were the teachers, who said that Herod was the Christ.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or, the leaven of the Pharisees is making the decrees of the divine law inferior to the traditions of men, preaching the law in word, attacking it in deed, tempting the Lord, and disbelieving His doctrine and His works; but the leaven of Herod is adultery, murder, rash swearing, a pretence of religion, hatred to Christ and His forerunner.

THEOPHYLACT. But the disciples themselves thought that the Lord spoke of the leaven of bread. Wherefore it goes on, And they reasoned amongst themselves, saying, it is because we have no bread; and this they said, as not understanding the power of Christ, who could make bread out of nothing; wherefore the Lord reproves them; for there follows, And when Jesus knew it, he said unto them, Why reason ye because ye have no bread?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Taking occasion then from the precept, which He had commanded, saying, Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees and of the leaven of Herod, our Saviour teaches them what was the meaning of the five and the seven loaves, concerning which He adds, And do ye not remember, when I brake the five loaves amongst five thousand, and how many baskets full of fragments ye took up? For if the leaven mentioned above means perverse traditions, of course the food, with which the people of God was nourished, means the true doctrine.

8:22–26

22. And he cometh to Bethsaida; and they bring a blind man unto him, and besought him to touch him.

23. And he took the blind man by the hand, and led him out of the town; and when he had spit on his eyes, and put his hands upon him, he asked him if he saw ought.

24. And he looked up, and said, I see men as trees, walking.

25. After that he put his hands again upon his eyes, and made him look up: and he was restored, and saw every man clearly.

26. And he sent him away to his house, saying, Neither go into the town, nor tell it to any in the town.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After the feeding of the multitude, the Evangelist proceeds to the giving sight to the blind, saying, And they come to Bethsaida, and they bring a blind man to him, and besought him to touch him.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 34) Knowing that the touch of the Lord could give sight to a blind man as well as cleanse a leper. It goes on, And he took the blind man by the hand, and led him out of the town.

THEOPHYLACT. For Bethsaida appears to have been infected with much infidelity, wherefore the Lord reproaches it, (Matt. 11:21) Woe to thee, Bethsaida, for if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. He then takes out of the town the blind man, who had been brought to Him, for the faith of those who brought him was not true faith. It goes on; And when he had spit in his eyes, and put his hands upon him, he asked him if he saw ought.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He spat indeed, and put His hand upon the blind man, because He wished to shew that wonderful are the effects of the Divine word added to action; for the hand is the symbol of working, but the spittle, of the word proceeding out of the mouth. Again He asked him whether he could see any thing, which He had not done in the case of any whom He had healed, thus shewing that by the weak faith of those who brought him, and of the blind man himself, his eyes could not altogether be opened. Wherefore there follows: And he looked up, and said, I see men as trees walking; because he was still under the influence of unfaithfulness, he said that he saw men obscurely.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Seeing indeed the shapes of bodies amongst the shadows, but unable to distinguish the outlines of the limbs, from the continued darkness of his sight; just as trees standing thick together are wont to appear to men who see them from afar, or by the dim light of the night, so that it cannot easily be known whether they be trees or men.

THEOPHYLACT. But the reason why he did not see at once perfectly, but in part, was, that he had not perfect faith; for healing is bestowed in proportion to faith.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat, in Marc.) From the commencement, however, of the return of his senses, He leads him to apprehend things by faith, and thus makes him see perfectly; wherefore it goes on, After that, he put his hands again upon his eyes, and he began to see, and afterwards he adds, And he was restored, and saw all things clearly; that is, being perfectly healed in his senses and his intellect. It goes on: And he sent him away to his house, saying, Go into thy home, and if thou enter into the town, tell it not to any one.

THEOPHYLACT. These precepts He gave him, because they were unfaithful, as has been said, lest perchance he should receive hurt in his soul from them, and they by their unbelief should ran into a more grievous crime.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, He leaves an example to His disciples that they should not seek for popular favour by the miracles which they did. 1Mystically, however, Bethsaida is interpreted ‘the house of the valley,’ that is, the world, which is the vale of tears. Again, they bring to the Lord a blind man, that is, one who neither sees what he has been, what he is, nor what he is to be. They ask Him to touch him, for what is being touched, but feeling compunction.?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For the Lord touches us, when He enlightens our minds with the breath of His Spirit, and He stirs us up that we may recognise our own infirmity, and be diligent in good actions. He takes the hand of the blind man, that He may strengthen him to the practice of good works.

PSEUDO-JEROME. And He brings him out of the town, that is, out of the neighbourhood of the wicked; and He puts spittle into his eyes, that he may see the will of God, by the breath of the Holy Ghost; and putting His hands upon him, He asked him if he could see, because by the works of the Lord His majesty is seen.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, putting spittle into the eyes of the blind man, he lays His hands upon him that he may see, because He has wiped away the blindness of the human race both by invisible gifts, and by the Sacrament of His assumed humanity; for the spittle, proceeding from the Head, points out the grace of the Holy Ghost. But though by one word He could cure the man wholly and all at once, still He cures him by degrees, that He may shew the greatness of the blindness of man, which can hardly, and only as it were step by step, be restored to light; and He exhibits to us His grace, by which He furthers each step towards perfection. Again, whoever is weighed down by a blindness of such long continuance, that he is unable to distinguish between good and evil, sees as it were men like trees walking, because he sees the deeds of the multitude without the light of discretion.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, he sees men as trees, because he thinks all men higher than himself. But He put His hands again upon his eyes, that he might see all things clearly, that is, understand invisible things by visible, and with the eye of a pure mind contemplate, what the eye hath not seen, the glorious state of his own soul after the rust of sin. He sent him to his home, that is, to his heart; that he might see in himself things which he had not seen before; for a man despairing of salvation does not think that he can do at all what, when enlightened, he can easily accomplish.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, after He has healed him He sends him to his home; for the home of every one of us is heaven, and the mansions which are there.

PSEUDO-JEROME. And He says to him, If thou enter into the town, tell it not to any one, that is, relate continually to thy neighbours thy blindness, but never tell them of thy virtue.

8:27–33

27. And Jesus went out, and his disciples, into the towns of Cæsarea Philippi: and by the way he asked his disciples, saying unto them, Whom do men say that I am?

28. And they answered, John the Baptist: but some say, Elias; and others, One of the prophets.

29. And he saith unto them, But whom say ye that I am? And Peter answereth and saith unto him, Thou art the Christ.

30. And he charged them that they should tell no man of him.

31. And he began to teach them, that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders, and of the chief priests, and scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again.

32. And he spake that saying openly. And Peter took him, and began to rebuke him.

33. But when he had turned about and looked on his disciples, he rebuked Peter, saying, Get thee behind me, Satan: for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men.

THEOPHYLACT. After taking His disciples afar from the Jews, He then asks them concerning Himself, that they might speak the truth without fear of the Jews; wherefore it is said, And Jesus entered, and his disciples, into the towns of Cæsarea Philippi.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 35) Philip was that brother of Herod, of whom we spoke above, who in honour of Tiberius Cæsar called that town, which is now called Paneas, Cæsarea Philippi. It goes on, And by the way he asked his disciples, saying unto them, Whom do men say that I am?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He asks the question with a purpose, for it was right that His disciples should praise Him better than the crowd.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Wherefore He first asks what is the opinion of men, in order to try the faith of the disciples, lest their confession should appear to be founded on the common opinion. It goes on, And they answered, saying, Some say John the Baptist, some Elias, and others, One of the prophets.

THEOPHYLACT. For many thought that John had risen from the dead, as even Herod believed, and that he had performed miracles after his resurrection. After however having enquired into the opinion of others, He asks them what was the belief of their own minds on this point; wherefore it continues, And he saith unto them, But whom say ye that I am?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Mat. 54) From the manner, however, itself of the question, He leads them to a higher feeling, and to higher thoughts, concerning Him, that they might not agree with the multitude. But the next words shew what the head of the disciples, the mouth of the Apostles, answered; when all were asked, Peter answereth and saith unto him, Thou art the Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. He confesses indeed that He is the Christ announced by the Prophets; but the Evangelist Mark passes over what the Lord answered to his confession, and how He blessed him, lest by this way of relating it, he should seem to be favouring his master Peter; Matthew plainly goes through the whole of it.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. Tom. xii. 15) Or else, Mark and Luke, as they wrote that Peter answered, Thou art the Christ, without adding what is put down in Matthew, the Son of the living God, so they omitted to relate the blessing which was conferred on this confession. It goes on, And he charged them that they should tell no man of him.

THEOPHYLACT. For He wished in the mean time to hide His glory, lest many should be offended because of Him, and so earn a worse punishment.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or else, that He might wait to fix the pure faith in their minds, till the Crucifixion, which was an offence to them, was over, for after it was once perfected, about the time of His ascension, He said unto the Apostles, Go ye and teach all nations.

THEOPHYLACT. But after the Lord had accepted the confession of the disciples, who called Him the true God, He then reveals to them the mystery of the Cross. Wherefore it goes on, And he began to teach them that the Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders and of the chief priests, and the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again; and he spake that saying openly, that is, concerning His future passion. But His disciples did not understand the order of the truth, neither could they comprehend His resurrection, but thought it better that He should not suffer.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. v. Chrys. ubi sup.) The reason, however, why the Lord told them this, was to shew, that after His cross and resurrection, Christ must be preached by His witnesses. Again, Peter alone, from the fervour of his disposition, had the boldness to dispute about these things. Wherefore it goes on, And Peter took him up, and began to rebuke hime.

BEDE. (ubi sup. Chrys. ubi sup.) This, however, he speaks with the feelings of a man who loves and desires; as if he said, This cannot be, neither can mine ears receive that the Son of God is to be slain.

CHRYSOSTOM. But how is this, that Peter, gifted with a revelation from the Father, has so soon fallen, and become unstable? Surely, however, it was not wonderful that one who had received no revelation concerning the Passion should be ignorant of this. For that He was the Christ, the Son of the living God, he had learnt by revelation; but the mystery of His cross and resurrection had not yet been revealed to him. He Himself, however, shewing that He must come to His Passion, rebuked Peter; wherefore there follows, And when he had turned about and looked on his disciples, he rebuked Peter, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For the Lord, wishing to shew that His Passion was to take place on account of the salvation of men, and that Satan alone was unwilling that Christ should suffer, and the race of man be saved, called

Peter Satan, because he savoured the things that were of Satan, and, from unwillingness that Christ should suffer, became His adversary; for Satan is interpreted ‘the adversary.’

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But He saith not to the devil, when tempting Him, Get thee behind me, but to Peter He saith, Get thee behind me, that is, follow Me, and resist not the design of My voluntary Passion. There follows, For thou savourest not the things which be of God, but which be of men.

THEOPHYLACT. He says that Peter savours the things which be of men, in that he in some way savoured carnal affections, for Peter wished that Christ should spare Himself and not be crucified.

8:34–38

34. And when he had called the people unto him with his disciples also, he said unto them, Whosoever will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me.

35. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the Gospel’s, the same shall save it.

36. For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?

37. Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?

38. Whosoever therefore shall be ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation; of him also shall the Son of man be ashamed, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.

BEDE. After shewing to His disciples the mystery of His passion and resurrection, He exhorts them, as well as the multitude, to follow the example of His passion. Wherefore it goes on; And when he had called the people unto him with his disciples also, he said unto them, Whosoever wishes to come after me, let him deny himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 55) As if He would say to Peter, Thou indeed dost rebuke Me, who am willing to undergo My passion, but I tell thee, that not only is it wrong to prevent Me from suffering, but neither canst thou be saved unless thou thyself diest. Again He says, Whosoever wishes to come after me; as if He said, I call you to those good things which a man should wish for, I do not force you to evil and burdensome things; for he who does violence to his hearer, often stands in his way; but he who leaves him free, rather draws him to himself. And a man denies himself when he cares not for his body, so that whether it be scourged, or whatever of like nature it may suffer, he bears it patiently.

THEOPHYLACT. For a man who denies another, be it brother or father, does not sympathize with him, nor grieve at his fate, though he be wounded and die; thus we ought to despise our body, so that if it should be wounded or hurt in any way, we should not mind its suffering.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But He says not, a man should not spare himself, but what is more, that he should deny himself, as if he had nothing in common with himself, but face danger, and look upon such things as if another were suffering; and this is really to spare himself; for parents then most truly act kindly to their children, when they give them up to their masters, with an injunction not to spare them. Again, He shews the degree to which a man should deny himself, when He says, And take up his cross, by which He means, even to the most shameful death.

THEOPHYLACT. For at that time the cross appeared shameful, because malefactors were fixed to it.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, as a skilful pilot, foreseeing a storm in a calm, wishes his sailors to be prepared; so also the Lord says, If any one will follow me, &c.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For we deny ourselves, when we avoid what we were of old, and strive to reach that point, whither we are newly called. And the cross is taken up by us, when either our body is pained by abstinence, or our soul afflicted by fellow-feeling for our neighbour.

THEOPHYLACT. But because after the cross we must have a new strength, He adds, and follow me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) And this He says, because it may happen that a man may suffer and yet not follow Christ, that is, when he does not suffer for Christ’s sake; for he follows Christ, who walks after Him, and conforms himself to His death, despising those principalities and powers under whose power, before the coming of Christ, he committed sin. Then there follows, For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the Gospel’s, the same shall save it. I give you these commands, as it were to spare you; for whosoever spares his son, brings him to destruction, but whosoever does not spare him, saves him. It is therefore right to be always prepared for death; for if in the battles of this world, he who is prepared for death fights better than others, though none can restore him to life after death, much more is this the case in spiritual battle, when so great a hope of resurrection is set before him, since he who gives up his soul unto death saves it.

REMIGIUS. And life is to be taken in this place for the present life, and not for the substance itself of the soul.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) As therefore He had said, For who so ever will save his life shall lose it, lest any one should suppose this loss to be equivalent to that salvation, He adds, For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul, &c. As if He said, Think not that he has saved his soul, who has shunned the perils of the cross; for when a man, at the cost of his soul, that is, his life, gains the whole world, what has he besides, now that his soul is perishing? Has he another soul to give for his soul? For a man can give the price of his house in exchange for the house, but in losing his soul, he has not another soul to give. And it is with a purpose that He says, Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul? for God, in exchange for our salvation, has given the precious blood of Jesus Christ.

BEDE. (in Marc. 2, 36) Or else He says this, because in time of persecution, our life is to be laid aside, but in time of peace, our earthly desires are to be broken, which He implies when He says, For what shall it profit a man, &c. But we are often hindered by a habit of shamefacedness, from expressing with our voice the rectitude which we preserve in our hearts; and therefore it is added, For whosoever shall confess me and my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, him also shall the Son of man confess, when he cometh in the glory of his Father with the holy angels.

THEOPHYLACT. For that faith which only remains in the mind is not sufficient, but the Lord requires also the confession of the mouth; for when the soul is sanctified by faith, the body ought also to be sanctified by confession.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He then who has learned this, is bound zealously to confess Christ without shame. And this generation is called adulterous, because it has left God the true Bridegroom of the soul, and has refused to follow the doctrine of Christ, but has prostrated itself to the devil and taken up the seeds of impiety, for which reason also it is called sinful. Whosoever therefore amongst them has denied the kingdom of Christ, and the words of God revealed in the Gospel, shall receive a reward befitting His impiety, when He hears in the second advent, I know you not. (Matt. 7:23)

THEOPHYLACT. Him then who shall have confessed that his God was crucified, Christ Himself also shall confess, not here, where He is esteemed poor and wretched, but in His glory and with a multitude of Angels.

GREGORY. (Hom. 32. in Evang.) There are however some, who confess Christ, because they see that all men are Christians; for if the name of Christ were not at this day in such great glory, the Holy Church would not have so many professors. The voice of profession therefore is not sufficient for a trial of faith whilst the profession of the generality defends it from shame. In the time of peace therefore there is another way, by which we may be known to ourselves. We are ever fearful of being despised by our neighbours, we think it shame to bear injurious words; if perchance we have quarrelled with our neighbour, we blush to be the first to give satisfaction; for our carnal heart, in seeking the glory of this life, disdains humility.

THEOPHYLACT. But because He had spoken of His glory, in order to shew that His promises were not vain, He subjoins, Verily I say unto you, That there be some of them that stand here who shall not taste of death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power. As if He said, Some, that is, Peter, James, and John, shall not taste of death, until I shew them, in my transfiguration, with what glory I am to come in my second advent; for the transfiguration was nothing else, but an announcement of the second coming of Christ, in which also Christ Himself and the Saints will shine.

BEDE. (in Marc. 3. 36) Truly it was done with a loving foresight, in order that they, having tasted for a brief moment the contemplation of everlasting joy, might with the greater strength bear up under adversity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 56) And He did not declare the names of those who were about to go up, lest the other disciples should feel some touch of human frailty, and He tells it to them beforehand, that they might come with minds better prepared to be taught all that concerned that vision.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else the present Church is called the kingdom of God; and some of the disciples were to live in the body until they should see the Church built up, and raised against the glory of the world; for it was right to make some promises concerning this life to the disciples who were uninstructed, that they might be built up with greater strength for the time to come.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Orig. in Matt. tom. xii. 33, 35) But in a mystical sense, Christ is life, and the devil is death, and he tastes of death, who dwells in sin; even now every one, according as he has good or evil doctrines, tastes the bread either of life or of death. And indeed, it is a less evil to see death, a greater to taste of it, still worse to follow it, worst of all to be subject to it.

CHAPTER 9

9:1–8

1. And he said unto them, Verily I say unto you, That there be some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power.

2. And after six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John, and leadeth them up into an high mountain apart by themselves: and he was transfigured before them.

3. And his raiment became shining, exceeding white as snow; so as no fuller on earth can white them.

4. And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses: and they were talking with Jesus.

5. And Peter answered and said to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here: and let us make three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.

6. For he wist not what to say; for they were sore afraid.

7. And there was a cloud that overshadowed them; and a voice came out of the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son: hear him.

8. And suddenly, when they had looked round about, they saw no man any more, save Jesus only with themselves.

PSEUDO-JEROME. After the consummation of the cross, the glory of the resurrection is shewn, that they, who were to see with their own eyes the glory of the resurrection to come, might not fear the shame of the cross; wherefore it is said, And after six days Jesus taketh with him Peter, and James, and John, and led them up into an high mountain apart by themselves, and he was transfigured before them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 65) Luke in saying, After eight days, does not contradict this; for he reckoned in both the day on which Christ had spoken what goes before, and the day on which he took them up. And the reason that he took them up after six days, was that they might be filled with a more eager desire during the space of these days, and with a watchful and anxious mind attend to what they saw.

THEOPHYLACT. And He takes with Him the three chiefs of the Apostles, Peter, as confessing and loving him, John, as the beloved one, James, as being sublime in speech and as a divine; for so displeasing was he to the Jews, that Herod wishing to please the Jews slew him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) He does not however shew His glory in a house, but He takes them up into a high mountain, for the loftiness of the mountain was adapted to shewing forth the loftiness of His glory.

THEOPHYLACT. And He took them apart, because He was about to reveal mysteries to them. We must also understand by transfiguration not the change of His features, but that, whilst His features remained as before, there was added unto Him a certain ineffable brightness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) It is not therefore fitting that in the kingdom of God any change of feature should take place, either in the Saviour Himself, or in those who are to be made like unto him, but only an addition of brightness.

BEDE. (in Marc. 3, 37) Our Saviour then when transfigured did not lose the substance of real flesh, but shewed forth the glory of His own or of our future resurrection; for such as He then appeared to the Apostles, He will after the judgment appear to all His elect. It goes on, And his raiment became shining.

GREGORY. (Mor. 32, 6) Because, in the height of the brightness of heaven above, they who shine in righteousness of life, will cling to Him; for by the name of garments, He means the just whom He joins to Himself. There follows, And there appeared unto them Elias with Moses, and they were talking with Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 56) He brings Moses and Elias before them; first, indeed, because the multitudes said that Christ was Elias, and one of the Prophets, He shews Himself to the Apostles with them, that they might see the difference between the Lord, and His servants. And again because the Jews accused Christ of transgressing the law, and thought Him a blasphemer, as if He arrogated to Himself the glory of His Father, He brought before them those who shone conspicuous in both ways; for Moses gave the Law, and Elias was zealous for the glory of God; for which reason neither would have stood near Him, if He had been opposed to God and to His law. And that they might know that He holds the power of life and of death, He brings before them both Moses who was dead, and Elias who had not yet suffered death. Furthermore He signified by this that the doctrine of the Prophets was the schoolmaster to the doctrine of Christ. He also signified the junction of the New and Old Testament, and that the Apostles shall be joined in the resurrection with the Prophets, and both together shall go forth to meet their common King. It goes on, And Peter answered and said to Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here; and let us make three tabernacles, one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) If the transfigured humanity of Christ and the society of but two saints seen for a moment, could confer delight to such a degree that Peter would, even by serving them, stay their departure, how great a happiness will it be to enjoy the vision of Deity amidst choirs of Angels for ever? It goes on, For he wist not what to say; although, however, Peter from the stupor of human frailty knew not what to say, still he gives a proof of the feelings which were within him; for the cause of his not knowing what to say, was his forgetting that the kingdom was promised to the Saints by the Lord not in any earthly region, but in heaven; he did not remember that he and his fellow-Apostles were still hemmed in by mortal flesh and could not bear the state of immortal life, to which his soul had already carried him away, because in our Father’s house in heaven, a house made with hands is not needed. But again even up to this time he is pointed at, as an ignorant man, who wishes to make three tabernacles for the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospel, since they in no way can be separated from each other.

CHRYSOSTOM.f Again, Peter neither comprehended that the Lord worked His transfiguration for the shewing forth of His true glory, nor that He did this in order to teach men, nor that it was impossible for them to leave the multitude and dwell in the mountain. It goes on, For they were sore afraid. But this fear of theirs was one by which they were raised from their usual state of mind to one higher, and they recognised that those who appeared to them were Moses and Elias. The soul also was drawn on to a state of heavenly feeling, as though carried away from human sense by the heavenly vision.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, Peter, fearing to come down from the mount because he had now a presentiment that Christ must be crucified, said, It is good for us to be here, and not to go down there, that is, in the midst of the Jews; but if they who are furious against Thee come hither, we have Moses who beat down the Egyptians, we have also Elias, who brought fire down from heaven and destroyed the five hundred.

ORIGEN. (in Matt tom. xii. 40) Mark says in his own person, For he wist not what to say. Where it is matter for, consideration, whether perchance Peter spoke this in the confusion of his mind, by the motion of a spirit not his own; whether perchance that spirit himself who wished, as far as in him lay, to be a stumbling-block to Christ, so that He might shrink from that Passion, which was the saving of all men, did not here work as a seducer and wish under the colour of good to prevent Christ from condescending to men, from coming to them, and taking death upon Himself for their sakes.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now because Peter sought for a material tabernacle, he was covered with the shadow of the cloud, that he might learn that in the resurrection they are to be protected not by the covering of houses, but by the glory of the Holy Ghost; wherefore it goes on, There was a cloud that overshadowed them. And the reason why they obtained no answer from the Lord was, that they asked unadvisedly; but the Father answered for the Son, wherefore there follows, And a voice came out of the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 56) The voice proceeded from a cloud in which God is wont to appear, that they might believe that the voice was sent forth from God. But in that He says, This is my beloved Son, He declares that the will of the Father and the Son is one, and that, save in that He is the Son, He is in all things One with Him who begot Him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He then whose preaching, as Moses foretold, every soul that wished to be saved should hear when He came in the flesh, He now come in the flesh is proclaimed by God the Father to the disciples as the one whom they were to hear. There follows, And suddenly, when they had looked round about, they saw no man any more, save Jesus only with themselves; for as soon as the Son was proclaimed, at once the servants disappeared, lest the voice of the Father should seem to have been sent forth to them.

THEOPHYLACT. Again mystically; after the end of this world, which was made in six days, Jesus will take us up (if we be His disciples) into an high mountain, that is, into heaven, where we shall see His exceeding glory.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And by the garments of the Lord are meant His saints, who will shine with a new whiteness. By the fuller we must understand Him, to whom the Psalmist says, (Ps. 51) Wash me throughly from my wickedness, and cleanse me from my sin; for He cannot give to His faithful ones upon earth that glory which remains laid up for them in heaven.

REMIGIUS. Or else, by the fuller are meant holy preachers and purifiers of the soul, none of whom in this life can so live as not to be stained with some spots of sin; but in the coming resurrection all the saints shall be purged from every stain of sin. Therefore the Lord will make them such as neither they themselves by taking vengeance on their own members, nor any preacher by his example and doctrine, can make.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or else, white garments are the writings of Evangelists and Apostles, the like to which no interpreter can frame.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. tom. xii. 39) Or else, fullers upon earth may by a moral interpretation be considered to be the wise of this world, who are thought to adorn even their foul understandings and doctrines with a false whitening drawn from their own minds. But their skill as fullers cannot produce any thing like a discourse which shews forth the brightness of spiritual conceptions in the unpolished words of Scripture, which by many are despised.

BEDE. (ubi. sup.) Moses and Elias, of whom one, as we read, died, the other was carried away to heaven, signify the coming glory of all the Saints, that is, of all who in the judgment-time are either to be found alive in the flesh, or to be raised up from that death of which they tasted, and who are all equally to reign with Him.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else it means, that we are to see in glory both the Law and the Prophets speaking with Him, that is, we shall then find that all those things which were spoken of Him by Moses and the other prophets agree with the reality; then too we shall hear the voice of the Father, revealing to us the Son of the Father, and saying, This is my beloved Son, and the cloud, that is, the Holy Ghost, the fount of truth, will overshadow us.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And we must observe, that, as when the Lord was baptized in Jordan, so on the mountain, covered with brightness, the whole mystery of the Holy Trinity is declared, because we shall see in the resurrection that glory of the Trinity which we believers confess in baptism, and shall praise it all together. Nor is it without reason that the Holy Ghost appeared here in a bright cloud, there in the form of a dove; because he who now with a simple heart keeps the faith which he hath embraced, shall then contemplate what he had believed with the brightness of open vision. But when the voice had been heard over the Son, He was found Himself alone, because when He shall have manifested Himself to His elect, God shall be all in all, yea Christ with His own, as the Head with the body, shall shine through all things. (1 Cor. 15:28).

9:9–13

9. And as they came down from the mountain, he charged them that they should tell no man what things they had seen, till the Son of man were risen from the dead.

10. And they kept that saying with themselves, questioning one with another what the rising from the dead should mean.

11. And they asked him, saying, Why say the Scribes that Elias must first come?

12. And he answered and told them, Elias verily cometh first, and restoreth all things; and how it is written of the Son of man, that he must suffer many things, and be set at nought.

13. But I say unto you, That Elias is indeed come, and they have done unto him whatsoever they listed, as it is written of him.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. tom. xii. 43) After the shewing of the mystery on the mount, the Lord commanded His disciples, as they were coming down from the mount, not to reveal His transfiguration, before the glory of His Passion and Resurrection; wherefore it is said, And as they came down from the mountain, he charged them that they should tell no man what things they had seen, till the Son of man were risen from the dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom in Matt. 56) Where He not only orders them to be silent, but mentioning His Passion, He implies the cause why they were to be silent.

THEOPHYLACT. Which He did lest men should be offended, hearing such glorious things of Him Whom they were about to see crucified. It was not therefore fitting to say such things of Christ before He suffered, but after His resurrection they were likely to be believed.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) But they, being ignorant of the mystery of the resurrection, took hold of that saying, and disputed one with another; wherefore there follows, And they kept that saying with themselves, questioning one with another what the rising from the dead should, mean.

PSEUDO-JEROME. This, which is peculiar to Mark, means, that when death shall have been swallowed up in victory, we shall have no memory for the former things. It goes on, And they asked him, saying, Why say the Scribes that Elias must first come.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) The design of the disciples in asking this question seems to me to be this. We indeed have seen Elias with Thee, and have seen Thee before seeing Elias, but the Scribes say that Elias cometh first; we therefore believe that they have lied.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or thus; the disciples thought that the change which they had seen in Him in the mount, was His transformation to glory; and they say, If Thou hast already come in glory, wherefore doth not Thy forerunner appear? chiefly because they had seen Elias go away.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 57) But what Christ answered to this, is seen by what follows, And he answered and told them, Elias verily cometh first, and restoreth all things; in which He shews that Elias will come before His second advent. For the Scriptures declare two advents of Christ, namely, one which has taken place, and another which is to come; but the Lord asserts that Elias is the forerunner of the second advent.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, He will restore all things, that is to say, those things which Malachi points out, saying, Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet, and he shall turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers; (Mal. 4:5, 6) he will yield up also to death that debt, which by his prolonged life he has delayed to render.

THEOPHYLACT. Now the Lord puts this forward to oppose the notion of the Pharisees, who held that Elias was the forerunner of the first advent, shewing that it led them to a false conclusion; wherefore he subjoins, And how it is written of the Son of man, that he must suffer many things, and be set at nought. As if He had said, When Elias the Tishbite cometh, he will pacify the Jews, and will bring them to the faith, and thus be the forerunner of the second advent. If then Elias is the forerunner of the first advent, how is it written that the Son of man must suffer? One of these two things therefore will follow; either that Elias is not the forerunner of the first advent, and thus the Scripture will be true; or that he is the forerunner of the first advent, and then the Scriptures will not be true, which say that Christ must suffer; for Elias must restore all things, in which case there will not be an unbelieving Jew, but all, whosoever hear him, must believe on his preaching.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or this, And how it is written: that is, in the same way as the prophets have written many things in various places concerning the Passion of Christ, Elias also, when he comes, is to suffer many things, and to be despised by the wicked.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Now as the Lord asserted that Elias was to be the forerunner of the second advent, so consequently He asserted that John was the forerunner of the first; wherefore He subjoins, But I say unto you, that Elias is indeed come.

GLOSS. (non in Gloss. sed ap. Chrys ubi sup.) He calls John Elias, not because he was Elias in person, but because he fulfilled the ministry of Elias; for as the latter will be the forerunner of the second advent, so the former has been that of the first.

THEOPHYLACT. For again, John rebuked vice, and was a zealous man, and a hermit like Elias; but they heard him not, as they will hear Elias, but killed him in wicked sport, and cut off his head; wherefore there follows, And they have done unto him whatsoever they listed, as it is written of him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, the disciples asked Jesus, how it was written that the Son of man must suffer? Now in answer to this, He says, As John came in the likeness of Elias, and they evil intreated him, so according to the Scriptures must the Son of man suffer.

9:14–29

14. And when he came to his disciples, he saw a great multitude about them, and the Scribes questioning with them.

15. And straightway all the people, when they beheld him, were greatly amazed, and running to him saluted him.

16. And he asked the Scribes, What question ye with them?

17. And one of the multitude answered and said, Master, I have brought unto thee my son, which hath a dumb spirit;

18. And wheresoever he taketh him, he teareth him: and he foameth, and gnasheth with his teeth, and pineth away: and I spake to thy disciples that they should cast him out; and they could not.

19. He answereth him, and saith, O faithless generation, how long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? bring him unto me.

20. And they brought him unto him: and when he saw him, straightway the spirit tare him; and he fell on the ground, and wallowed foaming.

21. And he asked his father, How long is it ago since this came unto him? And he said, Of a child.

22. And ofttimes it hath cast him into the fire, and into the waters, to destroy him: but if thou canst do any thing, have compassion on us, and help us.

23. Jesus said unto him, If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth.

24. And straightway the father of the child cried out, and said with tears, Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief.

25. When Jesus saw that the people came running together, he rebuked the foul spirit, saying unto him, Thou dumb and deaf spirit, I charge thee, come out of him, and enter no more into him.

26. And the spirit cried, and rent him sore, and came out of him: and he was as one dead; insomuch that many said, He is dead.

27. But Jesus took him by the hand, and lifted him up; and he arose.

28. And when he was come into the house, his disciples asked him privately, Why could not we cast him out?

29. And he said unto them, This kind can come forth by nothing, but by prayer and fasting.

THEOPHYLACT. After He had shewn His glory in the mount to the three disciples, He returns to the other disciples, who had not come up with Him into the mount; wherefore it is said, And when he came to his disciples, he saw a great multitude about them, and the Scribes questioning with them. For the Pharisees, catching the opportunity of the hour when Christ was not present, came up to them, to try to draw them over to themselves.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But there is no peace for man under the sun; envy is ever slaying the little ones, and lightnings strike the tops of the great mountains. Of all those who run to the Church, some as the multitudes come in faith to learn, others, as the Scribes, with envy and pride. It goes on, And straightway all the people, when they beheld Jesus, were greatly amazed, and feared.

BEDE. (in Marc. 3, 38) In all cases, the difference between the mind of the Scribes and of the people ought to be observed; for the Scribes arc never said to have shewn any devotion, faith, humility, and reverence, but as soon as the Lord was come, the whole multitude was greatly amazed and feared, and ran up to Him, and saluted Him; wherefore there follows, And running to him, saluted him.

THEOPHYLACT. For the multitude was glad to see Him, so that they saluted Him from afar, as He was coming to them; but some suppose that His countenance had become more beautiful from His transfiguration, and that this induced the crowd to salute Him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Now it was the people, and not the disciples, who on seeing Him were amazed and feared, for there is no fear in love; fear belongs to servants, amazement to fools. It goes on: And he asked them, What question ye with them. Why does the Lord put this question? That confession may produce salvation, and the murmuring of our hearts may be appeased by religious words.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The question, indeed, which was raised may, if I am not deceived, have been this, wherefore they, who were the disciples of the Saviour, were unable to heal the demoniac, who was placed in the midst, which may be gathered from the following words; And one of the multitude answered and said, Master, I have brought unto thee my son, which hath a dumb spirit; and wheresoever he taketh him, he teareth him: and he foameth, and gnasheth with his teeth, and pineth away.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) The Scriptures declare that this man was weak in faith, for Christ says, O faithless generation: and He adds, If thou canst believe. But although his want of faith was the cause of their not casting out the devil, he nevertheless accuses the disciples; wherefore it is added, And I spake to thy disciples that they should cast him out; but they could not. Now observe his folly; in praying to Jesus in the midst of the crowd, he accuses the disciples, wherefore the Lord before the multitude so much the more accuses him, and not only aims the accusation at himself, but also extends it to all the Jews; for it is probable that many of those present had been offended, and had held wrong thoughts concerning His disciples. Wherefore there follows, He answereth them and saith, O faithless generation, how long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you? By which He shewed both that He desired death, and that it was a burden to Him to converse with them.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) So far, however, is He from being angry with the person, though He reproved the sin, that He immediately added, Bring him unto me; and they brought him unto him. And when he saw him, straightway the spirit fare him, and he fell on the ground, and wallowed foaming.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But this the Lord permitted for the sake of the father of the boy, that when he saw the devil vexing his child, he might be brought on to believe that the miracle was to be wrought.

THEOPHYLACT. He also permits the child to be vexed, that in this way we might know the devil’s wickedness, who would have killed him, had he not been assisted by the Lord. It goes on: And he asked his father, How long is it ago since this came unto him? And he said, Of a child; and offtimes it has cast him into the fire and into the waters to destroy him.

BEDE. Let Juliang blush, who dares to say that all men are born in the flesh, without the infection of sin, as though they were innocent in all respects, just as Adam was when he was created. For what was there in the boy, that he should be troubled from infancy with a cruel devil, if he were not held at all by the chain of original sin? since it is evident that he could not yet have had any sin of his own.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Now he expresses in the words of his petition his want of faith; for that is the reason why he adds, But if thou canst do any thing, have compassion on us, and help us. For in that he says, If thou canst do any thing, he shews that he doubts His power, because he had seen that the disciples of Christ had failed in curing him; but he says, have compassion on us, to shew the misery of the son, who suffered, and the father, who suffered with him. It goes on: Jesus said unto him, If thou canst believe, all things are possible to him that believeth.

PSEUDO-JEROME. This saying, If thou canst, is a proof of the freedom of the will. Again, all things are possible to him that believeth, which evidently means all those things which are prayed for with tears in the name of Jesus, that is, of salvation.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The answer of the Lord was suited to the petition; for the man said, If thou canst do any thing, help us; and to this the Lord answered, If thou canst believe. On the other hand, the leper who cried out, with faith, Lord, if thou will, thou canst make me clean, (Matt. 8:2. 3) received an answer according to his faith, I will, be thou clean.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. sed v. Chrys. ubi sup.) His meaning is; such a plenitude of virtue is there in Me, that not only can I do this, but I will make others to have that power; where fore if thou canst believe as thou oughtest to do, thou shalt be able to cure not only him, but many more. In this way then, He endeavoured to bring back to the faith, the man who as yet speaks unfaithfully. There follows, And straightway the father of the child cried out, and said with tears, Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief. But if he had already believed, saying, I believe, how is it that he adds, help thou mine unbelief? We must say then that faith is manifold, that one sort of faith is elementary, another perfect; but this man, being but a beginner in believing, prayed the Saviour to add to his virtue what was wanting.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For no man at once reaches to the highest point, but in holy living a man begins with the least things that he may reach the great; for the beginning of virtue is different, from the progress and the perfection of it. Because then faith mounts up through the secret inspiration of grace, by the steps of its own meritsh, he who had not yet believed perfectly was at once a believer and an unbeliever.

PSEUDO-JEROME. By this also we are taught that our faith is tottering, if it lean not on the stay of the help of God. But faith by its tears receives the accomplishment of its wishes; Wherefore it continues, When Jesus saw that the multitude came running together, he rebuked the foul spirit, saying unto him, Thou dumb and deaf spirit, I charge thee come out of him, and enter no more into him.

THEOPHYLACT. The reason that He rebuked the foul spirit, when He saw the crowd running together, was that he did not wish to cure him before the multitude, that He might give us a lesson to avoid ostentation.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) And His rebuking him, and saying, I charge thee, is a proof of Divine power. Again, in that He says not only, come out of him, but also enter no more into him, He shews that the evil spirit was ready to enter again, because the man was weak in faith, but was prevented by the command of the Lord. It goes on, And the spirit cried, and rent him sore, and came out of him; and he was as one dead, insomuch that many said, He is dead. For the devil was not able to inflict death upon him, because the true Life was come.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But him, whom the unholy spirit made like unto death, the holy Saviour saved by the touch of His holy hand; wherefore it goes on, But Jesus took him by the hand, and lifted him up, and he arose. Thus as the Lord had shewn Himself to be very God by the power of healing, so He shewed that He had the very nature of our flesh, by the manner of His human touch. The Manichæani indeed madly denies that He was truly clothed in flesh; He Himself, however, by raising, cleansing, enlightening so many afflicted persons by His touch, condemned his heresy before its birth. It goes on: And when he was come into the house, his disciples asked him privately, Why could not we cast him out?

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) They feared that perchance they had lost the grace conferred upon them; for they had already received power over unclean spirits. It goes on: And he said unto them, This kind can come forth by nothing but by prayer and fasting.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, the whole class of lunatics, or simply, of all persons possessed with devils. Both the man to be cured, and he who cures him, should fast; for a real prayer is offered up, when fasting is joined with prayer, when he who prays is sober and not heavy with food.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, in a mystical sense, on high the Lord unfolds the mysteries of the kingdom to His disciples, but below He rebukes the multitude for their sins of unfaithfulness, and expels devils from those, who are vexed by them. Those who are still carnal and foolish, He strengthens, teaches, punishes, whilst He more freely instructs the perfect concerning the things of eternity.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, this devil is deaf and dumb; deaf, because he does not choose to hear the words of God; dumb, because he is unable to teach others their duty.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, a sinner foameth forth folly, gnasheth with anger, pineth away in sloth. But the evil spirit tears him, when coming to salvation, and in like manner those whom he would drag into his maw he tears asunder by terrors and losses, as he did Job.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For oftentimes when we try to turn to God after sin, our old enemy attacks us with new and greater snares, which he does, either to instil into us a hatred of virtue, or to avenge the injury of his expulsion.

GREGORY. (Mor. x. 30) But he who is freed from the power of the evil spirit is thought to be dead; for whosoever has already subdued earthly desires, puts to death within himself his carnal mode of life, and appears to the world as a dead man, and many look upon him as dead; for they who know not how to live after the Spirit, think that he who does not follow after carnal pleasures is altogether dead.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Further, in his being vexed from his infancy, the Gentile people is signified, from the very birth of whom the vain worship of idols arose, so that they in their folly sacrificed their children to devils. And for this reason it is said that it cast him into the fire and into the water; for some of the Gentiles worshipped fire, others water.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or by this demoniac are signified those, who are bound by the guilt of original sin, and coming into the world as criminals, are to be saved by grace; and by fire is meant the heat of anger, by water, the pleasures of the flesh, which melt the soul by their sweetness. But He did not rebuke the boy, who suffered violence, but the devil, who inflicted it, because he who desires to amend a sinner, ought, whilst he exterminates his vice by rebuking and cursing it, to love and cherish the man.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, the Lord applies to the evil spirit what he had inflicted on the man, calling him deaf and dumb spirit, because he never will hear and speak what the penitent sinner can speak and hear. But the devil, quitting a man, never returns, if the man keep his heart with the keys of humility and charity, and hold possession of the gate of freedom.1 The man who was healed became as one dead, for it is said to those who are healed, Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God. (Col. 3:3.)

THEOPHYLACT. (ap. Pseudo-Hier.) Again, when Jesus, that is, the word of the Gospel, takes hold of the hand, that is, of our powers of action, then shall we be freed from the devil. And observe that God first helps us, then it is required of us that we do good; for which reason it is said that Jesus raised him, in which is shewn the aid of God, and that he arose, in which is declared the zeal of man.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Further, our Lord, while teaching the Apostles how the worst devil is to be expelled, gives all of us rules for our life; that is, He would have us know that all the more grievous attacks of evil spirits or of men are to be overcome by fastings and prayers; and again, that the anger of the Lord, when it is kindled for vengeance on our crimes, can be appeased by this remedy alone. But fasting in general is not only abstinence from food, but also from all carnal delights, yea, from all vicious passions. In like manner prayer taken generally, consists not only in the words by which we call upon the Divine mercy, but also in all those things which we do with the devotedness of faith in obedience to our Maker, as the Apostle testifies, when he says, Pray without ceasing. (1 Thess. 5:17)

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, the folly which is connected with the softness of the flesh, is healed by fasting; anger and laziness are healed by prayer. Each wound has its own medicine, which must be applied to it; that which is used for the heel will not cure the eye; by fasting, the passions of the body, by prayer, the plagues of the soul, are healed.

9:30–37

30. And they departed thence, and passed through Galilee; and he would not that any man should know it.

31. For he taught his disciples, and said unto them, The Son of man is delivered into the hands of men, and they shall kill him; and after that he is killed, he shall rise the third day.

32. But they understood not that saying, and were afraid to ask him.

33. And he came to Capernaum: and being in the house he asked them, What was it that ye disputed among yourselves by the way?

34. But they held their peace: for by the way they had disputed among themselves, who should be the greatest.

35. And he sat down, and called the twelve, and saith unto them, If any man desire to be first, the same shall be last of all, and servant of all.

36. And he took a child, and set him in the midst of them: and when he had taken him in his arms, he said unto them,

37. Whosoever shall receive one of such children in my name, receiveth me: and whosoever shall receive me, receiveth not me, but him that sent me.

THEOPHYLACT. It is after miracles that the Lord inserts a discourse concerning His Passion, lest it should be thought that He suffered because He could not help it; wherefore it is said, And they departed thence, and passed through Galilee: and he would not that any man should know it. For he taught his disciples, and said unto them, The Son of man is delivered into the hands of men, and they shall kill him.

BEDE. (in Marc. 3, 39) He always mingles together sorrowful and joyful things, that sorrow should not by its suddenness frighten the Apostles, but be borne by them with prepared minds.

THEOPHYLACT. After, however, saying what was sorrowful, He adds what ought to rejoice them; wherefore it goes on: And after that he is killed, he shall rise the third day; in order that we may learn that joys come on after struggles. There follows: But they understood not that saying, and were afraid to ask him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This ignorance of the disciples proceeds not so much from slowness of intellect, as from love for the Saviour, for they were as yet carnal, and ignorant of the mystery of the cross, they could not therefore believe that He whom they had recognised as the true God, was about to die; being accustomed then to hear Him often talk in figures, and shrinking from the event of His death, they would have it, that something was conveyed figuratively in those things, which he spoke openly concerning His betrayal and passion. It goes on: And they came to Capernaum.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Capernaum means the city of consolation, and agrees with the former sentence, which He had spoken: And after that he is killed, he shall arise the third day. There follows: And being in the house he asked them, What was it that ye disputed among yourselves by the way? But they held their peace.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Matthew however says, that the disciples came to Jesus, saying, Who is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven? (Matt. 18:1) The reason is, that he did not begin the narrative from its commencement, but omitted our Saviour’s knowledge of the thoughts and words of His disciples; unless we understand Him to mean, that even what they thought and said, when away from Christ, was said unto Him, since it was as well known to Him as if it had been said to Him. It goes on: For by the way they had disputed among themselves, who should be the greatest. (Luke 9:46. Vulg.) But Luke says, that “the thought entered into the disciples which of them should be the greatest;” for the Lord laid open their thought and intention from their private discourse1 according to the Gospel narrative.

PSEUDO-JEROME. It was fit also that they should dispute concerning the chief place by the way; the dispute is like the place where it is held; for lofty station is only entered upon to be quitted: as long as a man keeps it, it is slippery, and it is uncertain at what stage, that is, on what day, it will end.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The reason why the dispute concerning the chief place arose amongst the disciples seems to have been, that Peter, James, and John, were led apart from the rest into the mountain, and that something secret was there entrusted to them, also that the keys of the kingdom of heaven were promised to Peter, according to Matthew. Seeing however the thoughts of the disciples, the Lord takes care to heal the desire of glory by humility; for He first, by simply commanding humility, admonishes them that a high station was not to be aimed at. Wherefore it goes on: And he sat down, and called the twelve, and saith unto them, If any man desire to be first, the same shall be last of all, and servant of all.

JEROME. Where it is to be observed, that the disciples disputed by the way concerning the chief place, but Christ Himself sat down to teach humility; for princes toil while the humble repose.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The disciples indeed wished to receive honour at the hands of the Lord; they also had a desire to be made great by Christ, for the greater a man is, the more worthy of honour he becomes, for which reason He did not throw an obstacle in the way of that desire, but brought in humility.

THEOPHYLACT. For His wish is not that we should usurp for ourselves chief places, but that we should attain to lofty heights by lowliness. He next admonishes them by the example of a child’s innocence; wherefore there follows: And he took a child, and set him in the midst of them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. Sed v. Chrys. Hom. in Matt. 58) By the very sight, persuading them to humility and simplicity; for this little one was pure from envy and vain glory, and from a desire of superiority. But He does not only say, If ye become such, ye shall receive a great reward, but also, if ye will honour others, who are such for my sake. Wherefore there follows: And when he had taken him in his arms, he said unto them, Whosoever shall receive one of such children in my name, receiveth me.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By which, He either simply shews, that those who would become greater must receive the poor of Christ in honour of Him, or He would persuade them to be in malice children, to keep simplicity without arrogance, charity without envy, devotedness without anger. Again, by taking the child into His arms, He implies that the lowly are worthy of His embrace and love. He adds also, In my name, that they might, with the fixed purpose of reason, follow for His name's sake that mould of virtue to which the child keeps, with nature for his guide. And because He taught that He Himself was received in children, lest it should be thought that there was nothing in Him but what was seen, he added, And whosoever shall receive me, receiveth not me, but Him that sent me; thus wishing, that we should believe Him to be of the same nature and of equal greatness with His Father.

THEOPHYLACT. See, how great is humility, for it wins for itself the indwelling of the Father, and of the Son, and also of the Holy Ghost.

9:38–42

38. And John answered him, saying, Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and he followeth not us: and we forbad him, because he followeth not us.

39. But Jesus said, Forbid him not: for there is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me.

40. For he that is not against us is on our part.

41. For whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward.

42. And whosoever shall offend one of these little ones that believe in me, it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) John, loving the Lord with eminent devotion, thought that He who performed an office to which He had no right was to be excluded from the benefit of it. Wherefore it is said, And John answered him, saying, Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and he followeth not us: and we forbad him, because he followeth not us.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) For many believers received gifts, and yet were, not with Christ, such was this man who cast out devils; for there were many of them deficient in some way; some were pure in life, but were not so perfect in faith; others again, contrariwise.

THEOPHYLACT. Or again, some unbelievers, seeing that the name of Jesus was full of virtue, themselves used it, and performed signs, though they were unworthy of Divine grace; for the Lord wished to extend His name even by the unworthy.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) It was not from jealousy or envy, however, that John wished to forbid him who cast out devils, but because he wished that all, who called on the name of the Lord, should follow Christ, and be one body with His disciples. But the Lord, however unworthy they who perform the miracles may be, incites others by their means to believe on Him, and induces themselves by this unspeakable grace to become better. Wherefore there follows: But Jesus said, Forbid him not.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By which He shews that no one is to be driven away from that partial goodness which he possesses already, but rather to be stirred up to that which he has not as yet obtained.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) In conformity to this, He shews that he is not to be forbidden, adding immediately after, For there is no man which shall do a miracle in my name, that can lightly speak evil of me. He says lightly, to meet the case of those who fell into heresy, such as were Simon and Menander, and Cerinthusk; not that they did miracles in the name of Christ, but by their deceptions had the appearance of doing them. But these others, though they do not follow us, cannot however set themselves to say any thing against us, because they honour My name by working miracles.

THEOPHYLACT. For how can he speak evil of Me, who draws glory from My name, and works miracles by the invocation of this very name. There follows, For he that is not against you is on your part.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 4. 5.) We must take care that this saying of the Lord appear not to be contrary to that, where He says, He who is not with me is against me. (Luke 11:23) Or will any one say that the difference lies in that here He says to His disciples, For he that is not against you is on your part, but in the other He speaks of Himself, He who is not with me is against me? As if indeed it were possiblel that he who is joined to Christ's disciples, who are as His members, should not be with Him. How if it were so, could it be true that he that receiveth you receiveth me? (Matt. 10:40) Or how is he not against Him, who is against His disciples? Where then will be that saying, He who despiseth you, despiseth me? But surely what is implied is, that a man is not with Him in as far as he is against Him, and is not against Him in as far as he is with Him. For instance, he who worked miracles in the name of Christ, and yet did not join himself to the body of His disciples, in as far as he worked the miracles in His name, was with them, and was not against them: again, in that he did not join their society, he was not with them, and was against them. But because they forbade his doing that in which he was with them, the Lord said unto them, Forbid him not; for they ought to have forbidden his being without their society, and thus to have persuaded him of the unity of the Church, but they should not have forbidden that in which he was with them, that is, his commendation of the name of their Lord and Master by the expulsion of devils. Thus the Church Catholic does not disapprove in heretics the sacraments, which are common, but she blames their division, or some opinion of theirs adverse to peace and to truth; for in this they are against us.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Or else, this is said of those who believe on Him, but nevertheless do not follow Him from the looseness of their lives. Again, it is said of devils, who try to separate all from God, and to disperse His congregation. There follows, For whosoever shall give you a cup of cold water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward.

THEOPHYLACT. Not only will I not forbid him who works miracles in My name, but also whosoever shall give you the smallest thing for My name's sake, and shall receive you, not on account of human and worldly favour, but from love to Me, shall not lose his reward.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 4. 6) By which He shews, that he of whom John had spoken was not so far separated from the fellowship of the disciples, as to reject it, as a heretic, but as men are wont to hang back from receiving the Sacraments of Christ, and yet favour the Christian name, so as even to succour Christians, and do them service only because they are Christians. Of these He says they shall not lose their reward; not that they ought already to think themselves secure on account of this good will which they have towards Christians, without being washed with His baptism, and incorporated in His unity, but that they are already so guided by the mercy of God, as also to attain to these, and thus to go away from this life in security.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) And that no man may allege poverty, He mentions that, of which none can be destitute, that is, a cup of cold water, for which also he will obtain a reward; for it is not the value of the gift, but the dignity of those who receive it, and the feelings of the giver, which makes a work worthy of reward. His words shew that His disciples are to be received, not only on account of the reward, which he who receives them obtains, but also, because he thus saves himself from punishment. There follows: And whosoever shall offend one of these little ones that believe in me, it is better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were cast into the sea: as though He would say,1 All who honour you for My sake have their reward, so also those who dishonour you, that is, offend you, shall receive the worst of vengeance. Further, from things which are palpable to us, He describes an intolerable torment, making mention of a millstone, and of being drowned; and He says not, let a millstone be hanged about his neck, but, it is better for him to suffer this, shewing by this that some more heavy evil awaits him. But He means by little ones that believe on Me, not only those who follow Him, but those who call upon His name, those also who offer a cup of cold water, though they do not any greater works. Now He will have none of these offended or plucked away; for this is what is meant by forbidding them to call upon His name.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And fitly the man who is offended is called a little one, for he who is great, whatever he may suffer, departs not from the faith; but he who is little and weak in mind looks out for occasions of stumbling. For this reason we must most of all look to those who are little ones in the faith, lest by our fault they should be offended, and go back from the faith, and fall away from salvation.

GREGORY. (in Ezech. 1. Hom. 7) We must observe, however, that in our good works we must sometimes avoid the offence of our neighbour, sometimes look down upon it as of no moment. For in as far as we can do it without sin, we ought to avoid the offence of our neighbour; but if a stumblingblock is laid before men in what concerns the truth, it is better to allow the offence to arise, than that the truth should be abandoned.

GREGORY. (de cura past. p. i. c. 2) Mystically by a millstone is expressed the tedious round and toil of a secular life, and by the depths of the sea, the worst damnation is pointed out. He who therefore, after having been brought to a profession of sanctity, destroys others, either by word or example, it had been indeed better for him that his worldly deeds should render him liable to death, under a secular garb, than that his holy office should hold him out as an example for others in his faults, because doubtless if he had fallen alone, his pain in hell would have been of a more endurable kind.

9:43–50

43. And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched:

44. Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.

45. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched:

46. Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.

47. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire:

48. Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.

49. For every one shall be salted with fire, and every sacrifice shall be salted with salt.

50. Salt is good: but if the salt have lost his saltness, wherewith will ye season it? Have salt in yourselves, and have peace one with another.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Because the Lord had taught us not to offend those who believe on Him, He now as next in order warns us how much we should beware of those who offend us, that is, who by their words or conduct strive to drag us into the perdition of sin; wherefore He says, And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 59) He says not this of our limbs, but of our intimate friends, whom as being necessary to us we look upon as our limbs; for nothing is so hurtful as mischievous society.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) That is, He calls by the name of hand, our intimate friend, of whose aid we daily stand in need; but if such an one should wish to do us a hurt in what concerns our soul, he is to be driven away from our society, lest by choosing a portion in this life with one who is lost, we should perish together with him in that which is to come. Where fore there follows, It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to enter into hell.

GLOSS. (non occ.) By maimed He means, deprived of the help of some friend, for it is better to enter into life without a friend, than to go with him into hell.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, It is better for thee to enter into life maimed, that is, without the chief place, for which you have wished, than having two hands to go into eternal fire. The two hands for high station are humility and pride; cut off pride, keeping to the estate of lowliness.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Then He introduces the witness of prophecy from the prophet Isaiah, saying, Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. (Isa. 66:24) He says not this of a visible worm, but He calls conscience, a worm, gnawing the soul for not having done any good thing; for each of us shall be made his own accuser, by calling to mind what he has done in this mortal life, and so their worm remains for ever.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And as the worm is the pain which inwardly accuses, so the fire is a punishment which rages without us; or by the worm is meant the rottenness of hell, by the fire, its heat.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, 21.9) But those who hold that both of these, namely, the fire and the worm, belong to the pains of the soul, and not of the body, say also that those who are separated from the kingdom of God are tortured, as with fire, by the pangs of a soul, repenting too late, and hopelessly; and they not unfitly contend that fire may be put for that burning grief, as says the Apostle, Who is offended, and I burn not? (2 Cor. 11:29) They also think that by the worm must be understood the same grief, as is said: As a moth destroys a garment, and a worm wood, so grief tortures the heart of man. (Prov. 25:20. vulg.) All those who hesitate not to affirm that there will be pain both of body and soul in that punishment, affirm that the body is burnt by the fire. But although this is more credible, because it is absurd that there either the pains of body or of soul should be wanting, still I think that it is easier to say that both belong to the body than that neither; and therefore it seems to me that Holy Scripture in this place is silent about the pains of the soul, because it follows that the soul also is tortured in the pains of the body. Let each man therefore choose which he will, either to refer the fire to the body, the worm to the soul, the one properly, the other in a figure, or else both properly to the body; for living things may exist even in fire, in burnings without being wasted, in pain without death, by the wondrous power of the Almighty Creator. It goes on: And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feel to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched; where their worm, dieth not, and the fire is not quenched.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) A friend is called a foot, on account of its service in going about for us, since he is as it were ready for our use. It goes on: And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire; where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. A friend who is useful, and anxious, and sharp in perception, is called an eye.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 4. 6) Here truly it appears that they who do acts of devotedness in the name of Christ, even before they have joined themselves to the company of Christians, and have been washed in the Christian Sacraments, are more useful than those who though already bearing the name of Christians, by their doctrine drag their followers with themselves into everlasting punishment; whom also under the name of members of the body, He orders, as an offending eye or hand, to be torn from the body, that is, from the fellowship itself of unity, that we may rather come to everlasting life without them, than with them go into hell. But the separation of those who separate themselves from them consists in the very circumstance of their not yielding to them, when they would persuade them to evil, that is, offend them. If indeed their wickedness becomes known to all the good men, with whom they are connected, they are altogether cut off from all fellowship, and even from partaking in the heavenly Sacraments. If however they are thus known only to the smaller number, whilst their wickedness is unknown to the generality, they are to he tolerated in such a way that we should not consent to join in their iniquity, and that the communion of the good should not be deserted on their account.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But because the Lord had three times made mention of the worm and the fire, that we might be able to avoid this torment, He subjoins, For every one shall be salted with fire. For the stink of worms always arises from the corruption of flesh and blood, and therefore fresh meat is seasoned with salt, that the moisture of the blood may be dried off, and so it may not breed worms. And if, indeed, that which is salted with salt, keeps off the putrefying worm, that which is salted with fire, that is, seasoned again with flames, on which salt is sprinkled, not only casts off worms, but also consumes the flesh itself. Flesh and blood therefore breed worms, that is, carnal pleasure, if unopposed by the seasoning of continence, produces everlasting punishment for the luxurious; the stink of which if any man would avoid, let him take care to chasten his body with the salt of continence, and his mind with the seasoning of wisdom, from the stain of error and vice. For salt means the sweetness of wisdom, and fire, the grace of the Holy Spirit. He says therefore, Every one shall be salted with fire, because all the elect ought to be purged by spiritual wisdom, from the corruption of carnal concupiscence. Or else, the fire is the fire of tribulation, by which the patience of the faithful is proved, that it may have its perfect work.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Similar to this is that which the Apostle says, And the fire shall try every man’s work of what sort it is. (1 Cor. 3:13.) Afterwards he brings in a witness from Leviticus: which says, And every oblation of thy meat offering shall thou season with salt. (Lev. 2:13.)

PSEUDO-JEROME. The oblation of the Lord is the race of man, which is here salted by means of wisdom, whilst the corruption of blood, the nurse of rottenness, and the mother of worms, is being consumed, which there also shall he tried by the purgatorial firem.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) We may also understand the altar to be the heart of the elect, and the victims and sacrifices to be offered on the altar are good works. But in all sacrifices salt ought to be offered, for that is not a good work which is not purged by the salt of wisdom from all corruption of vain glory, and other evil and superfluous thoughts.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (v. Vict. Ant. in Cat.) Or else it is meant, that every gift of our victim, which is accompanied by prayer and the assisting of our neighbour, is salted with that divine fire, of which it is said, I am come to send fire on earth. (Luke 12:49.) Concerning which it is added: Salt is good; that is, the fire of love. But if the salt have lost his saltness, that is, is deprived of itself, and that peculiar quality, by which it is called good, where with will ye season it? For there is salt, which has saltness, that is, which has the fulness of grace; and there is salt, which has no saltness, for that which is not peaceful is salt unseasoned.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or the good salt is the frequent hearing of God's word, and the seasoning the hidden parts of the heart with the salt of spiritual wisdom.

THEOPHYLACT. For as salt preserves flesh, and suffers it not to breed worms, so also the discourse of the teacher, if it can dry up what is evil, constrains carnal men, and suffers not the undying worm to grow up in them. But if it be without saltness, that is, if its virtue of drying up and preserving be gone, with what shall it be salted?

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (v. Vict. Ant. in Cat.) Or, according to Matthew, the disciples of Christ are the salt, which preserves the whole world, resisting the rottenness which proceeds from idolatry and sinful fornication. For it may also be meant, that each of us has salt, in as far as he contains in himself the graces of God. Wherefore also the Apostle joins together grace and salt, saying, Let your speech be always with grace, seasoned with salt. (Col. 4:6) For salt is the Lord Jesus Christ, Who was able to preserve the whole earth, and made many to be salt in the earth: and if any of these be corrupted, (for it is possible for even the good to be changed into corruption,) they are worthy to be cast out.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or otherwise; That salt is saltless which loves the chief place, and dares not rebuke others. Wherefore there follows, Have salt in yourselves, and have peace one with another. That is, let the love of your neighbour temper the saltness of rebuke, and the salt of justice season the love of your neighbour.

GREGORY. (De cura past. iii. c. 22) Or this is said against those whom greater knowledge, while it raises above their neighbours, cuts off from the fellowship of others; thus the more their learning increases, the more they unlearn the virtue of concord.

GREGORY. (Ibid. ii. 4) He also who strives to speak with wisdom should be greatly afraid, lest by his eloquence the unity of his hearers be thrown into confusion, lest, while he would appear wise, he unwisely cut asunder the bonds of unity.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, he who binds himself to his neighbour by the tie of love, has salt, and in this way peace with his neighbour.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. 4. 6) Mark relates that the Lord said these things consecutively, and has put down some things omitted by every other Evangelist, some which Matthew has also related, others which both Matthew and Luke relate, but on other occasions, and in a different series of events. Wherefore it seems to me that our Lord repeated in this place discourses which He had used in other places, because they were pertinent enough to this saying of His, by which He prevented their forbidding miracles to be wrought in His name, even by him who followed Him not together with His disciples.

CHAPTER 10

10:1–12

1. And he arose from thence, and cometh into the coasts of Judæa by the farther side of Jordan: and the people resort unto him again; and, as he was wont, he taught them again.

2. And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting him.

3. And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you?

4. And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away.

5. And Jesus answered and said unto them, For the hardness of your heart he wrote you this precept.

6. But from the beginning of the creation God made them male and female.

7. For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife;

8. And they twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh.

9. What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

10. And in the house his disciples asked him again of the same matter.

11. And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her.

12. And if a woman shall put away her husband and be married to another, she committeth adultery.

BEDE. (in Marc. 3, 40) Up to this time Mark hath related what our Lord said and did in Galilee; here he begins to relate what He did, taught, or suffered in Judæa, and first indeed across the Jordan on the east; and this is what is said in these words: And he arose from thence, and cometh into the coasts of Jadœa, by the farther side of Jordan; then also on this side Jordan, when He came to Jericho, Bethany, and Jerusalem. And though all the province of the Jews is generally called Judæa, to distinguish it from other nations, more especially, however, its southern portion was called Judæa, to distinguish it from Samaria, Galilee, Decapolis, and the other regions in the same province.

THEOPHYLACT. But He enters the region of Judæa, which the envy of the Jews had often caused Him to leave, because His Passion was to take place there. He did not, however, then go up to Jerusalem, but to the confines of Judæa, that He might do good to the multitudes, who were not evil; for Jerusalem was, from the malice of the Jews, the worker of all the wickedness. Wherefore it goes on: And the people resort unto him again, and, as he was wont, he taught them again.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Mark the difference of temper in the multitude and in the Pharisees. The former meet together, in order to be taught, and that their sick may be healed, as Matthew relates; the latter come to Him, to try to deceive their Saviour by tempting Him. Wherefore there follows, And the Pharisees came to him, and asked him, Is it lawful for a man to put away his wife? tempting Him. (Matt. 19:2)

THEOPHYLACT. They come to Him indeed, and do not quit Him, lest the multitudes should believe on Him; and by continually coming to Him, they thought to bring Him into difficulty, and to confuse Him by their questions. For they proposed to Him a question, which had on either side a precipice, so that whether He said that it was lawful for a man to put away his wife, or that it was not lawful, they might accuse Him, and contradict what He said, out of the doctrines of Moses. Christ, therefore, being Very Wisdom, in answering their question, avoids their snares.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. et v. Chrys. Hom. 62) For being asked, whether it is lawful, he does not immediately reply, it is not lawful, lest they should raise an outcry, but He first wished them to answer Him as to the sentence of the law, that they by their answer might furnish Him with what it was right to say. Wherefore it goes on, And he answered and said unto them, What did Moses command you? And afterwards, And they said, Moses suffered to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away. They put forward indeed this that Moses had said either on account of the question of our Saviour, or wishing to excite against Him a multitude of men. For divorce was an indifferent thing among the Jews, and all practised it, as though it were permitted by the law.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 2. 62) It makes nothing, however, to the truth of the fact, whether, as Matthew says,1 they themselves addressed to the Lord the question concerning the bill of divorcement, allowed to them by Moses, on our Lord's forbidding the separation, and confirming His sentence from the law, or whether it was in answer to a question of His, that they said this concerning the command of Moses, as Mark here says. For His wish was to give them no reason why Moses permitted it, before they themselves had mentioned the fact; since then the wish of the parties speaking, which is what the words ought to express, is in either way shewn, there is no discrepancy, though there be a difference in the way of relating it. It may also be meant that, as Mark expresses it, the question put to them by the Lord, What did Moses command? was in answer to those who had previously asked His opinion concerning the putting away of a wife; and when they had replied that Moses permitted them to write a bill of divorcement, and to put her away, (Matt. 19:4) His answer was concerning that same law, given by Moses, how God instituted the marriage of a male, and a female, saying those things which Matthew relates; on hearing which they again rejoined what they had replied to Him when He first asked them, namely, Why then did Moses command?

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 26) Moses, however, was against a man's dismissing his wife, for he interposed this delay, that a person whose mind was bent on separation, might be deterred by the writing of the bill, and desist; particularly, since, as is related, among the Hebrews, no one was allowed to write Hebrew characters but the scribes. The law therefore wished to send him, whom it ordered to give a bill of divorcement, before he dismissed his wife, to them, who ought to be wise interpreters of the law, and just opponents of quarrel. For a bill could only be written for him by men, who by their good advice might overrule him, since his circumstances and necessity had put him into their hands, and so by treating between him and his wife they might persuade them to love and concord. But if a hatred so great had arisen that it could not be extinguished and corrected, then indeed a bill was to be written, that he might not lightly put away her who was the object of his hate, in such a way as to prevent his being recalled to the love, which he owed her by marriage, through the persuasion of the wise. For this reason it is added, For the hardness of your heart, he wrote this precept; for great was the hardness of heart which could not be melted or bent to the taking back and recalling the love of marriage, even by the interposition of a bill in a way which gave room for the just and wise to dissuade them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Cat. in Marc. Oxon.) Or else, it is said, For the hardness of your hearts, because it is possible for a soul purged from desires and from anger to bear the worst of women; but if those passions have a redoubled force over the mind, many evils will arise from hatred in marriage. (Chrys. ubi sup.). Thus then, He saves Moses, who had given the law, from their accusation, and turns the whole upon their head. But since what He had said was grievous to them, He at once brings back the discourse to the old law, saying, But from the beginning of the creation, God made them male and female.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He says not male and females, which the sense would have required had it referred to the divorce of former wives, but male and female, so that they might be bound by the tie of one wife.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) If however he had wished one wife to be put away and another to be brought in, He would have created several women. Nor did God only join one woman to one man, but He also bade a man quit his parents and cleave to his wife. Wherefore it goes on: And he said, (that is, God said by Adam,) For this cause shall a man leave his father and mother, and cleave to his wife. From the very mode of speech, shewing the impossibility of severing marriage, because He said, He shall cleave.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And in like manner, because He says, he shall cleave to his wife, not wives. It goes on: And they twain shall be one flesh.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Being framed out of one root, they will join into one body. It goes on: So then they are no more twain, but one flesh.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The reward then of marriage is of two to become one flesh. Virginity being joined to the Spirit, becomes of one spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) After this, bringing forward an awful argument, He said not, do not divide, but He concluded, What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. xix. 29) Behold the Jews are convinced out of the books of Moses, that a wife is not to be put away, while they fancied that in putting her away, they were doing the will of Moses. In like manner from this place, from the witness of Christ Himself, we know this, that God made and joined male and female, for denying which the Manichees are condemned, resisting now not the books of Moses, but the Gospel of Christ.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) What therefore God hath conjoined by making one flesh of a man and a woman, that man cannot separate, but God alone. Man separates, when we dismiss the first wife because we desire a second; but it is God who separates, when by common consent, for the sake of serving God, we so have wives as though we had none.n

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) But if two persons, whom God has joined together, are not to be separated; much more is it wrong to separate from Christ, the Church, which God has joined to Him.

THEOPHYLACT. But the disciples were offended, as not being fully satisfied with what had been said; for this reason they again question Him, wherefore there follows, And in the house, his disciples asked him again of the same matter.

PSEUDO-JEROME. This second question is said to be asked again by the Apostles, because it is on the subject of which the Pharisees had asked Him, that is, concerning the state of marriage; and this is said by Mark in his own person.

GLOSS. (non occ.) For a repetition of a saying of the Word, produces not weariness, but thirst and hunger; (Ecclus. 24:29) wherefore it is said, They that eat me shall yet be hungry, and they that drink me shall yet be thirsty; for the tasting of the honied words of wisdom yields all manner of savour to them who love her. Wherefore the Lord instructs His disciples over again; for it goes on, And he saith unto them, Whosoever shall put away his wife and marry another, committeth adultery upon her.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The Lord calls by the name of adultery cohabitation with her who is not a man’s wife; she is not, however, a wife, whom a man has taken to him, after quitting his first; and for this reason he commits adultery upon her, that is, upon the second, whom he brings in. And the same thing is true in the case of the woman; wherefore it goes on, And if a woman shall put away her husband, and marry another, she committeth adultery; for she cannot be joined to another as her own husband, if she leave him who is really her own husband. The law indeed forbade what was plainly adultery; but the Saviour forbids this, which was neither plain, nor known to all, though it was contrary to nature.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In Matthew it is more fully expressed, Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication. (Matt. 19:9.) The only carnal cause then is fornication; the only spiritual cause is the fear of God, that a man should put away his wife to enter into religiono, as we read that many have done. But there is no cause allowed by the law of God for marrying another, during the lifetime of her who is quitted.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) There is no contrariety in Matthew’s relating that He spoke these words to the Pharisees, though Mark says that they were spoken to the disciples; for it is possible that He may have spoken them to both.

10:13–16

13. And they brought young children to him, that he should touch them: and his disciples rebuked those that brought them.

14. But when Jesus saw it, he was much displeased, and said unto them, Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God.

15. Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein.

16. And he took them up in his arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them.

THEOPHYLACT. The wickedness of the Pharisees in tempting Christ, has been related above, and now is shewn the great faith of the multitude, who believed that Christ conferred a blessing on the children whom they brought to Him, by the mere laying on of His hands. Wherefore it is said: And they brought young children to him, that he might touch them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But the disciples, out of regard for the dignity of Christ, forbade those who brought them. And this is what is added: And his disciples rebuked those who brought them. But our Saviour, in order to teach His disciples to be modest in their ideas, and to tread under foot worldly pride, takes the children to Him, and assigns to them the kingdom of God: wherefore it goes on: And he said unto them, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not.

ORIGEN. (Matt. tom. xv. 7) If any of those who profess to hold the office of teaching1 in the Church should see a person bringing to them some of the foolish of this world, and low born, and weak, who for this reason are called children and infants, let him not forbid the man who offers such an one to the Saviour, as though he were acting without judgment. After this He exhorts those of His disciples who are already grown to full stature to condescend to be useful to children, that they may become to children as children, that they may gain children; for He Himself, when He was in the form of God, humbled Himself, and became a child. On which He adds: For of such is the kingdom of heaven. (1 Cor. 9:22)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For indeed the mind of a child is pure from all passions, for which reason, we ought by free choice to do those works, which children have by nature.

THEOPHYLACT. Wherefore He says not, for of these, but of such is the kingdom of God, that is, of persons who have both in their intention and their work the harmlessness and simplicity which children have by nature. For a child does not hate, does nothing of evil intent, nor though beaten does he quit his mother; and though she clothe him in vile garments, prefers them to kingly apparel; in like manner he, who lives according to the good ways of his mother the Church, honours nothing before her, nay, not pleasure, which is the queen of many; wherefore also the Lord subjoins, Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, he shall not enter therein.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) That is, if ye have not innocence and purity of mind like that of children, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. Or else, we are ordered to receive the kingdom of God, that is, the doctrine of the Gospel, as a little child, because as a child, when he is taught, does not contradict his teachers, nor put together reasonings and words against them, but receives with faith what they teach, and obeys them with awe, so we also are to receive the word of the Lord with simple obedience, and without any gainsaying. It goes on: And he took them up in his arms, put his hands upon them, and blessed them.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) Fitly does He take them up into His arms to bless them, as it were, lifting into His own bosom, and reconciling Himself to His creation, which in the beginning fell from Him, and was separated from Him. Again, He puts His hands upon the children, to teach us the working of His divine power; and indeed, He puts His hands upon them, as others are wont to do, though His operation is not as that of others, for though He was God, He kept to human ways of acting, as being very man.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Having embraced the children, He also blessed them, implying that the lowly in spirit are worthy of His blessing, grace, and love.

10:17–27

17. And when he was gone forth into the way, there came one running, and kneeled to him, and asked him, Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?

18. And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God.

19. Thou knowest the commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Defraud not, Honour thy father and mother.

20. And he answered and said unto him, Master, all these have I observed from my youth.

21. Then Jesus beholding him loved him, and said unto him, One thing thou lackest: go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, take up the cross, and follow me.

22. And he was sad at that saying, and went away grieved: for he had great possessions.

23. And Jesus looked round about, and saith unto his disciples, How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!

24. And the disciples were astonished at his words. But Jesus answereth again, and saith unto them, Children, how hard is it for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God!

25. It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.

26. And they were astonished out of measure, saying among themselves, Who then can be saved?

27. And Jesus looking upon them saith, With men it is impossible, but not with God: for with God all things are possible,

BEDE. (ubi sup.) A certain man had heard from the Lord that only they who are willing to be like little children are worthy to enter into the kingdom of heaven, and therefore he desires to have explained to him, not in parables, but openly, by the merits of what works a man may attain everlasting life. Wherefore it is said: And when he was gone forth into the way, there came one running, and kneeled to him, and asked him, Good Master, what shall I do that I may inherit eternal life?

THEOPHYLACT. I wonder at this young man, who when all others come to Christ to be healed of their infirmities, begs of Him the possession of everlasting life, notwithstanding his love of money, the malignant passion which afterwards caused his sorrow.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 63) Because however he had come to Christ as he would to a man, and to one of the Jewish doctors, Christ answered him as Man. Wherefore it goes on: And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but the One God. In saying which He does not exclude men from goodness, but from a comparison with the goodness of God.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But by this one God, who is good, we must not only understand the Father, but also the Son, who says, I am the good Shepherd; (John 10:11) and also the Holy Ghost, because it is said, The Father which is in heaven will give the good Spirit to them that ask him. (Luke 2:15. Vulg.) For the One and Undivided Trinity itself, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the Only and One good God. The Lord, therefore, does not deny Himself to be good, but implies that He is God; He does not deny that He is good Master, but He declares that no master is good but God.

THEOPHYLACT. Therefore the Lord intended by these words to raise the mind of the young man, so that he might know Him to be God. But He also implies another thing by these words, that when you have to converse with a man, you should not flatter him in your conversation, but look back upon God, the root and fount of goodness, and do honour to Him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But observe that the righteousness of the law, when kept in its own time, conferred not only earthly goods, but also eternal life on those who chose it. Wherefore the Lord’s answer to one who enquires concerning everlasting life is, Thou knowest the commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill; for this is the childlike blamelessness which is proposed to us, if we would enter the kingdom of heaven. On which there follows, And he answered and said unto him, Master, all these have I observed from my youth. We must not suppose that this man either asked the Lord, with a wish to tempt him, as some have fancied, or lied in his account of his life; but we must believe that he confessed with simplicity how he had lived; which is evident, from what is subjoined, Then Jesus beholding him loved him, and said unto him. If however he had been guilty of lying or of dissimulation, by no means would Jesus, after looking on the secrets of his heart, have been said to love him.

ORIGEN. (in Evan. tom. xv. 14) For in that He loved, or kissed himp, He appears to affirm the truth of his profession, in saying that he had fulfilled all those things; for on applying His mind to him, He saw that the man answered with a good conscience.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Cat. in Marc. Oxon.) It is worthy of enquiry, however, how He loved a man, who, He knew, would not follow Him? But this is so much as to say, that since he was worthy of love in the first instance, because he observed the things of the law from his youth, so in the end, though he did not take upon himself perfection, he did not suffer a lessening of his former love. For although he did not pass the bounds of humanity, nor follow the perfection of Christ, still he was not guilty of any sin, since he kept the law according to the capability of a man, and in this mode of keeping it, Christ loved himq.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For God loves those who keep the commandments of the law, though they be inferior; nevertheless, He shews to those who would be perfect the deficiency of the law, for He came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil it. Wherefore there follows: And said unto him, One thing thou lackest; go thy way, sell whatsoever thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, follow me; (Matt. 5:17) for whosoever would be perfect ought to sell all that he has, not a part, like Ananias and Sapphira, but the whole.

THEOPHYLACT. And when he has sold it, to give it to the poor, not to stage-players and luxurious persons.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Well too did He say, not eternal life, but treasure, saying, And thou shalt have treasure in heaven; for since the question was concerning wealth, and the renouncing of all things, He shews that He returns more things than He has bidden us leave, in proportion as heaven is greater than earth.

THEOPHYLACT. But because there are many poor who are not humble, but are drunkards or have some other vice, for this reason He says, And come, follow me.

BEDE. (ubi sup) For he follows the Lord, who imitates Him, and walks in His footsteps. It goes on: And he was sad at that saying, and went away grieved.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) And the Evangelist adds the cause of his grief, saying, For he had great possessions. The feelings of those who have little and those who have much are not the same, for the increase of acquired wealth lights up a greater flame of covetousness. There follows: And Jesus looked round about, and said unto his disciples, How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God.

THEOPHYLACT. He says not here, that riches are bad, but that those are bad who only have them to watch them carefully; for He teaches us not to have them, that is, not to keep or preserve them, but to use them in necessary things.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But the Lord said this to His disciples, who were poor and possessed nothing, in order to teach them not to blush at their poverty, and as it were to make an excuse to them, and give them a reason, why He had not allowed them to possess any thing. It goes on: And the disciples were astonished at his words; for it is plain, since they themselves were poor, that they were anxious for the salvation of others.

BEDE. But there is a great difference between having riches, and loving them; wherefore also Solomon says not, He that hath silver, but, He that loveth silver shall not be satisfied, with silver. (Eccl. 5:10) Therefore the Lord unfolds the words of His former saying to His astonished disciples, as follows: But Jesus answereth again, and saith unto them, Children, how hard it is for them that trust in their riches to enter the kingdom of God. Where we must observe that He says not, how impossible, but how hard; for what is impossible cannot in any way come to pass, what is difficult can be compassed, though with labour.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or else, after saying difficult, He then shews that it is impossible, and that not simply, but with a certain vehemence; and he shews this by an example, saying, It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven.

THEOPHYLACT. It may be that by camel, we should understand the animal itself, or else that thick cable, which is used for large vessels.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) How then could either in the Gospel, Matthew and Joseph, or in the Old Testament, very many rich persons, enter into the kingdom of God, unless it be that they learned through the inspiration of God either to count their riches as nothing, or to quit them altogether. Or in a higher sense, it is easier for Christ to suffer for those who love Him, than for the lovers of this world to turn to Christ; for under the name of camel, He wished Himself to be understood, because He bore the burden of our weakness; and by the needle, He understands the prickings, that is, the pains of His Passion. By the eye of a needle, therefore, He means the straits of His Passion, by which He, as it were, deigned to mend the torn garments of our nature. It goes on; And they were astonished above measure, saying among themselves, Who then can be saved? Since the number of poor people is immeasurably the greater, and these might be saved, though the rich perished, they must have understood Him to mean that all who love riches, although they cannot obtain them, are reckoned in the number of the rich. It goes on; And Jesus looking upon them saith, With men it is impossible, but not with God; which we must not take to mean, that covetous and proud persons can enter into the kingdom of Heaven with their covetousness and pride, but that it is possible with God that they should be converted from covetousness and pride to charity and lowliness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) And the reason why He says that this is the work of God is, that He may shew that he who is put into this path by God, has much need of grace; from which it is proved, that great is the reward of those rich men, who are willing to follow the 1discipline of Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. Or we must understand that by, with man it is impossible, but not with God, He means, that when we listen to God, it becomes possible, but as long as we keep our human notions, it is impossible. There follows, For all things are possible with God; when He says all things, you must understand, that have a being; which sin has not, for it is a thing without being and substance.r. Or else: sin does not come under the notion of strength, but of weakness, therefore sin, like weakness, is impossible with God. But can God cause that not to have been done which has been done? To which we answer, that God is Truth, but to cause that what has been done should not have been done, is falsehood. How then can truth do what is false? He must first therefore quit His own nature, so that they who speak thus really say, Can God cease to be God? which is absurd.

10:28–31

28. Then Peter began to say unto him, Lo, we have left all, and have followed thee.

29. And Jesus answered and said, Verily I say unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my sake, and the Gospel's,

30. But he shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life.

31. But many that are first shall be last; and the last first.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Because the youth, on hearing the advice of our Saviour concerning the casting away of his goods, had gone away sorrowful, the disciples of Christ, who had already fulfilled the foregoing precept, began to question Him concerning their reward, thinking that they had done a great thing, since the young man, who had fulfilled the commandments of the law, had not been able to hear it without sadness. Wherefore Peter questions the Lord for himself and the others, in these words, Then Peter began to say unto him, Lo, we have left all, and have followed thee.

THEOPHYLACT. Although Peter had left but few things, still he calls these his all; for even a few things keep us by the bond of affection, so that he shall be beatified who leaves a few things.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And because it is not sufficient to have left all, he adds that which makes up perfection, and have followed thee. As if he said, We have done what Thou hast commanded. What reward therefore wilt Thou give us?1 But while Peter asks only concerning the disciples, our Lord makes a general answer; wherefore it goes on: Jesus answered and said, Verily I say unto you, There is no one that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or children, or lands. But in saying this, He does not mean that we should leave our fathers, without helping them, or that we should separate ourselves from our wives; but He instructs us to prefer the glory of God to the things of this world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 64) But it seems to me that by these words He intended covertly to proclaim that there were to be persecutions, as it would come to pass that many fathers would allure their sons to impiety, and many wives their husbands.1 Again He delays not to say, for my name's sake and the Gospel's, as Mark says, or for the kingdom of God, as Luke says; the name of Christ is the power of the Gospel, and of His kingdom; for the Gospel is received in the name of Jesus Christ, and the kingdom is made known, and comes by His name.

BEDE. Some, however, taking occasion from this saying, in which it is announced that he shall receive an hundredfold now in this time, teach that Jewish fable of a thousand years after the resurrection of the just, when all that we have left for the Lord's sake is to be restored with manifold usury, besides which we are to receive the crown of everlasting life. These persons do not perceive, that although the promise in other respects be honourable, yet in the hundred wives, which the other Evangelists mention, its foulness is made manifest: particularly when the Lord testifies that there shall be no marriage in the resurrection, and asserts that those things which are put away from us for His sake are to be received again in this life with persecutions, which, as they affirm, will not take place in their thousand yearss.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Cat. in Marc. Oxon.) This hundredfold reward therefore must be in participation, not in possession, for the Lord fulfilled this to them not carnally, but spiritually.

THEOPHYLACT. For a wife is busied in a house about her husband's food and raiment. See also how this is the case with the Apostles; for many women busied themselves about their food and their clothing, and ministered unto them. In like manner the Apostles had many fathers and mothers, that is, persons who loved them; as Peter, for instance, leaving one house, had afterwards the houses of all the disciples. And what is more wonderful, they are to be persecuted and oppressed, for it is with persecutions that the Saints are to possess all things, for which reason there follows, But many that are first shall be last, and the last first. For the Pharisees who were first became the last; but those who left all and followed Christ were last in this world through tribulation and persecutions, but shall be first by the hope which is in God.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This which is here said, shall receive an hundredfold, may be understood in a higher sense1. For the number a hundred which is reckoned by changing from the left to the right hand, although it has the same appearance in the bending of the fingers as the ten had on the left, nevertheless is increased to a much greater quantity. This means, that all who have despised temporal things for the sake of the kingdom of heaven through undoubting faith, taste the joy of the same kingdom in this life which is full of persecutions, and in the expectation of the heavenly country, which is signified by the right hand, have a share in the happiness of all the elect. But because all do not accomplish a virtuous course of life with the same ardour as they began it, it is presently added, But many that are first shall be last, and the last first; for we daily see many persons who, remaining in a lay habit, are eminent for their meritorious life; but others, who from their youth have been ardent in a spiritual profession, at last wither away in the sloth of ease, and with a lazy folly finish in the flesh, what they had begun in the Spirit.

10:32–34

32. And they were in the way going up to Jerusalem; and Jesus went before them: and they were amazed; and as they followed, they were afraid. And he took again the twelve, and began to tell them what things should happen unto him,

33. Saying, Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man shall be delivered unto the chief priests, and unto the scribes; and they shall condemn him to death, and shall deliver him to the Gentiles:

34. And they shall mock him, and shall scourge him, and shall spit upon him, and shall kill him: and the third day he shall rise again.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The disciples remembered the discourse in which the Lord had foretold that He was about to suffer many things from the chief priests and scribes, and therefore in going up to Jerusalem, they were amazed. And this is what is meant, when it is said, And they were in the way going up to Jerusalem, and Jesus went before them.

THEOPHYLACT. To shew that He runs to meet His Passion, and that He does not refuse death, for the sake of our salvation; and they were amazed, and as they followed, they were afraid.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Either lest they themselves should perish with Him, or at all events lest He, whose life and ministry was their joy, should fall under the hand of His enemies. But the Lord, foreseeing that the minds of His disciples would be troubled by His Passion, foretels to them both the pain of His Passion, and the glory of His resurrection; wherefore there follows, And he took again the twelve, and began to tell them what things should happen unto him.

THEOPHYLACT. He did this to confirm the hearts of the disciples, that from hearing these things beforehand, they might the better bear them afterwards, and might not be alarmed at their suddenness, and also in order to shew them that He suffered voluntarily; for he who foreknows a danger, and flies not, though flight is in his power, evidently of his own will gives himself up to suffering. But He takes His disciples apart, because it was fitting that He should reveal the mystery of His Passion to those who were more closely connected with Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc. sed v. Chrys. Hom. 65) And He enumerates each thing that was to happen to Him; lest if He should pass any thing over, they should be troubled afterwards at suddenly seing it; wherefore he adds, Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and the Son of Man.

GLOSS. (interlin.) That is, He to whom suffering belongs; for the Godhead cannot suffer. Shall be delivered, that is, by Judas, unto the Chief Priests, and unto the Scribes, and they shall condemn him to death; judging Him to be guilty of death; and shall deliver him to the Gentiles, that is, to Pilate the Gentile; and his soldiers shall mock him, and shall spit upon him, and scourge him, and put him to death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 65) But that when they were saddened on account of His Passion and death, they should then also look for His resurrection, He adds, And the third day he shall rise again; for since He had not hid from them the sorrows and insults which happened, it was fitting that they should believe Him on other points.

10:35–40

35. And James and John, the sons of Zebedee, come unto him, saying, Master, we would that thou shouldest do for us whatsoever we shall desire.

36. And he said unto them, What would ye that I should do for you?

37. They said unto him, Grant unto us that we may sit, one on thy right hand, and the other on thy left hand, in thy glory.

38. But Jesus said unto them, Ye know not what ye ask: can ye drink of the cup that I drink of? and be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized with?

39. And they said unto him, We can. And Jesus said unto them, Ye shall indeed drink of the cup that I drink of; and with the baptism that I am baptized withal shall ye be baptized:

40. But to sit on my right hand and on my left hand is not mine to give; but it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared.

CHRYSOSTOM. (v. Chrys. ubi sup.) The disciples hearing Christ oftentimes speaking of His kingdom, thought that this kingdom was to be before His death, and therefore now that His death was foretold to them, they came to Him, that they might immediately be made worthy of the honours of the kingdom: wherefore it is said, And James and John, the sons of Zebedee, came unto him, saying, Master, we would that thou shouldest do for us whatsoever we shall desire. For ashamed of the human weakness which they felt, they came to Christ, taking Him apart from the disciples; but our Saviour, not from ignorance of what they wanted to ask, but from a wish of making them answer Him, puts this question to them; And he said unto them, What would ye that I should do for you?

THEOPHYLACT. Now the abovementioned disciples thought that He was going up to Jerusalem, to reign there, and then to suffer what He had foretold. And with these thoughts, they desired to sit on the right and the left hand; wherefore there follows, They said unto him, Grant unto us that we may sit, one on thy right hand, the other on thy left hand, in thy glory.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 64) Matthew has expressed that this was said not by themselves, but by their mother, since she brought their wishes to the Lord; wherefore Mark briefly implies rather that they themselves, than that their mother, had used the words.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or we may fitly say that both took place; for seeing themselves honoured above the rest, they thought that they could easily obtain the foregoing petition; and that they might the more easily succeed in their request, they took their mother with them, that they might pray unto Christ together with her.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Then the Lord both according to Mark, and to Matthew, answered them rather than their mother. For it goes on, But Jesus said unto them, Ye know not what ye ask.

THEOPHYLACT. It will not be as ye think, that I am to reign as a temporal king in Jerusalem, but all these things, that is, these which belong to My kingdom, are beyond your understanding; for to sit on My right hand is so great a thing that it surpasses the Angelic orders.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, they know not what they ask, who seek from the Lord a seat of glory, which they do not yet merit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or else He says, Ye know not what ye ask; as if He said, Ye speak of honours, but I am discoursing of wrestlings and toil; for this is not a time of rewards, but of blood, of battles, and dangers. Wherefore He adds, Can ye drink of the cup that I drink of, and be baptized with the baptism that I am baptized withal? He draws them on by way of question, that by communication with Himself, their eagerness might increase.

THEOPHYLACT. But by the cup and baptism, He means the cross; the cup, that is, as being a potion by Him sweetly received, but baptism as the cause of the cleansing of our sins. And they answer Him, without understanding what He had said; wherefore it goes on: And they said unto him, We can; for they thought that He spoke of a visible cup, and of the baptism of which the Jews made use, that is, the washings before their meals.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) And they answered thus quickly, because they expected that what they had asked would be listened to; it goes on: And Jesus said unto them, Ye shall indeed drink of the cup that I drink of, and with the baptism that I am baptized withal shall ye be baptized; that is, ye shall be worthy of martyrdom, and suffer even as I.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) A question is raised, however, how James and John drank the cup of martyrdom, or how they were baptized with the baptism of the Lord, when the Scripture relates, that only James the Apostle was beheaded by Herod whilst John finished his life by a natural death. But if we read ecclesiastical histories, in which it is related, that he also on account of the witness which he bore was cast into a cauldron of burning oil, and was immediately sent away to the island of Patmos, we shall then see that the spirit of martyrdom was in him, and that John drank the cup of confession, which the Three Children also drank in the furnace of fire, though the persecutor did not spill their blood. It goes on: But to sit on my right hand and on my left hand is not mine to give, but it shall be given to them for whom it is prepared.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Where two questions are raised, one is, whether a seat on His right hand is prepared for any one; the other, whether the Lord of all has it not in His power to give it to those for whom it is prepared. To the first then we say, that no one sits on His right hand or on His left, for that throne is inaccessible to a creature. How then did He say, To sit on my right hand or on my left is not mine to give you, as though it belonged to some who were to sit there? He however answers the thoughts of those who asked Him, condescending to their meaning; for they did not know that lofty throne and seat, which is on the right hand of the Father, but sought one thing alone, that is, to possess the chief place, and to be set over others. And since they had heard it said of the Apostles, that they were to sit on twelve thrones, they begged for a place higher than all the rest, not knowing what was said. To the second question we must say, that such a gift does not transcend the power of the Son of God, but what is said by Matthew (Matt. 20:23), it is prepared by My Father, is the same as if it were said, “by Me,” wherefore also Mark did not say here, by My Father. What therefore Christ says here is this, Ye shall die, He says, for Me, but this is not enough to enable you to obtain the highest place, for if another person comes possessing besides martyrdom all other virtues, he will possess much more than you; for the chief place is prepared for those, who by works are enabled to become the first. Thus then the Lord instructed them not to trouble themselves vainly and absurdly for high places; at the same time He would not have them made sad.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, it is not mine to give to you, that is, to proud persons, for such as yet they were. It is prepared for other persons, and be ye other, that is, lowly, and it is prepared for you.

10:41–45

41. And when the ten heard it, they began to be much displeased with James and John.

42. But Jesus called them to him, and saith unto them, Ye know that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and their great ones exercise authority upon them.

43. But so shall it not be among you: but whosoever will be great among you, shall be your minister:

44. And whosoever of you will be the chiefest, shall be servant of all.

45. For even the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.

THEOPHYLACT. The other Apostles are indignant at seeing James and John seeking for honour; wherefore it is said, And when the ten heard it, they began to be much displeased with James and John. For being influenced by human feelings, they were moved with envy; and their first displeasure arose from their seeing that they were not taken up by the Lord; before that time they were not displeased because they saw that they themselves were honoured before other men. At this time the Apostles were thus imperfect, but afterwards they yielded the chief place one to another. Christ however cures them; first indeed by drawing them to Himself in order to comfort them; and this is meant, when it is said, But Jesus called them to him; then by shewing them that to usurp honour, and to desire the chief place, belongs to Gentiles. Wherefore there follows: And saith unto them, Ye know that they which are accounted to rule over the Gentiles exercise lordship; and their great ones exercise authority over them. The great ones of the Gentiles thrust themselves into the chief place tyrannically and as lords. It goes on: But so shall it not be among you.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In which He teaches, that he is the greater, who is the less, and that he becomes the lord, who is servant of all: vain, therefore, was it both for the one party to seek for immoderate things, and the other to be annoyed at their desiring greater things, since we are to arrive at the height of virtue not by power but by humility. Then He proposes an example, that if they lightly regarded His words, His deeds might make them ashamed, saying, For even the Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.

THEOPHYLACT. Which is a greater thing than to minister. For what can be greater or more wonderful than that a man should die for him to whom he ministers? Nevertheless, this serving and condescension of humility was His glory, and that of all; for before He was made man, He was known only to the Angels; but now that He has become man and has been crucified, He not only has glory Himself, but also has taken up others to a participation in His glory, and ruled by faith over the whole world.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He did not say, however, that He gave His life a ransom for all, but for many, that is, for those who would believe on Him.

10:46–52

46. And they came to Jericho: and as he went out of Jericho with his disciples and a great number of people, blind Bartimæus, the son of Timæus, sat by the highway side begging.

47. And when he heard that it was Jesus of Nazareth, he began to cry out, and say, Jesus, thou Son of David, have mercy on me.

48. And many charged him that he should hold his peace: but he cried the more a great deal, Thou Son of David, have mercy on me.

49. And Jesus stood still, and commanded him to be called. And they call the blind man, saying unto him, Be of good comfort, rise; he calleth thee.

50. And he, casting away his garment, rose, and came to Jesus.

51. And Jesus answered and said unto him, What wilt thou that I should do unto thee? The blind man said unto him, Lord, that I might receive my sight.

52. And Jesus said unto him, Go thy way; thy faith hath made thee whole. And immediately he received his sight, and followed Jesus in the way.

JEROME. The name of the city agrees with the approaching Passion of our Lord; for it is said, And they came to Jericho. Jericho means moon or anathema; but the failing of the flesh of Christ is the preparation of the heavenly Jerusalem. It goes on: And as he went out of Jericho with his disciples, and a great number of people, blind Bartimæus, the son of Timæus, sat by the wayside begging.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Matthew says, that there were two blind men sitting by the wayside, who cried to the Lord, and received their sight; but Luke relates that one blind man was enlightened by Him, with a like order of circumstances, as He was going into Jericho; where no one, at least no wise man, will suppose that the Evangelists wrote things contrary to one another, but that one wrote more fully, what another has left out. We must therefore understand that one of them was the more important, which appears from this circumstance, that Mark has related his name and the name of his father.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 65) It is for this reason that Mark wished to relate his case alone, because his receiving his sight had gained for the miracle a fame, illustrious in proportion to the extent of the knowledge of his affliction. But although Luke relates a miracle done entirely in the same way, nevertheless we must understand that a similar miracle was wrought on another blind man, and a similar method of the same miracle. It goes on: And when he heard that it was Jesus of Nazareth, he began to cry out, and say, Jesus, thou Son of David, have mercy upon me.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Vict. Ant. e Cat. in Marc.) The blind man calls the Lord, the Son of David, hearing the way in which the passing multitude praised Him, and feeling sure that the expectation of the prophets was fulfilled. There follows: And many charged him that he should hold his peace.t

ORIGEN. (in Matt. tom. xvi. 13) As if he said, Those who were foremost in believing rebuked him when he cried, Thou Son of David, that he might hold his peace, and cease to call Him by a contemptible name, when he ought to say, Son of God, have pity upon me. He however did not cease; wherefore it goes on: But he cried the more a great deal, Thou Son of David, have mercy upon me; and the Lord heard his cry; wherefore there follows: And Jesus stood still, and commanded him to be called. But observe, that the blind man, of whom Luke speaks, is inferior to this one; for neither did Jesus call him, nor order him to be called, but He commanded him to be brought to Him, as though unable to come by himself; but this blind man by the command of our Lord is called to Him. Wherefore it goes on: And they call the blind man, saying unto him, Be of good comfort, rise, he calleth thee; but he casting away his garment, comes to Him. It goes on: And he casting away his garment, rose, and came to Jesus. Perchance, the garment of the blind man means the veil of blindness and poverty, with which he was surrounded, which he cast away and came to Jesus; and the Lord questions him, as he is approaching. Wherefore there follows: And Jesus answered and said unto him, What will thou that I should do unto thee.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Could He who was able to restore sight be ignorant of what the blind man wanted? His reason then for asking is that prayer may be made to Him; He puts the question, to stir up the blind man's heart to pray.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 66) Or He asks, lest men should think that what He granted the man was not what he wanted. For it was His practice to make the good disposition of those who were to be cured known to all men, and then to apply the remedy, in order to stir up others to emulation, and to shew that he who was to be cured was worthy to obtain the grace. It goes on: The blind man said unto him, Lord, that I may receive my sight.

BEDE. For the blind man looks down upon every gift except light, because, whatever a blind man may possess, without light he cannot see what he possesses.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But Jesus, considering his ready will, rewards him with the fulfilment of his desire.

ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Again, it is more worthy to say Rabboni, or, as it is in other places, Master, than to say Son of David; wherefore He gives him health, not on his saying, Son of David, but when he said Rabboni. Wherefore there follows: And Jesus said unto him, Go thy way; thy faith hath made thee whole. And immediately he received his sight, and followed him in the way.

THEOPHYLACT. The mind of the blind man is grateful, for when he was made whole, he did not leave Jesus, but followed Him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In a mystical sense, however, Jericho, which means the moon, points out the waning of our fleeting race. The Lord restored sight to the blind man, when drawing near to Jericho, because coming in the flesh and drawing near to His Passion, He brought many to the faith; for it was not in the first years of His Incarnation, but in the few years before He suffered, that He shewed the mystery of the Word to the world.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the blindness in part, brought upon the Jews, will in the end be enlightened when He sends unto them the Prophet Elias. (Rom. 11:25)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now in that on approaching Jericho, He restored sight to one man, and on quitting it to two, He intimated, that before His Passion He preached only to one nation, the Jews, but after His resurrection and ascension, through His Apostles He opened the mysteries both of His Divinity and His Humanity to Jews and Gentiles. Mark indeed, in writing that one received his sight, refers to the saving of the Gentiles, that the figure might agree with the salvation of those, whom he instructed in the faith; but Matthew, who wrote his Gospel to the faithful among the Jews, because it was also to reach the knowledge of the Gentiles, fitly says that two received their sight, that He might teach us that the grace of faith belonged to each people. Therefore, as the Lord was departing with His disciples and a great multitude from Jericho, the blind man was sitting, begging by the way-side; that is, when the Lord ascended into heaven, and many of the faithful followed Him, yea when all the elect from the beginning of the world entered together with Him the gate of heaven,u, presently the Gentile people began to have hope of its own illumination; for it now sits begging by the wayside, because it has not entered upon and reached the path of truth.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The people of the Jews also, because it kept the Scriptures and did not fulfil them, begs and starves by the wayside; but he cries out, Son of David, have mercy upon me, because the Jewish people is enlightened by the merits of the Prophets. Many rebuke him that he may hold his peace, that is, sins and devils restrain the cry of the poor; and he cried the more, because when the battle waxes great, hands are to be lifted up with crying to the Rock of help, that is, Jesus of Nazareth.

BEDE. Again, the people of the Gentiles, having heard of the fame of the name of Christ, sought to be made a partaker of Him, but many spoke against Him, first the Jews, then also the Gentiles, lest the world which was to be enlightened should call upon Christ. The fury of those who attacked Him, however, could not deprive of salvation those who were fore-ordained to life. And He heard the blind man’s cry as He was passing, but stood when He restored his sight, because by His Humanity He pitied him, who by the power of His Divinity has driven away the darkness from our mind; for in that Jesus was born and suffered for our sakes, He as it were passed by, because this action is temporal; but when God is said to stand, it means, that, Himself without change, He sets in order all changeable things. But the Lord calls the blind man, who cries to Him, when He sends the word of faith to the people of the Gentiles by preachers; and they call on the blind man to be of good cheer and to rise, and bid him come to the Lord, when by preaching to the simple, they bid them have hope of salvation, and rise from the sloth of vice, and gird themselves for a life of virtue. Again, he throws away his garment and leaps, who, throwing aside the bands of the world, with unencumbered pace hastens to the Giver of eternal light.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, the Jewish people comes leaping, stripped of the old man, as a hart leaping on the mountains, that is, laying aside sloth, it meditates on Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles on high, and raises itself to heights of holiness. How consistent also is the order of salvation. First we heard by the Prophets, then we cry aloud by faith, next we are called by Apostles, we rise up by penitence, we are stripped of our old garment by baptism, and of our choice we are questioned. Again, the blind man when asked requires, that he may see the will of the Lord.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Therefore let us also imitate him, let us not seek for riches, earthly goods, or honours from the Lord, but for that Light, which we alone with the Angels can see, the way to which is faith; wherefore also Christ answers to the blind man, Thy faith hath saved thee. But he sees and follows who works what his understanding tells him is good; for he follows Jesus, who understands and executes what is good, who imitates Him, who had no wish to prosper in this world, and bore reproach and derision. And because we have fallen from inward joy, by delight in the things of the body, He shews us what bitter feelings the return thither will cost us.

THEOPHYLACT. Further, it says that he followed the Lord in the way, that is, in this life, because after it all are excluded who follow Him not here, by working His commandments.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or, this is the way of which He said, I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. This is the narrow way, which leads to the heights of Jerusalem, and Bethany, to the mount of Olives, which is the mount of light and consolation.

CHAPTER 11

11:1–10

1. And when they came nigh to Jerusalem, unto Bethphage and Bethany, at the mount of Olives, he sendeth forth two of his disciples,

2. And saith unto them, Go your way into the village over against you: and as soon as ye be entered into it, ye shall find a colt tied, whereon never man sat; loose him, and bring him.

3. And if any man say unto you, Why do ye this? say ye that the Lord hath need of him; and straightway he will send him hither.

4. And they went their way, and found the colt tied by the door without in a place where two ways met; and they loose him.

5. And certain of them that stood there said unto them, What do ye, loosing the colt?

6. And they said unto them even as Jesus had commanded: and they let them go.

7. And they brought the colt to Jesus, and cast their garments on him; and he sat upon him.

8. And many spread their garments in the way: and others cut down branches off the trees, and strawed them in the way.

9. And they that went before, and they that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna; Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord:

10. Blessed be the kingdom of our father David, that cometh in the name of the Lord: Hosanna in the highest.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Now that the Lord had given sufficient proof of His virtue, and the cross was at hand, even at the door, He did those things which were about to excite them against Him with a greater openness; therefore although He had so often gone up to Jerusalem, He never however had done so in such a conspicuous manner as now.

THEOPHYLACT. That thus, if they were willing, they might recognise His glory, and by the prophecies, which were fulfilled concerning Him, know that He is very God; and that if they would not, they might receive a greater judgment, for not having believed so many wonderful miracles. Describing therefore this illustrious entrance, the Evangelist says, And when they came nigh unto Jerusalem, and Bethany, at the mount of Olives, he sendeth forth two of his disciples.

BEDE. (in Marc. 3, 41) Bethany is a little village or town by the side of mount Olivet, where Lazarus was raised from the dead. But in what way He sent His disciples and for what purpose is shewn in these words, And saith unto them, Go your way into the village over against you.

THEOPHYLACT. Now consider how many things the Lord foretold to His disciples, that they should find a colt; wherefore it goes on, And as soon as ye be entered into it, ye shall find a colt tied, whereon never man sat, loose him, and bring him; and that they should be impeded in taking it, wherefore there follows, And if any man say unto you, Why do ye this? say ye, The Lord hath need of him; and that on saying this, they should be allowed to take him; wherefore there follows, And straightway he will send him hither; and as the Lord had said, so it was fulfilled. Thus it goes on: And they went their way, and found the colt tied by the door without, in a place where two ways meet; and they loose him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ii. 66) Matthew says, an ass and a colt, the rest however do not mention the ass. Where then both may be the case, there is no disagreement, though one Evangelist mentions one thing, and a second mentions another; how much less should a question be raised, when one mentions one, and another mentions that same one and another. It goes on: And certain of them that stood there said unto them, What do ye, loosing the colt? And they said unto them even as Jesus had commanded, and they let them take it, that is, the colt.

THEOPHYLACT. But they would not have allowed this, if the Divine power had not been upon them, to compel them, especially, as they were country people and farmers, and yet allowed them to take away the colt. It goes on: And they brought the colt to Jesus, and cast their garments on him; and he sat upon him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Cat. in Marc. Oxon.) Not indeed that He was compelled by necessity to ride on a colt from the mount of Olives to Jerusalem, for He had gone over Judæa and all Galilee on foot, but this action of His is typical. It goes on: And many spread their garments in the way: that is, under the feet of the colt; and others cut down branches off the trees, and strawed them in the way. 1This, however, was rather done to honour Him, and as a Sacrament, than of necessity. It goes on: And they that went before, and they that followed, cried, saying, Hosanna; blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. 2For the multitude, until it was corrupted, knew what was its duty, for which reason each honoured Jesus according to his own strength. Wherefore they praised Him, and took up the hymns of the Levites, saying, Hosanna, which according to some is the same as save me, but according to others means a hymn. I however suppose the former to be more probable, for there is in the 117th Psalm, (Ps. 118:25) Save now, I beseech thee, O Lord, which in the Hebrew is Hosanna.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But Hosanna is a Hebrew word, made out of two, one imperfect the other perfect. For save, or preserve, is in their language, hosy; but anna is a supplicatory interjection, as in Latin heu is an exclamation of grief.

PSEUDO-JEROME. They cry out Hosanna, that is save us, that men might be saved by Him who was blessed, and was a conqueror and came in the name of the Lord, that is, of His Father, since the Father is so called because of the Son, and the Son, because of the Father.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Cat. in Marc. Oxon.) Thus then they give glory to God, saying, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord. They also bless the kingdom of Christ, saying, Blessed be the kingdom of our father David, which cometh.

THEOPHYLACT. But they called the kingdom of Christ, that of David, both because Christ was descended from the seed of David, and because David means a man of a strong hand. For whose hand is stronger than the Lord’s, by which so many and so great miracles were wrought.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Cat. in Marc. Oxon.) Wherefore also the prophets so often call Christ by the name of David, on account of the descent according to the flesh of Christ from David.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now we read in the Gospel of John that He fled into a mountain, lest they should make him their king. Now, however, when He comes to Jerusalem to suffer, He does not shun those who call Him king, that He might openly teach them that He was King over an empire not temporal and earthly, but everlasting in the heavens, and that the path to this kingdom was through contempt of death. Observe also the agreement of the multitude with the saying of Gabriel, The Lord God will give him the throne of his father David; (Luke 1:32) that is, that He Himself may call by word and deed to a heavenly kingdom the nation to which David once furnished the government of a temporal rule.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Cat. in Marc. Oxon.) And further, they give glory to God, when they add Hosanna in the highest, that is, praise and glory be to the God of all, Who is in the highest.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or Hosanna, that is, save in the highest as well as in the lowest, that is, that the just be built on the ruin of Angels, and also that both those on the earth and those under the earth should be saved. In a mystical sense, also, the Lord approaches Jerusalem, which is ‘the vision of peace,’ in which happiness remains fixed and unmoved, being, as the Apostle says, the mother of all believers. (Gal. 4:26)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Bethany again means the house of obedience, because by teaching many before His Passion, he made for Himself a house of obedience; and it is said to be placed on the mount of Olives, because He cherishes His Church with the unction of spiritual gifts, and with the light of piety and knowledge. But He sent His disciples to a hold1, which was over against them, that is, He appointed doctors to penetrate into the ignorant parts of the whole world, into, as it were, the walls of the hold placed against them.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The disciples of Christ are called two by two, and sent two by two, since charity implies more than one, as it is written, Woe to him that is alone. (Eccl. 4:10) Two persons lead the Israelites out of Egypt: two bring down the bunch of grapes from the Holy Land, that men in authority might ever join together activity and knowledge, and bring forward two commandments from the Two Tables, and be washed from two fountains, and carry the ark of the Lord on two poles, and know the Lord between the two Cherubim, and sing to Him with both mind and spirit.

THEOPHYLACT. The colt, however, was not necessary to Him, but He sent for it to shew that He would transfer Himself to the Gentiles.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For the colt of the ass, wanton and unshackled, denotes the people of the nations, on whom no man had yet sat, because no wise doctor had, by teaching them the things of salvation, put upon them the bridle of correction, to oblige them to restrain their tongues from evil, or to compel them into the narrow path of life.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But they found the colt tied by the door without, because the Gentile people were bound by the chain of their sins before the door of faith, that is, without the Church.

AMBROSE. (in Luc. 9, 6) Or else, they found it bound before the door, because whosoever is not in Christ is without, in the way; but he who is in Christ, is not without. He has added in the way, or in a place where two ways meet, where there is no certain possession for any man, nor stall, nor food, nor stable; miserable is his service, whose rights are unfixed; for he who has not the one Master, has many. Strangers bind him that they may possess him, Christ looses him in order to keep him, for He knows that gifts are stronger ties than bonds.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, fitly did the colt stand in a place where two ways meet, because the Gentile people did not hold on in any certain road of life and faith, but followed in its error many doubtful paths of various sects.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or, in a place where two roads meet, that is, in the freedom of will, hesitating between life and death.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, in a place where two roads meet, that is, in this life, but it was loosed by the disciples, through faith and baptism.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But some said, What do ye? as if they would say, Who can remit sins?

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, those who prevent them are the devils, who were weaker than the Apostles.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, the masters of error, who resisted the teachers, when they came to save the Gentiles; but after that the power of the faith of the Lord appeared to believers, the faithful people were freed from the cavils of the adversaries, and were brought to the Lord, whom they bore in their hearts. But by the garments of the Apostles, which they put upon it, we may understand the teaching of virtues, or the interpretation of the Scriptures, or the various doctrines of the Church, by which they clothe the hearts of men, once naked and cold and fit them to become the seats of Christ.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, they put upon it their garments, that is, they bring to them the first robe of immortality by the Sacrament of Baptism. And Jesus sat upon it, that is, began to reign in them, so that sin should not reign in their wanton flesh, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the

Holy Ghost. Again, many spread their garments in the way, under the feet of the foal of the ass. What are feet, but those who carry, and the least esteemed, whom the Apostle has set to judge? (v. 1 Cor. 6:4.) And these too, though they are not the back on which the Lord sat, yet are instructed by John with the soldiers.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, many strew their garments in the way, because the holy martyrs put off from themselves the garment of their own flesh, and prepare a way for the more simple servants of God with their own blood. Many also strew their garments in the way, because they tame their bodies with abstinence, that they may prepare a way for God to the mount, or may give good examples to those who follow them. And they cut down branches from the trees, who in the teaching of the truth cull the sentences of the Fathers from their words, and by their lowly preaching scatter them in the path of God, when He comes into the soul of the hearer.

THEOPHYLACT. Let us also strew the way of our life with branches which we cut from the trees, that is, imitate the saints, for these are holy trees, from which, he who imitates their virtues cuts down branches.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For the righteous shall flourish as a palm tree, straitened in their roots, but spreading out wide with flowers and fruits; for they are a good odour unto Christ, and strew the way of the commandments of God with their good report. Those who went before are the prophets, and those who followed are the Apostles.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And because all the elect, whether those who were able to become such in Judæa, or those who now are such in the Church, believed and now believe on the Mediator between God and man, both those who go before and those who follow cried out Hosanna.

THEOPHYLACT. But both those of our deeds which go before and those which follow after must be done to the glory of God; for some in their past life make a good beginning, but their following life does not correspond with their former, neither does it end to the glory of God.

11:11–14

11. And Jesus entered into Jerusalem, and into the temple: and when he had looked round about upon all things, and now the eventide was come, he went out unto Bethany with the twelve.

12. And on the morrow, when they were come from Bethany, he was hungry:

13. And seeing a fig tree afar off having leaves, he came, if haply he might find any thing thereon: and when he came to it, he found nothing but leaves; for the time of figs was not yet.

14. And Jesus answered and said unto it, No man eat fruit of thee hereafter for ever. And his disciples heard it.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) As the time of His Passion approached, the Lord wished to approach to the place of His Passion, in order to intimate that He underwent death of His own accord: wherefore it is said, And Jesus entered into Jerusalem, and into the temple. And by His going to the temple on first entering the city, He shews us beforehand a form of religion, which we are to follow, that if by chance we enter a place, where there is a house of prayer, we should first turn aside to it. We should also understand from this, that such was the poverty of the Lord, and so far was He from flattering man, that in so large a city, He found no one to be His host, no abiding place, but lived in a small country place with Lazarus and his sisters; for Bethany is a hamlet of the Jews. Wherefore there follows: And when he had looked round about upon all things, (that is, to see whether any one would take Him in,) and now the eventide was come, he went out into Bethany with the twelve. Nor did He do this once only, but during all the five days, from the time that He came to Jerusalem, to the day of His Passion, He used always to do the same thing; during the day He taught in the temple, but at night, He went out and dwelt in the mount of Olives. It goes on, And on the morrow, when they were come from Bethany, he was hungry.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Matt. Hom. 67) How is it that He was hungry in the morning, as Matthew says, if it were not that by an economy He permitted it to His flesh? There follows, And seeing a fig tree afar off having leaves, he came, if haply he might find any thing thereon. Now it is evident that this expresses a conjecture of the disciples, who thought that it was for this reason that Christ came to the fig tree, and that it was cursed, because He found no fruit upon it. For it goes on: And when he came to it, he found nothing but leaves; for the time of figs was not yet. And Jesus answered and said unto it, No man eat fruit of thee hereafter for ever. He therefore curses the fig tree for His disciples sake, that they might have faith in Him. For He every where distributed blessings, and punished no one, yet at the same time, it was right to give them a proof of His chastising power, that they might learn that He could even cause the persecuting Jews to wither away; He was however unwilling to give this proof on men, wherefore He shewed them on a plant a sign of His power of punishing. This proves that He came to the fig tree principally for this reason, and not on account of His hunger, for who is so silly as to suppose that in the morning He felt so greatly the pains of hunger, or what prevented the Lord from eating before He left Bethany? Nor can it be said that the sight of the figs excited His appetite to hunger, for it was not the season of figs; and if He were hungry, why did He not seek food elsewhere, rather than from a fig-tree which could not yield fruit before its time? What punishment also did a fig tree deserve for not having fruit before its time? From all this then we may infer, that He wished to shew His power, that their minds might not be broken by His Passion.

THEOPHYLACT. Wishing to shew His disciples that if He chose He could in a moment exterminate those who were about to crucify Him. In a mystical sense, however, the Lord entered into the temple, but came out of it again, to shew that He left it desolate, and open to the spoiler.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Farther, He looks round about upon the hearts of all, and when in those who opposed the truth, He found no place to lay His head, He retires to the faithful, and takes up His abode with those who obey Him. For Bethany means the house of obedience.

PSEUDO-JEROME. He went in the morning to the Jews, and visits us in the eventide of the world.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Just in the same way as He speaks parables, so also His deeds are parables; therefore He comes hungry to seek fruit off the fig tree, and though He knew the time of figs was not yet, He condemns it to perpetual barrenness, that He might shew that the Jewish people could not be saved through the leaves, that is, the words of righteousness which it had, without fruit, that is, good works, but should be cut down and cast into the fire. Hungering therefore, that is, desiring the salvation of mankind, He saw the fig tree, which is, the Jewish people, having leaves, or, the words of the Law and the Prophets, and He sought upon it the fruit of good works, by teaching them, by rebuking them, by working miracles, and He found it not, and therefore condemned it. Do thou too, unless thou wouldest be condemned by Christ in the judgment, beware of being a barren tree, but rather offer to Christ the fruit of piety which He requires.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) We may also say, in another sense, that the Lord sought for fruit on the fig tree before its time, and not finding it, cursed it, because all who fulfil the commandments of the Law, are said to bear fruit in their own time, as, for instance, that commandment, Thou shalt not commit adultery; but he who not only abstains from adultery but remains a virgin, which is a greater thing, excels them in virtue. But the Lord exacts from the perfect not only the observance of virtue, but also that they bear fruit over and above the commandments.

11:15–18

15. And they come to Jerusalem: and Jesus went into the temple, and began to cast out them that sold and bought in the temple, and overthrew the tables of the moneychangers, and the seats of them that sold doves;

16. And would not suffer that any man should carry any vessel through the temple.

17. And he taught, saying unto them, Is it not written, My house shall be called of all nations the house of prayer? but ye have made it a den of thieves.

18. And the Scribes and Chief Priests heard it, and sought how they might destroy him: for they feared him, because all the people was astonished at his doctrine.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) What the Lord had done in figure, when He cursed the barren fig tree, He now shews more openly, by casting out the wicked from the temple. For the fig tree was not in fault, in not having fruit before its time, but the priests were blameable; wherefore it is said, And they come to Jerusalem; and Jesus went into the temple, and began to cast out them that sold and bought in the temple. Nevertheless, it is probable that He found them buying and selling in the temple things which were necessary for its ministry. If then the Lord forbids men to carry on in the temple worldly matters, which they might freely do any where else, how much more do they deserve a greater portion of the anger of Heaven, who carry on in the temple consecrated to Him those things, which are unlawful wherever they may be done. It goes on: and overthrew the tables of the moneychangers.

THEOPHYLACT. He calls moneychangers, changers of a particular sort of money, for the word means a small brass coin. There follows, and the seats of them that sold doves.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Because the Holy Spirit appeared over the Lord in the shape of a dove, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are fitly pointed out under the name of doves. The Dove therefore is sold, when the laying on of hands by which the Holy Spirit is received is sold for a price. Again, He overturns the seats of them who sell doves, because they who sell spiritual grace, are deprived of their priesthood, either before men, or in the eyes of God.

THEOPHYLACT. But if a man by sinning gives up to the devil the grace and purity of baptism, he has sold his Dove, and for this reason is cast out of the temple. There follows, And would not suffer that any man should carry any vessel through the temple.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He speaks of those vessels which were carried there for the purpose of merchandise. But God forbid that it should be taken to mean, that the Lord cast out of the temple, or forbade men to bring into it, the vessels consecrated to God; for here He shews a type of the judgment to come, for He thrusts away the wicked from the Church, and restrains them by His everlasting word from ever again coming in to trouble the Church. Furthermore, sorrow, sent into the heart from above, takes away from the souls of the faithful those sins which were in them, and Divine grace assists them so that they should never again commit them. It goes on: And he taught, saying unto them, My house shall be called of all nations the house of prayer. (Isa. 56:7)

PSEUDO-JEROME. According to Isaiah: But ye have made it a den of thieves, (Jer. 7:11) according to Jeremiah.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He says, to all nations, not to the Jewish nation alone, nor in the city of Jerusalem alone, but over the whole world; and he does not say a house of bulls, goats, and rams, but of prayer.

THEOPHYLACT. Further, He calls the temple, a den of thieves, on account of the money gained there; for thieves always troop together for gain. Since then they sold those animals which were offered in sacrifice for the sake of gain, He called them thieves.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For they were in the temple for this purpose, either that they might persecute with corporal pains those who did not bring gifts, or spiritually kill those who did. The mind and conscience of the faithful is also the temple and the house of God, but if it puts forth perverse thoughts, to the hurt of any one, it may be said that thieves haunt it as a den; therefore the mind of the faithful becomes the den of a thief, when leaving the simplicity of holiness, it plans that which may hurt others.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. lib. ii. 67) John, however, relates this in a very different order, wherefore it is manifest that not once only, but twice, this was done by the Lord, and that the first time was related by John, this last, by all the other three.

THEOPHYLACT. Which also turns to the greater condemnation of the Jews, because though the Lord did this so many times, nevertheless they did not correct their conduct.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. lib. ii. 68) In this again Mark does not keep the same order as Matthew; because however Matthew connects the facts together by this sentence, And he left them, and went out of the city into Bethany, (Matt. 21:17) returning from whence in the morning, according to his relation, Christ cursed the tree, therefore it is supposed with greater probability that he rather has kept to the order of time, as to the ejection from the temple of the buyers and sellers. Mark therefore passed over what was done the first day when He entered into the temple, and on remembering it inserted it, when he had said that He found nothing on the fig tree but leaves, which was done on the second day, as both testify.

GLOSS. (non occ.) But the Evangelist shews what effect the correction of the Lord had on the ministers of the temple, when he adds: And the Scribes and Chief Priests heard it, and sought how they might destroy him; according to that saying of Amos: They hate him that rebuketh in the gate, and they abhor him that speaketh uprightly. (Amos 5:10) From this wicked design, however, they were kept back for a time solely by fear. Wherefore it is added, For they feared him, because all the people were astonished at his doctrine. For he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes and Pharisees, as is said elsewhere.

11:19–26

19. And when even was come, he went out of the city.

20. And in the morning, as they passed by, they saw the fig tree dried up from the roots.

21. And Peter calling to remembrance saith unto him, Master, behold, the fig tree which thou cursedst is withered away.

22. And Jesus answering saith unto them, Have faith in God.

23. For verily I say unto you, That whosoever shall say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; and shall not doubt in his heart, but shall believe that those things which he saith shall come to pass; he shall have whatsoever he saith.

24. Therefore I say unto you, What things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them.

25. And when ye stand praying, forgive, if ye have ought against any: that your Father also which is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses.

26. But if ye do not forgive, neither will your Father which is in heaven forgive your trespasses.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The Lord, leaving darkness behind Him in the hearts of the Jews, went out, as the sun, from that city to another which is well-disposed and obedient. And this is what is meant, when it is said, And when even was come, he went out of the city. But the sun sets in one place, rises in another, for the light, taken from the Scribes, shines in the Apostles; wherefore He returns into the city; on which account there is added, And in the morning, as they passed by, (that is, going into the city,) they saw the fig tree dried up from the root.

THEOPHYLACT. The greatness of the miracle appears in the drying up so juicy and green a tree. But though Matthew says that the fig tree was at once dried up, and that the disciples on seeing it wondered, there is no reason for perplexity, though Mark now says, that the disciples saw the fig tree dried up on the morrow; for what Matthew says must be understood to mean that they did not see it at once, but on the next day.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 68) The meaning is not that it dried up at the time, when they saw it, but immediately after the word of the Lord; for they saw it, not beginning to dry up, but completely dried up; and they thus understood that it had withered immediately after our Lord spoke.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Now the fig tree withered from the roots is the synagogue withered from Cain, and the rest, from whom all the blood from Abel up to Zechariah is required.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Further, the fig tree was dried up from the roots to shew that the nation was impious not only for a time and in part, and was to be smitten for ever, not merely to be afflicted by the attacks of nations from without and then to be freed, as had often been done; or else it was dried up from the roots, to shew that it was stripped not only of the external favour of man, but altogether of the favour of heaven within it; for it lost both its life in heaven, and its country on earth.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Peter perceives the dry root, which is cut off, and has been replaced by the beautiful and fruitful olive, called by the Lord; wherefore it goes on: And Peter calling to remembrance saith unto him, Master, behold, the fig tree which thou cursedst is withered away.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) The wonder of the disciples was the consequence of imperfect faith, for this was no great thing for God to do; since then they did not clearly know His power, their ignorance made them break out into wonder; and therefore it is added, And Jesus answering saith unto them, Have faith in God. For verily I say unto you, That whosoever shall say unto this mountain, &c. That is; Thou shalt not only be able to dry up a tree, but also to change a mountain by thy command and order.

THEOPHYLACT. Consider the Divine mercy, how it confers on us, if we approach Him in faith, the power of miracles, which He Himself possesses by nature, so that we should be able even to change mountains.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Gentiles, who have attacked the Church, are in the habit of objecting to us, that we have never had full faith in God, for we have never been able to change mountains. 1It could, however, be done, if necessity called for it, as once we read that it was done by the prayers of the blessed Father Gregory of Neocæsarea, Bishop of Pontus, by which a mountain left as much space of ground for the inhabitants of a city as they wanted.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Or else, as He did not dry up the fig tree for its own sake, but for a sign that Jerusalem should come to destruction, in order to shew His power, in the same way we must also understand the promise concerning the mountain, though a removal of this sort is not impossible with God.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Christ then who is the mountain, which grew from the stone, cut out without hands, is taken up and cast into the sea, when the Apostles with justice say, Let us turn ourselves to other nations, since ye judged yourselves unworthy of hearing the word of God. (Acts 13:46)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, because the devil is often on account of his pride called by the name of a mountain, this mountain, at the command of those who are strong in the faith, is taken up from the earth and cast into the sea, whenever, at the preaching of the word of God by the holy doctors, the unclean spirit is expelled from the hearts of those who are fore-ordained to life, and is allowed to exert the tyranny of his power over the troubled and embittered souls of the faithless. At which time, he rages the more fiercely, the more he grieves at being turned away from hurting the faithful. It goes on: Therefore I say unto you, What things soever ye desire, when ye pray, believe that ye receive them, and ye shall have them.

THEOPHYLACT. For whosoever sincerely believes evidently lifts up his heart to God, and is joined to Him, and his burning heart feels sure that he has received what he asked for, which he who has experienced will understand; and those persons appear to me to experience this, who attend to the measure and the manner of their prayers. For this reason the Lord says, Ye shall receive whatsoever ye ask in faith; for he who believes that he is altogether in the hands of God, and interceding with tears, feels that he as it were has hold of the feet of the Lord in prayer, he shall receive what he has rightly asked for. Again, would you in another way receive what you ask for? Forgive your brother, if he has in any way sinned against you; this is also what is added: And when ye stand praying, forgive, if ye have ought against any: that your Father also which is in heaven may forgive you your trespasses.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Mark has, as he is wont, expressed seven verses of the Lord’s prayer in one prayer. But what can he, whose sins are all forgiven, require more, save that he may persevere in what has been granted unto him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But we must observe that there is a difference in those who pray; he who has perfect faith, which worketh by love, can by his prayer or even his command remove spiritual mountains, as Paul did with Elymas the sorcerer. But let those who are unable to mount up to such a height1 of perfection pray that their sins should be forgiven them, and they shall obtain what they pray for, provided that they themselves first forgive those who have sinned against them. If however they disdain to do this, not only shall they be unable to perform miracles by their prayers, but they shall not even be able to obtain pardon for their sins, which is implied in what follows; But if ye do not forgive, neither will your Father which is in heaven forgive your trespasses.

11:27–33

27. And they come again to Jerusalem: and as he was walking in the temple, there come to him the chief priests, and the scribes, and the elders,

28. And say unto him, By what authority doest thou these things? and who gave thee this authority to do these things?

29. And Jesus answered and said unto them, I will also ask of you one question, and answer me, and I will tell you by what authority I do these things.

30. The baptism of John, was it from heaven, or of men? answer me.

31. And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why then did ye not believe him?

32. But if we shall say, Of men; they feared the people: for all men counted John, that he was a prophet indeed.

33. And they answered and said unto Jesus, We cannot tell. And Jesus answering saith unto them, Neither do I tell you by what authority I do these things.

THEOPHYLACT. They were angry with the Lord, for having cast out of the temple those who had made it a place of merchandize, and therefore they come up to Him, to question and tempt Him. Wherefore it is said: And they come again to Jerusalem: and as he was walking in the temple, there come to him the Chief Priests, and the Scribes, and the elders, and say unto him, By what authority doest thou these things? and who gave thee authority to do these things? As if they had said, Who art thou that doest these things? Dost thou make thyself a doctor, and ordain thyself Chief Priest?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And indeed, when they say, By what authority doest thou these things, they doubt its being the power of God, and wish it to be understood that what He did was the devil’s work. When they add also, Who gave thee this authority, they evidently deny that He is the Son of God, since they believe that He works miracles, not by His own but by another’s power.

THEOPHYLACT. Further, they said this, thinking to bring Him to judgment, so that if He said, by mine own power, they might lay hold upon Him; but if He said, by the power of another, they might make the people leave Him, for they believed Him to be God. But the Lord asks them concerning John, not without a reason, nor in a sophistical way, but because John had borne witness of Him. Wherefore there follows: And Jesus answered and said unto them, I will also ask of you one question, and answer me, and I will tell you by what authority I do these things. The baptism of John, was it from heaven, or of men? answer me.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Lord might indeed have confuted the cavils of his tempters by a direct answer, but prudently puts them a question, that they might be condemned either by their silence or their speaking, which is evident from what is added, And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why then did ye not believe him? As if He had said, He whom you confess to have had his prophecy from heaven bore testimony of Me, and ye have heard from him, by what authority I do these things. It goes on: But if we shall say, Of men; they feared the people. They saw then that whatever they answered, they should fall into a snare; fearing to be stoned, they feared still more the confession of the truth. Wherefore it goes on: And they answered and said unto Jesus, We cannot tell.

PSEUDO-JEROME. They envied the Lamp, and were in the dark, wherefore it is said, I have ordained a lamp for mine anointed; his enemies will I clothe with shame. (Ps. 132:17, 18) There follows: And Jesus answering saith unto them, Neither do I tell you by what authority I do these things.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) As if He had said, I will not tell you what I know, since ye will not confess what ye know. Further, we must observe that knowledge is hidden from those who seek it, principally for two reasons, namely, when he who seeks for it either has not sufficient capacity to understand what he seeks for, or when through contempt for the truth, or some other reason, he is unworthy of having that for which he seeks opened to him.

CHAPTER 12

12:1–12

1. And he began to speak unto them by parables. A certain man planted a vineyard, and set an hedge about it, and digged a place for the winefat, and built a tower, and let it out to husbandmen, and went into a far country.

2. And at the season he sent to the husbandmen a servant, that he might receive from the husbandmen of the fruit of the vineyard.

3. And they caught him, and beat him, and sent him away empty.

4. And again he sent unto them another servant; and at him they cast stones, and wounded him in the head, and sent him away shamefully handled.

5. And again he sent another; and him they killed, and many others; beating some, and killing some.

6. Having yet therefore one son, his well-beloved, he sent him also last unto them, saying, They will reverence my son.

7. But those husbandmen said among themselves, This is the heir; come, let us kill him, and the inheritance shall be our’s.

8. And they took him, and killed him, and cast him out of the vineyard.

9. What shall therefore the lord of the vineyard do? he will come and destroy the husbandmen, and will give the vineyard unto others.

10. And have ye not read this Scripture; The stone which the builders rejected is become the head of the corner:

11. This was the Lord’s doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes?

12. And they sought to lay hold on him, but feared the people: for they knew that he had spoken the parable against them: and they left him, and went their way.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After the Lord had closed the mouths of His tempters by a wise question, He next shews their wickedness in a parable; wherefore it is said: And he began to speak unto them by parables. A certain man planted a vineyard.

PSEUDO-JEROME. God the Father is called a man by a human conception. The vineyard is the house of Israel; the hedge is the guardianship of Angels; the winefat is the law, the tower is the temple, and the husbandmen, the priests.

BEDE. (in Marc. 3, 42) Or else, the hedge is the wall of the city, the winefat is the altar, or1 those winefats, by which three psalms receive their name.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, the hedge is the law, which prohibited their mingling with strangers. There follows, And went into a far country.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Not by any change of place, but He seemed to go away from the vineyard, that He might leave the husbandmen to act on their own freewill. It goes on: And at the season he sent to the husbandmen a servant, that he might receive from the husbandmen of the fruit of the vineyard.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The servants who were sent were the prophets, the fruit of the vineyard is obedience; some of the prophets were beaten, others wounded, others slain. Wherefore it goes on, And they caught him, and beat him, and sent him away empty.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By the servant who was first sent, we must understand Moses, but they beat him, and sent him away empty, because they angered Moses in the tents. (Ps. 106:6) There follows, And again he sent unto them another servant, and they wounded him in the head, and sent him away shamefully handled. This other servant means David and the other Psalmists, but they wounded Him in the head and shamefully handled him, because they despised the songs of the Psalmists and rejected David himself, saying, What portion have we in David? (1 Kings 12:16) It goes on, And he sent another; and him they killed, and many others; heating some, and killing some. By the third servant and his companions, understand the band of the prophets. But which of the prophets did they not persecute? In these three kinds of servants, as the Lord Himself elsewhere pronounces, may be included in a figure all the doctors under the law, when He says, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning Me. (Luke 24:44)

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, By the first servant, understand the prophets who lived about the time of Elias, (2 Chron. 18:23.) for Zedekiah the false prophet beat Micaiah; and by the second servant whom they wounded in the head, that is, evil entreated, we may understand the prophets who lived about the time of Hosea and Isaiah; but by the third servant understand the prophets who flourished about the time of Daniel and Ezekiel. It goes on, Having yet therefore one son, his well-beloved, he sent him also last unto them, saying, Perchance they will reverence my son.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The well-beloved son and the last is the Only-begotten; and in that He says, They will reverence my son, He speaks in irony.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, this is not said in ignorance, but God is said to doubt, that freedom of will may be left to man.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, He said this not as though He were ignorant of what was to happen, but to shew what it was right and fitting that they should do. But those husbandmen said amongst themselves, This is the heir, come, let us kill him, and the inheritance will be ours.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Lord proves most clearly that the chiefs of the Jews did not crucify the Son of God through ignorance, but through envy; for they understood that this was He to whom it was said, I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance. (Ps. 2:8) But these evil husbandmen strove to seize upon it by slaying Him, when the Jews crucifying Him tried to extinguish the faith which is by Him, and rather to bring forward their own righteousness which is by the Law, and to thrust it on the nations, and to imbue them with it. There follows: And they took him, and killed him, and cast him out of the vineyard.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, without Jerusalem, for the Lord was crucified out of the city.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, they cast Him out of the vineyard, that is, out of the people, saying Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil. (John 8:48) 1Or, as far as in them lay, they cast Him out of their own borders, and gave Him up to the Gentiles that they might receive Him. There follows, What then will the Lord of the vineyard do? he will come and destroy those husbandmen, and give the vineyard unto other.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 70) Matthew indeed subjoins that they answered and said, He will miserably destroy those wicked men, (Matt. 21:41) which Mark here says was not their answer, but that the Lord after putting the question, as it were answered Himself. But we may easily understand either that their answer was subjoined without the insertion of, they answered, or they said, which at the same time was implied; or else, that their answer, being the truth, was attributed to the Lord, since He also Himself gave this answer concerning them, being the Truth.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord of the vineyard then is the Father of the Son who was slain, and the Son Himself is He who was slain, who will destroy those husbandmen, by giving them up to the Romans, and who will give the people to other husbandmen, that is, to the Apostles. Read the Acts of the Apostles, and you will find three thousand, and five thousand on a sudden believing and bearing fruit to God.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, the vineyard is given to others, that is, to those who come from the east, and from the west, and from the south, and from the north, and who sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But that this was done by Divine interposition he affirms, by immediately afterwards adding, And have ye not read this Scripture, The stone which the builders refused is become the head-stone in the corner? As if he had said, how is this prophecy to be fulfilled, save in that Christ, being rejected and slain by you, is to be preached to the Gentiles, who will believe on Him? Thus then as a corner stone, He will found the two people on Himself, and of the two people will build for Himself a city of the faithful, one temple. For the masters of the synagogue, whom He had just called husbandmen, He now calls builders, because the same persons, who seemed to cultivate His people, that they might bear the fruits of life, like a vineyard, were also commanded to construct and adorn this people, to be, as it were, a house worthy to have God for its inhabitant.

THEOPHYLACT. The stone then which the builders refused, the same has become the head-stone of the corner, that is, of the Church. For the Church is, as it were, the corner, joining together Jews and Gentiles; and this corner has been made by the Lord, and is wonderful in our eyes, that is, in the eyes of the faithful; for miracles meet with detraction from the faithless. The Church indeed is wonderful, as it were resting on wonders, for the Lord worked with the Apostles, and confirmed the word with signs. And this is what is meant, when it is said, This was the Lord’s doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes.

PSEUDO-JEROME. This rejected stone, which is borne by that corner where the lamb and the bread met in the supper, ending the Old and beginning the New Testament, does things marvellous in our eyes as the topaz. (Ps. 118, Ps. 127. Vulg.)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But the Chief Priests shewed that those things which the Lord had spoken were true; which is proved from what follows: And they sought to lay hold on him; for He Himself is the heir, whose unjust death He said was to be revenged by the Father. Again, in a moral sense, each of the faithful, when the Sacrament of Baptism is intrusted to him, receives on hire a vineyard, which he is to cultivate. But the servant sent to him is evil intreated, beaten, and cast out, when the word is heard by him and despised, or, what is worse, even blasphemed; further, he kills, as far as in him lies, the heir, who has trampled under foot the Son of God. The evil husbandman is destroyed, and the vineyard given to another, when the humble shall be enriched with that gift of grace, which the proud man has scorned. And it happens daily in the Church, that the Chief Priests wishing to lay hands on Jesus, are held back by the multitude, when some one, who is a brother only in name, either blushes or fears to attack the unity of the faith of the Church, and of its peace, though he loves it not, on account of the number of good brethren who dwell together within it.

12:13–17

13. And they send unto him certain of the Pharisees and of the Herodians, to catch him in his words.

14. And when they were come, they say unto him, Master, we know that thou art true, and carest for no man; for thou regardest not the person of men, but teachest the way of God in truth: Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar, or not?

15. Shall we give, or shall we not give? But he, knowing their hypocrisy, said unto them, Why tempt ye me? bring me a penny, that I may see it.

16. And they brought it. And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? And they said unto him, Cæsar’s.

17. And Jesus answering said unto them, Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s, and to God the things that are God’s. And they marvelled at him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Chief Priests though they sought to take Him, feared the multitude, and therefore they endeavoured to effect what they could not do of themselves, by means of earthly powers, that they might themselves appear to be guiltless of His death; and therefore it is said, And they send, unto him certain of the Pharisees and of the Herodians, to catch him in his words.

THEOPHYLACT. We have said elsewhere of the Herodians, that they were a certain new heresy, who said that Herod was the Christ, because the succession of the kingdom of Judah had failed. Others however say that the Herodians were the soldiers of Herod, whom the Pharisees brought as witnesses of the words of Christ, that they might take Him, and lead Him away. But observe how in their wickedness they wished to deceive Christ by flattery; for it goes on: Master, we know that thou art true.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For they questioned Him with honied words, and they surrounded Him as bees, who carry honey in their mouth, but a sting in their tail.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But this bland and crafty question was intended to induce Him in His answer rather to fear God than Cæsar, and to say that tribute should not be paid, so that the Herodians immediately on hearing it might hold Him to be an author of sedition against the Romans; and therefore they add, And carest for no man: for thou regardest not the person of any.

THEOPHYLACT. So that thou wilt not honour Cæsar, that is, against the truth; therefore they add, But teachest the way of God in truth. Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar, or not? Shall we give, or shall we not give? For their whole plot was one which had a precipice on both sides, so that if He said that it was lawful to give tribute to Cæsar, they might provoke the people against Him, as though He wished to reduce the nation itself to slavery; but if He said, that it was not lawful, they might accuse Him, as though He was stirring up the people against Cæsar; but the Fountain of wisdom escaped their snares. Wherefore there follows: But he, knowing their hypocrisy, said unto them, Why tempt ye me? bring me a penny, that I may see it. And they brought it.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) A denarius was a piece of money, accounted equal to ten smaller coins, and bearing the image of Cæsar; wherefore there follows: And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? And they said unto him, Cæsar’s. Let those who think that our Saviour asked the question through ignorance and not by an economy, learn from this that He might have known whose image it was; but He puts the question, in order to return them a fitting answer; wherefore there follows: And Jesus answering said unto them, Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He had said, Give what bears an image to him whose image it bears, that is, the penny to Cæsar; for we can both pay Cæsar his tribute, and offer to God what is His own.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) That is, tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and victims. In the same way as He gave tribute both for Himself and Peter, He also gave to God the things that are God's, doing the will of His Father.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Render to Cæsar the money bearing his image, which is collected for him, and render yourselves willingly up to God, for the light of thy countenance, O Lord, and not of Cæsar's, is stamped upon us. (Ps 4:7. Vulg.)

THEOPHYLACT. The inevitable wants of our bodies is as Cæsar unto each of us; the Lord therefore orders that there should be given to the body its own, that is, food and raiment, and to God the things that are God's. It goes on: And they marvelled at him. They who ought to have believed, wondered at such great wisdom, because they had found no place for their craftiness.

12:18–27

18. Then come unto him the Sadducees, which say there is no resurrection; and they asked him, saying,

19. Master, Moses wrote unto us, If a man's brother die, and leave his wife behind him, and leave no children, that his brother should take his wife, and raise up seed unto his brother.

20. Now there were seven brethren: and the first took a wife, and dying left no seed.

21. And the second took her, and died, neither left he any seed: and the third likewise.

22. And the seven had her, and left no seed: last of all the woman died also.

23. In the resurrection therefore, when they shall rise, whose wife shall she be of them? for the seven had her to wife.

24. And Jesus answering, said unto them, Do ye not therefore err, because ye know not the Scriptures, neither the power of God?

25. For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels which are in heaven.

26. And as touching the dead, that they rise: have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush God spake unto him, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob?

27. He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living: ye therefore do greatly err.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After that our Lord has prudently escaped the crafty temptation of the Pharisees, it is shewn how He also confounds the Sadducees, who tempt Him; wherefore it is said: Then come unto him the Sadducees, which say there is no resurrection.

THEOPHYLACT. A certain heretical sect of the Jews called Sadducees denied the resurrection, and said that there was neither angel nor spirit. These then coming to Jesus, craftily proposed to Him a certain tale, in order to shew that no resurrection should take place, or had taken place; and therefore there is added, And they asked him, saying, Master. And in this tale they lay down that seven men had married one woman, in order to make men draw back from belief in the resurrection.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And fitly do they frame such a fable in order to prove the madness of those who assert the resurrection of the body. Such a thing however might really have happened at some time or other among them.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But in a mystical sense: what can this woman, leaving no seed of seven brothers, and last of all dying, mean except the Jewish synagogue, deserted by the seven-fold Spirit, which filled those seven patriarchs, who did not leave to her the seed of Abraham, that is, Jesus Christ? For although a Son was born to them, nevertheless He was given to us Gentiles. This woman was dead to Christ, nor shall she be joined in the resurrection to any patriarch of the seven; for by the number seven is meant the whole company of the faithful. Thus it is said contrariwise by Isaiah, Seven women shall take hold of one man; (Is. 4:1) that is, the seven Churches, which the Lord loves, reproves, and chastises, adore Him with one faith. Wherefore it goes on: And Jesus answering, said unto them, Do ye not therefore err, not knowing the Scripture, neither the power of God?

THEOPHYLACT. As if He had said, Ye understand not what sort of a resurrection the Scriptures announce; for ye believe that there will be a restoration of our bodies, such as they are now, but it shall not be so. Thus then ye know not the Scriptures; neither again do ye know the power of God; for ye consider it as a difficult thing, saying, How can the limbs, which have been scattered, be united together and joined to the soul? But this in respect of the Divine power is as nothing. There follows: For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels which are in heaven; as if He had said, There will be a certain heavenly and angelic restoration to life, when there shall be no more decay, and we shall remain unchanged; and for this reason marriage shall cease. For marriage now exists on account of our decay, that we may be carried on by succession of our race, and not fail; but then we shall be as the Angels, who need no succession by marriage, and never come to an end.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) We must here consider that the Latin custom does not answer to the Greek idiom. For properly 1different words are used for the marriage of men, and that of women; but here we may simply understand that, marry is meant of men, and given in marriage of women.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Thus then they do not understand the Scripture, in that in the resurrection, men shall be as the Angels of God, that is, no man there dies, no one is born, no infant is there, no old man.

THEOPHYLACT. In another way also they are deceived, not understanding the Scriptures; for if they had understood them, they should also have understood how by the Scriptures the resurrection of the dead may be proved; wherefore He adds, And as touching the dead, that they rise, have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush God spake unto him, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob?

PSEUDO-JEROME. But 1 say, in the bush, in which is an image of you; for in it the fire was kindled, but it did not consume its thorns; so my words set you on fire, but do not burn off your thorns, which have grown under the curse.

THEOPHYLACT. But I say, I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. As if He had said, The God of the living, wherefore He adds, He is not the God of the dead, but of the living; for He did not say, I have been, but I am, as if they had been present. But some one perhaps will say, that God spake this only of the soul of Abraham, not of his body; to which I answer, that Abraham implies both, that is, soul and body, so that He also is the God of the body, and the body lives with God, that is, in God's ordinance.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else; because after proving that the soul remained after death, (for God could not be God of those who did not exist at all,) the resurrection of the body also might be inferred as a consequence, since it had done good and evil with the soul.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But when He says, The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; by naming God thrice, He implied the Trinity. But when He says, He is not the God of the dead, by naming again the One God, he implies One Substance. But they live who make good the portion, which they had chosen; and they are dead, who have lost what they had made good. Ye therefore do greatly err.

GLOSS. (non occ.) That is, because they contradicted the Scriptures, and derogated from the power of God.

12:28–34

28. And one of the scribes came, and having heard them reasoning together, and perceiving that he had answered them well, asked him, Which is the first commandment of all?

29. And Jesus answered him, The first of all the commandments is, Hear, O Israel; The Lord our God is one Lord:

30. And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment.

31. And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these.

32. And the scribe said unto him, Well, Master, thou hast said the truth; for there is one God; and there is none other but he:

33. And to love him with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the soul, and with all the strength, and to love his neighbour as himself, is more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices.

34. And when Jesus saw that he answered discreetly, he said unto him, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God. And no man after that durst ask

him any question.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After that the Lord confuted the Pharisees, and the Sadducees, who tempted Him, it is here shewn how He satisfied the Scribe who questioned Him; wherefore it is said, And one of the scribes came, and having heard them reasoning together, and perceiving that he had answered them well, asked him, Which is the first commandment of all?

PSEUDO-JEROME. This question is only that which is a problem common to all skilled in the law, namely, that the commandments are differently set forth in Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy. Wherefore He brought forward not one but two commandments, by which, as by two paps rising on the breast of the bride, our infancy is nourished. And therefore there is added, And Jesus answered him, The first of all the commandments is, Hear, O Israel; the Lord thy God is one God. He mentions the first and greatest commandment of all; this is that to which each of us must give the first place in his heart, as the only foundation of piety, that is, the knowledge and confession of the Divine Unity, with the practice of good works, which is perfected in the love of God and our neighbour; wherefore there is added, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy mind, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment.

THEOPHYLACT. See how He has enumerated all the powers of the soul; for there is a 1living power in the soul, which He explains, when He says, With all thy soul, and to this belong anger and desire, all of which He will have us give to Divine love. There is also another power, which is called natural, to which belong nutriment and growth, and this also is all to be given to God, for which reason He says, With all thy heart. There is also another power, the rational, which He calls the mind, and that too is to be given whole to God.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The words which are added, And with all thy strength, may be referred to the bodily powers. It goes on: And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.

THEOPHYLACT. He says that it is like, because these two commandments are harmonious one with the other, and mutually contain the other. For he who loves God, loves also His creature; but the chief of His creatures is man, wherefore he who loves God ought to love all men. But he who loves his neighbour, who so often offends him, ought much more to love Him, who is ever giving him benefits. And therefore on account of the connection between these commandments, He adds, There is none other commandment greater than these. It goes on: And the Scribe said unto him, Well, Master, thou hast said the truth: for there is one God, and there is none other but he: and to love him with all the heart, and with all the soul, and with all the understanding, and with all the strength, and to love his neighbour as himself, is more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He shews when he says, this is greater than all sacrifices, that a grave question was often debated between the scribes and Pharisees, which was the first commandment, or the greatest of the Divine law; that is, some praised offerings and sacrifices, others preferred acts of faith and love, because many of the fathers before the law pleased God by that faith only, which works by love. This scribe shews that he was of the latter opinion. But it continues, And when Jesus saw that he answered discreetly, he said unto him, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God.

THEOPHYLACT. By which He shews that he was not perfect, for He did not say, Thou art within the kingdom of heaven, but, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God.

BEDE. (ubi sup) But the reason why he was not far from the kingdom of God was, that he proved himself to be a favourer of that opinion, which is proper to the New Testament and to Gospel perfection.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 73) Nor let it trouble us that Matthew says, that he who addressed this question to the Lord tempted Him; for it may be that though he came as a tempter, yet he was corrected by the answer of the Lord. Or at all events, we must not look upon the temptation as evil, and done with the intention of deceiving an enemy, but rather as the caution of a man who wished to try a thing unknown to him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, he is not far who comes with knowledge; for ignorance is farther from the kingdom of God than knowledge; wherefore he says above to the Sadducees, Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures, or the power of God. It goes on: And no man after that durst ask him any questions.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For since they were confuted in argument, they ask Him no farther questions, but take Him without any disguise, and give Him up to the Roman power. From which we understand that the venom of envy may be overcome, but can hardly lie quiet.

12:35–40

35. And Jesus answered and said, while he taught in the temple, How say the Scribes that Christ is the Son of David?

36. For David himself said by the Holy Ghost, The Lord said to my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand, till I make thine enemies thy footstool.

37. David therefore himself calleth him Lord; and whence is he then his son? And the common people heard him gladly.

THEOPHYLACT. Because Christ was coming to His Passion, He corrects a false opinion of the Jews, who said that Christ was the Son of David, not his Lord; wherefore it is said, And Jesus answered and said, while he taught in the temple.

PSEUDO-JEROME. That is, He openly speaks to them of Himself, that they may be inexcusable; for it goes on: How say the Scribes that Christ is the Son of David?

THEOPHYLACT. But Christ shews Himself to be the Lord, by the words of David. For it goes on: For David himself said by the Holy Ghost, The Lord said to my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand; as if He had said, Ye cannot say that David said this without the grace of the Holy Spirit, but he called Him Lord in the Holy Spirit; and that He is Lord, he shews, by this that is added, Till I make thine enemies thy footstool; for they themselves were His enemies, whom God put under the footstool of Christ.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But the putting own of His enemies by the Father, does not shew the weakness of the Son, but the unity of nature, by which One works in the Other; for the Son also subjects the Father’s enemies, because He glorifies His Father upon earth.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Thus then the Lord concludes from what has gone before the doubtful question. For from the foregoing words of David it is proved that Christ is the Lord of David, but according to the saying of the Scribes, it is proved that He is his son. And this is what is added, David himself then calls him Lord, how is he then his son?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The question of Jesus is useful for us even now against the Jews; for they, acknowledging that Christ is to come, assert that He is a mere man, a holy Person descended from David. Let us then ask them, as our Lord has taught us, if He be a mere man, and only the son of David, how David in the Holy Spirit calls Him Lord. They are not however reproved for calling Him David's son, but for not believing Him to be the Son of God. It goes on, And the common people heard him gladly.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Namely, because they saw that He answered and put questions wisely.

38. And he said unto them in his doctrine, Beware of the scribes, which love to go in long clothing, and love salutations in the marketplaces,

39. And the chief seats in the synagogues, and the uppermost rooms at feasts:

40. Which devour widows' houses, and for a pretence make long prayers: these shall receive greater damnation.

PSEUDO-JEROME. After confuting the Scribes and Pharisees, He burns up as a fire their dry and withered examples; wherefore it is said, And he said unto them in his doctrine, Beware of the Scribes, which love to go in long clothing.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) To walk in long clothing is to go forth into public clad in garments too much ornamented, in which amongst other things, that rich man, who fared sumptuously every day, is said to have sinned.

THEOPHYLACT. But they used to walk in honourable garments, because they wished to be highly esteemed for it, and in like manner they desired other things, which lead to glory. For it goes on: And love salutations in the marketplaces, and the chief seats in the synagogues, and the uppermost rooms at feasts.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) We must observe that He does not forbid that those, to whom it falls by the rule of their office, should be saluted in the marketplace, or have chief seats and places at feasts, but He teaches that those who love those things unduly, whether they have them or no, are to be avoided by the faithful as wicked men: that is, He blames the intention and not the office; although this too is culpable, that the very men who wish to be called masters of the synagogue in Moses' seat, should have to do with lawsuits in the marketplace. We are in two ways ordered to beware of those who are desirous of vain glory; first, we should not be seduced by their hypocrisy into thinking that what they do is good; nor secondly, should we be excited to imitate them, through a vain rejoicing in being praised for those virtues which they affect.

THEOPHYLACT. He also especially teaches the Apostles, not to have any communication with the scribes, but to imitate Christ Himself; and in ordaining them to be masters in the duties of life, He places others under themv.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But they do not only seek for praise from men, but also for gain. Wherefore there follows, Which devour widows' houses, under the pretence of long prayers. For there are men who pretending to be just hesitate not to receive money from persons who are troubled in conscience, as though they would be their advocates in the judgment. A hand stretched out to the poor is always an accompaniment to prayer, but these men pass the night in prayer, that they may take away money from the poor.

THEOPHYLACT. But the Scribes used to come to women, who were left without the protection of their husbands, as though they were their protectors; and by a pretence of prayer, a reverend exterior and hypocrisy, they used to deceive widows, and thus also devour the houses of the rich. It goes on, These shall receive a greater damnation, that is, than the other Jews, who sinned.

12:41–44

41. And Jesus sat over against the treasury, and beheld how the people cast money into the treasury: and many that were rich cast in much.

42. And there came a certain poor widow, and she threw in two mites, which make a farthing.

43. And he called unto him his disciples, and saith unto them, Verily I say unto you, That this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they which have cast into the treasury:

44. For all they did cast in of their abundance; but she of her want did cast in all that she had, even all her living.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Lord, who had warned them to avoid the desire of high place and vain glory, now distinguishes by a sure test those who brought in gifts. Wherefore it is said, And Jesus sat over against the treasury, and beheld how the people cast money into the treasury. In the Greek language, phylassein means to keep, and gaza is a Persian word for treasure; wherefore the word gazophylacium. which is here used means a place where riches are kept, which name also was applied to the chest in which the offerings of the people were collected, for the necessary uses of the temple, and to the porch in which they were kept. You have a notice of the porch in the Gospel, These words spake Jesus in the treasury as He taught in the temple; and of the chest in the book of Kings, But Jehoiada the priest took a chest. (John 8:20. 2 Kings 12:9)

THEOPHYLACT. Now there was a praiseworthy custom amongst the Jews, that those who were able and willing should put something into the treasury, for the maintenance of the priests, the poor, and the widows; wherefore there is added, And many that were rich cast in much. But whilst many people were so engaged, a poor widow came up, and shewed her love by offering money according to her ability; wherefore it is said, And there came a certain poor widow, and she threw in two mites, which make a farthing.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Reckoners use the word ‘quadrans’ for the fourth part of any thing, be it place, money, or time. Perhaps then in this place is meant the fourth part of a shekel, that is, five pence. It goes on, And he called unto him his disciples, and saith unto them, Verily I say unto you, That this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they which have cast into the treasury: for God does not weigh the property but the conscience of those who offer; nor did He consider the smallness of the sum in her offering, but what was the store from which it came. Wherefore He adds, For all they did cast in of their abundance, but she of her want did cast in all that she had, even all her living.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But in a mystical sense, they are rich, who bring forth from the treasure of their heart things new and old, which are the obscure and hidden things of Divine wisdom in both testaments; but who is the poor woman, if it be not I and those like me, who cast in what I can, and have the will to explain to you, where I have not the power. For God does not consider how much ye hear, but what is the store from which it comes; but each at all events can bring his farthing, that is, a ready will, which is called a farthing, because it is accompanied by three things, that is, thought, word, and deed. And in that it is said that she cast in all her living, it is implied that all that the body wants is that by which it lives1; wherefore it is said, All the labour of man is for his mouth. (Eccl. 6:7)

THEOPHYLACT. Or else; That widow is the soul of man, which leaving Satan to which it had been joined, casts into the temple two mites, that is, the flesh and the mind, the flesh by abstinence, the mind by humility, that so it may be able to hear that it has cast away all its living, and has consecrated it, leaving nothing for the world of all that it possessed.

BEDE. (ubi sup) Again, in an allegorical way, the rich men, who cast gifts into the treasury, point out the Jews puffed up with the righteousness of the law; the poor widow is the simplicity of the Church: poor indeed, because she has cast away the spirit of pride and of the desires of worldly things; and a widow, because Jesus her husband has suffered death for her. She casts two mites into the treasury, because she brings the love of God and of her neighbour, or the gifts of faith and prayer; which are looked upon as mites in their own insignificance, but measured by the merit of a devout intention are superior to all the proud works of the Jews. The Jew sends of his abundance into the treasury, because he presumes on his own righteousness; but the Church sends her whole living into God's treasury, because she understands that even her very living is not of her own desert, but of Divine grace.

CHAPTER 13

13:1–2

1. And as he went out of the temple, one of his disciples saith unto him, Master, see what manner of stones and what buildings are here!

2. And Jesus answering said unto him, Seest thou these great buildings? there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down.

BEDE. (in Marc. lib. iv. 42) Because after the founding of the Church of Christ, Judæa was to be punished for her treachery, the Lord fitly, after praising the devotedness of the Church in the person of the poor widow, goes out of the temple, and foretold its coming ruin, and the contempt in which the buildings now so wonderful were soon to be held, wherefore it is said, And as he went out of the temple, one of his disciples saith unto him, Master, see what manner of stones and what buildings are here!

THEOPHYLACT. For, since the Lord had spoken much concerning the destruction of Jerusalem, His disciples wondered, that such numerous and beautiful buildings were to be destroyed; and this is the reason why they point out the beauty of the temple, and He answers not only that they were to be destroyed, but also that one stone should not be left upon another: wherefore it goes on: And Jesus answering said unto him, Seest thou these great buildings? there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down. Now some may endeavour to prove that Christ’s words were false, by saying that many ruins were left, but this is not at all the point; for though some ruins had been left, still at the consummation of all things one stone shall not be left upon another. Besides it is related, that Ælius Adrian overturned the city and the temple from the foundation, so that the word of the Lord here spoken was fulfilled.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But it was ordered by Divine power that after that the grace of the faith of the Gospel was made known through the world, the temple itself with its ceremonies should be taken away; lest perchance some one weak in the faith, if he saw that these things which had been instituted by God still remained, might by degrees drop from the sincerity of the faith, which is in Christ Jesus, into carnal Judaism.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Here also the Lord enumerates to His disciples the destruction of the last time, that is of the temple, with the people, and its letter; of which one stone shall not be left upon another, that is, no testimony of the Prophets upon those, to whom the Jews perversely applied them, that is, on Ezra, Zerubbabel, and the Maccabees.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Again, when the Lord left the temple, all the edifice of the law and the framework of the commandments were destroyed, so that nothing could be filled up by the Jews; and now that the head has been taken away, all the limbs fight one against the other.

13:3–8

3. And as he sat upon the mount of Olives over against the temple, Peter and James and John and Andrew asked him privately,

4. Tell us, when shall these things be? and what shall be the sign when all these things shall be fulfilled?

5. And Jesus answering them began to say, Take heed lest any man deceive you:

6. For many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and shall deceive many.

7. And when ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars, be ye not troubled: for such things must needs be; but the end shall not be yet.

8. For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom: and there shall be earth-quakes in divers places, and there shall be famines and troubles: these are the beginnings of sorrows.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Because the Lord, when some were praising the buildings of the temple, had plainly answered that all these were to be destroyed, the disciples privately enquired about the time and the signs of the destruction which was foretold; wherefore it is said: And as he sat upon the mount of Olives, over against the temple, Peter and James and John and Andrew asked him privately, Tell us when shall these things be? and what shall be the sign when all these things shall be fulfilled. The Lord sits upon the mount of Olives, over against the temple, when He discourses upon the ruin and destruction of the temple, so that even His bodily position may be in accordance with the words which He speaks, pointing out mystically that, abiding in peace with the saints, He hates the madness of the proud. For the mount of Olives marks the fruitful sublimity of the Holy Church.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. cxcix. 9.) In answer to the disciples, the Lord tells them of things which were from that time forth to have their course; whether He meant the destruction of Jerusalem which occasioned their question, or His own coming through the Church, (in which He ever comes even unto the end, for we know that He comes in His own, when His members are born day by day,) or the end itself, in which He will appear to judge the quick and the dead.

THEOPHYLACT. But before answering their question, He strengthens their minds that they may not be deceived, wherefore there follows: And Jesus answering them began to say, Take heed lest any man deceive you? And this He says, because when the sufferings of the Jews began, some arose professing to be teachers, wherefore there follows: For many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and shall deceive many.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For many came forward, when destruction was hanging over Jerusalem, saying that they were Christs, and that the time of freedom was now approaching. Many teachers of heresy also arose in the Church even in the time of the Apostles; and many Antichrists came in the name of Christ, the first of whom was Simon Magus, to whom the Samaritans, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles, listened, saying, This man is the great power of God: wherefore also it is added here, And shall deceive many. (Acts 8:10) Now from the time of the Passion of our Lord there ceased not amongst the Jewish people, who chose the seditious robber and rejected Christ the Saviour, either external wars or civil discord; wherefore it goes on: And when ye shall hear of wars and rumours of wars, be ye not troubled. And when these come, the Apostles are warned not to be afraid, or to leave Jerusalem and Judæa, because the end was not to come at once, nay was to be put off for forty years. And this is what is added: for such things must needs be; but the end shall not be yet, that is, the desolation of the province, and the last destruction of the city and temple. It goes on: For nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, the Romans against the Jews, which Josephus relates happened before the destruction of Jerusalem. For when the Jews refused to pay tribute, the Romans arose, in anger; but because at that time they were merciful they took indeed their spoils, but did not destroy Jerusalem. What follows shews that God fought against the Jews, for it is said, And there shall be earthquakes in divers places, and there shall be famines.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now it is on record that this literally took place at the time of the Jewish rebellion. But kingdom against kingdom, the pestilence of those whose word spreads as a canker, dearth of the word of God, the commotion of the whole earth, and the separation from the true faith, may all rather be understood of heretics who, by fighting one against the other, bring about the triumph of the Church.

13:9–13

9. But take heed to yourselves: for they shall deliver you up to councils; and in the synagogues ye shall be beaten: and ye shall be brought before rulers and kings for my sake, for a testimony against them.

10. And the Gospel must first be published among all nations.

11. But when they shall lead you, and deliver you up, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, neither do ye premeditate: but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye: for it is not ye that speak, but the Holy Ghost.

12. Now the brother shall betray the brother to death, and the father the son; and children shall rise up against their parents, and shall cause them to be put to death.

13. And ye shall be hated of all men for my name’s sake: but he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Lord shews how Jerusalem and the province of Judæa merited the infliction of such calamities, in the following words: But take heed to yourselves: for they shall deliver you up to councils; and in the synagogues ye shall be beaten. For the greatest cause of destruction to the Jewish people was, that after slaying the Saviour, they also tormented the heralds of His name and faith with wicked cruelty.

THEOPHYLACT. Fitly also did He premise a recital of those things which concerned the Apostles, that in their own tribulations they might find some consolation in the community of troubles and sufferings. There follows: And ye shall be brought before rulers and kings for my sake, for a testimony against them. He says kings and rulers, as, for instance, Agrippa, Nero, and Herod. Again, His saying, for my sake, gave them no small consolation, in that they were about to suffer for His sake. For a testimony against them, means, as a judgment beforehand against them, that they might be inexcusable, in that though the Apostles were labouring for the truth, they would not join themselves to it. Then, that they might not think that their preaching should be impeded by troubles and dangers, He adds: And the Gospel must first be published among all nations.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 77) Matthew adds: And then shall the end come. (Matt. 24:14) Mark, however, by the word first means before the end come.

BEDE. Ecclesiastical historians testify that this was fulfilled, for they relate that all the Apostles long before the destruction of the province of Judæa were dispersed to preach the Gospel over the whole world, except James the son of Zebedee and James the brother of our Lord, who had before shed their blood in Judæa for the word of the Lord. Since then the Lord knew that the hearts of the disciples would be saddened by the fall and destruction of their nation, He relieves them by this consolation, to let them know that even after the casting away of the Jews, companions in their joy and heavenly kingdom should not be wanting, nay that many more were to be collected out of all mankind than perished in Judæa.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Another anxiety might also arise in the breasts of the disciples. Lest therefore after hearing that they were to be brought before kings and rulers, they should fear that their want of science and eloquence should render them unable to answer, our Lord consoles them by saying, But when they shall lead you and deliver you up, take no thought beforehand what ye shall speak, but whatsoever shall be given you in that hour, that speak ye.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For when we are led before judges for Christ’s sake, all our duty is to offer up our will for Christ. As for the rest, Christ Himself who dwells in us speaks for us, and the grace of the Holy Ghost shall be given us, when we answer. Wherefore it goes on: For it is not ye that shall speak, but the Holy Ghost.

THEOPHYLACT. He also foretells to them a worse evil, that they should suffer persecution from their relations. Wherefore there follows: Now the brother shall betray the brother to death, and the father the son; and children shall rise up against their parents, and shall cause them to be put to death; and ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This has often been seen in time of persecution, nor can there be any firm affection amongst men who differ in faith.

THEOPHYLACT. And this He says, that on hearing it, they might prepare themselves to bear persecutions and ills with greater patience. Then He brings them consolation, saying, And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake; for the being hated for Christ's sake is a sufficient reason for suffering persecutions patiently,1 for it is not the punishment, but the cause, that makes the martyr. Again, that which follows is no small comfort amidst persecution: But he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved.

13:14–20

14. But when ye shall see the abomination of desolation, spoken of by Daniel the prophet, standing where it ought not, (let him that readeth understand,) then let them that be in Judæa flee to the mountains:

15. And let him that is on the housetop not go down into the house, neither enter therein, to take any thing out of his house:

16. And let him that is in the field not turn back again for to take up his garment.

17. But woe to them that are with child, and to them that give suck in those days!

18. And pray ye that your flight be not in the winter.

19. For in those days shall be affliction, such as was not from the beginning of the creation which God created unto this time, neither shall be.

20. And except that the Lord had shortened those days, no flesh should be saved: but for the elect's sake, whom he hath chosen, he hath shortened the days.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After speaking of the things which were to happen before the destruction of the city, the Lord now foretells those which happened about the destruction itself of the city, saying, But when ye shall see the abomination of desolation standing where it ought not, (let him that readeth understand.)

AUGUSTINE. (de con. ii. 77) Matthew says, standing in the holy place; but with this verbal difference Mark has expressed the same meaning; for He says where it ought not to stand, because it ought not to stand in the holy place.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) When we are challenged to understand what is said, we may conclude that it is mystical. But it may either be said simply of Antichrist, or of the statue of Cæsar, which Pilate put into the temple, or of the equestrian statue of Adrian, which for a long time stood in the holy of holies itself. An idol is also called abomination according to the Old Testament, and he has added of desolation, because it was placed in the temple when desolate and deserted.

THEOPHYLACT. Or he means by the abomination of desolation, the entrance of enemies into the city by violence.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. cxcix. 9.) But Luke, in order to shew that the abomination of desolation happened when Jerusalem was taken, in this same place gives the words of our Lord, And when ye shall see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that the desolation thereof is nigh. (Luke 21:20) It goes on: Then let them that be in Judæa flee to the mountains.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) It is on record that this was literally fulfilled, when on the approach of the war with Rome and the extermination of the Jewish people, all the Christians who were in that province, warned by the prophecy, fled far away, as Church history relates, and retiring beyond Jordan, remained for a time in the city of Pella under the protection of Agrippa, the king of the Jews, of whom mention is made in the Acts, and who with that part of the Jews, who chose to obey him, always continued subject to the Roman empire.

THEOPHYLACT. And well does he say, Who are in Judæa, for the Apostles were no longer in Judæa, but before the battle had been driven from Jerusalem.

GLOSS. (Non in Gloss. sed ap. Theoph.) Or rather went out of their own accord, being led by the Holy Ghost. It goes on, And let him that is on the housetop not go down into the house, neither enter therein, to take any thing out of his house; for it is a desirable thing to be saved even naked from such a destruction. It goes on: But woe to them that are with child, and to them that give suck in those days.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) That is, they whose wombs or whose hands, overladen with the burden of children, in no small measure impede their forced flight.

THEOPHYLACT. But it seems to me, that in these words He foretells the eating of children, for when afflicted by famine and pestilence, they laid hands on their children.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Again, after having mentioned this double impediment to flight, which might arise either from the desire of taking away property, or from having children to carry, He touches upon the third obstacle, namely, that coming from the season; saying, And pray ye that your flight be not in the winter.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, lest they who wish to fly should be impeded by the difficulties of the season. And He fitly gives the cause for so great a necessity for flight; saying, For in those days shall be affliction, such as was not from the beginning of the creation which God created unto this time, neither shall be.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. cxcix. 9.) For Josephus, who has written the history of the Jews, relates that such things were suffered by this people, as are scarcely credible, wherefore it is said, not without cause, that there was not such tribulation from the beginning of the creation until now, nor shall ever be. But although in the time of Antichrist there shall be one similar or greater, we must understand that it is of that people, that it is said that there shall never happen such another. For if they are the first and foremost to receive Antichrist, that same people may rather be said to cause than to suffer tribulation.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The only refuge in such evils is, that God who gives strength to suffer, should abridge the power of inflicting. Wherefore there follows: And except that the Lord had shortened those days.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, if the Roman war had not been soon finished, no flesh should be saved; that is, no Jew should have escaped; but for the elect's sake, whom he hath chosen, that is, for the sake of the believing Jews, or who were hereafter to believe, He hath shortened the days, that is, the war was soon finished, for God foresaw that many Jews would believe after the destruction of the city; for which reason He would not suffer the whole race to be utterly destroyed.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But some persons more fitly understand that the calamities themselves are signified by days, as evil days are spoken of in other parts of holy Scripture; for the days themselves are not evil, but what is done in them. The woes themselves therefore are said to be abridged, because through the patience which God gave they felt them less, and then what was great in itself was abridged.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else; these words, In those days shall be affliction, properly agree with the times of Antichrist, when not only tortures more frequent, and more painful than before are to be heaped on the faithful, but also, what is more terrible, the working of miracles shall accompany those who inflict torments. But in proportion as this tribulation shall be greater than those which preceded, by so much shall it be shorter. For it is believed, that during three years and a half, as far as may be conjectured from the prophecy of Daniel and the Revelations of John, the Church is to be attacked. In a spiritual sense, however, when we see the abomination of desolation standing where it ought not, that is, heresies and crimes reigning amongst them, who appear to be consecrated by the heavenly mysteries, then whosoever of us remain in Judæa, that is, in the confession of the true faith, ought to mount the higher in virtue, the more men we see following the broad paths of vice.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For our flight is to the mountains, that he who has mounted to the heights of virtue may not go down to the depths of sin.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Then let him who is on the house-top, that is, whose mind rises above carnal deeds, and who lives spiritually, as it were in the free air, not come down to the base acts of his former conversation, nor seek again those things which he had left, the desires of the world or the flesh. For our house either means this world, or that in which we live, our own flesh.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Pray that your flight may not be in the winter, or on the sabbath day, that is, that the fruit of our work may not be ended with the end of time; for fruit comes to an end in the winter and time in the sabbath.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But if we are to understand it of the consummation of the world, He commands that our faith and love for Christ should not grow cold, and that we should not grow lazy and cold in the work of God, by taking a sabbath from virtue.

THEOPHYLACT. We must also avoid sin with fervour, and not coldly and quietly.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the tribulation shall be great, and the days short, for the sake of the elect, lest the evil of this time should change their understanding.

13:21–27

21. And then if any man shall say to you, Lo, here is Christ; or, lo, he is there; believe him not:

22. For false Christs and false prophets shall rise, and shall shew signs and wonders, to seduce, if it were possible, even the elect.

23. But take ye heed: behold, I have foretold you all things.

24. But in those days, after that tribulation, the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light,

25. And the stars of heaven shall fall, and the powers that are in heaven shall be shaken.

26. And then shall they see the Son of man coming in the clouds with great power and glory.

27. And then shall he send his angels, and shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth to the uttermost part of heaven.

THEOPHYLACT. After that the Lord had finished all that concerned Jerusalem, He now speaks of the coming of Antichrist, saying, Then if any man shall say to you, Lo, here is Christ; or, lo, he is there; believe him not. But when He says, then, think not that it means immediately after these things are fulfilled about Jerusalem; as Matthew also says after the birth of Christ, In those days came John the Baptist; (Matt. 3:1) does he mean immediately after the birth of Christ? No, but he speaks indefinitely and without precision. So also here, then may be taken to mean not when Jerusalem shall be made desolate, but about the time of the coming of Antichrist. It goes on: For false Christs and false prophets shall arise, and shall shew signs and wonders, to seduce, if it were possible, even the elect. For many shall take upon them the name of Christ, so as to seduce even the faithful.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, xx. 19) For then shall Satan be unchained, and work through Antichrist in all his power, wonderfully indeed, but falsely. But a doubt is often raised whether the Apostle said Signs and lying wonders, because he is to deceive mortal senses, by phantoms, so as to appear to do what he does not, or because those wonders themselves, even though true, are to turn men aside to lies, because they will not believe that any power but a Divine power could do them, being ignorant of the power of Satan, especially when he shall have received such power as he never had before. But for whichever reason it is said, they shall be deceived by those signs and wonders who deserve to be deceived.

GREGORY. (v. Greg Hom. in Ezech. lib. i. 9) Why however is it said with a doubt if it were possible, when the Lord knows beforehand what is to be? One of two things is implied; that if they are elect, it is not possible; and if it is possible, they are not elect. (non potest, ap. Cat.) This doubt therefore in our Lord's discourse expresses the trembling in the mind of the elect. And He calls them elect, because He sees that they will persevere in faith and good works; for those who are chosen to remain firm are to be tempted to fall by the signs of the preachers of Antichrist.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Some however refer this to the time of the Jewish captivity, where many, declaring themselves to be Christs, drew after them crowds of deluded persons; but during the siege of the city there was no Christian to whom the Divine exhortation, not to follow false teachers, could apply. Wherefore it is better to understand it of heretics, who, coming to oppose the Church, pretended to be Christs; the first of whom was Simon Magus, but that last one, greater than the rest, is Antichrist. It goes on: But take ye heed: behold, I have foretold you all things.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 78) For He did not only foretel to His disciples the good things which He would give to His saints and faithful ones, but also the woes in which this world was to abound, that we might look for our reward at the end of the world with more confidence, from feeling the woes in like manner announced as about to precede the end of the world.

THEOPHYLACT. But after the coming of Antichrist, the frame of the world shall be altered and changed, for the stars shall be obscured on account of the abundance of the brightness of Christ. Wherefore it goes on: But in those days, after that tribulation, the sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light; and the stars of heaven shall fall.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For the stars in the day of judgment shall appear obscure, not by any lessening of their own light, but because of the brightness of the true light, that is, of the most high Judge coming upon them; although there is nothing to prevent its being taken to mean, that the sun and moon with all the other heavenly bodies then for a time are really to lose their light, just as we are told was the case with the sun at the time of our Lord's Passion. But after the day of judgment, when there shall be a new sky and a new earth, then shall happen what Isaiah says: Moreover, the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold. (Isa. 30:26) There follows, And the powers of heaven shall be shaken.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, the Angelic virtues shall be astonished, seeing that such great things are done, and that their fellow-servants are judged.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) What wonder is it that men should be troubled at this judgment, the sight of which makes the very Angelic powers to tremble? What will the stories of the house do when the pillars shake? What does the shrub of the wilderness undergo, when the cedar of paradise is moved?

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, the sun shall be darkened, at the coldness of their hearts, as in the winter time. And the moon shall not give her light with serenity, in this time of quarrel, and the stars of heaven shall fail in their light, when the seed of Abraham shall all but disappear, for to it they are likened. (Gen. 22:17) And the powers of heaven shall be stirred up to the wrath of vengeance, when they shall be sent by the Son of Man at His coming, of whose Advent it is said, And then shall they see the Son of Man coming in the clouds with great power and glory, He, that is, who first came down like rain into the fleece of Gideon in all lowliness.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. cxcix. 11.) For since it was said by the Angels to the Apostles, He shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven, (Acts 1:11) rightly do we believe that He will come not only in the same body, but on a cloud, since He is to come as He went away, and a cloud received Him as He was going.

THEOPHYLACT. But they shall see the Lord as the Son of Man, that is, in the body, for that which is seen is body.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. 13) For the vision of the Son of Man is shewn even to the bad, but the vision of the form of God to the pure in heart alone, for they shall see God. (Matt. 5:8) And because the wicked cannot see the Son of God, as He is in the form of God, equal to the Father, and at the same time both just and wicked are to see Him as Judge of the quick and dead, before Whom they shall be judged, it was necessary that the Son of

Man should receive power to judge. Concerning the execution of which power, there is immediately added, And then shall he send his angels.

THEOPHYLACT. Observe that Christ sends the Angels as well as the Father; where then are they who say that He is not equal to the Father? For the Angels go forth to gather together the faithful, who are chosen, that they may be carried into the air to meet Jesus Christ. Wherefore it goes on: And gather together his elect from the four winds.

PSEUDO-JEROME. As corn winnowed from the threshing-floor of the whole earth.

BEDE. By the four winds, He means the four parts of the world, the east, the west, the north, and the south. And lest any one should think that the elect are to be gathered together only from the four edges of the world, and not from the midland regions as well as the borders, He has fitly added, From the uttermost part of earth, to the uttermost part of heaven, that is, from the extremities of the earth to its utmost bounds, where the circle of the heavens appears to those who look from afar to rest upon the boundaries of the earth. No one therefore shall be elect in that day who remains behind and does not meet the Lord in the air, when He comes to judgment. The reprobate also shall come to judgment, that when it is finished they may be scattered abroad and perish from before the face of God.

13:28–31

28. Now learn a parable of the fig tree; When her branch is yet tender, and putteth forth leaves, ye know that summer is near:

29. So ye in like manner, when ye shall see these things come to pass, know that it is nigh, even at the doors.

30. Verily I say unto you, that this generation shall not pass, till all these things be done.

31. Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Under the example of a tree the Lord gave a pattern of the end, saying, Now learn a parable of the fig tree, when her branch is yet tender, and putteth forth leaves, ye know that summer is near. So ye in like manner, when ye shall see these things come to pass, know that it is nigh, even at the doors.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He had said, As when the fig tree puts forth its leaves, summer follows at once, so also after the woes of Antichrist, at once, without an interval, shall be the coming of Christ, who will be to the just as summer after winter, but to sinners, winter after summer.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 119, 11) All that is said by the three Evangelists concerning the Advent of our Lord, if diligently compared together and examined, will perchance be found to belong to His daily coming in His body, that is, the Church, except those places where that last coming is so promised, as if it were approaching; for instance in the last part of the discourse according to Matthew, the coming itself is clearly expressed, where it is said, When the Son of Man shall come in his glory. (Matt. 25:31) For what does he refer to in the words, when ye shall see these things come to pass, but those things which He has mentioned above, amongst which it is said, And then ye shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds. The end therefore shall not be then, but then it shall be near at hand. Or are we to say, that not all those things which are mentioned above are to be taken in, but only some of them, that is, leaving out these words, Then shall ye see the Son of man coming; for that shall be the end itself, and not its approach only. But Matthew has declared that it is to be received without exception, saying, When ye shall see all these things, know that it is near, even at the doors. That which is said above must therefore be taken thus; And he shall send his angels, and gather together the elect from the four winds; that is, He shall collect His elect from the four winds of heaven, which He does in the whole of the last hour, coming in His members as in clouds.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This fruitbearing of the fig tree may also be understood to mean the state of the synagogue, which was condemned to everlasting barrenness, because when the Lord came, it had no fruits of righteousness in those who were then unfaithful. (Rom. 11:25) But the Apostle has said, that when the fulness of the Gentiles is come in, all Israel shall be saved. What means this, but that the tree, which has been long barren, shall then yield the fruit, which it had withheld? When this shall happen, doubt not that a summer of true peace is at hand.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, the leaves which come forth are words now spoken, the summer at hand is the day of Judgment, in which every tree shall shew what it had within it, deadness for burning, or greenness to be planted with the tree of life. There follows: Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass, till these things be done.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By generation He either means the whole race of mankind, or specially the Jews.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, This generation shall not pass away, that is, the generation of Christians, until all things be fulfilled, which were spoken concerning Jerusalem and the coming of Antichrist; for He does not mean the generation of the Apostles, for the greater part of the Apostles did not live up to the destruction of Jerusalem. But He says this of the generation of Christians, wishing to console His disciples, lest they should believe that the faith should fail at that time; for the immoveable elements shall first fail, before the words of Christ fail; wherefore it is added, Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The heaven which shall pass away is not the ethereal or starry heaven, but the heaven where is the air. For wheresoever the water of the judgment could reach, there also, according to the words of the blessed Peter, the fire of judgment shall reach. (2 Pet. 3) But the heaven and the earth shall pass away in that form which they now have, but in their essence they shall last without end.

13:32–37

32. But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father.

33. Take ye heed, watch and pray: for ye know not when the time is.

34. For the Son of man is as a man taking a far journey, who left his house, and gave authority to his servants, and to every man his work, and commanded the porter to watch.

35. Watch ye therefore: for ye know not when the master of the house cometh, at even, or at midnight, or at the cockcrowing, or in the morning:

36. Lest coming suddenly he find you sleeping.

37. And what I say unto you I say unto all, Watch.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord wishing to prevent His disciples from asking about that day and hour, says, But of that day and that hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels which are in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father. For if He had said, I know, but I will not reveal it to you, He would have saddened them not a little; but He acted more wisely, and prevents their asking such a question, lest they should importune Him, by saying, neither the Angels nor I.

HILARY. (de Trin. ix) This ignorance of the day and hour is urged against the Only-Begotten God, as if, God born of God had not the same perfection of nature as God. But first, let common sense decide whether it is credible that He, who is the cause that all things are, and are to be, should be ignorant of any out of all these things. For how can it be beyond the knowledge of that nature, by which and in which that which is to be done is contained? And can He be ignorant of that day, which is the day of His own Advent? Human substances foreknow as far as they can what they intend to do, and the knowledge of what is to be done, follows upon the will to act. How then can the Lord of glory, from ignorance of the day of His coming, be believed to be of that imperfect nature, which has on it a necessity of coming, and has not attained to the knowledge of its own advent? But again, how much more room for blasphemy will there be, if a feeling of envy is ascribed to God the Father, in that He has withheld the knowledge of His beatitude from Him to whom He gave a foreknowledge of His death. But if there are in Him all the treasures of knowledge, He is not ignorant of this day; rather we ought to remember that the treasures of wisdom in Him are hidden; His ignorance therefore must be connected with the hiding of the treasures of wisdom, which are in Him. (Col. 2:3) For in all cases, in which God declares Himself ignorant, He is not under the power of ignorance, but either it is not a fit time for speaking, or it is an economy of not acting. But if God is said then to have known that Abraham loved Him, when He did not hide that His knowledge from Abraham, it follows, that the Father is said to know the day, because He did not hide it from the Son. (Gen. 22:12) If therefore the Son knew not the day, it is a Sacrament of His being silent, as on the contrary the Father alone is said to know, because He is not silent. But God forbid that any new and bodily changes should be ascribed to the Father or the Son. Lastly, lest He should be said to be ignorant from weakness, He has immediately added, Take ye heed, watch and pray, for ye know not when the time is.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For we must needs watch with our souls before the death of the body.

THEOPHYLACT. But He teaches us two things, watching and prayer; for many of us watch, but watch only to pass the night in wickedness; He now follows this up with a parable, saying, For the Son of man is as a man taking a far journey, who left his house, and gave his servants power over every work, and commanded the porter to watch.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The man who taking a far journey left his house is Christ, who ascending as a conqueror to His Father after the resurrection, left His Church, as to His bodily presence, but has never deprived her of the safeguard of His Divine presence.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evan. 9) For the earth is properly the place for the flesh, which was as it were carried away to a far country, when it was placed by our Redeemer in the heavens. And he gave his servants power over every work, when, by giving to His faithful ones the grace of the Holy Ghost, He gave them the power of serving every good work. He has also ordered the porter to watch, because He commanded the order of pastors to have a care over the Church committed to them. Not only, however, those of us who rule over Churches, but all are required to watch the doors of their hearts, lest the evil suggestions of the devil enter into them, and lest our Lord find us sleeping. Wherefore concluding this parable He adds, Watch ye therefore: for ye know not when the master of the house cometh, at even, or at midnight, or at cockcrow, or in the morning: lest coming suddenly he find you sleeping.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For he who sleeps applies not his mind to real bodies, but to phantoms, and when he awakes, he possesses not what he had seen; so also are those, whom the love of this world seizes upon in this life; they quit after this life what they dreamed was real.

THEOPHYLACT. See again that He has not said, I know not when the time will be, but, Ye know not. For the reason why He concealed it was that it was better for us; for if, now that we know not the end, we are careless, what should we do if we knew it? We should keep on our wickednesses even unto the end. Let us therefore attend to His words; for the end comes at even, when a man dies in old age; at midnight, when he dies in the midst of his youth; and at cockcrow, when our reason is perfect within us; for when a child begins to live according to his reason, then the cock cries loud within him, rousing him from the sleep of sense; but the age of childhood is the morning. Now all these ages must look out for the end; for even a child must be watched, lest he die unbaptized.

PSEUDO-JEROME. He thus concludes His discourse, that the last should hear from those who come first this precept which is common to all; wherefore He adds, But what I say unto you I say unto all, Watch.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. 199, 3) For He not only speaks to those in whose hearing He then spake, but even to all who came after them, before our time, and even to us, and to all after us, even to His last coming. But shall that day find all living, or will any man say that He speaks also to the dead, when He says, Watch, lest when he cometh he find you sleeping? Why then does He say to all, what only belongs to those who shall then be alive, if it be not that it belongs to all, as I have said? For that day comes to each man when his day comes for departing from this life such as he is to be, when judged in that day, and for this reason every Christian ought to watch, lest the Advent of the Lord find him unprepared; but that day shall find him unprepared, whom the last day of his life shall find unprepared.

CHAPTER 14

14:1–2

1. After two days was the feast of the Passover, and of unleavened bread: and the Chief Priests and the Scribes sought how they might take him by craft, and put him to death.

2. But they said, Not on the feast day, lest there be an uproar of the people.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Let us now sprinkle our book, and our thresholds with blood, and put the scarlet thread around the house of our prayers, and bind scarlet on our hand, as was done to Zarah, (Gen. 38:30) that we may be able to say that the red heifer is slain in the valley. (Num. 19:2, Deut. 21:4) For the Evangelist, being about to speak of the slaying of Christ, premises, After two days was the feast of the Passover, and of unleavened bread.

BEDE. (in Marc. iv. 43) Pascha which in Hebrew is phase, is not called from Passion, as many think, but from passing over, because the destroyer, seeing the blood on the doors of the Israelites, passed by them, and did not smite them; or the Lord Himself, bringing aid unto His people, walked above them.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else phase is interpreted a passing over, but Pascha means sacrifice. In the sacrifice of the lamb, and the passing of the people through the sea, or through Egypt, the Passion of Christ is prefigured, and the redemption of the people from hell, when He visits us after two days, that is, when the moon is most full, and the age of Christ is perfect, that when no part at all of it is dark, we may eat the flesh of the Lamb without spot, who taketh away the sins of the world, in one house, that is, in the Catholic Church, shod with charity, and armed with virtue.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The difference according to the Old Testament between the Passover and the feast of unleavened bread was, that the day alone on which the lamb was slain in the evening, that is, the fourteenth moon of the first month, was called Passover. But on the fifteenth moon, when they came out of Egypt, the feast of unleavened bread came on, which solemn time was appointed for seven days, that is, up to the twenty-first day of the same month in the evening. But the Evangelists indifferently use the day of unleavened bread for the Passover, and the Passover for the days of unleavened bread. Wherefore Mark also here says, After two days was the feast of the Passover, and of unleavened bread, because the day of the Passover was also ordered to be celebrated on the days of unleavened bread, and we also, as it were, keeping a continual passover, ought always to be passing out of this world.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But iniquity came forth in Babylon from the princes, who ought to have purified the temple and the vessels, and themselves according to the law, in order to eat the lamb. Wherefore there follows: And the Chief Priests and the Scribes sought how they might take him by craft, and put him to death. Now when the head is slain, the whole body is rendered powerless, wherefore these wretched men slay the Head. But they avoid the feast day, which indeed befits them, for what feasting can there be for them, who have lost life and mercy? Wherefore it goes on: But they said, Not on the feast day, lest there be an uproar of the people.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Not indeed, as the words seem to imply, that they feared the uproar, but they were afraid lest He should be taken out of their hands by the aid of the people.

THEOPHYLACT. Nevertheless, Christ Himself had determined for Himself the day of His Passion; for He wished to be crucified on the Passover, because He was the true Passover.

14:3–9

3. And being in Bethany in the house of Simon the leper, as he sat at meat, there came a woman having an alabaster box of ointment of spikenard very precious; and she brake the box, and poured it on his head.

4. And there were some that had indignation within themselves, and said, Why was this waste of the ointment made?

5. For it might have been sold for more than three hundred pence, and have been given to the poor. And they murmured against her.

6. And Jesus said, Let her alone; why trouble ye her? she hath wrought a good work on me.

7. For ye have the poor with you always, and whensoever ye will ye may do them good: but me ye have not always.

8. She hath done what she could: she is come aforehand to anoint my body to the burying.

9. Verily I say unto, Wheresoever this Gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world, this also that she hath done shall be spoken of for a memorial of her.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Lord when about to suffer for the whole world, and to redeem all nations with His blood, dwells in Bethany, that is, in the house of obedience; wherefore it is said, And being in Bethany in the house of Simon the leper, as he sat at meat, there came a woman.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For the fawn amongst the stags ever comes back to his couch, that is, the Son, obedient to the Father even unto death, seeks for obedience from us.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He says of Simon the leper, not because he remained still a leper at that time, but because having once been such, he was healed by our Saviour; his former name is left, that the virtue of the Healer may be made manifest.

THEOPHYLACT. But although the four Evangelists record the anointing by a woman, there were two women and not one; one described by John, the sister of Lazarus; it was she who six days before the Passover anointed the feet of Jesus; another described by the other three Evangelists. Nay, if you examine, you will find three; for one is described by John, another by Luke, a third by the other two. For that one described by Luke is said to be a sinner and to have come to Jesus during the time of His preaching; but this other described by Matthew and Mark is said to have come at the time of the Passion, nor did she confess that she had been a sinner.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 79) I however think that nothing else can be meant, but that the sinner who then came to the feet of Jesus was no other than the same Mary who did this twice; once, as Luke relates it, when coming for the first time with humility and tears she merited the remission of her sins. For John also relates this, when he began to speak of the raising of Lazarus before He came to Bethany, saying, It was that Mary which anointed the Lord with ointment, and wiped his feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus was sick. (John 11:2) But what she again did at Bethany is another act, unrecorded by Luke, but mentioned in the same way by the other three Evangelists. In that therefore Matthew and Mark say that the head of the Lord was anointed by the woman, whilst John says the feet, we must understand that both the head and the feet were anointed by the woman. Unless because Mark has said that she broke the box in order to anoint His head, any one is so fond of cavilling as to deny that, because the box was broken, any could remain to anoint the feet of the Lord. But a man of a more pious spirit will contend that it was not broken so as to pour out the whole, or else that the feet were anointed before it was broken, so that there remained in the unbroken box enough to anoint the head.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Alabaster is a sort of white marble, veined with various colours which is often hollowed out for boxes of ointment, because it keeps things of that nature most uncorrupt. Nard is an aromatic shrub of a large and thick root, but short, black, and brittle; though unctuous, it smells like cypress, and has a sharp taste, and small and dense leaves. Its tops spread themselves out like ears of corn, therefore, its gift being double, perfumers make much of the spikes and the leaves of the nard. And this is what is meant by Mark, when he says spikenard very precious, that is, the ointment which Mary brought for the Lord was not made of the root of nard, but even, what made it more precious, by the addition of the spikes and the leaves, the gratefulness of its smell and virtue was augmented.

THEOPHYLACT. Or as is said in Greek, of pistic nard, that is, faithful, because the ointment of the nard was made faithfully and without counterfeit. (Matt. 26:2)

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 78) It may appear to be a contradiction, that Matthew and Mark after mentioning two days and the Passover, (John 12:1) add afterwards that Jesus was in Bethany, where that precious ointment is mentioned; whilst John, just before he speaks of the anointing, says, that Jesus came into Bethany six days before the feast. But those persons who are troubled by this, are not aware that Matthew and Mark do not place that anointing in Bethany immediately after that two days of which he foretold, but by way of recapitulation at the time when there were yet six days to the Passover.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again in a mystic sense, Simon the leper means the world, first infidel, and afterwards converted, and the woman with the alabaster box, means the faith of the Church, who says, My spikenard sendeth forth its smell. It is called pistic nard, that is, faithful, and precious. (Cant. 1:12). The house filled with the smell of it is heaven and earth; the broken alabaster box is carnal desire, which is broken at the Head, from which the whole body is framed together, whilst He was reclining, that is, humbling Himself, that the faith of the sinner might be able to reach Him, for she went up from the feet to the head, and down from the head to the feet by faith, that is, to Christ and to His members. It goes on: And there were some that had indignation within themselves, and said, Why was this loss of the ointment? By the figure synecdoche, one is put for many, and many for one; for it is the lost Judas who finds loss in salvation; thus in the fruitful vine rises the snare of death. Under the cover of his avarice, however, the mystery of faith speaks; for our faith is bought for three hundred pence, in our ten senses, that is, (denarii i. e. ten asses.) our inward and outward senses which are again trebled by our body, soul, and spirit.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And in that he says, And they murmured against her, we must not understand this to be spoken of the faithful Apostles, but rather of Judas mentioned in the plural.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, it appears to be aptly implied that many disciples murmured against the woman, because they had often heard our Lord talking of alms. Judas, however, was indignant, but not with the same feeling, but on account of his love of money, and filthy gain; wherefore John also records him alone, as accusing the woman with a fraudulent intent. But he says, They murmured against her, meaning that they troubled her with reproaches, and hard words. Then our Lord reproves His disciples, for throwing obstacles against the wish of the woman. Wherefore it goes on: And Jesus said, Let her alone, why trouble ye her? For after she had brought her gift, they wished to prevent her purpose by their reproaches.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. 35.) For they were grieved at the waste of the ointment, which might be sold for a large sum and given to the poor. This however ought not to have been, for it was right that it should be poured over the head of Christ, with a holy and fitting stream; wherefore it goes on, She hath wrought a good work on me. And so effectual is the praise of this good work, that it ought to excite all of us to fill the head of the Lord with sweet smelling and rich offerings, that of us it may be said that we have done a good work over the head of the Lord. For we always have with us, as long as we remain in this life, the poor who have need of the care of those who have made progress in the word, and are enriched in the wisdom of God; they are not however able always day and night to have with them the Son of God, that is, the Word and Wisdom of God. For it goes on: For ye have the poor always with you, and whensoever ye will ye may do them good; but me ye have not always.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) To me, indeed, He seems to speak of His bodily presence, that He should by no means be with them after His resurrection, as He then was living with them in all familiarity.

PSEUDO-JEROME. He says also, She hath wrought a good work on me, for whosoever believes on the Lord, it is counted unto Him for righteousness. For it is one thing to believe Him, and to believe on Him, that is, to cast ourselves entirely upon Him. It goes on: She hath done what she could, she is come aforehand to anoint my body to the burying.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) As if the Lord said, What ye think is a waste of ointment is the service of my burial.

THEOPHYLACT. For she is come aforehand as though led by God to anoint my body, as a sign of my approaching burial; by which He confounds the traitor, as if He said, With what conscience canst thou confound the woman, who anoints my body to the burial, and dost not confound thyself, who wilt deliver me to death? But the Lord makes a double prophecy; one that the Gospel shall be preached over the whole world, another that the deed of the woman shall be praised. Wherefore it goes on: Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever this gospel shall be preached throughout the whole world, this also that she hath done shall be spoken of for a memorial of her.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Observe also, that as Mary won glory throughout the whole world for the service which she rendered to the Lord, so, on the contrary, he who was bold enough to reprove her service, is held in infamy far and wide; but the Lord in rewarding the good with due praise has passed over in silence the future shame of the impious.

14:10–11

10. And Judas Iscariot, one of the twelve, went unto the Chief Priests, to betray him unto them.

11. And when they heard it, they were glad, and promised to give him money. And he sought how he might conveniently betray him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The unhappy Judas wishes to compensate with the price of his Master for the loss which he thought he had made by the pouring out of the ointment; wherefore it is said, And Judas Iscariot, one of the twelve, went unto the Chief Priests to betray him unto them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (de Prod. Jud. Hom. 1) Why dost thou tell me of his country? would that I could also have been ignorant of his existence. But there was another disciple called Judas the zealot, the brother of James, and lest by calling him by this name there should arise a confusion between the two, he separates the one from the other. But he says not Judas the traitor, that he may teach us to be guiltless of detraction, and to avoid accusing others. In that however he says, one of the twelve, he enhanced the detestable guilt of the traitor; for there were seventy other disciples, these however were not so intimate with Him, nor admitted to such familiar intercourse. But these twelve were approved by Him, these were the regal band, out of which the wicked traitor came forth.

PSEUDO-JEROME. (ὁ περὶ τὸν βασιλέα χορὸς ap. Chrys.) But he was one of the twelve in number, not in merit, one in body, not in soul. But he went to the Chief Priests after he went out and Satan entered into him. Every living thing unites with what is like itself.

BEDE. But by the words, he went out, it is shewn that he was not invited by the Chief Priests, nor bound by any necessity, but entered upon this design from the spontaneous wickedness of his own mind.

THEOPHYLACT. It is said, to betray him unto them, that is, to announce to them when He should be alone. But they feared to rush upon Him when He was teaching, for fear of the people.

PSEUDO-JEROME. And he promises to betray Him, as his master the devil said before, All this power I will give thee. (Luke 4:6) It goes on, And when they heard it they were glad, and promised to give him money. They promise him money, and they lose their life, which he also loses on receiving the money.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Oh! the madness, yea, the avarice of the traitor, for his covetousness brought forth all the evil. For covetousness retains the souls which it has taken, and confines them in every way when it has bound them, and makes them forget all things, maddening their minds.

Judas, taken captive by this madness of avarice, forgets the conversation, the table of Christ, his own discipleship, Christ’s warnings and persuasion. For there follows, And he sought how he might conveniently betray him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. No opportunity for treachery can be found, such that it can escape vengeance here or there.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Many in this day shudder at the crime of Judas in selling his Master, his Lord and his God, for money, as monstrous and horrible wickedness; they however do not take heed, for when for the sake of gain they trample on the rights of charity and truth, they are traitors to God, who is Charity and Truth.

14:12–16

12. And the first day of unleavened bread, when they killed the Passover, his disciples said unto him, Where wilt thou that we go and prepare that thou mayest eat the Passover?

13. And he sendeth forth two of his disciples, and saith unto them, Go ye into the city, and there shall meet you a man bearing a pitcher of water: follow him.

14. And wheresoever he shall go in, say ye to the goodman of the house, The Master saith, Where is the guestchamber, where I shall eat the Passover with my disciples?

15. And he will shew you a large upper room furnished and prepared: there make ready for us.

16. And his disciples went forth, and came into the city, and found as he had said unto them: and they made ready the Passover.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Whilst Judas was plotting how to betray Him, the rest of the disciples were taking care of the preparation of the Passover: wherefore it is said, And the first day of unleavened bread, when they killed the Passover, his disciples said unto him, Where wilt thou that we go and prepare where thou mayest eat the Passover.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He means by the first day of the Passover the fourteenth day of the first month, when they threw aside leaven, and were wont to sacrifice, that is, to kill the lamb at even. The Apostle explaining this says, Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us. (1 Cor. 5:7) For although He was crucified on the next day, that is, on the fifteenth moon, yet on the night when the lamb was offered up, He committed to His disciples the mysteries of His Body and Blood, which they were to celebrate, and was seized upon and bound by the Jews; thus He consecrated the beginning of His sacrifice, that is, of His Passion.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the unleavened bread which was eaten with bitterness, that is with bitter herbs, is our redemption, and the bitterness is the Passion of our Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. From the words of the disciples, Where wilt thou that we go? it seems evident that Christ had no dwelling-place, and that the disciples had no houses of their own; for if so, they would have taken Him thither.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For they say, Where wilt thou that we go? to shew us that we should direct our steps according to the will of God. But the Lord points out with whom He would eat the Passover, and after His custom He sends two disciples, which we have explained above; wherefore it goes on, And he sendelh forth two of his disciples, and he saith unto them, Go ye into the city.

THEOPHYLACT. He sends two of His disciples, that is, Peter and John, as Luke says, to a man unknown to Him, implying by this that He might, if He had pleased, have avoided His Passion. For what could not He work in other men, who influenced the mind of a person unknown to Him, so that he received them? He also gives them a sign how they were to know the house, when He adds, And there shall meet you a man bearing a pitcher of water.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 80) Mark says a pitcher, Luke a two-handled vessel; one points out the kind of vessel, the other the mode of carrying it; both however mean the same truth.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) And it is a proof of the presence of His divinity, that in speaking with His disciples, He knows what is to take place elsewhere; wherefore it follows, And his disciples went forth, and came into the city, and found as he had said unto them; and they made ready the Passover.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Not our Passover, but in the meanwhile that of the Jews; but He did not only appoint ours, but Himself became our Passover. Why too did He eat it? Because He was made under the Law, to redeem them that were under the Law, (Gal. 4:4) and Himself give rest to the Law. And lest any one should say that He did away with it, because He could not fulfil its hard and difficult obedience, He first Himself fulfilled it, and then set it to rest.

PSEUDO-JEROME. And in a mystical sense the city is the Church, surrounded by the wall of faith, the man who meets them is the primitive people, the pitcher of water is the law of the letter.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, the water is the laver of grace, the pitcher points out the weakness of those who were to shew that grace to the world.

THEOPHYLACT. He who is baptized carries the pitcher of water, and he who bears baptism upon him comes to his rest, if he lives according to his reason; and he obtains rest, as being in the house. Wherefore it is added, Follow him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. That is, him who leads to the lofty place, where is the refreshment prepared by Christ. (John 21:15) The lord of the house is the Apostle Peter, to whom the Lord has entrusted His house, that there may be one faith under one Shepherd. The large upper-room is the wide-spread Church, in which the name of the Lord is spoken of, prepared by a variety of powers and tongues.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, the large upper-room is spiritually the Law, which comes forth from the narrowness of the letter, and in a lofty place, that is, in the lofty chamber of the soul, receives the Saviour. But it is designedly that the names both of the bearer of the water, and of the lord of the house, are omitted, to imply that power is given to all who wish to celebrate the true Passover, that is, to be embued with the sacraments of Christ, and to receive Him in the dwelling-place of their mind.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, the lord of the house is the intellect, which points out the large upper room, that is, the loftiness of intelligences, and which, though it be high, yet has nothing of vain glory, or of pride, but is prepared and made level by humility. But there, that is, in such a mind Christ’s Passover is prepared by Peter and John, that is by action and contemplation.

14:17–21

17. And in the evening he cometh with the twelve.

18. And as they sat and did eat, Jesus said, Verily I say unto you, One of you which eateth with me shall betray me.

19. And they began to be sorrowful, and to say unto him one by one, Is it I? and another said, Is it I?

20. And he answered and said unto them, It is one of the twelve, that dippeth with me in the dish.

21. The Son of man indeed goeth, as it is written of him: but woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! good were it for that man if he had never been born.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The Lord who had foretold His Passion, prophesied also of the traitor, in order to give him room for repentance, that understanding that his thoughts were known, he might repent. Wherefore it is said, And in the evening he cometh with the twelve. And as they sat and did eat, Jesus said, Verily I say unto you, One of you which eateth with me shall betray me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Where it is evident that He did not proclaim him openly to all, lest He should make him the more shameless; at the same time He did not altogether keep it silent, lest thinking that he was not discovered, he should boldly hasten to betray Him.

THEOPHYLACT. But how could they eat reclining, when the law ordered that standing and upright they should eat the Passover? It is probable that they had first fulfilled the legal Passover, and had reclined, when He began to give them His own Passover.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The evening of the day points out the evening of the world; for the last, who are the first to receive the penny of eternal life, come about the eleventh hour. All the disciples then are touched by the Lord; so that there is amongst them the harmony of the harp, all the well attuned strings answer with accordant tone; for it goes on: And they began to be sorrowful, and to say unto him one by one, Is it I? One of them however, unstrung, and steeped in the love of money, said, Is it I, Lord? as Matthew testifies.

THEOPHYLACT. But the other disciples began to be saddened on account of the word of the Lord; for although they were free from this passion, yet they trust Him who knows all hearts, rather than themselves. It goes on: And he answered and said unto them, It is one of the twelve, that dippeth with me in the dish.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) That is, Judas, who when the others were sad and held back their hands, puts forth his hand with his Master into the dish. And because He had before said, One of you shall betray me, and yet the traitor perseveres in his evil, He accuses him more openly, without however pointing out his name.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, He says, One out of the twelve, as it were separate from them, for the wolf carries away from the flock the sheep which he has taken, and the sheep which quits the fold lies open to the bite of the wolf. But Judas does not withdraw his foot from his traitorous design though once and again pointed at, wherefore his punishment is foretold, that the death denounced upon him might correct him, whom shame could not overcome; wherefore it goes on: The Son of man indeed goeth, as it is written of him.

THEOPHYLACT. The word here used, goeth, shews that the death of Christ was not forced but voluntary.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But because many do good, in the way that Judas did, without its profiting them, there follows: Woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed! good were it for that man if he had never been born.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Woe too to that man, to-day and for ever, who comes to the Lord’s table with an evil intent. For he, after the example of Judas, betrays the Lord, not indeed to Jewish sinners, but to his own sinning members. It goes on: Good were it for that man if he had never been born.

PSEUDO-JEROME. That is, hidden in his mother’s inmost womb, for it is better for a man not to exist than to exist for torments.

THEOPHYLACT. For as respects the end for which he was designed, it would have been better for him to have been born, if he had not been the betrayer, for God created him for good works; but after he had fallen into such dreadful wickedness, it would have been better for him never to have been born.

14:22–25

22. And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake it, and gave to them, and said, Take, eat: this is my body.

23. And he took the cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave it to them: and they all drank of it.

24. And he said unto them, This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many.

25. Verily I say unto you, I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, until that day that I drink it new in the kingdom of God.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) When the rites of the old Passover were finished, He passed to the new, in order, that is, to substitute the Sacrament of His own Body and Blood, for the flesh and blood of the lamb. Wherefore there follows: And as they did eat, Jesus took bread; that is, in order to shew that He Himself is that person to whom the Lord swore, Thou art a Priest for ever after the order of Melchizedec. (Ps. 110:4) There follows: And blessed, and brake it.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, giving thanks, He brake it, which we also do, with the addition of some prayers.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He Himself also breaks the bread, which He gives to His disciples, to shew that the breaking of His Body was to take place, not against His will, nor without His intervention; He also blessed it, because He with the Father and the Holy Spirit filled His human nature, which He took upon Him in order to suffer, with the grace of Divine power. He blessed bread and brake it, because He deigned to subject to death His manhood, which He had taken upon Him, in such a way as to shew that there was within it the power of Divine immortality, and to teach them that therefore He would the more quickly raise it from the dead. There follows: And gave to them, and said, Take, eat: this is my body.

THEOPHYLACT. That, namely, which I now give and which ye take. But the bread is not a mere figure of the Body of Christ, but is changed into the very Body of Christ. For the Lord said, The bread which I give you is my flesh. But the flesh of Christ is veiled from our eyes on account of our weakness, for bread and wine are things to which we are accustomed, if however we saw flesh and blood we could not bear to take them. For this reason the Lord bending Himself to our weakness keeps the forms of bread and wine, but changes the bread and wine into the reality of His Body and Blood.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Even now also that Christ is close to us; He who prepared that table, Himself also consecrates it. For it is not man who makes the offerings to be the Body and Blood of Christ, but Christ who was crucified for us. The words are spoken by the mouth of the Priest, and are consecrated by the power and the grace of God. By this word which He spoke, This is my body, the offerings are consecrated; and as that word which says, Increase and multiply, and fill the earth, (Gen. 1:28) was sent forth but once, yet has its effect throughout all time, when nature does the work of generation; so also that voice was spoken once, yet gives confirmation to the sacrifice through all the tables of the Church even to this day, even to His advent.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But in a mystical sense, the Lord transfigures into bread His body, which is the present Church, which is received in faith, is blessed in its number, is broken in its sufferings, is given in its examples, is taken in its doctrines; and He forms His Blood (formans sanguinem suum ap. Pseudo-Hier.) in the chalice of water and wine mingled together, that by one we may be purged from our sins, by the other redeemed from their punishment. For by the blood of the lamb our houses are preserved from the smiting of the Angel, and our enemies perish in the waters of the Red sea, which are the sacraments of the Church of Christ. Wherefore it goes on: And he took the cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave it to them. For we are saved by the grace of the Lord, not by our own deserts.

GREGORY. (Mor. ii. 37) When His Passion was approaching, He is said to have taken bread and given thanks. He therefore gave thanks, who took upon Him the stripes of other men’s wickedness; He who did nothing worthy of smiting, humbly gives a blessing in His Passion, to shew us, what each should do when beaten for his own sins, since He Himself bore calmly the stripes due to the sin of others; furthermore to shew us, what we who are the subjects of the Father should do under correction, when He who is His equal gave thanks under the lash.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The wine of the Lord’s cup is mixed with water, because we should remain in Christ and Christ in us. For on the testimony of John, the waters are the people, and it is not lawful for any one to offer either wine alone, or water alone, lest such an oblation should mean that the head may be severed from the members, and either that Christ could suffer without love for our redemption, and that we can be saved or be offered to the Father without His Passion. (Apoc. 17:15) It goes on: And they all drank of it.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Happy intoxication, saving fulness, which the more we drink gives the greater sobriety of mind!

THEOPHYLACT. Some say that Judas did not partake in these mysteries, but that he went out before the Lord gave the Sacrament. Some again say that He gave him also of that Sacrament.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For Christ offered His blood to him who betrayed Him, that he might have remission of his sins, if he had chosen to cease to be wicked.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Judas therefore drinks and is not satisfied, nor can he quench the thirst of the everlasting fire, because he unworthily partakes of the mysteries of Christ. There are some in the Church whom the sacrifice does not cleanse, but their foolish thought draws them on to sin, for they have plunged themselves in the stinking slough of cruelty.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Let there not be therefore a Judas at the table of the Lord; this sacrifice is spiritual food, for as bodily food, working on a belly filled with humours which are opposed to it, is hurtful, so this spiritual food if taken by one polluted with wickedness, rather brings him to perdition, not by its own nature, but through the fault of the recipient. Let therefore our mind be pure in all things, and our thought pure, for that sacrifice is pure. There follows: And he said unto them, This is my blood of the New Testament, which is shed for many.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This refers to the different circumstances of the Old Testament, which was consecrated by the blood of calves and of goats; and the lawgiver said in sprinkling it, This is the blood of the Testament which God hath injoined unto you. (Heb. 9:20. vide Ex. 24:8) It goes on: Which is shed for many.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For it does not cleanse all. It goes on: Verily I say unto you, I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, until that day that I drink it new in the kingdom of God.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He had said, I will not drink wine until the resurrection; for He calls His resurrection the kingdom, as He then reigned over death. But after His resurrection He ate and drank with His disciples, shewing that it was He Himself who had suffered. But He drank it new, that is, in a new and strange manner, for He had not a body subject to suffering, and requiring food, but immortal and incorruptible. We may also understand it in this way. The vine is the Lord Himself, by the offspring1 of the vine is meant mysteries, and the secret understanding, which He Himself begets2, who teaches man knowledge. But in the kingdom of God, that is, in the world to come, He will drink with His disciples mysteries and knowledge, teaching us new things, and revealing what He now hides.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, Isaiah testifies that the synagogue is called the vine or the vineyard of the Lord, saying, The vineyard of the Lord of hosts is the house of Israel. (Is. 5:7) The Lord therefore when about to go to His Passion, says, I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, as if He had said openly, I will no longer delight in the carnal rites of the synagogue, in which also these rites of the Paschal Lamb have held the chief place. For the time of my resurrection shall come, that day shall come, when in the kingdom of heaven, that is, raised on high with the glory of immortal life, I will be filled with a new joy, together with you, for the salvation of the same people born again of the fountain of spiritual grace.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But we must consider that here the Lord changes the sacrifice without changing the time; so that we never celebrate the Cæna Domini before the fourteenth moon. He who celebrates the resurrection on the fourteenth moon, will celebrate the Cæna Domini on the eleventh moon, which was never done in either Old or New Testament.

14:26–31

26. And when they had sung an hymn, they went out into the mount of Olives.

27. And Jesus saith unto them, All ye shall be offended because of me this night: for it is written, I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered.

28. But after that I am risen, I will go before you into Galilee.

29. But Peter said unto him, Although all shall be offended, yet will not I.

30. And Jesus saith unto him, Verily I say unto thee, That this day, even in this night, before the cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice.

31. But he spake the more vehemently, If I should die with thee, I will not deny thee in any wise. Likewise also said they all.

THEOPHYLACT. As they returned thanks, before they drank, so they return thanks after drinking; wherefore it is said, And when they had sung an hymn, they went out into the mount of Olives, to teach us to return thanks both before and after our food.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For by a hymn he means the praise of the Lord, as is said in the Psalms, The poor shall eat and be satisfied; they that seek after the Lord shall praise him. (Ps. 22:26, 29) And again, All such as be fat upon earth have eaten and worshipped.

THEOPHYLACT. He also shews by this that He was glad to die for us, because when about to be betrayed, He deigned to praise God. He also teaches us when we fall into troubles for the sake of the salvation of many, not to be sad, but to give thanks to God, who through our distress works the salvation of many.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) That hymn in the Gospel of John (John 17.) may also be meant, which the Lord sang, returning thanks to the Father, in which also He prayed, raising His eyes to heaven, for Himself and His disciples, and those who were to believe, through their word.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, He went out into a mountain, that they might come to Him in a lonely place, and take Him without tumult. For if they had come to Him, whilst He was abiding in the city, the multitude of the people would have been in an uproar, and then His enemies, who took occasion against Him, should seem to have slain Him justly, because He stirred up the people.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Beautifully also does the Lord lead out His disciples, when they had tasted His Sacraments, into the mount of Olives, to shew typically that we ought through the reception of the Sacraments to rise up to higher gifts of virtue, and graces of the Holy Ghost, that we may be anointed in heart.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Jesus also is held captive on the mount of Olives, whence He ascended to heaven, that we may know, that we ascend into heaven from that place in which we watch and pray; there we are bound and do not tend back again to earth.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But the Lord foretells to His disciples what is about to happen to them, that when they have gone through it, they may not despair of salvation, but work out their repentance, and be freed; wherefore there follows: And Jesus saith unto them, All ye shall be offended because of me this night.

PSEUDO-JEROME. All indeed fall, but all do not remain fallen. (Ps. 40:9. Vulg.) For shall not he who sleeps also rise up again? It is a carnal thing to fall, but devilish to remain lying when fallen.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord allowed them to fall that they might not trust in themselves, and lest He should seem to have prophesied, what He had said, as an open accusation (κατηγορία ap. Theoph.) of them, He brings forward the witness of Zechariah the Prophet; wherefore it goes on: For it is written, I will smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This is written in different words in Zecharias, and in the person of the Prophet it is said to the Lord; Smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered. (Zech. 13:7)

PSEUDO-JEROME. For the Prophet prays for the Passion of the Lord, and the Father answers, I will smite the shepherd according to the prayers of those below. The Son is sent and smitten by the Father, that is, He is made incarnate and suffers.

THEOPHYLACT. But the Father says, I will smite the shepherd, because He permitted him to be smitten. He calls the disciples sheep, as being innocent and without guile. At last He consoles them, by saying, But after that I am risen I will go before you into Galilee.

PSEUDO-JEROME. In which the true resurrection is promised, that their hope may not be extinguished. There follows: But Peter said unto him, Although all shall be offended, yet will not I. Lo, a bird unfledged strives to raise itself on high; but the body weighs down the soul, so that the fear of the Lord is overcome by the fear of human death.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Peter then promised in the ardour of his faith, and the Saviour as God knew what was to happen. Wherefore it goes on: And Jesus said unto him, Verily I say unto thee, that this day, even in this night, before the cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice.

AUGUSTINE. (iii. 2. de Con. Evan) Though all the Evangelists say that the Lord foretold that Peter was to deny before the cock crew, Mark alone has related it more minutely, wherefore some from inattention suppose that he does not agree with the others. For the whole of Peter’s denial is threefold; if it had begun altogether after the cock crew, the other three Evangelists would seem to have spoken falsely, in saying, that before the cock crew, he would deny him thrice. Again, if he had finished the entire threefold denial before the cock began to crow, Mark would in the person of the Lord seem to have said needlessly, Before the cock crow twice, thou shall deny me thrice. But because that threefold denial began before the first cock-crowing, the other three did not notice when Peter was to finish it, but how great it was to be, that is, threefold, and when it was to begin, that is, before the cock crew, although the whole was conceived in his mind, even before the first cock crew; but Mark has related more plainly the interval between his words themselves.

THEOPHYLACT. We are to understand that it happened thus; Peter denied once, then the cock crew, but after he had made two more denials, then the cock crew for the second time.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Who is the cock, the harbinger of day, but the Holy Ghost? by whose voice in prophecy, and in the Apostles, we are roused from our threefold denial, to most bitter tears after our fall, for we have thought evil of God, spoken evil of our neighbours, and done evil to ourselves.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The faith of the Apostle Peter, and his burning love for our Lord, is shewn in what follows. For it goes on: But he spake the more vehemently, If I should die with thee, I will not deny thee in any wise.

THEOPHYLACT. The other disciples also shewed a fearless zeal. For there follows, Likewise also said they all, but nevertheless they acted against the truth, which Christ had prophesied.

14:32–42

32. And they came to a place which was named Gethsemane: and he saith to his disciples, Sit ye here, while I shall pray.

33. And he taketh with him Peter and James and John, and began to be sore amazed, and to be very heavy;

34. And saith unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful unto death: tarry ye here, and watch.

35. And he went forward a little, and fell on the ground, and prayed that, if it were possible, the hour might pass from him.

36. And he said, Abba, Father, all things are possible unto thee; take away this cup from me: nevertheless not what I will, but what thou wilt.

37. And he cometh, and findeth them sleeping, and saith unto Peter, Simon, sleepest thou? couldest not thou watch one hour?

38. Watch ye and pray, lest ye enter into temptation. The spirit truly is ready, but the flesh is weak.

39. And again he went away, and prayed, and spake the same words.

40. And when he returned, he found them asleep again, (for their eyes were heavy,) neither wist they what to answer him.

41. And he cometh the third time, and saith unto them, Sleep on now, and take your rest: it is enough, the hour is come; behold, the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners.

42. Rise up, let us go; lo, he that betrayeth me is at hand.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After that the Lord had foretold the offence of His disciples, the Evangelist gives an account of His prayer, in which He is supposed to have prayed for His disciples; and first describing the place of prayer, he says, And they came to a place which was named Gethsemane.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The place Gethsemane, in which the Lord prayed, is shewn up to this day at the foot of the Mount of Olives. The meaning of Gethsemane is, the valley of the fat, or of fatness. Now when our Lord prays on a mountain, He teaches us that we should when we pray ask for lofty things; but by praying in the valley of fatness, He implies that in our prayer humility and the fatness of interior love must be kept. He also by the valley of humility and the fatness of charity underwent death for us.

PSEUDO-JEROME. In the valley of fatness also, the fat bulls beset Him. There follows, And he saith to his disciples, Sit ye here, while I shall pray; they are separated from Him in prayer, who are separated in His Passion; for He prays, they sleep, overcome by the sloth of their heart.

THEOPHYLACT. It was also His custom always to pray by Himself, in order to give us an example, to seek for silence and solitude in our prayers. There follows: And he taketh with him Peter, and James, and John. He takes only those who had been witnesses of His glory on Mount Tabor, that they who had seen His glory might also see His sufferings, and learn that He is really man, in that He is sorrowful. Wherefore there follows: And began to be sore amazed, and very heavy. For since He had taken on Himself the whole of human nature, He took also those natural things which belong to man, amazement, heaviness, and sorrow; for men are naturally unwilling to die. Wherefore it goes on: And he saith unto them, My soul is exceeding sorrowful unto death.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) As being God, dwelling in the body, He shews the frailty of flesh, that the blasphemy of those who deny the mystery of His Incarnation might find no place; for having taken up a body, He must needs also take up all that belongs to the body, hunger, thirst, pain, grief; for the Godhead cannot suffer the changes of these affections.

THEOPHYLACT. But some have understood this, as if He had said, I am sorrowful, not because I am to die, but because the Jews, my countrymen, are about to crucify me, and by these means to be shut out from the kingdom of God.

PSEUDO-JEROME. By this also we are taught to fear and to be sorrowful before the judgment of death, for not by ourselves, but by Him only, can we say, The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in Me. (John 14:30) There follows: Tarry ye here, and watch.

BEDE. He does not mean natural sleep by the sleep which He forbids, for the time of approaching danger did not allow of it, but the sleep of unfaithfulness, and the torpor of the mind. But going forward a little, He falls on His face, and shews his lowliness of mind, by the posture of His body. Wherefore there follows: And he went forward a little, and fell on the ground, and prayed that, if it were possible, the hour might pass from him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. iii. iv) He said not, if He could do it, but if it could be done; for whatever He wills is possible. We must therefore understand, if it be possible, as if it were; if He is willing. And lest any one should suppose that He lessened His Father’s power, he shews in what sense the words are to be understood; for there follows, And he said, Abba, Father, all things are possible unto thee. By which He sufficiently shews, that the words, if it be possible, must be understood not of any impossibility, but of the will of His Father. As to what Mark relates, that he said not only Father, but Abba, Father, Abba is the Hebrew for Father. And perhaps the Lord said both words, on account of some Sacrament contained in them; wishing to shew that He had taken upon Himself that 1sorrow in the person of His body, the Church, to which He was made the chief corner stone, and which came to Him, partly from the Hebrews, who are represented by the word Abba, partly from the Gentiles, to whom Father belongs.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But He prays, that the cup may pass away, to shew that He is very man, wherefore He adds: Take away this cup from me. But remembering why He was sent, He accomplishes the dispensation for which He was sent, and cries out, But not what I will, but what thou wilt. As if He had said, If death can die, without my dying according to the flesh, let this cup pass away; but since this cannot be otherwise, not what I will, but what thou wilt. Many still are sad at the prospect of death, but let them keep their heart right, and avoid death as much as they can; but if they cannot, then let them say what the Lord said for us.

PSEUDO-JEROME. By which also He ceases not up to the end to teach us to obey our fathers, and to prefer their will to ours. There follows: And he cometh, and findeth them sleeping. For as they are asleep in mind, so also in body. 1But after His prayer, the Lord coming, and seeing His disciples sleeping, rebukes Peter alone. Wherefore it goes on: And saith unto Peter, Simon, steepest thou? couldest not thou watch with me one hour? As if He had said, If thou couldest not watch one hour with me, how wilt thou be able to despise death, thou who promisest to die with me? It goes on: Watch and pray, that ye enter not into temptation, that is, the temptation of denying me.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He does not say, Pray that ye may not be tempted, because it is impossible for the human mind not to be tempted, but that ye enter not into temptation, that is, that temptation may not vanquish you.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But he is said to enter into temptation, who neglects to pray. There follows: The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He had said, Your spirit indeed is ready not to deny me, and for this reason ye promise; but your flesh is weak, in that unless God give power to your flesh through prayer, ye shall enter into temptation.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He here represses the rash, who think that they can compass whatever they are confident about. But in proportion as we are confident from the ardour of our mind, so let us fear from the weakness of our flesh. 2For this place makes against those, who say that there was but one operation in the Lord and one will. For He shews two wills, one human, which from the weakness of the flesh shrinks from suffering; one divine, which is most ready. It goes on: And again he went away and prayed, and spake the same words.

THEOPHYLACT. That by His second prayer He might shew Himself to be very man. It goes on: And when he returned, he found them asleep again; He however did not rebuke them severely. For their eyes were heavy, (that is, with sleep,) neither wist they what to answer him. By this learn the weakness of men, and let us not, whom even sleep can overcome, promise things which are impossible to us. Therefore He goes away the third time to pray the prayer mentioned above. Wherefore it goes on: And he cometh the third time, and saith unto them, Sleep on now, and take your rest. He is not vehement against them, though after His rebuke they had done worse, but He tells them ironically, Sleep on now, and take your rest, because He knew that the betrayer was now close at hand. And that He spoke ironically is evident, by what is added: It is enough, the hour is come; behold, the Son of man is betrayed into the hands of sinners. He speaks this, as deriding their sleep, as if He had said; Now indeed is a time for sleep, when the traitor is approaching. Then He says; Arise, let us go; lo, he that betrayeth me is at hand; he did not say this to bid them fly, but that they might meet their enemies.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or else; In that it is said, that after He had spoken these words, Sleep on note, and take your rest, He added, It is enough, and then, the hour is come; behold, the Son of man is betrayed, we must understand that after saying, Sleep on now, and take your rest, our Lord remained silent for a short time, to give space for that to happen, which He had permitted; and then that He added, the hour is come; and therefore He puts in between, it is enough, that is, your rest has been long enough.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The threefold sleep of the disciples points out the three dead, whom our Lord raised up; the first, in a house; the second, at the tomb; the third, from the tomb. And the threefold watch of the Lord teaches us in our prayers, to beg for the pardon of past, future, and present sins.

14:43–52

43. And immediately, while he yet spake, cometh Judas, one of the twelve, and with him a great multitude with swords and staves, from the Chief Priests and the Scribes and the elders.

44. And he that betrayed him had given them a token, saying, Whomsoever I shall kiss, that same is he; take him, and lead him away safely.

45. And as soon as he was come, he goeth straightway to him, and saith, Master, master; and kissed him.

46. And they laid their hands on him, and took him.

47. And one of them that stood by drew a sword, and smote a servant of the High Priest, and cut off his ear.

48. And Jesus answered and said unto them, Are ye come out, as against a thief, with swords and with staves to take me?

49. I was daily with you in the temple teaching, and ye took me not: but the Scriptures must be fulfilled.

50. And they all forsook him, and fled.

51. And there followed him a certain young man, having a linen cloth cast about his naked body; and the young men laid hold on him:

52. And he left the linen cloth, and fled from them naked.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) After that our Lord had prayed three times, and had obtained by His prayers that the fear of the Apostles should be amended by future repentance, He, being tranquil as to His Passion, goes to His persecutors, concerning the coming of whom the Evangelist says, And immediately, while he yet spake, cometh Judas Iscariot, one of the twelve.

THEOPHYLACT. This is not put without reason, but to the greater conviction of the traitor, since though he was of the chief company amongst the disciples, he turned himself to furious enmity against our Lord. There follows: And with him a great multitude with swords and staves from the Chief Priests and the Scribes and the elders.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For he who despairs of help from God, has recourse to the power of the world.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But Judas had still something of the shame of a disciple, for he did not openly betray Him to his persecutors, but by the token of a kiss. Wherefore it goes on: And he that betrayed him had given them a token, saying, Whomsoever I shall kiss, that same is he; take him, and lead him away safely.

THEOPHYLACT. See how in his blindness he thought to deceive Christ by the kiss, so as to be looked upon by Him as His friend. But if thou wert a friend, Judas, how didst thou come with His enemies? But wickedness is ever without foresight. It goes on: And as soon as he was come, he goeth straightway to him, and saith, Master, master; and kissed him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Judas gives the kiss as a token, with poisonous guile, just as Cain offered a crafty, reprobate sacrifice.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) With envy and with a wicked confidence, he calls Him master, and gives Him a kiss, in betraying Him. But the Lord receives the kiss of the traitor, not to teach us to deceive, but lest he should seem to avoid betrayal, and at the same time to fulfil that Psalm, Among them that are enemies unto peace, I labour for peace. (Ps. 120:5) It goes on: And they laid hands on him, and took him.

PSEUDO-JEROME.w This is the Joseph who was sold by his brethren, (Ps. 105:18) and into whose soul the iron entered. There follows: And one of them that stood by drew a sword, and smote a servant of the High Priest, and cut off his ear.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Peter did this, as John declares, with the same ardent mind with which he did all things; for he knew how Phineas had by punishing sacrilegious persons received the reward of righteousness and of perpetual priesthood.

THEOPHYLACT. Mark conceals his name, lest he should seem to be praising his master for his zeal for Christ. Again, the action of Peter points out that they were disobedient and unbelieving, despising the Scriptures; for if they had had ears to hear the Scriptures, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. But he cut off the ear of a servant of the High Priest, for the Chief Priests especially passed over the Scriptures, like disobedient servants. It goes on: And Jesus answered and said unto them, Are ye come out, as against a thief, with swords and with staves to take me?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) As if He had said, it is foolish to seek with swords and staves Him, who offers Himself to you of His own accord, and to search, as for one who hides Himself, by night and by means of a traitor, for Him who taught daily in the temple.

THEOPHYLACT. This, however, is a proof of His divinity, for when He taught in the temple they were unable to take Him, although He was in their power, because the time of His Passion had not yet come; but when He Himself was willing, then He gave Himself up, that the Scriptures might be fulfilled, for he was led as a lamb to the slaughter, not crying nor raising His voice, but suffering willingly. It goes on: And they all forsook him and fled.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In this is fulfilled the word, which the Lord had spoken, that all His disciples should be offended in Him that same night. There follows: And there followed him a certain young man, having a linen cloth cast about his naked body, that is, he had no other clothing but this linen cloth. It goes on: And they laid hold on him, and he left the linen cloth, and fled from them naked. That is, he fled from them, whose presence and whose deeds he abhorred, not from the Lord, for whom his love remained fixed in his mind, when absent from Him in body.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Just as Joseph left his mantle behind him, and fled naked from the wanton woman; so also let him, who would escape the hands of the evil ones, quit in mind all that is of the world, and fly after Jesus.

THEOPHYLACT. It appears probable that this young man was of that house, where they had eaten the Passover. But some say that this young man was James, the brother of our Lord, who was called Just; who after the ascension of Christ received from the Apostles the throne of the bishopric of Jerusalem.

GREGORY. (Mor. 14. 49) Or, he says this of John, who, although he afterwards returned to the cross to hear the words of the Redeemer, at first was frightened and fled.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For that he was a young man at that time, is evident from his long sojourn in the flesh. Perhaps he escaped from the hands of those who held him for the time, and afterwards got back his garment and returned, mingling under cover of the darkness with those who were leading Jesus, as though he was one of them, until he arrived at the door of the High Priest, to whom he was known, as he himself testifies in the Gospel. But as Peter, who washed away the sin of his denial with the tears of penitence, shews the recovery of those who fall away in time of martyrdom, so the other disciples who prevented their actual seizure, teach the prudence of flight to those who feel themselves unequal to undergo tortures.

14:53–59

53. And they led Jesus away to the High Priest: and with him were assembled all the Chief Priests and the elders and the Scribes.

54. And Peter followed him afar off, even into the palace of the High Priest: and he sat with the servants, and warmed himself at the fire.

55. And the Chief Priests and all the council sought for witness against Jesus to put him to death; and found none.

56. For many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed not together.

57. And there arose certain, and bare false witness against him, saying,

58. We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and within three days I will build another made without hands.

59. But neither so did their witness agree together.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Evangelist had related above how our Lord had been taken by the servants of the Priests, now he begins to relate how He was condemned to death in the house of the High Priest: wherefore it is said, And they led Jesus away to the High Priest.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He means by the High Priest Caiaphas, who (as John writes) was High Priest that year, of whom Josephus relates that he bought his priesthood of the Roman Emperor. There follows: And with him were assembled all the Chief Priests and the elders and the scribes.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Then took place the gathering together of the bulls among the heifers of the people. (Ps. 67:31, Vulg.) It goes on: And Peter followed him afar off, even into the palace of the High Priest. For though fear holds him back, love draws him on.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But rightly does he follow afar off, who is just about to betray Him; for he could not have denied Christ, if he had remained close to Him. There follows, And he sat with the servants, and warmed himself at the fire.

PSEUDO-JEROME. He warms himself at the fire in the hall, with the servants. The hall of the High-Priest is the enclosure of the world, the servants are the devils, with whom whosoever remains cannot weep for his sins; the fire is the desire of the flesh.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For charity is the fire of which it is said, I am come to send fire on the earth, (Luke 12:49) which flame coming down on the believers, taught them to speak with various tongues the praise of the Lord. There is also a fire of covetousness, of which it is said, They are all adulterers as an oven; (Hosea 7:4) this fire, raised up in the hall of Caiaphas by the suggestion of an evil spirit, was arming the tongues of the traitors to deny and blaspheme the Lord. For the fire lit up in the hall amidst the cold of the night was a figure of what the wicked assembly was doing within; for because of the abounding of iniquity the love of many waxes cold. Peter, who for a time was benumbed by this cold, wished as it were to be warmed by the coals of the servants of Caiaphas, because He sought in the society of traitors the consolation of worldly comfort. It goes on, And the Chief

Priests and all the council sought for witness against Jesus to put him to death. (Matt. 24:12)

THEOPHYLACT. Though the law commanded that there should be but one High Priest, there were then many put into the office, and stripped of it, year by year, by the Roman emperor. He therefore calls chief priests those who had finished the time allotted to them, and had been stripped of their priesthood. But their actions are a sign of their judgment, which they earned on as they had prejudged, for they sought for a witness, that they might seem to condemn and destroy Jesus with justice.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But iniquity lied as the queen did against Joseph, and the priests against Susannah, but a flame goes out, if it has no fuel; wherefore it goes on, And found none. For many bare false witness against him, but their witness agreed not together. For whatever is not consistent is held to be doubtful. There follows, And there arose certain, and bare false witness against him, saying, We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and within three days I will build another made without hands. It is usual with heretics out of the truth to extract the shadow; He did not say what they said, but something like it, of the temple of His body, which He raised again after two days.

THEOPHYLACT. For the Lord had not said, I will destroy, but, Destroy, nor did He say, made with hands, but, this temple.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He had said also, I will raise up, meaning a thing with life and soul, and a breathing temple. He is a false witness, who understands words in a sense, in which they are not spoken.

14:60–65

60. And the High Priest stood up in the midst, and asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against thee?

61. But he held his peace, and answered nothing. Again the High Priest asked him, and said unto him, Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed?

62. And Jesus said, I am: and ye shall see the Son of man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven.

63. Then the High Priest rent his clothes, and saith, What need we any further witnesses?

64. Ye have heard the blasphemy: what think ye? And they all condemned him to be guilty of death.

65. And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and to buffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy: and the servants did strike him with the palms of their hands.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The more Jesus remained silent before the false witnesses who were unworthy of His answer, and the impious priests, the more the High Priest, overcome with anger, endeavoured to provoke Him to answer, that he might find room for accusing Him, from any thing whatever which He might say. Wherefore it is said, And the High Priest stood up in the midst, and asked Jesus, saying, Answerest thou nothing? what is it which these witness against thee? The High Priest, angry and impatient at finding no room for accusation against Him, rises from his seat, thus shewing by the motion of his body the madness of his mind.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But our God and Saviour Himself, Who brought salvation to the world, and assisted mankind by His love, is led as a sheep to the slaughter, without crying, and remained mute and kept silence yea even from good words. (Ps. 39:3) Wherefore it goes on, But he field his peace, and answered nothing. The silence of Christ is the pardon for the defence or excuse of Adam. (Gen. 3:10.)

THEOPHYLACT. But He remained silent because He knew that they would not attend to his words; wherefore He answered according to Luke, If I tell you, ye will not believe. (Luke 22:67) Wherefore there follows, Again the High Priest asked him, and said unto him, Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed? The High Priest indeed puts this question, not that he might learn of Him and believe, but in order to seek occasion against Him. But he asks, Art thou the Christ, the Son of the Blessed, because there were many Christs, that is, anointed persons, as Kings and High Priests, but none of these was called the Son of the Blessed God, that is, the Ever-praised.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But they looked from afar off for Him, whom though near they cannot see, as Isaac from the blindness of his eyes does not know Jacob who was under his hands, but prophesies long before things which were to come to him. It goes on, Jesus said, I am; namely, that they might be inexcusable.

THEOPHYLACT. For He knew that they would not believe, nevertheless He answered them, lest they should afterwards say, If we had heard any thing from Him, we would have believed on Him; but this is their condemnation, that they heard and did not believe.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. iii. 6) Matthew, however, does not say that Jesus answered I am, but, Thou hast said. But Mark shews, that the words I am were equivalent to Thou hast said. There follows, And ye shall see the Son of Man silting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven. (Matt. 26:64)

THEOPHYLACT. As if He had said, Ye shall see Me as the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the Father, for He here calls the Father power. He will not however come without a body, but as He appeared to those who crucified Him, so will He appear in the judgment.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) If therefore to thee, O Jew, O Pagan, and heretic, the contempt, weakness, and cross in Christ are a subject of scorn, see how by this the Son of Man is to sit at the right hand of the Father, and to come in His majesty on the clouds of heaven.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The High Priest indeed asks the Son of God, but Jesus in His answer speaks of the Son of Man, that we may by this understand that the Son of God is also the Son of Man; and let us not make a quaternityx in the Trinity, but let man be in God and God in man. And He said, Sitting on the right hand of power, that is, reigning in life everlasting, and in the Divine power. He says, And coming with the clouds of heaven. He ascended in a cloud, He will come with a cloud; that is, He ascended in that body alone, which He took of the Virgin, and He will come to judgment with the whole Church, which is His body and His fulness.

LEO. (Serm. 5. de Pass.) But Caiaphas, to increase the odiousness of what they had heard rent his clothes, and without knowing what his frantic action meant, by his madness, deprived himself of the honour of the priesthood, forgetting that command, by which it is said of the High Priest, He shall not uncover his head or rend his clothes. For there follows: Then the High Priest rent his clothes, and saith, What need we any further witnesses? Ye have heard the blasphemy: what think ye?

THEOPHYLACT. The High Priest does after the manner of the Jews; for whenever any thing intolerable or sad occurred to them, they used to rend their clothes. In order then to shew that Christ had spoken great and intolerable blasphemy, he rent his clothes.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But it was also with a higher mystery, that in the Passion of our Lord the Jewish priest rent his own clothes, that is, his ephod, whilst the garment of the Lord could not be rent, even by the soldiers, who crucified Him. For it was a figure that the Jewish priesthood was to be rent on account of the wickedness of the priests themselves. But the solid strength of the Church, which is often called the garment of her Redeemer, can never be torn asunder.

THEOPHYLACT. The Jewish priesthood was to be rent from the time that they condemned Christ as guilty of death; wherefore there follows, And they all condemned him to be guilty of death.

PSEUDO-JEROME. They condemned Him to be guilty of death, that by His guiltiness He might absolve our guilt. It goes on: And some began to spit on him, and to cover his face, and to buffet him, and to say unto him, Prophesy: and the servants did strike him with the palms of their hands; that is, that by being spit upon He might wash the face of our soul, and by the covering of His face, might take away the veil from our hearts, and by the buffets, which were dealt upon His head, might heal the head of mankind, that is, Adam, and by the blows, by which He was smitten with the hands, His great praise might be testified by the clapping of our hands and by our lips, as it is said, O clap your hands together, all ye people. (Ps. 47:1)

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By saying, Prophesy, who is he that smote thee, they mean to insult Him, because He wished to be looked upon as a prophet by the people.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) We must understand by this, that the Lord suffered these things till morning, in the house of the High Priest, whither He had first been brought.

14:66–72

66. And as Peter was beneath in the palace, there cometh one of the maids of the High Priest:

67. And when she saw Peter warming himself, she looked upon him, and said, And thou also wast with Jesus of Nazareth.

68. But he denied, saying, I know not, neither understand I what thou sayest. And he went out into the porch; and the cock crew.

69. And a maid saw him again, and began to say to them that stood by, This is one of them.

70. And he denied it again. And a little after, they that stood by said again to Peter, Surely thou art one of them: for thou art a Galilæan, and thy speech agreeth thereto.

71. But he began to curse and to swear, saying, I know not this man of whom ye speak.

72. And the second time the cock crew. And Peter called to mind the word that Jesus said unto him, Before the cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice. And when he thought thereon, he wept.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Concerning the temptation of Peter, which happened during the injuries before mentioned, all the Evangelists do not speak in the same order. For Luke first relates the temptation of Peter, then these injuries of the Lord; but John begins to speak of the temptation of Peter, and then puts in some things concerning our Lord's ill-treatment, and adds, that He was sent from there to Caiaphas the High Priest, and then he goes back to unfold the temptation of Peter, which he had begun. Matthew and Mark on the other hand first notice the injuries done to Christ, then the temptation of Peter. Concerning which it is said, And as Peter was beneath in the palace, there cometh one of the maids of the High Priest.

BEDE. (upi. sup.) But what can be meant by his being first recognised by a woman, when men were more able to know him, if it be not that that sex might be seen to sin in the death of our Lord, and that sex be redeemed by His Passion? It goes on: But he denied, saying, I know not, neither understand I what thou sayest.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Peter when he had not the Spirit yielded and lost courage at the voice of a girl, though with the Spirit he was not afraid before princes and kings.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord allowed this to happen to him by His providence, that is, lest he should be too much elated, and at the same time, that he might prove himself merciful to sinners, as knowing from himself the result of human weakness. There follows: And he went out into the porch; and the cock crew.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) The other Evangelists do not mention this crowing of the cock; they do not however deny the fact, as also some pass over many other things in silence, which others relate. There follows: And a maid saw him again, and began to say to them that stood by, This is one of them

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.)y This maid is not the same, but another, as Matthew says. Indeed we must also understand, that in this second denial he was addressed by two persons, that is, by the maid whom Matthew and Mark mention, and by another person, of whom Luke takes notice. It goes on: And he denied it again. Peter had now returned, for John says that he denied Him again standing at the fire; wherefore the maid said what has been mentioned above, not to him, that is, Peter, but to those who, when he went out, had remained, in such a way however that he heard it; wherefore coming back and standing again at the fire, he contradicted them, and denied their words. For it is evident, if we compare the accounts of all the Evangelists on this matter, that Peter did not the second time deny him before the porch, but within the palace at the fire, whilst Matthew and Mark who mention his having gone out are silent, for the sake of brevity, as to his return.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By this denial of Peter we learn, that not only he denies Christ, who says that He is not the Christ, but he also, who although he is a Christian, denies himself to be such. For the Lord did not say to Peter, Thou shalt deny thyself to be my disciple, but, Thou shalt deny me; he therefore denied Christ, when he said that he was not His disciple. There follows: And a little after, they that stood by said again to Peter, Surely thou art one of them, for thou art a Galilæan, and thy speech agreeth thereto. Not that the Galilæans spoke a different tongue from the inhabitants of Jerusalem, for they were both Hebrews, but that each province and region has its own peculiarities, and cannot avoid a vernacular pronunciation.

THEOPHYLACT. Therefore Peter was seized with fear, and for-getting the word of the Lord, which said, Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess before my Father, (Matt. 30, 32) he denied our Lord; wherefore there follows: But he began to curse and to swear, saying, I know not this man of whom ye speak.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) How hurtful is it1 to speak with the wicked. He denies before infidels that he knows the man, whom amongst the disciples, he had confessed to be God. But the Scripture is wont to point out a Sacrament2 of the causes of things, by the state of the time; thus Peter, who denied at midnight, repented at cock crow; wherefore it is added: And the second time the cock crew. And Peter called to mind the word which Jesus said unto him, Before the cock crow twice, thou shalt deny me thrice. And he began to weep.

THEOPHYLACT. For tears brought Peter by penitence to Christ. Confounded then be the Novatians, who say that he who sins after receiving baptism, is not received to the remission of his sin. For behold Peter, who had also received the Body and Blood of the Lord, is received by penitence; for the failings of saints are written, that if we fall by want of caution, we also may be able to run back through their example, and hope to be relieved by penitence.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But in a mystical sense, the first maid means the wavering, the second, the assent, the third man is the act. This is the threefold denial which the remebrance of the word of the Lord washes away through tears. The cock then crows for us when some preacher up our hearts by repentance to compunction. We then begin to weep, when we are set on fire within by the spark of knowledge, and we go forth, when we cast out what we were within.

CHAPTER 15

15:1–5

1. And straightway in the morning the Chief Priests held a consultation with the elders and Scribes and the whole council, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to Pilate.

2. And Pilate asked him, Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answering said unto him, Thou sayest it.

3. And the Chief Priests accused him of many things: but he answered nothing.

4. And Pilate asked him again, saying, Answerest thou nothing? behold how many things they witness against thee.

5. But Jesus yet answered nothing; so that Pilate marvelled.

BEDE. (in Marc. 4, 44) The Jews had a custom of delivering him whom they had condemned to death, bound to the judge. Wherefore after the condemnation of Christ, the Evangelist adds: And straightway in the morning the Chief Priests held a consultation with the elders and Scribes and the whole council, and bound Jesus, and carried him away, and delivered him to Pilate. But it must be observed, that they did not then first bind Him, but they bound Him on first taking Him in the garden by night, as John declares.

THEOPHYLACT. They then gave Jesus up to the Romans, but were themselves given up by God into the hands of the Romans, that the Scriptures might be fulfilled, which say, Recompense them after the work of their hands. (Ps. 28:5) It goes on: And Pilate asked him, Art thou the King of the Jews?

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By Pilate’s asking Him about no other accusation, except whether He was King of the Jews, they are convicted of impiety, for they could not even find a false accusation against our Saviour. It goes on: And he answering said unto him, Thou sayest. He answers in this way so as both to speak the truth, and yet not to be open to cavil.

THEOPHYLACT. For His answer is doubtful, since it may mean, Thou sayest, but I say not so. 1And observe that He does somewhere answer Pilate, who condemned Him unwillingly, but does not choose to answer the priests and great men, and judges them unworthy of a reply. It goes on: And the Chief Priests accused him of many things.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. iii. 8) Luke has also laid open the false charges which they brought against Him; for he thus relates it: And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that he himself is Christ a King. (Luke 23:2) There follows: And Pilate asked him, saying, Answerest thou nothing? behold how many things they witness against thee.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He indeed who condemns Jesus is a heathen, but he refers it to the people of the Jew's as the cause. There follows: But Jesus yet answered nothing; so that Pilate marvelled. He was unwilling to give an answer, lest He should clear Himself of the charge, and be acquitted by the judge, and so the gain resulting from the Cross should be done away.

THEOPHYLACT. But Pilate wondered, because, though He was a teacher of the law, and eloquent, and able by His answer to destroy their accusations, He did not answer any thing, but rather bore their accusations courageously.

15:6–15

6. Now at that feast he released unto them one prisoner, whomsoever they desired.

7. And there was one named Barabbas, which lay bound with them that had made insurrection with him, who had committed murder in the insurrection.

8. And the multitude crying aloud began to desire him to do as he had ever done unto them.

9. But Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews?

10. For he knew that the Chief Priests had delivered him for envy.

11. But the Chief Priests moved the people, that he should rather release Barabbas unto them.

12. And Pilate answered and said again unto them, What will ye then that I shall do unto him whom ye call the King of the Jews?

13. And they cried out again, Crucify him.

14. Then Pilate said unto them, Why, what evil hath he done? And they cried out the more exceedingly, Crucify him.

15. And so Pilate, willing to content the people, released Barabbas unto them, and delivered Jesus, when he had scourged him, to be crucified.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Pilate furnished many opportunities of releasing Jesus, in the first place contrasting a robber with the Just One. Wherefore it is said, Now at that feast he released unto them one prisoner, whomsoever they desired.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Which indeed he was accustomed to do, to obtain favour with the people, and above all, on the feast day, when the people of the whole province of the Jews flocked to Jerusalem. And that the wickedness of the Jews might appear the greater, the enormity of the sin of the robber, whom they preferred to Christ, is next described. Wherefore there follows: And there was one Barabbas, who lay bound with them that had made insurrection with him, who had committed murder in the insurrection. In which words their wickedness is shewn both from the heinousness of his signal crime, in that he had committed murder, and from the way in which he did it, because he had in doing it raised a sedition and disturbed the city, and also because his crime was notorious, for he was bound with seditious persons. It goes on: And the multitude, when it had come up, began to desire him to do as he had ever done unto them.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) No one can feel it a difficulty that Matthew is silent as to their asking some one to be released unto them, which Mark here mentions; for it is a thing of no consequence that one should mention a thing which another leaves out. There follows: But Pilate answered them, saying, Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews? For he knew that the Chief Priests had delivered him for envy. Some one may ask, which were the words of which Pilate made use, those which are related by Matthew, or those which Mark relates; for there seems to be a difference between, Whom will ye that I release unto you? Barabbas, or Jesus which is called Christ? as Matthew has it; and, Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews? (Matt. 27:17) as is here said. But since they gave to kings the name of Christs, he who said this man or that must have asked whether they wished the King of the Jews to be released unto them, that is, Christ. It makes no difference to the sense that Mark has said nothing of Barabbas, wishing only to mention what belonged to the Lord, since by their answer he sufficiently shewed whom they wished to have released to them. For there follows, But the Chief Priests moved the people that he should rather release unto them Barabbas.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This demand which the Jews made with such toil to themselves still sticks to them. Because, when the choice was given to them, they chose a robber instead of Christ, a murderer instead of the Saviour, they deservedly lost their salvation and their life, and they subjected themselves to such a degree to robbery and sedition, that they lost their country and their kingdom which they preferred to Christ, and never regained their liberty, body or soul. Then Pilate gives another opportunity of releasing the Saviour, when there follows, And Pilate answered and said again unto them, What will ye then that I should do unto the King of the Jews?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It now is clear enough that Mark means by King of the Jews what Matthew means by the word Christ; for no kings but those of the Jews were called Christs. For in this place according to Matthew it is said, What then shall I do with Jesus which is called Christ? There follows, And they cried out again, Crucify him. (Matt. 27:22)

THEOPHYLACT. Now see the wickedness of the Jews, and the moderation of Pilate, though he too was worthy of condemnation for not resisting the people. For they cried out, Crucify; he faintly tries to save Jesus from their determined sentence, and again puts a question to them. Wherefore there follows, Then Pilate said unto them, Why, what evil hath he done? For he wished in this way to find an opportunity for releasing Christ, who was innocent.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But the Jews giving loose to their madness do not answer the question of the judge. Wherefore it goes on, And they cried out the more exceedingly, Crucify him, that those words of the Prophet Jeremiah might be fulfilled, Mine heritage is unto me as a lion in the forest, it crieth out against me. (Jer. 12:8) There follows, And so Pilate, willing to content the people, released Barabbas unto them, and delivered Jesus, when he had scourged him, to be crucified.

THEOPHYLACT. He wished indeed to satisfy the people, that is, to do their will, not what was agreeable to justice and to God.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Here are two goats; one is the scape goat, that is, one loosed and sent out into the wilderness of hell with the sin of the people; the other is slain, as a lamb, for the sins of those who are forgiven. The Lord’s portion is always slain; the devil’s part, (for he is the master of those men, which is the meaning of Barabbas,) when freed, is cast headlong into hell.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) We must understand that Jesus was scourged by no other than Pilate himself. For John writes, Pilate took Jesus, and scourged him, (John 13:1) which we must suppose that he did, that the Jews might be satisfied with His pains and insults, and cease from thirsting for His blood.

15:16–20

16. And the soldiers led him away into the hall, called Prætorium; and they call together the whole band.

17. And they clothed him with purple, and platted a crown of thorns, and put it about his head,

18. And began to salute him, Hail, King of the Jews!

19. And they smote him on the head with a reed, and did spit upon him, and bowing their knees worshipped him.

20. And when they had mocked him, they took off the purple from him, and put his own clothes on him.

THEOPHYLACT. The vainglory of soldiers, ever rejoicing in disorder and in insult, here displayed what properly belonged to them. Wherefore it is said, And the soldiers led him away into the hall called Prætorium, and they call together the whole band, that is, the whole company of the soldiers, and they clothed him with purple as a king.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For since He had been called King of the Jews, and the scribes and priests had objected to Him as a crime that He usurped rule over the Jewish people, they in derision strip Him of His former garments, and put on Him a purple robe, which ancient kings used to wear.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. iii. 9) But we must understand that the words of Matthew, they put on him a scarlet robe, Mark expresses by clothed him in purple; for that scarlet robe was used by them in derision for the royal purple, and there is a sort of red purple, very like scarlet. It may also be that Mark mentions some purple which the robe had about it, though it was of a scarlet colour.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But instead of the diadem, they put on Him a crown of thorns, wherefore it goes on, And platted a crown of thorns, and put it about his head. And for a royal sceptre they give Him a reed, as Matthew writes, and they bow before Him as a king, wherefore there follows, And began to salute him, Hail, King of the Jews! And that the soldiers worshipped Him as one who falsely called Himself God, is clear from what is added: And bowing their knees, worshipped him, as though He pretended to be God.

PSEUDO-JEROME. His shame took away our shame; His bonds made us free; by the thorny crown of His head, we have obtained the crown of the kingdom; by His wounds we are healed.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It appears that Matthew and Mark here relate things which took place previously, not that they happened when Pilate had already delivered Him to be crucified. For John says that these things took place at Pilate’s house; but that which follows, And when they had mocked him, they took off the purple from him, and put on him his own clothes, must be understood to have taken place last of all, when He was already being led to be crucified.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But in a mystic sense, Jesus was stripped of His clothes, that is, of the Jews, and is clothed in a purple robe, that is, in the Gentile church, which is gathered together out of the rocks. Again, putting it off in the end, as offending, He again is clothed with the Jewish people, for when the fulness of the Gentiles is come in, then shall all Israel be saved. (Rom. 11:25.)

BEDE. Or else, by the purple robe, with which the Lord is clothed, is meant His flesh itself, which He gave up to suffering, and by the thorny crown which He carried is meant, the taking upon Him of our sins.

THEOPHYLACT. Let us also put on the purple and royal robe, because we must walk as kings treading on serpents and scorpions, and 1 having sin under our feet. For we are called Christians, that is, anointed ones, just as kings were then called anointed. Let us also take upon ourselves the crown of thorns, that is, let us make haste to be crowned with a strict life, with self-denials and purity.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But they smite the head of Christ, who deny that He is very God. And because men are wont to use a reed to write with, they, as it were, smite the head of Christ with a reed, who speak against His divinity, and endeavour to confirm their error by the authority of Holy Writ. They spit in His face, who spit from them by their accursed words the presence of His grace. There are some also in this day, who adore Him, with a sure faith, as very God, but by their perverse actions, despise His words as though they were fabulous, and think the promises of that word inferior to worldly allurements. But just as Caiaphas said, though he knew not what it meant, It is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, (John 11:50) so also the soldiers do these things in ignorance.

15:20–28

20. —And led him out to crucify him.

21. And they compel one Simon a Cyrenian, who passed by, coming out of the country, the father of Alexander and Rufus, to bear his cross.

22. And they bring him unto the place Golgotha, which is, being interpreted, The place of a scull.

23. And they gave him to drink wine mingled with myrrh: but he received it not.

24. And when they had crucified him, they parted his garments, casting lots upon them, what every man should take.

25. And it was the third hour, and they crucified him.

26. And the superscription of his accusation was written over, THE KING OF THE JEWS.

27. And with him they crucify two thieves; the one on his right hand, and the other on his left.

28. And the Scripture was fulfilled, which saith, And he was numbered with the transgressors.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After the condemnation of Christ, and the insults heaped upon Him when He was condemned, the Evangelist proceeds to relate His crucifixion, saying, And led him out to crucify him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Here Abel is brought out into the field by his brother, to be slain by him. Here Isaac comes forth with the wood, and Abraham with the ram caught in the thicket. Here also Joseph with the sheaf of which he dreamed, and the long robe steeped in blood. Here is Moses with the rod, and the serpent hanging on the wood. Here is the cluster of grapes, carried on a staff. Here is Elisha with the piece of wood sent to seek for the axe, which had sunk, and which swam to the wood; that is, mankind, which by the forbidden tree, fell down to hell, but by the wood of the cross of Christ, and by the baptism of water, swims to paradise.z Here is Jonah out of the wood of the ship sent down into the sea and into the whale’s belly for three days. There follows: And they compel Simon a Cyrenian, who passed by, coming out of the country, the father of Alexander and Rufus, to bear his cross.

THEOPHYLACT. Now John says that He Himself bare His cross, for both took place; for He first bore the cross Himself, until some one passed, whom they compelled, and who then carried it. But he mentioned the name of his sons, to make it more credible and the affirmation stronger, for the man still lived to relate all that had happened about the cross.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Now since some men are known by the merits of their fathers, and some by those of their sons, this Simon, who was compelled to carry the cross, is made known by the merits of his sons, who were disciples. By this we are reminded, that in this life, parents are assisted by the wisdom and the merits of their children, wherefore the Jewish people is always held worthy of being remembered on account of the merits of the Patriarchs, Prophets, and Apostles. But this Simon who carries the cross, because he is compelled, is the man who labours for human praise. For men compel him to work, when the fear and love of God could not compel him.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or, since this Simon is not called a man of Jerusalem, but a Cyrenian, (for Cyrene is a city of Libya,) fitly is he taken to mean the nations of the Gentiles, which were once foreigners and strangers to the covenants, but now by obedience are heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ. Whence also Simon is fitly interpreted ‘obedient,’ and Cyrene ‘an heir.’ But he is said to come from a country place, for a country place is called ‘pagos’ in Greek, wherefore those whom we see to be aliens from the city of God, we call pagans. Simon then coming out from the country carries the cross after Jesus, when the Gentile nations leaving pagan rites embrace obediently the footsteps of our Lord’s Passion. There follows: And they bring him unto the place Golgotha, which is being interpreted, the place of Calvary. There are places without the city and the gate, in which the heads of condemned persons are cut off, and which receive the name of Calvary, that is, of the beheaded. But the Lord was crucified there, that where once was the field of the condemned, there the standards of martyrdom might be lifted up.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the Jews relate, that in this spot of the mountain the ram was sacrificed for Isaac, and there Christ is made bald1, that is, separated from His flesh, that is, from the carnal Jews. There follows: And they gave him to drink wine mingled with myrrh.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. iii. 11) This we must understand to be what Matthew expresses by, mixed with gall; for he put gall for any thing bitter, and wine mingled with myrrh is most bitter; although there may have been both gall and myrrh to make the wine most bitter.

THEOPHYLACT.a Or, they may have brought different things, in order, some vinegar and gall, and others wine mixed with myrrh.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Or else, wine mingled with myrrh, that is, vinegar; by it the juice of the deadly apple is wiped away.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Bitter the vine which bore the bitter wine, set before the Lord Jesus, that the Scripture might be fulfilled which saith, They gave me gall to eat, and when I was thirsty, they gave me vinegar to drink. (Ps. 69:22)

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) That which follows, But he received it not, must’ mean, He received it not to drink, but only tasted it, as Matthew witnesses. And what the same Matthew relates, he would not drink, Mark expresses by, he received it not, but was silent as to His tasting it.

PSEUDO-JEROME. He also refused to take sin for which He suffered, wherefore it is said of Him, I then paid the things that I never took. There follows: And when they had crucified him, they parted his garments, casting lots upon them, what every man should take. (Ps. 68:5. Vulg.) In this place salvation is figured by the wood; the first wood was that of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; the second wood is one of unmixed good for us, and is the wood of life. The first hand stretched out to the wood caught hold of death; the second found again the life which had been lost. By this wood we are carried through a stormy sea to the land of the living, for by His cross Christ has taken away our torment, and by His death has killed our death.b With the form of a serpent He kills the serpent, for the serpent made out of the rod swallowed up the other serpents. But what means the shape itself of the cross, save the four quarters of the world; the East shines from the top, the North is on the right, the South on the left, the West is firmly fixed under the feet. Wherefore the Apostle says: That we may know what is the height, and breadth, and length, and depth. (Eph. 3:18) Birds, when they fly in the air, take the shape of a cross; a man swimming in the waters is borne up by the form of a cross. A ship is blown along by its yards, which are in the shape of the cross. The letter Tau is written as the sign of salvation and of the cross.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, in the transverse beam of the cross, where the hands are fixed, the joy of hope is set forth; for by the hands we understand good works, by its expansion the joy of him who does them, because sadness puts us in straits. By the height to which the head is joined, we understand the expectation of reward from the lofty righteousness of God; by the length, over which the whole body is stretched, patience, wherefore patient men are called long-suffering; by the depth, which is fixed in the ground, the hidden Sacrament itself. As long therefore as our bodies work here to the destruction of the body of sin, it is the time of the cross for us.

THEOPHYLACT. But their casting lots for His garments was also meant as an insult, as though they were dividing the clothes of a king; for they were coarse and of no great value. And John's Gospel shews this more clearly, for the soldiers, though they divided every thing else into four parts, according to their number, cast lots for the coat, which was without seam, woven from the top throughout. (John 19:23)

PSEUDO-JEROME. Now the garments of the Lord are His commandments, by which His body, that is, the Church, is covered; which the soldiers of the Gentiles divide amongst themselves, that there may be four classes with one faith, the married, and the widowed, those who bear rule, and those who are separatec. They cast lots for the undivided garment, which is peace and unity. It goes on: And it was the third hour, and they crucified him. Mark has introduced this truly and rightly, for at the sixth hour darkness overspread the earth, so that no one could move his head.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. iii. 13) If Jesus was given up to the Jews to be crucified, when Pilate sat down at his tribunal about the sixth hour, as John relates, how could He be crucified at the third hour, as many persons have thought from not understanding the words of Mark? First then let us see at what hour He might have been crucified, then we shall see why Mark said that He was crucified at the third hour. It was about the sixth hour when He was given up to be crucified by Pilate sitting on his judgment seat, as has been said, for it was not yet fully the sixth hour, but about the sixth, that is, the fifth was over, and some of the sixth had begun, so that those things which are related of the crucifixion of our Lord took place after the finishing of the fifth, and at the commencement of the sixth, until, when the sixth was completed and He was hanging on the cross, the darkness which is spoken of took place. Let us now consider, why Mark has said, It was the third hour. He had already said positively, And when they had crucified him, they parted his garments; as also the others declare, that when He was crucified His garments were divided. Now if Mark had wished to fix the time of what was done, it would have been enough to say, And it was the third hour, why did He add, and they crucified him, unless it was that he wished to point to something which had gone before, and which if enquired into would be explained, since that same Scripture was to be read at a time, when it was known to the whole Church at what hour our Lord was crucified, by which means any error might be taken away, and any falsehood be refuted. But because he knew that the Lord was fixed to the cross not by the Jews but by the soldiers, as John very plainly shews, he wished to intimate that the Jews had crucified Him, since they cried out, Crucify Him, rather than those who executed the orders of their chief according to their duty. It is therefore implied, that it took place at the third hour when the Jews cried out, Crucify Him, and it is most truly shewn that they crucified Him, when they so cried out. But in the attempt of Pilate to save the Lord, and the tumultuous opposition of the Jews, we understand that a space of two hours was consumed, and that the sixth hour had begun, before the end of which, those things occurred which are related to have taken place from the time when Pilate gave up the Lord, and the darkness overspread the earth. Now he who will apply himself to these things, without the hard-heartedness of impiety, will see that Mark has fitly placed it at the third hour, in the same place as the deed of the soldiers who were the executors of it is related. Therefore lest any one should transfer in his thoughts so great a crime from the Jews to the soldiers, he says it was the third hour, and they crucified him, that the fault might rather by a careful enquirer be charged to them, who, as he would find, had at the third hour cried out for His crucifixion, whilst at the same time it would be seen that what was done by the soldiers was done at the sixth hourd.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Vet. et Nov. Test. 65) Therefore he wishes to imply that it was the Jews who passed sentence concerning the crucifixion of Christ at the third hour; for every condemned person is considered as dead, from the moment that sentence is passed upon him. Mark therefore shewed that our Saviour was not crucified by the sentence of the judge, because it is difficult to prove the innocence of a man so condemned.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Still there are not wanting persons who assert that the preparation, mentioned by John, Now it was the preparation about the sixth hour, was really the third hour of the day. For they say that on the day before the sabbath day, there was a preparation of the passover of the Jews, because on that sabbath, they began the unleavened bread; but however that the true passover, which is now celebrated on the day of our Lord’s Passion, that is, the Christian not the Jewish passover, began to be prepared, or to have its parasceue, from that ninth hour of the night, when His death began to be prepared by the Jews; for parasceue means preparation. Between that hour therefore of the night and His crucifixion occurs the sixth hour of preparation, according to John, and the third hour of the day, according to Mark. What Christian would not give in to this solution of the question, provided that we could find some circumstance, from which we might gather that this preparation of our Passover, that is, of the death of Christ, began at the ninth hour of the night? For if we say that it began when our Lord was taken by the Jews, it was still early in the night, but if when our Lord was carried away to the house of the father in law of Caiaphas, where also He was heard by the chief priests, the cock had not crowed; but if when He was given up to Pilate, it is very plain that it was morning. It remains therefore that we must understand the preparation of our Lord’s death to have commenced when all the Chief Priests pronounced, He is guilty of death. For there is nothing absurd in supposing that that was the ninth hour of the night, so that we may understand that Peter’s denial is put out of its order after it really happened. It goes on: And the superscription of his accusation was written over, THE KING OF THE JEWS.

THEOPHYLACT. They wrote this superscription, as the reason why He was crucified, thus wishing to reprove His vainglory in making Himself a king, that so the passers by might not pity Him, but rather hate Him as a tyrant.

PSEUDO-JEROME. He wrote it in three languages, in Hebrew, Melech Jeudim; in Greek, βασιλεὺς ἐξομολογητῶν in Latin, Rex confessorum. These three languages were consecrated to be the chief, in the superscription on the cross, that every tongue might record the treachery of the Jews.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But this superscription on the cross shews, that they could not even in killing Him take away the kingdom over them from Him who was about to render unto them according to their works. There follows: And with him they crucify two thieves, the one on his right hand, the other on his left.

THEOPHYLACT. They did this that men might have a bad opinion of Him, as though He also were a robber and a malefactor. But it was done by Providence to fulfil the Scriptures. There follows: And the Scripture was fulfilled which saith, And he was numbered with the transgressors.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Truth was numbered with the wicked; He left one on His left hand, the other He takes on the right, as He will do at the last day. With a similar crime they are allotted different paths; one precedes Peter into Paradise, the other Judas into hell. A short confession won for him a long life, and a blasphemy which soon ended is punished with endless pain.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Mystically, however, the thieves crucified with Christ signify those, who by their faith and confession of Christ undergo either the struggle of martyrdom, or some rules of a stricter discipline. But those who do these deeds for the sake of endless glory, are signified by the faith of the right hand robber; those again who do them for worldly praise copy the mind and the acts of the left hand robber.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else; the two robbers were meant to point out the two people, that is, the Jews and the Gentiles, for both were evil, the Gentile as transgressing natural law, but the Jew by breaking the written law, which the Lord had delivered to them; but the Gentile was penitent, the Jew a blasphemer unto the end. Between whom our Lord is crucified, for He is the corner stone, which binds us together.

29. And they that passed by railed on him, wagging their heads, and saying, Ah, thou that destroyest the temple, and buildest it in three days,

30. Save thyself, and come down from the cross.

31. Likewise also the Chief Priests mocking said among themselves with the Scribes, He saved others; himself he cannot save.

32. Let Christ the King of Israel descend now from the cross, that we may see and believe. And they that were crucified with him reviled him.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The foal of Judah (Gen. 49:11.) has been tied to the vine, and his clothes dyed in the blood of the grape, and the kids tear the vine, blaspheming Christ, and wagging their heads. Wherefore it is said: And they that passed by railed on him, wagging their heads, and saying, Ah, thou that destroyest the temple.

THEOPHYLACT. For the passers by blasphemed Christ, reproaching Him as a seducer. But the devil moved them to bid Him come down from the Cross; for he knew that salvation was being won by the Cross, therefore he again proceeded to tempt Christ, so that if He came down from the Cross, he might be certain that He is not truly the Son of God, and so the salvation, which is by the Cross, might be done away. But He being truly the Son of God, did not come down; for if He ought to have come down, He would not have ascended there at all; but since He saw that in this way salvation must be effected, He underwent the crucifixion, and many other sufferings, unto the finishing of His work. It goes on: Likewise also the Chief Priests mocking said among themselves with the Scribes, He saved others, himself he cannot save. They said this, to do away with His miracles, as though those which He had done were but the semblance of them, for by working miracles He saved many.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Thus also they confess, though against their will, that He saved many. Therefore your words condemn you, for He who saved others could have saved Himself. It goes on: Let Christ the King of Israel descend now from the cross, that we may see and believe.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Afterwards they saw Him arise from the grave, though they would not believe that He could come down from the tree of the Cross. Where, O Jews, is your lack of faith? Your own selves I appeal to; your own selves I bring as judges. How much more wonderful is it that a dead man should arise, than that one yet living should choose to come down from the cross. Ye asked but small things, till greater should have come to pass; but your want of faith could not be healed by signs much greater than those for which you sought. Here all have gone out of the way, all are become abominable. (Ps. 14:4) Wherefore it goes on: And they that were crucified with him reviled.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 3. 16) How can this be, when according to Luke one only reviled Him, but was rebuked by the other who believed on God; unless we understand that Matthew and Mark, who touched but slightly on this place, put the plural for the singular number?

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, both at first reviled Him, then one recognising Him as innocent, rebukes the other for blaspheming Him.

15:33–37

33. And when the sixth hour was come, there was darkness over the whole land until the ninth hour.

34. And at the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani? which is, being interpreted, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?

35. And some of them that stood by, when they heard it, said, Behold, he calleth Elias.

36. And one ran and filled a spunge full of vinegar, and put it on a reed, and gave him to drink, saying, Let alone; let us see whether Elias will come to take him down.

37. And Jesus cried with a loud voice, and gave up the ghost.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) This most glorious light took away its rays from the world, lest it should see the Lord hanging, and lest the blasphemers should have the benefit of its light. Wherefore it goes on: And when the sixth hour was come, there was darkness over the whole land until the ninth hour.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. 3, 17) Luke added to this account the cause of the darkness, that is, the darkening of the sun.

THEOPHYLACT. If this had been the time for an eclipse, some one might have said that this that happened was natural, but it was the fourteenth moon, when no eclipse can take place. There follows: And at the ninth hour Jesus cried with a loud voice, saying, Eloi, Eloi, lama sabachthani.

PSEUDO-JEROME. At the ninth hour, the tenth piece of money which had been lost is found, by the overturning of the house.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) For when Adam sinned, it is also written that he heard the voice of the Lord, walking in paradise, in the cool after mid-day; (Gen. 3:8.) and in that hour when the first Adam by sinning brought death into the world, in that same hour the second Adam by dying destroyed death. And we must observe, that our Lord was crucified, when the sun was going away from the centre of the world; but at sunrise He celebrated the mysteries of His resurrection; because He died for our sins, but rose again for our justification. Nor need you wonder at the lowliness of His words, at the complaints as of one forsaken, when you look on the offence of the cross, knowing the form of a servant. For as hunger, and thirst, and fatigue were not things proper to the Divinity, but bodily affections; so His saying, Why hast thou forsaken me? was proper to a bodily voice, for the body is never naturally wont to wish to be separated from the life which is joined to it. For although our Saviour Himself said this, He really shewed the weakness of His body; He spoke therefore as man, bearing about with Him my feelings, for when placed in danger we fancy that we are deserted by God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, He speaks this as man crucified by God for me, for we men have been forsaken by the Father, but He never has. For hear what He says; I am not alone, because the Father is with me. (John 16:32) Though He may also have said this as being a Jew, according to the flesh, as though He had said, Why hast thou forsaken the Jewish people, so that they have crucified Thy Son? For as we sometimes say, God has put on me, that is, my human nature, so here also we must understand thou hast forsaken me, to mean my nature, or the Jewish people. It goes on: And some of them that stood by, when they heard it, said, Behold, he calleth Elias.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) These however I suppose were Roman soldiers who did not understand the peculiarity of the Hebrew tongue, but, from His calling Eloi, thought that Elias was called by Him. But if the Jews are understood to have said this, they must be supposed to do this, as accusing Him of folly in calling for the aid of Elias. It goes on: And one ran and filled a sponge full of vinegar, and put it on a reed, and gave him to drink, saying, Let alone: let us see whether Elias will come to take him down. John shews more fully the reason why the vinegar was given to the Lord to drink, saying, that Jesus said, I thirst, (John 19:28.) that the Scriptures might be fulfilled. They however applied a sponge full of vinegar to His mouth.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Here he points out a similitude for the Jews; a sponge on a reed, weak, dry, fit for burning; they fill it with vinegar, that is, with wickedness and guile.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Matthew has not related, that the man who brought the sponge filled with vinegar, but that the others spoke about Elias; from whence we gather that both said it.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Though the flesh was weak, yet the heavenly voice, which said, Open me the gates of righteousness, (Ps. 117:19) waxed strong. Wherefore there follows: And Jesus cried with a loud voice, and gave up the ghost. We who are of the earth die with a very low voice, or with no voice at all; but He who descended from heaven breathed His last with a loud voice.

THEOPHYLACT. He who both rules over death and commands it dies with power, as its Lord. But what this voice was is declared by Luke: Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit. For Christ would have us understand by this, that from that time the souls of the saints go up into the hands of God. (v. note u, p. 217) For at first the souls of all were held in hell, till He came, who preached the opening of the prison to the captives.

15:38–41

38. And the veil of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom.

39. And when the centurion, which stood over against him, saw that he so cried out, and gave up the ghost, he said, Truly this man was the Son of God.

40. There were also women looking on afar off: among whom was Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James the less and of Joses, and Salome;

41. (Who also, when he was in Galilee, followed him, and mininistered unto him;) and many other women which came up with him unto Jerusalem.

GLOSS. After the Evangelist has related the Passion and the death of Christ, he now goes on to mention those things which followed after the death of our Lord. Wherefore it is said: And the veil of the temple was rent in twain from the top to the bottom.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The veil of the temple is rent, that is, the heaven is opened.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, God by the rending of the veil implied that the grace of the Holy Spirit goes away and is rent from the temple, so that the Holy of holies might be seen by all;e also that the temple will mourn amongst the Jews, when they shall deplore their calamities, and rend their clothes. This also is a figure of the living temple, that is, the body of Christ, in whose Passion His garment is torn, that is, His flesh. Again, it means another thing; for the flesh is the veil of our temple, that is, of our mind. But the power of the flesh is torn in the Passion of Christ, from the top to the bottom, that is, from Adam even down to the latest man; for also Adam was made whole by the Passion of Christ, and his flesh does not remain under the curse, nor does it deserve corruption, but we all are gifted with incorruption. And when the centurion who stood over against him saw. He who commands a hundred soldiers is called a centurion. But seeing that He died with such power as the Lord, he wondered and confessed.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now the cause of the centurion’s wonder is clear, that seeing that the Lord died in that way, that is, sent forth His spirit, he said, Truly this man was the Son of God. For no one can send forth his own spirit, but He who is the Creator of souls.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. 4, 13) This also he most of all wondered at, that after that voice which He sent forth as a figure of our sin, He immediately gave up His spirit. For the spirit of the Mediator shewed that no penalty of sin could have had power to cause the death of His flesh; for it did not leave the flesh unwillingly, but as it willed, for it was joined to the Word of God in the unity of person.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the last are now made the first. The Gentile people confesses. The blinded Jew denies, so that their error is worse than the first.

THEOPHYLACT. And so the order is inverted, for the Jew kills, and the Gentile confesses; the disciples fly, and the women remain. For there follows: There were also women looking on afar off, amongst whom was Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James the less and of Joses, and Salome.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. Tract. 35) But it seems to me, that here three women are chiefly named, by Matthew and Mark. Two indeed are set down by each Evangelist, Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James; the third is called by Matthew, the mother of the sons of Zebedee, but by Mark she is called Salome.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) He means by James the Less, the son of Alphæus, who was also called the brother of our Lord, because he was the son of Mary, our Lord's mother's sister, whom John mentions, saying, Now there stood by the cross of Jesus his mother and his mother's sister, Mary of Cleophas, and Mary Magdalene. (John 19:25) And he seems to call her Mary of Cleophas, from her father or some relation. But he was called James the Less, to distinguish him from James the Great, that is, the son of Zebedee, who was called amongst the first of the Apostles by our Lord. Further, it was a Jewish custom, nor was it thought blamable after the manners of an ancient people, that women should furnish to teachers food and clothing out of their substance. Wherefore there follows: Who also when he was in Galilee followed him, and ministered unto him. They ministered unto the Lord of their substance, that He might reap their carnal things whose spiritual things they reaped, and that He might shew forth a type for all masters, who ought to be content with food and clothing from their disciples. But let us see what companions He had with Him, for it goes on: And many other women which came up with him into Jerusalem.

PSEUDO-JEROME. As the female sex through the Virgin Mary is not shut out from salvation, so it is not thrust away from the knowledge of the mystery of the cross, and of the resurrection, through the widow Mary Magdalene, and the others, who were mothers.

15:42–47

42. And now when the even was come, because it was the preparation, that is, the day before the sabbath,

43. Joseph of Arimathæa, an honourable counsellor, which also waited for the kingdom of God, came, and went in boldly unto Pilate, and craved the body of Jesus.

44. And Pilate marvelled if he were already dead: and calling unto him the centurion, he asked him whether he had been any while dead.

45. And when he knew it of the centurion, he gave the body to Joseph.

46. And he bought fine linen, and took him down, and wrapped him in the linen, and laid him in a sepulchre which was hewn out of a rock, and rolled a stone unto the door of the sepulchre.

47. And Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of Joses beheld where he was laid.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After the passion and death of Christ, the Evangelist relates His burial, saying, And now when the even was come, because it was the preparation, that is, the day before the sabbath, Joseph of Arimathæa.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) What is called parasceue in Greek, is in Latin præparatio; by which name those Jews, who lived amongst Greeks, used to call the sixth day of the week, because on that day they used to prepare what was necessary for the rest of the sabbath day. Because then man was made on the sixth day, but on the seventh the Creator rested from all His work, fitly was our Saviour crucified on the sixth day, and thus fulfilled the mystery of man’s restoration. But on the sabbath, resting in the tomb, He was waiting for the event of the resurrection, which was to come on the eighth day. So we must also in this age of time be crucified to the world; but in the seventh day, that is, when a man has paid the debt to death, our bodies indeed must rest in the grave, but our souls after good works in hidden peace with God; till in the eighth period, even our bodies themselves, glorified in the resurrection, receive incorruption together with our souls. But the man who buried the body of the Lord must needs by his righteous merits have been worthy, and by the nobility of worldly power able to perform this service. Therefore it is said, An honourable counsellor, which also waited for the kingdom of God. He is called in Latin, decurio, because he is of the order of the curia, and served the office of a provincial magistracy; this officer was also called curialis, from his care of civic duties. Arimathæa is the same as Ramathain, the city of Elkanah and Samuel.

PSEUDO-JEROME. It is interpreted, taking down, of which was Joseph, who came to take down the body of Christ from the cross. There follows: Came and went in boldly unto Pilate, and craved the body of Jesus.

THEOPHYLACT. He was bold with a praiseworthy boldness; for he did not consider within himself, I shall fall from my rich estate, and I shall be expelled by the Jews, if I beg for the body of Him, who was condemned as a blasphemer. It goes on: And Pilate marvelled if he were already dead. For he thought that He should continue long alive upon the cross, as also the thieves used to live long, upon the instrument of their execution. It goes on: And calling unto him the centurion, he asked him if he had been any while dead; that is, before the time when other executed persons usually died. There follows: And when he knew it of the centurion, (that is, that He was dead,) he gave the body to Joseph.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But it was not an obscure person, nor a man of mean rank, who could come to the governor and obtain the body. There follows: And he bought fine linen, and took him down, and wrapped him in the linen.

THEOPHYLACT. Burying the precious body preciously; for being a disciple of our Lord, he knew how greatly the Lord’s body ought to be honoured.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) By this however, according to a spiritual meaning, we may understand that the body of the Lord should not be wrapped in gold or gems, or silk, but in a clean linen cloth. Hence it became a custom in the Church that the sacrifice of the altar should not be celebrated in silk, or in a dyed cloth, but in linen produced from the earth, just as the body of the Lord was wrapped in clean linen; as, we read in the Pontifical acts, it was ordered by the blessed Sylvesterf. Though it has also another meaning, that he who receives Jesus in a pure mind wraps Him in clean linen. There follows: And laid him in a sepulchre which was hewn out of a rock, and rolled a stone unto the door of the sepulchre. It is said that the sepulchre of the Lord is a round cell, hewn out of the rock which was around it, so high, that a man standing upright could scarcely touch the roof with his outstretched hand; and it has an entrance to the east, to which the great stone was rolled, and placed upon it. In the northern part of it is the tomb itself, that is, the place where our Lord’s body lay, made of the same rock, seven feet in length, raised three palms higher than the floor. It is not open from above, but on the south side, the whole of which is open, and through which the body was brought in. The colour of the sepulchre and of the recess is said to be a mixed white and red.

PSEUDO-JEROME. By the burial of Christ we rise again, by His going down into hell we mount up into heaven; here is found the honey in the mouth of the dead lion.

THEOPHYLACT. Let us too imitate Joseph, taking to ourselves the body of Christ by Unity, and let us place it in a sepulchre, hewn out of the rock, that is, in a soul recollected, never forgetful of God; for this is a soul hewn out of the rock, that is, out of Christ, for He is our rock, who holds together our strength. We ought also to wrap Him in linen, that is, to receive Him in a pure body; for the linen is the body which is the clothing of the soul. We must, however, not throw open, but wrap Him up; for He is secret, closed and hidden. There follows: And Mary Magdalene and Mary the mother of Joses beheld where he was laid.

BEDE. We read in Luke, that His acquaintances and the women who had followed Him stood afar off. When these then who were known to Jesus returned home after the burial of His body, the women alone, who were bound to Him with a closer love, after following the funeral, took care to see how He was laid, that they might be able at a fitting season to offer Him the sacrifice of their devotion. But on the day of the parasceue, that is, of the preparation, the holy women, that is, humble souls, do the same, when they burn with love for the Saviour, and diligently follow the steps of His Passion in this life, where their future rest is to be prepared; and they weigh with a pious minuteness the order in which His passion was accomplished, if perchance they be able to imitate it.

PSEUDO-JEROME. These things also fit the Jewish people, which finally is believing, which is ennobled by faith to become the child of Abraham. It lays aside its despair, it waits for the kingdom of God, it goes in to the Christians, that it may be baptized; which is implied by the name of Pilate, which is interpreted, ‘One who works with a hammer,’ that is, he who subdues the iron nations, that he may rule them with a rod of iron. It seeks for the sacrifice, that is, the viaticum, which is given to penitents at their last end, and wraps it up in a heart clean and dead to sin; it makes it firm in the safeguard of faith, and shuts it up with the covering of hope, through works of charity; (for the end of the commandment is charity;) (1 Tim. 1:5) whilst the elect, who are the stars of the sea, are looking on from afar, for, if it be possible, the very elect shall be offended.

CHAPTER 16

16:1–8

1. And when the sabbath was past, Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James, and Salome, had bought sweet spices, that they might come and anoint him.

2. And very early in the morning the first day of the week, they came unto the sepulchre at the rising of the sun.

3. And they said among themselves, Who shall roll us away the stone from the door of the sepulchre?

4. And when they looked, they saw that the stone was rolled away: for it was very great.

5. And entering into the sepulchre, they saw a young man sitting on the right side, clothed in a long white garment; and they were affrighted.

6. And he saith unto them, Be not affrighted: Ye seek Jesus of Nazareth, which was crucified: he is risen; he is not here: behold the place where they laid him.

7. But go your way, tell his disciples and Peter that he goeth before you into Galilee: there shall ye see him, as he said unto you.

8. And they went out quickly, and fled from the sepulchre; for they trembled and were amazed: neither said they any thing to any man; for they were afraid.

PSEUDO-JEROME. After the sadness of the sabbath, a happy day dawns upon them, which holds the chief place amongst days, for in it the chief light shines forth, and the Lord rises in triumph. Wherefore it is said, And when the sabbath was past, Mary Magdalene, and Mary the mother of James and Salome, had bought sweet spices.

GLOSS. (ord. ex Bedâ.) For these religious women after the burial of the Lord, as long as it was lawful to work, that is, up to sunset, prepared ointment, as Luke says. (Luke 23:56) And because they could not finish their work from the shortness of the time, when the sabbath was over, that is, at sunset, as soon as the time for working came round again, they hastened to buy spices, as Mark says, that they might go in the morning to anoint the body of Jesus. Neither could they come to the sepulchre on the evening of the sabbath, for night prevented them. Wherefore it goes on: And very early in the morning the first day of the week, they came unto the sepulchre at the rising of the sun.

SEVERIANUS. (occ. ap. Chrysologum, serm. 82) The women in this place run abroad with womanly devotion, for they do not bring Him faith as though He were alive, but ointments as to one dead; and they prepare the service of their grief for Him as buried, not the joys of heavenly triumph for Him as risen.

THEOPHYLACT. For they do not understand the greatness and dignity of the wisdom of Christ. But they came according to the custom of the Jews to anoint the body of Christ, that it might remain sweet-smelling, and might not burst forth into moisture, for spices have the property of drying up, and absorb the moisture of the body, so that they keep the body from corruption.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evan. 21) But if we believe on Him who is dead, and are filled with the sweet smell of virtue, and seek the Lord with the fame of good works, we come to His sepulchre with spices. There follows: And very early in the morning the first day of the week, they came unto the sepulchre at the rising of the sun.

AUGUSTINE. (Con. Evang. iii. 24) What Luke expresses by very early in the morning, and John by early when it was yet dark, Mark must be understood to mean, when he says, very early in the morning, at the rising of the sun, that is, when the sky was growing bright in the east, as is usual in places near the rising sun; for this is the light which we call the dawning. Therefore there is no discrepancy with the report which says, while it was yet dark. For when the day is dawning, the remains of darkness lessen in proportion as the light grows brighter; and we must not take the words very early in the morning, at the rising of the sun, to mean that the sun himself was seen upon the earth, but as expressing the near approach of the sun into those parts, that is, when his rising begins to light up the sky.

PSEUDO-JEROME. By very early in the morning, (Luke 24:1. diluculo Vulg.) he means what another Evangelist expresses by at the dawning. But the dawn is the time between the darkness of night, and the brightness of day, in which the salvation of man is coming forth with a happy closeness, to be declared in the Church, just as the sun, when he is rising and the light is near, sends before him the rosy dawn, that with prepared eyes she may bear to see the graciousness of his glorious brightness, when the time of our Lord's resurrection has dawned; that then the whole Church, after the example of the women, may sing the praises of Christ, since He has quickened the race of man after the pattern of His resurrection, since He has given life, and has poured upon them the light of belief.

BEDE. (in Marc. 4, 45) As then the women shew the great fervency of their love, by coming very early in the morning to the sepulchre, as the history relates, according to the mystical sense an example is given to us, that with a shining face, and shaking off the darkness of wickedness, we may be careful to offer the fragrance of good works and the sweetness of prayer to the Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. He says, On the first of the sabbaths, (μιᾶς σαββάτων.) that is, on the first of the days of the week. For the days of the week are called sabbaths, and by the word 'una' is meant 'prima.'

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or else, by this phrase is meant the first day from the day of sabbaths, or rests, which were kept on the sabbath. There follows: And they said among themselves, Who shall roll us away the stone from the door of the sepulchre?

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) Your breast was darkened, your eyes shut, and therefore ye did not before see the glory of the opened sepulchre. It goes on: And they looked, and saw that the stone was rolled away.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Matthew shews clearly enough, that the stone was rolled away by an Angel. This rolling away of the stone means mystically the opening of the Christian sacraments, which were held under the veil of the letter of the law; for the law was written on stone. It goes on: For it was very great.

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) Great indeed by its office rather than its size, for it can shut in and throw open the body of the Lord.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But the women who came with spices see the Angels; because those minds who come to the Lord with their virtues, through holy desires, see the heavenly citizens. Wherefore it goes on: And entering into the sepulchre, they saw a young man sitting on the right side, clothed in a long white garment; and they were affrighted.

THEOPHYLACT. Though Matthew says that the Angel was sitting on the stone, whilst Mark relates that the women entering into the sepulchre saw a young man sitting, yet we need not wonder, for they afterwards saw sitting within the sepulchre the same Angel as sat without on the stone.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Either let us suppose that Matthew was silent about that Angel, whom they saw on entering, whilst Mark said nothing of him, whom they saw outside sitting on the stone, so that they saw two and heard severally from two, the things which the Angels said concerning Jesus; or we must understand by entering into the sepulchre, their coming within some inclosure, by which it is probable that the place was surrounded a little space before the stone, by the cutting out of which the burial place had been made, so that they saw sitting on the right hand in that space him whom Matthew designates as sitting on the stone.

THEOPHYLACT. But some say the women mentioned by Matthew were different from those in Mark. But Mary Magdalene was with all parties, from her burning zeal and ardent love.

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) The women, then, entered the sepulchre, that being buried with Christ, they might rise again from the tomb with Christ. They see the young man, that is, they see the time of the Resurrection, for the Resurrection has no old age, and the period, in which man knows neither birth nor death, admits of no decay, and requires no increase. Wherefore what they saw was a young man, not an old man, nor an infant, but the age of joy.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Now they saw a young man sitting on the right side, that is, on the south part of the place where the body was laid. For the body, which was lying on its back, and had its head to the west, must have had its right to the south.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But what is meant by the left hand, but this present life, and what by the right, but everlasting life? Because then our Redeemer had already gone through the decay of this present life, fitly did the Angel, who had come to announce His everlasting life, sit on the right hand.

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) Again, they saw a young man sitting on the right, because the Resurrection has nothing sinister in it. They also see him dressed in a long white robe; that robe is not from mortal fleece, but of living virtue, blazing with heavenly light, not of an earthly dye, as saith the Prophet, Thou deckest thyself with light as with a garment; and of the just it is said, Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun. (Ps. 104:2) (Matt. 13:43)

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or else, he appeared covered with a white robe, because he announced the joys of our festivity, for the whiteness of the robe shews the splendour of our solemnity.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The white robe is also true joy, now that the enemy is driven away, the kingdom won, the King of Peace sought for and found and never let go by us. This young man then shews an image of the Resurrection to them who feared death. But their being frightened shews that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man to conceive the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him. (1 Cor 2:9) There follows, And he saith unto them, Be not affrighted.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) As though he had said, Let them fear, who love not the coming of the inhabitants of heaven; let them fear, who, weighed down with carnal desires, despair that they can ever attain to their company; but why should ye fear, ye who see your own fellow citizens.

PSEUDO-JEROME. For there is no fear in love. Why should they fear, who had found Him whom they sought?

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But let us hear what the Angel adds; Ye seek Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus means the Saviour, but at that time there may have been many a Jesus, not indeed really, but in name, therefore the place Nazareth is added, that it might be evident of what Jesus it was spoken. And immediately he subjoins the reason, Which was crucified.

THEOPHYLACT. For he does not blush at the Cross, for in it is the salvation of men, and the beginning of the Blessed.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But the bitter root of the Cross has disappeared. The flower of life has burst forth with its fruits, that is, He who lay in death has risen in glory. Wherefore he adds, He is risen; he is not here.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) He is not here, is spoken of His carnal presence, for He was not absent from any place as to the presence of His majesty.

THEOPHYLACT. As if he had said, Do ye wish to be certain of His resurrection, he adds, Behold the place where they laid him. This too was the reason why he had rolled away the stone, that he might shew the the place.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But immortality is shewn to mortals as1 due to thankfulness, that we may understand what we were, and that we may know what we are to be. There follows, But go your way, tell his disciples and Peter that he goeth before you into Galilee. The women are ordered to tell the Apostles, that as by a woman death was announced, so also might life rising again. But He says specially unto Peter, because he had shewn himself unworthy of being a disciple, since he had thrice denied his Master; but past sins cease to hurt us when they cease to be pleasing to us.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) If again the Angel had not expressly named him who had denied his Master, he would not have dared to come amongst the disciples; he is therefore called by name, lest he should despair on account of his denial.

AUGUSTINE. (Con. Evan. iii. 25) By saying, He will go before you into Galilee, there shall ye see him, as he said unto you, he seems to imply, that Jesus would not shew Himself to His disciples after His resurrection except in Galilee, which shewing of Himself Mark himself has not2 mentioned. For that which He has related, Early the first day of the week he appeared to Mary Magdalene, and after that to two of them as they walked and went into the country, we know took place in Jerusalem, on the very day of the resurrection; then he comes to His last manifestation, which we know was on the Mount of Olives, not far from Jerusalem. Mark therefore never relates the fulfilment of that which was foretold by the Angel; but Matthew does not mention any place at all, where the disciples saw the Lord after He arose, except Galilee, according to the Angel’s prophecy. But since it is not set down when this happened, whether first, before He was seen any where else, and since the very place where Matthew says that He went into Galilee to the mountain, does not explain the day, or the order of the narration, Matthew does not oppose the account of the others, but assists in explaining and receiving them. But nevertheless since the Lord was not first to shew Himself there, but sent word that He was to be seen in Galilee, where He was seen subsequently, it makes every faithful Christian on the look out, to find out in what mysterious sense it may be understood.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For Galilee means1 ‘a passing over;’ for our Redeemer had already passed from His Passion to His resurrection, from death unto life, and we shall have joy in seeing the glory of His resurrection, if only we pass over from vice to the heights of virtue. He then who is announced at the tomb, is shewn in ‘passing over,’ because He who is first known in mortification of the flesh, is seen in this passing over of the soul.

PSEUDO-JEROME. This sentence is but short in the number of syllables, but the promise is vast in its greatness. Here is the fountain of our joy, and the source of everlasting life is prepared. Here all that are scattered are brought together, and the contrite hearts are healed. There, he says, ye shall see Him, but not as ye have seen Him.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) It is also signified that the grace of Christ is about to pass over from the people of Israel to the Gentiles, by whom the Apostles would never have been received when they preached, if the Lord had not gone before them and prepared a way in their hearts; and this is what is meant by, He goeth before you into Galilee, there shall ye see him, that is, there shall ye find His members. There follows: And they went out quickly, and fled from the sepulchre, for they trembled and were amazed.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, they trembled because of the vision of Angels, and were amazed because of the resurrection.

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) The Angel indeed sits on the sepulchre, the women fly from it; he, on account of his heavenly substance, is confident, they are troubled because of their earthly frame. He who cannot die, cannot fear the tomb, but the women both fear from what was then done, and still, as being mortals, fear the sepulchre as mortals are wont.

PSEUDO-JEROME. This also is spoken of the life to come, in which grief and groaning will flee away. For the women prefigure before the resurrection all that is to happen to them after the resurrection, namely, they flee away from death and fear. There follows, Neither said they any thing to any man, for they were afraid.

THEOPHYLACT. Either on account of the Jews, or else they said nothing because the fear of the vision prevented them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. iii. 24.) We may however enquire how Mark can say this, when Matthew says, they departed quickly from the sepulchre with fear and great joy, and did run to bring his disciples word, (Matt. 28:8) unless we understand it to mean, that they did not dare to say a word to any of the Angels themselves, that is, to answer the words which they had spoken to them; or else to the guards whom they saw lying there;

for that joy of which Matthew speaks is not inconsistent with the fear which Mark mentions. For we ought to have understood that both feelings were in their minds, even though Matthew had not mentioned the fear. But since he has also said that they came out with fear and great joy, he does not allow room for any question to be raised.

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) It is said also in a marked manner, that they said nothing to any one, because it is the part of women to hear, and not to speak, to learn, not to teach.

16:9–13

9. Now when Jesus was risen early the first day of the week, he appeared first to Mary Magdalene, out of whom he had cast seven devils.

10. And she went and told them that had been with him, as they mourned and wept.

11. And they, when they had heard that he was alive, and had been seen of her, believed not.

12. After that he appeared in another form unto two of them, as they walked, and went into the country.

13. And they went and told it unto the residue: neither believed they them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. iii. 25) Now we must consider how the Lord appeared after the resurrection. For Mark says, Now when Jesus was risen early the first day of the week, he appeared first to Mary Magdalene, out of whom he had cast seven devils.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) John tells us most fully how and when this appearance took place. But the Lord rose in the morning from the sepulchre in which He had been laid in the evening, that those words of the Psalm might be fulfilled, Heaviness may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning. (Ps. 30:5)

THEOPHYLACT. Or else put a stop at, Now when Jesus was risen, and then read, early the first day of the week he appeared, &c.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For as Samson at midnight not only left Gaza, but also carried away the gates of it, so also our Redeemer rising before the light, did not only come out free from hell, but destroyed also the very gates of hell. 1But Mark here testifies that seven devils were cast out of Mary;

and what is meant by seven devils save all vices? for as by seven days is understood all time, so by the number seven 2 a whole is fitly figured.

THEOPHYLACT. But Mary had seven devils, because she was filled with all vices. Or else, by seven devils are meant seven spirits contrary to the seven virtues, as a spirit without fear, without wisdom, without understanding, and whatsoever else is opposed to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

PSEUDO-JEROME. Again, He is shewn to her, out of whom He had cast seven devils, because harlots and publicans shall go before the synagogue into the kingdom of heaven, as the thief reached it before the Apostles.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) In the beginning also woman brought man into sin, now she, who first tasted death, first sees the resurrection, lest she should have to bear the reproach of perpetual guilt amongst men; and she who had been the channel of guilt to man, now has become the first channel of grace. For it goes on: And she went and told them that had been with him as they mourned and wept.

PSEUDO-JEROME. They mourn and weep because they had not yet seen, but after a short time they shall receive a consolation. For blessed are they that weep now, for they shall be comforted.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Fitly too is this woman, who was the first to announce the joy of our Lord’s resurrection, said to have been cured of seven devils, lest any one worthily repenting of his sins should despair of pardon for what he had done, and that it might be shewn that where sin abounded, grace did much more abound. (Rom. 5:20)

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) Mary brings the news, not now as a woman, but in the person of the Church, so that, as above woman was silent, here as the Church she might bring tidings and speak. There follows, And they when they heard that he was alive and had been seen by her, believed not.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evan. xxix.) That the disciples were slow in believing our Lord’s resurrection was not so much a weakness of theirs as it is our strength. For the resurrection itself through their doubts was manifested by many proofs; and whilst we read and acknowledge them, what do we but become firmer through their doubting? There follows, After this he appeared in another form unto two of them as they walked and went to a farm house.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Luke relates the whole story respecting these two, one of whom was Cleophas, but Mark here touches but slightly upon it. That village of which Luke speaks may without absurdity be supposed to be what is here called a farm house, and indeed in some Greek manuscripts it is called the country. But by this name are understood not only villages, but also boroughs and country towns, because they are without the city, which is the head and mother of all the rest. That which Mark expresses by the Lord's appearance in another form, is what Luke means by saying that their eyes were holden that they could not know him. For something was upon their eyes, which was allowed to remain there, until the breaking of bread.

SEVERIANUS. (Chrysologus ubi sup.) But let no one suppose that Christ changed the form of His face by His resurrection, but the form is changed when of mortal it becomes immortal, so that this means that He gained a glorious countenance, not that He lost the substance of His countenance. But He was seen of two; because faith in the resurrection is to be preached and shewn to two people, that is, the Gentiles and the Jews. There follows, And they went and told it unto the residue, neither believed they them. How are we to understand the words of Mark compared with the account of Luke, that they then said, The Lord hath risen indeed, and hath appeared unto Simon, (Luke 24:34) if we do not suppose that there were some there who would not believe?

THEOPHYLACT. For he does not say this of the eleven, but of some others, whom He calls the residue.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But in a mystic sense we may understand that faith here labours, leading the active life, but there it reigns secure in the contemplative vision. Here we see His face through a glass, there we shall see the truth face to face, wherefore He was shewn to them as they were walking, that is, labouring, in another form. And when it was told, the disciples did not believe, because they saw, like Moses, that which was not enough for them, for he said, Shew me thyself; (Exod. 33:18. Sept.) forgetting his flesh, he prays in this life for that which we hope for in the life to come.

16:14–18

14. Afterward he appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat, and upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed not them which had seen him after he was risen.

15. And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature.

16. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believed not shall be damned.

17. And these signs shall follow them that believe; In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues;

18. They shall take up serpents; and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them; they shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recover.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Mark, when about to finish his Gospel, relates the last appearance of our Lord to His disciples after His resurrection, saying,1 For the last time he appeared unto the eleven as they sat at meat. (Acts 1:4, 9)

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) We should observe that Luke says in the Acts, As he2 was eating with them he commanded that they should not depart from Jerusalem, and shortly afterwards, while they beheld he was taken up. For He ate, and then ascended, that by the act of eating, the truth of the flesh might be declared; wherefore it is also here said, that he appeared to them for the last time as they sat at meat.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But He appeared when all the eleven were together, that all might be witnesses, and relate to all men what they had seen and heard in common. It goes on: And upbraided them with their unbelief and hardness of heart, because they believed not them who had seen him after his resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But how was this done the last time? The last occasion on which the Apostles saw the Lord upon earth happened forty days after the resurrection; but would He then have upbraided them for not believing those who had seen Him risen, when they themselves had so often seen Him after His resurrection? It remains therefore that we should understand that Mark wished to say it in few words, and said for the last time, because it was the last time that He shewed Himself that day, as night was coming on, when the disciples returned from the country into Jerusalem, and found, as Luke says (Luke 24:33.), the eleven and those who were with them, speaking together concerning the resurrection of our Lord. But there were some there who did not believe; when these then were sitting at meat, (as Mark says,) and were still speaking, (as Luke relates,) The Lord stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you; (Luke 24:36) as Luke and John say. (John 20:19) The rebuke therefore which Mark here mentions, must have been amongst those words, which Luke and John say, that the Lord at that time spoke to the disciples. But another question is raised, how Mark says that He appeared when the eleven sat at meat, if the time was the first part of the night on the Lord's day, when John plainly says that Thomas was not with them, who, we believe, had gone out, before the Lord came in to them, after those two had returned from the village, and spoken with the eleven, as we find in Luke's Gospel. But Luke in his relation leaves room for supposing that Thomas went out first, while they spoke these things, and that the Lord entered afterwards; Mark however from his saying, for the last time he appeared to the eleven as they sat at meat, forces us to believe that he was there, unless indeed, though one of them was absent, he chose to call them the eleven, because the company of the Apostles was then called by this number, before Matthias was chosen into the place of Judas. Or if this be a harsh way of understanding it, let us understand that it means that after many appearances, He shewed Himself for the last time, that is, on the fortieth day, to the Apostles, as they sat at meat, and that since He was about to ascend from them, He rather wished on that day to reprove them for not having believed those who had seen Him risen before seeing Him themselves, because after His ascension even the Gentiles on their preaching were to believe a Gospel, which they had not seen. And so the same Mark immediately after that rebuke says, And he said unto them, Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. And lower down, He that believeth not shall be condemned. Since then they were to preach this, were not they themselves to be first rebuked, because before they saw the Lord they had not believed those to whom He had first appeared?

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Another reason also why our Lord rebuked His disciples, when He left them as to His bodily presence, was, that the words which He spoke on leaving them might remain more deeply impressed upon the hearts of His hearers.

PSEUDO-JEROME. But He rebukes their want of faith, that faith might take its place; He rebukes the hardness of their stony heart, that the fleshy heart, full of love, might take its place.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) After rebuking the hardness of their hearts, let us hear the words of advice which He speaks. For it goes on: Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. Every man must be understood by every creature; for man partakes something of every creature; he has existence as have stones, life as trees, feeling as animals, understanding as have Angels. For the Gospel is preached to every creature, because he is taught by it, for whose sake all are created, whom all things are in some way like, and from whom therefore they are not alien. By the name of every creature also every nation of the Gentiles may be meant. For it had been said before, Go not into the way of the Gentiles. (Matt. 10:5) But now it is said, Preach the Gospel to every creature, so that the preaching of the Apostles which was thrust aside by Judæa, might be an assistance to us, since Judæa had haughtily rejected it, thus witnessing to her own damnation.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else; to every creature, that is, whether believing or unbelieving. It goes on: He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved. For it is not enough to believe, for he who believeth and is not baptized, but is a catechumen, has not yet attained to perfect salvation.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But perhaps some one may say in himself, I have already believed, I shall be saved. He says what is true, if he keeps his faith by works; for that is a true faith, which does not contradict by its deeds what it says in words. There follows: But he that believeth not shall be damned.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) What shall we say here about infants, who by reason of their age cannot yet believe; for as to older persons there is no question. In the Church then of our Saviour children believe by others, as also they drew from others the sins which are remitted to them in baptism. It goes on: And these signs shall follow them that believe; In my name shall they cast out devils; they shall speak with new tongues; they shall take up serpents.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, they shall scatter before them serpents, whether intellectual or sensible, as it is said, Ye shall tread upon serpents and scorpions, which is understood spiritually. But it may also mean sensible serpents, as when Paul received no hurt from the viper. There follows: And if they drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them. (Luke 10:19) We read of many such cases in history, for many persons have drank poison unhurt, by guarding themselves with the sign of Christ. It goes on: They shall lay hands on the sick, and they shall recorer.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Are we then without faith because we cannot do these signs? Nay, but these things were necessary in the beginning of the Church, for the faith of believers was to be nourished by miracles, that it might increase. Thus we also, when we plant groves, pour water upon them, until we see that they have grown strong in the earth; but when once they have firmly fixed their roots, we leave off irrigating them. These signs and miracles have other things which we ought to consider more minutely. For Holy Church does every day in spirit what then the Apostles did in body; for when her Priests by the grace of exorcism lay their hands on believers, and forbid the evil spirits to dwell in their minds, what do they, but cast out devils? And the faithful who have left earthly words, and whose tongues sound forth the Holy Mysteries, speak a new language; they who by their good warnings take away evil from the hearts of others, take up serpents; and when they are hearing words of pestilent persuasion, without being at all drawn aside to evil doing, they drink a deadly thing, but it will never hurt them; whenever they see their neighbours growing weak in good works, and by their good example strengthen their life, they lay their hands on the sick, that they may recover. And all these miracles are greater in proportion as they are spiritual, and by them souls and not bodies are raised.

16:19–20

19. So then after the Lord had spoken unto them, he was received up into heaven, and sat on the right hand of God.

20. And they went forth, and preached every where, the Lord working with them, and confirming the word with signs following. Amen.

PSEUDO-JEROME. The Lord Jesus, who had descended from heaven to give liberty to our weak nature, Himself also ascended above the heavens; wherefore it is said, So then after the Lord had spoken unto them, he was received up into heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) By which words He seems to shew clearly enough that the foregoing discourse was the last that He spake to them upon earth, though it does not appear to bind us down altogether to this opinion. For He does not say, After He had thus spoken unto them, wherefore it admits of being understood not as if that was the last discourse, but that the words which are here used, After the Lord had spoken unto them, he was received into heaven, might belong to all His other discourses. But since the arguments which we have used above make us rather suppose that this was the last time, therefore we ought to believe that after these words, together with those which are recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, our Lord ascended into heaven.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) We have seen in the Old Testament that Elias was taken up into heaven. But the ethereal heaven is one thing, the aerial is another. The aerial heaven is nearer the earth, Elias then was raised into the aerial heaven, that he might be carried off suddenly into some secret region of the earth, there to live in great calmness of body and spirit, until he return at the end of the world, and pay the debt of death. We may also observe that Elias mounted up in a chariot, that by this they might understand that a mere man requires help from without. But our Redeemer, as we read, was not carried up by a chariot, not by angels, because He who had made all things was borne over all by His own power. We must also consider what Mark subjoins, And sat at the right hand of God, since Stephen says, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing at the right hand of God. Now sitting is the attitude of a judge, standing of one fighting or helping. Therefore Stephen, when toiling in the contest, saw Him standing, whom he had for his helper; but Mark describes Him as sitting after His assumption into heaven, because after the glory of His assumption, He will in the end be seen as a judge.

AUGUSTINE. (de Symbolo, 4) Let us not therefore understand this sitting as though He were placed there in human limbs, as if the Father sat on the left, the Son on the right, but by the right hand itself we understand the power which He as man received from God, that He should come to judge, who first had come to be judged. For by sitting we express habitation, as we say of a person, he sat himself down in that country for many years; in this way then believe that Christ dwells at the right hand of God the Father. For He is blessed and dwells in blessedness, which is called the right hand of the Father; for all is right hand there, since there is no misery. It goes on: And they went forth and preached every where, the Lord working with than, and confirming the word with signs and wonders.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Observe that in proportion as Mark began his history later, so he makes it reach in writing to more distant times, for he began from the commencement of the preaching of the Gospel by John, and he reaches in his narrative those times in which the Apostles sowed the same word of the Gospel throughout the world.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But what should we consider in these words, if it be not that obedience follows the precept and signs follow the obedience? For the Lord had commanded them, Go into all the world preaching the Gospel, and, Ye shall be witnesses even unto the ends of the earth.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. cxcix. 12.) (Acts 1:8) But how was this preaching fulfilled by the Apostles, since there are many nations in which it has just begun, and others in which it has not yet begun to be fulfilled? Truly then this precept was not so laid upon the Apostles by our Lord, as though they alone to whom He then spoke were to fulfil so great a charge; in the same way as He says, Behold, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world, apparently to them alone; but who does not understand that the promise is made to the Catholic Church, which though some are dying, others are born, shall be here unto the end of the world?

THEOPHYLACT. But we must also know from this that words are confirmed by deeds as then in the Apostles works confirmed their words, for signs followed. Grant then, O Christ, that the good words which we speak may be confirmed by works and deeds, so that at the last, Thou working with us in word and in deed, we may be perfect, for Thine as is fitting is the glory both of word and deed. Amen.

CATENA AUREA: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS:

VOL. III, ST. LUKE

ADVERTISEMENT

THE. following Compilation not being admissible into the Library of the Fathers from the date of some few of the authors introduced into it, the Editors of the latter work have been led to publish it in a separate form, being assured that those who have subscribed to their Translations of the entire Treatises of the ancient Catholic divines, will not feel less interest, or find less benefit, in the use of so very judicious and beautiful a selection from them. The Editors refer to the Preface for some account of the natural and characteristic excellences of the work, which will be found as useful in the private study of the Gospels, as it is well adapted for family reading, and full of thought for those who are engaged in religious instruction.

Oxford, May 6, 1841.

PREFACE

THE. Catena on St. Luke differs from those on the three other Gospels, in its more frequent citations from the Greek writers. For besides the Commentaries of S. Ambrose and Bede, and certain Homilies of S. Augustine and Gregory, there seems to have been no other Latin work on St. Luke's Gospel which St. Thomas could have used. How far he was himself acquainted with Greek, it seems difficult to determine; but from the expression feci transferri, in his Preface to the three later Gospels, it has been supposed, that for this part of his work he employed others to make translations for him from the Greek writers, which he afterwards inserted in his Catena, not always (as he says himself) giving the very words, but frequently only the sense of the passage.

From the ignorance of the Greek language at that time, it was not to be supposed that these translations would be free from error; and when we couple with this the carelessness of transcribers, we cannot be surprised that in course of time the text of the Catena should have become very corrupt, and the sense of whole passages, but particularly the names of their authors, involved in great doubt and obscurity. The mistakes on this latter point Nicolai thinks were chiefly owing to the abbreviated form and character in which the names were written, so that one name was often put for another, from its similarity; as Theophilus for Theophylact; while others were altogether omitted. In Nicolai's edition, however, (which has been followed in the present volume,) very great corrections were made, for which, as the original works of most of the Greek writers quoted by S. Thomas no longer exist, he was chiefly indebted to the Greek Catenæ. By their assistance not only was the text carefully restored and amended from the original Greek, but the references verified afresh, and many for the first time supplied.

It may here then perhaps be useful to give first some account of the Catenæ used by Nicolai, and others which have been referred to in the following translation; next to mention those Fathers whose names are cited in St. Thomas, but their works from which his extracts are taken are either not to be found at all, or at least only fragments of them, in the published editions; and after them a number of inferior writers whom St. Thomas had included under the general title of Græcus, but whose names have now been furnished from the Greek Catenæ.

(1.) The Catena of most use to Nicolai was one formerly in the Mazarin, now in the Royal Library at Paris, (Montf. MSS. p. 1339.) It is said to be of the 13th century, and is compiled from fifty-six Fathers, whose names are clearly marked. But it embraces only the twelve first chapters of St. Luke. For the twelve latter he employed Corderius; but it is much to be regretted that he had not possessed the remainder of the Mazarin MSS. which seems to be existing in the Vatican from the description Maii gives of a fragment he discovered there; and Montfaucon says of the former part, that not the sixth part of it is contained in Corderius. Besides, Corderius is not at all to be trusted as to the names of authors, as may be seen from Maii[a] and Lambecius[b].

Maii has published a considerable part of another Catena, in his ninth vol. Vet. Script. Its date is very near the end of the 11th century, and it is entitled, ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκλογῆς τοῦ Νικητοῦ Σεῤῥῶν. He ascribes the first Catena to the same author, and a similar title is prefixed to a MS. in the Coislin Library, (Bibl. Coisl. No. 201.) of a later date, and containing a Catena on St. Luke of sixty-two Fathers. These three Catenæ, though differing in date, yet very similar in the names and number of the authors cited, must all be traced to the same source. Nor does there seem any reason why they should not be successive copies, only increased as time went on, of the original MS. of Nicetas, whose name they bear. Nicetas flourished about 1077. He was at first Deacon at Constantinople, then Bishop of Serræ in Macedonia, afterwards Archbishop of Heraclea in Thrace. He is proved by Wolf (De Catenis) to have been the author of a Catena on Job, generally assigned to Olympiodorus; and Lambecius (v. 63. iii. 81.) describes a Catena of his on the Psalms. That published by Possinus on St. Matthew, from a MS. in the Library of the Elector of Bavaria, contains extracts from thirty Fathers, with a prologue and several expositions under the name of Nicetas. It seems very probable then that Nicetas was the author of a new class of Catenæ, far exceeding in size and completeness those which previously existed. For among a great number of MSS. Catenæ on the

Gospels in the Paris, Venice, and Vienna Libraries, which bear date of the 10th or 11th centuries, there are scarcely any which number more than twelve Fathers, none certainly which approach to the extent of those above mentioned.

Of the MSS. Catenæ on St. Luke, of this date, some have the title prefixed to them, “From Chrysostom and other Fathers.” Some again bear the names of Cyril and Origen, but by far the greater number, particularly in the Paris Library, are ascribed to Titus Bostrensis. It is however quite plain, that the Titus Bostrensis, who flourished under Julian in the fourth century, could not have been the author of a Catena containing extracts from the works of Cyril, Chrysostom, and Isidore of Peleusium, who all lived some time later. Combefis (Bibl. Concion. Rec. Auct. p. 49.) thinks that this Titus wrote Commentaries on the Gospels of which only fragments remain, and also the four books ascribed to him against the Manicheans; but that there was a later writer of the same name, perhaps in the 6th century, who was the author of this Catena, and of the Commentary published under the name of Titus in the Bibl. Pat. For he says that there exist, in a MS. Catena on St. Matthew, passages assigned to Titus, which are not in that on St. Luke, and are very far superior to it. And these he conceives to belong to the elder Titus. It seems however most probable, that this Catena on St. Luke which Combefis speaks of, is an abridgment of a larger one, which was compiled from the ancient Titus and other later Fathers[a], and by the same anonymous hand which also compiled that on Matthew, for the latter is always referred to by the former whenever St. Luke repeats what has been before related by St. Matthew[b].

There is the same reference also in the Commentary on St. Luke above mentioned, which was first published in Greek with a Latin Translation by Peltanus, (Bib. Pat. Gr. Lat. 1548.) which is plainly nothing but an abridgment of the Catena, though in a different form, making no distinction between the separate authors.

Of the extracts given by St. Thomas from Titus, the greater number are accordingly to be found in the two Catenæ on St. Luke and St. Matthew, edited by Dr. Cramer, from Paris and Bodl. MSS. It appears also that these Catenæ are substantially the same as those mentioned by Savile, (vol. viii. p. 218.) of which the one on Matthew was published in a Latin Translation by Chris. Serrarigius at Venice, 1554, and is found also in the Lat. Ed. of

Chrysostom, 2 vol. p. 1151. under the title of Libellus Questionum. Paris, 1588.

(2.) The extracts cited by St. Thomas from Chrysostom are chiefly taken from the Homilies on Matthew, but there are some which seem to be gathered from different parts of his works by some writer who was well acquainted with them. Wastell assigns these to John of Jerusalem, whom he thinks he has proved to be the author of the Opus Imperfectum, generally imputed to Chrysostom, as well as of a Commentary on St. Luke, frequently quoted therein, and from which therefore he concludes these passages have been derived. However this may be, they are clearly from their occurrence in the oldest Catenæ to be attributed to some very early imitator or epitomist of Chrysostom.

The greater part of Origen’s Homilies on St. Luke are contained in St. Thomas, which St. Jerome tells us were written by Origen when he was young. Jerome gives a Latin translation of them, to which in the Ben. Ed. are affixed fragments of the Greek collected by Grabe, but they are published more at length both in Greek and Latin by Gallandi, Bibl. Pat. vol. 14. Maii has given some extracts in the Greek (6 vol. Class. Auct.) not in Gallandi. A passage on Luke 8:4. quoted by St. Thomas, is found in Origen on the Proverbs, published in the Bibl. Pat. as above. It may be remarked, that in the MSS. in the Library of St. Mark at Venice, from which Gallandi has published these works, what is ascribed to Titus and Origen, is in the Paris MSS. given to Titus alone.

A Commentary on St. Luke by Cyril is very largely quoted throughout this Catena. Nothing of the kind exists in the published Editions of his works, but Maii has lately given almost the whole of it in his 6th vol. Cl. Auct. A remarkable passage on the Eucharist quoted by St. Thomas, Luke 22:17 is found there, p. 371.

Several quotations from Athanasius, which have not been found in his published works, are supposed to be taken from a Commentary on St. Luke, of which a few fragments only remain, some in the Ben. Ed. and a few more in Montfaucon’s Ed. 1706.

A Commentary of Eusebius on St. Luke, but imperfect, has been published by Maii, (1st vol. Script. Vet.) as well as parts of his three books of Evangelical Questions, which seem to take in much of what is wanting to complete the Commentary on St. Luke. These have been edited from a MS.

in the Vatican of the 10th century, and supply several of the quotations given by St. Thomas.

(3.) Of the other Greek writers cited by St. Thomas, and in the earlier editions of the Catena Aurea under no other title than Græcus, almost all have been found in the συναγωγὴ ἐξηγήσεων published by Maii from the second Catena of Nicetas before mentioned. Some of them are but little known, and may therefore require a slight notice.

Alexander, a monk, perhaps a native of Cyprus, who wrote a book De Inventione S. Crucis, edited by Gretser, Gr. Lat. in his Tom. de Cruce, supposed also to be the same Alexander who recited an Oration on the Apostle Barnabas before the Abp. of Cyprus. See Leo Allatius de Symeonum. Sc. p. 99.

Amphilochius Bp. of Iconium in Lycaonia, 370. He was a Cappadocian by birth, and for some time lived a monastic life with S. Basil and Gregory, in 381. Theodosius committed to him the care of the Asiatic Diocese. His principal writings were a work against the Massilian Heretics, which is lost, and several Orations on the events of our Saviour’s Life, published by Combefis, 1644.

Antipater, Bp. of Bostrum in Arabia, 460. He is said to have answered the Apology of Eusebius for Origen. There are certain Sermons of his extant on St. John the Baptist, Zacharias, and the Salutation of the B. Virgin, which are among the works ascribed to Metaphrastes. See Leo Allat. p. 89.

Apollinaris, Bp. of Laodicea, celebrated for his opposition to Heathen books in the Christian schools. Before he promulgated his heretical doctrine, 376, he was the friend of Basil, Greg. Naz., Athanasius, and others. His heresy was condemned at Rome, 378. He wrote Commentaries on most of the books of Scripture; part of his Comm. on Luke is given in Maii, 1 vol. Vet. Script. p. 179.

Asterius, Bp. of Amasea in Pontus, flourished 401, under Julian, and wrote Homilies on the Gospels, some of which are in Mag. Bib. Pat. t. 4. and in Combefis Auctarium 1661; and fragments of others in Photius, Bibl. 271.

Evagrius, a Pontian by birth, studied under Greg. Naz. at Constantinople, and afterwards a disciple of S. Macarius in Egypt, wrote many monastic works, of which some are published among the writings of John Damascene.

Eutychius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 553, formerly a monk of Amasea. He wrote a book denying a sensible resurrection from the dead, concerning which there was a dispute held between him and Gregory the Great, then the Apocrisiary of Pope Vigilius at Constantinople. It was afterwards condemned by Tiberius the Emperor. See Greg. Mor. 1. 14. c. 29. where the retractation of this work is mentioned.

Isaac, a Syrian by birth, Bp. of Nineve 540, afterwards embraced the monastic life. Wrote several ascetic works, 53 Sermons under the title of De contemptu mundi, published Max. Bib. Pat. v. 11. See Lambec. lib. v. p. 73.

Geometer, Combefis places about the 7th century. He is chiefly known for his Hymns, (published Morell 1691,) in honour of the B. Virgin, and some Homilies; see also Allatius, p. 62.

Macarius the elder, flourished 373, a monk of Scetus and disciple of Antony in Egypt, lived 60 years in the desert, and died 391. Wrote 50 Homilies, De integritate quœ decet Christianos, which were published at Paris 1659, and in the works of Greg. Thaumaturgus 1622.

Nilus, Prefect of Constantinople 440. He was a disciple of Chrysostom, and after living for some time a secular life, he entered a monastery at Nitria in Egypt, where he wrote several works chiefly ascetic; these were published by Suares, 1673.

Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople, 858. Deposed in Council of Const. 869. For a list of his works, see Fabricius, vol. xi. c. 35. Some fragments of a Commentary on St. Luke are published by Maii, 1 vol. Script. Vet. but many of the extracts from his works in Catenæ on the Gospels are to be found in the Amphilochian Questions, of which some have been edited by Wolf, Schottus, and others; but several lately edited by Maii have never before been published; they are taken from a MS. in the Vatican, containing the whole 313.

Severus, Bp. of Antioch, 513; he was the first of the Monophysites, and was condemned by Justin, 519, for opposing the Council of Chalcedon. See Niceph. Hist. Ecc. 16. c. 35. His Commentary on Luke, which Montfaucon mentions, (Coisl. 54.) Maii gives, (6th vol. Cl. Auct. p. 418.)

Symeon Metaphrastes and Logotheta, born at Constantinople, secretary to the Emperor Leo, began to write his Lives of the Saints, 913. according to Cave and Allatius. Oudinus places him in the 12th century. His life of St.

Luke is quoted by St. Thomas, as also a Commentary on that Gospel, which does not however exist except in the Gr. Catenæ.

Symeon, Prefect of the Monastery of S. Maman in Xerocercus at Constantinople, 1050, wrote 33 Orations, De Fide et Moribus tum Christianis tum Monasticis, published in Latin, 1603, at Ingolstadt by Pontanus. See Allat. 167.

Theophanes is generally cited in the Greek Catenæ on St. Luke, together with Eusebius. Corderius doubts whether he was Theophanes Cerameus, Bp. of Tauromenia in Sicily, who wrote annals from Dioclesian to the Emperor Michael, and Homilies In Dominicas et Festa; or Theophanes, Bp. of Nicæa, who wrote against the Jews. Maii thinks the name has been mistaken for the Theophania Eusebii.

Victor, Presbyter of Antioch. See Preface to Catena on St. Mark.

Of the Latin Fathers quoted by St. Thomas, Bede is the only one which requires any mention here. His Commentary on St. Luke, as we learn from his letter to Acca prefixed to it, is chiefly a compilation from the writings of the four Doctors of the Latin Church, but particularly St. Ambrose. Some things however he has added himself "quæ auctor lucis ei aperuit," and from these St. Thomas has chiefly taken his extracts. The Glosses not to be found in the Glossa ordinaria or interlinearis, are supposed to be St. Thomas's own.

These introductory remarks have been supplied by the friend, who has translated the portion of St. Thomas's Commentary to which they relate, and which is contained in the following Volume, THOMAS DUDLEY RYDER. M. A. of Oriel College.

J. H. N.

PREFACE TO THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE

AMONG. those mysteries of Christ's Incarnation which the Prophet Esaias expressly and plainly foretels, he says, I will clothe the heavens with blackness, and make sackcloth their covering. The Lord hath given me the tongue of the learned, that I should know how by my word to uphold the weary. He wakeneth me at morn. At morn He wakeneth my ear to hearken unto Him as my Master. (Is. 50:3, 4.)

From these words we may understand the subject-matter of St. Luke's Gospel, the method of his writing, the object and condition of the writer.

AUGUSTINE. (de Consen. Evang. i. 2, 6.) St. Luke seems to dwell more than the other Evangelists upon the Priestly lineage and person of our Lord, and hence he has been represented under the symbol of a calf, because that is the principal victim of the Priest.

AMBROSE. (Prol. in Luc.) The calf being the Priestly victim, this book of the Gospel aptly answers to it, commencing as it does with the Priests, and ending in the calf, which, taking upon itself the sins of men, was sacrificed for the life of the whole world. This sacrifice of the calf also St. Luke describes with greater fulness than the rest.

GLOSS. As. then St. Luke's intention was mainly to set forth the Passion of Christ, the subject of his Gospel may be signified by these words; I will clothe the heavens with blackness, and make sackcloth their covering. For literally at Christ's Passion there was darkness, and the faith of the disciples was clouded.

JEROME. (sup. Esai. 53, 3.) And Christ was despised and made as one of no account, and His face was hidden and put to shame, that in the human flesh the Divine Power might be concealed.

JEROME. (sup. Esai. 6. 9.) St. Luke's style, as well in his Gospel as in the Acts of the Apostles, is more polished than that of the others, and has a tone of secular eloquence. Hence it is added, The Lord hath given me the tongue of the learned.

AMBROSE. (sup.) For although the divine Scriptures set aside the exercise of secular wisdom as of that which is rather decked out with a show of words than based upon true reason, yet will those who seek therein find the very examples which they consider most worthy of admiration. For St. Luke, while he has preserved a kind of historic order in his narrative, and made known to us more of our Lord's wonderful works than the other Evangelists, has at the same time contrived to unite the excellences of each kind of wisdom in the course of his Gospel. What more extraordinary in natural wisdom than his revelation that the Holy Spirit was also the Creator of our Lord's Incarnation! In the same book, he teaches morals, as, for example, in what manner I ought to love my enemy. (Luke 6:27, 32–35.) Again, he appeals to my reason, when I read, for he that is faithful in a little will be faithful also in much. (Luke 16:10.)

EUSEBIUS. (Hist. iii. 4.) St. Luke, a native of Antioch, by profession a Physician, has left us concerning that medicine which he had received from the Apostles either through his intercourse with them or by tradition, two medical books, whereby not our bodies but our souls may be healed. And hence it follows, That I should know how by my word to uphold the weary.

JEROME. (sup. Esai. 50, 4.) For he says that he has received the word from the Lord, by which he supports the weary and wanderer, and restores them to health.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes in vit. Luc.) St. Luke, being by nature of a noble and ardent mind, acquired in his youth the learning of the Greeks. He made himself perfectly acquainted with Grammar and Poetry, as well as complete master of the art of Rhetoric and the power of persuasion. Nor was he surpassed by any one in the gifts of Philosophy; last of all, he learns Medicine. And now by his natural quickness having drunk deep enough of human wisdom, he takes flight to something higher. He hastens accordingly to Judæa, and gains access to the presence and hearing of Christ. Being soon convinced of the truth, he becomes a true disciple of Christ, and has frequent intercourse with his Master. Hence it follows, He wakeneth me at morn, (in my youth, as it were, to secular wisdom). At morn He wakeneth my ear (to divine wisdom) to hearken unto Him as my Master, i. e. Christ Himself.

EUSEBIUS. (sup.) It is said that St. Luke wrote his Gospel as it was declared to him by the mouth of St. Paul, as St. Mark also wrote those things which were told him by St. Peter.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup. Matt. Hom. iv.) Each of them imitated his master; the one Paul, flowing more rapidly than the torrent; the other Peter, studying conciseness.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iv. 9.) They wrote at a time when they both were able to receive the approbation not only of the Church of Christ, but of the Apostles themselves, still abiding in the flesh. And thus much may suffice to have been said by way of Preface.

COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. LUKE

CHAPTER 1

1:1–4

Ver. 1. Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of those things which are most surely believed among us,

2. Even as they delivered them unto us, which from the beginning were eyewitnesses, and ministers of the word:

3. It seemed good to me also, having had perfect understanding of all things from the very first, to write unto thee in order, most excellent Theophilus,

4. That thou mightest know the certainty of those things, wherein thou hast been instructed.

EUSEBIUS. (Eccl. Hist. iii. 4.) St. Luke at the commencement of his Gospel has told us the reason of his writing, which was, that many others had rashly taken upon themselves to give accounts of those things of which he had a more certain knowledge. And this is his meaning when he says, Forasmuch as many have taken in hand to set forth in order a declaration of things.

AMBROSE. (Expos. Ev. Luc. l. i. c. i.) For as many among the Jewish people prophesied by inspiration of the Spirit of God, but others were false prophets rather than prophets, so now also have many attempted to write Gospels which the good moneychanger refuses to pass. One gospel is mentioned which the twelve Apostles are said to have written; another Basilides presumed to write; and another is said to have been by Matthias.

BEDE. (in procœm. Lucæ.) The many who are mentioned, he reckons not so much by their number, as by the variety of their manifold heresies; men who were not endued with the gift of the Holy Spirit, but engaging in a vain work, have rather set forth in order a relation of events, than woven a true history.

AMBROSE. Now they who have attempted to set forth these things in order have laboured by themselves, and have not succeeded in what they attempted. For without the assistance of man come the gifts and the grace of God, which, when it is infused, is wont so to flow, that the genius of the writer is not exhausted, but ever abounding. He well says therefore, Of things which have been fully accomplished among us, or which abound among us. For that which abounds is lacking to none, and no one doubts about that which is fulfilled, since the accomplishment builds up our faith, and the end manifests it.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (in procem. Lucæ.) He says, of things, because not by shadows, as the heretics say, did Jesus accomplish His advent in the flesh, but being as He was the Truth, so in very truth He performed His work.

ORIGEN. (Hom. i. in Luc.) The effect upon his own mind, St. Luke explains by the expression, of the things which have been fully accomplished among us, i. e. have had their full manifestation among us, (as the Greek word πεπληροφορημένων signifies, which the Latin cannot express in one word,) for he had been convinced of them by sure faith and reason, and wavered not in any thing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Comm. in Act. Apost. Hom. i.) The Evangelist was so far from being content with his single testimony, that he refers the whole to the Apostles, seeking from them a confirmation of his words; and therefore he adds, as they handed them down to us, who were themselves from the beginning eyewitnesses.

EUSEBIUS. (sup.) Luke is a sure witness, because he obtained his knowledge of the truth either from St. Paul’s instructions, or the instructions and traditions of the other Apostles, who were themselves eyewitnesses from the beginning.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup.) He says, were eyewitnesses, because this is our chief ground for believing in a thing, that we derive it from those who were actually eyewitnesses.

ORIGEN. It is plain that of one kind of knowledge, the end is in the knowledge itself, as in geometry; but of another kind, the end is counted to be in the work, as in medicine; and so it is in the word of God, and therefore having signified the knowledge by the words were themselves eyewitnesses, he points out the work by what follows, and were ministers of the word.

AMBROSE. This expression is used, not that we should suppose the ministry of the word to consist rather in seeing than hearing, but that, because by the word was meant not a word that can be spoken by the mouth, but one of real existence, we may understand that to have been not a common, but a Heavenly Word, to which the Apostles ministered.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) In what he says of the Apostles having been eyewitnesses of the word, he agrees with John, who says, The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we saw His glory. For the Word by means of the flesh was made visible.

AMBROSE. Now not only did they see the Lord in the body, but also in the Word. For they saw the Word, who with Moses and Elias saw the glory of the Word. Others did not see it, who could only see the body.

ORIGEN. It is written in Exodus, The people saw the voice of the Lord. (Exod. 20:18.) Now a voice is rather heard than seen. But it was so written, to shew us that men see the voice of the Lord with other eyes, which they only have who are worthy of them. Again in the Gospel, it is not the voice that is perceived, but the Word, which is more excellent than the voice.

THEOPHYLACT. (Præf. in Luc.) By these words it is plainly implied, that Luke was not a disciple from the beginning, but became one in course of time; others were disciples from the beginning, as Peter, and the sons of Zebedee.

BEDE. Nevertheless both Matthew and John were obliged in many things that they wrote to consult those who had had means of knowing the infancy, childhood, and genealogy of our Lord, and of seeing the things which he did.

ORIGEN. St. Luke hereby explains to us the source of his writing; seeing that what things he wrote, he gained not from report, but had himself traced them up from the beginning. Hence it follows, It seemed good to me also, having carefully investigated every thing from the very first, to write to thee in order, most excellent Theophilus.

AMBROSE. When he says, It seemed good to me, he does not deny that it seemed good to God: for it is God who predisposes the wills of men. Now no one has doubted that this book of the Gospel is more full of details than the others; by these words then he claims to himself, not any thing that is false, but the truth; and therefore he says, “It seemed good to me, having investigated every thing, to write.” Not to write every thing, but from a review of every thing; “for if all the things which Jesus did were written, I do not think the world itself could contain them.” (John 21:25.) But purposely has Luke passed by things that were written by others, in order that each book of the Gospel might be distinguished by certain mysteries and miracles peculiar to itself.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) He writes to Theophilus, a man probably of some distinction, and a governor; for the form, Most excellent, was not used except to rulers and governors. As for example, Paul says to Festus, Most excellent Festus. (Acts 26:25.)

BEDE. (sup.) Theophilus means, “loving God,” or “being loved by God.” Whoever then loves God, or desires to be loved by Him, let him think this Gospel to have been written to him, and preserve it as a gift presented to him, a pledge entrusted to his care. The promise was not to explain the meaning of certain new and strange things to Theophilus, but to set forth the truth of those words in which he had been instructed; as it is added, That thou mightest know the truth of those words in which thou hast been instructed; that is, “that thou mightest be able to know in what order each thing was said or done by the Lord.”

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup.) Or it may be, “That thou mightest feel certain and satisfied as to the truth of those things which thou hast heard, now that thou beholdest the same in writing.”

THEOPHYLACT. For frequently, when a thing is asserted by any one, and not expressed in writing, we suspect it of falsehood; but when a man has written what he asserts, we are the more inclined to believe it, as if, unless he thought it to be true, he would not commit it to writing.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius, comment. in Luc.) The whole Preface of this Evangelist contains two things; first, the condition of those who wrote Gospels before him, (Matthew and Mark for example;) secondly, the reason why he also himself proposed to write one.

Having said, “attempted,” a word which may be applied both to those who presumptuously engage upon a subject, and those who reverently handle it, he determines the doubtful expression by two additions; first, by the words, Of things which have been fully accomplished among us; and secondly, As they handed them down to us, who were eyewitnesses from the beginning. The word handed down seems to shew, that the eye-witnesses themselves had a commission to transmit the truth. For as they handed it down, so it became others also receiving it in due order, in their turn to publish it. But from the not depositing in writing what had been delivered, several difficulties through lapse of time sprang up. Rightly then did those who had received the tradition from the first eye-witnesses of the Word, establish it in writing for the whole world; thereby repelling falsehood, destroying forgetfulness, and making up from tradition itself a perfect whole.

1:5–7

5. There was in the days of Herod, the king of Judæa, a certain priest named Zacharias, of the course of Abia: and his wife was of the daughters of Aaron, and her name was Elisabeth.

6. And they were both righteous before God, walking in all the commandments and ordinances of the Lord blameless.

7. And they had no child, because that Elisabeth was barren, and they both were now well stricken in years.

CHRYSOSTOM. (noc occ.) St. Luke commences the history of his Gospel with Zacharias and the birth of John; relating one marvellous event before another, the less before the greater. For since a virgin was about to become a mother, it had been fore-ordained by grace that the old should previously conceive. He fixes the time, when he says, In the days of Herod, and in the following words adds his rank, king of Judæa. (in Matt. cap. 2.). There was another Herod, who killed John; he was tetrarch, whereas this one was king.

BEDE. (in Luc. Evang.) Now the time of Herod, i. e. of a foreign king, bears witness to our Lord’s coming, for it had been foretold, The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come. (Gen. 49:12.) For from the time that our fathers came out of Egypt, they were governed by judges of their own nation, until the Prophet Samuel; and then by kings, until the carrying away to Babylon. But after the return from Babylon, the chief power was in the hands of priests, until the time of Hyrcanus, who was both king and high priest. He was slain by Herod, after which the government of the kingdom was delivered over by the command of Augustus Cæsar to this same Herod, a foreigner, in whose thirty-first year, according to the prophecy we have mentioned, Shiloh came.

AMBROSE. Divine Scripture teaches us with respect to those whom we commemorate, that not only the characters of the men themselves, but of their parents also, ought to be praised, that they might be distinguished by an inheritance, as it were, handed down to them of unspotted purity. Now not only from his parents, but also from his ancestors, St. John derives his illustrious descent, a descent not exalted by secular power, but venerable from its sanctity. Complete then is that praise which comprehends birth, character, office, actions, and judgments.

The office was that of the Priesthood, as it is said, A certain Priest of the name of Zacharias.

BEDE. (in Homil. in vigil. S. Joh. Bap.) For John was allotted a Priestly tribe, that he might with the more authority herald forth a change of priesthood.

AMBROSE. His birth is implied in the mention made of his ancestors. Of the course of Abia, i. e. of high rank among the noblest families.

BEDE. There were Princes of the Sanctuary or High Priests, both of the sons of Eleazar and the sons of Thamar, whose courses according to their respective services when they entered into the House of God David divided into twenty-four lots, of which the family of Abia (from which Zacharias was descended) obtained the eighth lot. (1 Chron. 24.) But it was not without meaning that the first preacher of the new covenant was born with the rights of the eighth lot; because as the old Covenant is often expressed by the seventh number on account of the Sabbath, so frequently is the new Covenant by the eighth, because of the sacrament of our Lord’s or our resurrection.

THEOPHYLACT. Wishing to shew also that John was legally of Priestly descent, Luke adds, And his wife was of the daughters of Aaron, and her name was Elisabeth, for it was not permitted to the Jews to take a wife from any other tribe but their own. Elisabeth by interpretation signifies “rest,” Zacharias “the remembrance of the land.”

BEDE. John was born of just parents, that so he might the more boldly give precepts of justice to the people, which he had not learnt as novelties, but had received by right of inheritance from his ancestors. Hence it follows, And they were both just before God.

AMBROSE. Here their whole character is comprehended in their justice, but it is well said before God, for a man by affecting a popular good-will might seem just to me, but not be just before God, if that justice instead of springing from simpleness of heart, was a mere pretence carried on by flattery. Perfect then is the praise, “that a man is just before God;” for he only is perfect who is approved by Him who cannot be deceived. St. Luke comprehends the action in the commandment, the doing justice in the justification. Hence it follows, walking in all the commandments and justifications of the Lord. For when we obey the command of heaven we walk in the commandments of the Lord, when we observe justice we seem to possess the justification of the Lord. But to be “blameless” we must “provide things honest, not only before God, but also before men”; (Prov. 3:4.) there is no blame when both motive and action are alike good, but a too austere righteousness often provokes censure. A righteous act may also be done unrighteously, as when a man out of ostentation gives largely to the poor, which is not without just cause of blame. It follows, And they had no son, because Elisabeth was barren.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ex Hom. in Gen. 49.) Not only Elisabeth, but the wives of the Patriarchs also, Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, were barren, which was counted a disgrace among the ancients. Not that their barrenness was the effect of sin, since all were just and virtuous, but ordained rather for your benefit, that when you saw a virgin giving birth to the Lord, you might not be faithless, or perplexing your mind with respect to the womb of the barren.

THEOPHYLACT. And that you might learn that the law of God seeketh not a bodily increase of sons but a spiritual, both were far advanced, not only in the body but in the Spirit, “making ascents in their heartb,” having their life as the day not as the night, and walking honestly as in the day. (Ps. 84:6, 1 Thess. 5:5.)

1:8–10

8. And it came to pass, that while he executed the Priest’s office before God in the order of his course,

9. According to the custom of the Priest’s office, his lot was to burn incense when he went into the temple of the Lord.

10. And the whole multitude of the people were praying without at the time of incense.

BEDE. The Lord appointed by the hand of Moses one High Priest, at whose death another was to succeed in due order. This was observed until the time of David, who by the command of the Lord increased the number of the Priests; and so at this time Zacharias is said to have been performing his Priest’s office in the order of his course, as it follows: But it came to pass, when Zacharias was performing the Priest’s office in the order of his course before God, according to the custom of the Priesthood, his lot was, &c.

AMBROSE. Zacharias seems here to be designated High Priest, because into the second tabernacle went the High Priest alone once every year, not without blood, which he offered for himself and the sins of the people. (Heb. 9:7.)

BEDE. It was not by a new lot that he was chosen when the incense was to be burnt, but by the old lot, whereby according to the order of his Priesthood he succeeded in the course of Abia. It follows, And all the multitude of the people, &c. Incense was ordered to be carried into the Holy of Holies by the High Priest, the whole people waiting without the temple. It was to be on the tenth day of the seventh month, and this day was to be called the day of expiation or propitiation, the mystery of which day the Apostle explaining to the Hebrews, points to Jesus as the true High Priest, who in His own blood has entered the secret places of heaven that he might reconcile the Father unto us, and intercede for the sins of those who still wait praying before the doors.

AMBROSE. This then is that High Priest who is still sought by lot, for as yet the true High Priest is unknown; for he who is chosen by lot is not obtained by man’s judgment. That High Priest therefore was sought for, and another typified, the true High Priest for ever, who not by the blood of victims, but by His own blood, was to reconcile God the Father to mankind. Then indeed there were changes in the Priesthood, now it is unchangeable.

1:11–14

11. And there appeared unto him an angel of the the Lord standing on the right side of the altar of incense.

12. And when Zacharias saw him, he was troubled, and fear fell upon him.

13. But the angel said unto him, Fear not, Zacharias: for thy prayer is heard; and thy wife Elisabeth shall bear thee a son, and thou shalt call his name John.

14. And thou shalt have joy and gladness; and many shall rejoice at his birth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 2. de Inc. Dei Nat.) When Zacharias entered into the temple to offer up prayers to God for all men, interceding between God and man, he saw an angel standing within, as it is said, And there appeared unto him an angel.

AMBROSE. It is well said that there appeared an angel to Zacharias, who suddenly beheld him; and this is the expression especially used by Divine Scripture with respect to angels or God, that what cannot be seen beforehand may be said to appear. For things which are the objects of our senses are not seen as He is seen, Who is seen only as He will, and Whose nature is not to be seen.

ORIGEN. And we speak thus not only of the present time, but also of the future. When we shall have passed from the world, God will not appear unto all men, nor will the angels, but unto him only who has a clean heart. The place will neither hinder nor serve any one.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. in Matt.) But the angel evidently came not in a dream, because the tidings he brought were too hard to be understood, and needed therefore a more visible and marvellous manifestation.

DAMASCENE. (de fide Orthodox. ii. 3.) Angels, however, are revealed not as they really are, but transformed (as men are able to behold them) into whatever the Lord commands.

THEOPHYLACT. It is said the altar of incense, because the other altar was set apart for burnt offerings.

AMBROSE. It was not without good reason that the angel appeared in the temple, for the coming of the true High Priest was now announced, and the Heavenly Sacrifice was preparing at which angels were to minister. For one cannot doubt that an angel stands by where Christ is sacrificed. But he appeared at the right hand of the altar of incense, because he brought down the token of Divine mercy. For the Lord is on my right hand, so that I should not be moved. (Ps. 16:8.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (de Inc. Dei Nat.) The justest of men can not without fear behold an angel; Zacharias therefore, not sustaining the sight of the angel's presence, nor able to withstand his brightness, is troubled, as it is added, Zacharias was troubled. But as it happens, when a charioteer is frightened, and has let loose his reins, the horses run headlong, and the chariot is overturned; so is it with the soul, when it is taken by any surprise or alarm; as it is here added, and fear fell upon him.

ORIGEN. A new face suddenly presenting itself to the human eye, troubles and startles the mind. The angel knowing this to be the nature of man, first dispels the alarm, as it follows, But the angel said unto him, Fear not.

ATHANASIUS. (in vita Anton.) Whereby it is not difficult to discern between good and bad spirits, for if joy has succeeded to fear, we may know that relief has come from God, because the peace of the soul is a sign of the Divine Presence; but if the fear remains unshaken, it is an enemy who is seen.

ORIGEN. The angel not only soothes his fears, but gladdens him with good tidings, adding, For thy prayer is heard, and thy wife Elisabeth shall bear a son.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Evan. l. i. q. l.) Now here we must first consider that it is not likely that Zacharias, when offering sacrifice for the sins or for the salvation or redemption of the people, would neglect the public petitions, to pray (though himself an old man, and his wife also old) that he might receive children; and, next, above all that no one prays for what he despairs of ever obtaining. And even up to this time, sc much had he despaired of ever having children, that he would not believe, even when an angel promised it to him. The words, Thy prayer is heard, must be understood therefore to refer to the people; and as salvation, redemption, and the putting away of the sins of the people was to be through Christ, it is told Zacharias that a son shall be born to him, because that son was ordained to be the forerunner of Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup.) Or it means, that this was to be the proof of his prayer having been heard, namely, that a son should be born to him, crying, Behold the Lamb of God!

THEOPHYLACT. As if when Zacharias asks, How shall I know this? the angel answers, Because Elisabeth shall bring forth a son, thou shalt believe that the sins of thy people are forgiven.

AMBROSE. Or, as follows; Divine mercy is ever full and overflowing, not narrowed to a single gift, but pouring in an abundant store of blessings; as in this case, where first the fruit of his prayer is promised; and next, that his barren wife shall bear a child, whose name is announced as follows; And thou shalt call his name John.

BEDE. It is meant as a token of particular merit, when a man has a name given him or changed by God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Joann. Hom. xviii.) Which must be the meaning here, for those who from their earliest years were destined to shine forth in virtue, received their names at the very first from a divine source; while those who were to rise up in later years, had a name given them afterwards.

BEDE. John is therefore interpreted, “one in whom is grace, or the grace of God;” by which name it is declared, first, that grace was given to his parents, to whom in their old age a son was to be born; next, to John himself, who was to become great before the Lord; lastly, also to the children of Israel, whom he was to convert to the Lord. Hence it follows, And he shall be a joy unto thee, and a cause of rejoicing.

ORIGEN. For when a just man is born into the world, the authors of his birth rejoice; but when one is born who is to be as it were an exile to labour and punishment, they are struck with terror and dismay.

AMBROSE. But a saint is not only the blessing of his parents, but also the salvation of many; as it follows, And many shall rejoice at his birth. Parents are reminded here to rejoice at the birth of saints, and to give thanks. For it is no slight gift of God to vouchsafe unto us children, to be the transmitters of our race, to be the heirs of succession.

1:15–17

15. For he shall be great in the sight of the Lord, and shall drink neither wine nor strong drink; and he shall be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother’s womb.

16. And many of the children of Israel shall he turn to the Lord their God.

17. And he shall go before him in the spirit and power of Elias, to turn the hearts of the fathers to the children, and the disobedient to the wisdom of the just; to make ready a people prepared for the Lord.

AMBROSE. Next to his becoming the rejoicing of many, the greatness of his virtue is prophesied; as it is said, For he shall be great in the sight of the Lord. The greatness signified is not of the body, but of the soul. Greatness in the sight of the Lord is greatness of soul, greatness of virtue.

THEOPHYLACT. For many are called great before men, but not before God, as the hypocrites. And so in like manner was John called great, as the parents of John were called just, before the Lord.

AMBROSE. He extended not the boundaries of an empire, nor brought back in triumph the spoils of war, (but, what is far greater,) preaching in the desert he overcame by his great virtue the delights of the world, and the lusts of the flesh. Hence it follows; And he shall drink no wine nor strong drink.

BEDE. Sicera is interpreted "drunkenness," and by the word the Hebrews understand any drink that can intoxicate, (whether made from fruits, corn, or any other thing.) But it was part of the law of the Nazarites to give up wine and strong drink at the time of their consecration. (Numb. 6:5.) Hence John, and others like him, that they might always remain Nazarites, (i. e. holy,) are careful always to abstain from these things. For he ought not to be drunk with wine (in which is licentiousness) who desires to be filled with the new wine of the Holy Spirit; rightly then is he, from whom all drunkenness with wine is utterly put away, filled with the grace of the Spirit. But it follows, And he shall be filled with the Holy Spirit.

AMBROSE. On whomsoever the Holy Spirit is poured, in him there is fulness of great virtue; as in St. John, who before he was born, when yet in his mother's womb, bore witness to the grace of the Spirit which he had received, when leaping in the womb of his parent he hailed the glad tidings of the coming of the Lord. There is one spirit of this life, another of grace. The former has its beginning at birth, its end at death; the latter is not tied down to times and seasons, is not quenched by death, is not shut out of the womb.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes sup.) But what John's work is to be, and what he will do through the Holy Spirit, is shewn as follows; And many of the children of Israel shall he turn, &c.

ORIGEN. John indeed turned many, but it is the Lord's work to turn all to God their Father.

BEDE. Now since John (who, bearing witness to Christ, baptized the people in His faith) is said to have turned the children of Israel to the Lord their God, it is plain that Christ is the God of Israel. Let the Arians then cease to deny that Christ our Lord is God. Let the Photiniansc blush to ascribe Christ's beginning to the Virgin. Let the Manichæns no longer believe that there is one God of the people of Israel, another of the Christians.

AMBROSE. But we need no testimony that St. John turned the hearts of many, for to this point we have the express witness of both prophetic and and evangelical Scriptures. For the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, and make His paths straight; and his baptisms thronged by the people, declare the rapid progress of conversion. For the forerunner of Christ preached, not himself, but the Lord; and therefore it follows, And he shall go before Him. It was well said, that he shall go before Him, who both in birth and in death was His forerunner.

ORIGEN. In the spirit and power of Elijah.—He says not, in the mind of Elijah, but in the spirit and power. For the spirit which was in Elijah came upon John, and in like manner his power.

AMBROSE. For never is the spirit without power, nor power without the spirit. And therefore it is said, in the spirit and power; because holy Elijah had great power and grace. Power, so that he turned back the false hearts of the people to faith; power of abstinence, and patience, and the spirit of prophecy. Elijah was in the wilderness, in the wilderness also was John. The one sought not the favour of king Ahab; the other despised that of Herod. The one divided Jordan; the other brought men to the Saving waters; John, the forerunner of our Lord's first coming; Elijah of His latter.

BEDE. But what was foretold of Elias by Malachi, is now spoken by the angel of John; as it follows, That he should turn the hearts of the parents to the children; (Mal. 4:5, 6.) pouring into the minds of the people, by his preaching, the spiritual knowledge of the ancient saints. And the disobedient to the wisdom of the just; i. e. not laying claim to righteousness from the works of the law, but seeking salvation by faith. (Rom. 10. sup.)

GREEK EXPOSITOR. Or else; The Jews were the parents of John and the Apostles; but, nevertheless, from pride and infidelity raged violently against the Gospel. Therefore, like dutiful children, John first, and the Apostles after him, declared to them the truth, winning them over to their own righteousness and wisdom. So also will Elias convert the remnant of Hebrews to the truth of the Apostles.

BEDE. But because he had said that Zacharias’ prayer for the people was heard, he adds, To make ready a people prepared1 for the Lord; by which he teaches in what manner the same people must be healed and prepared; namely, by repenting at the preaching of John and believing on Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, John made ready a people not disbelieving but prepared, that is, previously fitted to receive Christ.

ORIGEN. This sacrament 2 of preparation is even now fulfilled in the world, for even now the spirit and power of John must come upon the soul, before it believes in Jesus Christ.

1:18–22

18. And Zacharias said unto the angel, Whereby shall I know this? for I am an old man, and my wife well stricken in years.

19. And the angel answering said unto him, I am Gabriel, that stand in the presence of God; and am sent to speak unto thee, and to shew thee these glad tidings.

20. And, behold, thou shalt be dumb, and not able to speak, until the day that these things shall be performed, because thou believest not my words, which shall be fulfilled in their season.

21. And the people waited for Zacharias, and marvelled that he tarried so long in the temple.

22. And when he came out, he could not speak unto them: and they perceived that he had seen a vision in the temple: for he beckoned unto them and remained speechless.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. ii. De Inc. Nat. Dei sup.) Considering his own age, and moreover the barrenness of his wife, Zacharias doubted; as it is said, And Zacharias said unto the angel, Whereby shall I know this? as if he said, “How shall this be?” And he adds the reason of his doubting; For I am an old man. An unseasonable time of life, an ill-suited nature; the planter infirm, the soil barren. But it is thought by some a thing unpardonable. in the priest, that he raises a course of objections; for whenever God declares any thing, it becomes us to receive it in faith, and moreover, disputes of this kind are the mark of a rebellious spirit. Hence it follows; And the angel answering said unto him, I am Gabriel, who stand before God.

BEDE. As if he says, "If it were man who promised these miracles, one might with impunity demand a sign, but when an angel promises, it is then not right to doubt. It follows; And I am sent to speak to thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup.) That when you hear that I am sent from God, you should deem none of the things which are said unto thee to be of man, for I speak not of myself, but declare the message of Him who sends me. And this is the merit and excellence of a messenger to relate nothing of his own.

BEDE. Here we must remark, that the angel testifies, that he both stands before God, and is sent to bring good tidings to Zacharias.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxxiv. in Evang.) For when angels come to us, they so outwardly fulfil their ministry, as at the same time inwardly to be never absent from His sight; since, though the angelic spirit is circumscribed, the highest Spirit, which is God, is not circumscribed. The angels therefore even when sent are before Him, because on whatever mission they go, they pass within Him.

BEDE. But he gives him the sign which he asks for, that he who spoke in unbelief, might now by silence learn to believe; as it follows; and, behold, thou shall be dumb.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup.) That the bonds might be transferred from the powers of generation to the vocal organs. From no regard to the priesthood was he spared, but for this reason was the more smitten, because in a matter of faith he ought to have set an example to others.

THEOPHYLACT. (cap. i.) Because the word in the Greek (κωφὸς) may also signify deaf, he well says, Because thou believest not, thou shalt be deaf, and shalt not be able to speak. For most reasonably he suffered these two things; as disobedient, he incurs the penalty of deafness; as an objector, of silence.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup.) But the Angel says, And, behold; in other words, "At this instant." But mark the mercy of God in what follows: Until the day in which these things shall be performed. As if he said, "When by the issues of events I shall have proved my words, and thou shalt perceive that thou art rightly punished, I will remove the punishment from thee." And he points out the cause of the punishment, adding, Because thou believest not my words, which shall be fulfilled in their season; not considering His power Who sent me, and before Whom I stand. But if he who was incredulous about a mortal birth is punished, how shall he escape vengeance, who speaks falsely of the heavenly and unspeakable birth?

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Antipater Bostrensis.) Now while these things were going on within, the delay excited surprise among the multitudes who were waiting without, as it follows: And the people waited for Zacharias, and marvelled that he tarried. And while various suspicions were going about, each man repeating them as it pleased him, Zacharias coming forth told by his silence what he secretly endured. Hence it follows, And when he came out, he could not speak.

THEOPHYLACT. But Zacharias beckoned to the people, who perhaps enquired the cause of his silence, which, as he was not able to speak, he signified to them by nodding. Hence it follows, And he beckoned to them, and remained speechless.

AMBROSE. But a nod is a certain action of the body, without speech endeavouring to declare the will, yet not expressing it.

1:23–25

23. And it came to pass, that, as soon as the days of his ministration were accomplished, he departed to his own house.

24. And after those days his wife Elisabeth conceived, and hid herself five months, saying,

25. Thus hath the Lord dealt with me in the days wherein he looked on me, to take away my reproach among men.

BEDE. During the time of their course, the priests of the temple were so occupied by their office, that they kept themselves not only from the society of their wives, but even from the very threshold of their houses. Hence it is said, And it came to pass, that, as soon as the days were accomplished, &c. For as there was then required a priestly succession from the root of Aaron, of necessity then a time was appointed for keeping up the inheritance. But as now not a carnal succession, but spiritual perfection, is looked for, the priests are enjoined (in order that they might ever be able to serve the altar) the perpetual observance of chastity. It follows: But after those days, &c. that is, after the days of Zacharias’s ministration were completed. But these things were done in the month of September, the twenty-second day of the month, upon which the Jews were bound to observe the feast of the Tabernacles, just before the equinox, at which the night began to be longer than the day, because Christ must increase, but John must decrease. And those days of fasting were not without their meaning; for by the mouth of John, repentance and mortification were to be preached to men. It follows: And she hid herself. (see John 3:30.)

AMBROSE. What reason then for concealment, except shame? For there are certain allowed times in wedlock, when it is becoming to attend to the begetting of children; while the years thrive, while there is hope of child-bearing. But when in good time old age has come on, and the period of life is more fitted for governing children, than begetting them, it is a shame to bear about the signs of pregnancy, however lawful. It is a shame to be laden with the burden of another age, and for the womb to swell with the fruit of not one’s own time of life. It was a shame then to her on account of her age; and hence we may understand the reason why they did not at this time come together, for surely she who blushed not at their coming together in their old age, would not blush at her child-bearing; and yet she blushes at the parental burden, while she yet is unconscious of the religious mystery. But she who hid herself because she had conceived a son, began to glory that she carried in her womb a prophet.

ORIGEN. And therefore he says, Five months, that is, until Mary should conceive, and her babe leaping with joy should prophesy.

AMBROSE. And though she might blush at the time of her child-bearing, on the other hand she rejoiced that she was free from reproach, saying, Thus hath the Lord dealt with me.

CHRYSOSTOM. Truly He has loosed her barrenness, a supernatural gift He has bestowed upon her, and the unfruitful rock has produced the green blade. He has taken away her disgrace, in that He has made her to bring forth. Hence it follows: In the days wherein he looked on me, to take away my reproach among men.

AMBROSE. For it is a shame among women not to receive that reward of marriage, which is the only cause of their being married.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Homil. de Anna.) Her joy therefore is twofold. The Lord has taken away from her the mark of barrenness, and also given her an illustrious offspring. In the case of other births, the coming together of the parents only occurs; this birth was the effect of heavenly grace.

BEDE. Now mystically by Zacharias may be signified the Jewish Priesthood, by Elisabeth the law itself; which, well administered by the teaching of the Priests, ought to have borne spiritual children to God, but was not able, because the Law made no one perfect. (Heb. 7:19, 1 Tim. 1:8.) Both were just, because the law is good, and the Priesthood for that time holy; both were well stricken in years, because at Christ’s coming both the Law and Priesthood were just bending to old age. Zacharias enters the temple, because it is the priest’s office to enter into the sanctuary of heavenly mysteries. There was a multitude without the doors, because the multitude cannot penetrate mysteries. When he places frankincense on the altar, he discovers that John will be born; for while the teachers are kindled with the flame of divine reading, they find the grace of God flow to them through Jesus: and this is done by an angel, for the Law was ordained by angels. (Gal. 3:19.)

AMBROSE. But in one man the voice of the people was put to silence, because in one man the whole people was addressing God. For the word of God has come over to us, and in us is not silent. He is dumb who understands not the Law; for why should you think the man who knows not a sound, to be more dumb than him who knows not a mystery. The Jewish people are like to one beckoning, who cannot make his actions intelligible.

BEDE. And yet Elisabeth conceives John, because the more inward parts of the Law abound with sacraments of Christ. She conceals her conception five months, because Moses in five books set forth the mysteries of Christ; or because the dispensation of Christ is represented by the words or deeds of the saints, in the five ages of the world.

1:26–27

26. And in the sixth month the angel Gabriel was sent from God unto a city of Galilee, named Nazareth,

27. To a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the virgin’s name was Mary.

BEDE. Because either the Incarnation of Christ was to be in the sixth age of the world, or because it was to serve to the fulfilling of the law, rightly in the sixth month of John's conception was an angel sent to Mary, to tell her that a Saviour should be born. Hence it is said, And in the sixth month, &c. We must understand the sixth month to be March, on the twenty-fifth day of which our Lord is reported to have been conceived, and to have suffered, as also to have been born on the twenty-fifth day of December. But if either the one day we believe to be the vernal equinox, or the other the winter solstice, it happens that with the increase of light He was conceived or born Who lighteneth every man that cometh into the world. But if any one shall prove, that before the time of our Lord's nativity or conception, light began either to increase, or supersede the darkness, we then say, that it was because John, before the appearance of His coming, began to preach the kingdom of heaven.

BASIL. (in Esai. 6.) The heavenly spirits visit us, not as it seems fit to them, but as the occasion conduces to our advantage, for they are ever looking upon the glory and fulness of the Divine Wisdom; hence it follows, The angel Gabriel was sent.

GREGORY. (Hom. 34, in Evan.) To the virgin Mary was sent, not any one of the angels, but the archangel Gabriel; for upon this service it was meet that the highest angel should come, as being the bearer of the highest of all tidings. He is therefore marked by a particular name, to signify what was his effectual part in the work. For Gabriel is interpreted, "the strength of God." By the strength of God then was He to be announced Who was coming as the God of strength, and mighty in battle, to put down the powers of the air.

GLOSS. (interlin.) But the place is also added whither he is sent, as it follows, To a city, Nazareth. For it was told that He would come a Nazarite, (i. e. the holy of the holy.)

BEDE. (in Homil. de fest Annunt.) It was a fit beginning for man's restoration, that an angel should be sent down from God to consecrate a virgin by a divine birth, for the first cause of man's perdition was the Devil sending a serpent to deceive a woman by the spirit of pride.

AUGUSTINE. (de san. Virg. cap. vi.) To a virgin, for Christ could be born from virginity alone, seeing He could not have an equal in His birth. It was necessary for our Head by this mighty miracle to be born according to the flesh of a virgin, that He might signify that his members were to be born in the spirit of a virgin Church.

PSEUDO-JEROME. (Hieron. vol. xi. 92. De Assumpt.) And rightly an angel is sent to the virgin, because the virgin state is ever akin to that of angels. Surely in the flesh to live beyond the flesh is not a life on earth but in heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup. Mat. Hom. 4.) The angel announces the birth to the virgin not after the conception, lest she should be thereby too much troubled, but before the conception he addresses her, not in a dream, but standing by her in visible shape. For as great indeed were the tidings she receives, she needed before the issue of the event an extraordinary visible manifestation.

AMBROSE. Scripture has rightly mentioned that she was espoused, as well as a virgin, a virgin, that she might appear free from all connexion with man; espoused, that she might not be branded with the disgrace of sullied virginity, whose swelling womb seemed to bear evident marks of her corruption. But the Lord had rather that men should cast a doubt upon His birth than upon His mother’s purity. He knew how tender is a virgin’s modesty, and how easily assailed the reputation of her chastity, nor did He think the credit of His birth was to be built up by His mother’s wrongs. It follows therefore, that the holy Mary’s virginity was of as untainted purity as it was also of unblemished reputation. Nor ought there, by an erroneous opinion, to be left the shadow of an excuse to living virgins, that the mother of our Lord even seemed to be evil spoken of. But what could be imputed to the Jews, or to Herod, if they should seem to have persecuted an adulterous offspring? And how could He Himself say, I came not to abolish the law, but to fulfil it, (Matt. 5:18.) if He should seem to have had his beginning from a violation of the law, for the issue of an unmarried person is condemned by the law? (Deut. 23:17.) Not to add that also greater credit is given to the words of Mary, and the cause of falsehood removed? For it might seem that unmarried becoming pregnant, she had wished to shade her guilt by a lie; but an espoused person has no reason for lying, since to women child-birth is the reward of wedlock, the grace of the marriage bed. Again, the virginity of Mary was meant to baffle the prince of the world, who, when he perceived her espoused to a man, could cast no suspicion on her offspring.

ORIGEN. For if she had had no husband, soon would the thought have stolen into the Devil’s mind, how she who had known no man could be pregnant. It was right that the conception should be Divine, something more exalted than human nature.

AMBROSE. But still more has it baffled the princes of the world, for the malice of devils soon detects even hidden things, while they who are occupied in worldly vanities, can not know the things of God. But moreover, a more powerful witness of her purity is adduced, her husband, who might both have been indignant at the injury, and revenged the dishonour, if he also had not acknowledged the mystery; of whom it is added, Whose name was Joseph, of the house of David.

BEDE. (in Homil. de Annunt. sup.) Which last applies not only to Joseph, but also to Mary, for the Law commanded that every one should take a wife out of his own tribe or family. It follows, And the virgin's name was Mary.

BEDE. Maria, in Hebrew, is the star of the sea; but in Syriac it is interpreted Mistress, and well, because Mary was thought worthy to be the mother of the Lord of the whole world, and the light of endless ages.

1:28–29

28. And the angel came in unto her, and said, Hail, thou that art highly favoured, the Lord is with thee: blessed art thou among women.

29. And when she saw him, she was troubled at his saying, and cast in her mind what manner of salutation this should be.

AMBROSE. Mark the virgin by her manner of life. Alone in an inner chamber, unseen by the eyes of men, discovered only by an angel; as it is said, And the angel came in unto her. That she might not be dishonoured by any ignoble address, she is saluted by an angel.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Diem Nat. Orat. in Christi.) Far different then to the news formerly addressed to the woman, is the announcement now made to the Virgin. In the former, the cause of sin was punished by the pains of childbirth; in the latter, through gladness, sorrow is driven away. Hence the angel not unaptly proclaims joy to the Virgin, saying, Hail.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer) But that she was judged worthy of the nuptials is attested by his saying, Full of grace. For it is signified as a kind of token or marriage gift of the bridegroom, that she was fruitful in graces. For of the things which he mentions, the one appertains to the bride, the other to the bridegroom.

PSEUDO-JEROME. (Jerome sup.) And it is well said, Full of grace, for to others, grace comes in part; into Mary at once the fulness of grace wholly infused itself. She truly is full of grace through whom has been poured forth upon every creature the abundant rain of the Holy Spirit. But already He was with the Virgin Who sent the angel to the Virgin. The Lord preceded His messenger, for He could not be confined by place Who dwells in all places. Whence it follows, The Lord is with thee.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Aug. in Serm. de Annunt. iii. app. 195.) More than with me, for He Himself is in thy heart, He is (made) in thy womb, He fills thy soul, He fills thy womb.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer) But this is the sum of the whole message. The Word of God, as the Bridegroom, effecting an incomprehensible union, Himself, as it were, the same both planting, and being planted, hath moulded the whole nature of man into Himself. But comes last the most perfect and comprehensive salutation; Blessed art thou among women. i. e. Alone, far before all other women; that women also should be blessed in thee, as men are in thy Son; but rather both in both. For as by one man and one woman came at once both sin and sorrow, so now also by one woman and one man hath both blessing and joy been restored, and poured forth upon all.

AMBROSE. But mark the Virgin by her bashfulness, for she was afraid, as it follows; And when she heard, she was troubled, It is the habit of virgins to tremble, and to be ever afraid at the presence of man, and to be shy when he addresses her. Learn, O virgin, to avoid light talking. Mary feared even the salutation of an angel.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (sup.) But as she might be accustomed to these visions, the Evangelist ascribes her agitation not to the vision, but to the things told her, saying, she was troubled at his words. Now observe both the modesty and wisdom of the Virgin; the soul, and at the same time the voice. When she heard the joyful words, she pondered them in her mind, and neither openly resisted through unbelief, nor forthwith lightly complied; avoiding equally the inconstancy of Eve, and the insensibility of Zacharias. Hence it is said, And she cast in her mind what manner of salutation this was, it is not said conception, for as yet she knew not the vastness of the mystery. But the salutation, was there aught of passion in it as from a man to a virgin? or was it not of God, seeing that he makes mention of God, saying, The Lord is with thee.

AMBROSE. She wondered also at the new form of blessing, unheard of before, reserved for Mary alone.

ORIGEN. For if Mary had known that similar words had been addressed to others, such a salutation would never have appeared to her so strange and alarming.

1:30–33

30. And the angel said unto her, Fear not, Mary: for thou hast found favour with God.

31. And, behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name JESUS.

32. He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Highest: and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David:

33. And he shall reign over the house of Jacob for ever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end.

When the angel saw that she was troubled at this unusual salutation, calling her by her name as if she was well known to him, he tells her she must not fear, as it follows; And the angel said, Fear not, Mary.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius.) As if he said, I came not to deceive you, nay rather to bring down deliverance from deception; I came not to rob you of your inviolable virginity, but to open a dwelling-place for the Author and Guardian of thy purity; I am not a servant of the Devil, but the ambassador of Him that destroyeth the Devil. I am come to form a marriage treaty, not to devise plots. So far then was he from allowing her to be harassed by distracting thoughts, lest he should be counted a servant unfaithful to his trust.

CHRYSOSTOM. But he who earns favour in the sight of God has nothing to fear. Hence it follows, For thou hast found favour before God. But how shall any one find it, except through the means of his humility. For God giveth grace to the humble. (James 4:6, 1 Pet. 5:5.)

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) For the Virgin found favour with God, in that decking her own soul in the bright robes of chastity, she prepared a dwelling-place pleasing to God. Not only did she retain her virginity inviolate, but her conscience also she kept from stain. As many had found favour before Mary, he goes on to state what was peculiar to her. Behold, thou shall conceive in thy womb.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) By the word behold, he denotes rapidity and actual presence, implying that with the utterance of the word the conception is accomplished.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Sev. Antiochenus.) Thou shalt conceive in thy womb, that he might shew that our Lord from the very Virgin's womb, and of our substance, took our flesh upon Him. For the Divine Word came to purify man's nature and birth, and the first elements of our generation. And so without sin and human seed, passing through every stage as we do, He is conceived in the flesh, and carried in the womb for the space of nine months.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) But since it happens also that to the spiritual mind is given in an especial manner to conceive the Divine Spirit, and bring forth the Spirit of salvation, as says the Prophet; therefore he added, And thou shalt bring forth a Son. (Is. 26:18.)

AMBROSE. But all are not as Mary, that when they conceive the word of the Holy Spirit, they bring forth; for some put forth the word prematurely, others have Christ in the womb, but not yet formed.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. in Diem Nat.) While the expectation of child-birth strikes a woman with terror, the sweet mention of her offspring calms her, as it is added, And thou shall call his name Jesus. The coming of the Saviour is the banishing of all fear.

BEDE. Jesus is interpreted Saviour, or Healing.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geom. sup.) And he says, Thou shalt call, not His father shall call, for He is without a father as regards His lower birth, as He is without a mother in respect of the higher.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (de fide ad Theod.) But this name was given anew to the Word in adaptation to His nativity in the flesh; as that prophecy saith, Thou shalt be called by a new name which the mouth of the Lord hath named. (Is. 62:2.)

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (sup.) But as this name was common to Him with the successor of Moses, the angel therefore implying that He should not be after Joshua's likeness, adds, He shall be great. (Josh. 1.)

AMBROSE. It was said also of John, that he shall be great, but of him indeed as of a great man, of Christ, as of the great God. For abundantly is poured forth the power of God; widely the greatness of the heavenly substance extended, neither confined by place, nor grasped by thought; neither determined by calculation, nor altered by age.

ORIGEN. See then the greatness of the Saviour, how it is diffused over the whole world. Go up to heaven, see there how it has filled the heavenly places; carry thy thoughts down to the deep, behold, there too He has descended. If thou seest this, then, in like manner, beholdest thou fulfilled in very deed, He shall be great.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius.) The assumption of our flesh does not diminish ought from the loftiness of the Deity, but rather exalts the lowness of man's nature. Hence it follows, And he shall be called the Son of the Highest. Not, Thou shalt give Him the name, but He Himself shall be called. By whom, but His Father of like substance with Himself? For no one hath known the Son but the Father. (Matt. 11:27.) But He in Whom exists the infallible knowledge of His Son, is the true interpreter as to the name which should be given Him, when He says, This is my beloved Son; (Matt. 17:5.) for such indeed from everlasting He is, though His name was not revealed till now; therefore he says, He shall be called, not shall be made or begotten. For before the worlds He was of like substance with the Father. Him therefore thou shalt conceive; His mother thou shalt become; Him shall thy virgin shrine enclose, Whom the heavens were not able to contain.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) But since it seems shocking or unworthy to some men that God should inhabit a body, is the Sun, I would ask, the heat whereof is felt by each body that receives its rays, at all sullied as to its natural purity? Much more then does the Sun of Righteousness, in taking upon Himself a most pure body from the Virgin's womb, escape not only defilement, but even shew forth His own mother in greater holiness.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus Antiochenus.) And to make the Virgin mindful of the prophets, he adds, And the Lord God shall give unto him the seat of David, that she might know clearly, that He Who is to be born of her is that very Christ, Whom the prophets promised should be born of the seed of David.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (contra Julian lib. viii.) Not however from Joseph proceeded the most pure descent of Christ. For from one and the same line of connexion had sprung both Joseph and the Virgin, and from this the only-begotten had taken the form of man.

BASIL. (Epist. 236. ad Amphil.) Our Lord sat not on the earthly throne of David, the Jewish kingdom having been transferred to Herod. The seat of David is that on which our Lord reestablished His spiritual kingdom which should never be destroyed. Hence it follows, And he shall reign over the house of Jacob.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. vii. in Matt.) Now He assigns to the present house of Jacob all those who were of the number of the Jews that believed on Him. For as Paul says, They are not all Israel which are of Israel, but the children of the promise are counted for the seed.

BEDE. Or by the house of Jacob he means the whole Church which either sprang from a good root, or though formerly a wild olive branch, has yet been for a reward of its faith grafted into the good olive tree. (Rom. 11:17.)

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) But to reign for ever is of none save God alone; and hence though because of the incarnation Christ is said to receive the seat of David, yet as being Himself God He is acknowledged to be the eternal King. It follows, And, his kingdom shall have no end, not in that He is God, but in that He is man also. Now indeed He has the kingdom of many nations, but finally he shall reign over all, when all things shall be put under Him. (1 Cor. 15:25.)

BEDE. Let Nestorius then cease to say that the Virgin’s Son is only man, and to deny that He is taken up by the Word of God into the unity of the Person. For the Angel when he says that the very same has David for His father whom he declares is called the Son of the Highest, demonstrates the one Person of Christ in two natures. The Angel uses the future tense (vocabitur, regnabit) not because, as the Heretics say, Christ was not before Mary, but because in the same person, man with God shares the same name of Son.

1:34–35

34. Then said Mary unto the angel, How shall this be, seeing I know not a man?

35. And the angel answered and said unto her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.

AMBROSE. It was Mary’s part neither to refuse belief in the Angel, nor too hastily take unto herself the divine message. How subdued her answer is, compared with the words of the Priest. Then said Mary to the Angel, How shall this be? She says, How shall this be? He answers, Whereby shall I know this? He refuses to believe that which he says he does not know, and seeks as it were still further authority for belief. She avows herself willing to do that which she doubts not will be done, but how, she is anxious to know. Mary had read, Behold, she shall conceive and bear a son. (Is. 7:14.) She believed therefore that it should be, but how it was to take place she had never read, for even to so great a prophet this had not been revealed. So great a mystery was not to be divulged by the mouth of man, but of an Angel.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. in Diem Nat. Christi.) Hear the chaste words of the Virgin. The Angel tells her she shall bear a son, but she rests upon her virginity, deeming her inviolability a more precious thing than the Angel’s declaration. Hence she says, Seeing that I know not a man.

BASIL. (235. Ep. Amph.) Knowledge is spoken of in various ways. The wisdom of our Creator is called knowledge, and an acquaintance with His mighty works, the keeping also of His commandments, and the constant drawing near to Him; and besides these the marriage union is called knowledge, as it is here.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (sup.) These words of Mary are a token of what she was pondering in the secrets of her heart; for if for the sake of the marriage union she had wished to be espoused to Joseph, why was she seized with astonishment when the conception was made known unto her? seeing in truth she might herself be expecting at the time to become a mother according to the law of nature. But because it was meet that her body being presented to God as an holy offering-should be kept inviolate, therefore she says, Seeing that I know not a man. As if she said, Notwithstanding that thou who speakest art an Angel, yet that I should know a man is plainly an impossible thing. How then can I be a mother, having no husband? For Joseph I have acknowledged as my betrothed.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) But mark, how the Angel solves the Virgin’s doubts, and shews to her the unstained marriage and the unspeakable birth. And the Angel answered, and said unto her, The Holy Spirit shall come upon thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 49 in Gen.) As if he said, Look not for the order of nature in things which transcend and overpower nature. Dost thou say, How shall this be, seeing I know not a man? Nay rather, shall it happen to thee for this very reason, that thou hast never known a husband. For if thou hadst, thou wouldest not have been thought worthy of the mystery, not that marriage is unholy, but virginity more excellent. It became the common Lord of all both to take part with us, and to differ with us in His nativity; for the being born from the womb, He shared in common with us, but in that He was born without cohabitation, He was exalted far above us.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. in Diem Nat.) O blessed is that womb which because of the overflowing purity of the Virgin Mary has drawn to itself the gift of life! For in others scarcely indeed shall a pure soul obtain the presence of the Holy Spirit, but in her the flesh is made the receptacle of the Spirit.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Lib. de Vita Moysis.) For the tables of our nature which guilt had broken, the true Lawgiver has formed anew to Himself from our dust without cohabitation, creating a body capable of taking His divinity, which the finger of God hath carved, that is to say, the Spirit coming upon the Virgin.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (in Diem Natal.) Moreover, the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee. Christ is the power of the most high King, who by the coming of the Holy Spirit is formed in the Virgin.

GREGORY. (18 Moral. c. 20. super Job 27:21.) By the term overshadowing, both natures of the Incarnate God are signified. For shadow is formed by light and matter. But the Lord by His Divine nature is light. Because then immaterial light was to be embodied in the Virgin’s womb, it is well said unto her, The power of the Highest shall overshadow thee, that is, the human body in thee shall receive an immaterial light of divinity. For this is said to Mary for the heavenly refreshing of her soul.

BEDE. Thou shalt conceive then not by the seed of man whom thou knowest not, but by the operation of the Holy Spirit, with which thou art filled. There shall be no flame of desire in thee when the Holy Spirit shall overshadow thee.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. in Diem Nat.) Or he says, overshadow thee, because as a shadow takes its shape from the character of those bodies which go before it, so the signs of the Son’s Deity will appear from the power of the Father. (non occ. in Greg. Nyss.). For as in us a certain life-giving power is seen in the material substance, by which man is formed; so in the Virgin, has the power of the Highest in like manner, by the life-giving Spirit, taken from the Virgin’s body a fleshly substance inherent in the body to form a new man. Hence it follows, Therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee.

ATHANASIUS. (Ep. ad Epictetum.) For we confess that which then was taken up from Mary to be of the nature of man and a most real body, the very same also according to nature with our own body. For Mary is our sister, seeing we have all descended from Adam.

BASIL. (Lib. de Spirit. Sanct. c. v.) Hence also, St. Paul says, God sent forth his Son, born not (through a woman) but of a woman. For the words through a woman might convey only a notion of birth as a passing through, but when it is said, of a woman, (Gal. 4:4.) there is openly declared a communion of nature between the son and the parent.

GREGORY. (18 Moral. c. 52. super Job 28:19.) To distinguish His holiness from ours, Jesus is stated in an especial manner to be born holy. For we although indeed made holy, are not born so, for we are constrained by the very condition of our corruptible nature to cry out with the Prophet, Behold, I was conceived in iniquity. (Ps. 51:5.) But He alone is in truth holy, who was not conceived by the cementing of a fleshly union, nor as the heretics rave, one person in His human nature, another in His divine; not conceived and brought forth a mere man, and afterwards by his merits, obtained that He should be God, but the Angel announcing and the Spirit coming, first the Word in the womb, afterwards within the womb the Word made flesh. Whence it follows, Shall be called the Son of God.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Victor Presbyter.) But observe, how the Angel has declared the whole Trinity to the Virgin, making mention of the Holy Spirit, the Power, and the Most High, for the Trinity is indivisible.c

1:36–38

36. And, behold, thy cousin Elisabeth, she hath also conceived a son in her old age: and this is the sixth month with her, who was called barren.

37. For with God nothing shall be impossible.

38. And Mary said, Behold the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word. And the angel departed from her.

CHRYSOSTOM. (49 in Gen.) Seeing that his previous words had overcome the mind of the virgin, the angel drops his discourse to a humbler subject, persuading her by reference to sensible things. Hence he says, And, behold, Elisabeth thy cousin, &c. Mark the discretion of Gabriel; he did not remind her of Sarah, or Rebecca, or Rachel, because they were examples of ancient times, but he brings forward a recent event, that he might the more forcibly strike her mind. For this reason also he noticed the age, saying, She also hath conceived a son in her old age; and the natural infirmity also. As it follows, And this is the sixth month with her who was called barren. For not immediately at the beginning of Elisabeth’s conception did he make this announcement, but after the space of six months, that the swelling of her womb might confirm its truth.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Carm. 18. de Geneal. Christi.) But some one will ask, How is Christ related to David, since Mary sprang from the blood of Aaron, the angel having declared Elisabeth to be her kinswoman? But this was brought about by the Divine counsel, to the end that the royal race might be united to the priestly stock; that Christ, Who is both King and Priest, might be descended from both according to the flesh. For it is written, that Aaron, the first High Priest according to the law, took from the tribe of Judah for his wife Elisabeth, the daughter of Aminadab. (Exod. 6:23.) And observe the most holy administration of the Spirit, in ordering that the wife of Zacharias should be called Elisabeth, so bringing us back to that Elisabeth whom Aaron married.

BEDE. So it was then, lest the virgin should despair of being able to bear a son, that she received the example of one both old and barren about to bring forth, in order that she might learn that all things are possible with God, even those which seem to be opposed to the order of nature. Whence it follows, For there shall be no word (verbum) impossible with God.

CHRYSOSTOM. For the Lord of nature can do all things as He will, Who executes and disposes all things, holding the reins of life and death.

AUGUSTINE. (contra Faust. l. xxvi. c. 5.) But whoever says, “If God is omnipotent, let Him cause those things which have been done to have not been done,” does not perceive that he says, “Let Him cause those things which are true, in that very respect in which they are true to be false.” For He may cause a thing not to be which was, as when He makes a man who began to be by birth, not to be by death. But who can say that He makes not to be that which no longer is in being? For whatever is past is no longer in being. But if aught can happen to a thing, that thing is still in being to which any thing happens, and if it is, how is it past? Therefore that is not in being which we have truly said has been, because the truth is, in our opinions, not in that thing which no longer is. But this opinion God can not make false; and we do not so call God omnipotent as supposing also that He could die. He plainly is alone truly called omnipotent, who truly is, and by whom alone that is, whatever in any wise exists, whether spirit or body.

AMBROSE. Behold now the humility, the devotion of the virgin. For it follows, But Mary said, Behold the handmaid of the Lord. She calls herself His handmaid, who is chosen to be His mother, so far was she from being exalted by the sudden promise. At the same time also by calling herself handmaid, she claimed to herself in no other way the prerogative of such great grace than that she might do what was commanded her. For about to bring forth One meek and lowly, she was bound herself to shew forth lowliness. As it follows, Be it unto me according to thy word. You have her submission, you see her wish. Behold the handmaid of the Lord, signifies the readiness of duty. Be it unto me according to thy word, the conception of the wish.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) Some men will highly extol one thing, some another, in these words of the virgin. One man, for example, her constancy, another her willingness of obedience; one man her not being tempted by the great and glorious promises of the great archangel; another, her self-command in not giving an instant assent, equally avoiding both the heedlessness of Eve and the disobedience of Zacharias. But to me the depth of her humility is an object no less worthy of admiration

GREGORY. (sup.) Through an ineffable sacrament of a holy conception and a birth inviolable, agreeable to the truth of each nature, the same virgin was both the handmaid and mother of the Lord.

BEDE. Having received the consent of the virgin, the angel soon returns heavenward, as it follows, And the angel departed from her.

EUSEBIUS. (vel Geometer.) Not only having obtained what he wished, but wondering at her virgin beauty, and the ripeness of her virtue.

1:39–45

39. And Mary arose in those days, and went into the hill country with haste, into a city of Juda;

40. And entered into the house of Zacharias, and saluted Elisabeth.

41. And it came to pass, that, when Elisabeth heard the salutation of Mary, the babe leaped in her womb; and Elisabeth was filled with the Holy Ghost:

42. And she spake out with a loud voice, and said, Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb.

43. And whence is this to me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me?

44. For, lo, as soon as the voice of thy salutation sounded in my ears, the babe leaped in my womb for joy.

45. And blessed is she that believed: for there shall be a performance of those things which were told her from the Lord.

AMBROSE. The Angel, when he announced the hidden mysteries to the Virgin, that he might build up her faith by an example, related to her the conception of a barren woman. When Mary heard it, it was not that she disbelieved the oracle, or was uncertain about the messenger, or doubtful of the example, but rejoicing in the fulfilment of her wish, and consicentious in the observance of her duty, she gladly went forth into the hill country. For what could Mary now, filled with God, (plena Deo) but ascend into the higher parts with haste!

ORIGEN. For Jesus who was in her womb hastened to sanctify John, still in the womb of his mother. Whence it follows, with haste.

AMBROSE. The grace of the Holy Spirit knows not of slow workings. Learn, ye virgins, not to loiter in the streets, nor mix in public talk.

THEOPHYLACT. She went into the mountains, because Zacharias dwelt there. As it follows, To a city of Juda, and entered into the house of Zacharias. Learn, O holy women, the attention which ye ought to shew for your kinswomen with child. For Mary, who before dwelt alone in the secret of her chamber, neither virgin modesty caused to shrink from the public gaze, nor the rugged mountains from pursuing her purpose, nor the tediousness of the journey from performing her duty. Learn also, O virgins, the lowliness of Mary. She came a kinswoman to her next of kin, the younger to the elder, nor did she merely come to her, but was the first to give her salutations; as it follows, And she saluted Elisabeth. For the more chaste a virgin is, the more humble she should be, and ready to give way to her elders. Let her then be the mistress of humility, in whom is the profession of chastity. Mary is also a cause of piety, in that the higher went to the lower, that the lower might be assisted, Mary to Elisabeth, Christ to John.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iv. in Matt.) Or else the Virgin kept to herself all those things which have been said, not revealing them to any one, for she did not believe that any credit would be given to her wonderful story; nay, she rather thought she would suffer reproach if she told it, as if wishing to screen her own guilt.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) But to Elisabeth alone she has recourse, as she was wont to do from their relationship, and other close bonds of union.

AMBROSE. But soon the blessed fruits of Mary’s coming and our Lord’s presence are made evident. For it follows, And it came to pass, that when Elisabeth heard the salutation of Mary, the babe leaped in her womb. Mark the distinction and propriety of each word. Elisabeth first heard the word, but John first experienced the grace. She heard by the order of nature, he leaped by reason of the mystery. She perceived the coming of Mary, he the coming of the Lord.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) For the Prophet sees and hears more acutely than his mother, and salutes the chief of Prophets; but as he could not do this in words, he leaps in the womb, which was the greatest token of his joy. Who ever heard of leaping at a time previous to birth? Grace introduced things to which nature was a stranger. Shut up in the womb, the soldier acknowledged his Lord and King soon to be born, the womb’s covering being no obstacle to the mystical sight.

ORIGEN. (vid. etiam Tit. Bos.) He was not filled with the Spirit, until she stood near him who bore Christ in her womb. Then indeed he was both filled with the Spirit, and leaping imparted the grace to his mother; as it follows, And Elisabeth was filled with the Holy Spirit. But we cannot doubt that she who was then filled with the Holy Spirit, was filled because of her son.

AMBROSE. She who had hid herself because she conceived a son, began to glory that she carried in her womb a prophet, and she who had before blushed, now gives her blessing; as it follows, And she spake out with a loud voice, Blessed art thou among women. With a loud voice she exclaimed when she perceived the Lord's coming, for she believed it to be a holy birth. But she says, Blessed art thou among women. For none was ever partaker of such grace or could be, since of the one Divine seed, there is one only parent.

BEDE. Mary is blessed by Elisabeth with the same words as before by Gabriel, to shew that she was to be reverenced both by men and angels.

THEOPHYLACT. But because there have been other holy women who yet have borne sons stained with sin, she adds, And blessed is the fruit of thy womb. Or another interpretation is, having said, Blessed art thou among women, she then, as if some one enquired the cause, answers, And blessed is the fruit of thy womb: as it is said, Blessed be he that cometh in the name of the Lord. The Lord God, and he hath shewed us light; (Ps. 118:26, 27.) for the Holy Scriptures often use and, instead of because.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Now she rightly calls the Lord the fruit of the virgin's womb, because He proceeded not from man, but from Mary alone. For they who are sown by their fathers are the fruits of their fathers.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) This fruit alone then is blessed, because it is produced without man, and without sin.

BEDE. This is the fruit which is promised to David, Of the fruit of thy body will I set upon thy throne. (Ps. 132:11.)

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) From this place we derive the refutation of Eutyches, in that Christ is stated to be the fruit of the womb. For all fruit is of the same nature with the tree that bears it. It remains then that the virgin was also of the same nature with the second Adam, who takes away the sins of the world. But let those also who invent curious fictions concerning the flesh of Christ, blush when they hear of the real child-bearing of the mother of God. For the fruit itself proceeds from the very substance of the tree. Where too are those who say that Christ passed through the virgin as water through an aqueduct? Let these consider the words of Elisabeth who was filled with the Spirit, that Christ was the fruit of the womb. It follows, And whence is this to me, that the mother of my Lord should come to me?

AMBROSE. She says it not ignorantly, for she knew it was by the grace and operation of the Holy Spirit that the mother of the prophet should be saluted by the mother of his Lord, to the advancement and growth of her own pledge; but being aware that this was of no human deserving, but a gift of Divine grace, she therefore says, Whence is this to me, that is, By what right of mine, by what that I have done, for what good deeds?

ORIGEN. (non occ. vide Theoph. et. Tit. Bost.) Now in saying this, she coincides with her son. For John also felt that he was unworthy of our Lord's coming to him. But she gives the name of "the mother of our Lord" to one still a virgin, thus forestalling the event by the words of prophecy. Divine foreknowledge brought Mary to Elisabeth, that the testimony of John might reach the Lord. For from that time Christ ordained John to be a prophet. Hence it follows, For, to, as soon as the voice of thy salutation sounded, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Epist. ad Dardanum 57.) But in order to say this, as the Evangelist has premised, she was filled with the Holy Spirit, by whose revelation undoubtedly she knew what that leaping of the child meant; lamely, that the mother of Him had come unto her, whose forerunner and herald that child was to be. Such then night be the meaning of so great an event; to be known indeed by grown up persons, but not understood by a little child; for she said not, "The babe leaped in faith in my womb," but leaped for joy. Now we see not only children leaping for joy, but even the cattle; not surely from any faith or religious feeling, or any rational knowledge. But this joy was strange and unwonted, for it was in the womb; and at the coming of her who was to bring forth the Saviour of the world. This joy, therefore, and as it were reciprocal salutation to the mother of the Lord, was caused (as miracles are) by Divine influences in the child, not in any human way by him. For even supposing the exercise of reason and the will had been so far advanced in that child, as that he should be able in the bowels of his mother to know, believe, and assent; yet surely that must be placed among the miracles of Divine power, not referred to human examples.

THEOPHYLACT. The mother of our Lord had come to see Elisabeth, as also the miraculous conception, from which the Angel had told her should result the belief of a far greater conception, to happen to herself; and to this belief the words of Elisabeth refer, And blessed art thou who hast believed, for there shall be a performance of those things which were told thee from the Lord.

AMBROSE. You see that Mary doubted not but believed, and therefore the fruit of faith followed.

BEDE. Nor is it to be wondered at, that our Lord, about to redeem the world, commenced His mighty works with His mother, that she, through whom the salvation of all men was prepared, should herself be the first to reap the fruit of salvation from her pledge.

AMBROSE. But happy are ye also who have heard and believed, for whatever soul hath believed, both conceives and brings forth the word of God, and knows His works.

BEDE. But every soul which has conceived the word of God in the heart, straightway climbs the lofty summits of the virtues by the stairs of love, so as to be able to enter into the city of Juda, (into the citadel of prayer and praise, and abide as it were for three months in it,) to the perfection of faith, hope, and charity.

GREGORY. (super Ezech. lib. i. Hom. i. 8.) She was touched with the spirit of prophecy at once, both as to the past, present, and future. She knew that Mary had believed the promises of the Angel; she perceived when she gave her the name of mother, that Many was carrying in her womb the Redeemer of mankind; and when she foretold that all things would be accomplished, she saw also what was to follow in the future.

1:46

46. And Mary said, My soul doth magnify the Lord.

AMBROSE. As evil came into the world by a woman, so also is good introduced by women; and so it seems not without meaning, that both Elisabeth prophesies before John, and Mary before the birth of the Lord. But it follows, that as Mary was the greater person, so she uttered the fuller prophecy.

BASIL. (in Psalm 33) For the Virgin, with lofty thoughts and deep penetration, contemplates the boundless mystery, the further she advances, magnifying God; And Mary said, My soul doth magnify the Lord.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Athanasius.) As if she said, Marvellous things hath the Lord declared that He will accomplish in my body, but neither shall my soul be unfruitful before God. It becomes me to offer Him the fruit also of my will, for inasmuch as I am obedient to a mighty miracle, am I bound to glorify Him who performs His mighty works in me.

ORIGEN. Now if the Lord could neither receive increase or decrease, what is this that Mary speaks of, My soul doth magnify (magnificat) the Lord? But if I consider that the Lord our Saviour is the image of the invisible God, and that the soul is created according to His image, so as to be an image of an image, then I shall see plainly, that as after the manner of those who are accustomed to paint images, each one of us forming his soul after the image of Christ, makes it great or little, base or noble, after the likeness of the original; so when I have made my soul great in thought, word, and deed, the image of God is made great, and the Lord Himself, whose image it is, is magnified in my soul.

1:47

47. And my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) The first-fruit of the Spirit is peace and joy. Because then the holy Virgin had drunk in all the graces of the Spirit, she rightly adds, And my spirit hath leaped for joy. (exultavit.) She means the same thing, soul and spirit. But the frequent mention of leaping for joy in the Scriptures implies a certain bright and cheerful state of mind in those who are worthy. Hence the Virgin exults in the Lord with an unspeakable springing (and bounding) of the heart for joy, and in the breaking forth into utterance of a noble affection. It follows, in God my Saviour.

BEDE. Because the spirit of the Virgin rejoices in the eternal Godhead of the same Jesus. (i. e. the Saviour,) whose flesh is formed in the womb by a temporal conception.

AMBROSE. The soul of Mary therefore magnifies the Lord, and her spirit rejoiced in God, because with soul and spirit devoted to the Father and the Son, she worships with a pious affection the one God from whom are all things. But let every one have the spirit of Mary, so that he may rejoice in the Lord. If according to the flesh there is one mother of Christ, yet, according to faith, Christ is the fruit of all. For every soul receives the word of God if only he be unspotted and free from sin, and preserves it with unsullied purity.

THEOPHYLACT. But he magnifies God who worthily follows Christ, and now that he is called Christian, lessens not the glory of Christ by acting unworthily, but does great and heavenly things; and then the Spirit (that is, the anointing of the Spirit) shall rejoice, (i. e. make him to prosper,) and shall not be withdrawn, so to say, and put to death.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) But if at any time light shall have crept into his heart, and loving God and despising bodily things he shall have gained the perfect standing of the just, without any difficulty shall he obtain joy in the Lord.

ORIGEN. But the soul first magnifies the Lord, that it may afterwards rejoice in God; for unless we have first believed, we can not rejoice.

1:48

48. For he hath regarded the low estate of his handmaiden: for, behold, from henceforth all generations shall call me blessed.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Isidore.) She gives the reason why it becomes her to magnify God and to rejoice in Him, saying, For he hath regarded the lowliness of his handmaiden; as if she said, “He Himself foresaw, therefore I did not look for Him.” I was content with things lowly, but now am I chosen unto counsels unspeakable, and raised up from the earth unto the stars.

AUGUSTINE. (Pseudo-Aug. Serm. de Assumpt 208.) O true lowliness, which hath borne God to men, hath given life to mortals, made new heavens and a pure earth, opened the gates of Paradise, and set free the souls of men. The lowliness of Mary was made the heavenly ladder, by which God descended upon earth. For what does regarded mean but “approved?” For many seem in my sight to be lowly, but their lowliness is not regarded by the Lord. For if they were truly lowly, their spirit would rejoice not in the world, but in God.

ORIGEN. But why was she lowly and cast down, who carried in her womb the Son of God? Consider that lowliness, which in the Scriptures is particularly praised as one of the virtues, is called by the philosophers “modestia.” And we also may paraphrase it, that state of mind in which a man instead of being puffed up, casts himself down.

BEDE. But she, whose humility is regarded, is rightly called blessed by all; as it follows, For, behold, from henceforth all shall call me blessed.

ATHANASIUS. For if as the Prophet says, Blessed are they who have seed in Sion, and kinsfolk in Jerusalem, (Isa. 31:9. apud LXX.) how great should be the celebration of the divine and ever holy Virgin Mary, who was made according to the flesh, the Mother of the Word?

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes.) She does not call herself blessed from vain glory, for what room is there for pride in her who named herself the handmaid of the Lord? But, touched by the Holy Spirit, she foretold those things which were to come.

BEDE. For it was fitting, that as by the pride of our first parent death came into the world, so by the lowliness of Mary should be opened the entrance into life.

THEOPHYLACT. And therefore she says, all generations, not only Elisabeth, but also every nation that believed.

1:49

49. For he that is mighty hath done to me great things; and holy is his name.

THEOPHYLACT. The Virgin shews that not for her own virtue is she to be pronounced blessed, but she assigns the cause, saying, For he that is mighty hath magnified me.

AUGUSTINE. (sup.) What great things hath He done unto thee? I believe that a creature thou gavest birth to the Creator, a servant thou broughtest forth the Lord, that through thee God redeemed the world, through thee He restored it to life.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But where are the great things, if they be not that I still a virgin conceive (by the will of God) overcoming nature? I have been accounted worthy, without being joined to a husband, to be made a mother, not a mother of any one, but of the only-begotten Saviour.

BEDE. But this has reference to the beginning of the hymn, where it is said, My soul doth magnify the Lord. For that soul can alone magnify the Lord with due praise, for whom he deigus to do mighty things.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But she says, that is mighty, that if men should disbelieve the work of her conception, namely, that while yet a virgin, she conceived, she might throw back the miracles upon the power of the Worker. Nor because the only-begotten Son has come to a woman is He thereby defiled, for holy is his name.

BASIL. (in Ps. 33.) But holy is the name of God called, not because in its letters it contains any significant power, but because in whatever way we look at God we distinguish his purity and holiness.

BEDE. For in the height of His marvellous power He is far beyond every creature, and is widely removed from all the works of His hands. This is better understood in the Greek tongue, in which the very word which means holy, (ἅγιον) signifies as it were to be “apart from the earth.”

1:50

50. And his mercy is on them that fear him from generation to generation.

BEDE. Turning from God’s special gifts to His general dealings, she describes the condition of the whole human race, And his mercy is from generation to generation on them that fear him. As if she said, Not only for me hath He that is mighty done great things, but in every nation he that feareth God is accepted by Him.

ORIGEN. For the mercy of God is not upon one generation, but extends to eternity from generation to generation.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Victor Pres.) According to the mercy which He hath upon generations of generations, I conceive, and He Himself is united to a living body, out of mercy alone undertaking our salvation. Nor is His mercy shewn indiscriminately, but upon those who are constrained by the fear of Him in every nation; as it is said, upon those who fear him, that is, upon those who being brought by repentance are turned to faith and renewal for the obstinate unbelievers have by their sin shut against themselves the gate of mercy.

THEOPHYLACT. Or by this she means that they who fear shall obtain mercy, both in that generation, (that is, the present world,) and the generation which is to come, (i. e. the life everlasting.) For now they receive a hundred-fold, but hereafter far more. (Matt. 19:29.)

1:51

51. He hath shewed strength with his arm, he hath scattered the proud in the imagination of their hearts.

BEDE. In describing the state of mankind, she shews what the proud deserve, and what the humble; saying, He hath shewed strength with his arm, &c. i. e. with the very Son of God. For as your arm is that whereby you work, so the arm of God is said to be His word by whom He made the world.

ORIGEN. But to those that fear Him, He hath done mighty things with His arm; though thou comest weak to God, if thou hast feared Him thou shalt obtain the promised strength.

THEOPHYLACT. For in His arm, that is, His incarnate Son, He hath shewed strength, seeing that nature was vanquished, a virgin bringing forth, and God becoming man.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius.) Or she says, Hath shewed, for will shew strength, not as long ago by the hand of Moses against the Egyptians, nor as by the Angel, (when he slew many thousand of the rebel Assyrians,) nor by any other instrument save His own power, He openly triumphed, overcoming spiritual (intelligibiles) enemies. Hence it follows, he hath scattered, &c. that is to say, every heart that was puffed up and not obedient to His coming He hath laid bare, and exposed the wickedness of their proud thoughts.

CYRIL OF JERUSALEM. But these words may be more appropriately taken to refer to the hostile ranks of the evil spirits. For they were raging on the earth, when our Lord’s coming put them to flight, and restored those whom they had bound, to His obedience.

THEOPHYLACT. This might also be understood of the Jews whom He scattered into all lands as they are now scattered.

1:52

52. He hath put down the mighty from their seats, and exalted them of low degree.

BEDE. The words, He hath shewed strength with his arm, and those which went before, And his mercy is on them that fear him from generation to generation, must be joined to this verse by a comma only. For truly through all generations of the world, by a merciful and just administration of Divine power, the proud do not cease to fall, and the humble to be exalted. As it is said, He hath put down the mighty from their seat, he hath exalted the humble and meek.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The mighty in knowledge were the evil spirits, the Devil, the wise ones of the Gentiles, the Scribes and Pharisees; yet these He hath put down, and raised up those who humbled themselves under the mighty hand of God (1 Pet. 5:6); giving them the power of treading upon serpents and scorpions and every power of the enemy. (Luke 10:19.) The Jews were also at one time puffed up with power, but unbelief slew them, and the mean and lowly of the Gentiles have through faith climbed up to the highest summit.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Macarius ex Serm. 1.) For our understanding is acknowledged to be the judgment-seat of God, but after the transgression, the powers of evil took their seat in the heart of the first man as on their own throne. For this reason then the Lord came and cast out the evil spirits from the seat of our will, and raised up those who were vanquished by devils, purging their consciences, and making their hearts his own dwelling place.

1:53

53. He hath filled the hungry with good things; and the rich he hath sent empty away.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Because human prosperity seems to consist chiefly in the honours of the mighty and the abundance of their riches, after speaking of the casting down of the mighty, and the exalting of the humble, he goes on to tell of the impoverishing of the rich and the filling of the poor, He hath filled the hungry, &c.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) These words regulate our conduct even with respect to sensible things, teaching the uncertainty of all worldly possessions, which are as shortlived as the wave which is dashed about to and fro by the violence of the wind. But spiritually all mankind suffered hunger except the Jews; for they possessed the treasures of legal tradition and the teachings of the holy prophets. But because they did not rest humbly on the Incarnate Word, they were sent away empty, carrying nothing with them, neither faith nor knowledge, and were bereft of the hope of good things, being shut out both of the earthly Jerusalem, and the life to come. But those of the Gentiles, who were brought low by hunger and thirst, because they clung to the Lord, were filled with spiritual goods.

GLOSS. (ordin.) They also who desire eternal life with their whole soul, as it were hungering after it, shall be filled when Christ shall appear in glory; but they who rejoice in earthly things, shall at the end be sent away emptied of all happiness.

1:54–55

54. He hath holpen his servant Israel, in remembrance of his mercy;

55. As he spake to our fathers, Abraham, and to his seed for ever.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After a general mention of the Divine mercy and holiness, the Virgin changes the subject to the strange and marvellous dispensation of the new incarnation, saying, He hath holpen his servant Israel, &c. as a physician relieves the sick, becoming visible among men, that He might make Israel (i. e. him who sees God) His servant.

BEDE. That is, obedient and humble; for he who disdains to be made humble, cannot be saved.

BASIL. (non occ.) For by Israel she means not Israel after the flesh, whom their own title made noble, but the spiritual Israel, which retained the name of faith, straining their eyes to see God by faith.

THEOPHYLACT. (vide etiam Tit. Bost.) It might also be applied to Israel after the flesh, seeing that out of that body multitudes believed. But this He did remembering His mercy, for He hath fulfilled what He promised to Abraham, saying, For in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed. (Gen. 12:3.) This promise then the mother of God called to mind, saying, As he spake to our father Abraham; (Gen. 17:12.) for it was said to Abraham, I will place my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, for an eternal covenant, that I shall be thy God, and the God of thy seed after thee.

BEDE. But by seed he means not so much those who are begotten in the flesh, as those who have followed the steps of Abraham’s faith, to whom the Saviour’s coming was promised for evermore.

GLOSS. (ordin.) For this promise of heritage shall not be narrowed by any limits, but to the very end of time there shall never lack believers, the glory of whose happiness shall be everlasting.

1:56

56. And Mary abode with her about three months, and returned to her own house.

AMBROSE. Mary abode with Elisabeth until she had accomplished the time of her bringing forth; as it is said, And Mary abode, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For in the sixth month of the conception of the forerunner, the Angel came to Mary, and she abode with Elisabeth three months, and so the nine months are completed.

AMBROSE. Now it was not only for the sake of friendship that she abode so long, but for the increase also of so great a prophet. For if at her first coming the child had so far advanced, that at the salutation of Mary he leaped in the womb, and his mother was filled with the Holy Spirit, how much must we suppose the presence of the Virgin Mary to have added during the experience of so long a time? Rightly then is she represented as having shewn kindness to Elisabeth, and preserved the mystical number.

BEDE. For the chaste soul which conceives a desire of the spiritual word must of necessity submit to the yoke of heavenly discipline, and sojourning for the days as it were of three months in the same place, cease not to persevere until it is illuminated by the light of faith, hope, and charity.

THEOPHYLACT. But when Elisabeth was going to bring forth, the Virgin departed, as it follows, And she returned; or, probably because of the multitude, who were about to assemble at the birth. But it became not a virgin to be present on such an occasion.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes.) For it is the custom for virgins to go away when the pregnant woman brings forth. But when she reached her own home, she went to no other place, but abode there until she knew the time of her delivery was at hand. And Joseph doubting, is instructed by an Angel.

1:57–58

57. Now Elisabeth’s full time came that she should be delivered; and she brought forth a son.

58. And her neighbours and her cousins heard how the Lord had shewed great mercy upon her; and they rejoiced with her.

AMBROSE. If you carefully observe, you will find that the word signifying fulness is no where used except at the birth of the righteous. Hence it is said, Now Elisabeth’s full time came. For the life of the righteous hath fulness, but the days of the wicked are empty.

CHRYSOSTOM. And for that reason the Lord kept back the delivery of Elisabeth, that her joy might be increased, and her fame the greater. Hence it follows, And her neighbours and cousins heard, &c. For they who had known her barrenness were made the witnesses of the Divine grace, and no one seeing the child departed in silence, but gave praise to God, Who had vouchsafed him beyond their expectation.

AMBROSE. For the bringing forth of saints causes the rejoicing of many; it is a common blessing; for justice is a public virtue, and therefore at the birth of a just man a sign of his future life is sent beforehand, and the grace of the virtue which is to follow is represented, being foreshadowed by the rejoicing of the neighbours.

1:59–64

59. And it came to pass, that on the eighth day they came to circumcise the child; and they called him Zacharias, after the name of his father.

60. And his mother answered and said, Not so; but he shall be called John.

61. And they said unto her, There is none of thy kindred that is called by this name.

62. And they made signs to his father, how he would have him called.

63. And he asked for a writing table, and wrote, saying, His name is John. And they marvelled all.

64. And his mouth was opened immediately, and his tongue loosed, and he spake, and praised God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Gen. Hom. 39.) The rite of circumcision was first delivered to Abraham as a sign of distinction, that the race of the Patriarch might be preserved in unmixed purity, and so might be able to obtain the promises. But now that the promise of the covenant is fulfilled, the sign attached to it is removed. So then through Christ circumcision ceased, and baptism came in its place; but first it was right that John should be circumcised; as it is said, And it came to pass, that on the eighth day, &c. For the Lord had said, Let the child of eight days be circumcised among you. (Gen. 17:13.) But this measurement of time I conceive was ordered by Divine mercy for two reasons. First, because in its most tender years the child the more easily bears the cutting of the flesh. Secondly, that from the very operation itself we might be reminded that it was done for a sign; for the young child scarcely distinguishes any of the things that are around him. But after the circumcision, the name was conferred, as it follows, And they called him. But this was done because we must first receive the seal of the Lord, then the name of man. Or, because no man except he first cast aside his fleshly lusts, which circumcision signifies, is worthy to have his name written in the book of life.

AMBROSE. The holy Evangelist has especially remarked, that many thought the child should be called after his father Zacharias, in order that we might understand, not that any name of his kinsfolk was displeasing to his mother, but that the same word had been communicated to her by the Holy Spirit, which had been foretold by the Angel to Zacharias. And in truth, being dumb, Zacharias was unable to mention his son's name to his wife, but Elisabeth obtained by prophecy what she had not learnt from her husband. Hence it follows, And she answered, &c. Marvel not that the woman pronounced the name which she had never heard, seeing the Holy Spirit who imparted it to the Angel revealed it to her; nor could she be ignorant of the forerunner of the Lord, who had prophesied of Christ. And it well follows, And they said unto her, &c. that you might consider that the name belongs not to the family, but to the Prophet. Zacharias also is questioned, and signs made to him, as it follows, And they made signs to the father, &c. But since unbelief had so bereft him of utterance and hearing, that he could not use his voice, he spoke by his hand-writing, as it follows, And he asked for a writing table, and wrote, saying, His name is John; that is, we give no name to him who has received his name from God.

ORIGEN. (non occ.) Zacharias is by interpretation "remembering God," but John signifies "pointing to." Now "memory" relates to something absent, "pointing to," to something present. But John was not about to set forth the memory of God as absent, but with his finger to point him out as present, saying, Behold the Lamb of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. But the name John is also interpreted the grace of God. Because then by the favour of Divine grace, not by nature, Elisabeth conceived this son, they engraved the memory of the benefit on the name of the child.

THEOPHYLACT. And because with the mother the dumb father also agreed as to the name of the child, it follows, And they all marvelled. For there was no one of this name among their kinsfolk that any one could say that they had both previously determined upon it.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. vi.) The birth of John then broke the silence of Zacharias, as it follows, And his mouth was opened. For it were unreasonable when the voice of the Word had come forth, that his father should remain speechless.

AMBROSE. Rightly also, from that moment was his tongue loosed, for that which unbelief had bound, faith set free. Let us then also believe, in order that our tongue, which has been bound by the chains of unbelief, may be loosed by the voice of reason. Let us write mysteries by the Spirit if we wish to speak. Let us write the forerunner of Christ, not on tables of stone, but on the fleshly tablets of the heart. For he who names John, prophesies Christ. For it follows, And he spake, giving thanks.

BEDE. Now in an allegory, the celebration of John’s birth was the beginning of the grace of the New Covenant. His neighbours and kinsfolk had rather give him the name of his father than that of John. For the Jews, who by the observance of the Law were united to him as it were by ties of kindred, chose rather to follow the righteousness which is of the Law, than receive the grace of faith. But the name of John, (i. e. the grace of God,) his mother in word, his father in writing, suffice to announce, for both the Law itself as well as the Psalms and the Prophecies, in the plainest language foretel the grace of Christ; and that ancient priesthood, by the foreshadowing of its ceremonies and sacrifices, bears testimony to the same. And well doth Zacharias speak on the eighth day of the birth of his child, for by the resurrection of the Lord, which took place on the eighth day, i. e. the day after the sabbath, (septimam sabbati.) the hidden secrets of the legal priesthood were revealed.

1:65–66

65. And fear came on all that dwelt round about them: and all these sayings were noised abroad throughout all the hill country of Judæa.

66. And all they that heard them laid them up in their hearts, saying, What manner of child shall this be! And the hand of the Lord was with him.

THEOPHYLACT. As at the silence of Zacharias the people marvelled, so likewise when he spoke. Hence it is said, And fear came upon all; that from these two circumstances all might believe there was something great in the child that was born. But all these things were ordained, to the end that he who was to bear witness of Christ might also be esteemed trustworthy. Hence it follows, And all they that heard them laid them up in their heart, saying, What manner of child, &c.

BEDE. For forerunning signs prepare the way for the forerunner of the truth, and the future prophet is recommended by auspices sent before him; hence it follows, For the hand of the Lord was with him.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes.) For God worked miracles in John which he did not himself, but the right hand of God in him.

GLOSS. (ordin.) But mystically, at the time of our Lord’s resurrection, by the preaching of the grace of Christ, a wholesome dread shook the hearts not only of the Jews, (who were neighbours, either from the place of their dwelling, or from the knowledge of the law,) but of the foreign nations also. The name of Christ surmounts not only the hilly country of Judæa, but all the heights of worldly dominion and wisdom.

1:67–68

67. And his father Zacharias was filled with the Holy Ghost, and prophesied, saying,

68. Blessed be the Lord God of Israel; for he hath visited and redeemed his people.

AMBROSE. God in His mercy and readiness to pardon our sins, not only restores to us what He has taken away, but grants us favours even beyond our expectations. Let no one then distrust Him, let no one from consciousness of past sins despair of the Divine blessing. God knoweth how to change His sentence, if thou hast known how to correct thy sin, seeing he that was long silent prophesies; as it is said, And Zacharias was filled with the Holy Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. That is, “with the working of the Holy Spirit;” for he had obtained the grace of the Holy Spirit, not in any manner, but fully; and the gift of prophecy shone forth in him; as it follows, And he prophesied.

ORIGEN. Now Zacharias being filled with the Holy Spirit utters two prophecies, the first relating to Christ, the second to John. And this is plainly proved by those words in which he speaks of the Saviour as present and already going about in the world, saying, Blessed be the Lord God of Israel, for he hath visited, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. Zacharias, when he is blessing God, says, that He hath visited His people, meaning thereby either the Israelites in the flesh, for He came to the lost sheep of the house of Israel; (Matt. 15:24.) or the spiritual Israel, that is, the faithful, who were worthy of this visitation, making the providence of God of good effect towards them.

BEDE. But the Lord visited His people who were pining away as it were from long sickness, and by the blood of His only begotten Son, redeemed them who were sold under sin. Which thing Zacharias, knowing that it would soon be accomplished, relates in the prophetic manner as if it were already passed. But he says, His people, not that when He came He found them His own, but that by visiting He made them so.

1:69

69. And hath raised up an horn of salvation for us in the house of his servant David.

THEOPHYLACT. God seemed to be asleep, disregarding the sins of the multitude, but in these last times coming in the flesh, He hath risen up and trodden down the evil spirits who hated us. Hence it is said, And he hath raised up an horn of salvation to us in the house of his servant David.

ORIGEN. Because Christ was born of the seed of David, according to the flesh, it is said, A horn of salvation to us in the house of his servant David; as it has also elsewhere been said, A vineyard hath been planted in a horn, (Is. 5:1.) i. e. in Jesus Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Serm. de Anna. IV.) Now by a horn he means power, glory, and honour, deriving it metaphorically from the brute creatures, to whom God has given horns for defence and glory.

BEDE. The kingdom of our Saviour Christ is called also the horn of salvation, because all our bones are clothed with flesh, but the horn alone stretches beyond the flesh; so the kingdom of Christ is called the horn of salvation, as reaching beyond the world and the delights of the flesh. According to which figure David and Solomon were consecrated by the horn of oil to the glory of the kingdom.

1:70

70. As he spake by the mouth of his holy prophets which have been since the world began.

THEOPHYLACT. That Christ was born of the house of David, Micah relates, saying, And thou, Bethlehem, art not the least in the city of Juda, for out of thee shall come a governor who shall rule my people Israel. (Micah 5:2.) But all the prophets spoke of the Incarnation, and therefore it is said, As he spake by the mouth of his holy prophets.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Victor Presbyter.) Whereby he means that God spoke through them, and that their speech was not of man.

BEDE. But he says, Which have been since the world began. Because all the Scriptures of the Old Testament were a constant prophecy of Christ. For both our father Adam himself, and the other fathers, by their deeds bore testimony to His dispensation.

1:71

71. That we should be saved from our enemies, and from the hand of all that hate us.

BEDE. Having first briefly said, He hath raised up a horn of salvation to us, he goes on to explain his words, adding, of salvation from our enemies. As if he said, He hath raised up to us a horn, i. e. He hath raised up to us salvation from our enemies, and from the hand of all who hate us.

ORIGEN. Let us not suppose that this refers to our bodily enemies, but our ghostly. For the Lord Jesus came mighty in battle (Ps. 24:8) to destroy all our enemies, that He might deliver us from their snares and temptation.

1:72–74

72. To perform the mercy promised to our forefathers, and to remember his holy covenant;

73. The oath which he sware to our father Abraham,

74. That he would grant unto us.

BEDE. Having announced that the Lord, according to the declaration of the Prophet, would be born of the house of David, he now says, that the same Lord to fulfil the covenant He made with Abraham will deliver us, because chiefly to these patriarchs of Abraham's seed was promised the gathering of the Gentiles, or the incarnation of Christ. But David is put first, because to Abraham was promised the holy assembly of the Church; whereas to David it was told that from him Christ was to be born. And therefore after what was said of David, he adds concerning Abraham the words, To perform the mercy promised to our fathers, &c.

ORIGEN. I think that at the coming of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, both Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were partakers of His mercy. For it is not to be believed, that they who had before seen His day, and were glad, should afterwards derive no advantage from His coming, since it is written, Having made peace through the blood of his Cross, whether in earth or in heaven. (Coloss. 1:20.)

THEOPHYLACT. The grace of Christ extends even to those who are dead, because through Him we shall rise again, not only we, but they also who have been dead before us. He performed His mercy also to our forefathers in fulfilling all their hopes and desires. Hence it follows, And to remember his holy covenant, that covenant, namely, wherein he said, Blessing, I will bless thee, and multiplying, I will multiply thee. (Gen. 22:17.) For Abraham was multiplied in all nations, who became his children by adoption, through following the example of his faith. But the fathers also, seeing their children enjoy these blessings, rejoice together with them, just as if they received the mercy in themselves. Hence it follows, The oath which he sware to our father Abraham, that he would grant unto us.

BASIL. (Hom. in Ps. 29. et in Ps. 14. App. op.) But let no one, hearing that the Lord had sworn to Abraham, be tempted to swear. For as when the wrath of God is spoken of, it does not signify passion but punishment; so neither dos God swear as man, but His word is in very truth expressed to us in place of an oath, confirming by an unchangeable sentence what He promised.

1:74

74. That we, being delivered out of the hands of our enemies, might serve him without fear.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having said that a horn of salvation had risen up to us from the house of David, he shews that through it we are partakers of His glory, and escape the assaults of the enemy. As he says, That being delivered out of the hands of our enemies, we might serve him without fear. The two things above mentioned will not easily be found united. For many escape danger, but fail of a glorious life, as criminals discharged from prison by the king's mercy. On the other hand, some reap glory, but are compelled for its sake to encounter dangers, as soldiers in war embracing a life of honour are oftentimes in the greatest peril. But the horn brings both safety and glory. Safety indeed as it rescues us from the hands of our enemies, not slightly but in a wonderful manner, insomuch that we have no more fear, which arc his very words; that being delivered from the hand of our enemies, we might serve him without fear.

ORIGEN. Or in another way; Frequently are men delivered from the hands of the enemy, but not without fear. For when fear and peril have gone before, and a man is then plucked from the enemies' hand, he is delivered indeed, but not without fear. Therefore said he, that the coming of Christ caused us to be snatched from the enemies' hands without fear. For we suffered not from their evil designs, but He suddenly parting us from them, hath led us out to our own allotted resting place.

1:75

75. In holiness and righteousness before him, all the days of our life.

CHRYSOSTOM. Zacharias glorifies the Lord, because He hath made us to serve Him with full confidence, not in the flesh as Judah did with the blood of victims, but in the spirit with good works. And this is what he means by in holiness and righteousness. For holiness is, a proper observance of our duty towards God, righteousness of our duty towards man; as, for example, when a man devoutly performs the Divine commands, and lives honourably among his fellow men. But he does not say "before men," as of hypocrites desirous to please men, but "before God," as of those whose praise is not of men, but of God; (Rom. 2:29.) and this not once or for a time; but all the days of their life, as it is said, all our days.

BEDE. For whosoever either departs from God’s service before he dies, or by any uncleanness stains either the strictness or purity of his faith, or strives to be holy and righteous before men, and not before God, does not yet serve the Lord in perfect freedom from the hand of his spiritual enemies, but after the example of the old Samaritans endeavours to serve equally the Gods of the Gentiles, and his Lord.

1:76

76. And thou, child, shalt be called the Prophet of the Highest: for thou shalt go before the face of the Lord to prepare his ways.

AMBROSE. In prophesying of the Lord he rightly addresses the prophet, shewing that prophecy also is a gift of the Lord, in order that he might not, while enumerating public benefits, seem to be so ungrateful as to be silent of his own. Hence it is said, And thou, child, shalt be called the Prophet of the Highest.

ORIGEN. The reason I suppose that Zacharias hastened to speak to his son, was because he knew that John was shortly about to be a sojourner in the wilderness, and that he himself should see him no more.

AMBROSE. Now perhaps some may think it an absurd extravagance of the mind to address a child of eight days old. But if we keep our eyes fixed upon higher things, we surely can understand that the son might hear the voice of his father, who before he was born heard the salutation of Mary. The Prophet knew that there were certain organs of hearing in a Prophet which were unclosed by the Spirit of God, not by the growth of the body. He possessed the faculty of understanding who was moved by the feeling of exultation.

BEDE. Unless indeed Zacharias be supposed to have wished as soon as he was able to speak, to proclaim for their instruction who were present, the future gifts of his son, which he had long before learnt from the Angel. Let the Arians however hear that our Lord Christ, whom John went before prophesying of Him, Zacharias calls “the Most High,” as it is said in the Psalms, A man was born in her, and the most highest has established her. (Ps. 87:5.)

CHRYSOSTOM. But as kings have their companions in arms, who stand nearest to them, so John, who was the friend of the Bridegroom, went before Him nigh unto His coming. And this is what follows, For thou shalt go before the face of the Lord to prepare his ways. For some prophets have preached the mystery of Christ at a distance, but he preached it nearer the time, that he might both see Christ, and declare Him to others.

GREGORY. (xix. Mor. sup. Job 28:23.) But all they who by preaching cleanse the hearts of their hearers from the filth of their sins, prepare a way for the coming of wisdom into the heart.

1:77

77. To give knowledge of salvation unto his people by the remission of their sins.

THEOPHYLACT. For the manner in which the forerunner prepared the way of the Lord he explains, adding, To give knowledge of salvation. The Lord Jesus is salvation, but the knowledge of salvation, i. e. of Christ, was given in John, who bore witness of Christ.

BEDE. For as if desiring to explain the name of Jesus, i. e. the Saviour, he frequently makes mention of salvation, but lest men should think it was a temporal salvation which was promised, he adds, for the forgiveness of sins.

THEOPHYLACT. For in no other way was He known to be God, but as having forgiven the sins of His people. For it is of God alone to forgive sins.

BEDE. But the Jews prefer not to receive Christ, but to wait for Antichrist; for they desire to be delivered not from the dominion of sin within, but from the yoke of man’s bondage without.

1:78

78.Through the tender mercy of our God; whereby the dayspring from on high hath visited us.

THEOPHYLACT. Because God hath forgiven our sins not for our works’ sake, but through His mercy, it is therefore fitly added, Through the tender mercy of our God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xiv. in Matt.) Which mercy we find not indeed by our own seeking, but God from on high hath appeared to us, as it follows; Whereby (i. e. by His tender mercy) the dayspring from on high (that is, Christ) hath visited us, taking upon Him our flesh.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) Abiding on high yet present upon the earth, suffering neither division nor limitation, which thing neither can our understanding embrace, nor any power of words express.

1:79

79.To give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, to guide our feet into the way of peace.

BEDE. Christ is rightly called the Day-spring, because He hath disclosed to us the rising of the true light, as it follows; To give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) By darkness he means not material darkness, but error and distance from the faith, or ungodliness.

BASIL. (sup. Esai. c. ii) For in thick darkness were the Gentile people sitting, who were sunk deep in idolatry, until the rising light dispersed the darkness, and spread abroad the brightness of truth.

GREGORY. (iv. Moral. sup. Job 3:5.) But the shadow of death is taken to mean the forgetfulness of the mind. For as death causes that which it kills to be no longer in life, so whatever oblivion touches ceases to be in the memory. Hence the Jewish people who were forgetful of God are said to sit in the shadow of death. The shadow of death is taken also for the death of the flesh, because as that is the true death, by which the soul is separated from God, so that is the shadow of death by which the flesh is separated from the soul. Hence in the words of the martyrs it is said, the shadow of death has come over us. (Ps. 44:19.) By the shadow of death also is represented the following of the devil, who is called Death (Rev. 6:8.) in the Revelations, because as a shadow is formed according to the quality of the body, so the actions of the wicked are expressed according to the manner of their following him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) He rightly says sitting, for we were not walking in darkness, but sitting down as having no hope of deliverance.

THEOPHYLACT. But not only does the Lord at His rising give light to those who sit in darkness, but he says something further as it follows, to direct our feet in the way of peace. The way of peace is the way of righteousness, to which He has directed our feet, i. e. the affections of our souls.

GREGORY. (Hom. 33. in Evang.) For we guide our steps in the way of peace, when we walk in that line of conduct wherein we depart not from the grace of our Maker.

AMBROSE. Mark also, in how few words Elisabeth prophesies, in how many Zacharias, and yet each spoke filled with the Holy Spirit; but this discipline is preserved, that women may study rather to learn what are the Divine commands than to teach them.

1:80

80. And the child grew, and waxed strong in spirit, and was in the deserts till the day of his shewing unto Israel.

BEDE. The future preacher of repentance, that he might the more boldly reclaim his hearers from the allurements of the world, passes the first part of his life in the deserts. Hence it is said, And the child grew.

THEOPHYLACT. i. e. in bodily stature, and waxed strong in spirit, for together with his body at the same time his spiritual gift increased, and the workings of the Spirit were more and more manifested in him.

ORIGEN. Or he increased in spirit, remaining not in the same measure in which he had begun, but the Spirit was ever growing in him. His will ever tending to better things, was making its own advances, and his mind ever contemplating something more divine, while his memory was exercising itself, that it might lay up more and more things in its treasury, and more firmly retain them. But he adds, And he waxed strong. For human nature is weak, as we learn, the flesh is weak. (Matt. 26:41.) It must therefore be made strong by the Spirit, for the Spirit is ready. Many wax strong in the flesh, but the wrestler of God must be strengthened by the Spirit that he may crush the wisdom of the flesh. He retires therefore to escape the noise of cities, and the thronging of the people. For it follows, And he was in the deserts. Where the air is purer, the sky more clear, and God a closer friend, that as the time had not yet arrived for his baptism and preaching, he might have leisure for praying, and might hold converse with the angels, calling upon God and fearing Him, saying, Behold, here am I.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, he was in the deserts that he might be brought up beyond the reach of the malice of the multitude, and not be afraid of man. For if he had been in the world, perchance he had been corrupted by the friendship and conversation of the world. And secondly, that he who was to preach Christ might also be esteemed trust-worthy. But he was hid in the desert until it pleased God to shew him forth to the people of Israel, as it follows, till the day of his shewing forth to Israel.

AMBROSE. And rightly is the time noted during which the prophet was in the womb, in order that the presence of Mary might not be passed over, while they are silent about the time of his childhood, because being strengthened in the womb by the presence of the Mother of the Lord, he knew not the struggles of childhood.

CHAPTER 2

2:1–5

1. And it came to pass in those days, that there went out a decree from Cæsar Augustus, that all the world should be taxed.

2. (And this taxing was first made when Cyrenius was governor of Syria.)

3. And all went to be taxed, every one into his own city.

4. And Joseph also went up from Galilee, out of the city of Nazareth, into Judæa, unto the city of David, which is called Bethlehem; (because he was of the house and lineage of David:)

5. To be taxed with Mary his espoused wife, being great with child.

BEDE. The Son of God, about to be born in the flesh, as by His birth of a virgin He shewed that the grace of virginity was most pleasing in His sight, is therefore begotten in the most peaceful time of the world, because He taught men to seek peace, and condescends to visit those who follow it. But there could be no greater sign of peace than for the whole world to be brought together under one taxing, while its ruler Augustus reigned with so great peace for the twelve years, about the time of our Lord's nativity, that war having been quelled throughout the whole world, there seemed to be a literal fulfilment of the Prophet's prediction, They shall beat their swords into ploughshares, &c.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes et Alexander ander Monachus.) Christ is born also at a time when the princes of Judah had failed, and the kingdom was transferred to Roman governors, to whom the Jews paid tribute; and then was fulfilled the prophecy, saying, There shall not fail a leader from Judah, nor a prince from between his feet, until he shall come who is to be sent. (Gen. 49:10.) And now when Cæsar Augustus was in the 42d year of his reign, there went forth an edict from him that all the world should be taxed for the payment of tribute, the management of which he committed to a certain Cyrinus, whom he made governor of Judæa and Syria; and so it follows, This taxing was first made, &c.

BEDE. St. Luke points out, that this taxing was either the first of those which comprehended the whole world, for before this very many parts of the earth are often mentioned as having been taxed; or first began at that time when Cyrinus was sent into Syria.

AMBROSE. He has rightly added the name of the governor, to mark the course of time. For if the names of the Consuls are affixed to the tables of prices, how much more ought the time to be noted down, of that event which was the redemption of all men?

BEDE. Now the registration of property was so appointed by Divine guidance, that every one was ordered to go into his own country, as it follows, And they all went to be taxed, every one to his own city. Which so came to pass, in order that the Lord, conceived in one place, born in another, might the more easily escape the fury of the crafty Herod. Hence it follows: Now Joseph also went up from Galilee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in diem natal. Christi.) It was the Lord who directed Augustus to give this edict, that he might minister unto the coming of the Only-begotten; for it was this edict that brought Christ's mother into her country as the prophets had foretold, namely, to Bethlehem of Judæa, according to the word, to a city of David, which is called Bethlehem.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Irenæus cont. Hær. 1. 3. c. 11.) Now he added, a city of David, that he might declare that the promise made by God to David, namely, that from the fruit of his loins there should go before him a king for ever, (2 Sam. 7:12.) was already fulfilled. Whence it follows, Because he was of the house and lineage of David. (Ps. 132:11.) But since Joseph was of the family of David, it pleased the Evangelist to make known also that the Virgin herself was of the same family, because the Divine law enjoined marriages between those of the same line; and therefore it follows, With Mary his espoused wife.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) It is said that she was espoused, to imply that nothing more than espousals preceded the conception; for it was not by man's seed that the Holy Virgin conceived.

GREGORY. (Hom. 8. in Ev.) But the registering of the whole world when our Lord was about to be born was mystical; for He appeared in the flesh Who should write down the names of His own elect in eternity.

AMBROSE. There is described a secular registration, implied a spiritual, to be laid before the King not of earth but of Heaven; a registering of faith:

a census of souls. For the old census of the Synagogue was abolished, a new census of the Church was preparing. And to decide that the census was not of Augustus, but of Christ, the whole world is ordered to be registered. For who could demand the registration of the whole world but He who had dominion over it, for the earth is not of Augustus, but the earth is the Lord’s? (Ps. 24:1.)

BEDE. And He most perfectly fulfilled what the name Augustus signifies, in that He was both desirous and able to increase (augere) His own.

THEOPHYLACT. Because it was fit also that at Christ’s coming the worship of many Gods should cease, and one God only be worshipped, one king is described as ruling the world.

ORIGEN. To those who attentively consider it, there seems to be expressed a kind of sacrament, in its being necessary that Christ should be put down in the registration of the whole world; in order that His name being written with all, He might sanctify all, and being placed in the census with the whole world, He might impart to the world the communion of Himself.

BEDE. As at that time in the reign of Augustus and under the governorship of Cyrinus, every one went to his own city to make returns of his property; so now when Christ reigns through His teachers (the governors of the Church) ought we to make returns of righteousness.

AMBROSE. This was then the first public enrolment of souls to the Lord, to Whom all enrol themselves not at the voice of the crier, but of the Prophet, who says, O clap your hands, all ye people. (Ps. 47:1.) But in order that men might know that it was an enrolment of righteousness, there came up to it Joseph and Mary, the just man and the virgin. He who was to be guardian of the Word and she who was to bring it forth.

BEDE. Our city and country is the resting-place of the blessed, to which we ought to be travelling with daily increasing virtues. But day by day does Holy Church wait upon her Teacher, and going up from the course of worldly business (which the name of Galilee signifies) to the city of Judah, i. e. the city of confession and praise, make returns of her devotion to the Eternal King. She, after the example of the blessed Virgin Mary, a Virgin has conceived us of the Spirit. Though espoused to another, she is made fruitful by Him; and while visibly joined to the Pontiff who is placed over her, is invisibly filled with the graces of the Spirit. And hence Joseph is well interpreted increased, declaring by his very name, that the earnestness of the master speaking is of no avail, except he receive increasing help from above, that he may be heard.

2:6–7

6. And so it was, that, while they were there, the days were accomplished that, she should be delivered.

7. And she brought forth her firstborn son, and wrapped him in swaddling clothes, and laid him in a manger; because there was no room for them in the inn.

AMBROSE. St. Luke has briefly explained the manner, time, and also the place in which Christ was born in the flesh; the manner, that is, in which the espoused has conceived, a virgin has born offspring.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Diem Nat. Christi.) Though coming in the form of man, yet not in every thing is He subject to the laws of man's nature; for while His being born of a woman, tells of human nature; virginity becoming capable of childbirth betokens something above man. Of Him then His mother's burden was light, the birth immaculate, the delivery without pain, the nativity without defilement, neither beginning from wanton desire, nor brought to pass with sorrow. For as she who by her guilt engrafted death into our nature, was condemned to bring forth in trouble, it was meet that she who brought life into the world should accomplish her delivery with joy. But through a virgin's purity He makes His passage into mortal life at a time in which the darkness was beginning to fail, and the vast expanse of night to fade away before the exceeding brightness of the light. For the death of sin had brought an end of wickedness which from henceforth tends to nothing by reason of the presence of the true light which has illuminated the whole world with the rays of the Gospel.

BEDE. He condescended to become incarnate at that time, that after His birth He might be enrolled in Cæsar's taxing, and in order to bring liberty to us might Himself become subject to slavery. It was well also that our Lord was born at Bethlehem, not only as a mark of the royal crown, but on account of the sacrament of the name.

GREGORY. (Hom. viii. in Ev.) Bethlehem is by interpretation the house of bread. For it is the Lord Himself who says, I am the bread of life which came down from heaven. (John 6:53.) The place therefore where the Lord was born was before called the house of bread, because it was there that He was to appear in His fleshly nature who should refresh the souls of the elect with spiritual fulness.

BEDE. But down to the very end of time, the Lord ceases not to be conceived at Nazareth, to be born at Bethlehem, whenever any of His hearers taking of the flour of the word makes himself a house of eternal bread. Daily in the Virgin’s womb, i. e. in the mind of believers, Christ is conceived by faith, born by baptism. It follows, and she brought forth her firstborn son.

JEROME. (cont. Helvid.) From this Helvidiusd strives to prove that no one can be called firstborn who has not brothers, as he is called only-begotten who is the only son of his parents. But we thus determine the matter. Every only-begotten is firstborn, not every firstborn is only-begotten. We say not that he is first-begotten whom others follow, but before whom there is no one; (otherwise, supposing there is no firstborn but who has brothers following him, there are then no firstlings due to the priests as long as there are no others begotten;) lest perchance when no birth follows afterward, there should be an only-begotten and not a firstborn.

BEDE. He is also only-begotten in the substance of His divinity, firstborn in the taking upon Himself humanity, firstborn in grace, only-begotten in nature.

JEROME. (ubi sup.) Now here was no midwife, no tender anxiety of women; she wrapped the Child up in swaddling clothes, herself both mother and midwife.

BEDE. He who clothes the whole world with its varied beauty, is wrapped up in common linen, that we might be able to receive the best robe; He by Whom all things are made, is folded both hands and feet, that our hands might be raised up for every good work, and our feet directed in the way of peace.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes) Oh the wonderful straitening and banishment which He underwent, Who holds the whole world in His hands! From the very beginning He seeks for poverty, and ennobles it in His own person.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Surely if He had so willed it, He might have come moving the heavens, making the earth to shake, and shooting forth His thunderbolts; but such was not the way of His going forth; His desire was not to destroy, but to save; and to trample upon human pride from its very birth, therefore He is not only man, but a poor man, and has chosen a poor mother, who had not even a cradle where she might lay her new born Child; as it follows, and she laid him in the manger.

BEDE. He is confined in the narrow space of a rude manger, whose seat is the heavens, that He may give us ample room in the joys of His heavenly kingdom. He Who is the bread of Angels is laid down in a manger, that He might feast us, as it were the sacred animals, with the bread of His flesh.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He finds man in his corrupt affections become like the beasts that perish, and therefore He is laid in the manger, in the place of food, that we changing the life of beasts, might be brought to the knowledge that befits man, partaking not of hay, but of the heavenly bread, the lifegiving body.

BEDE. He who sits at His Father's right hand, finds no room in an inn, that He might prepare for us in His Father's house many mansions; (John 14:2.) He is born not in His Father's house, but in an inn and by the way side, because through the mystery of the incarnation He was made the way by which to bring us to our country, (where we shall enjoy the truth and the life.) (John 14:6.)

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) And that He might shew that on account of the human form which He took upon Him, He was born as in a strange country, not according to His power but according to His nature.

AMBROSE. On thy account then am I weak, in Himself is He strong. On thy account am I poor, in Himself is He rich. Consider not what thou seest, but acknowledge that thou art redeemed. I owe more, O Lord Jesus, to Thy sufferings that I am redeemed, than to Thy works that I am created. It were no advantage to be born, had it not advantaged me to be redeemed also.

2:8–12

8. And there were in the same country shepherds abiding in the field, keeping watch over their flock by night.

9. And, lo, the angel of the Lord came upon them, and the glory of the Lord shone round about them: and they were sore afraid.

10. And the angel said unto them, Fear not: for, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people.

11. For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord.

12. And this shall be a sign unto you; Ye shall find the babe wrapped in swaddling clothes, lying in a manger.

AMBROSE. Observe with what care God builds up our faith. An Angel teaches Mary; an Angel teaches Joseph; an Angel the shepherds also, of whom it is said, And there were in the same country shepherds abiding in the field.

CHRYSOSTOM. To Joseph the Angel appeared in a dream, as to one who might be easily brought to believe, but to the shepherds in visible shape as to men of a ruder nature. But the Angel went not to Jerusalem, sought not for Scribes and Pharisees, (for they were corrupt and tormented with envy.) But these were simple men living in the ancient practices of Moses and the Patriarchs. There is a certain road which leads by innocence to Philosophy.

BEDE. (Hom. inter Hyem. de Sanctis v.) No where in the whole course of the Old Testament do we find that the Angels who so constantly appear to the Patriarchs, came with light. This privilege was rightly kept for this time when there arose in the darkness a light to them that were true of heart. Hence it follows, and the glory of God shone round about them. (Ps. 112:4.) He is sent forth from the womb, but He shines from heaven. He lies in a common inn, but He lives in celestial light.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) They were alarmed at the miracle, as it follows, And they were afraid, &c. But the Angel dispels their rising fears. He not only soothes their terrors, but pours gladness into their hearts; for it follows, For, behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, &c. not to the Jewish people only, but to all. The cause of their joy is declared; the new and wonderful birth is made manifest by the very names. It follows, For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord. The first of these, i. e. the Saviour, has reference to the action, the third, i. e. the Lord, to the dignity of the person.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But that which is in the middle, namely, Christ, has reference to the adoration, and signifies not the nature, but the compound substance of two natures. For on Christ our Saviour we confess the anointing to have been performed, not however figuratively, (as formerly on kings by the oil,) and as if by prophetic grace, nor for the accomplishment of any work, as it is said in Isaiah, Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus; (Isa. 45.) who although he was an idolater was said to be anointed, that he might by the decree of Heaven take possession of the whole province of Babylon; but the Saviour as man in the form of a servant, was anointed by the Holy Spirit, as God He Himself by His Holy Spirit anoints those that believe on Him.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer) He marks the time of our Lord's nativity, when he says, To-day, and the place when he adds, In the city of David; and the signs thereof when it follows, And there shall be a sign, &c. Now the Angels bring tidings to the shepherds of the Chief Shepherd, as of a lamb discovered and brought up in a cave.

BEDE. The infancy of the Saviour was impressed upon us, both by frequent heraldings of Angels and testimonies of Evangelists, that we might be the more deeply penetrated in our hearts by what has been done for us. And we may observe, that the sign given us of the newborn Saviour was, that He would be found not clothed in Tyrian purple, but wrapped in poor swaddling clothes, not laying on gilded couches, but in a manger.

MAXIMUS. (in Serm. Nativ. 4.) But if perhaps the swaddling clothes are mean in thy eyes, admire the Angels singing praises together. If thou despisest the manger, raise thy eyes a little, and behold the new star in heaven proclaiming to the world the Lord's nativity. If thou believest the mean things, believe also the mighty. If thou disputest about those which betoken His lowliness, look with reverence on what is high and heavenly.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) It was in a mystery that the Angel appeared to the shepherds while they were watching, and the glory of the Lord shone round about them, implying that they are thought worthy above the rest to see sublime things who take a watchful care of their faithful flocks; and while they themselves are piously watching over them, the Divine grace shines widely round about them.

BEDE. (Home. ubi sup.) For in a mystery, those shepherds, and their flocks, signify all teachers and guides of faithful souls. The night in which they were keeping watch over their flocks, indicates the dangerous temptations from which they never cease to keep themselves, and those placed under their care. Well also at the birth of our Lord do shepherds watch over their flocks; for He was born who says, I am the good Shepherd: (John 10:11, 16.) but the time also was at hand in which the same Shepherd was to recal His scattered sheep to the pastures of life.

ORIGEN. But if we would rise to a more hidden meaning, I should say, that there were certain shepherd angels, who direct the affairs of men, and while each one of them was keeping his watch, an angel came at the birth of the Lord, and announced to the shepherds that the true Shepherd had arisen. For Angels before the coming of the Saviour could bring little help to those entrusted to them, for scarcely did one single Gentile believe in God. But now whole nations come to the faith of Jesus.

2:13–14

13. And suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host praising God, and saying,

14. Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men.

BEDE. Lest the authority of a single Angel should appear small, as soon as one had revealed the sacrament of the new birth, straightway there was present a multitude of the heavenly host. Rightly has the attending Chorus of Angels received the name of heavenly host, seeing they both humbly bring their aid to that Leader mighty in battle, Who has appeared to put down the powers of the air, and also themselves by their celestial arms bravely vanquish those opposing powers lest they should prevail as they wish in tempting men. But because He is both God and man, rightly do they sing Peace to men and Glory to God. As it follows, Praising God and saying, Glory to God in the highest. As soon as one Angel, one messenger, had brought the good tidings that God was born in the flesh, the multitude of the heavenly host broke forth in the praise of the Creator, in order both to fix. their devotion on Christ, and to instruct us by their example, that as often as any of the brethren shall sound forth the word of sacred learning, or we ourselves shall have brought these holy things home to our minds, we should with our whole heart, our mouths and hands, return praise to God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Of old, indeed, Angels were sent to punish, as, for instance to the Israelites, to David, to the men of Sodom, to the valley of weeping. (Bochim. Judges 2:1.) Now on the other hand they sing the song of thanksgiving to God: because He hath revealed to them His coming down to men.

GREGORY. (28. Moral. sup. Job 38:7.) At the same time they also give praises because their voices of gladness accord well with our redemption, and while they behold our acceptance, they rejoice also that their number is completed.

BEDE. They wish also peace to men, as they add, On earth peace to men, because those whom they had before despised as weak and abject, now that our Lord has come in the flesh they esteem as friends.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This peace has been made through Christ, for He has reconciled us by Himself to God and our Father, (2 Cor. 5:18, 19, Eph. 2:16, Col. 1:20.) having taken away our guilt, which was the ground of offence also. He has united two nations in one man, and has joined the heavenly and the earthly in one flock.

BEDE. For whom they ask peace is explained in the words, Of good will. For them, namely, who receive the new born Christ. For there, is no peace to the ungodly, (Isa. 57:20.) but much peace to them that love the name of God. (Ps. 119:165)

ORIGEN. But the attentive reader will ask, How then does the Saviour say, I came not to send peace on the earth, whereas now the Angels’ song of His birth is, On earth peace to men? It is answered, that peace is said to be to men of goodwill. For the peace which the Lord does not give on the earth is not the peace of good will.

AUGUSTINE. (13. de Trin. cap. 13) For righteousness belongs to good will.

CHRYSOSTOM. Behold the wonderful working of God. He first brings Angels down to men, and then brings men up to heaven. The heaven became earth, when it was about to receive earthly things.

ORIGEN. But in a mystery, the Angels saw that they could not accomplish the work committed to them without Him Who was truly able to save, and that their healing fell short of what the care of men required. And so it was as if there should come one who had great knowledge in medicine, and those who before were unable to heal, acknowledging now the hand of a master, grudge not to see the corruptions of wounds ceasing, but break forth into the praises of the Physician, and of that God who sent to them and to the sick a man of such knowledge; the multitudes of the Angels praised God for the coming of Christ.

2:15–20

15. And it came pass, as the angels were gone away from them into heaven, the shepherds said one to another, Let us now go even unto Bethlehem, and see this thing which is come to pass, which the Lord hath made known unto us.

16. And they came with haste, and found Mary and Joseph, and the babe lying in a manger.

17. And when they had seen it, they made known abroad the saying which was told them concerning this child.

18. And all they that heard it wondered at those things which were told them by the shepherds.

19. But Mary kept all these things, and pondered them in her heart.

20. And the shepherds returned, glorifying and praising God for all the things that they had heard and seen, as it was told unto them.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) The shepherds were filled with astonishment at the things that they saw and heard, and so they left their sheep-folds, and set out by night to Bethlehem, seeking for the light of the Saviour; and therefore it is said, They spoke one to another, &c.

BEDE. As men who were truly watching, they said not, Let us see (the child; but) the word which has come to pass, i. e. the Word which was from the beginning, let us see how it has been made flesh for us. since this very Word is the Lord. For it follows, Which the Lord hath made, and has shewn to us; i. e. Let us see how the Lord hath made Himself, and hath shewn His flesh to us.

AMBROSE. How remarkably Scripture weighs the import of each word. For when we behold the flesh of the Lord, we behold the Word, which is the Son. Let not this seem to you a slight example of faith, because of the humble character of the shepherds. For simplicity is sought for, not pride. It follows, And they came in haste. For no one indolently seeks after Christ.

ORIGEN. But because they came in haste, and not with loitering steps, it follows, They found Mary, (i. e. her who had brought Jesus into the, world,) and Joseph, (i. e. the guardian of our Lord’s birth,) and the babe lying in the manger, (i. e. the Saviour Himself.)

BEDE. It seems to succeed in due order, that after having rightly celebrated the incarnation of the Word, we should at length come to behold the actual glory of that Word. Hence it follows: But when they saw it, they made known the word which had been spoken to them.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius) Beholding with hidden faith indeed the happy events which had been told them, and not content with marvelling at the reality of those things which at the very first they saw and embraced when the Angel told them, they began to relate them not only to Mary and Joseph, but to the others also, (and what is more they impressed them on their minds,) as it follows, And all who heard it marvelled. For how could it be otherwise, at the sight of one of the heavenly host upon earth, and earth in peace reconciled to heaven; and that ineffable Child binding together in one, by His divinity, heavenly things, by His humanity, earthly things, and by this conjunction of Himself effecting a wonderful union!

GLOSS. Not only do they marvel at the mystery of the incarnation, but also at so wonderful an attestation of the shepherds, men who could not have devised these unheard of things, but were with simple eloquence proclaiming the truth.

AMBROSE. Esteem not the words of the shepherds as mean and despicable. For from the shepherds Mary increases her faith, as it follows: Mary kept all these sayings, and pondered them in her heart. Let us learn the chastity of the sacred Virgin in all things, who no less chaste in her words than in her body, gathered up in her heart the materials of faith.

BEDE. (Hom. ubi sup.) For keeping the laws of virgin modesty, she who had known the secrets of Christ would divulge them to no one, but comparing what she had read in prophecy with what she now acknowledged to have taken place, she did not utter them with the mouth, but preserved them shut up in her heart.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes) Whatever the Angel had said unto her, whatever she had heard from Zacharias, and Elisabeth, and the shepherds, she collected them all in her mind, and comparing them together, perceived in all one harmony. Truly, He was God who was born from her.

ATHANASIUS. (non occ.) But every one rejoiced in the nativity of Christ, not with human feelings, as men are wont to rejoice when a son is born, but at the presence of Christ and the lustre of the Divine light. As it follows: And the shepherds returned, glorifying and praising God for every thing they had heard, &c.

BEDE. That is to say, from the Angels, and had seen, i. e. in Bethlehem, as it was told them, i. e. they glory in this, that when they came they found it even as it was told them, or as it was told them they give praise and glory to God. For this they were told by the Angels to do, not in very word commanding them, but setting before them the form of devotion when they sung glory to God in the highest.

BEDE. (Hom. ubi sup.) To speak in a mystery, let the shepherds of spiritual flocks, (nay, all the faithful,) after the example of these shepherds, go in thought even to Bethlehem, and celebrate the incarnation of Christ with due honours. Let us go indeed casting aside all fleshly lusts, with the whole desire of the mind even to the heavenly Bethlehem, (i. e. the house of the living bread,) that He whom they saw crying in the manger we may deserve to see reigning on the throne of His Father. And such bliss as this is not to be sought for with sloth and idleness, but with eagerness must we follow the footsteps of Christ. When they saw Him they knew Him; and let us haste to embrace in the fulness of our love those things which were spoken of our Saviour, that When the time shall come that we shall see with perfect knowledge we may be able to comprehend them.

BEDE. Again, the shepherds of the Lord’s flock by contemplating the life of the fathers who went before them, (which preserved the bread of life,) enter as it were the gates of Bethlehem, and find therein none other than the virgin beauty of the Church, that is, Mary; the manly company of spiritual doctors, that is, Joseph; and the lowly coming of Christ contained in the pages of Holy Scripture, that is, the infant child Christ, laid in the manger.

ORIGEN. That was the manger which Israel knew not, according to those words of Isaiah, The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master’s crib. (Isa. 3:1.)

BEDE. (Hom. ubi sup.) The shepherds did not hide in silence what they knew, because to this end have the Shepherds of the Church been ordained, that what they have learned in the Scriptures they might explain to their hearers.

BEDE. (in loc.) The masters of the spiritual flocks also, while others sleep, at one time by contemplation enter into the heavenly places, at another time pass around them by seeking the examples of the faithful, at another time by teaching return to the public duties of the pastoral office.

BEDE. (Hom. ubi sup.) Every one of us, even he who is supposed to live as a private person, exercises the office of shepherd, if, keeping together a multitude of good actions and pure thoughts, he strive to rule them with due moderation, to feed them with the food of the Scriptures, and to preserve them against the snares of the devil.

2:21

21. And when eight days were accomplished for the circumcising of the child, his name was called JESUS, which was so named of the angel before he was conceived in the womb.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Having related our Lord’s nativity, the Evangelist adds, And after that eight days were accomplished for the circumcision of the child.

AMBROSE. Who is this Child, but He of whom it was said, Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given? (Is. 9:6, Gal. 4:5.) For He was made under the law, that He might redeem them who were under the law.

EPIPHANIUS. (lib. i. Hær. 30.) Now the followers of Ebion and Cerinthus say e, “It is enough for a disciple if he be as his Master. But Christ circumcised Himself. Be thou therefore circumcised.” But herein do they deceive themselves, destroying their own principles; for if Ebion should confess that Christ as God descended from heaven and was circumcised on the eighth day, it might then afford the ground of an argument for circumcision; but since he affirms Him to be mere man, surely as a boy he cannot be the cause of Himself being circumcised, as neither are infants the authors of their own circumcision. But we confess that it is God Himself who has descended from heaven, and that inclosed in a virgin’s womb, He abode there the whole time necessary for her delivery, until He should perfectly form to Himself of the virgin’s womb a human body; and that in this body He was not in appearance but truly circumcised on the eighth day, in order that the figures having come to this spiritual fulfilment, both by Himself and His disciples, might now be spread abroad no longer the figures but the reality.

ORIGEN. As we have died with Him at His death, and risen together with Him at His resurrection, so with Him have we been circumcised, and therefore need not now circumcision in the flesh.

EPIPHANIUS. (ubi sup.) Christ was circumcised for several reasons. First indeed to shew the reality of His flesh, in opposition to Manichæus f and those who say that He came forth in appearance only. Secondly, that He might prove that His body was not of the same substance with the Deity, according to Apollinaris, and that it descended not from heaven, as Valentinian said. Thirdly, to add a confirmation to circumcision which He had of old instituted to wait His coming. Lastly, to leave no excuse to the Jews. For had He not been circumcised, they might have objected that they could not receive Christ uncircumcised.

BEDE. He was circumcised also that He might enjoin upon us by His example the virtue of obedience, and might take compassion on them who being placed under the law, were unable to bear the burdens of the law, to the end that He who came in the likeness of sinful flesh might not reject the remedy with which sinful flesh was wont to be healed. For circumcision brought in the law the same assistance of a saving cure to the wound of original sin which Baptism does in the time of the grace of revelation, except that as yet the circumcised could not enter the gates of the heavenly kingdom, but comforted after death with a blessed rest in Abraham’s bosom, they waited with a joyful hope for their entrance into eternal peace.

ATHANASIUS. (De Sabbato et Circumcisione.) For circumcision expressed nothing else, but the stripping off of the old birth, seeing that part was circumcised which caused the birth of the body. And thus it was done at that time as a sign of the future baptism through Christ. Therefore as soon as that of which it was a sign came, the figure ceased. For since the whole of the old man Adam is taken away by baptism, there remains nothing which the cutting of a part prefigures.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It was the custom on the eighth day to perform the circumcision of the flesh. For on the eighth day Christ rose from the dead, and conveyed to us a spiritual circumcision, saying, Go and teach all nations, baptizing them. (Matt. 28:19.)

BEDE. Now in His resurrection was prefigured the resurrection of each of us both in the flesh and the Spirit, for Christ has taught us by being circumcised that our nature must both now in itself be purged from the stain of vice, and at the last day be restored from the plague of death. And as the Lord rose on the eighth day, i. e. the day after the seventh, (which is the Sabbath,) so we also after six ages of the world and after the seventh, which is the rest of souls, and is now carrying on in another life, shall rise as on the eighth day.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But according to the command of the law, on the same day He received the imposition of a name, as it follows, His name was called Jesus, which is interpreted Saviour. For He was brought forth for the salvation of the whole world, which by His circumcision He prefigured, as the Apostle says to the Colossians, “Ye are circumcised with a circumcision made without hands, in the stripping off of the body of the flesh, to wit, the circumcision of Christ.” (Col. 2:11.)

BEDE. That upon the day of His circumcision He also received the imposition of the name was likewise done in imitation of the old observances. For Abraham, who received the first sacrament (Gen. 17:5.) of circumcision, was on the day of his circumcision thought worthy to be blessed by the increase of his name.

ORIGEN. But the name of Jesus, a glorious name and worthy of all honour, a name which is above every other, ought not first to be uttered by men, nor by them be brought into the world. Therefore significantly the Evangelist adds, which was called of the Angel, &c.

BEDE. Of this name the elect also in their spiritual circumcision rejoice to be partakers, that as from Christ they are called Christians, so also from the Saviour they may be called saved, which title was given them of God not only before they were conceived through faith in the womb of the Church, but even before the world began.

2:22–25

22. And when the days of her purification according to the law of Moses were accomplished, they brought him to Jerusalem, to present him to the Lord;

23. (As it is written in the law of the Lord, Every male that openeth the womb shall be called holy to the Lord;)

24 And to offer a sacrifice according to that which is said in the law of the Lord, A pair of turtledoves, or two young pigeons.

25. And, behold, there was a man in Jerusalem, whose name was Simeon; and the same man was just and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel; and the Holy Ghost was upon him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Next after the circumcision they wait for the time of purification, as it is said, And when the days of her purification according to the law of Moses were come.

BEDE. If you diligently examine the words of the law, you will find indeed that the mother of God as she is free from all connexion with man, so is she exempt from any obligation of the law. For not every woman who brings forth, but she who has received seed and brought forth, is pronounced unclean, and by the ordinances of the law is taught that she must be cleansed, in order to distinguish probably from her who though a virgin has conceived and brought forth. But that we might be loosed from the bonds of the law, as did Christ, so also Mary submitted herself of her own will to the law.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Therefore the Evangelist has well observed, that the days of her purification were come according to the law, who since she had conceived of the Holy Spirit, was free from all uncleanness. It follows, They brought him to Jerusalem to present him to the Lord.g

ATHANASIUS. But when was the Lord hid from His Father’s eye, that He should not be seen by Him, or what place is excepted from His dominion, that by remaining there He should be separate from His Father, unless brought to Jerusalem and introduced into the temple? But for us perhaps these things were written. For as not to confer grace on Himself was He made man and circumcised in the flesh, but to make us Gods through grace, and that we might be circumcised in the Spirit, so for our sakes is He presented to the Lord, that we also might learn to present ourselves to the Lord.

BEDE. On the thirty-third day after His circumcision He is presented to the Lord, signifying in a mystery that no one but he who is circumcised from his sins is worthy to come into the Lord’s sight, that no one who has not severed himself from all human ties can perfectly enter into the joys of the heavenly city. It follows, As it is written in the law of the Lord.

ORIGEN. Where are they who deny that Christ proclaimed in the Gospel the law to be of God, or can it be supposed that the righteous God made His own Son under a hostile law which He Himself had not given? It is written in the law of Moses as follows, Every male which openeth the womb shall be called holy unto the Lord. (Ex. 13:2, 12.)

BEDE. By the words, opening the womb, he signifies the first-born both of man and beast, and each one of which was, according to the commandment, to be called holy to the Lord, and therefore to become the property of the priest, that is, so far that he was to receive a price for every first-born of man, and oblige every unclean animal to be ransomed.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (in Hom. de occursu Domini.) Now this commandment of the law seems to have had its fulfilment in the incarnate God, in a very remarkable and peculiar manner. For He alone, ineffably conceived and incomprehensibly brought forth, opened the virgin’s womb, till then unopened by marriage, and after this birth miraculously retaining the seal of chastity.

AMBROSE. For no union with man disclosed the secrets of the virgin’s womb, but the Holy Spirit infused the immaculate seed into an inviolate womb. He then who sanctified another womb in order that a prophet should be born, He it is who has opened the womb of His own mother, that the Immaculate should come forth. By the words opening the womb, he speaks of birth after the usual manner, not that the sacred abode of the virgin’s womb, which our Lord in entering sanctified, should now be thought by His proceeding forth from it to be deprived of its virginity.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) But the offspring of this birth is alone seen to be spiritually male, as contracting no guilt from being born of a woman. Hence He is truly called holy, and therefore Gabriel, as if announcing that this commandment belonged to Him only, said, That Holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God. Now of other first-borns the wisdom of the Gospel has declared that they are called holy from their being offered to God. But the first-born of every creature, That holy thing which is born, &c. the Angel pronounces to be in the nature of its very being holy.

AMBROSE. For among those that are born of a woman, the Lord Jesus alone is in every thing holy, who in the newness of His immaculate birth experienced not the contagion of earthly defilement, but by His Heavenly Majesty dispelled it. For if we follow the letter, how can every male be holy, since it is undoubted that many have been most wicked? But He is holy whom in the figure of a future mystery the pious ordinances of the divine law prefigured, because He alone was to open the hidden womb of the holy virgin Church for the begetting of nations.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Hom. xi.) Oh the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! (Rom. 11:33.) He offers victims, Who in each victim is honoured equally with the Father. The Truth preserves the figures of the law. He who as God is the Maker of the law, as man has kept the law. Hence it follows, And that they should give a victim as it was ordered in the law of the Lord, a pair of turtle doves or two young pigeons. (Lev. 12:8.)

BEDE. (Hom. Purif.) Now this was the victim of the poor. For the Lord commanded in the law that they who were able should offer a lamb for a son or a daughter as well as a turtle dove or pigeon; but they who were not able to offer a lamb should give two turtle doves or two young pigeons. Therefore the Lord, though he was rich, deigned to become poor, that by his poverty He might make us partakers of His riches.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) But let us see what these offerings mean. The turtle dove is the most vocal of birds, and the pigeon the gentlest. And such was the Saviour made unto us; He was endowed with perfect meekness, and like the turtle dove entranced the world, fillinga His garden with His own melodies. There was killed then either a turtle dove or a pigeon, that by a figure He might be shewn forth unto us as about to suffer in the flesh for the life of the world.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) Or the pigeon denotes simplicity, the turtle dove chastity, for the pigeon is a lover of simplicity, and the turtle dove of chastity, so that if by chance she has lost her mate, she heeds not to find another. Rightly then are the pigeon and turtle dove offered as victims to the Lord, because the simple and chaste conversation of the faithful is a sacrifice of righteousness well pleasing to Him.

ATHANASIUS. (ubi sup.) He ordered two things to be offered, because as man consists of both body and soul, the Lord requires a double return from us, chastity and meekness, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Otherwise, man will be a dissembler and hypocrite, wearing the face of innocence to mask his hidden malice.

BEDE. (ubi sup.) But while each bird, from its habit of wailing, represents the present sorrows of the saints, in this they differ, that the turtle is solitary, but the pigeon flies about in flocks, and hence the one points to the secret tears of confession, the other to the public assembling of the Church.

BEDE. Or the pigeon which flies in flocks sets forth the busy intercourse of active life. The turtle, which delights in solitariness, tells of the lofty heights of the contemplative life. But because each victim is equally accepted by the Creator, St. Luke has purposely omitted whether the turtles or young pigeons were offered for the Lord, that he might not prefer one mode of life before another, but teach that both ought to be followed.

25. And, behold, there was a man in Jerusalem, whose name was Simeon; and the same man was just and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel: and the Holy Ghost was upon him.

26. And it was revealed unto him by the Holy Ghost, that he should not see death, before he had seen the Lord's Christ.

27. And he came by the Spirit into the temple: and when the parents brought in the child Jesus, to do for him after the custom of the law,

28. Then took he him up in his arms.

AMBROSE. Not only did Angels and Prophets, the shepherds and his parents, bear witness to the birth of the Lord, but the old men and the righteous. As it is said, And, behold, there was a man in Jerusalem whose name was Simeon, and he was a just man, and one who feared God. For scarcely is righteousness preserved without fear, I mean not that fear which dreads the loss of worldly goods, (which perfect love casteth out,) (1 John 4:18) but that holy fear of the Lord which abideth for ever, (Ps. 19:9.) by which the righteous man, the more ardent his love to God, is so much the more careful not to offend Him.

AMBROSE. Well is he called righteous who sought not his own good, but the good of his nation, as it follows, Waiting for the consolation of Israel.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) It was not surely worldly happiness that the prudent Simeon was waiting for as the consolation of Israel, but a real happiness, that is, a passing over to the beauty of truth from the shadow of the law. For he had learnt from the sacred oracles that he would see the Lord’s Christ before he should depart out of this present life. Hence it follows, And the Holy Spirit was in him, (by which indeed he was justified,) and he received an answer from the Holy Spirit.

AMBROSE. He desired indeed to be loosed from the chains of bodily infirmity, but he waits to see the promise, for he knew, Happy are those eyes which shall see it. (Job 6.)

GREGORY. (Mor. 7.) Hereby also we learn with what desire the holy men of Israel desired to see the mystery of His incarnation.

BEDE. To see death means to undergo it, and happy will he be to see the death of the flesh who has first been enabled to see with the eyes of his heart the Lord Christ, having his conversation in the heavenly Jerusalem, and frequently entering the doors of God’s temple, that is, following the examples of the saints in whom God dwells as in His temple. By the same grace of the Spirit whereby he foreknew Christ would come, he now acknowledges Him come, as it follows, And he came by the Spirit into the temple.

ORIGEN. If thou wilt touch Jesus and grasp Him in thy hands, strive with all thy strength to have the Spirit for thy guide, and come to the temple of God. For it follows, And when his parents brought in the child Jesus, (i. e. Mary His mother, and Joseph His reputed father,) to do for him after the custom of the law, then took he him up in his arms.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) How blessed was that holy entrance to holy things through which he hastened on to the end of life, blessed those hands which handled the word of life, and the arms which were held out to receive Him!

BEDE. Now the righteous man, according to the law, received the Child Jesus in his arms, that he might signify that the legal righteousness of works under the figure of the hands and arms was to be changed for the lowly indeed but saving grace of Gospel faith. The old man received the infant Christ, to convey thereby that this world, now worn out as it were with old age, should return to the childlike innocence of the Christian life.

2:28–32

28.—and blessed God, and said,

29. Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace, according to thy word:

30. For mine eyes have seen thy salvation,

31. Which thou hast prepared before the face of all people;

32. A light to lighten the Gentiles, and the glory of thy people Israel.

ORIGEN. If we marvel to hear that a woman was healed by touching the hem of a garment, what must we think of Simeon, who received an Infant in his arms, and rejoiced seeing that the little one he carried was He who had come to let loose the captive! Knowing that no one could release him from the chains of the body with the hope of future life, but He whom he held in his arms. Therefore it is said, And he blessed God, saying, Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart.

THEOPHYLACT. When he says Lord, he confesses that He is the very Lord of both life and death, and so acknowledges the Child whom he held in his arms to be God.

ORIGEN. As if he said, “As long as I held not Christ, I was in prison, and could not escape from my bonds.”

BASIL. (Hom. de grat. act.) If you examine the words of the righteous, you will find that they all sorrow over this world and its mournful delay. Alas me! says David, that my habitation is prolonged. (Ps. 120:5.)

AMBROSE. Observe then that this just man, confined as it were in the prison house of his earthly frame, is longing to be loosed, that he may again be with Christ. (Phil. 1:23.) But whoso would be cleansed, let him come into the temple;—into Jerusalem: let him wait for the Lord’s Christ, let him receive in his hands the word of God, and embrace it as it were with the arms of his faith. Then let him depart that he might not see death who has seen life.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius.) Simeon blessed God also, because the promises made to him had received their true fulfilment. For He was reckoned worthy to see with his eyes, and to carry in his arms the consolation of Israel. And therefore he says, According to thy word, i. e. since I have obtained the completion of thy promises. And now that I have seen with my eyes what was my desire to see, now lettest thou thy servant depart, neither dismayed at the taste of death, nor harassed with doubting thoughts: as he adds, in peace.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) For since Christ has destroyed the enemy, which is sin, and has reconciled us to the Father, the removal of saints has been in peace.

ORIGEN. But who departs from this world in peace, but he who is persuaded that God was Christ reconciling the world to Himself, (2 Cor. 5.) who has nothing hostile to God, having derived to himself all peace by good works in himself?

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) But it had been twice promised to him that he should not sec death before he should sec the Lord's Christ, and therefore he adds, to shew that this promise was fulfilled, For mine eyes have seen thy salvation.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) Blessed are the eyes, both of thy soul and thy body. For the one visibly embrace God, but the others not considering those things which are seen, but enlightened by the brightness of the Spirit of the Lord, acknowledge the Word made flesh. For the salvation which thou hast perceived with thy eyes is Jesus Himself, by which name salvation is declared.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) But Christ was the mystery which has been revealed in the last times of the world, having been prepared before the foundation of the world. Hence it follows, which thou hast prepared before the face of all men.

ATHANASIUS. (non occ.) That is to say, the salvation wrought by Christ for the whole world. How then was it said above that he was watching for the consolation of Israel, but because he truly perceived in the spirit that consolation would be to Israel at that time when salvation was prepared for all people.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius.) Mark the wisdom of the good and venerable old man, who before that he was thought worthy of the blessed vision, was waiting for the consolation of Israel, but when he obtained that which he was looking for, exclaims that he saw the salvation of all people. So enlightened was he by the unspeakable radiance of the Child, that he perceived at a glance things that were to happen a long time after.

THEOPHYLACT. By these words, Before the face, he signifies that our Lord's incarnation would be visible to all men. And this salvation he says is to be the light of the Gentiles and the glory of Israel, as it follows, A light to lighten the Gentiles.

ATHANASIUS. (non occ.) For the Gentiles before the coming of Christ were lying in the deepest darkness, being without the knowledge of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) But Christ coming was made a light to them that sat in darkness, being sore oppressed by the power of the devil, but they were called by God the Father to the knowledge of His Son, Who is the true light.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) Israel was enlightened though dimly by the law, so he says not that light came to them, but his words are, to be the glory of thy people Israel. Calling to mind the ancient history, that as of old Moses after speaking with God returned with his face glorious, so they also coming to the divine light of His human nature, casting away their old veil, might be transformed into the same image from glory to glory (2 Cor. 3:7.) For although some of them were disobedient, yet a remnant were saved and came through Christ to glory, of which the Apostles were first-fruits, whose brightness illumines the whole world. For Christ was in a peculiar manner the glory of Israel, because according to the flesh He came forth from Israel, although as God He was over all blessed for ever.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) He said therefore, of thy people, signifying that not only was He adored by them, but moreover of them was He born according to the flesh.

BEDE. And well is the enlightening of the Gentiles put before the glory of Israel, because when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have come in, then shall Israel be safe. (Rom 11:26.)

2:33–35

33. And Joseph and his mother marvelled at those things which were spoken of him.

34. And Simeon blessed them, and said unto Mary his mother, Behold, this child is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel; and for a sign which shall be spoken against;

35. (Yea, a sword shall pierce through thy own soul also,) that the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius.) The knowledge of supernatural things, as often as it is brought to the recollection, renews the miracle in the mind, and hence it is said, His father and mother marvelled at those things which were said of him.

ORIGEN. Both by the angel and the multitude of the heavenly host, by the shepherds also, and Simeon.

BEDE. Joseph is called the father of the Saviour, not because he was (as the Photinians say) His real father, but because from regard to the reputation of Mary, all men considered him so.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. in Evan. ii. 1.) He however might be called His father in that light in which he is rightly regarded as the husband of Mary, that is, not from any carnal connection, but by reason of the very bond of wedlock, a far closer relationship than that of adoption. For that Joseph was not to be called Christ's father was not, because he had not begotten Him by cohabitation, since in truth he might be a father to one whom he had not begotten from his wife, but had adopted from another.

ORIGEN. But they who look deeper into the matter may say, that since the genealogy is deduced from David to Joseph, therefore lest Joseph should seem to be mentioned for no purpose, as not being the father of the Saviour, he was called His father, that the genealogy might maintain its place.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) Having given praise to God, Simeon now turns to bless them that brought the Child, as it follows, And Simeon blessed them. He gave to each a blessing, but his presage of hidden things he imparts only to the mother, in order that in the common blessing He might not deprive Joseph of the likeness of a father, but in what he says to the mother apart from Joseph he might proclaim her to be the true mother.

AMBROSE. Behold what abundant grace is extended to all men by the birth of the Lord, and how prophecy is withheld from the unbelievers, not from the righteous. Simeon also prophesies that Christ Jesus has come for the fall and rising again of many.

ORIGEN. They who explain this simply, may say that He came for the fall of unbelievers, and the rising again of believers.

CHRYSOSTOM. As the light though it may annoy weak eyes, is still light; in like manner the Saviour endures, though many fall away, for His office is not to destroy; but their way is madness. Wherefore not only by the salvation of the good, but by the scattering of the wicked, is His power shewn. For the sun the brighter it shines, is the more trying to the weak sight.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) Mark the nice distinction here observed. Salvation is said to be prepared before the face of all people, but the falling and raising is of many; for the Divine purpose was the salvation and sanctification of every one, whereas the falling and lifting up stands in the will of many, believers and unbelievers. But that those who were lying in unbelief should be raised up again is not unreasonable.

ORIGEN. The careful interpreter will say, that no one falls who was not before standing. Tell me then, who were they who stood, for whose fall Christ came?

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) But by this he signifies a fall to the very lowest, as if the punishment before the mystery of the incarnation, fell far short of that after the giving and preaching of the Gospel dispensation. And those spoken of are chiefly of Israel, who must of necessity forfeit their ancient privileges, and pay a heavier penalty than any other nation, because they were so unwilling to receive Him Who had long been prophesied among them, had been worshipped, and had come forth from them. In a most especial manner then he threatens them with not only a fall from spiritual freedom, but also the destruction of their city, and of those who dwelt among them. But a resurrection is promised to believers, partly indeed as subject to the law, and about to be delivered from its bondage, but partly as buried together with Christ, and rising with Him.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (hom. de occ. Dom.) Now from these words, you may perceive through the agreement of men’s minds on the word of prophecy, that one and the same God and lawgiver hath spoken both in the Prophets and the New Testament. For the language of prophecy declared that there shall be a stone of fulling, and a rock of offence, that they who believe on Him should not be confounded. (Is. 8:14, Rom. 9:33.) The fall therefore is to them who are offended with the meanness of His coming in the flesh; the rising again to those who acknowledge the stedfastness of the Divine purpose.

ORIGEN. There is also a deeper meaning aimed against those who raise their voices against their Creator, saying, Behold the God of the Law and the Prophets of what sort He is! He says, I kill, and I make alive. (Deut. 32:39.) If God then is a bloody judge and a cruel master, it is most plain that

Jesus is His Son, since the same things here are written of Him, namely, that he comes for the fall and rising again of many.

AMBROSE. That is, to distinguish the merits of the just and the unjust, and according to the quality of our deeds, as a true and just Judge, to decree punishment or rewards.

ORIGEN. But we must take care lest by chance the Saviour should not come to some equally for the fall and rising again; for when I stood in sin, it was first good for me to fall, and die to sin. Lastly, Prophets and Saints when they were designing some great thing, used to fall on their faces, that by their fall their sins should be the more fully blotted out. This it is that the Saviour first grants to thee. Thou wert a sinner, let that which is sin fall in thee, that thou mayest thence rise again, and say, If we be dead with Him, we shall also live with Him. (2 Tim. 2:11.)

CHRYSOSTOM. The resurrection is a new life and conversation. For when the sensual man becomes chaste, the covetous merciful, the cruel man gentle, a resurrection takes place. Sin being dead, righteousness rises again. It follows, And for a sign which shall be spoken against.

BASIL. (ep. 260. ad Opt.) The sign which is spoken against is called in Scripture, the cross. For Moses, it says, made a brazen serpent, and placed it for a sign. (Numb. 21:8.)

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) He has joined together honour and dishonour. For to us Christians this sign is a token of honour, but it is a sign of contradiction, inasmuch by some indeed it is received as absurd and monstrous, by others with the greatest veneration. Or perhaps Christ Himself is termed a sign, as having a supernatural existence, and as the author of signs.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) For a sign betokens something marvellous and mysterious, which is seen indeed by the simple minded.

ORIGEN. But all the things which history relates of Christ are spoken against, not that those who believe on Him speak against Him, (for we know that all the things which are written of Him are true,) but that every thing which has been written of Him is with the unbelievers a sign which is spoken against.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) Though these things are said of the Son, yet they have reference also to His mother, who takes each thing to herself, whether it be of danger or glory. He announces to her not only her prosperity, but her sorrows; for it follows. And a sword shall pierce through thy own heart.

BEDE. No history tells us that Mary departed this life by being slain with the sword, therefore since not the soul but the body is killed with iron, we are left to understand that sword which is mentioned, And a sword in their lips, (Ps. 59:7.) that is, grief because of our Lord's passion passed through her soul, who although she saw Christ the very Son of God die a voluntary death, and doubted not that He who was begotten of her flesh would overcome death, could not without grief see Him crucified.

AMBROSE. Or it shews the wisdom of Mary, that she was not ignorant of the heavenly Majesty. For the word of God is living and strong, and sharper than the sharpest sword. (Heb. 4:12.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Nov. ac vet, Test. c. 73.) Or by this is signified that Mary also, through whom was performed the mystery of the incarnation, looked with doubt and astonishment at the death of her Lord, seeing the Son of God so humbled as to come down even to death. And as a sword passing close by a man causes fear, though it does not strike him; so doubt also causes sorrow, yet does not kill; for it is not fastened to the mind, but passes through it as through a shadow.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (de occ. Dom. non occ.) But it is not meant that she alone was concerned in that passion, for it is added, that the thoughts of many hearts may be revealed. The word that marks the event; it is not used causatively; for when all these events took place, there followed the discovery of many men's intentions. For some confessed God on the cross, others even then ceased not from their blasphemies and revilings. Or this was said, meaning that at the time of the passion the thoughts of men's hearts should be laid open, and be corrected by the resurrection. For doubts are quickly superseded by certainty. Or perhaps by revealing may be meant, the enlightening of the thoughts, as it is often used in Scripture.

BEDE. But now even down to the close of the present time, the sword of the severest tribulation ceases not to go through the soul of the Church, when with bitter sorrow she experiences the evil speaking against the sign of faith, when hearing the word of God that many are raised with Christ, she finds still more falling from the faith, when at the revealing of the thoughts of many hearts, in which the good seed of the Gospel has been sown, she beholds the tares of vice overshooting it, spreading beyond it, or growing alone.

ORIGEN. But the evil thoughts of men were revealed, that He Who died for us might slay them; for while they were hidden, it was impossible to utterly destroy them. Hence also when we have sinned we ought to say, Mine iniquity have I not hid. (Ps. 32:5.) For if we make known our sins not only to God, but to whoever can heal our wounds, our sins will be blotted out.

2:36–38

36. And there was one Anna, a prophetess, the daughter of Phanuel, of the tribe of Aser: she was of a great age, and had lived with an husband seven years from her virginity;

37. And she was a widow of about fourscore and four years, which departed not from the temple, but served God with fastings and prayers night and day.

38. And she coming in that instant gave thanks likewise unto the Lord, and spake of him to all them that looked for redemption in Jerusalem.

AMBROSE. Simeon had prophesied, a woman united in marriage had prophesied, a virgin had prophesied, it was meet also that a widow should prophesy, that there might lack no sex or condition of life, and therefore it is said, And there was one Anna a prophetess.

THEOPHYLACT. The Evangelist dwells some time on the account of Anna, mentioning both her father’s tribe, and adding, as it were, many witnesses who knew her father and her tribe.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) Or because at that time there were several others who were called by the same name, that there might be a plain way of distinguishing her, he mentions her father, and describes the quality of her parents.

AMBROSE. Now Anna, both from the duties of her widowhood and her manner of life, is found to be such that she is thought worthy to announce the Redeemer of the world. As it follows, She was of a great age, and had lived with her husband, &c.

ORIGEN. For the Holy Spirit dwelt not by chance in her. For the highest blessing, if any can possess it, is the grace of virginity, but if this cannot be, and it chance to a woman to lose her husband, let her remain a widow, which indeed not only after the death of her husband, but even while he is living, she ought to have in her mind, that supposing it should not happen, her will and determination might be crowned by the Lord, and her words should be, “This I vow, and promise, that if a certain condition of this life be mine, (which yet I wish not,) I will do nothing else but remain inviolate and a widow.” Most justly then was this holy woman thought worthy to receive the gift of prophecy, because by long chastity and long fastings she had ascended to this height of virtue, as it follows, Who departed not from the temple with fastings and prayers, &c.

ORIGEN. From which it is plain that she possessed a multitude of other virtues; and mark how she resembles Simeon in his goodness, for they were both in the temple together, and both counted worthy of prophetic grace, as it follows, And she coming in at this very instant, gave thanks to the Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, returned thanks for seeing in Israel the Saviour of the world, and she confessed of Jesus that He was the Redeemer and the Saviour. Hence it follows, And she spoke of him to all, &c.

ORIGEN. But because Anna’s words were nothing remarkable, and of no great note respecting Christ, the Gospel does not give the particulars of what she said, and perhaps for this reason one may suppose that Simeon anticipated her, since he indeed bore the character of the law, (for his name signifies obedience,) but she the character of grace, (which her name is by interpretation,) and Christ came between them. Therefore He let Simeon depart dying with the law, but Anna he sustains living beyond through grace.

BEDE. According to the mystical meaning, Anna signifies the Church, who at present is indeed a widow by the death of her Husband; the number also of the years of her widowhood marks the time of the Church, at which established in the body, she is separated from the Lord. For seven times twelve make eighty-four, seven indeed referring to the course of this world, which revolves in seven days; but twelve had reference to the perfection of Apostolic teaching, and therefore the Universal Church, or any faithful soul which strives to devote the whole period of its life to the following of Apostolic practice, is said to serve the Lord for eighty-four years. The term also of seven years, during which she lived with her husband, coincides. For through the prerogative of our Lord’s greatness, whereby abiding in the flesh, He taught, the simple number of seven years was taken to express the sign of perfection. Anna also favours the mysteries of the Church, being by interpretation its "grace," and being both the daughter of Phanuel, who is called "the face of God," and descended from the tribe of Aser, i. e. the blessed.

2:39–41

39. And when they had performed all things according to the law of the Lord, they returned into Galilee, to their own city Nazareth.

40. And the child grew, and waxed strong in spirit, filled with wisdom: and the grace of God was upon him.

41. Now his parents went to Jerusalem every year at the feast of the Passover.

BEDE. Luke has omitted in this place what he knew to have been sufficiently set forth by Matthew, that the Lord after this, for fear that He should be discovered and put to death by Herod, was carried by His parents into Egypt, and at Herod's death, having at length returned to Galilee, came to dwell in His own city Nazareth. For the Evangelists individually are wont to omit certain things which they either know to have been, or in the Spirit foresee will be, related by others, so that in the connected chain of their narrative, they seem as it were to have omitted nothing, whereas by examining the writings of another Evangelist, the careful reader may discover the places where the omissions have been. Thus after omitting many things, Luke says, And when they had accomplished all things, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Bethlehem was indeed their city, their paternal city, Nazareth the place of their abode.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. ii. 9.) Perhaps it may strike you as strange that Matthew should say that His parents went with the young Child into Galilee because they were unwilling to go to Judæa for fear of Archelaus, when they seem to have gone into Galilee rather because their city was Nazareth in Galilee, as Luke in this place explains it. But we must consider, that when the Angel, said in a dream to Joseph in Egypt, Rise, and take the young child and his mother, and go into the land of Israel, (Matt. 2:20.) it was at first understood by Joseph as a command to go into Judæa, for so at first sight the land of Israel might have been taken to mean. But when afterwards he finds that Herod’s son Archelaus was king, he was unwilling to be exposed to that danger, seeing the land of Israel might also be understood to include Galilee also as a part of it, for there also the people of Israel dwelt.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes.) Or again, Luke is here describing the time before the descent to Egypt, for before her purification Joseph had not taken Mary there. But before they went down into Egypt, they were not told by God to go to Nazareth, but as living more freely in their own country, thither of their own accord they went; for since the going up to Bethlehem was for no other reason but the taxing, when that was accomplished they go down to Nazareth.

THEOPHYLACT. Now our Lord might have come forth from the womb in the stature of mature age, but this would seem like something imaginary; therefore His growth is gradual, as it follows, And the child grew, and waxed strong.

BEDE. We must observe the distinction of words, that the Lord Jesus Christ in that He was a child, that is, had put on the condition of human weakness, was daily growing and being strengthened.

ATHANASIUS. (lib. de Incarn. Christi cont. Apollin.) But if as some say the flesh was changed into a Divine nature, how did it derive growth? for to attribute growth to an uncreated substance is impious.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Rightly with the growth in age, St. Luke has united increase in wisdom, as he says, And he was strengthened, (i. e. in spirit.) For in proportion to the measure of bodily growth, the Divine nature developed its own wisdom.

THEOPHYLACT. For if while yet a little child, He had displayed His wisdom, He would have seemed a miracle, but together with the advance of age He gradually shewed Himself, so as to fill the whole world. For not as receiving wisdom is He said to be strengthened in spirit. For that which is most perfect in the beginning, how can that become any more perfect. Hence it follows, Filled with wisdom, and the grace of God was in him.

BEDE. Wisdom truly, for in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, (Col. 2:19.) but grace, because it was in great grace given to the man Christ Jesus, that from the time He began to be man He should be perfect man and perfect God. But much rather because He was the word of God, and God needed not to be strengthened, nor was in a state of growth. But while He was yet a little child He had the grace of God, that as in Him all things were wonderful, His childhood also might be wonderful, so as to be filled with the wisdom of God. It follows, And his parents went every year to Jerusalem, at the feast of the Passover.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Orat. cont. Judæos.) At the feast of the Hebrews the law commanded men not only to observe the time, but the place, and so the Lord's parents wished to celebrate the feast of the Passover only at Jerusalem.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ii. 10.) But it may be asked, how did His parents go up all the years of Christ's childhood to Jerusalem, if they were prevented from going there by fear of Archelaus? This question might be easily answered, even had some one of the Evangelists mentioned how long Archelaus reigned. For it were possible that on the feast day amid so great a crowd they might secretly come, and soon return again, at the same time that they feared to remain there on other days, so as neither to be wanting in religious duties by neglecting the feast, nor leave themselves open to detection by a constant abode there. But now since all have been silent as to the length of Archelaus' reign, it is plain that when Luke says, They were accustomed to go up every year to Jerusalem, we are to understand that to have been when Archelaus was no longer feared.

2:42–50

42. And when he was twelve years old, they went up to Jerusalem after the custom of the feast.

43. And when they had fulfilled the days, as they returned, the child Jesus tarried behind in Jerusalem; and Joseph and his mother knew not of it.

44. But they, supposing him to have been in the company, went a day's journey; and they sought him among their kinsfolk and acquaintance.

45. And when they found him not, they turned back again to Jerusalem, seeking him.

46. And it came to pass, that after three days they found him in the temple, sitting in the midst of the doctors, both hearing them, and asking them questions.

47. And all that heard him were astonished at his understanding and answers.

48. And when they saw him, they were amazed: and his mother said unto him, Son, why hast thou thus dealt with us? behold, thy father and I have sought thee sorrowing.

49. And he said unto them, How is it that ye sought me? wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?

50. And they understood. not the saying which he spake unto them.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Evangelist having said before that the Child grew and waxed strong, verifies his own words when he relates, that Jesus with the holy Virgin went up to Jerusalem; as it is said, And when he was twelve years old, &c.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer) His indication of wisdom did not exceed the measure of His age, but at the time that with us the powers of discernment are generally perfected, the wisdom of Christ shews itself.

AMBROSE. Or the twelfth year was the commencement of our Lord's disputation with the doctors, for this was the number of the Evangelists necessary to preach the faith.

BEDE. We may also say, that as by the seventh number, so also by the twelfth, (which consists of the parts of seven multiplied alternately by one another,) the universality and perfection of either things or times is signified, and therefore rightly from the number twelve, the glory of Christ takes its beginning, being that by which all places and times are to be filled.

BEDE. (in Hom. post Epiph.) Now that the Lord came up every year to Jerusalem at the Passover, betokens His humility as a man, for it is man's duty to meet together to offer sacrifices to God, and conciliate Him with prayers. Accordingly the Lord as man, did among men what God by angels commanded men to do. Hence it is said, According to the custom of the feast day. (Gal. 3:14, Judges 6:20; 13:16.) Let us follow then the journey of His mortal life, if we delight to behold the glory of His divine nature.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes vel Geometer.) The feast having been celebrated, while the rest returned, Jesus secretly tarried behind. As it follows, And when they had fulfilled the days, as they returned, the child Jesus tarried behind in Jerusalem; and his parents knew not of it. It is said, When the days were accomplished, because the feast lasted seven days. But the reason of His tarrying behind in secret was, that His parents might not be a hindrance to His carrying on the discussion with the lawyers; or perhaps to avoid appearing to despise his parents by not obeying their commands. He remains therefore secretly, that he might neither be kept away nor be disobedient.

ORIGEN. But we must not wonder that they are called His parents, seeing the one from her childbirth, the other from his knowledge of it, deserved the names of father and mother.

BEDE. But some one will ask, how was it that the Son of God, brought up by His parents with such care, could be left behind from forgetfulness? To which it is answered, that the custom of the children of Israel while assembling at Jerusalem on the feast days, or returning to their homes, was for the women and men to go separately, and the infants or children to go with either parent indiscriminately. And so both Mary and Joseph each thought in turn that the Child Jesus, whom they saw not with them, was returning with the other parent. Hence it follows, But they, supposing him to have been in the company, &c.

ORIGEN. But as when the Jews plotted against Him He escaped from the midst of them, and was not seen; so now it seems that the Child Jesus remained, and His parents knew not where He was. As it follows, And not finding him, they returned to Jerusalem, seeking for him. (John 10:29.)

GLOSS. (ordin.) They were on their way home, one day's journey from Jerusalem; on the second day they seek for Him among their kinsfolk and acquaintance, and when they found Him not, they returned on the third day to Jerusalem, and there they found Him. As it follows, And it came to pass, after three days they found him.

ORIGEN. He is not found as soon as sought for, for Jesus was not among His kinsfolk and relations, among those who are joined to Him in the flesh, nor in the company of the multitude can He be found. Learn where those who seek Him find Him, not every where, but in the temple. And do thou then seek Jesus in the temple of God. Seek Him in the Church, and seek Him among the masters who are in the temple. For if thou wilt so seek Him, thou shalt find Him. They found Him not among His kinsfolk, for human relations could not comprehend the Son of God; not among His acquaintance, for He passes far beyond all human knowledge and understanding. Where then do they find Him? In the temple! If at any time thou seek the Son of God, seek Him first in the temple, thither go up, and verily shalt thou find Christ, the Word, and the Wisdom, (i. e. the Son of God.)

AMBROSE. After three days He is found in the temple, that it might be for a sign, that after three days of victorious suffering, He who was believed to be dead should rise again, and manifest Himself to our faith, seated in heaven with divine glory.

GLOSS. (ubi sup.) Or because the advent of Christ, which was looked for by the Patriarchs before the Law, was not found, nor again, that which was sought for by prophets and just men under the Law, but that alone is found which is sought for by Gentiles under grace.

ORIGEN. Because moreover He was the Son of God, He is found in the midst of the doctors, enlightening and instructing them. But because He was a little child, He is found among them not teaching but asking questions, as it is said, Sitting in the midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions. And this He did as a duty of reverence, that He might set us an example of the proper behaviour of children, though they be wise and learned, rather to hear their masters than teach them, and not to vaunt themselves with empty boasting. But He asked not that He might learn, but that asking He might instruct. For from the same source of learning is derived both the power of asking and answering wisely, as it follows, All who heard him were astonished at his wisdom.

BEDE. To shew that He was a man, He humbly listened to the masters; but to prove that He was God, He divinely answered those who spake.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes vel Geometer.) He asks questions with reason, He listens with wisdom, and answers with more wisdom, so as to cause astonishment. As it follows, And they who saw it were astonished.

CHRYSOSTOM. (sup. Joh. Hom. 20.) The Lord truly did no miracle in His childhood, yet this one fact St. Luke mentions, which made men look with wonder upon Him.

BEDE. For from His tongue there went forth divine wisdom, while His age exhibited man’s helplessness, and hence the Jews, amid the high things they hear and the lowly things they see, are perplexed with doubts and astonishment. But we can in no wise wonder, knowing the words of the Prophet, that thus unto us a Child is born, that He abideth the mighty God. (Is. 9:6.)

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) But the ever-wonderful mother of God, moved by a mother’s feelings, as it were with weeping makes her mournful enquiry, in every thing like a mother, with confidence, humility, and affection. As it follows, And his mother said unto him, Son, what hast thou done?

ORIGEN. The holy Virgin knew that He was not the Son of Joseph, and yet calls her husband His father according to the belief of the Jews, who thought that He was conceived in the common way. Now to speak generally we may say, that the Holy Spirit honoured Joseph by the name of father, because he brought up the Child Jesus; but more technically, that it might not seem superfluous in St. Luke, bringing down the genealogy from David to Joseph. But why sought they Him sorrowing? Was it that he might have perished or been lost? It could not be. For what should cause them to dread the loss of Him whom they knew to be the Lord? But as whenever you read the Scriptures you search out their meaning with pains, not that you suppose them to have erred or to contain anything incorrect, but that the truth which they have inherent in them you are anxious to find out; so they sought Jesus, lest perchance leaving them he should have returned to heaven, thither to descend when He would. He then who seeks Jesus must go about it not carelessly and idly, as many seek Him who never find Him, but with labour and sorrow.

GLOSS. (ordin.) Or they feared lest Herod who sought Him in His infancy, now that He was advanced to boyhood might find an opportunity of putting Him to death.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes et Geometer.) But the Lord Himself sets every thing at rest, and correcting as it were her saying concerning him who was His reputed father, manifests His true Father, teaching us not to walk on the ground, but to raise ourselves on high, as it follows, And he says unto them, What is it that you ask of me?

BEDE. He blames them not that they seek Him as their son, but compels them to raise the eyes of their mind to what was rather due to Him whose eternal Son He was. Hence it follows, Knew ye not? &c.

AMBROSE. There are two generations in Christ, one from His Father, the other from His mother; the Father’s more divine, the mother’s that which has come down for our use and advantage.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He says this then by way of shewing that He surpasses all human standards, and hinting that the Holy Virgin was made the handmaid of the work in bringing His flesh unto the world, but that He Himself was by nature and in truth God, and the Son of the Father most high. Now from this let the followers of Valentinus, hearing that the temple was of God, be ashamed to say that the Creator, and the God of the law and of the temple, is not also the Father of Christ.

EPIPHANIUS. (cont. Hær. l. ii. hær. 31.) Let Ebion know that at twelve years old, not thirty, Christ is found the astonishment of all men, wonderful and mighty in the words of grace. We can not therefore say, that after that the Spirit came to Him in Baptism He was made the Christ, that is, anointed with divinity, but from His very childhood He acknowledged both the temple and His Father.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) This is the first demonstration of the wisdom and power of the Child Jesus. For as to what are called thea acts of His childhood, we can not but suppose them to be the work not only of a childish but even of a devilish mind and perverse will, attempting to revile those things which are contained in the Gospel and the sacred prophecies. But should one desire to receive only such things as are generally believed, and are not contrary to our other declarations, but accord also with the words of prophecy, let it suffice that Jesus was distinguished in form above the sons of men; obedient to His mother, gentle in disposition; in appearance full of grace and dignity; eloquent in words, kind and thoughtful of the wants of others, known among all for a power and energy, as of one who was filled with all wisdom; and as in other things, so also in all human conversation, though above man, Himself the rule and measure. But that which most distinguished Him was His meekness, and that a razor had never come upon His head, nor any human hand except His mother’s. But from these words we may derive a lesson; for when the Lord reproves Mary seeking Him among His relations, He most aptly points to the giving up of all fleshly ties, shewing that it is not for him to attain the goal of perfection who is still encompassed by and walks among the things of the body, and that men fall from perfection through love of their relations.

BEDE. It follows, And they understood him not, that is, the word which He spoke to them of His divinity.

ORIGEN. Or they knew not whether when He said about my Father’s business, He referred to the temple, or something higher and more edifying; for every one of us who doeth good, is the seat of God the Father; but whoso is the seat of God the Father, has Christ in the midst of him.

51. And he went down with them, and came to Nazareth, and was subject unto them: but his mother kept all these sayings in her heart.

52. And Jesus increased in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) All that time of the life of Christ which He passed between His manifestation in the temple and His baptism, being devoid of any great public miracles or teaching, the Evangelist sums up in one word, saying, And he went down with them.

ORIGEN. Jesus frequently went down with His disciples, for He is not always dwelling on the mount, for they who were troubled with various diseases were not able to ascend the mount. For this reason now also He went down to them who were below. It follows: And he was subject to them, &c.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) Sometimes by His word He first institutes laws, and He afterwards confirms them by His work, as when He says, The good shepherd layeth down his life for his sheep. (John 10:11) For shortly after seeking our salvation He poured out His own life. But sometimes He first sets forth in Himself an example, and afterwards, as far as words can go, draws therefrom rules of life, as He does here, shewing forth by His work these three things above the rest, the love of God, honour to parents, but the preferring God also to our parents. For when He was blamed by His parents, He counts all other things of less moment than those which belong to God; again, He gives His obedience also to His parents.

BEDE. For what is the teacher of virtue, unless he fulfil his duty to his parents? What else did He do among us, than what He wished should be done by us?

ORIGEN. Let us then also ourselves be subject to our parents. But if our fathers are not, let us be subject to those who are our fathers. Jesus the Son of God is subject to Joseph and Mary. But I must be subject to the Bishop who has been constituted my father. It seems that Joseph knew that Jesus was greater than he, and therefore in awe moderated his authority. But let every one see, that oftentimes he who is subject is the greater. Which if they who are higher in dignity understand, they will not be clated with pride, knowing that their superior is subject to them.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. in 1 Cor. 15:28.) Further, since the young have not yet perfect understanding, and have need to be led forward by those who have advanced to a more perfect state; therefore when He arrived at twelve years, He is obedient to His parents, to shew that whatever is made perfect by moving forward, before that it arrives at the end profitably embraces obedience, (as leading to good.)

BASIL. (in Const. Mon. 4.) But from His very first years being obedient to His parents, He endured all bodily labours, humbly and reverently. For since His parents were honest and just, yet at the same time poor, and ill supplied with the necessaries of life, (as the stable which administered to the holy birth bears witness,) it is plain that they continually underwent bodily fatigue in providing for their daily wants. But Jesus being obedient to them, as the Scriptures testify, even in sustaining labours, submitted Himself to a complete subjection.

AMBROSE. And can you wonder if He who is subject to His mother, also submits to His Father? Surely that subjection is a mark not of weakness but of filial duty. Let then the heretic so raise his head as to assert that He who is sent has need of other help; yet why should He need human help, in obeying His mother's authority? He was obedient to a handmaid, He was obedient to His pretended father, and do you wonder whether He obeyed God? Or is it a mark of duty to obey man, of weakness to obey God?

BEDE. The Virgin, whether she understood or whether she could not yet understand, equally laid up all things in her heart for reflection and diligent examination. Hence it follows, And his mother laid up all these things, &c. Mark the wisest of mothers, Mary the mother of true wisdom, becomes the scholar or disciple of the Child. For she yielded to Him not as to a boy, nor as to a man, but as unto God. Further, she pondered upon both His divine words and works, so that nothing that was said or done by Him was lost upon her, but as the Word itself was before in her womb, so now she conceived the ways and words of the same, and in a manner nursed them in her heart. And while indeed she thought upon one thing at the time, another she wanted to be more clearly revealed to her; and this was her constant rule and law through her whole life. It follows, And Jesus increased in wisdom.

THEOPHYLACT. Not that He became wise by making progress, but that by degrees He revealed His wisdom. As it was when He disputed with the

Scribes, asking them questions of their law to the astonishment of all who heard Him. You see then how He increased in wisdom, in that He became known to many, and caused them to wonder, for the shewing forth of His wisdom is His increase. But mark how the Evangelist, having interpreted what it is to increase in wisdom, adds, and in stature, declaring thereby that an increase or growth in age is an increase in wisdom.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Thes. l. x. c. 7.) But the Eunomian Hereticsb say, "How can He be equal to the Father in substance, who is said to increase, as if before imperfect." But not because He is the Word, but because He is made man, He is said to receive increase. For if He really increased after that He was made flesh, as having before existed imperfect, why then do we give Him thanks as having thence become incarnate for us? But how if He is the true wisdom can He be increased, or how can He who gives grace to others be Himself advanced in grace. Again, if hearing that the Word humbled Himself, no one is offended (thinking slightingly of the true God,) but rather marvels at His compassion, how is it not absurd to be offended at hearing that He increases? For as He was humbled for us, so for us He increased, that we who have fallen through sin might increase in Him. For whatever concerns us, Christ Himself has truly undertaken for us, that He might restore us to a better state. And mark what He says, not that the Word, but Jesus, increases, that you should not suppose that the pure Word increases, but the Word made flesh; and as we confess that the Word suffered in the flesh, although the flesh only suffered, because of the Word the flesh was which suffered, so He is said to increase, because the human nature of the Word increased in Him. But He is said to increase in His human nature, not as if that nature which was perfect from the beginning received increase, but that by degrees it was manifested. For the law of nature brooks not that man should have higher faculties than the age of his body permits. The Word then (made man) was perfect, as being the power and wisdom of the Father, but because something was to be yielded to the habits of our nature, lest He should be counted strange by those who saw Him, He manifested Himself as man with a body, gradually advancing in growth, and was daily thought wiser by those who saw and heard Him.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Amphilochius.) He increased then in age, His body growing to the stature of man; but in wisdom through those who were taught divine truths by Him; in grace, that is, whereby we are advanced with joy, trusting at last to obtain the promises; and this indeed before God, because having put on the flesh, He performed His Father’s work, but before men by their conversion from the worship of idols to the knowledge of the Most High Trinity.

THEOPHYLACT. He says before God and men, because we must first please God, then man.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. 3. in Cant.) The word also increases in different degrees in those who receive it; and according to the measure of its increase a man appears either an infant, grown up, or a perfect man.

CHAPTER 3

3:1–2

1. Now in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judæa, and Herod being tetrarch of Galilee, and his brother Philip tetrarch of Ituræa and of the region of Trachonitis, and Lysanias the tetrarch of Abilene,

2. Annas and Caiaphas being the High Priests, the word of God came unto John the son of Zacharias in the wilderness.

GREGORY. (Hom. 20. in Ev.) The time at which the forerunner of the Saviour received the word of preaching, is marked by the names of the Roman sovereign and of the princes of Judæa, as it follows: Now in the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Cæsar, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judæa, and Herod being tetrarch of Galilee, &c. For because John came to preach Him who was to redeem some from among the Jews, and many among the Gentiles, therefore the time of his preaching is marked out by making mention of the king of the Gentiles and the rulers of the Jews. But because all nations were to be gathered together in one, one man is described as ruling over the Roman state, as it is said, The reign of Tiberius Cæsar.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes) For the emperor Augustus being dead, from whom the Roman sovereigns obtained the name of “Augustus,” Tiberius being his successor in the monarchy, was now in the 15th year of his receiving the reins of government.

ORIGEN. In the word of prophecy, spoken to the Jews alone, the Jewish kingdom only is mentioned, as, The vision of Esaias, in the days of Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, and Hezekiah, kings of Judah. (Is. 1:1.) But in the Gospel which was to be proclaimed to the whole world, the empire of Tiberius Cæsar is mentioned, who seemed the lord of the whole world. But if the Gentiles only were to be saved, it were sufficient to make mention only of Tiberius, but because the Jews also must believe, the Jewish kingdom therefore, or Tetrarchies, are also introduced, as it follows, Pontius Pilate being governor of Judæa, and Herod tetrarch, &c.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Because the Jews were to be scattered for their crime of treachery, the Jewish kingdom was shut up into parts under several governors. According to that saying, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation. (Luke 11:17.)

BEDE. Pilate was sent in the twelfth year of Tiberius to take the government of the Jewish nation, and remained there for ten successive years, almost until the death of Tiberius. But Herod, and Philip, and Lysanias, were the sons of that Herod in whose reign our Lord was born. Between these and Herod himself Archelaus their brother reigned ten years. He was accused by the Jews before Augustus, and perished in exile at Vienne. But in order to reduce the Jewish kingdom to greater weakness, August us divided it into Tetrarchies.

GREGORY. Because John preached Him who was to be at the same time both King and Priest, Luke the Evangelist has marked the time of that preaching by the mention not only of Kings, but also of Priests. As it follows, Under the High Priests Annas and Caiaphas.

BEDE. Both Annas and Caiaphas, when John began his preaching, were the High Priests, but Annas held the office that year, Caiaphas the same year in which our Lord suffered on the cross. Three others had held the office in the intervening time, but these two, as having particular reference to our Lord’s Passion, are mentioned by the Evangelist. For at that time of violence and intrigue, the commands of the Law being no longer in force, the honour of the High Priest’s office was never given to merit or high birth, but the whole affairs of the Priesthood were managed by the Roman power. For Josephus relates, that Valerius Gratus, when Annas was thrust out of the Priesthood, appointed Ismael High Priest, the son of Baphas; but not long after casting him off, he put in his place Eleazar the son of the High Priest Ananias. After the space of one year, he expelled him also from the office, and delivered the government of the High Priesthood to a certain Simon, son of Caiaphas, who holding it not longer than a year, had Joseph, whose name also was Caiaphas, for his successor; so that the whole time during which our Lord is related to have taught is included in the space of four years.

AMBROSE. The Son of God being about to gather together the Church, commences His work in His servant. And so it is well said, The word of the Lord came to John, that the Church should begin not from man, but from the Word. But Luke, in order to declare that John was a prophet, rightly used these few words, The word of the Lord came to him. He adds nothing else, for they need not their own judgment who are filled with the Word of God. By saying this one thing, he has therefore declared all. But Matthew and Mark desired to shew him to be a prophet, by his raiment, his girdle, and his food.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Matt. Hom. 10.) The word of God here mentioned was a commandment, for the son of Zacharias came not of himself, but God moved him.

THEOPHYLACT. Through the whole of the time until his shewing himself he was hid in the wilderness, that no suspicion might arise in men’s minds, that from his relation to Christ, and from his intercourse with Him from a child, he would testify such things of Him; and hence he said, I knew him not. (John 1:33.)

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (de Virg. c. 6.) Who also entered this life at once in the spirit and power of Elias, removed from the society of men, in uninterrupted contemplation of invisible things, that he might not, by becoming accustomed to the false notions forced upon us by our senses, fall into mistakes and errors in the discernment of good men. And to such a height of divine grace was he raised, that more favour was bestowed upon him than the Prophets, for from the beginning even to the end, he ever presented his heart before God pure and free from every natural passion.

AMBROSE. Again, the wilderness is the Church itself, for the barren has more children than she who has an husband. The word of the Lord came, that the earth which was before barren might bring forth fruit unto us.

3:3–6

3. And he came into all the country about Jordan, preaching the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins;

4. As it is written in the book of the words of Esaias the prophet, saying, The voice of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.

5. Every valley shall be filled, and every mountain and hill shall be brought low; and the crooked shall be made straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth;

6. And all flesh shall see the salvation of God.

AMBROSE. The Word came, and the voice followed. For the Word first works inward, then follows the office of the voice, as it is said, And he went into all the country about Jordan.

ORIGEN. Jordan is the same as descending, for there descends from God a river of healing water. But what parts would John be traversing but the country lying about Jordan, that the penitent sinner might soon arrive at the flowing stream, humbling himself to receive the baptism of repentance. For it is added, preaching the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) It is plain to every reader that John not only preached the baptism of repentance, but to some also he gave it, yet his own baptism he could not give for the remission of sins.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For as the sacrifice had not yet been offered up, nor had the holy Spirit descended, how could remission of sins be given? What is it then that St. Luke means by the words, for the remission of sins? Seeing the Jews were ignorant, and knew not the weight of their sins, and because this was the cause of their evils, in order that they might be convinced of their sins and seek a Redeemer, John came exhorting them to repentance, that being thereby made better and sorrowful for their sins, they might be ready to receive pardon. Rightly then after saying, that he came preaching the baptism of repentance, he adds, for the remission of sins. As if he should say, The reason by which he persuaded them to repent was, that thereby they would the more easily obtain subsequent pardon, believing on Christ. For if they were not led by repentance, in vain could they ask for grace, other than as a preparation for faith in Christ.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or John is said to preach the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins, because the baptism which was to take away sin, as he could not give, he preached; just as the Incarnate Word of the Father preceded the word of preaching, so the baptism of repentance, which was able to take away sin, was preceded by John’s baptism, which could not take away sin.

AMBROSE. And therefore many say that St. John is a type of the Law, because the Law could denounce sin, but could not pardon it.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 39.) To speak now of the difference of baptisms. Moses indeed baptized, but in the water, the cloud, and the sea, but this was done figuratively. John also baptized, not indeed according to the Jewish rite, (for he baptized not only with water,) but also for the remission of sins, yet not altogether spiritually, (for he adds not, in the Spirit.) Jesus baptizes but with the Spirit, and this is perfect baptism. There is also a fourth baptism, namely by martyrdom and blood, by which also Christ Himself was baptized, and which is so far more glorious than the others, as it is not sullied by repeated acts of defilement. There is also a fifth, the most weary, according to which David every night washed his bed and his couch with tears. It follows, As it is written in the book of Esaias the Prophet, The voice of one crying in the wilderness. (Is. 40:3.)

AMBROSE. John the forerunner of the Word is rightly called the voice, because the voice being inferior precedes, the Word, which is more excellent, follows.

GREGORY. (7, 20. in Ev.) John cries in the desert because he brings the glad tidings of redemption to deserted and forsaken Judæa, but what he cries is explained in the words, Prepare ye the way of the Lord. For they who preach true faith and good works, what else do they than prepare the way for the Lord’s coming into the hearts of the hearers, that they might make the paths of God straight, forming pure thoughts in the mind by the word of good preaching.

ORIGEN. Or, a way must be prepared in our heart for the Lord, for the heart of man is large and spacious if it has become clean. For imagine not that in the size of the body, but in the virtue of the understanding, consists that greatness which must receive the knowledge of the truth. Prepare then in thy heart by good conversation a way for the Lord, and by perfect works pursue the path of life, that so the word of God may have free course in thee.

BASIL. (non occ.) And because a path is a way trodden down by those that have gone before, and which former men have worn away, the word bids those who depart from the zeal of their predecessors repeatedly pursue it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But to cry, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, was not the office of the king, but of the forerunner. And so they called John the voice, because he was the forerunner of the Word.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (in Esai. 40. lib. 3.) But suppose some one should answer, saying, How shall we prepare the way of the Lord, or how shall we make His paths straight? since so many are the hindrances to those who wish to lead an honest life. To this the word of prophecy replies, There are some ways and paths by no means easy to travel, being in some places hilly and rugged, in others steep and precipitous; to remove which it says, Every valley shall be filled, every mountain and hill shall he brought low. Some roads are most unequally constructed, and while in one part rising, in another sloping downwards, are very difficult to pass. And here he adds, And the crooked ways shall be made straight, and the rough ways shall be made smooth. But this was in a spiritual manner brought to pass by the power of our Saviour. For formerly to pursue an Evangelical course of life was a difficult task, for men’s minds were so immersed in worldly pleasures. But now that God being made Man, has condemned sin in the flesh, all things are made plain, and the way of going has become easy, and neither hill nor valley is an obstacle to those who wish to advance.

ORIGEN. For when Jesus had come and sent His Spirit, every valley was filled with good works, and the fruits of the Holy Spirit, which if thou hast, thou wilt not only cease to become a valley, but will begin also to be a mountain of God.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) Or by the valleys he means a quiet habitual practice of virtue, as in the Psalms, The valleys shall be filled with corn. (Ps. 65:13.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) He denounces the haughty and arrogant by the name of mountains, whom Christ has brought low. But by the hills He implies the wreckless, not only because of the pride of their hearts, but because of the barrenness of despair. For the hill produces no fruit.

ORIGEN. Or you may understand the mountains and hills to be the hostile powers, which have been overthrown by the coming of Christ.

BASIL. (non occ.) But as the hills differ from mountains in respect of height, in other things are the same, so also the adverse powers agree indeed in purpose, but are distinguished from one another in the enormity of their offences.

GREGORY. (20. in Ev.) Or, the valley when filled increases, but the mountains and hills when brought low decrease, because the Gentiles by faith in Christ receive fulness of grace, but the Jews by their sin of treachery have lost that wherein they boasted. For the humble receive a gift because the hearts of the proud they keep afar off.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Matt. Hom. 10.) Or by these words he declares the difficulties of the law to be turned into the easiness of faith; as if he said, No more toils and labours await us, but grace and remission of sins make an easy way to salvation.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) Or, He orders the valleys to be filled, the mountains and hills to be cast down, to shew that the rule of virtue neither fails from want of good, nor transgresses from excess.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But the crooked places are become straight, when the hearts of the wicked, perverted by a course of injustice, are directed to the rule of justice. But the rough ways are changed to smooth, when fierce and savage dispositions by the influence of Divine grace return to gentleness and meckness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) He then adds the cause of these things, saying, And all flesh shall see, &c. shewing that the virtue and knowledge of the Gospel shall be extended even to the end of the world, turning mankind from savage manners and perverse wills to meekness and gentleness. Not only Jewish converts but all mankind shall see the salvation of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) That is, of the Father, who sent His Son as our Saviour. But the flesh is here taken for the whole man.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or else, All flesh, i. e. Every man can not see the salvation of God in Christ in this life. The Prophet therefore stretches his eye beyond to the last day of judgment, when all men both the elect and the reprobate shall equally see Him.

3:7–9

7. Then said he to the multitude that came forth to be baptized of him, O generation of vipers, who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?

8. Bring forth therefore fruits worthy of repentance, and begin not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you, That God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham.

9. And now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees: every tree therefore which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into

the fire,

ORIGEN. No one that remains in his old state, and forsakes not his old habits and practices, can rightly come to be baptized; whoever then wishes to be baptized, let him go forth. Hence are those words significantly spoken, And he said unto the multitude that went forth to be baptized of him. To the multitudes then who are going forth to the laver of baptism, He speaks the following words, for if they had already gone forth, He would not have said, O generation of vipers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 10.) The dweller in the wilderness, when he saw all the people of Palestine standing round him and wondering, bent not beneath the weight of such respect, but rose up against them and reproved them. (Hom. in Gen. 12.) The holy Scripture often gives the names of wild beasts to men, according to the passions which excite them, calling them sometimes dogs because of their impudence, horses on account of their lust, asses for their folly, lions and panthers for their ravening and wantonness, asps for their guile, serpents and vipers for their poison and cunning; and so in this place John calls the Jews a generation of vipers.

BASIL. (cont. Eunom. lib. 2.) Now it may be observed, that the following words natus and filius are spoken of animals, but genimen may be said of the fœtus before it is formed in the womb; the fruit of the palm trees is also called genimina, but that word is very seldom used with respect to animals, and when it is, always in a bad sense.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 11.) Now they say that the female viper kills the male in copulation, and the fœtus as it increases in the womb kills the mother, and so comes forth into life, bursting open the womb in revenge as it were of its father’s death; the viper progeny therefore are parricides. Such also were the Jews, who killed their spiritual fathers and teachers. But what if he found them not sinning, but beginning to be converted? He ought not surely to rebuke them, but to comfort them. We answer, that he gave not heed to those things which are outward, for he knew the secrets of their hearts, the Lord revealing them to him; for they vaunted themselves too much in their forefathers. Cutting therefore at this root, he calls them a generation of vipers, not indeed that he blamed the Patriarchs, or called them vipers.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 20, in Ev.) Because the Jews hated good men, and persecuted them, following the steps of their carnal parents, they are by birth the poisonous sons, as it were, of poisonous or sorcerous parents. But because the preceding verse declares that at the last judgment Christ shall be seen by all flesh, it is rightly added, Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come? The wrath to come being the awarding of final punishment.

AMBROSE. We see these men through the compassion of God, inspired with prudence to seek repentance of their crimes, dreading with wise devotion the terror of the judgment to come. Or perhaps, according to the precept, Be ye wise as serpents, (Matt. 10:16.) they are shewn to have a natural prudence, who perceive what is coming, and earnestly desire help, though they still forsake not what is hurtful.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But because he cannot then flee from the wrath of God, who now has not recourse to the sorrows of repentance, it is added, Bring forth therefore fruits.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For it is not sufficient for the penitent to leave off his sins, he must also bring forth the fruits of repentance, as it is in the Psalms, depart from evil and do good, (Ps. 34:14.) just as in order to heal, it will not do to pluck out the arrow only, but we must also apply a salve to the wound. But he says not fruit, but fruits, signifying abundance.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) He warns them that they must bring forth not only the fruits of repentance, but fruits worthy of repentance. For he that has violated no law, to him it is permitted to use what is lawful, but if a man has fallen into sin, he ought so to cut himself off from what is lawful, as he remembers to have committed what is unlawful. For the fruit of good works ought not to be equal in the man who has sinned less, and the man who has sinned more, nor in him who has fallen into no crimes, and him who has fallen into some. In this way it is adapted to the conscience of each man, that they should seek for so much the greater blessing on good works through repentance, as they have by guilt brought on themselves the heavier penalties.

MAXIMUS. (lib. Ascet.) The fruit of repentance is an equanimity of soul, which we do not fully obtain, as long as we are at times affected by our passions, for not as yet have we performed the fruits worthy of repentance. Let us then repent truly, that being delivered from our passions we may obtain the pardon of their sins.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But the Jews glorying in their noble birth were unwilling to acknowledge themselves sinners, because they were descended from the stock of Abraham. So then it is rightly said, And begin not to say within yourselves, we have Abraham for our father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Not meaning thereby that they had not descended in their natural course from Abraham, but that it avails them nothing to have Abraham for their father, unless they observed the relationship in respect of virtue. For Scripture is accustomed to entitle laws of relationship, such as do not exist by nature, but are derived from virtue or vice. To whichsoever of these two a man conforms himself, he is called its son or brother.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For what profits the nobleness we inherit through the flesh, unless it be supported by kindred feelings in us? It is folly then to boast of our worthy ancestors, and fall away from their virtues.

BASIL. (non occ.) For neither does the speed of its sire make the horse swift; but as the goodness of other animals is looked for in individuals, so also that is reckoned to be man’s legitimate praise which is decided by the test of his present worth. For it is a disgraceful thing for a man to be adorned with the honours of another, when he has no virtue of his own to commend him.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) So then having foretold the casting away of the Jews, He goes on to allude to the calling of the Gentiles, whom He calls stones. Hence it follows, For I say unto you, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) As if He said, Think not that if you perish the Patriarch will be deprived of sons, for God even from stones can produce men unto him, and prolong the line of his descendants. For so has it been from the beginning, seeing that for men to be made from stones unto Abraham is but equivalent to the coming forth of a son from the dead womb of Sarah.

AMBROSE. But although God can alter and change the most diverse natures, yet in my mind a mystery is of more avail than a miracle. For what else than stones were they who bowed down to stones, like indeed to them who made them. It is prophesied therefore that faith shall be poured into the stony hearts of the Gentiles, and through faith the oracles promise that Abraham shall have sons. But that you may know who are the men compared to stones, he has also compared men to trees, adding, For now the axe is laid to the root of the tree. This change of figure was made, that by means of comparison might be understood to have now commenced a more kindly growth of manhood.

ORIGEN. If the completion of all things had been then already begun, and the end of time close at hand, I should have no question but that the prophecy was given, because at that time it was to be fulfilled. But now that many ages have elapsed since the Spirit spoke this, I think it was prophesied to the people of Israel, because their cutting off was approaching. For to those that went out to him that they should be baptized, he gave this warning among others.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. By the axe then he declares the deadly wrath of God, which fell upon the Jews on account of the impieties they practised against Christ; he does not pronounce the axe to be yet fixed to the root, (ad radicem) but that it was laid, i. e. near the root. For though the branches were cut down, the tree itself was not yet entirely destroyed. For a remnant of Israel shall be saved.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or we may take it in this way; The tree represents the whole human race in this world, but the axe is our redeemer, who by the handle and iron, as it were, is held indeed in the hand of man, but strikes by the power of God. Which axe indeed is now laid at the root of the tree; for although it waits patiently, yet it is plain what it is about to do. And we must observe that the said axe is to be laid not at the branches, but at the root. For when the children of the wicked are taken away, what is this but the cutting off of the branches of an unfruitful tree. But when the whole family together with the parent is removed, the unfruitful tree is cut off from the very root. But every hardened sinner finds the fire of hell the quicker prepared for him, as he disdains to bring forth the fruits of good works. Hence it follows, Every one then.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is elegantly said, that beareth not fruit, and it is added, good. For God created man an animal fond of employment, and constant activity is natural to him, but idleness is unnatural. For idleness is hurtful to every member of the body, but much more to the soul. For the soul being by nature in constant motion does not admit of being slothful. But as idleness is an evil, so also is an unworthy activity. But having before spoken of repentance, he now declares that the axe lies near, not indeed actually cutting, but only striking terror.

AMBROSE. Let him then that is able bring forth fruit unto grace, him who ought, unto repentance. The Lord is at hand seeking for His fruit, who shall cherish the fruitful, but rebuke the barren.

3:10–14

10. And the people asked him, saying, What shall we do then?

11. He answereth and saith unto them, He that hath two coats, let him impart to him that hath none; and he that hath meat, let him do likewise.

12. Then came also Publicans to be baptized, and said unto him, Master, what shall we do?

13. And he said unto them, Exact no more than that which is appointed you.

14. And the soldiers likewise demanded of him, saying, And what shall we do? And he said unto them, Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be content with your wages.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) In the preceding words of John, it is plain that the hearts of his hearers were troubled, and sought for advice from him. As it is added, And they asked him, saying, &c.

ORIGEN. Three classes of men are introduced as enquiring of John concerning their salvation, one which the Scripture calls the multitude, another to which it gives the name of Publicans, and a third which is noticed by the appellation of soldiers.

THEOPHYLACT. Now to the Publicans and soldiers he gives a commandment to abstain from evil, but the multitudes, as not living in an evil condition, he commands to perform some good work, as it follows, He that hath two coats, let him give one.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Because a coat is more necessary for our use than a cloak, it belongs to the bringing forth of fruits worthy of repentance, that we should divide with our neighbours not only our superfluities but those which are absolutely necessary to us, as our coat, or the meat with which we support our bodies; and hence it follows, And he who has meat, let him do likewise.

BASIL. But we are hereby taught, that every thing we have over and above what is necessary to our daily support, we are bound to give to him who hath nothing for God’s sake, who hath given us liberally whatever we possess.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For because it was written in the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, he is proved to love his neighbour less than himself, who does not share with him in his distress, those things which are even necessary to himself. Therefore that precept is given of dividing with one’s neighbour the two coats, since if one is divided no one is clothed. But we must remark in this, of how much value are works of mercy, since of the works worthy of repentance these are enjoined before all others.

AMBROSE. For other commands of duty have reference only to individuals, mercy has a common application. It is therefore a common commandment to all, to contribute to him that has not. Mercy is the fulness of virtues, yet in mercy itself a proportion is observed to meet the capacities of man’s condition, in that each individual is not to deprive himself of all, but what he has to share it with the poor.

ORIGEN. But this place admits of a deeper meaning, for as we ought not to serve two masters, so neither to have two coats, lest one should be the clothing of the old man, the other of the new, but we ought to cast off the old man, and give to him who is naked. For one man has one coat, another has none at all, the strength therefore of the two is exactly contrary, and as it has been written that we should cast all our crimes to the bottom of the sea, so ought we to throw from us our vices and errors, and lay them upon him who has been the cause of them.

THEOPHYLACT. But some one has observed that the two coats are the spirit and letter of Scripture, but John advises him that hath these two to instruct the ignorant, and give him at least the letter.

BEDE. What great virtue there was in the discourse of the Baptist is manifested by this, that the Publicans, nay even the soldiers, he compelled to seek counsel of him concerning their salvation, as it follows, But the publicans came.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 24.) Great is the force of virtue that makes the rich seek the way of salvation from the poor, from him that hath nothing.

BEDE. He commands them therefore that they exact no more than what was presented to them, as it follows, And he said unto them, Do no more than what is appointed to you. But they are called publicans who collect the public taxes, or who are the farmers of the public revenue or public property? Those also who pursue the gain of this world by traffic are denoted by the same titles, all of whom, each in his own sphere, he equally forbids to practise deceit, that so by first keeping themselves from desiring other men’s goods, they might at length come to share their own with their neighbours. It follows, But the soldiers also asked him. In the justest manner he advises them not to seek gain by falsely accusing those whom they ought to benefit by their protection. Hence it follows, And he says unto them, Strike no one, (i. e. violently,) nor accuse any falsely, (i. e. by unjustly using arms,) and be content with your wages.

AMBROSE. Teaching thereby that wages were affixed to military duty, lest men seeking for gain should go about as robbers.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 19.) For by wages he refers to the imperial pay, and the rewards assigned to distinguished actions.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. lib. xxii c. 74.) For he knew that soldiers, when they use their arms, are not homicides, but the ministers of the law; not the avengers of their own injuries, but the defenders of the public safety. Otherwise he might have answered, “Put away your arms, abandon warfare, strike no one, wound no one, destroy no one.” For what is it that is blamed in war? Is it that men die, who some time or other must die, that the conquerors might rule in peace? To blame this is the part of timid not religious men. The desire of injury, the cruelty of revenge, a savage and pitiless disposition, the fierceness of rebellion, the lust of power, and such like things are the evils which are justly blamed in wars, which generally for the sake of thereby bringing punishment upon the violence of those who resist, are undertaken and carried on by good men either by command of God or some lawful authority, when they find themselves in that order of things in which their very condition justly obliges them either to command such a thing themselves, or to obey when others command it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 11.) But John’s desire when he spoke to the Publicans and soldiers, was to bring them over to a higher wisdom, for which as they were not fitted, he reveals to them commoner truths, lest if he put forward the higher they should pay no attention thereto, and be deprived of the others also.

15. And as the people were in expectation, and all men mused in their hearts of John, whether he were the Christ, or not;

16. John answered, saying unto them all, I indeed baptize you with water; but one mightier than I cometh, the latchet of whose shoes I am not worthy to unloose: he shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire.

17. Whose fan is in his hand, and he will throughly purge his floor, and will gather the wheat into his garner; but the chaff he will burn with fire unquenchable.

ORIGEN. It was meet that more deference should be paid to John than to other men, for he lived such as no other man. Wherefore indeed most rightly did they regard him with affection, only they kept not within due bounds; hence it is said, But while the people were expecting whether he were the Christ.

AMBROSE. Now what could be more absurd than that he who was fancied to be in another should not be believed in his own person? He whom they thought to have come by a woman, is not believed to have come by a virgin; while in fact the sign of the Divine coming was placed in the childbearing of a virgin, not of a woman.

ORIGEN. But love is dangerous when it is uncontrolled. For he who loves any one ought to consider the nature and causes of loving, and not to love more than the object deserves. For if he pass the due measure and bounds of love, both he who loves, and he who is loved, will be in sin.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Metaphrastes.) And hence John gloried not in the estimation in which all held him, nor in any way seemed to desire the deference of others, but embraced the lowest humility. Hence it follows, John answered.

BEDE. But how could he answer them who in secret thought that he was Christ, except it was that they not only thought, but also (as another Evangelist declares) sending Priests and Levites to him asked him whether he was the Christ or not?

AMBROSE. Or: John saw into the secrets of the heart; but let us remember by whose grace, for it is of the gift of God to reveal things to man, not of the virtue of man, which is assisted by the Divine blessing, rather than capable of perceiving by any natural power of its own. But quickly answering them, he proved that he was not the Christ, for his works were by visible operations. For as man is compounded of two natures, i. e.

soul and body, the visible mystery is made holy by the visible, the invisible by the invisible; for by water the body is washed, by the Spirit the soul is cleansed of its stains. It is permitted to us also in the very water to have the sanctifying influence of the Deity breathed upon us. And therefore there was one baptism of repentance, another of grace. The latter was by both water and Spirit, the former by one only; the work of man is to bring forth repentance for his sin, it is the gift of God to pour in the grace of His mystery. Devoid therefore of all envy of Christ's greatness, he declared not by word but by work that he was not the Christ. Hence it follows, There cometh after me one mightier than I. In those words, mightier than I, he makes no comparison, for there can be none between the Son of God and man, but because there are many mighty, no one is mightier but Christ. So far indeed was he from making comparison, that he adds, Whose shoes latchet I am not worthy to unloose.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Evang. lib. ii. 12.) Matthew says, Whose shoes I am not worthy to bear. If therefore it is worth while to understand any difference in these expressions, we can only suppose that John said one at one time, another at another, or both together, To bear his shoes, and to loose the latchet of his shoes, so that though one Evangelist may have related this, the others that, yet all have related the truth. But if John intended no more when he spoke of the shoes of our Lord but His excellence and his own humility, whether he said loosing the latchet of the shoes, or bearing them, they have still kept the same sense who by the mention of shoes have in their own words expressed the same signification of humility.

AMBROSE. By the words, Whose shoes I am not worthy to bear, he shews that the grace of preaching the Gospel was conferred upon the Apostles, who were shod for the Gospel. (Eph. 6:15.) He seems however to say it, because John frequently represented the Jewish people.

GREGORY. (Hom. 7. in Evan.) But John denounces himself as unworthy to loose the latchet of Christ's shoes: as if he openly said, I am not able to disclose the footsteps of my Redeemer, who do not presume unworthily to take unto myself the name of bridegroom, for it was an ancient custom thata when a man refused to take to wife her whom he ought, whoever should come to her betrothed by right of kin, was to loose his shoe. Or because shoes are made from the skins of dead animals, our Lord being made flesh appeared as it were with shoes, as taking upon Himself the carcase of our corruption. The latchet of the shoe is the connexion of the mystery. John therefore can not loose the latchet of the shoe, because neither is he able to fathom the mystery of the Incarnation, though he acknowledged it by the Spirit of prophecy.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) And having said that his own baptism was only with water, he next shews the excellence of that baptism which was brought by Christ, adding, He shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, and fire, signifying by the very metaphor which he uses the abundance of grace. For he says not, “He shall give you the Holy Spirit,” but He shall baptize you. And again, by the addition of fire, he shews the power of grace. And as Christ calls the grace of the Spirit, water, (John 4:14; 7:38.) meaning by water the purity resulting from it, and the abundant consolation which is brought to minds which are capable of receiving Him; so also John, by the word fire, expresses the fervour and uprightness of grace, as well as the consuming of sins.

BEDE. The Holy Spirit also may be understood by the word fire, for He kindles with love and enlightens with wisdom the hearts which He fills. Hence also the Apostles received the baptism of the Spirit in the appearance of fire. There are some who explain it, that now we are baptized with the Spirit, hereafter we shall be with fire, that as in truth we are now born again to the remission of our sins by water and the Spirit, so then we shall be cleansed from certain lighter sins by the baptism of purifying fire.

ORIGEN. And as John was waiting by the river Jordan for those who came to his baptism, and some he drove away, saying, Generation of vipers, but those who confessed their sins he received, so shall the Lord Jesus stand in the fiery stream with the flaming sword, that whoever after the close of this life desires to pass over to Paradise and needs purification, He may baptize him with this laver, and pass him over to paradise, but whoso has not the seal of the former baptisms, him He shall not baptize with the laver of fire.

BASIL. (lib. de Spir. Sanct. c. 12.) But because he says, He shall baptize you with the Holy Spirit, let no one admit that baptism to be valid in which the name of His Spirit only has been invoked, for we must ever keep undiminished that tradition which has been sealed to us in quickening grace. To add or take away ought thereof excludes from eternal life.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) By these words then, He shall baptize with the Holy Spirit, He signifies the abundance of His grace, the plenteousness of His mercy; but lest any should suppose that while to bestow abundantly is both in the power and will of the Creator, He will have no occasion to punish the disobedient, he adds, whose fan is in his hand, shewing that He is not only the rewarder of the righteous, but the avenger of them that speak lies. But the fan expresses the promptitude of His judgment. For not with the process of passing sentence on trial, but in an instant and without any interval he separates those that are to be condemned from the company of those that are to be saved.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Chrys. in Thes. lib. ii. c. 4.) By the following words, And he shall thoroughly purge his floor, the Baptist signifies that the Church belongs to Christ as her Lord.

BEDE. For by the floor is represented the present Church, in which many are called but few are chosen. The purging of which floor is even now carried on individually, when every perverse offender is either cast out of the Church for his open sins, (by the hands of the Priesthood,) or for his secret sins is after death condemned by Divine judgment. And at the end of the world it will be accomplished universally, when the Son of Man shall send His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom every thing that has offended.

AMBROSE. By the sign of a fan then the Lord is declared to possess the power of discerning merits, since when the corn is winnowed in the threshing floor, the full cars are separated from the empty by the trial of the wind blowing them. Hence it follows, And he shall gather the wheat into his barn. By this comparison, the Lord shews that on the day of judgment He will discern the solid merits and fruits of virtue from the unfruitful lightness of empty boasting and vain deeds, about to place the men of more perfect righteousness in His heavenly mansion. For that is indeed the more perfect fruit which was thought worthy to be like to Him who fell as a grain of wheat, that He might bring forth fruit in abundance. (John 12:24.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the chaff signifies the trifling and empty, blown about and liable to be carried away by every blast of sin.

BASIL. (non occ.) But they are mixed up with those who are worthy of the kingdom of heaven, as the chaff with the wheat. This is not however from consideration of their love of God and their neighbour, nor from their spiritual gifts or temporal blessings.

ORIGEN. Or, because without the wind the wheat and chaff cannot be separated, therefore He has the fan in His hand, which shews some to be chaff, some wheat; for when you were as the light chaff; (i. e. unbelieving,) temptation shewed you to be what you knew not; but when you shall bravely endure temptation, the temptation will not make you faithful and enduring, but it will bring to light the virtue which was hid in you.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) But it is well to know, that the treasures, which according to the promises are laid up for those who live honestly, are such as the words of man cannot express, as eye hath not seen, nor the ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. And the punishments which await sinners bear no proportion to any of those things which now affect the senses. And although some of those punishments are called by our names, yet their difference is very great. For when you hear of fire, you are taught to understand something else from the expression which follows, that is not quenched, beyond what comes into the idea of other fire.

GREGORY. (Mor. 15. sup. Job 20.) The fire of hell is here wonderfully expressed, for our earthly fire is kept up by heaping wood upon it, and cannot live unless supplied with fuel, but on the contrary the fire of hell, though a bodily fire, and burning bodily the wicked who are put into it, is not kept up by wood, but once made remains unquenchable.

3:18–20

18. And many other things in his exhortation preached he unto the people.

19. But Herod the tetrarch, being reproved by him for Herodias his brother Philip’s wife, and for all the evils which Herod had done,

20. Added yet this above all, that he shut up John in prison.

ORIGEN. John having announced the coming of Christ, was preaching the baptism of the Holy Spirit, and the other things which the Gospel history has handed down to us. But besides these he is declared to have announced others in the following words, And many other things in his exhortation preached he unto the people.

THEOPHYLACT. For his exhortation was the telling of good things, and therefore is fitly called the Gospel.

ORIGEN. And as in the Gospel according to St. John it is related of Christ that He spoke many other things, so also in this place we must understand Luke to say the same of John the Baptist, since certain things are announced by John too great to be entrusted to writing. But we marvel at John, because among them that are born of women there was not a greater than he, for by his good deeds he had been exalted to so high a fame for virtue, that by many he was supposed to be Christ. But what is much more marvellous he feared not Herod, nor dreaded death, as it follows, But Herod the tetrarch being reproved by him.

EUSEBIUS. (non occ.) He is called the tetrarch, to distinguish him from the other Herod, in whose reign Christ was born, and who was king, but this Herod was tetrarch. Now his wife was the daughter of Aretas, king of Arabia, but he had sacrilegiously married his brother Philip’s wife, though she had offspring by his brother. For those only were allowed to do this whose brothers died without issue. For this the Baptist had censured Herod. First indeed he heard him attentively, for he knew that his words were weighty and full of consolation, but the desire of Herodias compelled him to despise the words of John, and he then thrust him into prison. And so it follows, And he added this above all, that he shut up John in prison.

BEDE. But John was not imprisoned in those days. According to St. John’s Gospel it was not till after some miracles had been performed by our Lord, and after His baptism had been noised abroad; but according to Luke he had been seized beforehand by the redoubled malice of Herod, who, when he saw so many flock to the preaching of John, and the soldiers believing, the publicans repenting, and whole multitudes receiving baptism, on the contrary not only despised John, but having put him in prison, slew him.

GLOSS. (ordin.) For before that Luke relates any of the acts of Jesus, he says that John was taken by Herod, to shew that he alone was in an especial manner going to describe those of our Lord’s acts, which were performed since the year in which John was taken or put to death.

3:21–22

21. Now when all the people were baptized, it came to pass, that Jesus also being baptized, and praying, the heaven was opened,

22. And the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape like a dove upon him, and a voice came from heaven, which said, Thou art my beloved Son; in thee I am well pleased.

AMBROSE. In a matter which has been related by others, Luke has rightly given us only a summary, and has left more to be understood than expressed in the fact, that our Lord was baptized by John. As it is said, Now when all were baptized, it came to pass. Our Lord was baptized not that He might be cleansed by the waters but to cleanse them, that being purified by the flesh of Christ who knew no sin, they might possess the power of baptism.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (in Orat. 39.) Christ comes also to baptism perhaps to sanctify baptism, but doubtless to bury the old Adam in water.

AMBROSE. But the cause of our Lord’s baptism He Himself declares when He says, Thus it becomes us to fulfil all righteousness. But what is righteousness, except that what you would have another do to you, you should first begin yourself, and so by your example encourage others? Let none then avoid the laver of grace, since Christ avoided not the laver of repentance.

CHRYSOSTOM. Now there was a Jewish baptism which removed the pollutions of the flesh, not the guilt of the conscience; but our baptism parts us from sin, washes the soul, and gives us largely the outpouring of the Spirit. But John’s baptism was more excellent than the Jewish; for it did not bring men to the observance of bodily purifications, but taught them to turn from sin to virtue. But it was inferior to our baptism, in that it conveyed not the Holy Spirit, nor shewed forth the remission which is by grace, for there was a certain end as it were of each baptism. But neither by the Jewish nor our own baptism was Christ baptized, for He needed not the pardon of sins, nor was that flesh destitute of the Holy Spirit which from the very beginning was conceived by the Holy Spirit; He was baptized by the baptism of John, that from the very nature of the baptism, you might know that He was not baptized because He needed the gift of the Spirit. But he says, being baptized and praying, that you might consider how fitting to one who has received baptism is constant prayer.

BEDE. Because though all sins are forgiven in baptism, not as yet is the weakness of this fleshly substance made strong. For we rejoice at the overwhelming of the Egyptians having now crossed the Red sea, but in the wilderness of worldly living there meet us other foes, who, the grace of Christ directing us, may by our exertions be subdued until we come to our own country.

CHRYSOSTOM. But he says, The heavens opened, as if till then they had been shut. But now the higher and the lower sheep-fold being brought into one, and there being one Shepherd of the sheep, the heavens opened, and man was incorporated a fellow citizen with the Angels.

BEDE. For not then were the heavens opened to Him whose eyes scanned the innermost parts of the heaven, but therein is shewn the virtue of baptism, that when a man comes forth from it the gates of the heavenly kingdom are opened to him, and while his flesh is bathed unharmed in the cold waters, which formerly dreaded their hurtful touch, the flaming sword is extinguished.

CHRYSOSTOM. The Holy Spirit descended also upon Christ as upon the Founder of our race, that He might be in Christ first of all who received Him not for Himself, but rather for us. Hence it follows: And the Holy Spirit descended. Let not any one imagine that He received Him because He had Him not. For He as God sent Him from above, and as man received Him below. Therefore from Him the Spirit fled down to Him, i. e. from His deity to His humanity.

AUGUSTINE. But it is most strange that He should receive the Spirit when He was thirty years old. But as without sin He came to baptism, so not without the Holy Spirit. For if it was written of John, He shall be filled with the Spirit from his mother’s womb, (Luke 1:15.) what must we believe of the man Christ, the very conception of whose flesh was not carnal but spiritual. Therefore He condescended now to prefigure His body, i. e. the Church, in which the baptized especially receive the Holy Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. That baptism savoured partly of antiquity, partly of novelty. For that He should receive baptism from a Prophet shewed antiquity, but the Spirit’s descent denoted something new.

AMBROSE. Now the Spirit rightly shewed Himself in the form of a dove, for He is not seen in His divine substance. Let us consider the mystery why like a dove? Because the grace of baptism requires innocence, that we should be innocent as doves. The grace of baptism requires peace, which under the emblem of an olive branch the dove once brought to that ark which alone escaped the deluge.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or to shew the meekness of the Lord, the Spirit now appears in the form of a dove, but at Pentecost like fire, to signify punishment. For when He was about to pardon offences, gentleness was necessary; but having obtained grace, there remaineth for us the time of trial and judgment.

CYPRIAN. (De unit. Eccles.) the dove is a harmless and pleasant creature, with no bitterness of gall, no fierceness of bite, no violence of rending talons; they love the abodes of men, consort within one home, when they have young nurturing them together, when they fly abroad, hanging side by side upon the wing, leading their life in mutual intercourse, giving with their bills a sign of their peaceful harmony, and fulfilling a law of unanimity in every way.

CHRYSOSTOM. Christ indeed had already manifested Himself at His birth by many oracles, but because men would not consult them, He who had in the mean time remained secret, again more clearly revealed Himself in a second birth. For formerly a star in the heavens, now the Father at the waves of Jordan declared Him, and as the Spirit descended upon Him, pouring forth that voice over the head of Him who was baptized, as it follows, And a voice came from heaven, Thou art my beloved Son.

AMBROSE. We have seen the Spirit, but in a bodily shape, and the Father whom we cannot see we may hear. He is invisible because He is the Father, the Son also is invisible in His divinity, but He wished to manifest Himself in the body. And because the Father did not take the body, He wished therefore to prove to us that He was present in the Son, by saying, Thou art my Son.

ATHANASIUS. (De Dec. Nic. Syn.) The holy Scriptures by the name of Son set forth two meanings; one similar to that spoken of in the Gospel, He gave to them power that they should become the sons of God; another according to which Isaac is the son of Abraham. Christ is not then simply called a Son of God, but the article is prefixed, that we should understand that He alone is really and by nature the Son; and hence He is said to be the Only begotten. For if according to the madness of Arius He is called Son, as they are called who obtain the name through grace, He will seem in no way to differ from us. It remains therefore that in another respect we must confess Christ to be the Son of God, even as Isaac is acknowledged to be the son of Abraham. For that which is naturally begotten of another, and takes not its origin from any thing besides nature, accounts a son. But it is said, Was then the birth of the Son with suffering as of a man? By no means. God since He cannot be divided is without suffering the Father of the Son. Hence He is called the Word of the Father, because neither is the word of man even produced with suffering, and since God is by nature one, He is the Father of one only Son, and therefore it is added, Beloved. For when a man has only one son, he loves him very much, but if he becomes father of many, his affection is divided by being distributed.

ATHANASIUS. But as the prophet had before announced the promise of God, saying, I will send Christ my son, that promise being now as it were accomplished at Jordan, He rightly adds, In thee I am well pleased.

BEDE. As if He said, In Thee have I appointed My good pleasure, i. e. to carry on by Thee what seems good to Me.

GREGORY. (sup. Ezech. Hom. 8.) Or else, Every one who by repentance corrects any of his actions, by that very repentance shews that he has displeased himself, seeing he amends what he has done. And since the Omnipotent Father spoke of sinners after the manner of men, saying, It repents me that I have made man, (Gen. 6:7.) He (so to speak) displeased Himself in the sinners whom He had created. But in Christ alone He pleased Himself, for in Him alone He found no fault that He should blame Himself, as it were, by repentance.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 14.) But the words of Matthew, This is my beloved Son, and those of Luke, Thou art my beloved Son, convey the same meaning; for the heavenly voice spoke one of these. But Matthew wished to shew that by the words, This is my beloved Son, it was meant rather to declare to the hearers, that He was the Son of God. For that was not revealed to Christ which He knew, but they heard it who were present, and for whom the voice came.

3:23–38

23. And Jesus himself began to be about thirty years of age, being (as was supposed) the son of Joseph, which was the son of Heli,

24. Which was the son of Matthat, which was the son of Levi, which was the son of Melchi, which was the son of Janna, which was the son of Joseph,

25. Which was the son of Mattathias, which was the son of Amos, which was the son of Naum, which was the son of Esli, which was the son of Nagge,

26. Which was the son of Maath, which was the son of Mattathias, which was the son of Semei, which was the son of Joseph, which was the son of Juda,

27. Which was the son of Joanna, which was the son of Rhesa, which was the son of Zorobabel, which was the son of Salathiel, which was the son of Neri,

28. Which was the son of Melchi, which was the son of Addi, which was the son of Cosam, which was the son of Elmodam, which was the son of Er,

29. Which was the son of Jose, which was the son of Eliezer, which was the son of Jorim, which was the son of Matthat, which was the son of Levi,

30. Which was the son of Simeon, which was the son of Juda, which was the son of Joseph, which was the son of Jonan, which was the son of Eliakim,

31. Which was the son of Melea, which was the son of Menan, which was the son of Mattatha, which was the son of Nathan, which was the son of David,

32. Which was the son of Jesse, which was the son of Obed, which was the son of Booz, which was the son of Salmon, which was the son of Naasson,

33. Which was the son of Aminadab, which was the son of Aram, which was the son of Esrom, which was the son of Phares, which was the son of Juda,

34. Which was the son of Jacob, which was the son of Isaac, which was the son of Abraham, which was the son of Thara, which was the son of Nachor,

35. Which was the son of Saruch, which was the son of Ragau, which was the son of Phalec, which was the son of Heber, which was the son of Sala,

36. Which was the son of Cainan, which was the son of Arphaxad, which was the son of Sem, which was the son of Noe, which was the son of

Lamech,

37. Which was the son of Mathusala, which was the son of Enoch, which was the son of Jared, which was the son of Maleleel, which was the son of Cainan,

38. Which was the son of Enos, which was the son of Seth, which was the son of Adam, which was the son of God.

ORIGEN. Having related our Lord's baptism, he next enters upon the generation of the Lord, not bringing it down from the higher to the lower, but beginning with Christ, he carries it up to God Himself. Hence he says, And Jesus Himself began. For when He was baptized, and had Himself undergone the mystery of the second birth, then He is said to have begun, that thou also mightest destroy this first birth and be born in the second.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 39.) We must therefore consider who He was who was baptized, and by whom and when: seeing He was pure, baptized by John, and at a time when His miracles had begun, that we might thence derive the lesson of purifying ourselves beforehand, and of embracing humility, and of not beginning to preach until the maturity of our spiritual and natural life. The first of these was said for their sakes who are receiving baptism; for although the gift of baptism brings remission, yet we must fear lest we return again to our vomit. The second is pointed at those who exalt themselves against the stewards of the mysteries, whom they may excel in rank. The third was uttered for those who trust in their youth, and imagine that any age is fit for promotion and teaching. Jesus is cleansed, and dost thou despise purification? By John, and dost thou say ought against thy teacher. At thirty years old, but dost thou in teaching precede thy elders? But the example of Daniel and the like are ready in thy mouth, for every guilty person is ready with an answer. But that is not the law of the Church which seldom happens, as neither does a single swallow make the spring.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, He waited accomplishing the whole law until that age which takes in every sin, that none might say that He abrogated the law because He was not able to fulfil it.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) For this reason also He came at thirty years to be baptized, to shew that spiritual regeneration makes men perfect as far as regards their spiritual life.

BEDE. The thrice ten years also which our Saviour had passed when He was baptized might intimate also the mystery of our baptism, because of the faith in the Trinity, and the obedience to the Decalogue.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 40.) Still must a child be baptized if necessity demands it. For it is better to be insensibly sanctified, than to pass from this life unsealed. But you will say, Christ is baptized at thirty years old, and He was God, but thou biddest us to hasten our baptism. In that thou saidst God, the objection was done away: He needed no cleansing, nor was any danger hanging over Him while He put off His baptism. But with thee it extends to no slight calamity, if thou passest from this life born in corruption, but not if thou hast put on the robe of incorruption. And truly it is a blessed thing to keep unsullied the clean robe of baptism, but it is better at times to be slightly stained, than to be altogether devoid of grace.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Glaph. in Exod. lib. 1.) Although in truth Christ had no father according to the flesh, yet some fancied he had a father. Hence it follows, As was supposed the son of Joseph.

AMBROSE. Rightly as was supposed, since in reality He was not, but was supposed to be so, because Mary who was espoused to Joseph was His mother. But we might doubt why the descent of Joseph is described rather than that of Mary, (seeing that Mary brought forth Christ of the Holy Spirit, while Joseph seemed to be out of the line of our Lord’s descent,) were we not informed of the custom of the Holy Scripture, which always seeks the origin of the husband, and especially in this case, since in Joseph’s descent we also find that of Mary. For Joseph being a just man took a wife really from his own tribe and country, and so at the time of the taxing Joseph went up from the family and country of David to be taxed with Mary his wife. She who gives in the returns from the same family and country, shews herself to be of that family and country. Hence He goes on in the descent of Joseph, and adds, Who was the son of Eli. But let us consider the fact, that St. Matthew makes Jacob, who was the father of Joseph, to be son of Nathan, but Luke says that Joseph (to whom Mary was espoused) was the son of Eli. How then could there be two fathers, (namely, Eli and Jacob,) to one man.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Carm. 18.) But some say that there is one succession from David to Joseph, which each Evangelist relates under different names. But this is absurd, since at the beginning of this genealogy, two brothers come in Nathan and Salomon, from whom the lines are carried in different ways.

EUSEBIUS. Let us then more carefully explain the meaning of the words themselves. For if when Matthew affirmed Joseph to be the son of Jacob, Luke had in like manner affirmed that Joseph was the son of Eli, there would be some dispute. But seeing the case is that Matthew gives his opinion, Luke repeats the common opinion of many, not his own, saying, as was supposed, I do not think that there is any room for doubt. For since there were among the Jews different opinions of the genealogy of Christ, and yet all traced Him up to David because to him the promises were made, while many affirmed that Christ would come through Solomon and the other kings, some shunned this opinion because of the many crimes related of their kings, and because Jeremiah said of Jechonias that "a man should not rise of his seed to sit on the throne of David." (Jer. 22:30.) This last view Luke takes, though conscious that Matthew gives the real truth of the genealogy. This is the first reason. The next is a deeper one. For Matthew when he began to write of the things before the conception of Mary and the birth of Jesus in the flesh, very fitly as in a history commences with the ancestry in the flesh, and descending from thence deduces His generation from those who went before. For when the Word of God became flesh, He descended. But Luke hastens forward to the regeneration which takes place in baptism, and then gives another succession of families, and rising up from the lowest to the highest, keeps out of sight those sinners of whom Matthew makes mention, (because that he who is born again in God is separated from his guilty parents, being made the son of God,) and relates those who have led a virtuous life in the sight of God. For thus it was said to Abraham, Thou shalt set out to thy fathers, (Gen. 15:15.) not fathers in the flesh, but in God, on account of their likeness in virtue. To him therefore fore who is born in God he ascribes parents who are according to God on account of this resemblance in character.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Aug. Quæst. Nov. ac Vet. Test. 56.) Or in another way; Matthew descends from David through Salomon to Joseph: but Luke beginning from Eli, who was in the line of our Saviour, ascends through the line of Nathan the son of David, and joins the tribes of Eli and Joseph, shewing that they are both of the same family, and thereby that the Saviour was not only the Son of Joseph, but also of Eli. For by the same reason by which the Saviour is called the son of Joseph, he is also the son of Eli, and of all the rest who are of the same tribe. Hence that which the Apostle says, Of whom are the fathers, and from whom Christ came according to the flesh. (Rom. 9:5.)

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. ii. qu. 5.) Or there occur three reasons, by one of which the Evangelist was led. For either one Evangelist has mentioned the father by whom Joseph was begotten, but the other his maternal grandfather, or some one of his ancestors. Or one of the fathers mentioned was the natural father of Joseph, the other his father who had adopted him. Or after the manner of the Jews, when a man has died without children, the next of kin taking his wife ascribes to his dead kinsman the son whom he has himself begotten.

AMBROSE. For it is related that Matthas, who was descended from Salomon, begat Jacob as his son, and died leaving his wife living, whom Melchi took unto him as wife, and from her Eli was born. Again, Eli, when his brother Jacob died without children, was joined to his brother's wife, and begot a son Joseph, who according to law is called the son of Jacob, since Eli raised up seed to his deceased brother, according to the order of the ancient law. (Deut. 25:5.)

BEDE. Or else, Jacob, taking the wife of his brother Eli who had died without children according to the command of the law, begot Joseph, by natural parentage his own son, but by the ordinance of the law the son of Eli.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 3.) It is most probable that Luke took the origin by adoption, as not being willing to say that Joseph, was begotten by him whose son he related him to be. For more easily is a man said to be his son by whom he was adopted, than to be begotten by him from whose flesh he was not born. But Matthew saying, "Abraham begat Isaac, and Isaac begat Jacob," and continuing in the word "begat," until at last he says, but "Jacob begat Joseph," has sufficiently expressed that he has carried through the succession of the fathers, to that father by whom Joseph was not adopted, but begotten. Although even supposing that Luke should say that Joseph was begotten by Eli, neither ought that word to perplex us. For it is not absurd to say that a man has begotten not in the flesh but in love the Son whom he has adopted. But rightly has Luke taken the origin by adoption, for by adoption are we made the sons of God, by believing on the

Son of God, but by His birth in the flesh, the Son of God has rather for our sakes become the Son of man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 31, in Ep. ad Rom.) But because this part of the Gospel consists of a series of names, men think there is nothing valuable to be derived therefrom. Lest then we should feel this, let us try to examine every step. For from the mere name we may extract an abundant treasure, for names are indicative of many things. For they savour of the Divine mercy and the offerings of thanks by women, who when they obtained sons gave a name significant of the gift.

GLOSS. (interlin.) By interpretation then Eli means, "My God," or "climbing," Who was the son of Matthat, i. e. "forgiving sins." Who was the son of Levi, i. e. "being added."

AMBROSE. Luke rightly thought, seeing that he could not embrace more of the sons of Jacob, lest he should seem to be wandering from the line of descent in a superfluous course, that the ancient names of the Patriarchs though occurring in others far later, Joseph, Judah, Simeon, and Levi, should not be omitted. For we recognise in these four kinds of virtue; in Judah, the mystery of our Lord's Passion prophesied by figure; in Joseph, an example of chastity going before; in Simeon, the punishment of injured modesty; in Levi, the priestly office. Hence it follows, Who was the son of Melchi, i. e. "my King." Who was the son of Janna, i. e. "a right hand." Who was the son ofJoseph, i. e. "growing up;" but this was a different Joseph. Who was the son of Mattathias, i. e. "the gift of God," or "sometimes." Who was the son of Amos, i. e. "loading, or he loaded." Who was the son of Naum, i. e. "help me." Who was the son of Matthat, i. e. "desire." Who was the son of Mattathias, as above. Who was the son of Simei, i. e. "obedient." Who was the son ofJoseph, i. e. "increase." Who was the son of Judah, i. e. "confessing." Joanna, "the Lord, his grace," or "the gracious Lord." Resa, "merciful." Zorobabel, "chief or master of Babylon." Salathiel, "God my petition." Neri, "my lanthern." Melchi, "my kingdom." Addi, "strong or violent." Cosam, "divining." Her, "watching, or watch, or of skins." Who was the son of Jesus, i. e. "Saviour." Eliezer, i. e. "God my helper." Joarim, i. e. "God exalting, or, is exalting." Matthat, as above. Levi, as above. Simeon, i. e. "He has heard the sadness, or the sign." Juda, as above. Joseph, as above. Jonah, a dove, or wailing. Eliachim, i. e.

“the resurrection of God.” Melchi, i. e. “his king.” Menan, i. e. “my bowels.” Mattathias, i. e. “gift.” Nathan, i. e. “He gave, or, of giving.”

AMBROSE. But by Nathan we perceive expressed the dignity of Prophecy, that as Christ Jesus alone fulfilled all things, in each of His ancestors different kinds of virtue might precede Him. It follows, Who was the son of David.

ORIGEN. The Lord descending into the world took upon Him the person of all sinners, and was willing to be born of the stock of Solomon, (as Matthew relates,) whose sins have been written down, and of the rest, many of whom did evil in the sight of God. But when He ascended, and is described as being born a second time in baptism, (as Luke relates,) He is not born through Salomon, but Nathan, who reproves the father for the death of Uriah, and the birth of Solomon.

AUGUSTINE. (Retract. i. c. 26.) But it must be confessed that a prophet of this same name reproves David, that he might be thought to be the same man, whereas he was different.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (ubi sup.) From David upwards according to each Evangelist there is an unbroken line of descent; as it follows, Who was the son of Jesse.

GLOSS. (ubi sup.) David is interpreted, “with a mighty arm, strong in fight.” Obith, i. e. “slavery.” Booz, i. e. “strong.” Salmon, i. e. “capable of feeling, or peace-making.” Naasson, i. e. “augury, or belonging to serpents.” Aminadab, “the people being willing.” Aram, i. e. “upright, or lofty.” Esrom, i. e. “an arrow.” Phares, i. e. “division.” Judah, i. e. “confessing.” Who was the son of Jacob, i. e. “supplanted.” Isaac, i. e. “laughing or joy.” Abraham, i. e. “the father of many nations, or the people.”

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt 1.) Matthew, who wrote as for the Jews, had no further object than to shew that Christ proceeded from Abraham and David, for this was most grateful to the Jews. Luke however, as speaking to all men in common, carried his account beyond as far even as Adam. Hence it follows, Who was the son of Thara.

GLOSS. (ubi sup.) Which is interpreted, “finding out,” or “wickedness.” Nachor, i. e. “the light rested.” Sarug, i. e. “correction,” or “holding the reins,” or “perfection.” Ragan, i. e. “sick,” or “feeding.” Phares, i. e. “dividing,” or “divided.” Heber, i. e. “passing over.” Sala, i. e. “taking away.” Canaan, i. e. “lamentation,” or “their possession.”

BEDE. The name and generation of Cainan, according to the Hebrew reading, is found neither in Genesis, nor in the Chronicles, (dierum Vulg. verbis.) but Arphaxad is stated to have begot Sala his son, without any one intervening. Know then that Luke borrowed this generation from the Septuagint, where it is written, that Arphaxad at a hundred and thirty-five years old begot Cainan, but he at a hundred and thirty years begot Sala. It follows, Who was the son of Arphaxad.

GLOSS. (ubi sup.) i. e. “healing the laying waste.” Sem, i. e. “a name,” or being “named.” Who was the son of Noe, i. e. “rest.”

AMBROSE. The mention of just Noah ought not to be omitted among our Lord’s generations, that as our Lord was born the builder of His Church, He might seem to have sent Noah beforehand, the author of His race, who had before founded the Church under the type of an ark. Who was the son of Lamech.

GLOSS. (ubi sup.) i. e. “humility, or striking, or struck, or humble.” Who was the son of Mathusalem, i. e. “the sending forth of death,” or “he died,” also “he asked.”

AMBROSE. His years are numbered beyond the deluge, that since Christ is the only one whose life experiences no age, in His ancestors also He might seem to have felt not the deluge. Who was the son of Enoch. And here is a manifest declaration of our Lord’s piety and divinity, since our Lord neither experienced death, and returned to heaven, the founder of whose race was taken up into heaven. Whence it is plain that Christ could not die, but was willing that His death should profit us. And Enoch indeed was taken, that his heart might not change by wickedness, but the Lord, whom the wickedness of the world could not change, returned to that place whence He had come by the greatness of His own nature.

BEDE. But rightly rising up from the baptized Son of God to God the Father, he places Enoch in the seventy-seventh step, who, having put off death, was translated unto Paradise, that he might signify that those, who by the grace of adoption of sons are born again of water and the Holy Spirit, are in the mean time (after the dissolution of the body) to be received into eternal rest, for the number seventy, because of the seventh of the sabbath, signifies the rest of those who, the grace of God assisting them, have fulfilled the decalogue of the aw.

GLOSS. Enoch is interpreted “dedication.” Jared, i. e. descending or “holding together.” Malaleleel, i. e. “the praised of God,” or” praising God.” Cainan, as above. Enos, i. e. “man,” or “despairing,” or “violent.” Seth, i. e. “placing,” “settling,” “he hath placed.” Seth, the last son of Adam, is not omitted, that as there were two generations of people, it might be signified under a figure that Christ was to be reckoned rather in the last than the first.

It follows, Who was the son of Adam.

GLOSS. (ubi sup.) Which is “man,” or “of the earth,” or “needy.” Who was the son of God.

AMBROSE. What could better agree than that the holy generation should commence from the Son of God, and be carried up even to the Son of God; and that he who was created should precede in a figure, in order that he who was born might follow in substance, so that he who was made after the image of God might go before, for whose sake the image of God was to descend. For Luke thought that the origin of Christ should be referred to God, because God is the true progenitor of Christ, or the Father according to the true birth, or the Author of the mystical gift according to baptism and regeneration, and therefore he did not from the first begin to describe His generation, but not till after he had unfolded His baptism, that both by nature and by grace, he might declare Him to be the Son of God. But what more evident sign of His divine generation than that when about to speak of it St. Luke introduces first the Father, saying, Thou art my beloved Son?

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 3.) He sufficiently declared by this that he called not Joseph the son of Eli because he was begotten by him, but rather because he was adopted by him, for he has called also Adam himself son, since though made by God, yet by grace (which he forfeited by sin) he was placed as a son in paradise.

THEOPHYLACT. For this reason he closes the generations in God, that we may learn that those fathers who intervene, Christ will raise up to God, and make them sons of God, and that it might be believed also that the birth of Christ was without seed; as if he said, If thou believest not that the second Adam was made without seed, you must come to the first Adam, and you will find that he was made by God without seed.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup. c. 4.) Matthew indeed wished to set forth God descending to our mortality; accordingly at the beginning of the Gospel he recounted the generations from Abraham to the birth of Christ in a descending scale. But Luke, not at the beginning, but after the baptism of Christ, relates the generation not descending but ascending, as if marking out rather the high priest in the expiation of sins, of whom John bore testimony, saying, Behold, who taketh away the sins of the world. But by ascending he comes to God, to whom we are reconciled, being cleansed and expiated.

AMBROSE. Nor do the Evangelists seem so to differ who have followed the old order, nor can you wonder if from Abraham down to Christ there are more successions according to Luke, fewer according to Matthew, since you must admit the line to have been traced through different persons. But it might be that some men have passed a very long life, but the men of the next generation have died at an early age, since we see how many old men live to see their grandchildren, while others depart as soon as they have sons born to them.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 6.) But most fitly with regard to our baptized Lord does Luke reckon the generations through seventy-seven persons. For both the ascent to God is expressed, to whom we are reconciled by the abolition of sins, and by baptism is brought to man the remission of all his sins, which are signified by that number. For eleven times seven are seventy-seven. But by the tenth number is meant perfect happiness. Hence it is plain that the going beyond the tenth marks the sin of one through pride coveting to have more. But this is said to be seven times to signify that the transgression was caused by the moving of man. For by the third number the immortal part of man is represented, but by the fourth the body. But motion is not expressed in numbers, as when we say, one, two, three; but when we say, once, twice, thrice. And so by seven times eleven, is signified a transgression wrought by man’s action.

CHAPTER 4

4:1–4

1. And Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost returned from Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the wilderness,

2. Being forty days tempted of the devil. And in those days he did eat nothing: and when they were ended, he afterward hungered.

3. And the devil said unto him, If thou be the Son of God, command this stone that it be made bread.

4. And Jesus answered him, saying, It is written, That man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God.

THEOPHYLACT. Christ is tempted after His baptism, shewing us that after we are baptized, temptations await us. Hence it is said, But Jesus being full of the Holy Spirit, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. God said in times past, My Spirit shall not always abide in men, for that they are flesh. (Gen. 6:3. Vulg.) But now that we have been enriched with the gift of regeneration by water and the Spirit, we are become partakers of the Divine nature by participation of the Holy Spirit. But the first-born among many brethren first received the Spirit, who Himself also is the giver of the Spirit, that we through Him might also receive the grace of the Holy Spirit.

ORIGEN. When therefore you read that Jesus was full of the Holy Spirit, and it is written in the Acts concerning the Apostles, that they were filled with the Holy Spirit, you must not suppose that the Apostles were equal to the Saviour. For as if you should say, These vessels are full of wine or oil, you would not thereby affirm them to be equally full, so Jesus and Paul were full of the Holy Spirit, but Paul’s vessel was far less than that of Jesus, and yet each was filled according to its own measure. Having then received baptism, the Saviour, being full of the Holy Spirit, which came upon Him from heaven in the form of a dove, was led by the Spirit, because, as many as are led by the Spirit, they are the sons of God, (Rom. 8:14.) but He was above all, especially the Son of God.

BEDE. That there might be no doubt by what Spirit He was led, while the other Evangelists say, into the wilderness, Luke has purposely added, And he was led by the Spirit into the wilderness for forty days. That no unclean spirit should be thought to have prevailed against Him, who being full of the Holy Spirit did whatever He wished.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) But if we order our lives according to our own will, how was He led about unwillingly? Those words then, He was led by the Spirit, have some meaning of this kind: He led of His own accord that kind of life, that He might present an opportunity to the tempter.

BASIL. For not by word provoking the enemy, but by His actions rousing him, He seeks the wilderness. For the devil delights in the wilderness, he is not wont to go into the cities, the harmony of the citizens troubles him.

AMBROSE. He was led therefore into the wilderness, to the intent that He might provoke the devil, for if the one had not contended, the other it seems had not conquered. In a mystery, it was to deliver that Adam from exile who was cast out of Paradise into the wilderness. By way of example, it was to shew us that the devil envies us, whenever we strive after better things; and that then we must use caution, lest the weakness of our minds should lose us the grace of the mystery. Hence it follows: And he was tempted of the devil.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Behold, He is among the wrestlers, who as God awards the prizes. He is among the crowned, who crowns the heads of the saints.

GREGORY. (3. Mor. sup. Job 2.) Our enemy was however unable to shake the purpose of the Mediator between God and men. For He condescended to be tempted outwardly, yet so that His soul inwardly, resting in its divinity, remained unshaken.

ORIGEN. But Jesus is tempted by the devil forty days, and what the temptations were we know not. They were perhaps omitted, as being greater than could be committed to writing.

BASIL. Or, the Lord remained for forty days untempted, for the devil knew that He fasted, yet hungered not, and dared not therefore approach Him. Hence it follows: And he eat nothing in those days. He fasted indeed, to shew that He who would gird Himself for struggles against temptation must be temperate and sober.

AMBROSE. There are three things which united together conduce to the salvation of man; The Sacrament, The Wilderness, Fasting. No one who has not rightly contended receives a crown, but no one is admitted to the contest of virtue, except first being washed from the stains of all his sins, he is consecrated with the gift of heavenly grace.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 40.) He fasted in truth forty days, eating nothing. (For He was God.) But we regulate our fasting according to our strength, although the zeal of some persuades them to fast beyond what they are able.

BASIL. (ex Const. Mon.) But we must not however so use the flesh, that through want of food our strength should waste away, nor that by excess of mortification our understandings wax dull and heavy. Our Lord therefore, once performed this work, but during this whole succeeding time He governed His body with due order, and so in like manner did Moses and Elias.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 13. in Matt.) But very wisely, He exceeded not their number of days, lest indeed He should be thought to have come in appearance only, and not to have really received the flesh, or lest the flesh should seem to be something beyond human nature.

AMBROSE. But mark the mystical number of days. For you remember that for forty days the waters of the deep were poured forth, and by sanctifying a fast of that number of days, He brings before us the returning mercies of a calmer sky. By a fast of so many days also, Moses earned for himself the understanding of the law. Our fathers being for so many years settled in the wilderness, obtained the food of Angels.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 4.) Now that number is a sacrament of our time and labour, in which under Christ’s discipline we contend against the devil, for it signifies our temporal life. For the seasons of the year run in courses of four, but forty contains four tens. Again, those ten are completed by the number one successively advancing up to four. This plainly shews that the fast of forty days, i. e. the humiliation of the soul, the Law and the Prophets have consecrated by Moses and Elias, the Gospel by the fast of our Lord Himself.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) But because not to suffer hunger is above the nature of man, our Lord took upon Himself the feeling of hunger, and submitted Himself as it pleased Him to human nature, both to do and to suffer those things which were His own. Hence it follows: And those days being ended, he was a hungered. Not forced to that necessity which overpowers nature, but as if provoking the devil to the conflict. For the devil, knowing that wherever hunger is there is weakness, sets about to tempt Him, and as the deviser or inventer of temptations, Christ permitting him tries to persuade Him to satisfy His appetite with the stones. As it follows; But the devil said unto him, If thou art the Son of God, command these stones that they be made bread.

AMBROSE. There are three especial weapons which we are taught the devil is wont to arm himself with, that he may wound the soul of man. One is of the appetite, another of boasting, the third ambition. He began with that wherewith he had already conquered, namely, Adam. Let us then beware of the appetite, let us beware of luxury, for it is a weapon of the devil. But what mean his words, If thou art the Son of God, unless he had known that the Son would come, but supposed Him not to have come from the weakness of His body. He first endeavours to find Him out, then to tempt Him. He professes to trust Him as God, then tries to deceive Him as man.

ORIGEN. When a father is asked by his son for bread, he does not give him a stone for bread, but the devil like a crafty and deceitful foe gives stones for bread.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) He tried to persuade Christ to satisfy His appetite with stones, i. e. to shift his desire from the natural food to that which was beyond nature or unnatural.

ORIGEN. I suppose also that even now at this very time the devil shews a stone to men that he may tempt them to speak, saying to them, Command this stone to be made bread. If thou seest the heretics devouring their lying doctrines as if they were bread, know that their teaching is a stone which the devil shews them.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) But Christ while He vanquishes temptation, banishes not hunger from our nature, as though that were the cause of evils, (which is rather the preservative of life, but confining nature within its proper bounds, shews of what kind its nourishment is, as follows; And Jesus answered him, saying, It is written, Man shall not live by bread alone.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, Not by bread alone is human nature sustained, but the word of God is sufficient to support the whole nature of man. Such was the food of the Israelites when they gathered manna during the space of forty years, and when they delighted in the taking of quails. (Exod. 16:15, Numb. 11:32) By the Divine counsel Elias had the crows to entertain him; (1 Kings 17:6) Elisha fed his companions on the herbs of the field. (2 Kings 4:44.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or, our earthly body is nourished by earthly food, but the reasonable soul is strengthened by the Divine Word, to the right ordering of the spirit.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Poem. Mor. x. 624.) For the body nourishes not our immaterial nature.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (in Eccles. Hom. 5.) Virtue then is not sustained by bread, nor by flesh does the soul keep itself in health and vigour, but by other banquets than these is the heavenly life fostered, and increased. The nourishment of the good man is chastity, his bread, wisdom, his herbs, justice, his drink, freedom from passion, his delight, (εὐφροσύνη quasi ex εὐφρόνειν) to be rightly wise.

AMBROSE. You see then what kind of arms He uses to defend man against the assaults of spiritual wickedness, and the allurements of the appetite. He does not exert His power as God, (for how had that profited me,) but as man He summons to Himself a common aid, that while intent upon the food of divine reading He may neglect the hunger of the body, and gain the nourishment of the word. For he who seeks after the word cannot feel the want of earthly bread; for divine things doubtless make up for the loss of human. At the same time by saying, Man lives not by bread alone, He shews that man was tempted, that is, our flesh which He assumed, not His own divinity.

4:5–8

5. And the devil, taking him up into a high mountain, shewed unto him all the kingdoms of the world in a moment of time.

6. And the devil said unto him, All this power will I give thee, and the glory of them: for that is delivered unto me; and to whomsoever I will I give it.

7. If thou therefore wilt worship me, all shall be thine.

8. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Get thee behind me, Satan: for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.

THEOPHYLACT. The enemy had first assailed Christ by the temptation of the appetite, as also he did Adam. He next tempts Him with the desire of gain or covetousness, shewing Him all the kingdoms of the world. Hence it follows, And the devil taking him up.

GREGORY. (Hom. 6. in Ev.) What marvel that He permitted Himself to be led by the devil into the mountains, who even endured to be crucified in His own body?

THEOPHYLACT. But how did the devil shew Him all the kingdoms of the world? Some say that he presented them to Him in imagination, but I hold that he brought them before Him in visible form and appearance.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Or, the devil described the world in language, and as he thought brought it vividly before our Lord's mind as though it were a certain house.

AMBROSE. Truly in a moment of time, the kingdoms of this world are described. For here it is not so much the rapid glance of sight which is signified as is declared the frailty of mortal power. For in a moment all this passes by, and oftentimes the glory of this world has vanished before it has arrived. It follows, And he said unto him, I will give thee all this power.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) He lied in two respects. For he neither had to give, nor could he give that which he had not; he gains possession of nothing, but is an enemy reduced to fight.

AMBROSE. For it is elsewhere said, that all power is from God. (Rom. 13:1.) Therefore from God's hands comes the disposal of power, the lust of power is from the evil one; power is not itself evil, but he who evilly uses it. What then; is it good to exercise power, to desire honour? Good if it is bestowed upon us, not if it is seized. We must distinguish however in this good itself. There is one good use of the world, another of perfect virtue. It is good to seek God; it is a good thing that the desire of becoming acquainted with God should be hindered by no worldly business. But if he who seeks God, is from the weakness of the flesh, and the narrowness of his mind, often tempted, how much more is he exposed who seeks the world? We are taught then to despise ambition, because it is subject to the power of the devil. But honour abroad is followed by danger at home, and in order to rule others a man is first their servant, and prostrates himself in obedience that he may be rewarded with honours, and the higher he aspires the lower he bends with feigned humility; whence he adds, If thou will fall down and worship me.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. And dost thou, whose lot is the unquenchable fire, promise to the Lord of all that which is His own? Didst thou think to have Him for thy worshipper, from dread of whom the whole creation trembles?

ORIGEN. Or, to view the whole in another light. Two kings are earnestly contending for a kingdom; The king of sin who reigneth over sinners, that is, the devil; The king of righteousness who ruleth the righteous, that is, Christ. The devil, knowing that Christ had come to take away his kingdom, shews Him all the kingdoms of the world; not the kingdoms of the Persians and of the Medes, but his own kingdom whereby he reigned in the world, whereby some are under the dominion of fornication, others of covetousness. And he shews Him them in a moment of time, that is, in the present course of time, which is but a moment in comparison of eternity. For the Saviour needed not to be shewn for any longer time the affairs of this world, but as soon as He turned His eyes to look, He beheld sins reigning, and men made slaves to vice. The devil therefore says unto Him, Camest Thou to contend with me for dominion? Worship me, and behold I give Thee the kingdom I hold. Now the Lord would indeed reign, but being Righteousness itself, would reign without sin; and would have all nations subject to Him, that they might obey the truth, but would not so reign over others as that He Himself should be subject to the devil. Hence it follows, And Jesus answering said unto him, It is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God.

BEDE. The devil saying to our Saviour, If thou wilt fall down and worship me, receives answer that he himself ought rather to worship Christ as his Lord and God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (in Thes. 32.) But how comes it that the Son (if as the heretics say a created being) is worshipped? What charge can be brought against those who served the creature and not the Creator, if the Son (according to them a created being) we are to worship as God?

ORIGEN. Or else, All these, he says, I would have subject to me, that they might worship the Lord God, and serve Him alone. But dost thou wish sin to begin from Me, which I came hither to destroy?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This command touched him to the quick; for before Christ's coming he was every where worshipped. But the law of God casting him down from his usurped dominion, establishes the worship of Him alone who is really God.

BEDE. But some one may ask how this injunction agrees with the word of the Apostle, which says, Beloved, serve one another. (Gal. 5:13.) In the Greek, δουλεία signifies a common service, (i. e. given either to God or man,) according to which we are bid to serve one another; but λατρεία is the service due to the worship of the Deity, with which we are bid to serve God alone.

4:9–13

9. And he brought him to Jerusalem, and set him on a pinnacle of the temple, and said unto him, If thou be the Son of God, cast thyself down from hence:

10. For it is written, He shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee:

11. And in their hands they shall bear thee up, lest at any time thou dash thy foot against a stone.

12. And Jesus answering said unto him, It is said, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.

13. And when the devil had ended all the temptation, he departed from him for a season.

AMBROSE. The next weapon he uses is that of boasting, which always causes the offender to fall down; for they who love to boast of the glory of their virtue descend from the stand and vantage ground of their good deeds. Hence it is said, And he led him to Jerusalem.

ORIGEN. He followed evidently as a wrestler, gladly setting out to meet the temptation, and saying, as it were, Lead me where you will, and you will find me the stronger in every thing.

AMBROSE. It is the fate of boasting, that while a man thinks he is climbing higher, he is by his pretension to lofty deeds brought low. Hence it follows, And he said unto him, If thou art the Son of God, throw thyself down.

ATHANASIUS. (non occ.) The devil entered not into a contest with God, (for he durst not, and therefore said, If thou art the Son of God,) but he contended with man whom once he had power to deceive.

AMBROSE. That is truly the devil’s language, which seeks to cast down the soul of man from the high ground of its good deeds, while he shews at the same time both his weakness and malice, for he can injure no one that does not first cast himself down. For he who forsaking heavenly things pursues earthly, rushes as it were wilfully down the self-sought precipice of a falling life. As soon then as the devil perceived his dart blunted, he who had subdued all men to his own power, began to think he had to deal with more than man. But Satan transforms himself into an angel of light, and often from the Holy Scriptures weaves his mesh for the faithful: hence it follows, It is written, He shall give, &c.

ORIGEN. Whence knowest thou, Satan, that those things are written? Hast thou read the Prophets, or the oracles of God? Thou hast read them indeed, but not that thyself mightest be the better for the reading, but that from the mere letter thou mightest slay them who are friends to the letter. (2 Cor. 3:6.) Thou knowest that if thou wert to speak from His other books, thou wouldest not deceive.

AMBROSE. Let not the heretic entrap thee by bringing examples from the Scriptures. The devil makes use of the testimony of the Scriptures not to teach but to deceive.

ORIGEN. But mark how wily he is even in this testimony. For he would fain throw a slur upon the glory of the Saviour, as though He needed the assistance of angels, and would stumble were He not supported by their hands. But this was said not of Christ, but of the saints generally; He needs not the aid of angels, Who is greater than angels. But let this teach thee, Satan, that the angels would stumble did not God sustain them; and thou stumblest, because thou refusest to believe in Jesus Christ the Son of God. But why art thou silent as to what follows, Thou shalt walk upon the asp and the basilisk, (Ps. 91:13.) except that thou art the basilisk, thou art the dragon and the lion?

AMBROSE. But the Lord, to prevent the thought that those things which had been prophesied of Him were fulfilled according to the devil's will, and not by the authority of His own divine power, again so foils his cunning, that he who had alleged the testimony of Scripture, should by Scripture himself be overthrown. Hence it follows, And Jesus answering said, It is said, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.

CHRYSOSTOM. For it is of the devil to cast one's self into dangers, and try whether God will rescue us.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. God gives not help to those who tempt Him, but to those who believe on Him. Christ therefore did not shew His miracles to them that tempted Him, but said to them, An evil generation seeketh a sign, and no sign shall be given to them. (Mat. 12:39.)

CHRYSOSTOM. But mark how the Lord, instead of being troubled, condescends to dispute from the Scriptures with the wicked one, that thou, as far as thou art able, mightest become like Christ. The devil knew the arms of Christ, beneath which he sunk. Christ took him captive by meekness, He overcame him by humility. Do thou also, when thou seest a man who has become a devil coming to meet thee, subdue him in like manner. Teach thy soul to conform its words to those of Christ. For as a Roman judge, who on the bench refuses to hear the reply of one who knows not how to speak as he does; so also Christ, except thou speakest after His manner, will neither hear thee nor protect thee.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) In lawful contests the battle is terminated either when the adversary surrenders of his own accord to the conqueror, or is defeated in three falls, according to the rules of the art of fighting. Hence it follows, And all the temptation being completed, &c.

AMBROSE. He would not have said that all the temptation was ended, had there not been in the three temptations which have been described the materials for every crime; for the causes of temptations are the causes of desire, namely, the delight of the flesh, the pomp of vain-glory, greediness of power.

ATHANASIUS. (non occ.) The enemy came to Him as man, but not finding in Him the marks of his ancient seed, he departed.

AMBROSE. You see then that the devil is not obstinate on the field, is wont to give way to true virtue; and if he ceases not to hate, he yet dreads to advance, for so he escapes a more frequent defeat. As soon then as he heard the name of God, he retired (it is said) for a season, for afterwards he comes not to tempt, but to fight openly.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, having tempted Him in the desert with pleasure, he retires from Him until the crucifixion, when he was about to tempt Him with sorrow.

MAXIMUS. (lib. ad. piet. ex. 12.) Or the devil had prompted Christ in the desert to prefer the things of the world to the love of God. The Lord commanded him to leave Him, (which itself was a mark of Divine love.) It was afterwards then enough to make Christ appear the false advocate of love to His neighbours, and therefore while He was teaching the paths of life, the devil stirred up the Gentiles and Pharisees to lay traps for Him that He might be brought to hate them. But the Lord, from the feeling of love which He had towards them, exhorted, reproved, ceased not to bestow mercy upon them.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 6.) The whole of this narrative Matthew relates in a similar manner, but not in the same order. It is uncertain therefore which took place first, whether the kingdoms of the earth were first shewn unto Him, and He was afterwards taken up to the pinnacle of the temple; or whether this came first, and the other afterwards. It matters little however which, as long as it is clear that they all took place.

MAXIMUS. (ut sup.) But the reason why one Evangelist places this event first, and another that, is because vain-glory and covetousness give birth in turn to one another.

ORIGEN. But John, who had commenced his Gospel from God, saying, In the beginning was the Word, did not describe the temptation of the Lord, because God can not be tempted, of whom he wrote. But because in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke the human generations are given, and in Mark it is man who is tempted, therefore Matthew, Luke, and Mark have described the temptation of the Lord.

4:14–21

14. And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit into Galilee: and there went out a fame of him through all the region round about.

15. And he taught in their synagogues, being glorified of all.

16. And he came to Nazareth, where he had been brought up: and, as his custom was, he went into the synagogue on the sabbath day, and stood up for to read.

17. And there was delivered unto him the book of the prophet Esaias. And when he had opened the book, he found the place where it was written,

18. The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the Gospel to the poor: he hath sent me to heal the brokenhearted, to preach deliverance to the captives, and recovering of sight to the blind, to set at liberty them that are bruised,

19. To preach the acceptable year of the Lord.

20. And he closed the book, and he gave it again to the minister, and sat down. And the eyes of all them that were in the synagogue were fastened on him.

21. And he began to say unto them, This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears.

ORIGEN. The Lord having overcome the tempter, power was added to Him, i. e. as far as regards the manifestation of it. Hence it is said, And Jesus returned in the power of the Spirit.

BEDE. By the power of the Spirit he means shewing forth of miracles.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now He performed miracles not from any external power, and from having as it were the acquired grace of the Holy Spirit, as other saints, but rather as being by nature the Son of God, and partaking of all things which are the Father’s, He exercises as by His own power and operation that grace which is of the Holy Spirit. But it was right that from that time He should become known, and that the mystery of His humanity should shine forth among those who were of the seed of Israel. It therefore follows, And his fame went out.

BEDE. And because wisdom belongs to teaching, but power to works, both are joined here, as it follows, And he taught in the synagogue.

Synagogue, which is a Greek word, is rendered in Latin congregatio. By this name then the Jews were accustomed to call not only the gathering together of people, but also the house where they met together to hear the word of God; as we call by the name of Church, both the place and the company of the faithful. But there is this difference between the synagogue which is called congregation, and the Church which is interpreted convocation, that flocks and cattle, and any thing else can be gathered together in one, but only rational beings can be called together. Accordingly the Apostolical doctors thought right to call a people which was distinguished by the superior dignity of a new grace rather by the name of Church, than Synagogue. But rightly also was the fact of His being magnified by those present proved, by actual evidence of word and deed, as it follows, And he was magnified by all.

ORIGEN. But you must not think that they only were happy, and that you are deprived of Christ’s teaching. For now also throughout the world He teaches through His instruments, and is now more glorified by all men, than at that time when those only in one province were gathered together.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He communicates the knowledge of Himself to those among whom He was brought up according to the flesh. As it follows, And he came to Nazareth.

THEOPHYLACT. That He might teach us to benefit and instruct first our brethren, then to extend our kindness to the rest of our friends.

BEDE. They flocked together on the Sabbath day in the synagogues, that, resting from all worldly occupations, they might set themselves down with a quiet mind to meditate on the precepts of the Law. Hence it follows, And he entered as was his custom on the Sabbath day into the synagogue.

AMBROSE. The Lord in every thing so humbled Himself to obedience, that He did not despise even the office of a reader, as it follows, And he rose up to read, and there was delivered unto him the book, &c. He received the book indeed, that He might shew Himself to be the same who spoke in the Prophets, and that He might stop the blasphemies of the wicked, who say that there is one God of the Old Testament, another of the New; or who say that Christ had His beginning from a virgin. For how did He begin from a virgin, who spoke before that virgin was?

ORIGEN. He opens not the book by chance, and finds a chapter containing a prophecy of Himself, but by the providence of God. Hence it follows, And when he had opened the book, he found the place, &c. (Is. 61:1.)

ATHANASIUS. (Orat. 2. cont. Arian.) He says this to explain to us the cause of the revelation made to the world, and of His taking upon Him the human nature. For as the Son, though He is the giver of the Spirit, does not refuse to confess as man that by the Spirit He casts out devils, so, inasmuch as He was made man, He does not refuse to say, The Spirit of the Lord is upon me.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. In like manner we confess Him to have been anointed, inasmuch as He took upon Him our flesh, as it follows, Because he hath anointed me. For the Divine nature is not anointed, but that which is cognate to us. So also when He says that He was sent, we must suppose Him speaking of His human nature. For it follows, He hath sent me to preach the gospel to the poor.

AMBROSE. You see the Trinity coeternal and perfect. The Scripture speaks of Jesus as perfect God and perfect man. It speaks of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, who was shewn to be a cooperator, when in a bodily form as a dove He descended upon Christ.

ORIGEN. By the poor He means the Gentile nations, for they were poor, possessing nothing at all, having neither God, nor Law, nor Prophets, nor justice, and the other virtues.

AMBROSE. Or, He is anointed all over with spiritual oil, and heavenly virtue, that He might enrich the poverty of man’s condition with the everlasting treasure of His resurrection.

BEDE. He is sent also to preach the Gospel to the poor, saying, Blessed are the poor, for yours is the kingdom of heaven.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For perhaps to the poor in spirit He declares in these words, that among all the gifts which are obtained through Christ, upon them was bestowed a free gift. It follows, To heal the broken hearted. He calls those broken hearted, who are weak, of an infirm mind, and unable to resist the assaults of the passions, and to them He promises a healing remedy.

BASIL. (non occ.) Or, He came to heal the broken hearted, i. e. to afford a remedy to those that have their heart broken by Satan through sin, because beyond all other things sin lays prostrate the human heart.

BEDE. Or, because it is written, A broken and a contrite heart God will not despise. (Ps. 51:17.) He says therefore, that He is sent to heal the broken hearted, as it is written, Who heals the broken hearted. (Ps. 147:3.)

It follows, And to preach deliverance to the captives.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Ps. 125.) The word captivity has many meanings. There is a good captivity, which St. Paul speaks of when he says, Bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ. (2 Cor. 10:5.) There is a bad captivity also, of which it is said, Leading captive silly women laden with sins. (2 Tim. 3:6.) There is a captivity present to the senses, that is by our bodily enemies. But the worst captivity is that of the mind, of which he here speaks. For sin exercises the worst of all tyrannies, commanding to do evil, and destroying them that obey it. From this prison of the soul Christ lets us free.

THEOPHYLACT. But these things may be understood also of the dead, who being taken captive have been loosed from the dominion of hell by the resurrection of Christ. It follows, And recovering of sight to the blind.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For the darkness which the Devil has spread over the human heart, Christ the Sun of Righteousness has removed, making men, as the Apostle says, children not of night and darkness, but of light and the day. (1 Thess. 5:5.) For they who one time wandered have discovered the path of the righteous. It follows, To set at liberty them that are bruised.

ORIGEN. For what had been so shattered and dashed about as man, who was set at liberty by Jesus and healed?

BEDE. Or, to set at liberty them that are bruised; i. e. to relieve those who had been heavy laden with the intolerable burden of the Law.

ORIGEN. But all these things were mentioned first, in order that after the recovery of sight from blindness, after deliverance from captivity, after being healed of divers wounds, we might come to the acceptable year of the Lord. As it follows, To preach the acceptable year of the Lord. Some say that, according to the simple meaning of the word, the Saviour preached the Gospel throughout Judæa in one year, and that this is what is meant by preaching the acceptable year of the Lord. Or, the acceptable year of the Lord is the whole time of the Church, during which while present in the body, it is absent from the Lord.

BEDE. For not only was that year acceptable in which our Lord preached, but that also in which the Apostle preaches, saying, Behold, now is the accepted time. (2 Cor. 6:2.) After the acceptable year of the Lord, he adds, And the day of retribution;a that is, the final retribution, when the Lord shall give to every one according to his work.

AMBROSE. Or, by the acceptable year of the Lord, he means this day extended through endless ages, which knows of no return to a world of labour, and grants to men everlasting reward and rest. It follows, And he closed the book, and he gave it again.

BEDE. He read the book to those who were present to hear Him, but having read it, He returned it to the minister; for while He was in the world He spoke openly, teaching in the synagogues and in the temple; but about to return to heaven, He committed the office of preaching the Gospel to those who from the beginning were eye-witnesses and ministers of the word. He read standing, because while explaining those Scriptures which were written of Him, He condescended to work in the flesh; but having returned the book, He sits down, because He restored Himself to the throne of heavenly rest. For standing is the part of the workman, but sitting of one who is resting or judging. So also let the preacher of the word rise up and read and work and preach, and sit down, i. e. wait for the reward of rest. But He opens the book and reads, because sending the Spirit, He taught His Church all truth; having shut the book, He returned it to the minister, because all things were not to be said unto all, but He committed the word to the teacher to be dispensed according to the capacity of the hearers. It follows, And the eyes of all in the synagogue were fastened on him.

ORIGEN. And now also if we will, our eyes can look upon the Saviour. For when you direct your whole heart to wisdom, truth, and the contemplation of the only-begotten Son of God, your eyes behold Jesus.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But then He turned the eyes of all men upon Him, wondering how He knew the writing which He had never learnt. But since it was the custom of the Jews to say that the prophecies spoken of Christ are completed either in certain of their chiefs, i. e. their kings, or in some of their holy prophets, the Lord made this announcement; as it follows, But he began to say unto them that this Scripture is fulfilled.

BEDE. Because, in fact, as that Scripture had foretold, the Lord was both doing great things, and preaching greater.

4:22–27

22. And all bare him witness, and wondered at the gracious words which proceeded out of his mouth. And they said, Is not this Joseph’s son?

23. And he said unto them, Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, Physician, heal thyself: whatsoever we have heard done in Capernaum, do

also here in thy country.

24. And he said, Verily I say unto you, No prophet is accepted in his own country.

25. But I tell you of a truth, many widows were in Israel in the days of Elias, when the heaven was shut up three years and six months, when great famine was throughout all the land;

26. But unto none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta, a city of Sidon, unto a woman that was a widow.

27. And many lepers were in Israel in the time of Eliseus the prophet; and none of them was cleansed, saving Naaman the Syrian.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 48. in Matt.) When our Lord came to Nazareth, He refrains from miracles, lest He should provoke the people to greater malice. But He sets before them His teaching no less wonderful than His miracles. For there was a certain ineffable grace in our Saviour’s words which softened the hearts of the hearers. Hence it is said, And they all bare him witness.

BEDE. They bare Him witness that it was truly He, as He had said, of whom the prophet had spoken.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But foolish men though wondering at the power of His words little esteemed Him because of His reputed father. Hence it follows, And they said, Is not this the son of Joseph?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But what prevents Him from filling men with awe, though He were the Son as was supposed of Joseph? Do you not see the divine miracles, Satan already prostrate, men released from their sickness?

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For though after a long time and when He had begun to shew forth His miracles, He came to them; they did not receive Him, but again were inflamed with envy. Hence it follows, And he said unto them, Ye will surely say unto me this proverb, Physician, heal thyself.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It was a common proverb among the Hebrews, invented as a reproach, for men used to cry out against infirm physicians, Physician, heal thyself.

GLOSS. (ordin.) It was as if they said, We have heard that you performed many cures in Capernaum; cure also thyself, i. e. Do likewise in your own city, where you were nourished and brought up.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. lib. ii. 42.) But since St. Luke mentions that great things had been already done by Him, which he knows he had not yet related, what is more evident than that he knowingly anticipated the relation of them. For he had not proceeded so far beyond our Lord's baptism as that he should be supposed to have forgotten that he had not yet related any of those things which were done in Capernaum.

AMBROSE. But the Saviour purposely excuses Himself for not working miracles in His own country, that no one might suppose that love of country is a thing to be lightly esteemed by us. For it follows, But he says, Verily I say unto you, that no prophet is accepted in his own country.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He says, You wish me to work many miracles among you, in whose country I have been brought up, but I am aware of a very common failing in the minds of many. To a certain extent it always happens, that even the very best things are despised when they fall to a man's lot, not scantily, but ever at his will. So it happens also with respect to men. For a friend who is ever at hand, does not meet with the respect due to him.

BEDE. Now that Christ is called a Prophet in the Scriptures, Moses bears witness, saying, God shall raise up a Prophet unto you from among your brethren. (Deut. 18:15.)

AMBROSE. But this is given for an example, that in vain can you expect the aid of Divine mercy, if you grudge to others the fruits of their virtue. The Lord despises the envious, and withdraws the miracles of His power from them that are jealous of His divine blessings in others. For our Lord's Incarnation is an evidence of His divinity, and His invisible things are proved to us by those which are visible. See then what evils envy produces. For envy a country is deemed unworthy of the works of its citizen, which was worthy of the conception of the Son of God.

ORIGEN. As far as Luke's narrative is concerned, our Lord is not yet said to have worked any miracle in Capernaum. For before He came to Capernaum, He is said to have lived at Nazareth. I cannot but think therefore that in these words, "whatsoever we have heard done in Capernaum," there lies a mystery concealed, and that Nazareth is a type of the Jews, Capernaum of the Gentiles. For the time will come when the people of Israel shall say, "The things which thou hast shewn to the whole world, shew also to us." Preach thy word to the people of Israel, that then at least, when the fulness of the Gentiles has entered, all Israel may be saved. Our Saviour seems to me to have well answered, No prophet is accepted in his own country, but rather according to the type than the letter; though neither was Jeremiah accepted in Anathoth his country, nor the rest of the Prophets. But it seems rather to be meant that we should say, that the people of the circumcision were the countrymen of all the Prophets. And the Gentiles indeed accepted the prophecy of Jesus Christ, esteeming Moses and the Prophets who preached of Christ, far higher than they who would not from these receive Jesus.

AMBROSE. By a very apt comparison the arrogance of envious citizens is put to shame, and our Lord's conduct shewn to agree with the ancient Scriptures. For it follows, But I tell you of a truth, many widows were in Israel in the days of Elias: not that the days were his, but that he performed his works in them.

CHRYSOSTOM. He himself, an earthly angel, a heavenly man, who had neither house, nor food, nor clothing like others, carries the keys of the heavens on his tongue. And this is what follows, When the heaven was shut. But as soon as he had closed the heavens and made the earth barren, hunger reigned and bodies wasted away, as it follows, when there was a famine through the land.

BASIL. (Hom. 2. de jejun. Hom. de fame.) For when he beheld the great disgrace that arose from universal plenty, he brought a famine that the people might fast, by which he checked their sin which was exceeding great. But crows were made the ministers of food to the righteous, which are wont to steal the food of others.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Pet. et Eli.) But when the stream was dried up by which the cup of the righteous man was filled, God said, Go to Sarepta, a city of Sidon; there I wall command a widow woman to feed you. As it follows, But to none of them was Elias sent, save unto Sarepta, a city of Sidon, unto a woman that was a widow. And this was brought to pass by a particular appointment of God. For God made him go a long journey, as far as Sidon, in order that having seen the famine of the country he should ask for rain from the Lord. But there were many rich men at that time, but none of them did any thing like the widow. For in the respect shewn by the woman toward the prophet, consisted her riches not of lands, but of good will.

AMBROSE. But he says in a mystery, “In the days of Elias,” because Elias brought the day to them who saw in his works the light of spiritual grace, and so the heaven was opened to them that beheld the divine mystery, but was shut when there was famine, because there was no fruitfulness in acknowledging God. But in that widow to whom Elias was sent was prefigured a type of the Church.

ORIGEN. For when a famine came upon the people of Israel, i. e. of hearing the word of God, a prophet came to a widow, of whom it is said, For the desolate hath many more children than she which hath an husband; (Isa. 54:1, Gal. 4:27.) and when he had come, he multiplies her bread and her nourishment.

BEDE. Sidonia signifies a vain pursuit, Sarepta fire, or scarcity of bread. By all which things the Gentiles are signified, who, given up to vain pursuits, (following gain and worldly business,) were suffering from the flames of fleshly lusts, and the want of spiritual bread, until Elias, (i. e. the word of prophecy,) now that the interpretation of the Scriptures had ceased because of the faithlessness of the Jews, came to the Church, that being received into the hearts of believers he might feed and refresh them.

BASIL. (Hom. in div.) Every widowed soul, bereft of virtue and divine knowledge, as soon as she receives the divine word, knowing her own failings, learns to nourish it with the bread of virtue, and to water the teaching of virtue from the fountain of life.

ORIGEN. He cites also another similar example, adding, And there were many lepers in Israel at the time of Eliseus the Prophet, and none of them were cleansed but Naaman the Syrian, who indeed was not of Israel.

AMBROSE. Now in a mystery the people pollute the Church, that another people might succeed, gathered together from foreigners, leprous indeed at first before it is baptized in the mystical stream, but which after the sacrament of baptism, washed from the stains of body and soul, begins to be a virgin without spot or wrinkle.

BEDE. For Naaman, which means beautiful, represents the Gentile people, who is ordered to be washed seven times, because that baptism saves which the seven-fold Spirit renews. His flesh after washing began to appear as a child’s, because grace like a mother begets all to one childhood, or because he is conformed to Christ, of whom it is said, Unto us a Child is born. (Isa. 9:6.)

28. And all they in the synagogue, when they heard these things, were filled with wrath,

29. And rose up, and thrust him out of the city, and led him unto the brow of the hill whereon their city was built, that they might cast him down headlong.

30. But he passing through the midst of them went his way.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He convicted them of their evil intentions, and therefore they are enraged, and hence what follows, And all they in the synagogue when they heard these things were filled with wrath. Because He had said, This day is this prophecy fulfilled, they thought that He compared Himself to the prophets, and are therefore enraged, and expel Him out of their city, as it follows, And they rose up, and cast him out.

AMBROSE. It can not be wondered at that they lost their salvation who cast the Saviour out of their city. But the Lord who taught His Apostles by the example of Himself to be all things to all men, neither repels the willing, nor chooses the unwilling; neither struggles against those who cast Him out, nor refuses to hear those who supplicate Him. But that conduct was the result of no slight enmity, which, forgetful of the feelings of fellow citizens, converts the causes of love into the bitterest hatred. For when the Lord Himself was extending His blessings among the people, they began to inflict injuries upon Him, as it follows, And they led him unto the brow of the hill, that they might cast him down.

BEDE. Worse are the Jewish disciples than their master the Devil. For he says, Cast thyself down; they actually attempt to cast Him down. But Jesus having suddenly changed His mind, or seized with astonishment, went away, since He still reserves for them a place of repentance. Hence it follows, He passing through the midst of them went his way.

CHRYSOSTOM. (48. in Joann.) Herein He shews both His human nature and His divine. To stand in the midst of those who were plotting against Him, and not be seized, betokened the loftiness of His divinity; but His departure declared the mystery of the dispensation, i. e. His incarnation.

AMBROSE. At the same time we must understand that this bodily endurance was not necessary, but voluntary. When He wills, He is taken, when He wills, He escapes. For how could He be held by a few who was not held by a whole people? But He would not have the impiety to be the deed of the many, in order that by a few indeed He might be afflicted, but might die for the whole world. Moreover, He had still rather heal the Jews than destroy them, that by the fruitless issue of their rage they might be dissuaded from wishing what they could not accomplish.

BEDE. The hour of His Passion had not yet come, which was to be on the preparation of the Passover, nor had He yet come to the place of His Passion, which not at Nazareth, but at Jerusalem, was prefigured by the blood of the victims; nor had He chosen this kind of death, of whom it was prophesied that He should be crucified by the world.

4:31–37

31. And came down to Capernaum, a city of Galilee, and taught them on the sabbath days.

32. And they were astonished at his doctrine: for his word was with power.

33. And in the synagogue there was a man, which had a spirit of an unclean devil, and cried out with a loud voice,

34. Saying, Let us alone; what have we to do with thee, thou Jesus of Nazareth? art thou come to destroy us? I know thee who thou art; the Holy One of God.

35. And Jesus rebuked him, saying, Hold thy peace, and come out of him. And when the devil had thrown him in the midst, he came out of him, and hurt him not.

36. And they were all amazed, and spake among themselves, saying, What a word is this! for with authority and power he commandeth the unclean spirits, and they come out.

37. And the fame of him went out into every place of the country round about.

AMBROSE. Neither indignation at their treatment, nor displeasure at their wickedness, caused our Lord to abandon Judæa, but unmindful of His injuries, and remembering mercy, at one time by teaching, at another by healing, He softens the hearts of this unbelieving people, as it is said, And he went down to Capernaum.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For although He knew that they were disobedient and hard of heart, He nevertheless visits them, as a good Physician tries to heal those who are suffering from a mortal disease. But He taught them boldly in the synagogues, as Esaias saith, I have not spoken in secret, in a dark place of the earth. (Isa. 45:19.) On the sabbath day also He disputed with them, because they were at leisure. They wondered therefore at the mightiness of His teaching, His virtue, and His power, as it follows, And they were astonished at his doctrine, for his word was with power. That is, not soothing, but urging and exciting them to seek salvation. Now the Jews supposed Christ to be one of the saints or prophets. But in order that they might esteem Him higher, He passes beyond the prophetic limits. For he said not, “Thus saith the Lord,” but being the Master of the Law, He uttered things which were above the Law, changing the letter to the truth, and the figures to the spiritual meaning.

BEDE. The word of the teacher is with power, when he performs that which he teaches. But he who by his actions belies what he preaches is despised.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But He generally intermingles with His teaching the performance of mighty works. For those whose reason does not incline to knowledge, are roused by the manifestation of miracles. Hence it follows, And there was in the synagogue a man which had a devil.

AMBROSE. The work of divine healing commenced on the sabbath, signifying thereby that he began anew where the old creation ceased, in order that He might declare at the very beginning that the Son of God was not under the Law, but above the Law. Rightly also He began on the sabbath, that He might shew Himself the Creator, who interweaves His works one within another, and follows up that which He had before begun; just as a builder determining to reconstruct a house, begins to pull down the old one, not from the foundation, but from the top, so as to apply his hand first to that part, where he had before left off. Holy men may through the word of God deliver from evil spirits, but to bid the dead rise again, is the work of Divine power alone.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the Jews spoke falsely of the glory of Christ, saying, He casteth out devils by Beelzebub the prince of the devils. To remove this charge, when the devils came beneath His invincible power, and endured not the Divine Presence, they sent forth a savage cry, as it follows: And he cried with a loud voice, saying, Let us alone; what have we to do with thee, &c.

BEDE. As if he said, Abstain a while from troubling me, thou who hast no fellowship with our designs.

AMBROSE. It ought not to shock any one that the devil is mentioned in this book as the first to have spoken the name of Jesus of Nazareth. For Christ received not from him that name which an Angel brought down from heaven to the Virgin. The devil is of such effrontery, that he is the first to use a thing among men and bring it as something new to them, that he may strike people with terror at his power. Hence it follows: For I know thee who thou art, the Holy One of God.

ATHANASIUS. (ad Epise. Æg. et Lib.) He spoke of Him not as a Holy One of God, as if He were like to the other saints, but as being in a remarkable manner the Holy One, with the addition of the article. For He is by nature holy by partaking of whom all others are called holy. Nor again did He speak this as if He knew it, but He pretended to know it.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (et Tit. Bost.) For the devils thought by praises of this sort to make Him a lover of vainglory, that He might be induced to abstain from opposing or destroying them by way of grateful return.

CHRYSOSTOM. The devil wished also to disturb the order of things, and to deprive the Apostles of their dignity, and to incline the many to obey Him.

ATHANASIUS. (ut sup.) Although he confessed the truth he controlled his tongue, lest with the truth he should also publish his own disgrace, which should teach us not to care for such, although they speak the truth, for we who know the divine Scripture, must not be taught by the devil, as it follows: And Jesus rebuked him, saying, Be silent, &c.

BEDE. But by the permission of God, the man who was to be delivered from the devil is thrown into the midst, that the power of the Saviour being manifested might bring over many to the way of salvation. As it follows: And when he had thrown him in the midst. But this seems to be opposed to Mark, who says, And the unclean spirit tearing him, and crying with a loud voice, went out of him, unless we understand that Mark meant by tearing him the same as Luke by these words, And when he had thrown him in the midst, so that what follows, and hurt him not, might be understood to mean, that that twisting of limbs, and sore troubling, did not weaken him, as is often the case when devils depart from a man, leaving him with limbs cut and torn off. Well then do they wonder at such complete restoration of health. For it follows: And fear came upon all.

THEOPHYLACT. As if they said, What is this word by which he commands, Go out, and he went out?

BEDE. Holy men were able by the word of God to cast out devils, but the Word Himself does mighty works by His own power.

AMBROSE. In a mystery, the man in the synagogue with the unclean spirit is the Jewish people, which being fast bound in the wiles of the devil, defiled its vaunted cleanliness of body by the pollution of the heart. And truly it had an unclean spirit, because it had lost the Holy Spirit. For the devil entered whence Christ had gone out.

THEOPHYLACT. We must know also that many now have devils, namely, such as fulfil the desires of devils, as the furious have the dæmon of anger; and so of the rest. But the Lord came into the synagogue when the thoughts of the man were collected, and then says to the dæmon that dwelt there, Hold thy peace, and immediately throwing him into the middle he departs out of him. For it becomes not a man always to be angry, (that is, like the brutes,) nor always to be without anger, (for that is want of feeling,) but he must take the middle path, and have anger against what is evil; and so the man is thrown into the midst when the unclean spirit departs from him.

4:38–39

38. And he arose out of the synagogue, and entered into Simon’s house. And Simon’s wife’s mother was taken with a great fever: and they besought him for her.

39. And he stood over her, and rebuked the fever: and it left her: and immediately she arose and ministered unto them.

AMBROSE. Luke having first introduced a man delivered from an evil spirit, goes on to relate the healing of a woman. For our Lord had come to heal each sex, and he ought first to be healed who was first created. Hence it is said, And he arose out of the synagogue, and entered into Simon’s house.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 27. in Matt.) For He honoured His disciples by dwelling among them, and so making them the more zealous.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now see how Christ abides in the house of a poor man, suffering poverty of His own will for our sakes, that we might learn to visit the poor, and despise not the destitute and needy. It follows: And Simon's wife's mother was taken with a great fever: and they besought him for her.

BEDE. At one time at the request of others, at another of his own accord, our Saviour cures the sick, shewing that He is far aloof from the passions of sinners, and ever grants the prayer of the faithful, and what they in themselves little understand He either makes intelligible, or forgives their not understanding it. As, Who understands his errors? Lord, cleanse me from my secret faults. (Ps. 19:12.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Because Matthew is silent on the point of asking Him, he does not differ from Luke, or it matters not, for one Gospel had brevity in view, the other accurate research. It follows: And he stood over her, &c.

ORIGEN. Here Luke speaks figuratively, as of a command given to a sensible being, saying, that the fever was commanded, and neglected not the work of Him who commanded it. Hence it follows: And she arose, and ministered unto them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) For since the disease was curable, He shewed His power by the manner of the cure, doing what art could never do. For after the allaying of the fever, the patient needs much time ere he be restored to his former health, but at this time all took place at once.

AMBROSE. But if we weigh these things with deeper thoughts, we shall consider the health of the mind as well as the body; that the mind which was assailed by the wiles of the devil may be released first. Eve was not a hungered before the serpent beguiled her, and therefore against the author of evil himself ought the medicine of salvation first to operate. Perhaps also in that woman as in a type our flesh languished under the various fevers of crimes, nor should I say that the fever of love was less than that of bodily heat.

BEDE. For if we say that a man released from the devil represents morally the mind cleansed from unclean thoughts, consequently a woman vexed by fever, but cured at our Lord’s command, represents the flesh controlled by the rules of continence in the fury of its own lust.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Let us therefore receive Jesus. For when He has visited us, we carry Him in our heart and mind; He will then extinguish the flames of our unlicensed pleasures, and will make us whole, so that we minister unto Him, that is, do things well-pleasing to Him.

4:40–41

40. Now when the sun was setting, all they that had any sick with divers diseases brought them unto him; and he laid his hands on every one of them, and healed them.

41. And devils also came out of many, crying out, and saying, Thou art Christ the Son of God. And he rebuking them suffered them not to speak: for they knew that he was Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. We must observe the zeal of the multitude, who after the sun had set bring their sick unto Him, not deterred by the lateness of the day; as it is said, Now when the sun was setting, they brought their sick.

ORIGEN. It was ordered about sun-set, that is, when the day was gone, that they should bring them out, either because during the day they were employed about other things, or because they thought that it was not lawful to heal on the sabbath. But He healed them, as it follows, But he laid his hands upon every one of them.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But although as God He was able to drive away diseases by His word, He nevertheless touches them, shewing that His flesh was powerful to apply remedies, since it was the flesh of God; for as fire, when applied to a brazen vessel, imprints on it the effect of its own heat, so the omnipotent Word of God, when He united to Himself in real assumption a living virgin temple, endued with understanding, implanted in it a participation of His own power. May He also touch us, nay rather may we touch Him, that He may deliver us from the infirmities of our souls as well as the assaults of the evil spirit and pride! For it follows, And devils also came out.

BEDE. The devils confess the Son of God, and as it is afterwards said, they knew him to be Christ; for when the devil saw Him distressed by fasting, he perceived Him to be truly man, but when he prevailed not in his trial he doubted whether or not He were the Son of God, but now by the power of Christ's miracles he either perceived or suspected Him to be the Son of God. He did not then persuade the Jews to crucify Him because he thought Him not to be Christ or the Son of God, but because he did not foresee that by this death he himself would be condemned. Of this mystery hidden from the world the Apostle says, that none of the princes of this world knew, for if they had known they would never have crucified the Lord of Glory. (1 Cor. 2:8.)

CHRYSOSTOM. But in what follows, And he rebuking them suffered them not to speak, mark the humility of Christ, who would not let the unclean spirits make Him manifest. For it was not fit that they should usurp the glory of the Apostolical office, nor did it become the mysteries of Christ to be made public by impure tongues.

THEOPHYLACT. Because, "praise is not seemly in the mouth of a sinner." Or, because He did not wish to inflame the envy of the Jews by being praised of all.

BEDE. But the Apostles themselves are commanded to be silent concerning Him, lest by proclaiming His divine Majesty, the dispensation of His Passion should be delayed.

4:42–44

42. And when it was day, he departed and went into a desert place: and the people sought him, and came unto him, and stayed him, that he should not depart from them.

43. And he said unto them, I must preach the kingdom of God to other cities also: for therefore am I sent.

44. And he preached in the synagogues of Galilee.

CHRYSOSTOM. When he had bestowed sufficient favour upon the people by miracles, it was necessary for Him to depart. For miracles are always thought greater when the worker is gone, since they themselves are then the more heeded, and have in their turn a voice; as it is said, But when it was day, he departed, and went.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Victor Antiochenus.) He went also into the desert, as Mark says, and prayed; not that he needed prayer, but as an example to us of good works.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 25. in Matt.) The Pharisees indeed, seeing how that the miracles themselves published His fame, were offended at His power. But the people hearing His words, assented and followed; as it is said, And the multitudes sought him, not indeed any of the chief priests, or scribes, but all those who had not been blackened with the dark stain of malice, and preserved their consciences unhurt.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ut sup.) Now when Mark says that the Apostles came to him, saying, All seek thee, but Luke, that the people came, there is no difference between them, for the people came to Him following in the footsteps of the Apostles. But the Lord rejoiced in being held back, yet bid them let Him go, that others also might partake of His teaching, as the time of His presence would not last long; as it follows, And he said unto them, I must preach the kingdom of God to other cities also, &c. Mark says, Unto this I came, shewing the loftiness of His divine nature, and His voluntary emptying Himself of it. But Luke says, Unto this am I sent, shewing His incarnation, and calling also the decree of the Father, a sending Him forth; and one simply says, To preach, the other added, the kingdom of God, which is Christ Himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 48. in Matt.) Observe also, that He might, by abiding in the same place, have drawn all men over to Himself. He did not however do so, giving us an example to go about and seek those who are perishing, as the shepherd his lost sheep, and as the physician the sick. For by recovering one soul, we may be able to blot out a thousand sins. Hence also it follows, And he was preaching in the synagogues of Galilee. He frequently indeed went to the synagogues, to shew them that He was no deceiver. For if He were constantly to dwell in the desolate places, they would spread abroad that He was concealing Himself.

BEDE. But if the sun-setting mystically expresses the death of our Lord, the returning day denotes His resurrection, (the light of which being made manifest, He is sought for by the multitudes of believers, and being found in the desert of the Gentiles He is held back by them, lest He should depart;) especially as this took place on the first day of the week, on which day the Resurrection was celebrated.

CHAPTER 5

5:1–3

1. And it came to pass, that, as the people pressed upon him to hear the word of God, he stood by the lake of Gennesaret,

2. And saw two ships standing by the lake: but the fishermen were gone out of them, and were washing their nets.

3. And he entered into one of the ships, which was Simon’s, and prayed him that he would thrust out a little from the land. And he sat down, and taught the people out of the ship.

AMBROSE. When the Lord had performed many and various kinds of cures, the multitude began to heed neither time nor place in their desire to be healed. The evening came, they followed; a lake is before them, they still press on; as it is said, And it came to pass, as the people pressed upon him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 25. in Matt.) For they clung to Him with love and admiration, and longed to keep Him with them. For who would depart while He performed such miracles? who would not be content to see only His face, and the mouth that uttered such things? Nor as performing miracles only was He an object of admiration, but His whole appearance was overflowing with grace. Therefore when He speaks, they listen to Him in silence, interrupting not the chain of His discourse; for it is said, that they might hear the word of God, &c. It follows, And he stood near the lake of Gennesaret.

BEDE. The lake of Gennesaret is said to be the same as the sea of Galilee or the sea of Tiberias; but it is called the sea of Galilee from the adjacent province, the sea of Tiberias from a neighbouring city. Gennesaret however, is the name given it from the nature of the lake itself, (which is thought from its crossing waves to raise a breeze upon itself,) being the Greek expression for “making a breeze to itself.” (quasi a γιννάω et ἀὴρ.) For the water is not steady like that of a lake, but constantly agitated by the breezes blowing over it. It is sweet to the taste, and wholesome to drink. In the

Hebrew tongue, any extent of water, whether it be sweet or salt, is called a sea.

THEOPHYLACT. But the Lord seeks to avoid glory the more it followed Him, and therefore separating Himself from the multitude, He entered into a ship, as it is said, And he saw two ships standing near the lake: but the fishermen were gone out of them, and were washing their nets.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was a sign of leisure, but according to Matthew He finds them mending their nets. For so great was their poverty, that they patched up their old nets, not being able to buy new ones. But our Lord was very desirous to collect the multitudes, that none might remain behind, but they might all behold Him face to face; He therefore enters into a ship, as it is said, And he entered into a ship, which was Simon's, and prayed him.

THEOPHYLACT. Behold the gentleness of Christ; He asks Peter; and the willingness of Peter, who was obedient in all things.

CHRYSOSTOM. After having performed many miracles, He again commences His teaching, and being on the sea, He fishes for those who were on the shore. Hence it follows, And he sat down and taught the people out of the ship.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 37.) Condescending to all, in order that He might draw forth a fish from the deep, i. e. man swimming in the everchanging scenes and bitter storms of this life.

BEDE. Now mystically, the two ships represent circumcision and uncircumcision. The Lord sees these, because in each people He knows who are His, and by seeing, i. e. by a merciful visitation, He brings them nearer the tranquillity of the life to come. The fishermen are the doctors of the Church, because by the net of faith they catch us, and bring us as it were ashore to the land of the living. But these nets are at one time spread out for catching fish, at another washed and folded up. For every time is not fitted for teaching, but at one time the teacher must speak with the tongue, and at another time we must discipline ourselves. The ship of Simon is the primitive Church, of which St. Paul says, He that wrought effectually in Peter to the Apostleship of circumcision. (Gal. 2:8.) The ship is well called one, for in the multitude of believers there was one heart and one soul. (Acts 4:32.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. 1. 2. c. 2.) From which ship He taught the multitude, for by the authority of the Church He teaches the Gentiles. But the Lord entering the ship, and asking Peter to put off a little from the land, signifies that we must be moderate in our words to the multitude, that they may be neither taught earthly things, nor from earthly things rush into the depths of the sacraments. Or, the Gospel must first be preached to the neighbouring countries of the Gentiles, that (as He afterwards says, Launch out into the deep,) He might command it to be preached afterwards to the more distant nations.

5:4–7

4. Now when he had left speaking, he said unto Simon, Launch out into the deep, and let down your nets for a draught.

5. And Simon answering said unto him, Master, we have toiled all the night, and have taken nothing: nevertheless at thy word I will let down the net.

6. And when they had this done, they inclosed a great multitude of fishes: and their net brake.

7. And they beckoned unto their partners, which were in the other ship, that they should come and help them. And they came, and filled both the ships, so that they began to sink.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Having sufficiently taught the people, He returns again to His mighty works, and by the employment of fishing fishes for His disciples. Hence it follows, When he had left off speaking, he said unto Simon, Launch out into the deep, and let down your nets for a draught.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 6. in Matt.) For in His condescension to men, He called the wise men by a star, the fishermen by their art of fishing.

THEOPHYLACT. Peter did not refuse to comply, as it follows, And Simon answering said unto him, Master, we have toiled all night and have taken nothing. He did not go on to say, “I will not hearken to thee, nor expose myself to additional labour,” but rather adds, Nevertheless, at thy word I will let down the net. But our Lord, since he had taught the people out of the ship, left not the master of the ship without reward, but conferred on him a double kindness, giving him first a multitude of fishes, and next making him His disciple: as it follows, And when they had done this, they inclosed a great multitude of fishes. They took so many fishes that they could not pull them out, but sought the assistance of their companions; as it follows, But their net brake, and they beckoned to their partners who were in the other ship to come, &c. Peter summons them by a sign, being unable to speak from astonishment at the draught of fishes. We next hear of their assistance, And they came and filled both the ships.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. 4. c. 6.) John seems indeed to speak of a similar miracle, but this is very different from the one he mentions. That took place after our Lord's resurrection at the lake of Tiberias, and not only the time, but the miracle itself is very different. For in the latter the nets being let down on the right side took one hundred and fifty-three fishes, and these of large size, which it was necessary for the Evangelist to mention, because though so large the nets were not broken, and this would seem to have reference to the event which Luke relates, when from the multitude of the fishes the nets were broken.

AMBROSE. Now in a mystery, the ship of Peter, according to Matthew, is beaten about by the waves, (Matt. 8:24.) according to Luke, is filled with fishes, in order that you might understand the Church at first wavering, at last abounding. The ship is not shaken which holds Peter; that is which holds Judas. In each was Peter; but he who trusts in his own merits is disquieted by another's. Let us beware then of a traitor, lest through one we should many of us be tossed about. Trouble is found there where faith is weak, safety here where love is perfect. Lastly, though to others it is commanded, Let down your nets, to Peter alone it is said, Launch out into the deep, i. e. into deep researches. What is so deep, as the knowledge of the Son of God! But what are the nets of the Apostles which are ordered to be let down, but the interweaving of words and certain folds, as it were, of speech, and intricacies of argument, which never let those escape whom they have once caught. And rightly are nets the Apostolical instruments for fishing, which kill not the fish that are caught, but keep them safe, and bring up those that are tossing about in the waves from the depths below to the regions above. But he says, Master, we have toiled the whole night and have caught nothing; for this is not the work of human eloquence but the gift of divine calling. But they who had before caught nothing, at the word of the Lord inclosed a great multitude of fishes.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now this was a figure of the future. For they will not labour in vain who let down the net of evangelical doctrine, but will gather together the shoals of the Gentiles.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Now the circumstance of the nets breaking, and the ships being filled with the multitude of fishes so that they began to sink, signifies that there will be in the Church so great a multitude of carnal men, that unity will be broken up, and it will be split into heresies and schisms.

BEDE. The net is broken, but the fish escape not, for the Lord preserves His own amid the violence of persecutors.

AMBROSE. But the other ship is Judæa, out of which James and John are chosen. These then came from the synagogue to the ship of Peter in the Church, that they might fill both ships. For at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, whether Jew or Greek.

BEDE. Or the other ship is the Church of the Gentiles, which itself also (one ship being not sufficient) is filled with chosen fishes. For the Lord knows who are His, and with Him the number of His elect is sure. And when He finds not in Judæa so many believers as He knows are destined to eternal life, He seeks as it were another ship to receive His fishes, and fills the hearts of the Gentiles also with the grace of faith. And well when the net brake did they call to their assistance the ship of their companions, since the traitor Judas, Simon Magus, Ananias and Sapphira, and many of the disciples, went back. And then Barnabas and Paul were separated for the Apostleship of the Gentiles.

AMBROSE. We may understand also by the other ship another Church, since from one Church several are derived.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But Peter beckons to his companions to help them. For many follow the labours of the Apostles, and first those who brought out the writings of the Gospels, next to whom are the other heads and shepherds of the Gospel, and those skilled in the teaching of the truth.

BEDE. But the filling of these ships goes on until the end of the world. But the fact that the ships, when filled, begin to sink, i. e. become weighed low down in the water; (for they are not sunk, but are in great danger,) the Apostle explains when he says, In the last days perilous times shall come; men shall be lovers of their own selves, &c. (2 Tim. 3:1, 2.) For the sinking of the ships is when men, by vicious habits, fall back into that world from which they have been elected by faith.

5:8–11

8. When Simon Peter saw it, he fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord.

9. For he was astonished, and all that were with him, at the draught of the fishes which they had taken:

10. And so was also James, and John, the sons of Zebedee, which were partners with Simon. And Jesus said unto Simon, Fear not; from henceforth thou shalt catch men.

11. And when they had brought their ships to land, they forsook all, and followed him.

BEDE. Peter was astonished at the divine gift, and the more he feared, the less did he now presume; as it is said, When Simon Peter saw it, he fell down at Jesus' knees, saying, Depart from me; for I am a sinful man, O Lord.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For calling back to his consciousness the crimes he had committed, he is alarmed and trembles, and as being unclean, he believes it impossible he can receive Him who is clean, for he had learnt from the law to distinguish between what is defiled and holy.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. When Christ commanded to let down the nets, the multitude of the fishes taken was just as great as the Lord of the sea and land willed. For the voice of the Word is the voice of power, at whose bidding at the beginning of the world light and the other creatures came forth. At these things Peter wonders, for he was astonished, and all that were with him, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. lib. ii. 17.) He does not mention Andrew by name, who however is thought to have been in that ship, according to the accounts of Matthew and Mark. It follows, And Jesus said unto Simon, Fear not.

AMBROSE. Say thou also, Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord, that God may answer, Fear not. Confess thy sin, and the Lord will pardon thee. See how good the Lord is, who gives so much to men, that they have the power of making alive. As it follows, From henceforth thou shalt catch men.

BEDE. This especially belongs to Peter himself, for the Lord explains to him what this taking of fish means; that in fact as now he takes fishes by the net, so hereafter he will catch men by words. And the whole order of this event shews what is daily going on in the Church, of which Peter is the type.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 14. in Matt.) But mark their faith and obedience. For though they were eagerly engaged in the employment of fishing, yet when they heard the command of Jesus, they delayed not, but forsook all and followed Him. Such is the obedience which Christ demands of us; we must not forego it, even though some great necessity urges us. Hence it follows, And having brought their ships to land.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Matthew and Mark here briefly state the matter, and how it was done. Luke explains it more at large. There seems however to be this difference, that he makes our Lord to have said to Peter only, From henceforth thou shalt catch men, whereas they related it as having been spoken to both the others. But surely it might have been said at first to Peter, when he marvelled at the immense draught of fishes, as Luke suggests, and afterwards to both, as the other two have related it. Or we must understand the event to have taken place as Luke relates, and that the others were not then called by the Lord, but only it was foretold to Peter that he should catch men, not that he should no more be employed in fishing; and hence there is room for supposing that they returned to their fishing, so that afterwards that might happen which Matthew and Mark speak, of. For then the ships were not brought to land, as if with the intention of returning, but they followed Him as calling or commanding them to come. (Matt. 4:20, Mark 1:18.) But if according to John, Peter and Andrew followed Him close by Jordan, how do the other Evangelists say that He found them fishing in Galilee, and called them to the discipleship? Except we understand that they did not see the Lord near Jordan so as to join Him inseparably, but knew only who He was, and marvelling at Him returned to their own.

AMBROSE. But mystically, those whom Peter takes by his word, he claims not as his own booty or his own gift. Depart, he says, from me, O Lord. Fear not then also to ascribe what is thy own to the Lord, for what was His He has given to us.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. c. 2.) Or, Peter speaks in the character of the Church full of carnal men, Depart from me, for I am a sinful man. As if the Church, crowded with carnal men, and almost sunk by their vices, throws off from it, as it were, the rule in spiritual things, wherein the character of Christ chiefly shines forth. For not with the tongue do men tell the good servants of God that they should depart from them, but with the utterance of their deeds and actions they persuade them to go away, that they may not be governed by the good. And yet all the more anxiously do they hasten to pay honours to them, just as Peter testified his respect by falling at the feet of our Lord, but his conduct in saying, Depart from me.

BEDE. But the Lord allays the fears of carnal men, that no one trembling at the consciousness of his guilt, or astonished at the innocence of others, might be afraid to undertake the journey of holiness.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But the Lord did not depart from them, shewing thereby that good and spiritual men, when they are troubled by the wickedness of the many, ought not to wish to abandon their ecclesiastical duties, that they might live as it were a more secure and tranquil life. But the bringing their ships to land, and forsaking all to follow Jesus, may represent the end of time, when those who have clung to Christ shall altogether depart from the storms of this world.

5:12–16

12. And it came to pass, when he was in a certain city, behold a man full of leprosy: who seeing Jesus fell on his face, and besought him, saying, Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean.

13. And he put forth his hand, and touched him, saying, I will: be thou clean. And immediately the leprosy departed from him.

14. And he charged him to tell no man: but go, and shew thyself to the Priest, and offer for thy cleansing, according as Moses commanded, for a testimony unto them.

15. But so much the more went there a fame abroad of him: and great multitudes came together to hear, and to be healed by him of their infirmities.

16. And he withdrew himself into the wilderness, and prayed.

AMBROSE. The fourth miracle after Jesus came to Capernaum was the healing of a leprous man. But since He illumined the fourth day with the sun, and made it more glorious than the rest, we ought to think this work more glorious than those that went before; of which it is said, And it came to pass, when he was in a certain city, behold a man full of leprosy. Rightly no definite place is mentioned where the leprous man was healed, to signify that not one people of any particular city, but all nations were healed.

ATHANASIUS. (Ep. ad Adelph. 3.) Now the leper worshipped the Lord God in His bodily form, and thought not the Word of God to be a creature because of His flesh, nor because He was the Word did he think lightly of the flesh which He put on; nay rather in a created temple he adored the Creator of all things, falling down on his face, as it follows, And when he saw Jesus he fell on his face, and besought him.

AMBROSE. In falling upon his face he marked his humility and modesty, for every one should blush at the stains of his life, but his reverence kept not back his confession, he shews his wound, and asks for a remedy, saying, If thou wilt, thou canst make me clean. Of the will of the Lord he doubted, not from distrust of His mercy, but checked by the consciousness of his own unworthiness. But the confession is one full of devotion and faith, placing all power in the will of the Lord.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For he knew that leprosy yields not to the skill of physicians, but he saw the devils cast out by the Divine authority, and multitudes cured of divers diseases, all which he conceived was the work of the Divine arm.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Let us learn from the words of the leper not to go about seeking the cure of our bodily infirmities, but to commit the whole to the will of God, Who knows what is best for us, and disposes all things as He will.

AMBROSE. He heals in the same manner in which He had been entreated to heal, as it follows, And Jesus put forth his hand, and touched him, &c. The law forbids to touch the leprous man, but He who is the Lord of the law submits not to the law, but makes the law; He did not touch because without touching He was unable to make him clean, but to shew that he was neither subject to the law, nor feared the contagion as man; for He could not be contaminated Who delivered others from the pollution. On the other hand, He touched also, that the leprosy might be expelled by the touch of the Lord, which was wont to contaminate him that touched.

THEOPHYLACT. For His sacred flesh has a healing, and life-giving power, as being indeed the flesh of the Word of God.

AMBROSE. In the words which follow, I will, be thou clean, you have the will, you have also the result of His mercy.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Thes. 12. c. 14.) From majesty alone proceeds the royal command, how then is the Only-begotten counted among the servants, who by His mere will can do all things? We read of God the Father, that He hath done all things whatsoever He pleased. (Ps. 115:3; 135:6.) But He who exercises the power of His Father, how can He differ from Him in nature? Besides, whatsoever things are of the same power, are wont to be of the same substance. Again; let us then admire in these things Christ working both divinely and bodily. For it is of God so to will that all things are done accordingly, but of man to stretch forth the hand. From two natures therefore is perfected one Christ, for that the Word was made flesh.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. 1. in Resur. Christ.) And because the Deity is united with each portion of man, i. e. both soul and body, in each are evident the signs of a heavenly nature. For the body declared the Deity hidden in it, when by touching it afforded a remedy, but the soul, by the mighty power of its will, marked the Divine strength. For as the sense of touch is the property of the body, so the motion of the will of the soul. The soul wills, the body touches.

AMBROSE. He says then, I will, for Photinus, He commands, for Arius, He touches, for Manichæus. But there is nothing intervening between God’s work and His command, that we may see in the inclination of the healer the power of the work. Hence it follows, And immediately the leprosy departed from him. But lest leprosy should become rife among us, let each avoid boasting after the example of our Lord’s humility. For it follows, And he commanded him that he should tell it to no one, that in truth he might teach us that our good deeds are not to be made public, but to be rather concealed, that we should abstain not only from gaining money, but even favour. Or perhaps the cause of His commanding silence was that He thought those to be preferred, who had rather believed of their own accord than from the hope of benefit.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Though the leper was silent, the voice of the transaction itself was sufficient to publish it to all who acknowledged through him the power of the Curer.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 26. in Matt.) And since frequently men, when they are sick, remember God, but when they recover, wax dull, He bids him to always keep God before his eyes, giving glory to God. Hence it follows, But go and shew thyself to the Priest, in order that the leprous man being cleansed might submit himself to the inspection of the Priest, and so by his sanction be counted as healed.

AMBROSE. And that the Priest also should know that not by the order of the law, but by the grace of God above the law, he was cured. And since a sacrifice is commanded by the regulation of Moses, the Lord shews that He does not abrogate the law, but fulfil it. As it follows, And offer for thy cleansing according as Moses commanded.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. l. ii. qu. 3.) He seems here to approve of the sacrifice which had been commanded through Moses, though the Church does not require it. It may therefore be understood to have been commanded, because not as yet had commenced that most holy sacrifice which is His body. For it was not fitting that typical sacrifices should be taken away before that which was typified should be confirmed by the witness of the Apostles' preaching, and the faith of believers.

AMBROSE. Or because the law is spiritual He seems to have commanded a spiritual sacrifice. Hence he said, As Moses commanded. Lastly, he adds, for a testimony unto them. The heretics understand this erroneously, saying, that it was meant as a reproach to the law. But how would he order an offering for cleansing, according to Moses' commandments, if he meant this against the law?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He says then, for a testimony unto them, because this deed makes manifest that Christ in His incomparable excellence is far above Moses. For when Moses could not rid his sister of the leprosy, he prayed the Lord to deliver her. But the Saviour, in His divine power, declared, I will, be thou clean. (Numb. 12:13.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or, for a testimony against them, i. e. as a reproof of them, and a testimony that I respect the law. For now too that I have cured thee, I send thee for the examination of the priests, that thou shouldest bear me witness that I have not played false to the law. And although the Lord in giving out remedies advised telling them to no one, instructing us to avoid pride; yet His fame flew about every where, instilling the miracle into the ears of every one, as it follows, But so much the more went there a fame abroad of him.

BEDE. Now the perfect healing of one brings many multitudes to the Lord, as it follows, And great multitudes came together that they should be healed. For the leprous man that he might shew both his outward and inward cure, even though forbid ceases not, as Mark says, to tell of the benefit ho had received.

GREGORY. (Mor. xxviii. c. 13.) Our Redeemer performs His miracles by day, and passes the night in prayer, as it follows, And he withdrew himself into the wilderness, and prayed, hinting, as it were, to perfect preachers, that as neither they should entirely desert the active life from love of contemplation, so neither should they despise the joys of contemplation from an excess of activity, but in silent thought imbibe that which they might afterwards give back in words to their neighbours.

BEDE. Now that He retired to pray, you would not ascribe to that nature which says, I will, be thou clean, but to that which putting forth the hand touched the leprous man, not that according to Nestorius there is a double person of the Son, but of the same person, as there are two natures, so are there two operations.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (26.) And His works He indeed performed among the people, but He prayed for the most part in the wilderness, sanctioning the liberty of resting a while from labour to hold converse with God with a pure heart. For He needed no change or retirement, since there was nothing which could be relaxed in Him, nor any place in which He might confine Himself, for He was God, but it was that we might clearly know that there is a time for action, a time for each higher occupation.

BEDE. How typically the leprous man represents the whole race of man, languishing with sins full of leprosy, for all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God; (Rom. 3:23.) that so by the hand put forth, i. e. the word of God partaking of human nature, they might be cleansed from the vanity of their old errors, and offer for cleansing their bodies as a living sacrifice.

AMBROSE. But if the word is the healing of leprosy, the contempt of the word is the leprosy of the mind.

THEOPHYLACT. But mark, that after a man has been cleansed he is then worthy to offer this gift, namely, the body and blood of the Lord, which is united to the Divine nature.

5:17–26

17. And it came to pass on a certain day, as he was teaching, that there were Pharisees and doctors of the law sitting by, which were come out of every

town of Galilee, and Judæa, and Jerusalem: and the power of the Lord was present to heal them.

18. And, behold, men brought in a bed a man which was taken with a palsy: and they sought means to bring him in, and to lay him before him.

19. And when they could not find by what way they might bring him in because of the multitude, they went upon the housetop, and let him down through the tiling with his couch into the midst before Jesus.

20. And when he saw their faith, he said unto him, Man, thy sins are forgiven thee.

21. And the Scribes and the Pharisees began to reason, saying, Who is this which speaketh blasphemies? Who can forgive sins, but God alone?

22. But when Jesus perceived their thoughts, he answering said unto them, What reason ye in your hearts?

23. Whether is easier, to say, Thy sins be forgiven thee; or to say, Rise up and walk?

24. But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power upon earth to forgive sins, (he said unto the sick of the palsy,) I say unto thee, Arise, and take up thy couch, and go unto thine house.

25. And immediately he rose up before them, and took up that whereon he lay, and departed to his own house, glorifying God.

26. And they were all amazed, and they glorified God, and were filled with fear, saying, We have seen strange things to day.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Scribes and Pharisees who had become spectators of Christ’s miracles, heard Him also teaching. Hence it is said, And it came to pass on a certain day, as he was teaching, that there were Pharisees sitting by, &c. And the power of the Lord was present to heal them. Not as though He borrowed the power of another, but as God and the Lord He healed by His own inherent power. Now men often become worthy of spiritual gifts, but generally depart from the rule which the giver of the gifts knew. It was not so with Christ, for the divine power went on abounding in giving remedies. But because it was necessary where so great a number of Scribes and Pharisees had come together, that something should be done to attest His power before those men who slighted Him, He performed the miracle on the man with the palsy, who since medical art seemed to fail, was carried by his kinsfolk to a higher and heavenly Physician. As it follows, And behold men brought him.

CHRYSOSTOM. But they are to be admired who brought in the paralytic, since on finding that they could not enter in at the door, they attempted a new and untried way. As it follows, And when they could not find by what way they might bring him in, they went upon the housetop, &c. But unroofing the house they let down the couch, and place the paralytic in the midst, as it follows, And they let him down through the things. Some one may say, that the place was let down, from which they lowered the couch of the palsied man through the things.

BEDE. The Lord about to cure the man of his palsy, first loosens the chains of his sins, that He may shew him, that on account of the bonds of his sins, he is punished with the loosening of his joints, and that unless the former are set free, he cannot be healed to the recovery of his limbs. Hence it follows, And when he saw their faith, &c.

AMBROSE. Mighty is the Lord who pardons one man for the good deed of another, and while he approves of the one, forgives the other his sins. Why, O man, with thee does not thy fellowman prevail, when with God a servant has both the liberty to intercede in thy behalf, and the power of obtaining what he asks? If thou despairest of the pardon of heavy sins, bring the prayers of others, bring the Church to pray for thee, and at sight of this the Lord may pardon what otherwise He might deny to thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 29. in Matt.) But there was combined in this the faith also of the sufferer himself. For he would not have submitted to be let down, had he not believed.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 25.) But our Lord’s saying, Man, thy sins are forgiven, conveys the meaning that the man had his sins forgiven him, because in that he was man, he could not say, “I have not sinned,” but at the same time also, that He who forgave sins might be known to be God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Now if we suffer bodily, we are enough concerned to get rid of the hurtful thing; but when there has harm happened to the soul, we delay, and so are neither cured of our bodily ailments. Let us then remove the fountain of evil, and the waters of sickness will cease to flow. But from fear of the multitude, the Pharisees durst not openly expose their designs, but only meditated them in their hearts Hence it follows, And they began to reason, saying, Who is this which speaketh blasphemies?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. By this they hasten the sentence of death, for it was commanded in the law, that whoever blasphemed God should be punished with death. (Lev. 24:16.)

AMBROSE. From the Pharisees themselves therefore the Son of God receives testimony. For it is both more powerful evidence when men confess unwillingly, and a more fatal error when they who deny are left to the consequence of their own assertions. Hence it follows, Who can forgive sins, but God only? Great is the madness of an unbelieving people, who though they have confessed that it is of God alone to forgive sins, believe not God when He forgives sins.

BEDE. For they say true, that no one can forgive sins but God, who yet forgives through those to whom He gives the power of forgiving. And therefore Christ is proved to be truly God, for He is able to forgive sins as God.

AMBROSE. The Lord wishing to save sinners shews Himself to be God, by His knowledge of the secret thoughts; as it follows, But that ye may know.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if to say, O Pharisees, since ye say, Who can forgive sins, but God alone? I answer you, Who can search the secrets of the heart, but God alone, Who says by His prophet, I am the Lord, that searcheth the hearts, and trieth the reins. (Jer. 17:10.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) If then you disbelieve the first, (i. e. the forgiveness of sins,) behold, I add another, seeing that I lay open your inmost thoughts. Again, another that I make whole the body of the palsied man. Hence He adds, Whether is it easier? It is very plain that it is easier to restore the body to health. For as the soul is far nobler than the body, so is the forgiveness of sins more excellent than the healing of the body. But since you believe not the former, because it is hid; I will add that which is inferior, yet more open, in order that thereby that which is secret may be made manifest. And indeed in addressing the sick man, He said not, I forgive thee thy sins, expressing His own power, but, Thy sins are forgiven thee. But they compelled Him to declare more plainly His own power to them, when He said, But that you may know.

THEOPHYLACT. Observe that on earth He forgives sins. For while we are on earth we can blot out our sins. But after that we are taken away from the earth, we shall not be able to confess, for the gate is shut.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) He shews the pardon of sins by the healing of the body. Hence it follows, He says unto the sick of the palsy, I say unto thee, Rise. But He manifests the healing of the body by the carrying of the bed, that so that which took place might be accounted no shadow. Hence it follows, Take up thy bed. As if He said, “I was willing through thy suffering to cure those who think that they are in health, while their souls are sick, but since they are unwilling, go and correct thy household.”

AMBROSE. Nor is there any delay, health is present; there is but one moment both of words, and healing. Hence it follows, And immediately he rose. From this fact it is evident, that the Son of man has power on earth to forgive sins; He said this both for Himself and us. For He as God made man, as the Lord of the law, forgives sins; we also have been chosen to receive from Him the same marvellous grace. For it was said to the disciples, Whose sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them. (John 20:23.) But how does He not Himself forgive sins, Who has given to others the power of doing so? But the kings and princes of the earth when they acquit homicides, release them from their present punishment, but cannot expiate their crimes.

AMBROSE. They behold him rising up, still disbelieving, and marvel at his departing; as it follows, And they were all amazed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) The Jews creep on by degrees, glorifying God, yet thinking Him not God, for His flesh stood in their way. But still it was no slight thing to consider Him the chief of mortal men, and to have proceeded from God.

AMBROSE. But they had rather fear the miracles of divine working, than believe them. As it follows, And they were filled with fear. But if they had believed they had not surely feared, but loved; for perfect love casteth out fear. But this was no careless or trifling cure of the paralytic, since our Lord is said to have prayed first, not for the petition’s sake, but for an example.

AUGUSTINE. (l. ii. qu. 4.) With respect to the sick of the palsy, we may understand that the soul relaxed in its limbs, i. e. its operations, seeks Christ, i. e. the meaning of God’s word; but is hindered by the crowds, that is to say, unless it discovers the secrets of the thoughts, i. e. the dark parts of the Scriptures, and thereby arrives at the knowledge of Christ.

BEDE. And the house where Jesus was is well described as covered with tiles, since beneath the beggarly covering of letters is found the spiritual power of grace.

AMBROSE. Now let every sick person have those that will pray for his salvation, by whom the loosened joints of our life and halting steps may be renewed by the remedy of the heavenly word. Let there be then certain monitors of the soul, to raise the mind of man, though grown dull through the weakness of the external body, to higher things, by the aid of which being able again easily to raise and humble itself, it may be placed before Jesus worthy to be presented in the Lord's sight. For the Lord beholdeth the humble.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The men then by whom he is let down may signify the doctors of the Church. But that he is let down with the couch, signifies that Christ ought to be known by man, while yet abiding in his flesh.

AMBROSE. But the Lord, pointing out the full hope of resurrection, pardons the sins of the soul, sets aside the weakness of the flesh. For this is the curing of the whole man. Although then it is a great thing to forgive the sins of men, it is yet much more divine to give resurrection to the bodies, since indeed God is the resurrection. But the bed which is ordered to be taken up is nothing else but the human body.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) That the infirm soul may no more rest in carnal joys, as in a bed, but rather itself restrain the carnal affections, and tend toward its own home, i. e. the resting-place of the secrets of its heart.

AMBROSE. Or it may reseek its own home, i. e. return to Paradise, for that is its true home, which first received man, and was lost not fairly, but by treachery. Rightly then is the soul restored thither, since He has come Who will undo the treacherous knot, and reestablish righteousness.

5:27–32

27. And after these things he went forth, and saw a Publican, named Levi, sitting at the receipt of custom: and he said unto him, Follow me.

28. And he left all, rose up, and followed him.

29. And Levi made him a great feast in his own house: and there was a great company of Publicans and of others that sat down with them.

30. But their Scribes and Pharisees murmured against his disciples, saying, Why do ye eat and drink with Publicans and sinners?

31. And Jesus answering said unto them, They that are whole need not a physician; but they that are sick.

32. I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. l. ii. c. 26.) After the healing of the sick of the palsy, St. Luke goes on to mention the conversion of a publican, saying, And after these things, he went forth, and saw a publican of the name of Levi, sitting at the receipt of custom. This is Matthew, also called Levi.

BEDE. Now Luke and Mark, for the honour of the Evangelist, are silent as to his common name, but Matthew is the first to accuse himself, and gives the name of Matthew and publican, that no one might despair of salvation because of the enormity of his sins, when he himself was changed from a publican to an Apostle.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For Levi had been a publican, a rapacious man, of unbridled desires after vain things, a lover of other men’s goods, for this is the character of the publican, but snatched from the very worship of malice by Christ’s call. Hence it follows, And he said unto him, Follow me. He bids him follow Him, not with bodily step, but with the soul’s affections. Matthew therefore, being called by the Word, left his own, who was wont to seize the things of others, as it follows, And having left all, he rose, and followed him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 30. in Matt.) Here mark both the power of the caller, and the obedience of him that was called. For he neither resisted nor wavered, but forthwith obeyed; and like the fishermen, he did not even wish to go into his own house that he might tell it to his friends.

BASIL. (Reg. fus. tract. 8.) He not only gave up the profits of the customs, but also despised the dangers which might occur to himself and his family from leaving the accounts of the receipts uncompleted.

THEOPHYLACT. And so from him that received toll from the passers by, Christ received toll, not money, but entire devotion to His company.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But the Lord honoured Levi, whom He had called, by immediately going to his feast. For this testified the greater confidence in him. Hence it follows, And Levi made him a great feast in his own house. Nor did He sit down to meat with him alone, but with many, as it follows, And there was a great company of Publicans and others that sat down with them. For the publicans came to Levi as to their colleague, and a man in the same line with themselves, and he too glorying in the presence of Christ, called them all together. For Christ displayed every sort of remedy, and not only by discoursing and displaying cures, or even by rebuking the envious, but also by eating with them, He corrected the faults of some, thereby giving us a lesson, that every time and occasion brings with it its own profit. But He shunned not the company of Publicans, for the sake of the advantage that might ensue, like a physician, who unless he touch the afflicted part cannot cure the disease.

AMBROSE. For by His eating with sinners, He prevents not us also from going to a banquet with the Gentiles.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But nevertheless the Lord was blamed by the Pharisees, who were envious, and wished to separate Christ and His disciples, as it follows, And the Pharisees murmured, saying, Why do you eat with Publicans, &c.

AMBROSE. This was the voice of the Devil. This was the first word the Serpent uttered to Eve, Yea hath God said, Ye shall not eat. (Gen. 3:1) So they diffuse the poison of their father.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 27.) Now St. Luke seems to have related this somewhat different from the other Evangelists. For he does not say that to our Lord alone it was objected that He eat and drank with publicans and sinners, but to the disciples also, that the charge might be understood both of Him and them. But the reason that Matthew and Mark related the objection as made concerning Christ to His disciples, was, that seeing the disciples ate with publicans and sinners, it was the rather objected to their Master as Him whom they followed and imitated; the meaning therefore is the same, yet so much the better conveyed, as while still keeping to the truth, it differs in certain words.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But our Lord refutes all their charges, shewing, that so far from its being a fault to mix with sinners, it is but a part of His merciful design, as it follows, And Jesus answering said unto them, They that are whole need not a physician; in which He reminds them of their common infirmities, and shews them that they are of the number of the sick, but adds, He is the Physician. It follows, I came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance. As if He should say, So far am I from hating sinners, that for their sakes only I came, not that they should remain sinners, but be converted and become righteous.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Hence He adds, to repentance, which serves well to explain the passage, that no one should suppose that sinners, because they are sinners, are loved by Christ, since that similitude of the sick plainly suggests what our Lord meant by calling sinners, as a Physician, the sick, in order that from iniquity as from sickness they should be saved.

AMBROSE. But how does God love righteousness, and David has never seen the righteous man forsaken, if the righteous are excluded, the sinner called; unless you understand that He meant by the righteous those who boast of the law, (Ps. 11:7, Ps. 37:25.) and seek not the grace of the Gospel. Now no one is justified by the law, but redeemed by grace. He therefore calls not those who call themselves righteous, for the claimers to righteousness are not called to grace. For if grace is from repentance, surely he who despises repentance renounces grace.

AMBROSE. But He calls those sinners, who considering their guilt, and feeling that they cannot be justified by the law, submit themselves by repentance to the grace of Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. Now He speaks of the righteous ironically, as when He says, Behold Adam is become as one of us. (Gen. 3:22.) But that there was none righteous upon the earth St. Paul shews, saying, All have sinned, and need the grace of God. (Rom. 3:23.)

GREGORY OF NYSSA. Or, He means that the sound and righteous need no physician, i. e. the angels, but the corrupt and sinners, i. e. ourselves do; since we catch the disease of sin, which is not in heaven.

BEDE. Now by the election of Matthew is signified the faith of the Gentiles, who formerly gasped after worldly pleasures, but now refresh the body of Christ with zealous devotion.

THEOPHYLACT. Or the publican is he who serves the prince of this world, and is debtor to the flesh, to which the glutton gives his food, the adulterer his pleasure, and another something else. But when the Lord saw him sitting at the receipt of custom, and not stirring himself to greater wickedness, He calls him that he might be snatched from the evil, and follow Jesus, and receive the Lord into the house of his soul.

AMBROSE. But he who receives Christ into his inner chamber, is fed with the greatest delights of overflowing pleasures. The Lord therefore willingly enters, and reposes in his affection; but again the envy of the treacherous is kindled, and the form of their future punishment is prefigured; for while all the faithful are feasting in the kingdom of heaven, the faithless will be cast out hungry. Or, by this is denoted the envy of the Jews, who are afflicted at the salvation of the Gentiles.

AMBROSE. At the same time also is shewn the difference between those who are zealous for the law and those who are for grace, that they who follow the law shall suffer eternal hunger of soul, while they who have received the word into the inmost soul, refreshed with abundance of heavenly meat and drink, can neither hunger nor thirst. And so they who fasted in soul murmured.

5:33–39

33. And they said unto him, Why do the disciples of John fast often, and make prayers, and likewise the disciples of the Pharisees; but thine eat and drink?

34. And he said unto them, Can ye make the children of the bridechamber fast, while the bridegroom is with them?

35. But the days will come, when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them, and then shall they fast in those days.

36. And he spake also a parable unto them; No man putteth a piece of a new garment upon an old; if otherwise, then both the new maketh a rent, and the piece that was taken out of the new agreeth not with the old.

37. And no man putteth new wine into old bottles; else the new wine will burst the bottles, and be spilled, and the bottles shall perish.

38. But new wine must be put into new bottles; and both are preserved.

39. No man also having drunk old wine straightway desireth new: for he saith, The old is better.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As soon as they have received the first answer from Christ, they proceed from one thing to another, with the intent to shew that the holy disciples, and Jesus Himself with them, cared very little for the law. Hence it follows, Why do the disciples of John fast, but thine eat, &c. (Lev. 15, prævaricationis.) As if they said, Ye eat with publicans and sinners, whereas the law forbids to have any fellowship with the unclean, but compassion comes in as an excuse for your transgression; why then do ye not fast, as they are wont to do who wish to live according to the law? But holy men indeed fast, that by the mortification of their body they may quell its passions. Christ needed not fasting for the perfecting of virtue, since as God He was free from every yoke of passion. Nor again did His companions need fasting, but being made partakers of His grace without fasting they were strengthened in all holy and godly living. For when Christ fasted for forty days, it was not to mortify His passions, but to manifest to carnal men the rule of abstinence.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 27.) Now Luke evidently relates that this was spoken not by men of themselves, but by others concerning them. How then does Matthew say, Then came unto him the disciples of John, saying, Why do we and the Pharisees fast; unless that they themselves also came, and were all eager, as far as they were able, to put the question to Him?

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. l. ii. q. 18.) Now there are two fasts, one is in tribulation, to propitiate God for our sins; another in joy, when as carnal things delight us less, we feed the more on things spiritual. The Lord therefore being asked why His disciples did not fast, answered as to each fast. And first of the fast of tribulation; for it follows, And he said unto them, Can ye make the children of the bridegroom fast when the bridegroom is with them?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 30. in Matt.) As if He should say, The present time is one of joy and gladness, sorrow must not then be mixed up with it.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For the shewing forth of our Saviour in this world was nothing else but a great festival, (πανήγυρις) spiritually uniting our nature to Him as His bride, that she who was formerly barren might become fruitful. The children of the Bridegroom then are found to be those who have been called by Him through a new and evangelical discipline, but not the Scribes and Pharisees, who observe only the shadow of the law.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ii. c. 27.) Now this which Luke alone mentions, Ye cannot make the children of the bridegroom fast, is understood to refer to those very men who said that they would make the children of the Bridegroom mourn and fast, since they were about to kill the Bridegroom.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Having granted to the children of the Bridegroom that it was not fitting that they should be troubled, as they were keeping a spiritual feast, but that fasting should be abolished among them, He adds as a direction, But the days shall come when the Bridegroom shall be taken from them, and then shall they fast in those days.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. ii. qu. 18.) As if He said, Then shall they be desolate, and in sorrow and lamentation, until the joy of consolation shall be restored to them by the Holy Spirit.

AMBROSE. Or, That fast is not given up whereby the flesh is mortified, and the desires of the body chastened. (For this fast commends us to God.) But we cannot fast who have Christ, and banquet on the flesh and blood of Christ.

BASIL. The children of the Bridegroom also cannot fast, i. e. refuse nourishment to the soul, but live on every word which proceedeth out of the mouth of God.

AMBROSE. But when are those days, in which Christ shall be taken away from us, since He has said, I will be with you alway, even unto the end of the world? But no one can take Christ away from you, unless you take yourself away from Him.

BEDE. For as long as the Bridegroom is with us we both rejoice, and can neither fast nor mourn. But when He has gone away through our sins, then a fast must be declared and mourning be enjoined.

AMBROSE. Lastly, it is spoken of the fast of the soul, as the context shews, for it follows, But he said, No man putteth a piece of a new garment upon an old. He calleth fasting an old garment, which the Apostle thought should be taken off, saying, Put off the old man with his deeds. (Col. 3:9.) In the same manner we have a series of precepts not to mix up the actions of the old and new man.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or else, The gift of the Holy Spirit being received, there is a kind of fast, which is of joy, which they who are already renewed to a spiritual life most seasonably celebrate. Before they receive this gift, He says they are as old garments, to which a new piece of cloth is most unsuitably sewed on, i. e. any part of the doctrine which relates to the soberness of the new life; for if this takes place, the very doctrine itself also is in a measure divided, for it teaches a general fast not from pleasant food only, but from all delight in temporal pleasures, the part of which that appertains to food He said ought not to be given to men still devoted to their old habits, for therein seems to be a rent, and it agreeth not with the old. He says also, that they are like to old skins, as it follows, And no one putteth wine into old skins.

AMBROSE. The weakness of man’s condition is exposed when our bodies arc compared to the skins of dead animals.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But the Apostles are compared to old skins, who are more easily burst with new wine, i. e. with spiritual precepts, than contain them. Hence it follows, Else the new wine will burst the skins, and the wine will be spilled. But they were new skins at that time, when after the ascension of the Lord they received the Holy Spirit, when from desire of His consolation they were renewed by prayer and hope. Hence it follows, But the new wine must be put into new bottles, and both are preserved.

BEDE. Inasmuch as wine refreshes us within, but garments cover us without, the garments are the good works which we do abroad, by which we shine before men; wine, the fervour of faith, hope, and charity. Or, The old skins are the Scribes and Pharisees, the new piece and the new wine the precepts of the Gospel.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. de Deit. Filii et SS.) For wine newly drawn forth, evaporates on account of the natural heat in the liquor, throwing off from itself the scum by natural action. Such wine is the new covenant, which the old skins because of their unbelief contain not, and are therefore burst by the excellence of the doctrine, and cause the grace of the Spirit to flow in vain; because into an evil soul wisdom will not enter. (Sap. 1:4.)

BEDE. But to every soul which is not yet renewed, but goes on still in the old way of wickedness, the sacraments of new mysteries ought not to be given. They also who wish to mix the precepts of the Law with the Gospel, as the Galatians did, put new wine into old bottles. It follows, No man also having drank old wine straightway desireth new, for he saith, the old is better. For the Jews, imbued with the taste of their old life, despised the precepts of the new grace, and being defiled with the traditions of their ancestors, were not able to perceive the sweetness of spiritual words.

CHAPTER 6

6:1–5

1. And it came to pass on the second sabbath after the first, that he went through the corn fields; and his disciples plucked the ears of corn, and did eat, rubbing them in their hands.

2. And certain of the Pharisees said unto them, Why do ye that which is not lawful to do on the sabbath days?

3. And Jesus answering them said, Have ye not read so much as this, what David did, when himself was an hungred, and they which were with him;

4. How he went into the house of God, and did take and eat the shewbread, and gave also to them that were with him; which it is not lawful to eat but for the Priests alone?

5. And he said unto them, That the Son of man is Lord also of the sabbath.

AMBROSE. Not only in the form of expression, but in His very practice and mode of action, did the Lord begin to absolve man from the observance of the old law. Hence it is said, And it came to pass that he went through the corn fields, &c.

BEDE. For His disciples having no opportunity for eating because the multitudes thronged so, were naturally hungry, but by plucking the ears of corn they relieved their hunger, which is a mark of a strict habit of life, not seeking for prepared meats, but mere simple food.

THEOPHYLACT. Now He says, on the second sabbath after the first, because the Jews called every feast a sabbath. For sabbath means rest. Frequently therefore was there feasting at the preparation, and they called the preparation a sabbath because of the feast, and hence they gave to the principal sabbath the name of the second-first, as being the second in consequence of the festival of the day preceding.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 39. in Matt.) For there was a double feast; one on the principal sabbath, another on the next solemn day succeeding, which was also called a sabbath.

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (Isidore. l. i. Ep. 110.) He says, On the second-first, because it was the second day of the Passover, but the first of unleavened bread. Having killed the passover, on the very next day they kept the feast of unleavened bread. And it is plain that this was so from the fact, that the Apostles plucked ears of corn and ate them, for at that time the ears are weighed down by the fruit.

EPIPHANIUS. (cont. Hær. l. i. Hær. xxx. 32.) On the sabbath day then they were seen passing through the corn fields, and eating the corn, shewing that the bonds of the sabbath were loosened, when the great Sabbath was come in Christ, Who made us to rest from the working of our iniquities.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the Pharisees and Scribes not knowing the Holy Scriptures agreed together to find fault with Christ’s disciples, as it follows, And certain of the Pharisees said unto them, Why do ye, &c. Tell me now, when a table is set before you on the sabbath day; do you not break bread? Why then do you blame others?

BEDE. But some say that these things were objected to our Lord Himself; they might indeed have been objected by different persons, both to our Lord Himself and His disciples, but to whomsoever the objection is made, it chiefly refers to Him.

AMBROSE. But the Lord proves the defenders of the law to be ignorant of what belongs to the law, bringing the example of David; as it follows, And Jesus answering said to them, Have ye not read so much as this, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He said, Whereas the law of Moses expressly says, Give a righteous judgment, and ye shall not respect persons in judgment, (Deut. 1:16, 17.) how now do ye blame My disciples, who even to this day extol David as a saint and prophet, though he kept not the commandment of Moses?

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) And mark, that whenever the Lord speaks for His servants, (i. e. His disciples,) He brings forward servants, as for example David and the Priests; but when for Himself, He introduces His Father; as in that place, My Father worketh hitherto, and I work. (John 5:17.)

THEOPHYLACT. But he reproves them in another way, as it is added, And he said unto them, that the So of man is Lord also of the sabbath. As if he said, I am the Lord of the sabbath, as being He who ordained it, and as the Legislator I have power to loose the sabbath; for Christ was called the Son of man, who being the Son of God yet condescended in a miraculous manner to be made and called for man's sake the Son of man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But Mark declares that He uttered this of our common nature, for He said, The sabbath was made for man, not, man for the sabbath. It is therefore more fitting that the sabbath should be subject to man, than that man should bow his neck to the sabbath.

AMBROSE. But herein is a great mystery. For the field is the whole world, the corn is the abundant harvest of the saints in the seed of the human race, the ears of corn are the fruits of the Church, which the Apostles shaking off by their works fed upon, nourishing themselves with our increase, and by their mighty miracles, as it were out of the bodily husks, plucking forth the fruits of the mind to the light of faith.

BEDE. For they bruise the ears in their hands, because, when they wish to bring others over into the body of Christ, they mortify their old man with its acts drawing them away from worldly thoughts.

AMBROSE. Now the Jews thought this unlawful on the Sabbath, but Christ by the gift of new grace represented hereby the rest of the law, the work of grace. Wonderfully has He called it the second-first sabbath, not the first-second, because that was loosed from the law which was first, and this is made first which was ordained second. It is therefore called the second sabbath according to number, the first according to the grace of the work. For that sabbath is better where there is no penalty, than that where there is a penalty prescribed. Or this perhaps was first in the foreknowledge of wisdom, and second in the sanction of the ordinance. Now in David escaping with his companions, there was a foreshadowing of Christ in the law, who with His Apostles escaped the prince of the world. But how was it that the Observer and Defender of the law Himself both eat the bread, and gave it to those that were with Him, which no one was allowed to eat but the priests, except that He might shew by that figure that the priests' bread was to come over to the use of the people, or that we ought to imitate the priests' life, or that all the children of the Church are priests, for we are anointed into a holy priesthood, offering ourselves a spiritual sacrifice to

God. (1 Pet. 2:5.) But if the sabbath was made for men, and the benefit of men required that a man when hungry (having been long without the fruits of the earth) should forsake the abstinence of the old fast, the law is surely not broken but fulfilled.

6:6–11

6. And it came to pass also on another sabbath, that he entered into the synagogue and taught: and there was a man whose right hand was withered.

7. And the Scribes and Pharisees watched him, whether he would heal on the sabbath day; that they might find an accusation against him.

8. But he knew their thoughts, and said to the man which had the withered hand, Rise up, and stand forth in the midst. And he arose and stood forth.

9. Then said Jesus unto them, I will ask you one thing; Is it lawful on the sabbath days to do good, or to do evil? to save life, or to destroy it?

10. And looking round about upon them all, he said unto the man, Stretch forth thy hand. And he did so: and his hand was restored whole as the other.

11. And they were filled with madness; and communed one with another what they might do to Jesus.

AMBROSE. The Lord now proceeds to another work. For He who had determined to make the whole man safe, was able to cure each member. Hence it is said, And it came to pass also on another sabbath, that he entered into the synagogue and taught.

BEDE. He chiefly heals and teaches on the sabbaths, not only to convey the meaning of a spiritual sabbath, but because of the more numerous assembly of the people.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But He taught things far beyond their comprehension, and opened to his hearers the way to future salvation by Him; and then after having first taught them, He suddenly shewed His divine power, as it follows, and there was a man there whose right hand was withered.

BEDE. But since the Master had excused by an undeniable example the breach of the sabbath, with which they charged His disciples, their object is now by watching to bring a false accusation against the Master Himself. As it follows, And the Scribes and Pharisees watched him, if he would heal on the sabbath, that if He did not, they might accuse Him of cruelty or impotence; if He did, of violation of the sabbath. Hence it follows, that they might find an accusation against him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For this is the way of the envious man, he feeds in himself his pang of grief with the praises of others. But the Lord knew all things, and searches the hearts; as it follows, But he knew their thoughts, and said to the man who had the withered hand, Rise up, and stand. And he arose, and stood forth, that perchance he might stir up the cruel Pharisees to pity, and allay the flames of their passion.

BEDE. But the Lord anticipating the false charge which they were preparing against Him, reproves those who by wrongly interpreting the law thought that they must rest on the sabbath-day even from good works; whereas the law commands us to abstain from servile works, i. e. from evil, on the sabbath. Hence it follows, Then said Jesus unto them, I ask you, Is it lawful to do good on the sabbath, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This is a very useful question, for if it is lawful to do good on the sabbath, and there is no reason why those who work should not obtain mercy from God, cease to gather up accusation against Christ. But if it be not lawful to do good on the sabbath, and the law prohibits the safety of life, thou art become the accuser of the law. For if we examine the very institution of the sabbath, we shall find it was introduced for an object of mercy, for God commanded to keep holy the sabbath, that may rest thy man servant and thy maid servant, and all thy cattle. (Exod. 20:23.) But he who has mercy on his ox, and the rest of his cattle, how much rather will he not have mercy on man troubled with a severe disease?

AMBROSE. But the law by things present prefigured the form of things future, among which surely the days of rest to come are to be not from good works but from evil. For although secular works may be given up, yet it is no idle act of a good work to rest in the praise of God.

AUGUSTINE. Aug. de Qu. Ev. l. iii. qu. 7.) But though our Lord was healing the body, He asked this question, “is it lawful to save the soul or to lose it?” either because He performed His miracles on account of faith in which is the salvation of the soul; or, because the cure of the right hand signified the salvation of the soul, which ceasing to do good works, seemed in some measure to have a withered right hand, i. e. He placed the soul for the man, as men are wont to say, “So many souls were there.”

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 35.) But it may be questioned how Matthew came to say, that they asked the Lord, whether it was lawful to heal on the sabbath, when Luke in this place states that they rather were asked of the Lord. We must therefore believe that they first asked the Lord, and that then He understanding by their thoughts that they sought an opportunity to accuse Him, placed the man in the midst whom He was going to heal, and asked the question which Mark and Luke relate Him to have asked. It follows, And looking round about upon them all.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. When the eyes of all were, as it were, riveted together, and their minds also fixed upon the consideration of the matter, he said to the man, Stretch forth thy hand; I command thee, Who created man. But he who had the withered hand hears, and is made whole, as it follows, And he stretched it, and it was restored. But they who should have been astonished at the miracle, increased in malice; as it follows, But they were filled with madness; and communed one with another what they should do to Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Matt. 40.) And as Matthew relates, they go out to take counsel, that they should kill him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Thou perceivest, O Pharisee, a divine Worker, and Him Who delivers the sick by His heavenly power, and out of envy thou breathest forth death.

BEDE. The man represents the human race, withered by the unfruitfulness of good works, because of the hand in our first parent stretched forth to take the apple, which was healed by the innocent hand stretched forth on the cross. And rightly was the withered hand in the synagogue, because where there is the greater gift of knowledge, there the transgressor lies under the greater blame.

AMBROSE. You have heard then the words of Him who says, Stretch forth thy hand. That is a frequent and common cure, and thou that thinkest thy hand is whole, beware lest it be contracted by avarice or sacrilege. Stretch it forth oftener to help thy neighbour, to protect the widow, to save from injury him whom you see the victim of unjust attack; stretch it forth to the poor man who beseeches thee; stretch it forth to the Lord, to ask pardon of thy sins; as the hand is stretched forth so is it healed. (1 Kings 13:5, 6.)

6:12–16

12. And it came to pass in those days, that he went out into a mountain to pray, and continued all night in prayer to God.

13. And when it was day, he called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named apostles;

14. Simon, (whom he also named Peter,) and Andrew his brother, James and John, Philip and Bartholomew,

15. Matthew and Thomas, James the son of Alphæus, and Simon called Zelotes,

16. And Judas the brother of James, and Judas Iscariot, which also was the traitor.

GLOSS. (non occ.) When adversaries rose up against the miracles and teaching of Christ, He chose Apostles as defenders and witnesses of the truth, and prefaces their election with prayer; as it is said, And it came to pass, &c.

AMBROSE. Let not thy ears be open to deceit, that thou shouldest think that the Son of God prays from want of strength, that He may obtain what He could not perform; for being Himself the Author of power, the Master of obedience, He leads us by His own example to the precepts of virtue.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Let us examine then in the actions which Jesus did, how He teaches us to be instant in prayer to God, going apart by ourselves, and in secret, no one seeing us; putting aside also our worldly cares, that the mind may be raised up to the height of divine contemplation; and this we have marked in the fact, that Jesus went in to a mountain apart to pray.

AMBROSE. Every where also He prays alone, for human wishes comprehend not the wisdom of God; and no one can be a partaker of the secrets of Christ. But not every one who prays ascends a mountain, he only who prays advancing from earthly things to higher, who is not anxious for the riches or honours of the world. All whose minds are raised above the world ascend the mountain. In the Gospel therefore you will find, that the disciples alone ascend the mountain with the Lord. But thou, O Christian, hast now the character given, the form prescribed which thou shouldest imitate; as it follows, And he continued all night in prayer to God. For what oughtest thou to do for thy salvation, when Christ continues all night in prayer for thee?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. ad Pop. Ant. 42. et in Act. c. 16. Ed. Lat.) Rise then thou also at night time. The soul is then purer, the very darkness and great silence are in themselves enough to lead us to sorrow for our sins. But if thou lookest upon the heaven itself studded with stars as with unnumbered eyes, if thou thinkest that they who wanton and do unjustly in day time are then nothing different from the dead, thou wilt loathe all human undertakings. All these things serve to raise the mind. Vain-glory then disquiets not, no tumult of passion has the mastery; fire does not so destroy the rust of iron as nightly prayer the blight of sin. He whom the heat of the sun has fevered by day is refreshed by the dew; nightly tears are better than any dew, and are proof against desire and fear. But if a man is not cherished by the dew we speak of, he withers in the day. Wherefore although thou prayest not much at night, pray once with watching, and it is enough; shew that the night belongs not only to the body, but to the soul.

AMBROSE. But what does it become thee to do when thou wouldest commence any work of piety, when Christ, about to send out His disciples, first prayed? for it follows, And when it was day, he called his disciples, &c. whom truly He destined to be the means of spreading the salvation of man through the world. Turn thy eyes also to the heavenly council. Not the wise men, not the rich, not the noble, but He chose to send out fishermen and publicans, that they might not seem to turn men to their grace by riches or by the influence of power and rank, and that the force of truth, not the graces of oratory, might prevail.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ut sup.) But mark the great carefulness of the Evangelist. He not only says that the holy Apostles were chosen, but he enumerates them by name, that no one should dare to insert any others in the catalogue; Simon, whom he also called Peter, and Andrew his brother.

BEDE. He not only surnamed Peter first, but long before this, when he was brought by Andrew, it is said, Thou shall be called Cephas, which is by interpretation, a stone (John 1:42.). But Luke, wishing to mention the names of the disciples, since it was necessary to call him Peter, wished shortly to imply that this was not his name before, but the Lord had given it to him.

EUSEBIUS. The two next are James and John, as it follows, James and John, both indeed sons of Zebedee, who were also fishermen. After them he mentions Philip and Bartholomew. John says Philip was of Bethsaida, of the city of Andrew and Peter. Bartholomew was a simple man, devoid of all worldly knowledge and guile. But Matthew was called from those who used to collect taxes; concerning whom he adds Matthew and Thomas.

BEDE. Matthew places himself after his fellow-disciple Thomas, from humility, whereas by the other Evangelists he is put before him. It follows, James the son of Alphæus, and Simon who is called Zelotes.

GLOSS. Because in truth he was of Cana in Galilee, which is interpreted zeal; and this is added to distinguish him from Simon Peter. It follows, Judas the brother of James, and Judas Iscariot, who also betrayed him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 30.) With respect to the name of Judas the brother of James, Luke seems to differ from Matthew, who calls him Thaddæus. But what prevented a man from being called by two or three names? Judas the traitor is chosen, not unwittingly but knowingly, for Christ had indeed taken to Himself the weakness of man, and therefore refused not even this share of human infirmity. He was willing to be betrayed by His own Apostle, that thou when betrayed by thy friend mayest bear calmly thy mistaken judgment, thy kindness thrown away.

BEDE. But in a mystical sense the mountain on which our Lord chose His disciples represents the loftiness of justice in which they were to be instructed, and which they were to preach to others; so also the law was given on a mountain.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But if we may learn the interpretation of the Apostles’ names, know that Peter means, “loosening or knowing;” Andrew, “glorious power,” or “answering;” but James, “apostle of grief;” John, “the grace of the Lord;” Matthew, “given;” Philip, “large mouth,” or the “orifice of a torch;” Bartholomew, “the son of him who lets down water;” Thomas, “deep or twin;” James the son of Alphæus, “supplanter of the step of life;” Judas, “confession;” Simon, “obedience.”

6:17–19

17. And he came down with them, and stood in the plain, and the company of his disciples, and a great multitude of people out of all Judæa, and Jerusalem, and from the sea coast of Tyre and Sidon, which came to hear him, and to be healed of their diseases;

18. And they that were vexed with unclean spirits: and they were healed.

19. And the whole multitude sought to touch him: for there went virtue out of him, and healed them all.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When the ordination of the Apostles was accomplished, and great numbers were collected together from the country of Judæa, and from the sea coast of Tyre and Sidon, (who were idolaters,) he gave the Apostles their commission to be the teachers of the whole world, that they might recal the Jews from the bondage of the law, but the worshippers of devils from their Gentile errors to the knowledge of the truth. Hence it is said, And he came down with them, and stood in the plain, and a great multitude from Judæa, and the sea coast, &c.

BEDE. By the sea coast he does not refer to the neighbouring sea of Galilee, because this would not be accounted wonderful, but it is so called from the great sea, and therein also Tyre and Sidon may be comprehended, of which it follows, Both of Tyre and Sidon. And these states being Gentile, are purposely named here, to indicate how great was the fame and power of the Saviour which had brought even the citizens of the coast to receive His healing and teaching. Hence it follows, Which came to hear him.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, for the cure of their souls; and that they might be healed of their diseases, that is, for the cure of their bodies.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But after that the High Priest had made publicly known His choice of Apostles, He did many and great miracles, that the Jews and Gentiles who had assembled might know that these were invested by Christ with the dignity of the Apostleship, and that He Himself was not as another man, but rather was God, as being the Incarnate Word. Hence it follows, And the whole multitude sought to touch him, for there went virtue out of him. For Christ did not receive virtue from others, but since he was by nature God, sending out His own virtue upon the sick, He healed them all.

AMBROSE. But observe all things carefully, how He both ascends with His Apostles and descends to the multitude; for how could the multitude see Christ but in a lowly place. It follows him not to the lofty places, it ascends not the heights. Lastly, when He descends, He finds the sick, for in the high places there can be no sick.

BEDE. You will scarcely find any where that the multitudes follow our Lord to the higher places, or that a sick person is healed on a mountain; but having quenched the fever of lust and lit the torch of knowledge, each man approaches by degrees to the height of the virtues. But the multitudes which were able to touch the Lord are healed by the virtue of that touch, as formerly the leper is cleansed when our Lord touched him. The touch of the Saviour then is the work of salvation, whom to touch is to believe on Him, to be touched is to be healed by His precious gifts.

6:20–23

20. And he lifted up his eyes on his disciples, and said, Blessed be ye poor: for yours is the kingdom of God.

21. Blessed are ye that hunger now: for ye shall be filled. Blessed are ye that weep now: for ye shall laugh.

22. Blessed are ye, when men shall hate you, and when they shall separate you from their company, and shall reproach you, and cast out your name as evil, for the Son of man's sake.

23. Rejoice ye in that day, and leap for joy: for, behold, your reward is great in heaven: for in the like manner did their fathers unto the prophets.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. After the ordination of the Apostles, the Saviour directed His disciples to the newness of the evangelical life.

AMBROSE. But being about to utter His divine oracles, He begins to rise higher; although He stood in a low place, yet as it is said, He lifted up his eyes. What is lifting up the eyes, but to disclose a more hidden light?

BEDE. And although He speaks in a general way to all, yet more especially He lifts up His eyes on His disciples; for it follows, on his disciples, that to those who receive the word listening attentively with the heart, He might reveal more fully the light of its deep meaning.

AMBROSE. Now Luke mentions only four blessings, but Matthew eight; but in those eight are contained these four, and in these four those eight. For the one has embraced as it were the four cardinal virtues, the other has revealed in those eight the mystical number. For as the eighth 1 is the accomplishment of our hope, so is the eighth also the completion of the virtues. But each Evangelist has placed the blessings of poverty first, for it is the first in order, and the purest, as it were, of the virtues; for he who has despised the world shall reap an eternal reward. Now can any one obtain the reward of the heavenly kingdom who, overcome by the desires of the world, has no power of escape from them? Hence it follows, He said, Blessed are the poor.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. In the Gospel according to St. Matthew it is said, Blessed are the poor in spirit, that we should understand the poor in spirit to be one of a modest and somewhat depressed mind. Hence our Saviour says, Learn from me, for I am meek and lowly of heart. But Luke says, Blessed are the poor, without the addition of spirit, calling those poor who despise riches. For it became those who were to preach the doctrines of the saving Gospel to have no covetousness, but their affections set upon higher things.

BASIL. (in Ps. 33.) But not every one oppressed with poverty is blessed, but he who has preferred the commandment of Christ to worldly riches. For many are poor in their possessions, yet most covetous in their disposition; these poverty does not save, but their affections condemn. For nothing involuntary deserves a blessing, because all virtue is characterized by the freedom of the will. Blessed then is the poor man as being the disciple of Christ, Who endured poverty for us. For the Lord Himself has fulfilled every work which leads to happiness, leaving Himself an example for us to follow.

EUSEBIUS. But when the celestial kingdom is considered in the many gradations of its blessings, the first step in the scale belongs to those who by divine instinct embrace poverty. Such did He make those who first became His disciples; therefore He says in their person, For yours is the kingdom of heaven, as pointedly addressing Himself to those present, upon whom also He lifted up His eyes.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. After having commanded them to embrace poverty, He then crowns with honour those things which follow from poverty. It is the lot of those who embrace poverty to be in want of the necessaries of life, and scarcely to be able to get food. He does not then permit His disciples to be fainthearted on this account, but says, Blessed are ye who hunger now.

BEDE. That is, blessed are ye who chasten your body and subject it to bondage, who in hunger and thirst give heed to the word, for then shall ye receive the fulness of heavenly joys.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (de Beat. orat. 4.) But in a deeper sense, as they who partake of bodily food vary their appetites according to the nature of the things to be eaten; so also in the food of the soul, by some indeed that is desired which depends upon the opinion of men, by others, that which is essentially and of its own nature good. Hence, according to Matthew, men are blessed who account righteousness in the place of food and drink; by righteousness I mean not a particular but an universal virtue, which he who hungers after is said to be blessed.

BEDE. Plainly instructing us, that we ought never to account ourselves sufficiently righteous, but always desire a daily increase in righteousness, to the perfect fulness of which the Psalmist shews us that we can not arrive in this world, but in the world to come. I shall be satisfied when thy glory shall be made manifest (Ps. 17:15.). Hence it follows, For ye shall be filled.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) For to those who hunger and thirst after righteousness He promises abundance of the things they desire. For none of the pleasures which are sought in this life can satisfy those who pursue them. But the pursuit of virtue alone is followed by that reward, which implants a joy in the soul that never faileth.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But poverty is followed not only by a want of those things which bring delight, but also by a dejected look, because of sorrow. Hence it follows, Blessed are ye that weep. He blesses those who weep, not those who merely drop tears from their eyes, (for this is common to the believing and unbelieving, when sorrow befals them,) but rather He calls those blessed, who shun a careless life, mixed up with sin, and devoted to carnal pleasures, and refuse enjoyments almost weeping from their hatred of all worldly things.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 18. ad pop. Ant.) But godly sorrow is a great thing, and it worketh repentance to salvation. Hence St. Paul when he had no failings of his own to weep for, mourned for those of others. Such grief is the source of gladness, as it follows, For ye shall laugh. For if we do no good to those for whom we weep, we do good to ourselves. For he who thus weeps for the sins of others, will not let his own go unwept for; but the rather he will not easily fall into sin. Let us not be ever relaxing ourselves in this short life, lest we sigh in that which is eternal. Let us not seek delights from which flow lamentation, and much sorrow, but let us be saddened with sorrow which brings forth pardon. We often find the Lord sorrowing, never laughing.

BASIL. (Hom. de Grat. act.) But He promises laughing to those who weep; not indeed the noise of laughter from the mouth, but a gladness pure and unmixed with aught of sorrow.

BEDE. He then who on account of the riches of the inheritance of Christ, for the bread of eternal life, for the hope of heavenly joys, desires to suffer weeping, hunger, and poverty, is blessed. But much more blessed is he who does not shrink to maintain these virtues in adversity. Hence it follows, Blessed are ye when men shall hate you. For although men hate, with their wicked hearts they can not injure the heart that is beloved by Christ, It follows, And when they shall separate you. Let them separate and expel you from the synagogue. Christ finds you out, and strengthens you. It follows; And shall reproach you. Let them reproach the name of the Crucified, He Himself raises together with Him those that have died with Him, and makes them sit in heavenly places. It follows, And cast out your name as evil. Here he means the name of Christian, which by Jews and Gentiles as far as they were able was frequently erased from the memory, and east out by men, when there was no cause for hatred, but the Son of man; for in truth they who believed on the name of Christ, wished to be called after His name. Therefore He teaches that they are to be persecuted by men, but are to be blessed beyond men. As it follows, Rejoice ye in that day, and weep for joy, for behold your reward is great in heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. Great and little are measured by the dignity of the speaker. Let us enquire then who promised the great reward. If indeed a prophet or an apostle, little had been in his estimation great; but now it is the Lord in whose hands are eternal treasures and riches surpassing man’s conception, who has promised great reward.

BASIL. (Hom. 6. in Hex.) Again, great has sometimes a positive signification, as the heaven is great, and the earth is great; but sometimes it has relation to something else, as a great ox or great horse, on comparing two things of like nature. I think then that great reward will be laid up for those who suffer reproach for Christ’s sake, not as in comparison with those things in our power, but as being in itself great because given by God.

DAMASCENE. (in lib. de Logic c. 49.) Those things which may be measured or numbered are used definitely, but that which from a certain excellence surpasses all measure and number we call great and much indefinitely; as when we say that great is the longsuffering of God.

EUSEBIUS. He then fortifies His disciples against the attacks of their adversaries, which they were about to suffer as they preached through the whole world; adding, For in like manner did their fathers to the prophets.

AMBROSE. For the Jews persecuted the prophets even to death.

BEDE. They who speak the truth commonly suffer persecution, yet the ancient prophets did not therefore from fear of persecution turn away from preaching the truth.

AMBROSE. In that He says, Blessed are the poor, thou hast temperance; which abstains from sin, tramples upon the world, seeks not vain delights. In Blessed are they that hunger, thou hast righteousness; for he who hungers suffers together with the hungry, and by suffering together with him gives to him, by giving becomes righteous, and his righteousness abideth for ever. In Blessed are they that weep now (Ps. 112:9.), thou hast prudence; which is to weep for the things of time, and to seek those which are eternal. In Blessed are ye when men hate you, thou hast fortitude; not that which deserves hatred for crime, but which suffers persecution for faith. For so thou wilt attain to the crown of suffering, if thou slightest the favour of men, and seekest that which is from God.

Temperance therefore brings with it a pure heart; righteousness, mercy; prudence, peace; fortitude, meekness. The virtues are so joined and linked to one another, that he who has one seems to have many; and the Saints have each one especial virtue, but the more abundant virtue has the richer reward. What hospitality in Abraham, what humility, but because he excelled in faith, he gained the preeminence above all others. To every one there are many rewards because many incentives to virtue, but that which is most abundant in a good action, has the most exceeding reward.

6:24–26

24. But woe unto you that are rich! for ye have received your consolation.

25. Woe unto you that are full! for ye shall hunger. Woe unto you that laugh now! for ye shall mourn and weep.

26. Woe unto you, when all men shall speak well of you! for so did their fathers to the false prophets.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Having said before that poverty for God's sake is the cause of every good thing, and that hunger and weeping will not be without the reward of the saints, he goes on to denounce the opposite to these as the source of condemnation and punishment. But woe unto you rich, for ye have your consolation.

CHRYSOSTOM. For this expression, woe, is always said in the Scriptures to those who cannot escape from future punishment.

AMBROSE. But although in the abundance of wealth many are the allurements to crime, yet many also are the incitements to virtue. Although virtue requires no support, and the offering of the poor man is more commendable than the liberality of the rich, still it is not those who possess riches, but those who know not how to use them, that are condemned by the authority of the heavenly sentence. For as that poor man is more praiseworthy who gives without grudging, so is the rich man more guilty, who ought to return thanks for what he has received, and not to hide without using it the sum which was given him for the common good. It is not therefore the money, but the heart of the possessor which is in fault. And though there be no heavier punishment than to be preserving with anxious fear what is to serve for the advantage of successors, yet since the covetous desires are fed by a certain pleasure of amassing, they who have had their consolation in the present life, have lost an eternal reward. We may here however understand by the rich man the Jewish people, or the heretics, or at least the Pharisees, who, rejoicing in an abundance of words, and a kind of hereditary pride of eloquence, have overstepped the simplicity of true faith, and gained to themselves useless treasures.

BEDE. Woe to you that are full, for ye shall be hungry. That rich man clothed in purple was full, feasting sumptuously every day, but endured in hunger that dreadful “woe,” when from the finger of Lazarus, whom he had despised, he begged a drop of water.

BASIL. (Reg. fus. tract. 16–19.) Now it is plain that the rule of abstinence is necessary, because the Apostle mentions it among the fruits of the Spirit. (Gal. 5:23.) For the subjection of the body is by nothing so obtained as by abstinence, whereby, as it were a bridle, it becomes us to keep in check the fervour of youth. Abstinence then is the putting to death of sin, the extirpation of passions, the beginning of the spiritual life, blunting in itself the sting of temptations. But lest there should be any agreement with the enemies of God, we must accept every thing as the occasion requires, to shew, that to the pure all things are pure (Tit. 1:15.), by coming indeed to the necessaries of life, but abstaining altogether from those which conduce to pleasure. But since it is not possible that all should keep the same hours, or the same manner, or the same proportion, still let there be one purpose, never to wait to be filled, for fulness of stomach makes the body itself also unfit for its proper functions, sleepy, and inclined to what is hurtful.

BEDE. In another way. If those are happy who always hunger after the works of righteousness, they on the other hand are counted to be unhappy, who, pleasing themselves in their own desires, suffer no hunger after the true good. It follows, Woe to you who laugh, &c.

BASIL. (ut sup.) Whereas the Lord reproves those who laugh now, it is plain that there will never be a house of laughter to the faithful, especially since there is so great a multitude of those who die in sin for whom we must mourn. Excessive laughter is a sign of want of moderation, and the motion of an unrestrained spirit; but ever to express the feelings of our heart with a pleasantness of countenance is not unseemly.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 6. in Matt.) But tell me, why art thou distracting and wasting thyself away with pleasures, who must stand before the awful judgment, and give account of all things done here?

BEDE. But because flattery being the very nurse of sin, like oil to the flames, is wont to minister fuel to those who are on fire with sin, he adds, Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you.

CHRYSOSTOM. What is said here is not opposed to what our Lord says elsewhere, Let your light shine before men; (Matt. 5:16.) that is, that we should be eager to do good for the glory of God, not our own. For vain-glory is a baneful thing, and from hence springs iniquity, and despair, and avarice, the mother of evil. But if thou seekest to turn away from this, ever raise thy eyes to God, and be content with that glory which is from Him. For if in all things we must choose the more learned for judges, how dost thou trust to the many the decision of virtue, and not rather to Him, who before all others knoweth it, and can give and reward it, whose glory therefore if thou desirest, avoid the praise of men. For no one more excites our admiration than he who rejects glory. And if we do this, much more does the God of all. Be mindful then, that the glory of men quickly faileth, seeing in the course of time it is past into oblivion. It follows, For so did their fathers to the false prophets.

BEDE. By the false prophets are meant those, who to gain the favour of the multitude attempt to predict future events. The Lord on the mountain pronounces only the blessings of the good, but on the plain he describes also the “woe” of the wicked, because the yet uninstructed hearers must first be brought by terrors to good works, but the perfect need but be invited by rewards.

AMBROSE. And mark, that Matthew by rewards called the people to virtue and faith, but Luke also frightened them from their sins and iniquities by the denunciation of future punishment.

6:27–31

27. But I say unto you which hear, Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you,

28. Bless them that curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you.

29. And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other; and him that taketh away thy cloke forbid not to take thy coat also.

30. Give to every man that asketh of thee; and of him that taketh away thy goods ask them not again.

31. And as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise.

BEDE. Having spoken above of what they might suffer from their enemies, He now points out how they ought to conduct themselves towards their enemies, saying, But I say to you who hear.

AMBROSE. Having proceeded in the enumeration of many heavenly actions, He not unwisely comes to this place last, that He might teach the people confirmed by the divine miracles to march onward in the footsteps of virtue beyond the path of the law. Lastly, among the three greatest, (hope, faith, and charity,) the greatest is charity, which is commanded in these words, Love your enemies.

BASIL. (in reg. brev. 176.) It is indeed the part of an enemy to injure and be treacherous. Every one then who does harm in any way to any one is called his enemy.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But this way of life was well adapted to the holy teachers who were about to preach throughout the earth the word of salvation, and if it had been their will to take vengeance upon their persecutors, had failed to call them to the knowledge of salvation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 18. in Matt.) But He says not, Do not hate, but love; nor did He merely command to love, but also to do good, as it follows, Do good to them which hate you.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) But because man consists of body and soul, to the soul indeed we shall do this good, by reproving and admonishing such men, and leading them by the hand to conversion; but to the body, by profiting them in the necessaries of life.

It follows, Bless them that curse you.

CHRYSOSTOM. For they who pierce their own souls deserve tears and weeping, not curses. For nothing is more hateful than a cursing heart, or more foul than a tongue which utters curses. O man, spit not forth the poison of asps, nor be turned into a beast. Thy mouth was given thee not to bite with, but to heal the wounds of others. But he commands us to count our enemies in the rank of our friends, not only in a general way, but as our particular friends for whom we are accustomed to pray; as it follows, Pray for them which persecute you. But many on the contrary falling down, and striking their faces upon the ground, and stretching forth their hands, pray God not for their sins, but against their enemies, which is nothing else but piercing their own selves. When thou prayest to Him that He would hear thee cursing thy enemies, who has forbidden thee to pray against thy enemies, how is it possible for thee to be heard, since thou art calling Him to hear thee by striking an enemy in the king’s presence, not with the hand indeed, but with thy words. What art thou doing, O man? thou standest to obtain pardon of your sins, and thou fillest thy mouth with bitterness. It is a time of forgiveness, prayer, and mourning, not of rage.

BEDE. But the question is fairly raised, how it is that in the prophets are to be found many curses against their enemies. Upon which we must observe, that the prophets in the imprecations they uttered foretold the future, and that not with the feelings of one who wishes, but in the spirit of one who foresees.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now the old law commanded us not to injure one another; or if we are first injured, not to extend our wrath beyond the measure of the injurer, but the fulfilling of the law is in Christ and in

His commands. Hence it follows, And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek, offer also the other.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 18. in Matt.) For physicians also, when they are attacked by madmen, have then most compassion on them, and exert themselves to restore them. Have thou also a like consideration towards thy persecutors; for it is they who are under the greatest infirmity. And let us not cease until they have exhausted all their bitterness, they will then overpower thee with thanks, and God Himself will give thee a crown, because thou hast delivered thy brother from the worst disease.

BASIL. (in Esai. 1, 23. in App.) But we almost all of us offend against this command, and especially the powerful and rulers, not only if they have suffered insult, but if respect is not paid them, accounting all those their enemies who treat them with less consideration than they think they deserve. But it is a great dishonour in a prince to be ready to take revenge. For how shall he teach another, to return to no man evil for evil (Rom. 12:17.), if he is eager to retaliate on him who injures him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the Lord would moreover have us to be despisers of property. As it follows, And him that taketh away thy cloak, forbid not to take thy coat also. For this is the soul’s virtue, which is altogether alien from feeling the pleasure of wealth. For it becomes him who is merciful even to forget his misfortunes, that we may confer the same benefits upon our persecutors, whereby we assist our dear friends.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Now He said not, Bear humbly the rule of thy persecutor, but, Go on wisely, and prepare thyself to suffer what he desires thee to do; overcoming his insolence by thy great prudence, that he may depart with shame at thy excellent endurance.

But some one will say, How can this be? When thou hast seen God made man, and suffering so many things for thee, dost thou still ask and doubt how it is possible to pardon the iniquities of thy fellow servants? Who has suffered what thy God has, when He was bound, scourged, enduring to be spat upon, suffering death? Here it follows, But to every one who seeks, give.

AUGUSTINE. (de Serm. Dom. lib. 1. c. 20.) He says not, To him that seeketh give all things, but give what you justly and honestly can, that is, what as far as man can know or believe, neither hurts you, nor another: and if thou hast justly refused any one, the justice must be declared to him, (so as not to send him away empty,) sometimes thou wilt confer even a greater boon when thou hast corrected him who seeks what he ought not.

CHRYSOSTOM. Herein however we do not lightly err, when not only we give not to those who seek, but also blame them? Why (you say) does he not work, why is the idle man fed? Tell me, dost thou then possess by labour? but still if thou workest, dost thou work for this, that thou shouldest blame another? For a single loaf and coat dost thou call a man covetous? Thou givest nothing, make then no reproaches. Why dost thou neither take pity thyself, and dissuadest those who would? If we spend upon all indifferently, we shall always have compassion: for because Abraham entertains all, he also entertains angels. For if a man is a homicide and a robber, does he not, thinkest thou, deserve to have bread? Let us not then be severe censors of others, lest we too be strictly judged.

It follows, And of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 10. in 1 Cor.) Every thing we have we receive from God. But when we speak of “mine and thine,” they are only bare words. For if you assert a house to be yours, you have uttered an expression which wants the substance of reality. For both the air, the soil, and the moisture, are the Creator’s. Thou again art he who has built the house; but although the use is thine, it is doubtful, not only because of death, but also on account of the issues of things. Thy soul is not thy own possession, and will be reckoned to thee in like manner as all thy goods. God wishes those things to be thine which are entrusted to thee for thy brethren, and they will be thine if thou hast dispensed them for others. But if thou hast spent richly upon thyself what things are thine, they are now become another’s. But through a wicked desire of wealth men strive together in a state contrary to Christ’s words, And of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again.

AUGUSTINE. (de Ser. Dom. lib. 1. c. 19.) He says this of garments, houses, farms, beasts of burdens, and generally of all property. But a Christian ought not to possess a slave as he does a horse or money. If a slave is more honourably governed by thee than by him who desires to take him from thee, I know not whether any one would dare to say, that he ought to be despised, as a garment (ut vestimentum.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 13. ad Pop. Ant.) Now we have a natural law implanted in us, by which we distinguish between what is virtue, and what is vice. Hence it follows, And as ye would that men should do unto you, do ye also to them. He does not say, Whatever ye would not that men should do unto you, do not ye. For since there are two ways which lead to virtue, namely, abstaining from evil, and doing good, he names one, signifying by it the other also. And if indeed He had said, That ye may be men, love the beasts, the command would be a difficult one. But if they are commanded to love men, which is a natural admonition, wherein lies the difficulty, since even the wolves and lions observe it, whom a natural relation compels to love one another. It is manifest then that Christ has ordained nothing surpassing our nature, but what He had long before implanted in our conscience, so that thy own will is the law to thee. And if thou wilt have good done unto thee, thou must do good to others; if thou wilt that another should shew mercy to thee, thou must shew mercy to thy neighbour.

6:32–36

32. For if ye love them which love you, what thank have ye? for sinners also love those that love them.

33. And if ye do good to them which do good to you, what thank have ye? for sinners also do even the same.

34. And if ye lend to them of whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners, to receive as much again.

35. But love ye your enemies, and do good, and lend, hoping for nothing again; and your reward shall be great, and ye shall be the children of the Highest: for he is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil.

36. Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. i. in Col.) The Lord had said that we must love our enemies, but that you might not think this an exaggerated expression, regarding it solely as spoken to alarm them, he adds the reason, saying, For if you love them which love you, what thank have ye? There are indeed several causes which produce love; but spiritual love exceeds them all. For nothing earthly engenders it, neither gain, nor kindness, nor nature, nor time, but it descends from heaven. But why wonder that it needs not kindness to excite it, when it is not even overcome of malice? A father indeed suffering wrong bursts the bands of love. A wife after a quarrel leaves her husband. A son, if he sees his father come to a great age, is troubled. But Paul went to those who stoned him to do them good. (Acts

14:17) Moses is stoned by the Jews, and prays for them. (Exod. 17:4) Let us then reverence spiritual love, for it is indissoluble. Reproving therefore those who were inclined to wax cold, he adds, For sinners even love those which love them. As if he said, Because I wish you to possess more than these, I do not advise you only to love your friends, but also your enemies. It is common to all to do good to those who do good to them. But he shews that he seeks something more than is the custom of sinners, who do good to their friends. Hence it follows, And if you do good to those who do good to you, what thank have ye?

BEDE. But he not only condemns as unprofitable the love and kindness of sinners, but also the lending. As it follows, And if ye lend to those from whom ye hope to receive, what thank have ye? for sinners also lend to sinners, to receive as much again.

AMBROSE. Now philosophy seems to divide justice into three parts; one towards God, which is called piety; another towards our parents, or the rest of mankind; a third to the dead, that the proper rites may be performed. But the Lord Jesus passing beyond the oracle of the law, and the heights of prophecy, extended the duties of piety to those also who have injured us, adding, But love your enemies.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 58. in Gen.) Whereby thou wilt confer more upon thyself than him. For he is beloved by a fellow servant, but thou art made like unto God. But it is a mark of the greatest virtue when we embrace with kindness those who wish to do us harm. Hence it follows, And do good. For as water, when cast upon a lighted furnace, extinguishes it, so also reason joined with gentleness. But what water is to fire, such is lowliness and meekness to wrath; and as fire is not extinguished by fire, so neither is anger soothed by anger.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. cont. usurar.) But man ought to shun that baneful anxiety with which he seeks from the poor man increase of his money and gold, exacting a profit of barren metals. Hence he adds, And lend, hoping for nothing again, &c. If a man should call the harsh calculation of interest, theft, or homicide, he will not err. For what is the difference, whether a man by digging under a wall become possessed of property, or possess it unlawfully by the compulsory rate of interest?

BASIL. (Hom. in Ps. 14.) Now this mode of avarice is rightly called in the Greek τόκος, from producing, because of the fruitfulness of the evil.

Animals in course of time grow up and produce, but interest as soon as it is born begins to bring forth. Animals which bring forth most rapidly cease soonest from breeding, but the money of the avaricious goes on increasing with time. Animals when they transfer their bringing forth to their own young, themselves cease to breed, but the money of the covetous both produces an increase, and renews the capital. Touch not then the destructive monster. For what advantage that the poverty of to-day is escaped, if it falls upon us repeatedly, and is increased? Reflect then how canst thou restore thyself? Whence shall thy money be so multiplied as that it will partly relieve thy want, partly refresh thy capital, and besides bring forth interest? But thou sayest, How shall I get my living? I answer, work, serve, last of all, beg; any thing is more tolerable than borrowing upon interest. But thou sayest, what is that lending to which the hope of repayment is not attached? Consider the excellence of the words, and thou wilt admire the mercifulness of the author. When thou art about to give to a poor man from regard to divine charity, it is both a lending and a gift; a gift indeed, because no return is hoped for; lending, because of the beneficence of God, who restores it in its turn. Hence it follows, And great shall be your reward. Dost thou not wish the Almighty to be bound to restore to thee? Or, should He make some rich citizen thy security, dost thou accept him, but reject God standing as security for the poor?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 3. in. Gen.) Observe the wonderful nature of lending, one receives and another binds himself for his debts, giving a hundred fold at the present time, and in the future eternal life.

AMBROSE. How great the reward of mercy which is received into the privilege of divine adoption! For it follows, And ye shall be the sons of the Highest (Ps. 82:6.). Follow then mercy, that ye may obtain grace. Widely spread is the mercy of God; He pours His rain upon the unthankful, the fruitful earth refuses not its increase to the evil. Hence it follows, For he is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.

BEDE. Either by giving them temporal gifts, or by inspiring His heavenly gifts with a wonderful grace.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Great then is the praise of mercy. For this virtue makes us like unto God, and imprints upon our souls certain signs as it were of a heavenly nature. Hence it follows, Be ye then merciful, as your heavenly Father also is merciful.

ATHANASIUS. (Orat. 3. cont. Arian.) That is to say, that we beholding His mercies, what good things we do should do them not with regard to men, but to Him, that we may obtain our rewards from God, not from men.

6:37–38

37. Judge not, and ye shall not be judged: condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned: forgive, and ye shall be forgiven:

38. Give, and it shall be given unto you: good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall men give into your bosom. For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again.

AMBROSE. The Lord added, that we must not readily judge others, lest when conscious of guilt thyself, thou shouldest be compelled to pass sentence upon another.

CHRYSOSTOM. Judge not thy superior, that is, thou a disciple must not judge thy master, nor a sinner the innocent. Thou must not blame them, but advise and correct with love; neither must we pass judgment in doubtful and indifferent matters, which bear no resemblance to sin, or which are not serious or forbidden.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He here expresses that worst inclination of our thoughts or hearts, which is the first beginning and origin of a proud disdain. For although it becomes men to look into themselves and walk after God, this they do not, but look into the things of others, and while they forget their own passions, behold the infirmities of some, and make them a subject of reproach.

CHRYSOSTOM. You will not easily find any one, whether a father of a family or an inhabitant of the cloister, free from this error. But these are the wiles of the tempter. For he who severely sifts the fault of others, will never obtain acquittal for his own. Hence it follows, And ye shall not be judged. For as the merciful and meek man dispels the rage of sinners, so the harsh and cruel adds to his own crimes.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. Be not then rash to judge harshly of your servants, lest ye suffer the like. For passing judgment calls down a heavier condemnation; as it follows, Condemn not, and ye shall not be condemned. For he does not forbid judgment with pardon.

BEDE. Now in a short sentence he concisely sums up all that he had enjoined with respect to our conduct towards our enemies, saying, Forgive, and ye shall be forgiven, wherein he bids us forgive injuries, and shew kindness, and our sins shall be forgiven us, and we shall receive eternal life.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But that we shall receive more abundant recompense from God, who gives bountifully to those who love him, he explains as follows, Good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over, shall they give into your bosom.

THEOPHYLACT. As if he says, As when you wish to measure meal without sparing, you press it down, shake it together, and let it pour over abundantly; so the Lord will give a large and overflowing measure into your bosom.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. l. ii. q. 8.) But he says, shall they give, (Mat. 10:42.) because through the merits of those to whom they have given even a cup of cold water in the name of a disciple, shall they be thought worthy to receive a heavenly reward. It follows, For with the same measure that ye mete withal it shall be measured to you again.

BASIL. (Hom. in Ps. 61.) For according to the same measure with which each one of you metes, that is, in doing good works or sinning, will he receive reward or punishment.

THEOPHYLACT. But some one will put the subtle question, “If the return is made overabundantly, how is it the same measure?” to which we answer, that He said not, “In just as great a measure shall it be measured to you again, but in the same measure.” For he who has shewn mercy, shall have mercy shewn unto him, and this is measuring again with the same measure; but our Lord spoke of the measure running over, because to such a one He will shew mercy a thousand times. So also in judging; for he that judges and afterwards is judged receives the same measure. But as far as he was judged the more severely that he judged one like unto himself, was the measure running over.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the Apostle explains this when he says, He who sows sparingly, (that is, scantily, and with a niggardly hand,) shall also reap sparingly, (2 Cor. 6:9.) (that is, not abundantly,) and he who sows blessings, shall reap also blessings, that is, bountifully. But if a man has not, and performs not, he is not guilty. For a man is accepted in that which he has, not in that which he has not.

39. And he spake a parable unto them, Can the blind lead the blind? shall they not both fall into the ditch?

40. The disciple is not above his master: but every one that is perfect shall be as his master.

41. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but perceivest not the beam that is in thine own eye?

42. Either how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother, let me pull out the mote that is in thine eye, when thou thyself beholdest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Thou hypocrite, cast out first the beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to pull out the mote that is in thy brother’s eye.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Lord added to what had gone before a very necessary parable, as it is said, And he spake a parable to them, for His disciples were the future teachers of the world, and it therefore became them to know the way of a virtuous life, having their minds illuminated as it were by a divine brightness, that they should not be blind leaders of the blind. And then he adds, Can the blind lead the blind? But if any should chance to attain unto an equal degree of virtue with their teachers, let them stand in the measure of their teachers, and follow their footsteps. Hence it follows, The disciple is not above his master. Hence also Paul says, Be ye also followers of me, as I am of Christ (1 Cor. 1:11.). Since Christ therefore judged not, why judgest thou? for He came not to judge the world, but to shew mercy.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, If thou judgest another, and in the very same way sinnest thyself, art not thou like to the blind leading the blind? For how canst thou lead him to good when thou also thyself committest sin? For the disciple is not above his master. If therefore thou sinnest, who thinkest thyself a master and guide, where will he be who is taught and led by thee? For he will be the perfect disciple who is as his master.

BEDE. Or the sense of this sentence depends upon the former, in which we are enjoined to give alms, and forgive injuries. If, says He, anger has blinded thee against the violent, and avarice against the grasping, how canst thou with thy corrupt heart cure his corruption? If even thy Master Christ, who as God might revenge His injuries, chose rather by patience to render

His persecutors more merciful, it is surely binding on His disciples, who are but men, to follow the same rule of perfection.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. l. ii. q. 9.) Or, He has added the words, Can the blind, lead the blind, in order that they might not expect to receive from the Levites that measure of which He says, They shall give into thy bosom, because they gave tithes to them. And these He calls blind, because they received not the Gospel, that the people might the rather now begin to hope for that reward through the disciples of the Lord, whom wishing to point out as His imitators, He added, The disciple is not above his master.

THEOPHYLACT. But the Lord introduces another parable taken from the same figure, as follows, But why seest thou the mote (that is, the slight fault) which is in thy brother’s eye, but the beam which is in thine own eye (that is, thy great sin) thou regardest not?

BEDE. Now this has reference to the previous parable, in which He forewarned them that the blind cannot be led by the blind, that is, the sinner corrected by the sinner. Hence it is said, Or, how canst thou say to thy brother, Brother let me cast out the mote that is in thine eye, if thou seest not the beam that is in thine own eye?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He said, How can he who is guilty of grievous sins, (which He calls the beam,) condemn him who has sinned only slightly, or even in some cases not at all? For this the mote signifies.

THEOPHYLACT. But these words are applicable to all, and especially to teachers, who while they punish the least sins of those who are put under them, leave their own unpunished. Wherefore the Lord calls them hypocrites, because to this end judge they the sins of others, that they themselves might seem just. Hence it follows, Thou hypocrite, first cast the beam out of thine own eye, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. That is to say, first shew thyself clean from great sins, and then afterwards shalt thou give counsel to thy neighbour, who is guilty only of slight sins.

BASIL. (Hom. 9, in Hexameron.) In truth, self knowledge seems the most important of all. For not only the eye, looking at outward things, fails to exercise its sight upon itself, but our understanding also, though very quick in apprehending the sin of another, is slow to perceive its own defects.

43. For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit.

44. For every tree is known by his own fruit. For of thorns men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes.

45. A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil: for of the abundance of the heart his mouth speaketh.

BEDE. Our Lord continues the words which He had begun against the hypocrites, saying, For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; i. e. as if He says, If thou wouldest have a true and unfeigned righteousness, what thou settest forth in words make up also in works, for the hypocrite though he pretends to be good is not good, who doeth evil works; and the innocent though he be blamed, is not therefore evil, who doeth good works.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But take not these words to thyself as an encouragement to idleness, for the tree is moved conformably to its nature, but thou hast the exercise of free will; and every barren tree has been ordained for some good, but thou wert created unto the good work of virtue.

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (lib. iv. ep. 81.) He does not then exclude repentance, but a continuance in evil, which as long as it is evil cannot bring forth good fruit, but being converted to virtue, will yield abundance. But what nature is to the tree, our affections are to us. If then a corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit, how shall a corrupt heart?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 42. in Matt.) But although the fruit is caused by the tree, yet it brings to us the knowledge of the tree, because the distinctive nature of the tree is made evident by the fruit, as it follows, For every tree is known by its fruit.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Each man’s life also will be a criterion of his character. For not by extrinsic ornaments and pretended humility is the beauty of true happiness discovered, but by those things which a man does; of which he gives an illustration, adding, For of thorns men do not gather figs.

AMBROSE. On the thorns of this world the fig cannot be found, which as being better in its second fruit, is well fitted to be a similitude of the resurrection. Either because, as you read, The fig trees have put forth their green figs, (Cant. 2:13.) that is, the unripe and worthless fruit came first in the Synagogue. Or because our life is imperfect in the flesh, perfect in the resurrection, and therefore we ought to cast far from us worldly cares, which eat into the mind and scorch up the soul, that by diligent culture we may obtain the perfect fruits. This therefore has reference to the world and the resurrection, the next to the soul and the body, as it follows, Nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes. Either because no one living in sin obtains fruit to his soul, which like the grape nearest the ground is rotten, on the higher branches becomes ripe. Or because no one can escape the condemnations of the flesh, but he whom Christ has redeemed, Who as a grape hung on the tree.

BEDE. Or, I think the thorns and bramble are the cares of the world and the prickings of sin, but the figs and the grapes are the sweetness of a new life and the warmth of love, but the fig is not gathered from the thorns nor the grape from the bramble, because the mind still debased by the habits of the old man may pretend to, but cannot bring forth the fruits of the new man. But we must know, that as the fruitful palm tree is inclosed and supported by a hedge, and the thorn bearing fruit not its own, preserves it for the use of man, so the words and acts of the wicked wherein they serve the good are not done by the wicked themselves, but by the wisdom of God working upon them.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But having shewn that the good and the bad man may be discerned by their works as a tree by its fruits, he now sets forth the same thing by another figure, saying, A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good, and the evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth that which is evil.

BEDE. The treasure of the heart is the same as the root of the tree. He therefore who has in his heart the treasure of patience and perfect love, brings forth the best fruits, loving his enemy, and doing the other things which have been taught above. But he who keeps a bad treasure in his heart does the contrary to this.

BASIL. The quality of the words shews the heart from which they proceed, plainly manifesting the inclination of our thoughts. Hence it follows, For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 42. in Matt.) For it is a natural consequence when wickedness abounds within, that wicked words are breathed as far as the mouth; and therefore when you hear of a man uttering abominable things, do not suppose that there lies only so much wickedness in him as is expressed in his words, but believe the fountain to be more copious than the stream.

BEDE. By the speaking of the mouth the Lord signifies all things, which by word, or deed, or thought, we bring forth from the heart. For it is the manner of the Scripture to put words for deeds.

6:46–49

46. And why call ye me, Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?

47. Whosoever cometh to me, and heareth my sayings, and doeth them, I will shew you to whom he is like:

48. He is like a man which built an house, and digged deep, and laid the foundation on a rock: and when the flood arose, the stream beat vehemently upon that house, and could not shake it: for it was founded upon a rock.

49. But he that heareth, and doeth not, is like a man that without a foundation built an house upon the earth: against which the stream did beat vehemently, and immediately it fell; and the ruin of that house was great.

BEDE. Lest any one should vainly flatter himself with the words, Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh, as if words only and not rather works were required of a Christian, our Lord adds the following, But why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say? As if He said, Why do ye boast of sending forth the leaves of a right confession, and shew forth no fruit of good works.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But Lordship both in name and reality belongs only to the Highest Nature.

ATHANASIUS. (in Orat. cont. Sabell.) This is not then the word of man, but the Word of God, manifesting His own birth from the Father, for He is the Lord Who is born of the Lord alone. But fear not the duality of Persons, for they are not separate in nature.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the advantage which arises from the keeping of the commandments, or the loss from disobedience, he shews as follows; Whosoever cometh to me, and heareth my sayings, he is like to a man who built his house upon a rock, &c.

BEDE. The rock is Christ. He digs deep; by the precepts of humility He plucks out all earthly things from the hearts of the faithful, lest they should serve God from regard to their temporal good.

BASIL. (in Princ. Prov.) But lay your foundations upon a rock, that is, lean upon the faith of Christ, so as to persevere immoveable in adversity, whether it come from man or God.

BEDE. Or the foundation of the house is the resolution to live a good life, which the perfect hearer firmly lays in fulfilling the commandments of God.

AMBROSE. Or, He teaches that the obedience to heavenly precepts is the foundation of all virtue, by means of which this our house can be moved neither by the torrent of pleasures, nor by the violence of spiritual wickedness, neither by the storms of this world, nor by the cloudy disputations of heretics; hence it follows, But the flood came, &c.

BEDE. A flood comes in three ways, either by unclean spirits, or wicked men, or the very restlessness of mind or body; and as far as men trust in their own strength they fall away, but as long as they cling to the immoveable rock they cannot even be shaken.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 24. in Matt.) The Lord also shews us that faith profiteth a man nothing, if his manner of life be corrupt. Hence it follows, But he that heareth and doeth not, is like a man, that without a foundation, built an house upon the earth, &c.

BEDE. The house of the devil is the world which lieth in wickedness, (1 John 5:19.) which he builds upon the earth, because those who obey him he drags down from heaven to earth; he builds without foundation, for sin has no foundation, standing not by its own nature, for evil is without substance, which yet whatever it is, grows up in the nature of good. But because the foundation is called so from fundus, we may not unfitly understand that fundamentum is placed here for fundus. As then he who is fallen into a well is kept at the bottom of the well, so the soul falling away remains stationary, as it were, at the very bottom, as long as it continues in any measure of sin. But not content with the sin into which it is fallen, while daily sinking into worse, it can find no bottom, as it were, in the well to which it may fix itself. But every kind of temptation increasing, both the really bad and the feignedly good become worse, until at last they come to everlasting punishment. Hence it follows, Against which the stream did beat vehemently. By the force of the stream may be understood the trial of the last judgment, when both houses being finished, the wicked shall go into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal. (Mat. 25:46.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or they build upon the earth without foundation, who upon the quicksand of doubt, which relates to opinion, lay the foundation of their spiritual building, which a few drops of temptation wash away.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ii. 19.) Now this long discourse of our Lord, Luke begins in the same way as Matthew; for each says, Blessed are the poor. Then many things which follow in the narration of each are like, and finally the conclusion of the discourse is found to be altogether the same, I mean with respect to the men who build upon the rock and the sand. It might then easily be supposed that Luke has inserted the same discourse of our Lord, and yet has left out some sentences which Matthew has kept, and likewise put in others which Matthew has not; were it not that Matthew says the discourse was spoken by our Lord on the mountain, but Luke on the plain by our Lord standing. It is not however thought likely from this that these two discourses are separated by a long course of time, because both before and after both have related some things like, or the same. It may however have happened that our Lord was at first on a higher part of the mountain with His disciples alone, and that then he descended with them from the mount, that is, from the summit of the mountain to the flat place, that is, to some level ground, which was on the side of the mountain, and was able to hold large multitudes, and that there He stood until the crowds were gathered together to Him, and afterwards when He sat down His disciples came nearer, and to them, and the rest of the multitude who were present, He held the same discourse.

CHAPTER 7

7:1–10

1. Now when he had ended all his sayings in the audience of the people, he entered into Capernaum.

2. And a certain centurion’s servant, who was dear unto him, was sick, and ready to die.

3. And when he heard of Jesus, he sent unto him the elders of the Jews, beseeching him that he would come and heal his servant.

4. And when they came to Jesus, they besought him instantly, saying, That he was worthy for whom he should do this:

5. For he loveth our nation, and he hath built us a synagogue.

6. Then Jesus went with them. And when he was now not far from the house, the centurion sent friends to him, saying unto him, Lord, trouble not thyself: for I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my roof:

7. Wherefore neither thought I myself worthy to come unto thee: but say in a word, and my servant shall be healed.

8. For I also am a man set under authority, having under me soldiers, and I say unto one, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh; and to my servant, Do this, and he doeth it.

9. When Jesus heard these things, he marvelled at him, and turned him about, and said unto the people that followed him, I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel.

10. And they that were sent, returning to the house, found the servant whole that had been sick.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. When He had strengthened His disciples by more perfect teaching, He goes to Capernaum to work miracles there; as it is said, When he had ended all his sayings, he entered into Capernaum.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 20.) Here we must understand that He did not enter before He had ended these sayings, but it is not mentioned what space of time intervened between the termination of His discourse, and His entering into Capernaum. For in that interval the leper was cleansed whom Matthew introduced in his proper place.

AMBROSE. But having finished His teaching, He rightly instructs them to follow the example of His precepts. For straightway the servant of a Gentile centurion is presented to the Lord to be healed. Now the Evangelist, when he said that the servant was about to die, did not err, because he would have died had he not been healed by Christ.

EUSEBIUS. Although that centurion was strong in battle, and the prefect of the Roman soldiers, yet because his particular attendant lay sick at his house, considering what wonderful things the Saviour had done in healing the sick, and judging that these miracles were performed by no human power, he sends to Him, as unto God, not looking to the visible instrument by which He had intercourse with men; as it follows, And when he heard of Jesus, he sent unto him, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) How then will that be true which Matthew relates, A certain centurion came to him, seeing that he himself did not come? unless upon careful consideration we suppose that Matthew made use of a general mode of expression. For if the actual arrival is frequently said to be through the means of others, much more may the coming be by others. Not then without reason, (the centurion having gained access to our Lord through others,) did Matthew, wishing to speak briefly, say that this man himself came to Christ, rather than those by whom he sent his message, for the more he believed the nearer he came.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 26. in Matt.) How again does Matthew tell us that the centurion said, I am not worthy that thou shouldest enter under my roof, while Luke says here, that he beseeches Him that He would come. Now it seems to me that Luke sets before us the flatteries of the Jews. For we may believe that when the centurion wished to depart, the Jews drew him back, enticing him, saying, We will go and bring him. Hence also their prayers are full of flattery, for it follows, But when they came to Jesus, they besought him instantly, saying that he was worthy. Although it became them to have said, He himself was willing to come and supplicate Thee, but we detained him, seeing the affliction, and the body which was lying in the house, and so to have drawn out the greatness of his faith; but they would not for envy reveal the faith of the man, lest He should seem some great one to whom the prayers were addressed. But wherein Matthew represents the centurion to be not an Israelite, while Luke says, he has built us a synagogue, there is no contradiction, for he might not have been a Jew, and yet built a synagogue.

BEDE. But herein they shew, that as by a church, so also by a synagogue, they were wont to mean not only the assembly of the faithful, but also the place where they assembled.

EUSEBIUS. And the elders of the Jews indeed demand favours for a small sum spent in the service of the synagogue, but the Lord not for this, but a higher reason, manifested Himself, wishing in truth to beget a belief in all men by His own power, as it follows, Then Jesus went with them.

AMBROSE. Which certainly He did not do, because He was unable to heal when absent, but that He might set them an example of imitating His humility. He would not go to the son of the nobleman, lest He should seem thereby to have respected his riches; He went immediately here, that He might not seem to have despised the low estate of a centurion’s servant. But the centurion laying aside his military pride puts on humility, being both willing to believe and eager to honour; as it follows, And when he was not far off, he sent unto him, saying, Trouble not, thyself: for I am not worthy, &c. For by the power not of man, but of God, he supposed that health was given to man. The Jews indeed alleged his worthiness; but he confessed himself unworthy not only of the benefit, but even of receiving the Lord under his roof, For I am not worthy that thou shouldest enter under my roof.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For as soon as he was freed from the annoyance of the Jews, he then sends, saying, Think not that it was from negligence I came not unto Thee, but I counted myself unworthy to receive Thee in my house.

AMBROSE. But Luke well says, that friends were sent by the centurion to meet our Lord, lest by his own coming he might seem both to embarrass our Lord, and to have called for a requital of good offices. Hence it follows, Wherefore neither thought I myself worthy to come unto thee, but say in a word, and my servant shall be healed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Here observe that the centurion held a right opinion concerning the Lord; he said not, pray, but, command; and in doubt lest He should from humility refuse him, he adds, For I also am a man set under authority, &c.

BEDE. He says that he though a man subject to the power of the tribune or governor, yet has command over his inferiors, that it might be implied that much more is He who is God, able not only by the presence of His body, but by the services of His angels, to fulfil whatever He wishes. For the weakness of the flesh or the hostile powers were to be subdued both by the word of the Lord and the ministry of the angels. And to my servant, Do this, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (contra Anom. Hom. 17.) We must here remark, that this word, Fac, signifies a command given to a servant. So God when He wished to create man, said not to the Only-begotten, “Make man,” but, Let us make man, that by the form of unity in the words he might make manifest the equality of the agents. Because then the centurion considered in Christ the greatness of His dominion, therefore saith He, say in a word. For I also say to my servant. But Christ blames him not, but confirmed his wishes, as it follows, When Jesus heard these things, he marvelled.

BEDE. But who had wrought this very faith in him, save He who marvelled? But supposing another had done it, why should He marvel who foreknew it? Because then the Lord marvels, it signifies that we must marvel. For all such feelings when they are spoken of God, are the tokens not of a wonder-struck mind, but of a teaching master.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 27. in Matt.) But that you might see plainly that the Lord said this for the instruction of others, the Evangelist wisely explains it, adding, Verily I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel.

AMBROSE. And indeed if you read it thus, “In none in Israel have I found so great faith,” the meaning is simple and easy. But if according to the Greek, “Not even in Israel have I found so great faith,” faith of this kind is preferred even to that of the more elect, and those that see God.

BEDE. But he speaks not of Patriarchs and Prophets in times far back, but of the men of the present age to whom the faith of the centurion is preferred, because they were instructed in the precepts of the Law and the Prophets, but he with no one to teach him of his own accord believed.

AMBROSE. The faith of the master is proved, and the health of the servant established, as it follows, And they that were sent returning to the house, found the servant whole that had been sick. It is possible then that the good deed of a master may advantage his servants, not only through the merit of faith, but the practice of discipline.

BEDE. Matthew explains these things more fully, saying, that when our Lord said to the centurion, Go thy way, and as thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee, the servant was healed in the self-same hour. But it is the manner of the blessed Luke, to abridge or even purposely to pass by whatever he sees plainly set forth by the other Evangelists, but what he knows to be omitted by them, or briefly touched upon, to more carefully explain.

AMBROSE. Mystically, by the centurion’s servant is signified that the Gentile people who were enthralled by the chain of worldly bondage, and diseased with deadly passions, are to be healed by the mercy of the Lord.

BEDE. But the centurion, whose faith is preferred to Israel, represents the elect from the Gentiles, who as it were attended by their hundred soldiers, are exalted by their perfection of spiritual virtues. For the number hundred, which is transferred from the left to the righta, is frequently put to signify the celestial life. These then must pray to the Lord for those who are still oppressed with fear, in the spirit of bondage. But we of the Gentiles who believe can not ourselves come to the Lord, whom we are unable to see in the flesh, but ought to approach by faith; we must send the elders of the Jews, that is, we must by our suppliant entreaties gain as patrons the greatest men of the Church, who have gone before us to the Lord, who bearing us witness that we have a care to build up the Church, may intercede for our sins. It is well said that Jesus was not far from the house, for his salvation is nigh unto them that fear him, and he who rightly uses the law of nature, in that he does the things which he knows to be good, approaches nigh unto Him who is good.

AMBROSE. But the centurion wished not to trouble Jesus, for Whom the Jewish people crucified, the Gentiles desire to keep inviolate from injury, and (as touching a mystery) he saw that Christ was not yet able to pierce the hearts of the Gentiles.

BEDE. The soldiers and servants who obey the centurion, are the natural virtues which many who come to the Lord will bring with them in great numbers.

THEOPHYLACT. Or in another way. The centurion must be understood as one who stood foremost among many in wickedness, as long as he possesses many things in this life, i. e. is occupied with many affairs or concerns. But he has a servant, the irrational part of the soul, that is, the irascible and concupiscent part. And he speaks to Jesus, the Jews acting as mediators, that is, the thoughts and words of confession, and immediately he received his servant whole.

7:11–17

11. And it came to pass the day after, that he went into a city called Nain; and many of his disciples went with him, and much people.

12. Now when he came nigh to the gate of the city, behold, there was a dead man carried out, the only son of his mother, and she was a widow: and much people of the city was with her.

13. And when the Lord saw her, he had compassion on her, and said unto her, Weep not.

14. And he came and touched the bier: and they that bare him stood still. And he said, Young man, I say unto thee, Arise.

15. And he that was dead sat up, and began to speak. And he delivered him to his mother.

16. And there came a fear on all: and they glorified God, saying, That a great prophet is risen up among us; and, That God hath visited his people.

17. And this rumour of him went forth throughout all Judæa, and throughout all the region round about.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Lord joins one miracle upon another. In the Former instance He came indeed when called for, but in this He came self-invited; as it is said, And it came to pass the day after that he went into a city called Nain.

BEDE. Nain is a city of Galilee, within two miles of mount Tabor. But by the divine counsel there were large multitudes accompanying the Lord, that there might be many witnesses of so great a miracle. Hence it follows, And his disciples went with him, and much people.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Tract. de Anima et Res. Post med.) Now the proof of the resurrection we learn not so much from the words as from the works of our Saviour, who, beginning His miracles with the less wonderful, reconciled our faith to far greater. First indeed in the grievous sickness of the centurion’s servant, He verged upon the power of resurrection;

afterwards with a higher power he led men to the belief in a resurrection, when He raised the widow’s son, who was carried out to be buried; as it is said, Now when he came nigh to the gate of the city, behold, there was a dead man carried out, the only son of his mother.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But some one will say of the centurion’s servant, that he was not going to die. That such an one might restrain his rash tongue, the Evangelist explains that the young man whom Christ came upon was already dead, the only son of a widow. For it follows, And she was a widow, and much people of the city was. with her.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (de hom. Opif. c. 25.) He has told us the sum of misery in a few words. The mother was a widow, and had no further hope of having children, she had no one upon whom she might look in the place of him that was dead. To him alone she had given suck, he alone made her home cheerful. All that is sweet and precious to a mother, was he alone to her.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. These were sufferings to excite compassion, and which might well affect to mourning and tears, as it follows, And when the Lord saw her, he had compassion on her, saying, Weep not.

BEDE. As if He said, Cease to weep for one as dead, whom you shall soon see rise again alive.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Tit. Bost.) But when He bids us cease from weeping Who consoles the sorrowful, He tells us to receive consolation from those who are now dead, hoping for their resurrection. But life meeting death stops the bier, as it follows, And he came.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He performs the miracle not only in word, but also touches the bier, to the end that you might know that the sacred body of Christ is powerful to the saving of man. For it is the body of Life and the flesh of the Omnipotent Word, whose power it possesses. For as iron applied to fire does the work of fire, so the flesh, when it is united to the Word, which quickens all things, becomes itself also quickening, and the banisher of death.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) But the Saviour is not like to Elias mourning over the son of the widow of Sarepta, (1 Kings 17) nor as Elisha who laid his own body upon the body of the dead, (2 Kings 4) nor as Peter who prayed for Tabitha, (Acts 9:40) but is none other than He who calls those things which be not, as though they were, who can speak to the dead as to the living, (Rom. 4:17) as it follows, And he said, Young man

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) When He said, Young man, He signified that he was in the flower of his age, just ripening into manhood, who but a little while before was the sight of his mother's eyes, just entering upon the time of marriage, the scion of her race, the branch of succession, the staff of her old age.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But straightway he arose to whom the command was made. For the Divine power is irresistible; there is no delay, no urgency of prayer, as it follows, And he that was dead sat up, and began to speak, and he gave him to his mother. These are the signs. of a true resurrection, for the lifeless body cannot speak, nor would the mother have carried back to her house her dead and lifeless son.

BEDE. But well does the Evangelist testify that the Lord is first moved with compassion for the mother, and then raises her son, that in the one case He might set before us for our imitation an example of piety, in the other He might build up our belief in His wonderful power. Hence it follows. And there came a fear upon all, and they glorified God, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This was a great thing in an insensible and ungrateful people. For in a short time afterward they would neither esteem Him as a prophet, nor allow that He did aught for the public good. But none of those that dwelt in Judæa were ignorant of this miracle, as it follows, And this rumour of him went forth throughout all Judæa.

MAXIMUS. (non occ.) But it is worthy of remark, that seven resurrections are related before our Lord's, of which the first was that of the son of the widow of Sarepta, (1 Kings 17) the second of the Shunamite's son, (2 Kings 4) the third which was caused by the remains of Elisha, (2 Kings 13) the fourth which took place at Nain, as is here related, the fifth of the ruler of the Synagogue's daughter, (Mark 5) the sixth of Lazarus, (John 11) the seventh at Christ's passion, for many bodies of the saints arose. (Mat. 27.) The eighth is that of Christ, who being free from death remained beyond for a sign that the general resurrection which is to come in the eighth age shall not be dissolved by death, but shall abide never to pass away.

BEDE. But the dead man who was carried without the gate of the city in the sight of many, signifies a man rendered senseless by the deadening power of mortal sin, and no longer concealing his soul's death within the folds of his heart, but proclaiming it to the knowledge of the world, through the evidence of words or deeds as through the gate of the city. For the gate of the city, I suppose, is some one of the bodily senses. And he is well said to be the only son of his mother, for there is one mother composed of many individuals, the Church, but every soul that remembers that it is redeemed by the death of the Lord, knows the Church to be a widow.

AMBROSE. For this widow surrounded by a great multitude of people seems to be more than the woman who was thought worthy by her tears to obtain the resurrection of her only son, because the Church recalls the younger people from the funeral procession to life by the contemplation of her tears, who is forbid to weep for him to whom resurrection was promised.

BEDE. Or the dogma of Novatus is crushedb, who endeavouring to do away with the purifying of the penitent, denies that the mother Church, weeping for the spiritual extinction of her sons, ought to be consoled by the hope of their restoration to life.

AMBROSE. This dead man was borne on the bier by the four material elements to the grave, but there was a hope of his rising again because he was borne on wood, which though before it did not benefit us, yet after Christ had touched it, began to profit unto life, that it might be a sign that salvation was to be extended to the people by the wood of the cross. For we lie lifeless on the bier when either the fire of immoderate desire bursts forth, or the cold moisture breaks out, and through the sluggish state of our earthly body the vigour of our minds waxes dull.

BEDE. Or the coffin on which the dead is carried is the ill at ease conscience of a desperate sinner. But they who carry him to be buried are either unclean desires, or the allurements of companions, who stood when our Lord touched the bier, because the conscience, when touched by dread of the judgment from on high, often checking its carnal lusts, and those who unjustly praise, returns to itself, and answers its Saviour's call to life.

AMBROSE. If then thy sin is so heavy that by thy penitential tears thou canst not thyself wash it out, let the mother Church weep for thee, the multitude standing by; soon shalt thou rise from the dead and begin to speak the words of life; they all shall fear, (for by the example of one all are corrected;) they shall also praise God who has given us such great remedies for escaping death.

BEDE. But God has visited His people not only by the one incarnation of His Word, but by ever sending It into our hearts.

THEOPHYLACT. By the widow also you may understand a soul that has lost her husband in the divine word. Her son is the understanding, which is carried out beyond the city of the living. Its coffin is the body, which some indeed have called the tomb. But the Lord touching him raises him up, causing him to become young, and rising from sin he begins to speak and teach others. For before he would not have been believed.

7:18–23

18. And the disciples of John shewed him of all these things.

19. And John calling unto him two of his disciples sent them to Jesus, saying, Art thou he that should come? or look we for another?

20. When the men were come unto him, they said, John Baptist hath sent us unto thee, saying, Art thou he that should come? or look we for another?

21. And in the same hour he cured many of their infirmities and plagues, and of evil spirits; and unto many that were blind he gave sight.

22. Then Jesus answering said unto them, Go your way, and tell John what things ye have seen and heard; how that the blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, to the poor the Gospel is preached.

23. And blessed is he, whosoever shall not be offended in me.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Certain of His disciples relate to the holy Baptist the miracle which was known to all the inhabitants of Judæa and Galilee, as it follows, And they told John, &c.

BEDE. Not, as it seems to me, in simpleness of heart, but provoked by envy. For in another place also they complain, Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, behold the same baptizeth, and all men come unto him. (John 3:26.)

CHRYSOSTOM. But we are then most raised up to Him when we are fallen into straits. John therefore, being cast into prison, takes the opportunity, when his disciples were most in need of Jesus, to send them to

Christ. For it follows, And John calling two of his disciples sent them to Jesus, saying, Art thou he that should come, &c.

BEDE. He says not, Art thou He that hast come, but, Art thou he that should come. The sense is, Tell me who am to be slain by Herod, and about to descend into hell, (ad inferna) whether I should announce Thee to the souls below as I have announced Thee to those above? or is this not befitting the Son of God, and Thou art going to send another for these sacraments?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But we must altogether disallow such an opinion. For no where do we find the Holy Scriptures stating that John the Baptist foretold to those souls in hell the coming of our Saviour. It is also true to say, that the Baptist was not ignorant of the wonderful mystery of the incarnation of the Only-Begotten, and so also along with the other things had known this, that our Lord was about to preach the Gospel to those who were in hell, after He had tasted death for all living as well as dead. But since the word of holy Scripture indeed declared that Christ would come as the Lord and Chief, but the others were sent as servants before Him, therefore was the Lord and Saviour of all called by the prophets, He who cometh, or Who is to come; according to that, Blessed is he who cometh in the name of the Lord; (Ps. 118:26.) and, A little while, and he who is to come shall come, and will not tarry. (Hab. 2:3.) The blessed Baptist therefore, receiving as it were this name from Holy Scripture, sent certain of his disciples to seek whether it was indeed He who cometh, or, Who is to come.

AMBROSE. But how could it come to pass, that Him of whom he said, Behold him who taketh away the sins of the world, he should still not believe to be the Son of God? For either it is presumption to attribute to Christ a divine action ignorantly, or it is unbelief to have doubted concerning the Son of God. But some suppose of John himself that he was indeed so great a prophet as to acknowledge Christ, but still as not a doubting, but pious, prophet disbelieved that He would die, whom he believed was about to come. Not therefore in his faith but in his piety, he doubted; as Peter also, when he said, Be it far from thee, Lord; this shall not be unto thee. (Mat 16:22.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (Thes. lib. 11. c. 4.) Or he asks the question by economy. For as the forerunner he knew the mystery of Christ's passion, but that his disciples might be convinced how great was the excellence of the Saviour, he sent the more understanding of them, instructing them to enquire and learn from the very words of the Saviour, whether it was He who was expected; as it is added, But when the men were come unto him, they said, John the Baptist hath sent us unto thee, saying, Art thou He, &c. But He knowing as God with what intention John had sent them, and the cause of their coming, was at the time performing many miracles, as it follows, And in the same hour he healed many of their infirmities, &c. He said not positively to them I am he, but rather leads them to the certainty of the fact, in order that receiving their faith in Him, with their reason agreeing thereto, they might return to him who sent them. Hence He made not answer to the words, but to the intention of him who sent them; as it follows, And Jesus answering said unto them, Go your way, and tell John what things you have seen and heard: as if He said, Go and tell John the things which ye have heard indeed through the Prophets, but have seen accomplished by Me. For He was then performing those things which the Prophets prophesied He would do; that is of which it is added, For the blind see, the lame walk.

AMBROSE. An ample testimony surely by which the Prophet might recognise the Lord. For of the, Lord Himself it was prophesied, that the Lord giveth food to the hungry, raiseth up them that are bowed down, looseth the prisoners, openeth the eyes of the blind, and that he who doeth these things shall reign for ever. (Ps. 146:7–10.) Such then are not the tokens of human, but divine power. But these are found seldom or not at all before the Gospel. Tobias alone received sight, and this was the cure of an Angel, not of a man. (Tob. 11.) Elias raised the dead, but he prayed and wept, our Lord commanded. (1 Kings 17) Elisha caused the cleansing of a leper: yet then the cause was not so much in the authority of the command as in the figure of the mystery. (2 Kings 5.)

THEOPHYLACT. These are also the words of Elias, saying, The Lord himself shall come and save us. Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as an hart. (Isa. 35:4–6.)

BEDE. And what is not less than these, the poor have the Gospel preached to them, that is, the poor are enlightened by the Spirit, or hidden treasures, that there might be no difference between the rich and the poor.

These things prove the faith of the Master, when all who can be saved by Him are equal.

AMBROSE. But still these are but slight examples of the testimony to the Lord. The full assurance of faith is the cross of the Lord, His death and burial. Hence He adds, And blessed is he who shall not be offended in me. For the cross may cause offence, even to the elect. But there is no greater testimony than this of a divine person. For there is nothing which seems to be more surpassing the nature of man than that one should offer Himself for the whole world.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else, He wished by this to shew that whatever was passing in their hearts, could not be hid from His sight. For they were those who were offended at Him.

AMBROSE. But we have before said, that mystically John was the type of the Law, which was the forerunner of Christ. John then sends his disciples to Christ, that they might obtain the filling up of their knowledge, for Christ is the fulfilling of the Law. And perhaps those disciples are the two nations, of whom the one of the Jews believed, the other of the Gentiles believed because they heard. They wished then to see, because blessed are the eyes that see. But when they shall have come to the Gospel, and found that the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, then shall they say, “We have seen with our eyes,” for we seem to ourselves to see Him whom we read of. Or perhaps through the instrumentality (operatrice) of a certain part of our Body a we all seem to have traced out the course of our Lord’s passion; for faith comes through the few to the many. The Law then announces that Christ will come, the writings of the Gospel prove that He has come.

7:24–28

24. And when the messengers of John were departed, he began to speak unto the people concerning John, What went ye out into the wilderness for to see? A reed shaken with the wind?

25. But what went ye out for to see? A man clothed in soft raiment? Behold, they which are gorgeously apparelled, and live delicately, are in kings’ courts.

26. But what went ye out for to see? A prophet? Yea, I say unto you, and much more than a prophet.

27. This is he, of whom it is written, Behold, I send my messenger before thy face, which shall prepare thy way before thee.

28. For I say unto you, Among those that are born of women there is not a greater prophet than John the Baptist: but he that is least in the kingdom of God is greater than he.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) The Lord, knowing the secrets of men, foresaw that some would say, If until now John is ignorant of Jesus, how did lie shew Him to us, saying, Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sins of the world? To quench therefore this feeling which had taken possession of them, He prevented the injury which might arise from the offence, as it follows, And when the messengers of John were departed, he began to speak unto the people concerning John, what went ye out for to see? A reed shaken in the wind? As if He said, Ye marvelled at John the Baptist, and oftentimes came to see him, passing over long journeys in the desert; surely in vain, if you think him so fickle as to be like a reed bending down whichever way the wind moves it. For such he appeal’s to be, who lightly avows his ignorance of the things which he knows.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) But you went not out into the desert, (where there is no pleasantness,) leaving your cities, except as caring for this man.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Simeon) Now these things were spoken by our Lord after the departure of John’s disciples, for He would not utter the praises of the Baptist while they were present, lest His words should be counted as those of a flatterer.

AMBROSE. Not unmeaningly then is the character of John praised there, who preferred the way of righteousness to the love of life, and swerved not through fear of death. For this world seems to be compared to a desert, into which, as yet barren and uncultivated, the Lord says we must not so enter as to regard men puffed up with a fleshly mind, and devoid of inward virtue, and vaunting themselves in the heights of frail worldly glory, as a kind of example and model for our imitation. And such being exposed to the storms of this world, and tossed to and fro by a restless life, are rightly compared to a reed.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) We have also an infallible testimony to John’s way of life in his manner of clothing, and his imprisonment, into which he never would have been cast had he known how to court princes; as it follows, But what went ye out for to see? A man clothed with soft raiment? Behold they who are gorgeously apparelled, and live delicately, are in kings’ houses. By being clothed with soft raiment, he signifies men who live luxuriously.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 29. in ep. ad Heb.) But a soft garment relaxes the austerity of the soul; and if worn by a hard and rigorous body, soon, by such effeminacy, makes it frail and delicate. But when the body becomes softer, the soul must also share the injury; for generally its workings correspond with the conditions of the body.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) How then could a religious strictness, so great that it subdued to itself all fleshly lusts, sink down to such ignorance, except from a frivolity of mind, which is not fostered by austerities, but by worldly delights. If then ye imitate John, as one who cared not for pleasure, award him also the strength of mind, which befits his continence. But if strictness no more tends to this than a life of luxury, why do you, not respecting those who live delicately, admire the inhabitant of the desert, and his wretched garment of camel’s hair.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 37. in Matt.) By each of these sayings He shews John to be neither naturally nor easily shaken or diverted from any purpose.

AMBROSE. And although very many become effeminate by the use of softer garments, yet here other garments seem to be meant, namely, our mortal bodies, by which our souls are clothed. Again, luxurious acts and habits are soft garments, but those whose languid limbs are wasted away in luxuries are shut out of the kingdom of heaven, whom the rulers of this world and of darkness have taken captive. For these are the kings who exercise tyranny over those who are their fellows in their own works.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) But perhaps it does not concern us to excuse John upon this ground, for you confess that he is worthy of imitation, hence He adds, But what went ye out for to see? A prophet? Verily I say unto you, more than a prophet. For the prophets foretold that Christ would come, but John not only foretold that He would come, but also declared Him to be present, saying, Behold the Lamb of God.

AMBROSE. Indeed, greater than a prophet (or more than a prophet) was he in whom the prophets terminate; for many desired to see Him whom he saw, whom he baptized.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) Having then described his character by the place where he dwelt, by his clothing, and from the crowds who went to see him, He introduces the testimony of the prophet, saying, This is he of whom it is written, Behold, I send my angel. (Mal. 3:1.)

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. He calls a man an angel, not because he was by nature an angel, for he was by nature a man, but because he exercised the office of an angel, in heralding the advent of Christ.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) But by the words which follow, Before thy face, he signifies nearness of time, for John appeared to men close to the coming of Christ. Wherefore must he indeed be considered more than a prophet, for those also who in battle fight close to the sides of kings, are their most distinguished and greatest friends.

AMBROSE. But he prepared the way of the Lord not only in the order of birth according to the flesh, and as the messenger of faith, but also as the forerunner of His glorious passion. Hence it follows, Who shall prepare thy way before thee.

AMBROSE. But if Christ also is a prophet, how is this man greater than all. But it is said, among those born of woman, not of a virgin. For He was greater than those, whose equal he might be in way of birth, as it follows, For I say unto you, of those that are born of woman, there is not a greater prophet than John the Baptist.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) The voice of the Lord is indeed sufficient to bear testimony to John’s pre-eminence among men. But any one will find the real facts of the case confirming the same, by considering his food, his manner of life, the loftiness of his mind. For he dwelt on earth as one who had come down from heaven, casting no care upon his body, his mind raised up to heaven, and united to God alone, taking no thought for worldly things; his conversation grave and gentle, for with the Jewish people he dealt honestly and zealously, with the king boldly, with his own disciples mildly. He did nothing idle or trifling, but all things becomingly.

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (lib. l. Ep. 33.) John was also greatest among those that are born of women, because he prophesied from the very womb of his mother, and though in darkness, was not ignorant of the light which had already come.

AMBROSE. Lastly, so impossible is it that there should be any comparison between John and the Son of God, that he is counted even below the angels; as it follows, But he that is least in the kingdom of God, is greater than he.

BEDE. These words may be understood in two ways. For either he called that the kingdom of God, which we have not yet received, (in which are the Angels,) and the very least among them is greater than any righteous man, who bears about a body, which weighs down the soul. Or if by the kingdom of God be meant to be understood the Church of this time, the Lord referred to Himself, who in the time of His birth came after John, but was greater in divine authority, and the power of the Lord. Moreover, according to the first explanation, the distinction is as follows, But he who is least in the kingdom of God, and then it is added, is greater than he. According to the latter, But he who is least, and then added, is greater in the kingdom of God than he.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For He adds this, that the abundant praise of John might not give the Jews a pretext to prefer John to Christ. But do not suppose that he spoke comparatively of His being greater than John.

AMBROSE. For He is of another nature, which bears not comparison with human kind. For there can be no comparing of God with men.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But in a mystery, when shewing the superiority of John among those that are born of women, he places in opposition something greater, namely, Himself who was born by the holy Spirit the Son of God. For the kingdom of the Lord is the Spirit of God. Although then as respects works and holiness, we may be inferior to those who attained unto the mystery of the law, whom John represents, yet through Christ we have greater things, being made partakers of the Divine nature.

7:29–35

29. And all the people that heard him, and the Publicans, justified God, being baptized with the baptism of John.

30. But the Pharisees and Lawyers rejected the counsel of God against themselves, being not baptized of him.

31. And the Lord said, Whereunto then shall I liken the men of this generation? and to what are they like?

32. They are like unto children sitting in the marketplace, and calling one to another, and saying, We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced; we have mourned to you, and ye have not wept.

33. For John the Baptist came neither eating bread nor drinking wine; and ye say, He hath a devil.

34. The Son of man is come eating and drinking; and ye say, Behold a gluttonous man, and a winebibber, a friend of Publicans and sinners!

35. But wisdom is justified of all her children.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 37. in Matt.) Having declared the praises of John, he next exposes the great fault of the Pharisees and lawyers, who would not after the publicans receive the baptism of John. Hence it is said, And all the people that heard him, and the Publicans, justified God.

AMBROSE. God is justified by baptism, wherein men justify themselves confessing their sins. For he that sins and confesses his sin unto God, justifies God, submitting himself to Him who overcometh, and hoping for grace from Him; God therefore is justified by baptism, in which there is confession and pardon of sin.

EUSEBIUS. Because also they believed, they justified God, for He appeared just to them in all that He did. But the disobedient conduct of the Pharisees in not receiving John, accorded not with the words of the prophet, That thou mightest be justified when thou speakest. (Ps. 51:4.) Hence it follows, But the Pharisees and lawyers rejected the counsel of God, &c.

BEDE. These words were spoken either in the person of the Evangelist, or, as some think, of the Saviour; but when he says, against themselves, he means that he who rejects the grace of God, does it against himself. Or, they are blamed as foolish and ungrateful for being unwilling to receive the counsel of God, sent to themselves. The counsel then is of God, because He ordained salvation by the passion and death of Christ, which the Pharisees and lawyers despised.

AMBROSE. Let us not then despise (as the Pharisees did) the counsel of God, which is in the baptism of John, that is, the counsel which the Angel of great counsel searches out. (Is. 9:6. LXX.) No one despises the counsel of man. Who then shall reject the counsel of God?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. There was a certain play among the Jewish children of this kind. A company of boys were collected together, who, mocking the sudden changes in the affairs of this life, some of them sang, some mourned, but the mourners did not rejoice with those that rejoiced, nor did those who rejoiced fall in with those that wept. They then rebuked each other in turn with the charge of want of sympathy. That such were the feelings of the Jewish people and their rulers, Christ implied in the following words, spoken in the person of Christ; Whereunto then shall I liken the men of this generation, and to what are they like? They are like to children sitting in the market-place.

BEDE. The Jewish generation is compared to children, because formerly they had prophets for their teachers, of whom it is said, Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise.

AMBROSE. But the prophets sung, repeating in spiritual strains their oracles of the common salvation; they wept, soothing with mournful dirges the hard hearts of the Jews. The songs were not sung in the market-place, nor in the streets, but in Jerusalem. For that is the Lord’s forum, in which the laws of His heavenly precepts are framed.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. 6. in Eccl.) But singing and lamentation are nothing else but the breaking forth, the one indeed of joy, the other of sorrow. Now at the sound of a tune played upon a musical instrument, man by the concordant beating of his feet, and motion of his body, pourtrays his inward feelings. Hence he says, We have sung, and ye have not danced; we have mourned to you, and ye have not wept.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. q. 11.) Now these words have reference to John and Christ. For when he says, We have mourned, and ye have not wept, it is in allusion to John, whose abstinence from meat and drink signified penitential sorrow; and hence he adds in explanation, For John came neither eating bread, nor drinking wine, and ye say he hath a devil.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. They take upon themselves to slander a man worthy of all admiration. They say that he who mortifies the law of sin which is in his members hath a devil.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But his words, We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced, refer to the Lord Himself, who by using meats and drinks as others did, represented the joy of His kingdom. Hence it follows, The Son of man came eating and drinking, &c.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. For Christ would not abstain from this food, lest He should give a handle to heretics, who say that the creatures of God are bad, and blame flesh and wine.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But where could they point out the Lord as gluttonous? For Christ is found every where repressing excess, and leading men to temperance. But He associated with publicans and sinners. Hence they said against Him, He is a friend of Publicans and sinners, though He could in no wise fall into sin, but on the contrary was to them the cause of salvation. For the sun is not polluted though sending its rays over all the earth, and frequently falling upon unclean bodies. Neither will the Sun of righteousness be hurt by associating with the bad. But let no one attempt to place his own condition on a level with Christ's greatness, but let each considering his own infirmity avoid having dealing with such men, for "evil communications corrupt good manners." It follows, And wisdom is justified of all her children.

AMBROSE. The Son of God is wisdom, by nature, not by growth, which is justified by baptism, when it is not rejected through obstinacy, but through righteousness is acknowledged the gift of God. Herein then is the justification of God, if he seems to transfer His gifts not to the unworthy and guilty, but to those who are through baptism holy and just.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Ps. 108.) But by the children of wisdom, He means the wise. For Scripture is accustomed to indicate the bad rather by their sin than their name, but to call the good the children of the virtue which characterizes them.

AMBROSE. He well says, of all, for justice is reserved for all, that the faithful may be taken up, the unbelievers cast out.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, when he says, wisdom is justified of all her children, he shews that the children of wisdom understand that righteousness consists neither in abstaining from nor eating food, but in patiently enduring want. For not the use of such things, but the coveting after them, must be blamed; only let a man adapt himself to the kind of food of those with whom he lives.

7:36–50

36. And one of the Pharisees desired him that he would eat with him. And he went into the Pharisee’s house, and sat down to meat.

37. And, behold, a woman in the city, which was a sinner, when she knew that Jesus sat at meat in the Pharisee’s house, brought an alabaster box of ointment,

38. And stood at his feet behind him weeping, and began to wash his feet with tears, and did wipe them with the hairs of her head, and kissed his feet, and anointed them with the ointment.

39. Now when the Pharisee which had bidden him saw it, he spake within himself, saying, This man, if he were a prophet, would have known who and what manner of woman this is that toucheth him: for she is a sinner.

40. And Jesus answering said unto him, Simon, I have somewhat to say unto thee. And he saith, Master, say on.

41. There was a certain creditor which had two debtors: the one owed five hundred pence, and the other fifty.

42. And when they had nothing to pay, he frankly forgave them both. Tell me therefore, which of them will love him most?

43. Simon answered and said, I suppose that he, to whom he forgave most. And he said unto him, Thou hast rightly judged.

44. And he turned to the woman, and said unto Simon, Seest thou this woman? I entered into thine house, thou gavest me no water for my feet: but she hath washed my feet with tears, and wiped them with the hairs of her head.

45. Thou gavest me no kiss: but this woman since the time I came in hath not ceased to kiss my feet.

46. My head with oil thou didst not anoint: but this woman hath anointed my feet with ointment.

47. Wherefore I say unto thee, Her sins, which are many, are forgiven; for she loved much: but to whom little is forgiven, the same loveth little.

48. And he said unto her, Thy sins are forgiven.

49. And they that sat at meat with him began to say within themselves, Who is this that forgiveth sins also?

50. And he said to the woman, Thy faith hath saved thee: go in peace.

BEDE. Having said just before, And the people that heard him justified God, being baptized with the baptism of John, the same Evangelist builds up in deed what he had proposed in word, namely, wisdom justified by the righteous and the penitent, saying, And one of the Pharisees desired him, &c.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. de Mul. Peccat.) This account is full of precious instruction. For there are very many who justify themselves, being puffed up with the dreamings of an idle fancy, who before the time of judgment comes, separate themselves as lambs from the herds, not willing even to join in eating with the many, and hardly with those who go not to extremes, but keep the middle path in life. St. Luke, the physician of souls rather than of bodies, represents therefore our Lord and Saviour most mercifully visiting others, as it follows, And he went into the Pharisees' house, and sat down to meat. Not that He should share any of his faults, but might impart somewhat of His own righteousness.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. A woman of corrupt life, but testifying her faithful affection, comes to Christ, as having power to release her from every fault, and to grant her pardon for the crimes she had committed. For it follows, And behold a woman in the city, which was a sinner, brought an alabaster box of ointment.

BEDE. Alabaster is a kind of white marble tinged with various colours, which is generally used for vessels holding ointment, because it is said to be the best sort for preserving the ointment sweet.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 33. in Ev.) For this woman, beholding the spots of her shame, ran to wash them at the fountain of mercy, and blushed not at seeing the guests, for since she was courageously ashamed of herself within, she thought there was nothing which could shame her from without. Observe with what sorrow she is wrung who is not ashamed to weep even in the midst of a feast!

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) But to mark her own unworthiness, she stands behind with downcast eyes, and with her hair thrown about embraces His feet, and washing them with her tears, betokened a mind distressed at her state, and imploring pardon. For it follows, And standing behind, she began to wash his feet with her tears.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 33. in Evang.) For her eyes which once coveted after earthly things, she was now wearing out with penitential weeping. She once displayed her hair for the setting off of her face, she now wiped her tears with her hair. As it follows, And she wiped them with the hairs of her head. She once uttered proud things with her mouth, but kissing the feet of the Lord, she impressed her lips on the footsteps of her Redeemer. She once used ointment for the perfume of her body; what she had unworthily applied to herself, she now laudably offered to God. As it follows, And she anointed with ointment. As many enjoyments as she had in herself, so many offerings did she devise out of herself. She converts the number of her faults into the same number of virtues, that as much of her might wholly serve God in her penitence, as had despised God in her sin.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 6. in Matt.) Thus the harlot became then more honourable than the virgins. For no sooner was she inflamed with penitence, than she burst forth in love for Christ. And these things indeed which have been spoken of were done outwardly, but those which her mind pondered within itself, were much more fervent. God alone beheld them.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But the Pharisee beholding these things despises them, and finds fault, not only with the woman who was a sinner, but with the Lord who received her, as it follows, Now when the Pharisee who had bidden him saw it, he spake within himself, saying, This man, if he were a prophet, would have known who and what manner of woman this is which toucheth him. We see the Pharisee really proud in himself, and hypocritically righteous, blaming the sick woman for her sickness, the physician for his aid. The woman surely if she had come to the feet of the Pharisee would have departed with the heel lifted up against her. For he would have thought that he was polluted by another’s sin, not having sufficient of his own real righteousness to fill him. So also some gifted with the priests’ office, if perchance they have done any just thing outwardly or slightly, forthwith despise those who are put under them, and look with disdain on sinners who are of the people. But when we behold sinners, we must first bewail ourselves for their calamity, since we perhaps have had and are certainly liable to a similar fall. But it is necessary that we should carefully distinguish, for we are bound to make distinction in vices, but to have compassion on nature. For if we must punish the sinner, we must cherish a brother. But when by penance he has himself punished his own deed, our brother is no more a sinner, for he punished in himself what Divine justice condemned. The Physician was between two sick persons, but the one preserved her faculties in the fever, the other lost his mental perception. For she wept at what she had done; but the Pharisee, elated with a false sense of righteousness, overrated the vigour of his own health.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But the Lord not hearing his words, but perceiving his thoughts, shewed Himself to be the Lord of Prophets, as it follows, And Jesus answering said unto him, Simon, I have something to say unto thee.

GLOSS. (non occ. v. Lyra in loc.) And this indeed He spake in answer to his thoughts; and the Pharisee was made more attentive by these words of our Lord, as it is said, And he saith, Master, say on.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) A parable concerning two debtors is opposed to him, of whom the one owed more, the other less; as it follows, There was a certain creditor which had two debtors, &c.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. As if He said, Nor art thou without debts. What then! If thou art involved in fewer debts, boast not thyself, for thou art still in need of pardon. Then He goes on to speak of pardon, And when they had nothing to pay, he freely forgave them both.

GLOSS. (non occ.) For no one can of himself escape the debt of sin, but only by obtaining pardon through the grace of God.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But both debtors being forgiven, the Pharisee is asked which most loved the forgiver of the debts. For it follows, Who then will love him most? To which he at once answers, I suppose, that he to whom he forgave most. And here we must remark, that while the Pharisee is convicted upon his own grounds, the madman carries the rope by which he will be bound; as it follows, But he said unto him, Thou hast rightly judged. The good deeds of the sinful woman are enumerated to him, and the evils of the pretended righteous; as it follows, And he turned to the woman, and said unto Simon, Seest thou this woman? I entered into thy house, thou gavest me no water for my feet, but she hath washed my feet with her tears.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. As if He said, To provide water is easy, to pour forth tears is not easy. Thou hast not provided even what was at hand, she hath poured forth what was not at hand; for washing my feet with her tears, she washed away her own stains. She wiped them with her hair, that so she might draw to herself the sacred moisture, and by that by which she once enticed youth to sin, might now attract to herself holiness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 6. in Matt.) But as after the breaking of a violent storm there comes a calm, so when tears have burst forth, there is peace, and gloomy thoughts vanish; and as by water and the Spirit, so by tears and confession we are again made clean. Hence it follows, Wherefore I say unto you, Her sins which are many are forgiven, for she loveth much. For those who have violently plunged into evil, will in time also eagerly follow after good, being conscious to what debts they have made themselves responsible.

GREGORY. (Hom. 33. in Evan.) The more then the heart of the sinner is burnt up by the great fire of charity, so much the more is the rust of sin consumed.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But it more frequently happens that he who has sinned much is purified by confession, but he who has sinned little, refuses from pride to come to be healed thereby. Hence it follows, But to whom little is forgiven, the same loveth little.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 67. in Matt.) We have need then of a fervent spirit, for nothing hinders a man from becoming great. Let then no sinner despair, no virtuous man fall asleep; neither let the one be self-confident, for often the harlot shall go before him, nor the other distrustful, for he may even surpass the foremost. Hence it is also here added, But he said unto her, Thy sins are forgiven thee.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Behold she who had come sick to the Physician was healed, but because of her safety others are still sick; for it follows, And they that sat at meat began to say within themselves, Who is this that forgiveth sins also. But the heavenly Physician regards not those sick, whom He sees to be made still worse by His remedy, but her whom He had healed He encourages by making mention of her own piety; as it follows, But he said unto the woman, Thy faith hath made thee whole; for in truth she doubted not that she would receive what she sought for.

THEOPHYLACT. But after having forgiven her sins, He stops not at the forgiveness of sins, but adds good works, as it follows, Go in peace, i. e. in righteousness, for righteousness is the reconciliation of man to God, as sin is the enmity between God and man; as if He said, Do all things which lead you to the peace of God.

AMBROSE. Now in this place many seem to be perplexed with the question, whether the Evangelists do not appear to have differed concerning the faith.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus Antiochenus.) For since the four Evangelists relate that Christ was anointed with ointment by a woman, I think that there were three women, differing according to the quality of each, their mode of action, and the difference of times. John, for example, relates that Mary, the sister of Lazarus, six days before the Passover, anointed the feet of Jesus in her own house; but Matthew, after that the Lord had said, You know that after two days will be the Passover, adds, that in Bethany, at the house of Simon the leper, a woman poured ointment upon the head of our Lord, but did not anoint His feet as Mary. Mark also says the same as Matthew; but Luke gives the account not near the time of the Passover, but in the middle of the Gospel. Chrysostom explains it that there were two different women, one indeed who is described in John, another who is mentioned by the three.

AMBROSE. Matthew has introduced this woman as pouring ointment upon the head of Christ, and was therefore unwilling to call her a sinner, for the sinner, according to Luke, poured ointment upon the feet of Christ. She cannot then be the same, lest the Evangelists should seem to be at variance with one another. The difficulty may be also solved by the difference of merit and of time, so that the former woman may have been yet a sinner, the latter now more perfect.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. lib. ii. c. 79.) For I think we must understand that the same Mary did this twice, once indeed as Luke has related, when at first coming with humility and weeping, she was thought worthy to receive forgiveness of sins. Hence John, when he began to speak of the resurrection of Lazarus, before he came to Bethany, says, But it was Mary who anointed our Lord with ointment, and wiped his feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus was sick. (John 11:2.) Mary therefore had already done this; but what she again did in Bethany is another occurrence, which belongs not to the relation of Luke, but is equally told by the other three.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 33. in Evang.) Now in a mystical sense the Pharisee, presuming upon his pretended righteousness, is the Jewish people; the woman who was a sinner, but who came and wept at our Lord’s feet, represents the conversion of the Gentiles.

AMBROSE. Or, the leper, is the prince of this world; the house of Simon the leper, is the earth. The Lord therefore descended from the higher parts to this earth; for this woman could not have been healed, who bears the figure of a soul or the Church, had not Christ come upon earth. But rightly does she receive the figure of a sinner, for Christ also took the form of a sinner. If then thou makest thy soul approach in faith to God, it not with foul and shameful sins, but piously obeying the word of God, and in the confidence of unspotted purity, ascends to the very head of Christ. But the head of Christ is God. (1 Cor. 11:3.) But let him who holds not the head of Christ, hold the feet, the sinner at the feet, the just at the head; nevertheless she also who sinned, has ointment.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) What else is expressed by the ointment, but the sweet savour of a good report? If then we do good works by which we may sprinkle the Church with the sweet odour of a good report, what else do we but pour ointment upon the body of our Lord? But the woman stood by His feet, for we stood over against the feet of the Lord, when yet in our sins we resisted His ways. But if we are converted from our sins to true repentance, we now again stand by His feet, for we follow His footsteps whom we before opposed.

AMBROSE. Bring thou also repentance after sin. Wherever thou hearest the name of Christ, speed thither; into whatever house thou knowest that Jesus has entered, thither hasten; when thou findest wisdom, when thou findest justice sitting in any inner chamber, run to its feet, that is, seek even the lowest part of wisdom; confess thy sins with tears. Perhaps Christ washed not His own feet, that we might wash them with our tears. Blessed tears, which can not only wash away our own sin, but also water the footsteps of the heavenly Word, that His goings may abound in us. Blessed tears, in which there is not only the redemption of sinners, but the refreshing of the righteous.

GREGORY. (Hom. 33. in Evan.) For we water the feet of our Lord with tears if we are moved with compassion to any even the lowest members of our Lord. We wipe our Lord’s feet with our hair, when we shew pity to His saints (with whom we suffer in love) by the sacrifice of those things with which we abound.

AMBROSE. Throw about thy hair, scatter before Him all the graces of thy body. The hair is not to be despised which can wash the feet of Christ.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The woman kisses the feet which she has wiped. This also we fully do when we ardently love those whom we maintain by our bounty. By the feet also may be understood the mystery itself of the Incarnation. We then kiss the feet of the Redeemer when we love with our whole heart the mystery of the Incarnation. We anoint the feet with ointment, when we proclaim the power of His humanity with the good tidings of holy eloquence. But this also the Pharisee sees and grudges, for when the Jewish people perceives that the Gentiles preach God, it consumes away by its own malice. But the Pharisee is thus repulsed, that as it were through Him that false people might be made manifest, for in truth that unbelieving people never offered to the Lord even those things which were without them; but the Gentiles being converted, poured forth not only their substance but their blood. Hence He says to the Pharisee, Thou gavest me no water for my feet, but she hath washed my feet with her tears; for water is without us, the moisture of tears is within us. That unfaithful people also gave no kiss to the Lord, for it was unwilling to embrace Him from love whom it obeyed from fear, (for the kiss is the sign of love,) but the Gentiles being called cease not to kiss the feet of their Redeemer, for they ever breathe in His love.

AMBROSE. But she is of no slight merit of whom it is said, From the time that she entered has not ceased to kiss my feet, so that she knew not to speak aught but wisdom, to love aught but justice, to touch aught but chastity, to kiss aught but modesty.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But it is said to the Pharisee, My head with oil thou didst not anoint, for the very power even of Divinity on which the Jewish people professed to believe, he neglects to celebrate with due praise. But she hath anointed my feet with ointment. For while the Gentile people believed the mystery of His incarnation, it proclaimed also His lowest powers with the highest praise.

AMBROSE. Blessed is he even who can anoint with oil the feet of Christ, but more blessed is he who anoints with ointment, for the essence of many flowers blended into one, scatters the sweets of various odours. And perhaps no other than the Church alone can bring that ointment which has innumerable flowers of different perfumes, and therefore no one can love so much as she who loves in many individuals. But in the Pharisee’s house, that is, in the house of the Law and the Prophets, not the Pharisee, but the Church is justified. For the Pharisee believed not, the Church believed. The Law has no mystery by which secret faults are cleansed, and therefore that which is wanting in the Law is made up in the Gospel. But the two debtors are the two nations who are responsible for payment to the usurer of the heavenly treasury. But we do not owe to this usurer material money, but the balance of our good deeds, the coin of our virtues, the merits of which are estimated by the weight of sorrow, the stamp of righteousness, the sound of confession. But that denarius is of no slight value on which the image of the king is found. Woe to me if I shall not have what I received. Or because there is hardly any one who can pay the whole debt to the usurer, woe to me if I shall not seek the debt to be forgiven me. But what nation is it that owes most, if not we to whom most is lent? To them were entrusted the oracles of God, to us is entrusted the Virgin’s offspring, Immanuel, i. e. God with us, the cross of our Lord, His death, His resurrection. It cannot then be doubted that he owes most who receives most. Among men he perhaps offends most who is most in debt. By the mercy of the Lord the case is reversed, so that he loves most who owes most, if so be that he obtains grace. And therefore since there is nothing which we can worthily return to the Lord, woe be to me also if I shall not have loved. Let us then offer our love for the debt, for he loves most to whom most is given.

CHAPTER 8

8:1–3

1. And it came to pass afterward, that he went throughout every city and village, preaching and shewing the glad tidings of the kingdom of God: and the twelve were with him,

2. And certain women, which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities, Mary called Magdalene, out of whom went seven devils,

3. And Joanna the wife of Chuza Herod’s steward, and Susanna, and many others, which ministered unto him of their substance.

THEOPHYLACT. He who descended from heaven, for our example and imitation, gives us a lesson not to be slothful in teaching. Hence it is said, And it came to pass afterward that he went, &c.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. xxxvii. 2.) For He passes from place to place, that He may not only gain many, but may consecrate many places. He sleeps and labours, that He may sanctify sleep and labour. He weeps, that He may give a value to tears. He preaches heavenly things, that He may exalt His hearers.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. For He who descends from heaven to earth, brings tidings to them that dwell on earth of a heavenly kingdom. But who ought to preach the kingdom of heaven? Many prophets came, yet preached not the kingdom of heaven, for how could they pretend to speak of things which they perceived not?

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (lib. iii. ep. 206.) Now this kingdom of God some think to be higher and better than the heavenly kingdom, but some think it to be one and the same in reality, but called by different names; at one time the kingdom of God from Him who reigneth, but at another the kingdom of heaven from the Angels and Saints, His subjects, who are said to be of heaven.

BEDE. But like the eagle, enticing its young ones to fly, our Lord, step by step, raises up His disciples to heavenly things. He first of all teaches in the synagogues, and performs miracles. He next chooses twelve whom He names Apostles; He afterwards takes them alone with Him, as He preached throughout the cities and villages, as it follows, And the twelve were with him.

THEOPHYLACT. Not teaching or preaching, but to be instructed by Him. But lest it should seem that the women were hindered from following Christ, it is added, And certain women which had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities, Mary called Magdalene, out of whom went seven devils.

BEDE. Mary Magdalene is the same of whose repentance, without mention of her name, we have just read. For the Evangelist, when he relates her going with our Lord, rightly distinguishes her by her known name, but when describing the sinner but penitent, He speaks of her generally as a woman; lest the mark of her former guilt should blacken a name of so great report. Out of whom seven devils are reported to have gone, that it might be shewn that she was full of all vices.

GREGORY. (Hom. 33. in Ev.) For what is understood by the seven devils, but all vices? For since all time is comprehended by seven days, rightly by the number seven is universality represented: Mary therefore had seven devils, for she was full of every kind of vice. It follows, And Joanna the wife of Chuza Herod’s steward, and Susanna, and many others who ministered to him of their substance.

JEROME. (in Matt. 27:55.) It was a Jewish custom, nor was it thought blameable, according to the ancient manners of that nation, that women should afford of their substance food and clothing to their teachers. This custom, as it might cause offence to the Gentiles, St. Paul relates he had cast off. (1 Cor. 9:15.) But these ministered unto the Lord of their substance, that He might reap their carnal things from whom they had reaped spiritual things. Not that the Lord needed the food of His creatures, but that He might set an example to masters, that they ought to be content with food and clothing from their disciples.

BEDE. But Mary is by interpretation, “bitter sea,” because of the loud wailing of her penitence; Magdalene, “a tower, or rather belonging to a tower,” from the tower of which it is said, Thou art become my hope, my strong tower from the face of my enemy. (Ps. 61:3.) Joanna is by interpretation “the Lord her grace,” or “the merciful Lord,” for from Him cometh every thing that we live upon. But if Mary, cleansed from the corruption of her sins, points to the Church of the Gentiles, why does not Joanna represent the same Church formerly subject to the worship of idols?

For every evil spirit whilst he acts for the devil’s kingdom, is as it were Herod’s steward. Susanna is interpreted, “a lily,” or its grace, because of the fragrance and whiteness of the heavenly life, and the golden heat of inward love.

8:4–15

4. And when much people were gathered together, and were come to him out of every city, he spake by a parable:

5. A sower went out to sow his seed: and as he sowed, some fell by the way side; and it was trodden down, and the fowls of the air devoured it.

6. And some fell upon a rock; and as soon as it was sprung up, it withered away, because it lacked moisture.

7. And some fell among thorns; and the thorns sprang up with it, and choked it.

8. And other fell on good ground, and sprang up, and bare fruit an hundredfold. And when he had said these things, he cried, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

9. And his disciples asked him, saying, What might this parable be?

10. And he said, Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God: but to others in parables; that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand.

11. Now the parable is this: The seed is the word of God.

12. Those by the way side are they that hear; then cometh the devil, and taketh away the word out of their hearts, lest they should believe and be saved.

13. They on the rock are they, which, when they hear, receive the word with joy; and these have no root, which for a while believe, and in time of temptation fall away.

14. And that which fell among thorns are they, which, when they have heard, go forth, and are choked with cares and riches and pleasures of this life, and bring no fruit to perfection.

15. But that on the good ground are they, which in an honest and good heart, having heard the word, keep it, and bring forth fruit with patience.

THEOPHYLACT. That which David had foretold in the person of Christ, I will open my mouth in parables, (Ps. 78:2.) the Lord here fulfils; as it is said, And when much people were gathered together, and were come to him out of every city, he spake by a parable. But the Lord speaks by a parable, first indeed that He may make His hearers more attentive. For men were accustomed to exercise their minds on dark sayings, and to despise what was plain; and next, that the unworthy might not receive what was spoken mystically.

ORIGEN. And therefore it is significantly said, When much people were gathered together, and were come to him out of every city. For not many but few there are who walk the strait road, and find the way which leadeth to life. Hence Matthew says, that He taught without the house by parables, but within the house explained the parable to His disciples. (Matt. 13:36.)

EUSEBIUS. Now Christ most fitly puts forth His first parable to the multitude not only of those who then stood by, but of those also who were to come after them, inducing them to listen to His words, saying, A sower went out to sow his seed.

BEDE. The sower we can conceive to be none other but the Son of God, Who going forth from His Father’s bosom whither no creature had attained, came into the world that He might bear witness to the truth. (John 18:37.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 44. in Matt.) Now His going, Who is every where, was not local, but through the vail of the flesh He approached us. But Christ fitly denominates His advent, His going forth. For we were aliens from God, and cast out as criminals, and rebels to the king, but he who wishes to reconcile man, going out to them, speaks to them without, until having become meet for the royal presence, He brings them within; so also did Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. But He went out now, not to destroy the husbandmen, or to burn up the earth, but He went out to sow. For oftimes the husbandman who sows, goes out for some other cause, not only to sow.

EUSEBIUS. Some went out from the heavenly country and descended among men, not however to sow, for they were not sowers, but ministering spirits sent forth to minister. (Heb. 1:14.) Moses also and the prophets after him did not plant in men the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but by keeping back the foolish from the error of iniquity, and the worship of idols, they tilled as it were the souls of men, and brought them into cultivation.

But the only Sower of all, the Word of God, went out to sow the new seed of the Gospel, that is, the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven.

THEOPHYLACT. But the Son of God never ceases to sow in our hearts, for not only when teaching, but creating, He sows good seed in our hearts.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But He went out to sow His seed, He receives not the word as borrowed, for He is by nature the Word of the living God. The seed is not then of Paul, or of John, but they have it because they have received it. Christ has His own seed, drawing forth His teaching from His own nature. Hence also the Jews said, How knoweth this man letters, having never learned? (John 7:15.)

EUSEBIUS. He teaches therefore that there are two classes of those who received the seed; the first, of those who have been made worthy of the heavenly calling, but fall from grace through carelessness and sloth; but the second, of those who multiply the seed bearing good fruit. But according to Matthew he makes three divisions in each class. For those who corrupt the seed have not all the same manner of destruction, and those who bear fruit from it do not receive an equal abundance. He wisely sets forth the cases of those who lose the seed. For some though they have not sinned, have lost the good seed implanted in their hearts, through its having been withdrawn from their thoughts and memory by evil spirits, and devils who fly through the air; or deceitful and cunning men, whom He calls the birds of the air. Hence it follows, And as he sowed, some fell by the way side.

THEOPHYLACT. He said not that the sower threw some on the way side, but that it fell by the way side. For he who sows teaches the right word, but the word falls in different ways upon the hearers, so that some of them are called the way side: and it was trodden down, and the birds of the air devoured it.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For every way side is in some measure dry and uncultivated, because it is trodden down by all men, and no seed gains moisture on it. So the divine warning reaches not the unteachable heart, that it should bring forth the praise of virtue. These then are the ways frequented by unclean spirits. There are again some who bear faith about them, as if it consisted in the nakedness of words; their faith is without root, of whom it is added, And some fell upon a rock, and as soon as it sprung up, it withered away, because it lacked moisture.

BEDE. The rock, he says, is the hard and unsubdued heart. Now the moisture at the root of the seed is the same as what is called in another parable, the oil to trim the lamps of the virgins, that is, love and stedfastness in virtue. (Matt. 25.)

EUSEBIUS. There are also some who through covetousness, the desire of pleasure and worldly cares, which indeed Christ calls thorns, suffer the seed which has been sown in them to be choked.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 44. in Matt.) For as the thorns do not let the seed grow up, but when it has been sown choke it by thickening round it, so the cares of this present life permit not the seed to bear fruit. But in things of sense the husbandman must be reproved who would sow amid thorns on a rock and the way side, for it is impossible that the rocks should become earth, the way not be a way, the thorns not be thorns. But in rational things it is otherwise. For it is possible that the rock should be converted into a fruitful soil, the way not be trodden down, the thorns dispersed.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now the rich and fruitful ground is the honest and good hearts which receive deeply the seeds of the word, and retain them and cherish them. And whatever is added to this, And some fell upon good ground, and springing up, brought forth fruit an hundredfold. For when the divine word is poured into a soul free from all anxieties, then it strikes root deep, and sends forth as it were the ear, and in its due season comes to perfection.

BEDE. For by fruit a hundredfold, he means perfect fruit. For the number ten is always taken to imply perfection, because in ten precepts is contained the keeping, or the observance of the law. But the number ten multiplied by itself amounts to a hundred; hence by a hundred very great perfection is signified.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But what the meaning of the parable is, let us hear from him who made it, as it follows, And when he had said these things, he cried, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

BASIL. (Hom. in Princ. Prov.) Hearing has reference to the understanding. By this then our Lord stirs us up to listen attentively to the meaning of those things which are spoken.

BEDE. For as often as the admonition occurs either in the Gospel or the Revelation of St. John, it signifies that there is a mystical meaning in what is said, and we must inquire more closely into it. Hence the disciples who were ignorant ask our Saviour, for it follows, And his disciples asked him, &c. But let no one suppose that as soon as the parable was finished His disciples asked Him, but as Mark says, When he was alone they asked him. (Mark 4:10.)

ORIGEN. (in Prov. 1.) Now a parable is a narration of an action as done, yet not done according to the letter, though it might have been, representing certain things by means of others which are given in the parable. An enigma is a continued story of things which are spoken of as done, and yet have not been done, nor are possible to be done, but contains a concealed meaning, as that which is mentioned in the Book of Judges, that the trees went forth to anoint a king over them. (Judges 9:8.) But it was not literally a fact as is said, A sower went out to sow, like those facts related in history, yet it might have been so.

EUSEBIUS. But our Lord told them the reason why He spake to the multitudes in parables, as follows, And he said, Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of God.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (ubi sup.) When you hear this you must not entertain the notion of different natures, as certain heretics do, who think that some men indeed are of a perishing nature, others of a saving nature, but that some are so constituted that their will leads them to better or worse. But add to the words, To you it is given, if willing and truly worthy.

THEOPHYLACT. But to those who are unworthy of such mysteries, they are obscurely spoken. Hence it follows, But to the rest in parables, that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand. For they think they see, but see not, and hear indeed, but do not understand. For this reason Christ hides this from them, lest they should beget a greater prejudice against them, if after they had known the mysteries of Christ, they despised them. For he who understands and afterwards despises, shall be more severely punished.

BEDE. Rightly then do they hear in parables, who having closed the senses of their heart, care not to know the truth, forgetful of what the Lord told them. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 15 in Ev.) But our Lord condescended to explain what He said, that we might know how to seek for explanation in those things which He is unwilling to explain through Himself. For it follows, Now the parable is this: The seed is the word of God.

EUSEBIUS. Now He says, that there are three reasons why men destroy the seed implanted in their hearts. For some destroy the seed that is hid in them by lightly giving heed to those that wish to deceive, of whom He adds, Those by the way side are they that hear: then cometh the devil, and taketh away the word out of their hearts.

BEDE. Who in truth deign to receive the word which they hear with no faith, with no understanding, at least with no attempt to test the value of it.

EUSEBIUS. But some there are who having not received the word in any depth of heart, are soon overcome when adversity assails them, of whom it is added, They on the rock are they which when they hear, receive the word with joy; and these have no root, which for a while believe, and in time of temptation fall away.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For when they enter the Church they gladly wait on the divine mysteries, but with infirmity of purpose. But when they leave the Church they forget the sacred discipline, and as long as Christians are undisturbed, their faith is lasting; but when persecution harasses, their heart fails them, for their faith was without root.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Many men propose to begin a good work, but as soon as they have become annoyed by adversity or temptation, they abandon what they had begun. The rocky ground then had no moisture to carry on to constancy fruit which it had put forth.

EUSEBIUS. But some choke the seed which has been deposited in them with riches and vain delights, as if with choking thorns, of whom it is added, And that which fell among thorns are they, which, when they have heard, go forth, and are choked with cares and riches of this life, &c.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) It is wonderful that the Lord has represented riches as thorns, for these prick, while those delight, and yet they are thorns, for they lacerate the mind by the prickings of their thoughts, and whenever they entice to see they draw blood, as if inflicting a wound. But there are two things which He joins to riches, cares and pleasures, for they oppress the mind by anxiety and unnerve it by luxuries, but they choke the seed, for they strangle the throat of the heart with vexatious thoughts, and while they let not a good desire enter the heart, they close up as it were the passage of the vital breath.

EUSEBIUS. Now these things were foretold by our Saviour according to His foreknowledge, and that their case is so, experience testifies. For in no wise do men fall away from the truth of divine worship, but according to some of the causes before mentioned by Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 44. in Matt.) And to sum up many things in a few words. Some indeed as careless hearers, some as weak, but others as the very slaves of pleasure and worldly things, hold aloof from what is good. The order of the way side, the rock, and the thorns is well, for we have first need of recollection and caution, next of fortitude, and then of contempt of things present. He therefore places the good ground in opposition to the way, the rock, and the thorns. But that on the good ground are they, which in an honest and good heart, having heard the word, keep it, &c. For they who are on the way side keep not the word, but the devil takes away their seed. But they who are on the rock sustain not patiently the assaults of temptation through weakness. But they who are among thorns bear no fruit, but are choked.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The good ground then bears fruit through patience, for nothing we do is good unless we endure patiently our closest evils. They therefore bear fruit through patience, who when they bear strifes humbly, are after the scourge received with joy to a heavenly rest.

8:16–18

16. No man, when he hath lighted a candle, covereth it with a vessel, or putteth it under a bed; but setteth it on a candlestick, that they which enter in may see the light.

17. For nothing is secret, that shall not be made manifest; neither any thing hid, that shall not be known and come abroad.

18. Take heed therefore how ye hear: for whosoever hath, to him shall be given; and whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken even that which he seemeth to have.

BEDE. Having before said to His Apostles, Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of God, but to others in parables; He now shews that by them at length must the same mystery be revealed also to others, saying, No man when he hath lighted a candle covereth it with a vessel, or putteth it tender a bed.

EUSEBIUS. As if He said, As a lantern is lighted that it should give light, not that it should be covered under a bushel or a bed, so also the secrets of the kingdom of heaven when uttered in parables, although hid from those who are strangers to the faith, will not however to all men appear obscure. Hence he adds, For nothing is secret that shall not be made manifest, neither any thing hid that shall not be known, and come abroad. As if He said, Though many things are spoken in parables, that seeing they might not see, and hearing they might not understand, because of their unbelief, yet the whole matter shall be revealed.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. q. 12.) Or else in these words He typically sets forth the boldness of preaching, that no one should, through fear of fleshly ills, conceal the light of knowledge. For under the names of vessel and bed, he represents the flesh, but of that of lantern, the word, which whosoever keeps hid through fear of the troubles of the flesh, sets the flesh itself before the manifestation of the truth, and by it he as it were covers the word, who fears to preach it. But he places a candle upon a candlestick who so submits his body to the service of God, that the preaching of the truth stands highest in his estimation, the service of the body lowest.

ORIGEN. But he who would adapt his lantern to the more perfect disciples of Christ, must persuade us by those things which were spoken of John, for he was a burning and a shining light. (John 5:35.) It becomes not him then who lights the light of reason in his soul to hide it under a bed where men sleep, nor under any vessel, for he who does this provides not for those who enter the house for whom the candle is prepared, but they must set it upon a candlestick, that is, the whole Church.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 15. in Matt.) By these words he leads them to diligence of life, teaching them to be strong as exposed to the view of all men, and fighting in the world as on a stage. As if he said, Think not that we dwell in a small part of the world, for ye will be known of all men, since it cannot be that so great virtue should lie hid.

MAXIMUS. (Quæst. in Script. 63.) Or perhaps the Lord calls Himself a light shining to all who inhabit the house, that is, the world, since He is by nature God, but by the dispensation made flesh. And so like the light of the lamp He abides in the vessel of the flesh by means of the soul as the light in the vessel of the lamp by means of the flame. But by the candlestick he describes the Church over which the divine word shines, illuminating the house as it were by the rays of truth. But under the similitude of a vessel or bed he referred to the observance of the law, under which the word will not be contained.

BEDE. But the Lord ceases not to teach us to hearken to His word, that we may be able both to constantly meditate on it in our own minds, and to bring it forth for the instruction of others. Hence it follows, Take heed therefore how ye hear; for whosoever hath, to him shall be given. As if he says, Give heed with all your mind to the word which ye hear, for to him who has a love of the word, shall be given also the sense of understanding what he loves; but whoso hath no love of hearing the word, though he deems himself skilful either from natural genius, or the exercise of learning, will have no delight in the sweetness of wisdom; for oftentimes the slothful man is gifted with capacities, that if he neglect them he may be the more justly punished for his negligence, since that which he can obtain without labour he disdains to know, and sometimes the studious man is oppressed with slowness of apprehension, in order that the more he labours in his inquiries, the greater may be the recompense of his reward.

8:19–21

19. Then came to him his mother and his brethren, and could not come at him for the press.

20. And it was told him by certain which said, Thy mother and thy brethren stand without, desiring to see thee.

21. And he answered and said unto them, My mother and my brethren are these which hear the word of God, and do it.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Our Lord had left His kinsfolk according to the flesh, and was occupied in His Father’s teaching. But when they began to feel His absence, they came unto Him, as it is said, Then came unto him his mother and his brethren. When you hear of our Lord’s brethren you must include also the notions of piety and grace. For no one in regard of His divine nature is the brother of the Saviour, (for He is the Only-begotten,) but He has, by the grace of piety, made us partakers in His flesh and His blood, and He who is by nature God has become our brother.

BEDE. But those who are said to be our Lord’s brethren according to the flesh, you must not imagine to be the children of the blessed Mary, the mother of God, as Helvidius thinks, nor the children of Joseph by another wife, as some say, but rather believe to be their kinsfolk.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. His brethren thought that when He heard of their presence He would send away the people, from respect to His mother’s name, and from His affection towards her, as it follows, And it was told him, Thy mother and thy brethren stand without.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 44. in Matt.) Think what it was, when the whole people stood by, and were hanging upon His mouth, (for His teaching had already begun,) to withdraw Him away from them. Our Lord accordingly answers as it were rebuking them, as it follows, And he answered and said unto them, My mother and my brethren are they which hear the word of God, and do it, &c.

AMBROSE. The moral teacher who gives himself an example to others, when about to enjoin upon others, that he who has not left father and mother, is not worthy of the Son of God, first submits Himself to this precept, not that He denies the claims of filial piety, (for it is His own sentence, He that knoweth not his father and mother shall die the death,) but because He knows that He is more bound to obey His Father’s mysteries than the feelings of His mother. Nor however are His parents harshly rejected, but the bonds of the mind are shewn to be more sacred than those of the body. Therefore in this place He does not disown His mother, (as some heretics say, eagerly catching at His speech,) since she is also acknowledged from the cross; but the law of heavenly ordinances is preferred to earthly affection.

BEDE. They then who hear the word of God and do it, are called the mother of our Lord, because they daily in their actions or words bring Him forth as it were in their inmost hearts; they also are His brethren where they do the will of His Father, Who is in heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 41. in Matt.) Now He does not say this by way of reproof to His mother, but to greatly assist her, for if He was anxious for others to beget in them a just opinion of Himself, much more was He for His mother. And He had not raised her to such a height if she were always to expect to be honoured by Him as a son, and never to consider Him as her Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. But some take this to mean that certain men, hating Christ’s teaching, and mocking at Him for His doctrine, said, Thy mother and thy brethren stand without wishing to see thee; as if thereby to shew His meanness of birth. And He therefore knowing their hearts gave them this answer, that meanness of birth harms not, but if a man, though of low birth, hear the word of God, He reckons him as His kinsman. Because however hearing only saves no one, but rather condemns, He adds, and doeth it; for it becomes us both to hear and to do. But by the word of God He means His own teaching, for all the words which He Himself spake were from His Father.

AMBROSE. In a mystical sense he ought not to stand without, who was seeking Christ. Hence also that saying, Come unto him, and be enlightened (Ps. 34:6. Vulg.). For if they stand without, not even parents themselves are acknowledged; and perhaps for our example they are not. How are we acknowledged by Him if we stand without? That meaning also is not unreasonable, because by the figure of parents He points to the Jews of whom Christ was born, (Rom. 9:5.) and thought the Church to be preferred to the synagogue.

BEDE. For they cannot enter within when He is teaching whose words they refuse to understand spiritually. But the multitude went before and entered into the house, because when the Jews rejected Christ the Gentiles flocked to Him. But those who stand without, wishing to see Christ, are they, who not seeking a spiritual sense in the law, have placed themselves without to guard the letter of it, and as it were rather compel Christ to go out, to teach them earthly things, than consent to enter in themselves to learn spiritual things.

8:22–25

22. Now it came to pass on a certain day, that he went into a ship with his disciples: and he said unto them, Let us go over unto the other side of the lake. And they launched forth.

23. But as they sailed he fell asleep: and there came down a storm of wind on the lake; and they were filled with water, and were in jeopardy.

24. And they came to him, and awoke him, saying, Master, master, we perish. Then he arose, and rebuked the wind and the raging of the water: and they ceased, and there was a calm.

25. And he said unto them, Where is your faith? And they being afraid wondered, saying one to another, What manner of man is this! for he commandeth even the winds and water, and they obey him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When the disciples saw that all men received help from Christ, it seemed fitting that they themselves also should in turn rejoice in the benefits of Christ. For no one regards that which happens in the person of another equally with that to himself. The Lord therefore exposed the disciples to the sea and the winds, as it follows, Now it came to pass on a certain day that he went into a ship with his disciples; and he said unto them, Let us go over unto the other side of the lake: and they launched forth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 27. in Matt.) Luke indeed avoids the question which might be put to him with regard to the order of time, saying, that He went into a ship on a certain day. Now if the storm had arisen when our Lord was awake, the disciples either had not feared, or not believed that He could do such a thing. For this cause He sleeps, giving them an occasion for fear; for it follows, But as they sailed he fell asleep; and there came down a storm of wind on the lake.

AMBROSE. We are told above, moreover, that He passed the night in prayer. How then does He here fall asleep in a storm? The security of power is expressed, that while all were afraid, He alone lay fearless; but He lay asleep in the body, while in the mind he was in the mystery of divinity. For nothing happens without the Word.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) But it seems to have been especially and wonderfully ordained that they should not seek His assistance when first the storm began to affect the boat, but after the danger had increased, in order that the power of the Divine Majesty might be made more manifest. Hence it is said, And they were filled with water, and were in jeopardy. This indeed our Lord allowed for the sake of trial, that having confessed their danger they should acknowledge the greatness of the miracle. Hence when their great danger had driven them into intolerable fear, having no other hope of safety but the Lord of power Himself, they awoke Him. It follows, And they came to him, and awoke him, saying, Master, we perish.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. l. 2. c. 24.) Matthew says, Master, save us, we perish. Mark, Master, carest thou not that we perish? There is the same expression in all of men awakening our Lord, and anxious for their safety. Nor is it worth while to enquire which of these was most likely to have been said to Christ. For whether they said one of these three, or some other words which no Evangelist has mentioned, but of the same import, what matter is it? Though at the same time this may have been the case, that by the many who awoke Him, all these things were said, one by one, and another by another.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But it could not be that they should perish while the Almighty was with them. Christ then arose, Who has power over all things, and immediately quells the storm and the violence of the wind, and the tempest ceased, and there was a calm. Herein He shews Himself to be God, to Whom it is said, Thou rulest the raging of the sea: when the waves thereof arise, thou stillest them (Ps. 89:10.). So then as He sailed, our Lord manifested both natures in one and the same person, seeing that He who as man slept in the ship, as God by His word stilled the raging of the sea.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But together with the raging of the waters, He quiets also the tumult of their souls, as it follows, And he said unto them, Where is your faith? By which word He shewed, that it is not so much the assault of temptation which causes fear, as faint-heartedness. For as gold is proved in the fire, so is faith in temptation.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ut sup.) Now this is related by the other Evangelists in different words. For Matthew says, that Jesus said, Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith? (Matt. 8.) but Mark as follows, Why are ye so fearful? How is it that ye have no faith? (Mark 4.) i. e. that perfect faith like the grain of mustard seed. Mark then also says, O ye of little faith; but Luke, Where is your faith? And indeed all these may have been said, Why are ye fearful? Where is your faith? O ye of little faith. Hence one Evangelist relates one, another another.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When the tempest was quelled at the command of Christ, the disciples in astonishment whispered one to the other, as it follows, And they being afraid wondered, &c. Now the disciples said not this as ignorant of Him, for they knew that He was God, and Jesus the Son of God. But they marvel at the exceeding vastness of His natural power, and the glory of His divinity, although He was like to us, and visible in the flesh. Hence they say, Who is this? that is, of what manner of man?

how great, and with what great power and majesty? for it is a mighty work, a lordly command, no abject petition.

BEDE. Or, it was not His disciples, but the sailors and others in the ship who wondered.

But allegorically, the sea or lake is the dark and bitter tide of the world, the ship is the wood of the cross, by help of which the faithful, having passed the waves of this world, reach the shore of a heavenly country.

AMBROSE. Our Lord therefore, who knew that He came upon earth for a divine mystery, having left His kinsfolk, went up into the ship.

BEDE. His disciples also, when summoned, enter in with Him. Hence He says, If any one will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow me. (Mat. 16:24.) While His disciples are sailing, that is, the faithful passing through this world, and meditating in their minds the rest of the world to come, and by the breath of the Holy Spirit, or also their own exertions, eagerly leaving behind them the unbelieving pride of the world, suddenly our Lord fell asleep, that is, the time of our Lord’s passion was come, and the storm descended. For when our Lord entered the sleep of death upon the cross, the waves of persecution rose, stirred up by the breath of the devil, but while the patience of the Lord is not disturbed by the waves, the faint hearts of the disciples are shaken and tremble. They awoke our Lord lest they should perish while He slept, because having seen His death they wish for His resurrection, for if that were delayed they would perish for ever. He rises therefore and rebukes the wind, since by His sudden rising again He put down the pride of the devil who had the power of death. (Heb. 2:14.) But He makes the tempest of nature to cease, since by His resurrection He baffled the rage of the Jews, who plotted His death.

AMBROSE. You must remember that no one can pass from the course of this life without temptations, for temptation is the trial of faith. We are therefore subject to the storms of spiritual wickedness, but as watchful sailors we must awake the Pilot, who does not obey but commands the winds, who although He now no longer sleeps in the sleep of His own body, yet let us beware, lest through the sleep of our bodies He is to us asleep and at rest. But they are rightly reproved who feared, when Christ was present; since he surely who clings to Him can in no wise perish.

BEDE. In like manner, when He appeared after His death to His disciples, He upbraided them with their unbelief, (Mark 16:14.) and thus having calmed the swelling waves, He made plain to all the power of His divinity.

8:26–39

26. And they arrived at the country of the Gadarenes, which is over against Galilee.

27. And when he went forth to land, there met him out of the city a certain man, which had devils long time, and ware no clothes, neither abode in any house, but in the tombs.

28. When he saw Jesus, he cried out, and fell down before him, and with a loud voice said, What have I to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God most high? I beseech thee, torment me not.

29. (For he had commanded the unclean spirit to come out of the man. For oftentimes it had caught him: and he was kept bound with chains and in fetters; and he brake the bands, and was driven of the devil into the wilderness.)

30. And Jesus asked him, saying, What is thy name? And he said, Legion: because many devils were entered into him.

31. And they besought him that he would not command them to go out into the deep.

32. And there was there an herd of many swine feeding on the mountain: and they besought him that he would suffer them to enter into them. And he suffered them.

33. Then went the devils out of the man, and entered into the swine: and the herd ran violently down a steep place into the lake, and were choked.

34. When they that fed them saw what was done, they fled, and went and told it in the city and in the country.

35. Then they went out to see what was done; and came to Jesus, and found the man, out of whom the devils were departed, sitting at the feet of Jesus, clothed, and in his right mind: and they were afraid.

36. They also which saw it told them by what means he that was possessed of the devils was healed.

37. Then the whole multitude of the country of the Gadarenes round about besought him to depart from them; for they were taken with great fear: and he went up into the ship, and returned back again.

38. Now the man out of whom the devils were departed besought him that he might be with him: but Jesus sent him away, saying,

39. Return to thine own house, and shew how great things God hath done unto thee. And he went his way, and published throughout the whole city how great things Jesus had done unto him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Saviour, as He sailed with His disciples, came to a port, as it is said, And they arrived at the country of the Gadarenes, which is over against Galilee.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Many accurate copies have neither “Gerazenes” nor “Gadarenes,” but “Gergezenes.” For Gadara is a city in Judæa, but neither lake nor sea is found at it; and Geraza is a city of Arabia, having neither lake nor sea near. But Gergeza, from which the Gergezenes are called, is an ancient city near the lake of Tiberias, above which is a rock hanging over the lake, into which they say the swine were dashed down by the devils. But since Gadara and Geraza border upon the land of the Gergezenes, it is probable that the swine were led from thence to their parts.

BEDE. For Geraza is a famous city of Arabia, on the other side of the Jordan, close to the mountain of Galaad, which was possessed by the tribe of Manasseh, and not far from the lake of Tiberias, into which the swine were cast headlong.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 28. in Matt.) But as soon as our Lord had departed from the sea, He meets with another more awful wonder. For the demoniac, like an evil slave, when he sees Him confirms his bondage, as it follows, And when he went forth to land, there met him out of the city a certain man, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Cons. Ev. ut sup.) Whereas Matthew says, that there were two possessed, but Mark and Luke mention only one; you must understand one of them to be a more distinguished and famous person, for whom that neighbourhood was chiefly distressed, and in whose restoration they were greatly interested. Wishing to signify this, the two Evangelists thought right to mention him alone, concerning whom the report of this miracle had been most extensively noised abroad.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 28. in Matt.) Or, Luke selected from the two the one who was most savage. Hence he gives the most melancholy account of his calamity, adding, And he wore no clothes, neither abode in any house, but in the tombs. But the evil spirits visit the tombs of the dead, to instil into men that dangerous notion, that the souls of the dead become evil spirits.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now his going naked among the tombs of the dead was a mark of demoniacal wildness. But God permits some in His providence to become subject to evil spirits, that we may ascertain through them of what kind the evil spirits are towards us, in order that we may refuse to be made subject unto them, and so by the suffering of one many may be edified.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But because the people acknowledged Him to be man, the devils came publishing His divinity, which even the sea had proclaimed by its calmness. Hence it follows, When he saw Jesus he fell down before him, and with a loud voice said, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Mark here the combination of fear with boldness and great desperation, for it is a sign of devilish despair to speak out boldly, What have I to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God most high? but of fear when they pray, I beseech thee not to cast me out. But if thou knowest Him to be the Son of God most high, thou confessest Him to be the God of heaven and earth, and of all things that are contained in them. How then dost thou make use not of thy own but His words, saying, What have I to do with thee? But what earthly prince will altogether endure to have his subjects tormented by barbarians? Hence it follows, For he had commanded the unclean spirit to come out of him. And He shews the necessity of the command, adding, For oftentimes it had caught him, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Therefore since no one could hold the possessed, Christ goes to him and addresses him. It follows, And Jesus asked him, saying, What is thy name?

BEDE. He enquires not his name as ignorant of it, but that when the demoniac had confessed the plague which he endured, the power of the Healer might shine forth more welcome to him. But the priests also of our time, who through the grace of exorcism are able to cast out devils, are wont to say that the sufferers can no otherwise be cured than by openly telling in confession every thing which either waking or sleeping they have endured from the unclean spirits, and above all when they imagine that the devils seek and obtain the possession of the human body. So also here the confession is added, And he said, Legion, because many devils were entered into him.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. 14. in Cantic.) Certain evil spirits imitating the heavenly hosts and the legions of Angels say that they are legions. As also their prince says that he will exalt his throne above the stars that he may be like to the Most High. (Isaiah 14:13.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But when the Lord had overcome the evil spirits which disturbed His creatures, they thought that because of the enormity of those things which had been done, He would not wait the time of their punishment, and therefore since they could not deny their guilt, they entreat that they may not quickly undergo the penalty. As it follows, And they besought him that he would not command them to go out into the deep.

THEOPHYLACT. Which indeed the devils demand, wishing yet longer to mix with mankind.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. And hence it is plain that the rebel hosts against the Divine Majesty were thrust down to hell by the unspeakable power of the Saviour.

MAXIMUS. (Ep. ad Georgium.) Now the Lord ordains for each class of sinners an appropriate punishment. The fire of Hell unquenchable for fleshly burnings, gnashing of teeth for wanton mirth, intolerable thirst for pleasure and revelry, the worm that dieth not for a crooked and malignant heart, everlasting darkness for ignorance and deceit, the bottomless pit for pride. Hence the deep is assigned to the devils as unto the proud, it follows, And there was there an herd of swine, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. 24.) The words of Mark, that there was a herd of swine nigh unto the mountains, and of Luke, on the mountains, do not differ from one another. For the herd of swine was so large, that they might be part on the mountain, part near it. For there were two thousand swine, as Mark has stated. (Mark 5:13.)

AMBROSE. But the devils could not endure the clearness of the light of heaven, as those who have weak eyes can not bear the sun’s rays.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The multitude of unclean spirits seek therefore to be sent into the herd of unclean swine, like to themselves, for it follows, And they besought him that he would suffer them to enter into them.

ATHANASIUS. (de vita Anton.) But if they have no power over swine, the evil spirits have much less against men who are made after the image of God. We ought then to fear God alone, but despise them.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the Lord granted them permission, that this might be among other things to us an occasion of benefit, and the confidence of our safety. It follows, And he suffered them. We must therefore consider that the evil spirits are hostile to those which are subject to them, and this will be evident from their sending down the swine violently into the waters and choking them; as it follows, Then went the devils out of the man and entered into the swine, and the herd ran violently down a steep place into the lake, and were choked. And this Christ permitted to them which sought it, that it might appear from the event how cruel they are. It was also necessary to shew that the Son of God has no less power to foresee than the Father, that equal glory might be manifested in each.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (Vide Victor. Ant. in Mark 5.) But the shepherds take flight, lest they should perish with the swine. Hence it follows, When they that fed them saw what was done they fled, and went and told it in the city and in the country, and excited the like alarm among the citizens. But the severity of their loss led them to the Saviour; for it follows, Then they went out to see what was done, and came to Jesus; and here remark, that while God punishes men in their substance, He confers a blessing upon their souls. But when they had set out, they see him in his right mind who had been long vexed. It follows, And they found the man out of whom the devils had departed sitting at the feet of Jesus clothed, (whereas before he was naked,) and in his right mind. For he departed not from those feet, where he obtained safety; and so acknowledging the miracle, they were astonished at the cure of the malady, and marvelled at the event; for it follows, And they were afraid. But this thing they discover partly by sight, partly hearing it in words. It follows, They also which saw it told them by what means he that was possessed of the devils was healed. But they ought to have besought the Lord not to depart from them, but to be the guardian of their country, that no evil spirits might come near them; but through fear they lost their own salvation, asking the Saviour to depart. It follows, Then the whole multitude of the country of the Gadarenes round about besought him to depart from, them, for they were taken with great fear.

THEOPHYLACT. They feared lest they should again suffer some loss, as they had suffered in the drowning of the swine.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But observe the humility of Christ; for when after conferring so great benefits upon them they sent Him away, He offers no obstacle, but departs, leaving those who had proclaimed themselves unworthy of His teaching. It follows, And he went up into the ship, and returned back again.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But as He was departing, the man who had been afflicted will not part from his Saviour, for it follows, Now the man out of whom the devils were departed besought him that he might be with him.

THEOPHYLACT. For as one who had been tried by experience, he feared, lest perhaps when far from Jesus he should again become the prey of evil spirits. But the Lord shews him, that though He is not present with him, He can protect by His grace, for it follows, But Jesus sent him away, saying, Return to thine own house, and shew how great things God hath done for thee. But he said not, “how great things I have done for thee,” giving us an example of humility, that we should attribute all our righteousness to God.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. He does not however turn aside from the law of truth, for whatever the Son doth the Father doth. But why does He, who every where charged those who were delivered to tell no one, say to this man who was delivered from the legion, Shew how great things God hath done for thee? Because in truth that whole country knew not God, and was in bondage to the worship of devils. Or more truly, now that He refers the miracle to His Father, He says, Shew how great, &c. but when He speaks of Himself He charges to tell no one. But he who was healed of the evil spirits knew Jesus to be God, and therefore published what great things God had done for him. For it follows, And he went through the whole city, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) And so abandoning those who had proclaimed themselves unworthy of His teaching, He appoints as their teacher the man who had been released from the evil spirits.

BEDE. Now mystically; Gerasa signifies the Gentile nations, whom after His passion and resurrection Christ visited in His preachers. Hence Gerasa or Gergesa, as some say, is by interpretation “casting out an inhabitant,” that is, the devil by whom it was before possessed, or, “a stranger approaching,” who before was afar off.

AMBROSE. Now although the number of those healed by Christ is different in Luke and Matthew, yet the mystery is one and the same. For as he who had a devil is the figure of the Gentile people, the two also in like manner take the figure of the Gentiles. For whereas Noah begat three sons, Shem, Ham, and Japhet; the family of Shem only was called to the possession of God, and from the other two the people of different nations were descended. He (as Luke says) had devils long time, inasmuch as the Gentile people was vexed from the deluge down to our Lord’s coming. But he was naked, because the Gentiles lost the garment of their nature and virtue.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. q. 13.) He abode in no house, that is, he had no rest in his conscience; he dwelt among the tombs, because he delighted in dead works in his sins.

AMBROSE. Or what are the bodies of the unbelieving but kinds of tombs in which the word of God abides not?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Now that he was bound by brazen fetters and chains, signifies the harsh and severe laws of the Gentiles, by which also in their states offences are restrained. But, that having burst these chains he was driven by the evil spirit into the wilderness, means that having broken through these laws, he was also led by lust to those crimes which exceeded the ordinary life of men. By the expression that there was in him a legion of devils, the nations are signified who served many devils. But the fact that the devils were permitted to go into the swine, which fed on the mountains, signifies also the unclean and proud men over whom the evil spirits have dominion, because of their worship of idols. For the swine are they who, after the manner of unclean animals without speech and reason, have defiled the grace of their natural virtues by the filthy actions of their life.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But by their being sent down violently into the lake, it is meant that the Church has been purified, and now that the Gentiles are delivered from the dominion of evil spirits, those who refuse to believe in Christ, carry on their unholy rites in hidden places with dark and secret watchings.

AMBROSE. They are carried violently down, for they are reclaimed not by the contemplation of any good deed, but thrust as from a higher place to a lower, along the downward path of iniquity, they perish amidst the waves of this world, shut out from the approach of air. For they who are carried to and fro by the rapid tide of pleasure cannot receive the communication of the Spirit; we see then that man himself is the author of his own misery. For unless a man lived like the swine, the devil would never have received power over him, or received it, not to destroy but to prove him. And perhaps the devil, who after the coming of our Lord can no longer steal away the good, seeks not the destruction of all men, but only the wanton, as the robber lies in wait not for armed men, but the unarmed. When those who kept the herd saw this they fled. For neither the teachers of philosophy nor the chief of the synagogue can bring a cure to perishing mankind. It is Christ alone who takes away the sins of the people.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Evan. l. ii. q. 13.) Or, by the herdsmen of the swine flying and telling these things, He represents certain rulers of the wicked, who though they evade the law of Christianity, yet proclaim it among the nations by their astonishment and wonder. But by the Gerasenes, when they knew what was done, asking Jesus to depart from them, for they were struck with great fear, he represents the multitude delighting in their old pleasures, honouring indeed, but unwilling to endure the Christian law, saying that they cannot fulfil it, while they still marvel at the faithful released from their former abandoned mode of life.

AMBROSE. Or there seems to have been a kind of synagogue in the city of the Gerasenes who besought our Lord to depart, because they were seized with great fear. For the weak mind receives not the word of God, nor can it endure the burden of wisdom. And therefore He no longer troubled them, but ascends from the lower parts to the higher, from the Synagogue to the Church, and returned across the lake. For no one passes from the Church to the Synagogue without endangering his salvation. But whoever desires to pass from the Synagogue to the Church, let him take up his cross, that he may avoid the danger.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But that he, now that he is healed, desires to be with Christ, and it is said to him, Return to thy house, and tell what great things God has done for thee, implies that each should understand, that after the remission of his sins he should return to a good conscience as to his home, and obey the Gospel for the salvation of others, in order that there he may rest with Christ, lest by too early wishing to be with Christ he neglect the ministry of preaching necessary for this redemption of his brethren.

8:40–48

40. And it came to pass, that, when Jesus was returned, the people gladly received him: for they were all waiting for him.

41. And, behold, there came a man named Jairus, and he was a ruler of the synagogue: and he fell down at Jesus' feet, and besought him that he would come into his house:

42. For he had one only daughter, about twelve years of age, and she lay a dying. But as he went the people thronged him.

43. And a woman having an issue of blood twelve years, which had spent all her living upon physicians, neither could be healed of any,

44. Came behind him, and touched the border of his garment: and immediately her issue of blood stanched.

45. And Jesus said, Who touched me? When all denied, Peter and they that were with him said, Master, the multitude throng thee and press thee, and sayest thou, Who touched me?

46. And Jesus said, Somebody hath touched me: for I perceive that virtue is gone out of me.

47. And when the woman saw that she was not hid, she came trembling, and falling down before him, she declared unto him before all the people for what cause she had touched him, and how she was healed immediately.

48. And he said unto her, Daughter, be of good comfort: thy faith hath made thee whole: go in peace.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 28.) After relating the miracle of the Gadarenes, Luke goes on to relate that of the ruler of the synagogue's daughter; saying, And it came to pass, that, when Jesus was returned, the people gladly received him: for they were all waiting for him.

THEOPHYLACT. At once both because of His teaching, and His miracles.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But the event which He adds, And, behold, there came a man named Jairus, must not be supposed to have taken place immediately, but first that of the feast of the publicans which Matthew mentions, (Matt. 9:18.) to which he so joins on this that it cannot consequently be understood to have happened otherwise.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (Vide Victor. Ant. in Mark 5.) The name is inserted for the sake of the Jews, who at that time well knew the event, that the name might be a demonstrative proof of the miracle. And there came not one of the lowest, but a ruler of the synagogue, that the mouths of the

Jews might be the more closed. As it follows, And he was a ruler of the synagogue. Now he came to Christ because of his need; for grief sometimes urges us to do those things which are right, according to the Psalm, Hold their mouths with bit and bridle, who come not nigh unto thee. (Ps. 32:9.)

THEOPHYLACT. Through urgent need then he fell at His feet, as it follows, And he fell at Jesus’ feet; but it were right for him without a pressing necessity to fall at Christ’s feet and acknowledge Him to be God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 31. in Matt.) But mark his dulness of heart, for it follows, and besought him that he would come into his house; being ignorant in truth that He was able to heal when absent. For if he had known, he would have said as the centurion did, Speak the word, and my daughter shall be healed.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Asterius.) But the cause of his coming is told by adding, For he had only one daughter, the prop of his house, the succession of his race, about twelve years old, in the very flower of her age; and she lay dying, about to be carried to the grave instead of her nuptial bed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But the Lord had come not to judge the world, but to save it. Whereupon He does not weigh the rank of the petitioner, but calmly undertakes the work, knowing that what was to happen would be greater than what was asked. For He was called to heal the sick, but He knew that He would raise up one that was by this time dead, and implant on the earth a firm hope of the resurrection.

AMBROSE. But when about to raise the dead, in order to bring faith to the ruler of the synagogue, He first cured the issue of blood. So also a temporal resurrection is celebrated at the Passion of our Lord, that the other might be believed to be eternal. But as he went, the people thronged him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (v. Chrys. 31. in Matt.) This was the greatest sign that He had really put on our flesh, and trampled under foot all pride. For they followed Him not afar off, but thronged Him.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ubi sup.) Now a certain woman afflicted with a severe disease, whose infirmity had consumed her body, but physicians all her substance, finds her only hope in such great humbleness that she falls down before our Lord; of whom it follows, And a woman having an issue of blood twelve years, &c.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) Of how great praise then is this woman worthy, who with her bodily powers exhausted by the continual issue of blood, and with so great a crowd thronging around Him, in the strength of her affection and faith entered the crowd, and coming behind, secretly touched the hem of His garment.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For it was not lawful for the unclean either to touch any of the holy saints, or come near a holy man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 31. in Matt.) For by the custom of the Law a malady of this kind was accounted a great uncleanness. (Lev. 15:19–25.) Independently of this also, she had not yet a right estimation of Him, else she would not have thought to remain concealed, but nevertheless she came trusting to be healed.

THEOPHYLACT. But as when a man turns his eye to a shining light, or puts fuel to the fire, immediately they have their effects; so indeed he who brings faith to Him who is able to cure, immediately obtains his cure; as it is said, and immediately her issue of blood stanched.

CHRYSOSTOM. But not the garments alone saved her, (for the soldiers also allotted them among themselves,) but the earnestness of her faith.

THEOPHYLACT. For she believed, and was saved, and as was fitting first touched Christ with her mind, then with her body.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Asterius.) But the Lord heard the woman’s silent thoughts, and silently released her silent, permitting willingly the seizing of her cure. But afterwards He makes known the miracle, as it follows: And Jesus said, Who touched me?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For the miracle which was performed escaped not the Lord, but He who knew all things asks as if He were ignorant.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Victor. Ant.) Now His disciples who knew not what was asked, but supposed He spoke merely of one touching Him, answer our Lord’s question, as follows, When all denied, Peter and they that were with him said, Master, the multitude press thee and throng thee, and sayest thou, Who touched me? Our Lord therefore distinguishes the touching by His answer, as it follows, And Jesus said, Somebody has touched me: as He said also, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear, although all had bodily hearing of this kind; but it is not truly hearing if a man hear carelessly, nor truly touching if he touch unfaithfully. He now therefore publishes what was done, as it is added, For I perceive that virtue is gone out of me. He answers rather materially, in consideration of the minds of His hearers. He is here, however, manifested to us to be the true God, both by His miraculous deed, and by His word. For it is beyond us, and perhaps beyond angels also, to be able to communicate virtue as from our own nature. This belongs to the Supreme Nature alone. For nothing created possesses the power of healing, or even of doing any other like miracles, except it be divinely given. But it was not from desire of glory that He suffered not to remain concealed the exhibition of His divine power, Who had so often charged silence about His miracles, but because He looked to their advantage who are called through faith to grace.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For first He removes the woman’s fear, lest she should suffer the pangs of conscience, for as it were stealing the grace. Next He reproves her for thinking to lie concealed. Thirdly, He makes known her faith publicly for the sake of others, and betrays no less a miracle than the stanching of blood, by shewing that all things are open to His sight.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Moreover, He persuaded the ruler of the synagogue to believe undoubtingly that He would rescue his daughter from the hands of death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Now our Lord did not immediately discover her, for this reason, that by shewing that all things are known to Him, He might make the woman publish what was done, that the miracle might be free from all suspicion. Hence it follows, And when the woman saw that she was not hid, she came trembling.

ORIGEN. But the same cure which the woman obtained by touching Him, our Saviour confirmed by His word; as it follows, And he said unto her, Thy faith hath made thee whole; go in peace, that is, Be released from thy scourge. And indeed He first heals her soul by faith, then truly her body.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) He calls her daughter, as already healed because of her faith, for faith claims the grace of adoption.

EUSEBIUS. (Eccles. Hist. l. vii. c. 18.) Now they say that the woman set up in Paneas (Cæsarea Philippi, whence she came) a noble triumphal monument of the mercy vouchsafed to her by the Saviour. For there stood upon a lofty pedestal near the entrance to her house a brasen statue of a woman on bended knees, and with her hands joined as if in prayer; opposite to which was erected another statue like to a man, made of the same material, clothed in a stole, (διπλοῑς.a) and holding forth his hand to the woman. At his feet upon the base itself a strange kind of plant was growing, which reaching to the hem of the brasen stole, was said to be the cure of all diseases. And they said that this statue represents Christ. It was destroyed by Maximinus.

AMBROSE. Now mystically Christ had left the synagogue in Gerasa, and Him whom His own received not we strangers receive.

BEDE. Or at the end of the world the Lord is about to return to the Jews, and to be gladly received by them through confession of the faith.

AMBROSE. But whom do we suppose the chief of the synagogue to be, but the Law, from consideration of which our Lord had not entirely abandoned the synagogue.

BEDE. Or, by the ruler of the synagogue is understood Moses. Hence he is rightly called Jairus, that is, “enlightening” or “enlightened,” as he who receives the words of life to give to us, thereby both enlightens others, and is himself also enlightened by the Holy Spirit. But the ruler of the synagogue fell at the feet of Jesus, because the lawgiver with the whole race of the patriarchs knew that Christ, appearing in the flesh, would be far preferred to them. For if the head of Christ is God, (1 Cor. 11:3.) His feet must agreeably to this be taken for the Incarnation, by which He touched the earth of our mortality. The ruler asked Him to enter into his house, because he was desirous to behold His coming. His only daughter is the Synagogue, which alone was framed with a legal institution; which at twelve years of age, that is, when the time of puberty was approaching, lay dying; for having been brought up nobly by the prophets, as soon as it came to years of discretion, when it ought to bring forth spiritual fruits to God, being suddenly subdued through its weakness and error, it forgot to enter the way of spiritual life, and unless Christ had come to its help, would have fallen away into destruction. But the Lord going to heal the girl is thronged by the crowd, because giving wholesome warnings to the Jewish nation, He was borne down by the customs of a carnal people.

AMBROSE. But while the Word of God hastens to this daughter of the ruler that He might save the children of Israel, the holy Church collected from among the Gentiles which was perishing by its falling away into gross crimes, seized first by faith the health prepared for others.

BEDE. Now the issue of blood may be taken in two ways, that is, both for the prostitution of idolatry, and for those things which are done for the delights of the flesh and blood.

AMBROSE. But what means it that this daughter of the ruler was dying at twelve years, and the woman was afflicted with the issue of blood for twelve years, but that it might be understood that as long as the Synagogue flourished the Church was weak. For almost in the same age of the world, the Synagogue began to grow up among the patriarchs, and idolatry to pollute the Gentile nation.

AMBROSE. But as she had spent all her substance upon physicians, so the Gentile nations had lost all the gifts of nature.

BEDE. Now by physicians understand either false doctors, or philosophers and teachers of secular laws, who disputing much concerning virtue and vice, promised that they would give to mortals useful instructions for life; or suppose that by the physicians are signified the unclean spirits themselves, who by giving as it were advice to men, procure themselves to be worshipped as God, on listening to whom the Gentiles the more they consumed the strength of their natural industry, so much the less were they able to be cured from the pollution of their iniquity.

AMBROSE. Now hearing that the people of the Jews were sick, she begins to hope for the remedy of their salvation; she knew that the time was arrived when a Physician should come from heaven, she rose to meet Him, more ready from faith, more backward from modesty. For this is the part of modesty and faith to acknowledge weakness, not to despair of pardon. From modesty then she touched the hem of His garment; in faith she came, in piety believed, in wisdom knew herself to be healed; so the holy people of the Gentiles which believed God, blushed at its sins so as to desert them, offered its faith in believing, shewed its devotion in asking, put on wisdom in itself feeling its own cure, assumed boldness to confess that it had forestalled what was not its own. Now Christ is touched behind, as it is written, Thou shall walk after the Lord thy God (Deut. 13:4.)

BEDE. And He Himself says, If any man serve me, let him follow me. (John 13:26.) Or, because not seeing Christ present in the flesh, now that the sacraments of the temporary dispensation were completed, the Church began to follow His footsteps through faith.

GREGORY. (Mor. 3. c. 11. Job 2.) But while the crowd thronged Him, one woman touched our Redeemer, because all carnal men in the Church oppress Him from whom they are afar off, and they alone touch Him who are joined to Him in humility. () The crowd therefore press Him and touch Him not, because it is both importunate in presence, and absent in life.

BEDE. Or one believing woman touches the Lord, since Christ who is afflicted beyond measure by the diverse heresies multiplying around Him, is faithfully sought by the heart alone of the Catholic Church.

AMBROSE. For they believe not who throng Him; they believe who touch. By faith Christ is touched, by faith He is seen. Lastly, to express the faith of her who touched Him, He says, I know that virtue is gone out of me, which is a more palpable sign, that the Divine Nature is not confined within the possibility of man's condition, and the compass of the human body, but eternal virtue overflows beyond the bounds of our mediocrity. For the Gentile people is not released by man's aid, but the gathering of nations is the gift of God, which even by its little faith turns to itself the everlasting mercy. For if we think what our faith is, and understand how great the Son of God is, we see that in comparison of Him we touch only the hem, we cannot reach the upper parts of the garment. If then we also wish to be cured, let us touch by faith the hem of Christ. But he who has touched Him is not hidden. Happy the man who has touched the extreme part of the Word. For who can comprehend the whole?

8:49–56

49. While he yet spake, there cometh one from the ruler of the synagogue's house, saying to him, Thy daughter is dead; trouble not the Master.

50. But when Jesus heard it, he answered him, saying, Fear not: believe only, and she shall be made whole.

51. And when he came into the house, he suffered no man to go in, save Peter, and James, and John, and the father and the mother of the maiden.

52. And all wept, and bewailed her: but he said, Weep not; she is not dead, but sleepeth.

53. And they laughed him to scorn, knowing that she was dead.

54. And he put them all out, and took her by the hand, and called, saying, Maid, arise.

55. And her spirit came again, and she arose straightway: and he commanded to give her meat.

56. And her parents were astonished: but he charged them that they should tell no man what was done.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 31. in Matt.) Our Lord conveniently waited until the death of the girl, that the miracle of her resurrection might be made public. For which reason also He goes slower, and speaks longer with the woman, that the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue may expire, and messengers come to tell Him. As it is said, While he yet spake, there cometh one from the ruler of the synagogue's house, saying unto him, Thy daughter is dead.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 28.) But since Matthew states the ruler of the synagogue to have told our Lord that his daughter was not on the point of death but quite dead, and Luke and Mark say, that she was not yet dead, nay, even go so far as to say that there came some afterwards, who told her death; we must examine, lest they should seem to be at variance. And we must understand that for the sake of brevity, Matthew chose rather to say, that our Lord was asked to do what it is obvious He did, namely, to raise the dead. For our Lord needs not the words of the father concerning his daughter, but what is more important, his wishes. Certainly, if the other two or any one of them had mentioned that the father had said what those who came from the house said, that Jesus need not be troubled because the maid was dead, His words which Matthew has related would seem to be at variance with his thoughts. But now to those who brought that message, and said that the Master need not come, it is not said that the father assented. The Lord therefore did not blame him as distrustful, but the more strongly confirms his belief. As it follows, But when Jesus heard it, he answered the father of the girl, Believe only, &c.

ATHANASIUS. (Orat. in Pass. et Crucem. Dom. 4.) Our Lord requires faith from those who invoke Him, not because He needs the assistance of others, (for He is both the Lord and Giver of faith,) but not to seem to bestow His gifts according to His acceptance of persons, He shews that He favours those who believe, lest they should receive benefits without faith, and lose them by unbelief. For when He bestows a favour, He wishes it to last, and when He heals, the cure to remain undisturbed.

THEOPHYLACT. When He was about to raise the dead He put all out, as teaching us to be free from vain-glory, and to do nothing for show, for when any one ought to perform miracles, he must not be in the midst of a great many, but alone and apart from the other. As it follows, And when he came into the house, he suffered no man to go in, save Peter, and James, and John. Now these only He permitted to enter as the Heads of His disciples, and able to conceal the miracle. For He did not wish to be revealed to many before His time, perhaps on account of the envy of the Jews. So also when any one envies us, we ought not to make known to him our righteousness, lest we give him an occasion of greater envy.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But He took not with Him His other disciples, so provoking them to a strange desire, because also they were not yet fully prepared, but He took Peter, and with him the sons of Zebedee, that the others also might imitate them. He took also the parents as witnesses, lest any should say the evidence of the resurrection was false. Luke adds to this also, that He shut out from the house those that were weeping, and shewed that they were unworthy of a sight of this kind. For it follows, And they all wept, and bewailed her. But if He then shut them out, much more now. For then it had not yet been revealed that death was turned into sleep. Let no one then hereafter despise himself, bringing an insult to the victory of Christ, whereby He has overcome death, and turned it into sleep. In proof of which it is added, But he said, Weep not; she is not dead, but sleepeth, &c. shewing that all things were at His command, and that He would bring her to life as if He were awakening her from sleep. They yet nevertheless laughed Him to scorn. For it follows, And they laughed him to scorn. He did not reprove them nor put an end to their laughter, that laughter also might be a sign of death. For since generally, after a miracle has been performed men continue unfaithful, He takes them by their own words. But that He might by sight dispose to the belief of the resurrection, He takes the hand of the maid. As it follows, But he took her by the hand, and called, saying, Maid, arise. And when He had taken her by the hand, He awoke her. As it follows, And her spirit returned, and she arose straightway. For He poured not into her another soul, but restored the same which she had breathed forth. Nor does he only awake the maid, but orders her to take food. For it follows, And he commanded to give her meat. That it might not seem like a vision what was done. Nor did He Himself give to her, but He commanded others to do it. As also He said in the case of Lazarus, Loose him. (John 11:44.) And afterwards He made him partake of meat with Him.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) He next charges the parents, astonished at the miracle, and almost crying out, not to publish abroad what was done. As it follows, And her parents were astonished; but he charged them that they should tell no man what was done; shewing that He is the Giver of good things, but not covetous of glory, and that He gives the whole, receiving nothing. But he who seeks after the glory of his works has indeed shewn forth something, but receives something.

BEDE. But mystically, when the woman was cured of the issue of blood, word is brought that the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue is dead; because while the Church was cleansed from the stain of its sins, the Synagogue was forthwith destroyed by unbelief and envy; by unbelief indeed, in that it refused to believe in Christ; by envy, in that it was grieved that the Church had believed.

AMBROSE. But still also were the servants of the ruler incredulous with regard to the resurrection, which Jesus had foretold in the Law, fulfilled in the Gospel; therefore say they, Do not trouble him; (Ps. 16.) as if it were impossible for Him to raise the dead.

BEDE. Or this is even to this day said by those who see the state of the synagogue so destitute that they do not believe it can be restored, and therefore think nothing of praying for its resurrection. But those things which are impossible with men are possible with God. Therefore said the Lord to him, Fear not, only believe, and she shall be made whole. (Luke 18:27.) The father of the girl is taken for the assembly of the doctors of the Law, which if it were willing to believe, the Synagogue also which is subject to it will be safe.

AMBROSE. Therefore having entered into the house, He called a few to be judges of the coming resurrection: for the resurrection was not soon believed by the many. What then was the cause of this great difference? In a former case the widow’s son is raised up before all, here a few only are set apart to judge. But I think that herein the mercy of the Lord is shewn, since the widowed mother of an only son suffered no delay. There is also the token of wisdom, that in the widow’s son we should see the Church quick in believing; in the ruler of the synagogue’s daughter, the Jews about indeed to believe, but out of a great many only a few. Lastly, when our Lord says, She is not dead, but sleepeth, they laughed Him to scorn. For whoever believes not, laughs. Let them therefore mourn their dead who think they are dead.

Where there is a belief of the resurrection, the notion is not of death but of rest.

BEDE. The Synagogue also, because it has lost the joy of the Bridegroom, whereby alone it can live. lying dead as it were among those that mourn, understands not even the reason why it weeps.

AMBROSE. Now the Lord taking hold of the hand of the maid, cured her. Blessed is he whom wisdom takes by the hand, that she may bring him into her secret places, and command to be given him to eat. For the bread of heaven is the word of God. Hence comes also that wisdom which has filled its altars with the food of the body and blood of God. Come, she says, eat my bread, and drink the wine which I have mixed for you. (Prov. 9:5.)

BEDE. Now the maid arose straightway, because when Christ strengthens the hand, man revives from the death of the soul. For there are some, who only by the secret thought of sin are conscious of bringing death to themselves. The Lord signifying that such He brings to life again, raised the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue. But others, by committing the very evil in which they delight, carry their dead as it were without the gates, and to shew that He raises these, He raised the widow’s son without the gates. But some also, by habits of sin, bury themselves, as it were, and become corrupt; and to raise these also the grace of the Saviour is not wanting; to intimate which He raised from the dead Lazarus, who had been four days in the grave. But the deeper the death of the soul, so much the more intense should be the fervour of penitence. Hence He raises with a gentle voice the maid who lay dead in the room, the youth who was carried out He strengthens with many words, but to raise him who had been dead four days, He groaned in His spirit, He poured forth tears, and cried with a loud voice. But here also we must observe, that a public calamity needs a public remedy. Slight offences seek to be blotted out by secret penitence. The maid lying in the house rises again with few witnesses; the youth without the house is raised in the presence of a great crowd who accompanied him. Lazarus summoned from the tomb was known to many nations.

CHAPTER 9

9:1–6

1. Then he called his twelve disciples together, and gave them power and authority over all devils, and to cure diseases.

2. And he sent them to preach the kingdom of God, and to heal the sick.

3. And he said unto them, Take nothing for your journey, neither staves, nor scrip, neither bread, neither money; neither have two coats apiece.

4. And whatsoever house ye enter into, there abide, and thence depart.

5. And whosoever will not receive you, when ye go out of that city, shake off the very dust from your feet for a testimony against them.

6. And they departed, and went through the towns, preaching the Gospel, and healing every where.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It was fitting that those who were appointed the ministers of holy teaching should be able to work miracles, and by these very acts themselves be believed to be the ministers of God. Hence it is said, Then called he his twelve disciples together, and gave them power and authority over all devils. Herein He brings down the haughty pride of the devil, who once said, There is none who shall open his month against me. (Isai. 10:14.LXX.)

EUSEBIUS. And that through them the whole race of mankind may be sought out, He not only gives them power to drive away evil spirits, but to cure all kind of diseases at His command; as it follows, And to cure diseases.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (in Thesaur. l. 12. c. 14.) Mark here the divine power of the Son, which belongs not to a fleshly nature. For it was in the power of the saints to perform miracles not by nature, but by participation of the Holy Spirit; but it was altogether out of their power to grant this authority to others. For how could created natures possess dominion over the gifts of the Spirit? But our Lord Jesus Christ, as by nature God, imparts graces of this kind to whomsoever He will, not invoking upon them a power which is not His own, but infusing it into them from Himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 22. in Matt.) But after that they had been sufficiently strengthened by His guidance, and had received competent proofs of His power, He sends them out, as it follows, And he sent them to preach the kingdom of God. And here we must remark, that they are not commissioned to speak of sensible things as Moses and the Prophets; for they promised a land and earthly goods, but these a kingdom, and whatsoever is contained in it.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. ii. 69.) Now in sending His disciples to preach, our Lord enjoined many things on them, the chief of which are, that they should be so virtuous, so constant, so temperate, and, to speak briefly, so heavenly, that no less through their manner of living than their words, the teaching of the Gospel might be spread abroad. And therefore were they sent with lack of money, and staves, and a single garment; He accordingly adds, And he said to them, Take nothing in the way, neither staves.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Many things indeed He ordained hereby; first indeed it rendered the disciples unsuspected; secondly, it held them aloof from all care, so that they might give their whole study to the word; thirdly, it taught them their own proper virtue. But perhaps some one will say that the other things indeed are reasonable, but for what reason did He command them to have no scrip on their way, nor two coats, nor staff? In truth, because He wished to rouse them to all diligence, taking them away from all the cares of this life, that they might be occupied by the one single care of teaching.

EUSEBIUS. Wishing then that they should be free from the desire of wealth and the anxieties of life, He gave this injunction. He took it as a proof of their faith and courage, that when it was commanded them to lead a life of extreme poverty, they would not escape from what was ordered. For it was fitting that they should make a kind of bargain, receiving these saving virtues to recompense them for obedience to commands. And when He was making them soldiers of God, He girds them for battle against their enemies, by telling them to embrace poverty. For no soldier of God entangles himself in the affairs of a secular life. (2 Tim. 2:4.)

AMBROSE. Of what kind then he ought to be who preaches the Gospel of the kingdom of God is marked out by these Gospel precepts; that is, he must not require the supports of secular aid; and clinging wholly to faith, he must believe that the less he requires those things, the more they will be supplied to him.

THEOPHYLACT. For He sends them out as very beggars, so that He would have them neither carry bread, nor any thing else of which men are generally in want.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. l. 2. c. 30.) Or, the Lord did not wish the disciples to possess and carry with them these things, not that they were not necessary to the support of this life, but because He sent them thus to shew that these things were due to them from those believers to whom they announced the Gospel, that so they might neither possess security, nor carry about with them the necessaries of this life, either great or little. He has therefore, according to Mark, excluded all except a staff, shewing that the faithful owe every thing to their ministers who require no superfluities. But this permission of the staff He has mentioned by name, when He says, They should take nothing in the way, but a staff only.

AMBROSE. To those also who wish it, this place admits of being explained, so as to seem only to represent a spiritual temper of mind, which appears to have cast off as it were a certain covering of the body; not only rejecting power and despising wealth, but renouncing also the delights of the flesh itself.

THEOPHYLACT. Some also understand by the Apostles not carrying scrip, nor staff, nor two coats, that they must not lay up treasures, (which a scrip implies, collecting many things,) nor be angry and of a quarrelsome spirit, (which the staff signifies,) nor be false and of a double heart, (which is meant by the two coats.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ut sup.) But it may be said, How then shall necessary things be prepared for them. He therefore adds, And into whatsoever house ye enter, there abide, and thence depart. As if He said, Let the food of disciples suffice you, who receiving from you spiritual things, will minister unto you temporal. But He ordered them to abide in one house, so as neither to incommode the host, (that is, so as to send him away,) nor themselves to incur the suspicion of gluttony and wantonness.

AMBROSE. He pronounces it to be foreign to the character of a preacher of the heavenly kingdom to run from house to house and change the rights of inviolable hospitality; but as the grace of hospitality is supposed to be offered, so also if they are not received the dust must be shaken off, and they are commanded to depart from the city; as it follows, And whosoever will not receive you when ye go out of that city, shake off the very dust from your feet for a testimony, &c.

BEDE. The dust is shaken off from the Apostles' feet as a testimony of their labours, that they entered into a city, and the apostolical preaching had reached to the inhabitants thereof. Or the dust is shaken off when they receive nothing (not even of the necessaries of life) from those who despised the Gospel.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ubi sup.) For it is very improbable that those who despise the saving Word, and the Master of the household, will shew themselves kind to His servants, and seek further blessings.

AMBROSE. Or it is a great return of hospitality which is here taught, i. e. that we should not only wish peace to our hosts, but also if any faults of earthly infirmity obscure them, they should be removed by receiving the footsteps of apostolical preaching.

BEDE. But if any by treacherous negligence, or even from zeal, despise the word of God, their communion must be shunned, the dust of the feet must be shaken off, lest by their vain deeds which are to be compared to the dust, the footstep of a chaste mind be defiled.

EUSEBIUS. But when the Lord had girded His disciples as soldiers of God with divine virtue and wise admonitions, sending them to the Jews as teachers and physicians, they afterwards went forth, as it follows, And they departed, and went through the towns preaching the gospel, and healing every where.

9:7–9

7. Now Herod the tetrarch heard of all that was done by him: and he was perplexed, because that it was said of some, that John was risen from the dead;

8. And of some, that Elias had appeared; and of others, that one of the old prophets was risen again.

9. And Herod said, John have I beheaded: but who is this, of whom I hear such things? And he desired to see him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 48. in Matt.) It was not till a long time had passed that Herod took notice of the things that were done by Jesus, (to shew you the pride of a tyrant,) for he did not acknowledge them at first, as it is said, Now Herod heard, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Herod was the son of Herod the Great who slew the children, who was king, but this Herod was tetrarch. He inquired about Christ, who He was. Hence it follows, And he was perplexed.

CHRYSOSTOM. For sinners fear both when they know, and when they are ignorant; they are afraid of shadows, are suspicious about every thing, and are alarmed at the slightest noise. Such in truth is sin; when no one blames or finds fault, it betrays a man, when no one accuses it condemns, and makes the offender timid and backward. But the cause of fear is stated afterwards, in the words, Because that it was said of some.

THEOPHYLACT. For the Jews expected a resurrection of the dead to a fleshly life, eating and drinking, but those that rise again will not be concerned with the deeds of the flesh.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) When Herod then heard of the miracles which Jesus was performing, he says, John have I beheaded, which was not an expression of boasting, but by way of allaying his fears, and bringing his distracted soul to recollect that he had killed. And because he had beheaded John, he adds, but who is this.

THEOPHYLACT. If John is alive and has risen from the dead, I shall know him when I see him; as it follows, And he sought to see him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. 2. c. 45.) Now Luke, though he keeps the same order in his narrative with Mark, docs not oblige us to believe that the course of events was the same. In these words too, Mark testifies only to the fact that others (not Herod) said that John had risen from the dead, but since Luke has mentioned Herod’s perplexity, we must suppose either that after that perplexity, he confirmed in his own mind what was said by others, since he says to his servants, (as Matthew relates,) This is John the Baptist, he is risen from the dead, or these words of Matthew must have been uttered so as to signify that he was still doubting.

9:10–17

10. And the apostles, when they were returned, told him all that they had done. And he took them, and went aside privately into a desert place belonging to the city called Bethsaida.

11. And the people, when they knew it, followed him: and he received them, and spake unto them of the kingdom of God, and healed them that had need of healing.

12. And when the day began to wear away, then came the twelve, and said unto him, Send the multitude away, that they may go into the towns and country round about, and lodge, and get victuals: for we are here in a desert place.

13. But he said unto them, Give ye them to eat. And they said, We have no more but five loaves and two fishes; except we should go and buy meat for all this people.

14. For they were about five thousand men. And he said to his disciples, Make them sit down by fifties in a company.

15. And they did so, and made them all sit down.

16. Then he took the five loaves and the two fishes, and looking up to heaven, he blessed them, and brake, and gave to the disciples to set before the multitude.

17. And they did eat, and were all filled: and there was taken up of fragments that remained to them twelve baskets.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. 1. 2. c. 45.) Matthew and Mark, taking occasion from what had occurred above, relate here how John was slain by Herod. But Luke, who had long before given an account of John’s sufferings, after mentioning that perplexity of Herod’s, as to who our Lord was, immediately adds, And the apostles when they were returned told him all that they had done.

BEDE. But they not only tell Him what they had done and taught, but also, as Matthew implies, the things which John suffered while they were occupied in teaching, are now repeated to Him either by His own, or, according to Matthew, by John’s disciples. (Matt. 14:12.)

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (l. I. ep. 233.) Our Lord because He hates the men of blood, and those that dwell with them, as long as they depart not from their crimes, after the murder of the Baptist left the murderers and departed; as it follows, And he took them, and went aside privately into a desert place belonging to the city called Bethsaida.

BEDE. Now Bethsaida is in Galilee, the city of the Apostles Andrew, Peter, and Philip, near the lake of Gennesaret. Our Lord did not this from fear of death, (as some think,) but to spare His enemies, lest they should commit two murders, waiting also for the proper time for His own sufferings.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 49. in Matt.) Now He did not depart before, but after it was told Him what had happened, manifesting in each particular the reality of His incarnation.

THEOPHYLACT. But our Lord went into a desert place because He was about to perform the miracle of the loaves of bread, that no one should say that the bread was brought from the neighbouring cities.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or He went into a desert place that no one might follow Him. But the people did not retire, but accompanied Him, as it follows, And the people when they knew it, followed him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Some indeed asking to be delivered from evil spirits, but others desiring of Him the removal of their diseases; those also who were delighted with His teaching attended Him diligently.

BEDE. But He as the powerful and merciful Saviour by receiving the weary, by teaching the ignorant, curing the sick, filling the hungry, implies how He was pleased with their devotion; as it follows, And he received them, and spake unto them of the kingdom of God, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. That you may learn that the wisdom which is in us is distributed into word and work, and that it becomes us to speak of what has been done, and to do what we speak of. But when the day was wearing away, the disciples now beginning to have a care of others take compassion on the multitude.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For, as has been said, they sought to be healed of different diseases, and because the disciples saw that what they sought might be accomplished by His simple assent, they say, Send them away, that they be no more distressed. But mark the overflowing kindness of Him who is asked. He not only grants those things which the disciples seek, but to those who follow Him, He supplies the bounty of a munificent hand, commanding food to be set before them; as it follows, But he said unto them, Give ye them to eat.

THEOPHYLACT. Now He said not this as ignorant of their answer, but wishing to induce them to tell Him how much bread they had, that so a great miracle might be manifested through their confession, when the quantity of bread was made known.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But this was a command which the disciples were unable to comply with, since they had with them but five loaves and two fishes. As it follows, And they said, We have no more but five loaves and two fishes; except we go and buy meat for all this people.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 46.) In these words indeed Luke has strung together in one sentence the answer of Philip, saying, Two hundred pennyworth of bread is not sufficient for them, but that every one may have a little, (John 6:9.) and the answer of Andrew, There is a lad here who has five loaves and two small fishes, as John relates. For when Luke says, We have no more but five loaves and two fishes, he refers to the answer of Andrew. But that which he added, Except we go and buy food for all the people, seems to belong to Philip's answer, save that he is silent about the two hundred pennyworth, although this may be implied also in the expression of Andrew himself. For when he had said, There is a lad here who has five loaves and two fishes, he added, But what are these among so many? that is to say, unless we go and buy meat for all this people. From which diversity of words, but harmony of things and opinions, it is sufficiently evident that we have this wholesome lesson given us, that we must seek for nothing in words but the meaning of the speaker; and to explain this clearly, ought to be the care of all truthtelling authors whenever they relate any thing concerning man, or angel, or God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But that the difficulty of the miracle may be still more enhanced, the number of men is stated to have been by no means small. As it follows, And there were about five thousand men, besides women and children, (Mat. 14:21.) as another Evangelist relates.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord teaches us, that when we entertain any one, we ought to make him sit down at meat, and partake of every comfort. Hence it follows, And he said to his disciples, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) That Luke says here, that the men were ordered to sit down by fifties, but Mark, by fifties and hundreds, does not matter, seeing that one spoke of a part, the other of the whole. But if one had mentioned only the fifties, and the other only the hundreds, they would seem to be greatly opposed to one another; nor would it be sufficiently distinct which of the two was said. But who will not admit, that one was mentioned by one Evangelist, the other by another, and that if more attentively considered it must be found so. But I have said thus much, because often certain things of this kind exist, which to those who take little heed and judge hastily appear contrary to one another, and yet are not so.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 49. in Matt.) And to make men believe that He came from the Father, Christ when He was about to work the miracle looked up to heaven. As it follows, Then he took the five loaves, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This also He did purposely for our sakes, that we may learn that at the commencement of a feast when we are going to break bread, we ought to offer thanks for it to God, and to draw forth the heavenly blessing upon it. As it follows, And he blessed, and brake.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) He distributes to them by the hands of His disciples, so honouring them that they might not forget it when the miracle was past. Now He did not create food for the multitude out of what did not exist, that He might stop the mouth of the Manichæans, who say that the creatures are independent (ἀλλοτριούντων. κτίσιν.) of Him; shewing that He Himself is both the Giver of food, and the same who said, Let the earth bring forth, &c.He makes also the fishes to increase, to signify that He has dominion over the seas, as well as the dry land. But well did He perform a special miracle for the weak, at the same time that He gives also a general blessing in feeding all the strong as well as the weak. And they did all eat, and were filled.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. Catech. Mag. c. 23.) For whom neither the heaven rained manna, nor the earth brought forth corn according to its nature, but from the unspeakable garner of divine power the blessing was poured forth. The bread is supplied in the hands of those who serve, it is even increased through the fulness of those who eat. The sea supplied not their wants with the food of fishes, but He who placed in the sea the race of fishes.

AMBROSE. It is clear that the multitude were filled not by a scanty meal, but by a constant and increasing supply of food. You might see in an incomprehensible manner amid the hands of those who distributed, the particles multiplying which they broke not; the fragments too, untouched by the fingers of the breakers, spontaneously mounting up.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Nor was this all that the miracle came to; but it follows, And there was taken up of the fragments that remained, twelve baskets, that this might be a manifest proof that a work of love to our neighbour will claim a rich reward from God.

THEOPHYLACT. And that we might learn the value of hospitality, and how much our own store is increased when we help those that need.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But He caused not loaves to remain over, but fragments, that He might shew them to be the remnants of the loaves, and these were made to be of that number, that there might be as many baskets as disciples.

AMBROSE. After that she who received the type of the Church was cured of the issue of blood, and that the Apostles were appointed to preach the Gospel of the kingdom of God, the nourishment of heavenly grace is imparted. But mark to whom it is imparted. Not to the indolent, not to those in a city, of rank in the synagogue, or in high secular office, but to those who seek Christ in the desert.

BEDE. Who Himself having left Judæa, which by unbelief had bereft herself of the source of prophecy, in the desert of the Church which had no husband, dispenses the food of the word. But many companies of the faithful leaving the city of their former manner of life, and their various opinions, follow Christ into the deserts of the Gentiles.

AMBROSE. But they who are not proud are themselves received by Christ, and the Word of God speaks with them, not about worldly things, but of the kingdom of God. And if any have ulcers of bodily passions, to these He willingly affords His cure. But every where the order of the mystery is preserved, that first through the remission of sins the wounds should be healed, but afterwards the nourishment of the heavenly table should plentifully abound.

BEDE. Now when the day was going down, he refreshes the multitudes, that is, as the end of the world approaches, or when the Sun of righteousness sets for us.

AMBROSE. Although the multitude is not as yet fed with stronger food. For first, as milk, there are five loaves; secondly, seven; thirdly, the Body of Christ is the stronger food. But if any one fears to seek food, let him leave every thing that belongs to him, and listen to the word of God. But whoever begins to hear the word of God begins to hunger, the Apostles begin to see him hungering. And if they who eat, as yet know not what they eat, Christ knows; He knows that they cat not this world’s food, but the food of Christ.

For they did not as yet know that the food of a believing people was not to be bought and sold. Christ knew that we are rather to be bought with a ransom, but His banquet to be without price.

BEDE. The Apostles had only got but the five loaves of the Mosaic law, and the two fishes of each covenant, which were covered in the secret place of obscure mysteries, as in the waters of the deep. But because men have five external senses, the five thousand men who followed the Lord signify those who still live in worldly ways, knowing well how to use the external things they possess. For they who entirely renounce the world are raised aloft in the enjoyment of His Gospel feast. But the different divisions of the guests, indicate the different congregations of Churches throughout the world, which together compose the one Catholic.

AMBROSE. But here the bread which Jesus brake is mystically indeed the word of God, and discourse concorning Christ, which when it is divided is increased. For from these few words, He ministered abundant nourishment to the people. He gave us words like loaves, which while they are tasted by our mouth are doubled.

BEDE. Now our Saviour does not create new food for the hungry multitudes, but He took those things which the disciples had and blessed them, since coming in the flesh He preaches nothing else than what had been foretold, but demonstrates the words of prophecy to be pregnant with the mysteries of grace; He looks towards heaven, that thither He may teach us to direct the eye of the mind, there to seek the light of knowledge; He breaks and distributes to the disciples to be placed before the multitude, because He revealed to them the Sacraments of the Law and the Prophets that they might preach them to the world.

AMBROSE.; Not without meaning are the fragments which remained over and above what the multitudes had eaten, collected by the disciples, since those things which are divine you may more easily find among the elect than among the people. Blessed is he who can collect those which remain over and above even to the learned. But for what reason did Christ fill twelve baskets, except that He might solve that word concerning the Jewish people, His hands served in the basket? (Ps. 81:6.) that is, the people who before collected mud for the pots, now through the cross of Christ gather up the nourishment of the heavenly life. Nor is this the office of few, but all. For by the twelve baskets, as if of each of the tribes, the foundation of the faith is spread abroad.

BEDE. Or by the twelve baskets the twelve Apostles are figured, and all succeeding teachers, despised indeed by men without, but within loaded with the fragments of saving food.

9:18–22

18. And it came to pass, as he was alone praying, his disciples were with him: and he asked them, saying, Whom say the people that I am?

19. They answering said, John the Baptist; but some say, Elias; and others say, that one of the old prophets is risen again.

20. He said unto them, But whom say ye that I am? Peter answering said, The Christ of God.

21. And he straitly charged them, and commanded them to tell no man that thing;

22. Saying, The Son of man must suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders and Chief Priests and Scribes, and be slain, and be raised the third day.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Our Lord having retired from the multitude, and being in a place apart, was engaged in prayer. As it is said, And it came to pass, as he was alone praying. For He ordained Himself as an example of this, instructing His disciples by an easy method of teaching. For I suppose the rulers of the people ought to be superior also in good deeds, to those that are under them, ever holding converse with them in all necessary things, and treating of those things in which God delights.

BEDE. Now the disciples were with the Lord, but He alone prayed to the Father, since the saints may be joined to the Lord in the bond of faith and love, but the Son alone is able to penetrate the incomprehensible secrets of the Father's will. Every where then He prays alone, for human wishes comprehend not the counsel of God, nor can any one be a partaker with Christ of the deep things of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now His engaging in prayer might perplex His disciples. For they saw Him praying like a man, Whom before they had seen performing miracles with divine power. In order then to banish all perplexity of this kind, He asks them this question, not because He did not know the reports which they had gathered from without, but that He might rid them of the opinion of the many, and instil into them the true faith. Hence it follows, And he asked them, saying, Whom say the people that I am?

BEDE. Rightly does our Lord, when about to enquire into the faith of the disciples, first inquire into the opinion of the multitudes, lest their confession should appear not to be determined by their knowledge, but to be formed by the opinion of the generality, and they should be considered not to believe from experience, but like Herod to be perplexed by different reports which they heard.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 53.) Now it may raise a question, that Luke says that our Lord asked His disciples, Whom do men say that I am, at the same time that He was alone praying, and they also were with Him; whereas Mark says, that they were asked this question by our Lord on the way; but this is difficult only to him who never prayed on the way.

AMBROSE. But it is no trifling opinion of the multitude which the disciples mention, when it is added, But they answering said, John the Baptist, (whom they knew to be beheaded;) but some say, Elias, (whom they thought would come,) but others say that one of the old Prophets is risen again. But to make this enquiry belongs to a different kind of wisdom from ours, for if it were enough for the Apostle Paul to know nothing but Christ Jesus, and Him crucified, what more can I desire to know than Christ? (1 Cor. 2:2.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But mark the subtle skill of the question. For he directs them first to the praises of strangers, that having overthrown these, He might beget in them the right opinion. So when the disciples had given the opinion of the people, He asks them their own opinion; as it is added, And He said unto them, Whom say ye that I am? How marked is ye! He excludes them from the other, that they may avoid their opinions; as if He said, Ye who by my decree are called to the Apostleship, the witnesses of my miracles, whom do ye say that I am? But Peter anticipated the rest, and becomes the mouthpiece of the whole company, and launching forth into the eloquence of divine love, utters the confession of faith, as it is added, Peter answering said, The Christ of God. He says not merely that He was Christ of God, but now He uses the article. Hence it is in the Greek, τὸν χριστόν. For many divinely accounted persons are in diverse ways called Christs, for some were anointed kings, some prophets. But we through Christ have been anointed by the holy Spirit, have obtained the name of Christ. But there is only one who is the Christ of God and the Father, He alone as it were having His own Father who is in heaven. And so Luke agrees indeed in the same opinion as Matthew, who relates Peter to have said, Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God, but speaking briefly Luke says that Peter answered, the Christ of God.

AMBROSE. In this one name there is the expression both of His divinity and incarnation, and the belief of His passion. He has therefore comprehended every thing, having expressed both the nature and the name wherein is all virtue. (summa virtutum)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But we must observe, that Peter most wisely confessed Christ to be one, against those who presumed to divide Immanuel into two Christs. For Christ did not enquire of them, saying, Whom do men say the divine Word is? but the Son of man, whom Peter confessed to be the Son of God. Herein then is Peter to be admired, and thought worthy of such chief honour, seeing that Him whom he marvelled at in our form, he believed to be the Christ of the Father, that is to say, that the Word which proceeded of the Father’s Substance was become man.

AMBROSE. But our Lord Jesus Christ was at first unwilling to be preached, lest an uproar should arise; as it follows, And he straitly charged them, and commanded them to tell no man any thing. For many reasons He commands His disciples to be silent; to deceive the prince of this world, to reject boasting, to teach humility. Christ then would not boast and dost thou boast who art of ignoble birth? Likewise He did it to prevent rude and as yet imperfect disciples from being oppressed with the wonder of this awful announcement. They are then forbid to preach Him as the Son of God, that they might afterwards preach Him crucified.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 54. in Matt.) Timely also was our Lord’s command that no one should tell that He was Christ, in order that when offences should be taken away and the sufferings of the cross completed, a proper opinion of Him might be firmly rooted in the minds of the hearers. For that which has once taken root and afterwards been torn up. when fresh planted will scarcely ever be preserved. But that which when once planted continues undisturbed, grows up securely. For if Peter was offended merely by what he heard, what would be the feelings of those many who, after they had heard that He was the Son of God, saw Him crucified, and spit upon?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It was the duty then of the disciples to preach Him throughout the world. For this was the work of those who were chosen by Him to the office of the Apostleship. But as holy Scripture bears witness, There is a time for every thing. For it was fitting that the cross and resurrection should be accomplished, and then should follow the preaching of the Apostles; as it is spoken, saying, The Son of man must needs suffer many things.

AMBROSE. Perhaps because the Lord knew that the disciples would believe even the difficult mystery of the Passion and Resurrection, He wished to be Himself the proclaimer of His own Passion and Resurrection.

9:23–27

23. And he said to them all, If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross daily, and follow me.

24. For whosoever will save his life shall lose it: but whosoever will lose his life for my sake, the same shall save it.

25. For what is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, or be cast away?

26. For whosoever shall be ashamed of me and of my words, of him shall the Son of man be ashamed, when he shall come in his own glory, and in his Father’s, and of the holy angels.

27. But I tell you of a truth, there be some standing here, which shall not taste of death, till they see the kingdom of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) Great and noble leaders provoke the mighty in arms to deeds of valour, not only by promising them the honours of victory, but by declaring that suffering is in itself glorious. Such we see is the teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ. For He had foretold to His disciples, that He must needs suffer the accusations of the Jews, be slain, and rise again on the third day. Lest then they should think that Christ indeed was to suffer persecution for the life of the world, but that they might lead a soft life, He shews them that they must needs pass through similar struggles, if they desired to obtain His glory. Hence it is said, And he said unto all.

BEDE. He rightly addressed Himself to all, since He treats of the higher things (which relate to the belief in His birth and passion) apart with His disciples.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 55. in Matt.) Now the Saviour of His great mercy and lovingkindness will have no one serve Him unwillingly and from constraint, but those only who come of their own accord, and are grateful for being allowed to serve Him. And so not by compelling men and putting a yoke upon them, but by persuasion and kindness, He draws unto Him every where those who are willing, saying, If any man will, &c.

BASIL. (in Cons. Mon. cap. 4.) But He has left His own life for an example of blameless conversation to those who are willing to obey Him; as He says, Come after me, meaning thereby not a following of His body, for that would be impossible to all, since our Lord is in heaven, but a due imitation of His life according to their capacities.

BEDE. Now unless a man renounces himself, he comes not near to Him, who is above him; it is said therefore, Let him deny himself.

BASIL. (in reg. fus. int. 6.) A denial of one’s self is indeed a total forgetfulness of things past, and a forsaking of his own will and affection.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. tom. 12.) A man also denies himself when by a sufficient alteration of manners or a good conversation he changes a life of habitual wickedness. He who has long lived in lasciviousness, abandons his lustful self when he becomes chaste, and in like manner a forsaking of any crimes is a denial of one’s self.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) Now a desire of suffering death for Christ and a mortification of one’s members which are upon the earth, and a manful resolution to undergo any danger for Christ, and an indifference towards the present life, this it is to take up one’s cross. Hence it is added, And let him take up his cross daily.

THEOPHYLACT. By the cross, He speaks of an ignominious death, meaning, that if any one will follow Christ, he must not for his own sake flee from even an ignominious death.

GREGORY. (Hom. 32. in Ev) In two ways also is the cross taken up, either when the body is afflicted through abstinence, or the mind; touched by sympathy.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Isaac. Monac.) He rightly joins these two, Let him deny himself, and let him take up his cross, for as he who is prepared to ascend the cross conceives in his mind the intention of death, and so goes on thinking to have no more part in this life, so he who is willing to follow our Lord, ought first to deny himself, and so take up his cross, that his will may be ready to endure every calamity.

BASIL. (ubi sup. lnt. 8.) Herein then stands a man’s perfection, that he should have his affections hardened, even towards life itself, and have ever about him the answer (ἀποκρίμα.) of death a, that he should by no means trust in himself. (2 Cor. 1:9.) But perfection takes its beginning from the relinquishment of things foreign to it; suppose these to be possessions or vain-glory, or affection for things that profit not.

BEDE. We are bid then to take up the cross of which we have above spoken, and having taken it, to follow our Lord who bore His own cross. Hence it follows, And let him follow me.

ORIGEN. (ut sup.) He assigns the cause of this when He adds, For whosoever will save his life shall lose it; that is, whosoever will according to the present life keep his own soul fixed on things of sense, the same shall lose it, never reaching to the bounds of happiness. But on the other hand He adds, but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake, shall save it. That is, whosoever forsakes the things of sense looking upon truth, and exposes himself to death, as it were losing his life for Christ, shall the rather save it. If then it is a blessed thing to save our life, (with regard to that safety which is in God,) there must be also a certain good surrender of life which is made by looking upon Christ. It seems also to me from resemblance to that denying of one’s self which has been before spoken of, that it becomes us to lose a certain sinful life of ours, to take up that which is saved by virtue.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) But that incomparable exercise of the passion of Christ, which surpasses the delights and precious things of the world, is alluded to when he adds, What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world and lose himself, or be a cast away? As if he says, When a man, through his looking after the present delights, gains pleasure, and refuses indeed to suffer, but chooses to live splendidly in his riches, what advantage will he get then, when he has lost his soul? For the fashion of this world passeth away, and pleasant things depart as a shadow. (1 Cor. 7:31. Sap. 5:9.) For the treasures of ungodliness shall not profit, but righteousness snatches a man from death. (Prov. 10:2.)

GREGORY. (Hom. 32. in Ev.) Since then the holy Church has one time of persecution, another time of peace, our Lord has noticed both times in His command to us. For at the time of persecution we must lay down our soul, that is our life, which He signified, saying, Whosoever shall lose his life. But in time of peace, those things which have the greatest power to subdue us, our earthly desires, must be vanquished; which He signified, saying, What does it profit a man, &c. Now we commonly despise all fleeting things, but still we are so checked by that feeling of shame so common to man, that we are yet unable to express in words the uprightness which we preserve in our hearts. But to this wound the Lord indeed subjoins a suitable application, saying, For whoever shall be ashamed of me and my words, of him shall the Son of man be ashamed.

THEOPHYLACT. He is ashamed of Christ who says, Am I to believe on Him that is crucified? He also is ashamed of His words who despises the simplicity of the Gospel. But of him shall the Lord be ashamed in His kingdom, in the same manner as if a master of a household should have a bad servant, and be ashamed to have him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now he strikes fear into their hearts, when He says that He will descend from heaven, not in His former humility and condition proportioned to our capacities for receiving Him, but in the glory of the Father, with the Angels ministering unto Him. For it follows, When he shall come in his own glory, and his Father’s, and of the holy angels. Awful then and fatal will it be, to be branded as an enemy, and slothful in business, when so great a Judge shall descend with the armies of Angels standing round Him. But from this you may perceive, that though He has taken to Himself our flesh and blood, the Son is no less God, seeing that He promises to come in the glory of God the Father, and that Angels shall minister to Him as the Judge of all, Who was made man like unto us.

AMBROSE. Now our Lord while He ever raises us to look to the future reward of virtue, and teaches us how good it is to despise worldly things, so also He supports the weakness of the human mind by a present recompense. For it is a hard thing to take up the cross, and expose your life to danger and your body to death; to give up what you are, when you wish to be what you are not; and even the loftiest virtue seldom exchanges things present for future. The good Master then, lest any man should be broken down by despair or weariness, straightway promises that He will be seen by the faithful, in these words, But I say unto you, There are some standing here who shall not taste of death till they see the kingdom of God.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, the glory in which the righteous shall be. Now He said this of His transfiguration, which was the type of the glory to come; as if He said, There are some standing here, Peter, James, and John, who shall not reach death before they have seen at the time of My transfiguration what will be the glory of those who confess Me.

GREGORY. (Hom. 32. in Ev.) Or, by the kingdom of God in this place, is meant the present Church; and some of His disciples were to live in the body up to that time, when they should behold the Church of God built and raised up against the glory of the world.

AMBROSE. If then we also wish not to fear death, let us stand where Christ is. For they only cannot taste death who are able to stand with Christ, wherein we may consider from the nature of the very word, that they will not experience even the slightest perception of death, who are thought worthy to obtain union with Christ. At least let us suppose that the death of the body is tasted by touch, the life of the soul preserved by possession; for here not the death of the body, but of the soul, is denied.

9:28–31

28. And it came to pass about an eight days after these sayings, he took Peter and John and James, and went up into a mountain to pray.

29. And as he prayed, the fashion of his countenance was altered, and his raiment was white and glistering.

30. And, behold, there talked with him two men, which were Moses and Elias:

31. Who appeared in glory, and spake of his decease which he should accomplish at Jerusalem.

EUSEBIUS. Our Lord, when He made known to His disciples the great mystery of His second coming, that it might not seem that they were to believe in His words only, proceeds to works, manifesting to them, through the eyes of their faith, the image of His kingdom; as it follows, And it came to pass about an eight days after these sayings, he took Peter and John and James, and went up into a mountain to pray.

DAMASCENE. (Orat. de Trans fig. §. 8.) Matthew and Mark indeed say that the transfiguration took place on the sixth day after the promise made to the disciples, but Luke on the eighth. But there is no disagreement in these testimonies, but they who make the number six, taking off a day at each end, that is, the first and the last, the day on which He makes the promise, and that on which He fulfilled it, have reckoned only the intervening ones, but He who makes the number eight, has counted in each of the two days above mentioned. But why were not all called, but only some, to behold the sight? There was only one indeed who was unworthy to see the divinity, namely Judas, according to the word of Isaiah, Let the wicked be taken away, that he should not behold the glory of God. (Isai. 26:10 LXX.) If then he alone had been sent away, he might have, as it were from envy, been provoked to greater wickedness. Henceforward He takes away from the traitor every pretext for his treachery, seeing that He left below the rest of the company of the Apostles. But He took with Him three, that in the mouths of two or three witnesses every word should be established. He took Peter, indeed, because He wished to shew him that the witness he had borne to Him was confirmed by the witness of the Father, and that he was as it were to preside over the whole Church. He took with Him James, who was to be the first of all the disciples to die for Christ; but He took John as the clearest singer of the sacred doctrine, that having seen the glory of the Son, which submits not to time, he might sound forth, In the beginning was the Word. (John 1:1.)

AMBROSE. Or, Peter went up, who received the keys of the kingdom of heaven; John, to whom was committed our Lord’s mother; James, who first suffered martyrdom. (Acts 12:1.)

THEOPHYLACT. Or, He takes these with Him as men who were able to conceal this thing, and reveal it to no one else. But going up into a mountain to pray, He teaches us to pray solitary, and going up, into stooping to earthly things.

DAMASCENE. (ut sup. 10.) Servants however pray in one way; our Lord prayed in another. For the prayer of the servant is offered up by the lifting up of the mind to God, but the holy mind of Christ, (who was hypostatically [ὑπόστασιν] united to God,) prayed, that He might lead us by the hand to the ascent, whereby we mount up in prayer to God, and teach us that He is not opposed to God, but reverences the Father as His beginning;

(ὡς ἀρχὴν ἑαυτὸν) nay, even tempting the tyrant, who sought from Him whether He were God, (which the power of His miracles declared,) He concealed as it were under the bait a hook; that he who had deceived man with the hope of divinity might fitly himself be caught with the clothing of humanity. Prayer is the revelation of Divine glory; as it follows, And as he prayed, the fashion of his countenance was altered.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Not as though His body changed its human form, but a certain glistening glory overspread it.

DAMASCENE. (ut sup. 13.) Now the devil, seeing His face shining in prayer, recollected Moses, whose face was glorified. But Moses indeed was arrayed with a glory, which came from without; our Lord, with that which proceeded from the inherent brightness of Divine glory. (Exod. 34:29.) For since in the hypostatical union there is one and the same glory of the Word and the flesh, He is transfigured not as receiving what He was not, but manifesting to His disciples, what He was. Hence, according to Matthew, it is said, that He was transfigured before them, and that His face shone as the sun; (Mat. 17:2.) for what the sun is in things of sense, God is in spiritual things. And as the sun, which is the fountain of light, cannot be easily seen, but its light is perceived from that which reaches the earth; so the countenance of Christ shines more intensely, like the sun, but His raiment is white as snow; as it follows, And his raiment was white and glistering; that is, lighted up by its participation of the divine light. And a little afterwards, But while these things were so, that it might be shewn there was but one Lord of the new and old covenant, and the mouths of heretics might be shut, and men might believe on the resurrection, and He also, who was transfigured, be believed to be the Lord of the living and the dead, Moses and Elias, as servants, stand by their Lord in His glory; hence it follows, And behold there talked with him two men. For it became men, seeing the glory and confidence of their fellow servants, to admire indeed the merciful condescension of the Lord, but to emulate those who had laboured before them, and looking to the pleasantness of future blessings, to be the more strengthened for conflicts. For he who has known the reward of his labours, will the more easily endure them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 56. in Matt.) Or else this took place because the multitude said He was Elias or Jeremias, to shew the distinction between our Lord and His servants. And to make it plain that He was not an enemy of God, and transgressor of the law, He shewed these two standing by Him; (for else, Moses the lawgiver, and Elias who was zealous for the glory of God, had not stood by Him,) but also to give testimony to the virtues of the men. For each had ofttimes exposed Himself to death in keeping the divine commands. He wishes also His disciples to imitate them in the government of the people, that they might be indeed meek like Moses, and zealous like Elias. He introduces them also to set forth the glory of His cross, to console Peter and the others who feared His Passion. Hence it follows, And spake of his decease, which he should accomplish at Jerusalem.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The mystery, namely, of His incarnation, also the life-giving Passion accomplished on the sacred cross.

AMBROSE. Now in a mystical manner, after the words above said, is exhibited the transfiguration of Christ, since he who hears the words of Christ, and believes, shall see the glory of His resurrection. For, on the eighth day the resurrection took place. Hence also several Psalms are written, ‘for the eighth,’ (pro octava.) or perhaps it was that He might make manifest what He had said, that he who for the word of God shall lose his own life, shall save it, seeing that He will make good His promises at the resurrection.

BEDE. For as He rose from the dead after the seventh day of the Sabbath, during which He lay in the tomb, we also after the six ages of this world, and the seventh of the rest of souls, which meanwhile is passed in another life, shall rise again as it were in the eighth age.

AMBROSE. But Matthew and Mark have related that He took them with Him after six days, of which we may say after 6000 years, (for a thousand years in the Lord’s sight are as one day;) but more than 6000 years are reckoned. We had rather then take the six days symbolically, that in six days the works of the world were completed, that by the time we may understand the works, by the works the world. And so the times of the world being finished, the resurrection to come is declared; or because, He who has ascended above the world, and has passed beyond the moments of this life, is waiting, seated as it were on a high place, for the everlasting fruit of the resurrection.

BEDE. Hence He ascends the mountain to pray and be transfigured, to shew that those who expect the fruit of the resurrection, and desire to see the King in His glory, ought to have the dwelling place of their hearts on high, and be ever on their knees in prayer.

AMBROSE. I should think that in the three who are taken up into the mountain, was contained in a mystery the human race, because from the three sons of Noah sprung the whole race of man; I did not perceive that they were chosen out. Three then are chosen to ascend the mountain, because none can see the glory of the resurrection, but they who have preserved the mystery of the Trinity with inviolable purity of faith.

BEDE. Now the transfigured Saviour shews the glory of His own coming, or our resurrection; who as He then appeared to His Apostles shall in like manner appear to all the elect. But the raiment of the Lord is taken for the band of His Saints, which in truth when our Lord was upon earth seemed to be despised, but when He sought the mount, shines with a new whiteness; for now are we the sons of God; and it does not yet appear what we shall be. But we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him. (1 John 3:2.)

AMBROSE. Or else, according to your capacity is the word either lessened or increased to you, and unless you ascend the summit of a higher wisdom, you behold not what glory there is in the word of God. Now the garments of the Word, are the discourses of the Scriptures, and certain clothings of the Divine mind; and as His raiment shone white, so in the eyes of your understanding, the sense of the divine words becomes clear. Hence after Moses, Elias; that is, the Law and the Prophets in the Word. For neither can the Law exist without the Word, nor the Prophet, unless he prophesied of the Son of God.

9:32–36

32. But Peter and they that were with him were heavy with sleep: and when they were awake, they saw his glory, and the two men that stood with him.

33. And it came to pass, as they departed from him, Peter said unto Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here: and let us make three tabernacles; one for thee, and one for Moses, and one for Elias: not knowing what he said.

34. While he thus spake, there came a cloud, and overshadowed them: and they feared as they entered into the cloud.

35. And there came a voice out of the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son: hear him.

36. And when the voice was past, Jesus was found alone. And they kept it close, and told no man in those days any of those things which they had seen.

THEOPHYLACT. While Christ is engaged in prayer, Peter is heavy with sleep, for he was weak, and did what was natural to man; as it is said, But Peter and they that were with him were heavy with sleep. But when they awake, they behold His glory, and the two men with Him; as it follows, And when they were awake, they saw his glory, and the two men, that stood with him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 56. in Matt.) Or, by the word sleep, he means that strange maze that fell upon them by reason of the vision. For it was not night time, but the exceeding brightness of the light weighed down their weak eyes.

AMBROSE. For the incomprehensible brightness of the Divine nature oppresses our bodily senses. For if the sight of the body is unable to contain the sun’s ray when opposite to the eyes which behold it, how can the corruption of our fleshly members endure the glory of God? And perhaps they were oppressed with sleep, that after their rest they might behold the sight of the resurrection. Therefore when they were awake they saw His glory. For no one, except he is watching, sees the glory of Christ. Peter was delighted, and as the allurements of this world enticed him not, was carried away by the glory of the resurrection. Hence it follows, And it came to pass as they departed, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For perhaps holy Peter imagined that the kingdom of heaven was at hand, and therefore it seemed good to him to abide on the mount.

DAMASCENE. (Orat. de Trans. fig.) It were not good for thee, Peter, that Christ should abide there, for if He had remained, the promise made to thee would never receive its accomplishment. For neither wouldest thou have obtained the keys of the kingdom, nor the tyranny of death been abolished. Seek not bliss before its time, as Adam did to be made a God. The time shall come when thou shalt enjoy the sight without ceasing, and dwell together with Him who is light and life.

AMBROSE. But Peter distinguished not only by earnest feeling, but also by devout deeds, wishing like a zealous workman to build three tabernacles, offers the service of their united labour; for it follows, Let us make three tabernacles, one for thee, &c.

DAMASCENE. (ubi sup.) But the Lord ordained thee not the builder of tabernacles, but of the universal Church. Thy words have been brought to pass by thy disciples, by thy sheep, in building a tabernacle, not only for Christ, but also for His servants. But Peter said not this deliberately, but through the inspiration of the Spirit revealing things to come, as it follows, not knowing what he said.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He knew not what he said, for neither was the time come for the end of the world, or for the Saints' enjoyment of their promised hope. And when the dispensation was now commencing, how was it fitting that Christ should abandon His love of the world, Who was willing to suffer for it?

DAMASCENE. (ubi sup.) It behoved Him also not to confine the fruit of His incarnation to the service of those only who were on the mount, but to extend it to all believers, which was to be accomplished by His cross and passion.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) Peter also was ignorant what he said, seeing that it was not proper to make three tabernacles for the three. For the servants are not received with their Lord, the creature is not placed beside the Creator.

AMBROSE. Nor does the condition of man in this corruptible body allow of making a tabernacle to God, whether in the soul or in the body, or in any other place; and although he knew not what he said, yet a service was offered which not by any deliberate forwardness, but its premature devotion, receives in abundance the fruits of piety. For his ignorance was part of his condition, his offer of devotion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or else Peter heard that it was necessary Christ must die, and on the third day rise again, but he saw around him a very remote and solitary place; he supposed therefore that the place had some great protection. For this reason he said, It is good for us to be here. (Exod. 24:15, 2 Kings 1:12.) Moses, too was present, who entered into the cloud. Elias, who on the mount brought down fire from heaven. The

Evangelist then, to indicate the confusion of mind in which he utters this, added, Not knowing what he said.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 56.) Now in what Luke here says of Moses and Elias, And it came to pass as they departed from him, Peter said unto Jesus, Master, it is good for us to be here, he must not be thought contrary to Matthew and Mark, who have so connected Peter’s suggestion of this, as if Moses and Elias were still speaking with our Lord. For they did not expressly state that Peter said it then, but rather were silent about what Luke added, that as they departed, Peter suggested this to our Lord.

THEOPHYLACT. But while Peter spake, our Lord builds a tabernacle not made with hands, and enters into it with the Prophets. Hence it is added, While he thus spake there came a cloud and overshadowed them, to shew that He was not inferior to the Father. For as in the Old Testament it was said, the Lord dwelt in the cloud, so now also a cloud received our Lord, not a dark cloud, but bright and shining.

BASIL. (in Esai. c. 4. 5.) For the obscurity of the Law had passed away; for as smoke is caused by the fire, so the cloud by light; but because a cloud is the sign of calmness, the rest of the future state is signified by the covering of a cloud.

AMBROSE. For it is the overshadowing of the divine Spirit which does not darken, but reveals secret things to the hearts of men.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. tom. 12.) Now His disciples being unable to bear this, fell down, humbled under the mighty hand of God, greatly afraid since they knew what was said to Moses, No man shall see my face, and lice. Hence it follows, And they feared as they entered into the cloud.

AMBROSE. Now observe, that the cloud was not black from the darkness of condensed air, and such as to overcast the sky with a horrible gloom, but a shining cloud, from which we were not moistened with rain, but as the voice of Almighty God came forth the dew of faith was shed upon the hearts of men. For it follows, And there came a voice out of the cloud, saying, This is my beloved Son: hear ye him. Elias was not His Son. Moses was not. But this is the Son whom you see alone.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (in Thes. lib. 12. c. 14.) How then should men suppose Him who is really the Son to be made or created, when God the Father thundered from above, This is my beloved Son! as if He said, Not one of My sons, but He who is truly and by nature My Son, according to whose example the others are adopted, He ordered them then to obey Him, when He added, Hear ye him. And to obey Him more than Moses and Elias, for Christ is the end of the Law and the Prophets. Hence the Evangelist adds significantly, And when the voice was past, Jesus was found alone.

THEOPHYLACT. Lest in truth any one should suppose that these words, This is my beloved Son, were uttered about Moses or Elias.

AMBROSE. They then departed, when our Lord's manifestation had begun. There are three seen at the beginning, one at the end; for faith being made perfect, they are one. Therefore are they also received into the body of Christ, because we also shall be one in Christ Jesus; or perhaps, because the Law and the Prophets came out from the Word.

THEOPHYLACT. Now those things which began from the Word, end in the Word. For by this he implies that up to a certain time the Law and the Prophets appear, as here Moses and Elias; but afterwards, at their departure, Jesus is alone. For now abideth the Gospel, legal things having passed away.

BEDE. And mark, that as when our Lord was baptized in Jordan, so also when He was glorified on the Mount, the mystery of the whole Trinity is declared; for His glory which we confess at baptism, we shall see at the resurrection. Nor in vain does the Holy Spirit appear here in the cloud, there in the form of a dove, seeing that he who now preserves with a simple heart the faith which he receives, shall then in the light of open vision look upon those things which he believed.

ORIGEN. (ubi sup.) Now Jesus wishes not those things which relate to His glory to be spoken of before His passion. Hence it follows, And they kept it close. For men would have been offended, especially the multitude, if they saw Him crucified Who had been so glorified.

DAMASCENE. (ubi sup.) This also our Lord commands, since He knew His disciples to be imperfect, seeing that they had not yet received the full measure of the Spirit, lest the hearts of others who had not seen should be prostrated by sorrow, and lest the traitor should be stirred up to a frantic hatred.

9:37–43

37. And it came to pass, that on the next day, when they were come down from the hill, much people met him.

38. And, behold, a man of the company cried out, saying, Master, I beseech thee, look upon my son: for he is mine only child.

39. And, lo, a spirit taketh him, and he suddenly crieth out; and it teareth him that he foameth again, and bruising him hardly departeth from him.

40. And I besought thy disciples to cast him out; and they could not.

41. And Jesus answering said, O faithless and perverse generation, how long shall I be with you, and suffer you? Bring thy son hither.

42. And as he was yet a coming, the devil threw him down, and tare him. And Jesus rebuked the unclean spirit, and healed the child, and delivered him again to his father.

43. And they were all amazed at the mighty power of God.

BEDE. Certain places accord with certain events. On the Mount our Lord prays, is transfigured, reveals the secrets of His glory to His disciples; as He descends to the lower parts, He is received by a large concourse. As it is said, And it came to pass, that on the next day, when he was come down from the hill, much people met him. Above He makes known the voice of the Father, below He expels the evil spirits. Hence it follows, And, behold, a man of the company cried out, saying, Master, I beseech thee look upon my son.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) It seems indeed to me that this was a wise man. For he said not to the Saviour, “Do this or that,” but, Look on my son, for this suffices for His salvation; as the prophet said, Look on me, and have mercy on me; and he says, on my son, to shew that his was a reasonable forwardness in crying out aloud among the multitude. He adds, for he is mine only child. As if to say, There is none other I can expect to be the consolation of my old age. He next enters into the sufferings, that he may move his Hearer to compassion, saying, And, lo, the spirit taketh him. He then seems to accuse the disciples, but his answer is rather a justification of his casting aside his fear, saying, And I besought thy disciples to cast him out: and they could not. As if he said, Think not that I have come lightly unto Thee. Marvellous is Thy greatness! I did not intrude upon Thy presence at once, but went first to Thy disciples. Because they failed to work the cure, I am now compelled to approach Thee. Our Lord therefore does not blame him, but the faithless generation; for it follows, And Jesus answering said, O faithless and perverse generation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 57. in Matt.) But that this man was much weakened in faith, the writings of the Gospel shew us in several places. In that place where he says, Help thou my unbelief; (Mark 9:21, 23.) and, If thou canst. And in that where Christ said, All things are possible to him that believeth, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Hence it seems to me more correct to account the father of the demoniac unbelieving, because he also casts reproach upon the holy Apostles, saying that they could not subdue the evil spirits. But it were better to have sought favour from God by honouring Him, for He has respect to them that fear Him. But he who says that those are weak with respect to their power over evil spirits, who have obtained that power from Christ, calumniates rather the grace than those who are adorned with that grace in whom Christ works. Christ is therefore offended with the accusation of the saints, to whom was entrusted the word of holy preaching. Wherefore the Lord rebukes him and those like-minded with him, saying, O faithless and perverse generation. As if He said, Because of your unbelief the grace has not received its accomplishment.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 57. in Matt.) Now He does not direct His words to him alone, but to all the Jews, lest He should cause him to doubt. For it must have been that many were offended.

THEOPHYLACT. By the word perverse, He shews that this wickedness in them was not originally or by nature, for by nature indeed they were upright, being the seed of Abraham, but became perverted through malice.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if not knowing how to continue in the right beginnings. Now Christ disdains to dwell with those who are thus disposed. Hence He says, How long shall I be with you, and suffer you? Feeling troubled with their company, because of their evil deeds.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Hereby also He shews that His departure was desired by Him, not because the suffering of the cross was grievous, but rather their conversation.

BEDE. Not that weariness has overcome His patience, but after the manner of a physician, when he sees a sick man acting contrary to his commands, he says, ‘How long shall I come to thy house, when I order one thing, you do another. But to prove that He was not angry with the man, but with the sin, He immediately added, Bring thy son hither.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. He might indeed have healed him by His simple command, but He makes his sufferings public, bringing the weak in faith to the sight of things present. Then the devil, when he perceived our Lord, rends and dashes the child clown; as it follows, And as he was yet a coming, the devil threw him down, and tare him; that so first the sufferings should be made manifest, then the remedy be applied.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) The Lord however does this not for display, but for the father’s sake, that upon seeing the devil disturbed at the mere summons, he might thus at least be led to the belief of the future miracles; of which it follows, And Jesus rebuked the unclean spirit, and healed the child, and delivered him again unto his father.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now before not his father but the devil possessed him, but now the Evangelist adds that the people were astonished at the greatness of God, saying, And all were amazed at the mighty power of God, which he says, because of the gift of Christ, who conferred on the holy Apostles also the power of working divine miracles, and having the mastery over evil spirits.

BEDE. Now in a mystical manner in proportion to their deserts docs our Lord daily ascend to some men, seeing that the perfect and those whose conversation is in heaven, He glorifies by exalting higher, instructing them in things eternal, and teaching them things which can not be heard by the multitude, but to others he descends, in that He strengthens the earthly and foolish men, teaching and chastening them. Now this demoniac Matthew calls a lunatic; Mark, deaf and dumb. (Matt. 17:15, Mark 9:25.) Matthew signifies those who change as the moon, increasing and decreasing through different vices, Mark those who are dumb in not confessing the faith, deaf in not hearing the very word of faith. While the boy is coming to our Lord, he is dashed to the ground; because men when turned to the Lord are often grievously afflicted by the devil, that he may instil a hatred of virtue, or revenge the injury of his expulsion. As in the beginning of the Church he waged as many fierce conflicts as he had to bewail losses suddenly brought upon His kingdom. But our Lord rebukes not the boy who suffered violence, but the evil spirit who inflicted it; for he who desires to correct the sinner, ought by reproof and abhorrence to drive away the vice, but to revive the man by gentleness, until he can restore him to the spiritual father of the Church.

9:43–45

43.—But while they wondered every one at all things which Jesus did, he said unto his disciples,

44. Let these sayings sink down into your ears: for the Son of man shall be delivered into the hands of men.

45. But they understood not this saying, and it was hid from them, that they perceived it not: and they feared to ask him of that saying.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) Every thing that Jesus did claimed admiration from all men for a peculiar and divine light reflected upon each of His works, according to the Psalms, honour and majesty wilt thou lay upon him. (Ps. 21:5.) Although all indeed marvelled at those things which He did, He however addresses what follows, not to all, but to His disciples; as it is said, But while they wondered every one, &c. He had shewn His glory on the mount to His disciples, and after this delivered a man from an evil spirit, but it was necessary for Him to undergo His passion for our salvation. Now His disciples might have been perplexed, saying, “Have we then been deceived in that we thought him to be God?” That they might know then what was to happen to Him, He bids them lay up in their minds as a certain deposit the mystery of His passion, saying, Let these sayings sink down in your hearts. By the word your, He distinguishes them from others. For the multitude were not to know that He was about to suffer, but were rather to be assured that the dead would rise again, destroying death, lest they should be offended.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. While all thus were wondering at the miracles, He foretels His passion. For miracles do not save, but the cross conveys the benefit. Hence he adds, For the Son of man shall he delivered into the hands of men.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. tom. 13.) But it is not clearly expressed by whom He is to be delivered, for one says, that He is to be delivered up by Judas, another by the devil; but Paul says, that God the Father delivered Him up for us all; (Rom. 8:32.) but Judas, as he delivered Him up for money, did it traitorously, the Father for His mercies’ sake.

THEOPHYLACT. Now our Lord in condescension to their infirmities and governing them with a kind of economy, did not permit them to understand what was said of the cross; as it follows, But they understood not.

BEDE. This ignorance of the disciples proceeds not so much from slowness of understanding as from affection, for since they were yet carnal and ignorant of the mystery of the cross, they could not believe that He whom they thought to be really God would suffer death. And because they were often accustomed to hear Him speak by figure, they thought that He meant figuratively something else, by what He said of His betrayal.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now some one perhaps will say, How were the disciples ignorant of the mystery of the cross, seeing that it was touched upon in several places by the shadows of the Law? But as Paul relates, Even unto this day, when Moses is read, the vail is upon their hearts. (2 Cor. 3:15.) It becomes then those who approach Christ, to say, Open thou my eyes, that I may behold the wonderful things out of thy law. (Ps. 119:18.)

THEOPHYLACT. Mark also the reverence of the disciples in what follows, And they feared to ask him of that saying. For fear is the first step to reverence.

9:46–50

46. Then there arose a reasoning among them, which of them should be greatest.

47. And Jesus, perceiving the thought of their heart, took a child, and set him by him,

48. And said unto them, Whosoever shall receive this child in my name receiveth me: and whosoever shall receive me receiveth him that sent me: for he that is least among you all, the same shall be great.

49. And John answered and said, Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name; and we forbad him, because he followeth not with us.

50. And Jesus said unto him, Forbid him not: for he that is not against us is for us.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) The devil lays plots of various kinds for them that love the best way of life. And if indeed by carnal allurements he can gain possession of a man’s heart, He sharpens his love of pleasure; but if a man has escaped these snares, he excites in him a desire of glory, and this passion for vain-glory had seized some one of His apostles. Hence it is said, Then there arose a reasoning among them, which of them should be the greatest. For to have such thoughts, belongs to him who desires to be superior to the rest; but I think it improbable that all the disciples gave way to this weakness; and therefore suppose that the Evangelist, not to seem to lay the charge to any individual, expresses himself indefinitely, saying, that there arose a reasoning among them.

THEOPHYLACT. Now it seems that this feeling was excited by the circumstance of their not being able to cure the demoniac. And while they were disputing thereupon, one said, It was not owing to my weakness, but another's, that he could not be cured; and so thereby was kindled a strife among them, which was the greatest.

BEDE. Or, because they saw Peter, James, and John, taken apart to the mount, and the keys of the kingdom of heaven promised to Peter, they were angry that these three, or Peter, should have precedence over all; or because in the payment of the tribute they saw Peter made equal to the Lord, they supposed he was to be placed before the rest. But the attentive reader will find that the question was raised among them before the payment of the penny. For in truth Matthew relates that this took place at Capernaum; but Mark says, And he came to Capernaum, and being in the house, he asked them, What was it that ye disputed among yourselves in the way? But they held their peace; for by the way they had disputed among themselves who should be the greatest. (Mat. 18:24, Mark 9:33.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But our Lord, Who knew how to save, seeing in the hearts of the disciples the thought that had risen up thereupon as it were a certain root of bitterness, plucks it up by the roots before it received growth. For when passions first begin in us, they are easily subdued; but having gained strength, they are with difficulty eradicated. Hence it follows, And Jesus perceiving the thought of their heart, &c. Let him who thinks Jesus to be mere man, know that he has erred; for the Word, although made flesh, remained God. For it is God alone Who is able to search into the heart and reins. But in taking a child, and placing it beside Him, He did it for the Apostles' sake and ours. For the disease of vain-glory feeds generally on those who have the preeminence among other men. But a child has a pure mind and unspotted heart, and abides in simplicity of thought; he courts not honours, nor knows the limits of each one’s power, nor shuns seeming to be inferior to others, bearing no moroseness in his mind or heart. Such the Lord embraces and loves, and thinks them worthy to be near Him, as those who had chosen to taste of the things which are His; for He says, Learn of me, for I am meek and lowly of heart. Hence it follows, And he says unto them, Whosoever shall receive a child in my name, receiveth me. As if He were to say, Seeing that there is one and the same reward to those that honour the saints, whether perchance such an one be the least, or one distinguished for honours and glory, for in him is Christ received, how vain is it to seek to have the preeminence?

BEDE. Now herein He either teaches, that the poor of Christ are to be received by those who wish to be greater simply for His honour, or He persuades men that they are children in malice. Hence when He said, Whoever shall receive that child, he adds, in my name; that in truth they may pursue with diligence and reason for Christ’s name that form of virtue which the child observes, with only nature for its guide. But because He also teaches that He is received in the child, and He Himself was born unto us a child; lest it should be thought that this was all which was seen, He subjoined, And whoever shall receive me, receiveth him that sent me; wishing verily to be believed, that as was the Father, such and so great was He.

AMBROSE. For he who receives the followers of Christ, receives Christ; and he who receives the image of God, receives God; but because we cannot see the image of God, it has been made present to us by the incarnation of the Word, that the divine nature which is above us, may be reconciled to us.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now He still more plainly conveys the meaning of the preceding words, saying, For he that is least among you all, the same shall be great; in which He speaks of the modest man who from honesty thinks nothing high of himself.

THEOPHYLACT. Because then our Lord had said, He who is least among you all, the same shall be great, John feared, lest perhaps they had done wrong in hindering a certain man by their own power. For a prohibition does not shew the probitor to be inferior, but to be one who thinks himself somewhat superior. Hence it is added, And John answered and said, Master, we saw one casting out devils in thy name, and we forbad him. Not indeed from envy, but to distinguish the working of miracles, for he had not received the power of working miracles with them, nor had the Lord sent him as He did them; nor did he follow Jesus in all things. Hence he adds, because he followeth not with us.

AMBROSE. For John loving much, and therefore much beloved, thinks that they should be excluded from the privilege who did not practise obedience.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But we ought to consider not so much the worker of the miracles, as the grace which was in him, who, by the power of Christ, performed miracles. But what if there should be both those which be numbered together with the Apostles, and those who are crowned with the grace of Christ; there are many diversities in Christ's gifts. But because the Saviour had given the Apostles power to cast out evil spirits, (Matt. 10:8.) they thought no one else but themselves alone was permitted to have this privilege granted to him, and therefore they come to enquire if it were lawful for others also to do this.

AMBROSE. Now John is not blamed, because he did this from love, but he is taught to know the difference between the strong and the weak. And therefore our Lord though He rewards the stronger, yet does not exclude the weak; as it follows, And Jesus said unto him, Forbid him not, for he that is not against you is for you. True, O Lord. For both Joseph and Nicodemus, through fear Thy secret disciples, when the time came, did not refuse their offices. But still since Thou saidst elsewhere, He that is not with me is against me, and he that gathereth not with me scattereth, (Luke 11:23.) explain unto us lest the two seem contrary to one another. And it seems to me, if any one considers the Searcher of hearts, he cannot doubt that every man's action is distinguished by the motive of his heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 41. in Matt.) For in the other place when He said, He that is not with me is against me, He shews the Devil and the Jews to be opposed to Him; but here He shews that he who in Christ's name cast out devils, is partly on their side.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He said, On the side of you who love Christ, are all they who wish to follow those things which conduce to His glory, being crowned with His grace.

THEOPHYLACT. Marvel then at the power of Christ, how His grace works by means of the unworthy and those who are not His disciples: as also men are sanctified through the priests, although the priests be not holy.

AMBROSE. Now why does He in this place say that they are not to be hindered, who by the imposition of hands can subdue the unclean spirits, when according to Matthew, He says to these, I never knew you? (Matt. 7:23.) But we ought to perceive that there is no difference of opinion, but that the decision is this, that not only the official works but works of virtue are required in a priest, and that the name of Christ is so great, that even to the unholy it serves to give defence, but not grace. Let no one then claim to himself the grace of cleansing a man, because in him the power of the eternal Name has worked. For not by thy merits, but by his own hatred, the devil is conquered.

BEDE. Therefore in heretics and false catholics, it becomes us to abhor, and forbid not the common sacraments in which they are with us, and not against us, but the divisions contrary to peace and truth, wherein they are against us as following not the Lord.

9:51–56

51. And it came to pass, when the time was come that he should be received up, he stedfastly set his face to go to Jerusalem,

52. And sent messengers before his face: and they went, and entered into a village of the Samaritans, to make ready for him.

53. And they did not receive him, because his face was as though he would go to Jerusalem.

54. And when his disciples James and John saw this, they said, Lord, wilt thou that we command fire to come down from heaven, and consume them, even as Elias did?

55. But he turned, and rebuked them, and said, Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of.

56. For the Son of man is not come to destroy men’s lives, but to save them. And they went to another village.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When the time was near at hand in which it behoved our Lord to accomplish His life-giving Passion, and ascend up to heaven, He determines to go up to Jerusalem, as it is said, And it came to pass, &c.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Because it was necessary that the true Lamb should there be offered, where the typical lamb was sacrificed; but it is said, he stedfastly set his face, that is, He went not here and there traversing the villages and towns, but kept on His way straight towards Jerusalem.

BEDE. Let then the Heathen cease to mock the Crucified, as if He were a man, who it is plain, as God, both foresaw the time of His crucifixion, and going voluntarily to be crucified, sought with stedfast face, that is, with resolute and undaunted mind, the spot where He was to be crucified.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. And He sends messengers to make a place for Him and His companions, who when they came to the country of the Samaritans were not admitted, as it follows, And sent messengers before his face: and they went, and altered into a village of the Samaritans, to make ready for him. And they did not receive him.

AMBROSE. Mark that He was unwilling to be received by those who He knew had not turned to Him with a simple heart. For if He had wished, He might have made them devout, who were undevout. But God calls those whom He thinks worthy, and whom He wills He makes religious. But why they did not receive Him the Evangelist mentions, saying, Because his face was as if he would go to Jerusalem.

THEOPHYLACT. But if one understands that they did not receive Him for this reason, because He had determined to go to Jerusalem, an excuse is found for them, who did not receive Him. But we must say, that in the words of the Evangelist, And they did not receive him, is implied that He did not go into Samaria, but afterwards as if some one had asked St. Luke, he explained in these words, why they did not receive Him. And He went not to them, i. e. not that He was unable, but that He did not wish to go there, but rather to Jerusalem.

BEDE. Or the Samaritans see that our Lord is going to Jerusalem, and do not receive Him. For the Jews have no dealings with the Samaritans, (John 4:9.) as John shews.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But our Lord, Who knew all things before they came to pass, knowing that His messengers would not be received by the Samaritans, nevertheless commanded them to go before Him, because it was His practice to make all things conduce to the good of His disciples. Now He went up to Jerusalem as the time of His suffering drew near. In order then that they might not be offended, when they saw Him suffer, bearing in mind that they must also endure patiently when men persecute them, He ordained beforehand as a kind of prelude this refusal of the Samaritans. It was good for them also in another way. For they were to be the teachers of the world, going through towns and villages, to preach the doctrine of the Gospel, meeting sometimes with men who would not receive the sacred doctrine, allowing not that Jesus sojourned on earth with them. He therefore taught them, that in announcing the divine doctrine, they ought to be filled with patience and meekness, without bitterness, and wrath, and fierce enmity against those who had done any wrong to them. But as yet they were not so, nay, being stirred up with fervid zeal, they wished to bring down fire from heaven upon them. It follows, And when his disciples James and John saw this, they said, Lord, will thou that we command fire to come down from heaven, &c.

AMBROSE. For they knew both that when Phineas had slain the idolaters it was counted to him for righteousness; (Numb. 25:8, Ps. 107:31) and that at the prayer of Elijah fire came down from heaven, that the injuries of the prophet might be avenged. (2 Kings 1:10, 12.)

BEDE. For holy men who well knew that that death which detaches the soul from the body was not to be feared, still because of their feelings who feared it, punished some sins with death, that both the living might be struck with a wholesome dread, and those who were punished with death might receive harm not from death itself but from sin, which would be increased were they to live.

AMBROSE. But let him be avenged who fears. He who fears not, seeks not vengeance. At the same time the merits of the Prophets are likewise shewn to have been in the Apostles, seeing that they claim to themselves the right of obtaining the same power of which the Prophet was thought worthy; and fitly do they claim that at their command fire should come down from heaven, for they were the sons of thunder.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (v. Theophyl. in loc.) They thought it much juster that the Samaritans should perish for not admitting our Lord, than the fifty soldiers who tried to thrust down Elijah.

AMBROSE. But the Lord is not moved against them, that He might shew that perfect virtue has no feeling of revenge, nor is there any anger where there is fulness of love. For weakness must not be thrust out, but assisted. Let indignation be far from the religious, let the high-souled have no desire of vengeance. Hence it follows, But he turned and rebuked them, and said, Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of.

BEDE. The Lord blames them, not for following the example of the holy Prophet, but for their ignorance in taking vengeance while they were yet inexperienced, perceiving that they did not desire correction from love, but vengeance from hatred. After that He had taught them what it was to love their neighbour as themselves, and the Holy Ghost also had been infused into them, there were not lacking these punishments, though far less frequent than in the Old Testament, because the Son of man came not to destroy men’s lives, but to save them. As if He said, And do you therefore who are sealed with His Spirit, imitate also His actions, now determining charitably, hereafter judging justly.

AMBROSE. For we must not always punish the offender, since mercy sometimes does more good, leading thee to patience, the sinner to repentance. Lastly, those Samaritans believed the sooner, who were in this place saved from fire.

9:57–62

57. And it came to pass, that, as they went in the way, a certain man said unto him, Lord, I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest.

58. And Jesus said unto him, Foxes have holes, and birds of the air have nests; but the Son of man hath not where to lay his head.

59. And he said unto another, Follow me. But he said, Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father.

60. Jesus said unto him, Let the dead bury their dead; but go thou and preach the kingdom of God.

61. And another also said, Lord, I will follow thee; but let me first go bid them farewell, which are at home at my house.

62. And Jesus said unto him, No man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ.) Although the Almighty Lord is bountiful, He does not grant to every one absolutely and indiscriminately heavenly and divine gifts, but to those only who are worthy to receive them, who free themselves and their souls from the stains of wickedness. And this we are taught by the force of the angelic words, And it came to pass, that, us they went in the way, a certain man said unto him, Lord, I will follow thee. First indeed there is much tardiness implied in the manner of his coming. It is next shewn that he is filled with too great presumption. For he sought not to follow Christ simply as several others of the people, but rather caught at the honour of the Apostleship. Whereas Paul says, No one taketh the honour to himself but he that is called of God. (Heb. 5:4.)

ATHANASIUS. (non occ.) He dared also to match himself with the incomprehensible power of the Saviour, saying, I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest; for to follow the Saviour simply to hear His teaching is possible to human nature, as it directs itself towards men, but it is not possible to go with Him wherever He is; for He is incomprehensible, and is not confined by place.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. In another respect also our Lord deservedly gives him a refusal, for He taught that to follow the Lord, a man must take up his cross, and renounce the affection of this present life. And our Lord finding this lacking in him does not blame him, but corrects him.

It follows, And Jesus says to him, The foxes have holes, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For having seen our Lord drawing much people to Him, he thought that he received reward from them, and that if he followed our Lord, he might obtain money.

BEDE. Therefore it is said to him, Why do you seek to follow Me for the riches and gain of this world, when so great is My poverty that I have not even a place of rest, and take shelter under another man's roof.

CHRYSOSTOM. See how our Lord sets forth by his works the poverty which he taught. For him was no table spread, no lights, no house, nor any such thing.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now under a mystical signification He applies the name of foxes and birds of the air to the wicked and crafty powers of evil spirits. As if He said, Since foxes and birds of the air have their abode in thee, how shall Christ rest in thee? What fellowship has light with darkness? (2 Cor. 6:14.)

ATHANASIUS. Or herein our Lord teaches the greatness of His gift, as if He said, All created things may be confined by place, but the Word of God has incomprehensible power. Say not then, I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest. But if thou wouldest be a disciple, cast off 1 foolish things, for it is impossible for him who remains in foolishness to become a disciple of the Word.

AMBROSE. Or, He compares foxes to heretics, because they are indeed a wily animal, and, ever intent upon fraud, commit their robberies by stealth. They let nothing be safe, nothing be at rest, nothing secure, for they hunt their prey into the very abodes of men. The fox again, an animal full of craft, makes no hole for itself, yet likes to lie always concealed in a hole. So the heretics, who know not how to construct a house for themselves, circumscribe and deceive others. This animal is never tamed, nor is it of use to man. Hence the Apostle, A heretic after the first and second admonition reject. (Tit. 3:10.) But the birds of the air, which are frequently brought in to represent spiritual wickedness, build as it were their nests in the breasts of the wicked, and as long as deceit reigns over the affections, the divine principle has no opportunity to take possession. But when a man has proved his heart to be innocent, upon him Christ leans in some measure the weight of His greatness, for by a more abundant shedding of grace He is planted in the breasts of good men. So then it does not seem reasonable that we should think him faithful and simple, who is rejected by the judgment of the Lord, notwithstanding that he promised the service of unwearied attendance; but our Lord cares not for this kind of service, but only purity of affection, nor is his attendance accepted whose sense of duty is not proved. For the hospitality of faith should be given with circumspection, lest while opening the interior of our house to the unbelieving, through our imprudent credulity we fall a snare to the treachery of others. Therefore that you may be aware that God despises not attendance upon him but deceit, He who rejected the deceitful man chose the innocent. For it follows, And he said unto another, Follow me. But He says this to him, whose father He knew to be dead. Hence it follows, But he said, Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father.

BEDE. He did not refuse the discipleship, but his wish was, having fulfilled the filial duty of burying his father, to follow Christ more freely.

AMBROSE. But the Lord calls those upon whom He has compassion. Hence it follows, And Jesus said, Let the dead bury their dead. Since we have received as a religious duty the burial of the human body, how is it thus that the burial even of a father’s dead body is forbidden, unless you are to understand that human things are to be postponed to divine? It is a good employment, but the hindrance is greater, for he who divides his pursuits, draws down his affections; he who divides his care, delays his advances. We must first set about the things which are most important. For the Apostles also, that they might not be occupied in the office of distributing alms, ordained ministers for the poor.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 27. in Matt.) But what more necessary than the burial of his father, what more easy, seeing that there would not be much time given to it? We are then hereby taught that it becomes us not to spend even the slightest portion of our time in vain, although we have a thousand things to compel us, nay to prefer spiritual things to even our greatest necessities. For the devil watchfully presses close upon us, wishing to find any opening, and if he causes a slight negligence, he ends in producing a great weakness.

AMBROSE. The performance of a father’s burial is not then prohibited, but the observance of religious duty is preferred to the ties of relationship. The one is left to those in like condition, the other is commanded to those who are left. But how can the dead bury the dead? unless you here understand a twofold death, one a natural death, the other the death of sin. (Rom. 9:11.) There is also a third death, by which we die unto sin, live unto God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) By thus saying, their dead, he shews that this man’s father was not his dead, for I suppose that the deceased was of the number of the unbelieving.

AMBROSE. Or because the throat of the ungodly is an open sepulchre, their memory is ordered to be forgotten whose services die together with their bodies. Nor is the son recalled from his duty to his father, but the faithful is separated from the communion of the unbelieving; there is no prohibition of duty, but a mystery of religion, that is, that we should have no fellowship with the dead Gentiles.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else, his father was borne down with years, and he thought he was doing an honourable act in proposing to pay the kind offices which were due to him, according to Exodus, Honour thy father and thy mother. (Exod. 20:12.) Hence when calling him to the ministry of the Gospel, our Lord said, Follow me, he sought for a time of respite, which should suffice for the support of his decrepit father, saying, Permit me first to go and bury my father, not that he asked to bury his deceased father, for Christ would not have hindered the wish to do this, but he said, Bury, that is, support in old age even till death. But the Lord said to him, Let the dead bury their dead. For there were other attendants also bound by the same tie of relationship, but as I consider dead, because they had not yet believed Christ. Learn from this, that our duty to God is to be preferred to our love for our parents, to whom we shew reverence, because through them have we been born. But the God of all, when as yet we were not, brought us into being, our parents were made the ministers of our introduction.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 23.) Our Lord spoke this to the man to whom He had said, Follow me. But another disciple put himself forward, to whom no one had spoken any thing, saying, I will follow thee, O Lord; but let me first go and bid them farewell who are at home, lest perchance they look for me as they are wont.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now this promise is worthy of our admiration and full of all praise, but to bid farewell to those who are at home, to get leave from them, shews that he was still somehow divided from the Lord, in that he had not yet resolved, to make this venture with his whole heart. For to wish to consult relations who would not agree to his proposal betokens one somewhat wavering. Wherefore our Lord condemns this, saying, No man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God. He puts his hand to the plough who is ambitious to follow, yet looks back again who seeks an excuse for delay in returning home, and consulting with his friends.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 100.) As if he said to him, The East calls thee, and thou turnest to the West.

BEDE.: To put one’s hand to the plough, is also, (as it were by a certain sharp instrument,) by the wood and iron of our Lord’s passion, to wear away the hardness of our heart, and to open it to bring forth the fruits of good works. But if any one, having begun to exercise this, delights to look back with Lot’s wife to the things which he had left, he is deprived of the gift of the kingdom to come.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Nilus Monac.) For the frequent looking upon the things which we have forsaken, through the force of habit draws us back to our past way of life. For practice has great power to retain to itself. Is not habit generated of use, and nature of habit? But to get rid of or change nature is difficult; for although when compelled it for a while turns aside, it very rapidly returns to itself.

BEDE. But if the disciple about to follow our Lord is reproved for wishing even to bid farewell at home, what will be done to such as for no advantage-sake frequently visit the houses of those whom they have left in the world?

CHAPTER 10

10:1–2

1. After these things the Lord appointed other seventy also, and sent them two and two before his face into every city and place, whither he himself would come.

2. Therefore said he unto them, The harvest truly is great, but the labourers are few: pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he would send forth labourers into his harvest.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. God had made known by the Prophets that the preaching of the Gospel of salvation was to embrace not only Israel, but also the Gentile nations; and therefore after the twelve Apostles, there were other seventy-two (Vulg. septuaginta duos.) also appointed by Christ, as it is said, After these things the Lord appointed other seventy-two also.

BEDE. Rightly are seventy-two sent, for to so many nations of the world was the Gospel to be preached, that as at first twelve were appointed because of the twelve tribes of Israel, so, these also were ordained as teachers for the instruction of the foreign nations.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. 1. ii. q. 14.) As also in twenty-four hours the whole world moves round and receives light, so the mystery of enlightening the world by the Gospel of the Trinity, is hinted at in the seventy-two disciples. For three times twenty-four makes seventy-two. Now as no one doubts that the twelve Apostles foreshadowed the order of Bishops, so also we must know that these seventy-two represented the presbytery, (that is, the second order of priests.) Nevertheless, in the earliest times of the Church, as the Apostolical writings bear witness, both were called presbyters, both also called bishops, the former of these signifying “ripeness of wisdom,” the latter, “diligence in the pastoral care.”

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. An outline of this ordinance also was set forth in the words of Moses, who at the command of God chose out seventy, upon whom God poured out His Spirit. In the book of Numbers also it was written of the children of Israel, that they came to Elim, which is by interpretation "ascent," and there were there twelve fountains of water, and seventy palm trees. (Numb. 33:9.) For when we fly to spiritual refreshment, we shall find twelve fountains, namely, the holy Apostles, from whom we imbibe the knowledge of salvation as from the well-springs of the Saviour; (Isai. 12:3.) and seventy palms, that is, those who were now appointed by Christ. For the palm is a tree of sound core, striking deep root and fruitful, always growing by the water side, yet at the same time putting forth its leaves upwards.

It follows, And he sent them two and two.

GREGORY. (Hom. 17. in Ev.) He sends the disciples to preach two and two, because there are two commands of charity, the love of God, and love of our neighbour; (and charity cannot exist without at least two;) thereby silently suggesting to us, that he who has not love to another, ought not to undertake the office of preaching.

ORIGEN. Likewise also the twelve were reckoned by two and two, as Matthew shews in his enumeration of them. (Matt. 10:2.) For that two should be joined in service, seems from the word of God to be an ancient custom. For God led Israel out of Egypt by the hands of Moses and Aaron. Joshua and Caleb also, united together, appeased the people who had been provoked by the twelve spies. (Numb. 13, 14. Ex. 12.) Hence it is said, A brother assisted by a brother is as a fortified city. (Prov. 18:19. Vulg.)

BASIL. At the same time it is implied by this, that if any are equal in spiritual gifts, they should not suffer a fondness for their own opinion to get the better of them.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) It is rightly added, before his face into every city and place, whither he himself would come. For the Lord follows His preachers, since the preaching comes first, and then the Lord enters into the tabernacle of our heart; seeing that through the words of exhortation going before, truth is received into the mind. Hence Esaias says to the preachers, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight a highway for our God. (Isa. 40:3.)

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord had appointed the disciples for the sake of the multitude, who were in want of teachers. For as our corn fields require many reapers, so the innumerable company of those who are to believe need many teachers, as it follows, The harvest truly is great.

CHRYSOSTOM. But how does He give the name of harvest to a work only just now at its beginning? the plough not yet put down, nor the furrows turned, He yet speaks of harvests, for His disciples might waver and say, How can we so small a number convert the whole world, how can foolish men reform the wise, naked men those that are armed, subjects their rulers? Lest they should be disturbed then by such thoughts, He calls the Gospel a harvest; as if He says, All things are ready, I send you to a gathering of fruits already prepared. Ye can sow and reap the same day. As then the husbandman goes out to harvest rejoicing, much more also and with greater cheerfulness must you go out into the world. For this is the true harvest, which shews the fields all prepared for you.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But not without deep sorrow can we add, but the labourers are few. For although there are who would hear good things, they are wanting who should spread them. Behold the world is full of priests, but seldom is there found a labourer in God’s harvest, because we undertake indeed the priestly office, but we perform not its works.

BEDE. Now as the great harvest is this whole multitude of believers, so the few labourers are the Apostles, and their followers who are sent to this harvest.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (non occ. v. Tit. Bost.) As the large fields require many reapers, so also do the multitude of believers in Christ. Hence He adds, Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he would send forth labourers into his harvest. Now mark that when He said, Pray ye therefore the Lord of the harvest, that he would send forth labourers into the harvest, He afterwards Himself performed it. He then is the Lord of the harvest, and by Him, and together with Him, God the Father rules over all.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 32. in Matt.) But he afterwards increased them greatly, not by adding to their number, but awarding to them power. He implies that it is a great gift to send labourers into the divine harvest, by His saying that the Lord of the harvest must be prayed to upon this account.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Hereby also the people must be induced to pray for their pastors, that they may he able to work what is good for them, and that their tongue grow not lifeless in exhortation. For often for their own wickedness their tongue is tied. But often for the fault of the people it comes to pass that the word of preaching is withdrawn from their rulers.

3. Go your ways: behold, I send you forth as lambs among wolves.

4. Carry neither purse, nor scrip, nor shoes: and salute no man by the way.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Luke next relates, that the seventy disciples obtained for themselves from Christ apostolical learning, lowliness, innocency, justice, and to prefer no worldly things to holy preachings, but to aspire to such fortitude of mind as to be afraid of no terrors, not even death itself. He adds therefore, Go.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 33. in Matt.) For their comfort amid every danger was the power of Him who sent them. And therefore saith He, Behold, I send you; as if he said, This will suffice for your consolation, this will be enough to make you hope, instead of fearing the coming evils which He signifies, adding, as lambs among wolves.

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (l. i. ep. 438.) Denoting the simplicity and innocence in His disciples. For those who were riotous, and by their enormities did despite to their nature, He calls not lambs, but goats.

AMBROSE. Now these animals are at variance among themselves, so that the one is devoured by the other, the lambs by the wolves; but the good Shepherd has no fear of wolves for His flock. And therefore the disciples are appointed not to make prey, but to impart grace. For the watchfulness of the good Shepherd causes the wolves to attempt nothing against the lambs; He sends them as lambs amid wolves that that prophecy might be fulfilled, The wolf and the lamb shall feed together. (Isaiah 65:25.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 33 in Matt.) For this was a clear announcement of glorious triumph, that the disciples of Christ, when surrounded by their enemies as lambs among wolves, should still convert them.

BEDE. Or He especially gives the name of wolves to the Scribes and Pharisees, who are the Jewish clergy.

AMBROSE. Or the heretics are compared to wolves. For wolves are beasts who lay in wait near the sheep folds, and prowl about the shepherds’ cottages. They dare not enter the abodes of men, they pry out sleeping dogs, absent or slothful shepherds; they seize the sheep by the throat, that they may quickly strangle them; ravenous beasts, with bodies so stiff that they cannot easily turn themselves, but are carried along by their own impetus, and so are often deceived. If they are the first to see a man, it is said, they by a certain natural impulse, tear out his voice; but if a man first sees them, they quake with fear. In like manner the heretics lurk about Christ's sheep folds, howl near the cottages at night time. For night is the time for the treacherous who obscure the light of Christ with the mists of false interpretation. The inns of Christ, however, they dare not enter, and therefore are not healed, as he was in an inn who fell among thieves. They look out for the shepherds' absence, for they can not attack the sheep when the shepherds are by. Owing also to the inflexibility of a hard and obstinate mind, they seldom if ever turn from their error, while Christ the true interpreter of Scripture mocks them, so that they vent forth their violence in vain, and are not able to hurt; and if they overtake any one by the subtle trickery of their disputations, they make him dumb. For he is dumb who confesses not the word of God with the glory which belongs to it. Beware then lest the heretic deprive you of your voice, and lest you detect him not first. For he is creeping on while his treachery is disguised. But if you have discovered his unholy desires, you can not fear the loss of a holy voice. They attack the throat, they wound the vitals while they seek the soul. If also you hear any one called a priest, and you know his robberies, outwardly he is a sheep, inwardly a wolf, who is longing to gratify his rage with the insatiable cruelty of human murder.

GREGORY. (Hom. 17. in Ev.) For many when they receive the right of rule, are vehement in persecuting their subjects, and manifesting the terrors of their power. And since they have no bowels of mercy, their desire is to seem to be masters, forgetting altogether that they are fathers, changing an occasion for humility, into an exaltation of power. We must on the other hand consider, that as lambs we are sent among wolves that preserving the feeling of innocence, so we should make no malicious attacks. For he who undertakes the office of preacher ought not to bring evils upon others, but to endure them; who although at times an upright zeal demands that he should deal harshly with his subjects, should still inwardly in his heart love with a fatherly feeling those whom outwardly he visits with censure. And that ruler gives a good example of this, who never submits the neck of his soul to the yoke of earthly desire. Hence it is added, Carry neither purse nor scrip.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 2.) The sum of which is, that men ought to be so virtuous that the Gospel should make no less progress through their way of life than their preaching.

GREGORY. (Hom. 17. in Ev.) For the preacher (of the Gospel) ought to have such trust in God, that although he has provided not for the expenses of this present life, he should still be most certainly convinced that these will not fail him; lest while his mind is engaged in His temporal things, he should be less careful for the spiritual things of others.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Thus He had already commanded them to have no care for these persons, when He said, I send you as lambs among wolves. And He also forbade all care about what is external to the body, by saying, Take neither purse nor scrip. Nor did He allow men to take with them any of those things which were not attached to the body. Hence He adds, Nor shoes. He not only forbade them to take purse and scrip, but He did not allow them to receive any distraction in their work, such as interruption by greetings on their way. Hence He adds, Salute no one by the way. Which had long ago been said by Elisha. (2 Kings. 4:29.) As if He said, Proceed straight on to your work without exchanging blessings with others. For it is a loss to waste the time which is fitter for preaching, in unnecessary things.

AMBROSE. Our Lord did not then forbid these things because the exercise of benevolence was displeasing to Him, but because the motive of following after devotedness was more pleasing.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (ubi sup.) The Lord gave them these commands also for the glory of the word, lest it should seem that enticements could more prevail over them. He wished them also not to be anxious to speak to others.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) If any one would have these words taken also allegorically, the money shut up in a purse is the hidden wisdom. He then who has the word of wisdom, and neglects to employ it for his neighbour, is like one who keeps his money tied up in his purse. But by the scrip is meant the troubles of the world, by the shoes (made of the skins of dead animals) are signified the examples of dead works. He then who undertakes the office of preacher ought not to bear the burden of business, lest while this presses down his neck he should not rise to the preaching of heavenly things; nor ought he to behold the example of foolish works, lest he think to shield his own works as by dead skins, that is, lest because he observes that others have done these things, he imagine that he also is at liberty to do the same.

AMBROSE. Our Lord also would have nothing human in us. For Moses is bid to loose off the human and earthly shoe when he was sent to deliver the people. (Exod. 3:5) But if any one is perplexed why in Egypt we are ordered to eat the lamb with shoes on, (Exod. 12:11.) but the Apostles are appointed to preach the Gospel without shoes: he must consider, that one in Egypt ought still to beware of the serpent’s bite, for there were many poisonous creatures in Egypt. And he who celebrates the Passover in figure may be exposed to the wound, but the minister of truth fears no poison.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Now every one who salutes on the way does so from the accident of the journey, not for the sake of wishing health. He then who not from love of a heavenly country, but from seeking reward, preaches salvation to his hearers, does as it were salute on the journey, since accidentally, not from any fixed intention, he desires the salvation of his hearers.

10:5–12

5. And into whatever house ye enter, first say, Peace be to this house.

6. And if the son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon it: if not, it shall turn to you again.

7. And in the same house remain, eating and drinking such things as they give; for the labourer s worthy of his hire. Go not from house to house.

8. And into whatsoever city ye enter, and they receive you, eat such things as are set before you:

9. And heal the sick that are therein, and say unto them, The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you.

10. But into whatsoever city ye enter, and they receive you not, go your ways out into the streets of the same, and say,

11. Even the very dust of your city, which cleaveth on us, we do wipe off against you: notwithstanding be ye sure of this, that the kingdom of God is come nigh unto you.

12. But I say unto you, that it shall be more tolerable in that day for Sodom, than for that city.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 35. in Matt.) Peace is the mother of all good things, without it all other things are vain. Our Lord therefore commanded His disciples on entering a house first to pronounce peace as a sign of good things, saying, Into whatever house ye enter, first say, Peace be to this house.

AMBROSE. That in truth we should convey the message of peace, and that our very first entrance be attended with the blessing of peace.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 32. in Matt. Orat. cont. Jud. 3.) And hence he who presides in the Church gives it, saying, Peace unto all. Now holy men ask for peace, not only that which dwells among men in mutual intercourse, but that which belongs to ourselves. For oftentimes we wage war in our hearts, and are disturbed even when no one troubles us; bad desires also frequently rise up against us.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But it is said, Peace he to this house, that is, to them that dwell in the house. As if he says, I speak unto all, both the greater and the less, yet should not your salutation be addressed to them that are unworthy of it. Hence it is added, And if the son of peace be there, your peace shall rest upon it. As if he says, You indeed shall utter the word, but the blessing of peace shall be applied wherever I shall deem men worthy of it. But if any one is not worthy, ye are not mocked, the grace of your word has not perished, but is returned unto you. And this is what is added, But if not, it shall return unto you again.

GREGORY. (Hom. 17. in Ev.) For the peace which is offered by the mouth of the preacher shall either rest on the house, if there be any one in it predestined to life, who follows the heavenly word which he hears; or if no one be willing indeed to hear, the preacher himself shall not be without fruit, for the peace returns to him, while the Lord gives him the recompense of reward for the labour of his work. But if our peace is received, it is meet that we should obtain earthly supplies from those to whom we offer the rewards of a heavenly country. Hence it follows: And in the same house remain, eating and drinking such things as they give. Mark, that He who forbade them to carry purse and scrip, allows them to be an expense to others, and to receive sustenance from preaching.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But lest any one should say, I am spending my own property in preparing a table for strangers, He first makes them offer the gift of peace, to which nothing is equal, that you may know that you receive greater things than you give.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Or else; Since you are not appointed judges as to who are worthy and who are unworthy, eat and drink what things they offer to you. But leave to me the trial of those who receive you, unless you happen also to know that the son of peace is not there, for perhaps in that case you ought to depart.

THEOPHYLACT. See then how He taught His disciples to beg, and wished them to receive their nourishment as a reward. For it is added, For the labourer is worthy of his hire.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For now the very food which supports him is part of the wages of the labourer, as in this life the hire commences with the labour of preaching, which in the next is completed with the sight of truth. And here we must consider that two rewards are due to one work of ours, one on the journey, which supports us in labour, the other in our country, which recompenses us at the resurrection. Therefore the reward which we receive now ought so to work in us, that we the more vigorously strive to gain the succeeding reward. Every true preacher then ought not so to preach, that he may receive a reward at the present time, but so to receive a reward that he may have strength to preach. For whoever so preaches that here he may receive the reward of praise, or riches, deprives himself of an eternal reward.

AMBROSE. Another virtue is added, that we should not go about easily, changing from house to house. For it follows, Go not from house to house; that is, that we should preserve a consistency in our love towards our hosts, nor lightly loose any bond of friendship.

BEDE. Now having described the reception from different houses, he teaches them what they ought to do in the cities; namely, to have intercourse with the good in all, but to keep from the society of the wicked in every thing; as it follows, But into whatsoever city ye enter, and they receive you, eat such things as are set before you.

THEOPHYLACT. Although they be few and poor, ask for nothing more; He also tells them to work miracles, and their word shall draw men to their preaching. Hence he adds, And heal the sick that are therein, and say to them, The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you. For if you first heal and then teach, the word will prosper, and men believe that the kingdom of God is come nigh. For they would not be cured unless by the working of some divine power. But also when they are healed in their soul, the kingdom of God comes nigh unto them, for it is far off from him over whom sin has the dominion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 32. in Matt.) Now mark the excellence of the Apostles. They are bid to utter nothing relating to sensible things, such as Moses and the Prophets spoke of, namely, earthly goods, but certain new and marvellous things, namely, the kingdom of God.

MAXIMUS. (Cap. Theol. 191.) Which it is said is come nigh, not to shew the shortness of time, for the kingdom of God cometh not with observation, but to mark the disposition of men towards the kingdom of God, which is indeed potentially in all believers, but actually in those who reject the life of the body, and choose only the spiritual life; who are able to say, Now I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me. (Gal. 2:20.)

AMBROSE. He next teaches them to shake off the dust from their feet when the men of a city have refused to entertain them, saying, Into whatsoever city ye enter, and they receive you not, shake off the dust.

BEDE. Either as a testimony to the earthly toil which they had in vain undergone for them, or to shew that so far from seeking any thing earthly from them, they suffer not even the dust from their land to cleave to them. Or by the feet is meant the very labour and walking to and fro of preaching; but the dust with which they are sprinkled is the lightness of worldly thoughts, from which even the greatest teachers cannot be free. Those then who have despised the teaching, turn the labours and dangers of the teachers into a testimony of their condemnation.

ORIGEN. By wiping off the dust of their feet against them, they in some sort say, The dust of your sins shall deservedly come upon you. And mark that the cities which receive not the Apostles and sound doctrine have streets, according to Matthew, Broad is the way which leadeth to destruction. (Matt. 7:13.)

THEOPHYLACT. And as they who receive the Apostles are said to have the kingdom of God come nigh unto them as a blessing, so those who do not receive them are said to have it nigh unto them as a curse. Hence He adds, Notwithstanding, be ye sure of this, that the kingdom of God is come nigh unto you, as the coming of a king is to some for punishment, but to some for honour. Hence it is added respecting their punishment, But I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for Sodom, &c.

EUSEBIUS. For in the city of Sodom Angels were not without entertainment, but Lot was found worthy to receive them into his house. (Gen. 19.) If then at the coming of the disciples into a city there shall not be found one to receive them, will not that city be worse than Sodom? These words persuaded them to attempt boldly the rule of poverty. For there could not be a city or village without some inhabitants acceptable to God. For Sodom could not exist without a Lot found in it, at whose departure the whole was suddenly destroyed.

BEDE. The men of Sodom, although they were hospitable in the midst of all their wickedness of soul and body, yet were there no such guests found among them as the Apostles. Lot indeed was righteous both in seeing and hearing, yet he is not said to have taught or worked miracles.

10:13–16

13. Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon, which have been done in you, they had a great while ago repented, sitting in sackcloth and ashes.

14. But it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon at the judgment, than for you.

15. And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, shalt be thrust down to hell.

16. He that heareth you heareth me; and he that despiseth you despiseth me; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me.

AMBROSE. Our Lord warns us that they will meet with a heavier punishment who have refused to follow the Gospel than those who have chosen to break the law; saying, Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida!

BEDE. Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum, Tiberias also which John mentions, are cities of Galilee situated on the shore of the lake of Gennesaret, which is called by the Evangelists the sea of Galilee or Tiberias. Our Lord thus mourns over these cities which after such great miracles and wonders repented not, and are worse than the Gentiles who break through the law of nature only, seeing that after despising the written law, they feared not to despise also the Son of God and His glory. Hence it follows, For if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which have been done in you, they had a great while ago repented sitting in sackcloth and ashes, &c. By sackcloth, which is woven together from the hairs of goats, he signifies a sharp remembrance of previous sin. But by ashes, he hints at the consideration of death, by which we are reduced to dust. Again, by the sitting down, he implies the lowliness of our conscience. Now we have seen in this day the word of the Saviour fulfilled, since Chorazin and Bethsaida, though our Lord was present among them, believed not, and Tyre and Sidon were friendly both to David and Solomon, (1 Kings 5.) and afterwards believed in the disciples of Christ who preached the Gospel there.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 38. in Matt.) Our Lord mourns over these cities for our example, because shedding tears and bitter lamentations over those who are insensible to grief, is no slight antidote, tending both to the correction of the insensible, and to the remedy and consolation of those who mourn over them. Again, He draws them over to what is good, not only by lamenting over them, but also by alarming them. Hence it follows, But it shall be more tolerable for Tyre and Sidon, &c. This we ought also to listen to. For not upon them alone, but upon us also, He hath passed sentence, if we receive not the guests who come to us, since He commanded them to shake off the very dust from their feet. And in another place: Now when our Lord had done many mighty works in Capernaum, and had Himself dwelt there, it seemed to be exalted above the other cities, but through unbelief fell to destruction. Hence it follows, And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted to heaven, shall be thrust down to hell; that, in fact, the judgment might be in proportion to the honour.

BEDE. This sentence admits of two meanings: Either for this reason shalt thou be thrust down into hell, because thou proudly resisted My preaching; that in truth she might be understood to have raised herself up to heaven by her pride. Or, because thou art exalted to heaven by My dwelling in thee, and by My miracles, shalt thou be beaten with more stripes, since even these thou refusedst to believe. And that no one should suppose that this interpretation applied only either to the cities or the persons who, seeing our Lord in the flesh despised Him, and not to all also who now despise the words of the Gospel, He proceeds to add these words, He that heareth you, heareth me.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Whereby He teaches, that whatever is said by the holy Apostles must be received, since he who heareth them heareth Christ, and an inevitable punishment therefore hangs over heretics who neglect the words of the Apostles; for it follows, and he who despises you despises me.

BEDE. That is, that every one indeed on hearing or despising the preaching of the Gospel might learn that he is not despising or hearing the mere individual preacher, but our Lord and Saviour, nay the Father Himself; for it follows, And he that despiseth me, despiseth him that sent me. For the Master is heard in His disciple, the Father honoured in His Son.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 102.) But if the word of God reaches to us also, and appoints us in the Apostles place, beware of despising us, lest that reach unto Him which you have done unto us.

BEDE. It may also be understood as follows, He who despiseth you, despiseth me, that is, he who shews not mercy to one of the least of My brethren, neither shews it to Me. But he who despiseth me, (refusing to believe on the Son of God,) despiseth him that sent me. (Matt. 25:40.) For I and my Father are one. (John 10:30.)

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But at the same time He herein consoles His disciples, as if He said, Say not why are we about to suffer reproach. Let your speech be with moderation. I give you grace, upon Me your reproaches fall.

10:17–20

17. And the seventy returned again with joy, saying, Lord, even the devils are subject unto us through thy name.

18. And he said unto them, I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.

19. Behold, I give unto you power to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall by any means hurt you.

20. Notwithstanding in this rejoice not, that the spirits are subject unto you; but rather rejoice, because your names are written in heaven.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It was said above that our Lord sent forth His disciples sealed with the grace of the Holy Spirit, and that being made ministers of preaching, they received power over the unclean spirits. But now when they returned, they confess the power of Him who honoured them, as it is said, And the seventy returned again with joy, saying, Lord, even the devils are subject unto us, &c. They seemed indeed to rejoice rather that they were made workers of miracles, than that they had become ministers of preaching. But they had better have rejoiced in those whom they had taken, as St. Paul says to them that were called by him, My joy and my crown. (Phil. 4:1.)

GREGORY. (23. Mor. c. 4.) Now our Lord, in a remarkable manner, in order to put down high thoughts in the hearts of His disciples, Himself related the account of the fall which the teacher of pride suffered; that they might learn by the example of the author of pride, what they would have to dread from the sin of pride. Hence it follows, I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven.

BASIL. (Hom. Quod Deus non est auctor mali.) He is called Satan, because he is an enemy to God, (for this the Hebrew word signifies,) but he is called the Devil, because he assists us in doing evil, and is an accuser. His nature is incorporeal, his abode in the air.

BEDE. He says not, ‘I see now,’ but referring to past time, I saw, when he fell. But by the words as lightning, He signifies either a fall headlong from the high places to the lowest, or that now cast down, he transforms himself into an angel of light. (2 Cor. 11:14.)

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Now He says that He saw it, as being Judge, for He knew the sufferings of the spirits. Or He says, as lightning, because by nature Satan shone as lightning, but became darkness through his affections, since what God made good he changed in himself to evil.

BASIL. (adv. Eunom. l. 3.) For the heavenly Powers are not naturally holy, but according to the analogy of divine love they receive their measure of sanctification. And as iron placed in the fire does not cease to be iron, though by the violent application of the flame, both in effect and appearance, it passes into fire; so also the Powers on high, from their participation in that which is naturally holy, have a holiness implanted in them. For Satan had not fallen, if by nature he had been unsusceptible of evil.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else, I saw Satan as lightning fall from heaven, that is, from the highest power to the lowest impotence. For before the coming of our Saviour, he had subdued the world to him, and was worshipped by all men. But when the only-begotten Word of God came down from heaven, he fell as lightning, seeing that he is trodden under foot by those who worship Christ. As it follows, And, behold, I give unto you power to tread upon serpents, &c.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Serpents indeed at one time under a figure were made to bite the Jews, and kill them because of their unbelief. But there came One who should destroy those serpents; even the Brazen Serpent, (Numb. 21:8.) the Crucified, so that if any one should look on Him believing, he might be healed from his wounds and saved.

CHRYSOSTOM. Then lest we should suppose this was spoken of beasts, He added, And over all the power of the enemy.

BEDE. That is, I give you the power of casting out every kind of unclean spirit, from the bodies possessed. And as far as regards themselves, He adds, And nothing shall hurt you. Although it might also be taken literally. For Paul when attacked by a viper suffered no injury. (Acts 28:5.) John having drunk poison is not harmed by ita. But I think there is this difference between serpents who bite with the teeth, and scorpions who sting with the tail, that the serpents signify men or spirits raging openly, scorpions signify them plotting in secret. Or serpents are those which east the poison of evil persuasion upon virtues just beginning, scorpions which go about to corrupt at last virtues which have been brought to perfection.

THEOPHYLACT. Or serpents are those which visibly hurt, as the evil spirit of adultery and murder. But those are called scorpions which invisibly injure, as in the sins of the spirit.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. in Cant.) For pleasure is called in Scripture a serpent, which by nature is such that if its head has reached a wall so as to press upon it, it drags its whole body after it. So nature has given man the habitation which was necessary for him. But by means of this necessity, pleasure assaults the heart, and perverts it to the indulgence of immoderate ornament; in addition to this it brings in its train covetousness, which is followed by lust, that is, the last member or tail of the beast. But as it is not possible to draw back the serpent by its tail, so to remove pleasure we must not begin with the last, unless one has closed the first entrance to evil.

ATHANASIUS. (Orat. in Pass. et cruce Domini.) But now through the power of Christ boys make a mock at pleasure, which formerly led away the aged, and virgins stedfastly trample upon the desires of serpentine pleasure. Some also tread upon the very sting of the scorpion, that is, of the devil, namely death, and fearing not destruction, become witnesses of the word. But many giving up earthly things walk with a free step in heaven, dreading not the prince of the air.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But because the joy with which He saw them rejoice savoured of vain-glory, for they rejoiced that they were as it were exalted, and were a terror to men and evil spirits, our Lord therefore adds, Notwithstanding in this rejoice not, that the spirits are subject unto you, &c.

BEDE. They are forbidden to rejoice in the subjection of the spirits to God, since they were flesh; for to cast out spirits and to exercise other powers is sometimes not on account of his merit who works, but is wrought through the invocation of Christ's name to the condemnation of those who mock it, or to the advantage of those who see and hear.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Why, O Lord, dost not Thou permit men to rejoice in the honours which are conferred by Thee, since it is written, In thy name shall they rejoice all the day? (Ps. 89:16.) But the Lord raises them up by greater joys. Hence He adds, But rejoice that your names are written in heaven.

BEDE. As if he said, It becomes you to rejoice not in the putting down of the evil spirits, but in your own exaltation. But it would be well for us to understand, that whether a man has done heavenly or earthly works, he is thereby, as if marked down by letter, for ever fixed in the memory of God.

THEOPHYLACT. For the names of the saints are written in the book of life not in ink, but in the memory and grace of God. And the devil indeed fell from above; but men being below have their names inscribed above in heaven.

BASIL. (in Esai. 4.) There are some who are written indeed not in life, but according to Jeremiah in the earth, (Jer. 17:13.) that in this way there might be a kind of double enrolment, of the one indeed to life, but of the other to destruction. But since it is said, Let them be blotted out of the book of the living, (Ps. 69:28.) this is spoken of those who were thought worthy to be written in the book of God. And in this way a name is said to be put down in writing or blotted out, when we turn aside from virtue to sin, or the contrary.

10:21–22

21. In that hour Jesus rejoiced in spirit, and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes: even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight.

22. All things are delivered to me of my Father: and no man knoweth who the Son is, but the Father; and who the Father is, but the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him.

THEOPHYLACT. As a loving father rejoices to see his sons do right, so Christ also rejoices that His Apostles were made worthy of such good things. Hence it follows, In that hour, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He saw in truth that through the operation of the Holy Spirit, which He gave to the holy Apostles, the acquisition of many would be made, (or that many would be brought to the faith.) He is said therefore to have rejoiced in the Holy Spirit, that is, in the results which came forth through the Holy Spirit. For as one who loved mankind He considered the conversion of sinners to be a subject for rejoicing, for which He gives thanks. As it follows, I give thanks unto thee, O Father.

BEDE. Confessing (confiteor) does not always signify penitence, but also thanksgiving, as is frequently found in the Psalms. (Ps. 18:49; 30:12; 52:9.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now here, say they whose hearts are perverted, the Son gives thanks to the Father as being inferior. But what should prevent the Son of the same substance with the Father from praising His own Father, who saves the world by Him? But if you think that because of His giving thanks He shews Himself to be inferior, observe, that He calls Him His Father, and the Lord of heaven and earth.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (non occ.) For all other things have been produced by Christ from nothing, but He alone was incomprehensibly begotten of His Father; Who therefore of the Only-begotten alone, as a true Son, is by nature the Father. Hence He alone says to His Father, I give thanks to thee, O Father, Lord, &c. that is, I glorify thee. Marvel not that the Son glorifies the Father. For the whole substance of the Only-begotten is the glory of the Father. For both those things which were created, and the Angels, are the glory of the Creator. But since these are placed too low in respect of His dignity, the Son alone, since He is perfect God like His Father, perfectly glorifies His Father.

ATHANASIUS. (con. Greg. Sabell. 3. con. gentes 6.) We know also that the Saviour often speaks as man. For His divine nature has human nature joined to it, yet you would not, because of His clothing Himself with a body, be ignorant that He was God. But what do they answer to this, who wish to make out a substance of evil, but form to themselves another God, other than the true Father of Christ? And they say that he is unbegotten, the creator of evil and prince of iniquity, as well as the maker of the world's fabric. (Gen. 1:1.) Now our Lord, affirming the word of Moses, says, I give thanks unto thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth.

EPIPHANIUS. (adv. Hær. 42.) But a Gospel composed by Marcion has, "I give thanks to Thee, O Lord," being silent as to the words of heaven and earth, and the word Father, lest it should be supposed that He calls the Father the Creator of the heaven and the earth.

AMBROSE. Lastly, he unveils the heavenly mystery by which it pleased God to reveal His grace, rather to the little ones than the wise of the world. Hence it follows, That thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent.

THEOPHYLACT. The distinction may be, that it is said, the wise, meaning, the Pharisees and Scribes who interpret the law, and the prudent, meaning those who were taught by the Scribes, for the wise man is he who teaches, but the prudent man he who is taught; but the Lord calls His disciples babes, whom He chose not from the teachers of the law, but out of the multitude, and by calling, fishermen; babes, that is, as devoid of malice.

AMBROSE. Or by a babe we should here understand one who knew nothing of exalting himself, and of boasting in proud words of the excellence of his wisdom, as the Pharisees often do.

BEDE. He therefore gives thanks that He had revealed to the Apostles as unto babes the sacraments of His coming, of which the Scribes and Pharisees were ignorant, who think themselves wise, and are prudent in their own sight.

THEOPHYLACT. The mysteries then were hid from those who think themselves wise, and are not; for if they had been, these would have been revealed to them.

BEDE. To the wise and prudent then He opposed not the dull and foolish, but babes; that is, the humble, to shew that He condemned pride, not quickness of mind.

ORIGEN. For a feeling of deficiency is the preparation for coming perfection. For whoever by the presence of the apparent good perceives not that he is destitute of the true good, is deprived of the true good.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 38. in Matt.) Now He does not rejoice and give thanks because the mysteries of God were hid from the Scribes and Pharisees, (for this were not a subject of rejoicing, but of lament,) but for this cause gives He thanks, that what the wise knew not, babes knew. But moreover He gives thanks to the Father, together with whom He Himself does this, to shew the great love wherewith He loves us. He explains in the next place, that the cause of this thing was first His own will and the Father's, who of His own will did this. As it follows, Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight.

GREGORY. (25. Moral. c. 14.) We receive these words as an example of humility, that we should not rashly presume to scan the heavenly counsel, concerning the calling of some, and the rejection of others; for that cannot be unjust which seemed good to the Just One. In all things therefore, externally disposed, the cause of the visible system is the justice of the hidden will.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 38. in Matt.) But after He had said, I thank thee that thou hast revealed them to babes, lest you should suppose that Christ was destitute of the power to do this, He adds, All things are delivered to me of my Father.

ATHANASIUS. (Tract. in Matt. 11:22.) The followers of Arius, not rightly understanding this, rave against our Lord, saying, If all things were given to him, that is, the dominion of the creatures, there was a time when He had them not, and so was not of the substance of the Father. For if He had been, there would be no need for Him to receive. But hereby is their madness the rather detected. For if before He had received them, the creature was independent of the Word, how will that verse stand, In him all things consist? (Col. 4:17.) But if as soon as the creatures were made, they were all given to Him, where was the need to give, for by him were all things made? (John 13.) The dominion of the creation is not then, as they think, here meant, but the words signify the dispensation made in the flesh.

For after that man sinned, all things were confounded; the Word then was made flesh, that He might restore all things. All things therefore were given Him, not because He was wanting in power, but that as Saviour He should repair all things; that as by the Word all things at the beginning were brought into being, so when the Word was made flesh, He should restore all things in Himself.

BEDE. Or by the words, All things are delivered to me, He means not the elements of the world, but those babes to whom by the Spirit the Father made known the Sacraments of His Son; and in whose salvation when He here spoke He was rejoicing.

AMBROSE. Or, when you read all things, you acknowledge the Almighty, not the Son lower than the Father; when you read delivered, you confess the Son, to whom by the nature of one substance all things rightly belong, not conferred as a gift by grace.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now having said that all things were given Him by His Father, He rises to His own glory and excellence, shewing that in nothing He is surpassed by His Father. Hence He adds, And no one knoweth who the Son is but the Father, &c. For the mind of the creatures is not able to comprehend the manner of the Divine substance, which passes all understanding, and His glory transcends our highest contemplations. By Itself only is known what the Divine nature is. Therefore the Father, by that which He is, knoweth the Son; the Son, by that which He is, knoweth the Father, no difference intervening as regards the Divine nature. And in another place. For that God is, we believe, but what He is by nature, is incomprehensible. But if the Son was created, how could He alone know the Father, or how could He be known only by the Father. For to know the Divine nature is impossible to any creature, but to know each created thing what it is, does not surpass every understanding, though it is far beyond our senses.

ATHANASIUS. (Orat. 1. cont. Arian.) But though our Lord says this, it is plain that the Arians object to Him, saying, that the Father is not seen by the Son. But their folly is manifest, as if the Word did not know Itself which reveals to all men the knowledge of the Father and Itself; for it follows, And to whomsoever the Son will reveal him.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Now a revelation is the communication of knowledge in proportion to each man's nature and capacity; and when indeed the nature is congenial, there is knowledge without teaching; but here the instruction is by revelation.

ORIGEN. (non occ.) He wishes to reveal as the Word, not without the exercise of reason; and as Justice, who knoweth rightly both the times for revealing, and the measures of revelation; but He reveals by removing the opposing veil from the heart, (2 Cor. 3:15) and the darkness which He has made His secret place. (Ps. 18:11.) But since upon this men who are of another opinion think to build up their impious doctrine, that in truth the Father of Jesus was sent down to the ancient saints, we must tell them that the words, To whomsoever the Son will reveal him, not only refer to the future time, after our Saviour uttered this, but also to the past time. But if they will not take this word reveal for what is past, they must be told, that it is not the same thing to know and to believe. To one is given by the Spirit the word of knowledge; to another faith by the same Spirit. (1 Cor. 12:8, 9.) There were then those who believed, but did not know.

AMBROSE. But that you may know that as the Son revealed the Father to whom He will, the Father also reveals the Son to whom He will, hear our Lord’s words, Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, for flesh and blood have not revealed it to thee, but my Father which is in heaven.

10:23–24

23. And he turned him unto his disciples, and said privately, Blessed are the eyes which see the things that ye see:

24. For I tell you, that many prophets and kings have desired to see those things which ye see, and have not seen them; and to hear those things which ye hear, and have not heard them.

THEOPHYLACT. Having said above, No one knoweth who the Father is but the Son, and to whomsoever the Son will reveal him; He pronounces a blessing upon His disciples, to whom the Father was revealed through Him. Hence it is said, And he turned him unto his disciples, and said, Blessed are the eyes, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He turns to them indeed, since He rejected the Jews, who were deaf, with their understandings blinded, and not wishing to see, and gives Himself wholly to those who love Him; and He pronounces those eyes blessed which see the things no others had seen before. We must however know this, that seeing does not signify the action of the eyes, but the pleasure which the mind receives from benefits conferred. For instance, if any one should say, He hath seen good times, that is, he has rejoiced in good times, according to the Psalm, Thou shall see the good of Jerusalem. (Ps. 128:5.) For many Jews have seen Christ performing divine works, that is to say, with their bodily sight, yet all were not fitted to receive the blessing, for they believed not; but these saw not His glory with their mental sight. Blessed then are our eyes, since we see by faith the Word who is made man for us, shedding upon us the glory of His Godhead, that He may make us like unto Him by sanctification and righteousness.

THEOPHYLACT. Now He blesses them, and all truly who look with faith, because the ancient prophets and kings desired to see and hear God in the flesh, as it follows; For I say unto you, that many prophets and kings have desired, &c. (Matt. 13:17.)

BEDE. Matthew more clearly calls them prophets, and righteous men. For those are great kings, who have known how, not by yielding to escape from the assaults of temptations, but by mastering to gain the rule over them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Joan. Hom. 8.) Now from this saying many imagine that the prophets were without the knowledge of Christ. But if they desired to see what the Apostles saw, they knew that He would come to men, and dispense those things which He did. For no one desires what he has no conception of; they therefore knew the Son of God. Hence He does not merely say, They desired to see me, but those things which ye see, nor to hear me, but those things which ye hear. For they saw Him, but not yet Incarnate, nor thus conversing with men, nor speaking with such authority to them.

BEDE. For those looking afar off saw Him in a glass and darkly, but the Apostles having our Lord present with them, whatever things they wished to learn had no need to he taught by angels or any other kind of vision.

ORIGEN. (in Cant. 1:2.) But why does he say that many prophets desired, and not all? Because it is said of Abraham, That he saw the day of Christ and was glad, (John 8:56.) which sight not many, but few attained to; but there were other prophets and just men not so great as to reach to Abraham’s vision, and the experience of the Apostles, who, He says, saw not, but desired to see.

25. And, behold, a certain Lawyer stood up, and tempted him, saying, Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?

26. He said unto him, What is written in the law? how readest thou?

27. And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself.

28. And he said unto him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live.

BEDE. Our Lord had told His disciples above that their names were written in Heaven; from this it seems to me the lawyer took occasion of tempting our Lord, as it is said, And, behold, a certain lawyer stood up, and tempted him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For there were in fact certain men who then went about the whole country of the Jews bringing charges against Christ, and saying that He spoke of the commands of Moses as useless, and Himself introduced certain strange doctrines. A lawyer then, wishing to entrap Christ into saying something against Moses, comes and tempts Him, calling Him Master, though not bearing to be His disciple. And because our Lord was wont to speak to those who came to Him concerning eternal life, the lawyer adopts this kind of language. And since he tempted Him subtly, he receives no other answer than the command given by Moses; for it follows, He said unto him, What is written in the law? how readest thou?

AMBROSE. For he was one of those who think themselves skilled in the law, and who keep the letter of the law, while they know nothing of its spirit. From a part of the law itself our Lord proves them to be ignorant of the law, shewing that at the very first the law preached the Father and the Son, and announced the sacraments of the Lord’s Incarnation; for it follows, And he answering said, Thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind.

BASIL. (in Ps. 44.) By saying, with all thy mind, he does not admit of any division of love to other things, for whatever love you cast on lower things necessarily takes away from the whole. For as a vessel full of liquid, whatever flows therefrom must so much diminish its fulness; so also the soul, whatever love it has wasted upon things unlawful, has so much lessened its love to God.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (de Hom. Opif. c. 8.) the soul is divided into three faculties; one merely of growth and vegetation, such as is found in plants; another which relates to the senses, which is preserved in the nature of irrational animals; but the perfect faculty of the soul is that of reason, which is seen in human nature. By saying then the heart, He signified the bodily substance, that is, the vegetative; by the soul the middle, or the sensitive; but by saying the mind, the higher nature, that is, the intellectual or reflective faculty.

THEOPHYLACT. We must hereby understand that it becomes us to submit every power of the soul to the divine love, and that resolutely, not slackly. Hence it is added, And with all thy strength.

MAXIMUS. To this end then the law commanded a threefold love to God, that it might pluck us away from the threefold fashion of the world, as touching possessions, glory, and pleasure, wherein also Christ was tempted.

BASIL. (Reg. fus. ad int. 2.) But if any one ask how the love of God is to be obtained, we are sure that the love of God cannot be taught. For neither did we learn to rejoice in the presence of light, or to embrace life, or to love our parents and children; much less were we taught the love of God, but a certain seminal principle was implanted in us, which has within itself the cause, that man clings to God; which principle the teaching of the divine commands is wont to cultivate diligently, to foster watchfully, and to carry on to the perfection of divine grace. For naturally we love good; we love also what is our own, and akin to us; we likewise of our own accord pour forth all our affections on our benefactors. If then God is good, but all things desire that good, which is wrought voluntarily, He is by nature inherent in us, and although from His goodness we are far from knowing Him, yet from the very fact that we proceeded forth from Him, we are bound to love Him with exceeding love, as in truth akin to us; He is likewise also a greater benefactor than all whom by nature we love here. (ad int 3.). And again. The love of God then is the first and chief command, but the second, as filling up the first and filled up by it, bids us to love our neighbour. Hence it follows, And thy neighbour as thyself. But we have an instinct given us by God to perform this command, as who does not know that man is a kind and social animal? For nothing belongs so much to our nature as to communicate with one another, and mutually to need and love our relations. Of those things then of which in the first place He gave us the seed, He afterwards requires the fruits.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 32. in 1 Cor.) Yet observe how, almost to the same extent of obedience he requires the performance of each command, For of God he says, with all thy heart. Of our neighbour, as thyself. Which if it were diligently kept, there would be neither slave nor free man, neither conqueror nor conquered, (or rather, neither prince nor subject,) rich nor poor, nor would the devil be even known, for the chaff would rather stand the touch of fire than the devil the fervour of love; so surpassing all things is the constancy of love.

GREGORY. (19. Moral. c. 14.) But since it is said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, how is he merciful in taking compassion upon another, who still, by unrighteous living, is unmerciful to himself?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When the lawyer had answered the things contained in the law, Christ, to whom all things were known, cuts to pieces his crafty nets. For it follows, And he said to him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live.

ORIGEN. From these words it is undoubtingly gathered, that the life which is preached according to God the Creator of the world, and the Scriptures given by Him, is life everlasting. For the Lord Himself bears testimony to the passage from Deuteronomy, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God; (Deut. 6:5.) and from Leviticus, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. (Lev. 19:18.) But these things were spoken against the followers of Valentinus, Basil, and Marcion. For what else did he wish us to do in seeking eternal life, but what is contained in the Law and the Prophets?

10:29–37

29. But he, willing to justify himself, said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour?

30. And Jesus answering said, A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.

31. And by chance there came down a certain Priest that way: and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side.

32. And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side.

33. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was; and when he saw him, he had compassion on him,

34. And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him.

35. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay thee.

36. Which now of these three, thinkest thou, was neighbour unto him that fell among the thieves?

37. And he said, He that shewed mercy on him. Then said Jesus unto him, Go, and do thou likewise.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The lawyer, when praised by our Saviour for having answered right, breaks forth into pride, thinking that he had no neighbour, as though there was no one to be compared to him in righteousness. Hence it is said, But he willing to justify himself said unto Jesus, And who is my neighbour? For somehow first one sin and then another takes him captive. From the cunning with which he sought to tempt Christ, he falls into pride. But here when asking, who is my neighbour, he proves himself to be devoid of love for his neighbour, since he did not consider any one to be his neighbour, and consequently of the love of God; for he who loves not his brother whom he sees, cannot love God whom he does not see. (1 John 4:20.)

AMBROSE. He answered that he knew not his neighbour, because he believed not on Christ, and he who knows not Christ knows not the law, for being ignorant of the truth, how can he know the law which makes known the truth?

THEOPHYLACT. Now our Saviour defines a neighbour not in respect of actions or honour, but of nature; as if He says, Think not that because thou art righteous thou hast no neighbour, for all who partake of the same nature are thy neighbours. Be thou also their neighbour, not in place, but in affection and solicitude for them. And in addition to this, he brings forward the Samaritan as an example. As it follows, And Jesus answering him said, A certain man went down, &c.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus) He has well used the general term. For He says not, “a certain one went down,” but, a certain man, for his discourse was of the whole human race.

AUGUSTINE. (de Ev. l. ii. q. 19.) For that man is taken for Adam himself, representing the race of man; Jerusalem, the city of peace, that heavenly country, from the bliss of which he fell. Jericho is interpreted to be the moon, and signifies our mortality, because it rises, increases, wanes, and sets.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (Hypognos. lib. 3.) Or by Jerusalem, which is by interpretation “the sight of peace,” we mean Paradise, for before man sinned he was in sight of peace, that is, in paradise; whatever he saw was peace, and going thence he descended (as if brought low and made wretched by sin) into Jericho, that is, the world, in which all things that are born die as the moon.

THEOPHYLACT. Now he says not “descended,” but “was descending.” For human nature was ever tending downwards, and not for a time only, but throughout busied about a life liable to suffering.

BASIL. This interpretation corresponds to the places, if any one will examine them. For Jericho lies in the low parts of Palestine, Jerusalem is seated on an eminence, occupying the crest of a mountain. The man then came from the high parts to the low, to fall into the hands of the robbers who infested the desert. As it follows, And he fell among thieves.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in loc. Ed. Lat.) First, we must needs pity the ill fortune of the man who fell unarmed and helpless among robbers, and who was so rash and unwise as to choose the road in which he could not escape the attack of robbers. For the unarmed can never escape the armed, the heedless the villain, the unwary the malicious. Since malice is ever armed with guile, fenced round with cruelty, fortified with deceit, and ready for fierce attack.

AMBROSE. But who are those robbers but the Angels of night and darkness, among whom he had not fallen, unless by deviating from the divine command he had placed himself in their way.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) At the beginning of the world then the devil accomplished his treacherous attack upon man, against whom he practised the poison of deceit, and directed all the deadliness of his malice.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) He fell then among robbers, that is, the devil and his angels, who through the disobedience of the first man, stripped the race of mankind of the ornaments of virtue, and wounded him, that is, by ruining the gift of the power of free will. Hence it follows, who stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, for to that man sinning he gave a wound, but to us many wounds, since to one sin which we contract we add many.

AUGUSTINE. (de q. Ev. l. ii. q. 19.) Or they stripped man of his immortality, and wounding him (by persuading to sin) left him half dead; for wherein he is able to understand and know God, man is alive, but wherein he is corrupted and pressed down by sins, he is dead. And this is what is added, leaving him half dead.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For the half dead has his vital function (that is, free will) wounded, in that he is not able to return to the eternal life which he has lost. And therefore he lay, because he had not strength of his own sufficient to rise and seek a physician, that is, God, to heal him.

THEOPHYLACT. Or man after sin is said to be half dead, because his soul is immortal, but his body mortal, so that the half of man is under death. Or, because his human nature hoped to obtain salvation in Christ, so as not altogether to lie under death. But in that Adam had sinned death entered in the world, (Rom. 5:12.) in the righteousness of Christ death was to be destroyed.

AMBROSE. Or they stripped us of the garments which we have received of spiritual grace, and so are wont to inflict wounds. For if we keep the unspotted garments we have put on, we can not feel the wounds of robbers.

BASIL. Or it may be understood that they stripped us after first inflicting wounds; or wounds precede nakedness, as sin precedes the absence of grace.

BEDE. But sins are called wounds, because the perfectness of human nature is violated by them. And they departed, not by ceasing to lie in wait, but by hiding the craft of their devices.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Here then was man (that is, Adam) lying destitute of the aid of salvation, pierced with the wounds of his sins, whom neither Aaron the high priest passing by could advantage by his sacrifice; for it follows, And by chance there came down a certain priest that way, and when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. Nor again could his brother Moses the Levite assist him by the Law, as it follows, And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or by the Priest and the Levite, two times are represented, namely, of the Law and the Prophets. By the Priest the Law is signified, by which the priesthood and sacrifices were appointed; by the Levites the prophecies of the Prophets, in whose times the law of mankind could not heal, because by the Law came the knowledge not the doing away of sin.

THEOPHYLACT. But He says, passed by, (Rom. 3:20; 8:3.) because the Law came and stood till its time foreordained, then, not being able to cure, departed. Mark also that the Law was not given with this previous intention that it should cure man, for man could not from the beginning receive the mystery of Christ. And therefore it is said, And by chance there came a certain priest, which expression we use with respect to those things which happen without forethought.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 171.) Or it is said, passed by, because the man who came down from Jerusalem to Jericho is believed to have been an Israelite, and the priest who came down, certainly his neighbour by birth, passed him by lying on the ground. And a Levite also came by, likewise his neighbour by birth; and he also despised him as he lay.

THEOPHYLACT. They pitied him, I say, when they thought about him, but afterwards, overcome by selfishness, they went away again. For this is signified by the word, passed him by.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) A Samaritan coming by, far removed by birth, very near in compassion, acted as follows, But a certain Samaritan as he journeyed came where he was, &c. In whom our Lord Jesus Christ would have Himself typified. For Samaritan is interpreted to be keeper, and it is said of him, He shall not slumber nor sleep who keeps Israel; (Ps. 128:4.) since being raised from the dead he dieth no more. (Rom. 6:9.) Lastly, when it was said to him, Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil, (John 8:48.) He said He had not a devil, for He knew Himself to be the caster out of devils, He did not deny that He was the keeper of the weak.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) Now Christ here fully calls Himself a Samaritan. For in addressing the lawyer who was glorying in the Law, He wished to express that neither Priest nor Levite, nor all they who were conversant with the Law, fulfilled the requirements of the Law, but He came to accomplish the ordinances of the Law.

AMBROSE. Now this Samaritan was also coming down. For who is he that ascended upon into heaven, but he who came down from heaven, even the Son of Man who is in heaven (John 3:13.).

THEOPHYLACT. But He says, journeying, as though He purposely determined this in order to cure us.

AUGUSTINE. He came in the likeness of sinful flesh, therefore 1 near to him, as it were, in likeness.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. Or He came by the way. For He was a true traveller, not a wanderer; and came down to the earth for our sakes.

AMBROSE. Now when He came He was made very near to us by His taking upon Himself our infirmities, He became a neighbour by bestowing compassion. Hence it follows, And when he saw him he was moved with compassion.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Seeing him lying down weak and motionless. And therefore was He moved with compassion, because He saw in him nothing to merit a cure, but He Himself for sin condemned sin in the flesh. (Rom. 8:3.) Hence it follows, And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 171.) For what so distant, what so far removed, as God from man, the immortal from the mortal, the just from sinners, not in distance of place, but of likeness. Since then He had in Him two good things, righteousness and immortality, and we two evils, that is unrighteousness, and mortality, if He had taken upon Him both our evils He would have been our equal, and with us have had need of a deliverer. That He might be then not what we are, but near us, He was made not a sinner, as thou art, but mortal like unto thee. By taking upon Himself punishment, not taking upon Himself guilt, He destroyed both the punishment and the guilt.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. ii. 19.) The binding up of wounds is the checking of sins; oil is the consolation of a good hope, by the pardon given for the reconciliation of man; wine is the incitement to work fervently in spirit.

AMBROSE. Or, He binds up our wounds by a stricter commandment, as by oil he soothes by the remission of sin, as by wine he pricks to the heart by the denunciation of judgment.

GREGORY. (20. Moral. c. 8.) Or in the wine he applies the sharpness of constraint, in the oil the softness of mercy. By wine let the corrupt parts be washed, by oil let the healing parts be assuaged; we must then mix gentleness with severity, and we must so combine the two, that those who are put under us be neither exasperated by our excessive harshness, nor be relaxed by too much kindness.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, intercourse with man is the oil, and intercourse with God is the wine which signifies divinity, which no one can endure unmixed unless oil be added, that is, human intercourse. Hence he worked some things humanly, some divinely. He poured then in oil and wine, as having saved us both by His human and His divine nature.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in loc.) Or, he poured in wine, that is, the blood of His passion, and oil, that is, the anointing of the chrism, that pardon might be granted by His blood, sanctification be conferred by the chrism. The wounded parts are bound up by the heavenly Physician, and containing a salve within themselves, are by the working of the remedy restored to their former soundness. Having poured in wine and oil, he placed him upon His beast, as it follows, and placing him upon his beast, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. ii. q. 19.) His beast is our flesh, in which He has condescended to come to us. To be placed on the beast is to believe in the incarnation of Christ.

AMBROSE. Or, He places us on His beast in that He bears our sins, and is afflicted for us, (Isai. 53:4, LXX) for man hath been made like to the beasts, (Ps. 49:12) therefore He placed us on His beast, that we might not be as horse and mule, (Ps. 32:9.) in order that by taking upon Him our body, He might abolish the weakness of our flesh.

THEOPHYLACT. Or He placed us on His beast, that is, on His body. For He hath made us His members, and partakers of His body. The Law indeed did not take in all the Moabites, and the Ammonites shall not enter into the Church of God; (Deut. 23:3.) but now in every nation he that feareth the Lord is accepted by Him, who is willing to believe and to become part of the Church. Wherefore He says, that he brought him to an inn.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) For the Inn is the Church, which receives travellers, who are tired with their journey through the world, and oppressed with the load of their sins; where the wearied traveller casting down the burden of his sins is relieved, and after being refreshed is restored with wholesome food. And this is what is here said, and took care of him. For without is every thing that is conflicting, hurtful and evil, while within the Inn is contained all rest and health.

BEDE. And rightly He brought him placed on His beast, since no one, except he be united to Christ's body by Baptism, shall enter the Church.

AMBROSE. But as the Samaritan had not time to stay longer on the earth, he must needs return to the place whence he descended, as it follows, And on the morrow he took out two pence, &c. (Ps. 118:24.) What is that morrow, but perchance the day of our Lord's resurrection? of which it was said, This is the day the Lord hath made. But the two pence are the two covenants, which bear stamped on them the image of the eternal King, by the price of which our wounds are healed.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or the two pence are the two commandments of love, which the Apostles received from the Holy Spirit to preach to others; or the promise of the present life, and that which is to come.

ORIGEN. Or the two pence seem to me to be the knowledge of the sacrament, in what manner the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, which is given as a reward by the Angel to the Church that she may take more diligent care of the man entrusted to her whom in the shortness of the time He Himself had also cured. And it is promised that whatever she should spend on the cure of the half dead man, should be restored to her again, And whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The inn-keeper was the Apostle, who spent more either in giving counsel, as he says, Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord, yet I give my judgment; (1 Cor. 7:15.) or, in working even with his own hands, that he might not trouble any of the weak in the newness of the Gospel, (2 Thess. 3:8) though it was lawful for him to be fed from the Gospel. (1 Cor. 9:14.) Much more also did the Apostles spend, but those teachers also in their time have spent more who have interpreted both the Old and New Testament, for which they shall receive their reward.

AMBROSE. Blessed then is that inn-keeper who is able to cure the wounds of another; blessed is he to whom Jesus says, Whatsoever thou hast spent more, when I come again I will repay thee. But when wilt thou return, O Lord, save on the Judgment day? For though Thou art ever every where, and though standing in the midst of us, art not perceived by us, yet the time will be in which all flesh shall behold Thee coming again. Thou wilt then restore what Thou owest to the blessed, whose debtor Thou art. Would that we were confident debtors, that we could pay what we had received!

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. After what has gone before, our Lord fitly questions the lawyer; Which of these three thinkest thou was neighbour to him who fell among thieves? But he said, He that shewed mercy on him. For neither Priest nor Levite became neighbour to the sufferer, but he only who had compassion on him. For vain is the dignity of the Priesthood, and the knowledge of the Law, unless they are confirmed by good works. Hence it follows, And Jesus saith unto him, Go and do thou likewise.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Heb. Hom. 10.) As if He said, If thou seest any one oppressed, say not, Surely he is wicked; but be he Gentile or Jew and need help, dispute not, he has a claim to thy assistance, into whatever evil he has fallen.

AUGUSTINE. (de. Doc. Chris. lib. i. c. 30.) Hereby we understand that he is our neighbour, to whomsoever we must shew the duty of compassion, if he need it, or would have shewn if he had needed it. From which it follows, that even he who must in his turn shew us this duty, is our neighbour. For the name of neighbour has relation to something else, nor can any one be a neighbour, save to a neighbour; but that no one is excluded to whom the office of mercy is to be denied, is plain to all; as our Lord says, Do good to them that hate you. (Matt. 5:44.) Hence it is clear, that in this command by which we are bid to love our neighbour, the holy angels are included, by whom such great offices of mercy are bestowed upon us. Therefore our Lord Himself wished also to be called our neighbour, representing Himself to have assisted the half dead man who lay in the way.

AMBROSE. For relationship does not make a neighbour, but compassion, for compassion is according to nature. For nothing is so natural as to assist one who shares our nature.

10:38–42

38. Now it came to pass, as they went, that he entered into a certain village: and a certain woman named Martha received him into her house.

39. And she had a sister called Mary, which also sat at Jesus’ feet, and heard his word.

40. But Martha was cumbered about much serving, and came to him, and said, Lord, dost thou not care that my sister hath left me to serve alone? bid her therefore that she help me.

41. And Jesus answered and said unto her, Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things:

42. But one thing is needful: and Mary hath chosen that good part, which shall not be taken away from her.

BEDE. The love of God and our neighbour, which was contained above in words and parables, is here set forth in very deed and reality; for it is said, Now it came to pass, as they went, that he entered into a certain village.

ORIGEN. The name of which village Luke indeed here omits, but John mentions, calling it Bethany. (John 11.)

AUGUSTINE. (Ser. 103.) But the Lord, who came to his own, and his own received him not, (John 1:12.) was received as a guest, for it follows, And a certain woman named Martha received him into her house, &c. as strangers are accustomed to be received. But still a servant received her Lord, the sick her Saviour, the creature her Creator. But if any should say, “O blessed are they who have been thought worthy to receive Christ into their houses,” grieve not thou, for He says, For inasmuch as ye have done it to the least of my brethren, ye have done it unto me. (Matt. 25:40.) But taking the form of a servant, He wished therein to be fed by servants, by reason of His condescension, not His condition. He had a body in which He was hungry and thirsty, but when He was hungry in the desert, Angels ministered to Him. (Matt. 4:11.) In wishing therefore to be fed, He came Himself to the feeder. Martha then, setting about and preparing to feed our Lord, was occupied in serving; but Mary her sister chose rather to be fed by the Lord, for it follows, And she had a sister called Mary, which also sat at Jesus’ feet, and heard his word.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is not said of Mary simply that she sat near Jesus, but at His feet, to shew her diligence, stedfastness, and zeal, in hearing, and the great reverence which she had for our Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Now as was her humility in sitting at His feet, so much the more did she receive from Him. For the waters pour down to the lowest part of the valley, but flow away from the rising of the hill.

BASIL. (Const. Mon. c. 1.) Now every work and word of our Saviour is a rule of piety and virtue. For to this end did He put on our body, that as much as we can we might imitate His conversation.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. By His own example then He teaches His disciples how they ought to behave in the houses of those who receive them, namely, when they come to a house, they should not remain idle, but rather fill the minds of those who receive them with sacred and divine teaching. But let those who make ready the house, go to meet their guests gladly and earnestly, for two reasons. First, indeed, they will be edified by the teaching of those whom they receive; next also they will receive the reward of charity. And hence it follows here, But Martha was cumbered about much serving, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Martha was well engaged in ministering to the bodily wants or wishes of our Lord, as of one who was mortal, but He who was clothed in mortal flesh; in the beginning was the Word. Behold then what Mary heard, The Word was made flesh. Behold then Him to whom Martha ministered. The one was labouring, the other at rest. But yet Martha, when much troubled in her occupation and business of serving, interrupted our Lord, and complained of her sister. For it follows, And said, Lord, dost thou not care that my sister hath left me to serve alone? For Mary was absorbed in the sweetness of our Lord’s words; Martha was preparing a feast for our Lord, in whose feast Mary was now rejoicing. While then she was listening with delight to those sweet words, and was feeding on them with the deepest affection, our Lord was interrupted by her sister. What must we suppose was her alarm, lest the Lord should say to her, “Rise, and help thy sister?” Our Lord therefore, who was not at a loss, for He had shewn He was the Lord, answered as follows, And Jesus answered and said unto her, Martha, Martha. The repetition of the name is a mark of love, or perhaps of drawing the attention, that she should listen more earnestly. When twice called, she hears, Thou art troubled about many things, that is, thou art busied about many things. For man wishes to meet with something when he is serving, and can not; and thus between seeking what is wanting and preparing what is at hand, the mind is distracted. For if Martha had been sufficient of herself, she would not have required the aid of her sister. There are many, there are diverse things, which are carnal, temporal, but one is preferred to many. For one is not from many, but many from one. Hence it follows, But one thing is needful. Mary wished to be occupied about one, according to that, It is good for me to cling close unto the Lord. (Ps. 73:28.) The Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, are one. To this one he does not bring us, unless we being many have one heart. (Acts 4:32.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else, when certain brethren have received God, they will not be anxious about much service, nor ask for those things which are not in their hands, and are beyond their needs. For every where and in every thing that which is superfluous is burdensome. For it begets weariness in those who are wishing to bestow it, while the guests feel that they are the cause of trouble.

BASIL. (in reg. fus. int. 19.) It is foolish also to take food for the support of the body, and thereby in return to hurt the body, and to hinder it in the performance of the divine command. If then a poor man come, let him receive a model and example of moderation in food, and let us not prepare our own tables for their sakes, who wish to live luxuriously. For the life of the Christian is uniform, ever tending to one object, namely, the glory of God. But the life of those who are without is manifold and vacillating, changed about at will. And how in truth canst thou, when thou settest thy table before thy brother with profusion of meats, and for the pleasure of feasting sake, accuse him of luxury, and revile him as a glutton, censuring his indulgence in that which thou thyself affordest him? Our Lord did not commend Martha when busied about much serving.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 104.) What then? Must we think that blame was cast upon the service of Martha, who was engaged in the cares of hospitality, and rejoiced in having so great a guest? If this be true, let men give up ministering to the needy; in a word, let them be at leisure, intent only upon getting wholesome knowledge, taking no care what stranger is in the village in want of bread; let works of mercy be unheeded, knowledge only be cultivated.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord does not then forbid hospitality, but the troubling about many things, that is to say, hurry and anxiety. And mark the wisdom of our Lord, in that at first He said nothing to Martha, but when she sought to tear away her sister from hearing, then the Lord took occasion to reprove her. For hospitality is ever honoured as long as it keeps us to necessary things. But when it begins to hinder us from attending to what is of more importance, then it is plain that the hearing of the divine word is the more honourable.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 104.) Our Lord then does not blame the actions, but distinguishes between the duties. For it follows, Mary hath chosen that good part, &c. Not thine a bad one, but hers a better. Why a better? because it shall not be taken away from her. From thee the necessary burden of business shall one time be taken away. For when thou comest into that country, thou wilt find no stranger to receive with hospitality. But for thy good it shall be taken away, that what is better may be given thee. Trouble shall be taken away, that rest may be given. Thou art yet at sea; she is in port. For the sweetness of truth is eternal, yet in this life it is increased, and in the next it will be made perfect, never to be taken away.

AMBROSE. May you then like Mary be influenced by the desire of wisdom. For this is the greater, this the more perfect work. Nor let the care of ministering to others turn thy mind from the knowledge of the heavenly word, nor reprove or think indolent those whom thou seest seeking after wisdom.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Evang. l. ii. q. 30.) Now mystically, by Martha's receiving our Lord into her house is represented the Church which now receives the Lord into her heart. Mary her sister, who sat at Jesus' feet and heard His word, signifies the same Church, but in a future life, where ceasing from labour, and the ministering to her wants, she shall delight in Wisdom alone. But by her complaining that her sister did not help her, occasion is given for that sentence of our Lord, in which he shews that Church to be anxious and troubled about much service, when there is but one thing needful, which is yet attained through the merits of her service; but He says that Mary hath chosen the good part, for through the one the other is reached, which shall not be taken away.

GREGORY. (6. Mor. c. 18.) Or by Mary who sat and heard our Lord's words, is signified the contemplative life; by Martha engaged in more outward services, the active life. Now Martha's care is not blamed, but Mary is praised, for great are the rewards of an active life, but those of a contemplative are far better. Hence Mary's part it is said will never be taken away from her, for the works of an active life pass away with the body, but the joys of the contemplative life the rather begin to increase from the end.

CHAPTER 11

11:1–4

1. And it came to pass, that, as he was praying in a certain place, when he ceased, one of his disciples said unto him, Lord, teach us to pray, as John also taught his disciples.

2. And he said unto them, When ye pray, say, Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so in earth.

3. Give us day by day our daily bread.

4. And forgive us our sins; for we also forgive every one that is indebted to us. And lead us not into temptation; but deliver us from evil.

BEDE. After the account of the sisters, who signified the two lives of the Church, our Lord is not without reason related to have both Himself prayed, and taught His disciples to pray, seeing that the prayer which He taught contains in itself the mystery of each life, and the perfection of the lives themselves is to be obtained not by our own strength, but by prayer. Hence it is said, And it came to pass, that, as he was praying in a certain place.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now whereas He possesses every good in abundance, why does He pray, since He is full, and has altogether need of nothing? To this we answer, that it befits Him, according to the manner of His dispensation in the flesh, to follow human observances at the time convenient for them. For if He eats and drinks, He rightly was used to pray, that He might teach us not to be lukewarm in this duty, but to be the more diligent and earnest in our prayers.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (in Matt.) The disciples having seen a new way of life, desire a new form of prayer, since there were several prayers to be found in the Old Testament. Hence it follows, When he ceased, one of his disciples said to him, Lord, teach us to pray, in order that we might not sin against God in asking for one thing instead of another, or by approaching God in prayer in a manner that we ought not.

ORIGEN. And that he might point out the kind of teaching, the disciple proceeds, as John also taught his disciples. Of whom in truth thou hast told us, that among them that are born of women there had arisen none greater than he. And because thou hast commanded us to seek things that are great and eternal, whence shall we arrive at the knowledge of these but from Thee, our God and Saviour?

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. Dom. Serm. 1.) He unfolds the teaching of prayer to His disciples, who wisely desire the knowledge of prayer, directing them how they ought to beseech God to hear them.

BASIL. (Const. Monast. cap. 1.) There are two kinds of prayer, one composed of praise with humiliation, the other of petitions, and more subdued. Whenever then you pray, do not first break forth into petition; but if you condemn your inclination, supplicate God as if of necessity forced thereto. And when you begin to pray, forget all visible and invisible creatures, but commence with the praise of Him who created all things. Hence it is added, And he says unto them, When you pray, say, Our Father.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (App. Serm. 84.) The first word, how gracious is it? Thou durst not raise thy face to heaven, and suddenly thou receivest the grace of Christ. From an evil servant thou art made a good son. Boast not then of thy working, but of the grace of Christ; for therein is no arrogance, but faith. To proclaim what thou hast received is not pride, but devotion. Therefore raise thy eyes to thy Father, who begot thee by Baptism, redeemed thee by His Son. Say Father as a son, but claim no especial favour to thyself. Of Christ alone is He the especial Father, of us the common Father. For Christ alone He begot, but us he created. And therefore according to Matthew when it is said, Our Father, (Matt. 6:9.) it is added, which art in heaven, that is, in those heavens of which it was said, The heavens declare the glory of God. (Ps. 19:1.) Heaven is where sin has ceased, and where there is no sting of death.

THEOPHYLACT. But He says not, which art in heaven, as though He were confined to that place, but to raise the hearer up to heaven, and draw him away from earthly things.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. Dom. Serm. 2.) See how great a preparation thou needest, to be able to say boldly to God, O Father, for if thou hast thy eyes fixed on worldly things, or courtest the praise of men, or art a slave to thy passions, and utterest this prayer, I seem to hear God saying, ‘Whereas thou that art of a corrupt life callest the Author of the incorruptible thy Father, thou pollutest with thy defiled lips an incorruptible name. For He who commanded thee to call Him Father, gave thee not leave to utter lies. (et serm. 3.). But the highest of all good things is to glorify God’s name in our lives. Hence He adds, Hallowed be thy name. For who is there so debased, as when He sees the pure life of those who believe, does not glorify the name invoked in such a life. He then who says in his prayer, Be thy name, which I call upon, hallowed in me, prays this, “May I through Thy concurring aid be made just, abstaining from all evil.”

CHRYSOSTOM. For as when a man gazes upon the beauty of the heavens, he says, Glory be thee, O God; so likewise when He beholds a man’s virtuous actions, seeing that the virtue of man glorifies God much more than the heavens.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or it is said, Hallowed be thy name; that is, let Thy holiness be known to all the world, and let it worthily praise Thee. For praise becometh the upright, (Ps. 33.) and therefore He bids them pray for the cleansing of the whole world.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Since among those to whom the faith has not yet come, the name of God is still despised. But when the rays of truth shall have shined upon them, they will confess the Holy of Holies. (Dan. 9:24.)

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (ubi sup.) And because in the name of Jesus is the glory of God the Father, the name of the Father will be hallowed whenever Christ shall be known.

ORIGEN. Or, because the name of God is given by idolaters, and those who are in error, to idols and creatures, it has not as yet been so made holy, as to be separated from those things from which it ought to be. He teaches us therefore to pray that the name of God may be appropriated to the only true God; to whom alone belongs what follows, Thy kingdom come, to the end that may be put down all the rule, authority, and power, and kingdom of the world, together with sin which reigns in our mortal bodies.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) We beseech also to be delivered by the Lord from corruption, to be taken out of death. Or, according to some, Thy kingdom come, that is, May Thy Holy Spirit come upon us to purify us.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For then cometh the kingdom of God, when we have obtained His grace. For He Himself says, The kingdom of God is within you. (Luke 17:21.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or they who say this seem to wish to have the Saviour of all again illuminating the world. But He has commanded us to desire in prayer that truly awful time, in order that men might know that it behoves them to live not in sloth and backwardness, lest that time bring upon them the fiery punishment, but rather honestly and according to His will, that that time may weave crowns for them. Hence it follows, according to Matthew,a Thy will be done, as in heaven, so in earth.

CHRYSOSTOM. As if He says, Enable us, O Lord, to follow the heavenly life, that whatever Thou willest, we may will also.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. Dom. serm. 4.) For since He says that the life of man after the resurrection will be like to that of Angels, it follows, that our life in this world should be so ordered with respect to that which we hope for hereafter, that living in the flesh we may not live according to the flesh. But hereby the true Physician of the souls destroys the nature of the disease, that those who have been seized with sickness, whereby they have departed from the Divine will, may forthwith be released from the disease by being joined to the Divine will. For the health of the soul is the due fulfilment of the will of God.

AUGUSTINE. (in Enchirid. c. 116.) It seems according to the Evangelist Matthew, that the Lord’s prayer contains seven petitions, but Luke has comprehended it in five. Nor in truth does the one disagree from the other, but the latter has suggested by his brevity how those seven are to be understood. For the name of God is hallowed in the spirit, but the kingdom of God is about to come at the resurrection of the body. Luke then, shewing that the third petition is in a manner a repetition of the two former, wished to make it so understood by omitting it. He then added three others. And first, of daily bread, saying, Give us day by day our daily bread.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (App. Serm. 84..) In the Greek the word is ἐπιούσιον, that is, something added to the substance. (supersubstantialem) It is not that bread which goes into the body, but that bread of everlasting life, which supports the substance of our soul. But the Latins call this “daily” bread, which the Greeks call “coming to.” If it is daily bread, why is it eaten a year old, as is the custom with the Greeks in the east? Take daily what profits thee for the day; so live that thou mayest daily be thought worthy to receive. The death of our Lord is signified thereby, and the remission of sins, and dost thou not daily partake of that bread of life? He who has a wound seeks to be cured; the wound is that we are under sin, the cure is the heavenly and dreadful Sacrament. If thou receivest daily, daily does "To-day" come unto thee. Christ is to thee To-day; (Heb. 13:8.) Christ rises to thee daily.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Or the bread of souls is the Divine power, bringing the everlasting life which is to come, as the bread which comes out of the earth preserves the temporal life. But by saying "daily," He signifies the Divine bread which comes and is to come, which we seek to be given to us daily, requiring a certain earnest and taste of it, seeing that the Spirit which dwells in us hath wrought a virtue surpassing all human virtues, as chastity, humility, and the rest.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now perhaps some think it unfit for saints to seek from God bodily goods, and for this reason assign to these words a spiritual sense. But granting that the chief concern of the saints should be to obtain spiritual gifts, still it becomes them to see that they seek without blame, according to our Lord's command, their common bread. For from the fact that He bids them ask for bread, that is daily food, it seems that He implies that they should possess nothing, but rather practise an honourable poverty. For it is not the part of those who have bread to seek it, but rather of those who are oppressed with want.

BASIL. (in Reg. brev. ad inter. 252.) As if He said, For thy daily bread, namely, that which serves for our daily wants, trust not to thyself, but fly to God for it, making known to Him the necessities of thy nature.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 23. in Matt.) We must then require of God the necessities of life; not varieties of meats, and spiced wines, and the other things which please the palate, while they load thy stomach and disturb thy mind, but bread which is able to support the bodily substance, that is to say, which is sufficient only for the day, that we may take no thought of the morrow. But we make only one petition about things of sense, that the present life may not trouble us.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. Dom. Serm. 5.) Having taught us to take confidence through good works, He next teaches us to implore the remission of our offences, for it follows, And forgive us our sins.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (in Matt.) This also was necessarily added, for no one is found without sin, that we should not be hindered from the holy participation on account of man’s guilt. For whereas we are bound to render unto Christ all manner of holiness, who maketh His Spirit to dwell in us, we are to be blamed if we keep not our temples clean for Him. But this defect is supplied by the goodness of God, remitting to human frailty the severe punishment of sin. And this act is done justly by the just God, when we forgive as it were our debtors, those, namely, who have injured us, and have not restored what was due. Hence it follows, For we also forgive every one that is indebted to us.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For He wishes, if I may so speak, to make God the imitator of the patience which men practise, that the kindness which they have shewn to their fellowservants, they should in like manner seek to receive in equal balance from God, who recompenses to each man justly, and knows how to have mercy upon all men.

CHRYSOSTOM. Considering then these things, we ought to shew mercy to our debtors. For they are to us if we are wise the cause of our greatest pardon; and though we perform only a few things, we shall find many. For we owe many and great debts to the Lord, of which if the least part should be exacted from us, we should soon perish.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But what is the debt except sin? If thou hadst not received, thou wouldest not owe money to another. And therefore sin is imputed to you. For thou hadst money with which thou wert born rich, and made after the likeness and image of God, but thou hast lost what thou then hadst. As when thou puttest on pride thou losest the gold of humility, thou hast receipted the devil’s debt which was not necessary; the enemy held the bond, but the Lord crucified it, and cancelled it with His blood. But the Lord is able, who has taken away our sins and forgiven our debts, to guard us against the snares of the devil, who is wont to produce sin in us. Hence it follows, And lead us not into temptation, such as we are not able to bear, but like the wrestler we wish only such temptation as the condition of man can sustain.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (ubi sup.) For it is imposible not to be tempted by the devil, but we make this prayer that we may not be abandoned to our temptations. Now that which happens by Divine permission, God is sometimes in Scripture said to do. And in this way by hindering not the increase of temptation which is above our strength, he leads us into temptation.

MAXIMUS. (in Orat. Dom.) Or, the Lord commands us to pray, Lead us not into temptation, let us not have experience of lustful and self-induced temptations. But James teaches those who contend only for the truth, not to be unnerved by involuntary and troublesome temptations, saying, My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations. (James 1:2.)

BASIL. (in reg. brev. ad inter. 221.) It does not however become us to seek by our prayers bodily afflictions. For Christ has universally commanded men every where to pray that they enter not into temptation. But when one has already entered, it is fitting to ask from the Lord the power of enduring, that we may have fulfilled in us those words, He that endureth to the end shall be saved. (Mat. 10:22.)

AUGUSTINE. (in Enchirid. c. 116.) But what Matthew has placed at the end, But deliver us from evil, Luke has not mentioned, that we might understand it belongs to the former, which was spoken of temptation. He therefore says, But deliver us, not, “And deliverus,” clearly proving this to be but one petition,” Do not this, but this.” But let every one know that he is therein delivered from evil, when he is not brought into temptation.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For each man seeks to be delivered from evil, that is, from his enemies and sin, but he who gives himself up to God, fears not the devil, for if God is for us, who can be against us? (Rom. 8:31.)

11:5–8

5. And he said unto them, Which of you shall have a friend, and shall go unto him at midnight, and say unto him, Friend, lend me three loaves;

6. For a friend of mine in his journey is come to me, and I have nothing to set before him?

7. And he from within shall answer and say, Trouble me not: the door is now shut, and my children are with me in bed; I cannot rise and give thee.

8. I say unto you, Though he will not rise and give him, because he is his friend, yet because of his importunity he will rise and give him as many as he needeth.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Saviour had before taught, in answer to the request of His apostles, how men ought to pray. But it might happen that those who had received this wholesome teaching, poured forth their prayers indeed according to the form given to them, but carelessly and languidly, and then when they were not heard in the first or second prayer, left off praying. That this then might not be our case, He shews by means of a parable, that cowardice in our prayers is hurtful, but it is of great advantage to have patience in them. Hence it is said, And he says unto them, Which of you shall have a friend.

THEOPHYLACT. God is that friend, who loveth all men, and wills that all should he saved.

AMBROSE. Who is a greater friend to us, than He who delivered up His body for us? Now we have here another kind of command given us, that at all times, not only in the day, but at night, prayers should be offered up. For it follows, And shall go into him at midnight. (Ps. 119:62.) As David did when he said, At midnight I will rise and give thanks unto thee. For he had no fear of awakening them from sleep, whom he knew to be ever watching. For if David who was occupied also in the necessary affairs of a kingdom was so holy, that seven times in the day he gave praise to God, (Ps. 119:164.) what ought we to do, who ought so much the more to pray, as we more frequently sin, through the weakness of our mind and body? But if thou lovest the Lord thy God, thou wilt be able to gain favour, not only for thyself, but others. For it follows, And say unto him, Friend, lend me three loaves, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 105) But what are these three loaves but the food of the heavenly mystery? For it may be that one has had a friend asking for what he cannot supply him with, and then finds that he has not what he is compelled to give. A friend then comes to you on his journey, that is, in this present life, in which all are travelling on as strangers, and no one remains possessor, but to every man is told, Pass on, O stranger, give place to him that is coming. (Ecclus 29, 27.) Or perhaps some friend or yours comes from a bad road, (that is, an evil life,) wearied and not finding the truth, by hearing and receiving which he may become happy. He comes to thee as to a Christian, and says, “Give me a reason,” asking perhaps what you from the simplicity of your faith are ignorant of, and not having wherewith to satisfy his hunger, are compelled to seek it in the Lord’s books. For perhaps what he asked is contained in the book, but obscure. You are not permitted to ask Paul himself, or Peter, or any prophet, for all that family is now resting with their Lord, and the ignorance of the world is very great, that is, it is midnight, and your friend who is urgent from hunger presses this, not contented with a simple faith; must he then be abandoned? Go therefore to the Lord Himself with whom the family is sleeping, Knock, and pray; of whom it is added, And he from within shall answer and say, Trouble me not. He delays to give, wishing that you should the more earnestly desire what is delayed, lost by being given at once it should grow common.

BASIL. (Const. Mon. c. 1.) For perhaps He delays purposely, to redouble your earnestness and coming to him, and that you may know what the gift of God is, and may anxiously guard what is given. For whatever a man acquires with much pains he strives to keep safe, lest with the loss of that he should lose his labour likewise.

GLOSS. (ordin.) He does not then take away the liberty of asking, but is the more anxious to kindle the desire of praying, by shewing the difficulty of obtaining that we ask for. For it follows, The door is now shut.

AMBROSE. This is the door which Paul also requests may be opened to him, beseeching to be assisted not only by his own prayers, but those also of the people, that a door of utterance may be opened to him to speak the mystery of Christ. (Col. 4:3.) And perhaps that is the door which John saw open, and it was said to him, Come up hither, and, I will shew thee things which must be hereafter. (Rev. 4:1.)

AUGUSTINE. (Qu. Ev. l. ii. qu. 21.) The time then referred to is that of the famine of the word, when the understanding is shut up, (Amos 8:11.) and they who dealing out the wisdom of the Gospel as it were bread, preached throughout the world, are now in their secret rest with the Lord. And this it is which is added, And my children are with me in bed.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. Well does he call those children who by the arms of righteousness have claimed to themselves freedom from passion, shewing that the good which by practice we have acquired, had been from the beginning laid up in our nature. For when any one renouncing the flesh, by living in the exercise of a virtuous life, has overcome passion, then he becomes as a child, and is insensible to the passions. But by the bed we understand the rest of Christ.

GLOSS. (ordin.) And because of what has gone before he adds, I cannot rise and give thee, which must have reference to the difficulty of obtaining.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 21.) Or else, the friend to whom the visit is made at midnight, for the loan of the three loaves, is evidently meant for an allegory, just as a person set in the midst of trouble might ask God that He would give him to understand the Trinity, by which he may console the troubles of this present life. For his distress is the midnight in which he is compelled to be so urgent in his request for the three. Now by the three loaves it is signified, that the Trinity is of one substance. But the friend coming from his journey is understood the desire of man, which ought to obey reason, but was obedient to the custom of the world, which he calls the way, from all things passing along it. Now when man is converted to God, that desire also is reclaimed from custom. But if not consoled by that inward joy arising from the spiritual doctrine which declares the Trinity of the Creator, he is in great straits who is pressed down by earthly sorrows, seeing that from all outward delights he is commanded to abstain, and within there is no refreshment from the delight of spiritual doctrine. And yet it is effected by prayer, that he who desires should receive understanding from God, even though there be no one by whom wisdom should be preached. For it follows, And if that man shall continue, &c. The argument is drawn from the less to the greater. For, if a friend rises from his bed, and gives not from the force of friendship, but from weariness, how much more does God give who without weariness gives most abundantly whatever we ask?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But when thou shalt have obtained the three loaves, that is, the food and knowledge of the Trinity, thou hast both the source of life and of food. Fear not. Cease not. For that bread will not come to an end, but will put an end to your want. Learn and teach. Live and eat.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, The midnight is the end of life, at which many come to God. But the friend is the Angel who receives the soul. Or, the midnight is the depth of temptations, in which he who has fallen, seeks from God three loaves, the relief of the wants of his body, soul, and spirit; through whom we run into no danger in our temptations. But the friend who comes from his journey is God Himself, who proves by temptations who has nothing to set before Him, and who is weakened in temptation. But when He says, And the door is shut, we must understand that we ought to be prepared before temptations. But after that we have fallen into them, the gate of preparation is shut, and being found unprepared, unless God keep us, we are in danger.

11:9–13

9. And I say unto you, Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you.

10. For every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened.

11. If a son shall ask bread of any of you that is a father, will he give him a stone? or if he ask a fish, will he for a fish give him a serpent?

12. Or if he shall ask an egg, will he offer him a scorpion?

13. If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children: how much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Having laid aside the metaphor, our Lord added an exhortation, and expressly urged us to ask, seek, and knock, until we receive what we are seeking. Hence he says, And I say unto you, Ask, and it shall be given you.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The words, I say unto you, have the force of an oath. For God doth not lie, but whenever He makes known any thing to His hearers with an oath, he manifests the inexcusable littleness of our faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 23. in Matt.) Now by asking, He means prayer, but by seeking, zeal and anxiety, as He adds, Seek, and ye shall find. For those things which are sought require great care. And this is particularly the case with God. For there are many things which block up our senses. As then we search for lost gold, so let us anxiously seek after God. He shews also, that though He does not forthwith open the gates, we must yet wait. Hence he adds, Knock, and it shall be opened unto you; for if you continue seeking, you shall surely receive. For this reason, and as the door shut makes you knock, therefore he did not at once consent that you might entreat.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus Antioch.) Or by the word knock perhaps he means seeking effectually, for one knocks with the hand, but the hand is the sign of a good work. Or these three may be distinguished in another way. For it is the beginning of virtue to ask to know the way of truth. But the second step is to seek how we must go by that way. The third step is when a man has reached the virtue to knock at the door, that he may enter upon the wide field of knowledge. All these things a man acquires by prayer. Or to ask indeed is to pray, but to seek is by good works to do things becoming our prayers. And to knock is to continue in prayer without ceasing.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 105.) But He would not so encourage us to ask were He not willing to give. Let human slothfulness blush, He is more willing to give than we to receive.

AMBROSE. Now he who promises any thing ought to convey a hope of the thing promised, that obedience may follow commands, faith, promises. And therefore he adds, For every one that asketh receiveth.

ORIGEN. But some one may seek to know, how it comes that they who pray are not heard? To which we must answer, that whose sets about seeking in the right way, omitting none of those things which avail to the obtaining of our requests, shall really receive what he has prayed to be given him. But if a man turns away from the object of a right petition, and asks not as it becomes him, he does not ask. And therefore it is, that when he does not receive, as is here promised, there is no falsehood. For so also when a master says, “Whoever will come to me, he shall receive the gift of instruction;” we understand it to imply a person going in real earnest to a master, that he may zealously and diligently devote himself to his teaching. Hence too James says, Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss, (James 4:3.) namely, for the sake of vain pleasures. But some one will say, Nay, when men ask to obtain divine knowledge, and to recover their virtue they do not obtain? To which we must answer, that they sought not to receive the good things for themselves, but that thereby they might reap praise.

BASIL. (in Const. c. 1.) If also any one from indolence surrenders himself to his desires, and betrays himself into the hands of his enemies, God neither assists him nor hears him, because by sin he has alienated himself from God. It becomes then a man to offer whatever belongs to him, but to cry to God to assist him. Now we must ask for the Divine assistance not slackly, nor with a mind wavering to and fro, because such a one will not only not obtain what it seeks, but will the rather provoke God to anger. For if a man standing before a prince has his eye fixed within and without, lest perchance he should be punished, how much more before God ought he to stand watchful and trembling? But if when awakened by sin you are unable to pray stedfastly to the utmost of your power, check yourself, that when you stand before God you may direct your mind to Him. And God pardons you, because not from indifference, but infirmity, you cannot appear in His presence as you ought. If then you thus command yourself, do not depart until you receive. For whenever you ask and receive not, it is because your request was improperly made, either without faith, or lightly, or for things which are not good for you, or because you left off praying. But some frequently make the objection, “Why pray we? Is God then ignorant of what we have need?” He knows undoubtedly, and gives us richly all temporal things even before we ask. But we must first desire good works, and the kingdom of heaven; and then having desired, ask in faith and patience, bringing into our prayers whatever is good for us, convicted of no offence by our own conscience.

AMBROSE. The argument then persuading to frequent prayer, is the hope of obtaining what we pray for. The ground of persuasion was first in the command, afterwards it is contained in that example which He sets forth, adding, If a son shall ask bread of any of you, will he give him a stone? &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. In these words our Saviour gives us a very necessary piece of instruction. For often-times we rashly, from the impulse of pleasure, give way to hurtful desires. When we ask any such thing from God, we shall not obtain it. To shew this, He brings an obvious example from those things which are before our eyes, in our daily experience. For when thy son asks of thee bread, thou givest it him gladly, because he seeks a wholesome food. But when from want of understanding he asks for a stone to eat, thou givest it him not, but rather hinderest him from satisfying his hurtful desire. So that the sense may be, But which of you asking his father for bread, (which the father gives,) will he give him a stone? (that is, if he asked it.) There is the same argument also in the serpent and the fish; of which he adds, Or if he asks a fish, will he for a fish give him a serpent? And in like manner in the egg and scorpion, of which he adds, Or if he ask an egg, will he offer him a scorpion?

ORIGEN. Consider then this, if the bread be not indeed the food of the soul in knowledge, without which it can not be saved, as, for example, the well planned rule of a just life. But the fish is the love of instruction, as to know the constitution of the world, and the effects of the elements, and whatever else besides wisdom treats of. Therefore God does not in the place of bread offer a stone, which the devil wished Christ to eat, nor in the place of a fish does He give a serpent, which the Ethiopians eat who are unworthy to eat fishes. Nor generally in the place of what is nourishing does he give what is not eatable and injurious, which relates to the scorpion and egg.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 22.) Or by the bread is meant charity, because we have a greater desire of it, and it is so necessary, that without it all other things are nothing, as the table without bread is mean. Opposed to which is hardness of heart, which he compared to a stone. But by the fish is signified the belief in invisible things, either from the waters of baptism, or because it is taken out of invisible places which the eye cannot reach. Because also faith, though tossed about by the waves of this world, is not destroyed, it is rightly compared to a fish, in opposition to which he has placed the serpent on account of the poison of deceit, which by evil persuasion had its first seed in the first man. Or, by the egg is understood hope. For the egg is the young not yet formed, but hoped for through cherishing, opposed to which he has placed the scorpion, whose poisoned sting is to be dreaded behind; as the contrary to hope is to look back, since the hope of the future reaches forward to those things which are before.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 105.) What great things the world speaks to thee, and roars them behind thy back to make thee look behind! O unclean world, why clamourest thou! Why attempt to turn him away! Thou wouldest detain him when thou art perishing, what wouldest thou if thou wert abiding for ever? Whom wouldest thou not deceive with sweetness, when bitter thou canst infuse false food?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now from the example just given he concludes, If then ye being evil, (i. e. having a mind capable of wickedness, and not uniform and settled in good, as God,) know how to give good gifts; how much more shall your heavenly Father?

BEDE. Or, he calls the lovers of the world evil, who give those things which they judge good according to their sense, which are also good in their nature, and are useful to aid imperfect life. Hence he adds, Know how to give good gifts to your children. The Apostles even, who by the merit of their election had exceeded the goodness of mankind in general, are said to be evil in comparison with Divine goodness, since nothing is of itself good but God alone. But that which is added, How much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask him, for which Matthew has written, will give good things to them that ask him, shews that the Holy Spirit is the fulness of God’s gifts, since all the advantages which are received from the grace of God’s gifts flow from that source.

ATHANASIUS. (Dial. 1. de Trin.) Now unless the Holy Spirit were of the substance of God, Who alone is good, He would by no means be called good, since our Lord refused to be called good, inasmuch as He was made man.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 105.) Therefore, O covetous man, what seekest thou? or if thou seekest any thing else, what will suffice thee to whom the Lord is not sufficient?

11:14–16

14. And he was casting out a devil, and it was dumb. And it came to pass, when the devil was gone out, the dumb spake; and the people wondered.

15. But some of them said, He casteth out devils through Beelzebub the chief of the devils.

16. And others, tempting him, sought of him a sign from heaven.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The Lord had promised that the Holy Spirit should be given to those that asked for it; the blessed effects whereof He indeed clearly shews in the following miracle. Hence it follows, And Jesus was casting out a devil, and it was dumb.

THEOPHYLACT. Now he is called κωφὸς, as commonly meaning one who does not speak. It is also used for one who does not hear, but more properly who neither hears nor speaks. But he who has not heard from his birth necessarily cannot speak. For we speak those things which we are taught to speak by hearing. If however one has lost his hearing from a disease that has come upon him, there is nothing to hinder him from speaking. But He who was brought before the Lord was both dumb in speech, and deaf in hearing.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (in Matt.) Now He calls the devil deaf or dumb, as being the cause of this calamity, that the Divine word should not be heard. For the devil, by taking away the quickness of human feeling, blunts the hearing of our soul. Christ therefore comes that He might cast out the devil, and that we might hear the word of truth. For He healed one that He might create a universal foretaste of man’s salvation. Hence it follows, And when he had cast out the devil, the dumb spake.

BEDE. But that demoniac is related by Matthew to have been not only dumb, but blind. Three miracles then were performed at the same time on one man. The blind see, the dumb speaks, and he that was possessed by a devil is set free. The like is daily accomplished in the conversion of believers, so that the devil being first cast out, they see the light, and then those mouths which were before silent are loosened to speak the praises of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now when the miracle was performed, the multitude extolled Him with loud praises, and the glory which was due to God. As it follows, And the people wondered.

BEDE. But since the multitudes who were thought ignorant always marvelled at our Lord’s actions, the Scribes and Pharisees took pains to deny them, or to pervert them by an artful interpretation, as though they were not the work of a Divine power, but of an unclean spirit. Hence it follows, But some of them said, He casteth out devils through Beelzebub the prince of the devils. Beelzebub was the God Accaron. For Beel is indeed Baal himself. But Zebub means a fly. Now he is called Beelzebub as the man of flies, from whose most foul practices the chief of the devils was so named.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But others by similar darts of envy sought of him a sign from heaven. As it follows, And others, tempting him, sought of him a sign from heaven. As if they said, “Although thou hast cast out a devil from the man, this is no proof however of Divine power. For we have not yet seen any thing like to the miracles of former times. Moses led the people through the midst of the sea, (Exod. 14) and Joshua his successor stayed the sun in Gibeon. (Josh. 10:13.) But thou hast shewn us none of these things.” For to seek signs from heaven shewed that the speaker was at that time influenced by some feeling of this kind towards Christ.

11:17–20

17. But he, knowing their thoughts, said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and a house divided against a house falleth.

18. If Satan also be divided against himself, how shall his kingdom stand? because ye say that I cast out devils through Beelzebub.

19. And if I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your sons cast them out? therefore shall they be your judges.

20. But if I with the finger of God cast out devils, no doubt the kingdom of God is come upon you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 41. in Matt.) The suspicion of the Pharisees being utterly without reason, they dared not divulge it for fear of the multitude, but pondered it in their minds. Hence it is said, But he, knowing their thoughts, said unto them, Every kingdom divided against itself will be brought to desolation.

BEDE. He answered not their words but their thoughts, that so at least they might be compelled to believe in His power, who saw into the secrets of the heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) He did not answer them from the Scriptures, since they gave no heed to them, explaining them away falsely; but he answers them from things of every day occurrence. For a house and a city if it be divided is quickly scattered to nothing; and likewise a kingdom, than which nothing is stronger. For the harmony of the inhabitants maintains houses and kingdoms. If then, says He, I cast out devils by means of a devil, there is dissension among them, and their power perishes. Hence He adds, But if Satan be divided against himself, how shall he stand? For Satan resists not himself, nor hurts his soldiers, but rather strengthens his kingdom. It is then by Divine power alone that I crush Satan under my feet.

AMBROSE. Herein also He shews His own kingdom to be undivided and everlasting. Those then who possess no hope in Christ, but think that He casts out devils through the chief of the devils, their kingdom, He says, is not everlasting. This also has reference to the Jewish people. For how can the kingdom of the Jews be everlasting, when by the people of the law Jesus is denied, who is promised by the law? Thus in part does the faith of the Jewish people impugn itself; the glory of the wicked is divided, by division is destroyed. And therefore the kingdom of the Church shall remain for ever, because its faith is undivided in one body.

BEDE. The kingdom also of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is not divided, because it is sealed with an eternal stability. Let then the Arians cease to say that the Son is inferior to the Father, but the Holy Spirit inferior to the Son, since whose kingdom is one, their power is one also.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 23. in Matt) This then is the first answer; the second which relates to His disciples He gives as follows, And if I by Beelzebub cast out devils, by whom do your sons cast them out? He says not, “My disciples,” but your sons, wishing to soothe their wrath.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For the disciples of Christ were Jews, and sprung from Jews according to the flesh, and they had obtained from Christ power over unclean spirits, and delivered those who were oppressed by them in Christ’s name. Seeing then that your sons subdue Satan in My name, is it not very madness to say that I have My power from Beelzebub? Ye are then condemned by the faith of your children. Hence He adds, Therefore shall they be your judges.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) For since they who come forth from you are obedient unto Me, it is plain that they will condemn those who do the contrary.

BEDE. Or else, By the sons of the Jews He means the exorcists of that nation, who cast out devils by the invocation of God. As if He says, If the casting out of devils by your sons is ascribed to God, not to devils, why in My case has not the same work the same cause? Therefore shall they be your judges, not in authority to exercise judgment, but in act, since they assign to God the casting out of devils, you to Beelzebub, the chief of the devils.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Since then what you say bears upon it the mark of calumny, it is plain that by the Spirit of God I cast out devils. Hence He adds, But if I by the finger of God cast out devils, no doubt the kingdom of God is come upon you.

AUGUSTINE. (de cons. Ev. l. ii. c. 38.) That Luke speaks of the finger of God, where Matthew has said, the Spirit, does not take away from their agreement in sense, but it rather teaches us a lesson, that we may know what meaning to give to the finger of God, whenever we read it in the Scriptures.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. qu. 17.) Now the Holy Spirit is called the finger of God, because of the distribution of gifts which are given through Him, to every one his own gift, whether he be of men or angels. For in none of our members is division more apparent than in our fingers.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or the Holy Spirit is called the finger of God for this reason. The Son was said to be the hand and arm of the Father, (Ps. 98:1.) for the Father worketh all things by Him. As then the finger is not separate from the hand, but by nature a part of it; so the Holy Spirit is consubstantially united to the Son, and through Him the Son does all things.

AMBROSE. Nor would you think in the compacting together of our limbs any division of power to be made, for there can be no division in an undivided thing. And therefore the appellation of finger must be referred to the form of unity, not to the distinction of power.

ATHANASIUS. (Orat. 2. con. Arian.) But at this time our Lord does not hesitate because of His humanity to speak of Himself as inferior to the Holy Spirit, saying, that He cast out devils by Him, as though the human nature was not sufficient for the casting out of devils without the power of the Holy Spirit.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. And therefore it is justly said, The kingdom of God is come upon you, that is, “If I as a man cast out devils by the Spirit of God, human nature is enriched through Me, and the kingdom of God is come.”

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 41. ut sup.) But it is said, upon you, that He might draw them to Him; as if He said, If prosperity comes to you, why do you despise your good things?

AMBROSE. At the same time He shews that it is a regal power which the Holy Spirit possesses, in whom is the kingdom of God, and that we in whom the Spirit dwells are a royal house.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. (in Matt.) Or He says, The kingdom of God is come upon you, signifying, “is come against you, not for you.” For dreadful is the second coming of Christ to faithless Christians.

11:21–23

21. When a strong man armed keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace:

22. But when a stronger than he shall come upon him and overcome him, he taketh from him all his armour wherein he trusted, and divideth his spoils.

23. He that is not with me is against me: and he that gathereth not with me scattereth.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As it was necessary for many reasons to refute the cavils of His opponents, our Lord now makes use of a very plain example, by which He proves to those who will consider it that He overcomes the power of the world, by a power inherent in Himself, saying, When a strong man armed keepeth his palace.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 41. in Matt.) He calls the devil a strong man, not because he is naturally so, but referring to his ancient dominion, of which our weakness was the cause.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For he used before the coming of the Saviour to seize with great violence upon the flocks of another, that is, God, and carry them as it were to his own fold.

THEOPHYLACT. The Devil's arms are all kinds of sins, trusting in which he prevailed against men.

BEDE. But the world he calls his palace, which lieth in wickedness, (1 John 5:19.) wherein up to our Saviour's coming he enjoyed supreme power, because he rested in the hearts of unbelievers without any opposition. But with a stronger and mightier power Christ has conquered, and by delivering all men has cast him out. Hence it is added, But if a stronger than he shall come upon him, and overcome, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For as soon as the Word of the Most High God, the Giver of all strength, and the Lord of Hosts, was made man, He attacked him, and took away his arms.

BEDE. His arms then are the craft and the wiles of spiritual wickedness, but his spoils are the men themselves, who have been deceived by him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For the Jews who had been a long time entrapped by him into ignorance of God and sin, have been called out by the holy Apostles to the knowledge of the truth, and presented to God the Father, through faith in the Son.

BASIL. Christ also divides the spoil, shewing the faithful watch which angels keep over the salvation of men.

BEDE. As conqueror too Christ divides the spoils, which is a sign of triumph, for leading captivity captive He gave gifts to men, ordaining some Apostles, some Evangelists, some Prophets, and some Pastors and Teachers. (Ephes. 4:8, 11.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Next we have the fourth answer, where it is added, He who is not with me is against me; as if He says, I wish to present men to God, but Satan the contrary. How then would he who does not work with Me, but scatters what is Mine, become so united with Me, as with Me to cast out devils? It follows, And he who gathereth not with me, scattereth.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He said, I came to gather together the sons of God whom he hath scattered. And Satan himself as he is not with Me, tries to scatter those which I have gathered and saved. How then does he whom I use all My efforts to resist, supply Me with power?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 41. in Matt.) But if he who does not work with Me is My adversary, how much more he who opposes Me? It seems however to me that he here under a figure refers to the Jews, ranging them with the devil. For they also acted against, and scattered those whom He gathered together.

11:24–26

24. When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, he walketh through dry places, seeking rest; and finding none, he saith, I will return unto my house whence I came out.

25. And when he cometh, he findeth it swept and garnished.

26. Then goeth he, and taketh to him seven other spirits more wicked than himself; and they enter in, and dwell there: and the last state of that man is worse than the first.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. After what had gone before, our Lord proceeds to shew how it was that the Jewish people had sunk to these opinions concerning Christ, saying, When the unclean spirit is gone out of a man, &c. For that this example relates to the Jews, Matthew has explained when he says, Even so shall it be also unto this wicked generation. (Matt. 12:45.) For all the time that they were living in Egypt in the practice of the Egyptians, there dwelt in them an evil spirit, which was drawn out of them when they sacrificed the lamb as a type of Christ, and were sprinkled with its blood, and so escaped the destroyer.

AMBROSE. The comparison then is between one man and the whole Jewish people, from whom through the Law the unclean spirit had been cast out. But because in the Gentiles, whose hearts were first barren, but afterwards in baptism moistened with the dew of the Spirit, the devil could find no rest because of their faith in Christ, (for to the unclean spirits Christ is a flaming fire,) he then returned to the Jewish people. Hence it follows, And finding none, he saith, I will return to my house whence I came.

ORIGEN. That is, to those who are of Israel, whom he saw possessing nothing divine in them, but desolate, and vacant for him to take up his abode there; and so it follows, And when he came, he findeth it swept and garnished.

AMBROSE. For Israel being adorned with a mere outward and superficial beauty, remains inwardly the more polluted in her heart. For she never quenched or allayed her fires in the water of the sacred fountain, and rightly did the unclean spirit return to her, bringing with him seven other spirits more wicked than himself. Hence it follows, And he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits more wicked than himself, and they enter in and dwell there. Seeing that in truth she has sacrilegiously profaned the seven weeks of the Law, (i. e. from Easter to Pentecost,) and the mystery of the eighth day. Therefore as upon us is multiplied the seven-fold gifts of the Spirit, so upon them falls the whole accumulated attack of the unclean spirits. For the number seven is frequently taken to mean the whole.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 43. in Matt.) Now the evil spirits who dwell in the souls of the Jews, are worse than those in former times. For then the Jews raged against the Prophets, now they lift up their hands against the Lord of the Prophets, and therefore suffered worse things from Vespasian and Titus than in Egypt and Babylon. Hence it follows, And the last state of that man is worse than the former. Then too they had with them the Providence of God, and the grace of the Holy Spirit; but now they are deprived even of this protection, so that there is now a greater lack of virtue, and their sorrows are more intense, and the tyranny of the evil spirits more terrible.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The last state also is worse than the first, according to the words of the Apostle, It were better not to have known the way of truth, than after they have known it to turn back from it. (2 Pet. 2:21.)

BEDE. This may also be taken to refer to certain heretics or schismatics, or even to a bad Catholic, from whom at the time of his baptism the evil spirit had gone out. And he wanders about in dry places, that is, his crafty device is to try the hearts of the faithful, which have been purged of all unstable and transient knowledge, if he can plant in them any where the footsteps of his iniquity. But he says, I will return to my house whence I came out. And here we must beware lest the sin which we supposed extinguished in us, by our neglect overcome us unawares. But he finds his house swept and garnished, that is, purified by the grace of baptism from the stain of sin, yet replenished with no diligence in good works. By the seven evil spirits which he takes to himself, he signifies all the vices. And they are called more wicked, because he will have not only those vices which are opposed to the seven spiritual virtues, but also by his hypocrisy he will pretend to have the virtues themselves.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Let us receive the words which follow, as said not only to them, but also to ourselves, And the last state of that man shall be worse than the first; for if enlightened and released from our former sins we again return to the same course of wickedness, a heavier punishment will await our latter sins.

BEDE. It may also be simply understood, that our Lord added these words to shew the distinction between the works of Satan and His own, that in truth He is ever hastening to cleanse what has been defiled, Satan to defile with still greater pollution what has been cleansed.

11:27–28

27. And it came to pass, as he spake these things, a certain woman of the company lifted up her voice, and said unto him, Blessed is the womb that bare thee, and the paps which thou hast sucked.

28. But he said, Yea rather, blessed are they that hear the word of God, and keep it.

BEDE. While the Scribes and Pharisees were tempting our Lord, and uttering blasphemies against Him, a certain woman with great boldness confessed His incarnation, as it follows, And it came to pass, as he spake these things, a certain woman of the company lifted up her voice, and said unto him, Blessed is the womb that bare thee, &c. by which she refutes both the calumnies of the rulers present, and the unbelief of future heretics. For as then by blaspheming the works of the Holy Spirit, the Jews denied the true Son of God, so in after times the heretics, by denying that the

Evervirgin Mary, by the cooperating power of the Holy Spirit, ministered of the substance of her flesh to the birth of the only-begotten Son, have said, that we ought not to confess Him who was the Son of man to be truly of the same substance with the Father. But if the flesh of the Word of God, who was born according to the flesh, is declared alien to the flesh of His Virgin Mother, what cause is there why the womb which bare Him and the paps which gave Him suck are pronounced blessed? By what reasoning do they suppose Him to be nourished by her milk, from whose seed they deny Him to be conceived? Whereas according to the physicians, from one and the same fountain both streams are proved to flow. But the woman pronounces blessed not only her who was thought worthy to give birth from her body to the Word of God, but those also who have desired by the hearing of faith spiritually to conceive the same Word, and by diligence in good works, either in their own or the hearts of their neighbours, to bring it forth and nourish it; for it follows, But he said, Yea rather, blessed are they that hear the word of God, and keep it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 44. in Matt.) In this answer He sought not to disown His mother, but to shew that His birth would have profited her nothing, had she not been really fruitful in works and faith. But if it profited Mary nothing that Christ derived His birth from her, without the inward virtue of her heart, much less will it avail us to have a virtuous father, brother, or son, while we ourselves are strangers to virtue.

BEDE. But she was the mother of God, and therefore indeed blessed, in that she was made the temporal minister of the Word becoming incarnate; yet therefore much more blessed that she remained the eternal keeper of the same ever to be beloved Word. But this expression startles the wise men of the Jews, who sought not to hear and keep the word of God, but to deny and blaspheme it.

11:29–32

29. And when the people were gathered thick together, he began to say, This is an evil generation: they seek a sign; and there shall no sign be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet.

30. For as Jonas was a sign unto the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation.

31. The queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with the men of this generation, and condemn them; for she came from the utmost parts of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon; and, behold, a greater than Solomon is here.

32. The men of Nineve shall rise up in the judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it: for they repented at the preaching of Jonas; and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here.

BEDE. Our Lord had been assailed with two kinds of questions, for some accused Him of casting out devils through Beelzebub, to whom up to this point His answer was addressed; and others tempting Him, sought from Him a sign from heaven, and these He now proceeds to answer. As it follows, And when the people were gathered thick together, he began to say, This is an evil generation, &c.

AMBROSE. That you may know that the people of the Synagogue are treated with dishonour, while the blessedness of the Church is increased. But as Jonas was a sign to the Ninevites, so also will the Son of man be to the Jews. Hence it is added, They seek a sign; and there shall no sign be given them but the sign of Jonas the prophet.

BASIL. (in Esai. 7.) A sign is a thing brought openly to view, containing in itself the manifestation of something hidden, as the sign of Jonas represents the descent to hell, the ascension of Christ, and His resurrection from the dead. Hence it is added, For as Jonas was a sign to the Ninevites, so shall also the Son of man be to this generation. He gives them a sign, not from heaven, because they were unworthy to see it, but from the lowest depths of hell; a sign, namely, of His incarnation, not of His divinity; of His passion, not of His glorification.

AMBROSE. Now as the sign of Jonas is a type of our Lord’s passion, so also is it a testimony of the grievous sins which the Jews have committed. We may remark at once both the mighty voice of warning, and the declaration of mercy. For by the example of the Ninevites both a punishment is denounced, and a remedy promised. Hence even the Jews ought not to despair of pardon, if they will but practise repentance.

THEOPHYLACT. Now Jonas after he came forth from the whale’s belly converts the men of Nineveh by his preaching, but when Christ rose again, the Jewish nation believed not. So there was a sentence already passed upon them, of which there follows a second example, as it is said, The queen of the south shall rise up in the judgment with the men of this generation, and condemn them.

BEDE. Not certainly by any authority to judge, but by the contrast of a better deed. As it follows, For she came from the utmost parts of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon; and, behold, a greater than Solomon is here. Hie in this place is not the pronoun, but the adverb of place, that is, “there is one present among you who is incomparably superior to Solomon.” He said not, “I am greater than Solomon,” that he might teach us to be humble, though fruitful in spiritual graces. As if he said, “The barbarian woman hastened to hear Solomon, taking so long a journey to be instructed in the knowledge of visible living creatures, and the virtues of herbs. But ye when ye stand by and hear Wisdom herself teaching you invisible and heavenly things, and confirming her words with signs and wonders, are strangers to the word, and senselessly disregard the miracles.”

BEDE. But if the queen of the South, who doubtless is of the elect, shall rise up in judgment together with the wicked, we have a proof of the one resurrection of all men, good as well as bad, and that not according to Jewish fables to happen a thousand years before the judgment, but at the judgment itself.

AMBROSE. Herein also while condemning the Jewish people, He strongly expresses the mystery of the Church, which in the queen of the South, through the desire of obtaining wisdom, is gathered together from the uttermost parts of the whole earth, to hear the words of the Peacemaking Solomon; a queen plainly whose kingdom is undivided, rising up from different and distant nations into one body.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. 7. Cant.) Now as she was queen of the Ethiopians, and in a far distant country, so in the beginning the Church of the Gentiles was in darkness, and far off from the knowledge of God. But when Christ the Prince of peace shone forth, the Jews being still in darkness, thither came the Gentiles, and offered to Christ the frankincense of piety, the gold of divine knowledge, and precious stones, that is, obedience to His commands.

THEOPHYLACT. Or because the South is praised in Scripture as warm and life-giving, therefore the soul reigning in the south, that is, in all spiritual conversation, comes to hear the wisdom of Solomon, the Prince of peace, the Lord our God, (i. e. is raised up to contemplate Him,) to whom no one shall come except he reign in a good life. But He brings next an example from the Ninevites, saying, The men of Nineveh shall rise up in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) The judgment of condemnation comes from men like or unlike to those who are condemned. From like, for instance, as in the parable of the ten virgins, but from unlike, when the Ninevites condemn those who lived at the time of Christ, that so their condemnation might be the more remarkable. (Hom. 43. in Matt.). For the Ninevites indeed were barbarians, but these Jews. The one enjoying the prophetic teaching, the other having never received the divine word. To the former came a servant, to the latter the Master, of whom the one foretold destruction, the other preached the kingdom of heaven. To all men then was it known that the Jews ought rather to have believed, but the contrary happened; therefore he adds, For they repented at the preaching of Jonas, and, behold, a greater than Jonas is here.

AMBROSE. Now in a mystery, the Church consists of two things, either ignorance of sin, which has reference mainly to the queen of the South, or ceasing to sin, which relates indeed to the repentant Ninevites. For repentance blots out the offence, wisdom guards against it.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. lib. ii. c. 39.) Luke indeed relates this in the same place as Matthew, but in a somewhat different order. But who does not see that it is an idle question, in what order our Lord said those things, seeing that we ought to learn by the most precious authority of the Evangelist, that there is no falsehood. But not every man will repeat another’s words in the same order in which they proceeded from his mouth, seeing that the order itself makes no difference with respect to the fact, whether it be so or not.

11:33–36

33. No man, when he hath lighted a candle, putteth it in a secret place, neither under a bushel, but on a candlestick, that they which come in may see the light.

34. The light of the body is the eye: therefore when thine eye is single, thy whole body also is full of light; but when thine eye is evil, thy body also is full of darkness.

35. Take heed therefore that the light which is in thee be not darkness.

36. If thy whole body therefore be full of light, having no part dark, the whole shall be full of light, as when the bright shining of a candle doth give thee light.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Jews said, that our Lord performed His miracles not for faith, i. e. that they might believe on Him, but to gain the applause of the spectators, i. e. that He might have more followers. He refutes therefore this calumny, saying, No man, when he hath lighted a candle, putteth it in a secret place, neither under a bushel, but on a candlestick.

BEDE. Our Lord here speaks of Himself, shewing that although He had said above that no sign should be given to this wicked generation but the sign of Jonas, yet the brightness of His light should by no means be hid from the faithful. He Himself indeed lights the candle, who filled the vessel of our nature with the fire of His divinity; and this candle surely He wished neither to hide from believers, nor to place under a bushel, that is, enclose it in the measure of the law, or confine it within the limits of the single nation of the Jews. But He placed it upon a candlestick, that is, the Church, for He has imprinted on our foreheads the faith of His incarnation, that they who with a true faith wish to enter the Church, might be able to see clearly the light of the truth. Lastly, He bids them remember to cleanse and purify not only their works, but their thoughts, and the intentions of the heart. For it follows, The light of the body is the eye.

AMBROSE. Either faith is the light, as it is written, Thy word, O Lord, is a lantern to my feet. (Ps. 119:105.) For the word of God is our faith. But a lantern cannot shine except it has received its quality from something else. Hence also the powers of our mind and senses are enlightened, that the piece of money which had been lost may be found. Let no one then place faith under the law, for the law is bound by certain limits, grace is unlimited; the law obscures, grace makes clear.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, because the Jews, seeing the miracles, accused them out of the malice of their heart, therefore our Lord tells them, that, receiving the light, that is, their understanding, from God, they were so darkened with envy, as not to recognise His miracles and mercies. But to this end received we our understanding from God, that we should place it upon a candlestick, that others also who are entering in may see the light.

The wise man indeed has already entered, but the learner is still walking. As if He said to the Pharisees, You ought to use your understanding to know the miracles, and declare them to others, seeing that what you see are the works not of Beelzebub, but the Son of God. Therefore, keeping up the meaning, He adds, The light of the body is the eye.

ORIGEN. For He gives the name of the eye especially to our understanding, but the whole soul, although not corporeal, He metaphorically calls the body. For the whole soul is enlightened by the understanding.

THEOPHYLACT. But as if the eye of the body be light the body will be light, but if dark the body will be dark also, so is it with the understanding in relation to the soul. Hence it follows, If thine eye be single, thy whole body will be full of light; but if evil, thy whole body will be full of darkness.

ORIGEN. For the understanding from its very beginning desires only singleness, containing no dissimulation, or guile, or division in itself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 20. in Matt.) If then we have corrupted the understanding, which is able to let loose the passions, we have done violence to the whole soul, and suffer dreadful darkness, being blinded by the perversion of our understanding. Therefore adds he, Take heed, therefore, that the light which is in thee be not darkness. He speaks of a darkness which may be perceived, but which has its origin within itself, and which we every where carry about with us, the eye of the soul being put out. Concerning the power of this light He goes on to say, If thy whole body therefore be full of light, &c. &c.

ORIGEN. That is, If thy material body, when the light of a candle shines upon it, is made full of light, so that not one of thy members is any longer in darkness; much more when thou sinnest not, shall thy whole spiritual body be so full of light, that its brightness may be compared to the shining of a candle, while the light which was in the body, and which used to be darkness, is directed whithersoever the understanding may command.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Epist. 41.) Or else; The light and eye of the Church is the Bishop. It is necessary then that as the body is rightly directed as long as the eye keeps itself pure, but goes wrong when it becomes corrupt, so also with respect to the Prelate, according to what his state may be, must the Church in like manner suffer shipwreck, or be saved.

GREGORY. (28. Mor. c. 12.) Or else; By the name body each particular action is understood which follows its own intention, as it were the eye of the spectators. Therefore it is said, The light of the body is the eye, because by the ray of a good intention the deserving parts of an action receive light. If then thy eye be single, thy whole body will be full of light, for if we intend rightly in singleness of heart, we accomplish a good work, even though it seem not to be good. And if thy eye be evil, thy whole body will be full of darkness, because when with a crooked intention even a right thing is done, although it appears to glitter in men’s sight, yet before the bar of the internal judge it is covered with darkness. Hence too it is rightly added, Take heed therefore that the light which is in thee be not darkness. For if what we think we do well we cloud by a bad intention, how many are the evils themselves which even when we do them we know to be evil?

BEDE. Now when He adds, If thy whole body therefore, &c. by the whole of our body He means all our works. If then thou hast done a good work with a good intention, having in thy conscience nothing approaching to a dark thought, though it chance that thy neighbour is injured by thy good actions, nevertheless for thy singleness of heart shalt thou be rewarded with grace here, and with glorious light hereafter; which he signifies, adding, And as the bright shining of a candle shall it give thee light. These words were especially directed against the hypocrisy of the Pharisees, who sought for signs that they might catch him.

11:37–44

37. And as he spake, a certain Pharisee besought him to dine with him, and he went in, and sat down to meat.

38. And when the Pharisee saw it, he marvelled that he had not first washed before dinner.

39. And the Lord said unto him, Now do ye Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter; but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness.

40. Ye fools, did not he that made that which is without make that which is within also?

41. But rather give alms of such things as ye have; and, behold, all things are clean unto you.

42. But woe unto you, Pharisees! for ye tithe mint and rue and all manner of herbs, and pass over judgment and the love of God: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.

43. Woe unto you, Pharisees! for ye love the uppermost seats in the synagogues, and greetings in the markets.

44. Woe unto you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye are as graves which appear not, and the men that walk over them are not aware of them.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Pharisee, while our Lord still continued on speaking, invites Him to his own house. As it is said, And while he was speaking, a certain Pharisee besought him to dine with him.

BEDE. Luke expressly says, And as he spake these things, to shew that He had not quite finished what He had purposed to say, but was somewhat interrupted by the Pharisee asking Him to dine.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. lib. ii. c. 40.) For in order to relate this, Luke has made a variation from Matthew, at that place where both had mentioned what our Lord said concerning the sign of Jonah, and the queen of the south, and the unclean spirit; after which discourse Matthew says, While he yet talked to the people, behold his mother and his brethren stood without desiring to speak to him; but Luke having also in that discourse of our Lord related some of our Lord’s sayings which Matthew omitted, now departs from the order which he had hitherto kept with Matthew.

BEDE. Accordingly, after that it was told Him that His mother and brethren stood without, and He said, For he that doeth the will of God, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother, we are given to understand that He by the request of the Pharisee went to the dinner.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For Christ, knowing the wickedness of those Pharisees, Himself purposely condescends to be occupied in admonishing them, after the manner of the best physicians, who bring remedies of their own making to those who are dangerously ill. Hence it follows, And he went in and sat down to meat. But what gave occasion for the words of Christ was, that the ignorant Pharisees were offended, that while men thought Him to be a great man and a prophet, He conformed not to their unreasonable customs. Therefore it is added, But the Pharisee began to think and say within himself, Why had he not first washed before dinner?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 106.) For every day before dinner the Pharisees washed themselves with water, as if a daily washing could be a cleansing of the heart. But the Pharisee thought within himself, yet did not give utterance to a word; nevertheless, He heard who perceived the secrets of the heart. Hence it follows, And the Lord said unto him, Now do ye Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter; but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now our Lord might also have used other words to admonish the foolish Pharisee, but he seizes the opportunity and framed his reproof from the things that were ready before him. At the hour, namely, of meals He takes for His example the cup and the platter, pointing out that it became the sincere servants of God to be washed and clean, not only from bodily impurity, but also from that which lies concealed within the power of the soul, just as any of the vessels which are used for the table ought to be free from all inward defilement.

AMBROSE. Now mark that our bodies are signified by the mention of earthly and fragile things, which when let fall a short distance are broken to pieces, and those things which the mind meditates within, it easily expresses through the senses and actions of the body, just as those things which the cup contains within make a glitter without. Hence also hereafter, by the word cup doubtless the passion of the body is spoken of. You perceive then, that not the outside of the cup and platter defiles us, but the inner parts. For he said, But your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 106.) But how was it that He spared not the man by whom He was invited? Yea rather, He spared him by reproof, that when corrected He might spare him in the judgment. Further, He shews us that baptism also which is once given cleanses by faith; but faith is something within, not without. The Pharisees despised faith, and used washings which were without; while within they remained full of pollution. The Lord condemns this, saying, Ye fools, did not he that made that which is without make that which is within also?

BEDE. As if He says, He who made both natures of man, will have each to be cleansed. This is against the Manicheans, who think the soul only was created by God, but the flesh by the devil. It is also against those who abominate the sins of the flesh, such as fornication, theft, and the like; while those of the Spirit, which are no less condemned by the Apostle, they disregard as trifling.

AMBROSE. Now our Lord as a good Master taught us how we ought to purify our bodies from defilement, saying, But rather give alms of such things as ye have over: and, behold, all things are clean unto you. You see what the remedies are; almsgiving cleanseth us, the word of God cleanseth us, according to that which is written, Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you. (John 15:3.)

CYPRIAN. (de Op. et Eleem.) The Merciful bids us to shew mercy; and because He seeks to save those whom He has redeemed at a great price, He teaches that they who have been defiled after the grace of baptism may again be made clean.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 72. in Joan.) Now He says, give alms, not injury. For almsgiving is that which is free from all injury. It makes all things clean, and is more excellent than fasting; which though it be the more painful, the other is the more profitable. It enlightens the soul, enriches it, and makes it good and beautiful, He who resolves to have compassion on the needy, will sooner cease from sin. For as the physician who is in the habit of healing the diseased is easily grieved by the misfortunes of others; so we, if we have devoted ourselves to the relief of others, shall easily despise things present, and be raised up to heaven. The unction of almsgiving then is no slight good, since it is capable of being applied to every wound.

BEDE. (quod superest.) He speaks of “what is over and above” our necessary food and clothing. For you are not commanded to give alms so as to consume yourself by want, but that after satisfying your wants, you should supply the poor to the utmost of your power. Or it must be taken in this way. Do that which remains within your power, that is, which is the only remedy remaining to those who have been hitherto engaged in so much wickedness; give alms. Which word applies to every thing which is done with profitable compassion. For not he alone gives alms who gives food to the hungry and things of that kind, but he also who gives pardon to the sinner, and prays for him, and reproves him, visiting him with some correcting punishment.

THEOPHYLACT. Or He means, “That which is uppermost.” For wealth rules the covetous man’s heart.

AMBROSE. The whole then of this beautiful discourse is directed to this end, that while it invites us to the study of simplicity, it should condemn the luxury and worldliness of the Jews. And yet even they are promised the abolition of their sins if they will follow mercy.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 106.) But if they cannot be cleansed except they believe on Him who cleanses the heart by faith, what is this which He says, Give alms, and behold all things are clean to you? Let us give heed, and perhaps He Himself explains it to us.

For the Jews withdrew a tenth part from all their produce, and gave it in alms, which rarely a Christian does. Therefore they mocked Him, for saying this to them as to men who did not give alms. God knowing this adds, But woe unto you, Pharisees! for ye tithe mint and rue and all manner of herbs, and pass over judgment and the love of God. This then is not giving alms. For to give alms is to shew mercy. If thou art wise, begin with thyself: for how art thou merciful to another, if cruel to thyself? Hear the Scripture, which says unto thee, Have mercy on thy own soul, and please God. (Ecclus. 30:23.) Return unto thy conscience, thou that livest in evil or unbelief, and then thou findest thy soul begging, or perhaps struck dumb with want. In judgment and love give alms to thy soul. What is judgment? Do what is displeasing to thyself. What is charity? Love God, love thy neighbour. If thou neglectest this alms, love as much you like, thou doest nothing, since thou doest it not to thyself.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or He says it by way of censure upon the Pharisees, who ordered those precepts only to be strictly observed by their people, which were the cause of fruitful returns to themselves. Hence they omitted not even the smallest herbs, but despised the work of inspiring love to God, and the just awarding of judgment.

THEOPHYLACT. For because they despised God, treating sacred things with indifference, He commands them to have love to God; but by judgment He implies the love of our neighbour. For when a man judges his neighbour justly, it proceeds from his love to him.

AMBROSE. Or judgment, because they do not bring to examination every thing that they do; charity, because they love not God with their heart. But that He might not make us zealous of the faith, to the neglect of good works, He sums up the perfection of a good man in a few words, these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 73. in Matt.) Where indeed the subject treated was the Jewish cleansing, He altogether passed it by, but as the tithe is a kind of almsgiving, and the time was not yet come for absolutely destroying the customs of the law, therefore He says, these ought ye to have done.

AMBROSE. He reproves also the arrogance of the boasting Jews in seeking the preeminence: for it follows, Woe unto you, Pharisees, for ye love the uppermost seats in the synagogues, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. By means of those things for which He blames us He makes us better. For He would have us be free from ambition, and not desire after vain show rather than the reality, which the Pharisees were then doing. For the greetings of men, and the rule over them, do not move us to be really useful, for these things fall to men though they be not good men. Therefore he adds, Woe unto you, who are as graves which appear not. For in wishing to receive greetings from men and to exercise authority over them, that they might be accounted great, they differ not from hidden graves, which glitter indeed with outward ornaments, but within are full of all uncleanness.

AMBROSE. And like graves which appear not, they deceive by their outside beauty, and by their look impose upon the passers by; as it follows, And the men that walk over them are not aware of them; so much that in truth, though they give outward promise of what is beautiful, inwardly they enclose all manner of pollution.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 73.) But that the Pharisees were so, cannot be wondered at. But if we who are counted worthy to be the temples of God suddenly become graves full only of corruption, this is indeed the lowest wretchedness.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (con. Julian. lib. 10.) Now here the apostate Julian says, that we must avoid graves which Christ says are unclean; but he knew not the force of our Saviour’s words, for He did not command us to depart from the graves, but likened to them the hypocritical people of the Pharisees.

11:45–54

45. Then answered one of the Lawyers, and said unto him, Master, thus saying thou reproachest us also.

46. And he said, Woe unto you also, ye Lawyers! for ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with

one of your fingers.

47. Woe unto you! for ye build the sepulchres of the prophets, and your fathers killed them.

48. Truly ye bear witness that ye allow the deeds of your fathers: for they indeed killed them, and ye build their sepulchres.

49. Therefore also said the wisdom of God, I will send them prophets and apostles, and some of them they shall slay and persecute:

50. That the blood of all the prophets, which was shed from the foundation of the world, may be required of this generation;

51. From the blood of Abel unto the blood of Zacharias, which perished between the altar and the temple: verily I say unto you, It shall be required of this generation.

52. Woe unto you, Lawyers! for ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye enter not in yourselves, and them that were entering in ye hindered.

53. And as he said these things unto them, the Scribes and Pharisees began to urge him vehemently, and to provoke him to speak of many things:

54. Laying wait for him, and seeking to catch something out of his mouth, that they might accuse him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. A reproof which exalts the meek is generally hateful to the proud man. When therefore our Saviour was blaming the Pharisees for transgressing from the right path, the body of Lawyers were struck with consternation. Hence it is said, Then answered one of the Lawyers, and said unto him, Master, thus saying thou reproachest us also.

BEDE. In what a grievous state is that conscience, which hearing the word of God thinks it a reproach against itself, and in the account of the punishment of the wicked perceives its own condemnation.

THEOPHYLACT. Now the Lawyers were different from the Pharisees. For the Pharisees being separated from the rest had the appearance of a religious sect; but those skilled in the Law were the Scribes and Doctors who solved legal questions.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But Christ brings a severe charge against the Lawyers, and subdues their foolish pride, as it follows, And he said, Woe unto you also, ye Lawyers, for ye lade men, &c. He brings forward an obvious example for their direction. The Law was burdensome to the Jews as the disciples of Christ confess, but these Lawyers binding together legal burdens which could not be borne, placed them upon those under them, taking care themselves to have no toil whatever.

THEOPHYLACT. As often also as the teacher does what he teaches, he lightens the load, offering himself for an example. But when he does none of the things which he teaches others, the loads appear heavy to those who learn his teaching, as being what even their teacher is not able to bear.

BEDE. Now they are rightly told that they would not touch the burdens of the Law even with one of their fingers, that is, they fulfil not in the slightest point that law which they pretend to keep and transmit to the keeping of others, contrary to the practice of their fathers, without faith and the grace of Christ.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. So also are there now many severe judges of sinners, yet weak combatants; burdensome imposers of laws, yet weak bearers of burdens; who wish neither to approach nor to touch strictness of life, though they sternly exact it from their subjects.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Having then condemned the burdensome dealing of the Lawyer, He brings a general charge against all the chief men of the Jews, saying, Woe to you who build the tombs of the prophets, and your fathers killed them.

AMBROSE. This is a good answer to the foolish superstition of the Jews, who in building the tombs of the prophets condemned the deeds of their fathers, but by rivalling their fathers' wickedness, throw back the sentence upon themselves. For not the building but the imitation of their deeds is looked upon as a crime. Therefore He adds, Truly ye bear witness that ye allow, &c.

BEDE. They pretended indeed, in order to win the favour of the multitude, that they were shocked at the unbelief of their fathers, since by splendidly honouring the memories of the prophets who were slain by them they condemned their deeds. But in their very actions they testify how much they coincide with their fathers' wickedness, by treating with insult that Lord whom the prophets foretold. Hence it is added, Therefore also said the wisdom of God, I will send them prophets and apostles, and some of them they shall slay and persecute.

AMBROSE. The wisdom of God is Christ. The words indeed in Matthew are, Behold I send unto you prophets and wise men.

BEDE. But if the same Wisdom of God sent prophets and Apostles, let heretics cease to assign to Christ a beginning from the Virgin; let them no longer declare one God of the Law and Prophets, another of the New Testament. For although the Apostolic Scripture often calls by the name of prophets not only those who foretell the coming Incarnation of Christ, but those also who foretell the future joys of the kingdom of heaven, yet I should never suppose that these were to be placed before the Apostles in the order of enumeration.

ATHANASIUS. (Apol. 1. de fuga sua.) Now if they kill, the death of the slain will cry out the louder against them; if they pursue, they send forth memorials of their iniquity, for flight makes the pursuit of the sufferers to redound to the great disgrace of the pursuers. For no one flees from the merciful and gentle, but rather from the cruel and evil-minded man. And therefore it follows, That the blood of all the prophets who have been slain from the foundation of the world may be required of this generation.

BEDE. It is asked, How comes it that the blood of all the prophets and just men is required of the single generation of the Jews; whereas many of the saints, both before the Incarnation and after, have been slain by other nations? But it is the manner of the Scriptures frequently to reckon two generations of men, one of the good, and the other of the evil.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Although then He says pointedly of this generation, He expresses not merely those who were then standing by Him and listening, but every manslayer. For like is attributed to like.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 74. in Matt.) But if He means that the Jews are about to suffer worse things, this will not be undeserved, for they have dared to do worse than all. And they have been corrected by none of their past calamities, but when they saw others sin, and punished, they were not made better, but did likewise; yet it will not be that one shall suffer punishment for the sins of others.

THEOPHYLACT. But our Lord shews that the Jews have inherited the malice of Cain, since he adds, From the blood of Abel, to the blood of Zacharias, &c. Abel, inasmuch as he was slain by Cain; but Zacharias, whom they slew between the temple and the altar, some say was the Zacharias of old time, the son of Jehoiadah the Priest.

BEDE. Why He begins from the blood of Abel, who was the first martyr, we need not wonder; but why, to the blood of Zacharias, is a question, since many were slain after him even up to our Lord’s birth, and soon after His birth the Innocents, unless perhaps it was because Abel was a shepherd, Zacharias a Priest. And the one was killed in the field, the other in the court of the temple, martyrs of each class, that is, under their names are shadowed both laymen, and those engaged in the office of the altar.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. in Diem Nat. Christi.) But some say that Zacharias, the father of John, by the spirit of prophecy forecasting the mystery of the immaculate virginity of the mother of God, in no wise separated her from the part of the temple set apart for virgins, wishing to shew that it was in the power of the Creator of all things to manifest a new birth, while he did not deprive the mother of the glory of her virginity. Now this part was between the altar and the temple, in which was placed the brazen altar, where for this reason they slew him. It is said also, that when they heard the King of the world was about to come, from fear of subjection they designedly attacked him who bore witness to His coming, and slew the priest in the temple.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Geometer.) But others give another reason for the destruction of Zacharias. For at the murder of the children the blessed John was to be slain with the rest of the same age, but Elisabeth, snatching up her son from the midst of the slaughter, sought the desert. And so when Herod’s soldiers could not find Elisabeth and the child, they turn their wrath against Zacharias, killing him as he was ministering in the temple.

It follows, Woe to you, lawyers, for ye have taken away the key of knowledge.

BASIL. (in Esai. 1.) This word woe, which is uttered with pain intolerable, is suited to those who were shortly after to be cast out into grievous punishment.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now we say, the law itself is the key of knowledge. For it was both a shadow and a figure of the righteousness of Christ, therefore it became the Lawyers, as instructors of the Law of Moses and the words of the Prophets, to reveal in a certain measure to the Jewish people the knowledge of Christ. This they did not, but on the contrary detracted from the divine miracles, and spoke against His teaching, Why hear ye him? So then they took away the key of knowledge. Hence it follows, Ye entered not in yourselves, and them that were entered in ye hindered. But faith also is the key of knowledge. For by faith comes also the knowledge of truth, according to that of Isaiah, Unless ye have believed, ye will not understand. (Isa. 7:9. LXX.) The Lawyers then have taken away the key of knowledge, not permitting men to believe in Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (de qu. Ev. l. ii. q. 23.) But the key of knowledge is also the humility of Christ, which they would neither themselves understand, nor let be understood by others.

AMBROSE. Those also are even now condemned under the name of Jews, and made subject to future punishment, who, while usurping to themselves the teaching of divine knowledge, both hinder others, and do not themselves acknowledge that which they profess.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. lib. ii. c. 75.) Now all these things Matthew records to have been said after our Lord had come into Jerusalem. But Luke relates them here, when our Lord was yet on His journey to Jerusalem. From which they appear to me to be similar discourses, of which Matthew has given one, Luke the other.

BEDE. But how true were the charges of unbelief, hypocrisy, and impiety, brought against the Pharisees and Lawyers they themselves testify, striving not to repent, but to entrap the Teacher of truth; for it follows, And as he said these things to them, the Pharisees and Lawyers began to urge him vehemently.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now this urging is taken to mean pressing upon Him, or threatening Him, or waxing furious against Him. But they began to interrupt His words in many ways, as it follows, And to force him to speak of many things.

THEOPHYLACT. For when several are questioning a man on different subjects, since he can not reply to all at once, foolish people think he is doubting. This also was part of their wicked design against Him; but they sought also in another way to control His power of speech, namely, by provoking Him to say something by which He might be condemned; whence it follows, Laying in wait for him, and seeking to catch something out of his mouth, that they might accuse him. Having first spoken of “forcing,” Luke now says to catch or seize something from His mouth; at one time indeed they asked Him concerning the Law, that they might convict as a blasphemer Him who accused Moses; but at another time concerning Cæsar, that they might accuse Him as a traitor and rebel against the majesty of Cæsar.

CHAPTER 12

12:1–3

1. In the mean time, when there were gathered together an innumerable multitude of people, insomuch that they trode one upon another, he began to say unto his disciples first of all, Beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy.

2. For there is nothing covered, that shall not be revealed; neither hid, that shall not be known.

3. Therefore whatsoever ye have spoken in darkness shall be heard in the light; and that which ye have spoken in the ear in closets shall be proclaimed upon the housetops.

THEOPHYLACT. The Pharisees sought indeed to catch Jesus in His talk, that they might lead away the people from Him. But this design of theirs is reversed. For the people came all the more unto Him gathered together by thousands, and so desirous to attach themselves to Christ, that they pressed one upon another. So mighty a thing is truth, so feeble every where deceit. Whence it is said, And when there were gathered together a great multitude, insomuch that they trode upon one another, he began to sag unto his disciples, Beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For they were false accusers; therefore Christ warned His disciples against them.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. When leaven is praised it is as composing the bread of life, but when blamed it signifies a lasting and bitter maliciousness.

THEOPHYLACT. He calls their hypocrisy leaven, as perverting and corrupting the intentions of the men in whom it has sprung up. For nothing so changes the characters of men as hypocrisy.

BEDE. For as a little leaven leaveneth a whole lump of meal, (1 Cor. 5:6.) so hypocrisy will rob the mind of all the purity and integrity of its virtues.

AMBROSE. Our Lord has introduced a most forcible argument for preserving simplicity, and being zealous for the faith, that we should not after the manner of faithless Jews put one thing in practice, while in words we pretend another, namely, that at the last day the hidden thoughts accusing or else excusing one another, shall be seen to reveal the secrets of our mind. Whence it is added, There is nothing hid which shall not be revealed.

ORIGEN. He either then says this concerning that time when God shall judge the secrets of men, or He says it because however much a man may endeavour to hide the good deeds of another by discredit, good of its own nature cannot be concealed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 34. in Matt.) As if He says to His disciples, Although now some call you deceivers and wizards, time shall reveal all things and convict them of calumny, while it makes known your virtue. Therefore whatsoever things I have spoken to you in the small corner of Palestine, these boldly and with open brow, casting away all fear, proclaim to the whole world. And therefore He adds, Whatsoever ye have spoken in darkness shall be heard in light.

BEDE. Or He says this, because all the things which the Apostles of old spoke and suffered amid the darkness of oppression and the gloom of the prison, arc now that the Church is made known through the world and their acts are read, publicly proclaimed. The words, shall be proclaimed on the housetops, are spoken according to the manner of the country of Palestine, where they are accustomed to live on the housetops. For their roofs were not after our way raised to a point, but flat shaped, and level at the top. Therefore He says, proclaimed on the housetops; that is, spoken openly in the hearing of all men.

THEOPHYLACT. Or this is addressed to the Pharisees; as if He said, O Pharisees, what you have spoken in darkness, that is, all your endeavours to tempt me in the secrets of your hearts, shall be heard in the light, for I am the light, and in My light shall be known whatsoever your darkness devises. And what you have spoken in the ear and in closets, that is, whatsoever in whispers you have poured into one another’s ears, shall be proclaimed on the housetops, that is, was as audible to me as if it had been cried aloud on the housetops. Herein also you may understand that the light is the Gospel, but the housetop the lofty souls of the Apostles. But whatever things the

Pharisees plotted together, were afterwards divulged and heard in the light of the Gospel, the great Herald, the Holy Spirit, presiding over the souls of the Apostles.

12:4–7

4. And I say unto you my friends, Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do.

5. But I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: Fear him, which after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell; yea, I say unto you, Fear him.

6. Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings, and not one of them is forgotten before God?

7. But even the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Fear not therefore: ye are of more value than many sparrows.

AMBROSE. Since unbelief springs from two causes, either from a deeply-seated malice or a sudden fear; lest any one from terror should be compelled to deny the God whom he acknowledges in his heart, He well adds, And I say unto you my friends, Be not afraid of them that kill the body, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For it is not absolutely to every one that this discourse seems to apply, but to those who love God with their whole heart to whom it belongs to say, Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? (Rom. 8:3.) But they who are not such, are tottering, and ready to fall down. Moreover our Lord says, Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. (John 15:13.) How then is it not most ungrateful to Christ not to repay Him what we receive?

AMBROSE. He tells us also, that that death is not terrible for which at a far more costly rate of interest immortality is to be purchased.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. We must then consider that crowns and honours are prepared for the labours of those upon whom men are continually venting forth their indignation, and to them the death of the body is the end of their persecutions. Whence He adds, And after this have nothing more that they can do.

BEDE. Their rage then is but useless raving, who cast the lifeless limbs of martyrs to be torn in pieces by wild beasts and birds, seeing that they can in no wise prevent the omnipotence of God from quickening and bringing them to life again.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 22. in Matt.) Observe how our Lord makes His disciples superior to all, by exhorting them to despise that very death which is terrible to all. At the same time also he brings them proofs of the immortality of the soul: adding, I will forewarn you whom ye shall fear: fear him, which after he hath killed hath power to cast into hell.

AMBROSE. For our natural death is not the end of punishment: and therefore He concludes that death is the cessation of bodily punishment, but the punishment of the soul is everlasting. And God alone is to be feared, to whose power nature prescribes not, but is herself subject; adding, Yea, I say unto you, Fear him.

THEOPHYLACT. Here observe, that upon sinners death is sent as a punishment, since they are here tormented by destruction, and afterwards thrust down into hell. But if you will sift the words you will understand something farther. For He says not, “Who casts into hell,” but has power to cast. For not every one dying in sin is forthwith thrust down into hell, but there is sometimes pardon given for the sake of the offerings and prayers which are made for the deada.

AMBROSE. Our Lord then had instilled the virtue of simplicity, had awakened a courageous spirit. Their faith alone was wavering, and well did He strengthen it by adding with respect to things of less value, Are not five sparrows sold for two farthings? and not one of them is forgotten before God. As if He said, If God forgets not the sparrows, how can He man?

BEDE. The dipondius is a coin of the lightest weight, and equal to two asses.

GLOSS. (ordin.) Now that which in number is one is in weight an ass, but that which is two is a dipondius.

AMBROSE. But perhaps some one will say, How is it that the Apostle says, Does the Lord care for oxen? (1 Cor. 9:9.) whereas an ox is of more value than a sparrow; but to care for is one thing, to have knowledge another.

ORIGEN. Literally, hereby is signified the quickness of the Divine foresight, which reaches even to the least things. But mystically, the five sparrows justly represent the spiritual senses, which have perception of high and heavenly things: beholding God, hearing the Divine voice, tasting of the bread of life, smelling the perfume of Christ's anointing, handling the Word of Life. And these being sold for two farthings, that is, being lightly esteemed by those who count as perishing whatever is of the Spirit, are not forgotten before God. But God is said to be forgetful of some because of their iniquities.

THEOPHYLACT. Or these five senses are sold for two farthings, that is, the New and Old Testament, and are therefore not forgotten by God. Of those whose senses are given up to the word of life that they may be fit for the spiritual food, the Lord is ever mindful.

AMBROSE. Or else; A good sparrow is one which nature has furnished with the power of flying; for nature has given us the grace of flying, pleasure has taken it away, which loads with meats the soul of the wicked, and moulds it towards the nature of a fleshly mass. The five senses of the body then, if they seek the food of earthly alloy, cannot fly back to the fruits of higher actions. A bad sparrow therefore is one which has lost its habit of flying through the fault of earthly grovelling; such are those sparrows which are sold for two farthings, namely, at the price of worldly luxury. For the enemy sets up his, as it were, captive slaves, at the very lowest price. But the Lord, being the fit judge of His own work, has redeemed at a great price us, His noble servants, whom He hath made in His own image.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It is His care then diligently to know the life of the saints. Whence it follows, But the hairs of your heads are all numbered; by which He means, that of all things which relate to them He has most accurate knowledge, for the numbering manifests the minuteness of the care exercised.

AMBROSE. Lastly, the numbering of the hairs is not to be taken with reference to the act of reckoning, but to the capability of knowing. Yet they are well said to be numbered, because those things which we wish to preserve we number.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now mystically, indeed, the head of a man is his understanding, but his hairs the thoughts, which are open to the eye of God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, by the head of each of the faithful, you must understand a conversation meet for Christ, but by his hair, the works of bodily mortification which are numbered by God, and are worthy of the Divine regard.

AMBROSE. If then such is the majesty of God, that a single sparrow or the number of our hair is not beside His knowledge, how unworthy is it to suppose that the Lord is either ignorant of the hearts of the faithful, or despises them so as to account them of less value. Hence He proceeds to conclude, Fear not then, ye are of more value than many sparrows.

BEDE. We must not read, Ye are more, which relates to the comparison of number, but ye are of more value, that is, of greater estimation in the sight of God.

ATHANASIUS. (pluris estis) Now I ask the Arians, if God, as if disdaining to make all other things, made only His Son, but deputed all things to His Son; how is it that He extends His providence even to such trifling things as our hair, and the sparrows? For upon whatever things He exercises His providence, of these is He the Creator by His own word.

12:8–12

8. Also I say unto you, Whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God:

9. But he that denieth me before men shall be denied before the angels of God.

10. And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of man, it shall be forgiven him: but unto him that blasphemeth against the Holy Ghost it shall not be forgiven.

11. And when they bring you unto the synagogues, and unto magistrates, and powers, take ye no thought how or what thing ye shall answer, or what ye shall say:

12. For the Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say.

BEDE. It was said above, that every hidden work and word is to be revealed, but He now declares that this revelation is to take place in the presence of the heavenly city and the eternal Judge and King; saying, But I say unto you, Whosoever shall confess me, &c.

AMBROSE. He has also well introduced faith, stimulating us to its confession, and to faith itself He has placed virtue as a foundation. For as faith is the incentive to fortitude, so is fortitude the strong support of faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 34. in Matt.) The Lord is not then content with an inward faith, but requires an outward confession, urging us to confidence and greater love. And since this is useful for all, He speaks generally, saying, Whosoever shall confess me, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now Paul says, If thou wilt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. (Rom. 10:9.) The whole mystery of Christ is conveyed in these words. For we must first confess that the Word born of God the Father, that is, the only-begotten Son of His substance, is Lord of all, not as one who had gained His Lordship from without and by stealth, but who is in truth by His nature Lord, as well as the Father. Next we must confess that God raised Him from the dead, who was Himself truly made man, and suffered in the flesh for us; for such He rose from the dead. Whoever then will so confess Christ before men, namely, as God and the Lord, Christ will confess him before the angels of God at that time when He shall descend with the holy angels in the glory of His Father at the end of the world.

EUSEBIUS. But what will be more glorious than to have the only-begotten Word of God Himself to bear witness in our behalf at the divine judgment, and by His own love to draw forth as a recompense for confession, a declaration upon that soul to whom He bears witness, For not as abiding without him to whom He bears witness, but as dwelling in him and filling him with light, He will give His testimony. But having confirmed them with good hope by so great promises, He again rouses them by more alarming threats, saying, But he that denieth me before men, shall be denied before the Angels of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Both in condemnation a greater punishment is announced, and in blessing a greater reward; as if He said, Now you confess and deny, but I then, for a far greater recompense of good and evil awaits them in the world to come.

EUSEBIUS. He rightly declares this threatening, in order that none should refuse to confess Him by reason of the punishment, which is to be denied by the Son of God, to be disowned by Wisdom, to fall away from life, to be deprived of light, and to lose every blessing; but all these things to suffer before God the Father who is in heaven, and the Angels of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now they who deny are first indeed those who in time of persecution renounce the faith. Besides these, there are heretical teachers also, and their disciples.

CHRYSOSTOM. There are other modes also of denying which St. Paul describes, saying, They profess that they know God, but in works they deny him. (Tit. 1:16.) And again, If any provide not for his own, and specially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel. (1 Tim. 5:8.) Also, Flee from covetousness, which is idolatry. (Col. 3:5.) Since then there are so many modes of denial, it is plain that there are many likewise of confession, which whosoever has practised, shall hear that most blessed voice with which Christ greets all who have confessed Him. But mark the precaution of the words. For in the Greek he says, Whosoever shall confess in Me, shewing that not by his own strength, but by the aid of grace from above, a man confesses Christ. But of him who denies, He said not "in Me," but me. For though being destitute of grace he denies, he is nevertheless condemned, because the destitution is owing to him who is forsaken, or he is forsaken for his own fault.

BEDE. But lest from what He says, that those who have denied Him are to be denied, it should be supposed that the condition of all was alike, that is, both of those who deny deliberately, and those who deny from infirmity or ignorance, He immediately added, And whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But if our Saviour means to imply, that if any injurious word is spoken by us against a common man, we shall obtain pardon if we repent, there is no difficulty in the passage, for since God is by nature merciful, He restores those who are willing to repent. But if the words are referred to Christ how is he not to be condemned who speaks a word against Him?

AMBROSE. Truly by the Son of Man we understand Christ, Who by the Holy Spirit was born of a virgin, seeing that His only parent on earth is the Virgin. What then, is the Holy Spirit greater than Christ, that they who sin against Christ should obtain pardon, while they who offend against the Holy Spirit are not thought worthy to obtain it? But where there is unity of power there is no question of comparison.

ATHANASIUS. (Ep. 4. ad Serap.) The ancients indeed, the learned Origen and the great Theognostus, describe this to be the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, when they who have been counted worthy of the gift of the Holy Spirit in Baptism, fall back into sin. For they say that for this reason they can not obtain pardon; as Paul says, It is impossible for those who have been made partakers of the Holy Ghost to renew them again, &c. (Heb. 6:4.)

But each adds his own explanation. For Origen gives this as his reason; God the Father indeed penetrates and contains all things, but the power of the Son extends to rational things only; the Holy Spirit is only in those who partake of Him in the gift of Baptism. When then catechumens and heathens sin, they sin against the Son who abideth in them, yet they may obtain pardon when they become worthy of the gift of regeneration. But when the baptized commit sin, he says that their offence touches the Spirit, after coming to whom they have sinned, and therefore their condemnation must be irrevocable.

But Theognostus says, that he who has gone beyond both the first and second threshold deserves less punishment, but he who has also passed the third, shall no more receive pardon. By the first and second threshold, he speaks of the doctrine of the Father and the Son, but by the third the partaking of the Holy Spirit. According to St. John, When the Spirit of truth is come, he will lead you into all truth. (John 16:13.) Not as though the doctrine of the Spirit was above that of the Son, but because the Son condescends to those who are imperfect, but the Spirit is the seal of those who are perfect. If then not because the Spirit is above the Son, blasphemy against the Spirit is unpardonable; but because remission of sin is indeed to the imperfect, but no excuse remains to the perfect, therefore since the Son is in the Father, He is in those in whom the Father and the Spirit are not absent, for the Holy Trinity cannot be divided. Besides this, if all things were made by the Son, and all things consist in Him, He will Himself be truly in all; so that it must needs be, that he who sinneth against the Son, sinneth against the Father also, and against the Holy Spirit. But holy Baptism is given in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. And so they that sin after baptism commit blasphemy against the holy Trinity. But if the Pharisees had not received baptism, how did He condemn them as if they had spoken blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, of which they were not yet partakers, especially since He did not accuse them simply of sin, but of blasphemy? But these differ, for he who sins transgresses the Law, but he who blasphemes offends against the Deity Himself. But again, if to those who sin after baptism there is no remission of the punishment of their offences, how does the Apostle pardon the penitent at Corinth; (2 Cor. 11:10) but he travails in birth of the backsliding Galatians until Christ be formed again in them. (Gal. 4:19.)

And why also do we oppose Novatus, who does away with repentance after baptism? The Apostle to the Hebrews does not thus reject the repentance of sinners, but lest they should suppose that as according to the rites of the Law, under the veil of repentance there could be many and daily baptisms, he therefore warns them indeed to repent, but tells them that there could be only one renewal, namely, by Baptism. But with such considerations I return to the dispensation (οἰκονομίαν) which is in Christ, who being God was made man; as very God raised the dead; as clothed with the flesh, thirsted, laboured, suffered. When any then, looking to human things, see the Lord athirst or in suffering, and speak against the Saviour as if against a man, they sin indeed, yet may speedily on repentance receive pardon, alleging as excuse the weakness of His body. And again when any, beholding the works of Deity, doubt concerning the nature of our Lord’s body, they also sin grievously. But these too if they repent may be quickly pardoned, seeing that they have an excuse in the greatness of the works. But when they refer the works of God to the Devil, justly do they undergo the irrevocable sentence, because they have judged God to be the Devil, and the true God to have nothing more in His works than the evil spirits. To this unbelief then the Pharisees had come. For when the Saviour manifested the works of the Father, raising the dead, giving sight to the blind, and such like deeds, they said that these were the works of Beelzebub. As well might they say, looking at the order of the world and the providence exercised over it, that the world was created by Beelzebub. As long then as regarding human things they erred in knowledge, saying, Is not this the carpenter’s son, and how knoweth this man things which he never learnt? He suffered them as sinning against the Son of man; but when they wax more furious, saying that the works of God are the works of Beelzebub, He no longer endured them. For thus also He endured their fathers so long as their murmurings were for bread and water; but when having found a calf, they impute to it the divine mercies they had received, they were punished. At first indeed multitudes of them were slain, afterwards He said indeed, Nevertheless, in the day when I visit I will visit their sin upon them. (Exod. 32:34.) Such then is the sentence passed upon the Pharisees, that in the flame prepared for the devil they shall be together with him everlastingly consumed. Not then to make comparison between a blasphemy spoken against Himself and the Holy Spirit said He these things, as if the Spirit were the greater, but each blasphemy being uttered against Him, He shews the one to be greater, the other less. For looking at Him as man they reviled Him, and said that His works were those of Beelzebub.

AMBROSE. Thus it is thought by some that we should believe both the Son and the Holy Spirit to be the same Christ, preserving the distinction of Persons with the unity of the substance, since Christ both God and man is one Spirit, as it is written, The Spirit before our face, Christ the Lord; (Lam. 4:20.) the same Spirit is holy, for both the Father is holy, and the Son holy, and the Spirit holy. If then Christ is each, what difference is there except we know that it is not lawful for us to deny the divinay of Christ?

BEDE. Or else; Whoso saith that the works of the Holy Spirit are those of Beelzebub, it shall not be forgiven him either in the present world, or in that which is to come. Not that we deny that if he could come to repentance he could be forgiven by God, but that we believe that such a blasphemer as by the necessity of his deserts he would never come to forgiveness, so neither to the fruits themselves of a worthy repentance; according to that, He hath blinded their eyes, so that they should not be converted, and I should heal them. (Isa. 6:10.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But if the Holy Spirit were a creature, and not of the divine substance of the Father and the Son, how does an injury committed against Him entail upon it so great a punishment as is denounced against those that blaspheme against God?

BEDE. Nor however are all they who say that the Spirit is not holy, or is not God, but is inferior to the Father and the Son, involved in the crime of unpardonable blasphemy, because they are led to do it through human ignorance, not a demoniacal hatred, as the rulers of the Jews were.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 71.) Or if it were here said, “Who hath spoken any blasphemy whatever against the Holy Spirit,” we ought then to understand thereby “all blasphemy;” but because it was said, who blasphemeth against the Holy Spirit, let it be understood of him that blasphemed not in any way, but in such a manner that it can never be pardoned him. For so when it was said, The Lord tempteth no man, (James 1:13.) that is not spoken of every, but only of a certain kind of temptation. Now what that kind of blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is, let us sec. The first blessing of believers is forgiveness of sins in the Holy Spirit. Against this free gift the impenitent heart speaks. Impenitence itself therefore is blasphemy against the Spirit, which is neither forgiven in this world, nor in that which is to come; for repentance gains that forgiveness in this world which is to avail in the world to come.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the Lord after having inspired such great fear, and prepared men to resist those who depart from a right confession, commanded them for the rest to take no care what they should answer, because for those who are faithfully disposed, the Holy Spirit frames fit words, as their teacher, and dwelling within them. Whence it follows, And when they shall bring you into synagogues, take no thought how or what ye shall answer.

GLOSS. (inter.) Now he says, how, with respect to the manner of speaking, what, with respect to the manner of intention. How ye shall answer to those who ask, or what ye shall say to those who wish to learn.

BEDE. For when we are led for Christ’s sake before judges, we ought to offer only our will for Christ, but in answering, the Holy Spirit will supply His grace, as it is added, For the Holy Spirit will leach you, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 33. in Matt.) But elsewhere it is said, Be ready to answer every one who shall ask you for a reason of the hope that is in you. When indeed a contest or strife arises among friends, He bids us take thought, but when there are the terrors of a court of justice and fear on every side, He gives His own strength so as to inspire boldness and utterance, but not dismay.

THEOPHYLACT. Since then our weakness is twofold, and either from fear of punishment we shun martyrdom, or because we are ignorant and can not give a reason of our faith, he has excluded both; the fear of punishment in that He said, Fear not them which kill the body, but the fear of ignorance, when He said, Take no thought how or what ye shall answer, &c.

12:13–15

13. And one of the company said unto him, Master, speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me.

14. And he said unto him, Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?

15. And he said unto them, Take heed, and beware of covetousness: for a man’s life consisteth not in the abundance of the things which he possesseth.

AMBROSE. The whole of the former passage is given to prepare us for undergoing suffering for confessing the Lord, or for contempt of death, or for the hope of reward, or for denunciation of the punishment that will await him to whom pardon will never be granted. And since covetousness is generally wont to try virtue, for destroying this also, a precept and example is added, as it is said, And one of the company said to him, Speak to my brother, that he divide the inheritance with me.

THEOPHYLACT. As these two brothers were contending concerning the division of their paternal inheritance, it follows, that one meant to defraud the other; but our Lord teaches us that we ought not to be set on earthly things, and rebukes him that called Him to the division of inheritance; as it follows, And he said unto him, Man, who made me a judge or a divider over you?

BEDE. He who wills to impose the trouble of division of lands upon the Master who is commending the joys of heavenly peace, is rightly called man, according to that, whereas there is envying, strife, and divisions among you, are ye not men? (1 Cor. 3:3.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now the Son of God, when He was made like unto us, was appointed by God the Father to be King and Prince upon his holy Mount of Sion, to make known the Divine command.

AMBROSE. Well then does He avoid earthly things who had descended for the sake of divine things, and deigns not to be a judge of strifes and arbiter of laws, having the judgment of the quick and dead and the recompensing of works. You should consider then, not what you seek, but from whom you ask it; and you should not eagerly suppose that the greater are to be disturbed by the less. Therefore is this brother deservedly disappointed who desired to occupy the steward of heavenly things with corruptible, seeing that between brothers no judge should intervene, but natural affection should be the umpire to divide the patrimony, although immortality not riches should be the patrimony which men should wait for.

BEDE. He takes occasion from this foolish petitioner to fortify both the multitudes and His disciples alike by precept and example against the plague of covetousness. Whence it follows, He said to them, Take heed, and beware of all covetousness; and he says, of all, because some things seem to be honestly done, but the internal judge decides with what intention they are done.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or he says, of all covetousness, that is, great and little. For covetousness is unprofitable, as the Lord says, Ye shall build houses of hewn stone, and shall not dwell in them. (Amos 5:11, Isa. 5:10.) And elsewhere, Yea ten acres of vineyards shall yield one bath, and the seed of an homer shall yield an ephah. But also in another way it is unprofitable, as he shews, adding, For a man’s life consisteth not in the abundance, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. This our Lord says to rebuke the motives of the covetous, who seem to heap up riches as if they were going to live for a long time. But will wealth ever make thee long lived? Why then dost thou manifestly undergo evils for the sake of an uncertain rest? For it is doubtful whether thou oughtest to attain to an old age, for the sake of which thou art collecting treasures.

12:16–21

16. And he spake a parable unto them, saying, The ground of a certain rich man brought forth plentifully:

17. And he thought within himself, saying, What shall I do, because I have no room where to bestow my fruits?

18. And he said, This will I do: I will pull down my barns, and build greater; and there will I bestow all my fruits and my goods.

19. And I will say to my soul, Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years; take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry.

20. But God said unto him, Thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee: then whose shall those things be, which thou hast provided?

21. So is he that layeth up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God.

THEOPHYLACT. Having said that the life of man is not extended by abundance of wealth, he adds a parable to induce belief in this, as it follows, And he spake a parable unto them, saying, The ground of a certain rich man brought forth plentifully.

BASIL. (in Hom. de Avar.) Not indeed about to reap any good from his plenty of fruits, but that the mercy of God might the more appear, which extends its goodness even to the bad; sending down His rain upon the just and the unjust. But what are the things wherewith this man repays his Benefactor? He remembered not his fellow-creatures, nor deemed that he ought to give of his superfluities to the needy. His barns indeed bursting from the abundance of his stores, yet was his greedy mind by no means satisfied. He was unwilling to put up with his old ones because of his covetousness, and not able to undertake new ones because of the number, for his counsels were imperfect, and his care barren. Hence it follows, And he thought. His complaint is like that of the poor. Does not the man oppressed with want say, What shall I do, whence can I get food, whence clothing? Such things also the rich man utters. For his mind is distressed on account of his fruits pouring out from his storehouse, lest perchance when they have come forth they should profit the poor; like the glutton who had rather burst from eating, than give any thing of what remains to the starving.

GREGORY. (Mor. 15. c. 13.) O adversity, the child of plenty. For saying, What shall I do, he surely betokens, that, oppressed by the success of his wishes, he labours as it were under a load of goods.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) It was easy for him to say, I will open my barn, I will call together the needy, but he has no thought of want, only of amassing; for it follows, And he said, This will I do, I will pull down my barns. Thou doest well, for the storehouses of iniquity are worthy of destruction. Pull down thy barns, from which no one receives comfort. He adds, I will build greater. But thou shalt complete these, wilt thou again destroy them? What more foolish than labouring on for ever. Thy barns, if thou wilt, are the home of the poor. But thou wilt say, Whom do I wrong by keeping what is my own? For it follows also, And there will I bestow all my fruits and my goods. Tell me what is thine, from whence didst thou get it and bring it into life? As he who anticipates the public games, injures those who are coming by appropriating to himself what is appointed for the common use, so likewise the rich who regard as their own the common things which they have forestalled. For if every one receiving what is sufficient for his own necessity would leave what remains to the needy, there would be no rich or poor.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Observe also in another respect the folly of his words, when he says, I will gather all my fruits, as if he thought that he had not obtained them from God, but that they were the fruits of his own labours.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) But if thou confessest that those things have come to thee from God, is God then unjust in distributing to us unequally. Why dost thou abound while another begs? unless that thou shouldest gain the rewards of a good stewardship, and be honoured with the meed of patience. Art not thou then a robber, for counting as thine own what thou hast received to distribute? It is the bread of the famished which thou receivest, the garment of the naked which rots in thy possession, the money of the pennyless which thou hast buried in the earth. Wherefore then dost thou injure so many to whom thou mightest be a benefactor.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 8. in 2 ad Tim.) But in this he errs, that he thinks those things good which are indifferent. For there are some things good, some evil, some between the two. The good are chastity, and humility, and the like, which when a man chooses he becomes good. But opposed to these are the evil, which when a man chooses he becomes bad; and there are the neutral, as riches, which at one time indeed are directed to good, as to almsgiving, at other times to evil, as to covetousness. And in like manner poverty at one time leads to blasphemy, at another to wisdom, according to the disposition of the user.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The rich man then builds barns which last not, but decay, and what is still more foolish, reckons for himself upon a long life; for it follows, And I will say unto my soul, Soul, thou hast much goods laid up for many years. But, O rich man, thou hast indeed fruits in thy barns, but as for many years whence canst thou obtain them?

ATHANASIUS. (non occ.) Now if any one lives so as to die daily, seeing that our life is naturally uncertain, he will not sin, for the greater fear destroys very much pleasure, but the rich man on the contrary, promising to himself length of life, secks after pleasures, for he says, Rest, that is, from toil, eat, drink, and be merry, that is, with great luxury.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) Thou art so careless with respect to the goods of the soul, that thou ascribest the meats of the body to the soul. If indeed it has virtue, if it is fruitful in good works, if it clings to God, it possesses many goods, and rejoices with a worthy joy. But because thou art altogether carnal and subject to the passions, thou speakest from thy belly, not from thy soul.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 39, 8. in 1 ad Cor.) Now it behoves us not to indulge in delights which fattening the body make lean the soul, and bring a heavy burden upon it, and spread darkness over it, and a thick covering, because in pleasure our governing part which is the soul becomes the slave, but the subject part, namely the body, rules. But the body is in need not of luxuries but of food, that it may be nourished, not that it may be racked and melt away. For not to the soul alone are pleasures hurtful, but to the body itself, because from being a strong body it becomes weak, from being healthy diseased, from being active slothful, from being beautiful unshapely, and from youthful old.

BASIL. (Hom. in loc.) But he was permitted to deliberate in every thing, and to manifest his purpose, that he might receive a sentence such as his inclinations deserved. But while he speaks in secret, his words are weighed in heaven, from whence the answers come to him. For it follows, But God said unto him, Thou fool, this night thy soul shall they require of thee. Hear the name of folly, which most properly belongs to thee which not man has imposed, but God Himself.

GREGORY. (22. Mor. c. 2.) The same night he was taken away, who had expected many years, that he indeed who had in gathering stores for himself looked a long time forward, should not see even the next day.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Concio. 2. de Lazar.) They shall require of thee, for perhaps certain dread powers were sent to require it, since if when going from city to city we want a guide, much more will the soul when released from the body, and passing to a future life, need direction. On this account many times the soul rises and sinks into the deep again, when it ought to depart from the body. For the consciousness of our sins is ever pricking us, but most of all when we are going to be dragged before the awful tribunal. For when the whole accumulation of crimes is brought up again, and placed before the eyes, it astounds the mind. And as prisoners are always indeed sorrowful, but particularly at the time when they are going to be brought before the judge; so also the soul at this time is greatly tormented by sin and afflicted, but much more after it has been removed.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But in the night the soul was taken away which had gone forth in the darkness of its heart, being unwilling to have the light of consideration, so as to foresee what it might suffer. But He adds, Then whose shall those things be which thou hast provided?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 23. in Gen.) For here shalt thou leave those things, and not only reap no advantage from them, but carry a load of sins upon thy own shoulders. And these things which thou hast laid up will for the most part come into the hands of enemies, but of thee shall an account of them be required. It follows, So is he that layeth up treasure for himself, and is not rich toward God.

BEDE. For such a one is a fool, and will be taken off in the night. He then who wishes to be rich toward God, will not lay up treasures for himself, but distribute his possessions to the poor.

AMBROSE. For in vain he amasses wealth who knows not how to use it. Neither are these things ours which we cannot take away with us. Virtue alone is the companion of the dead, mercy alone follows us, which gains for the dead an everlasting habitation.

12:22–23

22. And he said unto his disciples, Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat: neither for the body, what ye shall put on.

23. The life is more than meat, and the body is more than raiment.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord carries us onward by degrees to a more perfect teaching. For He taught us above to beware of covetousness, and He added the parable of the rich man, intimating thereby that the fool is he who desires more than is enough. Then as His discourse goes on, He forbids us to be anxious even about necessary things, plucking out the very root of covetousness; whence he says, Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought. As if He said, Since he is a fool, who awards to himself a longer measure of life, and is thereby rendered more covetous; be not ye careful for your soul, what ye shall eat, not that the intellectual soul eats, but because there seems no other way for the soul to dwell united to the body except by being nourished. Or because it is a part of the animate body to receive nourishment, he fitly ascribes nourishment to the soul. For the soul is called also a nutritive power, as it is so understood. Be not then anxious for the nourishing part of the soul, what ye shall eat. But a dead body may also be clothed, therefore he adds, Nor for your body, what ye shall put on.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 21. in Matt.) Now the words, Take no thought, are not the same as do no work, but, “Have not your minds fixed on earthly things.” For it so happens, that the man who is working takes no thought.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now the soul is more excellent than food, and the body than clothing. Therefore He adds, The life is more than meat, &c. As if He said, “God who has implanted that which is greater, how will He not give that which is less?” Let not our attention then be stayed upon trifling things, nor our understanding serve to seek for food and raiment, but rather think on whatever saves the soul, and raises it to the kingdom of heaven.

AMBROSE. Now nothing is more likely to produce conviction in believers that God can give us all things, than the fact, that the ethereal spirit perpetuates the vital union of the soul and body in close fellowship, without our exertion, and the healthgiving use of food does not fail until the last day of death has arrived. Since then the soul is clothed with the body as with a garment, and the body is kept alive by the vigour of the soul, it is absurd to suppose that a supply of food will be wanting to us, who are in possession of the everlasting substance of life.

12:24–26

24. Consider the ravens: for they neither sow nor reap; which neither have storehouse nor barn; and God feedeth them: how much more are ye better than the fowls?

25. And which of you with taking thought can add to his stature one cubit?

26. If ye then be not able to do that thing which is least, why take ye thought for the rest?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As before in raising our minds to spiritual boldness, He assured us by the example of the birds, which are counted of little worth, saying, Ye are of more value than many sparrows; so now also from the instance of birds, He conveys to us a firm and undoubting trust, saying, Consider the ravens, for they neither sow nor reap, which neither have storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them; how much more are ye better than fowls?

BEDE. That is, ye are more precious, because a rational animal like man is of a higher order in the nature of things than irrational things, as the birds are.

AMBROSE.: But it is a great thing to follow up this example in faith. For to the birds of the air who have no labour of tilling, no produce from the fruitfulness of crops, Divine Providence grants an unfailing sustenance. It is true then that the cause of our poverty seems to be covetousness. For they have for this reason a toilless and abundant use of food, because they think not of claiming to themselves by any special right fruits given for common food. We have lost what things were common by claiming them as our own. For neither is any thing a man's own, where nothing is perpetual, nor is supply certain when the end is uncertain.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now whereas our Lord might have taken an example from the men who have cared least about earthly things, such as Elias, Moses, and John, and the like, He made mention of the birds, following the Old Testament, which sends us to the bee and the ant, and others of the same kind, in whom the Creator has implanted certain natural dispositions.

THEOPHYLACT. Now the reason that he omits mention of the other birds, and speaks only of the ravens, is, that the young of the ravens are by an especial providence fed by God. For the ravens produce indeed, but do not feed, but neglect their young, to whom in a marvellous manner from the air their food comes, brought as it were by the wind, which they receive having their mouths open, and so are nourished. Perhaps also such things were spoken by synecdoche, i. e. the whole signified by a part. Hence in Matthew our Lord refers to the birds of the air, (Matt. 6:26.) but here more particularly to the ravens, as being more greedy and ravenous than others.

EUSEBIUS. By the ravens also he signifies something else, for the birds which pick up seeds have a ready source of food, but those that feed on flesh as the ravens do have more difficulty in getting it. Yet birds of this kind suffer from no lack of food, because the providence of God extends every where; but he brings to the same purpose also a third argument, saying, And which of you by taking thought can add to his stature?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 21. in Matt.) Observe, that when God has once given a soul, it abides the same, but the body is taking growth daily. Passing over then the soul as not receiving increase, he makes mention only of the body, giving us to understand that it is not increased by food alone, but by the Divine Providence, from the fact that no one by receiving nourishment can add any thing to his stature. It is therefore concluded, If ye then be not able to do that thing which is least, take no thought for the rest.

EUSEBIUS. If no one has by his own skill contrived a bodily stature for himself, but can not add even the shortest delay to the prefixed limit of his time of life, why should we be vainly anxious about the necessaries of life?

BEDE. To Him then leave the care of directing the body, by whose aid you see it to come to pass that you have a body of such a stature.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. l. ii. qu. 28.) But in speaking concerning increasing the stature of the body, He refers to that which is least, that is, to God, to make bodies.

12:27–31

27. Consider the lilies how they grow: they toil not, they spin not; and yet I say unto you, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.

28. If then God so clothe the grass, which is to day in the field, and to morrow is cast into the oven; how much more will he clothe you, O ye of little faith?

29. And seek not ye what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, neither be ye of doubtful mind.

30. For all these things do the nations of the world seek after: and your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things.

31. But rather seek ye the kingdom of God; and all these things shall be added unto you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 22. in Matt.) As our Lord had before given instruction about food, so now also about raiment, saying, Consider the lilies of the field how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin, that is, to make themselves clothing. Now as above when our Lord said, the birds sow not, He did not reprove sowing, but all superfluous trouble; so when He said, They toil not, neither do they spin, He does not put an end to work, but to all anxiety about it.

EUSEBIUS. But if a man wishes to be adorned with precious raiment, let him observe closely how even down to the flowers which spring from the earth God extends His manifold wisdom, adorning them with divers colours, so adapting to the delicate membranes of the flowers dyes far superior to gold and purple, that under no luxurious king, not even Solomon himself, who was renowned among the ancients for his riches as for his wisdom and pleasures, has so exquisite a work been devised; and hence it follows, But I say unto you, that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 22. in Matt.) He does not here employ the example of the birds, making mention of a swan or a peacock, but the lilies, for he wishes to give force to the argument on both sides, that is to say, both from the meanness of the things which have obtained such honour, and from the excellence of the honour conferred upon them; and hence a little after He does not call them lilies, but grass, as it is added, If then God so clothe the grass, which to-day is, He says not, which to-morrow is not, but to-morrow is cast into the oven; nor does He say simply, God clothe, but He says, God so clothe, which has much meaning, and adds, how much more you, which expresses His estimation and care of the human race. Lastly, when it behoves Him to find fault, He deals here also with mildness, reproving them not for unbelief, but for littleness of faith, adding, O ye of little faith, that He may so the more rouse us up to believe in His words, that we should not only take no thought about our apparel, but not even admire elegance in dress.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For it is sufficient to the prudent for the sake of necessity only, to have a suitable garment, and moderate food, not exceeding what is enough. To the saints it is sufficient even to have those spiritual delights which are in Christ, and the glory that comes after.

AMBROSE. Nor does it seem of light moment, that a flower is either compared to man, or even almost more than to man is preferred to Solomon, to make us conceive the glory expressed, from the brightness of the colour to be that of the heavenly angels; who are truly the flowers of the other world, since by their brightness the world is adorned, and they breathe forth the pure odour of sanctification, who shackled by no cares, employed in no toilsome task, cherish the grace of the Divine bounty towards them, and the gifts of their heavenly nature. Therefore well also is Solomon hero described to be clothed in his own glory, and in another place to he veiled, because the frailty of his bodily nature be clothed as it were by the powers of his mind to the glory of his works. But the Angels, whose diviner nature remains free from bodily injury, are rightly preferred, although he be the greatest man. We should not however despair of God’s mercy to us, to whom by the grace of His resurrection He promises the likeness of angels.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. it were strange for the disciples, who ought to set before others the rule and pattern of life, to fall into those things, which it was their duty to advise men to renounce; and therefore our Lord adds, And seek not what, ye shall eat, &c. Herein also our Lord strongly recommends the study of holy preaching, bidding His disciples to cast away all human cares.

BEDE. It must however be observed, that He says not, Do not seek or take thought about meat, or drink, or raiment, but what ye shall eat or drink, in which He seems to me to reprove those who, despising the common food and clothing, seek for themselves either more delicate or coarser food and clothing than theirs with whom they live.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (in Orat. Dom. Serm. 1.) Some have obtained dominion and honours and riches by praying for them, how then dost thou forbid us to seek such things in prayer? And indeed that all these things belong to the Divine counsel is plain to every one, yet are they conferred by God upon those that seek them, in order that by learning that God listens to our lower petitions, we may be raised to the desire of higher things; just as we see in children, who as soon as they are born cling to their mother’s breasts, but when the child grows up it despises the milk, and seeks after a necklace or some such thing with which the eye is delighted; and again when the mind has advanced together with the body, giving up all childish desires, he seeks from his parents those things which are adapted to a perfect life.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu Ev. l. ii. qu. 29.) Now having forbidden all thought about food, he next goes on to warn men not to be puffed up, saying, Neither be ye lifted up, (nolite in sublime tolli μὴ μετεωρίζισθε.) for man first seeks these things to satisfy his wants, but when he is filled, he begins to be puffed up concerning them. This is just as if a wounded man should boast that he had many plasters in his house, whereas it were well for him that he had no wounds, and needed not even one plaster.

THEOPHYLACT. Or by being lifted up he means nothing else but an unsteady motion of the mind, meditating first one thing, then another, and jumping from this to that, and imagining lofty things.

BASIL. And that you may understand an elation of this kind, remember the vanity of your own youth; if at any time while by yourself you have thought about life and promotions, passing rapidly from one dignity to another, have grasped riches, have built palaces, benefitted friends, been revenged upon enemies. Now such abstraction is sin, for to have our delights fixed upon useless things, leads away from the truth. Hence He goes on to add, For all these things do the nations of the world seek after, &c.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) For to be careful about visible things is the part of those who possess no hope of a future life, no fear of judgment to come.

BASIL. But with respect to the necessaries of life, He adds, And your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 22. in Matt.) He said not “God,” but your Father, to incite them to greater confidence. For who is a father, and would not allow the want of his children to be supplied? But He adds another thing also; for you could not say that He is indeed a father, yet knoweth not that we are in need of these things. For He who has created our nature, knoweth its wants.

AMBROSE. But He goes on to shew, that neither at the present time, nor hereafter, will grace be lacking to the faithful, if only they who desire heavenly things seek not earthly; for it is unworthy for men to care for meats, who fight for a kingdom. The king knoweth wherewithal he shall support and clothe his own family. Therefore it follows, But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Now Christ promises not only a kingdom, but also riches with it; for if we rescue from cares those who neglecting their own concerns are diligent about ours, much more will God.

BEDE. For He declares that there is one thing which is primarily given, another which is superadded; that we ought to make eternity our aim, the present life our business.

12:32–34

32. Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father’s good pleasure to give you the kingdom.

33. Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that faileth not, where no thief approacheth, neither moth corrupteth.

34. For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Our Lord having removed the care of temporal things from the hearts of His disciples, now banishes fear from them, from which superfluous cares proceed, saying, Fear not, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. By the little flock, our Lord signifies those who are willing to become His disciples, or because in this world the Saints seem little because of their voluntary poverty, or because they are outnumbered by the multitude of Angels, who incomparably exceed all that we can boast of. The name little our Lord gives to the company of the elect, either from comparison with the greater number of the reprobate, or rather because of their devout humility.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But why they ought not to fear, He shews, adding, for it is your Father’s good pleasure; as if He says, How shall He who gives such precious things be wearied in shewing mercy towards you? For although His flock is little both in nature and number and renown, yet the goodness of the Father has granted even to this little flock the lot of heavenly spirits, that is, the kingdom of heaven. Therefore that you may possess the kingdom of heaven, despise this world’s wealth. Hence it is added, Sell that ye have, &c.

BEDE. As if He says, Fear not lest they who warfare for the kingdom of God, should be in want of the necessaries of this life. But sell that ye have for alms’ sake, which then is done worthily, when a man having once for his Lord’s sake forsaken all that he hath, nevertheless afterwards labours with his hands that he may be able both to gain his living, and give alms.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 25. in Act.) For there is no sin which almsgiving does not avail to blot out. It is a salve adapted to ever wound. But almsgiving has to do not only with money, but with all matters also wherein man succours man, as when the physician heals, and the wise man gives counsel.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 14.) Now I fear lest you should think deeds of mercy to be not necessary to you, but voluntary. I also thought so, but was alarmed at the goats placed on the left hand, not because they robbed, but did not minister unto Christ among the poor.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) For without alms it is impossible to see the kingdom. For as a fountain if it keeps its waters within itself grows foul, so also rich men when they retain every thing in their possession.

BASIL. (reg. brev. ad int. 92.) But some one will ask, upon what grounds ought we to sell that which we have? Is it that these things are by nature hurtful, or because of the temptation to our souls? To this we must answer, first, that every thing existing in the world if it were in itself evil, would be no creation of God, for every creation of God is good. (1 Tim. 4:4.) And next, that our Lord's command teaches us not to cast away as evil what we possess, but to distribute, saying, and give alms.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now perhaps this command is irksome to the rich, yet to those who are of a sound mind, it is not unprofitable, for their treasure is the kingdom of heaven. Hence it follows, Provide for yourselves bags which wax not old, &c.

BEDE. That is, by doing alms, the reward of which abideth for ever; which must not be taken as a command that no money be kept by the saints either for their own, or the use of the poor, since we read that our Lord Himself, to whom the angels ministered, (Matt. 4:11) had a bag in which he kept the offerings of the faithful; (John 12:6.) but that God should not be obeyed for the sake of such things, and righteousness be not forsaken from fear of poverty.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. But He bids us lay up our visible and earthly treasures where the power of corruption does not reach, and hence He adds, a treasure that faileth not, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, "Here the moth corrupts, but there is no corruption in heaven." Then because there are some things which the moth does not corrupt, He goes on to speak of the thief. For gold the moth corrupts not, but the thief takes away.

BEDE. Whether then should it be simply understood, that money kept faileth, but given away to our neighbour bears everlasting fruit in heaven;

or, that the treasure of good works, if it be stored up for the sake of earthly advantage, is soon corrupted and perishes; but if it be laid up solely from heavenly motives, neither outwardly by the favour of men, as by the thief which steals from without, nor inwardly by vainglory, as by the moth which devours within, can it be defiled.

GLOSS. Or, the thieves are heretics and evil spirits, who are bent upon depriving us of spiritual things. The moth which secretly frets the garments is envy, which mars good desires, and bursts the bonds of charity.

THEOPHYLACT. Moreover, because all things are not taken away by theft, He adds a more excellent reason, and one which admits of no objection whatever, saying, For where your treasure is, there will your hearts be also; as if He says, “Suppose that neither moth corrupts nor thief takes away, yet this very thing, namely, to have the heart fixed in a buried treasure, and to sink to the earth a divine work, that is, the soul, how great a punishment it deserves.”

EUSEBIUS. For every man naturally dwells upon that which is the object of his desire, and thither he directs all his thoughts, where he supposes his whole interest to rest. If any one then has his whole mind and affections, which he calls the heart, set on things of this present life, he lives in earthly things. But if he has given his mind to heavenly things, there will his mind be; so that he seems with his body only to live with men, but with his mind to have already reached the heavenly mansion.

BEDE. Now this must not only be felt concerning love of money, but all the passions. Luxurious feasts are treasures; also the sports of the gay and the desires of the lover,

12:35–40

35. Let your loins be girded about, and your lights burning;

36. And ye yourselves like unto men that wait for their lord, when he will return from the wedding; that when he cometh and knocketh, they may open unto him immediately.

37. Blessed are those servants, whom the lord when he cometh shall find watching: verily I say unto you, that he shall gird himself, and make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth and serve them.

38. And if he shall come in the second watch, or in the third watch, and find them so, blessed are those servants.

39. And this know, that if the goodman of the house had known what hour the thief would come, he would have watched, and not have suffered his house to be broken through.

40. Be ye therefore ready also: for the Son of man cometh at an hour when ye think not.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord having taught His disciples moderation, taking from them all care and conceit of this life, now leads them on to serve and obey, saying, Let your loins be girded, that is, always ready to do the work of your Lord, and your lamps burning, that is, do not lead a life in darkness, but have with you the light of reason, shewing you what to do and what to avoid. For this world is the night, but they have their loins girded, who follow a practical or active life. For such is the condition of servants who must have with them also lamps burning; that is, the gift of discernment, that the active man may be able to distinguish not only what he ought to do, but in what way; otherwise men rush down the precipice of pride. But we must observe, that He first orders our loins to be girded, secondly, our lamps to be burning. For first indeed comes action, then reflection, which is an enlightening of the mind. Let us then strive to exercise the virtues, that we may have two lamps burning, that is, the conception of the mind ever shining forth in the soul, by which we are ourselves enlightened, and learning, whereby we enlighten others.

MAXIMUS. Or, he teaches us to keep our lamps burning, by prayer and contemplation and spiritual love.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or, to be girded, signifies activity and readiness to undergo evils from regard to Divine love. But the burning of the lamp signifies that we should not suffer any to live in the darkness of ignorance.

GREGORY. (Hom. 13. in Evang.) Or else, we gird our loins when by continence we control the lusts of the flesh. For the lust of men is in their loins, and of women in their womb; by the name of loins, therefore, from the principal sex, lust is signified. But because it is a small thing not to do evil, unless also men strive to labour in good works, it is added, And your lamps burning in your hands; for we hold burning lamps in our hands, when by good works we shew forth bright examples to our neighbours.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. lib. ii. q. 25.) Or, He teaches us also to gird our loins for the sake of keeping ourselves from the love of the things of this world, and to have our lamps burning, that this thing may be done with a true end and right intention.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But if a man has both of these, whosoever he be, nothing remains for him but that he should place his whole expectation on the coming of the Redeemer. Therefore it is added, And be ye like to men that wait for their Lord, when he will return from the wedding, &c. For our Lord went to the wedding, when ascending up into heaven as the Bridegroom He joined to Himself the heavenly multitude of angels.

THEOPHYLACT. Daily also in the heavens He betroths the souls of the Saints, whom Paul or another offers to Him, as a chaste virgin. (2 Cor 11:2.) But He returns from the celebration of the heavenly marriage, perhaps to all at the end of the whole world, when He shall come from heaven in the glory of the Father; perhaps also every hour standing suddenly present at the death of each individual.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now consider that He comes from the wedding as from a festival, which God is ever keeping; for nothing can cause sadness to the Incorruptible Nature.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. 11. in Cant..) Or else, when the wedding was celebrated and the Church received into the secret bridal chamber, the angels were expecting the return of the King to His own natural blessedness. And after their example we order our life, that as they living together without evil, are prepared to welcome their Lord’s return, so we also, keeping watch at the door, should make ourselves ready to obey Him when He comes knocking; for it follows, that when he cometh and knocketh, they may open to him immediately.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For He comes when He hastens to judgment, but He knocks, when already by the pain of sickness He denotes that death is at hand; to whom we immediately open if we receive Him with love. For he who trembles to depart from the body, has no wish to open to the Judge knocking, and dreads to see that Judge whom he remembers to have despised. But he who rests secure concerning his hope and works, immediately opens to Him that knocks; for when he is aware of the time of death drawing near, he grows joyful, because of the glory of his reward; and hence it is added, Blessed are the servants whom the Lord when he cometh shall find watching. He watches who keeps the eyes of his mind open to behold the true light; who by his works maintains that which he beholds, who drives from himself the darkness of sloth and carelessness.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) For the sake then of keeping watch, our Lord advised above that our loins should be girded, and our lamps burning, for light when placed before the eyes drives away sleep. The loins also when tied with a girdle, make the body incapable of sleep. For he who is girt about with chastity, and illuminated by a pure conscience, continues wakeful.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When then our Lord coming shall find us awake and girded, having our hearts enlightened, He will then pronounce us blessed, for it follows, Verily I say unto you, that he shall gird himself; from which we perceive that He will recompense us in like manner, seeing that He will gird Himself with those that are girded. (Isa. 11:5.)

ORIGEN. For He will be girded about His loins with righteousness.

GREGORY. (Hom. 13. in Ev.) By which He girds Himself, that is, prepares for judgment.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, He will gird Himself, in that He imparts not the whole fulness of blessings, but confines it within a certain measure. For who can comprehend God how great He is? Therefore are the Seraphims said to veil their countenance, because of the excellence of the Divine brightness. It follows, and will make them to sit down; for as a man sitting down causes his whole body to rest, so in the future coming the Saints will have complete rest; for here they have not rest for the body, but there together with their souls their spiritual bodies partaking of immortality will rejoice in perfect rest.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He will then make them to sit down as a refreshment to the weary, setting before them spiritual enjoyments, and ordering a sumptuous table of His gifts.

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. (Dion. in Ep. ad Tit.) The “sitting down” is taken to be the repose from many labours, a life without annoyance, the divine conversation of those that dwell in the region of light enriched with all holy affections, and an abundant pouring forth of all gifts, whereby they are filled with joy. For the reason why Jesus makes them to sit down, is that He might give them perpetual rest, and distribute to them blessings without number. Therefore it follows, And will pass over (transiens) and serve them.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, Give back to them, as it were, an equal return, that as they served Him, so also He will serve them.

GREGORY. (Hom. 13. in Ev.) But He is said to be passing over, when He returns from the judgment to His kingdom. Or the Lord passes to us after the judgment, and raises us from the form of His humanity to a contemplation of His divinity.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Our Lord knew the proneness of human infirmity to sin, but because He is merciful, He docs not allow us to despair, but rather has compassion, and gives us repentance as a saving remedy. And therefore He adds, And if he shall come in the second watch, &c. For they who keep watch on the walls of cities, or observe the attacks of the enemy, divide the night into three or four watches.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The first watch then is the earliest time of our life, that is, childhood, the second youth and manhood, but the third represents old age. He then who is unwilling to watch in the first, let him keep even the second. And he who is unwilling in the second, let him not lose the remedies of the third watch, that he who has neglected conversion in childhood, may at least in the time of youth or old age recover himself.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Of the first watch, however, he makes no mention, for childhood is not punished by God, but obtains pardon; but the second and third age owe obedience to God, and the leading of an honest life according to His will.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) Or, to the first watch belong those who live more carefully, as having gained the first step, but to the second, those who keep the measure of a moderate conversation, but to the third, those who are below these. And the same must be supposed of the fourth, and if it should so happen also of the fifth. For there are different measures of life, and a good rewarder metes out to every man according to his deserts.

THEOPHYLACT. Or since the watches are the hours of the night which lull men to sleep, you must understand that there are also in our life certain hours which make us happy if we are found awake. Does any one seize your goods? Are your children dead? Are you accused? But if at these times you have done nothing against the commandments of God, He will find you watching in the second and third watch, that is, at the evil time, which brings destructive sleep to idle souls.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But to shake off the sloth of our minds, even our external losses are by a similitude set before us. For it is added, And this know, that if the goodman of the house had known what hour the thief would come.

THEOPHYLACT. Some understand this thief to be the devil, the house, the soul, the goodman of the house, man. This interpretation, however, does not seem to agree with what follows. For the Lord's coming is compared to the thief as suddenly at hand, according to the word of the Apostle, The day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night. (1 Thess. 5:2.) And hence also it is here added, Be ye also ready, for the Son of man cometh at an hour when ye think not.

GREGORY. (Hom. 13. in Ev.) Or else; unknown to the master the thief breaks into the house, because while the spirit sleeps instead of guarding itself, death comes unexpectedly, and breaks into the dwelling place of our flesh. But he would resist the thief if he were watching, because being on his guard against the coming of the Judge, who secretly seizes his soul, he would by repentance go to meet Him, lest he should perish impenitent. But the last hour our Lord wishes to be unknown to us, in order as we cannot foresee it, we may be unceasingly preparing for it.

12:41–46

41. Then Peter said unto him, Lord, speakest thou this parable unto us, or even to all?

42. And the Lord said, Who then is that faithful and wise steward, whom his lord shall make ruler over his household, to give them their portion of meat in due season?

43. Blessed is that servant, whom his lord when he cometh shall find so doing.

44. Of a truth I say unto you, that he will make him ruler over all that he hath.

45. But and if that servant say in his heart, My lord delayeth his coming; and shall begin to beat the menservants and maidens, and to eat and drink, and to be drunken;

46. The lord of that servant will come in a day when he looketh not for him, and at an hour when he is not aware, and will cut him in sunder, and will appoint him his portion with the unbelievers.

THEOPHYLACT. Peter, to whom the Church had already been committed, as having the care of all things, inquires whether our Lord put forth this parable to all. As it follows, Then Peter said unto him, Lord, speakest thou this parable unto us, or even unto all?

BEDE. Our Lord had taught two things in the preceding parable unto all, even that He would come suddenly, and that they ought to be ready and waiting for Him. But it is not very plain concerning which of these, or whether both, Peter asked the question, or whom he compared to himself and his companions, when he said, Speakest thou to us, or to all? Yet in truth by these words, us and all, he must be supposed to mean none other than the Apostles, and those like to the Apostles, and all other faithful men; or Christians, and unbelievers; or those who dying separately, that is, singly, both unwillingly indeed and willingly, receive the coming of their Judge, and those who when the universal judgment comes are to be found alive in the flesh. Now it is marvellous if Peter doubted that all must live soberly, piously, and justly, who wait for a blessed hope, or that the judgment will to each and all be unexpected. It therefore remains to be supposed, that knowing these two things, he asked about that which he might not know, namely, whether those sublime commands of a heavenly life in which He bade us sell what we have and provide bags which wax not old, and watch with our loins girded, and lamps burning, belonged to the Apostles only, and those like unto them, or to all who were to be saved.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now to the courageous rightly belong the great and difficult of God’s holy commandments, but to those who have not yet attained to such virtue, belong those things from which all difficulty is excluded. Our Lord therefore uses a very obvious example, to shew that the above-mentioned command is suited to those who have been admitted into the rank of disciples, for it follows, And the Lord said, Who then is that faithful steward?

AMBROSE. Or else, the form of the first command is a general one adapted to all, but the following example seems to be proposed to the stewards, that is, the priests; and therefore it follows, And the Lord said, Who then is that faithful and wise steward, whom his Lord shall make ruler over his household, to give, them their portion of meat in due season?

THEOPHYLACT. The above-mentioned parable relates to all the faithful in common, but now hear what suits the Apostles and teachers. For I ask, where will be found the steward, that possesses in himself faithfulness and wisdom? for as in the management of goods, whether a man be careless yet faithful to his master, or else wise yet unfaithful, the things of the master perish; so also in the things of God there is need of faithfulness and wisdom. For I have known many servants of God, and faithful men, who because they were unable to manage ecclesiastical affairs, have destroyed not only possessions, but souls, exercising towards sinners indiscreet virtue by extravagant rules of penance or unseasonable indulgence.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 77. in Matt.) But our Lord here asks the question not as ignorant, who was a faithful and wise steward, but wishing to imply the rareness of such, and the greatness of this kind of chief government.

THEOPHYLACT. Whosoever then has been found a faithful and wise steward, let him bear rule over the Lord’s household, that he may give them their portion of meat in due season, either the word of doctrine by which their souls are fed, or the example of works by which their life is fashioned.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. l. ii. c. 26.) Now he says portion, because of suiting His measure to the capacity of his several hearers.

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (l. 3. Ep. 170.) It was added also in their due season, because a benefit not conferred at its proper time is rendered vain, and loses the name of a benefit. The same bread is not equally coveted by the hungry man, and him that is satisfied. But with respect to this servant’s reward for his stewardship, He adds, Blessed is that servant whom his Lord when he cometh shall find so doing.

BASIL. (in Proœm. in reg. fus.) He says not, ‘doing,’ as if by chance, but so doing. For not only conquest is honourable, but to contend lawfully, which is to perform each thing as we have been commanded.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Thus the faithful and wise servant prudently giving out in due season the servants’ food, that is, their spiritual meat, will be blessed according to the Saviour’s word, in that he will obtain still greater things, and will be thought worthy of the rewards which are duo to friends. Hence it follows, Of a truth I say unto you, that he will make him ruler over all that he hath.

BEDE. For whatever difference there is in the merits of good hearers and good teachers, such also there is in their rewards; for the one whom when He cometh He finds watching, He will make to sit down; but the others whom He finds faithful and wise stewards, He will place over all that He hath, that is, over all the joys of the kingdom of heaven, not certainly that they alone shall have power over them, but that they shall more abundantly than the other saints enjoy eternal possession of them.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, he will make him ruler over all that he hath, not only over His own household, but that earthly things as well as heavenly shall obey him. As it was with Joshua the son of Nun, and Elias, the one commanding the sun, the other the clouds; and all the Saints as God's friends use the things of God. Whosoever also passes his life virtuously, and has kept in due submission his servants, that is, anger and desire, supplies to them their portion of food in due season; to anger indeed that he may feel it against those who hate God, but to desire that he may exercise the necessary provision for the flesh, ordering it unto God. Such an one, I say, will be set over all things which the Lord hath, being thought worthy to look into all things by the light of contemplation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 77. in Matt.) But our Lord not only by the honours kept in store for the good, but by threats of punishment upon the bad, leads the hearer to correction, as it follows, But if that servant shall say in his heart, My Lord delayeth his coming.

BEDE. Observe that it is counted among the vices of a bad servant that he thought the coming of his Lord slow, yet it is not numbered among the virtues of the good that he hoped it would come quickly, but only that he ministered faithfully. There is nothing then better than to submit patiently to be ignorant of that which can not be known, but to strive only that we be found worthy.

THEOPHYLACT. Now from not considering the time of our departure, there proceed many evils. For surely if we thought that our Lord was coming, and that the end of our life was at hand, we should sin the less. Hence it follows, And shall begin to strike the man servants and maidens, and to eat and drink and be drunken.

BEDE. In this servant is declared the condemnation of all evil rulers, who, forsaking the fear of the Lord, not only give themselves up to pleasures, but also provoke with injuries those who are put under them. Although these words may be also understood figuratively, meaning to corrupt the hearts of the weak by an evil example; and to eat, drink, and be drunken, to be absorbed in the vices and allurements of the world, which overthrow the mind of man. But concerning his punishment it is added, The Lord of that servant will come in a day when he looketh not for him, that is, the day of his judgment or death, and will cut him in sunder.

BASIL. (in lib. de Sp. San. c. 16.) The body indeed is not divided, so that one part indeed should be exposed to torments, the other escape. For this is a fable, nor is it a part of just judgment when the whole has offended that half only should suffer punishment; nor is the soul cut in sunder, seeing that the whole possesses a guilty consciousness, and cooperates with the body to work evil; but its division is the eternal severing of the soul from the Spirit. For now although the grace of the Spirit is not in the unworthy, yet it seems ever to be at hand expecting their turning to salvation, but at that time it will be altogether cut off from the soul. The Holy Spirit then is the prize of the just, and the chief condemnation of sinners, since they who are unworthy will lose Him.

BEDE. Or He will cut him in sunder, by separating him from the communion of the faithful, and dismissing him to those who have never attained unto the faith. Hence it follows, And will appoint him his portion with the unbelievers; (1 Tim. 5:8.) for he who has no care for his own, and those of his own house, has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.

THEOPHYLACT. Rightly also shall the unbelieving steward receive his portion with the unbelievers, because he was without true faith.

12:47–48

47. And that servant, which knew his lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes.

48. But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required: and to whom men have committed much, of him they will ask the more.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord here points to something still greater and more terrible, for the unfaithful steward shall not only be deprived of the grace he had, so that it should profit him nothing in escaping punishment, but the greatness of his dignity shall the rather become a cause of his condemnation. Hence it is said, And that servant who knew his lord's will and did it not, shall be beaten with many stripes.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 26. in Matt.) For all things are not judged alike in all, but greater knowledge is an occasion of greater punishment. Therefore shall the Priest, committing the same sin with the people, suffer a far heavier penalty.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For the man of understanding who has given up his will to baser things will shamelessly implore pardon, because he has committed an inexcusable sin, departing as it were maliciously from the will of God, but the rude or unlearned man will more reasonably ask for pardon of the avenger. Hence it is added, But he that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.

THEOPHYLACT. Here some object, saying, He is deservedly punished who, knowing the will of His Lord, pursues it not; but why is the ignorant punished? Because when he might have known, be would not, but being himself slothful, was the cause of his own ignorance.

BASIL. (in reg. brev. 267.) But you will say, If the one indeed received many stripes, and the other few, how do some say He assigns no end to punishments? But we must know, that what is here said assigns neither measure nor end of punishments, but their differences. For a man may deserve unquenchable fire, to either a slight or more intense degree of heat, and the worm that dieth not with greater or more violent gnawings.

THEOPHYLACT. But he goes on to shew why teachers and learned men deserve a severer punishment, as it is said, For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required. Teachers indeed are given the grace to perform miracles, but entrusted the grace of speech and learning. But not in that which is given, He says, is any thing more to be sought, but in that which is entrusted or deposited; for the grace of the word needs increase. But from a teacher more is required, for he should not lie idle, but improve the talent of the word.

BEDE. Or else, much is often given also to certain individuals, upon whom is bestowed the knowledge of God's will, and the means of performing what they know; much also is given to him to whom, together with his own salvation, is committed the care also of feeding our Lord’s flock. Upon those then who are gifted with more abundant grace a heavier penalty falls; but the mildest punishment of all will be theirs, who, beyond the guilt they originally contracted, have added none besides; and in all who have added, theirs will be the more tolerable who have committed fewest iniquities.

12:49–53

49. I am come to send fire on the earth; and what will I, if it be already kindled?

50. But I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!

51. Suppose ye that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, Nay; but rather division:

52. For from henceforth there shall be five in one house divided, three against two, and two against three.

53. The father shall be divided against the son, and the son against the father; the mother against the daughter, and the daughter against the mother; the mother in law against her daughter in law, and the daughter in law against her mother in law.

AMBROSE. To stewards, that is, to Priests, the preceding words seem to have been addressed, that they may thereby know that hereafter a heavier punishment awaits them, if, intent upon the world’s pleasures, they have neglected the charge of their Lord’s household, and the people entrusted to their care. But as it profiteth little to be recalled from error by the fear of punishment, and far greater is the privilege of charity and love, our Lord therefore kindles in men the desire of acquiring the divine nature, saying, I came to send fire on earth, not indeed that He is the Consumer of good men, but the Author of good will, who purifies the golden vessels of the Lord’s house, but burns up the straw and stubble.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now it is the way of holy Scripture to use sometimes the term fire, of holy and divine words. For as they who know how to purify gold and silver, destroy the dross by fire, so the Saviour by the teaching of the Gospel in the power of the Spirit cleanses the minds of those who believe in Him. This then is that wholesome and useful fire by which the inhabitants of earth, in a manner cold and dead through sin, revive to a life of piety.

CHRYSOSTOM. For by the earth He now means not that which we tread under our feet, but that which was fashioned by His hands, namely, man, upon whom the Lord pours out fire for the consuming of sins, and the renewing of souls.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. And we must here believe that Christ came down from heaven. For if He had come from earth to earth, He would not say, I came to send fire upon the earth.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But our Lord was hastening the kindling of the fire, and hence it follows, And what will I, save that it be kindleda? (nisi ut accendatur) For already some of the Jews believed, of whom the first were the holy Apostles, but the fire once lighted in Judæa was about to take possession of the whole world, yet not till after the dispensation of His Passion had been accomplished. Hence it follows, But I have a baptism to be baptized with. For before the holy cross and His resurrection from the dead, in Judæa only was the news told of His preaching and miracles; but after that the Jews in their rage had slain the Prince of life, then commanded He His Apostles, saying, Go and teach all nations. (Matt. 28:19.)

GREGORY. (in Ezech. lib. i. Hom. 2.) Or else, fire is sent upon the earth, when by the fiery breath of the Holy Spirit, the earthly mind has all its carnal desires burnt up, but inflamed with spiritual love, bewails the evil it has done; and so the earth is burnt, when the conscience accusing itself, the heart of the sinner is consumed in the sorrow of repentance.

BEDE. But He adds, I have a baptism to be baptized with, that is, I have first to be sprinkled with the drops of My own Blood, and then to inflame the hearts of believers by the fire of the Spirit.

AMBROSE. But so great was our Lord’s condescension, that He tells us He has a desire of inspiring us with devotion, of accomplishing perfection in us, and of hastening His passion for us; as it follows, And how am I straitened till it be accomplished?

BEDE. Some manuscripts have, “And how am I anguished,” (coangor) that is, grieved. For though He had in Himself nothing to grieve Him, yet was He afflicted by our woes, and at the time of death He betrayed the anguish which He underwent not from the fear of His death, but from the delay of our redemption. For he who is troubled until he reaches perfection, is secure of perfection, for the condition of bodily affections not the dread of death offends him. For ho who has put on the body must suffer all things which are of the body, hunger, thirst, vexation, sorrow; but the Divine nature knows no change from such feelings. At the same time He also shews, that in the conflict of suffering consists the death of the body, peace of mind has no struggle with grief.

BEDE. But the manner in which after the baptism of His passion and the coming of the spiritual fire the earth will be burnt, He declares as follows, Suppose ye that I am to give peace, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. What sayest thou, O Lord? Didst thou not come to give peace, Who art made peace for us? (Eph. 2:14.) making peace by Thy cross with things in earth and things in heaven; (Col. 1:20.) Who saidst, My peace I give unto you. (John 14:27.) But it is plain that peace is indeed a good, but sometimes hurtful, and separating us from the love of God, that is, when by it we unite with those who keep away from God. And for this reason we teach the faithful to avoid earthly bonds. Hence it follows, For from henceforth there shall be five in one house divided, three against two, &c.

AMBROSE. Though the connexion would seem to be of six persons, father and son, mother and daughter, mother in law and daughter in law, yet are they five, for the mother and the mother in law may be taken as the same, since she who is the mother of the son, is the mother in law of his wife.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) Now hereby He declared a future event, for it so happened in the same house that there have been believers whose fathers wished to bring them to unbelief; but the power of Christ’s doctrines has so prevailed, that fathers were left by sons, mothers by daughters, and children by parents. For the faithful in Christ were content not only to despise their own, but at the same time also to suffer all things as long as they were not without the worship of their faith. But if He were mere man, how would it have occurred to Him to conceive it possible that He should be more loved by fathers than their children were, by children than their fathers, by husbands than their wives, and they too not in one house or a hundred, but throughout the world? And not only did he predict this, but accomplish it in deed.

AMBROSE. Now in a mystical sense the one house is one man, but by two we often mean the soul and the body. But if two things meet together, each one has its part; there is one which obeys, another which rules. But there are three conditions of the soul, one concerned with reason, another with desire, the third with anger. Two then are divided against three, and three against two. For by the coming of Christ, man who was material became rational. We were carnal and earthly, God sent His Spirit into our hearts, and we became spiritual children. (Gal. 4:6.) We may also say, that in the house there are five others, that is, smell, touch, taste, sight, and hearing. If then with respect to those things which we hear or see, separating the sense of sight and hearing, we shut out the worthless pleasures of the body which we take in by our taste, touch, and smell, we divide two against three, because the mind is not carried away by the allurements of vice. Or if we understand the five bodily senses, already are the vices and sins of the body divided among themselves. The flesh and the soul may also seem separated from the smell, touch, and taste of pleasure, for while the stronger sex of reason is impelled, as it were, to manly affections, the flesh strives to keep the reason more effeminate. Out of these then there spring up the motions of different desires, but when the soul returns to itself it renounces the degenerate offspring. The flesh also bewails that it is fastened down by its desires (which it has borne to itself,) as by the thorns of the world. But pleasure is a kind of daughter in law of the body and soul, and is wedded to the motions of foul desire. As long then as there remained in one house the vices conspiring together with one consent, there seemed to be no division; but when Christ sent fire upon the earth which should burn out the offences of the heart, or the sword which should pierce the very secrets of the heart, then the flesh and the soul renewed by the mysteries of regeneration cast off the bond of connection with their offspring. So that parents are divided against their children, while the intemperate man gets rid of his intemperate desires, and the soul has no more fellowship with crime. Children also are divided against parents when men having become regenerate renounce their old vices, and younger pleasure flies from the rule of piety, as from the discipline of a strict house.

BEDE. Or in another way. By three are signified those who have faith in the Trinity, by two the unbelievers who depart from the unity of the faith. But the father is the devil, whose children we were by following him, but when that heavenly fire came down, it separated us from one another, and shewed us another Father who is in heaven. The mother is the Synagogue, the daughter is the Primitive Church, who had to bear the persecution of that same synagogue, from whom she derived her birth, and whom she did herself in the truth of the faith contradict. The mother in law is the Synagogue, the daughter in law the Gentile Church, for Christ the husband of the Church is the son of the Synagogue, according to the flesh. The Synagogue then was divided both against its daughter in law, and its daughter, persecuting believers of each people. But they also were divided against their mother in law and mother, because they wished to abolish the circumcision of the flesh.

12:54–57

54. And he said also to the people, When ye see a cloud rise out of the west, straightway ye say, There cometh a shower; and so it is.

55. And when ye see the south wind blow, ye say, There will be heat; and it cometh to pass.

56. Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky and of the earth; but how is it that ye do not discern this time?

57. Yea, and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right?

THEOPHYLACT. When He spoke about preaching, and called it a sword, His hearers may have been troubled, not knowing what He meant. And therefore our Lord adds, that as men determine the state of the weather by certain signs, so ought they to know His coming. And this is what he means by saying, When ye see a cloud rise out of the west, straightway ye say, There cometh a shower. And when ye see the south wind blowing, ye say, There will be heat, &c. As if He says, Your words and works shew me to be opposed to you. Ye may therefore suppose that I came not to give peace, but the storm and whirlwind. For I am a cloud, and I come out of the west, that is, from human nature; which has been long since clothed with the thick darkness of sin. I came also to send fire, that is, to stir up heat. For I am the strong south wind, opposed to the northern coldness.

BEDE. Or, they who from the change of the elements can easily when they like predetermine the state of the weather, might if they wished also understand the time of our Lord’s coming from the words of the Prophets.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For the prophets have in many ways foretold the mystery of Christ; it became them therefore, if they were wise, to stretch their prospect beyond to the future, nor will ignorance of the time to come avail them after the present life. For there will be wind and rain, and a future punishment by fire; and this is signified when it is said, A shower cometh. It became them also not to be ignorant of the time of salvation, that is, the coming of the Saviour, through whom perfect piety entered into the world. And this is meant when it is said, Ye say that there will be heat. Whence it follows in censure of them, Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky and the earth, but how is it that ye do not discern this time?

BASIL. (in Hexam. Hom. 6, 4.) Now we must observe, that conjectures concerning the stars are necessary to the life of man, as long as we do lot push our searches into their signs beyond due limits. For it is possible to discover some things with respect to coming rain, still more concerning heat and the force of the winds, whether partial or universal, stormy or gentle. But the great advantage that is rendered to life by these conjectures is known to every one. For it is of importance to the sailor to prognosticate the dangers of storms, to the traveller the changes of the weather, to the husbandman the abundant supply of his fruits.

BEDE. But lest any of the people should allege their ignorance of the prophetical books as a reason why they could not discern the courses of the times, He carefully adds, And why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right, shewing them that although unlearned they might still by their natural ability discern Him, who did works such as none other man did, to be above man, and to be God, and that therefore after the injustice of this world, the just judgment of the creation would come.

ORIGEN. But had it not been implanted in our nature to judge what is right, our Lord would never have said this.

12:58–59

58. When thou goest with thine adversary to the magistrate, as thou art in the way, give diligence that thou mayest be delivered from him; lest he hale thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and the officer cast thee into prison.

59. I tell thee, thou shalt not depart thence, till thou hast paid the very last mite.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord having described a rightful difference, next teaches us a rightful reconciliation, saying, When thou goest with thine adversary to the magistrate, as thou art in the way, give diligence that thou mayest be delivered from him, &c. As if He says, When thine adversary is bringing thee to judgment, give diligence, that is, try every method, to be released from him. Or give diligence, that is, although thou hast nothing, borrow in order that thou may be released from him, lest he summon thee before the judge, as it follows, Lest he hale thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer, and the officer cast thee into prison.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Where thou wilt suffer want until thou payest the last farthing; and this is what He adds, I say unto you, thou shalt not depart hence.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 16. in Matt.) It seems to me that He is speaking of the present judges, and of the way to the present judgment, and of the prison of this world. For by these things which are visible and at hand, ignorant men are wont to gain improvement. For often He gives a lesson, not only from future good and evil but from present, for the sake of His ruder hearers.

AMBROSE. Or our adversary is the devil, who lays his baits for sin, that he may have those his partners in punishment who were his accomplices in crime; our adversary is also every vicious practice. Lastly, our adversary is an evil conscience, which affects us both in this world, and will accuse and betray us in the next. Let us then give heed, while we are in this life's course, that we may be delivered from every bad act as from an evil enemy. Nay, while we are going with our adversary to the magistrate, as we are in the way, we should condemn our fault. But who is the magistrate, but He in whose hands is all power? But the Magistrate delivers the guilty to the Judge, that is, to Him, to whom He gives the power over the quick and dead, namely, Jesus Christ, through Whom the secrets are made manifest, and the punishment of wicked works awarded. He delivers to the officer, and the officer casts into prison, for He says, Bind him hand and foot, and cast him into outer darkness. (Matt. 22:12.) And he shews that His officers are the angels, of whom he says, The angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire;

(Matt. 13:49.) but it is added, I tell thee, thou shalt not depart thence till thou hast paid the very last mite. For as they who pay money on interest do not get rid of the debt of interest before that the amount of the whole principal is paid even up to the least sum in every kind of payment, so by the compensation of love and the other acts, or by each particular kind of satisfaction the punishment of sin is cancelled.

ORIGEN. Or else, He here introduces four characters, the adversary, the magistrate, the officer, and the judge. But with Matthew the character of the magistrate is left out, and instead of the officer a servant is introduced. They differ also in that the one has written a farthing, the other a mite, but each has called it the last. Now we say that all men have present with them two angels, a bad one who encourages them to wicked deeds, a good one who persuades all that is best. Now the former, our adversary whenever we sin rejoices, knowing that he has an occasion for exultations and boasting with the prince of the world, who sent him. But in the Greek, “the adversary” is written with the article, to signify that he is one out of many, seeing that each individual is under the ruler of his nation. Give diligence then that you may be delivered from your adversary, or from the ruler to whom the adversary drags you, by having wisdom, justice, fortitude, and temperance. But if you have given diligence, let it be in Him who says, I am the life, (John 14:6.) otherwise the adversary will hale thee to the judge. Now he says, hale, to point out that they are forced unwillingly to condemnation. But I know no other judge but our Lord Jesus Christ who delivers to the officer. Each of us have our own officers; the officers exercise rule over us, if we owe any thing. If I paid every man every thing, I come to the officers and answer with a fearless heart, “I owe them nothing.” But if I am a debtor, the officer will cast me into prison, nor will he suffer me to go out from thence until I have paid every debt. For the officer has no power to let me off even a farthing. He who forgave one debtor five hundred pence and another fifty, (Luke 7:41.) was the Lord, but the exactor is not the master, but one appointed by the master to demand the debts. But the last mite he calls slight and small, for our sins are either heavy or slight. Happy then is he who sinneth not, and next in happiness he who has sinned slightly. Even among slight sins there is diversity, otherwise he would not say until he has paid the last mite. For if he owes a little, he shall not come out till he pays the last mite. But he who has been guilty of a great debt, will have endless ages for his payment.

BEDE. Or else, our adversary in the way is the word of God, which opposes our carnal desires in this life; from which he is delivered who is subject to its precepts. Else he will be delivered to the judge, for of contempt of God’s word the sinner will be accounted guilty in the judgment of the judge. The judge will deliver him to the officer, that is, the evil spirit for punishment. He will then be cast into prison, that is, to hell, where because he will ever have to pay the penalty by suffering, but never by paying it obtain pardon, he will never come out from thence, but with that most terrible serpent the devil, will expiate everlasting punishment.

CHAPTER 13

13:1–5

1. There were present at that season some that told him of the Galilæans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices.

2. And Jesus answering said unto them, Suppose ye that these Galilæans were sinners above all the Galilæans, because they suffered such things?

3. I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.

4. Or those eighteen, upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem?

5. I tell you, Nay: but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish.

GLOSS. As He had been speaking of the punishments of sinners, the story is fitly told Him of the punishment of certain particular sinners, from which He takes occasion to denounce vengeance also against other sinners: as it is said, There were present at that season some that told him of the Galilæans, whose blood Pilate had mingled with their sacrifices.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For these were followers of the opinions of Judas of Galilee, of whom Luke makes mention in the Acts of the Apostles, (Acts 5:37.) who said, that we ought to call no man master. Great numbers of them refusing to acknowledge Cæsar as their master, were therefore punished by Pilate. They said also that men ought not to offer God any sacrifices that were not ordained in the law of Moses, and so forbade to offer the sacrifices appointed by the people for the safety of the Emperor and the Roman people. Pilate then, being enraged against the Galilæans, ordered them to be slain in the midst of the very victims which they thought they might offer according to the custom of their law; so that the blood of the offerers was mingled with that of the victims offered. Now it being generally believed that these Galilæans were most justly punished, as sowing offences among the people, the rulers, eager to excite against Him the hatred of the people, relate these things to the Saviour, wishing to discover what He thought about them. But He, admitting them to be sinners, does not however judge them to have suffered such things, as though they were worse than those who suffered not. Whence it follows, And he answered and said unto them, Suppose ye that these Galilæans were sinners above all the Galilæans, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (de Laz. Conc. 3.) For God punishes some sinners by cutting off their iniquities, and appointing to them hereafter a lighter punishment, or perhaps even entirely releasing them, and correcting those who are living in wickedness by their punishment. Again, he does not punish others, that if they take heed to themselves by repentance they may escape both the present penalty and future punishment, but if they continue in their sins, suffer still greater torment.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. And He here plainly shews, that whatever judgments are passed for the punishment of the guilty, happen not only by the authority of the judges, but the will of God. Whether therefore the judge punishes upon the strict grounds of conscience, or has some other object in his condemnation, we must ascribe the work to the Divine appointment.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. To save therefore the multitudes, from the intestine seditions, which were excited for the sake of religion, He adds, but unless ye repent, and unless ye cease to conspire against your rulers, for which ye have no divine guidance, ye shall all likewise perish, and your blood shall be united to that of your sacrifices.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) And herein he shews that He permitted them to suffer such things, that the heirs of the kingdom yet living might be dismayed by the dangers of others. “What then,” you will say, “is this man punished, that I might become better?” Nay, but he is punished for his own crimes, and hence arises an opportunity of salvation to those who see it.

BEDE. But because they repented not in the fortieth year of our Lord’s Passion, the Romans coming, (whom Pilate represented, as belonging to their nation,) and beginning from Galilee, (whence our Lord’s preaching had begun,) utterly destroyed that wicked nation, and defiled with human blood not only the courts of the temples, where they were wont to offer sacrifies, but also the inner parts of the doors, (where there was no entrance to the Galileans.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Again, there had been eighteen others crushed to death by the falling of a tower, of whom He adds the same things, as it follows, Or those eighteen upon whom the tower of Siloam fell and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwell in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay, For he does not punish all in this life, giving them a time meet for repentance. Nor however does he reserve all for future punishment, lest men should deny His providence.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Now one tower is compared to the whole city, that the destruction of a part may alarm the whole. Hence it is added, But, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish; as if He said, The whole city shall shortly be smitten if the inhabitants continue in impenitence.

AMBROSE. In those whose blood Pilate mingled with the sacrifices, there seems to be a certain mystical type, which concerns all who by the compulsion of the Devil offer not a pure sacrifice, whose prayer is for a sin, (Ps. 109:7.) as it was written of Judas, who when he was amongst the sacrifices devised the betrayal of our Lord’s blood.

BEDE. For Pilate, who is interpreted, “The mouth of the hammerer,” signifies the devil ever ready to strike. The blood expresses sin, the sacrifices good actions. Pilate then mingles the blood of the Galilæans with their sacrifices when the devil stains the alms and other good works of the faithful either by carnal indulgence, or by courting the praise of men, or any other defilement. Those men of Jerusalem also who were crushed by the falling of the tower, signify that the Jews who refuse to repent will perish within their own walls. Nor without meaning is the number eighteen given, (which number among the Greeks is made up of I and H, that is, of the same letters with which the name of Jesus begins.) And it signifies that the Jews were chiefly to perish, because they would not receive the name of the Saviour. That tower represents Him who is the tower of strength. And this is rightly in Siloam, which is interpreted, “sent;” for it signifies Him who, sent by the Father, came into the world, and who shall grind to powder all on whom He falls.

13:6–9

6. He spake also this parable; A certain man had a fig tree planted in his vineyard; and he came and sought fruit thereon, and found none.

7. Then said he unto the dresser of his vineyard, Behold, these three years I come seeking fruit on this fig tree, and find none; cut it down: why cumbereth it the ground?

8. And he answering said unto him, Lord, let it alone this year also, till I shall dig about it, and dung it:

9. And if it bear fruit, well: and if not, then after that thou shalt cut it down.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. The Jews were boasting, that while the eighteen had perished, they all remained unhurt. He therefore sets before them the parable of the fig tree, for it follows, He spake also this parable; A certain man had a fig tree planted in his vineyard.

AMBROSE. There was a vineyard of the Lord of hosts, which He gave for a spoil to the Gentiles. And the comparison of the fig tree to the synagogue is well chosen, because as that tree abounds with wide and spreading foliage, and deceives the hopes of its possessor with the vain expectation of promised fruit, so also in the synagogue, while its teachers are unfruitful in good works, yet magnify themselves with words as with abundant leaves, the empty shadow of the law stretches far and wide. This tree also is the only one which puts forth fruit in place of flowers. And the fruit falls, that other fruit may succeed; yet some few of the former remain, and do not fall. For the first people of the synagogue fell off as a useless fruit, in order that out of the fruitfulness of the old religion might arise the new people of the Church; yet they who were the first out of Israel whom a branch of a stronger nature bore, under the shadow of the law and the cross, in the bosom of both, stained with a double juice after the example of a ripening fig, surpassed all others in the grace of most excellent fruits; to whom it is said, You shall sit upon twelve thrones. Some however think the fig tree to be a figure not of the synagogue, but of wickedness and treachery; yet these differ in nothing from what has gone before, except that they choose the genus instead of the species.

BEDE. The Lord Himself who established the synagogue by Moses, came born in the flesh, and frequently teaching in the synagogue, sought for the fruits of faith, but in the hearts of the Pharisees found none; therefore it follows, And came seeking fruit on it, and found none.

AMBROSE. But our Lord sought, not because He was ignorant that the fig tree had no fruit, but that He might shew in a figure that the synagogue ought by this time to have fruit. Lastly, from what follows, He teaches that He Himself came not before the time who came after three years. For so it is said, Then said he to the dresser of the vineyard, Behold, these three years I come seeking fruit on this fig tree, and find none. He came to Abraham, He came to Moses, He came to Mary, that is, He came in the seal of the covenant, He came in the law, He came in the body. We recognise His coming by His gifts; at one time purification, at another sanctification, at another justification. Circumcision purified, the law sanctified, grace justified. The Jewish people then could not be purified because they had not the circumcision of the heart, but of the body; nor be sanctified, because ignorant of the meaning of the law, they followed carnal things rather than spiritual; nor justified, because not working repentance for their offences, they knew nothing of grace. Rightly then was there no fruit found in the synagogue, and consequently it is ordered to be cut down; for it follows, Cut it down, why cumbereth it the ground? But the merciful dresser, perhaps meaning him on whom the Church is founded, foreseeing that another would be sent to the Gentiles, but he himself to them who were of the circumcision, piously intercedes that it may not be cut off; trusting to his calling, that the Jewish people also might be saved through the Church. Hence it follows, And he answering said unto him, Lord, let it alone this year also. He soon perceived hardness of heart and pride to be the causes of the barrenness of the Jews. He knew therefore how to discipline, who knew how to censure faults. Therefore adds He, till I shall dig about it. He promises that the hardness of their hearts shall be dug about by the Apostles’ spades, lest a heap of earth cover up and obscure the root of wisdom. And He adds, and dung it, that is, by the grace of humility, by which even the fig is thought to become fruitful toward the Gospel of Christ. Hence He adds, And if it bear fruit, well, that is, it shall be well, but if not, then after that thou shall cut it down.

BEDE. Which indeed came to pass under the Romans, by whom the Jewish nation was cut off, and thrust out from the land of promise.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, in another sense, the fig tree is the race of mankind. For the first man after he had sinned concealed with fig leaves his nakedness, that is, the members from which we derive our birth.

THEOPHYLACT. But each one of us also is a fig tree planted in the vineyard of God, that is, in the Church, or in the world.

GREGORY. (Hom. 31. in Evang.) But our Lord came three times to the fig tree, because He sought after man’s nature before the law, under the law, and under grace, by waiting, admonishing, visiting; but yet He complains that for three years he found no fruit, for there are some wicked men whose hearts are neither corrected by the law of nature breathed into them, nor instructed by precepts, nor converted by the miracles of His incarnation.

THEOPHYLACT. Our nature yields no fruit though three times sought for; once indeed when we transgressed the commandment in paradise; the second time, when they made the molten calf under the law; thirdly, when they rejected the Saviour. But that three years' time must be understood to mean also the three ages of life, boyhood, manhood, and old age.

GREGORY. (ubi. sup.) But with great fear and trembling should we hear the word which follows, Cut it down, why cumbereth it the ground. For every one according to his measure, in whatsoever station of life he is, except he shew forth the fruits of good works, like an unfruitful tree, cumbereth the ground; for wherever he is himself placed, he there denies to another the opportunity of working.

PSEUDO-BASIL. (De Pœnit.) For it is the part of God's mercy not silently to inflict punishment, but to send forth threatenings to recall the sinner to repentance, as He did to the men of Nineveh, and now to the dresser of the vineyard, saying, Cut it down, exciting him indeed to the care of it, and stirring up the barren soil to bring forth the proper fruits.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 32.) Let us not then strike suddenly, but overcome by gentleness, lest we cut down the fig tree still able to bear fruit, which the care perhaps of a skilful dresser will restore. Hence it is also here added, And he answering said unto him, Lord, let alone, &c.

GREGORY. (31. in Ev.) By the dresser of the vineyard is represented the order of Bishops, who, by ruling over the Church, take care of our Lord's vineyard.

THEOPHYLACT. Or the master of the household is God the Father, the dresser is Christ, who will not have the fig tree cut down as barren, as if saying to the Father, Although through the Law and the Prophets they gave no fruit of repentance, I will water them with My sufferings and teaching, and perhaps they will yield us fruits of obedience.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, the husbandman who intercedes is every holy man who within the Church prays for them that are without the Church, saying, O Lord, O Lord, let it alone this year, that is, for that time vouchsafed under grace, until I dig about it. To dig about it, is to teach humility and patience, for the ground which has been dug is lowly. The dung signifies the soiled garments, but they bring forth fruit. The soiled garment of the dresser, is the grief and mourning of sinners; for they who do penance and do it truly are in soiled garments.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or, the sins of the flesh are called the dung. From this then the tree revives to bear fruit again, for from the remembrance of sin the soul quickens itself to good works. But there are very many who hear reproof, and yet despise the return to repentance; wherefore it is added, And if it bear fruit, well.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) That is, it will be well, but if not, then after that thou shalt cut it down; namely, when Thou shalt come to judge the quick and the dead. In the mean time it is now spared.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But he who will not by correction grow rich unto fruitfulness, falls to that place from whence he is no more able to rise again by repentance.

13:10–17

10. And he was teaching in one of the synagogues on the sabbath.

11. And, behold, there was a woman which had a spirit of infirmity eighteen years, and was bowed together, and could in no wise lift up herself.

12. And when Jesus saw her, he called her to him, and said unto her, Woman, thou art loosed from thine infirmity.

13. And he laid his hands on her: and immediately she was made straight, and glorified God.

14. And the ruler of the synagogue answered with indignation, because that Jesus had healed on the sabbath day, and said unto the people, There are six days in which men ought to work: in them therefore come and be healed, and not on the sabbath day.

15. The Lord then answered him, and said, Thou hypocrite, doth not each one of you on the sabbath loose his ox or his ass from the stall, and lead him away to watering?

16. And ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, be loosed from this bond on the sabbath day?

17. And when he had said these things, all his adversaries were ashamed: and all the people rejoiced for all the glorious things that were done by him.

AMBROSE. He soon explained that He had been speaking of the synagogue, shewing, that He truly came to it, who preached in it, as it is said, And he was teaching in one of the synagogues.

CHRYSOSTOM. He teaches indeed not separately, but in the synagogues; calmly, neither wavering in any thing, nor determining aught against the law of Moses; on the Sabbath also, because the Jews were then engaged in the hearing of the law.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now that the Incarnation of the Word was manifested to destroy corruption and death, and the hatred of the devil against us, is plain from the actual events; for it follows, And behold there was a woman which had a spirit of infirmity, &c. He says spirit of infirmity, because the woman suffered from the cruelty of the devil, forsaken by God because of her own crimes or for the transgression of Adam, on account of which the bodies of men incur infirmity and death. But God gives this power to the Devil, to the end that men when pressed down by the weight of their adversity might betake them to better things. He points out the nature of her infirmity, saying, And was bowed together, and could in no wise lift up herself.

BASIL. (Hom. 9. in Hex.) Because the head of the brutes is bent down towards the ground and looks upon the earth, but the head of man was made erect towards the heaven, his eyes tending upward. For it becomes us to seek what is above, and with our sight to pierce beyond earthly things.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But our Lord, to shew that His coming into this world was to be the loosing of human infirmities, healed this woman. Hence it follows, And when Jesus saw her, he called her to him, and said unto her, Woman, thou art loosed from thine infirmity. A word most suitable to God, full of heavenly majesty; for by His royal assent He dispels the disease. He also laid His hands upon her, for it follows, He laid his hands on her, and immediately she was made straight, and glorified God. We should here answer, that the Divine power had put on the sacred flesh. For it was the flesh of God Himself, and of no other, as if the Son of Man existed apart from the Son of God, as some have falsely thought. But the ungrateful ruler of the synagogue, when he saw the woman, who before was creeping on the ground, now by Christ's single touch made upright, and relating the mighty works of God, sullies his zeal for the glory of the Lord with envy, and condemns the miracle, that he might appear to be jealous for the Sabbath. As it follows, And the ruler of the synagogue answered with indignation, because that Jesus had healed on the sabbath-day, and said unto the people, There are six days in which men ought to work, and not on the sabbath-day. He would have those who are dispersed about on the other days, and engaged in their own works, not come on the Sabbath to see and admire our Lord's miracles, lest by chance they should believe. But the law has not forbidden all manual work on the Sabbath-day, and has it forbidden that which is done by a word or the mouth? Cease then both to eat and drink and speak and sing. And if thou readest not the law, how is it a Sabbath to thee? But supposing the law has forbidden manual works, how is it a manual work to raise a woman upright by a word?

AMBROSE. Lastly, God rested from the works of the world not from holy works, for His working is constant and everlasting; as the Son says, My Father worketh until now, and I work; (John 5:17.) that after the likeness of God our worldly, not our religious, works should cease. Accordingly our Lord pointedly answered him, as it follows, Thou hypocrite, doth not each one of you on the sabbath-day loose his ox or his ass? &c.

BASIL. (Basil. Hom. 1. de Jej.) The hypocrite is one who on the stage assumes a different character from his own. So also in this life some men carry one thing in their heart, and shew another on the surface to the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. Well then does he call the ruler of the synagogue a hypocrite, for he had the appearance of an observer of the law, but in his heart was a crafty and envious man. For it troubles him not that the Sabbath is broken, but that Christ is glorified. Now observe, that whenever Christ orders a work to be done, (as when He ordered the man sick of the palsy to take up his bed,) He raises His words to something higher, convincing men by the majesty of the Father, as He says, My Father worketh until now, and I work. (John 5:17.) But in this place, as doing every thing by word, He adds nothing further, refuting their calumny by the very things which they themselves did.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now the ruler of the synagogue is convicted a hypocrite, in that he leads his cattle to watering on the Sabbath-day, but this woman, not more by birth than by faith the daughter of Abraham, he thought unworthy to be loosed from the chain of her infirmity. Therefore He adds, And ought not this woman, being a daughter of Abraham, whom Satan has bound, lo, these eighteen years, to be loosed from this bond on the sabbath-day? The ruler preferred that this woman should like the beasts rather look upon the earth than receive her natural stature, provided that Christ was not magnified. But they had nothing to answer; they themselves unanswerably condemned themselves. Hence it follows, And when he had said these things, all his adversaries were ashamed. But the people, reaping great good from His miracles, rejoiced at the signs which they saw, as it follows, And all the people rejoiced. For the glory of His works vanquished every scruple in them who sought Him not with corrupt hearts.

GREGORY. (Hom. 31. in Evang.) Mystically the unfruitful fig tree signifies the woman that was bowed down. For human nature of its own will rushes into sin, and as it would not bring forth the fruit of obedience, has lost the state of uprightness. The same fig tree preserved signifies the woman made upright.

AMBROSE. Or the fig tree represents the synagogue; afterwards in the infirm woman there follows as it were a figure of the Church, which having fulfilled the measure of the law and the resurrection, and now raised up on high in that eternal resting place, can no more experience the frailty of our weak inclinations. Nor could this woman be healed except she had fulfilled the law and grace. For in ten sentences is contained the perfection of the law, and in the number eight the fulness of the resurrection.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Or else; man was made on the sixth day, and on the same sixth day were all the works of the Lord finished, but the number six multiplied three times makes eighteen. Because then man who was made on the sixth day was unwilling to do perfect works, but before the law, under the law, and at the beginning of grace, was weak, the woman was bowed down eighteen years.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 110.) That which the three years signified in the tree, the eighteen did in the woman, for three times six is eighteen. But she was crooked and could not look up, for in vain she heard the words, lift up your hearts.

GREGORY. (up sup.) For every sinner who thinketh earthly things, not seeking those that are in heaven, is unable to look up. For while pursuing his baser desires, he declines from the uprightness of his state; or his heart is bent crooked, and he ever looks upon that which he unceasingly thinks about. The Lord called her and made her upright, for He enlightened her and succoured her. He sometimes calls but does not make upright, for when we are enlightened by grace, we ofttimes see what should be done, but because of sin do not practise it. For habitual sin binds down the mind, so that it cannot rise to uprightness. It makes attempts and fails, because when it has long stood by its own will, when the will is lacking, it falls.

AMBROSE. Now this miracle is a sign of the coming sabbath, when every one who has fulfilled the law and grace, shall by the mercy of God put off the toils of this weak body. But why did He not mention any more animals, save to shew that the time would come when the Jewish and Gentile nations should quench their bodily thirst, and this world's heat in the fulness of the fountain of the Lord, and so through the calling forth of two nations, the Church should be saved.

BEDE. But the daughter of Abraham is every faithful soul, or the Church gathered out of both nations into the unity of the faith. There is the same mystery then in the ox or ass being loosed and led to water, as in the daughter of Abraham being released from the bondage of our affections.

13:18–21

18. Then said he, Unto what is the kingdom of God like? and whereunto shall I resemble it?

19. It is like a grain of mustard seed, which a man took, and cast into his garden; and it grew, and waxed a great tree; and the fowls of the air lodged in the branches of it.

20. And again he said, Whereunto shall I liken the kingdom of God?

21. It is like leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened.

GLOSS. While His adversaries were ashamed, and the people rejoiced, at the glorious things that were done by Christ, He proceeds to explain the progress of the Gospel under certain similitudes, as it follows, Then said he, Unto what is the kingdom of God like? It is like a grain of mustard seed, &c. (Mat. 17:19.)

AMBROSE. In another place, a grain of mustard seed is introduced where it is compared to faith. If then the mustard seed is the kingdom of

God, and faith is as the grain of mustard seed; faith is truly the kingdom of heaven, which is within us. (Luke 17:21.) A grain of mustard seed is indeed a mean and trifling thing, but as soon as it is crushed, it pours forth its power. And faith at first seems simple, but when it is buffeted by adversity, pours forth the grace of its virtue. The martyrs are grains of mustard seed. They have about them the sweet odour of faith, but it is hidden. Persecution comes; they are smitten by the sword; and to the farthest boundaries of the whole world they have scattered the seeds of their martyrdom. The Lord Himself also is a grain of mustard seed; He wished to be bruised that we might see that we are a sweet savour of Christ. (2 Cor. 2:15.) He wishes to be sown as a grain of mustard seed, which when a man takes he puts it into his garden. For Christ was taken and buried in a garden, where also He rose again and became a tree, as it follows, And it waxed into a great tree. For our Lord is a grain when He is buried in the earth, a tree when He is lifted up into the heaven. He is also a tree overshadowing the world, as it follows, And the fowls of the air rested in his branches; that is, the heavenly powers and they whoever (for their spiritual deeds) have been thought worthy to fly forth. Peter is a branch, Paul is a branch, into whose arms, by certain hidden ways of disputation, we who were a far off now fly, having taken up the wings of the virtues. Sow then Christ in thy garden; a garden is truly a place full of flowers, wherein the grace of thy work may blossom, and the manifold odour of thy different virtues be breathed forth. Wherever is the fruit of the seed, there is Christ.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else; The kingdom of God is the Gospel, through which we gain the power of reigning with Christ. As then the mustard seed is surpassed in size by the seeds of other herbs, yet so increases as to become the shelter of many birds; so also the life-giving doctrine was at first in the possession only of a few, but afterwards spread itself abroad.

BEDE. Now the man, is Christ, the garden, His Church, to be cultivated by His discipline. He is well said to have taken the grain, because the gifts which He together with the Father gave to us from His divinity, He took from His humanity. But the preaching of the Gospel grew and was disseminated throughout the whole world. It grows also in the mind of every believer, for no one is suddenly made perfect. But in its growth, not like the grass, (which soon withers,) but it rises up like the trees. The branches of this tree are the manifold doctrines, on which the chaste souls, soaring upwards on the wings of virtue, build and repose.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, any man receiving a grain of mustard seed, that is, the word of the Gospel, and sowing it in the garden of his soul, makes it a great tree, so as to bring forth branches, and the birds of the air (that is, they who soar above the earth) rest in the branches, (that is, in sublime contemplation.) For Paul received the instruction of Ananias (Acts 9:17.) as it were a small grain, but planting it in his garden, he brought forth many good doctrines, in which they dwell who have high heavenly thoughts, as Dionysius, Hierotheus, and many others.

He next likens the kingdom of God to leaven, for it follows, And again he says, Whereunto shall I liken it? It is like to leaven, &c.

AMBROSE. Many think Christ is the leaven, for leaven which is made from meal, excels its kind in strength, not in appearance. So also Christ (according to the Fathers) shone forth above others equal in body, but unapproachable in excellence. The Holy Church therefore represents the type of the woman, of whom it is added, Which a woman, took and hid in three measures (sata) of meal, till the whole was leavened.

BEDE. The Satum is a kind of measure in use in the province of Palestine, holding about a bushel and a half.

AMBROSE. But we are the meal of the woman which hide the Lord Jesus in the secrets of our hearts, until the heat of heavenly wisdom penetrates our innermost recesses. And since He says it was hid in three measures, it seems fitting that we should believe the Son of God to have been hid in the Law, veiled in the Prophets, manifested in the preaching of the Gospel. Here however I am invited to proceed farther, because our Lord Himself has taught us, that the leaven is the spiritual teaching of the Church. Now the Church sanctifies with its spiritual leaven the man who is renewed in body, soul, and spirit, seeing that these three are united in a certain equal measure of desire, and there breathes forth a complete harmony of the will. If then in this life the three measures abide in the same person until they are leavened and become one, there will be hereafter an incorruptible communion with them that love Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, for the woman you must understand the soul; but the three measures, its three parts, the reasoning part, the affections, and the desires. If then any one has hidden in these three the word of God, he will make the whole spiritual, so as not by his reason to lie in argument, nor by his anger or desire to be transported beyond control, but to be conformed to the word of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 111.) Or, the three measures of meal are the race of mankind, which was restored out of the three sons of Noah. The woman who hid the leaven is the wisdom of God.

EUSEBIUS. Or else, by the leaven our Lord means the Holy Spirit, the Sower proceeding (as it were) from the seed, which is the word of God. But the three measures of meal, signify the knowledge of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, which the woman, that is, Divine wisdom, and the Holy Spirit, impart.

BEDE. Or, by the leaven He speaks of love, which kindles and stirs up the heart; the woman, that is, the Church, hides the leaven of love in three measures, because she bids us love God with all our hearts, all our minds, and all our strength. And this until the whole is leavened, that is, until love moves the whole soul into the perfection of itself, which begins here, but will be completed hereafter.

13:22–30

22. And he went through the cities and villages, teaching, and journeying toward Jerusalem.

23. Then said one unto him, Lord, are there few that be saved? And he said unto them,

24. Strive to enter in at the strait gate: for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able.

25. When once the master of the house is risen up, and hath shut to the door, and ye begin to stand without, and to knock at the door, saying, Lord, Lord, open unto us; and he shall answer and say unto you, I know you not whence ye are:

26. Then shall ye begin to say, We have eaten and drunk in thy presence, and thou hast taught in our streets.

27. But he shall say, I tell you, I know you not whence ye are; depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity.

28. There shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, when ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets, in the kingdom of

God, and you yourselves thrust out.

29. And they shall come from the east, and from the west, and from the north, and from the south, and shall sit down in the kingdom of God.

30. And, behold, there are last which shall be first, and there are first which shall be last.

GLOSS. Having spoken in parables concerning the increase of the teaching of the Gospel, He every where endeavours to spread it by preaching. Hence it is said, And he went through the cities and villages.

THEOPHYLACT. For he did not visit the small places only, as they do who wish to deceive the simple, nor the cities only, as they who are fond of show, and seek their own glory; but as their common Lord and Father providing for all, He went about every where. Nor again did He visit the country towns only, avoiding Jerusalem, as if He feared the cavils of the lawyers, or death, which might follow therefrom; and hence he adds, And journeying towards Jerusalem. For where there were many sick, there the Physician chiefly shewed Himself. It follows, Then said one unto him, Lord, are there few that be saved?

GLOSS. This question seems to have reference to what had gone before. For in the parable which was given above, He had said, that the birds of the air rested on its branches, by which it might be supposed that there would be many who would obtain the rest of salvation. And because one had asked the question for all, the Lord does not answer him individually, as it follows, And he said unto them, Strive to enter in at the strait gate.

BASIL. (in reg. ad int. 240.) For as in earthly life the departure from right is exceeding broad, so he who goes out of the path which leads to the kingdom of heaven, finds himself in a vast extent of error. (int. 241.). But the right way is narrow, the slightest turning aside being full of danger, whether to the right or to the left, as on a bridge, where he who slips on either side is thrown into the river.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The narrow gate also represents the toils and sufferings of the saints. For as a victory in battle bears witness to the strength of the soldiers, so a courageous endurance of labours and temptations will make a man strong.

CHRYSOSTOM. (24, 40. in Matt.) What then is that which our Lord says elsewhere, My yoke is easy, and my burden is light? (Matt. 11:30.) There is indeed no contradiction, but the one was said because of the nature of temptations, the other with respect to the feeling of those who overcame them. For whatever is troublesome to our nature may be considered easy when we undertake it heartily. Besides also, though the way of salvation is narrow at its entrance, yet through it we come into a large space, but on the contrary the broad way leadeth to destruction.

GREGORY. (Mor. 11. c. 50.) Now when He was about to speak of the entrance of the narrow gate, He said first, strive, for unless the mind struggles manfully, the wave of the world is not overcome, by which the soul is ever thrown back again into the deep.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now our Lord does not seem to satisfy him who asked whether there are few that be saved, when He declares the way by which man may become righteous. But it must be observed, that it was our Saviour's custom to answer those who asked Him, not according as they might judge right, as often as they put to Him useless questions, but with regard to what might be profitable to His hearers. And what advantage would it have been to His hearers to know whether there should be many or few who would be saved. But it was more necessary to know the way by which man may come to salvation. Purposely then He says nothing in answer to the idle question, but turns His discourse to a more important subject.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 111.) Or else, our Lord confirmed the words He heard, that is, by saying that there are few who are saved, for few enter by the strait gate, but in another place He says this very thing, Narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there are who enter into it. (Matt. 7:14.) Therefore He adds, For many I say unto you shall seek to enter;

BEDE. Urged thereto by their love of safety, yet shall not be able, frightened by the roughness of the road.

BASIL. (Hom. in Psalm 1, 15.) For the soul wavers to and fro, at one time choosing virtue when it considers eternity, at another preferring pleasures when it looks to the present. Here it beholds ease, or the delights of the flesh, there its subjection or captive bondage; here drunkenness, there sobriety; here wanton mirth, there overflowing of tears; here dancing, there praying; here the sound of the pipe, there weeping; here lust, there chastity.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 111.) Now our Lord in no wise contradicts Himself when He says, that there are few who enter in at the strait gate, and elsewhere, Many shall come from the east and the west; (Matt. 8:11.) for there are few in comparison with those who are lost, many when united with the angels. Scarcely do they seem a grain when the threshing floor is swept, but so great a mass will come forth from this floor, that it will fill the granary of heaven.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But that they who cannot enter are regarded with wrath, He has shewn by an obvious example, as follows, When once the master of the house has risen up, &c. as if when the master of the house who has called many to the banquet has entered in with his guests, and shut to the door, then shall come afterwards men knocking.

BEDE. The master of the house is Christ, who since as very God He is every where, is already said to be within those whom though He is in heaven He gladdens with His visible presence, but is as it were without to those whom while contending in this pilgrimage, He helps in secret. But He will enter in when He shall bring the whole Church to the contemplation of Himself. He will shut the door when He shall take away from the reprobate all room for repentance. Who standing without will knock, that is, separated from the righteous will in vain implore that mercy which they have despised. Therefore it follows, And he will answer and say to you, I know you not whence ye are.

GREGORY. (Moral. 2. c. 5.) For God not to know is for Him to reject, as also a man who speaks the truth is said not to know how to lie, for he disdains to sin by telling a lie, not that if he wished to lie he knew not how, but that from love of truth he scorns to speak what is false. Therefore the light of truth knows not the darkness which it condemns. It follows, Then shall ye begin to say, We have eaten and drunk in thy presence, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This refers to the Israelites, who, according to the practice of their law, when offering victims to God, eat and are merry. They heard also in the synagogues the books of Moses, who in his writings delivered not his own words, but the words of God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or it is said to the Israelites, simply because Christ was born of them according to the flesh, and they ate and drank with Him, and heard Him preaching. But these things also apply to Christians. For we eat the body of Christ and drink His blood as often as we approach the mystic table, and He teaches in the streets of our souls, which are open to receive Him.

BEDE. Or mystically, he eats and drinks in the Lord’s presence who eagerly receives the food of the word. Hence it is added for explanation, Thou hast taught in our streets. For Scripture in its more obscure places is food, since by being expounded it is as it were broken and swallowed. In the clearer places it is drink, where it is taken down just as it is found. But at a feast the banquet does not delight him whom the piety of faith commends not. The knowledge of the Scriptures does not make him known to God, whom the iniquity of his works proves to be unworthy; as it follows, And he will say unto you, I know not whence ye are; depart from me.

BASIL. (reg. brev. ad int. 282.) He perhaps speaks to those whom the Apostle describes in his own person, saying, If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have all knowledge, and give all my goods to feed the poor, but have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. For whatever is done not from regard to the love of God, but to gain praise from men, obtains no praise from God.

THEOPHYLACT. Observe also that they are objects of wrath in whose street the Lord teaches. If then we have heard Him teaching not in the streets, but in poor and lowly hearts, we shall not be regarded with wrath.

BEDE. But the twofold punishment of hell is here described, that is, the feeling cold and heat. For weeping is wont to be excited by heat, gnashing of teeth by cold. Or gnashing of teeth betrays the feeling of indignation, that he who repents too late, is too late angry with himself.

GLOSS. Or the teeth will gnash which here delighted in eating, the eyes will weep which here wandered with desire. By each He represents the real resurrection of the wicked.

THEOPHYLACT. This also refers to the Israelites with whom He was speaking, who receive from this their severest blow, that the Gentiles have rest with the fathers, while they themselves are shut out. Hence He adds, When you shall see Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of God, &c.

EUSEBIUS. For the Fathers above mentioned, before the times of the Law, forsaking the sins of many gods to follow the Gospel way, received the knowledge of the most high God; to whom many of the Gentiles were conformed through a similar manner of life, but their children suffered estrangement from the Gospel rules; and herein it follows, And behold they are last which shall be first, and they are first which shall be last.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For to the Jews who held the first place have the Gentiles been preferred.

THEOPHYLACT. But we as it seems are the first who have received from our very cradles the rudiments of Christian teaching, and perhaps shall be last in respect of the heathens who have believed at the end of life.

BEDE. Many also at first burning with zeal, afterwards grow cold; many at first cold, on a sudden become warm; many despised in this world, will be glorified in the world to come; others renowned among men, will in the end be condemned.

13:31–35

31. The same day there came certain of the Pharisees, saying unto him, Get thee out, and depart hence: for Herod will kill thee.

32. And he said unto them, Go ye, and tell that fox, Behold, I cast out devils, and I do cures to day and to morrow, and the third day I shall be perfected.

33. Nevertheless I must walk to day, and to morrow, and the day following: for it cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem.

34. O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee; how often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen doth gather her brood under her wings, and ye would not!

35. Behold, your house is left unto you desolate: and verily I say unto you, Ye shall not see me, until the time come when ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The preceding words of our Lord roused the Pharisees to anger. For they perceived that the people were now smitten in their hearts, and eagerly receiving His faith. For fear then of losing their office as rulers of the people, and lacking their gains, with pretended love for Him, they persuade Him to depart from hence, as it is said, The same day there came certain of the Pharisees, saying unto him, Get thee out and depart hence, for Herod will kill thee: but Christ, who searcheth the heart and the reins, answers them meekly and under figure. Hence it follows, And he said unto them, Go ye and tell that fox.

BEDE. Because of his wiles and stratagems He calls Herod a fox, which is an animal full of craft, concealing itself in a ditch because of snares, having a noisome smell, never walking in straight paths, all which things belong to heretics, of whom Herod is a type, who endeavours to destroy Christ (that is, the humility of the Christian faith) in the hearts of believers.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else the discourse seems to change here, and not to refer so much to the character of Herod as some think, as to the lies of the Pharisees. For He almost represents the Pharisees themselves to be standing near, when He said, Go tell this fox, as it is in the Greek. Therefore he commanded them to say that which might rouse the multitude of Pharisees. Behold, said He, I cast out devils, and I do cures to day and to morrow, and on the third day I shall be perfected. He promises to do what was displeasing to the Jews, namely, to command the evil spirits, and deliver the sick from disease, until in His own person He should undergo the suffering of the cross. But because the Pharisees thought that He who was the Lord of hosts, feared the hand of Herod. He refutes this, saying, Nevertheless I must walk to day and to morrow, and the day following. When He says must, He by no means implies a necessity imposed upon Him, but rather that He walked where He liked according to the inclination of His will, until He should come to the end of the dreadful cross, the time of which Christ shews to be now drawing near, when He says, To day and to morrow.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He says, What think ye of My death? Behold, a little while, and it will come to pass. But by the words, To day and to morrow, are signified many days; as we also are wont to say in common conversation, “To day and to morrow such a thing takes place,” not that it happens in that interval of time. And to explain more clearly the words of the Gospel, you must not understand them to be, I must walk to day and to morrow, but place a stop after to day and to morrow, then add, and walk on the day following, as frequently in reckoning we are accustomed to say, “The Lord’s day and the day after, and on the third I will go out,” as if by reckoning two, to denote the third. So also our Lord speaks as if calculating, I must do so to day, and so to morrow, and then afterward on the third day I must go to Jerusalem.

AUGUSTINE. (con. Julian. lib. 6. c. 19.) Or these things are understood to have been spoken mystically by Him, so as to refer to His body, which is the Church. For devils are cast out when the Gentiles having forsaken their superstition, believe in Him. And cures are perfected when according to His commands, after having renounced the devil and this world until the end of the resurrection, (by which as it were the third day will be completed,) the Church shall be perfected in angelical fulness by the immortality also of the body.

THEOPHYLACT. But because they said unto Him, Depart from hence, for Herod seeks to kill thee, speaking in Galilee where Herod reigned, He shews that not in Galilee, but in Jerusalem it had been fore-ordained that He should suffer. Hence it follows, For it can not be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem. When thou hearest, It can not be (or it is not fitting) that a prophet should perish out of Jerusalem, think not that any violent constraint was imposed upon the Jews, but He says this seasonably with reference to their eager desire after blood; just as if any one seeing a most savage robber, should say, the road on which this robber lurks can not be without bloodshed to travellers. So also no where else but in the abode of robbers must the Lord of the prophets perish. For accustomed to the blood of His prophets, they will also kill the Lord; as it follows, O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, which killest the prophets.

BEDE. In calling upon Jerusalem, He addresses not the stones and buildings of the city, but the dwellers therein, and He weeps over it with the affection of a father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 75. in Matt.) For the twice repeated word betokens compassion or very great love. For the Lord speaks, if we may say it, as a lover would to his mistress who despised him, and was therefore about to be punished.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Severus.) But the repetition of the name also shews the rebuke to be severe. For she who knew God, how does she persecute God’s ministers?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now that they were unmindful of the Divine blessings He proves as follows, How often would I have gathered thy children together as a hen doth gather her brood under her wings, and ye would not. He led them by the hand of Moses full of all wisdom. He warns them by His prophets, He wished to have them under His wings, (i. e. under the shelter of His power,) but they deprived themselves of these choice blessings, through their ingratitude.

AUGUSTINE. (Enchir. 97.) As many as I gathered together, it was done by my all prevailing will, yet thy unwillingness, for thou wert ever ungrateful.

BEDE. Now He who aptly had called Herod a fox, who was plotting His death, compares Himself to a bird, for foxes are ever lying in wait for birds.

BASIL. (in Esaiam c. 16. §. 301.) He compared also the sons of Jerusalem to birds in the net, as if He said, Birds who are used to fly in the air are caught by the treacherous devices of the catchers, but thou shalt be as a chicken in want of another’s protection; when thy mother then has fled away, thou art taken from thy nest as too weak to defend thyself, too feeble to fly; as it follows, Behold, your house is left unto you desolate.

BEDE. The city itself which He had called the nest, He now calls the house of the Jews; for when our Lord was slain, the Romans came, and plundering it as a deserted nest, took away both their place, nation, and kingdom.

THEOPHYLACT. Or your house, (that is, temple,) as if He says, As long as there was virtue in you, it was my temple, but after that you made it a den of thieves, it was no more my house but yours. Or by house He meant the whole Jewish nation, according to the Psalm, O house of Jacob, bless ye the Lord, (Psalm 135:20.) by which he shews that it was He Himself who governed them, and took them out of the hand of their enemies. It follows, And verily I say unto you, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. lib. 2. c. 72.) There seems nothing opposed to St. Luke’s narrative, in what the multitudes said when our Lord came to Jerusalem, Blessed is he who cometh in the name of the Lord, (Mat. 21:9.) for He had not as yet come thither, nor had this yet been spoken.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For our Lord had departed from Jerusalem, as it were abandoning those who were unworthy of His presence, and afterwards returned to Jerusalem, having performed many miracles, when that crowd meets Him, saying, Osanna to the Son of David, blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. ubi sup.) But as Luke does not say to what place our Lord went from thence, so that He should not come except at that time, (for when this was spoken He was journeying onward until He should come to Jerusalem,) He means therefore to refer to that coming of His, when He should appear in glory.

THEOPHYLACT. For then also will they unwillingly confess Him to be their Lord and Saviour, when there shall be no departure hence. But in saying, Ye shall not see me until he shall come, &c. does not signify that present hour, but the time of His cross; as if He says, When ye have crucified Me, ye shall no more see Me until I come again.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Luke must be understood then as wishing to anticipate here, before his narrative brought our Lord to Jerusalem, or to make Him when approaching the same city, give an answer to those who told Him to beware of Herod, like to that which Matthew says He gave when He had already reached Jerusalem.

BEDE. Ye shall not see, that is, unless ye have worked repentance, and confessed Me to be the Son of the Father Almighty, ye shall not see My face at the second coming.

CHAPTER 14

14:1–6

1. And it came to pass, as he went into the house of one of the chief Pharisees to eat bread on the sabbath day, that they watched him.

2. And, behold, there was a certain man before him which had the dropsy.

3. And Jesus answering spake unto the Lawyers and Pharisees, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath day?

4. And they held their peace. And he took him, and healed him, and let him go;

5. And answered them, saying, Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightway pull him out on the sabbath day?

6. And they could not answer him again to these things.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Although our Lord knew the malice of the Pharisees, yet He became their guest, that He might benefit by His words and miracles those who were present. Whence it follows, And it came to pass, as he went into the house of one of the chief Pharisees to eat bread on the sabbath day, that they watched him; to see whether He would despise the observance of the law, or do any thing that was forbidden on the sabbath day. When then the man with the dropsy came into the midst of them, He rebukes by a question the insolence of the Pharisees, who wished to detect Him; as it is said, And, behold, there was a certain man before him which had the dropsy. And Jesus answering, &c.

BEDE. When it is said that Jesus answered, there is a reference to the words which went before, And they watched him. For the Lord knew the thoughts of men.

THEOPHYLACT. But by His question He exposes their folly. For while God blessed the sabbath, (Gen. 2:1.) they forbade to do good on the sabbath; but the day which does not admit the works of the good is accursed.

BEDE. But they who were asked, are rightly silent, for they perceived that whatever they said, would be against themselves. For if it is lawful to heal on the sabbath day, why did they watch the Saviour whether He would heal? If it is not lawful, why do they take care of their cattle on the sabbath? Hence it follows, But they held their peace.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Disregarding then the snares of the Jews, He cures the dropsical, who from fear of the Pharisees did not ask to be healed on account of the sabbath, but only stood up, that when Jesus beheld him, He might have compassion on him and heal him. And the Lord knowing this, asked not whether he wished to be made whole, but forthwith healed him. Whence it follows; And he took him, and healed him, and let him go. Wherein our Lord took no thought not to offend the Pharisees, but only that He might benefit him who needed healing. For it becomes us, when a great good is the result, not to care if fools take offence.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But seeing the Pharisees awkwardly silent, Christ baffles their determined impudence by some important considerations. As it follows; And he answered and said unto them, Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightway pull him out on the sabbath day?

THEOPHYLACT. As though He said, If the law forbids to have mercy on the sabbath-day, have no care of thy son when in danger on the sabbath-day. But why speak I of a son, when thou dost not even neglect an ox if thou seest it in danger?

BEDE. By these words He so refutes His watchers, the Pharisees, as to condemn them also of covetousness, who in the deliverance of animals consult their own desire of wealth. How much more then ought Christ to deliver a man, who is much better than cattle!

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Evan. lib. 2. cap. 29.) Now He has aptly compared the dropsical man to an animal which has fallen into a ditch, (for he is troubled by water,) as He compared that woman, whom He spoke of as bound, and whom He Himself loosed, to a beast which is let loose to be led to water.

BEDE. By a suitable example then He settles the question, shewing that they violate the sabbath by a work of covetousness, who contend that he does so by a work of charity. Hence it follows, And they could not answer him again to these things. Mystically, the dropsical man is compared to him who is weighed down by an overflowing stream of carnal pleasures. For the disease of dropsy derives the name from a watery humour.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or we rightly compare the dropsical man to a covetous rich man. For as the former, the more he increases in unnatural moisture the greater his thirst; so also the other, the more abundant his riches, which he does not employ well, the more ardently he desires them.

GREGORY. (14 Mor. c. 6.) Rightly then is the dropsical man healed in the Pharisees’ presence, for by the bodily infirmity of the one, is expressed the mental disease of the other.

BEDE. In this example also He well refers to the ox and the ass; so as to represent either the wise and the foolish, or both nations; that is, the Jew oppressed by the burden of the law, the Gentile not subject to reason. For the Lord rescues from the pit of concupiscence all who are sunk therein.

14:7–11

7. And he put forth a parable to those which were bidden, when he marked how they chose out the chief rooms; saying unto them,

8. When thou art bidden of any man to a wedding, sit not down in the highest room; lest a more honourable man than thou be bidden of him;

9. And he that bade thee and him come and say to thee, Give this man place; and thou begin with shame to take the lowest room.

10. But when thou art bidden, go and sit down in the lowest room; that when he that bade thee cometh, he may say unto thee, Friend, go up higher: then shalt thou have worship in the presence of them that sit at meat with thee.

11. For whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.

AMBROSE. First the dropsical man is cured, in whom the abundant discharges of the flesh crushed down the powers of the soul, quenched the ardour of the Spirit. Next, humility is taught, when at the nuptial feast the desire of the highest place is forbidden. As it is said, And he spake, Sit not down in the highest room.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For to rush forward hastily to honours which are not fitting for us, indicates rashness and casts a slur upon our actions. Hence it follows, lest a more honourable man than thou be invited, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) And so the seeker of honour obtained not that which he coveted, but suffered a defeat, and busying himself how he might be loaded with honours, is treated with dishonour. And because nothing is of so much worth as modesty, He leads His hearer to the opposite of this seeking; not only forbidding him to seek the highest place, but bidding him search for the lowest. As it follows; But when thou art bidden, go and sit down in the lowest room.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For if a man wishes not to be set before others, he obtains this honour according to the divine word. As it follows; That when he that bade thee cometh, he may say unto thee, Friend, go up higher. In these words He does not harshly chide, but gently admonishes; for a word of advice is enough for the wise. And thus for their humility men are crowned with honours; as it follows, Then shall thou have worship.

BASIL. (in reg. fus. ad inter. 12.) To take then the lowest place at a feast, according to our Lord’s command, is becoming to every man, but again to rush contentiously after this is to be condemned as a breach of order and cause of tumult; and a strife raised about it, will place you on a level with those who dispute concerning the highest place. Wherefore, as our Lord here says, it becomes him who makes the feast to arrange the order of sitting down. Thus in patience and love should we mutually bear ourselves, following all things decently according to order, not for external appearance or public display; nor should we seem to study or affect humility by violent contradiction, but rather gain it by condescension or by patience. For resistance or opposition is a far stronger token of pride than taking the first seat at meat, when we obtain it by authority.

THEOPHYLACT. Now let no one deem the above precepts of Christ to be trifling, and unworthy of the sublimity and grandeur of the Word of God. For you would not call him a merciful physician who professed to heal the gout, but refused to cure a scar on the finger or a tooth-ache. Besides, how can that passion of vainglory appear slight, which moved or agitated those who sought the first seats. It became then the Master of humility to cut off every branch of the bad root. But observe this also, that when the supper was ready, and the wretched guests were contending for precedency before the eyes of the Saviour, there was a fit occasion for advice.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Having shewn therefore from so slight an example the degradation of the ambitious and the exaltation of the humbleminded, He adds a great thing to a little, pronouncing a general sentence, as it follows, For every one who exalts himself shall be abased, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted. This is spoken according to the divine judgment, not after human experience, in which they who desire after glory obtain it, while others who humble themselves remain inglorious.

THEOPHYLACT. Moreover, he is not to be respected in the end, nor by all men, who thrusts himself into honours; but while by some he is honoured, by others he is disparaged, and sometimes even by the very men who outwardly honour him.

BEDE. But as the Evangelist calls this admonition a parable, we must briefly examine what is its mystical meaning. Whosoever being bidden has come to the marriage feast of Christ's Church, being united to the members of the Church by faith, let him not exalt himself as higher than others by boasting of his merits. For he will have to give place to one more honourable who is bidden afterwards, seeing that he is overtaken by the activity of those who followed him, and with shame he occupies the lowest place, now that knowing better things of the others he brings low whatever high thoughts he once had of his own works. But a man sits in the lowest place according to that verse, The greater thou art, humble thyself in all things. (Eccles. 3:18.) But the Lord when He cometh, whomsoever He shall find humble, blessing him with the name of friend, He will command him to go up higher. For whoever humbleth himself as a little child, he is the greatest in the kingdom of heaven. But it is well said, Then shalt thou have glory, that thou mayest not begin to seek now what is kept for thee in the end. It may also be understood, even in this life, for daily does God come to His marriage feast, despising the proud; and often giving to the humble such great gifts of His Spirit, that the assembly of those who sit at meat, i. e. the faithful, glorify them in wonder. But in the general conclusion which is added, it is plainly declared that the preceding discourse of our Lord must be understood typically. For not every one who exalts himself before men is abased; nor is he who humbleth himself in their sight, exalted by them. But whoever exalteth himself because of his merits, the Lord shall bring low, and him who humbleth himself on account of his mercies, shall He exalt.

12. Then said he also to him that bade him, When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, neither thy kinsmen, nor thy rich neighbours; lest they also bid thee again, and a recompence be made thee.

13. But when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, the blind:

14. And thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee: for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just.

THEOPHYLACT. The supper being composed of two parties, the invited and the inviter, and having already exhorted the invited to humility, He next rewards by His advice the inviter, guarding him against making a feast to gain the favour of men. Hence it is said, Then said he also to him that bade him, When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 1, 3. in ep. Col.) Many are the sources from which friendships are made. Leaving out all unlawful ones, we shall speak only of those which are natural and moral; the natural are, for instance, between father and son, brother and brother, and such like; which He meant, saying, Nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen; the moral, when a man has become your guest or neighbour; and with reference to these He says, nor thy neighbours.

BEDE. Brothers then, and friends, and the rich, are not forbidden, as though it were a crime to entertain one another, but this, like all the other necessary intercourse among men, is shewn to fail in meriting the reward of everlasting life; as it follows, Lest perchance they also bid thee again, and a recompense be made thee. He says not, “and sin be committed against thee.” And the like to this He speaks in another place, And if ye do good to those who do good to you, what thank have ye? (Luke 6:33.) There are however certain mutual feastings of brothers and neighbours, which not only incur a retribution in this life, but also condemnation hereafter. And these are celebrated by the general gathering together of all, or the hospitality in turn of each one of the company; and they meet together that they may perpetrate foul deeds, and through excess of wine be provoked to all kinds of lustful pleasure.

CHRYSOSTOM. Let us not then bestow kindness on others under the hope of return. For this is a cold motive, and hence it is that such a friendship soon vanishes. But if you invite the poor, God, who never forgets, will be your debtor, as it follows, But when ye make a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 45. in Act.) For the humbler our brother is, so much the more does Christ come through him and visit us. For he who entertains a great man does it often from vainglory. And elsewhere, But very often interest is his object, that through such a one he may gain promotion. I could indeed mention many who for this pay court to the most distinguished of the nobles, that through their assistance they may obtain the greater favour from the prince. Let us not then ask those who can recompense us, as it follows, And thou shalt be blessed, for they cannot recompense thee. And let us not be troubled when we receive no return of a kindness, but when we do; for if we have received it we shall receive nothing more, but if man does not repay us, God will. As it follows, For thou shall be recompensed at the resurrection of the just.

BEDE. And though all rise again, yet it is called the resurrection of the just, because in the resurrection they doubt not that they are blessed. Whoever then bids the poor to his feast shall receive a reward hereafter. But he who invites his friends, brothers, and the rich, has received his reward. But if he does this for God’s sake after the example of the sons of Job, God, who Himself commanded all the duties of brotherly love, will reward him.

CHRYSOSTOM. But thou sayest, the poor are unclean and filthy. Wash him, and make him to sit with thee at table. If he has dirty garments, give him clean ones. Christ comes to thee through him, and dost thou stand trifling?

GREGORY OF NYSSA. Do not then let them lie as though they were nothing worth. Reflect who they are, and thou wilt discover their preciousness. They have put on the image of the Saviour. Heirs of future blessings, bearing the keys of the kingdom, able accusers and excusers, not speaking themselves, but examined by the judge.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 45. in Act.) It would become thee then to receive them above in the best chamber, but if thou shrinkest, at least admit Christ below, where are the menials and servants. Let the poor man be at least thy door keeper. For where there is alms, the devil durst not enter. And if thou sittest not down with them, at any rate send them the dishes from thy table.

ORIGEN. But mystically, he who shuns vain-glory calls to a spiritual banquet the poor, that is, the ignorant, that he may enrich them; the weak, that is, those with offended consciences, that he may heal them; the lame, that is, those who have wandered from reason, that he may make their paths straight; the blind, that is, those who discern not the truth, that they may behold the true light. But it is said, They cannot recompense thee, i. e. they know not how to return an answer.

14:15–24

15. And when one of them that sat at meat with him heard these things, he said unto him, Blessed is he that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God.

16. Then said he unto him, A certain man made a great supper, and bade many:

17. And sent his servant at supper time to say to them that were bidden, Come; for all things are now ready.

18. And they all with one consent began to make excuse. The first said unto him, I have bought a piece of ground, and I must needs go and see it: I pray thee have me excused.

19. And another said, I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to prove them: I pray thee have me excused.

20. And another said, I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come.

21. So that servant came, and shewed his lord these things. Then the master of the house being angry said to his servant, Go out quickly into the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in hither the poor, and the maimed, and the halt, and the blind.

22. And the servant said, Lord, it is done as thou hast commanded, and yet there is room.

23. And the lord said unto the servant, Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled.

24. For I say unto you, That none of those men which were bidden shall taste of my supper.

EUSEBIUS. Our Lord had just before taught us to prepare our feasts for those who cannot repay, seeing that we shall have our reward at the resurrection of the just. Some one then, supposing the resurrection of the just to be one and the same with the kingdom of God, commends the above-mentioned recompense; for it follows, When one of them that sat at meat with him heard these things, he said unto him, Blessed is he that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. That man was carnal, and a careless hearer of the things which Christ delivered, for he thought the reward of the saints was to be bodily.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 112.) Or because he sighed for something afar off, and that bread which he desired lay before him. For who is that Bread of the kingdom of God but He who says, I am the living bread which came down from heaven? (John 6:51.) Open not thy mouth, but thy heart.

BEDE. But because some receive this bread by faith merely, as if by smelling, but its sweetness they loathe to really touch with their mouths, our Lord by the following parable condemns the dulness of those men to be unworthy of the heavenly banquet. For it follows, But he said unto him, A certain man made a great supper, and bade many.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This man represents God the Father just as images are formed to give the resemblance of power. For as often as God wishes to declare His avenging power, He is called by the names of bear, leopard, lion, and others of the same kind; but when He wishes to express mercy, by the name of man. The Maker of all things, therefore, and Father of Glory, or the Lord, prepared the great supper which was finished in Christ.

For in these latter times, and as it were the setting of our world, the Son of God has shone upon us, and enduring death for our sakes, has given us His own body to eat. Hence also the lamb was sacrificed in the evening according to the Mosaic law. Rightly then was the banquet which was prepared in Christ called a supper.

GREGORY. (Hom. 36. in Evan.) Or he made a great supper, as having prepared for us the full enjoyment of eternal sweetness. He bade many, but few came, because sometimes they who themselves are subject to him by faith, by their lives oppose his eternal banquet. And this is generally the difference between the delights of the body and the soul, that fleshly delights when not possessed provoke a longing desire for them, but when possessed and devoured, the eater soon turns from satiety to loathing;

spiritual delights, on the other hand, when not possessed are loathed, when possessed the more desired. But heavenly mercy recalls those despised delights to the eyes of our memory, and in order that we should drive away our disgust, bids us to the feast. Hence it follows, And he sent his servant, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. That servant who was sent is Christ Himself, who being by nature God and the true Son of God, emptied Himself, and took upon Him the form of a servant. But He was sent at supper time. For not in the beginning did the Word take upon Him our nature, but in the last time; and he adds, For all things are ready. For the Father prepared in Christ the good things bestowed upon the world through Him, the removal of sins, the participation of the Holy Spirit, the glory of adoption. To these Christ bade men by the teaching of the Gospel.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or else, the Man is the Mediator between God and man, Christ Jesus; He sent that they who were bidden might come, i. e. those who were called by the prophets whom He had sent; who in the former times invited to the supper of Christ, were often sent to the people of Israel, often bade them to come at supper time. They received the inviters, refused the supper. They received the prophets and killed Christ, and thus ignorantly prepared for us the supper. The supper being now ready, i. e. Christ being sacrificed, the Apostles were sent to those, to whom prophets had been sent before.

GREGORY. By this servant then who is sent by the master of the family to bid to supper, the order of preachers is signified. But it is often the case that a powerful person has a despised servant, and when his Lord orders any thing through him, the servant speaking is not despised, because respect for the master who sends him is still kept up in the heart. Our Lord then offers what he ought to be asked for, not ask others to receive. He wishes to give what could scarcely be hoped for; yet all begin at once to make excuse, for it follows, And they all began with one consent to make excuse. Behold a rich man invites, and the poor hasten to come. We are invited to the banquet of God, and we make excuse.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Now there were three excuses, of which it is added, The first said unto him, I have bought a piece of ground, and I must needs go and see it. The bought piece of ground denotes government.

Therefore pride is the first vice reproved. For the first man wished to rule, not willing to have a master.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) Or by the piece of ground is meant worldly substance. Therefore he goes out to see it who thinks only of outward things for the sake of his living.

AMBROSE. Thus it is that the worn out soldier is appointed to serve degraded offices, as he who intent upon things below buys for himself earthly possessions, can not enter into the kingdom of heaven. Our Lord says, Sell all that thou hast, and follow me.

It follows, And another said, I have bought five yoke of oxen, and I go to prove them.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 112.) The five yoke of oxen are taken to be the five senses of the flesh; in the eyes sight, in the ears hearing, in the nostrils smelling, in the mouth taste, in all the members touch. But the yoke is more easily apparent in the three first senses; two eyes, two ears, two nostrils. Here are three yoke. And in the mouth is the sense of taste which is found to be a kind of double, in that nothing is sensible to the taste, which is not touched both by the tongue and palate. The pleasure of the flesh which belongs to the touch is secretly doubled. It is both outward and inward. But they are called yoke of oxen, because through those senses of the flesh earthly things are pursued. For the oxen till the ground, but men at a distance from faith, given up to earthly things, refuse to believe in any thing, but what they arrive at by means of the five-fold sense of the body. “I believe nothing but what I see.” If such were our thoughts, we should be hindered from the supper by those five yoke of oxen. But that you may understand that it is not the delight of the five senses which charms and conveys pleasure, but that a certain curiosity is denoted, he says not, I have bought five yoke of oxen, and go to feed them, but go to prove them.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 36. in Ev.) By the bodily senses also because they cannot comprehend things within, but take cognizance only of what is without, curiosity is rightly represented, which while it seeks to shake off a life which is strange to it, not knowing its own secret life, desires to dwell upon things without. But we must observe, that the one who for his farm, and the other who to prove his five yoke of oxen, excuse themselves from the supper of their Inviter, mix up with their excuse the words of humility. For when they say, I pray thee, and then disdain to come, the word sounds of humility, but the action is pride. It follows, And this said, I have married a wife, and therefore I cannot come.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) That is, the delight of the flesh which hinders many, I wish it were outward and not inward. For he who said, I have married a wife, taking pleasure in the delights of the flesh, excuses himself from the supper; let such a one take heed lest he die from inward hunger.

BASIL. But he says, I cannot come, because that the human mind when it is degenerating to worldly pleasures, is feeble in attending to the things of God.

GREGORY. (Hom. 36.) But although marriage is good, and appointed by Divine Providence for the propagation of children, some seek therein not fruitfulness of offspring, but the lust of pleasure. And so by means of a righteous thing may not unfitly an unrighteous thing be represented.

AMBROSE. Or marriage is not blamed; but purity is held up to greater honour, since the unmarried woman careth for the things of the Lord, that she may be holy in body and spirit, but she that is married careth for the things of the world. (1 Cor. 7:34.)

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Now John when he said, all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, (1 John 2:16.) began from the point where the Gospel ended. The lust of the flesh, I have married a wife; the lust of the eyes, I have bought fire yoke of oxen; the pride of life, I have bought a farm. But proceeding from a part to the whole, the five senses have been spoken of under the eyes alone, which hold the chief place among the five senses. Because though properly the sight belongs to the eyes, we are in the habit of ascribing the act of seeing to all the five senses.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But whom can we suppose these to be who refused to come for the reason just mentioned, but the rulers of the Jews, whom throughout the sacred history we find to have been often reproved for these things?

ORIGEN. Or else, they who have bought a piece of ground and reject or refuse the supper, are they who have taken other doctrines of divinity, but have despised the word which they possessed. But he who has bought five yoke of oxen is he who neglects his intellectual nature, and follows the things of sense, therefore he cannot comprehend a spiritual nature. But he who has married a wife is he who is joined to the flesh, a lover of pleasure rather than of God. (1 Tim. 3:4.)

AMBROSE. Or let us suppose that three classes of men are excluded from partaking of that supper, Gentiles, Jews, Heretics. The Jews by their fleshly service impose upon themselves the yoke of the law, for the five yoke are the yoke of the Ten Commandments, of which it is said, And he declared unto you his covenant, which he commanded you to perform, even ten commandments; and he wrote them upon two tables of stone. (Deut. 4:13.) That is, the commands of the Decalogue. Or the five yoke are the five books of the old law. But heresy indeed, like Eve with a woman's obstinacy, tries the affection of faith. And the Apostle says that we must flee from covetousness, lest entangled in the customs of the Gentiles we be unable to come to the kingdom of Christ. (Eph. 5:3, Col. 3:5, Heb. 13:5, 1 Tim. 6:11.) Therefore both he who has bought a farm is a stranger to the kingdom, and he who has chosen the yoke of the law rather than the gift of grace, and he also who excuses himself because he has married a wife.

It follows, And the servant returned, and told these things to his Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (in Gen. ad lit. c. 19.) Not for the sake of knowing inferior beings does God require messengers, as though He gained aught from them, for He knows all things stedfastly and unchangeably. But he has messengers for oursakes and their own, because to be present with God, and stand before Him so as to consult Him about His subjects, and obey His heavenly commandments, is good for them in the order of their own nature.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But with the rulers of the Jews who refused their call, as they themselves confessed, Have any of the rulers believed on him? (John 7:48.) the Master of the household was wroth, as with them that deserved His indignation and anger; whence it follows, Then the master of the house being angry, &c.

PSEUDO-BASIL. (app. Hom. in Ps. 37.) Not that the passion of anger belongs to the Divine substance, but an operation such as in us is caused by anger, is called the anger and indignation of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Thus it was that the master of the house is said to have been enraged with the chiefs of the Jews, and in their stead were called men taken from out of the Jewish multitude, and of weak and impotent minds. For at Peter's preaching, first indeed three thousand, then five thousand believed, and afterwards much people; whence it follows, He said unto his servant, Go out straightway into the streets and lanes of the city, and bring in hither the poor, and the maimed, and the halt, and the blind. (Acts 2:41, 44.

AMBROSE. He invites the poor, the weak, and the blind, to shew that weakness of body shuts out no one from the kingdom of heaven, and that he is guilty of fewer sins who lacks the incitement to sin; or that the infirmities of sin are forgiven through the mercy of God. Therefore he sends to the streets, that from the broader ways they may come to the narrow way.

Because then the proud refuse to come, the poor (Greg. Hom. 36.) are chosen, since they are called weak and poor who are weak in their own judgment of themselves, for there are poor, and yet as it were strong, who though lying in poverty are proud; the blind are they who have no brightness of understanding; the lame are they who have walked not uprightly in their works. But since the faults of these are expressed in the weakness of their members, as those were sinners who when bidden refused to come, so also are these who are invited and come; but the proud sinners are rejected, the humble are chosen. God then chooses those whom the world despises, because for the most part the very act of contempt recals a man to himself. And men so much the sooner hear the voice of God, as they have nothing in this world to take pleasure in. When then the Lord calls certain from the streets and lanes to supper, He denotes that people who had learnt to observe in the city the constant practice of the law. But the multitude who believed of the people of Israel did not fill the places of the upper feast room. Hence it follows, And the servant said, Lord, it is done as thou hast commanded, and yet there is room. For already had great numbers of the Jews entered, but yet there was room in the kingdom for the abundance of the Gentiles to be received. Therefore it is added, And the Lord said unto the servant, Go out into the highways and hedges, and compel them to come in, that my house may be filled. When He commanded His guests to be collected from the wayside and the hedges, He sought for a rural people, that is, the Gentiles.

AMBROSE. Or, He sends to the highways and about the hedges, because they are fit for the kingdom of God, who, not absorbed in the desire for present goods, are hastening on to the future, set in a certain fixed path of good will. And who like a hedge which separates the cultivated ground from the uncultivated, and keeps off the incursion of the cattle, know how to distinguish good and evil, and to hold up the shield of faith against the temptations of spiritual wickedness.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 112.) The Gentiles came from the streets and lanes, the heretics come from the hedges. For they who make a hedge seek for a division; let them be drawn away from the hedges, plucked asunder from the thorns. But they are unwilling to be compelled. By our own will, say they, will we enter. Compel them to enter, He says. Let necessity be used from without, thence arises a will.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 36.) They then who, broken down by the calamities of this world, return to the love of God, are compelled to enter. But very terrible is the sentence which comes next. For I say unto you, That none of those men which were bidden shall taste of my supper. Let no one then despise the call, lest if when bidden he make excuse, when he wishes to enter he shall not be able.

14:25–27

25. And there went great multitudes with him: and he turned, and said unto them,

26. If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.

27. And whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, cannot be my disciple.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 37. in Ev.) The mind is kindled, when it hears of heavenly rewards, and already desires to be there, where it hopes to enjoy them without ceasing; but great rewards cannot be reached except by great labours. Therefore it is said, And there went great multitudes with him: and he turned to them, and said, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For because many of those that accompanied Him followed not with their whole heart, but lukewarmly, He shews what kind of a man his disciple ought to be.

GREGORY. (in Hom. ut sup.) But it may be asked, how are we bid to hate our parents and our relations in the flesh, who are commanded to love even our enemies? But if we weigh the force of the command we are able to do both, by rightly distinguishing them so as both to love those who are united to us by the bond of the flesh, and whom we acknowledge our relations, and by hating and avoiding not to know those whom we find our enemies in the way of God. For he is as it were loved by hatred, who in his carnal wisdom, pouring into our ears his evil sayings, is not heard.

AMBROSE. For if for thy sake the Lord renounces His own mother, saying, Who is my mother? and who are my brethren? (Matt. 12:48, Mark 3:33.) why dost thou deserve to be preferred to thy Lord? But the Lord will have us neither be ignorant of nature, nor be her slaves, but so to submit to nature, that we reverence the Author of nature, and depart not from God out of love to our parents.

GREGORY. (in Hom. ut sup.) Now to shew that this hatred towards relations proceeds not from inclination or passion, but from love, our Lord adds, yea, and his own life also. It is plain therefore that a man ought to hate his neighbour, by loving as himself him who hated him. For then we rightly hate our own soul when we indulge not its carnal desires, when we subdue its appetites, and wrestle against its pleasures. That which by being despised is brought to a better condition, is as it were loved by hatred.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But life must not be renounced, which both in the body and the soul the blessed Paul also preserved, that yet living in the body he might preach Christ. But when it was necessary to despise life so that he might finish his course, he counts not his life dear unto him. (Acts 20:24.)

GREGORY. (in Hom. ut sup.) How the hatred of life ought to be shewn He declares as follows; Whosoever bears not his cross, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. He means not that we should place a beam of wood on our shoulders, but that we should ever have death before our eyes. As also Paul died daily and despised death. (1 Cor. 15:31.)

BASIL. By bearing the cross also he announced the death of his Lord, saying, The world is crucified to me, and I to the world, (Gal. 6:14.) which we also anticipate at our very baptism, in which our old man is crucified, that the body of sin may be destroyed.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 37. in Ev.) Or because the cross is so called from torturing. In two ways we bear our Lord’s cross, either when by abstinence we afflict our bodies, or when through compassion of our neighbour we think all his necessities our own. But because some exercise abstinence of the flesh not for God’s sake but for vain-glory, and shew compassion, not spiritually but carnally, it is rightly added, And, cometh after me. For to bear His cross and come after the Lord, is to use abstinence of the flesh, or compassion to our neighbour, from the desire of an eternal gain.

14:28–33

28. For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it?

29. Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him,

30. Saying, This man began to build, and was not able to finish.

31. Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?

32. Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage, and desireth conditions of peace.

33. So likewise, whosoever he be of you that for-saketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple.

GREGORY. (37. in Ev.) Because He had been giving high and lofty precepts, immediately follows the comparison of building a tower, when it is said, For which of you intending to build a tower does not first count &c. For every thing that we do should be preceded by anxious consideration. If then we desire to build a tower of humility, we ought first to brace ourselves against the ills of this world.

BASIL. (in Esai. 2.) Or the tower is a lofty watch-tower fitted for the guardianship of the city and the discovery of the enemy’s approach. In like manner was our understanding given us to preserve the good, to guard against the evil. For the building up whereof the Lord bids us sit down and count our means if we have sufficient to finish.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (lib. de Virg. 17.) For we must be ever pressing onward that we may reach the end of each difficult undertaking by successive increases of the commandments of God, and so to the completion of the divine work. For neither is one stone the whole fabric of the tower, nor does a single command lead to the perfection of the soul. But we must lay the foundation, and according to the Apostle, thereupon must be placed store of gold, silver, and precious stones. (1 Cor. 3:12.) Whence it is added, Lest haply after he hath laid the foundation, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For we ought not to lay a foundation, i. e. begin to follow Christ, and not bring the work to an end, as those of whom St. John writes, That many of his disciples went backward. (John 6:66.) Or by the foundation understand the word of teaching, as for instance concerning abstinence. There is need therefore of the above-mentioned foundation, that the building up of our works be established, a tower of strength from the face of the enemy. (Ps. 61:3.) Otherwise, man is laughed at by those who see him, men as well as devils.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For when occupied in good works, unless we watch carefully against the evil spirits, we find those our mockers who are persuading us to evil. But another comparison is added proceeding from the less to the greater, in order that from the least things the greatest may be estimated. For it follows, Or what king, going to make war against another king, sitteth not down first, and consultelh whether he be able with ten thousand to meet him that cometh against him with twenty thousand?

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For we fight against spiritual wickedness in high places; (Eph. 6:12.) but there presses upon us a multitude also of other enemies, fleshly lust, the law of sin raging in our members, and various passions, that is, a dreadful multitude of enemies.

AUGUSTINE. Or the ten thousand of him who is going to fight with the king who has twenty, signify the simplicity of the Christian about to contend with the subtlety of the devil.

THEOPHYLACT. The king is sin reigning in our mortal body; (Rom. 6:12.) but our understanding also was created king. If then he wishes to fight against sin, let him consider with his whole mind. For the devils are the satellites of sin, which being twenty thousand, seem to surpass in number our ten thousand, because that being spiritual compared to us who are corporeal, they are come to have much greater strength.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) But as with respect to the unfinished tower, he alarms us by the reproaches of those who say, The man began to build, and was not able to finish, so with regard to the king with whom the battle was to be, he reproved even peace, adding, Or else, while the other is yet a great way off, he sendeth an ambassage, and desireth conditions of peace; signifying that those also who forsake all they possess cannot endure from the devil the threats of even coming temptations, and make peace with him by consenting unto him to commit sin.

GREGORY. (in Hom. ut sup.) Or else, in that awful trial we come not to the judgment a match for our king, for ten thousand are against twenty thousand, two against one. He comes with a double army against a single. For while we are scarcely prepared in deeds only, he sifts us at once both in thought and deed. While then he is yet afar off, who though still present in judgment, is not seen, let us send him an embassy, our tears, our works of mercy, the propitiatory victim. This is our message which appeases the coming king.

AUGUSTINE. Now to what these comparisons refer, He on the same occasion sufficiently explained, when he said, So likewise whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be my disciple. The cost therefore of building the tower, and the strength of the ten thousand against the king who has twenty thousand, mean nothing else than that each one should forsake all that he hath. The foregoing introduction tallies then with the final conclusion. For in the saying that a man forsakes all that he hath, is contained also that he hates his father and mother, his wife and children, brothers and sisters, yea and his own wife also. For all these things are a man’s own, which entangle him, and hinder him from obtaining not those particular possessions which will pass away with time, but those common blessings which will abide for ever.

BASIL. But our Lord’s intention in the above-mentioned example is not indeed to afford occasion or give liberty to any one to become His disciple or not, as indeed it is lawful not to begin a foundation, or not to treat of peace, but to shew the impossibility of pleasing God, amidst those things which distract the soul, and in which it is in danger of becoming an easy prey to the snares and wiles of the devil.

BEDE. But there is a difference between renouncing all things and leaving all things. For it is the way of few perfect men to leave all things, that is, to cast behind them the cares of the world, but it is the part of all the faithful to renounce all things, that is, so to hold the things of the world as by them not to be held in the world.

14:34–35

34. Salt is good: but if the salt have lost his savour, wherewith shall it be seasoned?

35. It is neither fit for the land, nor yet for the dunghill; but men cast it out. He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.

BEDE. He had said above that the tower of virtue was not only to be begun, but also to be completed, and to this belongs the following, Salt is good. It is a good thing to season the secrets of the heart with the salt of spiritual wisdom, nay with the Apostles to become the salt of the earth. (Matt. 5:14.) For salt in substance consists of water and air, having a slight mixture of earth, but it dries up the fluent nature of corrupt bodies so as to preserve them from decay. Fitly then He compares His disciples to salt, inasmuch as they are regenerated by water and the Spirit; and as living altogether spiritually and not according to the flesh, they after the manner of salt change the corrupt life of men who live on the earth, and by their own virtuous lives delight and season their followers.

THEOPHYLACT. But not only those who are gifted with the grace of teachers, but private individuals also He requires to become like salt, useful to those around them. But if he who is to be useful to others becomes reprobate, he cannot be profited, as it follows, But if the salt has lost his savour, where-with shall it be seasoned?

BEDE. As if He says, “If a man who has once been enlightened by the seasoning of truth, falls back into apostacy, by what other teacher shall he be corrected, seeing that the sweetness of wisdom which he tasted he has cast away, alarmed by the troubles or allured by the attractions of the world; hence it follows, It is neither fit for the land, nor yet for the dunghill, &c. For salt when it has ceased to be fit for seasoning food and drying flesh, will be good for nothing. For neither is it useful to the land, which when it is east thereon is hindered from bearing, nor for the dunghill to benefit the dressing of the land. So he who after knowledge of the truth falls back, is neither able to bring forth the fruit of good works himself, nor to instruct others; but he must be cast out of doors, that is, must be separated from the unity of the Church.

THEOPHYLACT. But because His discourse was in parables and dark sayings, our Lord, in order to rouse His hearers that they might not receive indifferently what was said of the salt, adds, He that hath ears to hear, let him hear, that is, as he has wisdom let him understand. For we must take the ears here as the perceptive power of the mind and capacity of understanding.

BEDE. Let him hear also not by despising, but by doing what he has learnt.

CHAPTER 15

15:1–7

1. Then drew near unto him all the Publicans and sinners for to hear him.

2. And the Pharisees and Scribes murmured, saying, This man receiveth sinners, and eateth with them.

3. And he spake this parable unto them, saying,

4. What man of you, having an hundred sheep, if he lose one of them, doth not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, and go after that which is lost, until he find it?

5. And when he hath found it, he layeth it on his shoulders, rejoicing.

6. And when he cometh home, he calleth together his friends and neighbours, saying unto them, Rejoice with me; for I have found my sheep which was lost.

7. I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance.

AMBROSE. Thou hadst learnt by what went before not to be occupied by the business of this world, not to prefer transitory things to eternal. But because the frailty of man can not keep a firm step in so slippery a world, the good Physician has shewn thee a remedy even after falling; the merciful Judge has not denied the hope of pardon; hence it is added, Then drew near unto him all the publicans.

GLOSS. (interlin.) That is, those who collect or farm the public taxes, and who make a business of following after worldly gain.

THEOPHYLACT. For this was His wont, for the sake whereof He had taken upon Him the flesh, to receive sinners as the physician those that are sick. But the Pharisees, the really guilty, returned murmurs for this act of mercy, as it follows, And the Pharisees and Scribes murmured, saying, &c.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 34. in Evang.) From which we may gather, that true justice feels compassion, false justice scorn, although the just are wont rightly to repel sinners. But there is one act proceeding from the swelling of pride, another from the zeal for discipline. For the just, though without they spare not rebukes for the sake of discipline, within cherish sweetness from charity. In their own minds they set above themselves those whom they correct, whereby they keep both them under by discipline, and themselves by humility. But, on the contrary, they who from false justice are wont to pride themselves, despise all others, and never in mercy condescend to the weak; and thinking themselves not to be sinners, are so much the worse sinners. Of such were the Pharisees, who condemning our Lord because He received sinners, with parched hearts reviled the very fountain of mercy. But because they were so sick that they knew not of their sickness, to the end that they might know what they were, the heavenly Physician answers them with mild applications. For it follows, And he spake this parable unto them, saying, What man of you having an hundred sheep, and if he lose one of them, does not go after it, &c. He gave a comparison which man might recognise in himself, though it referred to the Creator of men. For since a hundred is a perfect number, He Himself had a hundred sheep, seeing that He possessed the nature of the holy angels and men. Hence he adds, Having an hundred sheep.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. We may hence understand the extent of our Saviour’s kingdom. For He says there are a hundred sheep, bringing to a perfect sum the number of rational creatures subject to Him. For the number hundred is perfect, being composed of ten decades. But out of these one has wandered, namely, the race of man which inhabits earth.

AMBROSE. Rich then is that Shepherd of whom we all are a hundredth part; and hence it follows, And if he lose one of them, does he not leave &c.

GREGORY. One sheep then perished when man by sinning left the pastures of life. But in the wilderness the ninety and nine remained, because the number of the rational creatures, that is to say of Angels and men who were formed to see God, was lessened when man perished; and hence it follows, Does he not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness, because in truth he left the companies of the Angels in heaven. But man then forsook heaven when he sinned. And that the whole body of the sheep might be perfectly made up again in heaven, the lost man was sought for on earth; as it follows, And go after that &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But was He then angry with the rest, and moved by kindness only to one? By no means. For they are in safety, the right hand of the Most Mighty being their defence. It behoved Him rather to pity the perishing, that the remaining number might not seem imperfect. For the one being brought back, the hundred regains its own proper form.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. 2. qu. 32.) Or He spoke of those ninety and nine whom He left in the wilderness, signifying the proud, who bear solitude as it were in their mind, in that they wish to appear themselves alone, to whom unity is wanting for perfection. For when a man is torn from unity, it is by pride; since desiring to be his own master, he follows not that One which is God, but to that One God ordains all who are reconciled by repentance, which is obtained by humility.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Hom. de Mul. Pecc.) But when the shepherd had found the sheep, he did not punish it, he did not get it to the flock by driving it, but by placing it upon his shoulder, and carrying it gently, he united it to his flock. Hence it follows, And when he hath found it, he layeth it upon his shoulders rejoicing.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 34.) He placed the sheep upon his shoulders, for taking man’s nature upon Him he bore our sins. But having found the sheep, he returns home; for our Shepherd having restored man, returns to his heavenly kingdom. And hence it follows, And coming he collects together his friends and neighbours, saying to them, Rejoice with me, for I have found my sheep which was lost. (1 Pet. 2:24, Isai. 53.) By His friends and neighbours He means the companies of Angels, who are His friends because they are keeping His will in their own stedfastness; they are also His neighbours, because by their own constant waiting upon Him they enjoy the brightness of His sight.

THEOPHYLACT. The heavenly powers thus are called sheep, because every created nature as compared with God is as the beasts, but inasmuch as it is rational, they are called friends and neighbours.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 34.) And we must observe that He says not, “Rejoice with the sheep that is found,” but with me, because truly our life is His joy, and when we are brought home to heaven we fill up the festivity of His joy.

AMBROSE. Now the angels, inasmuch as they are intelligent beings, do not unreasonably rejoice at the redemption of men, as it follows, I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons who need no repentance. Let this serve as an incentive to goodness, for a man to believe that his conversion will be pleasing to the assembled angels, whose favour he ought to court, or whose displeasure to fear.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But he allows there is more joy in heaven over the converted sinner, than over the just who remain stedfast; for the latter for the most part, not feeling themselves oppressed by the weight of their sins, stand indeed in the way of righteousness, but still do not anxiously sigh after the heavenly country, frequently being slow to perform good works, from their confidence in themselves that they have committed no grievous sins. But, on the other hand, sometimes those who remember certain iniquities that they have committed, being pricked to the heart, from their very grief grow inflamed towards the love of God; and because they consider they have wandered from God, make up for their former losses by the succeeding gains. Greater then is the joy in heaven, just as the leader in battle loves that soldier more who having turned from flight, bravely pursues the enemy, than him who never turned his back and never did a brave act. So the husbandman rather loves that land which after bearing thorns yields abundant fruit, than that which never had thorns, and never gave him a plentiful crop. But in the mean time we must be aware that there are very many just men in whose life there is so much joy, that no penitence of sinners however great can in any way be preferred to them. Whence we may gather what great joy it causes to God when the just man humbly mourns, if it produces joy in heaven when the unrighteous by his repentance condemns the evil that he has done.

15:8–10

8. Either what woman having ten pieces of silver, if she lose one piece, doth not light a candle, and sweep the house, and seek diligently till she find it?

9. And when she hath found it, she calleth her friends and her neighbours together, saying, Rejoice with me; for I have found the piece which I had lost.

10. Likewise, I say unto you, there is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) By the preceding parable, in which the race of mankind was spoken of as a wandering sheep, we were shewn to be the creatures of the most high God, who has made us, and not we ourselves, and we are the sheep of his pasture. (Ps. 95:7.) But now is added a second parable, in which the race of man is compared to a piece of silver which was lost, by which he shews that we were made according to the royal likeness and image, that is to say, of the most high God. For the piece of silver is a coin having the impress of the king's image, as it is said, Or what woman having ten pieces of silver, if she lose one, &c.

GREGORY. (Hom. 34. in Ev.) He who is signified by the shepherd, is also by the woman. For it is God Himself, God and the wisdom of God, but the Lord has formed the nature of angels and men to know Him, and has created them after His likeness. The woman then had ten pieces of silver, because there are nine orders of angels, but that the number of the elect might be filled up, man the tenth was created.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. 2. qu. 33.) Or by the nine pieces of silver, as by the ninety and nine sheep, He represents those who trusting in themselves, prefer themselves to sinners returning to salvation. For there is one wanting to nine to make it ten, and to ninety-nine to make it a hundred. To one He assigns all who are reconciled by repentance.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) And because there is an image impressed on the piece of silver, the woman lost the piece of silver when man (who was created after the image of God) by sinning departed from the likeness of his Creator. And this is what is added, If she lose one piece, doth she not light a candle. The woman lighted a candle because the wisdom of God appeared in man. For the candle is a light in an earthen vessel, but the light in an earthen vessel is the Godhead in the flesh. But the candle being lit, it follows, And disturbs (evertit) the house. Because verily no sooner had his Divinity shone forth through the flesh, than all our consciences were appalled. Which word of disturbance differs not from that which is read in other manuscripts, sweeps, (everrit) because the corrupt mind if it be not first overthrown through fear, is not cleansed from its habitual faults. But when the house is broken up, the piece of silver is found, for it follows, And seeks diligently till she find it; for truly when the conscience of man is disturbed, the likeness of the Creator is restored in man.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. xlv. 26.) But the piece of silver being found, He makes the heavenly powers partakers of the joy whom He made the ministers of His dispensation, and so it follows, And when she had found it, she calls together her friends and neighbours.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 23. ut sup.) For the heavenly powers are nigh unto Divine wisdom, inasmuch as they approach Him through the grace of continual vision.

THEOPHYLACT. Either they are friends as performing His will, but neighbours as being spiritual; or perhaps His friends are all the heavenly powers, but His neighbours those that come near to Him, as Thrones, Cherubims, and Seraphims.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (lib. de Virgin. c. 12.) Or else; this I suppose is what our Lord sets before us in the search after the lost piece of silver, that no advantage attaches to us from the external virtues which He calls pieces of silver, although all of them be ours, as long as that one is lacking to the widowed soul, by which in truth it obtains the brightness of the Divine image. Wherefore He first bids us light a candle, that is to say, the divine word which brings hidden things to light, or perhaps the torch of repentance. But in his own house, that is, in himself and his own conscience, must a man seek for the lost piece of silver, that is, the royal image, which is not entirely defaced, but is hid under the dirt, which signifies its corruption of the flesh, and this being diligently wiped away, that is, washed out by a well-spent life, that which was sought for shines forth. Therefore ought she who has found it to rejoice, and to call to partake of her joy the neighbours, (that is, the companion virtues,) reason, desire, and anger, and whatever powers are observed round the soul, which she teaches to rejoice in the Lord. Then concluding the parable, He adds, There is joy in the presence of the angels over one sinner that repenteth.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 34. ut sup.) To work repentance is to mourn over past sins, and not to commit things to be mourned over. For he who weeps over some things so as yet to commit others, still knows not how to work repentance, or is a hypocrite; he must also reflect that by so doing he satisfies not his Creator, since he who had done what was forbidden, must cut off himself even from what is lawful, and so should blame himself in the least things who remembers that he has offended in the greatest.

11. And he said, A certain man had two sons:

12. And the younger of them said to his father, Father, give me the portion of goods that falleth to me. And he divided unto them his living.

13. And not many days after the younger son gathered all together, and took his journey into a far country, and there wasted his substance with riotous living.

14. And when he had spent all, there arose a mighty famine in that land; and he began to be in want.

15. And he went and joined himself to a citizen of that country; and he sent him into his fields to feed swine.

16. And he would fain have filled his belly with the husks that the swine did eat: and no man gave unto him.

AMBROSE. St. Luke has given three parables successively; the sheep which was lost and found, the piece of silver which was lost and found, the son who was dead and came to life again, in order that invited by a threefold remedy, we might heal our wounds. Christ as the Shepherd bears thee on His own body, the Church as the woman seeks for thee, God as the Father receives thee, the first, pity, the second, intercession, the third, reconciliation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Patre et duobus Filiis.) There is also in the above-mentioned parable a rule of distinction with reference to the characters or dispositions of the sinners. The father receives his penitent son, exercising the freedom of his will, so as to know from whence he had fallen; and the shepherd seeks for the sheep that wanders and knows not how to return, and carries it on his shoulders, comparing to an irrational animal the foolish man, who, taken by another’s guile, had wandered like a sheep. This parable is then set forth as follows; But he said, A certain man had two sons. There are some who say of these two sons, that the elder is the angels, but the younger, man, who departed on a long journey, when he fell from heaven and paradise to earth; and they adapt what follows with reference to the fall or condition of Adam. This interpretation seems indeed a lenient one, but I know not if it be true. For the younger son came to repentance of his own accord, remembering the past plenty of his father’s house, but the Lord coming called the race of man to repentance, because he saw that to return of their own accord to whence they had fallen had never been in their thoughts; and the elder son is vexed at the return and safety of his brother, whereas the Lord says, There is joy in heaven over one sinner repenting.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But some say that by the elder son is signified Israel according to the flesh, but by the other who left his father, the multitude of the Gentiles.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. qu. 33.) This man then having two sons is understood to be God having two nations, as if they were two roots of the human race; and the one composed of those who have remained in the worship of God, the other, of those who have ever deserted God to worship idols. From the very beginning then of the creation of mankind the elder son has reference to the worship of the one God, but the younger seeks that the part of the substance which fell to him should be given him by his father. Hence it follows, And the younger of them said unto his father, Give me the portion of goods which falleth to me; just as the soul delighted with its own power seeks that which belongs to it, to live, to understand, to remember, to excel in quickness of intellect, all which are the gifts of God, but it has received them in its own power by free will. Hence it follows, And he divided unto them his substance.

THEOPHYLACT. The substance of man is the capacity of reason which is accompanied by free will, and in like manner whatever God has given us shall be accounted for our substance, as the heaven, the earth, and universal nature, the Law and the Prophets.

AMBROSE. Now you see that the Divine patrimony is given to them that seek; nor think it wrong in the father that he gave it to the younger, for no age is weak in the kingdom of God; faith is not weighed down by years. He at least counted himself sufficient who asked, And I wish he had not departed from his father, nor had had the hindrance of age. For it follows, And not many days after, the younger son gathered all together, and took his journey into a far country.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) The younger son set out into a distant country, not locally departing from God, who is every where present, but in heart. For the sinner flees from God that he may stand afar off.

AUGUSTINE. (in Ps. 70.) Whoever wishes to be so like to God as to ascribe his strength to Him, (Ps. 59:9.) let him not depart from Him, but rather cleave to Him that he may preserve the likeness and image in which he was made. But if he perversely wishes to imitate God, that as God has no one by whom He is governed, so should he desire to exercise his own power as to live under no rules, what remains for him but that having lost all heat he should grow cold and senseless, and, departing from truth, vanish away.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 33.) But that which is said to have taken place not many days after, namely, that gathering all together he set out abroad into a far country, which is forgetfulness of God, signifies that not long after the institution of the human race, the soul of man chose of its free will to take with it a certain power of its nature, and to desert Him by whom it was created, trusting in its own strength, which it wastes the more rapidly as it has abandoned Him who gave it. Hence it follows, And there wasted his substance in riotous living. But he calls a riotous or prodigal life one that loves to spend and lavish itself with outward show, while exhausting itself within, since every one follows those things which pass on to something else, and forsakes Him who is closest to himself. As it follows, And when he had spent all, there arose a great famine in that land. The famine is the want of the word of truth.

It follows, And he began to be in want. Fitly did he begin to be in want who abandoned the treasures of the wisdom and the knowledge of God, and the unfathomableness of the heavenly riches. It follows, And he went and joined himself to a citizen of that country.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) One of the citizens of that country was a certain prince of the air belonging to the army of the devil, whose fields signify the manner of his power, concerning which it follows, And he sent him into the field to feed swine. The swine are the unclean spirits which are under him.

BEDE. But to feed swine is to work those things in which the unclean spirits delight. It follows, And he would have filled his belly with the husks which the swine did eat. The husk is a sort of bean, empty within, soft outside, by which the body is not refreshed, but filled, so that it rather loads than nourishes.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The husks then with which the swine were fed are the teaching of the world, which cries loudly of vanity; according to which in various prose and verse men repeat the praises of the idols, and fables belonging to the gods of the Gentiles, wherewith the devils are delighted. Hence when he would fain have filled himself, he wished to find therein something stable and upright which might relate to a happy life, and he could not; as it follows, And no one gave to him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But since the Jews are frequently reproved in holy Scripture for their many crimes, how agree with this people the words of the elder son, saying, Lo, these many years do I serve thee, neither transgressed I at any time thy commandment. (Jer. 2:5, Isa. 29:13.) This then is the meaning of the parable. The Pharisees and Scribes reproved Him because He received sinners; He set forth the parable in which He calls God the man who is the father of the two sons, (that is, the righteous and the sinners,) of whom the first degree is of the righteous who follow righteousness from the beginning, the second is of those men who are brought back by repentance to righteousness.

BASIL. (Esai. 3, 23.) Besides, it belongs more to the character of the aged to have an old man's mind and gravity, than his hoar hairs, nor is he blamed who is young in age, but it is the young in habits who lives according to his passions.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. The younger son then went away not yet matured in mind, and seeks from his father the part of his inheritance which fell to him, that in truth he might not serve of necessity. For we are rational animals endowed with free will.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Now the Scripture says, that the father divided equally between his two sons his substance, that is, the knowledge of good and evil, which is a true and everlasting possession to the soul that uses it well. The substance of reason which flows from God to men at their earliest birth, is given equally to all who come into this world, but after the intercourse that follows, each one is found to possess more or less of the substance; since one believing that which he has received to be from his father, preserves it as his patrimony, another abuses it as something that may be wasted away, by the liberty of his own possession. But the freedom of will is shewn in that the father neither kept back the son who wished to depart, nor forced the other to go that desired to remain, lest he should seem rather the author of the evil that followed. But the youngest son went afar off, not by changing his place, but by turning aside his heart. Hence it follows, He took a journey into a far country.

AMBROSE. For what is more afar off than to depart from one’s self, to be separate not by country but by habits. For he who severs himself from Christ is an exile from his country, and a citizen of this world. Fitly then does he waste his patrimony who departs from the Church.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Hence too was the prodigal denominated one who wasted his substance, that is, his right understanding, the teaching of chastity, the knowledge of the truth, the recollections of his father, the sense of creation.

AMBROSE. Now there came to pass in that country a famine not of food but of good works and virtues, which is the more wretched fast. For he who departs from the word of God is hungry, because man does not live on bread alone, but on every word of God. (Matt. 4:4.) And he who departs from his treasures is in want. Therefore began he to be in want and to suffer hunger, because nothing satisfies a prodigal mind. He went away therefore, and attached himself to one of the citizens. For he who is attached, is in a snare. And that citizen seems to be a prince of the world. Lastly, he is sent to his farm which he bought who excused himself from the kingdom. (Luke 14:18.)

BEDE. For to be sent to the farm is to be enthralled by the desire of worldly substance.

AMBROSE. But he feeds those swine into whom the devil sought to enter, living in filth and pollution. (Matt. 8, Mark 2, Luke 8.)

THEOPHYLACT. There then he feeds, who surpassed others in vice, such as are panders, arch-robbers, arch-publicans, who teach others their abominable works.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Or he who is destitute of spiritual riches, as wisdom and understanding, is said to feed swine, that is, to nourish in his soul sordid and unclean thoughts, and he devours the material food of evil conversation, sweet indeed to him who lacks good works, because every work of carnal pleasure seems sweet to the depraved, while it inwardly unnerves and destroys the powers of the soul. Food of this kind, as being swines’ food and hurtfully sweet, that is, the allurements of fleshly delights, the Scripture describes by the name of husks.

AMBROSE. But he desired to fill his belly with the husks. For the sensual care for nothing else but to fill their bellies.

THEOPHYLACT. To whom no one gives a sufficiency of evil; for he is afar from God who lives on such things, and the devils do their best that a satiety of evil should never come.

GLOSS. Or no one gave to him, because when the devil makes any one his own, he procures no further abundance for him, knowing him to be dead.

15:17–24

17. And when he came to himself, he said, How many hired servants of my father's have bread enough and to spare, and I perish with hunger!

18. I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and before thee,

19. And am no more worthy to be called thy son: make me as one of thy hired servants.

20. And he arose, and came to his father. But when he was yet a great way off, his father saw him, and had compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him.

21. And the son said unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and in thy sight, and am no more worthy to be called thy son.

22. But the father said to his servants, Bring forth the best robe, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet:

23. And bring hither the fatted calf, and kill it; and let us eat, and be merry:

24. For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found. And they began to be merry.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. in mul. peccat.) The younger son had despised his father when first he departed, and had wasted his father's money. But when in course of time he was broken down by hardship, having become a hired servant, and eating the same food with the swine, he returned, chastened, to his father's house. Hence it is said, And when he came to himself, he said, How many hired servants of my father's have bread enough and to spare, but I perish with hunger.

AMBROSE. He rightly returns to himself, because he departed from himself. For he who returns to God restores himself to himself, and he who departs from Christ rejects himself from himself.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 33.) But he returned to himself, when from those things which without unprofitably entice and seduce, he brought back his mind to the inward recesses of his conscience.

BASIL. There are three different distinct kinds of obedience. For either from fear of punishment we avoid evil and are servilely disposed; or looking to the gain of a reward we perform what is commanded, like to mercenaries; or we obey the law for the sake of good itself and our love to Him who gave it, and so savour of the mind of children.

AMBROSE. For the son who has the pledge of the Holy Spirit in his heart seeks not the gain of an earthly reward, but preserves the right of an heir. These are also good husbandmen, to whom the vineyard is let out. (Matt. 21:41.) They abound not in husks, but bread.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But whence could he know this who had that great forgetfulness of God, which exists in all idolaters, unless it was the reflection of one returning to his right understanding, when the Gospel was preached. Already might such a soul see that many preach the truth, among whom there were some not led by the love of the truth itself, but the desire of getting worldly profit, who yet do not preach another Gospel like the heretics. Therefore are they rightly called mercenaries. For in the same house there are men who handle the same bread of the word, yet are not called to an eternal inheritance, but hire themselves for a temporal reward.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Patre et duobus Filiis.) After that he had suffered in a foreign land all such things as the wicked deserve, constrained by the necessity of his misfortunes, that is, by hunger and want, he becomes sensible of what had been his ruin, who through fault of his own will had thrown himself from his father to strangers, from home to exile, from riches to want, from abundance and luxury to famine; and he significantly adds, But I am here perishing with hunger. As though he said; I am not a stranger, but the son of a good father, and the brother of an obedient son; I who am free and noble am become more wretched than the hired servants, sunk from the highest eminence of exalted rank, to the lowest degradation.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) But he returned not to his former happiness before that coming to himself he had experienced the presence of overpowering bitterness, and resolved the words of repentance, which are added, I will arise.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For he was lying down. And I will go, for he was a long way off. To my father, because he was under a master of swine. But the other words are those of one meditating repentance in confession of sin, but not yet working it. For he does not now speak to his father, but promises that he will speak when he shall come. You must understand then that this “coming to the father” must now be taken for being established in the Church by faith, where there may yet be a lawful and effectual confession of sins. He says then that he will say to his father, Father.

AMBROSE. How merciful! He, though offended, disdains not to hear the name of Father. I have sinned; this is the first confession of sin to the Author of nature, the Ruler of mercy, the Judge of faith. But though God knows all things, He yet waits for the voice of thy confession. For with the mouth confession is made to salvation, since he lightens the load of error, who himself throweth the weight upon himself, and shuts out the hatred of accusation, who anticipates the accuser by confessing. In vain would you hide from Him whom nothing escapes; and you may safely discover what you know to be already known. Confess the rather that Christ may intercede for thee, the Church plead for thee, the people weep over thee: nor fear that thou wilt not obtain; thy Advocate promises pardon, thy Patron favour, thy Deliverer promises thee the reconciliation of thy Father’s affection. But he adds, Against heaven and before thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) When he says, Before thee, he shews that this father must be understood as God. For God alone beholds all things, from Whom neither the simple thoughts of the heart can be hidden.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Evan. l. ii. qu. 33.) But whether was this sin against heaven, the same as that which is before thee; so that he described by the name of heaven his father’s supremacy. I have sinned against heaven, i. e. before the souls of the saints; but before thee in the very sanctuary of my conscience.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Or by heaven in this place may be understood Christ. For he who sins against heaven, which although above us is yet a visible element, is the same as he who sins against man, whom the Son of God took into Himself for our salvation.

AMBROSE. Or by these words are signified the heavenly gifts of the Spirit impaired by the sin of the soul, or because from the bosom of his mother Jerusalem which is in heaven, he ought never to depart. But being cast down, he must by no means exalt himself. Hence he adds, I am no more worthy to be called thy son. And that he might be raised up by the merit of his humility, he adds, Make me as one of thy hired servants.

BEDE. To the affection of a son, who doubts not that all things which are his father’s are his, he by no means lays claim, but desires the condition of a hired servant, as now about to serve for a reward. But he admits that not even this could he deserve except by his father’s approbation.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ubi sup.) Now this prodigal son, the Holy Spirit has engraved upon our hearts, that we may be instructed how we ought to deplore the sins of our soul.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 14. in Ep. Rom.) Who after that he said, I will go to my father, (which brought all good things,) tarried not, but took the whole journey; for it follows, And he arose, and came to his father. Let us do likewise, and not be wearied with the length of the way, for if we are willing, the return will become swift and easy, provided that we desert sin, which led us out from our father’s house. But the father pitieth those who return. For it is added, And when he was yet afar off.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) For before that he perceived God afar off, when he was yet piously seeking him, his father saw him. For the ungodly and proud, God is well said not to see, as not having them before his eyes. For men are not commonly said to be before the eyes of any one except those who are beloved.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 10. in Ep. Rom. Greg. ubi sup.) Now the father perceiving his penitence did not wait to receive the words of his confession, but anticipates his supplication, and had compassion on him, as it is added, and was moved with pity.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. His meditating confession so won his father to him, that he went out to meet him, and kissed his neck; for it follows, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him. This signifies the yoke of reason imposed on the mouth of man by Evangelical tradition, which annulled the observance of the law.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Patre et duob. Fil.) For what else means it that he ran, but that we through the hindrance of our sins cannot by our own virtue reach to God. But because God is able to come to the weak, he fell on his neck. The mouth is kissed, as that from which has proceeded the confession of the penitent, springing from the heart, which the father gladly received.

AMBROSE. He runs then to meet thee, because He hears thee within meditating the secrets of thy heart, and when thou wert yet afar off, He runs lest any one should stop Him. He embraces also, (for in the running there is fore-knowledge, in the embrace mercy,) and as if by a certain impulse of paternal affection, falls upon thy neck, that he may raise up him that is cast down, and bring back again to heaven him that was loaded with sins and bent down to the earth. I had rather then be a son than a sheep. For the sheep is found by the shepherd, the son is honoured by the father.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or running he fell upon his neck; because the Father abandoned not His Only-Begotten Son, in whom He has ever been running after our distant wanderings. For God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself. (2 Cor. 5:19.) But to fall upon his neck is to lower to his embrace His own Arm, which is the Lord Jesus Christ. But to be comforted by the word of God's grace unto the hope of pardon of our sins, this is to return after a long journey to obtain from a father the kiss of love. But already planted in the Church, he begins to confess his sins, nor says he all that he promised he would say. For it follows, And his son said unto him, &c. He wishes that to be done by grace, of which he confesses himself unworthy by any merits of his own. He does not add what he had said, when meditating beforehand, Make me as one of thy hired servants. For when he had not bread, he desired to be even a hired servant, which after the kiss of his father he now most nobly disdained.

CHRYSOSTOM. (non occ.) The father does not direct his words to his son, but speaks to his steward, for he who repents, prays indeed, but receives no answer in word, yet beholds mercy effectual in operation. For it follows, But the father said unto his servants, Bring forth the best robe, and put it on him.

THEOPHYLACT. By the servants (or angels) you may understand administering spirits, or priests who by baptism and the word of teaching clothe the soul with Christ Himself. For as many of us as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ. (Gal. 3:27.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. q. 33.) Or the best robe is the dignity which Adam lost; the servants who bring it are the preachers of reconciliation.

AMBROSE. Or the robe is the cloke of wisdom, by which the Apostle covers the nakedness of the body. But he received the best wisdom; for there is one wisdom which knew not the mystery. The ring is the seal of our unfeigned faith, and the impression of truth; concerning which it follows, And put a ring on his hand.

BEDE. That is, his working, that by works faith may shine forth, and by faith his works be strengthened.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Or the ring on the hand is a pledge of the Holy Spirit, because of the participation of grace, which is well signified by the finger.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Or he orders the ring to be given, which is the symbol of the seal of salvation, or rather the badge of betrothment, and pledge of the nuptials with which Christ espouses His Church. Since the soul that recovers is united by this ring of faith to Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But the shoes on the feet are the preparation for preaching the Gospel, in order not to touch earthly things.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Patre et duobus Filiis.) Or he bids them put shoes on his feet, either for the sake of covering the soles of his feet that he may walk firm along the slippery path of the world, or for the mortification of his members. For the course of our life is called in the Scriptures a foot, and a kind of mortification takes place in shoes; inasmuch as they are made of the skins of dead animals. He adds also, that the fatted calf must be killed for the celebration of the feast. For it follows, And bring the fatted calf, that is, the Lord Jesus Christ, whom he calls a calf, because of the sacrifice of a body without spot; but he called it fatted, because it is rich and costly, inasmuch as it is sufficient for the salvation of the whole world. But the Father did not Himself sacrifice the calf, but gave it to be sacrificed to others. For the Father permitting, the Son consenting thereto by men was crucified.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Or, the fatted calf is our Lord Himself in the flesh loaded with insults. But in that the Father commands them to bring it, what else is this but that they preach Him, and by declaring Him cause to revive, yet unconsumed by hunger, the bowels of the hungry son? He also bids them kill Him, alluding to His death. For He is then killed to each man who believes Him slain. It follows, And let us eat.

AMBROSE. Rightly the flesh of the calf, because it is the priestly victim which was offered for sin. But he introduces him feasting, when he says, Be merry; to shew that the food of the Father is our salvation; the joy of the Father the redemption of our sins.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) For the father himself rejoices in the return of his son, and feasts on the calf, because the Creator, rejoicing in the acquisition of a believing people, feasts on the fruit of His mercy by the sacrifice of His Son. Hence it follows, For this my son was dead, and is alive again.

AMBROSE. He is dead who was. Therefore the Gentiles are not, the Christian is. Here however might be understood one individual of the human race; Adam was, and in him we all were. Adam perished, and in him we all have perished. Man then is restored in that Man who has died. It might also seem to be spoken of one working repentance, because he dies not who has not at one time lived. And the Gentiles indeed when they have believed are made alive again by grace. But he who has fallen recovers by repentance.

THEOPHYLACT. As then with respect to the condition of his sins, he had been despaired of; so in regard to human nature, which is changeable and can be turned from vice to virtue, he is said to be lost. For it is less to be lost than to die. But every one who is recalled and turned from sin, partaking of the fatted calf, becomes an occasion of joy to his father and his servants, that is, the angels and priests. Hence it follows, And they all began to be merry.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Those banquets are now celebrated, the Church being enlarged and extended throughout the whole world. For that calf in our Lord’s body and blood is both offered up to the Father, and feeds the whole house.

15:25–32

25. Now his elder son was in the field: and as he came and drew nigh to the house, he heard musick and dancing.

26. And he called one of the servants, and asked what these things meant.

27. And he said unto him, Thy brother is come; and thy father hath killed the fatted calf, because he hath received him safe and sound.

28. And he was angry, and would not go in: therefore came his father out, and intreated him.

29. And he answering said to his father, Lo, these many years do I serve thee, neither transgressed I at any time thy commandment: and yet thou never gavest me a kid, that I might make merry with my friends:

30. But as soon as this thy son was come, which hath devoured thy living with harlots, thou hast killed for him the fatted calf.

31. And he said unto him, Son, thou art ever with me, and all that I have is thine.

32. It was meet that we should make merry, and be glad: for this thy brother was dead, and is alive again; and was lost, and is found.

BEDE. While the Scribes and Pharisees were murmuring about His receiving sinners, our Saviour put three parables to them successively. In the two first He hints at the joy He has with the angels in the salvation of penitents. But in the third He not only declares His own joy and that of His angels, but He also blames the murmurings of those who were envious. For He says, Now his elder son was in the field.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The elder son is the people of Israel, not indeed gone into a distant country, yet not in the house, but in the field, that is, in the paternal wealth of the Law and the Prophets, choosing to work earthly things. But coming from the field he began to draw nigh to the house, that is, the labour of his servile works being condemned by the same Scriptures, he was looking upon the liberty of the Church. Whence it follows; And as he came and drew nigh to the house, he heard music and dancing; that is, men filled with the Holy Spirit, with harmonious voices preaching the Gospel. It follows, And he called one of the servants, &c. that is, he takes one of the prophets to read, and as he searches in it, asks in a manner, why are those feasts celebrated in the Church at which he finds himself present? His Father’s servant, the prophet, answers him. For it follows; And he said unto him, Thy brother is come, &c. As if he should say, Thy brother was in the farthest parts of the earth, but hence the greater rejoicing of those who sing a new song, because His praise is from the end of the earth; (Is. 42:10.) and for his sake who was afar off, was slain the Man who knows how to bear our infirmities, for they who have not been told of Him have seen Him. (See Isa. 53:4; 52:15.)

AMBROSE. But the younger son, that is the Gentile people, is envied by Israel as the elder brother, the privilege of his father’s blessing. Which the Jews did because Christ sat down to meat with the Gentiles, as it follows; And he was angry, and would not go in, &c.

AUGUSTINE. He is angry even also now, and still is unwilling to enter. When then the fulness of the Gentiles shall have come in, His father will go out at the fit time that all Israel also may be saved, as it follows, therefore came his father out and entreated him. (Rom. 11:26.) For there shall he at some time an open calling of the Jews to the salvation of the Gospel. Which manifestation of calling he calls the going out of the father to entreat the elder son. Next the answer of the elder son involves two questions; for it follows, And he answering said to his father, Lo these many years do I serve thee, neither transgressed I at any time thy commandment. With respect to the commandment not transgressed, it at once occurs, that it was not spoken of every command, but of that most essential one, that is, that he was seen to worship no other God but one, the Creator of all. Nor is that son to be understood to represent all Israelites, but those who have never turned from God to idols. For although he might desire earthly things, yet sought he them from God alone, though in common with sinners. Hence it is said, I was as a least before thee, and I am always with thee. (Ps. 7, 22.) But who is the kid which he never received to make merry upon? for it follows, Thou never gavest me a kid, &c. Under the name of a kid the sinner may be signified.

AMBROSE. The Jew requires a kid, the Christian a lamb, and therefore is Barabbas released to them, to us a lamb is sacrificed. Which thing also is seen in the kid, because the Jews have lost the ancient rite of sacrifice. Or they who seek for a kid wait for Antichrist.

AUGUSTINE. But I do not see the object of this interpretation, for it is very absurd for him to whom it is afterwards said, Thou art ever with me, to have wished for this from his father, i. e. to believe in Antichrist. Nor altogether can we rightly understand any of the Jews who are to believe in Antichrist to be that son.

And how could he feast upon that kid which is Antichrist who did not believe in him? But if to feast upon the slain kid, is the same as to rejoice at the destruction of Antichrist, how does the son whom the father did not entertain say that this was never given him, seeing that all the sons will rejoice at his destruction? His complaint then is, that the Lord Himself was denied him to feast upon, because he deems Him a sinner. For since He is a kid to that nation which regards Him as a violater and profaner of the Sabbath, it was not meet that they should be made merry at his banquet. But his words with my friends are understood according to the relation of the chiefs with the people, or of the people of Jerusalem with the other nations of Judæa.

JEROME. (in Ep. 21. ad Damasum.) Or he says, Thou never gavest me a kid, that is, no blood of prophet or priest has delivered us from the Roman power.

AMBROSE. Now the shameless son is like to the Pharisee justifying himself. Because he had kept the law in the letter, he wickedly accused his brother for having wasted his father's substance with harlots. For it follows, But as soon as this thy son is come, who hath devoured thy living, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The harlots are the superstitions of the Gentiles, with whom he wastes his substance, who having left the true marriage of the true God, goes a whoring: after evil spirits from foul desire.

JEROME. (Ubi sup.) Now in that which he says, Thou hast killed for him the fatted calf, he confesses that Christ has come, but envy has no wish to be saved.

AUGUSTINE. But the father does not rebuke him as a liar, but commending his stedfastness with him invites him to the perfection of a better and happier rejoicing. Hence it follows, But he said to him, Son, thou art ever with me.

JEROME. (ubi sup.) Or after having said, "This is boasting, not truth," the father does not agree with him, but restrains him in another way, saying, Thou art with me, by the law under which thou art bound; not as though he had not sinned, but because God continually drew him back by chastening. Nor is it wonderful that he lies to his father who hates his brother.

AMBROSE. But the kind father was still desirous to save him, saying, Thou art ever with me, either as a Jew in the law, or as the righteous man in communion with Him.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But what means he that he adds, And all that I have is thine, as if they were not his brother's also? But it is thus that all things are looked at by perfect and immortal children, that each is the possession of all, and all of each. For as desire obtains nothing without want, so charity nothing with want. But how all things? Must then God be supposed to have subjected the angels also to the possession of such a son? If you so take possession as that the possessor of a thing is its lord, certainly not all things. For we shall not be the lords, but the companions of angels. Again, if possession is thus understood, how do we rightly say that our souls possess truth? I see no reason why we may not truly and properly say so. For we do not so speak as to call our souls the mistresses of truth. Or if by the term possession we are hindered from this sense, let that also be set aside. For the father says not, “Thou possessest all things,” but All that I have is thine, still not as if thou wert its lord. For that which is our property may be either food for our families, or ornament, or something of the kind. And surely, when he can rightly call his father his own, I do not see why he may not also rightly call his own what belongs to his father, only in different ways. For when we shall have obtained that blessedness, the higher things will be ours to look upon, equal things ours to have fellowship with, the lower things ours to rule. Let then the elder brother join most safely in the rejoicing.

AMBROSE. For if he ceases to envy, he will feel all things to be his, either as the Jew possessing the sacraments of the Old Testament, or as a baptized person those of the New also.

THEOPHYLACT. Or to take the whole differently; the character of the son who seems to complain is put for all those who are offended at the sudden advances and salvation of the perfect, as David introduces one who took offence at the peace of sinners.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. The elder son then as a husbandman was engaged in husbandry, digging not the land, but the field of the soul, and planting trees of salvation, that is to say, the virtues.

THEOPHYLACT. Or he was in the field, that is, in the world, pampering his own flesh, that he might be filled with bread, and sowing in tears that he might reap in joy, but when he found what was being done, he was unwilling to enter into the common joy.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 64. in Matt.) But it is asked, whether one who grieves at the prosperity of others is affected by the passion of envy. We must answer, that no Saint grieves at such things; but rather looks upon the good things of others as his own. Now we must not take every thing contained in the parable literally, but bringing out the meaning which the author had in view, search for nothing farther. This parable then was written to the end that sinners should not despair of returning, knowing that they shall obtain great things. Therefore he introduces others so troubled at these good things as to be consumed with envy, but those who return, treated with such great honour as to become themselves an object of envy to others.

THEOPHYLACT. Or by this parable our Lord reproves the will of the Pharisees, whom according to the argument he terms just, as if to say, Let it be that you are truly just, having transgressed none of the commandments, must we then for this reason refuse to admit those who turn away from their iniquities?

JEROME. (ubi sup.) Or, in another way, all justice in comparison of the justice of God is injustice. Therefore Paul says, Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? (Rom. 7:24.) and hence were the Apostles moved with anger at the request of the sons of Zebedee. (Matt. 20:24.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Which we also ourselves sometimes feel; for some live a most excellent and perfect life, another off time even in his old age is converted to God, or perhaps when just about to close his last day, through God’s mercy washes away his guilt. But this mercy some men reject from restless timidity of mind, not counting upon the will of our Saviour, who rejoices in the salvation of those who are perishing.

THEOPHYLACT. The son then says to the father, For nothing I left a life of sorrow, ever harassed by sinners who were my enemies, and never hast thou for my sake ordered a kid to be slain, (that is, a sinner who persecuted me,) that I might enjoy myself for a little. Such a kid was Ahab to Elijah, who said, Lord, they have killed thy prophets. (1 Kings 19:14.)

AMBROSE. Or else, This brother is described so as to be said to come from the farm, that is, engaged in worldly occupations, so ignorant of the things of the Spirit of God, as at last to complain that a kid had never been slain for him. For not for envy, but for the pardon of the world, was the Lamb sacrificed. The envious seeks a kid, the innocent a lamb, to be sacrificed for it. Therefore also is he called the elder, because a man soon grows old through envy. Therefore too he stands without, because his malice excludes him; therefore could he not hear the dancing and music, that is, not the wanton fascinations of the stage, but the harmonious song of a people, resounding with the sweet pleasantness of joy for a sinner saved. For they who seem to themselves righteous are angry when pardon is granted to one confessing his sins. Who art thou that speakest against thy Lord, that he should not, for example, forgive a fault, when thou pardonest whom thou wilt? But we ought to favour forgiving sin after repentance, lest while grudging pardon to another, we ourselves obtain it not from our Lord. Let us not envy those who return from a distant country, seeing that we ourselves also were afar off.

CHAPTER 16

16:1–7

1. And he said unto his disciples, There was a certain rich man, which had a steward; and the same was accused unto him that he had wasted his goods.

2. And he called him, and said unto him, How is it that I hear this of thee? give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest be no longer steward.

3. Then the steward said within himself, What shall I do? for my lord taketh away from me the stewardship: I cannot dig; to beg I am ashamed.

4. I am resolved what to do, that, when I am put out of the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses.

5. So he called every one of his lord’s debtors unto him, and said unto the first, How much owest thou unto my lord?

6. And he said, An hundred measures of oil. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and sit down quickly, and write fifty.

7. Then said he to another, And how much owest thou? And he said, An hundred measures of wheat. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and write fourscore.

BEDE. Having rebuked in three parables those who murmured because He received penitents, our Saviour shortly after subjoins a fourth and a fifth on almsgiving and frugality, because it is also the fittest order in preaching that almsgiving should be added after repentance. Hence it follows, And he said unto his disciples, There was a certain rich man.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Divite.) There is a certain erroneous opinion inherent in mankind, which increases evil and lessens good. It is the feeling that all the good things we possess in the course of our life we possess as lords over them, and accordingly we seize them as our especial goods. But it is quite the contrary. For we are placed in this life not as lords in our own house, but as guests and strangers, led whither we would not, and at a time we think not of. He who is now rich, suddenly becomes a beggar. Therefore whoever thou art, know thyself to be a dispenser of the things of others, and that the privileges granted thee are for a brief and passing use. Cast away then from thy soul the pride of power, and put on the humility and modesty of a steward.

BEDE. (ex Hieron.) The bailiff is the manager of the farm, therefore he takes his name from the farm. But the steward, or director of the household, (villicus œconomus) is the overseer of money as well as fruits, and of every thing his master possesses.

AMBROSE. From this we learn then, that we are not ourselves the masters, but rather the stewards of the property of others.

THEOPHYLACT. Next, that when we exercise not the management of our wealth according to our Lord’s pleasure, but abuse our trust to our own pleasures, we are guilty stewards. Hence it follows, And he was accused to him.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Meanwhile he is taken and thrust out of his stewardship; for it follows, And he called him, and said unto him, What is this that I hear of thee? give an account of thy stewardship, for thou canst be no longer steward. Day after day by the events which take place our Lord cries aloud to us the same thing, shewing us a man at midday rejoicing in health, before the evening cold and lifeless; another expiring in the midst of a meal. And in various ways we go out from our stewardship; but the faithful steward, who has confidence concerning his management, desires with Paul to depart and be with Christ. (Phil. 1:23.) But he whose wishes are on earth is troubled at his departing. Hence it is added of this steward, Then the steward said within himself, What shall I do, for my Lord taketh away from me the stewardship? I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed. Weakness in action is the fault of a slothful life. For no one would shrink who had been accustomed to apply himself to labour. But if we take the parable allegorically, after our departure hence there is no more time for working; the present life contains the practice of what is commanded, the future, consolation. If thou hast done nothing here, in vain then art thou careful for the future, nor wilt thou gain any thing by begging. The foolish virgins are an instance of this, who unwisely begged of the wise, but returned empty. (Matt 25:8.) For every one puts on his daily life as his inner garment; it is not possible for him to put it off or exchange it with another. But the wicked steward aptly contrived the remission of debts, to provide for himself an escape from his misfortunes among his fellow-servants; for it follows, I am resolved what to do, that when I am put out of the stewardship, they may receive me into their houses. For as often as a man, perceiving his end approaching, lightens by a kind deed the load of his sins, (either by forgiving a debtor his debts, or by giving abundance to the poor,) dispensing those things which are his Lord’s, he conciliates to himself many friends, who will afford him before the judge a real testimony, not by words, but by the demonstration of good works, nay moreover will provide for him by their testimony a resting-place of consolation. But nothing is our own, all things are in the power of God. Hence it follows, So he called every one of his Lord’s debtors unto him, and said unto the first, How much owest thou unto my Lord? And he said, A hundred casks of oil.

BEDE. A cadus in Greek is a vessel containing three urns. It follows, And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and sit down quickly, and write fifty, forgiving him the half. It follows, Then said he to another, And how much owest thou? And he said, An hundred measures of wheat. A corus is made up of thirty bushels. And he said unto him, Take thy bill, and write fourscore, forgiving him a fifth part. It may be then simply taken as follows: whosoever relieves the want of a poor man, either by supplying half or a fifth part, will be blessed with the reward of his mercy.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. l. ii. qu. 34.) Or because out of the hundred measures of oil, he caused fifty to be written down by the debtors, and of the hundred measures of wheat, fourscore, the meaning thereof is this, that those things which every Jew performs toward the Priests and Levites should be the more abundant in the Church of Christ, that whereas they give a tenth, Christians should give a half, as Zaccheus gave of his goods, (Luke 19:8.) or at least by giving two tenths, that is, a fifth, exceed the payments of the Jews.

16:8–13

8. And the lord commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely: for the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light.

9. And I say unto you, Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness; that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting

habitations.

10. He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much: and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much.

11. If therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to your trust the true riches?

12. And if ye have not been faithful in that which is another man's, who shall give you that which is your own?

13. No servant can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) The steward whom his Lord cast out of his stewardship is nevertheless commended because he provided himself against the future. As it follows, And the Lord commended the unjust steward, because he had done wisely; we ought not however to take the whole for our imitation. For we should never act deceitfully against our Lord in order that from the fraud itself we may give alms.

ORIGEN. (in Prov. 1:1.) But because the Gentiles say that wisdom is a virtue, and define it to be the experience of what is good, evil, and indifferent, or the knowledge of what is and what is not to be done, we must consider whether this word signifies many things, or one. For it is said that God by wisdom prepared the heavens. (Prov. 3:19.) Now it is plain that wisdom is good, because the Lord by wisdom prepared the heavens. It is said also in Genesis, according to the LXX, that the serpent was the wisest animal, wherein He makes wisdom not a virtue, but evil-minded cunning. And it is in this sense that the Lord commended the steward that he had done wisely, that is, cunningly and evilly. And perhaps the word commended was spoken not in the sense of real commendation, but in a lower sense; as when we speak of a man being commended in slight and indifferent matters, and in a certain measure clashings and sharpness of wit are admired, by which the power of the mind is drawn out.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) On the other hand this parable is spoken, that we should understand that if the steward who acted deceitfully, could be praised by his lord, how much more they please God who do their works according to His commandment.

ORIGEN. The children of this world also are not called wiser but more prudent than the children of light, and this not absolutely and simply, but in their generation. For it follows, For the children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light, &c.

BEDE. The children of light and the children of this world are spoken of in the same manner as the children of the kingdom, and the children of hell. For whatever works a man does, he is also termed their son.

THEOPHYLACT. By the children of this world then He means those who mind the good things which are on the earth; by the children of light, those who beholding the divine love, employ themselves with spiritual treasures. But it is found indeed in the management of human affairs, that we prudently order our own things, and busily set ourselves to work, in order that when we depart we may have a refuge for our life; but when we ought to direct the things of God, we take no forethought for what shall be our lot hereafter.

GREGORY. (18. Mor. cap. 18.) In order then that after death they may find something in their own hand, let men before death place their riches in the hands of the poor. Hence it follows, And I say to you, Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 113.) That which the Hebrews call mammon, in Latin is “riches.” As if He said, “Make to yourselves friends of the riches of unrighteousness.” Now some misunderstanding this, seize upon the things of others, and so give something to the poor, and think that they are doing what is commanded. That interpretation must be corrected into, Give alms of your righteous labours. (Prov. 3:9. LXX.) For you will not corrupt Christ your Judge. If from the plunder of a poor man, you were to give any thing to the judge that he might decide for you, and that judge should decide for you, such is the force of justice, that you would be ill pleased in yourself. Do not then make to yourself such a God. God is the fountain of Justice, give not your alms then from interest and usury. I speak to the faithful, to whom we dispense the body of Christ. But if you have such money, it is of evil that you have it. Be no longer doers of evil. Zaccheus said, Half my goods I give to the poor. (Luke 19:8.) See how he runs who runs to make friends of the mammon of unrighteousness; and not to be held guilty from any quarter, he says, I If hare taken any thing from any one, I restore fourfold. According to another interpretation, the mammon of unrighteousness are all the riches of the world, whenever they come. For if you seek the true riches, there arc some in which Job when naked abounded, when he had his heart full towards God. The others are called riches from unrighteousness; because they are not true riches, for they are full of poverty, and ever liable to chances. For if they were true riches, they would give you security.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. q. 34.) Or the riches of unrighteousness are so called, because they are not riches except to the unrighteous, and such as rest in their hopes and the fulness of their happiness. But when these things are possessed by the righteous, they have indeed so much money, but no riches are theirs but heavenly and spiritual.

AMBROSE. Or he spoke of the unrighteous Mammon, because by the various enticements of riches covetousness corrupts our hearts, that we may be willing to obey riches.

BASIL. (Hom. de Avar.) Or if thou hast succeeded to a patrimony, thou receivest what has been amassed by the unrighteous; for in a number of predecessors some one must needs be found who has unjustly usurped the property of others. But suppose that thy father has not been guilty of exaction, whence hast thou thy money? If indeed thou answerest, "From myself;" thou art ignorant of God, not having the knowledge of thy Creator; but if, "From God," tell me the reason for which thou receivedst it. Is not the earth and the fulness thereof the Lord's? (Ps. 24:1.) If then whatever is ours belongs to our common Lord, so will it also belong to our fellow-servant.

THEOPHYLACT. Those then are called the riches of unrighteousness which the Lord has given for the necessities of our brethren and fellow-servants, but we spend upon ourselves. It became us then, from the beginning, to give all things to the poor, but because we have become the stewards of unrighteousness, wickedly retaining what was appointed for the aid of others, we must not surely remain in this cruelty, but distribute to the poor, that we may be received by them into everlasting habitations. For it follows, That, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations.

GREGORY. (21. Mor. cap. 14.) But if through their friendship we obtain everlasting habitations, we ought to calculate that when we give we rather offer presents to patrons, than bestow benefits upon the needy.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 113.) For who are they that shall have everlasting habitations but the saints of God? and who are they that are to be received by them into everlasting habitations but they who administer to their want, and whatsoever they have need of, gladly supply. They are those little ones of Christ, who have forsaken all that belonged to them and followed Him; and whatsoever they had have given to the poor, that they might serve God without earthly shackles, and freeing their shoulders from the burdens of the world, might raise them aloft as with wings.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. q. 34.) We must not then understand those by whom we wish to be received into everlasting habitations to be as it were debtors of God; seeing that the just and holy are signified in this place, who cause those to enter in, who administered to their necessity of their own worldly goods.

AMBROSE. Or else, make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness, that by giving to the poor we may purchase the favour of angels and all the saints.

CHRYSOSTOM. Mark also that He said not, “that they may receive you into their own habitations.” For it is not they who receive you. Therefore when He said, Make to yourselves friends, he added, of the mammon of unrighteousness, to shew, that their friendship will not alone protect us unless good works accompany us, unless we righteously cast away all riches unrighteously amassed. The most skilful then of all arts is that of almsgiving. For it builds not for us houses of mud, but lays up in store an everlasting life. Now in each of the arts one needs the support of another; but when we ought to shew mercy, we need nothing else but the will alone.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Thus then Christ taught those who abound in riches, earnestly to love the friendship of the poor, and to have treasure in heaven. But He knew the sloth of the human mind, how that they who court riches bestow no work of charity upon the needy. That to such men there results no profit of spiritual gifts, He shews by obvious examples, adding, He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much. Now our Lord opens to us the eye of the heart, explaining what He had said, adding, If therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to your trust the true riches? That which is least then is the mammon of unrighteousness, that is, earthly riches, which seem nothing to those that are heavenly wise. I think then that a man is faithful in a little, when he imparts aid to those who are bowed down with sorrow. If then we have been unfaithful in a little thing, how shall we obtain from hence the true riches, that is, the fruitful gift of Divine grace, impressing the image of God on the human soul? But that our Lord's words incline to this meaning is plain from the following; for He says, And if ye have not been faithful in that which is another man's, who shall give you that which is your own?

AMBROSE. Riches are foreign to us, because they are something beyond nature, they are not born with us, and they do not pass away with us. But Christ is ours, because He is the life of man. Lastly, He came unto His own.

THEOPHYLACT. Thus then hitherto He has taught us how faithfully we ought to dispose of our wealth. But because the management of our wealth according to God is no otherwise obtained than by the indifference of a mind unaffected towards riches, He adds, No man can serve two masters.

AMBROSE. Not because the Lord is two, but one. For although there are who serve mammon, yet he knoweth no rights of lordship; but has himself placed upon himself a yoke of servitude. There is one Lord, because there is one God. Hence it is evident, that the power of the Father and the Son is one: and He assigns a reason, thus saying, For either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. lib. ii. q. 36.) But these things were not spoken indifferently or at random. For no one when asked whether he loves the devil, answers that he loves him, but rather that he hates him; but all generally proclaim that they love God. Therefore either he will hate the one, (that is, the devil,) and love the other, (that is, God;) or will hold to the one, (that is, the devil, when he pursues as it were temporal wants,) and will despise the other, (that is, God,) as when men frequently neglect His threats for their desires, who because of His goodness flatter themselves that they will have impunity.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the conclusion of the whole discourse is what follows, Ye cannot serve God and mammon. Let us then transfer all our devotions to the one, forsaking riches.

BEDE. (ex Hier.) Let then the covetous hear this, that we can not at the same time serve Christ and riches; and yet He said not, "Who has riches," but, who serves riches; for ho who is the servant of riches, watches them as a servant; but he who has shaken off the yoke of servitude, dispenses them as a master; but he who serves mammon, verily serves him who is set over those earthly things as the reward of his iniquity, and is called the prince of this world. (John 12:31, 2 Cor. 4:4.)

16:14–18

14. And the Pharisees also, who were covetous, heard all these things: and they derided him.

15. And he said unto them, Ye are they which justify yourselves before men; but God knoweth your hearts: for that which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God.

16. The Law and the Prophets were until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it.

17. And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law to fail.

18. Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband committeth adultery.

BEDE. Christ had told the Pharisees not to boast of their own righteousness, but to receive penitent sinners, and to redeem their sins by almsgiving. But they derided the Preacher of mercy, humility, and frugality; as it is said, And the Pharisees also, who were covetous, heard these things; and derided him: it may be for two reasons, either because He commanded what was not sufficiently profitable, or cast blame upon their past superfluous actions.

THEOPHYLACT. But the Lord detecting in them a hidden malice, proves that they make a pretence of righteousness. Therefore it is added, And he said unto them, Ye are they which justify yourselves before men.

BEDE. They justify themselves before men who despise sinners as in a weak and hopeless condition, but fancy themselves to be perfect and not to need the remedy of almsgiving; but how justly the depth of deadly pride is to be condemned, He sees who will enlighten the hidden places of darkness. Hence it follows, But God knoweth your hearts.

THEOPHYLACT. And therefore ye are an abomination to Him because of your arrogance, and love of seeking after the praise of men; as He adds, For that which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God.

BEDE. Now the Pharisees derided our Saviour disputing against covetousness, as if He taught things contrary to the Law and the Prophets, in which many very rich men are said to have pleased God; but Moses also himself promised that the people whom he ruled, if they followed the Law, should abound in all earthly goods. (Deut. 28:11.) These the Lord answers by shewing that between the Law and the Gospel, as in these promises so also in the commands, there is not the slightest difference. Hence He adds, The Law and the Prophets were until John.

AMBROSE. Not that the Law failed, but that the preaching of the Gospel began; for that which is inferior seems to be completed when a better succeeds.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 37. in Matt. Pseudo-Chrys. Hom. 19. op. imp.) He hereby disposes them readily to believe on Him, because if as far as John's time all things were complete, I am He who am come. For the Prophets had not ceased unless I had come; but you will say, "how" were the Prophets until John, since there have been many more Prophets in the New than the Old Testament. But He spoke of those prophets who foretold Christ's coming.

EUSEBIUS. Now the ancient prophets knew the preaching of the kingdom of heaven, but none of them had expressly announced it to the Jewish people, because the Jews having a childish understanding were unequal to the preaching of what is infinite. But John first openly preached that the kingdom of heaven was at hand, as well as also the remission of sins by the laver of regeneration. Hence it follows, Since that time the kingdom of heaven is preached, and every one presseth into it.

AMBROSE. For the Law delivered many things according to nature, as being more indulgent to our natural desires, that it might call us to the pursuit of righteousness. Christ breaks through nature as cutting off even our natural pleasures. But therefore we keep under nature, that it should not sink us down to earthly things, but raise us to heavenly.

EUSEBIUS. A great struggle befals men in their ascent to heaven. For that men clothed with mortal flesh should be able to subdue pleasure and every unlawful appetite, desiring to imitate the life of angels, must be compassed with violence. But who that looking upon those who labour earnestly in the service of God, and almost put to death their flesh, will not in reality confess that they do violence to the kingdom of heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. q. 87.) They also do violence to the kingdom of heaven, in that they not only despise all temporal things, but also the tongues of those who desire their doing so. This the Evangelist added, when he said that Jesus was derided when He spoke of despising earthly riches.

BEDE. But lest they should suppose that in His words, the Law and the Prophets were until John, He preached the destruction of the Law or the Prophets, He obviates such a notion, adding, And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the law should fail. For it is written, the fashion of this world passeth away. (1 Cor. 7:31.) But of the Law, not even the very extreme point of one letter, that is, not even the least things are destitute of spiritual sacraments. And yet the Law and the Prophets were until John, because that could always be prophesied as about to come, which by the preaching of John it was clear had come. But that which He spoke beforehand concerning the perpetual inviolability of the Law, He confirms by one testimony taken therefrom for the sake of example, saying, Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery: and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband, committeth adultery; that from this one instance they should learn that He came not to destroy but to fulfil the commands of the Law.

THEOPHYLACT. For that to the imperfect the Law spoke imperfectly is plain from what he says to the hard hearts of the Jews, “If a man hate his wife, let him put her away,” (Deut. 24:1.) because since they were murderers and rejoiced in blood, they had no pity even upon those who were united to them, so that they slew their sons and daughters for devils. But now there is need of a more perfect doctrine. Wherefore I say, that if a man puts away his wife, having no excuse of fornication, he commits adultery, and he who marrieth another commits adultery.

AMBROSE. But we must first speak, I think, of the law of marriage, that we may afterwards discuss the forbidding of divorce. Some think that all marriage is sanctioned by God, because it is written, Whom God hath joined, let not man put asunder. (Matt. 19:6.) How then does the Apostle say, If the unbelieving depart, let him depart? (Mark 10:9, 1 Cor. 7:15.) Herein he shews that the marriage of all is not from God. For neither by God’s approval are Christians joined with Gentiles. Do not then put away thy wife, lest thou deny God to be the Author of thy union. For if others, much more oughtest thou to bear with and correct the behaviour of thy wife. And if she is sent away pregnant with children, it is a hard thing to shut out the parent and keep the pledge; so as to add to the parents’ disgrace the loss also of filial affection. Harder still if because of the mother thou drivest away the children also. Wouldest thou suffer in thy lifetime thy children to be under a step-father, or when the mother was alive to be under a step-mother? How dangerous to expose to error the tender age of a young wife. How wicked to desert in old age one, the flower of whose growth thou hast blighted. Suppose that being divorced she does not marry, this also ought to be displeasing to you, to whom though an adulterer, she keeps her troth. Suppose she marries, her necessity is thy crime, and that which thou supposest marriage, is adultery.

But to understand it morally. Having just before set forth that the kingdom of God is preached, and said that one tittle could not fall from the Law, He added, Whosoever putteth away his wife, &c. Christ is the husband; whomsoever then God has brought to His son, let not persecution sever, nor lust entice, nor philosophy spoil, nor heretics taint, nor Jew seduce. Adulterers are all such as desire to corrupt truth, faith, and wisdom.

16:19–21

19. There was a certain rich man, which was clothed in purple and fine linen, and fared sumptuously every day:

20. And there was a certain beggar named Lazarus, which was laid at his gate, full of sores,

21. And desiring to be fed with the crumbs which fell from the rich man’s table: moreover the dogs came and licked his sores.

BEDE. Our Lord had just before advised the making friends of the Mammon of unrighteousness, which the Pharisees derided. He next confirms by examples what he had set before them, saying, There was a certain rich man, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. There was, not is, because he had passed away as a fleeting shadow.

AMBROSE. But not all poverty is holy, or all riches criminal, but as luxury disgraces riches, so does holiness commend poverty.

It follows, And he was clothed in purple and fine linen.

BEDE. (bysso.) Purple, the colour of the royal robe, is obtained from sea shells, which are scraped with a knife. Byssus is a kind of white and very fine linen.

GREGORY. (Hom. 40. in Ev.) Now if the wearing of fine and precious robes were not a fault, the word of God would never have so carefully expressed this. For no one seeks costly garments except for vainglory, that he may seem more honourable than others; for no one wishes to be clothed with such, where he cannot be seen by others.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Ashes, dust, and earth he covered with purple, and silk; or ashes, dust, and earth bore upon them purple and silk. As his garments were, so was also his food. Therefore with us also as our food is, such let our clothing be Hence it follows, And he fared sumptuously every day.

GREGORY. (Hom. 40. in Ev.) And here we must narrowly watch ourselves, seeing that banquets can scarcely be celebrated blamelessly, for almost always luxury accompanies feasting; and when the body is swallowed up in the delight of refreshing itself, the heart relaxes to empty joys.

It follows, And there was a certain beggar named Lazarus.

AMBROSE. This seems rather a narrative than a parable, since the name is also expressed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) But a parable is that in which an example is given, while the names are omitted. Lazarus is interpreted, “one who was assisted.” For he was poor, and the Lord helped him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else; This discourse concerning the rich man and Lazarus was written after the manner of a comparison in a parable, to declare that they who abound in earthly riches, unless they will relieve the necessities of the poor, shall meet with a heavy condemnation. But the tradition of the Jews relates that there was at that time in Jerusalem a certain Lazarus who was afflicted with extreme poverty and sickness, whom our Lord remembering, introduces him into the example for the sake of adding greater point to His words.

GREGORY. (Moral. 1. c. 8.) We must observe also, that among the heathen the names of poor men are more likely to be known than of rich. Now our Lord mentions the name of the poor, but not the name of the rich, because God knows and approves the humble, but not the proud. But that the poor man might be more approved, poverty and sickness were at the same time consuming him; as it follows, who was laid at his gale full of sores.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Div.) He lay at his gate for this reason, that the rich might not say, I never saw him, no one told me; for he saw him both going out and returning. The poor is full of sores, that so he might set forth in his own body the cruelty of the rich. Thou seest the death of thy body lying before the gate, and thou pitiest not. If thou regardest not the commands of God, at least have compassion on thy own state, and fear lest also thou become such as he. But sickness has some comfort if it receives help. How great then was the punishment in that body, in which with such wounds he remembered not the pain of his sores, but only his hunger; for it follows, desiring to be fed with the crumbs, &c. As if he said, What thou throwest away from thy table, afford for alms, make thy losses gain.

AMBROSE. But the insolence and pride of the wealthy is manifested afterwards by the clearest tokens, for it follows, and no one gave to him. For so unmindful are they of the condition of mankind, that as if placed above nature they derive from the wretchedness of the poor an incitement to their own pleasure, they laugh at the destitute, they mock the needy, and rob those whom they ought to pity.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 367.) For the covetousness of the rich is insatiable, it neither fears God nor regards man, spares not a father, keeps not its fealty to a friend, oppresses the widow, attacks the property of a ward.

GREGORY. (in Ev. Hom. 40.) Moreover the poor man saw the rich as he went forth surrounded by flatterers, while he himself lay in sickness and want, visited by no one. For that no one came to visit him, the dogs witness, who fearlessly licked his sores, for it follows, moreover the dogs came and licked his sores.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Those sores which no man deigned to wash and dress, the beasts tenderly lick.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) By one thing Almighty God displayed two judgments. He permitted Lazarus to lie before the rich man’s gate, both that the wicked rich man might increase the vengeance of his condemnation, and the poor man by his trials enhance his reward; the one saw daily him on whom he should shew mercy, the other that for which he might be approved.

16:22–26

22. And it came to pass, that the beggar died, and was carried by the angels into Abraham’s bosom: the rich man also died, and was buried;

23. And in hell he lift up his eyes, being in torments, and seeth Abraham afar off, and Lazarus in his bosom.

24. And he cried and said, Father Abraham, have mercy on me, and send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water, and cool my tongue; for I am tormented in this flame.

25. But Abraham said, Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst thy good things, and likewise Lazarus evil things: but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented.

26. And beside all this, between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you cannot; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) We have heard how both fared on earth, let us see what their condition is among the dead. That which was temporal has passed away; that which follows is eternal. Both died; the one angels receive, the other torments; for it is said, And it came to pass, that the beggar died, and was carried by the angels, &c. Those great sufferings are suddenly exchanged for bliss. He is carried after all his labours, because he had fainted, or at least that he might not tire by walking; and he was earned by angels. One angel was not sufficient to carry the poor man, but many come, that they may make a joyful band, each angel rejoicing to touch so great a burden. Gladly do they thus encumber themselves, that so they may bring men to the kingdom of heaven. But he was carried into Abraham’s bosom, that he might be embraced and cherished by him; Abraham’s bosom is Paradise. And the ministering angels carried the poor man, and placed him in Abraham’s bosom, because though he lay despised, he yet despaired not nor blasphemed, saying, This rich man living in wickedness is happy and suffers no tribulation, but I cannot get even food to supply my wants.

AUGUSTINE. (de Orig. Anim. 4. 16) Now as to your thinking Abraham's bosom to be any thing bodily, I am afraid lest you should be thought to treat so weighty a matter rather lightly than seriously. For you could never be guilty of such folly, as to suppose the corporeal bosom of one man able to hold so many souls, nay, to use your own words, so many bodies as the Angels carry thither as they did Lazarus. But perhaps you imagine that one soul to have alone deserved to come to that bosom. If you would not fall into a childish mistake, you must understand Abraham's bosom to be a retired and hidden resting-place where Abraham is; and therefore called Abraham's, not that it is his alone, but because he is the father of many nations, and placed first, that others might imitate his preeminence of faith.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 40.) When the two men were below on earth, that is, the poor and the rich, there was one above who saw into their hearts, and by trials exercised the poor man to glory, by endurance awaited the rich man to punishment. Hence it follows, The rich man also died.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 6. in 2 ad Cor.) He died then indeed in body, but his soul was dead before. For he did none of the works of the soul. All that warmth which issues from the love of our neighbour had fled, and he was more dead than his body. (Conc. 2. de Lazaro.). But no one is spoken of as having ministered to the rich man's burial as to that of Lazarus. Because when he lived pleasantly in the broad road, he had many busy flatterers; when he came to his end, all forsook him. For it simply follows, and was buried in hell. But his soul also when living was buried, enshrined in its body as it were in a tomb.

AUGUSTINE. The burial in hell is the lowest depth of torment which after this life devours the proud and unmerciful.

PSEUDO-BASIL. (In Esai. 5.) Hell is a certain common place in the interior of the earth, shaded on all sides and dark, in which there is a kind of opening stretching downward, through which lies the descent of the souls who are condemned to perdition.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Chrys. Op. imp, Hom. 53. Matt. 8:22, 25.) Or as the prisons of kings are placed at a distance without, so also hell is somewhere far off without the world, and hence it is called the outer darkness.

THEOPHYLACT. But some say that hell is the passing from the visible to the invisible, and the unfashioning of the soul. For as long as the soul of the sinner is in the body, it is visible by means of its own operations. But when it flies out of the body, it becomes shapeless.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Conc. 2. de Lazaro.) As it made the poor man's affliction heavier while he lived to lie before the rich man's gate, and to behold the prosperity of others, so when the rich man was dead it added to his desolation, that he lay in hell and saw the happiness of Lazarus, feeling not only by the nature of His own torments, but also by the comparison of Lazarus's honour, his own punishment the more intolerable. Hence it follows, But lifting up his eyes, He lifted up his eyes that he might look on him, not despise him; for Lazarus was above, he below. Many angels earned Lazarus; he was seized by endless torments. Therefore it is not said, being in torment, but torments. For he was wholly in torments, his eyes alone were free, so that he might behold the joy of another. His eyes are allowed to be free that he may be the more tortured, not having that which another has. The riches of others are the torments of those who are in poverty.

GREGORY. (lib. 4. Mor. c. 29.) Now if Abraham sate below, the rich man placed in torments would not see him. For they who have followed the path to the heavenly country, when they leave the flesh, are kept back by the gates of hell; not that punishment smites them as sinners, but that resting in some more remote places, (for the intercession of the Mediator was not yet come,) the guilt of their first fault prevents them from entering the kingdom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ad Hom. 2. in ep. Phil. Chrys. Conc. de Laz.) There were many poor righteous men, but he who lay at his door met his sight to add to his woe. For it follows, And Lazarus in his bosom. It may here be observed, that all who are offended by us are exposed to our view. But the rich man sees Lazarus not with any other righteous man, but in Abraham's bosom. For Abraham was full of love, but the man is convicted of cruelty. Abraham sitting before his door followed after those that passed by, and brought them into his house, the other turned away even them that abode within his gate.

GREGORY. (Hom. 40. in Ev.) And this rich man forsooth, now fixed in his doom, seeks as his patron him to whom in this life he would not shew mercy.

THEOPHYLACT. He does not however direct his words to Lazarus, but to Abraham, because he was perhaps ashamed, and thought Lazarus would remember his injuries; but he judged of him from himself. Hence it follows, And he cried and said.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Div.) Great punishments give forth a great cry. Father Abraham. As if he said, I call thee father by nature, as the son who wasted his living, although by my own fault I have lost thee as a father. Have mercy on me. In vain thou workest repentance, when there is no place for repentance; thy torments drive thee to act the penitent, not the desires of thy soul. He who is in the kingdom of heaven, I know not whether he can have compassion on him who is in hell. The Creator pitieth His creature. There came one Physician who was to heal all; others could not heal. Send Lazarus. Thou errest, wretched man. Abraham cannot send, but he can receive. To dip the tip of his finger in water. Thou wouldest not deign to look upon Lazarus, and now thou desirest his finger. What thou seekest now, thou oughtest to have done to him when alive. Thou art in want of water, who before despisedst delicate food. Mark the conscience of the sinner; he durst not ask for the whole of the finger. We are instructed also how good a thing it is not to trust in riches. (Chrys. Conc. 2. de Laz). See the rich man in need of the poor who was before starving. Things are changed, and it is now made known to all who was rich and who was poor. For as in the theatres, when it grows towards evening, and the spectators depart, then going out, and laying aside their dresses, they who seemed kings and generals are seen as they really are, the sons of gardeners and fig-sellers. So also when death is come, and the spectacle is over, and all the masks of poverty and riches are put off, by their works alone are men judged, which are truly rich, which poor, which are worthy of honour, which of dishonour.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) For that rich man who would not give to the poor man even the scraps of his table, being in hell came to beg for even the least thing. For he sought for a drop of water, who refused to give a crumb of bread.

BASIL. But he receives a meet reward, fire and the torments of hell; the parched tongue; for the tuneful lyre, wailing; for drink, the intense longing for a drop; for curious or wanton spectacles, profound darkness; for busy flattery, the undying worm. Hence it follows, That he may cool my tongue, for I am tormented in the flame.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) But not because he was rich was he tormented, but because he was not merciful.

GREGORY. We may gather from this, with what torments he will be punished who robs another, if he is smitten with the condemnation to hell, who does not distribute what is his own.

AMBROSE. He is tormented also because to the luxurious man it is a punishment to be without his pleasures; water is also a refreshment to the soul which is set fast in sorrow.

GREGORY. But what means it, that when in torments he desires his tongue to be cooled, except that at his feasts having sinned in talking, now by the justice of retribution, his tongue was in fierce flame; for talkativeness is generally rife at the banquet.

CHRYSOSTOM. His tongue too had spoken many proud things. Where the sin is, there is the punishment; and because the tongue offended much, it is the more tormented.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or, in that he wishes his tongue to be cooled, when he was altogether burning in the flame, that is signified which is written, Death and life are in the hands of the tongue, (Prov. 18:21.) and with the mouth confession is made to salvation; (Rom. 10:10.) which from pride he did not do, but the tip of the finger means the very least work in which a man is assisted by the Holy Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (de Orig. Anim. 4. 16.) Thou sayest that the members of the soul are here described, and by the eye thou wouldest have the whole head understood, because he was said to lift up his eyes; by the tongue, the jaws; by the finger, the hand. But what is the reason that those names of members when spoken of God do not to thy mind imply a body, but when of the soul they do? It is that when spoken of the creature they are to be taken literally, but when of the Creator metaphorically and figuratively. Wilt thou then give us bodily wings, seeing that not the Creator, but man, that is, the creature, says, If I take not the wings in the morning? (Ps. 139:9.) Besides, if the rich man had a bodily tongue, because he said, to cool my tongue, in us also who live in the flesh, the tongue itself has bodily hands, for it is written, Death and life are in the hands of the tongue. (Prov. 18:21.)

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. 5. de Beat.) As the most excellent of mirrors represents an image of the face, just such as the face itself which is opposite to it, a joyful image of that which is joyful, a sorrowful of that which is sorrowful; so also is the just judgment of God adapted to our dispositions. Wherefore the rich man because he pitied not the poor as he lay at his gate, when he needs mercy for himself, is not heard, for it follows, And Abraham said unto him, Son, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Conc. 2, 3. de Lazaro.) Behold the kindness of the Patriarch; he calls him son, (which may express his tenderness,) yet gives no aid to him who had deprived himself of cure. Therefore he says, Remember, that is, consider the past, forget not that thou delightedst in thy riches, and thou receivedst good things in thy life, that is, such as thou thoughtest to be good. Thou couldest not both have triumphed on earth, and triumph here. Riches can not be true both on earth and below. It follows, And Lazarus likewise evil things; not that Lazarus thought them evil, but he spoke this according to the opinion of the rich man, who thought poverty, and hunger, and severe sickness, evils. When the heaviness of sickness harasses us, let us think of Lazarus, and joyfully accept evil things in this life.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. Lib. ii. qu. 38.) All this then is said to Him because he chose the happiness of the world, and loved no other life but that in which he proudly boasted; but he says, Lazarus received evil things, because he knew that the perishableness of this life, its labours, sorrows, and sickness, are the penalty of sin, for we all die in Adam who by transgression was made liable to death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Conc. 3. de Lazaro.) He says, Thou receivedst good things in thy life, (as if thy due;) as though he said, If thou hast done any good thing for which a reward might be due, thou hast received all things in that world, living luxuriously, abounding in riches, enjoying the pleasure of prosperous undertakings; but he if he committed any evil has received all, afflicted with poverty, hunger, and the depths of wretchedness. And each of you came hither naked; Lazarus indeed of sin, wherefore he receives his consolation; thou of righteousness, wherefore thou endurest thy inconsolable punishment; and hence it follows, But now he is comforted, and thou art tormented.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 40.) Whatsoever then ye have well in this world, when ye recollect to have done any thing good, be very fearful about it, lest the prosperity granted you be your recompense for the same good. And when ye behold poor men doing any thing blameably, fear not, seeing that perhaps those whom the remains of the slightest iniquity defiles, the fire of honesty cleanses.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Conc. 3. de Lazaro.) But you will say, Is there no one who shall enjoy pardon, both here and there? This is indeed a hard thing, and among those which are impossible. For should poverty press not, ambition urges; if sickness provoke not, anger inflames; if temptations assail not, corrupt thoughts often overwhelm. It is no slight toil to bridle anger, to cheek unlawful desires, to subdue the swellings of vain-glory, to quell pride or haughtiness, to lead a severe life. He that doeth not these things, can not be saved.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) It may also be answered, that evil men receive in this life good things, because they place their whole joy in transitory happiness, but the righteous may indeed have good things here, yet not receive them for reward, because while they seek better things, that is, eternal, in their judgment whatever good things are present seem by no means good.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Conc. de Laz.) But after the mercy of God, we must seek in our own endeavours for hope of salvation, not in numbering fathers, or relations, or friends. For brother does not deliver brother; and therefore it is added, And beside all this between us and yon there is a great gulf fixed.

THEOPHYLACT. The great gulf signifies the distance of the righteous from sinners. For as their affections were different, so also their abiding places do not slightly differ.

CHRYSOSTOM. The gulf is said to be fixed, because it cannot be loosened, moved, or shaken.

AMBROSE. Between the rich and the poor then there is a great gulf, because after death rewards cannot be changed. Hence it follows, So that they who would pass from hence to you cannot, nor come thence to us.

CHRYSOSTOM. As if he says, We can see, we cannot pass; and we see what we have escaped, you what you have lost; our joys enhance your torments, your torments our joys.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) For as the wicked desire to pass over to the elect, that is, to depart from the pangs of their sufferings, so to the afflicted and tormented would the just pass in their mind by compassion, and wish to set them free. But the souls of the just, although in the goodness of their nature they feel compassion, after being united to the righteousness of their Author, are constrained by such great uprightness as not to be moved with compassion towards the reprobate. Neither then do the unrighteous pass over to the lot of the blessed, because they are bound in everlasting condemnation, nor can the righteous pass to the reprobate, because being now made upright by the righteousness of judgment, they in no way pity them from any compassion.

THEOPHYLACT. You may from this derive an argument against the followers of Origen, who say, that since an end is to be placed to punishments, there will be a time when sinners shall be gathered to the righteous and to God.

AUGUSTINE. (Qu. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 88.) For it is shewn by the unchangeableness of the Divine sentence, that no aid of mercy can be rendered to men by the righteous, even though they should wish to give it; by which he reminds us, that in this life men should relieve those they can, since hereafter even if they be well received, they would not be able to give help to those they love. For that which was written, that they may receive you into everlasting habitations, was not said of the proud and unmerciful, but of those who have made to themselves friends by their works of mercy, whom the righteous receive, not as if by their own power benefitting them, but by Divine permission.

16:27–31

27. Then he said, I pray thee therefore, father, that thou wouldest send him to my father’s house:

28. For I have five brethren; that he may testify unto them, lest they also come into this place of torment.

29. Abraham saith unto him, They have Moses and the prophets; let them hear them.

30. And he said, Nay, father Abraham: but if one went unto them from the dead, they will repent.

31. And he said unto him, If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.

GREGORY. (Hom. 40. in Ev.) When the rich man in flames found that all hope was taken away from him, his mind turns to those relations whom he had left behind, as it is said, Then said he, I pray thee therefore, father Abraham, to send him to my father's house.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) He asks that Lazarus should be sent, because he felt himself unworthy to offer testimony to the truth. And as he had not obtained even to be cooled for a little while, much less does he expect to be set free from hell for the preaching of the truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Now mark his perverseness; not even in the midst of his torments does he keep to truth. If Abraham is thy father, how sayest thou, Send him to thy father's house? But thou hast not forgotten thy father, for he has been thy ruin.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) The hearts of the wicked are sometimes by their own punishment taught the exercise of charity, but in vain; so that they indeed have an especial love to their own, who while attached to their sins did not love themselves. Hence it follows, For I have five brethren, that he may testify to them, lest they also come into this place of torment.

AMBROSE. But it is too late for the rich man to begin to be master, when he has no longer time for learning or teaching.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) And here we must remark what fearful sufferings are heaped upon the rich man in flames. For in addition to his punishment, his knowledge and memory are preserved. He knew Lazarus whom he despised, he remembered his brethren whom he left. For that sinners in punishment may be still more punished, they both see the glory of those whom they had despised, and are harassed about the punishment of those whom they have unprofitably loved. But to the rich man seeking Lazarus to be sent to them, Abraham immediately answers, as follows, Abraham saith to him, They have Moses and the prophets, let them hear them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Conc. 4. de Lazaro.) As if he said, Thy brethren are not so much thy care as God's, who created them, and appointed them teachers to admonish and urge them. But by Moses and the Prophets, he here means the Mosaic and prophetic writings.

AMBROSE. In this place our Lord most plainly declares the Old Testament to be the ground of faith, thwarting the treachery of the Jews, and precluding the iniquity of Heretics.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 40.) But he who had despised the words of God, supposed that his followers could not hear them. Hence it is added, And he said, Nay, father Abraham, but if one went to them from the dead they would repent. For when he heard the Scriptures he despised them, and thought them fables, and therefore according to what he felt himself, he judged the like of his brethren.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (lib. de Anima.) But we are also taught something besides, that the soul of Lazarus is neither anxious about present things, nor looks back to aught that it has left behind, but the rich man, (as it were caught by birdlime,) even after death is held down by his carnal life. For a man who becomes altogether carnal in his heart, not even after he has put off his body is out of the reach of his passions.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) But soon the rich man is answered in the words of truth; for it follows, And he said unto him, If they hear not, Moses and the prophets, neither will they believe though one rose from the dead. For they who despise the words of the Law, will find the commands of their Redeemer who rose from the dead, as they are more sublime, so much the more difficult to fulfil.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) But that it is true that he who hears not the Scriptures, takes no heed to the dead who rise again, the Jews have testified, who at one time indeed wished to kill Lazarus, but at another laid hands upon the Apostles, notwithstanding that some had risen from the dead at the hour of the Cross. Observe this also, that every dead man is a servant, but whatever the Scriptures say, the Lord says. Therefore let it be that dead men should rise again, and an angel descend from heaven, the Scriptures are more worthy of credit than all. For the Lord of Angels, the Lord as well of the living and the dead, is their author. But if God knew this that the dead rising again, profited the living, He would not have omitted it, seeing that He disposes all things for our advantage. Again, if the dead were often to rise again, this too would in time be disregarded. And the devil also would easily insinuate perverse doctrines, devising resurrection also by means of his own instruments, not indeed really raising up the deceased, but by certain delusions deceiving the sight of the beholders, or contriving, that is, setting up some to pretend death.

AUGUSTINE. (de cura pro Mortuis habenda.) But some one may say, If the dead have no care for the living, how did the rich man ask Abraham, that he should send Lazarus to his five brethren? But because he said this, did the rich man therefore know what his brethren were doing, or what was their condition at that time? His care about the living was such that he might yet be altogether ignorant what they were doing, just as we care about the dead, although we know nothing of what they do. But again the question occurs, How did Abraham know that Moses and the prophets are here in their books? whence also had he known that the rich man had lived in luxury, but Lazarus in affliction. Not surely when these things were going on in their lifetime, but at their death he might know through Lazarus' telling him, that in order that might not be false which the prophet says; Abraham heard us not. (Isa. 63:10.) The dead might also hear something from the angels who are ever present at the things which are done here. They might also know some things which it was necessary for them to have known, not only past, but also future, through the revelation of the Church of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. ii. qu. 38.) But these things may be so taken in allegory, that by the rich man we understand the proud Jews ignorant of the righteousness of God, and going about to establish their own. The purple and fine linen are the grandeur of the kingdom. And the kingdom of God (he says) shall be taken away from you. (Rom. 10:3.) The sumptuous feasting is the boasting of the Law, in which they gloried, rather abusing it to swell their pride, than using it as the necessary means of salvation. But the beggar, by name Lazarus, which is interpreted "assisted," signifies want; as, for instance, some Gentile, or Publican, who is all the more relieved, as he presumes less on the abundance of his resources.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 40. in Ev.) Lazarus then full of sores, figuratively represents the Gentile people, who when turned to God, were not ashamed to confess their sins. Their wound was in the skin. For what is confession of sins but a certain bursting forth of wounds. But Lazarus, full of wounds, desired to be fed by the crumbs which fell from the rich man's table, and no one gave to him; because that proud people disdained to admit any Gentile to the knowledge of the Law, and words flowed down to him from knowledge, as the crumbs fell from the table.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) But the dogs which licked the poor man’s sores are those most wicked men who loved sin, who with a large tongue cease not to praise the evil works, which another loathes, groaning in himself, and confessing.

GREGORY. Sometimes also in the holy Word by dogs are understood preachers; according to that, That the tongue of thy dogs may be red by the very blood of thy enemies; (Ps. 68:23. Vulg.) for the tongue of dogs while it licks the wound heals it; for holy teachers, when they instruct us in confession of sin, touch as it were by the tongue the soul’s wound. The rich man was buried in hell, but Lazarus was carried by angels into Abraham’s bosom, that is, into that secret rest of which the truth says, Many shall come from the east and the west, and shall lie down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven, but the children of the kingdom shall be cast into outer darkness. But being afar off, the rich man lifted up his eyes to behold Lazarus, because the unbelievers while they suffer the sentence of their condemnation, lying in the deep, fix their eyes upon certain of the faithful, abiding before the day of the last Judgment in rest above them, whose bliss afterwards they would in no wise contemplate. But that which they behold is afar off, for thither they cannot attain by their merits. But he is described to burn chiefly in his tongue, because the unbelieving people held in their mouth the word of the Law, which in their deeds they despised to keep. In that part then a man will have most burning wherein he most of all shews he knew that which he refused to do. Now Abraham calls him his son, whom at the same time he delivers not from torments; because the fathers of this unbelieving people, observing that many have gone aside from their faith, are not moved with any compassion to rescue them from torments, whom nevertheless they recognise as sons.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 39.) By the five brothers whom he says he has in his father’s house, he means the Jews who were called five, because they were bound under the Law, which was given by Moses who wrote five books.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or he had five brothers, that is, the five senses, to which he was before a slave, and therefore he could not love Lazarus because his brethren loved not poverty. Those brethren have sent thee into these torments, they cannot be saved unless they die; otherwise it must needs be that the brethren dwell with their brother. But why seekest thou that I should send Lazarus? They have Moses and the Prophets. Moses was the poor Lazarus who counted the poverty of Christ greater than the riches of Pharaoh. (Heb. 11:26.) Jeremiah, cast into the dungeon, was fed on the bread of affliction; and all the prophets teach those brethren. (Jer. 38:9.) But those brethren cannot be saved unless some one rise from the dead. For those brethren, before Christ was risen, brought me to death; He is dead, but those brethren have risen again. For my eye sees Christ, my ear hears Him, my hands handle Him. From what we have said then, we determine the fit place for Marcion and Manichæus, who destroy the Old Testament. See what Abraham says, If they hear not Moses and the prophets. As though he said, Thou doest well by expecting Him who is to rise again; but in them Christ speaks. If thou wilt hear them, thou wilt hear Him also.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 40.) But the Jewish people, because they disdained to spiritually understand the words of Moses, did not come to Him of whom Moses had spoken.

AMBROSE. Or else, Lazarus is poor in this world, but rich to God; for not all poverty is holy, nor all riches vile, but as luxury disgraces riches, so holiness commends poverty. Or is there any Apostolical man, poor in speech, but rich in faith, who keeps the true faith, requiring not the appendage of words. To such a one I liken him who oft-times beaten by the Jews offered the wounds of his body to be licked as it were by certain dogs. Blessed dogs, unto whom the dropping from such wounds so falls as to fill the heart and mouth of those whose office it is to guard the house, preserve the flock, keep off the wolf! And because the word is bread, our faith is of the word; the crumbs are as it were certain doctrines of the faith, that is to say, the mysteries of the Scriptures. But the Arians, who court the alliance of regal power that they may assail the truth of the Church, do not they seem to you to be in purple and fine linen? And these, when they defend the counterfeit instead of the truth, abound in flowing discourses. Rich heresy has composed many Gospels, and poor faith has kept this single Gospel, which it had received. Rich philosophy has made itself many gods, the poor Church has known only one. Do not those riches seem to you to be poor, and that poverty to be rich?

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Again also that story may be so understood, as that we should take Lazarus to mean our Lord; lying at the gate of the rich man, because he condescended to the proud ears of the Jews in the lowliness of His incarnation; desiring to be fed from the crumbs which fell from the rich man’s table, that is, seeking from them even the least works of righteousness, which through pride they would not use for their own table, (that is, their own power,) which works, although very slight and without the discipline of perseverance in a good life, sometimes at least they might do by chance, as crumbs frequently fall from the table. The wounds are the sufferings of our Lord, the dogs who licked them are the Gentiles, whom the Jews called unclean, and yet, with the sweetest odour of devotion, they lick the sufferings of our Lord in the Sacraments of His Body and Blood throughout the whole world. Abraham’s bosom is understood to be the hiding place of the Father, whither after His Passion our Lord rising again was taken up, whither He was said to be carried by the angels, as it seems to me, because that reception by which Christ reached the Father’s secret place the angels announced to the disciples. The rest may be taken according to the former explanation, because that is well understood to be the Father’s secret place, where even before the resurrection the souls of the righteous live with God.

CHAPTER 17

17:1–2

1. Then said he unto the disciples, It is impossible but that offences will come: but woe unto him, through whom they come!

2. It were better for him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea, than that he should offend one of these little ones.

THEOPHYLACT. Because the Pharisees were covetous and railed against Christ when He preached poverty, He put to them the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. Afterwards, in speaking with His disciples concerning the Pharisees, He declares them to be men who caused division, and placed obstacles in the divine way. As it follows; Then said he unto his disciples, It is impossible but that offences will come, that is, hindrances to a good life and which is pleasing to God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now there are two kinds of offences, of which the one resist the glory of God, but the other serve only to cause a stumbling-block to the brethren. For the inventions of heresies, and every word that is spoken against the truth, are obstructions to the glory of God. Such offences however do not seem to be mentioned here, but rather those which occur between friends and brethren, as strifes, slanders, and the like. Therefore He adds afterwards, If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, He says that there must arise many obstacles to preaching and to the truth, as the Pharisees hindered the preaching of Christ. But some ask, If it needs be that offences should come, why does our Lord rebuke the author of the offences? for it follows, But woe to him through whom they come. For whatsoever necessity engenders is pardonable, or deserving of pardon. But observe, that necessity itself derives its birth from free-will. For our Lord, seeing how men cling to evil, and put forward nothing good, spoke with reference to the consequence of those things which are seen, that offences must needs come; just as if a physician, seeing a man using an unwholesome diet, should say, It is impossible but that such a one should be sick. And therefore to him that causes offences He denounces woe, and threatens punishment, saying, It were better for him that a mill-stone were hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea, &c.

BEDE. This is spoken according to the custom of the province of Palestine; for among the ancient Jews the punishment of those who were guilty of the greater crimes was that they should be sunk into the deep with a stone tied to them; and in truth it were better for a guilty man to finish his bodily life by a punishment however barbarous, yet temporal, than for his innocent brother to deserve the eternal death of his soul. Now he who can be offended is rightly called a little one; for he who is great, whatsoever he is witness of, and how great soever his sufferings, swerves not from the faith. As far then as we can without sin, we ought to avoid giving offence to our neighbours. But if an offence is taken at the truth, it is better to let the offence be, than that truth should be abandoned.

CHRYSOSTOM. But by the punishment of the man who offends, learn the reward of him who saves. For had not the salvation of one soul been of such exceeding care to Christ, He would not threaten with such a punishment the offender.

17:3–4

3. Take heed to yourselves: If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him; and if he repent, forgive him.

4. And if he trespass against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent; thou shalt forgive him.

AMBROSE. After the parable of the rich man who is tormented in punishment, Christ added a commandment to give forgiveness to those who turn themselves from their trespasses, lest any one through despair should not be reclaimed from his fault; and hence it is said, Take heed to yourselves.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He says, Offences must needs come; but it does not follow that you must perish, if only you be on your guard: as it need not that the sheep should perish when the wolf comes, if the shepherd is watching. And since there are great varieties of offenders, (for some are incurable, some are curable,) He therefore adds, If thy brother trespass against thee, rebuke him.

AMBROSE. That there might neither be hard-wrung pardon, nor a too easy forgiveness, neither a harsh upbraiding, to dishearten, nor an overlooking of faults, to invite to sin; therefore it is said in another place, Tell him his fault between him and thee alone. (Mat. 18:15.) For better is a friendly correction, than a quarrelsome accusation. The one strikes shame into a man, the other moves his indignation. He who is admonished will more likely be saved, because he fears to be destroyed. For it is well that he who is corrected should believe you to be rather his friend than his enemy. For we more readily give ear to counsel than yield to injury. Fear is a weak preserver of consistency, but shame is an excellent master of duty. For he who fears is restrained, not amended. But He has well said, If he trespass against thee. For it is not the same thing to sin against God and to sin against man.

BEDE. But we must mark, that He does not bid us forgive every one who sins, but him only who repents of his sins. For by taking this course we may avoid offences, hurting no one, correcting the sinner with a righteous zeal, extending the bowels of mercy to the penitent.

THEOPHYLACT. But some one may well ask, If when I have several times forgiven my brother he again trespass against me, what must I do with him? In answer therefore to this question He adds, And if he trespass against thee seven times in a day, and seven times in a day turn again to thee, saying, I repent; forgive him.

BEDE. By using the number seven He assigns no bound to the giving of pardon, but commands us either to forgive all sins, or always to forgive the penitent. For by seven the whole of any thing or time is frequently represented.

AMBROSE. Or this number is used because God rested on the seventh day from His works. After the seventh day of the world everlasting rest is promised us, that as the evil works of that world shall then cease, so also may the sharpness of punishment be abated.

17:5–6

5. And the apostles said unto the Lord, Increase our faith.

6. And the Lord said, If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye might say unto this sycamine tree, Be thou plucked up by the root, and be thou planted in the sea; and it should obey you.

THEOPHYLACT. The disciples hearing our Lord discoursing of certain arduous duties, such as poverty, and avoiding offences, entreat Him to increase their faith, that so they might be able to follow poverty, (for nothing so prompts to a life of poverty as faith and hope in the Lord,) and through faith to guard against giving offences. Therefore it is said, And the Apostles said unto the Lord, Increase our faith.

GREGORY. (22. Mor. c. 21.) That is, that the faith which has already been received in its beginning, might go on increasing more and more unto perfection.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. lib. 2. qu. 39.) We may indeed understand that they asked for the increase of that faith by which men believe in the things which they see not; but there is further signified a faith in things, whereby not with the words only, but the things themselves present, we believe. And this shall be, when the Wisdom of God, by whom all things were made, shall reveal Himself openly to His saints face to face.

THEOPHYLACT. But our Lord told them that they asked well, and that they ought to believe stedfastly, forasmuch as faith could do many things; and hence it follows, And the Lord said, If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed, &c. Two mighty acts are here brought together in the same sentence; the transplanting of that which was rooted in the earth, and the planting thereof in the sea, (for what is ever planted in the waves?) by which two things He declares the power of faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 57. in Matt.) He mentions the mustard seed, because, though small in size, it is mightier in power than all the others. He implies then that the least part of faith can do great things. But though the Apostles did not transplant the mulberry tree, do not thou accuse them; for our Lord said not, You shall transplant, but, You shall be able to transplant. But they did not, because there was no need, seeing that they did greater things. (Hom. 32 in 1 ad Cor. c. 13:2.). But some one will ask, How does Christ say, that it is the least part of faith which can transplant a mulberry tree or a mountain, whereas Paul says that it is all faith which moves mountains? We must then answer, that the Apostle imputes the moving of mountains to all faith, not as though only the whole of faith could do this, but because this seemed a great thing to carnal men on account of the vastness of the body.

BEDE. Or our Lord here compares perfect faith to a grain of mustard seed, because it is lowly in appearance, but fervid in heart. But mystically by the mulberry tree, (whose fruit and branches are red with a blood-red colour,) is represented the Gospel of the cross, which, through the faith of the Apostles being uprooted by the word of preaching from the Jewish nation, in which it was kept as it were in the lineal stock, was removed and planted in the sea of the Gentiles.

AMBROSE. Or this is said because faith keeps out the unclean spirit, especially since the nature of the tree falls in with this meaning. For the fruit of the mulberry is at first white in the blossom, and being formed from thence grows red, and blackens as it gets ripe. The devil also having by transgression fallen from the white flower of the angelic nature and the bright beams of his power, grows terrible in the black odour of sin.

CHRYSOSTOM. The mulberry may be also compared to the devil, for as by the leaves of the mulberry tree certain worms are fed, so the devil, by the imaginations which proceed from him, is feeding for us a never dying worm; but this mulberry tree faith is able to pluck out of our souls, and plunge it into the deep.

17:7–10

7. But which of you, having a servant plowing or feeding cattle, will say unto him by and by, when he is come from the field, Go and sit down to meat?

8. And will not rather say unto him, Make ready wherewith I may sup, and gird thyself, and serve me, till I have eaten and drunken; and afterward thou shalt eat and drink?

9. Doth he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I trow not.

10. So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do.

THEOPHYLACT. Because faith makes its possessor a keeper of God’s commandments, and adorns him with wonderful works; it would seem from thence that a man might thereby fall into the sin of pride. Our Lord therefore forewarned His Apostles by a fit example, not to boast themselves in their virtues, saying, But which of you having a servant plowing, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. 2. qu. 39.) Or else; To the many who understand not this faith in the truth already present, our Lord might seem not to have answered the petitions of His disciples. And there appears a difficulty in the connexion here, unless we suppose He meant the change from faith to faith, from that faith, namely, by which we serve God, to that whereby we enjoy Him. For then will our faith be increased when we first believe the word preached, next the reality present. But that joyful contemplation possesseth perfect peace, which is given unto us in the everlasting kingdom of God. And that perfect peace is the reward of those righteous labours, which are performed in the administration of the Church. Be then the servant in the field ploughing, or feeding, that is, in this life either following his worldly business, or serving foolish men, as it were cattle, he must after his labours return home, that is, be united to the Church.

BEDE. Or the servant departs from the field when giving up for a time his work of preaching, the teacher retires into his own conscience, pondering his own words or deeds within himself. To whom our Lord does not at once say, Go from this mortal life, and sit down to meat, that is, refresh thyself in the everlasting resting-place of a blessed life.

AMBROSE. For we know that no one sits down before he has first passed over. Moses indeed also passed over, that he might see a great sight. Since then thou not only sayest to thy servant, Sit down to meat, but requirest from him another service, so in this life the Lord does not put up with the performance of one work and labour, because as long as we live we ought always to work. Therefore it follows, And will not rather say, Make ready wherewith I may sup.

BEDE. He bids make ready wherewith he may sup, that is, after the labours of public discourse, He bids him humble himself in self-examination. With such a supper our Lord desires to be fed. But to gird one’s self is to collect the mind which has been enfolded in the base coil of fluctuating thoughts, whereby its steps in the cause of good works are wont to be entangled. For he who girds up his garments does so, that in walking he may not be tripped up. But to minister unto God, is to acknowledge that we have no strength without the help of His grace.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. ubi sup.) While His servants also are ministering, that is, preaching the Gospel, our Lord is eating and drinking the faith and confession of the Gentiles. It follows, And afterward thou shall eat and drink. As if He says, After that I have been delighted with the work of thy preaching, and refreshed myself with the choice food of thy compunction, then at length shalt thou go, and feast thyself everlastingly with the eternal banquet of wisdom.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Our Lord teaches us that it is no more than the just and proper right of a master to require, as their bounden duty, subjection from servants, adding, Doth he thank that servant because he did the things that were commanded him? I trow not. Here then is the disease of pride cut away. Why boastest thou thyself? Dost thou know that if thou payest not thy debt, danger is at hand, but if thou payest, thou doest nothing thankworthy? As St. Paul says, For though I preach the Gospel I have nothing to glory of, for necessity is laid upon me, yea, woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel. (1 Cor. 9:16.)

Observe then that they who have rule among us, do not thank their subjects, when they perform their appointed service, but by kindness gaining the affections of their people, breed in them a greater eagerness to serve them. So likewise God requires from us that we should wait upon Him as His servants, but because He is merciful, and of great goodness, He promises reward to them that work, and the greatness of His loving-kindness far exceeds the labours of His servants.

AMBROSE. Boast not thyself then that thou hast been a good servant. Thou hast done what thou oughtest to have done. The sun obeys, the moon submits herself, the angels are subject; let us not then seek praise from ourselves. Therefore He adds in conclusion, So likewise ye, when ye have done all good things, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which it was our duty to do.

BEDE. Servants, I say, because bought with a price; (1 Cor. 6:20) unprofitable, for the Lord needeth not our good things, (Ps. 16:2) or because the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared to the glory which shall be revealed in us. (Rom. 8:18.) Herein then is the perfect faith of men, when having done all things which were commanded them, they acknowledge themselves to be imperfect.

17:11–19

11. And it came to pass, as he went to Jerusalem, that he passed through the midst of Samaria and Galilee.

12. And as he entered into a certain village, there met him ten men that were lepers, which stood afar off:

13. And they lifted up their voices, and said, Jesus, Master, have mercy on us.

14. And when he saw them, he said unto them, Go shew yourselves unto the priests. And it came to pass, that, as they went, they were cleansed.

15. And one of them, when he saw that he was healed, turned back, and with a loud voice glorified God,

16. And fell down on his face at his feet, giving him thanks: and he was a Samaritan.

17. And Jesus answering said, Were there not ten cleansed? but where are the nine?

18. There are not found that returned to give glory to God, save this stranger.

19. And he said unto him, Arise, go thy way: thy faith hath made thee whole.

AMBROSE. After speaking the foregoing parable, our Lord censures the ungrateful;

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. saying, And it came to pass, shewing that the Samaritans were indeed well disposed towards the mercies above mentioned, but the Jews not so. For there was enmity between the Jews and the Samaritans, and He to allay this, passed into the midst of both nations, that he might cement both into one new man.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Saviour next manifests His glory by drawing over Israel to the faith. As it follows, And as he entered into a certain village, there met him ten men that were lepers, men who were banished from the towns and cities, and counted unclean, according to the rites of the Mosaic law.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. They associated together from the sympathy they felt as partakers of the same calamity, and were waiting till Jesus passed, anxiously looking out to see Him approach. As it is said, Which stood afar off, for the Jewish law esteems leprosy unclean, whereas the law of the Gospel calls unclean not the outward, but the inward leprosy.

THEOPHYLACT. They therefore stand afar off as if ashamed of the uncleanness which was imputed to them, thinking that Christ would loathe them as others did. Thus they stood afar off, but were made nigh unto Him by their prayers. For the Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon him in truth. (Ps. 145:18.) Therefore it follows, And they lifted up their voices, and said, Jesus, Master, have mercy upon us.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. They pronounce the name of Jesus, and gain to themselves the reality. For Jesus is by interpretation Saviour. They say, Have mercy upon us, because they were sensible of His power, and sought neither for gold and silver, but that their bodies might put on again a healthful appearance.

THEOPHYLACT. They do not merely supplicate or entreat Him as if He were a man, but they call Him Master or Lord, as if almost they looked upon Him as God. But He bids them shew themselves to the priests, as it follows, And when he saw them, he said, Go, shew yourselves unto the priests. For they were examined whether they were cleansed from their leprosy or not.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The law also ordered, that those who were cleansed from leprosy should offer sacrifice for the sake of their purification.

THEOPHYLACT. Therefore in bidding them go to the priests, he meant nothing more than that they were just about to be healed; and so it follows, And it came to pass that as they went they were healed.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Whereby the Jewish priests who were jealous of His glory might know that it was by Christ granting them health that they were suddenly and miraculously healed.

THEOPHYLACT. But out of the ten, the nine Israelites were ungrateful, whereas the Samaritan stranger returned and lifted up his voice in thanksgiving, as it follows, And one of them turned back, and with a loud voice glorified God.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. When he found that he was cleansed, he had boldness to draw near, as it follows, And fell down on his face at his feet giving him thanks. Thus by his prostration and prayers shewing at once both his faith and his gratitude.

It follows, And he was a Samaritan.

THEOPHYLACT. We may gather from this that a man is not one whit hindered from pleasing God because he comes from a cursed race, only let him bear in his heart an honest purpose. Further, let not him that is born of saints boast himself, for the nine who were Israelites were ungrateful; and hence it follows, And Jesus answering him said, Were there not ten cleansed?

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Wherein it is shewn, that strangers were more ready to receive the faith, but Israel was slow to believe; and so it follows, And he said unto him, Arise, go thy way, thy faith has made thee whole.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. qu. 40.) The lepers may be taken mystically for those who, having no knowledge of the true faith, profess various erroneous doctrines. For they do not conceal their ignorance, but blazen it forth as the highest wisdom, making a vain show of it with boasting words. But since leprosy is a blemish in colour, when true things appear clumsily mixed up with false in a single discourse or narration, as in the colour of a single body, they represent a leprosy streaking and disfiguring as it were with true and false dyes the colour of the human form. Now these lepers must be so put away from the Church, that being as far removed as possible, they may with loud shouts call upon Christ. But by their calling Him Teacher, I think it is plainly implied that leprosy is truly the false doctrine which the good teacher may wash away. Now we find that of those upon whom our Lord bestowed bodily mercies, not one did He send to the priests, save the lepers, for the Jewish priesthood was a figure of that priesthood which is in the Church. All vices our Lord corrects and heals by His own power working inwardly in the conscience, but the teaching of infusion by means of the Sacrament, or of catechizing by word of mouth, was assigned to the Church. And as they went, they were cleansed; just as the Gentiles to whom Peter came, having not yet received the sacrament of Baptism, whereby we come spiritually to the priests, are declared cleansed by the infusion of the Holy Spirit. Whoever then follows true and sound doctrine in the fellowship of the Church, proclaiming himself to be free from the confusion of lies, as it were a leprosy, yet still ungrateful to his Cleanser does not prostrate himself with pious humility of thanksgiving, is like to those of whom the Apostle says, that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, nor were thankful. (Rom. 1:21.) Such then will remain in the ninth number as imperfect. For the nine need one, that by a certain form of unity they may be cemented together, in order to become ten. But he who gave thanks was approved of as a type of the one only Church. And since these were Jews, they are declared to have lost through pride the kingdom of heaven, wherein most of all unity is preserved. But the man who was a Samaritan, which is by interpretation "guardian," giving back to Him who gave it that which he had received, according to the Psalm, My strength will I preserve for thee, (Ps. 59:9.) has kept the unity of the kingdom with humble devotion.

BEDE. He fell upon his face, because he blushes with shame when he remembers the evils he had committed. And he is commanded to rise and walk, because he who, knowing his own weakness, lies lowly on the ground, is led to advance by the consolation of the divine word to mighty deeds. But if faith made him whole, who hurried himself back to give thanks, therefore does unbelief destroy those who have neglected to give glory to God for mercies received. Wherefore that we ought to increase our faith by humility, as it is declared in the former parable, so in this is it exemplified in the actions themselves.

17:20–21

20. And when he was demanded of the Pharisees, when the kingdom of God should come, he answered them and said, The kingdom of God cometh not with observation:

21. Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, lo there! for, behold, the kingdom of God is within you.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Because our Saviour, in His discourses which He addressed to others, spake often of the kingdom of God, the Pharisees derided Him; hence it is said, And when he was asked by the Pharisees when the kingdom of God should come. As though they said tauntingly, "Before the kingdom of God come, which Thou speakest of, the death of the cross will be Thy lot." But our Lord testifying His patience, when reviled reviles not again, but the rather because they were evil, returns not a scornful answer; for it follows, He answered and said, The kingdom cometh not with observation; as if he says, “Seek not to know the time when the kingdom of heaven shall again be at hand. For that time can be observed neither by men nor angels, not as the time of the Incarnation which was proclaimed by the foretelling of Prophets and the heraldings of Angels.” Wherefore He adds, Neither shall they say, Lo here! or, Lo there! Or else, They ask about the kingdom of God, because, as is said below, they thought that on our Lord’s coming into Jerusalem, the kingdom of God would be immediately manifested. Therefore our Lord answers, that the kingdom of God will not come with observation.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now it is only for the benefit of each individual that He says that which follows, For behold the kingdom of God is within you; that is, it rests with you and your own hearts to receive it. For every man who is justified by faith and the grace of God, and adorned with virtues, may obtain the kingdom of heaven.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (lib. de prop. sec. Deum.) Or, perhaps, the kingdom of God being within us, means that joy that is implanted in our hearts by the Holy Spirit. For that is, as it were, the image and pledge of the everlasting joy with which in the world to come the souls of the Saints rejoice.

BEDE. Or the kingdom of God means that He Himself is placed in the midst of them, that is, reigning in their hearts by faith.

17:22–25

22. And he said unto the disciples, The days will come, when ye shall desire to see one of the days of the Son of man, and ye shall not see it.

23. And they shall say to you, See here; or, see there: go not after them, nor follow them.

24. For as the lightning, that lighteneth out of the one part under heaven, shineth unto the other part under heaven; so shall also the Son of man be in his day.

25. But first must he suffer many things, and be rejected of this generation.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When our Lord said, The kingdom of God is within you, He would fain prepare His disciples for suffering, that being made strong they might be able to enter the kingdom of God; He therefore foretells to them, that before His coming from heaven at the end of the world, persecution will break out upon them. Hence it follows, And he said unto the disciples, The days will come, &c. meaning that so terrible will be the persecution, that they would desire to see one of His days, that is, of that time when they yet walked with Christ. Truly the Jews ofttimes beset Christ with reproaches and insults, and sought to stone Him, and ofttimes would have hurled Him down from the mountain; but even these seem to be looked upon as slight in comparison of greater evils that are to come.

THEOPHYLACT. For their life was then without trouble, for Christ took care of them and protected them. But the time was coming when Christ should be taken away, and they should be exposed to perils, being brought before kings and princes, and then they should long for the first time and its tranquillity.

BEDE. Or, by the day of Christ He signifies His kingdom, which we hope will come, and He rightly says, one day, because there shall no darkness disturb the glory of that blessed time. It is right then to long for the day of Christ, yet from the earnestness of our longing, let us not vision to ourselves as though the day were at hand. Hence it follows, And they shall say to you, Lo here! and, Lo there!

EUSEBIUS. As if he said, If at the coming of Antichrist, his fame shall be spread abroad, as though Christ had appeared, go not out, nor follow him. For it cannot be that He who was once seen on earth, shall any more dwell in the corners of the earth. It will therefore be he of whom we speak, not the true Christ. For this is the clear sign of the second coming of our Saviour, that suddenly the lustre of His coming shall fill the whole world; and so it follows, For as the lightning that lighteneth, &c. For He will not appear walking upon the earth, as any common man, but will illuminate our whole universe, manifesting to all men the radiance of His divinity.

BEDE. And he well says, that lighteneth out of the one part under heaven, because the judgment will be given under the heaven, that is, in the midst of the air, as the Apostle says, We shall be caught up together with them in the clouds. (1 Thess. 4:17.) But if the Lord shall appear at the Judgment like lightning, then shall no one remain hidden in the deep of his heart, for the very brightness of the Judge pierces through him; we may also take this answer of our Lord to refer to His coming, whereby He comes daily into His Church. For ofttimes have heretics so vexed the Church, by saying that the faith of Christ stands in their own dogma, that the faithful in those times longed that the Lord would if it were possible even for one day return to the earth, and Himself make known what was the true faith. And you shall not see it, because it need not that the Lord should again testify by a bodily presence that which has been spiritually declared by the light of the Gospel, once scattered and diffused throughout the whole world.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now His disciples supposed that He would go to Jerusalem, and would at once make a manifestation of the kingdom of God. To rid them therefore of this belief, He informs them that it became Him first to suffer the Life-giving Passion, then to ascend to the Father and shine forth from above, that He might judge the world in righteousness. Hence He adds, But first must he suffer many things, and be rejected of this generation.

BEDE. He means the generation not only of the Jews, but also of all wicked men, by whom even now in His own body, that is, His Church, the Son of man suffers many things, and is rejected. But while He spake many things of His coming in glory, He inserts something also concerning His Passion, that when men saw Him dying, whom they had heard would be glorified, they might both soothe their sorrow for His sufferings by the hope of the promised glory, and at the same time prepare themselves, if they love the glories of His kingdom, to look without alarm upon the horrors of death.

17:26–30

26. And as it was in the days of Noe, so shall it be also in the days of the Son of man.

27. They did eat, they drank, they married wives, they were given in marriage, until the day that Noe entered into the ark, and the flood came, and destroyed them all.

28. Likewise also as it was in the days of Lot; they did eat, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded;

29. But the same day that Lot went out of Sodom it rained fire and brimstone from heaven, and destroyed them all.

30. Even thus shall it be in the day when the Son of man is revealed.

BEDE. The coming of our Lord, which He had compared to lightning flying swiftly across the heavens, He now likens to the days of Noah and Lot, when a sudden destruction came upon mankind.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 1, in Ep. 1. ad Thess.) For refusing to believe the words of warning they were suddenly visited with a real punishment from God; but their unbelief proceeded from self-indulgence, and softness of mind. For such as a man's wishes and inclinations are, will also be his expectations. Therefore it follows, they eat and drank.

AMBROSE. He rightly declares the deluge to have been caused by our sins, for God did not create evil, but our deservings found it out for themselves. Let it not however be supposed that marriages, or again meat and drink, are condemned, seeing that by the one succession is sustained, by the other nature, but moderation is to be sought for in all things. For whatsoever is more than this is of evil.

BEDE. Now Noah builds the ark mystically. The Lord builds His Church of Christ's faithful servants, by uniting them together in one, as smooth pieces of wood; and when it is perfectly finished, He enters it: as at the day of Judgment, He who ever dwells within His Church enlightens it with His visible presence. But while the ark is in building, the wicked flourish, when it is entered, they perish; as they who revile the saints in their warfare here, shall when they are crowned hereafter be smitten with eternal condemnation.

EUSEBIUS. Having used the example of the deluge, that no one might expect a future deluge by water, our Lord cites, secondly, the example of Lot, to shew the manner of the destruction of the wicked, namely, that the wrath of God would descend upon them by fire from heaven.

BEDE. Passing by the unutterable wickedness of the Sodomites, He mentions only those which may be thought trifling offences, or none at all; that you may understand how fearfully unlawful pleasures are punished, when lawful pleasures taken to excess receive for their reward fire and brimstone.

EUSEBIUS. He does not say that fire came down from heaven upon the wicked Sodomites before that Lot went out from them, just as the deluge did not swallow up the inhabitants of the earth before that Noah entered the ark; for as long as Noah and Lot dwelt with the wicked, God suspended His anger that they might not perish together with the sinners, but when He would destroy those, He withdrew the righteous. So also at the end of the world, the consummation shall not come before all the just are separated from the wicked.

BEDE. For He who in the mean time though we see Him not yet sees all things, shall then appear to judge all things. And He shall come especially at that time, when He shall see all who are forgetful of His judgments in bondage to this world.

THEOPHYLACT. For when Antichrist has come, then shall men become wanton, given up to abominable vices, as the Apostle says, Lovers of pleasure rather than lovers of God. (2 Tim. 3:4.) For if Antichrist is the dwelling-place of every sin, what else will he then implant in the miserable race of men, but what belongs to himself. And this our Lord implies by the instances of the deluge and the people of Sodom.

BEDE. Now mystically, Lot, which is interpreted ‘turning aside,’ is the people of the elect, who, while in Sodom, i. e. among the wicked, live as strangers, to the utmost of their power turning aside from all their wicked ways. But when Lot went out, Sodom is destroyed, for at the end of the world, the angels shall go forth and sever the wicked from among the just, and cast them into a furnace of fire. (Matt. 13:49.) The fire and brimstone, however, which He relates to have rained from heaven, does not signify the flame itself of everlasting punishment, but the sudden coming of that day.

17:31–33

31. In that day, he which shall he upon the housetop, and his stuff in the house, let him not come down to take it away: and he that is in the field, let him likewise not return back.

32. Remember Lot’s wife.

33. Whosoever shall seek to save his life shall lose it; and whosoever shall lose his life shall preserve it.

AMBROSE. Because good men must needs on account of the wicked be sore vexed in this world, in order that they may receive a more plentiful reward in the world to come, they are here punished with certain remedies, as it is here said, In that day, &c. that is, if a man goes up to the top of his house and rises to the summit of the highest virtues, let him not fall back to the grovelling business of this world.

AUGUSTINE. For he is on the housetop who, departing from carnal things, breathes as it were the free air of a spiritual life. But the vessels in the house are the carnal senses, which many using to discover truth which is only taken in by the intellect, have entirely missed it. Let the spiritual man then beware, lest in the day of tribulation he again take pleasure in the carnal life which is fed by the bodily senses, and descend to take away this world's vessels. It follows, And he that is in the field, let him not return back; that is, He who labours in the Church, as Paul planting and Apollos watering, let him not look back upon the worldly prospects which he has renounced.

THEOPHYLACT. Matthew relates all these things to have been said by our Lord, with reference to the destruction of Jerusalem, that when the Romans came upon them, they who were on the housetop should not come down to take any thing, but fly at once, nor they that were in the field return home. And surely so it was at the taking of Jerusalem, and again will be at the coming of Antichrist, but much more at the completion of all things, when that intolerable destruction shall come.

EUSEBIUS. He hereby implies that a persecution will come from the son of perdition upon Christ's faithful. By that day then He means the time previous to the end of the world, in which let not him who is flying return, nor care to lose his goods, lest he imitate Lot's wife, who when she fled out of the city of Sodom, turning back, died, and became a pillar of salt.

AMBROSE. Because thus she looked behind, she lost the gift of her nature. For Satan is behind, behind also Sodom. Wherefore flee from intemperance, turn away from lust, for recollect, that he who turned not back to his old pursuits escaped, because he reached the mount; whereas she looking back to what was left behind, could not even by the aid of her husband reach the mount, but remained fixed.

AUGUSTINE. Lot's wife represents those who in time of trouble look back and turn aside from the hope of the divine promise, and hence she was made a pillar of salt as a warning to men not to do likewise, and to season as it were their hearts, lest they become corrupt.

THEOPHYLACT. Next follows the promise, Whosoever shall seek, &c. as if he said, Let no man in the persecutions of Antichrist seek to secure his life, for he shall lose it, but whoso shall expose himself to trials and death shall be safe, never submitting himself to the tyrant from his love of life.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. How a man may lose his own life to save it, St. Paul explains when he speaks of some who crucified their flesh with the affections and lusts, (Gal. 5:24.) that is, with perseverance and devotion engaging in the conflict.

17:34–37

34. I tell you, in that night there shall be two men in one bed; the one shall be taken, and the other shall be left.

35. Two women shall be grinding together; the one shall be taken, and the other left.

36. Two men shall be in the field; the one shall be taken, and the other left.

37. And they answered and said unto him, Where, Lord? And he said unto them, Wheresoever the body is, thither will the eagles be gathered together.

BEDE. Our Lord had just before said, that he who is in the field must not return back; and lest this should seem to have been spoken of those only who would openly return from the field, that is, who would publicly deny their Lord, He goes on to shew, that there are some who, while seeming to turn their face forward, are yet in their heart looking behind.

AMBROSE. He rightly says, night, for Antichrist is the hour of darkness, because he pours a dark cloud over the minds of men while he declares himself to be Christ. But Christ as lightning shines brightly, that we may be able to see in that night the glory of the resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 41.) Or He says, in that night, meaning in that tribulation.

THEOPHYLACT. Or He teaches us the suddenness of Christ’s coming, which we are told will be in the night. And having said that the rich can scarcely be saved, He shews that not all the rich perish, nor all the poor are saved.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For by the two men in one bed, He seems to denote the rich who repose themselves in worldly pleasures, for a bed is a sign of rest. But not all who abound in riches are wicked, but if one is good and elect in the faith, he will be taken, but another who is not so will be left. For when our Lord descends to judgment, He will send His Angels, who while they leave behind on the earth the rest to suffer punishment, will bring the holy and righteous men to Him; according to the Apostle's words, We shall be caught up together in the clouds to meet Christ in the air. (1 Thess 4:17.)

AMBROSE. Or out of the same bed of human infirmity, one is left, that is, rejected, another is taken up, that is, is caught to meet Christ in the air. By the two grinding together, he seems to imply the poor and the oppressed. To which belongs what follows. Two men shall be in the field, &c. For in these there is no slight difference. For some nobly bear up against the burden of poverty, leading a lowly but honest life, and these shall be taken up; but the others are very active in wickedness, and they shall be left. Or those grinding at the mill seem to represent such as seek nourishment from hidden sources, and from secret places draw forth things openly to view. And perhaps the world is a kind of corn mill, in which the soul is shut up as in a bodily prison. And in this corn mill either the synagogue or the soul exposed to sin, like the wheat, softened by grinding and spoilt by too great moisture, cannot separate the outward from the inner parts, and so is left because its flour dissatisfies. But the holy Church, or the soul which is not soiled by the stains of sin, which grinds such wheat as is ripened by the heat of the eternal sun, presents to God a good flour from the secret shrines of the heart. Who the two men in the field are we may discover if we consider, that there are two minds in us, one of the outer man which wasteth away, the other of the inner man which is renewed by the Sacrament. These are then the labourers in the field, the one of which by diligence brings forth good fruit, the other by idleness loses that which he has. Or those who are compared we may interpret to be two nations, one of which being faithful is taken, the other being unfaithful is left.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. ut sup) Or there are three classes of men here represented. The first is composed of those who prefer their ease and quiet, and busy not themselves in secular or ecclesiastical concerns. And this quiet life of theirs is signified by the bed. The next class embraces those who being placed among the people are governed by teachers. And such he has described by the name of women, because it is best for them to be ruled by the advice of those who are set over them; and he has described these as grinding at the mill, because in their hands revolves the wheel and circle of temporal concerns. And with reference to these matters he has represented them as grinding together, inasmuch as they give their services to the benefit of the Church. The third class are those who labour in the ministry of the Church as in the field of God. In each of these three classes then there are two sorts of men, of which the one abide in the Church and are taken up, the other fall away and are left.

AMBROSE. For God is not unjust that He should separate in His reward of their deserts men of like pursuits in life, and not differing in the quality of their actions. But the habit of living together does not equalize the merits of men, for not all accomplish what they attempt, but he only who shall persevere to the end shall be saved.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When He said that some should be taken up, the disciples not unprofitably inquire, ‘Where, Lord?’

BEDE. Our Lord was asked two questions, where the good should be taken up, and where the bad left; He gave only one answer, and left the other to be understood, saying, Wheresoever the body is, thither will the eagles be gathered together.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As if He said, As when a dead body is thrown away, all the birds which feed on human flesh flock to it, so when the Son of man shall come, all the eagles, that is, the saints, shall haste to meet Him.

AMBROSE. For the souls of the righteous are likened to eagles, because they soar high and forsake the lower parts, and are said to live to a great age. Now concerning the body, we can have no doubt, and above all if we remember that Joseph received the body from Pilate. (Matt. 28.) And do not you see the eagles around the body are the women and Apostles gathered together around our Lord’s sepulchre? Do not you see them then, when he shall come in the clouds, and every eye shall behold him? (Rev. 1:7.) But the body is that of which it was said, My flesh is meat indeed; (John 6:55.) and around this body are the eagles which fly about on the wings of the Spirit, around it also eagles which believe that Christ has come in the flesh. And this body is the Church, in which by the grace of baptism we are renewed in the Spirit.

EUSEBIUS. Or by the eagles feeding on the dead animals, he has here described the rulers of the world, and those who shall at that time persecute the saints of God, in whose power are left all those who are unworthy of being taken up, who are called the body or carcase. Or by the eagles are meant the avenging powers which shall fly about to torment the wicked.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 7.) these things which Luke has given us in a different place from Matthew, he either relates by anticipation, so as to mention beforehand what was afterwards spoken by our Lord, or he means us to understand that they were twice uttered by Him.

CHAPTER 18

18:1–8

1. And he spake a parable unto them to this end, that men ought always to pray, and not to faint;

2. Saying, There was in a city a judge, which feared not God, neither regarded man:

3. And there was a widow in that city; and she came unto him, saying, Avenge me of mine adversary.

4. And he would not for a while: but afterwards he said within himself, Though I fear not God, nor regard man;

5. Yet because this widow troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming she weary me.

6. And the Lord said, Hear what the unjust judge saith.

7. And shall not God avenge his own elect, which cry day and night unto him, though he bear long with them?

8. I tell you that he will avenge them speedily. Nevertheless when the Son of man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord having spoken of the trials and dangers which were coming, adds immediately afterward their remedy, namely, constant and earnest prayer.

CHRYSOSTOM. He who hath redeemed thee, hath shewn thee what He would have thee do. He would have thee be instant in prayer, He would have thee ponder in thy heart the blessings thou art praying for, He would have thee ask and receive what His goodness is longing to impart. He never refuses His blessings to them that pray, but rather stirs men up by His mercy not to faint in praying. Gladly accept the Lord’s encouragement: be willing to do what He commands, not to do what He forbids. Lastly, consider what a blessed privilege is granted thee, to talk with God in thy prayers, and make known to Him all thy wants, while He though not in words, yet by

His mercy, answers thee, for He despiseth not petitions, He tires not but when thou art silent.

BEDE. We should say that he is always praying, and faints not, who never fails to pray at the canonical hours. Or all things which the righteous man does and says towards God, are to be counted as praying.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. ii. qu. 45.) Our Lord utters His parables, either for the sake of the comparison, as in the instance of the creditor, who when forgiving his two debtors all that they owed him was most loved by him who owed him most; or on account of the contrast, from which he draws his conclusion; as, for example, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which to-day is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith. So also here when he brings forward the case of the unjust judge.

THEOPHYLACT. We may observe, that irreverence towards man is a token of a greater degree of wickedness. For as many as fear not God, yet are restrained by their shame before men, are so far the less sinful; but when a man becomes reckless also of other men, the burden of his sins is greatly increased.

It follows, And there was a widow in that city.

AUGUSTINE. The widow may be said to resemble the Church, which appears desolate until the Lord shall come, who now secretly watches over her. But in the following words, And she came unto him, saying, Avenge me, &c. we are told the reason why the elect of God pray that they may be avenged; which we find also said of the martyrs in the Revelations of St. John, (Rev. 6:10.) though at the same time we are very plainly reminded to pray for our enemies and persecutors. This avenging of the righteous then we must understand to be, that the wicked may perish. And they perish in two ways, either by conversion to righteousness, or by punishment having lost the opportunity of conversion. Although, if all men were converted to God, there would still remain the devil to be condemned at the end of the world. And since the righteous are longing for this end to come, they are not unreasonably said to desire vengeance.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else; Whenever men inflict injury upon us, we must then think it a noble thing to be forgetful of the evil; but when they offend against the glory of God by taking up arms against the ministers of God’s ordinance, we then approach God imploring His help, and loudly rebuking them who impugn His glory.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) If then with the most unjust judge, the perseverance of the suppliant at length prevailed even to the fulfilment of her desire, how much more confident ought they to feel who cease not to pray to God, the Fountain of justice and mercy? And so it follows. And the Lord said, Hear what, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, If perseverance could melt a judge defiled with every sin, how much more shall our prayers incline to mercy God the Father of all mercies! But some have given a more subtle meaning to the parable, saying, that the widow is a soul that has put off the old man, (that is, the devil,) who is her adversary, because she approaches God, the righteous Judge, who neither fears (because He is God alone) nor regards man, for with God there is no respect of persons. Upon the widow then, or soul ever supplicating Him against the devil, God shews mercy, and is softened by her importunity. After having taught us that we must in the last days resort to prayer because of the dangers that are coming, our Lord adds, Nevertheless, when the Son of man cometh, shall he find faith on the earth?

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 115.) Our Lord speaks this of perfect faith, which is seldom found on earth. See how full the Church of God is; were there no faith, who would enter it? Were there perfect faith, who would not move mountains?

BEDE. When the Almighty Creator shall appear in the form of the Son of man, so scarce will the elect be, that not so much the cries of the faithful as the torpor of the others will hasten the world’s fall. Our Lord speaks then as it were doubtfully, not that He really is in doubt, but to reprove us; just as we sometimes, in a matter of certainty, might use the words of doubt, as, for instance, in chiding a servant, “Remember, am I not thy master?”

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Our Lord adds this to shew, that when faith fails, prayer dies. In order to pray then, we must have faith, and that our faith fail not, we must pray. Faith pours forth prayer, and the pouring forth of the heart in prayer gives stedfastness to faith.

18:9–14

9. And he spake this parable unto certain which trusted in themselves that they were righteous, and despised others:

10. Two men went up into the temple to pray; the one a Pharisee, and the other a Publican.

11. The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, God, I thank thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this Publican.

12. I fast twice in the week, I give tithes of all that I possess.

13. And the Publican, standing afar off, would not lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast, saying, God be merciful to me a sinner.

14. I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other: for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 115.) Since faith is not a gift of the proud but of the humble, our Lord proceeds to add a parable concerning humility and against pride.

THEOPHYLACT. Pride also beyond all other passions disturbs the mind of man. And hence the very frequent warnings against it. It is moreover a contempt of God; for when a man ascribes the good he doth to himself and not to God, what else is this but to deny God? For the sake then of those that so trust in themselves, that they will not ascribe the whole to God, and therefore despise others, He puts forth a parable, to shew that righteousness, although it may bring man up to God, yet if he is clothed with pride, casts him down to hell.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Asterius.) To be diligent in prayer was the lesson taught by our Lord in the parable of the widow and the judge, He now instructs us how we should direct our prayers to Him, in order that our prayers may not be fruitless. The Pharisee was condemned because he prayed heedlessly. As it follows, The Pharisee stood and prayed with himself.

THEOPHYLACT. It is said “standing,” to denote his haughty temper. For his very posture betokens his extreme pride.

BASIL. (in Esai. c. 2.) “He prayed with himself,” that is, not with God, his sin of pride sent him back into himself. It follows, God, I thank thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 115.) His fault was not that he gave God thanks, but that he asked for nothing further. Because thou art full and aboundest, thou hast no need to say, Forgive us our debts. What then must be his guilt who impiously fights against grace, when he is condemned who proudly gives thanks? Let those hear who say, “God has made me man, I made myself righteous. O worse and more hateful than the Pharisee, who proudly called himself righteous, yet gave thanks to God that he was so.

THEOPHYLACT. Observe the order of the Pharisee’s prayer. He first speaks of that which he had not, and then of that which he had. As it follows, That I am not as other men are.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) He might at least have said, “as many men;” for what does he mean by “other men,” but all besides himself? “I am righteous, he says, the rest are sinners.”

GREGORY. (23. Mor. c. 6.) There are different shapes in which the pride of self-confident men presents itself; when they imagine that either the good in them is of themselves; or when believing it is given them from above, that they have received it for their own merits; or at any rate when they boast that they have that which they have not. Or lastly, when despising others they aim at appearing singular in the possession of that which they have. And in this respect the Pharisee awards to himself especially the merit of good works.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) See how he derives from the Publican near him a fresh occasion for pride. It follows, Or even as this Publican; as if he says, “I stand alone, he is one of the others.”

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 2. de Pœn.) To despise the whole race of man was not enough for him; he must yet attack the Publican. He would have sinned, yet far less if he had spared the Publican, but now in one word he both assails the absent, and inflicts a wound on him who was present. (Hom. 3. in Matt.). To give thanks is not to heap reproaches on others. When thou returnest thanks to God, let Him be all in all to thee. Turn not thy thoughts to men, nor condemn thy neighbour.

BASIL. (ubi sup.) The difference between the proud man and the scorner is in the outward form alone. The one is engaged in reviling others, the other in presumptuously extolling himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. He who rails at others does much harm both to himself and others. First, those who hear him are rendered worse, for if sinners they are made glad in finding one as guilty as themselves, if righteous, they are exalted, being led by the sins of others to think more highly of themselves. Secondly, the body of the Church suffers; for those who hear him are not all content to blame the guilty only, but to fasten the reproach also on the Christian religion. Thirdly, the glory of God is evil spoken of; for as our well-doing makes the name of God to be glorified, so our sins cause it to be blasphemed. Fourthly, the object of reproach is confounded and becomes more reckless and immoveable. Fifthly, the ruler is himself made liable to punishment for uttering things which are not seemly.

THEOPHYLACT. It becomes us not only to shun evil, but also to do good; and so after having said, I am not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, he adds something by way of contrast, I fast twice in a week. They called the week the Sabbath, (Sabbatho) from the last day of rest. The Pharisees fasted upon the second and fifth day. He therefore set fasting against the passion of adultery, for lust is born of luxury; but to the extortioners and usurists he opposed the payment of tithes; as it follows, I give tithes of all I possess; as if he says, So far am I from indulging in extortion or injuring, that I even give up what is my own.

GREGORY. (19. Mor. c. 21.) So it was pride that laid bare to his wily enemies the citadel of his heart, which prayer and fasting had in vain kept closed. Of no use are all the other fortifications, as long as there is one place which the enemy has left defenceless.

AUGUSTINE. If you look into his words, you will find that he asked nothing of God. He goes up indeed to pray, but instead of asking God, praises himself, and even insults him that asked. The Publican, on the other hand, driven by his stricken conscience afar off, is by his piety brought near.

THEOPHYLACT. Although reported to have stood, the Publican yet differed from the Pharisee, both in his manner and his words, as well as in his having a contrite heart. For he feared to lift up his eyes to heaven, thinking unworthy of the heavenly vision those which had loved to gaze upon and wander after earthly things. He also smote his breast, striking it as it were because of the evil thoughts, and moreover rousing it as if asleep. And thus he sought only that God would be reconciled to him, as it follows, saying, God, be merciful.

CHRYSOSTOM. He heard the words, that I am not as the Publican. He was not angry, but pricked to the heart. The one uncovered the wound, the other seeks for its remedy. Let no one then ever put forth so cold an excuse as, I dare not, I am ashamed, I cannot open my mouth. The devils have that kind of fear. The devil would fain close against thee every door of access to God.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 115.) Why then marvel ye, whether God pardons, since He himself acknowledges it. The Publican stood afar off, yet drew near to God. And the Lord was nigh unto him, and heard him, For the Lord is on high, yet hath he regard to the lowly. He lifted not so much as his eyes to heaven; that he might be looked upon, he looked not himself. Conscience weighed him down, hope raised him up, he smote his own breast, he exacted judgment upon himself. Therefore did the Lord spare the penitent. Thou hast heard the accusation of the proud, thou hast heard the humble confession of the accused. Hear now the sentence of the Judge; Verily I say unto you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other.

CHRYSOSTOM. (de Inc. Dei Nat. Hom. 5.) This parable represents to us two chariots on the race course, each with two charioteers in it. In one of the chariots it places righteousness with pride, in the other sin and humility. You see the chariot of sin outstrip that of righteousness, not by its own strength but by the excellence of humility combined with it, but the other is defeated not by righteousness, but by the weight and swelling of pride. For as humility by its own elasticity rises above the weight of pride, and leaping up reaches to God, so pride by its great weight easily depresses righteousness. Although therefore thou art earnest and constant in well doing, yet thinkest thou mayest boast thyself, thou art altogether devoid of the fruits of prayer. But thou that bearest a thousand loads of guilt on thy conscience, and only thinkest this thing of thyself that thou art the lowest of all men, shalt gain much confidence before God. And He then goes on to assign the reason of His sentence. For every one who exalteth himself shall be abased, and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted. (in Ps. 142). The word humility has various meanings. There is the humility of virtue, as, A humble and contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise. (Ps. 51:17.) There is also a humility arising from sorrows, as, He has humbled my life upon the earth. (Ps. 142:3.) There is a humility derived from sin, and the pride and insatiability of riches. For can any thing be more low and debased than those who grovel in riches and power, and count them great things?

BASIL. (in Esai 2. 12.) In like manner it is possible to be honourably elated when your thoughts indeed are not lowly, but your mind by greatness of soul is lifted up towards virtue. This loftiness of mind is seen in a cheerfulness amidst sorrow; or a kind of noble dauntlessness in trouble; a contempt of earthly things, and a conversation in heaven. And this loftiness of mind seems to differ from that elevation which is engendered of pride, just as the stoutness of a well-regulated body differs from the swelling of the flesh which proceeds from dropsy.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de Prof. Ev.) This inflation of pride can cast down even from heaven the man that taketh not warning, but humility can raise a man up from the lowest depth of guilt. The one saved the Publican before the Pharisee, and brought the thief into Paradise before the Apostles; the other entered even into the spiritual powers. But if humility though added to sin has made such rapid advances, as to pass by pride united to righteousness, how much swifter will be its course when you add to it righteousness? It will stand by the judgment-seat of God in the midst of the angels with great boldness. Moreover if pride joined to righteousness had power to depress it, unto what a hell will it thrust men when added to sin? This I say not that we should neglect righteousness, but that we should avoid pride.

THEOPHYLACT. But should any one perchance marvel that the Pharisee for uttering a few words in his own praise is condemned, while Job, though he poured forth many, is crowned, I answer, that the Pharisee spoke these at the same time that he groundlessly accused others; but Job was compelled by an urgent necessity to enumerate his own virtues for the glory of God, that men might not fall away from the path of virtue.

BEDE. Typically, the Pharisee is the Jewish people, who boast of their ornaments because of the righteousness of the law; but the Publican is the Gentiles, who being at a distance from God confess their sins. Of whom the one for His pride returned humbled, the other for his contrition was thought worthy to draw near and be exalted.

18:15–17

15. And they brought unto him also infants, that he would touch them: but when his disciples saw it, they rebuked them.

16. But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Suffer little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of God.

17. Verily I say unto you, Whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child shall in no wise enter therein.

THEOPHYLACT. After what He had said, our Lord teaches us a lesson of humility by His own example; He does not turn away the little children who are brought to Him, but graciously receives them.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 115.) To whom are they brought to be touched, but to the Saviour? And as being the Saviour they are presented to Him to be saved, who came to save that which was lost. But with regard to these innocents, when were they lost? The Apostle says, By one man sin entered into the world. (Rom. 5:12.) Let then the little children come as the sick to a physician, the lost to their Redeemer.

AMBROSE. It may be thought strange by some that the disciples wished to prevent the little children from coming to our Lord, as it is said, when they saw it, they rebuked them. But we must understand in this either a mystery, or the effect of their love to Him. For they did it not from envy or harsh feeling towards the children, but they manifested a holy zeal in their Lord’s service, that he might not be pressed by the crowds. Our own interest must be given up where an injury is threatened to God. But we may understand the mystery to be, that they desired the Jewish people to be first saved, of whom they were according to the flesh.

They knew indeed the mystery, that to both nations the call was to be made, (for they entreated for the Canaanitish woman,) but perhaps they were still ignorant of the order. It follows, But Jesus called them unto him, and said, Suffer little children, &c. One age is not preferred to another, else it were hurtful to grow up. But why does He say that children are fitter for the kingdom of heaven? It is because they are ignorant of guile, are incapable of theft, dare not return a blow, are unconscious of lust, have no desire for wealth, honours, or ambition. But to be ignorant of these things is not virtue, we must also despise them. For virtue consists not in our inability to sin, but in our unwillingness. Childhood then is not meant here, but that goodness which rivals the simplicity of childhood.

BEDE. Hence our Lord pointedly says, of such, not “of these,” to shew that to character, not to age, is the kingdom given, and to such as have a childlike innocence and simplicity is the promise of the reward.

AMBROSE. Lastly, our Saviour expressed this when He said, Verily I say unto you, Whosoever will not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, &c. What child were Christ’s Apostles to imitate but Him of whom Esaias speaks, Unto us a Child is given? (Isai. 9:6.) Who when He was reviled, reviled not again. (1 Pet. 2.) So that there is in childhood a certain venerable antiquity, and in old age a childlike innocence.

BASIL. (in Reg. Brev. ad int. 217.) We shall receive the kingdom of God as a child if we are disposed towards our Lord’s teaching as a child under instruction, never contradicting nor disputing with his masters, but trustfully and teachably imbibing learning.

THEOPHYLACT. The wise men of the Gentiles therefore who seek for wisdom in a mystery, which is the kingdom of God, and will not receive this without the evidence of logical proof, are rightly shut out from this kingdom.

18:18–23

18. And a certain ruler asked him, saying, Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?

19. And Jesus said unto him, Why callest thou me good? none is good, save one, that is, God.

20. Thou knowest the commandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Honour thy father and thy mother.

21. And he said, All these have I kept from my youth up.

22. Now when Jesus heard these things, he said unto him, Yet lackest thou one thing: sell all that thou hast, and distribute unto the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, follow me.

23. And when he heard this, he was very sorrowful: for he was very rich.

BEDE. A certain ruler having heard our Lord say, that only those who would be like little children should enter the kingdom of heaven, entreats Him to explain to him not by parable but openly by what works he may merit to obtain eternal life.

AMBROSE. That ruler tempting Him said, Good Master, he ought to have said, Good God. For although goodness exists in divinity and divinity in goodness, yet by adding Good Master, he uses good only in part, not in the whole. For God is good altogether, man partially.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now he thought to detect Christ in blaming the law of Moses, while He introduced His own commands. He went then to the Master, and calling Him good, says that he wishes to be taught by Him, for he sought to tempt Him. But He who takes the wise in their craftiness answers him fitly as follows, Why callest thou me good? there is none good, save God alone.

AMBROSE. He does not deny that He is good, but points to God. None is good then except he be full of goodness. But should it strike any one that it is said, none is good, let this also strike him, save God, and if the Son is not excepted from God, surely neither is Christ excepted from good. For how is He not good who is born from good? A good tree brings forth good fruits. (Matt. 7:17.) How is He not good, seeing that the substance of His goodness which He took unto Him from the Father has not degenerated in the Son which did not degenerate in the Spirit. Thy good spirit, he says, shall lead me into a land of uprightness. (Ps. 148:10.) But if the Spirit is good who received from the Son, verily He also is good who gave It. Because then it was a lawyer who tempted Him, as is plainly shewn in another book, He therefore well said, None is good, save God, that He might remind him that it was written, Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God, (Deut. 6:16.) but he the rather gives thanks to the Lord that He is good. (Ps. 118.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 63. in Matt.) Or else; I shall not hesitate to call this ruler covetous, for with this Christ reproaches him, but I say not that he was a tempter.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. When he says then, Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? it is the same as if he says, Thou art good; vouchsafe me then an answer to my question. I am learned in the Old Testament, but I see in Thee something far more excellent. For Thou makest no earthly promises, but preachest the kingdom of heaven. Tell me then, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? The Saviour then considering his meaning, because faith is the way to good works, passes over the question he asked, and leads him to the knowledge of faith; as if a man was to ask a physician, “What shall I eat?” and he was to shew him what ought to go before his food. And then He sends him to His Father, saying, Why callest thou me good? not that He was not good, for He was the good branch from the good tree, or the good Son of the good Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 63.) It may seem that the account given in Matthew is different, where it is said, "Why askest thou me of good?" which might apply better to the question which he asked, What good shall I do? (Matt. 10.) In this place he both calls Him good, and asks the question about good. It will be best then to understand both to have been said, Why callest thou me good? and, Why askest thou me of good? though the latter may rather be implied in the former.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. After instructing him in the knowledge of the faith, He adds, Thou knowest the commandments. As though He said, Know God first, and then will it be time to seek what thou askest.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the ruler expected to hear Christ say, Forsake the commandments of Moses, and listen to Mine. Whereas He sends him to the former; as it follows, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery.

THEOPHYLACT. The law first forbids those things to which we are most prone, as adultery for instance, the incitement to which is within us, and of our nature; and murder, because rage is a great and savage monster. But theft and bearing false witness are sins which men seldom fall into. And besides, the former also are the more grievous sins, therefore He places theft and bearing false witness in the second place, as both less common, and of less weight than the other.

BASIL. (in Esai. cap. 1. 23.) Now we must not understand by thieves, only such as cut strips off hides, or commit robberies in the baths. But all such also as, when appointed leaders of legions, or installed governors of states or nations, are guilty of secret embezzlement, or violent and open exactions.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But you may observe that these commandments consist in not doing certain things; that if thou hast not committed adultery, thou art chaste; if thou stealest not, honestly disposed; if thou bearest not false witness, truth-telling. Virtue then we see is rendered easy through the goodness of the Lawgiver. For He speaks of avoiding of evil, not practising of good. And any cessation from action is easier than any actual work.

THEOPHYLACT. Because sin against parents, although a great crime, very rarely happens, He places it last of all, Honour thy father and mother.

AMBROSE. Honour is concerned not only with paying respect, but also with giving bountifully. For it is honouring to reward deserts. Feed thy father, feed thy mother, and when thou hast fed them thou hast not requited all the pangs and agony thy mother underwent for thee. To the one thou owest all thou hast, to the other all thou art. What a condemnation, should the Church feed those whom thou art able to feed! But it may be said, What I was going to bestow upon my parents, I prefer to give to the Church. God seeks not a gift which will starve thy parents, but the Scripture says as well that parents are to be fed, as that they are to be left for God's sake, should they check the love of a devout mind.

It follows, And he said, All these things have I kept from my youth up.

JEROME. (in Matt. 19:19.) The young man speaks false, for if he had fulfilled that which was afterwards placed among the commandments, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, how was it that when he heard, Go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, he went away sorrowful?

BEDE. Or we must not think him to have lied, but to have avowed that he had lived honestly, that is, at least in outward things, else Mark could never have said, And Jesus seeing him, loved him. (Mark. 10:21.)

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Our Lord next declares, that though a man has kept the old covenant, he is not perfect, since he lacks to follow Christ. Thou yet lackest one thing, Sell all that thou hast, &c. As if He says, Thou askest how to possess eternal life; scatter thy goods among the poor, and thou shalt obtain it. A little thing is that thou spendest, thou receivest great things.

ATHANASIUS. (ex Apol. de sua fuga.) For when we despise the world, we must not imagine we have resigned any thing great, for the whole earth in comparison of the heaven is but a span long; therefore even should they who renounce it be lords of the whole earth, yet still it would be nothing worth in comparison of the kingdom of heaven.

BEDE. Whoever then wishes to be perfect must sell all that he hath, not a part only, as Ananias and Sapphira did, but the whole.

THEOPHYLACT. Hence when he says, All that thou hast, He inculcates the most complete poverty. For if there is any thing left over or remaining to thee, thou art its slave.

BASIL. (in Reg. Brev. int. 92.) He does not tell us to sell our goods, because they are by nature evil, for then they would not be God's creatures;

He therefore does not bid us cast them away as if they were bad, but distribute them; nor is any one condemned for possessing them, but for abusing them. And thus it is, that to lay out our goods according to God’s command both blots out sins, and bestows the kingdom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 22. in 1 ad Cor.) God might indeed feed the poor without our taking compassion upon them, but He wishes the givers to be bound by the ties of love to the receivers.

BASIL. (in Reg. fus. disp. 3. ad int. 9.) When our Lord says, Give to the poor, it becomes a man no longer to be careless, but diligently to dispose of all things, first of all by himself if in any measure he is able, if not, by those who are known to be faithful, and prudent in their management; for cursed is he who doeth the work of the Lord negligently. (Jerem. 49, 10.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 32. in 1. ad Cor.) But it is asked, how does Christ acknowledge the giving all things to the poor to be perfection, whereas St. Paul declares this very thing without charity to be imperfect. Their harmony is shewn in the words which succeed, And come, follow me, which betokens it to be from love. For herein shall all men know that ye are my, disciples, if ye have love one toward another. (John 13:35.)

THEOPHYLACT. Together with poverty must exist all the other virtues, therefore He says, Come, follow me, that is, In all other things be My disciples, be always following Me.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The ruler was not able to contain the new word, but being like an old bottle, burst with sorrow.

BASIL. (Hom. de eleemos.) The merchant when he goes to the market, is not loth to, part with all that he has, in order to obtain what he requires, but thou art grieved at giving mere dust and ashes that thou mayest gain everlasting bliss.

18:24–30

24. And when Jesus saw that he was very sorrowful, he said, How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God!

25. For it is easier for a camel to go through a needle’s eye, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.

26. And they that heard it said, Who then can be saved?

27. And he said, The things which are impossible with men are possible with God.

28. Then Peter said, Lo, we have left all, and followed thee.

29. And he said unto them, Verily I say unto you, There is no man that hath left house, or parents, or brethren, or wife, or children, for the kingdom of God's sake,

30. Who shall not receive manifold more in this present time, and in the world to come life everlasting.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord, seeing that the rich man was sorrowful when it was told him to surrender his riches, marvelled, saying, How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of God! He says not, It is impossible for them to enter, but it is difficult. For they might through their riches reap an heavenly reward, but it is a hard thing, seeing that riches are more tenacious than birdlime, and hardly is the soul ever plucked away, that is once seized by them. But he next speaks of it as impossible. It is easier for a camel to go through a needle's eye. The word in the Greek answers equally to the animal called the camel, and to a cable, or ship rope. However we may understand it, impossibility is implied. What must we say then? First of all that the thing is positively true, for we must remember that the rich man differs from the steward, or dispenser of riches. The rich man is he who reserves his riches to himself, the steward or dispenser one who holds them entrusted to his care for the benefit of others.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 24. in 1 ad Cor.) Abraham indeed possessed wealth for the poor. And all they who righteously possess it, spend it as receiving it from God, according to the divine command, while those who have acquired wealth in an ungodly way, are ungodly in their use of it; whether in squandering it on harlots or parasites, or hiding it in the ground, but sparing nothing for the poor. (Hom. 18. in Joan.). He does not then forbid men to be rich, but to be the slaves of their riches. He would have us use them as necessary, not keep guard over them. It is of a servant to guard, of a master to dispense. Had he wished to preserve them, He would never have given them to men, but left them to remain in the earth.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, observe that He says, a rich man can not possibly be saved, but one who possesses riches hardly; as if he said, The rich man who has been taken captive by his riches, and is a slave to them, shall not be saved; but he who possesses or is the master of them shall with difficulty be saved, because of human infirmity. For the devil is ever trying to make our foot slip as long as we possess riches, and it is a hard matter to escape his wiles. Poverty therefore is a blessing, and as it were free from temptation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 80. in Matt.) There is no profit in riches while the soul suffers poverty, no hurt in poverty, while the soul abounds in wealth. But if the sign of a man waxing rich is to be in need of nothing, and of becoming poor to be in want, it is plain that the poorer a man is, the richer he grows. For it is far easier for one in poverty to despise wealth, than for the rich. Nor again is avarice wont to be satisfied by having more, for thereby are men only the more inflamed, just as a fire spreads, the more it has to feed upon. Those which seem to be the evils of poverty, it has in common with riches, but the evils of riches are peculiar to them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst Evang. lib. ii. c. 42.) The name of “rich” he here gives to one who covets temporal things, and boasts himself in them. To such rich men are opposed the poor in spirit, of whom is the kingdom of heaven. Now mystically it is easier for Christ to suffer for the lovers of this world, than for the lovers of this world to be converted to Christ. For by the name of a camel He would represent Himself: for He voluntarily humbled Himself to bear the burdens of our infirmity. By the needle He signifies sharp piercings, and thereby the pangs received in His Passion, but by the form of the needle He describes the straitening of the Passion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 63. in Matt.) These weighty words so far exceeded the capacity of the disciples, that when they heard them, they asked, Who then can be saved? not that they feared for themselves, but for the whole world.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Seeing that there is an incomparably greater number of poor which might be saved by forsaking their riches, they understood that all who love riches, even though they cannot obtain them, were to be counted among the number of the rich. It follows, And he said to them, The things which are impossible with men are possible with God, which must not be taken as if a rich man with covetousness and pride might enter into the kingdom of God, but that it is possible with God for a man to be converted from covetousness and pride, to charity and humility.

THEOPHYLACT. With men therefore whose thoughts creep earthward, salvation is impossible, but with God it is possible. For when man shall have God for his counsellor, and shall have received the righteousness of God and His teaching concerning poverty, as well as have invoked His aid, this shall be possible to him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The rich man who has despised many things will naturally expect a reward, but he who possessing little resigns what he has, may fairly ask what there is in store for him; as it follows, Then Peter said, Lo, we have left all. Matthew adds, What shall we have therefore? (Matt. 19:27.)

BEDE. As if he says, We have done what Thou commandedst us, what reward then wilt Thou give us? And because it is not enough to have left all things, he adds that which made it perfect, saying, And have followed thee.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It was necessary to say this, because those who forsake a few things, as far as regards their motives and obedience, are weighed in the same balance with the rich, who have forsaken all, inasmuch as they act from the like affections, in voluntarily making a surrender of all that they possess. And therefore it follows, Verily I say unto you, there is no man that hath left house, &c. who shall not receive manifold more, &c. He inspires all who hear Him with the most joyful hopes, confirming His promises to them with an oath, beginning His declaration with Verily. For when the divine teaching invites the world to the faith of Christ, some perhaps regarding their unbelieving parents are unwilling to distress them by coming to the faith, and have the like respect of others of their relations; while some again forsake their father and mother, and hold lightly the love of their whole kindred in comparison of the love of Christ.

BEDE. The sense then is this; He who in seeking the kingdom of God has despised all earthly affections, has trampled under foot all riches, pleasures, and smiles of the world, shall receive far greater in the present time. Upon the ground of this declaration, some of the Jews build up the fable of a millennium after the resurrection of the just, when all things which we have given up for God’s sake shall be restored with manifold interest, and eternal life be granted. Nor do they from their ignorance seem to be aware, that even if in other things there might be a fit promise of restoration, yet in the matter of wives, who might be according to some Evangelists an hundred fold, it would be manifestly shocking, especially since our Lord declares that in the resurrection there will be no marrying. And according to Mark, those things which have been given up, He declares shall be received at this time with persecutions, which these Jews assert will be absent for a thousand years.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This then we say, that he who gives up all worldly and carnal things will gain for himself far greater, inasmuch as the Apostles, after leaving a few things, obtained the manifold gifts of grace, and were accounted great every where. We then shall be like to them. If a man has left his home, he shall receive an abiding place above. If his father, he shall have a Father in heaven. If he has forsaken his kindred, Christ shall take him for a brother. If he has given up a wife, he shall find divine wisdom, from which he shall beget spiritual offspring. If a mother, he shall find the heavenly Jerusalem, who is our mother. From brethren and sisters also united together with him by the spiritual bond of his will, he shall receive in this life far more kindly affections.

18:31–34

31. Then he took unto him the twelve, and said unto them, Behold, we go up to Jerusalem, and all things that are written by the prophets concerning the Son of man shall be accomplished.

32. For he shall be delivered unto the Gentiles, and shall be mocked, and spitefully entreated, and spitted on:

33. And they shall scourge him, and put him to death: and the third day he shall rise again.

34. And they understood none of these things: and this saying was hid from them, neither knew they the things which were spoken.

GREGORY. (Hom. 2. in Ev.) The Saviour foreseeing that the hearts of His disciples would be troubled at His Passion, tells them long beforehand both the suffering of His Passion and the glory of His Resurrection.

BEDE. And knowing that there would arise certain heretics, saying, that Christ taught things contrary to the Law and the Prophets, He shews already that the voices of the Prophets had proclaimed the accomplishment of His Passion, and the glory which should follow.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 65. in Matt.) He speaks with His disciples apart, concerning His Passion. For it was not fitting to publish this word to the multitudes, lest they should be troubled, but to His disciples He foretold it, that being habituated by expectation, they might be the more able to bear it.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. And to convince them that He foreknew His Passion, and of His own accord came to it, that they might not say, “How has He fallen into the hands of the enemy, who promised us salvation?” He relates in order the successive events of the Passion; He shall be delivered unto the Gentiles, and shall be mocked, and scourged, and spitted on.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Esaias prophesied of this when he said, I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair: I hid not my face from shame and spitting. (Isa. 50:5.) The Prophet also foretold the crucifixion, saying, He hath poured out his soul unto death, and was numbered with the transgressors; (Isa. 53:12.) as it is said here, And after they have scourged him, they shall put him to death. But David foretold Christ’s resurrection, For thou shalt not leave my soul in hell, (Ps. 16:10.) and so it is here added, And on the third day he shall rise again.

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (l. ii. Ep. 212.) I marvel at the folly of those who ask how Christ rose again before the three days. If indeed He rose later than he had foretold, it were a mark of weakness, but if sooner, a token of the highest power. For when we see a man who has promised his creditor that he will pay him his debt after three days, fulfilling his promise on that very day, we are so far from looking upon him as deceitful, that we admire his veracity. I must add, however, that He said not that He should rise again after three days, but on the third day. You have then the preparation, the Sabbath until sun set, and the fact that He rose after the Sabbath was over.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The disciples did not as yet know exactly what the Prophets had foretold, but after He rose again, He opened their understanding that they should understand the Scriptures. (Luke 24:25.)

BEDE. For because they desired His life above all things, they could not hear of His death, and as they knew him to be not only a spotless man, but also very God, they thought He could in no wise die. And whenever in the parables, which they frequently heard Him utter, He said any thing concerning His Passion, they believed it to be spoken allegorically, and referred to something else. Hence it follows, And this saying was hid from them, neither knew they the things which were spoken. But the Jews, who conspired against His life, knew that He spoke concerning His Passion, when he said, The Son of man must be lifted up; therefore said they, We have heard in our law that Christ abideth for ever, and how sayest thou the Son of man must be lifted up?

35. And it came to pass, that as he was come nigh unto Jericho, a certain blind man sat by the way side begging:

36. And hearing the multitude pass by, he asked what it meant.

37. And they told him, that Jesus of Nazareth passeth by.

38. And he cried, saying, Jesus, thou Son of David, have mercy on me.

39. And they which went before rebuked him, that he should hold his peace: but he cried so much the more, Thou Son of David, have mercy on me.

40. And Jesus stood, and commanded him to be brought unto him: and when he was come near, he asked him,

41. Saying, What wilt thou that I shall do unto thee? And he said, Lord, that I may receive my sight.

42. And Jesus said unto him, Receive thy sight: thy faith hath saved thee.

43. And immediately he received his sight, and followed him, glorifying God: and all the people, when they saw it, gave praise unto God.

GREGORY. (Hom. 2. in Ev.) Because the disciples being yet carnal were unable to receive the words of mystery, they are brought to a miracle. Before their eyes a blind man receives his sight, that by a divine work their faith might be strengthened.

THEOPHYLACT. And to shew that our Lord did not even walk without doing good, He performed a miracle on the way, giving His disciples this example, that we should be profitable in all things, and that nothing in us should be in vain.

AUGUSTINE. We might understand the expression of being nigh to Jericho, as if they had already gone out of it, but were still near. It might, though less common in this sense, be so taken here, since Matthew relates, that as they were going out of Jericho, two men received their sight who sat by the way side. There need be no question about the number, if we suppose that one of the Evangelists remembering only one was silent about the other. Mark also mentions only one, and he too says that he received his sight as they were going out of Jericho; he has given also the name of the man and of his father, to let us understand that this one was well known, but the other not so, so that it might come to pass that the one who was known would be naturally the only one mentioned. But seeing that what follows in

St. Luke’s Gospel most plainly proves the truth of his account, that while they were yet coming to Jericho, the miracle took place, we cannot but suppose that there were two such miracles, the first upon one blind man when our Lord was coming to that city, the second on two, when He was departing out of it; Luke relating the one, Matthew the other.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de cæco et Zacchæo) There was a great multitude gathered round Christ, and the blind man indeed knew Him not, but felt a drawing towards Him, and grasped with his heart what his sight embraced not. As it follows, And when he heard the multitude passing by, he asked what it was. And those that saw spoke indeed according to their own opinion. And they told him that Jesus of Nazareth passeth by. But the blind man cried out. He is told one thing, he proclaims another; for it follows, And he cried out, saying, Jesus, thou Son of David, have mercy on me. Who taught thee this, O man? Hast thou that art deprived of sight read books? Whence then knowest thou the Light of the world? Verily the Lord giveth sight to the blind. (Ps. 146:8.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Having been brought up a Jew, he was not ignorant that of the seed of David should God be born according to the flesh, and therefore he addresses Him as God, saying, Have mercy upon me. Would that those might imitate him who divide Christ into two. For he speaks of Christ as God, yet calls Him Son of David. But they marvel at the justice of his confession, and some even wished to prevent him from confessing his faith. But by checks of this kind his ardour was not damped. For faith is able to resist all, and to triumph over all. It is a good thing to lay aside shame in behalf of divine worship. For if for money’s sake some are bold, is it not fitting when the soul is at stake, to put on a righteous boldness? As it follows, But he cried out the more, Son of David, & c. The voice of one invoking in faith stops Christ, for He looks back upon them who call upon Him in faith. And accordingly He calls the blind man to Him, and bids him draw nigh, that he in truth who had first laid hold on Him in faith, might approach Him also in the body. The Lord asks this blind man as he drew near, What will thou that I shall do? He asks the question purposely, not as ignorant, but that those who stood by might know that he sought not money, but divine power from God. And thus it follows, But he said, Lord, that I may receive my sight.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Chrys. ut sup.) Or because the Jews perverting the truth might say, as in the case of him who was born blind, This is not he, but one like unto to him, (John 9:8.) He wished the blind first to make manifest the infirmity of his nature, that then he might fully acknowledge the greatness of the grace bestowed upon him. And as soon as the blind man explained the nature of his request, with words of the highest authority He commanded him to see. As it follows, And Jesus said to him, Receive thy sight. This served only still more to increase the guilt of unbelief in the Jews. For what prophet ever spoke in this way? Observe moreover what the physician claims from him whom he has restored to health. Thy faith hath saved thee. For faith then mercies are sold. Where faith is willing to accept, there grace abounds. And as from the same fountain some in small vessels draw little water, while others in large draw much, the fountain knowing no difference in measure; and as according to the windows which are opened, the sun sheds more or less of its brightness within; so according to the measure of a man's motives does he draw down supplies of grace. The voice of Christ is changed into the light of the afflicted. For He was the Word of true light. And thus it follows, And immediately he said. But the blind man as before his restoration he shewed an earnest faith, so afterwards did he give plain tokens of his gratitude; And he followed him, glorifying God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. From which it is clear, that he was released from a double blindness, both bodily and intellectual. For he would not have glorified Him as God, had he not truly seen Him as He is. But he also gave occasion to others to glorify God; as it follows, And all the people, when they saw it, gave praise unto God.

BEDE. Not only for the gift of light obtained, but for the merit of the faith which obtained it.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Chrys. ubi sup.) We may here well inquire, why Christ forbids the healed demoniac who wished to follow Him, but permits the blind man who had received his sight. There seems to be a good reason for both the one case and the other. He sends away the former as a kind of herald, to proclaim aloud by the evidence of his own state his benefactor, for it was indeed a notable miracle to see a raving madman brought to a sound mind. But the blind man He allows to follow Him, since He was going up to Jerusalem about to accomplish the high mystery of the

Cross, that men having a recent report of a miracle might not suppose that He suffered so much from helplessness as from compassion.

AMBROSE. In the blind man we have a type of the Gentile people, who have received by the Sacrament of our Lord the brightness of the light which they had lost. And it matters not whether the cure is conveyed in the case of one or two blind men, inasmuch as deriving their origin from Ham and Japhet, the sons of Noah, in the two blind men they put forward two authors of their race.

GREGORY. (Hom. 2. in Ev.) Or, blindness is a symbol of the human race, which in our first parent knowing not the brightness of heavenly light, now suffers the darkness of his condemnation. Jericho is interpreted ‘the moon,’ whose monthly wanings represent the feebleness of our mortality. While then our Creator is drawing nigh to Jericho, the blind is restored to sight, because when God took upon Him the weakness of our flesh, the human race received back the light which it had lost. He then who is ignorant of this brightness of the everlasting light, is blind. But if he does no more than believe in the Redeemer who said, I am the way, the truth, and the life; (John 13:6.) he sits by the way side. If he both believes and prays that he may receive the everlasting light, he sits by the way side and begs. Those that went before Jesus, as He was coming, represent the multitude of carnal desires, and the busy crowd of vices which before that Jesus comes to our heart, scatter our thoughts, and disturb us even in our prayers. But the blind man cried out the more; for the more violently we are assailed by our restless thoughts, the more fervently ought we to give ourselves to prayer. As long as we still suffer our manifold fancies to trouble us in our prayers, we feel in some measure Jesus passing by. But when we are very stedfast in prayer, God is fixed in our heart, and the lost light is restored. Or to pass by is of man, to stand is of God. The Lord then passing by heard the blind man crying, standing still restored him to sight, for by His humanity in compassion to our blindness He has pity upon our cries, by the power of His divinity He pours upon us the light of His grace.

Now for this reason He asks what the blind man wished, that He might stir up his heart to prayer, for He wishes that to be sought in prayer, which He knows beforehand both that we seek and He grants.

AMBROSE. Or, He asked the blind man to the end that we might believe, that without confession no man can be saved.

GREGORY. (ubi sup.) The blind man seeks from the Lord not gold, but light. Let us then seek not for false riches, but for that light which together with the Angels alone we may see, the way whereunto is faith. Well then was it said to the blind, Receive thy sight; thy faith hath saved thee. He who sees, also follows, because the good which he understands he practises.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. qu. 48.) If we interpret Jericho to mean the moon, and therefore death, our Lord when approaching His death commanded the light of the Gospel to be preached to the Jews only, who are signified by that one blind man whom Luke speaks of, but rising again from the dead and ascending to heaven, to both Jews and Gentiles; and these two nations seem to be denoted by the two blind men whom Matthew mentions.

CHAPTER 19

19:1–10

1. And Jesus entered and passed through Jericho.

2. And, behold, there was a man named Zacchæus, which was the chief among the Publicans, and he was rich.

3. And he sought to see Jesus who he was; and could not for the press, because he was little of stature.

4. And he ran before, and climbed up into a sycomore tree to see him: for he was to pass that way.

5. And when Jesus came to the place, he looked up, and saw him, and said unto him, Zacchæus, make haste, and come down; for to day I must abide at thy house.

6. And he made haste, and came down, and received him joyfully.

7. And when they saw it, they all murmured, saying, That he was gone to be guest with a man that is a sinner.

8. And Zacchæus stood, and said unto the Lord; Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor; and if I have taken any thing from any man by false accusation, I restore him fourfold.

9. And Jesus said unto him, This day is salvation come to this house, forsomuch as he also is a son of Abraham.

10. For the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost.

AMBROSE. Zacchæus in the sycamore, the blind man by the way side: upon the one our Lord waits to shew mercy, upon the other He confers the great glory of abiding in his house. The chief among the Publicans is here fitly introduced. For who will hereafter despair of himself, now that he attains to grace who gained his living by fraud. And he too moreover a rich man, that we may know that not all rich men are covetous.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But Zacchæus made no delay in what he did, and so was accounted worthy of the favour of God, which gives sight to the blind, and calls them who are afar off.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. The seed of salvation had begun to spring up in him, for he desired to see Jesus, having never seen Him. For if he had seen Him, he would long since have given up the Publican's wicked life. No one that sees Jesus can remain any longer in wickedness. But there were two obstacles to his seeing Him. The multitude not so much of men as of his sins prevented him, for he was little of stature.

AMBROSE. What means the Evangelist by describing his stature, and that of none other? It is perhaps because he was young in wickedness, or as yet weak in the faith. For he was not yet prostrate in sin who could climb up. He had not yet seen Christ.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. But he discovered a good device; running before he climbed up into a sycamore, and saw Him whom he had long wished for, i. e. Jesus, passing by. Now Zacchæus desired no more than to see, but He who is able to do more than we ask for, granted to Him far above what he expected; as it follows, And when Jesus came to the place, he looked up, and saw him. He saw the soul of the man striving earnestly to live a holy life, and converts him to godliness.

AMBROSE. Uninvited he invites Himself to his house; as it follows, Zacchæus, make haste, and come down, & c. for He knew how richly He would reward his hospitality. And though He had not yet heard the word of invitation, He had already seen the will.

BEDE. See here, the camel disencumbered of his hunch passes through the eye of a needle, that is, the rich man and the publican abandoning his love of riches, and loathing his dishonest gains, receives the blessing of his Lord's company. It follows, And he made haste, and came down, and received him joyfully.

AMBROSE. Let the rich learn that guilt attaches not to the goods themselves, but to those who know not how to use them. For riches, as they are hindrances to virtue in the unworthy, so are they means of advancing it in the good.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. de cæc. et Zacc.) Observe the gracious kindness of the Saviour. The innocent associates with the guilty, the fountain of justice with covetousness, which is the source of injustice. Having entered the publican's house, He suffers no stain from the mists of avarice, but disperses them by the bright beam of His righteousness. But those who deal with biting words and reproaches, try to cast a slur upon the things which were done by Him; for it follows, And when they saw it, they all murmured, saying, That he was gone to be guest with a man that is a sinner. But He, though accused of being a wine-bibber and a friend of publicans, regarded it not, so long as He could accomplish His end. As a physician sometimes can not save his patients from their diseases without the defilement of blood. And so it happened here, for the publican was converted, and lived a better life. Zacchæus stood, and said unto the Lord, Behold, Lord, the half of my goods I give to the poor; and if I have defrauded any man, I restore him fourfold. Behold here is a marvel: without learning he obeys. And as the sun pouring its rays into a house enlightens it not by word, but by work, so the Saviour by the rays of righteousness put to flight the darkness of sin; for the light shineth in darkness. Now every thing united is strong, but divided, weak; therefore Zacchæus divides into two parts his substance. But we must be careful to observe, that his wealth was not made up from unjust gains, but from his patrimony, else how could he restore fourfold what he had unjustly extorted. He knew that the law ordered what was wrongly taken away to be restored fourfold, that if the law deterred not, a man’s losses might soften him. Zacchæus waits not for the judgment of the law, but makes himself his own judge.

THEOPHYLACT. If we examine more closely, we shall see that nothing was left of his own property. For having given half of his goods to the poor, out of the remainder he restored fourfold to those whom he had injured. He not only promised this, but did it. For he says not, “I will give the half, and I will restore fourfold, but, I give, and I restore. To such Christ announces salvation; Jesus saith unto him, This day is salvation come to this house, signifying that Zacchæus had attained to salvation, meaning by the house the inhabitant thereof. And it follows, forasmuch as he also is a son of Abraham. For He would not have given the name of a son of Abraham to a lifeless building.

BEDE. Zacchæus is called the son of Abraham, not because he was born of Abraham’s seed, but because he imitates his faith, that as Abraham left his country and his father’s house, so he abandoned all his goods in giving them to the poor. And He well says, “He also,” to declare that not only those who had lived justly, but those who are raised up from a life of injustice, belong to the sons of promise.

THEOPHYLACT. He said not that he “was” a son of Abraham, but that he now is. For before when he was the chief among the publicans, and bore no likeness to the righteous Abraham, he was not his son. But because some murmured that he tarried with a man who was a sinner, he adds in order to restrain them, For the Son of man came to seek and to save that which was lost.

PSEUDO-CHRYSOSTOM. (ubi sup.) Why do ye accuse me if I bring sinners to righteousness? So far am I from hating them, that for their sakes I came. For I came to heal, not to judge, therefore am I the constant guest of those that are sick, and I suffer their noisomeness that I may supply remedies. But some one may ask, how does Paul bid us, If we have a brother that is a fornicator or covetous man, with such not even to take food; (1 Cor. 5:11.) whereas Christ was the guest of publicans? They were not as yet so far advanced as to be brethren, and besides, St. Paul bids us avoid our brethren only when they persist in evil, but these were converted.

BEDE. Mystically, Zacchæus, which is by interpretation “justified,” signifies the Gentile believers, who were depressed and brought very low by their worldly occupations, but sanctified by God. And he was desirous to see our Saviour entering Jericho, inasmuch as he sought to share in that faith which Christ brought into the world.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The crowd is the tumultuous state of an ignorant multitude, which cannot see the lofty top of wisdom. Zacchæus therefore, while he was in the crowd, saw not Christ, but having advanced beyond the vulgar ignorance, was thought worthy to entertain Him, whom he desired to look upon.

BEDE. Or the crowd, that is, the general habit of vice, which rebuked the blind man crying out, lest he should seek the light, also impedes Zacchæus looking up, that he might not see Jesus; that as by crying out the more the blind man overcame the crowd, so the man weak in the faith by forsaking earthly things, and climbing the tree of the Cross, surmounts the opposing multitude. The sycamore, which is a tree resembling the mulberry in foliage, but exceeding it in height, whence by the Latins it is called “lofty,” is called the “foolish fig-tree;” and so the Cross of our Lord sustains believers, as the fig-tree figs, and is mocked by unbelievers as foolishness. This tree Zacchæus, who was little in stature, climbed up, that he might be raised together with Christ; for every one who is humble, and conscious of his own weakness, cries out, God forbid that I should glory, save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ. (Gal. 6:14.)

AMBROSE. He has well added, that our Lord was to pass that way, either where the sycamore-tree was, or where he was who was about to believe, that so He might preserve the mystery, and sow the seeds of grace. For He had so come as that through the Jews He came to the Gentiles. He sees then Zacchæus above, for already the excellence of his faith shone forth amidst the fruits of good works, and the loftiness of the fruitful tree; but Zacchæus stands out above the tree, as one who is above the law.

BEDE. The Lord as He journeyed came to the place where Zacchæus had climbed the sycamore, for having sent His preachers throughout the world in whom He Himself spoke and went, He comes to the Gentile people, who were already raised up on high through faith in His Passion, and whom when He looked up He saw, for He chose them through grace. Now our Lord once abode in the house of the chief of the Pharisees, but when He did works such as none but God could do, they railed at Him. Wherefore hating their deeds He departed, saying, Your house shall be left unto you desolate; (Matt. 23:38.) but now He must needs stay at the house of the weak Zacchæus, that is, by the grace of the new law brightly shining, He must take rest in the hearts of the lowly nations. But that Zacchæus is bid to come down from the sycamore tree, and prepare an abode for Christ, this is what the Apostle says, Yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him no more. (2 Cor. 5:16.) And again elsewhere, For though he was crucified through weakness, yet he liveth by the power of God. (2 Cor. 13:4.) It is plain that the Jews always hated the salvation of the Gentiles; but salvation, which formerly filled the houses of the Jews, has this day shone upon the Gentiles, forasmuch as this people also by believing on God is a son of Abraham.

THEOPHYLACT. It is easy to turn this to a moral use. For whoever surpasses many in wickedness is small in spiritual growth, and cannot see Jesus for the crowd. For disturbed by passion and worldly things, he beholds not Jesus walking, that is, working in us, not recognising His operation. But he climbs up to the top of a sycamore-tree, in that he rises above the sweetness of pleasure, which is signified by a fig, and subduing it, and so becoming more exalted, he sees and is seen by Christ.

GREGORY. (Mor. 27. c. 46.) Or because the sycamore is from its name called the foolish fig, the little Zacchæus gets up into the sycamore and sees the Lord, for they who humbly choose the foolish things of this world are those who contemplate most closely the wisdom of God. For what is more foolish in this world than not to seek for what is lost, to give our possessions to robbers, to return not injury for injury? However, by this wise foolishness, the wisdom of God is seen, not yet really as it is, but by the light of contemplation.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord said to him, Make haste and come down, that is, “Thou hast ascended by penitence to a place too high for thee, come down by humility, lest thy exaltation cause thee to slip. I must abide in the house of a humble man. We have two kinds of goods in us, bodily, and spiritual; the just man gives up all his bodily goods to the poor, but he forsakes not his spiritual goods, but if he has extorted any thing from any one, he restores to him fourfold; signifying thereby that if a man by repentance walks in the opposite path to his former perverseness, he by the manifold practice of virtue heals all his old offences, and so merits salvation, and is called the son of Abraham, because he went out from his own kindred, that is, from his ancient wickedness.

19:11–27

11. And as they heard these things, he added and spake a parable, because he was nigh to Jerusalem, and because they thought that the kingdom of God should immediately appear.

12. He said therefore, A certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return.

13. And he called his ten servants, and delivered them ten pounds, and said unto them, Occupy till I come.

14. But his citizens hated him, and sent a message after him, saying, We will not have this man to reign over us.

15. And it came to pass, that when he was returned, having received the kingdom, then he commanded these servants to be called unto him, to whom he had given the money, that he might know how much every man had gained by trading.

16. Then came the first, saying, Lord, thy pound hath gained ten pounds.

17. And he said unto him, Well, thou good servant: because thou hast been faithful in a very little, have thou authority over ten cities.

18. And the second came, saying, Lord, thy pound hath gained five pounds.

19. And he said likewise to him, Be thou also over five cities.

20. And another came, saying, Lord, behold, here is thy pound, which I have kept laid up in a napkin:

21. For I feared thee, because thou art an austere man: thou takest up that thou layedst not down, and reapest that thou didst not sow.

22. And he saith unto him, Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee, thou wicked servant. Thou knewest that I was an austere man, taking up that I laid not down, and reaping that I did not sow:

23. Wherefore then gavest not thou my money into the bank, that at my coming I might have required mine own with usury?

24. And he said unto them that stood by, Take from him the pound, and give it to him that hath ten pounds.

25. (And they said unto him, Lord, he hath ten pounds.)

26. For I say unto you, That unto every one which hath shall be given; and from him that hath not, even that he hath shall be taken away from him.

27. But those mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring hither, and slay them before me.

EUSEBIUS. There were some who thought that our Saviour’s kingdom would commence at His first coming, and they were expecting it shortly to appear when He was preparing to go up to Jerusalem; so astonished were they by the divine miracles which He did. He therefore informs them, that He should not receive the kingdom from His Father until He had left mankind to go to His Father.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord points out the vanity of their imaginations, for the senses cannot embrace the kingdom of God; He also plainly shews to them, that as God He knew their thoughts, putting to them the following parable, A certain nobleman, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. This parable is intended to set before us the mysteries of Christ from the first to the last. For God was made man, who was the Word from the beginning; and though He became a servant, yet was He noble because of His unspeakable birth from the Father.

BASIL. (in Esai. c. 13. 13.) Noble, not only in respect of His Godhead, but of His manhood, being sprung from the seed of David according to the flesh. He went into a far country, separated not so much by distance of place as by actual condition. For God Himself is nigh to every one of us, when our good works bind us to Him. And He is afar off, as often as by cleaving to destruction, we remove ourselves away from Him. To this earthly country then He came at a distance from God, that He might receive the kingdom of the Gentiles, according to the Psalm, Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance. (Ps. 2:8.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 40.) Or the far country is the Gentile Church, extending to the uttermost parts of the earth. For He went that the fulness of the Gentiles might come in; He will return that all Israel may be saved.

EUSEBIUS. Or by His setting out into a far country, He denotes His own ascension from earth to heaven. But when He adds, To receive for himself a kingdom, and to return; He points out His second appearance, when He shall come as a King and in great glory. He first of all calls Himself a man, because of His nativity in the flesh, then noble; not yet a King, because as yet at His first appearance He exercised no kingly power. It is also well said to obtain for Himself a kingdom, according to Daniel, Behold one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and a kingdom was given to him. (Dan. 7:13.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For ascending up to heaven, He sits on the right hand of the Majesty on high. (Heb. 1:3.) But being ascended, He hath dispensed to those that believe on Him different divine graces, as unto the servants were committed their Lord’s goods, that gaining something they might bring him token of their service. As it follows, And he called his ten servants, and delivered them ten pounds.

CHRYSOSTOM. Holy Scripture is accustomed to use the number ten as a sign of perfection, for if any one wishes to count beyond it, he has again to begin from unity, having in ten as it were arrived at a goal. And so in the giving of the talents, the one who reaches the goal of divine obedience is said to have received ten pounds.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Or by the ten pounds he signifies the law, because of the ten commandments, and by the ten servants, those to whom while under the law grace was preached. For so we must interpret the ten pounds given them for trading, seeing that they understood the law, when its veil was removed, to belong to the Gospel.

BEDE. A pound which the Greeks call μνᾶ is equal in weight to a hundred drachmas, and every word of Scripture, as suggesting to us the perfection of the heavenly life, shines as it were with the greatness of the hundredth number.

EUSEBIUS. By those then who receive the pounds, He means His disciples, giving a pound to each, since He entrusts to all an equal stewardship; He bade them put it out to use, as it follows, Occupy till I come. Now there was no other employment but to preach the doctrine of His kingdom to those who would hear it. But there is one and the same doctrine for all, one faith, one baptism. And therefore is one pound given to each.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But greatly indeed do these differ from those who denied the kingdom of God, of whom it is added, But his citizens hated him. And this it is for which Christ upbraided the Jews, when He said, But now have they both seen and hated me and my Father. (John 15:24.) But they rejected His kingdom, saying to Pilate, We have no king but Cæsar. (John 19:15.)

EUSEBIUS. By citizens He signifies the Jews, who were sprung from the same lineage according to the flesh, and with whom He joined in the customs of the law.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. ut sup.) And they sent a message after Him, because after His resurrection also, they persecuted His Apostles, and refused the preaching of the Gospel.

EUSEBIUS. After our Saviour had instructed them in the things belonging to His first coming, He proceeds to set forth His second coming with majesty and great glory, saying, And it came to pass, that when he was returned, having received the kingdom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 39. in 1. ad Cor.) Holy Scripture notes two kingdoms of God, one indeed by creation, since by right of creation He is King over all men; the other by justification, since He reigns over the just, of their own will made subject to Him. And this is the kingdom which He is here said to have received.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. ut sup.) He also returns after having received His kingdom, because in all glory will He come who appeared lowly to them to whom He said, My kingdom is not of this world. (John 18:36.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But when Christ returns, having taken unto Himself His kingdom, the ministers of the word will receive their deserved praises and delight in heavenly rewards, because they multiplied their talent by acquiring more talents, as it is added, Then came the first, saying, Lord, thy pound has gained ten pounds.

BEDE. The first servant is the order of teachers sent to the circumcision, who received one pound to put out to use, inasmuch as it was ordered to preach one faith. But this one pound gained ten pounds, because by its teaching it united to itself the people who were subject to the law. It follows, And he said unto him, Well done, thou good servant: because thou hast been faithful in a very little, &c. The servant is faithful in a very little who does not adulterate the word of God. For all the gifts we receive now are but small in comparison of what we shall have.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Evagrius.) Because he receives the reward of his own good works, he is said to be set over ten cities. And some conceiving unworthily of these promises imagine that they themselves are preferred to magistracies and chief places in the earthly Jerusalem, which is built with precious stones, because they have had their conversation honest in Christ; so little do they purge their soul of all hankering after power and authority among men.

AMBROSE. But the ten cities are the souls over whom he is rightly placed who has deposited in the minds of men his Lord’s money and the holy words, which are tried as silver is tried in the fire. For as Jerusalem is said to be built as a city, (Ps. 121:3.) so are peace-making souls. And as angels have rule, so have they who have acquired the life of angels.

It follows, And the second came, saying, Lord, thy pound has gained five pounds.

BEDE. That servant is the assembly of those who were sent to preach the Gospel to the uncircumcision, whose pound, that is the faith of the Gospel, gained five pounds, because it converted to the grace of Evangelical faith, the nations before enslaved to the five senses of the body. And he said likewise to him, Be thou also over five cities; that is, be exalted to shine through the faith and conversation of those souls which thou hast enlightened.

AMBROSE. Or perhaps differently; he who gained five pounds has all the moral virtues, for there are five senses of the body. He who gained ten has so much more, that is to say, the mysteries of the law as well as the moral virtues. The ten pounds may also here be taken to mean the ten words, that is, the teaching of the law; the five pounds, the ordering of discipline. But the scribe must be perfect in all things. And rightly, since He is speaking of the Jews, are there two only who bring their pounds multiplied, not indeed by a gainful interest of money, but a profitable stewardship of the Gospel. For there is one kind of usury in money lent on interest, another in heavenly teaching.

CHRYSOSTOM. For in earthly wealth it does not belong to one man to be made rich without another being made poor, but in spiritual riches, without his making another rich also. For in earthly matters participation lessens, in spiritual it increases wealth.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Evan. lib. ii. qu. 46.) Or else; That one of those who well employed their money gained ten pounds, another five, signifies that they acquired them for the flock of God, by whom the law was now understood through grace, either because of the ten commandments of the law, or because he, through whom the law was given, wrote five books; and to this belong the ten and five cities over which He appoints them to preside. For the manifold meanings or interpretations which spring up concerning some individual precept or book, when reduced and brought together in one, make as it were a city of living eternal reasons. Hence a city is not a multitude of living creatures, but of reasonable beings bound together by the fellowship of one law. The servants then who bring an account of that which they had received, and are praised for having gained more, represent those giving in their account who have well employed what they had received, to increase their Lord’s riches by those who believe on Him, while they who are unwilling to do this are signified by that servant who kept his pound laid up in a napkin; of whom it follows, And the third came, saying, Lord, behold, here is thy pound, which I have kept laid up in a napkin, &c. For there are some who flatter themselves with this delusion, saying, It is enough for each individual to answer concerning himself, what need then of others to preach and minister, in order that every one should be compelled also to give an account of himself, seeing that in the Lord’s sight even they are without excuse to whom the law was not given, and who were not asleep at the time of the preaching of the Gospel, for they might have known the Creator through the creature; and then it follows, For I feared thee, because thou art an austere man, &c. For this is, as it were, to reap when he did not sow, that is, to hold those guilty of ungodliness to whom this word of the law or the Gospel was not preached, and avoiding as it were this peril of judgment, with slothful toil they rest from the ministration of the word. And this it is to tie up in a napkin what they had received.

THEOPHYLACT. For with a napkin the face of the dead is covered; well then is this idler said to have wrapped up his pound in a napkin, because leaving it dead and unprofitable he neitheir touched nor increased it.

BEDE. Or to tie up money in a napkin is to hide the gifts we have received under the indolence of a sluggish body. But that which he thought to have used as an excuse is turned to his own blame, as it follows, He says unto him, Out of thy own mouth will I judge thee, thou wicked servant. He is called a wicked servant, as being slothful in business, and proud in questioning his Lord’s judgment. Thou knewest that I was an austere man, taking up that I laid not down, and reaping that I did not sow: wherefore then gavest thou not my money into the bank? As though he said, If thou knewest me to be a hard man, and a seeker of what is not mine own, why did not the thought of this strike thee with terror, that thou mightest be sure that I would require mine own with strictness?

But money or silver is the preaching of the Gospel and the word of God, for the words of the Lord are pure words as silver tried in the fire. (Ps. 12:6.) And this word of the Lord ought to be given to the bank, that is, put into hearts meet and ready to receive it.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. ubi sup.) Or the bank into which the money was to be given, we take to be the very profession of religion which is publicly put forth as a means necessary to salvation.

CHRYSOSTOM. In the payment of earthly riches the debtors are obliged only to strictness. Whatever they receive, so much must they return, nothing more is required of them. But with regard to the words of God, we are not only bound diligently to keep, but we are commanded to increase; and hence it follows, that at my coming I might have required the same with usury.

BEDE. For they who by faith receive the riches of the word from a teacher, must by their works pay it back with usury, or be earnestly desirous to know something more than what they have as yet learnt from the mouth of their preachers.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It is the work of teachers to engraft in their hearers' minds wholesome and profitable words, but of divine power to win the hearers to obedience, and render their understanding fruitful. Now this servant, so far from being commended or thought worthy of honour, was condemned as slothful, as it follows, And he said unto them that stood by, Take from him the pound, and give to him that hath ten pounds.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. qu. 46.) Signifying thereby that both he will lose the gift of God, who having, hath not, that is, useth it not, and that he will have it increased, who having, hath, that is, rightly useth it.

BEDE. The mystical meaning I suppose is this, that at the coming in of the Gentiles all Israel shall be saved, (Rom. 11:26.) and that then the abundant grace of the Spirit will be poured out upon the teachers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 43. in Act.) He says then to them that stood by, Take from him the pound, because it is not the part of a wise man to punish, but he needs some one else as the minister of the judge in executing punishment. For even God does not Himself inflict punishment, but through the ministry of His angels.

AMBROSE. Nothing is said of the other servants, who like wasteful debtors lost all that they had received. By those two servants who gained by trading, are signified that small number, who in two companies were sent as dressers of the vineyard; by the remainder all the Jews. It follows, And they said unto him, Lord, he has ten pounds. And lest this should seem unjust, it is added, For to every one that hath, it shall be given.

THEOPHYLACT. For seeing that he gained ten, by multiplying his pound tenfold, it is plain that by having more to multiply, he would be an occasion of greater gain to his Lord. But from the slothful and idle, who stirs not himself to increase what he has received, shall be taken away even that which he possesses, that there may be no gap in the Lord's account when it is given to others and multiplied. But this is not to be applied only to the words of God and teaching, but also to the moral virtues; for in respect of these also, God sends us His gracious gifts, endowing one man with fasting, another with prayer, another with mildness or humility; but all these so long as we watch strictly over ourselves we shall multiply, but if we grow cold we shall extinguish. He adds of His adversaries, But those mine enemies who would not that I should reign over them, bring them hither, and slay them before me.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Whereby He describes the ungodliness of the Jews who refused to be converted to Him.

THEOPHYLACT. Whom he will deliver to death, casting them into the outer fire. But even in this world they were most miserably slain by the Roman army.

CHRYSOSTOM. These things are of force against the Marcionists. For Christ also says, Bring hither my enemies, and slay them before me. (Mat. 21:41). Whereas they say Christ indeed is good, but the God of the Old Testament evil. Now it is plain that both the Father and the Son do the same things. For the Father sends His army to the vineyard, and the Son causes His enemies to be slain before Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 78. in Matt. Mat. 25.) This parable as it is related in Luke is different from that given in Matthew concerning the talents. For in the former indeed out of one and the same principal there were different sums produced, seeing that from the profits of one pound received, one servant brought five, another ten pounds. But with Matthew it is very different. For he who received two pounds, thereto added two more. He who received five, gained as much again. So the rewards given are unlike also.

19:28–36

28. And when he had thus spoken, he went before, ascending up to Jerusalem.

29. And it came to pass, when he was come nigh to Bethphage and Bethany, at the mount called the mount of Olives, he sent two of his disciples,

30. Saying, Go ye into the village over against you; in the which at your entering ye shall find a colt tied, whereon yet never man sat: loose him, and bring him hither.

31. And if any man ask you, Why do ye loose him? thus shall ye say unto him, Because the Lord hath need of him.

32. And they that were sent went their way, and found even as he had said unto them.

33. And as they were loosing the colt, the owners thereof said unto them, Why loose ye the colt?

34. And they said, The Lord hath need of him.

35. And they brought him to Jesus: and they cast their garments upon the colt, and they set Jesus thereon.

36. And as he went, they spread their clothes in the way.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Because the Lord had said, The kingdom of heaven is at hand, they that saw Him going up to Jerusalem thought that He was going then to commence the kingdom of God. When then the parable was finished in which He reproved the error above mentioned, and shewed plainly that He had not yet vanquished that death which was plotting against him, he proceeded forth to His passion, going up to Jerusalem.

BEDE. Proving at the same time that the parable had been pronounced concerning the end of that city which was about both to slay Him, and to perish itself by the scourge of the enemy. It follows, And it came to pass, when he was come nigh to Bethphage, &c. Bethphage was a small village belonging to the priests on Mount Olivet. Bethany was also a little town or hamlet on the side of the same mountain, about fifteen stades from Jerusalem.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 66. in Matt.) At the beginning of His ministry our Lord shewed Himself indifferent to the Jews, but when He had given sufficient token of His power, He transacts every thing with the highest authority. Many are the miracles which then took place. He foretold to them, ye shall find an unbroken colt. He foretels also that no one should hinder them, but as soon as they heard it, should hold their peace.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Here it was evident that there would be a divine summons. For no one can resist God calling for what is His own. But the disciples when ordered to fetch the colt refused not the office as a slight one, but went to bring him.

BASIL. So likewise should we set about even the lowest works with the greatest zeal and affection, knowing that whatever is done with God before our eyes is not slight, but meet for the kingdom of heaven.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. They who had tied the ass are struck dumb, because of the greatness of His mighty power, and are unable to resist the words of the Saviour; for “the Lord” is a name of majesty, and as a King was He about to come in the sight of all the people.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. lib. ii. cap. 66.) Nor matters it that Matthew speaks of an ass and its foal, while the others say nothing of the ass; for when both may be conceived, there is no variance even though one relate one thing, and another another, much less where one relates one thing, another both.

GLOSS. (non occ.) The disciples waited upon Christ not only in bringing the colt of another, but also with their own garments, some of which they placed upon the ass, others they strewed in the way.

BEDE. According to the other Evangelists, not the disciples only, but very many also out of the crowds scattered their garments in the way.

AMBROSE. Mystically, our Lord came to Mount Olivet, that he might plant new olive trees on the heights of virtue. And perhaps the mountain itself is Christ, for who else could bear such fruit of olives abounding in the fulness of the Spirit?

BEDE. Rightly are the towns described as placed on Mount Olivet, that is, on the Lord Himself, who rekindles the unction of spiritual graces with the light of knowledge and piety.

ORIGEN. Bethany is interpreted, the house of obedience, but Bethphage the house of cheek bones, being a place belonging to the priests, for cheek bones in the sacrifices were the right of the priests, as it is commanded in the law. To that place then where obedience is, and where the priests have the possession, our Saviour sends His disciples to loose the ass’s colt.

AMBROSE. For they were in the village, and the colt was tied with its mother, nor could it be loosed except by the command of the Lord. The apostle’s hand looses it. Such was the act, such the life, such the grace. Be such, that thou mayest be able to loose those that are bound. In the ass indeed Matthew represented the mother of error, but in the colt Luke has described the general character of the Gentile people. And rightly, whereon yet never man sat, for none before Christ called the nations of the Gentiles into the Church. But this people was tied and bound by the chains of iniquity, being subject to an unjust master, the servant of error, and could not claim to itself authority whom not nature but crime had made guilty. Since the Lord is spoken of, one master is recognised. O wretched bondage under a doubtful mastery! For he has many masters who has not one. Others bind that they may possess, Christ looses that he may keep, for He knew that gifts are more powerful than chains.

ORIGEN. There were then many masters of this colt, before that the Saviour had need of him. But as soon as He began to be the master, there ceased to be any other. For no one can serve God and mammon. (Matt. 6:24.) When we are the servants of wickedness we are subject to many vices and passions, but the Lord has need of the colt, because He would have us loosed from the chain of our sins.

ORIGEN. (sup. Joan. tom. ii.) Now I think this place is not without reason said to be a small village. For as if it were a village without any further name, in comparison of the whole earth the whole heavenly country is despised.

AMBROSE. Nor is it for nothing that two disciples are directed thither; Peter to Cornelius, Paul to the rest. And therefore He did not mark out the persons, but determined the number. Still should any one require the persons, he may believe it to be spoken of Philip, whom the Holy Spirit sent to Gaza, when he baptized the eunuch of Queen Candace. (Acts 8:38.)

THEOPHYLACT. Or the two sent imply this, that the Prophets and Apostles make up the two steps to the bringing in of the Gentiles, and their subjection to Christ. But they bring the colt from a certain village, that it may be known to us that this people was rude and unlearned.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Those men who were directed, when they were loosing the colt, did not use their own words, but spoke as Jesus had told them, that you may know that not by their own words, but the word of God, not in their own name but in Christ’s, they implanted the faith among the Gentile nations; and by the command of God the hostile powers ceased, which claimed to themselves the obedience of the Gentiles.

ORIGEN. (in Luc. 37.) The disciples next place their garments upon the ass, and cause the Saviour to sit thereon, inasmuch as they take upon themselves the word of God, and make it to rest upon the souls of their hearers. They divest themselves of their garments, and strew them in the way, for the clothing of the Apostles is their good works. And truly does the ass loosened by the disciples and carrying Jesus, walk upon the garments of the Apostles, when it imitates their doctrine. Which of us is so blessed, that Jesus should rest upon him?

AMBROSE. For it pleased not the Lord of the world to be borne upon the ass’s back, save that in a hidden mystery by a more inward sitting, the mystical Ruler might take His seat in the secret depths of men’s souls, guiding the footsteps of the mind, bridling the wantonness of the heart. His word is a rein, His word is a goad.

19:37–40

37. And when he was come nigh, even now at the descent of the mount of Olives, the whole multitude of the disciples began to rejoice and praise God with a loud voice for all the mighty works that they had seen;

38. Saying, Blessed be the King that cometh in the name of the Lord: peace in heaven, and glory in the highest.

39. And some of the Pharisees from among the multitude said unto him, Master, rebuke thy disciples.

40. And he answered and said unto them, I tell you that, if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out

ORIGEN. As long as our Lord was in the mount His Apostles only were with Him, but when He began to be near the descent, then there came to Him a multitude of the people.

THEOPHYLACT. He calls by the name of disciples not only the twelve, or the seventy-two, but all who followed Christ, whether for the sake of the miracles, or from a certain charm in His teaching, and to them may be added the children, as the other Evangelists relate. Hence it follows, For all the mighty works which they had seen.

BEDE. They beheld indeed many of our Lord’s miracles, but marvelled most at the resurrection of Lazarus. For as John says, For this cause the people also met him, for that they heard that he had done this miracle. For it must be observed that this was not the first time of our Lord’s coming to Jerusalem, but He came often before, as John relates.

AMBROSE. The multitude then acknowledging God, proclaims Him King, repeats the prophecy, and declares that the expected Son of David according to the flesh had come, saying, Blessed be the King that cometh in the name of the Lord.

BEDE. That is, in the name of God the Father, although it might be taken “in His own name,” since He Himself is the Lord. But His own words are better guides to the meaning when He says, I am come in my Father’s name. For Christ is the Master of humility. Christ is not called King as one who exacts tribute, or arms His forces with the sword, or visibly crushes

His enemies, but because He rules men’s minds, and brings them believing, hoping, and loving into the kingdom of heaven. For Ho was willing to be King of Israel, to shew His compassion, not to increase His power. But because Christ appeared in the flesh, as the redemption and light of the whole world, well do both the heaven and earth, each in their turn, chaunt His praises. When He is born into the world, the heavenly hosts sing; when He is about to return to heaven, men send back their note of praise. As it follows, Peace in heaven.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, the ancient warfare, wherein we were at enmity against God, has ceased. And glory in the highest, inasmuch as Angels are glorifying God for such a reconciliation. For this very thing, that God visibly walks in the land of His enemies, shews that He has peace with us. But the Pharisees when they heard that the crowd called Him King, and praised Him as God, murmured, imputing the name of King to sedition, the name of God to blasphemy. And some of the Pharisees said, Master, rebuke thy disciples.

BEDE. O the strange folly of the envious; they scruple not to call Him Master, because they knew He taught the truth, but His disciples, as though themselves were better taught, they deem worthy of rebuke.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the Lord forbade not them that glorified Him as God, but rather forbade those that blamed them, so bearing witness to Himself concerning the glory of the Godhead. Hence it follows, He answered and said unto them, I tell you, if these should hold their peace, the stones would immediately cry out.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, Not without cause do men praise me thus, but being constrained by the mighty works which they have seen.

BEDE. And so at the crucifixion of our Lord, when His kinsfolk were silent from fear, the stones and rocks sang forth, while after that He gave up the ghost, the earth was moved, and the rocks were rent, and the graves opened.

AMBROSE. Nor is it wonderful that the stones against their nature should chaunt forth the praises of the Lord, whom His murderers, harder than the rocks, proclaim aloud, that is, the multitude, in a little while about to crucify their God, denying Him in their hearts, whom with their mouths they confess. Or perhaps it is said, because, when the Jews were struck silent after the Lord’s Passion, the living stones, as Peter calls them, (1 Pet. 2:5.) were about to cry out.

ORIGEN. When we also are silent, (that is, when the love of many waxeth cold,) the stones cry out, for God can from stones raise up children to Abraham.

AMBROSE. Rightly we read that the crowds praising God met Him at the descent of the mountain, that they might signify that the works of the heavenly mystery had come to them from heaven.

BEDE. Again, when our Lord descends from the mount of Olives, the multitude descend also, because since the Author of mercy has suffered humiliation, it is necessary that all those who need His mercy should follow His footsteps.

19:41–44

41. And when he was come near, he beheld the city, and wept over it,

42. Saying, If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes.

43. For the days shall come upon thee, that thine enemies shall cast a trench about thee, and compass thee round, and keep thee in on every side,

44. And shall lay thee even with the ground, and thy children within thee; and they shall not leave in thee one stone upon another; because thou knewest not the time of thy visitation.

ORIGEN. All the blessings which Jesus pronounced in His Gospel He confirms by His own example, as having declared, Blessed are the meek; He afterwards sanctions it by saying, Learn of me, for I am meek; and because He had said, Blessed are they that weep, He Himself also wept over the city.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For Christ had compassion upon the Jews, who wills that all men should be saved. Which had not been plain to us, were it not revealed by a certain mark of His humanity. For tears poured forth are the tokens of sorrow.

GREGORY. (Hom. 39. in Ev.) The merciful Redeemer wept then over the fall of the false city, which that city itself knew not was about to come upon it. As it is added, saying, If thou hadst known, even thou (we may here understand) wouldest weep. Thou who now rejoicest, for thou knowest not what is at hand. It follows, at least in this thy day. For when she gave herself up to carnal pleasures, she had the things which in her day might be her peace. But why she had present goods for her peace, is explained by what follows, But now they are hidden from thy eyes. For if the eyes of her heart had not been hidden from the future evils which were hanging over her, she would not have been joyful in the prosperity of the present. Therefore He shortly added the punishment which was near at hand, saying, For the days shall come upon thee.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. If thou hadst known, even thou. The Jews were not worthy to receive the divinely inspired Scriptures, which relate the mystery of Christ. For as often as Moses is read, a veil overshadows their heart that they should not see what has been accomplished in Christ, who being the truth puts to flight the shadow. And because they regarded not the truth, they rendered themselves unworthy of the salvation which flows from Christ.

EUSEBIUS. He here declares that His coming was to bring peace to the whole world. For unto this He came, that He should preach both to them that were near, and those that were afar off. But as they did not wish to receive the peace that was announced to them, it was hid from them. And therefore the siege which was shortly to come upon them He most expressly foretells, adding, For the days shall come upon thee, &c.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) By these words the Roman leaders are pointed out. For that overthrow of Jerusalem is described, which was made by the Roman emperors Vespasian and Titus.

EUSEBIUS. But how these things were fulfilled we may gather from what is delivered to us by Josephus, who though he was a Jew, related each event as it toot place, in exact accordance with Christ’s prophecies.

GREGORY. This too which is added, namely, They shall not leave in thee one stone upon another, is now witnessed in the altered situation of the same city, which is now built in that place where Christ was crucified without the gate, whereas the former Jerusalem, as it is called, was rooted up from the very foundation. And the crime for which this punishment of overthrow was inflicted is added, Because thou knewest not the time of thy visitation.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, of my coming. For I came to visit and to save thee, which if thou hadst known and believed on Me, thou mightest have been reconciled to the Romans, and exempted from all danger, as did those who believed on Christ.

ORIGEN. I do not deny then that the former Jerusalem was destroyed because of the wickedness of its inhabitants, but I ask whether the weeping might not perhaps concern this your spiritual Jerusalem. For if a man has sinned after receiving the mysteries of truth, he will be wept over. Moreover, no Gentile is wept over, but he only who was of Jerusalem, and has ceased to be.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) For our Redeemer does not cease to weep through His elect whenever he perceives any to have departed from a good life to follow evil ways. Who if they had known their own damnation, hanging over them, would together with the elect shed tears over themselves. But the corrupt soul here has its day, rejoicing in the passing time; to whom things present are its peace, seeing that it takes delight in that which is temporal. It shuns the foresight of the future which may disturb its present mirth; and hence it follows, But now are they hid from thine eyes.

ORIGEN. But our Jerusalem is also wept over, because after sin enemies surround it, (that is, wicked spirits,) and cast a trench round it to besiege it, and leave not a stone behind; especially when a man after long continency, after years of chastity, is overcome, and enticed by the blandishments of the flesh, has lost his fortitude and his modesty, and has committed fornication, they will not leave on him one stone upon another, according to Ezekiel, His former righteousness I will not remember. (Ezek 18:24.)

GREGORY. (Hom. 39. in Ev.) Or else; The evil spirits lay siege to the soul, as it goes forth from the body, for being seized with the love of the flesh, they caress it with delusive pleasures. They surround it with a trench, because bringing all its wickedness which it has committed before the eyes of its mind, they close confine it to the company of its own damnation, that being caught in the very extremity of life, it may see by what enemies it is blockaded, yet be unable to find any way of escape, because it can no longer do good works, since those which it might once have done it despised. On every side also they inclose the soul when its iniquities rise up before it, not only in deed but also in word and thought, that she who before in many ways greatly enlarged herself in wickedness, should now at the end be straitened every way in judgment. Then indeed the soul by the very condition of its guilt is laid prostrate on the ground, while its flesh which it believed to be its life is bid to return to dust. Then its children fall in death, when all unlawful thoughts which only proceed from it, are in the last punishment of life scattered abroad. These may also be signified by the stones. For the corrupt mind when to a corrupt thought it adds one more corrupt, places one stone upon another. But when the soul is led to its doom, the whole structure of its thoughts is rent asunder. But the wicked soul God ceases not to visit with His teaching, sometimes with the scourge and sometimes with a miracle; that the truth which it knew not it may hear, and though still despising it, may return pricked to the heart in sorrow, or overcome with mercies may be ashamed at the evil which it has done. But because it knows not the time of its visitation, at the end of life it is given over to its enemies, that with them it may be joined together in the bond of everlasting damnation.

19:45–48

45. And he went into the temple, and began to cast out them that sold therein, and them that bought;

46. Saying unto them, It is written, My house is the house of prayer: but ye have made it a den of thieves.

47. And he taught daily in the temple. But the Chief Priests and the Scribes and the chief of the people sought to destroy him,

48. And could not find what they might do: for all the people were very attentive to hear him.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) When He had related the evils that were to come upon the city, He straightway entered the temple, that He might cast out them that bought and sold in it. Shewing that the destruction of the people arose chiefly from the guilt of the priests.

AMBROSE. For God wishes not His temple to be a house of traffic, but the dwelling-place of holiness, nor does He fix the priestly service in a saleable performance of religion, but in a free and willing obedience.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now there were in the temple a number of sellers who sold animals, by the custom of the law, for the sacrificial victims, but the time was now come for the shadows to pass away, and the truth of Christ to shine forth. Therefore Christ, who together with the Father was worshipped in the temple, commanded the customs of the law to be reformed, but the temple to become a house of prayer; as it is added, My house, &c.

GREGORY. For they who sat in the temple to receive money would doubtless sometimes make exaction to the injury of those who gave them none.

THEOPHYLACT. The same thing our Lord did also at the beginning of His preaching, as John relates; and now He did it a second time, because the crime of the Jews was much increased by their not having been chastened by the former warning.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. lib. ii. qu. 48.) Now mystically, you must understand by the temple Christ Himself, as man in His human nature, or with His body united to Him, that is, the Church. But inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, it was said, Destroy this temple, and I will raise it up in three days. (John 2:19.) Inasmuch as the Church is joined to Him, is the temple so interpreted, of which He seems to have spoken in the same place, Take these away from hence; signifying that there would be those in the Church who would rather be pursuing their own interest, or find a shelter therein to conceal their wickedness, than follow after the love of Christ, and by confession of their sins receiving pardon be restored.

GREGORY. (Hom. 39. ut sup.) But our Redeemer does not withdraw His word of preaching even from the unworthy and ungrateful. Accordingly after having by the ejection of the corrupt maintained the strictness of discipline, He now pours forth the gifts of grace. For it follows, And he was teaching daily in the temple.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now from what Christ had said and done it was meet that men should worship Him as God, but far from doing this, they sought to slay Him; as it follows, But the chief priests and scribes and the chief of the people sought to destroy him.

BEDE. Either because He daily taught in the temple, or because He had cast the thieves therefrom, or that coming thereto as King and Lord, He was greeted with the honour of a heavenly hymn of praise.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But the people held Christ in far higher estimation than the Scribes and Pharisees, and chiefs of the Jews, who not receiving the faith of Christ themselves, rebuked others. Hence it follows, And they could not find what they might do: for all the people were very attentire to hear him.

BEDE. This may be taken in two ways; either that fearing a tumult of the people they knew not what they should do with Jesus, whom they had settled to destroy; or they sought to destroy Him because they perceived their own authority set aside, and multitudes flocking to hear Him.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Mystically, such as the temple of God is in a city, such is the life of the religious in a faithful people. And there are frequently some who take upon themselves the religious habit, and while they are receiving the privilege of Holy Orders, are sinking the sacred office of religion into a bargain of worldly traffic. For the sellers in the temple are those who give at a certain price that which is the rightful possession of others. For to sell justice is to observe it on condition of receiving a reward. But the buyers in the temple are those, who whilst unwilling to discharge what is just to their neighbour, and disdaining to do what they are in duty bound to, by paying a price to their patrons, purchase sin.

ORIGEN. If any then sells, let him be cast out, and especially if he sells doves. For of those things which have been revealed and committed to me by the Holy Spirit, I either sell for money to the people, or do not teach without hire, what else do I but sell a dove, that is, the Holy Spirit?

AMBROSE. Therefore our Lord teaches generally that all worldly bargains should be far removed from the temple of God; but spiritually He drove away the money-changers, who seek gain from the Lord’s money, that is, the divine Scripture, lest they should discern good and evil.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) And these make the house of God a den of thieves, because when corrupt men hold religious offices, they slay with the sword of their wickedness their neighbours, whom they ought to raise to life by the intercession of their prayers. The temple also is the soul of the faithful, which if it put forth corrupt thoughts to the injury of a neighbour, then is it become as it were a lurking place of thieves. But when the soul of the faithful is wisely instructed to shun evil, truth teaches daily in the temple.

CHAPTER 20

20:1–8

1. And it came to pass, that on one of those days, as he taught the people in the temple, and preached the Gospel, the Chief Priests and the Scribes came upon him with the elders,

2. And spake unto him, saying, Tell us, by what authority doest thou these things? or who is he that gave thee this authority?

3. And he answered and said unto them, I will also ask you one thing; and answer me:

4. The baptism of John, was it from heaven, or of men?

5. And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why then believed ye him not?

6. But and if we say, Of men; all the people will stone us: for they be persuaded that John was a prophet.

7. And they answered, that they could not tell whence it was.

8. And Jesus said unto them, Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. l. ii. c. 69.) Having related the casting out of those that bought and sold in the temple, Luke omits Christ's going to Bethany and His return again to the city, and the circumstances of the fig-tree, and the answer which was made to the astonished disciples, concerning the power of faith. And having omitted all these, as he does not, like Mark, pursue the events of each day in order, he commences with these words, And it came to pass, that on one of those days; by which we may understand that day on which Matthew and Mark related that event to have taken place.

EUSEBIUS. But the rulers who should have been struck with wonder at one who taught such heavenly doctrines, and have been convinced by His words and deeds that this was the same Christ whom the Prophets had foretold, came to hinder Him, so helping onward the destruction of the people. For it follows, And spake unto him, saying, Tell us, by what authority doest thou these things? &c. As if he said; By the law of Moses, those only who are sprung from the blood of Levi have authority to teach, and power over the sacred buildings. But Thou who art of the line of Judah usurpest the offices assigned to us. Whereas, O Pharisee, if thou hadst known the Scriptures, thou wouldest have called to mind that this is the Priest after the order of Melchisedec, who offers to God them that believe on Him by that worship which is above the law. Why then art thou troubled. He cast out of the sacred house things which seemed necessary for the sacrifices of the law, because He calls us by faith to the true righteousness.

BEDE. Or when they say, By what authority doest thou these things? they doubt concerning the power of God, and wish it to be understood that of the devil He doeth this. Adding moreover, And who is he that gave thee this authority? Most plainly do they deny the Son of God when they think that not by His own power but another's He doeth miracles. Now our Lord by a simple answer might have refuted such a calumny; but He wisely asks a question, that by their silence or their words they might condemn themselves. And he answered and said unto them, I also will ask, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For that He might shew that they had always rebelled against the Holy Spirit, and that besides Isaiah, whom they remembered not, they had refused to believe John whom they had lately seen; He now in his turn puts the question to them, proving that if so great a Prophet as John who was accounted greatest among them had been disbelieved when he testified of Him, they would in no wise believe Him, answering by what authority He did this.

EUSEBIUS. His question concerning John the Baptist is not from whence was he sprung, but whence received he his law of baptism But they feared not to shun the truth. For God sent John as a voice, crying, Prepare ye the way of the Lord. But they dreaded to speak the truth, lest it should be said, Why did ye not believe? and they scruple to blame the forerunner, not from fear of God, but of the people; as it follows, And they reasoned within themselves, saying, If we shall say, From, heaven; he will say, Why then believed ye him not.

BEDE. As if He should say, He whom yon confess had his gift of prophecy from heaven, and gave testimony to Me. And ye heard from him by what power I should do these things. It follows, But if we shall say, Of men; the whole people will stone us: for they be persuaded that John was a prophet. Therefore perceived they in whatever way they should answer they would fall into a trap, fearing the stoning, but much more the confession of the truth. And then it follows, And they answered, that they could not tell whence it was. Because they will not confess that which they knew, they were baffled, and the Lord would not tell them what He knew; as it follows, And Jesus said unto them, Neither will I tell you by what authority I do these things. For there are two reasons especially why we should conceal the truth from those that ask; for example, when the questioner is incapable of understanding what he asks, or when from hatred or contempt he is unworthy to have his questions answered.

20:9–18

9. Then began he to speak to the people this parable; A certain man planted a vineyard, and let it forth to husbandmen, and went into a far country for a long time.

10. And at the season he sent a servant to the husbandmen, that they should give him of the fruit of the vineyard: but the husbandmen beat him, and sent him away empty.

11. And again he sent another servant: and they beat him also, and entreated him shamefully, and sent him away empty.

12. And again he sent a third: and they wounded him also, and cast him out.

13. Then said the lord of the vineyard, What shall I do? I will send my beloved son: it may be they will reverence him when they see him.

14. But when the husbandmen saw him, they reasoned among themselves, saying, This is the heir: come, let us kill him, that the inheritance may be our’s.

15. So they cast him out of the vineyard, and killed him. What therefore shall the lord of the vineyard do unto them?

16. He shall come and destroy these husbandmen, and shall give the vineyard to others. And when they heard it, they said, God forbid.

17. And he beheld them, and said, What is this then that is written, The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner?

18. Whosoever shall fall upon that stone shall be broken; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder.

EUSEBIUS. The rulers of the Jewish people being now assembled together in the temple, Christ put forth a parable, foretelling by a figure the things they were about to do to Him, and the rejection that was in store for them.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. l. ii. c. 70.) Matthew has omitted for brevity’s sake what Luke has not, namely, that the parable was spoken not to the rulers only who asked concerning His authority, but also to the people.

AMBROSE. Now many derive different meanings from the name vineyard, but Esaias clearly relates the vineyard of the Lord of Sabaoth to be the house of Israel. (Isa. 5.) This vineyard who else but God planted?

BEDE. The man then who plants the vineyard is the same who, according to another parable, hired labourers into his vineyard.

EUSEBIUS. But the parable which Esaias gives denounces the vineyard, whereas our Saviour’s parable is not directed against the vineyard, but the cultivators of it; of whom it is added, And he let it out to husbandmen, that is, to the elders of the people, and the chief priests, and the doctors, and all the nobles.

THEOPHYLACT. Or each one of the people is the vineyard, each likewise is the husbandman, for every one of us takes care of himself. Having committed then the vineyard to the husbandmen, he went away, that is, he left them to the guidance of their own judgment. Hence it follows, And went into a far country for a long time.

AMBROSE. Not that our Lord journeys from place to place, seeing that He is ever present in every place, but that He is more present to those who love Him, while He removes Himself from those who regard Him not. But He was absent for a long time, lest His coming to require His fruit might seem too early. For the more indulgent it is, it renders obstinacy the less excusable.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or God took Himself away from the vineyard for the course of many years, for since the time that He was seen to descend in the likeness of fire upon Mount Sinai, He no longer vouchsafed to them His visible presence; though no change took place, in which He sent not His prophets and righteous men to give warning thereof; as it follows, And at the time of the vintage he sent a servant to the husbandmen, that they should give him of the fruit of the vineyard. (Exod. 19.)

THEOPHYLACT. He says of the fruit of the vineyard, because not the whole fruit, but part only, He wished to receive. For what does God gain from us, but His own knowledge, which is also our profit.

BEDE. But it is rightly written fruit, not increase. For there was no increase in this vineyard. The first servant sent was Moses, who for forty years sought of the husbandmen the fruit of the law which he had given, but he was wroth against them, for they provoked his spirit. Hence it follows, But they beat him, and sent him away empty.

AMBROSE. And it came to pass that He ordained many others, whom the Jews sent back to him disgraced and empty, for they could reap nothing from them; as it follows, And again he sent another servant.

BEDE. By the other servant is meant David, who was sent after the commandment of the law, that he by the music of his psalmody might stir up the husbandmen to the exercise of good works. But they on the contrary declared, What portion have we in David, neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse. (1 Sam. 20:1.). Hence it follows, And they beat him also, and entreated him shamefully, and sent him away empty. (1 Kings 12:16.) But He does not stop here, for it follows, And again he sent a third: whereby we must understand the company of prophets who constantly visited the people with their testimony. But which of the Prophets did they not persecute; as it follows, And they wounded him also, and cast him out. Now these three successions of servants, our Lord elsewhere shews to comprehend under a figure all the teachers under the law, when He says, For all those things must be fulfilled which were written in the law of Moses, and the Prophets, and the Psalms, concerning me.

THEOPHYLACT. After the prophets then had suffered all these things, the Son is delegated; for it follows, Then said the Lord of the vineyard, What shall I do? That the Lord of the vineyard speaks doubtingly, arises not from ignorance, for what is there that the Lord knows not? but He is said to hesitate, that the free will of man may be preserved.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Lord of the vineyard also ponders what He should do, not that He is in need of ministers, but that having thoroughly tried every device of human aid, yet His people being in no wise healed, He may add something greater; as He goes on to say, I will send my beloved son: it may be they will reverence him when they see him.

THEOPHYLACT. Now He said this, not as ignorant that they would treat Him worse than they did the prophets, but because the Son ought to be reverenced by them. But if they should still be rebellious and slay Him, this would crown their iniquity. Lest therefore any should say that the Divine Presence has necessarily been the cause of their disobedience, He uses purposely this doubtful mode of speech.

AMBROSE. When then the only-begotten Son was sent to them, the unbelieving Jews, wishing to be rid of the Heir, put Him to death by crucifying Him, and rejected Him by denying Him. Christ is the Heir and the Testator likewise. The Heir, because He survives His own death; and of the testament which He Himself bequeathed, He reaps as it were the hereditary profits in our advances.

BEDE. But our Lord most clearly proves that the Jewish rulers crucified the Son of God not from ignorance but for envy. For they knew it was He to whom it was said, I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance. (Ps. 2:8.) And they cast him out of the vineyard, and slew him. (Heb. 13:12.) Because Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His blood, suffered without the gate.

THEOPHYLACT. Since we have already assumed the people, not Jerusalem, to be the vineyard, it may perhaps be more properly said that the people indeed slew Him without the vineyard; that is, our Lord suffered without the hands of the people, because in truth the people did not with their own hands inflict death upon Him, but delivered Him up to Pilate and the Gentiles. But some by the vineyard have understood the Scripture, which not believing they slew the Lord. And so without the vineyard, that is, without Scripture, our Lord is said to have suffered.

BEDE. Or was He cast out of the vineyard and slain, because He was first driven out of the hearts of the unbelievers, and then fastened to the cross?

CHRYSOSTOM. Now it was not accidentally but part of the purpose of the divine dispensation that Christ came after the prophets. For God does not pursue all things at once, but accommodates Himself to mankind through His great mercy; for if they despised His Son coming after His servants, much less would they have heard Him before. For they who listened not to the inferior commands, how would they have heard the greater?

AMBROSE. He rightly puts a question to them, that they may condemn themselves by their own words, as it follows, What then will the Lord of the vineyard do to them?

BASIL. And this happens as it were to men who are condemned, having nothing to answer to the plain evidence of justice. But it is the property of Divine mercy not to inflict punishment in secret, but to foretell it with threatenings, that so it might recall men to repentance; and thus it follows here, He shall come and destroy those husbandmen.

AMBROSE. He says, the Lord of the vineyard will come, because in the Son is present also the Father's majesty; or because in the last times He will be more graciously present by His Spirit in the hearts of men.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Jewish rulers were shut out then, because they resisted their Lord's will, and made the vineyard barren which was entrusted to them. But the cultivation of the vineyard was given to the Priests of the New Testament, upon which the Scribes and Pharisees, as soon as they perceived the force of the parable, refuse to permit it, saying as follows, God forbid. They did not however escape any whit the more, because of their obstinacy and disobedience to the faith of Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. Now Matthew seems to relate the parable differently; that when our Saviour asked indeed, What will he do then to the husbandmen? the Jews answered, he will miserably destroy them. But there is no difference between the two circumstances. The Jews at first pronounced that opinion, then perceiving the point of the parable said, God forbid, as Luke here relates.

AUGUSTINE. (de con. Ev. lib. iv. cap. 70.) Or else, in the multitude of which we are speaking there were those who craftily asked our Lord by what authority He acted; there were those also who not craftily, but faithfully, cried aloud, Blessed is he who cometh in the name of the Lord. And so there would be some who would say, He will miserably destroy those husbandmen, and let out his vineyard to others. Which are rightly said to have been the words of our Lord Himself, either on account of their truth, or because of the unity of the members with the head; while there would be others also who would say to those who made this answer, God forbid, inasmuch as they understood the parable was spoken against themselves. It follows, And he beheld them, and said, What is this then that is written, The stone which the builders rejected, the same is become the head of the corner?

BEDE. As if He said, How shall the prophecy be fulfilled, except that Christ, being rejected and slain by you, is to be preached to the Gentiles, who will believe on Him, that as the corner stone He may thus from both nations build up one temple to Himself?

EUSEBIUS. Christ is called a stone on account of His earthly body, cut out without hands, (Dan. 2:34.) as in the vision of Daniel, because of His birth of the Virgin. But the stone is neither of silver nor gold, because He is not any glorious King, but a man lowly and despised, wherefore the builders rejected Him.

THEOPHYLACT. For the rulers of the people rejected Him, when they said, This man is not of God. (John 9:16.) But He was so useful and so precious, that He was placed as the head stone of the corner.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But holy Scripture compares to a corner the meeting together of the two nations, the Jew and the Gentile, into one faith. (1 Pet. 2:7. Eph. 2:20.) For the Saviour has compacted both peoples into one new man, reconciling them in one body to the Father. Of saving help then is that stone to the corner made by it, but to the Jews who resist this spiritual union, it bringeth destruction.

THEOPHYLACT. He mentions two condemnations or destructions of them, one indeed of their souls, which they suffered being offended in Christ. And He touches this when He says, Whosoever shall fall upon that stone shall be shaken to pieces. But the other of their captivity and extermination, which the Stone that was despised by them brought upon them. And He points to this when He says, But upon whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder, or winnow him. For so were the Jews winnowed through the whole world, as the straw from the threshing floor. And mark the order of things; for first comes the wickedness committed against Him, then follows the just vengeance of God.

BEDE. Or else, He who is a sinner, yet believes on Christ, falls indeed upon the stone and is shaken, for he is preserved by penitence unto salvation. But upon whomsoever it shall fall, that is, upon whom the stone itself has come down because he denied it, it shall grind him to powder, so that not even a broken piece of a vessel shall be left, in which may be drunk a little water. Or, He means by those who fall upon Him, such as only despise Him, and therefore do not yet utterly perish, but are shaken violently so that they cannot walk upright. But upon whom it falls, upon them shall He come in judgment with everlasting punishment, therefore shall it grind them to powder, that they may be as the dust which the wind scatters from the face of the earth. (Ps. 1:4.)

AMBROSE. The vineyard is also our type. For the husbandman is the Almighty Father, the vine is Christ, but we are the branches. (John 15:5.) Rightly are the people of Christ called a vine, either because it carries on its front the sign of the cross, or because its fruits are gathered in the latter time of the year, or because to all men, as to the equal rows of vines, poor as well as rich, servants as well as masters, there is an equal allotment in the Church without distinction of persons. And as the vine is married to the trees, so is the body to the soul. Loving this vineyard, the husbandman is wont to dig it and prune it, lest it grow too luxuriant in the shade of its foliage, and check by unfruitful boastfulness of words the ripening of its natural character. Here must be the vintage of the whole world, for here is the vineyard of the whole world.

BEDE. (in Marc. 12.) Or understanding it morally; to every one of the faithful is let out a vineyard to cultivate, in that the mystery of baptism is entrusted to him to work out. One servant is sent, a second and a third, when the Law, the Psalms, and the Prophets are read. But the servant who is sent is said to be treated despitefully or beaten, when the word heard is despised or blasphemed. The heir who is sent that man kills as far as he can, who by sin tramples under foot the Son of God. (Heb. 6:6.) The wicked husbandman being destroyed, the vineyard is given to another, when with the gift of grace, which the proud man spurned, the humble are enriched.

20:19–26

19. And the Chief Priests and the Scribes the same hour sought to lay hands on him; and they feared the people: for they perceived that he had spoken this parable against them.

20. And they watched him, and sent forth spies, which should feign themselves just men, that they might take hold of his words, that so they might deliver him unto the power and authority of the governor.

21. And they asked him, saying, Master, we know that thou sayest and teachest rightly, neither acceptest thou the person of any, but teachest the way of God truly:

22. Is it lawful for us to give tribute unto Cæsar, or no?

23. But he perceived their craftiness, and said unto them, Why tempt ye me?

24. Shew me a penny. Whose image and superscription hath it? They answered and said, Cæsar’s.

25. And he said unto them, Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which be Cæsar’s, and unto God the things which be God’s.

26. And they could not take hold of his words before the people: and they marvelled at his answer, and held their peace.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. It became indeed the rulers of the Jews, perceiving that the parable was spoken of them, to depart from evil, having been thus as it were warned concerning the future. But little mindful of this, they rather gather a fresh occasion for their crimes. The commandment of the Law restrained them not, which says, The innocent and righteous men thou shalt not slay, (Exod. 23:7.) but the fear of the people checked their wicked purpose. For they set the fear of man before the reverence of God. The reason of this purpose is given, for they perceived that he spoke this parable against them.

BEDE. And so by seeking to slay Him, they proved the truth of what He had said in the parable. For He Himself is the Heir, whose unjust death He said was to be punished. They are the wicked husbandmen who sought to kill the Son of God. This also is daily committed in the Church when any one, only in name a brother, is ashamed or afraid, because of the many good men with whom he lives, to break into that unity of the Church’s faith and peace which he abhors. And because the chief priests sought to lay hold of our Lord but could not by themselves, they tried to accomplish it by the hands of the governor; as it follows, And they watched him, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For they seemed to be trifling, yet were in earnest, forgetful of God, who says, Who is this that hideth his counsel from me? (Job 42:3.) For they come to Christ the Saviour of all, as though He were a common man, as it follows, that they might take him in his speech.

THEOPHYLACT. They laid snares for our Lord, but got their own feet entangled in them. Listen to their cunning, And they asked Him, saying, Master, we know that thou sayest and teachest rightly.

BEDE. This smooth and artful question was to entice the answerer to say that he fears God rather than Cæsar, for it follows, Neither acceptest thou the person of any, but teachest the way of God truly. This they say, to entice Him to tell them that they ought not to pay tribute, in order that the servants of the guard, (who according to the other Evangelists are said to have been present,) might immediately upon hearing it seize Him as the leader of a sedition against the Romans. And so they proceed to ask, Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar, or not? For there was a great division among the people, some saying that for the sake of security and quiet, seeing that the Romans fought for all, they ought to pay tribute; while the Pharisees, on the contrary, declared, that the people of God who gave tithes and first fruits, ought not to be subject to the law of man.

THEOPHYLACT. Therefore it was intended, in case He said they ought to give tribute to Cæsar, that He should be accused by the people, as placing the nation under the yoke of slavery, but if He forbade them to pay the tax, that they should denounce Him as a stirrer up of divisions to the governor. But He escapes their snares, as it follows, Perceiving their craftiness, he said unto them, Why tempt ye me? Shew me a penny. Whose image and superscription has it?

AMBROSE. Our Lord here teaches us, how cautious we ought to be in our answers to heretics or Jews; as He has said elsewhere, Be ye wise as serpents (Mat. 10:16).

BEDE. Let those who impute the question of our Saviour to ignorance, learn from this place that Jesus was well able to know whose image was on the money; but He asks the question, that He might give a fitting answer to their words; for it follows, They answered and said, Cæsar’s. We must not suppose Augustus is thereby meant, but Tiberius, for all the Roman kings were called Cæsar, from the first Caius Cæsar. But from their answer our Lord easily solves the question, for it follows, And he said unto them, Render unto Cæsar the things which be Cœsar’s, and unto God the things which be God’s.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. As if He said, With your words ye tempt me, obey me in works. Ye have indeed Cæsar’s image, ye have undertaken his offices, to him therefore give tribute, to God fear. For God requireth not money, but faith.

BEDE. Render also to God the things which be God’s, that is to say, tithes, first fruits, offerings, and sacrifices.

THEOPHYLACT. And observe that He said not, give, but return. For it is a debt. Thy prince protects thee from enemies, renders thy life tranquil. Surely then thou art bound to pay him tribute. Nay, this very piece of money which thou bringest thou hast from him. Return then to the king the king’s money. God also has given thee understanding and reason, make then a return of these to Him, that thou mayest not be compared to the beasts, but in all things mayest walk wisely.

AMBROSE. Be unwilling then, if thou wouldest not offend Cæsar, to possess worldly goods. And thou rightly teachest, first to render the things which be Cæsar’s. For no one can be the Lord’s unless he has first renounced the world. Oh most galling chain! To promise to God, and pay not. Far greater is the contract of faith than that of money.

ORIGEN. Now this place contains a mystery. For there are two images in man, one which he received from God, as it is written, Let us make man in our own image: (Gen. 1:26.) another from the enemy, which he has contracted through disobedience and sin, allured and won by the enticing baits of the prince of this world. For as the penny has the image of the emperor of the world, so he who does the works of the power of darkness, bears the image of Him whose works he doth. He says then, Render unto Cæsar the things which be Cæsar’s, that is, cast away the earthly image, that ye may be able, by putting on the heavenly image, to render unto God the things which be God’s, namely, to love God. Which things Moses says God requires of us. (Deut. 10:12.) But God makes this demand of us, not because He has need that we should give Him any thing, but that, when we have given, He might grant us this very same gift for our salvation.

BEDE. Now they who ought rather to have believed such great wisdom, marvelled that in all their cunning they had found no opportunity of catching Him. As it follows, And they could not take hold of his words before the people: and they marvelled at his answer, and held their peace.

THEOPHYLACT. This was their main object, to rebuke Him before the people, which they were unable to do because of the wonderful wisdom of His answer.

20:27–40

27. Then came to him certain of the Sadducees, which deny that there is any resurrection; and they asked him,

28. Saying, Master, Moses wrote unto us, If any man's brother die, having a wife, and he die without children, that his brother should take his wife, and raise up seed unto his brother.

29. There were therefore seven brethren: and the first took a wife, and died without children.

30. And the second took her to wife, and he died childless.

31. And the third took her; and in like manner the seven also: and they left no children, and died.

32. Last of all the woman died also.

33. Therefore in the resurrection whose wife of them is she? for seven had her to wife.

34. And Jesus answering said unto them, The children of this world marry, and are given in marriage:

35. But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage:

36. Neither can they die any more: for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection.

37. Now that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.

38. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto him.

39. Then certain of the Scribes answering said, Master, thou hast well said.

40. And after that they durst not ask him any question at all.

BEDE. There were two heresies among the Jews, one of the Pharisees, who boasted in the righteousness of their traditions, and hence they were called by the people, "separated;" the other of the Sadducees, whose name signified "righteous," claiming to themselves that which they were not. When the former went away, the latter came to tempt Him.

ORIGEN. The heresy of the Sadducees not only denies the resurrection of the dead, but also believes the soul to die with the body. Watching then to entrap our Saviour in His words, they proposed a question just at the time when they observed Him teaching His disciples concerning the resurrection;

as it follows, And they asked him, saying, Master, Moses wrote to us, If a brother, &c.

AMBROSE. According to the letter of the law, a woman is compelled to marry, however unwilling, in order that a brother may raise up seed to his brother who is dead. The letter therefore killeth, but the Spirit is the master of charity.

THEOPHYLACT. Now the Sadducees resting upon a weak foundation, did not believe in the doctrine of the resurrection. For imagining the future life in the resurrection to be carnal, they were justly misled, and hence reviling the doctrine of the resurrection as a thing impossible they invent the story, There were seven brothers, &c.

BEDE. (ut sup.) They devise this story in order to convict those of folly, who assert the resurrection of the dead. Hence they object a base fable, that they may deny the truth of the resurrection.

AMBROSE. Mystically, this woman is the synagogue, which had seven husbands, as it is said to the Samaritan, Thou hadst five husbands, (John 4:18.) because the Samaritan follows only the five books of Moses, the synagogue for the most part seven. And from none of them has she received the seed of an hereditary offspring, and so can have no part with her husbands in the resurrection, because she perverts the spiritual meaning of the precept into a carnal. For not any carnal brother is pointed at, who should raise seed to his deceased brother, but that brother who from the dead people of the Jews should claim unto himself for wife the wisdom of the divine worship, and from it should raise up seed in the Apostles, who being left as it were unformed in the womb of the synagogue, have according to the election of grace been thought worthy to be preserved by the admixture of a new seed.

BEDE. Or these seven brothers answer to the reprobate, who throughout the whole life of the world, which revolves in seven days, are fruitless in good works, and these being carried away by death one after another, at length the course of the evil world, as the barren woman, itself also passes away.

THEOPHYLACT. But our Lord shews that in the resurrection there will be no fleshly conversation, thereby overthrowing their doctrine together with its slender foundation; as it follows, And Jesus said unto them, The children of this world marry, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. l. ii. cap. 49.) For marriages are for the sake of children, children for succession, succession because of death. Where then there is no death, there are no marriages; and hence it follows, But they which shall be accounted worthy, &c.

BEDE. Which must not be taken as if only they who are worthy were either to rise again or be without marriage, but all sinners also shall rise again, and abide without marriage in that new world. But our Lord wished to mention only the elect, that He might incite the minds of His hearers to search into the glory of the resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Ev. ubi sup.) As our discourse is made up and completed by departing and succeeding syllables, so also men themselves whose faculty discourse is, by departure and succession make up and complete the order of this world, which is built up with the mere temporal beauty of things. But in the future life, seeing that the Word which we shall enjoy is formed by no departure and succession of syllables, but all things which it has it has everlastingly and at once, so those who partake of it, to whom it alone will be life, shall neither depart by death, nor succeed by birth, even as it now is with the angels; as it follows, For they are equal to the angels.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For as the multitude of the angels is indeed very great, yet they are not propagated by generation, but have their being from creation, so also to those who rise again, there is no more necessity for marriage; as it follows, And are the children of God.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, Because it is God who worketh in the resurrection, rightly are they called the sons of God, who are regenerated by the resurrection. For there is nothing carnal seen in the regeneration of them that rise again, there is neither coming together, nor the womb, nor birth.

BEDE. Or they are equal to the angels, and the children of God, because made new by the glory of the resurrection, with no fear of death, with no spot of corruption, with no quality of an earthly condition, they rejoice in the perpetual beholding of God’s presence.

ORIGEN. But because the Lord says in Matthew, which is here omitted, Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, (Mat. 22:29.) I ask the question, where is it so written, They shall neither marry, nor be given in marriage? for as I conceive there is no such thing to be found either in the Old or New Testament, but the whole of their error had crept in from the reading of the

Scriptures without understanding; for it is said in Esaias, My elect shall not have children for a curse. (Isai. 65:23.) Whence they suppose that the like will happen in the resurrection. But Paul interpreting all these blessings as spiritual, knowing them not to be carnal, says to the Ephesians, Ye have blessed us in all spiritual blessings. (Eph. 1:3.)

THEOPHYLACT. Or to the reason above given the Lord added the testimony of Scripture, Now that the dead are raised, Moses also shewed at the bush, (Exod. 3:6.) as the Lord saith, I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. As if he said, If the patriarchs have once returned to nothing so as not to live with God in the hope of a resurrection, He would not have said, I am, but, I was, for we are accustomed to speak of things dead and gone thus, I was the Lord or Master of such a thing; but now that He said, I am, He shews that He is the God and Lord of the living. This is what follows, But he is not a God of the dead, but of the living: for all live unto him. For though they have departed from life, yet live they with Him in the hope of a resurrection.

BEDE. Or He says this, that after having proved that the souls abide alter death, (which the Sadducees denied,) He might next introduce the resurrection also of the bodies, which together with the souls have done good or evil. But that is a true life which the just live unto God, even though they are dead in the body. Now to prove the truth of the resurrection, He might have brought much more obvious examples from the Prophets, but the Sadducees received only the five books of Moses, rejecting the oracles of the Prophets.

CHRYSOSTOM. (de Anna, Serm. 4.) As the saints claim as their own the common Lord of the world, not as derogating from His dominion, but testifying their affection after the manner of lovers, who do not brook to love with many, but desire to express a certain peculiar and especial attachment; so likewise does God call Himself especially the God of these, not thereby narrowing but enlarging His dominion; for it is not so much the multitude of His subjects that manifests His power, as the virtue of His servants. Therefore He does not so delight in the name of the God of heaven and earth, as in that of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Now among men servants are thus denominated by their masters; for we say, ‘The steward of such a man,’ but on the contrary God is called the God of Abraham.

THEOPHYLACT. But when the Sadducees were silenced, the Scribes commend Jesus, for they were opposed to them, saying to Him, Master, thou hast well said.

BEDE. And since they had been defeated in argument, they ask Him no further questions, but seize Him, and deliver Him up to the Roman power. From which we may learn, that the poison of envy may indeed be subdued, but it is a hard thing to keep it at rest.

20:41–44

41. And he said unto them, How say they that Christ is David’s son?

42. And David himself saith in the book of Psalms, The LORD. said unto my Lord, Sit thou on my right hand,

43. Till I make thine enemies thy footstool.

44. David therefore calleth him Lord, how is he then his son?

THEOPHYLACT. Although our Lord was shortly about to enter on His Passion, He proclaims His own Godhead, and that too neither incautiously nor boastfully, but with modesty. For He puts a question to them, and having thrown them into perplexity, leaves them to reason out the conclusion; as it follows, And he said unto them, How say they that Christ is David’s son?

AMBROSE. They are not blamed here because they acknowledge Him to be David’s Son, for the blind man for so doing was thought worthy to be healed. (Luke 18:42.) And the children saying, Hosanna to the Son of David, (Matt. 21:9.) rendered to God the glory of the highest praise; but they are blamed because they believe Him not to be the Son of God. Hence it is added, And David himself saith in the book of Psalms, The Lord said unto my Lord. (Ps. 110:1.) Both the Father is Lord and the Son is Lord, but there are not two Lords, but one Lord, for the Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father. He Himself sits at the right hand of the Father, for He is coequal with the Father, inferior to none; for it follows, Sit thou at my right hand. He is not honoured by sitting at the right hand, nor is He degraded by being sent. Degrees of dignity are not sought for, where is the fulness of divinity.

AUGUSTINE. (de Symbolo. ad Catech. l. ii. c. 7.) By the sitting we must not conceive a posture of the human limbs, as if the Father sat on the left and the Son on: the right, but the right hand itself we must interpret to be the power which that Man received who was taken up into Himself by God, that He should come to judge, who at first came to be judged.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or, that He sits on the Father's right hand proves His heavenly glory. For whose throne is equal, their Majesty is equal. But sitting when it is said of God signifies a universal kingdom and power. Therefore He sitteth at the right hand of the Father, because the Word proceeding from the substance of the Father, being made flesh, putteth not off His divine glory.

THEOPHYLACT. He manifests then that He is not opposed to the Father, but agrees with Him, since the Father resists the Son's enemies, Until I make thine enemies thy footstool.

AMBROSE. We must believe then that Christ is both God and man, and that His enemies are made subject to Him by the Father, not through the weakness of His power, but through the unity of their nature, since in the one the other works. For the Son also subjects enemies to the Father, in that He glorifies the Father upon earth. (John 17:6.)

THEOPHYLACT. Therefore He asks the question, and having excited their doubts, leaves them to deduce the consequence; as it follows, David therefore calleth him Lord, how is he then his son?

CHRYSOSTOM. David in truth was both the Father and the servant of Christ, the former indeed according to the flesh, the latter in the Spirit.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. We then likewise in answer to the new Pharisees, who neither confess the Son of the holy Virgin to be the true Son of God, nor to be God, but divide one son into two, put the like objections: How then is the Son of David David's Lord, and that not by human lordship, but divine?

20:45–47

45. Then in the audience of all the people he said unto his disciples,

46. Beware of the Scribes, which desire to walk in long robes, and love greetings in the markets, and the highest seats in the synagogues, and the chief rooms at feasts;

47. Which devour widows' houses, and for a shew make long prayers: the same shall receive greater damnation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 19. in Joann.) Now nothing is more powerful than to argue from the Prophets. For this is even of more weight than miracles themselves. For when Christ worked miracles, He was often gainsayed. But when He cited the Prophets, men were at once silent, because they had nothing to say. But when they were silent, He warns against them; as it is said, Then in the audience of all the people he said to his disciples.

THEOPHYLACT. For as He was sending them to teach the world, He rightly warns them not to imitate the pride of the Pharisees. Beware of the Scribes, who desire to walk in long robes, that is, to go forth into public, dressed in fine clothes, which was one of the sins remarked in the rich man. (Luke 16:19.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The passions of the Scribes were the love of vainglory and the love of gain. That the disciples should avoid these hateful crimes, He gives them this warning, and adds, And love greetings in the markets.

THEOPHYLACT. Which is the way of those who court and hunt after a good reputation, or they do it for the sake of collecting money.

It follows, And the chief seats in synagogues.

BEDE. He does not forbid those to sit first in the synagogue, or at the feast, to whom this dignity belongs by right, but He tells them to beware of those who love this unduly; denouncing not the distinction, but the love of it. Though the other also would not be free from blame, when the same men who wish to take part in the disputes in the market, desire also to be called masters in the synagogue. For two reasons we are bid to beware of those who seek after vain-glory, either lest we be led away by their pretences, supposing those things to be good which they do, or be inflamed with jealousy, desiring in vain to be praised for the good deeds which they pretend to. But they seek not only for praise from men, but money; for it follows, Who devour widows’ houses, and for a shew make long prayers. For pretending to be righteous and of great merit before God, they do not fail to receive large sums of money from the sick and those whose consciences are disturbed with their sins, as though they would be their protectors in the judgment.

CHRYSOSTOM. Thrusting themselves also into the possessions of widows, they grind down their poverty, not content to eat as it may be afforded them, but greedily devouring; using prayer also to an evil end, they thus expose themselves to a heavier condemnation; as it follows, These shall receive the greater damnation.

THEOPHYLACT. Because they not only do what is evil, but make a pretence of prayer, so making virtue an excuse for their sin. They also impoverish widows whom they were bound to pity, by their presence driving them to great expenses.

BEDE. Or because they seek from men praise and money, they are punished with the greater damnation.

CHAPTER 21

21:1–4

1. And he looked up, and saw the rich men casting their gifts into the treasury.

2. And he saw also a certain poor widow casting in thither two mites.

3. And he said, Of a truth I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast in more than they all:

4. For all these have of their abundance cast in unto the offerings of God: but she of her penury hath cast in all the living that she had.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Our Lord having rebuked the covetousness of the Scribes who devoured widows’ houses, commends the almsgiving of a widow; as it is said, And he looked up, and saw the rich men casting into the treasury, & c.

BEDE. In the Greek language, φυλάξαι signifies to keep, and gaza in Persian means riches, hence gazophylacium is used for the name of the place in which money is kept. Now there was a chest with an opening at the top placed near the altar, on the right hand of those entering the house of God, into which the Priests cast all the money, which was given for the Lord’s temple. But our Lord as He overthrows those who trade in His house, so also He remarks those who bring gifts, giving praise to the deserving, but condemning the bad. Hence it follows, And he saw also a certain poor widow casting in thither two mites.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. She offered two oboli, which with the sweat of her brow she had earned for her daily living, or what she daily begs for at the hands of others she gives to God, shewing that her poverty is fruitful to her. Therefore does she surpass the others, and by a just award receives a crown from God; as it follows, Of a truth I say unto you, that this poor widow hath cast in more, &c.

BEDE. For whatever we offer with an honest heart is well pleasing to God, who hath respect unto the heart, not the substance, nor does He weigh the amount of that which is given in sacrifice, but of that from which it is taken; as it follows, For all these have cast in of their abundance, but she all that she had.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 1. in Ep. ad Heb., Hom. 28.) For God regarded not the scantiness of the offering, but the overflowing of the affection. Almsgiving is not the bestowing a few things out of many, but it is that of the widow emptying, herself of her whole substance. But if you cannot offer as much as the widow, at least give all that remains over.

BEDE. Now mystically, the rich men who cast their gifts into the treasury signify the Jews puffed up with the righteousness of the law; the poor widow, the simplicity of the Church which is called poor, because it has either cast away the spirit of pride, or its sins, as if they were worldly riches. But the Church is a widow, because her Husband endured death for her. She cast two mites into the treasury, because in God’s sight, in whose keeping are all the offerings of our works, she presents her gifts, whether of love to God and her neighbour, or of faith and prayer. And these excel all the works of the proud Jews, for they of their abundance cast into the offerings of God, in that they presume on their righteousness, but the Church casts in all her living, for every thing that hath life she believes to be the gift of God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or the widow may be taken to mean any soul bereft as it were of her first husband, the ancient law, and not worthy to be united to the Word of God. Who brings to God instead of a dowry faith and a good conscience, and so seems to offer more than those who are rich in words, and abound in the moral virtues of the Gentiles.

21:5–8

5. And as some spake of the temple, how it was adorned with goodly stones and gifts, he said,

6. As for these things which ye behold, the days will come, in the which there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down.

7. And they asked him, saying, Master, but when shall these things be? and what sign will there be when these things shall come to pass?

8. And he said, Take heed that ye be not deceived: for many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and the time draweth near: go ye not therefore after them.

EUSEBIUS. How beautiful was every thing relating to the structure of the temple, history informs us, and there are yet preserved remains of it, enough to instruct us in what was once the character of the buildings. But our Lord proclaimed to those that were wondering at the building of the temple, that there should not be left in it one stone upon another. For it was meet that that place, because of the presumption of its worshippers, should suffer every kind of desolation.

BEDE. For it was ordained by the dispensation of God that the city itself and the temple should be overthrown, lest perhaps some one yet a child in the faith, while wrapt in astonishment at the rites of the sacrifices, should be carried away by the mere sight of the various beauties.

AMBROSE. It was spoken then of the temple made with hands, that it should be overthrown. For there is nothing made with hands which age does not impair, or violence throw down, or fire burn. Yet there is also another temple, that is, the synagogue, whose ancient building falls to pieces as the Church rises. There is also a temple in every one, which falls when faith is lacking, and above all when any one falsely shields himself under the name of Christ, that so he may rebel against his inward inclinations.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now His disciples did not at all perceive the force of His words, but supposed they were spoken of the end of the world. Therefore asked they Him, saying, Master, but when shall these things be? and what sign, &c.

AMBROSE. Matthew adds a third question, that both the time of the destruction of the temple, and the sign of His coming, and the end of the world, might be inquired into by the disciples. But our Lord being asked when the destruction of the temple should be, and what the sign of His coming, instructs them as to the signs, but does not mind to inform them as to the time. It follows, Take heed that ye be not deceived.

ATHANASIUS. (Orat. 1. cont. Arian.) For since we have received, delivered unto us by God, graces and doctrines which are above man, (as, for example, the rule of a heavenly life, power against evil spirits, the adoption and the knowledge of the Father and the Word, the gift of the Holy Spirit,) our adversary the devil goeth about seeking to steal from us the seed of the word which has been sown. But the Lord, shutting up in us His teaching as His own precious gift, warns us, lest we be deceived. And one very great gift He gives us, the word of God, that not only we be not led away by what appears, but even if there is ought lying concealed, by the grace of God we may discern it. For seeing that the devil is the hateful inventor of evil, what he himself is he conceals, but craftily assumes a name desirable to all; just as if a man wishing to get into his power some children not His own, should in the absence of the parents counterfeit their looks, and lead away the children who were longing for them. In every heresy then the devil says in disguise, “I am Christ, and with me there is truth.” And so it follows, For many shall come in my name, saying, I am Christ; and the time draweth near.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. For before His descent from heaven, there shall come some to whom we must not give place. For the Only-begotten Son of God, when He came to save the world, wished to be in secret, that He might bear the cross for us. But His second coming shall not be in secret, but terrible and open. For He shall descend in the glory of God the Father, with the Angels attending Him, to judge the world in righteousness. Therefore He concludes, Go ye not therefore after them.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Or perhaps He docs not speak of false Christs coming before the end of the world, but of those who existed in the Apostles’ time.

BEDE. For there were many leaders when the destruction of Jerusalem was at hand, who declared themselves to be Christ, and that the time of deliverance was drawing nigh. Many heresiarchs also in the Church have preached that the day of the Lord is at hand, whom the Apostles condemn. (2 Thess. 2:2.) Many Antichrists also came in Christ’s name, of whom the first was Simon Magus, who said, This man is the great power of God. (Acts 8:10.)

21:9–11

9. But when ye shall hear of wars and commotions, be not terrified: for these things must first come to pass; but the end is not by and by.

10. Then said he unto them, Nation shall rise against nation, and kingdom against kingdom:

11. And great earthquakes shall be in divers places, and famines, and pestilences; and fearful sights and great signs shall there be from heaven.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 35. in Evang.) God denounces the woes that shall forerun the destruction of the world, that so they may the less disturb when they come, as having been foreknown. For darts strike the less which are foreseen. And so He says, But when ye shall hear of wars and commotions, &c. Wars refer to the enemy, commotions to citizens. To shew us then that we shall be troubled from within and without, He asserts that the one we suffer from the enemy, the other from our own brethren.

AMBROSE. But of the heavenly words none are greater witnesses than we, upon whom the ends of the world have come. What wars and what rumours of wars have we received!

GREGORY. But that the end will not immediately follow these evils which come first, it is added, These things must first come to pass; but the end is not yet, &c. For the last tribulation is preceded by many tribulations, because many evils must come first, that they may await that evil which has no end. It follows, Then said he unto them, Nation shall rise against nation, &c. For it must needs be that we should suffer some things from heaven, some from earth, some from the elements, and some from men. Here then are signified the confusions of men. It follows, And great earthquakes shall be in divers places. This relates to the wrath from above.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 11. in Acta.) For an earthquake is at one time a sign of wrath, as when our Lord was crucified the earth shook; but at another time it is a token of God’s providence, as when the Apostles were praying, the place was moved where they were assembled. It follows, and pestilence.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 35.) Look at the vicissitudes of bodies. And famine. Observe the barrenness of the ground. And fearful sights and great signs there shall be from heaven. Behold the variableness of the climate, which must be ascribed to those storms which by no means regard the order of the seasons. For the things which come in fixed order are not signs. For every thing that we receive for the use of life we pervert to the service of sin, but all those things which we have bent to a wicked use, are turned to the instruments of our punishment.

AMBROSE. The ruin of the world then is preceded by certain of the world’s calamities, such as famine, pestilence, and persecution.

THEOPHYLACT. Now some have wished to place the fulfilment of these things not only at the future consummation of all things, but at the time also of the taking of Jerusalem. For when the Author of peace was killed, then justly arose among the Jews wars and sedition, But from wars proceed pestilence and famine, the former indeed produced by the air infected with dead bodies, the latter through the lands remaining uncultivated. Josephus also relates the most intolerable distresses to have occurred from famine; and at the time of Claudius Cæsar there was a severe famine, as we read in the Acts, (Acts 11:28.) and many terrible events happened, forboding, as Josephus says, the destruction of Jerusalem.

CHRYSOSTOM. But He says, that the end of the city shall not come immediately, that is, the taking of Jerusalem, but there shall be many battles first.

BEDE. The Apostles are also exhorted not to be alarmed by these forerunners, nor to desert Jerusalem and Judæa. But the kingdom against kingdom, and the pestilence of those whose word creepeth as a cancer, and the famine of hearing the word of God, and the shaking of the whole earth, and the separation from the true faith, may be explained also in the heretics, who contending one with another bring victory to the Church.

AMBROSE. There are also other wars which the Christian wages, the struggles of different lusts, and the conflicts of the will; and domestic foes are far more dangerous than foreign.

21:12–19

12. But before all these, they shall lay their hands on you, and persecute you, delivering you up to the synagogues, and into prisons, being brought before kings and rulers for my name’s sake.

13. And it shall turn to you for a testimony.

14. Settle it therefore in your hearts, not to meditate before what ye shall answer:

15. For I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay nor resist.

16. And ye shall be betrayed both by parents, and brethren, and kinsfolks, and friends; and some of you shall they cause to be put to death.

17. And ye shall be hated of all men for my name’s sake.

18. But there shall not an hair of your head perish.

19. In your patience possess ye your souls.

GREGORY. (Hom. 35. in Evang.) Because the things which have been prophesied of arise not from the injustice of the inflictor of them, but from the deserts of the world which suffers them, the deeds or wicked men are foretold; as it is said, But before all these things, they shall lay their hands upon you: as if He says, First the hearts of men, afterwards the elements, shall be disturbed, that when the order of things is thrown into confusion, it may be plain from what retribution it arises. For although the end of the world depends upon its own appointed course, yet finding some more corrupt than others who shall rightly be overwhelmed in its fall, our Lord makes them known.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or He says this, because before that Jerusalem should be taken by the Romans, the disciples, having suffered persecution from the Jews, were imprisoned and brought before rulers; Paul was sent to Rome to Cæsar, and stood before Festus and Agrippa.

It follows, And it shall turn to you for a testimony. In the Greek it is εἰς μαρτύριον, that is, for the glory of martyrdom.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Or, for a testimony, that is, against those who by persecuting you bring death upon themselves, or living do not imitate you, or themselves becoming hardened perish without excuse, from whom the elect take example that they may live. But as hearing so many terrible things the hearts of men may be troubled, He therefore adds for their consolation, Settle it therefore in your hearts, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. For because they were foolish and inexperienced, the Lord tells them this, that they might not be confounded when about to give account to the wise. And He adds the cause, For I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist. As if He said, Ye shall forthwith receive of me eloquence and wisdom, so that all your adversaries, were they gathered together in one, shall not be able to resist you, neither in wisdom, that is, the power of the understanding, nor in eloquence, that is, excellence of speech, for many men have often wisdom in their mind, but being easily provoked to their great disturbance, mar the whole when their time of speaking comes, But not such were the Apostles, for in both these gifts they were highly favoured.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) As if the Lord said to His disciples, "Be not afraid, go forward to the battle, it is I that fight; you utter the words, I am He that speaketh."

AMBROSE. Now in one place Christ speaks in His disciples, as here; in another, the Father; (Mat. 16:17) in another the Spirit of the Father speaketh. (Mat. 10:20.) These do not differ but agree together, In that one speaketh, three speak, for the voice of the Trinity is one.

THEOPHYLACT. Having in what has gone before dispelled the fear of inexperience, He goes on to warn them of another very certain event, which might agitate their minds, lest falling suddenly upon them, it should dismay them; for it follows, And ye shall be betrayed both by parents, and brethren, and kinsfolk, and some of you shall they cause to be put to death.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) We are the more galled by the persecutions we suffer from those of whose dispositions we made sure, because together with the bodily pain, we are tormented by the bitter pangs of lost affection.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. But let us consider the state of things at that time. While all men were suspected, kinsfolk were divided against one another, each differing from the other in religion; the gentile son stood up the betrayer of his believing parents, and of his believing son the unbelieving father became the determined accuser; no age was spared in the persecution of the faith; women were unprotected even by the natural weakness of their sex.

THEOPHYLACT. To all this He adds the hatred which they shall meet with from all men.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) But because of the hard things foretold concerning the affliction of death, there immediately follows a consolation, concerning the joy of the resurrection, when it is said, But there shall not an hair of your head perish. As though He said to the martyrs, Why fear ye for the perishing of that which when cut, pains, when that can not perish in you, which when cut gives no pain?

BEDE. Or else, There shall not perish a hair of the head of our Lord's Apostles, because not only the noble deeds and words of the Saints, but even the slightest thought shall meet with its deserving reward.

GREGORY. (Mor. 5. c. 16.) He who preserves patience in adversity, is thereby rendered proof against all affliction, and so by conquering himself, he gains the government of himself; as it follows, In your patience shall ye possess your souls. For what is it to possess your souls, but to live perfectly in all things, and sitting as it were upon the citadel of virtue to hold in subjection every motion of the mind?

GREGORY. (Hom. 35. in Ev.) By patience then we possess our souls, because when we are said to govern ourselves, we begin to possess that very thing which we are. But for this reason, the possession of the soul is laid in the virtue of patience, because patience is the root and guardian of all virtues. Now patience is to endure calmly the evils which are inflicted by others, and also to have no feeling of indignation against him who inflicts them.

21:20–24

20. And when ye shall see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that the desolation thereof is nigh.

21. Then let them which are in Judæa flee to the mountains; and let them which are in the midst of it depart out; and let not them that are in the countries enter thereinto.

22. For these be the days of vengeance, that all things which are written may be fulfilled.

23. But woe unto them that are with child, and to them that give suck, in those days! for there shall be great distress in the land, and wrath upon this people.

24. And they shall fall by the edge of the sword, and shall be led away captive into all nations: and Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled.

BEDE. Hitherto our Lord had been speaking of those things which were to come to pass for forty years, the end not yet coming. He now describes the very end itself of the desolation, which was accomplished by the Roman army; as it is said, And when ye shall see Jerusalem compassed, &c.

EUSEBIUS. By the desolation of Jerusalem, He means that it was never again to be set up, or its legal rites to be reestablished, so that no one should expect, after the coming siege and desolation, any restoration to take place, as there was in the time of the Persian king, Antiochus the Great, and Pompey.

AUGUSTINE. (ad Hesych. Ep. 199.) These words of our Lord, Luke has here related to shew, that the abomination of desolation which was prophesied by Daniel, and of which Matthew and Mark had spoken, (Mat. 24, Mark 13.) was fulfilled at the siege of Jerusalem.

AMBROSE. For the Jews thought that the abomination of desolation took place when the Romans, in mockery of a Jewish observance, cast a pig’s head into the temple.

EUSEBIUS. Now our Lord, foreseeing that there would be a famine in the city, warned His disciples in the siege that was coming, not to betake themselves to the city as a place of refuge, and under God’s protection, but rather to depart from thence, and flee to the mountains.

BEDE. (Ecc. Hist. lib. iii. c. 5.) The ecclesiastical history relates, that all the Christians who were in Judæa, when the destruction of Jerusalem was approaching, being warned of the Lord, departed from that place, and dwelt beyond the Jordan in a city called Pella, until the desolation of Judæa was ended.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) And before this, Matthew and Mark said, And let him that is on the housetop not come down into his house; and Mark added, neither enter therein to take any thing out of his house; in place of which Luke subjoins, And let them which are in the midst of it depart out.

BEDE. But how, while the city was already compassed with an army, were they to depart out? except that the preceding word “then” is to be referred, not to the actual time of the siege, but the period just before, when first the armed soldiers began to disperse themselves through the parts of Galilee and Samaria.

AUGUSTINE. (uti sup.) But where Matthew and Mark have written, Neither let him which is in the field return back to take his clothes, Luke adds more clearly, And let not them that are in the countries enter thereinto, for these be the days of vengeance, that all the things which are written may be fulfilled.

BEDE. And these are the days of vengeance, that is, the days exacting vengeance for our Lord’s blood.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Then Luke follows in words similar to those of the other two; But woe to them that are with child, and them that give suck in those days; and thus has made plain what might otherwise have been doubtful, namely, that what was said of the abomination of desolation belonged not to the end of the world, but the taking of Jerusalem.

BEDE. He says then, Woe to them that nurse, or give suck, as some interpret it, whose womb or arms now heavy with the burden of children, cause no slight obstacle to the speed of flight.

THEOPHYLACT. But some say that the Lord hereby signified the devouring of children, which Josephus also relates.

CHRYSOSTOM. (adv. oppug. mon. vit.) He next assigns the cause of what he had just now said, For there shall be great distress in the land, and wrath upon this people. For the miseries that took hold of them were such as, in the words of Josephus, no calamity can henceforth compare to them.

EUSEBIUS. For so in truth it was, that when the Romans came and were taking the city, many multitudes of the Jewish people perished in the mouth of the sword; as it follows, And they shall fall by the edge of the sword. But still more were cut off by famine. And these things happened at first indeed under Titus and Vespasian, but after them in the time of Hadrian the Roman general, when the land of their birth was forbidden to the Jews. Hence it follows, And they shall be led away captive into all nations. For the Jews filled the whole land, reaching even to the ends of the earth, and when their land was inhabited by strangers, they alone could not enter it; as it follows, And Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled.

BEDE. Which indeed the Apostle makes mention of when he says, Blindness in part is happened to Israel, and so all Israel shall be saved. (Rom. 11:25.) Which when it shall have gained the promised salvation, hopes not rashly to return to the land of its fathers.

AMBROSE. Now mystically, the abomination of desolation is the coming of Antichrist, for with ill-omened sacrilege he pollutes the innermost recesses of the heart, sitting as it is literally in the temple, that he may claim to himself the throne of divine power. But according to the spiritual meaning, he is well brought in, because he desires to impress firmly on the affections the footstep of his unbelief, disputing from the Scriptures that he is Christ. Then shall come desolation, for very many falling away shall depart from the true religion. Then shall be the day of the Lord, since as His first coming was to redeem sin, so also His second shall be to subdue iniquity, lest more should be carried away by the error of unbelief. There is also another Antichrist, that is, the Devil, who is trying to besiege Jerusalem, i. e. the peaceful soul, with the hosts of his law. When then the Devil is in the midst of the temple, there is the desolation of abomination. But when upon any one in trouble the spiritual presence of Christ has shone, the unjust one is cast out, and righteousness begins her reign. There is also a third Antichrist, as Arius and Sabellius and all who with evil purpose lead us astray. But these are they who are with child, to whom woe is denounced, who enlarge the size of their flesh, and the step of whose inmost soul waxes slow, as those who are worn out in virtue, pregnant with vice. But neither do those with child escape condemnation, who though firm in the resolution of good acts, have not yet yielded any fruits of the work undertaken. These are those which conceive from fear of God, but do not all bring forth. For there are some which thrust forth the word abortive before their delivery. There are others too which have Christ in the womb, but have not yet formed Him. Therefore she who brings forth righteousness, brings forth Christ. Let us also hasten to nourish our children, lest the day of judgment or death find us as it were the parents of an imperfect offspring. And this you will do if you keep all the words of righteousness in your heart, and wait not the time of old age, but in your earliest years, without corruption of your body, quickly conceive wisdom, quickly nourish it. But at the end shall all Judæa be made subject to the nations which shall believe, by the mouth of the spiritual sword, which is the two-edged word. (Rev. 1:16; 19:15.)

21:25–27

25. And there shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars; and upon the earth distress of nations, with perplexity; the sea and the waves roaring;

26. Men’s hearts failing them for fear, and for looking after those things which are coming on the earth: for the powers of heaven shall be shaken.

27. And then shall they see the Son of man coming in a cloud with power and great glory.

BEDE. The events which were to follow the fulfilment of the times of the Gentiles He explains in regular order, saying, There shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars

AMBROSE. All which signs are more clearly described in Matthew, Then shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven.

EUSEBIUS. For at that time when the end of this perishing life shall be accomplished, and, as the Apostle says, The fashion of this world passeth away, (1 Cor. 7:13.) then shall succeed a new world, in which instead of sensible light, Christ Himself shall shine as a sunbeam, and as the King of the new world, and so mighty and glorious will be His light, that the sun which now dazzles so brightly, and the moon and all the stars, shall be hidden by the coming of a far greater light.

CHRYSOSTOM. For as in this world the moon and the stars are soon dimmed by the rising of the sun, so at the glorious appearance of Christ shall the sun become dark, and the moon not shed her ray, and the stars shall fall from heaven, stripped of their former attire, that they may put on the robe of a better light.

EUSEBIUS. What things shall befall the world after the darkening of the orbs of light, and whence shall arise the straitening of nations, He next explains as follows, And on the earth distress of nations, by reason of the confusion of the roaring of the sea. Wherein He seems to teach, that the beginning of the universal change will be owing to the failing of the watery substance. For this being first absorbed or congealed, so that no longer is heard the roaring of the sea, nor do the waves reach the shore because of the exceeding drought, the other parts of the world, ceasing to obtain the usual vapour which came forth from the watery matter, shall undergo a revolution. Accordingly since the appearance of Christ must put down the prodigies which resist God, namely, those of Antichrist, the beginnings of wrath shall take their rise from droughts, such as that neither storm nor roaring of the sea be any more heard. And this event shall be succeeded by the distress of the men who survive; as it follows, Men’s hearts being dried up for fear, and looking after those things which shall come upon the whole world. But the things that shall then come upon the world He proceeds to declare, adding, For the powers of heaven shall be shaken.

THEOPHYLACT. Or else, When the higher world shall be changed, then also the lower elements shall suffer loss; whence it follows, And on the earth distress of nations, &c. As if He said, the sea shall roar terribly, and its shores shall be shaken with the tempest, so that of the people and nations of the earth there shall be distress, that is, a universal misery, so that they shall pine away from fear and expectation of the evils which are coming upon the world.

AUGUSTINE. (ad Hes. Ep. 199.) But you will say, your punishment compels you to confess that the end is now approaching, seeing the fulfilment of that which was foretold. For it is certain there is no country, no place in our time, which is not affected or troubled. But if those evils which mankind now suffer are sure signs that our Lord is now about to come, what meaneth that which the Apostle says, For when they shall say peace and safety. (1 Thess. 5:3.) Let us see then if it be not perhaps better to understand the words of prophecy to be not so fulfilled, but rather that they will come to pass when the tribulation of the whole world shall be such that it shall belong to the Church, which shall be troubled by the whole world, not to those who shall trouble it. For they are those who shall say, Peace and safety. But now these evils which are counted the greatest and most immoderate, we see to be common to both the kingdoms of Christ and the Devil. For the good and the evil are alike afflicted with them, and among these great evils is the yet universal resort to licentious feasts. Is not this the being dried up from fear, or rather the being burnt up from lust?

THEOPHYLACT. But not only shall men be tossed about when the world shall be changed, but angels even shall stand amazed at the terrible revolutions of the universe. Hence it follows, And the powers of heaven shall be shaken.

GREGORY. (Hom. 1. in Ev.) For whom does He call the powers of heaven, but the angels, dominions, principalities, and powers? which at the coming of the strict Judge shall then appear visibly to our eyes, that they may strictly exact judgment of us, seeing that now our invisible Creator patiently bears with us.

EUSEBIUS. When also the Son of God shall come in glory, and shall crush the proud empire of the son of sin, the angels of heaven attending Him, the doors of heaven which have been shut from the foundation of the world shall be opened, that the things that are on high may be witnessed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ad Olymp. Ep. 2.) Or the heavenly powers shall be shaken, although themselves know it not. For when they see the innumerable multitudes condemned, they shall not stand there without trembling.

BEDE. Thus it is said in Job, the pillars of heaven tremble and are afraid at his reproof. (Job 26:11.) What then do the boards do, when the pillars tremble? what does the shrub of the desert suffer, when the cedar of Paradise is shaken?

EUSEBIUS. Or the powers of heaven are those which preside over the sensible parts of the universe, which indeed shall then be shaken that they may attain to a better state. For they shall be discharged from the ministry with which they serve God toward the sensible bodies in their perishing condition.

AUGUSTINE. (ad Hes. ut sup.) But that the Lord may not seem to have foretold as extraordinary those things concerning His second coming, which were wont to happen to this world even before His first coming, and that we may not be laughed at by those who have read more and greater events than these in the history of nations, I think what has been said may be better understood to apply to the Church. For the Church is the sun, the moon, and the stars, to whom it was said, Fair as the moon, elect as the sun. (Cant. 6:10.) And she will then not be seen for the unbounded rage of the persecutors.

AMBROSE. While many also fall away from religion, clear faith will be obscured by the cloud of unbelief, for to me that Sun of righteousness is either diminished or increased according to my faith; and as the moon in its monthly wanings, or when it is opposite the sun by the interposition of the earth, suffers eclipse, so also the holy Church when the sins of the flesh oppose the heavenly light, cannot borrow the brightness of divine light from Christ’s rays. For in persecutions, the love of this world generally shuts out the light of the divine Sun; the stars also fall, that is, men who shine in glory fall when the bitterness of persecution waxes sharp and prevails. And this must be until the multitude of the Church be gathered in, for thus are the good tried and the weak made manifest.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) But in the words, And upon the earth distress of nations, He would understand by nations, not those which shall be blessed in the seed of Abraham, but those which shall stand on the left hand.

AMBROSE. So severe then will be the manifold fires of our souls, that with consciences depraved through the multitude of crimes, by reason of our fear of the coming judgment, the dew of the sacred fountain will be dried upon us. But as the Lord’s coming is looked for, in order that His presence may dwell in the whole circle of mankind or the world, which now dwells in each individual who has embraced Christ with his whole heart, so the powers of heaven shall at our Lord’s coming obtain an increase of grace, and shall be moved by the fulness of the Divine nature more closely infusing itself. There are also heavenly powers which proclaim the glory of God, which shall be stirred by a fuller infusion of Christ, that they may see Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Or the powers of heaven shall be stirred, because when the ungodly persecute, some of the most stout-hearted believers shall be troubled.

THEOPHYLACT. (ut sup.) It follows, And then shall they see the Son of man coming in the clouds. Both the believers and unbelievers shall see Him, for He Himself as well as His cross shall glisten brighter than the sun, and so shall be observed of all.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) But the words, coming in the clouds, may be taken in two ways. Either coming in His Church as it were in a cloud, as He now ceases not to come. But then it shall be with great power and majesty, for far greater will His power and might appear to His saints, to whom He will give great virtue, that they may not be overcome in such a fearful persecution. Or in His body in which He sits at His Father’s right hand He must rightly be supposed to come, and not only in His body, but also in a cloud, for He will come even as He went away, And a cloud received him out of their sight.

CHRYSOSTOM. For God ever appears in a cloud, according to the Psalms, clouds and darkness are round about him. (Ps. 17:11.) Therefore shall the Son of man come in the clouds as God, and the Lord, not secretly, but in glory worthy of God. Therefore He adds, with great power and majesty.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Great must be understood in like manner. For His first appearance He made in our weakness and lowliness, the second He shall celebrate in all His own power.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) For in power and majesty will men see Him, whom in lowly stations they refused to hear, that so much the more acutely they may feel His power, as they are now the less willing to bow the necks of their hearts to His sufferings.

28. And when these things begin to come to pass, then look up, and lift up your heads; for your redemption draweth nigh.

29. And he spake to them a parable; Behold the fig tree, and all the trees;

30. When they now shoot forth, ye see and know of your own selves that summer is now nigh at hand.

31. So likewise ye, when ye see these things come to pass, know ye that the kingdom of God is nigh at hand.

32. Verily I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, till all be fulfilled.

33. Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away.

GREGORY. (Hom. 1. in Ev.) Having in what has gone before spoken against the reprobate, He now turns His words to the consolation of the elect; for it is added, When these things begin to be, look up, and lift up your heads, for your redemption draweth nigh; as if he says, When the buffettings of the world multiply, lift up your heads, that is, rejoice your hearts, for when the world closes whose friends ye are not, the redemption is near which ye seek. For in holy Scripture the head is often put for the mind, for as the members are ruled by the head, so are the thoughts regulated by the mind. To lift up our heads then, is to raise up our minds to the joys of the heavenly country.

EUSEBIUS. Or else, To those that have passed through the body and bodily things, shall be present spiritual and heavenly bodies: that is, they will have no more to pass the kingdom of the world, and then to those that are worthy shall be given the promises of salvation. For having received the promises of God which we look for, we who before were crooked shall be made upright, and we shall lift up our heads who were before bent low; because the redemption which we hoped for is at hand; that namely for which the whole creation waiteth.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, perfect liberty of body and soul. For as the first coming of our Lord was for the restoration of our souls, so will the second be manifested unto the restoration of our bodies.

EUSEBIUS. He speaks these things to His disciples, not as to those who would continue in this life to the end of the world, but as if uniting in one body of believers in Christ both themselves and us and our posterity, even to the end of the world.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) That the world ought to be trampled upon and despised, He proves by a wise comparison, adding, Behold the fig tree and all the trees, when they now put forth fruit, ye know that summer is near. As if He says, As from the fruit of the tree the summer is perceived to be near, so from the fall of the world the kingdom of God is known to be at hand. Hereby is it manifested that the world's fall is our fruit. For hereunto it puts forth buds, that whomsoever it has fostered in the bud it may consume in slaughter. But well is the kingdom of God compared to summer; for then the clouds of our sorrow flee away, and the days of life brighten up under the clear light of the Eternal Sun.

AMBROSE. Matthew speaks of the fig-tree only, Luke of all the trees. But the fig-tree shadows forth two things, either the ripening of what is hard, or the luxuriance of sin; that is, either that, when the fruit bursts forth in all trees and the fruitful fig-tree abounds, (that is, when every tongue confesses God, even the Jewish people confessing Him,) we ought to hope for our Lord's coming, in which shall be gathered in as at summer the fruits of the resurrection. Or, when the man of sin shall clothe himself in his light and fickle boasting as it were the leaves of the synagogue, we must then suppose the judgment to be drawing near. For the Lord hastens to reward faith, and to bring an end of sinning.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) But when He says, When ye shall see these things to come to pass, what can we understand but those things which were mentioned above. But among them we read, And then shall they see the Son of man coming. When therefore this is seen, the kingdom of God is not yet, but nigh at hand. Or must we say that we are not to understand all the things before mentioned, when He says, When ye shall see these things, &c. but only some of them; this for example being excepted, And then shall they see the Son of man. But Matthew would plainly have it taken with no exception, for he says, And so ye, when ye see all these things, among which is the seeing the coming of the Son of man; in order that it may be understood of that coming whereby He now comes in His members as in clouds, or in the Church as in a great cloud.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Or else, He says, the kingdom of God is at hand, meaning that when these things shall be, not yet shall all things come to their last end, but they shall be already tending towards it. For the very coming of our Lord itself, casting out every principality and power, is the preparation for the kingdom of God.

EUSEBIUS. For as in this life, when winter dies away, and spring succeeds, the sun sending forth its warm rays cherishes and quickens the seeds hid in the ground, just laying aside their first form, and the young plants sprout forth, having put on different shades of green; so also the glorious coming of the Only-begotten of God, illuminating the new world with His quickening rays, shall bring forth into light from more excellent bodies than before the seeds that have long been hidden in the whole world, i. e. those who sleep in the dust of the earth. And having vanquished death, He shall reign from henceforth the life of the new world.

GREGORY. (in Hom. 1. in Ev.) But all the things before mentioned are confirmed with great certainty, when He adds, Verily I say unto you, &c.

BEDE. He strongly commends that which he thus foretels. And, if one may so speak, his oath is this, Amen, I say unto you. Amen is by interpretation “true.” Therefore the truth says, I tell you the truth, and though He spoke not thus, He could by no means lie. But by generation he means either the whole human race, or especially the Jews.

EUSEBIUS. Or by generation He means the new generation of His holy Church, shewing that the generation of the faithful would last up to that time, when it would see all things, and embrace with its eyes the fulfilment of our Saviour’s words.

THEOPHYLACT. For because He had foretold that there should be commotions, and wars, and changes, both of the elements and in other things, lest any one might suspect that Christianity itself also would perish, He adds, Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words shall not pass away: as if He said, Though all things should be shaken, yet shall my faith fail not. Whereby He implies that He sets the Church before the whole creation. The creation shall suffer change, but the Church of the faithful and the words of the Gospel shall abide for ever.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Or else, The heaven and earth shall pass away, &c. As if He says, All that with us seems lasting, does not abide to eternity without change, and all that with Me seems to pass away is held fixed and immoveable, for My word which passeth away utters sentences which remain unchangeable, and abide for ever.

BEDE. But by the heaven which shall pass away we must understand not the æthereal or the starry heaven, but the air from which the birds are named “of heaven.” But if the earth shall pass away, how does Ecclesiastes say, The earth standeth for ever? (Ecc. 1:4.) Plainly then the heaven and earth in the fashion which they now have shall pass away, but in essence subsist eternally.

21:34–36

34. And take heed to yourselves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharged with surfeiting, and drunkenness, and cares of this life, and so that day come upon you unawares.

35. For as a snare shall it come on all them that dwell on the face of the whole earth.

36. Watch ye therefore, and pray always, that ye may be accounted worthy to escape all these things that shall come to pass, and to stand before the Son of man.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord declared above the fearful and sensible signs of the evils which should overtake sinners, against which the only remedy is watching and prayer, as it is said, And take heed to yourselves, lest at any time, &c.

BASIL. (Hom. 1. in illud Atten de tibi.) Every animal has within itself certain instincts which it has received from God, for the preservation of its own being. Wherefore Christ has also given us this warning, that what comes to them by nature, may be ours by the aid of reason and prudence: that we may flee from sin as the brute creatures shun deadly food, but that we seek after righteousness, as they wholesome herbs. Therefore saith He, Take heed to yourselves, that is, that you may distinguish the noxious from the wholesome. But since there are two ways of taking heed to ourselves, the one with the bodily eyes, the other by the faculties of the soul, and the bodily eye does not reach to virtue; it remains that we speak of the operations of the soul. Take heed, that is, Look around you on all sides, keeping an ever watchful eye to the guardianship of your soul. He says not, Take heed to your own or to the things around, but to yourselves. For ye are mind and spirit, your body is only of sense. Around you are riches, arts, and all the appendages of life, you must not mind these, but your soul, of which you must take especial care. The same admonition tends both to the healing of the sick, and the perfecting of those that are well, namely, such as are the guardians of the present, the providers of the future, not judging the actions of others, but strictly searching their own, not suffering the mind to be the slave of their passions, but subduing the irrational part of the soul to the rational. But the reason why we should take heed He adds as follows, Lest at any time your hearts be overcharged, &c.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. As if He says, Beware lest the eyes of your mind wax heavy. For the cares of this life, and surfeiting, and drunkenness, scare away prudence, shatter and make shipwreck of faith.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. (Clem. Al. lib. ii. Pædag. c. 2.) Drunkenness is an excessive use of wine; crapula1 is the uneasiness, and nausea attendant on drunkenness, a Greek word so called from the motion of the head. And a little below. As then we must partake of food lest we suffer hunger, so also of drink lest we thirst, but with still greater care to avoid falling into excess. For the indulgence of wine is deceitful, and the soul when free from wine will be the wisest and best, but steeped in the fumes of wine is lost as in a cloud.

BASIL. (in Reg. Brev. ad int. 88.) But carefulness, or the care of this life, although it seems to have nothing unlawful in it, nevertheless if it conduce not to religion, must be avoided. And the reason why He said this He shews by what comes next, And so that day come upon you unawares.

THEOPHYLACT. For that day will not come when men are expecting it, but unlooked for and by stealth, taking as a snare those who are unwary. For as a snare shall it come upon all them that sit upon the face of the earth. But this we may diligently keep far from us. For that day will take those that sit on the face of the earth, as the unthinking and slothful. But as many as are prompt and active in the way of good, not sitting and loitering on the ground, but rising from it, saying to themselves, Rise up, begone, for here there is no rest for thee. To such that day is not as a perilous snare, but a day of rejoicing.

EUSEBIUS. He taught them therefore to take heed unto the things we have just before mentioned, lest they fall into the indolence resulting therefrom. Hence it follows, Watch ye therefore, and pray always, that ye may be accounted worthy to escape all those things that shall come to pass.

THEOPHYLACT. Namely, hunger, pestilence, and such like, which for a time only threaten the elect and others, and those things also which are hereafter the lot of the guilty for ever. For these we can in no wise escape, save by watching and prayer.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. ii. c. 77.) This is supposed to be that flight which Matthew mentions; which must not be in the winter or on the sabbath day. To the winter belong the cares of this life, which are mournful as the winter, but to the sabbath surfeiting and drunkenness, which drowns and buries the heart in carnal luxury and delight, since on that day the Jews are immersed in worldly pleasure, while they are lost to a spiritual sabbath.

THEOPHYLACT. And because a Christian needs not only to flee evil, but to strive to obtain glory, He adds, And to stand before the Son of man. For this is the glory of angels, to stand before the Son of man, our God, and always to behold His face.

BEDE. Now supposing a physician should bid us beware of the juice of a certain herb, lest a sudden death overtake us, we should most earnestly attend to his command; but when our Saviour warns us to shun drunkenness and surfeiting, and the cares of this world, men have no fear of being wounded and destroyed by them; for the faith which they put in the caution of the physician, they disdain to give to the words of God.

21:37–38

37. And in the day time he was teaching in the temple; and at night he went out, and abode in the mount that is called the mount of Olives.

38. And all the people came early in the morning to him in the temple, for to hear him.

BEDE. What our Lord commanded in word, He confirms by His example. For He who bid us watch and pray before the coming of the Judge, and the uncertain end of each of us, as the time of His Passion drew near, is Himself instant in teaching, watching, and prayer. As it is said, And in the day time he was teaching in the temple, whereby He conveys by His own example, that it is a thing worthy of God, to watch, or by word and deed to point out the way of truth to our neighbour.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But what were the things He taught, unless such as transcended the worship of the law?

THEOPHYLACT. Now the Evangelists are silent as to the greater part of Christ’s teaching; for whereas He preached for the space nearly of three years, all the teaching which they have written down would scarcely, one might say, suffice for the discourse of a single day. For out of a great many things extracting a few, they have given only a taste as it were of the sweetness of His teaching. But our Lord here instructs us, that we ought to address God at night and in silence, but in day time to be doing good to men; and to gather indeed at night, but in the day distribute what we have gathered. As it is added, And at night he went out and abode in the mount that is called Olivet. Not that He had need of prayer, but He did this for our example.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But because His speech was with power, and with authority He applied to spiritual worship the things which had been delivered in figures by Moses and the Prophets, the people heard Him gladly. As it follows, And the whole people made haste to come early to hear him in the temple. But the people who came to Him before light might with fitness say, O God my God, early do I wait upon thee.

BEDE. Now mystically, we also when amid our prosperity we behave ourselves soberly, piously, and honestly, teach by day time in the temple, for we hold up to the faithful the model of a good work; but at night we abide on mount Olivet, when in the darkness of anguish we are refreshed with spiritual consolation; and to us also the people come early in the morning, when either having shaken off the works of darkness, or scattered all the clouds of sorrow, they follow our example.

CHAPTER 22

22:1–2

1. Now the feast of unleavened bread drew nigh, which is called the Passover.

2. And the Chief Priests and Scribes sought how they might kill him; for they feared the people.

CHRYSOSTOM. The actions of the Jews were a shadow of our own. Accordingly if you ask of a Jew concerning the Passover, and the feast of unleavened bread, he will tell you nothing momentous, mentioning the deliverance from Egypt; whereas should a man inquire of me he would not hear of Egypt or Pharaoh, but of freedom from sin and the darkness of Satan, not by Moses, but by the Son of God;

GLOSS. (non occ.) Whose Passion the Evangelist being about to relate, introduces the figure of it, saying, Now the feast of unleavened bread drew nigh, which is called the Passover.

BEDE. Now the Passover, which is called in Hebrew “Phase,” is not so named from the Passion, but from the passing over, because the destroying angel, seeing the blood on the doors of the Israelites, passed over them, and touched not their first-born. Or the Lord Himself, giving assistance to His people, walked over them. But herein is the difference between the Passover and the feast of unleavened bread, that by the Passover is meant that day alone on which the lamb was slain towards the evening, that is, on the fourteenth day of the first month, but on the fifteenth, when the Israelites went out of Egypt, followed the feast of unleavened bread for seven days, up to the twenty-first of the same month. Hence the writers of the Gospel substitute one indifferently for the other. As here it is said, The day of unleavened bread, which is called the Passover. But it is signified by a mystery, that Christ having suffered once for us, has commanded us through the whole time of this world which is passed in seven days, to live in the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. Chrys. Hom. 79. in Matt.) The Chief Priests set about their impious deed on the feast, as it follows, And the Chief Priests and Scribes, &c. Moses ordained only one Priest, at whose death another was to be appointed. But at that time, when the Jewish customs had begun to fall away, there were many made every year. These then wishing to kill Jesus, are not afraid of God, lest in truth the holy time should aggravate the pollution of their sin, but every where fear man. Hence it follows, For they feared the people.

BEDE. Not indeed that they apprehended sedition, but were afraid lest by the interference of the people He should be taken out of their hands. And these things Matthew reports to have taken place two days before the Passover, when they were assembled in the judgment hall of Caiaphas.

22:3–6

3. Then entered Satan into Judas surnamed Iscariot, being of the number of the twelve.

4. And he went his way, and communed with the Chief Priests and captains, how he might betray him unto them.

5. And they were glad, and covenanted to give him money.

6. And he promised, and sought opportunity to betray him unto them in the absence of the multitude.

THEOPHYLACT. Having already said that the Chief Priests sought means how they might slay Jesus without incurring any danger, he next goes on to relate the means which occurred to them, as it is said, Then entered Satan into Judas.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Satan entered into Judas not by force, but finding the door open. For forgetful of all that he had seen, Judas now turned his thoughts solely to covetousness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 80. in Matt.) St. Luke gives his surname, because there was another Judas.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. And he adds, one of the twelve, since he made up the number, though he did not truly discharge the Apostolic office. Or the Evangelist adds this, as it were for contrast sake. As if he said, “He was of the first band of those who were especially chosen.”

BEDE. There is nothing contrary to this in what John says, that after the sop Satan entered into Judas; seeing he now entered into him as a stranger, but then as his own, whom he might lead after him to do whatsoever he willed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) Observe the exceeding iniquity of Judas, that he both sets out by himself, and that he does this for gain. It follows, And he went his way, and communed with the chief priests and captains.

THEOPHYLACT. The magistrates here mentioned were those appointed to take care of the buildings of the temple, or it may be those whom the Romans had set over the people to keep them from breaking forth into tumult; for they were seditious.

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) By covetousness then Judas became what he was, for it follows, And they covenanted to give him money. Such are the evil passions which covetousness engenders, it makes men irreligious, and compels them to lose all knowledge of God, though they have received a thousand benefits from Him, nay, even to injure Him, as it follows, And he contracted with them.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, he bargained and promised. And sought opportunity to betray him unto them, without the crowds, that is, when he saw Him standing by Himself apart, in the absence of the multitude.

BEDE. Now many shudder at the wickedness of Judas, yet do not guard against it. For whosoever despises the laws of truth and love, betrays Christ who is truth and love. Above all, when he sins not from infirmity or ignorance, but after the likeness of Judas seeks opportunity, when no one is present, to change truth for a lie, virtue for crime.

22:7–13

7. Then came the day of unleavened bread, when the Passover must be killed.

8. And he sent Peter and John, saying, Go and prepare us the Passover, that we may eat.

9. And they said unto him, Where wilt thou that we prepare?

10. And he said unto them, Behold, when ye are entered into the city, there shall a man meet you, bearing a pitcher of water; follow him into the house where he entereth in.

11. And ye shall say unto the goodman of the house, The Master saith unto thee, Where is the guestchamber, where I shall eat the Passover with my disciples?

12. And he shall shew you a large upper room furnished: there make ready.

13. And they went, and found as he had said unto them: and they made ready the Passover.

TITUS BOSTRENSIS. Our Lord, in order to leave us a heavenly Passover, ate a typical one, removing the figure, that the truth might take its place.

BEDE. By the day of unleavened bread of the Passover, He means the fourteenth day of the first month, the day on which, having put away the leaven, they were accustomed to hold the Passover, that is, the lamb, towards evening.

EUSEBIUS. But should any one say, "If on the first day of unleavened bread the disciples of our Saviour prepare the Passover, on that day then should we also celebrate the Passover;" we answer, that this was not an admonition, but a history of the fact. It is what took place at the time of the saving Passion; but it is one thing to relate past events, another to sanction and leave them an ordinance to posterity. Moreover, the Saviour did not keep His Passover with the Jews at the time that they sacrificed the lamb. For they did this on the Preparation, when our Lord suffered. Therefore they entered not into the hall of Pilate, that they might not be defiled, but might eat the Passover. (John 18:28.) For from the time that they conspired against the truth, they drove far from them the Word of truth. Nor on the first day of unleavened bread, on which the Passover ought to be sacrificed, did they eat their accustomed Passover, for they were intent upon something else, but on the day after, which was the second of unleavened bread. But our Lord on the first day of unleavened bread, that is, on the fifth day of the week, kept the Passover with His disciples.

THEOPHYLACT. Now on the same fifth day He sends two of His disciples to prepare the Passover, namely, Peter and John, the one in truth as loving, the other as loved. In all things shewing, that even to the end of His life He opposed not the law. And He sends them to a strange house; for He and His disciples had no house, else would He have kept the Passover in one of them. So it is added, And they said, Where will thou that we prepare?

BEDE. As if to say, We have no abode, we have no place of shelter. Let those hear this, who busy themselves in building houses. Let them know that Christ, the Lord of all places, had not where to lay His head.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 81. in Matt.) But as they knew not to whom they were sent, He gave them a sign, as Samuel to Saul, as it follows, And he said unto them, Behold, when ye are entered into the city, there shall a man meet you bearing a pitcher of water; follow him into the house where he entereth in. (1 Sam. 10:3.)

AMBROSE. First observe the greatness of His divine power. He is talking with His disciples, yet knows what will happen in another place. Next behold His condescension, in that He chooses not the person of the rich or powerful, but seeks after the poor, and prefers a mean inn to the spacious palaces of nobles. Now the Lord was not ignorant of the name of the man whose mystery He knew, and that he would meet the disciples, but he is mentioned without a name, that he may be counted as ignoble.

THEOPHYLACT. He sends them for this reason to an unknown man: to shew them that He voluntarily underwent His Passion, since He who so swayed the mind of one unknown to Him, that He should receive them, was able to deal with the Jews just as He wished. But some say that He gave not the name of the man, lest the traitor knowing his name might open the house to the Pharisees, and they should have come and taken Him before that the supper was eaten, and He had delivered the spiritual mysteries to His disciples. But He directs them by particular signs to a certain house; whence it follows, And ye shall say to the goodman of the house, The Master saith, Where is the guestchamber, &c. And he will shew you an upper room, &c.

GLOSS. (non occ.) And perceiving these signs, the disciples zealously fulfilled all that had been commanded them; as it follows, And they went, and found as he had said unto them, and made ready the Passover.

BEDE. To explain this Passover, the Apostle says, Christ our Passover is sacrificed for us. (1 Cor. 5:7.) Which Passover in truth must needs have been slain there, as it was so ordained by the Father’s counsel and determination. And thus although on the next day, that is, the fifteenth, He was crucified, yet, on this night on which the lamb was slain by the Jews, being seized and bound, He consecrated the beginning of His sacrifice, that is, of His Passion.

THEOPHYLACT. By the day of unleavened bread, we must understand that conversation which is wholly in the light of the Spirit, having lost all trace of the old corruption of Adam’s first transgression. And living in this conversation, it becomes us to rejoice in the mysteries of Christ. Now these mysteries Peter and John prepare, that is, action and contemplation, fervid zeal and peaceful meekness. And these preparers a certain man meets, because in what we have just mentioned, lies the condition of man who was created after the image of God. And he carries a pitcher of water, which signifies the grace of the Holy Spirit. But the pitcher is humbleness of heart; for He giveth grace to the humble, who know themselves to be but earth and dust.

AMBROSE. Or the pitcher is a more perfect measure, but the water is that which was thought meet to be a sacrament of Christ; to wash, not to be washed.

BEDE. They prepare the Passover in that house, whither the pitcher of water is carried, for the time is at hand in which to the keepers of the true Passover, the typical blood is taken away from the lintel, and the baptism of the lifegiving fountain is consecrated to take away sin.

ORIGEN. (in Matt. 26:18.) But I think that the man who meets the disciples as they enter into the city, carrying a pitcher of water, was some servant of a master of a house, carrying water in an earthen vessel either for washing or for drinking. And this I think is Moses conveying the spiritual doctrine in fleshly histories. But they who follow him not, do not celebrate the Passover with Jesus. Let us then ascend with the Lord united to us, to the upper part in which is the guestchamber, which is shewn by the understanding, that is, the goodman of the house, to every one of the disciples of Christ. But this upper room of our house must be large enough to receive Jesus the Word of God, who is not comprehended but by those who are greater in comprehension. And this chamber must be made ready by the goodman of the house, (that is, the understanding,) for the Son of God, and it must be cleaned, wholly purged of the filth of malice. The master of the house also must not be any common person having a known name. Hence He says mystically in Matthew, Go ye to such a one.

AMBROSE. Now in the upper parts he has a large room furnished, that you may consider how great were his merits in whom the Lord could sit down with His disciples, rejoicing in His exalted virtues.

ORIGEN. (ut sup.) But we should know that they who are taken up with banquetings and worldly cares do not ascend into that upper part of the house, and therefore do not keep the Passover with Jesus. For after the words of the disciples wherewith they questioned the goodman of the house, (that is, the understanding,) the Divine Person came into that house to feast there with His disciples.

22:14–18

14. And when the hour was come, he sat down, and the twelve apostles with him.

15. And he said unto them, With desire I have desired to eat this Passover with you before I suffer:

16. For I say unto you, I will not any more eat thereof, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God.

17. And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and said, Take this, and divide it among yourselves:

18. For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God shall come.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As soon as the disciples had prepared the Passover, they proceed to eat it; as it is said, And when the hour was come, &c.

BEDE. By the hour of eating the Passover, He signifies the fourteenth day of the first month, far gone towards evening, the fifteenth moon just appearing on the earth.

THEOPHYLACT. But how is our Lord said to sit down, whereas the Jews eat the Passover standing? They say, that when they had eaten the legal Passover, they sat down, according to the common custom, to eat their other food.

It follows, And he said unto them, With desire have I desired to eat this Passover with you, &c.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He says this, because the covetous disciple was looking out for the time for betraying Him; but that he might not betray

Him before the feast of the Passover, our Lord had not divulged either the house, or the man with whom He should keep the Passover. That this was the cause is very evident from these words.

THEOPHYLACT. Or He says, With desire have I desired; as if to say, This is My last supper with you, therefore it is most precious and welcome to Me; just as those who are going away to a distance, utter the last words to their friends most affectionately.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or He says this, because after that Passover the Cross was at hand. But we find Him frequently prophesying of His own Passion, and desiring it to take place.

BEDE. He first then desires to eat the typical Passover, and so to declare the mysteries of His Passion to the world.

EUSEBIUS. Or else; When our Lord was celebrating the new Passover, He fitly said, With desire have I desired this Passover, that is, the new mystery of the New Testament which He gave to His disciples, and which many prophets and righteous men desired before Him. He then also Himself thirsting for the common salvation, delivered this mystery, to suffice for the whole world. But the Passover was ordained by Moses to be celebrated in one place, that is, in Jerusalem. Therefore it was not adapted for the whole world, and so was not desired.

EPIPHANIUS. (adv. Hær. 30. 22.) Hereby we may refute the folly of the Ebionites concerning the eating of flesh, seeing that our Lord eats the Passover of the Jews. Therefore He pointedly said, “This Passover,” that no one might transfer it to mean another.

BEDE. Thus then was our Lord the approver of the legal Passover; and as He taught that it related to the figure of His own dispensation, He forbids it henceforth to be represented in the flesh. Therefore He adds, For I say unto you, I will not any more eat thereof, until it be fulfilled in the kingdom of God. That is, I will no more celebrate the Mosaic Passover, until, being spiritually understood, it is fulfilled in the Church. For the Church is the kingdom of God; as in Luke, The kingdom of God is within you. (Luke 17:21.) Again, the ancient Passover, which He desired to bring to an end, is also alluded to in what follows; And he took the cup, and gave thanks, and said, Take ye, &c. For this gave He thanks, that the old things were about to pass away, and all things to become new.

CHRYSOSTOM. (conc. de Laz.) Remember then when thou sittest down to meat that after the meal thou must pray; therefore satisfy thy hunger, but with moderation, lest being overcharged thou shouldest not be able to bend thy knees in supplication and prayer to God. Let us not then after our meals turn to sleep, but to prayer. For Christ plainly signifies this, that the partaking of food should not be followed by sleep or rest, but by prayer and reading the holy Scripture. It follows, For I say unto you, I will not drink of the fruit of the vine, until the kingdom of God come.

BEDE. This may be also taken literally, for from the hour of supper up to the time of resurrection He was about to drink no wine. Afterwards He partook both of meat and drink, as Peter testifies, Who did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead. (Acts 10:41.)

THEOPHYLACT. The resurrection is called the kingdom of God, because it has destroyed death. Therefore David also says, The Lord reigneth: He hath put on beauty, (Ps. 93:1.) that is, a beautiful robe, having put off the corruption of the flesh. (Isa. 63:1.) But when the resurrection comes, He again drinks with His disciples; to prove that the resurrection was not a shadow only.

BEDE. But it is far more natural, that as before of the typical lamb, so now also of the drink of the Passover, He should say that He would no more taste, until the glory of the kingdom of God being made manifest, the faith of the whole world should appear; that so by means of the spiritual changing of the two greatest commands of the law, namely, the eating and drinking of the Passover, you might learn that all the Sacraments of the law were to be transferred to a spiritual observance.

22:19–20

19. And he took bread, and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me.

20. Likewise also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you.

BEDE. Having finished the rites of the old Passover, He passes on to the new, which He desires the Church to celebrate in memory of His redemption, substituting for the flesh and blood of the lamb, the Sacrament of His own Flesh and Blood in the figure of the bread and wine, being made a Priest for ever after the order of Melchisedech. (Ps. 110:4.) Hence it is said, And he took bread, and gave thanks, (Heb. 7:21.) as also He had given thanks upon finishing the old feast, leaving us an example to glorify God at the beginning and end of every good work. It follows, And brake it. He Himself breaks the bread which He holds forth, to shew that the breaking of His Body, that is, His Passion, will not be without His will. And gave unto them, saying, This is my body which is given for you.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. de Bapt. Christ.) For the bread before the consecration is common bread, but when the mystery has consecrated it, it is, and it is called, the Body of Christ.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (in Luc.) Nor doubt that this is true; for He plainly says, This is my body; but rather receive the words of thy Saviour in faith. For since He is the Truth, He lies not. (Ep. ad Calosyr.). a They rave foolishly then who say that the mystical blessing loses its power of sanctifying, if any remains are left till the following day. For the most holy Body of Christ will not be changed, but the power of blessing and the life-giving grace is ever abiding in it. (in Luc. ut sup.). For the life-giving power of God the Father is the only-begotten Word, which was made flesh not ceasing to be the Word, but making the flesh life-giving. What then? since we have in us the life of God, the Word of God dwelling in us, will our body be life-giving? But it is one thing for us by the habit of participation to have in ourselves the Son of God, another for Himself to have been made flesh, that is, to have made the body which He took from the pure Virgin His own Body. He must needs then be in a certain manner united to our bodies by His holy Body and precious Blood, which we have received for a life-giving blessing in the bread and wine. For lest we should be shocked, seeing the Flesh and Blood placed on the holy altars, God, in compassion to our infirmities, pours into the offerings the power of life, changing them into the reality of His own flesh, that the body of life may be found in us, as it were a certain life-giving seed. He adds. Do this in commemoration of me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 46. in Joan.) Christ did this to bring us to a closer bond of friendship, and to betoken His love toward us, giving Himself to those who desire Him, not only to behold Him, but also to handle Him, to eat Him, to embrace Him with the fulness of their whole heart. Therefore as lions breathing fire do we depart from that table, rendered objects of terror to the devil.

BASIL. (Moral. Reg. 21. c. 3. Reg. Brev. ad int. 172.) Learn then in what manner you ought to eat the Body of Christ, namely, in remembrance of Christ's obedience even unto death, that they who live may no more live in themselves, but in Him who died for them, and rose again. (2 Cor. 5:15.)

THEOPHYLACT. Now Luke mentions two cups; of the one we spoke above, Take this, and divide it among yourselves, which we may say is a type of the Old Testament; but the other after the breaking and giving of bread, He Himself imparts to His disciples. Hence it is added, Likewise also the cup after supper.

BEDE. He gave to them, is here understood to complete the sentence.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 1.) Or because Luke has twice mentioned the cup, first before Christ gave the bread, then after He had given it, on the first occasion he has anticipated, as he frequently does, but on the second that which he has placed in its natural order, he had made no mention of before. But both joined together make the same sense which we find in the others, that is, Matthew and Mark.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord calls the cup the New Testament, as it follows, This cup is the New Testament in my blood, which shall be shed for you, signifying that the New Testament has its beginning in His blood. For in the Old Testament the blood of animals was present when the law was given, but now the blood of the Word of God signifies to us the New Testament. But when He says, for you, He does not mean that for the Apostles only was His Body given, and His Blood poured out, but for the sake of all mankind. And the old Passover was ordained to remove the slavery of Egypt; but the blood of the lamb to protect the first-born. The new Passover was ordained to the remission of sins; but the Blood of Christ to preserve those who are dedicated to God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 46. in Joan.) For this Blood moulds in us a royal image, it suffers not our nobleness of soul to waste away, moreover it refreshes the soul, and inspires it with great virtue. This Blood puts to flight the devils, summons angels, and the Lord of angels. This Blood poured forth washed the world, and made heaven open. They that partake of it are built up with heavenly virtues, and arrayed in the royal robes of Christ; yea rather clothed upon by the King Himself. And since if thou comest clean, thou comest healthfully; so if polluted by an evil conscience, thou comest to thy own destruction, to pain and torment. For if they who defile the imperial purple are smitten with the same punishment as those who tear it asunder, it is not unreasonable that they who with an unclean heart receive Christ should be beaten with the same stripes as they were who pierced Him with nails.

BEDE. Because the bread strengthens, and the wine produces blood in the flesh, the former is ascribed to the Body of Christ, the latter to His Blood. But because both we ought to abide in Christ, and Christ in us, the wine of the Lord’s cup is mixed with water, for John bears witness, The people are many waters. (Rev. 17:15.)

THEOPHYLACT. But first the bread is given, next the cup. For in spiritual things labour and action come first, that is, the bread, not only because it is toiled for by the sweat of the brow, but also because while being eaten it is not easy to swallow. Then after labour follows the rejoicing of Divine grace, which is the cup.

BEDE. For this reason then the Apostles communicated after supper, because it was necessary that the typical passover should be first completed, and then they should pass on to the Sacrament of the true Passover. But now in honour of so great a Sacrament, the masters of the Church think right that we should first be refreshed with the spiritual banquet, and afterward with the earthly.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Eutychius Patriarch.) He that communicates receives the whole Body and Blood of our Lord, even though he receive but a part of the Mysteries. For as one seal imparts the whole of its device to different substances, and yet remains entire after distribution, and as one word penetrates to the hearing of many, so there is no doubt that the Body and Blood of our Lord is received whole in all. But the breaking of the sacred bread signifies the Passion.

22:21–23

21. But, behold, the hand of him that betrayeth me is with me on the table.

22. And truly the Son of man goeth, as it was determined: but woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed.

23. And they began to enquire among themselves, which of them it was that should do this thing.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. iii. c. 1.) When our Lord had given the cup to His disciples, He again spoke of His betrayer, saying, But, behold, the hand of him that betrayeth me, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. And this He said not only to shew that He knew all things, but also to declare unto us His own especial goodness, in that He left nothing undone of those things which belonged to Him to do; (for He gives us an example, that even unto the end we should be employed in reclaiming sinners;) and moreover to point out the baseness of the traitor who blushed not to be His guest.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 82. in Matt.) Yet though partaking of the mystery, he was not converted. Nay, his wickedness is made only the more awful, as well because under the pollution of such a design, he came to the mystery, as that coming he was not made better, either by fear, gratitude, or respect.

BEDE. And yet our Lord does not especially point him out, lest being so plainly detected, he might only become the more shameless. But He throws the charge on the whole twelve, that the guilty one might be turned to repentance. He also proclaims his punishment, that the man whom shame had not prevailed upon, might by the sentence denounced against him be brought to amendment. Hence it follows, And truly the Son of man goeth, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Not as if unable to preserve Himself, but as determining for Himself to suffer death for the salvation of man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 81. in Matt.) Because then Judas in the things which are written of him acted with an evil purpose, in order that no one might deem him guiltless, as being the minister of the dispensation, Christ adds, Woe unto that man by whom he is betrayed.

BEDE. But woe also to that man, who coining unworthily to the Table of our Lord, after the example of Judas, betrays the Son, not indeed to Jews, but to sinners, that is, to his own sinful members. Although the eleven Apostles knew that they were meditating nothing against their Lord, yet notwithstanding because they trust more to their Master than themselves, fearing their own infirmities, they ask concerning a sin of which they had no consciousness.

BASIL. (in Reg. Brev. ad int. 301.) For as in bodily diseases there are many of which the affected are not sensible, but they rather put faith in the opinion of their physicians, than trust their own insensibility; so also in the diseases of the soul, though a man is not conscious of sin in himself, yet ought he to trust to those who are able to have more knowledge of their own sins.

22:24–27

24. And there was also a strife among them, which of them should be accounted the greatest.

25. And he said unto them, The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors.

26. But ye shall not be so: but he that is greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief, as he that doth serve.

27. For whether is greater, he that sitteth at meat, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at meat? but I am among you as he that serveth.

THEOPHYLACT. While they were enquiring among themselves who should betray the Lord, they would naturally go on to say to one another, “Thou art the traitor,” and so become impelled to say, “I am the best, I am the greatest.” Hence it is said, And there was also a strife among them which should be accounted the greatest.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Apollinarius in loc.) Or the strife seems to have arisen from this, that when our Lord was departing from the world, it was thought that some one must become their head, as taking our Lord’s place.

BEDE. As good men seek in the Scriptures the examples of their fathers, that they may thereby gain profit and be humbled, so the bad, if by chance they have discovered any thing blameable in the elect, most gladly seize upon it, to shelter their own iniquities thereby. Many therefore most eagerly read, that a strife arose among the disciples of Christ.

AMBROSE. If the disciples did contend, it is not alleged as any excuse, but held out as a warning. Let us then beware lest any contentions among us for precedence be our ruin.

BEDE. Rather let us look not what carnal disciples did, but what their spiritual Master commanded; for it follows, And he said unto them, The kings of the Gentiles, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 65. in Matt.) He mentions the Gentiles, to shew thereby how faulty it was. For it is of the Gentiles to seek after precedence.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Soft words are also given them by their subjects, as it follows, And they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors. Now they truly as alien from the sacred law are subject to these evils, but your preeminence is in humility, as it follows, But ye shall not be so.

BASIL. (in Reg. fus. dis. int. 30.) Let not him that is chief be puffed up by his dignity, lest he fall away from the blessedness of humility, but let him know that true humility is the ministering unto many. As then he who attends many wounded and wipes away the blood from their wounds, least of all men enters upon the service for his own exaltation, much more ought he to whom is committed the care of his sick brethren as the minister of all, about to render an account of all, to be thoughtful and anxious. And so let him that is greatest be as the younger. (ad int. 31.). Again, it is meet that those who are in the chief places should be ready to offer also bodily service, after our Lord's example, who washed His disciples' feet. Hence it follows, And he that is chief, as he that doth serve. But we need not fear that the spirit of humility will be weakened in the inferior, while he is being served by his superior, for by imitation humility is extended.

AMBROSE. But it must be observed, that not every kind of respect and deference to others betokens humility, for you may defer to a person for the world's sake, for fear of his power, or regard to your own interest. In that case you seek to advance yourself, not to honour another. Therefore there is one form of the precept given to all men, namely, that they boast not about precedence, but strive earnestly for humility.

BEDE. In this rule however, given by our Lord, the great have need of no little judgment, that they do not indeed like the kings of the Gentiles delight to tyrannize over their subjects, and be puffed up with their praises, yet notwithstanding that they be provoked with a righteous zeal against the wickedness of offenders.

But to the words of the exhortation He subjoins His own example, as it follows, For which is greater, he who sitteth at meat, or he that serveth? But I am among you, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. As if He says, Think not that thy disciple needs you, but that you do not need him. For I who need no one whom all things in heaven and earth need, have condescended to the degree of a servant.

THEOPHYLACT. He shews Himself to be their servant, when He distributes the bread and the cup, of which service He makes mention, reminding them that if they have eaten of the same bread, and drunk of the same cup, if Christ Himself served all, they ought all to think the same things.

BEDE. Or He speaks of that service wherewith, according to John, He their Lord and Master washed their feet. Although by the word itself serving, (John 13:5.) all that He did in the flesh may be implied, but by serving He also signifies that He poureth forth His blood for us.

22:28–30

28. Ye are they which have continued with me in my temptations.

29. And I appoint unto you a kingdom, as my Father hath appointed unto me;

30. That ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

THEOPHYLACT. As the Lord had denounced woe to the traitor, so on the other hand to the rest of the disciples He promises blessings, saying, Ye are they which have continued with me, &c.

BEDE. For not the first effort of patience, but long-continued perseverance, is rewarded with the glory of the heavenly kingdom, for perseverance, (which is called constancy or fortitude of mind,) is, so to say, the pillar and prop of all virtues. The Son of God then conducts those who abide with Him in His temptations to the everlasting kingdom. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection. (Rom. 6:5.) Hence it follows, And I give to you a kingdom, &c.

AMBROSE. The kingdom of God is not of this world, But it is not equality with God, but likeness to Him, unto which man must aspire. For Christ alone is the full image of God, on account of the unity of His Father’s glory expressed in Him. But the righteous man is after the image of God, if for the sake of imitating the likeness of the Divine conversation, He through the knowledge of God despises the world. Therefore also we eat the Body and Blood of Christ, that we may be partakers of eternal life. Whence it follows, That ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom. For the reward promised to us is not food and drink, but the communication of heavenly grace and life.

BEDE. Or the table offered to all saints richly to enjoy is the glory of a heavenly life, wherewith they who hunger and thirst after righteousness shall be filled, resting in the long-desired enjoyment of the true God. (Matt. 5:6.)

THEOPHYLACT. He said this not as if they would have there bodily food, or as if His kingdom were to be a sensible one. For their life then shall be the life of angels, as He before told the Sadducees. (Mat. 22:30, Luke 20:36) But Paul also says that the kingdom of God is not meat and drink. (Rom. 14:17.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. By means of the things of our present life He describes spiritual things. For they exercise a high privilege with earthly kings, who sit at their table as guests. So then by man’s estimation He shews who shall be rewarded by Him with the greatest honours.

BEDE. This then is the exchange to the right hand of the Most High, (Ps. 118:15.) that those who now in lowliness rejoice to minister to their fellow-servants, shall then at our Lord’s table on high be fed with the banquet of everlasting life, and they who here in temptations abide with the Lord being unjustly judged, shall then come with Him as just judges upon their tempters. Hence it follows, And sit on thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, the unbelievers condemned out of the twelve tribes.

AMBROSE. But the twelve thrones are not as it were any resting-places for the bodily posture, but because since Christ judges after the Divine likeness by knowledge of the hearts, not by examination of the actions, rewarding virtue, condemning iniquity; so the Apostles are appointed to a spiritual judgment, for the rewarding of faith, the condemnation of unbelief, repelling error with virtue, inflicting vengeance on the sacrilegious.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 64. in Matt.) What then will Judas also sit there? Observe what the law was which God gave by Jeremiah, If I have promised any good, and thou art counted unworthy of it, I will punish you. (Jerem.

18:10.) Therefore speaking to His disciples He did not make a general promise, but added, Ye who have continued with me in my temptations.

BEDE. From the high excellence of this promise Judas is excluded. For before the Lord said this, Judas must be supposed to have gone out. They also are excluded whoever having heard the words of the incomprehensible Sacrament, have gone backwards. (John 6:67.)

22:31–34

31. And the Lord said, Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat:

32. But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren.

33. And he said unto him, Lord, I am ready to go with thee, both into prison, and to death.

34. And he said, I tell thee, Peter, the cock shall not crow this day, before that thou shalt thrice deny that thou knowest me.

BEDE. Lest the eleven should be boastful, and impute it to their own strength, that they almost alone among so many thousands of the Jews were said to have continued with our Lord in His temptations, He shews them, that if they had not been protected by the aid of their Master succouring them, they would have been beaten down by the same storm as the rest. Hence it follows, And the Lord said unto Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired thee, that he may sift thee as wheat. That is, he hath longed to tempt you and to shake you, as he who cleanses wheat by winnowing. Wherein He teaches that no man’s faith is tried unless God permits it.

THEOPHYLACT. Now this was said to Peter, because he was bolder than the rest, and might feel proud because of the things which Christ had promised.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or to shew that men being as nought, (as regards human nature, and the proneness of our minds to fall,) it is not meet that they should wish to be above their brethren. Therefore passing by all the others, He comes to Peter, who was the chief of them, saying, But I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 82. in Matt.) Now He said not, ‘I have granted,’ but I have prayed. For He speaks humbly as approaching unto His Passion, and that He may manifest His human nature. For He who had spoken not in supplication, but by authority, Upon this rock I will build my Church, and I will give thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, (Matt. 16:18.) how should He have need of prayer that He might stay one agitated soul? He does not say, “I have prayed that thou deny not,” but that thou do not abandon thy faith.

THEOPHYLACT. For albeit thou art for a time shaken, yet thou boldest stored up, a seed of faith; though the spirit has shed its leaves in temptation, yet the root is firm. Satan then seeks to harm thee, because he is envious of my love for thee, but notwithstanding that I have prayed for thee, thou shalt fall. Hence it follows, And when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren. As if He says, After that thou hast wept and repented thy denial of Me, strengthen thy brethren, for I have deputed thee to be the head of the Apostles. For this befits thee who art with Me, the strength and rock of the Church. And this must be understood not only of the Apostles who then were, but of all the faithful who were about to be, even to the end of the world; that none of the believers might despair, seeing that Peter though an Apostle denied his Lord, yet afterwards by penitence obtained the high privilege of being the Ruler (ἐπιστάτης) of the world.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Marvel then at the superabundance of the Divine forbearance: lest He should cause a disciple to despair, before the crime was committed, He granted pardon, and again restored him to his Apostolic rank, saying, Strengthen thy brethren.

BEDE. As if to say, As I by prayer protected your faith that it should not fail, so do you remember to sustain the weaker brethren, that they despair not of pardon.

AMBROSE. Beware then of boasting, beware of the world; he is commanded to strengthen his own brethren, who said, Master, we have left all, and followed thee. (Matt. 19:27.)

BEDE. Because the Lord said He had prayed for Peter’s faith, Peter conscious of present affection and fervent faith, but unconscious of his coming fall, does not believe he could in any way fall from Christ. As it follows, And he said unto him, Lord, I am ready to go with thee to prison and to death.

THEOPHYLACT. He burns forth indeed with too much love, and promises what is impossible to him. But it behoved him as soon as he heard from the Truth that he was to be tempted, to be no longer confident. Now the Lord, seeing that Peter spoke boastfully, reveals the nature of his temptation, namely, that he would deny Him; I tell thee, Peter, the cock shall not crow this day, before that thou thrice deny, &c.

AMBROSE. Now Peter although earnest in spirit, yet still weak in bodily inclination, is declared about to deny his Lord; for he could not equal the constancy of the Divine will. Our Lord's Passion has rivals, but no equal.

THEOPHYLACT. From hence we draw a great doctrine, that human resolve is not sufficient without the Divine support. For Peter with all his zeal, nevertheless when forsaken of God was overthrown by the enemy.

BASIL. (in Reg. Brev. ad int. 8.) We must know then, that God sometimes allows the rash to receive a fall, as a remedy to previous self-confidence. But although the rash man seems to have committed the same offence with other men, there is no slight difference. For the one has sinned by reason of certain secret assaults and almost against his will, but the others, having no care either for themselves or God, knowing no distinction between sin and virtuous actions. For the rash needing some assistance, in regard to this very thing in which he has sinned ought to suffer reproof. But the others, having destroyed all the good of their soul, must be afflicted, warned, rebuked, or made subject to punishment, until they acknowledge that God is a just Judge, and tremble.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. iii. c. 2.) Now what is here said concerning the foregoing denial of Peter is contained in all the Evangelists, but they do not all happen to relate it upon the same occasion in the discourse. Matthew and Mark subjoin it after our Lord had departed from the house where He had eaten the Passover, but Luke and John before He went out from thence. But we may easily understand either that the two former used these words, recapitulating them, or the two others anticipating them: only it rather moves us, that not only the words but even the sentences of our Lord, in which Peter being troubled used that boast of dying either for or with our Lord, are given so differently, as rather to compel us to believe that he thrice uttered his boast at different parts of our Lord's discourse, and that he was thrice answered by our Lord, that before the cock crowed he should deny Him thrice.

22:35–38

35. And he said unto them, When I sent you without purse, and scrip, and shoes, lacked ye any thing? And they said, Nothing.

36. Then said he unto them, But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip: and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one.

37. For I say unto you, that this that is written must yet be accomplished in me, And he was reckoned among the transgressors: for the things concerning me have an end.

38. And they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. And he said unto them, It is enough.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Our Lord had foretold to Peter that he should deny Him; namely, at the time of His being taken. But having once made mention of His being taken captive, He next announces the struggle that would ensue against the Jews. Hence it is said, And he said unto them, When I sent you without purse, &c.For the Saviour had sent the holy Apostles to preach in the cities and towns the kingdom of heaven, bidding them to take no thought of the things of the body, but to place their whole hope of salvation in Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in illud ad Rom. 16. Salutate Priscillam.) Now as one who teaches to swim, at first indeed placing his hands under his pupils, carefully supports them, but afterward frequently withdrawing his hand, bids them help themselves, nay even lets them sink a little; so likewise did Christ deal with His disciples. At the beginning truly He was present to them, giving them most richly abundance of all things; as it follows, And they said unto them, Nothing. But when it was necessary for them to shew their own strength, He withdrew from them for a little His grace, bidding them do something of themselves; as it follows, But now he that hath a purse, that is, wherein to carry money, let him take it, and likewise his scrip, that is, to carry provisions in. And truly when they had neither shoes, nor girdle, nor staff, nor money, they never suffered the want of any thing. But when He allowed them purse and scrip, they seem to suffer hunger, and thirst, and nakedness. As if He said to them, Hitherto all things have been most richly supplied to you, but now I would have you also experience poverty, therefore I hold you no longer to the former rule, but I command you to get purse and scrip. Now God might even to the end have kept them in plenty, but for many reasons He was unwilling to do so. First that they might impute nothing to themselves, but acknowledge that every thing flowed from God; secondly, that they might learn moderation; thirdly, that they might not think too highly of themselves. For this cause while He permitted them to fall into many unlooked for evils, He relaxed the rigour of the former law, lest it should become grievous and intolerable.

BEDE. For He does not train His disciples in the same rule of life, in time of persecution, as in the time of peace. When He sent them to preach, He ordered them to take nothing in the way, ordaining in truth, that He who preaches the Gospel should live by the Gospel. But when the crisis of death was at hand, and the whole nation persecuted both the shepherd and the flock, He proposes a law adapted to the time, allowing them to take the necessaries of life, until the rage of the persecutors was abated, and the time of preaching the Gospel had returned. Herein He leaves us also an example, that at times when a just reason urges, we may intermit without blame somewhat of the strictness of our determination.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. lib. xxii. c. 77.) By no inconsistency then of Him who commands, but by the reason of the dispensation, according to the diversity of times are commandments, counsels, or permissions changed.

AMBROSE. But He who forbids to strike, why does He order them to buy a sword? unless perchance that there may be a defence prepared, but no necessary retaliation; a seeming ability to be revenged, without the will. Hence it follows, And he who has not, (that is, a purse,) let him sell his garment, and buy a sword.

CHRYSOSTOM. What is, this? He who said, If any one strike you on the right cheek, turn unto him the other also, (Matt. 5:39.) now arms His disciples, and with a sword only. For if it were fitting to be completely armed, not only must a man possess a sword, but shield and helmet. But even though a thousand had arms of this kind, how could the eleven be prepared for all the attacks and lying in wait of people, tyrants, allies, and nations, and how should they not quake at the mere sight of armed men, who had been brought up near lakes and rivers? We must not then suppose that He ordered them to possess swords, but by the swords He points at the secret attack of the Jews. And hence it follows, For I say unto you, that this that is written must be accomplished in me: And he was numbered with the transgressors. (Isa. 53:12.)

THEOPHYLACT. While they were contending among themselves above concerning priority, He saith, It is not a time of dignities, but rather of danger and slaughter. Behold I even your Master am led to a disgraceful death, to be reckoned with the transgressors. For these things which are prophesied of Me have an end, that is, a fulfilment. Wishing then to hint at a violent attack, He made mention of a sword, not altogether revealing it, lest they should be seized with dismay, nor did He entirely provide that they should not be shaken by these sudden attacks, but that afterwards recovering, they might marvel how He gave Himself up to the Passion, a ransom for the salvation of men.

BASIL. (Reg. Brev. int. 31.) Or the Lord does not bid them carry purse and scrip and buy a sword, but predicts that it should come to pass, that in truth the Apostles, forgetful of the time of the Passion, of the gifts and law of their Lord, would dare to take up the sword. For often does the Scripture make use of the imperative form of speech in the place of prophecy. Still in many books we do not find, Let him take, or buy, but, he will take, he will buy.

THEOPHYLACT. Or He hereby foretels to them that they would incur hunger and thirst, which He implies by the scrip, and sundry kinds of misery, which he intends by the sword.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Or else; When our Lord says, He who hath a purse, let him take it, likewise a scrip, His discourse He addressed to His disciples, but in reality He regards every individual Jew; as if He says, If any Jew is rich in resources, let him collect them together and fly. But if any one oppressed with extreme poverty applies himself to religion, let him also sell his cloak and buy a sword. For the terrible attack of battle shall overtake them, so that nothing shall suffice to resist it. He next lays open the cause of these evils, namely, that He suffered the penalty due to the wicked, being crucified with thieves. And when it shall have come at last to this, the word of dispensation will receive its end. But to the persecutors shall happen all that has been foretold by the Prophets. These things then God prophesied concerning what should befall the country of the Jews, but the disciples understood not the depth of His words, thinking they had need of swords against the coming attack of the traitor. Whence it follows; But they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords.

CHRYSOSTOM. And in truth, if He wished them to use human aid, not a hundred swords would have sufficed; but if He willed not the assistance of man, even two are superfluous.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord then was unwilling to blame them as not understanding Him, but saying, It is enough, He dismissed them; as when we are addressing any one, and see that he does not understand what is said, we say, Well, let us leave him, lest we trouble him. But some say, that our Lord said, It is enough, ironically; as if He said, Since there are two swords, they will amply suffice against so large a multitude as is about to attack us.

BEDE. Or the two swords suffice for a testimony that Jesus suffered voluntarily. The one indeed was to teach the Apostles the presumption of their contending for their Lord, and His inherent virtue of healing; the other never taken out of its sheath, to shew that they were not even permitted to do all that they could for His defence.

AMBROSE. Or, because the law does not forbid to return a blow, perhaps He says to Peter, as he is offering the two swords, It is enough, as though it were lawful until the Gospel; in order that there may be in the law, the knowledge of justice; in the Gospel, perfection of goodness. There is also a spiritual sword, that you may sell your patrimony, and buy the word, by which the nakedness of the soul is clothed. There is also a sword of suffering, so that you may strip your body, and with the spoils of your sacrificed flesh purchase for yourself the sacred crown of martyrdom. Again it moves, seeing that the disciples put forward two swords, whether perhaps one is not of the Old Testament, the other of the New, whereby we are armed against the wiles of the devil. Therefore the Lord says, It is enough, because he wanted nothing who is fortified by the teaching of both Testaments.

22:39–42

39. And he came out, and went, as he was wont, to the mount of Olives; and his disciples also followed him.

40. And when he was at the place, he said unto them, Pray that ye enter not into temptation.

41. And he was withdrawn from them about a stone’s cast, and kneeled down, and prayed,

42. Saying, Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me: nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done.

BEDE. As He was to be betrayed by His disciple, our Lord goes to the place of His wonted retirement, where He might most easily be found; as it follows, And he came out, and went, as he was want, to the mount of Olives.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. By day He was in Jerusalem, but when the darkness of night came on He held converse with His disciples on the mount of Olives; as it is added, And his disciples followed.

BEDE. Rightly does He lead the disciples, about to be instructed in the mysteries of His Body, to the mount of Olives, that He might signify that all who arc baptized in His death should be comforted with the anointing of the Holy Spirit.

THEOPHYLACT. Now after supper our Lord betakes Himself not to idleness or sleep, but to prayer and teaching. Hence it follows, And when he was at the place, he said unto them, Pray, &c.

BEDE. It is indeed impossible for the soul of man not to be tempted. Therefore he says not, Pray that ye be not tempted, but, Pray that ye enter not into temptation, that is, that the temptation do not at last overcome you.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. But not to do good by words only, He went forward a little and prayed; as it follows, And he was withdrawn from them about a stone’s cast. You will every where find Him praying apart, to teach you that with a devout mind and quiet heart we should speak with the most high God. He did not betake Himself to prayer, as if He was in want of another’s help, who is the Almighty power of the Father, but that we may learn not to slumber in temptation, but rather to be instant in prayer.

BEDE. He also alone prays for all, who was to suffer alone for all, signifying that His prayer is as far distant from ours as His Passion.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Evang. lib. ii. qu. 50.) He was torn from them about a stone’s cast, as though He would typically remind them that to Him they should point the stone, that is, up to Him bring the intention of the law which was written on stone.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. But what meaneth His bending of knees? of which it is said, And he kneeled down, and prayed. It is the way of men to pray to their superiors with their faces on the ground, testifying by the action that the greater of the two are those who are asked. Now it is plain that human nature contains nothing worthy of God's imitation. Accordingly the tokens of respect which we evince to one another, confessing ourselves to be inferior to our neighbours, we have transferred to the humiliation of the Incomparable Nature. And thus He who bore our sicknesses and interceded for us, bent His knee in prayer, by reason of the man which He assumed, giving us an example, that we ought not to exalt ourselves at the time of prayer, but in all things be conformed to humility; for God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble. (James 4:6, 1 Pet. 5:5.)

CHRYSOSTOM. Now every art is set forth by the words and works of him who teacheth it. Because then our Lord had come to teach no ordinary virtue, therefore He speaks and does the same things. And so having in words commanded to pray, lest they enter into temptation, He does the same likewise in work, saying, Father, if thou be willing, remove this cup from me. He saith not the words, If thou wilt, as if ignorant whether it was pleasing to the Father. For such knowledge was not more difficult than the knowledge of His Father's substance, which He alone clearly knew, according to John, As the Father knoweth me, even so have I known the Father. (John 10:15.) Nor says He this, as refusing His Passion. For He who rebuked a disciple, who wished to prevent His Passion, (Matt. 16:23.) so as even after many commendations, to call him Satan, how should He be unwilling to be crucified? Consider then why it was so said. How great a thing was it to hear that the unspeakable God, who passes all understanding, was content to enter the virgin's womb, to suck her milk, and to undergo every thing human. Since then that was almost incredible which was about to happen, He sent first indeed Prophets to announce it, afterwards He Himself comes clothed in the flesh, so that you could not suppose Him to be a phantom. He permits His flesh to endure all natural infirmities, to hunger, to thirst, to sleep, to labour, to be afflicted, to be tormented; on this account likewise He refuses not death, that He might manifest thereby His true humanity.

AMBROSE. He says then, If thou wilt, remove this cup from me, as man refusing death, as God maintaining His own decree.

BEDE. Or He begs the cup to be removed from Him, not indeed from fear of suffering, but from His compassion for the first people, lest they should have to drink the cup first drunk by Him. Therefore He says expressly, not, Remove from Me the cup, but this cup, that is, the cup of the

Jewish people, who can have no excuse for their ignorance in slaying Me, having the Law and the Prophets daily prophesying of Me.

DIONYSIUS OF ALEXANDRIA. (Dion. de Martyr. c. 7.) Or when He says, Let this cup pass from me, it is not, let it not come to Me, for unless it had come it could not pass away. It was therefore when He perceived it already present that He began to be afflicted and sorrowful, and as it was close at hand, He says, Let this cup pass; for as that which has passed can neither be said not to have come nor yet to remain, so also the Saviour asks first that the temptation slightly assailing Him may pass away. And this is the not entering into temptation which He counsels to pray for. But the most perfect way of avoiding temptation is manifested, when he says, Nevertheless, not my will, but thine be done. For God is not a tempter to evil, but lie wishes to grant us good things above what we either desire or understand. Therefore He seeks that the perfect will of His Father which He Himself had known, should dispose of the event, which is the same will as His own, as respects the Divine nature. But He shrinks to fulfil the human will, which He calls His own, and which is inferior to His Father’s will.

ATHANASIUS. (de Incarn. et cont. Ar.) For here He manifests a double will. One indeed human, which is of the flesh, the other divine. For our human nature, because of the weakness of the flesh, refuses the Passion, but His divine will eagerly embraced it, for that it was not possible that He should be holden of death.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (non occ.) Now Apollinaris asserts that Christ had not His own will according to His earthly nature, but that in Christ exists only the will of God who descends from heaven. Let him then say what will is it which God would have by no means to be fulfilled? And the Divine nature does not remove His own will.

BEDE. When He drew near His Passion, the Saviour also took upon Him the words of weak man; as when something threatens us which we do not wish to come to pass, we then through weakness seek that it may not be, to the end that we also may be prepared by fortitude to find the will of our Creator contrary to our own will.

22:43–46

43. And there appeared an angel unto him from heaven, strengthening him.

44. And being in an agony he prayed more earnestly: and his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground.

45. And when he rose up from prayer, and was come to his disciples, he found them sleeping for sorrow.

46. And said unto them, Why sleep ye? rise and pray, lest ye enter into temptation.

THEOPHYLACT. To make known unto us the power of prayer that we may exercise it in adversity, our Lord when praying is comforted by an Angel. (Matt. 4:11.)

BEDE. In another place we read that Angels came and ministered unto Him. In testimony then of each nature, Angels are said both to have ministered to Him and comforted Him. For the Creator needed not the protection of His creature, but being made man as for our sakes He is sad, so for our sakes He is comforted.

THEOPHYLACT. But some say that the Angel appeared, glorifying Him, saying, O Lord, Thine is the power, for Thou art able to vanquish death, and to deliver weak mankind.

CHRYSOSTOM. And because not in appearance but in reality He took upon Himself our flesh, in order to confirm the truth of the dispensation He submits to bear human suffering; for it follows, And being in an agony he prayed more earnestly.

AMBROSE. Many are shocked at this place who turn the sorrows of the Saviour to an argument of inherent weakness from the beginning, rather than taken upon Him for the time. But I am so far from considering it a thing to be excused, that I never more admire His mercy and majesty; for He would have conferred less upon me had He not taken upon Him my feelings. For He took upon Him my sorrow, that upon me He might bestow His joy. With confidence therefore I name His sadness, because I preach His cross. He must needs then have undergone affliction, that He might conquer. For they have no praise of fortitude whose wounds have produced stupor rather than pain. He wished therefore to instruct us how we should conquer death, and what is far greater, the anguish of coming death. Thou smartedst then, O Lord, not from thy own but my wounds; for he was wounded for our transgressions. And perhaps He is sad, because that after Adam’s fall the passage by which we must depart from this world was such that death was necessary. Nor is it far from the truth that He was sad for His persecutors, who He knew would suffer punishment for their wicked sacrilege.

GREGORY. (Mor. 24. c. 17.) He has expressed also the conflict of our mind in itself, as death approaches, for we suffer a certain thrill of terror and dread, when by the dissolution of the flesh we draw near to the eternal judgment; and with good reason, for the soul finds in a moment that which can never be changed.

THEOPHYLACT. Now that the preceding prayer was of His human nature, not His divine, as the Arians say, is argued from what is said of His sweat, which follows, And his sweat was as it were great drops of blood falling down to the ground.

BEDE. Let no one ascribe this sweat to natural weakness, nay, it is contrary to nature to sweat blood, but rather let him derive therefrom a declaration to us, that He was now obtaining the accomplishment of His prayer, namely, that He might purge by His blood the faith of His disciples, still convicted of human frailty.

AUGUSTINE. (Prosp. ex Aug. Sent. 68.) Our Lord praying with a bloody sweat represented the martyrdoms which should flow from His whole body, which is the Church.

THEOPHYLACT. Or this is proverbially said of one who has sweated intensely, that He sweated blood; the Evangelist then wishing to shew that He was moistened with large drops of sweat, takes drops of blood for an example. But afterwards finding His disciples asleep for sorrow, He upbraids them, at the same time reminding them to pray; for it follows, And when he rose from prayer and was come to his disciples, he found them sleeping.

CHRYSOSTOM. For it was midnight, and the disciples’ eyes were heavy from grief, and their sleep was not that of drowsiness but sorrow.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 4.) Now Luke has not stated after which prayer He came to His disciples, still in nothing does he disagree with Matthew and Mark.

BEDE. Our Lord proves by what comes after, that He prayed for His disciples whom He exhorts by watching and prayer to be partakers of His prayer; for it follows, And he saith unto them, Why sleep ye? Rise and pray, lest ye enter into temptation.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, that they should not be overcome by temptation, for not to be led into temptation is not to be overwhelmed by it. Or He simply bids us pray that our life may be quiet, and we be not cast into trouble of any kind. For it is of the devil and presumptuous, for a man to throw himself into temptation. Therefore James said not, “Cast yourselves into temptation,” but, When ye are fallen, count it all joy, (Jam. 1:2.) making a voluntary act out of an involuntary.

22:47–53

47. And while he yet spake, behold a multitude, and he that was called Judas, one of the twelve, went before them, and drew near unto Jesus to kiss him.

48. But Jesus said unto him, Judas, betrayest thou the Son of man with a kiss?

49. When they which were about him saw what would follow, they said unto him, Lord, shall we smite with the sword?

50. And one of them smote the servant of the high priest, and cut off his right ear.

51. And Jesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus far. And he touched his ear, and healed him.

52. Then Jesus said unto the chief priests, and captains of the temple, and the elders, which were come to him, Be ye come out, as against a thief, with swords and staves?

53. When I was daily with you in the temple, ye stretched forth no hands against me: but this is your hour, and the power of darkness.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After first mentioning the prayer of Christ, St. Luke goes on to speak of His betrayal wherein He is betrayed by His disciple, saying, And while he yet spake, behold a multitude, and he that was called Judas.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. He says, he that was called Judas, holding his name as it were in abhorrence; but adds, one of the twelve, to signify the enormity of the traitor. For he who had been honoured as an apostle became the cause of the murder of Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. For just as incurable wounds yield neither to severe nor soothing remedies, so the soul when once it is taken captive, and has sold itself to any particular sin, will reap no benefit from admonition. And so it was with Judas, who desisted not from His betrayal, though deterred by Christ by every manner of warning. Hence it follows, And drew near unto Jesus to kiss him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Unmindful of the glory of Christ, he thought to be able to act secretly, daring to make an especial token of love the instrument of his treachery.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Conc. 1. de Laz.) Now we must not depart from admonishing our brethren, albeit nothing comes of our words. For even the streams though no one drink therefrom still flow on, and him whom thou hast not persuaded to-day, peradventure thou mayest to-morrow. For the fisherman after drawing empty nets the whole day, when it was now late takes a fish. And thus our Lord, though He knew that Judas was not to be converted, yet ceased not to do such things as had reference to him. It follows, But Jesus said unto him, Judas, betrayest thou the Son of man with a kiss?

AMBROSE. It must be used I think by way of question, as if he arrests the traitor with a lover’s affection.

CHRYSOSTOM. And He gives him his proper name, which was rather like one lamenting and recalling him, than one provoked to anger.

AMBROSE. He says, Betrayest thou with a kiss? that is, dost thou inflict a wound with the pledge of love? with the instruments of peace dost thou impose death? a slave, dost thou betray thy Lord; a disciple, thy master; one chosen, Him who chose thee?

CHRYSOSTOM. But He said not, “Betrayest thou thy Master, thy Lord, thy Benefactor,” but the Son of man, that is, the humble and meek, who though He were not thy Master and Lord, forasmuch as He has borne himself so gently toward thee, should have never been betrayed by thee.

AMBROSE. O great manifestation of Divine power, great discipline of virtue! Both the design of thy traitor is detected, and yet forbearance is not withheld. He shews whom it is Judas betrays, by manifesting things hidden; He declares whom he delivers up, by saying, the Son of man, for the human flesh, not the Divine nature, is seized. That however which most confounds the ungrateful, is the thought that he had delivered up Him, who though He was the Son of God, yet for our sakes wished to be the Son of man; as if He said, “For thee did I undertake, O ungrateful man, that which thou betrayest in hypocrisy.

AUGUSTINE. The Lord when He was betrayed first said this which Luke mentions, Betrayest thou the Son of man with a kiss? next, what Matthew says, Friend, wherefore art thou come? and lastly, what John records, Whom seek ye?

AMBROSE. Our Lord kissed him, not that He would teach us to dissemble, but both that He might not seem to shrink from the traitor, and that He might the more move him by not denying him the offices of love.

THEOPHYLACT. The disciples are inflamed with zeal, and unsheath their swords. But whence have they swords? Because they had slain the lamb, and had departed from the feast. Now the other disciples ask whether they should strike; but Peter, always fervent in defence of his Master, waits not for permission, but straightway strikes the servant of the High Priest; as it follows, And one of them smote, &c.

AUGUSTINE. He who struck, according to John, was Peter, but he whom he struck was called Malchus.

AMBROSE. For Peter being well versed in the law, and full of ardent affection, knowing that it was counted righteousness in Phineas that he had killed the sacrilegious persons, struck the High Priest’s servant.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 5.) Now Luke says, But Jesus answered and said, Suffer ye thus far; which is what Matthew records, Put thy sword up into its sheath. Nor will it move you as contrary thereto, that Luke says here that our Lord answered, Suffer ye thus far, as if He had so spoken after the blow to shew that what was done had pleased Him so far, but He did not wish it to proceed farther, seeing that in these words which Matthew has given, it may rather be implied that the whole circumstance in which Peter used the sword was displeasing to our Lord. For the truth is, that upon their asking, Lord, shall we strike with the sword? He then answered, Suffer ye thus far, that is, be not troubled with what is about to happen. They must be permitted to advance so far, that is, to take Me, and so to fulfil the things which were written of Me. For he would not say, And Jesus answering, unless He answered this question, not Peter’s deed. But between the delay of their words of question to our Lord and His answer, Peter in the eagerness of defence struck the blow. And two things cannot be said, though one may be said and another may be done, at the same time.

Then, as Luke says, He healed him who was struck, as it follows, And he touched his ear, and healed him.

BEDE. For the Lord is never forgetful of His lovingkindness. While they are bringing death upon the righteous, He heals the wounds of His persecutors.

AMBROSE. The Lord in wiping away the bloody wounds, conveyed thereby a divine mystery, namely, that the servant of the prince of this world, not by the condition of His nature but by guilt, should receive a wound on the ear, for that he had not heard the words of wisdom. Or, by Peter so willingly striking the ear, he taught that he ought not to have a ear outwardly, who had not one in a mystery. But why did Peter do this? Because he especially obtained the power of binding and loosing; therefore by his spiritual sword he takes away the interior ear of him who understandeth not. But the Lord Himself restores the hearing, shewing that even they, if they would turn, might be saved, who inflicted the wounds in our Lord’s Passion; for that all sin may be washed away in the mysteries of faith.

BEDE. Or that servant is the Jewish people sold by the High Priests to an unlawful obligation, who, by the Passion of our Lord, lost their right ear; that is, the spiritual understanding of the law. And this ear indeed is cut off by Peter’s sword, not that he takes away the sense of understanding from those that hear, but manifests it withdrawn by the judgment of God from the careless. But the same right ear in those who among the same people have believed, is restored by the Divine condescension to its former office.

It follows, Then said Jesus unto them, Are ye come out as against a thief with swords and slaves? &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. For they had come at night fearing an outbreak of the multitude, therefore He says, “What need was there of these arms against one who was always with you?” as it follows, When I was daily with you.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Whereby He does not blame the chiefs of the Jews that they had not sooner prepared their murderous designs against Him, but convicts them of having presumptuously supposed they had attacked Him against His will; as if He says, “Ye did not take Me then, because I willed it not, but neither could ye now, did I not of My own accord surrender Myself into your hands.” Hence it follows, But this is your hour, that is, a short time is permitted you to exercise your vengeance against Me, but the Father’s will agrees with Mine. He also says, that this power is given to darkness, i. e. the Devil and the Jews, of rising in rebellion against Christ. And then is added, And the power of darkness.

BEDE. As if He says, Therefore are ye assembled against Me in darkness, because your power, wherewith ye are thus armed against the light of the world, is in darkness. But it is asked, how Jesus is said to be addressing the chief priests, the officers of the temple, and the elders, who came to Him, whereas they are reported not to have gone of themselves, but to have sent their servants while they waited in the hall of Caiaphas? The answer then to this contradiction is, that they came not by themselves, but by those whom they sent to take Christ in the power of their command.

22:54–62

54. Then took they him, and led him, and brought him into the high priest’s house. And Peter followed affar off.

55. And when they had kindled a fire in the midst of the hall, and were set down together, Peter sat down among them.

56. But a certain maid beheld him as he sat by the fire, and earnestly looked upon him, and said, This man was also with him.

57. And he denied him, saying, Woman, I know him not.

58. And after a little while another saw him, and said, Thou art also of them. And Peter said, Man, I am not.

59. And about, the space of one hour after another confidently affirmed, saying, Of a truth this fellow also was with him: for he is a Galilæan.

60. And Peter said, Man, I know not what thou sayest. And immediately, while he yet spake, the cock crew.

61. And the Lord turned, and looked upon Peter. And Peter remembered the word of the Lord, how he had said unto him, Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice.

62. And Peter went out, and wept bitterly.

AMBROSE. The wretched men understood not the mystery, nor had reverence unto an outpouring of compassion so merciful, that even His enemies He suffered not to be wounded. For it is said, Then look they him, &c. When we read of Jesus being holden, let us guard against thinking that He is holden with respect to His divine nature, and unwilling through weakness, for He is held captive and bound according to the truth of His bodily nature.

BEDE. Now the Chief Priest means Caiaphas, who according to John was High Priest that year.

AUGUSTINE. But first He was led to Annas, the father-in-law of Caiaphas, as John says, then to Caiaphas, as Matthew says, but Mark and Luke do not give the name of the High Priest.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 83. in Matt.) It is therefore said, to the house of the High Priest, that nothing whatever might be done without the consent of the chief of the Priests. For thither had they all assembled waiting for Christ. Now the great zeal of Peter is manifested in his not flying when he saw all the others doing so; for it follows, But Peter followed afar off.

AMBROSE. Rightly he followed afar off, soon about to deny, for he could never have denied if he had clung close to Christ. But herein must he be revered, that he forsook not our Lord, even though he was afraid. Fear is the effect of nature, solicitude of tender affection.

BEDE. But that when our Lord was going to His Passion, Peter followed afar off represents the Church about to follow indeed, that is, to imitate our Lord’s Passion, but in a far different manner, for the Church suffers for herself, our Lord suffered for the Church.

AMBROSE. And by this time there was a fire burning in the house of the High Priest; as it follows, And when they had kindled a fire, &c. Peter came to warm himself, because his Lord being taken prisoner, the heart of his soul had been chilled in him.

PSEUDO-AUGUSTINE. (App. Serm. 79.) For to Peter were delivered the keys of the kingdom of heaven, to him were entrusted an innumerable multitude of people, who were wrapped up in sin. But Peter was somewhat too vehement, as the cutting off the car of the High Priest’s servant betokens. If he then who was so stern and so severe had obtained the gift of not sinning, what pardon would he have given to the people committed to him? Therefore Divine Providence suffers him first to be holden of sin, that by the consciousness of his own fall he might soften his too harsh judgment towards sinners. When he wished to warm himself at the fire, a maid came to him, of whom it follows, But a certain maid beheld him, &c.

AMBROSE. What meaneth it, that a maid is the first to betray Peter, whereas surely men ought the more easily to have recognised him, save that

that sex should be plainly implicated in our Lord’s murder, in order that it might also be redeemed by His Passion? But Peter when discovered denies, for better that Peter should have denied, than our Lord’s word should have failed. Hence it follows, And he denied, saying, Woman, I know him not.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) What ails thee, Peter, thy voice is suddenly changed? That mouth full of faith and love, is turned to hatred and unbelief. Not yet awhile is the scourge applied, not yet the instruments of torture. Thy interrogator is no one of authority, who might cause alarm to the confessor. The mere voice of a woman asks the question, and she perhaps not about to divulge thy confession, nor yet a woman, but a door-keeper, a mean slave.

AMBROSE. Peter denied, because he promised rashly. He does not deny on the mount, nor in the temple, nor in his own house, but in the judgment-hall of the Jews. There he denies where Jesus was bound, where truth is not. And denying Him he says, I know him not. It were presumptuous to say that he knew Him whom the human mind can not grasp. For no one knoweth the Son but the Father. (Matt. 11:17). Again, a second time he denies Christ; for it follows, And after a little while another saw him, and said, Thou wert also one of them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 6.) And it is supposed that in the second denial he was addressed by two persons, namely, by the maid whom Matthew and Mark mention, and by another whom Luke speaks of. With respect then to what Luke here relates, And after a little while, &c. Peter had already gone out of the gate, and the cock had crowed the first time, as Mark says; and now he had returned, that, as John says, he might again deny standing by the fire. Of which denial it follows, And Peter said, Man, I am not.

AMBROSE. For he preferred to deny himself rather than Christ, or because he seemed to deny being of the company of Christ, he truly denied himself.

BEDE. In this denial then of Peter we affirm that not only is Christ denied by him who says that He is not Christ, but by him also, who, being a Christian, says he is not.

AMBROSE. He is also asked a third time; for it follows, And about the space of one hour after, another confidently affirmed, saying, Of a truth this fellow also was with him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ut sup.) What Matthew and Mark call after a little while, Luke explains by saying, about the space of one hour after; but with regard to the space of time, John says nothing. Likewise when Matthew and Mark record not in the singular but in the plural number those who conversed with Peter, while Luke and John speak of one, we may easily suppose either that Matthew and Mark used the plural for the singular by a common form of speech, or that one person in particular addressed Peter, as being the one who had seen him, and that others trusting to his credit joined in pressing him. But now as to the words which Matthew asserts were said to Peter himself, Truly thou art one of them, for thy speech bewrayeth thee; as also those which to the same Peter John declared to have been said, Did not I see thee in the garden? whereas Mark and Luke state that they spoke to one another concerning Peter; we either believe that they held the right opinion who say that they were really addressed to Peter; (for what was said concerning him in his presence amounts to the same as if it had been said to him;) or that they were said in both ways, and that some of the Evangelists related them one way, some the other.

BEDE. But he adds, For he is a Galilæan; not that the Galilæans spoke a different language from the inhabitants of Jerusalem, who indeed were Hebrews, but that each separate province and country having its own peculiarities could not avoid a vernacular tone of speech. It follows, And Peter said, Man, I know not what thou sayest.

AMBROSE. That is, I know not your blasphemies. But we make excuse for him. He did not excuse himself. For an involved answer is not sufficient for our confessing Jesus, but an open confession is required. And therefore Peter is not represented to have answered this deliberately, for he afterwards recollected himself, and wept.

BEDE. Holy Scripture is often wont to mark the character of certain events by the nature of the times in which they take place. Hence Peter who sinned at midnight repented at cock-crow; for it follows, And immediately, while he yet spake, the cock crew. The error he committed in the darkness of forgetfulness, he corrected by the remembrance of the true light.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) The cock-crow we understand to have been after the third denial of Peter, as Mark has expressed it.

BEDE. This cock must, I think, be understood mystically as some great Teacher, who rouses the listless and sleepy, saying, Awake, ye righteous, and sin not.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 83. in Joan.) Marvel now at the case of the Master, who though He was a prisoner, had exercised much forethought for His disciple, whom by a look He brought to Himself, and provoked to tears; for it follows, And the Lord turned, and looked upon Peter.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) How we should understand this, requires some careful consideration; for Matthew says, Peter was sitting without in the hall, which he would not have said unless the transaction relating to our Lord were passing within. Likewise also, where Mark said, And as Peter was beneath in the hall, he shews that the things he had been speaking of took place not only within but in the upper part. How then did our Lord look upon Peter? not with His bodily face, since Peter was without in the hall among those who were warming themselves, while these things were going on in the inner part of the house. Wherefore, that looking upon Peter seems to me to have been done in a divine manner. And as it was said, Look thou, and hear me, (Ps. 13:3.) and, Turn and deliver my soul, (Ps. 6:4.) so I think the expression here used, The Lord turned and looked upon Peter.

BEDE. For to look upon him is to have compassion, seeing that not only while penance is being practised, but that it may be practised, the mercy of God is necessary.

AMBROSE. Lastly, those whom Jesus looks upon weep for their sins. Hence it follows, And Peter remembered the word of the Lord, how he had said to him, Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice. And he went out, and wept bitterly. Why did he weep? Because he sinned as man. I read of his tears, I do not read of his confession. Tears wash away an offence which it is shame to confess in words. The first and second time he denied and wept not, for as yet our Lord had not looked upon him. He denied the third time, Jesus looked upon him, and he wept bitterly. So then if thou wilt obtain pardon, wash away thy guilt in tears.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now Peter did not dare to weep openly, lest he should be detected by his tears, but he went out and wept. Ho wept not because of punishment, but because he denied his beloved Lord, which was more galling than any punishment.

22:63–71

63. And the men that held Jesus mocked him, and smote him.

64. And when they had blindfolded him, they struck him on the face, and asked him, saying, Prophesy, who is it that smote thee?

65. And many other things blasphemously spake they against him.

66. And as soon as it was day, the elders of the people and the chief priests and the scribes came together, and led him into their council, saying,

67. Art thou the Christ? tell us. And he said unto them, If I tell you, ye will not believe:

68. And if I also ask you, ye will not answer me, nor let me go.

69. Hereafter shall the Son of man sit on the right hand of the power of God.

70. Then said they all, Art thou then the Son of God? And he said unto them, Ye say that I am.

71. And they said, What need we any further witness? for we ourselves have heard of his own mouth.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 7.) The temptation of Peter which took place between the mockings of our Lord is not related by all the Evangelists in the same order. For Matthew and Mark first mention those, then Peter's temptation; but Luke has first described the temptations of Peter, then the mockings of our Lord, saying, And the men that held Jesus mocked him, &c.

CHRYSOSTOM. Jesus, the Lord of heaven and earth, sustains and suffers the mockings of the ungodly, giving us an example of patience.

THEOPHYLACT. Likewise the Lord of prophets is derided as a false prophet. It follows, And they blindfolded him. This they did as a dishonour to Him who wished to be accounted by the people as a prophet. But He who was struck with the blows of the Jews, is struck also now by the blasphemies of false Christians. And they blindfolded Him, not that He should not see their wickedness, but that they might hide His face from them. But heretics, and Jews, and wicked Catholics, provoke Him with their vile actions, as it were mocking Him, saying, Who smote thee? while they flatter themselves that their evil thoughts and works of darkness are not known by Him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ut sup.) Now our Lord is supposed to have suffered these things until morning in the house of the High Priest, to which He was first led. Hence it follows, And as soon as it was day, the elders of the people and the chief priests and the scribes came together, and led him into their council, saying, Art thou the Christ? &c.

BEDE. They wished not for truth, but were contriving calumny. Because they expected that Christ would come only as man, of the root of David, they sought this of Him, that if He should say, “I am the Christ,” they might falsely accuse Him of claiming to Himself the kingly power.

THEOPHYLACT. He knew the secrets of their hearts, that they who had not believed His works would much less believe His words. Hence it follows, And he said unto them, If I tell you, ye will not believe, &c.

BEDE. For He had often declared Himself to be the Christ; as when he said, l and my Father are one, (John 10:30.) and other such like things. And if I also ask you, ye will not answer me. For He had asked them how they said Christ was the Son of David, whereas David in the Spirit called Him his Lord. But they wished neither to believe His words nor to answer His questions. However, because they sought to accuse falsely the seed of David, they hear something still farther; as it follows, Hereafter shall the Son of man sit on the right hand of the power of God.

THEOPHYLACT. As if he said, There is no time left to you any longer for discourses and teaching, but hereafter shall be the time of judgment, when ye shall see Me, the Son of man, sitting on the right hand of the power of God.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Whenever sitting and a throne are spoken of God, His kingly and supreme majesty is signified. For we do not imagine any judgment-seat to be placed, on which we believe the Lord of all takes His seat; nor again, that in any wise right hand or left hand appertain to the Divine nature; for figure, and place, and sitting, are the properties of bodies. But how shall the Son be seen to be of equal honour and to sit together on the same throne, if He is not the Son according to nature, having in Himself the natural property of the Father?

THEOPHYLACT. When then they heard this, they ought to have been afraid, but after these words they are the more frantic; as it follows, All said, &c.

BEDE. They understood that He called Himself the Son of God in these words, The Son of man shall sit on the right hand of the power of God.

AMBROSE. The Lord had rather prove Himself a King than call Himself one, that they might have no excuse for condemning Him, when they confess the truth of that which they lay against Him. It follows, And he said, Ye say that I am.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When Christ spoke this, the company of the Pharisees were very wroth, uttering shameful words; as it follows, Then said they, What need we any further witness? &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Whereby it is manifest, that the disobedient reap no advantage, when the more secret mysteries are revealed to them, but rather incur the heavier punishment. Wherefore such things ought to be concealed from them.

CHAPTER 23

23:1–5

1. And the whole multitude of them arose, and led him unto Pilate.

2. And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that he himself is Christ a King.

3. And Pilate asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews? And he answered him and said, Thou sayest it.

4. Then said Pilate to the chief priests and to the people, I find no fault in this man.

5. And they were the more fierce, saying, He stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Jewry, beginning from Galilee to this place.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 7.) Luke, after he had finished relating the denial of Peter, recapitulated all that took place concerning our Lord during the morning, mentioning some particulars which the others omitted; and so he has composed his narrative, giving a similar account with the rest, when he says, And the whole multitude of them arose, and led him to Pilate, &c.

BEDE. That the word of Jesus might be fulfilled which He prophesied of His own death, He shall be delivered to the Gentiles, that is, to the Romans. For Pilate was a Roman, and the Romans had sent him as governor to Judæa.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. iii. c. 8.) He next relates what happens before Pilate, as follows, And they began to accuse him, saying, We found this fellow perverting our nation, &c. Matthew and Mark do not give this, though affirming that they accused Him, but Luke has laid open the very charges which they falsely brought against Him.

THEOPHYLACT. Most plainly are they opposed to the truth. For our Lord was so far from forbidding to give tribute, that He commanded it to be given. How then did He pervert the people? Was it that He might take possession of the kingdom? But this is incredible to all, for when the whole multitude wished to choose Him for their king, He was aware of it, and fled.

BEDE. Now two charges having been brought against our Lord, namely, that He forbade to pay tribute to Cæsar, and called Himself Christ the King, it may be that Pilate had chanced to hear that which our Lord spake, Render unto Cæsar the things which be Cæsar’s; and therefore setting aside this accusation as a palpable lie of the Jews, he thought fit to ask concerning that alone of which he knew nothing, the saying about the kingdom; for it follows, Pilate asked him, saying, Art thou the King of the Jews, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. It seems to me that he asked this question of Christ by way of deriding the wantonness or hypocrisy of the alleged charge. As if he said, Thou a poor humble naked man, with none to help Thee, art accused of seeking a kingdom, for which Thou wouldest need many to help Thee, and much money.

BEDE. He answers the governor in the same words which He used to the Chief Priests, that Pilate might be condemned by his own voice; for it follows, And he answering said, Thou sayest.

THEOPHYLACT. Now they finding nothing else to support their calumny, have resort to the aid of clamour, for it follows, And they were the more fierce, saying, He stirreth up the people, teaching throughout all Jewry, beginning from Galilee to this place. As if they said, He perverts the people, not in one part only, but beginning from Galilee He arrives at this place, having passed through Judæa. I think then that they purposely made mention of Galilee, as desirous to alarm Pilate, for the Galilæans were of a different sect and given to sedition, as, for example, Judas of Galilee who is mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles.

BEDE. But with these words they accuse not Him, but themselves. For to have taught the people, and by teaching to have roused them from their former idleness, and doing this to have passed through the whole land of promise, was an evidence not of sin, but of virtue.

AMBROSE. Our Lord is accused and is silent, for He needs no defence. Let them cast about for defence who fear to be conquered. He does not then confirm, the accusation by His silence, but He despises it by not refuting it. Why then should He fear who does not court safety? The Safety of all men forfeits His own, that He may gain that of all.

6. When Pilate heard of Galilee, he asked whether the man were a Galilæan.

7. And as soon as he knew that he belonged unto Herod’s jurisdiction, he sent him to Herod, who himself also was at Jerusalem at that time.

8. And when Herod saw Jesus, he was exceeding glad: for he was desirous to see him of a long season, because he had heard many things of him; and he hoped to have seen some miracle done by him.

9. Then he questioned with him in many words; but he answered him nothing.

10. And the chief priests and scribes stood and vehemently accused him.

11. And Herod with his men of war set him at nought, and mocked him, and arrayed him in a gorgeous robe, and sent him again to Pilate.

12. And the same day Pilate and Herod were made friends together: for before they were at enmity between themselves.

BEDE. Pilate having determined not to question our Lord concerning the above-mentioned accusation, is the rather glad now that an opportunity offers to escape from passing judgment upon Him. Hence it is said, When Pilate heard of Galilee, he asked whether the man were a Galilæan. And lest he should be compelled to pass sentence against one whom he knew to be innocent, and delivered for envy, sends Him to be heard by Herod, preferring that he who was the Tetrarch of our Lord’s country might be the person either to acquit or punish Him; for it follows, And as soon as he knew that he belonged to Herod’s jurisdiction.

THEOPHYLACT. Wherein he follows the Roman law, which provided that every man should be judged by the governor of his own jurisdiction.

GREGORY. (Mor. 10. c. 31.) Now Herod wished to make proof of Christ’s fame, desiring to witness His miracles; for it follows, And when Herod saw Jesus, he was glad, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Not as though he was about to gain any benefit from the sight, but seized with curiosity he thought he should see that extraordinary man, of whose wisdom and wonderful works he had heard so much. He also wished to hear from His mouth what He could say. Accordingly he asks Him questions, making a sport of Him, and ridiculing Him. But Jesus, who performed all things prudently, and who, as David testifies, ordereth His words with discretion, (Ps. 112:5.) thought it right in such a case to be silent. For a word uttered to one whom it profiteth nothing becomes the cause of his condemnation. Therefore it follows, But he answered him nothing.

AMBROSE. He was silent and did nothing, for Herod's unbelief deserved not to see Him, and the Lord shunned display. And perhaps typically in Herod are represented all the ungodly, who if they have not believed the Law and the Prophets, cannot see Christ's wonderful works in the Gospel.

GREGORY. (Mor. 22. c. 16.) From these words we ought to derive a lesson, that whenever our hearers wish as if by praising us to gain knowledge from us, but not to change their own wicked course, we must be altogether silent, lest if from love of ostentation we speak God's word, both they who were guilty cease not to be so, and we who were not become so. And there are many things which betray the motive of a hearer, but one in particular, when they always praise what they hear, yet never follow what they praise.

GREGORY. (Mor. 10. c. 31.) The Redeemer therefore though questioned held His peace, though expected disdained to work miracles. And keeping Himself secretly within Himself, left those who were satisfied to seek for outward things, to remain thankless without, preferring to be openly set at nought by the proud, than be praised by the hollow voices of unbelievers. Hence it follows, And the chief priests and scribes stood and vehemently accused him. And Herod with his men of war set him at nought, and mocked him, and arrayed him in a white robe.

AMBROSE. It is not without reason that He is arrayed by Herod in a white robe, as bearing a sign of His immaculate Passion, that the Lamb of God without spot would take upon Himself the sins of the world.

THEOPHYLACT. Nevertheless, observe how the Devil is thwarted by the thing which He does. He heaps up scorn and reproaches against Christ, whereby it is made manifest that the Lord is not seditious. Otherwise He would not have been derided, when so great a danger was afloat, and that too from a people who were held in suspicion, and so given to change. But the sending of Christ by Pilate to Herod, becomes the commencement of a mutual friendship, Pilate not receiving those who were subject to Herod's authority, as it is added, And they were made friends, &c. Observe the Devil every where uniting together things separate, that he may compass the death of Christ. Let us blush then, if for the sake of our salvation we keep not even our friends in union with us.

AMBROSE. Under the type also of Herod and Pilate, who from enemies were made friends by Jesus Christ, is preserved the figure of the people of Israel and the Gentile nation; that through our Lord's Passion should come to pass the future concord of both, yet so that the people of the Gentiles should receive the word of God first, and then transmit it by the devotion of their faith to the Jewish people; that they too may with the glory of their majesty clothe the body of Christ, which before they had despised.

BEDE. Or this alliance between Herod and Pilate signifies that the Gentiles and Jews, though differing in race, religion, and character, agree together in persecuting Christians.

23:13–25

13. And Pilate, when he had called together the chief priests and the rulers and the people,

14. Said unto them, Ye have brought this man unto me, as one that perverteth the people: and, behold, I, having examined him before you, have found no fault in this man touching those things whereof ye accuse him:

15. No, nor yet Herod: for I sent you to him; and, lo, nothing worthy of death is done unto him.

16. I will therefore chastise him, and release him.

17. (For of necessity he must release one unto them at the feast.)

18. And they cried out all at once, saying, Away with this man, and release unto us Barabbas:

19. (Who for a certain sedition made in the city, and for murder, was cast into prison.)

20. Pilate therefore, willing to release Jesus, spake again to them.

21. But they cried, saying, Crucify him, crucify him.

22. And he said unto them the third time, Why, what evil hath he done? I have found no cause of death in him: I will therefore chastise him, and let him go.

23. And they were instant with loud voices, requiring that he might be crucified. And the voices of them and of the chief priests prevailed.

24. And Pilate gave sentence that it should be as they required.

25. And he released unto them him that for sedition and murder was east into prison, whom they had desired; but he delivered Jesus to their will.

AUGUSTINE. Luke returns to those things which were going on before the governor, from which He had digressed in order to relate what took place with Herod; saying as follows, And Pilate, when he had called, &c. from which we infer, that he has omitted the part wherein Pilate questioned our Lord what He had to answer to His accusers.

AMBROSE. Here Pilate, who as a judge acquits Christ, is made the minister of His crucifixion. He is sent to Herod, sent back to Pilate, as it follows, Nor yet Herod, for I sent you to him, and behold nothing worthy of death is done unto him. They both refuse to pronounce Him guilty, yet for fear's sake, Pilate gratifies the cruel desires of the Jews.

THEOPHYLACT. Wherefore by the testimony of two men, Jesus is declared innocent, but the Jews His accusers brought forward no witness whom they could believe. See then how truth triumphs. Jesus is silent, and His enemies witness for Him; the Jews make loud cries, and not one of them corroborates their clamour.

BEDE. Perish then those writings, which, composed so long a time after Christ, convict not the accused of magical arts against Pilate, but the writers themselves of treachery and lying against Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. Pilate therefore lenient and easy, yet wanting in firmness for the truth, because afraid of being accused, adds, I will therefore chastise him and release him.

BEDE. As if he said, I will subject Him to all the scourgings and mockings you desire, but do not thirst after the innocent blood. It follows, For of necessity he must release one unto them, &c. an obligation not imposed by a decree of the imperial law, but binding by the annual custom of the nation, whom in such things he was glad to please.

THEOPHYLACT. For the Romans permitted the Jews to live according to their own laws and customs. And it was a natural custom of the Jews to seek pardon of the prince for those who were condemned, as they asked Jonathan of Saul. And hence it is now added, with respect to their petition, And they cried all at once, Away with this man, and release unto us Barabbas, &c. (1 Sam. 14:45.)

AMBROSE. Not unreasonably do they seek the pardon of a murderer, who were themselves demanding the death of the innocent. Such are the laws of iniquity, that what innocence hates, guilt loves. And here the interpretation of the name affords a figurative resemblance, for Barabbas is in Latin, the son of a father. Those then to whom it is said, Ye are of your father the Devil, are represented as about to prefer to the true Son of God the son of their father, that is, Antichrist.

BEDE. Even to this day their request still clings to the Jews. For since when they had the choice given to them, they chose a robber for Jesus, a murderer for a Saviour; rightly lost they both life and salvation, and became subject to such robberies and seditions among themselves as to forfeit both their country and kingdom.

THEOPHYLACT. Thus it came to pass, the once holy nation rages to slay, the Gentile Pilate forbids slaughter; as it follows, Pilate therefore spoke again unto them, but they cried out, Crucify, &c.

BEDE. With the worst kind of death, that is, crucifixion, they long to murder the innocent. For they who hung on the cross, with their hands and feet fixed by nails to the wood, suffered a prolonged death, that their agony might not quickly cease; but the death of the cross was chosen by our Lord, as that which having overcome the Devil, He was about to place as a trophy on the brows of the faithful.

THEOPHYLACT. Three times did Pilate acquit Christ, for it follows, And he said unto them the third time, Why, what evil hath he done? I will chastise him, and let him go.

BEDE. This chastisement wherewith Pilate sought to satisfy the people, lest their rage should go even so far as to crucify Jesus, John’s words bear testimony that he not only threatened but performed together with mockings and scourgings. But when they saw all their charges which they brought against the Lord baffled by Pilate’s diligent questioning, they resort at last to prayers only; entreating that He might be crucified.

THEOPHYLACT. They cry out the third time against Christ, that by this third voice, they may approve the murder to be their own, which by their entreaties they extorted; for it follows, And Pilate gave sentence that it should be as they required. And he released him that for sedition and murder was cast into prison, but delivered Jesus to their will.

CHRYSOSTOM. For they thought they could add this, namely, that Jesus was worse than a robber, and so wicked, that neither for mercy’s sake, or by the privilege of the feast, ought He to be let free.

23:26–32

26. And as they led him away, they laid hold upon one Simon, a Cyrenian, coming out of the country, and on him they laid the cross, that he might bear it after Jesus.

27. And there followed him a great company of people, and of women, which also bewailed and lamented him.

28. But Jesus turning unto them said, Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselves, and for your children.

29. For, behold, the days are coming, in the which they shall say, Blessed are the barren, and the wombs that never bare, and the paps which never gave suck.

30. Then shall they begin to say to the mountains, Fall on us; and to the hills, Cover us.

31. For if they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?

32. And there were also two other, malefactors, led with him to be put to death.

GLOSS. (non occ.) Having related the condemnation of Christ, Luke naturally goes on to speak of His crucifixion; as it is said, And as they led him away, they laid hold upon one Simon, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 10.) But John relates that Jesus bore His own cross, from which is understood that He was Himself carrying His cross, when He went forth to that place which is called Calvary; but as they journeyed Simon was forced into the service on the road, and the cross was given him to carry as far as that place.

THEOPHYLACT. For no one else accepted to bear the cross, because the wood was counted an abomination. Accordingly upon Simon the Cyrenian they imposed as it were to his dishonour the bearing of the cross, which others refused. Here is fulfilled that prophecy of Isaiah, Whose government shall be upon his shoulder. (Isa. 9:6.) For the government of Christ is His cross; for which the Apostle says, God hath exalted him. (Phil. 2:9.) And as for a mark of dignity, some wear a belt, others a head dress, so our Lord the cross. And if thou seekest, thou wilt find that Christ does not reign in us save by hardships, whence it comes that the luxurious are the enemies of the cross of Christ.

AMBROSE. Christ therefore bearing His cross, already as a conqueror carried His trophies. The cross is laid upon His shoulders, because, whether Simon or Himself bore it, both Christ bore it in the man, and the man in Christ. Nor do the accounts of the Evangelists differ, since the mystery reconciles them. And it is the rightful order of our advance that Christ should first Himself erect the trophy of His cross, then hand it down to be raised by His martyrs. He is not a Jew who bears the cross, but an alien and a foreigner, nor does he precede but follow, according as it is written, Let him lake up his cross, and follow me. (Matt. 16:24, Luke 9:23.)

BEDE. Simon is by interpretation "obedient," Cyrene "an heir." By this man therefore the people of the Gentiles are denoted, who formerly foreigners and aliens to the covenant, have now by obedience been made heirs of God. But Simon coming out of a village, bears the cross after Jesus, because forsaking the pagan rites, he obediently embraces the footsteps of our Lord's Passion. For a village is in Greek called πάγος, from whence Pagans derive their name.

THEOPHYLACT. Or he takes up the cross of Christ, who comes from the village; that is, he leaves this world and its labours, going forward to Jerusalem, that is, heavenly liberty. Hereby also we receive no slight instruction. For to be a master after the example of Christ, a man must himself first take up his cross, and in the fear of God crucify his own flesh, that he may so lay it upon those that are subject and obedient to him.

But there followed Christ a great company of people, and of women.

BEDE. A large multitude indeed followed the cross of Christ, but with very different feelings. For the people who had demanded His death were rejoicing that they should see Him dying, the women weeping that He was about to die. But He was followed by the weeping only of women, not because that vast crowd of men was not also sorrowful at His Passion, but because the less esteemed female sex could more freely give utterance to what they thought.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Women also are ever prone to tears, and have hearts easily disposed to pity.

THEOPHYLACT. He bids those who weep for Him cast their eyes forward to the evils that were coming, and weep for themselves.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Signifying that in the time to come women would be bereft of their children. For when war breaks out upon the land of the Jews, all shall perish, both small and great. Hence it follows, For, behold, the days are coming, in the which they shall say, Blessed are the barren, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. Seeing indeed that women shall cruelly roast their children, and the belly which had produced shall miserably again receive that which it bore.

BEDE. By these days He signifies the time of the siege and captivity which was coming upon them from the Romans, of which He had said before, Woe to them that are with child, and give suck in those days. It is natural, when captivity by an enemy is threatening, to seek for refuge in fastnesses or hidden places, where men may lie concealed. And so it follows, Then shall they begin to say to the mountains, Fall on us; and to the hills, Cover us. For Josephus relates, that when the Romans pressed hard upon them, the Jews sought hastily the caverns of the mountains, and the lurking places in the hills. It may be also that the words, Blessed are the barren, are to be understood of those of both sexes, who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake, and that it is said to the mountains and hills, Fall upon us, and Cover us, because all who are mindful of their own weakness, when the crisis of their temptations breaks upon them, have sought to be protected by the example, precepts, and prayers, of certain high and saintly men.

It follows, But if they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?

GREGORY. (Mor. 12. c. 4) He has called Himself the green wood and us the dry, for He has in Himself the life and strength of the Divine nature; but we who are mere men are called the dry wood.

THEOPHYLACT. As though He said to the Jews, If then the Romans have so raged against Me, a fruit-bearing and ever flourishing tree, what will they not attempt against you the people, who are a dry tree, destitute of every lifegiving virtue, and bearing no fruit?

BEDE. Or as if He spake to all: If I who have done no sin being called the tree of life, do not depart from the world without suffering the fire of my

Passion, what torment think ye awaits those who are barren of all fruits?

THEOPHYLACT. But the Devil, desiring to engender an evil opinion of our Lord, caused robbers also to be crucified with Him; whence it follows, And there were two other malefactors led with him to be put to death.

23:33

33. And when they were come to the place, which is called Calvary, there they crucified him, and the malefactors, one on the right hand, and the other on the left.

ATHANASIUS. (Hom. in Pass. Dom.) When mankind became corrupted, then Christ manifested His own body, that where corruption has been seen, there might spring up incorruption. Wherefore He is crucified in the place of Calvary; which place the Jewish doctors say was the burial-place of Adam.

BEDE. Or else, without the gate were the places where the heads of condemned criminals were cut off, and they received the name of Calvary, that is, beheaded. Thus for the salvation of all men the innocent is crucified among the guilty, that where sin abounded, there grace might much more abound.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The only-begotten Son of God did not Himself in His own nature in which He is God suffer the things which belong to the body, but rather in His earthly nature. For of one and the same Son both may be affirmed, namely, that He doth not suffer in His divine nature, and that He suffered in His human.

EUSEBIUS. But if, on the contrary, after His intercourse with men, He suddenly disappeared, flying away to avoid death, He might be likened by man to a phantom. And just as if any one wished to exhibit some incombustible vessel, which triumphed over the nature of fire, he would put it into the flame, and then directly draw it out from the flame unharmed; so the Word of God, wishing to shew that the instrument which He used for the salvation of men was superior to death, exposed His mortal body to death to manifest His nature, then after a little rescued it from death by the force of His divine power. This is indeed the first cause of Christ’s death. But the second is the manifestation of the divine power of Christ inhabiting a body. For seeing that men of old deified those who were destined to a like end with themselves, and whom they called Heroes and Gods, He taught that He alone of the dead must be acknowledged the true God, who having vanquished death is adorned with the rewards of victory, having trodden death under His feet. The third reason is, that a victim must be slain for the whole race of mankind, which being offered, the whole power of the evil spirits was destroyed, and every error put to silence. There is also another cause of the healthgiving death, that the disciples with secret faith might behold the resurrection after death. Whereunto they were taught to lift up their own hopes, that despising death they might embark cheerfully in the conflict with error.

ATHANASIUS. (de Inc. Verb. Dei.) Now our Saviour came to accomplish not His own death, but that of man, for He experienced not death who is Life. Therefore not by His own death did He put off the body, but He endured that which was inflicted by men. But although His body had been afflicted, and was loosed in the sight of all men, yet was it not fitting that He who should heal the sicknesses of others should have His own body visited with sickness. But yet if without any disease He had put off His body apart in some remote place, He would not be believed when speaking of His resurrection. For death must precede resurrection; why then should He openly proclaim His resurrection, but die in secret? Surely if these things had happened secretly, what calumnies would unbelieving men have invented? How would the victory of Christ over death appear, unless undergoing it in the sight of all men He had proved it to be swallowed up by the incorruption of His body? But you will say, At least He ought to have devised for Himself a glorious death, to have avoided the death of the cross. But if He had done this, He would have made Himself suspected of not having power over every kind of death. As then the champion by laying prostrate whomsoever the enemy has opposed to him is shewn to be superior to all, so the Life of all men took upon Him that death which His enemies inflicted, because it was the most dreadful and shameful, the abominable death upon the cross, that having destroyed it, the dominion of death might be entirely overthrown. Wherefore His head is not cut off as John’s was; He was not sawn asunder as Isaiah, that He might preserve His body entire, and indivisible to death, and not become an excuse to those who would divide the Church. For He wished to bear the curse of sin which we had incurred, by taking upon Him the accursed death of the cross, as it is said, Cursed is he that hangeth upon a tree. He dies also on the cross with outstretched hands, that with one indeed He may draw to Him the ancient people, with the other the Gentiles, joining both to Himself. Dying also on the cross He purges the air of evil spirits, and prepares for us an ascent into heaven.

THEOPHYLACT. Because also by a tree death bad entered, it must needs be that by a tree it should be abolished, and that the Lord passing unconquered through the pains of a tree should subdue the pleasures which flow from a tree.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. 1. de Res. Christ.) But the figure of the cross from one centre of contact branching out into four separate terminations, signifies the power and providence of Him who hung upon it extending every where.

AUGUSTINE. (de Gr. Nov. Test. Ep. 140.) For not without reason did He choose this kind of death, in order that He might be the master of breadth and length, and heighth and depth. For breadth lies in that cross piece of wood which is fastened from above. This belongs to good works, because on it the hands are outstretched. Length lies in that which is seen reaching from the former piece to the ground, for there in a certain manner we stand, that is, abide firm or persevere. And this is applied to longsuffering. Heighth is in that piece of wood which is left reaching upwards from that which is fixed across, that is, to the head of the Crucified; for the expectation of those who hope for better things is upward. Again, that part of the wood which is fixed hidden in the ground, signifies the depth of unrestrained grace.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 87. in Matt.) Two thieves also they crucified on the two sides, that He might be a partaker of their reproach; as it follows, And the thieves one on his right hand, the other on his left. But it did not so turn out. For of them nothing is said, but His cross is every where honoured. Kings, laying aside their crowns, assume the cross on their purple, on their diadems, on their arms. On the consecrated table, throughout the whole earth, the cross glitters. Such things are not of men. For even in their lifetime those who have acted nobly are mocked by their own actions, and when they perish their actions perish also. But in Christ it is quite different. For before the cross all things were gloomy, after it all things are joyful and glorious, that you may know that not a mere man was crucified.

BEDE. But the two robbers crucified with Christ signify those who under the faith of Christ undergo either the pains of martyrdom, or the rules of a still stricter continence. But they do this for eternal glory, who imitate the actions of the thief on the right hand; while they who do it to gain the praise of men, imitate the thief on the left hand.

23:34–37

34. Then said Jesus, Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do. And they parted his raiment, and cast lots.

35. And the people stood beholding. And the rulers also with them derided him, saying, He saved others; let him save himself, if he be Christ, the chosen of God.

36. And the soldiers also mocked him, coming to him, and offering him vinegar,

37. And saying, If thou be the king of the Jews, save thyself.

CHRYSOSTOM. Because the Lord had said, Pray for them that persecute you, (Matt. 5:44.) this likewise He did, when He ascended the cross, as it follows, Then said Jesus, Father, forgive them, not that He was not able Himself to pardon them, but that He might teach us to pray for our persecutors, not only in word, but in deed also. But He says, Forgive them, if they should repent. For He is gracious to the penitent, if they are willing after so great wickedness to wash away their guilt by faith.

BEDE. Nor must we imagine here that He prayed in vain, but that in those who believed after His passion He obtained the fruit of His prayers? It must be remarked, however, that He prayed not for those who chose rather to crucify, rather than to confess Him whom they knew to be the Son of God, but for such as were ignorant what they did, having a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge, as He adds, For they know not what they do.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. But for those who after the crucifixion remain in unbelief, no one can suppose that they are excused by ignorance, because of the notable miracles that with a loud voice proclaimed Him to be the Son of God.

AMBROSE. It is important then to consider, in what condition He ascends the cross; for I see Him naked. Let him then who prepares to overcome the world, so ascend that he seek not the appliances of the world.

Now Adam was overcome who sought for a covering. He overcame who laid aside His covering. He ascends such as nature formed us, God being our Creator. Such as the first man had dwelt in paradise, such did the second man enter paradise. But about to ascend the cross rightly, did He lay aside His royal garments, that you may know that He suffered not as God, but as man, though Christ is both.

ATHANASIUS. (Hom. in Pass. Dom.) He also who for our sakes took upon Him all our conditions, put on our garments, the signs of Adam's death, that He might put them off, and in their stead clothe us with life and incorruption.

It follows, And they parted his raiment among them, and cast lots.

THEOPHYLACT. For perhaps many of them were in want. Or perhaps rather they did this as a reproach, and from a kind of wantonness. For what treasure did they find in His garments?

BEDE. But in the lot the grace of God seems to be commended; for when the lot is cast, we yield not to the merits of any person, but to the secret judgment of God.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 12.) This matter indeed was briefly related by the three first Evangelists, but John more distinctly explains how it was done.

THEOPHYLACT. They did it then mockingly. For when the rulers scoffed, what can we say of the crowd? for it follows, And the people stood, who in truth had entreated that He should be crucified, waiting, namely, for the end. And the rulers also with them derided.

AUGUSTINE. (ubi sup.) Having mentioned the rulers, and said nothing of the priests, St. Luke comprehended under a general name all the chief men, so that hereby may be understood both the scribes and the elders.

BEDE. And these also unwillingly confess that He saved others, for it follows, Saying, He saved others, let him save himself, &c.

ATHANASIUS. (ubi sup.) Now our Lord being truly the Saviour, wished not by saving Himself, but by saving His creatures, to be acknowledged the Saviour. For neither is a physician by healing himself known to be a physician, unless he also gives proof of his skill towards the sick. So the Lord being the Saviour had no need of salvation, nor by descending from the cross did He wish to be acknowledged the Saviour, but by dying. For truly a much greater salvation does the death of the Saviour bring to men, than the descent from the cross.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. Now the Devil, seeing that there was no protection for him, was at a loss, and as having no other resource, tried at last to offer Him vinegar to drink. But he knew not that he was doing this against himself; for the bitterness of wrath caused by the transgression of the law, in which he kept all men bound, he now surrendered to the Saviour, who took it and consumed it, in order that in the place of vinegar, He might give us wine to drink, which wisdom had mingled. (Prov. 9:5.)

THEOPHYLACT. But the soldiers offered Christ vinegar, as it were ministering unto a king, for it follows, saying, If thou art the king of the Jews, save thyself.

BEDE. And it is worthy of remark, that the Jews blaspheme and mock the name of Christ, which was delivered to them by the authority of Scripture; whereas the soldiers, as being ignorant of the Scriptures, insult not Christ the chosen of God, but the King of the Jews.

23:38–43

38. And a superscription also was written over him in letters of Greek, and Latin, and Hebrew, THIS IS THE KING OF THE JEWS.

39. And one of the malefactors which were hanged railed on him, saying, If thou be Christ, save thyself and us.

40. But the other answering rebuked him, saying, Dost not thou fear God, seeing thou art in the same condemnation?

41. And we indeed justly; for we receive the due reward of our deeds: but this man hath done nothing amiss.

42. And he said unto Jesus, Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom.

43. And Jesus said unto him, Verily I say unto thee, To day shalt thou be with me in paradise.

THEOPHYLACT. Observe a second time the device of the devil turned against himself. For in letters of three different characters he published the accusation of Jesus, that in truth it might not escape one of the passers by, that He was crucified because He made Himself King. For it is said, In Greek, Latin, and Hebrew, by which it was signified, that the most powerful of the nations, (as the Romans,) the wisest, (as the Greeks,) those who most worshipped God, (as the Jewish nation,) must be made subject to the dominion of Christ.

AMBROSE. And rightly is the title placed above the cross, because Christ's kingdom is not of the human body, but of the power of God. I read the title of the King of the Jews, when I read, My kingdom is not of this world. (John 18:36.) I read the cause of Christ written above His head, when I read, And the Word was God. (John 1:1.) For the head of Christ is God. (1 Cor. 11:3.)

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now one of the thieves uttered the same revilings as the Jews, but the other tried to check his words, while he confessed his own guilt, adding, We indeed justly, for we receive the due reward of our deeds.

CHRYSOSTOM. Here the condemned performs the office of judge, and he begins to decide concerning truth who before Pilate confessed his crime only after many tortures. For the judgment of man from whom secret things are hid is of one kind; the judgment of God who searches the heart of another. And in the former case punishment follows after confession, but here confession is made unto salvation. But he also pronounces Christ innocent, adding, But this man hath done nothing wrong: as if to say, Behold a new injury, that innocence should be condemned with crime. We kill the living, He raised the dead. We have stolen from others, He bids us give up even what is our own. The blessed thief thus taught those that stood by, uttering the words by which he rebuked the other. But when he saw that the ears of those who stood by were stopped up, he turns to Him who knoweth the hearts; for it follows, And he said to Jesus, Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom. Thou beholdest the Crucified, and thou acknowledgest Him to be thy Lord. Thou seest the form of a condemned criminal, and thou proclaimest the dignity of a king. Stained with a thousand crimes, thou askest the Fountain of righteousness to remember thy wickedness, saying, But I discover thy hidden kingdom; and thou turnest away my public iniquities, and acceptest the faith of a secret intention. Wickedness usurped the disciple of truth, truth did not change the disciple of wickedness.

GREGORY. (Mor. 18. c. 40.) On the cross nails had fastened his hands and feet, and nothing remained free from torture, but his heart and tongue.

By the inspiration of God, the thief offered to Him the whole which he found free, that as it is written, With the heart he might believe unto righteousness, with the mouth he might confess unto salvation. (Rom. 10:10.) But the three virtues which the Apostle speaks of, (1 Cor. 13:13.) the thief suddenly filled with grace both received and preserved on the cross. He had faith, for example, who believed that God would reign whom he saw dying equally with himself. He had hope who asked for an entrance into His kingdom. He preserved charity also zealously in his death, who for his iniquity reproved his brother and fellow-thief, dying for a like crime to his own.

AMBROSE. A most remarkable example is here given of seeking after conversion, seeing that pardon is so speedily granted to the thief. The Lord quickly pardons, because the thief is quickly converted. And grace is more abundant than prayer; for the Lord ever gives more than He is asked for. The thief asked that He should remember him, but our Lord answers, Verily I say unto thee, This day shall thou be with me in Paradise. To be with Christ is life, and where Christ is, there is His kingdom.

THEOPHYLACT. And as every king who returns victorious carries in triumph the best of his spoils, so the Lord having despoiled the devil of a portion of his plunder, carries it with Him into Paradise.

CHRYSOSTOM. Here then might one see the Saviour between the thieves weighing in the scales of justice faith, and unbelief. The devil cast Adam out of Paradise. Christ brought the thief into Paradise before the whole world, before the Apostles. By a mere word and by faith alone he entered into Paradise, that no one after his sins might despair of entrance. Mark the rapid change, from the cross to heaven, from condemnation to Paradise, that you may know that the Lord did it all, not with regard to the thief’s good intention, but His own mercy.

But if the reward of the good has already taken place, surely a resurrection will be superfluous. For if He introduced the thief into Paradise while his body remained in corruption without, it is clear there is no resurrection of the body. Such are the words of some, But shall the flesh which has partaken of the toil be deprived of the reward? Hear Paul speaking, Then must this corruptible put on incorruption. (1 Cor. 15:53.) But if the Lord promised the kingdom of heaven, but introduced the thief into Paradise, He does not yet recompense him the reward. But they say, Under the name of Paradise He signified the kingdom of heaven, using a well-known name in addressing a thief who knew nothing of difficult teaching. Now some do not read it, This day shall thou be with me in Paradise, but thus, I say unto thee on this day, and then follows, thou shalt be with me in Paradise. But we will add a still more obvious solution. For physicians when they see a man in a desperate state, say, He is already dead. So also the thief, since he no longer fears his falling back to perdition, is said to have entered Paradise.

THEOPHYLACT. This however is more true than all, that although they have not obtained all the promises, I mean, the thief and the other saints in order that without us they might not be made perfect, (Heb. 11:40.) they are notwithstanding in the kingdom of heaven and Paradise.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. Here again, we must examine how the thief should be thought worthy of Paradise, seeing that a flaming sword prevents the entrance of the saints. But observe that the word of God describes it as turning about, so as it should obstruct the unworthy, but open a free entrance to life to the worthy.

GREGORY. (Mor. 12. c. 9.) Or that flaming sword is said to be turning, because that He knew the time would come when it must be removed; when He in truth should come, who by the mystery of His incarnation was to open to us the way of Paradise.

AMBROSE. But it must also be explained how the others, that is, Matthew and Mark, introduced two thieves reviling, while Luke, one reviling, the other resisting him. Perhaps this other at first reviled, but was suddenly converted. It may also have been spoken of one, but in the plural number; as in the Hebrews, They wandered in goat-skins, and they were sawn asunder; (Heb. 11:37.) whereas Elijah alone is related to have had a goat-skin, and Isaiah to have been sawn asunder. But mystically, the two thieves represent the two sinful people who were to be crucified by baptism with Christ, (Rom. 6:3.) whose disagreement likewise represents the difference of believers.

BEDE. For as many of us as were baptized in Christ Jesus, were baptized in His death; but we are washed by baptism, seeing we were sinners. But some, in that they praise God suffering in the flesh, are crowned; others, in that they refuse to have the faith or works of baptism, are deprived of the gift which they have received.

44. And it was about the sixth hour, and there was a darkness over all the earth until the ninth hour.

45. And the sun was darkened, and the veil of the temple was rent in the midst.

46. And when Jesus had cried with a loud voice, he said, Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit: and having said thus, he gave up the ghost.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. As soon as the Lord of all had been given up to be crucified, the whole framework of the world bewailed its rightful Master, and the light was darkened at mid-day, (Amos 8:9.) which was a manifest token that the souls of those who crucified Him would suffer darkness.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 17.) What is here said of the darkness, the other two Evangelists, Matthew and Mark, confirm, but St. Luke adds the cause whence the darkness arose, saying, And the sun was darkened.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, l. iii. c. 15.) This darkening of the sun it is quite plain did not happen in the regular and fixed course of the heavenly bodies, because it was then the Passover, which is always celebrated at the full moon. But a regular eclipse of the sun does not take place except at new moon.

PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS. (Dion. Areop. ad Polye.) When we were both at Heliopolis together, we both saw at the same time in a marvellous manner the moon meeting the sun, (for it was not then the time of new moon,) and then again, from the ninth hour until evening supernaturally brought back to the edge of the sun’s diameter. (ad diametrum solis.) Besides, we observed that this obscuration began from the east, and having reached as far as the sun’s western border at length returned, and that the loss and restoration of light took place not from the same side, but from opposite sides of the diameter. Such were the miraculous events of that time, and possible to Christ alone who is the cause of all things.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. This miracle then took place that it might be made known, that He who had undergone death was the Ruler of the whole creation.

AMBROSE. The sun also is eclipsed to the sacrilegious, that it may overshadow the scene of their awful wickedness; darkness was spread over the eyes of the unbelieving, that the light of faith might rise again.

BEDE. But Luke, wishing to join miracle to miracle, adds, And the veil of the temple was rent in twain. This took place when our Lord expired, as Matthew and Mark bear witness, but Luke related it by anticipation.

THEOPHYLACT. By this then our Lord shewed that the Holy of Holies should be no longer inaccessible, but being given over into the hands of the Romans, should be defiled, and its entrance laid open.

AMBROSE. The veil also is rent, by which is declared the division of the two people, and the profanation of the synagogue. The old veil is rent that the Church may hang up the new veils of faith. The covering of the synagogue is drawn up, that we may behold with the eyes of the mind the inward mysteries of religion now revealed to us.

THEOPHYLACT. Whereby it is signified that the veil which kept us asunder from the holy things which are in heaven, is broken through, namely, enmity and sin.

AMBROSE. It took place also at that time when every mystery of Christ's assumed mortality was fulfilled, and His immortality alone remained; as it follows, And when Jesus had cried with a loud voice, he said.

BEDE. By invoking the Father He declares Himself to be the Son of God, but by commending His Spirit, He signifies not the weakness of His strength, but His confidence in the same power with the Father.

AMBROSE. The flesh dies that the Spirit may rise again. The Spirit is commended to the Father, that heavenly things also may be loosed from the chain of iniquity, and peace be made in heaven, which earthly things should follow.

CHRYSOSTOM. Now this voice teaches us, that the souls of the saints are not henceforth shut up in hell as before, but are with God, Christ being made the beginning of this change.

ATHANASIUS. (de Incar. et cout. Ar.) For He commends to His Father through Himself all mankind quickened in Him; for we are His members; as the Apostle says, Ye are all one in Christ. (Gal. 3:28.)

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. i. de Res.) But it becomes us to enquire how our Lord distributes Himself into three parts at once; into the bowels of the earth, as He told the Pharisees; into the Paradise of God, as He told the thief; into the hands of the Father, as it is said here. To those however who rightly consider, it is scarcely worthy of question, for He who by His divine power is in every place, is present in any particular place.

AMBROSE. His spirit then is commended to God, but though He is above He yet gives light to the parts below the earth, that all things may be redeemed. For Christ is all things, and in Christ are all things.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (ut sup.) There is another explanation, that at the time of His Passion, His Divinity being once united to His humanity, left neither part of His humanity, but of its own accord separated the soul from the body, yet shewed itself abiding in each. For through the body in which He suffered death He vanquished the power of death, but through the soul He prepared for the thief an entrance into Paradise. Now Isaiah says of the heavenly Jerusalem, which is no other than Paradise, Upon my hands I have painted thy walls; (Is. 49:16. ap. LXX.) whence it is clear, that he who is in Paradise dwelleth in the hands of the Father.

DAMASCENE. (Hom. de Sabb. San.) Or to speak more expressly, In respect of His body, He was in the grave, in respect of His soul, He was in hell, and with the thief in Paradise; but as God, on the throne with His Father and the Holy Spirit.

THEOPHYLACT. But crying with a loud voice He gives up the ghost, because He had in Himself the power of laying down His life and taking it up again.

AMBROSE. He gave up His Spirit, because He did not lose it as one unwilling; for what a man sends forth is voluntary, what he loses, compulsory.

23:47–49

47. Now when the centurion saw what was done, he glorified God, saying, Certainly this was a righteous man.

48. And all the people that came together to that sight, beholding the things which were done, smote their breasts, and returned.

49. And all his acquaintance, and the women that followed him from Galilee, stood afar off, beholding these things.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. 13.) When after uttering that voice He immediately gave up the ghost, those who were present greatly marvelled. For those who hung upon the cross were generally tortured by a prolonged death. Hence it is said, Now when the centurion saw, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 20.) There is no contradiction in that Matthew says, that the centurion seeing the earthquake marvelled, whereas Luke says that he marvelled, that Jesus while uttering the loud voice expired, shewing what power He had when He was dying. But in that Matthew not only says, at the sight of the earthquake, but added, and at the things that were done, he has made it clear that there was ample room for Luke to say, that the centurion marvelled at the death of the Lord. But because Luke also himself said, Now when the centurion saw what was done, he has included in that general expression all the marvellous things which took place at that hour, as if relating one marvellous event of which all those miracles were the parts and members. Again, because one Evangelist stated that the centurion said, Truly this man was the Son of God, but Luke gives the words, was a just man, they might be supposed to differ. But either we ought to understand that both these were said by the centurion, and that one Evangelist related one, another another. Or perhaps, that Luke expresses the opinion of the centurion, in what respect he called Him the Son of God. For perhaps the centurion did not know Him to be the Only-begotten, equal to the Father, but called Him the Son of God, because he believed Him to be just, as many just persons are called the sons of God. (Gen. 6:2, 4.) But again, because Matthew added, those who were with the centurion, while Luke omits this, there is no contradiction, since one says what another is silent about. And Matthew said, They were greatly afraid; but Luke does not say that he feared, but that he glorified God. Who then does not see that by fearing he glorified God?

THEOPHYLACT. The words of our Lord seem now to be fulfilled, wherein He said, When I shall be lifted up I will draw all men unto me. For when lifted upon the cross He drew to Him the thief and the centurion, besides some of the Jews also, of whom it follows, And all the people that came together smote their breasts.

BEDE. By their smiting their breasts as if betokening a penitential sorrow, two things may be understood; either that they bewailed Him unjustly slain whose life they loved, or that remembering that they had demanded His death, they trembled to see Him in death still farther glorified. But we may observe, that the Gentiles fearing God glorify Him with works of public confession; the Jews only striking their breasts returned silent home.

AMBROSE. O the breasts of the Jews, harder than the rocks! The judge acquits, the officer believes, the traitor by his death condemns his own crime, the elements flee away, the earth quakes, the graves are opened; the hardness of the Jews still remains immoveable, though the whole world is shaken.

BEDE. Rightly then by the centurion is the faith of the Church signified, which in the silence of the synagogue bears witness to the Son of God. And now is fulfilled that complaint which the Lord makes to His Father, neighbour and friend hast thou put far from me, and mine acquaintance because of misery. (Ps. 88:18.) Hence it follows, And all his acquaintance stood afar off.

THEOPHYLACT. But the race of women formerly cursed remains and sees all these things; for it follows, And the women which followed him from Galilee, seeing these things. And thus they are the first to be renewed by justification, or by the blessing which flows from His passion, as also from His resurrection.

23:50–56

50. And, behold, there was a man named Joseph, a counsellor; and he was a good man, and a just:

51. (The same had not consented to the counsel and deed of them;) he was of Arimathæa, a city of the Jews: who also himself waited for the kingdom of God.

52. This man went unto Pilate, and begged the body of Jesus.

53. And he took it down, and wrapped it in linen, and laid it in a sepulchre that was hewn in stone, wherein never man before was laid.

54. And that day was the preparation, and the sabbath drew on.

55. And the women also, which came with him from Galilee, followed after, and beheld the sepulchre, and how his body was laid.

56. And they returned, and prepared spices and ointments; and rested the sabbath day according to the commandment.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Photius.) Joseph had been at one time a secret disciple of Christ, but at length bursting through the bonds of fear, and become very zealous, he took down the body of our Lord, basely hanging on the cross; thus gaining a precious jewel by the meekness of His words. Hence it follows, And, behold, there was a man named Joseph, a counsellor.

BEDE. A counsellor, or decurio, is so called because he is of the order of the curia or council, and administers the office of the curia. He is also wont to be called curialis, from his management of civil duties. Joseph then is said to have been of high rank in the world, but of still higher estimation before God; as it follows, A good man, and a just, of Arimathæa, a city of the Jews, &c. Arimathæa is the same as Ramatha, the city of Helcanah and Samuel.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 22.) Now John says, that Joseph was a disciple of Jesus. Hence it is also here added, Who also himself waited for the kingdom of God. But it naturally causes surprise how he who for fear was a secret disciple should have dared to beg our Lord’s body, which none of those who openly followed Him dared to do; for it is said, This man went unto Pilate, and begged the body of Jesus. We must understand then, that he did this from confidence in his rank, by which he might be privileged to enter familiarly into Pilate’s presence. But in performing that last funeral rite, he seems to have eared less for the Jews, although it was his custom in hearing our Lord to avoid their hostility.

BEDE. So then being fitted by the righteousness of his works for the burial of our Lord’s body, he was worthy by the dignity of his secular power to obtain it. Hence it follows, And he took it down, and wrapped it in linen. By the simple burial of our Lord, the pride of the rich is condemned, who not even in their graves can be without their wealth.

ATHANASIUS. (in Vit. Ant. 90.) They also act absurdly who embalm the bodies of their dead, and do not bury them, even supposing them to be holy. For what can be more holy or greater than our Lord’s body? And yet this was placed in a tomb until it rose again the third day. For it follows, And he laid it in a hewn sepulchre.

BEDE. That is, hewn out of a rock, lest if it had been built of many stones, and the foundations of the tomb being dug up after the resurrection, the body should be said to have been stolen away. It is laid also in a new tomb, wherein never man before was laid, lest when the rest of the bodies remained after the resurrection, it might be suspected that some other had risen again. But because man was created on the sixth day, rightly being crucified on the sixth day our Lord fulfilled the secret of man's restitution. It follows, And it was the day of the παρασκευὴ, which means the preparation, the name by which they called the sixth day, because on that day they prepared the things which were necessary for the Sabbath. But because on the seventh day the Creator rested from His work, the Lord on the Sabbath rested in the grave. Hence it follows, And the Sabbath was dawning. Now we said above, that all His acquaintance stood afar off, and the women which followed Him. These then of His acquaintance, after His body was taken down, returned to their homes, but the women who more tenderly loved Him, following His funeral, desired to see the place where He was laid. For it follows, And the women also, which came with him from Galilee, followed after, and beheld the sepulchre, and how his body was laid, that in truth they might make the offerings of their devotion at the proper time.

THEOPHYLACT. For they had not yet sufficient faith, but prepared as if for a mere man spices and ointments, after the manner of the Jews, who performed such duties to their dead. Hence it follows, And they returned, and prepared spices. For our Lord being buried, they were occupied as long as it was lawful to work, (that is, until sun-set,) in preparing ointments. But it was commanded to keep silence on the Sabbath, that is, rest from evening to evening. For it follows, And rested the sabbath day according to the commandment.

AMBROSE. Now mystically, the just man buries the body of Christ. For the burial of Christ is such as to have no guile or wickedness in it. But rightly did Matthew call the man rich, for by carrying Him that was rich he knew not the poverty of faith. The just man covers the body of Christ with linen. Do thou also clothe the body of Christ with His own glory, that thou mayest be thyself just. And if thou believest it to be dead, still cover it with the fulness of His own divinity. But the Church also is clothed with the grace of innocence.

BEDE. He also wraps Jesus in clean linen, who has received Him with a pure mind.

AMBROSE. Nor without meaning has one Evangelist spoken of a new tomb, another of the tomb of Joseph. For the grave is prepared by those who are under the law of death; the Conqueror of death has no grave of His own. For what fellowship hath God with the grave. He alone is enclosed in this tomb, because the death of Christ, although it was common according to the nature of the body, yet was it peculiar in respect of power. But Christ is rightly buried in the tomb of the just, that He may rest in the habitation of justice. For this monument the just man hews out with the piercing word in the hearts of Gentile hardness, that the power of Christ might extend over the nations. And very rightly is there a stone rolled against the tomb; for whoever has in himself truly buried Christ, must diligently guard, lest he lose Him, or lest there be an entrance for unbelief.

BEDE. Now that the Lord is crucified on the sixth day and rests on the seventh, signifies that in the sixth age of the world we must of necessity suffer for Christ, and as it were be crucified to the world. (Gal. 6:14.) But in the seventh age, that is, after death, our bodies indeed rest in the tombs, but our souls with the Lord. But even at the present time also holy women, (that is, humble souls,) fervent in love, diligently wait upon the Passion of Christ, and if perchance they may be able to imitate Him, with anxious carefulness ponder each step in order, by which this Passion is fulfilled. And having read, heard, and called to mind all these, they next apply themselves to make ready the works of virtue, by which Christ may be pleased, in order that having finished the preparation of this present life, in a blessed rest they may at the time of the resurrection meet Christ with the frankincence of spiritual actions.

CHAPTER 24

24:1–12

1. Now upon the first day of the week, very early in the morning, they came unto the sepulchre, bringing the spices which they had prepared, and certain others with them.

2. And they found the stone rolled away from the sepulchre.

3. And they entered in, and found not the body of the Lord Jesus.

4. And it came to pass, as they were much perplexed thereabout, behold, two men stood by them in shining garments:

5. And as they were afraid, and bowed down their faces to the earth, they said unto them, Why seek ye the living among the dead?

6. He is not here, but is risen: remember how he spake unto you when he was yet in Galilee,

7. Saying, The Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and the third day rise again.

8. And they remembered his words,

9. And returned from the sepulchre, and told all these things unto the eleven, and to all the rest.

10. It was Mary Magdalene, and Joanna, and Mary the mother of James, and other women that were with them, which told these things unto the apostles.

11. And their words seemed to them as idle tales, and they believed them not.

12. Then arose Peter, and ran unto the sepulchre; and stooping down, he beheld the linen clothes laid by themselves, and departed, wondering in himself at that which was come to pass.

BEDE. Devout women not only on the day of preparation, but also when the sabbath was passed, that is, at sun-set, as soon as the liberty of working returned, bought spices that they might come and anoint the body of Jesus, as Mark testifies. (Mark 16:1.) Still as long as night time restrained them, they came not to the sepulchre. And therefore it is said, On the first day of the week, very early in the morning, &c. One of the Sabbath, (una Sabbathi) or the first of the Sabbath, is the first day from the Sabbath; which Christians are wont to call “the Lord’s day,” because of our Lord’s resurrection. But by the women coming to the sepulchre very early in the morning, is manifested their great zeal and fervent love of seeking and finding the Lord.

AMBROSE. Now this place has caused great perplexity to many, because while St. Luke says, Very early in the morning, Matthew says that it was in the evening of the sabbath that the women came to the sepulchre. But you may suppose that the Evangelists spoke of different occasions, so as to understand both different parties of women, and different appearances. Because however it was written, that in the evening of the sabbath, as it began to dawn towards the first day of the week, (Matt. 28:1.) our Lord rose, we must so take it, as that neither on the morning of the Lord’s day, which is the first after the sabbath, nor on the sabbath, the resurrection should be thought to have taken place. For how are the three days fulfilled? Not then as the day grew towards evening, but in the evening of the night He rose. Lastly, in the Greek it is “late;” (ὀψὶ) but late signifies both the hour at the end of the day, and the slowness of any thing; as we say, “I have been lately told.” Late then is also the dead of the night. And thus also the women had the opportunity of coming to the sepulchre when the guards were asleep. And that you may know it was in the night time, some of the women are ignorant of it. They know who watch night and day, they know not who have gone back. According to John, one Mary Magdalene knows not, for the same person could not first know and then afterwards be ignorant. Therefore if there are several Maries, perhaps also there are several Mary Magdalenes, since the former is the name of a person, the second is derived from a place.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 24.) Or Matthew by the first part of the night, which is the evening, wished to represent the night itself, at the end of which night they came to the sepulchre, and for this reason, because they had been now preparing since the evening, and it was lawful to bring spices because the sabbath was over.

EUSEBIUS. The Instrument of the Word lay dead, but a great stone enclosed the sepulchre, as if death had led Him captive. But three days had not yet elapsed, when life again puts itself forth after a sufficient proof of death, as it follows, And they found the stone rolled away.

THEOPHYLACT. An angel had rolled it away, as Matthew declares.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 90. in Matt.) But the stone was rolled away after the resurrection, on account of the women, that they might believe that the Lord had risen again, seeing indeed the grave without the body. Hence it follows, And they entered in, and found not the body of the Lord Jesus.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. When then they found not the body of Christ which was risen, they were distracted by various thoughts, and for their love of Christ and the tender care they had shewn Him, were thought worthy of the vision of angels. For it follows, And it came to pass as they were much perplexed thereabout, behold, two men stood by them in shining garments.

EUSEBIUS. The messengers of the health-bearing resurrection and their shining garments stand for tokens of pleasantness and rejoicing. For Moses preparing plagues against the Egyptians, perceived an angel in the flame of fire. But not such were those who appeared to the women at the sepulchre, but calm and joyful as became them to be seen in the kingdom and joy of the Lord. And as at the Passion the sun was darkened, holding forth signs of sorrow and woe to the crucifiers of our Lord, so the angels, heralds of life and resurrection, marked by their white garments the character of the health-bearing feast day.

AMBROSE. But how is it that Mark has mentioned one young man sitting in white garments, and Matthew one, but John and Luke relate that there were seen two angels sitting in white garments.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ut sup.) We may understand that one Angel was seen by the women, as both Mark and Matthew say, so as supposing them to have entered into the sepulchre, that is, into a certain space which was fenced off by a kind of wall in front of the stone sepulchre; and that there they saw an Angel sitting on the right hand, which Mark says, but that afterwards when they looked into the place where our Lord was lying, they saw within two other Angels standing, (as Luke says,) who spoke to encourage their minds, and build up their faith. Hence it follows, And as they were afraid.

BEDE. The holy women, when the Angels stood beside them, are reported not to have fallen to the ground, but to have bowed their faces to the earth; nor do we read that any of the saints, at the time of our Lord’s resurrection, worshipped with prostration to the ground either our Lord Himself, or the Angels who appeared to them. Hence has arisen the ecclesiastical custom, either in memory of our Lord’s resurrection, or in the hope of our own, of praying on every Lord’s day, and through the whole season of Pentecost, not with bended knees, but with our faces bowed to the earth. But not in the sepulchre, which is the place of the dead, was He to be sought, who rose from the dead to life. And therefore it is added, They said to them, that is, the Angels to the women, Why seek ye the living among the dead? He is not here, but is risen. On the third day then, as He Himself foretold to the women, together with the rest of His disciples, He celebrated the triumph of His resurrection. Hence it follows, Remember how he spake unto you when he was yet in Galilee, saying, The Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified, and on the third day rise again, &c. For on the day of the preparation at the ninth hour giving up the ghost, buried in the evening, early on the morning of the first day of the week He rose again.

ATHANASIUS. (Lib. de Inc. Fil. Dei.) He might indeed at once have raised His body from the dead. But some one would have said that He was never dead, or that death plainly had never existed in Him. And perhaps if the resurrection of our Lord had been delayed beyond the third day, the glory of incorruption had been concealed. In order therefore to shew His body to be dead, He suffered the interval of one day, and on the third day manifested His body to be without corruption.

BEDE. One day and two nights also He lay in the sepulchre, because He joined the light of His single death to the darkness of our double death.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now the women, when they had received the sayings of the Angels, hastened to tell them to the disciples; as it follows, And they remembered his words, and returned from the sepulchre, and told all these things to the eleven, and to all the rest. For woman who was once the minister of death, is now the first to receive and tell the awful mystery of the resurrection. The female race has obtained therefore both deliverance from reproach, and the withdrawal of the curse.

AMBROSE. It is not allowed to women to teach in the church, but they shall ask their husbands at home. (1 Tim. 2:12, 1 Cor. 14:35.) To those then who are at home is the woman sent. But who these women were he explains, adding, It was Mary Magdalene,

BEDE. (who Was also the sister of Lazarus,) and Joanna, (the wife of Chuza, Herod’s steward,) and Mary the mother of James, (that is, the mother of James the less, and Joseph.) And it is added generally of the others, and other women that were with them, which told these things to the Apostles.

BEDE. (ex Amb.) For that the woman might not endure the everlasting reproach of guilt from men, she who had transfused sin into the man, now also transfuses grace.

THEOPHYLACT. Now the miracle of the resurrection is naturally incredible to mankind. Hence it follows, And their words seemed to them as idle tales.

BEDE. (ex Greg.) Which was not so much their weakness, as so to speak our strength. For the resurrection itself was demonstrated to those who doubted by many proofs, which while we read and acknowledge we are through their doubts confirmed in the truth.

THEOPHYLACT. Peter, as soon as he heard this, delays not, but runs to the sepulchre; for fire when applied to matter knows no delay; as it follows, Then arose Peter, and ran to the sepulchre.

EUSEBIUS. For he alone believed the women saying that they had seen Angels; and as he was of more ardent feelings than the rest, he anxiously put himself foremost, looking every where for the Lord; as it follows, And stooping down, he beheld the linen clothes laid by themselves.

THEOPHYLACT. But now when he was at the tomb, he first of all obtained that he should marvel at those things which had before been derided by himself or the others; as it is said, And departed, wondering in himself at that which was come to pass; that is, wondering in himself at the way in which it had happened, how the linen clothes had been left behind, since the body was anointed with myrrh; or what opportunity the thief had obtained, that putting away the clothes wrapped up by themselves, he should take away the body with the soldiers standing round.

AUGUSTINE. Luke is supposed to have mentioned this concerning Peter, recapitulating. For Peter ran to the sepulchre at the same time that John also went, as soon as it had been told to them alone by the women, (especially Mary Magdalene,) that the body was taken away. But the vision of Angels took place afterwards. Luke therefore mentioned Peter only, because to him Mary first told it. It may also strike one, that Luke says that Peter, not entering but stooping down, saw the linen clothes by themselves, and departed wondering, whereas John says, that he himself saw the linen clothes in the same position, and that he entered after Peter. We must understand then that Peter first saw them stooping down, which Luke mentions, John omits, but that he afterwards entered before John came in.

BEDE. According to the mystical meaning, by the women coming early in the morning to the sepulchre, we have an example given us, that having cast away the darkness of our vices, we should come to the Body of the Lord. For that sepulchre also bore the figure of the Altar of the Lord, wherein the mysteries of Christ's Body, not in silk or purple cloth, but in pure white linen, like that in which Joseph wrapped it, ought to be consecrated, that as He offered up to death for us the true substance of His earthly nature, so we also in commemoration of Him should place on the Altar the flax, pure from the plant of the earth, and white, and in many ways refined by a kind of crushing to death. But the spices which the women bring, signify the odour of virtue, and the sweetness of prayers by which we ought to approach the Altar. The rolling back of the stone alludes to the unclosing of the Sacraments which were concealed by the veil of the letter of the law which was written on stone, the covering of which being taken away, the dead body of the Lord is not found, but the living body is preached; for although we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him no more. (2 Cor. 5:16.) But as when the Body of our Lord lay in the sepulchre, Angels are said to have stood by, so also at the time of consecration are they to be believed to stand by the mysteries of Christ. Let us then after the example of the devout women, whenever we approach the heavenly mysteries, because of the presence of the Angels, or from reverence to the Sacred Offering, with all humility, bow our faces to the earth, recollecting that we are but dust and ashes.

24:13–24

13. And, behold, two of them went that same day to a village called Emmaus, which was from Jerusalem about threescore furlongs.

14. And they talked together of all these things which had happened.

15. And it came to pass, that, while they communed together and reasoned, Jesus himself drew near, and went with them.

16. But their eyes were holden that they should not know him.

17. And he said unto them, What manner of communications are these that ye have one to another, as ye walk, and are sad?

18. And the one of them, whose name was Cleopas, answering said unto him, Art thou only a stranger in Jerusalem, and hast not known the things which are come to pass there in these days?

19. And he said unto them, What things? And they said unto him, Concerning Jesus of Nazareth, which was a prophet mighty in deed and word before God and all the people:

20. And how the chief priests and our rulers delivered him to be condemned to death, and have crucified him.

21. But we trusted that it had been he which should have redeemed Israel: and beside all this, to day is the third day since these things were done.

22. Yea, and certain women also of our company made us astonished, which were early at the sepulchre;

23. And when they found not his body, they came, saying, that they had also seen a vision of angels, which said that he was alive.

24. And certain of them which were with us went to the sepulchre, and found it even so as the women had said: but him they saw not.

GLOSS. (non occ.) After the manifestation of Christ's resurrection made by the Angels to the women, the same resurrection is further manifested by an appearance of Christ Himself to His disciples; as it is said, And behold two of them.

THEOPHYLACT. Some say that Luke was one of these two, and for this reason concealed his name.

AMBROSE. Or to two of the disciples by themselves our Lord shewed Himself in the evening, namely, Ammaon and Cleophas.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 25.) The fortress mentioned here we may not unreasonably take to have been also called according to Mark, a village, He next describes the fortress, saying, which was from Jerusalem about the space of sixty stades, called Emmaus.

BEDE. It is the same as Nicopolis, a remarkable town in Palestine, which after the taking of Judæa under the Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antonius, changed together with its condition its name also. But the stadium which, as the Greeks say, was invented by Hercules to measure the distances of roads, is the eighth part of a mile; therefore sixty stades are equal to seven miles and fifty paces. And this was the length of journey which they were walking, who were certain about our Lord's death and burial, but doubtful concerning His resurrection. For the resurrection which took place after the seventh day of the week, no one doubts is implied in the number eight. The disciples therefore as they walk and converse about the Lord had completed the sixth mile of their journey, for they were grieving that He who had lived without blame, had come at length even to death, which He underwent on the sixth day. They had completed also the seventh mile, for they doubted not that He rested in the grave. But of the eighth mile they had only accomplished half; for the glory of His already triumphant resurrection, they did not believe perfectly.

THEOPHYLACT. But the disciples above mentioned talked to one another of the things which had happened, not as believing them, but as bewildered at events so extraordinary.

BEDE. And as they spoke of Him, the Lord comes near and joins them, that He may both influence their minds with faith in His resurrection, and fulfil that which He had promised, Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them (Mat. 18:20); as it follows, And it came to pans while they communed together and reasoned, Jesus himself drew near and went with them.

THEOPHYLACT. For having now obtained a spiritual body, distance of place is no obstacle to His being present to whom He wished, nor did He any further govern His body by natural laws, but spiritually and supernaturally. Hence as Mark says, He appeared to them in a different form, in which they were not permitted to know Him; for it follows, And their eyes were holden that they should not know him; in order truly that they may reveal their entirely doubtful conceptions, and uncovering their wound may receive a cure; and that they might know that although the same body which suffered, rose again, yet it was no longer such as to be visible to all, but only to those by whom He willed it to be seen; and that they should not wonder why henceforth He walks not among the people, seeing that His conversation was not fit for mankind, but rather divine; which is also the character of the resurrection to come, in which we shall walk as the Angels and the sons of God.

GREGORY. (23. in Ev.) Rightly also He refrained from manifesting to them a form which they might recognise, doing that outwardly in the eyes of the body, which was done by themselves inwardly in the eyes of the mind. For they in themselves inwardly both loved and doubted. Therefore to them as they talked of Him He exhibited His presence, but as they doubted of Him He concealed the appearance which they knew. He indeed conversed with them, for it follows, And he said to them, What manner of communications, &c.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (Anonm. in Cat. Gr.) They were in truth discoursing among themselves, no longer expecting to see Christ alive, but sorrowing as concerning their Saviour slain. Hence it follows, And one of them whose name was Cleophas, answering him said, Art thou only a stranger?

THEOPHYLACT. As if he said, “Art thou a mere stranger, and one dwelling beyond the confines of Jerusalem, and therefore unacquainted with what has happened in the midst of it, that thou knowest not these things?

BEDE. Or he says this, because they thought Him a stranger, whose countenance they did not recognise. But in reality He was a stranger to them, from the infirmity of whose natures, now that He had obtained the glory of the resurrection, He was far removed, and to whose faith, as yet ignorant of His resurrection, He remained foreign. But again the Lord asks; for it follows, And he said unto them, What things? And their answer is given, Concerning Jesus of Nazareth, who was a Prophet. They confess Him to be a Prophet, but say nothing of the Son of God; either not yet perfectly believing, or fearful of falling into the hands of the persecuting Jews; either knowing not who He was, or concealing the truth which they believed. They add in praise of Him, mighty in deed and word.

THEOPHYLACT. First comes deed, then word; for no word of teaching is approved unless first he who teaches shews himself to be a doer thereof. For acting goes before sight; for unless by thy works thou hast cleansed the glass of the understanding, the desired brightness does not appear. But still further it is added, Before God and all the people. For first of all we must please God, and then have regard as far as we can to honesty before men, that placing the honour of God first, we may live without offence to mankind.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. (ut sup.) They next assign the cause of their sadness, the betrayal and passion of Christ; and add in the voice of despair, But we hoped it had been he who should have redeemed Israel. We hoped, (he says,) not we hope; as if the death of the Lord were like to the deaths of other men.

THEOPHYLACT. For they expected that Christ would redeem Israel from the evils that were rising up among them and the Roman slavery. They trusted also that He was an earthly king, whom they thought would be able to escape the sentence of death passed upon Him.

BEDE. Reason had they then for sorrow, because in some sort they blamed themselves for having hoped redemption in Him whom now they saw dead, and believed not that He would rise again, and most of all they bewailed Him put to death without a cause, whom they knew to be innocent.

THEOPHYLACT. And yet those men seem not to have been altogether without faith, by what follows, And besides all this, to day is the third day since these things were done. Whereby they seem to have a recollection of what the Lord had told them that He would rise again on the third day.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. The disciples also mention the report of the resurrection which was brought by the women; adding, Yea, and certain women also of our company made us astonished, &c. They say this indeed as if they did not believe it; wherefore they speak of themselves as frightened or astonished. For they did consider as established what was told them, or that there had been an angelic revelation, but derived from it reason for astonishment and alarm. The testimony of Peter also they did not regard as certain, since he did not say that he had seen our Lord, but conjectured His resurrection from the fact that His body was not lying in the sepulchre. Hence it follows, And certain of them that were with us went, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) But since Luke has said that Peter ran to the sepulchre, and has himself related the words of Cleophas, that some of them went to the sepulchre, he is understood to confirm the testimony of John, that two went to the sepulchre. He first mentioned Peter only, because to him first Mary had related the news.

24:25–35

25. Then he said unto them, O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken:

26. Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into his glory?

27. And beginning at Moses and all the prophets, he expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself.

28. And they drew nigh unto the village, whither they went: and he made as though he would have gone further.

29. But they constrained him, saying, Abide with us: for it is toward evening, and the day is far spent. And he went in to tarry with them.

30. And it came to pass, as he sat at meat with them, he took bread, and blessed it, and brake, and gave to them.

31. And their eyes were opened, and they knew him; and he vanished out of their sight.

32. And they said one to another, Did not our heart burn within us, while he talked with us by the way, and while he opened to us the Scriptures?

33. And they rose up the same hour, and returned to Jerusalem, and found the eleven gathered together, and them that were with them,

34. Saying, The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon.

35. And they told what things were done in the way, and how he was known of them in breaking of bread.

THEOPHYLACT. Because the above-mentioned disciples were troubled with too much doubt, the Lord reproves them, saying, O fools, (for they almost used the same words as those who stood by the cross, He saved others, himself he cannot save.) And He proceeds, and slow of heart to believe all that the prophets have spoken. For it is possible to believe some of these things and not all; as if a man should believe what the Prophets say of the cross of Christ, as in the Psalms, They pierced my hands and my feet; (Ps. 22:16.) but should not believe what they say of the resurrection, as, Thou shall not suffer thy Holy One to see corruption. (Ps. 16:10.) But it becomes us in all things to give faith to the Prophets, as well in the glorious things which they predicted of Christ, as the inglorious, since through the suffering of evil things is the entrance into glory. Hence it follows, Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into his glory? that is, as respects His humanity.

ISIDORE OF PELEUSIUM. (lib. iii. Ep. 98.) But although it behoved Christ to suffer, yet they who crucified Him are guilty of inflicting the punishment. For they were not concerned to accomplish what God purposed. Therefore their execution of it was impious, but God's purpose most wise, who converted their iniquity into a blessing upon mankind, using as it were the viper's flesh for the working of a health-giving antidote.

CHRYSOSTOM. And therefore our Lord goes on to shew that all these things did not happen in a common way, but from the predestined purpose of God. Hence it follows, And beginning at Moses and all the Prophets, he expounded to them in all the Scriptures the things concerning himself. As if He said, Since ye are slow I will render you quick, by explaining to you the mysteries of the Scriptures. For the sacrifice of Abraham, when releasing Isaac he sacrificed the ram, prefigured Christ's sacrifice. But in the other writings of the Prophets also there are scattered about mysteries of Christ's cross and the resurrection.

BEDE. But if Moses and the Prophets spoke of Christ, and prophesied that through His Passion He would enter into glory, how does that man boast that he is a Christian, who neither searches how these Scriptures relate to Christ, nor desires to attain by suffering to that glory which he hopes to have with Christ.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. But since the Evangelist said before, Their eyes were holden that they should not know him, until the words of the Lord should move their minds to faith, He fitly affords in addition to their hearing a favourable object to their sight. As it follows, And they drew nigh to the fortress whither they were going, and he feigned as if he was going further.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Ev. lib. ii. c. 51.) Now this relates not to falsehood. For not every thing we feign is a falsehood, but only when we feign that which means nothing. But when our feigning has reference to a certain meaning it is not a falsehood, but a kind of figure of the truth. Otherwise all the things figuratively spoken by wise and holy men, or even by our Lord Himself, must be accounted falsehoods. For to the experienced understanding truth consists not in certain words, but as words so also deeds are feigned without falsehood to signify a particular thing.

GREGORY. (Hom. 22 in Ev.) Because then He was still a stranger to faith in their hearts, He feigned as if he would go further. By the word “fingere” we mean to put together or form, and hence formers or preparers of mud we call “figuli.” He who was the Truth itself did nothing then by deceit, but exhibited Himself in the body such as He came before them in their minds. But because they could not be strangers to charity, with whom charity was walking, they invite Him as if a stranger to partake of their hospitality. Hence it follows, And they compelled him. From which example it is gathered that strangers are not only to be invited to hospitality, but even to be taken by force.

GLOSS. They not only compel Him by their actions, but induce Him by their words; for it follows, saying, Abide with us, for it is towards evening, and the day is far gone, (that is, towards its close.)

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Now behold Christ since He is received through His members, so He seeks His receivers through Himself; for it follows, And he went in with them. They lay out a table, they bring food. And God whom they had not known in the expounding of Scriptures, they knew in the breaking of bread; for it follows, And it came to pass, as he sat at meat with them, he took bread, and blessed it, and brake, and gave it to them. And their eyes were opened, and they knew him.

CHRYSOSTOM. This was said not of their bodily eyes, but of their mental sight.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. iii. c. 25.) For they walked not with their eyes shut, but there was something within them which did not permit them to know that which they saw, which a mist, darkness, or some kind of moisture, frequently occasions. Not that the Lord was not able to transform His flesh that it should be really a different form from that which they were accustomed to behold; since in truth also before His passion, He was transfigured in the mount, so that His face was bright as the sun. But it was not so now. For we do not unfitly take this obstacle in the sight to have been caused by Satan, that Jesus might not be known. But still it was so permitted by Christ up to the sacrament of the bread, that by partaking of the unity of His body, the obstacle of the enemy might be understood to be removed, so that Christ might be known.

THEOPHYLACT. But He also implies another thing, that the eyes of those who receive the sacred bread are opened that they should know Christ. For the Lord’s flesh has in it a great and ineffable power.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Or because the Lord feigned as if He would go farther, when He was accompanying the disciples, expounding to them the sacred Scriptures, who knew not whether it was He, what does He mean to imply but that through the duty of hospitality men may arrive at a knowledge of Him; that when He has departed from mankind far above the heavens, He is still with those who perform this duty to His servants. He therefore holds to Christ, that He should not go far from him, whoever being taught in the word communicates in all good things to him who teaches. (Gal. 6:6.) For they were taught in the word when He expounded to them the Scriptures. And because they followed hospitality, Him whom they knew not in the expounding of the Scriptures, they know in the breaking of bread. For not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified. (Rom. 2:13.)

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Whoever then wishes to understand what he has heard, let him hasten to fulfil in work what he can now understand. Behold the Lord was not known when He was speaking, and He vouchsafed to be known when He is eating. It follows, And he vanished out of their sight.

THEOPHYLACT. For He had not such a body as that He was able to abide longer with them, that thereby likewise He might increase their affections. And they said one to another, Did not our hearts burn, within us while he talked with us by the way, and while he opened to us the scriptures?

ORIGEN. By which is implied, that the words uttered by the Saviour inflamed the hearts of the hearers to the love of God.

GREGORY. (Hom. 10. in Ev.) By the word which is heard the spirit is kindled, the chill of dulness departs, the mind becomes awakened with heavenly desire. It rejoices to hear heavenly precepts, and every command in which it is instructed, is as it were adding a faggot to the fire.

THEOPHYLACT. Their hearts then were turned either by the fire of our Lord’s words, to which they listened as the truth, or because as He expounded the Scriptures, their hearts wore greatly struck within them, that He who was speaking was the Lord. Therefore were they so rejoiced, that without delay they returned to Jerusalem. And hence what follows, And they rose up the same hour, and returned to Jerusalem. They rose up indeed the same hour, but they arrived after many hours, as they had to travel sixty stades.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. iii. c. 25.) It had been already reported that Jesus had risen by the women, and by Simon Peter, to whom He had appeared. For these two disciples found them talking of these things when they came to Jerusalem; as it follows, And they found the eleven gathered together, and them that were with them, saying, The Lord is risen indeed, and hath appeared to Simon.

BEDE. It seems that our Lord appeared to Peter first of all those whom the four Evangelists and the Apostle mention.

CHRYSOSTOM. For He did not shew Himself to all at the same time, in order that He might sow the seeds of faith. For he who had first seen and was sure, told it to the rest. Afterwards the word going forth prepared the mind of the hearer for the sight, and therefore He appeared first to him who was of all the most worthy and faithful. For He had need of the most faithful soul to first receive this sight, that it might be least disturbed by the unexpected appearance. And therefore He is first seen by Peter, that he who first confessed Christ should first deserve to see His resurrection, and also because he had denied Him He wished to see him first, to console him, lest he should despair. But after Peter, He appeared to the rest, at one time fewer in number, at another more, which the two disciples attest; for it follows, And they told what things were done by the way, and how he was known of them in breaking of bread.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) But with respect to what Mark says, that they told the rest, and they did not believe them, whereas Luke says, that they had already begun to say, The Lord is risen indeed, what must we understand, except that there were some even then who refused to believe this?

24:36–40

36. And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you.

37. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed they had seen a spirit.

38. And he said unto them, Why are ye troubled? and why do thoughts arise in your hearts?

39. Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have.

40. And when he had thus spoken, he shewed them his hands and feet.

CHRYSOSTOM. The report of Christ's resurrection being published every where by the Apostles, and while the anxiety of the disciples was easily awakened to see Christ, He that was so much desired comes, and is revealed to them that were seeking and expecting Him. Nor in a doubtful manner, but with the clearest evidence, He presents Himself, as it is said, And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. iii. c. 25.) This manifestation of our Lord after His resurrection, John also relates. But when John says that the Apostle Thomas was not with the rest, while according to Luke, the two disciples on their return to Jerusalem found the eleven gathered together, we must understand undoubtedly that Thomas departed from them, before our Lord appeared to them as they spoke these things. For Luke gives occasion in his narrative, that it may be understood that Thomas first went out from them when the rest were saying these things, and that our Lord entered afterwards. Unless some one should say that the eleven were not those who were then called Apostles, but that these were eleven disciples out of the large number of disciples. But since Luke has added, And those that were with them, he has surely made it sufficiently evident that those called the eleven were the same as those who were called Apostles, with whom the rest were.

But let us see what mystery it was for the sake of which, according to Matthew and Mark, our Lord when He rose again gave the following command, I will go before you into Galilee, there shall ye see me. Which although it was accomplished, yet it was not till after many other things had happened, whereas it was so commanded, that it might be expected that it would have taken place alone, or at least before other things.

AMBROSE. Therefore I think it most natural that our Lord indeed instructed His disciples, that they should see Him in Galilee, but that He first presents Himself as they remained still in the assembly through fear.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. Nor was it a violation of His promise, but rather a mercifully hastened fulfilment on account of the cowardice of the disciples.

AMBROSE. But afterwards when their hearts were strengthened, the eleven set out for Galilee. Or there is no difficulty in supposing that they should be reported to have been fewer in the assembly, and a larger number on the mountain.

EUSEBIUS. For the two Evangelists, that is, Luke and John, write that He appeared to the eleven alone in Jerusalem, but those two disciples told not only the eleven, but all the disciples and brethren, that both the angel and the Saviour had commanded them to hasten to Galilee; of whom also Paul made mention, saying, Afterwards he appeared to more than five hundred brethren at once. (1 Cor. 15:6.) But the truer explanation is, that at first indeed while they remained in secret at Jerusalem, He appeared once or twice for their comfort, but that in Galilee not in the assembly, or once or twice, but with great power, He made a manifestation of Himself, shewing Himself living to them after His Passion with many signs, as Luke testifies in the Acts. (Acts 1:3.)

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) But that which was said by the Angel, that is the Lord, must be taken prophetically, for by the word Galilee according to its meaning of transmigration, it is to be understood that they were about to pass over from the people of Israel to the Gentiles, to whom the Apostles preaching would not entrust the Gospel, unless the Lord Himself should prepare His way in the hearts of men. And this is what is meant by, He shall go before you into Galilee, there shall ye see him. But according to the interpretation of Galilee, by which it means “manifestation,” we must understand that He will be revealed no more in the form of a servant, but in that form in which He is equal to the Father, which He has promised to His elect. That manifestation will be as it were the true Galilee, when we shall see Him as He is. This will also be that far more blessed transmigration from the world to eternity, from whence though coming to us He did not depart, and to which going before us He has not deserted us.

THEOPHYLACT. The Lord then standing in the midst of the disciples, first with His accustomed salutation of “peace,” allays their restlessness, shewing that He is the same Master who delighted in the word wherewith He also fortified them, when He sent them to preach. Hence it follows, And he said to them, Peace be unto you; I am he, fear not.

GREGORY NAZIANZEN. (Orat. 22.) Let us then reverence the gift of peace, which Christ when He departed hence left to us. Peace both in name and reality is sweet, which also we have heard to be of God, as it is said, The peace of God; (Phil. 4:7.) and that God is of it, as He is our peace.

(Eph. 2:14.) Peace is a blessing commended by all, but observed by few. What then is the cause? Perhaps the desire of dominion or riches, or the envy or hatred of our neighbour, or some one of those vices into which we see men fall who know not God. For peace is peculiarly of God, who binds all things together in one, to whom nothing so much belongs as the unity of nature, and a peaceful condition. It is borrowed indeed by angels and divine powers, which are peacefully disposed towards God and one another. It is diffused through the whole creation, whose glory is tranquillity. But in us it abides in our souls indeed by the following and imparting of the virtues, in our bodies by the harmony of our members and organs, of which the one is called beauty, the other health.

BEDE. The disciples had known Christ to be really man, having been so long a time with Him; but after that He was dead, they do not believe that the real flesh could rise again from the grave on the third day. They think then that they see the spirit which He gave up at His passion. Therefore it follows, But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit. This mistake of the Apostles was the heresy of the Manichæans.

AMBROSE. But persuaded by the example of their virtues, we can not believe that Peter and John could have doubted. Why then does Luke relate them to have been affrighted. First of all because the declaration of the greater part includes the opinion of the few. Secondly, because although Peter believed in the resurrection, yet he might be amazed when the doors being closed Jesus suddenly presents Himself with His body.

THEOPHYLACT. Because by the word of peace the agitation in the minds of the Apostles was not allayed, He shews by another token that He is the Son of God, in that He knew the secrets of their hearts; for it follows, And he said to them, Why are ye troubled, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts?

BEDE. What thoughts indeed but such as were false and dangerous. For Christ had lost the fruit of His passion, had He not been the Truth of the resurrection; just as if a good husbandman should say, What I have planted there, I shall find, that is, the faith which descends into the heart, because it is from above. But those thoughts did not descend from above, but ascended from below into the heart like worthless plants.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Here then was a most evident sign that He whom they now see was none other but the same whom they had seen dead on the cross, and lain in the sepulchre, who knew every thing that was in man.

AMBROSE. Let us then consider how it happens that the Apostles according to John believed and rejoiced, according to Luke are reproved as unbelieving. John indeed seems to me, as being an Apostle, to have treated of greater and higher things; Luke of those which relate and are close akin to human. The one follows an historic course, the other is content with an abridgment, because it could not be doubted of him, who gives his testimony concerning those things at which he was himself present. And therefore we deem both true. For although at first Luke says that they did not believe, yet he explains that they afterwards did believe.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. Now our Lord testifying that death was overcome, and human nature had now in Christ put on incorruption, first shews them His hands and His feet, and the print of the nails; as it follows, Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself.

THEOPHYLACT. But He adds also another proof, namely, the handling of His hands and feet, when He says, Handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have. As if to say, Ye think me a spirit, that is to say, a ghost, as many of the dead are wont to be seen about their graves. But know ye that a spirit hath neither flesh nor bones, but I have flesh and bones.

AMBROSE. Our Lord said this in order to afford us an image of our resurrection. For that which is handled is the body. But in our bodies we shall rise again. But the former is more subtle, the latter more carnal, as being still mixed up with the qualities of earthly corruption. Not then by His incorporeal nature, but by the quality of His bodily resurrection, Christ passed through the shut doors.

GREGORY. (Mor. 14. c. 55.) For in that glory of the resurrection our body will not be incapable of handling, and more subtle than the winds and the air, (as Eutychius said,) but while it is subtle indeed through the effect of spiritual power, it will be also capable of handling through the power of nature. It follows, And when he had thus spoken, he shewed them his hands and his feet, on which indeed were clearly marked the prints of the nails. But according to John, He also shewed them His side which had been pierced with the spear, that by manifesting the scar of His wounds He might heal the wound of their doubtfulness. But from this place the Gentiles are fond of raising up a calumny, as if He was not able to cure the wound inflicted on Him. To whom we must answer, that it is not probable that He who is proved to have done the greater should be unable to do the less. But for the sake of His sure purpose, He who destroyed death would not blot out the signs of death. First indeed, that He might thereby build up His disciples in the faith of His resurrection. Secondly, that supplicating the Father for us, He might always shew forth what kind of death He endured for many. Thirdly, that He might point out to those redeemed by His death, by setting before them the signs of that death, how mercifully they have been succoured. Lastly, that He might declare in the judgment how justly the wicked are condemned.

24:41–44

41. And while they yet believed not for joy, and wondered, he said unto them, Have ye here any meat?

42. And they gave him a piece of a broiled fish, and of an honeycomb.

43. And he took it, and did eat before them.

44. And he said unto them, These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled, which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. The Lord had shewn His disciples His hands and His feet, that He might certify to them that the same body which had suffered rose again. But to confirm them still more, He asked for something to eat.

GREGORY OF NYSSA. (Orat. 1. de Res.) By the command of the law indeed the Passover was eaten with bitter herbs, because the bitterness of bondage still remained, but after the resurrection the food is sweetened with a honeycomb; as it follows, And they gave him a piece of a broiled fish, and a honeycomb.

BEDE. To convey therefore the truth of His resurrection, He condescends not only to be touched by His disciples, but to eat with them, that they might not suspect that His appearance was not actual, but only imaginary.

Hence it follows, And when he had eaten before them, he took the remnant, and gave to them. He ate indeed by His power, not from necessity. The thirsty earth absorbs water in one way, the burning sun in another way, the one from want, the other from power.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. But some one will say, If we allow that our Lord ate after His resurrection, let us also grant that all men will after the resurrection take the nourishment of food. But these things which for a certain purpose are done by our Saviour, are not the rule and measure of nature, since in other things He has purposed differently. For He will raise our bodies, not defective but perfect and incorrupt, who yet left on His own body the prints which the nails had made, and the wound in His side, in order to shew that the nature of His body remained the same after the resurrection, and that He was not changed into another substance.

BEDE. He ate therefore after the resurrection, not as needing food, nor as signifying that the resurrection which we are expecting will need food; but that He might thereby build up the nature of a rising body. But mystically, the broiled fish of which Christ ate signifies the sufferings of Christ. For He having condescended to lie in the waters of the human race, was willing to be taken by the hook of our death, and was as it were burnt up by anguish at the time of His Passion. But the honeycomb was present to us at the resurrection. By the honeycomb He wished to represent to us the two natures of His person. For the honeycomb is of wax, but the honey in the wax is the Divine nature in the human.

THEOPHYLACT. The things eaten seem also to contain another mystery. For in that He ate part of a broiled fish, He signifies that having burnt by the fire of His own divinity our nature swimming in the sea of this life, and dried up the moisture which it had contracted from the waves, He made it divine food; and that which was before abominable He prepared to be a sweet offering to God, which the honeycomb signifies. Or by the broiled fish He signifies the active life, drying up the moisture with the coals of labour, but by the honeycomb, the contemplative life on account of the sweetness of the oracles of God.

BEDE. But after that He was seen, touched, and had eaten, lest He should seem to have mocked the human senses in any one respect, He had recourse to the Scriptures. And he said unto them, These are the words which I spake unto you, when I was yet with you, that is, when I was yet in the mortal flesh, in which ye also are. He indeed was then raised again in the same flesh, but was not in the same mortality with them. And He adds, That all things must be fulfilled which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning me.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. lib. i. c. 11.) Let those then who dream that Christ could have done such things by magical arts, and by the same art have consecrated His name to the nations to be converted to Him, consider whether He could by magical arts fill the Prophets with the Divine Spirit before He was born. For neither supposing that He caused Himself to be worshipped when dead, was He a magician before He was born, to whom one nation was assigned to prophesy His coming.

24:45–49

45. Then opened he their understanding, that they might understand the Scriptures,

46. And said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day:

47. And that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem.

48. And ye are witnesses of these things.

49. And, behold, I send the promise of my Father upon you: but tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high.

BEDE. After having presented Himself to be seen with the eye, and handled with hands, and having brought to their minds the Scriptures of the law, He next opened their understanding that they should understand what was read.

THEOPHYLACT. Otherwise, how would their agitated and perplexed minds have learnt the mystery of Christ. But He taught them by His words; for it follows, And said unto them, Thus it is written, and thus it behoved Christ to suffer, that is, by the wood of the Cross.

BEDE. But Christ would have lost the fruit of His Passion had He not been the Truth of the resurrection, therefore it is said, And to rise from the dead. He then after having commended to them the truth of the body, commends the unity of the Church, adding, And that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name among all nations.

EUSEBIUS. For it was said, Ask of me, and I will give thee the heathen for thine inheritance. (Ps. 2:8.) But it was necessary that those who were converted from the Gentiles should be purged from a certain stain and defilement through His virtue, being as it were corrupted by the evil of the worship of devils, and as lately converted from an abominable and unchaste life. And therefore He says that it behoves that first repentance should be preached, but next, remission of sins, to all nations. For to those who first shewed repentance for their sins, by His saving grace He granted pardon of their transgression, for whom also He endured death.

THEOPHYLACT. But herein that He says, Repentance and remission of sins, He also makes mention of baptism, in which by the putting off of our past sins there follows pardon of iniquity. But how must we understand baptism to be performed in the name of Christ alone, whereas in another place He commands it to be in the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost. First indeed we say that it is not meant that baptism is administered in Christ's name alone, but that a person is baptized with the baptism of Christ, that is, spiritually, not Judaically, nor with the baptism, wherewith John baptized unto repentance only, but unto the participation of the blessed Spirit; as Christ also when baptized in Jordan manifested the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove. Moreover you must understand baptism in Christ's name to be in His death. For as He after death rose again on the third day, so we also are three times dipped in the water, and fitly brought out again, receiving thereby an earnest of the immortality of the Spirit. This name of Christ also contains in itself both the Father as the Anointer, and the Spirit as the Anointing, and the Son as the Anointed, that is, in His human nature. But it was fitting that the race of man should no longer be divided into Jews and Gentiles, and therefore that He might unite all in one, He commanded that their preaching should begin at Jerusalem, but be finished with the Gentiles. Hence it follows, Beginning at Jerusalem. (Rom. 3:2, Rom. 9:4.)

BEDE. Not only because to them were entrusted the oracles of God, and theirs is the adoption and the glory, but also that the Gentiles entangled in various errors might by this sign of Divine mercy be chiefly invited to come to hope, seeing that to them even who crucified the Son of God pardon is granted.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. i. in Act.) Further, lest any should say that abandoning their acquaintances they went to shew themselves, (or as it were to vaunt themselves with a kind of pomp,) to strangers, therefore first among the very murderers themselves are the signs of the resurrection displayed, in that very city wherein the frantic outrage burst forth. For where the crucifiers themselves are seen to believe, there the resurrection is most of all demonstrated.

EUSEBIUS. But if those things which Christ foretold are already receiving their accomplishment, and His word is perceived by a seeing faith to be living and effectual throughout the whole world; it is time for men not to be unbelieving towards Him who uttered that word. For it is necessary that He should live a divine life, whose living works are shewn to be agreeable to His words; and these indeed have been fulfilled by the ministry of the Apostles. Hence He adds, But ye are witnesses of these things, &c. that is, of My death and resurrection.

THEOPHYLACT. Afterwards, lest they should be troubled at the thought, How shall we private individuals give our testimony to the Jews and Gentiles who have killed Thee? He subjoins, And, behold, I send the promise of my Father upon you, &c. which indeed He had promised by the mouth of the prophet Joel, I will pour my Spirit upon all flesh. (Joel 2:18.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. i. in Act.) But as a general does not permit his soldiers who are about to meet a large number, to go out until they are armed, so also the Lord does not permit His disciples to go forth to the conflict before the descent of the Spirit. And hence He adds, But tarry ye in the city of Jerusalem, until ye be endued with power from on high.

THEOPHYLACT. That is, not with human but heavenly power. He said not, until ye receive, but be endued with, shewing the entire protection of the spiritual armour.

BEDE. But concerning the power, that is, the Holy Spirit, the Angel also says to Mary, And the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee. (Luke 1:35.) And the Lord Himself says elsewhere, For I know that virtue is gone out of me. (Luke 8:45.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (ut sup.) But why did not the Spirit come while Christ was present, or immediately on His departure? Because it was fitting that they should become desirous of grace, and then at length receive it. For we are then most awakened towards God, when difficulties press upon us. It was necessary in the mean time that our nature should appear in Heaven, and the covenants be completed, and that then the Spirit should come, and pure joys be experienced. Mark also what a necessity He imposed upon them of being at Jerusalem, in that He promised that the Spirit should there be given them. For lest they should again flee away after His resurrection, by this expectation, as it were a chain, He kept them all there together. But He says, until ye be endued from on high. He did not express the time when, in order that they may be constantly watchful. But why then marvel that He does not reveal to us our last day, when He would not even make known this day which was close at hand.

GREGORY. (de Past. 3. c. 25.) They then are to be warned, whom age or imperfection hinders from the office of preaching, and yet rashness impels, lest while they hastily arrogate to themselves so responsible an office, they should cut themselves off from the way of future amendment. For the Truth Itself which could suddenly strengthen those whom it wished, in order to give an example to those that follow, that imperfect men should not presume to preach, after having fully instructed the disciples concerning the virtue of preaching, commanded them to abide in the city, until they were endued with power from on high. For we abide in a city, when we keep ourselves close within the gates of our minds, lest by speaking we wander beyond them; that when we are perfectly endued with divine power, we may then as it were go out beyond ourselves to instruct others.

AMBROSE. But let us consider how according to John they received the Holy Spirit, while here they are ordered to stay in the city until they should be endued with power from on high. Either He breathed the Holy Spirit into the eleven, as being more perfect, and promised to give it to the rest afterwards; or to the same persons He breathed in the one place, He promised in the other. Nor does there seem to be any contradiction, since there are diversities of graces. Therefore one operation He breathed into them there, another He promised here. For there the grace of remitting sins was given, which seems to be more confined, and therefore is breathed into them by Christ, that you may believe the Holy Spirit to be of Christ, to be from God. For God alone forgiveth sins. But Luke describes the pouring forth of the grace of speaking with tongues.

CHRYSOSTOM. Or He said, Receive ye the Holy Spirit, that He might make them fit to receive it, or indicated as present that which was to come.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. 15. c. 26.) Or the Lord after His resurrection gave the Holy Spirit twice, once on earth, because of the love of our neighbour, and again from heaven, because of the love of God.

24:50–53

50. And he led them out as far as to Bethany, and he lifted up his hands, and blessed them.

51. And it came to pass, while he blessed them, he was parted from them, and carried up into heaven.

52. And they worshipped him, and returned to Jerusalem with great joy:

53. And were continually in the temple, praising and blessing God. Amen.

BEDE. Having omitted all those things which may have taken place during forty-three days between our Lord and His disciples, St. Luke silently joins to the first day of the resurrection, the last day when He ascended into heaven, saying, And he led them out as far as to Bethany. First, indeed, because of the name of the place, which signifies “the house of obedience.” For He who descended because of the disobedience of the wicked, ascended because of the obedience of the converted. Next, because of the situation of the same village, which is said to be placed on the side of the mount of Olives; because He has placed the foundations, as it were, of the house of the obedient Church, of faith, hope, and love, in the side of that highest mountain, namely, Christ. But He blessed them to whom He had delivered the precepts of His teaching; hence it follows, And he lifted up his hands, and blessed them.

THEOPHYLACT. Perhaps pouring into them a power of preservation, until the coming of the Spirit; and perhaps instructing them, that as often as we go away, we should commend to God by our blessing those who are placed under us.

ORIGEN. But that He blessed them with uplifted hands, signifies that it becomes him who blesses any one to be furnished with various works and labours in behalf of others. For in this way are the hands raised up on high.

CHRYSOSTOM. But observe, that the Lord submits to our sight the promised rewards. He had promised the resurrection of the body; He rose from the dead, and conferred with His disciples for forty days. It is also promised that we shall be caught up in the clouds through the air; this also He made manifest by His works. For it follows, And it came to pass, while he blessed them, he was parted, &c.

THEOPHYLACT. And Elias indeed was seen, as it were, to be taken up into heaven, but the Saviour, the forerunner of all, Himself ascended into heaven to appear in the Divine sight in His sacred body; and already is our nature honoured in Christ by a certain Angelic power.

CHRYSOSTOM. But you will say, How does this concern me? Because thou also shalt be taken up in like manner into the clouds. For thy body is of like nature to His body, therefore shall thy body be so light, that it can pass through the air. For as is the head, so also is the body; as the beginning, so also the end. See then how thou art honoured by this beginning. Man was the lowest part of the rational creation, but the feet have been made the head, being lifted up aloft into the royal throne in their head.

BEDE. When the Lord ascended into heaven, the disciples adoring Him where His feet lately stood, immediately return to Jerusalem, where they were commanded to wait for the promise of the Father; for it follows, And they worshipped him, and returned, &c. Great indeed was their joy, for they rejoice that their God and Lord after the triumph of His resurrection had also passed into the heavens.

GREEK EXPOSITOR. And they were watching, praying, and fasting, because indeed they were not living in their own homes, but were abiding in the temple, expecting the grace from on high; among other things also learning from the very place piety and honesty. Hence it is said, And were continually in the temple.

THEOPHYLACT. The Spirit had not yet come, and yet their conversation is spiritual. Before they were shut up; now they stand in the midst of the chief priests; distracted by no worldly object, but despising all things, they praise God continually; as it follows, Praising and blessing God.

BEDE. And observe that among the four beasts in heaven, (Ezek. 1:10. Rev. 4:7) Luke is said to be represented by the calf, for by the sacrifice of a calf, they were ordered to be initiated who were chosen to the priesthood; (Exod. 29:1.) and Luke has undertaken to explain more fully than the rest the priesthood of Christ; and his Gospel, which he commenced with the ministry of the temple in the priesthood of Zacharias, he has finished with the devotion in the temple. And he has placed the Apostles there, about to be the ministers of a new priesthood, not in the blood of sacrifices, but in the praises of God and in blessing, that in the place of prayer and amidst the praises of their devotion, they might wait with prepared hearts for the promise of the Spirit.

THEOPHYLACT. Whom imitating, may we ever dwell in a holy life, praising and blessing God; to Whom be glory and blessing and power, for ever and ever. Amen.

CATENA AUREA: COMMENTARY ON THE FOUR GOSPELS COLLECTED OUT OF THE WORKS OF THE FATHERS: VOL. IV. PART 1 AND 2 ST. JOHN

ADVERTISEMENT

THE. following Compilation not being admissible into the Library of the Fathers from the date of some few of the authors introduced into it, the Editors of the latter work have been led to publish it in a separate form, being assured entire Treatises of the ancient Catholic divines, will not feel less interest, or find less benefit, in the use of so very judicious and beautiful a selection form them. The Editors refer to the Preface for some account of the natural and characteristic excellences of the work, which will be found as useful in the private study of the Gospels, as it is well adapted for family reading, and full of thought for those who are engaged in religious instruction.

Oxford, May 6, 1841.

COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL ACCORDING TO ST. JOHN

CHAPTER 1

1:1

Ver. 1. In the beginning was the Word,

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iv. [iii.] in Joan) While all the other Evangelists begin with the Incarnation, John, passing over the Conception, Nativity, education, and growth, speaks immediately of the Eternal Generation, saying, In the beginning was the Word.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. q. 63) The Greek word “logos” signifies both Word and Reason. But in this passage it is better to interpret it Word; as referring not only to the Father, but to the creation of things by the operative power of the Word; whereas Reason, though it produce nothing, is still rightly called Reason.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. super Joan. i. c. 8) Words by their daily use, sound, and passage out of us, have become common things. But there is a word which remaineth inward, in the very man himself; distinct from the sound which proceedeth out of the mouth. There is a word, which is truly and spiritually that, which you understand by the sound, not being the actual sound. (de Trin. l. xv. c. 19. [x.]). Now whoever can conceive the notion of word, as existing not only before its sound, but even before the idea of its sound is formed, may see enigmatically, and as it were in a glass, some similitude of that Word of Which it is said, In the beginning was the Word. For when we give expression to something which we know, the word used is necessarily derived from the knowledge thus retained in the memory, and must be of the same quality with that knowledge. For a word is a thought formed from a thing which we know; which word is spoken in the heart, being neither Greek nor Latin, nor of any language, though, when we want to communicate it to others, some sign is assumed by which to express it.… (Ibid. cap. 20. [xi.]). Wherefore the word which sounds externally, is a sign of the word which lies hid within, to which the name of word more truly appertains. For that which is uttered by the mouth of our flesh, is the voice of the word; and is in fact called word, with reference to that from which it is taken, when it is developed externally.

BASIL. (Hom. in princ. Joan.) This Word is not a human word. For how was there a human word in the beginning, when man received his being last of all? There was not then any word of man in the beginning, nor yet of Angels; for every creature is within the limits of time, having its beginning of existence from the Creator. But what says the Gospel? It calls the Only-Begotten Himself the Word.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. ii. [i.] §. 4) But why omitting the Father, does he proceed at once to speak of the Son? Because the Father was known to all; though not as the Father, yet as God; whereas the Only-Begotten was not known. As was meet then, he endeavours first of all to inculcate the knowledge of the Son on those who knew Him not; though neither in discoursing on Him, is he altogether silent on the Father. And inasmuch as he was about to teach that the Word was the Only-Begotten Son of God, that no one might think this a passible (παθητὴν) generation, he makes mention of the Word in the first place, in order to destroy the dangerous suspicion, and shew that the Son was from God impassibly. And a second reason is, that He was to declare unto us the things of the Father. (John. 15:15) But he does not speak of the Word simply, but with the addition of the article, in order to distinguish It from other words. For Scripture calls God’s laws and commandments words; but this Word is a certain Substance, or Person, an Essence, coming forth impassibly from the Father Himself.

BASIL. (Hom. in Princ. Joan. c. 3) Wherefore then Word? Because born impassibly, the Image of Him that begat, manifesting all the Father in Himself; abstracting from Him nothing, but existing perfect in Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (xv. de Trin. c. 22. [xiii.]) As our knowledge differs from God’s, so does our word, which arises from our knowledge, differ from that Word of God, which is born of the Father’s essence; we might say, from the Father’s knowledge, the Father’s wisdom, or, more correctly, the Father Who is Knowledge, the Father Who is Wisdom. (c. 23. (xiv.)) The Word of God then, the Only-Begotten Son of the Father, is in all things like and equal to the Father; being altogether what the Father is, yet not the Father; because the one is the Son, the other the Father. And thereby He knoweth all things which the Father knoweth; yet His knowledge is from the Father, ever as is His being: for knowing and being are the same with Him; and so as the Father's being is not from the Son, so neither is His knowing. Wherefore the Father begat the Word equal to Himself in all things as uttering forth Himself. For had there been more or less in His Word than in Himself, He would not have uttered Himself fully and perfectly. With respect however to our own inner word, which we find, in whatever sense, to be like the Word, let us not object to see how very unlike it is also. (cap. 25. (xv.)) A word is a formation of our mind going to take place, but not yet made, and something in our mind which we toss to and fro in a slippery circuitous way, as one thing and another is discovered, or occurs to our thoughts. When this, which we toss to and fro, has reached the subject of our knowledge, and been formed therefrom, when it has assumed the most exact likeness to it, and the conception has quite answered to the thing; then we have a true word. Who may not see how great the difference is here from that Word of God, which exists in the Form of God in such wise, that It could not have been first going to be formed, and afterwards formed, nor can ever have been unformed, being a Form absolute, and absolutely equal to Him from Whom It is. Wherefore in speaking of the Word of God here nothing is said about thought in God; lest we should think there was any thing revolving in God, which might first receive form in order to be a Word, and afterwards lose it, and be carried round and round again in an unformed state.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. 38) Now the Word of God is a Form, not a formation, but the Form of all forms, a Form unchangeable, removed from accident, from failure, from time, from space, surpassing all things, and existing in all things as a kind of foundation underneath, and summit above them.

BASIL. (Hom. in princ. Joan. c. 3) Yet has our outward word some similarity to the Divine Word. For our word declares the whole conception of the mind; since what we conceive in the mind we bring out in word. Indeed our heart is as it were the source, and the uttered word the stream which flows therefrom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. i) Observe the spiritual wisdom of the Evangelist. He knew that men honoured most what was most ancient, and that honouring what is before every thing else, they conceived of it as God.

On this account he mentions first the beginning, saying, In the beginning was the Word.

ORIGEN. (tom. i. in Joan. c. 16. et sq.) There are many significations of this word beginning. For there is a beginning of a journey, and beginning of a length, according to Proverbs, The beginning of the right path is to do justice. (Prov. 16. Vulg. Job. 40:19) There is a beginning too of a creation, according to Job, He is the beginning1 of the ways of God. Nor would it be incorrect to say, that God is the Beginning of all things. The preexistent material again, where supposed to be original, out of which any thing is produced, is considered as the beginning. There is a beginning also in respect of form: as where Christ is the beginning of those who are made according to the image of God. And there is a beginning of doctrine, according to Hebrews; When for the time ye ought to be teachers, ye have need that one teach you again which be the first principles of the oracles of God. (Heb. 5:12) For there are two kinds of beginning of doctrine: one in itself, the other relative to us; as if we should say that Christ, in that He is the Wisdom and Word of God, was in Himself the beginning of wisdom, but to us, in that He was the Word incarnate. (c. 22). There being so many significations then of the word, we may take it as the Beginning through Whom, i. e. the Maker; for Christ is Creator as The Beginning, in that He is Wisdom; so that the Word is in the beginning, i. e. in Wisdom; the Saviour being all these excellences at once. As life then is in the Word, so the Word is in the Beginning, that is to say, in Wisdom. Consider then if it be possible according to this signification to understand the Beginning, as meaning that all things are made according to Wisdom, and the patterns contained therein; or, inasmuch as the Beginning of the Son is the Father, the Beginning of all creatures and existencies, to understand by the text, In the beginning was the Word, that the Son, the Word, was in the Beginning, that is, in the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. vi. c. 3 [ii]) Or, In the beginning, as if it were said, before all things.

BASIL. (Hom. in Princ. Joan.) The Holy Ghost foresaw that men would arise, who should envy the glory of the Only-Begotten, subverting their hearers by sophistry; as if because He were begotten, He was not; and before He was begotten, He was not. That none might presume then to babble such things, the Holy Ghost saith, In the beginning was the Word.

HILARY. (ii. de Trin. c. 13) Years, centuries, ages, are passed over, place what beginning thou wilt in thy imagining, thou graspest it not in time, for He, from Whom it is derived, still was.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. i) As then when our ship is near shore, cities and port pass in survey before us, which on the open sea vanish, and leave nothing whereon to fix the eye; so the Evangelist here, taking us with him in his flight above the created world, leaves the eye to gaze in vacancy on an illimitable expanse. For the words, was in the beginning, are significative of eternal and infinite essence.

AUGUSTINE. (de verb. Dom. Serm. 38. [117.] §. 6) They say, however, if He is the Son, He was born. We allow it. They rejoin: if the Son was born to the Father, the Father was, before the Son was born to Him. This the Faith rejects. Then they say, explain to us how the Son could be born from the Father, and yet be coeval with Him from whom He is born: for sons are born after their fathers, to succeed them on their death. They adduce analogies from nature; and we must endeavour likewise to do the same for our doctrine. But how can we find in nature a coeternal, when we cannot find an eternal? However, if a thing generating and a thing generated can be found any where coeval, it will be a help to forming a notion of coeternals. Now Wisdom herself is called in the Scriptures, (Wisd. 7:26) the brightness of Everlasting Light, the image of the Father. Hence then let us take our comparison, and from coevals form a notion of coeternals. Now no one doubts that brightness proceeds from fire: fire then we may consider the father of the brightness. Presently, when I light a candle, at the same instant with the fire, brightness ariseth. Give me the fire without the brightness, and I will with thee believe that the Father was without the Son. An image is produced by a mirror. The image exists as soon as the beholder appears; yet the beholder existed before he came to the mirror. Let us suppose then a twig, or a blade of grass which has grown up by the water side. Is it not born with its image? If there had always been the twig, there would always have been the image proceeding from the twig. And whatever is from another thing, is born. So then that which generates may be coexistent from eternity with that which is generated from it. But some one will say perhaps, Well, I understand now the eternal Father, the coeternal Son: yet the Son is like the emitted brightness, which is less brilliant than the fire, or the reflected image, which is less real than the twig. Not so: there is complete equality between Father and Son. I do not believe, he says; for thou hast found nothing whereto to liken it. However, perhaps we can find something in nature by which we may understand that the Son is both coeternal with the Father, and in no respect inferior also: though we cannot find any one material of comparison that will be sufficient singly, and must therefore join together two, one of which has been employed by our adversaries, the other by ourselves. For they have drawn their comparison from things which are preceded in time by the things which they spring from, man, for example, from man. Nevertheless, man is of the same substance with man. We have then in that nativity an equality of nature; an equality of time is wanting. But in the comparison which we have drawn from the brightness of fire, and the reflexion of a twig, an equality of nature thou dost not find, of time thou dost. In the Godhead then there is found as a whole, what here exists in single and separate parts; and that which is in the creation, existing in a manner suitable to the Creator.

THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS. (Gest. Conc. Eph.) Wherefore in one place divine Scripture calls Him the Son, in another the Word, in another the Brightness of the Father; names severally meant to guard against blasphemy. For, forasmuch as thy son is of the same nature with thyself, the Scripture wishing to shew that the Substance of the Father and the Son is one, sets forth the Son of the Father, born of the Father, the Only-Begotten. Next, since the terms birth and son, convey the idea of passibleness, therefore it calls the Son the Word, declaring by that name the impassibility of His Nativity. But inasmuch as a father with us is necessarily older than his son, lest thou shouldest think that this applied to the Divine nature as well, it calls the Only-Begotten the Brightness of the Father; for brightness, though arising from the sun, is not posterior to it. Understand then that Brightness, as revealing the coeternity of the Son with the Father; Word as proving the impassibility of His birth, and Son as conveying His consubstantiality.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. iii. [ii.] §. 2.) But they say that In the beginning does not absolutely express eternity: for that the same is said of the heaven and the earth: In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth. (Gen. 1:1) But are not made and was, altogether different? For in like manner as the word is, when spoken of man, signifies the present only, but when applied to God, that which always and eternally is; so too was, predicated of our nature, signifies the past, but predicated of God, eternity.

ORIGEN. (Hom. ii. divers. loc.) The verb to be, has a double signification, sometimes expressing the motions which take place in time, as other verbs do; sometimes the substance of that one thing of which it is predicated, without reference to time. Hence it is also called a substantive verb.

HILARY. (ii. de Trin. c. xiii) Consider then the world, understand what is written of it. In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth. Whatever therefore is created is made in the beginning, and thou wouldest contain in time, what, as being to be made, is contained in the beginning. But, lo, for me, an illiterate unlearned fisherman (meus piscator [Hil.]) is independent of time, unconfined by ages, advanceth beyond all beginnings. For the Word was, what it is, and is not bounded by any time, nor commenced therein, seeing It was not made in the beginning, but was.

ALCUIN. To refute those who inferred from Christ's Birth in time, that He had not been from everlasting, the Evangelist begins with the eternity of the Word, saying, In the beginning was the Word.

And the Word was with God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii. [ii.] 3) Because it is an especial attribute of God, to be eternal and without a beginning, he laid this down first: then, lest any one on hearing in the beginning was the Word, should suppose the Word Unbegotten, he instantly guarded against this; saying, And the Word was with God.

HILARY. (ii. de Trin) From the beginning He is with God: and though independent of time, is not independent of an Author.

BASIL. (Hom. in princ. Joan. §. 4) Again he repeats this, was, because of men blasphemously saying, that there was a time when He was not. Where then was the Word? Illimitable things are not contained in space. Where was He then? With God. For neither is the Father bounded by place, nor the Son by aught circumscribing.

ORIGEN. (Hom. ii. in Joan. c. 1) It is worth while noting, that, whereas the Word is said to come1 [be made] to some, as to Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, with God it is not made, as though it were not with Him before. But, the Word having been always with Him, it is said, and the Word was with God: for from the beginning it was not separate from the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii) He has not said, was in God, but was with God: exhibiting to us that eternity which He had in accordance with His Person.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loco.) Sabellius is overthrown by this text. For he asserts that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one Person, Who sometimes appeared as the Father, sometimes as the Son, sometimes as the Holy Ghost. But he is manifestly confounded by this text, and the Word was with God; for here the Evangelist declares that the Son is one Person, God the Father another.

And the Word was God

HILARY. (ii. de Trin. c. 15) Thou wilt say, that a word is the sound of the voice, the enunciation of a thing, the expression of a thought: this Word was in the beginning with God, because the utterance of thought is eternal, when He who thinketh is eternal. But how was that in the beginning, which exists no time either before, or after, I doubt even whether in time at all? For speech is neither in existence before one speaks, nor after; in the very act of speaking it vanishes; for by the time a speech is ended, that from which it began does not exist. But even if the first sentence, in the beginning was the Word, was through thy inattention lost upon thee, why disputest thou about the next; and the Word was with God? Didst thou hear it said, “In God,” so that thou shouldest understand this Word to be only the expression of hidden thoughts? Or did John say with by mistake, and was not aware of the distinction between being in, and being with, when he said, that what was in the beginning, was not in God, but with God? Hear then the nature and name of the Word; and the Word was God. No more then of the sound of the voice, of the expression of the thought. The Word here is a Substance, not a sound; a Nature, not an expression; God, not a nonentity.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 9, 10, 11.) But the title is absolute, and free from the offence of an extraneous subject. To Moses it is said, I have given1 thee for a god to Pharaoh: (Exod. 7:1) but is not the reason for the name added, when it is said, to Pharaoh? Moses is given for a god to Pharaoh, when he is feared, when he is entreated, when he punishes, when he heals. And it is one thing to be given for a God, another thing to be God. I remember too another application of the name in the Psalms, I have said, ye are gods. (Ps. 82) But there too it is implied that the title was but bestowed; and the introduction of, I said, makes it rather the phrase of the Speaker, than the name of the thing. But when I hear the Word was God, I not only hear the Word said to be, but perceive It proved to be, God.

BASIL. (Hom. i. in princ. Joan. c. 4) Thus cutting off the cavils of blasphemers, and those who ask what the Word is, he replies, and the Word was God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or combine it thus. From the Word being with God, it follows plainly that there are two Persons. But these two are of one Nature; and therefore it proceeds, In the Word was God: to shew that Father and Son are of One Nature, being of One Godhead.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. in Joan. in princ.) We must add too, that the Word illuminates the Prophets with Divine wisdom, in that He cometh to them; but that with God He ever is, because He is Goda. For which reason he placed and the Word was with God, before and the Word was God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. ii. [i.] §. 4) Not asserting, as Plato does, one to be intelligence,1 the other soul;2 for the Divine Nature is very different from this.… But you say, the Father is called God with the addition of the article, the Son without it. What say you then, when the Apostle. writes, The great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ; (Tit. 2:13) and again, Who is over all, God; (Rom. 9:5) and Grace be unto you and peace from God our Father; (Rom. 1:7) without the article? Besides, too, it were superfluous here, to affix what had been affixed just before. So that it does not follow, though the article is not affixed to the Son, that He is therefore an inferior God.

1:2

2. The same was in the beginning with God

HILARY. (ii. de Trin. c. 16) Whereas he had said, the Word was God, the fearfulness, and strangeness of the speech disturbed me; the prophets having declared that God was One. But, to quiet my apprehensions, the fisherman reveals the scheme of this so great mystery, and refers all to one, without dishonour, without obliterating [the Person], without reference to timeb, saying, The Same was in the beginning with God; with One Unbegotten God, from whom He is, the One Only-begotten God.

THEOPHYLACT. Again, to stop any diabolical suspicion, that the Word, because He was God, might have rebelled against His Father, as certain

Gentiles fable, or, being separate, have become the antagonist of the Father Himself, he says, The Same was in the beginning with God; that is to say, this Word of God never existed separate from God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iv. [iii.] §. 1) Or, lest hearing that In the beginning was the Word, you should regard It as eternal, but yet understand the Father’s Life to have some degree of priority, he has introduced the words, The Same was in the beginning with God. For God was never solitary, apart from Him, but always God with God. (ibid. 3). Or forasmuch as he said, the Word was God, that no one might think the Divinity of the Son inferior, he immediately subjoins the marks of proper Divinity, in that he both again mentions Eternity, The Same was in the beginning with God; and adds His attribute of Creator (τδ δημιουργικὸν), All things were made by Him.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. in Joan. c. 4) Or thus, the Evangelist having begun with those propositions, reunites them into one, saying, The Same was in the beginning with God. For in the first of the three we learnt in what the Word was, that it was in the beginning; in the second, with whom, with God; in the third who the Word was, God. Having, then, by the term, The Same, set before us in a manner God the Word of Whom he had spoken, he collects all into the fourth proposition, viz. In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God; into, the Same was in the beginning with God. It may be asked, however, why it is not said, In the beginning was the Word of God, and the Word of God was with God, and the Word of God was God? Now whoever will admit that truth is one, must needs admit also that the demonstration of truth, that is wisdom, is one. But if truth is one, and wisdom is one, the Word which enuntiates truth and developes wisdom in those who are capable of receiving it, must be One also. And therefore it would have been out of place here to have said, the Word of God, as if there were other words besides that of God, a word of angels, word of men, and so on. We do not say this, to deny that It is the Word of God, but to shew the use of omitting the word God. John himself too in the Apocalypse says, And his Name is called the Word of God. (Rev. 19:13)

ALCUIN. Wherefore does he use the substantive verb, was? That you might understand that the Word, Which is coeternal with God the Father, was before all time.

3. All things were made by him

ALCUIN. After speaking of the nature of the Son, he proceeds to His operations, saying, All things were made by him, i. e. every thing whether substance, or property.

HILARY. (ii. de Trin. c. 17) Or thus: [It is said], the Word indeed was in the beginning, but it may be that He was not before the beginning. But what saith he; All things were made by him. He is infinite by Whom every thing, which is, was made: and since all things were made by Him, time is likewisec.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. v. [iv.] 1) Moses indeed, in the beginning of the Old Testament, speaks to us in much detail of the natural world, saying, In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth; and then relates how that the light, and the firmament, and the stars, and the various kinds of animals were created. But the Evangelist sums up the whole of this in a word, as familiar to his hearers; and hastens to loftier matter, making the whole of his book to bear not on the works, but on the Maker.

AUGUSTINE. (1. de Gen ad lit. cap. 2) Since all things were made by him, it is evident that light was also, when God said, Let there be light. And in like manner the rest. But if so, that which God said, viz. Let there be light, is eternal. For the Word of God, God with God, is coeternal with the Father, though the world created by Him be temporal. For whereas our when and sometimes are words of time, in the Word of God, on the contrary, when a thing ought to be made, is eternal; and the thing is then made, when in that Word it is that it ought to be made, which Word hath in It neither when, or at sometimes, since It is all eternal.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. tract. i. c. 11) How then can the Word of God be made, when God by the Word made all things? For if the Word Itself were made, by what other Word was It made? If you say it was the Word of the Word by Which That was made, that Word I call the Only-Begotten Son of God. But if thou dost not call It the Word of the Word1, then grant that that Word was not made, by which all things were made.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. c. 9. [vi.]) And if It is not made, It is not a creature; but if It is not a creature, It is of the same Substance with the

Father. For every substance which is not God is a creature; and what is not a creature is God.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) The Arians are wont to say, that all things are spoken of as made by the Son, in the sense in which we say a door is made by a saw, viz. as an instrument; not that He was Himself the Maker. And so they talk of the Son as a thing made, as if He were made for this purpose, that all things might be made by Him. Now we to the inventors of this lie reply simply: If, as ye say, the Father had created the Son, in order to make use of Him as an instrument, it would appear that the Son were less honourable than the things made, just as things made by a saw are more noble than the saw itself; the saw having been made for their sake. In like way do they speak of the Father creating the Son for the sake of the things made, as if, had He thought good to create the universe, neither would He have produced the Son. What can be more insane than such language? They argue, however, why was it not said that the Word made all things, instead of the preposition by1 being used? For this reason, that thou mightest not understand an Unbegotten and Unoriginate Son, a rival Godd.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. v. [iv.] c. 2) If the preposition by perplex thee, and thou wouldest learn from Scripture that the Word Itself made all things, hear David, Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of Thy hands. (Ps. 101) That he spoke this of the Only-Begotten, you learn from the Apostle, who in the Epistle to the Hebrews applies these words to the Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. v. c. 2. 3) But if you say that the prophet spoke this of the Father, and that Paul applied it to the Son, it comes to the same thing. For he would not have mentioned that as applicable to the Son, unless he fully considered that the Father and the Son were of equal dignity. If again thou dream that in the preposition by any subjection is implied, why does Paul use t of the Father? as, God is faith ful, by Whom ye were called into the fellowship of His Son; (1 Cor. 1:9) and again, Paul an Apostle by the will of God. (2 Cor. 1:1)

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. c. 8) Here too Valentinus errs, saying, that the Word supplied to the Creator the cause of the creation of the worlde. If this interpretation is true, it should have been written that all things had their existence from the Word through the Creator, not contrariwise, through the Word from the Creator.

And without him was not any thing made

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. v. in princ.) That you may not suppose, when he says, All things were made by Him, that he meant only the things Moses had spoken of, he seasonably brings in, And without Him was not any thing made, nothing, that is, cognizable either by the senses, or the understanding. Or thus; Lest you should suspect the sentence, All things were made by Him, to refer to the miracles which the other Evangelists had related, he adds, and without Him was not any thing made.

HILARY. (lib. ii. de Trin. c. 18) Or thus; That all things were made by him, is pronouncing too much, it may be said. There is an Unbegotten Who is made of none, and there is the Son Himself begotten from Him Who is Unbegotten. The Evangelist however again implies the Author, when he speaks of Him as Associated; saying, without Him was not any thing made. This, that nothing was made without Him, I understand to mean the Son's not being alone, for 'by whom' is one thing, 'not without whom' another.

ORIGEN. (Hom. iii. in div. loc.): Or thus, that thou mightest not think that the things made by the Word had a separate existence, and were not contained in the Word, he says, and without Him was not any thing made: that is, not any thing was made externally of Him; for He encircles all things, as the Preserver of all things.

AUGUSTINE. (Quæst. Test. N. V. qu. 97) Or, by saying, without Him was not any thing made, he tells us not to suspect Him in any sense to be a thing made. For how can He be a thing made, when God, it is said, made nothing without Him?

ORIGEN. (in Joh. tom. ii. c. 7) If all things were made by the Word, and in the number of all things is wickedness, and the whole influx of sin, these too were made by the Word; which is false. Now 'nothing' and 'a thing which is not,' mean the same. And the Apostle seems to call wicked things, things which are not, God calleth those things which be not, (Rom. 4:17) as though they were. All wickedness then is called nothing, forasmuch as it is made without the Word. Those who say however that the devil is not a creature of God, err. In so far as he is the devil, he is not a creature of God; but he, whose character it is to be the devil, is a creature of God. It is as if we should say a murderer is not a creature of God, when, so far as he is a man, he is a creature of God.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joh. tract. i. c. 13) For sin was not made by Him; for it is manifest that sin is nothing, and that men become nothing when they sin. Nor was an idol made by the Word. It has indeed a sort of form of man, and man himself was made by the Word; but the form of man in an idol was not made by the Word: for it is written, we know that an idol is nothing. (1 Cor. 8:4) These then were not made by the Word; but whatever things were made naturally, the whole universe, were; every creature from an angel to a worm.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. c. 8) Valentinus excludes from the things made by the Word, all that were made in the ages which he believes to have existed before the Word. This is plainly false; inasmuch as the things which he accounts divine are thus excluded from the "all things," and what he deems wholly corrupt are properly 'all things!'

AUGUSTINE. (de Natura boni, c. 25) The folly of those men is not to be listened to, who think nothing is to be understood here as something, because it is placed at the end of the sentence1: as if it made any difference whether it was said, without Him nothing was made, or, without Him was made nothing.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. c. 9) If 'the word' be taken for that which is in each man, inasmuch as it was implanted in each by the Word, which was in the beginning, then also, we commit nothing without this 'word' [reason] taking this word 'nothing' in a popular sense. For the Apostle says that sin was dead without the law, but when the commandment came, sin revived; for sin is not imputed when there is no law. But neither was there sin, when there was no Word, for our Lord says, If I had not come and spoken to them, they had not had sin. (John 15:22) For every excuse is withdrawn from the sinner, if, with the Word present, and enjoining what is to be done, he refuses to obey Him. Nor is the Word to be blamed on this account; any more than a master, whose discipline leaves no excuse open to a delinquent pupil on the ground of ignorance. All things then were made by the Word, not only the natural world, but also whatever is done by those acting without reason.

1:4

4. In him was life. (Vulg. quod factum est in ipso vita erat.)

BEDE. (in 1 Joh.) The Evangelist having said that every creature was made by the Word, lest perchance any one might think that His will was changeable, as though He willed on a sudden to make a creature, which from eternity he had not made; he took care to shew that, though a creature was made in time, in the Wisdom of the Creator it had been from eternity arranged what and when He should create.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joh. tr. i. c. 16, 17) The passage can be read thus: What was made in Him was life1. Therefore the whole universe is life: for what was there not made in Him? He is the Wisdom of God, as is said, In Wisdom hast Thou made them all. (Ps. 104) All things therefore are made in Him, even as they are by Him. But, if whatever was made in Him is life, the earth is life, a stone is life. We must not interpret it so unsoundly, lest the sect of the Manicheans creep in upon us, and say, that a stone has life, and that a wall has life; for they do insanely assert so, and when reprehended or refuted, appeal as though to Scripture, and ask, why was it said, That which was made in Him was life? Read the passage then thus: make the stop after What was made, and then proceed, In Him was life. The earth was made; but, the earth itself which was made is not life. In the Wisdom of God however there is spiritually a certain Reason after which the earth is made. This is Lifef. A chest in workmanship is not life, a chest in art is, inasmuch as the mind of the workman lives wherein that original pattern exists. And in this sense the Wisdom of God, by Which all things are made, containeth in art ‘all things which are made, according to that art.’ And therefore whatever is made, is not in itself life, but is life in Him.

ORIGEN. (Hom. ii. in div. loc. ante med.) It may also be divided thus: That which was made in him; and then, was life; the sense being, that all things that were made by Him and in Him, are life in Him, and are one in Him. They were, that is, in Him; they exist as the cause, before they exist in themselves as effects. If thou ask how and in what manner all things which were made by the Word subsist in Him vitally, immutably, causally, take some examples from the created world. See how that all things within the arch of the world of sense have their causes simultaneously and harmoniously subsisting in that sun which is the greatest luminary of the world: how multitudinous crops of herbs and fruits are contained in single seeds: how the most complex variety of rules, in the art of the artificer, and the mind of the director, are a living unit, how an infinite number of lines coexist in one point. Contemplate these several instances, and thou wilt be able as it were on the wings of physical science, to penetrate with thy intellectual eye the secrets of the Word, and as far as is allowed to a human understanding, to see how all things which were made by the Word, live in Him, and were made in Him.

HILARY. Or it can be understood thus. In that he had said, without Him was not any thing made, one might have been perplexed, and have asked, Was then any thing made by another, which yet was not made without Him? if so, then though nothing is made without, all things are not made by Him: it being one thing to make, another to be with the maker. On this account the Evangelist declares what it was which was not made without Him, viz. what was made in Him. This then it was which was not made without Him, viz. what was made in Him. And that which was made in Him, was also made by Him. For all things were created in Him and by Him. Now things were made in Him, because He was born God the Creator. And for this reason also things that were made in Him, were not made without Him, viz. that God, in that He was born, was life, and He who was life, was not made life after being born. Nothing then which was made in Him, was made without Him, because He was life, in Whom they were made; because God Who was born of God was God, not after, but in that He was bornh.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. v. [iv.] in Joan. c. 1, 2) Or to give an other explanation. We will not put the stop at without Him was not any thing made, as the heretics do. For they wishing to prove the Holy Ghost a creature, read, That which was made in Him, was life. But this cannot be so understood. For first, this was not the place for making mention of the Holy Ghost. But let us suppose it was; let us take the passage for the present according to their reading, we shall see that it leads to a difficulty. For when it is said, That, which was made in Him, was life; they say the life spoken of is the Holy Ghost. But this life is also light; for the Evangelist proceeds, The life was the light of men. Where fore according to them, he calls the Holy Ghost the light of all men. But the Word mentioned above, is what he here calls consecutively, God, and Life, and Light. Now the Word was made flesh. It follows that the Holy Ghost is incarnate, not the Son. Dismissing then this reading, we adopt a more suitable one, with the following meaning: All things were made by Him, and without Him was not any thing made which was made: there we make a stop, and begin a fresh sentence: In

Him was life. Without Him was not any thing made which wan made; (γενητὸν) i. e. which could be made. You see how by this short addition, he removes any difficulty which might follow. For by introducing without Him was not any thing made, and adding, which was made, be includes all things invisible, and excepts the Holy Spirit: for the Spirit cannot be made. (δημιουργίας) To the mention of creation, succeeds that of providence. In Him was life1. As a fountain which produces vast depths of water, and yet is nothing diminished at the fountain head; so worketh the Only-Begotten. How great soever His creations be, He Himself is none the less for them. By the word life here is meant not only creation, but that providence by which the things created are preserved. But when you are told that in Him was life, do not suppose Him compounded; for, as the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself. (John 5:26) As then you would not call the Father compounded, so neither should you the Son.

ORIGEN. (t. ii. c. 12, 13.) Or thus: Our Saviour is said to be some things not for Himself, but for others; others again, both for Himself and others. When it is said then, That which was made in Him was life; we must enquire whether the life is for Himself and others, or for others only; and if for others, for whom? Now the Life and the Light are both the same Person: He is the light of men: He is therefore their life. The Saviour is called Life here, not to Himself, but to others; whose Light He also is. This life is inseparable from the Word, from the time it is added on to it. For Reason or the Word must exist before in the soul, cleansing it from sin, till it is pure enough to receive the life, which is thus ingrafted or inborn in every one who renders himself fit to receive the Word of God. Hence observe, that though the Word itself in the beginning was not made, the Beginning never having been without the Word; yet the life of men was not always in the Word. This life of men was made, in that It was the light of men; and this light of men could not be before man was; the light of men being understood relatively to menk. And therefore he says, That which was made in the Word was life; not That which was in the Word was life. Some copies read, not amiss, “That which was made, in Him is life.” If we understand the life in the Word, to be He who says below, ‘I am the life,’ we shall confess that none who believe not in Christ live, and that all who live not in God, are dead. (John 11:25; 14:6)

And the life was the light of men.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) He had said, In him was life, that you might not suppose that the Word was without life. Now he shews that life is spiritual, and the light of all reasonable creatures. And the life was the light of men: i. e. not sensible, but intellectual light, illuminating the very soul.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joh. tr. 1. c. 18) Life of itself gives illumination to men, but to cattle not: for they have not rational souls, by which to discern wisdom: whereas man, being made in the image of God, has a rational soul, by which he can discern wisdom. Hence that life, by which all things are made, is light, not however of all animals whatsoever, but of men.

THEOPHYLACT. He saith not, the Light of the Jews only, but of all men: for all of us, in so far as we have received intellect and reason, from that Word which created us, are said to be illuminated by Him. For the reason which is given to us, and which constitutes us the reasonable beings we are, is a light directing us what to do, and what not to do.

ORIGEN. (non occ.) We must not omit to notice, that he puts the life before the light of men. For it would be a contradiction to suppose a being without life to be illuminated; as if life were an addition to illumination. (tom. ii. c. 16). But to proceed: if the life was the light of men, meaning men only, Christ is the light and the life of men only; an heretical supposition. It does not follow then, when a thing is predicated of any, that it is predicated of those only; for of God it is written, that He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; and yet He is not the God of those fathers only. In the same way, the light of men is not excluded from being the light of others as well. (c. 17). Some moreover contend from Genesis, (Gen. 1:26) Let us make man after our image, that man means whatever is made after the image and similitude of God. If so, the light of men is the light of any rational creature what ever.

1:5

5. And the light shineth in darkness.

AUGUSTINE. (tr. 1. c. 19) Whereas that life is the light of men, but foolish hearts cannot receive that light, being so incumbered with sins that they cannot see it; for this cause lest any should think there is no light near them, because they cannot see it, he continues: And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not. For suppose a blind man standing in the sun, the sun is present to him, but he is absent from the sun. In like manner every fool is blind, and wisdom is present to him; but, though present, absent from his sight, forasmuch as sight is gone: the truth being, not that she is absent from him, but that he is absent from her.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. t. ii. c. 14) This kind of darkness however is not in men by nature, according to the text in the Ephesians, Ye were sometime darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord1. (Eph. 5:8)

ORIGEN. (Hom. ii. in div. loc.) Or thus, The light shineth in the darkness of faithful souls, beginning from faith, and drawing onwards to hope; but the deceit and ignorance of undisciplined souls did not comprehend the light of the Word of God shining in the flesh. That however is an ethical meaning. The metaphysical signification of the words is as follows. Human nature, even though it sinned not, could not shine by its own strength simply; for it is not naturally light, but only a recipient of it; it is capable of containing wisdom, but is not wisdom itself. As the air, of itself, shineth not, but is called by the name of darkness, even so is our nature, considered in itself, a dark substance, which however admits of and is made partaker of the light of wisdom. And as when the air receives the sun’s rays, it is not said to shine of itself, but the sun’s radiance to be apparent in it; so the reasonable part of our nature, while possessing the presence of the Word of God, does not of itself understand God, and intellectual things, but by means of the divine light implanted in it. Thus, The light shineth in darkness: for the Word of God, the life and the light of men, ceaseth not to shine in our nature; though regarded in itself, that nature is without form and darkness. And forasmuch as pure light cannot be comprehended by any creature, hence the text: The darkness comprehended it not.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. v. [iv.] c. 3) Or thus: throughout the whole foregoing passage he had been speaking of creation; then he mentions the spiritual benefits which the Word brought with it: and the life was the light of men. He saith not, the light of Jews, but of all men without exception; for not the Jews only, but the Gentiles also have come to this knowledge. The Angels he omits, for he is speaking of human nature, to whom the Word came bringing glad tidings.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. in Joan. c. 19) But they ask, why is not the Word Itself called the light of men, instead of the life which is in the Word? We reply, that the life here spoken of is not that which rational and irrational animals have in common, but that which is annexed to the Word which is within us through participation of the primæval Word. For we must distinguish the external and false life, from the desirable and true. We are first made partakers of life: and this life with some is light potentially only, not in act; with those, viz. who are not eager to search out the things which appertain to knowledge: with others it is actual light, those who, as the Apostle saith, covet earnestly the best gifts, (1 Cor. 12:31) that is to say, the word of wisdom. (c. 14.). (Ifk the life and the light of men are the same, whoso is in darkness is proved not to live, and none who liveth abideth in darkness.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. v. [iv.] c. 3)l. Life having come to us, the empire of death is dissolved; a light having shone upon us, there is darkness no longer: but there remaineth ever a life which death, a light which darkness cannot overcome. Whence he continues, And the light shineth in darkness: by darkness meaning death and error, for sensible light does not shine in darkness, but darkness must be removed first; whereas the preaching of Christ shone forth amidst the reign of error, and caused it to disappear, and Christ by dying changed death into life, so overcoming it, that, those who were already in its grasp, were brought back again. Forasmuch then as neither death nor error hath overcome his light, which is every where conspicuous, shining forth by its own strength; therefore he adds, And the darkness comprehended it notm.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. c. 20) As the light of men is a word expressing two spiritual things, so is darkness also. To one who possesses the light, we attribute both the doing the deeds of the light, and also true understanding, inasmuch as he is illuminated by the light of knowledge: and, on the other hand, the term darkness we apply both to unlawful acts, and also to that knowledge, which seems such, but is not. Now as the Father is light, and in Him is no darkness at all, so is the Saviour also. Yet, inasmuch as he underwent the similitude of our sinful flesh, it is not incorrectly said of Him, that in Him there was some darkness; for He took our darkness upon Himself, in order that He might dissipate it. This Light therefore, which was made the life of man, shines in the darkness of our hearts, when the prince of this darkness wars with the human race. This Light the darkness persecuted, as is clear from what our Saviour and His children suffer; the darkness fighting against the children of light. But, forasmuch as God takes up the cause, they do not prevail; nor do they apprehend the light, for they are either of too slow a nature to overtake the light’s quick course, or, waiting for it to come up to them, they are put to flight at its approach. We should bear in mind, however, that darkness is not always used in a bad sense, but sometimes in a good, as in Psalm 17. He made darkness His secret place: (Ps. 18:11) the things of God being unknown and incomprehensible. This darkness then I will call praiseworthy, since it tends toward light, and lays hold on it: for, though it were darkness before, while it was not known, yet it is turned to light and knowledge in him who has learned.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civit. Dei, l. x. c. 29. circ. fin.) A certain Platonist once said, that the beginning of this Gospel ought to be copied in letters of gold, and placed in the most conspicuous place in every church.

BEDE. (in loc.) The other Evangelists describe Christ as born in time; John witnesseth that He was in the beginning, saying, In the beginning was the Word. The others describe His sudden appearance among men; he witnesseth that He was ever with God, saying, And the Word was with God. The others prove Him very man; he very God, saying, And the Word was God. The others exhibit Him as man conversing with men for a season; he pronounces Him God abiding with God in the beginning, saying, The Same was in the beginning with God. The others relate the great deeds which He did amongst men; he that God the Father made every creature through Him, saying, All things were made by Him, and without Him was not any thing made.

1:6–8

6. There was a man sent from God, whose name was John.

7. The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light, that all men through him might believe.

8. He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii. c. 2) What is said above, refers to the Divinity of Christ. He came to us in the form of man, but man in such sense, as that the Godhead was concealed within Him. And therefore there was sent before a great man, to declare by his witness that He was more than man. And who was this? He was a man.

THEOPHYLACT. Not an Angel, as many have held. The Evangelist here refutes such a notion.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii) And how could he declare the truth concerning God, unless he were sent from God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. vi. [v.] c. 1) After this esteem nothing that he says as human; for he speaketh not his own, but his that sent him. And therefore the Prophet calls him a messenger, I send My messenger, (Mal. 3:1) for it is the excellence of a messenger, to say nothing of his own. But the expression, was sent, does not mean his entrance into life, but to his office. As Esaias was sent on his commission, not from any place out of the world, but from where he saw the Lord sitting upon His high and lofty throne; (Isai. 6:1.) in like manner John was sent from the desert to baptize; for he says, He that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, Upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending, and remaining on Him, the same is He which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost. (John 1:33)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii) What was he called? whose name was John?

ALCUIN. That is, the grace of God, or one in whom is grace, who by his testimony first made known to the world the grace of the New Testament, that is, Christ. Or John may be taken to mean, to whom it is given: because that through the grace of God, to him it was given, not only to herald, but also to baptize the King of kings.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii. c. 6) Wherefore came he? The same came for a witness, to bear witness of the Light.

ORIGEN. (t. ii. c. 28) Some try to undo the testimonies of the Prophets to Christ, by saying that the Son of God had no need of such witnesses; the wholesome words which He uttered and His miraculous acts being sufficient to produce belief; just as Moses deserved belief for his speech and goodness, and wanted no previous witnesses. To this we may reply, that, where there are a number of reasons to make people believe, persons are often impressed by one kind of proof, and not by another, and God, Who for the sake of all men became man, can give them many reasons for belief in Him. And with respect to the doctrine of the Incarnation, certain it is that some have been forced by the Prophetical writings into an admiration of Christ by the fact of so many prophets having, before His advent, fixed the place of His nativity; and by other proofs of the same kind. It is to be remembered too, that, though the display of miraculous powers might stimulate the faith of those who lived in the same age with Christ, they might, in the lapse of time, fail to do so; as some of them might even get to be regarded as fabulous. Prophecy and miracles together are more convincing than simply past miracles by themselves. We must recollect too that men receive honour themselves from the witness which they bear to God. He deprives the Prophetical choir of immeasurable honour, whoever denies that it was their office to bear witness to Christ. John when he comes to bear witness to the light, follows in the train of those who went before him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. vi. [v.] in Joh. c. 1) Not because the light wanted the testimony, but for the reason which John himself gives, viz. that all might believe on Him. For as He put on flesh to save all men from death; so He sent before Him a human preacher, that the sound of a voice like their own, might the readier draw men to Him.

BEDE. (Bed. in loc.) He saith not, that all men should believe in him; for, cursed be the man that trusteth in man; (Jer. 17:5) but, that all men through him might believe; i. e. by his testimony believe in the Light.

THEOPHYLACT. Though some however might not believe, he is not accountable for them. When a man shuts himself up in a dark room, so as to receive no light from the sun’s rays, he is the cause of the deprivation, not the sun. In like manner John was sent, that all men might believe; but if no such result followed, he is not the cause of the failure.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. vi. in Joh. c. 1) Forasmuch however as with us, the one who witnesses, is commonly a more important, a more trustworthy person, than the one to whom he bears witness, to do away with any such notion in the present case the Evangelist proceeds; He was not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. If this were not his intention, in repeating the words, to bear witness of the Light, the addition would be superfluous, and rather a verbal repetition, than the explanation of a truth.

THEOPHYLACT. But it will be said, that we do not allow John or any of the saints to be or ever to have been light. The difference is this: If we call any of the saints light, we put light without the article. So if asked whether John is light, without the article, thou mayest allow without hesitation that he is: if with the article, thou allow it not. For he is not very, original, light, but is only called so, on account of his partaking of the light, which cometh from the true Light.

9. That was the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. ii) What Light it is to which John bears witness, he shews himself, saying, That was the true Light.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. vii. [vi.] 1) Or thus; Having said above that John had come, and was sent, to bear witness of the Light, lest any from the recent coming of the witness, should infer the same of Him who is witnessed to, the Evangelist takes us back to that existence which is beyond all beginning, saying, That was the true Light.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. ii. in Joh. §. 7) Wherefore is there added, true? Because man enlightened is called light, but the true Light is that which lightens. For our eyes are called lights, and yet, without a lamp at night, or the sun by day, these lights are open to no purpose. Wherefore he adds: which lighteneth every man: but if every man, then John himself. He Himself then enlightened the person, by whom He wished Himself to be pointed out. And just as we may often, from the reflexion of the sun's rays on some object, know the sun to be risen, though we cannot look at the sun itself; as even feeble eyes can look at an illuminated wall, or some object of that kind: even so, those to whom Christ came, being too weak to behold Him, He threw His rays upon John; John confessed the illumination, and so the Illuminator Himself was discovered. It is said, that cometh into the world. Had man not departed from Him, he had not had to be enlightened; but therefore is he to be here enlightened, because he departed thence, when he might have been enlightened.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Let the Manichean blush, who pronounces us the creatures of a dark and malignant creator: for we should never be enlightened, were we not the children of the true Light.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. viii. c. 2) Where are those too, who deny Him to be very God? We see here that He is called very Light. But if He lighteneth every man that cometh into the world, how is it that so many have gone on without light? For all have not known the worship of Christ. The answer is: He only enlighteneth every man, so far as pertains to Him. If men shut their eyes, and will not receive the rays of this light, their darkness arises not from the fault of the light, but from their own wickedness, inasmuch as they voluntarily deprive themselves of the gift of grace. For grace is poured out upon all; and they, who will not enjoy the gift, may impute it to their own blindness.

AUGUSTINE. (de Pecc. Mer. et Remiss. i. c. xxv) Or the words, lighteneth every man, may be understood to mean, not that there is no one who is not enlightened, but that no one is enlightened except by Him.

BEDE. Including both natural and divine wisdom; for as no one can exist of himself, so no one can be wise of himself.

ORIGEN. (Hom. 2, in div. loc.) Or thus: We must not understand the words, lighteneth every man that cometh into the world, of the growth from hidden seeds to organized bodies, but of the entrance into the invisible world, by the spiritual regeneration and grace, which is given in Baptism. Those then the true Light lighteneth, who come into the world of goodness, not those who rush into the world of sin.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Or thus: The intellect which is given in us for our direction, and which is called natural reason, is said here to be a light given us by God. But some by the ill use of their reason have darkened themselves.

1:10

10. He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. in Joan. ii. c. 8) The Light which lighteneth every man that cometh into the world, came here in the flesh; because while He was here in His Divinity alone, the foolish, blind, and un-righteous could not discern Him; those of whom it is said above, The darkness comprehended it not. Hence the text; He was in the world.

ORIGEN. (Hom. 2 in div. loc.) For as, when a person leaves off speaking, his voice ceases to be, and vanishes; so if the Heavenly Father should cease to speak His Word, the effect of that Word, i. e. the universe which is created in the Word, shall cease to exist.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii. c. 10) You must not suppose, however, that He was in the world in the same sense in which the earth, cattle, men, are in the world; but in the sense in which an artificer controls his own work; whence the text, And the world was made by Him. Nor again did He make it after the manner of an artificer; for whereas an artificer is external to what he fabricates, God pervades the world, carrying on the work of creation in every part, and never absent from any part: by the presence of His Majesty He both makes and controls what is made. Thus He was in the world, as He by Whom the world was made.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. viii. c. 1) And again, because He was in the world, but not coeval with the world, for this cause he introduced the words, and the world was made by Him: thus taking you back again to the eternal existence of the Only-Begotten. For when we are told that the whole of creation was made by Him, we must be very dull not to acknowledge that the Maker existed before the work.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Here he overthrows at once the insane notion of the Manichæano, who says that the world is the work of a malignant creature, and the opinion of the Arian, that the Son of God is a creature.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. in Joan. ii. c. 11) But what meaneth this, The world was made by Him? The earth, sky, and sea, and all that are therein, are called the world. But in another sense, the lovers of the world are called the world, of whom he says, And the world knew Him not. For did the sky, or Angels, not know their Creator, Whom the very devils confess, Whom the whole universe has borne witness to? Who then did not know Him? Those who, from their love of the world, are called the world; for such live in heart in the world, while those who do not love it, have their body in the world, but their heart in heaven; as saith the Apostle, our conversation is in heaven. (Phil. 3:20) By their love of the world, such men merit being called by the name of the place where they live. And just as in speaking of a bad house, or good house, we do not mean praise or blame to the walls, but to the inhabitants; so when we talk of the world, we mean those who live there in the love of it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. viii. c. 8. 56.) But they who were the friends of God, knew Him even before His presence in the body; whence Christ saith below, Your father Abraham rejoiced to see My day. When the Gentiles then interrupt us with the question, Why has He come in these last times to work our salvation, having neglected us so long? we reply, that He was in the world before, superintending what He had made, and was known to all who were worthy of Him; and that, if the world knew Him not, those of whom the world was not worthy knew Him. The reason follows, why the world knew Him not. The Evangelist calls those men the world, who are tied to the world, and savour of worldly things; for there is nothing that disturbs the mind so much, as this melting with the love of present things.

1:11–13

11. He came unto his own, and his own received him not.

12. But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name:

13. Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. ix. 1) When He said that the world knew Him not, he referred to the times of the old dispensation, but what follows has reference to the time of his preaching; He came unto his own.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. i) Because all things were made by Him.

THEOPHYLACT. By his own, understand either the world, or Judæa, which He had chosen for His inheritance.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. x. [ix.] 2) He came then unto His own, not for His own good, but for the good of others. But whence did He Who fills all things, and is every where present, come? He came out of condescension to us, though in reality He had been in the world all along. But the world not seeing Him, because it knew Him not, He deigned to put on flesh. And this manifestation and condescension is called His advent. But the merciful God so contrives His dispensations, that we may shine forth in proportion to our goodness, and therefore He will not compel, but invites men, by persuasion and kindness, to come of their own accord: and so, when He came, some received Him, and others received Him not. He desires not an unwilling and forced service; for no one who comes unwillingly devotes himself wholly to Him. Whence what follows, And his own received him not. (Hom. ix. [viii.] 1). He here calls the Jews His own, as being his peculiar people; as indeed are all men in some sense, being made by Him. And as above, to the shame of our common nature, he said, that the world which was made by Him, knew not its Maker: so here again, indignant at the ingratitude of the Jews, he brings a heavier charge, viz. that His own received Him not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. in Joan. ii. 12) But if none at all received, none will be saved. For no one will he saved, but he who received Christ at His coming; and therefore he adds, As many as received Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. x. [ix.] 2) Whether they be bond or free, Greek or Barbarian, wise or unwise, women or men, the young or the aged, all are made meet for the honour, which the Evangelist now proceeds to mention. To them gave He power to become the sons of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii. 13) O amazing goodness! He was born the Only Son, yet would not remain so; but grudged not to admit joint heirs to His inheritance. Nor was this narrowed by many partaking of it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. x. [ix.] 2) He saith not that He made them the sons of God, but gave them power to become the sons of God: shewing that there is need of much care, to preserve the image, which is formed by our adoption in Baptism, untarnished: and shewing at the same time also that no one can take this power from us, except we rob ourselves of it. Now, if the delegates of worldly governments have often nearly as much power as those governments themselves, much more is this the case with us, who derive our dignity from God. But at the same time the Evangelist wishes to shew that this grace comes to us of our own will and endeavour: that, in short, the operation of grace being supposed, it is in the power of our free will to make us the sons of God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or the meaning is, that the most perfect sonship will only be attained at the resurrection, as saith the Apostle, Waiting for the adoption, to wit, the redemption of our body. (Rom. 8:23) He therefore gave us the power to become the sons of God, i. e. the power of obtaining this grace at some future time.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. x. 2) And because in the matter of these ineffable benefits, the giving of grace belongs to God, but the extending of faith to man, He subjoins, even to those who believe on his name. Why then declarest thou not, John, the punishment of those who received Him not? Is it because there is no greater punishment than that, when the power of becoming the sons of God is offered to men, they should not become such, but voluntarily deprive themselves of the dignity? But besides this, inextinguishable fire awaits all such, as will appear clearly farther on.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii. 14) To be made then the sons of God, and brothers of Christ, they must of course be born; for if they are not born, how can they be sons? Now the sons of men are born of flesh and blood, and the will of man, and the embrace of wedlock; but how these are born, the next words declare: Not of bloods1; that is, the male's and the female's. Bloods is not correct Latin, but as it is plural in the Greek, the translator preferred to put it so, though it be not strictly grammatical, at the same time explaining the word in order not to offend the weakness of one's hearers.

BEDE. It should be understood that in holy Scripture, blood in the plural number, has the signification of sin: thus in the Psalms Deliver me from blood-guiltinessp. (Ps. 51:14).

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii. 14) In that which follows, Nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, the flesh is put for the female; because, when she was made out of the rib, Adam said, This is now bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh. (Gen. 2:23) The flesh therefore is put for the wife, as the spirit sometimes is for the husband; because that the one ought to govern, the other to obey. For what is there worse than an house, where the woman hath rule over the man? But these that we speak of are born neither of the will of the flesh, nor the will of man, but of God.

BEDE. The carnal birth of men derives its origin from the embrace of wedlock, but the spiritual is dispensed by the grace of the Holy Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. x. [ix.] 3) The Evangelist makes this declaration, that being taught the vileness and inferiority of our former birth, which is through blood, and the will of the flesh, and understanding the loftiness and nobleness of the second, which is through grace, we might hence receive great knowledge, worthy of being bestowed by him who begat us, and after this shew forth much zeal.

1:14

14. And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ii. 15) Having said, Born of God; to prevent surprise and trepidation at so great, so apparently incredible a grace, as that men should be born of God; to assure us, he says, And the Word was made flesh. Why marvellest thou then that men are born of God? Know that God Himself was born of man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xi. [x.] 1) Or thus, After saying that they were born of God, who received Him, he sets forth the cause of this honour, viz. the Word being made flesh, God's own Son was made the son of man, that he might make the sons of men the sons of God. Now when thou hearest that the Word was made flesh, be not disturbed, for He did not change His substance into flesh, which it were indeed impious to suppose; but remaining what He was, took upon Him the form of a servant. But as there are some who say, that the whole of the incarnation was only in appearance, to refute such a blasphemy, he used the expression, was made, meaning to represent not a conversion of substance, but an assumption of real flesh. But if they say, God is omnipotent; why then could He not be changed into flesh? we reply, that a change from an unchangeable nature is a contradiction.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. xv. c. 20. [xi.]) As our wordq becomes the bodily voice, by its assumption of that voice, as a means of developing itself externally; so the Word of God was made flesh, by assuming flesh, as a means of manifesting Itself to the world. And as our word is made voice, yet is not turned into voice; so the Word of God was made flesh, but never turned into flesh. It is by assuming another nature, not by consuming themselves in it, that our word is made voice, and the Word, flesh.

THE COUNCIL OF EPHESUS. (P. iii. Hom. Theod. Ancyr. de Nat. Dom.) The discourse which we utter, which we use in conversation with each other, is incorporeal, imperceptible, impalpable; but clothed in letters and characters, it becomes material, perceptible, tangible. So too the Word of God, which was naturally invisible, becomes visible, and that comes before us in tangible form, which was by nature incorporeal.

ALCUIN. (in Joan. 1:1.) When we think how the incorporeal soul is joined to the body, so as that of two is made one man, we too shall the more easily receive the notion of the incorporeal Divine substance being joined to the soul in the body, in unity of person; so as that the Word is not turned into flesh, nor the flesh into the Word; just as the soul is not turned into body, nor the body into soul.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Apollinarius of Laodicea raised a heresy upon this text; saying, that Christ had flesh only, not a rational soul; in the place of which His divinity directed and controlled His body.

AUGUSTINE. (con. Serm. Arian. c. 7. [9.]) If men are disturbed however by its being said that the Word was made flesh, without mention of a soul; let them know that the flesh is put for the whole man, the part for the whole, by a figure of speech; as in the Psalms, Unto thee shall all flesh come; (Ps. 65:2) and again in Romans, By the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified. (Rom. 3:20) In the same sense it is said here that the Word was made flesh; meaning that the Word was made man.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) The Evangelist intends by making mention of the flesh, to shew the unspeakable condescension of God, and lead us to admire His compassion, in assuming for our salvation, what was so opposite and incongenial to His nature, as the flesh: for the soul has some propinquity to God. If the Word, however, was made flesh, and assumed not at the same time a human soul, our souls, it would follow, would not be yet restored: for what He did not assume, He could not sanctify. What a mockery then, when the soul first sinned, to assume and sanctify the flesh only, leaving the weakest part untouched! This text overthrows Nestorius, who asserted that it was not the very Word, even God, Who the Self-same was made man, being conceived of the sacred blood of the Virgin: but that the Virgin brought forth a man endowed with every kind of virtue, and that the Word of God was united to him: thus making out two sons, one born of the Virgin, i. e. man, the other born of God, that is, the Son of God, united to that man by grace, and relation, and lover. In opposition to him the Evangelist declares, that the very Word was made Man, not that the Word fixing upon a righteous man united Himself to him.

CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA. (ad Nes. Ep. 8) The Word uniting to Himself a body of flesh animated with a rational soul, substantially, was ineffably and incomprehensibly made Man, and called the Son of man, and that not according to the will only, or good-pleasure, nor again by the assumption of the Person alone. The natures are different indeed which are brought into true union, but He Who is of both, Christ the Son, is One; the difference of the natures, on the other hand, not being destroyed in consequence of this coalition.

THEOPHYLACT. (in v. 14) From the text, The Word was made flesh, we learn this farther, that the Word Itself is man, and being the Son of God was made the Son of a woman, who is rightly called the Mother of God, as having given birth to God in the flesh.

HILARY. (x. de Trin. c. 21, 22) Some, however, who think God the Only-Begotten, God the Word, Who was in the beginning with God, not to be God substantially, but a Word sent forth, the Son being to God the Father, what a word is to one who utters it, these men, in order to disprove that the Word, being substantially God, and abiding in the form of God, was born the Man Christ, argue subtilly, that, whereas that Man (they say) derived His life rather from human origin than from the mystery of a spiritual conception, God the Word did not make Himself Man of the womb of the Virgin; but that the Word of God was in Jesus, as the spirit of prophecy in the Prophets. And they are accustomed to charge us with holding, that Christ was born a Man, notr of our body and soul; whereas we preach the Word made flesh, and after our likeness born Man, so that He Who is truly Son of God, was truly born Son of man; and that, as by His own act He took upon Him a body of the Virgin, so of Himself He took a soul also, which in no case is derived from man by mere parental origin. And seeing He, The Self-same, is the Son of man, how absurd were it, besides the Son of God, Who is the Word, to make Him another person besides, a sort of prophet, inspired by the Word of God; whereas our Lord Jesus Christ is both the Son of God, and the Son of man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. xi. [x.] 2) Lest from it being said, however, that the Word was made flesh, you should infer improperly a change of His incorruptible nature, he subjoins, And dwelt among us. For that which inhabits is not the same, but different from the habitation: different, I say, in nature; though as to union and conjunction, God the Word and the flesh are one, without confusion or extinction of substance.

ALCUIN. Or, dwelt among us, means, lived amongst men.

14. And we saw his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xii. [xi.] 1.) Having said that we are made the sons of God, and in no other way than because the Word was made flesh; he mentions another gift, And we saw His glory. Which glory we should not have seen, had He not, by His alliance with humanity, become visible to us. For if they could not endure to look on the glorified face of Moses, but there was need of a veil, how could soiled and earthly creatures, like ourselves, have borne the sight of undisguised Divinity, which is not vouchsafed even to the higher powers themselves.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. ii. c. 16) Or thus; in that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, His birth became a kind of ointment to anoint the eyes of our heart, that we might through His humanity discern His majesty; and therefore it follows, And we saw His glory. No one could see His glory, who was not healed by the humility of the flesh. For there had flown upon man’s eye as it were dust from the earth: the eye had been diseased, and earth was sent to heal it again; the flesh had blinded thee, the flesh restores thee. The soul by consenting to carnal affections had become carnal; hence the eye of the mind had been blinded: then the physician made for thee ointment. He came in such wise, as that by the flesh He destroyed the corruption of the flesh. And thus the Word was made flesh, that thou mightest be able to say, We saw His glory.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. xii. [xi.] 1.) He subjoins, As of the Only-Begotten of the Father: for many prophets, as Moses, Elijah, and others, workers of miracles, had been glorified, and Angels also who appeared unto men, shining with the brightness belonging to their nature; Cherubim and Seraphim too, who were seen in glorious array by the prophets. But the Evangelist withdrawing our minds from these, and raising them above all nature, and every preeminence of fellow servants, leads us up to the summit Himself; as if he said, Not of prophet, or of any other man, or of Angel, or Archangel, or any of the higher powers, is the glory which we beheld; but as that of the very Lord, very King, very and true Only-Begotten Son.

GREGORY. (lxviii. Moral. c. 6. [12.]) In Scripture language as, and as it were, are sometimes put not for likeness but reality; whence the expression, As of the Only-Begotten of the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xii. [xi.] 1) As if he said: We saw His glory, such as it was becoming and proper for the Only-Begotten and true Son to have. We have a form of speech, like it, derived from our seeing kings always splendidly robed. When the dignity of a man’s carriage is beyond description, we say, In short, he went as a king. So too John says, We saw His glory, the glory as of the Only Begotten of the Father. For Angels, when they appeared, did every thing as servants who had a Lord, but He as the Lord appearing in humble form. Yet did all creatures recognise their Lord, the star calling the Magi, the Angels the shepherds, the child leaping in the womb acknowledged Him: yea the Father bore witness to Him from heaven, and the Paraclete descending upon Him: and the very universe itself shouted louder than any trumpet, that the King of heaven had come. For devils fled, diseases were healed, the graves gave up the dead, and souls were brought out of wickedness, to the utmost height of virtue. What shall one say of the wisdom of precepts, of the virtue of heavenly laws, of the excellent institution of the angelical life?

ORIGEN. (Hom. 2) Full of grace and truth. Of this the meaning is twofold. For it may be understood of the Humanity, and the Divinity of the Incarnate Word, so that the fulness of grace has reference to the Humanity, according to which Christ is the Head of the Church, and the first-born of every creature: for the greatest and original example of grace, by which man, with no preceding merits, is made God, is manifested primarily in Him. The fulness of the grace of Christ may also be understood of the Holy Spirit, whose sevenfold operation filled Christ's Humanity. (Is. 11:2) The fulness of truth applies to the Divinity … But if you had rather understand the fulness of grace and truth of the New Testament, you may with propriety pronounce the fulness of the grace of the New Testament to be given by Christ, and the truth of the legal types to have been fulfilled in Him.

THEOPHYLACT. (hoc loc.) Or, full of grace, inasmuch as His word was gracious, as saith David, Full of grace are thy lips; and truth, (Ps. 45:3) because what Moses and the Prophets spoke or did in figure, Christ did in reality.

1:15

15. John bare witness of him, and cried, saying, This was he of whom I spake, He that cometh after me is preferred before me, for he was before me.

ALCUIN. He had said before that there was a man sent to bear witness; now he gives definitely the forerunner's own testimony, which plainly declared the excellence of His Human Nature and the Eternity of His Godhead. John bare witness of Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. in Joan. xiii. [xii.] 1, 2, 3) Or he introduces this, as if to say, Do not suppose that we bear witness to this out of gratitude, because we were with Him a long time, and partook of His table; for John who had never seen Him before, nor tarried with Him, bare witness to Him. The Evangelist repeats John's testimony many times here and there, because he was held in such admiration by the Jews. Other Evangelists refer to the old prophets, and say, This was done that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the prophet. But he introduces a loftier, and later witness, not intending to make the servant vouch for the master, but only condescending to the weakness of his hearers. For as Christ would not have been so readily received, had He not taken upon Him the form of a servant; so if he had not excited the attention of servants by the voice of a fellow-servant beforehand, there would not have been many Jews embracing the word of Christ. It follows, And cried; that is, preached with openness, with freedom, without reservation. He did not however begin with asserting that this one was the natural only-begotten Son of God, but cried, saying, This was He of whom I spake, He that cometh after me is preferred before me, for He was before me. For as birds do not teach their young all at once to fly, but first draw them outside the nest, and afterwards try them with a quicker motion; so John did not immediately lead the Jews to high things, but began with lesser flights, saying, that Christ was better than he; which in the mean time was no little advance. And observe how prudently he introduces his testimony; he not only points to Christ when He appears, but preaches Him beforehand; as, This is He of whom I spake. This would prepare men's minds for Christ's coming: so that when He did come, the humility of His garb would be no impediment to His being received. For Christ adopted so humble and common an appearance, that if men had seen Him without first hearing John's testimony to His greatness, none of the things spoken of Him would have had any effect.

THEOPHYLACT. He saith, Who cometh after me, that is, as to the time of His birth. John was six months before Christ, according to His humanity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xiii. [xii.] 3) Or this does not refer to the birth from Mary; for Christ was born, when this was said by John; but to His coming for the work of preaching. He then saith, is madea before me; that is, is more illustrious, more honourable; as if he said, Do not suppose me greater than He, because I came first to preach.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) The Arians infer from this word1, that the Son of God is not begotten of the Father, but made like any other creature.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. 3) It does not mean—He was made before I was made; but He is preferred to me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xiii. [xii.] 3) If the words, made before me, referred to His coming into being, it was superfluous to add, For He was before me. For who would be so foolish as not to know, that if He was made before him, He was before him. It would have been more correct to say, He was before me, because He was made before me. The expression then, He was made before me, must be taken in the sense of honour: only that which was to take place, he speaks of as having taken place already, after the style of the old Prophets, who commonly talk of the future as the past.

1:16–17

16. And of his fulness have all we received, and grace for grace.

17. For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. t. vi. 3.) This is to be considered a continuation of the Baptist’s testimony to Christ, a point which has escaped the attention of many, who think that from this to, He hath declared Him, (v. 18) St. John the Apostle is speaking. But the idea that on a sudden, and, as it would seem, unseasonably, the discourse of the Baptist should be interrupted by a speech of the disciple’s, is inadmissible. And any one, able to follow the passage, will discern a very obvious connexion here. For having said, He is preferred before me, for He was before me, he proceeds, From this I know that He is before me, because I and the Prophets who preceded me have received of His fulness, and grace for grace, (the second grace for the first.) For they too by the Spirit penetrated beyond the figure to the contemplation of the truth. And hence receiving, as we have done, of his fulness, we judge that the law was given by Moses, but that grace and truth were made1, by Jesus Christ—made, not given: the Father gave the law by Moses, but made grace and truth by Jesus. But if it is Jesus who says below, I am the Truth, (John 14:6) how is truth made by Jesus? We must understand however that the very substantial Truth2, from which First Truth and Its Image many truths are engraven on those who treat of the truth, was not made through Jesus Christ, or through any one; but only the truth which is in individuals, such as in Paul, e. g. or the other Apostles, was made through Jesus Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Joan. Hom. xiv. [xiii.] 1) Or thus; John the Evangelist here adds his testimony to that of John the Baptist, saying, And of his fulness have we all received. These are not the words of the forerunner, but of the disciple; as if he meant to say, We also the twelve, and the whole body of the faithful, both present and to come, have received of His fulness.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. iii. c. 8. et seq.) But what have ye received? Grace for grace. So that we are to understand that we have received a certain something from His fulness, and over and above this, grace for grace; that we have first received of His fulness, first grace; and again, we have received grace for grace. What grace did we first receive? Faith: which is called grace, because it is given freely3. This is the first grace then which the sinner receives, the remission of his sins. Again, we have grace for grace; i. e. in stead of that grace in which we live by faith, we are to receive another, viz. life eternal: for life eternal is as it were the wages of faith. And thus as faith itself is a good grace, so life eternal is grace for grace. There was not grace in the Old Testament; for the law threatened, but assisted not, commanded, but healed not, shewed our weakness, but relieved it not. It prepared the way however for a Physician who was about to come, with the gifts of grace and truth: whence the sentence which follows: For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth were made by Jesus Christ. The death of thy Lord hath destroyed death, both temporal and eternal; that is the grace which was promised, but not contained, in the law.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xiv. [xiii.] sparsim.) Or we have received grace for grace; that is, the new in the place of the old. For as there is a justice and a justice besides, an adoption and another adoption, a circumcision and another circumcision; so is there a grace and another grace: only the one being a type, the other a reality. He brings in the words to shew that the Jews as well as ourselves are saved by grace: it being of mercy and grace that they received the law. Next, after he has said, Grace for grace, he adds something to shew the magnitude of the gift; For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth were made by Jesus Christ. John when comparing himself with Christ above had said, He is preferred before me: but the Evangelist draws a comparison between Christ, and one much more in admiration with the Jews than John, viz. Moses. And observe his wisdom. He does not draw the comparison between the persons, but the things, contrasting grace and truth to the law: the latter of which he says was given, a word only applying to an administrator; the former made, as we should speak of a king, who does every thing by his power: though in this King it would be with grace also, because that with power He remitted all sins. Now His grace is shewn in His gift of Baptism, and our adoption by the Holy Spirit, and many other things; but to have a better insight into what the truth is, we should study the figures of the old law: for what was to be accomplished in the New Testament, is prefigured in the Old, Christ at His Coming filling up the figure. Thus was the figure given by Moses, but the truth made by Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. xiii. c. 24. [xix.]) Or, we may refer grace to knowledge, truth to wisdom. Amongst the events of time the highest grace is the uniting of man to God in One Person; in the eternal world the highest truth pertains to God the Word.

1:18

18. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. t. vi. §. 2) Heraclcon asserts, that this is a declaration of the disciple, not of the Baptist: an unreasonable supposition; for if the words, Of His fulness have we all received, are the Baptist's, does not the connexion run naturally, that he receiving of the grace of Christ, the second in the place of the first grace, and confessing that the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ; understood here that no man had seen God at any time, and that the Only Begotten, who was in the bosom of the Father, had committed this declaration of Himself to John, and all who with him had received of His fulness? For John was not the first who declared Him; for He Himself who was before Abraham, tells us, that Abraham rejoiced to see His glory.

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Joan. Hom. xiv. [xiii.] 1) Or thus; the Evangelist after shewing the great superiority of Christ's gifts, compared with those dispensed by Moses, wishes in the next place to supply an adequate reason for the difference. The one being a servant was made a minister of a lesser dispensation: but the other Who was Lord, and Son of the King, brought us far higher things, being ever coexistent with the Father, and beholding Him. Then follows, No man hath seen God at any time, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. to Paulina [Ep. 147. al. 112. c. 5]) What is that then which Jacob said, I have seen God face to face; (Gen. 32.) and that which is written of Moses, he talked with God face to face; (Ex. 33) and that which the prophet Isaiah saith of himself, I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne? (Isa. 6.)

GREGORY. (xviii. Moral. c. 54. [88] rec. 28) It is plainly given us to understand here, that while we are in this mortal state, we can see God only through the medium of certain images, not in the reality of His own nature. A soul influenced by the grace of the Spirit may see God through certain figures, but cannot penetrate into his absolute essence. And hence it is that Jacob, who testifies that he saw God, saw nothing but an Angel: and that Moses, who talked with God face to face, says, Shew me Thy way, that I may know Thee: (Exod. 33:13) meaning that he ardently desired to see in the brightness of His own infinite Nature, Him Whom he had only as yet seen reflected in images.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xv. [xiv.]) If the old fathers had seen That very Nature, they would not have contemplated It so variously, for It is in Itself simple and without shape; It sits not, It walks not; these are the qualities of bodies. Whence he saith through the Prophet, I have multiplied visions, and used similitudes, by the ministry of the Prophets: (Hosea 12:10) i. e. I have condescended to them, I appeared that which I was not. For inasmuch as the Son of God was about to manifest Himself to us in actual flesh, men were at first raised to the sight of God, in such ways as allowed of their seeing Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Ep. to Paulina sparsim.) Now it is said, Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God; (Matt. 5:8) and again, When He shall appear, we shall be like unto Him, for we shall see Him as He is. (1 John 3:2) What is the meaning then of the words here: No man hath seen God at any time? The reply is easy: those passages speak of God, as to be seen, not as already seen. They shall see God, it is said, not, they have seen Him: nor is it, we have seen Him, but, we shall see Him as He is. For, No man hath seen God at any time, neither in this life, nor yet in the Angelic, as He is; in the same way in which sensible things are perceived by the bodily vision.

GREGORY. (xviii. Moral.) If however any, while inhabiting this corruptible flesh, can advance to such an immeasurable height of virtue, as to be able to discern by the contemplative vision, the eternal brightness of God, their case affects not what we say. For whoever seeth wisdom, that is, God, is dead wholly to this life, being no longer occupied by the love of it.

AUGUSTINE. (xii. on Gen. ad litteram c. 27) For unless any in some sense die to this life, either by leaving the body altogether, or by being so withdrawn and alienated from carnal perceptions, that he may well not know, as the Apostle says, whether he be in the body or out of the body, (2 Cor. 12:2) he cannot be carried away, and borne aloft to that vision.

GREGORY. (xviii. Moral. c. 54. 90. vet. xxxviii.) Some hold that in the place of bliss, God is visible in His brightness, but not in His nature. This is to indulge in over much subtlety. For in that simple and unchangeable essence, no division can be made between the nature and the brightness.

AUGUSTINE. (to Paul. c. iv.) If we say, that the text, No oned hath seen God at any time, (1 Tim. 6:16) applies only to men; so that, as the Apostle more plainly interprets it, Whom no man hath seen nor can see, no one is to be understood here to mean, no one of men: the question may be solved in a way not to contradict what our Lord says, Their Angels do always behold the face of My Father; (Mat. 18:10) so that we must believe that Angels see, what no one, i. e. of men, hath ever seen.

GREGORY. (xviii. Moral. c. 54. [91] vet. xxxviii.) Some however there are who conceive that not even the Angels see God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xv. [xiv.] 1) That very existence which is God, neither Prophets, nor even Angels, nor yet Archangels, have seen. For enquire of the Angels; they say nothing concerning His Substance; but sing, Glory to God in the highest, and Peace on earth to men of good will. (Luke 2:1) Nay, ask even Cherubim and Seraphim; thou wilt hear only in reply the mystic melody of devotion, and that heaven and earth are full of His glory. (Is. 6:3)

AUGUSTINE. (to Paulina c. 7) Which indeed is true so far, that no bodily or even mental vision of man hath ever embraced the fulness of God; for it is one thing to see, another to embrace the whole of what thou seest. A thing is seen, if only the sight of it be caught; but we only see a thing fully, when we have no part of it unseen, when we see round its extreme limits.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xv. [xiv.] 1.) In this complete sense only the Son and the Holy Ghost see the Father. For how can created nature see that which is uncreated? So then no man knoweth the Father as the Son knoweth Him: and hence what follows, The Only-Begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him. That we might not be led by the identity of the name, to confound Him with the sons made so by grace, the article is annexed in the first place; and then, to put an end to all doubt, the name Only-Begotten is introduced.

HILARY. (de Trin. vi. 39) The Truth of His Nature did not seem sufficiently explained by the name of Son, unless, in addition, its peculiar force as proper to Him were expressed, so signifying its distinctness from all beside. For in that, besides Son, he calleth Him also the Only-Begotten, he cut off altogether all suspicion of adoption, the Nature of the Only-Begotten guaranteeing the truth of the name.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xv. [xiv.] 2.) He adds, Which is in the bosom of the Father. To dwell in the bosom is much more than simply to see. For he who sees simply, hath not the knowledge thoroughly of that which he sees; but he who dwells in the bosom, knoweth every thing. When you hear then that no one knoweth the Father save the Son, do not by any means suppose that he only knows the Father more than any other, and does not know Him fully. For the Evangelist sets forth His residing in the bosom of the Father on this very account: viz. to shew us the intimate converse of the Only-Begotten, and His coeternity with the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. iii. c. 17) In the bosom of the Father, i. e. in the secret Presence1 of the Father: for God hath not the folde on the bosom, as we have; nor must be imagined to sit, as we do; nor is He bound with a girdle, so as to have a fold: but from the fact of our bosom being placed innermost, the secret Presence of the Father is called the bosom of the Father. He then who, in the secret Presence of the Father, knew the Father, the same hath declared what He saw.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xv. [xiv.] 3) But what hath He declared? That God is one. But this the rest of the Prophets and Moses proclaim: what else have we learnt from the Son Who was in the bosom of the Father? In the first place, that those very truths, which the others declared, were declared through the operation of the Only Begotten: in the next place, we have received a far greater doctrine from the Only Begotten; viz. that God is a Spirit, and those who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth; and that God is the Father of the Only Begotten.

BEDE. (in loc.) Farther, if the word declared have reference to the past, it must be considered that He, being made man, declared the doctrine of the Trinity in unity, and how, and by what acts we should prepare ourselves for the contemplation of it. If it have reference to the future, then it means that He will declare Him, when He shall introduce His elect to the vision of His brightness.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iii. c. 18) Yet have there been men, who, deceived by the vanity of their hearts, maintained that the Father is invisible, the Son visible. Now if they call the Son visible, with respect to His connexion with the flesh, we object not; it is the Catholic doctrine. But it is madness in them to say He was so before His incarnation; i. e. if it be true that Christ is the Wisdom of God, and the Power of God. The Wisdom of God cannot be seen by the eye. If the human word cannot be seen by the eye, how can the Word of God?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvi. [xv.] 1.) The text then, No man hath seen God at any time, applies not to the Father only, but also to the Son: for He, as Paul saith, is the Image of the invisible God; but He who is the Image of the Invisible, must Himself also be invisible.

1:19–23

19. And this is the record of John, when the Jews sent priests and Levites from Jerusalem to ask him, Who art thou?

20. And he confessed, and denied not; but confessed, I am not the Christ.

21. And they asked him, What then? Art thou Elias? And he saith, I am not. Art thou that prophet? And he answered, No.

22. Then said they unto him, Who art thou? that we may give an answer to them that sent us. What sayest thou of thyself?

23. He said, I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness, Make straight the way of the Lord, as said the prophet Esaias.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. tom. ii. c. 29) This is the second testimony of John the Baptist to Christ, the first began with, This is He of Whom I spake; and ended with, He hath declared Him.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Or, after the introduction above of John’s testimony to Christ, is preferred before me, the Evangelist now adds when the above testimony was given, And this is the record of John, when the Jews sent priests and Levites from Jerusalem.

ORIGEN. (t. vi. c. 4) The Jews of Jerusalem, as being of kin to the Baptist, who was of the priestly stock, send Priests and Levites to ask him who he is; (c. 6). that is, men considered to hold a superior rank to the rest of their order, by God’s election, and coming from that favoured above all cities, Jerusalem. Such is the reverential way in which they interrogate

John. We read of no such proceeding towards Christ: but what the Jews did to John, John in turn does to Christ, when he asks Him, through His disciples, Art thou He that should come, (Luke 7:20) or look we for another?

CHRYSOSTOM. (in Joan. Hom. xvi. [xv.]) Such confidence had they in John, that they were ready to believe him on his own words: witness how it is said, To ask him, Who art thou?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. 4. c. 3) They would not have sent, unless they had been impressed by his lofty exercise of authority, in daring to baptize.

ORIGEN. (in Joh. tom. vi. c. 6) John, as it appears, saw from the question, that the Priests and Levites had doubts whether it might not be the Christ, who was baptizing; which doubts however they were afraid to profess openly, for fear of incurring the charge of credulity. He wisely determines therefore first to correct their mistake, and then to proclaim the truth. Accordingly, he first of all shews that he is not the Christ: And he confessed, and denied not; but confessed, I am not the Christ. We may add here, that at this time the people had already begun to be impressed with the idea that Christ's advent was at hand, in consequence of the interpretations which the lawyers had collected out of the sacred writings to that effect. Thus Theudas had been enabled to collect together a considerable body, on the strength of his pretending to be the Christ; and after him Judas, in the days of the, taxation, had done the same. (Acts 5) Such being the strong expectation of Christ's advent then prevalent, the Jews send to John, intending by the question, Who art thou? to extract from him whether he were the Christ.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Evang. c. 1) He denied directly being what he was not, but he did not deny what he was: thus, by his speaking truth, becoming a true member of Him Whose name he had not dishonestly usurped.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvi. [xv.] 1, 2) Or take this explanation: The Jews were influenced by a kind of human sympathy for John, whom they were reluctant to see made subordinate to Christ, on account of the many marks of greatness about him; his illustrious descent in the first place, he being the son of a chief priest; in the next, his hard training, and his contempt of the world. Whereas in Christ the contrary were apparent; a humble birth, for which they, reproach Him; Is not this the carpenter's son?

(Mat. 13:55) an ordinary way of living; a dress such as every one else wore. As John then was constantly sending to Christ, they send to him, with the view of having him for their master, and thinking to induce him, by blandishments, to confess himself Christ. They do not therefore send inferior persons to him, ministers and Herodians, as they did to Christ, but Priests and Levites; and not of these an indiscriminate party, but those of Jerusalem, i. e. the more honourable ones; but they send them with this question, to ask, Who art thou? not from a wish to be informed, but in order to induce him to do what I have said. John replies then to their intention, not to their interrogation: And he confessed, and denied not; but confessed, I am not the Christ. And observe the wisdom of the Evangelist: he repeats the same thing three times, to shew John's virtue, and the malice and madness of the Jews. For it is the character of a devoted servant, not only to forbear taking to himself his lord's glory, but even, when numbers offer it to him, to reject it. The multitude indeed believed from ignorance that John was the Christ, but in these it was malice; and in this spirit they put the question to him, thinking, by their blandishments to bring him over to their wishes. For unless this had been their design, when he replied, I am not the Christ, they would have said, We did not suspect this; we did not come to ask this. When caught, however, and discovered in their purpose, they proceed to another question: And they asked him, What then? Art thou Elias?

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. iv. c. 4) For they knew that Elias was to preach Christ; the name of Christ not being unknown to any among the Jews; but they did not think that He our Lord was the Christ: and yet did not altogether imagine that there was no Christ about to come. In this way, while looking forward to the future, they mistook at the present.

And he said, I am not.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. c. 1) These words gave rise to a very different question. In another place, our Lord, when asked by His disciples concerning the coming of Elias, replied, If ye will receive it, this is Elias. (Mat. 11:14) But John says, I am not Elias. How is he then a preacher of the truth, if he agrees not with what that very Truth declares?

ORIGEN. (in Joan. tom. vi. c. 7) Some one will say that John was ignorant that he was Elias; as those say, who maintain, from this passage the doctrine of a second incorporation, as though the soul took up a new body, after leaving its old one. For the Jews, it is said, asking John by the Levites and priests, whether he is Elias, suppose the doctrine of a second body to be already certain; as though it rested upon tradition, and were part of their secret system. To which question, however, John replies, I am not Elias: not being acquainted with his own prior existence. But how is it reasonable to imagine, if John were a prophet enlightened by the Spirit, and had revealed so much concerning the Father, and the Only-Begotten, that he could be so in the dark as to himself, as not to know that his own soul had once belonged to Elias?

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Evang. c. 1) But if we examine the truth accurately, that which sounds inconsistent, will be found not really so. The Angel told Zacharias concerning John, He shall go before Him in the spirit and power of Elias. (Luke 1:17) As Elias then will preach the second advent of our Lord, so John preached His first; as the former will come as the precursor of the Judge, so the latter was made the precursor of the Redeemer. John was Elias in spirit, not in person: and what our Lord affirms of the spirit, John denies of the Person: there being a kind of propriety in this; viz. that our Lord to His disciples should speak spiritually of John, and that John, in answering the carnal multitude, should speak of his body, not of his spirit.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. tom. vi. c. 7) He answers then the Levites and Priests, I am not, conjecturing what their question meant: for the purport of their examination was to discover, not whether the spirit in both was the same, but whether John was that very Elias, who was taken up, now appearing again, as the Jews expected, without another birthI. But he whom we mentioned above as holding this doctrine of a reincorporation, will say that it is not consistent that the Priests and Levites should be ignorant of the birth of the son of so dignified a priest as Zacharias, who was born too in his father’s old age, and contrary to all human probabilities: especially when Luke declares, that fear came on all that dwelt round about them. (Luke 1:65) But perhaps, since Elias was expected to appear before the coming of Christ near the end, they may seem to put the question figuratively, Art thou he who announcest the coming of Christ at the end of the world? to which he answers, I am not. But there is in fact nothing strange in supposing that John’s birth might not have been known to all. For as in the case of our Saviour many knew Him to be born of Mary, and yet some wrongly imagined that He was John the Baptist, or Elias, or one of the

Prophets; so in the case of John, some were not unacquainted with the fact of his being son of Zacharias, and yet some may have been in doubt whether he were not the Elias who was expected. Again, inasmuch as many prophets had arisen in Israel, but one was especially looked forward to, of whom Moses had prophesied, The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a Prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me; unto Him shall ye hearken: (Deut. 18, 15) they ask him in the third place, not simply whether he is a prophet, but with the article prefixed, Art thou that Prophet? For every one of the prophets in succession had signified to the people of Israel that he was not the one whom Moses had prophesied of; who, like Moses, was to stand in the midst between God and man, and deliver a testament, sent from God to His disciples. They did not however apply this name to Christ, but thought that He was to be a different person; whereas John knew that Christ was that Prophet, and therefore to this question, he answered, No.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. iv. c. 8) Or because John was more than a prophet: for that the prophets announced Him afar off, but John pointed Him out actually present.

Then said they unto him, Who art thou? that we may give an answer to them that sent us. What sayest thou of thyself?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvi. [xv.] 2) You see them here pressing him still more strongly with their questions, while he on the other hand quietly puts down their suspicions, where they are untrue, and establishes the truth in their place: saying, I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iv. c. 7) So spoke Esaias: the prophecy was fulfilled in John the Baptist.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. c. 2) Ye know that the only-begotten Son is called the Word of the Father. Now we know, in the case of our own utterance, the voice first sounds, and then the word is heard. Thus John declares himself to be the voice, i. e. because he precedes the Word, and, through his ministry, the Word of the Father is heard by man.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. tom. vi. c. 12) Heracleon, in his discussion on John and the Prophets, infers that because the Saviour was the Word, and John the voice, therefore the whole of the prophetic order was only sound. To which we reply, that, if the trumpet gives an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle? If the voice of prophecy is nothing but sound, why does the Saviour send us to it, saying, Search the Scriptures? (John 5:39) But John calls himself the voice, not that crieth, but of one that crieth in the wilderness; viz. of Him Who stood and cried, If any man thirst, let him come unto Me and drink. (John 7:37) He cries, in order that those at a distance may hear him, and understand from the loudness of the sound, the vastness of the thing spoken of.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Or because he declared the truth plainly, while all who were under the law spoke obscurely.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Ev. c. 2) John crieth in the wilderness, because it is to forsaken and destitute Judæa that he bears the consolatory tidings of a Redeemer.

ORIGEN. (tom. vi. c. 10. 11) There is need of the voice crying in the wilderness, that the soul, forsaken by God, may be recalled to making straight the way of the Lord, following no more the crooked paths of the serpent. This has reference both to the contemplative life, as enlightened by truth, without mixture of falsehood, and to the practical, as following up the correct perception by the suitable action. Wherefore he adds, Make straight the way of the Lord, as saith the prophet, Esaias.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Evang. c. 2) The way of the Lord is made straight to the heart, when the word of truth is heard with humility; the way of the Lord is made straight to the heart, when the life is formed upon the precept.

1:24–28

24. And they which were sent were of the Pharisees.

25. And they asked him, and said unto him, Why baptizest thou then, if thou he not that Christ, nor Elias, neither that prophet?

26. John answered them, saying, I baptize with water: but there standeth one among you, whom ye know not;

27. He it is, who coming after me is preferred before me, whose shoe’s latchet I am not worthy to unloose.

28. These things were done in Bethabara beyond Jordan, where John was baptizing.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. tom. vi. c. 13) The questions of the priests and Levites being answered, another mission comes from the Pharisees: And they that were sent were of the Pharisees. So far as it is allowable to form a conjecture from the discourse itself here, I should say that it was the third occasion of John’s giving his witness. Observe the mildness of the former question, so befitting the priestly and levitical character, Who art thou? There is nothing arrogant or disrespectful, but only what becomes true ministers of God. The Pharisees however, being a sectarian body, as their name implies, address the Baptist in an importunate and contumelious way. And they said, Why baptizest thou then, if thou be not that Christ, neither Elias, neither that Prophet? not caring about information, but only wishing to prevent him baptizing. Yet the very next thing they did, was to come to John’s baptism. The solution of this is, that they came not in faith, but hypocritically, because they feared the people.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvi. [al. xv.] 2) Or, those very same priests and Levites were of the Pharisees, and, because they could not undermine him by blandishments, began accusing, after they had compelled him to say what he was not. And they asked him, saying, Why baptizest thou then, if thou art not the Christ, neither Elias, neither that Prophet? As if it were an act of audacity in him to baptize, when he was neither the Christ, nor His precursor, nor His proclaimer, i. e. that Prophet.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Evang c. 3) A saint, even when perversely questioned, is never diverted from the pursuit of goodness. Thus John to the words of envy opposes the words of life: John answered them, saying, I indeed baptize with water.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. tom. vi. c. 15) For how would the question, Why then baptizest thou, be replied to in any other way, than by setting forth the carnal nature of his own baptism?

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Evang. c. 3) John baptizeth not with the Spirit, but with water; not being able to remit sins, he washes the bodies of the baptized with water, but not their souls with pardon. Why then doth he baptize, when he doth not remit sins by baptism? To maintain his character of forerunner. As his birth preceded our Lord’s, so doth his baptism precede our Lord’s baptism. And he who was the forerunner of Christ in His preaching, is forerunner also in His baptism, which was the imitation of that Sacrament. And withal he announces the mystery of our redemption, saying that He, the Redeemer, is standing in the midst of men, and they know it not: There standeth one among you, whom ye know not: for our Lord, when He appeared in the flesh, was visible in body, but in majesty invisible.

CHRYSOSTOM. (xvi. 3) One among you. It was fitting that Christ should mix with the people, and be one of the many, shewing every where His humility. Whom ye know not; i. e. not, in the most absolute and certain sense; not, who He is, and whence Ho is.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iv. c. 9) In His low estate He was not seen; and therefore the candle was lighted.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Or it was, that our Lord was in the midst of the Pharisees; and they not knowing Him. For they thought that they knew the Scriptures, and therefore, inasmuch as our Lord was pointed out there, He was in the midst of them, i. e. in their hearts. But they knew Him not, inasmuch as they understood not the Scriptures. Or take another interpretation. He was in the midst of them, as mediator between God and man, wishing to bring them, the Pharisees, to God. But they knew Him not.

ORIGEN. (in Joan. tom. vi. c. 15) Or thus; Having said, I indeed baptize with water, in answer to the question, Why baptizest thou then?—to the next, If thou be not Christ? he replies by declaring the preexistent substance of Christ; that it was of such virtue, that though His Godhead was invisible, He was present to every one, and pervaded the whole world; as is conveyed in the words; There standeth one among you. For He it is, Who hath diffused Himself through the whole system of nature, insomuch that every thing which is created, is created by Him; All things were made by Him. Whence it is evident that even those who enquired of John, Why baptizest thou then? had Him among them. Or, the words, There standeth one among you, are to be understood of mankind generally. For, from our character as rational beings, it follows that the words exists in the centre of us, because the heart, which is the spring of motion within us, is situated in the centre of the body. Those then who carry the word within them, but are ignorant of its nature, and the source and beginning and the way in which it resides in them; these, hearing the word within them, know it not. But John recognised Him, and reproached the Pharisees, saying, Whom ye know not. For, though expecting Christ's coming, the Pharisees had formed no lofty conception of Him, but supposed that He would only be a holy man: wherefore he briefly refutes their ignorance, and the false ideas that they had of His excellence. He saith, standeth; for as the Father standeth, i. e.

exists without variation or change, so standeth the Word ever in the work of salvation, though It assume flesh, though It be in the midst of men, though It stand invisible. Lest any one however should think that the invisible One Who cometh to all men, and to the universal world, is different from Him Who was made man, and appeared on the earth, he adds, He that cometh after me; i. e. Who will appear after me. The after however here has not the same meaning that it has, when Christ calls us after Him; for there we are told to follow after Him, that by treading in His steps, we may attain to the Father; but here the word is used to intimate what should follow upon John's teaching; for he came that all may believe, having by his ministry been fitted gradually by lesser things, for the reception of the perfect Word. Therefore he saith, He it is Who cometh after me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvi. [al. xv.] 3) As if he said, Do not think that every thing is contained in my baptism; for if my baptism were perfect, another would not come after me with another baptism. This baptism of mine is but an introduction to the other, and will soon pass away, like a shadow, or an image. There is One coming after me to establish the truth: and therefore this is not a perfect baptism; for, if it were, there would be no room for a second: and therefore he adds, Who is made before me: i. e. is more honourable, more lofty.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Ev. c. 3) Made before me, i. e. preferred before me. He comes after me, that is, He is born after me; He is made before me, that is, He is preferred to me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvi. [al. xv.] 3) But lest thou shouldest think this to be the result of comparison, he immediately shews it to be a superiority beyond all comparison; Whose shoe's latchet I am not worthy to unloose: as if He said, He is so much before me, that I am unworthy to be numbered among the lowest of His attendants: the unloosing of the sandal being the very lowest kind of service.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iv) To have pronounced himself worthy even of unloosing His shoe's latchet, he would have been thinking too much of himself.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Ev. c. 3) Or thus: It was a law of the old dispensation, that, if a man refused to take the woman, who of right came to him, to wife, he who by right of relationship came next to be the husband, should unloose his shoe. Now in what character did Christ appear in the world, but as Spouse of the Holy Church? (John 3:29.) John then very properly pronounced himself unworthy to unloose this shoe’s latchet: as if he said, I cannot uncover the feet of the Redeemer, for I claim not the title of spouse, which I have no right to. Or the passage may be explained in another way. We know that shoes are made out of dead animals. Our Lord then, when He came in the flesh, put on, as it were, shoes; because in His Divinity He took the flesh of our corruption, wherein we had of ourselves perished. And the latchet of the shoe, is the seal upon the mystery. John is not able to unloose the shoe’s latchet; i. e. even he cannot penetrate into the mystery of the Incarnation. So he seems to say: What wonder that He is preferred before me, Whom, being born after me, I contemplate, yet the mystery of Whose birth I comprehend not.

ORIGEN. (tom. vi. in Joan.) The place has been understood not amiss thus by a certain person1; I am not of such importance, as that for my sake He should descend from this high abode, and take flesh upon Him, as it were a shoe.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii. [al. xvi.] 1. in Joan) John having preached the thing concerning Christ publicly and with becoming liberty, the Evangelist mentions the place of His preaching: These things were done in Bethany beyond Jordan, where John was baptizing. For it was in no house or corner that John preached Christ, but beyond Jordan, in the midst of a multitude, and in the presence of all whom He had baptized. Some copies read more correctly Bethabara: for Bethany was not beyond Jordan, or in the desert, but near Jerusalem.

GLOSS. Or we must suppose two Bethanies; one over Jordan, the other on this side, not far from Jerusalem, the Bethany where Lazarus was raised from the dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii) He mentions this too for another reason, viz. that as He was relating events which had only recently happened, He might, by a reference to the place, appeal to the testimony of those who were present and saw them.

ALCUIN. The meaning of Bethany is, house of obedience; by which it is intimated to us, that all must approach to baptism, through the obedience of faith.

ORIGEN. (tom. vi. c. 24) Bethabara means house of preparation; which agreeth with the baptism of Him, who was making ready a people prepared for the Lord. (c.25. et seq.). Jordan, again, means, “their descent.” Now what is this river but our Saviour, through Whom coming into this earth all must be cleansed, in that He came down not for His own sake, but for theirs. This river it is which separateth the lots given by Moses, from those given by Jesus; its streams make glad the city of God. (c. 29). As the serpent lies hid in the Egyptian river, so doth God in this; for the Father is in the Son. Wherefore whosoever go thither to wash themselves, lay aside the reproach of Egypt, (Joshua 5:9.) are made meet to receive the inheritance, are cleansed from leprosy, (2 Kings 5:14.) are made capable of a double portion of grace, and ready to receive the Holy Spirit; (2 Kings 2:9.) nor doth the spiritual dove light upon any other river. John again baptizes beyond Jordan, as the precursor of Him Who came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance.

1:29–31

29. The next day John seeth Jesus coming to him, and saith, Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.

30. This is he of whom I said, After me cometh a man which is preferred before me: for he was before me.

31. And I knew him not: but that he should be made manifest to Israel, therefore am I come baptizing with water.

ORIGEN. (tom. vi. c. 30) After this testimony, Jesus is seen coming to John, not only persevering in his confession, but also advanced in goodness: as is intimated by the second day. Wherefore it is said, The next day John seeth Jesus coming to him. Long before this, the Mother of Jesus, as soon as she had conceived Him, went to see the mother of John then pregnant; and as soon as the sound of Mary’s salutation reached the ears of Elisabeth, John leaped in the womb: but now the Baptist himself after his testimony seeth Jesus coming. Men are first prepared by hearing from others, and then see with their own eyes. The example of Mary going to see Elisabeth her inferior, and the Son of God going to see the Baptist, should teach us modesty and fervent charity to our inferiors. What place the Saviour came from when He came to the Baptist we are not told here; but we find it in Matthew, Then cometh Jesus from Galilee to Jordan unto John to be baptized of him. (Matt. 3:13)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii. [al. xvi.]) Or; Matthew relates directly Christ's coming to His baptism, John His coming a second time subsequent to His baptism, as appears from what follows: I saw the Spirit descending, &c. The Evangelists have divided the periods of the history between them; Matthew passing over the part before John's imprisonment, and hastening to that event; John chiefly dwelling on what took place before the imprisonment. Thus he says, The next day John seeth Jesus coming to him. But why did He come to him the next day after His baptism? Having been baptized with the multitude, He wished to prevent any from thinking that He came to John for the same reason that others did, viz. to confess His sins, and be washed in the river unto repentance. He comes therefore to give John an opportunity of correcting this mistake; which John accordingly did correct; viz. by those words, Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world. For He Who was so pure, as to be able to absolve other men's sins, evidently could not have come thither for the sake of confessing His own; but only to give John an opportunity of speaking of Him. He came too the next day, that those who had heard the former testimonies of John, might hear them again more plainly; and other besides. For he saith, Behold the Lamb of God, signifying that He was the one of old sought after, and reminding them of the prophecy of Isaiah, and of the shadows of the Mosaic law, in order that through the figure he might the easier lead them to the substance.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iv. c. 10) If the Lamb of God is innocent, and John is the lamb, must he not be innocent? But all men come of that stock of which David sings sorrowing, Behold, I was conceived in wickedness. (Ps. 51:5) He then alone was the Lamb, who was not thus conceived; for He was not conceived in wickedness, nor in sin did His mother bear Him in her womb, Whom a virgin conceived, a virgin brought forth, because that in faith she conceived, and in faith received.

ORIGEN. (tom. vi. c. 32. et seq.) But whereas five kinds of animals are offered in the temple, three beasts of the field, a calf, a sheep, and a goat; and two fowls of the air, a turtle dove and a pigeon; and of the sheep kind three are introduced, the ram, the ewe, the lamb; of these three he mentions only the lamb; the lamb, as we know, being offered in the daily sacrifice, one in the morning, and one in the evening. But what other daily offering can there be, that can be meant to be offered by a reasonable nature, except the perfect Word, typically called the Lamb? This sacrifice, which is offered up as soon as the soul begins to be enlightened, shall be accounted as a morning sacrifice, referring to the frequent exercise of the mind in divine things; for the soul cannot continually apply to the highest objects because of its union with an earthly and gross body. By this Word too, Which is Christ the Lamb, we shall be able to reason on many things, and shall in a manner attain to Him in the evening, while engaged with things of the bodyt. But He Who offered the lamb for a sacrifice, was God hid in human form, the great Priest, He who saith below, No man taketh it (My life) from Me, but I lay it down of Myself: (John 10:18) whence this name, the Lamb of God: for He carrying our sorrows, (Isaiah 53:4. 1 Pet. 2:24.) and taking away the sins of the whole world, hath undergone death, as it were baptism. (Luke 12:50.) For God suffers no fault to pass uncorrected; but punishes it by the sharpest discipline.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) He is called the Lamb of God, because God the Father accepted His death for our salvation, or, in other words, because He delivered Him up to death for our sakes. For just as we say, This is the offering of such a man, meaning the offering made by him; in the same sense Christ is called the Lamb of God Who gave His Son to die for our salvation. And whereas that typical lamb did not take away any man’s sin, this one hath taken away the sin of the whole world, rescuing it from the danger it was in from the wrath of God. Behold Him1 Who taketh away the sin of the world: he saith not, who will take, but, Who taketh away the sin of the world; as if He were always doing this. For He did not then only take it away when He suffered, but from that time to the present, He taketh it away; not by being always crucified, for He made one sacrifice for sins, but by ever washing it by means of that sacrifice.

GREGORY. (Moral. viii. c. 32) But then only will sin be entirely taken away from the human race, when our corruption has been turned to a glorious incorruption. We cannot be free from sin, so long as we are held in the death of the body.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Why does he say the sin of the world, not sins? Because he wished to express sin universally: just as we say commonly, that man was cast out of paradise; meaning the whole human race.

GLOSS. Or by the sin of the world is meant original sin, which is common to the whole world: which original sin, as well as the sins of every one individually, Christ by His grace remits.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iv. c. 10, 11) For He Who took not sin from our nature, He it is Who taketh away our sin. Some say, We take away the sins of men, because we are holy; for if he, who baptizes, is not holy, how can he take away the other’s sin, seeing he himself is full of sin? Against these reasoners let us point to the text; Behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world; in order to do away with such presumption in man towards man.

ORIGEN. (tom. vi. c. 36) As there was a connexion between the other sacrifices of the law, and the daily sacrifice of the lamb, in the same way the sacrifice of this Lamb has its reflexion in the pouring out of the blood of the Martyrs, by whose patience, confession, and zeal for goodness, the machinations of the ungodly are frustrated.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) John having said above to those who came from the Pharisees, that there stood one among them whom they knew not, he here points Him out to the persons thus ignorant: This is He of whom I said, After me cometh a man which is preferred before me. Our Lord is called a man, in reference to His mature age, being thirty years old when He was baptized: or in a spiritual sense, as the Spouse of the Church; in which sense St. Paul speaks, I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ. (2 Cor. 11:2)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iv) He cometh after me, because he was born after me: He is made before me, because He is preferred to me.

GREGORY. (Hom. vii. in Ev. c. 3) He explains the reason of this superiority, in what follows: For He was before me; as if his meaning was; And this is the reason of His being superior to me, though born after me, viz. that He is not circumscribed by the time of His nativity. He Who was born of His mother in time, was begotten of His Father out of time.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Attend, O Arius. He saith not, He was created before me, but He was before me. Let the false sect of Paul of Samosata attend. They will see that He did not derive His original existence from Mary; for if He derived the beginning of His being from the Virgin, how could He have been before His precursor? it being evident that the precursor preceded Christ by six months, according to the human birth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii. [al. xvi.] 2) That He might not seem however to give His testimony from any motive of friendship or kindred, in consequence of his being related to our Lord according to the flesh, he says, I knew Him not. John could not of course know Him, having lived in the desert. And the miraculous events of Christ's childhood, the journey of the Magi, and such like, were now a long time past; John having been quite an infant, when they happened. And throughout the whole of the interval, He had been absolutely unknown: insomuch that John proceeds, But that He should be made manifest to Israel, therefore am I come baptizing with water. (And hence it is clear that the miracles said to have been performed by Christ in His childhood, are false and fictitious. For if Jesus had performed miracles at this early age, he would not have been unknown to John, nor would the multitude have wanted a teacher to point Him out.) Christ Himself then did not want baptism; nor was that washing for any other reason, than to give a sign beforehand of faith in Christ. For John saith not, in order to change men, and deliver from sin, but, that he should be made manifest in Israel, have I come baptizing. But would it not have been lawful for him to preach, and bring crowds together, without baptizing? Yes: but this was the easier way, for he would not have collected such numbers, had he preached without baptizing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. iv. c. 12, 13) Now when our Lord became known, it was unnecessary to prepare a way for Him; for to those who knew Him, He became His own way. And therefore John's baptism did not last long, but only so long as to shew our Lord's humility. (Tr. v. c. 5.). Our Lord received baptism from a servant, in order to give us such a lesson of humility as might prepare us for receiving the grace of baptism. And that the servant's baptism might not be set before the Lord's, others were baptized with it; who after receiving it, had to receive our Lord's baptism: whereas those who first received our Lord's baptism, did not receive the servant's after.

1:32–34

32. And John bare record, saying, I saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove, and it abode upon him.

33. And I knew him not: but he that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending, and

remaining on him, the same is he which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost.

34. And I saw, and bare record that this is the Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii. [al. xvi.] 2) John having made a declaration, so astonishing to all his hearers, viz. that He, whom he pointed out, did of Himself take away the sins of the world, confirms it by a reference to the Father and the Holy Spirit. For John might be asked, how did you know Him? Wherefore he replies beforehand, by the descent of the Holy Spirit: And John bare record, saying, I saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove, and it abode upon him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. xv. c. 46. [26.]) This was not however the first occasion of Christ's receiving the unction of the Holy Spirit: viz. Its descent upon Him at His baptism; wherein He condescended to prefigure His body, the Church, wherein those who are baptized receive preeminently the Holy Spirit. For it would be absurd to suppose that at thirty years old, (which was His age, when He was baptized by John,) He received for the first time the Holy Spirit: and that, when He came to that baptism, as He was without sin, so was He without the Holy Spirit. For if even of His servant and forerunner John it is written, He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from His mother's womb; if He, though sprung from His father's seed, yet received the Holy Ghost, when as yet He was only formed in the womb; what ought we to think and believe of Christ, whose very flesh had not a carnal but spiritual conception?

AUGUSTINE. (de Agon. Christiano, c. 24. [22.]) We do not attribute to Christ only the possession of a real body, and say that the Holy Spirit assumed a false appearance to men's eyes: for the Holy Spirit could no more, in consistency with His nature, deceive men, than could the Son of God. The Almighty God, Who made every creature out of nothing, could as easily form a real body of a dove, without the instrumentality of other doves, as He made a real body in the womb of the Virgin, without the seed of the male.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. vi. sparsim) The Holy Ghost was made to appear visibly in two ways: as a dove, upon our Lord at His baptism; and as a flame upon His disciples, when they were met together: the former shape denoting simplicity, the latter fervency. The dove intimates that souls sanctified by the Spirit should have no guile; the fire, that in that simplicity there should not be coldness. Nor let it disturb thee, that the tongues are cloven; fear no division; unity is assured to us in the dove. It was meet then that the Holy Spirit should be thus manifested descending upon our Lord; in order that every one who had the Spirit might know, that he ought to be simple as a dove, and be in sincere peace with the brethren. The kisses of doves represent this peace. Ravens kiss, but they tear also; but the nature of the dove is most alien to tearing. Ravens feed on the dead, but the dove eats nothing but the fruits of the earth. If doves moan in their love, marvel not that He Who appeared in the likeness of a dove, the Holy Spirit, maketh intercession for us with groanings that cannot be uttered. (Rom. 8:26) The Holy Spirit however groaneth not in Himself, but in us: He maketh us to groan. And he who groaneth, as knowing that, so long as He is under the burden of this mortality, he is absent from the Lord, groaneth well: it is the Spirit that hath taught him to groan. But many groan because of earthly calamities; because of losses which disquiet them, or bodily sickness which weigh heavily on them: they groan not, as doth the dove. What then could more fitly represent the Holy Spirit, the Spirit of unity, than the dove? as He saith Himself to His reconciled Church, My dove is one. (Cant. 6:9) What could better express humility, than the simplicity and moaning of a dove? Wherefore on this occasion it was that there appeared the very most Holy Trinity, the Father in the voice which said, Thou art My beloved Son; the Holy Spirit in the likeness of the dove. (Matt. 28:19) In that Trinity the Apostles were sent to baptize, i. e. in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.

GREGORY. (Moral. liv. [90.]) He saith, Abode upon Him: for the Holy Spirit visits all the faithful; but on the Mediator alone does He abide for ever in a peculiar manner; never leaving the Son’s Humanity, even as Ho proceeds Himself from the Son’s Divinity. But when the disciples are told of the same Spirit, (John 14:17.) He shall dwell with you, how is the abiding of the Spirit a peculiar sign of Christ? This will appear if we distinguish between the different gifts of the Spirit. As regards those gifts which are necessary for attaining to life, the Holy Spirit ever abides in all the elect; such are gentleness, humility, faith, hope, charity: but with respect to those, which have for their object, not our own salvation, but that of others, he does not always abide, but sometimes withdraws, and ceases to exhibit them; that men may be more humble in the possession of His gifts. But Christ had all the gifts of the Spirit, uninterruptedly always.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii [al. xvi.] 2. in Joan.) Should any however think that Christ really wanted the Holy Spirit, in the way that we do, he corrects this notion also, by informing us that the descent of the Holy Ghost took place only for the purpose of manifesting Christ: And I knew Him not: but He that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending, and remaining on Him, the same is He which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost.

AUGUSTINE. (Aug. Tr. v. c. i) But who sent John? If we say the Father, we say true; if we say the Son, we say true. But it would be truer to say, the Father and the Son. How then knew he not Him, by Whom he was sent? For if he knew not Him, by Whom he wished to be baptized, it was rash in him to say, I have need to be baptized by Thee. So then he knew Him; and why saith he, I knew Him not?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii. [al. xvi.] c. 3. in Joan.) When he saith, I knew Him not, he is speaking of time past, not of the time of his baptism, when he forbad Him, saying, I have need to be baptized of Thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Aug. Tr. iv.v. and vi. sparsim.) Let us turn to the other Evangelists, who relate the matter more clearly, and we shall find most satisfactorily, that the dove descended when our Lord ascended from the water. If then the dove descended after baptism, but John said before the baptism, I have need to be baptized of Thee, he knew Him before His baptism also. How then said he, I knew him not, but He which sent me to baptize? Was this the first revelation made to John of Christ’s person, or was it not rather a fuller disclosure of what had been already revealed? John knew the Lord to be the Son of God, knew that He would baptize with the Holy Ghost: for before Christ came to the river, many having come together to hear John, he said unto them, He that cometh after me is mightier than I: He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire. (Matt. 3:11) What then? He did not know that our Lord (lest Paul or Peter might say, my baptism, as we find Paul did say, my Gospel,) would have and retain to Himself the power of baptism, the ministering of it however passing to good and bad indiscriminately. What hindrance is the badness of the minister, when the Lord is good? So then we baptize again after John’s baptism; after a homicide’s we baptize not: because John gave his own baptism, the homicide gives Christ’s; which is so holy a sacrament, that not even a homicide’s ministration can pollute it. Our Lord could, had He so willed, have given power to any servant of His to give baptism as it were in His own stead; and to the baptism, thus transferred to the servant, have imparted the same power, that it would have had, when given by Himself. But this He did not choose to do; that the hope of the baptized might be directed to Him, Who had baptized them; He wished not the servant to place hope in the servant. And again, had He given this power to servants, there would have been as many baptisms as servants; as there had been the baptism of John, so should we have had the baptism of Paul and of Peter. It is by this power then, which Christ retains in His own possession exclusively, that the unity of the Church is established; of which it is said, My dove is one. (Cant. 6:9) A man may have a baptism besides the dove; but that any besides the dove should profit, is impossible.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xvii. [al. xvi.] 3) The Father having sent forth a voice proclaiming the Son, the Holy Spirit came besides, bringing the voice upon the head of Christ, in order that no one present might think that what was said of Christ, was said of John. But it will be asked: How was it that the Jews believed not, if they saw the Spirit? Such sights however require the mental vision, rather than the bodily. If those who saw Christ working miracles were so drunken with malice, that they denied what their own eyes had seen, how could the appearance of the Holy Spirit in the form of a dove overcome their incredulity? Some say however that the sight was not visible to all, but only to John, and the more devotional part. But even if the descent of the Spirit, as a dove, was visible to the outward eye, it does not follow that because all saw it, all understood it. Zacharias himself, Daniel, Ezechiel, and Moses saw many things, appearing to their senses, which no one else saw: and therefore John adds, And I saw and bare record that this is the Son of God. He had called Him the Lamb before, and said that He would baptize with the Spirit; but he had no where called Him the Son before.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. in Joan) It was necessary that the Only Son of God should baptize, not an adopted son. Adopted sons are ministers of the Only Son: but though they have the ministration, the Only one alone has the power.

1:35–36

35. Again the next day after John stood, and two of his disciples;

36. And looking upon Jesus as he walked, he saith, Behold the Lamb of God!

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. [al. xvii.] 1) Many not having attended to John's words at first, he rouses them a second time: Again the next day after John stood, and two of his disciples.

BEDE. (Hom. in Vigil. S. And.) John stood, because he had ascended that citadel of all excellences, from which no temptations could cast him down: his disciples stood with him, as stout-hearted followers of their master.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. [al. xvii.] c. 2) But wherefore went he not all about, preaching in every place of Judæa; instead of standing near the river, waiting for His coming, that he might point Him out? Because he wished this to be done by the works of Christ Himself. And observe how much greater an effort was produced; He struck a small spark, and suddenly it rose into a flame. Again, if John had gone about and preached, it would have seemed like human partiality, and great suspicion would have been excited. Now the Prophets and Apostles all preached Christ absent; the former before His appearance in the flesh, the latter after His assumption. But He was to be pointed out by the eye, not by the voice only; and therefore it follows: And looking upon Jesus us He walked, he saith, Behold the Lamb of God!

THEOPHYLACT. Looking he saith, as if signifying by his looks his love and admiration for Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 8) John was the friend of the Bridegroom; he sought not his own glory, but bare witness to the truth. And therefore he wished not his disciples to remain with him, to the hindrance of their duty to follow the Lord; but rather shewed them whom they should follow, saying, Behold the Lamb of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. 1. in Joan) He makes not a long discourse, having only one object before him, to bring them and join them to Christ; knowing that they would not any further need his witness. (c. 2.). John does not however speak to his disciples alone, but publicly in the presence of all. And so, undertaking to follow Christ, through this instruction common to all, they remained thenceforth firm, following Christ for their own advantage, not as an act of favour to their masterx. John does not exhort: he simply gazes in admiration on Christ, pointing out the gifty He came to bestow, the cleansing from sin: and the mode in which this would be accomplished: both of which the word Lamb testifies to. Lamb has the article affixed to it, as a sign of preeminence.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 5) For He alone and singly is the Lamb without spot, without sin; not because His spots are wiped off, but because He never had a spot. He alone is the Lamb of God, for by His blood alone can men be redeemed. (c. 6). This is the Lamb whom the wolves fear; even the slain Lamb, by whom the lion was slain.

BEDE. (Hom. 1) The Lamb therefore he calls Him; for that He was about to give us freely His fleece, that we might make of it a wedding garment; i. e. would leave us an example of life, by which we should be warmed into love.

ALCUIN. John stands in a mystical sense, the Law having ceased, and Jesus comes, bringing the grace of the Gospel, to which that same Law bears testimony. Jesus walks, to collect disciples.

BEDE. (Hom. in Vigil. S. And.) The walking of Jesus has a reference to the economy of the Incarnation, by means of which He has condescended to come to us, and give us a pattern of life.

1:37–40

37. And the two disciples heard him speak, and they followed Jesus.

38. Then Jesus turned, and saw them following, and saith unto them, What seek ye? They said unto Him, Rabbi, (which is to say, being interpreted, Master,) where dwellest thou?

39. He saith unto them, Come and see. They came and saw where he dwelt, and abode with him that day: for it was about the tenth hour.

40. One of the two which heard John speak, and followed him, was Andrew, Simon Peter’s brother.

ALCUIN. John having borne witness that Jesus was the Lamb of God, the disciples who had been hitherto with him, in obedience to his command, followed Jesus: And the two disciples heard him speak, and they followed Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. 1 et sq.) Observe; when he said, He that cometh after me is made before me, and, Whose shoe’s latchet I am not worthy to unloose, he gained over none; but when he made mention of the economy, and gave his discourse a humbler turn, saying, Behold the Lamb of God, then his disciples followed Christ. For many persons are less influenced by the thoughts of God’s greatness and majesty, than when they hear of His being man’s Helper and Friend; or any thing pertaining to the salvation of men. Observe too, when John says, Behold the Lamb of God, Christ says nothing. The Bridegroom stands by in silence; others introduce Him, and deliver the Bride into His hands; He receives her, and so treats her that she no longer remembers those who gave her in marriage. Thus Christ came to unite to Himself the Church; He said nothing Himself; but John, the friend of the Bridegroom, came forth, and put the Bride’s right hand in His; i. e. by his preaching delivered into His hands men’s souls, whom receiving He so disposed of, that they returned no more to John. And observe farther; As at a marriage the maiden goes not to meet the bridegroom, (even though it be a king’s son who weds a humble handmaid,) but he hastens to her; so is it here. For human nature ascended not into heaven, but the Son of God came down to human nature, and took her to His Father’s house. Again; There were disciples of John who not only did not follow Christ, but were even enviously disposed toward Him; but the better part heard, and followed; not from contempt of their former master, but by his persuasion; because he promised them that Christ would baptize with the Holy Ghost. And see with what modesty their zeal was accompanied. They did not straight way go and interrogate Jesus on great and necessary doctrines, nor in public, but sought private converse with Him; for we are told that Jesus turned, and saw them following, and saith unto them, What seek ye? Hence we learn, that when we once begin to form good resolutions, God gives us opportunities enough of improvement. Christ asks the question, not because He needed to be told, but in order to encourage familiarity and confidence, and shew that He thought them worthy of His instructions.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) Observe then, that it was upon those who followed Him, that our Lord turned His face and looked upon them. Unless thou by thy good works follow Him, thou shalt never be permitted to see His face, or enter into His dwelling.

ALCUIN. The disciples followed behind His back, in order to see Him, and did not see His face. So He turns round, and, as it were, lowers His majesty, that they might be enabled to behold His face.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. c. 29) Perhaps it is not without a reason, that after six testimonies John ceases to bear witness, and Jesus asks seventhly, What seek ye?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. in Joan. sparsim) And besides following Him, their questions shewed their love for Christ; They said unto Him, Rabbi, (which is, being interpreted, Master,) where dwellest Thou? They call Him, Master, before they have learnt any thing from Him; thus encouraging themselves in their resolution to become disciples, and to shew the reason why they followed.

ORIGEN. An avowal, befitting persons who came from hearing John's testimony. They put themselves under Christ's teaching, and express their desire to see the dwelling of the Son of God.

ALCUIN. They do not wish to be under His teaching for a time only, but enquire where He abides; wishing an immediate initiation in the secrets of His word, and afterwards meaning often to visit Him, and obtain fuller instruction. And, in a mystical sense too, they wish to know in whom Christ dwells, that profiting by their example they may themselves become fit to be His dwelling. Or, their seeing Jesus walking, and straightway enquiring where He resides, is an intimation to us, that we should, remembering His Incarnation, earnestly entreat Him to shew us our eternal habitation. The request being so good a one, Christ promises a free and full disclosure. He saith unto them, Come and see: that is to say, My dwelling is not to be understood by words, but by works; come, therefore, by believing and working, and then see by understanding.

ORIGEN. (tom. ii. c. 29) Or perhaps come, is an invitation to action; see, to contemplation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. [al. xvii.] 3) Christ does not describe His house and situation, but brings them after Him, shewing that he had already accepted them as His own. He says not, It is not the time now, to-morrow ye shall hear if ye wish to learn; but addresses them familiarly, as friends who had lived with him a long time. But how is it that He saith in another place, The Son of man hath not where to lay His head? (Matt. 8:20) when here He says, Come and see where I live? His not having where to lay His head, could only have meant that He had no dwelling of His own, not that He did not live in a house at all: for the next words arc, They came and saw where He dwelt, and abode with Him that day. Why they stayed the Evangelist does not say: it being obviously for the sake of His teaching.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 9) What a blessed day and night was that! Let us too build up in our hearts within, and make Him an house, whither He may come and teach us.

THEOPHYLACT. And it was about the tenth hour. The Evangelist mentions the time of day purposely, as a hint both to teachers and learners, not to let time interfere with their work.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. 3) It shewed a strong desire to hear Him, since even at sunset they did not turn from Him. To sensual persons the time after meals is unsuitable for any grave employment, their bodies being overloaded with food. But John, whose disciples these were, was not such an one. His evening was a more abstemious one than our mornings.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 10) The number here signifies the law, which was composed of ten commandments. The time had come when the law was to be fulfilled by love, the Jews, who acted from fear, having been unable to fulfil it, and therefore was it at the tenth hour that our Lord heard Himself called, Rabbi; none but the giver of the law is the teacher1 of the law.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xviii. 3) One of the two which heard John speak and followed Him was Andrew, Simon Peter’s brother. Why is the other name left out? Some say, because this Evangelist himself was that other. Others, that it was a disciple of no eminence, and that there was no use in telling his name any more than those of the seventy-two, which are omitted.

ALCUIN. Or it would seem that the two disciples who followed Jesus were Andrew and Philip.

1:41–42

41. He first findeth his own brother Simon, and saith unto him, We have found the Messias, which is, being interpreted, the Christ.

42. And he brought him to Jesus. And when Jesus beheld him, he said, Thou art Simon the son of Jona: thou shalt be called Cephas, which is by interpretation, A stone.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Chrys. Hom. xix. 1) Andrew kept not our Lord’s words to himself; but ran in haste to his brother, to report the good tidings:

He first findeth his own brother Simon, and saith unto him, We have found the Messias, which is, being interpreted, the Christ.

BEDE. (Hom. in Vig. St. Andr.) This is truly to find the Lord; viz. to have fervent love for Him, together with a care for our brother's salvation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xix. [al. xviii.] 1) The Evangelist docs not mention what Christ said to those who followed Him; but we may infer it from what follows. Andrew declares in few words what he had learnt, discloses the power of that Master Who had persuaded them, and his own previous longings after Him. For this exclamation, We have found, expresses a longing for His coming, turned to exultation, now that He was really come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 13) Messias in Hebrew, Christus in Greek, Unctus in Latin. Chrism is unction, and He had a special unction, which from Him extended to all Christians, as appears in the Psalm, God, even Thy God, hath anointed Thee with the oil of gladness above Thy fellows1. (Ps. 44, [45]) All holy persons arc partakers with Him; but He is specially the Holy of Holies, specially anointed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xix. 1, 2) And therefore he said not Messias, but the Messias. Mark the obedience of Peter from the very first; ho went immediately without delay, as appears from the next words: And he brought him to Jesus. Nor let us blame him as too yielding, because he did not ask many questions, before he received the word. It is reasonable to suppose that his brother had told him all, and sufficiently fully; but the Evangelists often make omissions for the sake of brevity. But, besides this, it is not absolutely said that he did believe, but only, He took him to Jesus; i. e. to learn from the mouth of Jesus Himself, what Andrew had reported. Our Lord begins now Himself to reveal the things of His Divinity, and to exhibit them gradually by prophecy. For prophecies are no less persuasive than miracles; inasmuch as they are preeminently God's work, and are beyond the power of devils to imitate, while miracles may be phantasy or appearance: the foretelling future events with certainty is an attribute of the incorruptible nature alone: And when Jesus beheld him, He said, Thou art Simon the son of Jonas; thou shall be called Cephas, which is by interpretation, A stone.

BEDE. (Hom. i. Temp. Hier. in Vig. S. Andr.) He beheld him not with His natural eye only, but by the insight of His Godhead discerned from eternity the simplicity and greatness of his soul, for which he was to be elevated above the whole Church. In the word Peter, we must not look for any additional meaning, as though it were of Hebrew or Syriac derivation; for the Greek and Latin word Peter, has the same meaning as Cephas; being in both languages derived from petra. He is called Peter on account of the firmness of his faith, in cleaving to that Rock, of which the Apostle speaks, And that Rock was Christ; (1 Cor. 10:4) which secures those who trust in it from the snares of the enemy, and dispenses streams of spiritual gifts.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 14) There was nothing very great in our Lord saying whose son he was, for our Lord knew the names of all His saints, having predestinated them before the foundation of the world. But it was a great thing for our Lord to change his name from Simon to Peter. Peter is from petra, rock, which rock is the Church: so that the name of Peter represents the Church. And who is safe, unless he build upon a rock? Our Lord here rouses our attention: for had he been called Peter before, we should not have seen the mystery of the Rock, and should have thought that he was called so by chance, and not providentially. God therefore made him to be called by another name before, that the change of that name might give vividness to the mystery.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xix. [al. xviii. 2]) He changed the name too to shew that He was the same who done so before in the Old Testament; who had called Abram Abraham, Sarai Sarah, Jacob Israel. Many He had named from their birth, as Isaac and Samson; others again after being named by their parents, as were Peter, and the sons of Zebedee. Those whose virtue was to be eminent from the first, have names given them from the first; those who were to be exalted afterwards, are named afterwards.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. l. ii. c. 17) The account here of the two disciples on the Jordan, who follow Christ (before he had gone into Galilee) in obedience to John’s testimony; viz. of Andrew bringing his brother Simon to Jesus, who gave him, on this occasion, the name of Peter; disagrees considerably with the account of the other Evangelists, viz. that our Lord found these two, Simon and Andrew, fishing in Galilee, and then bid them follow Him: unless we understand that they did not regularly join our Lord when they saw Him on the Jordan; but only discovered who He was, and full of wonder, then returned to their occupations. Nor must we think that Peter first received his name on the occasion mentioned in

Matthew, when our Lord says, Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build My Church; (Mat. 16:18) but rather when our Lord says, Thou shall be called Cephas, which is by interpretation, A stone.

ALCUIN. Or perhaps He does not actually give him the name now, but only fixes beforehand what He afterwards gave him when He said, Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build My Church. And while about to change his name, Christ wishes to shew that even that which his parents had given him, was not without a meaning. For Simon signifies obedience, Joanna grace, Jona a dove: as if the meaning was; Thou art an obedient son of grace, or of the dove, i. e. the Holy Spirit; for thou hast received of the Holy Spirit the humility, to desire, at Andrew's call, to see Me. The elder disdained not to follow the younger; for where there is meritorious faith, there is no order of seniority.

1:43–46

43. The day following Jesus would go forth into Galilee, and findeth Philip, and saith unto him, Follow me.

44. Now Philip was of Bethsaida, the city of Andrew and Peter.

45. Philip findeth Nathanael, and saith unto him, We have found him, of whom Moses in the law, and the prophets, did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the son of Joseph.

46. And Nathanael said unto him, Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth? Philip saith unto him, Come and see.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xix) After gaining these disciples, Christ proceeded to convert others, viz. Philip and Nathanael: The day following, Jesus would go forth into Galilee.

ALCUIN. Leaving, that is, Judæa, where John was baptizing, out of respect to the Baptist, and not to appear to lower his office, so long as it continued. He was going too to call a disciple, and wished to go forth into Galilee, i. e. to a place of "transition" or "revelation," that is to say, that as He Himself increased in wisdom or stature, and in favour with God and man, and as He suffered and rose again, and entered into His glory: so He would teach His followers to go forth, and increase in virtue, and pass through suffering to joy. He findeth Philip, and saith unto him, Follow Me.

Every one follows Jesus who imitates His humility and suffering, in order to be partaker of His resurrection and ascension.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx. 1) Observe, He did not call them, before some had of their own accord joined Him: for had He invited them, before any had joined Him, perhaps they would have started back: but now having determined to follow of their own free choice, they remain firm ever after. He calls Philip, however, because he would be known to him, from living in Galilee. But what made Philip follow Christ? Andrew heard from John the Baptist, and Peter from Andrew; he had heard from no one; and yet on Christ saying, Follow Me, was persuaded instantly. It is not improbable that Philip may have heard John: and yet it may have been the mere voice of Christ which produced this effect.

THEOPHYLACT. For the voice of Christ sounded not like a common voice to some, that is, the faithful, but kindled in their inmost soul the love of Him. Philip having been continually meditating on Christ, and reading the books of Moses, so confidently expected Him, that the instant he saw, he believed. Perhaps too he had heard of Him from Andrew and Peter, coming from the same district; an explanation which the Evangelist seems to hint at, when he adds, Now Philip was of Bethsaida, the city of Andrew and Peter.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx. 1) The power of Christ appears by His gathering fruit out of a barren country. For from that Galilee, out of which there ariseth no prophet, He takes His most distinguished disciples.

ALCUIN. Bethsaida means house of hunters. The Evangelist introduces the name of this place by way of allusion to the characters of Philip, Peter, and Andrew, and their future office, i. e. catching and saving souls.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx. 1) Philip is not persuaded himself, but begins preaching to others: Philip findeth Nathanael, and saith unto him, We have found Him of whom Moses in the Law, and the Prophets, did write, Jesus of Nazareth, the Son of Joseph. See how zealous he is, and how constantly he is meditating on the books of Moses, and looking for Christ’s coming. That Christ was coming he had known before; but he did not know that this was the Christ, of whom Moses and the Prophets did write: He says this to give credibility to his preaching, and to shew his zeal for the Law and the Prophets, and how that he had examined them attentively. Be not disturbed at his calling our Lord the Son of Joseph; this was what He was supposed to be.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 15) The person to whom our Lord’s mother had been betrothed. The Christians know from the Gospel, that He was conceived and born of an undefiled mother. He adds the place too, of Nazareth.

THEOPHYLACT. He was bred up there: the place of His birth could not have been known generally, but all knew that He was bred up in Nazareth.

And Nathanael said unto him, Can there any good thing come out of Nazareth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 15, 16, 17) However you may understand these words, Philip’s answer will suit. You may read it either as affirmatory, Something good can come out of Nazareth; to which the other says, Come and see: or you may read it as a question, implying doubt on Nathanael’s part, Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? Come and see. Since either way of reading agrees equally with what follows, we must inquire the meaning of the passage. Nathanael was well read in the Law, and therefore the word Nazareth (Philip having said that he had found Jesus of Nazareth) immediately raises his hopes, and he exclaims, Something good can come out of Nazareth. He had searched the Scriptures, and knew, what the Scribes and Pharisees could not, that the Saviour was to be expected thence.

ALCUIN. He who alone is absolutely holy, harmless, undefiled; of whom the prophet saith, There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch (Nazaræus) shall grow out of his roots. (Isaiah 11:1) Or the words may be taken as expressing doubt, and asking the question.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx. 1, 2) Nathanael knew from the Scriptures, that Christ was to come from Bethlehem, according to the prophecy of Micah, And thou, Bethlehem, in the land of Judah,—out of thee shall come a Governor, that shall rule my people Israel. (Micah 5:2) On hearing of Nazareth, then, he doubted, and was not able to reconcile Philip’s tidings with prophecy. For the Prophets call Him a Nazarene, only in reference to His education and mode of life. Observe, however, the discretion and gentleness with which he communicates his doubts. He does not say, Thou deceivest me, Philip; but simply asks the question, Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? Philip too in turn is equally discrete. He is not confounded by the question, but dwells upon it, and lingers in the hope of bringing him to Christ: Philip saith unto him, Come and see. He takes him to Christ, knowing that when he had once tasted of His words and doctrine, he will make no more resistance.

1:47–51

47. Jesus saw Nathanael coming to him, and saith of him, Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile!

48. Nathanael saith unto him, Whence knowest thou me? Jesus answered and said unto him, Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee.

49. Nathanael answered and saith unto him, Rabbi, thou art the Son of God; thou art the King of Israel.

50. Jesus answered and said unto him, Because I said unto thee, I saw thee under the fig tree, believest thou? thou shalt see greater things than these.

51. And he saith unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xix) Nathanael, in difficulty as to Christ coming out of Nazareth, shewed the care with which he had read the Scriptures: his not rejecting the tidings when brought him, shewed his strong desire for Christ’s coming. He thought that Philip might be mistaken as to the place. It follows, Jesus saw Nathanael coming to Him, and saith of him, Behold an Israelite indeed, in whom is no guile! There was no fault to be found with him, though he had spoken like one who did not believe, because he was more deeply read in the Prophets than Philip. He calls him guileless, because he had said nothing to gain favour, or gratify malice.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 19) What meaneth this, In whom is no guile? Had he no sin? Was no physician necessary for him? Far from it. No one was ever born, of a temper not to need the Physician. It is guile, when we say one thing, and think another. How then was there no guile in him? Because, if he was a sinner, he confessed his sin; whereas if a man, being a sinner, pretends to be righteous, there is guile in his mouth. Our Lord then commended the confession of sin in Nathanael; He did not pronounce him not a sinner.

THEOPHYLACT. Nathanael however, notwithstanding this praise, does not acquiesce immediately, but waits for further evidence, and asks, Whence knowest Thou me?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx) He asks as man, Jesus answers as God: Jesus answered and said unto him, Before that Philip called thee, when thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee: not having beheld him as man, but as God discerning him from above. I saw thee, He says, that is, the character of thy life, when thou wast under the fig tree: where the two, Philip and Nathanael, had been talking together alone, nobody seeing them; and on this account it is said, that on seeing him a long way off, He said, Behold an Israelite indeed; whence it appears that this speech was before Philip came near, so that no suspicion could attach to Christ's testimony. Christ would not say, I am not of Nazareth, as Philip told you, but of Bethlehem; in order to avoid an argument: (ἀμφισβητήσιμον λόγον.) and because it would not have been sufficient proof, had He mentioned it, of His being the Christ. He preferred rather proving this by His having been present at their conversation.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. c. 21) Has this fig tree any meaning? We read of one fig tree which was cursed, because it had only leaves, and no fruit. Again, at the creation, Adam and Eve, after sinning, made themselves aprons of fig leaves. Fig leaves then signify sins; and Nathanael, when he was under the fig tree, was under the shadow of death: so that our Lord seemeth to say, O Israel, whoever of you is without guile, O people of the Jewish faith, before that I called thee by My Apostles, when thou wert as yet under the shadow of death, and sawest Me not, I saw thee.

GREGORY. (xviii. Mor. c. xxxviii. [59.]) When thou wast under the fig tree, I saw thee; i. e. when thou wast yet under the shade of the law, I chose thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. 40. [122.]) Nathanael remembered that he had been under the fig tree, where Christ was not present corporeally, but only by His spiritual knowledge. Hence, knowing that he had been alone, he recognised our Lord's Divinity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx) That our Lord then had this knowledge, had penetrated into his mind, had not blamed but praised his hesitation, proved to Nathanael that He was the true Christ: Nathanael answered and saith unto Him, Rabbi, Thou art the Son of God, Thou art the King of Israel: as if he said, Thou art He who was expected, thou art He who was sought for. Sure proof being obtained, he proceeds to make confession; herein shewing his devotion, as his former hesitation had shewn his diligence.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxi. [al. xx.] 1) Many when they read this passage, are perplexed at finding that, whereas Peter was pronounced blessed for having, after our Lord's miracles and teaching, confessed Him to be the Son of God, Nathanael, who makes the same confession before, has no such benediction. The reason is this. Peter and Nathanael both used the same words, but not in the same meaning. Peter confessed our Lord to be the Son of God, in the sense of very God; the latter in the sense of mere man; for after saying, Thou art the Son of God, he adds, Thou art the King of Israel; whereas the Son of God was not the King of Israel only, but of the whole world. This is manifest from what follows. For in the case of Peter Christ added nothing, but, as if his faith were perfect, said, that he would build the Church upon his confession; whereas Nathanael, as if his confession were very deficient, is led up to higher things: Jesus answered and said unto him, Because I said unto thee, I saw thee under the fig tree, believest thou? Thou shalt see greater things than these. As if He said, What I have just said has appeared a great matter to thee, and thou hast confessed Me to be King of Israel; what wilt thou say when thou seest greater things than these? What that greater thing is He proceeds to shew: And He saith unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man. See how He raises him from earth for a while, and forces him to think that Christ is not a mere man: for how could He be a mere man, whom angels ministered to? It was, as it were, saying, that He was Lord of the Angels; for He must be the King's own Son, on whom the servants of the King descended and ascended; descended at His crucifixion, ascended at His resurrection and ascension. Angels too before this came and ministered unto Him, and angels brought the glad tidings of His birth. Our Lord made the present a proof of the future. After the powers He had already shewn, Nathanael would readily believe that much more would follow.

AUGUSTINE. (in Verb. Dom.) Let us recollect the Old Testament account. Jacob saw in a dream a ladder reaching from earth to heaven; the Lord resting upon it, and the angels ascending and descending upon it. Lastly, Jacob himself understanding what the vision meant, set up a stone, and poured oil upon it. (Gen. 28:12.) When he anointed the stone, did he make an idol? No: he only set up a symbol, not an object of worship. Thou seest here the anointing; see the Anointed also. He is the stone which the builders refused. If Jacob, who was named Israel, saw the ladder, and Nathanael was an Israelite indeed, there was a fitness in our Lord telling him Jacob's dream; as if he said, Whose name thou art called by, his dream hath appeared unto thee: for thou shalt see the heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man. If they descend upon Him, and ascend to Him, then He is both up above and here below at the same time; above in Himself, below in His members.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. vii. in Joan. c. 23) Good preachers, however, who preach Christ, are as angels of God; i. e. they ascend and descend upon the Son of man; as Paul, who ascended to the third heaven, and descended so far even as to give milk to babes. He saith, We shall see greater things than these: (2 Cor. 12:2. 1 Cor. 3:2) because it is a greater thing that our Lord has justified us, whom He hath called, than that He saw us lying under the shadow of death. For had we remained where He saw us, what profit would it have been? (c. 17.). It is asked why Nathanael, to whom our Lord bears such testimony, is not found among the twelve Apostles. We may believe, however, that it was because he was so learned, and versed in the law, that our Lord had not put him among the disciples. He chose the foolish, to confound the world. Intending to break the neck of the proud, He sought not to gain the fisherman through the orator, but by the fisherman the emperor. The great Cyprian was an orator; but Peter was a fisherman before him; and through him not only the orator, but the emperor, believed.

CHAPTER 2

2:1–4

1. And the third day there was a marriage in Cana of Galilee; and the mother of Jesus was there:

2. And both Jesus was called, and his disciples, to the marriage.

3. And when they wanted wine, the mother of Jesus saith unto him, They have no wine.

4. Jesus saith unto her, Woman, what have I to do with thee? mine hour is not yet come.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxi. [al. xx.] 1) Our Lord being known in Galilee, they invite Him to a marriage: And the third day there was a marriage in Cana of Galilee.

ALCUIN. Galilee is a province; Cana a village in it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxi. 1) They invite our Lord to the marriage, not as a great person, but merely as one they knew, one of the many; for which reason the Evangelist says, And the mother of Jesus was there. As they invited the mother, so they invited the Son: and therefore, Jesus was called, and His disciples to the marriage: and He came, as caring more for our good, than His own dignity. He who disdained not to take upon Him the form of a servant, disdained not to come to the marriage of servants.

AUGUSTINE. (In Verb. Dom. Serm. xli) Let the proud man blush to see the humility of God. Lo, among other things, the Son of the Virgin comes to a marriage; He who, when He was with the Father, instituted marriage.

BEDE. (Hom. 2d Sund. after Epiph.) His condescension in coming to the marriage, and the miracle He wrought there, are, even considering them in the letter only, a strong confirmation of the faith. Therein too are condemned the errors of Tatian, Marcion, and others who detract from the honour of marriage. For if the undefiled bed, and the marriage celebrated with due chastity, partook at all of sin, our Lord would never have come to one. Whereas now, conjugal chastity being good, the continence of widows better, the perfection of the virgin state best, to sanction all these degrees, but distinguish the merit of each, He deigned to be born of the pure womb of the Virgin; was blessed after birth by the prophetic voice of the widow Anna; and now invited in manhood to attend the celebration of a marriage, honours that also by the presence of His goodness.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. viii. c. 4) What marvel, if He went to that house to a marriage, Who came into this world to a marriage. For here He has His spouse whom He redeemed with His own blood, to whom He gave the pledge of the Spirit, and whom He united to Himself in the womb of the Virgin. For the Word is the Bridegroom, and human flesh the bride, and both together arc one Son of God and Son of man. That womb of the Virgin Mary is His chamber, from which he went forth as a bridegroom. (Ps. 19:5)

BEDE. (in loc.) Nor is it without some mysterious allusion, that the marriage is related as taking-place on the third day. The first age of the world, before the giving of the Law, was enlightened by the example of the Patriarchs; the second, under the Law, by the writings of the Prophets; the third, under grace, by the preaching of the Evangelists, as if by the light of the third day; for our Lord had now appeared in the flesh. The name of the place too where the marriage was held, Cana of Galilee, which means, desire of migrating, has a typical signification, viz. that those are most worthy of Christ, who burn with devotional desires, and have known the passage from vice to virtue, from earthly to eternal things. The wine was made to fail, to give our Lord the opportunity of making better; that so the glory of God in man might be brought out of its hiding place: And when they wanted wine, the mother of Jesus saith unto Him, They have no wine.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxi. 1, 2) But how came it into the mother's mind to expect so great a thing from her Son? for he had done no miracle as yet: as we read afterwards, This beginning of miracles did Jesus. His real nature, however, was beginning now to be revealed by John, and His own conversations with His disciples; besides that His conception, and the circumstances of His birth, had from the first given rise to high expectations in her mind: as Luke tells us, His mother kept all these sayings in her heart. (Luke 2:51) Why then did she never ask Him to work a miracle before? Because the time had now come that He should be made known. Before He had lived so much like an ordinary person, that she had not had the confidence to ask Him. But now that she heard that John had borne witness to Him, and that He had disciples, she asks Him confidently.

ALCUIN. She represents here the Synagogue, which challenges Christ to perform a miracle. It was customary with the Jews to ask for miracles.

Jesus saith unto her, Woman, what have I to do with thee?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. viii. c. 5) Some who derogate from the Gospel, and say that Jesus was not born of the Virgin Mary, try to draw an argument for their error from this place; for, how, say they, could she be His mother to whom He said, What have I to do with thee? Now who is it who gives this account, and on whose authority do we believe it? The Evangelist John. But he himself says, The mother of Jesus was there. Why should He say it, unless both were true. But did He therefore come to the marriage to teach men to despise their mother?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxi. [al. xx.] 2) That He greatly venerated His mother, we know from St. Luke, who tells us that He was subject unto His parents. For where parents throw no obstacle in the way of God's commands, it is our duty to be subject to them; but when they demand any thing at an unseasonable time, or cut us off from spiritual things, we should not be deceived into compliance.

AUGUSTINE. (de Symbolo Serm. ii. c. 14. [5]) To mark a distinction between His Godhead and manhood, that according to His manhood He was inferior and subject, but according to His Godhead supreme, He saith, Woman, what have I to do with thee?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxi. [al. xx.] 2) And for another reason, viz. to prevent any suspicion attaching to His miracles: for these it was proper should be asked for by those who wanted them, not by His mother. He wished to shew them that He would perform all in their proper time, not all at once, to prevent confusion; (xxii. [al. xxi] 1). for He saith, Mine hour is not yet come; i. e. I am not yet known to the persons present; nay, they know not that the wine hath failed; let them find out that first; he who perceives not his want beforehand, will not perceive when his want is supplied.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. viii. c. 9. et seq. sparsim) Or it was because our Lord as God had not a mother, though as man He had, and the miracle He was about to work was the act of His Divinity, not of human infirmity. When therefore His mother demanded a miracle, He, as though not acknowledging a human birth, when about to perform a divine work, said, Woman, what have I to do with thee? As if He said, Thou didst not beget that in Me, which works the miracle, My Divinity. (She is called woman, with reference to the female sex, not to any injury of her virginity.) But because thou broughtest forth My infirmity, I will acknowledge thee then, when that very infirmity shall hang on the cross. And therefore He adds, Mine hour is not yet come: as if to say, I will acknowledge thee when the infirmity, of which thou art the mother, shall hang from the cross. He commended His mother to the disciple, when about to die, and to rise again, before her death. But note; just as the Manicheans have found an occasion of error and pretext for their faithlessness in our Lord's word, What have I to do with thee? in the same way the astrologers support theirs from the words, Mine hour is not yet come. For, say they, if Christ had not been under the power of fate, He would never have said this. But let them believe what God says below, I have power to lay it (my life) down, and I have power to take it again: (John 10:18) and then let them ask, why He says, Mine hour is not yet come: nor let them on such a ground subject the Creator of heaven to fate; seeing that, even were there a fatality in the stars, the Maker of the stars could not be under the dominion of the stars. And not only had Christ nothing to do with fate, as ye call it; but neither hast thou, or any other man. Wherefore said He then, Mine hour is not yet come? Because He had the power to die when He pleased, but did not think it expedient yet to exert the power. He was to call the disciples, to proclaim the Kingdom of heaven, to do marvellous works, to approve His divinity by miracles, His humility by partaking of the sufferings of our mortal state. And when He had done all, then the hour was come, not of destiny, but of will, not of obligation, but of power.

2:5–11

5. His mother saith unto the servants, Whatsoever he saith unto you, do it.

6. And there were set there six waterpots of stone, after the manner of the purifying of the Jews, containing two or three firkins apiece.

7. Jesus saith unto them, Fill the waterpots with water. And they filled them up to the brim.

8. And he saith unto them, Draw out now, and bear unto the governor of the feast. And they bare it.

9. When the ruler of the feast had tasted the water that was made wine, and knew not whence it was: (but the servants which drew the water knew;) the governor of the feast called the bridegroom,

10. And saith unto him, Every man at the beginning doth set forth good wine; and when men have well drunk, then that which is worse: but thou hast kept the good wine until now.

11. This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee, and manifested forth his glory; and his disciples believed on him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxii. [al. xxi.] 1.) Although He had said, Mine hour is not yet come, He afterwards did what His mother told Him, in order to shew plainly, that He was not under subjection to the hour. For if He was, how could He have done this miracle before the hour appointed for it? In the next place, He wished to shew honour to His mother, and mate it appear that He did not go counter to her eventually. He would not put her to shame in the presence of so many; especially as she had sent the servants to Him, that the petition might come from a number, and not from herself only; His mother saith unto the servants, Whatsoever He saith unto you, do it.

BEDE. (in loc.) As if she said, Though He appear to refuse, He will do it nevertheless. She knew His pity and mercifulness. And there were set there six waterpots of stone, after the manner of the purifying of the Jews, containing two or three firkins apiece. Hydriæ1 are vessels to hold water: hydor being the Greek for water.

ALCUIN. Vessels to hold water were there, after the manner of the purifying of Jews. Among other traditions of the Pharisees, they observed frequent washings.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxii. [al. xxi.] 2.) Palestine being a dry country, with few fountains or wells, they used to fill waterpots with water, to prevent the necessity of going to the river, if they were unclean, and to have materials for washing at hand. To prevent any unbeliever from suspecting that a very thin wine was made by the dregs having been left in the vessels, and water poured in upon them, He says expressly, According to the manner of the purifying of the Jews: which shews that those vessels were never used to hold wine.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ix. c. 7) A firkin is a certain measure; as urn, amphora, and the like. Metron is the Greek for measure: whence metretæ1. Two or three, is not to be taken to mean some holding two, others three, but the same vessels holding two or three.

Jesus saith unto them, Fill the waterpots with water. And they filled them up to the brim.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxii. 2) But why did He not work the miracle before they had filled the waterpots, which would have been much more wonderful; inasmuch as it is one thing to change the quality of some existing substance, another to make it that substance out of nothing? The latter miracle would be the more wonderful, but the former would be the more easy of belief. And this principle often acts as a check, to moderate the greatness of our Lord's miracles: He wishes to make them more credible, therefore He makes them less marvellous; a refutation this of the perverse doctrine of some, that He was a different Being from the Maker of the world. For we see He performs most of His miracles upon subject-matter already existing, whereas were He contrary to the Creator of the world, He would not use a material thus alien, to demonstrate His own power. He did not draw out the water Himself which He made wine, but ordered the servants to do so. This was for the sake of having witnesses of the miracle; And He saith unto them, Draw out now, and bear unto the governor of the feast.

ALCUIN. The Triclinium is a circle of three couches, cline signifying couch: the ancients used to recline upon couches. And the Architriclinus is the one at the head of the Triclinium, i. e. the chief of the guests. Some say that among the Jews, He was a priest, and attended the marriage in order to instruct in the duties of the married state.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxii. 2) Or thus; It might be said that the guests were drunken, and could not, in the confusion of their senses, tell whether it were water or wine. But this objection could not be brought against the attendants, who must have been sober, being occupied wholly in performing the duties of their service gracefully and in order. Our Lord therefore bid the attendants bear unto the governor of the feast; who again would of course be perfectly sober. He did not say, Give to the guests to drink.

HILARY. (iii. de Trin. c. 5) Water is poured into the waterpots; wine is drawn out into the chalices; the senses of the drawer out agree not with the knowledge of the pourer in. The pourer in thinks that water is drawn out; the drawer out thinks that wine was poured in. When the ruler of the feast had tasted the water that was made wine, and knew not whence it was, (but the servants who drew the water knew,) the governor of the feast called the bridegroom. It was not a mixture, but a creation: the simple nature of water vanished, and the flavour of wine was produced; not that a weak dilution was obtained, by means of some strong infusion, but that which was, was annihilated; and that which was not, came to be.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxii. 2, 3) Our Lord wished the power of His miracles to be seen gradually; and therefore He did not reveal what He had done Himself, nor did the ruler of the feast call upon the servants to do so; (for no credit would have been given to such testimony concerning a mere man, as our Lord was supposed to be,) but He called the bridegroom, who was best able to see what was done. Christ moreover did not only make wine, but the best wine. And (the ruler of the feast) saith unto him, Every man at the beginning doth set forth good wine, and when men have well drunk, then that which is worse; but thou hast kept the good wine until now. The effects of the miracles of Christ are more beautiful and better than the productions of nature. So then that the water was made wine, the servants could testify; that it was made good wine, the ruler of the feast and the bridegroom. It is probable that the bridegroom made some answer; but the Evangelist omits it, only mentioning what it was necessary for us to know, viz. the water being made wine. He adds, This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee. (Hom. xxiii. 1.). It was very necessary to work miracles just then, when His devoted disciples were all collected, and present at the place, attending to what was going on.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx) Should any say that there is not sufficient proof of this being the beginning of miracles, because it is added, in Cana of Galilee, as if some had been preferred elsewhere: we answer, as we did before, that John says below, That He might be made manifest to Israel, therefore have I come baptizing. (c. 1) (Hom. xxi. 2). Now if He had performed miracles in the earlier part of His life, the Jews would not have wanted another person to point Him out. If our Lord in a short time became so distinguished for the number of His miracles, that His Name was known to every one, would He not have been much more so, had He worked miracles from His earliest years? for the things themselves would have been the more extraordinary, being performed by a Child, and in so long a time must have become notorious. It was fit and proper however that He should not begin to work miracles at so early an age: for men would have thought the Incarnation a phantasy, and in the extremity of envy would have delivered Him to be crucified before the appointed time.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ix) This miracle of our Lord's, turning the water into wine, is no miracle to those who know that God worked it. For the Same that day made wine in the waterpots, Who every year makes wine in the vine: only the latter is no longer wonderful, because it happens uniformly. And therefore it is that God keeps some extraordinary acts in store for certain occasions, to rouse men out of their lethargy, and make them worship Him. Thus it follows, He manifested forth His glory.

ALCUIN. He was the King of glory, and changed the elements because He was their Lord.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. 1) He manifests His glory, as far as related to His own act; and if at the time many knew it not, yet was it afterwards to be heard and known of all. And His disciples believed on Him. It was probable that these would believe more readily, and give more attention to what went on.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Evang. l. ii c. xvii. [38.]) If now for the first time they believed on Him, they were not His disciples when they came to the marriage. This however is a form of speech, such as saying that the Apostle Paul was born in Tarsus of Cilicia; not meaning by this that he was an Apostle then. In the same way when we hear of Christ's disciples being invited to the marriage, we should understand not disciples already, but who were to be disciples.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ix. c. 5) But see the mysteries which lie hid in that miracle of our Lord. It was necessary that all things should be fulfilled in Christ which were written of Him: those Scriptures were the water. He made the water wine when He opened unto them the meaning of these things, and expounded the Scriptures; for thus that came to have a taste which before had none, and that inebriated, which did not inebriate before.

BEDE. (in v. 1) At the time of our Lord's appearing in the flesh, the sweet vinous taste of the law had been weakened by the carnal interpretations of the Pharisees.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ix. 5. et sq.) Now if He ordered the water to be poured out, and then introduced the wine from the hidden recesses1 of creation, He would seem to have rejected the Old Testament. But converting, as He did, the water into wine, He shewed us that the Old Testament was from Himself, for it was by His order that the waterpots were filled. But those Scriptures have no meaning, if Christ be not understood there. Now we know from what time the law dates, viz. from the foundation of the world. From that time to this are six ages; the first, reekoning from Adam to Noah; the second, from Noah to Abraham; the third, from Abraham to David; the fourth, from David to the carrying away into Babylon; the fifth, from that time to John the Baptist; the sixth, from John the Baptist to the end of the world. The six waterpots then denote these six ages of prophecy. The prophecies are fulfilled; the waterpots are full. But what is the meaning of their holding two or three firkins apiece? Had He said three only, our minds would have run immediately to the mystery of the Trinity. Nor perhaps can we reject it, even though it is said, two or three: for the Father and the Son being named, the Holy Ghost may be understood by consequence; inasmuch as it is the love between the Father and the Son, which is the Holy Ghost. (c. 17.). Nor should we pass over another interpretation, which makes the two firkins alluded to the two races of men, the Jews and the Greeks; and the three to the three sons of Noah.

ALCUIN. The servants are the doctors of the New Testament, who interpret the holy Scripture to others spiritually; the ruler of the feast is some lawyer, as Nicodemus, Gamaliel, or Saul. When to the former then is committed the word of the Gospel, hid under the letter of the law, it is the water made wine, being set before the ruler of the feast. And the three rows1 of guests at table in the house of the marriage are properly mentioned; the Church consisting of three orders of believers, the married, the continent, and the doctors. Christ has kept the good wine until now, i. e. He has deferred the Gospel till this, the sixth age.

2:12–13

12. After this he went down to Capernaum, he, and his mother, and his brethren, and his disciples: and they continued there not many days.

13. And the Jews’ passover was at hand, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii) Our Lord being about shortly to go up to Jerusalem, proceeded to Capernaum, that He might not take His mother and brethren every where about with Him: After this he went down to Capernaum, He, and His mother, and His brethren, and His disciples, and they continued there not many days.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. in Joan. 1, 2) The Lord our God is He, high, that He might create us; low, that He might create us anew; walking among men, suffering what was human, hiding what was divine. So He hath a mother, hath brethren, hath disciples: whence He hath a mother, thence hath He brethren. Scripture frequently gives the name of brethren, not to those only who are born of the same womb, or the same father, but to those of the same generation, cousins by the father’s or mother’s side. Those who are unacquainted with this way of speaking, ask, Whence hath our Lord brothers? did Mary bring forth again? That could not be: with her commenced the dignity of the virgin state. Abraham was uncle of Lot, and Jacob was nephew to Laban the Syrian. Yet Abraham and Lot are called brethren; and likewise Jacob and Laban.

ALCUIN. Our Lord’s brethren are the relations of Mary and Joseph, not the sons of Mary and Joseph. For not only the blessed Virgin, but Joseph also, the witness of her chastity, abstained from all conjugal intercourse.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. c. ii. c. xvii. [39.]) And His disciples; it is uncertain whether Peter and Andrew and the sons of Zebedee, were of their number or not at this time. For Matthew first relates that our Lord came and dwelt at Capernaum, and afterwards that He called those disciples from their boats, as they were fishing. Is Matthew perhaps supplying what he had omitted? For without any mention that it was at a subsequent time, he says, Jesus walking by the sea of Galilee saw two brethren. (Matt. 4:18) Or is it better to suppose that these were other disciples? For the writings of the Evangelists and Apostles, call not the twelve only, but all who believing in God were prepared for the kingdom of heaven by our Lord’s teaching, disciplesa. (id. cap. 18). How is it too that our Lord’s journey to Galilee is placed here before John the Baptist’s imprisonmentb, when Matthew says, Now when Jesus had heard that John was cast into prison, he departed into Galilee: and Mark the same? Luke too, though he says nothing of John’s imprisonment, yet places Christ’s visit to Galilee after His temptation and baptismc, as the two former do. We should understand then that the three Evangelists are not opposed to John, but pass over our Lord’s first coming into Galilee after his baptism; at which time it was that He converted the water into wine.

EUSEBIUS. (Euseb. Eccl. Hist. l. iii. c. 24) When copies of the three Gospels had come to the Evangelist John, he is reported, while he confirmed their fidelity and correctness, to have at the same time noticed some omissions, especially at the opening of our Lord’s ministry. Certain it is that the first three Gospels seem only to contain the events of the year in which John the Baptist was imprisoned, and put to death. And therefore John, it is said, was asked to write down those acts of our Saviour’s before the apprehension of the Baptist, which the former Evangelists had passed over. Any one then, by attending, will find that the Gospels do not disagree, but that John is relating the events of a different date, from that which the others refer to.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. 1) He did not perform any miracle at Capernaum, the inhabitants of which city were in a very corrupt state, and not well disposed to Him; He went there however, and stayed some time out of respect to His motherd.

BEDE. He did not stay many days there, on account of the Passover, which was approaching: And the Jews’ passover was at hand.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 14) But what need of saying, of the Jews, when no other nation had the rite of the Passover? Perhapse because there are two sorts of Passover, one human, which is celebrated in a way very different from the design of Scripture; another the true and Divine, which is kept in spirit and in truth. To distinguish it then from the Divine, it is said, of the Jews.

ALCUIN. And He went up to Jerusalem. The Gospels mention two journeys of our Lord to Jerusalem, one in the first year of His preaching, before John was sent to prison, which is the journey now spoken of; the other in the year of His Passion. Our Lord has set us here an example of careful obedience to the Divine commands. For if the Son of God fulfilled the injunctions of His own law, by keeping the festivals, like the rest, with what holy zeal should we servants prepare for and celebrate them?

ORIGEN. (tom. x. c. 6, 7) In a mystical sense, it was meet that after the marriage in Cana of Galilee, and the banquet and wine, our Lord should take His mother, brethren, and disciples to the land of consolation (as Capernaum signifiesf) to console, by the fruits that were to spring up and by abundance of fields, those who received His discipline, and the mind which had conceived Him by the Holy Ghost; and who were there to be holpen. For some there are bearing fruit, to whom our Lord Himself comes down with the ministers of His word and disciples, helping such, His mother being present. Those however who are called to Capernaum, do not seem capable of His presence long: that is, a land which admitteth lower consolation, is not able to take in the enlightenment from many doctrines; being capable to receive few only.

ALCUIN. Or Capernaum, we may interpret "a most beautiful village," and so it signifies the world, to which the Word of the Father came down.

BEDE. But He continued there only a few days, because he lived with men in this world only a short time.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 16) Jerusalem, as our Saviour Himself saith, is the city of the great King, into which none of those who remain on earth ascend, or enter. Only the soul which has a certain natural loftiness, and clear insight into things invisible, is the inhabitant of that city. Jesus alone goes up thitherg. But His disciples seem to have been present afterwards. The zeal of Thine house hath eaten me up. But it is as though in every one of the disciples who went up, it was Jesus who went up.

2:14–17

14. And found in the temple those that sold oxen and sheep and doves, and the changers of money sitting:

15. And when he had made a scourge of small cords, he drove them all out of the temple, and the sheep, and the oxen; and poured out the changers' money, and overthrew the tables;

16. And said unto them that sold doves, Take these things hence; make not my Father's house an house of merchandise.

17. And his disciples remembered that it was written, The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up.

BEDE. Our Lord on coming to Jerusalem, immediately entered the temple to pray; giving us an example that, wheresoever we go, our first visit should be to the house of God to pray. And He found in the temple those that sold oxen, and sheep, and doves, and the changers of money sitting. (Mat. 21)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. c. 4) Such sacrifices were prescribed to the people, in condescension to their carnal minds; to prevent them from turning aside to idols. They sacrificed sheep, and oxen, and doves.

BEDE. Those however, who came from a distance, being unable to bring with them the animals required for sacrifice, brought the money instead. For their convenience the Scribes and Pharisees ordered animals to be sold in the temple, in order that, when the people had bought and offered them afterwards, they might sell them again, and thus make great profits. And changers of money sitting; changers of money sat at the table to supply change to buyers and sellers. But our Lord disapproving of any worldly business in His house, especially one of so questionable a kind, drove out all engaged in it.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. c. 5) He who was to be scourged by them, was first of all the scourger; And when He had made a scourge of small cords, He drore them all out of the temple.

THEOPHYLACT. Nor did He cast out only those who bought and sold, but their goods also: The sheep, and the oxen, and poured out the changers' money, and overthrew the tables, i. e. of the money changers, which were coffers of pence.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 16) Should it appear something out of the order of things, that the Son of God should make a scourge of small cords, to drive them out of the temple? We have one answer in which some take refuge, viz. the divine power of Jesus, Who, when He pleased, could extinguish the wrath of His enemies however innumerable, and quiet the tumult of their minds: The Lord bringeth the counsel of the heathen to nought. (Ps. 32, 33:10) This act indeed exhibits no less power, than His more positive miracles; nay rather, more than the miracle by which water was converted into wine: in that there the subject-matter was inanimate, here, the minds of so many thousands of men are overcome.

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Ev. l. ii. c. 67) It is evident that this was done on two several occasions; the first mentioned by John, the last by the other three.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 17) John says here that He drove out the sellers from the temple; Matthew, the sellers and buyers. The number of buyers was much greater than of the sellers: and therefore to drive them out was beyond the power of the carpenter's Son, as He was supposed to be, had He not by His divine power put all things under Him, as it is said.

BEDE. The Evangelist sets before us both natures of Christ: the human in that His mother accompanied Him to Capernaum; the divine, in that He said, Make not My Father's house an house of merchandize.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. in Joan. c. 2) Lo, He speaks of God as His Father, and they are not angry, for they think He means it in a common sense. But afterwards when He spoke more openly, and shewed that He meant equality, they were enraged. In Matthew's account too, (c. 21) on driving them out, He says, Ye have made it (My Father's house) a den of thieves. (21:13.) This was just before His Passion, and therefore He uses severer language. But the former being at the beginning of His miracles, His answer is milder and more indulgent.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. in Joan. c. 4) So that temple was still a figure only, and our Lord cast out of it all who came to it as a market. And what did they sell? Things that were necessary for the sacrifice of that time. What if He had found men drunken? If the house of God ought not to be a house of merchandize, ought it to be a house of drunkenness?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. 2) But why did Christ use such violence? He was about to heal on the Sabbath day, and to do many things which appeared to them transgressions of the Law. That He might not appear therefore to be acting contrary to God, He did this at His own peril; and thus gave them to understand, that He who exposed Himself to such peril to defend the decency of the house, did not despise the Lord of that house. For the same reason, to shew His agreement with God, He said not, the Holy house, but, My Father's house. It follows, And His disciples remembered what was written; The zeal of thine house hath eaten me up.

BEDE. (in loc.) His disciples seeing this most fervent zeal in Him, remembered that it was from zeal for His Father's house that our Saviour drove the ungodly from the temple.

ALCUIN. Zeal, taken in a good sense, is a certain fervour of the Spirit, by which the mind, all human fears forgotten, is stirred up to the defence of the truth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. c. 9) He then is eaten up with zeal for God's house, who desires to correct all that he sees wrong there; and, if he cannot correct, endures and mourns. In thine house thou busiest thyself to prevent matters going wrong; in the house of God, where salvation is offered, oughtest thou to be indifferent? Hast thou a friend? admonish him gently; a wife? coerce her severely; a maid-servant? even compel her with stripes. Do what thou art able, according to thy station.

ALCUIN. To take the passage mystically, God enters His Church spiritually every day, and marks each one's behaviour there. Let us be careful then, when we are in God's Church, that we indulge not in stories, or jokes, or hatreds, or lusts, lest on a sudden He come and scourge us, and drive us out of His Church.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 16) It is possible even for the dweller in Jerusalem to incur guilt, and even the most richly endowed may stray. And unless these repent speedily, they lose the capacity wherewith they were endued. He finds them in the temple, i. e. in sacred places, or in the office of enunciating the Church's truths, some who make His Father's house an house of merchandize; i. e. who expose to sale the oxen whom they ought to reserve for the plough, lest by turning back they should become unfit for the kingdom of God: also who prefer the unrighteous mammon to the sheep, from which they have the material of ornament; also who for miserable gain abandon the watchful care of them who are called metaphorically doves, without all gall or bitternessh. Our Saviour finding these in the holy house, maketh a scourge of small cords, and driveth them out, together with the sheep and oxen exposed for sale, scatters the heaps of money, as unbeseeming in the house of God, and overthrows the tables set up in the minds of the covetous, forbidding them to sell doves in the house of God any longer. I think too that He meant the above, as a mystical intimation that whatsoeveri was to be performed with regard to that sacred oblation by the priests, was not to be performed after the manner of material oblations, and that the law was not to be observed as the carnal Jews wished. For our Lord, by driving away the sheep and oxen, and ordering away the doves, which were the most common offerings among the Jews, and by overthrowing the tables of material coins, which in a figure only, not in truth, bore the Divine stamp, (i. e. what according to the letter of the law seemed good,) and when with His own hand He scourged the people, He as much as declared that the dispensation was to be broken up and destroyed, and the kingdom translated to the believing from among the Gentiles.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. c. 6) Or, those who sell in the Church, are those who seek their own, not the things of Jesus Christ. They who will not be bought, think they may sell earthly things. Thus Simon wished to buy the Spirit, that he might sell Him: for he was one of those who sell doves. (The Holy Spirit appeared in the form of a dove.) The dove however is not sold, but is given of free grace1; for it is called grace.

BEDE. (in loc.) They then are the sellers of doves, who, after receiving the free grace of the Holy Spirit, do not dispense it freely2, as they are commanded, but at a price: who confer the laying on of hands, by which the Holy Spirit is received, if not for money, at least for the sake of getting favour with the people, who bestow Holy Orders not according to merit, but favour.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. c. 7) By the oxen may be understood the Apostles and Prophets, who have dispensed to us the holy Scriptures. Those who by these very Scriptures deceive the people, from whom they seek honour, sell the oxen; and they sell the sheep too, i. e. the people themselves; and to whom do they sell them, but to the devil? For that which is cut off from the one Church, (1 Pet. 5:8) who taketh away, except the roaring lion, who goeth about every where, and seeketh whom he may devour?

BEDE. (in loc.) Or, the sheep are works of purity and piety, and they sell the sheep, who do works of piety to gain the praise of men. They exchange money in the temple, who, in the Church, openly devote themselves to secular business. And besides those who seek for money, or praise, or honour from Holy Orders, those too make the Lord’s house a house of merchandize, who do not employ the rank, or spiritual grace, which they have received in the Church at the Lord’s hands, with singleness of mind, but with an eye to human recompense.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. c. 5) Our Lord intended a meaning to be seen in His making a scourge of small cords, and then scourging those who were carrying on the merchandize in the temple. Every one by his sins twists for himself a cord, in that he goes on adding sin to sin. So then when men suffer for their iniquities, let them be sure that it is the Lord making a scourge of small cords, and admonishing them to change their lives: which if they fail to do, they will hear at the last, Bind. him hand and foot. (Mat. 23)

BEDE. (in loco.) With a scourge then made of small cords, He cast them out of the temple; for from the part and lot of the saints are cast out all, who, thrown externally among the Saints, do good works hypocritically, or bad openly. The sheep and the oxen too He cast out, to shew that the life and the doctrine of such were alike reprobate. And He overthrew the change heaps of the money-changers and their tables, as a sign that, at the final condemnation of the wicked, He will take away the form even of those things which they loved. The sale of doves He ordered to be removed out of the temple, because the grace of the Spirit, being freely received, should be freely given.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 16) By the temple we may understand too the soul wherein the Word of God dwelleth; in which, before the teaching of Christ, earthly and bestial affections had prevailed. The ox being the tiller of the soil, is the symbol of earthly affections: the sheep, being the most irrational of all animals, of dull ones; the dove is the type of light and volatile thoughts; and money, of earthly good things; which money Christ cast out by the Word of His doctrine, that His Father's house might be no longer a market.

2:18–22

18. Then answered the Jews and said unto him, What sign shewest thou unto us, seeing that thou doest these things?

19. Jesus answered and said unto them, Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.

20. Then said the Jews, Forty and six years was this temple in building, and wilt thou rear it up in three days?

21. But he spake of the temple of his body.

22. When therefore he was risen from the dead, his disciples remembered that he had said this unto them: and they believed the Scripture, and the word which Jesus had said.

THEOPHYLACT. (hoc loco.) The Jews seeing Jesus thus acting with power, and having heard Him say, Make not My Father's house an house of merchandize, ask of Him a sign; Then answered the Jews and said unto Him, What sign shewest Thou unto us, seeing that Thou doest these things?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. 2) But were signs necessary for His putting a stop to evil practices? Was not the having such zeal for the house of God, the greatest sign of His virtue? They did not however remember the prophecy, but asked for a sign; at once irritated at the loss of their base gains, and wishing to prevent Him from going further. For this dilemma, they thought, would oblige Him either to work miracles, or give up His present course. But He refuses to give them the sign, as He did on a like occasion, when He answers, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign, and there shall no sign he given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet; (Mat. 12:39) only the answer is more open there than here. He however who even anticipated men's wishes, and gave signs when He was not asked, would not have rejected here a positive request, had He not seen a crafty design in it. As it was, Jesus answered and said unto them, Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up.

BEDE. For inasmuch as they sought a sign from our Lord of His right to eject the customary merchandize from the temple, He replied, that that temple signified the temple of His Body, in which was no spot of sin; as if He said, As by My power I purify your inanimate temple from your merchandize and wickedness; so the temple of My Body, of which that is the figure, destroyed by your hands, on the third day I will raise again.

THEOPHYLACT. He does not however provoke them to commit murder, by saying, Destroy; but only shews that their intentions were not hidden from Him. Let the Arians observe how our Lord, as the destroyer of death, says, I will raise it up; that is to say, by My own power.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. x. in Joan c. 11.) The Father also raised Him up again; to Whom He says, Raise Thou me up, and I shall reward them. (Ps. 41:10) But what did the Father do without the Word? As then the Father raised Him up, so did the Son also: even as He saith below, I and My Father are one. John 10:30.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. 3) But why does He give them the sign of His resurrection? Because this was the greatest proof that He was not a mere man; shewing, as it did, that He could triumph over death, and in a moment overthrow its long tyranny.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 20) Both those, i. e. both the Body of Jesus and the temple, seem to me to be a type of the Church, which with lively stones is built up into a spiritual house, into an holy priesthood; according to St. Paul, Ye are the body of Christ, and members in particular. (1 Cor. 12:27) And though the structure of stones seem to be broken up, and all the bones of Christ scattered by adversities and tribulations, yet shall the temple be restored, and raised up again in three days, and stablished in the now heaven and the new earth. For as that sensible body of Christ was crucified and buried, and afterward rose again; so the whole body of Christ's saints was crucified with Christ, (each glorying in that cross, by which He Himself too was crucified to the world,) and, after being buried with Christ, hath also risen with Him, walking in newness of life. Yet have we not risen yet in the power of the blessed resurrection, which is still going on, and is yet to be completed. Whence it is not said, On the third day I will build it up, but, in three days; for the erection is being in process throughout the whole of the three days.

THEOPHYLACT. The Jews, supposing that He spoke of the material temple, scoffed: Then said the Jews, Forty and six years was this temple in building, and will Thou rear it up in three days?

ALCUIN. Note, that they allude here not to the first temple under Solomon, which was finished in seven years, but to the one rebuilt under Zorobabel. (Ezra 4:5) This was forty-six years building, in consequence of the hindrance raised by the enemies of the work.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. c. 22) Or some will reckon perhaps the forty and six years from the time that David consulted Nathan the Prophet on the building of the temple. David from that time was busy in collecting materials. But perhaps the number forty may with reference to the four corners of the temple allude to the four elements of the world, and the number six, to the creation of man on the sixth day.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. 9. [v.]) Or it may be that this number fits in with the perfection of the Lord's Body. For six times forty-six are two hundred and seventy-six days, which make up nine months and six days, the time that our Lord's Body was forming in the womb; as we know by authoritative traditions handed down from our fathers, and preserved by the Church. He was, according to general belief, conceived on the eighth of the Kalends of April, (March 24) the day on which He suffered, and born on the eighth of the Kalends of January1. (Dec. 25) The intervening time contains two hundred and seventy-six days, i. e. six multiplied by forty-six.

AUGUSTINE. (b. lxxxiii. Quæst. 2. 5. f.) The process of human conception is said to be this. The first six days produce a substance like milk, which in the following nine is converted into blood; in twelve more is consolidated, in eighteen more is formed into a perfect set of limbs, the growth and enlargement of which fills up the rest of the time till the birth. For six, and nine, and twelve, and eighteen, added together are forty-five, and with the addition of one (which1 stands for the summing up, all these numbers being collected into one) forty-six. This multiplied by the number six, which stands at the head of this calculation2, makes two hundred and seventy-six, i. e. nine months and six days. It is no unmeaning information then that the temple was forty and six years building; for the temple prefigured His Body, and as many years as the temple was in building, so many days was the Lord's Body in forming.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. x. c. 12) Or thus, if you take the four Greek words, anatole, the east; dysis, the west; arctos, the north; and mesembria, the south; the first letters of these words make Adam. And our Lord says that He will gather together His saints from the four winds, when He comes to judgment. Now these letters of the word Adam, make up, according to Greek figuring, the number of the years during which the temple was building. For in Adam we have alpha, one; delta, four; alpha again, one; and mi, forty; making up together forty-six. The temple then signifies the body derived from Adam; which body our Lord did not take in its sinful state, but renewed it, in that after the Jews had destroyed it, He raised it again the third day. The Jews however, being carnal, understood carnally; He spoke spiritually. He tells us, by the Evangelist, what temple He means; But He spake of the temple of His Body.

THEOPHYLACT. (ad loc. fin.) From this Apollinarius draws an heretical inference: and attempts to shew that Christ's flesh was inanimate, because the temple was inanimate. In this way you will prove the flesh of Christ to be wood and stone, because the temple is composed of these materials. Now if you refuse to allow what is said, Now is My soul troubled; (John 12:27) and, I have power to lay it (My life) down, (ib. 10:18) to be said of the rational soul, still how will you interpret, Into Thy hands, O Lord, I commend My spirit? (Luke 23:46) you cannot understand this of an irrational soul: or again, the passage, Thou shall not leave My soul in hell. (Ps. 16:11)

ORIGEN. (tom. x. in Joan. c. 23) Our Lord’s Body is called the temple, because as the temple contained the glory of God dwelling therein, so the Body of Christ, which represents the Church, contains the Only-Begotten, Who is the image and glory of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. in Joan. 3) TWO. things there were in the mean time very far removed from the comprehension of the disciples: one, the resurrection of our Lord’s Body: the other, and the greater mystery, that it was God who dwelt in that Body: as our Lord declares by saying, Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up. And thus it follows, When therefore He had risen from the dead, His disciples remembered that He had said this unto them: and they believed the Scripture, and the word which Jesus had said.

ALCUIN. For before the resurrection they did not understand the Scriptures, because they had not yet received the Holy Ghost, Who was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. (John 7:39) But on the day of the resurrection our Lord appeared and opened their meaning to His disciples; that they might understand what was said of Him in the Law and the Prophets. And then they believed the prediction of the Prophets that Christ would rise the third day, and the word which Jesus had spoken to them: Destroy this temple, &c.

ORIGEN. (t. x. c. 27) But (in the mystical interpretation) we shall attain to the full measure of faith, at the great resurrection of the whole body of Jesus, i. e. His Church; inasmuch as the faith which is from sight, is very different from that which seeth as through a glass darkly.

2:23–25

23. Now when he was in Jerusalem at the passover, in the feast day, many believed in his name, when they saw the miracles which he did.

24. But Jesus did not commit himself unto them, because he knew all men.

25. And needed not that any should testify of man: for he knew what was in man.

BEDE. (in loc.) The Evangelist has related above what our Lord did on his way to Jerusalem; now He relates how others were affected towards Him at Jerusalem; Now when He was in Jerusalem at the Passover, in the feast day, many believed in His Name, when they saw the miracles which He did.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. c. 30) But how was it that many believed on Him from seeing His miracles? for he seems to have performed no supernatural works at Jerusalem, except we suppose Scripture to have passed them over. May not however the act of His making a scourge of small cords, and driving all out of the temple, be reckoned a miracle?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv. 1) Those had been wiser disciples, however, who were brought to Christ not by His miracles, but by His doctrine. For it is the duller sort who are attracted by miracles; the more rational are convinced by prophecy, or doctrine. And therefore it follows, But Jesus did not commit Himself unto them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xi. in Joan. c. 2. 3) What meaneth this, Many believed in His Name—but Jesus did not commit Himself unto them? Was it that they did not believe in Him, but only pretended that they did? In that case the Evangelist would not have said, Many believed in His Name. Wonderful this, and strange, that men should trust Christ, and Christ trusts not Himself to men; especially considering that He was the Son of God, and suffered voluntarily, or else need not have suffered at all. Yet such are all catechumens. If we say to a catechumen, Believest thou in Christ? he answers, I do believe, and crosses himself. If we ask him, Dost thou eat the flesh of the Son of man? he knows not what we sayk, for Jesus has not committed Himself to him.

ORIGEN. (tom. x. c. 28) Or, it was those who believed in His Name, not on Him, to whom Jesus would not commit Himself. They believe on Him, who follow the narrow way which leadeth unto life; they believe in His Name, who only believe the miracles.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxv. 1) Or it means that He did not place confidence in them, as perfect disciples, and did not, as if they were brethren of confirmed faith, commit to them all His doctrines, for He did not attend to their outward words, but entered into their hearts, and well knew how short-lived was their zeal1. Because He knew all men, and needed not that any should testify of man, for He knew what was in man. To know what is in man’s heart, is in the power of God alone, who fashioned the heart. He does not want witnesses, to inform Him of that mind, which was of His own fashioning.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xi. c. 2) The Maker knew better what was in His own work, than the work knew what was in itself. Peter knew not what was in himself when he said, I will go with Thee unto death; (Luke 22:33. ver. 61) but our Lord's answer shewed that He knew what was in man; Before the cock crow, thou shalt thrice deny Me.

BEDE. An admonition to us not to be confident of ourselves, but ever anxious and mistrustful; knowing that what escapes our own knowledge, cannot escape the eternal Judge.

CHAPTER 3

3:1–3

1. There was a man of the Pharisees, named Nicodemus, a ruler of the Jews:

2. The same came to Jesus by night, and said unto him, Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God: for no man can do these miracles that thou doest, except God be with him.

3. Jesus answered and said unto him, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xi) He had said above that, when He was at Jerusalem—many believed in His Name, when they saw the miracles which He did. Of this number was Nicodemus, of whom we are told; There was a man of the Pharisees, Nicodemus, a ruler of the Jews.

BEDE. His rank is given, A ruler of the Jews; and then what he did, This man came to Jesus by night: hoping, that is, by so secret an interview, to learn more of the mysteries of the faith; the late public miracles having given him an elementary knowledge of them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv. 1) As yet however he was withheld by Jewish infirmity: and therefore he came in the night, being afraid to come in the day. Of such the Evangelist speaks elsewhere, Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also many believed on Him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess Him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue. (John 12:42)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xi. c. 3, 4) Nicodemus was one of the number who believed, but were not as yet born again. Wherefore he came to Jesus by night. Whereas those who are born of water and the Holy Ghost, are addressed by the Apostle, Ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord. (Eph. 5:8)

HAYMO. (Hom. in Oct. Pent.) Or, well may it be said that he came in the night, enveloped, as he was, in the darkness of ignorance, and not yet come to the light, i. e. the belief that our Lord was very God. Night in the language of Holy Writ is put for ignorance. And said unto him, Rabbi, we know that Thou art a teacher come from God. The Hebrew Rabbi, has the meaning of Magister in Latin. He calls him, we see, a Master, but not God: he does not hint at that; he believes Him to be sent from God, but does not see that He is God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xi. c. 3) What the ground of his belief was, is plain from what immediately follows: For no one can do these miracles that Thou doest, except God be with him. Nicodemus then was one of the many who believed in His Name, when they saw the signs that He did.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv. 2. in Joan) He did not however conceive any great idea of them from His miracles; and attributed to Him as yet only a human character, speaking of Him as a Prophet, sent to execute a commission, and standing in need of assistance to do His work; whereas the Father had begotten Him perfect, selfsufficient, and free from all defect. It being Christ’s design however for the present not so much to reveal His dignity, as to prove that He did nothing contrary to the Father; in words He is often humble, while His acts ever testify His power. And therefore to Nicodemus on this occasion He says nothing expressly to magnify Himself; but He imperceptibly corrects his low views of Him, and teaches him that He was Himself all-sufficient, and independent in His miraculous works. Hence He answers, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xi. c. 4) Those then are the persons to whom Jesus commits Himself, those born again, who come not in the night to Jesus, as Nicodemus did. Such persons immediately make professsion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv. 2) He says therefore, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God: as if He said, Thou art not yet born again, i. e. of God, by a spiritual begetting; and therefore thy knowledge of Me is not spiritual, but carnal and human. But I say unto thee, that neither thou, nor any one, except he be born again of God, shall be able to see the glory which is around me, but shall be out of the kingdom: for it is the begetting by baptism, which enlightens the mind. Or the meaning is, Except thou art born from above, and hast received the certainty of my doctrines, thou wanderest out of the way, and art far from the kingdom of heaven. By which words our Lord discloses His nature, shewing that He is more than what He appears to the outward eye. The expression, From abovea, means, according to some, from heaven, according to others, from the beginning. Had the Jews heard it, they would have left Him in scorn; but Nicodemus shews the love of a disciple, by staying to ask more questions.

3:4–8

4. Nicodemus saith unto him, How can a man be born when he is old? can he enter the second time into his mother's womb, and be born?

5. Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.

6. That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit.

7. Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again.

8. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv. 3) Nicodemus coming to Jesus, as to a man, is startled on learning greater things than man could utter, things too lofty for him. His mind is darkened, and he does not stand firm, but reels like one on the point of falling away from the faith. Therefore he objects to the doctrine as being impossible, in order to call forth a fuller explanation. Two things there are which astonish him, such a birth, and such a kingdom; neither yet heard of among the Jews. First he urges the former difficulty, as being the greatest marvel. Nicodemus saith unto him, How can a man be born when he is old? can he enter a second time into his mother's womb, and be born?

BEDE. (in loc.) The question put thus sounds as if a boy might enter a second time into his mother's womb and be born. But Nicodemus, we must remember, was an old man, and took his instance from himself; as if he said, I am an old man, and seek my salvation; how can I enter again into my mother's womb, and be born?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv. 2) Thou callest Him Rabbi, and sayest that He comes from God, and yet receivest not His sayings, but usest to thy master a word which brings in endless confusion; for that how, is the enquiry of a man who has no strong belief; and many who have so enquired, have fallen from the faith; some asking, how God became incarnate? others, how He was bornb? Nicodemus here asks from anxiety. But observe when a man trusts spiritual things to reasonings of his own, how ridiculously he talks.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xi. c. 6) It is the Spirit that speaketh, whereas he understandeth carnally; he knew of no birth save one, that from Adam and Eve; from God and the Church he knows of none. But do thou so understand the birth of the Spirit, as Nicodemus did the birth of the flesh; for as the entrance into the womb cannot be repeated, so neither can baptism.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiv. 3) While Nicodemus stumbles, dwelling upon our birth here, Christ reveals more clearly the manner of our spiritual birth; Jesus answered, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 5) As if He said, Thou understandest me to speak of a carnal birth; but a man must be born of water and of the Spirit, if he is to enter into the kingdom of God. If to obtain the temporal inheritance of his human father, a man must be born of the womb of his mother; to obtain the eternal inheritance of his heavenly Father, he must be born of the womb of the Church. And since man consists of two parts, body and soul, the mode even of this latter birth is twofold; water the visible part cleansing the body; the Spirit by His invisible cooperation, changing the invisible soul.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxv. 1) If any one asks how a man is born of water, I ask in return, how Adam was born from the ground. For as in the beginning though the element of earth was the subject-matter, the man was the work of the fashioner; so now too, though the element of water is the subject-matter, the whole work is done by the Spirit of grace. He then gave Paradise for a place to dwell in; now He hath opened heaven to us. (c. 2.). But what need is there of water, to those who receive the Holy Ghost? It carries out the divine symbols of burial, mortification, resurrection, and life. For by the immersion of our heads in the water, the old man disappears and is buried as it were in a sepulchre, whence he ascends a new man. Thus shouldest thou learn, that the virtue of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, filleth all things. For which reason also Christ lay three days in the grave before His resurrection. (Hom. xxvi. 1.). That then which the womb is to the offspring, water is to the believer; he is fashioned and formed in the water. But that which is fashioned in the womb needeth time; whereas the water all is done in an instant. For the nature of the body is such as to require time for its completion; but spiritual creations are perfect from the beginning. From the time that our Lord ascended out of the Jordan, water produces no longer reptiles, i. e. living souls; but souls rational and endued with the Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. i. de Bapt. per. c. 30) Because He does not say, Except a man be born again1 of water and of the Spirit, he shall not have salvation, or eternal life; but, he shall not enter into the kingdom of God; from this, some infer that children are to be baptized in order to be with Christ in the kingdom of God, where they would not be, were they not baptized; but that they will obtain salvation and eternal life even if they die without baptism, not being bound with any chain of sin. But why is a man born again, except to be changed from his old into a new state? Or why doth the image of God not enter into the kingdom of God, if it be not by reason of sin?

HAYMO. (Hom. in Oct. Pent.) But Nicodemus being unable to take in so great and deep mysteries, our Lord helps him by the analogy of our carnal birth, saying, That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit. For as flesh generates flesh, so also doth spirit spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvi. in Joan. 1) Do not look then for any material production, or think that the Spirit generates flesh; for even the Lord’s flesh is generated not by the Spirit only, but also by the flesh. That which is born of the Spirit is spiritual. The birth here spoken of takes place not according to our substance, but according to honour and grace. But the birth of the Son of God is otherwise; for else what would He have been more than all who are born again? And He would be proved too inferior to the Spirit, inasmuch as His birth would be by the grace of the Spirit. How does this differ from the Jewish doctrine?—But mark next the part of the Holy Spirit, in the divine work. For whereas above some are said to be born of God, (c. 1:13.) here, we find, the Spirit generates them.—The wonder of Nicodemus being roused again by the words, He who is born of the Spirit is spirit, Christ meets him again with an instance from nature; Marvel not that I said unto thee, Ye must be born again. The expression, Marvel not, shews that Nicodemus was surprised at His doctrine. He takes for this instance some thing, not of the grossness of other bodily things, but still removed from the incorporeal nature, the wind; The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit. That is to say, if no one can restrain the wind from going where it will; much less can the laws of nature, whether the condition of our natural birth, or any other, restrain the action of the Spirit. That He speaks of the wind here is plain, from His saying, Thou hearest the sound thereof, i. e. its noise when it strikes objects. He would not in talking to an unbeliever and ignorant person, so describe the action of the Spirit. He says, Bloweth where it listethc; not meaning any power of choice in the wind, but only its natural movements, in their uncontrolled power. But canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth; i. e. If thou canst not explain the action of this wind which comes under the cognizance both of thy feeling and hearing, why examine into the operation of the Divine Spirit? He adds, So is every one that is born of the Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 7) But who of us does not see, for example, that the south wind blows from south to north, another wind from the east, another from the west? And how then do we not know whence the wind cometh, and whither it goeth?

BEDE. (in Hom. in part. Invent. S. Cruc. Ed. Nic.) It is the Holy Spirit therefore, Who bloweth where He listeth. It is in His own power to choose, whose heart to visit with His enlightening grace. And thou hearest the sound thereof. When one filled with the Holy Spirit is present with thee and speaks to thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 5) The Psalm soundeth, the Gospel soundeth, the Divine Word soundeth; it is the sound of the Spirit. This means that the Holy Spirit is invisibly present in the Word and Sacrament, to accomplish our birth.

ALCUIN. Therefore, Thou knowest not whence it cometh, or whither it goeth; for, although the Spirit should possess a person in thy presence at a particular time, it could not be seen how He entered into him, or how He went away again, because He is invisible.

HAYMO. (Hom. in Oct. Pent.) Or, Thou canst not tell whence it cometh; i. e. thou knowest not how He brings believers to the faith; or whither it goeth, i. e. how He directs the faithful to their hope. And so is every one that is born of the Spirit; as if He said, The Holy Spirit is an invisible Spirit; and in like manner, every one who is born of the Spirit is born invisibly.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 5) Or thus: If thou art born of the Spirit, thou wilt be such, that he, who is not yet born of the Spirit, will not know whence thou comest, or whither thou goest. For it follows, So is every one that is born of the Spirit.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) This completely refutes Macedonius the impugner of the Spirit, who asserted that the Holy Ghost was a servant. The Holy Ghost, we find, works by His own power, where He will, and what He will.

3:9–12

9. Nicodemus answered and said unto him, How can these things be?

10. Jesus answered and said unto him, Art thou a master of Israel, and knowest not these things?

11. Verily, verily, I say unto thee, We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen; and ye receive not our witness.

12. If I have told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe, if I tell you of heavenly things.

HAYMO. Nicodemus cannot take in the mysteries of the Divine Majesty, which our Lord reveals, and therefore asks how it is, not denying the fact, not meaning any censure, but wishing to be informed: Nicodemus answered and said unto Him, How can these things be?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvi. 2) Forasmuch then as he still remains a Jew, and, after such clear evidence, persists in a low and carnal system, Christ addresses him henceforth with greater severity: Jesus answered and said unto him, Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 6) What think we? that our Lord wished to insult this master in Israel? He wished him to be born of the Spirit: and no one is born of the Spirit except he is made humble; for this very humility it is, which makes us to be born of the Spirit. He however was inflated with his eminence as a master, and thought himself of importance because he was a doctor of the Jews. Our Lord then casts down his pride, in order that he may be born of the Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvi. 2) Nevertheless He does not charge the man with wickedness, but only with want of wisdom, and enlightenment. But some one will say, What connexion hath this birth, of which Christ speaks, with Jewish doctrines? Thus much. The first man that was made, the woman that was made out of his rib, the barren that bare, the miracles which were worked by means of water, I mean, Elijah's bringing up the iron from the river, the passage of the Red Sea, and Naaman the Syrian's purification in the Jordan, were all types and figures of the spiritual birth, and of the purification which was to take place thereby. Many passages in the Prophets too have a hidden reference to this birth: as that in the Psalms, Making thee young and lusty as an eagle: (Ps. 102:5) and, Blessed is he whose unrighteousness is forgiven. (Ps. 31:1) And again, Isaac was a type of this birth. Referring to these passages, our Lord says, Art thou a master in Israel, and knowest not these things? A second time however He condescends to his infirmity, and makes use of a common argument to render what He has said credible: Verily, verily, I say unto thee, We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen, and ye receive not our testimony. (ver. 11) Sight we consider the most certain of all the senses; so that when we say, we saw such a thing with our eyes, we seem to compel men to believe us. In like manner Christ, speaking after the manner of men, does not indeed say that he has seen actually, i. e. with the bodily eye, the mysteries He reveals; but it is clear that He means it of the most certain absolute knowledge. This then, viz. That we do know, he asserts of Himself alone.

HAYMO. (Hom. in Oct. Pent.) Why, it is asked, does He speak in the plural number, We speak that we do know? Because the speaker being the Only-Begotten Son of God, He would shew that the Father was in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both, proceeding indivisibly.

ALCUIN. Or, the plural number may have this meaning; I, and they who are born again of the Spirit, alone understand what we speak; and having seen the Father in secret, this we testify openly to the world; and ye, who are carnal and proud, receive not our testimony.

THEOPHYLACT. This is not said of Nicodemus, but of the Jewish race, who to the very last persisted in unbelief.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvi. 3) They are words of gentleness, not of anger; a lesson to us, when we: argue and cannot converse, not by sore and angry words, but by the absence of anger and clamour, (for clamour is the material of anger,) to prove the soundness of our views. Jesus in entering upon high doctrines, ever checks Himself in compassion to the weakness of His hearer: and does not dwell continuously on the most important truths, but turns to others more humble. Whence it follows: If I have told you earthly things, and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. in Joan. c. 7) That is: If ye do not believe that I can raise up a temple, which you have thrown down, how can ye believe that men can be regenerated by the Holy Ghost?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii. 1) Or thus: Be not surprised at His calling Baptism earthly. It is performed upon earth, and is compared with that stupendous birth, which is of the substance of the Father, an earthly birth being one of mere grace. And well hath He said, not, Ye understand not, but, Ye believe not: for when the understanding cannot take in certain truths, we attribute it to natural deficiency or ignorance: but where that is not received which it belongs to faith only to receive, the fault is not deficiency, but unbelief. These truths, however, were revealed that posterity might believe and benefit by them, though the people of that age did not.

3:13

13. And no man hath ascended up to heaven, but he that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (De Pecc. mer. et remiss. c. xxxi) After taking notice of this lack of knowledge in a person, who, on the strength of his magisterial station, set himself above others, and blaming the unbelief of such men, our Lord says, that if such as these do not believe, others will: No one hath ascended into heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of man who is in heaven. This may be rendered: The spiritual birth shall be of such sort, as that men from being earthly shall become heavenly: which will not be possible, except they are made members of Me; so that he who ascends, becomes one with Him who descended. Our Lord accounts His body, i. e. His Church, as Himself.

GREGORY. (xxvii. Mor. c. 8. al. 11.) For as much as we are made one with Him, to the place from which He came alone in Himself, thither He returns alone in us; and He who is ever in heaven, daily ascendeth to heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Although He was made the Son of man upon earth, yet His Divinity with which, remaining in heaven, He descended to earth, He hath declared not to disagree with the title of Son of man, as He hath thought His flesh worthy the name of Son of God. For through the Unity of person, by which both substances are one Christ, He walked upon earth, being Son of God; and remained in heaven, being Son of man. And the belief of the greater, involves belief in the less. If then the Divine substance, which is so far more removed from us, and could for our sake take up the substance of man so as to unite them in one person; how much more easily may we believe, that the Saints united with the man Christ, become with Him one Christ; so that while it is true of all, that they ascend by grace, it is at the same time true, that He alone ascends to heaven, Who came down from heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii. 1) Or thus: Nicodemus having said, We know that Thou art a teacher sent from God; our Lord says, And no man hath ascended, &c. in that He might not appear to be a teacher only like one of the Prophets.

THEOPHYLACT. But when thou hearest that the Son of man came down from heaven, think not that His flesh came down from heaven; for this is the doctrine of those heretics, who held that Christ took His Body from heaven, and only passed through the Virgin.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii. 1) By the title Son of man here, He does not mean His flesh, but Himself altogether; the lesser part of His nature being put to express the whole. It is not uncommon with Him to name Himself wholly from His humanity, or wholly from His divinity.

BEDE. If a man of set purpose descend naked to the valley, and there providing himself with clothes and armour, ascend the mountain again, he who ascended may be said to be the same with him who descended.

HILARY. (de Trin. c. 16.) Or, His descending from heaven is the source of His origin as conceived by the Spirit: Mary gave not His body its origin, though the natural qualities of her sex contributed its birth and increase. That He is the Son of man is from the birth of the flesh which was conceived in the Virgin. That He is in heaven is from the power of His everlasting nature, which did not contract the power of the Word of God, which is infinite, within the sphere of a finite body. Our Lord remaining in the form of a servant, far from the whole circle, inner and outer, of heaven and the world, yet as Lord of heaven and the world, was not absent therefrom. So then He came down from heaven because He was the Son of man; and He was in heaven, because the Word, which was made flesh, had not ceased to be the Word.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 8) But thou wonderest that He was at once here, and in heaven. Yet such power hath He given to His disciples. Hear Paul, Our conversation is in heaven. (Phil. 3:20) If the man Paul walked upon earth, and had his conversation in heaven; shall not the God of heaven and earth be able to be in heaven and earth?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom xxvii. 1) That too which seemeth very lofty is still unworthy of His vastness. For He is not in heaven only, but every where, and filleth all things. But for the present He accommodates Himself to the weakness of His hearer, that by degrees He may convert him.

3:14–15

14. And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up:

15. That whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii. 1) Having made mention of the gift of baptism, He proceeds to the. source of it, i. e. the cross: And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up.

BEDE. He introduces the teacher of the Mosaic law, to the spiritual sense of that law; by a passage from the Old Testament history, which was intended to be a figure of His Passion, and of man’s salvation.

AUGUSTINE. (de Pecc. mer. et remiss. c. xxxii) Many dying in the wilderness from the attack of the serpents, Moses, by commandment of the Lord, lifted up a brazen serpent: and those who looked upon it were immediately healed. The lifting up of the serpent is the death of Christ; the cause, by a certain mode of construction, being put for the effect. The serpent was the cause of death, inasmuch as he persuaded man into that sin, by which he merited death. Our Lord, however, did not transfer sin, i. e. the poison of the serpent, to his flesh, but death; in order that in the likeness of sinful flesh, there might be punishment without sin, by virtue of which sinful flesh might be delivered both from punishment and from sin.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) See then the aptness of the figure. The figure of the serpent has the appearance of the beast, but not its poison: in the same way Christ came in the likeness of sinful flesh, being free from sin. By Christ's being lifted up, understand His being suspended on high, by which suspension He sanctified the air, even as He had sanctified the earth by walking upon it. Herein too is typified the glory of Christ: for the height of the cross was made His glory: for in that He submitted to be judged, He judged the prince of this world; for Adam died justly, because he sinned; our Lord unjustly, because He did no sin. So He overcame him, who delivered Him over to death, and thus delivered Adam from death. And in this the devil found himself vanquished, that he could not upon the cross torment our Lord into hating His murderers: but only made Him love and pray for them the more. In this way the cross of Christ was made His lifting up, and glory.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii. 2) Wherefore He does not say, 'The Son of man must be suspended, but lifted up, a more honourable term, but coming near the figure. He uses the figure to shew that the old dispensation is akin to the new, and to shew on His hearers' account that He suffered voluntarily; and that His death issued in life.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 11) As then formerly he who looked to the serpent that was lifted up, was healed of its poison, and saved from death; so now he who is conformed to the likeness of Christ's death by faith and the grace of baptism, is delivered both from sin by justification, and from death by the resurrection: as He Himself saith; That whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have everlasting life. What need then is there that the child should be conformed by baptism to the death of Christ, if he be not altogether tainted by the poisonous bite of the serpent?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii. 2) Observe; He alludes to the Passion obscurely, in consideration to His hearer; but the fruit of the Passion He unfolds plainly; viz. that they who believe in the Crucified One should not perish. And if they who believe in the Crucified live, much more shall the Crucified One Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 11) But there is this difference between the figure and the reality, that the one recovered from temporal death, the other from eternal.

3:16–18

16. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life.

17. For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved.

18. He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Having said, Even so must the Son of man be lifted up, alluding to His death; lest His hearer should be cast down by His words, forming some human notion of Him, and thinking of His death as an evil1, He corrects this by saying, that He who was given up to death was the Son of God, and that His death would be the source of life eternal; So God loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life; as if He said, Marvel not that I must be lifted up, that you may be saved: for so it seemeth good to the Father, who hath so loved you, that He hath given His Son to suffer for ungrateful and careless servants. The text, God so loved the world, shews intensity of love. For great indeed and infinite is the distance between the two. He who is without end, or beginning of existence, Infinite Greatness, loved those who were of earth and ashes, creatures laden with sins innumerable. And the act which springs from the love is equally indicative of its vastness. For God gave not a servant, or an Angel, or an Archangel, but His Son. Again, had He had many sons, and given one, this would have been a very great gift; but new He hath given His Only Begotten Son.

HILARY. (vi. de Trin. c. 40) If it were only a creature given up for the sake of a creature, such a poor and insignificant loss were no great evidence of love. They must be precious things which prove our love, great things must evidence its greatness. God, in love to the world, gave His Son, not an adopted Son, but His own, even His Only Begotten. Here is proper Sonship, birth, truth: no creation, no adoption, no lie: here is the test of love and charity, that God sent His own and only begotten Son to save the world.

THEOPHYLACT. (in loc.) As He said above, that the Son of man came down from heaven, not meaning that His flesh did come down from heaven, on account of the unity of person in Christ, attributing to man what belonged to God: so now conversely what belongs to man, he assigns to God the Word. The Son of God was impassible; but being one in respect of person with man, who was passible, the Son is said to be given up to death; inasmuch as He truly suffered, not in His own nature, but in His own flesh. From this death follows an exceeding great and incomprehensible benefit: viz. that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life. The Old Testament promised to those who obeyed it, length of days: the Gospel promises life eternal, and imperishable.

BEDE.1; Note here, that the same which he before said of the Son of man, lifted up on the cross, he repeats of the only begotten Son of God: viz. That whosoever believeth in Him, &c. For the same our Maker and Redeemer, who was Son of God before the world was, was made at the end of the world the Son of man; so that He who by the power of His Godhead had created us to enjoy the happiness of an endless life, the same restored us to the life we have lost by taking our human frailty upon Him.

ALCUIN. Truly through the Son of God shall the world have life; for for no other cause came He into the world, except to save the world. God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 12) For why is He called the Saviour of the world, but because Ho saves the world? The physician, so far as his will is concerned, heals the sick. If the sick despises or will not observe the directions of the physician, he destroys himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii. 1) Because however He says this, slothful men in the multitude of their sins, and excess of carelessness, abuse God’s mercy, and say, There is no hell, no punishment; God remits us all our sins. But let us remember, that there are two advents of Christ; one past, the other to come. The former was, not to judge but to pardon us: the latter will be, not to pardon but to judge us. It is of the former that He says, I have not come to judge the world. Because He is merciful, instead of judgment, He grants an internal remission of all sins by baptism; and even after baptism opens to us the door of repentance, which had He not done all had been lost; for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God. (Rom. 3:23) Afterwards, however, there follows something about the punishment of unbelievers, to warn us against flattering ourselves that we can sin with impunity. Of the unbeliever He says, ‘he is judged already.’—But first He says, He that believeth on Him is not judged. He who believeth, He says, not who enquires. But what if his life be impure? Paul very strongly declares that such are not believers: They confess, he says, that they know God, but in works deny Him. (Tit. 1:16) That is to say, Such will not be judged for their belief, but will receive a heavy punishment for their works, though unbelief will not be charged against them.

ALCUIN. He who believes on Him, and cleaves to Him as a member to the head, will not be condemned.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. c. 12) What didst thou expect Him to say of him who believed not, except that he is condemned. Yet mark His words: He that believeth not is condemned already. The Judgment hath not appeared, bat it is already given. For the Lord knows who are His; who are awaiting the crown, and who the fire.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii. 1) Or the meaning is, that disbelief itself is the punishment of the impenitent: inasmuch as that is to be without light, and to be without light is of itself the greatest punishment. Or He is announcing what is to be. Though a murderer be not yet sentenced by the Judge, still his crime has already condemned him. In like manner he who believes not, is dead, even as Adam, on the day that he ate of the tree, died.

GREGORY. (1. xxvi. Mor. c. xxvii. [50.]) Or thus: In the last judgment some perish without being judged, of whom it is here said, He that believeth not is condemned already. For the day of judgment does not try those who for unbelief are already banished from the sight of a discerning judge, are under sentence of damnation; but those, who retaining the profession of faith, have no works to shew suitable to that profession. For those who have not kept even the sacraments of faith, do not even hear the curse of the Judge at the last trial. They have already, in the darkness of their unbelief, received their sentence, and are not thought worthy of being convicted by the rebuke of Him whom they had despised Again; For an earthly sovereign, in the government of his state, has a different rule of punishment, in the case of the disaffected subject, and the foreign rebel. In the former case, he consults the civil law; but against the enemy he proceeds at once to war, and repays his malice with the punishment it deserves, without regard to law, inasmuch as he who never submitted to law, has no claim to suffer by the law.

ALCUIN. He then gives the reason why he who believeth not is condemned, viz. because he believeth not in the name of the only begotten Son of God. For in this name alone is there salvation. God hath not many sons who can save; He by whom He saves is the Only Begotten.

AUGUSTINE. (de Pecc. mer. et Rem. l. 1. c. 33) Where then do we place baptized children? Amongst those who believe? This is acquired for them by the virtue of the Sacrament, and the pledges of the sponsors. And by this same rule we reckon those who are not baptized, among those who believe not.

3:19–21

19. And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil.

20. For every one that doeth evil hateth the light, neither cometh to the light, lest his deeds should be reproved.

21. But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God.

ALCUIN. Here is the reason why men believed not, and why they are justly condemned; This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii. 2) As if He said, So far from their having sought for it, or laboured to find it light itself hath come to them, and they have refused to admit it; Men loved darkness rather than light. Thus He leaves them no excuse. He came to rescue them from darkness, and bring them to light; who can pity him who does not choose to approach the light when it comes unto him?

BEDE. (in loc. c. 1) He calls Himself the light, whereof the Evangelist speaks, That was the true light; whereas sin He calls darkness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii. 2) Then because it seemed incredible that man should prefer light to darkness, he gives the reason of the infatuation, viz. that their deeds were evil. And indeed had He come to Judgment, there had been some reason for not receiving Him; for he who is conscious of his crimes, naturally avoids the judge. But criminals are glad to meet one who brings them pardon. And therefore it might have been expected that men conscious of their sins would have gone to meet Christ, as many indeed did; for the publicans and sinners came and sat down with Jesus. But the greater part being too cowardly to undergo the toils of virtue for righteousness' sake, persisted in their wickedness to the last; of whom our Lord says, Every one that doeth evil, hateth the light. He speaks of those who choose to remain in their wickedness.

ALCUIN. Every one that doeth evil, hateth the light; i. e. he who is resolved to sin, who delights in sin, hateth the light, which detects his sin.

AUGUSTINE. (Conf. l. x. c. xxiii. [34.]) Because they dislike being deceived, and like to deceive, they love light for discovering herself, and hate her for discovering them. Wherefore it shall be their punishment, that she shall manifest them against their will, and herself not be manifest unto them. They love the brightness of truth, they hate her discrimination; and therefore it follows, Neither cometh to the light, that his deeds should be reproved.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxvii. 2) No one reproves a Pagan, because his own practice agrees with the character of his gods; his life is in accordance with his doctrines. But a Christian who lives in wickedness all must condemn. If there are any Gentiles whose life is good, I know them not. But are there not Gentiles? it may be asked. For do not tell me of the naturally amiable and honest; this is not virtue. But shew me one who has strong passions, and lives with wisdom. You cannot. For if the announcement of a kingdom, and the threats of hell, and other inducements, hardly keep men virtuous when they are so, such calls will hardly rouse them to the attainment of virtue in the first instance. Pagans, if they do produce any thing which looks well, do it for vain-glory's sake, and will therefore at the same time, if they can escape notice, gratify their evil desires as well. And what profit is a man's sobriety and decency of conduct, if he is the slave of vain-glory? The slave of vain-glory is no less a sinner than a fornicator; nay, sins oven oftener, and more grievously. However, even supposing there are some few Gentiles of good lives, the exceptions so rare do not affect my argument.

BEDE. Morally too they love darkness rather than light, who when their preachers tell them their duty, assail them with calumny.

But he that doeth truth cometh to the light, that his deeds may be made manifest, that they are wrought in God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii. 3) He does not say this of those who are brought up under the Gospel, but of those who are converted to the true faith from Paganism or Judaism. He shews that no one will leave a false religion for the true faith, till he first resolve to follow a right course of life.

AUGUSTINE. (de Pecc. mer. et Remiss. l. i. c. 33) He calls the works of him who comes to the light, wrought in God; meaning that his justification is attributable not to his own merits, but to God’s grace.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xii. 13, 14) But if God hath discovered all men’s works to be evil, how is it that any have done the truth, and come to the light, i. e. to Christ? Now what He saith is, that they loved darkness rather than light; He lays the stress upon that. Many have loved their sins, many have confessed them. God accuseth thy sins; if thou accuse them too, thou art joined to God. Thou must hate thine own work, and love the work of God in thee. The beginning of good works, is the confession of evil works, and then thou doest the truth: not soothing, not flattering thyself. And thou art come to the light, because this very sin in thee, which displeaseth thee, would not displease thee, did not God shine upon thee, and His truth shew it unto thee. And let those even who have sinned only by word or thought, or who have only exceeded in things allowable, do the truth, by making confession, and come to the light by performing good works. For little sins, if suffered to accumulate, become mortal. Little drops swell the river: little grains of sand become an heap, which presses and weighs down. The sea coming in by little and little, unless it be pumped out, sinks the vessel. And what is to pump out, but by good works, mourning, fasting, giving and forgiving, to provide against our sins overwhelming us?

3:22–26

22. After these things came Jesus and his disciples into the land of Judæa; and there he tarried with them, and baptized.

23. And John also was baptizing in Ænon near to Salim, because there was much water there: and they came, and were baptized.

24. For John was not yet cast into prison.

25. Then there arose a question between some of John’s disciples and the Jews about purifying.

26. And they came unto John, and said unto him, Rabbi, he that was with thee beyond Jordan, to whom thou barest witness, behold, the same baptizeth, and all men come to him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 1) Nothing is more open than truth, nothing bolder; it neither seeks concealment, or avoids danger, or fears the snare, or cares for popularity. It is subject to no human weakness. Our Lord went up to Jerusalem at the feasts, not from ostentation or love of honour, but to teach the people His doctrines, and shew miracles of mercy. After the festival He visited the crowds who were collected at the Jordan. After these things came Jesus and His disciples into the land of Judæa; and there he tarried with them, and baptized.

BEDE. After these things, is not immediately after His dispute with Nicodemus, which took place at Jerusalem; but on His return to Jerusalem after some time spent in Galilee.

ALCUIN. By Judæa are meant those who confess, whom Christ visits; for wherever there is confession of sins, or the praise of God, thither cometh Christ and His disciples, i. e. His doctrine and enlightenment; and there He is known by His cleansing men from sin: And there He tarried with them, and baptized.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 1) As the Evangelist says afterwards, that Jesus baptized not but His disciples, it is evident that he means the same here, i. e. that the disciples only baptized.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiii. c. 4) Our Lord did not baptize with the baptism wherewith He had been baptized; for He was baptized by a servant, as a lesson of humility to us, and in order to bring us to the Lord’s baptism, i. e. His own; for Jesus baptized, as the Lord, the Son of God.

BEDE. John still continues baptizing, though Christ has begun; for the shadow remains still, nor must the forerunner cease, till the truth is manifested. And John also was baptizing in Ænon, near to Salim. Ænon is Hebrew for water; so that the Evangelist gives, as it were, the derivation of the name, when he adds, For there was much water there. Salim is a town on the Jordan, where Melchisedec once reigned.

JEROME. (Hierom. Ep. c. xxiii. ad Evag.) It matters not whether it is called Salem, or Salim; since the Jews very rarely use vowels in the middle of words; and the same words are pronounced with different vowels and accents, by different readers, and in different places.

And they came, and were baptized.

BEDE. The same kind of benefit which catechumens receive from instruction before they are baptized, the same did John's baptism convey before Christ's. As John preached repentance, announced Christ's baptism, and drew all men to the knowledge of the truth now made manifest to the world: so the ministers of the Church first instruct those who come to the faith, then reprove their sins; and lastly, drawing them to the knowledge and love of the truth, offer them remission by Christ's baptism.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 1) Notwithstanding the disciples of Jesus baptized, John did not leave off till his imprisonment; as the Evangelist's language intimates, For John was not yet cast into prison.

BEDE. He evidently here is relating what Christ did before John's imprisonment; a part which has been passed over by the rest, who commence after John's imprisonment.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiii. c. 6) But why did John baptize? Because it was necessary that our Lord should be baptized. And why was it necessary that our Lord should be baptized? That no one might ever think himself at liberty to despise baptism.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xx. 1) But why did he go on baptizing now? Because, had he left off, it might have been attributed to envy or anger: whereas, continuing to baptize, he got no glory for himself, but sent hearers to Christ. And he was better able to do this service, than were Christ's own disciples; his testimony being so free from suspicion, and his reputation with the people so much higher than theirs. He therefore continued to baptize, that he might not increase the envy felt by his disciples against our Lord's baptism. Indeed, the reason, I think, why John's death was permitted, and, in his room, Christ made the great preacher, was, that the people might transfer their affections wholly to Christ, and no longer be divided between the two. For the disciples of John did become so envious of Christ's disciples, and even of Christ Himself, that when they saw the latter baptizing, they threw contempt upon their baptism, as being inferior to that of John's; And there arose a question from some of John's disciples with the Jews about purifying. That it was they who began the dispute, and not the Jews, the Evangelist implies by saying, that there arose a question from John’s disciples, whereas he might have said, The Jews put forth a question.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiii. c. 8) The Jews then asserted Christ to be the greater person, and His baptism necessary to be received. But John’s disciples did not understand so much, and defended John’s baptism. At last they come to John, to solve the question: And they came unto John, and said unto him, Rabbi, He that was with thee beyond Jordan, behold, the Same baptizeth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 2) Meaning, He, Whom thou baptizedst, baptizeth. They did not say expressly, Whom thou baptizedst, for they did not wish to be reminded of the voice from heaven, but, He Who was with thee, i. e. Who was in the situation of a disciple, who was nothing more than any of us, He now separateth Himself from thee, and baptizeth. They add, To Whom thou barest witness; as if to say, Whom thou shewedst to the world, Whom thou madest renowned, He now dares to do as thou dost. Behold, the Same baptizeth. And in addition to this, they urge the probability that John’s doctrines would fall into discredit. All men come to Him.

ALCUIN. Meaning, Passing by thee, all men run to the baptism of Him Whom thou baptizedst.

3:27–30

27. John answered and said, A man can receive nothing, except it be given him from heaven.

28. Ye yourselves bear me witness, that I said, I am not the Christ, but that I am sent before him.

29. He that hath the bride is the bridegroom; but the friend of the bridegroom, which standeth and heareth him, rejoiceth greatly because of the bridegroom’s voice: this my joy therefore is fulfilled.

30. He must increase, but I must decrease.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 2) John, on this question being raised, does not rebuke his disciples, for fear they might separate, and turn to some other school, but replies gently, John answered and said, A man can receive nothing, except it be given him from heaven; as if he said, No wonder that Christ does such excellent works, and that all men come to Him; when He Who doeth it all is God. Human efforts are easily seen through, are feeble, and short-lived. These are not such: they are not therefore of human, but of divine originating. He seems however to speak somewhat humblyk of Christ, which will not surprise us, when we consider that it was not fitting to tell the whole truth, to minds prepossessed with such a passion as envy. He only tries for the present to alarm them, by shewing that they are attempting impossible things, and fighting against God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiii. c. 9) Or perhaps John is speaking here of himself: I am a mere man, and have received all from heaven, and therefore think not that, because it has been given me to be somewhat, I am so foolish as to speak against the truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 2) And see; the very argument by which they thought to have overthrown Christ, To whom, thou barest witness, he turns against them; Ye yourselves bear me witness, that I said, I am not the Christ; as if he said, If ye think my witness true, ye must acknowledge Him more worthy of honour than myself. He adds, But that I was sent before Him; that is to say, I am a servant, and perform the commission of the Father which sent me; my witness is not from favour or partiality; I say that which was given me to say.

BEDE. Who art thou then, since thou art not the Christ, and who is He to Whom thou bearest witness? John replies, He is the Bridegroom; I am the friend of the Bridegroom, sent to prepare the Bride for His approach: He that hath the Bride, is the Bridegroom. By the Bride he means the Church, gathered from amongst all nations; a Virgin in purity of heart, in perfection of love, in the bond of peace, in chastity of mind and body; in the unity of the Catholic faith; for in vain is she a virgin in body, who continueth not a virgin in mind. This Bride hath Christ joined unto Himself in marriage, and redeemed with the price of His own Blood.

THEOPHYLACT. Christ is the spouse of every soul; the wedlock, wherein they are joined, is baptism; the place of that wedlock is the Church; the pledge of it, remission of sins, and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost; the consummation, eternal life; which those who are worthy shall receive. Christ alone is the Bridegroom: all other teachers are but the friends of the

Bridegroom, as was the forerunner. The Lord is the giver of good; the rest are the despisers of His gifts.

BEDE. His Bride therefore our Lord committed to His friend, i. e. the order of preachers, who should be jealous of her, not for themselves, but for Christ; The friend of the Bridegroom which standeth and heareth Him, rejoiceth greatly because of the Bridegroom's voice.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiii. c. 12) As if He said, She is not My spouse. But dost thou therefore not rejoice in the marriage? Yea, I rejoice, he saith, because I am the friend of the Bridegroom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii. 2) But how doth he who said above, Whose shoe's latchet I am not worthy to unloose, call himself a friend? As an expression not of equality, but of excess of joy: (for the friend of the Bridegroom is always more rejoiced than the servant,) and also, as a condescension to the weakness of his disciples, who thought that he was pained at Christ's ascendancy. For he hereby assures them, that so far from being pained, he was right glad that the Bride recognised her Spouse.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiii) But wherefore doth he stand? Because he falleth not, by reason of his humility. A sure ground this to stand upon, Whose shoe's latchet I am not worthy to unloose. Again; He standeth, and heareth Him. So then if he falleth, he heareth Him not. Therefore the friend of the Bridegroom ought to stand and hear, i. e. to abide in the grace which he hath received, and to hear the voice in which he rejoiceth. I rejoice not, he saith, because of my own voice, but because of the Bridegroom's voice. I rejoice; I in hearing, He in speaking; I am the ear, He the Word. For he who guards the bride or wife of his friend, takes care that she love none else; if he wish to be loved himself in the stead of his friend, and to enjoy her who was entrusted to him, how detestable doth he appear to the whole world? Yet many are the adulterers I see, who would fain possess themselves of the spouse who was bought at so great a price, and who aim by their words at being loved themselves instead of the Bridegroom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 3) Or thus; The expression, which standeth, is not without meaning, but indicates that his part is now over, and that for the future he must stand and listen. This is a transition from the parable to the real subject. For having introduced the figure of a bride and bridegroom, he shews how the marriage is consummated, viz. by word and doctrine. Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God. (Rom.

10:17) And since the things he had hoped for had come to pass, he adds, This my joy therefore is fulfilled; i. e. The work which I had to do is finished, and nothing more is left, that I can do.

THEOPHYLACT. For which cause I rejoice now, that all men follow Him. For had the bride, i. e. the people, not come forth to meet the Bridegroom, then I, as the friend of the Bridegroom, should have grieved,

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv. c. 3) Or thus; This my Joy is fulfilled, i. e. my joy at hearing the Bridegroom's voice. I have my gift; I claim no more, lest I lose that which I have received. He who would rejoice in himself, hath sorrow; but he who would rejoice in the Lord, shall ever rejoice, because God is everlasting.

BEDE. He rejoiceth at hearing the Bridegroom's voice, who knows that he should not rejoice in his own wisdom, but in the wisdom which God giveth him. Whoever in his good works seeketh not his own glory, or praise, or earthly gain, but hath his affections set on heavenly things; this man is the friend of the Bridegroom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxix. 3) He next dismisses the motions of envy, not only as regards the present, but also the future, saying, He must increase, but I must decrease: as if he said, My office hath ceased, and is ended; but His advanceth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. c. 4, 5) What meaneth this, He must increase? God neither increases, nor decreases. And John and Jesus, according to the flesh, were of the same age: for the six months' difference between them is of no consequence. This is a great mystery. Before our Lord came, men gloried in themselves; He came in no man's nature, that the glory of man might be diminished, and the glory of God exalted. For He came to remit sins upon man's confession: a man's confession, a man's humility, is God's pity, God's exaltation. This truth Christ and John proved, even by their modes of suffering: John was beheaded, Christ was lifted up on the cross. Then Christ was born, when the days begin to lengthen; John, when they begin to shorten. Let God's glory then increase in us, and our own decrease, that ours also may increase in God. But it is because thou understandest God more and more, that He seemeth to increase in thee: for in His own nature He increaseth not, but is ever perfect: even as to a man cured of blindness, who beginneth to see a little, and daily seeth more, the light seemeth to increase, whereas it is in reality always at the fall, whether he seeth it or not. In like manner the inner man maketh advancement in God, and it seemeth as if God were increasing in Him; but it is He Himself that decreaseth, falling from the height of His own glory, and rising in the glory of God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or thus; As, on the sun rising, the light of the other heavenly bodies seems to be extinguished, though in reality it is only obscured by the greater light: thus the forerunner is said to decrease; as if he were a star hidden by the sun. Christ increases in proportion as he gradually discloses Himself by miracles; not in the sense of increase, or advancement in virtue, (the opinion of Nestorius,) but only as regards the manifestation of His divinity.

3:31–32

31. He that cometh from above is above all: he that is of the earth is earthly, and speaketh of the earth: he that cometh from heaven is above all.

32. And what he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth;

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 1) As the worm gnaws wood, and rusts iron, so vainglory destroys the soul that cherishes it. But it is a most obstinate fault. John with all his arguments can hardly subdue it in his disciples: for after what he has said above, he saith yet again, He that cometh from above is above all: meaning, Ye extol my testimony, and say that the witness is more worthy to be believed, than He to whom he bears witness. Know this, that He who cometh from heaven, cannot be accredited by an earthly witness. He is above all; being perfect in Himself, and above comparison.

THEOPHYLACT. Christ cometh from above, as descending from the Father; and is above all, as being elected in preference to all.

ALCUIN. Or, cometh from above; i. e. from the height of that human nature which was before the sin of the first man. For it was that human nature which the Word of God assumed: He did not take upon Him man’s sin, as He did his punishment.

He that is of the earth is of the earth; i. e. is earthly, and speaketh of the earth, speaketh earthly things.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 1) And yet he was not altogether of the earth; for he had a soul, and partook of a spirit, which was not of the earth.

What means he then by saying that he is of the earth? Only to express his own worthlessness, that he is one born on the earth, creeping on the ground, and not to be compared with Christ, Who cometh from above. Speaketh of the earth, does not mean that he spoke from his own understanding; but that, in comparison with Christ's doctrine, he spoke of the earth: as if he said, My doctrine is mean and humble, compared with Christ's; as becometh an earthly teacher, compared with Him, (Col. 2:3) in Whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv. c. 6) Or, speaketh of the earth, he saith of the man, i. e. of himself, so far as he speaks merely humanly. If he says ought divine, he is enlightened by God to say it: as saith the Apostle; Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me. (1 Cor. 15:10) John then, so far as pertains to John, is of the earth, and speaketh of the earth: if ye hear ought divine from him, attribute it to the Enlightener, not to him who hath received the light.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 1) Having corrected the bad feeling of his disciples, he comes to discourse more deeply upon Christ. Before this it would have been useless to reveal the truths which could not yet gain a place in their minds. It follows therefore, He that cometh from heaven.

GLOSS. That is, from the Father. He is above all in two ways; first, in respect of His humanity, which was that of man before he sinned: secondly, in respect of the loftiness of the Father, to whom He is equal.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 1) But after this high and solemn mention of Christ, his tone lowers: And what he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth. As our senses are our surest channels of knowledge, and teachers are most depended on who have apprehended by sight or hearing what they teach, John adds this argument in favour of Christ, that, what he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth; meaning that every thing which He saith is true. I want, saith John, to hear what things He, Who cometh from above, hath seen and heard, i. e. what He, and He alone, knows with certainty.

THEOPHYLACT. When ye hear then, that Christ speaketh what He saw and heard from the Father, do not suppose that He needs to be taught by the Father; but only that that knowledge, which He has naturally, is from the Father. For this reason He is said to have heard, whatever He knows, from the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv. c. 7) But what is it, which the Son hath heard from the Father? Hath He heard the word of the Father? Yea, but He is the Word of the Father. When thou conceivest a word, wherewith to name a thing, the very conception of that thing in the mind is a word. Just then as thou hast in thy mind and with thee thy spoken word; even so God uttered the Word, i. e. begat the Son. Since then the Son is the Word of God, and the Son hath spoken the Word of God to us, He hath spoken to us the Father's word. What John said is therefore true.

3:32–36

32. —and no man receiveth his testimony.

33. He that hath received his testimony hath set to his seal that God is true.

34. For he whom God hath sent speaketh the words of God: for God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto him.

35. The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hand.

36. He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 1) Having said, And what he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth, to prevent any from supposing, that what he said was false, because only a few for the present believed, he adds, And no man receiveth his testimony; i. e. only a few; for he had disciples who received his testimony. John is alluding to the unbelief of his own disciples, and to the insensibility of the Jews, of whom we read in the beginning of the Gospel, He came unto His own, and His own received Him not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv. c. 8) Or thus; There is a people reserved for the wrath of God, and to be condemned with the devil; of whom none receiveth the testimony of Christ. And others there are ordained to eternal life. Mark how mankind are divided spiritually, though as human beings they are mixed up together: and John separated them by the thoughts of their heart, though as yet they were not divided in respect of place, and looked on them as two classes, the unbelievers, and the believers. Looking to the unbelievers, he saith, No man receiveth his testimony. Then turning to those on the right hand he saith, He that hath received his testimony, hath set to his seal.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 2) i. e. hath shewn that God is true. This is to alarm them: for it is as much as saying, no one can disbelieve Christ without convicting God, Who sent Him, of falsehood: inasmuch as He speaks nothing but what is of the Father. For He, it follows, Whom God hath sent, speaketh the words of God.

ALCUIN. Or, Hath put to his seal, i. e. hath put a seal on his heart, for a singular and special token, that this is the true God, Who suffered for the salvation of mankind.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv. c. 8) What is it, that God is true, except that God is true, and every man a liar? For no man can say what truth is, till he is enlightened by Him who cannot lie. God then is true, and Christ is God. Wouldest thou have proof? Hear His testimony, and thou wilt find it so. But if thou dost not yet understand God, thou hast not yet received His testimony. Christ then Himself is God the true, and God hath sent Him; God hath sent God, join both together; they are One God. For John saith, Whom God hath sent, to distinguish Christ from himself. What then, was not John himself sent by God? Yes; but mark what follows, For God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto Him. To men He giveth by measure, to His only Son He giveth not by measure. To one man is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge: one has one thing, another another; for measure implies a kind of division of gifts. But Christ did not receive by measure, though He gave by measure.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 2) By Spirit here is meant the operation of the Holy Spirit. He wishes to shew that all of us have received the operation of the Spirit by measure, but that Christ contains within Himself the whole operation of the Spirit. How then shall He be suspected, Who saith nothing, but what is from God, and the Spirit? For He makes no mention yet of God the Word, but rests His doctrine on the authority of the Father and the Spirit. For men knew that there was God, and knew that there was the Spirit, (although they had not right belief about His nature;) but that there was the Son they did not know.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv. c. 11) Having said of the Son, God giveth not the Spirit by measure unto Him; he adds, The Father loveth the Son, and farther adds, and hath given all things into His hand; in order to shew that the

Father loveth the Son, in a peculiar sense. For the Father loveth John, and Paul, and yet hath not given all things into their hands. But the Father loveth the Son, as the Son, not as a master his servant: as an only, not as an adopted, Son. Wherefore He hath given all things into His hand; so that, as great as the Father is, so great is the Son; let us not think then that, because He hath deigned to send the Son, any one inferior to the Father has been sent.

THEOPHYLACT. The Father then hath given all things to the Son in respect of His divinity; of right, not of grace. Or; He hath given all things into His hand, in respect of His humanity: inasmuch as He is made Lord of all things that are in heaven, and that are in earth.

ALCUIN. And because all things are in His hand, the life everlasting is too: and therefore it follows, He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life.

BEDE. We must understand here not a faith in words only, but a faith which is developed in works.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 1) He means not here, that to believe on the Son is sufficient to gain everlasting life, for elsewhere He says, Not every one that saith unto Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven. (Matt. 7) And the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is of itself sufficient to send into hell. But we must not think that even a right belief on Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is sufficient for salvation; for we have need of a good life and conversation. Knowing then that the greater part are not moved so much by the promise of good, as by the threat of punishment, he concludes, But He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him. See how He refers to the Father again, when He speaketh of punishment. He saith not, the wrath of the Son, though the Son is judge; but maketh the Father the judge, in order to alarm men more. And He does not say, in Him, but on Him, meaning that it will never depart from Him; and for the same reason He says, shall not see life, i. e. to shew that He did not mean only a temporary death.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv. c. 13) Nor does He say, The wrath of God cometh to him, but, abideth on him. For all who are born, are under the wrath of God, which the first Adam incurred. The Son of God came without sin, and was clothed with mortality: He died that thou mightest live. Whosoever then will not believe on the Son, on him abideth the wrath of God, of which the Apostle speaks, We were by nature the children of wrath. (Eph. 2:3)

CHAPTER 4

4:1–6

1. When therefore the Lord knew how the Pharisees had heard that Jesus made and baptized more disciples than John,

2. (Though Jesus himself baptized not, but his disciples,)

3. He left Judæa, and departed again into Galilee.

4. And he must needs go through Samaria.

5. Then cometh he to a city of Samaria, which is called Sychar, near to the parcel of ground that Jacob gave to his son Joseph.

6. Now Jacob’s well was there. Jesus therefore, being wearied with his journey, sat thus on the well: and it was about the sixth hour.

GLOSS.1 The Evangelist, after relating how John checked the envy of his disciples, on the success of Christ’s teaching, comes next to the envy of the Pharisees, and Christ’s retreat from them. When therefore the Lord knew that the Pharisees had heard, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 2) Truly had the Pharisees’ knowledge that our Lord was making more disciples, and baptizing more than John, been such as to lead them heartily to follow Him, He would not have left Judæa, but would have remained for their sake: but seeing, as He did, that this knowledge of Him was coupled with envy, and made them not followers, but persecutors, He departed thence. He could too, had He pleased, have stayed amongst them, and escaped their hands; but He wished to shew His own example to believers in time to come, that it was no sin for a servant of God to fly from the fury of persecutors. He did it like a good teacher, not out of fear for Himself, but for our instruction.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 1) He did it too to pacify the envy of men, and perhaps to avoid bringing the dispensation of the incarnation into suspicion. For had he been taken and escaped, the reality of His flesh would have been doubted.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 3) It may perplex you, perhaps, to be told that Jesus baptized more than John, and then immediately after, Though Jesus Himself baptized not. What? Is there a mistake made, and then corrected?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 1) Christ Himself did not baptize, but those who reported the fact, in order to raise the envy of their hearers, so represented it as to appear that Christ Himself baptized. (non occ.). The reason why He baptized not Himself, had been already declared by John, He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire. (Luke 3:16) Now He had not yet given the Holy Spirit: it was therefore fitting that He should not baptize. But His disciples baptized, as an efficacious mode of instruction; better than gathering up believers here and there, as had been done in the case of Simon and his brother. Their baptism, however, had no more virtue than the baptism of John; both being without the grace of the Spirit, and both having one object, viz. that of bringing men to Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 3) Or, both are true; for Jesus both baptized, and baptized not. He baptized, in that He cleansed: He baptized not, in that He dipped not. The disciples supplied the ministry of the body, He the aid of that Majesty of which it was said, The Same is He which baptizeth. (ver. 33)

ALCUIN. The question is often asked, whether the Holy Ghost was given by the baptism of the disciples; when below it is said, The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified. (c. 7) We reply, that the Spirit was given, though not in so manifest a way as he was after the Ascension, in the shape of fiery tongues. For, as Christ Himself in His human nature ever possessed the Spirit, and yet afterwards at His baptism the Spirit descended visibly upon Him in the form of a dove; so before the manifest and visible coming of the Holy Spirit, all saints might possess the Spirit secretly.

AUGUSTINE. (Ad Seleuciam Ep. xviii.) But we must believe that the disciples of Christ were already baptized themselves, either with John’s baptism, or, as is more probable, with Christ’s. For He who had stooped to the humble service of washing His disciples’ feet, had not failed to administer baptism to His servants, who would thus be enabled in their turn to baptize others.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 2) Christ on withdrawing from Judæa, joined those whom He was with before, as we read next, And departed again into Galilee. As the Apostles, when they were expelled by the Jews, went to the Gentiles, so Christ goes to the Samaritans. But, to deprive the Jews of all excuse, He does not go to stay there, but only takes it on His road, as the Evangelist implies by saying, And he must needs go through Samaria. Samaria receives its name from Somer, a mountain there, so called from the name of a former possessor of it. The inhabitants of the country were formerly not Samaritans, but Israelites. But in process of time they fell under God’s wrath, and the king of Assyria transplanted them to Babylon and Media; placing Gentiles from various parts in Samaria in their room. God however, to shew that it was not for want of power on His part that He delivered up the Jews, but for the sins of the people themselves, sent lions to afflict the barbarians. This was told the king, and he sent a priest to instruct them in God’s law. But not even then did they wholly cease from their iniquity, but only half changed. For in process of time they turned to idols again, though they still worshipped God, calling themselves after the mountain, Samaritans.

BEDE. He must needs pass through Samaria; because that country lay between Judea and Galilee. Samaria was the principal city of a province of Palestine, and gave its name to the whole district connected with it. The particular place to which our Lord went is next given: Then cometh He to a city of Samaria which is called Sychar.

CHRYSOSTOM. (xxxi. 2) It was the place where Simeon and Levi made a great slaughter for Dinah.

THEOPHYLACT. But after the sons of Jacob had desolated the city, by the slaughter of the Sychemites, Jacob annexed it to the portion of his son Joseph, as we read in Genesis, I have given to thee one portion above thy brethren, which I took out of the hand of the Amorite with my sword, and with my bow. (Gen. 48:22) This is referred to in what follows, Near to the place of ground which Jacob gave to his son Joseph.

Now Jacob’s well was there.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 5) It was a well. Every well is a spring, but every spring is not a well. Any water that rises from the ground, and can be drawn for use, is a spring: but where it is ready at hand, and on the surface, it is called a spring only; where it is deep and low down, it is called a well, not a spring.

THEOPHYLACT. But why does the Evangelist make mention of the parcel of ground, and the well? First, to explain what the woman says, Our father Jacob gave us this well: secondly, to remind you that what the Patriarchs obtained by their faith in God, the Jews had lost by their impiety. They had been supplanted to make room for Gentiles. And therefore there is nothing new in what has now taken place, i. e. in the Gentiles succeeding to the kingdom of heaven in the place of the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 3) Christ prefers labour and exercise to ease and luxury, and therefore travels to Samaria, not in a carriage but on foot; until at last the exertion of the journey fatigues Him; a lesson to us, that so far from indulging in superfluities, we should often even deprive ourselves of necessaries: Jesus therefore being wearied with His journey, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv, c. 6) Jesus, we see, is strong and weak: strong, because in the beginning was the Word; weak, because the Word was made flesh. Jesus thus weak, being wearied with his journey, sat on the well.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxx. 3) As if to say, not on a seat, or a couch, but on the first place He saw—upon the ground. He sat down because He was wearied, and to wait for the disciples. The coolness of the well would be refreshing in the midday heat: And it was about the sixth hour.

THEOPHYLACT. He mentions our Lord’s sitting and resting from His journey, that none might blame Him for going to Samaria Himself, after He had forbidden the disciples going.

ALCUIN. Our Lord left Judæa also mystically, i. e. He left the unbelief of those who condemned Him, and by His Apostles, went into Galilee, i. e. into the ficklenessa of the world; thus teaching His disciples to pass from vices to virtues. The parcel of ground I conceive to have been left not so much to Joseph, as to Christ, of whom Joseph was a type; whom the sun, and moon, and all the stars truly adore. To this parcel of ground our Lord came, that the Samaritans, who claimed to be inheritors of the Patriarch Israel, might recognise Him, and be converted to Christ, the legal heir of the Patriarch.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 7) His journey is His assumption of the flesh for our sake. For whither doth He go, Who is every where present? What is this, except that it was necessary for Him, in order to come to us, to take upon Him visibly a form of flesh? So then His being wearied with His journey, what meaneth it, but that He is wearied with the flesh? And wherefore is it the sixth hour? Because it is the sixth age of the world. Reckon severally as hours, the first age from Adam to Noah, the second from Noah to Abraham, the third from Abraham to David, the fourth from David unto the carrying away into Babylon, the fifth from thence to the baptism of John; on this calculation the present age is the sixth hour.

AUGUSTINE. (1. lxxxiii. Quæst. qu. 64) At the sixth hour then our Lord comes to the well. The black abyss of the well, methinks, represents the lowest parts of this universe, i. e. the earth, to which Jesus came at the sixth hour, that is, in the sixth age of mankind, the old age, as it were, of the old man, which we are bidden to put off, (Col. 3:9.) that we may put on the new. For so do we reckon the different ages of man's life: the first age is infancy, the second childhood, the third boyhood, the fourth youth, the fifth manhood, the sixth old age. Again, the sixth hour, being the middle of the day, the time at which the sun begins to descend, signifies that we, who are called by Christ, are to check our pleasure in visible things, that by the love of things invisible refreshing the inner man, we may be restored to the inward light which never fails. By His sitting is signified His humility, or perhaps His magisterial character; teachers being accustomed to sit.

4:7–12

7. There cometh a woman of Samaria to draw water: Jesus saith unto her, Give me to drink.

8. (For his disciples were gone away unto the city to buy meat.)

9. Then saith the woman of Samaria unto him, How is it that thou, being a Jew, askest drink of me, which am a woman of Samaria? for the Jews have no dealings with the Samaritans.

10. Jesus answered and said unto her, If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink; thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water.

11. The woman saith unto him, Sir, thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep: from whence then hast thou that living water?

12. Art thou greater than our father Jacob, which gave us the well, and drank thereof himself, and his children, and his cattle?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 4) That this conversation might not appear a violation of His own injunctions against talking to the Samaritans, the Evangelist explains how it arose; viz. for He did not come with the intention beforehand of talking with the woman, but only would not send the woman away, when she had come. There came a woman of Samaria to draw water. Observe, she comes quite by chance.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xv. c. 10) The woman here is the type of the Church, not yet justified, but just about to be. And it is a part of the resemblance, that she comes from a foreign people. The Samaritans were foreigners, though they were neighbours; and in like manner the Church was to come from the Gentiles, and to be alien from the Jewish race.

THEOPHYLACT. The argument with the woman arises naturally from the occasion: Jesus saith unto her, Give me to drink. As man, the labour and heat He had undergone had made Him thirsty.

AUGUSTINE. (1. lxxxiii. Quæst. qu. 64) Jesus also thirsted after that woman's faith? He thirsteth for their faith, for whom He shed His blood.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 3) This shews us too not only our Lord's strength and endurance as a traveller, but also his carelessness about food; for His disciples did not carry about food with them, since it follows, His disciples were gone away into the city to buy food. Herein is shewn the humility of Christ; He is left alone. It was in His power, had He pleased, not to send away all, or, on their going away, to leave others in their place to wait on Him. But He did not choose to have it so: for in this way He accustomed His disciples to trample upon pride of every kind. However some one will say, Is humility in fishermen and tent-makers so great a matter? But these very men were all on a sudden raised to the most lofty situation upon earth, that of friends and followers of the Lord of the whole earth. And men of humble origin, when they arrive at dignity, are on this very account more liable than others to be lifted up with pride; the honour being so new to them. Our Lord therefore to keep His disciples humble, taught them in all things to subdue themselves. The woman on being told, Give Me to drink, very naturally asks, How is it that Thou, being a Jew, askest drink of me, who am a woman of Samaria? She knew Him to be a Jew from His figure and speech. Here observe her simpleness. For even had our Lord been bound to abstain from dealing with her, that was His concern, not hers; the Evangelist saying not that the Samaritans would have no dealings with the Jews, but that the Jews have no dealings with the Samaritans. The woman however, though not in fault herself, wished to correct what she thought a fault in another. The Jews after their return from the captivity entertained a jealousy of the Samaritans, whom they regarded as aliens, and enemies; and the Samaritans did not use all the Scriptures, but only the writings of Moses, and made little of the Prophets. They claimed to be of Jewish origin, but the Jews considered them Gentiles, and hated them, as they did the rest of the Gentile world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xiii) The Jews would not even use their vessels. So it would astonish the woman to hear a Jew ask to drink out of her vessel; a thing so contrary to Jewish rule.

CHRYSOSTOM. But why did Christ ask what the law allowed not? It is no answer to say that He knew she would not give it, for in that case, He clearly ought not to have asked for it. Rather His very reason for asking, was to shew His indifference to such observances, and to abolish them for the future.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xv) He who asked to drink, however, out of the woman’s vessel, thirsted for the woman’s faith: Jesus answered and said unto her, If thou knewest the gift of God, or Who it is that saith to thee, Give Me to drink, thou wouldest have asked of Him, and He would have given thee living water.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiv. in Joan) For it is as it were a doctrine, that no one receives a divine gift, who seeks not for it. Even the Saviour Himself is commanded by the Father to ask, that He may give it Him, as we read, Require of Me, and I will give Thee the heathen for Thine inheritance. (Ps. 2:8) And our Saviour Himself says, Ask, and it shall be given you. (Luke 11:9) Wherefore He says here emphatically, Thou wouldest have asked of Him, and He would have given thee.

AUGUSTINE. (1. lxxxiii. Quæst. qu. 64) He lets her know that it was not the water, which she meant, that Ho asked for; but that knowing her faith, He wished to satisfy her thirst, by giving her the Holy Spirit. For so must we interpret the living water, which is the gift of God; as He saith, If thou knewest the gift of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv) Living water is that which comes out of a spring, in distinction to what is collected in ponds and cisterns from the rain. If spring water too becomes stagnant, i. e. collects into some spot, where it is quite separated from its fountain head, it ceases to be living water.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii) In Scripture the grace of the Holy Spirit is sometimes called fire, sometimes water, which shews that these words are expressive not of its substance, but of its action. The metaphor of fire conveys the lively and sin-consuming property of grace; that of water the cleansing of the Spirit, and the refreshing of the souls who receive Him.

THEOPHYLACT. The grace of the Holy Spirit then He calls living water; i. e. lifegiving, refreshing, stirring. For the grace of the Holy Spirit is ever stirring him who does good works, directing the risings of his heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 4) These words raised the woman's notions of our Lord, and make her think Him no common person. She addresses Him reverentially by the title of Lord; The woman saith unto Him, Lord, Thou hast nothing to draw with, and the well is deep: from whence then hast Thou that living water?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 13.) She understands the living water to be the water in the well; and therefore says, Thou wishest to give me living water; but Thou hast nothing to draw with as I have: Thou canst not then give me this living water; Art Thou greater than our father Jacob, who gave us the well, and drank thereof himself, and his children, and his cattle?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 4) As if she said, Thou canst not say that Jacob gave us this spring, and used another himself; for he and they that were with him drank thereof, which would not have been done, had he had another better one. Thou canst not then give me of this spring; and Thou hast not another better spring, unless Thou confess Thyself greater than Jacob. Whence then hast Thou the water, which Thou promisest to give us?

THEOPHYLACT. The addition, and his cattle, shews the abundance of the water; as if she said, Not only is the water sweet, so that Jacob and his sons drank of it, but so abundant, that it satisfied the vast multitude of the Patriarchs' cattle.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxi. 4) See how she thrusts herself upon the Jewish stock. The Samaritans claimed Abraham as their ancestor, on the ground of his having come from Chaldea; and called Jacob their father, as being Abraham's grandson.

BEDE. Or she calls Jacob their father, because she lived under the Mosaic law, and possessed the farm which Jacob gave to his son Joseph.

ORIGEN. (t. xiii. 6) In the mystical sense, Jacob’s well is the Scriptures. The learned then drink like Jacob and his sons; the simple and uneducated, like Jacob’s cattle.

4:13–18

13. Jesus answered and said unto her, Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again:

14. But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life.

15. The woman saith unto him, Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw.

16. Jesus saith unto her, Go, call thy husband, and come hither.

17. The woman answered and said, I have no husband. Jesus said unto her, Thou hast well said, I have no husband:

18. For thou hast had five husbands; and he whom thou now hast is not thy husband: in that saidst thou truly.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 1) To the woman’s question, Art Thou greater than our father Jacob? He does not reply, I am greater, lest He should seem to boast; but His answer implies it; Jesus answered and said to her, Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again: but whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; as if He said, If Jacob is to be honoured because he gave you this water, what wilt thou say, if I give thee far better than this? He makes the comparison however not to depreciate Jacob, but to exalt Himself. For He does not say, that this water is vile and counterfeit, but asserts a simple fact of nature, viz. that whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 16) Which is true indeed both of material water, and of that of which it is the type. For the water in the well is the pleasure of the world, that abode of darkness. Men draw it with the waterpot of their lusts; pleasure is not relished, except it be preceded by lust. And when a man has enjoyed this pleasure, i. e. drunk of the water, he thirsts again; but if he have received water from Me, he shall never thirst. For how shall they thirst, who are drunken with the abundance of the house of God? (Ps. 36:8.) But He promised this fulness of the Holy Spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 1) The excellence of this water, viz. that he that drinketh of it never thirsts, He explains in what follows, But the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life. As a man who had a spring within him, would never feel thirst, so will not he who has this water which I shall give him.

THEOPHYLACT. For the water which I give him is ever multiplying. The saints receive through grace the seed and principle of good; but they themselves make it grow by their own cultivation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 1) See how the woman is led by degrees to the highest doctrine. First, she thought He was some lax Jew. Then hearing of the living water, she thought it meant material water. Afterwards she understands it as spoken spiritually, and believes that it can take away thirst, but she does not yet know what it is, only understands that it was superior to material things: The woman saith unto Him, Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw. Observe, she prefers Him to the patriarch Jacob, for whom she had such veneration.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 15–18) Or thus; The woman as yet understands Him of the flesh only. She is delighted to be relieved for ever from thirst, and takes this promise of our Lord’s in a carnal sense. For God had once granted to His servant Elijah, that he should neither hunger nor thirst for forty days; and if He could grant this for forty days, why not for ever? Eager to possess such a gift, she asks Him for the living water; The woman saith unto Him, Sir, give me this water, that I thirst not, neither come hither to draw. Her poverty obliged her to labour more than her strength could well bear; would that she could hear, Come unto Me, all that labour and are heavy laden, and I will refresh you. (Mat. 11:28) Jesus had said this very thing, i. e. that she need not labour any longer; but she did not understand Him. At last our Lord was resolved that she should understand: Jesus saith unto her, Go call thy husband, and come hither. What meaneth this? Did He wish to give her the water through her husband? Or, because she did not understand, did He wish to teach her by means of her husband? The Apostle indeed saith of women, If they will learn any thing, let them ask their husbands at home. (1 Cor. 14:35) But this applies only where Jesus is not present. Our Lord Himself was present here; what need then that He should speak to her through her husband? Was it through her husband that He spoke to Mary, who sat at His feet?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 2) The woman then being urgent in asking for the promised water, Jesus saith unto her, Go call thy husband; to shew that he too ought to have a share in these things. But she was in a hurry to receive the gift, and wished to conceal her guilt, (for she still imagined she was speaking to a man:) The woman answered and said, I have no husband. Christ answers her with a seasonable reproof; exposing her as to former husbands, and as to her present one, whom she had concealed; Jesus said unto her, Thou hast well said, I have no husband.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 20) Understand, that the woman had not a lawful husband, but had formed an irregular connexion with some one. He tells her, Thou hast had fire husbands, in order to shew her His miraculous knowledge.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. in Joan. c. 5, 6) May not Jacob’s well signify mystically the letter of Scripture; the water of Jesus, that which is above the letter, which all are not allowed to penetrate into? That which is written was dictated by men, whereas the things which the eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, cannot be reduced to writing, but are from the fountain of water, that springeth up unto everlasting life, i. e. the Holy Ghost. These truths are unfolded to such as carrying no longer a human heart within them, are able to say with the Apostle, We have the mind of Christ. (1 Cor. 11:16) Human wisdom indeed discovers truths, which are handed down to posterity; but the teaching of the Spirit is a well of water which springeth up into everlasting life. The woman wished to attain, like the angels, to angelic and super-human truth without the use of Jacob’s water. For the angels have a well of water within them, springing from the Word of God Himself. She says therefore, Sir, give me this water. But it is impossible here to have the water which is given by the Word, without that which is drawn from Jacob’s well; and therefore Jesus seems to tell the woman that He cannot supply her with it from any other source than Jacob’s well; If we are thirsty, we must first drink from Jacob’s well. Jesus saith unto her, Go, call thy husband, and come hither. (Rom. 7:1) According to the Apostle, the Law is the husband of the soul.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. qu. 64) The five husbands some interpret to be the five books which were given by Moses. And the words, He whom thou now hast is not thy husband, they understand as spoken by our Lord of Himself; as if He said, Thou hast served the five books of Moses, as five husbands; but now he whom thou hast, i. e. whom thou hearest, is not thy husband; for thou dost not yet believe in him. But if she did not believe in Christ, she was still united to those five husbands, i. e. five books, and therefore why is it said, Thou hast had five husbands, as if she no longer had them? And how do we understand that a man must have these five books, in order to pass over to Christ, when he who believes in Christ, so far from forsaking these books, embraces them in this spiritual meaning the more strongly? Let us turn to another interpretation.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 19) Jesus seeing that the woman did not understand, and wishing to enlighten her, says, Call thy husband; i. e. apply thine understanding. For when the life is well ordered, the understanding governs the soul itself, pertaining to the soul. For though it is indeed nothing else than the soul, it is at the same time a certain part of the soul. And this very part of the soul which is called the understanding and the intellect, is itself illuminated by a light superior to itself. Such a Light was talking with the woman; but in her there was not understanding to be enlightened. Our Lord then, as it were, says, I wish to enlighten, and there is not one to be enlightened; Call thy husband, i. e. apply thine understanding, through which thou must be taught, by which governed. The five former husbands may be explained as the five senses, thus: a man before he has the use of his reason, is entirely under the government of his bodily senses. Then reason comes into action; and from that time forward he is capable of entertaining ideas, and is either under the influence of truth or error. The woman had been under the influence of error, which error was not her lawful husband, but an adulterer. Wherefore our Lord says, Put away that adulterer which corrupts thee, and call thy husband, that thou mayest understand Me.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 8) And what more proper place than Jacob’s well, for exposing the unlawful husband, i. e. the perverse law? For the Samaritan woman is meant to figure to us a soul, that has subjected itself to a hind of law of its own, not the divine law. And our Saviour wishes to marry her to a lawful husband, i. e. Himself; the Word of truth which was to rise from the dead, and never again to die.

4:19–24

19. The woman saith unto him, Sir, I perceive that thou art a prophet.

20. Our fathers worshipped in this mountain; and ye say, that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship.

21. Jesus saith unto her, Woman, believe me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father.

22. Ye worship ye know not what: we know what we worship: for salvation is of the Jews.

23. But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship him.

24. God is a Spirit: and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii) The woman is not offended at Christ’s rebuke. She does not leave Him, and go away. Far from it: her admiration for Him is raised: The woman saith unto Him, Sir, I perceive that Thou art a Prophet: as if she said, Thy knowledge of me is unaccountable, Thou must be a prophet.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 23) The husband was beginning to come to her, though He had not yet fully come. She thought our Lord a prophet, and He was a prophet: for He says of Himself, A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country. (Mat. 13:57)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 2) And having come to this belief she asks no questions relating to this life, the health or sickness of the body: she is not troubled about thirst, she is eager for doctrine.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 23) And she begins enquiries on a subject that perplexed her; Our fathers worshipped in this mountain; and ye say that in Jerusalem is the place where men ought to worship. This was a great dispute between the Samaritans and the Jews. The Jews worshipped in the temple built by Solomon, and made this a ground of boasting over the Samaritans. The Samaritans replied, Why boast ye, because ye have a temple which we have not? Did our fathers, who pleased God, worship in that temple? Is it not better to pray to God in this mountain, where our fathers worshipped?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 2) By, our fathers, she means Abraham, who is said to have offered up Isaac here.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 13) Or thus; The Samaritans regarded Mount Gerizim, near which Jacob dwelt, as sacred, and worshipped upon it; while the sacred place of the Jews was Mount Sion, God's own choice. The Jews being the people from whom salvation came, are the type of true believers; the Samaritans of heretics. Gerizim, which signifies division, becomes the Samaritans; Sion, which signifies watch-tower, becomes the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 3) Christ however does not solve this question immediately, but leads the woman to higher things, of which He had not spoken till she acknowledged Him to be a prophet, and therefore listened with a more full belief: Jesus saith unto her, Woman, believe Me, the hour cometh, when ye shall neither in this mountain, nor yet at Jerusalem, worship the Father. He says, Believe me, because we have need of faith, the mother of all good, the medicine of salvation, in order to obtain any real good. They who endeavour without it, are like men who venture on the sea without a boat, and, being able to swim only a little way, are drowned.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 24) Believe Me, our Lord says with fitness, as the husband is now present. For now there is one in thee that believes, thou hast begun to be present in the understanding; but if ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established. (Isa. 7:9)

ALCUIN. In saying, the hour cometh, He refers to the Gospel dispensation, which was now approaching; under which the shadows of types were to withdraw, and the pure light of truth was to enlighten the minds of believers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 1) There was no necessity for Christ to shew why the fathers worshipped in the mountain, and the Jews in Jerusalem. He therefore was silent on that question; but nevertheless asserted the religious superiority of the Jews on another ground, the ground not of place, but, of knowledge; Ye worship ye know not what, we know what we worship; for salvation if of the Jews.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 17) Ye, literally refers to the Samaritans, but mystically, to all who understand the Scriptures in an heretical sense. We again literally means the Jews, but mystically, I the Word, and all who conformed to My Image, obtain salvation from the Jewish Scriptures.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 1) The Samaritans worshipped they knew not what, a local, a partial God, as they imagined, of whom they had the same notion that they had of their idols. And therefore they mingled the worship of God with the worship of idols. But the Jews were free from this superstition: indeed they knew God to be the God of the whole world; wherefore He says, We worship what we know. He reckons Himself among the Jews, in condescension to the woman's idea of Him; and says as if He were a Jewish prophet, We worship, though it is certain that He is the Being who is worshipped by all. The words, For salvation is of the Jews, mean that every thing calculated to save and amend the world, the knowledge of God, the abhorrence of idols, and all other doctrines of that nature, and even the very origin of our religion, comes originally from the Jews. In salvation too He includes His own presence, which He says is of the Jews, as we are told by the Apostle, Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came. (Rom. 9:5) See how He exalts the Old Testament, which He shews to be the root of every thing good; thus proving in every way that He Himself is not opposed to the Law.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. xv. c. 26) It is saying much for the Jews, to declare in their name, We worship what we know. But He does not speak for the reprobate Jews, but for that party from whom the Apostles and the Prophets came. Such were all those saints who laid the prices of their possessions at the Apostle's feet.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 1) The Jewish worship then was far higher than the Samaritan; but even it shall be abolished; The hour cometh, and now is, when, the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth. He says, and now is, to shew that this was not a prediction, like those of the ancient Prophets, to be fulfilled in the course of ages. The event, He says, is now at hand, it is approaching your very doors. The words, true worshippers, are by way of distinction: for there are false worshippers who pray for temporal and frail benefits, or whose actions are ever contradicting their prayers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. 2) Or by saying, true, he excludes the Jews together with the Samaritans. For the Jews, though better than the Samaritans, were yet as much inferior to those who were to succeed them, as the type is to the reality. The true worshippers do not confine the worship of God to place, but worship in the spirit; as Paul saith, Whom I serve with my spirit. (Rom. 1:9)

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 14) Twice it is said, The hour cometh, and the first time without the addition, and now is. The first seems to allude to that purely spiritual worship which is suited only to a state of perfection; the second to earthly worship, perfected as far as is consistent with human nature. When that hour cometh, which our Lord speaks of, the mountain of the Samaritans must be avoided, and God must be worshipped in Sion, where is Jerusalem, which is called by Christ the city of the Great King. And this is the Church, where sacred oblations and spiritual victims are offered up by those who understand the spiritual law. So that when the fulness of time shall have come, the true worship, we must suppose, will no longer be attached to Jerusalem, i. e. to the present Church: for the Angels do not worship the Father at Jerusalem: and thus those who have obtained the likeness of the Jews, worship the Father better than they who are at Jerusalem. And when this hour is come, we shall be accounted by the Father as sons. Wherefore it is not said, Worship God, but, Worship the Father. But for the present the true worshippers worship the Father in spirit and in trutha.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 2) He speaks here of the Church; wherein there is true worship, and such as becometh God; and therefore adds, For the Father seeketh such to worship Him. For though formerly He willed that mankind should linger under a dispensation of types and figures, this was only done in condescension to human frailty, and to prepare men for the reception of the truth.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 20) But if the Father seeks, He seeks through Jesus, Who came to seek and to save that which was lost, and to teach men what true worship was. God is a Spirit; i. e. He constitutes our real life, just as our breath (spirit) constitutes our bodily life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 2) Or it signifies that God is incorporeal; and that therefore He ought to be worshipped not with the body, but with the soul, by the offering up a pure mind, i. e. that they who worship Him, must worship Him in spirit and in truth. The Jews neglected the soul, but paid great attention to the body, and had various kinds of purification. Our Lord seems here to refer to this, and to say, not by cleansing of the body, but by the incorporeal nature within us, i. e. the understanding, which He calls the spirit, that we must worship the incorporeal God.

HILARY. (ii. de Trin. c. 31) Or, by saying that God being a Spirit ought to be worshipped in spirit, He indicates the freedom and knowledge of the worshippers, and the uncircumscribed nature of the worship: according to the saying of the Apostle, Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty. (2 Cor. 3:17)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 2) And that we are to worship in truth, means that whereas the former ordinances were typical; that is to say, circumcision, burnt offerings, and sacrifices; now, on the contrary, every thing is real.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, because many think that they worship God in the spirit, i. e. with the mind, who yet held heretical doctrines concerning Him, for this reason He adds, and in truth. May not the words too refer to the two kinds of philosophy among us, i. e. active and contemplative; the spirit standing for action, according to the Apostle, As many as are led by the Spirit of God; (Rom. 8:14) truth, on the other hand, for contemplation. Or, (to take another view,) as the Samaritans thought that God was confined to a certain place, and ought to be worshipped in that place; in opposition to this notion, our Lord may mean to teach them here, that the true worshippers worship not locally, but spiritually. Or again, all being a type and shadow in the Jewish system, the meaning may be that the true worshippers will worship not in type, but in truth. God being a Spirit, seeketh for spiritual worshippers; being the truth, for true ones.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 25) O for a mountain to pray on, thou criest, high and inaccessible, that I may be nearer to God, and God may hear me better, for He dwelleth on high. Yes, God dwelleth on high, but He hath respect unto the humble. Wherefore descend that thou mayest ascend. “Ways on high are in their heart,” (Ps. 74:7.) it is said, “passing in the valley of tears,” and in “tears” is humility. Wouldest thou pray in the temple? pray in thyself; but first do thou become the temple of God.

4:25–26

25. The woman saith unto him, I know that Messias cometh, which is called Christ: when he is come, he will tell us all things.

26. Jesus saith unto her, I that speak unto thee am he.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 2) The woman was struck with astonishment at the loftiness of His teaching, as her words shew: The woman saith unto Him, I know that Messias cometh, which is called Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 27) Unctus in Latin, Christ in Greek, in the Hebrew Messias. She knew then who could teach her, but did not know Who was teaching her. When He is come, He will tell us all things: as if she said, The Jews now contend for the temple, we for the mountain; but He, when He comes, will level the mountain, overthrow the temple, and teach us how to pray in spirit and in truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxii. 2) But what reason had the Samaritans for expecting Christ’s coming? They acknowledged the books of Moses, which foretold it. Jacob prophesies of Christ, The sceptre shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from beneath his feet, until Shiloh come. (Gen. 49:10) And Moses says, The Lord thy God shall raise up a Prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren. (Deut. 18:15)

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 27) It should be known, that as Christ rose out of the Jews, not only declaring but proving Himself to be Christ; so among the Samaritans there arose one Dositheus by name, who asserted that he was the Christ prophesied of.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. qu. 64) It is a confirmation to discerning minds that the five senses were what were signified by the five husbands, to find the woman making five carnal answers, and then mentioning the name of Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 2) Christ now reveals Himself to the woman: Jesus saith unto her, I that speak unto thee am He. Had He told the woman this to begin with, it would have appeared vanity. Now, having gradually awakened her to the thought of Christ, His disclosure of Himself is perfectly opportune. He is not equally open to the Jews, who ask Him, If Thou be the Christ, tell us plainly; (John 10:24) for this reason, that they did not ask in order to learn, but to do Him injury; whereas she spoke in the simplicity of her heart.

4:27–30

27. And upon this came his disciples, and marvelled that he talked with the woman: yet no man said, What seekest thou? or, Why talkest thou with her?

28. The woman then left her waterpot, and went her way into the city, and saith to the men,

29. Come, see a man, which told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Christ?

30. Then they went out of the city, and came unto him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 2, 3) The disciples arrive opportunely, and when the teaching is finished: And upon this came His disciples, and marvelled that He talked with the woman. They marvelled at the exceeding kindness and humility of Christ, in condescending to converse with a poor woman, and a Samaritan.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 29) He who came to seek that which was lost, sought the lost one. This was what they marvelled at: they marvelled at His goodness; they did not suspect evil.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 3) But notwithstanding their wonder, they asked Him no questions, No man said, What seekest Thou? or, Why talkest Thou with her? So careful were they to observe the rank of disciples, so great was their awe and veneration for Him. On subjects indeed which concerned themselves, they did not hesitate to ask Him questions. But this was not one.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. in Joan. c. 28) The woman is almost turned into an Apostle. So forcible are His words, that she leaves her waterpot to go to the city, and tell her townsmen of them. The woman then left her waterpot, i. e. gave up low bodily cares, for the sake of benefitting others. Let us do the same. Let us leave off caring for things of the body, and impart to others of our own.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 30) Hydria answers to our word aquarium; hydor being Greek for water.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 1) As the Apostles, on being called, left their nets, so does she leave her waterpot, to do the work of an Evangelist, by calling not one person, but a whole city: She went her way into the city, and saith to the men, Come, see a man which told me all things that ever I did: is not this the Christ?

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. in Joan. c. 29) She calls them together to see a man, whose words were deeper than man’s. She had had five husbands, and then was living with the sixth, not a lawful husband. But now she gives him up for a seventh, and she leaving her waterpot, is converted to chastity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 1) She was not prevented by shamefacedness from spreading about what had been said to her. For the soul, when it is once kindled by the divine flame, regards neither glory, nor shame, nor any other earthly thing, only the flame which consumes it. But she did not wish them to trust to her own report only, but to come and judge of Christ for themselves. Come, see a man, she says. She does not say, Come and believe, but, Come and see; which is an easier matter. For well she knew that if they only tasted of that well, they would feel as she did.

ALCUIN. It is only by degrees, however, that she comes to the preaching of Christ. First she calls Him a man, not Christ; for fear those who heard her might be angry, and refuse to come.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 1) She then neither openly preaches Christ, nor wholly omits Him, but says, Is not this the Christ? This wakened their attention, Then they went out of the city, and came unto Him.

AUGUSTINE. The circumstance of the woman’s leaving her waterpot on going away, must not be overlooked. For the waterpot signifies the love of this world, i. e. concupiscence, by which men from the dark depth, of which the well is the image, i. e. from an earthly conversation, draw up pleasure. It was right then for one who believed in Christ to renounce the world, and, by leaving her waterpot, to shew that she had parted with worldly desires.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 30) She cast away therefore concupiscence, and hastened to proclaim the truth. Let those who wish to preach the Gospel, learn, that they should first leave their waterpots at the well.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 29) The woman having become a vessel of wholesome discipline, lays aside as contemptible her former tastes and desires.

4:31–34

31. In the mean while his disciples prayed him, saying, Master, eat.

32. But he said unto them, I have meat to eat that ye know not of.

33. Therefore said the disciples one to another, Hath any man brought him ought to eat?

34. Jesus saith unto them, My meat is to do the will of him that sent me, and to finish his work.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 31) His disciples had gone to buy food, and had returned. They offered Christ some: In the mean while His disciples prayed Him, saying, Master, eat.

CHRYSOSTOM. They all ask Him at once, Him so fatigued with the journey and heat. This is not impatience in them, but simply love, and tenderness to their Master.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 31) They think the present time convenient for dining; it being after the departure of the woman to the city, and before the coming of the Samaritans; so that they sit at meat by themselves. This explains, In the mean while.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord, knowing that the woman of Samaria was bringing the whole town out to Him, tells His disciples, I have meat that ye know not of.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 1) The salvation of men He calls His food, shewing His great desire that we should be saved. As food is an object of desire to us, so was the salvation of men to Him. Observe, He does not express Himself directly, but figuratively; which makes some trouble necessary for His hearers, in order to comprehend His meaning, and thus gives a greater importance to that meaning when it is understood.

THEOPHYLACT. That ye know not of, i. e. know not that I call the salvation of men food; or, know not that the Samaritans are about to believe and be saved. The disciples however were in perplexity: Therefore said the disciples one to another, Hath any man brought Him ought to eat?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 31) What wonder that the woman did not understand about the water? Lo, the disciples do not understand about the meat.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 1) They shew, as usual, the honour and reverence in which they hold their Master, by talking among themselves, and not presuming to question Him.

THEOPHYLACT. From the question of the disciples, Hath any man brought Him ought to eat, we may infer that our Lord was accustomed to receive food from others, when it was offered Him: not that He who giveth food to all flesh, (Ps. 146.) needed any assistance; but He received it, that they who gave it might obtain their reward, and that poverty thenceforth might not blush, nor the support of others be esteemed a disgrace. It is proper and necessary that teachers should depend on others to provide them with food, in order that, being free from all other cares, they may attend the more to the ministry of the word.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 31) Our Lord heard His doubting disciples, and answered them as disciples, i. e. plainly and expressly, not circuitously, as He answered the women; Jesus saith unto them, My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 6) Fit meat for the Son of God, who was so obedient to the Father, that in Him was the same will that was in the Father: not two wills, but one will in both. The Son is capable of first accomplishing the whole will of the Father. Other saints do nothing against the Father’s will; He does that will. That is His meat in an especial sense. And what means, To finish His work? It would seem easy to say, that a work was what was ordered by him who set it; as where men are set to build or dig. But some who go deeper ask whether a work being finished does not imply that it was before incomplete; and whether God could originally have made an incomplete work? The completing of the work, is the completing of a rational creature: for it was to complete this work, which was as yet imperfect, that the Word made flesh come.

THEOPHYLACT. He finished the work of God, i. e. man, He, the Son of God, finished it by exhibiting our nature in Himself without sin, perfect and uncorrupt. He finished also the work of God, i. e. the Law, (Rom. 10:4) (for Christ is the end of the Law,) by abolishing it, when every thing in it had been fulfilled, and changing a carnal into a spiritual worship.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 31) The matter of spiritual drink and living water being explained, the subject of meat follows. Jesus had asked the woman of Samaria, and she could give Him none good enough. Then came the disciples, having procured some humble food among the people of the country, and offered it Him, beseeching Him to eat. They fear perhaps lest the Word of God, deprived of His own proper nourishment, fail within them; and therefore with such as they have found, immediately propose to feed Him, that being confirmed and strengthened, He may abide with His nourishers. Souls require food as well as bodies. And as bodies require different kinds of it, and in different quantities, so is it in things which are above the body. (Heb. 5:12) Souls differ in capacity, and one needs more nourishment, another less. So too in point of quality, the same nourishment of words and thoughts does not suit all. Infants just born need the milk of the word; the grown up, solid meat. Our Lord says, I have meat to eat. For one who is over the weak who cannot behold the same things with the stronger, may always speak thusb.

4:35–38

35. Say not ye, There are yet four months, and then cometh harvest? behold, I say unto you, Lift up your eyes, and look on the fields; for they are white already to harvest.

36. And he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal: that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together.

37. And herein is that saving true, One soweth, and another reapeth.

38. I sent you to reap that whereon ye bestowed no labour: other men laboured, and ye are entered into their labours.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 1) What is the will of the Father He now proceeds to explain: Say ye not, There are yet four months, and then cometh harvest?

THEOPHYLACT. Now ye are expecting a material harvest. But I say unto you, that a spiritual harvest is at hand: Lift up your eyes, and look on the fields; for they are white already to harvest. He alludes to the Samaritans who are approaching.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 2) He leads them, as his custom is, from low things to high. Fields and harvest here express the great number of souls, which are ready to receive the word. The eyes are both spiritual, and bodily ones, for they saw a great multitude of Samaritans now approaching. This expectant crowd he calls very suitably white fields. For as the corn, when it grows white, is ready for the harvest; so were these ready for salvation. But why does He not say this in direct language? Because by making use in this way of the objects around them, he gave greater vividness and power to His words, and brought the truth home to them; and also that His discourse might be more pleasant, and might sink deeper into their memories.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 32) He was intent now on beginning the work, and hastened to send labourers: And he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal, that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 2) Again, He distinguishes earthly from heavenly things, for as above He said of the water, that he who drank of it should never thirst, so here He says, He that reapeth gathereth fruit unto life eternal; adding, that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together. The Prophets sowed, the Apostles reaped, yet are not the former deprived of their reward. For here a new thing is promised; viz. that both sowers and reapers shall rejoice together. How different this from what we see here. Now he that soweth grieveth because he soweth for others, and he only that reapeth rejoiceth. But in the new state, the sower and reaper share the same wages.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 32) The Apostles and Prophets had different labours, corresponding to the difference of times; but both will attain to like joy, and receive together their wages, even eternal life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 2) He confirms what He says by a proverb, And herein is that saying true, one soweth and another reapeth, i. e. one party has the labour, and another reaps the fruit. The saying is especially applicable here, for the Prophets had laboured, and the disciples reaped the fruits of their labours: I sent you to reap that whereon ye bestowed no labour.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 32) So then He sent reapers, no sowers. The reapers went where the Prophets had preached. Read the account of their labours: they all contain prophecy of Christ. And the harvest was gathered on that occasion when so many thousands brought the prices of their possessions, and laid them at the Apostles’ feet; relieving their shoulders from earthly burdens, that they might follow Christ. Yea verily, and from that harvest were a few grains scattered, which filled the whole world. And now ariseth another harvest, which will be reaped at the end of the world, not by Apostles, but by Angels. The reapers, He says, are the Angels. (Mat. 13)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 2) I sent you to reap that whereon ye bestowed no labour, i. e. I have reserved you for a favourable time, in which the labour is less, the enjoyment greater. The more laborious part of the work was laid on the Prophets, viz. the sowing of the seed: Other men laboured, and ye are entered into their labours. Christ here throws light on the meaning of the old prophecies. He shews that both the Law and the Prophets, if rightly interpreted, led men to Him; and that the Prophets were sent in fact by Himself. Thus the intimate connexion is established between the Old Testament and the New.

ORIGEN. (tom. xv. in Joan. c. 39–49) How can we consistently give an allegorical meaning to the words, Lift up your eyes, &c. and only a literal one to the words, There are yet four months, and then cometh harvest? The same principle of interpretation surely must be applied to the latter, that is to the former. The four months represent the four elements, i. e. our natural life; the harvest, the end of the world, when all conflict shall have ceased, and truth shall prevail. The disciples then regard the truth as incomprehensible in our natural state, and look forward to the end of the world for attaining the knowledge of it. But this idea our Lord condemns: Say not ye, there are four months, and then cometh harvest? Behold, I say unto you, Lift up your eyes. In many places of Holy Scripture, we are commanded in the same way to raise the thoughts of our minds, which cling so obstinately to earth. A difficult task this for one who indulges his passions, and lives carnally. Such an one will not see if the fields be white to the harvest. For when are the fields white to the harvest? When the Word of God comes to light up and make fruitful the fields of Scripture. Indeed, all sensible things are as it were fields made white for the harvest, if only reason be at hand to interpret them. We lift up our eyes, and behold the whole universe overspread with the brightness of truth. And he that reapeth those harvests, has a double reward of his reaping; first, his wages; And he that reapeth receiveth wages; meaning his reward in the life to come; secondly, a certain good state of the understanding, which is the fruit of contemplation, And gathereth fruit unto life eternal. The man who thinks out the first principles of any science, is as it were the sower in that science; others taking them up, pursuing them to their results, and engrafting fresh matter upon them, strike out new discoveries, from which posterity reaps a plentiful harvest. And how much more may we perceive this in the art of arts? The seed there is the whole dispensation of the mystery, now revealed, but formerly hidden in darkness; for while men were unfit for the advent of the Word, the fields were not yet white to their eyes, i. e. the legal and prophetical Scriptures were shut up. Moses and the Prophets, who preceded the coming of Christ, were the sowers of this seed; the Apostles who came after Christ and saw His glory were the reapers. They reaped and gathered into barns the deep meaning which lay hid under the prophetic writings; and did in short what those do who succeed to a scientific system which others have discovered, and who with less trouble attain to clearer results than they who originally sowed the seed. But they that sowed and they that reaped shall rejoice together in another world, in which all sorrow and mourning shall be done away. Nay, and have they not rejoiced already? Did not Moses and Elias, the sowers, rejoice with the reapers Peter, James, and John, when they saw the glory of the Son of God at the Transfiguration? Perhaps in, one soweth and another reapeth, one and another may refer simply to those who live under the Law, and those who live under the Gospel. For these may both rejoice together, inasmuch as the same end is laid up for them by one God, through one Christ, in one Holy Spirit.

4:39–42

39. And many of the Samaritans of that city believed on him for the saying of the woman, which testified, He told me all that ever I did.

40. So when the Samaritans were come unto him, they besought him that he would tarry with them: and he abode there two days.

41. And many more believed because of his own word;

42. And said unto the woman, Now we believe, not because of thy saying: for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. in Joan. c. 50) After this conversation with the disciples, Scripture returns to those who had believed on the testimony of the woman, and were come to see Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv. 2) It is now, as it were, harvest time, when the corn is gathered, and a whole floor soon covered with sheaves; And many of the Samaritans of that city believed on Him, for the saying of the woman which testified, He told me all that ever I did. They considered that, the woman would never of her own accord have conceived such admiration for one Who had reproved her offences, unless He were really some great and wonderful person. (Hom. xxxv. 1). And thus relying solely on the testimony of the woman, without any other evidence, they went out to beseech Christ to stay with them: So when the Samaritans were come to Him, they besought Him that He would tarry with them. The Jews when they saw His miracles, so far from begging Him to stay, tried in every way to get rid of His presence. Such is the power of malice, and envy, and vainglory, that obstinate vice which poisons even goodness itself. Though the Samaritans however wished to keep Him with them, He would not consent, but only tarried there two days.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 51) It is natural to ask, why our Saviour stays with the Samaritans, when He had given a command to His disciples not to enter into any city of the Samaritans. But we must explain this mystically. To go the way of the Gentiles, is to be imbued with Gentile doctrine; to go into a city of the Samaritans, is to admit the doctrines of those who believe the Scriptures, but interpret them heretically. But when men have given up their own doctrines, and come to Jesus, it is lawful to stay with them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 1) The Jews disbelieved in spite of miracles, while these exhibited great faith, before even a miracle was wrought, and when they had only heard our Lord's words. And many more believed because of His own word. Why then do not the Evangelists give these words? To shew that they omit many important things, and because the result shews what they were; the result being that the whole city was convinced. On the other hand, when the hearers are not convinced, the Evangelists are obliged to give our Lord's words, that the failure may be seen to be owing to the indifference of the hearers, not to any defect in the preacher. And now, having become Christ's disciples, they dismiss their first instructor; And they said unto the woman, Now we believe not because of thy saying: for we have heard Him ourselves, and know that this is indeed the Christ, the Saviour of the world. How soon they understand that He was come for the deliverance of the whole world, and could not therefore confine His purposes to the Jews, but must sow the Word every where. Their saying too, The Saviour of the world, implies that they looked on this world as miserable and lost; and that, whereas Prophets and Angels had come to save it, this was the only real Saviour, the Author not only of temporal but eternal salvation. And, observe, whereas the woman had spoken doubtfully, Is not this the Christ? they do not say, we suspect, but we know, know, that this is indeed the Saviour of the world, not one Christ out of many. Though they had only heard His words, they said as much as they could have done, had they seen ever so many and great miracles.

ORIGEN. (tom. xvii. c. 50) With the aid of our former observations on Jacob's well, and the water, it will not be difficult to see, why, when they find the true word, they leave other doctrines, i. e. the city, for a sound faith. (c. 51). Observe, they did not ask our Saviour only to enter Samaria, St. John particularly remarks, or enter that city, but to tarry there. Jesus tarries with those who ask Him, and especially with those who go out of the city to Him.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 53) They were not ready yet for the third day; having no anxiety to see a miracle, as those had who supped with Jesus in Cana of Galilee. (This supper was after He had been in Cana three days.) The woman's report was the ground of their belief. The enlightening power of the Word itself was not yet visible to them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xv. c. 33) So then they knew Christ first by report of another, afterwards by His own presence; which is still the case of those that are without the fold, and not yet Christians. Christ is announced to them by some charitable Christians, by the report of the woman, i. e. the Church; they come to Christ, they believe on Him, through the instrumentality of that woman; He stays withthem two days, i. e. gives them two precepts of charity. And thenceforth their belief is stronger. They believe that He is indeed the Saviour of the world.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 52) For it is impossible that the same impression should be produced by hearing from one who has seen, and seeing one's self; walking by sight is different from walking by faith. The Samaritans now do not believe only from testimony, but from really seeing the truth.

4:43–45

43. Now after two days he departed thence, and went into Galilee.

44. For Jesus himself testified, that a prophet hath no honour in his own country.

45. Then when he was come into Galilee, the Galilæans received him, having seen all the things that he did at Jerusalem at the feast: for they also went unto the feast.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvi) After staying two days in Samaria, He departed into Galilee, where He resided: Now after two days He departed thence, and went into Galilee.

AUGUSTINE. Why then does the Evangelist say immediately, For Jesus Himself testified, that a prophet hath no honour in his own country. For He would seem to have testified more to the truth, had He remained in Samaria, and not gone into Galilee. Not so: He stayed two days in Samaria, and the Samaritans believed on Him: He stayed the same time in Galilee, and the Galileans did not believe on Him, and therefore He said, that a prophet hath no honour in his own country.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 1) Or consider this the reason that He went, not to Capernaum, but to Galilee and Cana, as appears below, His country being, I think, Capernaum. As He did not obtain honour there, hear what He says; And thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shall be brought down to hell. (Mat. 11:23) He calls it His own country, because He had most resided here.

THEOPHYLACT. Or thus: Our Lord on leaving Samaria for Galilee, explains why He was not always in Galilee: viz. because of the little honour He received there. A prophet hath no honour in his own country.

ORIGEN. (tom. xvii. c. 54) The country of the prophets was Judæa, and every one knows how little honour they received from the Jews, as we read, Whom of the prophets have not your fathers persecuted? (Mat. 23) One cannot but wonder at the truth of this saying, exemplified not only in the contempt cast upon the holy prophets and our Lord Himself, but also in the case of other teachers of wisdom who have been despised by their fellow-citizens and put to deathc.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 2) But do we not see many held in admiration by their own people? We do; but we cannot argue from a few instances. If some are honoured in their own country, many more are honoured out of it, and familiarity generally subjects men to contempt. The Galileans however received our Lord: Then when He was come into Galilee, the Galileans received Him. Observe how those who are spoken ill of, are always the first to come to Christ. Of the Galileans we find it said below, Search and look, for out of Galilee ariseth no prophet. And He is reproached with being a Samaritan, Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil. And yet the Samaritans and Galileans believe, to the condemnation of the Jews. The Galileans however are superior to the Samaritans; for the latter believed from hearing the woman’s words, the former from seeing the signs which He did: Having seen all the things that He did at Jerusalem at the feast.

ORIGEN. (tom. xvii. c. 55) Our Lord by ejecting those who sold sheep and oxen from the temple, had impressed the Galileans with a strong idea of His Majesty, and they received Him. His power was shewn no less in this act, than in making the blind to see, and the deaf to hear. But probably He had performed some other miracles as well.

BEDE. They had seen Him at Jerusalem, For they also went unto the feast. Our Lord's return has a mystical meaning, viz. that, when the Gentiles have been confirmed in the faith by the two precepts of love, i. e. at the end of the world, He will return to His country, i. e. Judæa.

ORIGEN. (tom. xiii. c. 55) The Galilæans were allowed to keep the feast at Jerusalem, where they had seen Jesus. Thus they were prepared to receive Him, when He came: otherwise they would either have rejected Him; or He, knowing their unprepared state, would not have gone near them.

4:46–54

46. So Jesus came again into Cana of Galilee, where he made the water wine. And there was a certain nobleman, whose son was sick at Capernaum.

47. When he heard that Jesus was come out of Judæa into Galilee, he went unto him, and besought him that he would come down, and heal his son: for he was at the point of death.

48. Then said Jesus unto him, Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe.

49. The nobleman saith unto him, Sir, come down ere my child die.

50. Jesus saith unto him, Go thy way; thy son liveth. And the man believed the word that Jesus had spoken unto him, and he went his way.

51. And as he was now going down, his servants met him, and told him, saying, Thy son liveth.

52. Then enquired he of them the hour when he began to amend. And they said unto him, Yesterday at the seventh hour the fever left him.

53. So the father knew that it was at the same hour, in the which Jesus said unto him, Thy son liveth: and himself believed, and his whole house.

54. This is again the second miracle that Jesus did, when he was come out of Judæa into Galilee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 2) On a former occasion our Lord attended a marriage in Cana of Galilee, now He goes there to convert the people, and confirm by His presence the faith which His miracle had produced. He goes there in preference to His own country.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvi. c. 3) There, we are told, His disciples believed on Him. Though the house was crowded with guests, the only persons who believed in consequence of this great miracle, were His disciples. He therefore visits the city again, in order to try a second time to convert them.

THEOPHYLACT. The Evangelist reminds us of the miracle in order to express the praise due to the Samaritansd. For the Galileans in receiving Him were influenced as well by the miracle He had wrought with them, as by those they had seen at Jerusalem. The nobleman certainly believed in consequence of the miracle performed at Cana, though he did not yet understand Christ’s full greatness; And there was a certain nobleman whose son was sick at Capernaum.

ORIGEN. (tom. xvii. c. 57) Some think that this was an officer of King Herod’s; others, that he was one of Cæsar’s household, then employed on some commission in Judæa. It is not said that He was a Jew.

AUGUSTINE. He is called a nobleman, (βασιλικὸς) either as being of the royal family, or as having some office of government.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 2) Some think that he is the same centurion, who is mentioned in Matthew. (Matt. 8:5) But that he is a different person is clear from this; that the latter, when Christ wished to come to his house, entreated Him not; whereas the former brought Christ to his house, though he had received no promise of a cure. And the latter met Jesus on His way from the mountain to Capernaum; whereas the former came to Jesus in Cana. And the latter servant was laid up with the palsy, the former’s son with a fever. Of this nobleman then we read, When he heard that Jesus was come out of Judæa into Galilee, he went unto Him, and besought Him that He would heal his son: for he was at the point of death

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvi. c. 3) Did not he who made this request believe? Mark what our Lord says; Then said Jesus unto him, Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe. This is to charge the man either with lukewarmness, or coldness of faith, or with want of faith altogether: as if his only object was to put Christ’s power to the test, and see who and what kind of person Christ was, and what He could do. The word prodigy (wonder) signifies something far off, in futurity.

AUGUSTINE. Our Lord would have the mind of the believer so raised above all mutable things, as not to seek even for miracles. For miracles, though sent from heaven, are, in their subject matter, mutable.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xxviii. 1) Remember what He asked for, and you will plainly see that he doubted. He asked Him to come down and see his son: The nobleman saith unto him, Sir, come down, ere my child die. His faith was deficient; in that he thought that our Lord could not save, except He were personally present.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 2) And mark his earthly mind, shewn in hurrying Christ along with him; as if our Lord could not raise his son after death. Indeed it is very possible that he may have asked in unbelief. For fathers often are so carried away by their affection, as to consult not only those they depend upon, but even those they do not depend upon at all: not wishing to leave any means untried, which might save their children. But had he had any strong reliance upon Christ, he would have gone to Him in Judæa.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xxviii. 1, 2) Our Lord in His answer implies that He is in a certain sense where He is invited present, even when He is absent from a place. He saves by His command simply, even as by His will He created all things: Jesus saith unto him, Go thy way, thy son liveth. Here is a blow to that pride which honours human wealth and greatness, and not that nature which is made after the image of God. Our Redeemer, to shew that things made much of among men, were to be despised by Saints, and things despised made much of, did not go to the nobleman’s son, but was ready to go to the centurion’s servant.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 2) Or thus; In the centurion there was confirmed faith and true devotion, and therefore our Lord was ready to go. But the nobleman’s faith was still imperfect, as he thought our Lord could not heal in the absence of the sick person. But Christ’s answer enlightened him. And the man believed the word which Jesus had spoken to him, and went his way. He did not believe, however, wholly or completely.

ORIGEN. His rank appears in the fact of his servants meeting him: And as he was now going down, his servants met him, and told him, saying, Thy son liveth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxv. 3) They met him, to announce what had happened, and prevent Christ from coming, as He was no longer wanted. That the nobleman did not fully believe, is shewn by what follows: Then enquired he of them at what hour he began to amend. He wished to find out whether the recovery was accidental, or owing to our Lord’s word. And they said unto him, Yesterday at the seventh hour the fever left him. How obvious is the miracle? His recovery did not take place in an ordinary way, but all at once; in order that it might be seen to be Christ’s doing, and not the result of nature: So the father knew that it was at the same hour, in the which Jesus said unto him, Thy son livelh; and himself believed, and his whole house.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvi. c. 3) If he only believed when he was told that his son was well again, and had compared the hour according to his servant’s account, with the hour predicted by Christ, he did not believe when he first made the petition.

BEDE. So, we see, faith, like the other virtues, is formed gradually, and has its beginning, growth, and maturity. His faith had its beginning, when he asked for his son’s recovery; its growth, when he believed our Lord’s words, Thy son liveth; its maturity, after the announcement of the fact by his servants.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvi. c. 3) The Samaritans believed on the strength of His words only: that whole house believed on the strength of the miracle which had been brought in it. The Evangelist adds, This is again the second miracle which Jesus did, when He was come out of Judæa into Galilee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvi. 1) The second miracle, he says markedly. The Jews had not come to the more perfect faith of the Samaritans, who saw no miracle.

ORIGEN. (tom. xvii. c. 60) The sentence is ambiguous. Taken one way, it means that Jesus after coming to Galilee, performed two miracles, of which that of healing the nobleman’s son was the second: taken another, it means, that of the two miracles which Jesus performed in Galilee, the second was done after coming from Judæa into Galilee. The latter is the true and received meaning. Mystically, the two journeys of Christ into Galilee signify His two advents; (c. 56.). at the first of which He makes us His guest at supper, and gives us wine to drink; at the second, He raises up the nobleman’s son who was at the point of death, i. e. the Jewish people, who, after the fulness of the Gentiles, attain themselves to salvation. For, as the great King of Kings is He, whom God hath seated upon His holy hill of Sion, so the lesser king is he, who saw his day, and was glad, i. e. Abrahame. And therefore his sick son is the Jewish people fallen from the true religion, and thrown into a fever in consequence by the fiery darts of the enemy. And we know that the saints of old, even when they had put off the covering of the flesh, made the people the object of their care: for we read in Maccabees, after the death of Jeremiah, This is Jeremias the prophet of the Lord, who prayeth much for the people. (2 Macc. 12) Abraham therefore prays to our Saviour to succour his diseased people. Again, the word of power, Thy son liveth, comes forth from Cana, i. e. the work of the Word, the healing of the nobleman's son, is done in Capernaum, i. e. the land of consolation. The nobleman's son signifies the class of believers who though diseased are yet not altogether destitute of fruits. The words, Except ye see signs and wonders, ye will not believe, are spoken of the Jewish people in general, or perhaps of the nobleman, i. e. Abraham himself, in a certain sense. For as John waited for a sign; on Whom thou shall see the Spirit descending; so too the Saints who died before the coming of Christ in the flesh, expected Him to manifest Himself by signs and wonders. And this nobleman too had servants as well as a son; which servants stand for the lower and weaker class of believers. Nor is it chance that the fever leaves the son at the seventh hour; for seven is the number of rest.

ALCUIN. Or it was the seventh hour, because all remission of sins is through the sevenfold Spirit; for the number seven divided into three and four, signifies the Holy Trinity, in the four seasons of the world, in the four elements.

ORIGEN. (t. xviii. c. 56) There may be an allusion in the two journeys to the two advents of Christ in the soul, the first supplying a spiritual banquet of wine, the second taking away all remains of weakness and death.

THEOPHYLACT. The little king stands for man generally; man not only deriving his soul from the King of the universe, but having Himself dominion over all things. His son, i. e. his mind, labours under a fever of evil passion and desires. He goes to Jesus and entreats Him to come down; i. e. to exercise the condescension of His pity, and pardon his sins, before it is too late. Our Lord answers; Go thy way, i. e. advance in holiness, and then thy son will live; but if thou stop short in thy course, thou wilt destroy the power of understanding and doing right.

CHAPTER 5

5:1–13

1. After this there was a feast of the Jews; and Jesus went up to Jerusalem.

2. Now there is at Jerusalem by the sheep market a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches.

3. In these lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, waiting for the moving of the water.

4. For an angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water: whosoever then first after the troubling of the water stepped in, was made whole of whatsoever disease he had.

5. And a certain man was there, which had an infirmity thirty and eight years.

6. When Jesus saw him lie, and knew that he had been now a long time in that case, he saith unto him, Wilt thou be made whole?

7. The impotent man answered him, Sir, I have no man, when the water is troubled, to put me into the pool: but while I am coming, another steppeth down before me.

8. Jesus saith unto him, Rise, take up thy bed, and walk.

9. And immediately the man was made whole, and took up his bed, and walked: and on the same day was the sabbath.

10. The Jews therefore said unto him that was cured, It is the sabbath day: it is not lawful for thee to carry thy bed.

11. He answered them, He that made me whole, the same said unto me, Take up thy bed, and walk.

12. Then asked they him, What man is that which said unto thee, Take up thy bed, and walk?

13. And he that was healed wist not who it was: for Jesus had conveyed himself away, a multitude being in that place.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. l. iv. c. 10) After the miracle in Galilee, He returns to Jerusalem: After this there was a feast of the Jews, and Jesus went up to Jerusalem.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvi. 1) The feast of Pentecost. Jesus always went up to Jerusalem at the time of the feasts, that it might be seen that He was not an enemy to, but an observer of, the Law. And it gave Him the opportunity of impressing the simple multitude by miracles and teaching: as great numbers used then to collect from the neighbouring towns.

Now there is at Jerusalem by the sheep-market a pool, which is called in the Hebrew tongue Bethesda, having five porches.

ALCUIN. The pool by the sheep-market, is the place where the priest washed the animals that were going to be sacrificed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvi. 1) This pool was one among many types of that baptism, which was to purge away sin. First God enjoined water for the cleansing from the filth of the body, and from those defilements, which were not real, but legal, e. g. those from death, or leprosy, and the like. Afterwards infirmities were healed by water, as we read: In these (the porches) lay a great multitude of impotent folk, of blind, halt, withered, waiting for the moving of the water. This was a nearer approximation to the gift of baptism, when not only defilements are cleansed, but sicknesses healed. Types are of various ranks, just as in a court, some officers are nearer to the prince, others farther off. The water, however, did not heal by virtue of its own natural properties, (for if so the effect would have followed uniformly,) but by the descent of an Angel: For an Angel went down at a certain season into the pool, and troubled the water. In the same way, in Baptism, water does not act simply as water, but receives first the grace of the Holy Spirit, by means of which it cleanses us from all our sins. And the Angel troubled the water, and imparted a healing virtue to it, in order to prefigure to the Jews that far greater power of the Lord of the Angels, of healing the diseases of the soul. But then their infirmities prevented their applying the cure; for it follows, Whosoever then first after the troubling of the water stepped in, was made whole of whatsoever disease he had. But now every one may attain this blessing, for it is not an Angel which troubleth the water, but the Lord of Angels, which worketh every where. Though the whole world come, grace fails not, but remains as full as ever; like the sun’s rays which give light all day, and every day, and yet are not spent. The sun’s light is not diminished by this bountiful expenditure: no more is the influence of the Holy Spirit by the largeness of its outpourings.

Not more than one could be cured at the pool; God’s design being to put before men’s minds, and oblige them to dwell upon, the healing power of water; that from the effect of water on the body, they might believe more readily its power on the soul.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 1) It was a greater act in Christ, to heal the diseases of the soul, than the sicknesses of the perishable body. But as the soul itself did not know its Restorer, as it had eyes in the flesh to discern visible things, but not in the heart wherewith to know God; our Lord performed cures which could be seen, that He might afterwards work cures which could not be seen. He went to the place, where lay a multitude of sick, out of whom He chose one to heal: And a certain man was there, which had an infirmity thirty and eight years.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiii. 1, 2) He did not, however, proceed immediately to heal him, but first tried by conversation to bring him into a believing state of mind. Not that He required faith in the first instance, as He did from the blind man, saying, Believe ye that I am able to do this? (Matt. 9:28) for the lame man could not well know who He was. Persons who in different ways had had the means of knowing Him, were asked this question, and properly so. But there were some who did not and could not know Him yet, but would be made to know Him by His miracles afterwards. And in their case the demand for faith is reserved till after those miracles have taken place: When Jesus saw him lie, and knew that he had been a long time in that case, He saith unto him, Wilt thou be made whole? He does not ask this question for His own information, (this were unnecessary,) but to bring to light the great patience of the man, who for thirty and eight years had sat year after year by the place, in the hope of being cured; which sufficiently explains why Christ passed by the others, and went to him. And He does not say, Dost thou wish Me to heal thee? for the man had not as yet any idea that He was so great a Person. Nor on the other hand did the lame man suspect any mockery in the question, to make him take offence, and say, Hast thou come to vex me, by asking me if I would be made whole; but he answered mildly, Sir, I have no man, when the water is troubled, to put me into the pool; but while I am coming, another steppeth down before me. He had no idea as yet that the Person who put this question to him would heal him, but thought that Christ might probably be of use in putting him into the water. But Christ’s word is sufficient, Jesus saith unto him, Rise, take up thy bed, and walk.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 7) Three distinct biddings. Rise, however, is not a command, but the conferring of the cure. Two commands were given upon his cure, take up thy bed, and walk.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvi. 1, 2) Behold the richness of the Divine Wisdom. He not only heals, but bids him carry his bed also. This was to shew the cure was really miraculous, and not a mere effect of the imagination; for the man’s limbs must have become quite sound and compact, to allow him to take up his bed. The impotent man again did not deride and say, The Angel cometh down, and troubleth the water, and he only cureth one each time; dost Thou, who art a mere man, think that Thou canst do more than an Angel? On the contrary, he heard, believed Him who bade him, and was made whole: And immediately the man was made whole, and took up his bed, and walked.

BEDE. There is a wide difference between our Lord’s mode of healing, and a physician’s. He acts by His word, and acts immediately: the other’s requires a long time for its completion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvii. 2) This was wonderful, but what follows more so. As yet he had no opposition to face. It is made more wonderful when we see him obeying Christ afterwards in spite of the rage and railing of the Jews: And on the same day was the sabbath. The Jews therefore said unto him that was cured, It is the sabbath day, it is not lawful for thee to carry thy bed.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 10) They did not charge our Lord with healing on the sabbath, for He would have replied that if an ox or an ass of theirs had fallen into a pit, would not they have taken it out on the sabbath day: but they addressed the man as he was carrying his bed, as if to say, Even if the healing could not be delayed, why enjoin the work? He shields himself under the authority of his Healer: He that made me whole, the Same said unto me, Take up thy bed, and walk: meaning, Why should not I receive a command, if I received a cure from Him?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvii. 2) Had he been inclined to deal treacherously, he might have said, If it is a crime, accuse Him Who commanded it, and I will lay down my bed. And he would have concealed his cure, knowing, as he did, that their real cause of offence was not the breaking of the Sabbath, but the miracle. But he neither concealed it, nor asked for pardon, but boldly confessed the cure. They then ask spitefully; What man is that who said unto thee, Take up thy bed, and walk. They do not say, Who is it, who made thee whole? but only mention the offence. It follows, And he that was healed wist not who it was, for Jesus had conveyed Himself away, a multitude being in that place. This He had done first, because the man who had been made whole, was the best witness of the cure, and could give his testimony with less suspicion in our Lord's absence; and secondly, that the fury of men might not be excited more than was necessary. For the mere sight of the object of envy, is no small incentive to envy. For these reasons He departed, and left them to examine the fact for themselves. Some are of opinion, that this is the same with the one who had the palsy, whom Matthew mentions. But he is not. For the latter had many to wait upon, and carry him, whereas this man had none. And the place where the miracle was performed, is different.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 1) Judging on low and human notions of this miracle, it is not at all a striking display of power, and only a moderate one of goodness. Of so many, who lay sick, only one was healed; though, had He chosen, He could have restored them all by a single word. How must we account for this? By supposing that His power and goodness were asserted more for imparting a knowledge of eternal salvation to the soul, than working a temporal cure on the body. That which received the temporal cure was certain to decay at last, when death arrived: whereas the soul which believed passed into life eternal. The pool and the water seem to me to signify the Jewish people: for John in the Apocalypse obviously uses water to express people. (Rev. 17:15.)

BEDE. (in v. cap. Joan.) It is fitly described as a sheep pool. By sheep are meant people, according to the passage, We are Thy people, and the sheep of Thy pasture. (Ps. 95:7)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 2) The water then, i. e. the people, was enclosed within five porches, i. e. the five books of Moses. But those books only betrayed the impotent, and did not recover them; that is to say, the Law convicted the sinner, but did not absolve him.

BEDE. Lastly, many kinds of impotent folk lay near the pool: the blind, i. e. those who are without the light of knowledge; the lame, i. e. those who have not strength to do what they are commanded; the withered, i. e. those who have not the marrow of heavenly love.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 3) So then Christ came to the Jewish people, and by means of mighty works, and profitable lessons, troubled the sinners, i. e. the water, and the stirring continued till He brought on His own passion. But He troubled the water, unknown to the world. For had they known Him, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory. (1 Cor. 11) But the troubling of the water came on all at once, and it was not seen who troubled it. Again, to go down into the troubled water, is to believe humbly on our Lord's passion. Only one was healed, to signify the unity of the Church: whoever came afterwards was not healed, to signify that whoever is out of this unity cannot be healed. Wo to them who hate unity, and raise sects. Again, he who was healed had had his infirmity thirty and eight years: this being a number which belongs to sickness, rather than to health. The number forty has a sacred character with us, and is significative of perfection. For the Law was given in Ten Commandments, and was to be preached throughout the whole world, which consists of four parts; and four multiplied into ten, make up the number forty. And the Law too is fulfilled by the Gospel, which is written in four books. So then if the number forty possesses the perfectness of the Law, and nothing fulfils the Law, except the twofold precept of love, why wonder at the impotence of him, who was two less than forty? Some man was necessary for his recovery; but it was a man who was God. He found the man falling short by the number two, and therefore gave two commandments, to fill up the deficiency. For the two precepts of our Lord signify love; the love of God being first in order of command, the love of our neighbour, in order of performance. Take up thy bed, our Lord saith, meaning, When thou wert impotent, thy neighbour carried thee; now thou art made whole, carry thy neighbour. And walk; but whither, except to the Lord thy God.

BEDE. (c. v. num. 30) What mean the words, Arise, and walk; except that thou shouldest raise thyself from thy torpor and indolence, and study to advance in good works. Take up thy bed, i. e. thy neighbour by which thou art carried, and bear him patiently thyself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 9) Carry him then with whom thou walkest, that thou mayest come to Him with Whom thou desirest to abide. As yet however he wist not who Jesus was; just as we too believe in Him though we see Him not. Jesus again does not wish to be seen, but conveys Himself out of the crowd. It is in a kind of solitude of the mind, that God is seen: the crowd is noisy; this vision requires stillness.

5:14–18

14. Afterward Jesus findeth him in the temple, and said unto him, Behold, thou art made whole: sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee.

15. The man departed, and told the Jews that it was Jesus, which had made him whole.

16. And therefore did the Jews persecute Jesus, and sought to slay him, because he had done these things on the sabbath day.

17. But Jesus answered them, My Father worketh hitherto, and I work.

18. Therefore the Jews sought the more to kill him, because he not only had broken the sabbath, but said also that God was his Father, making himself equal with God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxvii) The man, when healed, did not proceed to the market place, or give himself up to pleasure or vain glory, but, which was a great mark of religion, went to the temple: Afterward Jesus findeth him in the temple.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 11) The Lord Jesus saw him both in the crowd, and in the temple. The impotent man does not recognise Jesus in the crowd; but in the temple, being a sacred place, he does.

ALCUIN. (in loc.)c. For if we would know our Maker’s grace, and attain to the sight of Him, we must avoid the crowd of evil thoughts and affections, convey ourselves out of the congregation of the wicked, and flee to the temple; in order that we may make ourselves the temple of God, souls whom God will visit, and in whom He will deign to dwell.

And (He) said unto him, Behold, thou art made whole; sin no more, lest a worse thing come upon thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. 1) Here we learn in the first place, that his disease was the consequence of his sins. We are apt to bear with great indifference the diseases of our souls; but, should the body suffer ever so little hurt, we have recourse to the most energetic remedies. Wherefore God punishes the body for the offences of the soul. Secondly, we learn, that there is really a Hell. Thirdly, that it is a place of lasting and infinite punishment.

Some say indeed, Because we have corrupted ourselves for a short time, shall we be tormented eternally? But see how long this man was tormented for his sins. Sin is not to be measured by length of time, but by the nature of the sin itself. And besides this we learn, that if, after undergoing a heavy punishment for our sins, we fall into them again, we shall incur another and a heavier punishment still: and justly; for one, who has undergone punishment, and has not been made better by it, proves himself to be a hardened person, and a despiser; and, as such, deserving of still greater torments. Nor let it embolden us, that we do not see all punished for their offences here: for if men do not suffer for their offences here, it is only a sign that their punishment will be the greater hereafter. Our diseases however do not always arise from sins; but only most commonly so. For some spring from other lax habits: some are sent for the sake of trial, as Job's were. But why does Christ make mention of this palsied man's sins? Some say, because he had been an accuser of Christ. And shall we say the same of the man afflicted with the palsy? For he too was told, Thy sins are forgiven thee? (Matt. 9:2) The truth is, Christ does not find fault with the man here for his past sins, but only warns him against future. In healing others, however, He makes no mention of sins at all: so that it would seem to be the case that the diseases of these men had arisen from their sins; whereas those of the others had come from natural causes only. Or perhaps through these, He admonishes all the rest. Or he may have admonished this man, knowing his great patience of mind, and that he would bear an admonition. It is a disclosure too of His divinity, for He implies in saying, Sin no more, that He knew what sins He had committed.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xviii. c. 12) Now that the man had seen Jesus, and knew Him to be the author of his recovery, he was not slow in preaching Him to others: The man departed, and told the Jews that it was Jesus which had made him whole.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. 2) He was not so insensible to the benefit, and the advice he had received, as to have any malignant aim in speaking this news. Had it been done to disparage Christ, he could have concealed the cure, and put forward the offence. But he does not mention Jesus's saying, Take up thy bed, which was an offence in the eyes of the Jews; but told the Jews that it was Jesus which had made him whole.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. c. 13) This announcement enraged them, And therefore did the Jews persecute Jesus, because He had done these things on the sabbath day. A plain bodily work had been done before their eyes, distinct from the healing of the man's body, and which could not have been necessary, even if healing was; viz. the carrying of the bed. Wherefore our Lord openly says, that the sacrament of the Sabbath, the sign of observing one day out of seven, was only a temporary institution, which had attained its fulfilment in Him: But Jesus answered them, My Father worketh hitherto, and I work: as if He said, Do not suppose that My Father rested on the Sabbath in such a sense, as that from that time forth, He has ceased from working; for He worketh up to this time, though without labour, and so work I. God's resting means only that He made no other creature, after the creation. The Scripture calls it rest, to remind us of the rest we shall enjoy after a life of good works here. And as God only when He had made man in His own image and similitude, and finished all His works, and seen that they were very good, rested on the seventh day: so do thou expect no rest, except thou return to the likeness in which thou wert made, but which thou hast lost by sin; i. e. unless thou doest good works.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. Super Gen. ad litteram [c. xi.]) It may be said then, that the observance of the sabbath was imposed on the Jews, as the shadow of something to come; viz. that spiritual rest, which God, by the figure of His own rest promised to all who should perform good works.

AUGUSTINE. There will be a sabbath of the world, when the six ages, i. e. the six days, as it were, of the world, have passed: then will come that rest which is promised to the saints.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. Gen. ad lit. c. xi.) The mystery of which rest the Lord Jesus Himself scaled by His burial: for He rested in His sepulchre on the sabbath, having on the sixth day finished all His work, inasmuch as He said, It is finished. (c. 19) What wonder then that God, to prefigure the day on which Christ was to rest in the grave, rested one day from His works, afterwards to carry on the work of governing the world. We may consider too that God, when He rested, rested from the work of creation simply, i. e. made no more new kinds of creatures: but that from that time till now, He has been carrying on the government of those creatures. For His power, as respects the government of heaven and earth, and all the things that He had made, did not cease on the seventh day: they would have perished immediately, without His government: because the power of the Creator is that on which the existence of every creature depends. If it ceased to govern, every species of creation would cease to exist: and all nature would go to nothing. For the world is not like a building, which stands after the architect has left it; it could not stand the twinkling of an eye, if God withdrew His governing hand. Therefore when our Lord says, My Father worketh hitherto, he means the continuation of the work; the holding together, and governing of the creation. It might have been different, had He said, Worketh even now. This would not have conveyed the sense of continuing. As it is we find it, Until now; i. e. from the time of the creation downwards.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. s. 15) He says then, as it were, to the Jews, Why think ye that I should not work on the sabbath? The sabbath day was instituted as a typed of Me. Ye observe the works of God: by Me all things were made. The Father made light, but He spoke, that it might be made. If He spoke, then He made it by the Word; and I am His Word. My Father worked when He made the world, and He worketh until now, governing the world: and as He made the world by Me, when He made it, so He governs it, by Me, now He governs it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. 2) Christ defended His disciples, by putting forward the example of their fellow-servant David: but He defends Himself by a reference to the Father. We may observe too that He does not defend Himself as man, nor yet purely as God, but sometimes as one, sometimes as the other; wishing both to he believed, both the dispensation of His humiliation, and the dignity of His Godhead; wherefore He shews His equality to the Father, both by calling Him His Father emphatically, (My Father,) and by declaring that He doeth the same things, that the Father doth, (And I work.) Therefore, it follows, the Jews sought the more to kill Him, because he not only had broken the sabbath, but said also that God was His Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. s. 16) i. e. not in the secondary sense in which it is true of all of us, but as implying equality. For we all of us say to God, Our Father, Which art in heaven. (Matt. 6) And the Jews say, Thou art our Father. (Isaiah 63:16) They were not angry then because He called God His Father, but because He called Him so in a sense different from men.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. l. iv. c. x) The words, My Father worketh hitherto, and I work, suppose Him to be equal to the Father. This being understood, it followed from the Father's working, that the Son worked: inasmuch as the Father cloth nothing without the Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. s. 3) Were He not the Son by nature, and of the same substance, this defence would be worse than the former accusation made. For no prefect could clear Himself from a transgression of the king's law, by urging that the king broke it also. But, on the supposition of the Son's equality to the Father, the defence is valid. It then follows, that as the Father worked on the Sabbath without doing wrong: the Son could do so likewise.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. s. 16) So, the Jews understood what the Arians do not. For the Arians say that the Son is not equal to the Father, and hence sprang up that heresy which afflicts the Church.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. 3) Those however who are not well-disposed to this doctrine, do not admit that Christ made Himself equal to the Father, but only that the Jews thought He did. But let us consider what has gone before. That the Jews persecuted Christ, and that He broke the sabbath, and said that God was His Father, is unquestionably true. That which immediately follows then from these premises, viz. His making Himself equal with God, is true also.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 15) The Evangelist here explains why the Jews wished to kill Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. And again, had it been that our Lord Himself did not mean this, but that the Jews misunderstood Him, He would not have overlooked their mistake. Nor would the Evangelist have omitted to remark upon it, as he does upon our Lord's speech, Destroy this temple. (c. 2.)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xvii. s. 16) The Jews however did not understand from our Lord that He was the Son of God, but only that He was equal with God; though Christ gave this as the result of His being the Son of God. It is from not seeing this, while they saw at the same time that equality was asserted, that they charged Him with making Himself equal with God: the truth being, that He did not make Himself equal, but the Father had begotten Him equal.

5:19–20

19. Then answered Jesus and said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of himself, but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise.

20. For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth him all things that himself doeth: and he will shew him greater works than these, that ye may marvel.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 17) He refers to the charge of violating the sabbath, brought against Him. My Father worketh hitherto, and I work; meaning that He had a precedent for claiming the right He did; and that what He did was in reality His Father’s doing, who acted in the Son. And to quiet the jealousy which had been raised, because by the use of His Father’s name He had made Himself equal with God, and to assert the excellency of His birth and nature, He says, Verily, verily, I say unto you, The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xviii. 3, 5) Some who would be thought Christians, the Arian heretics, who say that the very Son of God who took our flesh upon Him, was inferior to the Father, take advantage of these words to throw discredit upon our doctrine, and say, You see that when our Lord perceived the Jews to be indignant, because He seemed to make Himself equal with God, He gave such an answer as shewed that He was not equal. For they say, he who can do nothing but what he sees the Father do is not equal but inferior to the Father. But if there is a greater God, and a less God, (the Word being God,) we worship two Gods, and not onee.

HILARY. (vii. de Tr. c. 17.) Lest then that assertion of His equality, which must belong to Him, as by Name and Nature the Son, might throw doubt upon His Nativityf, He says that the Son can do nothing of Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xx. 4) As if He said: Why are ye offended that I called God My Father, and that I make Myself equal with God? I am equal, but equal in such a sense as is consistent with His having begotten Me; with My being from Him, not Him from Me. With the Son, being and power are one and the same thing. The Substance of the Son then being of the Father, the power of the Son is of the Father also: and as the Son is not of Himself, so He can not of Himself. The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do.— (xxi. 4). His seeing and His being born of the Father are the same. His vision is not distinct from His Substance, but the whole together is of the Father.

HILARY. (vii. de Tr. c. 17) That the wholesome order of our confession, i. e. that we believe in the Father and the Son, might remain, He shews the nature of His birth; viz. that He derived the power of acting not from an accession of strength supplied for each work, but by His own knowledge in the first instance. And this knowledge He derived not from any particular visible precedents, as if what the Father had done, the Son could do afterwards; but that the Son being born of the Father, and consequently conscious of the Father's virtue and nature within Him, could do nothing but what He saw the Father do: as he here testifies; God does not see by bodily organs, but by the virtue of His nature.

AUGUSTINE. (ii. de Tr. c. 3) If we understand this subordination of the Son to arise from the human nature, it will follow that the Father walked first upon the water, and did all the other things which the Son did in the flesh, in order that the Son might do them. Who can be so insane as to think thisd?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xx. s. 6) Yet that walking of the flesh upon the sea was done by the Father through the Son. For when the flesh walked, and the Divinity of the Son guided, the Father was not absent, as the Son Himself saith below, The Father that dwelleth in Me, He doeth the works. (c. 14) (s. 9). He guards however against the carnal interpretation of the words, The Son can do nothing of Himself. (v. 19) As if the case were like that of two artificers, master and disciple, one of whom made a chest, and the other made another like it, by adding, For whatsoever things he doeth, these doeth the Son likewise.He does not say, Whatsoever the Father doeth, the Son does other things like them, but the very same things. The Father made the world, the Son made the world, the Holy Ghost made the world. If the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one, it follows that one and the same world was made by the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Ghost. Thus it is the very same thing that the Son doeth. He adds likewise, to prevent another error arising. For the body seems to do the same things with the mind, but it does not do them in a like way, inasmuch as the body is subject, the soul governing, the body visible, the soul invisible. When a slave does a thing at the command of his master, the same thing is done by both; but is it in a like way? Now in the Father and Son there is not this difference; they do the same things, and in a like way. Father and Son act with the same power; so that the Son is equal to the Father.

HILARY. (vii. de Tr. c. 18) Or thus; All things and the same, He says, to shew the virtue of His nature, its being the same with God's. That is the same nature, which can do all the same things. And as the Son does all the same things in a like way, the likeness of the works excludes the notion of the worker existing aloneg. Thus we come to a true idea of the Nativity, as our faith receives it: the likeness of the works bearing witness to the Nativity, their sameness to the Nature.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. 4) Or thus; That the Son can do nothing of Himself, must be understood to mean, that He can do nothing contrary to, or displeasing to, the Father. And therefore He does not say that He does nothing contrary, but that He can do nothing; in order to shew His perfect likeness, and absolute equality to the Father. Nor is this a sign of weakness in the Son, but rather of goodness. For as when we say that it is impossible for God to sin, we do not charge Him with weakness, but bear witness to a certain ineffable goodness; so when the Son says, I can do nothing of myself, it only means, that He can do nothing contrary to the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (contra Serm. Arianorum, c. 9. [xiv.]) This is not a sign of failing in Him, but of His abiding in His birth from the Father. And it is as high an attribute of the Almighty that He does not change, as it is that He does not die. The Son could do what He had not seen the Father doing, if He could do what the Father does not do through Him; i. e. if He could sin: a supposition inconsistent with the immutably good nature which was begotten from the Father. That He cannot do; this then is to be understood of Him, not in the sense of deficiency, but of power.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. 4) And this is confirmed by what follows: For whatsoever he doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise. For if the Father does all things by Himself, so does the Son also, if this likewise is to stand good. You see how high a meaning these humble words bear. He gives His thoughts a humble dress purposely. For whenever He expressed Himself loftily, He was persecuted, as an enemy of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxi. s. 2) Having said that He did the same things that the Father did, and in a like way, He adds, For the Father loveth the Son, and sheweth Him all things that Himself doeth. And sheweth Him all things that Himself doeth: this has a reference to the words above; But what He seeth the Father do. But again, our human ideas are perplexed, and one may say, So then the Father first does something, that the Son may see what He does; just as an artificer teaches his son his art, and shews him what he makes, that he may be able to make the same after him. On this supposition, when the Father does a thing, the Son does not do it; in that the Son is beholding what His Father doeth. But we hold it as a fixed and incontrovertible truth, that the Father makes all things through the Son, and therefore He must shew them to the Son, before He makes them. And where does the Father shew the Son what He makes, except in the Son Himself, by whom He makes them? For if the Father makes a thing for a pattern, and the Son attends to the workmanship as it goes on, where is the indivisibility of the Trinity? The Father therefore does not shew the Son what He doeth by doing it, but by shewing doeth it, through the Son. The Son seeth, and the Father sheweth, before a thing is made, and from the shewing of the Father, and the seeing of the Son, that is made which is made; made by the Father, through the Son. But thou wilt say, I shew my Son what I wish him to make, and he makes it, and I make it through him. True; but before thou doest any thing, thou shewest it to thy son, that he may do it for thy example, and thou by him; but thou speakest to thy son words which are not thyself; whereas the Son Himself is the Word of the Father; and could He speak by the Word to the Word? Or, because the Son was the great Word, were lesser words to pass between the Father and the Son, or a certain sound and temporary creation, as it were, to go out of the mouth of the Father, and strike the ear of the Son? Put away these bodily notions, and if thou art simple, see the truth in simplicity. If thou canst not comprehend what God is, comprehend at least what He is not. Thou wilt have advanced no little way, if thou thinkest nothing that is untrue of God. See what I am saying exemplified in thine own mind. Thou hast memory, and thought, thy memory sheweth to thy thought Carthage: before thou perceivest what is in her, she sheweth it to thought, which is turned toward her: the memory then hath shewn, the thought hath perceived, and no words have passed between them, no outward sign been used. But whatever is in thy memory, thou receivest from without: that which the Father sheweth to the Son, He doth not receive from without; the whole goes on within; there being no creature existing without, but what the Father hath made by the Son. And the Father maketh by shewing, in that He maketh by the Son who sees. The Father's shewing begets the Son's seeing, as the Father begets the Son? Shewing begets seeing, not seeing shewing. But it would be more correct, and more spiritual, not to view the Father as distinct from His shewing, or the Son from His seeing.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 19) It must not be supposed that the Only Begotten God needed such shewing on account of ignorance. For the shewing here is only the doctrine of the nativityh; the self-existing Son, from the self-existing Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxi) For to see the Father is to see His Son. The Father so shews all His works to the Son, that the Son sees them from the Fatheri. For the birth of the Son is in His seeing: He sees from the same source, from which He is, and is born, and remains.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 19) Nor did the heavenly discourse lack the caution, to guard against our inferring from these words any difference in the nature of the Son and the Father. For He says that the works of the Father were shewn to Him, not that strength was supplied Him for the doing of them, in order to teach that this shewing is substantially nothing else than His birth; for that simultaneously with the Son Himself is born the Son's knowledge of the works the Father will do through Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxi. s. 5) But now from Him whom we called coeternal with the Father, who saw the Father, and existed in that He saw, we return to the things of time, And He will shew him greater works than these. But if He will shew him, i. e. is about to shew him, He hath not yet shewn him: and when He does shew him, others also will see; (Tr. xix). for it follows, That ye may believe. It is difficult to see what the eternal Father can shew in time to the coeternal Son, Who knows all that exists within the Father's mind. For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will. To raise the dead was a greater work than to heal the sick. But this is explained by consideriug that He Who a little before spoke as God, now begins to speak as man. As man, and therefore living in time, He will be shewn greater works in time. Bodies will rise again by the human dispensation by which the Son of God assumed manhood in time; but souls by virtue of the eternity of the Divine Substance. For which reason it was said before that the Father loved the Son, and shewed Him what things soever He did. For the Father shews the Son that souls are raised up; for they are raised up by the Father and the Son, even as they cannot live, except God give them life. (Tr. xxi). Or the Father is about to shew this to us, not to Him; according to what follows, That ye may believe. This being the reason why the Father would shew Him greater things than these. But why did He not say, shall shew you, instead of the Son? Because we are members of the Son, and He, as it were, learns in His members, even as He suffers in us. For as He says, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these My brethren, ye have done it unto Me: (Matt. 25:40) so, if we ask Him, how He, the Teacher of all things, learns, He replies, When one of the least of My brethren learns, I learn.

5:21–23

21. For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneth whom he will.

22. For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son:

23. That all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father. He that honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father which hath sent him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxi. s. 5, 6) Having said that the Father would shew the Son greater works than these, He proceeds to describe these greater works: For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will. These are plainly greater works, for it is more of a miracle that a dead man should rise again, than that a sick man should recover. We must not understand from the words, that some are raised by the Father, others by the Son; but that the Son raises to life the same whom the Father raiseth. And to guard against any one saying, The Father raises the dead by the Son, the former by His own power, the latter, like an instrument, by another power, He asserts distinctly the power of the Son: The Son quickeneth whom he will. Observe here not only the power of the Son, but also His will. Father and Son have the same power and will. The Father willeth nothing distinct from the Son; but both have the same will, even as they have the same substance.

HILARY. (de Trin. vii. c. 19) For to will is the free power of a nature, which by the act of choice, resteth in the blessedness of perfect excellence.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxi. s. 11.) But who are these dead, whom the Father and Son raise to life? He alludes to the general resurrection which is to be;

not to the resurrection of those few, who were raised to life, that the rest might believe; as Lazarus, who rose again, to die afterwards. Having said then, For as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, to prevent our taking the words to refer to the dead whom He raised up for the sake of the miracle, and not to the resurrection to life eternal, He adds, For the Father judgeth no man; thus shewing that He spoke of that resurrection of the dead which would take place at the judgment. (Tr. xxiii. s. 13). Or the words, As the Father raiseth up the dead, &c.refer to the resurrection of the soul; For the Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son, to the resurrection of the body. For the resurrection of the soul takes place by the substance of the Father and the Sonk, and therefore it is the work of the Father and the Son together: but the resurrection of the body takes place by a dispensation of the Son's humanity, which is a temporal dispensation, and not coeternal with the Father. (Tr. xxi. s. 12.). But see how the Word of Christ leads the mind in different directions, not allowing it any carnal resting place; but by variety of motion exercising it, by exercise purifying it, by purifying enlarging its capacity, and after enlarging filling it. He said just before that the Father shewed what things soever He did to the Son. So I saw, as it were, the Father working, and the Son waiting: now again I see the Son working, the Father resting.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. c. 29. [xiii.]) For this, viz. that the Father hath given all judgment unto the Son, does not mean that He begat the Son with this attribute, as is meant in the words, So hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself. For if so, it would not be said, The Father judgeth no man, because, in that the Father begat the Son equal, He judgeth with the Son. What is meant is, that in the judgment, not the form of God but the form of the Son of man will appear; not because He will not judge Who hath given all judgment to the Son; since the Son says of Him below, There is one that seeketh and judgeth, (c. 8.) but the Father judgeth no man; i. e. no one will see Him in the judgment, but all will see the Son, because He is the Son of man, even the ungodly who will look on Him Whom they pierced. (Zech. 12)

HILARY. (de Trin vii. c. 20) Having said that the Son quickeneth whom He will, in order that we might not lose sight of the nativity, and think that He stood upon the ground of His own unborn power, He immediately adds, For the Father judgeth no man, but hath given all judgment unto the Son. In that all judgment is given to Him, both His nature, and His nativity are shewn; because only a self-existent nature can possess all things, and nativity cannot have any thing, except what is given it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxviii. 1) As He gave Him life, i. e. begot Him living; so He gave Him judgment, i. e. begot Him a judge. Gave, it is said, that thou mayest not think Him unbegotten, and imagine two Fathers: All judgment, because He has the awarding both of punishment and reward.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 20) All judgment is given to Him, because He quickens whom He will. Nor can the judgment be looked on as taken away from the Father, inasmuch as the cause of His not judging is, that the judgment of the Son is His. For all judgment is given from the Father. And the reason for which He gives it, appears immediately after: That all men may honour the Son even as they honour the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxix. 2) For, lest you should infer from hearing that the Author of His power was the Father, any difference of substance, or inequality of honour, He connects the honour of the Son with the honour of the Father, shewing that both have the same. But shall men then call Him the Father? God forbid; he who calls Him the Father, does not honour the Son equally with the Father, but confounds both.

AUGUSTINE. (xxi. s. 13) First indeed, the Son appeared as a servant, and the Father was honoured as God. But the Son will be seen to be equal to the Father, that all men may honour the Son, even as they honour the Father. 1But what if persons are found, who honour the Father, and do not honour the Son? It cannot be: He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father which hath sent Him. It is one thing to acknowledge God, as God; and another to acknowledge Him as the Father. When thou acknowledgest God the Creator, thou acknowledgest an almighty, supreme, eternal, invisible, immutable Spirit. When thou acknowledgest the Father, thou dost in reality acknowledge the Son; for He could not be the Father, had He not the Son. But if thou honour the Father as greater, the Son as less, so far as thou givest less honour to the Son, thou takest away from the honour of the Father. For thou in reality thinkest that the Father could not or would not beget the Son equal to Himself; which if He would not do, He was envious, if He could not, He was weak. (Tr. xxiii. s. 13). Or, That all men should honour the Son even as they honour the Father; has a reference to the resurrection of souls, which is the work of the Son, as well as of the

Father. But the resurrection of the body is meant in what comes after: He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father that sent Him. Here is no as; the man Christ is honoured, but not as the Father Who sent Him, since with respect to His manhood He Himself saith, My Father is greater than I. (Tr. xxi. s. 17). But some one will say, if the Son is sent by the Father, He is inferior to the Father. Leave thy fleshly actions, and understand a mission, not a separation. Human things deceive, divine things make clear; although even human things give testimony against thee, e. g. if a man offers marriage to a woman, and cannot obtain her by himself, he sends a friend, greater than himself, to urge his suit for him. But see the difference in human things. A man does not go with him whom he sends; but the Father Who sent the Son, never ceased to be with the Son; as we read, I am not alone, but the Father is with Me. (c. 16)

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. 28. [xx.]) It is not, however, as being born of the Father, that the Son is said to be sent, but from His appearing in this world, as the Word made flesh; as He says, I went forth from the Father, and am come into the world: (John 16:28) or from His being received into our minds individually, as we readl, Send her, that she may be with me, and may labour with me.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 21) The conclusion then stands good against all the fury of heretical minds. He is the Son, because He does nothing of Himself: He is God, because, whatsoever things the Father doeth, He doeth the same; They are one, because They are equal in honour: He is not the Father, because He is sent.

5:24

24. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life.

GLOSS. Having said that the Son quickeneth whom He will, He next shews that we attain to life through the Son: Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth My word, and believeth on Him that sent Me, hath everlasting life.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxii. s. 2) If in hearing and believing is eternal life, how much more in understanding? But the step to our piety is faith, the fruit of faith, understanding. It is not, Believeth on Me, but on Him that sent Me. Why is one to hear His word, and believe another? Is it not that He means to say, His word is in Me? And what is, Heareth My word, but heareth Me? And it is, Believeth on Him that sent Me; as to say, He that believeth on Him, believeth on His Word, i. e. on Me, because I am the Word of the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxix. 2) Or, He did not say, He that heareth My words, and believeth on Me; as they would have thought this empty boasting and arrogance. To say, Believeth on Him that sent Me, was a better way of making His discourse acceptable. To this end He says two things: one, that he who hears Him, believes on the Father; the other, that he who hears and believes shall not come into condemnation.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxii. s. 4. et sq.) But who is this favoured Person? Will there be any one better than the Apostle Paul, who says, We must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ? (1 Cor. 6) Now judgment sometimes means punishment, sometimes trial. In the sense of trial, we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ: in the sense of condemnation we read, some shall not come into judgment; i. e. shall not be condemned. It follows, but is passed from death into life: not, is now passing, but hath passed from the death of unbelief, into the life of faith, from the death of sin, unto the life of righteousness. Or, it is so said perhaps, to prevent our supposing that faith would save us from bodily death, that penalty which we must pay for Adam’s transgression. He, in whom we all then were, heard the divine sentence, Thou shall surely die; (Gen. 2) nor can we evade it. But when we have suffered the death of the old man, we shall receive the life of the new, and by death make a passage to life. But to what life? (Tr. xix.). To life everlasting: the dead shall rise again at the end of the world, and enter into everlasting life. (Tr. xxii.). For this life does not deserve the name of life; only that life is true which is eternal.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. lxiv) We see the lovers of this present transitory life so intent on its welfare, that when in danger of death, they will take any means to delay its approach, though they can not hope to drive it off altogether. If so much care and labour then is spent on gaining a little additional length of life, how ought we to strive after life eternal? And if they are thought wise, who endeavour in every way to put off death, though they can live but a few days longer; how foolish are they who so live, as to lose the eternal day?

5:25–26

25. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live.

26. For as the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiii. s. 14) Some one might ask thee, The Father quickeneth him who believes on Him; but what of thee? dost thou not quicken? Observe thou that the Son also quickens whom He will: Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxix. 2) After, The hour cometh, He adds, and now is; to let us know that it will not be long before it comes. For as in the future resurrection we shall be roused by hearing His voice speaking to us, so is it now.

THEOPHYLACT. Here He speaks with a reference to those whom He was about to raise from the dead: viz. the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, the son of the widow, and Lazarus.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxii. s. 12) Or, He means to guard against our thinking, that the being passed from death to life, refers to the future resurrection; its meaning being, that he who believes is passed: and therefore He says, Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour cometh, (what hour?) and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. He saith not, because they live, they hear; but in consequence of hearing, they come to life again. But what is hearing, but obeying? For they who believe and do according to the true faith, live, and are not dead; whereas those who believe not, or, believing, live a bad life, and have not love, are rather to be accounted dead. And yet that hour is still going on, and will go on, the same hour, to the end of the world: as John says, It is the last hour. (1 John 2:13)

AUGUSTINE. When the dead, i. e. unbelievers, shall hear the voice of the Son of God, i. e. the Gospel: and they that hear, i. e. who obey, shall live, i. e. be justified, and no longer remain in unbelief.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxii. s. 9) But some one will ask, Hath the Son life, whence those who believe will live? Hear His own words: As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself. Life is original and absolute in Him, cometh from no other source, dependeth on no other power. He is not as if He were partaker of a life, which is not Himself; but has life in Himself: so as that He Himself is His own life. Hear, O dead soul, the Father, speaking by the Son: arise, that thou mayest receive that life which thou hast not in thyself, and enter into the first resurrection. For this life, which the Father and the Son are, pertaineth to the soul, and is not perceived by the body. The rational mind only discovers the life of wisdom.

HILARY. The heretics, driven hard by Scripture proofs, are obliged to attribute to the Son at any rate a likeness, in respect of virtue, to the Father. But they do not admit a likeness of nature, not being able to see that a likeness of virtue, could not arise but from a likeness of nature; as an inferior nature can never attain to the virtue of a higher and better one. And it cannot be denied that the Son of God has the same virtue with the Father, when He says, What things soever (the Father) doeth, the same doeth the Son likewise. But an express mention of the likeness of nature follows: As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself. In life are comprehended nature and essence. And the Son, as He hath it, so hath He it given to Him. For the same which is life in both, is essence in both; and the life, i. e. essence, which is begotten from life, is born; though not born unlike the other. For, being life from life, it remains like in nature to its origin.

AUGUSTINE. (xv. de Trin. c. 47. [xxvi.]) The Father must he understand not to have given life to the Son, who was existing without life, but so to have begotten Him, independently of time, that the life which He gave Him in begetting, was coeternal with His own.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 27, 28) Living born from living, hath the perfection of nativity, without the newness of nature. For there is nothing new implied in generation from living to living, the life not coming at its birth from nothing. And the life which derives its birth from life, must by the unity of nature, and the sacrament of a perfect birth, both be in the living being, and have the being who lives it, in itself. Weak human nature indeed is made up of unequal elements, and brought to life out of inanimate matter; nor does the human offspring live for some time after it is begotten. Neither does it wholly live from life, since much grows up in it insensibly, and decays insensibly. But in the case of God, the whole of what He is, lives: for God is life, and from life, can nothing be but what is living.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxii. s. 10) Given to the Son, then, has the meaning of, begat the Son; for He gave Him the life, by begetting. As He gave Him being, so He gave Him to have life in Himself; so that the Son did not stand in need of life to come to Him from without; but was in Himself the fulness of life, whence others, i. e. believers, received their life. What then is the difference between Them? This, that one gave, the other received.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxix. 3) The likeness is perfect in all but one respect, viz. that, in point of essence, one is the Father, the other the Son.

HILARY. For the person of the receiver, is distinct from that of the giver: it being inconceivable that one and the same person, should give to and receive from Himself. He who lives of Himself is one person: He who acknowledges an Author of His life is another.

5:27–29

27. And hath given him authority to execute judgment also, because he is the Son of man.

28. Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice,

29. And shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation.

THEOPHYLACT. The Father granted the Son power not only to give life, but also to execute judgment. And hath given Him authority to execute judgment.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxix. s. 3) But why does He dwell so constantly on these subjects; judgment, resurrection, and life? Because these are the most powerful arguments for bringing men over to the faith, and the most likely ones to prevail with obstinate hearers. For one who is persuaded that he shall rise again, and be called by the Son to account for his misdeeds, will, though he know nothing more than this, be anxious to propitiate his Judge. It follows, Because He is the Son of man, marvel not at this. Paul of Samosata reads it, Hath given Him power to execute judgment also, because He is the Son of man. But this connexion has no meaning; for He does not receive the power to judge because He is man, (as, on this supposition, what would prevent all men from being judges:) but because He is the ineffable Son of God; therefore is He Judge. We must read it then, Because He is the Son of man, marvel not at this. As Christ's hearers thought him a mere man, and as what He asserted of Himself was too high to be true of men, or even angels, or any being short of God Himself, there was a strong obstacle in the way of their believing, which our Lord notices in order to remove it: Marvel not, He says, that He is the Son of man: and then adds the reason why they should not marvel: For the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God. And why did He not say, Marvel not that He is the Son of man: because in truth He is the Son of God? Because, having given out that it was He who should raise men from the dead, the resurrection being a strictly divine work, He leaves His hearers to infer that He is God, and the Son of God. Persons in arguing often do this. When they have brought out grounds amply sufficient to prove the conclusion they want, they do not draw that conclusion themselves; but, to make the victory greater, leave the opponent to draw it. In referring above to the resurrection of Lazarus and the rest, he said nothing about judgment, for Lazarus did not rise again for judgment; whereas now, that He is speaking of the general resurrection, He brings in the mention of the judgment: And (they) shall come forth, He says, they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation. Having said above, He that heareth My words, and believeth on Him that sent Me, hath everlasting life; that men might not suppose from this, that belief was sufficient for salvation, He proceeds to speak of works: And they that have done good,—and they that have done evil.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxii. in Joan. s. 10, 11) Or thus: Inasmuch as the Word was in the beginning with God, the Father gave Him to have life in Himself; but inasmuch as the Word was made flesh of the Virgin Mary, being made man, He became the Son of man: and as the Son of man, He received power to execute judgment at the end of the world; at which time the bodies of the dead shall rise again. The souls then of the dead God raises by Christ the Son of God; their bodies by the same Christ, the Son of man. Wherefore He adds, Because He is the Son of man: for, as to the Son of God, He always had the power.

AUGUSTINE. (de Ver. Dom. Ser. 64) At the judgment will appear the form of man, that form will judge, which was judged; He will sit a Judge Who stood before the judge; He will condemn the guilty, Who was condemned innocent. For it is proper that the judged should see their Judge. Now the judged consist of both good and bad; so that the form of the servant will be shewn to good and bad alike; the form of God to the good only. Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God. (Matt. 5:8)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xix. s. 14) None if the founders of false religious sects have been able to deny the resurrection of the soul, but many have denied the resurrection of the body; and, unless Thou, Lord Jesus, hadst declared it, what answer could we give the gainsayer? To set forth this truth, He says, Marvel not at this; (i. e. that He hath given power to the Son of man to execute judgment,) for the hour is coming, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (de Ver. Dom. Ser. 64) He does not add, And now is, here; because this hour would be at the end of the world. Marvel not, i. e. marvel not, men will all be judged by a man. But what men? Not those only, whom He will find alive, For the hour cometh, in which all that are in their graves shall hear His voice.

AUGUSTINE. (Sup. Joan. Tr. xix. s. 17, 18) What can be plainer? Men’s bodies are in their graves, not their souls. Above when He said, The hour cometh, and added, and now is; He proceeds, When the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God. He does not say, All the dead; for by the dead are meant the wicked, and the wicked have not all been brought to obey the Gospel. But in the end of the world all that are in their graves shall hear His voice, and come forth. He does not say, Shall live, as He said above, when He spoke of the eternal and blessed life; which all will not have, who shall come forth from their graves. This judgment was committed to Him because He was the Son of man. But what takes place in this judgment? They that have done good shall go unto the resurrection of life, i. e. to live with the Angels of God; they that have done evil unto the resurrection of judgment. Judgment here meaning damnation.

5:30

30. I can of mine own self do nothing: as I hear, I judge: and my judgment is just; because I seek not mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xix. s. 19) We were about to ask Christ, Thou wilt judge, and the Father not judge: wilt not Thou then judge according to the Father? He anticipates us by saying, I can of Mine own Self do nothing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxix. 4) That is, nothing that is a departure from, or that is unlike to, what the Father wishes, shall ye see done by Me, but as I hear, I judge. He is only shewing that it was impossible He should ever wish any thing but what the Father wished. I judge, His meaning is, as if it were My Father that judged.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiii. s. 15) When He spoke of the resurrection of the soul, He did not say, Hear, but, See. (v. 19) Hear implies a command issuing from the Father. He speaks as man, who is inferior to the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. contr. Arrian. c. 9. [xiv.]) As I hear, I judge, is said with reference either to His human subordination, as the Son of man, or to that immutable and simple nature of the Sonship derived from the Father; in which nature hearing and seeing is identical with being. (ut sup. c. xvii.). Wherefore as He hears, He judges. The Word is begotten one with the Father, and therefore judges according to truth. (c. xviii). It follows, And My judgment is just, because I seek not Mine own will, but the will of the Father which hath sent Me. This is intended to take us back to that man (sc. Adam.) who, by seeking his own will, not the will of Him who made him, did not judge himself justly, but had a just judgment pronounced upon him. He did not believe that, by doing his own will, not God’s, he should die. So he did his own will, and died; because the judgment of God is just, which judgment the Son of God executes, by not seeking His own will, i. e. His will as being the Son of man. Not that He has no will in judging, but His will is not His own in such sense, as to be different from the Father’s.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xix. 19.) I seek not then Mine own will, i. e. the will of the Son of man, in opposition to God: for men do their own will, not God’s, when, to do what they wish, they violate God’s commands. But when they so do what they wish, as at the same time to follow the will of God, they do not their own will. Or, I seek not Mine own will: i. e. because I am not of myself, but of the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxix. 4) He shews that the Father’s will is not a different one from His own, but one and the same, as a ground of defence. Nor marvel if being hitherto thought no more than a mere man, He defends Himself in a somewhat human way, and shews his judgment to be just on the same ground which any other person would have taken; viz. that one who has his own ends in view, may incur suspicion of injustice, but that one who has not cannot.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxi) The only Son says, I seek not Mine own will: and yet men wish to do their own will. Let us do the will of the Father, Christ, and Holy Ghost: for these have one will, power, and majesty.

5:31–40

31. If I bear witness of myself, my witness is not true.

32. There is another that beareth witness of me; and I know that the witness which he witnesseth of me is true.

33. Ye sent unto John, and he bare witness unto the truth.

34. But I receive not testimony from man: but these things I say, that ye might be saved.

35. He was a burning and a shining light: and ye were willing for a season to rejoice in his light.

36. But I have greater witness than that of John: for the works which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me.

37. And the Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of me. Ye have neither heard his voice at any time, nor seen his shape.

38. And ye have not his word abiding in you: for whom he hath sent, him ye believe not.

39. Search the Scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life: and they are they which testify of me.

40. And ye will not come to me, that ye might have life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl. 1) He now brings proof of those high declarations respecting Himself. He answers an objection: If I bear witness of Myself, My witness is not true. These are Christ’s own words. But does not Christ in many places bear witness of Himself? And if all this is false, where is our hope of salvation? Whence shall we obtain truth, when the

Truth Itself says, My witness is not true. We must believe then that true, here, is said, not with reference to the intrinsic value of His testimony, but to their suspicions; for the Jews might say, We do not believe Thee, because no one who bears witness to himself is to be depended on. In answer then, he puts forth three clear and irrefragable proofs, three witnesses as it were, to the truth of what He had said; the works which He had done, the testimony of the Father, and the preaching of John: putting the least of these foremost, i. e. the preaching of John: There is another that beareth witness of Me: and I know that the witness which he witnesseth of Me is true.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. 43) He knew Himself that His witness of Himself was true, but in compassion to the weak and unbelieving, the Sun sought for candles, that their weak sight might not be dazzled by His full blaze. And therefore John was brought forward to give his testimony to the truth. Not that there is such testimony really, for whatever witnesses bear witness to Him, it is really He who bears witness to Himself; as it is His dwelling in the witnesses, which moves them so to give their witness to the truth.

ALCUIN. Or thus; Christ, being both God and man, He shews the proper existence of both, by sometimes speaking according to the nature he took from man, sometimes according to the majesty of the Godhead. If I bear witness of Myself, My witness is not true: this is to be understood of His humanity; the sense being, If I, a man, bear witness of Myself, i. e. without God, My witness is not true: and then follows, There is another that beareth witness of Me. The Father bore witness of Christ, by the voice which was heard at the baptism, and at the transfiguration on the mount. And I know that His witness is true; because He is the God of truth. How then can His witness be otherwise than true?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl. 2) But according to the former interpretation, they might say to Him, If Thy witness is not true, how sayest Thou, I know that the witness of John is true? But His answer meets the objection: Ye sent unto John, and he bare witness of the truth: as if to say: Ye would not have sent to John, if ye had not thought him worthy of credit. And what is more remarkable, they did send to him, not to ask Him about Christ, but about himself. For they who were sent out did not say, What sayest thou of Christ? but, Who art thou? what sayest thou of thyself? (c. 1:22) In so great admiration did they hold him.

ALCUIN. But he bore witness not to himself, but to the truth: as the friend of the truth, he bore witness to the truth, i. e. Christ. Our Lord, on His part, does not reject the witness of John, as not being necessary, but shews only that men ought not to give such attention to John as to forget that Christ's witness was all that was necessary to Himself. But I receive not, He says, testimony from men.

BEDE. Because I do not want it. John, though he bore witness, did it not that Christ might increase, but that men might be brought to the knowledge of Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl. 2) Even the witness of John was the witness of God: for what he said, God taught him. But to anticipate their asking how it appeared that God taught John, as if the Jews had objected that John's witness might not be true, our Lord anticipates them by saying, "Ye sought him yourselves to enquire of him; that is why I use his testimony, for I need it not." He adds, But these things I say that ye might be saved. As if He said, I being God, needed not this human kind of testimony. But, since ye attend more to him, and think him more worthy of credit than any one else, while ye do not believe me, though I work miracles; for this cause I remind you of his testimony. But had they not received John's testimony? Before they have time to ask this, He answers it: He was a burning and a shining light, and ye were willing for a season to rejoice in his light. He says this to shew, how lightly they had held by John, and how soon they had left him, thus preventing him from leading them to Christ. He calls him a candle, because John had not his light from himself, but from the grace of the Holy Spirit.

ALCUIN. John was a candle lighted by Christ, the Light, burning with faith and love, shining in word and deed. He was sent before, to confound the enemies of Christ, according to the Psalm, I have ordained a lantern for Mine Anointed; as for His enemies, I shall clothe them with shamem. (Ps. 131)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl. 2) I therefore direct you to John, not because I want his testimony, but that ye may be saved: for I have greater witness than that of John, i. e. that of my works; The works which the Father hath given Me to finish, the same works that I do bear witness of Me, that the Father hath sent Me.

ALCUIN. That He enlightens the blind, that He opens the deaf ear, looses the mouth of the dumb, casts out devils, raises the dead; these works bear witness of Christ.

HILARY. (vi. de Trin. c. 27) The Only-begotten God shews Himself to be the Son, on the testimony not of man only, but of His own power. The works which He does, bear witness to His being sent from the Father. Therefore the obedience of the Son and the authority of the Father are set forth in Him who was sent. But the testimony of works not being sufficient evidence, it follows, And the Father Himself which hath sent Me, hath borne witness of Me. Open the Evangelic volumes, and examine their whole range: no testimony of the Father to the Son is given in any of the books, other than that He is the Son. So what a calumny is it in men now saying that this is only a name of adoption: thus making God a liar, and names unmeaning.

BEDE. (v. Joan.) By His mission we must understand His incarnation. Lastly, He shews that God is incorporeal, and cannot be seen by the bodily eye: Ye have neither heard His voice at any time, nor seen His shape.

ALCUIN. The Jews might say, We heard the voice of the Lord at Sinai, and saw Him under the appearance of fire. If God then bears witness of Thee, we should know His voice. To which He replies, I have the witness of the Father, though ye understand it not; because ye never heard His voice, or saw His shape.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl. 3) How then says Moses, Ask—whether there hath been any such thing as this great thing is: did ever people hear the voice of God, speaking out of the midst of the fire, as thou hast heard and seen? (Deut. 4:32, 33) Isaiah too, and many others, are said to have seen Him. So what does Christ mean here? He means to impress upon them the philosophical doctrine, that God has neither voice, or appearance, or shape; but is superior to such modes of speaking of Him. For as in saying, Ye have never heard His voice, He does not mean to say that He has a voice, only not an audible one to them; so when He says, Nor have even His shape, no tangible, sensible, or visible shape is implied to belong to God: but all such mode of speaking is pronounced inapplicable to God.

ALCUIN. For it is not by the carnal ear, but by the spiritual understanding, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, that God is heard. And they did not hear the spiritual voice, because they did not love or obey Him, nor saw they His shape; inasmuch as that is not to be seen by the outward eye, but by faith and love.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl. 3) But it was impossible for them to declare that they had received, and obeyed God's commands: and therefore He adds, Ye have not His word abiding in you; i. e. the commandments, the law, and the prophets; though God instituted them, ye have them not. For if the Scriptures every where tell you to believe on Me, and ye believe not, it is manifest that His word is gone from you: For whom He hath sent, Him ye believe not.

ALCUIN. Or thus; they cannot have abiding in them the Word which was in the beginning, who came not to keep in mind, or fulfil in practice, that word of God which they hear. Having mentioned the testimonies of John, and the Father, and of His works, He adds now that of the Mosaic Law: Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life; and they are they which testify of Me: as if He said, Ye think ye have eternal life in the Scriptures, and reject Me as being opposed to Moses: but you will find that Moses himself testifies to My being God, if you search the Scripture carefully. All Scripture indeed bears witness of Christ, whether by its types, or by prophets, or by the ministering of Angels. But the Jews did not believe these intimations of Christ, and therefore could not obtain eternal life: Ye will not come to Me, that ye may have life; meaning, The Scriptures bear witness of Me, but ye will not come to Me notwithstanding, i. e. ye will not believe on Me, and seek for salvation at My hands.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xl. 3) Or the connection may be given thus. They might say to Him, How, if we have never heard God's voice, has God borne witness to you? So He says, Search the Scriptures; meaning that God had borne witness of Him by the Scriptures. He had borne witness indeed at the Jordan, and on the mount. But they did not hear the voice on the mount, and did not attend to it at the Jordan. Wherefore He sends them to the Scriptures, when they would also find the Father's testimony. (Hom. xli. 1). He did not send them however to the Scriptures simply to read them, but to examine them attentively, because Scripture ever threw a shade over its own meaning, and did not display it on the surface. The treasure was, as it were, hidden from their eye. He does not say, For in them ye have eternal life, but, For in them ye think ye have eternal life; meaning that they did not reap much fruit from the Scriptures, thinking, as they did, that they should be saved by the mere reading of them, without faith. For which reason He adds, Ye will not come to Me; i. e. ye will not believe on Me.

BEDE. (in v. Joan.) That coming is put for believing we know, Come unto Him, and be lightened. He adds, That ye might have life; (Ps. 33) For, if the soul which sinneth dies, they were dead in soul and mind. And therefore He promises the life of the soul, i. e. eternal happiness.

5:41–47

41. I receive not honour from men.

42. But I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you.

43. I am come in my Father’s name, and ye receive me not: if another shall come in his own name, him ye will receive.

44. How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only?

45. Do not think that I will accuse you to the Father: there is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom ye trust.

46. For had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me: for he wrote of me.

47. But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe my words?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 1) Our Lord having made mention of John, and the witness of God, and His own works, many, who did not see that His motive was to induce them to believe, might suspect Him of a desire for human glory, and therefore He says, I receive not honour from men: i. e. I do not want it. My nature is not such as to want that glory, which cometh from men. For if the Son receives no addition from the light of a candle, much more am not I in want of human glory.

ALCUIN. Or, I receive not honour from men: i. e. I seek not human praise; for I came not to receive carnal honour from men, but to give spiritual honour to men. I do not bring forward this testimony then, because I seek my own glory; but because I compassionate your wanderings, and wish to bring you back to the way of truth. Hence what follows, But I know you that ye have not the love of God in you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 1) As if to say, I said this to prove that it is not from your love of God, that you persecute Me; for He bears witness to Me, by My own works, and by the Scriptures. So that, if ye loved God, as ye rejected Me, thinking Me against God, so now ye would come to Me. But ye do not love Him. And He proves this, not only from what they do now, but from what they will do in time to come: I am come in My Father's name, and ye receive Me not; if another shall come in his own name, him ye will receive. He says plainly, I am come in the Father's name, that they might never be able to plead ignorance as an excuse

ALCUIN. As if He said, For this cause came I into the world, that through Me the name of the Father might be glorified; for I attribute all to Him. As then they would not receive Him, Who came to do His Father's will; they had not the love of God. But Antichrist will come not in the Father's name, but in his own, to seek, not the Father's glory, but his own. And the Jews having rejected Christ, it was a fit punishment on them, that they should receive Antichrist, and believe a lie, as they would not believe the Truth.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. 45. a med.) Hear John, As ye have heard that Antichrist shall come, even now are there many Antichrists. (1 John 2:18) But what dost thou dread in Antichrist, except that he will exalt his own name, and despise the name of the Lord? And what else does he do, who says, "I justify;" or those who say, "Unless we are good, ye must perisho?" Wherefore my life shall depend on Thee, and my salvation shall be fastened to Thee. Shall I so forget my foundation? Is not my rock Christ?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 13.) Here is the crowning proof of their impiety. He says, as it were, If it was the love of God that made you persecute me, you would persecute Antichrist much more: for he does not profess to be sent by the Father, or to come according to His will; but, on the contrary, usurping what does not belong to him, will proclaim himself to be God over all. It is manifest that your persecution of Me is from malice and hatred of God. Then He gives the reason of their unbelief: How can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only? another proof this, that theirs was not a zeal for God, but a gratification of their own passions.

ALCUIN. How faulty then is the boasting temper, and that eagerness for human praise, which likes to be thought to have what it has not, and would fain be thought to have all that it has, by its own strength. Men of such temper cannot believe; for in their hearts, they are bent solely on gaining praise, and setting themselves up above others.

BEDE. The best way of guarding against this sin, is to bring to our consciences the remembrance, that we are dust, and should ascribe all the good that we have not to ourselves, but to God. And we should endeavour always to be such, as we wish to appear to others. Then, as they might ask, Wilt thou accuse us then to the Father? He anticipates this question: Do not think that I will accuse you to the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 2) For I am not come to condemn, but to save. There is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom you trust. As He had said of the Scriptures above: In them ye think ye have eternal life. So now of Moses He says, In whom ye trust, always answering them out of their authorities. But they will say, How will he accuse us? What hast Thou to do with Moses, Thou who hast broken the sabbath? So He adds: For had ye believed Moses, ye would perhaps have believed Me, for he wrote of me, This is connected with what was said before. For where evidence that He came from God had been forced upon them by His words, by the voice of John, and the testimony of the Father, it was certain that Moses would condemn them; (alluding to Deut. 13:1.) for he had said, If any one shall come, doing miracles, leading men to God, and foretelling the future with certainty, you must obey him. Christ did all this, and they did not obey Him.

ALCUIN. Perhaps, He says, in accommodation to our way of speaking, not because there is really any doubting in God. Moses prophesied of Christ, A Prophet shall the Lord your God raise up from among your brethren like unto me: Him shall ye hear. (Deut. 18:18)

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. l. xvi. c. 9) But, in fact, the whole that Moses wrote, was written of Christ, i. e. it has reference to Him principally; whether it point to Him by figurative actions, or expression; or set forth His grace and glory.

But if ye believe not his writings, how shall ye believe My words.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, He has even written, and has left his books among you, as a constant memento to you, lest you forget His words. And since you believe not his writings, how can ye believe My unwritten words?

ALCUIN. From this we may infer too, that he who knows the commandments against stealing, and other crimes, and neglects them, will never fulfil the more perfect and refined precepts of the Gospel.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xli. 2) Indeed had they attended to His words, they ought and would have tried to learn from Him, what the things were which Moses had written of Him. But they are silent. For it is the nature of wickedness to defy persuasion. Do what you will, it retains its venom to the last.

CHAPTER 6

6:1–14

1. After these things Jesus went over the sea of Galilee, which is the sea of Tiberias.

2. And a great multitude followed him, because they saw his miracles which he did on them that were diseased.

3. And Jesus went up into a mountain, and there he sat with his disciples.

4. And the Passover, a feast of the Jews, was nigh.

5. When Jesus then lifted up his eyes, and saw a great company come unto him, he saith unto Philip, Whence shall we buy bread, that these may cat?

6. And this he said to prove him: for he himself knew what he would do.

7. Philip answered him, Two hundred pennyworth of bread is not sufficient for them, that every one of them may take a little.

8. One of his disciples, Andrew, Simon Peter’s brother, saith unto him,

9. There is a lad here, which hath five barley loaves, and two small fishes: but what are they among so many?

10. And Jesus said, Make the men sit down. Now there was much grass in the place. So the men sat down, in number about five thousand.

11. And Jesus took the loaves; and when he had given thanks, he distributed to the disciples, and the disciples to them that were set down; and likewise of the fishes as much as they would.

12. When they were filled, he said unto his disciples, Gather up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost.

13. Therefore they gathered them together, and filled twelve baskets with the fragments of the five barley loaves, which remained over and above unto them that had eaten.

14. Then those men, when they had seen the miracle that Jesus did, said, This is of a truth that Prophet that should come into the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 1) As missiles rebound with great force from a hard body, and fly off in all directions, whereas a softer material retains and stops them; so violent men are only excited to greater rage by violence on the side of their opponents, whereas gentleness softens them. Christ quieted the irritation of the Jews by retiring from Jerusalem. He went into Galilee, but not to Cana again, but beyond the sea: After these things Jesus went over the sea of Galilee, which is the sea of Tiberias.

ALCUIN. This sea hath different names, from the different places with which it is connected; the sea of Galilee, from the province; the sea of Tiberias, from the city of that name. It is called a sea, though it is not salt water, that name being applied to all large pieces of water, in Hebrew. This sea our Lord often passes over, in going to preach to the people bordering on it.

THEOPHYLACT. He goes from place to place to try the dispositions of people, and excite a desire to hear Him: And a great multitude followed Him, because they saw His miracles which He did on them that were diseased.

ALCUIN. viz. His giving sight to the blind, and other like miracles. And it should be understood, that all, whom He healed in body, He renewed likewise in soul.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 1) Though favoured with such teaching, they were influenced less by it, than by the miracles; a sign of their low state of belief: for Paul says of tongues, that they are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not. (1 Cor. 14:22) They were wiser of whom it is said, that they were astonished at His doctrine. (Matt. 7:28) The Evangelist does not say what miracles He wrought, the great object of his book being to give our Lord’s discourses. It follows: And Jesus went up into a mountain, and there sat with His disciples. He went up into the mountain, on account of the miracle which was going to be done. That the disciples alone ascended with Him, implies that the people who stayed behind were in fault for not following. He went up to the mountain too, as a lesson to us to retire from the tumult and confusion of the world, and leave wisdom in solitude. And the passover, a feast of the Jews, was nigh. Observe, in a whole year, the Evangelist has told us of no miracles of Christ, except His healing the impotent man, and the nobleman’s son. His object was to give not a regular history, but only a few of the principal acts of our Lord. But why did not our Lord go up to the feast? He was taking occasion, from the wickedness of the Jews, gradually to abolish the Law.

THEOPHYLACT. The persecutions of the Jews gave Him reason for retiring, and thus setting aside the Law. The truth being now revealed, types were at an end, and He was under no obligation to keep the Jewish feasts. Observe the expression, a feast of the Jews, (Mat. 14:13) not a feast of Christ.

BEDE. If we compare the accounts of the different Evangelists, we shall find very clearly, that there was an interval of a year between the beheading of John, and our Lord's Passion. For, since Matthew says that our Lord, on hearing of the death of John, withdrew into a desert place, where He fed the multitude; and John says that the Passover was nigh, when He fed the multitude; it is evident that John was beheaded shortly before the Passover. And at the same feast, the next year Christ suffered. It follows, When Jesus then lifted up His eyes, and saw a great company come unto Him, He saith unto Philip, Whence shall we buy bread, that these may eat? When Jesus lifted up His eyes, this is to shew us, that Jesus was not generally with His eyes lifted up, looking about Him, but sitting calm and attentive, surrounded by His disciples.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 1) Nor did He only sit with His disciples, but conversed with them familiarly, and gained possession of their minds. Then He looked, and saw a crowd advancing. But why did He ask Philip that question? Because He knew that His disciples, and he especially, needed further teaching. For this Philip it was who said afterwards, Shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us. (c. 14:8) And if the miracle had been performed at once, without any introduction, the greatness of it would not have been seen. The disciples were made to confess their own inability, that they might see the miracle more clearly; And this He said to prove him.

AUGUSTINE. (de verb. Dom. Serm. 17) One kind of temptation leads to sin, with which God never tempts any one; (James 1:13.) and there is another kind by which faith is tried. (Deut. 13:3.) In this sense it is said that Christ proved His disciple. This is not meant to imply that He did not know what Philip would say; but is an accommodation to men's way of speaking. For as the expression, Who searcheth the hearts of men, does not mean the searching of ignorance, but of absolute knowledge; so here, when it is said that our Lord proved Philip, we must understand that He knew him perfectly, but that He tried him, in order to confirm his faith. The Evangelist himself guards against the mistake which this imperfect mode of speaking might occasion, by adding, For He Himself knew what He would do.

ALCUIN. He asks him this question, not for His own information, but in order to shew His yet unformed disciple his dulness of mind, which he could not perceive of himself.

THEOPHYLACT. Or to shew others it. He was not ignorant of His disciple’s heart Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. l. ii. c. xlvi) But if our Lord, according to John’s account, on seeing the multitude, asked Philip, tempting him, whence they could buy food for them, it is difficult at first to see how it can be true, according to the other account, that the disciples first told our Lord, to send away the multitude; and that our Lord replied, They need not depart; give ye them to eat. (Matt. 25:16) We must understand then it was after saying this, that our Lord saw the multitude, and said to Philip what John had related, which has been omitted by the rest.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. s. 1) Or they are two different occasions altogether.

THEOPHYLACT. Thus tried by our Lord, Philip was found to be possessed with human notions, as appears from what follows, Philip answered Him, Two hundred pennyworth of bread is not sufficient for them, that every one of them may take a little.

ALCUIN. Wherein he shews his dulness: for, had he perfect ideas of his Creator, he would not be thus doubting His power.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evan. l. ii. c. xlvi) The reply, which is attributed to Philip by John, Mark puts in the mouth of all the disciples, either meaning us to understand that Philip spoke for the rest, or else putting the plural number for the singular, which is often done.

THEOPHYLACT. Andrew is in the same perplexity that Philip is; only he has rather higher notions of our Lord: There is a lad here which hath five burley loares and two small fishes.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 2.) Probably He had some reason in his mind for this speech. He would know of Elijah’s miracle, by which a hundred men were fed with twenty loaves. This was a great step; but here he stopped. He did not rise any higher. For his next words are, But what are these among so many? He thought that less could produce less in a miracle, and more more; a great mistake; inasmuch as it was as easy for Christ to feed the multitude from a few fishes as from many. He did not really want any material to work from, but only made use of created things for this purpose in order to shew that no part of the creation was severed from His wisdom.

THEOPHYLACT. This passage confounds the Manicheans, who say that bread and all such things were created by an evil Deity. The Son of the good God, Jesus Christ, multiplied the loaves. Therefore they could not have been naturally evil; a good God would never have multiplied what was evil.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. ii. c. xlvi) Andrew's suggestion about the five loaves and two fishes, is given as coming from the disciples in general, in the other Evangelists, and the plural number is used.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 2.) And let those of us, who are given to pleasure, observe the plain and abstemious eating of those great and wonderful menb. He made the men sit down before the loaves appeared, to teach us that with Him, things that are not are as things that are; as Paul says, Who calleth those things that be not, as though they were. (Rom. 4:17.) The passage proceeds then: And Jesus said, Make the men sit down.

ALCUIN. Sit down, i. e. lie down, as the ancient custom was, which they could do, as there was much grass in the place.

THEOPHYLACT. i. e. green grass. It was the time of the Passover, which was kept the first month of the spring. So the men sat down in number about five thousand. The Evangelist only counts the men, following the direction in the law. Moses numbered the people from twenty years old and upwards, making no mention of the women; to signify that the manly and juvenile character is especially honourable in God's eyes. And Jesus took the loaves; and when He had given thanks, He distributedc to them that were sat down: and likewise of the fishes as much as they would.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 2.) But why when He is going to heal the impotent, to raise the dead, to calm the sea, does He not pray, but here does give thanks? To teach us to give thanks to God, whenever we sit down to eat. And He prays more in lesser matters, in order to shew that He does not pray from any motive of need. For had prayer been really necessary to supply His wants, His praying would have been in proportion to the importance of each particular work. But acting, as He does, on His own authority, it is evident, He only prays out of condescension to us. And, as a great multitude was collected, it was an opportunity of impressing on them, that His coming was in accordance with God’s will. Accordingly, when a miracle was private, He did not pray; when numbers were present, He did.

HILARY. (iii. de Trin. c. 18) Five loaves are then set before the multitude, and broken. The broken portions pass through into the hands of those who break, that from which they are broken all the time not at all diminishing. And yet there they are, the bits taken from it, in the hands of the persons breakingd. There is no catching by eye or touch the miraculous operation: that is, which was not, that is seen, which is not understood. It only remains for us to believe that God can do all things.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiv. s. 1.) He multiplied in His hands the five loaves, just as He produces harvest out of a few grains. There was a power in the hands of Christ; and those five loaves were, as it were, seeds, not indeed committed to the earth, but multiplied by Him who made the earth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 3) Observe the difference between the servant and the lord. The Prophets received grace, as it were, by measure, and according to that measure performed their miracles: whereas Christ, working this by His own absolute power, produces a kind of superabundant result. When they were filled, He said unto His disciples, Gather up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost. Therefore they gathered them together, and filled twelve baskets with the fragments. This was not done for needless ostentation, but to prevent men from thinking the whole a delusion; which was the reason why He made use of an existing material to work from. But why did He give the fragments to His disciples to carry away, and not to the multitude? Because the disciples were to be the teachers of the world, and therefore it was most important that the truth should be impressed upon them. Wherefore I admire not only the multitude of the loaves which were made, but the definite quantity of the fragments; neither more nor less than twelve baskets full, and corresponding to the number of the twelve Apostles.

THEOPHYLACT. We learn too from this miracle, not to be pusillanimous in the greatest straits of poverty.

BEDE. When the multitude saw the miracle our Lord had done, they marvelled; as they did not know yet that He was God. Then those men, the Evangelist adds, i. e. carnal men, whose understanding was carnal, when they had perceived the miracle that Jesus did, said, This is of a truth that Prophet that should come into the world.

ALCUIN. Their faith being as yet weak, they only call our Lord a Prophet, not knowing that He was God. But the miracle had produced considerable effect upon them, as it made them call our Lord that Prophet, singling Him out from the rest. They call Him a Prophet, because some of the Prophets had worked miracles; and properly, inasmuch as our Lord calls Himself a Prophet; It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem. (Luke 13:33)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiv. s. 7) Christ is a Prophet, and the Lord of Prophets; as He is an Angel, and the Lord of Angels. In that He came to announce something, He was an Angel; in that He foretold the future, He was a Prophet; in that He was the Word made flesh, He was Lord both of Angels and Prophets; for none can be a Prophet without the word of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. Their expression, that should come into the world, shews that they expected the arrival of some great Prophet. And this is why they say, This is of a truth that Prophet: the article being put in the Greek, to shew that He was distinct from other Prophets.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiv. s. 1, 2) But let us reflect a little here. Forasmuch as the Divine Substance is not visible to the eye, and the miracles of the divine government of the world, and ordering of the whole creation, are overlooked in consequence of their constancy; God has reserved to Himself acts, beside the established course and order of nature, to do at suitable times; in order that those who overlooked the daily course of nature, might be roused to wonder by the sight of what was different from, though not at all greater, than what they were used to. The government of the world is a greater miracle, than the satisfying the hunger of five thousand with five loaves; and yet no one wonders at this: the former excited wonder; not from any real superiority in it, but because it was uncommon. But it would be wrong to gather no more than this from Christ’s miracles: for, the Lord who is on the mounte, and the Word of God which is on high, the same is no humble person to be lightly passed over, but we must look up to Him reverently.

ALCUIN. Mystically, the sea signifies this tumultuous world. In the fulness of time, when Christ had entered the sea of our mortality by His birth, trodden it by His death, passed over it by His resurrectionf, then followed Him crowds of believers, both from the Jews and Gentiles.

BEDE. Our Lord went up to the mountain, when He ascended to heaven, which is signified by the mountain.

ALCUIN. His leaving the multitude below, and ascending the heights with His disciples, signifies, that lesser precepts are to be given to beginners, higher to the more matured. His refreshing the people shortly before the Passover signifies our refreshment by the bread of the divine word; and the body and blood, i. e. our spiritual passover, by which we pass over from vice to virtue. And the Lord's eyes are spiritual gifts, which he mercifully bestows on His Elect. He turns His eyes upon them, i. e. has compassionate respect unto them.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. q. 61. in princ.) The five barley loaves signify the old law; either because the law was given to men not as yet spiritual, but carnal, i. e. under the dominion of the five senses, (the multitude itself consisted of five thousand:) or because the Law itself was given by Moses in five books. And the loaves being of barley is also an allusion to the Law, which concealed the soul's vital nourishment, under carnal ceremonies. For in barley the corn itself is buried under the most tenacious husk. Or, it alludes to the people who were not yet freed from the husk of carnal appetite, which cling to their heart.

BEDE. (Hom. in Luc. c. vi.) Barley is the food of cattle and slaves: and the old law was given to slaves and cattle, i. e. to carnal men.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiv. Quæst. qu. 61) The two fishes again, that gave the pleasant taste to the bread, seem to signify the two authorities by which the people were governed, the Royal, viz. and the Priestly; both of which prefigure our Lord, who sustained both characters.

BEDE. Or, by the two fishes are meant the saying or writings of the Prophets, and the Psalmist. And whereas the number five refers to the five senses, a thousand stands for perfection. But those who strive to obtain the perfect government of their five senses, are called men, in consequence of their superior powers: they have no womanly weaknesses; but by a sober and chaste life, earn the sweet refreshment of heavenly wisdom.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiv. 5) The boy who had these is perhaps the Jewish people, who, as it were, carried the loaves and fishes after a servile fashion, and did not eat them. That which they carried, while shut up, was only a burden to them; when opened became their food.

BEDE. (Aug. xxiv. 5) And well is it said, But what are these among so many? The Law was of little avail, till He took it into His hand, i. e. fulfilled it, and gave it a spiritual meaning. The Law made nothing perfect. (Heb. 7:19)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiv. s. 5) By the act of breaking He multiplied the five loaves. The five books of Moses, when expounded by breaking, i. e. unfolding them, made many books.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. qu. 61) Our Lord by breaking, as it were, what was hard in the Law, and opening what was shut, that time when He opened the Scriptures to the disciples after the resurrection, brought the Law out in its full meaning.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiv. s. 5) Our Lord’s question proved the ignorance of His disciples, i. e. the people’s ignorance of the Law. They lay on the grass, i. e. were carnally minded, rested in carnal things, for all flesh is grass. (Isa. 40:6) Men are filled with the loaves, when what they hear with the ear, they fulfil in practice.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxiv. s. 6) And what are the fragments, but the parts which the people could not eat? An intimation, that those deeper truths, which the multitude cannot take in, should be entrusted to those who are capable of receiving them, and afterwards teaching them to others; as were the Apostles. For which reason twelve baskets were filled with them.

ALCUIN. Baskets are used for servile work. The baskets here are the Apostles and their followers, who, though despised in this present life, are within filled with the riches of spiritual sacraments. The Apostles too are represented as baskets, because, that through them, the doctrine of the Trinity was to be preached in the four parts of the world. His not making new loaves, but multiplying what there were, means that He did not reject the Old Testament, but only developed and explained it.

6:15–21

15. When Jesus therefore perceived that they would come and take him by force, to make him a king, he departed again into a mountain himself alone.

16. And when even was now come, his disciples went down unto the sea,

17. And entered into a ship, and went over the sea toward Capernaum. And it was now dark, and Jesus was not come to them.

18. And the sea arose by reason of a great wind that blew.

19. So when they had rowed about five and twenty or thirty furlongs, they see Jesus walking on the sea, and drawing nigh unto the ship: and they were afraid.

20. But he saith unto them, It is I; be not afraid.

21. Then they willingly received him into the ship: and immediately the ship was at the land whither they went.

BEDE. The multitude concluding, from so great a miracle, that He was merciful and powerful, wished to make Him a king. For men like having a merciful king to rule over them, and a powerful one to protect them. Our Lord knowing this, retired to the mountain: When Jesus therefore perceived that they would come and take Him by force to make Him a king, He departed again into a mountain Himself alone. From this we gather, that our Lord went down from the mountain before, where He was sitting with His disciples, when He saw the multitude coming, and had fed them on the plain below. For how could He go up to the mountain again, unless He had come down from it.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ii. c. xlvii) This is not at all inconsistent with what we read, that He went up into a mountain apart to pray: (Mat. 14:23) the object of escape being quite compatible with that of prayer. Indeed our Lord teaches us here, that whenever escape is necessary, there is great necessity for prayer.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 2) Yet He who feared to be made a king, was a king; not made king by men, (for He ever reigneth with the Father, in that He is the Son of God,) but making men kings: which kingdom of His the Prophets had foretold. Christ by being made man, made the believers in Him Christians, i. e. members of His kingdom, incorporated and purchased by His Word. And this kingdom will be made manifest, after the judgment; when the brightness of His saints shall be revealed. The disciples however, and the multitude who believed on Him, thought that He had come to reign now; and so would have taken Him by force, to make Him a king, wishing to anticipate His time, which He kept secret.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 3) See what the belly can do. They care no more for the violation of the Sabbath; all their zeal for God is fled, now that their bellies are filled: Christ has become a Prophet, and they wish to enthrone Him as king. But Christ makes His escape; to teach us to despise the dignities of the world. He dismisses His disciples, and goes up into the mountain.— (Hom. xliii. 1). These, when their Master had left them, went down in the evening to the sea; as we read; And when even was now come, His disciples went down unto the sea. They waited till evening, thinking He would come to them; and then, as He did not come, delayed no longer searching for Him, but in the ardour of love, entered into a ship, and went over the sea toward Capernaum. They went to Capernaum thinking they should find Him there.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. s. 5) The Evangelist now returns to explain why they went, and relate what happened to them while they were crossing the lake: And it was dark, he says, and Jesus was not come to them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlii. 1) The mention of the time is not accidental, but meant to shew the strength of their love. They did not mate excuses, and say, It is evening now, and night is coming on, but in the warmth of their love went into the ship. And now many things alarm them: the time, And it was now dark; and the weather, as we read next, And the sea arose by reason of a great wind that blew; their distance from land, So when they had rowed about five and twenty or thirty furlongs.

BEDE. (in v. cap. Joan.) The way of speaking we use, when we are in doubt; about five and twenty, we say, or thirty.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliii. 1) And at last He appears quite unexpectedly: They see Jesus walking upon the sea, drawing nigh. He reappears after His retirement, teaching them what it is to be forsaken, and stirring them to greater love; His reappearance manifesting His power. They were disturbed, were afraid, it is said. Our Lord comforts them: But He saith unto them, It is I, be not afraid.

BEDE. (in Matt. c. xiv.) He does not say, I am Jesus, but only I am. He trusts to their easily recognising a voice, which was so familiar to them, or, as is more probable, He shews that He was the same who said to Moses, I am that I am (Exod. 3:14)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliii. s. 1) He appeared to them in this way, to shew His power; for He immediately calmed the tempest: Then they wished to receive Him into the ship; and immediately the ship was at the land, whither they went. So great was the calm, He did not even enter the ship, in order to work a greater miracle, and to shew his Divinity more clearlyg.

THEOPHYLACT. Observe the three miracles here; the first, His walking on the sea; the second, His stilling the waves; the third, His putting them immediately on shore, which they were some distance off, when our Lord appeared.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliii. 1) Jesus does not shew Himself to the crowd walking on the sea, such a miracle being too much for them to hear. Nor even to the disciples did He shew Himself long, but disappeared immeditately.

AUGUSTINE. Mark’s1 account does not contradict this. He says indeed that our Lord told the disciples first to enter the ship, and go before Him over the sea, while He dismissed the crowds, and that when the crowd was dismissed, He went up alone into the mountain to pray: while John places His going up alone in the mountain first, and then says, And when even was now come, His disciples went down unto the sea. But it is easy to see that John relates that as done afterwards by the disciples, which our Lord had ordered before His departure to the mountain.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliii. 1) Or take another explanation. This miracle seems to me to be a different one, from the one given in Matthew: for there they do not receive Him into the ship immediately, whereas here they doh: and there the storm lasts for some time, whereas here as soon as He speaks, there is a calm. He often repeats the same miracle in order to impress it on men’s minds.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. s. 3. et seq.) There is a mystical meaning in our Lord’s feeding the multitude, and ascending the mountain: for thus was it prophesied of Him, So shall the congregation of the people come about Thee: for their sake therefore lift up Thyself again: (Ps. 7) i. e. that the congregation of the people may come about Thee, lift up Thyself again. But why is it fled; for they could not have detained Him against His will? This fleeing has a meaning; viz. that His flight is above our comprehension; just as, when you do not understand a thing, you say, It escapes me. He fled alone unto the mountain, because He is ascended from above all heavens. But on His ascension aloft a storm came upon the disciples in the ship, i. e. the Church, and it became dark, the light, i. e. Jesus, having gone. As the end of the world draws nigh, error increases, iniquity abounds. Light again is love, according to John, He that hateth his brother is in darkness. (1 John 2:9) The waves and storms and winds then that agitate the ship, are the clamours of the evil speaking, and love waxing cold. Howbeit the wind, and storm, and waves, and darkness were not able to stop, and sink the vessel; For he that endureth to the end, the same shall be saved. (Matt. 10:22) As the number five has reference to the Law, the books of Moses being five, the number five and twenty, being made up of five pieces, has the same meaning. And this law was imperfect, before the Gospel came. Now the number of perfection is six, so therefore five is multiplied by six, which makes thirty: i. e. the law is fulfilled by the Gospel. To those then who fulfil the law Jesus comes treading on the waves, i. e. trampling under foot all the swellings of the world, all the loftiness of men: and yet such tribulations remain, that even they who believe on Jesus, fear lest they should be lost.

THEOPHYLACT. When either men or devils try to terrify us, let us hear Christ saying, It is I, be not afraid, i. e. I am ever near you, God unchangeable, immoveable; let not any false fears destroy your faith in Me. Observe too our Lord did not come when the danger was beginning, but when it was ending. He suffers us to remain in the midst of dangers and tribulations, that we may be proved thereby, and flee for succour to Him Who is able to give us deliverance when we least expect it. When man’s understanding can no longer help him, then the Divine deliverance comes. If we are willing also to receive Christ into the ship, i. e. to live in our hearts, we shall find ourselves immediately in the place, where we wish to be, i. e. heaven.

BEDE. This ship, however, does not carry an idle crew; they are all stout rowers; i. e. in the Church not the idle and effeminate, but the strenuous and persevering in good works, attain to the harbour of everlasting salvation.

6:22–27

22. The day following, when the people which stood on the other side of the sea saw that there was none other boat there, save that one whereinto his disciples were entered, and that Jesus went not with his disciples into the boat, but that his disciples were gone away alone;

23. (Howbeit there came other boats from Tiberias nigh unto the place where they did eat bread, after that the Lord had given thanks:)

24. When the people therefore saw that Jesus was not there, neither his disciples, they also took shipping, and came to Capernaum, seeking for Jesus.

25. And when they had found him on the other side of the sea, they said unto him, Rabbi, when camest thou hither?

26. Jesus answered them and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Ye seek me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves, and were filled.

27. Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, which the Son of man shall give unto you: for him hath God the Father sealed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliii. 2) Our Lord, though He did not actually shew Himself to the multitude walking on the sea, yet gave them the opportunity of inferring what had taken place; The day following, the people which stood on the other side of the sea saw that there was none other boat there, save that one whereinto His disciples were entered, and that Jesus went not with His disciples into the boat, but that His disciples were gone away alone. What was this but to suspect that He had walked across the sea, on His going away? For He could not have gone over in a ship, as there was only one there, that in which His disciples had entered; and He had not gone in with them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 8) Knowledge of the miracle was conveyed to them indirectly. Other ships had come to the place where they had eaten bread; in these they went after Him; Howbeit there came other boats from Tiberias, nigh unto the place where they did eat bread, after that the Lord had given thanks. When the people therefore saw that Jesus was not there, neither His disciples, they also look shipping, and came to Capernaum, seeking for Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliii. 1) Yet after so great a miracle, they did not ask Him how He had passed over, or shew any concern about it: as appears from what follows; And when they had found Him on the other side of the sea, they said unto Him, Rabbi, when earnest Thou hither? Except we say that this when meant how. And observe their lightness of mind. After saying, This is that Prophet, and wishing to take Him by force to make Him king, when they find Him, nothing of the kind is thought of.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 8) So He Who had fled to the mountain, mixes and converses with the multitude. Only just now they would have kept Him, and made Him king. But after the sacrament of the miracle, He begins to discourse, and fills their souls with His word, whose bodies He had satisfied with bread.

ALCUIN.i He who set an example of declining praise, and earthly power, sets teachers also an example of deliverance in preaching.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv. 1) Kindness and lenity are not always expedient. To the indolent or insensible disciple the spur must be applied; and this the Son of God does. For when the multitude comes with soft speeches, Rabbi, when earnest Thou hither? He shews them that He did not desire the honour that cometh from man, by the severity of His answer, which both exposes the motive on which they acted, and rebukes it. Jesus answered them and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Ye seek Me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves, and were filled.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 10) As if He said, Ye seek Me to satisfy the flesh, not the spirit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv. 1) After the rebuke, however, He proceeds to teach them: Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that meat which endureth unto everlasting life; meaning, Ye seek for temporal food, whereas I only fed your bodies, that ye might seek the more diligently for that food, which is not temporary, but contains eternal life.

ALCUIN. Bodily food only supports the flesh of the outward man, and must be taken not once for all, but daily; whereas spiritual food remaineth for ever, imparting perpetual fulness, and immortality.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 10) Under the figure of food He alludes to Himself. Ye seek Me, He saith, for the sake of something else; seek Me for My own sake.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv. 1.) But, inasmuch as some who wish to live in sloth, pervert this precept, Labour not, &c. it is well to notice what Paul says, Let him that stole steal no more, but rather let him labour, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth. Ephes. 4:28) And he himself too, when he resided with Aquila and Priscilla at Corinth, worked with his hand. By saying, Labour not for the meat which perisheth, our Lord does not mean to tell us to be idle; but to work, and give alms. This is that meat which perisheth not; to labour for the meat which perisheth, is to be devoted to the interests of this life. Our Lord saw that the multitude had no thought of believing, and only wished to fill their bellies, without working; and this He justly called the meat which perisheth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 10) As He told the woman of Samaria above, If thou knewest Who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink, thou wouldest have asked of Him, and He would have given thee living water. (c. 4) So He says here, Which the Son of man shall give unto you.

ALCUIN. When, through the hand of the priest, thou receivest the Body of Christ, think not of the priest which thou seest, but of the Priest thou dost not see. The priest is the dispenser of this food, not the author. The Son of man gives Himself to us, that we may abide in Him, and He in us. Do not conceive that Son of man to be the same as other sons of men: He stands alone in abundance of grace, separate and distinct from all the rest: for that Son of man is the Son of God, as it follows, For Him hath God the Father sealed. To seal is to put a mark upon; so the meaning is, Do not despise Me because I am the Son of man, for I am the Son of man in such sort, as that the Father hath sealed Me, i. e. given Me something peculiar, to the end that I should not be confounded with the human race, but that the human race should be delivered by Me.

HILARY. (viii. de Trin. c. 44) A seal throws out a perfect impression of the stamp, at the same time that it takes in that impression. This is not a perfect illustration of the Divine nativity: for sealing supposes matter, different kinds of matter, the impression of harder upon softer. Yet He who was God Only-Begotten, and the Son of man only by the Sacrament of our salvation, makes use of it to express the Father’s fulness as stamped upon Himself. He wishes to shew the Jews He has the power of giving the eternal meat, because He contained in Himself the fulness of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv. 1) Or sealed, i. e. sent Him for this purpose, viz. to bring us food; or, sealed, was revealed the Gospel by means of His witness.

ALCUIN. To take the passage mystically: on the day following, i. e. after the ascension of Christ, the multitude standing in good works, not lying in worldly pleasures, expects Jesus to come to them. The one ship is the one Church: the other ships which come besides, are the conventicles of heretics, who seek their own, not the things of Jesus Christ. Wherefore He well says, Ye seek Me, because ye did eat of the loaves. (Phil. 2:21)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 10) How many there are who seek Jesus, only to gain some temporary benefit. One man has a matter of business, in which he wants the assistance of the clergy; another is oppressed by a more powerful neighbour, and flies to the Church for refuge: Jesus is scarcely ever sought for Jesus' sake.

GREGORY. (xxiii. Moral. [c. xxv.]) In their persons too our Lord condemns all those within the holy Church, who, when brought near to God by sacred Orders, do not seek the recompense of righteousness, but the interests of this present life. To follow our Lord, when filled with bread, is to use Holy Church as a means of livelihood; and to seek our Lord not for the miracle's sake, but for the loaves, is to aspire to a religious office, not with a view to increase of grace, but to add to our worldly means.

BEDE. They too seek Jesus, not for Jesus' sake, but for something else, who ask in their prayers not for eternal, but temporal blessings. The mystical meaning is, that the conventicles of heretics are without the company of Christ and His disciples. And other ships coming, is the sudden growth of heresies. By the crowd, which saw that Jesus was not there, or His disciples, are designated those who seeing the errors of heretics, leave them and turn to the true faith.

6:28–34

28. Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we might work the works of God?

29. Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent.

30. They said therefore unto him, What sign shewest thou then, that we may see, and believe thee? what dost thou work?

31. Our fathers did eat manna in the desert; as it is written, He gave them bread from heaven to eat.

32. Then said Jesus unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Moses gave you not that bread from heaven; but my Father giveth you the true bread from heaven.

33. For the bread of God is he which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world.

34. Then said they unto him, Lord, evermore give us this bread.

ALCUIN. They understood that the meat, which remaineth unto eternal life, was the work of God: and therefore they ask Him what to do to work the work of God, i. e. obtain the meat: Then said they unto Him, What shall we do that we might work the works of God?

BEDE. i. e. By keeping what commandments shall we be able to fulfil the law of God?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlv. 1) But they said this, not that they might learn, and do them, but to obtain from Him another exhibition of His bounty.

THEOPHYLACT. Christ, though He saw it would not avail, yet for the good of others afterwards, answered their question; and shewed them, or rather the whole world, what was the work of God: Jesus answered and said unto them, This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. in Joan) He does not say, That ye believe Him, but, that ye believe on Him. For the devils believed Him, and did not believe on Him; and we believe Paul, but do not believe on Paul. To believe on Him is believing to love, believing to honour Him, believing to go unto Him, and be made members incorporate of His Body. The faith, which God requires of us, is that which worketh by love. Faith indeed is distinguished from works by the Apostle, who says, That man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law. (Rom. 3:28) But the works indeed which appear good, without faith in Christ, are not really so, not being referred to that end, which makes them good. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth (Rom. 10:4). And therefore our Lord would not separate faith from works, but said that faith itself was the doing the work of God; He saith not, This is your work, but, This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him: in order that he that glorieth might glory in the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (xxv. 12) To eat then that meat which endureth unto everlasting life, is to believe on Him. Why dost thou make ready thy tooth and thy belly? Only believe, and thou hast eaten already. As He called on them to believe, they still asked for miracles whereby to believe; They said therefore unto Him, What sign shewest Thou then, that we may see and believe Thee? What dost Thou work?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlv. 1) Nothing can be more unreasonable than their asking for another miracle, as if none had been given already. And they do not even leave the choice of the miracle to our Lord; but would oblige Him to give them just that sign, which was given to their fathers: Our fathers did eat manna in the desert.

ALCUIN. And to exalt the miracle of the manna, they quote the Psalm, As it is written, He gave them bread from heaven to eat.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlv. 1) Whereas many miracles were performed in Egypt, at the Red Sea, and in the desert, they remembered this one the best of any. Such is the force of appetite. They do not mention this miracle as the work either of God, or of Moses, in order to avoid raising Him on the one hand to an equality with God, or lowering Him on the other by a comparison with Moses; but they take a middle ground, only saying, Our fathers did eat manna in the desert.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. s. 12) Or thus; Our Lord sets Himself above Moses, who did not dare to say that He gave the meat which perisheth not. The multitude therefore remembering what Moses had done, and wishing for some greater miracle, say, as it were, Thou promisest the meat which perisheth not, and doest not works equal to those Moses did. He gave us not barley loaves, but manna from heaven.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxv. 1) Our Lord might have replied, that He had done miracles greater than Moses: but it was not the time for such a declaration. One thing He desired, viz. to bring them to taste the spiritual meat: then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Moses gave you not that bread from heaven; but My Father giveth you the true bread from heaven. Did not the manna come from heaven? True, but in what sense did it? The same in which the birds are called, the birds of heavenk; and just as it is said in the Psalm, The Lord thundered out of heaven. (Ps. 17) He calls it the true bread, not because the miracle of the manna was false, but because it was the figure, not the reality. He does not say too, Moses gave it you not, but I: but He puts God for Moses, Himself for the manna.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 13.) As if He said, That manna was the type of this food, of which I just now spoke; and which all my miracles refer to.

You like my miracles, you despise what is signified by them. This bread which God gives, and which this manna represented, is the Lord Jesus Christ, as we read next, For the bread of God is He which cometh down from heaven, and giveth life unto the world.

BEDE. Not to the physical world, but to men, its inhabitants.

THEOPHYLACT. He calls Himself the true bread, because the only-begotten Son of God, made man, was principally signified by the manna. For manna means literally, what is this? The Israelites were astonished at first on finding it, and asked one another what it was. And the Son of God, made man, is in an especial sense this mysterious manna, which we ask about, saying, What is this? How can the Son of God be the Son of man? How can one person consist of two natures?

ALCUIN. Who by the humanity, which was assumed, came down from heaven, and by the divinity, which assumed it, gives life to the world.

THEOPHYLACT. But this bread, being essentially life, (for He is the Son of the living Father,) in quickening all things, does but what is natural to Him to do. For as natural bread supports our weak flesh, so Christ, by the operations of the Spirit, gives life to the soul; and even incorruption to the body, (for at the resurrection the body will be made incorruptible.) Wherefore He says, that He giveth life unto the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlv. 1) Not only to the Jews, but to the whole world. The multitude, however, still attached a low meaning to His words: Then said they unto Him, Lord, evermore give us this bread. They say, Give us this bread, not, Ask Thy Father to give it us: whereas He had said that His Father gave this bread.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 13) As the woman of Samaria, when our Lord told her, Whosoever drinketh of this water shall never thirst, thought He meant natural water, and said, Sir, give me this water, that she might never be in want of it again: in the same way these say, Give us this bread, which refreshes, supports, and fails not.

6:35–40

35. And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst.

36. But I said unto you, That ye also have seen me, and believe not.

37. All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out.

38. For I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me.

39. And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day.

40. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlv. 2) Our Lord now proceeds to set forth mysteries; and first speaks of His Divinity: And Jesus said unto them, I am the bread of life. He does not say this of His body, for He speaks of that at the end; The bread that I will give you is My flesh. Here He is speaking of His Divinity. The flesh is bread, by virtue of the Word; this bread is heavenly bread, on account of the Spirit which dwelleth in it.

THEOPHYLACT. He does not say, I am the bread of nourishment, but of life, for, whereas all things brought death, Christ hath quickened us by Himself. But the life here, is not our common life, but that which is not cut short by death: He that cometh to Me shall never hunger; and He that believeth on Me shall never thirst.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 14) He that cometh to Me, i. e. that believeth on Me, shall never hunger, has the same meaning as shall never thirst; both signifying that eternal society, where there is no want.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, shall never hunger or thirst, i. e. shall never be wearied1 of hearing the word of God, and shall never thirst as to the understanding: as though He had not the water of baptism, and the sanctification of the Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 14) Ye desire bread from heaven: but, though you have it before you, you eat it not. This is what I told you: But I said unto you, that ye also have seen Me, and believe not.

ALCUIN. As if He said, I did not say what I did to you about the bread, because I thought you would eat it, but rather to convict you of unbelief. I say, that ye see Me, and believe not.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv. 2. c. 5.) Or, I said to you, refers to the testimony of the Scriptures, of which He said above, They are they which testify of Me; and again, I am come in My Father's name, and ye receive Me not. That ye have seen Me, is a silent allusion to His miracles.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 14) But, because ye have seen Me, and believed not, I have not therefore lost the people of God: All that the Father giveth Me, shall come unto Me; and him that cometh to Me, I will in no wise cast out.

BEDE. All, He saith, absolutely, to shew the fulness of the number who should believe. These are they which the Father gives the Son, when, by His secret inspiration, He makes them believe in the Son.

ALCUIN. Whomsoever therefore the Father draweth to belief in Me, he, by faith, shall come to Me, that he may be joined to Me. And those, who in the steps of faith and good works, shall come to Me, I will in no wise cast out; i. e. in the secret habitation of a pure conscience, he shall dwell with Me, and at the last I will receive him to everlasting felicity.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 14) That inner place, whence there is no casting out, is a great sanctuary, a secret chamber, where is neither weariness, or the bitterness of evil thoughts, or the cross of pain and temptation: of which it is said, Enter thou into the joy of thy Lord. (Mat. 25)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv. 2) The expression, that the Father giveth Me, shews that it is no accident whether a man believes or not, and that belief is not the work of human cogitation, but requires a revelation from on high, and a mind devout enough to receive the revelation. Not that they are free from blame, whom the Father does not give, for they are deficient even in that which lies in their own power, the will to believe. This is a virtual rebuke to their unbelief, as it shews that whoever does not believe in Him, transgresses the Father's will. Paul, however, says, that He gives them up to the Father: When He shall have given up the kingdom to God, even the Father. (1 Cor. 15:24) But as the Father, in giving, does not take from Himself, so neither does the Son when He gives up. The Son is said to give up to the Father, because we are brought to the Father by Him. And of the Father at the same time we read, By Whom ye were called unto the fellowship of His Son. (1 Cor. 1:9) Whoever then, our Lord says, cometh to Me, shall be saved, for to save such I took up flesh: For I came down from heaven not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me. But what? Has thou one will, He another? No, certainly. Mark what He says afterwards; And this is the will of Him that sent Me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on Him, should have everlasting life. And this is the Son's will too; For the Son quickeneth whom He will. (c. 5:21) He says then, I came to do nothing but what the Father wills, for I have no will distinct from My Father's: all things that the Father hath are Mine. But this not now: He reserves these higher truths for the end of His ministry.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 15) This is the reason why He does not cast out those who come to Him. For I came down from heaven not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me. The soul departed from God, because it was proud. Pride casts us out, humility restores us. When a physician in the treatment of a disease, cures certain outward symptoms, but not the cause which produces them, his cure is only temporary. So long as the cause remains, the disease may return. That the cause then of all diseases, i. e. pride, might be eradicated, the Son of God humbled Himself. Why art thou proud, O man? The Son of God humbled Himself for thee. It might shame thee, perhaps, to imitate a humble man; but imitate at least a humble God. And this is the proof of His humility: I came not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me. Pride does its own will; humility the will of God.

HILARY. (iii. de Trin. c. 9) Not that He does what He does not wish. He fulfils obediently His Father's will, wishing also Himself to fulfil that will.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv in Joan. 16) For this very reason therefore, I will not cast out Him that cometh to Me; because I came not to do Mine own will. I came to teach humility, by being humble Myself. He that cometh to Me, is made a member of Me, and necessarily humble, because He will not do His own will, but the will of God; and therefore is not cast out. He was cast out, as proud; he returns to Me humble, he is not sent away, except for pride again; he who keeps his humility, falleth not from the truth. And further, that He does not cast out such, because He came not to do His will, He shews when He says, And this is the Father's will which hath sent Me, that of all which He hath given Me, I should lose nothing. (Mat. 18:14) Every one of an humble mind is given to Him: It is not the will of your Father, that one of these little ones should perish. The swelling ones may perish; of the little ones none can; for except ye be as a little child, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven. (Mat. 18:3, 5)

AUGUSTINE. (de Cor. et Gratia, c. ix) They therefore who by God's unerring providence are foreknown, and predestined, called, justified, glorified, even before their new birth, or before they are born at all, are already the sons of God, and cannot possibly perish; these are they who truly come to Christ. By Him there is given also perseverance in good unto the end; which is given only to those who will not perish. Those who do not persevere will perish.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xliv. 3) I should lose nothing; He lets them know, he does not desire his own honour, but their salvation. After these declarations, I will in no wise cast out, and I should lose nothing, He adds, But should raise it up at the last day. In the general resurrection the wicked will be cast out, according to Matthew, Take him, and cast him into outer darkness. (Mat. 22:13) And, Who is able to cast both soul and body into hell. (Mat. 10:28) He often brings in mention of the resurrection for this purpose: viz. to warn men not to judge of God's providence from present events, but to carry on their ideas to another world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxv. 19) See how the twofold resurrection is expressed here. He who cometh to Me, shall forthwith rise again; by becoming humble, and a member of Me. But then He proceeds; But I will raise him up at the last day. To explain the words, All that the Father hath given Me, and, I should lose nothing, He adds; And this is the will of Him that hath sent Me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on Him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day. Above He said, Whoso heareth My word, and believeth on Him that sent Me: (c. 5:24) now it is, Every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on Him. He does not say, believe on the Father, because it is the same thing to believe on the Father, and on the Son; for as the Father hath life in Himself, even so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself; and again, That whoso seeth the Son and believeth on Him, should have everlasting life: i. e. by believing, by passing over to life, as at the first resurrection. But this is only the first resurrection, He alludes to the second when He says, And I will raise him up at the last day.

6:41–46

41. The Jews then murmured at him, because he said, I am the bread which came down from heaven.

42. And they said, Is not this Jesus, the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that he saith, I came down from heaven?

43. Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Murmur not among yourselves.

44. No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day.

45. It is written in the prophets, And they shall be all taught of God. Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.

46. Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is of God, he hath seen the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 1) The Jews, so long as they thought to get food for their carnal eating, had no misgivings; but when this hope was taken away, then, we read, the Jews murmured at Him because He said, I am the bread which came down from heaven. This was only a pretence. The real cause of their complaint was that they were disappointed in their expectation of a bodily feast. As yet however they reverenced Him, for His miracle; and only expressed their discontent by murmurs. What these were we read next: And they said, Is not this Jesus, the Son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? how is it then that He saith, I came down from heaven?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 1) But they were far from being fit for that heavenly bread, and did not hunger for it. For they had not that hunger of the inner man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 1) It is evident that they did not yet know of His miraculous birth: for they call Him the Son of Joseph. Nor are they blamed for this. Our Lord does not reply, I am not the Son of Joseph: for the miracle of His birth would have overpowered them. And if the birth according to the flesh were above their belief, how much more that higher and ineffable birth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi) He took man’s flesh upon Him, but not after the manner of men; for, His Father being in heaven, He chose a mother upon earth, and was born of her without a father. The answer to the murmurers next follows: Jesus therefore answered and said unto them, Murmur not among yourselves; as if to say, I know why ye hunger not after this bread, and so cannot understand it, and do not seek it: No man can come to Me except the Father who hath sent Me draw him. This is the doctrine of grace: none cometh, except he be drawn. But whom the Father draws, and whom not, and why He draws one, and not another, presume not to decide, if thou wouldest avoid falling into error. Take the doctrine as it is given thee: and, if thou art not drawn, pray that thou mayest be.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 1) But here the Manichees attack us, asserting that nothing is in our own power. Our Lord's words however do not destroy our free agency, but only shew that we need Divine assistance. For He is speaking not of one who comes without the concurrence of his own will, but one who has many hindrances in the way of his coming.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 2. et sq.) Now if we are drawn to Christ without our own will, we believe without our own will; the will is not exercised, but compulsion is applied. But, though a man can enter the Church involuntarily, he cannot believe other than voluntarily; for with the heart man believeth unto righteousness. Therefore if he who is drawn, comes without his will, he does not believe; if he does not believe, he does not come. For we do not come to Christ, by running, or walking, but by believing, not by the motion of the body, but the will of the mind. Thou art drawn by thy will. But what is it to be drawn by the will? Delight thou in the Lord, and He will give thee thy heart's desire. (Ps. 36) There is a certain craving of the heart, to which that heavenly bread is pleasant. If the Poet could say, "Trahit sua quemque voluptas," how much more strongly may we speak of a man being drawn to Christ, i. e. being delighted with truth, happiness, justice, eternal life, all which is Christ? Have the bodily senses their pleasures, and has not the soul hers? Give me one who loves, who longs, who burns, who sighs for the source of his being and his eternal home; and he will know what I mean. But why did He say, Except my Father draw him? If we are to be drawn, let us be drawn by Him to whom His love saith, Draw me, we will run after Thee. (Cant. 1:4) But let us see what is meant by it. The Father draws to the Son those who believe on the Son, as thinking that He has God for His Father. For the Father begat the Son equal to Himself; and whoso thinks and believes really and seriously that He on Whom He believes is equal to the Father, him the Father draws to the Son. Arius believed Him to be a creature; the Father drew not him. Thomas says, Christ is only a man. Because he so believes, the Father draws him not. He drew Peter who said, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God (Mat. 16); to whom accordingly it was told, For flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven. That revelation is the drawing. For if earthly objects, when put before us, draw us; how much more shall Christ, when revealed by the Father? For what doth the soul more long after than truth? But here men hunger, there they will be filled. Wherefore He adds, And I will raise him up at the last day: as if He said, He shall be filled with that, for which he now thirsts, at the resurrection of the dead; for I will raise him up.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. Nov. et Vet.) Or the Father draws to the Son, by the works which He did by Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 1) Great indeed is the Son's dignity; the Father draws men, and the Son raises them up. This is no division of works, but an equality of power. He then shews the way in which the Father draws. It is written in the Prophets, And they shall all be taught of God. You see the excellence of faith; that it cannot be learnt from men, or by the teaching of man, but only from God Himself. The Master sits, dispensing His truth to all, pouring out His doctrine to all. But if all are to be taught of God, how is it that some believe not? Because all here only means the generality, or, all that have the will.

AUGUSTINE. (de Prædest. Sanctorum, c. viii) Or thus; When a schoolmaster is the only one in a town, we say loosely, This man teaches all here to read; not that all learn of him, but that he teaches all who do learn. And in the same way we say that God teaches all men to come to Christ: not that all do come, but that no one comes in any other way.

AUGUSTINE. (super Joan. Tr. xxv. 7) All the men of that kingdom shall be taught of God; they shall hear nothing from men: for, though in this world what they hear with the outward ear is from men, yet what they understand is given them from within; from within is light and revelation. I force certain sounds into your ears, but unless He is within to reveal their meaning, how, O ye Jews, can ye acknowledge Me, ye whom the Father hath not taught?

BEDE. He uses the plural, In the Prophets, because all the Prophets being filled with one and the same spirit, their prophecies, though different, all tended to the same end; and with whatever any one of them says, all the rest agree; as with the prophecy of Joel, All shall be taught of God. (Joel 2:23)

GLOSS. These words are not found in Joel, but something like them; Be glad then ye children of Sion, and rejoice in the Lord your God, for He hath given you a Teacher. (Quia dedit nobis lectorem justitiæ. Vulg.) And more expressly in Isaiah, And all thy children shall be taught of the Lord. (Isa. 54:13)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 1) An important distinction. All men before learnt the things of God through men; now they learn them through the Only Son of God, and the Holy Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (de Prædest. Sanctorum, c. viii. et seq.) All that are taught of God come to the Son, because they have heard and learnt from the Father of the Son: wherefore He proceeds, Every man that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh to Me. But if every one that hath heard and learnt of the Father cometh, every one that hath not heard of the Father hath not learnt. For beyond the reach of the bodily senses is this school, in which the Father is heard, and men taught to come to the Son. Here we have not to do with the carnal ear, but the ear of the heart; for here is the Son Himself, the Word by which the Father teacheth, and together with Him the Holy Spirit: the operations of the three Persons being inseparable from each other. This is attributed however principally to the Father, because from Him proceeds the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Therefore the grace which the Divine bounty imparts in secret to men’s hearts, is rejected by none from hardness of heart: seeing it is given in the first instance, in order to take away hard-heartedness. Why then does He not teach all to come to Christ? Because those whom He teaches, He teaches in mercy; and those whom He teaches not, He teaches not in judgment. But if we say, that those, whom He teaches not, wish to learn, we shall be answered, Why then is it said, Wilt thou not turn again, and quicken us? (Ps. 84:6) If God does not make willing minds out of unwilling, why prayeth the Church, according to our Lord’s command, for her persecutors? For no one can say, I believed, and therefore He called me: rather the preventing mercy of God called him, that he might believe.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 7. et seq.) Behold then how the Father draweth; not by laying a necessity on man, but by teaching the truth. To draw, belongeth to God: Every one that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh to Me. What then? Hath Christ taught nothing? Not so. What if men saw not the Father teaching, but saw the Son. So then the Father taught, the

Son spoke. As I teach you by My word, so the Father teaches by His Word. But He Himself explains the matter, if we read on: Not that any man hath seen the Father, save He which is of God, He hath seen the Father; as if He said, Do not when I tell you, Every man that hath heard and learnt of the Father, say to yourselves, We have never seen the Father, and how then can we have learnt from Him? Hear Him then in Me. I know the Father, and am from Him, just as a word is from him who speaks it; i. e. not the mere passing sound, but that which remaineth with the speaker, and draweth the hearer.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. s. 1) We are all from God. That which belongs peculiarly and principally to the Son, He omits the mention of, as being unsuitable to the weakness of His hearers.

6:47–51

47. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me hath everlasting life.

48. I am that bread of life.

49. Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead.

50. This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, that a man may eat thereof, and not die.

51. I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. s. 10.) Our Lord wishes to reveal what He is; Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on Me, hath everlasting life. As if He said; He that believeth on Me hath Me: but what is it to have Me? It is to have eternal life: for the Word which was in the beginning with God is life eternal, and the life was the light of men. Life underwent death, that life might kill death.

CHRYSOSTOM. ([Nic.] Theoph.) The multitude being urgent for bodily food, and reminding Him of that which was given to their fathers, He tells them that the manna was only a type of that spiritual food which was now to be tasted in reality, I am that bread of life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlv. 1) He calls Himself the bread of life, because He constitutes one life, both present, and to come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 11) And because they had taunted Him with the manna, He adds, Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. Your fathers they are, for ye are like them; murmuring sons of murmuring fathers. For in nothing did that people offend God more, than by their murmurs against Him. And therefore are they dead, because what they saw they believed, what they did not see they believed not, nor understood.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 2) The addition, In the wilderness, is not put in without meaning, but to remind them how short a time the manna lasted; only till the entrance into the land of promise. And because the bread which Christ gave seemed inferior to the manna, in that the latter had come down from heaven, while the former was of this world, He adds, This is the bread which cometh down from heaven.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. s. 12) This was the bread the manna typified, this was the bread the altar typified. Both the one and the other were sacraments, differing in symbol, alike in the thing signified. Hear the Apostle, They did all eat the same spiritual meat. (1 Cor. 10)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 2) He then gives them a strong reason for believing that they were given for higher privileges than their fathers. Their fathers eat manna and were dead; whereas of this bread He says, that a man may eat thereof, and not die. The difference of the two is evident from the difference of their ends. By bread here is meant wholesome doctrine, and faith in Him, or His body: for these are the preservatives of the soul.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 11) But are we, who eat the bread that cometh down from heaven, relieved from death? From visible and carnal death, the death of the body, we are not: we shall die, even as they died. But from spiritual death which their fathers suffered, we are delivered. Moses and many acceptable of God, eat the manna, and died not, because they understood that visible food in a spiritual sense, spiritually tasted it, and were spiritually filled with it. And we too at this day receive the visible food; but the Sacrament is one thing, the virtue of the Sacrament another. Many a one receiveth from the Altar, and perisheth in receiving; eating and drinking his own damnation, (1 Cor. 11:29) as saith the Apostle. To eat then the heavenly bread spiritually, is to bring to the Altar an innocent mind. Sins, though they be daily, are not deadly. Before you go to the Altar, attend to the prayer you repeat: Forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debtors. (Matt. 6:12) If thou forgivest, thou art forgiven: approach confidently; it is bread, not poison. None then that eateth of this bread, shall die. But we speak of the virtue of the Sacrament, not the visible Sacrament itself; of the inward, not of the outward eater.

ALCUIN. Therefore I say, He that eateth this bread, dieth not: I am the living bread which came down from heaven.

THEOPHYLACT. (in v. 83) By becoming incarnate, He was not then first man, and afterwards assumed Divinity, as Nestorius fables.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 13) was The manna too came down from heaven; but the manna was shadow, this is substance.

ALCUIN. But men must be quickened by my life: If any man eat of this bread, he shall live, not only now by faith and righteousness, but for ever.

6:51

51. —And the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.

AUGUSTINE. (Gloss. Nic.) Our Lord pronounces Himself to be bread, not only in respect of that Divinity, which feeds all things, but also in respect of that human nature, which was assumed by the Word of God: And the bread, He says, that I will give is My flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.

BEDE. This bread our Lord then gave, when He delivered to His disciple the mystery of His Body and Blood, and offered Himself to God the Father on the altar of the cross. For the life of the world, i. e. not for the elements, but for mankind, who are called the world.

THEOPHYLACT. Which I shall give: this shews His power; for it shews that He was not crucified as a servant, in subjection to the Father, but of his own accord; for though He is said to have been given up by the Father, yet He delivered Himself up also. And observe, the bread which is taken by us in the mysteries, is not only the sign of Christ’s flesh, but is itself the very flesh of Christ; for He does not say, The bread which I will give, is the sign of My flesh, but, is My flesh. The bread is by a mystical benediction conveyed in unutterable words, and by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, transmuted into the flesh of Christ. But why see we not the flesh? Because, if the flesh were seen, it would revolt us to such a degree, that we should be unable to partake of it. And therefore in condescension to our infirmity, the mystical food is given to us under an appearance suitable to our minds. He gave His flesh for the life of the world, in that, by dying, He destroyed death. By the life of the world too, I understand the resurrection; our Lord's death having brought about the resurrection of the whole human race. It may mean too the sanctified, beatified, spiritual life; for though all have not attained to this life, yet our Lord gave Himself for the world, and, as far as lies in Him, the whole world is sanctified.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 13) But when does flesh receive the bread which He calls His flesh? The faithful know and receive the Body of Christ, if they labour to be the body of Christ. And they become the body of Christ, if they study to live by the Spirit of Christ: for that which lives by the Spirit of Christ, is the body of Christ. This bread the Apostle sets forth, where he says, We being many are one body. (1 Cor. 12:12) O sacrament of mercy, O sign of unity, O bond of love! Whoso wishes to live, let him draw nigh, believe, be incorporated, that he may be quickened.

6:52–54

52. The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us his flesh to eat?

53. Then Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you.

54. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. s. 14) The Jews not understanding what was the bread of peace, strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us His flesh to eat? Whereas they who eat the bread strive not among themselves, for God makes them to dwell together in unity.

BEDE. The Jews thought that our Lord would divide His flesh into pieces, and give it them to eat: and so mistaking Him, strove.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 1) As they thought it impossible that He should do as He said, i. e. give them His flesh to eat, He shews them that it was not only possible, but necessary: Then said Jesus unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, ye have no life in you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 15) As if He said, The sense in which that bread is eaten, and the mode of eating it, ye know not; but, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink His blood, ye have no life in you.

BEDE. And that this might not seem addressed to them alone, He declares universally, Whoso eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, hath eternal life.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 15) And that they might not understand him to speak of this life, and make that an occasion of striving, He adds, Hath eternal life. This then he hath not who eateth not that flesh, nor drinketh that blood. The temporal life men may have without Him, the eternal they cannot. This is not true of material food. If we do not take that indeed, we shall not live, neither do we live, if we take it: for either disease, or old age, or some accident kills us after all. Whereas this meat and drink, i. e. the Body and Blood of Christ, is such that he that taketh it not hath not life, and he that taketh it hath life, even life eternal.

THEOPHYLACT. (in v. 52) For it is not the flesh of man simply, but of God: and it makes man divine, by inebriating him, as it were, with divinity.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, l. xxi. c. 25.) There are some who promise men deliverance from eternal punishment, if they are washed in Baptism and partake of Christ’s Body, whatever lives they live. The Apostle however contradicts them, where he says, The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like; of the which I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God. (Gal. 5:19. et seq.) Let us examine what is meant here. He who is in the unity of His body, (i. e. one of the Christian members,) the Sacrament of which body the faithful receive when they communicate at the Altar; he is truly said to eat the body, and drink the blood of Christ. And heretics and schismatics, who are cut off from the unity of the body, may receive the same Sacrament; but it does not profit them, nay, rather is hurtful, as tending to make their judgment heavier, or their forgiveness later. Nor ought they to feel secure in their abandoned and damnable ways, who, by the iniquity of their lives, desert righteousness, i. e. Christ; either by fornication, or other sins of the like kind. Such are not to be said to eat the body of Christ;

forasmuch as they are not to be counted among the members of Christ. For, not to mention other things, men cannot be members of Christ, and at the same time members of an harlot.

AUGUSTINE. (super Joan. c. xxvi. 15) By this meat and drink then, He would have us understand the society of His body, and His members, which is the Church, in the predestined, and called, and justified, and glorified saints and believers. The Sacrament whereof, i. e. of the unity of the body and blood of Christ, is administered, in some places daily, in others on such and such days from the Lord's Table: and from the Lord's Table it is received by some to their salvation, by others to their condemnation. But the thing itself of which this is the Sacrament, is for our salvation to every one who partakes of it, for condemnation to none. To prevent us supposing that those who, by virtue of that meat and drink, were promised eternal life, would not die in the body, He adds, And I will, raise him up at the last day; i. e. to that eternal life, a spiritual rest, which the spirits of the Saints enter into. But neither shall the body be defrauded of eternal life, but shall be endowed with it at the resurrection of the dead in the last day.

6:55–59

55. For my flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed.

56. He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him.

57. As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father: so he that eateth me, even he shall live by me.

58. This is that bread which came down from heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever.

59. These things said he in the synagogue, as he taught in Capernaum.

BEDE. He had said above, Whoso eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood, hath eternal life: and now to shew the great difference between bodily meat and drink, and the spiritual mystery of His body and blood, He adds, For My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 1) i. e. this is no enigma, or parable, but ye must really eat the body of Christ; or He means to say that the true meat was He who saved the soul.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 17) Or thus: Whereas men desire meat and drink to satisfy hunger and thirst, this effect is only really produced by that meat and drink, which makes the receivers of it immortal and incorruptible; i. e. the society of Saints, where is peace and unity, full and perfect. On which account our Lord has chosen for the types of His body and blood, things which become one out of many. Bread is a quantity of grains united into one mass, wine a quantity of grapes squeezed together. Then He explains what it is to eat His body and drink His blood: He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, dwelleth in Me, and I in him. So then to partake of that meat and that drink, is to dwell in Christ and Christ in thee. He that dwelleth not in Christ, and in whom Christ dwelleth not, neither eateth His flesh, nor drinketh His blood: but rather eateth and drinketh the sacrament of it to his own damnation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 1) Or, having given a promise of eternal life to those that eat Him, He says this to confirm it: He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, dwelleth in Me, and I in him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom.) As for those, as indeed there are many, who either eat that flesh and drink that blood hypocritically, or, who having eaten, become apostates, do they dwell in Christ, and Christ in them? Nay, but there is a certain mode of eating that flesh, and drinking that blood, in the which he that eateth and drinketh, dwelleth in Christ, and Christ in him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei, l. xxi. c. 25) That is to say, such an one eateth the body and drinketh the blood of Christ not in the sacramental sense, but in reality.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi) And because I live, it is manifest that he will live also: As the living Father hath sent Me, and I lice by the Father, even so he that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me. (Aug. de Verb. Dom. [Nic.]). As if He said, As the Father liveth, so do I live; adding, lest you should think Him unbegotten, By the Father, meaning that He has His source in the Father. He that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me; the life here meant is not life simply, but the justified life: for even unbelievers live, who never eat of that flesh at all. Nor is it of the general resurrection He speaks, (for all will rise again,) but of the resurrection to glory, and reward.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. s. 19) He saith not, As I eat the Father, and live by the Father, so he that eateth Me, even he shall live by Me. For the Son does not grow better by partaking of the Father, as we do by partaking of the Son, i. e. of His one body and blood, which this eating and drinking signifies. So that His saying, I live by the Father, because He is from Him, must not be understood as detracting from His equality. Nor do the words, Even he that eateth Me, the same shall live by Me, give us the equality that He has. He does not equalize, but only mediates between God and man. If, however, we understand the words, I live by the Father, in the sense of those below, My Father is greater than I, (c. 14:28) then it is as if He said, That I live by the Father, i. e. refer my life to Him, as my superior, my1 humiliation in my incarnation is the cause; but He who lives by Me, lives by Me by virtue of partaking of My flesh.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 14) Of the truth then of the body and blood of Christ, no room for doubting remains: for, by the declaration of our Lord Himself, and by the teaching of our own faith, the flesh is really flesh, and the blood really blood. This then is our principle of life. While we are in the flesh, Christ dwelleth in us by His flesh. (c.14:19) And we shall live by Him, according as He liveth. If then we live naturally by partaking of Him according to the flesh, He also liveth naturally by the indwelling of the Father according to the Spirit. His birth did not give Him an alien or different nature from the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. c. 20) That we who cannot obtain eternal life of ourselves, might live by the eating that bread, He descended from heaven: This is the bread which cometh down from heaven.

HILARY. (de Trin. x. c. 18.) He calls Himself the bread, because He is the origin of His own body. And lest it should be thought that the virtue and nature of the Word had given way to the flesh, He calls the bread His flesh, that, inasmuch as the bread came down from heaven, it might be seen that His body was not of human conception, but a heavenly body. To say that the bread is His own, is to declare that the Word assumed His body Himself.

THEOPHYLACT. For we do not eat God simply, God being impalpable and incorporeal; nor again, the flesh of man simply, which would not profit us. But God having taken flesh into union with Himself, that flesh is quickening. Not that it has changed its own for the Divine nature; but, just as heated iron remains iron, with the action of the heat in it; so our Lord’s flesh is quickening, as being the flesh of the Word of God.

BEDE. And to shew the wide interval between the shadow and the light, the type and the reality, He adds, Not as your fathers did eat manna, and are dead: he that eateth of this bread shall live for ever.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvi. 20) The death here meant is death eternal. For even those who eat Christ are subject to natural death; but they live for ever, because Christ is everlasting life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 1) For if it was possible without harvest or fruit of the earth, or any such thing, to preserve the lives of the Israelites of old for forty years, much more will He be able to do this with that spiritual food, of which the manna is the type. He knew how precious a thing life was in men's eyes, and therefore repeats His promise of life often; just as the Old Testament had done; (Exod. 20:12) only that it only offered length of life, He life without end. (Deut. 22:7) This promise was an abolition of that sentence of death, which sin had brought upon us. These things said He in the synagogue, as He taught in Capernaum; (1 Kings 3:14) where many displays of His power took place. (Ps. 21:4; 91:16) He taught in the synagogue and in the temple, (Prov. 3:2) with the view of attracting the multitude, and as a sign that He was not acting in opposition to the Father.

BEDE. Mystically, Capernaum, which means beautiful town, stands for the world: the synagogue, for the Jewish people. The meaning is, that our Lord hath, by the mystery of the incarnation, manifested Himself to the world, and also taught the Jewish people His doctrines.

6:60–71

60. Many therefore of his disciples, when they had heard this, said, This is an hard saying; who can hear it?

61. When Jesus knew in himself that his disciples murmured at it, he said unto them, Doth this offend you?

62. What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where he was before?

63. It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing: the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.

64. But there are some of you that believe not. For Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him.

65. And he said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father.

66. From that time many of his disciples went back, and walked no more with him.

67. Then said Jesus unto the twelve, Will ye also go away?

68. Then Simon Peter answered him, Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life.

69. And we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God.

70. Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?

71. He spake of Judas Iscariot the son of Simon: for he it was that should betray him, being one of the twelve.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. 2) Such is our Lord’s discourse. The people did not perceive that it had a deep meaning, or, that grace went along with it: but receiving the matter in their own way, and taking His words in a human sense, understood Him as if He spoke of cutting of the flesh of the Word into pieces, for distribution to those who believed on Him: Many therefore, not of His enemies, but even of His disciples, when they heard this, said, This is an hard saying, who can hear it?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 2) i. e. difficult to receive, too much for their weakness. They thought He spoke above Himself, and more loftily than He had a right to do; and so said they, Who can bear it? which was answering in fact for themselves, that they could not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. 2) And if His disciples thought that saying hard, what would His enemies think? Yet it was necessary to declare a thing, which would be unintelligible to men. God’s mysteries should draw men’s attention, not enmity.

THEOPHYLACT. When you hear, however, of His disciples murmuring, understand not those really such, but rather some who, as far as their air and behaviour went, seemed to be receiving instruction from Him. For among His disciples were some of the people, who were called such, because they stayed some time with His disciples.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. 3) They spoke, however, so as not to be heard by Him. But He, who knew what was in them, heard within Himself: When Jesus knew within Himself that His disciples murmured at it, He said unto them, Doth this offend you?

ALCUIN. i. e. that I said, you should eat My flesh, and drink My blood.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 2) The revelation however of these hidden things was a mark of His Divinity: hence the meaning of what follows; And if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before; supply, What will ye say? He said the same to Nathanael, Because I said to thee, I saw thee under the fig tree, believest thou? Thou shalt see greater things than these. He does not add difficulty to difficulty, but to convince them by the number and greatness of His doctrines. For if He had merely said that He came down from heaven, without adding any thing further, he would have offended His hearers more; but by saying that His flesh is the life of the world, and that as He was sent by the living Father, so He liveth by the Father; and at last by adding that He came down from heaven, He removed all doubt. Nor does He mean to scandalize His disciples, but rather to remove their scandal. For so long as they thought Him the Son of Joseph, they could not receive His doctrines; but if they once believed that He had come down from heaven, and would ascend thither, they would be much more willing and able to admit them.

AUGUSTINE. Or, these words are an answer to their mistake. They supposed that He was going to distribute His body in bits: whereas He tells them now, that He should ascend to heaven whole and entire: What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before? ye will then see that He does not distribute His body in the way ye think. Again; Christ became the Son of man, of the Virgin Mary here upon earth, and took flesh upon Him: He says then, What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before? to let us know that Christ, God and man, is one person, not two; and the object of one faith, not a quaternity, but a Trinity. He was the Son of man in heaven, as He was Son of God upon earth; the Son of God upon earth by assumption of the flesh, the Son of man in heaven, by the unity of the person.

THEOPHYLACT. Do not suppose from this that the body of Christ came down from heaven, as the heretics Marcion and Apollinarius say; but only that the Son of God and the Son of man are one and the same.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 3) He tries to remove their difficulties in another way, as follows, It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing: that is to say, You ought to understand My words in a spiritual sense: he who understands them carnally is profited nothing. To interpret carnally is to take a proposition in its bare literal meaning, and allow no other. But we should not judge of mysteries in this way; but examine them with the inward eye; i. e. understand them spiritually. It was carnal to doubt how our Lord could give His flesh to eat. What then? Is it not real flesh? Yea, verily. In saying then that the flesh profiteth nothing, He does not speak of His own flesh, but that of the carnal hearer of His word.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxvii. s. 5) Or thus, the flesh profiteth nothing. They had understood by His flesh, as it were, of a carcase, that was to be cut up, and sold in the shambles, not of a body animated by the spirit. Join the spirit to the flesh, and it profiteth much: for if the flesh profited not, the Word would not have become flesh, and dwelt among us. The Spirit hath done much for our salvation, by means of the flesh.

AUGUSTINE. For the flesh does not cleanse of itself, but by the Word who assumed it: which Word, being the principle of life in all things, having taken up soul and body, cleanseth the souls and bodies of those that believe. It is the spirit, then, that quickeneth: the flesh profiteth nothing; i. e. the flesh as they understood it. I do not, He seems to say, give My body to be eaten in this sense. He ought not to think of the flesh carnally: The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 2) i. e. are spiritual, have nothing carnal in them, produce no effects of the natural sort; not being under the dominion of that law of necessity, and order of nature established on earth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii) If then thou understandest them spiritually, they are life and spirit to thee: if carnally, even then they are life and spirit, but not to thee. Our Lord declares that in eating His body, and drinking His blood, we dwell in Him, and He in us. But what has the power to affect this, except love? The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, which is given to us. (Rom. 5:5)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 2) Having spoken of His words being taken carnally, He adds, But there are some of you that believe not. Some, He says, not including His disciples in the number. This insight shews His high nature.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. s. 7) He says not, There are some among you who understand not; but gives the reason why they do not understand. The Prophet said, Except ye believe, ye shall not understanda. (Is. 7:9) For how can he who opposes be quickened? An adversary, though he avert not his face, yet closes his mind to the ray of light which should penetrate him. But let men believe, and open their eyes, and they will be enlightened.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 2) To let you know that it was before these words, and not after, that the people murmured and were offended, the Evangelist adds, For Jesus knew from the beginning, who they were that believed not, and who should betray Him.

THEOPHYLACT. The Evangelist wishes to shew us, that He knew all things before the foundation of the world: which was a proof of His divinity.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. 7) And after distinguishing those who believed from those who did not believe, our Lord gives the reason of the unbelief of the latter, And He said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto Me, except it were given him of My Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 2) As if He said, Men’s unbelief does not disturb or astonish Me: I know to whom the Father hath given to come to Me. He mentions the Father, to shew first that He had no eye to His own glory; secondly, that God was His Father, and not Joseph.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. 7) So then (our) faith is given to us: and no small gift it is. Wherefore rejoice if thou believest; but be not lifted up, for what hast thou which thou didst not receive? (1 Cor. 4:7.) And that this grace is given to some, and not to others, no one can doubt, without going against the plainest declarations of Scripture. As for the question, why it is not given to all, this cannot disquiet the believer, who knows that in consequence of the sin of one man, all are justly liable to condemnation; and that no blame could attach to God, even if none were pardoned; it being of His great mercy only that so many are. And why He pardons one rather than another, rests with Him, whose judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out.

And from that time many of the disciples went back, and walked no more with Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 3) He does not say, withdrewb, but went back, i. e. from being good hearers, from the belief which they once had.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. 8) Being cut off from the body, their life was gone. They were no longer in the body; they were created among the unbelieving. There went back not a few, but many alter Satan, not alter Christ; as the Apostle says of some women, For some had already turned aside after Satan. (1 Tim. 5:15). Our Lord says to Peter, Get thee behind Me. He does not tell Peter to go after Satan.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvi. 2) But it may be asked, what reason was there for speaking words to them which did not edify, but might rather have injured them? It was very useful and necessary; for this reason, they had been just now urgent in petitioning for bodily food, and reminding Him of that which had been given to their fathers. So He reminds them here of spiritual food; to shew that all those miracles were typical. They ought not then to have been offended, but should have enquired of Him further. The scandal was owing to their fatuity, not to the difficulty of the truths declared by our Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. 8) And perhaps this took place for our consolation; since it sometimes happens that a man says what is true, and what He says is not understood, and they which hear are offended and go. Then the man is sorry he spoke what was true; for he says to himself, I ought not to have spoken it; and yet our Lord was in the same case. He spoke the truth, and destroyed many. But He is not disturbed at it, because He knew from the beginning which would believe. We, if this happens to us, are disturbed. Let us desire consolation then from our Lord’s example; and withal use caution in our speech.

BEDE. Our Lord knew well the intentions of the other disciples which stayed, as to staying or going; but yet He put the question to them, in order to prove their faith, and hold it up to imitation: Then said Jesus unto the twelve, Will ye also go away?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 3) This was the right way to retain them. Had He praised them, they would naturally, as men do, have thought that they were conferring a favour upon Christ, by not leaving Him: by shewing, as He did, that He did not need their company, He made them hold the more closely by Him. He does not say, however, Go away, as this would have been to cast them off, but asks whether they wished to go away; thus preventing their staying with Him from any feeling of shame or necessity: for to stay from necessity would be the same as going away. Peter, who loved his brethren, replies for the whole number, Lord, to whom shall we go?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. s. 9) As if he said, Thou castest us from Thee: give us another to whom we shall go, if we leave Thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 3) A speech of the greatest love: proving that Christ was more precious to them than father or mother. And that it might not seem to be said, from thinking that there was no one whose guidance they could look to, he adds, Thou hast the words of eternal life: which shewed that he remembered his Master's words, I will raise Him up, and, hath eternal life. The Jews said, Is not this the Son of Joseph? how differently Peter: We believe and are sure, that Thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. s. 9) For we believed, in order to know. Had we wished first to know, and then to believe, we could never have been able to believe. This we believe, and know, that Thou art the Christ the Son of God; i. e. that Thou art eternal life, and that in Thy flesh and blood Thou givest what Thou art Thyself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 3) Peter however having said, We believe, our Lord excepts Judas from the number of those who believed: Jesus answered them, Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil? i. e. Do not suppose that, because you have followed Me, I shall not reprove the wicked among you. It is worth enquiring, why the disciples say nothing here, whereas afterwards they ask in fear, Lord, is it I? (Matt. 26:22) But Peter had not yet been told, Get thee behind Me, Satan; (Mat. 16:23) and therefore had as yet no fear of this sort. Our Lord however does not say here, One of you shall betray Me, but, is a devil: so that they did not know what the speech meant, and thought that it was only a case of wickedness in general, that He was reproving. The Gentiles on the subject of election blame Christ foolishly. His election does not impose any necessity upon the person with respect to the future, but leaves it in the power of His will to be saved or perish.

BEDE. Or we must say, that He elected the eleven for one purpose, the twelfth for another: the eleven to fill the place of Apostles, and persevere in it unto the end; the twelfth to the service of betraying Him, which was the means of saving the human race.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxvii. s. 10) He was elected to be an involuntary and unconscious instrument of producing the greatest good. For as the wicked turn the good works of God to an evil use, so reversely God turns the evil works of man to good. What can be worse than what Judas did? Yet our Lord made a good use of his wickedness; allowing Himself to be betrayed, that He might redeem us. In, Have I not chosen you twelve, twelve seems to be a sacred number used in the case of those, who were to spread the doctrine of the Trinity through the four quarters of the world. Nor was the virtue of that number impaired, by one perishing; inasmuch as another was substituted in his room.

GREGORY. (Moral. 1. xiii. c. xxxiv.) One of you is a devil: the bodyb is here named after its head.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlvii. 4) Mark the wisdom of Christ: He neither, by exposing him, makes him shameless and contentious; nor again emboldens him, by allowing him to think himself concealed.

CHAPTER 7

7:1–8

1. After these things Jesus walked in Galilee: for he would not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill him.

2. Now the Jews’ feast of tabernacles was at hand.

3. His brethren therefore said unto him, Depart hence, and go into Judæa, that thy disciples also may see the works that thou doest.

4. For there is no man that doeth any thing in secret, and he himself seeketh to be known openly. If thou do these things, shew thyself to the world.

5. For neither did his brethren believe in him.

6. Then Jesus said unto them, My time is not yet come: but your time is alway ready.

7. The world cannot hate you: but me it hateth, because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil.

8. Go ye up unto this feast: I go not up yet unto this feast; for my time is not yet fully come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxviii. 2) As the believer in Christ would have in time to come to hide himself from persecution, that no guilt might attach to such concealment, the Head began with doing Himself, what He sanctioned in the member; After these things Jesus walked in Galilee: for he would not walk in Jewry, because the Jews sought to kill Him.

BEDE. The connexion of this passage admits of much taking place in the interval previously. Judæa and Galilee are divisions of the province of Palestine. Judæa has its name from the tribe of Judah; but it embraces not only the territories of Judah, but of Benjamin, all of which were called Judæa, because Judah was the royal tribe. Galilee has its name, from the milky, i. e. white, colour of its inhabitants; Galilee being Greek for milk.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxviii. 2) It is not meant that our Lord could not walk among the Jews, and escape being killed; for He had this power, whenever

He chose to shew it: but He set the example of so doing, as an accommodation to our weakness. He had not lost His power, but He indulged our frailty.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii. 1) That is to say, He displayed the attribute both of divinity and humanity. He fled from His persecutors as man, He remained and appeared amongst them as God; being really both.

THEOPHYLACT. He withdrew too now to Galilee, because the hour of His passion was not yet come; and He thought it useless to stay in the midst of His enemies, when the effect would only have been to irritate them the more. The time at which this happened is then given; Now the Jews’ feast of tabernacles was at hand.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxviii. 3) What the feast of tabernacles is, we read in the Scriptures. They used to make tents on the festival, like those in which they lived during their journey in the desert, after their departure from Egypt. They celebrated this feast in commemoration of the good things the Lord had done for them; though they were the very people who were about to slay the Lord. It is called the day of the feasta, though it lasted many days.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii. 1) It appears here, that a considerable time had passed since the last events. For when our Lord sat upon the mount, it was near the feast of the Passover, and now it is the feast of tabernacles: so that in the five intermediate months the Evangelist has related nothing but the miracle of the loaves, and the conversation with those who ate of them. As our Lord was unceasingly working miracles, and holding disputes with people, the Evangelists could not relate all; but only aimed at giving those, in which complaint or opposition had followed on the part of the Jews, as was the case here.

THEOPHYLACT. His brethren saw that He was not preparing to go to the feast: His brethren therefore said unto him, Depart hence, and go into Judæa.

BEDE. Meaning to say, Thou doest miracles, and only a few see them: go to the royal city, where the rulers are, that they may see Thy miracles, and so Thou obtain praise. And as our Lord had not brought all His disciples with Him, but left many behind in Judæa, they add, That Thy disciples also may see the works that Thou doest.

THEOPHYLACT. i. e. the multitudes that follow Thee. They do not mean the twelve, but the others that bad communication with Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxviii. 3) When you hear of our Lord’s brethren, you must understand the kindred of Mary, not her offspring after our Lord’s birth. For as the body of our Lord once only lay in the sepulchre, and neither before, nor after that once; so could not the womb of Mary have possibly conceived any other mortal offspring. Our Lord’s works did not escape His disciples, but they escaped His brethren; hence their suggestion, That Thy disciples may see the works that Thou doest. They speak according to the wisdom of the flesh, to the Word that was made flesh, and add, For there is no man that doeth any thing in secret, and he himself seeketh to be known openly. If Thou do these things, shew Thyself to the world; as if to say, Thou doest miracles, do them in the eyes of the world, that the world may honour Thee. Their admonitions aim at procuring glory for Him; and this very thing, viz. aiming at human glory, proved that they did not believe in Him, as we next read, For neither did His brethren believe on Him. They were Christ’s kindred, but they were on that very account above believing in Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii. 1, 2) It is striking to observe the great sincerity of the Evangelists; that they are not ashamed to mention things which appear to be to our Lord’s disadvantage, but take particular care to tell us of them. It is a considerable reflexion on our Lord, that His brethren do not believe on Him. The beginning of their speech has a friendly appearance about it: but there is much bitterness in it, thus charging Him with the motives of fear and vain glory; No man, say they, doeth any thing in secret: this was reproaching Him tacitly with fear; and was an insinuation too that His miracles had not been real and solid ones. In what follows, And he himself seeketh to be known openly, they taunt Him with the love of glory. Christ however answers them mildly, teaching us not to take the advice of people ever so inferior to ourselves angrily; Then Jesus said unto them, My time is not yet come: but your time is alway ready.

BEDE. This is no contradiction to what the Apostle says, But when the fulness of time was come, God sent forth His Son. (Gal. 4:4) Our Lord referring here to the time not of His nativity, but of His glorification.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxviii. 5) They gave Him advice to pursue glory, and not allow Himself to remain in concealment and obscurity; appealing altogether to worldly and secular motives. But our Lord was laying down another road to that very exaltation, viz. humility: My time, He says, i. e. the time of My glory, when I shall come to judge on high, is not yet come; but your time, i. e. the glory of the world, is always ready. And let us, who are the Lord's body, when insulted by the lovers of this world, say, Your time is ready: ours is not yet come. Our country is a lofty one, the way to it is low. Whoso rejecteth the way, why seeketh he the country?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii. 2) Or there seems to be another meaning concealed in the words; perhaps they intended to betray Him to the Jews; and therefore He says, My time is not yet come, i. e. the time of My cross and death: but your time is always ready; for though you are always with the Jews, they will not kill you, because you are of the same mind with them: The world cannot hate you; but Me it hateth, because I testify of it, that the works thereof are evil: as if He said, How can the world hate them who have the same wishes and aims with itself? It hateth Me, because I reprove it. I seek not then glory from men; inasmuch as I hesitate not to reprove them, though I know that I am hated in consequence, and that My life is aimed at. Here we see that the hatred of the Jews was owing to His reproofs, not to His breaking the sabbath.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord brings two arguments in answer to their two charges. To the charge of fear He answers, that He reproves the deeds of the world, i. e. of those who love worldly things; which He would not do, if He were under the influence of fear; and He replies to the charge of vain glory, by sending them to the feast, Go ye up unto this feast. Had He been possessed at all with the desire for glory, He would have kept them with Him: for the vain glorious like to have many followers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii. 2) This is to shew too, that, while He does not wish to humour them, He still allows them to observe the Jewish ordinances.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxviii. 5. 8) Or He seems to say, Go ye up to this feast, and seek for human glory, and enlarge your carnal pleasures, and forget heavenly things.

I go not up unto this feast;

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii. 2) i. e. not with you, for My time is not yet full come. It was at the next passover that He was to be crucified.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii. 8) Or My time, i. e. the time of My glory, is not yet come. That will be My feast day; not a day which passeth and is gone, like holidays here: but one which remaineth for ever. Then will be festivity; joy without end, eternity without stain, sunshine without a cloud.

7:9–13

9. When he had said these words unto them, he abode still in Galilee.

10. But when his brethren were gone up, then went he also up unto the feast, not openly, but as it were in secret.

11. Then the Jews sought him at the feast, and said, Where is he?

12. And there was much murmuring among the people concerning him: for some said, He is a good man: others said, Nay; but he deceiveth the people.

13. Howbeit no man spake openly of him for fear of the Jews.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord at first declares that He will not go up to the feast, (I go not up with you,) in order not to expose Himself to the rage of the Jews; and therefore we read, that, When He had said these words unto them, He abode still in Galilee. Afterwards, however, He goes up; But when His brethren were gone up, then went He also up unto the feast.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii. 8) He went up, however, not to get temporary glory, but to teach wholesome doctrine, and remind men of the eternal feast.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlviii. s. 2) He goes up, not to suffer, but to teach. And He goes up secretly; because, though He could have gone openly, and kept the violence and impetuosity of the Jews in check, as He had often done before; yet to do this every time, would have disclosed His divinity; and he wished to establish the fact of His incarnation, and to teach us the way of life. And He went up privately too, to shew us what we ought to do, who cannot check our persecutors. It is not said, however, in secret, but, as it were in secret; to shew that it was done as a kind of economy. For had He done all things as God, how should we of this world know what to do, when we fell into danger?

ALCUIN. Or, He went up in secret, because He did not seek the favour of men, and took no pleasure in pomp, and being followed about with crowds.

BEDE. (non occ.) The mystical meaning is, that to all those carnal persons who seek human glory, the Lord remains in Galilee; the meaning of which name is, “passing over;” applying to those his members who pass from vice to virtue, and make progress in the latter. And our Lord Himself delayed to go up, signifying that Christ’s members seek not temporal but eternal glory. And He went up secretly, because allb glory is from within: that is, (Ps. 45:14.) from a pure heart and good conscience, and faith unfeigned. (1 Tim. 1:5)

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii. 9) Or the meaning is, that all the ceremonial of the ancient people was the figure of what was to be; such as the feast of tabernacles. Which figure is now unveiled to us. Our Lord went up in secret, to represent the figurative system. He concealed Himself at the feast itself, because the feast itself signified, that the members of Christ were in a strange country. For he dwells in the tents, who regards himself as a stranger in the world. The word scenopegia here means the feast of tabernacles.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 1) Then the Jews sought Him at the feast, and said, Where is He? out of hatred and enmity; for they would not call Him by His name. There was not much reverence or religion in this observance of the feast, when they wanted to make it an opportunity of seizing Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii. s. 11) And there was much murmuring in the people concerning Him. A murmuring arising from disagreement. For some said, He is a good man: others said, Nay; but He seduceth the people. Whoever had any spark of grace, said, He is a good man; the rest, Nay, hut He seduceth the people. That such was said of Him, Who was God, is a consolation to any Christian, of whom the same may be said. If to seduce be to decide, Christ was not a seducer, nor can any Christian be. But if by seducing be meant bringing a person by persuasion out of one way of thinking into another, then we must enquire from what, and to what. If from good to evil, the seducer is an evil man; if from evil to good, a good one. And would that we were all called, and really were, such seducers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 1) The former, I think, was the opinion of the multitude, the one, viz. who pronounced Him a good man; the latter the opinion of the priests and rulers; as is shewn by their saying, He deceiveth the people, not, He deceiveth us.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii. 12) Howbeit no man spake openly of Him, for fear of the Jews; none, that is, of those who said, He is a good man. They who said, He deceiveth the people, proclaimed their opinion openly enough; while the former only dared whisper theirs.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 1) Observe, the corruption is in the rulers: the common people are sound in their judgment, but have not liberty of speech, as is generally their case.

7:14–18

14. Now about the midst of the feast Jesus went up into the temple, and taught.

15. And the Jews marvelled, saying, How knoweth this man letters, having never learned?

16. Jesus answered them, and said, My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me.

17. If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.

18. He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory: but he that seeketh his glory that sent him, the same is true, and no unrighteousness is in him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 1. Aug.) Our Lord delays His visit, in order to excite men’s attention, and goes up not the first day, but about the middle of the feast: Now about the midst of the feast Jesus went up into the temple, and taught. Those who had been searching for Him, when they saw Him thus suddenly appear, would be more attentive to His teaching, both favourers and enemies; the one to admire and profit by it; the other to find an opportunity of laying hands on Him.

THEOPHYLACT. At the commencement of the feast, men would be attending more to the preachings of the festival itself; and afterwards would be better disposed to hear Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii. s. 8.) The feast seems, as far as we can judge, to have lasted several days. And therefore it is said, “about the middle of the feast day:c” i. e. when as many days of that feast had passed, as were to come. So that His assertion, I go not up yet to this feast day, (i. e. to the first or second day, as you would wish me,) was strictly fulfilled. For He went up afterwards, about the middle of the feast.

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Nov. et Vet. Test. 2. 78) In going there too, He went up, not to the feast day, but to the light. They had gone to enjoy the pleasures of the festival, but Christ’s feast day was that on which by His Passion He redeemed the world.

AUGUSTINE. (super Joan. Tract. xxix. 2) He who had before concealed Himself, taught and spoke openly, and was not laid hold on. The one was intended for an example to us, the other to testify His power.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 1) What His teaching is, the Evangelist does not say; but that it was very wonderful is shewn by its effect even upon those who had accused Him of deceiving the people, who turned round and began to admire Him: And the Jews marvelled, saying, How knoweth this Man letters, having never learned? See how perverse they are even in their admiration. It is not His doctrine they admire, but another thing altogether.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxix. 2) All, it would appear, admired, but all were not converted. Whence then the admiration? Many knew where He was born, and how He had been educated; but had never seen Him learning letters. Yet now they heard Him disputing on the law, and bringing forward its testimonies. No one could do this, who had not read the law; no one could read who had not learnt letters; and this raised their wonder.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 1) Their wonder might have led them to infer, that our Lord became possessed of this learning in some divine way, and not by any human process. But they would not acknowledge this, and contented themselves with wondering. So our Lord repeated it to them: Jesus answered them and said, My doctrine is not Mine, but His that sent Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxix. s. 3) Mine is not mine, appears a contradiction; why did He not say, This doctrine is not Mine? Because the doctrine of the Father being the Word of the Father, and Christ Himself being that Word, Christ Himself is the doctrine of the Father. And therefore He calls the doctrine both His own, and the Father’s. A word must be a word of some one’s. What is so much Thine as Thou, and what is so much not Thine as Thou, if what Thou art, Thou art of another. His saying then, My doctrine is not Mine own, seems briefly to express the truth, that He is not from Himself; it refutes the Sabellian heresy, which dares to assert that the Son is the same as the Father, there being only two names for one thing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 2) Or He calls it His own, inasmuch as He taught it; not His own, inasmuch as the doctrine was of the Father. If all things however which the Father hath are His, the doctrine for this very reason is His; i. e. because it is the Father's. Rather that He says, Is not Mine own, shews very strongly, that His doctrine and the Father's are one: as if He said, I differ nothing from Him; but so act, that it may be thought I say and do nothing else than doth the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (de Trin. i. c. xi) Or thus: In one sense He calls it His, in another sense not His; according to the form of the Godhead His, according to the form of the servant not His.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxix. s. 6) Should any one however not understand this, let him hear the advice which immediately follows from our Lord: If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of Myself. What meaneth this, If any man will do His will? To do His will is to believe on Him, as He Himself says, This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He hath sent. (c. 6:29) And who does not know, that to work the work of God, is to do His will? To know is to understand. Do not then seek to understand in order to believe, but believe in order to understand, for, Except ye believe, ye shall not understand. (Is. 7:9. Vulg.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 1) This is as much as to say, Put away the anger, envy, and hatred which you have towards Me, and there will be nothing to prevent your knowing, that the words which I speak are from God. Then He brings in an irresistible argument taken from human experience: He that speaketh of himself, seeketh his own glory: as if to say, He who aims at establishing some doctrine of his own, does so for no purpose, but to get glory. But I seek the glory of Him that sent me, and wish to teach you for His, i. e. another's, sake: and then it follows, But he that seeketh His glory that sent Him, the same is true, and there is no unrighteousness in Him.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, I speak the truth, because My doctrine containeth the truth: there is no unrighteousness in Me, because I usurp not another's glory.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxix. s. 8) He who seeketh his own glory is Antichrist. But our Lord set us an example of humility, in that being found in fashion as a man, He sought His Father's glory, not His own. Thou, when thou doest good, takest glory to thyself, when thou doest evil, upbraidest God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 2) Observe, the reason why He spake so humbly of Himself, is to let men know, that He does not aim at glory, or power; and to accommodate Himself to their weakness, and to teach them moderation, and a humble, as distinguished from an assuming, way of speaking of themselves.

7:19–24

19. did not Moses give you the law, and yet none of you keepeth the law? Why go ye about to kill me?

20. The people answered and said, Thou hast a devil: who goeth about to kill thee?

21. Jesus answered and said unto them, I have done one work, and ye all marvel.

22. Moses therefore gave unto you circumcision: (not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers:) and ye on the sabbath day circumcise a man.

23. If a man on the sabbath day receive circumcision, that the law of Moses should not be broken; are ye angry at me, because I have made a man every whit whole on the sabbath day?

24. Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgment.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 2) The Jews brought two charges against Christ; one, that He broke the sabbath; the other, that He said God was His Father, making Himself equal with God. The latter He confirmed first by shewing, that He did nothing in opposition to God, but that both taught the same. Then turning to the charge of breaking the sabbath, He says, did not Moses give you a law, and none of you keepeth the law? as much as to say, The law says, Thou shalt not kill, whereas ye kill. And then, Why go ye about to kill Me? As if to say, If I broke a law to heal a man, it was a transgression, but a beneficial one; whereas ye transgress for an evil end; so you have no right to judge Me for breaking the law. He rebukes them then for two things; first, because they went about to kill Him; secondly, because they were going about to kill another, when they had not even any right to judge Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxx. 2) Or He means to say, that if they kept the law, they would see Him pointed to in every part of it, and would not seek to kill Him, when He came. The people return an answer quite away from the subject, and only shewing their angry feelings: The people answered and said, Thou hast a devil: who goeth about to kill Thee? He who cast out devils, was told that He had a devil. Our Lord however, in no way disturbed, but retaining all the serenity of truth, returned not evil for evil, or railing for railing.

BEDE. Wherein He left us an example to take it patiently, whenever wrong censures are passed upon us, and not answer them by asserting the truth, though able to do so, but rather by some wholesome advice to the persons; as doth our Lord: Jesus answered and said unto them, I have done one work, and ye all marvel.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxx. s. 3) As if He said, What if ye saw all My works? For all that they saw going on in the world was of His working, but they saw not Him Who made all things. But He did one thing, made a man whole on the sabbath day, and they were in commotion: as if, when any one of them recovered from a disease on the sabbath, he who made him whole were any other than He, who had offended them by making one man whole on the sabbath.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 3) Ye marvel, i. e. are disturbed, are in commotion. Observe how well He argues with them from the law. He wishes to prove that this work was not a violation of the law; and shews accordingly that there are many things more important than the law for the observance of the sabbath, by the observance of which that law is not broken but fulfilled. Moses therefore, He says, gave unto you circumcision, not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers, and ye on the sabbath day circumcise a man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxx. s. 4) As if He said, Ye have done well to receive circumcision from Moses, not because it is of Moses, but of the fathers; for Abraham first received circumcision from the Lord. And ye circumcise on the sabbath. Moses has convicted you: ye received a law to circumcise on the eighth day; and ye received a law to rest on the seventh day. If the eighth day after a child is born happen to be the sabbath, ye circumcise the child; because circumcision appertaineth to, is a kind of sign of, salvation; and men ought not to rest from the work of salvation on the sabbath.

ALCUIN. Circumcision was given for three reasons; first, as a sign of Abraham’s great faith; secondly, to distinguish the Jews from other nations; thirdly, that the receiving of it on the organ of virility, might admonish us to observe chastity both of body and mind. And circumcision then possessed the same virtue that baptism does now; only that the gate was not yet open. Our Lord concludes: If a man on the sabbath day receive circumcision, that the law of Moses should not be broken; are ye angry at Me because I have made a man every whit whole on the sabbath day?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 3) Which is as much as to tell them, The breaking of the sabbath in circumcision is a keeping of the law; and in the same way I by healing on the sabbath have kept the law. Ye, who are not the legislators, enforce the law beyond its proper bounds; whereas Moses made the law give way to the observance of a commandment, which did not come from the law, but from the fathers. His saying, I have made a man every whit whole on the sabbath day, implies that circumcision was a partial recovering.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxx. 5) Circumcision also was perhaps a type of our Lord Himself. For what is circumcision but a robbing of the flesh, to signify the robbing the heart of its carnal lusts. And therefore it was not without reason that it was applied to that member by which the mortal creature is propagated: for by one man sin entered into the world. (Rom. 5:12) And therefore every one is born with the foreskin, because every one is born with the fault of his propagation. (vite propagenis) And God does not change us either from the corruption of our birth, or from that we have contracted ourselves by a bad life, except by Christ: and therefore they circumcised with knives of stone, to prefigure Christ, who is the stone; and on the eighth day, because our Lord’s resurrection took place on the day after the seventh day; which resurrection circumcises us, i. e. destroys our carnal appetites. Regard this, saith our Lord, as a type of My good work in making a man every whit whole on the sabbath day: for he was healed, that he might be whole in body, and he believed, that he might be whole in mind. Ye are forbidden indeed to do servile work on the sabbath; but is it a servile work to heal on the sabbath? Ye eat and drink on the sabbath, because it is necessary for your health: which shews that works of healing are by no means to be omitted on the sabbath.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 3) He does not say, however, I have done a greater work than circumcision; but only states the matter of fact, and leaves the judgment to them, saying, Judge not according to the appearance, but Judge righteous judgment: as if to say, Do not, because Moses has a greater name with you than I, decide by degree of personal eminence; but decide by the nature of the thing itself, for this is to judge righteously. No one however has blamed Moses for making the sabbath give place to the commandment of circumcision, which was not derived from the law, but from another source. Moses then commands the law to be broken to give effect to a commandment not of the law: and he is more worthy of credit than you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxx. s. 7) What our Lord here tells us to avoid, in judging by the person, is very difficult in this world not to do. His admonition to the Jews is an admonition to us as well; for every sentence which our Lord uttered, was written for us, and is preserved to us, and is read for our profit. Our Lord is above; but our Lord, as the truth, is here as well. The body with which He rose can be only in one place, but His truth is diffused every where. Who then is he who judges not by the person? He who loves all alike. For it is not the paying men different degrees of honour according to their situation, that will make us chargeable with accepting persons. There may be a case to decide between father and son: we should not put the son on an equality with the father in point of honour; but, in respect of truth, if he have the better cause, we should give him the preference; and so give to each their due, that justice do not destroy desertd.

7:25–30

25. Then said some of them of Jerusalem, Is not this he, whom they seek to kill?

26. But, lo, he speaketh boldly, and they say nothing unto him. Do the rulers know indeed that this is the very Christ?

27. Howbeit we know this man whence he is: but when Christ cometh, no man knoweth whence he is.

28. Then cried Jesus in the temple as he taught, saying, Ye both know me, and ye know whence I am: and I am not come of myself, but he that sent me is true, whom ye know not.

29. But I know him: for I am from him, and he hath sent me.

30. Then they sought to take him: but no man laid hands on him, because his hour was not yet come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxxi. 1) It was said above that, our Lord went up to the feast secretly, not because He feared being taken (for He had power to prevent it,) but to shew figuratively, that even in the very feast which the Jews celebrated, He was hid, and that it was His mystery. Now however the power appears, which was thought timidity: He spoke publicly at the feast, in so much that the multitude marvelled: They said some of them at Jerusalem, Is not this He, whom they seek to kill? but, lo, He speaketh boldly, and they say nothing to Him. They knew the fierceness with which He had been sought for; they marvelled at the power by which he was not taken.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 1) The Evangelist adds, from Jerusalem: for there had been the greatest display of miracles, and there the people were in the worst state, seeing the strongest proofs of His divinity, and yet willing to give up all to the judgment of their corrupt rulers. Was it not a great miracle, that those who raged for His life, now that they had Him in their grasp, became on a sudden quiet?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxxi. 1) So, not fully understanding Christ's power, they supposed that it was owing to the knowledge of the rulers that He was spared: Do the rulers know indeed that this is the very Christ?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 1) But they do not follow the opinion of the rulers, but put forth another most perverse and absurd one; Howbeit we know this Man, whence He is; but when Christ cometh, no man knoweth whence He is.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxxi. s. 2) This notion did not arise without foundation. We find indeed that the Scriptures said of Christ, He shall be called a Nazarene, (Matt. 2:23) and thus predicted whence He would come. And the Jews again told Herod, when he enquired, that Christ would be born in Bethlehem of Judah, and adduced the testimony of the Prophet. How then did this notion of the Jews arise, that, when Christ came, no one would know whence He was? From this reason, viz. that the Scriptures asserted both. As man, they foretold whence Christ would be; as God, He was hid from the profane, but revealed Himself to the godly. This notion they had taken from Isaiah, Who shall declare His generation? (Isa. 53) Our

Lord replies, that they both knew Him, and knew Him not: Then cried Jesus in the temple as He taught, saying, Ye both know Me, and know whence I am: that is to say, Ye both know whence I am, and do not know whence I am: ye know whence I am, that I am Jesus of Nazareth, whose parents ye know. The birth from the Virgin was the only part of the matter unknown to them: with this exception, they knew all that pertained to Jesus as man. So He well says, Ye both know Me, and know whence I am: i. e. according to the flesh, and the likeness of man. But in respect of His divinity, He says, I am not come of Myself, but He that sent Me is true.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 1) By which He discloses what was in their minds. I am not, He seems to say, of the number of those who have come without reason, but He is true that sent Me; and if He is true, He hath sent Me in truth; and therefore He who is sent must needs speak the truth. He then convicts them from their own assertions. For whereas they had said, When Christ cometh, no man knoweth whence He is, He shews that Christ did come from one whom they knew not, i. e. the Father. Wherefore He adds, Whom ye know not.

HILARY. (de Trin. ult. med.) Every man, ever born in the flesh, is in a certain sense from God. How then could He say that they were ignorant who He was, and whence He wasa? Because our Lord is here referring to His own peculiar birth from God, which they were ignorant of, because they did not know that He was the Son of God. His very saying then that they did not know whence He was, was telling them whence He was. If they did not know whence He was, He could not be from nothing; for then there would be no whence to be ignorant of. He must therefore be from God. And then not knowing whence He is, was the reason that they did not know who He is. He does not know the Son who does not know His birth from the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 1) Or the ignorance, He here speaks of, is the ignorance of a bad life; as Paul saith, They profess that they know God, but in works they deny Him. (Tit. 1:16) Our Lord’s reproof is twofold: He first published what they were speaking secretly, crying out, in order to put them to shame.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxxi. 4) Lastly, to shew whence they could get to know Him (who had sent Him), He adds, I know Him: so if you would know Him, enquire of Me. No one knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal Him. And if I should say, I know Him not, I should be a liar like unto you. (c. 8:55)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 1) Which is impossible: for He that sent Me is true, and therefore He that is sent must be true likewise. He every where attributes the knowledge of the Father to Himself, as being from the Father: thus here, But I know Him, for I am from Him.

HILARY. (vi. de Trin. ultra med.) I ask however, does the being from Him express a work of creation, or a birth by generation? If a work of creation, then every thing which is created is from Him. And how then does not all creation know the Father, if the Son knows Him, because He is from Him? But if the knowledge of the Father is peculiar to Him, as being from Him, then the being from Him is peculiar to Him also; i. e. the being the true Son of God by nature. So you have then a peculiar knowledge springing from a peculiar generation. To prevent however any heresy applying the being from Him, to the time of His advent, He adds, And He hath sent Me: thus preserving the order of the Gospel sacrament; first announcing Himself born, and then sent.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxxi. 4) I am from Him, He says, i. e. as the Son from the Father: but that you see Me in the flesh is because He hath sent Me. Wherein understand not a difference of nature, but the authority of a father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 2) His saying however, Whom ye know not, irritated the Jews, who professed to have knowledge; and they sought to take Him, but no man laid hands on Him. Mark the invisible check which is kept upon their fury: though the Evangelist does not mention it, but preserves purposely a humble and human way of speaking, in order to impress us with Christ’s humanity; and therefore only adds, Because His hour was not yet come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. s. 5) That is, because He was not so pleased; for our Lord was not born subject to fate. Thou must not believe this even of thyself, much less of Him by Whom thou wert made. And if thine hour is in His will, is not His hour in His own will? His home then here does not mean the time that He was obliged to die, but the time that He deigned to be put to death.

7:31–36

31. And many of the people believed on him, and said, When Christ cometh, will he do more miracles than these which this man hath done?

32. The Pharisees heard that the people murmured such things concerning him; and the Pharisees and the chief priests sent officers to take him.

33. Then said Jesus unto them, Yet a little while am I with you, and then I go unto him that sent me.

34. Ye shall seek me, and shall not find me: and where I am, thither ye cannot come.

35. Then said the Jews among themselves, Whither will he go, that we shall not find him? will he go unto the dispersed among the Gentiles, and teach the Gentiles?

36. What manner of saying is this that he said, Ye shall seek me, and shall not find me: and where I am, thither ye cannot come?

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. 7) And many of the people believed on Him. Our Lord brought the poor and humble to be saved. The common people, who soon saw their own infirmities, received His medicine without hesitation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 2) Neither had these however a sound faith; but took up a low way of speaking, after the manner of the multitude: When Christ cometh, will He do more miracles than this Man hath done? Their saying, When Christ cometh, shews that they were not steady in believing that He was the Christ: or rather, that they did not believe He was the Christ at all; for it is the same as if they said, that Christ, when He came, would be a superior person, and do more miracles. Minds of the grosser sort are influenced not by doctrine, but by miracles.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. 7) Or they mean, If there are not to be two Christs, this is He. The rulers however, possessed with madness, not only refused to acknowledge the physician, but even wished to kill Him: The Pharisees heard that the people murmured such things concerning Him, and the Pharisees and chief priests sent officers to take Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. He had discoursed often before, but they had never so treated Him. The praises of the multitude however now irritated them; though the transgression of the sabbath still continued to be the reason put forward. Nevertheless, they were afraid of taking this step themselves, and sent officers instead.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. s. 8) Not being able to take Him against His will, they sent men to hear Him teach. Teach what? Then said Jesus unto them, Yet a little while I am with you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 2) He speaks with the greatest humility: as if to say, Why do ye make such haste to kill Me? Only wait a little time.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. 8) That which ye wish to do now, ye shall do sometime, but not now: because it is not My will. For I wish to fulfil My mission in due course, and so to come to My passion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 2) In this way He astonished the bolder part of the multitude, and made the earnest among them more eager to hear Him; so little time being now left, during which they could have the benefit of His teaching. He does not say, I am here, simply; but, I am with you; meaning, Though you persecute Me, I will not cease fulfilling my part towards you, teaching you the way to salvation, and admonishing you. What follows, And I go unto Him that sent Me, was enough to excite some fear.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He were going to complain of them to the Father: for if they reviled Him who was sent, no doubt they did an injury to Him that sent.

BEDE. I go to Him that sent Me: i. e. I return to My Father, at whose command I became incarnate. He is speaking of that departure, from which He has never returned.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 2) That they wanted His presence, appears from His saying, Ye seek Me, and shall not find Me. But when did the Jews seek Him? Luke relates that the women lamented over Him: and it is probable that many others did the same. And especially, when the city was taken, would they call Christ and His miracles to remembrance, and desire His presence.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. 9) Here He foretels His resurrection: for the search for Him was to take place after His resurrection, when men were conscience-stricken. They would not acknowledge Him, when present; afterward they sought Him, when they saw the multitude believing on Him; and many pricked in their hearts said, What shall we do? They perceived that Christ’s death was owing to their sin, and believed in Christ’s pardon to sinners; and so despaired of salvation, until they drank of that blood which they shed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 3) Then lest any should think that His death would take place in the common way, He adds, And where I am, thither ye cannot come. If He continued in death, they would be able to go to Him: for we all are going thitherwards.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. 9) He does not say, Where I shall be, but Where I am. For Christ was always there in that place whither He was about to return: He returned in such a way, as that He did not forsake us. Visibly and according to the flesh, He was upon earth; according to His invisible majesty, He was in heaven and earth. Nor again is it, Ye will not be able, but, Ye are not able to come: for they were not such at the time, as to be able. That this is not meant to drive men to despair, is shewn by His saying the very same thing to His disciples; Whither I go, ye cannot come; and by His explanation last of all to Peter, Whither I go, ye cannot follow Me now, but ye shall follow Me afterwards.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. 1. 32.) He wants them to think seriously how little time longer He should be with them, and what regret they will feel when He is gone, and they are not able to find Him. I go unto Him that sent Me; this shews that no injury was done Him by their plots, and that His passion was voluntary. The words had some effect upon the Jews, who asked each other, where they were to go, which was like persons desiring to be quit of Him: Then said the Jews among themselves, Whither will He go, that we shall not find Him? Will He go to the dispersed among the Gentiles, and teach the Gentiles? In the fulness of their self-satisfaction, they call them Gentiles, as a term of reproach; the Gentiles being dispersed every where; a reproach which they themselves underwent afterwards. Of old all the nation was united together: but now that the Jews were mixed with the Gentiles in every part of the world, our Lord would not have said, Whither I go, ye cannot come, in the sense of going to the Gentiles.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxi. 10) Whither I go, i. e. to the bosom of the Father. This they did not at all understand: and yet even their mistake is an unwitting prophecy of our salvation; i. e. that our Lord would go to the Gentiles, not in His own person, but by His feet, i. e. His members. He sent to us those whom He had made His members, and so made us His members.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 3) They did not mean, that our Lord was going to the Gentiles for their hurt, but to teach them. Their anger had subsided, and they believed what He had said. Else they would not have thought of asking each other, What manner of saying is this that He said, Ye shall seek Me, and shall not find Me: and whither I am, ye cannot come.

7:37–39

37. In the last day, that great day of the feast, Jesus stood and cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto me, and drink.

38. He that believeth on me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water.

39. (But this spake he of the Spirit, which they that believe on him should receive: for the Holy Ghost was not yet given; because that Jesus was not yet glorified.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 1) The feast being over, and the people about to return home, our Lord gives them provisions for the way: In the last day, that great day of the feast, Jesus stood and cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto Me, and drink.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxii. 1) The feast was then going on, which is called scenopegia, i. e. building of tents.

CHRYSOSTOM. Which lasted seven days. The first and last days were the most important; In the last day, that great day of the feast, says the Evangelist. Those between were given chiefly to amusements. He did not then make the offer on the first day, or the second, or the third, lest amidst the excitements that were going on, people should let it slip from their minds, He cried out, on account of the great multitude of people present.

THEOPHYLACT. To make Himself audible, inspire confidence in others, and shew an absence of all fear in Himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 1) If any thirsteth: as if to say, I use no compulsion or violence: but if any have the desire strong enough, let him come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxii. 2.) For there is an inner thirst, because there is an inner man: and the inner man of a certainty loves more than the outer. So then if we thirst, let us go not on our feet, but on our affections, not by change of place, but by love.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 1) He is speaking of spiritual drink, as His next words shew: He that believeth on Me, as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water. But where does the Scripture say this? No where. What then? We should read, He that believeth in Me, as saith the Scripture, putting the stop here; and then, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water: the meaning being, that that was a right kind of belief, which was formed on the evidence of Scripture, not of miracles. Search the Scriptures, He had said before.

JEROME. (Hierom. in prolog. Gen.) Or this testimony is taken from the Proverbs, where it is said, Let thy fountains be dispersed abroad, and rivers of waters in the streets. (Prov. 5:16)

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxii. 4) The belly of the inner man, is the heart’s conscience. Let him drink from that water, and his conscience is quickened and purified; he drinks in the whole fountain, nay, becomes the very fountain itself. But what is that fountain, and what is that river, which flows from the belly of the inner man? The love of his neighbour. If any one, who drinks of the water, thinks that it is meant to satisfy himself alone, out of his belly there doth not flow living water. But if he does good to his neighbour, the stream is not dried up, but flows.

GREGORY. (super Ezech. Hom. x.) When sacred preaching floweth from the soul of the faithful, rivers of living water, as it were, run down from the bellies of believers. For what are the entrails of the belly but the inner part of the mind; i. e. a right intention, a holy desire, humility towards God, mercy toward man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 1) He says, rivers, not river, to shew the copious and overflowing power of grace: and living water, i. e. always moving; for when the grace of the Spirit has entered into and settled in the mind, it flows freer than any fountain, and neither fails, nor empties, nor stagnates. The wisdom of Stephen, the tongue of Peter, the strength of Paul, are evidences of this. Nothing hindered them; but, like impetuous torrents, they went on, carrying every thing along with them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxii 5) What kind of drink it was, to which our Lord invited them, the Evangelist next explains; But this He spake of the Spirit, which they that believe on Him should receive. Whom does the Spirit mean, but the Holy Spirit? For every man has within him his own spirit.

ALCUIN. He promised the Holy Spirit to the Apostles before the Ascension; He gave it to them in fiery tongues, after the Ascension. The

Evangelist’s words, Which they that believe on Him should receive, refer to this.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxii. 6) The Spirit of God was, i. e. was with God, before now; but was not yet given to those who believed on Jesus; for our Lord had determined not to give them the Spirit, till He was risen again: The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 1) The Apostles indeed cast out devils by the Spirit before, but only by the power which they had from Christ. For when He sent them, it is not said, He gave them the Holy Spirit, but, He gave unto them power. With respect to the Prophets, however, all agree that the Holy Spirit was given to them: but this grace had been withdrawn from the world.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. xx) Yet we read of John the Baptist, He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother’s womb. (Luke 1:15) And Zacharias was filled with the Holy Ghost, and prophesied. Mary was filled with the Holy Ghost, and prophesied of our Lord. And so were Simeon and Anna, that they might acknowledge the greatness of the infant Christ. We are to understand then that the giving of the Holy Spirit was to be certain, after Christ’s exaltation, in a way in which it never was before. It was to have a peculiarity at His coming, which it had not before. For we no where read of men under the influence of the Holy Spirit, speaking with tongues which they had never known, as then took place, when it was necessary to evidence His coming by sensible miracles.

AUGUSTINE. If the Holy Spirit then is received now, why is there no one who speaks the tongues of all nations? Because now the Church herself speaks the tongues of all nations. Whoso is not in her, neither doth he now receive the Holy Spirit. But if only thou lovest unity, whoever hath any thing in her, hath it for thee. Put away envy, and that which I have is thine. Envy separateth, love unites: have it, and thou hast all things: whereas without it nothing that thou canst have, will profit thee. The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given to us. (Rom. 5:9) But why did our Lord give the Holy Spirit after His resurrection? That the flame of love might mount upwards to our own resurrection: separating us from the world, and devoting us wholly to God. He who said, He that believeth in Me, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living water, hath promised life eternal, free from all fear, and change, and death. Such then being the gifts which He promised to those in whom the Holy Spirit kindled the flame of love, He would not give that Spirit till He was glorified: in order that in His own person He might shew us that life, which we hope to attain to in the resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (cont. Faust. l. xxxii. c. 17) If this then is the cause why the Holy Spirit was not yet given; viz. because Jesus was not yet glorified; doubtless, the glorification of Jesus when it took place, was the cause immediately of its being given. The Cataphryges, however, said that they first received the promised Paraclete, and thus strayed from the Catholic faith. The Manichæans too apply all the promises made respecting the Holy Spirit to Manichæus, as if there were no Holy Spirit given before.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 2) Or thus; By the glory of Christ, He means the cross. For, whereas we were enemies, and gifts are not made to enemies, but to friends, it was necessary that the victim should be first offered up, and the enmity of the flesh removed; that, being made friends of God, we might be capable of receiving the gift.

7:40–53

40. Many of the people therefore, when they heard this saying, said, Of a truth this is the Prophet.

41. Others said, This is the Christ. But some said, Shall Christ come out of Galilee?

42. Hath not the Scripture said, That Christ cometh of the seed of David, and out of the town of Bethlehem, where David was?

43. So there was a division among the people because of him.

44. And some of them would have taken him; but no man laid hands on him.

45. Then came the officers to the chief priests and Pharisees; and they said unto them, Why have ye not brought him?

46. The officers answered, Never man spake like this man.

47. Then answered them the Pharisees, Are ye also deceived?

48. Have any of the rulers or of the Pharisees believed on him?

49. But this people who knoweth not the law are cursed.

50. Nicodemus saith unto them, (he that came to Jesus by night, being one of them,)

51. Doth our law judge any man, before it hear him, and know what he doeth?

52. They answered and said unto him, Art thou also of Galilee? Search, and look: for out of Galilee ariseth no prophet.

53. And every man went unto his own house.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 1) Our Lord having invited those, who believed in Him, to drink of the Holy Spirit, a dissension arose among the multitude: Many of the people therefore, when they heard this saying, said, Of a truth this is the Prophet.

THEOPHYLACT. The one, that is, who was expected. Others, i. e. the people said, This is the Christ.

ALCUIN. These had now begun to drink in that spiritual thirst1, and had laid aside the unbelieving thirst. But others still remained dried up in their unbelief: But some said, Shall Christ come out of Galilee? Hath not the Scripture said, That Christ cometh of the seed of David, and out of the town of Bethlehem, where David was? They knew what were the predictions of the Prophets respecting Christ, but knew not that they all were fulfilled in Him. They knew that He had been brought up at Nazareth, but the place of His birth they did not know; and did not believe that it answered to the prophecies.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 2.) But be it so, they knew not His birth-place: were they ignorant also of His extraction? that He was of the house and family of David? Why did they ask, Hath not the Scripture said, that Christ cometh of the seed of David? They wished to conceal His extraction, and therefore put forward where He had been educated. For this reason, they do not go to Christ and ask, How say the Scriptures that Christ must come from Bethlehem, whereas Thou comest from Galilee? purposely and of malice prepense they do not do this. And because they were thus inattentive, and indifferent about knowing the truth, Christ did not answer them: though He had lauded Nathanael, when he said, Can any good thing come out of Nazareth? and called Him an Israelite indeed, as being a lover of truth, and well learned in the ancient Scriptures.

So there was a division among the people concerning Him.

THEOPHYLACT. Not among the rulers; for they were resolved one way, viz. not to acknowledge Him as Christ. The more moderate of them only used malicious words, in order to oppose Christ’s path to glory; but the more malignant wished to lay hands on Him: And some of them would have taken Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 2) The Evangelist says this to shew, that they had no concern for, and no anxiety to learn, the truth.

But no man laid hands on Him.

ALCUIN. That is, because He Who had the power to control their designs, did not permit it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. li. 2) This were sufficient to have raised some compunction in them; but no, such malignity believes nothing; it looks only to one thing, blood.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 1) They however who were sent to take Him, returned guiltless of the offence, and full of admiration: Then came the officers to the chief priests and Pharisees; and they said unto them, Why have ye not brought Him?

ALCUIN. They who wished to take and stone Him, reprove the officers for not bringing Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 1) The Pharisees and Scribes profited nothing by seeing the miracles, and reading the Scriptures; but their officers, who had done neither, were captivated with once hearing Him; and they who went to take hold of Him, were themselves taken hold of by the miracle. Nor did they say, We could not because of the multitude: but made themselves proclaimers of Christ’s wisdom: The officers answered, Never man spake like this Man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 1) He spoke thus, because He was both God and man.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 1) Not only is their wisdom to be admired, for not wanting miracles, but being convinced by His teaching only, (for they do not say, Never man did such miracles as this Man, but, Never man spake like this Man,) but also their boldness, in saying this to the Pharisees, who were such enemies of Christ. They had not heard a long discourse, but minds unprepossessed against Him did not require one.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 1) The Pharisees however rejected their testimony: Then answered them the Pharisees, Are ye also led away? As if to say, We see that you are charmed by His discourse.

ALCUIN. And so they were led away; and laudably too, for they had left the evil of unbelief, and were gone over to the faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 1) They make use of the most foolish argument against them: Have any of the rulers or of the Pharisees believed on Him? but this people who knoweth not the law are cursed? This then was their ground of accusation, that the people believed, but they themselves did not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 1) They who knew not the law, believed on Him who had given the law, and they who taught the law condemned Him; thus fulfilling our Lord's words, I am come, that they which see not might see, and that they which see might be made blind. (c. 19:39)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 1) How then are they cursed, who are convinced by the law? Rather are ye cursed, who have not observed the law.

THEOPHYLACT. The Pharisees answer the officers courteously and gently; because they are afraid of their forthwith separating from them, and joining Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 1) As they said that none of the rulers believed on Him, the Evangelist contradicts them: Nicodemus saith unto them, (he that came to Jesus by night, being one of them.)

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 1) He was not unbelieving, but fearful; and therefore came by night to the light, wishing to be enlightened, but afraid of being known to go. He replies, Doth our law judge any man before it hear him, and know what he doeth? He thought that, if they would only hear Him patiently, they would be overcome, as the officers had been. But they preferred obstinately condemning Him, to knowing the truth.

AUGUSTINE. He calls the law of God, our law; because it was given to men.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 1, 2) Nicodemus shews that they knew the law, and did not act according to the law. They, instead of disproving this, take to rude and angry contradiction: They answered and said unto him, Art thou also of Galilee?

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 2) i. e. led away by a Galilean. Our Lord was called a Galilean, because His parents were of the town of Nazareth; I mean by parents, Mary.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 2.) Then, by way of insult, they direct Him to the Scriptures, as if He were ignorant of them; Search and look, for out of Galilee ariseth no prophet: as if to say, Go, learn what the Scriptures say.

ALCUIN. They knew the place where He had resided, but never thought of enquiring where He was born; and therefore they not only denied that He was the Messiah, but even that He was a prophet.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 2.) No prophet indeed ariseth out of Galilee, but the Lord of prophets arose thence.

And every man went unto his own house.

ALCUIN. Having effected nothing, devoid of faith, and therefore incapable of being benefited, they returned to their home of unbelief and ungodliness.

CHAPTER 8

8:1–11

1. Jesus went unto the mount of Olives.

2. And early in the morning he came again into the temple, and all the people came unto him; and he sat down, and taught them.

3. And the Scribes and Pharisees brought unto him a woman taken in adultery; and when they had set her in the midst,

4. They say unto him, Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act.

5. Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned: but what sayest thou?

6. This they said, tempting him, that they might have to accuse him. But Jesus stooped down, and with his finger wrote on the ground, as though he heard them not.

7. So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and said unto them, He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her.

8. And again He stooped down, and wrote on the ground.

9. And they which heard it, being convicted by their own conscience, went out one by one, beginning at the eldest, even unto the last: and Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst.

10. When Jesus had lifted up himself, and saw none but the woman, he said unto her, Woman, where are those thine accusers? hath no man condemned thee?

11. She said, No man, Lord. And Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more.

ALCUIN. Our Lord at the time of His passion used to spend the day in Jerusalem, preaching in the temple, and performing miracles, and return in the evening to Bethany, where He lodged with the sisters of Lazarus. Thus on the last day of the feast, having, according to His wont, preached the whole day in the temple, in the evening He went to the mount of Olives.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 3) And where ought Christ to teach, except on the mount of Olives; on the mount of ointment, on the mount of chrism. For the name Christ is from chrism, chrism being the Greek word for unction. He has anointed us, for wrestling with the devil.

ALCUIN. The anointing with oil is a relief to the limbs, when wearied and in pain. The mount of Olives also denotes the height of our Lord's pity, olive in the Greek signifying pity. The qualities of oil are such as to fit in to this mystical meaning. For it floats above all other liquids: and the Psalmist says, Thy mercy is over all Thy works. And early in the morning, He came again into the temple: (Ps. 144) i. e. to denote the giving and unfolding of His mercy, i. e. the now dawning light of the New Testament in the faithful, that is, in His temple. His returning early in the morning, signifies the new rise of grace.

BEDE. And next it is signified, that after He began to dwell by grace in His temple, i. e. in the Church, men from all nations would believe in Him: And all the people came to Him, and He sat down and taught them.

ALCUIN. The sitting down, represents the humility of His incarnation. And the people came to Him, when He sat down, i. e. after taking up human nature, and thereby becoming visible, many began to hear and believe on Him, only knowing Him as their friend and neighbour. But while these kind and simple persons are full of admiration at our Lord's discourse, the Scribes and Pharisees put questions to Him, not for the sake of instruction, but only to entangle the truth in their nets: And the Scribes and Pharisees brought unto Him a woman taken in adultery; and when they had set her in the midst, they say unto Him, Master, this woman was taken in adultery, in the very act.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. s. 4) They had remarked upon Him already, as being over lenient. Of Him indeed it had been prophesied, Ride on because of the word of truth, of meekness, and of righteousness. (Ps. 44) So as a teacher He exhibited truth, as a deliverer meekness, as a judge righteousness. When He spoke, His truth was acknowledged; when against His enemies He used no violence, His meekness was praised. So they raised the scandal on the score of justice. For they said among themselves, If He decide to let her go, He will not do justice; for the law cannot command what is unjust: Now Moses in the law commanded us, that such should be stoned: but to maintain His meekness, which has made Him already so acceptable to the people, He must decide to let her go. Wherefore they demand His opinion: And what sayest Thou? hoping to find an occasion to accuse Him, as a transgressor of the law: And this they said tempting Him, that they might have to accuse Him. But our Lord in His answer both maintained His justice, and departed not from meekness. Jesus stooped down, and with His finger wrote on the ground.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. lib. ii. c. 10) As if to signify that such persons were to be written in earth, not in heaven, where He told His disciples they should rejoice they were written. Or His bowing His head (to write on the ground), is an expression of humility; the writing on the ground signifying that His law was written on the earth which bore fruit, not on the barren stone, as before.

ALCUIN. The ground denotes the human heart, which yieldeth the fruit either of good or of bad actions: the finger jointed and flexible, discretion. He instructs us then, when we see any faults in our neighbours, not immediately and rashly to condemn them, but after searching our own hearts to begin with, to examine them attentively with the finger of discretion.

BEDE. His writing with His finger on the ground perhaps shewed, that it was He who had written the law on stone.

So when they continued asking Him, He lifted Himself up.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 5) He did not say, Stone her not, lest He should seem to speak contrary to the law. But God forbid that He should say, Stone her; for He came not to destroy that which He found, but to seek that which was lost. What then did He answer? He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her. This is the voice of justice. Let the sinner be punished, but not by sinners; the law carried into effect, but not by transgressors of the law.

GREGORY. For he who judges not himself first, cannot know how to judge correctly in the case of another. For though He know what the offence is, from being told, yet He cannot judge of another’s deserts, who supposing himself innocent, will not apply the rule of justice to himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 5) Having with the weapon of justice smitten them, He deigned not even to look on the fallen, but averted His eyes: And again He stooped down, and wrote on the ground.

ALCUIN. This is like our Lord; while His eyes are fixed, and He seems attending to something else, He gives the bystanders an opportunity of retiring: a tacit admonition to us to consider always both before we condemn a brother for a sin, and after we have punished him, whether we are not guilty ourselves of the same fault, or others as bad.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. s. 5) Thus smitten then with the voice of justice, as with a weapon, they examine themselves, find themselves guilty, and one by one retire: And they which heard it, went out one by one, beginning at the eldesta.

GLOSS. The more guilty of them, perhaps, or those who were more conscious of their faults.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiii. 5, 6) There were left however two, the pitiable1 and the pitiful, And Jesus was left alone, and the woman standing in the midst: the woman, you may suppose, in great alarm, expecting punishment from one in whom no sin could be found. But He who had repelled her adversaries with the word of justice, lifted on her the eyes of mercy, and asked; When Jesus had lifted Himself up, and saw none but the woman, He said unto her, Woman, where are these thine accusers? hath no man condemned thee? She said, No man, Lord. We heard above the voice of justice; let us hear now that of mercy: Jesus said unto her, Neither do I condemn thee; I, who thou fearedst would condemn thee, because thou foundest no fault in me. What then, Lord? Dost Thou favour sin? No, surely. Listen to what follows, Go, and sin no more. So then our Lord condemned sin, but not the sinner. For did He favour sin, He would have said, Go, and live as thou wilt: depend on my deliverance: howsoever great thy sins be, it matters not: I will deliver thee from hell, and its tormentors. But He did not say this. Let those attend, who love the Lord's mercy, and fear His truth. Truly, Gracious and righteous is the Lord. (Ps. 35:7)

8:12

12. Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the light of the world: he that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life.

ALCUIN. Having absolved the woman from her sin, lest some should doubt, seeing that He was really man, His power to forgive sins, He deigns to give further disclosure of His divine nature; Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the Light of the world.

BEDE. Where it is to be observed, He does not say, I am the light of Angels, or of heaven, but the Light of the world, i. e. of mankind who live in darkness, as we read, To give light to them that sit in darkness, and in the shadow of death. (Luke 1:79)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 2) As they had brought Galilee as an objection against Him, and doubted His being one of the Prophets, as if that was all He claimed to be, He wished to shew that He was not one of the Prophets, but the Lord of the whole earth: Then spake Jesus again unto them, saying, I am the Light of the world: not of Galilee, or of Palestine, or of Judæa.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiv. 2) The Manichæans suppose the sun of the natural world to be our Lord Christ; but the Catholic Church reprobates such a notion; for our Lord Christ was not made the sun, but the sun was made by Him: inasmuch as all things were made by Him. (c. 1:3) And for our sake did He come to be under the sun, being the light which made the sun: He hid Himself under the cloud of the flesh, not to obscure, but to temper His light. Speaking then through the cloud of the flesh, the Light unfailing, the Light of wisdom says to men, I am the Light of the world.

THEOPHYLACT. You may bring these words against Nestorius: for our Lord does not say, In Me is the light of the world, but, I am the Light of the world: He who appeared man, was both the Son of God, and the Light of the world; not, as Nestorius fondly holds, the Son of God dwelling in a mere man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxiv. s. 5) He withdraws you however from the eyes of the flesh, to those of the heart, in that He adds, He that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life. He thinks it not enough to say, shall have light, but adds, of life. These words of our Lord agree with those of the Psalm, In Thy light shall we see light; for with Thee is the well of life. (Ps. 35) For bodily uses, light is one thing, and a well another; and a well ministers to the mouth, light to the eyes. With God the light and the well are the same. He who shines upon thee, that thou mayest see Him, the Same flows unto thee, that thou mayest drink Him. What He promises is put in the future tense; what we ought to do in the present. He that followeth Me, He says, shall have; i. e. by faith now, in sight hereafter. The visible sun accompanieth thee, only if thou goest westward, whither it goeth also; and even if thou follow it, it will forsake thee, at its setting. Thy God is every where wholly; He will not fall from thee, if thou fall not from Him. Darkness is to be feared, not that of the eyes, but that of the mind; and if of the eyes, of the inner not the outer eyes; not those by which white and black, but those by which just and unjust, are discerned.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 2) Walketh not in darkness, i. e. spiritually abideth not in error. Here He tacitly praises Nicodemus and the officers, and censures those who had plotted against Him; as being in darkness and error, and unable to come to the light.

8:13–18

13. The Pharisees therefore said unto him, Thou bearest record of thyself; thy record is not true.

14. Jesus answered and said unto them, Though I bear record of myself, yet my record is true: for I know whence I came, and whither I go; but ye cannot tell whence I come, and whither I go.

15. Ye judge after the flesh; I judge no man.

16. And yet if I judge, my judgment is true: for I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent me.

17. It is also written in your law, that the testimony of two men is true.

18. I am one that bear witness of myself, and the Father that sent me beareth witness of me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 2) Our Lord having said, I am the Light of the world; and, he that followeth Me, walketh not in darkness, the Jews wish to overthrow what He has said: The Pharisees therefore said unto Him, Thou bearest record of Thyself, Thy record is not true.

ALCUIN. As if our Lord Himself were the only (one that bore) witness to Himself; whereas the truth was that He had, before His incarnation, sent many witnesses to prophesy of His Sacraments.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 2) Our Lord however overthrew their argument: Jesus answered and said, Though I bear record of Myself, yet My record is true. This is an accommodation to those who thought Him no more than a mere man. He adds the reason, For I know whence I come, and whither I go; i. e. I am God, from God, and the Son of God: though this He does not say expressly, from His habit of mingling lofty and lowly words together. Now God is surely a competent witness to Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxv. 6) The witness of light is true, whether the light shew itself, or other things. The Prophet spake the truth, but whence had he it, but by drawing from the fount of truth? Jesus then is a competent witness to Himself. (s. 5). For I know whence I come, and whither I go: this has reference to the Father; for the Son gave glory to the Father who sent Him. How greatly then should man glorify the Creator, who made Him. He did not separate from His Father, however, when He came, or desert us when He returned: unlike that sun which in going to the west, leaves the east. And as that sun throws its light on the faces both of him who sees, and him who sees not; only the one sees with the light, the other sees not: so the Wisdom of God, the Word, is every where present, even to the minds of unbelievers; but they have not the eyes of the understanding, wherewith to see. To distinguish then between believers and enemies among the Jews, as between light and darkness, He adds, But ye cannot tell whence I come, and whither I go. (Tract. xxxvi. 3). These Jews saw the man, and did not believe in the God, and therefore our Lord says, Ye judge after the flesh, i. e. in saying, Thou bearest record of Thyself, Thy record is not true.

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say: Ye judge untruly, according to the flesh, thinking, because I am in the flesh, that I am flesh only, and not God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvi. 3. in Joan.) Understanding Me not as God, and seeing Me as man, ye think Me arrogant in bearing witness of Myself. For any man who bears high testimony to himself, is thought proud and arrogant. But men are frail, and may either speak the truth, or lie: the Light cannot lie.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l. 2) As to live according to the flesh is to live amiss; so to judge according to the flesh, is to judge unjustly. They might say, however, If we judge wrongly, why dost Thou not convict us, why dost Thou not condemn us? So He adds, I judge no man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvi. s. 4) Which may be understood in two ways; I judge no man, i. e. not now: as He says elsewhere, God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved: not that He abandons, but only defers, His justice. Or having said, Ye judge according to the flesh, He says immediately, I judge no man, to let you know that Christ does not judge according to the flesh, as men judged Him. For that Christ is a judge appears from the next words, And yet if I judge, My judgment is true.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 2) As if to say: In saying, I judge no man, I meant that I did not anticipate judgment. If I judged justly, I should condemn you, but now is not the time for judging. He alludes however to the future judgment, in what follows; For I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me; which means that He will not condemn them alone, but He and the Father together. This is intended too to quiet suspicion, as men did not think the Son worthy to be believed, unless He had the testimony of the Father also.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvi. 7) But if the Father is with Thee, how did He send Thee? O Lord, Thy mission is Thy incarnation. Christ was here according to the flesh without withdrawing from the Father, because the Father and the Son are every where. Blush, thou Sabellian; our Lord doth not say, I am the Father, and I the self-same person am the Son; but, I am not alone, because the Father is with Me. Make a distinction then of persons, and distinction of intelligences: acknowledge that the Father is the Father, the Son the Son: but beware of saying, that the Father is greater, the Son less. Theirs is one substance, one coeternity, perfect equality. Therefore, He says, My judgment is true, because I am the Son of God. But that thou mayest understand how that the Father is with Me, it is not for the Son ever to leave the Father. I have taken up the form of a servant; but I have not lost the form of God. He had spoken of judgment: now He speaks of witness: It is also written in your law, that the testimony of two men is true.

AUGUSTINE. Is this made a bad use of by the Manichæans, that our Lord does not say, in the law of God, but, in your law? Who does not recognise here a manner of speaking customary in Scripture? In your law, i. e. the law given to you. The Apostle speaks of his Gospel in the same way, though he testifies to having received it not from men, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvi. 10) There is much difficulty, and a great mystery seems to be contained, in God’s words, In the mouth of two or three witnesses, let every word be established. (Deut. 10) It is possible that two may speak false. The chaste Susannah was arraigned by two false witnesses: the whole people spake against Christ falsely. How then must we understand the word, By the mouth of two or three witnesses shall every word be established: except as an intimation of the mystery of the Trinity, in which is perpetual stability of truth? Receive then our testimony, lest ye feel our judgment. I delay My judgment: I delay not My testimony: I am one that beareth witnes of Myself, and the Father that sent Me beareth witness of Me.

BEDE. In many places the Father bears witness of the Son; as, This day have I begotten Thee; (Ps. 2) also, This is My beloved Son. (Matt. 3:17)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 3) It is written in your law, that the testimony of two men is true. If this is to be taken literally, in what respect does our Lord differ from men? The rule has been laid down for men, on the ground that one man alone is not to be relied on: but how can this be applicable to God? These words are quoted then with another meaning. When two men bear witness, both to an indifferent matter, their witness is true: this constitutes the testimony of two men. But if one of them bear witness to himself, then they are no longer two witnesses. Thus our Lord means to shew that He is consubstantial with the Father, and does not need another witness, i. e. besides the Father’s. I and the Father that sent Me. Again, on human principles, when a man bears witness, his honesty is supposed; he is not borne witness to; and a man is admitted as a fair and competent witness in an indifferent matter, but not in one relating to himself, unless he is supported by other testimony. But here it is quite otherwise. Our Lord, though giving testimony in His own case, and though saying that He is borne witness to by another, pronounces Himself worthy of belief; thus shewing His all-sufficiency. He says He deserves to be believed.

ALCUIN. Or it is as if He said, If your law admits the testimony of two men who may be deceived, and testify to more than is true; on what grounds can you reject Mine and My Father’s testimony, the highest and most sure of all?

8:19–20

19. Then said they unto him, Where is thy Father? Jesus answered, Ye neither know me, nor my Father: if ye had known me, ye should have known my Father also.

20. These words spake Jesus in the treasury, as he taught in the temple: and no man laid hands on him; for his hour was not yet come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvii. 1) Those who had heard our Lord say, Ye judge after the flesh, shewed that they did so; for they understood what He said of His Father in a carnal sense: Then said they unto Him, Where is Thy Father? meaning, We have heard Thee say, I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me. We see Thee alone; prove to us then that Thy Father is with Thee.

THEOPHYLACT. Some remark that this is said in contumely and contempt; to insinuate either that He is born of fornication, and knows not who His Father is; or as a slur on the low situation of His father, i. e. Joseph; as if to say, Thy father is an obscure, ignoble person; why dost Thou so often mention him? So because they asked the question, to tempt Him, not to get at the truth, Jesus answered, Ye neither know Me, nor My Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvii. 2.) As if He said, Ye ask where is Thy Father? As if ye knew Me already, and I were nothing else but what ye see. But ye know Me not, and therefore I tell you nothing of My Father. Ye think Me indeed a mere man, and therefore among men look for My Father. But, forasmuch as I am different altogether, according to My seen and unseen natures, and speak of My Father in the hidden sense according to My hidden nature; it is plain that ye must first know Me, and then ye will know My Father; If ye had known Me, ye would have known My Father also.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lii. 3) He tells them, it is of no avail for them to say they know the Father, if they do not know the Son.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. l. in Joan. in princ.) Ye neither know Me, nor My Father: this seems inconsistent with what was said above, Ye both know Me, and know whence I am. But the latter is spoken in reply to some from Jerusalem, who asked, Do the rulers know indeed that this is the very Christ? Ye neither know Me is addressed to the Pharisees. To the former persons from Jerusalem however He said, He that sent Me, is true, Whom ye know not. You will ask then, How is that true, If ye know Me, ye would know My Father also? when they of Jerusalem, to whom He said, Ye know Me, did not know the Father. To this we must reply, that our Saviour sometimes speaks of Himself as man, and some-times as God. Ye both know Me, He says as man: ye neither know Me, as God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvii. 7) What does this mean: If ye knew Me, ye would know My Father also, but, I and My Father are one? It is a common expression, when you see one man very like another, If you have seen him, you have seen the other. You say this, because they are so like. And thus our Lord says, If ye had known Me, ye had known My Father also; not that the Father is the Son, but that the Son is like the Father.

THEOPHYLACT. Let the Arian blush: for if, as he says, the Son be a creature, how does it follow that he who knows the creature, knows God? For not even by knowing the substance of Angels, does one know the Divine Substance? Forasmuch therefore as he who knows the Son, knows the Father, it is certain that the Son is consubstantial with the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxviii. s. 3) This word perhapsc is used only by way of rebuke, though it seems to express doubt. As used by men indeed it is the expression of doubt, but He who knew all things could only mean by that doubt to rebuke unbelief. Nay, even we sometimes say perhaps, when they are certain of a thing, e. g. when you are angry with your slave, and say, Do not you heed me? Consider, perhaps I am your master. So our Lord's doubt is a reproof to the unbelievers, when He says, Ye should have known perhaps My Father also.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. l. in Joan. in princ.) It is proper to observe, that the followers of other sects think this text proves clearly, that the God, whom the Jews worshipped, was not the Father of Christ. For if, say they, our Saviour said this to the Pharisees, who worshipped God as the Governor of the world, it is evident that the Father of Jesus, whom the Pharisees knew not, was a different person from the Creator. But they do not observe that this is a usual manner of speaking in Scripture. Though a man may know the existence of God, and have learned from the Father that He only must be worshipped, yet if his life is not good, he is said not to have the knowledge of God. Thus the sons of Eli, on account of their wickedness, are said not to have known God. And thus again the Pharisees did not know the Father; because they did not live according to their Creator's command. And there is another thing meant too by knowing God, different from merely believing in Him. It is said, Be still then, and know that I am God. (Ps. 45:10) And this, it is certain, was written for a people that believed in the Creator. But to know by believing, and believe simply, are different things. To the Pharisees, to whom He says, Ye neither know Me, nor My

Father, He could with right have said, Ye do not even believe in My Father; for he who denies the Son, has not the Father, either by faith or knowledge. But Scripture gives us another sense of knowing a thing, viz. being joined to that thing. Adam knew his wife, when he was joined to her. And if he who is joined to a woman knows that woman, he who is joined to the Lord is one spirit, and knows the Lord. And in this sense the Pharisees neither knew the Father, nor the Son. But may not a man know God, and yet not know the Father? Yes; these are two different conceptions. And therefore among an infinite number of prayers offered up in the Law, we do not find any one addressed to God the Father. They only pray to Him as God and Lord; in order not to anticipate the grace shed by Jesus over the whole world, calling all men to the Sonship, according to the Psalm, I will declare Thy name unto my brethren.

These words spake Jesus in the treasury, as He taught in the temple.

ALCUIN. Treasury (Gazophylacium): Gaza is the Persian for wealth: phylattein is to keep. It was a place in the temple, where the money was kept.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. iii. 1) He spake in the temple magisterially, and now He was speaking to those who railed at and accused Him, for making Himself equal to the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvii. 8) Great however is His confidence and fearlessness: it not being possible that He should undergo any suffering, but that which He voluntarily undertook. Wherefore it follows, And no man laid hands on Him, for His hour was not yet come. Some, when they hear this, think Christ to have been under the control of fate. But if fate comes from the verb fari, to speak, as some derive it, how can the Word of God be under the control of fate? Where are the fates? In the heavens, you say, in the courses and revolutions of the stars. How then can fate have power over Him, by Whom the heavens and stars were made; when even thy will, if thou exert it aright, transcends the stars? Dost thou think that because the flesh of Christ was placed beneath the heavens, that therefore His power was subjected to the heavens? His hour then had not yet come; i. e. the hour, not on which he should be obliged to die, but on which He should deign to be put to death.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. in Joan.) Whenever it is added, Jesus spoke these words in such a place, you will, if you attend, discover a meaning in the addition. The treasury (γαζοφυλακίῳ) was a place for keeping the money, which was given for the honour of God, and the support of the poor. The coins are the divine words, stamped with the likeness of the great King. In this sense then let every one contribute to the edification of the Church, carrying into that spiritual treasury all that he can collect, to the honour of God, and the common good. But while all were thus contributing to the treasury of the temple, it was especially the office of Jews to contribute his gifts, which were the words of eternal life. While Jesus therefore was speaking in the treasury, no one laid hands on Him; His discourse being stronger than those who wished to take Him; for there is no weakness in that which the Word of God utters.

BEDE. Or thus; Christ speaks in the treasury; i. e. He had spoken in parables to the Jews; but now that He unfolded heavenly things to His disciples, His treasury began to be opened, which was the meaning of the treasury being joined to the temple; all that the Law and the Prophets had foretold in figure, appertained to our Lord.

8:21–24

21. Then said Jesus again unto them, I go my way, and ye shall seek me, and shall die in your sins: whither I go, ye cannot come.

22. Then said the Jews, Will he kill himself? because he saith, Whither I go, ye cannot come.

23. And he said unto them, Ye are from beneath; I am from above: ye are of this world, I am not of this world.

24. I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins: for if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxviii. 2) In accordance with what was just, He said that no man laid hands on Him, because His hour was not yet come; He now speaks to the Jews of His passion, as a free, and not a compulsory sacrifice on His part: Then said Jesus again unto them, I go My way. Death to our Lord was a return to the place whence He had come.

BEDE. The connexion of these words is such, that they might have been spoken at one place and one time, or at another place and another time: as either nothing at all, or some things, or many may have intervened.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. in Joan. s. 3.) But some one will object: If this was spoken to men who persisted in unbelief, how is it He says, Ye shall seek Me? For to seek Jesus is to seek truth and wisdom. You will answer that it was said of His persecutors, that they sought to take Him. There are different ways of seeking Jesus. All do not seek Him for their health and profit: and only they who seek Him aright, find peace. And they are said to seek Him aright, who seek the Word which was in the beginning with God, in order that He may lead them to the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxviii. 2) Ye shall seek Me, then, He says, not from compassionate regret, but from hatred: for after He had departed from the eyes of men, He was sought for both by those who hated, and those who loved Him: the one wanting to persecute, the other to have His presence. And that ye may not think that ye shall seek Me in a good sense, I tell you, Ye shall die in your sin. (ἁμαρτίᾳ plural in our Transl.) This is to seek Christ amiss, to die in one’s sin: this is to hate Him, from Whom alone cometh salvation. He pronounces sentence on them prophetically, that they shall die in their sins.

BEDE. Note: sin is in the singular number, your in the plural; to express one and the same wickedness in all.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. in Joan. s. 3.) But I ask, as it is said below that many believed on Him, whether He speaks to all present, when He says, Ye shall die in your sins? No: He speaks to those only, whom He knew would not believe, and would therefore die in their sins, not being able to follow Him. Whither I go, He says, ye cannot come; i. e. there where truth and wisdom are, for with them Jesus dwells. They cannot, He says, because they will not: for had they wished, He could not reasonably have said, Ye shall die in your sin.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii. s. 2) This He tells His disciples in another place; without saying to them, however, Ye shall die in your sin, He only says, Whither I go, ye cannot follow Me now; not preventing, but only delaying their coming.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. 3.) The Word, while still present, yet threatens to depart. So long as we preserve the seeds of truth implanted in our minds, the Word of God does not depart from us. But if we fall into wickedness, then He says to us, I go away; and when we seek Him, we shall not find Him, but shall die in our sin, die caught in our sin. But we should not pass over without notice the expression itself: Ye shall die in your sins. If ye shall die be understood in the ordinary sense, it is manifest that sinners die in their sins, the righteous in their righteousness. But if we understand it of death in the sense of sin; then the meaning is, that not their bodies, but their souls were sick unto death. The Physician seeing them thus grievously sick, says, Ye shall die in your sins. And this is evidently the meaning of the words, Whither I go ye cannot come. For when a man dies in his sin, he cannot go where Jesus goes: no dead man can follow Jesus: The dead praise not Thee, O Lord. (Ps. 113)

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxviii) They take these words, as they generally do, in a carnal sense, and ask, Will He kill Himself, because He saith, Whither I go, ye cannot come? A foolish question. For why? Could they not go where He went, if He killed Himself? Were they never to die themselves? Whither I go, then, He says; meaning not His departure at death, but where He went after death.

THEOPHYLACT. He shews here that He will rise again in glory, and sit at the right hand of God.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. in Joan. s. 4.) May they not however have a higher meaning in saying this? For they had opportunities of knowing many things from their apocryphal books or from tradition. As then there was a prophetical tradition, that Christ was to be born at Bethlehem, so there may have been a tradition also respecting His death, viz. that He would depart from this life in the way which He declares, No man taketh it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself. (c. 10:18) So then the question, Will He kill Himself, is not to be taken in its obvious sense, but as referring to some Jewish tradition about Christ. For His saying, I go My way, shews that He had power over His own death, and departure from the body; so that these were voluntary on His part. But I think that they bring forward this tradition which had come down to them, on the death of Christ, contemptuously, and not with any view to give Him glory. Will He kill Himself? say they: whereas, they ought to have used a loftier way of speaking, and have said, Will His soul wait His pleasure, to depart from His body? Our Lord answers, Ye are from beneath, i. e. ye love earth; your hearts are not raised upwards. He speaks to them as earthly men, for their thoughts were earthly.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 1) As if to say, No wonder that ye think as ye do, seeing ye are carnal, and understand nothing spiritually. I am from above.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxviii. 4) From whom above? From the Father Himself, Who is above all. Ye are of this world, I am not of this world. How could He be of the world, by Whom the world was made?

BEDE. And Who was before the world, whereas they were of the world, having been created after the world had begun to exist.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 1) Or He says, I am not of this world, with reference to worldly and vain thoughts.

THEOPHYLACT. I affect nothing worldly, nothing earthly: I could never come to such madness as to kill Myself. Apollinarius, however, falsely infers from these words, that our Lord’s body was not of this world, but came down from heaven. did the Apostles then, to whom our Lord says below, Ye are not of this world, (c. 15:19) derive all of them their bodies from heaven? In saying then, I am not of this world, He must be understood to mean, I am not of the number of you, who mind earthly things.

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. in Joan. s. 5.) Beneath, and, of this world, are different things. Beneath, refers to a particular place; this material world embraces different tractsd, which all are beneath, as compared with things immaterial and invisible, but, as compared with one another, some beneath, some above. Where the treasure of each is, there is his heart also. If a man then lay up treasure upon earth, he is beneath: if any man lay up treasure in heaven, he is above; yea, ascends above all hearers, attains to a most blissful end. And again, the love of this world makes a man of this world: whereas he who loveth not the world, neither the things that are in the world, is not of the world. Yet is there beyond this world of sense, another world, in which are things invisible, the beauty of which shall the pure in heart behold, yea, the First-born of every creature may be called the world, insomuch as He is absolute wisdom, and in wisdom all things were made. In Him therefore was the whole world, differing from the material world, in so far as the1 scheme divested of the matter, differs from the subject matter itself. The soul of Christ then says, I am not of this world; i. e. because it has not its conversation in this world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxviii. 6) Our Lord expresses His meaning in the words, Ye are of this world, i. e. ye are sinners. All of us are born in sin; all have added by our actions to the sin in which we were born. The misery of the Jews then was, not that they had sin, but that they would die in their sin:

I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sin. Amongst the multitude, however, who heard our Lord, there were some who were about to believe; whereas this most severe sentence had gone forth against all: Ye shall die in your sin; to the destruction of all hope even in those who should hereafter believe. So His next words recall the latter to hope: For if ye believe not that I am He, ye shall die in your sin: therefore if ye believe that I am He, ye shall not die in your sin.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 1) For if He came in order to take away sin, and a man cannot put that off, except by washing, and cannot be baptized except he believe; it follows, that he who believes not must pass out of this life, with the old man, i. e. sin, within him: not only because he believes not, but because he departs hence, with his former sins upon him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxviii. 8) His saying, If ye believe not that I am, without adding any thing, proves a great deal. For thus it was that God spoke to Moses, I am that I am. But how do I understand, I am that I am, (Exod. 3) and, If ye believe not that I am? In this way. All excellence, of whatever kind, if it be mutable, cannot be said really to be, for there is no real to be, where there is a not to be. Analyze the idea of mutability, and you will find, was, and will be; contemplate God, and you will find, is, without possibility of a past. In order to be, thou must leave him behind thee. So then, If ye believe not that I am, means in fact, If ye believe not that I am God; this being the condition, on which we shall not die in our sins. God be thanked that He says, If ye believe not, not, If ye understand not; for who could understand this?

ORIGEN. (tom. xix. in Joan.) It is manifest, that he, who dies in his sins, though he say that he believes in Christ, does not really believe. For he who believes in His justice does not do injustice; he who believes in His wisdom, does not act or speak foolishly; in like manner with respect to the other attributes of Christ, you will find that he who does not believe in Christ, dies in his sins: inasmuch as he comes to be the very contrary of what is seen in Christ.

8:25–27

25. Then said they unto him, Who art thou? And Jesus saith unto them, Even the same that I said unto you from the beginning.

26. I have many things to say and to judge of you: but he that sent me is true; and I speak to the world those things which I have heard of him.

27. They understood not that he spake to them of the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxviii. s. 11) Our Lord having said, If ye believe not that I am, ye shall die in your sins; they enquire of Him, as if wishing to know in whom they are to believe, that they might not die in their sin: Then said they unto Him, Who art Thou? For when Thou saidst, If ye believe not that I am, Thou didst not add, who Thou art. But our Lord knew that these were some who would believe, and therefore after being asked, Who art Thou? that such might know what they should believe Him to be, Jesus saith unto them, The beginning, who also speak to you; not as if to say, I am the beginning, but, Believe Me to be the beginning; as is evident from the Greek, where beginning is feminine. Believe Me then to be the beginning, but ye die in your sins: for the beginning cannot be changed; it remains fixed in itself, and is the source of change to all things. (Tract. xxxix. 1, 2). But it is absurd to call the Son the beginning, and not the Father also. And yet there are not two beginnings, even as these are not two Gods. The Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and the Son; not being either the Father, or the Son. Yet Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, one Light, one beginning. (Tract. xxxviii. 11). He adds, Who also speak to you, i. e. Who humbled Myself for your sakes, and condescended to those words. Therefore believe Me to be the beginning; because that ye may believe this, not only am I the beginning, but I also speak with you, that ye may believe that I am. For if the Beginning had remained with the Father in its original nature, and not taken upon it the form of a servant, how could men have believed in it? Would their weakly minds have taken in the spiritual Word, without the medium of sensible sound?

BEDE. In some copies we find, Who also speak to you; but it is more consistent to read for (quia), not, who (qui): in which case the meaning is: Believe Me to be the beginning, for for your sakes have I condescended to these words.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 1) See here the madness of the Jews; asking after so long time, and after all His miracles and teaching, Who art Thou? What is Christ’s answer? From the beginning I speak with you; as if to say, Ye do not deserve to hear any thing from Me, much less this thing, Who I am. For ye speak always, to tempt Me. But I could, if I would, confound and punish you: I have many things to say, and to judge of you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxix) Above He said, I judge no man; but, I judge not, is one thing, I have to judge, another. I judge not, He says, with reference to the present time. But the other, I have many things to say, and to judge of you, refers to a future judgment. And I shall be true in My judgment, because I am truth, the Son of the true One. He that sent Me is true. My Father is true, not by partaking of, but begetting truth. Shall we say that truth is greater than one who is true? If we say this, we shall begin to call the Son greater than the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 1) He says this, that they may not think that He allows them to talk against Him with impunity, from inability to punish them; or that He is not alive to their contemptuous designs.

THEOPHYLACT. Or having said, I have many things to say, and to judge of you, thus reserving His judgment for a future time, He adds, But He that sent Me is true: as if to say, Though ye are unbelievers, My Father is true, Who hath appointed a day of retribution for you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 1) Or thus: As My Father hath sent Me not to judge the world, but to save the world, and My Father is true, I accordingly judge no man now; but speak thus for your salvation, not your condemnation: And I speak to the world those things that I have heard of Him.

ALCUIN. And to hear from the Father is the same as to be from the Father; He has the hearing from the same sense that He has the being.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxix. s. 6) The coequal Son gives glory to the Father: as if to say, I give glory to Him whose Son I am: how proudly thou detractest from Him, whose servant Thou art.

ALCUIN. They did not understand however what He meant by saying, He is true that sent Me: they understand not that He spake to them of the Father. For they had not the eyes of their mind yet opened, to understand the equality of the Father with the Son.

8:28–30

28. Then said Jesus unto them, When ye have lifted up the Son of man, then shall ye know that I am he, and that I do nothing of myself; but as my

Father hath taught me, I speak these things.

29. And he that sent me is with me: the Father hath not left me alone; for I do always those things that please him.

30. As he spake these words, many believed on him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xl. 2) When our Lord said, He is true that sent Me, the Jews did not understand that He spake to them of the Father. But He saw some there, who, He knew, would believe on Him after His passion. Then said Jesus unto them, When ye have lifted up the Son of man, then ye shall know that I am. (Exod. 3:14) Recollect the words, I am that I am, and ye will know why I say, I am. I pass over your knowledge, in order that I may fulfil My passion. In your appointed time ye will know who I am; when ye have lifted up the Son of man. He means the lifting up of the cross; for He was lifted up on the cross, when He hung thereon. This was to be accomplished by the hands of those who should afterwards believe, whom He is now speaking to; with what intent, but that no one, however great his wickedness and consciousness of guilt might despair, seeing even the murderers of our Lord forgiven.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 1, 2) Or the connection is this: When His miracles and teaching had failed to convert men, He spoke of the cross; When ye have lifted up the Son of man, then ye shall know that I am He: as if to say, Ye think that ye have killed Me; but I say that ye shall then, by the evidence of miracles, of My resurrection, and your captivity, know most especially, that I am Christ the Son of God, and that I do not act in opposition to God; But that as My Father hath taught Me, I speak these things. Here He shews the likeness of His substance to the Father’s; and that He says nothing beyond the Paternal intelligence. If I were contrary to God, I should not have moved His anger so much against those who did not hear Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xl. s. 3. et seq.) Or thus: Having said, Then shall ye know that I am, and in this, I am, implied the whole Trinity: lest the Sabellian error should creep in, He immediately adds, And I do nothing of Myself; as if to say, I am not of Myself; the Son is God from the Father. Let not what follows, as the Father hath taught Me, I speak these things, suggest a carnal thought to any of you. Do not place as it were two men before your eyes, a Father speaking to his son, as you do when you speak to your sons. For what words could be spoken to the only Word? If the Father speaks in your hearts without sound, how does He speak to the Son? The Father speaks to the Son incorporeally, because He begat the Son incorporeally: nor did He teach Him, as having begotten Him untaught; rather the teaching Him, was the begetting Him knowing. For if the nature of truth be simple, to be, in the Son, is the same as to know. As then the Father gave the Son existence by begetting, so He gave Him knowledge also.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 2) He gives now a humbler turn to the discourse: And He that sent Me. That this might not be thought however to imply inferiority, He says, Is with Me. The former is His dispensation, the latter His divinity.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr xl. 6) And though both are together, yet one is sent, the other sends. For the mission is the incarnation; and the incarnation is of the Son only, not of the Father. He says then, He that sent Me, meaning, By whose Fatherly authority I am made incarnate. The Father however, though He sent the Son, did not withdraw from Him, as He proceeds to say: The Father hath not left Me alone. For it could not be that where He sent the Son, there the Father was not; He who says, I fill heaven and earth. (Jer. 33) And He adds the reason why He did not leave Him: For I do always those things that please Him; always, i. e. not from any particular beginning, but without beginning and without end. For the generation from the Father hath no beginning in time.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liii. 2) Or, He means it as an answer to those who were constantly saying that He was not from God, and that because He did not keep the sabbath; I do always, He says, do those things that please Him; shewing that the breaking the sabbath even was pleasing to Him. He takes care in every way to shew that He does nothing contrary to the Father. And as this was speaking more after a human fashion, the Evangelist adds, As He spake these words, many believed on Him; as if to say, Do not be disturbed at hearing so humble a speech from Christ; for those who had heard the greatest doctrines from Him, and were not persuaded, were persuaded by these words of humility. These then believed on Him, yet not as they ought; but only out of joy, and approbation of His humble way of speaking. And this the Evangelist shews in his subsequent narration, which relates their unjust proceedings towards Him.

8:31–36

31. Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on him, If ye continue in my word, then are ye my disciples indeed;

32. And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

33. They answered him, We be Abraham’s seed, and were never in bondage to any man: how sayest thou, Ye shall be made free?

34. Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.

35. And the servant abideth not in the house for ever: but the Son abideth ever.

36. If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Aug. [Chrys. Nic.] Hom. liv. 1) Our Lord wished to try the faith of those who believed, that it might not be only a superficial belief: Then said Jesus to those Jews which believed on Him, If ye continue in My word, then are ye My disciples indeed. His saying, if ye continue, made it manifest what was in their hearts. He knew that some believed, and would not continue. And He makes them a magnificent promise, viz. that they shall become His disciples indeed; which words are a tacit rebuke to some who had believed and afterwards withdrawn.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. xlvii) We have all one Master, and are fellow disciples under Him. Nor because we speak with authority, are we therefore masters; but He is the Master of all, Who dwells in the hearts of all. It is a small thing for the disciple to come to Him in the first instance: he must continue in Him: if we continue not in Him, we shall fall. A little sentence this, but a great work; if ye continue. For what is it to continue in God’s word, but to yield to no temptations? Without labour, the reward would be gratis; if with, then a great reward indeed.

And ye shall know the truth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xli. 1) As if to say: Whereas ye have now belief, by continuing, ye shall have sight. (xl. 9.). For it was not their knowledge which made them believe, but rather their belief which gave them knowledge. Faith is to believe that which you see not: truth to see that which you believe? By continuing then to believe a thing, you come at last to see the thing; i. e. to the contemplation of the very truth as it is; not conveyed in words, but revealed by light. The truth is unchangeable; it is the bread of the soul, refreshing others, without diminution to itself; changing him who eats into itself, itself not changed. This truth is the Word of God, which put on flesh for our sakes, and lay hid; not meaning to bury itself, but only to defer its manifestation, till its suffering in the body, for the ransoming of the body of sin, had taken place.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 1) Or, ye shall know the truth, i. e. Me: for I am the truth. The Jewish was a typical dispensation; the reality ye can only know from Me.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. xlviii. ἐλευθερώσες) Some one might say perhaps, And what does it profit me to know the truth? So our Lord adds, And the truth shall free you; as if to say, If the truth doth not delight you, liberty will. To be freed is to be made free, as to be healed is to be made whole. This is plainer in the Greek; in the Latin we use the word free chiefly in the sense of escape of danger, relief from care, and the like.

THEOPHYLACT. As He said to the unbelievers alone, Ye shall die in your sin, so now to them who continue in the faith He proclaims absolution.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. 18) From what shall the truth free us, but from death, corruption, mutability, itself being immortal, uncorrupt, immutable? Absolute immutability is in itself eternity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 1) Men who really believed could have borne to be rebuked. But these men began immediately to shew anger. Indeed if they had been disturbed at His former saying, they had much more reason to be so now. For they might argue; If He says we shall know the truth, He must mean that we do not know it now: so then the law is a lie, our knowledge a delusion. But their thoughts took no such direction: their grief is wholly worldly; they know of no other servitude, but that of this world: They answered Him, We be Abraham’s seed, and were never in bondage to any man. How sayest Thou then, we shall be made free? As if to say, They of Abraham’s stock are free, and ought not to be called slaves: we have never been in bondage to any one.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xli. 2) Or it was not those who believed, but the unbelieving multitude that made this answer. But how could they say with truth, taking only secular bondage into account, that we have never been in bondage to any man? Was not Joseph sold? were not the holy prophets carried into captivity? Ungrateful people! Why does God remind you so continually of His having taken you out of the house of bondage if you never were in bondage? Why do you who are now talking, pay tribute to the Romans, if you never were in bondage?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 1) Christ then, who speaks for their good, not to gratify their vainglory, explains His meaning to have been that they were the servants not of men, but of sin, the hardest kind of servitude, from which God only can rescue: Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xli. 3) This asseveration is important: it is, if one may say so, His oath. Amen means true, but is not translated. Neither the Greek nor the Latin Translator have dared to translate it. It is a Hebrew word; and men have abstained from translating it, in order to throw a reverential veil over so mysterious a word: not that they wished to lock it up, but only to prevent it from becoming despised by being exposed. How important the word is, you may see from its being repeated. Verily I say unto you, says Verity itself; which could not be, even though it said not verily. Our Lord however has recourse to this mode of enforcing His words, in order to rouse men from their state of sleep and indifference. Whosoever, He saith, committeth sin, whether Jew or Greek, rich or poor, king or beggar, is the servant of sin.

GREGORY. (iv. Mor. c. 42. in Nov. Ex. 21) Because whoever yields to wrong desires, puts his hitherto free soul under the yoke of the evil one, and takes him for his master. But we oppose this master, when we straggle against the wickedness which has laid hold upon us, when we strongly resist habit, when we pierce sin with repentance, and wash away the spots of filth with tears.

GREGORY. (xxv. Moral. c. 20. not in Nov. Ex. 14) And the more freely men follow their perverse desires, the more closely are they in bondage to them.

AUGUSTINE. O miserable bondage! The slave of a human master when wearied with the hardness of his tasks, sometimes takes refuge in flight. But whither does the slave of sin flee? He takes it along with him, wherever he goes; for his sin is within him. The pleasure passes away, but the sin does not pass away: its delight goes, its sting remains behind. He alone can free from sin, who came without sin, and was made a sacrifice for sin. And thus it follows: The servant abideth not in the house for ever. The Church is the house: the servant is the sinner; and many sinners enter into the Church. So He does not say, The servant is, not in the house; but, The servant abideth not in the house for ever. If a time then is to come, when there shall be no servant in the house; who will there be there? Who will boast that he is pure from sin? Christ's are fearful words. But He adds, The Son abideth for ever. So then Christ will live alone in His house. Or does not the word Son, imply both the body and the head? Christ purposely alarms us first, and then gives us hope. He alarms us, that we may not love sin; He gives us hope, that we may not despair of the absolution of our sin. Our hope then is this, that we shall be freed by Him who is free. He hath paid the price for us, not in money, but in His own blood: If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Ser. xlvii) Not from the barbarians, but from the devil; not from the captivity of the body, but from the wickedness of the soul.

AUGUSTINE. (super Joan. Tr. xl. 10. et seq.) The first stage of freedom is, the abstaining from sin. But that is only incipient, it is not perfect freedom: for the flesh still lusteth against the spirit, so that ye do not do the things that ye would. Full and perfect freedom will only be, when the contest is over, and the last enemy, death, is destroyed.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 1, 2) Or thus: Having said that whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin, He anticipates the answer that their sacrifices saved them, by saying, The servant abideth not in the house for ever, but the Son abideth ever. The house, He says, meaning the Father's house on high; in which, to draw a comparison from the world, He Himself had all the power, just as a man has all the power in his own house. Abideth not, means, has not the power of giving; which the Son, who is the master of the house, has. The priests of the old law had not the power of remitting sins by the sacraments of the law; for all were sinners. Even the priests, who, as the Apostle says, were obliged to offer up sacrifices for themselves. But the Son has this power; and therefore our Lord concludes: If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed; implying that that earthly freedom, of which men boasted so much, was not true freedom.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xli. 8) Do not then abuse your freedom, for the purpose of sinning freely; but use it in order not to sin at all. Your will will be free, if it be merciful: you will be free, if you become the servant of righteousness.

8:37–41

37. I know that ye are Abraham’s seed; but ye seek to kill me, because my word hath no place in you.

38. I speak that which I have seen with my Father: and ye do that which ye have seen with your father.

39. They answered and said unto him, Abraham is our father. Jesus saith unto them, If ye were Abraham’s children, ye would do the works of Abraham.

40. But now ye seek to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth, which I have heard of God: this did not Abraham.

41. Ye do the deeds of your father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 1) The Jews had asserted they were free, because they were Abraham’s seed. Our Lord replies, I know that ye are Abraham’s seed; as if to say, I know that ye are the sons of Abraham, but according to the flesh, not spiritually and by faith. So He adds, But ye seek to kill Me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 2) He says this, that they might not attempt to answer, that they had no sin. He reminds them of a present sin; a sin which they had been meditating for some time past, and which was actually at this moment in their thoughts: putting out of the question their general course of life. He thus removes them by degrees out of their relationship to Abraham, teaching them not to pride themselves so much upon it: for that, as bondage and freedom were the consequences of works, so was relationship. And that they might not say, We do so justly, He adds the reason why they did so; Because My word hath no place in you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 1) That is, hath not place in your heartc, because your heart does not take it in. The word of God to the believing, is like the hook to the fish; it takes when it is taken: and that not to the injury of those who are caught by it. They are caught for their salvation, not for their destruction.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 2) He does not say, Ye do not take in My word, but My word has not room in you; shewing the depth of His doctrines. But they might say; What if thou speakest of thyself? So He adds, I speak that which I have seen of My Father; for I have not only the Father’s substance, but His truth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 11) Our Lord by His Father wishes us to understand God: as if to say, I have seen the truth, I speak the truth, because I am the truth. If our Lord then speaks the truth which He saw with the

Father, it is Himself that He saw, Himself that He speaks; He being Himself the truth of the Father.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. in Joan. s. 7.) This is proof that our Saviour was witness to what was done with the Father: whereas men, to whom the revelation is made, were not witnesses.

THEOPHYLACT. But when you hear, I speak that which I have seen, do not think it means bodily vision, but innate knowledge, sure, and approved. For as the eyes when they see an object, see it wholly and correctly; so I speak with certainty what I know from My Father.

And ye do that which ye have seen with your father.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 13.) As yet He has not named their father; He mentioned Abraham indeed a little above, but now He is going to mention another father, viz. the devil: whose sons they were, in so far as they were wicked, not as being men. Our Lord is reproaching them for their evil deeds.

CHRYSOSTOM. Another reading has, And1 do ye do that which ye have seen with your father; as if to say, As I both in word and deed declare unto you the Father, so do ye by your works shew forth Abraham.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 7.) Also another reading has; And do ye do what ye have heard from the Father. All that was written in the Law and the Prophets they had heard from the Father. He who takes this reading, may use it to prove against them who hold otherwise, that the God who gave the Law and the Prophets, was none other than Christ's Father.d And we use it too as an answer to those who maintain two original natures in men, and explain the words, My word hath no place in you, (c. 8) to mean that these were by nature incapable of receiving the word. How could those be of an incapable nature, who had heard from the Fathere? And how again could they be of a blessed nature, who sought to kill our Saviour, and would not receive His words. They answered and said unto Him, Abraham is our father. This answer of the Jews is a great falling off from our Lord's meaning. He had referred to God, but they take Father in the sense of the father of their nature, Abraham.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. s. 3) As if to say, What art thou going to say against Abraham? They seem to be inviting Him to say something in disparagement of Abraham; and so to give them an opportunity of executing their purpose.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 9.) Our Saviour denies that Abraham is their father: Jesus saith unto them, If ye were Abraham’s children, ye would do the works of Abraham.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 4) And yet He says above, I know that ye are Abraham’s seed. So He does not deny their origin, but condemns their deeds. Their flesh was from him; their life was not.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 2. et sq.) Or we may explain the difficulty thus. Above it is in the Greek, I know that ye are Abraham’s seed. So let us examine whether there is not a difference between a bodily seed and a child. It is evident that a seed contains in itself all the proportions of him whose seed it is, as yet however dormant, and waiting to be developed; when the seed first has changed and moulded the material it meets with in the woman, derived nourishment from thence and gone through a process in the womb, it becomes a child, the likeness of its begetter. So then a child is formed from the seed: but the seed is not necessarily a child. Now with reference to those who are from their works judged to be the seed of Abraham, may we not conceive that they are so from certain seminal proportions implanted in their souls? All men are not the seed of Abraham, for all have not these proportions implanted in their souls. But he who is the seed of Abraham, has yet to become his child by likeness. And it is possible for him by negligence and indolence even to cease to be the seed. But those to whom these words were addressed, were not yet cut off from hope: and therefore Jesus acknowledged that they were as yet the seed of Abraham, and had still the power of becoming children of Abraham. So He says, If ye are the children of Abraham, do the works of Abraham. If as the seed of Abraham, they had attained to their proper sign and growth, they would have taken in our Lord’s words. But not having grown to be children, they cared not; but wish to kill the Word, and as it were break it in pieces, since it was too great for them to take in. If any of you then be the seed of Abraham, and as yet do not take in the word of God, let him not seek to kill the word; but rather change himself into being a son of Abraham, and then he will be able to take in the Son of God. Some select one of the works of Abraham, viz. that in Genesis, And Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness. (Gen. 15:6) But even granting to them that faith is a work, if this were so, why was it not, Do the work of Abraham: using the singular number, instead of the plural? The expression as it stands is, I think, equivalent to saying, Do all the works of Abraham: i. e. in the spiritual sense, interpreting Abraham’s history allegorically. For it is not incumbent on one, who would be a son of Abraham, to many his maidservants, or after his wife’s death, to marry another in his old age.

But now ye seek to kill Me, a man that hath told you the truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 2) This truth, that is, that He was equal to the Father: for it was this that moved the Jews to kill Him. To shew, however, that this doctrine is not opposed to the Father, He adds, Which I have heard from God.

ALCUIN. Because He Himself, Who is the truth, was begotten of God the Father, to hear, being in fact the same with to be from the Father.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 11.) To kill Me, He says, a man. I say nothing now of the Son of God, nothing of the Word, because the Word cannot die; I speak only of that which ye see. It is in your power to kill that which you see, and offend Him Whom ye see not.

This did not Abraham.

ALCUIN. As if to say, By this you prove that you are not the sons of Abraham; that you do works contrary to those of Abraham.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 12.) It might seem to some, that it were superfluous to say that Abraham did not this; for it were impossible that it should be; Christ was not born at that time. But we may remind them, that in Abraham’s time there was a man born who spoke the truth, which he heard from God, and that this man’s life was not sought for by Abraham. Know too that the Saints were never without the spiritual advent of Christ. I understand then from this passage, that every one who, after regeneration, and other divine graces bestowed upon him, commits sin, does by this return to evil incur the guilt of crucifying the Son of God, which Abraham did not do.

Ye do the works of your father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 6) He does not say as yet who is their father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 2) Our Lord says this with a view to put down their vain boasting of their descent; and persuade them to vest their hopes of salvation no longer on the natural relationship, but on the adoption. For this it was which prevented them from coming to Christ; viz. their thinking that their relationship to Abraham was sufficient for their salvation.

41. Then said they to him, We be not born of fornication; we have one Father, even God.

42. Jesus said unto them, If God were your Father, ye would love me: for I proceeded forth and came from God; neither came I of myself, but he sent me.

43. Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my word.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 7.) The Jews had begun to understand that our Lord was not speaking of sonship according to the flesh, but of manner of life. Scripture often speaks of spiritual fornication, with many gods, and of the soul being prostituted, as it were, by paying worship to false gods. This explains what follows: Then said they to Him, We be not born of fornication; we have one Father, even God.

THEOPHYLACT. As if their motive against Him was a desire to avenge God’s honour.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 14.) Or their sonship to Abraham having been disproved, they reply by bitterly insinuating, that our Saviour was the offspring of adultery. But perhaps the tone of the answer is disputatious, more than any thing else. For whereas they have said shortly before, We have Abraham for our father, and had been told in reply, If ye are Abraham’s children, do the works of Abraham; they declare in return that they have a greater Father than Abraham, i. e. God; and that they were not derived from fornication. For the devil, who has no power of creating any thing from himself, (qui nihil facit ex se) begets not from a spouse, but a harlot, i. e. matter, those who give themselves up to carnal things, that is, cleave to matter.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 3) But what say ye? Have ye God for your Father, and do ye blame Christ for speaking thus? Yet true it was, that many of them were born of fornication, for people then used to form unlawful connexions. But this is not the thing our Lord has in view. He is bent on proving that they are not from God. Jesus said unto them, If God were your Father, ye would love Me: for I proceeded forth and came from God.

HILARY. (vi. de Trin. c. 30) It was not that the Son of God condemned the assumption of so religious a name; that is, condemned them for professing to be the sons of God, and calling God their Father; but that He blamed the rash presumption of the Jews in claiming God for their Father, when they did not love the Son. For I proceeded forth, and came from God. To proceed forth, is not the same with to come. When our Lord says that those who called God their Father, ought to love Him, because He came forth from God, He means that His being born of God was the reason why He should be loved: the proceeding forth, having reference to His incorporeal birth. Their claim to be the sons of God, was to be made good by their loving Christ, Who was begotten from God. For a true worshipper of God the Father must love the Son, as being from Godf. And he only can love the Father, who believes that the Son is from Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 8) This then is the eternal procession, the proceeding forth of the Word from God: from Him It proceeded as the Word of the Father, and came to us: The Word was made flesh. (c. 1:14) His advent is His humanity: His staying, His divinity. Ye call God your Father; acknowledge Me at least to be a brother.

HILARY. (lib. v. ibid.) In what follows, He teaches that His origin is not in Himself; Neither came I of Myself, but He sent Me.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 15.) This was said, I think, in allusion to some who came without being sent by the Father, of whom it is said in Jeremiah, I have not sent these prophets, yet they ran. (Jer. 23:21) Some, however, use this passage1 to prove the existence of two naturesg. To these we may reply, Paul hated Jesus when he persecuted the Church of God, at the time, viz. that our Lord said, Why persecutest thou Me? Now if it is true, as is here said, If God were your Father, ye would love Me; (Acts 9:4) the converse is true, If ye do not love Me, God is not your Father. And Paul for some time did not love Jesus. There was a time when God was not Paul’s father. Paul therefore was not by nature the son of God, but afterwards was made so. And when does God become any one’s Father, except when he keeps His commandments?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 3) And because they were ever enquiring, What is this which He saith, Whither I go ye cannot come? He adds here, Why do ye not understand My speech? even because ye cannot hear My word.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 9) And they could not hear, because they would not believe, and amend their lives.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 18. [Nic.]) First then, that virtue must be sought after, which hears the divine word; that by degrees we may be strong enough to embrace the whole teaching of Jesus. For so long as a man has not had his hearing restored by the Word, which says to the deaf ear, Be opened: (Mark 7:34) so long he cannot hear.

8:44–47

44. Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.

45. And because I tell you the truth, ye believe me not.

46. Which of you convinceth me of sin? And if I say the truth, why do ye not believe me?

47. He that is of God heareth God's words: ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 3) Our Lord, having already cut off the Jews from relationship to Abraham, overthrows now this far greater claim, to call God their Father, Ye are of your father the devil.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 10) Here we must guard against the heresy of the Manichæans, who hold a certain original nature of evil, and a nation of darkness with princes at their head, whence the devil derives his existence. And thence they say our flesh is produced; and in this way interpret our Lord's speech, Ye are of your father the devil: viz. to mean that they were by nature evil, drawing their origin from the opposite seed of darkness.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx.) And this seems to be the same mistake, as if one said, that an eye which saw right was different in kind from an eye which saw wrong. For just as in these there is no difference of kind, only one of them for some reason sees wrong; so, in the other case, whether a man receives a doctrine, or whether he does not, he is of the same nature.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 11) The Jews then were children of the devil by imitation, not by birth: And the lusts of your father ye will do, our Lord says. Ye are his children then, because ye have such lusts, not because ye are born of him: for ye seek to kill Me, a man that hath told you the truth: and he envied man, and killed him: he was a murderer from the beginning;

i. e. of the first man on whom a murder could be committed: man could not be slain, before man was created. The devil did not go, girt with a sword, against man: he sowed an evil word, and slew him. Do not suppose therefore that you are not guilty of murder, when you suggest evil thoughts to your brother. The very reason why ye rage against the flesh, is that ye cannot assault the soul.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 21.) Consider too; it was not one man only that he killed, but the whole human race, inasmuch as in Adam all die; so that he is truly called a murderer from the beginning.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 3) He does not say, his works, but his lusts ye will do, meaning that both the devil and the Jews were bent on murder, to satisfy their envy. And stood not in the truth. He shews whence sprang their continual objection to Him, that He was not from God.

AUGUSTINE. (xi. de Civ. Dei, c. 13) But it will be objected perhaps, that if from the beginning of his existence, the devil stood not in the truth, he was never in a state of blessedness with the holy angels, refusing, as he did, to be subject to his Creator, and therefore false and deceitful; unwilling at the cost of pious subjection to hold that which by nature he was; and attempting in his pride and loftiness to simulate that which he was not. This opinion is not the same with that of the Manichæans, that the devil has his own peculiar nature, derived as it were from the opposite principle of evil. This foolish sect does not see that our Lord says not, Was alien from the truth, but Stood not in the truth, meaning, fell from the truth. And thus they interpret John, The devil sinneth from the beginning, (1 John 3:8) not seeing that if sin is natural, it is no sin. But what do the testimonies of the prophets reply? Isaiah, setting forth the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon, says, How art thou fallen from heaven, O Lucifer, son of the morning! (Ezek. 28:13) Ezekiel says, Thou hast been in Eden, the garden of God. Which passages, as they cannot be interpreted in any other way, shew that we must take the word, He stood not in the truth, to mean, that he was in truth, but did not remain in it; and the other, that the devil sinneth from the beginning, to mean, that he was a sinner not from the beginning of his creation, but from the beginning of sin. For sin began in him, and he was the beginning of sin.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 22.) There is only one way of standing in the truth; many and various of not standing in it. Some try to stand in the truth, but their feet tremble and shake so, they cannot. Others are not come to that pass, but are in danger of it, as we read in the Psalms, My feet were almost gone: (Ps. 72) others fall from it. Because the truth is not in him, is the reason why the devil did not stand in the truth. He imagined vain things, and deceived himself; wherein He was so far worse than others, in that, while others are deceived by him, he was the author of his own deception. But farther; does the truth is not in him, mean that he holds no true doctrine, and that every thing he thinks is false; or that he is not a member of Christ, who says, I am the truth? (c. 14:6) Now it is impossible that any rational being should think falsely on every subject and never be even ever so slightly right in opinion. The devil therefore may hold a true doctrine, by the mere law of his rational nature: and therefore his nature is not contrary to truth, i. e. does not consist of simple error and ignorance; otherwise he could never have known the truth.

AUGUSTINE. (xi. de Civ. Dei, c. xiv) Or when our Lord says, The truth is not in him, He intends it as an index: as if we had asked Him, how it appeared that the devil stood not in the truth; and He said, Because the truth is not in him. For it would be in him, if he stood in it.

When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. s. 12, 13) Some have thought from these words that the devil had a father, and asked who was the father of the devil. This is the error of the Manichæans. But our Lord calls the devil the father of a lie for this reason: Every one who lies is not the father of his own lie; for you may tell a lie, which you have received from another; in which case you have lied, but are not the father of the lie. But the lie wherewith, as with a serpent’s bite, the devil slew man. had no source but himself: and therefore he is the father a lie, as God is the Father of the truth.

THEOPHYLACT. For he accused God to man, saying to Eve, But of envy He hath forbidden you the tree: and to God he accused man, as in Job, Doth Job serve God for nought? (Job 1:9)

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 23.) Note however; this word, liar, is applied to man, as well as to the devil, who begat a lie, as we read in the Psalm, All men are liars. (Ps. 111) If a man is not a liar, he is not an ordinary man, but one of those, to whom it is said, I have said, Ye are Gods. (Ps. 81) When a man speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; but the Holy Spirit speaketh the word of truth and wisdom; as he said below, He shall receive of Mine, and shall shew it unto you. (c. 16:15)

AUGUSTINE. (de Quæst. Nov. et Vet. Test. 2, 90) Or thus: The devil is not a singular, but a common name. In whomsoever the works of the devil are found, he is to be called the devil. It is the name of a work, not of a nature. Here then our Lord means by the father of the Jews, Cain; whom they wished to imitate, by killing the Saviour: for he it was who set the first example of murdering a brother. That he spoke a lie of his own, means that no one sins but by his own will. And inasmuch as Cain imitated the devil, and followed his works, the devil is said to be his father.

ALCUIN. Our Lord being the truth, and the Son of the true God, spoke the truth; but the Jews, being the sons of the devil, were averse to the truth; and this is why our Lord says, Because I tell you the truth, ye believe not.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 24.) But how is this said to the Jews who believed on Him? Consider: a man may believe in one sense, not believe in another; e. g. that our Lord was crucified by Pontius Pilate, but not that He was born of the Virgin Mary. In this same way, those whom He is speaking to, believed in Him as a worker of miracles, which they saw Him to be; but did not believe in His doctrines, which were too deep for them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. s. 3) Ye wish to kill Me then, because ye are enemies of the truth, not that ye have any fault to find in Me: for, which of you convinceth Me of sin?

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say: If ye are the sons of God, ye ought to hold sinners in hatred. If ye hate Me, when ye cannot convince Me of sin, it is evident that ye hate Me because of the truth: i. e. because I said I was the Son of God.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. in Joan. s. 25.) A bold speech this; which none could have had the confidence to utter, but he Who did no sin; even our Lord.

GREGORY. (Hom. xviii. in Evang.) Observe here the condescension of God. He who by virtue of His Divinity could justify sinners, deigns to shew from reason, that He is not a sinner. It follows: He that is of God heareth God’s words; ye therefore hear them not, because ye are not of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlii. 16) Apply this not to their nature, but to their faults. They both are from God, and are not from God at the same time; their nature is from God, their fault is not from God. This was spoken too to those, who were not only faulty, by reason of sin, in the way in which all are: but who it was foreknown would never possess such faith as would free them from the bonds of sin.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Let him then, who would understand God’s words, ask himself whether he hears them with the ears of his heart. For there are some who do not deign to hear God’s commands even with their bodily ears; and there are others who do this, but do not embrace them with their heart’s desire; and there are others again who receive God’s words readily, yea and are touched, even to tears: but who afterwards go back to their sins again; and therefore cannot be said to hear the word of God, because they neglect to practise it.

8:48–51

48. Then answered the Jews, and said unto him, Say we not well that thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil?

49. Jesus answered, I have not a devil; but I honour my Father, and ye do dishonour me.

50. And I seek not mine own glory; there is one that seeketh and judgeth.

51. Verily, verily, I say unto you, If a man keep my saying, he shall never see death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 1) Whenever our Lord said any thing of lofty meaning, the Jews in their insensibility set it down madness: Then answered the Jews and said unto Him, Say we not well that Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil?

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 28.) But how, we may ask, when the Samaritans denied a future life, and the immortality of the soul, could they dare to call our Saviour, Who had preached so much on the resurrection and the judgment, a Samaritan? Perhaps they only mean a general rebuke to Him for teaching, what they did not approve of.

ALCUIN. The Samaritans were hated by the Jews; they lived in the land that formerly belonged to the ten tribes, who had been carried away.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 28.) It is not unlikely too, some may have thought that He held the Samaritan opinion of there being no future state really, and only put forth the doctrine of a resurrection and eternal life, in order gain to the favour of the Jews. They said that He had a devil, because His discourses were above human capacity, those, viz. in which He asserted that

God was His Father, and that He had come down from heaven, and others of a like kind: or perhaps from a suspicion, which many had, that He cast out devils by Beelzebub, the prince of the devils.

THEOPHYLACT. Or they called Him a Samaritan, because He transgressed the Hebrew ordinances, as that of the sabbath: the Samaritans not being correct observers of the law. And they suspected Him of having a devil, because He could disclose what was in their thoughts. When it was that they called Him a Samaritan, the Evangelist no where says: a proof that the Evangelists left out many things.

GREGORY. (Hom. xviii. in Evang.) See; when God suffers a wrong, He does not reply reproachfully: Jesus answered, I have not a devil. An intimation this to us, that when reproached by our neighbours falsely, we should not retort upon them by bringing forward their evil deeds, however true such charges might be; lest the vehicle of a just rebuke turn into a weapon of rage.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 1) And observe, when He had to teach them, and pull down their pride, He used roughness; but now that He has to suffer rebuke, He treats them with the utmost mildness: a lesson to us to be severe in what concerns God, but careless of ourselves.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 1. 2) And to imitate His patience first, if we would attain to His power. But though being reviled, He reviled not again, it was incumbent on Him to deny the charge. Two charges had been made against Him: Thou art a Samaritan, and hast a devil. In reply He does not say, I am not a Samaritan: for Samaritan means keeper; and He knew He was a keeper: He could not redeem us, without at the same time preserving us. Lastly, He is the Samaritan, who went up to the wounded, and had compassion on him.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. s. 28.) Our Lord, even more than Paul, wished to become all things to all men, that He might gain some: and therefore He did not deny being a Samaritan. (s. 29.). I have not a devil, is what Jesus alone can say; as He alone can say, The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in Me. (c. 14:30). None of us are quite free from having a devil. For even lesser faults come from him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 3) Then after being so reviled, all that He says to vindicate His glory, is, But I honour My Father: as if to say, That you may not think Me arrogant, I tell you, I have One, Whom I honour.

THEOPHYLACT. He honoured the Father, by revenging Him, and not suffering murderers or liars to call themselves the true sons of God.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 29.) Christ alone honoured the Father perfectly. No one, who honours any thing which is not honoured by God, honours God.

GREGORY. (Hom. xliii. 3) As all who have zeal toward God are liable to meet with dishonour from wicked men, our Lord has Himself set us an example of patience under this trial; And ye do dishonour Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 3) As if to say, I do my duty: ye do not do yours.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 29.) And this was not addressed to them only, but to all who by unrighteous deeds inflict injury upon Christ, who is righteousness; or by scoffing at wisdom wrong Him who is wisdom: and the like.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) How we are to take injuries, He shews us by His own example, when He adds, I seek not Mine own glory, there is one that seeketh and judgeth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 1) As if to say, I have told you thish on account of the honour which I have for My Father; and for this ye dishonour Me. But I concern not myself for your reviling: ye are accountable to Him, for whose sake I undergo it.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. s. 30.) God seeks Christ’s glory, in every one of those who receive Him: which glory He finds in those who cultivate the seeds of virtue implanted in them. And those in whom He finds not His Son’s glory, He punishes: There is one that seeketh and judgeth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 4) Meaning of course the Father. But how is it then that He says in another place, The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son. (c. 5:22) Judgment is sometimes put for condemnation, whereas here it only stands for trial: as if to say, There is one, even My Father, who distinguishes My glory from yours; ye glory after this world, I not after this world. The Father distinguishes the glory of the Son, from that of all men: for that He has been made man, does not bring us to a comparison with Him. We men have sin: He was without sin, even when He was in the form of a servant; for, as the Word which was in the beginning, who can speak worthily of Him?

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 31.[Nic.]) Or thus; If that is true which our Saviour says below, All men are thine, (c. 17:10) it is manifest that the judgment itself of the Son, is the Father’s.

GREGORY. (Hom. xviii. in Evang.) As the perversity of the wicked increases, preaching so far from giving way, ought even to become more active. Thus our Lord, after He had been accused of having a devil, imparts the treasures of preaching in a still larger degree: Verily, verily, I say unto you, If a man keep My saying, he shall never see death.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 10, 11) See is put for experience. But since, about to die Himself, He spoke with those about to die, what means this, If a man keep My saying, he shall never see death? What, but that He saw another death from which He came to free us, death eternal, the death of the damned, which is shared with the devil and his angels! That is the true death: the other is a passage only.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. s. 31.) We must understand Him, as it were, to say, If a man keep My light, he shall not see darkness for ever; for ever being taken as common to both clauses, as if the sentence were, If a man keep My saying for ever, He shall not see death for ever: meaning that a man does not see death, so long as he keeps Christ's word. But when a man, by becoming sluggish in the observance of His words, and negligent in the keeping of his own heart, ceases to keep them, he then sees death; he brings it upon himself. Thus taught then by our Saviour, to the prophet who asks, What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death? (Ps. 88) we are able to answer, He who keepeth Christ's word.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 1) He says, keep, i. e. not by faith, but by purity of life. And at the same time too He means it as a tacit intimation that they can do nothing to Him. For if whoever keepeth His word, shall never die, much less is it possible that He Himself should die.

8:52–56

52. Then said the Jews unto him, Now we know that thou hast a devil. Abraham is dead, and the prophets; and thou sayest, If a man keep my saying, he shall never taste of death.

53. Art thou greater than our father Abraham, which is dead? and the prophets are dead; whom makest thou thyself?

54. Jesus answered, If I honour myself, my honour is nothing; it is my Father that honoureth me; of whom ye say, that he is your God:

55. Yet ye have not known him; but I know him: and if I should say, I know him not, I shall be a liar like unto you: but I know him, and keep his saying.

56. Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day: and he saw it, and was glad.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) As it is necessary that the good should grow better by contumely, so are the reprobate made worse by kindness. On hearing our Lord’s words, the Jews again blaspheme: Then said the Jews unto Him, Now we know Thou hast a devil.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 32, 33.) Those who believe the Holy Scriptures, understand that what men do contrary to right reason, is not done without the operation of devils. Thus the Jews thought that Jesus had spoken by the influence of the devil, when He said, If a man keep My saying, he shall never see death. And this idea they laboured under, because they did not know the power of God. For here He was speaking of that death of enmity to reason (ἐχθρὸν τῷ λόγῳ), by which sinners perish:whereas they understand Him of that death which is common to all; and therefore blame Him for so speaking, when it was certain that Abraham and the Prophets were dead: Abraham is dead, and the Prophets; and Thou sayest, If a man keep My saying, he shall never taste of death. Shall never taste of death, they say, instead of, shall not see death; though between tasting and seeing death there is a difference. Like careless hearers, they mistake what our Lord said. For as our Lord, in that He is the true bread, is good to taste; in that He is wisdom, is beautiful to behold; in like manner His adversary death is both to be tasted and seen. When then a man stands by Christ’s help in the spiritual place pointed out to him, (ἐν τῷ δεικνυ μένω νοητῷ τόπῳ) he shall not taste of death if he preserves that state: according to Matthew, There he those standing HERE. which shall not taste of death. (Matt. 16:28) But when a man hears Christ’s words and keeps them, he shall not see death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 1) Again, they have recourse to the vainglorious argument of their descent: Art Thou greater than our father Abraham, winch is dead? They might have said, Art Thou greater than God, whose words they are dead who heard? But they do not say this, because they thought Him inferior even to Abraham.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 33.) For they do not see that not Abraham only, but every one born of woman, is less than He who was born of a Virgin. Now were the Jews right in saying that Abraham was dead? for he heard the word of Christ, and kept it, as did also the Prophets, who, they say, were dead. For they kept the word of the Son of God, when the word of the Lord came to Hosea, Isaiah, or Jeremiah; if any one else kept the word, surely those Prophets did. They utter a lie then when they say, We know that Thou hast a devil; and when they say, Abraham is dead, and the Prophets.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) For being given over to eternal death, which death they saw not, and thinking only, as they did, of the death of the body, their minds were darkened, even while the Truth Himself was speaking. They add: Whom makest Thou Thyself?

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say, Thou a person of no account, a carpenter’s son of Galilee, to take glory to Thyself!

BEDE. Whom makest Thou Thyself? i. e. Of what merit, of what dignity wouldest Thou be accounted? Nevertheless, Abraham only died in the body; his soul lived. And the death of the soul which is to live for ever, is greater than the death of the body that must die some time.

ORIGEN. (tom. xx. 33.) This was the speech of persons spiritually blind. For Jesus did not make Himself what He was, but received it from the Father: Jesus answered and said, If I honour Myself, My honour is nothing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 1, 2. c. 5) This is to answer their suspicions; as above, If I bear witness of Myself, My witness is not true.

BEDE. He shews in these words that the glory of this present life is nothing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 14) This is to answer those who said, Whom makest Thou Thyself? He refers His glory to the Father, from Whom is: It is My Father that honoureth Me. The Arians take occasion from those words to calumniate our faith, and say, Lo, the Father is greater, for He glorifieth the Son. Heretics, have ye not read that the Son also glorifieth the Father?

ALCUIN. The Father glorified the Son, at His baptism, on the mount, at the time of His passion, when a voice came to Him, in the midst of the crowd, when He raised Him up again after His passion, and placed Him at the right hand of His Majesty.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 2) He adds, Of whom ye say that He is your God; meaning to tell them that they were not only ignorant of the Father, but even of God.

THEOPHYLACT. For had they known the Father really, they would have reverenced the Son. But they even despise God, who in the Law forbad murder, by their clamours against Christ. Wherefore He says, Ye have not known Him.

ALCUIN. As if to say, Ye call Him your God, after a carnal manner, serving Him for temporal rewards. Ye have not known Him, as He should be known; ye are not able to serve Him spiritually.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 15) Some heretics say that the God proclaimed in the Old Testament is not the Father of Christ, but a kind of prince of bad angels. These He contradicts when He calls Him His Father, whom the Jews called their God, and knew not. For had they known Him, they would have received His Son. Of Himself however He adds, But I know Him. And here too, to men judging after the flesh, He might appear arrogant. But let not arrogance be so guarded against, as that truth be deserted. Therefore our Lord says, And if I should say I know Him not, I should be a liar like unto you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 2) As if to say, As ye, saying that ye know Him, lie; so were I a liar, did I say I knew Him not. It follows, however, (which is the greatest proof of all that He was sent from God,) But I know Him.

THEOPHYLACT. Having that knowledge by nature; for as I am, so is the Father also; I know Myself, and therefore I know Him. And He gives the proof that He knows Him: And I keep His saying, i. e. His commandments. Some understand, I keep His saying, to mean, I keep the nature of His substance unchanged; for the substance of the Father and the Son is the same, as their nature is the same; and therefore I know the Father. And here has the force of because: I know Him because I keep His saying.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 15) He spoke the saying of the Father too, as being the Son; and He was Himself that Word of the Father, which He spoke to men.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lv. 2) In answer then to their question, Art Thou greater than our father Abraham, He shews them that He is greater than Abraham; Your father Abraham rejoiced to see My day: he saw it, and was glad; he must have rejoiced, because My day would benefit him, which is to acknowledge Me greater than himself.

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say, He regarded My day, as a day to be desired, and full of joy; not as if I was an unimportant or common person.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 16) He did not fear, but rejoiced to see: he rejoiced in hope, believing, and so by faith saw. It admits of doubt whether He is speaking here of the temporal day of the Lord, that, viz. of His coming in the flesh, or of that day which knows neither rising or setting. I doubt not however that our father Abraham knew the whole: as he says to his servant whom he sent, Put thy hand under my thigh, and swear to me by the God of heaven. (Gen. 24:2) What did that oath signify, but that the God of heaven was to come in the flesh, out of the stock of Abraham.

GREGORY. (Hom. xv. in Evang.) Abraham saw the day of the Lord even then, when he entertained the three Angels, a figure of the Trinity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 2) They are aliens from Abraham if they grieve over what he rejoiced in. By this day perhaps He means the day of the cross, which Abraham prefigured by the offering up of Isaac and the ram: intimating hereby that He did not come to His passion unwillingly.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 16) If they rejoiced to whom the Word appeared in the flesh, what was his joy, who beheld in spiritual vision the light ineffable, the abiding Word, the bright illumination of pious souls, the indefectible wisdom, still abiding with God the Father, and sometime to come in the flesh, but not to leave the Father’s bosom.

8:57–59

57. Then said the Jews unto him. Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham?

58. Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am.

59. Then took they up stones to cast at him: but Jesus hid himself, and went out of the temple, going through the midst of them, and so passed by.

GREGORY. (Hom. xviii. in Evang.) The carnal minds of the Jews are intent on the flesh only; they think only of His age in the flesh: Then said the Jews unto Him, Thou art not fifty years old, and hast Thou seen

Abraham? that is to say, Many ages have passed since Abraham died; and how then could he see thy day? For they took His words in a carnal sense.

THEOPHYLACT. Christ was then thirty-three years old. Why then do they not say, Thou art not yet forty years old, instead of fifty? A needless question this: they simply spoke as chance led them at the time. Some however say that they mentioned the fiftieth year on account of its sacred character, as being the year of jubilee, in which they redeemed their captives, and gave up the possessions they had bought.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Our Saviour mildly draws them away from their carnal view, to the contemplation of His Divinity; Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was, I am. Before is a particle of past time, am, of present. Divinity has no past or future, but always the present; and therefore He does not say, Before Abraham was, I was: but, Before Abraham was, I am: (Exod. 3:14) as it is in Exodus, I am that I am. Before and after might be said of Abraham with reference to different periods of his life; to be, in the present, is said of the truth only.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 18) Abraham being a creature, He did not say before Abraham was, but, before Abraham was made. Nor does He say, I am made; because that, in the beginning WAS. the Word.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) Their unbelieving minds, however, were unable to support these indications of eternity; and not understanding Him, sought to destroy Him: Then they took up stones to cast at Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 18) Such hardness of heart, whither was it to run, but to its truest likeness, even the stones? But now that He had done all that He could do as a teacher, and they in return wished to stone Him, since they could not bear correction, He leaves them: Jesus hid Himself, and went out of the temple. He did not hide Himself in a corner of the temple, as if He was afraid, or take refuge in a house, or run behind a wall, or a pillar; but by His heavenly power, making Himself invisible to His enemies, went through the midst of them: Jesus hid Himself, and went out of the temple.

GREGORY. Who, had He chosen to exert the power of His Divinity, could, without a word, by His mere nod, have seized them, with the very stones in their hands, and delivered them to immediate death. But He who came to suffer, was slow to execute judgment.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 18) For His part was more to exhibit patience than exercise power.

ALCUIN. He fled, because His hour was not yet come; and because He had not chosen this kind of death.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliii. 18) So then, as a man, He flies from the stones; but woe to them, from whose stony hearts God flies.

BEDE. Mystically, a man throws a stone at Jesus, as often as he harbours an evil thought; and if he follows it up, so far as lies in him, he kills Jesus.

GREGORY. (ut sup.) What does our Lord mean by hiding Himself, but that the truth is hidden to them, who despise His words. The truth flies the company of an unhumbled soul. His example shews us, that we should in all humility rather retreat from the wrath of the proud, when it rises, than resist it, even though we might be able,

CHAPTER 9

9:1–7

1. And as Jesus passed by, he saw a man which was blind from his birth.

2. And his disciples asked him, saying, Master, who did sin, this man, or his parents, that he was born blind?

3. Jesus answered, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents: but that the works of God should be made manifest in him.

4. I must work the works of him that sent me, while it is day: the night cometh, when no man can work.

5. As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world.

6. When he had thus spoken, he spat on the ground, and made clay of the spittle, and he anointed the eyes of the blind man with the clay,

7. And said unto him, Go, wash in the pool of Siloam, (which is by interpretation, Sent.) He went his way therefore, and washed, and came seeing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvi. 1) The Jews having rejected Christ’s words, because of their depth, He went out of the temple, and healed the blind man; that His absence might appease their fury, and the miracle soften their hard hearts, and convince their unbelief. And as Jesus passed by, He saw a man which was blind from his birth. It is to be remarked here that, on going out of the temple, He betook Himself intently to this manifestation of His power. He first saw the blind man, not the blind man Him: and so intently did He fix His eye upon him, that His disciples were struck, and asked, Rabbi, who did sin, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?

BEDE. Mystically, our Lord, after being banished from the minds of the Jews, passed over to the Gentiles. (non occ.). The passage or journey here is His descent from heaven to earth, where He saw the blind man, i. e. looked with compassion on the human race.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 1, 2) For the blind man here is the human race. Blindness came upon the first man by reason of sin: and from him we all derive it: i. e. man is blind from his birth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 1, 2) Rabbi is Master. They call Him Master, because they wished to learn: they put their question to our Lord, as to a Master.

THEOPHYLACT. This question does not seem a proper one. For the Apostles had not been taught the fond notion of the Gentiles, that the soul has sinned in a previous state of existence. It is difficult to account for their putting it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 1. c. 5) They were led to ask this question, by our Lord having said above, on healing the man sick of the palsy, Lo, thou art made whole; sin no more. Thinking from this that the man had been struck with the palsy for his sins, they ask our Lord of the blind man here, whether he did sin, or his parents; neither of which could have been the reason of his blindness; the former, because he had been blind from his birth; the latter, because the son does not suffer for the father.

Jesus answered, Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 3) Was he then born without original sin, or had he never added to it by actual sin? Both this man and his parents had sinned, but that sin was not the reason why he was born blind. Our Lord gives the reason; viz. That the works of God should be made manifest in him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvi. 1, 2) He is not to be understood as meaning that others had become blind, in consequence of their parents’ sins: for one man cannot be punished for the sin of another. But had the man therefore suffered unjustly? Rather I should say that that blindness was a benefit to him: for by it he was brought to see with the inward eye. At any rate He who brought him into being out of nothing, had the power to make him in the event no loser by it. Some too say, that the that here, is expressive not of the cause, but of the event, as in the passage in Romans, The law entered that sin might abound; (Rom. 5:20) the effect in this case being, that our Lord by opening the closed eye, and healing other natural infirmities, demonstrated His own power.

GREGORY. (in Præf. Moral. c. 5) One stroke falls on the sinner, for punishment only, not conversion; another for correction; another not for correction of past sins, but prevention of future; another neither for correcting past, nor preventing future sins, but by the unexpected deliverance following the blow, to excite more ardent love of the Saviour's goodness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. liv. 2) That the glory of God should be made manifest, He saith of Himself, not of the Father; the Father's glory was manifest already. I must work the works of Him that sent Me: i. e. I must manifest Myself, and shew that I do the same that My Father doeth.

BEDE. For when the Son declared that He worked the works of the Father, He proved that His and His Father's works were the same: which are to heal the sick, to strengthen the weak, and enlighten man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 4) By His saying, Who sent Me, He gives all the glory to Him from Whom He is. The Father hath a Son Who is from Him, but hath none from whom He Himself is.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvi. 2) While it is day, He adds; i. e. while men have the opportunity of believing in Me; while this life lasts; The night cometh, when none can work. Night here means that spoken of in Matthew, Cast him into outer darkness. (Mat. 22:13) Then will there be night, wherein none can work, but only receive for that which he has worked. While thou livest, do that which thou wilt do: for beyond it is neither faith, nor labour, nor repentance.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 5) But if we work now, now is the day time, now is Christ present; as He says, As long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world. This then is the day. The natural day is completed by the circuit of the sun, and contains only a few hours: the day of Christ's presence will last to the end of the world: for He Himself has said, Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. (Mat. 28:20)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvi. 2) He then confirms His words by deeds: When He had thus spoken, He spat on the ground, and made clay of the spittle, and anointed the eyes of the blind man with the clay. He who had brought greater substances into being out of nothing, could much more have given sight without the use of any material: but He wished to shew that He was the Creator, Who in the beginning used clay for the formation of man. (Hom. lvii. 1). He makes the clay with spittle, and not with water, to make it evident that it was not the pool of Siloam, whither He was about to send him, but the virtue proceeding from His mouth, which restored the man's sight. And then, that the cure might not seem to be the effect of the clay, He ordered the man to wash: And He said unto him, Go, wash in the pool of

Siloam. The Evangelist gives the meaning of Siloam, which is by interpretation, Sent, to intimate that it was Christ's power that cured him even there. As the Apostle says of the rock in the wilderness, that that Rock was Christ, (1 Cor. 10:14) so Siloam had a spiritual character: the sudden rise of its water being a silent figure of Christ's unexpected manifestation in the flesh. But why did He not tell him to wash immediately, instead of sending him to Siloam? That the obstinacy of the Jews might be overcome, when they saw him going there with the clay on his eyes. Besides which, it proved that He was not averse to the Law, and the Old Testament. And there was no fear of the glory of the case being given to Siloam: as many had washed their eyes there, and received no such benefit. And to shew the faith of the blind man, who made no opposition, never argued with himself, that it was the quality of clay rather to darken, than give light, that He had often washed in Siloam, and had never been benefited; that if our Lord had the power, He might have cured him by His word; but simply obeyed: he went his way therefore, and washed, and came seeing. (Hom. lvi. 2). Thus our Lord manifested His glory: and no small glory it was, to be proved the Creator of the world, as He was proved to be by this miracle. For on the principle that the greater contains the less, this act of creation included in it every other. Man is the most honourable of all creatures; the eye the most honourable member of man, directing the movements, and giving him sight. The eye is to the body, what the sun is to the universe; and therefore it is placed aloft, as it were, upon a royal eminence.

THEOPHYLACT. Some think that the clay was not laid upon the eyes, but made into eyes.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 2) Our Lord spat upon the ground, and made clay of the spittle, because He was the Word made flesh. The man did not see immediately as he was anointed; i. e. was, as it were, only made a catechumen. But he was sent to the pool which is called Siloam, i. e. he was baptized in Christ; and then he was enlightened. The Evangelist then explains to us the name of this pool: which is by interpretation, Sent: for, if He had not been sent, none of us would have been delivered from our sins.

GREGORY. (viii. Moral. c. xxx. [49.]) Or thus: By His spittle understand the savour of inward contemplation. It runs down from the head into the mouth, and gives us the taste of revelation from the Divine splendour even in this life. The mixture of His spittle with clay is the mixture of supernatural grace, even the contemplation of Himself with our carnal knowledge, to the soul’s enlightenment, and restoration of the human understanding from its original blindness.

9:8–17

8. The neighbours therefore, and they which before had seen him that he was blind, said, Is not this he that sat and begged?

9. Some said, This is he: others said, He is like him: but he said, I am he.

10. Therefore said they unto him, How were thine eyes opened?

11. He answered and said, A man that is called Jesus made clay, and anointed mine eyes, and said unto me, Go to the pool of Siloam, and wash: and I went and washed, and I received sight.

12. Then said they unto him, Where is he? He said, I know not.

13. They brought to the Pharisees him that aforetime was blind.

14. And it was the sabbath day when Jesus made the clay, and opened his eyes.

15. Then again the Pharisees also asked him how he had received his sight. He said unto them, He put clay upon mine eyes, and I washed, and do see.

16. Therefore said some of the Pharisees, This man is not of God, because he keepeth not the Sabbath day. Others said, How can a man that is a sinner do such miracles? And there was a division among them.

17. They say unto the blind man again, What sayest thou of him, that he hath opened thine eyes? He said, He is a prophet.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvii. s. 1) The suddenness of the miracle made men incredulous: The neighbours therefore, and they which had seen him that he was blind, said, Is not this he that sat and begged? Wonderful clemency and condescension of God! Even the beggars He heals with so great considerateness: thus stopping the mouths of the Jews; in that He made not the great, illustrious, and noble, but the poorest and meanest, the objects of His providence. Indeed He had come for the salvation of all. Some said, This is he. The blind man having been clearly recognised in the course of his long walk to the pool; the more so, as people’s attention was drawn by the strangeness of the event; men could no longer say, This is not he; Others said, Nay, but he is like him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 8) His eyes being opened had altered his look. But he said, I am he. He spoke gratefully; a denial would have convicted Him of ingratitude.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvii. s. 2) He was not ashamed of his former blindness, nor afraid of the fury of the people, nor averse to shew himself, and proclaim his Benefactor. Therefore said they unto him, How were thine eyes opened? How they were, neither he nor any one knew: he only knew the fact; he could not explain it. He answered and said, A man that is called Jesus made clay, and anointed mine eyes. Mark his exactness. He does not say how the clay was made; for he could not see that our Lord spat on the ground; he does not say what he does not know; but that He anointed him he could feel. And said unto me, Go to the pool of Siloam, and wash. This too he could declare from his own hearing; for he had heard our Lord converse with His disciples, and so knew His voice. Lastly, he shews how strictly he had obeyed our Lord. He adds, And I went, and washed, and received sight.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. s. 8) Lo, he is become a proclaimer of grace, an evangelist, and testifies to the Jews. That blind man testified, and the ungodly were vexed at the heart, because they had not in their heart what appeared upon his countenance. Then said they unto him, Where is He?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvii. 2) This they said, because they were meditating His death, having already begun to conspire against Him. Christ did not appear in company with those whom He cured; having no desire for glory, or display. He always withdrew, after healing any one; in order that no suspicion might attach to the miracle. His withdrawal proved the absence of all connexion between Him and the healed; and therefore that the latter did not publish a false cure out of favour to Him. He said, I know not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 8) Here he is like one anointed, but unable yet to see: he preaches, and knows not what he preaches.

BEDE. Thus he represents the state of the catechumen, who believes in Jesus, but does not, strictly speaking, know Him, not being yet washed. It fell to the Pharisees to confirm or deny the miracle.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvii. 2) The Jews, whom they asked, Where is He? were desirous of finding Him, in order to bring Him to the Pharisees; but, as they could not find Him, they bring the blind man. They brought to the Pharisees him that aforetime was blind; i. e. that they might examine him still more closely. The Evangelist adds, And it was the sabbath day when Jesus made the clay, and opened his eyes; in order to expose their real design, which was to accuse Him of a departure from the law, and thus detract from the miracle: as appears from what follows, Then again the Pharisees also asked him how he had received his sight. But mark the firmness of the blind man. To tell the truth to the multitude before, from whom he was in no danger, was not so great a matter: but it is remarkable, now that the danger is so much greater, to find him disavowing nothing, and not contradicting any thing that he said before: He said unto them, He put clay upon mine eyes, and I washed, and do see. Ho is more brief this time, as his interrogators were already informed of the matter: not mentioning the name of Jesus, nor His saying, Go, and wash; but simply, He put clay upon mine eyes, and I washed, and do see; the very contrary answer to what they wanted. They wanted a disavowal, and they receive a confirmation of the story.

Therefore said some of the Pharisees.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 9) Some, not all: for some were already anointed. But they, who neither saw, nor were anointed, said, This man is not of God, because he keepeth not the sabbath day. Rather He kept it, in that He was without sin; for to observe the sabbath spiritually, is to have no sin. And this God admonishes us of, when He enjoins the sabbath, saying, In it thou shall do no servile work. (Exod. 20:10) What servile work is, our Lord tells us above, Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin. (c. 8:34) They observed the sabbath carnally, transgressed it spiritually.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvii. 2) Passing over the miracle in silence, they give all the prominence they can to the supposed transgression; not charging Him with healing on the sabbath, but with not keeping the sabbath. Others said, How can a man that is a sinner do such miracles? They were impressed by His miracles, but only in a weak and unsettled way. For whereas such might have shewn them, that the sabbath was not broken; they had not yet any idea that He was God, and therefore did not know that it was the Lord of the sabbath who had worked the miracle. Nor did any of them dare to say openly what his sentiments were, but spoke ambiguously; one, because he thought the fact itself improbable; another, from his love of station. It follows, And there was a division among them. That is, the people were divided first, and then the rulers.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 4, 5) It was Christ, who divided the day into light and darkness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 1) Those who said, Can a man that is a sinner do such miracles? wishing to stop the others' mouths, make the object of our Lord's goodness again come forward; but without appearing to take part with Him themselves: They say unto the blind man again, What sayest thou of Him, that He hath opened thine eyes?

THEOPHYLACT. See with what good intent they put the question. They do not say, What sayest thou of Him that keepeth not the sabbath, but mention the miracle, that He hath opened thine eyes; meaning it would seem, to draw out the healed man himself; He hath benefited them, they seem to say, and thou oughtest to preach Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 9) Or they sought how they could throw reproach upon the man, and cast him out of their synagogue. He declares however openly what he thinks: He said, He is a Prophet. Not being anointed yet in heart, he could not confess the Son of God; nevertheless, he is not wrong in what he says: for our Lord Himself says of Himself, A prophet is not without honour, save in his own country. (Luke 4:24)

9:18–23

18. But the Jews did not believe concerning him, that he had been blind, and received his sight, until they called the parents of him that had received his sight.

19. And they asked them, saying, Is this your son, who ye say was born blind? how then doth he now see?

20. His parents answered them and said, We know that this is our son, and that he was born blind:

21. But by what means he now seeth, we know not; or who hath opened his eyes, we know not: he is of age; ask him: he shall speak for himself.

22. These words spake his parents, because they feared the Jews: for the Jews had agreed already, that if any man did confess that he was Christ, he should be put out of the synagogue.

23. Therefore said his parents, He is of age; ask him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 1) The Pharisees being unable, by intimidation, to deter the blind man from publicly proclaiming his Benefactor, try to nullify the miracle through the parents: But the Jews did not believe concerning him, that he had been blind, and received his sight, until they had called the parents of him that had received his sight.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. s. 10) i. e. had been blind, and now saw.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 3) But it is the nature of truth, to be strengthened by the very snares that are laid against it. A lie is its own antagonist, and by its attempts to injure the truth, sets it off to greater advantage: as is the case now. For the argument which might otherwise have been urged, that the neighbours knew nothing for certain, but spoke from a mere resemblance, is cut off by introduction of the parents, who could of course testify to their own son. Having brought these before the assembly, they interrogate them with great sharpness, saying, Is this your son, (they say not, who was born blind, but) who ye say was born blind? Say. Why what father is there, that would say such things of a son, if they were not true? Why not say at once, Whom ye made blind? They try two ways of making them deny the miracle: by saying, Who ye say was born blind, and by adding, How then doth he now see?

THEOPHYLACT. Either, say they, it is not true that he now sees, or it is untrue that he was blind before: but it is evident that he now sees; therefore it is not true that he was born blind.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 2) Three things then being asked,—if he were their son, if he had been blind and how he saw,—they acknowledge two of them: His parents answered them and said, We know that this is our son, and that he was born blind. But the third they refuse to speak to: But by what means he now seeth, we know not. The enquiry in this way ends in confirming the truth of the miracle, by making it rest upon the incontrovertible evidence of the confession of the healed person himself; He is of age, they say, ask him; he can speak for himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 10) As f to say, We might justly be compelled to speak for an infant, that could not speak for itself: but he, though blind from his birth, has been always able to speak.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvii. 2) What sort of gratitude is this in the parents; concealing what they knew, from fear of the Jews? as we are next told; These words spake his parents, because they feared the Jews. And then the Evangelist mentions again what the intentions and dispositions of the Jews were: For the Jews had agreed already, that if any man did confess that He was Christ, he should be put out of the synagogue.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 10) It was no disadvantage to be put out of the synagogue: whom they cast out, Christ took in.

Therefore said his parents, He is of age, ask him.

ALCUIN. The Evangelist shews that it was not from ignorance, but fear, that they gave this answer.

THEOPHYLACT. For they were fainthearted; not like their son, that intrepid witness to the truth, the eyes of whose understanding had been enlightened by God.

9:24–34

24. Then again called they the man that was blind, and said unto him, Give God the praise: we know that this man is a sinner.

25. He answered and said, Whether he be a sinner or no, I know not: one thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see.

26. Then said they to him again, What did he to thee? how opened he thine eyes?

27. He answered them, I have told you already, and ye did not hear: wherefore would ye hear it again? will ye also be his disciples?

28. Then they reviled him, and said, Thou art his disciple; but we are Moses’ disciples.

29. We know that God spake unto Moses: as for this fellow, we know not from whence he is.

30. The man answered and said unto them, Why herein is a marvellous thing, that ye know not from whence he is, and yet he hath opened mine eyes.

31. Now we know that God heareth not sinners: but if any man be a worshipper of God, and doeth his will, him he heareth.

32. Since the world began was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind.

33. If this man were not of God, he could do nothing.

34. They answered and said unto him, Thou wast altogether born in sins, and dost thou teach us? And they cast him out.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 2) The parents having referred the Pharisees to the healed man himself, they summon him a second time: Then again called they the man that was blind. They do not openly say now, Deny that Christ has healed thee, but conceal their object under the pretence of religion: Give God the praise, i. e. confess that this man has had nothing to do with the work.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. s. 11) Deny that thou hast received the benefit. This is not to give God the glory, but rather to blaspheme Him.

ALCUIN. They wished him to give glory to God, by calling Christ a sinner, as they did: We know that this man is a sinner.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 2) Why then did ye not convict Him, when He said above, Which of you convinceth Me of sin? (c. 8:46)

ALCUIN. The man, that he might neither expose himself to calumny, nor at the same time conceal the truth, answers not that he knew Him to be righteous, but, Whether He be a sinner or no, I know not.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 2) But how comes this, whether He be a sinner, I know not, from one who had said, He is a Prophet? did the blind fear? far from it: he only thought that our Lord's defence lay in the witness of the fact, more than in another's pleading. And he gives weight to his reply by the mention of the benefit he had received: One thing I know, that, whereas I was blind, now I see: as if to say, I say nothing as to whether He is a sinner; but only repeat what I know for certain. So being unable to overturn the fact itself of the miracle, they fall back upon former arguments, and enquire the manner of the cure: just as dogs in hunting pursue wherever the scent takes them: Then said they to him again, What did He do to thee? How opened He thine eyes? i. e. was it by any charm? For they do not say, How didst thou see? but, How opened He thine eyes? to give the man an opportunity of detracting from the operation. So long now as the matter wanted examining, the blind man answers gently and quietly; but, the victory being gained, he grows bolder: He answered them, I have told you already, and ye did not hear: wherefore would ye hear it again? i. e. Ye do not attend to what is said, and therefore I will no longer answer you vain questions, put for the sake of cavil, not to gain knowledge: Will ye also be His disciples?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. s. 11) Will ye also? i. e. I am already, do ye wish to be? I see now, but do not envy (video, non invideo). He says this in indignation at the obstinacy of the Jews; not tolerating blindness, now that he is no longer blind himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 2) As then truth is strength, so falsehood is weakness: truth elevates and ennobles whomever it takes up, however mean before: falsehood brings even the strong to weakness and contempt.

Then they reviled him, and said, Thou art His disciple.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 12) A malediction only in the intention of the speakers, not in the words themselves. May such a malediction (ἐλοιδόρησαν, maledixerunt, Vulg.) be upon us, and upon our children! It follows: But we are Moses' disciples. We know that God spake unto Moses.But ye should have known, that our Lord was prophesied of by Moses, after hearing what He said, Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed Me, for he wrote of Me. (c. 5:46) Do ye follow then a servant, and turn your back on the Lord? Even so, for it follows: As for this fellow, we know not whence He is.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. s. 3) Ye think sight less evidence than hearing; for what ye say, ye know, is what ye have heard from your fathers. But is not He more worthy of belief, who has certified that He comes from God, by miracles which ye have not heard only, but seen? So argues the blind man: The man answered and said, Why herein is a marvellous thing, that ye know not whence He is, and yet He hath opened mine eyes. He brings in the miracle every where, as evidence which they could not invalidate: and, inasmuch as they had said that a man that was a sinner could not do such miracles, he turns their own words against them; Now we know that God heareth not sinners; as if to say, I quite agree with you in this opinion.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. s. 13) As yet however He speaks as one but just anointed1, for God hears sinners too. Else in vain would the publican cry, God be merciful to me a sinner. (Luke 18:13) By that confession he obtained2 justification, as the blind man had his sight.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, that God heareth not sinners, means, that God does not enable sinners to work miracles. When sinners however implore pardon for their offences, they are translated from the rank of sinners to that of penitents.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 3) Observe then, when he said above, Whether He be a sinner, I know not, it was not that he spoke in doubt; for here he not only acquits him of all sin, but holds him up as one well pleasing to God: But if any man be a worshipper of God, and doeth His will, him He heareth. It is not enough to know God, we must do His will. Then he extols His deed: Since the world began, was it not heard that any man opened the eyes of one that was born blind: as if to say, If ye confess that God heareth not sinners; and this Man has worked a miracle, such an one, as no other man has; it is manifest that the virtue whereby He has wrought it, is more than human: If this Man were not of God, He could do nothing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 13) Freely, stedfastly, truly. For how could what our Lord did, be done by any other than God, or by disciples even, except when their Lord dwelt in them?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 3.) So then because speaking the truth he was in nothing confounded, when they should most have admired, they condemned him: Thou wast altogether born in sins, and dost thou teach us?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 14) What meaneth altogether? That he was quite blind. Yet He who opened his eyes, also saves him altogether.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lviii. 3) Or, altogether, that is to say, from thy birth thou art in sins. They reproach his blindness, and pronounce his sins to be the cause of it; most unreasonably. So long as they expected him to deny the miracle, they were willing to believe him, but now they cast him out.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 14) It was they themselves who had made him teacher; themselves, who had asked him so many questions; and now they ungratefully cast him out for teaching.

BEDE. It is commonly the way with great persons to disdain learning any thing from their inferiors.

9:35–41

35. Jesus heard that they had cast him out; and when he had found him, he said unto him, Dost thou believe on the Son of God?

36. He answered and said, Who is he, Lord, that I might believe on him?

37. And Jesus said unto him, Thou hast both seen him, and it is he that talketh with thee.

38. And he said, Lord, I believe. And he worshipped him.

39. And Jesus said, For judgment I am come into this world, that they which see not might see; and that they which see might be made blind.

40. And some of the Pharisees which were with him heard these words, and said unto him, Are we blind also?

41. Jesus said unto them, If ye were blind, ye should have no sin: but now ye say, We see: therefore your sin remaineth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 1) Those who suffer for the truth's sake, and confession of Christ, come to greatest honour; as we see in the instance of the blind man. For the Jews cast him out of the temple, and the Lord of the temple found him; and received him as the judge doth the wrestler after his labours, and crowned him: Jesus heard that they had cast him out; and when He had found hint, He saith unto him, Dost thou believe on the Son of God? The Evangelist makes it plain that Jesus came in order to say this to him. He asks him, however, not in ignorance, but wishing to reveal Himself to him, and to shew that He appreciated his faith; as if He said, The people have cast reproaches on Me, but I care not for them; one thing only I care for, that thou mayest believe. Better is he that doeth the will of God, than ten thousand of the wicked.

HILARY. (vi. de Trin. circa fin.) If any mere confession whatsoever of Christ were the perfection of faith, it would have been said, Dost thou believe in Christ? But inasmuch as all heretics would have had this name in their mouths, confessing Christ, and yet denying the Son, that which is true of Christ alone, is required of our faith, viz. that we should believe in the Son of God. But what availeth it to believe on the Son of God as being a creature, when we are required to have faith in Christ, not as a creature of God, but as the Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 1) But the blind man did not yet know Christ, for before he went to Christ he was blind, and after his cure, he was taken hold of by the Jews: He answered and said, Who is He, Lord, that I might believe on Him? The speech this of a longing and enquiring mind. He knows not who He is for whom he had contended so much; a proof to thee of his love of truth. The Lord however says not to him, I am He who healed thee; but uses a middle way of speaking, Thou hast both seen Him.

THEOPHYLACT. This He says to remind him of his cure, which had given him the power to see. And observe, He that speaks is born of Mary, and the Son is the Son of God, not two different Persons, according to the error of Nestorius: And it is He that talketh with thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 15) First, He washes the face of his heart. Then, his heart's face being washed, and his conscience cleansed, he acknowledges Him as not only the Son of man, which he believed before, but as the Son of God, Who had taken flesh upon Him: And he said, Lord, I believe. I believe, is a small thing. Wouldest thou see what he believes of Him? And falling down, he worshipped Him. (Vulgate)

BEDE. An example to us, not to pray to God with uplifted neck, but prostrate upon earth, suppliantly to implore His mercy.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 1) He adds the deed to the word, as a clear acknowledgment of His divine power. The Lord replies in a way to confirm His faith, and at the same time stirs up the minds of His followers: And Jesus said, For judgment have I come into this world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xliv. 16, 17) The day then was divided between light and darkness. So it is rightly added, that they which see not, may see; for He relieved men from darkness. But what is that which follows: And that they which see might he made blind. Hear what comes next. Some of the Pharisees were moved by these words: And some of the Pharisees which were with Him heard these words, and said unto Him, Are we blind also? What had moved them were the words, And that they which see might be made blind. It follows; Jesus saith unto them, If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; i. e. If ye called yourselves blind, and ran to the physician. But now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth: for in that saying, We see, ye seek not a physician, ye shall remain in your blindness. This then which He has just before said, I came, that they that see not might see; i. e. they who confess they cannot see, and seek a physician, in order that they may see: and that they which see not may be made blind; i. e. they which think they can see, and seek not a physician, may remain in their blindness. This act of division He calls judgment, saying, For judgment have I come into this world: not that judgment by which He will judge quick and dead at the end of the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 1) Or, for judgment, He saith; i. e. for greater punishment, shewing that they who condemned Him, were the very ones who were condemned. Respecting what He says, that they which see not might see, and that they which see might be made blind; it is the same which St. Paul says, The Gentiles which followed not after righteousness, have attained to righteousness, even the righteousness which is of faith. But Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness, hath not attained to the law of righteousness. (Rom. 9:30, 31)

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say, Lo, he that saw not from his birth, now sees both in body and soul; whereas they who seem to see, have had their understanding darkened.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 1) For there is a twofold vision, and a twofold blindness; viz. that of sense, and that of the understanding. But they were intent only on sensible things, and were ashamed only of sensible blindness: wherefore He shews them that it would be better for them to be blind, than seeing so: If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; your punishment would be easier; But now ye say, We see.

THEOPHYLACT. Overlooking the miracle wrought on the blind man, ye deserve no pardon; since even visible miracles make no impression on you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 1, 2) What then they thought their great praise, He shews would turn to their punishment; and at the same time consoles him who had been afflicted with bodily blindness from his birth. For it is not without reason that the Evangelist says, And some of the Pharisees which were with him, heard these words; but that he may remind us that those were the very persons who had first withstood Christ, and then wished to stone Him. For there were some who only followed in appearance, and were easily changed to the contrary side.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, if ye were blind, i. e. ignorant of the Scriptures, your offence would be by no means so heavy a one, as erring out of ignorance: but now, seeing ye call yourselves wise and understanding in the law, your own selves condemn you.

CHAPTER 10

10:1–5

1. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that entereth not by the door into the sheepfold, but climbeth up some other way, the same is a thief and a robber.

2. But he that entereth in by the door is the shepherd of the sheep.

3. To him the porter openeth; and the sheep hear his voice: and he calleth his own sheep by name, and leadeth them out.

4. And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him: for they know his voice.

5. And a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him: for they know not the voice of strangers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 2) Our Lord having reproached the Jews with blindness, they might have said, We are not blind, but we avoid Thee as a deceiver. Our Lord therefore gives the marks which distinguish a robber and deceiver from a true shepherd. First come those of the deceiver and robber: Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that entereth not by the door into the sheepfold, but climbeth up some other way, the same is a thief and a robber. There is an allusion here to Antichrist, and to certain false Christs who had been, and were to be. The Scriptures He calls the door. They admit us to the knowledge of God, they protect the sheep, they shut out the wolves, they bar the entrance to heretics. He that useth not the Scriptures, but climbeth up some other way, i. e. some self-chosen1, some unlawful way, is a thief. Climbeth up, He says, not, enters, as if it were a thief getting over a wall, and running all risks. Some other way, may refer too to the commandments and traditions of men which the Scribes taught, to the neglect of the Law. When our Lord further on calls Himself the Door, we need not be surprised. According to the office which He bears, He is in one place the Shepherd, in another the Sheep. In that He introduces us to the Father, He is the Door; in that He takes care of us, He is the Shepherd.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 2. et sq.) Or thus: Many go under the name of good men according to the standard of the world, and observe in some sort the commandments of the Law, who yet are not Christians. And these generally boast of themselves, as the Pharisees did; Are we blind also? But inasmuch as all that they do they do foolishly, without knowing to what end it tends, our Lord saith of them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that entereth not by the door into the sheepfold, hut climbeth up some other way, the name is a thief and a robber. Let the Pagans then, the Jews, the Heretics, say, "We lead a good life;" if they enter not by the door, what availeth it? A good life only profiteth, as leading to life eternal. Indeed those cannot be said to lead a good life, who are either blindly ignorant of, or wilfully despise, the end of good living. No one can hope for eternal life, who knows not Christ, who is the life, and by that door enters into the fold. Whoso wisheth to enter into the sheepfold, let him enter by the door; let him preach Christ; let him seek Christ's glory, not his own. Christ is a lowly door, and he who enters by this door must be lowly, if he would enter with his head whole. He that doth not humble, but exalt himself, who wishes to climb up over the wall, is exalted that he may fall. Such men generally try to persuade others that they may live well, and not be Christians. Thus they climb up by some other way, that they may rob and kill. They are thieves, because they call that their own, which is not; robbers, because that which they have stolen, they kill.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 2) You have seen His description of a robber, now see that of the Shepherd: But he that entereth in by the door is the shepherd of the sheep.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. xlix) He enters by the door, who enters by Christ, who imitates the suffering of Christ, who is acquainted with the humility of Christ, so as to feel and know, that if God became man for us, man should not think himself God, but man. He who being man wishes to appear God, does not imitate Him, who being God, became man. Thou art bid to think less of thyself than thou art, but to know what thou art.

To Him the porter openeth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 2) The porter perhaps is Moses; for to him the oracles of God were committed.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, the Holy Spirit is the porter, by whom the Scriptures are unlocked, and reveal the truth to us.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvi. 2) Or, the porter is our Lord Himself; for there is much less difference between a door and a porter, than between a door and a shepherd. And He has called Himself both the door and the shepherd. Why then not the door and the porter? He opens Himself, i. e. reveals1 Himself. If thou seek another person for porter, take the Holy Spirit, of whom our Lord below saith, He will guide you into all truth. (c. 16:13) The door is Christ, the Truth; who openeth the door, but He that will guide you into all Truth? Whomsoever thou understand here, beware that thou esteem not the porter greater than the door; for in our houses the porter ranks above the door, not the door above the porter.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 3. c. 7, 48.) As they had called Him a deceiver, and appealed to their own unbelief as the proof of it; (Which of the rulers believeth on Him?) He shews here that it was because they refused to hear Him, that they were put out of His flock. The sheep hear His voice. The Shepherd enters by the lawful door; and they who follow Him are His sheep; they who do not, voluntarily put themselves out of His flock.

And He calleth His own sheep by name.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 12) He knew the names of the predestinated; as He saith to His disciples, Rejoice that your names are written in heaven. (Luke 19:14)

And leadeth them out.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 2) He led out the sheep, when He sent them not out of the reach of, but into the midst of, the wolves. There seems to be a secret allusion to the blind man. He called him out of the midst of the Jews; and he heard His voice.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 14) And who is He who leads them out, but the Same who loosens the chain of their sins, that they may follow Him with free unfettered step?

GLOSS. And when He putteth forth His own sheep, He goeth before them, He leadeth them out from the darkness of ignorance into light, while He goeth before in the pillar of cloud, and fire.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 2) Shepherds always go behind their sheep; but He, on the contrary, goes before, to shew that He would lead all to the truth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. c. 14) And who is this that goeth before the sheep, but He who being raised from the dead, dieth no more; (Rom. 6:9) and who said, Father, I will also that they, whom Thou hast given Me, be with Me where I am? (Infra 17:24)

And the sheep follow Him, for they know His voice. And a stranger will they not follow, but will flee from him; for they know not the voice of strangers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xlix. 3) The strangers are Theudas, and Judas, and the false apostles who came after Christ. That He might not appear one of this number, He gives many marks of difference between Him and them. First, Christ brought men to Him by teaching them out of the Scriptures; they drew men from the Scriptures. Secondly, the obedience of the sheep; for men believed on Him, not only during His life, but after death: their followers ceased, as soon as they were gone.

THEOPHYLACT. He alludes to Antichrist, who shall deceive for a time, but lose all his followers when he dies.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 10. ct seq.) But here is a difficulty. Sometimes they who are not sheep hear Christ's voice; for Judas heard, who was a wolf. And sometimes the sheep hear Him not; for they who crucified Christ heard not; yet some of them were His sheep. You will say, While they did not hear, they were not sheep; the voice, when they heard it, changed them from wolves to sheep. Still I am disturbed by the Lord's rebuke to the shepherds in Ezekiel, Neither have ye brought again that which strayed. (Ezek. 34:4) He calls it a stray sheep, but yet a sheep all the while; though, if it strayed, it could not have heard the voice of the Shepherd, but the voice of a stranger. What I say then is this; The Lord knoweth them that are His. (2 Tim. 2:19) He knoweth the foreknown, he knoweth the predestinated. They are the sheep: for a time they know not themselves, but the Shepherd knows them; for many sheep are without the fold, many wolves within. He speaks then of the predestinated. And now the difficulty is solved. The sheep do hear the Shepherd's voice, and they only. When is that? It is when that voice saith, He that endureth to the end shall be saved. (Mat. 10:32) This speech His own hear, the alien hear not.

10:6

6. This parable spake Jesus unto them: but they understood not what things they were which he spake unto them.

AUGUSTINE. (ut sup.) Our Lord feedeth by plain words, exerciseth by obscure. For when two persons, one godly, the other ungodly, hear the words of the Gospel, and they happen to be such that neither can understand them; one says, What He saith is true and good, but we do not understand it: the other says, It is not worth attending to. The former, in faith, knocks, yea, and, if he continue to knock, it shall be opened unto him. The latter shall hear the words in Isaiah, If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not be established1. (Isa. 7:9)

10:7–10

7. Then said Jesus unto them again, Verily, verily, I say unto you, I am the door of the sheep.

8. All that ever came before me are thieves and robbers: but the sheep did not hear them.

9. I am the door: by me if any man enter in, he shall be saved, and shall go in and out, and find pasture.

10. The thief cometh not, but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy: I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 3) Our Lord, to waken the attention of the Jews, unfolds the meaning of what He has said; Then said Jesus unto them again, Verily, verily, I say unto you, I am the door of the sheep.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 8) Lo, the very door which He had shut up, He openeth; He is the Door: let us enter, and let us enter with joy.

All that ever came before Me are thieves and robbers.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 3) He saith not this of the Prophets, as the heretics think, but of Theudas, and Judas, and other agitators. So he adds in praise of the sheep, The sheep heard them not; but he no where praises those who disobeyed the prophets, but condemns them severely.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 8) Understand, All that ever came at variance with Me. The Prophets were not at variance2 with Him. They came with Him, who came with the Word of God, who spake the truth. He, the Word, the Truth, sent heralds before Him, but the hearts of those whom He sent were His own. They came with Him, inasmuch as He is always, though He assumed the flesh in time: In the beginning was the Word. His humble advent in the flesh was preceded by just men, who believed on Him as about to come, as we believe on Him come. The times are different, the faith is the same. Our faith knitteth together both those who believed that He was about to come, and those who believe that He has come. All that ever came at variance with Him were thieves and robbers; i. e. they came to steal and to kill; but the sheep did not hear them. They had not Christ's voice; but were wanderers, dreamers, deceivers. Why He is the Door, He next explains, I am the Door; by Me if any man enter in he shall be saved.

ALCUIN. As if to say, The sheep hear not them, but Me they hear; for I am the Door, and whoever entereth by Me not falsely but in sincerity, shall by perseverance be saved.

THEOPHYLACT. The door admits the sheep into the pasture; And shall go in and out, and find pasture. What is this pasture, but the happiness to come, the rest to which our Lord brings us?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. c. 15) What is this, shall go in and out? To enter into the Church by Christ the Door, is a very good thing, but to go out of the Church is not. Going in must refer to inward cogitation; going out to outward action; as in the Psalm, Man goeth forth to his work. (Ps. 103:23)

THEOPHYLACT. Or, to go in is to watch over the inner man; to go out, (Colos. 3) to mortify the outward man, i. e. our members which are upon the earth. He that doth this shall find pasture in the life to come.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 3) Or, He refers to the Apostles who went in and out boldly; for they became the masters of the world, none could turn them out of their kingdom, and they found pasture.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlv. 15) But He Himself explains it more satisfactorily to me in what follows: The thief cometh not, but for to steal, and for to kill: I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly. By going in they have life; i. e. by faith, which worketh by love; by which faith they go into the fold. The just liveth1 by faith. And by going out they will have it more abundantly: (Heb. 10:38) i. e. when true believers die, they have life more abundantly, even a life which never ends. Though in this fold there is not wanting pasture, then they will find pasture, such as will satisfy them. To-day shalt thou be with Me in paradise. (Luke 23:43)

GREGORY. (super Ezek. Hom. xiii.) Shall go in, i. e. to faith: shall go out, i. e. to sight: and find pasture, i. e. in eternal fulness.

ALCUIN. The thief cometh not but for to steal, and to kill. As if He said, And well may the sheep not hear the voice of the thief; for he cometh not but for to steal: he usurpeth another’s office, forming his followers not on Christ’s precepts, but on his own. And therefore it follows, and to kill, i. e. by drawing them from the faith; and to destroy, i. e. by their eternal damnation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lix. 1) The thief cometh not but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy; this was literally fulfilled in the case of those movers of seditiona, whose followers were nearly all destroyed; deprived by the thief even of this present life. But came, He saith, for the salvation of the sheep; That they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly, in the kingdom of heaven. This is the third mark of difference between Himself, and the false prophets.

THEOPHYLACT. Mystically, the thief is the devil, steals by wicked thoughts, kills by the assent of the mind to them, and destroys by acts.

10:11–13

11. I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep.

12. But he that is an hireling, and not the shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep, and fleeth: and the wolf catcheth them, and scattereth the sheep.

13. The hireling fleeth, because he is an hireling, and careth not for the sheep.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvi. 1) Our Lord has acquainted us with two things which were obscure before; first, that He is the Door; and now again, that He is the Shepherd: I am the good Shepherd. (c. xlvii. 1, 3). Above He said that the shepherd entered by the door. If He is the Door, how doth He enter by Himself? Just as He knows the Father by Himself, and we by Him; so He enters into the fold by Himself, and we by Him. We enter by the door, because we preach Christ; Christ preaches Himself. A light shews both other things, and itself too. (Tr. xlvi. 5). There is but one Shepherd. For though the rulers of the Church, those who are her sons, and not hirelings, are shepherds, they are all members of that one Shepherd. (Tr. xlvii. 3). His office of Shepherd He hath permitted His members to bear. Peter is a shepherd, and all the other Apostles: all good Bishops are shepherds. But none of us calleth himself the door. He could not have added good, if there were not bad shepherds as well. They are thieves and robbers; or at least mercenaries.

GREGORY. (Hom. xiv. in Evang.) And He adds what that goodness (forma bonitatis) is, for our imitation: The good Shepherd giveth His life for the sheep. He did what He bade, He set the example of what He commanded: He laid down His life for the sheep, that He might convert His body and blood in our Sacrament, and feed with His flesh the sheep He had redeemed. A path is shewn us wherein to walk, despising death; a stamp is applied to us, and we must submit to the impression. Our first duty is to spend our outward possessions upon the sheep; our last, if it be necessary, is to sacrifice our life for the same sheep. Whoso doth not give his substance to the sheep, how can he lay down his life for them?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvii) Christ was not the only one who did this. And yet if they who did it are members of Him, one and the same Christ did it always. He was able to do it without them; they were not without Him.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. 1) All these however were good shepherds, not because they shed their blood, but because they did it for the sheep. For they shed it not in pride, but in love. Should any among the heretics suffer trouble in consequence of their errors and iniquities, they forthwith boast of their martyrdom; that they may be the better able to steal under so fair a cloak: for they are in reality wolves. But not all who give their bodies to be burned, are to be thought to shed their blood for the sheep; rather against the sheep; for the Apostle saith, Though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. (1 Cor. 13:3) And how hath he even the smallest charity, who does not love connexion (convictus) with Christians? to command which, our Lord did not mention many shepherds, but one, I am the good Shepherd.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 5) Our Lord shews here that He did not undergo His passion unwillingly; but for the salvation of the world. He then gives the difference between the shepherd and the hireling: But he that is an hireling, and not the shepherd, whose own the sheep are not, seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep, and fleeth.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xiv.) Some there are who love earthly possessions more than the sheep, and do not deserve the name of a shepherd. He who feeds the Lord’s flock for the sake of temporal hire, and not for love, is an hireling, not a shepherd. An hireling is he who holds the place of shepherd, but seeketh not the gain of souls, who panteth after the good things of earth, and rejoices in the pride of station.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. xlix) He seeketh therefore in the Church, not God, but something else. If he sought God he would be chaste; for the soul hath but one lawful husband, God. Whoever seeketh from God any thing beside God, seeketh unchastely.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xiv.) But whether a man be a shepherd or an hireling, cannot be told for certain, except in a time of trial. In tranquil times, the hireling generally stands watch like the shepherd. But when the wolf comes, then every one shews with what spirit he stood watch over the flock.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. xlix.) The wolf is the devil, and they that follow him; according to’ Matthew, Which come to you in sheeps’ clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. (Matt. 7:15)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvi. 8) Lo, the wolf hath seized a sheep by the throat, the devil hath enticed a man into adultery. The sinner must be excommunicated. But if he is excommunicated, he will be an enemy, he will plot, he will do as much harm as he can. Wherefore thou art silent, thou dost not censure, thou hast seen the wolf coming, and fled. Thy body has stood, thy mind has fled. For as joy is relaxation, sorrow contraction, desire a reaching forward of the mind; so fear is the flight of the mind.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xiv.) The wolf too cometh upon the sheep, whenever any spoiler and unjust person oppresses the humble believers. And he who seems to be shepherd, but leaves the sheep and flees, is he who dares not to resist his violence, from fear of danger to himself. He flees not by changing place, but by withholding consolation from his flock. The hireling is inflamed with no zeal against this injustice. He only looks to outward comforts, and overlooks the internal suffering of his flock. The hireling fleeth, because he is an hireling, and careth not for the sheep. The only reason that the hireling fleeth, is because he is an hireling; as if to say, He cannot stand at the approach of danger, who doth not love the sheep that he is set over, but seeketh earthly gain. Such an one dares not face danger, for fear he should lose what he so much loves.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvi. 7) But if the Apostles were shepherds, not hirelings, why did they flee in persecution? And why did our Lord say, When they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another? (Mat. 10:23) Let us knock, then will come one, who will explain.

AUGUSTINE. (ad Honor. Ep. clxxx.) A servant of Christ, and minister of His Word and Sacraments, may flee from city to city, when he is specially aimed at by the persecutors, apart from his brethren; so that his flight does not leave the Church destitute. But when all, i. e. Bishops, Clerics, and Laics, are in danger in common, let not those who need assistance be deserted by those who should give it. Let all flee together if they can, to some place of security; but, if any are obliged to stay, let them not be forsaken by those who are bound to minister to their spiritual wants. Then, under pressing persecution, may Christ's ministers flee from the place where they are, when none of Christ's people remain to be ministered to, or when that ministry may be fulfilled by others who have not the same cause for flight. But when the people stay, and the ministers flee, and the ministry ceases, what is this but a damnable flight of hirelings, who care not for the sheep?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvi. 1) On the good side are the door, the porter, the shepherd, and the sheep; on the bad, the thieves, the robbers, the hirelings, the wolf.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. xlix) We must love the shepherd, beware of the wolf, tolerate the hireling. For the hireling is useful so long as he sees not the wolf, the thief, and the robber. When he sees them, he flees.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvi. 5) Indeed he would not be an hireling, did he not receive wages from the hirer. (c. 6). Sons wait patiently for the eternal inheritance of their father; the hireling looks eagerly for the temporal wages from his hirer; and yet the tongues of both speak abroad the glory of Christ. The hireling hurteth, in that he doeth wrong, not in that he speaketh right: the grape bunch hangeth amid thorns; pluck the grape, avoid the thorn. Many that seek temporal advantages in the Church, preach Christ, and through them Christ's voice is heard; and the sheep follow not the hireling, but the voice of the Shepherd heard through the hireling.

10:14–21

14. I am the good shepherd, and know my sheep, and am known of mine.

15. As the Father knoweth me, even so know I the Father: and I lay down my life for the sheep.

16. And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear my voice; and there shall be one fold, and one shepherd.

17. Therefore doth my Father love me, because I lay down my life, that I might take it again.

18. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself. I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again. This commandment have I received of my Father.

19. There was a division therefore again among the Jews for these sayings.

20. And many of them said, He hath a devil, and is mad; why hear ye him?

21. Others said, These are not the words of him that hath a devil. Can a devil open the eyes of the blind?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 1) Two evil persons have been mentioned, one that kills, and robs the sheep, another that doth not hinder: the one standing for those movers of seditions; the other for the rulers of the Jews, who did not take care of the sheep committed to them. Christ distinguishes Himself from both; from the one who came to do hurt by saying, I am come that they might have life; from those who overlook the rapine of the wolves, by saying that He giveth His life for the sheep. Wherefore He saith again, as He said before, I am the good Shepherd. And as He had said above that the sheep heard the voice of the Shepherd and followed Him, that no one might have occasion to ask, What sayest Thou then of those that believe not? He adds, And I know My sheep, and am known of Mine. (Rom. 11:12) As Paul too saith, God hath not cast away His people, whom He foreknew.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xiv.) As if He said, I love My sheep, and they love and follow Me. For he who loves not the truth, is as yet very far from knowing it.

THEOPHYLACT. Hence the difference of the hireling and the Shepherd. The hireling does not know his sheep, because he sees them so little. The Shepherd knows His sheep, because He is so attractive to them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 1) Then that thou mayest not attribute to the Shepherd and the sheep the same measure of knowledge, He adds, As the

Father knoweth Me, even so know I the Father: i. e. I know Him as certainly as He knoweth Me. This then is a case of like knowledge, the other is not; as He saith, No man knoweth who the Son is, but the Father. (Luke 10:23)

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xiv.) And I lay down My life for My sheep. As if to say, This is why I know My Father, and am known by the Father, because I lay down My life for My sheep; i. e. by My love for My sheep, I shew how much I love My Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 1) He gives it too as a proof of His authority. In the same way the Apostle maintains his own commission in opposition to the false Apostles, by enumerating his dangers and sufferings.

THEOPHYLACT. For the deceivers did not expose their lives for the sheep, but, like hirelings, deserted their followers. Our Lord, on the other hand, protected His disciples: Let these go their way. (infr. 18:8)

GREGORY. (Hom. xiv.) But as He came to redeem not only the Jews, but the Gentiles, He adds, And other sheep I have, which are not of this fold.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. 1) The sheep hitherto spoken of are those of the stock of Israel according to the flesh. But there were others of the stock of Israel, according to faith, Gentiles, who were as yet out of the fold; predestinated, but not yet gathered together. They are not of this fold, because they are not of the race of Israel, but they will be of this fold: Them also I must bring.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 2) What wonder that these should hear My voice, and follow Me, when others are waiting to do the same. Both these flocks are dispersed, and without shepherds; for it follows, And they shall hear My voice. And then He foretells their future union: And there shall be one fold and one Shepherd.

GREGORY. (Hom. Evang. xiv.) Of two flocks He maketh one fold, uniting the Jews and Gentiles in His faith.

THEOPHYLACT. For there is one sign of baptism for all, and one Shepherd, even the Word of God. Let the Manichean mark; there is but one fold and one Shepherd set forth both in the Old and New Testaments.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvii. 4) What does He mean then when He says, I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel? Only, that whereas He manifested Himself personally to the Jews, He did not go Himself to the Gentiles, but sent others.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx) The word must here (I must bring) does not signify necessity, but only that the thing would take place. Therefore doth My Father love Me, because I lay down My life, that I might take it again. They had called Him an alien from His Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvii. 7) i. e. Because I die, to rise again. There is great force in, I lay down. Let not the Jews, He says, boast; rage they may, but if I should not choose to lay down My life, what will they do by raging?

THEOPHYLACT. The Father does not bestow His love on the Son as a reward for the death He suffered in our behalf; but He loves Him, as beholding in the Begotten His own essence, whence proceeded such love for mankind.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 2) Or He says, in condescension to our weakness, Though there were nothing else which made Me love you, this would, that ye are so loved by My Father, that, by dying for you, I shall win His love. Not that He was not loved by the Father before, or that we are the cause of such love. For the same purpose He shews that He does not come to His Passion unwillingly: No man taketh it from Me, but I lay it down of Myself.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. xiii.) Wherein He shewed that His natural death was not the consequence of sin in Him, but of His own simple will, which was the why, the when, and the how: I have power to lay it down.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 2) As they had often plotted to kill Him, He tells them their efforts will be useless, unless He is willing. I have such power over My own life, that no one can take it from Me, against My will. This is not true of men. We have not the power of laying down our own lives, except we put ourselves to death. Our Lord alone has this power. And this being true, it is true also that He can take it again when He pleases: And I have power to take it again: which words declare beyond a doubt a resurrection. That they might not think His death a sign that God had forsaken Him, He adds, This commandment have I received from My Father; i. e. to lay down My life, and take it again. By which we must not understand that He first waited to hear this commandment, and had to learn His work; He only shows that that work which He voluntarily undertook, was not against the Father’s will.

THEOPHYLACT. He only means His perfect agreement with His Father.

ALCUIN. For the Word doth not receive a command by word, but containeth in Himself all the Father's commandments. When the Son is said to receive what He possesseth of Himself, His power is not lessened, but only His generation declared. The Father gave the Son every thing in begetting Him. He begat Him perfect.

THEOPHYLACT. After declaring Himself the Master of His own life and death, which was a lofty assumption, He makes a more humble confession; thus wonderfully uniting both characters; shewing that He was neither inferior to or a slave of the Father on the one hand, nor an antagonist on the other; but of the same power and will.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlvii) How doth our Lord lay down His own life? Christ is the Word, and man, i. e. in soul and body. Doth the Word lay down His life, and take it again; or doth the human soul, or doth the flesh? If it was the Word of God that laid down His soul1 and took it again, that soul was at one time separated from the Word. But, though death separated the soul and body, death could not separate the Word and the soul. It is still more absurd to say that the soul laid down itself; if it could not be separated from the Word, how could it be from itself? The flesh therefore layeth down its life and taketh it again, not by its own power, but by the power of the Word which dwelleth in it. This refutes the Apollinarians, who say that Christ had not a human, rational soul.

ALCUIN. But the light shined in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not. There was a division among the Jews for these sayings. And many of them said, He hath a devil, and is mad.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lx. 3) Because He spoke as one greater than man, they said He had a devil. But that He had not a devil, others proved from His works: Others said, These are not the words of Him that hath a devil. Can a devil open the eyes of the blind? As if to say, Not even the words themselves are those of one that hath a devil; but if the words do not convince you, be persuaded by the works. Our Lord having already given proof who He was by His works, was silent. They were unworthy of an answer. Indeed, as they disagreed amongst themselves, an answer was unnecessary. Their opposition only brought out, for our imitation, our Lord's gentleness, and long suffering.

ALCUIN. We have heard of the patience of God, and of salvation preached amid revilings. They obstinately preferred tempting Him to obeying Him.

10:22–30

22. And it was at Jerusalem the feast of the dedication, and it was winter.

23. And Jesus walked in the temple in Solomon’s porch.

24. Then came the Jews round about him, and said unto him, How long dost thou make us to doubt? If thou be the Christ, tell us plainly,

25. Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not: the works that I do in my Father’s name, they bear witness of me.

26. But ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you.

27. My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me.

28. And I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand.

29. My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father’s hand.

30. I and my Father are one.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 2) And it was at Jerusalem the feast of the dedication. Encænia is the feast of the dedication of the temple; from the Greek word καινὸν, signifying new. The dedication of any thing new was called encænia.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi. 1) It was the feast of the dedication of the temple, after the return from the Babylonish captivity.

ALCUIN. Or, it was in memory of the dedication under Judas Maccabeus. The first dedication was that of Solomon in the autumn; the second that of Zorobabel, and the priest Jesus in the spring. This was in winter time.

BEDE. Judas Maccabeus instituted an annual commemoration of this dedication.

THEOPHYLACT. The Evangelist mentions the time of winter, to shew that it was near His passion. He suffered in the following spring; for which reason He took up His abode at Jerusalem.

GREGORY. (i. Mor. e. 11) Or because the season of cold was in keeping with the cold malicious hearts of the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi. 1.) Christ was present with much zeal at this feast, and thenceforth stayed 1in Judæa; His passion being now at hand. And Jesus walked in the temple in Solomon’s porch.

ALCUIN. It is called Solomon’s porch, because Solomon went to pray there. The porches of a temple are usually named after the temple. If the Son of God walked in a temple where the flesh of brute animals was offered up, how much more will He delight to visit our house of prayer, in which His own flesh and blood are consecrated?

THEOPHYLACT. Be thou also careful, in the winter time, i. e. while yet in this stormy wicked world, to celebrate the dedication of thy spiritual temple, by ever renewing thyself, ever rising upward in heart. Then will Jesus be present with thee in Solomon’s porch, and give thee safety under His covering. (τῇ σκέπῃ αὐτοῦ) But in another life no man will be able to dedicate Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 3) The Jews cold in love, burning in their malevolence, approached Him not to honour, but persecute. Then came the Jews round about Him, and said unto Him, How long dost Thou make us to doubt? If Thou be the Christ, tell us plainly. They did not want to know the truth, but only to find ground of accusation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi) Being able to find no fault with His works, they tried to catch Him in His words. And mark their perversity. When He instructs by His discourse, they say, What sign shewest Thou? When He demonstrates by His works, they say, If Thou be the Christ, tell us plainly. Either way they are determined to oppose Him. There is great malice in that speech, Tell us plainly. He had spoken plainly1, when up at the feasts, and had hid nothing. They preface however with flattery: How long dost Thou make us2 to doubt? as if they were anxious to know the truth, but really only meaning to provoke Him to say something that they might lay hold of.

ALCUIN. They accuse Him of keeping their minds in suspense and uncertainty, who had come to save their soulsa.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii) They wanted our Lord to say, I am the Christ. Perhaps, as they had human notions of the Messiah, having failed to discern His divinity in the Prophets, they wanted Christ to confess Himself the Messiah, of the seed of David; that they might accuse Him of aspiring to the regal power.

ALCUIN. And thus they intended to give Him into the hands of the Proconsul for punishment, as an usurper against the emperor. Our Lord so managed His reply as to stop the mouths of His calumniators, open those of the believers; and to those who enquired of Him as a man, reveal the mysteries of His divinity: Jesus answered them, I told you, and ye believed not; the works that I do in My Father’s name, they bear witness of Me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi. 2) He reproves their malice, for pretending that a single word would convince them, whom so many words had not. If you do not believe My works, He says, how will you believe My words? And He adds why they do not believe: But ye believe not, because ye are not of My sheep.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. c. 4) He saw that they were persons predestinated to eternal death, and not those for whom He had bought eternal life, at the price of His blood. The sheep believe, and follow the Shepherd.

THEOPHYLACT. After He had said, Ye are not of My sheep, He exhorts them to become such: My sheep hear My voice.

ALCUIN. i. e. Obey My precepts from the heart. And I know them, and they follow Me, here by walking in gentleness and innocence, hereafter by entering the joys of eternal life: And I give unto them eternal life.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 5, 6) This is the pasture of which He spoke before: And shall find pasture. Eternal life is called a goodly pasture: the grass thereof withereth not, all is spread with verdure. But these cavillers thought only of this present life. And they shall not perish eternally; (οὐ μὴ ἀπόλλυνται εἰς τὸν αἴωνα) as if to say, Ye shall perish eternally, because ye are not of My sheep.

THEOPHYLACT. But how then did Judas perish? Because he did not continue to the end. Christ speaks of them who persevere. If any sheep is separated from the flock, and wanders from the Shepherd, it incurs danger immediately.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 6) And He adds why they do not perish: Neither shall any man pluck them out of My hand. (2 Tim. 2:19) Of those sheep of which it is said, The Lord knoweth then that are His, the wolf robbeth none, the thief taketh none, the robber killeth none. Christ is confident of their safety; and He knows what He gave up for them.

HILARY. (de Trin. vii. c. 22) This is the speech of conscious power. Yet to shew, that though of the Divine nature He hath His nativity from God, He adds, My Father which gave Me them is greater than all. He does not conceal His birth from the Father, but proclaims it. For that which He received from the Father, He received in that He was born from Him. He received it in the birth itself, not after it; though He was born when He received it.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii) The Son, born from ever lasting of the Father, God from God, has not equality with the Father by growth, but by birth. This is that greater than all which the Father gave Himb; viz. to be His Word, to be His Only-Begotten Son, to be the brightness of His light. Wherefore no man taketh His sheep out of His hand, any more than from His Father's hand: And no man is able to pluck them out of My Father's hand. If by hand we understand power, the power of the Father and the Son is one, even as Their divinity is one. If we understand the Son, the Son is the hand of the Father, not in a bodily sense, as if God the Father had limbs, but as being He by Whom all things were made. Men often call other men hands, when they make use of them for any purpose. And sometimes a man's work is itself called his hand, because made by his hand; as when a man is said to know his own hand, when he recognises his own handwriting. In this place, however, hand signifies power. If we take it for Son, we shall be in danger of imagining that if the Father has a hand, and that hand is His Son, the Son must have a Son too.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 22) The hand of the Son is spoken of as the hand of the Father, to let thee see, by a bodily representation, that both have the same nature, that the nature and virtue of the Father is in the Son also.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi) Then that thou mayest not suppose that the Father's power protects the sheep, while He is Himself too weak to do so, He adds, I and My Father are one.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxxvi. non occ.) Mark both those words, one and are, and thou wilt be delivered from Scylla and Charybdis. In that He says, one the Arian, in we are the Sabellian, is answered. There are both Father and Son. And if one, then there is no difference of persons between them.

AUGUSTINE. (vii. de Trin. c. 2) We are one. What He is, that am I, in respect of essence, not of relation.

HILARY. (viii. de Trin. c. 5) The heretics, since they cannot gainsay these words, endeavour by an impious lie to explain them away. They maintain that this unity is unanimity only; a unity of will, not of nature; i. e. that the two are one, not in that they are the same, but in that they will the same. But they are one, not by any economy merely, but by the nativity of the Son's nature, since there is no falling off of the Father's divinity in begetting Him. They are one whilst the sheep that are not plucked out of the Son's hand, are not plucked out of the Father's hand: whilst in Him working, the Father worketh; whilst He is in the Father, and the Father in Him. This unity, not creation but nativity, not will but power, not unanimity but nature accomplisheth. But we deny not therefore the unanimity of the Father and Son; for the heretics, because we refuse to admit concord in the place of unity, accuse us of making a disagreement between the Father and Son. We deny not unanimity, but we place it on the ground of unity. The Father and Son are one in respect of nature, honour, and virtue: and the same nature cannot will different things.

10:31–38

31. Then the Jews took up stones again to stone him.

32. Jesus answered them, Many good works have I shewed you from my Father; for which of those works do ye stone me?

33. The Jews answered him, saying, For a good work we stone thee not; but for blasphemy; and because that thou, being a man, makest thyself God.

34. Jesus answered them, Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods?

35. If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken;

36. Say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?

37. If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.

38. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works: that ye may know, and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 8) At this speech, I and My Father are one, the Jews could not restrain their rage, but ran to take up stones, after their hardhearted way: Then the Jews took up stones again to stone Him.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 23) The heretics now, as unbelieving and rebellious against our Lord in heaven, shew their impious hatred by the stones, i. e. the words they cast at Him; as if they would drag Him down again from His throne to the cross.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord remonstrates with them; Many good works have I shewed you from My Father, shewing that they had no just reason for their anger.

ALCUIN. Healing of the sick, teaching, miracles. He shewed them of the Father, because He sought His Father’s glory in all of them. For which of these works do ye stone Me? They confess, though reluctantly, the benefit they have received from Him, but charge Him at the same time with blasphemy, for asserting His equality with the Father; For a good work we stone Thee not, but for blasphemy; and because that Thou, being a man, makest Thyself God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 8) This is their answer to the speech, I and My Father are one. Lo, the Jews understood what the Arians understand not. For they are angry for this very reason, that they could not conceive but that by saying, I and My Father are one, He meant the equality of the Father and the Son.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 23) The Jew saith, Thou being a man, the Arian, Thou being a creature: but both say, Thou makest Thyself God. The Arian supposes a God of a new and different substance, a God of another kind, or not a God at all. He saith, Thou art not Son by birth, Thou art not God of truth; Thou art a superior creature.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi. 2) Our Lord did not correct the Jews, as if they misunderstood His speech, but confirmed and defended it, in the very sense in which they had taken it. Jesus answered them, Is it not written in your law,

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii) i. e. the Law given to you, I have said, Ye are Gods? (Ps. 82:6) God saith this by the Prophet in the Psalm. Our Lord calls all those Scriptures the Law generally, though elsewhere He spiritually distinguishes the Law from the Prophets. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the Prophets. (Matt. 22:40) In another place He makes a threefold division of the Scriptures; All things must be fulfilled which were written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms concerning Me. (Luke 24:44) Now He calls the Psalms the Law, and thus argues from them; If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came, and the scripture cannot be broken, say ye of Him whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. c. 24) Before proving that He and His Father are one, He answers the absurd and foolish charge brought against Him, that He being man made Himself God. When the Law applied this title to holy men, and the indelible word of God sanctioned this use of the incommunicable name, it could not be a crime in Him, even though He were man, to make Himself God. The Law called those who were mere men, gods; and if any man could bear the name religiously, and without arrogance, surely that man could, who was sanctified by the Father, in a sense in which none else is sanctified to the Sonship; as the blessed Paul saith, Declared1 to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of holiness. (Rom. 1:4) For all this reply refers to Himself as man; the Son of God being also the Son of man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii) Or sanctified, i. e. in begetting, gave Him holiness, begat Him holy. If men to whom the word of God came were called gods, much more the Word of God Himself is God. If men by partaking of the word of God were made gods, much more is the Word of which they partake, God.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, sanctified, i. e. set apart to be sacrificed for the world: a proof that He was God in a higher sense than the rest. To save the world is a divine work, not that of a man made divine by grace.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi) Or, we must consider this a speech of humility, made to conciliate men. After it he leads them to higher things; If I do not the works of My Father, believe Me not; which is as much as to say, that He is not inferior to the Father. As they could not see His substance, He directs them to His works, as being like and equal to the Father’s. For the equality of their works, proved the equality of their power.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin. 26) What place hath adoption, or the mere conception of a name then, that we should not believe Him to be the Son of God by nature, when He tells us to believe Him to be the Son of God, because the Father’s nature shewed itself in Him by His works? A creature is not equal and like to God: no other nature has power comparable to the divine. He declares that He is carrying on not His own work, but the

Father’s, lest in the greatness of the works, the nativity of His nature be forgotten. And as under the sacrament1 of the assumption of a human body in the womb of Mary, the Son of God was not discerned, this must be gathered from His work; But if I do, though ye believe not Me, believe the works. Why doth the sacrament of a human birth hinder the understanding of the divine, when the divine birth accomplishes all its work by aid of the human? Then He tells them what they should gather from His works; That ye may know and believe, that the Father is in Me, and I in Him. The same declaration again, I am the Son of God: I and the Father are one.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 10) The Son doth not say, The Father is in Me, and I in Him, in the sense in which men who think and act aright may say the like; meaning that they partake of God’s grace, and are enlightened by His Spirit. The Only-begotten Son of God is in the Father, and the Father in Him, as an equal in an equal.

10:39–42

39. Therefore they sought again to take him: but he escaped out of their hand,

40. And went away again beyond Jordan into the place where John at first baptized; and there he abode.

41. And many resorted unto him, and said, John did no miracle: but all things that John spake of this man were true.

42. And many believed on him there.

BEDE. The Jews still persist in their madness; Therefore they sought again to take Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. 11) To lay hold of Him, not by faith and the understanding, but with bloodthirsty violence. Do thou so lay hold of Him, that thou mayest have sure hold; they would fain have laid hold on Him, but they could not: for it follows, But He escaped out of their hand. They did lay hold of Him with the hand of faith. It was no great matter for the Word to rescue His flesh from the hands of flesh.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi. 3) Christ, after discoursing on some high truth, commonly retires immediately, to give time to the fury of people to abate, during His absence. Thus He did now: He went away again beyond Jordan, into the place where John at first baptized. He went there that He might recall to people's minds, what had gone on there; John's preaching and testimony to Himself.

BEDE. (non occ.) He was followed there by many: And many resorted unto Him, and said, John did no miracle.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. c. 12) did not cast out devils, did not give sight to the blind, did not raise the dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxi. 3) Mark their reasoning, John did no miracle, but this Man did; wherefore He is the superior. But lest the absence of miracles should lessen the weight of John's testimony, they add, But all things that John spake of this Man were true. Though he did no miracle, yet every thing he said of Christ was true, whence they conclude, if John was to be believed, much more this Man, who has the evidence of miracles. Thus it follows, And many believed on Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlviii. c. 12) These laid hold of Him while abiding, not, like the Jews, when departing. Let us approach by the candle to the day. John is the candle, and gave testimony to the day.

THEOPHYLACT. We may observe that our Lord often brings out the people into solitary places, thus ridding them of the society of the unbelieving, for their furtherance in the faith: just as He led the people into the wilderness, when He gave them the old Law. Mystically, Christ departs from Jerusalem, i. e. from the Jewish people; and goes to a place where are springs of water, i. e. to the Gentile Church, that hath the waters of baptism. And many resort unto Him, passing over the Jordan, i. e. through baptism.

CHAPTER 11

11:1–5

1. Now a certain man was sick, named Lazarus, of Bethany, the town of Mary and her sister Martha.

2. (It was that Mary which anointed the Lord with ointment, and wiped his feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus was sick.)

3. Therefore his sisters sent unto him, saying, Lord, behold, he whom thou lovest is sick.

4. When Jesus heard that, he said, This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God might be glorified thereby.

5. Now Jesus loved Martha, and her sister, and Lazarus.

BEDE. (non occ.) After our Lord had departed to the other side of Jordan, it happened that Lazarus fell sick: A certain man was sick, named Lazarus, of Bethany.In some copies the copulative conjunction precedes, to mark the connection with the words preceding. (ἦν δέ τις, now a certain man.) Lazarus signifies helped. Of all the dead which our Lord raised, he was most helped, for he had lain dead four days, when our Lord raised him to life.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 1) The resurrection of Lazarus is more spoken of than any of our Lord’s miracles. But if we bear in mind who He was who wrought this miracle, we shall feel not so much of wonder, as of delight. He who made the man, raised the man; and it is a greater thing to create a man, than to revive him. Lazarus was sick at Bethany, the town of Mary and her sister Martha. The place was near Jerusalem.

ALCUIN. And as there were many women of this name, He distinguishes her by her well-known act: It was that Mary which anointed the Lord with ointment, and wiped His feet with her hair, whose brother Lazarus was sick.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Greg. Hom. lxii. 1) First we are to observe that this was not the harlot mentioned in Luke, but an honest woman, who treated our Lord with marked reverence.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. ii. lxxix.) John here confirms the passage in Luke (Luke 7:38), where this is said to have taken place in the house of one Simon a Pharisee: Mary had done this act therefore on a former occasion. That she did it again at Bethany is not mentioned in the narrative of Luke, but is in the other three Gospels.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. lii) A cruel sickness had seized Lazarus; a wasting fever was eating away the body of the wretched man day by day: his two sisters sat sorrowful at his bedside, grieving for the sick youth continually. They sent to Jesus: Therefore his sisters sent unto Him, saying, Lord, behold he whom Thou lovest is sick.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 5) They did not say, Come and heal; they dared not say, Speak the word there, and it shall be done here; but only, Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick. As if to say, It is enough that Thou know it, Thou art not one to love and then to desert whom Thou lovest.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) They hope to excite Christ’s pity by these words, Whom as yet they thought to be a man only. Like the centurion and nobleman, they sent, not went, to Christ; partly from their great faith in Him, for they knew Him intimately, partly because their sorrow kept them at home.

THEOPHYLACT. And because they were women, and it did not become them to leave their home if they could help it. Great devotion and faith is expressed in these words, Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick. Such was their idea of our Lord’s power, that they were surprised, that one, whom He loved, could be seized with sickness.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 6) When Jesus heard that, He said, This sickness is not unto death. For this death itself was not unto death, but to give occasion for a miracle; whereby men might be brought to believe in Christ, and so escape real death. It was for the glory of God, wherein observe that our Lord calls Himself God by implication, thus confounding those heretics who say that the Son of God is not God. For the glory of what God? Hear what follows, That the Son of God might be glorified thereby, i. e. by that sickness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) That here signifies not the cause, but the event. The sickness sprang from natural causes, but He turned it to the glory of God.

Now Jesus loved Martha, and her sister, and Lazarus.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 7) He is sick, they sorrowful, all beloved. Wherefore they had hope, for they were beloved by Him Who is the Comforter of the sorrowful, and the Healer of the sick.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii non occ. v. lxii. 3.) Wherein the Evangelist instructs us not to be sad, if sickness ever falls upon good men, and friends of God.

11:6–10

6. When he had heard therefore that he was sick, he abode two days still in the same place where he was.

7. Then after that saith he to his disciples, Let us go into Judæa again.

8. His disciples say unto him, Master, the Jews of late sought to stone thee; and goest thou thither again?

9. Jesus answered, Are there not twelve hours in the day? If any man walk in the day, he stumbleth not, because he seeth the light of this world.

10. But if a man walk in the night, he stumbleth, because there is no light in him.

ALCUIN. Our Lord heard of the sickness of Lazarus, but suffered four days to pass before He cured it; that the recovery might be a more wonderful one. When He had heard therefore that he was sick, He abode two days still in the place where He was.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) To give time for his death and burial, that they might say, he stinketh, and none doubt that it was death, and not a trance, from which he was raised.

Then after that saith He to His disciples, Let us go into Judæa again.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 7) Where He had just escaped being stoned; for this was the cause of His leaving. He left indeed as man: He left in weakness, but He returns in power.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) He had not as yet told His disciples where He was going; but now He tells them, in order to prepare them beforehand, for they are in great alarm, when they hear of it: His disciples say unto Him, Master, the Jews sought to stone Thee, and goest Thou thither again? They feared both for Him, and for themselves; for they were not yet confirmed in faith.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 8) When men presumed to give advice to God, disciples to their Master, our Lord rebuked them: Jesus answered, Are there not twelve hours in the day? He shewed Himself to be the day, by appointing twelve disciples: i. e. reckoning Matthias in the place of Judas, and passing over the latter altogether. The hours are lightened by the day; that by the preaching of the hours, the world may believe on the day. Follow Me then, saith our Lord, if ye wish not to stumble: If any man walk in the day, he stumbleth not, because he seeth the light of this world: But if a man walk in the night he stumbleth, because there is no light in him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) As if to say, The upright need fear no evil: the wicked only have cause to fear. We have done nothing worthy of death, and therefore are in no danger. Or, If any one seeth this world's light, he is safe; much more he who is with Me.

THEOPHYLACT. Some understand the day to be the time preceding the Passion, the night to be the Passion. In this sense, while it is day, would mean, before My Passion; Ye will not stumble before My Passion, because the Jews will not persecute you; but when the night, i. e. My Passion, cometh, then shall ye be beset with darkness and difficulties.

11:11–16

11. These things said he: and after that he saith unto them, Our friend Lazarus sleepeth; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep.

12. Then said his disciples, Lord, if he sleep, he shall do well.

13. Howbeit Jesus spake of his death: but they thought that he had spoken of taking of rest in sleep.

14. Then said Jesus unto them plainly, Lazarus is dead.

15. And I am glad for your sakes I was not there, to the intent ye may believe; nevertheless let us go unto him.

16. Then said Thomas, which is called Didymus, unto his fellowdisciples, Let us also go, that we may die with him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) After He has comforted His disciples in one way, He comforts them in another, by telling them that they were not going to Jerusalem, but to Bethany: These things saith He: and after that He saith unto them, Our friend Lazarus sleepeth; but I go that I may awake him out of sleep: as if to say, I am not going to dispute again with the Jews, but to awaken our friend. Our friend, He says, to shew how strongly they were bound to go.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. c. 9) It was really true that He was sleeping. To our Lord, he was sleeping; to men who could not raise him again, he was dead. Our Lord awoke him with as much ease from his grave, as thou awakest a sleeper from his bed. He calls him then asleep, with reference to His own power, as the Apostle saith, But I would not have you to be ignorant, concerning them which are asleep. (1 Thess. 4:13) Asleep, He says, because He is speaking of their resurrection which was to be. But as it matters to those who sleep and wake again daily, what they see in their sleep, some having pleasant dreams, others painful ones, so it is in death; every one sleeps and rises again with his own account.a

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) The disciples however wished to prevent Him going to Judæa: Then said His disciples, Lord, if he sleep, he shall do well. Sleep is a good sign in sickness. And therefore if he sleep, say they, what need to go and awake him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 11) The disciples replied, as they understood Him: Howbeit Jesus spake of his death; but they thought that He had spoken of taking rest in sleep.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 2.) But if any one say, that the disciples could not but have known that our Lord meant Lazarus’s death, when He said, that I may awake him; because it would have been absurd to have gone such a distance merely to awake Lazarus out of sleep; we answer, that our Lord’s words were a kind of enigma to the disciples, here as elsewhere often.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 11) He then declares His meaning openly: Then said Jesus unto them plainly, Lazarus is dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 2) But He does not add here, I go that I may awake him. He did not wish to anticipate the miracle by talking of it; a hint to us to shun vain glory, and abstain from empty promises.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 11) He had been sent for to restore Lazarus from sickness, not from death. But how could the death be hid from Him, into whose hands the soul of the dead had flown?

And I am glad for your sakes that I was not there, that ye might believe; i. e. seeing My marvellous power of knowing a thing I have neither seen nor heard. The disciples already believed in Him in consequence of His miracles; so that their faith had not now to begin, but only to increase. That ye might believe, means, believe more deeply, more firmly.

THEOPHYLACT. Some have understood this place thus. I rejoice, He says, for your sakes; for if I had been there, I should have only cured a sick man; which is but an inferior sign of power. But since in My absence he has died, ye will now see that I can raise even the dead putrefying body; and your faith will be strengthened.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 2) The disciples all dreaded the Jews; and especially Thomas; Then said Thomas, which is called Didymus, unto his fellow-disciples, Let us also go, that we may die with him. But he who was now the most weak and unbelieving of all the disciples, afterwards became stronger than any. And he who dared not go to Bethany, afterwards went over the whole earth, in the midst of those who wished his death, with a spirit indomitable.

BEDE. The disciples, checked by our Lord's answer to them, dared no longer oppose; and Thomas, more forward than the rest, says, Let us also go that we may die with him. What an appearance of firmness! He speaks as if he could really do what he said; unmindful, like Peter, of his frailty.

11:17–27

17. Then when Jesus came, he found that he had lain in the grave four days already.

18. Now Bethany was nigh unto Jerusalem, about fifteen furlongs off:

19. And many of the Jews came to Martha and Mary, to comfort them concerning their brother.

20. Then Martha, as soon as she heard that Jesus was coming, went and met him: but Mary sat still in the house.

21. Then said Martha unto Jesus, Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died.

22. But I know, that even now, whatsoever thou wilt ask of God, God will give it thee.

23. Jesus saith unto her, Thy brother shall rise again.

24. Martha saith unto him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day.

25. Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection, and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live:

26. And whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die. Believest thou this?

27. She saith unto him, Yea, Lord: I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world.

ALCUIN. Our Lord delayed His coming for four days, that the resurrection of Lazarus might be the more glorious: Then when Jesus came, He found that He had lain in the grave four days already.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 2) Our Lord had stayed two days, and the messenger had come the day before; the very day on which Lazarus died. This brings us to the fourth day.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xlix. 12) Of the four days many things may be said. They refer to one thing, but one thing viewed in different ways. There is one day of death which the law of our birth brings upon us. Men transgress the natural law, and this is another day of death. The written law is given to men by the hands of Moses, and that is despised—a third day of death. The Gospel comes, and men transgress it—a fourth day of death. But Christ doth not disdain to awaken even these.

ALCUIN. The first sin was elation of heart, the second assent, the third act, the fourth habit.

Now Bethany was nigh unto Jerusalem, about fifteen furlongs off.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 2) Two miles. This is mentioned to account for so many coming from Jerusalem: And many of the Jews came to Martha and Mary, to comfort them concerning their brother. But how could the Jews be consoling the beloved of Christ, when they had resolved that whoever confessed Christ should be put out of the synagogue? Perhaps the extreme affliction of the sisters excited their sympathy; or they wished to shew respect for their rank. Or perhaps they who came were of the better sort; as we find many of them believed. Their presence is mentioned to do away with all doubt of the real death of Lazarus.

BEDE. Our Lord had not yet entered the town, when Martha met Him: Then Martha, as soon as she heard that Jesus was coming, went and met Him: but Mary sat still in the house.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 2.) Martha does not take her sister with her, because she wants to speak with Christ alone, and tell Him what has happened. When her hopes had been raised by Him, then she went her way, and called Mary.

THEOPHYLACT. At first she does not tell her sister, for fear, if she came, the Jews present might accompany her. And she did not wish them to know of our Lord’s coming.

Then saith Martha unto Jesus, Lord, if Thou hadst been here, my brother had not died.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 3) She believed in Christ, but she believed not as she ought. She did not speak as if He were God: If Thou hadst been here, my brother had not died.

THEOPHYLACT. She did not know that He could have restored her brother as well absent as present.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 3) Nor did she know that He wrought His miracles by His own independent power: But I know that even now, whatsoever Thou will ask of God, God will give it Thee. She only thinks Him some very gifted man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 13) She does not say to Him, Bring my brother to life again; for how could she know that it would be good for him to come to life again; she says, I know that Thou canst do so, if Thou wilt; but what Thou wilt do is for Thy judgment, not for my presumption to determine.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 3) But our Lord taught her the truths which she did not know: Jesus saith unto her, Thy brother shall rise again. Observe, He does not say, I will ask God, that he may rise again, nor on the other hand does He say, I want no help, I do all things of Myself; a declaration which would have been too much for the woman; but something between the two, He shall rise again.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 14) Shall rise again, is ambiguous: for He does not say, now. And therefore it follows: Martha saith unto Him, I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day: of that resurrection I am certain; of this I am doubtful.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii) She had often heard Christ speak of the resurrection. Jesus now declares His power more plainly: Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life. He needed therefore none to help Him; for if He did, how could He be the resurrection. And if He is the life, He is not confined by place, but is every where, and can heal every where.

ALCUIN. I am the resurrection, because I am the life; as through Me he will rise at the general resurrection, through Me he may rise now.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii) To Martha’s, Whatsoever Thou shall ask, He replies, He that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: shewing her that He is the Giver of all good, and that we must ask of Him. Thus He leads her to the knowledge of high truths; and whereas she had been enquiring only about the resurrection of Lazarus, tells her of a resurrection in which both she and all present would share.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 15) He that believeth in Me, though he were dead: i. e. though his flesh die, his soul shall live till the flesh rise again, never to die more. For faith is the life of the soul.

And whosoever liveth, in the flesh, and believeth in Me, though he die for a time in the flesh, shall not die eternally.

ALCUIN. Because He hath attained to the life of the Spirit, and to an immortal resurrection. Our Lord, from Whom nothing was hid, knew that she believed, but sought from her a confession unto salvation: Believest thou this? She saith unto Him, Yea, Lord, I believe that Thou art the Christ the Son of God, which should come into the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 3) She seems not to have understood His words; i. e. she saw that He meant something great, but did not see what that was. She is asked one thing, and answers another.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 15) When I believed that Thou wert the Son of God, I believed that Thou wert the resurrection, that Thou wert lifeb; and that he that believeth in Thee, though he were dead, shall live.

11:28–32

28. And when she had so said, she went her way, and called Mary her sister secretly, saying, The Master is come, and calleth for thee.

29. And as soon as she heard that, she arose quickly, and came unto him.

30. Now Jesus was not yet come into the town, but was in that place where Martha met him.

31. The Jews then which were with her in the house, and comforted her, when they saw Mary, that she rose up hastily and went out, followed her, saying, She goeth unto the grave to weep there.

32. Then when Mary was come where Jesus was, and saw him, she fell down at his feet, saying unto him, Lord, if thou hadst been here, my brother had not died.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 3) Christ's words had the effect of stopping Martha's grief. In her devotion to her Master she had no time to think of her afflictions: And when she had so said, she went her way, and called Mary her sister secretly.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 16) Silently1, i. e. speaking in a low voice. For she did speak, saying, The Master is come, and calleth for thee.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii) She calls her sister secretly, in order not to let the Jews know that Christ was coming. (non occ.). For had they known, they would have gone, and not been witnesses of the miracle.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 16) We may observe that the Evangelist has not said, where, or when, or how, the Lord called Mary, but for brevity's sake has left it to be gathered from Martha's words.

THEOPHYLACT. Perhaps she thought the presence of Christ in itself a call, as if it were inexcusable, when Christ came, that she should not go out to meet Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 1) While the rest sat around her in her sorrow, she did not wait for the Master to come to her, but, not letting her grief detain her, rose immediately to meet Him; As soon as she heard that, she arose quickly, and came unto Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. non occ.) So we see, if she had known of His arrival before, she would not have let Martha go without her.

Now Jesus was not yet come into the town, but was in that place where Martha met Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 1) He went slowly, that He might not seem to catch at an occasion of working a miracle, but to have it forced upon Him by others asking. Mary, it is said, arose quickly, and thus anticipated His coming. The Jews accompanied her: The Jews then which were with her in the house, and comforted her, when they saw Mary that she arose up hastily and went out, followed her, saying, She goeth unto the grave to weep there.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 16) The Evangelist mentions this to shew how it was that so many were present at Lazarus' resurrection, and witness of that great miracle.

Then when Mary was come where Jesus was, and saw Him, she fell down at His feet.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 1) She is more fervent than her sister. Forgetful of the crowd around her, and of the Jews, some of whom were enemies to Christ, she threw herself at her Master’s feet. In His presence all earthly things were nought to her; she thought of nothing but giving Him honour.

THEOPHYLACT. But her faith seems as yet imperfect: Lord, if Thou hadst been here, my brother had not died.

ALCUIN. As if to say, Lord, while Thou wert with us, no disease, no sickness dared to shew itself, amongst those with whom the Life deigned to take up His abode.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. lii) O faithless assembly! Whilst Thou art yet in the world, Lazarus Thy friend dieth! If the friend dies, what will the enemy suppose? Is it a small thing that they will not serve Thee upon earth? lo, hell hath taken Thy beloved.

BEDE. Mary did not say so much as Martha, she could not bring out what she wanted for weeping, as is usual with persons overwhelmed with sorrow.

11:33–41

33. When Jesus therefore saw her weeping, and the Jews also weeping which came with her, he groaned in the spirit, and was troubled,

34. And said, Where have ye laid him? They said unto him, Lord, come and see.

35. Jesus wept.

36. Then said the Jews, Behold how he loved him!

37. And some of them said, Could not this man, which opened the eyes of the blind, have caused that even this man should not have died?

38. Jesus therefore again groaning in himself cometh to the grave. It was a cave, and a stone lay upon it.

39. Jesus said, Take ye away the stone. Martha, the sister of him that was dead, saith unto him, Lord, by this time he stinketh: for he hath been dead four days.

40. Jesus saith unto her, Said I not unto thee, that, if thou wouldest believe, thou shouldest see the glory of God?

41. Then they took away the stone from the place where the dead was laid.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 1) Christ did not answer Mary, as He had her sister, on account of the people present. In condescension to them He humbled Himself, and let His human nature be seen, in order to gain them as witnesses to the miracle: When Jesus therefore saw her weeping, and the Jews also weeping which came with her, He groaned in His spirit, and was troubled.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix) For who but Himself could trouble Him? Christ was troubled, because it pleased Him to be troubled; He hungered, because it pleased Him to hunger. It was in His own power to be affected in this or that way, or not. The Word took up soul and flesh, and whole man, and fitted it to Himself in unity of person. And thus according to the nod and will of that higher nature in Him, in which the sovereign power resides, He becomes weak and troubled.

THEOPHYLACT. To prove His human nature He sometimes gives it free vent, while at other times He commands, and restrains it by the power of the Holy Ghost. Our Lord allows His nature to be affected in these ways, both to prove that He is very Man, not Man in appearance only; and also to teach us by His own example the due measures of joy and grief. For the absence altogether of sympathy and sorrow is brutal, the excess of them is womanly.

AUGUSTINE. (de Ver. Dom. s. lii) And said, Where have ye laid him? He knew where, but He asked to try the faith of the people.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 1) He did not wish to thrust the miracle upon them, but to make them ask for it, and thus do away with all suspicions.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. 83. Quæst. qu. lxv.) The question has an allusion too to our hidden calling. That predestination by which we are called, is hidden; and the sign of its being so is our Lord asking the question: He being as it were in ignorance, so long as we are ignorant ourselves. Or because our Lord elsewhere shews that He knows not sinners, saying, I know you not, (Matt. 7:23) because in keeping His commandments there is no sin.

They said unto Him, Lord, come and see.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 1) He had not yet raised any one from the dead; and seemed as if He came to weep, not to raise to life. Wherefore they say to Him, Come and see.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 20.) The Lord sees when He pities, as we read, Look upon my adversity and misery, and forgive me all my sin. (Ps. 24:18.)

Jesus wept.

ALCUIN. Because He was the fountain of pity. He wept in His human nature for him whom He was able to raise again by His divine.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. non occ.) Wherefore did Christ weep, but to teach men to weep?

BEDE. It is customary to mourn over the death of friends; and thus the Jews explained our Lord's weeping: Then said the Jews, Behold how He loved him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 21) Loved him. Our Lord came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance. And some of them said, Could not this Man which opened the eyes of the blind, have caused that even this man should not have died? He was about to do more than this, to raise him from death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 1) It was His enemies who said this. The very works, which should have evidenced His power, they turn against Him, as if He had not really done them. This is the way that they speak of the miracle of opening the eyes of the man that was born blind. They even prejudge Christ before He has come to the grave, and have not the patience to wait for the issue of the matter. Jesus therefore again groaning in Himself, cometh to the grave. That He wept, and He groaned, are mentioned to shew us the reality of His human nature. John who enters into higher statements as to His nature than any of the other Evangelists, also descends lower than any in describing His bodily affections.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix) And do thou too groan in thyself, if thou wouldest rise to new life. To every man is this said, who is weighed down by any vicious habit. It was a cave, and a stone lay upon it. The dead under the stone is the guilty under the Law. For the Law, which was given to the Jews, was graven on stone. And all the guilty are under the Law, for the Law was not made for a righteous man.

BEDE. A cave is a hollow in a rock. It is called a monument, because it reminds us of the dead.

Jesus said, Take ye away the stone.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 2) But why did He not raise him without taking away the stone? Could not He who moved a dead body by His voice, much more have moved a stone? He purposely did not do so, in order that the miracle might take place in the sight of all; to give no room for saying, as they had said in the case of the blind man, This is not he. Now they might go into the grave, and feel and see that this was the man.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. c. 22) Take ye away the stone; mystically, Take away the burden of the law, proclaim grace.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. 83. Quæst. qu. 61) Perhaps those are signified who wished to impose the rite of circumcision on the Gentile converts; or men in the Church of corrupt life, who offend believers.

AUGUSTINE. (de Ver. Dom. serm. lii) Mary and Martha, the sisters of Lazarus, though they had often seen Christ raise the dead, did not fully believe that He could raise their brother; Martha, the sister of him that was dead, saith unto Him, Lord, by this time he stinketh, for he hath been dead four days.

THEOPHYLACT. Martha said this from weakness of faith, thinking it impossible that Christ could raise her brother, so long after death.

BEDE. (non occ. [Nic.]) Or, these are not words of despair, but of wonder.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii. 2) Thus every thing tends to stop the months of the unbelieving. Their hands take away the stone, their ears hear Christ's voice, their eyes see Lazarus come forth, they perceive the smell of the dead body.

THEOPHYLACT. Christ reminds Martha of what He had told her before, which she had forgotten: Jesus saith unto her, Said I not unto thee, that, if thou wouldest believe, thou shouldest see the glory of God?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiii) She did not remember what He said above, He that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live. To the disciples He had said, That the Son of God might be glorified thereby; here it is the glory of the Father He speaks of. The difference is made to suit the different hearers. Our Lord could not rebuke her before such a number, but only says, Thou shalt see the glory of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix) Herein is the glory of God, that he that stinketh and hath been dead four days, is brought to life again.

Then they took away the stone.

ORIGEN. (tom. in Joan. xxviii.) The delay in taking away the stone was caused by the sister of the dead, who said, By this time he stinketh, for he hath been dead four days. If she had not said this, it would not be said, Jesus said, Take away the stone. Some delay had arisen; it is best to let nothing come between the commands of Jesus and doing them.

11:41–46

41. And Jesus lifted up his eyes, and said, Father, I thank thee that thou hast heard me.

42. And I knew that thou hearest me always: but because of the people which stand by I said it, that they may believe that thou hast sent me.

43. And when he thus had spoken, he cried with a loud voice, Lazarus, come forth.

44. And he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with graveclothes: and his face was bound about with a napkin. Jesus saith unto them, Loose him, and let him go.

45. Then many of the Jews which came to Mary, and had seen the things which Jesus did, believed on him.

46. But some of them went their ways to the Pharisees, and told them what things Jesus had done.

ALCUIN. Christ, as man, being inferior to the Father, prays to Him for Lazarus’s resurrection; and declares that He is heard: And Jesus lifted up His eyes, and said, Father, I thank Thee that Thou hast heard Me.

ORIGEN. (tom. xxviii.) He lifted up His eyes; mystically, He lifted up the human mind by prayer to the Father above. We should pray after Christ’s pattern, Lift up the eyes of our heart, and raise them above present things in memory, in thought, in intention. If to them who pray worthily after this fashion is given the promise in Isaiah, Thou shalt cry, and He shall say, Here I am; (Isa. 58:9) what answer, think we, our Lord and Saviour would receive? He was about to pray for the resurrection of Lazarus. He was heard by the Father before He prayed; His request was granted before mad. And therefore He begins with giving thanks; I thank Thee, Father, that Thou hast heard Me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv. 2) i. e. There is no difference of will between Me and Thee. Thou hast heard Me, does not shew any lack of power in Him, or that He is inferior to the Father. It is a phrase that is used between friends and equals. That the prayer is not really necessary for Him, appears from the words that follow, And I knew that Thou heardest Me always: as if He said, I need not prayer to persuade Thee; for Ours is one will. He hides His meaning on account of the weak faith of His hearers. For God regards not so much His own dignity, as our salvation; and therefore seldom speaks loftily of Himself, and, even when He does, speaks in an obscure way; whereas humble expressions abound in His discourses.

HILARY. (lib. x. de Trin.) He did not therefore need to pray: He prayed for our sakes, that we might know Him to be the Son: But because of the people which stand by I said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me. His prayer did not benefit Himself, but benefited our faith. He did not want help, but we want instruction.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv. 2) He did not say, That they may believe that I am inferior to Thee, in that I cannot do this without prayer, but, that Thou hast sent Me. He saith not, hast sent Me weak, acknowledging subjection, doing nothing of Myself, but hast sent Me in such sense, as that man may see that I am from God, not contrary to God; and that I do this miracle in accordance with His will.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. Serm. lii) Christ went to the grave in which Lazarus slept, as if He were not dead, but alive and able to hear, for He forthwith called him out of his grave: And when He had thus spoken, He cried with a loud voice, Lazarus, come forth. He calls him by name, that He may not bring out all the dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv. 2) He does not say, Arise, but, Come forth, speaking to the dead as if he were alive. For which reason also He does not say, Come forth in My Father’s name, or, Father, raise him, but throwing off the whole appearance of one praying, proceeds to shew His power by acts. This is His general way. His words shew humility, His acts power.

THEOPHYLACT. The voice which roused Lazarus, is the symbol of that trumpet which will sound at the general resurrection. (He spoke loud, to contradict the Gentile fable, that the soul remained in the tomb. The soul of Lazarus is called to as if it were absent, and a loud voice were necessary to summon it.) And as the general resurrection is to take place in the twinkling of an eye, so did this single one: And he that was dead came forth, bound hand and foot with grave clothes, and his face was bound about with a napkin. Now is accomplished what was said above, The hour is coming, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. (5:25)

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii.) His cry and loud voice it was which awoke him, as Christ had said, I go to awake him. The resurrection of Lazarus is the work of the Father also, in that He heard the prayer of the Son. It is the joint work of Father and Son, one praying, the other hearing; for as the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will. (5:21)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv) He came forth bound, that none might suspect that he was a mere phantom. Besides, that this very fact, viz. of coming forth bound, was itself a miracle, as great as the resurrection. Jesus saith unto them, Loose him, that by going near and touching him they might be certain he was the very person. And let him go. His humility is shewn here; He does not take Lazarus about with Him for the sake of display.

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii. 10.) Our Lord had said above, Because of the people that stand by I said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me. It would have been ignorance of the future, if He had said this, and none believed, after all. Therefore it follows: Then many of the Jews which came to Mary, and had seen the things which Jesus did, believed on Him. But some of them went their way to the Pharisees, and told them what things Jesus had done. It is doubtful from these words, whether those who went to the Pharisees, were of those many who believed, and meant to conciliate the opponents of Christ; or whether they were of the unbelieving party, and wished to inflame the envy of the Pharisees against Him. The latter seems to me the true supposition; especially as the Evangelist describes those who believed as the larger party. Many believed; whereas it is only a few who go to the Pharisees: Some of them went to the Pharisees, and told them what things Jesus had done.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. q. 65) Although according to the Gospel history, we hold that Lazarus was really raised to life, yet I doubt not that his resurrection is an allegory as well. We do not, because we allegorize facts, lose our belief in them as facts.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. super Joan. xlix. 3) Every one that sinneth, dies; but God, of His great mercy, raises the soul to life again, and does not suffer it to die eternally. The three miraculous resurrections in the Gospels, I understand to testify the resurrection of the soul.

GREGORY. (iv. Moral. c. xxix.) The maiden is restored to life in the house, the young man outside the gate, Lazarus in his grave. She that lies dead in the house, is the sinner lying in sin: he that is carried out by the gate is the openly and notoriously wicked.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 3) Or, it is death within; when the evil thought has not come out into action. But if thou actually do the evil thing, thou hast as it were carried the dead outside the gate.

GREGORY. (v. Moral.) And one there is who lies dead in his grave, with a load of earth upon him; i. e. who is weighed down by habits of sin. But the Divine grace has regard even unto such, and enlightens them.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxii. Quæst. q. lxv.) Or we may take Lazarus in the grave as the soul laden with earthly sins.

AUGUSTINE. (in Joan. Tr. xlix) And yet our Lord loved Lazarus. For had He not loved sinners, He would never have come down from heaven to save them. Well is it said of one of sinful habits, that He stinketh. He hath a bad report1 already, as it were the foulest odour.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. q. 65) Well may she say, He hath been dead four days. For the earth is the last of the elements. It signifies the pit of earthly sins, i. e. carnal lusts.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. in Joan. xlix. 19) The Lord groaned, wept, cried with a loud voice. It is hard for Him to arise, who is bowed down with the weight of evil habits. Christ troubleth Himself, to signify to thee that thou shouldest be troubled, when thou art pressed and weighed down with such a mass of sin. Faith groaneth, he that is displeased with himself groaneth, and accuseth his own evil deeds; that so the habit of sin may yield to the violence of repentance. When thou sayest, I have done such a thing, and God has spared me; I have heard the Gospel, and despised it; what shall I do? then Christ groaneth, because faith groaneth; and in the voice of thy groaning appeareth the hope of thy rising again.

GREGORY. (xxii. Moral.) Lazarus is bid to come forth, i. e. to come forth and condemn himself with his own mouth, without excuse or reservation: that so he that lies buried in a guilty conscience, may come forth out of himself by confession.

AUGUSTINE. (lib. lxxxiii. Quæst. q. 65) That Lazarus came forth from the grave, signifies the soul's deliverance from carnal sins. That he came bound up in grave clothes means, that even we who are delivered from carnal things, and serve with the mind the law of God, yet cannot, so long as we are in the body, be free from the besetments of the flesh. That his face was bound about with a napkin means, that we do not attain to full knowledge in this life. And when our Lord says, Loose him, and let him go, we learn that in another world all veils will be removed, and that we shall see face to face.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix) Or thus: When thou despisest, thou liest dead; when thou confessest, thou comest forth. For what is to come forth, but to go out, as it were, of thy hiding place, and shew thyself? But thou canst not make this confession, except God move thee to it, by crying with a loud voice, i. e. calling thee with great grace. But even after the dead man has come forth, he remains bound for some time, i. e. is as yet only a penitent. Then our Lord says to His ministers, Loose him, and let him go, i. e. remit his sins: Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. (Matt. 18:18)

ALCUIN. Christ awakes, because His power it is which quickens us inwardly: the disciples loose, because by the ministry of the priesthood, they who are quickened are absolved.

BEDE. By those who went and told the Pharisees, are meant those who seeing the good works of God's servants, hate them on that very account, persecute, and calumniate them.

11:47–53

47. Then gathered the chief priests and the Pharisees a council, and said, What do we? for this man doeth many miracles.

48. If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him: and the Romans shall come and take away both our place and nation.

49. And one of them, named Caiaphas, being the high priest that same year, said unto them, Ye know nothing at all,

50. Nor consider that it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not.

51. And this spake he not of himself: but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation;

52. And not for that nation only, but that also he should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad.

53. Then from that day forth they took counsel together for to put him to death.

THEOPHYLACT. Such a miracle as this should have drawn forth wonder and praise. But they make it a reason of plotting against His life: Then gathered the chief priests and Pharisees a council, and said, What do we?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. c. 26) But they had no thought of believing. The miserable men only consulted how they might hurt and kill Him, not how themselves might be saved from death. What do we? for this Man doeth many miracles.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv. c. 3) Him of whose divinity they had received such certain proofs, they call only a man.

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii. c. 11.) This speech is an evidence of their audacity and blindness: of their audacity, because they testified that He had done many miracles, and yet thought that they could contend successfully against Him, and that He would have no power of withstanding their plots; of their blindness, because they did not reflect that He who had wrought such miracles could easily escape out of their hands; unless indeed they denied that these miracles were done by Divine power. They resolved then not to let Him go; thinking that they should thus place an impediment in the way of those who wished to believe in Him, and also prevent the Romans from taking away their place and nation. If we let Him thus alone, all men will believe on Him, and the Romans shall come and take away both our place and nation.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv. 3) They say this to alarm the people; as if they were incurring the suspicion of setting up an usurper. If, say they, the Romans in crowds follow Him, they will suspect us of setting up a tyranny, and will destroy our state. But this was wholly a fiction of their own. For what was the fact? Did He take armed men about with Him, did He go with horsemen in His train? Did He not rather choose desert places to go to?

However, that they might not be suspected of consulting only their own interests, they declare the whole state is in danger.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 26) Or, they were afraid that, if all believed in Christ, none would remain to defend the city of God and the temple against the Romans: since they thought that Christ's teaching was directed against the temple, and their laws. They were afraid of losing temporal things, and thought not of eternal life; and thus they lost both. For the Romans, after our Lord had suffered and was glorified, did come and take away their place and nation, reducing the one by siege, and dispersing the other.

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii.) Mystically: It was fit that the Gentiles should occupy the place of them of the circumcision; because by their fall salvation came to the Gentiles. (non occ.). The Romans represent the Gentiles, being the rulers of the Gentile world. Their nation again was taken away, because they who had been the people of God, were made not a people.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv) When they hesitated, and asked, What do we? one of them gave most cruel and shameless advice, viz. Caiaphas, who was1 High Priest that same year.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix) How is it that he is called the High Priest of that year, when God appointed one hereditary High Priest? This was owing to the ambition and contention of parties amongst the Jews themselves, which had ended in the appointment of several High Priests, who took the office in turn, year by year. And sometimes even there seems to have been more than one in office.

ALCUIN. Of this Caiaphas Josephus relates, that he bought the priesthood for a year, for a certain sum.

ORIGEN. (t. xxx. c. 12.) a The character of Caiaphas is shewn by his being called the High Priest of that same year; the year, viz. in which our Saviour suffered. Being the High Priest that same year, he said unto them, Ye know nothing at all, nor consider that it is expedient for us that one man should die for the people, and that the whole nation perish not. (non occ.). i. e. Ye sit still, and give no attention. Attend to me. So insignificant a thing as the life of one man may surely be made a sacrifice for the safety of the state.

THEOPHYLACT. He said this with a bad intention, yet the Holy Spirit used his mouth as the vehicle of a prophecy: And this spake he not of himself: but being high priest that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for that nation.

ORIGEN. (tom. xxviii. c. 12.) Not every one that prophesieth is a prophet; as not every one that does a just action is just, he, for example, that does one for vainglory. Caiaphas prophesied without being a prophet, as did Balaam. Perhaps some will deny that Caiaphas prophesied by the Holy Spirit, on the ground that evil spirits may bear witness to Christ, as the one in Luke, who says, I know Thee who Thou art, the Holy One of God; (Luke 4:34) the intention of Caiaphas too being not to induce his hearers to believe on Him, but to excite them to kill Him. (c. 14.). It is expedient for us. Is this part of his prophecy true or false? If it is true, then those who contended against Jesus in the council, since Jesus died for the people, and they participate in the advantage of His death, are saved. This you say is absurd; and thence argue that the prophecy is false, and, if false, not dictated by the Holy Spirit, since the Holy Spirit does not lie. On the other side it is argued, for the truth of the prophecy, that these words only meant that He by the grace of God should taste death for all men; (Heb. 2:9) that He is the Saviour of all men, specially of them that believe. (1 Tim. 4:10) And in the same way the former part of the speech, Ye know nothing at all, is made out to be an assertion of the truth. They knew nothing of Jesus, who did not know that He was truth, wisdom, justice, and peace. And again, That one MAN. should die for the people. It was as man that He died for the people: in so far as He is the image of the invisible God, He was incapable of death. And He died for the people, in that He took upon Himself, made away with, blotted out the sins of the whole world. (c. 15.). And this spake he not of himself. Hence we see, what men say sometimes proceeds from themselves, sometimes from the influence of some power upon them. In the latter case though they may not be taken quite out of themselves, and in a certain sense go along with their own words, yet they do not go along with the meaning of them. Thus Caiaphas says nothing of himself; and therefore does not interpret his own prophcey, because he does not understand it. Thus Paul too speaks of some teachers of the law, who understand neither what they say, nor whereof they affirm. (1 Tim. 1:7)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 27.) We learn hence that even bad men may foretell things to come by the spirit of prophecy, which power the

Evangelist ascribes to a divine sacrament, he being Pontifex, i. e. High Priest.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv. 1) See the great virtue of the Holy Spirit, in drawing forth a prophecy from a wicked man. And see too the virtue of the pontifical office, which made him, though an unworthy High Priest, unconsciously prophesy. Divine grace only used his mouth; it touched not his corrupt heart.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 27) Caiaphas prophesied of the Jewish nation alone; in which nation were the sheep, of which our Lord says, I am not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel. (Matt. 15:34) But the Evangelist knew that there were other sheep, not of this fold, which were to be brought in, and therefore adds, And not for that nation only, but also that He should gather together in one the children of God that were scattered abroad; i. e. those who were predestined to be so: for as yet there were neither sheep, nor children of God.

GREGORY. (vi. Moral.) His persecutors accomplished this wicked purpose, and put Him to death, thinking to extinguish the devotion of His followers; but faith grew from the very thing which these cruel and unbelieving men thought would destroy it. That which human cruelty had executed against Him, He turned to the purposes of His mercy.

ORIGEN. (tom. xxviii. c. 17.) Inflamed by the speech of Caiaphas, they determined on killing our Lord: Then from that day forth they took counsel together to put Him to death. Was this then the work of the Holy Spirit, as well as the former, or was it another spirit which did both first speak by the mouth of a wicked man, and then excite others like him to kill Christ? Answer: It is not necessary that both should be the work of the same spirit. As some turn the Scriptures themselves, which were given for our good, to the support of bad doctrines; so this true prophecy respecting our Saviour was understood in a wrong sense, as if it were a call to put Him to death.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv. 1) They sought before to kill Him; now their resolution was confirmed.

11:54–57

54. Jesus therefore walked no more openly among the Jews; but went thence unto a country near to the wilderness, into a city called Ephraim, and

there continued with his disciples.

55. And the Jews’ passover was nigh at hand: and many went out of the country up to Jerusalem before the passover, to purify themselves.

56. Then sought they for Jesus, and spake among themselves, as they stood in the temple, What think ye, that he will not come to the feast?

57. Now both the chief priests and the Pharisees had given a commandment, that, if any man knew where he were, he should shew it, that they might take him.

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii. 18.) After this resolution of the Chief Priests and Pharisees, Jesus was more cautious in shewing Himself among the Jews, and retired to remote parts, and avoided populous places: Jesus therefore walked no more openly among the Jews; but went thence into a country near to the wilderness, into a city called Ephraim.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 28) Not that His power had failed Him; for, had He pleased, He might still have walked openly among the Jews, and they done nothing to Him. But He wished to shew the disciples, by His own example, that believers did not sin by retiring out of the sight of their persecutors, and hiding themselves from the fury of the wicked, rather than inflame that fury by their presence.

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii. 18.) It is praiseworthy, when struggles are at hand, not to avoid confession, or refuse to suffer death for the truth’s sake. And it is no less praiseworthy now to avoid giving occasion for such trial. Which we should take care to do, not only on account of the uncertainty of the event of a trial in our own case, but also not to be the occasion of increasing the impiety and guilt of others. For he who is the cause of sin in another, shall be punished. If we do not avoid our persecutor, when we have the opportunity, we make ourselves responsible for his offence. But our Lord not only retired Himself, but to remove all occasion of offence from His persecutors, took His disciples with Him: And there stayed with His disciples.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv. 2) How must it have troubled the disciples to see Him save Himself by merely human means? Whileall were rejoicing and keeping the feast, they remained hid, and in danger. Yet they continued with Him; as we read in Luke, Ye are they which have continued with Me in My temptations. (Luke 22:28)

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii. c. 19.) Mystically, Jesus walked openly among the Jews, when the Word of God used to come to them by the Prophets. But this Word ceased, i. e. Jesus went thence. (Is. 54:1) And He went to that town near the wilderness, whereof Isaiah says, More are the children of the desolate, than the children of the married wife. Ephraim signifies fertility. Ephraim was the younger brother of Manasses: Manasses stands for the elder people forgotten; the word Manasses meaning forgotten. When the elder people were forgotten and passed over, there came an abundant harvest from the Gentiles. Our Lord left the Jews, and went forth into a country—the whole world—near the wilderness, the deserted Church1, to Ephraim, the fruitful city; and there continues with His disciples up to this day.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l. 2) He who came from heaven to suffer, wished to draw near the place of His Passion, His hour being now at hand: And the Jews' passover was nigh at hand. That passover they had resolved to celebrate by shedding our Lord's blood; the blood which consecrated the Passover, the blood of the Lamb. The Law obliged every one to go up to the feast: And many went out of the country up to Jerusalem before the passover to purify them. But ours is the true Passover; the Jewish one was a shadow. The Jews held their passover in the dark, we in the light: their posts were stained with the blood of a slain animal, our foreheads are signed with the blood of Christ.

THEOPHYLACT. They went up before the passover, to be purified. For whoever had sinned willingly or unwillingly could not keep the passover, unless they were first purified by washings, fastings, and shaving of the head, and also offering certain stated oblations. While engaged in these purifications, they were plotting our Lord's death: Then sought they for Jesus, and spake among themselves, as they stood in the temple, What think ye, that He will not come to the feast?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv) They lay in wait for Him at the passover, and made the feast time the time of His death.

ORIGEN. (t. xxviii.) Wherefore the Evangelist does not call it the Lord's passover, but the Jews' passover. For then it was that they plotted our Lord's death.

ALCUIN. They sought Jesus with bad intent. We seek Him, standing in God's temple, mutually encouraging one another, and praying Him to come to our feast, and sanctify us by His presence.

THEOPHYLACT. If the common people only had done these things, the Passion would have seemed owing to men’s ignorance; but the Pharisees it is, who order Him to be taken: Now both the chief priests and the Pharisees had given a commandment, that, if any man knew where He were, he should shew it, that they might take Him.

ORIGEN. (tom. xxviii.) Observe, they did not know where He was; they knew that He had gone away. Mystically, they did not know where He was, because, in the place of the divine commandments, they taught the doctrines and commandments of men.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l. 4) Let us at least shew the Jews where He is; O that they would hear, that they would come to the Church, and take hold of Him for themselves!

CHAPTER 12

12:1–11

1. Then Jesus six days before the passover came to Bethany, where Lazarus was which had been dead, whom he raised from the dead.

2. There they made him a supper: and Martha served: but Lazarus was one of them that sat at the table with him.

3. Then took Mary a pound of ointment of spikenard, very costly, and anointed the feet of Jesus, and wiped his feet with her hair: and the house was filled with the odour of the ointment.

4. Then saith one of his disciples, Judas Iscariot, Simon’s son, which should betray him,

5. Why was not this ointment sold for three hundred pence, and given to the poor?

6. This he said, not that he cared for the poor; but because he was a thief, and had the bag, and bare what was put therein.

7. Then said Jesus, Let her alone: against the day of my burying hath she kept this.

8. For the poor always ye have with you; but me ye have not always.

9. Much people of the Jews therefore knew that he was there: and they came not for Jesus’ sake only, but that they might see Lazarus also, whom he had raised from the dead.

10. But the chief priests consulted that they might put Lazarus also to death:

11. Because that by reason of him many of the Jews went away, and believed on Jesus.

ALCUIN. As the time approached in which our Lord had resolved to suffer, He approached the place which He had chosen for the scene of His suffering: Then Jesus six days before the passover came to Bethany. First, He went to Bethany, then to Jerusalem; to Jerusalem to suffer, to Bethany to keep alive the recollection of the recent resurrection of Lazarus; Where Lazarus was, which had been dead, whom He raised from the dead.

THEOPHYLACT. On the tenth day of the month they took the lamb which was to be sacrificed on the passover, and from that time began the preparation for the feast. Or rather the ninth day of the month, i. e. six days before the passover, was the commencement of the feast. They feasted abundantly on that day. Thus we find Jesus partook of a banquet at Bethany: There they made Him a supper, and Martha served. That Martha served, shews that the entertainment was in her house. See the fidelity of the woman: she does not leave the task of serving to the domestics, but takes it upon herself. The Evangelist adds, in order, it would seem, to settle Lazarus' resurrection beyond dispute, But Lazarus was one of them that sat at the table with Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l. 5) He lived, talked, feasted; the truth was established, the unbelief of the Jews confounded.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv) Mary did not take part in serving the guests generally, but gave all her attention to our Lord, treating Him not as mere man, but as God: Then took Mary a pound of spikenard, very costly, and anointed the feet of Jesus, and wiped His feet with her hair.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l. 6) The word pistici seems to be the name of some place, from which this precious ointment came.

ALCUIN. Or pistici means genuine, non-adulterated. She is the woman that was a sinner, who came to our Lord in Simon's house with the box of ointment.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. ii. lxxix) That she did this on another occasion in Bethany is not mentioned in Luke's Gospel, but is in the other three. Matthew and Mark say that the ointment was poured on the head, John says, on the feet. Why not suppose that it was poured both on the head, and on the feet? (c. lxxviii.). Matthew and Mark introduce the supper and the ointment out of place in the order of time. (Mat 26:6. Mark 14:3.) When they are some way farther on in their narrationa, they go back to the sixth day before the passover.

And the house was filled with the odour of the ointment.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l) Remember the Apostle's words: To the one we are the savour of death unto death; and to the other the savour of life unto life. (2 cor. 11:16)

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. ii. lxxix. [156.]) Then saith one of His disciples, Judas Iscariot, Simon’s son, which should betray Him, Why was not this ointment sold for three hundred pence, and given to the poor? In the other Gospels it is the disciples who murmured at the waste of the ointment. I think myself that Judas is put for the whole body of disciples; the singular for the plural. But at any rate we may supply for ourselves, that the other disciples said it, or thought it, or were persuaded by this very speech of Judas. The only difference is, that Matthew and Mark expressly mention the concurrence of the others, whereas John only mentions Judas, whose habit of thieving He takes occasion to notice: This he said, not that he cared for the poor, but because he was a thief, and had the bag, and bare what was put therein.

ALCUIN. He carried it as a servant, he took it out as a thief.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l. 10) Judas did not perish at the time when he received money from the Jews to betray our Lord. He was already a thief, already lost, and followed our Lord in body, not in heart; wherein we are taught the duty of tolerating wicked men, lest we divide the body of Christ. He who robs the Church of any thing may be compared to the lost Judas. Tolerate the wicked, thou that art good, that thou mayest receive the reward of the good, and not fall into the punishment of the wicked. Follow the example of our Lord’s conversation upon earth. Wherefore had He bags, to Whom the Angels ministered, except because His Church should afterwards have bags? Why did He admit thieves, but to shew that His Church should tolerate thieves, while it suffered from them. It is not surprising that Judas, who was accustomed to steal money from the bags, should betray our Lord for money.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv. 2) But why was a thief entrusted with the bags of the poor? Perhaps it was to give him no excuse of wanting money, for of this he had enough in the bag for all his desires.

THEOPHYLACT. Some suppose that Judas had the keeping of the money, as being the lowest kind of service. For that the ministry of money matters ranks below the ministry of doctrine, we know from what the Apostle says in the Acts, It is not reason that we should leave the word of God, and serve tables. (Acts 6:2)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv. 2) Christ, with great forbearance, does not rebuke Judas for his thieving, in order to deprive him of all excuse for betraying Him.

ALCUIN. Then said Jesus, Let her alone: against the day of My burying hath she kept this: meaning that He was about to die, and that this ointment was suitable for His burial. So to Mary who was not able to be present, though much wishing, at the anointing of the dead body, was it given to do Him this office in His lifetime.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxv. 2) Again, as if to remind His betrayer, He alludes to His burial; For the poor ye have always with you, but Me ye have not always: as if He said, I am a burden, a trouble to thee; but wait a little, and I shall be gone.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l. 13) He was speaking of His bodily presence; for in respect of His majesty, providence, ineffable and invisible grace, those words are fulfilled, Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. (Mat. 28:20) (c. 12.). Or thus: In the person of Judas are represented the wicked in the Church; for if thou art a good man, thou hast Christ now by faith, and the Sacrament, and thou shalt have Him always, for when thou hast departed hence, thou shalt go to Him who said to the thief, To-day shalt thou be with Me in paradise. (Luke 23:43) But if thou art wicked, thou seemest to have Christ, because thou art baptized with the baptism of Christ, because thou approachest to the altar of Christ: but by reason of thy wicked life, thou shalt not have Him alway. It is not thou hast, but ye have, the whole body of wicked men being addressed in Judas. (c. 14). Much people of the Jews therefore knew that He was there, and they came not for Jesus' sake only, but that they might see Lazarus also, whom He had raised from the dead. Curiosity brought them, not love.

THEOPHYLACT. They wished to see with their own eyes him who had been raised from the dead, and thought that Lazarus might bring back a report of the regions below.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. l. 14) When the news of this great miracle had spread every where, and was supported by such clear evidence, that they could neither suppress or deny the fact, then, The chief priests consulted that they might put Lazarus to death. O blind rage! as if the Lord could raise the dead, and not raise the slain. Lo, the Lord hath done both. He raised Lazarus, and He raised Himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 1) No other miracle of Christ excited such rage as this. It was so public, and so wonderful, to see a man walking and talking after he had been dead four days. And the fact was so undeniable. In the case of some other miracles they had charged Him with breaking the sabbath, and so diverted people's minds: but here there was nothing to find fault with, and therefore they vent their anger upon Lazarus. They would have done the same to the blind man, had they not had the charge to make of breaking the sabbath. Then again the latter was a poor man, and they cast him out of the temple; but Lazarus was a man of rank, as is plain from the number who came to comfort his sisters. It vexed them to see all leaving the feast, which was now coming on, and going to Bethany.

ALCUIN. Mystically, that He came to Bethany six days before the passover, means, that He who made all things in six days, who created man on the sixth, in the sixth age of the world, the sixth day, the sixth hour, came to redeem mankind. The Lord's Supper is the faith of the Church, working by love. Martha serveth, whenever a believing soul devotes itself to the worship of the Lord. Lazarus is one of them that sit at table, when those who have been raised from the death of sin, rejoice together with the righteous, who have been ever such, in the presence of truth, and are fed with the gifts of heavenly grace. The banquet is given in Bethany, which means, house of obedience, i. e. in the Church: for the Church is the house of obedience.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 6) The ointment with which Mary anointed the feet of Jesus was justice. It was therefore a pound. It was ointment of spikenard (pistici) too, very precious. Πίστις is Greek for faith. Dost thou seek to do justice? The just liveth by faith. (Heb. 10:38) Anoint the feet of Jesus by good living, follow the Lord's footsteps: if thou hast a superfluity, give to the poor, and thou hast wiped the Lord's feet; for the hair is a superfluous part of the body.

ALCUIN. And observe, on the first occasion of her anointing, she anointed His feet only, but now she anoints both His feet and head. The former denotes the beginnings of penitence, the latter the righteousness of souls perfected. By the head of our Lord the loftiness of His Divine nature, by His feet the lowliness of His incarnation are signified; or by the head, Christ Himself, by the feet, the poor who are His members.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 7) The house was filled with the odour; the world was filled with the good fame.

12. On the next day much people that were come to the feast, when they heard that Jesus was coming to Jerusalem,

13. Took branches of palm trees, and went forth to meet him, and cried, Hosanna: Blessed is the King of Israel that cometh in the name of the Lord.

14. And Jesus, when he had found a young ass, sat thereon; as it is written,

15. Fear not, daughter of Sion: behold, thy King cometh, sitting on an ass’s colt.

16. These things understood not his disciples at the first: but when Jesus was glorified, then remembered they that these things were written of him, and that they had done these things unto him.

17. The people therefore that was with him when he called Lazarus out of his grave, and raised him from the dead, bare record.

18. For this cause the people also met him, for that they heard that he had done this miracle.

19. The Pharisees therefore said among themselves, Perceive ye how ye prevail nothing? behold, the world is gone after him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxiv) The Law enjoined, that on the tenth day of the first month a lamb or a kid should be shut up in the house, and be kept to the fourteenth day of the same month, on the evening of which day it was sacrificed. In accordance with this law, the Elect Lamb, the Lamb without spot, when He went up to Jerusalem to be immolated for the sanctification of the people, went up five days before, i. e. on the tenth day.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 1) See how great was the fruit of His preaching, and how large a flock of the lost sheep of the house of Israel heard the voice of their Shepherd: On the next day much people that were come to the feast, when they heard that Jesus was coming to Jerusalem, took branches of palm trees. The branches of palms are songs of praise, for the victory which our Lord was about to obtain by His death over death, and His triumph over the devil, the prince of death, by the trophy of the cross.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 1) They shewed now at last that they thought Him greater than a prophet: And went forth to meet Him, and cried, Hosanna! Blessed is the King of Israel, that cometh in the name of the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 2) Hosanna is a simple exclamation, rather indicating some excitement of the mind, than having any particular meaning; like many interjections that we have in Latin.

BEDE. It is a compound of two words; Hosi is shortened into save; Anna a mere exclamation, complete. Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord. The name of the Lord here is the name of God the Father; though we may understand it as His own name; inasmuch as He also is the Lord. But the former sense agrees better with the text above, I am come in My Father’s name. (5:43) He does not lose His divinity, when He teaches us humility.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 1) This is what more than any thing made men believe in Christ, viz. the assurance, that He was not opposed to God, that He came from the Father. The words shew us the divinity of Christ. Hosanna is, Save us; and salvation in Scripture is attributed to God alone. And cometh, it is said, not is brought: the former befits a lord, the latter a servant. In the name of the Lord, goes to prove the same thing. He does not come in the name of a servant, but in the name of the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 4) It were a small thing to the King eternal to be made a human king. Christ was not the King of Israel, to exact tribute, and command armies, but to direct souls, and bring them to the kingdom of heaven. For Christ then to be King of Israel, was a condescension, not an elevation, a sign of Hispity, not an increase of His power. For He who was called on earth the King of the Jews, is in heaven the King of Angels.

THEOPHYLACT. The Jews, when they called Him King of Israel, dreamed of an earthly king. They expected a king to arise, of more than human greatness, who would deliver them from the government of the Romans. But how did our Lord come? The next words tell us; And Jesus when He had found a young ass, sat thereon.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 5) John relates the matter briefly, the other Evangelists are more full. The ass, we read in them, was the foal of an ass on which no man had sat: i. e. the Gentile world, who had not received our Lord. The other ass, which was brought, (not the foal, for there were two,) is the believing Jew.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 1) He did this prophetically, to figure the unclean Gentiles being brought into subjection to the Gospel; and also as a fulfilment of prophecy.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li) This act of our Lord’s is pointed to in the Prophets, though the malignant rulers of the Jews did not see in it any fulfilment of prophecy: As it is written, Fear not, daughter of Sion, behold thy King cometh sitting on an ass’s colt. Yea, in that nation though reprobate, though blind, there remained still the daughter of Sion; even Jerusalem. To her it is said, Fear not, acknowledge Him whom thou praisest, and tremble not when He suffers. That blood it is which shall wipe away thy sins, and redeem thy life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 1) Or thus: Whereas they had had wicked kings, who had subjected them to wars, He saith to them, Trust Me, I am not such as they, but gentle and mild: which He shewed by the manner of His entrance. For He did not enter at the head of an army, but simply riding on an ass. And observe the philosophy (φιλοσοφίαν) of the Evangelist, who is not ashamed of confessing his ignorance at the time of what these things meant: These things understood not the disciple at the first, but when Jesus was glorified.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li) i. e. When He shewed the power of His resurrection, then they remembered that these things were written of Him, and that they had done these things unto Him, i. e. those things that were written of Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lvi. 1) Our Lord had not then revealed these things to them. Indeed it would have been a scandal to them had they known Him to be King at the time of His sufferings. Nor would they have understood the nature of His kingdom, but have mistaken it for a temporal one.

THEOPHYLACT. (non occ.) See then the consequences of our Lord’s passiona. It was not to no purpose that He had reserved His greatest miracle for the last. For the resurrection of Lazarus it was that made the crowd believe in Him. The people therefore that was with Him when He called Lazarus out of his grave, and raised him from the dead, bare record. For this cause the people also met Him, for that they heard that He had done this miracle. Hence the spite and plotting of the Pharisees: The Pharisees therefore said among themselves, Perceive ye how ye prevail nothing? behold the world is gone after Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 7) The crowd was disturbed by the crowd. (Turba turbavit turbam) But why grudgeth that blind crowd, that the world should go after Him, by Whom the world was made?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 2) The world means here the crowd. This seems to be the speech of that part who were sound in their faith, but dared not profess it. They try to deter the rest by exposing the insuperable difficulties they would have to contend with.

THEOPHYLACT. As if they said, The more you attack Him, the more will His power and reputation increase. What use then of these attempts?

12:20–26

20. And there were certain Greeks among them that came up to worship at the feast.

21. The same came therefore to Philip, which was of Bethsaida of Galilee, and desired him, saying, Sir, we would see Jesus.

22. Philip cometh and telleth Andrew: and again Andrew and Philip tell Jesus.

23. And Jesus answered them, saying, The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified.

24. Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit.

25. He that loveth his life shall lose it, and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal.

26. If any man serve me, let him follow me; and where I am, there shall also my servant be: if any man serve me, him will my Father honour.

BEDE. The temple at Jerusalem was so famous, that on the feast days, not only the people near, but many Gentiles from distant countries came to worship in it; as that eunuch of Candace, Queen of the Ethiopians, mentioned in the Acts. The Gentiles who were at Jerusalem now, had come up for this purpose: And there were certain Gentiles among them who came to worship at the feast.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 2) The time being now near, when they would be made proselytes. They hear Christ talked of, and wish to see Him: The same came therefore to Philip, which was of Bethsaida of Galilee, and desired him, saying, Sir, we would see Jesus.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 8) Lo! the Jews wish to kill Him, the Gentiles to see Him. But they also were of the Jews who cried, Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord. So behold them of the circumcision, and them of the uncircumcision, once so wide apart, coming together like two walls, and meeting in one faith of Christ by the kiss of peace.

Philip cometh and telleth Andrew.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 2) As being the elder disciple. He had heard our Saviour say, Go not into the way of the Gentiles; (Matt. 10:5) and therefore he communicates with his fellow-disciple, and they refer the matter to their Lord: And again Andrew and Philip tell Jesus.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 8) Listen we to the voice of the corner stone: And Jesus answered them, saying, The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified. Did He think Himself glorified, because the Gentiles wished to see? No. But He saw that after His passion and resurrection, the Gentiles in all lands would believe on Him; and took occasion from this request of some Gentiles to see Him, to announce the approaching fulness of the Gentiles, for that the hour of His being glorified was now at hand, and that after He was glorified in the heavens, the Gentiles would believe; according to the passage in the Psalm, Set up Thyself, O God, above the heavens, and Thy glory above all the earth. (Ps. 56, and 107) But it was necessary that His exaltation and glory should be preceded by His humiliation and passion; wherefore He says, Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except a corn of wheat fall into they round and die, it abideth alone: but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit. That corn was He; to be mortified in the unbelief of the Jews, to be multiplied in the faith of the Gentiles.

BEDE. He Himself, of the seed of the Patriarchs, was sown in the field of this world, that by dying, He might rise again with increase. He died alone; He rose again with many.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi. 2) He illustrates His discourse by an example from nature. A grain of corn produces fruit, after it has died. How much more then must the Son of God? The Gentiles were to be called after the Jews had finally offended; i. e. after His crucifixion. Now then that the Gentiles of their own accord offered their faith, He saw that His crucifixion could not be far off. And to console the sorrow of His disciples, which He foresaw would arise, He tells them that to bear patiently not only His death, but their own too, is the only way to good: He that loveth his life shall lose it.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 10) This may be understood in two ways: 1. If thou lovest it, lose it: if thou wouldest preserve thy life in Christ, fear not death for Christ. 2. Do not love thy life here, lest thou lose it hereafter. The latter seems to be the more evangelical (evangelicus) sense; for it follows, And he that hateth his life in this world, shall keep it unto life eternal.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 1) He loveth his life in this world, who indulges its inordinate desires; he hateth it, who resists them. It is not, who doth not yield to, but, who hateth. For as we cannot bear to hear the voice or see the face of them whom we hate; so when the soul invites us to things contrary to God, we should turn her away from them with all our might.

THEOPHYLACT. It were harsh to say that a man should hate his soul; so He adds, in this world: i. e. for a particular time, not for ever. And we shall gain in the end by so doing: shall keep it unto life eternal.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li. 10) But think not for an instant, that by hating thy soul, is meant that thou mayest kill thyself. For wicked and perverse men have sometimes so mistaken it, and have burnt and strangled themselves, thrown themselves from precipices, and in other ways put an end to themselves. This did not Christ teach; nay, when the devil tempted Him to cast Himself down, He said, Get thee hence, Satanb. But when no other choice is given thee; when the persecutor threatens death, and thou must either disobey God’s law, or depart out of this life, then hate thy life in this world, that thou mayest keep it unto life eternal.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 1) This present life is sweet to them who are given up to it. But he who looks heavenwards, and sees what good things are there, soon despises this life. When the better life appears, the worse is despised. This is Christ’s meaning, when He says, If any man serve Me, let him follow Me, i. e. imitate Me, both in My death, and life. For he who serves, should follow him whom he serves.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. li) But what is it to serve Christ? The very words explain. They serve Christ who seek not their own things, but the things of Jesus Christ, i. e. who follow Him, walk in His, not their own, ways, do all good works for Christ’s sake, not only works of mercy to men’s bodies, but all others, till at length they fulfil that great work of love, and lay down their lives for the brethren. But what fruit, what reward? you ask. The next words tell you: And where I am, there shall also My servant be. Love Him for His own sake, and think it a rich reward for thy service, to be with Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii) So then death will be followed by resurrection. Where I am, He says; for Christ was in heaven before His resurrection. Thither let us ascend in heart and in mind.

If any man serve Me, him will My Father honour. This must be understood as an explanation of the preceding. There also shall My servant be. For what greater honour can an adopted son receive than to be where the Only Son is?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii) He says, My Father will honour him, not, I will honour him; because they had not yet proper notions of His nature, and thought Him inferior to the Father.

12:27–33

27. Now is my soul troubled; and what shall I say? Father, save me from this hour: but for this cause came I unto this hour.

28. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.

29. The people therefore, that stood by, and heard it, said that it thundered: others said, An angel spake to him.

30. Jesus answered and said, This voice came not because of me, but for your sakes.

31. Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out.

32. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me.

33. This he said, signifying what death he should die.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvi) To our Lord’s exhortation to His disciples to endurance, they might have replied that it was easy for Him, Who was out of the reach of human pain, to talk philosophically about death, and to recommend others to bear what He is in no danger of having to bear Himself. So He lets them see that He is Himself in an agony, but that He does not intend to decline death, merely for the sake of relieving Himself: Now is My soul troubled.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 2) I hear Him say, He that hateth his life in this world, shall keep it unto life eternal; and I am ravished, I despise the world; the whole of this life, however long, is but a vapour in My sight; all temporal things are vile, in comparison with eternal. And again I hear Him say, Now is My soul troubled. Thou biddest my soul follow Thee; but I see Thy soul troubled. What foundation shall I seek, if the Rock gives way? Lord, I acknowledge Thy mercy. Thou of Thy love wast of Thine own will troubled, to console those who are troubled through the infirmity of nature; that the members of Thy body perish not in despair. The Head took upon Himself the affections of His members. He was not troubled by any thing, but, as was said above, He troubled Himself. (c. 11:33)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii) As He draws near to the Cross, His human nature appears, a nature that did not wish to die, but cleaved to this present life. He shews that He is not quite without human feelings. For the desire of this present life is not necessarily wrong, any more than hunger. Christ had a body free from sin, but not from natural infirmities. But these attach solely to the dispensation of His humanity, not to His divinity.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii) Lastly, let the man who would follow Him, hear at what hour he should follow. A fearful hour has perhaps come: a choice is offered, either to do wrong, or suffer: the weak soul is troubled. Hear our Lord. What shall I say?

BEDE. i. e. What but something to confirm My followers? Father, save Me from this hour.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 3) He teaches thee Whom thou shouldest call on, whose will prefer to thine own. Let Him not seem to fall from His greatness, because He wishes thee to rise from thy meanness. He took upon Him man’s infirmity, that He might teach the afflicted to say, Not what I will, but what Thou wilt. Wherefore He adds, But for this cause came I unto this hour. Father, glorify Thy name: i. e. in My passion and resurrection.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 2) As if He said, I cannot say why I should ask to be saved from it; For for this cause came I unto this hour. However ye may be troubled and dejected at the thought of dying, do not run away from death. I am troubled, yet I ask not to be spared. I do not say, Save Me from this hour, but the contrary, Glorify Thy name. To die for the truth was to glorify God, as the event shewed; for after His crucifixion the whole world was to be converted to the knowledge and worship of God, both the Father and the Son. But this He is silent about.

Then came there a voice from heaven, saying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again.

GREGORY. (Moral. xxviii.) When God speaks audibly, as He does here, but no visible appearance is seen, He speaks through the medium of a rational creature: i. e. by the voice of an Angel.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 4) I have glorified it, i. e. before I made the world; and will glorify it again, i. e. when Thou shalt rise from the dead. Or, I have glorified it, when Thou wast born of a Virgin, didst work miracles, wast made manifest by the Holy Ghost descending in the shape of a dove; and will glorify it again, when Thou shalt rise from the dead, and, as God, be exalted above the heavens, and Thy glory above all the earth.

The people therefore that stood by and heard it, said that it thundered.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 2) The voice though loud and distinct, soon passed off from their gross, carnal, and sluggish minds; only the sound remaining. Others perceived an articulate voice, but did not catch what it said: Others said, An Angel spake to Him.

Jesus answered and said, This voice came not because of Me, but for your sakes.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 5) i. e. It did not come to tell Him what He knew already, but them what they ought to know. And as that voice did not come for His sake, but for theirs, so His soul was not troubled for His sake, but for theirs.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 2) The voice of the Father proved what they were so fond of denying, that He was from God. For He must be from God, if He was glorified by God. It was not that He needed encouragement of such a voice Himself, but He condescended to receive it for the sake of those who were by. Now is the judgment of this world: this fits on to the preceding, as shewing the mode of His being glorified.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 6) The judgment at the end of the world will be of eternal rewards and punishments. But there is another judgment, not of condemnation, but of selection, which is the one meant here; the selection of His own redeemed, and their deliverance from the power of the devil: Now shall the prince of this world be cast out. The devil is not called the prince of this world, in the sense of being lord over heaven and earth; God forbid. The world here stands for the wicked dispersed over all the world. In this sense the devil is the prince of the world, i. e. of all the wicked men who live in the world. The world also sometimes stands for the good dispersed throughout the world: God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself. (2 Cor. 5:19) These are they from whose hearts the prince of this world shall be cast out. Our Lord foresaw that after His passion and glorifying, great nations all over the world would be converted, in whom the devil was then, but from whose hearts, on their truly renouncing him1, he would be cast out. But was he not cast out of the hearts of righteous men of old? Why is it, Now shall be cast out? Because that which once took place in a very few persons, was now to take place in whole nations. What then, does the devil not tempt at all the minds of believers? Yea, he never ceases to tempt them. But it is one thing to reign within, another to lay siege from without.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 2) What kind of judgment it is by which the devil is cast out, I will explain by an example. A man demands payment from his debtors, beats them, and sends them to prison. He treats with the same insolence one who owes him nothing. The latter will take vengeance both for himself and the others too. This Christ does. He revenges what He has suffered at the devil’s hands, and with Himself He revenges us too. But that none may say, How will he be cast out, if he overcome thee? He adds, And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Me. How can He be overcome, who draws others unto Him? This is more than saying, I shall rise again. Had He said this, it would not have proved that He would draw all things unto Him; but, I shall draw, includes the resurrection, and this besides.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 11) What is this all that He draweth, but that from which the devil is cast out? He does not say, All men, but, All things; for all men have not faith. He does not mean then all mankind, but the whole of a man, i. e. spirit, soul, and body; by which respectively we understand, and live, and are visible. Or, if all means all men, it means those who are predestined to salvation: or all kinds of men, all varieties of character, excepting in the article of sin.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxvii. 3.) Why then did He say above, that the Father drew men? (c. 6:46.) Because the Father draws, by the Son who draws. I shall draw, He says, as if men were in the grasp of some tyrant, from which they could not extricate themselves.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 11) If I be lifted up from the earth, He says, i. e. when I shall be lifted up. He does not doubt that the work will be accomplished which He came to do. By His being lifted up, He means His passion on the cross, as the Evangelist adds: This He said, signifying by what death He should die.

12:34–36

34. The people answered him, We have heard out of the law that Christ abideth for ever: and how sayest thou, The Son of man must be lifted up? who is this Son of man?

35. Then Jesus said unto them, Yet a little while is the light with you. Walk while ye have the light, lest darkness come upon you: for he that walketh in darkness knoweth not whither he goeth.

36. While ye have light, believe in the light, that ye may be the children of light. These things spake Jesus, and departed, and did hide himself from them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 12) The Jews when they understood that our Lord spoke of His own death, asked how that could be: The people answered Him, We have heard out of the law that Christ abideth for ever: and how sayest Thou, The Son of man must be lifted up? Who is this Son of man? Though our Lord did not call Himself the Son of man here, they remembered that He often called Himself so; as He had just before: The hour is come, that the Son of man should be glorified. They remember this, and ask, If Christ abideth for ever, how will He be lifted up from the earth; i. e. how will He die upon the cross?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 1) Hence we see, that they understood many of the things that He spake in parables. As He had talked about death a little time before, they saw now what was meant by His being lifted up.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 12) Or they interpreted the word by their own intended act. It was not wisdom imparted, but conscience disturbed, which disclosed its meaning to them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 1) And see how maliciously they put the question. They do not say, We have heard out of the law, that Christ doth not suffer; for in many places of Scripture His passion and resurrection are spoken of together, but, abideth for ever. And yet His immortality was not inconsistent with the fact of His suffering. They thought this proved however that He was not Christ. Then they ask, Who is this Son of man? another malicious question; as if to say, Do not charge us with putting this question out of hatred to Thee; for we simply ask for information. Christ shews them in His answer that His passion does not prevent Him from abiding for ever: Then Jesus said unto them, Yet a little while is the light with you: as if His death were but going away for a time, as the sun's light only sets to rise again.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 13) Yet a little while is the light with you. Hence it is that ye understand1 that Christ abideth for ever. Wherefore walk while ye have the light, approach, understand the whole, that Christ will both die, and live for ever: do this while ye have the light.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 1) He does not mean only the time before His crucifixion, but the whole of their lives. For many believed on Him after His crucifixion. Lest darkness come upon you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii. 13) i. e. if ye so believe in the eternity of Christ, as to deny His humiliation and death.

For he that walketh in darkness, knoweth not whither he goeth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 1) What things do the Jews now, and know not what they do; thinking, like men in the dark, that they are going the right road, while they are taking directly the wrong one. Wherefore He adds, While ye have the light, believe in the light.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii) i. e. While ye have any truth, believe in the truth, that ye may be born again of the truth: That ye may be the children of the light.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii) i. e. My children. In the beginning of the Gospel it is said, Born of God, (c. 1:13) i. e. of the Father. But here He Himself is the Begetter. The same act is the act both of Father and Son.

These things spake Jesus, and departed, and did hide Himself from them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lii) Not from those which began to believe in and love Him, but from those who saw and envied Him. When He hid Himself, He consulted our weakness, He did not derogate from His own power.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 1) But why did He hide Himself, when they neither took up stones to cast at Him, nor blasphemed? Because He saw into their hearts, and knew the fury they were in; and therefore did not wait till they broke out into act, but retired to give their envy time to subside.

12:37–43

37. But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him:

38. That the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed?

39. Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again,

40. He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them.

41. These things said Esaias, when he saw his glory, and spake of him.

42. Nevertheless among the chief rulers also many believed on him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue:

43. For they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 1) And thusb the Evangelist tacitly explains it, when he adds, But though He had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on Him.

THEOPHYLACT. He means the miracles related above. It was no small wickedness to disbelieve against such miracles as those.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 2) But why then did Christ come? Did He not know that they would not believe in Him? Yes: the Prophets had prohibited this very unbelief, and He came that it might be made manifest, to their confusion and condemnation; That the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled, which He spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed?

ALCUIN. Who, i. e. so very few believed.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liii. 2) It is evident here that the arm of the Lord is the Son of God Himself. Not that the Father has a human fleshly form; He is called the arm of the Lord, because all things were made by Him. If a man had power of such a kind, as that without any motion of his body, what he said was forthwith done, the word of that man would be his arm. Here is no ground to justify, however, the error of those who say that the Godhead is one Person only, because the Son is the arm of the Father, and a man and his arm are not two persons, but one. These men do not understand, that the commonest things require to be explained often by applying language to them taken from other things in which there happens to be a likeness, [cand that, when we are upon things incomprehensible, and which cannot be described as they actually are, this is much more necessary. Thus one man calls another man, whom he makes great use of, his arm; and talks of having lost his arm, of having his arm taken away from him.] But some mutter, and ask, What fault was it of the Jews, if it was necessary that the sayings of Esaias should be fulfilled? We answer, that God, foreseeing the future, predicted by the Prophet the unbelief of the Jews, but did not cause it. God does not compel men to sin, because He knows they will sin. He foreknows their sins, not His own. The Jews committed the sin, which He who knows all things foretold they would commit.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 2) That the saying of Esaias might be fulfilled: that here is expressive not of the cause, but of the event. They did not disbelieve because Esaias said they would; but because they would disbelieve, Esaias said they would.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liii. 5) But what follows involved a deeper question: Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts, that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them. That they should not believe; but if so, what sin is there in a man doing what he cannot help doing? And what is a graver point still, the cause is assigned to God; since He it is who blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart. This is not said to be the devil's doing, but God's. Yet if any ask why they could not believe, I answer, Because they would not. For as it is to the praise of the Divine will that God cannot deny Himself, so is it the fault of the human will that they could not believe.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 2) This is a common form of speech among ourselves. I cannot love such a man, meaning by this necessity only a vehement will. The Evangelist says could not, to shew that it was impossible that the Prophet should lie, not that it was impossible that they should believe.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liii. 5) But the Prophet, you say, mentions another cause, not their will; viz. that God had blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart. But I answer, that they well deserved this. For God hardens and blinds a man, by forsaking and not supporting him; and this He may by a secret sentence, by an unjust one He cannot.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii) For He does not leave us, except we wish Him, as He saith in Hosea, Seeing thou hast forgotten the law of thy God, I will also forget thy children. (Hos. 4:6) Whereby it is plain that we begin to forsake first, and are the cause of our own perdition. For as it is not the fault of the sun, that it hurts weak eyes, so neither is God to blame for punishing those who do not attend to His words.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liii. 11) And be converted, and I should heal them. Is not to be understood here, from the beginning of the sentence—that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their hearts, nor be converted; conversion being the free gift of God? ord, shall we suppose that a heavenly remedy is meant; whereby those who wished to establish their own righteousness, were so far deserted and blinded, as to stumble on the stumbling stone, till, with confusion of face, they humbled themselves, and sought not their own righteousness which puffeth up the proud, but God's righteousness, which justifieth the ungodly. For many of those who put Christ to death, were afterward troubled with a sense of their guilt; which led to their believing in Him. (c. 12). These things said Esaias, when he saw His glory, and spake of Him. He saw Him not really, but figuratively, in prophetic vision. Be not deceived by those who say that the Father is invisible, the Son visible, making the Son a creature. For in the form of God, in which He is equal to the Father, the Son also is invisible; though He took upon Him the form of a servant, that He might be seen by men. Before His incarnation too, He made Himself visible at times to human eyes; but visible through the medium of created matter, not visible as He is.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 2) His glory means the vision of Him sitting on His lofty throne: I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne. Also I heard the voice of the Lord, saying, Whom shall I send, and who will go for us? (Is. 6:1)

ALCUIN. Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also many believed on Him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess Him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue. For they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God. The praise of God is publicly to confess Christ: the praise of men is to glory in earthly things.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liii. 13) As their faith grew, their love of human praise grew still more, and outstripped it.

44. Jesus cried and said, He that believeth on me, believeth not on me, but on him that sent me.

45. And he that seeth me seeth him that sent me.

46. I am come a light into the world, that whosoever believeth on me should not abide in darkness.

47. And if any man hear my words, and believe not, I judge him not: for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world.

48. He that rejecteth me, and receiveth not my words, hath one that judgeth him: the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day.

49. For I have not spoken of myself; but the Father which sent me, he gave me a commandment, what I should say, and what I should speak.

50. And I know that His commandment is life everlasting: whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto me, so I speak.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 1) Because the love of human praise prevented the chief rulers from believing, Jesus cried and said, He that believeth on Me, believeth not on Me, but on Him that sent Me: as if to say, Why are ye afraid to believe on Me? Your faith through Me passes to God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liv. 2) He signifies to them that He is more than He appears to be, (for to men He appeared but a man; His Godhead was hid.) Such as the Father is, such am I in nature and in dignity; He that believeth on Me, believeth not on Me, i. e. on that which He sees, but on Him that sent Me, i. e. on the Father. [1He that believes in the Father must believe in Him as the Father, i. e. must believe that He has a Son; and reversely, he who believes in the Son thereby believes in the Father.] And again, if any one thinks that God has sons by grace, but not a Son equal and coeternal with Himself, neither does he believe 2on the Father, who sent the Son; because what he believes on is not the Father who sent Him. (c. 3.). And to shew that He is not the Son, in the sense of one out of many, a son by grace, but the Only Son equal to the Father, He adds, And He that seeth Me, seeth Him that sent Me; so little difference is there between Me and Him that sent Me, that He that seeth Me, seeth Him. Our Lord sent His Apostles, yet none of them dared to say, He that believeth on Me. We believe an Apostle, but we do not believe on an Apostle. Whereas the Only Begotten says, He that believeth on Me, doth not believe on Me, but on Him that sent Me. Wherein He does not withdraw the believer’s faith from Himself, but gives him a higher object than the form of a servant, for that faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxix. 1) He that believeth on Me, believeth not on Me, but on Him that sent Me: as if He said, He that taketh water from a stream, taketh the water not of the stream, but of the fountain. Then to shew that it is not possible to believe on the Father, if we do not believe on Him, He says, He that seeth Me, seeth Him that sent Me. What then? Is God a body? By no means; seeing here is the mind’s vision. What follows still further shews His union with the Father. I am come a light into the world. This is what the Father is called in many places. He calls Himself the light, because he delivers from error, and disperses the darkness of the understanding; that whosoever believeth in Me should not abide in darkness.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liv. 4) Whereby it is evident, that He found all in darkness. In which darkness if they wish not to remain, they must believe in the light which is come into the world. He says in one place to His disciples, Ye are the light of the world; but He did not say to them, Ye are come a light into the world, that whosoever believeth on you should not abide in darkness. All saints are lights, but they are so by faith, because they are enlightened by Him, from Whom to withdraw is darkness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxix. 1) And to shew that He does not let His despisers go unpunished, from want of power, He adds, And if any man hear My words and believe not, I judge him not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liv. 5, 6) i. e. I judge him not now. He does not say, I judge him not at the last day, for that would be contrary to the sentence above, The Father hath committed all judgment unto the Son. (5:22) And the reason follows, why He does not judge now; For I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. Now is the time of mercy, afterward will be the time of judgment.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxix. 2) But that this might not serve to encourage sloth, He warns men of a terrible judgment coming; He that rejecteth Me, and heareth not My words, hath one that judgeth him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liv. 6) Mean time they waited to know who this one was; so He proceeds: The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him at the last day. He makes it sufficiently clear that He Himself will judge at the last day. For the word that He speaks, is Himself. He speaks Himself, announces Himself. We gather too from these words that those who have not heard, will be judged differently from those who have heard and despised.

AUGUSTINE. (i. de Trin. c. xii. [26.]) I judge him not; the word that I have spoken shall judge him: for I have not spoken of Myself. The word which the Son speaks judges, because the Son did not speak of Himself: for I have nut spoken of Myself: i. e. I was not born of Myself.

AUGUSTINE.e I ask then how we shall understand this, I will not judge, but the word which I have spoken will judge? Yet He Himself is the Word of the Father which speaketh. Is it thus? I will not judge by My human power, as the Son of man, but as the word of God, because I am the Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxviii. 2) Or, I judge him not, i. e. I am not the cause of his destruction, but he is himself, by despising my words. The words that I have just said, shall be his accusers, and deprive him of all excuse; the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him. And what word? This, viz. thatf I have not spoken of Myself, but the Father which sent Me gave Me a commandment what I should say, and what I should speak. All these things were said on their account, that they might have no excuse.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liv. 7) When the Father gave the Son a commandment, He did not give Him what He had not: for in the Wisdom of the Father, i. e. in the Word, are all the commandments of the Father. The commandment is said to be given, because it is not from him to whom it is said to be given. But to give the Son that which He never was without, is the same as to beget the Son who never was not.

THEOPHYLACT. Since the Son is the Word of the Father, and reveals completely what is in the mind of the Father, He says He receives a commandment what He should say, and what He should speak: just as our word, if we say what we think, brings out what is in our minds.

And I know that His commandment is life everlasting.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. liv) If life everlasting is the Son Himself, and the commandment is life everlasting, what is this but saying, I am the commandment of the Father? And in the same way in the following; Whatsoever I speak therefore, even as the Father said unto Me, so I speak, we must not understand, said unto Me, as if words were spoken to the Only Word. The Father spoke to the Son, as He gave life to the Son; not that the Son knew not, or had not, but that He was the Son. What is meant by, as He said unto Me, so I speak, but that I am the Word who speaks. The Father is true, the Son is truth: the True, begat the Truth. What then could He say to the Truth, if the Truth was perfect from the beginning, and no new truth could be added to Him? That He spake to the Truth then, means that He begat the Truth.

CHAPTER 13

13:1–5

1. Now before the feast of the passover, when Jesus knew that his hour was come that he should depart out of this world unto the Father, having loved his own which were in the world, he loved them unto the end.

2. And supper being ended, the devil having now put into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon’s son, to betray him;

3. Jesus knowing that the Father had given all things into his hands, and that he was come from God, and went to God;

4. He riseth from supper, and laid aside his garments; and took a towel, and girded himself.

5. After that he poureth water into a bason, and began to wash the disciples’ feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith he was girded.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord being about to depart out of this life, shews His great care for His disciples: Now before the feast of the Passover, when Jesus knew that His hour was come that He should depart out of this world unto the Father, having loved His own which were in the world, He loved them unto the end.

BEDE. The Jews had many feasts, but the principal one was the passover; and therefore it is particularly said, Before the feast of the passover.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lv) Pascha is not a Greek word, as some think, but Hebrew: though there is remarkable agreement of the two languages in it. The Greek word to suffer being πασχεῖν, pascha has been thought to mean passion, as being derived from the above word. But in Hebrew, pascha is a passing over; the feast deriving its name from the passing of the people of God over the Red Sea into Egypt. All was now to take place in reality, of which that passover was the type. Christ was led as a lamb to the slaughter; whose blood sprinkled upon our door-posts, i. e. whose sign of the cross marked on our foreheads, delivers us from the dominion of this world, as from Egyptian bondage. And we perform a most wholesome journey or pass-over, when we pass over from the devil to Christ, from this unstable world to His sure kingdom. In this way the Evangelist seems to interpret the word: When Jesus knew that His hour was come when He should pass over1 out of this world unto the Father. This is the pascha, this the passing over.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 1) He did not know then for the first time: He had known long before. By His departure He means His death. Being so near leaving His disciples, He shews the more love for them: Having loved His own which were in the world, He loved them unto the end; i. e. He left nothing undone which one who greatly loved should do. He reserved this for the last, that their love might be increased by it, and to prepare them by such consolation for the trials that were coming. His own He calls them, in the sense of intimacy. The word was used in another sense in the beginning of the Gospel: (c. 1:11) His own received Him not. It follows, which were in the world: for those were dead who were His own, such as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, who were not in the world. These then, His own which were in the world, He loved all along, and at the last manifested His love in completeness: He loved them unto the end.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lv. 2) He loved them unto the end, i. e. that they themselves too might pass out of this worlda, by love, unto Him their head. For what is unto the end, but unto Christ? (Rom. 10:4) For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. But these words may be understood after a human sort, to mean that Christ loved His own up to His death. But God forbid that He should end His love by death, who is not ended by death: except indeed we understand it thus: He loved His own unto death: i. e. His love for them led Him to death. And supper having been made, i. e. having been got ready, and laid on the table before them; not having been consumed and finished: for it was during supper that He rose, and washed His disciples’ feet; as after this He sat at table again, and gave the sop to the traitor. What follows: The devil having now put it into the heart of Judas Iscariot, Simon’s son, to betray Him, refers to a secret suggestion, not made to the ear, but to the mind; the suggestions of the devil being part of our own thoughts. Judas then had already conceived, through diabolical instigation, the intention of betraying his Master.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 1) The Evangelist inserts this as if in astonishment: our Lord being about to wash the feet of the very person who had resolved to betray Him. It shews the great wickedness too of the traitor, that even the partaking of the same table, which is a check to the worst of men, did not stop him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lv. 6) The Evangelist being about to relate so great an instance of our Lord's humility, reminds us first of His lofty nature: knowing that the Father had given all things into His hand, not excepting the traitor.

GREGORY. He knew that He had even His persecutors in His hand that He might convert them from malice to love of Him.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxiv. 3) The Father hath given all things into His hands; i. e. into His power; for His hands hold all thingsb: or to Him, for His work; My Father worketh hitherto, and I work. (John 5:17)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 1) Had given all things into His hand. What is given Him is the salvation of the believers. Think not of this giving up in a human way. It signifies His honour for, and agreement with, the Father. For as the Father hath given up all things to Him, so hath He given up all things to the Father. (1 Cor. 15:24) When He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lv. 5) Knowing too, that He was come from God, and went to God; not that He left God when He came, or will leave us when He returns.

THEOPHYLACT. The Father having given up all things into His hands, i. e. having given up to Him the salvation of the faithful, He deemed it right to shew them all things that pertained to their salvation; and gave them a lesson of humility, by washing His disciples' feet. Though knowing that He was from God, and went to God, He thought it in no way took from His glory, to wash His disciples' feet; thus proving that He did not usurp His greatness. For usurpers do not condescend, for fear of losing what they have irregularly got.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lv. 6) Since the Father had given all things into His hands, He washed not His disciples' hands indeed, but their feet; and since He knew that He came from God, and went to God, He performed the work not of God and Lord, but of a man and servant.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 1) It was a thing worthy of Him, Who came from God, and went to God, to trample upon all pride; He riseth from supper, and laid aside His garment, and took a towel, and girded Himself. After that He poureth water into a bason, and began to wash His disciples' feet, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith He was girded. (c. 2). See what humility He shews, not only in washing their feet, but in other things. For it was not before, but after they had sat down, that He rose; and He not only washed them, but laid aside His garments, and girded Himself with a towel, and filled a bason; He did not order others to do all this, but did it Himself, teaching us that we should be willing and ready to do such things.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 2.) Mystically, dinner is the first meal, taken early in the spiritual day, and adapted to those who have just entered upon this day. Supper is the last meal, and is set before those who are farther advanced. According to another sense, dinner is the understanding of the Old Testament, the supper the understanding the mysteries hid in the New. Yet even they who sup with Jesus, who partake of the final meal, need a certain washing, not indeed of the top parts of their body, i. e. the soul, but its lower parts and extremities, which cleave necessarily to earth. (c. 4.). It is, And began to wash; for He did not finish His washing till afterwards. The feet of the Apostles were defiled now: All of ye shall be offended because of Me this night. (Matt. 26:31) But afterwards He cleansed them, so that they needed no more cleansing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lv. 7) He laid aside His garments, when, being in the form of God, He emptied Himself; He girded. Himself with a towel, took upon Him the form of a servant; He poured water into a bason, out of which He washed His disciples' feet. He shed His blood on the earth, with which He washed away the filth of their sins; He wiped them with the towel wherewith He was girded; with the flesh wherewith He was clothed, He established the steps of the Evangelists; He laid aside His garments, to gird Himself with the towel; that He might take upon Him the form of a servant, He emptied Himself, not laying aside indeed what He had, but assuming what He had not. Before He was crucified, He was stripped of His garments, and when dead was wound up in linena clothes: the whole of His passion is our cleansing.

13:6–11

6. Then cometh he to Simon Peter: and Peter said unto him, Lord, dost thou wash my feet?

7. Jesus answered and said unto him, What I do thou knowest not now; but thou shalt know hereafter.

8. Peter saith unto him, Thou shalt never wash my feet. Jesus answered him, If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with me.

9. Simon Peter saith unto him, Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands and my head.

10. Jesus saith to him, He that is washed needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit: and ye are clean, but not all.

11. For he knew who should betray him; therefore said he, Ye are not all clean.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii.) As a physician, who has many sick under his care, begins with those who want his attention most; so Christ, in washing His disciples' feet, begins with the most unclean, and so comes at last to Peter, who needed the washing less than any: Then cometh He to Simon Peter. Peter resisted being washed, perhaps because his feet were nearly clean: And Peter said unto Him, Lord, dost Thou wash my feel?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lvi. 1) What is the meaning of Thou and my feet? It is better to think than speak of this; lest one should fail in explaining adequately what might have been rightly conceived.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 2) Though Peter was the first of the Apostles, yet it is possible that the traitor petulantly placed himself above him; and that this may be the reason, why our Lord first began to wash, and then cometh to Peter.

THEOPHYLACT. It is plain that our Lord did not wash Peter first, but none other of the disciples would have attempted to be washed before him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 2) Some one will ask why none of them prevented Him, except Peter, this being a sign not of want of love, but of reverence. The reason seems to be, that He washed the traitor first, and came next to Peter, and that the other disciples were checked by the reply to Peter. Any of the rest would have said what Peter did, had his turn come first.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 5.) Or thus: All the rest put out their feet, certain that so great a one would not want to wash them without reason: but Peter, looking only to the thing itself, and seeing nothing beyond it, refused out of reverence to let his feet be washed. He often appears in Scripture as hasty in putting forth his own ideas of what is right and expedient.

AUGUSTINE. Or thus: We must not suppose that Peter was afraid and refused, when the others had willingly and gladly submitted to the washing. Our Lord did not go through the others first, and to the first of the Apostles afterwards; (for who is ignorant that the most blessed Peter was the first of all the Apostles?) but began with him: and Peter being the first to whom He came, was afraid; as indeed any of the others would have been.

Jesus answered and said unto him, What I do thou knowest not now; but thou shalt know hereafter.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 2) i. e. How useful a lesson of humility it teaches thee, and how directly this virtue leads to God.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii.) Or our Lord insinuates that this is a mystery. By washing and wiping, He made beautiful the feet of those who were to preach glad tidings, (Is. 52:7.) and to walk on that way of which He tells them, I am the way. (infr. 14:6) Jesus laid aside His garments that He might make their clean feet still cleaner, or that He might receive the uncleanness of their feet unto His own body, by the towel with which alone He was girded: for He hath borne our griefs. Observe too, He chose for washing His disciples' feet the very time that the devil had put it into the heart of Judas to betray Him, and the dispensation for mankind was about to take place. Before this the time was not come for washing their feet. And who would have washed their feet in the interval between this and the Passion? During the Passion, there was no other Jesus to do it. And after it the Holy Ghost came upon them, by which time they should already have had their feet washed. This mystery, our Lord says to Peter, is too great for thee to understand now, but thou shalt know it hereafter when thou art enlightened.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lvi. 2) He did not refuse, because our Lord's act was above his understanding, but he could not bear to see Him bending at his feet: Peter saith unto Him, Thou shalt not wash my feel for ever; i. e. I will never suffer it: not for ever is the same as never.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 5.) This is an instance, that a man may say a thing with a good intention, and yet ignorantly to His hurt. Peter, ignorant of our Lord's deep meaning, at first, as if in doubt, says mildly, Lord, dost Thou wash my feet? and then, Thou shalt never wash my feet; which was in reality to cut himself off from having a part with Jesus. Whence he not only blames our Lord for washing the disciples' feet, but also his fellow-disciples for giving their feet to be washed. (c. 6.). As Peter then did not see his own good, our Lord did not allow His wish to be fulfilled: Jesus answered and said unto him, If I wash thee not, thou hast no part with Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lvi. 2) If I wash thee not, He says, though it was only his feet that He was going to wash, just as we say, Thou treadest on me; though it is only our foot that is trodden on.

ORIGEN. Let those who refuse to allegorize these and like passages, say how it is probable that he who out of reverence for Jesus said, Thou shalt never wash my feet, would have had no part with the Son of God; as if not having his feet washed was a deadly wickedness. Wherefore it is our feet, i. e. the affections of our mind, that are to be given up to Jesus to be washed, that our feet may be beautiful; especially if we emulate higher gifts, and wish to be numbered with those who preach glad tidings.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 2) He does not say on what account He performs this act of washing, but only threatens him. For Peter was not persuaded by the first answer: Thou shalt know hereafter: he did not say, Teach me then that I may submit. But when he was threatened with separation from Christ, then he submitted.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 6.) This saying we may use against those who make hasty and indiscreet resolutions. By shewing them, that if they adhere to these, they will have no part with Jesus, we disengage them from such resolves; even though they may have bound themselves by oath.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lvi. 2) But he, agitated by fear and love, dreaded more the being denied Christ, than the seeing Him at His feet: Simon Peter saith unto Him, Lord, not my feet only, but also my hands and my head.

ORIGEN. Jesus was unwilling to wash hands, and despised what was said of Him in this respect: Thy disciples wash not their hands when they eat bread. (Matt. 15:2) And He did not wish the head to be submerged, in which was apparent the image and glory of the Father; it was enough for Him that the feet were given Him to wash: Jesus answered and said, He that is washed needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit: and ye are clean, but not all.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lvi. 4) Clean all except the feet. The whole of a man is washed in baptism, not excepting his feet; but living in the world afterwards, we tread upon the earth. Those human affections then, without which we cannot live in this world, are, as it were, our feet, which connect us with human things, so that if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. (1 John 1:8) But if we confess our sins, He who washed the disciples' feet, forgives us our sins even down to our feet, wherewith we hold our converse with earth.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii.) It was impossible that the lowest parts and extremities of a soul should escape defilement, even in one perfect as far as man can be; and many, even after baptism, are covered up to their head with the dust of wickedness; but the real disciples of Christ only need washing for their feet.

AUGUSTINE. (Ad. Seleuc. Ep. c. viii.) From what is here said, we understand that Peter was already baptized. Indeed that He baptized by His disciples, shews that His disciples must have been baptized, either with John's baptism, or, which is more probable, Christ's. He baptized by means of baptized servants; for He did not refuse the ministry of baptizing, Who had the humility to wash feet.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lviii. 1) And ye are clean, but not all: what this means the Evangelist immediately explains: For He knew who should betray Him; therefore said He, Ye are not all clean.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 6.) Ye are clean, refers to the eleven; but not all, to Judas. He was unclean, first, because he cared not for the poor, but was a thief; secondly, because the devil had put it into his heart to betray Christ. Christ washes their feet after they are clean, shewing that grace goes beyond necessity, according to the text, He that is holy, let him be holy still. (Apoc. 22:11)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lvi. 4) Or, the disciples when washed had only to have their feet washed; because while man lives in this world, he contracts himself with earth, by means of his human affections, which are as it were his feet.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 2) Or thus: When He calls them clean, you must not suppose that they were delivered from sin before the victim was offered. He means cleanness in respect of knowledge; for they were now delivered from Jewish error.

13:12–20

12. So after he had washed their feet, and had taken his garments, and was set down again, he said unto them, Know ye what I have done to you?

13. Ye call me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am.

14. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet; ye also ought to wash one another's feet.

15. For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you.

16. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The servant is not greater than his lord: neither he that is sent greater than he that sent him.

17. If ye know these things, happy are ye if ye do them.

18. I speak not of you all: I know whom I have chosen: but that the Scripture may be fulfilled, He that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel against me.

19. Now I tell you before it come, that, when it is come to pass, ye may believe that I am he.

20. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that receiveth whomsoever I send receiveth me; and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lviii. 2) Our Lord, mindful of His promise to Peter that he should know the meaning of His act, Thou shalt know hereafter, now begins to teach him: So after He had washed their feet, and had taken His garments, and was sat down again, He said unto them, Know ye what I have done to you?

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 7.) Know ye, is either interrogative, to shew the greatness of the act, or imperative, to rouse their minds.

ALCUIN. Mystically, when at our redemption we were changed by the shedding of His blood, He took again His garments, rising from the grave the third day, and clothed in the same body now immortal, ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of the Father, from whence He shall come to judge the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxi. 1) He speaks now not to Peter alone, but to all: Ye call Me Master and Lord. He accepts their judgment; and to prevent the words being set down merely to favour on their parts, adds, And ye say well, for so I am.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lviii. 3) It is enjoined in the Proverbs, Let another man praise thee, and not thine own mouth. (Prov. 27:2.) For it is dangerous for one to praise himself, who has to beware of pride. But He who is above all things, howsoever He praise Himself, extolleth not Himself too highly. Nor can God be called arrogant: for that we should know Him is no gain to Him, but to us. Nor can any one know Him, unless He who knows, shews Himself. So that if to avoid arrogance He did not praise Himself, He would be denying us wisdom. But why should the Truth fear arrogance? To His calling Himself Master, no one could object, even were He man only, since professors in different arts call themselves so without presumption. But what free man can bear the title of lord in a man? Yet when God speaks, height cannot exalt itself, truth cannot lie; it is for us to submit to that height, to obey that truth. Wherefore ye say well in that ye call Me Master and Lord, for so I am; but if I were not what ye say, ye would say ill.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 7.) They do not say well, Lord, to whom it shall be said, Depart from Me, ye that work iniquity. (Matt. 7:23) But the Apostles say well, Master and Lord, for wickedness had not dominion over them, but the Word of God.

If then I your Lord and Master have washed your feet, ye also ought to wash one another's feet.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxx. 1) He shews us the greater, that we may do the less. For He was the Lord, but we, if we do it, do it to our fellow-servants: For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you.

BEDE. Our Lord first did a thing, then taught it: as it is said, Jesus began both to do and to teach. (Acts 1:1)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lviii. 4) This is, blessed Peter, what thou wast ignorant of; this thou wert told that thou shouldest know afterwards.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. c. 7.) But it is not necessary for one who wishes to do all the commandments of Jesus, literally to perform the act of washing feet. This is merely a matter of custom; and the custom is now generally dropped.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lviii. 4) This act is done literally by many1, when they receive one another in hospitality. For it is unquestionably better that it should be done with the hands, and that the Christian disdain not to do what Christ did. For when the body is bent at the feet of a brother, the feeling of humility is made to rise in the heart, or, if it be there already, is confirmed. But besides this moral meaning, is not a brother able to change a brother from the pollution of sin? Let us confess our faults one to another, forgive one another's faults, pray for one another's faults. In this way we shall wash one another's feet.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 7.) Or thus: This spiritual washing of the feet is done primarily by Jesus Himself, secondarily by His disciples, in that He said to them, Ye ought to wash one another's feet. Jesus washed the feet of His disciples as their Master, of His servants as their Lord. But the object of the master is to make His disciples as Himself; and our Saviour beyond all other masters and lords, wished His disciples to be as their Master and Lord, not having the spirit of bondage, but the spirit of adoption, whereby they cry, Abba, Father. (Rom. 8:19) So then before they become masters and lords, they need the washing of the feet, being as yet insufficient disciples, and savouring of the spirit of bondage. But when they have attained to the state of master and lord, they then are able to imitate their Master, and to wash the disciples' feet by their doctrine.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxi. 2) He continues to urge them to wash one another's feet; Verily, verily, I say unto you, The servant is not greater than his lord, neither He that is sent greater than He that sent Him; as if to say, If I do it, much more ought you.

THEOPHYLACT. This was a necessary admonition to the Apostles, some of whom were about to rise higher, others to lower degrees of eminence. That none might exult over another, He changes the hearts of all.

BEDE. To know what is good, and not to do it, tendeth not to happiness, but to condemnation; as James saith, To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin (James 4:17). Wherefore He adds, If ye know these things, happy are ye if yo do them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. Lxxi. 2) For all know, but all do not do. He then rebukes the traitor, not openly, but covertly: I speak not of you all.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lix. 1) As if to say, There is one among you who will not be blessed, nor doeth these things. I know whom I have chosen. Whom, but those who shall be happy by doing His commandments? Judas therefore was not chosen. But if so, why does He say in another place, Have not I chosen you twelve? Because Judas was chosen for that for which he was necessary, but not for that happiness of which He says, Happy are ye, if ye do them.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 8.) Or thus: I speak not of you all, does not refer to, Happy are ye if ye do them. For of Judas, or any other person, it may be said, Happy is he if he do them. The words refer to the sentence above, The servant is not greater than his lord, neither He that is sent greater than He that sent Him. For Judas, being a servant of sin, was not a servant of the Divine Word; nor an Apostle, when the devil had entered into him. Our Lord knew those who were His, and did not know who were not His, and therefore says, not, I know all present, but, I know whom I have chosen, i. e. I know My Elect.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxi. 1) Then, that He might not sadden them all, He adds, But that the Scripture must be fulfilled, He that eateth bread with Me, hath lifted up his heel against Me: shewing that He knew who the traitor was, an intimation that would surely have checked him, if any thing would. He does not say, shall betray Me, but, shall lift up his heel against Me, alluding to his deceit and secret plotting.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lix. 1) Shall lift up his heel against Me, i. e. shall tread upon Me. The traitor Judas is meant.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxi. 2) He that eateth bread with Me; i. e. who was fed by Me, who partook of My table. So that if injured ever by our servants or inferiors, we need not be offended. Judas had received infinite benefits, and yet thus requited his Benefactor.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lix. 1) They then who were chosen ate the Lord; he ate the bread of the Lord, to injure the Lord; they ate life, he damnation; for he that eateth unworthily, eateth damnation to himself. (1 Cor. 11:27)

Now I tell you before it come, that when it is come, ye may believe that I am He, i. e. of whom that Scripture foretold.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 9.) That ye may believe, is not said, as if the Apostles did not believe already, but is equivalent to saying, Do as ye believe, and persevere in your belief, seeking for no occasion of falling away. For besides the evidences the disciples had already seen, they had now that of the fulfilment of prophecy.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. Lxxii. 3) As the disciples were about to go forth and to suffer many things, He consoles them by promising His own assistance and that of others; His own, when He says, Happy are ye if ye do them; that of others, in what follows, Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that receiveth whomsoever I send, receiveth Me; and he that receiveth Me receiveth Him that sent Me.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 10.) For he that receiveth him whom Jesus sends, receiveth Jesus who is represented by him; and he that receiveth Jesus, receiveth the Father. Therefore he that receiveth whom Jesus sends, receiveth the Father that sent. The words may have this meaning too: He that receiveth whom I send, had attained unto receiving Me: he who receiveth Me not by means of any Apostle, but by My own entrance into his soul, receiveth the Father; so that not only I abide in him, but the Father also.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix. 2) The Arians, when they hear this passage, appeal immediately to the gradations in their system, that as far as the Apostle is from the Lord, so far is the Son from the Father. But our Lord hath left us no room for doubt on this head; for He saith, I and My Father are one. (supr. 10:30) But how shall we understand those words of our Lord, He that receiveth Me, receiveth Him that sent Me? If we take them to mean that the Father and the Son are of one nature, it will seem to follow, when He says, He that receiveth whomsoever I send, receiveth Me, that the Son and an Apostle are of one nature. May not the meaning be, He that receiveth whosoever I send, receiveth Me, i. e. Me as man: But He that receiveth Me, i. e. as God, receiveth Him that sent Me. But it is not this unity of nature, which is here put forth, but the authority of the Sender, as represented by Him who is sent. In Peter hear Christ, the Master of the disciple, in the Son the Father, the Begotten of the Only Begotten.

13:21–30

21. When Jesus had thus said, he was troubled in spirit, and testified, and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, that one of you shall betray me.

22. Then the disciples looked one on another, doubting of whom he spake.

23. Now there was leaning on Jesus’ bosom one of his disciples, whom Jesus loved.

24. Simon Peter therefore beckoned to him, that he should ask who it should be of whom he spake.

25. He then lying on Jesus’ breast saith unto him, Lord, who is it?

26. Jesus answered, He it is, to whom I shall give a sop, when I have dipped it. And when he had dipped the sop, he gave it to Judas Iscariot, the

son of Simon.

27. And after the sop Satan entered into him. Then said Jesus unto him, That thou doest, do quickly.

28. Now no man at the table knew for what intent he spake this unto him.

29. For some of them thought, because Judas had the bag, that Jesus had said unto him, Buy those things that we have need of against the feast; or, that he should give something to the poor.

30. He then having received the sop went immediately out: and it was night.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) Our Lord after His twofold promise of assistance to the Apostles in their future labours, remembers that the traitor is cut off from both, and is troubled at the thought: When Jesus had thus said, He was troubled in spirit, and testified, and said, Verily, verily, I say unto you, that one of you shall betray Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lx. 1) This did not come into His mind’then for the first time; but He was now about to make the traitor known, and single him out from the rest, and therefore was troubled in spirit. The traitor too was now just about to go forth to execute his purpose. He was troubled at the thought of His Passion being so near at hand, at the dangers to which His faithful followers would be brought at the hand of the traitor, which were even now impending over Him. Our Lord deigned to be troubled also, to shew that false brethren cannot be cut off, even in the most urgent necessity, without the troubling of the Church. (Tr. lxi. 1.). He was troubled not in flesh, but in spirit; for on occasion of scandals of this kind, the spirit is troubled, not perversely, but in love, lest in separating the tares, some of the wheat too be plucked up with them. (Tr. lx. 5.). But whether He was troubled by pity for perishing Judas, or, by the near approach of His own death, He was troubled not through weakness of mind, but power: He was not troubled because any thing compelled Him, but He troubled Himself, as was said above. And in that He was troubled, He consoles the weak members of His body, i. e. His Church, that they may not think themselves reprobate, should they be troubled at the approach of death.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 11.) His being troubled in spirit, was the human part, suffering under the 1excess of the spiritual. For if every Saint lives, acts, and suffers in the spirit, how much more is this true of Jesus, the Rewarder of Saints.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lx. 3) Away then with the reasonings of the Stoics, who deny that perturbation of mind can come upon a wise man; who, as they take vanity for truth, so make their healthy state of mind insensibility. It is good that the mind of the Christian may be perturbed, not by misery, but by pity. (lxi. 2). One of you,He saith, i. e. one in respect of number, not of merit, in appearance1 not in virtue.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 1) As He did not mention Him by name, all began to fear: Then the disciples looked one on another, doubting of whom He spake; not conscious of any evil in themselves, and yet trusting to Christ's words, more than to their own thoughts.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxi. 3) They had a devoted love for their Master, but yet so that human weakness made them doubt of one another2.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 12.) They remembered too, that, as men, before they were matured, their minds were liable to change, so as to form wishes the very opposite to what they might have had before.

CHRYSOSTOM. While all were trembling, and not excepting even Peter, their head, John, as the beloved disciple, lay upon Jesus' breast. He then lying on Jesus' breast saith unto Him, Lord, who is it?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxi. 4) This is John, whose Gospel this is, as he afterwards declares. It is the custom of the sacred writers, when they come to any thing relating to themselves, to speak of themselves, as if they were speaking of another. For if the thing itself is related correctly, what does truth lose by the omission of boasting on the writer's part?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 1) If thou want to know the cause of this familiarity, it is love: Whom Jesus loved. Others were loved, but he was loved more than any.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 13.) I think this has a peculiar meaning, viz. that John was admitted to a knowledge of the more secret mysteries of the Word.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 1) Whom Jesus loved. This John says to shew his own innocence, and also why it was that Peter beckoned to him, inasmuch as he was not Peter's superior: Simon Peter therefore beckoned to him, that he should ask who it should be of whom he spake. Peter had been just reproved, and therefore, checking the customary vehemence of his love, he did not speak himself now, but made John speak for him. He always appears in Scripture as zealous, and an intimate friend of John's.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxi. 6.) Observe too his mode of speaking, which was not by word, but by beckoning; Beckoned and spake, i. e. spake by beckoning. If even thoughts speak, as when it is said, They spake among themselves, much more may beckonings, which are a kind of outward expression of our thoughts.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 13.) Or, at first he beckoned, and then not content with beckoning, spake: Who is it of whom he speaks?

He then lying on Jesus' breast, saith unto Him, Lord, who is it?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lx. 4) On Jesus' breast; the same as in Jesus' bosom. Or, he lay first in Jesus' bosom, and then ascended higher, and lay upon His breast; as if, had he remained lying in His bosom, and not ascended to lie on His breast, our Lord would not have told him what Peter wanted to know. By his lying at last on Jesus' breast, is expressed that greater and more abundant grace, which made him Jesus' special disciple.

BEDE. That he lay in the bosom, and upon the breast, was not only an evidence of present love, but also a sign of the future, (non occ.). viz. of those new and mysterious doctrines which he was afterwards commissioned to reveal to the world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxi. 6) For by bosom what else is signified but secret? Here is the hollow of the breast, the secret1 chamber of wisdom.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 1) But not even then did our Lord expose the traitor by name; Jesus answered, He it is, to whom I shall give a sop when I have dipped it. Such a mode of declaring him, should itself have turned him from his purpose. Even if a partaking of the same table did not shame him, a partaking of the same bread might have. And when He had dipped the sop, He gave it to Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxii. 3) Not as some careless readers think, that then Judas received singly Christ's body. For our Lord had already distributed the sacraments of His body and blood to all of them, while Judas was there, as Luke relates; and after this He dipped the sop, as John relates, and gave it to the traitor; the dipping of the bread perhaps signifying the deep dye of his sin; for some dipping cannot be washed out again; i. e. when things are dipped, in order to receive a permanent dye. If however this dipping meant any thing good, he was ungrateful for it, and deserved the damnation which followed him; And after the sop, Satan entered into him.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 14.) Observe, that at first Satan did not enter into Judas, but only put it into his heart to betray his Master. But after the bread, he entered into him. Wherefore let us beware, that Satan thrust not any of his flaming darts into our heart; for if he do, he then watches till he gets an entrance there himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxii. 1) So long as he was one of the twelve, the devil did not dare to force an entrance into him; but when he was pointed out, and expelled, then he easily leaped into him,

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxii. 2) Or entered into him, that he might have more full possession of him: for he was in him, when he agreed with the Jews to betray our Lord for a sum of money, according to Luke: Then entered Satan into Judas Iscariot, and he went away, and communed with the chief priests. (Luke 22:3. 4) In this state he came to the supper. But after the sop the devil entered, not to tempt him, as though he were independent but to possess him as his own,

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 14.) It was proper that by the ceremony of the bread, that good should be taken from him, which he thought he had: whereof being deprived, he was laid open to admit Satan’s entrance.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxii) But some will say, was his being given up to the devil the effect of his receiving the sop from Christ? To whom we answer, that they may learn here the danger of receiving amiss what is in itself good. If he is reproved who does not discern, i. e. who does not distinguish, the Lord’s body from other food, how is he condemned who, feigning himself a friend, comes an enemy to the Lord’s table?

Then said Jesus unto him, That thou doest, do quickly.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 15.) This may have been said either to Judas, or to Satan, either to provoke the enemy to the combat, or the traitor to do his part in bringing on that dispensation, which was to save the world; which He wished not to be delayed any longer, but to be as soon as possible matured.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxii. 4) He did not however enjoin the act, but foretold it, not from desire for the destruction of the perfidious, but to hasten on the salvation of the faithful.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 2.) That thou doest, do quickly, is not a command, or a recommendation, but a reproof, meant to shew too that He was not going to offer any hindrance to His betrayal. Now no man at the table knew for what intent He spake this unto him. It is not easy to see, when the disciples had asked, Who is he, and He had replied, He it is to whom I shall give a sop, how it was that they did not understand Him; unless it was that He spoke too low to be heard; and that John lay upon His breast, when he asked the question, for that very reason, i. e. that the traitor might not be made known. For had Christ made him known, perhaps Peter would have killed him. So it was then, that none at the table knew what our Lord meant. But why not John? Because he could not conceive how a disciple could fall into such wickedness: he was far from such wickedness himself, and therefore did not suspect it of others. What they thought He meant we are told in what follows: For some of them thought, because Judas had the bag, that Jesus had said unto him, Buy those things that we have need of against the feast, or, that he should give something to the poor.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxii. 5) Our Lord then had bags, in which He kept the oblations of the faithful, to supply the wants of His own followers, or the poor. Here is the first institution of ecclesiastical property. Our Lord shews that His commandment not to think of the morrow, does not mean that the Saints should never save money; but that they should not neglect the service of God for it, or let the fear of want tempt them to injustice.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 2.) None of the disciples contributed this money, but it is hinted that it was certain women, who, it is said, ministered to Him of their means. But how was it that He Who forbad scrip, and staff, and money, carried bags for the relief of the poor? It was to shew thee, that even the very poor, those who are crucified to this world, ought to attend to this duty. He did many things in order to instruct us in our duty.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 16.) Our Lord then said to Judas, That thou doest, do quickly, and the traitor this once obeyed his Master. For having received the sop, he started immediately on his work: He then having received the sop, went, immediately out. And indeed he did go out, not only from the house in which he was, but from Jesus altogether. It would seem that Satan, after he had entered into Judas, could not bear to be in the same place with Jesus: for there is no agreement between Jesus and Satan. Nor is it idle enquiring why after he had received the sop, it is not added, that he ate it. Why did not Judas eat the bread, after he received it? Perhaps because, as soon as he had received it, the devil, who had put it into his heart to betray Christ, fearful that the bread, if eaten, might drive out what he had put in, entered into him, so that he went out immediately, before he ate it. And it may be serviceable to remark, that as he who eateth our Lord’s bread and drinketh His cup unworthily, eateth and drinketh to his own damnation; so the bread which Jesus gave him was eaten by the rest to their salvation, but by Judas to his damnation, inasmuch as after it the devil entered into him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 2.) It follows: And it was night, to shew the impetuosity of Judas, in persisting in spite of the unseasonableness of the hour.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 16.) The time of night corresponded with the night which overspread the soul of Judas.

GREGORY. (ii. Mor. 11) By the time of the day is signified the end of the action. Judas went out in the night to accomplish his perfidy, for which he was never to be pardoned.

13:31–32

31. Therefore, when he was gone out, Jesus said, Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in him.

32. If God be glorified in him, God shall also glorify him in himself, and shall straightway glorify him.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 17.) After the glory of His miracles, and His transfiguration, the next glorifying of the Son of man began, when Judas went out with Satan, who had entered into him; Therefore when he was gone out, Jems said, Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in Him. For it is not the eternal only-begotten Word, but the glory of the Man born of the seed of David, which is here meant. Christ at His death, in which He glorified God, having spoiled principalities and powers, made a shew of them, openly triumphing over them. (Colos. 2:15) And again, Made peace by the blood of His cross, to reconcile all things unto Himself, whether they be things in earth, or things in heaven. (Colos. 1:20) Thus the Son of man was glorified, and God glorified in Him; for Christ cannot be glorified, except the Father be glorified with Him. But whoever is glorified, is glorified by some one. By whom then is the Son of man glorified? He tells you; If God be glorified in Him, God shall also glorify Him in Himself, and shall straightway glorify Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 2.) i. e. by Himself, not by any other. And shall straightway glorify Him, i. e. not at any distant time, but immediately, while He is yet on the very cross shall His glory appear. For the sun was darkened, rocks were rent, and many bodies of those that slept arose. In this way He restores the drooping spirits of His disciples, and persuades them, instead of sorrowing, to rejoice.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxiii. 2) Or thus: The unclean went out: the clean remained with their cleanser. Thus will it be when the tares are separated from the wheat; The righteous shall shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. (Matt. 13:43) Our Lord, foreseeing this, said, when Judas went out, as if the tares were now separated, and He left alone with the wheat, the holy Apostles, Now is the Son of man glorified; as if to say, Behold what will take place at My glorifying, at winch none of the wicked shall be present, none of the righteous shall perish. He does not say, Now is the glorifying of the Son of man signified; but, Now is the Son of man glorified; as it is not that rock signified Christ, but, That Rock was Christ. (1 Cor. 10:4) Scripture often speaks of the things signifying, as if they were the things signified. (c. 3). But the glorifying of the Son of man, is the glorifying of God in Him; as He adds, And God is glorified in Him, which He proceeds to explain; If God is glorified in Him—for He came not to do His own will, but the will of Him that sent Him—God shall also glorify Him in Himself, so that the human nature which was assumed by the eternal Word, shall also be endowed with eternity. And shall straightway glorify Him. He predicts His own resurrection, which was to follow immediately, not at the end of the world, like ours. Thus it is; Now is the Son of man glorified; the now referring not to His approaching Passion, but the resurrection which was immediately to follow it: as if that which was so very soon to be, had already taken place.

HILARY. (xi. de. Trin. c. 42) That God is glorified in Him, refers to the glory of the body, which glory is the glory of God, in that the body borrows its glory from its association with the Divine nature. Because God is glorified in Him, therefore He will glorify Him in Himself, in that He who reigns in the glory arising from the glory of God, He forthwith passes over into God’s glorya, leaving the dispensation of His manhood, wholly to abide in God. Nor is He silent as to the time: And shall straightway glorify Him. This referring to the glory of His resurrection which was immediately to follow His passion, which He mentions as present, because Judas had now gone out to betray Him; whereas that God would glorify Him in Himself, He reserves for the future. The glory of God was shewn in Him by the miracle of the resurrection; but He will abide in the glory of God when He has left the dispensation of subjection. The sense of these first words, Now is the Son of man glorified, is not doubtful: it is the glory of the flesh which is meant, not that of the Word. But what means the next, And God is glorified in Him? The Son of man is not another Person from the Son of God, for, the Word was made flesh. (John 1:14) How is God glorified in this Son of man, who is the Son of God? The next clause helps us; If God is glorified in Him, God also will glorify Him in Himself. A man is not glorified in himself, nor, on the other hand, does God who is glorified in man, because He receives glory, cease to be God. So the words, God is glorified in Him, either mean that Christ is glorified in the flesh, or that God is glorified in Christ. If God means Christ, it is Christ who is glorified in the flesh; if the Father, then it is the Sacrament of unity, the Father glorified in the Son. Again, God glorifies in Himself God glorified in the Son of man. This overthrows the impious doctrine that Christ is not very God, in verity of nature. For how can that which God glorifies in Himself be out of Himself? He whom the Father glorifies must be confessed to be in His glory, and He who is glorified in the glory of the Father, must be understood to be in the same case with the Father.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 17.) Or thus: The word glory is here used in a different sense from that which some Pagans attach to it, who defined glory to be the collected praises of the many. It is evident that glory in such a sense is a different thing from that mentioned in Exodus, where it is said, that the glory of the Lord filled the tabernacle, (Exod. 40:34) and that the face of Moses was glorified. The glory here mentioned is something visible, a certain divine appearance in the temple, and on Moses’ face; but in a higher and more spiritual sense we are glorified, when with the eye of the understanding we penetrate into the things of God. For the mind when it ascends above material things, and spiritually sees God, is deified: and of this spiritual glory, the visible glory on the face of Moses is a figure: for his mind it was that was deified by converse with God. But there is no comparison between the excellent glory of Christ, and the knowledge of Moses, whereby the face of his soul was glorified: for the whole of the

Father’s glory shines upon the Son, who is the brightness of His glory, and the express image of His Person. (Heb. 1:3) (c. 18.). Yea, and from the light of this whole glory there go forth particular glories, throughout the whole rational creation: though none can take in the whole of the divine glory, except the Son. But so far as the Son was known to the world, so far only was He glorified. And as yet He was not fully known. But afterward the Father spread the knowledge of Him over the whole world, and then was the Son of man glorified in those who knew Him. And of this glory He hath made all who know Him partakers: as saith the Apostle; We all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, (2 Cor. 3:18) i. e. from His glory receive glory. When He was approaching then that dispensation, by which He was to become known to the world, and to be glorified in the glory of those who glorified Him, He says, Now is the Son of man glorified. (Matt. 11:27) And because no man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him, and the Son by the dispensation (ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομίας) was about to reveal the Father; for this reason He saith, And God is glorified in Him. Or compare this with the text below: He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father. (c. 14:9) The Father who begat the Word is seen in the Word, who is God, and the image of the invisible God. But the words may be taken in a larger sense. For as through some the name of God was blasphemed among the Gentiles, so through the saints whose good deeds are seen and acknowledged by the world, the name of the Father in heaven is magnified. But in whom was He so glorified as in Jesus, Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth? Such being the Son, He is glorified, and God is glorified in Him. And if God is glorified in Him, the Father returns Him more than He gave. For the glory of the Son of man, when the Father glorifies Him, far exceeds the Father’s glory, when He is glorified in the Son: it being fit that the greater should return the greater glory. And as this, viz. the glorifying of the Son of man, was just about to be accomplished, our Lord adds, And will straightway glorify Him.

13:33–35

33. Little children, yet a little while I am with you. Ye shall seek me: and as I said unto the Jews, Whither I go, ye cannot come; so now I say to you.

34. A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another.

35. By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another.

AUGUSTINE. After He had said, And shall straightway glorify Him, that they might not think that God was going to glorify Him in such a way, as that He would no longer have any converse with them on earth, He says, Little children, yet a little while I am with you: as if He said, I shall indeed straightway be glorified by My resurrection, but I shall not straightway ascend to heaven. For we read in the Acts of the Apostles, that He was with them forty days after His resurrection. These forty days are what He means by, A little while I am with you.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 19.) Little children, He says; for their souls were yet in infancy. But these little children, after His death, were made brethren; as before they were little children, they were servants.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxiv. 1) It may be understood too thus: I am as yet in this frail flesh, even as ye are, until I die and rise again. He was with them after His resurrection, by bodily presence, not by participation of human frailty. These are the words which I spake unto you, while I was yet with you, (Luke 24:44) He says to His disciples after His resurrection; meaning, while I was in mortal flesh, as ye are. He was in the same flesh then with them, but not subject to the same mortality. But there is another Divine Presence unknown to mortal senses, of which He saith, Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. (Mat. 28:20) This is not the presence meant by, A little while I am with you; for it is not a little while to the end of the world: or even if it is a little while, because that in the eye of God, a thousand years are as one day, yet what follows shews that it is not what our Lord is here alluding to; for He adds, Whither I go ye cannot follow Me now. At the end of the world they were to follow Him, whither He went; as He saith below; Father, I will that they be with Me, where I am. (c. 17:24)

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 19.) But may there not be a deeper meaning in the words, yet a little while &c. After a little while He was not with them. In what sense not with them? Not because He was not with them according to the flesh, in that He was taken from them, was brought before Pilate, was crucified, descended into hell: but because they all forsook Him, fulfilling His prophecy: All ye shall be offended because of Me this night. He was not with them, because He only dwells with those who are worthy of Him. But though they thus wandered from Jesus for a little while, it was only for a little while; they soon sought Him again. Peter wept bitterly after his denial of Jesus, and by his tears sought Him: and therefore it follows, Ye shall seek Me, and as I said unto the Jews, whither I go, ye cannot follow Me now. To seek Jesus, is to seek the Word, wisdom, righteousness, truth, all which is Christ. To His disciples therefore who wish to follow Him, not in a bodily sense, as the ignorant think, but in the way He ordains, Whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after Me, cannot be My disciple. Our Lord saith, Whither I go ye cannot follow Me now. For though they wished to follow the Word, and to confess Him, they were not yet strong enough to do so; The Spirit was not yet given to them, because that Jesus was not yet glorified. (supra c. 7)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxiv. 4) Or He means that they were not yet fit to follow Him to death for righteousness’ sake. For how could they, when they were not ripe for martyrdom? Or how could they follow our Lord to immortality, they who were to die, and not to rise again till the end of the world? Or how could they follow Him to the bosom of the Father, when none could partake of that felicity, but they whose love was perfected? When He told the Jews this, He did not add now. But the disciples, though they could not follow Him then, would be able to do so afterwards, and therefore He addsc, So now I say to you.

ORIGEN. (t. xxxii. 19.) As if He said, I say it to you, but with the addition of now. The Jews, who He foresaw would die in their sins, would never be able to follow Him; but the disciples were unable only for a little time.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 3) And therefore He said, little children; for He did not mean to speak to them, as He had to the Jews. Ye cannot follow Me now, He says, in order to rouse the love of His disciples. For the departure of loved friends kindles all our affection, and especially if they are going to a place where we cannot follow them. He purposely too speaks of His death, as a kind of translation, a happy removal to a place, where mortal bodies do not enter.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxv. 1) And now He teaches them how to fit themselves to follow Him: A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another. (Levit. 19:18) But does not the old law say, Thou shall love thy neighbour as thyself? Why then does He call it a new commandment? Is it because it strips us of the old man, and puts on us the new? That it renews the hearer, or rather the doer of it? Love does do this; but it is that love which our Lord distinguishes from the carnal affection: As I have loved you, that ye also love one another. Not the love with which men love one another, but that of the children of the Most High God, who would be brethren of His only-begotten Son, and therefore love one another with that love with which He loved them, and would lead them to the fulfilment of their desires.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 3) Or, as I have loved you: for My love has not been the payment of something owing to you, but had its beginning on My side. And ye ought in like manner to do one another good, though ye may not owe it.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxiv. 2) But do not think that that greater commandment, viz. that we should love the Lord our God, is passed by. For, if we understand the two precepts aright, each is implied in the other. He who loves God cannot despise His commandment that he should love his neighbour; and he who loves his neighbour in a heavenly spiritual way, in the neighbour loves God. That is the love which our Lord distinguishes from all human love, when He adds, As I have loved you. For what did He, in loving us, love, but God in us; not who was in us, but so that He might be? Wherefore let each of us so love the other, as that by this working of love, we make each other the habitations of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 4) Passing over the miracles, which they were to perform, He makes love the distinguishing mark of His followers; By this shall all men know that ye are My disciples, if ye have love one to another. This it is that evidences the saint or the disciple, as He calls him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxv. 3) if He said, Other gifts are shared with you by those who are not mine; birth, life, sense, reason, and such good things as belong alike to man and brutes; nay, and tongues, sacraments, prophecy, knowledge, faith, bestowing of goods upon the poor, giving the body to be burned: but forasmuch as they have not charity, they are tinkling cymbals, they are nothing: nothing profits them.

13:36–38

36. Simon Peter said unto him, Lord, whither goest thou? Jesus answered him, Whither I go, thou canst not follow me now; but thou shalt follow me afterwards.

37. Peter said unto him, Lord, why cannot I follow thee now? I will lay down my life for thy sake.

38. Jesus answered him, Wilt thou lay down thy life for my sake? Verily, verily, I say unto thee, The cock shall not crow, till thou hast denied me thrice.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii. 3) Great is love, and stronger than fire; nothing can stop its course. Peter the most ardent of all, as soon as he hears our Lord say, Whither I go ye cannot follow Me now, asks, Lord, whither goest Thou?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxvi. 1) The disciple asks this, as if he were ready to follow. But our Lord saw his heart; Jesus answered him, Whither I go, thou canst not follow Me now; He checks his forwardness, but does not destroy his hope; nay, confirms it; But thou shalt follow Me afterwards. Why hastenest thou, Peter? The Rock has not yet established thee with His spirit. Be not lifted up with presumptions, thou canst not now; be not cast down with despair, thou shalt follow Me afterwards.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxii. 1) Peter, on receiving this answer, does not check his desire, but hastily conceives favourable hopes from it, and having got rid of the fear of betraying our Lord, feels secure, and becomes himself the interrogator, while the rest are silent: Peter said unto Him, Lord, why cannot I follow Thee now? I will lay down my life for Thy sake. What sayest thou, Peter? He hath said, thou canst not, and thou sayest, thou canst: wherefore thou shalt know by experience, that thy love is nothing, unless thou art enabled from above: Jesus answered him, Will thou lay down thy life for My sake?

BEDE. Which sentence may be read in two ways: either as affirming, thou shalt lay down thy life for My sake, but now through fear of the death of the body, thou shalt incur spiritual death: or as mocking; as if He said,

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxvi. 1) Wilt thou do that for Me, which I have not done yet for thee? Canst thou go before, who canst not come after? Why presumest thou so? Hear what thou art: Verily, verily, I say unto thee, The cock shall not crow, till thou hast denied Me thrice. Thou who promisest Me thy death, shall thrice deny thy life. Peter knew his great desire, his strength he knew not: he boasted of his will, while he was yet weak; but the Physician saw his weakness. (c. 2.). Some who perversely favour Peter, excuse him, and say that he did not deny Christ, because when asked by the servant maid, he said he did not know Him, as the other Evangelists witness more expressly. As if to deny the man Christ, was not to deny Christ; yea, that in Christ, which He was made for our sakes, that that which He made us, might not perish. By what is He the Head of the Church, but by His humanity? And how then is he in the body of Christ, who denies the man Christ? But why do I argue so long? Our Lord does not say, The cock shall not crow till thou deniest man, or the Son of man, but till thou deniest Me. What is Me, but that which He was? So then whatever Peter denied, he denied Christ: it is impious to doubt it. Christ said so, and Christ said true: beyond a doubt, Peter denied Christ. Let us not, to defend Peter, accuse Christ. The frailty of Peter himself, acknowledged its sin, when he witnessed by his tears the evil he had done in denying Christ. Nor do we say this, because we have pleasure in blaming the first of the Apostles; but that we may take warning from him, not to be confident of our own strength.

BEDE. Nevertheless, should any one fall, let the example of Peter save him from despair, and teach him that he can without delay obtain pardon from God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii. 1) It is manifest that our Lord permitted Peter’s fall. He might have recalled him to begin with, but as he persisted in his vehemence, though He did not drive him to a denial, He let him go without assistance, that He might learn his own weakness, and not fall into such sin again, when the superintendence of the world had come to him, but that remembering what had happened to himd, he might know himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxvi. 2) That took place in the soul of Peter, which he offered in the body; though differently from what he meant. For before the death and resurrection of our Lord, he both died by his denial, and lived again by his tears.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. c. 2. [5.]) This speech, The cock shall not crow, occurs in all the Evangelists, but not at the same time in all. Matthew and Mark introduce it after they have left the house, in which they were eating; Luke and John before. We may suppose either that the two former are recurring to what had passed, or the two latter anticipating what is coming. Or the great difference not only of the words, but of the subjects which precede the speech, and which excite Peter to the presumption of offering to die, for or with our Lord, may lead us to conclude that he made this offer three times, and that our Lord three times replied, Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny Me thrice.

CHAPTER 14

14:1–4

1. Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in me.

2. In my Father's house are many mansions: if it were not so, I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you.

3. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also.

4. And whither I go ye know, and the way ye know.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxvii. 1) Our Lord consoles His disciples, who, as men, would be naturally alarmed and troubled at the idea of His death, by assuring them of His divinity: Let not your heart be troubled: ye believe in God, believe also in Me; as if they must believe in Him, if they believed in God; which would not follow, unless Christ were God. Ye are in fear for this form of a servant; let not your heart be troubled; the form of God shall raise it up.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii. 1) Faith too in Me, and in the Father that begat Me, is more powerful than any thing that shall come upon you; and will prevail in spite of all difficulties. He shews His divinity at the same time by discerning their inward feelings: Let not your heart be troubled.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxvii. 2) And as the disciples were afraid for themselves, when Peter, the boldest and most zealous of them, had been told, The cock shall not crow, till thou hast denied Me thrice, He adds, In My Father's house are many mansions, by way of an assurance to them in their trouble, that they might with confidence and certainty look forward, after all their trials, to dwelling together with Christ in the presence of God. For though one man is bolder, wiser, juster, holier than another, yet no one shall be removed from that house of God, but each receive a mansion suited to his deserts. The penny indeed which the householder paid to the labourers who worked in his vineyard, was the same to all; for life eternal, which this penny signifies, is of the same duration to all. But there may be many mansions, many degrees of dignity, in that life, corresponding to people’s deserts.

GREGORY. (Super Ezech. Hom. xvi.) The many mansions agree with the one penny, because, though one may rejoice more than another, yet all rejoice with one and the same joy, arising from the vision of their Maker.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxvii. 2) And thus God will be all in all; that is, since God is love, love will bring it to pass, that what each has, will be common to all. That which one loves in another is one’s own, though one have it not one’s self. And then there will be no envy at superior grace, for in all hearts will reign the unity of love.

GREGORY. (Moral. ult. c. xxiv.) Nor is there any sense of deficiency in consequence of such inequality; for each will feel as much as sufficeth for himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxvii. 3) But they are rejected by the Christians, who infer from there being many mansions that there is a place outside the kingdom of heaven, where innocent souls, that have departed this life without baptism, and could not there enter into the kingdom of heaven, remain happy. But God forbid, that when every house of every heir of the kingdom is in the kingdom, there should be a part of the regal house itself not in the kingdom. Our Lord does not say, In eternal bliss are many mansions, but they are in My Father’s house.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii. 1) Or thus: Our Lord having said above to Peter, Whither I go, thou canst not follow Me now, but thou shalt follow Me afterwards, that they might not think that this promise was made to Peter only, He says, In My Father’s house are many mansions; i. e. You shall be admitted into that place, as well as Peter, for it contains abundance of mansions, which are ever ready to receive you: If it were not so, I would have told you: I go to prepare a place for you.

AUGUSTINE. He means evidently that there are already many mansions, and that there is no need of His preparing one.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii. 1) Having said, Thou canst not follow Me now, that they might not think that they were cut off for ever, He adds: And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto Myself, that where I am, there ye may be also: a recommendation to them to place the strongest trust in Him.

THEOPHYLACT. And if not, I would have told you: I go to prepare, &c. As if He said; Either way ye should not be troubled, whether places are prepared for you, or not. For, if they are not prepared, I will very quickly prepare them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxviii. 1) But why does He go and prepare a place, if there are many mansions already? Because these are not as yet so prepared as they will be. The same mansions that He hath prepared by predestination, He prepares by operation. They are prepared already in respect of predestination; if they were not, He would have said, I will go and prepare, i. e. predestinate, a place for you; but inasmuch as they are not yet prepared in respect of operation, He says, And if I go and prepare a place for you. And now He is preparing mansions, by preparing occupants for them. Indeed, when He says, In My Father's house are many mansions, what think we the house of God to be but the temple of God, of which the Apostle saith, The temple of God is holy, which temple ye are. (1 Cor. 3:17) This house of God then is now being built, now being prepared. (c. 3.). But why has He gone away to prepare it, if it is ourselves that He prepares: if He leaves us, how can He prepare us? The meaning is, that, in order that those mansions may be prepared, the just must live by faith: and if thou seest, there is no faith. Let Him go away then, that He be not seen; let Him be hid, that He be believed. Then a place is prepared, if thou live by faith: let faith desire, that desire may enjoy. If thou rightly understandest Him, He never leaves either the place He came from, or that He goes from. He goes, when He withdraws from sight, He comes, when He appears. But except He remain in power, that we may grow in goodness, no place of happiness will be prepared for us.

ALCUIN. He says then, If I go, by the absence of the flesh, I shall come again, by the presence of the Godhead; or, I shall come again to judge the quick and dead. And as He knew that they would ask whither He went, or by what way He went, He adds, And whither I go ye know, i. e. to the Father, and the way ye know, i. e. Myself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxiii. 2) He shews them that He is aware of their curiosity to know His meaning, and thus excites them to put questions to Him.

14:5–7

5. Thomas saith unto him, Lord, we know not whither thou goest; and how can we know the way?

6. Jesus saith unto him, I am the way, the truth, and the life: no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.

7. If ye had known me, ye should have known My Father also; and from henceforth ye know him, and have seen him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii. 2) If the Jews, who wished to be separated from Christ, asked whither He was going, much more would the disciples, who wished never to be separated from Him, be anxious to know it. So with much love, and, at the same time, fear, they proceed to ask: Thomas saith unto Him, Lord, we know not whither Thou goest; and how can we know the way?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxix. 1) Our Lord had said that they knew both, Thomas says that they knew neither. Our Lord cannot lie; they knew not that they did know. Our Lord proves that they did: Jesus saith unto Him, I am the way, the truth, and the life.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. liv) As if He said, I am the way, whereby thou wouldest go; I am the truth, whereto thou wouldest go; I am the life, in which thou wouldest abide. The truth and the life every one understands (capit); but not every one hath found the way. Even the philosophers of the world have seen that God is the life eternal, the truth which is the end of all knowledge. And the Word of God, which is truth and life with the Father, by taking upon Him human nature, is made the way. Walk by the Man, and thou wilt arrive at God. For it is better to limp on the right way, than to walk ever so stoutly by the wrong.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) For He who is the way doth not lead us into devious courses out of the way; nor does He who is the truth deceive us by falsehoods; nor does He who is the life leave us in the darkness of death.

THEOPHYLACT. When thou art engaged in the practical, He is made thy way; when in the contemplative, He is made thy truth. And to the active and the contemplative is joined life: for we should both act and contemplate with reference to the world to come.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxix. 2) They knew then the way, because they knew He was the way. But what need to add, the truth, and the life? Because they were yet to be told whither He went. He went to the truth; He went to the life. He went then to Himself, by Himself. But didst Thou leave Thyself, O

Lord, to come to us? (c. 3.). I know that Thou tookest upon Thee the form of a servant; by the flesh Thou camest, remaining where Thou wast; by that Thou returnedst, remaining where Thou hadst come to. If by this then Thou camest, and returnedst, by this Thou wast the way, not only to us, to come to Thee, but also to Thyself to come, and to return again. And when Thou wentest to life, which is Thyself, Thou raisedst that same flesh of Thine from death to life. Christ therefore went to life, when His flesh arose from death to life. And since the Word is life, Christ went to Himself; Christ being both, in one person, i. e. Word-flesh. Again, by the flesh God came to men, the truth to liars; for God is true, but every man a liar. When then He withdrew Himself from men, and lifted up His flesh to that place in which no liar is, the same Christ, by the way, by which He being the Word became flesh, by Himself, i. e. by His flesh, by the same returned to Truth, which is Himself, which truth, even amongst the liars He maintained unto death. Behold I myself1, if I make you understand what I say, do in a certain sense go to you, though I do not leave myself. And when I cease speaking, I return to myself, but remain with you, if ye remember what ye have heard. If the image which God hath made can do this, how much more the Image which God hath begotten? Thus He goes by Himself, to Himself and to the Father, and we by Him, to Him and to the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiii. 2) For if, He says, ye have Me for your guide to the Father, ye shall certainly come to Him. Nor can ye come by any other way. (c. 6:44) Whereas He had said above, No man can come to Me, except the Father draw him, now He says, No man cometh unto the Father but by Me, thus equalling Himself to the Father. The next words explain, Whither I go ye know, and the way ye know. If ye had known Me, He says, ye should have known My Father also; i. e. If ye had known My substance and dignity, ye would have known the Father’s. They did know Him, but not as they ought to do. Nor was it till afterwards, when the Spirit came, that they were fully enlightened. On this account He adds, And from henceforth ye know Him, know Him, that is, spiritually. And have seen Him, i. e. by Me; meaning that he who had seen Him, had seen the Father. They saw Him, however, not in His pure substance, but clothed in flesh.

BEDE. How can our Lord say, If ye had known Me, ye should have known My Father also; when He has just said, Whither I go ye know, and the way ye know? We must suppose that some of them knew, and others not: among the latter, Thomas.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) Or thus: When it is said that the Son is the way to the Father, is it meant that He is so by His teaching, or by His nature? We shall be able to see from what follows: If ye had known Me, ye should have known My Father also. In His incarnation asserting His Divinity, He maintained a certain order of sight and knowledge: separating the time of seeing from that of knowing. For Him, who He saith must be known, He speaks of as already seen: that henceforward they might from this revelation have knowledge of the Divine Nature which they had all along seen in Him.

14:8–11

8. Philip saith unto him, Lord, shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us.

9. Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known me, Philip? he that hath seen me hath seen the Father; and how sayest thou then, Shew us the Father?

10. Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in me? the words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself: but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.

11. Believe me that I am in the Father, and the Father in me: or else believe me for the very works’ sake.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) A declaration so new startled Philip. Our Lord is seen to be man. He confesses Himself to be the Son of God, declares that, if He were known, the Father would be known, that, if He is seen, the Father is seen. The familiarity of the Apostle therefore breaks forth into questioning our Lord, Philip saith unto Him, Lord, shew us the Father, and it sufficeth us.He did not deny He could be seen (non visum negavit), but wished to be shewn him; nor did he wish to see with his bodily eyes, but that He whom he had seen might be made manifest to his understanding. He had seen the Son in the form of man, but how through that form He saw the Father, he did not know. This he wants to be shewn him, shewn to his understanding, not set before his eyes; and then he will be satisfied: And it sufficeth us.

AUGUSTINE. (i. de Trin. c. viii) For to that joy of beholding His face, nothing can be added. Philip understood this, and said, Lord, shew us the

Father, and it sufficeth us. But he did not yet understand that he could in the same way have said, Lord, shew us Thyself, and it sufficeth us. But our Lord's answer enlightens him, Jesus saith unto him, Have I been so long with you, and yet hast thou not known Me, Philip?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxx. 1) But how is this, when our Lord said that they knew whither He was going, and the way, because they knew Him? The question is easily settled by supposing that some of them knew, and others not; among the latter, Philip.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) He reproves the ignorance of Philip in this respect. For whereas his actions had been strictly divine, such as walking on the water, commanding the winds, remitting sins, raising the dead, He complained that in His assumed humanity, the Divine nature was not discerned. Accordingly to Philip's request, to be shewn the Father, Our Lord answers, He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxx) When two persons are very like each, we say, If you have seen the one, you have seen the other. So here, He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father; not that He is both the Father, and the Son, but that the Son is an absolute likeness of the Father.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) He does not mean the sight of the bodily eye: for His fleshly part, born of the Virgin, doth not avail towards contemplating the form and image of God in Him; but the Son of God being known with the understanding, it follows that the Father is known also, forasmuch as He is the image of God, not differing from but expressing His Author1. For our Lord's expressions do not speak of one person solitary and without relationship, but teach us His birth. The Father also excludes the supposition of a single solitary person, and leaves us no other doctrine but that the Father is seen in the Son, by the incommunicable likeness of birth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxx. 3) But is he to be reproved, who, when he has seen the likeness, wishes to see the man of whom he is the likeness? No: our Lord rebuked the question, only with reference to the mind of the asker. Philip asked, as if the Father were better than the Son; and so shewed that He did not know the Son. Which opinion our Lord corrects: Believest thou not that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me? as if He said, If it is a great wish with thee to see the Father, at any rate believe what thou dost not see.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) For what excuse was there for ignorance of the Father, or what necessity to shew Him, when the Father was seen in the Son by His essential nature2, while by the identity of unity, the Begotten and the Begetter are one: Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in Me?

AUGUSTINE. (i. de. Trin. 8) He wished him to live by faith, before he had sight, and therefore says, Believest thou not? Spiritual vision is the reward of faith, vouchsafed to minds purified by faith.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) But the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, not by a conjunction of two harmonizing essences3, nor by a nature grafted into a more capacious substance as in material bodies, in which it is impossible that what is within can be made external to that which contains it; but by the birth of a nature which is life from life; forasmuch as from God nothing but God can be born.

HILARY. (v. de Trin) The unchangeable God follows, so to speak, His own nature, by begetting unchangeable God. Nor does the perfect birth of unchangeable God from unchangeable God forsake His own nature. We understand then here the nature of God subsisting in Him, since God is in God, nor besides Him who is God, can any other be God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 1) Or thus: Philip, because [he thought] he had seen the Son with his bodily eye, wished to see the Father in the same way; perhaps too remembering what the Prophet said, I saw the Lord, and therefore he says, Shew us the Father. (Isa. 6:1) The Jews had asked, who was His Father; and Peter and Thomas, whither He went; and neither were told plainly. Philip therefore, that he might not seem burdensome, after saying, Shew us the Father, adds, And it sufficeth us: i. e. we seek for no more. Our Lord in reply does not say, that he asked an impossible thing, but that he had not seen the Son to begin with, for that if he had seen Him, he would have seen the Father: Have I been so long time with you, and yet hast thou not known Me? He does not say, not seen Me, but, not known Me; not known that the Son, being what the Father is, does in Himself fitly shew the Father. Then dividing the Persons, He says, He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father; that none might maintain that He was both the Father and the Son. The words shew too that even the Son was not seen in a bodily sense. So if any one takes seeing here, for knowing, I will not contradict him, but will take the sentence as if it was, He that hath known Me, hath known the Father. He shews here His consubstantiality with the Father: He that hath seen My substance, hath seen the Father. Whence it is evident He is not a creature: for all know and see the creature, but not all God; Philip, for instance, who wished to see the substance of the Father. If Christ then had been of another substance from the Father, He would never have said, He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father. A man cannot see the substance of gold in silver: one nature cannot be made apparent by another.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxx. 3. and lxxi. 1) He then addresses all of them, not Philip only: The word that I speak unto you, I speak not of Myself. What is, I speak not of Myself, but, I that speak am not of Myself? He attributes what He does to Him, from whom He Himself, the doer, is.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) Wherein He neither desires Himself to be the Son, nor hides the existence1 of His Father's power in Him. In that He speaks, it is Himself that speaks in His own person; in that He speaks not of Himself, He witnesseth His nativity, that He is God from God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 2) Mark the abundant proof of the unity of substance. For He continues; But the Father that dwelleth in Me, He doeth the works. As if He said, My Father and I act together, not differently from each other; agreeing with what He said below: If I do not the works of My Father, believe Me not. But why does He pass from words to works? Why does He not say as we might have expected, He speaketh the words? Because He means to apply what He says both to His doctrine, and to His miracles; or because His words are themselves works.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxx. 1, 2) For he that edifieth his neighbour by speaking, doth a good work. These two sentences are brought against us by different sects of heretics; the Arians saying that the Son is unequal to the Father, because He does not speak of Himself; the Sabellians, that the same who is the Father is the Son. For what is meant, they ask, by, The Father that dwelleth in Me, He doeth the works, but, I that dwell in Myself, do these works.

HILARY. (vii. de Trin) That the Father dwells in the Son, shews that He is not single, or solitary; that the Father works by the Son, shews that He is not different or alien. As He is not solitary who doth not speak from Himself, so neither is He alien and separable who speaketh by Him. Having shewn then that the Father spoke and worked in Him, He formally states this union: Believe Me that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me: that they might not think that the Father worketh and speaketh in the Son as by a mere agent or instrument, not by the unity of nature implied in His Divine birth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxi. 2) Philip alone was reproved before.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 2) But if this does not suffice to shew ray consubstantiality, at least learn it from My works: Or else believe Me for the very works' sake. Ye have seen My miracles, and all the proper signs of My divinity; works which the Father alone worketh, sins remitted, life restored, and the like.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxi. 2) Believe then for My works' sake, that I am in the Father, and the Father in Me; for, were we separated, we could not be working together.

14:12–14

12. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also: and greater works than these shall he do; because I go unto my Father.

13. And whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son.

14. If ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 2) Having said, Believe for the works' sake, our Lord goes on to declare that He can do much greater than these, and what is more wonderful, give others the power of working them. Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on Me, the works that I do, shall he do also; and greater works than these shall he do.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxi. 3) But what are these greater works? Is it that the shadow of the Apostles, as they passed, by, healed the sick? It is indeed a greater thing that a shadow should heal, than that the border of a garment should. Nevertheless, by works here our Lord refers to His words. For when He says, My Father that dwelleth in Me, He doeth the works, what are these works but the words which He spoke? And the fruit of those words was their faith. But these were but few converts in comparison with what those disciples made afterwards by their preaching: they converted the Gentiles to the faith. Did not the rich man go away sorrowful from His words? And yet that which one did not do at His own exhortation, many did afterwards when He preached through the disciples. He did greater works when preached by the believing, than when speaking to men’s ears. (lxxii. 2). Still these greater works He did by His Apostles, whereas He includes others besides them, when He says, He that believeth on Me. Are we not to compute any one among the believers in Christ, who does not do greater works than Christ? This sounds harsh if not explained. The Apostle says, To him that believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness. (Rom. 4:5) By this work then we shall do the works of Christ, the very believing in Christ being the work of Christ, for He worketh this in us, though not without us. Attend then’; He that believeth on Me, the works that I do, shall he do also. First I do them, then he will do them: I do them, that he may do them. Do what works but this, viz. that a man, from being a sinner, become just? which thing Christ worketh in us, though not without us. This in truth I call a greater work to do, than to create the heaven and the earth; for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the salvation and justification of the predestinated shall remain. (c. 3.). However, the Angels in heaven are the work of Christ; shall he who worketh with Christ for his own justification, do greater even than these? Judge any one which be the greater work, to create the just, or to justify the ungodly? At least, if both be of equal power, the latter hath more of mercy. But it is not necessary to understand all the works of Christ, when He says, greater works than these shall he do. These perhaps refers to the works He had done that hour. He had then been instructing them in the faith1. And surely it is a less work to preach righteousness, which He did without us, than to justify the ungodly, which He so does in us, as that we do it ourselves. Great things truly did our Lord promise His people, when He went to His Father: Because I go unto My Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 2) i. e. I shall not perish, but shall remain in My proper dignity, in heaven. Or He means: It is your part henceforth to work miracles, since I am going.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxiii. 2) And that no one might attribute the merit to himself, He shews, that even those greater works were His own doing: And whatsoever ye shall ask in My name, that will I do. Before it was, He shall do, now, I will do: as if He said, Let not this appear impossible to you. He that believeth in Me, will not be greater than I; but I shall do greater works then than now; greater by him that believeth on Me, than now by Myself; which will not be a failing, but a condescension.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 2) In My name, He says. Thus the Apostles; In the name of Jesus of Nazareth, arise and walk. (Acts 3:6) All the miracles that they did, He did: the hand of the Lord was with them.

THEOPHYLACT. This is an explanation of the doctrine of miracles. It is by prayer, and invocation of His name, that a man is able to work miracles.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxii. 2) Whatsoever ye shall ask. Then why do we often see believers asking, and not receiving? Perhaps it is that they ask amiss. When a man would make a bad use of what he asks for, God in His mercy does not grant him it. Still if God even in kindness often refuses the requests of believers, how are we to understand, Whatsoever ye shall ask in My name, I will do? Was this said to the Apostles only? No. He says above, He that believeth on Me, the works that I do shall he do also. And if we go to the lives of the Apostles themselves, we shall find that he who laboured more than they all, prayed that the messenger of Satan might depart from him, but was not granted his request. But attend: does not our Lord lay down a certain condition? In My name, which is Christ Jesus. Christ signifies King, Jesus, Saviour. Therefore whatever we ask for that would hinder our salvation, we do not ask in our Saviour's name: and yet He is our Saviour, not only when He does what we ask, but also when He does not. When He sees us ask any thing to the disadvantage of our salvation, He shews Himself our Saviour by not doing it. The physician knows whether what the sick man asks for is to the advantage or disadvantage of his health; and does not allow what would be to his hurt, though the sick man himself desires it; but looks to his final cure. And some things we may even ask in His name, and He will not grant them us at the time, though He will some time. What we ask for is deferred, not denied. He adds, that the Father may be glorified in the Son. The Son does not do any thing without the Father, inasmuch as He does it in order that the Father may be glorified in Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 2) For when the great power of the Son is manifested, He that begat Him is glorified. He introduces this last, to confirm the truth of what He has said.

THEOPHYLACT. Observe the order (ἀκολουθίαν) in which the glorifying of the Father comes. In the name of Jesus miracles were done, by which men were made to believe the Apostles' preaching. This brought them to the knowledge of the Father, and thus the Father was glorified in the Son.

14:15–17

15. If ye love me, keep my commandments.

16. And I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever;

17. Even the Spirit of truth; whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him: but ye know him; for he dwelleth with you, and shall be in you.

CHRYSOSTOM. Our Lord having said, Whatsoever ye shall ask in My name, that I will do; that they might not think simply asking would be enough, He adds, If ye love Me, keep My commandments. And then I will do what ye ask, seems to be His meaning. Or the disciples having heard Him say, I go to the Father, and being troubled at the thought of it, He says, To love Me, is not to be troubled, but to keep My commandments: this is love, to obey and believe in Him who is loved. And as they had been expressing a strong desire for His bodily presence, He assures them that His absence will be supplied to them in another way: And I will pray the Father, and He will give you another Comforter.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxiv. 4) Wherein He shews too that He Himself is the Comforter. Paraclete means advocate, and is applied to Christ: We have an Advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. (1 John 2:1)

ALCUIN. Paraclete, i. e. Comforter. They had then one Comforter, who comforted and elevated them by the sweetness of His miracles, and His preaching.

DIDYMUS. (Didym. De Spiritu Sancto.) But the Holy Ghost was another Comforter: differing not in nature, but in operation. For whereas our Saviour in His office of Mediator, and of Messenger1, and as High Priest, made supplication for our sins; the Holy Ghost is a Comforter in another sense, i. e. as consoling our griefs. But do not infer from the different operations of the Son and the Spirit, a difference of nature. For in other places we find the Holy Spirit performing the office of intercessor2 with the Father, as, The Spirit Himself intercedeth for us. (Rom. 8:26) And the Saviour, on the other hand, pours consolation into those hearts that need it:

as in Maccabees, He strengthened those of the people that were brought low. (1 Macc. 14:15)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 2) He says, I will ask the Father, to make them believe Him: which they could not have done, had He simply said, I will send.

AUGUSTINE. (contra Serm. Arrian. c. xix.) Yet to shew that His works are inseparable from His Father's, He says below, When I shall go, I will send Him unto you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv) But what had He more than the Apostles, if He could only ask the Father to give others the Spirit? The Apostles did this often even without praying.

ALCUIN. I will ask—He says, as being the inferior in respect of His humanity—My Father, with Whom I am equal and consubstantial in respect of My Divine nature.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 1) That He may abide with you for ever. The Spirit does not depart even at death. He intimates too that the Holy Ghost will not suffer death, or go away, as He has done. But that the mention of the Comforter might not lead them to expect another incarnation, a Comforter to be seen with the eye, He adds, Even the Spirit of truth, Whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth Him not, neither knoweth Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxiv. 1) This is the Holy Ghost in the Trinity, Whom the Catholic faith professes to be consubstantial and coeternal with the Father and the Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 1) The Spirit of truth He calls Him, because He unfolds the figures of the Old Testament. The world are the wicked, seeing is certain knowledge; sight being the most certain of the senses.

BEDE. Note too, that when He calls the Holy Spirit the Spirit of truth, He shews that the Holy Spirit is His Spirit: then when He says He is given by the Father, He declares Him to be the Spirit of the Father also. Thus the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father, and from the Son.

GREGORY. (v. Mor.) The Holy Spirit kindles in every one, in whom He dwells, the desire of things invisible. And since worldly minds love only things visible, this world receiveth Him not, because it rises not to the love of things invisible. In proportion as secular minds enlarge themselves by the spread of their desires, in that proportion they narrow themselves, with respect to admitting Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxiv. 4) Thus the world, i. e. the lovers of the world, cannot, He says, receive the Holy Spirit: that is to say, unrighteousness cannot be righteous. The world, i. e. the lovers of the world, cannot receive Him, because it seeth Him not. The love of the world hath not invisible eyes wherewith to see that, which can only be seen invisibly. It follows: But ye know Him, for He dwelleth (manebit) with you. And that they might not think this meant a visible dwelling, in the sense in which we use the phrase with respect to a guest, He adds, And shall be in you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 1) As if He said, He will not dwell with you as I have done, but will dwell in your souls.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxiv. 5) To be in a place is prior to dwelling. Be in you, is the explanation of dwell with you: i. e. shews that the latter means not that He is seen, but that He is known, He must be in us, that the knowledge of Him may be in us. We see the Holy Ghost then in us, in our consciences.

GREGORY. (ii. Mor.) But if the Holy Spirit abides in the disciples, how is it a special mark of the Mediator that He abides in Him. (supr. 1:32. ἐπʹ αὐτὸν) We shall better understand, if we distinguish between the different gifts of the Spirit. In respect of those gifts without which we cannot attain to salvation, the Holy Spirit ever abides in all the Elect: but in respect of those which do not relate to our own salvation, but to the procuring that of others, He does not always abide in them. For He sometimes withdraws His miraculous gifts, that His grace may be possessed with humility. Christ has Him without measure and always.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 1) This speech levels at a stroke, as it were, the opposite heresies. The word another, shews the distinct personality of the Spirit: the word Paraclete, His consubstantiality.

AUGUSTINE. (contr. Serm. Arrian. c. xix.) Comforter, the title of the Holy Spirit, the third Person in the Trinity, the Apostle applies to God: God that comforteth those that are cast down, comforted us. (2 Cor. 7:6) The Holy Spirit therefore Who comforts those that are cast down, is God. Or if they will have this said by the Apostle of the Father or the Son, let them not any longer separate the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, in His peculiar office of comforting.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxiv. c. 1) But when the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us, (Rom. 5:6) how shall we love and keep the commandments of Christ, so as to receive the Spirit, when we are not able to love or to keep them, unless we have received the Spirit? Does love in us go first, i. e. do we so love Christ and keep His commandments as to deserve to receive the Holy Spirit, and to have the love of God the Father shed abroad in our hearts? This is a perverse opinion. For he who does not love the Father, does not love the Son, however he may think he does. (c. 2). It remains for us to understand, that he who loves has the Holy Spirit, and by having Him, attains to having more of Him, and by having more of Him, to loving more. The disciples had already the Spirit which our Lord promised; but they were to be given more of Him: they had Him secretly, they were to receive Him openly. The promise is made both to him who has the Spirit, and to him who has Him not; to the former, that he shall have Him; to the latter, that He shall have more of Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 1) When He had cleansed His disciples by the sacrifice of His passion, and their sins were remitted, and they were sent forth to dangers and trials, it was necessary that they should receive the Holy Spirit abundantly. But they were made to wait some time for this gift, in order that they might feel the want of it, and so be the more grateful for it when it came.

14:18–21

18. I will not leave you comfortless: I will come to you.

19. Yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more: but ye see me: because I live, ye shall live also.

20. At that day ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you.

21. He that hath my commandments, and keepeth them, he it is that loveth me: and he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxv. 1) That no one might think, because our Lord was about to give the Holy Spirit, that He would therefore not be present Himself in Him, He adds, I will not leave you comfortless. The Greek word ὀρφανοὶ signifies “wards.” Although then the Son of God has made us the adopted sons of the Father, yet here He Himself shews the affection of a Father towards us.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 1) At the first He said, Whither I go ye shall come; but as this was a long time off, He promises them the Spirit in the interval. And as they knew not what that was, He promises them that they most desired, His own presence, I will come to you: but intimates at the same time that they are not to look for the same kind of presence over again: Yet a little while, and the world seeth Me no more: as if He said, I will come to you, but not to live with you every day as I did before. And, I will come to you alone, He says, thus preventing any inconsistency with what He had said to the Jews: Henceforth ye shall not see Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxv. 2) For the world saw Him then with the carnal eye, manifest in the flesh, though it did not see the Word hidden under the flesh. But after the resurrection He was unwilling to shew even His flesh, except to His own followers, whom He allowed to see and to handle it: Yet a little while, and the world seeth Me no more; but ye shall see Me. But, inasmuch as the world, by which are meant all who are aliens from His kingdom, will see Him at the last judgment, it is better perhaps to understand Him here as pointing to that time, when He will be taken for ever from the eyes of the wicked, to be seen thenceforth by those who love Him. A little while, He says, for that which seems a long time to men, is but a moment in the eyes of God.

Because I live, ye shall live also.

THEOPHYLACT. AS if He said, Though I shall die, I shall rise again. And ye shall live also, i. e. when ye see Me risen again, ye will rejoice, and be as dead men brought to life again.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 2) To me however he seems to refer not only to the present life, but to the future; as if He said, The death of the cross shall not separate you from Me for ever, but only hide Me from you for a moment.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxv. 3) But why does He speak of life as present to Him, future to them? Because His resurrection preceded, theirs was to follow. His resurrection was about so soon to take place, that He speaks of it as present; theirs being deferred till the end of the world, He does not say ye live, but ye shall live. Because He lives, therefore we shall live: As by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. (1 Cor. 15:21) It follows: In that day (the day of which He saith, ye shall live also) ye shall know, i. e. whereas now ye believe, then ye shall see, that I am in the Father, and ye in Me, and I in you. For when we shall have attained to that life in which death is swallowed up, then shall be finished that which is now begun by Him, that He should be in us, and we in Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 2) Or, in that day, on which I shall rise again, ye shall know. For His resurrection it was that established their faith. Then the powerful teaching of the Holy Spirit began. His saying, I am in the Father, expresses His humility; the next, And ye in Me, and I in you, His humanity and God’s assistance to Him. Scripture often uses the same words in different senses, as applied to God and to men.

HILARY. (viii. de Trin) Or He means by this, that whereas He was in the Father by the nature of His divinity, and we in Him by means of His birth in the flesh; He on the other hand should be believed to be in us by the mystery of the Sacrament: as He Himself testified above: Whoso eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, dwelleth in Me, and I in Him. (supr. 6:54)

ALCUIN. By love, and the observance of His commandments, that will be perfected in us which He has begun, viz. that we should be in Him, and He in us. And that this blessedness may be understood to be promised to all, not to the Apostles only, He adds, He that hath My commandments and keepeth them, he it is that loveth Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxv. 5) He that hath them in mind, and keepeth them in life; he that hath them in words, and keepeth them in works; he that hath them by hearing, and keepeth them by doing; he that hath them by doing, and keepeth them by persevering, he it is that loveth Me. Love must be shewn by works, or it is a mere barren name.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, Ye think that by sorrowing, as ye do, for my death ye prove your affection; but I esteem the keeping of My commandments the evidence of love. And then He shews the privileged state of one who loves: And he that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxv. 5) I will love him, as if now He did not love him. What meaneth this? He explains it in what follows: And will manifest Myself unto him, i. e. I love him so far as to manifest Myself to him; so that, as the reward of his faith, he will have sight. Now He only loves us so that we believe; then He will love us so that we see. And whereas we love now by believing that which we shall see, then we shall love by seeing that which we have believed.

AUGUSTINE. (ad Paul. de videndo Dei, Ep. 112:100, 10) He promises to shew Himself to them that love Him as God with the Father, not in that body which He bore upon earth, and which the wicked saw.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, as after the resurrection He was to appear to them in a body more assimilated to His divinity, that they might not take Him then for a spirit, or a phantom, He tells them now beforehand not to have misgivings upon seeing Him, but to remember that He shews Himself to them as a reward for their keeping His commandments; and that therefore they are bound ever to keep them, that they may ever enjoy the sight of Him.

14:22–27

22. Judas saith unto him, not Iscariot, Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world?

23. Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him.

24. He that loveth me not keepeth not my sayings: and the word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father’s which sent me.

25. These things have I spoken unto you, being yet present with you.

26. But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you.

27. Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I unto you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxvi. 1) Our Lord having said, A little while, and the world seeth Me no more: but ye shall see Me: Judas, not the traitor named Scariot, but he whose Epistle is read among the Canonical

Scriptures, asks His meaning: Judas saith unto Him, not Iscariot, Lord, how is it that Thou wilt manifest Thyself unto us, and not unto the world? Our Lord in reply explains why He manifests Himself to His own, and not to aliens, viz. because the one love Him, the other do not. Jesus answered and said unto him, If a man love Me, he will keep My words.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxx. in Evang.) If thou wouldest prove thy love, shew thy works. The love of God is never idle; whenever it is, it doeth great things: if it do not work, it is not.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxvi. 2) Love distinguishes the saints from the world: it maketh men to be of one mind in an house; in which house the Father and the Son take their abode; who give that love to those, to whom in the end they will manifest themselves. For there is a certain inner manifestation of God, unknown to the ungodly, to whom there is no manifestation made of the Father and the Holy Spirit, and only could be of the Son in the flesh; which latter manifestation is not as the former, being only for a little while, not for ever, for judgment, not for joy, for punishment, not for reward. And We will come unto him: They come to us, in that we go to Them; They come by succouring, we go by obeying; They come by enlightening, we go by contemplating; They come by filling, we go by holding: so Their manifestation to us is not external, but inward; Their abode in us not transitory, but eternal. It follows, And will make Our abode with him.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxx.) Into some hearts He cometh, but not to make His abode with them. For some feel compunction for a season and turn to God, but in time of temptation forget that which gave them compunction, and return to their former sins, just as if they had never lamented them. But whoso loveth God truly, into his heart the Lord both comes, and also makes His abode therein: for the love of the Godhead so penetrates him, that no temptation withdraws him from it. He truly loves, whose mind no evil pleasure overcomes, through his consent thereto.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxvi. 4) But while the Father and the Son make Their abode with the loving soul, is the Holy Spirit excluded? What meaneth that which is said of the Holy Spirit above: He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you, but that the Spirit makes His abode with us? Unless indeed a man be so absurd as to think that when the Father and the Son come, the Holy Spirit departs, as if to give place to His superiors. Yet even this carnal thought is met by Scripture, in that it says, Abide with you for ever. (v.16) He will therefore be in the same abode with Them for ever. As He did not come without Them, so neither They without Him. As a consequence of the Trinity, acts are sometimes attributed to single persons in it: but the substance of the same Trinity demands, that in such acts the presence of the other Persons also be implied.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxx.) In proportion as a man’s love rests upon lower things, in that proportion is he removed from heavenly love: He that loveth Me not, keepeth not My sayings. To the love then of our Maker, let the tongue, mind, life bear witness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 1, 2) Or thus: Judas thought that he should see Him, as we see the dead in sleep: How is it, that Thou wilt manifest Thyself unto us, and not unto the world? meaning, Alas, as Thou art to die, Thou wilt appear to us but as one dead. To correct this mistake, He says, I and My Father will come to him, i. e. I shall manifest Myself, even as My Father manifests Himself. And will make our abode with Him; which is not like a dream. It follows, And the word which ye hear is not Mine, but the Father’s which sent Me; i. e. He that heareth not My words, inasmuch as he loveth not Me, so loveth he not My Father. This He says to shew that He spoke nothing which was not the Father’s, nothing beside what seemed good to the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxvi. 5) And perhaps there is a distinction at bottom, since He speaks of His sayings, when they are His own, in the plural number; as when He says, He that loveth Me not, keepeth not My sayings: when they are not His own, but the Father’s, in the singular, i. e. as the Word, which is Himself. For He is not His own Word, but the Father’s, as He is not His own image, but the Father’s, or His own Son, but the Father’s.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 3) These things have I spoken unto you, being yet present with you. Some of these things were obscure, and not understood by the disciples.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxvii. 1) The abode He promised them hereafter is altogether a different one from this present abode He now speaks of. The one is spiritual and inward, the other outward, and perceptible to the bodily sight and hearing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 3) To enable them to sustain His bodily departure more cheerfully, He promises that that departure shall be the source of great benefit; for that while He was then in the body, they could never know much, because the Spirit would not have come: But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, Whom the Father will send in My name, He shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxx. in Evang.) Paraclete is Advocate, or Comforter. The Advocate then intercedes with the Father for sinners, when by His inward power He moves the sinner to pray for himself. The Comforter relieves the sorrow of penitents, and cheers them with the hope of pardon.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 3) He often calls Him the Comforter, in allusion to the affliction in which they then were.

DIDYMUS. (Didym. de Spir. Sancto, l. ii. inter opera Hieron.) The Saviour affirms that the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father, in His, the Saviour's, name; which name is the Son. Here an agreement of nature and propriety1, so to speak, of persons is shewn. The Son can come in the Father's name only, consistently with the proper1 relationship of the Son to the Father, and the Father to the Son. No one else comes in the name of the Father, but in the name of God, of the Lord, of the Almighty, and the like. As servants who come in the name of their Lord, do so as being the servants of that Lord, so the Son who comes in the name of the Father, bears that name as being the acknowledged only-begotten Son of the Father. That the Holy Spirit then is sent in the Son's name, by the Father, shews that He is in unity with the Son: whence He is said too to be the Spirit of the Son, and to make those sons by adoption, who are willing to receive Him. The Holy Spirit then, Who cometh in the name of the Son from the Father, shall teach them, who are established in the faith of Christ, all things; all things which are spiritual, both the understanding of truth, and the sacrament of wisdom. But He will teach not like those who have acquired an art or knowledge by study and industry, but as being the very art, doctrine, knowledge itself. As being this Himself, the Spirit of truth will impart the knowledge of divine things to the mind.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxx.) Unless the Spirit be present to the mind of the hearer, the word of the teacher is vain. Let none then attribute to the human teacher, the understanding which follows in consequence of his teaching:

for unless there be a teacher within, the tongue of the teacher outside will labour in vain. Nay even the Maker Himself does not speak for the instruction of man, unless the Spirit by His unction speaks at the same time.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxvii. 2) So then the Son speaks, the Holy Spirit teaches: when the Son speaks we take in the words, when the Holy Spirit teaches, we understand those words. The whole Trinity indeed both speaks and teaches, but unless each person worked separately as well, the whole would be too much for human infirmity to take in.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxx.) But why is it said of the Spirit, He shall suggest2 all things to you: to suggest being the office of an inferior? The word is used here, as it is used sometimes, in the sense of supplying secretly. The invisible Spirit suggests, not because He takes a lower place in teaching, but because. He teaches secretly.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xxvii. 2) Suggest, i. e. bring to your remembrance. Every wholesome hint to remember that we receive is of the grace of the Spirit.

THEOPHYLACT. The Holy Spirit then was both to teach and to bring to remembrance: to teach what Christ had forborne to tell His disciples, because they were not able to bear it; to bring to remembrance what Christ had told them, but which on account of its difficulty, or their slowness of understanding, they were unable to remember.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxiv. 3) Peace I leave with you, My peace I give unto you: He says this to console His disciples, who were now troubled at the prospect of the hatred and opposition which awaited them after His departure.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxvii. 2) He left no peace in this world; in which we conquer the enemy, and have love one to another: He will give us peace in the world to come, when we shall reign without an enemy, and where we shall be able to avoid disagreement. This peace is Himself, both when we believe that He is, and when we shall see Him as He is. But why does He say, Peace I leave with you, without the My, whereas He puts in My in, My peace I give unto you? Are we to understand My in the former; or is it not rather left out with a meaning? His peace is such peace as He has Himself; the peace which He left us in this world is rather our peace than His. He has nothing to fight against in Himself, because He has no sin: but ours is a peace in which we still say, Forgive us our debts. (Matt. 6:12) And in like manner we have peace between ourselves, because we mutually trust one another, that we mutually love one another. But neither is that a perfect peace; for we do not see into each other's minds. I could not deny however that these words of our Lord's may be understood as a simple repetition. He adds, Not as the world giveth, give I unto you: i. e. not as those men, who love the world, give. They give themselves peace, i. e. free, uninterrupted enjoyment of the world. And even when they allow the righteous peace, so far as not to persecute them, yet there cannot be true peace, where there is no true agreement, no union of heart.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 3) External peace is often even hurtful, rather than profitable to those who enjoy it.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. serm. ix) But there is a peace which is serenity of thought, tranquillity of mind, simplicity of heart, the bond of love, the fellowship of charity. None will be able to come to the inheritance of the Lord who do not observe this testament of peace; none be friends with Christ, who are at enmity with the Christians.

14:27–31

27. Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid.

28. Ye have heard how I said unto you, I go away, and come again unto you. If ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I said, I go unto the Father: for my Father is greater than I.

29. And now I have told you before it come to pass, that, when it is come to pass, ye might believe.

30. Hereafter I will not talk much with you: for the prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in me.

31. But that the world may know that I love the Father: and as the Father gave me commandment, even so I do. Arise, let us go hence.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 3) After saying, Peace I leave with you, which was like taking farewell, He consoles them: Let not your heart be troubled, neither let it be afraid: the two feelings of love and fear were now the uppermost in them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxviii. 1) Though He was only going for a time, their hearts would be troubled and afraid for what might happen before He returned; lest in the absence of the Shepherd the wolf might attack the flock: Ye have heard how I said unto you, I go away, and come again to you. In that He was man, He went: in that He was God, He stayed. Why then be troubled and afraid, when He left the eye only, not the heart? To make them understand that it was as man that He said, I go away, and come again to you; He adds, If ye loved Me ye would rejoice, because I said, I go unto My Father; for My Father is greater than I. In that the Son then is unequal with the Father, through that inequality He went to the Father, from Him to come again to judge the quick and dead: in that He is equal to the Father, He never goes from the Father, but is every where altogether with Him in that Godhead, which is not confined to place. Nay, the Son Himself, because that being equal to the Father in the form of God, He emptied Himself, not losing the form of God, but taking that of a servant, is greater even than Himself: the form of God which is not lost, is greater than the form of a servant which was put on. In this form of a servant, the Son of God is inferior not to the Father only, but to the Holy Ghost; in this the Child Christ was inferior even to His parents; to whom we read, He was subject. Let us acknowledge then the twofold substance of Christ, the divine, which is equal to the Father, and the human, which is inferior. But Christ is both together, not two, but one Christ: else the Godhead is a quaternity, not a Trinity. Wherefore He says, If ye loved Me, ye would rejoice, because I said, I go to the Father; for human nature should exult at being thus taken up by the Only Begotten Word, and made immortal in heaven; at earth being raised to heaven, and dust sitting incorruptible at the right hand of the Father. Who, that loves Christ, will not rejoice at this, seeing, as he doth, his own nature immortal in Christ, and hoping that He Himself will be so by Christ.

HILARY. (de Trin. ix) Or thus: If the Father is greater by virtue of giving, is the Son less by confessing the gift? The giver is the greater, but He to whom unity with that giver is given, is not the less.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxv. 4) Or thus: The Apostles did not yet know what the resurrection was of which He spoke when He said, I go, and come again to you; or what they ought to think of it. They only knew the great power of the Father. So He tells them: Though ye fear I shall not be able to save Myself, and do not trust to My appearing again after My crucifixion; yet when ye hear that I go to My Father, ye should rejoice, because I go to one greater, one able to dissolve and change all things. All this is said in accommodation to their weakness: as we see from the next words; And now I have told you before it come to pass; that when it does come to pass, ye may believe.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxix. 1) But is not the time for belief before a thing takes place? Is it not the praise of faith, that it believes what it does not see? according to what is said below to Thomas: Because thou hast seen, thou hast believed. He saw one thing, believed another: what he saw was man, what he believed was God. And if belief can be talked of with reference to things seen, as when we say that we believe our eyes; yet it is not mature faith, but is merely preparatory to our believing what we do not see. When it has come to pass; then He says, because after His death they would see Him alive again, and ascending to His Father; which sight would convince them that He was the Christ, the Son of God; able as He was to do so great a thing, and to foretell it. Which faith however would not be a new, but only an enlarged faith; or a faith which had failed at His death, and been renewed by His resurrection.

HILARY. (ix. de Trin) He next alludes to the approach of the time when He would resume His glory. Hereafter I will not talk much with you.

BEDE. He says this because the time was now approaching for His being taken, and given up to death: For the Prince of this world cometh.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxix. 2) i. e. the devil; the prince of sinners, not of creatures; as the Apostle saith, Against the rulers of this world. (Eph. 6:12) Or, as He immediately adds by way of explanation, this darkness, meaning, the ungodly. And hath nothing in Me. God had no sin as God, nor had His flesh contracted it by a sinful birth, being born of the Virgin. But how, it might be asked, canst thou die, if thou hast no sin: He answers, But that the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father gave Me commandment, even so I do. Arise, let us go hence. He had been sitting at table with them all this time. Let us go: i. e. to the place, where He, Who had done nothing to deserve death, was to be delivered to death. But He had a commandment from His Father to die.

AUGUSTINE. (contr. Serm. Arrian. c. xi.) That the Son is obedient to the will and commandment of the Father, no more shews a difference in the two, than it would in a human father and son. But over and above this comes the consideration that Christ is not only God, and as such equal to the Father, but also man, and as such inferior to the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi. 1) Arise, let us go hence, is the beginning of the sentence which follows. The time and the place (they were in the midst of a town, and it was night time) had excited the disciples’ fears to such a degree, that they could not attend to any thing that was said, but rolled their eyes about, expecting persons to enter and assault them; especially when they heard our Lord say, Yet a little while I am with you; and, The prince of this world cometh. To quiet their alarm then, He takes them to another place, where they imagine themselves safe, and would be able to attend to the great doctrines which He was going to set before them.

CHAPTER 15

15:1–3

1. I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman.

2. Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away: and every branch that beareth fruit, he purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit.

3. Now ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you.

HILARY. (ix. de Trin) He rises in haste to perform the sacrament of His final passion in the flesh, (such is His desire to fulfil His Father’s commandment:) and therefore takes occasion to unfold the mystery of His assumption of His flesh, whereby He supports us, as the vine doth its branches: I am the true vine.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxx. 2) He says this as being the Head of the Church, of which we are the members, the Man Christ Jesus; for the vine and the branches are of the same nature. When He says, I am the true vine, He does not mean really a vine; for He is only called so metaphorically, not literally, even as He is called the Lamb, the Sheep, and the like; but He distinguishes Himself from that vine to whom it is said, How art thou turned into the degenerate plant of a strange vine unto me. (Jer. 11:21) For how is that a true vine, which when grapes are expected from it, produces only thorns?

HILARY. (ix. de Trin) But He wholly separates this humiliation in the flesh from the form of the Paternal Majesty, by setting forth the Father as the diligent Husbandman of this vine: And My Father is the Husbandman.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. serm. lix) For we cultivate God, and God cultivates us. But our culture of God does not make Him better: our culture is that of adoration, not of ploughing: His culture of us makes us better. His culture consists in extirpating all the seeds of wickedness from our hearts, in opening our heart to the plough, as it were, of His word, in sowing in us the seeds of His commandments, in waiting for the fruits of piety.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi) And forasmuch as Christ was sufficient for Himself, but His disciples needed the help of the Husbandman, of the vine He says nothing, but adds concerning the branches, Every branch in Me that beareth not fruit, He taketh away. By fruit is meant life, i. e. that no one can be in Him without good works.

HILARY. (ix. de Trin) The useless and deceitful branches He cuts down for burning.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi. 1) And inasmuch as even the best of men require the work of the husbandman, He adds, And every branch that beareth fruit, He purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit. He alludes here to the tribulations and trials which were coming upon them, the effect of which would be to purge, and so to strengthen them. By pruning the branches we make the tree shoot out the more.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. lxxx. 3) And who is there in this world so clean, that he cannot be more and more changed? Here, if we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves. (1 John 1:8) He cleanseth then the clean, i. e. the fruitful, that the cleaner they be, the more fruitful they may be. Christ is the vine, in that He saith, My Father is greater than I; but in that He saith, I and My Father are one, He is the husbandman; not like those who carry on an external ministry only; for He giveth increase within. Thus He calls Himself immediately the cleanser of the branches: Now ye are clean through the word, which I have spoken unto you. He performs the part of the husbandman then, as well as of the vine. But why does He not say, ye are clean by reason of the baptism wherewith ye are washed? Because it is the word in the water which cleanseth. Take away the word, and what is the water, but water? Add the word to the element, and you have a sacrament. Whence hath the water such virtue as that by touching the body, it cleanseth the heart, but by the power of the word, not spoken only, but believed? For in the word itself, the passing sound is one thing, the abiding virtue another. This word of faith is of such avail in the Church of God, that by Him who believes, presents, blesses, sprinkles the infant, it cleanseth that infant, though itself is unable to believe.

CHRYSOSTOM. Ye are clean through the word which I have spoken unto you, i. e. ye have been enlightened by My doctrine, and been delivered from Jewish error.

15:4–7

4. Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me.

5. I am the vine, ye are the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing.

6. If a man abide not in me, he is cast forth as a branch, and is withered; and men gather them, and cast them into the fire, and they are burned.

7. If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi non occ.) Having said that they were clean through the word which He had spoken unto them, He now teaches them that they must do their part.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxi. 1) Abide in Me, and I in you: not they in Him, as He in them; for both are for the profit not of Him, but them. The branches do not confer any advantage upon the vine, but receive their support from it: the vine supplies nourishment to the branches, takes none from them: so that the abiding in Christ, and the having Christ abiding in them, are both for the profit of the disciples, not of Christ; according to what follows, As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in Me. Great display of grace! He strengtheneth the hearts of the humble, stoppeth the mouth of the proud. They who hold that God is not necessary for the doing of good works, the subverters, not the assertors, of free will, contradict this truth. For he who thinks that he bears fruit of himself, is not in the vine; he who is not in the vine, is not in Christ; he who is not in Christ, is not a Christian.

ALCUIN. All the fruit of good works proceeds from this root. He who hath delivered us by His grace, also carries us onward by his help, so that we bring forth more fruit. Wherefore He repeats, and explains what He has said: I am the vine, ye are the branches. He that abideth in Me, by believing, obeying, persevering, and I in Him, by enlightening, assisting, giving perseverance, the same, and none other, bringeth forth much fruit.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxi. 3) But lest any should suppose that a branch could bring forth a little fruit of itself, He adds, For without Me ye can do nothing. He does not say, ye can do little. Unless the branch abides in the vine, and lives from the root, it can bear no fruit whatever. Christ, though He would not be the vine, except He were man, yet could not give this grace to the branches, except He were God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi. 1) The Son then contributes no less than the Father to the help of the disciples. The Father changeth, but the Son keepeth them in Him, which is that which makes the branches fruitful. And again, the cleansing is attributed to the Son also, and the abiding in the root to the Father who begat the root. (c. 2.). It is a great loss to be able to do nothing, but He goes on to say more than this: If a man abide not in Me, he is cast forth as a branch, i. e. shall not benefit by the care of the husbandman, and withereth, i. e. shall lose all that it desires from the root, all that supports its life, and shall die.

ALCUIN. And men gather them, i. e. the reapers, the Angels, and cast them into the fire, everlasting fire, and they are burned.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxi. 3) For the branches of the vine are as contemptible, if they abide not in the vine, as they are glorious, if they abide. One of the two the branch must be in, either the vine, or the fire: if it is not in the vine, it will be in the fire.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi. 2) Then He shews what it is to abide in Him. If ye abide in Me, and My words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you. It is to be shewn by their works.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxi. 4) For then may His words be said to abide in us, when we do what He has commanded, and love what He has promised. But when His words abide in the memory, and are not found in the life, the branch is not accounted to be in the vine, because it derives no life from its root. So far as we abide in the Saviour we cannot will any thing that is foreign to our salvation. We have one will, in so far as we are in Christ, another, in so far as we are in this world. And by reason of our abode in this world, it sometimes happens that we ask for that which is not expedient, through ignorance. But never, if we abide in Christ, will He grant it us, Who does not grant except what is expedient for us. And here we are directed to the prayer, Our Father. Let us adhere to the words and the meaning of this prayer in our petitions, and whatever we ask will be done for us.

15:8–11

8. Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; so shall ye be my disciples.

9. As the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you: continue ye in my love.

10. If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love: even as I have kept my Father’s commandments, and abide in his love.

11. These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy might remain in you, and that your joy might be full.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi. 2) Our Lord shewed above, that those who plotted against them should be burned, inasmuch as they abode not in Christ: now He shews that they themselves would be invincible, bringing forth much fruit; Herein is My Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit: as if He said, If it appertains to My Father’s glory that ye bring forth fruit, He will not despise His own glory. And he that bringeth forth fruit is Christ’s disciple: So shall ye be My disciples.

THEOPHYLACT. The fruit of the Apostles are the Gentiles, who through their teaching were converted to the faith, and brought into subjection to the glory of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxii. 1) Made bright or glorified; the Greek word may be translated in either way. Δόξα signifies glory; not our own glory, we must remember, as if we had it of ourselves: it is of His grace that we have it; and therefore it is not our own but His glory. For from whom shall we derive our fruitfulness, but from His mercy preventing us. Wherefore He adds, As My Father hath loved Me, even so love I you. This then is the source of our good works. Our good works proceed from faith which worketh by love: but we could not love unless we were loved first: As My Father hath loved Me, even so love I you. This does not prove that our nature is equal to His, as His is to the Father’s, but the grace, whereby He is the Mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus. The Father loves us, but in Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvi. 2) If then I love you, be of good cheer; if it is the Father’s glory that ye bring forth good fruit, bear no evil. Then to rouse them to exertion, He adds, Continue ye in My love; and then shews how this is to be done: If ye keep My commandments, ye shall abide in My love.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxii. 3. et seq.) Who doubts that love precedes the observance of the commandments? For who loves not, has not that whereby to keep the commandments. These words then do not declare whence love arises, but how it is shewn, that no one might deceive himself into thinking that he loved our Lord, when he did not keep His commandments. Though the words, Continue ye in My love, do not of themselves make it evident which love He means, ours to Him, or His to us, yet the preceding words do: I love you, He says: and then immediately after, Continue ye in My love. Continue ye in My love, then, is, continue in My grace: and, If ye keep My commandments, ye shall abide in My love, is, Your keeping of My commandments, will be evidence to you that ye abide in My love. It is not that we keep His commandments first, and that then He loves; but that He loves us, and then we keep His commandments. This is that grace, which is revealed to the humble, but hidden from the proud. But what means the next words, Even as I have kept My Father's commandments, and abide in His love: i. e. the Father's love, wherewith He loveth the Son. Must this grace, wherewith the Father loves the Son, be understood to be like the grace wherewith the Son loveth us? No; for whereas we are sons not by nature, but by grace, the Only Begotten is Son not by grace, but by nature. We must understand this then to refer to the manhood in the Son, even as the words themselves imply: As My Father hath loved Me, even so love I you. The grace of a Mediator is expressed here; and Christ is Mediator between God and man, not as God, but as man. This then we may say, that since human nature does not pertain to the nature of God, but does by grace pertain to the Person of the Son, grace also pertains to that Person; such grace as has nothing superior, nothing equal to it. For no merits on man's part preceded the assumption of that nature.

ALCUIN. Even as I have kept My Father's commandments. The Apostle explains what these commandments were: Christ became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. (Phil. 2:8)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 1) Then because the Passion was now approaching to interrupt their joy, He adds, These things have I spoken unto you, that my joy may remain in you: as if He said, And if sorrow fall upon you, I will take it away; so that ye shall rejoice in the end.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxiii. 1) And what is Christ's joy in us, but that He deigns to rejoice on our account? And what is our joy, which He says shall be full, but to have fellowship with Him? He had perfect joy on our account, when He rejoiced in foreknowing, and predestinating us; but that joy was not in us, because then we did not exist: it began to be in us, when

He called us And this joy we rightly call our own, this joy wherewith we shall be blessed; which is begun in the faith of them who are born again, and shall be fulfilled in the reward of them who rise again.

15:12–16

12. This is my commandment, That ye love one another, as I have loved you.

13. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.

14. Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you.

15. Henceforth I call you not servants; for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth: but I have called you friends; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you.

16. Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you, that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain: that whatsoever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, he may give it you.

THEOPHYLACT. Having said, If ye keep My commandments, ye shall abide in My love, He shews what commandments they are to keep: This is My commandment, That ye love one another.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvii. in Evang.) But when all our Lord’s sacred discourses are full of His commandments, why does He give this special commandment respecting love, if it is not that every commandment teaches love, and all precepts are one? Love and love only is the fulfilment of every thing that is enjoined. As all the boughs of a tree proceed from one root, so all the virtues are produced from one love: nor hath the branch, i. e. the good work, any life, except it abide in the root of love.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxiii. 3) Where then love is, what can be wanting? where it is not, what can profit? But this love is distinguished from men’s love to each other as men, by adding, As I have loved you. To what end did Christ love us, but that we should reign with Him? Let us therefore so love one another, as that our love be different from that of other men; who do not love one another, to the end that God may be loved, because they do not really love at all. They who love one another for the sake of having God within them, they truly love one another.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvii.) The highest, the only proof of love, is to love our adversary; as did the Truth Himself, who while He suffered on the cross, shewed His love for His persecutors: Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do. (Luke 23:34) Of which love the consummation is given in the next words: Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Our Lord came to die for His enemies, but He says that He is going to lay down His life for His friends, to shew us that by loving, we are able to 1 gain over our enemies, so that they who persecute us are by anticipation our friends.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvi. 1) Having said, This is My commandment, that ye love one another, even as I have loved you, it follows, as John saith in his Epistle, that as Christ laid down His life for us, so we should lay down our lives for the brethren. (1 John 3) This the martyrs have done with ardent love. And therefore in commemorating them at Christ’s table, we do not pray for them, as we do for others, but we rather pray that we may follow their steps. For they have shewn the same love for their brother, that has been shewn them at the Lord’s table.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvii.) But whoso in time of tranquillity will not give up his time to God, how in persecution will he give up his soul? Let the virtue of love then, that it may be victorious in tribulation, be nourished in tranquillity by deeds of mercy.

AUGUSTINE. (viii. de Trin. c. viii) From one and the same love, we love God and our neighbour; but God for His own sake, our neighbour for God’s. So that, there being two precepts of love, on which hang all the Law and the Prophets, to love God, and to love our neighbour, Scripture often unites them into one precept. For if a man love God, it follows that he does what God commands, and if so, that he loves his neighbour, God having commanded this. Wherefore He proceeds: Ye are My friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you.

GREGORY. (xxvii. Moral.) A friend is as it were a keeper of the soul. He who keeps God’s commandments, is rightly called His friend.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxv. 2) Great condescension! Though to keep his Lord’s commandments, is only what a good servant is obliged to do, yet, if they do so, He calls them His friends. The good servant is both the servant, and the friend. But how is this? He tells us: Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth. Shall we therefore cease to be servants, as soon as ever we are good servants? And is not a good and tried servant sometimes entrusted with his master's secrets, still remaining a servant? (c. 3.). We must understand then that there are two kinds of servitude, as there are two kinds of fear. There is a fear which perfect love casteth out; which also hath in it a servitude, which will be cast out together with the fear. And there is another, a pure (castus) fear, which remaineth for ever. It is the former state of servitude, which our Lord refers to, when He says, Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth; not the state of that servant to whom it is said, Well done, thou good servant, enter thou into the joy of thy Lord: (Matt. 25:21) but of him of whom it was said below, The servant abideth not in the house for ever, but the Son abideth ever. Forasmuch then as God hath given us power to become the sons of God, so that in a wonderful way, we are servants, and yet not servants, we know that it is the Lord who doth this. This that servant is ignorant of, who knoweth not what his Lord doeth, and when he doeth any good thing, is exalted in his own conceit, as if he himself did it, and not his Lord; and boasts of himself, not of his Lord.

But I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard of My Father, I have made known unto you.

THEOPHYLACT. As if He said, The servant knoweth not the counsels of his lord; but since I esteem you friends, I have communicated my secrets to you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvi. 1) But how did He make known to His disciples all things that He had heard from the Father, when He forebore saying many things, because He knew they as yet could not bear them? He made all things known to His disciples, i. e. He knew that He should make them known to them in that fulness of which the Apostle saith, Then we shall know, even as we are known. (1 Cor. 13:12) For as we look for the death of the flesh, and the salvation of the soul; so should we look for that knowledge of all things, which the Only-Begotten heard from the Father.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvii.) Or all things which He heard from the Father, which He wished to be made known to His servants; the joys of spiritual love, the pleasures of our heavenly country, which He impresses daily on our minds by the inspiration of His love. For while we love the heavenly things we hear, we know them by loving, because love is itself knowledge.

He had made all things known to them then, because being withdrawn from earthly desires, they burned with the fire of divine love.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 1) All things, i. e. all things that they ought to hear. I have heard, shews that what He had taught was no strange doctrine, but received from the Father.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Evang. xxvii.) But let no one who has attained to this dignity of being called the friend of God, attribute this superhuman gift1 to his own merits: Ye have not chosen Me, but I have chosen you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvi. 3) Ineffable grace! For what were we before Christ had chosen us, but wicked, and lost? We did not believe in Him, so as to be chosen by Him: for had He chosen us believing, He would have chosen us choosing. This passage refutes the vain opinion of those who say that we were chosen before the foundation of the world, because God foreknew that we should be good, not that He Himself would make us good. For had He chosen us, because He foreknew that we should be good, He would have foreknown also that we should first choose Him, for without choosing Him we cannot be good; unless indeed he can be called good, who hath not chosen good. What then hath He chosen in them who are not good? Thou canst not say, I am chosen because I believed; for hadst thou believed in Him, thou hadst chosen Him. Nor canst thou say, Before I believed I did good works, and therefore was chosen. For what good work is there before faith? What is there for us to say then, but that we were wicked, and were chosen, that by the grace of the chosen we might become good?

AUGUSTINE. (de Prad. Sanct. c. xvii.) They are chosen then before the foundation of the world, according to that predestination by which God foreknew His future acts. They are chosen out of the world by that call whereby God fulfills what He has predestined: whom He did predestinate, them He also called. (Rom. 8:30)

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvi. 3) Observe, He does not choose the good; but those, whom He hath chosen, He makes good: And I have ordained you that ye should go, and bring forth fruit. This is the fruit which He meant, when He said, Without Me ye can do nothing. He Himself is the way in which He hath set (ἔθηκα, posui) us to go.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvii.) I have set you,i. e. have planted you by grace, that ye should go by will (volendo not in Vulg.); to will being to go in mind, and bring forth fruit, by works. What kind of fruit they should bring forth

He then shews: And that your fruit may remain: for worldly labour hardly produces fruit to last our life: and if it does, death comes at last, and deprives us of it all. But the fruit of our spiritual labours endures even after death; and begins to be seen at the very time that the results of our carnal labour begin to disappear. Let us then produce such fruits as may remain, and of which death, which destroys every thing, will be the commencement.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvi. 3) Love then is one fruit, now existing in desire only, not yet in fulness. Yet even with this desire whatever we ask in the name of the Only-Begotten Son, the Father giveth us: That whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My name, He may give it you. We ask in the Saviour's name, whatever we ask, that will be profitable to our salvation.

15:17–21

17. These things I command you, that ye love one another.

18. If the world hate you, ye know that it hated me before it hated you.

19. If ye were of the world, the world would love his own: but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you.

20. Remember the word that I said unto you, The servant is not greater than his lord. If they have persecuted me, they will also persecute you; if they have kept my saying, they will keep yours also.

21. But all these things will they do unto you for my name's sake, because they know not him that sent me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvii. 1) Our Lord had said, I have ordained that ye should walk, and bring forth fruit. Love is this fruit. Wherefore He proceeds: These things I command you, that ye love one another. (Gal. 5:22) Hence the Apostle saith: The fruit of the Spirit is love; and enumerates all other graces as springing from this source. Well then doth our Lord commend love, as if it were the only thing commanded: seeing that without it nothing can profit, with it nothing be wanting, whereby a man is made good.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 2) Or thus: I have said that I lay down My life for you, and that I first chose you. I have said this not by way of reproach, but to induce you to love one another. Then as they were about to suffer persecution and reproach, He bids them not to grieve, but rejoice on that account: If the world hate you, ye know that it hated Me before it hated you: as if to say, I know it is a hard trial, but ye will endure it for My sake.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvii. 2) For why should the members exalt themselves above the head? Thou refusest to be in the body, if thou art not willing, with the head, to endure the hatred of the world. For love's sake let us be patient: the world must hate us, whom it sees hate whatever it loves; If ye were of the world, the world would love his own.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 2) As if Christ's suffering were not consolation enough, He consoles them still further by telling them, the hatred of the world would be an evidence of their goodness; so that they ought rather to grieve if they were loved by the world: as that would be evidence of their wickedness.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxvii. 2) He saith this to the whole Church, which is often called the world; as, God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself. (2 Cor. 5:19) The whole world then is the Church, and the whole world hateth the Church. The world hateth the world, the world in enmity, the world reconciled, the defiled world, the changed world. (Tract. lxxxviii. 4.). Here it may be asked, If the wicked can be said to persecute the wicked; e. g. if impious kings, and judges, who persecute the righteous, punish murderers and adulterers also; how are we to understand our Lord's words, If ye were of the world, the world would love his own? In this way; The world is in them who punish these offences, and the world is in them who love them. The world then hates its own so far as it punishes the wicked, loves its own so far as it favours them. (Tract. lxxxvii. 4.). Again, if it be asked how the world loves itself, when it hates the means of its redemption, the answer is, that it loves itself with a false, not a true love, loves what hurts it; hates nature, loves vice. Wherefore we are forbidden to love what it loves in itself; commanded to love what it hates in itself. The vice in it we are forbidden, the nature in it we are commanded, to love. And to separate us from this lost world, we are chosen out of it, not by merit of our own, for we had no merits to begin with, not by nature which was radically corrupt, but by grace: But because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ezech. ix.) For the dispraise of the perverse, is our praise. There is nothing wrong in not pleasing those, who do not please God. For no one can by one and the same act please God, and the enemies of God. He proves himself no friend to God, who pleases His enemy; and he whose soul is in subjection to the Truth, will have to contend with the enemies of that Truth.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxviii. 1) Our Lord, in exhorting His servants to bear patiently the hatred of the world, proposes to them an example than which there can be no better and higher one, viz. Himself: Remember the word that I said unto you, The servant is not greater than his lord. If they have persecuted Me, they will also persecute you: if they have kept My saying, they will keep yours also.

GLOSS. They observed1 it in order to calumniate it, as we read in the Psalms, The ungodly seeth2 the righteous.

THEOPHYLACT. Or thus: If, Me says, they have persecuted your Lord, much more will they persecute you; if they had persecuted Him, but kept His commandments, they would keep yours also.

CHRYSOSTOM. As if He said, Ye must not be disturbed at having to share My sufferings; for ye are not better than I.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxviii. 1) The servant is not greater than his Lord. Here the servant is the one who has the purified fear, which abideth for ever.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 2) Then follows another consolation, viz. that the Father is despised and injured with them: But all these things will they do unto you for My name’s sake, because they know not Him that sent Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxviii. 2) All these things, viz. what He had mentioned, that the world would hate them, persecute them, despise their word. For My Name’s sake, i. e. in you they will hate Me, in you persecute Me, your word they will not keep, because it is mine. They who do these things for His name’s sake are as miserable, as they who suffer them are blessed: except when they do them to the wicked as well; for then both they who do, and they who suffer, are miserable. But how do they do all these things for His name’s sake, when they do nothing for Christ’s name’s sake, i. e. for justice sake? We shall do away with this difficulty, if we take the words as applying to the righteous; as if it were, All these things will ye suffer from them, for My name’s sake. If, for My name’s sake, mean this, i. e. My name which they hate in you, justice which they hate in you; of the good, when they persecute the wicked, it may be said in the same way, that they do so both for righteousness' sake, which they love, which love is their motive in persecuting, and for unrighteousness' sake, the unrighteousness of the wicked, which they hate. Because they know not Him that sent Me, i. e. know not according to that knowledge of which it is said, To know Thee is perfect righteousness. (Wisd. 15:3)

15:22–25

22. If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: but now they have no cloke for their sin.

23. He that hateth me hateth my Father also.

24. If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father.

25. But this cometh to pass, that the word might be fulfilled that is written in their law, They hated me without a cause.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 2) Then by way of another consolation, He declares the injustice of these persecutions both towards Him and them: If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. lxxxix. 1) Christ spoke to the Jews only, not to any other nation. In them then was that world which hated Christ and His disciples; and not only in them, but in us also. Were the Jews then without sin before Christ came in the flesh, because Christ had not spoken to them? By sin here He means not every sin, but a certain great sin, which includes all, and which alone hinders the remission of other sins, viz. unbelief. They did not believe in Christ, who came that they might believe on Him. This sin then they would not have had, had not Christ come; for Christ's advent, as it was the salvation of the believing, so was the perdition of the unbelieving. But now they have no cloke for their sin. If those to whom Christ had not come or spoken, had not an excuse (πρόφασιν, excusationem Vulg. cloke E. T.) for their sin, why is it said here that these had no excuse, because Christ had come and spoken to them? If the first had excuse, did it do away with their punishment altogether, or only mitigate it? I answer, that this excuse covered, not all their sin, but only this one, viz. that they did not believe in Christ. But they are not of this number to whom Christ came by His disciples: they are not to be let off with a lighter punishment, who altogether refused to receive Christ's love, and, as far as concerned them, wished its destruction. This excuse they may have who died before they heard of Christ's Gospel; but this will not shield them from damnation. For whoever are not saved in the Saviour, who came to seek what was lost, shall without doubt go to perdition: though some will have lighter, others severer punishments. He perishes to God, who is punished with an exclusion from that happiness which is given to the saints. But there is as great a diversity of punishments, as there is of sins: though how this is settled is a matter known to the Divine Wisdom indeed, but too deep for human conjecture to examine or pronounce upon.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 2) As the Jews persecuted Him out of professed regard for the Father, He takes away this excuse: He that hateth Me, hateth My Father also.

ALCUIN. For as he who loves the Son, loves the Father also, the love of the Father being one with that of the Son, even as their nature is one: so he who hateth the Son, hateth the Father also.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xc. 1) But He has just said, Because they know not Him that sent Me. How could they hate one whom they did not know? For if they hated God, believing Him to be something else, and not God, this was not hatred of God. In the case of men, it often happens that we hate or love persons whom we have never seen, simply in consequence of what we have heard of them. But if a man's character is known to us, he cannot properly be said to be unknown. And a man's character is not shewn by his face, but by his habits and way of life: else we should not be able to know ourselves, for we cannot see our own face. But history and fame sometimes lie; and our faith is imposed upon. We cannot penetrate into men's hearts; we only know that such things are right, and others wrong; and if we escape error here, to be mistaken in men is a venial matter. A good man may hate a good man ignorantly, or rather love him ignorantly, for he loves the good man, though he hates the man whom he supposes him to be. A bad man may love a good man, supposing him to be a bad man like himself, and therefore not, properly speaking, loving him, but the person whom he takes him to be. And in the same way with respect to God. If the Jews were asked whether they loved God, they would reply that they did love Him, not intending to lie, but only being mistaken in so saying. For how could they who hated the Truth, love the Father of the Truth? They did not wish their actions to be judged, and this the Truth did. They hated the Truth then, because they hated the punishment which He would inflict upon such as they. But at the same time they did not know that He was the Truth, who came to condemn them. They did not know that the Truth was born of God the Father, and therefore they did not know God the Father Himself. Thus they both hated, and also knew not, the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 2) Thus then they have no excuse, He says; I gave them doctrine, I added miracles, which, according to Moses' law, should convince all if the doctrine itself is good also: If I had not done among them the works that none other man did, they had not had sin.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xci. 1) The sin of not believing Him, notwithstanding His doctrine and His miracles. But why does He add, Which none other man did? Christ did no work greater than the raising of the dead, which we know the ancient Prophets did before Him. Is it that He did some things which no one else did? But others also did what neither He nor any one else did. True: yet none of the ancient prophets, that we read of, healed so many bodily defects, sicknesses, infirmities. For to say nothing of single cases, Mark says, that whithersoever He entered, into villages, or cities, or country, they laid the sick in the streets, and besought Him that they might touch if it were but the border of His garment: and as many as touched Him were made whole. (Mark 6:56) Such works as these no one else had done in them. In them, meaning, not amongst them, or before them, but within them. But even where particular works, like some of these, had been done before, whoever worked such did not really do them; for He did them through them; whereas He performs these miracles by His own power. For even if the Father or the Holy Spirit did them, yet it was none other than He; for the Three Persons are of one substance. For these benefits then they ought to have returned Him not hatred, but love. And this He reproaches them with; But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 1) And that the disciples may not say, Why then hast Thou brought us into such difficulties? Couldest not thou foresee the resistance and hatred we should meet with, He quotes the prophecy: But this cometh to pass, that the word might be fulfilled that is written in their law, They hated Me without a cause.

AUGUSTINE. (xv. de Trin. c. xvii) Under the name of the Law, the whole of the Old Testament is included: and therefore our Lord says here, That is written in their law; the passage being in the Psalms.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xci. 4) Their law, He says, not as made by them, but as given to them. A man hates without a cause, who seeks no advantage from his hatred. Thus the ungodly hate God; the righteous love Him, i. e. looking for no other good but Him: He is their all in all.

GREGORY. (xxv. Moral.) It is one thing not to do good, another to hate the teacher of goodness; as there is a difference between sudden and deliberate sins. Our state generally is that we love what is good, but from infirmity cannot perform it. But to sin of set purpose, is neither to do nor to love what is good. As then it is sometimes a heavier offence to love than to do, so is it more wicked to hate justice than not to do it. There are some in the Church, who not only do not do what is good, but even persecute it, and hate in others what they neglect to do themselves. The sin of these men is not that of infirmity or ignorance, but deliberate wilful sin.

15:26–27

26. But when the Comforter is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of me:

27. And ye also shall bear witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 2) The disciples might say, If they have heard words from Thee, such as none other hath spoken, if they have seen works of Him, such as none other hath done, and yet have not been convinced, but have hated Thy Father, and Thee with Him, why dost Thou send us to preach? How shall we be believed? Such thoughts as these He now answers: But when the Comforter is come, Whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of Truth which proceedeth from the Father, he shall testify of Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xcii. 2) As if He said, Seeing Me, they hated and killed Me: but the Comforter shall give such testimony concerning Me, as shall make them believe, though they see Me not. And because He shall testify, ye shall testify also: And ye also shall bear witness: He will inspire your hearts, and ye shall proclaim with your voices. And ye will preach what ye know; Because ye have been with Me from the beginning; which now ye do not do, because ye have not yet the fulness of the Spirit. But the love of God shall then be shed abroad in your hearts by the Spirit which shall be given you, and shall make you confident witnesses to Me. The Holy Spirit by His testimony made others testify; taking away fear from the friends of Christ's, and converting the hatred of His enemies into love.

DIDYMUS. (Didym. De Spir. Sanct.) The Holy Spirit He calls the Comforter, a name taken from His office, which is not only to relieve the sorrows of the faithful, but to fill them with unspeakable joy. Everlasting gladness is in those hearts, in which the Spirit dwells. The Spirit, the Comforter, is sent by the Son, not as Angels, or Prophets, or Apostles, are sent, but as the Spirit must be sent which is of one nature with the Divine wisdom and power that sends Him. The Son when sent by the Father, is not separated from Him, but abides in the Father, and the Father in Him. In the same way the Holy Spirit is not sent by the Son, and proceedeth from the Father, in the sense of change of place. For as the Father's nature, being incorporeal, is not local, so neither hath the Spirit of truth, Who is incorporeal also, and superior to all created things, a local nature.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii. 3) He calls Him not the Holy Spirit, but the Spirit of truth, to shew the perfect faith that was due to Him. He knew that He proceedeth from the Father, for He knew all things; He knew where He Himself came from, as He says of Himself above, I know whence I came, and whither I go. (John 8:14)

DIDYMUS. (ut sup.) He does not say, from God, or, from the Almighty, but, from the Father: because though the Father and God Almighty are the same, yet the Spirit of truth properly proceeds from God, as the Father, the Begetter. The Father and the Son together send the Spirit of truth: He comes by the will both of the Father and the Son.

THEOPHYLACT. Elsewhere He says that the Father sends the Spirit; now He says He does: Whom I will send unto you; thus declaring the equality of the Father and the Son. That He might not be thought however to be opposed to the Father, and to be another and rival source, as it were, of the Spirit, He adds, From the Father; i. e. the Father agreeing, and taking an equal part in sending Him. When it is said that He proceedeth, do not understand His procession to be an external mission, such as is given to ministering spirits, but a certain peculiar, and distinct procession, such as is true of the Holy Spirit alone. To proceed is not the same as being sent, but is the essential nature of the Holy Ghost, as coming from the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xcix. 6, et sq.) If it be asked here whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son also, we may answer thus: The Son is the Son of the Father alone, and the Father is the Father of the Son only; but the Holy Spirit is not the Spirit of one, but of both; since Christ Himself saith, The Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you. (Matt. 10:20) And the Apostle says, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts. (Gal. 4:6) This indeed, I think, is the reason why He is called peculiarly the Spirit. For both of the Father and the Son separately we may pronounce, that each is a Spirit. But what each is separately in a general sense, He who is not either one separately, but the union of both, is spiritually. But if the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, why should we not believe that He proceeds from the Son? Indeed if He did not proceed from the Son, Christ would not after the resurrection have breathed on His disciples, and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost. (John 20:29) This too is what is meant by the virtue which went out of Him, and healed all. (Luke 6.) If the Holy Ghost then proceeds both from the Father and the Son, why does Christ say, Who proceedeth from the Father? He says it in accordance with His general way of referring all that He has to Him from whom He is; as where He says, My doctrine is not Mine, but His that sent Me. If the doctrine was His, which He says was not His own, but the Father's, much more does the Holy Spirit proceed from Him, consistently with His proceeding from the Father. From whom the Son hath His Godhead, from Him He hath it that the Holy Ghost proceedeth from Him. And this explains why the Holy Ghost is not said to be born, but to proceed. For if He were born, He would be the Son of both Father and Son, an absurd supposition; for if two together have a Son, those two must be father and mother. But to imagine any such relation as this between God the Father, and God the Son, is monstrous. Even the human offspring does not proceed from father or mother at the same time; when it proceeds from the father, it does not proceed from the mother. Whereas the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son into the creature to be sanctified; but proceeds from Father and Son at once. And if the Father is life, and the Son is life, so the Holy Ghost is life also. Just then as the Father when He had life in Himself, gave also to the Son to have life in Himself; so He gave to the Son also that life should proceed from Him, even as it proceeded from Himself.

CHAPTER 16

16:1–4

1. These things have I spoken unto you, that ye should not be offended.

2. They shall put you out of the synagogues: yea, the time cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service.

3. And these things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father, nor me.

4. But these things have I told you, that when the time shall come, ye may remember that I told you of them. And these things I said not unto you at the beginning, because I was with you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xciii) After the promise of the Holy Spirit, to inspire them with strength to give witness; He well adds, These things have I spoken unto you, that ye should not be offended. (Rom. 5:5) For when the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which is given to us, then great peace have they that love God’s law, and they are not offended at it. (Ps. 118.) What they were about to suffer follows next: They shall put you out of the synagogues.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxvii) For the Jews had already agreed, if any confessed that He was Christ, that he should be put out of the synagogue.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xciii) But what evil was it to the Apostles to be put out of the Jewish synagogues, which they would have gone out of, even if none had put them out? Our Lord wished to make known to them, that the Jews were about not to receive Him, while they on the other hand were not going to desert Him. There was no other people of God beside the seed of Abraham: if they acknowledged Christ, the Churches of Christ would be none other than the synagognes of the Jews. But inasmuch as they refused to acknowledge Him, nothing remained but that they should put out of the synagogue those who would not forsake Christ. He adds: But the time cometh, that whoever killeth you, will think that he doeth God service. Is this intended for a consolation, as if they would so take to heart their expulsion from the synagogues, that death would be a positive relief to them after it? God forbid that they who sought God's glory, not men's, should be so disturbed. The meaning of the words is this: They shall put you out of the synagogue, but do not be afraid of being left alone. Separated from their assemblies, ye shall assemble so many in my name, that they fearing that the temple and rites of the old law will be deserted, will kill you, and think to do God service thereby, having a zeal for God, but not according to knowledge. These who kill, are the same with those who put out of the synagogues, viz. the Jews. For Gentiles would not have thought that they were doing God service, by killing Christ's witnesses, but their own false gods; whereas every one of the Jews, who killed the preacher of Christ, thought he was doing God service, believing that whoever were converted to Christ, deserted the God of Israel.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii) Then He consoles them: And all these things will they do unto you, because they have not known the Father nor Me. As if He said, Let this consolation content you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xciii) And He mentions these things beforehand, because trials, however soon to pass away, when they come upon men unprepared for them, are very overwhelming: But these things have I told you, that when the hour shall come, ye may remember that I told you of them: the hour, the hour of darkness, the hour of night. But the night of the Jews was not allowed to mix with or darken the day of the Christians.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii) And He predicted these trials for another reason, viz. that they might not say that He had not foreseen them; That ye may remember that I told you of them, or that He had only spoken to please them, and given false hopes. And the reason is added, why He did not reveal these things sooner: And these things I said not unto you at the beginning, because I was with you; because, that is, ye were in My keeping, and might ask when you pleased, and the whole battle rested upon Me. There was no need then to tell you these things at the first, though I myself knew them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xciv. 1) In the other three Evangelists these predictions occur before the supper; John gives them after. Still if they relate them as given very near His Passion, that is enough to explain His saying, These things I said not unto you at the beginning. Matthew however relates these prophecies as given long before His Passion, on the occasion of His choosing the twelve. How do we reconcile this with our Lord’s words? By supposing them to apply to the promise of the Holy Spirit, and the testimony He would give amidst their suffering. This was what He had not told them at the beginning, and that because He was with them, and His presence was a sufficient consolation. But as He was about to depart, it was meet that He should tell them of His coming, by whom the love of God would be shed abroad in their hearts, to preach the word of God with boldness.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii. 1) Or, He had foretold that they should suffer scourgings, but not that their death could be thought doing God service; which was the strangest thing of all. Or, He there told them what they would suffer from the Gentiles, here what from the Jews.

16:5–11

5. But now I go my way to him that sent me; and none of you asketh me, Whither goest thou?

6. But because I have said these tilings unto you, sorrow hath filled your heart.

7. Nevertheless I tell you the truth; It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you.

8. And when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment:

9. Of sin, because they believe not on me;

10. Of righteousness, because I go to my Father, and ye see me no more;

11. Of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii. 1) The disciples, not as yet perfected, being overcome by sorrow, our Lord blames and corrects them, saying, But now I go My way to Him that sent Me; and none of you asketh Me, Whither goest Thou? They were so struck down at hearing that whosoever killed them would think that he was doing God service, that they could say nothing. Wherefore He adds, But because I have said these things unto you, sorrow hath filled your hearts. It was no small consolation to them to know, that the Lord knew their superabundant sorrow, because of His leaving them, and because of the evils which they heard they were to suffer, but knew not whether they should suffer manfully.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xciv) Or whereas they had asked Him above, whither He was going, and He had replied that He was going whither they would not come; now He promises that He will go in such a way that no one will ask Him whither He goeth: and none of you asketh Me, Whither goest Thou? Going up to heaven, they questioned Him not in words, but followed with their eyes. But our Lord saw what effect His words would produce upon their minds. Not having yet that inward consolation which the Holy Ghost was to impart, they were afraid to lose the outward presence of Christ, and so, when they could no longer doubt from His own words that they were going to lose Him, their human affections were saddened, for the loss of their visible object. Wherefore it follows; But because I have said these things unto you, sorrow hath filled your heart. But He knew that it would be for their good, forasmuch as that inward sight wherewith the Holy Ghost would console them, was the better one: Nevertheless I tell you the truth; It is expedient for you that I go away.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii) As if He said, Though your grief be ever so great, ye must hear how that it is profitable for you that I go away. What the profit is He then shews: For if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you.

AUGUSTINE. (i. de Trin. c. 9.) This He says not on account of any inequality between the Word of God and the Holy Ghost, but because the presence of the Son of man amongst them would impede the coming of the latter. For the Holy Ghost did not humble Himself as did the Son, by taking upon Him the form of a servant. It was necessary therefore that the form of the servant should he removed from their eyes; for so long as they looked upon that, they thought that Christ was no more than what they saw Him to be. So it follows: But if I depart, I will send Him unto you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xciv) But could He not send Him while here, Him, Who, we know, came and abode on Him at His baptism, yea Him from Whom we know He never could be separated? What meaneth then, If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you, but, ye cannot receive the Spirit, so long as ye know Christ according to the flesh? Christ departing in the body, not the Holy Ghost only, but the Father, and the Son also came spiritually.

GREGORY. (viii. Moral. c. xvii.) As if He said plainly, If I withdraw not My body from your eyes, I cannot lead you to the understanding of the Invisible, through the Comforting Spirit.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. serm. lx) The Holy Ghost the Comforter brought this, that the form of a servant which our Lord had received in the womb of the Virgin, being removed from the fleshly eye, He was manifested to the purified mental vision in the very form of God in which He remained equal to the Father, even while He deigned to appear in the flesh.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxviii) What say they here, who entertain unworthy notions of the Spirit? Is it expedient for the master to go away, and a servant to come? He then shews the good that the Spirit will do: And when He is come, He will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xcv. 1) But how is it that Christ did not reprove the world? Is it because Christ spoke among the Jews only, whereas the Holy Spirit, poured into His disciples throughout the whole world, reproved not one nation only, but the world? But who would dare to say that the Holy Ghost reproved the world by Christ's disciples, and that Christ did not, when the Apostle exclaims, Do ye seek a proof of Christ speaking in Me? (2 Cor. 13:3. Vulg.) Those then whom the Holy Ghost reproves, Christ reproves also. He shall reprove the world, means, He shall pour love into your hearts, insomuch, that fear being cast out, ye shall be free to reprove. He then explains what He has said: Of sin, because they believed not in Me. He mentions this as the sin above all others, because while it remains, the others are retained, when it departs, the others are remitted.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. lxi) But it makes a great difference whether one believes in Christ, or only that He is Christ. For that He was Christ, even the devils believed: but e believes in Christ, who both hopes in Christ and loves Christ.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xcv. 2) The world is reproved of sin, because it believes not in Christ, and reproved of righteousness, the righteousness of those that believe. The very contrast of the believing, is the censure of the unbelieving. Of righteousness, because I go to the Father: as it is the common objection of unbelievers, How can we believe what we do not see? so the righteousness of believers lies in this, Because I go to the Father, and ye see Me no more. For blessed are they which see not, and believe. The faith even of those who saw Christ is praised, not because they believed what they saw, i. e. the Son of man, but because they believed what they saw not, i. e. the Son of God. And when the form of the servant was withdrawn from their sight altogether, then only was fulfilled in completeness the text, The just liveth by faith. (Heb. 10:38) It will be your righteousness then, of which the world will be reproved, that ye shall believe in Me, not seeing Me. And when ye shall see Me, ye shall see Me as I shall be, not as I am now with you, i. e. ye shall not see Me mortal, but everlasting. For in saying, Ye see Me no more (jam non videbitis me Vulg.), He means that they should see Him no more for ever.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. s. lxi) Or thus: They believed not, He went to the Father. Theirs therefore was the sin, His the righteousness. But that He came from the Father to us, was mercy; that He went to the Father, was righteousness; according to the saying of the Apostle, Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him. (Philip. 2:9) But if He went to the Father alone, what profit is it to us? Is He not alone rather in the sense of being one with all His members, as the head is with the body? So then the world is reproved of sin, in those who believe not in Christ; and of righteousness, in those who rise again in the members of Christ. It follows, Of judgment, because the prince of this world is judged: i. e. the devil, the prince of the wicked, who in heart dwell only in this world which they love. (s. lx). He is judged in that he is cast out; and the world is reproved of this judgment; for it is vain for one who does not believe in Christ to complain of the devil, whom judged, i. e. cast out, and permitted to attack us from without, only for our trial, not men only but women, boys and girls, have by martyrdom overcome.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xcv) Or, is judged, i. e. is destined irrevocably for the punishment of eternal fire. And of this judgment is the world reproved, in that it is judged with its prince, the proud and ungodly one whom it imitates. Let men therefore believe in Christ, lest they be reproved of the sin of unbelief, by which all sins are retained; pass over to the number of the believing, lest they be reproved of the righteousness of those whom justified they do not imitate; beware of the judgment to come, lest with the prince of this world whom they imitate, they too be judged.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii) Or thus: Shall reprove the world of sin, i. e. cut off all excuse, and shew that they have sinned unpardonably in not believing in Me, when they see the ineffable gift of the Holy Ghost obtained by calling upon Me.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. N. et V. Test. qu. 89) In this way too the Holy Ghost reproved the world of sin, i. e. by the mighty works He did in the name of the Saviour, Who was condemned by the world. The Saviour, His righteousness retained, feared not to return to Him Who sent Him, and in that He returned, proved that He had come from Him: Of righteousness, because I go to the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii. 2) i. e. My going to the Father will be a proof that I have led an irreproachable life, so that they will not be able to say, This man is a sinner; this man is not from God. (c. 9:24, 16) Again, inasmuch as I conquered the devil, (which no one who was a sinner could do,) they cannot say that I have a devil, and am a deceiver. But as he hath been condemned by Me, they shall be assured that they shall trample upon him afterwards; and My resurrection will shew that he was not able to detain Me.

AUGUSTINE. (de Qu. V. et N. Test. qu. 89) The devils seeing souls go from hell1 to heaven, knew that the prince of this world was judged, and being brought to trial in the Saviour’s cause, had lost all right to what he held. This was seen on our Saviour’s ascension, but was declared plainly and openly in the descent of the Holy Ghost on the disciples.

16:12–15

12. I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now.

13. Howbeit when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth: for he shall not speak of himself: but whatsoever he shall hear, that shall he speak; and he will shew you things to come.

14. He shall glorify me: for he shall receive of mine, and shall shew it unto you.

15. All things that the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, that he shall take of mine, and shall shew it unto you.

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord having said above, It is expedient for you that I go away, He enlarges now upon it: I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. xcvii) All heretics, when their fables are rejected for their extravagance by the common sense of mankind, try to defend themselves by this text; as if these were the things which the disciples could not at this time bear, or as if the Holy Spirit could teach things, which even the unclean spirit is ashamed openly to teach and preach. (Tr. xcvi. 5). But bad doctrines such as even natural shame cannot bear are one thing, good doctrines such as our poor natural understanding cannot bear are another. The one are allied to the shameless body, the other lie far beyond the body. (Tr. xcvi. 1). But what are these things which they could not bear? I cannot mention them for this very reason; for who of us dare call himself able to receive what they could not? Some one will say indeed that many, now that the Holy Ghost has been sent, can do what Peter could not then, as earn the crown of martyrdom. But do we therefore know what those things were, which He was unwilling to communicate? For it seems most absurd to suppose that the disciples were not able to bear then the great doctrines, that we find in the Apostolical Epistles, which were written afterwards, which our Lord is not said to have spoken to them. For why could they not bear then what every one now reads and bears in their writings, even though he may not understand? Men of perverse sects indeed cannot bear what is found in Holy Scripture concerning the Catholic faith, as we cannot bear their sacrilegious vanities; for not to bear means not to acquiesce in. But what believer or even catechumen before he has been baptized and received the Holy Ghost, does not acquiesce in and listen to, even if he does not understand, all that was written after our Lord’s ascension? (xcvii. 5). But some one will say, Do spiritual men never hold doctrines which they do not communicate to carnal men, but do to spiritual? (xcviii. 3). There is no necessity why any doctrines should be kept secret from the babes, and revealed to the grown up believersa. Spiritual men ought not altogether to withhold spiritual doctrines from the carnal, seeing the Catholic faith ought to be preached to all; nor at the same time should they lower them in order to accommodate them to the understanding of persons who cannot receive them, and so make their own preaching contemptible, rather than the truth intelligible. (xcvii. 1). So then we are not to understand these words of our Lord to refer to certain secret doctrines, which if the teacher revealed, the disciple would not be able to bear, but to those very things in religious doctrine which are within the comprehension of all of us. If Christ chose to communicate these to us, in the same way in which He does to the Angels, what men, yea what spiritual men, which the Apostles were not now, could bear them? For indeed every thing which can be known of the creature is inferior to the Creator; and yet who is silent about Him? (xcvi. 4). While in the body we cannot know all the truth, as the Apostle says, We know in part; (1 Cor. 13) but the Holy Spirit sanctifying us, fits us for enjoying that fulness of which the same Apostle says, Then face to face. Our Lord's promise, But when He the Spirit of truth shall come, He shall teach you all truth, or shall lead you into all truth, does not refer to this life only, but to the life to come, for which this complete fulness is reserved. The Holy Spirit both teaches believers now all the spiritual things which they are capable of receiving, and also kindles in their hearts a desire to know more.

DIDYMUS. (Didym. de Sp. Sanct. ii. ult med. inter opera Hieron.) Or He means that His hearers had not yet attained to all those things which for His name's sake they were able to bear: so revealing lesser things, He puts off the greater for a future time, such things as they could not understand till the Cross itself of their crucified Head had been their instruction. As yet they were slaves to the types, and shadows, and images of the Law, and could not bear the truth of which the Law was the shadow. But when the Holy Ghost came, He would lead them by His teaching and discipline into all truth, transferring them from the dead letter to the quickening Spirit, in Whom alone all Scripture truth resides.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii) Having said then, Ye cannot bear them now, but then ye shall be able, and, The Holy Spirit shall lead you into all truth; lest this should make them suppose that the Holy Spirit was the superior, He adds, For He shall not speak of Himself but whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He speak.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xlix) This is like what He said of Himself above, i. e. I can of Mine own Self do nothing; as I hear I judge. But that may be understood of Him as man; how must we understand this of the Holy Ghost, Who never became a creature by assuming a creature? As meaning that He is not from Himself. The Son is born of the Father, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. In what the difference consists between proceeding and being born, it would require a long time to discuss, and would be rash to define. But to hear is with Him to know, to know to be. As then He is not from Himself, but from Him from Whom He proceeds, from Whom His being is, from the same is His knowledge. From the same therefore His hearing. The Holy Ghost then always hears, because He always knows; and He hath heard, hears, and will hear from Him from Whom He is.

DIDYMUS. (ut supr.) He shall not speak of Himself i. e. not without Me, and Mine and the Father's will: because He is not of Himself, but from the Father and Me. That He exists, and that He speaks, He hath from the Father and Me. I speak the truth; i. e. I inspire as well as speak by Him, since He is the Spirit of Truth. To say and to speak in the Trinity must not be understood according to our usage, but according to the usage of incorporeal natures, and especially the Trinity, which implants Its will in the hearts of believers, and of those who are worthy to hear It. For the Father then to speak, and the Son to hear, is a mode of expressing (significatio est) the identity of their nature, and their agreement. Again, the Holy Spirit, Who is the Spirit of truth, and the Spirit of wisdom, cannot hear from the Son what He does not know, seeing He is the very thing which is produced from the Son, i. e. truth proceeding from truth, Comforter from Comforter, God from God. Lastly, lest any one should separate Him from the will and society of the Father and the Son, it is written, Whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He speak.

AUGUSTINE. (ii. de Trin. c. iii) But it does not follow from hence that the Holy Spirit is inferior: for it is only signified that He proceeds from the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xcix) Nor let the use of the future tense perplex you: that hearing is eternal, because the knowledge is eternal. To that which is eternal, without beginning, and without end, a verb of any tense may be applied. For though an unchangeable nature does not admit of was, and shall be, but only is, yet it is allowable to say of It, was, and is, and shall be; was, because It never began; shall be, because It never shall end; is, because It always is.

DIDYMUS. (ut sup.) By the Spirit of truth too the knowledge of future events hath been granted to holy men. Prophets filled with this Spirit foretold and saw things to come, as if they were present: And He will shew you things to come.

BEDE. It is certain that many filled with the grace of the Holy Spirit have foreknown future events. But as many gifted saints have never had this power, the words, He will shew you things to come, may be taken to mean, bring back to your minds the joys of your heavenly country. He did however inform the Apostles of what was to come, viz. of the evils that they would have to suffer for Christ's sake, and the good things they would receive in recompense.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii. 2) In this way then He raised their spirits; for there is nothing for which mankind so long, as the knowledge of the future. He relieves them from all anxiety on this account, by shewing that dangers would not fall upon them unawares. Then to shew that He could have told them all the truth into which the Holy Spirit would lead them, He adds, He shall glorify Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. c) By pouring love into the hearts of believers, and making them spiritual, and so able to see that the Son Whom they had known before only according to the flesh, and thought a man like themselves, was equal to the Father. Or certainly because that love filling them with boldness, and casting out fear, they proclaimed Christ to men, and so spread His fame throughout the whole world. For what they were going to do in the power of the Holy Ghost, this the Holy Ghost says He does Himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxviii. 2) And because He had said, Ye have one Master, even Christ, (Mat. 23:8) that they might not be prevented by this from admitting the Holy Ghost as well, He adds, For He shall receive of Mine, and shall shew it unto you.

DIDYMUS. (Didym. de Spir. Sanct. ut sup.) To receive must be taken here in a sense agreeable to the Divine Nature. As the Son in giving is not deprived of what He gives, nor imparts to others with any loss of His own, so too the Holy Ghost does not receive what before He had not; for if He received what before He had not, the gift being transferred to another, the giver would be thereby a loser. We must understand then that the Holy Ghost receives from the Son that which belonged to His nature, and that there are not two substances implied, one giving, and the other receiving, but one substance only. In like manner the Son too is said to receive from the Father that wherein He Himself Subsists. For neither is the Son any thing but what is given Him by the Father, nor the Holy Ghost any substance but that which is given Him by the Son.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. c) But it is not true, as some heretics have thought, that because the Son receives from the Father, the Holy Ghost from the Son, as if by gradation, that therefore the Holy Ghost is inferior to the Son. He Himself solves this difficulty, and explains His own words: All things that the Father hath are Mine: therefore said I, that He shall take of Mine, and shall shew it unto you.

DIDYMUS. (ut sup.) As if He said, Although the Spirit of truth proceeds from the Father, yet all things that the Father hath are Mine, and even the Spirit of the Father is Mine, and receiveth of Mine. But beware, when thou hearest this, that thou think not it is a thing or possession which the Father and the Son have. That which the Father hath according to His substance, i. e. His eternity, immutability, goodness, it is this which the Son hath also. Away with the cavils of logicians, who say, therefore the Father is the Son. Had He said indeed, All that God hath are Mine, impiety might have taken occasion to raise its head; but when He saith, All things that the Father hath are Mine, by using the name of the Father, He declareth Himself the Son, and being the Son, He usurpeth not the Paternity, though by the grace of adoption He is the Father of many saints.

HILARY. (viii. de Trin. ante med) Our Lord therefore hath not left it uncertain whether the Paraclete be from the Father, or from the Son; for He is sent by the Son, and proceedeth from the Father, both these He receiveth from the Son. You ask whether to receive from the Son and to proceed from the Father be the same thing. Certainly, to receive from the Son must be thought one and the same thing with receiving from the Father: for when He says, All things that the Father hath are Mine, therefore said I, that He shall receive of Mine, He sheweth herein that the things are received from Him, because all things which the Father hath are His, but that they are received from the Father also. This unity hath no diversity; nor doth it matter from whom the thing is received; since that which is given by the Father, is counted also as given by the Son.

16:16–22

16. A little while, and ye shall not see me: and again, a little while, and ye shall see me, because I go to the Father.

17. Then said some of his disciples among themselves, What is this that he saith unto us, A little while, and ye shall not see me: and again, a little while, and ye shall see me: and, Because I go to the Father?

18. They said therefore, What is this that he saith, A little while? we cannot tell what he saith.

19. Now Jesus knew that they were desirous to ask him, and said unto them, Do ye enquire among yourselves of that I said, A little while, and ye shall not see me: and again, a little while, and ye shall see me?

20. Verily, verily, I say unto you, That ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice: and ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy.

21. A woman when she is in travail hath sorrow, because her hour is come: but as soon as she is delivered of the child, she remembereth no more the anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world.

22. And ye now therefore have sorrow: but I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice, and your joy no man taketh from you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) Our Lord after having relieved the spirits of the disciples by the promise of the Holy Spirit, again depresses them: A little while, and ye shall not see Me. He does this to accustom them to the mention of His departure, in order that they may bear it well, when it does come. For nothing so quiets the troubled mind, as the continued recurrence to the subject of its grief.

BEDE. (Hom. 1. Dom. See. Par. Oct. Pasch.) He saith, A little while, and ye shall not see Me, alluding to His going to be taken that night by the Jews, His crucifixion the next morning, and burial in the evening, which withdrew Him from all human sight.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix. 1) But then, if one examines, these are words of consolation: Because I go to the Father. For they shew that His death was only a translation: and more consolation follows: And again, a little while, and ye shall see Me: an intimation this that He would return, and after a short separation, come and live with them for ever.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. c. 1) The meaning of these words however was obscure, before their fulfilment; Then said some of His disciples among themselves, What is this that He saith unto us, A little while, and ye shall not see Me: and again, a little while, and ye shall see Me: and, Because I go to the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix. 1) Either sorrow had confused their minds, or the obscurity of the words themselves prevented their understanding them, and made them appear contradictory. If we shall see Thee, they say, how goest Thou? If Thou goest, how shall we see Thee? What is this that He saith unto us, A little while? We cannot tell what He saith.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ci. 1) For above, because He did not say, A little while, but simply, I go to the Father, He seemed to speak plainly. But what to them was obscure at the time, but by and by manifested, is manifest to us. For in a little while He suffered, and they did not see Him; and again, in a little while He rose again, and they saw Him. He says, And ye shall see Me no more; for the mortal Christ they saw no more.

ALCUIN. Or thus, It will be a little time during which ye will not see Me, i. e. the three days that He rested in the grave; and again, it will be a little time during which ye shall see Me, i. e. the forty days of His appearance amongst them, from His Passion to His ascension. And ye shall see Me for that little time only, Because I go to the Father; for I am not going to stay always in the body here, but, by that humanity which I have assumed to ascend to heaven. It follows; Now Jesus knew that they were desirous to ask Him, and said unto them, Do ye enquire among yourselves of that I said, A little while, and ye shall not see Me: and again, a little while, and ye shall see Me? Verily, verily, I say unto you, That ye shall weep and lament. Their merciful Master, understanding their ignorance and doubts, replied so as to explain what He had said.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ci) Which must be understood thus, viz. that the disciples sorrowed at their Lord’s death, and then immediately rejoiced at His resurrection. The world (i. e. the enemies of Christ, who put Him to death) rejoiced just when the disciples sorrowed, i. e. at His death: Ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice; and ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy.

ALCUIN. But this speech of our Lord’s is applicable to all believers who strive through present tears and afflictions to attain to the joys eternal. While the righteous weep, the world rejoiceth; for having no hope of the joys to come, all its delight is in the present.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) Then He shews that sorrow brings forth joy, short sorrow infinite joy, by an example from nature; A woman when she is in travail hath sorrow, because her hour is come; but as soon as she is delivered of the child, she remembereth no more the anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ci) This comparison does not seem difficult to understand. It was one which lay near at hand, and He Himself immediately shews its application. And ye now therefore have sorrow; but I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice. The bringing forth is compared to sorrow, the birth to joy, which is especially true in the birth of a boy. And your joy no man taketh from you: their joy is Christ. This agrees with what the Apostle saith, Christ being risen from the dead dieth no more. (Rom. 6:9)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) By this example He also intimates that He loosens the chains of death, and creates men anew. He does not say however that she should not have tribulation, but that she should not remember it; so great is the joy which follows. And so is it with the saints. He saith not, that a boy is born, but that a man, a tacit allusion to His own resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ci. 6) To this joy it is better to refer what was said above, A little while and ye shall not see Me, and again, a little while and ye shall see Me. For the whole space of time that this world continues is but a little while. Because I go to the Father, refers to the former clause, a little while and ye shall not see Me, not to the latter, a little while and ye shall see Me. His going to the Father was the reason why they would not see Him. So to them who then saw Him in the body He says, A little while and ye shall not see Me; for He was about to go to the Father, and mortals would thenceforth never see Him again, as they saw Him now. The next words, A little while and ye shall see Me, are a promise to the whole Church. For this little while appears long to us while it is passing, but when it is finished we shall then see how little a time it has been.

ALCUIN. The woman is the holy Church, who is fruitful in good works, and brings forth spiritual children unto God. This woman, while she brings forth, i. e. while she is making her progress in the world, amidst temptations and afflictions, hath sorrow because her hour is come; for no one ever hated his own flesh.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ci. 6) Nor yet in this bringing forth of joy, are we entirely without joy to lighten our sorrow, but, as the Apostle saith, we rejoice in hope: (Rom. 12:12) for even the woman, to whom we are compared, rejoiceth more for her future offspring, than she sorrows for her present pain.

ALCUIN. But as soon as she is delivered, i. e. when her laborious struggle is over, and she has got the palm, she remembereth no more her former anguish, for joy at reaping such a reward, for joy that a man is born into the world. For as a woman rejoiceth when a man is born into the world, so the Church is filled with exultation when the faithful are born into life eternal.

BEDE. (in Hom. Dom. Sec. post. vet. Pasch.) Nor should it appear strange, if one who departeth from this life is said to be born. For as a man is said to be born when he comes out of his mother’s womb into the light of day, so may he be said to be born who from out of the prison of the body, is raised to the light eternal. Whence the festivals of the saints, which are the days on which they died, are called their birthdays.

ALCUIN. I will see you again, i. e. I will take you to Myself. Or, I will see you again, i. e. I shall appear again and be seen by you; and your heart shall rejoice.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ci. 5) This fruit indeed the Church now yearneth for in travail, but then will enjoy in her delivery. And it is a male child, because all active duties are for the sake of devotion; for that only is free which is desired for its own sake, not for any thing else, and action is for this end. This is the end which satisfies and is eternal: for nothing can satisfy but what is itself the ultimate end. Wherefore of them it is well said, Your joy no man taketh from you.

16:23–28

23. And in that day ye shall ask me nothing. Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you.

24. Hitherto have ye asked nothing in my name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full.

25. These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs: but the time cometh, when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs, but I shall shew

you plainly of the Father.

26. At that day ye shall ask in my name: and I say not unto you, that I will pray the Father for you:

27. For the Father himself loveth you, because ye have loved me, and have believed that I came out from God.

28. I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world: again, I leave the world, and go to the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) Again our Lord shews that it is expedient that He should go: And in that day shall ye ask Me nothing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ci. 4) The word ask here means not only to seek for, but to ask a question: the Greek word from which it is translated has both meanings.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) He says, And in that day, i. e. when I shall have risen again, ye shall ask Me nothing, i. e. not say to Me, Shew us the Father, and, Whither goest Thou? since ye will know this by the teaching of the Holy Ghost: or, Ye shall ask Me nothing, i. e. not want Me for a Mediator to obtain your requests, as My name will be enough, if you only call upon that: Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My Name, He will give it you. Wherein He shews His power; that neither seen, or asked, but named only to the Father, He will do miracles. Do not think then, He saith, that because for the future I shall not be with you, that you are therefore forsaken: for My name will be a still greater protection to you than My presence: Hitherto have ye asked nothing in My Name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full.

THEOPHYLACT. For when your prayers shall be fully answered, then will your gladness be greatest.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) These words being obscure, He adds, These things have I spoken to you in proverbs, but the time cometh when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs: for forty days He talked with them as they were assembled, speaking of the kingdom of God. And now, He says, ye are in too great fear to attend to My words, but then, when you see Me risen again, you will be able to proclaim these things openly.

THEOPHYLACT. (adhuc.) He still cheers them with the promise that help will be given them from above in their temptations: At that day ye shall ask in My Name. And ye will be so in favour with the Father, that ye will no longer need my intervention: And I say not unto you that I will pray the Father for you, for the Father Himself loveth you. But that they might not start back from our Lord, as though they were no longer in need of Him, He adds, Because ye have loved Me: as if to say, The Father loves you, because ye have loved Me; when therefore ye fall from My love, ye will straightway fall from the Fathers love.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cii) But does He love us because we love Him; or rather do not we love Him, because He loved us? This is what the Evangelist says, Let us love God, because God first loved us. (1 John 4:19) The Father then loves us, because we love the Son, (Diligamus Deum, Vulg.) it being from the Father and the Son, that we receive the love from the Father and the Son. He loves what He has made; but He would not make in us what He loved, except He loved us in the first place.

HILARY. (vi. de. Trin. c. 31) Perfect faith in the Son, which believes and loves what has come forth from God, and deserveth to be heard and loved for its own sake, this faith confessing the Son of God, born from Him, and sent by Him, needeth not an intercessor with the Father: wherefore it follows, And have believed that I came forth from God. His nativity and advent are signified by, I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world. The one is dispensation, the other nature. To have come from the Father, and to have come forth from God, have not the same meaning; because it is one thing to have come forth from God in the relation of Sonship1, another thing to have come from the Father into this world to accomplish the mystery2 of our salvation. Since to come forth from God is to subsist as His Son3, what else can He be but God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) As it was consolatory to them to hear of His resurrection, and how He came from God, and went to God, He dwells again and again on these subjects: Again I leave the world, and go to the Father. The one was a proof that their faith in Him was not vain: the other that they would still be under His protection.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cii) He came forth from the Father, because He is of the Father; He came into the world, because He shewed Himself in the body to the world. He left the world by His departure in the body, and went to the Father by the ascension of His humanity, nor yet in respect of the government of His presence, left the world; just as when He went forth from the Father and came into the world, He did so in such wise as not to leave the Father. But our Lord Jesus Christ, we read, was asked questions, and petitioned after His resurrection: for when about to ascend to Heaven He was asked by His disciples when He would restore the kingdom to Israel; when in Heaven He was asked by Stephen, to receive his spirit. And who would dare to say that as mortal He might be asked, as immortal He might not? I think then that when He says, In that day ye shall ask Me nothing, He refers not to the time of His resurrection, but to that time when we shall see Him as He is: which vision is not of this present life, but of the life everlasting, when we shall ask for nothing, ask no questions, because there will remain nothing to be desired, nothing to be learnt.

ALCUIN. This is His meaning then: In the world to come, ye shall ask Me nothing: but in the mean time while ye are travelling on this wearisome road, ask what ye want of the Father, and He will give it you: Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My Name, He will give it you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cii) The word whatsoever, must not be understood to mean any thing, but something which with reference to obtaining the life of blessedness is not nothing. That is not sought in the Saviour’s name, which is sought to the hindering of our salvation; for by, in My name, must be understood not the mere sound of the letters or syllables, but that which is rightly and truly signified by that sound. He who holds any notion concerning Christ, which should not be held of the only Son of God, does not ask in His name. But he who thinks rightly of Him, asks in His name, and receives what he asks, if it be not against his eternal salvation: he receives when it is right he should receive; for some things are only denied at present in order to be granted at a more suitable time. Again, the words, He will give it you, only comprehend those benefits which properly appertain to the persons who ask. All saints are heard for themselves, but not for all; for it is not, will give, simply, but, will give you; what follows: Hitherto have ye asked nothing in My name, may be understood in two ways: either that they had not asked in His name, because they had not known it as it ought to be known; or, Ye have asked nothing, because with reference to obtaining the thing ye ought to ask for, what ye have asked for is to be counted nothing. That therefore they may ask in His name not for what is nothing, but for the fulness of joy, He adds, Ask and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full. This full joy is not carnal, but spiritual joy; and it will be full, when it is so great that nothing can be added to it.

AUGUSTINE. (1. de Trin. c. 8) And this is that full joy, than which nothing can be greater, viz. to enjoy God, the Trinity, in the image of Whom we are made.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cii) Whatsoever then is asked, which appertained to the getting this joy, this must be asked in the name of Christ. For His saints that persevere in asking for it, He will never in His divine mercy disappoint. But whatever is asked beside this is nothing, i. e. not absolutely nothing, but nothing in comparison (computatione) with so great a thing as this. It follows: These things have I spoken unto you in proverbs: but the time cometh, when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs, but I shall shew you plainly of the Father. The hour of which He speaks may be understood of the future life, when we shall see Him, as the Apostle saith, face to face, (1 Cor. 13:12) and, These things have I spoken to you in proverbs, of that which the Apostle saith, Now we see as in a glass darkly. But I will shew you that the Father shall be seen through the Son; For no man knoweth the Father save the Son, and he to whom the Son shall reveal Him. (Mat. 11:17)

GREGORY. (xxx. Moral. viii.) When He declares that He will shew them plainly of the Father, He alludes to the manifestation about to take place of His own majesty, which would both shew His own equality with the Father, and the procession of the coeternal Spirit from both.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cii. c. 3) But this sense seems to be interfered with by what follows: At that day ye shall ask in My name. What shall we have to ask for in a future life, when all our desires shall be satisfied? Asking implies the want of something. It remains then that we understand the words of Jesus going to make His disciples spiritual, from being carnal and natural beings. The natural man so understands whatever he hears of God in a bodily sense, as being unable to conceive any other. Wherefore whatever Wisdom saith of the incorporeal, immutable substance are proverbs to him, not that he accounts them proverbs, but understands them as if they were proverbs. But when, become spiritual, he hath begun to discern all things, though in this life he see but in a glass and in part, ye doth he perceive, not by bodily sense, not by idea of the imagination, but by most sure intelligence of the mind, perceive and hold that God is not body, but spirit: the Son sheweth so plainly of the Father, that He who sheweth is seen to be of the same nature with Him who is shewn. Then they who ask, ask in His name, because by the sound of that name they understand nothing but the thing itself which is expressed by that name. These are able to think that our Lord Jesus Christ, in so far as He is man, intercedes with the Father for us, in so far as He is God, hears us together with the Father: which I think is His meaning when He says, And I say not unto you that I will pray the Father for you. To understand this, viz. how that the Son does not ask the Father, but Father and Son together hear those who ask, is beyond the reach of any but the spiritual vision.

16:29–33

29. His disciples said unto him, Lo, now speakest thou plainly, and speakest no proverb.

30. Now are we sure that thou knowest all things, and needest not that any man should ask thee: by this we believe that thou camest forth from God.

31. Jesus answered them, Do ye now believe?

32. Behold, the hour cometh, yea, is now come, that ye shall be scattered, every man to his own, and shall leave me alone: and yet I am not alone, because the Father is with me.

33. These things I have spoken unto you, that in me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) The disciples were so refreshed with the thought of being in favour with the Father, that they say they are sure He knows all things: His disciples said unto Him, Now speakest Thou plainly, and speakest no proverb.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ciii) But why do they say so, when the hour in which He was to speak without proverbs was yet future, and only promised? Because, our Lord’s communications still continuing proverbs to them, they are so far from understanding them, that they do not even understand their not understanding them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix. 2) But since His answer met what was in their minds, they add, Now we are sure that Thou knowest all things. See how imperfect they yet were, after so many and great things now at last to say, Now we are sure &c. saying it too as if they were conferring a favour. And needest not that any man should ask thee; i. e. Thou knowest what offends us, before we tell Thee, and Thou hast relieved us by saying that the Father loveth us.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ciii. 2) Why this remark? To one Who knew all things, instead of saying, Thou needest not that any man should ask Thee; it would have been more appropriate to have said, Thou needest not to ask any man: yet we know that both of these were done, viz. that our Lord both asked questions, and was asked. But this is soon explained; for both were for the benefit, not of Himself, but of those whom He asked questions of, or by whom He was asked. He asked questions of men not in order to learn Himself, but to teach them: and in the case of those who asked questions of Him, such questions were necessary to them in order to gain the knowledge they wanted; but they were not necessary to Him to tell Him what that was, because He knew the wish of the enquirer, before the question was put. Thus to know men’s thoughts beforehand was no great thing for the Lord, but to the minds of babes it was a great thing: By this we know that Thou camest, forth from God.

HILARY. (vi. de Trin. c. 34) They believe that He came forth from God, because He does the works of God. For whereas our Lord had said both, I came forth from the Father, and, I am come into the world from the Father, they testified no wonder at the latter words, I am come into the world, which they had often heard before. But their reply shews a belief in and appreciation of the former, I came forth from the Father. And they notice this in their reply: By this we believe that Thou camest forth from God; not adding, and art come into the world, for they knew already that He was sent from God, but had not yet received the doctrine of His eternal generation. That unutterable doctrine they now began to see for the first time in consequence of these words, and therefore reply that He spoke no longer in parables. For God is not born from God after the manner of human birth: His is a coming forth from, rather than a birth from, God. He is one from one; not a portion, not a defection, not a diminution, not a derivation, not a pretension, not a passion, but the birth of living nature from living nature. He is God coming forth from God, not a creature appointed to the name of God; He did not begin to be from nothing, but came forth from an abiding (manente) nature. To come forth, hath the signification of birth, not of beginning.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ciii) Lastly, He reminds them of their weak tender age in respect of the inner man. Jesus answered them, Do ye now believe?

BEDE. Which can be understood in two ways, either as reproaching, or affirming. If the former, the meaning is, Ye have awaked somewhat late to belief, for behold the hour cometh, yea is now come, that ye shall be scattered every man to his home. If the latter, it is, That which ye believe is true, but behold the hour cometh, &c.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ciii) For they did not only with their bodies leave His body, when He was taken, but with their minds the faith.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix) Ye shall be scattered; i. e. when I am betrayed, fear shall so possess you, that ye will not be able even to take to flight together. But I shall suffer no harm in consequence: And yet I am not alone, because the Father is with Me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. ciii) He wishes to advance them so far as to understand that He had not separated from the Father because He had come forth from the Father.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxix. 2) These things have I said unto you, that ye might have peace: i. e. that ye may not reject Me from your minds. For not only when I am taken shall ye suffer tribulation, but so long as ye are in the world: In the world ye shall have tribulation.

GREGORY. (xxvi. Moral. c. xi.) As if He said, Have Me within you to comfort you, because you will have the world without you.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. ciii. 3) The tribulation of which He speaks was to commence thus, i. e. in every one being scattered to his home, but was not to continue so. For in saying, And leave Me alone, He does not mean this to apply to them in their sufferings after His ascension. They were not to desert Him then, but to abide and have peace in Him. Wherefore He adds, Be of good cheer.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxx) i. e. raise up your spirits again: when the Master is victorious, the disciples should not be dejected; I have overcome the world.

AUGUSTINE. When the Holy Spirit was given them, they were of good cheer, and, in His strength, victorious. For He would not have overcome the world, had the world overcome His members. When He says, These things have I spoken to you, that in Me ye might have peace, He refers not only to what He has just said, but to what He had said all along, either from the time that He first had disciples, or since the supper, when He began this long and wonderful discourse. He declares this to be the object of His whole discourse, viz. that in Him they might have peace. And this peace shall have no end, but is itself the end of every pious action and intention.

CHAPTER 17

17:1–5

1. These words spake Jesus, and lifted up his eyes to heaven, and said, Father, the hour is come; glorify thy Son, that thy Son also may glorify thee:

2. As thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him.

3. And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.

4. I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do.

5. And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxx) After having said, In the world ye shall have tribulation, our Lord turns from admonition to prayer; thus teaching us in our tribulations to abandon all other things, and flee to God.

BEDE. These things spake Jesus, those things that He had said at the supper, partly sitting as far as the words, Arise, let us go hence; (c. 14:31.) and thence standing, up to the end of the hymn which now commences, And lifted up His eyes and said, Father, the hour is come; glorify Thy Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxx. 1) He lifted up His eyes to heaven to teach us intentness in our prayers: that we should stand with uplifted eyes, not of the body only, but of the mind.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. civ) Our Lord, in the form of a servant, could have prayed in silence had He pleased; but He remembered that He had not only to pray, but to teach. For not only His discourse, but His prayer also, was for His disciples’ edification, yea and for ours who read the same. Father, the hour is come, shews that all time, and every thing that He did or suffered to be done, was at His disposing, Who is not subject to time. Not that we must suppose that this hour came by any fatal necessity, but rather by God’s ordering. Away with the notion, that the stars could doom to death the Creator of the stars.

HILARY. (iii. Tr. c. 10) He doth not say that the day, or the time, but that the hour is come. An hour contains a portion of a day. What was this hour? He was now to be spit upon, scourged, crucified. But the Father glorifies the Son. The sun failed in his course, and with him all the other elements felt that death. The earth trembled under the weight of our Lord hanging on the Cross, and testified that it had not power to hold within it Him who was dying. The Centurion proclaimed, Truly this was the Son of God. (Matt. 27:54) The event answered the prediction. Our Lord had said, Glorify Thy Son, testifying that He was not the Son in name only, but properly the Son. Thy Son, He saith. Many of us are sons of God; but not such is the Son. For He is the proper, true Son by nature, not by adoption, in truth, not in name, by birth, not by creation. Therefore after His glorifying, to the manifestation of the truth there succeeded confession. The Centurion confesses Him to be the true Son of God, that so none of His believers might doubt what one of His persecutors could not deny.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. civ) But if He was glorified by His Passion, how much more by His Resurrection? For His Passion rather shewed His humility than His glory. So we must understand, Father, the hour is come, glorify Thy Son, to mean, the hour is come for sowing the seed, humility; defer not the fruit, glory.

HILARY. (iii. de. Trin) But perhaps this proves weakness in the Son; His waiting to be glorified by one superior to Himself. And who does not confess that the Father is superior, seeing that He Himself saith, The Father is greater than I? But beware lest the honour of the Father impair the glory of the Son. It follows: That Thy Son also may glorify Thee. So then the Son is not weak, inasmuch as He gives back in His turn glory for the glory which He receives. This petition for glory to be given and repaid, shews the same divinity to be in both.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cv) But it is justly asked, how the Son can glorify the Father, when the eternal glory of the Father never experienced abasement in the form of man, and in respect of its own Divine perfection, does not admit of being added to. But among men this glory was less when God was only known in Judæa; and therefore the Son glorified the Father, when the Gospel of Christ spread the knowledge of the Father among the Gentiles.

Glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee; i. e. Raise Me from the dead, that by Me Thou mayest be known to the whole world. Then He unfolds further the manner in which the Son glorifies the Father; As Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, that He should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given Him. All flesh signifies all mankind, the part being put for the whole. And this power which is given to Christ by the Father over all flesh, must be understood with reference to His human nature.

HILARY. (iii. de Trin) For being made flesh Himself, He was about to restore eternal life to frail, corporeal, and mortal man.

HILARY. (ix. de Trin. 31) If Christ be God, not begotten, but unbegotten, then let this receiving be thought weakness. But not if His receiving of power signifies His begetting, in which He received what He is. This gift cannot be counted for weakness. For the Father is such in that He gives; the Son remains God in that He hath received the power of giving eternal life.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxx) He saith, Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, to shew that His preaching extended not to the Jews only, but to the whole world. But what is all flesh? For all did not believe? So far as lay with Him, all did. If they did not attend to His words, it was not His fault who spoke, but theirs who did not receive.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cv. 2) He saith, As Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, so the Son may glorify Thee, i. e. make Thee known to all flesh which Thou hast given Him; for Thou hast so given it to Him, that He should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given Him.

HILARY. (iii. de Tr. c. 14) And in what eternal life is, He then shews: And this is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God. To know the only true God is life, but this alone does not constitute life. What else then is added? And Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent.

HILARY. (iv. de Tr. c. 9) The Arians hold, that as the Father is the only true, only just, only wise God, the Son hath no communion of these attributes; for that which is proper to one, cannot be partaken of by another. And as these are as they think in the Father alone, and not in the Son, they necessarily consider the Son a false and vain God.

HILARY. (v. de Tr. 3) But it must be clear to every one that the reality of any thing is evidenced by its power. For that is true wheat, which when rising with grain and fenced with ears, and shaken out by the winnowing machine, and ground into corn, and baked into bread, and taken for food, fulfils the nature and function of bread. I ask then wherein the truth of Divinity is wanting to the Son, Who hath the nature and virtue of Divinity. For He so made use of the virtue of His nature, as to cause to be things which were not, and to do every thing which seemed good to Him.

HILARY. (ix. de Trin) Because He says, Thee the only, does He separate Himself from communion and unity with God? He doth separate Himself, but that He adds immediately, And Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent. For the Catholic faith confesses Christ to be true God, in that it confesses the Father to be the only true God; for natural birth did not introduce any change of nature into the Only-Begotten God.

AUGUSTINE. (vi. de Tr. c. 9) Dismissing then the Arians, let us see if we are forced to confess, that by the words, That they may know Thee to be the only true God, He means us to understand that the Father only is the true God, in such sense as that only the Three together, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are to be called God? Does our Lord's testimony authorize us to say that the Father is the only true God, the Son the only true God, and the Holy Ghost the only true God, and at the same time, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost together, i. e. the Trinity, are not three Gods, but onea true God?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. c. 5) Or is not the order of the words, That they may know Thee and Jesus Christ, Whom Thou hast sent, to be the only true God? the Holy Spirit being necessarily understood, because the Spirit is only the love of the Father and the Son, consubstantial with both. If then the Son so glorifies Thee as Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, and Thou hast given Him the power, that He should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given Him, and, This is life eternal, to know Thee, it follows that He glorifies Thee by making Thee known to all whom Thou hast given Him. Moreover, if the knowledge of God is life eternal, the more advance we make in this knowledge, the more we make in life eternal. But in life eternal we shall never die. Where then there is no death, there will then be perfect knowledge of God; there will God be most glorified1, because His glory will be greatest. Glory was defined among the ancients to be fame accompanied with praise. But if man is praised in dependence on what is said of him, how will God be praised when He shall be seen? as in the Psalm, Blessed are they who dwell in Thy house: they will be alway praising Thee. (Ps. 83:4) There will be praise of God without end, where will be full knowledge of God. There then shall be heard the everlasting praise of God, for there will there be full knowledge of God, and therefore full glorifying of Him.

AUGUSTINE. (i. de Trin. c. viii) What He said to His servant Moses, I am that I am; (Exod. 3) this we shall contemplate in the life eternal.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. xviii) For when sight has made our faith truth, then eternity shall take possession of and displace our mortality.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cv) But God is first glorified here, when He is proclaimed, made known to, and believed in, by men: I have glorified Thee on the earth.

HILARY. (iii. de Trin) This new glory with which our Lord had glorified the Father, does not imply any advancement2 in Godhead, but refers to the honour received from those who are converted from ignorance to knowledge.

CHRYSOSTOM. He says, on the earth; for He had been glorified in heaven, both in respect of the glory of His own nature, and of the adoration of the Angels. The glory therefore here spoken of is not that which belongeth to His substance, but that which pertaineth to the worship of man: wherefore it follows, I have finished the work which Thou gavest Me to do.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cv) Not Thou commandest Me, but, Thou gavest Me, implying evidently grace. For what hath human nature, even in the Only-Begotten, what it hath not received? But how had He finished the work which had been given Him to do, when there yet remained His passion to undergo? He says He has finished it, i. e. He knows for certain that He will.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxx) Or, I have finished, i. e. He had done all His own part, or had done the chief of it, that standing for the whole; (for the root of good was planted:) or He connects Himself with the future, as if it were already present.

HILARY. (ix. de Trin) After which, that we may understand the reward of His obedience, and the mystery of the whole dispensation, He adds, And now glorify Me with the glory with Thine own Self, with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cv. 5) He had said above, Father, the hour is come; glorify Thy Son, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee: the order of which words shews that the Son was first to be glorified by the Father, that the

Father might be glorified by the Son. But now He says, I have glorified Thee; and now glorify Me; as if He had first glorified the Father, and then asked to be glorified by Him. We must understand that the first is the order in which one was to succeed the other, but that He afterwards uses a past tense, to express a thing future; the meaning being, I will glorify Thee on the earth, by finishing the work Thou hast given Me to do: and now, Father, glorify Me, which is quite the same sentence with the first one, except that He adds here the mode in which He is to be glorified; with the glory which I had before the world was, with Thee. The order of the words is, The glory which I had with Thee before the world was. This has been taken by some to mean, that the human nature which was assumed by the Word, would be changed into the Word, that man would be changed into God, or, to speak more correctly, be lost in God. For no one would say that the Word of God would by that change be doubled, or even made at all greater. But we avoid this error, if we take the glory which He had with the Father before the world was, to be the glory which He predestined for Him on earth: (for if we believe Him to be the Son of man, we need not be afraid to say that He was predestinated.) This predestined time of His being glorified, He now saw was arrived, that He might now receive what had been aforetime predestined, He prayed accordingly: And now, Father, glorify Me, &c. i. e. that glory which I had with Thee by Thy predestination, it is now time that I should have at Thy right hand.

HILARY. (iii. de Trin) Or He prayed that that which was mortal, might receive the glory immortal, that the corruption of the flesh might be transformed and absorbed into the incorruption of the Spirit.

17:6–8

6. I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them me; and they have kept thy word.

7. Now they have known that all things whatsoever thou hast given me are of thee.

8. For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me: and they have received them, and have known surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) Having said, I have finished My work, He shews what kind of work it was, viz. that He should make known the name of God: I have manifested Thy name unto the men which Thou gavest Me out of the world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvi) If He speaks of the disciples only with whom He supped, this has nothing to do with that glorifying of which He spoke above, wherewith the Son glorified the Father; for what glory is it to be known to twelve or eleven men? But if by the men which were given to Him out of the world, He means all those who should believe in Him afterwards, this is without doubt the glory wherewith the Son glorifies the Father; and, I have manifested Thy name, is the same as what He said before, I have glorified Thee; the past being put for the future both there and here. But what follows shews that He is speaking here of those who were already His disciples, not of all who should afterwards believe on Him. At the beginning of His prayer then our Lord is speaking of all believers, all to whom He should make known the Father, thereby glorifying Him: for after saying, that Thy Son also may glorify Thee, in shewing how that was to be done, He says, As Thou hast given Him power over all flesh. Now let us hear what He says to the disciples: I have manifested Thy name to the men which Thou gavest Me out of the world. Had they not known the name of God then, when they were Jews? We read in the Psalms, In Jewry is God known; His name is great in Israel. (Ps. 76:1) I have manifested Thy name, then, must be understood not of the name of God, but of the Father’s name, which name could not be manifested without the manifestation of the Son. For God’s name, as the God of the whole creation, could not have been entirely unknown to any nation. As the Maker then of the world, He was known among all nations, even before the spread of the Gospel. In Jewry He was known as a God, Who was not to be worshipped with the false gods: but as the Father of that Christ, by whom He took away the sins of the world, His name was unknown; which name Christ now manifesteth to those whom the Father had given Him out of the world. But how did He manifest it, when the hour had not come of which He said above, The hour cometh, when I shall no more speak unto you in proverbs. We must understand the past to be put for the future.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) That He was the Son of the Father, Christ had already manifested to them by words and deeds.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvi) Which Thou hast given Me out of the world: i. e. who were not of the world. But this they were by regeneration, not by nature. What is meant by, Thine they were, and Thou gavest them Me? Had ever the Father any thing without the Son? God forbid. But the Son of God had that sometimes, which He had not as Son of man; for He had the universe with His Father, while He was still in His mother's womb. Wherefore by saying, They were Thine, the Son of God does not separate Himself from the Father; but only attributes all His power to Him, from whom He is, and hath the same. And Thou gavest them Me, then, means that He had received as man the power to have them; nay, that He Himself had given them to Himself, i. e. Christ as God with the Father, to Christ as man not with the Father. His purpose here is to shew His unanimity with the Father, and how that it was the Father's pleasure that they should believe in Him.

BEDE. And they have kept Thy word. He calls Himself the Word of the Father, because the Father by Him created all things, and because He contains in Himself all words: as if to say, They have committed Me to memory so well, that they never will forget Me. Or, They have kept Thy word, i. e. in that they have believed in Me: as it follows, Now they have known that all things whatsoever Thou hast given Me, are of Thee. Some read, Now I have known, &c. But this cannot be correct. For how could the Son be ignorant of what was the Father's? It is the disciples He is speaking of; as if to say, They have learnt that there is nothing in Me alien from Thee, and that whatever I teach cometh from Thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvi) The Father gave Him all things, when having all things He begat Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) And whence have they learned? From My words, wherein I taught them that I came forth from Thee. For this was what He has been labouring to shew throughout the whole of the Gospel: For I have given unto them the words which Thou gavest Me, and they have received them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvi. c. 6) i. e. have understood and remembered them. For then is a word received, when the mind apprehends it; as it follows, And have known surely that I came out from Thee. And that none might imagine that that knowledge was one of sight, not of faith, He adds, And they hare believed (surely, is understood) that Thou didst send Me. What they believed surely, was what they knew surely; for, I came out from Thee, is the same with, Thou didst send Me. They believed surely, i. e. not as He said above they believed1, but surely, i. e. as they were about to believe firmly, steadily, unwaveringly: never any more to be scattered to their own, and leave Christ. The disciples as yet were not such as He describes them to be in the past tense, meaning such as they were to be when they had received the Holy Ghost. The question how the Father gave those words to the Son, is easier to solve, if we suppose Him to have received them from the Father as Son of man. But if we understand it to be as the Begotten of the Father, let there be no time supposed previous to His having them, as if He once existed without them: for whatever God the Father gave God the Son, He gave in begetting.

17:9–13

9. I pray for them: I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine.

10. And all mine are thine, and thine are mine; and I am glorified in them.

11. And now I am no more in the world, but these are in the world, and I come to thee. Holy Father, keep through thine own name those whom thou hast given me, that they may be one, as we are.

12. While I was with them in the world, I kept them in thy name: those that thou gavest me I have kept, and none of them is lost, but the son of perdition; that the scripture might be fulfilled.

13. And now come I to thee; and these things I speak in the world, that they might have my joy fulfilled in themselves.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) As the disciples were still sad in spite of all our Lord’s consolations, henceforth He addresses Himself to the Father to shew the love which He had for them; I pray for them; He not only gives them what He has of His own, but entreats another for them, as a still further proof of His love.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvi) When He adds, I pray not for the world, by the world He means those who live according to the lust of the world, and have not the lot to be chosen by grace out of the world, as those had for whom He prayed: But for them which Thou hast given Me. It was because the Father had given Him them, that they did not belong to the world. Nor yet had the Father, in giving them to the Son, lost what He had given: For they are Thine.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi. 1) He often repeats, Thou hast given Me, to impress on them that it was all according to the Father's will, and that He did not come to rob another, but to take unto Him His own. Then to shew them that this power1 had not been lately received from the Father, He adds, And all Mine are Thine, and Thine are Mine: as if to say, Let no one, hearing Me say, Them which Thou hast given Me, suppose that they are separated from the Father; for Mine are His: nor because I said, They are Thine, suppose that they are separate from Me: for whatever is His is Mine.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvi. 6) It is sufficiently apparent from hence, that all things which the Father hath, the Only-Begotten Son hath; hath in that He is God, born from the Father, and equal with the Father; not in the sense in which the elder son is told, All that I have is thine. (Luke 15:31) For all there means all creatures below the holy rational creature, but here it means the very rational creature itself, which is only subjected to God. Since this is God the Father's, it could not at the same time be God the Son's, unless the Son were equal to the Father. For it is impossible that saints, of whom this is said, should be the property of any one, except Him who created and sanctified them. When He says above in speaking of the Holy Spirit, All things that the Father hath are Mine, (c. 16:15) He means all things which pertain to the divinity of the Father; for He adds, He (the Holy Ghost) shall receive of Mine; and the Holy Ghost would not receive from a creature which was subject to the Father and the Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) Then He gives proof of this, I am glorified in them. If they glorify Me, believing in Me and Thee, it is certain that I have power over them: for no one is glorified by those amongst whom he has no power.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvii. 3) He speaks of this as already done, meaning that it was predestined, and sure to be. But is this the glorifying of which He speaks above, And now, O Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own Self? If then with Thyself, what meaneth here, In them? Perhaps that this very thing, i. e. His glory with the Father, was made known to them, and through them to all that believe.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) And now I am no more in the world: i. e. though I no longer appear in the flesh, I am glorified by those who die for Me, as for the Father, and preach Me as the Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvii. 4) At the time at which He was speaking, both were still in the world. Yet we must not understand, I am no more in the world, metaphorically of the heart and life; for could there ever have been a time when He loved the things of the world? It remains then that He means that He was not in the world, as He had been before; i. e. that He was soon going away. Do we not say every day, when any one is going to leave us, or going to die, such an one is gone? This is shewn to be the sense by what follows; for He adds, And now I come to Thee. And then He commends to His Father those whom He was about to leave: Holy Father, keep through Thine own name those whom Thou hast given Me. As man He prays God for His disciples, whom He received from God. But mark what follows: That they may be one, as We are: He does not say, That they may be one with Us, as We are one; but, that they may be one: that they may be one in their nature, as We are one in Ours. For, in that He was God and man in one person, as man He prayed, as God He was one with Him to Whom He prayed.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. ix) He does not say, That I and they maybe one, though He might have said so in the sense, that He was the head of the Church, and the Church His body; not one thing, but one person: the head and the body being one Christ. But shewing something else, viz. that His divinity is consubstantial with the Father, He prays that His people may in like manner be one; but one in Christ, not only by the same nature, in which mortal man is made equal to the Angels, but also by the same will, agreeing most entirely in the same mind, and melted into one Spirit by the fire of love. This is the meaning of, That they may be one as We are: viz. that as the Father and the Son are one not only by equality of substance, but also in will, so they, between whom and God the Son is Mediator, may be one not only by the union of nature, but by the union of love.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) Again He speaks as man: While I was with them in the world, I kept them in Thy name; i. e. by Thy help. He speaks in condescension to the minds of His disciples, who thought they were more safe in His presence.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvii. 6) The Son as man kept His disciples in the Father's name, being placed among them in human form: the Father again kept them in the Son's name, in that He heard those who asked in the Son's name. But we must not take this carnally, as if the Father and Son kept us in turns, for the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost guard us at the same time: but Scripture does not raise us, except it stoop to us. Let us understand then that when our Lord says this, He is distinguishing the persons, not dividing the nature, so that when the Son was keeping His disciples by His bodily presence, the Father was waiting to succeed Him on His departure; but both kept them by spiritual power, and when the Son withdrew His bodily presence, He still held with the Father the spiritual keeping. For when the Son as man received them into His keeping, He did not take them from the Father's keeping, and when the Father gave them into the Son's keeping, it was to the Son as man, who at the same time was God. Those that Thou gavest Me I have kept, and none of them is lost but the son of perdition; i. e. the betrayer of Christ, predestined to perdition; that the Scripture might be fulfilled, especially the prophecy in Psalm 108.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxi) He was the only one indeed who perished then, but there were many after. None of them is lost, i. e. as far as I am concerned; as He says above more clearly; I will in no wise cast out. But when they cast themselves out, I will not draw them to Myself by dint of compulsion. It follows: And now I come to Thee. But some one might ask, Canst Thou not keep them? I can. Then why sayest Thou this? That they may have My joy fulfilled in them, i. e. that they may not be alarmed in their as yet imperfect state.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cvii) Or thus: That they might have the joy spoken of above: That they may be one, as We are one. This His joy, i. e. bestowed by Him, He says, is to be fulfilled in them: on which account He spoke thus in the world. This joy is the peace and happiness of the life to come. He says He spoke in the world, though He had just now said, I am no more in the world. For, inasmuch as He had not yet departed, He was still here; and inasmuch as He was going to depart, He was in a certain sense not here.

17:14–19

14. I have given them thy word; and the world hath hated them, because they are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

15. I pray not that thou shouldest take them out of the world, but that thou shouldest keep them from the evil.

16. They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

17. Sanctify them through thy truth; thy word is truth.

18. As thou hast sent me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world.

19. And for their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also might be sanctified through the truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) Again, our Lord gives a reason why the disciples are worthy of obtaining such favour from the Father: I have given them Thy word; and the world hath hated them; i. e. They are had in hatred for Thy sake, and on account of Thy word.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cviii) They had not yet experienced these sufferings which they afterwards met with; but, after His custom, He puts the future into the past tense. Then He gives the reason why the world haled them; viz. Because they are not of the world. This was conferred upon them by regeneration; for by nature they were of the world. It was given to them that they should not be of the world, even as He was not of the world; as it follows; Even as I am not of the world. He never was of the world; for even His birth of the form of a servant He received from the Holy Ghost, from Whom they were born again. But though they were no longer of the world, it was still necessary that they should be in the world: I pray not that Thou shouldest take them out of the world.

BEDE. As if to say, The time is now at hand, when I shall be taken out of the world; and therefore it is necessary that they should be still left in the world, in order to preach Me and Thee to the world. But that Thou shouldest keep them from the evil; every evil, but especially the evil of schism.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cviii) He repeats the same thing again; They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii. 1) Above, when He said, Them whom Thou gavest Me out of the world, He meant their nature; here He means their actions. They are not of the world; because they have nothing in common with earth, they are made citizens of heaven. Wherein He shews

His love for them, thus praising them to the Father. The word as when used with respect to Him and the Father expresses likeness of nature; but between us and Christ there is immense distance. Keep them from the evil, i. e. not from dangers only, but from falling away from the faith.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cviii) Sanctify them through Thy truth: for thus were they to be kept from the evil. But it may be asked, how it was that they were not of the world, when they were not yet sanctified in the truth? Because the sanctified have still to grow in sanctity, and this by the help of God’s grace. The heirs of the New Testament are sanctified in that truth, the shadows of which were the sanctification of the Old Testament; they are sanctified in Christ, Who said above, I am the way, the truth, and the life. (c. 14:6) It follows, Thy discourse is truth. The Greek is λόγος, i. e. word. The Father then sanctified them in the truth, i. e. in His Word the Only-Begotten, them, i. e. the heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) Or thus: Sanctify them in Thy truth; i. e. Make them holy, by the gift of the Holy Spirit, and sound doctrines: for sound doctrines give knowledge of God, and sanctify the soul. And as He is speaking of doctrines, He adds, Thy word is truth, i. e. there is in it no lie, nor any thing typical, or bodily. Again, Sanctify them in Thy truth, may mean, Separate them for the ministry of the word, and preaching.

GLOSS. As Thou hast sent Me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world. For what Christ was sent into the world, for the same end were they; as saith Paul, God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself; and hath given to us the word of reconciliation. (2 cor. 5:19) As does not express perfect likeness between our Lord and His Apostles, but only as much as was possible in men. Have sent them, He says, according to His custom of putting the past for the future.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cviii) It is manifest by this, that He is still speaking of the Apostles; for the very word Apostle means in the Greek, sent. But since they are His members, in that He is the Head of the Church, He says, And for their sakes I sanctify Myself; i. e. I in Myself sanctify them, since they are Myself. And to make it more clear that this was His meaning, He adds, That they also might be sanctified through the truth, i. e. in Me; inasmuch as the Word is truth, in which the Son of man was sanctified from the time that the Word was made flesh. For then He sanctified Himself in Himself, i. e. Himself as man, in Himself as the Word: the Word and man being one

Christ. But of His members it is that He saith, And for their sakes I sanctify Myself, i. e. them in Me, since in Me both they and I are. That they also might be sanctified in truth: they also, i. e. even as Myself; and in the truth, i. e. Myself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) Or thus: For their sakes I sanctify Myself, i. e. I offer Myself as a sacrifice to Thee; for all sacrifices, and things that are offered to God, are called holy. And whereas this sanctification was of old in figure, (a sheep being the sacrifice,) but now in truth, He adds, That they also might be sanctified through the truth; i. e. For I make them too an oblation to Thee; either meaning that He who was offered up was their head, or that they would be offered up too: as the Apostle saith, Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy. (Rom. 12:1)

17:20–23

20. Neither pray I for these alone, but for them also which shall believe on me through their word;

21. That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us: that the world may believe that thou hast sent me.

22. And the glory which thou gavest me I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one:

23. I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one: and that the world may know that thou hast sent me, and hast loved them, as thou hast loved me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cix) When our Lord had prayed for His disciples, whom He named also Apostles, He added a prayer for all others who should believe on Him; Neither pray I for these alone, but for all others who shall believe on Me through their word.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) Another ground of consolation to them, that they were to be the cause of the salvation of others.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cix) All, i. e. not only those who were then alive, but those who were to be born; not those only who heard the Apostles themselves, but us who were born long after their death. We have all believed in Christ through their word: for they first heard that word from Christ, and then preached it to others, and so it has come down, and will go down to all posterity. We may see that in this prayer there are some disciples whom He does not pray for; for those, i. e. who were neither with Him at the time, nor were about to believe on Him afterwards through the Apostles' word, but believed already. Was Nathanael with Him then, or Joseph of Arimathea, and many others, who, John says, believed on Him? I do not mention old Simeon, or Anna the prophetess, Zacharias, Elisabeth, or John the Baptist; for it might be answered that it was not necessary to pray for dead persons, such as these who departed with such rich merits. With respect to the former then we must understand that they did not yet believe in Him, as He wished, but that after His resurrection, when the Apostles were taught and strengthened by the Holy Spirit, they attained to a right faith. The case of Paul however still remains, An Apostle not of men, or by men; (Gal. 1:1) and that of the robber, who believed when even the teachers themselves of the faith fell away. We must understand then, their word, to mean the word of faith itself which they preached to the world; it being called their word, because it was preached in the first instance and principally by them; for it was being preached by them, when Paul received it by revelation from Jesus Christ Himself. And in this sense the robber too believed their word. Wherefore in this prayer the Redeemer prays for all whom He redeemed, both present and to come. And then follows the thing itself which He prays for, That they all may be one. He asks that for all, which he asked above for the disciples; that all both we and they may be one.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) And with this prayer for unanimity, He concludes His prayer; and then begins a discourse on the same subject: A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another.

HILARY. (vii de Trin) And this unity is recommended by the great example of unity: As Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in Us, i. e. that as the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, so, after the likeness of this unity, all may be one in the Father and in the Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) This as again does not express perfect likeness, but only likeness as far as it was possible in men; as when He saith, Be ye merciful, even as your Father, which is in heaven, is merciful. (Luke 6:36)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cx) We must particularly observe here, that our Lord did not say, that we may be all one, but that they may be all one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee, are one, understood. For the Father is so in the Son, that They are one, because They are of one substance; but we can be one in Them, but not with Them; because we and They are not of one substance. They are in us, and we in Them, so as that They are one in Their nature, we one in ours. They are in us, as God is in the temple; we in Them, as the creature is in its Creator. Wherefore He adds, in Us, to shew, that our being made one by charity, is to be attributed to the grace of God, not to ourselves.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de. Trin. c. ix) Or that in ourselves we cannot be one, severed from each other by diverse pleasures, and lusts, and the pollution of sin, from which we must be cleansed by a Mediator, in order to be one in Him.

HILARY. (viii. de Trin) Heretics endeavouring to get over the words, I and My Father are one, as a proving unity of nature, and to reduce them to mean a unity simply of natural love, and agreement of will, bring forwards these words of our Lord’s as an example of this kind of unity: That they may be all one, as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee. But though impiety can cheat its own understanding, it cannot alter the meaning1 of the words themselves. For they who are born again of a nature that gives unity in life eternal, they cease to be one in will merely, acquiring the same nature by their regeneration: but the Father and Son alone are properly one, because God, only-begotten of God, can only exist in that nature from which He is derived.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cx) But why does He say, That the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me? Will the world believe when we shall all be one in the Father and the Son? Is not this unity that peace eternal, which is the reward of faith, rather than faith itself? For though in this life all of us who hold in the same common faith are one, yet even this unity is not a means to belief, but the consequence of it. What means then, That all may be one, that the world may believe? He prays for the world when He says, Neither pray I for these alone, but for all those who shall believe on Me through their word. Whereby it appears that He does not make this unity the cause of the world believing, but prays that the world may believe, as He prays that they all may be one. The meaning will be clearer if we always put in the word ask; I ask that they all may be one; I ask that they may be one in Us; I ask that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me.

HILARY. (viii. de Trin) Or, the world will believe that the Son is sent from the Father, for that reason, viz. because all who believe in Him are one in the Father and the Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) For there is no scandal so great as division, whereas unity amongst believers is a great argument for believing; as He said at the beginning of His discourse, By this shall all men know that ye are My disciples, if ye have love one to another. For if they quarrel, they will not be looked on as the disciples of a peacemaking Master. And I, He saith, not being a peacemaker, they will not acknowledge Me as sent from God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cx) Then our Saviour, Who, by praying to the Father, shewed Himself to be man, now shews that, being God with the Father, He doth what He prays for: And the glory which Thou gavest Me, I have given them. What glory, but immortality, which human nature was about to receive in Him? For that which was to be by unchangeable predestination, though future, He expresses by the past tense. That glory of immortality, which He says was given Him by the Father, we must understand He gave Himself also. For when the Son is silent of His own cooperation in the Father’s work, He shews His humility: when He is silent of the Father’s cooperation in His work, He shews His equality. In this way here He neither disconnects Himself with the Father’s work, when He says, The glory which Thou gavest Me, nor the Father with His work, when He says, I have given them. But as He was pleased by prayer to the Father to obtain that all might be one, so now He is pleased to effect the same by His own gift; for He continues, That all may be one, even as We are one.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii. 2) By glory, He means miracles, and doctrines, and unity; which latter is the greater glory. For all who believed through the Apostles are one. If any separated, it was owing to men’s own carelessness; not but that our Lord anticipates this happening.

HILARY. (viii. de Trin) By this giving and receiving of honour, then, all are one. But I do not yet apprehend in what way this makes all one. Our Lord, however, explains the gradation and order in the consummating of this unity, when He adds, I in them, and Thou in Me; so that inasmuch as He was in the Father by His divine nature, we in Him by His incarnation, and He again in us by the mystery of the sacrament, a perfect union by means of a Mediator was established.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) Elsewhere1 He says of Himself and the Father, We will come and make Our abode with Him; by the mention of two persons, stopping the mouths of the Sabellians. Here by saying that the Father comes to the disciples through Him, He refutes the notion of the Arians.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cx. 4) Nor is this said, however, as if to mean that the Father was not in us, or we in the Father. He only means to say, that He is Mediator between God and man. And what He adds, That they may be made perfect in one, shews that the reconciliation made by this Mediator, was carried on even to the enjoyment of everlasting blessedness. So what follows, That the world may know that Thou hast sent Me, must not be taken to mean the same as the words just above, That the world may believe. For as long as we believe what we do not see, we are not yet made perfect, as we shall be when we have merited to see what we believe. So that when He speaks of their being made perfect, we are to understand such a knowledge as shall be by sight, not such as is by faith. These that believe are the world, not a permanent enemy, but changed from an enemy to a friend; as it follows: And hast loved them, as Thou hast loved Me. The Father loves us in the Son, because He elected us in Him. These words do not prove that we are equal to the Only Begotten Son; for this mode of expression, as one thing so another, does not always signify equality. It sometimes only means, because one thing, therefore another. And this is its meaning here: Thou hast loved them, as Thou hast loved Me, i. e. Thou hast loved them, because Thou hast loved Me. There is no reason for God loving His members, but that He loves him. But since He hateth nothing that He hath made, who can adequately express how much He loves the members of His Only Begotten Son, and still more the Only Begotten Himself.

17:24–26

24. Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory, which thou hast given me: for thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world.

25. O righteous Father, the world hath not known thee: but I have known thee, and these have known that thou hast sent me.

26. And I have declared unto them thy name, and will declare it: that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii. 2) After He has said that many should believe on Him through them, and that they should obtain great glory, He then speaks of the crowns in store for them; Father, I will that they also whom Thou hast given Me, be with Me where I am.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxi. 1) These are they whom He has received from the Father, whom He also chose out of the world; as He saith at the beginning of this prayer, Thou hast given Him power over all flesh, i. e. all mankind, That He should give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given Him. Wherein He shews that He had received power over all men, to deliver whom He would, and to condemn whom He would. Wherefore it is to all His members that He promises this reward, that where He is, they may be also. Nor can that but be done, which the Almighty Son saith that He wishes to the Almighty Father: for the Father and the Son have one will, which, if weakness prevent us from comprehending, piety must believe. Where I am: so far as pertains to the creature, He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh: He might say, Where I am, meaning where He was shortly to be, i. e. heaven. In heaven then, He promises us, we shall be. For thither was the form of a servant raised, which He had taken from the Virgin, and there placed on the right hand of God.

GREGORY. (Moral.) What means then what the Truth saith above, No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that came down from heaven, even the Son of man which is in heaven. (John 3:13) Yet here is no discrepancy, for our Lord being the Head of His members, the reprobates excluded, He is alone with us. And therefore, we making one with Him, whence He came alone in Himself, thither He returns alone in us.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxi) But as respects the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, if we understand these words, that they may be with Me where I am, with reference to that, then away with all bodily ideas, and enquire not where the Son, Who is equal to the Father, is: for no one hath discovered where He is not. Wherefore it was not enough for Him to say, I will that they may be where I am, but He adds, with Me. For to be with Him is the great good: even the miserable can be where He is, but only the happy can be with Him. And as in the ease of the visible, though very different be whatever example we take, a blind man will serve for one, as a blind man though He is where the light is, yet is not himself with the light, but is absent from it in its presence, so not only the unbelieving, but the believing, though they cannot be where Christ is not, yet are not themselves with Christ by sight: by faith we cannot doubt but that a believer is with Christ. But here He is speaking of that sight wherein we shall see Him as He is; as He adds, That they may behold My glory, which Thou hast given Me. That they may behold, He says, not, that they may believe. It is the reward of faith which He speaks of, not faith itself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) He saith not, that they may partake of My glory, but, that they may behold, intimating that the rest there is to see the Son of God. The Father gave Him glory, when He begat Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxi. 3) When then we shall have seen the glory which the Father gave the Son, though by this glory we do not understand here, that which He gave to the equal Son when He begat Him, but that which He gave to the Son of man, after His crucifixion; then shall the judgment be, then shall the wicked be taken away, that he see not the glory of the Lord: what glory but that whereby He is God? If then we take their words, That they may be with Me where I am, to be spoken by Him as Son of God, in that case they must have a higher meaning, viz. that we shall be in the Father with Christ. As He immediately adds, That they may see My glory which Thou hast given Me; and then, Which Thou gavest Me before the foundation of the world. For in Him He loved us before the foundation of the world, and then predestined what He should do at the end of the world.

BEDE. That which He calls glory then is the love wherewith He was loved with the Father before the foundation of the world. And in that glory He loved us too before the foundation of the world.

THEOPHYLACT. After then that He had prayed for believers, and promised them so many good things, another prayer follows worthy of His mercy and benignity: O righteous Father, the world hath not known Thee; as if to say, I would wish that all men obtained these good things, which I have asked for the believing. But inasmuch as they have not known Thee, they shall not obtain the glory and crown.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) He says this as if He were troubled at the thought, that they should be unwilling to know One so just and good. And whereas the Jews had said, that they knew God, and He knew Him not: He on the contrary says, But I have known Thee, and these have known that Thou hast sent Me, and I have declared unto them Thy name, and will declare1 it, by giving them perfect knowledge through the Holy Ghost. When they have learned what Thou art, they will know that I am not separate from Thee, but Thine own Son greatly beloved, and joined to Thee. This I have told them, that I might receive them, and that they who believe this aright, shall preserve their faith and love toward Me entire; and I will abide in them: That the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them, and I in them.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxi. 5) Or thus; What is to know Him, but eternal life, which He gave not to a condemned but to a reconciled world? For this reason the world hath not known Thee; because Thou art just, and hast punished them with this ignorance of Thee, in reward for their misdeeds. And for this reason the reconciled world knows Thee, because Thou art merciful, and hast vouchsafed this knowledge, not in consequence of their merits, but of thy grace. It follows: But I have known Thee. He is God the fountain of grace by nature, man of the Holy Ghost and Virgin by grace ineffable. Then because the grace of God is through Jesus Christ, He says, And they have known Me, i. e. the reconciled world have known Me, by grace, forasmuch as Thou hast sent Me. And I have made known Thy name to them by faith, and will make it known by sight: that the love wherewith Thou hast loved Me may be in them. (2 Tim. 4:7) The Apostle uses a like phrase, I have fought a good fight, by a good fight being the more common form. The love wherewith the Father loveth the Son in us, can only be in us because we are His members, and we are loved in Him when He is loved wholly, i. e. both head and body. And therefore He adds, And I in them; He is in us, as in His temple, we in Him as our Head.

CHAPTER 18

18:1–2

1. When Jesus had spoken these words, he went forth with his disciples over the brook Cedron, where was a garden, into the which he entered, and his disciples.

2. And Judas also, which betrayed him, knew the place: for Jesus ofttimes resorted thither with his disciples.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) The discourse, which our Lord had with His disciples after supper, and the prayer which followed, being now ended, the Evangelist begins the account of His Passion. When Jesus had spoken these words, He came forth with His disciples over the brook Cedron, where was a garden, into which He entered, and His disciples. But this did not take place immediately after the prayer was ended; there was an interval containing some things, which John omits, but which are mentioned by the other Evangelists.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. iii. c. 3.) A contention took place between them, which of them was the greater, as Luke relates. He also said to Peter, as Luke adds in the same place, Behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he might sift you as wheat, &c. (Luke 22:31) And according to Matthew and Mark, they sang a hymn, and then went to Mount Olivet. (Mat. 26:30. Mark 14:26) Matthew lastly brings the two narratives together: Then went Jesus with His disciples to a place which is called Gethsemane. That is the place which John mentions here, Where there was a garden, into the which He entered, and His disciples.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) When Jesus had spoken these words, shews that He did not enter before He had finished speaking.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) But why does not John say, When He had prayed, He entered? Because His prayer was a speaking for His disciples’ sake. It is now night time; He goes and crosses the brook, and hastens to the place which was known to the traitor; thus giving no trouble to those who were lying in wait for Him, and shewing His disciples that He went voluntarily to die.

ALCUIN. Over the brook Cedron, i. e. of cedars. It is the genitive in the Greek. He goes over the brook, i. e. drinks of the brook of His Passion. Where there was a garden, that the sin which was committed in a garden, He might blot out in a garden. Paradise signifies garden of delights.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxii) That it might not be thought that He went into a garden to hide Himself, it is added, But Judas who betrayed Him knew the place: for Jesus often resorted thither with His disciples.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) There the wolf in sheep's clothing, permitted by the deep counsel of the Master of the flock to go among the sheep, learned in what way to disperse the flock, and ensnare the Shepherd.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Jesus had often met and talked alone with His disciples there, on essential doctrines, such as it was lawful for others to hear. He does this on mountains, and in gardens, to be out of reach of noise and tumult. Judas however went there, because Christ had often passed the night there in the open air. He would have gone to His house, if he had thought he should find Him sleeping there.

THEOPHYLACT. Judas knew that at the feast time our Lord was wont to teach His disciples high and mysterious doctrines, and that He taught in places like this. And as it was then a solemn season, he thought He would be found there, teaching His disciples things relating to the feast.

18:3–9

3. Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and torches and weapons.

4. Jesus therefore, knowing all things that should come upon him, went forth, and said unto them, Whom seek ye?

5. They answered him, Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus saith unto them, I am he. And Judas also, which betrayed him, stood with them.

6. As soon then as he said unto them, I am he, they went backward, and fell to the ground.

7. Then asked he them again, Whom seek ye? And they said, Jesus of Nazareth.

8. Jesus answered, I have told you that I am he: if therefore ye seek me, let these go their way:

9. That the saying might be fulfilled, which he spake, Of them which thou gavest me have I lost none.

GLOSS. (Nihil tale in G.) The Evangelist had shewn how Judas had found out the place where Christ was, now he relates how he went there. Judas then, having received a band of men and officers from the chief priests and Pharisees, cometh thither with lanterns and torches and weapons.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) It was a band not of Jews, but of soldiers, granted, we must understand, by the Governor, with legal authority to take the criminal, as He was considered, and crush any opposition that might be made.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) But how could they persuade the band? By hiring them; for being soldiers, they were ready to do any thing for money.

THEOPHYLACT. They carry torches and lanterns, to guard against Christ escaping in the dark.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) They had often sent elsewhere to take Him, but had not been able. Whence it is evident that He gave Himself up voluntarily; as it follows, Jesus therefore, knowing all things that should come upon Him, went forth, and said unto them, Whom seek ye?

THEOPHYLACT. He asks not because He needed to know, for He knew all things that should come upon Him; but because He wished to shew, that though present, they could not see or distinguish Him: Jesus saith unto them, I am He.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) He Himself had blinded their eyes. For that darkness was not the reason is clear, because the Evangelist says that they had lanterns. Though they had not lanterns, however, they should at least have recognised Him by His voice. And if they did not know Him, yet how was it that Judas, who had been with Him constantly also, did not know Him? And Judas also which betrayed Him stood with them. Jesus did all this to shew that they could not have taken Him, or even seen Him when He was in the midst of them, had He not permitted it.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) As soon then as He said unto them, I am He, they went backtward. Where now is the band of soldiers, where the terror and defence of arms? Without a blow, one word struck, drove back, prostrated a crowd fierce with hatred, terrible with arms. For God was hid in the flesh, and the eternal day was so obscured by His human body, that He was sought for with lanterns and torches, to be slain in the darkness. What shall He do when He cometh to judge, Who did thus when He was going to be judged? And now even at the present time Christ saith by the Gospel, I am He, and an Antichrist is expected by the Jews: to the end that they may go backward, and fall to the ground; because that forsaking heavenly, they desire earthly things.

GREGORY. (Ezech. Hom. ix.) Why is this, that the Elect fall on their faces, the reprobate backward? Because every one who falls back, sees not where he falls, whereas he who falls forward, sees where he falls. The wicked when they suffer loss in invisible things, are said to fall backward, because they do not see what is behind them: but the righteous, who of their own accord cast themselves down in temporal things, in order that they may rise in spiritual, fall as it were upon their faces, when with fear and repentance they humble themselves with their eyes open.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Lastly, lest any should say that He had encouraged the Jews to kill Him, in delivering Himself into their hands, He says every thing that is possible to reclaim them. But when they persisted in their malice, and shewed themselves inexcusable, then He gave Himself up into their hands: Then asked He them again, Whom seek ye? And they said, Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus answered, I have told you that I am He.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) They had heard at the first, I am He, but had not understood it; because He who could do whatever He would, willed not that they should. But had He never permitted Himself to be taken by them, they would not have done indeed what they came to do; but neither would He what He came to do. So now having shewn His power to them when they wished to take Him and could not, He lets them seize Him, that they might be unconscious agents of His will; If ye seek Me, let these go their way.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv) As if to say, Though ye seek Me, ye have nothing to do with these: lo, I give Myself up: thus even to the last hour does He shew His love for His own.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) He commands His enemies, and they do what He commands; they permit them to go away, whom He would not have perish.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) The Evangelist, to shew that it was not their design to do this, but that His power did it, adds, That the saying might be fulfilled which He spoke, Of them which Thou hast given Me, have I lost none. He had said this with reference not to temporal, but to eternal death: the Evangelist however understands the word of temporal death also.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii. 4) But were the disciples never to die? Why then would He lose them, even if they died then? Because they did not yet believe in Him in a saving way.

18:10–11

10. Then Simon Peter having a sword drew it, and smote the high priest’s servant, and cut off his right ear. The servant’s name was Malchus.

11. Then said Jesus unto Peter, Put up thy sword into the sheath: the cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink it?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Peter trusting to these last words of our Lord’s, and to what He had just done, assaults those who came to take Him: Then Simon Peter having a sword drew it, and smote the high priest’s servant. But how, commanded as he had been to have neither scrip, nor two garments, had he a sword? Perhaps he had foreseen this occasion, and provided one.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, he had got one for sacrificing the lamb, and carried it away with him from the Supper.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 2) But how could he, who had been forbidden ever to strike on the cheek, be a murderer? Because what he had been forbidden to do was to avenge himself, but here he was not avenging himself, but his Master. They were not however yet perfect: afterwards ye shall see Peter beaten with stripes, and bearing it humbly. And cut off his right ear: this seems to shew the impetuosity of the Apostle; that he struck at the head itself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) The servant’s name was Malchus; John is the only Evangelist who mentions the servant’s name; as Luke is the only one who mentions that our Lord touched the ear and healed him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) He wrought this miracle both to teach us, that we ought to do good to those who suffer, and to manifest His power. The Evangelist gives the name, that those who then read it might have the opportunity of enquiring into the truth of the account. And he mentions that he was the servant of the high priest, because in addition to the miracle of the cure itself, this shews that it was performed upon one of those who came to take Him, and who shortly after struck Him on the face.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii. 5) The name Malchus signifies, about to reign. What then does the ear cut off for our Lord, and healed by our Lord, denote, but the abolition of the old, and the creating of a new, hearing1 in the newness of the Spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter? To whomsoever this is given, who can doubt that he will reign with Christ? But he was a servant too, hath reference to that oldness, which generated to bondage: the cure figures liberty.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, the cutting off of the high priest's servant's right ear is a type of the people's deafness, of which the chief priests partook most strongly: the restoration of the ear, of ultimate reenlightenment of the understanding of the Jews, at the coming of Elias.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) Our Lord condemned Peter's act, and forbad him proceeding further: Then said Jesus unto Peter, Put up thy sword into the sheath. He was to be admonished to have patience: and this was written for our learning.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 2) He not only restrained Him however by threats, but consoled him also at the same time: The cup that My Father giveth Me, shall I not drink it? Whereby He shews that it was not by their power, but by His permission, that this had been done, and that He did not oppose God, but was obedient even unto death.

THEOPHYLACT. In that He calls it a cup, He shews how pleasing and acceptable death for the salvation of men was to Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) The cup being given Him by the Father, is the same with what the Apostle saith, Who spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all. (Rom. 8:32) But the Giver of this cup and the Drinker of it are the same; as the same Apostle saith, Christ loved us, and gave Himself for us. (Eph. 5:2)

18:12–14

12. Then the band and the captain and officers of the Jews took Jesus, and bound him,

13. And led him away to Annas first; for he was father in law to Caiaphas, which was the high priest that same year.

14. Now Caiaphas was he, which gave counsel to the Jews, that it was expedient that one man should die for the people.

THEOPHYLACT. Every thing having been done that could be to dissuade the Jews, and they refusing to take warning, He suffered Himself to be delivered into their hands: Then the band and the captain and officers of the Jews took Jesus.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxii) They took Him Whom they did not draw nigh to; nor understood that which is written in the Psalms, Draw nigh unto Him, and be ye lightened. (Ps. 34:5. accedite ad eum, Vulg.) For had they thus drawn nigh to Him, they would have taken Him, not to kill Him, but to be in their hearts. But now that they take Him in the way they do, they go backward. It follows, and bound Him, Him by Whom they ought to have wished to be loosed. And perhaps there were among them some who, afterwards delivered by Him, exclaimed, Thou hast broken My chains asunder. (Ps. 116) But after that they had bound Jesus, it then appears most clearly that Judas had betrayed Him not for a good, but a most wicked purpose: And led Him away to Annas first.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 2) In exultation, to shew what they had done, as if they were raising a trophy.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) Why they did so, he tells us immediately after: For he was father in law to Caiaphas, which was the high priest that same year. Matthew, in order to shorten the narrative, says that He was led to Caiaphas; because He was led to Annas first, as being the father in law of Caiaphas. So that we must understand that Annas wished to act Caiaphas’s part.

BEDE. In order that, while our Lord was condemned by his colleague, he might not be guiltless, though his crime was less. Or perhaps his house lay in the way, and they were obliged to pass by it. Or it was the design of Providence, that they who were allied in blood, should be associated in guilt. That Caiaphas however was high priest for that year sounds contrary to the law, which ordained that there be only one high priest, and made the office hereditary. But the pontificate had now been abandoned to ambitious men.

ALCUIN. Josephus relates that this Caiaphas bought the high priesthood for this year. No wonder then if a wicked high priest judged wickedly. A man who was advanced to the priesthood by avarice, would keep himself there by injustice.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) That no one however might be disturbed at the sound of the chains, the Evangelist reminds them of the prophecy that His death would be the salvation of the world: Now Caiaphas was he which gave counsel to the Jews, that it was expedient that one man should die for the people. Such is the overpowering force of truth, that even its enemies echo it.

18:15–18

15. And Simon Peter followed Jesus, and so did another disciple: that disciple was known unto the high priest, and went in with Jesus into the palace of the high priest.

16. But Peter stood at the door without. Then went out that other disciple, which was known unto the high priest, and spake unto her that kept the door, and brought in Peter.

17. Then saith the damsel that kept the door unto Peter, Art not thou also one of this man’s disciples? He saith, I am not.

18. And the servants and officers stood there, who had made a fire of coals; for it was cold: and they warmed themselves: and Peter stood with them, and warmed himself.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. vi) The temptation of Peter, which took place in the midst of the contumelies offered to our Lord, is not placed by all in the same order. Matthew and Mark put the contumelies first, the temptation of Peter afterwards; Luke the temptation first, the contumelies after. John begins with the temptation: And Simon Peter followed Jesus, and so did another disciple.

ALCUIN. He followed his Master out of devotion, though afar off, on account of fear.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) Who that other disciple was we cannot hastily decide, as his name is not told us. John however is wont to signify himself by this expression, with the addition of, whom Jesus loved. Perhaps therefore he is the one.

CHRYSOSTOM. He omits his own name out of humility: though he is relating an act of great virtue, how that he followed when the rest fled. He puts Peter before himself, and then mentions himself, in order to shew that he was inside the hall, and therefore related what took place there with more certainty than the other Evangelists could. That disciple was known unto the high priest, and went in with Jesus into the palace of the high priest. This he mentions not as a boast, but in order to diminish his own merit, in having been the only one who entered with Jesus. It is accounting for the act in another way, than merely by greatness of mind. Peter’s love took him as far as the palace, but his fear prevented him entering in: But Peter stood at the door without.

ALCUIN. He stood without, as being about to deny his Lord. He was not in Christ, who dared not confess Christ.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) But that Peter would have entered the palace, if he had been permitted, appears by what immediately follows: Then went out that other disciple who was known to the high priest, and spake unto her who kept the doors, and brought in Peter. He did not bring him in himself, because he kept near Christ. It follows: Then saith the damsel that kept the door unto Peter, Art not thou also one of this Man’s disciples? He saith, I am not. What sayest thou, O Peter? Didst thou not say before, I will lay down my life for thy sake? (Mat. 26:35) What then had happened, that thou givest way even when the damsel asks thee? It was not a soldier who asked thee, but a mean porteress. Nor said she, Art thou this Deceiver’s disciple, but, this Man’s: an expression of pity. Art not thou also, she says, because John was inside.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) But what wonder, if God foretold truly, man presumed falsely. Respecting this denial of Peter we should remark, that Christ is not only denied by him, who denies that He is Christ, but by him also who denies himself to be a Christian. For the Lord did not say to Peter, Thou shalt deny that thou art My disciple, but, Thou shalt deny Me. (Luke 22:34) He denied Him then, when he denied that he was His disciple. And what was this but to deny that he was a Christian? How many afterwards, even boys and girls, were able to despise death, confess Christ, and enter courageously into the kingdom of heaven; which he who received the keys of the kingdom, was now unable to do? Wherein we see the reason for His saying above, Let these go their way, for of those which Thou hast given

Me, have I lost none. If Peter had gone out of this world immediately after denying Christ, He must have been lost.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Serm. de Petro et Elia.) Therefore did Divine Providence permit Peter first to fall, in order that he might be less severe to sinners from the remembrance of his own fall. Peter, the teacher and master of the whole world, sinned, and obtained pardon, that judges might thereafter have that rule to go by in dispensing pardon. For this reason I suppose the priesthood was not given to Angels; because, being without sin themselves, they would punish sinners without pity. Passible man is placed over man, in order that remembering his own weakness, he may be merciful to others.

THEOPHYLACT. Some however foolishly favour Peter, so far as to say that he denied Christ, because he did not wish to be away from Christ, and he knew, they say, that if he confessed that he was one of Christ's disciples, he would be separated from Him, and would no longer have the liberty of following and seeing his beloved Lord; and therefore pretended to be one of the servants, that his sad countenance might not be perceived, and so exclude him: And the servants and officers stood there, who had made a fire of coals, and warmed themselves; and Peter stood with them, and warmed himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) It was not winter, and yet it was cold, as it often is at the vernal equinox.

GREGORY. (ii. Mor. c. 11) The fire of love was smothered in Peter's breast, and he was warming himself before the coals of the persecutors, i. e. with the love of this present life, whereby his weakness was increased.

18:19–21

19. The high priest then asked Jesus of his disciples, and of his doctrine.

20. Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing.

21. Why askest thou me? ask them which heard me, what I have said unto them: behold, they know what I said.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 3) As they could bring no charge against Christ, they asked Him of His disciples: The high priest then asked Jesus of

His disciples; perhaps where they were, and on what account He had collected them, he wished to prove that he was a seditious and factious person whom no one attended to, except His own disciples.

THEOPHYLACT. He asks Him moreover of His doctrine, what it was, whether opposed to Moses and the law, that he might take occasion thereby to put Him to death as an enemy of God.

ALCUIN. He does not ask in order to know the truth, but to find out some charge against Him, on which to deliver Him to the Roman Governor to be condemned. But our Lord so tempers His answer, as neither to conceal the truth, nor yet to appear to defend Himself: Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) There is a difficulty here not to be passed over: if He did not speak openly even to His disciples, but only promised that He would do so at some time, how was it that He spoke openly to the world? He spoke more openly to His disciples afterwards, when they had withdrawn from the crowd; for He then explained His parables, the meaning of which He concealed from the others. When He says then, I spake openly to the world, He must be understood to mean, within the hearing of many. So in one sense He spoke openly, i. e. in that many heard Him; in another sense not openly, i. e. in that they did not understand Him. His speaking apart with His disciples was not speaking in secret; for how could He speak in secret before the multitude, especially when that small number of His disciples were to make known what He said to a much larger?

THEOPHYLACT. He refers here to the prophecy of Esaias; I have not spoken in secret, in a dark place of the earth. (Isa. 45:19)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Or, He spoke in secret, but not, as these thought, from fear, or to excite sedition; but only when what He said was above the understanding of the many. To establish the matter, however, upon superabundant evidence, He adds, Why askest thou Me? ask them which heard Me what I said unto them; behold, they know what I said unto them: as if He said, Thou askest Me of My disciples; ask My enemies, who lie in wait for Me. These are the words of one who was confident of the truth of what He said: for it is incontrovertible evidence, when enemies are called in as witnesses.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii. 3) For what they had heard and not understood, was not of such a kind, as that they could justly turn it against Him. And as often as they tried by questioning to find out some charge against Him, He so replied as to blunt all their stratagems, and refute their calumnies.

18:22–24

22. And when he had thus spoken, one of the officers which stood by struck Jesus with the palm of his hand, saying, Answerest thou the high priest so?

23. Jesus answered him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why smitest thou me?

24. Now Annas had sent him bound unto Caiaphas the high priest.

THEOPHYLACT. When Jesus had appealed to the testimony of the people by, an officer, wishing to clear himself, and shew that he was not one of those who admired our Lord, struck Him: And when He had thus spoken, one of the officers which stood by struck Jesus with the palm of his hand, saying, Answerest Thou the high priest so?

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. vi) This shews that Annas was the high priest, for this was before He was sent to Caiaphas. And Luke in the beginning of his Gospel says, that Annas and Caiaphas were both high priests.

ALCUIN. Here is fulfilled the prophecy, I gave my cheek to the smiters. Jesus, though struck unjustly, replied gently: Jesus answered him, If I have spoken evil, bear witness of the evil: but if well, why smitest thou Me?

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say, If thou hast any fault to find with what I have said, shew it; if thou hast not, why ragest thou? Or thus: If I taught any thing unadvisedly, when I taught in the synagogues, give proof of it to the high priest; but if I taught aright, so that even ye officers admired, why smitest thou Me, Whom before thou admiredst?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) What can be truer, gentler, kinder, than this answer? He Who received the blow on the face neither wished for him who struck it that fire from heaven should consume him, or the earth open its mouth and swallow him; or a devil seize him; or any other yet more horrible kind of punishment. Yet had not He, by Whom the world was made, power to cause any one of these things to take place, but that He preferred teaching us that patience by which the world is overcome? Some one will ask here, why He did not do what He Himself commanded, i. e. not make this answer, but give the other cheek to the smiter? But what if He did both, both answered gently, and gave, not His check only to the smiter, but His whole body to be nailed to the Cross? And herein He shews, that those precepts of patience are to be performed not by posture of the body, but by preparation of the heart: for it is possible that a man might give his cheek outwardly, and yet be angry at the same time. How much better is it to answer truly, yet gently, and be ready to bear even harder usage patiently.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) What should they do then but either disprove, or admit, what He said? Yet this they do not do: it is not a trial they are carrying on, but a faction, a tyranny. Not knowing what to do further, they send Him to Caiaphas: Now Annas sent Him bound to Caiaphas the high priest.

THEOPHYLACT. Thinking that as he was more cunning, he might find out something against Him worthy of death.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) He was the one to whom they were taking Him from the first, as Matthew says; he being the high priest of this year. We must understand that the pontificate was taken between them year by year alternately, and that it was by Caiaphas's consent that they led Him first to Annas; or that their houses were so situated, that they could not but pass straight by that of Annas.

BEDE. Sent Him bound, not that He was bound now for the first time, for they bound Him when they took Him. They sent Him bound as they had brought Him. Or perhaps He may have been loosed from His bonds for that hour, in order to be examined, after which He was bound again, and sent to Caiaphas.

18:25–27

25. And Simon Peter stood and warmed himself. They said therefore unto him, Art not thou also one of his disciples? He denied it, and said, I am not.

26. One of the servants of the high priest, being his kinsman whose ear Peter cut off, saith, Did not I see thee in the garden with him?

27. Peter then denied again: and immediately the cock crew.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) After the Evangelist has said that they sent Jesus bound from Annas to Caiaphas, he returns to Peter and his three denials, which took place in the house of Annas: And Simon Peter stood and warmed himself. He repeats what he had said before.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Or, He means that the once fervid disciple was now too torpid, to move even when our Lord was carried away: shewing thereby how weak man's nature is, when God forsakes him. Asked again, he again denies: They said therefore unto him, Art not thou also one of His disciples? He denied it, and said, I am not.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 6) Here we find Peter not at the gate, but at the fire, when he denies the second time: so that he must have returned after he had gone out of doors, where Matthew says he was. He did not go out, and another damsel see him on the outside, but another damsel saw him as he was rising to go out, and remarked him, and told those who were by, i. e. those who were standing with her at the fire inside the hall, This fellow also was with Jesus of Nazareth. (Matt. 26:71, 72) He heard this outside, and returned, and swore, I do not know the man. Then John continues: They said therefore unto him, Art not thou also one of His disciples? which words we suppose to have been said to him when he had come back, and was standing at the fire. And this explanation is confirmed by the fact, that besides the other damsel mentioned by Matthew and Mark in the second denial, there was another person, mentioned by Luke, who also questioned him. So John uses the plural: They said therefore unto him. And then follows the third denial: One of the servants of the high priest, being his kinsman whose ear Peter cut off, saith, Did not I see thee in the garden with Him? That Matthew and Mark speak of the party who here question Peter in the plural number, whereas Luke mentions only one, and John also, adding that that one was the kinsman of him whose ear Peter cut off, is easily explained by supposing that Matthew and Mark used the plural number by a common form of speech for the singular; or that one who had observed him most strictly put the question first, and others followed it up, and pressed Peter with more.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 3) But neither did the garden bring back to his memory what he had then said, and the great professions of love he had made: Peter then denied again, and immediately the cock crew.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiii) Lo, the prophecy of the Physician is fulfilled, the presumption of the sick man demonstrated. That which Peter had said he would do, he had not done. I will lay down my life for Thy sake; but what our Lord had foretold had come to pass, Thou shall deny Me thrice. (Luke 22:34)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 3) The Evangelists have all given the same account of the denials of Peter, not with any intention of throwing blame upon him, but to teach us how hurtful it is to trust in self, and not ascribe all to God.

BEDE. Mystically, by the first denial of Peter are denoted those who before our Lord's Passion denied that He was God, by the second, those who did so after His resurrection. So by the first crowing of the cock His resurrection is signified; by the second, the general resurrection at the end of the world. By the first damsel, who obliged Peter to deny, is denoted lust, by the second, carnal delight: by one or more servants, the devils who persuade men to deny Christ.

18:28–32

28. Then led they Jesus from Caiaphas unto the hall of judgment: and it was early; and they themselves went not into the judgment hall, lest they should be defiled; but that they might eat the Passover.

29. Pilate then went out unto them, and said, What accusation bring ye against this man?

30. They answered and said unto him, If he were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered him up unto thee.

31. Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye him, and judge him according to your law. The Jews therefore said unto him, It is not lawful for us to put any man to death.

32. That the saying of Jesus might be fulfilled, which he spake, signifying what death he should die.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiv) The Evangelist returns to the part where he had left off, in order to relate Peter's denial: Then led they Jesus to Caiaphas (a Caiapha Vulg.) unto the hall of judgment: to Caiaphas from his colleague and father in law Annas, as has been said. But if to Caiaphas, how to the prætorium, which was the place where the governor Pilate resided?

BEDE. The prætorium is the place where the prætor sat. Prætors were called prefects and preceptors, because they issue decrees.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiv) Either then for some urgent reason Caiaphas proceeded from the house of Annas, where both had been sitting, to the prætorium of the governor, and left Jesus to the hearing of his father in law: or Pilate had established the prætorium in the house of Caiaphas, which was large enough to afford a separate lodging to its owner, and the governor at the same time.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. l. iii. c. vii) According to Matthew, When the morning came, they led Him away, and delivered Him to Pontius Pilate. (Mat. 27:1, 2) But He was to have been led to Caiaphas at first. How is it then that He was brought to him so late? The truth is, now He was going as it were a committed criminal, Caiaphas having already determined on His death. And He was to be given up to Pilate immediately.

And it was early.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) He was led to Caiaphas before the cock crew, but early in the morning to Pilate. Whereby the Evangelist shews, that all that night of examination, ended in proving nothing against Him; and that He was sent to Pilate in consequence. But leaving what passed then to the other Evangelists, he goes to what followed.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xiv) And they themselves entered not into the judgment hall: i. e. into that part of the house which Pilate occupied, supposing it to be the house of Caiaphas. Why they did not enter is next explained: Lest they should be defiled, but that they might eat the Passover.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) For the Jews were then celebrating the passover; He Himself celebrated it one day before, reserving His own death for the sixth day; on which day the old passover was kept. Or, perhaps, the passover means the whole season.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiv) The days of unleavened bread were beginning; during which time it was defilement to enter the house of a stranger.

ALCUIN. The passover was strictly the fourteenth day of the month, the day on which the lamb was killed in the evening: the seven days following were called the days of unleavened bread, in which nothing leavened ought to be found in their houses. Yet we find the day of the passover reckoned among the days of unleavened bread: Now the first day of the feast of unleavened bread the disciples came to Jesus, saying unto Him, Where wilt Thou that we prepare for Thee to eat the passover? (Mat. 26:17) And here also in like manner: That they might eat the passover; the passover here signifying not the sacrifice of the lamb, which took place the fourteenth day at evening, but the great festival which was celebrated on the fifteenth day, after the sacrifice of the lamb. Our Lord, like the rest of the Jews, kept the passover on the fourteenth day: on the fifteenth day, when the great festival was held, He was crucified. His immolation however began on the fourteenth day, from the time that He was taken in the garden.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiv) O impious blindness! They feared to be defiled by the judgment hall of a foreign prefect, to shed the blood of an innocent brother they feared not. For that He Whom they killed was the Lord and Giver of life, their blindness saved them from knowing.

THEOPHYLACT. Pilate however proceeds in a more gentle way: Pilate then went out unto them.

BEDE. It was the custom of the Jews when they condemned any one to death, to notify it to the governor, by delivering the man bound.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 4) Pilate however seeing Him bound, and such numbers conducting Him, supposed that they had not unquestionable evidence against Him, so proceeds to ask the question: And said, What accusation bring ye against this Man? For it was absurd, he said, to take the trial out of his hands, and yet give him the punishment. They in reply bring forward no positive charge but only their own conjectures: They answered and said unto him, If He were not a malefactor, we would not have delivered Him up unto thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiv) Ask the freed from unclean spirits, the blind who saw, the dead who came to life again, and, what is greater than all, the fools who were made wise, and let them answer, whether Jesus was a malefactor. But they spoke, of whom He had Himself prophesied in the Psalms, They rewarded Me evil for good. (Ps. 39.)

AUGUSTINE. (de Cons. Evang. iii. 8) But is not this account contradictory to Luke’s, who mentions certain positive charges: And they began to accuse Him, saying, We found this fellow perverting the nation, and forbidding to give tribute to Cæsar, saying that He Himself is Christ a King. (Luke 23:2) According to John, the Jews seem to have been unwilling to bring actual charges, in order that Pilate might condemn Him simply on their authority, asking no questions, but taking it for granted that if He was delivered up to him, He was certainly guilty. Both accounts are however compatible. Each Evangelist only inserts what he thinks sufficient. And

John’s account implies that some charges had been made, when it comes to Pilate’s answer: Then said Pilate unto them, Take ye Him, and judge Him according to your law.

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say, Since you will only have such a trial as will suit you, and are proud, as if you never did any thing profane, take ye Him, and condemn Him; I will not be made a judge for such a purpose.

ALCUIN. Or as if he said, Ye who have the law, know what the law judgeth concerning such: do what ye know to be just.

The Jews therefore said unto him, It is not lawful for us to put any man to death.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiv. 4) But did not the law command not to spare malefactors, especially deceivers such as they thought Him? We must understand them however to mean, that the holiness of the day which they were beginning to celebrate, made it unlawful to put any man to death. Have ye then so lost your understanding by your wickedness, that ye think yourselves free from the pollution of innocent blood, because ye deliver it to be shed by another?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 4) Or, they were not allowed by the Roman law to put Him to death themselves. Or, Pilate having said, Judge Him according to your law, they reply, It is not lawful for us: His sin is not a Jewish one, He hath not sinned according to our law: His offence is political, He calls Himself a King. Or they wished to have Him crucified, to add infamy to death: they not being allowed to put to death in this way themselves. They put to death in another way, as we see in the stoning of Stephen: That the saying of Jesus might be fulfilled, which He spake, signifying what death He should die. Which was fulfilled in that He was crucified, or in that He was put to death by Gentiles as well as Jews.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxiv) As we read in Mark, Behold, we go up to Jerusalem; and the Son of man shall be delivered unto the chief priests, and unto the scribes; and they shall condemn Him to death, and shall deliver Him to the Gentiles. (Mark 10:33) Pilate again was a Roman, and was sent to the government of Judæa, from Rome. That this saying of Jesus then might be fulfilled, i. e. that He might be delivered unto and killed by the Gentiles, they would not accept Pilate’s offer, but said, It is not lawful for us to put any man to death.

18:33–38

33. Then Pilate entered into the judgment hall again, and called Jesus, and said unto him, Art thou the King of the Jews?

34. Jesus answered him, Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of me?

35. Pilate answered, Am I a Jew? Thine own nation and the chief priests have delivered thee unto me: what hast thou done?

36. Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world: if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews: but now is my kingdom not from hence.

37. Pilate therefore said unto him, Art thou a king then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth. Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice.

38. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii.) Pilate, wishing to rescue Him from the hatred of the Jews, protracted[1] the trial a long time: Then Pilate entered into the judgment hall, and called Jesus.

THEOPHYLACT. i. e. Apart, because he had a strong suspicion that He was innocent, and thought he could examine Him more accurately, away from the crowd: and said unto Him, Art Thou the King of the Jews?

ALCUIN. Wherein Pilate shews that the Jews had charged Him with calling Himself King of the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 4) Or Pilate had heard this by report; and as the Jews had no charge to bring forward, began to examine Him himself with respect to the things commonly reported of Him.

Jesus answered him, Sayest thou this thing of thyself, or did others tell it thee of Me?

THEOPHYLACT. He intimates here that Pilate was judging blindly and indiscreetly: If thou sayest this thing of thyself, He says, bring forward proofs of My rebellion; if thou hast heard it from others, make regular enquiry into it.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) Our Lord knew indeed both what He Himself asked, and what Pilate would answer; but He wished it to be written down for our sakes.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) He asks not in ignorance, but in order to draw from Pilate himself an accusation against the Jews: Pilate answered, Am I a Jew? Thine own nation and the chief priests have delivered Thee unto me.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) He rejects the imputation that He could have said it of Himself; Thine own nation and the chief priests have delivered Thee unto me: adding, what hast Thou done? Whereby he shews that this charge had been brought against Him, for it is as much as to say, If Thou deniest that Thou art a King, what hast Thou done to be delivered up to me? As if it were no wonder that He should be delivered up, if He called Himself a King.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) He then tries to bring round the mind of Pilate, not a very bad man, by proving to him, that He is not a mere man, but God, and the Son of God; and overthrowing all suspicion of His having aimed at a tyranny, which Pilate was afraid of, Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv. 1) This is what the good Master wished to teach us. But first it was necessary to shew the falsity of the notions of both Jews and Gentiles as to His kingdom, which Pilate had heard of; as if it meant that He aimed at unlawful power; a crime punishable with death, and this kingdom were a subject of jealousy to the ruling power, and to be guarded against as likely to be hostile either to the Romans or Jews. Now if our Lord had answered immediately Pilate’s question, He would have seemed to have been answering not the Jews, but the Gentiles only. But after Pilate’s answer, what He says is an answer to both Gentiles and Jews: as if He said, Men, i. e. Jews and Gentiles, I hinder not your dominion in this world. What more would ye have? Come by faith to the kingdom which is not of this world. For what is His kingdom, but they that believe in Him, of whom He saith, Ye are not of the world: although He wished that they should be in the world. In the same way, here He does not say, My kingdom is not in this world; but, is not of this world. Of the world are all men, who created by God are born of the corrupt race of Adam. All that are born again in Christ, are made a kingdom not of this world. Thus hath God taken us out of the power of darkness, and translated us to the kingdom of His dear Son.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Or He means that He does not derive His kingdom from the same source that earthly kings do; but that He hath

His sovereignty from above; inasmuch as He is not mere man, but far greater and more glorious than man: If My kingdom were of this world, then would My servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews. Here He shews the weakness of an earthly kingdom, that it has its strength from its servants, whereas that higher kingdom is sufficient to itself, and wanting in nothing. And if His kingdom was thus the greater of the two, it follows that He was taken of His own will, and delivered up Himself.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) After shewing that His kingdom was not of this world, He adds, But now My kingdom is not from hence. He does not say, Not here, for His kingdom is here unto the end of the world, having within it the tares mixed with the wheat until the harvest. But yet it is not from hence, since it is a stranger in the world.

THEOPHYLACT. Or He says, from hence, not, here; because He reigns in the world, and carries on the government of it, and disposes all things according to His will; but His kingdom is not from below, but from above, and before all ages.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Heretics infer from these words that our Lord is a different person (ἀλλότριον) from the Creator of the world. But when He says, My kingdom is not from hence, He does not deprive the world of His government and superintendence, but only shews that His government is not human and corruptible. Pilate therefore said unto Him, Art Thou a King then? Jesus answered, Thou sayest that I am a King.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) He did not fear to confess Himself a King, but so replied as neither to deny that He was, nor yet to confess Himself a King in such sense as that His kingdom should be supposed to be of this world. He says, Thou sayest, meaning, Thou being carnal sayest it carnally. He continues, To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness to the truth. The pronoun here, in hoc, must not be dwelt long on, as if it meant, in hâc re, but shortened, as if it stood, ad hoc natus sum, as the next words are, ad hoc veni in mundum. Wherein it is evident He alludes to His birth in the flesh, not to that divine birth which never had beginning.

THEOPHYLACT. Or, to Pilate’s question whether He was a King, our Lord answers, To this end was I born, i. e. to be a King. That I am born from a King, proves that I am a King.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii. 4) If then He was a King by birth, He hath nothing which He hath not received from another. For this I came, that I should bear witness to the truth, i. e. that I should make all men believe it. We must observe how He shews His humility here: when they accused Him as a malefactor, He bore it in silence; but when He is asked of His kingdom, then He talks with Pilate, instructs him, and raises his mind to higher things. That I should bear witness to the truth, shews that He had no crafty purpose in what He did.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) But when Christ bears witness to the truth, He bears witness to Himself; as He said above, I am the truth. (c. 14:6) But inasmuch as all men have not faith, He adds, Every one that is of the truth heareth My voice: heareth, that is, with the inward ear; obeys My voice, believes Mc. Every one that is of the truth, hath reference to the grace by which He calleth according to His purpose. For as regards the nature in which we are created, since the truth created all, all are of the truth. But it is not all to whom it is given by the truth to obey the truth. For had He even said, Every one that heareth My voice is of the truth, it still would be thought that such were of the truth, because they obeyed the truth. But He does not say this, but, Every one that is of the truth heareth My voice. A man then is not of the truth, because he hears His voice, but hears His voice because he is of the truth. This grace is conferred upon him by the truth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) These words have an effect upon Pilate, persuade him to become a hearer, and elicit from him the short enquiry, What is truth? Pilate said unto Him, What is truth?

THEOPHYLACT. For it had almost vanished from the world, and become unknown in consequence of the general unbelief.

18:38–40

38. And when he had said this, he went out again unto the Jews, and saith unto them, I find in him no fault at all.

39. But ye have a custom, that I should release unto you one at the passover: will ye therefore that I release unto you the King of the Jews?

40. Then cried they all again, saying, Not this man, but Barabbas. Now Barabbas was a robber.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) After Pilate had asked, What is truth? he remembered a custom of the Jews, of releasing one prisoner at the passover, and did not wait for Christ's answer, for fear of losing this chance of saving Him, which he much wished to do: And when he had said this, he went out again unto the Jews.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) He knew that this question required time to answer, and it was necessary immediately to rescue Him from the fury of the Jews. So he went out.

ALCUIN. Or, he did not wait to hear the reply, because he was unworthy to hear it.

And saith unto them, I find no fault in Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) He did not say, He has sinned and is worthy of death; yet release Him at the feast; but acquitting Him in the first place, he does more than he need do, and asks it as a favour, that, if they are unwilling to let Him go as innocent, they will at any rate allow Him the benefit of the season: But ye have a custom, that I should release one unto you at the passover.

BEDE. This custom was not commanded in the law, but had been handed down by tradition from the old fathers, viz. that in remembrance of their deliverance out of Egypt, they should release a prisoner at the passover. Pilate tries to persuade them: Will ye therefore that I release unto you the King of the Jews.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) He could not dismiss the idea from his mind, that Jesus was King of the Jews; as if the Truth itself, whom he had just asked what it was, had inscribed it there as a title.

THEOPHYLACT. Pilate is judicious in replying that Jesus had done nothing wrong, and that there was no reason to suspect Him of aiming at a kingdom. For they might be sure that if He set Himself up as a King, and a rival of the Roman empire, a Roman prefect would not release Him. When then He says, Will ye that I release unto you the King of the Jews? he clears Jesus of all guilt, and mocks the Jews, as if to say, Him whom ye accuse of thinking Himself a King, the same I bid you release: He does no such thing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxv) Upon this they cried out: Then cried they all again, saying, Not this man, but Barabbas. Now Barabbas was a robber. We blame you not, O Jews, for releasing a guilty man at the passover, but for killing an innocent one. Yet unless this were done, it were not the true passover.

BEDE. Inasmuch then as they abandoned the Saviour, and sought out a robber, to this day the devil practises his robberies upon them.

ALCUIN. The name Barabbas signifies, The son of their master, i. e. the devil; his master in his wickedness, the Jews' in their perfidy.

CHAPTER 19

19:1–5

1. Then Pilate therefore took Jesus, and scourged him.

2. And the soldiers platted a crown of thorns, and put it on his head, and they put on him a purple robe,

3. And said, Hail, King of the Jews! and they smote him with their hands.

4. Pilate therefore went forth again, and saith unto them, Behold, I bring him forth to you, that ye may know that I find no fault in him.

5. Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns, and the purple robe. And Pilate saith unto them, Behold the man!

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) When the Jews had cried out that they did not wish Jesus to be released on account of the passover, but Barabbas, Then Pilate therefore took Jesus, and scourged Him. Pilate seems to have done this for no reason but to satisfy the malice of the Jews with some punishment short of death. On which account he allowed his band to do what follows, or perhaps even commanded them. The Evangelist only says however that the soldiers did so, not that Pilate commanded them: And the soldiers platted a crown of thorns, and put it on His head, and they put on Him a purple robe, and said, Hail, King of the Jews! and they smote Him with their hands.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiii) Pilate having called Him the King of the Jews, they put the royal dress upon Him, in mockery.

BEDE. For instead of a diadem, they put upon Him a crown of thorns, and a purple robe to represent the purple robe which kings wear. Matthew says, a scarlet robe, (Mat. 27:28) but scarleta and purple are different names for the same colour. And though the soldiers did this in mockery, yet to us their acts have a meaning. For by the crown of thorns is signified the taking of our sins upon Him, the thorns which the earth of our body brings forth. And the purple robe signifies the flesh crucified. For our Lord is robed in purple, wherever He is glorified by the triumphs of holy martyrs.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. xxxiv) It was not at the command of the governor that they did this, but in order to gratify the Jews. For neither were they commanded by him to go to the garden in the night, but the Jews gave them money to go. He bore however all these insults silently. Yet do thou, when thou hearest of them, keep stedfastly in thy mind the King of the whole earth, and Lord of Angels bearing all these contumelies in silence, and imitate His example.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) Thus were fulfilled what Christ had prophesied of Himself; thus were martyrs taught to suffer all that the malice of persecutors could inflict; thus that kingdom which was not of this world conquered the proud world, not by fierce fighting, but by patient suffering.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv) That the Jews might cease from their fury, seeing Him thus insulted, Pilate brought out Jesus before them crowned: Pilate therefore went forth again, and, saith unto them, Behold, I bring Him forth to you, that ye may know that I find no fault in Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) Hence it is apparent that these things were not done without Pilate's knowledge, whether he commanded, or only permitted them, for the reason we have mentioned, viz. that His enemies seeing the insults heaped upon Him, might not thirst any longer for His blood: Then came Jesus forth, wearing the crown of thorns, and the purple robe: not the insignia of empire, but the marks of ridicule. And Pilate saith unto them, Behold the man! as if to say, If ye envy the King, spare the outcast. Ignominy overflows, let envy subside.

19:6–8

6. When the chief priests therefore and officers saw him, they cried out, saying, Crucify him, crucify him. Pilate saith unto them, Take ye him, and crucify him: for I find no fault in him.

7. The Jews answered him, We have a law, and by our law he ought to die, because he made himself the Son of God.

8. When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he was the more afraid.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) The envy of the Jews does not subside at Christ's disgraces; yea, rather rises: When the chief priests therefore and officers saw Him, they cried out, saying, Crucify Him. crucify Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) Pilate saw then that it was all in vain: Pilate saith unto them, Take ye Him, and crucify Him. This is the speech of a man abhorring (ἀφοσιούμενον) the deed, and urging others to do a deed which he abhors himself. They had brought our Lord indeed to him that He might be put to death by his sentence, but the very contrary was the result; the governor acquitted Him: For I find no fault in Him. He clears Him immediately from all charges: which shews that he had only permitted the former outrages, to humour the madness of the Jews. But nothing could shame the Jewish hounds: The Jews answered him, We have a law, and by our law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of God.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) Lo, another greater outbreak of envy. The former was lighter, being only to punish Him for aspiring to a usurpation of the royal power. Yet did Jesus make neither claim falsely; both were true: He was both the Only-begotten Son of God, and the King appointed by God upon the holy hill of Sion. And He would have demonstrated His right to both now, had He not been as patient as He was powerful.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv) While they disputed with each other, He was silent, fulfilling the prophecy, He openeth not His mouth; He was taken from prison and from judgment. (Is. 53:7, 8)

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 8) This agrees with Luke’s account, We found this fellow perverting the nation, (Luke 23:2) only with the addition of, because He made Himself the Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) Then Pilate begins to fear that what had been said might be true, and that he might appear to be administering justice improperly: When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he was the more afraid.

BEDE. It was not the law that he was afraid of, as he was a stranger: but he was more afraid, lest he should slay the Son of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. They were not afraid to say this, that He made Himself the Son of God: but they kill Him for the very reasons for which they ought to have worshipped Him.

19:9–12

9. And went again into the judgment hall, and saith unto Jesus, Whence art thou? But Jesus gave him no answer.

10. Then saith Pilate unto him, Speakest thou not unto me? knowest thou not that I have power to crucify thee, and have power to release thee?

11. Jesus answered, Thou couldest have no power at all against me, except it were given thee from above: therefore he that delivered me unto thee hath the greater sin.

12. And from thenceforth Pilate sought to release him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) Pilate, agitated with fear, begins again examining Him: And went again into the judgment hall, and saith unto Jesus, Whence art Thou? He no longer asks, What hast Thou done? But Jesus gave him no answer. For he who had heard, To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, and, My kingdom is not from hence, ought to have resisted, and rescued Him, instead of which he had yielded to the fury of the Jews. Wherefore seeing that he asked questions without object, He answers him no more. Indeed at other times He was unwilling to give reasons, and defend Himself by argument, when His works testified so strongly for Him; thus shewing that He came voluntarily to His work.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi. 4) In comparing the accounts of the different Evangelists together, we find that this silence was maintained more than once; viz. before the High Priest, before, Herod, and before Pilate. So that the prophecy of Him, As a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so opened He not His mouth, (Isa. 53:7.) was amply fulfilled. To many indeed of the questions put to Him, He did reply, but where He did not reply, this comparison of the sheep shews us that His was not a silence of guilt, but of innocence; not of self-condemnation, but of compassion, and willingness to suffer for the sins of others.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) He remaining thus silent, Then saith Pilate unto Him, Speakest Thou not unto me? knowest Thou not that I have power to crucify Thee, and have power to release Thee? See how he condemns himself. If all depends upon thee, why, when thou findest no fault of offence, dost thou not acquit Him?

Jesus answered, Thou couldest have no power at all against Me, except it were given thee from above; shewing that this judgment was accomplished not in the common and natural order of events, but mysteriously. But lest we should think that Pilate was altogether free from blame, He adds, Therefore he that hath delivered Me unto thee hath the greater sin. But if it was given, thou wilt say, neither he nor they were liable to blame. Thou speakest foolishly. Given means permitted; as if He said, He hath permitted this to be done; but ye are not on that account free from guilt.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) So He answers. When He was silent, He was silent not as guilty or crafty, but as a sheep: when He answered, He taught as a shepherd. Let us hear what He saith; which is that, as He teacheth by His Apostle, There is no power but of God; (Rom. 13:1) and that he that through envy delivers an innocent person to the higher power, who puts to death from fear of a greater power, still sins more than that higher power itself. God had given such power to Pilate, as that he was still under Cæsar's power: wherefore our Lord says, Thou couldest have no power at all against Me, i. e. no power however small, unless it, whatever it was, was given thee from above. And as that is not so great as to give thee complete liberty of action, therefore he that delivered Me unto thee hath the greater sin. He delivered Me into thy power from envy, but thou wilt exercise that power from fear. And though a man ought not to kill another even from fear, especially an innocent man, yet to do so from envy is much worse. Wherefore our Lord does not say, He that delivered Me unto thee hath the sin, as if the other had none, but, hath the greater sin, implying that the other also had some.

THEOPHYLACT. He that delivered Me unto thee, i. e. Judas, or the multitude. When Jesus had boldly replied, that unless He gave Himself up, and the Father consented, Pilate could have had no power over Him, Pilate was the more anxious to release Him; And from thenceforth Pilate sought to release Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) Pilate had sought from the first to release: so we must understand, from thence, to mean from this cause, i. e. lest he should incur guilt by putting to death an innocent person.

19:12–16

12. But the Jews cried out, saying, If thou let this man go, thou art not Cæsar's friend: whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against Cæsar.

13. When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he brought Jesus forth, and sat down in the judgment seat in a place that is called the Pavement, but in the Hebrew, Gabbatha.

14. And it was the preparation of the passover, and about the sixth hour: and he saith unto the Jews, Behold your King!

15. But they cried out, Away with him, away with him, crucify him. Pilate saith unto them, Shall I crucify your King? The chief priests answered, We have no king but Cæsar.

16. Then delivered he him therefore unto them to be crucified.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) The Jews thought they could alarm Pilate more by the mention of Cæsar, than by telling him of their law, as they had done above; We have a law, and by that law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of God. So it follows, But the Jews cried out, saying, If thou let this Man go, thou art not Cæsar's friend; whosoever maketh himself a king speaketh against Cæsar.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) But how can ye prove this? By His purple, His diadem, His chariot, His guards? Did He not walk about with His twelve disciples only, and every thing mean about Him, food, dress, and habitation?

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) Pilate was before afraid not of violating their law by sparing Him, but of killing the Son of God, in killing Him. But he could not treat his master Cæsar with the same contempt with which he treated the law of a foreign nation: When Pilate therefore heard that saying, he brought Jesus forth, and sat down in the judgment seat in a place that is called the Pavement, but in the Hebrew, Gabbatha.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) He went out to examine into the matter: his sitting down on the judgment seat shews this.

GLOSS. The tribunal is the seat of the judge, as the throne is the seat of the king, and the chair the seat of the doctor.

BEDE. Lithostraton, i. e. laid with stone; the word signifies pavement. It was an elevated place.

And it was the preparation of the Passover.

ALCUIN. Parasceve, i. e. preparation. This was a name for the sixth day, the day before the Sabbath, on which they prepared what was necessary for the Sabbath; as we read, On the sixth day they gathered twice as much bread. (Exod. 16:22) As man was made on the sixth day, and God rested on the seventh; so Christ suffered on the sixth day, and rested in the grave on the seventh.

And it was about the sixth hour.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxvii) Why then doth Mark say, And it was the third hour, and they crucified Him? (Mark 15:25) Because on the third hour our Lord was crucified by the tongues of the Jews, on the sixth by the hands of the soldiers. So that we must understand that the fifth hour was passed, and the sixth began, when Pilate sat down on the judgment seat, (about the sixth hour, John says,) and that the crucifixion, and all that took place in connexion with it, filled up the rest of the hour, from which time up to the ninth hour there was darkness, according to Matthew, Mark, and Luke. But since the Jews tried to transfer the guilt of putting Christ to death from themselves to the Romans, i. e. to Pilate and his soldiers, Mark, omitting to mention the hour at which He was crucified by the soldiers, has expressly recorded the third hour; in order that it might be evident that not only the soldiers who crucified Jesus on the sixth hour, but the Jews who cried out for His death at the third, were His crucifiers. There is another way of solving this difficulty, viz. that the sixth hour here does not mean the sixth hour of the day; as John does not say, It was about the sixth hour of the day, but, It was the preparation of the passover, and about the sixth hour. Parasceve means in Latin, præparatio. For Christ our passover, as saith the Apostle, is sacrificed for us. The preparation for which passover, counting from the ninth hour of the night, which seems to have been the hour at which the chief priests pronounced upon our Lord’s sacrifice, saying, He is guilty of death, between it and the third hour of the day, when He was crucified, according to Mark, is an interval of six hours, three of the night and three of the day.

THEOPHYLACT. Some suppose it to be a fault of the transcriber, who for the letter y, three, puts, six.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv) Pilate, despairing of moving them, did not examine Him, as he intended, but delivered Him up. And he saith unto the Jews, Behold your King!

THEOPHYLACT. As if to say, See the kind of Man whom ye suspect of aspiring to the throne, a humble person, who cannot have any such design.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) A speech that should have softened their rage; but they were afraid of letting Him go, lest He might draw away the multitude again. For the love of rule is a heavy crime, and sufficient to condemn a man. They cried out, Away with Him, away with Him. And they resolved upon the most disgraceful kind of death, Crucify Him, in order to prevent all memorial of Him afterwards.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi. 8) Pilate still tries to overcome their apprehensions on Cæsar’s account; Pilate saith unto them, Shall I crucify your King? He tries to shame them into doing what he had not been able to soften them into by putting Christ to shame.

The chief priests answered, We have no king but Cæsar.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxiv. 2) They voluntarily brought themselves under punishment, and God gave them up to it. With one accord they denied the kingdom of God, and God suffered them to fall into their own condemnation; for they rejected the kingdom of Christ, and called down upon their own heads that of Cæsar.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) But Pilate is at last overcome by fear: Then delivered he Him therefore unto them to be crucified. For it would be taking part openly against Cæsar, if when the Jews declared that they had no king but Cæsar, he wished to put another king over them, as he would appear to do if he let go unpunished a Man whom they had delivered to him for punishment on this very ground. It is not however, delivered Him unto them to crucify Him, but, to be crucified, i. e. by the sentence and authority of the governor. The Evangelist says, delivered unto them, to shew that they were implicated in the guilt from which they tried to escape. For Pilate would not have done this except to please them.

19:16–18

16. And they took Jesus, and led him away.

17. And he bearing his cross went forth into a place called the place of a skull, which is called in the Hebrew Golgotha:

18. Where they crucified him, and two other with him, on either side one, and Jesus in the midst.

GLOSS. By the command of the governor, the soldiers took Christ to be crucified. And they took Jesus, and led Him away.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxvi) They, i. e. the soldiers, the guards of the governor, as appears more clearly afterwards; Then the soldiers when they had crucified Jesus; though the Evangelist might justly have attributed the whole to the Jews, who were really the authors of what they procured to be done.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 1) They compel Jesus to bear the cross, regarding it as unholy, and therefore avoiding the touch of it themselves. And He bearing His cross went forth into a place called the place of a skull, which is called in Hebrew Golgotha, where they crucified Him. The same was done typically by Isaac, who carried the wood. But then the matter only proceeded as far as his father's good pleasure ordered, but now it was fully accomplished, for the reality had appeared.

THEOPHYLACT. But as there Isaac was let go, and a ram offered; so here too the Divine nature remains impassible, but the human, of which the ram was the type, the offspring of that straying ram, was slain. But why does another Evangelist say that they hired Simon to bear the cross?

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. x) Both bore it; first Jesus, as John says, then Simon, as the other three Evangelists say. On first going forth, He bore His own cross.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxvii) Great spectacle, to the profane a laughing-stock, to the pious a mystery. Profaneness sees a King bearing a cross instead of a sceptre; piety sees a King bearing a cross, thereon to nail Himself, and afterwards to nail it on the foreheads of kings. That to profane eyes was contemptible, which the hearts of Saints would afterwards glory in; Christ displaying His own cross on His shoulders, and bearing that which was not to be put under a bushel, the candlestick of that candle which was now about to burn.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) He carried the badge of victory on His shoulders, as conquerors do. Some say that the place of Calvary was where Adam died and was buried; so that in the very place where death reigned, there Jesus erected His trophy.

JEROME. (super Matt. c. xxvii.) An apt connexion, and smooth to the ear, but not true. For the place where they cut off the heads of men condemned to death, called in consequence Calvary, was outside the city gates, whereas we read in the book of Jesus the son of Nave, that Adam was buried by Hebron and Arbah.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 1) They crucified Him with the thieves: And two others with Him, on either side one, and Jesus in the midst; thus fulfilling the prophecy, And He was numbered with the transgressors. (Isa.

53:12) What they did in wickedness, was a gain to the truth. The devil wished to obscure what was done, but could not. Though three were nailed on the cross, it was evident that Jesus alone did the miracles; and the arts of the devil were frustrated. Nay, they even added to His glory; for to convert a thief on the cross, and bring him into paradise, was no less a miracle than the rending of the rocks.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. xxxi. in fin.) Yea, even the cross, if thou consider it, was a judgment seat: for the Judge being the middle, one thief, who believed, was pardoned, the other, who mocked, was damned: a sign of what He would once do to the quick and dead, place the one on His right hand, the other on His left.

19:19–22

19. And Pilate wrote a title, and put it on the cross. And the writing was, JESUS OF NAZARETH, THE KING OF THE JEWS.

20. This title then read many of the Jews: for the place where Jesus was crucified was nigh to the city: and it was written in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin.

21. Then said the chief priests of the Jews to Pilate, Write not, The King of the Jews; but that he said, I am King of the Jews.

22. Pilate answered, What I have written I have written.

CHRYSOSTOM. As letters are inscribed on a trophy declaring the victory, so Pilate wrote a title on Christ’s cross. And Pilate wrote a title, and put it on the cross: thus at once distinguishing Christ from the thieves with Him, and exposing the malice of the Jews in rising up against their King: And the writing was, Jesus of Nazareth, the King of the Jews.

BEDE. Wherein was shewn that His kingdom was not, as they thought, destroyed, but rather strengthened.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxviii) But was Christ the King of the Jews only? or of the Gentiles too? Of the Gentiles too, as we read in the Psalms, Yet have I set My King upon My holy hill of Sion; (Ps. 2:6) after which it follows, Demand of Me, and I will give Thee the heathen for Thine inheritance. So this title expresses a great mystery, viz. that the wild olive-tree was made partaker of the fatness of the olive-tree, not the olive-tree made partaker of the bitterness of the wild olive-tree. Christ then is King of the Jews according to the circumcision not of the flesh, but of the heart; not in the letter, but in the spirit. This title then read many of the Jews: for the place where Jesus was crucified was nigh to the city.

CHRYSOSTOM. It is probable that many Gentiles as well as Jews bad come up to the feast. So the title was written in three languages, that all might read it: And it was written in Hebrew, and Greek, and Latin.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxviii) These three were the languages most known there: the Hebrew, on account of being used in the worship of the Jews: the Greek, in consequence of the spread of Greek philosophy: the Latin, from the Roman empire being established every where.

THEOPHYLACT. The title written in three languages signifies that our Lord was King of the whole world; practical, natural, and spiritual1. The Latin denotes the practical, because the Roman empire was the most powerful, and best managed one; the Greek the physical, the Greeks being the best physical philosophers; and, lastly, the Hebrew the theological, because the Jews had been made the depositaries of religious knowledge.

CHRYSOSTOM. But the Jews grudged our Lord this title: Then said the chief priests of the Jews to Pilate, Write not, The King of the Jews; but that He said, I am King of the Jews, For as Pilate wrote it, it was a plain and single declaration that He was King, but the addition of, that he said, made it a charge against Him of petulance and vain glory. But Pilate was firm: Pilate answered, What I have written I have written.

AUGUSTINE. O ineffable working of Divine power even in the hearts of ignorant men! Did not some hidden voice sound from within, and, if we may say so, with clamorous silence, saying to Pilate in the prophetic words of the Psalm, Alter not the inscription of the titlea? But what say ye, ye mad priests: will the title be the less true, because Jesus said, I am the King of the Jews? If that which Pilate wrote cannot be altered, can that be altered which the Truth spoke? Pilate wrote what he wrote, bceause our Lord said what He said.

19:23–24

23. Then the soldiers, when they had crucified Jesus, took his garments, and made four parts, to every soldier a part; and also his coat: now the coat was without seam, woven from the top throughout.

24. They said therefore among themselves, Let us not rend it, but cast lots for it, whose it shall be: that the Scripture might be fulfilled, which saith, They parted my raiment among them, and for my vesture they did cast lots.

On Pilate giving sentence, the soldiers under his command crucified Jesus: Then the soldiers, when they had crucified Jesus, took His garments. And yet if we look to their intentions, their clamours, the Jews were rather the people which crucified Him. On the parting and casting lots for His garment, John gives more circumstances than the other Evangelists, And made four parts, to every soldier a part: whence we see there were four soldiers who executed the governor's sentence. And also His coat: took, understood. They took His coat too. The sentence is brought in so to shew that this was the only garment for which they cast lots, the others being divided. Now the coat was without seam, woven from the top throughout.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) The Evangelist describes the tunic, to shew that it was of an inferior kind, the tunics commonly worn in Palestine being made of two pieces.

THEOPHYLACT. Others say that they did not weave in Palestine, as we do, the shuttle being driven upwards through the warp; so that among them the woof was not carried upwards but downwardsb.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxviii) Why they cast lots for it, next appears: They said therefore among themselves, Let us not rend it, but cast lots for it whose it should be. It seems then that the other garments were made up of equal parts, as it was not necessary to rend them; the tunic only having to be rent in order to give each an equal share of it; to avoid which they preferred casting lots for it, and one having it all. This answered to the prophecy: That the Scripture might be fulfilled which saith, They parted My raiment among them, and for My vesture they did cast lots.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) Behold the sureness of prophecy. The Prophet foretold not only what they would part, but what they would not. They parted the raiment, but cast lots for the vesture.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxviii. 3) Matthew in saying, They parted His garments, casting lots, (Mat. 27:35.) means us to understand the whole division of the garments, including the tunic also for which they cast lots. Luke says the same: They parted His raiment, and cast lots. (Luke 23:34) In parting His garments they came to the tunic, for which they cast lots. Mark is the only one that raises any question: They parted His garments, casting upon them what every man should take: (Mark 15:24) as if they cast lots for all the garments, and not the tunic only. But it is his brevity that creates the difficulty. Casting lots upon them: as if it was, casting lots when they were parting the garments. What every man should take: i. e. who should take the tunic; as if the whole stood thus: Casting lots upon them, who should take the tunic which remained over and above the equal shares, into which the rest of the garments were divided. The fourfold division of our Lord's garment represents His Church, spread over the four quarters of the globe, and distributed equally, i. e. in concord, to all. The tunic for which they cast lots signifies the unity of all the parts, which is contained in the bond of love. And if love is the more excellent way, above knowledge, and above all other commandments, according to Colossians, Above all things have charity, (Col. 3:14) the garment by which this is denoted, is well said to be woven from above. (desuper, ἄνωθεν) Through the whole, is added, because no one is void of it, who belongs to that whole, from which the Church Catholic is named. It is without seam again, so that it can never come unsown, and is in one piece, i. e. brings all together into one. (ad unum provenit) By the lot is signified the grace of God: for God elects not with respect to person or merits, but according to His own secret counsel.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 1) According to some, The tunic without seam, woven from above throughout, is an allegory shewing that He who was crucified was not simply man, but also had Divinity from above.

THEOPHYLACT. The garment without seam denotes the body of Christ, which was woven from above; for the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin, and the power of the Highest overshadowed her. This holy body of Christ then is indivisible: for though it be distributed for every one to partake of, and to sanctify the soul and body of each one individually, yet it subsists in all wholly and indivisibly. The world consisting of four elements, the garments of Christ must be understood to represent the visible creation, which the devils divide amongst themselves, as often as they deliver to death the word of God which dwelleth in us, and by worldly allurements bring us over to their side.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxviii) Nor let any one say that these things had no good signification, because they were done by wicked men; for if so, what shall we say of the cross itself? For that was made by ungodly men, and yet certainly by it were signified, What is the length, and depth, and breadth, and height, (Eph. 3:18) as the Apostle saith. Its breadth consists of a cross beam, on which are stretched the hands of Him who hangs upon it. This signifies the breadth of charity, and the good works done therein. Its length consists of a cross beam going to the ground, and signifies perseverance in length of time. The height is the top which rises above the cross beam, and signifies the high end to which all things refer. The depth is that part which is fixed in the ground; there it is hidden, but the whole cross that we see rises from it. Even so all our good works proceed from the depth of God's incomprehensible grace. But though the cross of Christ only signify what the Apostle saith, They that are Christ's have crucified the flesh, with the affections and lusts, (Gal. 5:24) how great a good is it? Lastly, what is the sign of Christ, but the cross of Christ? Which sign must be applied to the foreheads of believers, to the water of regeneration, to the oil of chrism, to the sacrifice whereby we are nourished, or none of these is profitable for life.

19:24–27

24. These things therefore the soldiers did.

25. Now there stood by the cross of Jesus his mother, and his mother's sister, Mary the wife of Cleophas, and Mary Magdalene.

26. When Jesus therefore saw his mother, and the disciple standing by, whom he loved, he saith unto his mother, Woman, behold thy son!

27. Then saith he to the disciple, Behold thy mother! And from that hour that disciple took her to his own home.

THEOPHYLACT. While the soldiers were doing their cruel work, He was thinking anxiously of His mother: These things therefore the soldiers did. Now there stood by the cross of Jesus His mother, and His mother's sister, Mary the wife of Cleophas, and Mary Magdalene.

AMBROSE. Mary the mother of our Lord stood before the cross of her Son. None of the Evangelists hath told me this except John. The others have related how that at our Lord's Passion the earth quaked, the heaven was overspread with darkness, the sun fled, the thief was taken into paradise after confession. John hath told us, what the others have not, how that from the cross whereon He hung, He called to His mother. He thought it a greater thing to shew Him victorious over punishment, fulfilling the offices of piety to His mother, than giving the kingdom of heaven and eternal life to the thief. For if it was religious to give life to the thief, a much richer work of piety it is for a son to honour his mother with such affection. Behold, He saith, thy son; behold thy mother. Christ made His Testament from the cross, and divided the offices of piety between the Mother and the disciples. Our Lord made not only a public, but also a domestic Testamnet. And this His Testament John sealed, a witness worthy of such a Testator. A good testament it was, not of money, but of eternal life, which was not written with ink, but with the spirit of the living God: My tongue is the pen of a ready writer. (Ps. 45:1) Mary, as became the mother of our Lord, stood before the cross, when the Apostles fled, and with pitiful eyes beheld the wounds of her Son. For she looked not on the death of the Hostage, but on the salvation of the world; and perhaps knowing that her Son's death would bring this salvation, she who had been the habitation of the King, thought that by her death she might add to that universal gift.

But Jesus did not need any help for saving the world, as we read in the Psalm, I have been even as a man with no help, free among the dead. (Ps. 87) He received indeed the affection of a parent, but He did not seek another's help. Imitate her, ye holy matrons, who, as towards her only most beloved Son, hath set you an example of such virtue: for ye have not sweeter sons, nor did the Virgin seek consolation in again becoming a mother.

JEROME. The Mary which in Mark and Matthew is called the mother of James and Joses, was the wife of Alpheus, and sister of Mary the mother of our Lord: which Mary John here designates of Cleophas, either from her father, or family, or for some other reason. She need not be thought a different person, because she is called in one place Mary the mother of James the less, and here Mary of Cleophas, for it is customary in Scripture to give different names to the same person.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) Observe how the weaker sex is the stronger; standing by the cross when the disciples fly.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. iii. 21) If Matthew and Mark had not mentioned by name Mary Magdalen, we should have thought that there were two parties, one of which stood far off, and the other near. But how must we account for the same Mary Magdalen and the other women standing afar off, as Matthew and Mark say, and being near the cross, as

John says? By supposing that they were within such a distance as to be within sight of our Lord, and yet sufficiently far off to be out of the way of the crowd and Centurion, and soldiers who were immediately about Him. Or, we may suppose that after our Lord had commended His mother to the disciple, they retired to be out of the way of the crowd, and saw what took place afterwards at a distance: so that those Evangelists who do not mention them till after our Lord's death, describe them as standing afar off. (Matthew and Mark.) That some women are mentioned by all alike, others not, makes no matter.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 2) Though there were other women by, He makes no mention of any of them, but only of His mother, to shew us that we should specially honour our mothers. Our parents indeed, if they actually oppose the truth, are not even to be known: but otherwise we should pay them all attention, and honour them above all the world beside: When Jesus therefore saw His mother, and the disciple standing by, whom he loved, He saith unto His mother, Woman, behold thy son!

BEDE. By the disciple whom Jesus loved, the Evangelist means himself; not that the others were not loved, but he was loved more intimately on account of his estate of chastity; for a Virgin our Lord called him, and a Virgin he ever remained.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 2.) Heavens! (Papæ) what honour does He pay to the disciple; who however conceals his name from modesty. For had he wished to boast, he would have added the reason why he was loved, for there must have been something great and wonderful to have caused that love. This is all He says to John; He does not console his grief, for this was a time for giving consolation. Yet was it no small one to be honoured with such a charge, to have the mother of our Lord, in her affliction, committed to his care by Himself on His departure: Then saith He to the disciple, Behold thy mother!

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxix. 1) This truly is that hour of the which Jesus, when about to change the water into wine, said, Mother, what have I to do with thee? Mine hour is not yet come. Then, about to act divinely, He repelled the mother of His humanity, of His infirmity, as if He knew her not: now, suffering humanly, He commends with human affection her of whom He was made man. Here is a moral lesson. The good Teacher shews us by

His example how that pious sons should take care of their parents. The cross of the sufferer, is the chair of the Master.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 2) The shameless doctrine of Marcion is refuted here. For if our Lord were not born according to the flesh, and had not a mother, why did He make such provision for her? Observe how imperturbable He is during His crucifixion, talking to the disciple of His mother, fulfilling prophecies, giving good hope to the thief; whereas before His crucifixion, He seemed in fear. The weakness of His nature was shewn there, the exceeding greatness of His power here. He teaches us too herein, not to turn back, because we may feel disturbed at the difficulties before us; for when we are once actually under the trial, all will be light and easy for us.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxix. 2) He does this to provide as it were another son for His mother in his place; And from that hour that disciple took her unto his own. Unto his own what? Was not John one of those who said, Lo, we have left all, and followed Thee? (Mat. 19:27) He took her then to his own, i. e. not to his farm, for he had none, but to his care, for of this he was master.

BEDE. Another reading is, Accepit eam discipulus in suam, his own mother some understand, but to his own care seems better.

19:28–30

28. After this, Jesus knowing that all things were now accomplished, that the Scripture might be fulfilled, saith, I thirst.

29. Now there was set a vessel full of vinegar: and they filled a spunge with vinegar, and put it upon hyssop, and put it to his mouth.

30. When Jesus therefore had received the vinegar, he said, It is finished: and he bowed his head, and gave up the ghost.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxix.) He who appeared man, suffered all these things; He who was God, ordered them: After this Jesus knowing that all things were now accomplished; i. e. knowing the prophecy in the Psalms, And when I was thirsty, they gave me vinegar to drink, (Ps. 68) said, I thirst:As if to say, ye have not done all (minus): give me yourselves: for the Jews were themselves vinegar, having degenerated from the wine of the Patriarchs and the Prophets. Now there was a vessel full of vinegar: they had drunk from the wickedness of the world, as from a full vessel, and their heart was deceitful, as it were, a spunge full of caves and crooked hiding places: And they filled a spunge with vinegar, and put it upon hyssop, and put it to his mouth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) They were not softened at all by what they saw, but were the more enraged, and gave Him the cup to drink, as they did to criminals, i. e. with a hyssop.

AUGUSTINE. The hyssop around which they put the spunge full of vinegar, being a mean herb, taken to purge the breast, represents the humility of Christ, which they hemmed in and thought they had circumvented. (ὑσσώπῳ περιθέντες) For we are made clean by Christ’s humility. Nor let it perplex you that they were able to reach His mouth when He was such a height above the ground: for we read in the other Evangelists, what John omits to mention, that the spunge was put upon a reed.

THEOPHYLACT. Some say that the hyssop is put here for reed, its leaves being like a reed.

When Jesus therefore had received the vinegar, He said, It is finished.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxix) viz. what prophecy had foretold so long before.

BEDE. It may be asked here, why it is said, When Jesus had received the vinegar, when another Evangelists says, He would not drink. (Mat. 27:34) But this is easily settled. He did not receive the vinegar, to drink it, but fulfil the prophecy.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxix) Then as there was nothing left Him to do before He died, it follows, And He bowed His head, and gave up the ghost, only dying when He had nothing more to do, like Him who had to lay down His life, and to take it up again.

GREGORY. (xi. Mor. iii.) Ghost is put here for soul: for had the Evangelist meant any thing else by it, though the ghost departed, the soul might still have remained.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) He did not bow His head because He gave up the ghost, but He gave up the ghost because at that moment He bowed His head. Whereby the Evangelist intimates that He was Lord of all.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxix) For who ever had such power to sleep when he wished, as our Lord had to die when He wished? What power must He have, for our good or evil, Who had such power dying?

THEOPHYLACT. Our Lord gave up His ghost to God the Father, shewing that the souls of the saints do not remain in the tomb, but go into the hand of the Father of all; while sinners are reserved for the place of punishment, i. e. hell.

19:31–37

31. The Jews therefore, because it was the preparation, that the bodies should not remain upon the cross on the sabbath day, (for that sabbath day was an high day,) besought Pilate that their legs might be broken, and that they might be taken away.

32. Then came the soldiers, and brake the legs of the first, and of the other which was crucified with him.

33. But when they came to Jesus, and saw that he was dead already, they brake not his legs:

34. But one of the soldiers with a spear pierced his side, and forthwith came there out blood and water.

35. And he that saw it bare record, and his record is true: and he knoweth that he saith true, that ye might believe.

36. For these things were done, that the Scripture should be fulfilled, A bone of him shall not be broken.

37. And again another Scripture saith, They shall look on him whom they pierced.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) The Jews who strained at a gnat and swallowed a camel, after their audacious wickedness, reason scrupulously about the day: The Jews therefore because it was the preparation, that the bodies should not remain upon the cross on the sabbath.

BEDE. Parasceue, i. e. preparation: the sixth day was so called because the children of Israel prepared twice the number of loaves on that day. For that sabbath day was an high day, i. e. on account of the feast of the passover.

Besought Pilate that their legs might be broken.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) Not in order to take away the legs, but to cause death, that they might be taken down from the cross, and the feast clay not be defiled by the sight of such horrid torments.

THEOPHYLACT. For it was commanded in the Law that the sun should not set on the punishment of any one; or they were unwilling to appear tormentors and homicides on a feast day.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 3) How forcible is truth: their own devices it is that accomplish the fulfilment of prophecy: Then came the soldiers and brake the legs of the first, and of the other which was crucified with Him. But when they came to Jesus, and saw that He was dead already, they brake not His legs: but one of the soldiers with a spear pierced His side.

THEOPHYLACT. To please the Jews, they pierce Christ, thus insulting even His lifeless body. But the insult issues in a miracle: for a miracle it is that blood should flow from a dead body.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx.) The Evangelist has expressed himself cautiously; not struck, or wounded, but opened His side: (ἔνυξε, aperuit V.) whereby was opened the gate of life, from whence the sacraments of the Church flowed, without which we cannot enter into that life which is the true life: And forthwith came thereout blood and water. That blood was shed for the remission of sins, that water tempers the cup of salvation. This it was which was prefigured when Noah was commanded to make a door in the side of the ark, by which the animals that were not to perish by the deluge entered; which animals prefigured the Church. To shadow forth this, the woman was made out of the side of the sleeping man; for this second Adam bowed His head, and slept on the cross, that out of that which came therefrom, there might be formed a wife for Him. O death, by which the dead are quickened, what can be purer than that blood, what more salutary than that wound!

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) This being the source whence the holy mysteries are derived, when thou approachest the awful cup, approach it as if thou wert about to drink out of Christ’s side.

THEOPHYLACT. Shame then upon them who mix not water with the wine in the holy mysteries: they seem as if they believed not that the water flowed from the side. Had blood flowed only, a man might have said that there was some life left in the body, and that that was why the blood flowed. But the water flowing is an irresistible miracle, and therefore the Evangelist adds, And he that saw it bare record.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 3) As if to say, I did not hear it from others, but saw it with mine own eyes. And his record is true, he adds, not as if he had mentioned something so wonderful that his account would be suspected, but to stop the mouths of heretics, and in contemplation of the deep value of those mysteries which he announces.

And he knoweth that he saith true, that ye might believe.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) He that saw it knoweth; let him that saw not believe his testimony. He gives testimonies from the Scriptures to each of these two things he relates. After, they brake not His legs, He adds, For these things were done, that the Scripture should be fulfilled, A bone of Him shall not be broken, a commandment which applied to the sacrifice of the paschal lamb under the old law, which sacrifice foreshadowed our Lord's. Also after, One of the soldiers with a spear opened His side, then follows another Scripture testimony; And again another Scripture saith, They shall look on Him whom they pierced, (Zech. 12:10) a prophecy which implies that Christ will come in the very flesh in which He was crucified.

JEROME. (Pref. ad Pentet.) This testimony is taken from Zacharias.

19:38–42

38. And after this Joseph of Arimathæa, being a disciple of Jesus, but secretly for fear of the Jews, besought Pilate that he might take away the body of Jesus: and Pilate gave him leave. He came therefore, and took the body of Jesus.

39. And there came also Nicodemus, which at the first came to Jesus by night, and brought a mixture of myrrh and aloes, about an hundred pound weight.

40. Then took they the body of Jesus, and wound it in linen clothes with the spices, as the manner of the Jews is to bury.

41. Now in the place where he was crucified there was a garden, and in the garden a new sepulchre, wherein was never man yet laid.

42. There laid they Jesus therefore because of the Jews' preparation day; for the sepulchre was nigh at hand.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) Joseph thinking that the hatred of the Jews would be appeased by His crucifixion, went with confidence to ask permission to take charge of His burial: And after this, Joseph of Arimathea besought Pilate.

BEDE. Arimathea is the same as Ramatha, the city of Elkanah, and Samuel. It was providentially ordered that he should be rich, in order that he might have access to the governor, and just, in order that he might merit the charge of our Lord's body: That he might take the body of Jesus, because he was His disciple.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 3) He was not of the twelve, but of the seventy, for none of the twelve came near. Not that their fear kept them back, for Joseph was a disciple, secretly for fear of the Jews. But Joseph was a person of rank, and known to Pilate; so he went to him, and the favour was granted, and afterwards believed Him, not as a condemned man, but as a great and wonderful Person: He came therefore, and took the body of Jesus.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 22) In performing this last office to our Lord, he shewed a bold indifference to the Jews, though he had avoided our Lord's company when alive, for fear of incurring their hatred.

BEDE. Their ferocity being appeased for the time by their success, he sought the body of Christ. He did not come as a disciple, but simply to perform a work of mercy, which is due to the evil as well as to the good. Nicodemus joined him: And there came also Nicodemus, which at the first came to Jesus by night, and brought a mixture of myrrh and aloes, about an hundred pound weight.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) We must not read the words, at the first, first bringing a mixture of myrrh, but attach the first to the former clause. For Nicodemus at the first came to Jesus by night, as John relates in the former part of the Gospel. From these words then we are to infer that that was not the only time that Nicodemus went to our Lord, but simply the first time; and that he came afterwards and heard Christ's discourses, and became a disciple.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) They bring the spices most efficacious for preserving the body from corruption, treating Him as a mere man. Yet this shews great love.

BEDE. We must observe however that it was simple ointment; for they were not allowed to mix many ingredients together. Then took they the body of Jesus, and wound it in linen clothes with the spices, as the manner of the Jews is to bury. (Exod. 30:34, 38)

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) Wherein the Evangelist intimates, that in paying the last offices of the dead, the custom of the nation is to be followed. It was the custom of the Jewish nation to embalm their dead bodies, in order that they might keep the longer.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 23) Nor does John here contradict the other Evangelists, who, though they are silent about Nicodemus, yet do not affirm that our Lord was buried by Joseph alone. Nor because they say that our Lord was wrapped in a linen cloth by Joseph, do they say that other linen cloths may not have been brought by Nicodemus in addition; so that John may be right in saying, not, in a single cloth, but, in linen cloths. Nay more, the napkin which was about His head and the bands which were tied round His body being all of linen, though there were but one linen cloth, He may yet be said to have been wrapped up in linen cloths: linen cloths being taken in a general sense, as comprehending all that was made of linen.

BEDE. Hence hath come down the custom of the Church, of consecrating the Lord’s body not on silk or gold cloth, but in a clean linen cloth.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 4) But as they were pressed for time, for Christ died at the ninth hour, and after that they had gone to Pilate, and taken away the body, so that the evening was now near, they lay Him in the nearest tomb: Now in the place where He was crucified there was a garden; and in the garden a new sepulchre, wherein was never man yet laid. A providential design, to make it certain that it was His resurrection, and not any other person’s that lay with Him.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) As no one before or after Him was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary, so in this grave was there none buried before or after Him.

THEOPHYLACT. In that it was a new sepulchre, we are given to understand, that we are all renewed by Christ’s death, and death and corruption destroyed. Mark too the exceeding poverty that He took up for our sakes. He had no house in His lifetime, and now He is laid in another’s sepulchre at His death, and His nakedness covered by Joseph. There laid they Jesus therefore because of the Jews’ preparation day; for the sepulchre was nigh at hand.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx. 5) Implying that the burial was hastened, in order to finish it before the evening, when, on account of the preparation, which the Jews with us call more commonly in the Latin, Cæna pura, it was unlawful to do any such thing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) The sepulchre was near, that the disciples might approach it more easily, and be better witnesses of what took place there, and that even enemies might be made the witnesses of the burial, being placed there as guards, and the story of His being stolen away shewed to be false.

BEDE. Mystically, the name Joseph means, apt for the receiving of a good work; whereby we are admonished that we should make ourselves worthy of our Lord’s body, before we receive it.

THEOPHYLACT. Even now in a certain sense Christ is put to death by the avaritious, in the person of the poor man suffering famine. Be therefore a Joseph, and cover Christ’s nakedness, and, not once, but continually by contemplation, embalm Him in thy spiritual tomb, cover Him, and mix myrrh and bitter aloes; considering that bitterest sentence of all, Depart, ye cursed, into everlasting fire. (Matt. 25:41)

CHAPTER 20

20:1–9

1. The first day of the week cometh Mary Magdalene early, when it was yet dark, unto the sepulchre, and seeth the stone taken away from the sepulchre.

2. Then she runneth, and cometh to Simon Peter, and to the other disciple, whom Jesus loved, and saith unto them, They have taken away the Lord out of the sepulchre, and we know not where they have laid him.

3. Peter therefore went forth, and that other disciple, and came to the sepulchre.

4. So they ran both together: and the other disciple did outrun Peter, and came first to the sepulchre.

5. And he stooping down, and looking in, saw the linen clothes lying: yet went he not in.

6. Then cometh Simon Peter following him, and went into the sepulchre, and seeing the linen clothes lie,

7. And the napkin, that was about his head, not lying with the linen clothes, but wrapped together in a place by itself.

8. Then went in also that other disciple, which came first to the sepulchre, and he saw, and believed.

9. For as yet they knew not the Scripture, that he must rise again from the dead.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) The Sabbath being now over, during which it was unlawful to be there, Mary Magdalene could rest no longer, but came very early in the morning, to seek consolation at the grave: The first day of the week cometh Mary Magdalene early, when it was yet dark, unto the sepulchre.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 24) Mary Magdalene, undoubtedly the most fervent in love, of all the women that ministered to our Lord; so that John deservedly mentions her only, and says nothing of the others who were with her, as we know from the other Evangelists.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) Una sabbati is the day which Christians call the Lord’s day, after our Lord’s resurrection. Matthew calls it prima sabbati.

BEDE. Una sabbati, i. e. one day after the sabbath.

THEOPHYLACT. Or thus: The Jews called the days of the week sabbath, and the first day, one of the sabbaths, which day is a type of the life to come; for that life will be one day not cut short by any night, since God is the sun there, a sun which never sets. On this day then our Lord rose again, with an incorruptible body, even as we in the life to come shall put on incorruption.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 24.) What Mark says, Very early in the morning, at the rising of the sun (Mark 16:1), does not contradict John’s words, when it was yet dark. At the dawn of day, there are yet remains of darkness, which disappear as the light breaks in. We must not understand Mark’s words, Very early in the morning, at the rising of the sun, ἡλίου ἀνατεέλαντος to mean that the sun was above the horizon, but rather what we ourselves ordinarily mean by the phrase, when we want any thing to be done very early, we say at the rising of the sun, i. e. some time before the sun is risen.

GREGORY. (Hom. in Ev. xxii.) It is well said, When it was yet dark: Mary was seeking the Creator of all things in the tomb, and because, she found Him not, thought He was stolen. Truly it was yet dark when she came to the sepulchre.

And seeth the stone taken away from the sepulchre.

AUGUSTINE. (Con. Evang. iii. 24) Now took place what Matthew only relates, the earthquake, and rolling away of the stone, and fright of the guards.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv. 4) Our Lord rose while the stone and seal were still on the sepulchre. But as it was necessary that others should be certified of this, the sepulchre is opened after the resurrection, and so the fact confirmed. This it was which roused Mary. For when she saw the stone taken away, she entered not nor looked in, but ran to the disciples with all the speed of love. But as yet she knew nothing for certain about the resurrection, but thought that His body had been carried off.

GLOSS. And therefore she ran to tell the disciples, that they might seek Him with her, or grieve with her: Then she runneth, and cometh to Simon Peter, and to the other disciple, whom Jesus loved.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) This is the way in which he usually mentions himself. Jesus loved all, but him in an especial and familiar way. And saith unto them, They have taken away the Lord out of the sepulchre, and we know not where they have laid Him.

GREGORY. (iii. Mor. ix.) She puts the part for the whole; she had come only to seek for the body of our Lord, and now she laments that our Lord, the whole of Him, is taken away.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) Some of the Greek copies have, taken away my Lord, which is more expressive of love, and of the feeling of an handmaiden. But only a few have this reading.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) The Evangelist does not deprive the woman of this praise, nor leaves out from shame, that they had the news first from her. As soon as they hear it, they hasten to the sepulchre.

GREGORY. (xxii. in Evang.) But Peter and John before the others, for they loved most; Peter therefore went forth, and that other disciple, and came to the sepulchre.

THEOPHYLACT. But how came they to the sepulchre, while the soldiers were guarding it? an easy question to answer. After our Lord’s resurrection and the earthquake, and the appearance of the angel at the sepulchre, the guards withdrew, and told the Pharisees what had happened.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) After saying, came to the sepulchre, he goes back and tells us how they came: So they ran both together: and the other disciple did outrun Peter, and came first to the sepulchre; meaning himself, but he always speaks of himself, as if he were speaking of another person.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxv) On coming he sees the linen clothes set aside: And he slooping down, and looking in, saw the linen clothes lying. But he makes no further search: yet went he not in. Peter on the other hand, being of a more fervid temper, pursued the search, and examined every thing: Then cometh Simon Peter following him, and went into the sepulchre, and seeth the linen clothes lie, and the napkin, that was about His head, not lying with the linen clothes, but wrapped together in a place by itself. Which circumstances were proof of His resurrection. For had they carried Him away, they would not have stripped Him; nor, if any had stolen Him, would they have taken the trouble to wrap up the napkin, and put it in a place by itself, apart from the linen clothes; but would have taken away the body as it was. John mentioned the myrrh first of all, for this reason, i.

e. to shew you that He could not have been stolen away. For myrrh would make the linen adhere to the body, and so caused trouble to the thieves, and they would never have been so senseless as to have taken this unnecessary pains about the matter. After Peter however, John entered: Then went in also that other disciple, which came first to the sepulchre, and he saw, and believed.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) i. e. That Jesus had risen again, some think: but what follows contradicts this notion. He saw the sepulchre empty, and believed what the woman had said: For as yet they knew not the Scripture, that He must rise again from the dead. If he did not yet know that He must rise again from the dead, he could not believe that He had risen. They had heard as much indeed from our Lord, and very openly, but they were so accustomed to hear parables from Him, that they took this for a parable, and thought He meant something else.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxii. in Evang.) But this account of the Evangelist1 must not be thought to be without some mystical meaning. By John, the younger of the two, the synagogue; by Peter, the elder, the Gentile Church is represented: for though the synagogue was before the Gentile Church as regards the worship of God, as regards time the Gentile world was before the synagogue. They ran together, because the Gentile world ran side by side with the synagogue from first to last, in respect of purity and community of life, though a purity and community of understanding2 they had not. The synagogue came first to the sepulchre, but entered not: it knew the commandments of the law, and had heard the prophecies of our Lord's incarnation and death, but would not believe in Him who died. Then cometh Simon Peter, and enteredinto the sepulchre: the Gentile Church both knew Jesus Christ as dead man, and believed in Him as living God. The napkin about our Lord's head is not found with the linen clothes, i. e. God, the Head of Christ, and the incomprehensible mysteries of the Godhead are removed from our poor knowledge; His power transcends the nature of the creature. And it is found not only apart, but also wrapped together; because of the linen wrapped together, neither beginning nor end is seen; and the height of the Divine nature had neither beginning nor end. And it is into one place: for where there is division, God is not; and they merit His grace, who do not occasion scandal by dividing themselves into sects. But as a napkin is what is used in labouring to wipe the sweat of the brow, by the napkin here we may understand the labour of God: which napkin is found apart, because the suffering of our Redeemer is far removed from ours; inasmuch as He suffered innocently, that which we suffer justly; He submitted Himself to death voluntarily, we by necessity. But after Peter entered, John entered too; for at the end of the world even Judæa shall be gathered in to the true faith.

THEOPHYLACT. Or thus: Peter is practical and prompt, John contemplative and intelligent, and learned in divine things. Now the contemplative man is generally beforehand in knowledge and intelligence, but the practical by his fervour and activity gets the advance of the other’s perception, and sees first into the divine mystery.

20:10–18

10. Then the disciples went away again unto their own home.

11. But Mary stood without at the sepulchre weeping: and as she wept, she stooped down, and looked into the sepulchre,

12. And seeth two angels in white sitting, the one at the head, and the other at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain.

13. And they say unto her, Woman, why weepest thou? She saith unto them, Because they have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid him.

14. And when she had thus said, she turned herself back, and saw Jesus standing, and knew not that it was Jesus.

15. Jesus saith unto her, Woman, why weepest thou? whom seekest thou? She, supposing him to be the gardener, saith unto him, Sir, if thou have borne him hence, tell me where thou hast laid him, and I will take him away.

16. Jesus saith unto her, Mary. She turned, herself, and saith unto him, Rabboni; which is to say, Master.

17. Jesus saith unto her, Touch me not; for I am not yet ascended to my Father: but go to my brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto my Father, and your Father; and to my God, and your God.

18. Mary Magdalene came and told the disciples that she had seen the Lord, and that he had spoken these things unto her.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv. in Evang.) Mary Magdalene, who had been the sinner in the city, and who had washed out the spots of her sins by her tears, whose soul burned with love, did not retire from the sepulchre when the others did: Then the disciples went away again unto their own home.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi. 1) i. e. To the place where they were lodging, and from which they had ran to the sepulchre. But though the men returned, the stronger love of the woman fixed her to the spot. But Mary stood without at the sepulchre weeping.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. iii. xxiv. 69) i. e. Outside of the place where the stone sepulchre was, but yet within the garden.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) Be not astonished that Mary wept for love at the sepulchre, and Peter did not; for the female sex is naturally tender, and inclined to weep.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi. 1) The eyes then which had sought our Lord, and found Him not, now wept without interruption; more for grief that our Lord had been removed, than for His death upon the cross. For now even all memorial of Him was taken away.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Ev. iii. xxiv. 69) She then saw, with the other women, the Angel sitting on the right, on the stone which had been rolled away from the sepulchre, at whose words it was that she looked into the sepulchre. (Mat. 28:5.)

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) The sight of the sepulchre itself was some consolation. Nay, behold her, to console herself still more, stooping down, to see the very place where the body lay: And as she wept, she stooped down, and looked into the sepulchre.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv. ut supr.) For to have looked once is not enough for love. Love makes one desire to look over and over again.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) In her too great grief she could believe neither her own eyes, nor the disciples’. Or was it a divine impulse which caused her to look in?

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv.) She sought the body, and found it not; she persevered in seeking; and so it came to pass that she found. Her longings, growing the stronger, the more they were disappointed, at last found and laid hold on their object. For holy longings ever gain strength by delay; did they not, they would not be longings. Mary so loved, that not content with seeing the sepulchre, she stooped down and looked in: let us see the fruit which came of this persevering love: And seeth two Angels in white sitting, the one at the head, and the other at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi. 1) As her understanding was not so raised as to be able to gather from the napkins the fact of the resurrection, she is given the sight of Angels in bright apparel, who sooth her sorrow.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) But why did one sit at the head, the other at the feet? To signify that the glad tidings of Christ's Gospel was to be delivered from the head to the feet, from the beginning to the end. The Greek word Angel means one who delivers news.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv. in Evang. c. 1, 14) The Angel sits at the head when the Apostles preach that in the beginning was the Word: he sits, as it were, at the feet, when it is said, The Word was made flesh. By the two Angels too we may understand the two testaments; both of which proclaim alike the incarnation, death, and resurrection of our Lord. The Old seems to sit at the head, the New at the feet.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) The Angels who appear say nothing about the resurrection; but by degrees the subject is entered on. First of all they address her compassionately, to prevent her from being overpowered by a spectacle of such extraordinary brightness: And they say unto her, Woman, why weepest thou? The Angels forbad tears, and announced, as it were, the joy that was at hand: Why weepest thou? As if to say, Weep not.

GREGORY. (Hom. fin.) The very declarations of Scripture which excite our tears of love, wipe away those very tears, by promising us the sight of our Redeemer again.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) But she, thinking that they wanted to know why she wept, tells them the reason: She saith unto them, Because they have taken away my Lord. The lifeless body of her Lord, she calls her Lord, putting the part for the whole; just as we confess that Jesus Christ the Son of God was buried, when only His flesh was buried. And I know not where they have placed Him: it was a still greater grief, that she did not know where to go to console her grief.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) As yet she knew nothing of the resurrection, but thought the body had been taken away.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. xxiv) Here the Angels must be understood to rise up, for Luke describes them as seen standing.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) The hour was now come, which the Angels announced, when sorrow should be succeeded by joy: And when she had thus said, she turned herself back.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. l) But why, when she is talking to the Angels, and before she has heard any thing from them, does she turn back? It seems to me that while she was speaking, Christ appeared behind her, and that the Angels by their posture, look, and motion, shewed that they saw our Lord, and that thus it was that she turned back.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv.) We must observe that Mary, who as yet doubted our Lord's resurrection, turned back to see Jesus. By her doubting she turned her back, as it were, upon our Lord. Yet inasmuch as she loved, she saw Him. She loved and doubted: she saw, and did not recognise Him: And saw Jesus standing, and knew not that it was Jesus.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) To the Angels He appeared as their Lord, but not so to the woman, for the sight coming upon her all at once, would have stupified her. She was not to be lifted suddenly, but gradually to high things.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv.) Jesus saith unto her, Woman, why weepest thou? He asks the cause of her grief, to set her longing still more. For the mere mentioning His name whom she sought would inflame her love for Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi 1) Because He appeared as a common person, she thought Him the gardener: She, supposing Him to be the gardener, saith unto Him, Sir, if Thou have borne Him hence, tell me where Thou hast laid Him, and I will take Him away. i. e. If thou hast taken Him away from fear of the Jews, tell me, and I will take Him again.

THEOPHYLACT. She was afraid that the Jews might vent their rage even on the lifeless body, and therefore wished to remove it to some secret place.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv.) Perhaps, however, the woman was right in believing Jesus to be the gardener. Was not He the spiritual Gardener, who by the power of His love had sown strong seeds of virtue in her breast? But how is it that, as soon as she sees the gardener, as she supposes Him to be, she says, without having told Him who it was she was seeking, Sir, if Thou hast borne Him hence? It arises from her love; when one loves a person, one never thinks that any one else can be ignorant of him. Our Lord, after calling her by the common name of her sex, and not being recognised, calls her by her own name: Jesus saith unto her, Mary; as if to say, Recognise Him, who recognises thee. Mary, being called by name, recognises Him; that it was He whom she sought externally, and He who taught her internally to seek: She turned herself, and saith unto Him, Rabboni; which is to say, Master.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi. 1) Just as He was sometimes in the midst of the Jews, and they did not know Him till He pleased to make Himself known. But why does she turn herself, when she had turned herself before? It seems to me that when she said, Where thou hast laid Him, she turned to the Angels, to ask why they were astonished. Then Christ, calling her, discovered Himself by His voice, and made her turn to Him again.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) Or she first turned her body, but thought Him what He was not; now she was turned in heart, and knew who He was. Let no one however blame her, because she called the gardener, Lord, and Jesus, Master. The one was a title of courtesy to a person from whom she was asking a favour; the other of respect to a Teacher from whom she was used to learn to distinguish the divine from the human. The word Lord is used in different senses, when she says, They have taken away my Lord, and when she says, Lord, if Thou have borne Him away.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv.) The Evangelist does not add what she did upon recognising Him, but we know from what our Lord said to her: Jesus saith unto her, Touch Me not. Mary then had tried to embrace His feet, but was not allowed. Why not? The reason follows: For I am not yet ascended to My Father.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi. 3) But if standing upon the earth, He is not touched, how shall He be touched sitting in heaven? And did He not before His ascension offer Himself to the touch of the disciples: Handle Me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones? (Luke 24:39) Who can be so absurd as to suppose that He was willing that disciples should touch Him before He ascended to His Father, and unwilling that women should till after? Nay, we read of women after the resurrection, and before He ascended to His Father, touching Him, one of whom was Mary Magdalene herself, according to Matthew. Either then Mary here is a type of the Gentile Church, which did not believe in Christ till after His ascension: or the meaning is that Jesus is to be believed in, i. e. spiritually touched, in no other way, but as being one with the Father. He ascends to the Father mystically, as it were, in the mind of him who hath so far advanced as to acknowledge that He is equal to the Father. But how could Mary believe in Him otherwise than carnally, when she wept for Him as a man?

AUGUSTINE. (i. de Trin) Touch is as it were the end of knowledge1; and He was unwilling that a soul intent upon Him should have its end, in thinking Him only what He seemed to be.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi. 2) Mary wished to be as familiar with Christ now, as she was before His Passion; forgetting, in her joy, that His body was made much more holy by its resurrection. So, Touch Me not, He says, to remind her of this, and make her feel awe in talking with Him. For which reason too He no longer keeps company with His disciples, viz. that they might look upon Him with the greater awe. Again, by saying I have not yet ascended, He shews that He is hastening there. And He who was going to depart and live no more with men, ought not to be regarded with the same feeling that He was before: But go to My brethren, and say unto them, I ascend unto My Father, and your Father; and to My God, and your God.

HILARY. (de Trin.) Heretics, among their other impieties, misinterpret these words of our Lord's, and say, that if His Father is their Father, His God their God, He cannot be God Himself. But though He remained in the form of God, He took upon Him the form of a servant; and Christ says this in the form of a servant to men. And we cannot doubt that in so far as He is man, the Father is His Father in the same sense in which He is of other men, and God His God in like manner. Indeed He begins with saying, Go to My brethren. But God can only have brethren according to the flesh; the Only-Begotten God, being Only-Begotten, is without brethren.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) He does not say, Our Father, but, My Father and your Father: Mine therefore and yours in a different sense; Mine by nature, yours by grace. Nor does He say, Our God, but, My God—under Him I am man—and your God; between you and Him I am Mediator.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. xxiv. 69) She then went away from the sepulchre, i. e. from that part of the garden before the rock which had been hollowed out, and with her the other women. But these, according to Mark, were seized with trembling and amazement, and said nothing to any man: Mary Magdalene came and told the disciples that she had seen the Lord, and that He had spoken these things unto her.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxv.) So the sin of mankind is buried in the very place whence it came forth. For whereas in Paradise the woman gave the man the deadly fruit, a woman from the sepulchre announced life to men; a woman delivers the message of Him who raises us from the dead, as a woman had delivered the words of the serpent who slew us.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 25) While she was going with the other women, according to Matthew, Jesus met them, saying, All hail. (Matt 28:9) So we gather that there were two visions of Angels; and that our Lord too was seen twice, once when Mary took Him for the gardener, and again, when He met them by the way, and by this repeating His presence confirmed their faith. And so Mary Magdalen came and told the disciples, not alone, but with the other women whom Luke mentions.

BEDE. Mystically, Mary, which name signifies, mistress, enlightened, enlightener, star of the sea, stands for the Church, which is also Magdalen, i. e. towered, (Magdalen being Greek for tower,) as we read in the Psalms, Thou hast been a strong tower for me. (Ps. 61:3) In that she announced Christ’s resurrection to the disciples, all, especially those to whom the office of preaching is committed, are admonished to be zealous in setting forth to others whatever is revealed from above.

20:19–25

19. Then the same day at evening, being the first day of the week, when the doors were shut where the disciples were assembled for fear of the Jews, came Jesus and stood in the midst, and saith unto them, Peace be unto you.

20. And when he had so said, he shewed unto them his hands and his side. Then were the disciples glad, when they saw the Lord.

21. Then said Jesus to them again, Peace be unto you: as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you.

22. And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost:

23. Whose soever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained.

24. But Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came.

25. The other disciples therefore said unto him, We have seen the Lord. But he said unto them, Except I shall see in his hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into his side, I will not believe.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) The disciples, when they heard what Mary told them, were obliged either to disbelieve, or, if they believed, to grieve that He did not count them worthy to have the sight of Him. He did not let them however pass a whole day in such reflections, but in the midst of their longing trembling desires to see Him, presented Himself to them: Then the same day at evening, being the first day of the week, when the doors were shut where the disciples were assembled for fear of the Jews.

BEDE. Wherein is shewn the infirmity of the Apostles. They assembled with doors shut, through that same fear of the Jews, which had before scattered them: Came Jesus, and stood in the midst. He came in the evening, because they would be the most afraid at that time.

THEOPHYLACT. Or because He waited till all were assembled: and with shut doors, that he might shew how that in the very same way he had risen again, i. e. with the stone lying on the scpulchre.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. cx. et cl. Pasch. aliquid simile.) Some are strongly indisposed to believe this miracle, and argue thus: If the same body rose again, which hung upon the Cross, how could that body enter through shut doors? But if thou comprehendest the mode, it is no miracle: when reason fails, then is faith edified.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxx) The shut door did not hinder the body, wherein Divinity resided. He could enter without open doors, who was born without a violation of His mother’s virginity.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) It is wonderful that they did not think him a phantom. But Mary had provided against this, by the faith she had wrought in them. And He Himself too shewed Himself so openly, and strengthened their wavering minds by His voice: And saith unto them, Peace he unto you, i. e. Be not disturbed. Wherein too He reminds them of what He had said before His crucifixion; My peace I give to you; (c. 14:27; 16:33) and again, In Me ye shall have peace.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvi. in Evang.) And because their faith wavered even with the material body before them, He shewed them His hands and side: And when He had said this, He shewed them His hands and His side.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) The nails had pierced His hands, the lance had pierced His side. For the healing of doubting hearts, the marks of the wounds were still preserved.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) And what He had promised before the crucifixion, I shall see you again, and your heart shall rejoice, is now fulfilled: Then were the disciples glad when they saw the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (de Civ. Dei.) The glory, wherewith the righteous shall shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father, i. e. in Christ’s body, we must believe to have been rather veiled than not to have been there at all. He accommodated His presence to man’s weak sight, and presented Himself in such form, as that His disciple could look at and recognise Him.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) All these things brought them to a most confident faith. As they were in endless war with the Jews, He says again, Then said Jesus unto them again, Peace be unto you.

BEDE. A repetition is a confirmation: whether He repeats it because the grace of love is twofold, or because He it is who made of twain one.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi. 3) At the same time He shews the efficacy of the cross, by which He undoes all evil things, and gives all good things; which is peace. To the women above there was announced joy; for that sex was in sorrow, and had received the curse, In sorrow shalt thou bring forth. (Gen. 3:16) All hindrances then being removed, and every thing made straight, (πατωρθωται.) he adds, As My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxii. in Evang.) The Father sent the Son, appointed Him to the work of redemption. He says therefore, As My Father hath sent Me, even so send I you; i. e. I love you, now that I send you to persecution, with the same love wherewith My Father loved Me, when He sent Me to My sufferings.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) We have learnt that the Son is equal to the Father: here He shews Himself Mediator; He Me, and I you.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi. 2) Having then given them confidence by His own miracles, and appealing to Him who sent Him, He uses a prayer to the Father, but of His own authority gives them power: And when He had said thus, He breathed on them, and saith unto them, Receive ye the Holy Ghost.

AUGUSTINE. (iv. de Trin. c. xx) That corporeal breath was not the substance of the Holy Ghost, but to shew, by meet symbol, that the Holy Ghost proceeded not only from the Father, but the Son. For who would be so mad as to say, that it was one Spirit which He gave by breathing, and another which He sent after His ascension?

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvi.) But why is He first given to the disciples on earth, and afterwards sent from heaven? Because there are two commandments of love, to love God, and to love our neighbour. The spirit to love our neighbour is given on earth, the spirit to love God is given from heaven. As then love is one, and there are two commandments; so the Spirit is one, and there are two gifts of the Spirit. And the first is given by our Lord while yet upon earth, the second from heaven, because by the love of our neighbour we learn how to arrive at the love of God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) Some say that by breathing He did not give them the Spirit, but made them meet to receive the Spirit. For if Daniel's senses were so overpowered by the sight of the Angel, how would they have been overwhelmed in receiving that unutterable gift, if He had not first prepared them for it! It would not be wrong however to say that they received then the gift of a certain spiritual power, not to raise the dead and do miracles, but to remit sins: Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them, and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi. 3) The love of the Church, which is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, remits the sins of those who partake of it; but retains the sins of those who do not. Where then He has said, Receive ye the Holy Ghost, He instantly makes mention of the remission and retaining of sins.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvi.) We must understand that those who first received the Holy Ghost, for innocence of life in themselves, and preaching to a few others, received it openly after the resurrection, that they might profit not a few only, but many. The disciples who were called to such works of humility, to what a height of glory are they led! Lo, not only have they salvation for themselves, but are admitted1 to the powers of the supreme Judgment-seat; so that, in the place of God, they retain some men's sins, and remit others. Their place in the Church, the Bishops now hold;

who receive the authority to bind, when they are admitted to the rank of government. Great the honour, but heavy the burden of the place. It is ill if one who knows not how to govern his own life, shall be judge of another's.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi. 4) A priest though he may have ordered well his own life, yet, if he have not exercised proper vigilance over others, is sent to hell with the evil doers. Wherefore, knowing the greatness of their danger, pay them all respect, even though they be not men of notable goodness. For they who are in rule, should not be judged by those who are under them. And their incorrectness of life will not at all invalidate what they do by commission from God. For not only cannot a priest, but not even angel or archangel, do any thing of themselves; the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost do all. The priest only furnishes the tongue, and the hand. For it were not just that the salvation of those who come to the Sacraments in faith, should be endangered by another's wickedness. (Hom. lxxxvii. 1). At the assembly of the disciples all were present but Thomas, who probably had not returned from the dispersion: But Thomas, one of the twelve, called Didymus, was not with them when Jesus came.

ALCUIN. Didymus, double or doubtful, because he doubted in believing: Thomas, depth, because with most sure faith he penetrated into the depth of our Lord's divinity.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvi.) It was not an accident that that particular disciple was not present. The Divine mercy ordained that a doubting disciple should, by feeling in his Master the wounds of the flesh, heal in us the wounds of unbelief. The unbelief of Thomas is more profitable to our faith, than the belief of the other disciples; for, the touch by which he is brought to believe, confirming our minds in belief, beyond all question.

BEDE. But why does this Evangelist say that Thomas was absent, when Luke writes that two disciples on their return from Emmaus found the eleven assembled? We must understand that Thomas had gone out, and that in the interval of his absence, Jesus came and stood in the midst.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii. 1) As to believe directly, (ἁπλῶς) and any how, is the mark of too easy a mind, so is too much enquiring of a gross one: and this is Thomas's fault. For when the Apostle said, We have seen the Lord, he did not believe, not because he discredited them, but from an idea of the impossibility of the thing itself: The other disciples therefore said unto him, We have seen the Lord. But he said unto them, Except I shall see in His hands the print of the nails, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into His side, I will not believe. Being the grossest of all, he required the evidence of the grossest sense, viz. the touch, and would not even believe his eyes: for he does not say only, Except I shall see, but adds, and put my finger into the print of the nails, and thrust my hand into His side.

20:26–31

26. And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you,

27. Then saith he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side: and be not faithless, but believing.

28. And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God.

29. Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed.

30. And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book:

31. But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) Consider the mercy of the Lord, how for the sake of one soul, He exhibits His wounds. And yet the disciples deserved credit, and He had Himself foretold the event. Notwithstanding, because one person, Thomas, would examine Him, Christ allowed him. But He did not appear to him immediately, but waited till the eighth day, in order that the admonition being given in the presence of the disciples, might kindle in him greater desire, and strengthen his faith for the future. And after eight days again His disciples were within, and Thomas with them: then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you.

AUGUSTINE. (in Serm. Tap. ad Cat. ii. 8.) You ask; If He entered by the shut door, where is the nature of His body? (ubi est modus corporis.) And I reply; If He walked on the sea, where is the weight of His body? The Lord did that as the Lord; and did He, after His resurrection, cease to be the Lord?

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii. 1) Jesus then comes Himself, and does not wait till Thomas interrogates Him. But to shew that He heard what Thomas said to the disciples, He uses the same words. And first He rebukes him; Then saith He to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold My hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into My side: secondly, He admonishes him; And be not faithless, but believing. Note how that before they receive the Holy Ghost faith wavers, but afterward is firm. We may wonder how an incorruptible body could retain the marks of the nails. But it was done in condescension; in order that they might be sure that it was the very person Who was crucified.

AUGUSTINE. (de Symb. ad Cat. ii. 8) He might, had He pleased, have wiped all spot and trace of wound from His glorified body; but He had reasons for retaining them. He shewed them to Thomas, who would not believe except he saw and touched; and He will shew them to His enemies, not to say, as He did to Thomas, Because thou hast seen, thou hast believed, but to convict them: Behold the Man whom ye crucified, see the wounds which ye inflicted, recognise the side which ye pierced, that it was by you, and for you, that it was opened, and yet ye cannot enter there.

AUGUSTINE. (xxii. Civ. Dei, xix) We are, as I know not how, afflicted with such love for the blessed martyrs, that we would wish in that kingdom to see on their bodies the marks of those wounds which they have borne for Christ’s sake. And perhaps we shall see them; for they will not have deformity, but dignity, and, though on the body, shine forth not with bodily, but with spiritual beauty (virtutis). Nor yet, if any of the limbs of martyrs have been cut off, shall they therefore appear without them in the resurrection of the dead; for it is said, There shall not an hair of your head perish. But if it be fit that in that new world, the traces of glorious wounds should still be preserved on the immortal flesh, in the places where the limbs were cut off there, though those same limbs withal be not lost but restored, shall the wounds appear. For though all the blemishes of the body shall then be no more, yet the evidences of virtue are not to be called blemishes.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvi.) Our Lord gave that flesh to be touched which He had introduced through shut doors: wherein two wonderful, and, according to human reason, contradictory things appear, viz. that after the resurrection He had a body incorruptible, and yet palpable. For that which is palpable must be corruptible, and that which is incorruptible must be impalpable. But He shewed Himself incorruptible and yet palpable, to prove that His body after His resurrection was the same in nature as before, but different in glory.

GREGORY. (Mor. xii. 31) Our body also in that resurrection to glory will be subtle by means of the action of the Spirit, but palpable by its true nature, not, as Eutychius says, impalpable, and subtler than the winds and the air.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) Thomas saw and touched the man, and confessed the God whom he neither saw nor touched. By means of the one he believed the other undoubtingly: Thomas answered and said unto Him, My Lord and my God.

THEOPHYLACT. He who had been before unbelieving, after touching the body shewed himself the best divine; for he asserted the twofold nature and one Person of Christ; by saying, My Lord, the human nature, by saying, My God, the divine, and by joining them both, confessed that one and the same Person was Lord and God.

Jesus saith unto him, Because thou hast seen Me, thou hast believed.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) He saith not, Hast touched me, but, hast seen me; the sight being a kind of general sense, and put in the place often of the other four senses; as when we say, Hear, and see how well it sounds; smell, and see how sweet it smells; taste, and see how well it tastes; touch, and see how warm it is. Wherefore also our Lord says, Reach hither thy finger, and behold My hands. What is this but, Touch and see? And yet he had not eyes in his finger. He refers them both to seeing and to touching, when He says, Because thou hast seen, thou hast believed. Although it might be said, that the disciple did not dare to touch, what was offered to be touched.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxvi.) But when the Apostle says, Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen, (Heb. 11:1) it is plain that things which are seen, are objects not of faith, but of knowledge. Why then is it said to Thomas who saw and touched, Because thou hast seen Me, thou hast believed? Because he saw one thing, believed another; saw the man, confessed the God. But what follows is very gladdening; Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed. In which sentence we are specially included, who have not seen Him with the eye, but retain Him in the mind, provided we only develope our faith in good works. For he only really believes, who practises what he believes.

AUGUSTINE. (Tr. cxxi) He uses the past tense, the future to His knowledge having already taken place by His own predestination.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) If any one then says, Would that I had lived in those times, and seen Christ doing miracles! let him reflect, Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed.

THEOPHYLACT. Here He means the disciples who had believed without seeing the print of the nails, and His side.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) John having related less than the other Evangelists, adds, And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of His disciples, which are not written in this book. Yet neither did the others relate all, but only what was sufficient for the purpose of convincing men. He probably here refers to the miracles which our Lord did after His resurrection, and therefore says, In the presence of His disciples, and they being the only persons with whom He conversed after His resurrection. Then to let you understand, that the miracles were not done for the sake of the disciples only, He adds, But these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; addressing Himself to mankind generally. And, this belief, he then says, profits ourselves, not Him in Whom we believe. And that believing ye might have life through His name, i. e. through Jesus, which is life.

CHAPTER 21

21:1–11

1. After these things Jesus shewed himself again to the disciples at the sea of Tiberias; and on this wise shewed he himself.

2. There were together Simon Peter, and Thomas called Didymus, and Nathanael of Cana in Galilee, and the sons of Zebedee, and two other of his disciples.

3. Simon Peter saith unto them, I go a fishing. They say unto him, We also go with thee. They went forth, and entered into a ship immediately; and that night they caught nothing.

4. But when the morning was now come, Jesus stood on the shore: but the disciples knew not that it was Jesus.

5. Then Jesus saith unto them, Children, have ye any meat? They answered him, No.

6. And he said unto them, Cast the net on the right side of the ship, and ye shall find. They cast therefore, and now they were not able to draw it for the multitude of fishes.

7. Therefore that disciple whom Jesus loved saith unto Peter, It is the Lord. Now when Simon Peter heard that it was the Lord, he girt his fisher's coat unto him, (for he was naked,) and did cast himself into the sea.

8. And the other disciples came in a little ship; (for they were not far from land, but as it were two hundred cubits,) dragging the net with fishes.

9. As soon then as they were come to land, they saw a fire of coals there, and fish laid thereon, and bread.

10. Jesus saith unto them, Bring of the fish which ye have now caught.

11. Simon Peter went up, and drew the net to land full of great fishes, an hundred and fifty and three: and for all there were so many, yet was not the net broken.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) The preceding words of the Evangelist seem to indicate the end of the book; but He goes on farther to give an account of our Lord’s appearance by the sea of Tiberias: After these things Jesus shewed Himself again to the disciples at the sea of Tiberias.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) He says, Afterwards, because He did not go continually with His disciples as before; and, manifested Himself, because His body being incorruptible, it was a condescension to allow Himself to be seen. He mentions the place, to shew that our Lord had taken away a good deal of their fear, and that they no longer kept within doors, though they had gone to Galilee to avoid the persecution of the Jews.

BEDE. The Evangelist, after his wont, first states the thing itself, and then says how it took place: And on this wise shewed He Himself.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) As our Lord was not with them regularly, and the Spirit was not given them, and they had received no commission, and had nothing to do, they followed the trade of fishermen: And on this wise shewed He Himself. There were together Simon Peter, and Thomas called Didymus, and Nathanael of Cana in Galilee; he who was called by Philip, and the sons of Zebedee, i. e. James and John, and two other of His disciples. Simon Peter saith unto them, I go a fishing.

GREGORY. (Hom.) It may be asked, why Peter, who was a fisherman before his conversion, returned to fishing, when it is said, No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for kingdom of God. (Luke 9:62.).

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) If the disciples had done this after the death of Jesus, and before His resurrection, we should have imagined that they did it in despair. But now after that He has risen from the grave, after seeing the marks of His wounds, after receiving, by means of His breathing, the Holy Ghost, all at once they become what they were before, fishers, not of men, but of fishes. We must remember then that they were not forbidden by their Apostleship from earning their livelihood by a lawful craft, provided they had no other means of living. For if the blessed Paul used not that power which he had with the rest of the preachers of the Gospel, as they did, but went a warfare upon his own resources, lest the Gentiles, who were aliens from the name of Christ, might be offended at a doctrine apparently venal; if, educated in another way, he learnt a craft he never knew before, that, while the teacher worked with his own hands, the hearer might not be burdened; much more might Peter, who had been a fisherman, work at what he knew, if he had nothing else to live upon at the time. But how had he not, some one will ask, when our Lord promises, Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you? (Matt. 6:33) Our Lord, we answer, fulfilled this promise, by bringing them the fishes to catch: for who else brought them? He did not bring upon them that poverty which obliged them to go fishing, except in order to exhibit a miracle1.

GREGORY. (Hom. lxxxiv.) The craft which was exercised without sin before conversion, was no sin after it. Wherefore after his conversion Peter returned to fishing; but Matthew sat not down again for the receipt of custom (ad telonii negotium resedit). For there are some businesses which cannot or can hardly be carried on without sin; and these cannot be returned to after conversion.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) The other disciples followed Peter: They say unto him, We also go with thee; for from this time they were all bound together; and they wished too to see the fishing: They went forth and entered into a ship immediately. And that night they caught nothing. They fished in the night, from fear.

GREGORY. (Hom.) The fishing was made to be very unlucky, in order to raise their astonishment at the miracle after: And that night they caught nothing.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) In the midst of their labour and distress, Jesus presented Himself to them: But when the morning was now come, Jesus stood on the shore: but the disciples knew not that it was Jesus. He did not make Himself known to them immediately, but entered into conversation; and first He speaks after human fashion: Then Jesus saith unto them, Children, have ye any meat? as if He wished to beg some of them. They answered, No. He then gives them a sign to know Him by: And He said unto them, Cast the net on the right side of the ship, and ye shall find. They cast therefore, and now they were not able to draw it for the multitude of fishes. The recognition of Him brings out Peter and John in their different tempers of mind; the one fervid, the other sublime; the one ready, the other penetrating. John is the first to recognise our Lord: Therefore that disciple whom Jesus loved saith unto Peter, It is the Lord; Peter is the first to come to Him: Now when Simon Peter heard that it was the Lord, he girt his fisher’s coat unto Him, for he was naked.

BEDE. The Evangelist alludes to himself here the same way he always does. He recognised our Lord either by the miracle, or by the sound of His voice, or the association of former occasions on which He found them fishing. Peter was naked in comparison with the usual dress he wore, in the sense in which we say to a person whom we meet thinly clad, You are quite bare. Peter was hare for convenience sake, as fishermen are in fishing.

THEOPHYLACT. Peter's girding himself is a sign of modesty. He girt himself with a linen coat, such as Thamian and Tyrian fishermen throw over them, when they have nothing else on, or even over their other clothes.

BEDE. He went to Jesus with the ardour with which he did every thing: And did cast himself into the sea. And the other disciples came in a little ship. We must not understand here that Peter walked on the top of the water, but either swam, or walked through the water, being very near the land: For they were not far from land, but as it were about two hundred cubits.

GLOSS. A parenthesis; for it follows, dragging the net with fishes. The order is, The other disciples came in a little ship, dragging the net with fishes.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) Another miracle follows: As soon then as they were come to land, they saw a fire of coals there, and fish laid thereon, and bread. He no longer works upon already existing materials, but in a still more wonderful way; shewing that it was only in condescension1 that He wrought His miracles upon existing matter before His crucifixion.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) We must not understand that the bread was laid on the coals, but read it as if it stood, They saw a fire of coals there, and fish laid on the coals; and they saw bread.

THEOPHYLACT. To shew that it was no vision, He bade them take of the fish they had caught. Jesus saith unto them, Bring of the fish which ye have now caught. Another miracle follows; viz. that the net was not broken by the number of fish: Simon Peter went up, and drew the net to land full of great fishes, an hundred and fifty and three: and for all there were so many, yet was not the net broken.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) Mystically, in the draught of fishes He signified the mystery1 of the Church, such as it will be at the final resurrection of the dead. And to make this clearer, it is put near the end of the book. The number seven, which is the number of the disciples who were fishing, signifies the end of time; for time is counted by periods of seven days.

THEOPHYLACT. In the night time before the presence of the sun, Christ, the Prophets took nothing; for though they endeavoured to correct the people, yet these often fell into idolatry.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxiv.) It may be asked, why after His resurrection He stood on the shore to receive the disciples, whereas before He walked on the sea? The sea signifies the world, which is tossed about with various causes of tumults, and the waves of this corruptible life; the shore by its solidity figures the rest eternal. The disciples then, inasmuch as they were still upon the waves of this mortal life, were labouring on the sea; but the Redeemer having by His resurrection thrown off the corruption of the flesh, stood upon the shore.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) The shore is the end of the sea, and therefore signifies the end of the world. The Church is here typified as she will be at the end of the world, just as other draughts of fishes typified her as she is now. Jesus before did not stand on the shore, but went into a ship which was Simon’s, and asked him to put out a little from the land. In a former draught the nets are not thrown to the right, or to the left, so that the good or the bad should be typified alone, but indifferently: Let down your nets for a draught, (Luke 5:4) meaning that the good and bad were mixed together. But here it is, Cast the net on the right side of the ship; to signify those who should stand on the right hand, the good. The one our Lord did at the beginning of His ministry, the other after His resurrection, shewing therein that the former draught of fishes signified the mixture of bad and good, which composes the Church at present; the latter the good alone, which it will contain in eternity, when the world is ended, and the resurrection of the dead completed. But they who belong to the resurrection of life, i. e. to the right hand, and are caught within the net of the Christian name, shall only appear on the shore, i. e. at the end of the world, after the resurrection: wherefore they were not able to draw the net into the ship, and unload the fishes, as they were before. The Church keeps these of the right hand, after death, in the sleep of peace, as it were in the deep, till the net come to shore. That the first draught was taken in two little ships, the last two hundred cubits from land, a hundred and a hundred, typifies, I think, the two classes of elect, circumcised and uncircumcised.

BEDE. By the two hundred cubits is signified the twofold grace of love; the love of God and the love of our neighbour; for by them we approach to Christ. The fish broiled is Christ Who suffered. He deigned to be hid in the waters of human nature, and to be taken in the net of our night; and having become a fish by the taking of humanity, became bread to refresh us by His divinity.

GREGORY. To Peter was the holy Church committed; to him is it specially said, Feed My sheep. That then which is afterwards declared by word, is now signified by act. He it is who draws the fishes to the firm shore, because he it was who pointed out the stability of the eternal country to the faithful. This he did by word of mouth, by epistles; this he does daily by signs and miracles. After saying that the net was full of great fishes, the number follows: Full of great fishes, an hundred and fifty and three.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) In the draught before, the number of the fishes is not mentioned, as if in fulfilment of the prophecy in the Psalm, If I should declare them, and speak of them, they should be more than I am able to express; (Ps. 41:7) but here there is a certain number mentioned, which we must explain. The number which signifies the law is ten, from the ten Commandments. But when to the law is joined grace, to the letter spirit, the number seven is brought in, that being the number which represents the Holy Spirit, to Whom sanctification properly belongs. For sanctification was first heard of in the law, with respect to the seventh day; and Isaiah praises the Holy Spirit for His sevenfold work and office. The seven of the Spirit added to the ten of the law make seventeen; and the numbers from one up to seventeen when added together, make a hundred and fifty-three.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxiv.) Seven and ten multiplied by three make fifty-one. The fiftieth year was a year of rest to the whole people from all their work. In unity is true rest; for where division is, true rest cannot be.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) It is not then signified that only a hundred and fifty-three saints are to rise again to eternal life, but this number represents all who partake of the grace of the Holy Spirit: which number too contains three fifties, and three over, with reference to the mystery of the Trinity. And the number fifty is made up of seven sevens, and one in addition, signifying that those sevens are one. That they were great fishes too, is not without meaning. For when our Lord says, I came not to destroy the law, but to fulfil, by giving, that is, the Holy Spirit through Whom the law can be fulfilled, He says almost immediately after, Whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. In the first draught the net was broken, to signify schisms; but here to shew that in that perfect peace of the blessed there would be no schisms, the Evangelist continues: And for all they were so great1, yet was not the net broken; as if alluding to the case before, in which it was broken, and making a favourable comparison.

21:12–14

12. Jesus saith unto them, Come and dine. And none of the disciples durst ask him, Who art thou? knowing that it was the Lord.

13. Jesus then cometh, and taketh bread, and giveth them, and fish likewise.

14. This is now the third time that Jesus shewed himself to his disciples, after that he was risen from the dead.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiii) The fishing being over, our Lord invites them to dine: Jesus saith unto them, Come and dine.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvi) John does not say that He ate with them, but Luke does. He ate however not to satisfy the wants of nature, but to shew the reality of His resurrection.

AUGUSTINE. (xiii. de Civ. Dei, c. xxii) The bodies of the just, when they rise again, shall need neither the word of life that they die not of disease, or old age, nor any bodily nourishment to prevent hunger and thirst. For they shall be endowed with a sure and inviolable gift of immortality, that they shall not eat of necessity, but only be able to eat if they will. Not the power, but the need of eating and drinking shall be taken away from them; in like manner as our Saviour after His resurrection took meat and drink with His disciples, with spiritual but still real flesh, not for the sake of nourishment, but in exercise of a power.

And none of His disciples durst ask Him, who art Thou? knowing that it was the Lord.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) No one dared to doubt that it was He, much less deny it; so evident was it. Had any one doubted, he would have asked.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) He means that they had not confidence to talk to Him, as before, but sat looking at Him in silence and awe, absorbed in regarding His altered and now supernatural form, and unwilling to ask any question. Knowing that it was the Lord, they were in fear, and only ate what, in exercise of His great power, He had created. He again does not look up to heaven, or do any thing after a human sort, thus shewing that His former acts of that kind were done only in condescension: Jesus then cometh, and taketh bread, and giveth them, and fish likewise.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiii. 2) Mystically, the fried fish is Christ Who suffered. And He is the bread that came down from heaven. To Him the Church is united to His body for participation of eternal bliss. Wherefore He says, Bring of the fishes which ye have now caught; to signify that all of us who have this hope, and are in that septenary number of disciples, which represents the universal Church here, partake of this great sacrament, and are admitted to this bliss.

GREGORY. (Hom. xxiv.) By holding this last feast with seven disciples, he declares that they only who are full of the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit, shall be with Him in the eternal feast. Time also is reckoned by periods of seven days, and perfection is often designated by the number seven. They therefore feast upon the presence of the Truth in that last banquet, who now strive for perfection.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) Inasmuch, however, as He did not converse with them regularly, or in the same way as before, the Evangelist adds, This is now the third time that Jesus shewed Himself to His disciples, after that He was risen from the dead.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiii. 3) Which has reference not to manifestations, but to days; i. e. the first day after He had risen, eight days after that, when Thomas saw and believed, and this day at the draught of fishes; and thenceforward as often as He saw them, up to the time of His ascension.

AUGUSTINE. (de Con. Evang. iii. 25.) We find in the four Evangelists ten occasions mentioned, on which our Lord was seen after His resurrection: one at the sepulchre by the women; a second by the women returning from the sepulchre; a third by Peter; a fourth by the two going to1 Emmaus; a fifth in Jerusalem, when Thomas was not present; a sixth when Thomas saw Him; a seventh at the sea of Tiberias; an eighth by all the eleven on a mountain of Galilee, mentioned by Matthew; a ninth when for the last time He sat at meat with the disciples; a tenth when He was seen no longer upon earth, but high up on a cloud.

21:15–17

15. So when they had dined, Jesus saith to Simon Peter, Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me more than these? He saith unto him, Yea, Lord; thou knowest that I love thee. He saith unto him, Feed my lambs.

16. He saith to him again the second time, Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me? He saith unto him, Yea, Lord; thou knowest that I love thee. He saith unto him, Feed my sheep.

17. He saith unto him the third time, Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me? Peter was grieved because he said unto him the third time, Lovest thou me? And he said unto him, Lord, thou knowest all things; thou knowest that I love thee. Jesus saith unto him, Feed my sheep.

THEOPHYLACT. The dinner being ended, He commits to Peter the superintendence over the sheep of the world, not to the others: So when they had dined, Jesus saith to Simon Peter, Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou Me more than these?

AUGUSTINE. Our Lord asked this, knowing it: He knew that Peter not only loved Him, but loved Him more than all the rest.

ALCUIN. He is called Simon, son of John, John being his natural father. But mystically, Simon is obedience, John grace, a name well befitting him who was so obedient to God’s grace, that he loved our Lord more ardently than any of the others. Such virtue arising from divine gift, not mere human will.

AUGUSTINE. While our Lord was being condemned to death, he feared, and denied Him. But by His resurrection Christ implanted love in his heart, and drove away fear. Peter denied, because he feared to die: but when our Lord was risen from the dead, and by His death destroyed death, what should he fear? He saith unto Him, Yea, Lord; Thou knowest that I love Thee. On this confession of his love, our Lord commends His sheep to him: He saith unto him, Feed My lambs: as if there were no way of Peter’s shewing his love for Him, but by being a faithful shepherd, under the chief Shepherd.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii. 1) That which most of all attracts the Divine love is care and love for our neighbour. Our Lord passing by the rest, addresses this command to Peter: he being the chief of the Apostles, the mouth of the disciples, and head of the college. Our Lord remembers no more his sin in denying Him, or brings that as a charge against him, but commits to him at once the superintendence over his brethren. If thou lovest Me, have rule over thy brethren, shew forth that love which thou hast evidenced throughout, and that life which thou saidst thou wouldest lay down for Me, lay down for the sheep.

He saith to him again the second time, Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou Me? He saith unto Him, Yea, Lord; Thou knowest that I love Thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxii) Well doth He say to Peter, Lovest thou Me (ἀγαπᾶς diligis), and Peter answer, Amo Te (φελῶ amo), and our Lord replies again, Feed My lambs. Whereby, it appears that amor and dilectio are the same thing: especially as our Lord the third time He speaks does not say, Diligis Me, but Amas Me. He saith unto him the third time, Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou Me? A third time our Lord asks Peter whether he loves Him. Three confessions are made to answer to the three denials; that the tongue might shew as much love as it had fear, and life gained draw out the voice as much as death threatened.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii) A third time He asks the same question, and gives the same command; to shew of what importance He esteems the superintendence of His own sheep, and how He regards it as the greatest proof of love to Him.

THEOPHYLACT. Thence is taken the custom of threefold confession in baptism.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii) The question asked for the third time disturbed him: Peter was grieved because He said unto him the third time, Lovest thou Me? He was afraid perhaps of receiving a reproof again for professing to love more than he did. So he appeals to Christ Himself: And he said unto Him, Lord, Thou knowest all things, i. e. the secrets of the heart, present and to come.

AUGUSTINE. (de Verb. Dom. serm. 50) He was grieved because he was asked so often by Him Who knew what He asked, and gave the answer. He replies therefore from his inmost heart; Thou knowest that I love Thee.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiv) He says no more, He only replies what he knew himself; he knew he loved Him; whether any else loved Him he could not tell, as he could not see into another’s heart: (non occ.). Jesus saith unto him, Feed My sheep; as if to say, Be it the office of love to feed the Lord’s flock, as it was the resolution of fear to deny the Shepherd.

THEOPHYLACT. There is a difference perhaps between lambs and sheep. The lambs are those just initiated, the sheep are the perfected.

ALCUIN. To feed the sheep is to support the believers in Christ from falling from the faith, to provide earthly sustenance for those under us, to preach and exemplify withal our preaching by our lives, to resist adversaries, to correct wanderers.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiii) They who feed Christ’s sheep, as if they were their own, not Christ’s, shew plainly that they love themselves, not Christ; that they are moved by lust of glory, power, gain, not by the love of obeying, ministering, pleasing God. Let us love therefore, not ourselves, but Him, and in feeding His sheep, seek not our own, but the things which are His. For whoso loveth himself, not God, loveth not himself: man that cannot live of himself, must die by loving himself; and he cannot love himself, who loves himself to his own destruction. Whereas when He by Whom we live is loved, we love ourselves the more, because we do not love ourselves; because we do not love ourselves in order that we may love Him by Whom we live.

AUGUSTINE. (Serm. Pass.) But unfaithful servants arose, who divided Christ’s flock, and handed down the division to their successors: and you hear them say, Those sheep are mine, what seekest thou with my sheep, I will not let thee come to my sheep. If we call our sheep ours, as they call them theirs, Christ hath lost His sheep.

21:18–19

18. Verily, verily, I say unto thee, When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself, and walkedst whither thou wouldest: but when thou shalt be old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hands, and another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldest not.

19. This spake he, signifying by what death he should glorify God.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxvii) Our Lord having made Peter declare his love, informs him of his future martyrdom; an intimation to us how we should love: Verily, verily, I say unto thee, When thou wast young, thou girdedst thyself, and walkedst whither thou wouldest. He reminds him of his former life, because, whereas in worldly matters a young man has powers, an old man none; in spiritual things, on the contrary, virtue is brighter, manliness stronger, in old age; age is no hindrance to grace. Peter had all along desired to share Christ's dangers; so Christ tells him, Be of good cheer; I will fulfil thy desire in such a way, that what thou hast not suffered when young, thou shalt suffer when old: But when thou art old. Whence it appears, that he was then neither a young nor an old man, but in the prime of life.

ORIGEN. (super. Matt.) It is not easy to find any ready to pass at once from this life; and so he says to Peter, When thou art old, thou shalt stretch forth thy hand.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiii. 5) That is, shalt be crucified. And to come to this end, Another shall gird thee, and carry thee whither thou wouldest not. First He said what would come to pass, secondly, how it would come to pass. For it was not when crucified, but when about to be crucified, that he was led whither he would not. He wished to be released from the body, and be with Christ; but, if it were possible, he wished to attain to eternal life without the pains of death: to which he went against his will, but conquered by the force of his will, and triumphing over the human feeling, so natural a one, that even old age could not deprive Peter of it. But whatever be the pain of death, it ought to be conquered by the strength of love for Him, Who being our life, voluntarily also underwent death for us. For if there is no pain in death, or very little, the glory of martyrdom would not be great.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii) He says, Whither thou wouldest not, with reference to the natural reluctance of the soul to be separated from the body; an instinct implanted by God to prevent men putting an end to themselves. Then raising the subject, the Evangelist says, This spake He, signifying by what death he should glorify God: not, should die: he expresses himself so, to intimate that to suffer for Christ was the glory of the sufferer. (non occ.). But unless the mind is persuaded that He is very God, the sight of Him can in no way enable us to endure death. Wherefore the death of the saints is certainty of divine glory.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiii) He who denied and loved, died in perfect love for Him, for Whom he had promised to die with wrong haste. It was necessary that Christ should first die for Peter's salvation, and then Peter die for Christ's Gospel.

21:19–23

19. And when he had spoken this, he saith unto him, Follow me.

20. Then Peter, turning about, seeth the disciple whom Jesus loved following; which also leaned on his breast at supper, and said, Lord, which is he that betrayeth thee?

21. Peter seeing him saith to Jesus, Lord, and what shall this man do?

22. Jesus saith unto him, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? follow thou me.

23. Then went this saying abroad among the brethren, that that disciple should not die: yet Jesus said not unto him, He shall not die; but, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiv) Our Lord having foretold to Peter by what death he should glorify God, bids him follow Him. And when He had spoken this, He saith unto him, Follow Me. Why does He say, Follow Me, to Peter, and not to the others who were present, who as disciples were following their Master? Or if we understand it of his martyrdom, was Peter the only one who died for the Christian truth? Was not James put to death by Herod? Some one will say that James was not crucified, and that this was fitly addressed to Peter, because he not only died, but suffered the death of the cross, as Christ did.

THEOPHYLACT. Peter hearing that he was to suffer death for Christ, asks whether John was to die: Then Peter, turning about, seeth the disciple whom Jesus loved following; which also leaned on His breast at supper, and said, Lord, which is he that betrayeth Thee? Peter seeing him saith to Jesus, Lord, and what shall this man do?

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiv) He calls himself the disciple whom Jesus loved, because Jesus had a greater and more familiar love for him, than for the rest; so that He made him lie on His breast at supper. In this way John the more commends the divine excellency of that Gospel which he preached. Some think, and they no contemptible commentators upon

Scripture, that the reason why John was loved more than the rest, was, because he had lived in perfect chastity from his youth up. Then went this saying abroad among the brethren, that that disciple should not die: yet Jesus said not unto him, He shall not die; but, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?

THEOPHYLACT. i. e. Shall he not die?

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiv) Jesus saith unto him, What is that to thee? and He then repeats, Follow thou Me, as if John would not follow Him, because he wished to remain till He came; Then went this saying abroad among the disciples, that that disciple should not die. Was it not a natural inference of the disciple's? But John himself does away with such a notion: Yet Jesus said not unto him, He shall not die; but, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? But if any so will, let him contradict, and say that what John says is true, viz. that our Lord did not say that that disciple should not die, but that nevertheless this was signified by using such words as John records.

THEOPHYLACT. Or let him say, Christ did not deny that John was to die, for whatever is born dies; but said, I will that he tarry till I come, i. e. to live to the end of the world, and then he shall suffer martyrdom for Me. And therefore they confess that he still lives, but will be killed by Antichrist, and will preach Christ's name with Elias. But if his sepulchre be objected, then they say that he entered in alive, and went out of it afterwards.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiv.) Or perhaps he will allow that John still lies in his sepulchre at Ephesus, but asleep, not dead; and will give us a proof, that the soil over his grave is moist and watery, owing to his respiration. But why should our Lord grant it as a great privilege to the disciple whom He loved, that he should sleep this long time in the body, when he released Peter front the burden of the flesh by a glorious martyrdom, and gave him what Paul had longed for, when he said, I have a desire to depart and be with Christ? If there really takes place at John's grave that which report says, it is either done to commend his precious death, since that had not martyrdom to commend it, or for some other cause not known to us. Yet the question remains, Why did our Lord say of one who was about to die, I will that he tarry till I come? It may be asked too why our Lord loved John the most, when Peter loved our Lord the most? I might easily reply, that the one who loved Christ the more, was the better man, and the one whom Christ loved the more, the more blessed; only this would not be a defence of our Lord’s justice. This important question then I will endeavour to answer. The Church acknowledges two modes of life, as divinely revealed, that by faith, and that by sight. The one is represented by the Apostle Peter, in respect of the primacy of his Apostleship; the other by John: wherefore to the one it is said, Follow Me, i. e. imitate Me in enduring temporal sufferings; of the other it is said, I will that he tarry till I come: as if to say, Do thou follow Me, by the endurance of temporal sufferings, let him remain till I come to give everlasting bliss; or to open out the meaning more, Let action be perfected by following the example of My Passion, but let contemplation wait inchoate till at My coming it be completed: wait, not simply remain, continue, but wait for its completion at Christ’s coming. Now in this life of action it is true, the more we love Christ, the more we are freed from sin; but He does not love us as we are, He frees us from sin, that we may not always remain as we are, but He loves us heretofore rather, because hereafter we shall not have that which displeases Him, and which He frees us from. So then let Peter love Him, that we may be freed from this mortality; let John be loved by Him, that we may be preserved in that immortality. John loved less than Peter, because, as he represented that life in which we are much more loved, our Lord said, I will that he remain (i. e. wait) till I come; seeing that that greater love we have not yet, but wait till we have it at His coming. And this intermediate state is represented by Peter who loves, but is loved less, for Christ loves us in our misery less than in our blessedness: and we again love the contemplation of truth such as it will be then, less in our present state, because as yet we neither know nor have it. But let none separate those illustrious Apostles; that which Peter represented, and that which John represented, both were sometime to be.

GLOSS. I will that he tarry, i. e. I will not that he suffer martyrdom, but wait for the quiet dissolution of the flesh, when I shall come and receive him into eternal blessedness.

THEOPHYLACT. When our Lord says to Peter, Follow Me, He confers upon him the superintendence over all the faithful, and at the same time bids him imitate Him in every thing, word and work. He shews too His affection for Peter; for those who are most dear to us, we bid follow us.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii. 2) But if it be asked, How then did James assume the see of Jerusalem? I answer, that our Lord enthroned Peter, not as Bishop of this see, but as Doctor of the whole world: Then Peter, turning about, seeth the disciple whom Jesus loved following, which also leaned on his breast at supper. It is not without meaning that that circumstance of leaning on His breast is mentioned, but to shew what confidence Peter had after his denial. For he who at the supper dared not ask himself, but gave his question to John to put, has the superintendence over his brethren committed to him, and whereas before he gave a question which concerned himself to another to put, he now asks questions himself of his Master concerning others. Our Lord then having foretold such great things of him, and committed the world to him, and prophesied his martyrdom, and made known his greater love, Peter wishing to have John admitted to a share of this calling, says, And what shall this man do? as if to say, Will he not go the same way with us? For Peter had great love for John, as appears from the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles, which give many proofs of their close friendship. So Peter does John the same turn, that John had done him; thinking that he wanted to ask about himself, but was afraid, he puts the question for him. However, inasmuch as they were now going to have the care of the world committed to them, and could not remain together without injury to their charge, our Lord says, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? as if to say, Attend to the work committed to thee, and do it: if I will that he abide here, what is that to thee?

THEOPHYLACT. Some have understood, Till I come, to mean, Till I come to punish the Jews who have crucified Me, and strike them with the Roman rod. For they say that this Apostle lived up to the time of Vespasian, who took Jerusalem, and dwelt near when it was taken. Or, Till I come, i. e. till I give him the commission to preach, for to you I commit now the pontificate of the world: and in this follow Me, but let him remain till I come and call him, as I do thee now.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii) The Evangelist then corrects the opinion taken up by the disciples.

21:24–25

24. This is the disciple which testifieth of these things, and wrote these things: and we know that his testimony is true.

25. And there are also many other things which Jesus did, the which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written. Amen.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii. 2) John appeals to his own knowledge of these events, having been witness of them: This is the disciple which testifieth of these things. When we assert any undoubted fact in common life, we do not withhold our testimony: much less would he, who wrote by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. (Acts 2:32) And thus the other Apostles, And we are witnesses of these things, and wrote these things. John is only one who appeals to his own testimony; and he does so, because he was the last who wrote. And for this reason he often mentions Christ's love for him, i. e. to shew the motive which led him to write, and to give weight to his history. And we know that his testimony is true. He was present at every event, even at the crucifixion, when our Lord committed His mother to him; circumstances which both shew Christ's love, and his own importance as a witness. But if any believe not, let him consider what follows: And there are also many other things which Jesus did. If, when there were so many things to relate, I have not said so much as the other, and have selected often reproaches and contumelies in preference to other things, it is evident that I have not written partially. One who wants to shew another off to advantage does the very contrary, omits the dishonourable parts.

AUGUSTINE. (Tract. cxxiv. 8) The which, if they should be written every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written; meaning not the world had not space for them, but that the capacity of readers was not large enough to hold them: though sometimes words themselves may exceed the truth, and yet the thing they express be true; a mode of speech which is used not to explain an obscure and doubtful, but to magnify or estimate a plain, thing: nor does it involve any departure from the path of truth; inasmuch as the excess of the word over the truth is evidently only a figure of speech, and not a deception. This way of speaking the Greeks call hyperbole, and it is found in other parts of Scripture.

CHRYSOSTOM. (Hom. lxxxviii) This is said to shew the power of Him Who did the miracles; i. e. that it was as easy for Him to do them, as it is for us to speak of them, seeing He is God over all, blessed for ever.

COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE’S DE ANIMA

BOOK ONE

TEXT

402a1–403b2

BOOK I, CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY. THE IMPORTANCE AND DIFFICULTY OF THE STUDY OF THE SOUL

Holding as we do that knowledge is a good and honourable thing, yet that some kinds of knowledge are more so than others, either because they are more certain or because they deal with subjects more excellent and wonderful, we naturally give a primary place, for both these reasons, to an enquiry about the soul. §§ 1-6

Indeed an acquaintance with the soul would seem to help much in acquiring all truth, especially about the natural world; for it is, as it were, the principle of living things. § 7

We seek then to consider and understand, first, its nature and essence, then whatever qualities belong to it. Of these, some seem to be proper to the soul alone, others to be shared m common’ and to exist in animate beings on account of it. §8

To ascertain, however, anything reliable about it is one of the most difficult of undertakings. Such an enquiry being Common to many topics—I mean, an enquiry into the essence, and what each thing is—it might seem to some that one definite procedure were available for all things of which we wished to know the essence; as there is demonstration for the accidental properties of things. So we should have to discover what is this one method. But if there is no one method for determining what an essence is, our enquiry becomes decidedly more difficult, and we shall have to find a procedure for each case in particular. If, on the other hand, it is clear that either demonstration, or division, or some such process is to be employed, there are still many queries and uncertainties to which answers must be found. For the principles in different subject matters are different, for instance in the case of numbers and surfaces. Perhaps the first thing needed is to divide off the genus of the subject and to say what sort of thing it is,—I mean, whether it be a particular thing or substance, or a quality, or quantity, or any other of the different categories. Further, whether it is among things in potency or is an actuality—no insignificant distinction. Again, whether it is divisible or indivisible, and whether every soul is of the same sort or no: and if not, whether they differ specifically or generically. Indeed those who at present talk of and discuss the soul seem to deal only with the human soul. One must be careful not to leave unexplored the question whether there is a single definition of it, as of 'animal' in general, or a different one for each [of its kinds]: as, say, for horse, dog, man or god. Now 'animal' as a universal is nothing real, or is secondary; and we must say the same of any other general predicate. §§ 9-13

Further, if there are not many souls, but only many parts of a single one, we must ask whether one ought to look first at the whole or the parts. It is difficult to see what parts are by nature diverse from one another, and whether one ought to look first at the parts or their functions, for instance at the act of understanding or at the intellective power, at the act of sensing or at the sensitive faculty; and likewise in other in stances. But if one is to examine first the operations, it might be asked whether one should not first enquire about their objects, as, in the sensitive function, the thing sensed; and in the intellectual, the thing intelligible. § 14

Now, it seems that not only does knowledge of the essence help one to understand the causes of the accidents of any substance (as in Mathematics to know what is the straight and the curved, and what is a line and what a plane enables one to discover the number of right angles to which those of a triangle are equal) but, conversely, accidental qualities contribute much to knowing, what a thing essentially is. When we can give an account of such qualities (some or all) according to appearances, then we shall have material for dealing as well as possible with the essence. The principle of every demonstration is what a thing is. Hence, whatsoever definitions do not afford us a knowledge of accidents, or even a fair conjecture about them, are obviously vain and sophistical. § 15

LECTIO ONE

§ 1. in studying any class of things, it is first of all necessary, as the Philosopher says in the De Animalibus [I, 5], to consider separately what is common to the class as a whole, and afterwards what is proper to particular members of the class. Such is Aristotle's method in First Philosophy; for at the beginning of the Metaphysics he investigates the common properties of being as such, and only then does he go on to the particular kinds of being. The reason for this procedure is that it saves frequent repetition.

Now living beings taken all together form a certain class of being; hence in studying them the first thing to do is to consider what living things have in common, and afterwards what each has peculiar to itself. What they have in common is a life-principle or soul; in this they are all alike. In conveying knowledge, therefore, about living things one must first convey it about the soul as that which is common to them all. Thus when Aristotle sets out to treat of living things, he begins with the soul; after which, in subsequent books, he defines the properties of particular living beings.

§ 2. In the present treatise on the soul we find, first, an Introduction: in which the author does the three things that should be done in any Introduction. For in writing an Introduction one has three objects in view: first, to gain the reader's good will; secondly, to dispose him to learn; thirdly, to win his attention. The first object one achieves by showing the reader the value of the knowledge in question; the second by explaining the plan and divisions of the treatise; the third by warning him of its difficulties. And all this Aristotle does here. First, he points out the high value of the science he is introducing. Secondly, at 'We seek then,' he explains the plan of the treatise. Thirdly, at 'To ascertain anything reliable' he warns of its difficulty. Under the first point he explains, first the dignity of this science, and then, at 'Indeed, an acquaintance,' its utility.

§ 3. As regards, then, the said dignity we should note that, while all knowledge is good and even honourable, one science can surpass another in this respect. All knowledge is obviously good because the good of anything is that which belongs to the fulness of being which all things seek after and desire; and man as man reaches fulness of being through knowledge. Now of good things some are just valuable, namely, those which are useful in view of some end—as we value a good horse because it runs well; whilst other good things are also honourable: namely, those that exist for their own sake; for we give honour to ends, not means. Of the sciences some are practical, others speculative; the difference being that the former are for the sake of some work to be done, while the latter arc for their own sake. The speculative sciences are therefore honourable as well as good, but the practical are only valuable. Every speculative science is both good and honourable.

§ 4. Yet even among the speculative sciences there are degrees of goodness and honourableness. Every science is valued first of all as a kind of activity, and the worth of any activity is reckoned in two ways: from its object and from its mode or quality. Thus building is a better activity than bed-making because its object is better. But where the activities are the same in kind, and result in the same thing, the quality ‘alone makes a difference; if a building is better built it will be a better building. Considering then science, or its activity, from the point of view of the object, that science is nobler which is concerned with better and nobler things; but from the point of view of mode or quality, the nobler science is that which is more certain. One science, then, is reckoned nobler than another, either because it concerns better and nobler objects or because it is more certain.

§ 5. Now there is this difference between sciences, that some excel in certainty and yet are concerned with inferior objects, while others with higher and better objects are nevertheless less certain. All the same, that science is the better which is about things; because, as the Philosopher observes in Book XI of the De Animalibus, we have a greater desire for even a little knowledge of noble and exalted things—even for a conjectural and probable sort of knowledge—than for a great and certain knowledge of inferior things. For the former is noble in itself and essential, but the latter only through its quality or mode.

§ 6. Now this science of the soul has both merits. It has certainty; for everyone knows by experience that he has a soul which is his life-principle. Also it has a high degree of nobility; for among lower things the soul has a special nobility. This is what Aristotle means here when he says, ‘Holding as we do that knowledge’, i.e. speculative science, ‘is good and honourable.’ And one science is better and nobler than another in two ways:

either, as we have seen, because it is more certain—hence he says ‘more certain’,—or because it is about ‘more excellent’ things, i.e. things that are good in themselves, and ‘more wonderful things’, i.e. things whose cause is unknown. ‘For both these reasons’, he goes on to say, ‘we give a primary place to an enquiry about the soul’. He uses the term ‘enquiry’ because he is going to discuss the soul in a general way, without attempting, in this treatise, a thorough examination of all its properties. As to the words ‘a primary place’, if they are taken as applying to the whole of Natural Science, then they refer to superiority in dignity and not to priority in order; but if they refer to the science of living things only, they mean priority of order.

§ 7. Then, with ‘Indeed an acquaintance etc.,’ he gains the reader’s good will by showing the utility of this science. Some knowledge of the soul he says, would seem to be very useful in all the other sciences. it can be of considerable service to philosophy in general. In First Philosophy it is impossible to attain knowledge of the divine and highest causes except through what we can acquire by actualising our intellectual power; and if we knew nothing about the nature of this power we should know nothing about the immaterial substances, as the Commentator remarks à propos of Book XI of the Metaphysics. Again, as regards Moral Philosophy. We cannot master the science of morals unless we know the powers of the soul; thus in the Ethics the Philosopher assigns the virtues to the different powers. So, too, it is useful for the Natural Scientist, because many of the things he studies are animate things, all of whose movements originate in the soul: ‘for it is,’ says Aristotle, ‘as it were, the principle of living things’: the phrase ‘as it were’ does not express a comparison; it is descriptive.

§ 8. Next, at ‘We seek then’, he states the plan of his treatise, saying that we are ‘to consider’, i.e. by way of outward symptoms, and ‘to understand’, i.e. by way of demonstration, what the soul really is in its nature and essence; and then whatever qualities belong to it or affect it. But in the latter a diversity appears: for while some of the soul’s modifications, such as understanding and speculative knowledge, seem to belong to the soul of and in itself, others, such as pleasure and pain, the senses and imagination, though they depend on some soul or other, seem to be common to all animals.

§ 9. Then at ‘To ascertain’, he introduces the difficulty of this study; and this from two points of view. It is hard, first, to know the essence of the soul, and secondly to know its accidents or characteristic qualities. As to the essence, there is a double difficulty: first, as to how it ought to be defined, and then as to the elements of the definition (this point comes at ‘Perhaps the first thing needed’).

He remarks, therefore, that while knowledge of the soul would be valuable, it is not easy to know just what the soul is. Now this is a difficulty in studying anything; for the question about substance and essence is common to the study of soul and of many other things; the first difficulty being that we do not know what method to use; for some say we should use deductive demonstration, others the method of elimination, others one of comparison. Aristotle himself preferred the method of comparison.

§ 10. The second difficulty concerns the elements of the definition. A definition manifests a thing’s essence; and this cannot be grasped apart from the principles on which it depends. But different things have different principles, and it is hard to see which principle is involved in any particular thing. Hence, in formulating or seeking for a definition of soul we encounter three main difficulties: (a) concerning its essence; (b) concerning its parts; (c) concerning that necessary contribution to a definition which comes from knowing the soul’s accidental qualities.

§ 11. As regards the essence of soul, there is a doubt about that which is the first thing to be looked for in defining anything, i.e. the genus to which it belongs. What is the genus of soul? Is it a substance or a quantity or a quality? And not only must we decide upon the ultimate genus, but also on the proximate one; thus we do not define man as a substance, but as an animal. And if soul is found to belong to the genus of substance we shall still have to decide whether it is actual or potential substance, since every genus can be regarded both as potential and as actual. Also, since substances are either composite or simple, we shall have to ask which is one or the other and whether it is divisible or indivisible. There is also the question whether all souls are of the same species or not; and if they are not, whether they are generically different or not. Again there is uncertainty as to what is to be included in the definition, some things being defined in terms of genus, some as species; hence the question whether we should define soul in terms of genus or as the specification of a species.,

§ 12. For some enquirers seem to have in view only the human soul. Among the earlier philosophers there were two opinions about soul. The Platonists, holding that universals existed separately as the Forms or Ideas that caused knowledge and being in individual things, maintained that there was a Soul-in-Itself which was the cause and ‘idea’ of particular souls and from which all that we find in these drew its origin. On the other hand were the Natural Philosophers who maintained that no universal substances existed in the real world, that the only real things were individuals. And this raises the question for us, whether we, like the Platonists, ought to look for one common idea of Soul; or rather, as the Natural Philosophers said, study this or that particular soul, e.g. of horse or man, or god. He says ‘or god’ because at that time men believed that the heavenly bodies were gods, and that they were alive.

§ 13. However, Aristotle chose to seek a definition of both—of Soul in general and of each kind of soul. But when he says, on this point, that ‘animal as universal is nothing real, or is secondary’, we must understand that one can speak of a ‘universal animal’ in two ways: either as universal, i.e. as one nature existing in, or predicated of, many individuals; or as animal. And both these aspects can be regarded either in relation to existence in the real world or as existing in the mind. As regards existence in the real, world, Plato held that the universal animal did so exist and existed prior to particular animals; because, as has been said, he thought that there were universals and ideas with an independent existence. Aristotle, however, said that the universal as such had no real existence, and that if it was anything at all it came after the individual thing. But if we regard the nature of animals from a different point of view, i.e. not as a universal, then it is indeed something real, and it precedes the individual animal as the potential precedes the actual.

§ 14. Then, at ‘Further, if there are not many’, Aristotle touches on the difficulties that arise concerning the soul’s potentialities. For, in, the soul are ‘parts’ that exist as potencies: the intellectual and sensitive and vegetative ‘parts’. The question is whether these are different souls, as the Platonists liked to think (and even maintained), or are only potencies in the soul. And if they are potencies, we must further decide whether to enquire first into the potencies themselves, and then into their acts, or into the acts first and then the potencies—e.g. into the act of understanding before the intellect. And if we take the acts first, there is still the question whether the objects of these acts should be studied before the faculties, e.g. the sense-object before the sense-faculty or the thing understood before the understanding.

§ 15. Next, at ‘Now it seems’, he states the difficulties that arise with regard to those accidental qualities which contribute to a definition of the soul. These are relevant here because a definition ought to reveal a thing’s accidental qualities, as well as its essential principles. If indeed the latter could be known and correctly defined there would be no need, to define the former; but since the essential principles of things are hidden from us we are compelled to make use of accidental differences as indications of what is essential. Thus to be two-footed is not of the essence of anything, yet it helps to indicate an essence. By such accidental differences we are led towards knowledge of the essential ones. It would indeed be easier to grasp even What is accidental to the soul if we could only first understand its essence, just, as in mathematics, it is a great help towards understanding that the angles of a triangle are equal to (two) right angles to know first what is meant by straight, curved and plane. Hence the difficulty of our present position. On the other hand a prior examination of the accidental factors is a considerable help towards knowing the essence, as has been said. if, therefore, one were to propose a definition from which no knowledge of the accidental attributes of the defined thing could be derived, such a definition would not be real, but abstract and hypothetical. But one from which a knowledge of the accidents flows is a real definition, based on what is proper and essential to the thing.

TEXT

403a 2-403 b 23

BOOK I, CHAPTER, I, CONTINUED

INTRODUCTION CONTINUED

QUESTIONS OF METHOD

The modifications of the soul present a problem: are they all shared by what has soul, or are some proper to the soul alone? § 16

It is necessary indeed, but not easy, to deal with this problem. For in most cases there is, apparently, no action or being acted on without the body; as in anger, desire, confidence, and sensation in general. Understanding however would seem especially proper to the soul. Yet if this too is a sort of imagination, or never occurs without it, not even this exists, in fact, apart from the body. § 17-20

But if the soul has some operation or affection exclusive to itself, then it could exist as a separate entity. If, however, there is nothing thus proper to it, then it is not separable, but is like a straight line, which has, as such, many properties—such as being able to touch a bronze sphere at a given point; but straightness separated does not touch it; not being in fact separable, since it is always with a bodily subject. § 21

Now all the soul's modifications do seem to involve the body—anger, meekness, fear, compassion, and joy and love and hate. For along with these the body also is to some degree affected. An indication of this is that sometimes violent and unmistakable occurrences arouse no excitement or alarm; while at other times one is moved by slight and trifling matters, when the physical system is stimulated to the condition appropriate to anger. This is still more evident fearful being present, feelings occur as in one when, nothing who is frightened. If this is the case, it is evident that the passions are material principles; hence such terms as ‘becoming angry’ mean a motion of such and such a body, or of a part or power proceeding from and existing for the body. § 22

For this reason, therefore, the natural scientist ought to examine the soul, either all kinds, or this kind. § 23

The natural scientist and the dialectician will define each of those modifications differently. Take the question, what is anger? The latter will say, a desire for retaliation, or something similar; the former, an effervescence of blood or heat about the heart. Of these, the natural scientist designates the matter, the dialectician, the form or idea. For this ‘idea’ is the thing’s form. This however must have existence in material of the sort in question; if it is a house, one formula will be, ‘a covering to prevent destruction from wind and rain and excessive heat’; the other, ‘stones and beams and timber’; another, ‘the form; in these materials; for those reasons. Which is the physical definition? That which states the matter ans ignores the idea? Or that which states. the idea only?

Or rather, the compound of both? What then of the other two? Now there is no one who deals with inseparable qualities of matter, precisely as inseparable from it; but he who is concerned with the affections and activities of the special matter of this or that body is the natural scientist; whereas whatever things are not specifically such, another considers; in certain matters it may perchance be a technical expert, a carpenter or physician. Concerning however what is inseparable from matter, and yet as not involved in the specific qualities of this or that body, but abstracted from any, the mathematician; and concerning what is separable, the ‘first philosopher’. § 24-9

To return from our digression. We were saying that the passions, of the soul are not separable from the physical material of animals (anger and fear having this kind of existence), and yet also that they differ, in this, from the line and the surface.

CHAPTER II

Investigating the soul, it is necessary, while suspending judgment on matters which should be held uncertain, that we study the opinions of certain thinkers who have dealt with the subject, so as to take note of anything they said pertinently, whilst avoiding their mistakes. § 30

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWO

§ 16. Having stated the difficulty of this science in respect of the problem of the soul's substance and essence, the Philosopher proceeds to the problem of its modifications and accidental qualities. And here he does two things: he states, first, and solves a difficulty concerning the soul's modifications; and then, using this solution, 'he shows that knowledge of the soul pertains to natural science or 'physics', where he says, 'For this reason, therefore, the natural scientist'. As to the first point, he says it is a problem whether the soul's modifications and activities belong to it independently of the body, as Plato thought, or are none of them peculiar to the soul, being all shared by soul and body together.

§ 17. Going on at 'It is necessary,' he again does two things. First he shows the difficulty of the question, and then, at 'But if the Soul,' the necessity of putting it. He begins then by observing that we cannot avoid the question whether the soul's modes and activities ire proper to it or shared by the body, and that this is not an easy question but a very difficult one. The difficulty, as he explains, arises from the fact that many activities seem to be common to soul and body and to require the body, for instance, getting angry and having sensations and so on; which all involve body as well as soul. If there is anything peculiar to the soul it would appear to be the intellectual activity or understanding; this seems to belong to the soul in a special way.

§ 18. And yet, on closer consideration, even understanding would not seem to pertain to the soul alone. For either it is the same as imagination, as the Platonists thought, or it does not occur without the use of imagination (for there used to be men, such as the early natural philosophers, who said that intellect in no way differed from the senses, which would imply that it does not differ from the imagination; as indeed the Platonists were led to say). As, then, imagination presupposes the body and depends on it, they said that understanding was common to soul and body together, rather than the work of the soul alone. And even granted that intellect and imagination are not identical, still the one cannot function without the other. It would follow that understanding is not of the soul alone, since imagining presupposes the body. Understanding then, it seems, does not occur where there is no body.

§ 19. Now although Aristotle clears up this problem in Book III, we shall say something about it here. Understanding, then, is in one sense, proper to the soul alone, and in another sense common to both soul and body. For it should be realised that certain activities or modifications of the soul depend on the body both as an instrument and as an object. Sight, for instance, needs a body as object—because its object is colour, which is only found in bodies;—and also as an instrument—because, while the act of seeing involves the soul, it cannot occur except through the instrumentality of a visual organ, the pupil of the eye. Sight then is the act of the organ as well as of the soul. But there is one activity which only depends on the body to provide its object, not its instrument; for understanding is not accomplished with a bodily organ, though it does bear on a bodily object; because, as will be shown later, in Book III, the phantasms in the imagination are to the intellect as colours to sight: as colours provide sight with its object, so do the phantasms serve the intellect. Since then there cannot be phantasms without a body, it seems that understanding presupposes a body-not, however, as its instrument, but simply as its object.

§ 20. Two things follow from this. (1) Understanding is an act proper to the soul alone, needing the body, as was said above, only to provide its object; whereas seeing and various other functions involve the compound of soul and body together. (2) Whatever operates of itself independently, has also an independent being and subsistence of its own; which is not the case where the operation is not independent. Intellect then is a self-subsistent actuality, whereas the other faculties are actualities existing in matter. And the difficulty in dealing with this type of question arises simply from the fact that all functions of the soul seem at first sight to be also functions of the body.

§ 21. After this, when Aristotle says ‘But if the soul’, he states a reason for putting this question, namely, that on its answer depends the answer to a question that everyone asks very eagerly about the soul: whether it can be separated from the body. So he says that if the soul has any function proper to itself it can certainly be separated, because, as was pointed out above, whatever can operate on ,its own can exist on its own. Conversely, if the soul had no such proper function it would not be separable from the body; it would be in the same case as a straight line—for though many things can happen to a straight line qua straight line, such as touching a brass sphere at a certain point, still they can only come about in a material way: a straight line cannot touch a brass sphere at any point except materially. So also with the soul; if it has no activity proper to itself, then, however many things affect it, they win do so only in a material way.

§ 22. Next, when he says ‘Now all the soul’s,’ he draws out what had been presupposed above, namely that certain modifications affect soul and body together, not the soul alone. And this he shows by one argument in two parts; which runs as follows. Whenever the physical constitution of the body contributes to a vital activity, the latter pertains to the body as well as the soul; but this happens in the case of all the ‘modifications’ of the soul, such as anger, meekness, fear, confidence, pity and so forth, hence all these ‘modifications’ would seem to belong partly to the body. And to show that the physical constitution plays a part in them he uses two arguments. (1) We sometimes see a man beset by obvious and severe afflictions without being provoked or frightened, whereas when he is already excited by violent passions arising from his bodily disposition, he is disturbed by mere trifles and behaves as though he were really angry. (2) At ‘This is still more evident:’ what makes this point even clearer is that we see in some people, even when there is no danger present, passions arising that resemble one such ‘modification’ of the soul; for instance melancholy people, simply as a result of their physical state, are often timid when there is no real cause to be. Obviously then, if the bodily constitution has this effect on the passions, the latter must be ‘material principles’, i.e. must exist in matter. This is why ‘such terms,’ i.e. the definitions of these passions, are not to be predicated without reference to matter; so that if anger is being defined, let it be called a movement ‘of some body’ such as the heart, or ‘of some part or power’ of the body. Saying this he refers to the subject or material cause of the passion; whereas ‘proceeding from’ refers to the efficient cause; and ‘existing for’ to the final cause.

§ 23. Then at ‘For this reason,’ he concludes from the foregoing that the study of the soul pertains to natural science—a conclusion following from the way the soul is defined. So he does two things here: (1) he proves his statement; (2) he pursues his discussion of definitions, where he says ‘the natural scientist and the dialectician’. The proof of his statement runs thus. Activities and dispositions of the soul are also activities and dispositions of the body, as has been shown. But the definition of any disposition must include that which is disposed; for its subject always falls within the definition of a disposition. If, then, dispositions of this kind are in the body as well as in the soul, the former must be included in their definition. And since everything bodily or material falls within the scope of natural science, so also must the dispositions of which we speak. Moreover, since the subject of any dispositions enters into the study of them, it must be the task of the natural scientist to study the soul—either absolutely ‘all’ souls, or ‘of this kind’, i.e. the soul that is joined to a body. He adds this because he has left it uncertain whether intellect is joined to the body.

§ 24. Where he says ‘The natural scientist and the dialectician,’ he continues his discussion of definitions. Explaining that, while some definitions of the dispositions of the soul include matter and the body, others exclude matter and refer only to the form, he shows that the latter kind of definition is inadequate. This leads him to go into the difference between these types of definition. Sometimes the body is omitted, as when anger is defined as a desire of revenge; and sometimes the bodily or material factor is included, as when anger is called a heating of blood round the heart. The former is a logical definition, but the latter is physical, since it includes a material factor, and so pertains to the natural scientist. The natural scientist points to the material factor when he says that anger is a heating of blood round the heart; whereas the dialectician points to the species or formal principle; since to call anger a desire of revenge is to state its formal principle.

§ 25. Now the first type of definition is obviously inadequate. The definition of any form existing in a particular matter must take account of the matter. This form, ‘the desire for retaliation’, exists in a definite matter, and if the matter is not included, the definition is clearly inadequate. The definition, then, must state that this thing, i.e. the form, has being in this particular sort of matter.

§ 26. Thus we have three kinds of definition. The first states the species and specific principle of a thing, and is purely formal—as if one were to define a house as a shelter from wind, rain and heat. The second kind indicates the matter, as when a house is called a shelter made of stones and beams and wood. But the third kind includes in the definition ‘both’, namely matter and form, calling a house a particular kind of shelter, built of particular materials, for a particular purpose—to keep out the wind, etc. So he says that ‘another’ definition has three elements: the material, ‘in these’, i.e. beams and stones; the formal,”the form’; and the final, ‘for those reasons’, i.e. to keep out the wind. So matter is included when he says ‘in these’. form when he says ‘form’. and the final cause when he says ‘for those reasons’. All three are needed for a perfect definition.

§ 27. To the question which of these types of definition pertains to the natural scientist, I answer that the purely formal one is not physical but logical. That which includes matter but omits the form pertains to no one but the natural scientist, because only he is concerned with matter. Yet that which includes both factors is also in a special way the natural scientist’s. Thus two of these definitions pertain to natural science, but of the two the merely material one is imperfect, while the other, that includes the form also, is perfect. For only the natural scientist studies the inseparable dispositions of matter.

§ 28. But there are various ways of studying the dispositions of matter, as Aristotle now proceeds to show. He divides the students of these dispositions into three classes. One class consists of those who, while they study material dispositions, differ from the natural scientist in their point of view; thus the craftsman differs from the scientist in that he starts from the point of view of art, but the natural scientist from that of real nature. Another class consists of those who, though they consider forms that exist in sense-perceptible matter, do not include such matter in their definitions. The forms referred to are such as curved, straight, and so on, which, though they exist in matter and are, in fact, inseparable from it, are not, by the mathematician, regarded under their sense-perceptible aspect. The reason is that if it is through its quality that a thing is sense-perceptible, quality presupposes quantity; hence the mathematician abstracts from this or that particular material factor in order to attend exclusively to the purely quantitative. Finally, the third class studies things whose existence is either completely independent of matter or can be found without matter. This is First Philosophy.

§ 29. Note that this division of Philosophy is entirely based on definition and the method of defining. The reason is that definition is the principle of demonstration. Since things are defined by their essential principles, diverse definitions reveal a diversity of essential principles; and this implies a diversity of sciences.

§ 30. Then at ‘To return,” he comes back to the matter in hand after the apparent digression about definitions. The point under discussion was that such modifications of the soul as love, fear and so forth are inseparable from physical animal matter inasmuch as they have this sort of existence, i.e. as passions in the body; in which they differ from lines, plane-surfaces and so on, which can be considered by the mind apart from the matter that they naturally imply. If this is the case then the study of such dispositions, and even of the soul itself, becomes, as has been said, the affair of the natural scientist.

And ‘concerning this’ i.e. the soul, we must, at our present stage, take account of the opinions of the ancients no matter who they were, provided they had anything to say about it. This win be useful in two ways. First, we shall profit by what is sound in their views. Secondly, we shall be put on our guard against their errors.

TEXT

403b24–404b7

BOOK I, CHAPTER II, CONTINUED

PREVIOUS THEORIES

DEMOCRITUS, THE PYTHAGOREANS, ANAXAGORAS

Our enquiry must begin with a statement of what seems most to belong by nature to the soul. The animated being would appear to differ from the inanimate in two primary respects: by motion and by sense-perception. And these two notions are roughly what our predecessors have handed down to us concerning the soul. § 31-2

For some say that the soul is principally and primarily what moves. Holding that what does not itself move moves no other moving thing, they thought that the soul too was thus. § 33

Hence Democritus, said it was a kind of fire or heat. There exist an infinite number of shapes and atoms, and those of the spherical kind are, he said, fire and soul: like the dust-motes in the air called ‘atomies’ seen in the rays of the sun in doorways; and of all the seeds of these, he said, are the elements of all Nature. Leucippus had a similar opinion. Those round in shape make the soul, because they are most able to penetrate everywhere, and since they move of themselves, they have also the power to move everything else. The soul, they maintained, is what causes movement in living things: and accordingly breathing is coterminous with living. That which envelops all bodies expels by compression the atoms [within], thus causing movement in animals, for these [atoms] are never at rest. A reinforcement must come therefore [he said] from without; in that other atoms enter by respiration, preventing from dispersal those that are within the animate body, and which simultaneously resist the constraining and compressing environment; and that animals live so long as they can do this. § 34-5

The teaching of the Pythagoreans seems to have had much the same purport. Some of these said the soul consisted of atoms in the air; others, that it was what sets these in motion. And these atoms are mentioned. because they seem to be always moving, even if the soul be quite tranquil. § 36

All who say that the soul is a thing that moves itself tend in the same direction; all seem to hold that movement is what is most proper to the soul, and accordingly that all things are in motion on account of the soul, but the soul itself on its own account; because one sees nothing moving other things that is not itself moving. § 37

Anaxagoras likewise said that the soul is a mover, as also did anyone else who held that a Mind moves all things. But his view is not exactly Democritus'. § 38

He [Democritus], asserts that intellect and soul are absolutely identical; and that what appears is the truth. And therefore that Homer aptly says of Hector that he lay 'other-minded'. He does not use the term intellect to denote a definite faculty concerned with truth, but identifies soul and intellect. § 39

Anaxagoras is less definite about these matters. He often says that the cause of being right or good is intellect, and that this is the soul. For it is, he says, in all animals, great and small, noble and base. § 40

It does not seem, however, that there exists mind, in the sense of prudence, alike in all animals: nor even in all men. § 41

All those therefore who have regarded life from the point of view of movement have held soul to be pre-eminently a moving force. § 42

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO THREE

§ 31. So much by way of Introduction. The Philosopher has stated his aim in general and the difficulty of the undertaking; which he now proceeds to carry out in the order already indicated. The whole treatise divides into two parts. In the first the soul's nature is discussed as other philosophers have regarded it; but in the second as it is in reality. The latter section begins at Book II. The first part itself has two parts. The former simply relates the opinions of other philosophers; the second, beginning at 'The first thing to be considered,'examines them. The former part itself divides into two parts, in the first of which Aristotle distinguishes

between the starting points of the other philosophers, while in the second, starting at 'For some say', he shows how they severally came to hold their different opinions.

§ 32. First of all then he says that one ought to start by gathering together everything that would seem to belong to the soul by nature. As to this, we should note that when we find things differing both by clear and understandable differences and by differences that are still obscure, we must assuredly take the former as a means to arrive at knowledge of the latter. This was the method used by the philosophers in their study of the soul. Living things differ from non-living in having 'souls'; but because the nature of the soul was not evident and could not be investigated except by way of certain more obvious notes which differentiate animate from inanimate things, the philosophers first took these more evident characteristics and tried, through them, to come to knowledge of the soul's nature. These evident notes are two: sensation and movement. Animate things seem to be characterised chiefly by movement, in that they move themselves, and by having sense awareness or perception. So the ancients thought that if they could discover the principle of these two factors they would know the soul; hence their efforts to discern the cause of movement and sensation. They all agreed in identifying the soul with the cause of movement and sense-perception. But just at this point also their differences began; for some tried to arrive at the soul by way of movement, and others by way of sense-perception.

§ 33. Hence at 'For some say' he states these differences: taking those of his predecessors first who started their enquiry from movement; and then, at 'All who have considered', those who started from knowledge; and thirdly, at 'But since the soul', those who started from both. With regard to the first group we should note that it had one principle in common, namely, that if living things are moving things, the soul must be both moving and moved.

They assumed this because they, thought that one thing could only move another if it were itself already moved; that is, only what is moved moves. So if living things are moved, by the soul, then clearly the soul itself, and preeminently, must be moved. It was this that led the early students of Nature to class the soul among things that are moved. But about this also different opinions arose.

§ 34. When therefore he says, 'Hence Democritus', Aristotle states first of all the view of Democritus, one of the early philosophers, who, thinking that the soul by nature was in a state of maximum movement, which state seems natural to fire, maintained that the soul 'was a kind of fire or heat'. Such was his view. For he did not admit the existence of anything in Nature except what is sense-perceptible and corporeal; and the first principles, he said, of all things are indivisible bodies, infinite in number, which he called atoms. These atoms, he said, are all the same by nature, differing from each other only in shape, position and arrangement (though here only the difference of shape is alluded to, as being the only necessary one. This consists in some being round, some square, some pyramids, and so on). He also maintained that the atoms were mobile and never ceased moving, and that the world had come into being through their fortuitous coming together. And to illustrate the mobility of these bodies he took the example of the particles that move in the air even when no wind blows, as we can see when a sunbeam shines through a doorway. Since the atoms, being indivisible, are much smaller than such particles, they must obviously be extremely mobile. And because the spherical is, of all shapes, the one best suited for movement—having no angles to impede it,—and since the soul, as the cause of movement in living was thought to have maximum mobility, Democritus concluded that among these infinitely numerous bodies the spherical ones were the soul.

135. Leucippus, a companion of Democritus, held the same opinion. And Democritus thought the following was a sign of its truth. He maintained that 'coterminous with', or essential to, life is respiration (a short-sighted view since not all living things breathe), and that respiration is necessary because the body is full of small ever-moving spherical particles (the cause, as he thought, of all movement in animal bodies) and that the surrounding air compresses what it 'envelops', i.e. our bodies, and 'expels', i.e. thrusts out of them, those particles which are so shaped as to impart movement to

animals, being never at rest themselves. Lest, therefore, our bodies should decay with the loss of all these particles, he said that respiration is necessary whereby fresh particles may be brought in, and those already within prevented from leaving by those that inhaling brings in. And he said that animals can live as long as they can do this, i.e. as long as they can breathe. The point of the argument is that if breathing is called the cause of life because it keeps the spherical particles inside the animal body, and also introduces fresh ones lest the body should decay through loss of particles by movement, then it is clearly implied that the particles ate the soul itself. They are indeed the same particles that Democritus said were fiery by nature and the cause of heat.

§ 36. Next, at ‘The teaching of the Pythagoreans,’ Aristotle mentions a view of certain Pythagoreans which resembles that of Democritus; for their statement and his seem to mean the same’ although the Pythagoreans themselves do not all agree. Some of them, agreeing with Democritus, said that motes in the air, i.e. indivisible, infinitely numerous particles, were the soul. Others, however, of the same school, said that the soul was rather the force that moved those particles. Of this opinion was a certain Archelaus, the master of Socrates, as Augustine remarks in the De Civitate Dei [VIII, 2]. The reason why the soul has been thus identified with these particles has been already given—namely, that as the soul was regarded as being especially mobile, and as those particles seem to be always moving (even when the air is calm) they identified the one with the other.

§ 37. Then, at ‘All who say,’ he summarises the views of a number of philosophers, saying that all who have defined the soul in terms of movement and called it that which moves itself, ‘tend in the same direction’, i.e. the same as those mentioned already. All these, it seems, agreed -in thinking that the soul’s first and chief characteristic was movement; all things being moved by soul, and soul by itself. The reason for this was, as has been noted, that they all thought that only what was itself in motion could move other things. Since the soul moves other things, they thought the soul especially and principally was in motion.

§ 38. In the third place, at ‘Anaxagoras likewise’, he states the view of Anaxagoras. He first shows how this philosopher agrees with those already mentioned, saying that he, and anyone else who held that Intellect moved all things, really agreed with them that the source of all movement was a soul. Anaxagoras, however, differed in this that he denied that every mover was itself in motion, and maintained the existence of a pure and transcendent Intellect which, motionless itself, moved all other things; and that the soul was of this nature too. (This view led some into the error of divinising the soul.) Thus Anaxagoras agreed with the other philosophers in calling the soul a principle of movement, but disagreed with them in saying that it was not itself moved (for they said the contrary). And he also differed from Democritus in what he understood by intellect.

§ 39. When Aristotle therefore says ‘He (i.e. Democritus) asserts’, he states this last difference, first stating Democritus’ opinion that intellect and soul were ‘absolutely’, i.e. everywhere and in all respects, the same. Democritus said this because he held that only sense-perceptible things existed in the real world, and that no cognitive faculty existed in the soul except sensitivity. From this he inferred that no definite truth about things was attainable, that nothing could be definitely known with certainty: truth being simply what appears to be true; and what one man thought about anything being never any nearer the truth than what another man thought about the same thing at the same time. in consequence he maintained that contradictories were both true at the same time; and this because, as we have said, he took intellect to be, not the faculty for knowing truth and understanding intelligible objects, but a mere sense-faculty. Only the sensible, he thought, could be known, since only the sensible existed. And because the latter is continually changing there could be no certain truth about anything. Never attaining to an understanding of the intellect as the supreme faculty ‘concerned with truth’, i.e. which bears on true being, and admitting only the faculties of sense, he completely ‘identifies soul and intellect’. The intellect changed, he said, as the whole man changed. Hence his approval of Homer’s Phrase ‘Hector lies other-minded’, i.e. Hector’s mind was altered by Hector’s condition; for he thought one thing as conqueror, another as conquered.

§ 40. Next, at ‘Anaxagoras is less definite’, he shows how Anaxagoras differed from Democritus, first stating the former’s opinion and then, at ‘it does not seem’, criticising it. First then he observes that Anaxagoras spoke with less certainty and less conclusively about the soul. He often said that intelligence was the cause of right actions, whilst elsewhere he also identifies intelligence with the soul; for it is agreed that a soul is found in all animals, the lower as well as the higher, the smaller as well as the larger; and Anaxagoras said that intelligence was in all of them. Clearly then he identifies soul and intelligence.

§ 41. Secondly, at ‘It does not seem’, he shows the inconsistency of Anaxagoras’ use of the term intellect. For sometimes Anaxagoras distinguishes between soul and intellect, but sometimes also he identifies them. These are contradictory statements which cannot both be true; as Aristotle proceeds to show. Right action, he says, admittedly derives from intellect perfected by prudence. If then the intellect that causes right action is the same thing as the soul, it follows that intellect perfected by prudence is the same as the soul. But this is false; because, while all animals have souls, not all—not even all men—are prudent. Therefore the soul is something else.

§ 42. Lastly, at ‘All those therefore,’ he states that all who have regarded animate beings from the standpoint of movement, i.e. as self-movers, thought that the chief mover in them was the soul, as the above-mentioned opinions show.

TEXT

404 b 8-404 b 29

BOOK 1, CHAPTER II, CONTINUED

PREVIOUS THEORIES. EMPEDOCLES, PLATO, SOUL AS SELF-MOVING NUMBER

All who have considered it as knowing and perceiving realities identify the soul with the [elemental] principles,—some making several principles, others one. § 43-4

Empedocles, for instance, says that it is composed of all elements, and that each of these is a soul, saying,

As by earth we know earth, by ether divine ether,
By water water, by fire, it is clear, fire mysterious and hidden;
Love by love, hate by sad hate. §45

In the same way Plato in the Timaeus constitutes the soul from the elements. For like [he says] is known by like; and things are made up of elements. §§46-7

In the lectures 'On Philosophy' he likewise lays it down that the animate itself is compounded of the idea of the One, together with the primary Length and Depth and Breadth; other things existing in the same manner. § 48-50

Again, rather differently, that intellect is the One, knowledge the Two (for [this proceeds] as one to one), and the number of the Plane belongs to opinion, and that of the Solid to sensation. For he said that numbers are the specific forms and principles of beings, and are themselves constituted from elements. Some things are discerned by understanding, some by science, some by opinion, some by sensation. But these same numbers are the specific forms of things. § 51

But since the soul seems to be both a moving and a knowing principle, some have made it out to bea combination of these two, stating that it is a self-moving number. § 52

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FOUR

§ 43. Having shown how some have approached a knowledge of soul through movement, the Philosopher now turns to those who came to it by way of sensation or knowledge. He does this in. two stages. First he shows where the latter were in agreement; and secondly, at 'Empedocles, for instance,' where they disagreed.

He begins then by saying that all who studied the soul in or through its knowing and sensing agreed in holding that the soul was composed of the principles of things; but some 'made', i. e. posited, many such principles, while others posited only one. Even the earliest philosophers assumed these principles to be in the soul, as though compelled by the force of truth itself; they dreamed, as it were, of the truth. The truth, in fact, is that knowledge is caused by the knower containing a likeness of the thing known; for the latter must be in the knower somehow. The early philosophers, however, thought that it existed in the knower in its own natural being, i.e. with the being that it has in itself. Like, they said, must be known by like. If then the soul is to know all things it must contain a likeness of all things according to their natural mode of being. They could not distinguish between the mode of existence that a thing has in the mind or the eye or the imagination from that which it has in itself. Therefore, since whatever is of a thing's essence is a constituent principle of the thing, and to know its constituent principles is to know the thing itself, these philosophers maintained that the reason why the soul can know all things is that it is made up of the principles of all things. This theory was common to them all.

§ 44. But they differed about these principles. They did not all admit the same; one admitted many, another only one, and one this and another that. Hence they disagreed also about the constituents of the soul.

§ 45. So, at ‘Empedocles, for instance,’ Aristotle states these differences. He gives first the opinion of Empedocles, saying that the early philosophers who studied the soul by way of its sense-perceptions thought it was composed of the elements. Those who admitted only one principle said that this precisely was the soul; and those who admitted many said that the soul was made up of many; thus Empedocles held that the soul was constituted by all the elements, and that each of these was itself a soul. Note that Empedocles admitted six principles: four material, namely earth, water, fire and air; and two active and passive principles, namely strife and friendship. And since he assumed that the soul knew all things, he said it, was composed of all these principles. Thus as earthy we know earth; as ethereal or airy we know air; as aequous we know water; and as fiery, of course, we know fire. Through love we know love, and through ‘sad hate’ we know hatred. ‘Sad’ comes in here because Empedocles wrote in verse.

§ 46. Next, when he says ‘In the same way Plato’ Aristotle states the opinion of Plato who also, he says, made the soul consist of elements, i.e. be constituted by the, principles of things. And as evidence for this statement he takes three passages from Plato. The first is from the Timaeus, where Plato says that there are two elements or first principles, Identity and Difference. For there is a certain kind of nature that is simple and unchanging, as are immaterial things; and this nature he calls Identity. And there is another kind which does not stay the same, but undergoes change and division, as do material things; and this nature he calls Difference. And it is of these two principles, of Identity and Difference, that the soul, he says, is composed; not that the two are in the soul as its parts; but rather as in the mean between extremes; for the rational soul is by nature lower and less noble than the higher and purely immaterial substances, but it is higher and nobler than inferior material things.

§ 47. Now this opinion rests on the principle already mentioned, that like is known by like. For it seemed to Plato that if the soul knew all things, and if Identity and Difference were fundamental principles, then the soul itself must be constituted of Identity and Difference; in so far as it participated in ‘Identity’ the soul, he thought, knew the ‘identical’, while so far as it participated in ‘Difference’ it knew the ‘different’, i.e. material things. Hence the actual process of the soul in knowing things. For when it gathers things together under genera and species, then, said Plato, it manifests

Sameness or Identity, but when it attends to accidents and differentiations he finds in it Difference. That is how Plato in the Timaeus understood the soul as made up of principles.

§ 48. The second passage, showing that this was Plato's theory, Aristotle refers to when he says 'In the lectures "On Philosophy".' Here too the soul is represented as constituted from principles. Note, in this connection, that Plato took the objects known by the intellect to be things in themselves, existing apart from matter in perpetual actuality, and the causes of knowledge and of being in things of sense. For Aristotle this view involved so many difficulties that he was compelled to excogitate the theory of the 'agent intellect'. But from Plato's position it followed that to what could be thought of in the abstract corresponded subsistent and actual realities. We can, however, form abstractions in two ways: one is by proceeding from particulars to universals; and the other is that by which mathematical objects are abstracted from objects of sense. So Plato found himself obliged to posit three types of subsistent being: the objects of sense-perception; mathematical objects; and universal ideas-these last being the cause, by participation, of the other two types.

§ 49. Plato also held that numbers were causes of real things, being unaware of the distinction between unity as identical with being, and unity as the principle of the number that is a kind of quantity. Hence he inferred that universals were of the nature of number; for the universal existing separately is the cause of things whose substance is numerical. He said indeed that the constituent principles of all beings were 'species' and 'specific number', which he called specific in the sense of being constituted from 'species'. And he reduced number itself to unity and duality as to its fundamental elements; for, as nothing can proceed from one alone, there must, he thought, be some nature, subordinate to unity, whence multiplicity might proceed; and this nature he called duality.

§ 50. Thus Plato envisaged three classes of beings, graded according to their connection with matter. As sensible objects are more material than the objects considered in mathematics, and the latter more so than the universal ideas, he placed sense-objects on the lowest level, and above them mathematical objects, and above these the separately existing universals and ideas. Universals differ from mathematical objects in this that the latter include numerical differences Within the same species, whereas ideas and separated substances exhibit no numerical differences in the one species; there is but ore idea for each species. These ideas, he said, are numerical in nature, and from them are derived such numerical qualities of sensible things as length, breadth and depth. Hence he said that the idea of length was the primary duality, for length is from unit to unit, from point to point; and that of breadth was the first trinity, for the triangle is the first of plane figures; and that of depth, which includes both length and breadth, was the first quaternity, for the first solid figure is the pyramid which is constructed of four angles. So too the sensitive soul, in Plato's system, implied a Soul existing separately as its cause, and constituted, like the other 'separate' things and ideas, by number, that is, by the unity and duality which for him were fundamental in ,things.

§ 5 1. Then at 'Again, rather differently,' Aristotle alludes to the third text adduced to show that for Plato the soul was made up of elements or principles. As we have said, it was Plato's view that the specific forms and, principles of things were numbers; so when he came to treat of the soul he based its knowledge of things on its fundamentally numerical composition; all of its activities, he maintained, sprang from this source. Take for instance the diverse apprehensive functionings of the soul: simple understanding, science, opinion and sensation. Simple understanding Plato connected with the idea of One; it has the nature of Unity; for in one act it apprehends a unity. Again, science for him relates to Duality since it proceeds from one to one, i.e. from principles to conclusions. And opinion relates to the first Trinity, proceeding from one to two, i.e. from principles to a conclusion which is accompanied by the fear that a different conclusion may be true; so forming a triad out of one principle and one admitted and one feared conclusion. Finally, sensation derives from the first Quaternity, i.e. from the notion of a solid body constructed (as we have said) from four angles; for bodies are the object of sensation. Since then all knowing is contained in these four, i.e. in simple understanding, science, opinion and sensation, all of which, said Plato, are in the soul in virtue of its participating in the nature of Unity, Duality, Trinity and Quaternity, it obviously follows that for Plato the separated Soul, the 'idea', as he called it, of particular souls, was constituted by numbers, which are the elements or principles of reality. So much to show that Plato regarded the soul as made up of principles.

§ 52. Next at ‘But since the soul seems,’ Aristotle observes that some philosophers defined the soul, and came to know something about it, through both movement and sensation or knowledge. He says that, as the soul seemed to them to be both self-moving and cognitive, they joined the two aspects in their definition and called it a ‘self-moving number’. ‘Number’ refers to the cognitive power because they thought, in accordance with what has been said already, that the soul was able to know in virtue of its participating in the nature of specific number (Plato’s opinion). ‘Self-moving’ refers to the soul’s motive power.

TEXT

404b30–405b30

BOOK I, CHAPTER, II, CONTINUED

PREVIOUS THEORIES

SOUL AS IDENTIFIED WITH THE ELEMENTS

Opinions differ however as to the elemental principles—what they are, how many they are; and the difference is greatest between those who make these corporeal and those who make them incorporeal. But some, making a mixture, have defined the principles in terms of both. They differ also as to the number, some positing one, others several. And they assign a soul to these [principles] accordingly. (For they not unreasonably assumed that what by nature causes movement was primary.) §§ 53-4

Hence some have held it to be fire; for this is the most subtle, and much the least corporeal of the elements; moreover, it moves itself, being the first cause of movement in other things. Democritus said something which rather neatly gives the reason for either fact. He said that soul is the same as mind, and that this originates in primary indivisible particles and that it causes motion by its fineness and shape. He says that the sphere is the most light and mobile of shapes, and that fire and mind must both be of such a nature. §§ 55-6

Anaxagoras, however (as we said above), seems to speak of soul and mind as diverse, yet he employs both terms as for a single essence. Nevertheless, he posits Intellect as the principle par excellence of the Universe, saying that this alone among beings is simple, unmixed and pure.

He attributes, indeed, to the same principle both knowing and moving; saying that the Intellect moves all things. § 57

It seems that Thales, from what they recollect of him, was also of opinion that the soul was a cause of motion,—if it is a fact that he said that the magnet had a 'soul' because it attracts iron. §58

Now Diogenes, like certain others, held that air is the most subtle of all things and is their principle; and is the cause of the soul's knowing and moving. As primary, it is cognitive of all else: and as the most subtle thing, it is the motive force. § 59

Heraclitus, however, says that soul, as a principle, is some vapour of which it is constituted, since this is the least corporeal of substances and is always flowing; and that any moving object is known by a moving object—he and many others holding that all realities are in movement. § 60

Alcmaeon seems to have held opinions on the soul similaR to these. For he said it was immortal because it. bore a resemblance to immortal beings. And this he attributed to it because it always moves; all heavenly things seem to be in motion continually—the sun, the moon, the stars, all heaven. § 61

Some cruder thinkers, like Hippo, thought it was water. They seem to have been persuaded of this because semen is liquid in all animals. For he confutes those who say the soul is the blood, on the ground that semen, which is the inchoate Soul, is not blood. § 62

Others, such as Critias, held it was blood; that sensation was most distinctive of the soul; and that it was due to the nature of blood that this power was in it.

For opinions have been given in favour of every element excepting earth: which no one has proposed, unless whosoever may have said it was derived from all the elements, or was identical with them, did so. § 64

All, taken together, define soul, we may say, by three things: by movement, by sensation, and by immateriality. And each of these is reduced to elemental principles. Hence, in defining it as cognitive, they make it either an element or consist of several elements, one saying much the same as another (with a single exception). For they say that anything is known by what resembles it, and as the soul knows all things, go they constitute it of all principles: some saying that there is one cause and one element, and that the soul is a single thing—fire or water, for example; others that there are several principles, and that the soul is multiple. § 65

But Anaxagoras, standing alone, says that mind is beyond the reach of influence and has nothing in common with other things. But, granted that this be true, he, did not explain how it acquires knowledge, in virtue of what cause; nor is this made clear by anything else he said. § 66

Those who posit contraries as first principles also maintain that the soul consists of such contraries, while those who favour some one among contraries (hot or cold, or some other like these) make the soul, accordingly, one of these. Whence also some follow names, as those who allege that it is heat, because life is due to heat and is named from it. But those who identify the soul with cold say that it is named from respiration and breathing.

Such then are the opinions that have been transmitted to us about the soul, together with the reasons given for them. § 67

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FIVE

§ 53. In the preceding chapters Aristotle has shown the old philosophers agreeing in their analysis of the soul, in that they all regarded it as the origin of movement and knowledge. in the section beginning now he shows how they variously interpreted that common presupposition. This section falls into three parts: in the first he shows the root of the divergence of these philosophers in their teaching on the soul; the second enumerates the various points of difference (beginning at ‘Hence some’); the third summarises all that we have to consider in these differences (at ‘All, taken together’). The root of the divergence of the philosophers in their teaching on the soul is to be looked for in the way they analysed it into its ultimate elements; as they disagreed about these elements so did they differ about the soul. They all agreed that the soul was made up of ultimate elements, but they could not agree that it was made up of the same elements; and, differing as to the elements, they differed in their theories of the soul.

§ 54. They differ in two ways about the ultimate elements: first, as to their essential nature, i.e. ‘what’ they are; secondly, as to their number, ‘how many’ they are. As regards their essential nature, some said these principles were corporeal (fire or water or air) while others said they were incorporeal and immaterial, such as those who spoke of numbers and ideas; and there were others, like the Platonists, who blended both views and allowed that there existed both sensibly perceptible and separate immaterial principles. As to their number or multiplication, there were some who admitted only one principle. Heraclitus, for instance, said it was air; and someone else, fire; while others said there were many principles—Empedocles for instance, who maintained the theory of the four elements. And their theories of the soul in respect of the elements followed these various hypotheses concerning ultimate elements. Those who held to a theory of material first principles, like Empedodes, said the soul was composed of such; and those, like Plato, who held to immaterial principles, said that the soul was composed of these. But one and all considered the soul to be the chief source of movement.

§ 55. Next, at 'Hence some', he proceeds to run through the more particular differences between the philosophers. it should be noted that of those who thought that a corporeal thing was the first principle, not one deigned to identify this with mere earth. Some said it was fire, others air, others water, but nobody said it was earth, except those who thought that all the four elements together were the first principle. (The reason being that, with its density, earth seemed always to presuppose some more ultimate principle). Aristotle, then, does three things here. He gives first the views of those who identified the first principle and the soul itself with fire; secondly, of those who held that they were air (at 'Now Diogenes'); and thirdly, the opinion of those who held that water was both the first principle and the soul (beginning at: 'Some cruder thinkers').4

§ 56. As to the first of these groups, we should note that since movement and knowledge were ascribed to the soul, it appeared to some that the soul possessed these properties in the highest degree; and as movement and knowledge seemed to connote what is lightest and most rarified, they concluded that the soul was fire, which is the lightest and most rarified of bodies. And. while many were of this opinion and thought the soul was fire, Democritus more subtly and rationally explained 'the reason for either fact', that is, he expressed more clearly the nature of movement and of knowledge. He held, as we have seen,, that all things are made of atoms; and though for him these atoms were primary he maintained, nevertheless, that the round ones were of the nature of fire, so that the soul, he said, was composed of spherical atoms. Considered as first principles, these atoms were by nature cognitive, but considered as spherical they were mobile; hence he said that the soul knows and moves all things precisely because it is made up of these round, indivisible bodies. And in assuming that they were of the nature of fire, he agreed with those who thought that everything was fiery.

§ 57. Then at ‘Anaxagoras, however’, Aristotle gives the view of Anaxagoras who agreed with the others already mentioned in ascribing knowledge and motion to the soul. Anaxagoras, as we saw, sometimes appears to distinguish between soul and intellect, but sometimes he uses both terms as though they meant the same thing. He ascribes to the soul motive power and knowledge, but he also says that intellect knows and moves all things, thus identifying the soul and the intellect. But he differed from the others in this, that whereas Democritus held that the soul was corporeal by nature, being composed of material elements, Anaxagoras said that intellect was ‘simple’, excluding intrinsic division from its essence, and ‘unmixed’, excluding composition with anything else, and ‘pure’, excluding any addition to it from outside. But he ascribed movement and knowledge to one and the same principle, i.e. the intellect; for intellect of its nature knows; and movement pertains to it, so he said, because it moves everything else.

§ 58. Next, at ‘It seems that Thales’, he states the opinion of a philosopher called Thales who had only this in common with the others mentioned above, that he identified soul with a motive force. This Thales was one of the Seven Wise Men; but while the others studied moral questions, Thales devoted himself to the world of nature and was the first natural philosopher. Hence Aristotle remarks ‘from what they recollect etc.’, referring to those who said that water was the basic principle of things. For Thales thought that the way to find the principle of all things was by searching into the principle of living things, and since all the principles or seeds of living things are moist, he thought that the absolutely first principle must be the most moist of things; and this being water, he said water was that principle. Yet he did not follow his theory to the point of saying that soul was water; rather, he defined it as that which has motive force. Hence he asserted that a certain stone, the magnet, had a soul because it moved iron. Anaxagoras and Thales, then, are included in the present list; not for identifying the soul with fire, but because the former said that the soul was the source of knowledge and sensation, and the latter that it was at the ,origin of movement.

§ 59. Where he says, ‘Now Diogenes’, Aristotle alludes to those who thought that air was the first principle and the soul. There were three of these. First there was Diogenes who held that air was the first principle and also the finest-grained of all bodies, and that the soul therefore was air,—hence its power to know and move. The knowing power was due to the fact that air was (as he said) the first principle; for as knowledge is through likeness, as we have seen, the soul could not know all things unless it included the principles of all. And the moving power was due, he said, to the fact that air was the finest-grained of bodies and therefore the most mobile.

§ 60. Then at ‘Heraclitus, however’ he states the second opinion, that of Heraclitus who thought that not mere air but vapour, the blend of air and water, was the first principle. He could not allow that this was either water by itself, or fire, or air; it had to be something betwixt and between, because, being a materialist, he was concerned to find a principle midway between the opposite extremes of material quality. Thinking that vapour answered this requirement most precisely, he said that the soul was vapour; which explained its extraordinary capacity to know and to move. His view was, indeed, that everything was in continual flux, that nothing stayed the same even for one hour, and that no definite statement could be made about anything. And it was just because vapour is so unstable that he identified it with the first principle of all things; which, he said, was a soul. As the first principle, soul has the power to know, whilst as the least material and most fluid of things it has movement.

61. Thirdly, at ‘Alcmaeon seems,’ he gives the third opinion, Alcmaeon’s, which agrees with the others only as regards movement. This man said that the soul was pre-eminently a thing in motion, resembling in this the immortal heavenly bodies with their heavenly and divine nature. For he thought that the perpetual movement of the sun and moon and the rest, was the cause of their being immortal; and that the same inference was valid in the case of the soul.

§ 62. Then at ‘Some cruder thinkers’, Aristotle states an opinion of some who made water the first principle. For there were certain rather crude followers of Thales who tried to make the principle of one particular thing an analogy of the first principle of Nature as a whole. Observing that moisture was fundamental to living things they concluded that it must be the first principle of an things; in short, that the latter was water. So far indeed they followed their master, Thales; but whereas he, though admitting water to be the first principle, would not, as we have seen, allow that the soul was water, but rather a motive force, his cruder disciples (such as Hippo) asserted that it was water. Hippo tried to refute those who said the soul was blood with the argument that blood is not the generating seed (which they called ‘the inchoate soul’) of animate things. He identified this with water on account of its humidity.

§ 63. Next, at ‘Others, such as Critias’ he alludes to a philosopher who was more interested in the soul’s knowledge. He was still cruder in his expressions, saying that the soul itself was blood. His reason was that sense-perception only takes place in animals through the medium of blood: for the bloodless organs, such as bones, nails and teeth are without sensation (he forgot the nerves which are extremely sensitive and yet bloodless). If then, he said, the soul is the root of knowledge, the soul must be blood. it was Critias who said this.

§ 64. In case anyone should wonder why he has not mentioned earth along with the other elements, Aristotle, at, ‘Opinions have etc.,’ explains that his predecessors’ views on the soul followed on what they thought about the first principles; and as nobody judged earth to be a first principle, nobody said it was the soul; unless we count those—such as Democritus and Empedocles—who said that soul was, or was composed of, all the principles.

§ 65. Then, at ‘All, taken together,’ he summarises, concluding this part of the enquiry; and first with reference to the elements or principles themselves, and then with regard to the contrarieties that are found in them.

First, then, he notes that the soul has been described by all-in terms of these three notes: fineness of grain or texture (incorporeality); knowledge; movement; and that each of these notes has been also traced back to a first principle. For that is called a principle which is simple. Also a principle, it is said, is essentially cognitive (for, to recall what, was said above, I since like is known by like, they said that the soul was composed of, or even was, the elements of all things. Anaxagoras, to be sure, is an exception with his pure unmixed Intellect). Again, they identified the chief motive-force in things with a ‘principle’ since a principle is what is least corporeal. And the soul’s knowledge of all things proves, they said, that it was composed of all the principles or elements. All their theories turn on this correspondence between the soul and the first principles. Whoever posited some one cause or principle or element, such as fire, air or water, identified just that one with the soul. So, too, whoever upheld many principles either identified them with the soul. or with its component elements.

§ 66. Having excepted Anaxagoras, touching the theory of the soul’s composition, he goes on, at ‘But Anaxagoras’ to show how this man differed from the others. He alone, says Aristotle, denied the passivity of the intellect, its share in the nature of the things that it knows. But how intellect knows, Anaxagoras does not say; nor can one infer anything certain from what he does say.

§ 67. To end this section, Aristotle summarises what he has to say touching the contrariety of the above-mentioned principles to one another. Some, he says, arrange the first principles of things in pairs of opposites; and the soul also they regard as a synthesis of contraries. Thus Empedocles thought that the heat and cold, the moisture and dryness which he found ‘in the elements were intrinsic to the soul also. As earthy, he said, we know earth, as watery water, and so on. Others found their first principle in only one element, whose particular quality they then attributed to the soul. If it was fire, then the soul, they said, was hot; if water, then the soul was cold. According to the principle assumed so was the quality attributed to the soul, as though it shared in the nature of heat or cold etc. This is clear from the names they gave to the soul. Those who said it was hot gave it names derived from zaein or zooein, meaning to live, which itself comes from zeein, meaning to boil; while others who said it was cold called it psychron, meaning cold, whence comes psyche, a term applied to the soul because the coolness caused by breathing preserves animal life. Those who thought the soul by nature hot, named it from life; those who thought it by nature cold, from respiration. And Aristotle concludes by saying that the foregoing are the opinions handed down about the soul, together with the grounds on which they are maintained.

TEXT

405b32–406b14

BOOK I, CHAPTER III

PREVIOUS THEORIES

SOUL AS A SELF-MOVING ESSENCE

The first thing to be considered is movement. For perhaps it is not only false to say that this is the essence of the soul, as some mean when they say the soul is self-moving, or is able to move itself, but that there should be movement in it at all is an impossibility. It has already been stated that it is not necessary that everything that causes motion be itself moving. For everything moves in one of two ways: either by another, or of itself. We say, ‘by another’, of anything that moves through being in that which moves, like sailors; for these are not in motion in the same way as the ship. The latter moves of itself, but they through being in what moves. This is evident if we consider their parts. Walking is the proper motion of the feet—and also of men—; but for the time being the sailors do not walk. Movement being thus predicated in two ways, we now turn to the soul, asking whether it moves of itself and participates in motion. §§ 68-74

Since there are four kinds of movement (local, by alteration, by increase, by decrease) its motion must be one of these, or some, or all. But if its movement is not incidental, then motion will be in it by nature: and if so, it will be [in] place; for all the aforesaid movements are in place. If it is the essence of the soul to move itself, to be in motion will not be in it incidentally, as in what is white or three cubits long; for these also participate in movement, but incidentally. For what moves is the body in which these inhere; hence of themselves they have no place; but the soul has it, if indeed it naturally participates in motion. §§ 75-7

Further, if it moves by nature, so it will move by force; and if by force, then, by nature. And its rest will be in the same way. Whithersoever it moves by nature, there it will come to rest by nature; and likewise wheresoever it is moved by force, there it will come to rest by force. But what kind of enforced motions and rests will there be in the soul? To find an answer is not easy, nor, even to imagine one! §§ 78-9

Again, if it moves upwards, it will be fire; and if downwards, earth; for such are the movements of these bodies; and the same holds of the intermediate [elements]. § 80

Since it seems to move the body, it would seem reasonable [to say] that it does so by the same motions as those by which it moves itself. If so, then it is true to say, conversely, that just as the body moves, the soul also moves. Now the body moves by change of place; hence the soul too will move in accordance with the body, either the whole or the parts being transposed. If this is so, then it might happen that after leaving the body it could return to it. (But it is utterly impossible that the dead rise again.) And it would follow that dead animals could rise again. §§ 81-83

If it does move, however, by something else, its motion will be incidental; for certainly an animal can be driven by force. But what has self-movement as of its essence cannot be moved by another, save incidentally; as that which is good in itself or for its own sake cannot exist for the sake of another, or on account of another.

One might certainly say that, if the soul is moved at all, it is moved by the objects of sensation. §§ 84-5

But if it moves itself it also is in motion. Hence if all motion is a displacement of the moved as such, then the soul must be displaced from its own essence by itself, unless its movement be incidental; but [in fact] this is a self-movement of its essence. § 86

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SIX

§ 68. The Philosopher now begins to criticise the theories he has been recounting. These theories amount to three statements about the soul: that it is the source of movement and of knowledge, and that it is in a special way incorporeal. The two former attributions, the principal ones, have been predicated of the soul in an absolute sense, as referring directly to its essence. The third is, however, true in one sense and false in another. For if immateriality is taken as predicated simply and absolutely of the soul, then the statement is true; for soul is certainly the least material and most rarified of things. But if it is predicated only in relation to the body, as if to say that soul is the least material of bodies, then the statement is not true. Hence the Philosopher sets to work only with the two former attributions, of movement and of knowledge.

§ 69. This part of the treatise falls into three divisions. Aristotle first argues against the philosophers who had made the soul the source of movement; then at 'There are then three ways' against those who regarded it as the seat of knowledge; and thirdly, at 'Since knowledge pertains' he raises the question whether movement, feeling and knowing ought to be attributed to the soul as to one principle or several. The first of these divisions is again divided. He first adduces objections against simply identifying the soul itself with a source of movement; and then against an opinion, proceeding from this identification, according to which the soul was also a self-moving number. (This comes at 'Much the most unreasonable'.) The former argument again subdivides into, first a criticism of the way in which these philosophers had predicated movement of the soul, and secondly, at 'One might with more reason,' a query whether this predication might have been made differently. Then the criticism is divided into, first, a general argument against all who said that the soul was the source of movement; and secondly, at 'Some say that a soul moves' a series of particular discussions of special points. Finally, the general argument is subdivided. First, he says what he intends to do; secondly, he argues 'in support of his own opinion. The latter begins at 'Since there are four kinds of movement'.

§ 70. He begins then by remarking that philosophers have studied the soul from two points of view, from motion and from knowledge. This is clear from what has been said. And Aristotle says that he will start from motion. Now all the others who started from this point of view had one notion in common, that everything that produces movement is itself moving. They thought therefore that if soul is by nature a cause of movement, it must be by its nature a moving essence. So they put movement into its definition, calling it something that moves itself.

§ 71. Now here there are two disputable points; the theory itself is disputable, and so is the principle upon which it rests. The principle presupposed as a self-evident truth, namely that every active mover is itself in movement, is in fact not true, as is clearly enough shown in Book VIII of the Physics, where Aristotle proves the existence of an unmoved mover. And as to this, we may give here a short proof that if a thing produces movement it does not have to be in movement itself. It is clear that in so far as a thing produces movement it is in act, and in so far as it is caused to move, it is in potency. (if then as causing movement it were moved), the same thing would be in act and potency in the same respect; which hardly makes sense.

§ 72. But even setting this difficulty aside, the theory that the soul is in movement is disputable. Its upholders indeed added the further proposition, that movement was of the soul's essence; but Aristotle denies both parts of this theory where he says, 'For perhaps', etc. He puts it like this because he has not yet proved his assertion, namely that not only is it false to say that movement is of the essence of the soul (which is what they imply when they define the soul as an actual or potential self-mover) but that it is also quite impossible that the soul should move at all.

§ 73. That not everything which causes movement need itself be moved was shown in an earlier work, Book VIII of the Physics. Now in any self-mover there are two things to be considered, the thing moving, and the thing moved; and the former cannot as such be the same as the latter. In living things, however, though the moving part is not moved in itself, absolutely speaking, yet it is moved indirectly. For there are two kinds of movement, direct and indirect: direct, when a thing itself is moving, e.g. a ship; indirect when a thing itself is at rest, but moved with the movement of something else which contains it, as the sailor on board ship moves with the ship's movement, not his own. So the ship moves directly and in itself, but the sailor only in an accidental way or relatively. This is clear if we consider that when anything moves in itself, its parts are moving, as in walking the feet make the first movement; but once the sailor is on board this does not happen. Movement then can be taken in either of these two senses; but since the philosophers we are discussing said that the soul is moved in itself, directly, we can forgo at present the question whether it is moved indirectly, and consider only whether it is directly affected by movement, as they maintained.

§ 74. To show that the soul does not move in itself, Aristotle uses six arguments, with regard to which we should note that, while they may not appear very cogent, still they are effective in relation to the theory he is criticising. For it is one thing to argue out the simple truth of a question, and another to reason against a particular theory; in the former case you have to make sure that your premisses are true, but in the latter you proceed from what your adversary concedes or asserts. Hence it is that when Aristotle criticises the views of others, he often seems to use rather weak arguments. In each case he is, in fact, destroying his adversary's position by drawing out its logical consequences.

§ 75. The first argument begins at 'Since there are four kinds', and may be stated as follows. If the soul moves, its movement is either direct (in the sense explained) or indirect. if indirect, then it is not of the essence of the soul (which is against their opinion), and the soul moves in the same way as whiteness or 3 inches, which are accidental qualities moving only with the thing that is white or 3 inches long, and not themselves, as such, requiring a position in space. But if the soul moves in itself, it moves in one of the four kinds of movement: change of place, growth, decrease or alteration. Coming-to-be and passing-away are not movements, strictly speaking, but changes, because they are instantaneous, whilst movements are successive. Hence the soul will have to move in one of these four ways—from place to place; by increase or decrease in size; or by qualitative alteration. But if all these movements involve position in space, the soul will then be localised in space.

§ 76. There seem to be two doubtful points in this argument. The first is that, while it is clear enough as regards locomotion, growth and decrease, it suggests a difficulty about alteration. Some meet this difficulty by saying that as only bodies are subject to alteration, and all bodies are in place, alteration itself may be said to occur in place. But this does not keep to the letter of the argument: Aristotle says that this kind of movement is in place and not merely according to place. Movement in place is quite different from movement according to place; and, following Aristotle, I maintain that alteration certainly occurs in place. Of itself, and not simply because of its localised subject, it is in place; for, when any alteration occurs, the agent producing it must draw near to the thing altered; otherwise nothing would ever be altered. And since drawing near is a local movement, it follows that here and now the cause of a given alteration is a change in place.

§ 77. The second difficulty is that these philosophers do not in fact see anything unreasonable in the soul's being in place, since they maintain that it moves in itself, absolutely. So Aristotle's objection seems to misfire. To this two answers might be given, (a) that the objection to the soul's being in place will become clearer as we proceed, and (b) that if the soul were in place, it would have to be assigned a definite position in the body and thus would not be the form of the whole body. This reinforces the objection to the soul's being in place.

§ 78. The second argument, at 'Further, if it moves', is this. If the soul moves 'absolutely' from place to place, the movement must be natural to it. But anything that can be moved naturally can be moved violently.' Now its natural movement implies a natural ceasing to move; and therefore also its enforced, violent movement implies an enforced ceasing to move. Hence the soul may both move and stop moving under compulsion; which is impossible if by nature both its movement and ceasing to move are spontaneous.

§ 79. A difficulty here seems to be that what moves naturally does not in fact move under compulsion. I answer that what Aristotle says is false absolutely speaking, but true relative to the theory under discussion. For these philosophers maintained that the only bodies that moved with a natural movement were the four elements; in which we do observe both natural and enforced movement and ceasing to move. This opinion is presupposed by the argument.

§ 80. The third argument, at 'Again, if,' runs as follows: these men who ascribe movement primarily to the soul, and to the body only as derived from the soul, also say that this movement is due to one or other of the elements, fire or earth or one of the others. But if the soul moved with the nature of fire it would only rise; if with the nature of earth it would only sink; whereas in fact it moves in all directions. This argument also is ad hominem.

§ 81. The fourth argument comes at ‘Since it seems’. It is this. You say that it is in moving the body that the soul moves. Logically, then, it follows that it moves the body by its own movements; and conversely that it is moved by the same movements which move the body. But the body moves by changing position in space; so also then the soul. But if the soul’s local movements affect the body, the soul might, after leaving the body, enter it once more. And since it is the soul’s presence that gives life to the body, it follows that dead animals might, even naturally, come back to life: which is impossible.

§ 82. Against this argument some have objected that it ignores the difference between the movements which affect the soul itself and those by which it moves other things, including the body. The former are movements of desire and will; not so the latter. But in reply one may say that desires and volitions and so on are not properly ‘movements’ of the. soul but ‘operations’. ‘Movements’ and ‘operations’ are different: a movement is an act of something that is incomplete, whereas an operation is an act of a subject already possessing full actuality. Still, what Aristotle says is true relative to the theory under discussion; for this had identified all the movements of the soul with those by which it moved the body.

§ 83. But is it true that if the soul had local movement dead animals would come to life again? Well, some philosophers have maintained that the soul pervades the whole body, forming a unity with it through some kind of proportion, and that the two cannot be separated without this proportion being destroyed; so that, so far as this view is concerned, the conclusion would not follow. But it does follow from—and is a valid objection against—the opinion of those who say the soul is located in the body as in a vessel which it sometimes enters and sometimes leaves.

§ 84. The fifth argument comes at ‘If it does move’, and runs as follows. It is clear that when anything is of the essence of a given subject its presence in the latter does not need, except incidentally, to be explained by anything else. If then the soul is essentially moving, it is mobile of its own nature; it does not need to be moved through or by anything else. But we know that it is in fact moved by sensible objects when it senses, and by things desirable when it desires; therefore it does not move of itself.

§ 85. The Platonists meet this argument by denying that the soul is moved by sensible objects; these, they say, are merely involved in the soul’s own movement when it passes from one object to another. But this is untrue. As Aristotle has proved, the intellectual potency is brought into act precisely by means of the sensible objects as apprehended; so that it is moved by them in this way.

§ 86. The sixth argument begins at ‘But if it moves itself’. Clearly, if the soul is self-moving, its own essence governs its movement. But in every movement the moving thing comes away or proceeds from that which moves it and governs its movement; for instance, if anything is moved by a quantity, it departs and proceeds from the latter. If then the soul is moved by its own essence (as they say) it must depart or proceed from its own essence; which is as much as to say that it causes its own destruction. How then could it be through movement that the soul becomes god-like and immortal, as some philosophers whom we have mentioned supposed?, This argument bears against those who did not distinguish between movement proper and operation. For movement implies that what is moved comes away from the cause of movement; but operation is a perfection intrinsic to the operating agent itself

TEXT

406b15–407a2

BOOK I, CHAPTER III, CONTINUED

SOUL AS A MOVER OF THE BODY

DEMOCRITUS AND PLATO

Some say that a soul moves the body in which it dwells just as it moves itself; as did Democritus, who spoke like Philip the comic poet; for the latter relates that Daedalus made a wooden Venus mobile by pouring quicksilver into it. Democritus, then, spoke in like manner, saying that there are in movement indivisible globules of which the nature is to be never at rest, and which therefore draw together and move the whole body. §§ 87-8

Now, what we would ask is, whether this is also the cause of coming to rest? How it could be, on this hypothesis, is difficult to see, indeed impossible. § 89

The soul seems, in general, not to move the animate being in this way, but rather by a sort of choice and understanding. § 90

In the same way, the Timaeus sets out a physical theory as to how the soul moves the body. For, from the fact that the soul moves itself, it moves the body, as a result of its connection with the body. § 91

‘Being compounded of the elements and divided according to harmonic numbers, so that it have a connatural sense of harmony, and the whole be borne along with well attuned motions, §§ 92-8

[God] bent the straight line into a circle, and, dividing it, made out of one two circles, adjusted at two points; and, again, he divided one of these into seven circles, as though the heavenly motions were the soul’s motions.” §§ 99-106

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SEVEN

§ 87. Having argued in a general way against the view that movement pertains essentially to the soul, the Philosopher now brings forward arguments against particular philosophers whose theories of the movement of the soul seem to give rise to some special difficulty. These arguments fall into three groups. First, he opposes an opinion of Democritus; then, at ‘In the same way’, one of Plato; and thirdly, at ‘There is another opinion’ another theory.

He begins, then, by stating the view of Democritus on the soul’s movement; and then brings objections against it.

§ 88. This theory has already been referred to by Aristotle in his fourth objection to the view that the soul moves in itself and by this movement makes the body move. If the soul moves the body, he has said, it must do so in virtue of its own movement. This was admitted by those who said that each soul moved its own body in a manner corresponding to the movement in itself; among whom was Democritus who made use of the following illustration. There was a certain comic dramatist called Philip who tells somewhere of one Daedalus, that he made a wooden statue of the goddess Venus, and that this statue, being filled with quicksilver, was able to move. It moved as the quicksilver moved. And what Democritus said of the soul’s movement was rather similar. The soul, he said, (as has been noted above) was composed of indivisible spheres or atoms which, being round in shape, were always moving about, and by their incessant movement made the whole body cohere and move accordingly.

§ 89. Then, at ‘Now, what we, etc.’, Aristotle puts two objections to this. First, it is agreed that in animals the soul is the cause of resting, as well as the cause of movement. But according to Democritus the soul is never the cause of rest, though it is the cause of animal movements. For he could hardly maintain that those spherical atoms ever rested if they never cease to move.

§ 90. Again, at ‘The soul seems’ he puts a second objection. The movement caused by quicksilver in the statue is obviously not spontaneous; it is a compelled movement. On the contrary, that of the soul is spontaneous, proceeding from mind and will. Hence the view of Democritus seems worthless.

§ 91. Then at ‘In the same way’ he first states the opinion of Plato, which, at ‘Now in the first place,’ he will reject. But before explaining what Plato said about the soul he shows its similarity to the theory of Democritus. As Democritus had supposed that the soul’s movements moved the body to which it was joined, so also did Timaeus, a speaker introduced by Plato. For he said that soul moves body in so far as soul itself moves; because the two are, as it were, bound up together.

§ 92. With ‘Being compounded, etc.’ Aristotle makes Plato’s view explicit; first as to what constitutes the essence of the soul, at ‘God bent, etc.,’ as to how movement proceeds from it. Regarding the former question, note that the words quoted here are used by Plato in the Timaeus and refer to the Soul of the world which, according to him, is imitated by inferior souls. So when he touches, as here, on the nature of the World-Soul, he refers also, in a way, to any soul. Now Plato, for the reason already given, maintained that the essence of all things was numerical; and that in number the formal element, so to say, was one and the material element two—all numbers being made up of one and two. And as odd numbers retain something of the indivision of one, he laid down two elements of number, the even and the odd, attributing to the odd identity and finitude, but to the even difference and infinity.

§ 93. Some explanation of this theory may be found in the Physics, Book III. If odd numbers are added to unity in sequence the same type of number 2 always results; e.g. if 3, the first odd number, is added to 1, you get the square number 4; if to 4 You add the second odd number, 5, you get 9, Which is also a square number; and so on to infinity. But with even numbers the result is always a different type of number. Add 2, the first even number, to 1, the result is the ‘triangular’ number 3; to which if you add 4 the second even number, you get 7 which is ‘septangular’; and so on to infinity. Hence Plato made Identity and Difference the first elements of all things, attributing the former to odd numbers, the latter to even.

§ 94. And because he placed the soul mid-way between the higher substances, which never change, and corporeal substances, which change and move, he thought that the soul was constituted of the elements of Identity and Difference, and so of odd and even numbers. For the mean must participate in both extremes. This is why Aristotle says that Plato held the soul to be constituted by these elements.

§ 95. Again, we should note that in numbers there are different proportions and infinities, of which some are harmonic, i.e. the cause of harmony. The double proportion causes the harmony called a whole octave; that of 3 to 2 causes the harmony called a fifth; (that of 4 to 3 causes the harmony called a fourth); that of 9 to 8 causes a tone; and the other harmonies are caused by other proportions: for example the harmony composed of an octave and a fifth is caused by the triple proportion; that of the double octaves is caused by the quadruple proportion which was discovered by Pythagoras, as Boethius [De Musica, I, 10] relates, from the striking of four hammers which sounded in harmony according to the aforesaid proportions. Thus if one hammer weighed twelve ounces, one nine, one eight and one six, the one that weighed twelve ounces would be in the proportion of two to one to the one weighing six, and the two together would render the harmony of the octave. Again, the one weighing twelve ounces would be as three to two to the one that weighed eight, and the harmony produced would be that of a fifth; similarly in the case of those that weighed nine ounces and six ounces. Again, the one weighing twelve ounces is in the proportion of from four to three to the one weighing nine, and in es with it the harmony of a fourth; so also does the one that weighs eight with that weighing six; while the one weighing, nine is proportioned to the one that weighs eight, and produces with it the harmony called a tone.

§ 96. But if Plato reduced everything to numbers, these were not harmonic numbers, except in the case of the soul. Hence Aristotle gives it as Plato’s view that the soul was ‘divided’. or, as it were, weighed out, ‘according to harmonic numbers’, i.e. to numbers related to each other in musical proportions. He said that the soul was constituted of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9 and 27; in which these harmonic proportions are found.

§ 97. And he had two reasons for thinking this. One was the fact that similarity and connaturality are always a cause of pleasure. We find the soul taking pleasure in all harmonies and disliking whatever is unharmonious in sounds and colours and indeed in any sensible quality. So harmony seems to be natural to the soul. This is what he means by saying that the soul has ‘a connatural sense (i.e. knowledge) of harmony’.

§ 98. The second reason is that the Pythagoreans and Platonists thought that beautifully harmonious sounds resulted from the movements of the heavenly bodies; and since they supposed these movements to be caused by the World-Soul they naturally concluded that the soul was made up of harmonic numbers. Hence Aristotle says ‘that the whole (i.e. Universe) be borne along with well-attuned motions’.

§ 99. Next, when he says ‘God bent, etc.” Aristotle explains how the World-Soul is the cause of heavenly movements. Taking all numbers ‘in their natural order, we must think of them as laid in a straight line, each one adding to the preceding one. Now the natural numerical series can give rise to several other series; for example, one might take the geometrical series whose common ratios are 2 or 3 or 4, and so on for other ratios. As then man, by thought, can manipulate numbers, so does God in building up the substances of things from numbers. In constructing the soul’s substance out of the aforesaid numbers, namely all those placed in a straight line series according to their natural order, he divides them into two series: one, the geometrical series whose common ratio is 2; the other, the geometrical series whose common ratio is 3; because these two embrace all the harmonic proportions. For the double proportion is divided into the ratios 3:2 and 4:3; the triple into 2:1 and 3:2. Therefore the above-mentioned numbers are taken, in the geometrical series with common ratio 2, up to the first cube number, e.g. 1,2,4 up to 8; so also with the series with common ratio 3, e.g., 1,3,9,27. These two series meet at unity like two straight lines containing an angle.

§ 100. Moreover, if the numbers in the series whose common ratio is three are joined to unity we get as a result the numbers of the series whose common ratio is 2; e.g. if to 1 is added 3 the result is 4. Conversely, if to 1 is added 2 the result is 3. Thus it is as if two lines were drawn intersecting each other like the Greek letter X.

§ 101. if we proceed further we return to the same numbers. For from 4 we go on to 8 and from 3 to 27; both series concluding with the same type of number, as though we were going round in a circle.

§ 102. We must realise that for Plato the more complex things found in nature are composed of simpler natures, just as the harmonies of sounds arise from the proportions between numbers. He put the essence of the soul mid-way between numbers, which are eminently abstract, and sensible substances; and so deduced the soul's properties from the said numbers. Thus in the soul we find, first, a direct knowing, in that it looks directly at its object; and then the circular return by which the intellect reflects upon itself. So too the intellectual soul moves in a sort of circle with respect to the even and the odd in knowing things both like and unlike itself. And this principle is extended to the substance of the visible heavens moved by the World-Soul.

§ 103. For in the heavens we find two circular movements. One is simple and uniform by which the heavens move or revolve daily from east to west according to the equinoctial circle. The other is that of the planets, which is from west to east according to the circle of the zodiac, intersecting the equinoctial circle at the two points of solstice, i.e. at the beginning of Cancer and of Capricorn.

§ 104. And since the former motion is uniform, it is not divided into several motions; and in this it resembles the circle of the odd numbers; which is also why it is the greatest circle; for the odd numbers referred to are greater than the even.

§ 105. The second motion, however, is very much diversified, and seems therefore to answer to the circle of even numbers. It divides into seven circles according to the intervals between the numbers in the two series of multiples of 2 and of 3, as is said in the Timaeus. Where there are six points of division there must be seven parts divided off. Hence these circles are smaller and are contained by the highest circle which is that of the odd numbers. So the text is to be interpreted thus: 'As the whole', i.e. the Universe, is 'borne along with well-attuned motions', that is to say, as the harmonised movements of the heavens are due to the harmony of the World-Soul, God 'bent the straight line into a circle' in the manner described, according to the properties of number and of the soul; and dividing this one circle—one by the unity of the natural series of numbers, or by that of the intellectual power of the soul—into two, he forms the pair of numerical circles, the odd and the even, ,and the pair of circles in the soul, the understanding of moving and of motionless objects, and the pair of heavenly circles, the equinoctial and zodiacal motions.

§ 106. He adds, however, ‘adjusted at two points’, because any two intersecting circles touch each other at two points. And ‘again one’, i.e. the inferior one,’he divided into seven circles’, as if of the planets, ‘as though the heavenly motions were the soul’s motions, i.e. as if the heavens moved by the movement of the World-Soul.

TEXT

1407a3–407b25

BOOK I, CHAPTER III, CONTINUED

SOUL AS A SPATIAL MAGNITUDE

CRITIQUE OF PLATO

Now in the first place it is not correct to say, that the soul is a magnitude. For that of the Whole he (Plato) regards as of the same nature as what is sometimes called mind, not as the sensitive or the appetitive soul; for the movement of these is not circular. Now mind is one and continuous, as is the act of understanding, which in turn consists of thoughts. But these have unity by succession, like number, not like extension. Therefore neither is mind thus continuous; but it is either indivisible, or not continuous in the way that anything extended is. §§ 107-11

How would it understand, if it were an extended quantity? As a whole, or by each of its parts? If by its parts, then by an extended part or by a point, if one may call a point a part. If by a point (of which there is an infinite, number) it is evident that it will. never complete the process. If by an extended part, it will understand the same thing many times over, even to infinity. Yet it seems to do so once for all. But if it is sufficient that it make contact with any one of its parts, why should it move in a circle or have any magnitude at all? But if it is necessary that it understand by contact with the whole of its circumference, what is the contact it makes by its parts? §§ 112-16

Again, how can the divisible be understood by the indivisible, or the indivisible by the divisible? § 117

It is necessary that intellect, be this circle; for as the movement of the intellect is to understand, and that of the circle is to revolve, if, then, understanding is a revolving, the intellect must be a circle whose revolving is thinking., But then it will always think something—since revolving goes on for ever. Practical thoughts, however, have limits, each being for the sake of something else; while speculative thinking likewise is limited by ideas and every idea is either a definition or a demonstration. But demonstrations begin from principles, and have as their term a conclusion or an inference. Even if they do not reach a conclusion, they do not come round again to their starting-point; they always take a new middle term and conclusion, and proceed straight forward. But revolving returns again to the beginning. Definitions too are all finite. §§ 118-21

Further, if the same revolving occurs many times over, there will be a multiple understanding of the same thing. §§ 122-4

Moreover, intelligence is better compared with stillness and rest than with motion,—and the same holds of logical deduction. §§ 123-6

Again, that will not be content which is not at ease but in a state of strain. But if movement is not of the essence of the soul, it will only move unnaturally. § 127

It must be burdensome for the soul to be entangled with the body without possibility of release; and indeed this should be shunned if it is better for the mind not to dwell in the body as is commonly said, and as seems true to many. § 128

It is not clear why the Heavens move by circular movement; for the essence of the soul is not the cause of the soul moving in a circle, for such movement is only incidental to soul. Still less is the body the cause, but rather the soul a cause for the body. Nor is this alleged as for the best; yet the reason why God made the soul revolve must have been because it is more worthy for it to move than to remain stationary, and to move in this way rather than in any other. But this speculation is better suited to other contexts, so let us now dismiss it. § 129

Another absurdity arises in this argument and in many others dealing with the soul. They conjoin body and soul, placing the soul in the body without stating anything definite as to the cause of this, or how the body is disposed. Yet this explanation is surely necessary, for it is in virtue of something in common that one is an agent, the other acted upon, one moves and the other is moved. No such correlations are to be found at random. These thinkers only endeavour to state what the soul is, without determining anything about the body which receives it, as if it happened that any soul entered any body, as in the fables of the Pythagoreans. For each body seems to have its own proper form and species. It is like saying that carpentry enters into flutes; for each art must use its tools, and the soul its body. §§ 130-1

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO EIGHT

§ 107. Having stated Plato’s opinion, Aristotle now proceeds to its refutation. Here we should note that often, in criticising Plato, it is not precisely Plato’s own meaning that Aristotle criticises, but the obvious sense of his words. He has to do this because Plato’s method of teaching was faulty; he constantly used figures of speech, teaching by symbols and giving his words a meaning quite other than their literal sense; as when he calls the soul a circle. So lest anyone should be led astray by this literal sense, Aristotle sometimes argues precisely against it, in criticising Plato.

§ 108. Against the above-mentioned opinion, then, he brings ten arguments, some of which bear on Plato’s own view, and some on the literal sense of his words. Plato did not really mean that the intellect was anything quantitative or circular; he was talking metaphorically. Still, lest there should be any mistake about this, Aristotle argues on a literal interpretation of the words.

§ 109. In the first argument, then, he explains what ‘soul’ Plato had in mind, that it was the Soul of the Universe, and that ‘that’ (soul) which is ‘of the whole’, i.e. of the Universe, is exclusively intellectual, according to Plato. It is not vegetative, since it needs no nourishment; nor sensitive since it has no organs of sense; nor appetitive since appetite follows sensitivity. Indeed it could not in any sense be sensitive or appetitive, granted that the movement of the Universal Soul is circular; because neither sense nor appetite moves in a circle (for sense does not reflect upon itself) but. only the intellect (which does reflect upon itself, as when a man knows that he knows). So Plato concluded that the World-Soul was only intellectual, and said that intellect itself was a sort of spatial magnitude and a circle.

§ 110. Aristotle denies this, saying that Plato was wrong in representing the soul as a spatial magnitude circular in shape, and in dividing it into two circles.

§ 111. And he points out where Plato went astray. In this matter of the nature of the soul we have to base our judgement concerning any of its faculties upon the act or operation of that faculty, and our judgement concerning the act or operation upon the object of this act or operation; for faculties are known by their acts, and acts by their objects. Thus in the definition of a faculty is included its act, and in the definition of an act its object. Now it is clear that a thing gets its unity from whatever gives it being and specific nature. If then the intellect gets its being and specific nature from the intelligible which is its object (I speak of the intellect in act, which as such is nothing before the act of understanding occurs), it is clear that if it is one and continuous, as Plato held, it will be so in the same way as intelligible objects are one and continuous. For the intellect is one only in the same way as its operation (understanding) is one; and its operation is one only in the same way as its object is one; since acts are differentiated according to their objects. Since then the intellect's object is intelligibles, and intelligibles compose a unity, not like a magnitude or a continuum, but like numbers which follow in a series, it is clear that the intellect is not, as Plato thought, a magnitude. It is either indivisible, as it is the nature of first principles to be, or, if it is continuous, it is so not as a magnitude but as number is; for as one number leads to another, so do we understand one object after another. And frequently several numbers terminate in one, as the premisses in a syllogism terminate in one conclusion.

§ 112. The second argument comes at 'How would it understand'. For it might be answered that Plato's reason for attributing magnitude to the intellect was not that there are many intelligibles, but that each intelligible by itself shows it to be a magnitude.

§ 113. But this will not do. For Plato maintained that the act of understanding was not a reception of intelligible forms into the mind, but a sort of contact (as of a circle, we have seen) due to the mind's going out to meet intelligible forms. But I ask you, how precisely does the mind understand by contact, if it is a magnitude? it must touch its object either with the whole of itself or with a part. But if with the. whole of itself, then its parts are not needed and there is no necessity for supposing that the intellect is a magnitude or a circle. If, on the other hand, it touches with some of its parts, and thus understands in part, then either several of its parts are involved or only one. If only one, then again the other parts are superfluous and we need not suppose that the intellect has parts. But if it understands by touching with all its parts, these must be either points or quantities; and if points, then, since the number of points in any magnitude is infinite, the intellect would have to touch its object an infinity of times before it understood the latter at all; and thus it never would understand, since infinity cannot be traversed.

§ 114. Aristotle says ‘points’ not because he thought that a magnitude could be partitioned into points, but as disputing with Plato who regarded bodies as composed of planes, planes of lines, and lines of points; an opinion refuted by Aristotle in the Physics, Book VI, where it is shown that a point added to a point makes no difference.

§ 115. But if the mind understands by touching with quantitative parts, then, as each part is divisible into many, it must understand the same object many times over. Again, since any quantity is infinitely divisible into parts that are proportionately, not quantitatively, the same, it would follow that the mind understands the same thing an infinite number of times,—which raises difficulties. it would seem then that it touches its object once only, and that it cannot be called a magnitude, either with respect to many intelligibles or to only one.

§ 116. Notice that Aristotle is implying here that intellect is indivisible of its nature. What is intelligible in any thing is its essence or nature; which is present wholly in every part of it, as the specific nature is wholly present in each individual of the species; the whole nature of man in each individual man; and the individual as such is indivisible. Hence what is intelligible in anything is indivisible; and therefore so is the intellect.

§ 117. The third argument comes at ‘Again, how’. Granted that the mind is indivisible, we can easily see how it can understand both the indivisible and the divisible. It understands the indivisible in virtue of its own nature which is indivisible; and the divisible by abstracting from divisibility. But once allow, with Plato, that mind is divisible, it becomes impossible to understand how it can think of the indivisible. ‘Hence the difficulty of admitting Plato’s theory.

§ 118. The fourth argument begins at ‘It is necessary’. It runs thus. You say that intellect is circular and in movement. Now the movement of circles is a circling and that of the intellect is understanding; hence if intellect is a circle, understanding must be a circling. But this is false; for, since circular movement has no actual beginning or end, as is shown in the Physics, Book VIII, it would follow that understanding, the proper act of the intellect, never reached a term. But understanding has an actual beginning and end: hence it is not the same as circular movement, and therefore the intellect is not a circle.

§ 119. That understanding has an actual beginning and end can be proved in this way. All thinking is either practical or speculative. Clearly all practical thinking reaches a term or end; for it is all for the sake of something else, namely a work to be done, and in this work it terminates. And speculative thinking too has its proper end, namely ideas; for it always comes to rest in some idea: either, in a definition, when the mind simply apprehends something, or in demonstrations, when it combines and distinguishes things. But the first demonstrations begin from absolute first principles and terminate, in their turn, in the conclusions of syllogisms.

§ 120. If it be objected that one conclusion follows another, and thus there is no definite end, I answer that conclusions are nevertheless not circular. For, as is shown in the Posterior Analytics, Book I, demonstration cannot go in a circle; it always goes in a straight line; and an infinite movement or progression in a straight line is impossible.

§ 121. Definitions too have a beginning and an end, for you cannot go on to infinity in the enumeration of genera; the most general genus has to be taken as the first one. Similarly in enumerating species; you cannot particularise to infinity, but must stop at the most particular species. Hence the most general genus is the beginning, and the most particular species is the term or end, in definitions. Clearly, then, every act of the mind has an actual starting point and term.

§ 122. The fifth argument begins at ‘Further, if’. In a sense this argument depends on the previous one and is a part of it. It has been shown that if the intellect were a circle, as Plato thought, understanding would be a circling; and in the preceding argument Aristotle has shown that understanding is not a circling; which he now proves once more in the following way. The difference between a circular motion and any other motion lies in this, that the latter can never be repeated on the same quantity. This becomes clear if we think of the different kinds of movement in particular. Thus the movement of ‘alteration’ cannot be repeated in the same subject in the same respect; for the same thing is not in the same respect changed from white to black and black to white. So too in the movement of growth, the same thing cannot in the same respect both increase and diminish. So also in local movement; if this goes in a straight line it must have two actual terms; and if it is to be repeated, the term at the end of the movement must be used twice, once as end and once as beginning, and, since there must intervene a moment of rest at that term, it is not exactly the same movement. In circular motion alone can one and the same movement be many times repeated according to the same quantity; the reason being that in circular motion there are no actual terms; hence, no matter how often it is repeated, no interval of rest intervenes nor does the motion vary in any way.

§ 123. This being granted, Aristotle argues as follows. If you say that the intellect is a circle, then the act of thinking must be a circular motion. But this consequence is not admissible; therefore neither is the premiss.

§ 124. He then shows that the consequence is not admissible. Granted, he says, that the same circular movement is multiplied, that is, repeated, in the same respect. If thinking, then, is a circular movement, as you say, it will be repeated again and again as one and the same movement bearing upon one and the same object; and so the mind will think the same thing many times over. For the mind, in moving, touches and by this touching it thinks, as they say. If then its motion is circular it touches and thinks the same thing over and over again; which gives rise to difficulties.

§ 125. The sixth argument, at ‘Moreover, intelligence’ is as follows. if thinking is, as you say, a circular motion, it should be associated with movement, but in fact the contrary is true; thinking is associated rather with repose. This Aristotle himself teaches in Book VII of the Physics, where he says that if a man is to become wise he must first achieve an inward tranquillity; which is why the young and the restless are not, as a rule, wise. Wisdom and prudence are acquired, says Aristotle, by one who is content to sit down and be quiet.

§ 126. But lest it be said that, while this is true of simple apprehension, it is not true of syllogistic reasoning, he adds that reasoning also is more like a repose than a movement. Because, of course, before the syllogism is complete the mind and intellect are swaying from one conclusion to another and resting in neither; but when it is finished the mind holds on to one conclusion and rests in it.

§ 127. The seventh argument, at ‘Again, that, etc.’, runs as follows. Let us agree that thinking makes the soul happy. Now happiness cannot reside in anything violent or coercive, since it is the soul’s perfection and last end. As then movement is not of the soul’s essential nature, but is indeed alien to it, that operation in which the soul finds its happiness, namely, understanding, cannot be a movement, as Plato maintained. But that movement is not of the soul’s nature is implied by Plato’s own theory, for he said that the soul was first constituted by numbers, and then that it divide into two circles and was reflected into seven, from which followed movement. According to this view, then, movement is in the soul not naturally but accidentally.

§ 128. The eighth argument, at ‘It must be burdensome’, goes as follows. It seems to have been Plato’s view that it was not of the nature of the soul to be joined to the body; for he said that it was first constituted of the elements and then compacted with the body, so that it cannot leave the body at will. Well then; whenever one thing is united against its nature to another, and cannot leave it at will, the resulting state is painful; and whenever a thing deteriorates through its union with another thing the union is harmful and to be avoided. But ex hypothesi the union of soul and body is contrary to the soul’s nature; nor can the soul break away at will; and the result is bad for the Soul, as the Platonists are always saying. Apparently, then, union with the body is a painful and fearful thing for the soul; which hardly squares with Plato’s own theory that the soul is composed of elements and compacted with its body from the beginning.

§ 129. The ninth argument, at ‘It is not clear’, is as follows. Plato speaks of the Soul of the Universe and says it moves round in a circle. But this provides no explanation of the circular movement of the heavens; that is to say, it does not define the cause of it. For if the heavens move in a circle, this must be due either to intrinsic principles or to some extrinsic purpose. If intrinsic principles are the cause, the ‘nature’ in question will be either that of the soul or of the heavenly bodies. But it cannot be the soul's nature, for circular movement is not of the essence of the soul, but is accidental to it; for, as we have said, the nature of the soul is to move in a straight line, which is then 'bent into circles'. Nor can the cause be the nature of the heavenly bodies, for body as such is not the cause of the soul's movements, but rather the soul of the body's. But, if the cause is an extrinsic purpose, one cannot, on Plato's principles, point to any definite end in answer to the question why the heavens move in a circle rather than in any other way; unless one brings in the will of God. God has indeed, for some reason, chosen to move the heavens rather than leave them motionless, and to move them in a circular way. But why he does this Plato cannot tell. However, as this matter belongs rather to 'other contexts', i.e. to another treatise (the De Coelo). We can leave it aside for the present.

§ 130. The tenth argument starts at 'Another absurdity'. It is effective not only against Plato, but against many others also. It runs thus. It is dear that there must always be some proportion between mover and moved, agent and patient, form and matter. Not every form suits every body in the same way, nor does every agent act upon every patient. Nor, again, does every principle of movement move everything capable of receiving movement. There must be some correlation and proportion between them by which the one is naturally the mover, the other the moved in each case. Now obviously these philosophers admitted that the soul was in the body and moved it. Since then they spoke of the nature of the soul, it seems that they should also have had something to say about the nature of the body; about why the soul is joined to the body and how the body is related to and contrasts with the soul. Their study of the soul was inadequate so long as they discussed it alone and neglected to explain the nature of the body that receives it.

§ 131. Indeed, we may associate their thesis (Aristotle goes on to say) with the Pythagorean fable that any soul can enter any body; the soul of a fly for instance might perchance enter the body of an elephant. This cannot in fact happen; for the body of each particular thing, and especially of living things, has its own form and species and type of movement: hence there are great differences between the bodies of a worm, a dog, an elephant and a gnat. When they say that any soul can enter any body, it is as if one were to say that the art of weaving could enter flutes, or that the art of the coppersmith could enter a weaver’s loom. If it was in the power of these arts to enter bodies or instruments they would not do so indiscriminately, but the art of playing the flute would enter flutes, and not lyres, while the art of playing stringed instruments would enter stringed instruments and not flutes. In the same way, if there is a body for every soul, any soul does not enter any body; rather the soul shapes the body fit for itself; it does not enter a ready-made body. Plato and the others who speak only about the soul are too superficial; they fail to define which body answers to which soul, and the precise mode of existence of each in union with the other.

BOOK I, CHAPTER, IV

THEORY OF SOUL AS HARMONY

There is another opinion handed down about the soul, acceptable to many, and in no way inferior to the theories already discussed, yet chastised, as it were, and condemned, even in public discussions. For some call the soul a kind of harmony. §§ 132-3

And they say that harmony is a composition or tempering of opposites, and that the body is compounded of opposites. § 134

Yet a harmony is either a proportion in the components [of a compound] or the composition itself; and the soul cannot be either of these. § 135

Further [active] movement, which all attribute to the soul, does not pertain to harmony. § 136

It would be more appropriate to call health a harmony, and in general the powers of the body, rather than of the soul. This is evident if one tries to explain the passions and operations of the soul by some harmony: it is difficult indeed to correlate these! § 137

Further, we speak of harmony with two considerations in mind. Primarily as a correctly proportioned measurement, in what has motion and position, of component parts, so that nothing is missing that is becoming to them. secondly, the ratio of this composition. In neither way is this [predication of harmony to the soul] reasonable. The composition of the parts of the body is very easy to examine, for there are many and various such compositions. Of what and how can one suppose the mind to be a composition? Or sensation? Or appetite? It is no less absurd to account the soul the ratio of a composition. The synthesis of elements for bone is not the same as that for flesh. There would have to be many souls [in one body]; and indeed [a soul] for every body, if each is a mixture of elements, and the ratio of the mixture a harmony and a soul. §§ 138-40

One might at this point question Empedocles. He says that each of these exists in virtue of a proportion. Is this proportion then the soul; or is soul some other thing, thus inborn in the members? § 141

Or further: is concord the cause of any chance combination, or only of one based on some ratio? § 142

And whether this concord is the ratio of the composition or something else? These are the kinds of problem involved in this, hypothesis. § 143

But if the soul is other than the composition, why does it perish together with the essence of flesh and of other parts of the body? Moreover, granted that each of these parts has a soul, if the soul is not the ratio of the whole composition, what is it that is, corrupted when the soul departs? § 144

It is evident, then, from what has been said, that the soul cannot be a harmony, or move by revolving. It can, however, be moved and move itself, incidentally, in so far as what it dwells in moves and is moved by the soul. In no other way can it move in place. § 145

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO NINE

§ 132. After rejecting Plato’s theory the Philosopher goes on to dispose of another opinion rather similar to Plato’s. For certain philosophers thought the soul was a harmony; agreeing so far with Plato’s view that the soul was composed of harmonic numbers; yet differing from him in that, while he spoke only of a numerical harmony, they extended the principle to include harmonies of compounds, mixtures and contrary qualities.

§ 133. First then he tells us, of a tradition handed down from the early philosophers concerning the soul, which seemed to contain some truth, not only about the soul, but about something common to all the principles of things. He says ‘something common’ because the early philosophers said nothing about formal causes treating only of material causes. Democritus and Empedocles were the two who seem to have come nearest to treating of the formal cause. The latter reduced everything to six principles, of which four—the elements—were material and two were formal, namely the part-active and part-passive principles, Concord and Strife. And the material elements were, they said, linked together by a certain proportion, whence they had a certain unity without which they could not exist together. And this proportion they called the form and harmony of things; whence it followed that, the soul was a harmony like other forms.

§ 134. Then, at ‘And they say that harmony,’ he states the ground of this opinion: harmony is the combination and mixing in due proportion of contraries in compounds and mixtures. The proportion itself is called harmony and is the form of the compound; and because the soul is a kind of form it was reckoned a harmony. Such was apparently the view of Dynarchus, Simiates and Empedocles.

§ 135. Next, at ‘Yet a harmony’, he begins to criticise it: first in a general way, and then, at ‘One might, etc.,’ with particular reference to Empedocles who formulated it.

The general theory is attacked with four arguments. The first is as follows. Harmony, strictly speaking, pertains to sounds, but is transferred by these philosophers to mean any due proportion, either in things composed of different parts or in mixtures of contrary elements. On this view, then, harmony is one of two things: either the compound or mixture itself, or the proportion existing in it. But the soul is clearly neither of these; therefore it is not a harmony. The reason why the soul cannot be, for these philosophers, either a compound or the proportion in a compound is that these are both accidental factors, whilst the soul, according to them, is a substance.

§ 136. The second argument begins at ‘Further, movement’. All philosophers agree that the soul moves something. But harmony does not move anything; rather it is a result and trace of movement, just as in music the movement of strings leaves its trace in harmonious sound. Similarly, the putting together and coadaptation of parts by some composing agent results in a certain proportional composition. If then the soul were a harmony resulting from some producer of harmony, we should have to posit another soul in the producer.

§ 137. The third argument comes at ‘It would be more appropriate’. In the Physics, Book IV, Aristotle had said that, if the definition of anything is to be adequate, it must answer to all that the given thing can do of itself or receive from other things; for the best definition states not only the substance and nature of a thing, but also its accidental qualities and capacities. If then the soul were a harmony, we ought to be able to work out its capacities and accidental qualities from our knowledge of this harmony. But this is extremely difficult; if, for example, we want to derive the operations of the soul from harmony, to what harmony does feeling or love, hating or understanding belong? It would be easier indeed to know the body through harmony. Thus we certainly can define good health as the duly proportioned and equally balanced commingling of the body’s humours; and likewise with other bodily qualities. Thus harmony belongs apparently to the body rather than to the soul.

§ 138. The fourth argument starts at ‘Further, we speak’. Harmony is sometimes found in things composed together and moving, when, that is, such things are so coapted and arranged that ‘nothing becoming to them is missing’, i.e. no defect occurs within the nature of the thing in question. The parts then are said to be well harmonised and the whole composition is called a harmony, e.g. of wood or stones or other natural bodies. In the same way when stringed. instruments or flutes are well-tuned, so that agreeable sounds result, they are said to be well harmonised. This is the proper meaning of the word. Sometimes, again, ‘harmony’ is found in mixtures of contraries; as, when contrary elements are so combined and mixed that no incompatibility remains, nor any excess of any one of them, e.g. of heat or cold or moisture or dryness; then they are said to be harmonised well and their ratio or proportion is called a harmony. So, if the soul is called a harmony it must be in one of these ways. But in fact it cannot rationally be so called in either of these ways. Those philosophers therefore spoke amiss.

§ 139. Clearly, the soul should not be called a harmony precisely in the sense in which compounds and compositions are harmonious. For in the body the interrelation of the various parts is quite evident; we can easily tell how the bones or the nerves are interrelated, what the arm is to the hand and the flesh to. the bone. On the other hand the principle according to which the parts of the soul are interrelated is obscure; nor does the correlation of parts in the body reveal to us how the parts of the soul, the understanding, and the senses, and desire, and so forth, are related to each other.

§ 140. Nor can the soul be called a harmony in the same way as the proportion in bodies compounded of a mixture of contrary qualities; and this for two reasons. One reason is that a different proportion is to be found in different parts of the living body; for the elements do not mix in the same ratio or proportion to form flesh as to form bone; and consequently there would be different souls for the different parts of the same living body, according to the proportional diversity and multiplication of its parts. The other reason is that all bodies are compounded of elements and contrary qualities; hence if the proportion of each compound is a harmony, and each harmony is a soul, there will be no body without a soul; which is an awkward thesis to maintain. It is not therefore of much use to call the soul a harmony.

§ 141. Next, at ‘One might at this point’, Aristotle attacks Empedocles by drawing three unforeseen consequences from his account of the matter. The first is this. If you maintain that every body has a certain ratio or proportion, which you call harmony and identify with the soul, I put the question to you whether the soul itself is this ratio or proportion, or something else. If you answer that it is the proportion itself, then, since in the same body there are different proportions for the different parts, two difficulties arise; there will be many souls in the same body; and there will be a soul for every compound. But if you answer that the soul is not the proportion itself, then, since harmony is proportion, the soul will not be a harmony.

§ 142.The second argument begins at ‘Or further’. Empedocles had asserted that the cause of union in things was Concord and the cause of disunion was Strife. Now union implies a certain proportion. I ask you, then, whether Concord is the cause of any and every union or only of such unions as are harmonious. If you answer ‘of every union’, then you must find sole cause other than Concord for the harmony and proportion proper to harmonious unions—unless you say that the latter occur by chance. But if you say that Concord is the cause of harmonious unions, then it is not the cause of all unions.

§ 143. The third argument, at ‘And whether this’, runs as follows. Empedocles says that Concord is what unites things. I ask: is Concord the same as the actual union in harmony, or is it not? If it is the same, then, since nothing causes itself, love cannot be the cause of the union as Empedocles asserted. But suppose it is not the same. Still, harmonious union as such is only a kind of agreement, which seems to be precisely what Concord is too. So they are the same after all; and the preceding argument applies as before.

§ 144. Proceeding, Aristotle shows how plausible is the theory in question. Its plausibility, he says, relies on the argument that if you grant one thing another must follow, and if you re move one thing another is removed. Thus when a body loses its harmony it loses its soul, and while its harmony remains the soul too remains. Yet the conclusion does not follow; for this kind of proportion is not, as those philosophers thought, the form itself, but only a disposition of the matter in view of the form. And if the harmony of a composite being is taken in this its proper sense, i.e. to mean a disposition, then the consequence is quite correct, that, so long as the matter's disposition to the form remains, the form itself remains, and when the disposition goes, the form also goes. Not that the harmony is the form, but that it is a disposition of the matter in view of the form.

§ 145. Finally, where he says 'It is evident, then' Aristotle, concluding, summarises his rejection both of Plato's view that the soul moves in a circle and of Empedocles that it is a harmony. The soul, as has been said, is moved indirectly, and it moves itself. That it is moved indirectly is clear, for it moves when its body moves; but the body itself receives movement from the soul. Only indirectly, and in no other way, does the soul move from place to place.

TEXT

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BOOK I, CHAPTER, IV, CONTINUED

THEORY OF SOUL AS A SELF-MOVER RECONSIDERED

One might with more reason enquire about the soul as in movement by considering such facts as these: that it is, as we say, sad, pleased, confident, frightened; or again, that it is angry, feels and understands. All these seem to be movements; from which one might suppose that the soul moves. § 146

This, however, is not a necessary conclusion. Even if feeling pain or being glad or understanding are in the fullest sense movements, and each of these is a ‘being moved’ (e. a. being angry or fearful occurs by some movement of the heart), this being moved is from the soul. But as for understanding, it is either of such a nature or perhaps something other. §§ 147-50

Of these, however, some occur with a change of place in that which moves; others with an alteration,—of what sort or how is another question. To say that the soul is angry is like saying it builds or weaves. For it is perhaps better to say, not that the soul is compassionate, or learns, or understands, but a man by his soul. These modifications occur by movements not so much in the soul as, in some cases, proceeding to it, and in others, proceeding from it,as sensation proceeds from things, whilst remembering proceeds from the soul to the motions or rests which occur in the sensitive organs. §§ 151-62.

But intellect would seem to be a subsisting essence implanted in the soul, and not to corrupt. For it would corrupt [if it did], principally through the debility accompanying old age. But in fact what happens is similar to the case of the sensitive powers. If an old man could acquire the eye of a young man, I he would see as a young man; hence, senility is not an affliction of the soul, but of that which it inhabits, like drunkenness or disease. Understanding and thinking, then, decay with the decay of something else within. Understanding itself cannot be affected. But reasoning and loving and hating are not affections of the intellect, but of that which has it, precisely in so far as it has it. Wherefore, when this decays, the soul ceases to remember or love. For these proceeded, not from it, but from what was common, which has disintegrated. But perhaps intellect is something more godlike and unalterable.

Therefore, that the soul cannot be moved is manifest from these arguments. But if it cannot be moved, it is evident that it cannot be self-moving. §§ 163-7

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TEN

§ 146. After stating and criticising the arguments of those who thought that, because the soul moves the body, it must itself be in movement, the philosopher is next concerned to show that a stronger support for the assertion that the soul was in movement might be drawn from considering the activities proper to it. Dividing his treatment into two parts, he first states the hypothesis that the soul’s activities are evidence of its movement; and then settles the problem so far as his present purpose requires, this part beginning at ‘This, however’.

First, then, he says that whereas the philosophers, of whom he has been speaking, thought that the soul might be in movement from considering the fact that it moved the body, a more rational, i.e. a more plausible, argument might be drawn ‘by considering such facts as these’, i.e. as the activities of the soul itself. For from these one might build up a very plausible argument in favour of the soul’s being in movement. For we say that the soul ‘is sad, pleased, confident (i.e. daring) and frightened’; and we say that it gets angry and senses and understands. And since all these are activities of the soul, and also types of movement, it would seem that the soul moves. And this is a more plausible suggestion than the one already discussed. For the latter argued the soul’s movement from the body’s, according to the principle that every mover is itself moved; so that if soul moves body the soul itself is moved. But the theory now to be considered regards the movement of the soul from the standpoint of the soul’s own activities.

§ 147. Next, at ‘This, however,’ he clears up the difficulty. Here we should note that when Aristotle is searching for truth by a process of stating and answering objections, he will sometimes employ this method after having already demonstrated the truth in question; and then his objections and solutions are governed by the opinion he has already formed for himself. But sometimes he does all this before demonstrating the truth, and then he bases his objections and solutions on the views of others and not on his own opinion or on what he believes to be the truth. For example, in Book III of the Physics, where he argues against those who maintained the existence of an infinite, he employs a number of principles false in themselves but considered true by his opponents, e.g. that every body is both light and heavy. For he had not yet decided about the lightness and heaviness of bodies; this he did later on in the De Coelo, where, in consequence, he reopens the question of the infinite. And such is his method here. His criticism rests upon presupposing as true the views of his opponents.

§ 148. These latter, especially the Platonists, thought that sorrow, joy, anger, sensation and thought, and so forth, were movements in the soul, and that each of these activities, not excepting thought, had its own particular organ; so that in this respect there was no difference between sensitivity and intelligence; and every kind of soul, not the intellectual soul only, was immortal. All of which Aristotle concedes, presupposing that all such activities, even thinking, are organic, and that all souls are immortal. He only denies that such activities as sensation and joy are movements in the soul, asserting that they belong rather to the compound of body and soul. This alone he makes the point at issue.

§ 149. And here he does two things. First, he shows that the activities in question are not movements of the soul; secondly, he proves this with a special argument beginning at ‘But intellect’. His opponents, he says, maintain two points: (1) that joy and sorrow and so forth are movements; (2) that these movements are to be attributed to the soul; which therefore moves. But the conclusion does not necessarily follow; and in any case both propositions are false—the activities in question are not movements, nor are such things as anger, joy, sensation, to be attributed to the soul. But even granted, for the sake of argument, that they are movements, they should not be attributed to the soul; nor the soul , in consequence, be held to move in and with them.

§ 150. For it is obvious that; even if these activities are movements and are of the soul, they are not of the soul except with respect to certain definite parts of the body: thus sensation only takes place in certain parts of the body, such as the eye, the organ o sight; and anger in the heart; and so with the rest. it is clear that they are movements not of the soul alone, but of soul and body together. Yet they are from the soul; for example, when the soul thinks that anything is worthy of anger, the animal organ called the heart is disturbed and the blood gets heated around it. So also with fear; it makes a definite part of the body contract and change. And likewise with the rest. In these cases, then, the soul in itself does not move, but only moves in the movement of another thing, e.g. the heart. But in view of a point which Aristotle is going to prove later on, namely that understanding is an act of the soul alone, in which the body has no share, he observes here that perhaps understanding should be distinguished from all those activities which occur in the compound of soul and body. He says ‘perhaps’ because he is speaking tentatively. But in asserting that the other activities are of soul and body together he implies that they do arise from the soul.

§ 151. So, when he says ‘of these, etc.’ he means to show that these movements arise from the soul to the accompaniment of certain local changes; as in the case of anger, which occurs in the soul when parts of the body in and around the heart are moved: the blood heated by the heart is dispelled towards the extremities of the body. There may also be an ‘alteration’ or qualitative movement, as in fear, when the heart contracts and grows cold and one turns pale. What these passions are, and how they come about, is another question; but it is clear that as movements they are not in the soul alone, but in soul and body together.

§ 152. Hence just as any animal’s bodily activities spring not from its soul alone but from its body, or from the compound of soul and body, so too sense-perception and joy and so forth should not be attributed to the soul alone, but to body and soul together. To say that the soul gets angry and is thereby moved is like saying that the soul weaves or builds or plays the harp. The soul indeed is the cause of these activities; for the acquired ability to build or weave or play the harp is in the soul, and the exercise of the ability in each case springs from the soul. But, as it is better to say that the builder, not the art of building, builds, though the builder builds by his art, so perhaps it is better to say that it is not the soul that feels pity or learns or thinks, but the man who does these things with his soul. He says ‘perhaps etc.’ for the reason given above.

§ 153. But since the statement that the soul does not move, but man with his soul, might be taken to mean that movement exists in the soul as its subject, to forestall this Aristotle explains that when he says that man moves with his soul he means that movement is derived, as it were, from the soul, not that it is found in the soul itself

§ 154. For when I say ‘this moves with that’, my statement can be taken in two senses: either that the source of a given movement is itself moving, as when I say that a man moves with his feet, the feet themselves moving; or that something motionless in itself moves another thing; and it is in this latter sense that a man is said to move with his soul.

§ 155. Now this movement is two-fold. Sometimes the soul represents the term, to which the movement tends, as in sensation; for in the act of the soul’s apprehending exterior sense-objects, the sensitive faculty in the bodily organ is aroused and, moving, transmits ‘to it’, i.e. to the soul, images and notions of sensible things. But sometimes the soul behaves as the starting point of movement, as in remembering, when the latent, buried images and notions of things are brought to light, in order that sensible things may be understood through them. Whether the inward storing away of images should itself be called a movement or a resting is not immediately relevant.

§ 156. Movements of this sort, then, are not to be attributed to the soul, but to the soul and body together; if they spring from the soul, this does not imply movement in the soul.

§ 157. But observe that this solution of the problem is only provisional; it does not leave us with the truth perfectly defined. For movement is attributed to the soul’s activities in different ways by different people. In fact, three kinds of movement are discernible therein In some of these activities movement in the strict sense is found. In others it is found in a less exact sense of the term. And in others in a still looser sense.

§ 158. For movement proper occurs in the activities of the vegetative soul and in sensuous desire. In vegetative activity the material substance itself moves, in consequence of assimilating food. This movement is growth; wherein the vegetative soul plays the active part, the body a passive one. In sensuous desire also movement proper occurs, both through qualitative alterations and also through changes of place. No sooner does a man desire anything than he is affected by certain changes—becoming angry, as in the desire for revenge, or glad as in the pursuit of pleasure. And, accompanying this, the blood moves outwards from the heart to the extremities of the body; besides the fact that the whole man moves from one place to another in pursuit of what he desires.

§ 159. In a less strict sense, however, movement occurs in the acts of the sensitive soul. Here there is no movement of the material substance itself, but only a 'spiritual' movement of cognition: for example, the act of seeing is not a material modification; it is 'spiritual' reception into the eye of sensible forms. Yet it does involve some material change, because the faculty of sight is lodged in the body: and to this extent it involves movement, though it is not movement in the strict sense. Movement in the strict sense is not ascribed to the soul's activities except when a modification of the material substance is the direct term of the activity.

§ 160. Least strictly of all, and indeed only by a metaphor, is movement to be ascribed to the act of the intellect, in which there is no movement of the material substance, as in the case of vegetative activities, nor even any alteration of the subject of 'spiritual' operations, as in the case of sense-awareness. There is only an activity which is called movement simply because the mind goes from potency into act. This differs from movement proper; for whereas the latter connotes an imperfection in the moving subject, this activity proceeds from the subject as already perfect and complete.

§ 161. Clearly then the acts of the vegetative and sensitive souls are not exclusively of the soul, but of soul and body together; while those of the intellect are only called movements metaphorically, and are exclusively of the soul, without the use of any particular bodily organ.

§ 162. Note too that, as desire and cognition are both found in the sensitive fart, the same division appears in the intellectual part also. Hence love, hatred, delight and so forth can be understood either as sensitive, and in this sense they are accompanied by a bodily movement; or as exclusively intellectual and volitional, without any accompanying sensuous desire; and understood in this sense they are not movements, for they involve no accompanying bodily change. In this latter sense they pertain even to immaterial substances, as will be shown more clearly later.

§ 163. Then, at ‘But intellect’, Aristotle sets out to prove what has been shown, namely that even if activities of this kind are movements (as the philosophers he is discussing maintained) still they are not movements of the soul alone, but involve the body also. So he takes one of their opinions (famous in his time), namely that not the intellect only, but every kind of soul without exception, is immortal. According to this view the intellect was a substance in the making, still incomplete, and was immortal. For it is a fact of experience that all the weakening and decay that affect the intellect or the senses come from the side of the bodily organ, not from the soul itself. Whence it would seem to follow that the intellect and every other sort of soul was incorruptible; if its activities grow feeble that does not imply its own decay, but the decay of the organs of the body.

§ 164. If the soul itself decayed it would decay especially in old age; that is when the organs of sense grow feeble. Yet in fact the soul itself is unaffected by old age; if an old man could be given a young man’s eye he would see just as well as a young man. The decline.,of old age, then, is not due to a decline in the soul or in the faculties of sense, but to the body; just as in sickness or drunkenness it is the body, not the soul, that is enfeebled. Hence ‘understanding’, i.e. simple apprehension, and thinking,’ i.e. the intellectual activity of combining and distinguishing ideas, grow weak, not through a weakness in the intellect, but through ‘the decay of something else within’, i.e. the intellect’s organ or instrument. Understanding ‘in itself cannot be affected’.

§ 165. Now in saying this Aristotle is not giving it as his opinion that the intellect has a special bodily organ, but, in the manner already explained, he is arguing on the supposition that the views of the philosophers whom he is criticising are sound; and it was their view, as we have seen, that each of the soul’s activities, and even intellect itself, had its special bodily organ. Assuming this, therefore, he gives as the reason for the decay of the understanding that it is one of those activities (like hating and loving) which are not of the soul alone, but of ‘that which has it’, i.e. of the compound of body and soul, or the bodily organ—precisely, he adds, in so far as this compound has ‘it’, i.e. understanding, and so forth. Consequently when ‘this’ (i.e. the bodily organ) ‘decays’ its activities, such as loving or understanding, decay likewise, and the soul itself neither remembers nor loves any more. The reason is that such processes did not only involve the soul, but that which was common’, i.e. the whole compound being; which has now decayed and passed away. Clearly, then, if all such movements and activities decay through the body’s decay, not the soul’s. they are not themselves exclusively of the soul, but of the soul and body together; and not the soul, but soul and body together, is what moves.

§ 166. But to remove any impression that he himself believes the intellect to be what the argument he is using supposes it to be, he adds these words, ‘Perhaps intellect is something more godlike and unalterable’, i.e. some sort of nobler power than any we are considering now, whose activity is exclusively of the soul. He says ‘perhaps’ because the question has not been decided yet; it will be cleared up in Book III. So much to show that he is arguing on a supposition.

§ 167. Finally, he concludes from all this that it is now clear that the soul itself cannot be the subject of movement. And if so, then the soul is obviously not a self-mover with movements of the kinds here discussed, as the philosophers he is criticising had maintained.

TEXT

408b32–409b18

BOOK I, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED

SOUL AS A SELF-MOVING NUMBER

Much the most unreasonable thing said about the soul is that it is a number moving itself In this there are several impossibilities. First, what follows upon 'being moved', as they say; and then the special difficulties that follow their assertion that it is a number. How is one to conceive a unity, indivisible and undifferentiated in itself, as moving? Or by what? Or in what way? For if it is both moved and mover, there must be some difference in itself. §§ 168-9

Further, since they say that a line, being moved, makes a plane, and a point, being moved, a line, the movements of the units will be lines. Now a point is unit having position; so that the number of a soul must be in some place and have position. § 170

Further, if one subtracts from a number a number or a unit, another number is left. Plants, however, and many animals, live on after being divided, and seem to retain specifically the same soul. § 171

It would seem to be a matter of indifference whether one says 'units' or 'small bodies'. For if the spheres of Democritus were to become points, and only quantity remained, there would remain in them a moving and a moved, as in extended matter, For the distinction spoken of is not due to largeness or smallness, but to quantity as such. Hence there must necessarily be something moving the units. But if it is the soul which moves the animal, so also in the case of number: then the soul is not a moving thing, which is also moved, but a mover only. § 172

Now this would have somehow to be a unit. If so, it must have some principle of differentiation from other units. But how can one isolated point differ from others, but in position? But if there are many different units and points in a body, they will be units in the same subject, and will occupy space as points. But, if there are two in the same place, what is there to prevent an infinity of them together? That of which the place is indivisible is itself such. But if the points in the body are the ‘numbers’ of the soul, or if the ‘number’ of body-points is that of the soul, why are there not souls in all bodies? For in all things there seem to be points, even to infinity. § 173

Furthermore, how is it possible for these points to be separated and released from the body? Since lines cannot be divided up into points? § 174

CHAPTER V

This amounts to saying (as we said before), either, under one aspect, the same as those who posit the soul. as a body of very refined elements, or, under another aspect, what Democritus said of the movement of the soul,—a thing intrinsically absurd. For if the soul is in all the body as sentient, there must be two bodies in the same place, if the soul is some sort of body. And for those who say it is a number, there are many points in one point, or else every body has a soul; unless the soul's 'number' be other than that of the points in the body. The animal would then come to be moved by a number, precisely as Democritus said. What difference does it make whether one says small spheres or large units, or, in general, that units are in motion? In any case it must needs be that the animal moves when these are moving. §§ 175-6

These and many other consequences result for those who would combine number and movement in a single principle. It is impossible for such to be not only a definition of the soul, but even one of its accidents-as is clear if one attempts by this procedure to account for the soul's activities and modifications, such as pleasure, pain and so forth. As we said before, on ihese principles it is not easy even to hazard a conjecture. § 177

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO ELEVEN

§ 168. After refuting those who asserted that the soul was a thing that moved, the Philosopher goes on now to criticise the view of Xenocrates who said, in addition, that soul was a self-moving number; a far less rational opinion than the others already mentioned. For it involves many absurdities. First of course there are those arising from 'being moved', the irrationalities, namely into which all who say that the soul itself moves are led; and then, in addition, there are the special difficulties involved in the notion that soul is a number. Therefore in Xenocrates’ definition of soul the Philosopher criticises, not merely the terms employed, but the meaning itself. This critique has two parts. First he shows that the definition does not fit the soul itself or its substance; and then that ‘it does not fit its accidental qualities,—this at ‘These and many other consequences’. The former part subdivides into reasons for (a) rejecting the said definition and (b) for thinking that it involves all the difficulties implicit in the views of the other philosophers already criticised; this part beginning at ‘This amounts to saying’.

§ 169. He shows the unsuitability of the definition by six arguments; the first being as follows. You call the soul a self-moving number; but number is composed of units; the soul then, in your view, consists of units which move themselves. Now in any self-moving thing there are two parts (as is shown in Book VIII of the Physics), one moving, the other moved. Therefore you must mean that each unit or point is composed of two parts, one moving, the other moved. But this is impossible. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number. To show the impossibility of a unit having a moving part and a moved part: what is wholly indivisible and undifferentiated cannot be thought of as moving itself in such a way that one part moves and another is moved. For the motive or moving factor and the mobile or moved factor cannot exist without differing. Since, then, the unit is indivisible and undifferentiated, it cannot have such parts as these. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.

§ 170. The second argument, at ‘Further, since’, runs thus. You say the soul is a number; and therefore composed of units, as has been said. Now the only difference between a unit and a point is that a point has position—it is a unit in position. But if the soul is a number, this number must exist somewhere in position. Therefore the soul is a unit in position, that is to say a point. But according to the Platonists a point in movement makes a line, a line in movement makes a surface, and a surface a body. If then the soul is a self-moving number each of its units is self-moving, and each of these is a self-moving point. But such a point can only make a line; therefore the same is true of the movement of the soul. Hence not life, but a line is the effect of the soul; which is not true. Therefore thesoul is not a self-moving number.

§ 171. The third argument, at ‘Further, if’, is the following. if, as you say, the soul is a number, it must have the nature and attributes of number. Now it is evident that whenever a unit is taken from or added to a number, the number is essentially changed. if you add 1 to 3 you alter the number in kind: 4 differs in kind from 3. Similarly if you take 1 from 3, leaving 2. Now it is agreed that living things are specified by their soul; since it is through the form that things are specified. if” then, the soul is a number, any addition to, or subtraction from, it must alter it in kind. But this is not true: for if plants and segmented animals are cut up the divisions go on living, the same in kind as before. Therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.

§ 172. The fourth argument, at ‘It would seem to be’ is as follows. You say the soul is a number; whence it follows, as we know, that it consists of units in position, i.e. points. But on this, supposition it is obvious that there is no difference between saying, with Democritus, that the soul consists of small indivisible bodies and saying that it is composed of units in position. For each unit in position is a quantity and indivisible.

Very well then; the soul, in your view, is a self-moving number and, consequently, consists of units and points moving themselves. Let us suppose then that the indivisible bodies of Democritus are points (there is no difference, as we have seen) and are quantities (as they must be, since only quantities, properly speaking, move). Now these points will move themselves if the soul is a self-moving number. But every self-mover, as has been said, is two-fold; hence each point itself is two-fold, having a moving part and a moved part; and this, no matter whether they be large parts or small, provided they have some quantity; for every self-moving continuum contains the two factors; a moving one and a moved one. So there must be a mover of the units. But in living things the mover is the soul; therefore the mover of the number would be the soul; whence it follows that the soul is not a moved but a mover, and thus, the definition of it as a self-moving number is incorrect. It should rather be defined as a number moving another number.

§ 173. The fifth argument begins at ‘Now this would have somehow to be a unit’. In Xenocrates’ opinion the soul is a unity. But if so, then it is a point; for it must, as a unity, differ from other unities and it cannot differ except through position. For what is it that differentiates ‘isolated points’, i.e. unities as here understood, excepting their position? Moreover, only through position are unities points. The soil, then, is not a mere unity, but a point. Yet it exists in the body and every body as such has its own points. Well then, are the soul-points identical with the body-points or not? If they are not, then every part of the body will contain also soul-points, and in every such part there will be two points at the same time in the same place. And if two, why not more than two, ad infinitum? Things whose place is indivisible are themselves indivisible; and require no increase of space if they increase in number; so, that if two can be in an indivisible place, there is no reason why an infinite number should not be there. On the other hand if body-points are identical with soul-points, then every body has a soul, since every body has points. But this is false; therefore the soul is not a self-moving number.

§ 174. The sixth argument, at ‘Furthermore, how’, continues the preceding one. It follows from Xenocrates’ theory that the soul is composed of points. Points are obviously inseparable and undetachable from bodies; for lines are not separable from surfaces, nor points from lines. But this is not true of the soul; hence it is not a point or a number. Clearly then, Xenocrates’ definition is intrinsically inappropriate.

§175. Then, at ‘This amounts to saying,’ he finds this definition objectionable in its consequences. These consequences involve all the objectionable consequences flowing from the theories of all who have philosophised about the soul. For some of these fell into the mistake of saying that the soul was a body made up of extremely fine parts, whence it would follow that two bodies would be together in the same place; for the soul is wherever sensation occurs, and this is everywhere in the body. And the same would follow, as has been said, if the soul were composed of points: two points, or even an infinite number of points, would exist together in the same place at the same time. This would follow if the soul-points differed from body-points. And if ‘the number be other’, i.e. if there is no difference between soul-points and body-points, then every body contains a soul, since it must contain points.

§ 176. Others, like Democritus erred in saying that the soul itself moved, and the body because of the soul. And from Democritus’ statement that the soul was made up of indivisible spheres whose movement caused the body to move it followed that indivisible bodies were the cause of bodily movements. The same difficulty follows from the definition which states that an animal is moved by a number and so by points. It makes no difference what size we give to the moving spheres or units; for ‘in any case’, i.e. with spheres or with units, the origin of the soul’s movement is the movement of bodily spheres and points.

§ 177. Next, at ‘These and etc.,’ he shows the weakness of the above definition with respect to accidental qualities. A complete definition, he says, must give knowledge of the accidents as well as of the substance of the thing defined. But if we combine number and movement in our definition of the soul, we shall find ourselves involved in many difficulties besides those that concern the soul’s substance. For these two things, number and movement, not only cannot belong to the substance of the soul, but are not even accidental qualities of it, nor are they means to a knowledge of these qualities. Hence the definition itself is unsuitable; it does not help us to know the accidental qualities of the thing defined. This will be evident to anyone who, relying on this definition, tries to attribute to the soul affections and activities such as reasoning, pleasure, pain and the like. If we started from number and movement, we should not only find it, hard to reach any knowledge of the soul’s accidental qualities and passions and activities, but we could not even begin to hazard any conjecture about them.

TEXT

409b18–411a7

BOOK I, CHAPTER V, CONTINUED

EMPEDOCLES’S THEORY OF COGNITION

SOUL NOT COMPOSED OF THE ELEMENTS

There are, then, three ways in which men have defined the soul: some declaring that it is the principal mover, being self-moving; some, that it is the most subtle of bodies, or the least corporeal of things (what contradictions and problems these views entail we have briefly reviewed); so what is left for us to consider is how it is said to be constituted from the elements. They say this is so because the soul perceives things that are and knows each one. But many irrational consequences follow upon this. For they suppose that like is known by like, as if they meant to identify things themselves with the soul. But those [elements] are not the only things; there are many others, perhaps infinite in number, derived from them.

Granted, then, that the soul knows and perceives the elements of which each of these is formed, yet it will not know or perceive wholes, such as what a divinity is, or a man, or flesh, or bone, or anything else compounded. For the elements of these are not interrelated at random, but by some ratio or principle of composition, as Empedocles said of bone,

The earth all gracious in its ample caverns
Took two parts out of eight of water and light,
But four from the god of fire, and then
White bone was made.

So it is no use supposing elements to be in the soul unless there are in it also principles and co-ordination. Let each know its like, it will not know bone or man unless these be in it. It is hardly necessary to say, however, that this is impossible; who would ever think of enquiring if there is a stone in the soul, or a man? Likewise, the good or the not-good; and similarly with other things. §§ 178-80

Further, ‘that which is’ can be predicated in several ways: in one way, substance, in another, quality, in another, quantity; and in any other way according to the categories that have been distinguished. Will the soul be made up of all these or no? But it does not seem that there are elements common to all these. is it from those of substance only? How then will it know anything of the other kinds? Or is one to say that there are elements and principles proper to each category of which the soul is composed? then there will be quality and quantity and substance in the soul. But it is impossible that of the elements of quantity be derived substance, and not quantity. For those who hold that the soul is composed of all things, these (and other such) difficulties arise. §§ 181-2

It is unreasonable to say that one thing cannot be acted on by its like, and yet that sensation and knowledge is ‘like by like’. For they posit sensation as being moved and affected, and knowing and understanding likewise. § 183

What has now been said witnesses to the many difficulties and doubts to be faced by one who, with Empedocles, says that each thing is known through its corporeal elements and [their relation] to its likeness. For whatever things in the body are obviously earthy (bones, sinews, hair) seem to perceive nothing; nor therefore even their likenesses; and yet they ought [on this hypothesis]. § 184

Again, each one of the principles will have more ignorance than understanding. For it will know a single principle and be ignorant of many others, indeed of all others. § 185

Further, for Empedocles, the Divinity must be the least knowing of all things, for he alone will not know one of the elements, namely Strife; but mortals, all; for every individual is composed of all. § 186

In general then, why is it that everything has not a soul? For all things are either elements or are made of one, or of several, or of all. They ought accordingly to know one, or several, or all. § 187

One might wonder what gives unity to them. For the elements are comparable to matter, and that which holds them together, whatever it is, is the most essential principle. That it should have a higher function or be more excellent than the soul is impossible; still more impossible that it be higher than intellect. For that this is the primordial and most exalted and godlike thing by nature is in full accord with reason. Yet these men say that the elements have priority among beings. § 188

Not one of those who maintain that the soul is constituted from elements because it perceives and knows realities, and that it is primary among moving forces, considers every kind of soul. For not all sentient beings move; for certain species of animals are observed to remain in one place, although it would seem that the soul moved the animal with this one motion only [i.e. locally]. Likewise with those who would make of elements the sensitive and intellectual powers; for plants seem to live, but are not endowed with local motion or perception; and many animals lack intelligence. Even setting this fact on one side, and admitting that intellect is a part of the soul, and the sensitive power likewise, they would not be speaking of every soul, nor of the whole of any soul, nor of one [entire soul]. The same objection tells against a notion expressed in the Orphic hymns, where it is said, 'The soul enters from the universe, breathed in by the winds.' This cannot occur in the case of plants and certain animals: unless, indeed, all use respiration; a fact overlooked by those who put forward this view. §§ 189-90

But if one must constitute the soul from the elements, there is no need to use them all; for one term of contraries suffices for the discernment of itself and its opposite; thus by the straight line we know both itself and the oblique; the criterion of both is the rule, but the curved is a criterion neither of itself nor of the straight.

ST. THOMAS COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWELVE

§ 178. Having in the preceding sections explained that the early philosophers pursued their enquiry into the soul by three ways, that of movement, of knowledge and of incorporeal being, and having pressed certain objections against those who took the way of movement, and against those who identified soul with something bodiless and entirely simple, the Philosopher now turns to criticise the upholders of the principle that the soul knows everything because everything is included in itself.

§ 179. With their theory that all knowledge takes place by means of assimilation these philosophers had caught, as it were, a far-off glimpse of the truth; but they expressed this by saying that the reason why the soul knew all things was that all things entered into its composition, and that the soul possessed the likeness of all things according to the mode of existence, i.e. a corporeal one, which things have in themselves outside it. Hence, if things consist of elements, the same is true, they said, of the soul; and that is the cause of sensation and knowledge. The chief upholder of this view was Empedocles, who posited more elements in the soul than anyone else; and therefore the Philosopher is more concerned here to refute him than anyone else. So he first attacks the opinion of Empedocles, and only then, at ‘And some say’ that of certain others.

§ 180. Against Empedocles he brings ten arguments. The first is as follows. Empedocles argues that the soul must be composed of all the objects of its knowledge because knowledge takes place by means of similitude. But this involves many difficulties and absurdities. For clearly the elements are not all that any given thing contains; it includes much else besides, such as the proportion in which its elements are combined and the formulable essence of each one in particular, and there may even be an infinity of accidents belonging to things made up of elements. Take, for example, bones. To understand bones we need to know, not only the elements of which they are composed, but also how these elements combine in them, and the functional pattern of bones; for the order of elements in compound things is not a random one, it involves a certain definite proportional arrangement. If bone, as Empedocles says, is composed of eight parts, each bone has eight parts into which the various elements enter in unequal measure: for earth, he says, contributes two parts, air and water one each, and fire four—to which predominance of fire is due the whiteness of bone, while from earth comes its dryness. Thus in compound things there are, besides the elements, certain proportions and patterns. Well then, either these proportions are in the soul together with the elements, or not. If they are in the soul, then bones and flesh and so forth, and therefore men and stones and bodies and things quite contrary to one another, are all in the soul; and this nobody dreams of conceding. But if only the elements are in the soul, then it does not in fact know the proportion in things nor compound things as such; and how can it know God (i.e. the Heavens as a whole) or man or stone or bone? It cannot possibly know these things; it knows only the elements which compose them, according to this view.

§ 181. The second argument, starting at ‘Further, that which is’, runs thus. You say the soul is made up of elementary principles. But these differ according to the different categories of things, such as substance, quality, quantity and the rest. Is then the soul made up of the elementary principles of substance alone, or does it include those of the other categories? If the first alternative is right, then the soul only knows substance; yet the supposition is that it knows everything. But if it includes the elements of all the categories, then, since whatever has the elementary principles of substance is a substance, and whatever has those of quantity is a quantity, and so on likewise with the rest, it follows that the soul is at once both a substance, and a quality, and a relation, and so on and so forth.

§ 182. It might be answered that the elementary principles of substance are also those of quantity, quality, etc., since everything is grounded in substance; hence the soul need only possess the principles of substance to know everything. But I say that things have both remote and proximate principles, and should be known by means of the latter. The principles of substance may be the remote, but they are not the proximate, principles of the other categories; hence they cannot give knowledge of anything except substance.

§ 183. The third argument, starting at ‘It is unreasonable’, is this. The reason why the soul is said to be composed of all the elements is that it knows all things and knowledge is by similarity. Against this is the admitted fact that sensation and knowledge are a sort of being acted upon; and it seems unreasonable to say that like is acted upon by like, and not rather by its contrary; and consequently, to say that sensation or knowledge are by similarity.

§ 184. The fourth argument, at ‘What has now’, is this. What has been said already is enough to show that Empedocles’s theory is highly questionable and his manner of expressing it slipshod. But there is a yet stronger objection. If the soul, as he says, knows by similarity, then the element air Will know air, and so on for the other elements. But we know that animals’ bodies have many earthy parts which lack sensation, such as hair, bones and nerves; yet they ought to have sensation according to this theory. Therefore knowledge is not by similarity nor the soul composed of the elements.

§ 185. The fifth argument’s at ‘Again etc.’, runs thus. Another objection to this view is that it implies that principles as such are more ignorant than percipient. For if knowledge is only by similarity, and if every principle is quite simple, having no likeness to anything but itself, it follows that each principle only knows itself and is ignorant of everything else.

§ 186. The sixth argument comes at ‘Further’. This theory also implies the doubtful consequence that God is the most ignorant of all living beings. For, as we have seen, Empedocles thought that everything on this earth could be reduced to the four elements together with Strife and Friendship, these last being the causes of coming-to-be and passing-away. But the sky he called God and said it was composed of the four elements and Friendship, but not of Strife; and was therefore incorruptible. If then knowledge is by similarity, God cannot know Strife, since it does not form part of him, and God is therefore less percipient, strictly speaking, than other living beings which know Strife because they include it.

§ 187. The seventh argument’ comes at ‘In general, why’. If the soul is made of all the elements, then all things have souls; for all things are made of either all or some elements. Now whatever is made up of elements or of compounds of elements is a body. Hence all bodies, indeed all beings, have souls; which is false.

§ 188. The eighth argument’ begins at ‘One might wonder’. The elements are many and contrary; but whenever contrary things come together in a composition there must be some other thing which includes and unifies them. Hence if the soul is made up of the elements there must be something in it which unifies them. But it is extremely doubtful what this can be; for it must be something in the soul nobler than the soul, which is an impossibility, at least as regards that, which it is reasonable to consider the supremely noble and divine thing, namely the mind. Besides, this other thing would have to be prior to the elements, whereas Empedocles and the rest have asserted that the elements were the first of all beings. Therefore the soul is not made up of elements.

§ 189. He begins the ninth argument at ‘Not one of those’, showing the weakness of Empedocles’s view and that of all the others who have enquired about the soul, whether by way of movement or by way of sense-perception. For (1) there is a gap in the arguments of all who defined the soul in terms of local movement. Many living beings, such as plants and things resembling plants, do not move locally at all but are fixed in one place. And (2) there is a like inadequacy in the definition of the soul in terms of intellect or sensation; for plenty of living things neither sense nor think. And if local motion, intellect and sensation are taken separately and regarded as distinct parts of the one soul, this will not apply to soul in general, since not all souls are intellectual; nor to the whole of any one soul, since only parts of it will be intellectual and sensitive; nor to any one single soul, since this description does not enumerate all the characteristics of any given soul; for in any soul there are other things besides understanding and sensation.

§ 190. And a certain philosopher named Orpheus having fallen into a rather similar error in what he said about the soul, he too is mentioned here. Orpheus was one of those three early thinkers who were, so to say, poet-theologians; for they wrote in verse on philosophy and about God. The other two were Museus and a certain Linus. Orpheus, a wonderful orator whose words had power to civilise wild and brutish folk, was the first man to induce his fellows to five together in society. For this reason it is said of him that he could make rocks dance to the sweet sounds of his harp, which really means that his eloquence could melt the hardest hearts. And after these three poet-philosophers came the seven sages, of whom Thales was one. Now this Orpheus thought that the whole air was alive, was indeed a sort of living soul, and that the so-called souls of living bodies were really nothing but the air these bodies breathed; and this idea he expressed in verse. But the Philosopher objects to the Orphic theory, saying that it is just as inadequate as the others he has criticised; for there are many animals that do not breathe at all, ‘a fact’, he says, ‘which was overlooked’ by those who held this opinion. The criticism touches the inadequacy of the theory.

§ 191. At ‘But if one’ comes the tenth argument; which convicts the Empedoclean theory of unnecessary complication. The soul’s capacity for knowledge is explained by its composition from elements. Now it is a matter of experience that knowledge of anything rests on few, rather than many, principles-, hence even if we grant that the soul is composed of elements we ought not to suppose that these are all the elements, but at the most two. And that knowledge rests on few rather than many principles is clear if we consider that in composite things, consisting of two principles, one of perfection, the other of imperfection, it is in the light of the former that we know the latter; and that in contraries, which can be reduced to a quality and its privation, it suffices to understand the term denoting quality and perfection in order to understand also the other term denoting privation and imperfection. Thus by, the idea of straight line we know and for in judgements about both straight and crooked lines; for ‘the rule’, i.e. the measure, is the means of knowing both; but the crooked line is the means of knowing neither itself nor the straight. Hence there was no need to regard the soul as made up of all the elements; enough to adduce two only, fire and earth, as its means of knowing both itself and contrary things. Through fire it could know both cold and hot objects, and through earth the dry and the moist.

TEXT

41a 8–411a25

BOOK I, CHAPTER V, CONTINUED

THE ELEMENTS HAVE NO SOUL

And some say that the soul is intermingled generally with the Universe. That is perhaps why Thales thought that the whole world was full of divinities. § 192

This, however, involves several difficulties. For why does the soul in fire and air not result in an animated being, whereas it does so in composite beings?—and that, even though it is thought to be more excellent in the former. (And one might well query why the soul in the air should be nobler and more enduring than that in animals.) On either count the theory is absurd and unreasonable. To say that air or fire is an animal is among the most wanton of absurdities; and if there is a soul in them, it is inconsistent not to call them animals. §§ 193-5

They seem to have held that there was a soul in these on the ground that the Universe is made up of homogeneous parts; so that if animals become animate by partaking of the containing element, they must say that the soul [of the Whole] is homogeneous with its parts. § 196

If then the air, divided off thus, be homogeneous, but the soul be composed of heterogeneous parts, something of it [the soul] will exist and something not. It is necessary then, either that it be of homogeneous parts, or that it be not in any and every part of the whole. § 197

It is evident then, from what has been said, that the cause of knowledge being in the soul is not that soul is made up of the elements; and that it is neither true nor apposite to say that it is in motion. § 198

I That the distinction here referred to between parts of 'soul' refers to mortal and immortal existence is St. Thomas's interpretation of this passage (§ 197).

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO THIRTEEN

§ 192. Having stated and rejected the theories and arguments of those who maintained that the soul was composed of elements, the Philosopher is now led, by the same train of thought, to discuss the notion, upheld by some, according to which a soul is intermingled with the elements. First, then, he states this opinion, and then, at 'They seemed to have held', the argument used to support it. And the opinion itself is first stated and then, at 'This, however,' attacked.

There are, he says, some who see a soul intermingled with everything, whether simple elements or things composed of these. This perhaps is what Thales meant when he said that everything was full of gods; perhaps he thought that the entire Universe was alive and its life was divine; that just as soul exists everywhere in each living thing so a god was everywhere in the Universe and everything therefore was 'full of divinities'. And perhaps this was the notion that underlay idolatry.

§ 193, At 'This, however,' he points out, against this opinion, that it presents certain difficulties. For instance, if a soul exists in air and in fire (and of these two especially this was asserted) it is hard to see why it does not make 'animated beings' of them, i.e. why air and fire are not animals. Things composed of several elements are animals precisely because they contain a soul; and one would expect the soul to be all the more powerful where the element is pure and simple.

§ 194. Again , one might ask, he says, why the soul which they place in the elements should be considered higher and more immortal than the soul of things composed of elements. For the latter constitute knowing, sentient animals; not so the former.

§ 195. But, however the objections are put, the result is damaging to this theory. To say that fire or air is a living body is most improbable in itself; it is contradicted by experience; and is unsupported by any good reason. And to deny that things which have souls need be living bodies is most unreasonable; for it would follow that there was no difference between souls that exist in bodies and those that do not.

§ 196. Then, at ‘They seem to have held’, he states the reason used in support of this theory and refutes it; after which, at ‘It is... evident’ he draws a general conclusion from all the foregoing discussions. The reason, he says, why some philosophers seem to have thought that a soul existed in ‘these’, i.e. in all the elements, was that they thought that the whole and the parts in elements were of the same nature, since the elements are simple. Observing that that part of ‘the containing element’, i.e. the air, which came into contact with the bodies of animals through their breathing, was the cause and principle of animal life, they thought it necessary to conclude that the soul of the whole was ‘of the same specific nature as the parts’, that is to say, that all the containing air was alive.

§ 197. At ‘If then’ he refutes this argument. The assumption is that, because the portion of the air removed and inhaled by an animal is of a like nature to the air as a whole, the soul of the animal itself is, as it were, a portion of the soul of the whole air. But on their own principle this is clearly false; for, according to them, the soul of air ‘exists’, i.e. is immortal, as that which has never ceased from vivifying animate beings, whereas the soul of this or that particular animal ‘does not exist’, i.e. is not immortal. Therefore either of two awkward consequences flow from this theory. If all the parts of air, those outside and those breathed in, are homogeneous, then the same is true of the soul; but this has been disproved. But if the soul’s parts are heterogeneous while the air’s are homogeneous, then the soul is not in every part ‘of the whole’, i.e. of the whole air; which is against those who said that all the air had a soul.

§ 198. Then at ‘It is evident’ Aristotle concludes this part of the discussion of earlier opinions. Neither of these two predications made’ by the ancients was, he says, either true or well-expressed; namely that knowledge in the soul is a consequence of its being composed of elements, and that movement is in it for the same reason. So much should be clear to anyone who has followed the discussion up to the present.

TEXT

411a26–41lb30

BOOK I, CHAPTER V, CONTINUED

THE UNITY OF THE SOUL

Since knowledge pertains to the soul, and sensation, and thinking, as well as desiring and deliberating—in a word, all appetition; and as in animate beings there also occur local motion, and growth, and preservation, and decay, all from the soul, is each of these in the whole soul, and do we understand and perceive and do and undergo every particular experience, with the whole soul? Or does each require a different part? And is life itself in any one of these? Or in several? Or in all? Or is it from some quite distinct cause? §§ 199-203

Some say the soul is divisible, understanding by one part and desiring by another. §§ 204-5

If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together? Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true, that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask, concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one, why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum. § 206

A further query arises about the soul’s parts: what power has each in the body? if the whole soul holds together the whole body, it would be fitting if each of the parts controlled some part of the body. But this looks like an impossibility. It is difficult even to imagine what part the intellect would hold together, or how. § 207

It is also held that plants live after being divided, and certain divided animals also; as if they had a soul specifically one, but not numerically. For each of these parts is endowed with sensation and moves locally for a certain time. If they are not long-lived, that is no objection: they have not the organs. requisite for the preservation of their natures. Nevertheless, in each of the parts are to be found all the parts of the soul; and those separated parts are specifically the same as each other and as the whole; as each other, as if they were not separable; as the whole, as having an indivisible unity. § 208

It would seem that the principle in plants is some sort of soul. Plants have only this in common with animals, and while this is independent of the sensitive principle, nothing has sensation without having this. §§ 209-10

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FOURTEEN

§ 199. Having reviewed and criticised earlier opinions on the soul the Philosopher proceeds now to put certain questions of his own; which at ‘Some say’ he begins to answer. But first we have to realise that the activities, of the soul, such as sensation, understanding, desire, movement in space, and growth, can be considered in two distinct ways. We can consider the mode of these activities; and from this point of view we can distinguish, underlying these activities, three powers of the soul: the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual.

§ 200. And these powers differ. For whilst the vegetative or nutritive power acts through active and passive qualities of matter, such as heat and cold and the like, the sensitive power requires no such sensible qualities for its sentient activity, though it does depend on corporeal organs; while the intellectual power acts through neither sensible qualities nor a corporeal organ, for it functions in an entirely incorporeal way.

§ 201. But if we consider the kinds of activities within the soul’s range, then we distinguish five powers with five corresponding activities: the nutritive, sensitive, locomotive, appetitive and intellectual powers.

§ 202. Having then discussed and criticised earlier opinions on the soul in general, Aristotle begins now an enquiry into the parts and particular activities of the soul. And he proposes two problems. The first is whether activities like sensing, rational judgement, desiring, deliberating, and also appetition (which he related to special parts of the soul in a more general way than these, placing the irascible urge in both the sensitive and the rational parts), together with local motion and rest, growth and decline, whether all these pertain to the whole soul in such a way that each one occurs in every part of the soul, so that with each part we both understand and sense and move and desire and assimilate food; or whether the truth is not rather that each activity has its own special part, that is to Say, that with one part we understand, with another we sense, and so on

§ 203. The second problem is this. Granted that each activity has its special part of the soul, is this true of the activity of simply being alive? Is this activity proper to any one of these parts? Or to many? Or to all at once? Or does it perhaps belong to some other part?

§ 204. Then at 'Some say' he answers these questions in order. As to the first one, he states and then rejects a view of certain philosophers that the activities in question spring severally from the soul's parts, ilot from the soul in general; that the soul is so divided into parts that it understands with one and desires with another, just as some people hold that the sensitive power is in the brain and the vital power in the heart, and so on.

§ 205. Now this is partly true and partly false. if you take it to mean that the soul has different parts potentially, it is quite true that its parts and powers are distinct and that one of them understands and another senses. The soul is a whole in the sense that it has a total capacity with partial capacities subordinate to the whole. But if you take it quantitatively, as though the soul were of a certain size with parts of certain sizes, then this opinion is false. And this was how the philosophers in question thought of the soul—even to the extent that they made out the soul's different powers to be different souls.

§ 206. Next, at 'If then the soul', Aristotle attacks this last hypothesis, with three arguments. The, first is this. Different things cannot be unified except by something else that unites them. If the one body contained several souls, these would have to be joined together and contained by something else. But there is nothing else that can do this; therefore the hypothesis is groundless. That there is no other unifying principle is shown thus. Whatever contains and unifies the soul will be either the body or some other thing. Now it is not the body. Rather, the body is contained and unified by its soul and falls to pieces when the soul leaves it. Then it is something else; but this must be a soul if it pertains especially the soul to unify and control. Is then this unifying soul itself intrinsically one, or made of several parts? If of several parts, then what unites them? And so on ad infinitum. But if this unifying soul is intrinsically one, then ‘why not call it the soul straight away’, i.e. why not concede at the beginning that the soul is intrinsically one? The soul, then, is not, as they thought, quantitatively divisible.

§ 207. The second argument comes at ‘A further query’. If the different parts of the soul are in different parts of the body, then each soul-activity has its own corporeal part or organ. But the intellect has no special corporeal organ. Hence their conception of the soul’s parts is false.

§ 208. The third argument starts at ‘It is also held’. If each of the various activities of soul is proper to a special part of the body, then no one part is the organ of several distinct activities, nor are there several parts ‘in an animal’ body the same in kind. But experience proves that certain living things have parts with several activities each, and a soul that is identical in kind in the whole and in all the parts; e.g. in plants and in certain (segmented) animals ‘ which go on living after being cut up, the cut off parts retaining their feelings and movement for some time. It does not matter if these parts live for only a short time through lack of the organs of self-preservation. The point is that several soul-activities exist in several distinct corporeal parts at once, and the latter are specifically similar to each other and to the whole. Therefore the soul is not divided according to the different parts of the body.

The reason why such animals go on living after being divided is that the number and diversity of activities complete in themselves varies in direct proportion to the perfection of the soul in living things. The higher the soul, the wider is the range of its activities; and the wider its active range the more, and the more distinctly diversified, organs or bodily instruments are required by it. So the relatively greater nobility of the rational soul calls for a greater diversity of its bodily organs, whilst the far lower soul of a segmented animal or a plant has only a narrow field of activity and therefore needs a body that is more uniform and less articulated, and in any part of which, taken separately, it can maintain its being.

§ 209. Then, at ‘It would seem’, he answers the second question; concerning which we must realise that life belongs, properly speaking, to things that move and act of themselves and are not caused to do so by others. So ‘to live’ has two meanings. It can mean the being of a living thing, and in this sense Aristotle says that living is the being of living things. And also it can mean activity.

§ 210. Now the soul of plants, the vegetative soul, seems to be a sort of primary manifestation of life among things here on earth; for nothing lives without it and all living things share in it, though in other ways their modes of life differ. Animals and plants have only this in common. It can exist without sense or intelligence, but not sense or intelligence without it; no animal has sense or reason except it first have vegetative life. Thus it bears the same relation to life as touch to sensation. Not that living things only live by this principle, but it is the point where life first appears.

BOOK TWO

TEXT

412a1–412b9

BOOK II, CHAPTER I

THE DEFINITION OF THE SOUL

Hitherto we have spoken of what our predecessors handed down to us about the soul. But let us now re-open the enquiry from the beginning and endeavour to determine what the soul is and what is its most comprehensive definition. § 211

Now, we say that one of the kinds of things that are is substance. Of this, there is one element, matter, which of itself is no particular thing; another, the form or species according to which it is called ‘this particular thing’; and a third, that which is from both of these. Matter is, indeed, potency, and the form, act; and this latter has two modes of being, one, like knowledge possessed, the other, like the act of knowing. §§ 212-16

Bodies especially seem to be substances; and, among these, natural bodies, for these are the principle’s of the others. Of natural bodies, some possess vitality, others do not. We mean by ‘possessing vitality’, that a thing can nourish itself and grow and decay. §§ 217-19

Therefore every natural body sharing in life will be a substance, and this substance will be in some way composite. Since, however, it is a body of such and such a nature, i.e. having vitality, the soul will not itself be the body. For the body is not one of the factors existing in the subject; rather, it is as the subject and the matter. It is necessary, then, that the soul be a substance in the sense of the specifying principle of a physical body potentially alive. Now, substance [in this sense] is act; it will therefore be the act of a body of this sort. §§ 220-6

Now this can mean one of two things: one, as is the possession of knowledge; another, as is the act of knowing. It is plain that it is like knowledge possessed. For the soul remains in the body whether one is asleep or awake. Being awake is comparable to the act of knowing, sleep to possession without use. Now knowledge possessed is prior in the order of generation, in one and the same thing. The soul, therefore, is the primary act of a physical body capable of life. §§ 227-9

Such a body will be organic. Parts of plants, indeed, are organs, though very elementary—the leaf is the covering of the pericarp and the pericarp of the fruit: roots, too, are like mouths, for both draw in nourishment. §§ 230-2

If then there is anyone generalisation to be made for any and every soul, the soul will be the primary act of a physical bodily organism. § 233

Hence it is unnecessary to enquire whether the soul and body be one, any more than whether the wax and an impression made in it are one; or in general, the matter of anything whatever, and that of which it is the matter. For while one and being are predicated in many ways, that which is properly so is actuality, § 234

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO ONE

§ 211. Having reviewed, in Book One, other men’s opinions on the soul, Aristotle now begins Book Two of his Treatise, in which he sets out what he himself holds on the matter. First, then, linking up with what has gone before, he states his general aim; I and secondly, at ‘Now we say that one’, he starts to carry it out. He begins by saying that despite all the previous accounts of the soul it is necessary to go into the whole matter again from the beginning. The subject is so difficult that it is wiser to assume that the truth about it has not yet been discovered. And in answer to the question raised in the Introduction to Book One, whether one should first define the soul, and afterwards its parts, he decides now to define the essence of the soul before coming to conclusions about its parts. As though explaining this decision, he adds that we shall thus have acquired the most comprehensive idea of soul. For the definition of the soul itself comprises what is most common or general, whereas that of each of its parts or potencies comprises only some special aspect of it. And as he explains at the beginning of the Physics, the right way to teach is to begin with what is most general and end with precisions in detail.

§ 212. Beginning then at ‘Now we say’, his treatment divides into two parts, in the first of which he-shows what soul in general is, and in the second, starting at ‘Of the soul’s powers’, what are its parts or powers. The first part subdivides into (a) a definition that concludes, and (b) one that introduces, a demonstrative argument;—this latter part comes at ‘Since it is from the less clear’. Note in passing that any definition, as he says in Book I of the Posterior Analytics, is either the conclusion of a demonstration, e.g. ‘Thunder is a continuous noise in the clouds’, or it is the demonstration’s starting point, e.g. ‘Thunder is the extinction of fire in the clouds’, or it is the demonstration itself, but thrown into a different order, e.g. ‘Thunder is a continuous noise etc., caused by the extinction of fire etc.’ in which the conclusion and the starting point both appear, though not in syllogistic order.

As to (a), it includes first a definition of the soul, and then, at ‘It has been stated then’, an explanation of the definition. And to clear the ground before the defining proper begins (at ‘Therefore every natural body’), he makes some preliminary distinctions.

§ 213. It should be noted here that, according to the teaching of Book VII of the Metaphysics, there is this difference between defining substance and defining accidents that in the former case nothing extrinsic is included: every substance is defined in terms merely of its material and formal principles; but in the latter case something extrinsic to the thing defined is referred to, i.e. the subject of the accidents in question—as when one defines snubness as ‘curvature of the nose’. The reason is that a definition must express what a thing is, and while substance is something complete in its being and kind, accidents have being only in relation to a substance. In the same way no form as such is complete in kind; completeness in this sense belongs only to the substance composed of form and matter; so that the latter’s definition is complete without reference to anything else, whilst that of the form has to include d, reference to its proper subject which is matter. Hence, if the soul is a form its definition will not be complete without reference to its subject or matter.

§ 214. So, in the first part of this section, he makes certain distinctions, first in view of the work of defining the soul’s essence, and then, at ‘Bodies especially seem to be substances,’ in view of defining its subject. As regards the former point he alludes to three distinctions, of which the first is that of being into the ten categories; this he hints at when he says that substance is reckoned to be ‘one of the kinds of things that are’.

§ 215. The second distinction alluded to is that of substance into matter, form and the compound of both. Matter is that which is not as such a ‘particular thing’ but is in mere potency to become a ‘particular thing’. Form is that by which a ‘particular thing’ actually exists. And the compound is ‘the particular thing’ itself; for that is said to be a ‘particular thing’ (i.e. something you can point to) which is complete in being and in kind; and among material things only the compound is such. For although immaterial substances are not compounds of matter and form, still they are particular things, having actual existence in themselves, and being complete in their own nature. Not so the rational soul; for though it has the existence in itself which belongs to a ‘particular thing’, it is not a complete nature by itself; it is rather a part of a specific nature. Hence it is not in all respects a ‘particular thing’.

Matter, then, differs from form in this, that it is potential being; form is the ‘entelechy’ or actuality that renders matter actual; and the compound is the resulting actual being.

§ 216. Thirdly, he distinguishes two senses of the term ‘act’. In one sense knowledge is an act, in the other thinking is an act; and the difference can be understood by relating these acts to their potencies. Before one acquires the grammatical habit and becomes a grammarian, whether self-taught or led by another, one is only potentially so; and this potency is actualised by the habit. But once the habit is acquired one is still in potency to the use of it, so long as one is not actually thinking about grammar; and this thinking is a further actualisation. In this sense, then, knowledge is one act and thinking another.

§ 217. Then at ‘Bodies especially’ he alludes to three distinctions which are presupposed by his enquiry into the meaning of the definition of the soul, so far as the subject endowed with soul is concerned. The first is the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal substances. Now the former are the most evident to us: for, whatever the latter may be in themselves, they do not impinge on our senses, but are only discoverable by an exercise of the reason. Hence he says that ‘bodies especially seem to be substances’.

§ 218. The next distinction, is between physical or natural bodies and artificial bodies. Man and wood and stone are natural bodies, but a house or a saw is artificial. And of these the natural bodies seem to be the more properly called substances, since artificial bodies are made out of them. Art works upon materials furnished by nature, giving these, moreover, a merely accidental form, such as a new shape and so forth; so that it is only in virtue of their matter, not their form, that artificial bodies are substances at all; they are substances because natural bodies are such. Natural bodies therefore are the more properly called substances, being such through their form as well as through their matter.

§ 219. Thirdly, he distinguishes between living and non-living natural bodies; and the living are those which of themselves take nutriment and grow and decay. Note here that this is said by way of example rather than definition. For, besides growth and decay, living things may exhibit sensation and intellectual knowledge and other vital activities. Immaterial substances, as is proved in the Metaphysics, Book XI, have the life of intellect and volition, though they cannot grow and do not take food. But because, in the sphere of things that are born and die, the plant-soul (the principle of nutrition and growth) marks the point where life begins, this soul is here taken as the type of all living things. However, life is essentially that by which anything has power to move itself, taking movement in its wide sense so as to include the ‘movement’ or activity of the intellect. For we call those things inanimate which are moved only from outside.

§ 220. After this, at ‘Therefore every natural body” he begins to define the soul, presupposing the distinctions already made. And his enquiry here has three parts: (a) he enquires into the elements of the definition taken separately; (b) at, ‘If, then, there is any one generalisation’, he states his definition; and (c) at ‘Hence it is unnecessary’, he uses it to refute an objection. As to (a) he first deals with the elements that refer to the soul’s essence, and then to those that refer to its subject, at ‘Such a body will be organic’, and in the part that concerns the essence he considers first the statement that the soul is an ‘act’, and then, at ‘Now this can mean one of two things’. that it is a ‘primary act’.

Aristotle's first conclusion, then, in line with what has been said already, is that if physical bodies are substances in the fullest sense, all living bodies are substances too, for they are physical bodies. And as each living body is an actual being, it must be a compound substance. But just because to say 'living body' is to imply two things, the body itself and that modification of body by which it is alive, it cannot be said that the element in the composition referred to by the term body is itself the principle of life or the 'soul'. By 'soul' we understand that by which a living thing is alive; it is understood, therefore, as existing in a subject, taking 'subject' in a broad sense to include not only those actual beings which are subjects of their accidental modifications, but also bare matter or potential being. On the other hand the body that receives life is more like a subject and a matter than a modification existing in a subject.

§ 221. Since, then, there are three sorts of substance: the compound; matter; and form; and since the soul is neither the compound-the living body itself; nor its matter—the body as the subject that receives life; we have no choice but to say that the soul is a substance in the manner of a form that determines or characterises a particular sort of body, i.e. a physical body potentially alive.

§ 222. Note that he does not say simply 'alive', but 'potentially alive'. For by a body actually alive is understood a living compound; and no compound as such can enter into the definition of a form. On the other hand the matter of a living body stands to the body's life as a potency to its act; and the soul is precisely the actuality whereby the body has life. It is as though we were to say that shape is an actuality; it is not exactly the actuality of an actually shaped body—i.e. the compound of body and shape —but rather of the body as able to receive a shape, of the body as in potency tq an actual shape.

§.223. But lest it be thought that soul is an actuality in the manner of any merely accidental form, he adds that it is a substantial actuality or form. And since every form has the matter proper to it, the soul must actualise just this special sort of body.

§ 224. The difference between accidental form and substantial form is that whereas the former does not make a thing simply be, but only makes it be in this or that mode—e.g. as quantified, or white— the substantial form gives it simple being. Hence the accidental form presupposes an already existing subject; but the substantial form presupposes only potentiality to existence, i.e. bare matter. That is why there cannot be more than one substantial form in any one thing; the first makes the thing an actual being; and if others are added, they confer only accidental modifications, since they presuppose the subject already in act of being.

§ 225. We can therefore reject the view of Avicebron (in the Book called Fons Vitae) that according to the way in which any given thing can be divided into genera and species so it can be divided into substantial forms. Thus an individual man would have one form that made him a substance, another that gave him a body, another that gave him life, and so on. But what our premisses compel us to say is that it is one and the same substantial form that makes a man a particular thing or substance, and a bodily thing, and a living thing, and so on. For the higher form can give to its matter all that a lower form gives, and more; the soul gives not only substance and body (as a stone's form does) but life also. We must not think, therefore, of the soul and body as though the body had its own form making it a body, to which a soul is superadded, making it a living body; but rather that the body gets both its being and its life from the soul. This is not to deny, however, that bodily being as such is, in its imperfection, material with respect to life.

§ 226. Therefore, when life departs the body is not left specifically the same; the eyes and flesh of a dead man, as is shown in the Metaphysics, Book VII, are only improperly called eyes and flesh. When the soul leaves the body another substantial form takes its place; for a passing-away always involves a concomitant coming-to-be.

§ 227. Then, at 'Now this can mean', he examines the second term in the definition. He observes that there are two kinds of actuality, as we explained above, the kind that is like knowledge and the kind like thinking. And clearly the soul is of the former kind; for it is due to the soul that an animal is able to be both awake and asleep; and while waking is similar to thinking (for it is a use of the exterior senses just as thinking is a use of knowledge already possessed), sleep is more like the knowledge which lies dormant in the mind so long as it is not actually being used; for in sleep an animal's faculties are quiescent.

§ 228. Now, of these two actualities, knowledge comes first in the order of coming-to-be in the same person; for it stands to thinking as potency to act. But in the order of nature or essence act is prior to potency (see the Metaphysics, Book IX) as the end and complete perfection of potency. And even in the temporal order of coming-to-be, act, in a quite general sense, is prior; for the potential is actualised only by something already in act. But in this or that particular thing considered in itself potentiality may come first; the thing may be actualised by degrees. Hence his remark that ‘knowledge... is prior (i.e. to thinking) in the order of generation in one and the same thing’.

§ 229. So he concludes that soul is the primary act of a physical body potentially alive, where act means the same sort of actuality as knowledge. He says primary act, not only to distinguish soul from its subsequent activities, but also to distinguish it from the forms of the elements; for these retain their own proper activities, unless impeded.

§ 230. Next, at ‘Such a body’ he examines that part of the definition which has to do with the soul’s subject, observing that the ‘physical body’ referred to is any organic body, i.e. any body equipped with the various organs required by a living body in consequence of the life-principle’s various vital activities. For from this principle (the soul) which is the richest of embodied forms, spring many different activities, so that it requires, in the matter informed by it, a full equipment of different organs. Not so the less perfect forms of inanimate things.

§ 231. Now plants, the least perfect of animate things, exhibit less organic diversity than animals. That is why Aristotle chooses plants to illustrate his assertion that every animate body is organic, saying that even plants have organically diversified parts. But these parts are very simple, i.e. like to one another; they lack the differentiation that we find in animals. Thus the foot of an animal is made up of different parts, flesh, nerves, bones and so forth, but the organs of plants are composed of less diverse sets of parts.

§ 232. The organic character of the parts of plants is displayed in their diverse functions. Thus a leaf functions as a covering for the pericarp, or fruit-bearing part, i.e. for the part in which the fruit is born. The pericarp, again, protects the fruit itself. So too the roots have a function in a plant similar to that of the mouth in an animal; they draw in nourishment.

§ 23 3. Next, at ‘if, then,’ he gathers all these observations into one definition, saying that if any definition covers all types of ‘soul’ it will be this: the soul is the primary actuality of a physical bodily organism. He does not need to add ‘having life potentially’; for this is implied in ‘organism’.

§ 234. Then at ‘Hence it is’ he applies this definition to solve a difficulty. There had been much uncertainty about the way the soul and body are conjoined. Some had supposed a sort of medium connecting the two together by a sort of bond. But the difficulty can be set aside now that it has been shown that the soul is the form of the body. As he says, there is no more reason to ask whether soul and body together make one thing than to ask the same about wax and the impression sealed on it, or about any other matter and its form. For, as is shown in the Metaphysics, Book VIII, form is directly related to matter as the actuality of matter; once matter actually is it is informed. Moreover, although, as he goes on to say, being and unity are variously predicated (in one way of potential, and in another way of actual, being), that is primarily and properly a being and a unity which has actuality. just as potential being is only a being under a certain aspect, so it is only a unity under a certain aspect; for unity follows being. Therefore, just as the body gets its being from the soul, as from its form, so too it makes a unity with this soul to which it is immediately related. If, on the other hand, we regard the soul in its function as the mover of the body, then there is no reason why it should not move by means of a medium, moving one part of the body by means of another.

TEXT

412b10–413a10

BOOK II, CHAPTER I, CONTINUED

THE DEFINITION EXPLAINED

SOUL AND BODY

It has been stated, then, what the soul in general is. It is ‘substance’ as definable form; and this means what is the essence of such a kind of body. If some utensil, for example an axe, were a natural body, then ‘being an-axe’ [axeishness] would be its substance, and this would be its soul. Apart from this, it would no longer be an axe, save equivocally. As it is, it is really an axe. And the soul is not the essence or ‘what-it-is’ of such a body as this, but of a natural body, such as has in itself the principle of motion and rest. §§235-8

Now what has been said should be considered with respect to parts. For if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul. For this is the substance, in the sense of the definable form, of the eye. The eye is the matter of sight, and apart from this it is an eye no longer save equivocally, as with a painted or stone eye. What, therefore, holds of a part, we ought to apply to the whole living body: for the relation of a part [of the soul] to part [of the body] corresponds to that of sensitivity as a whole to the whole sensitive body, considered as such. §239

Not that which has cast off its soul is ‘capable of life’, but that which possesses it. But seed and fruit are only in potency such a body. As cutting or seeing is act, so is consciousness. The soul is like sight and the capacity of a tool; the body, like the thing in potency. But as an eye is a pupil together with the power of sight, so is there a living thing where there are both body and soul. §§ 240-1

Therefore it is evident enough that the soul is inseparable from the body—or certain parts of it, if it naturally has parts; for it is of certain bodily parts themselves that it is the act. But with respect to certain of its parts there is nothing to prevent its being separated, because these are acts of nothing bodily. Furthermore, it is not clear that the soul is not the 'act' of the body in the way that a sailor is of his ship. Let these remarks serve to describe and define the soul, in outline. §§ 242-4

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWO

§ 235. The Philosopher now begins to explain the definition of the soul given in Lectio 1; after which, at 'Therefore it is evident', he draws a conclusion from it.The explanation has two parts, in the first of which he is concerned directly with the soul itself, while in the second, where he says 'Not that which has cast off' he explains that part of the definition which refers to the subject which has a soul. With regard to the soul itself, he begins by illustrating the definition by a comparison with artificial things; and then goes on, at 'Now what has.' to explain it by considering the parts of the soul separately.

In artificial things, made by human skiff, the forms imposed on the material are accidental forms; and since these are easier for us to perceive than is substantial form, as being more accessible to the senses, it is obviously reasonable to approach the soul, which is a substantial form, through a comparison with accidental forms. And again, the soul's parts or potencies are more readily perceptible to us than its essence; for all our enquiry into the soul has to start from the objective terms of its activities and then proceed from these activities to their potencies, and thence to an understanding of the soul in its essence; that is why a study of the soul's parts can throw light on the definition of it.

§ 236. First, then, he observes that the definition given above is 'general', i.e. it applies to any soul. It posits the soul as a substance, which is a form; and this means that it presents to us the idea of the essence of something.

For there is this difference between a form that is substance and one that is not, that the latter sort are not strictly of the essence or ‘whatness’ of a thing: whiteness is not of the essence of a white body; whereas substantial form is essential and quidditative. To call the soul a substantial form, therefore, is to imply that it is of the essence and ‘whatness’ of the body it animates. Hence he says ‘this’, i.e. this quidditative substance, ‘is the essence of this body’, i.e. of the body that is what it is precisely through having this particular form. For this form is essential to the thing, and is denoted by the definition of what the thing is.

§ 237. And because substantial forms, including the forms of natural bodies, are not evident to us, Aristotle makes his meaning clear with an example taken from the forms (accidental) of artificial. things. ‘If’, he says, ‘some utensil (i.e. an artificial instrument) for example an axe, were a physical (i.e. a natural) body,’it would possess a form in the manner already explained. So he continues: ‘Then being-an-axe would be its substance,’ i.e. would be the substantial form of the axe, which is that to which we refer our idea of axe as such. This idea of axe as such he identifies with the essence of the axe, with what causes it to be an axe; and this essential form he identifies with the substance of the axe. He says ‘substance’ because the forms of natural bodies are substantial forms. Furthermore, if the axe were not merely a natural, but also an animate, body, its form would be a soul; and if it lost this soul it would no longer be an axe, except in name; just as when the soul leaves the body there is no longer an eye or flesh, except in name. Of course the axe, not being in fact a natural body, has no axe-form which is of the essence of the body that it is; so that if it lost the form of axe, the axe would still exist substantially, because the substance of artificial things is their matter which remains when the artificial form and, with this artificial form, the actuality of the artificial body as such, is removed.

§ 238. Then he explains why he has distinguished between the axe as it actually is and as it would be were it a physical (that is, a natural) living body: for the soul is not the essence and idea, i.e. the form, of an artificial body like an axe, but ‘of such a physical body’, i.e. of a body that is alive. To make this clearer he adds ‘as has in itself the principle of movement and rest’—which is characteristic of natural things. For Nature is this sort of principle, as he says in the Physics, Book II.

§ 239. Then at ‘Now what has been said’ he applies what has been concluded about the soul as a whole, and the animate body as a whole, to the parts of each. if, he says, the eye were a whole animal, its soul would be sight; for sight is the essential form of the eye; which in itself is the material condition of sight; in the same way as an organic body is the material condition of a soul. Once sight is lost, the eye, is no longer an eye, except in the sense that a stone or painted eye may be called an eye equivocally (this term is used when the same name is given to essentially different things). Remove, then, what makes an eye really an eye, and there is left only the name. And the same argument applies to the animate body as a whole: what makes it an animate body is its form, the soul. This removed, you have a living body only equivocally. For as one part of the sensitive soul is to one part of the sensitive body, so the faculty of sense as a whole is to the whole sensitive body as such.

§ 240. Next, at ‘Not that which has cast off’, he explains what was meant by defining the soul as the ‘act of a potentially animate body’. Now ‘potentially’ may be said about a thing in either of two senses: (a) as lacking the power to act; (b) as possessed of this power but not acting by it. And the body, whose act is the soul, is potentially animate in the second sense only. So, when he calls the body a thing potentially alive he does not mean that it has lost the soul it had and now lacks a life-principle altogether; he is speaking of what still has such a principle. On the other hand, seeds and the fruits that contain them are only potentially living bodies with souls; for a seed as yet lacks a soul. It is ‘potential’ therefore like that which has lost its soul.

§ 241. And to show just how the body is potential to the actuality that comes from its soul he adds that being awake is the actuality of the sensitive soul in the same way as cutting is the actuality of a knife and seeing is that of an eye; for each of these acts is the activity and use of a principle already there. But the soul is the first and underlying actuality; like the faculty of sight itself or the capacity of any tool; for each of these is the operative principle itself. So the body, complete with its soul, is potentially animate in the sense that, though it has its first actuality, it may lack the second. And as the eye is a thing composed of a pupil as its matter and the faculty of sight as its form, so an animal is a thing composed of soul as its form and body as its matter.

§ 242. Then, at ‘Therefore it is evident’, he deduces a truth from the foregoing. Having shown that the soul is the whole body’s actuality, its ‘parts’ being the actualities of the body’s parts, and granted that an actuality or form cannot be separated from that which is actual and has form, we can certainly conclude that no soul can be separated from its body,—at least certain parts of the soul ‘cannot be separated, if the soul can be said to have parts. For obviously some ‘parts’ of the soul are nothing but actualities of parts of the body; as we have seen in the case of sight, that it is the eye’s actuality. On the other hand, certain parts of the soul may well be separable from the body, since they are not the actuality of any corporeal part, as will be proved when we come to treat of the intellect.

§ 243. As to Plato’s opinion that the soul is the act of the body not as its form but as its mover, he adds that it is not yet clear whether the soul is the act of the body as a sailor of a ship, i.e. as its mover only.

§ 244. Finally, recapitulating, he says that the foregoing is an ‘outline’ description of the soul, meaning that it is extrinsic, as it were, and superficial and incomplete. It will be completed when he comes to define the innermost nature of the soul and the nature of each of its parts.

TEXT

413a11–413b13

BOOK II, CHAPTER II

THE DEFINITION JUSTIFIED

MODES OF LIFE

Since it is from the less clear, though more obvious, facts that what is certain and more evident to thought emerges, let us attempt to approach the matter afresh. § 245

For it is not enough that a defining principle should merely show a fact, as do most formulae, but also there should be contained and made plain the causes involved. Usually the constituent terms are like conclusions: for instance, what is a square that is equal to an oblong? An equilateral orthogon. Such a term is of the nature of a conclusion. But to say that a square is the discovery of a mean line states the reason why. §§ 246-52

Going back, then, to the beginning of our enquiry, let us say that the animate is distinguished from the inanimate by being alive.

To live, however, is predicated in several ways; and even if one only of these is present, we say there is life; as, for example, intellection, sensation, or movement and rest in place; as well as the movement and rest involved in nourishment, and growth and decay. §§ 253-5

Hence all plants seem to live. They appear to have in themselves a power and principle of this kind, by which they increase or decay in various directions—that is to say, they do not grow up but not down, but alike either way; and in all their parts they are continually nourished, and they live so long as they can take nourishment. §§ 256-7

It is possible for this power to exist apart from the others; but for the others to exist apart from it is impossible, at least in mortal beings. This is evident in plants; for there is in them no other soul-power. To live by this principle, then, is common to all living things. § 258

But an animal is such primarily by sensation. For we also call animals things that do not move or change their place, provided they have sensation, and do not merely live. There seem to be many of this sort: by nature they stay in one place, but they have one of the senses. § 259

Touch is in all, primarily. As the vegetative powers can be separated from touch and all sensation as a whole, so can touch from the other senses. (We give the name 'vegetative' to that part of the soul in which plants participate). All animals are seen to possess the sense of touch. § 260

For what cause each of these facts is so we shall say later on. At present only this need be said: that soul is the principle of the qualities we have discussed, and is characterised by the vegetative, sensitive, intellective and motive powers. § 261

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO THREE

§ 245. Having defined the soul the Philosopher now sets out to prove his definition. First he says what he intends to do, and then, at 'Going back, then,' proceeds to do it. As to the former point, he first determines the method of demonstration that he intends to use; after which, at 'For it is not enough' he explains how certain types of definition can be proved. With regard to the method to be used we should note that, since we can only come to know the unknown if we start from what we know, and since the purpose of demonstration is precisely to cause knowledge, it follows that every demonstration must begin from something more knowable to us than the thing to be made known by it. Now in certain subjects, such as mathematics, which abstract from matter, what is the more knowable is such both in itself and relatively to us; hence in these subjects, demonstration can start from what is absolutely and of its nature more knowable, and therefore can deduce effects from their causes; whence the name given it of a priori demonstration. But in the quite different sphere of the natural sciences, what is more knowable is not the same thing in itself and relatively to us; for sensible effects are generally more evident than their causes. Hence in these sciences we generally have to begin from what is, indeed, absolutely speaking less knowable, but is more evident relatively to us (see the Physics, Book 1).

§ 246. And this is the kind of demonstration which will be used here. So he says that what is of its nature more certain, and is more evident to thought, becomes certain to us by means of things less certain in nature but more certain to us; and that this shows us the method to use in enquiring once more into the soul and showing the grounds of the definition given above.

§ 247. Then, at ‘For it is not enough’, he tells us why the question must be taken up again. Certain definitions can, he says, be demonstrated, and in these cases it is not enough for the defining formula to express, as most ‘formulae’, i.e. definitions, do, the mere fact; it should also give the cause of the fact; and this being given, one can then proceed to deduce the definition which states the mere fact. At present many definitions are given in the form of conclusions; and he gives an example from geometry.

§ 248. To understand which we must note that there are two kinds of four-sided figure: those whose angles are all right angles, and these are called rectangles; and the kind with no right angles, and these are called rhomboids. Of the rectangles, again, there is one with four equal sides—the square or tetragon; and another which, without having all four sides equal, has two pairs of equal and opposite sides—the oblong. Thus:

deanima1.jpg square

oblong

rhomboid

§ 249. Note further, that in any rectangular surface the two straight lines enclosing the right angle are said to contain the whole figure; because, the other two sides being equal to these two, each equal to its opposite, it follows that one of the enclosing lines measures the length of the whole figure, and the other its breadth: so that the whole figure is given in the contact of the two lines. If we imagine one of these lines moving along the other we see the whole figure form itself

§ 250. Note also that if, between the two unequal sides that contain the oblong, one takes the proportional mean and squares it, one gets a quadrilateral equal to the oblong. This would take too long to prove geometrically, so let a numerical argument do for the present. Let our oblong then have its longer side 9 feet and its shorter side 4 feet. Then the proportional mean line will be 6 feet; for as 6 is to 9, so 4 is to 6. Now the square of this line must equal the oblong; which is obvious numerically: 4 x 9 = 36, 6 x 6 = 36.

§ 2,51. Now it is thus, he says,' that the question, What is a square (i.e. the quadrilateral equal to an oblong)? is answered; it is said 'to be an orthogon', i.e. a right-angled plane figure, which is 'equilateral', i.e. having all its sides equal, and so on. 'Such a term', i.e. a definition of this sort, is really 'of the nature of a conclusion', namely of a presupposed demonstration; whereas if one were to say that a square is 'the discovery of a mean line', i.e. of the proportional mean between the two unequal sides of the oblong, meaning that a square is what is constructed from this line, then at last the definition would disclose the 'reason why' of the thing defined.

§ 252. Note, however, that this example is only relevant to the definition of the soul in so far as this definition is simply to be demonstrated; it must not be taken to imply that our demonstration can proceed a priori from causes to effects.

§ 253. Next, at 'Going back then', he begins to prove the definition of the soul given above; and this in the way indicated, i.e. from effects to causes. This is how he sets about it: the first principle of fife in things is the actuality and form of living bodies; but soul is the first principle of life in living things; therefore it is actuality and form of living bodies. Now this argument is clearly a posteriori; for in reality the soul is the source of vital activities because it is the form of a living body, not e converso. So he has to do two things here; first, to show that soul is the source or principle of vitality, and secondly, to show that the first principle of vitality is the form of living bodies (this comes at 'Since that whereby etc.'). With regard to the first point he does three things: (a) he distinguishes modes of life, (b) he shows that the soul is the principle of living activities—at 'Hence all plants'; and (c) he explains how these parts of the soul are interrelated, by means of which it originates vital activities. This is at 'We now ask whether each of these'.

§ 254. He starts then by saying that to carry put our intention of proving the definition of the soul, we must assume as a kind of principle that things with souls differ from those without souls in being alive. Life is the test; and as life shows itself in several ways, if a thing has life in only one of these ways it is still said to be alive and to possess a soul.

§ 255. Life, he says, shows itself in four modes: (1) as intellectual; (2) as sensitive; (3) as the cause of motion or rest in space; (4) as cause of the motions of taking nourishment, decay and growth. He distinguishes only these four modes, although he has already distinguished five main types of vital activity, and this because he is thinking here and now of the degrees of animate being. There are four such degrees, distinguished in the same way as the four modes in which life is manifested: for some living things, i.e. plants, only take nourishment and grow and decay; some have also sensation, but are always fixed to one place—such are the inferior animals like shell-fish; some again, i.e. the complete animals like oxen and horses, have, along with sensation, the power to move from place to place; and finally some, i.e. men, have, in addition, mind. The appetitive power, which makes a fifth type of vitality, does not, however, imply a distinct degree of living being; for it always accompanies sensation.

§ 256. Next, at ‘Hence all plants’, he shows that a soul is involved in all these modes of life. He does this with regard (1) to plants, and (2) to animals, at ‘But an animal is such, primarily’. Then (3), he summarises, at ‘For what cause”, what has been said and remains to be said. As to (1) he does two things. First he shows that the life-principle in plants is a soul. We have remarked, he says, that whatever evinces one of the four modes of life mentioned above can be said to live. Therefore plants are alive; for they all possess some intrinsic power or principle of growth and decay.

§ 257. Now this principle is not mere nature. Nature does not move in opposite directions, but growth and decay are in opposite directions; for all plants grow not only upwards or downwards, but in both directions. Hence a soul, not nature, is clearly at work in them. Nor do plants live only when actually growing or decaying, but, as things that take nourishment, they live so long as they can assimilate the food that induces growth.

§ 258. Next, at ‘It is possible’, he shows that this principle of feeding and growing can exist apart from other life-principles, but these cannot exist apart from it, at least in things subject to death. He adds this last clause because of immortal beings like immaterial substances or heavenly bodies; because, if these have a soul, it is intellectual; it is not a capacity to take nourishment. And the separability of this life principle from others is clearly evident in plants which have, in fact, no other one but this. it follows that what first of all causes life in mortal things is this principle of growth and nourishment, the so-called vegetative soul.

§ 259. Then, at 'But an animal is such primarily' he shows that a soul is the source of living in animals. And here he does two things. First he observes that what primarily distinguishes animals is sensation, though there are animals which have local movement as well; for we call those things animals (not just living beings) which have sensation, even if they are fixed to one place. For there are many such animals whose nature restricts them to one place, but which have the power of sense, e.g. shell-fish, which cannot move from place to place.

§ 260. Then at 'Touch is' he shows that touch is the primary sense in animals. For just as the vegetative soul, he says, is separable from all the senses including touch, so touch is separable from all the other senses. For many inferior animals have only the sense of touch; but there are no animals without this sense. Now that degree of soul in which even plants participate we call the vegetative. Hence we can distinguish three degrees of living beings: first, plants; secondly, the inferior animals fixed to one place and with no sense but touch; and, thirdly, the higher, complete animals which have the other senses and also the power to move from place to place. And a fourth degree consists, evidently, of beings which have all this and mind as well.

§ 261. Finally, at 'For what cause' summarising what has been said and remains to be said, he remarks that the cause of both these phenomena, namely the separability of the vegetative principle from sensation and of touch from the other senses, will be -given later on. He does this at the end of the whole Treatise. For the present it suffices to say that 'soul' is the one principle underlying the four distinct modes in which life is manifested, namely the vegetative mode which belongs to plants and to all living things; the sensitive mode in all animals; the intellectual mode in all men; and fourthly, the mode that is a power to move from place to place, which exists in all the higher animals, both those with senses only and those with intellect as well.

TEXT

413b13–44a28

BOOK II, CHAPTER II, CONTINUED

DIFFERENT KINDS OF SOUL

We now ask whether each of these [powers] is a soul, or a part of a soul: and if a part, whether it is separable only in thought or has also a distinct place. § 262

Concerning some of these powers it is not difficult to see [the answers to our questions]; others, however, give rise to doubts. For, as in the case of plants some, on being divided, seem to go on living in separation from one another, as if there were in each plant one soul in act, but several in potency; so we find it happens in the case of other differentiations of soul, for instance in divided animals each division has sensation and local motion; and if sensation, phantasm and appetition; for where there is sensation there is pleasure, and pain, and where these are there must necessarily be appetition. §§ 263-7

But as regards intellect and the speculative faculty, nothing has so far been demonstrated; but it would seem to be another kind of soul, and alone capable of being separated, as the eternal from the perishable. It is evident, however, from the foregoing, that the other parts of the soul are not separable, as some have said. § 268

By definition, however, they are obviously distinct. For if feeling is other than opining, the sense-faculty will differ from the capacity to form opinions. Likewise with each of the other powers mentioned. § 269

Further, all these powers are in some animals; in others, some only; in yet others, only one. This makes the varieties of animal. Why this should be so will be considered later. The same obtains with regard to the senses: certain species of animal have all; certain others, some; yet others have only the one most necessary, touch. § 270

Since ‘that whereby we live and perceive’ can mean two things,—like ‘that by which we know’. for we name one thing knowledge, and another, the soul, though we are said to know by both of these; and likewise as ‘that by which we are healthy’; for health is one thing, while a part of the body (or the whole of it) is another; and in these cases knowledge, or health, is the form and specific essence or ratio, and, as it were, the act of such as can receive knowledge in the one case and health in the other (for the action of an agent seems to exist in the recipient or disposed material)—and soul being that by which we primarily live and perceive and move and understand it follows that the soul will be a sort of species or ratio; not, as it were, a matter or substratum. Substance is predicated in three ways, as we have said: in one way as the form; in another as the matter; and in another as what is from both. Of these, matter is the potency, form the act; hence if what is from both is the animate being, the body is not the act of the soul, but the soul of the body. §§ 271-5.

And on this account they were right who thought that the soul is neither apart from the body nor the same as the body; for it is not, indeed, the body; yet is something of the body. And therefore it is in a body, and a body of a definite kind; and not as some earlier thinkers made out, who related it to a body without defining at all the nature and quality of that body; despite the fact that it is apparent that not any subject whatever can receive any form at random. And that such is the case is confirmed by reason: the act of any one thing is of that which is in potency to it, and it occurs naturally and fittingly in matter appropriate to it. That the soul, then, is an actuality and formal principle of a thing in potency to exist accordingly, is evident from these considerations. §§ 276-8

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FOUR

§ 262. After showing that 'soul' is the one principle common to the several types of vitality, the Philosopher now enquires into the various principles of the latter, asking how they are related both to the soul and to each other. And he does two things here. First, he put two questions (a) If the soul, the life-principle, is realised actually as a vegetative, sensitive, locomotive or intellectual principle, is each of these principles to be identified with the soul proper, or is each no more than apart of the soul? Now obviously, where the thing's vitality consists entirely in growing and taking nourishment (as in plants) the vegetative principle is simply the soul or life-principle itself. But where the thing also has sensation, this vegetative principle is only a part of the soul. And the same reasoning applies to other cases. (b) If each of these principles is a part of the life-principle, as in the human soul which contains all of them, are they parts in the sense that they are merely diverse powers of the one soul, existing in one thing though they can be thought of apart from one another, or are they distinct beings having each its distinct locality, so that the sense-power is in one part of the body, appetition. in another, locomotion in another, and so on; as some indeed have thought.

§ 263. Secondly, when he says 'Concerning some of these', he answers the above questions: first the second one; then, at 'Further, all these powers', the first. The second question is answered in two parts: (a) with respect to the local separability of the parts of the soul, and (b) at 'By definition' concerning their separability in the mind. As to (a) he says that some parts of the soul raise no difficulties, but that others do.

§ 264. And he illustrates this by a comparison with plant-life. Certain parts, he says, of plants can be cut off and yet seem to go on living; for the cuttings, grafted or replanted, unite with a new stem or with the soil. In these cases the life-principle appears to be actually single but potentially many. The same sort of thing is observable in the forms of inanimate physical bodies; as each such body is actually one and potentially many, so in the lower animate bodies whose parts are still undifferentiated, the soul exists as one whole actually, but as many potentially. For inanimate bodies can be divided into parts which each retain the same specific nature (e.g. air, water, minerals) and this nature was also the nature of the whole body; and it is somewhat the same with plants, the lowest order of animate beings;

they require very little differentiation in their parts, and the life-principle of the whole survives, as such, in some of the separated parts.

§ 265. So also with those animals which remain alive after being cut up. Each division still has a sensitive soul: it will shrink back if you prick it. And obviously it can move about. So the same part retains, evidently, the principle of sensation and local movement. And if sensation, then it must also have imagination which is simply a certain motion derived from actual sensation, as we shall see later. Again, it must also have appetition, since sensation necessarily involves satisfaction or dissatisfaction, i.e. pleasure or pain, because it involves a contact with the congenial or the uncongenial. And pleasure and pain involve desire and appetition. So the divided parts of such animals are able to desire.

§ 266. Now if each such divided part contains the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive and locomotive principles all together, it is clear that these principles are not to be located in any special parts of the animal’s body. Yet certain powers are obviously so located: seeing is only in the eye, hearing in the ear, smelling in the nostrils, taste on the tongue and palate. But the fundamental and most necessary sense of touch is found over the whole body.

§ 267. A doubt may occur about imagination; for some assign to it a special organ of the body. But note that imagination (as will be shown later) in the lower animals is indefinite; it is definite only in the higher animals. Hence if we assign a special organ to imagination, this is because the special completeness and definiteness of its activities call for a special organ of the body, just as seeing requires an eye. But as to some powers of the soul it is not difficult to decide whether they are located in distinct parts of the body.

§ 268. Then, at ‘But as regards intellect’, he points to one part of the soul over which doubts may arise. About the intellect, or whatever we call the percipient or speculative faculty, we are still, he says, uncertain. No proof has yet been given of its location in any special or particular organ of the body. Yet even at first sight it would seem to be of a different nature from the other parts of the soul, and to exist ‘in a different way; and that it alone is separarable from the rest of the soul (and may even exist apart from any organ of the body) as what is immortal from what is mortal. That the other parts of the soul are not locally separated is now clear.

§ 269. Then at ‘By definition” he shows that they are mentally separable from one another. For we distinguish potencies by their relation to acts; if the acts are specifically distinct, then so are the potencies. Hence he says here that the sensitive and opining, i.e. intellectual, principles are diverse; meaning that,, as sensing is other than forming opinions, the faculties implied have distinct definitions. And the same is true of the other principles already mentioned.

§ 270. Then, at ‘Further, all these powers’, he answers the first of the two questions proposed above, observing that animals differ in this, that in some are found all the four vital principles mentioned above, in others only some of them, and in some only one. And where one only of these principles is found it is the soul itself; but where several are found together each is a part of the soul and the soul itself is named after the principal part, whether sensitive or intellectual as the case may be (the reason why animals differ in this way will be shown later). And as with the powers of the soul, so with the particular senses; for some animals, (the higher) have all the senses; some (e.g. moles) have some, but not all; while some (die lowest animals) have only the most necessary one, touch.

This passage might also be understood as referring to the statement, made a few lines earlier, that the parts of the soul which coexist ‘in any one animal are not distinct beings nor in different places. For from this one might argue that they are not separable as between one animal and another; which error this passage removes.

§ 271. Next, at ‘Since etc.’, he concludes, from the fact, that the soul is the first principle of life, to the definition of it already given; first proving this definition, and then, at ‘And on this account’, drawing some further conclusions. The proof runs thus. Granted that there are two principles of our being and activity, one (the form) will be prior to the other (the matter). Now both body and soul are principles of life in us, but the soul comes first in this respect. The soul then is the form of the living body; which agrees with the definition already given: the soul is the primary actuality of a physical body capable of life. Clearly, the middle term of this argument is the definition of the soul as the primary principle of life.

§ 272. The argument itself he sets out in four parts. (1) Explaining the major, he observes that we can speak of the principle of life and sensation from two points of view, formally or materially, just as we speak of the act of knowing as proceeding either from knowledge itself or from the soul; or as we speak of becoming healthy either with respect to health itself, or with respect to some part of the body, or to the whole of it. In both these cases, one of the principles is formal and the other material. For knowledge and health are forms or actualities of certain subjects: knowledge is a form of the part of the soul that knows, health of the body capable of health. Thus he says ‘capable of knowing’ and ‘capable of health’ in order to indicate the, particular subject’s aptitude to its particular form. For the actuality of an active principle, such as the form transmitted to matter by an agent, always appears to exist in what receives it and is adapted to it, i.e. in the subject, whose nature it. is to receive from some one particular active principle, and which is adapted to attain the final term of the receiving-process, namely the form in question.

§ 273. (2) At ‘and soul being that by which’, he states the minor, saying that the soul is the primary principle of our life and feeling and movement and understanding—these being the four chief manifestations of vitality already mentioned (for by ‘life’ here is meant the vegetative principle which, as has been said, is common to all living things). Now though it is in the body that we enjoy health, health itself is that by which we are called healthy primarily. Only in so far as the body has health are we said to be healthy. So too our souls are not said to know except in so far as they have knowledge; thus knowledge itself is that by which, primarily, the soul is said to be in the state of knowing. And the same is true of our body and its life; we are not said to live by the body except in so far as the body has a soul. Therefore he calls the ‘soul’ here the first principle of life and feeling, etc.

§ 274. (3) He concludes at ‘it follows that the soul’, linking this phrase with the previous one, that the soul is a sort of nature or specific form; not the material for, or mere subject of, anything.

§ 275. (4) Then at ‘Substance is predicated’, I he shows how this conclusion follows from the premisses. For it might have seemed to follow that the body no less than the soul was a form, since we call the body also a principle of life. So, to clinch the argument, he adds that if, as we have said, the term ‘substance’ can refer to three things, to matter, to form, and to the complex of both (the matter being the potential element; the form the actuality; and the complex the thing that is alive in this way) the body is clearly not the soul’s actuality, but rather the soul is the body’s; for the body is potential with respect to the soul. And if the foregoing argument has led us to the alternative that the specifying principle is either the soul or the body, we can now conclude that it is the soul; for it is now dear that the body is not the form of the soul.

§ 276. Then at ‘And on this account’, he deduces from the foregoing: (a) that they were right who thought that the soul required the body and yet was essentially distinct from it. It is not the body, for it is not matter; but it is essentially involved with the body, because it is its actuality; whence too it follows, as he says here, that it exists in that body whose actuality it is.

§ 277. (b) Being then in the body, and in a special kind of body, namely physical and organic, it is not, however, in it as the old natural philosophers fancied when they spoke of it. For they did not specify the kind of body that it has. Yet it does in fact have only one kind of body. And this we should expect a priori, it being natural to any act to be realised in some definite and appropriate material. So also, then, with the soul.

§ 278. Summarising, he concludes that the soul is a certain actuality and formal principle of that which exists accordingly, namely as potentially animate.

TEXT

414a28–414b31

BOOK II, CHAPTER III

THE SOUL’S POWERS IN GENERAL

Of the soul s powers already spoken of all are present in some, certain only are present in others, and one only in yet others. By the powers of the soul we mean the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive and the intellectual. §§ 279-87

In plants there is only the vegetative; in other living things, this and the sensitive; but if the sensitive is present, so must the appetitive be. For appetition means desire, and anger and will. Now all animals have the sense of touch; and where sensation is found there is pleasure and pain, the pleasant and the repugnant. What has these has appetite, this being desire for a pleasurable object. §§ 288-9

Further; all have a sense of nutriment, inasmuch as touch is lis sense. For all living beings are nourished by things dry and wet or hot and cold; and the sense of touch is of these. But they are nourished by the other sense-objects only indirectly. Sound, colour and smell contribute nothing to nutrition; and as for savour, it is found in objects of touch. Hunger and thirst being appetites, hunger for the hot and dry and thirst for the cold and liquid, savour is as it were the delectable in these. We must settle these questions later; for the present let us only say that animals endowed with touch have appetition also. The case of imagination is not clear and must be examined later. Some animals, again, have local motion; some intellect and mind—

such as men and whatever other beings there are of a like nature, or of one even more excellent. §§ 290-4

It is therefore clear that the idea of soul must be one in the same way as that of figure: for as there is no figure other than the triangle and those that derive from it, so there is no soul apart from the aforesaid. There will be, however, in the case of figures a general idea applicable to all figures, yet proper to none. Likewise with these souls just mentioned. Hence it is absurd to seek a common definition in this matter (or in any other) which will be that of no existing thing, and on the other hand, to seek to define in terms of the individual species without taking into account such a common definition. There is indeed an analogy between what holds of figures and what holds of the soul. For in that which is consequent there is always potential that which is primary, both in figures and in animate beings. As the triangle is contained in the square, so is the vegetative in the sensitive. §§ 295-8

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FIVE

§ 279. After defining the soul in general Aristotle comes to treat of its ‘parts’. Now the soul has no parts except in the sense that its potentialities are parts of it; in that one subject, being in potency to many activities, its power with respect to each in particular can be called a part of it. To treat of its parts then is to treat of its various potencies. This he does here in two main sections: the first treats of the soul’s powers in general and their distinction from one another; the second, at ‘Hence we must speak first’, takes them one by one. The former subdivides into (a) a division of the powers of the soul; and (b) at ‘So we must enquire” a discussion of what has to be proved about them, and how and in what order. The division itself of the powers (at ‘it is therefore clear’) necessitates showing how the soul as a whole is related to its parts; but before we come to this, the powers enumerated have to be related to each other, which he does at ‘In plants there is etc.’ First of all, then, he observes that, of the powers already enumerated, all are in some beings (men); some are in some beings (the other animals); and one only is in some others (plants). And having previously called them, not ‘powers’, but ‘parts’ of the soul, he clearly implies that the two terms mean the same. Now of these parts or powers there are five main types: the vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive and intellectual.

§ 280. Regarding this five-fold division two things must be made clear: (1) why the usual threefold division of potencies into vegetative, sensitive and intellectual is set aside; and (2) why he has already made a fourfold division.

§ 281. As to (1) we should note that all potencies are defined by their proper acts, and operative potencies by activities. The soul, being a form, has operative potencies; hence by differences between its activities we have to differentiate between its potencies. Now, as the activity of anything is consequent upon and corresponds to its being, we have to study vital activities precisely in the living beings which display them.

§ 282. The being of things whose actuality is ‘soul’, i.e. of the animate beings that exist on this earth and are the subject of the present discussion, this being includes two factors: one, material, in which it resembles the being of all other material things; and the other, immaterial, by which it has something in common with the world of the higher substances.

§ 283. Now there is this difference between these two divisions of being, that in so far as a thing is material, it is restricted by its matter to being this particular thing and nothing else, e.g. a stone; whilst in so far as it is unmaterial, a thing is free from the restriction of matter and has a certain width and infinity, so that it is not merely this particular subject but, in a certain sense, it is other things as well. That is why everything pre-exists, somehow, in the higher immaterial substances, as in universal causes.

§ 284. But in the lower terrestrial natures there are two degrees of immateriality. There is the perfect immateriality of intelligible being; for in the intellect things exist not only without matter, but even without their individuating material conditions, and also apart from any material organ. Then there is the half-way state of sensible being. For as things exist in sensation they are free indeed from matter, but are not without their individuating material conditions, nor apart from a bodily organ. For sensation is of objects in the particular, but intellection of objects universally. It is with reference to these two modes of existence that the philosopher will say, in Book III, that the soul is somehow all things.

§ 285. The activities, therefore, appropriate to living things in their material being are those we attribute to the vegetative soul. They fulfil the same purpose as the actions of inanimate beings, i.e. to attain and maintain existence; but they do this in a higher or nobler way. Inanimate bodies are brought into being and maintained by an exterior moving principle, whereas animate beings are generated by an intrinsic principle, i.e. seed, and are kept in existence by an intrinsic nutritive principle. It seems characteristic of living things that their activities should thus proceed from within themselves. But the purely immaterial activities of living things we identify with the intellectual part of the soul; while those in between belong to its sensitive part. Hence it is usual to distinguish three kinds of soul: vegetative, sensitive, intellectual.

§ 286. But since everything exists as formed in a certain way, the being of the sensible must have a sensible form, and the being of the intelligible an intelligible form. Now every form has by nature a certain trend or tendency whence proceed its activities or operations. Thus the form of fire tends naturally upwards (giving to fire its lightness) whence follows fire’s activity which is the movement upwards. Now the trend that proceeds from a sensible or intellectual form is called sensitive or intellectual desire; as that of any form in nature is called a natural desire. And from this desire follows the activity of local movement. Here then is the explanation we required of the five-fold division of the powers of soul.

§ 287. And as to the second point, note that when Aristotle wished to show that soul was the life-principle in things that five, he divided these into grades; which are not the same as those different kinds of vital activity whence we get our division of the powers of the soul. For, since all things that sense also desire, desire or appetition does not constitute a distinct grade of animate being; so we are left with only four such grades.

§ 288. Then, at ‘In plants there is only’, he shows the interconnection of the powers of the soul, thus explaining what he said previously, that all these powers are in some things, some of them in tome, and only one in some others. Here we have to consider that the completeness of the Universe requires that there should be no gaps in its order, that in Nature there should everywhere be a gradual development from the less to the more perfect. Hence, in the Metaphysics, BookVIII, Aristotle likens the nature of things to numbers; which increase by tiny degrees, one by one.

Thus among living things there are some, i.e. plants, which have only the vegetative capacity,—which, indeed, they must have because no living being could maintain an existence in matter without the vegetative activities. Next are the animals, with sensitivity as well as vegetative life; and sensitivity implies a third power, appetition, which itself divides into three: into desire, in the stricter sense, which springs from the concupiscible appetite; anger, corresponding to the irascible appetite—both of these being in the sensitive part and following sense-knowledge; and finally will, which is the intellectual appetite and follows intellectual apprehension.

§ 289. That appetition exists in all animals he demonstrates in two ways. (1) All animals have at least one sense, touch; but where there is any sensation there is pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow. Now while joy and sorrow seem to spring from inward apprehension, pain and pleasure come from external sensations, especially from touch. But joy and sorrow necessarily imply some sweet or disagreeable object, i.e. something pleasant or painful. For everything touched is either congenial to the one touching, and then it gives pleasure; or uncongenial, and then it gives pain. But whatever can feel pleasure and pain can desire the pleasant. Since then all animals, without exception, have a sense of touch, all can desire.

§ 290. (2) This second argument begins at ‘Further, all have’ and runs thus. All animals have the sense that is aware of food; and this is touch; which is as necessary therefore to every animal as eating the food that agrees with it. The fact that it is touch that perceives food is clear if we consider that, as living bodies are made up of warm, moist, cold and dry elements it is of these that their food must consist; and these elements are just what touch is aware of. But other sense-objects’, he says, do not, save indirectly, nourish living bodies; they do so only so far as they are involved in the objects of touch. Sound, colour, smell have nothing to do with food as such; they occur in food only in so far as things that sound or are coloured or odorous, are also hot, or cold, moist or dry. Savour, however, is reckoned a tangible quality—so that tasting is a sort of touch. Clearly, then, all animals have a sense-awareness of food.

§ 291. But whatever has this awareness can feel the two desires of nourishment, hunger and thirst. Hunger is desire for the hot and the dry elements, i.e. food; thirst for the cold and the moist, i.e. drink. Savour is a certain delectability in food and drink indicating a proper balance of the hot and cold, the moist and dry elements. It is more of a pleasure added to eating than a necessity. Desire, then, always accompanies touch.

§ 292.What imagination has to do with desire and sensitivity will be shown later.

§ 293. Now besides these three powers, the vegetative, the sensitive and the appetitive, some animals also have the capacity to move from one place to another. Some, too, i.e. human beings and any other kind of beings, if such exist, resembling or even perhaps excelling mankind, have, in addition to these four capacities, the power of understanding or intellect. The beings ‘more excellent’ are the immaterial substances and the heavenly bodies, the latter, however, only if they are alive. Among living corruptible beings the human race alone is endowed with intellect.

§ 294. For as intellect has no bodily organ, intelligent beings cannot be differentiated according to a physical diversity in the constitution of their bodily organs, as are the different species of animals (whose different constitutions cause them to sense in different ways).

§ 295. Then at ‘It is therefore clear’ he shows how his definition of soul is related to the ‘parts’ that we have enumerated. To understand him here we must remember what Plato said about universal ideas, that they had a separate existence of their own. He did not say, however, that objects which follow successively from each other, such as numbers and geometrical figures, had a universal idea, i.e. he did not posit a universal idea of Number apart from particular numbers—as, for him, there was a universal idea of Man in addition to all existing men; and this because the classes of number are, of their nature, derived successively from each other, so that the first of these, duality, is the cause of all the rest. There is no need to posit a general idea of Number as the cause of the numerical species. The same argument applies to geometrical figures. They follow each other in the same way as numbers: from the triangle comes the tetragon, and from the latter the pentagon.

§ 296. Aristotle, then, says that the idea of Soul is one in the same way as that of geometrical figure is one. just as there is no figure existing apart from the triangle and the rest, as their common idea, so it is with the soul. There exists’ no soul apart from the parts which have been enumerated.

§ 297. But while, there is (even for the Platonists), no figure existing apart from all figures, nevertheless one common definition can be found which answers to all figures, without being proper to any particular one. And the same is true of living beings. It would be ludicrous therefore to seek a common definition, whether of animals or anything else, which did not fit any particular living thing actually existing. On the other hand it will not do to look for a definition that will fit only one sort of soul, ignoring what all have in common. We need a common definition which must, however, be applicable to souls in particular.

§ 298. He goes on now to show the resemblance between the two definitions, namely of soul and of geometrical figure. In both cases what comes first is potentially in what follows. In figures the three-sided figure exists potentially in the square; for the square is divisible into two triangles. Likewise the sensitive life-principle contains the vegetative, both as potential, as it were, with respect to sensitivity, and also as a certain life-principle in itself. The same holds good with the other figures and the other divisions of soul.

TEXT

414b32–415a22

BOOK II, CHAPTER III, CONTINUED

THE SOUL'S POWERS CONTINUED

THEIR INTERRELATION

HOW TO DEFINE EACH

So We must enquire in each particular case what the soul is of each: of plant, of man, of beast § 299

It must be considered why they stand in this order: for there is no sensitive soul without the vegetative, yet in plants the vegetative exists apart from the sensitive. Again, there can be no sense apart from that of touch, but touch exists without the others; for many animals have no sight or hearing or sense of smell. Again, among sentient beings, some. have local motion, others not. Last and least extensive of all [the species] that reasons and understands (as man and any other such). For mortal beings which possess reason have also all the other [powers], but reason is not found in all that have any one of the latter; some indeed have not even imagination, others live by this alone. The speculative intellect is another issue.

Clearly then, whatever is the most precise definition with respect to each of the above will be that also of the soul. §§ 300-2

CHAPTER IV

It is necessary lbr the student of these [parts of the soul] to discover what is the nature of each, and only then to investigate habits and other matters. § 303

But if one is to say what each of them is (namely the intellectual power or the sensitive or the vegetative) one must first say what it is to understand or perceive by sense; for actions and operations are prior to faculties in the order of thought. And if this is so, one ought first to consider the appropriate objects; which are prior even to the operations, and correspond to them;,and thus to determine, in the first place, what these objects are—for instance, food and the sense-object and the intelligible. §§ 304-8

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SIX

§ 299. After enumerating the powers of the soul and showing how the general definition given above is related to the particular divisions. of soul, the Philosopher now explains what remains to be cleared up and in what order. There are, he says, still two points to be made clear, one of which links up with the argument just given. For we have seen that, just as we must not be satisfied with a completely general definition of soul, such as will not express any of its particular realisations, so too we cannot rest content even with a definition which does answer in some way to these latter; we must pursue our enquiry until we shall have defined precisely what is proper to each of these divisions of soul in particular. Whence it follows that we have to ask about each particular type of living being—plant or man or animal—what is its own particular life-principle; thus applying and particularising our common notion of soul.

§ 300. Then at 'It must be considered', he states the next point to be decided. He has already said that the parts of the soul follow each other in a series like the kinds of geometrical figure; and it remains to consider the reason for this. This reason will be given at the end of the Treatise; here he only shows how the parts of soul follow one from the other successively. The sensitive part, he says, cannot exist without the vegetative, but the latter can, in plants, exist without the sensitive. And this is not surprising; for, as we have seen, the purpose of the vegetative activities is to attain and retain existence itself, which is the ground of all the rest, as it were. And the senses display a like sequence; there. are no senses at an unless there is touch; but touch itself can exist without the others. Many animals neither see, nor hear, nor smell, but only touch. And this will appear quite reasonable if we consider that by touch an animal is aware of the elements of which its substance consists (what it consists of and is nourished by), with which elements the other senses are only indirectly concerned. Hence the latter are not necessary for all animals, and in fact are found only in the higher animals.

§ 301. Again, there is the connection between sensitive and motive powers. Motive power cannot exist without sensitive, but the converse is not true. Some sentient beings move from place to place, but not all. We are speaking of the progressive movement of animals from one place to another; which is not found in all ,animals; though such as lack it show certain local movements of expansion and contraction—for instance, shellfish.

The ultimate division of soul—and the least extensive since it is not subdivided into different species—is that which has the power of reason and understanding; because where reason exists in mortal beings, there also are found all the other aforesaid powers. He says ‘mortal’ to exclude immaterial substances and the heavenly bodies (if these are alive) which, as neither being born nor dying, do not need the vegetative power; and as being able to understand by a direct intuition of the intelligible object, do not require sense-knowledge as a preliminary condition of understanding; whereas in corruptible natures all the sub-intellectual powers are presupposed as instruments preparing the way for intellect, which is the final perfection of Nature. But these sub-intellectual powers do not necessarily imply reason in the subjects that possess them. And in view of the affinity between intellect and imagination (as he said above, intellect either is, or is accompanied by, imagination), he adds that some animals lack not only intellect but also imagination.

§ 302. Now this might seem to contradict a previous remark of his, that if a part cut from an animal retains sensation and desire, it retains also images—if the latter imply imagination, as seems likely. We must therefore say that (as will be shown in Book III)3 the lower animals have indeed a sort of imagination but indeterminately: i.e. the activity of imagining does not, in them, outlast actual sense-apprehension, as it does in the higher animals which retain images of things sensed after these have been removed. Thus, as he says here, imagination varies in different animals. Some animals, lacking reason, live only by imagination, being led by it as we are led by reason. And though certain other animals lack both imagination and speculative intelligence, these two powers are not the same, as we shall see.

Clearly, then, the definition of the soul which has been given applies very precisely to each part of the soul.

§ 303. Then, at ‘It is necessary’, he shows the order to be followed in examining the parts of soul. From one point of view, he explains, the first thing to do is to define the nature of each of these parts; and then consider ‘habits’, i.e. whatever other parts of soul derive from them, and anything else pertaining to them and to whatever they animate, such as the organs of the body and things of that kind. This procedure is necessary to avoid confusion.

§ 304. Then, at ‘But if etc.’, he observes that, from another point of view, our definition of any part of the soul—intellect or sensitivity or vegetativity—must begin from the act of the part in question, e.g. understanding or actual sensation; because in idea acts and operations precede potentialities. Potentiality is nothing but a capacity to act or be acted upon; it essentially involves a relation to actuality and can only be defined in such terms. And if this is the case with acts and potencies, acts in their turn connote something prior to themselves, i.e. their objects.

§ 305. For the type of every act or operation is determined by an object. Every operation of the soul is the act of a potentiality—either active or passive. Now the objects of passive potentialities stand to these as the causal agents which bring each potentiality into its proper activity; and it is thus that visible objects, and indeed all sensible things, are related to sight and to the other senses. But the objects of the active capacities are related to these as the final terms attained by their activities; for in this case the object is what each of these activities effectively realises. It is obvious that whenever an activity effectively realises anything besides the activity itself, the thing thus realised is the final term of the activity (cf. the Ethics, Book I); for example a house is the final term of building. Hence all the objects of the soul's activities are either causal agents or final terms; and in both respects they specify those activities.

For, obviously, specifically diverse causal agents do specifically diverse things—as heat heats and cold chills. And so also with the final term of activity: becoming well or becoming ill differ as 'doings', because health differs from illness. Thus in the work of seeking definitions we have to consider the objects of the soul's operations before these operations themselves.

§ 306. We ought, therefore, to reach conclusions about objects before activities for the same reason as leads us to define activities before potencies. The 'objects' in question are such things as food and sensible being and intelligible being, with respect to the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual faculties respectively.

§ 307. But note that the activities and powers of soul are not distinguished with respect to distinct objects except precisely in so far as these are objects. For instance, visible being differs from audible being precisely as object. But if there is no difference as object, then it does not matter what other differences there may be; they win not essentially affect the kind of activity or potentiality. Thus by the same faculty we see a coloured man and a coloured stone; the difference is merely incidental to the object of the faculty.

§ 308. Note too that our intellectual potency is, as such, only potentially intelligible; in order to be understood it must be actualised through an idea drawn from sensible images. A thing is knowable only in the degree that it is actual; hence our intellectual potency attains to self-knowledge only through possessing an intelligible object in a concept (as will be explained in Book III), and not by directly intuiting its own essence. This is why the process of self-knowledge has to start from the exterior things whence the mind draws the intelligible concepts in which it perceives itself; so we proceed from objects to acts, from acts to faculties, and from faculties to essence. But if the soul could know its essence in itself and directly it would be better to follow the reverse procedure; for in that case the closer anything was to the soul's essence, the more directly could it be known by the soul.

TEXT

415a23–415b28

BOOK II, CHAPTER, IV, CONTINUED

THE VEGETATIVE PRINCIPLE

HOW SOUL CAUSES BODY

We must first speak of nutrition and generation. For the vegetative soul is present in others, and is primary, and is that most general power of the soul by which life is present in anything: its operations being reproduction and the use of nutriment. §§ 309-10

For the most natural of the operations of such living beings as are mature, and not defective nor spontaneously generated, is to produce others like themselves: an animal an animal, and a plant a plant. To this extent do they participate, as far as they are able, in the imperishable and the divine. For this all things seek after, doing all that they do by nature for the sake of this. Now ‘that for the sake of which’ anything takes place, is twofold, one, the end ‘for which’, the other the end ‘in which’. Since then they cannot share by a continuous being, in the divine and everlasting (since nothing corruptible remains for ever numerically one and the same) each shares in this as far as it is able, one, however, more, and another less. And thus it endures, not the same, but as if the same; one indeed, but in species, not numerically. §§311-17

The soul is the cause and principle of the living body. Now these words can be used in many ways. The soul, however, is a cause in three established senses: for it is that whence comes movement; that ‘for the sake of which’; and as the essence of living bodies. § 318

That it is as the essence is evident. For in all things, the essence is the cause of existence. In things that live, to live is to be; and the cause and principle of this is the soul. § 319

Further: of that which is in potency, the act is the [immanent] idea. § 320

It is manifest that the soul is also a cause ‘for the sake of which’. For Nature operates for a purpose, in the same way as, as mind; and this is its end. Such is the soul in living thin according to Nature. For all natural bodies are instruments of the soul: whether of animals or of plants, they”exist as for the sake of the soul. ‘For the sake of’ is a phrase used in two ways, as ‘that for which’, and ‘that in which’. §§ 321-2

But also the soul is the principle whence comes local motion. Yet this power is not present in all living things. Change and growth are, however, due to a soul, while sensation seems to be a kind of alteration, and nothing senses unless it has a soul. The same holds good of growth and decay; for nothing undergoes growth or decay physically, unless it is nourished; and nothing is nourished which does not share in life. § 323

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SEVEN

§ 309. Having distinguished the capacities of ‘soul’ from one another, and explained how and in what order he means to discuss them, the Philosopher now treats of them in the order indicated. This he does in two stages. First, he examines one by one the divisions into which he has analysed soul, coming to certain conclusions about all of them. After that, in the penultimate chapter of this book, where he says, ‘All living things have the vegetative soul’, he explains the interrelation of these ‘parts’ of soul.

The former section divides into four treatises:

(1) On the vegetative principle.

(2) Starting at ‘These questions being settled’ [II, 10: §350] on the sensitive principle.

(3) At ‘As to the part of the soul by which it knows’ [III, 7: §671], on the intellect.

(4) At ‘We must now consider’ [III, 14: §795], on the principle of local movement.

To the appetitive principle is assigned no special treatise, because it does not of itself constitute any special grade of animate being. It is treated, along with motion, in Book III.

Treatise (1) divides into two parts: the first part contains certain preliminaries to the study of the vegetative principle; the second, beginning at ‘Since the vegetative and generative’ [II, 9: §333], contains Aristotle’s conclusions on this matter. The former section again divides into (a) a statement of his aim, and (b) at ‘For the most natural’ [§311] an exposition of certain things which an understanding of the vegetative principle presupposes.

§ 3 10. (a) First of all, then, he remarks that if, as we saw in the last chapter, objects and acts have to be defined before potencies, and the fundamental potency before those which follow from it, we ought in consequence to begin by discussing nourishment, the object with which the vegetative principle deals, and generation, which is this principle's activity. Now this principle should be discussed first; because, whenever it coexists in one subject with the other parts. of 'soul', it is as it were their foundation; for through its activities the physical reality, underlying both sensitivity and intelligence, is maintained. Besides, this part of 'soul' is common to all living things, and while it can exist apart from the others, they cannot exist without it; and it is always best to start with the more general datum. Its activities, then, being reproduction and taking nourishment, it is with these that we begin.

§ 3 11. (b) Next, when he says 'For the most natural' he settles a few preliminary questions; and this in two stages. First, he shows that to generate one's kind is an act of the vegetative principle. This he had not yet shown, having spoken so far only of growth and decay in this connection. Next, at 'The soul is cause', he proves that a soul is the principle of all vegetative activities (for indeed these activities might have seemed to come from mere nature, and not from a life-principle, since it is of their essence that they make use of the active and passive physical and corporeal qualities; and still more, because life in plants is hard to discern and latent).

§ 312. The first point is proved thus. All activities found to be natural to all living things spring, as we have seen, from the vegetative principle as the fundamental condition of there being any life at all; and reproduction being one such activity, it must spring from the vegetative principle. Indeed, he relates reproduction to this principle because it is, as he says, the activity most natural to all living things; and this because in a certain way the process of generation is common to all beings, even to inanimate things. Of course the latter are generated differently; still, they are generated. But with them the generating principle is something quite exterior to the thing that comes into being, whereas animate things proceed from an, interior principle inasmuch as they spring from the seed with its potentiality for new life.

§ 313. There are, however, three exceptions to the general rule that living things reproduce their kind. First, the immature; for children do not beget. Secondly, those defective in some essential requirement, such as the impotent and eunuchs. Thirdly, the case of spontaneous generation from putrefying matter. In this last case the life resulting is of a type so inferior that the general environment suffices to cause it, i.e. the influence of the heavenly bodies and the right material conditions. But these causes alone are not sufficient to generate the higher animals: this requires also the activity of particular causes of the same species as the animals generated.

§ 314. Hence he says that any living thing can reproduce its kind provided that it is ‘mature’ (excluding children) and not ‘defective’ (excluding eunuchs and such like) and that the effect generated is not ‘spontaneously generated’ (excluding things produced by putrefaction, which are said to come to be ‘spontaneously’ because they spring up without seed, which is something like the way things are done, as we say, spontaneously, i.e. not under exterior compulsion). And what he means by living things producing their like is that animals produce animals and plants plants; and more precisely that each species produces its like, men producing men and olive-trees olive-trees. And the reason why living things produce their like is that they may continuously participate, so far as they can, in what is divine and immortal, i.e. that they may become as like to the divine as possible.

§ 315. For just as there are degrees of perfection in one and the same being, inasmuch as it develops from potentiality into act, so there are more and less perfect beings; and therefore the more perfect a given thing is in itself, the more does it resemble the more perfect beings. Hence just as, while a thing is moving from potency to actuality, and as long as it is still in potency, it has a natural relation and inclination towards actuality, and when it attains incomplete actuality it still desires a more complete actuality, so, in the same way, everything in a lower form of existence is inclined to the maximum possible assimilation to the higher form. Hence Aristotle adds that ‘all things seek this’, i.e. an assimilation to what is divine and imperishable, and this is that ‘for the sake of which they do all that they do by nature’.

§ 316. Now ‘that for the sake of which’ something is done can mean two things: (a) the end aimed at directly by an activity, as health is the direct aim of doctoring; and (b) as the end aimed at indirectly; and this again may be taken in two ways. For we might take the ‘end’ to include also that subject in which the activity’s direct aim is realised, and in this sense the end of doctoring would be not health merely, but a healthy body. Alternately, we could mean by ‘end’ not only what is principally intended, but also the means to be employed; we might say, e.g. that the end of doctoring was to keep the body warm, because warmth preserves that harmony of elements in the body which is health. So then, when it is said here that perpetuity of being is the reason for the activity in question, we are referring either to some imperishable nature which material things strive, by reproducing their kind, to resemble, or to the reproductive process itself, which is the means to this end.

§ 317. Because, then, the lower forms of life are unable to share in the perpetual, divine being by way of continuity of their individual identity—since it is absolutely and intrinsically necessary (not merely a necessity imposed from without) that all corruptible things should individually pass away since they are intrinsically material—it follows that they can only share in it so far as their nature allows; the more lasting natures more, the less lasting less; but all sharing in it continuously by way of reproduction; each remaining one and the same, not indeed literally, but ‘as if the same’ in the sense that one and the same species remains. Hence he adds that it does not remain one thing numerically, i.e. in the strict sense of the terms, but only specifically; and this because each individual reproduces its like according to species.

§ 318. Then, at ‘The soul is the cause’, he shows the connection between the activities attributed to the vegetative principle and the soul. And he does two things here: first, he establishes a truth; secondly, at ‘Empedocles’, he points out an error. The proof of the truth, again, has two stages. First, he states his aim, asserting that the soul is principle and cause of the living body; and since these terms are ambiguous, going on to distinguish three senses in which this proposition is to be taken. Soul, he says, is cause of the living body, (a) as the source of its movements, (b) as ‘that for the sake of which’, or end, and (c) as its ‘essence’ or form.

§ 319. in the second place, at ‘That it is’, he proves his proposition; and first with regard to soul being the cause of the living body as its form. Here he uses two arguments: first, the cause of anything as its ‘essence’, i.e.

form, is the same as the cause of its being, for everything has actual existence through its form. Now it is the soul that gives being to living things; for their being is precisely their life, which they have from the soul. Hence the soul causes the body as its form.

§ 320. Then the second argument, at ‘Further’: the actuality of anything is the immanent idea and form of the thing as in potency. Now the soul, as we have seen, is the living body’s actuality. Therefore it is the form and immanent idea of the living body.

§ 321. Next, at ‘It is manifest’, he shows that the soul is a final cause of living bodies. For Nature, like mind, acts for a purpose, as was shown in Book II of the Physics. But the mind, in its constructions, always orders and arranges materials in view of some form. So also, then, does Nature. If then the soul is the living body’s form, it must also be its final cause.

§ 322. Moreover the soul is the end not only of living bodies, but also of all sublunary natural bodies. For it is evident that all such bodies are, as it were, instruments of ‘soul’—not only of animals’ souls but of the plant soul as well. Thus men turn to their own, purposes both animals and inanimate things; animals make use of plants and inanimate things; and plants of the inanimate things which support and feed them. If then the action of things is an index to their nature it seems that all inanimate bodies are naturally instruments of animate things and exist for their sake. And, incidentally, the lower animate things exist for the higher. After this he distinguishes ‘for the sake of’ into the two aspects which have already been explained.

§ 323. Thirdly, at ‘But also the soul’, he shows that the soul is the source of movement in the body. The form of every natural body, he explains, is the principle of the characteristic movement of that particular kind of body —e.g. the form of fire is cause of fire’s movement. Now certain movements are characteristic of living bodies; such, for instance, as that by which animals move themselves about from place to place, though this, to be sure, is not found in all living things. Similarly sensation involves a certain alteration of the body not found except in beings that have soul. So too with growth and decay; these movements imply the use of food and therefore also a soul. The soul, then, is the principle of all these movements.

TEXT

415b28–416a18

BOOK II, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED

THE VEGETATIVE PRINCIPLE CONTINUED

TWO ERRORS REFUTED

Empedocles is mistaken here, adding that growth occurs in plants by their sending a root downwards, because earth is by nature below, and also upwards because of fire. § 324

Nor did he understand aright ‘up’ and ‘down’; for these are not for all things the same as for the Universe; but roots of plants correspond to the head, in animals, if it is permissible to identify organs by their functions. For we reckon those organs to be the same which perform the same operations. §§ 325-7

Besides, what holds fire and earth together if they tend in contrary directions? They must come apart if there is nothing to prevent this. But if there is such a thing, it must be the soul; and be also the cause of growth and nourishment. § 328

Now it seems to some that the nature of fire is the sole cause of growth and nutrition; for it certainly seems to be the only one of the bodies and elements that is self-nourishing and self-increasing. Whence the notion that it is this that is operative in plants and animals. §§ 329-30

It is indeed a concomitant cause, but the cause absolutely is not fire, but rather the soul. For the increase of fire is infinite so long as there is anything combustible. But there are limitations to all things that subsist naturally, and some definite principle governs their dimensions and growth. And this belongs to the soul, not to fire, and to a specific principle rather than to matter. §§ 331-2

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO EIGHT

§ 324. The Philosopher has just shown that the activities we call vegetative have their origin in the soul. He now proceeds to refute two errors on this subject, which he deals with respectively in two sections; the second of which begins at ‘Now it seems to some that the nature of fire’. In the first section he begins by stating the error, and then, at ‘Nor did he understand’ attacks it. Regarding the error itself, we should note that just as Empedocles refused to explain other cases of purposeful arrangement in Nature by any natural finality—for example he said that animals had the sort of feet they have, not in order to help them to walk, but simply because the matter of that part of their bodies happened to be arranged in that sort of way; so also the growth of living things he ascribed merely to the motion of light and heavy bodies. Observing that living things increase their size in different directions, e.g. up and down—as is evident in plants, which thrust their roots down and their branches up—he said that the downward growth of plants was due to the earth in their composition, which is heavy and therefore necessarily tends downwards; whilst their upward growth was due to fire which, being light, must tend upwards.

§ 325. Aristotle, then, at ‘Nor did he’, brings two arguments against this opinion of Empedocles. First, he says that Empedocles misunderstood ‘up and down’. To see what he means here we should note that ‘up and down’, and the other differences of position (before and behind, right and left) are differentiated in some objects naturally, whilst in others they are merely relative to ourselves. In things which have definite parts as the natural principle of their various movements, these positions are based on Nature itself Thus the Cosmos as a whole has a mid-point to which heavy things naturally tend, and a circumference to which light things naturally rise; which makes a natural cosmic difference between up and down, according to the natural resting places of the light and the heavy. Again, in living things and mortal beings up and down follow growth and decay: the upper is that part which takes in food, and the lower the opposite part which ejects superfluities.

§ 326. Again, in some animals before and behind are determined in relation to their senses, and the right and the left by their movements in space. But things, no part of which is a special source or term of movement, have no natural differences of position in themselves; these are fixed simply by the thing's position relative to us. So is it with inanimate objects: the same pillar is said to be on the right or the left according as it is to the right or left of a man. Now in certain living things the natural upper and lower parts are fixed in the same way as in the Cosmos as a whole. It is so in man whose head is turned towards the top of the Cosmos and his feet to its bottom. But the reverse is found in plants, whose roots correspond to the head in man, since they function (as the part which takes in food) in the same way as the head in man. For we reckon that instruments are similar or dissimilar if their functions are so; hence the likeness between a plant's roots and the head of an animal, although they point downwards. Up and down, then, mean opposite things in plants and in the Cosmos as a whole. But brute animals are different; their heads are turned neither up nor down in relation to the Cosmos as a whole. This is what he means when he says that up and down are not for all things (i.e. living things) what they are for the Cosmos.

§ 327. But Empedocles took up and down to be the same for all living things and for the Cosmos. And. indeed, if the movement of growth, by which we fix the upper and lower in living beings, followed the movements of the heavy and the light, by which the same relations are fixed for the Cosmos as a whole, then up and down would mean the same in all living beings and in the Cosmos. This is what led Empedocles to say that the roots of plants grew downwards.

§ 328. The second argument against Empedocles begins at 'Besides, what holds'. To understand it, we should note that each element in a mixture is present not equally but virtually, and, therefore lacking the movement proper to itself. The whole mixture moves with the movement of the element that predominates. If each, as, Empedocles seems to have thought, retained its own movement, then, since the elements have natural movements in contrary directions, it follows that they would become quite separate from one another, unless some containing force held them together.

Now it is just this container of the element which seems to be the chief cause of growth. For though, to be sure, the increase of the body in its various parts is due to diverse motions of the elements, yet,’ given the contrariety of elemental motion, growth is inconceivable unless the elements remain conjoined; otherwise there would be division, not growth. But in living things the soul is what holds the elements together; it is also, therefore, the’ source of their growth.

§ 329. Next, at ‘Now it seems to some’, he states another theory; which, at ‘It is indeed’ he then disproves. Unlike the theory. of Empedocles, which put the causes of growth and nutrition in both earth and fire, this theory ascribes them only to fire.

§ 330. The reason given is that the cause of anything’s modifications or motion would appear to be whatever had such modifications or motions essentially—e.g. fire, being essentially hot, is the cause of heat in things that contain other elements as well; and in the same way earth is the cause of heaviness. Now of the elements fire alone seems to ‘feed’ itself and to ‘grow’ ; if we take these terms in a superficial sense. Therefore fire alone would seem to cause growth and nutrition in plants and animals. But whether fire really feeds itself and grows will be made clear later.

§ 331. Then he attacks the above opinion. But note its grain of truth. All food has to be cooked, and this is done by fire, so that fire does play a part in nutrition, and consequently in growth also; not indeed as the principal agent (which is the soul) but as a secondary, instrumental agent. To say then that fire is a sort of concurrent or instrumental cause of growth and nutrition is true. But it cannot be the principal cause or agent, as he goes on to show.

§ 332. The principal agent in any action is that which imposes the term or natural limit upon what is done; thus in artificial things like boxes or houses the limit or term is fixed, not by the instruments used in the work, but by the art itself. The instruments, as such, are quite indifferent as to whether they are used to produce a thing of this shape and quantity or of that. A saw, as such, can be used to cut wood for a door or a bench or a house, and in any quantity you please; and if it cuts wood in this or that particular shape and quantity, this is due to the man who uses it. Now in Nature each thing obviously has certain limits to its size and its increase; each thing grows to a certain fixed pattern. For as each species of thing requires its own accidental modifications, so it needs its own measure of quantity, though some margin must be left to material differences and other individual factors. Men are nor all equal in size. But there is a limit both to their largeness and their littleness; and whatever determines this limit is the true principal cause of growth. But this cannot be fire, because the growth of fire has no naturally fixed limits; it would spread to infinity if an infinite amount of fuel were supplied to it. Clearly, then, fire is not the chief cause of growth and nutrition, but rather the soul. And this is reasonable enough, for the quantitative limits of material things are fixed by form—the specific principle—rather than matter. Now the soul of a living being is to the elements it contains as form is to matter; the soul, then, rather than fire, sets the term and natural limit to size and growth.

TEXT

416a19–416b31

BOOK II, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED

THE VEGETATIVE PRINCIPLE CONTINUED

NUTRITION

Since the vegetative and generative faculties of the soul are a single power, it is first necessary to fix the nature of nutrition. For it is by this operation that [this power] is distinguished from the others. § 333

It would appear that food is a contrary to that which is fed: yet not every contrariety [involves feeding]; but only such contraries as find their increase as well as their origin in each other. For there are many things which originate from opposites: but not all derive their increase thus; (for instance, health coming from sickness). Nor, it seems, do all that do so nourish one another in the same way. For water is a food to fire, but fire does not feed water. And with uncompounded bodies this seems especially to be the case; that which feeds is one thing and that which is fed another. §§ 334-5

But a difficulty arises here. For some say that anything is nourished by what is similar to it; just as it is increased thus. But to others, as we have said, it seems, on the contrary, that a thing is nourished by its opposite,—as though it were impossible that like [should be altered] by, like; whilst food is altered and digested. Change in all things is either [to] an opposite or to a mean state. Moreover nutriment is acted upon by that which is nourished: not the latter by the nourishment; any more than a craftsman by his material; but this is acted on by him—the craftsman changing only from repose to activity.

It makes all the difference indeed whether food is. considered as what it is at first or as what it becomes finally. But if as both, in the one sense as undigested, in the other as digested, then certainly both the [above] theories of food can be upheld: for as it is undigested, one of two contraries is nourished by the other: but in so far as it is digested, one of two similars is nourished by the other. Whence it is clear that both parties speak in one way rightly, and in another way wrongly. § 339

Since only what is alive is nourished, what is nourished is the animate body as such. Wherefore nutriment means something related to what is animate, and this not incidentally only. §§ 340-2

To be nutritive and to be active are two distinct things. In so far as the living being is quantitative, food is active; but in so far as it is substantial, food is nutritive. It preserves the substance, and this just so long as it is fed. § 343

And it is productive of generation, not of the one nourished, but of such a one as the one nourished—for this latter is already a substance; and nothing generates itself, it only maintains itself in being. § 344

Wherefore, this soul-principle is a power able to preserve what possesses it as a thing of such a kind; and food is preparatory to the operation; hence the being cannot continue, deprived of food. § 345

Since there are three factors: what is nourished; that by which it is nourished; and that which nourishes; what nourishes is the primary soul, that which is nourished is the body containing it, and that by which it is nourished is food. § 346

Since all things are rightly named from their end and the end [of this soul] is to have generated another being like itself, then the primary soul is generative of what is like itself. § 347

‘That by which’ in nourishment is twofold, as ‘that by which’ in steering is the hand or the rudder: the one moving and moved, the other moving only. Now of necessity all food must be such that it can be digested, and what effects digestion is heat. Hence every animate being has heat.

In outline, then, we have stated what nutriment is: the subject must be further examined later in a special discussion. §§ 348-9

LECTIO NINE

§ 333. After showing that the activities called vegetative originate in the soul, the Philosopher proceeds to examine these activities. And first he examines their subject-matter, which is food. Next he shows how the activities and their subject-matter correspond—this at ‘Since only what is alive’. Thirdly, at ‘Wherefore this soul-principle’, he defines the faculties brought into play in these activities. As regards the first point he does three things: (a) he states the plan of the present argument; (b) at ‘It would appear that food’, he says what at first sight appears true about nutrition; to which (c) at ‘But a difficulty’ he brings an objection.

In the first place, then, (a) he observes that, as the vegetative and reproductive powers are included in the same general vegetative power (‘vegetative’ as a special power being really the nutritive power), we should discuss food first of all in relation to this power as a whole. For it is taking food that characterises this part of the soul as distinct from the intellectual or sensitive parts. For the other vegetative activities all presuppose taking food.

§ 334. Then (b) he states in three points what appears at first sight with regard to nourishment. First, food would always seem to be the contrary of the subject fed; and this because it has to become the latter, and becoming is from one thing to its contrary. Secondly, however, it seems to be clear that not any contraries will do; they must be such as can change into one another. Food is changed into the being of the one fed; hence all contraries which alternate in a subject without the one ever actually changing into the other have nothing to do with food. Thus sickness is not the food of health, nor white of black. But how substances come to contain contraries is another question.

§ 335. (c) Again, since increase of bulk seems to follow nutrition, the contraries involved must be such as affect each other in this way. Water may be generated by fire and e converso, but we do not say that water is fed by fire. Yet we can say that fire is fed by water, inasmuch as watery vapour nourishes fire. When water comes from fire there is no new coming-to-be of water; but fire can make use of and grow by means of watery vapours.

Among the elements, therefore, only fire seems to be fed and only water seems to be food, taking water to include all vapours and liquids.

§ 336. Then at ‘But a difficulty” Aristotle brings an objection against what he has just said. The difficulty concerns the statement that food is a ‘contrary’. For some maintain that food should resemble the subject fed. Food causes growth, and a thing grows by what it resembles; otherwise the growth would be a mere addition of something extrinsic. Therefore like, it seems, is fed by like.

§ 337. To others, however, it seems that food must, as we have said, be contrary to what is fed. And they are moved by two reasons. (a) Food, being cooked, is transformed into the subject fed. But all transformation is either into a contrary or into an intermediate, as white into either black or grey. And the intermediate is a sort of contrary: grey compared with white, is black; and compared with black, is white; for it combines both. Therefore food is contrary to the subject into which it is transformed.

§ 338. (b) Again, every agent is contrary to that on which it acts; like is not passive to like. But food is passive to what is fed: it is transformed and digested. What is fed is not passive to its food, any more than an artist to his material (for it is the material that is altered, not the artist, except indirectly, in so far as he moves from potency to act). It would seem, then, that food is contrary to what is fed. Now the first of these two reasons is drawn from the contrariety between the two terns of a change; and the second from the contrariety between agent and patient. That which is fed, and itself acts upon the food, is the term into which the food is transformed.

§ 339. Then at ‘It makes all the difference’, he solves the problem, saying that the answer depends on whether by ‘food’ we mean what remains at the end of the process of heating and digesting, or what is received at first before this process begins. If food can be taken in both these senses—namely as the finished and as the raw product—then the two answers are both admissible. If it is taken in the latter sense, then subjects are fed by their contrary, which itself is acted upon and transformed; but if in the former sense, then like is fed by like; for the active agent assimilates what it acts upon, which is ultimately made like the agent and, as such, can increase the agent’s bulk. Thus both the above opinions were in one way true and another way false.

340. Next, at ‘Since only’, he shows how food is related to the activities of the vegetative principle: to taking nourishment; to growth (at ‘To be nutritive’) ; and to reproduction (at ‘And it is productive’).

First, then, he observes that nothing is fed except what has life and soul; hence the besouled body is what is fed. Now food is potential with respect to the subject fed; for it is changed into this subject. It follows that, inasmuch as food is the material of feeding, it is essentially, not accidentally, related to the besouled body as in potency to this body.

§ 341. Nothing then is, properly speaking, fed excepting what has a soul. Fire might seem to resemble in some way things that are fed, but it is not fed, strictly speaking. For that is properly said to be fed which absorbs something else in order to maintain its own being; and though this appears to happen with fire, it does not really happen. Once a fire has started, if you add fresh fuel, a new fire starts in the new fuel; but not in such a way that the new fuel maintains the fire already started before it was added. By starting a fire in fresh wood you do not maintain the flame in the other wood already burning. For the one flame made up of many flames is not one in the simple sense of the term; it is only one by the aggregation of many units, like a heap of stones. And it is this sort of unity that gives to burning a certain likeness to taking food.

§ 342. Living bodies, on the other hand, are really fed; food maintains life precisely where it already existed. This also is why only living bodies, properly speaking, grow; for each and every part in them is fed and increases; whereas inanimate things increase only by addition of part to part; what existed already does not increase, it is merely made into a new whole together with some other thing added to it.

But if fire has a special likeness to living and growing things, this is because the formal principle in fire is stronger than in the other elements, and its active power greater. It seems, therefore, to feed and grow because it so obviously seizes and subdues to itself other things.

§ 343. Then, at ‘To be nutritive’, he relates taking food to growth, observing that whilst the objective terms of feeding as feeding and of growing as growing are one and the same thing, they differ in idea. Food, we have seen, is in potency to the living body; which itself is both a quantum and a definite particular thing or substance. As a quantum it receives its food (which itself is a quantum) as a cause of growth; but as a particular sort of substance it receives food precisely as food. For it is of the nature of food to maintain the substance of what is fed; which is required by the continuous using up of natural warmth and moisture. Hence the substance of the thing fed lasts just so long as it is fed.

§ 344. Then at ‘And it is productive’ he relates nutrition to generation, as the latter’s cause. For seed, the generative principle, is the residue of food. And food is an agent in generating, not the subject fed, but other subjects of the same kind; for the subject fed already exists and cannot be generated afresh. Nothing generates itself; only what does not yet exist is generated. This is not to say, however, that things cannot maintain themselves.

§ 345. Next, at ‘Wherefore, this soul-principle’ he concludes with a definition of the powers of the vegetative soul: first, of the nutritive power, and then, at ‘Since all things’, of the whole vegetative principle. As to the nutritive power, he observes that it is simply that faculty by which a living being is able to maintain itself as such; while food is the condition of this faculty’s activity, that by means of which it maintains its subject. Hence loss of being follows lack of food.

§ 346. And, having remarked ‘that the source of nutritive activity is a capacity in the soul relating essentially to food, he goes on, at ‘Since there are three’, to show how that power and the food itself differ as sources of nutrition. Nutrition, he says, involves three factors: what is fed; that, wherewith it is fed; and the primary agent in feeding: this primary agent is the primary, i.e. vegetative, soul. What is fed is its body; and that wherewith it is fed is food. Thus a capacity in the soul is the cause of taking food as the principal agent; but food as the instrumental agent.

§ 347. Next, at ‘Since all things’, he defines that primary or vegetative soul (the entire soul of plants, but only part of any animal’s soul). To understand his definition, we must realise that the three vegetative activities fall into a certain order. First is taking food, by which things are maintained in being; the second and more perfect activity is growth, by which a thing increases in both quantity and capacity; while the third and most perfect and ultimate vegetative activity is reproduction, by which a being, already pretty complete in itself, gives existence and perfection to another being. For each thing is at its best, as is said in the Meteorologica, Book IV, when it can reproduce its likeness in another. If then all things are rightly defined and named in terms of their end, and the end of all the activities of the vegetative soul is to generate its likeness in another, it follows that we can suitably define this ‘primary soul’ as that which is reproductive of another, like to itself in kind.

§ 348. And in view of his previous remark that this primary soul’s instrument was food, to prevent anyone thinking that it had no other instrument, he shows, at ‘That by which’ that the subject fed has another instrument wherewith it is fed; just as in steering a ship there are two instruments. For the pilot steers with both hand and rudder. Now the hand is a conjoined instrument which has the soul for its form. Whilst, then, the rudder is an instrument which moves the boat and itself is moved by the hand, the hand itself is not moved by an exterior motive force, but by an interior one; for it is a part of the man and the man moves himself. Similarly, the instrument of nutrition is twofold. There is the separated instrument not yet informed by the soul; and this is food. But there must also be a conjoined instrument; for the food must be digested; and this requires heat. As then a pilot moves the rudder with his hand, and the boat with the rudder, so the soul moves the food with heat and, by means of the food, nourishes itself. The heat is the soul’s conjoined instrument; a natural warmth inseparably rooted in the soul and necessary to all living things as the condition of their digesting their food. And it. is because this primary soul is, unlike the intellect, the actuality of a. part of the body that it has a conjoined instrument.

§ 349. Summarising, Aristotle says that he has defined ‘in outline’, that is in general, what food is; later he will treat of it with more precision and finality. For he wrote a special book on food, as also on the generation and movement of animals.

TEXT

416b32–417a21

BOOK II, CHAPTER V

SENSITIVITY POTENCY AND ACT IN SENSATION

These questions being settled, let us speak of sensation in general. As has been said, sensation occurs in a being moved and acted upon; for it appears to be a kind of alteration. Some say, ‘like is acted on by like’. How far this is possible or impossible has been stated in our general discussion of activity and passivity. §§ 350-1

It may be asked why there is no sensation of the senses themselves; and why they do not produce sensation without something extraneous, seeing that they contain within themselves fire and earth and the other elements that give rise to sensation, either of themselves or through their accidental qualities. It becomes evident that the sensitive power is not an actuality, but is only potential; which explains why it does not sense [without an exterior object] as the combustible does not bum of itself without something to make it burn. Otherwise it would burn itself, and not need a fire already alight. § 352-4

But as we speak of sensing in two ways, (for we say that one who sees and hears in potency sees and hears, even when he happens to be asleep; and also that one does so actually) so we may speak of ‘sense’ in two ways, —as in potency and as in act. Likewise, to perceive is both potential and actual. § 355

To start with then, let us speak as if being acted upon and moved were the same as action and moving. For movement is a kind of activity, though imperfect, as has been stated elsewhere. § 356

All things are moved and affected by an agent, or something in act. Hence it is, that a thing is affected both by its similar and also by its dissimilar, as we have said. What is being affected is dissimilar: what has been affected is similar. § 357

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TEN

§ 350. After treating of the vegetative part of soul the Philosopher now begins to examine the sensitive part. This treatment divides into two sections, the first of which deals with what is most apparent in sensitivity, i.e. the exterior senses, while the second, beginning at ‘That there is no other sense’, treats of what is latent therein. In the former section Aristotle first explains how sense-faculties are related to sensible objects, and then, at ‘In treating of each sense’ he defines both faculty and object. Regarding the former point, he first repeats some earlier observations and then, at ‘It may be asked’, proceeds to the present problem.

First of all, then, he remarks that this is the place to start discussing the sensitive soul, beginning with a general view of the subject and going on later to a more detailed treatment. And he repeats two things already said: that to sense is to be moved or acted upon in some way, for the act of sensation involves a certain alteration of the subject; and secondly, that it was the view of some enquirers that the passivity of sensation was an instance of like being acted upon by like.

§ 351. For some early thinkers held that like is known and sensed by like: as Empedocles said, earth knows earth, fire knows fire, and so on. Now the general problem of the action of like upon like is discussed in the De Generatione, where Aristotle’s conclusion is that, although at the start of any action the agent and patient are contrary, when the action is finished they are similar. For the agent, in acting, assimilates the patient.

§ 352. Then, at ‘It may be asked’, he proceeds to the present problem. He shows that in themselves the senses are in potency; then, at ‘But since we speak of sensing in two ways’, that they are sometimes in act; and thirdly, at ‘Distinctions however’, he shows how they move from potency into act.

To understand the first of these three points, note that all who, like Empedocles, said that like was known by like, thought that the senses were actually the sense-objects themselves,—that the sensitive soul was able to know all sense-objects because it consisted somehow of those objects; that is, of the elements of which the latter are composed.

§ 353. Two things follow from this hypothesis. (1) If the senses actually are, or are made up of, the sense-objects, then, if the latter can be sensed, the senses themselves can be sensed. (2) Since the presence of its object suffices, to enable the sense-faculty to sense, then, if this object actually exists in the faculty as part of its composition, it follows that sensation can take place in the absence of external objects. But both these consequences are false. He introduces them here as specimens of the problems which the early philosophers could not solve. So he says, 'It may be asked why there is no sensation of the senses', i.e. why the senses themselves are not sensed; for it seems they would be sensed if they, the faculties, were really like their objects.

§ 354. It is also hard to see 'why they do not produce sensation', i.e. why actual sensation does not occur, 'without something extraneous', i.e. without exterior sense-objects; since, in the opinion of the ancients, fire, earth and the other elements belong to the inner nature of the sense-faculty and are perceptible by sense, either in themselves, i.e. in their essence (as these philosophers thought, not distinguishing between the senses and the intellect which alone perceives essence), or in the accidental qualities proper to them, namely heat and cold and so forth, which are essentially sense-perceptible. Now since these difficulties are insurmountable if the sense-faculty consists of its objects in their actuality (as the early philosophers thought), Aristotle concludes that the sensitive soul is clearly not actually, but only potentially, the sense-object. That is why sensation will not occur without an exterior sense-object, just as combustible material does not burn of itself, but needs to be set on fire by an exterior agent; whereas if it were actually fire it would burn simply by itself.

§ 355. Then, at 'But as we speak of sensing', he shows, by the two ways in which we speak of anyone sensing, that sensation is intermittently actual. For we sometimes say that a man sees or hears when he only does these things potentially, as when he is asleep; but sometimes we mean that what he is actually doing is seeing or hearing. Clearly, then, sensation and sensing may be referred to either in act or in potency.

§ 356. Next, at ‘To start with then,’ he explains the above. For to speak of sensation as ‘in act’ might seem contradictory to his previous statement that it was a certain passive being acted upon or moved; for to be in act seems to pertain to an active agent. So he explains that in calling sensation an ‘act’ he is referring precisely to the state of being acted upon or moved; inasmuch as this is a certain state of being actual. For movement has a certain actuality; which is the actuality (as he says in the Physics, Book III) of the imperfect or potential, that is to say, of changeable being. In the same way, being moved and sensation itself are a sort of action, as implying an actuality of being. The phrase ‘To start with’, however, means that he will add something later to show how the senses become actual in fact.

§ 357. Thirdly, at ‘All things are moved and affected’, he shows how it follows from the above that the old theory that like senses like cannot be true. Everything potential, he says, is acted upon and moved by some active agent already existing; which in its actualising function makes the potential thing like itself In some sense, then, a thing is acted upon by both its like and its unlike (as we have already remarked). At first, and while the transforming process is going on, there is dissimilarity; but at the end, when the thing is transformed and changed, there is similarity. And so it is as between the sense-faculty and its object. And the early philosophers went wrong because they missed this distinction.

TEXT

417a 22–417b17

BOOK II, CHAPTER V, CONTINUED

SENSITIVITY

POTENCY AND ACT CONTINUED

Distinctions however must be made concerning potency and act; for at present we are speaking of these in one sense only. § 358

For there is such a thing as ‘a knower’, in one sense, as when we say that man is ‘a knower’ because man is of the class of beings able to have knowledge. But also as when we speak of a, man as ‘knowing’ because he possesses the science of grammar. These two are not capable in the same way; but the former’s power is, as it were, generic and comparable to matter; whereas the latter has the power to consider at will, so long as no extraneous obstacle intervenes. Yet again, only he who is actually attending to (say) the letter A, is in the strictest sense knowing. §§ 359-61

Therefore the first two are knowing in potency. But one has undergone a change through being taught, and is often altered from the contrary state, whereas the other is moved to action from simply having sense or grammar without acting [accordingly]; but in a different way from formerly when he had not yet acquired any habit [of knowing]. §§ 362-4

Nor is ‘being acted on’ a simple term. It is one thing to be somehow destroyed by a contrary; quite another when what is in potency is maintained by what is in act, and is of a similar nature, being related to the latter as potency to act. §§ 365-6

For when a man possessed of knowledge becomes actually thinking, there is certainly either no ‘alteration’—there being a new perfection in him, and an increase of actuality;—or it is some novel kind of alteration. Hence it is as misleading a statement to say that a man is ‘altered’ when he thinks, as to say this of the builder when he builds. The process from being in potency to understand and think to actually doing so should not be called instruction, but has by rights some other name. §§ 367-8

The change from being in potency, in one who learns and receives instruction from another (who actually has learning and teaches) either should not be called a ‘being acted upon’ (as we have said), or there are two modes of alteration, one a change to a condition of privation, the other to possession and maturity. §§ 369-72

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO ELEVEN

§ 358. Having explained how the sensitive faculties are both in act and in potency, the Philosopher now goes on to say how they are brought from potency into act. This he does in two parts: first distinguishing between act and potency, and between the diverse ways in which a thing may pass from one state to the other, taking his example from the intellect; and secondly, at ‘The first change in the sensitive being’, he applies all this to the case of sensation.

As regards the first of these parts he does three things: (a) he states his intention; (b) he distinguishes, at ‘For there is such a thing as’, between act and potency in the intellect; and (c) he explains, at ‘Therefore the first two’ how what is potential, in both the two senses of the term which have been distinguished, becomes actual.

First of all, then, he says he is about to discuss potency and act, in order to show the diverse ways in which things can be said to be actual or potential—because so far the two terms have been used ‘in one sense only’, i.e. without distinctions.

§ 359. Then at ‘For there is such a thing as’, he distinguishes act and potency in the intellect. We speak, he says, in one sense of potency when we say that man is a knower, referring to his natural capacity for knowledge. Man, we say, is one of that class of beings that know or have knowledge, meaning that his nature can know and form habits of knowing. In another sense, however, we say of someone that he knows, meaning that he knows certain definite things; thus we say of one who has the habit of some science—e.g. Grammar—that he is now one who knows.

§ 360. Now, obviously, in both cases the man’s capacities are implied by calling him a knower; but not in the same way in both cases. In the first case man is said to be ‘able’ through belonging to a certain genus or ‘matter’, i.e. his nature has a certain capacity that puts him in this genus, and he is in potency to knowledge as matter to its form. But the second man, with his acquired habit of knowing, is called ‘able’ because when he wishes he can reflect on his knowledge—unless, of course, he is accidentally prevented, e.g. by exterior preoccupations or by some bodily indisposition.

§ 361. A third case would be that of a man who ‘was actually thinking about something here and now. He it is who most properly and perfectly is a knower in any field; e.g. knowing the letter A, which belongs to the above-mentioned science of Grammar. Of the three, then, the third is simply in act; the first is simply in potency; while the second is in act as compared with the first and in potency as compared with the third. Clearly, then, potentiality is taken in two senses (the first and second man); and actuality also in two senses (the second and third man).

§ 362. Then where he says ‘Therefore the first two’, he explains (1) how both these types of potency are actualised, and (2), at ‘Nor is being acted on’, he discusses whether this actualisation is the result of a being acted upon.

First, then, he remarks that while in the two first cases there is potential knowledge, and while potency as such is able to be actualised, there is a difference, in respect of actualisation, between a primary and a secondary potency. One in primary potency to knowledge is brought into act through being, as it were, changed or altered by teaching received from another (the teacher) who already knows actually. And often, he says, this change is from a contrary habit; alluding to those who come to actual knowledge from a state of ignorance.

§ 363. Ignorance has two meanings. it can be purely negative: when the ignorant person neither knows the truth nor is involved in the opposite error; and in this case he is simply brought into actual knowledge, not changed by being rid of a contrary habit. On the other hand, ignorance may imply the bad condition of being involved in error contrary to the truth; and to acquire knowledge, then, one must be changed by being delivered from that contrary habit.

§ 364. But one in potency in the secondary sense—i.e. as already possessing the habit—passes from the state of having, indeed, sensations or knowledge but not exercising them, into the state of actually knowing something here and now. And this kind of actualisation differs from the other.

§ 365. Then at ‘Nor is being acted on’ he discusses the question whether both kinds of actualisation can be called being acted upon. First, he explains the different meanings of ‘being acted on’. Then at ‘For when a man possessed of etc.’, he applies these distinctions to the present problem. First, then, he remarks that being acted upon has several meanings, like potency and act. In one sense it implies some kind of destruction caused by a contrary quality. For in the strict sense the state of being passive to action seems to connote, on the side of the patient, a loss of something proper to it through its being overcome by the agent; and this loss is a sort of destruction, either absolutely, as when the patient loses its substantial form, or relatively, as in the loss of an accidental form. And the loss implies a contrariety in the agent, the imposition upon the patient’s matter, or being, of a contrary form from outside. In the first and strict sense, then, ‘being acted on’ means a destruction caused by a contrary agent.

§ 366. In another and looser sense the term connotes any reception of something from outside. And as a receiver is to what it receives as a potency to its actuality; and as actuality is the perfection of what is potential; so being acted upon in this sense implies rather that a certain preservation and perfection of a thing in potency is received from a thing in act. For only the actual can perfect the potential; and actuality is not, as such, contrary to potency; indeed the two are really similar, for potency is nothing but, a certain relationship to act. And without this likeness there would be no necessary correspondence between this act and this potency. Hence potency in this sense is not actualised from contrary to contrary, but rather from like to like, in the sense that the potency resembles its act.

§ 367. Next at ‘When a man possessed of’, Aristotle discusses whether the actualising of already acquired knowledge involves a being acted upon.

And he takes first the transit from secondary potentiality into fullest actuality; and then at ‘The change from being in potency’, that from primary potentiality into the acquired habit of knowledge. Now, as to the former point, he asserts that this movement into actual thinking is not truly a passive being altered; for, as we have seen, no movement into act, as movement into act, is such. The term applies, strictly, only to the alteration of a subject from one to the other of two mutually exclusive qualities. But this is not what happens when a man begins to exercise his mind on knowledge he already possesses; rather, he is developing a quality already possessed; as Aristotle says here, it is ‘a new perfection in him and an increase of actuality’; for perfection increases with actuality. And if one insists on using the terms ‘actuality’ and ‘being acted upon’, they must be taken in a wider and less strict sense. And to illustrate the point he adds that it is just as inept to speak of a thinker being ‘altered’ when he actually thinks as to say of a builder that he is altered by building.

§ 368. A further conclusion: if it be granted that to pass from habitual to actual knowing is not a reception of new knowledge, but rather a drawing out and perfection of knowledge possessed already, it remains true that to be taught is to acquire new knowledge. Therefore, when a man is brought simply to the act of knowing or understanding, this ought not, strictly speaking, to be called ‘instruction’; it might be given some other name, though perhaps no other has in fact been found for it.

§ 369. Then at ‘The change from being in potency’, he discusses whether the transit from potency to act of one who acquires completely fresh knowledge is an ‘alteration’, in the sense of a ‘being acted upon’. He says that when a learner, previously knowing only potentially, is instructed by a master already knowing actually, one should either call this simply not a case of alteration and being acted upon, or else distinguish two kinds of alteration. The one kind is ‘a change to a condition of privation’, i.e. into qualities opposed to those which the thing already has, and incompatible with these, and therefore until now excluded by them. The other kind is ‘by a change to a possession and maturity’, i.e. through receiving habits and forms which perfect the thing’s nature and involve no loss of what it already has. And the learner is altered in this second sense, not in the first.

§ 370. Now this seems to contradict what was said above, that learners often changed from a contrary habit, and thus, it would seem, acquired qualities opposed to their former ones. But really, when one is brought from error to the knowledge of truth there is indeed a certain likeness to the change from one quality to its opposite, but it is only a likeness. For where there is true alteration both the opposed qualities—the terms of the process—are necessarily and essentially involved, e.g. becoming white involves not only white, but also black, or some intermediary colour which in relation to white is a sort of blackness. But where knowledge is acquired it is quite accidental that the learner was previously in error. He could learn without first being in error. Hence it is not in the true sense an alteration.,

§ 371. Another difficulty occurs where he says that the learner as such is taught by a master who already knows. For it does not always happen thus; a man may acquire knowledge by finding out for himself. To this we reply that whenever a potential knower becomes an actual knower, he must indeed be actualised by what is already in act. But this may be effected either by a purely extrinsic cause, as when air is lit up by an already actual fight, or by an intrinsic cause as well, as when a man is healed both by nature and by a doctor. In this latter case both causes of healing are actual health; for obviously health exists both in the mind of a doctor and in some healthy part of the man's nature (i.e. the heart) in virtue of which the rest of the man recovers health. Doctors make use of such natural means to health as warmth or cold or other variable dispositions, so that we can say that the whole of their skill consists in helping nature to drive out sickness. If nature were strong enough she could do this by herself without a doctor's aid.

§ 372. And the case is the same when a man acquires knowledge. For here again there are two principles involved: an intrinsic one, which a man uses when he finds things out for himself; and an extrinsic one, as when he learns from others. But in both cases a potency is actualised by something already in act. The fight of the agent intellect gives a man immediate actual knowledge of the first principles which we know by nature, and in virtue of this actual knowing he is led to actual knowledge of conclusions previously known by him only potentially. In like manner too a teacher can help him towards knowledge, leading him step by step from principles he already knows to conclusions hitherto unknown to him. Nor would this external aid be necessary if the human mind were always strong enough to deduce conclusions from the principles it possesses by nature; and indeed the power so to deduce is present in men, but in varying degrees.

TEXT

417b18–418a25

BOOK II, CHAPTER V, CONTINUED

SENSITIVITY

ACTUALISATIONS OF SENSE AND INTELLECT COMPARED

The first change in the sensitive being is caused by the parent. When it is born it is already endowed as with knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the act of thinking. §§ 373-4

They differ, however. For the actuation of sense-operations is from without; namely from the visible, the audible, and so on for the other senses. The cause [of the difference] is that sensation, even in act, is of particulars: whereas scientific knowledge is of universals. For the latter are, in a way, within the soul itself; hence the act of the intellect is interior and at will; whereas sensation is not from within the soul, and requires that a sense-object be presented. The same holds good of the sciences which concern sense-objects, and for the same reason, i.e. that sense objects are singulars and are external. But there will be time later to deal with these more conclusively. §§ 375-80

For the present it is sufficiently established that ‘in potency’ is not univocally predicated; but it means one thing when, for example, we say that a child is able to be a soldier, and quite another thing when we say this of an adult. The same holds of the sensitive power. Since, however, this distinction has no name, and yet it is settled that the [two stages] differ, and in what way, it is necessary to use the expressions ‘to be acted upon’ and ‘to be altered’ as if they were precise terms. The sensitive power is potentially that which the sense-object is actually, as we have said. It is acted upon in so far as it is not like: it becomes like, in being acted upon; and is then such as is the other. §§ 381-2

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWELVE

§ 373. After distinguishing between potency and act, and elucidating in terms of intellectual activity the transit from one state to the other, the Philosopher now applies what he has said to the case of sensation. First, he shows how there is a transit from potency to act in sensing. Secondly, at ‘They differ, however’ he explains the difference between the two cases. Thirdly, at ‘For the present it is sufficiently established’, he recapitulates what has been said about sensation.

Regarding the first point, we must take into account that, as in intellectual cognition, so too in sensation, potency and act are each two-fold. For what so far possesses no sense-faculty but is due by nature to have one, is in potency to sensation; and what has the sense-faculty, but does not yet sense, is in potency to actual sensation in the same way as we have seen in the case of acquired intellectual knowledge. Now, as a subject moves from primary potency into primary actuality when it acquires knowledge through teaching, so too a subject’s primary potency to the possession of a sense-faculty is actualised by his birth. But whereas a sense-faculty is natural to every animal,—so that in the act of being generated it acquires a sense-faculty along with its own specific nature—the case is not the same with intellectual knowledge; this is not naturally inborn in man; it has to be acquired through application and discipline.

§ 374. This is what he means by saying that ‘the first change in the sensitive being’ is caused by the parent. This ‘first change’, he explains, is from sheer potency to the primary actuality; and it is due to the parent; because there is a power in the semen to actualise the sensitive soul with all its capacities. Once an animal has been generated it has its senses in the same way as a man who has been taught possesses knowledge. And when it actually senses it corresponds to the man who actually exercises his knowledge by thinking.

§ 375. Then at ‘They differ, however’, he sets himself to discriminate between actual sensation and thinking; and he finds the first reason for distinguishing these activities in the difference between their objects, i.e. the sense-objects and intelligible objects which are attained by actual sensation and actual thinking respectively. The sense-objects which actuate sensitive activities—the visible, the audible, etc.—exist outside the soul; the reason being that actual sensation attains to the individual things which exist externally; whereas rational knowledge is of universals which exist somehow within the soul. Whence it is clear that the man who already has scientific knowledge about certain things does not need to seek such things outside himself, he already possesses them inwardly, and is able, unless prevented by some incidental cause, to reflect on them whenever he pleases. But a man cannot sense whatever he pleases; not possessing sense-objects inwardly, he is forced to receive them from outside.

§ 376. And as with sense-activities, so with the sciences of sense-objects; for the latter are individual things existing outside the soul. Therefore a man cannot speculate scientifically on any sense-objects, but only on such as he perceives in sensation. But there will be time to treat conclusively of this matter later on, in Book III, where we discuss the intellect and its relation to the senses.

§ 377. Concerning what is said here, we have to ask ourselves (a) why sensation is of individual things, whereas science is of universals; and (b) how exactly universals exist in the soul.

As to (a) we should note that while the sense-faculty is always the function of a bodily organ, intellect is an immaterial power—it is not the actuality of any bodily organ. Now everything received is received in the mode of the recipient. If then all knowledge implies that the thing known is somehow present in the knower (present by its similitude), the knower’s actuality as such being the actuality of the thing known, it follows that the sense-faculty receives a similitude of the thing sensed in a bodily and material way, whilst the intellect receives a similitude of the thing

understood in an incorporeal and immaterial way. Now in material and corporeal beings the common nature derives its individuation from matter existing within specified dimensions, whereas the universal comes into being by abstraction from such matter and all the individuating material conditions. Clearly, then, a thing’s similitude as received in sensation represents the thing as an individual; as received, however, by the intellect it represents the thing in terms of a universal nature. That is why individuals are known by the senses, and universals (of which are the sciences) by the intellect.

§ 378. As to (b), note that the term ‘universal’ can be taken in two senses. It can refer to the nature itself, common to several things , in so far as this common nature is regarded in relation to those several things; or it can refer to the nature taken simply in itself Similarly, in a ‘white thing’ we can consider either the thing that happens to be white or the thing precisely as white. Now a nature—say, human nature,—which can bethought of universally, has two modes of existence: one, material, in the matter supplied by nature; the other, immaterial, in the intellect. As in the material mode of existence it cannot be represented in a universal notion, for in that mode it is individuated by its matter; this notion only applies to it, therefore, as abstracted from individuating matter. But it cannot, as so abstracted, have a real existence, as the Platonists thought; man in reality only exists (as is proved in the Metaphysics, Book VII) in this flesh and these bones. Therefore it is only in the intellect that human nature has any being apart from the principles which individuate it.

§ 379. Nevertheless, there is no deception when the mind apprehends a common nature apart from its individuating principles; for in this apprehension the mind does not judge that the nature exists apart; it merely apprehends this nature without apprehending the individuating principles; and in this there is no falsehood. The alternative would indeed be false—as though I were so to discriminate whiteness from a white man as to understand him not to be white. This would be false; but not if I discriminate the two in such wise as to think of the man without giving a thought to his whiteness. For the truth of our conceptions does not require that, merely apprehending anything, we apprehend everything in it. Hence the mind abstracts, without any falsehood, a genus from a species when it understands the generic nature without considering the differences; or it may abstract the species from individuals when it understands the specific nature, without considering the individuating principles.

§ 380. It is dear, then, that universality can be predicated of a common nature only in so far as it exists in the mind: for a unity to be predicable of many things it must first be conceived apart from the principles by which it is divided into many things. Universals as such exist only in the soul; but the natures themselves, which are conceivable universally, exist in things. That is why the common names that denote these natures are predicated of individuals; but not the names that denote abstract ideas. Socrates is a ‘man’, not a ‘species’—although ‘man’ is a ‘species’.

§ 381. Finally, at ‘For the present etc.’, he recapitulates his remarks on sensation and observes that only now has it become clear that what we call potency has more than one meaning. It is in one sense that we say that a boy can be a soldier, i.e. by a remote potentiality. But in another sense we say that a grown man can be a soldier, i.e. by proximate potentiality. And the same distinction applies to sense-perception; as we have seen there are two ways of being in potency to sense anything. Though we have found no terms to express this difference, we have seen, nevertheless, that the two kinds of potency differ, and how they differ.

§ 382. And in spite of the fact that a thing which passes from the second stage of potency into act, through actualising its sense-faculty, ought not, strictly speaking, to be said to be ‘altered’ or ‘acted upon’, we cannot help using these terms; and this because the sense-faculty is potentially such as the sense-object is actually. It follows that, whilst at the start of the process of being acted upon the faculty is not like its object, at the term of the process it has this likeness. It was because they failed to make this distinction that the earlier philosophers thought that sense-faculties were composed of the same elements as their objects.

TEXT

418a6–418a26

BOOK II, CHAPTER VI

SENSE OBJECTS IN GENERAL

In treating of each sense we must first discuss sense-objects. We speak of a sense-object in three ways: two [kinds of sense-objects] are perceptible essentially; one incidentally. Of the two former, one is proper to each sense, the other common to all. § 383

Now, I call that the proper object of each sense which does not fall within the ambit of another sense, and about which there can be no mistake,—as sight is of colour, and hearing of sound, and taste of savour; while touch has several different objects. Each particular sense can discern these proper objects without deception; thus sight errs not as to colour, nor hearing as to sound; I though it might err about what is coloured, or where it is, or about what is giving forth a sound. This, then, is what is meant by the proper objects of particular senses. §§ 384-5

Now the sense-objects in common are movement, rest, number, shape, dimension. Qualities of this kind are proper to no one sense, but are common to all; thus a movement is perceptible both by touch and by sight. These, then, are the essential objects of sensation. § 386

To be a sense-object ‘incidentally’ is said, for example, of a white object that is the son of Diares. This is perceived incidentally because whiteness happens to belong to what is perceived: but the sense, is unaffected by that object as such. Of objects essentially sense-perceptible, the proper are properly such; and to these the essence of each sense is naturally adapted. §§ 387-98

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO THIRTEEN

§ 383. Having explained in general terms how sense-faculties are related to their objects, the Philosopher now begins his examination of objects and faculties separately. This enquiry divides into two parts, of which one is concerned with the sense-objects, and the other, starting at ‘It must be taken as a general rule’, with the faculties. The first part again divides into (a) a discrimination of the proper or special sense-objects from the rest, and (b) at ‘That of which there is sight’, an examination of the special objects of each sense. As to (a) he first makes a division of the sense-objects, and then, at ‘Now I call that the proper object,’ explains this division piecemeal.

Beginning then, he observes that before we decide what the senses themselves are we must discuss the objects of each sense; for objects are prior to faculties. Now the term sense-object is used in three ways, in one way incidentally, and in two ways essentially or absolutely; and of the latter we use one in referring to the special objects proper to each sense, and the other in referring to objects that-are common to more than one sense in all sentient beings.

§ 384. Then at ‘Now I call that’, he explains the members of the division, and first what he means by a special sense-object. He says that he means by this term what is perceived by one sense and by no other, and in respect of which the perceiving sense cannot err; thus it is proper to sight to know colour, to hearing to know sound, to taste to know flavour or savour. Touch, however, has several objects proper to itself— heat and moisture, cold and dryness, the heavy and the light, etc. Each sense judges the objects proper to itself and is not mistaken about these, e.g. sight with regard to such and such a colour or hearing with regard to sound.

§ 385. But the senses can be deceived both about objects only incidentally sensible and about objects common to several senses., Thus sight would prove fallible were one to attempt to judge by sight what a coloured thing was or where it was; and hearing likewise if one tried to determine by hearing alone what was causing a sound. Such then are the special objects of each sense.

§ 386. Next, at 'Now the sense-objects', he says, touching the second member of the division, that the common sense-objects are five: movement, rest, number, shape and size. These are not proper to any one sense but are common to all; which we must not take to mean that all these are common to all the senses, but that some of them, i.e. number, movement and rest, are common to all. But touch and sight perceive all five.

It is clear now what are the sense-objects that are such in themselves or absolutely.

§ 387. Then, at 'To be a sense-object incidentally', he takes the third member of the division. We might, he says, call Diarus or Socrates incidentally a sense-object because each happens to be white: that is sensed incidentally which happens to belong to what is sensed absolutely. It is accidental to the white thing, which is sensed absolutely, that it should be Diarus; hence Diarus is a sense-object incidentally. He does not, as such, act upon the sense at all.

While it is true, however, that both common and special sense-objects are all absolutely or of themselves perceptible by sense, yet, strictly speaking, only the special sense-objects are directly perceived, for the very essence and definition of each sense consists in its being naturally fitted to be affected by some such special object proper to itself The nature of each faculty consists in its relation to its proper object.

§ 388. A difficulty arises here about the distinction between common and incidental sense-objects. For if the latter are only perceived in so far as the special objects are perceived, the same is true of the common sense-objects: the eye would never perceive size or shape if it did not perceive colour. It would seem then that the common objects themselves are incidental objects.

§ 389. Now there are some who base the distinction between common and incidental sense-objects upon two reasons. They say that (a) the common objects are proper to the 'common sense', as the special objects are to the particular senses; and (b) that the proper objects are inseparable from the common objects, but not from the incidental objects.

§ 390. But both answers are inept. The first is based on the fallacy that these common sense-objects are the special object of the 'common sense'. As we shall see later, the common sense is the faculty whereat the modifications affecting all the particular senses terminate; hence it cannot have as its special object anything, that is not an object of a particular sense. In fact, it is concerned with those modifications of the particular senses by their objects which these senses themselves cannot perceive; it is aware of these modifications themselves, and of the differences between the objects of each particular sense. It is by the common sense that we are aware of our own life, and that we can distinguish between the objects of different senses, e.g. the white and the sweet.

§ 391. Moreover, even granted that the common sense-objects were proper to the common sense, this would not prevent their being the incidental objects of the particular senses. For we are still studying the sense-objects in relation to the particular senses; the common sense has not yet been elucidated. As we shall see later, the special object of an interior faculty may happen to be only incidentally sensible. Nor is this strange; for even as regards the exterior senses, what is in itself and essentially perceptible by one of these exterior senses is incidentally perceptible by another; as sweetness is incidentally visible.

§ 392. The second reason is also inept. Whether or no the subject of a sensible quality pertains essentially to that quality makes no difference to the question whether the quality itself is an incidental sense-object. No one, for instance, would maintain that fire, which is the essential and proper subject of heat, was directly and in itself an object of touch.

§ 393. So we must look for another answer. We have seen that sensation is a being acted upon and altered in some way. Whatever, then, affects the faculty in, and so makes a difference to, its own proper reaction and modification has an intrinsic relation to that faculty and can be called a sense-object in itself or absolutely. But whatever makes no difference to the immediate modification of the faculty we call an incidental sense-object. Hence, the Philosopher says explicitly that the senses are not affected at all by the incidental object as such.

§ 394. Now an object may affect the faculty's immediate reaction in two ways. One way is with respect to the kind of agent causing this reaction; and in this way the immediate objects of sensation differentiate sense-experience, inasmuch as one such object is colour, another is sound, another white, another black, and so on. For the various kinds of stimulants of sensation are, in their actuality as such, precisely the special sense-objects themselves; and to them the sense-faculty (as a whole) is by nature adapted; so that precisely by their differences is sensation itself differentiated.

On the other hand there are objects which differentiate sensation with respect, not to the kind of agent, but to the mode of its activity. For as sense-qualities affect the senses corporeally and locally, they do so in different ways, if they are qualities of large or small bodies or are diversely situated, i.e. near, or far, or together, or apart. And it is thus that the common sensibles differentiate sensation. Obviously, size and position vary for all the five senses. And not being related to sensation as variations in the immediate factors which bring the sense into act, they do not properly differentiate the sense-faculties; they remain common to several faculties at once.

§ 395. Having seen how we should speak of the absolute or essential sense-objects, both common and-special, it remains to be seen how anything is a sense-object ‘incidentally’. Now for an object to be a sense-object incidentally it must first be connected accidentally with an essential sense-object; as a man, for instance, may happen to be white, or a white thing happen to be sweet. Secondly, it must be perceived by the one who is sensing; if it were connected with the sense-object without itself being perceived, it could not be said to be sensed incidentally. But this implies that with respect to some cognitive faculty of the one sensing it, it is known, not incidentally, but absolutely. Now this latter faculty must be either another sense-faculty, or the intellect, or the cogitative faculty, or natural instinct. I say ‘another sense-faculty’, meaning that sweetness is incidentally visible inasmuch as a white thing seen is in fact sweet, the sweetness being directly perceptible by another sense, i.e. taste.

§ 396. But, speaking precisely, this is not in the fullest sense an incidental sense-object; it is incidental to the sense of sight, but it is essentially sensible. Now what is not perceived by any special sense is known by the intellect, if it be a universal; yet not anything knowable by intellect in sensible matter should be called a sense-object incidentally, but only what is at once intellectually apprehended as soon as a sense-experience occurs. Thus, as soon as I see anyone talking or moving himself my intellect tells me that he is alive; and I can say that I see him live. But if this apprehension is of something individual, as when, seeing this particular coloured thing, I perceive this particular man or beast, then the cogitative faculty (in the case of man at least) is at work, the power which is also called the ‘particular reason’ because it correlates individualised notions, just as the ‘universal reason’ correlates universal ideas.

§ 397. Nevertheless, this faculty belongs to sensitivity; for the sensitive power at its highest—in man, in whom sensitivity is joined to intelligence—has some share in the life of intellect. But the lower animals’ awareness of individualised notions is called natural instinct, which comes into play when a sheep, e.g., recognises its offipring by sight, or sound, or something of that sort.

§ 398. Note, however, that the cogitative faculty differs from natural instinct. The former apprehends the individual thing as existing in a common nature, and this because it is united to intellect in one and the same subject. Hence it is aware of a man as this man, and this tree as this tree; whereas instinct is not aware of an individual thing as in a common nature, but only in so far as this individual thing is the term or principle of some action or passion. Thus a sheep knows this particular lamb, not as this lamb, but simply as something to be suckled; and it knows this grass just in so far as this grass is its food. Hence, other individual things which have no relation to its own actions or passions it does not apprehend at all by natural instinct. For the purpose of natural instinct in animals is to direct them in their actions and passions, so as to seek and avoid things according to the requirements of their nature.

TEXT

418a26–418b26

BOOK II, CHAPTER VII

SIGHT. ITS OBJECT

That of which there is sight is the visible; and the visible is colour, and also something which, ,though it has no name, we can state descriptively. It will be evident what we mean when we have gone further into the matter. § 399

For the visible is colour, and it is this of which visibility is predicated essentially; not, however, by definition, but because :it has in itself the cause of being visible. For every colour is a motivating force upon the actually transparent: this is its very nature. Hence nothing, is visible without light; but by light each and every colour can be seen. Wherefore, we must first decide what light is. §§ 400-3

There is, accordingly, something transparent. By transparent I mean that which is, indeed, visible, yet not of itself, or absolutely, but by virtue of concomitant colour. Air and water and many solids are such. But transparency does not depend on either air or water as such, but on the same quality being found in both, and in the eternal sphere above as well. § 404

Light is the act of this transparency, as such: but in potency this [transparency] is also darkness. Now, light is a kind of colour of the transparent, in so far as this is actualised by fire or something similar to the celestial body; which contains indeed something of one and the same nature as fire. § 405

We have then indicated what the transparent is, and what light is; that light is not fire or any bodily thing, nor any emanation from a body—[if it were this last,] it would be a sort of body, and so be fire or the presence of something similar in the transparent. § 406

For it is impossible for two bodies to exist in the same place at the same time. § 407

Light seems to be the contrary of darkness; and the latter is the privation of this quality in the transparent. So it is plain that the presence of this is light. § 408

Empedocles (or anyone else who may have said the same) was wrong when he said that light was borne along and extended between the earth and its envelope, unperceived by us. This is in contradiction alike to sound reasoning and to appearance. Such a thing might happen unobserved over a small space: but that it should remain unnoticed from the, east to the west is a very extravagant postulate. §§ 409-26

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FOURTEEN

§ 399. Having distinguished the proper sense-objects from the common, and from those that are sensible incidentally, the Philosopher now treats of the proper object of each sense: first of the proper object of sight; then, at ‘Now let us start’, of that of hearing; then, at ‘It is not so easy’, of that of smell; then, at ‘The tasteable’, of that of taste; and lastly, at ‘The same reasoning holds’, of that of touch.

As to sight, he discusses, first, its object, and then, at ‘At present what is clear’, how this object comes to be seen. Touching the object of sight, he does two things. First, he determines what is the visible, dividing it into two. secondly, he deals with either visible, at ‘For the visible is colour’. He says then, first, that, the proper sense-object being that which each sense perceives of itself exclusively, the sense-object of which the special recipient is sight is the visible. Now in the visible two things are included; for both colour is a visible, and also something else, which can be described in speech, but has no proper name; which visible belongs to things which can be seen by night, such as glow-worms and certain fungi on oak-trees and the like, concerning which the course of this treatise will inform us more clearly as we gain a deeper understanding of the visible; but we have to start from colour which is the more obvious visible.

§ 400. Then, at ‘For the visible’, he begins to define both objects of sight: first colour and then, at ‘Not all visible things’,” that of which he says that it has no proper name. As to colour he does two things: first, he shows what colour has to do with visibility; secondly, at ‘There is, accordingly, something transparent’ he settles what is required for colour to be seen.

First of all, then, he says that, colour being visible, it is visible of itself, for colour as such is essentially visible.

§ 401. ‘Essentially’ is said in two ways. In one way, when the predicate of a proposition falls within the definition of the subject, e.g. ‘man is an animal’; for animal enters into the definition of man. And since that which falls within the definition of anything is in some way the cause of it, in cases such as these the predicate is said to be the cause of the subject. In another way, on the contrary, when the subject of the proposition falls within the definition of the predicate, as when it is said that a nose is snub, or a number is even; for snubness is nothing but a quality of a nose, and evenness of a number which can be halved; and in these cases the subject is a cause of the predicate.

§ 402. Now colour is essentially visible in this second manner, not in the first; for visibility is a quality, as being snub is a quality of a nose. And this is why he says that colour is visible ‘essentially’, but ‘not by definition’; that is to say, not because visibility is placed in its definition, but because it possesses of itself the reason why it should be visible, as a subject possesses in itself the reason for its own peculiar qualities.

§ 403. Which he proves by this, that every colour as such is able to affect what is actually diaphanous. The diaphanous is the same as the transparent (e.g. air or water), and colour has it in its nature to actualise further an actual transparency. And from this, that it affects the actually transparent, it is visible; whence it follows that colour is of its nature visible. And since the transparent is brought to its act only by light, it follows that colour is not visible without light. And therefore before explaining how colour is seen, we must discuss light.

§ 404. Then, at ‘There is, accordingly’, he discusses those things without which colour cannot be seen, namely the transparent and light; and this in three sections. First, he explains the transparent. Secondly, at ‘Light is’, he treats of the transparent’s actuality, i.e. light. Thirdly, he shows how the transparent is receptive of colour, at ‘Now that only can receive colour’.

To begin with, therefore, he says that if colour is that which of its nature affects the transparent, the latter must be, and in fact is, that which has no intrinsic colour to make ie visible of itself, but is receptive of colour from without in a way which renders it somehow visible. Examples of the transparent are air and water and many solid bodies, such as certain jewels and glass. Now, whereas other accidents pertaining to the elements or to bodies constituted from them, are in these bodies on account of the nature of those elements (such as heat and cold, weight and lightness, etc.), transparency does not belong to the nature of air or water as such, but is consequent upon some quality common, not only to air and water, which are corruptible bodies, but also to the celestial bodies, which are perpetual and incorruptible. For at least some of the celestial bodies are manifestly transparent. We should not be able to see the fixed stars of the eighth sphere unless the lower spheres of the planets were transparent or diaphanous. Hence it is evident that to be transparent is not a property consequent on the nature of air or water, but of some more generic nature, in which the cause of transparency is to be found, as we shall see later.

§ 405. Next, at ‘Light etc.’, he explains light, first stating the truth, then dismissing an error. He says, to begin with, that light is the act of the transparent as such. For it is evident that neither air nor water nor anything of that sort is actually transparent unless it is luminous. Of itself the transparent is in potency to both light and darkness (the latter being a privation of light) as primary matter is in potency both to form and the privation of form. Now light is to the transparent as colour is to a body of definite dimensions: each is the act and form of that which receives it. And on this account he says that light is the colour, as it were, of the transparent, in virtue of which the transparent is made actually so by some light-giving body, such as fire, or anything else of that kind, or by a celestial body. For to be full of light and to communicate it is common to fire and to celestial bodies, just as to be diaphanous is common to air and water and the celestial bodies.

§ 406. Then, at ‘We have then indicated’ he rejects a false opinion on light; and this in two stages. First, he shows that light is not a body; then he refutes an objection brought against the arguments which prove that fight is not a body, at ‘Empedocles... was wrong’. As to the first point he does three things.

(a) He states his own view, saying that, once it is clear what the transparent is, and what light is, it is evident that light is neither fire (as some have said, positing three kinds of fire, the combustible, and flame, and light); nor a body at all, or anything flowing from a body, as Democritus supposed, asserting that light consisted of atomic particles emanating from luminous bodies. If there were these emanations from bodies, they would themselves be bodies, or something corporeal, and light would thus be nothing other than fire, or something material of that sort, present in the diaphanous; which is the same'as to say that light is a body or an emanation from a body.

§ 407. (b) At 'For it is impossible', he proves his own hypothesis thus. It is impossible for two bodies to be in one place at one time. If therefore light were a body, it could not co-exist with a diaphanous body; but this is false; therefore light is not a body.

§ 408. (c) At 'Light seems' he shows that light does co-exist with the diaphanous body. For contraries exist in one and the same subject. But light and darkness are contraries in the manner in which a quality and its privation are contraries, as is stated in the Metaphysics, Book X. Obviously, darkness is a privation of this quality, i.e. of light in the diaphanous body-which is therefore the subject of darkness. Hence tooethe presenct of this quality is light. Therefore light co-exists with the diaphanum.

§ 409. Then at 'Empedocles... was wrong' he refutes an answer to one argument which might be urged against those who hold that light is a body. For it is possible to argue thus against them: if light were a body, illumination ought to be a local motion of light passing through the transparent; but no local movement of any body can be sudden or instantaneous; therefore, illumination would be, not instantaneous but successive, according to this view.

§ 410. Of which the contrary is a fact of experience; for in the very instant in which a luminous body becomes present, the transparent it illuminated all at once, not part after part. So Empedocles, and all others of the same opinion, erred in saying that light was borne along by local motion, as a body is; and that it spread out successively through space, which is the medium between the earth and its envelope, i.e. the sky; and that this successive motion escapes our observation, so that the whole of space seems to us to be illuminated simultaneously.

§ 411. For this assertion is irrational. The illumination of the transparent simply and solely presupposes the placing of a luminous body over against the one illumined, with no intervening obstacle.

§ 412. Again, it contradicts appearances. One might indeed allow that successive local motion over a small space could escape our notice; but that a successive movement of light from the eastern to the western horizon should escape our notice is so great an improbability as to appear quite impossible.

§ 413. But as the subject matter under discussion is threefold, i.e. the nature of light, and of transparency, and the necessity of light for seeing, we must take these three questions one by one.

On the nature of light various opinions have been held. Some, as we have seen, held that light was a body; being led to this by certain expressions used in speaking of light. For instance, we are accustomed to say that a ray 'passes through' the air, that it is 'thrown back', that rays 'intersect', and so forth; which all seem to imply something corporeal.

§ 414. But this theory is groundless, as the arguments here adduced of Aristotle show, to which others might easily be added. Thus it is hard to see how a body could be suddenly multiplied over the whole hemisphere, or come into existence or vanish, as light does; nor how the mere intervention of an opaque body should extinguish light in any part of a transparent body if light, itself were a body. To speak of the motion or rebounding of light is to use metaphors, as when we speak of heat 'proceeding into' things that are being heated or being 'thrown back' when it meets an obstacle.

§ 415. Then there are those who mairitain, on the contrary, that light is spiritual in nature. Otherwise, they say, why should we use the term 'light' in speaking of intellectual things? For we say that intellectual things possess a certain intelligible 'light'. But this also is inadmissible.

§ 416. For it is impossible that any spiritual or intelligible nature should fall within the apprehension of the senses; whose power, being essentially embodied, cannot acquire knowledge of any but bodily things. But if anyone should say that there is a spiritual 'light' other than the light that is sense-perceived, we need not quarrel with him; so long as he admits that the light which is senseperceived is not spiritual in nature. For there is no reason why quite different things should not have the same name.

§ 417. The reason, in fact, why we employ ‘light’ and other words referring to vision in matters concerning the intellect is that the sense of sight has a special dignity; it is more spiritual and more subtle than any other sense. This is evident in two ways. First, from the object of sight. For objects fall under sight in virtue of properties which earthly bodies have in common with the heavenly bodies. On the other hand, touch is receptive of properties which are proper to the elements (such as heat and cold and the like); and taste and smell perceive properties that pertain to compound bodies, according as these aie variously compounded of heat and cold, moisture and dryness; sound, again, is due to local movement which, indeed, is also common to earthly and heavenly bodies, but which, in the case of the cause of sound; is a different kind of movement from that of the heavenly bodies, according to the opinion of Aristotle. Hence, from the very nature of the object it would appear that sight is the highest of the senses; with hearing nearest to it, and the others still more remote from its dignity.

§ 418. The same point will appear if we consider the way in which the sense of sight is exercised. In the other senses what is spiritual in their exercise is always accompanied by a material change. I mean by ‘material change’ what happens when a quality is received by a subject according to the material mode A the subject’s own existence, as e.g. when anything is cooled, or heated, or moved about in space; whereas by a ‘spiritual change’ I mean, here, what happens when the likeness of an object is received in the sense-organ, or in the medium between object and organ, as aform, causing knowledge, and not merely as a form in matter. For there is a difference between the mode of being which a sensible form has in the senses and that which it has in the thing sensed. Now in the case of touching and tasting (which is a kind of touching) it is clear that a material change occurs: the organ itself grows hot or cold by contact with a hot or cold object; there is not merely a spiritual change. So too the exercise of smell involves a sort of vaporous exhalation; and that of sound involves movement in space. But seeing involves only a spiritual change-hence its maximum spirituahty; with hearing as the next in this order. These two senses are therefore the most spiritual, and are the only ones under our control. Hence the use we make of what refers to them—and especially of what refers to sight—in speaking of intellectual objects and operations.

§ 419. Then again some have simply identified light with the manifestation of colour. But this is patently untrue in the case of things that shine by night, their colour, nevertheless, remaining obscure.

§ 420. Others, on the other hand, have said that light was the substantial form of the sum, and that the brightness proceeding therefrom (in the form of colours in the air) had the sort of being that belongs to objects causing knowledge as such. But both these propositions are false. The former, because no substantial form is in and of itself an object of sense perception; it can only be intellectually apprehended. And if it is said that what the sense sees in the sun is not light itself but the splendour of light, we need not dispute about names, provided only it be granted that what we call light, i.e. the sight-perceived thing, is not a substantial form. And the latter proposition too is false; because whatever simply has the being of a thing causing knowledge does not, as such, cause material chanee; but the rays from the heavenly bodies do in fact materially affect all things on earth. Hence our own conclusion is that, just as the corporeal elements have certain active qualities through which they affect things materially, so light is the active quality of the heavenly bodies; by their light these bodies are active; and this light is in the third species of quality, like heat.

§ 421. But it differs from heat in this: that light is a quality of the primary change-effecting body, which has no contrary: therefore light has no contrary: whereas there, is a contrary to heat. And because there is no positive contrary to light, there is no place for a contrary disposition in its recipient: therefore, too, its matter, i.e. the transparent body, is always as such immediately disposed to its form. That is why illumination occurs instantaneously, whereas what can become hot only becomes so by degrees. Now this participation or effect of light in a diaphanum is called ‘luminosity’. And if it comes about in a direct line to the lightened body, it is called a ‘ray’; but if it is caused by the reflection of a ray upon a light-receiving body, it is called ‘splendour’. But luminosity is the common name for every effect of light in the diaphanum.

§ 422. So much being admitted as to the nature of light, we can easily understand why certain bodies are always actually lucent, whilst others are diaphanous, and others opaque. Because light is a quality of the primary change-effecting body, which is the most perfect and least material of bodies, those among other bodies which are the most formal and the most mobile to actualisation are always actually lucent; and the next in this order are diaphanous; whilst those that are extremely material, being neither luminous of themselves nor receptive of light, are opaque. One may see this in the elements: fire is lucent by nature, though its light does not appear except in other things. Air and water, being more material, are diaphanous; whilst earth, the most material of all, is opaque.

§ 423. With regard to the third point (the necessity of light for seeing), note that it has been the opinion of some that not merely seeing, but the object of seeing, i.e. colour as such, presupposed the presence of light; that colour as such had no power to affect a transparent medium; that it does this only through light. An indication of this was, they said, that one who stands in the shadow can see what is in the light, but one who stands in the light cannot see what is -in shadow. The cause of this fact, they said, lay in a correspondence between sight and its object: as seeing is a single act, so it must bear on an object formally single; which would not be the case if colour were visible of itself—not in virtue of light—and light also were visible of itself.

§ 424. Now this view is clearly contrary to what Aristotle says here, ‘and... has in itself the cause of being visible’; hence, following his opinion, I say that light is necessary for seeing, not because of colour, in diat it actualises colours (which some say are in only potency so long as they are in darkness), but because of the transparent medium which light renders actual, as the text states.

§ 425. And in proof of this, note that every form is, as such, a principle of effects resembling itself colour, being a form, has therefore of itself the power to impress its likeness on the medium. But note also that there is this difference between the form with a complete, and the form with an incomplete, power to act, that the former is able not merely to impress its likeness on matter, but even to dispose matter to fit it for this likeness; which is beyond the power of the latter. Now the active power of colour is of the latter sort; for it is, in fact, only a kind of light somehow dimmed by admixture of opaque matter. Hence it lacks the power to render the medium fully disposed to receive colour; but this pure light can do.

§ 426. Whence it is also clear that, as light is, in a certain way, the very substance of colour, all visible objects as such share in the same nature:, nor does colour require to be made visible by some other, extrinsic, light. That colours in light are visible to one standing in the shade is due to the medium’s having been sufficiently illumined.

TEXT

418b2–419b27

BOOK II, CHAPTER VII, CONTINUED

SIGHT. HOW COLOUR IS SEEN

Now that only can receive colour which has none, as only that which is soundless, can receive sound. What is without colour is the transparent and the invisible, or what is barely seen, being dark. The transparent is precisely of this nature when it is not in act, but in potency. For the same substance is sometimes dark, sometimes light. §§ 427-8

Not all visible things, however, are visible in light, but only the colour proper to each. There are certain things which are, indeed, not seen in light, but which produce a sensation in darkness, such as those which burn or are luminous. These are not called by any one term. Such are the fungi of certain trees, horn, fish-heads, scales, and eyes. But the colour proper to each of these is not perceived. Why these things are thus seen is matter for another enquiry. §§ 429-30

At present what is dear is that what is seen in light is colour; [and that] therefore it is not seen without light. For to be colour is to be able to move the transparent into act; and this act of the transparent is light. A plain proof whereof is that if one places on the sight itself a coloured object, it is not seen. But colour moves the transparent medium (say, air); and the sensitive organ is moved by this extended continuum. §§ 43 1-2

Democritus. put forward the erroneous opinion that if the medium were a vacuum, perception would be everywhere exact, even of an ant in the sky. This is, however, impossible; for only when the sensitive faculty is affected does vision occur. This cannot, however, be effected by the colour seen, in itself. It must therefore be due to the medium. If there were a vacuum, a thing, so far from being perceived clearly, would not be seen at all. We have stated, then, why it is necessary that colour be seen in light. §§ 433-5

But fire is seen in both darkness and light: necessarily, for the transparent is made light by it. § 436

The same account holds for both sound and smell. No sensation is produced when either of these touches the organ: but a medium is affected by sound and smell, and the sense organ of one or the other sense by the medium. But if one places an object that sounds or smells upon the sense-organ itself, no sensation occurs. The same holds good of touch and taste, although this is not obvious. The reason for this will be made clear later. § 437

The medium of sound is air; that of smell has no special name. For as there is a common quality for colour, to wit, the transparent, in air and water, so there is a common quality in them for smell. For it seems that aquatic animals possess a sense of smell. But man, and whatever living things breathe, are unable to smell except when breathing. The cause of this will be dealt with later. § 438

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FIFTEEN

§ 427. After treating of colour and the transparent medium and luminosity, the Philosopher now proceeds to explain how the medium is related to colour. It is clear, from the foregoing, that the transparent medium is receptive of colour; for colour, we have seen, acts upon it. Now what is receptive of colour must itself be colourless, as what receives sound must be soundless; for nothing receives what it already has. The transparent medium is therefore colourless.

§ 428. But, as bodies are visible by their colours, the transparent medium must itself be invisible. Yet since one and the same power apprehends contrary qualities, it follows that sight, which apprehends light, also apprehends darkness. Hence, although the transparent medium of itself possesses neither light nor colour, being receptive of both, and is thus not of itself visible in the way that things bright or coloured are visible, it can, all the same, be called visible in the same sort of way as dark things and scarcely visible things are so called. The diaphahum is therefore a kind of darkness, so long as it is not actually but only potentially transparent: the same thing is the subject, sometimes of darkness, sometimes of light. Thus the diaphanum, while it lacks luminosity and is only potentially transparent, is in a state of darkness.

§ 429. Then at ‘Not all’, having decided about colour, which is made visible by light, he reaches a conclusion about that other visible object of which he said above that it had no proper name. He observes that not all things depend on light for being seen, but only the colour that is proper to each particular thing. Some things, e.g. certain animals that appear fiery and lucent in the dark, are not visible in the light, but only in darkness. There are many such things, including the fungi of oaks, the horn of certain beasts and heads of certain fish, and some animals’ scales and eyes. But while all these things are visible in the dark, the colour proper to each is not seen in the dark. The things are seen both in light and in darkness; but in darkness only as bright objects, in light as coloured objects.

§ 430. The reason why they are seen shining in the darkness is another matter. Aristotle only mentions the fact incidentally, in order to show the relation of the visible to luminosity. This, however, seems to be the reason for their being visible in the dark, that such things have in their constitution something of light, inasmuch as the brightness of fire and the transparency of air and water is not entirely smothered in them by the opacity of earth. But having only a small amount of light, their brightness is obscured in the presence of a greater light. Hence in the light they appear not as bright, but only as coloured. The light in their constitution is so weak that it is unable perfectly to actualise the potentially transparent medium to receive the full effect of the colours which by nature it is fitted to receive. Hence, by this light neither their own colour, nor that of other things, is seen: but only their brightness. For brightness, being a more effective agent upon the medium than colour, and in itself more visible, can be seen with less alteration of the medium than colour requires.

§ 431. Next, at ‘At present what is clear’, he explains how colour actually affects sight, first pointing out what this necessarily presupposes, and then, at ‘The same account holds’, indicating a like necessary condition in the case of the other senses. As to the forffier point, he first decides what is the truth of the matter, and then at ‘Democritus etc.’, sets aside an error. First, then, he says that we are now clear that what is seen in light is colour, and that colour is invisible without light; and this because, as has been explained, colour of its nature acts upon a transparent medium, and it does this in,virtue of fight, which is the latter’s actuality. Hence light is necessary if colour is to be seen.

§ 432. An indication of this is the fact that if a coloured body is placed upon the organ of sight it cannot be seen; for then there remains no transparent medium to be affected by the colour. The pupil of the eye is indeed some such medium, but, so long as the coloured body remains placed upon it, it lacks actual transparency. There has to be a medium, say air or something of the kind, which, being actualised by colour, itself acts upon the organ of sight as upon a body continuous with itself For bodies only affect one another through actual contact.

§ 433. Then at ‘Democrituis etc.’, he sets aside an erroneous view. Democritus, he says, was wrong in thinking that if the medium between the eye and the thing seen were a vacuum, any object, however small, would be visible at any distance, e.g. an ant in the sky. This cannot be. For if anything is to be seen it must actually affect the organ of sight. Now it has been shown that this organ as such is not affected by an immediate object—such as an object placed upon the eye. So there must be a medium between organ and object. But a vacuum is not a medium; it cannot receive or transmit effects from the object. Hence through a vacuum nothing would be seen at all.

§ 434. Democritus went wrong because he thought that the reason why distance diminishes visibility was that the medium is of itself an impediment to the action of the visible object upon sight. But it is not so. The transparent medium as such is not in the least incompatible with luminosity or colour; on the contrary, it is proximately disposed to their reception; a sign of which is that it is illumined or coloured instantaneously. The real reason why distance diminishes visibility, is that everything seen is seen within the angle of a triangle, or rather pyramid, whose base is the object seen and apex in the eye that sees.

§ 435. It makes no difference whether seeing takes place by a movement from the eye outwards, so that the lines enclosing the triangle or pyramid run from the eye to the object, or e converso, so long as seeing does involve this triangular or pyramidal figure; which is necessary because, since the object is larger than the pupil of the eye, its effect upon the medium has to be scaled down gradually until it reaches the eye. And, obviously, the longer are the sides of a triangle or pyramid the smaller is the angle at the apex, provided that the base remains the same. The further away, then, is the object, the less does it appear—until at a certain distance it cannot be seen at all.

§ 436. Next, at ‘But fire’, he explains how fire and bright bodies are seen—which are visible not only, like coloured objects, in the light, but even in the dark. There is a necessary reason for this, namely that fire contains enough light to actualise perfectly the transparent medium, so that both itself and other things become visible. Nor does its light fade out in the presence of a greater light, as does that of the objects mentioned above.

§ 437. Then, at ‘The same account’, he shows how the case of the other senses is similar to sight. No sound or odour, e.g., is perceived if there is immediate contact with the organ in question. There must be a medium affected by sound or odour, which itself then. affects our sense of hearing or of smell. A sounding or odorous body placed upon the organ is not perceived as such. The same is true even of touch and taste, though, for a reason to be given later, this is less evident.

§ 438. Finally, at ‘The medium of sound’ he states what is the medium in hearing and smelling. That of hearing is air, and that of smelling is something common to air and water—just as both of these provide a medium for colour in so far as each is a transparency. There is indeed no name for the quality in air and water which provides the medium for odour; but it certainly is not transparency. And that both air and water are conductors of smell he shows from the fact that marine animals have a sense of smell. Man, however, and other animals that walk and breathe, only smell by breathing; which proves that air is the medium of smell. This fact will be explained later.

TEXT

419b3-419b33

BOOK II, CHAPTER VIII

SOUND. ITS CAUSES. ECHO

Now let us start by treating of sound and hearing. Sound is twofold: the sort that is actual, and the sort that is potential. For certain things, we say, have no sound, such as sponges, wool and fur; while others, such as bronze and all other smooth and hard things, have sound, because they are able to produce it, i.e. to cause actual sound in the medium and in the hearing. §§ 439-41

Sound in act is always of something, on something, in something: for it is caused by percussion. Hence it is impossible for anything by itself, as a single thing, to produce sound. For there must be one thing that strikes and another that is struck; hence whatever enlits sound does so 'on something'. i.e. by contact with something—which, when touched with a blow, sounds. And the blow necessarily implies movement. § 442

As we said before, it is not a blow upon anything whatever that gives sound: wool makes no sound, although it be struck; but bronze, or anything smooth and hollow, is such. Bronze because it is smooth; whilst hollow things by repercussion produce many 'blows' after the first, since what is set in motion cannot find an outlet. § 443-4

Further: sound is heard in air and water, but less in water. It is, however, neither air nor water that, properly, sounds; there must be a percussion of solid objects on each other, and on air. This happens if air is confined when struck, and cannot disperse. Hence if the striking is rapid and violent sound results. For the movement of what strikes must be sudden, if it is to out-run the breaking-up of the air; just as if one were to strike a rapidly-moving heap of sand or pile of stones. §§ 445-6

Echo arises when air rebounds like a ball against air rendered a compact unity by a restraining vessel that prevents its dispersion. §§ 447-9

It seems there is always some echo, but not always a clear one. For the same occurs with sound as with light; which also is always, reflected: otherwise it would not spread to every part, but beyond the area illuminated by the sun there would be darkness. Still, it is not [always] reflected as it is reflected by water or bronze or other smooth things; hence it makes the shadow by which we discern the boundaries of light.

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SIXTEEN

§ 439. Having disposed of the visible, the Philosopher now deals with the audible, that is, withsound. This section divides into two parts. In the first he deals with sound in general. In the second he deals with one kind of sound, namely voice, at 'Voice' etc. The first part is again divided into two 'arts. First, he deals with sound itself; then with difference of sound, at 'Differences in sonorous things'. The former part again subdivides. First, he reaches a conclusion on sound; then he raises a doubt about this conclusion, at 'is it that which strikes'. The former of these sections again divides into two conclusions, the first on the origin of sound, and the second on the way that sound affects the hearing, at 'Empty space'.

Should it be asked why he now raises the question of the origin of sound, whereas he did not deal with the production of colour, but only with colour's effects on sense-organ and medium, the, answer is that colour and odour and taste and the tangible qualities have a fixed and permanent existence in their subjects. The consideration therefore of these qualities in themselves is one thing, and that of the way they affect the senses is another. The two questions are quite distinct. So the Philosopher deals with the origin of colour, taste and smell in his work De Sensu et Sensato; and with that of tangible qualities in the De Generatione, and in part also in the Meteorologica; whilst in the present book he is only considermig the objects of sensation in so far as they affect the sense-organs. But as sound is caused by change and has no fixed and stable existence in a subject, but actually consists in a movement or change, therefore it can be considered at one and the same time in its objective origin and in its effect on the senses. Its origin, then, is regarded under two aspects: first he deals with the primary origin of sound; and then, at ‘Echo arises’, with its secondary origin, produced by reverberation. As to the primary origin, he first explains that sound is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency; after which he shows how sound comes to be in act, at ‘Sound in act’.

§ 440. He says, then, first that, before dealing with touch and taste, we must consider sound and smell; but first sound, because it is more spiritual, as has been shown. We speak of sound in two ways: as in act and as in potency. We say a thing has a sound when it is actually sounding, and also when it is only able to make sounds; as when we say, ‘this bell sounds well’, though it may not be actually ringing. In the same way we say of some things that they have no sound, meaning that they have no power to produce sound, e.g. sponges and similar soft objects; whereas other things, on the contrary, are said to sound because they are especially apt to produce sound, such as bronze, and other smooth and even materials. So it is clear that sound is sometimes spoken of as potential, and sometimes as actual.

§ 441. But the actuality of sound involves the medium and the faculty of hearing. For we can speak of a sense-object as actual in two ways: (1) So far as the object is actually being sensed, i.e. when its likeness is affecting the sense-organ. In this way a sound is actual when it is heard. (2) So far as the object actually is such that it can be sensed, but is such simply in its own objective being, outside the senses. And in this way the other sense-objects, colour, odour, savour, etc., exist actually in coloured or odorous or savourable bodies. But not so sound; for in a sound-productive body there is sound only potentially: actual sound exists only when the medium is affected by a disturbance from that body. Therefore the act of sound exists, he says, in the medium and in the hearing, but not in the audible body.

§ 442. Then at ‘Sound in act’, Aristotle shows how sound actually comes about: first with regard to the number of factors required for sound to come into act; and then, at ‘As we said before’, with regard to what these factors are. First then, there are three concurrent factors in sound: Sound is ofsomething, on something, in something. Therefore no single thing by itself can produce sound—the reason (or sign) of this being that the cause of sound is percussion, which implies a thing struck and a striker. Hence his saying ‘of something, on something’, i.e. of the thing striking and on the thing struck. What produces sound must touch something as with a sudden blow. Now a blow implies local movement, which implies a medium. Hence the need for a medium, if sound is to be produced actually. Hence his saying, ‘in something’.

§ 443. When he says ‘As we said before’, he shows what sort of factors produce sound. And first he shows of what sort must the striking and the struck objects be; and then, at ‘Further etc.’ what sort of thing the medium must be. First, then, as we have already noted, sound is not produced by striking any material body whatever. Wool and sponges and suchlike soft things cannot give out sound even when struck; the reason being that soft things yield to the impact, so that no air is expelled by it-no air in which a sound might be formed by the blow of a striker and the resistance of something struck. Yet when such soft things are compressed firmly enough to resist an impact, then a sound results, though only a dull one. But bronze objects, and bodies that are smooth and concave, give out sound when struck. Hardness is needed; else air will not be driven out by the blow, and consequently no sound be caused. And the body struck should also be smooth, so that the air expelled may hold compactly together in one, as will be explained below.

§ 444. Hollow bodies give out sound very well, when struck, because they hold the air in, and, as this air first set in motion cannot at once come out, it disturbs the rest of the air, and thus by repercussion the impact and the sounding are multiplied. For this reason also materials with a suitable disposition of air in their composition are especially sonorous, such as bronze and silver; but materials in which air is less well disposed are less sonorous, like lead and such things as are more earthy and sedimentary.

§ 445. Then, at ‘Further: sound is heard’, he explains the medium in which sound is produced: observing that the medium of sound is air or water, but water less than air. The most suitable medium for both the production and the reception of sound is air. And since the medium of any sense must lack all the sensible qualides perceived by that sense, if it is to serve as the receiver of them, it is evident that neither air nor water has a sound of its own; but if sound is to be produced in air or water some firm and solid and hard objects must strike upon one another, and so cause an impact on the air.

§ 446. Now if the impact of solid bodies upon one another is to be simultaneous with the production of sound in the air, it is necessary that the air remain a whole and continuous, that it be not broke up before receiving the effect of the impact. Hence it is, as experience shows that when two bodies are brought slowly together no sound occurs: for the air recedes and melts away before the contact is made. But if the impact is swift and violent, then a sound results; for if sound is to occur, the movement of what strikes must precede the division of the air, so that the air can be struck while still en bloc, or collected, and so a sound be produced in it. It is as when one strikes swiftly with a whip, hitting a whole heap of stones all at once, before they fall apart. For the same reason, when anything passes rapidly through the air, it makes a noise as it goes, because the air itself, being compact, serves as the object struck, not merely as the medium.

§ 447. Next, at ‘Echo arises’, he deals with the secondary production of sound, which is by reverberation. This sound is called echo. He settles, first, how echo itself is produced; and then, at ‘It seems’, how its varieties occur. With regard to the former point, we may note that the production of sound in air follows the movement of air, as has been said. What takes place in the air when sound is produced is like what happens in water when something is thrown into it. Obviously, circular undulations form in the water where it is hit; and these are small around the point of striking, but with a strong movement; whilst further away the undulations are large and the movement is weak. Ultimately, the movement disappears altogether and the undulations cease. But if the undulations meet an obstacle before they cease moving a contrary wave-movement is set up, so much the more violent as it is closer to the original impact.

§ 448. Now, in a similar way, when sounding bodies strike together the air is moved in a circular motion and the sound diffused in all directions. Near to the impact the air-circles are small, but are moving swiftly. Hence, there the sound will be very distinctly heard. Further away the circles are larger and the sound is less distinct; and at length it ceases altogether. But if, before the circles vanish, the air so moving and so carrying sound, is repulsed from some body, the undulations return on their tracks and a new sound comes in the reverse direction. And this is called ‘echo’.

§ 449. This effect is realised most perfectly when the obstacle in question is concave, for then it acts like a vessel that holds the air together in its own unity, preventing its dispersal. For then the moving air, thus held together and unable to move further because of the obstacle, is thrown back on the air behind and a reverse movement begins-just as when a ball thrown against an obstacle rebounds.

§ 450. Then, where he says ‘It seems’, he explains how echo occurs in various ways, saying that there would seem to be always some echo produced, but it is not always definite, i.e. clearly perceptible. This he shows by a simile drawn from light. Light, he says, is always reflected; but sometimes the reflection is perceptible, sometimes not. The reflection of light is visible when it comes from a shining body; for then the reflection is accompanied by some brightness, as was the original emission of light. The reflection is not visible when it comes from an opaque body, for then it takes place with no brightness or radiance. Yet unless the sun’s rays were reflected by opaque bodies there would be no light at all in the air of any part of the upper hemisphere, but instead only darkness everywhere away from the sun, i.e. outside the places reached by the solar rays directly. But light is not reflected by opaque bodies in the same way as by water or air or any of the smooth and polished bodies which throw back light brightly and radiantly. The reflection from opaque bodies is ‘dark’, that is to say, it forms the shadow extending outside the limit of the clear light of the solar rays. So also, then, when the repercussion of sound takes place in a concave body, wherein sound cannot but be multiplied, a clear and distinctly perceptible echo results. But when the repercussion of sound is from other bodies which do not naturally redouble it, there is no perceptible echo.

TEXT

419b33-420b5

BOOK II, CHAPTER VIII, CONTINUED

HEARING. ITS MEDIUM. HIGH AND LOW SOUNDS

Empty syace is rightly said to be necessary for hearing,—for by that is meant air which, when moved as a simple continuum, causes hearing. On account of its ‘instability, however, it gives no sound unless what is struck be smooth; then it has the required unity, holding together on account of the even surface, for the surface of a smooth thing is uniform. The sonorous, therefore, is that which moves a compact mass of air continuous as far as the organ of hearing. §§ 451-452

Hearing is naturally conjoined with air; and because it is in air, therefore by amovement in the air outside is caused an interior movement also. Hence an animal does not hear all over its body, nor does air pass through every member. For the animate body and the part to be set in motion have not air throughout (as [also liquid is only in the eyeball]). § 453

Of itself air is soundless; for, being mobile, it easily yields. But when its motion cannot be diffused a sound arises. There is air, built into the ears, so as to be immobile; and it accordingly registers every variety of motion with exactitude. § 454

On this account therefore we hear also in water, for this does not penetrate to that inner air, nor, by reason of its many convolutions, into the ear. Should it do so, one would not hear; nor if the eardrum were ailing—just as we do not see if the cornea of the pupil is diseased. §§ 455-7

A test of good hearing on the contrary is whether there is a continual ringing in the ear, like a horn. For then the air in the ear is perpetually moving by a motion ofits own; whereas sound is from without, and is not the ear's own. And for this reason they say that we hear by a "resounding vacuum" because we hear by what holds air in constraint. § 458

Is it that which strikes, or that which is struck, which sounds? Or both, but in different ways? For sound is a movement of something that can move in the way that a bouncing body flies off a smooth surface one flings it at. As has been said, not everything that strikes or is struck gives a sound, for instance one needle struck against another. But what is struck must have a plane surface smooth and regular so that the air rebound and be set in motion instantaneously. §§ 459-60

Differences in sonorous things are apparent in the actu sounding. For just as colours are not seen without light, so there is no high or low note apart from sounding. § 461

These terms are used by metaphor from things perceived by touch. § 462

A high note moves the sense-organ much in a brief space of time; the low note, little, in a longer time. § 463

But this does not mean that the fast is the high and the slow the low; rather, the former arises because of swiftness of motion, the latter because of slowness. § 464

So there seems to be an analogy with the tangible, as sharp and blunt. For the 'sharp' pierces, while the 'blunt' thuds; and the reason is that the one moves in a brief period, the other in a greater. Hence it comes about that the former is swift, the latter slow.

Let this serve to define sound. § 465

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SEVENTEEN

§ 451. After deciding about the origin of sound the Philosopher now comes to certain conclusions about sound's impression on sense: and first, at 'Hearing' is etc., about its eftect on the senseorgan. First, then, he observes that, the medium of sound being air, it has been rightly said that the vacuum was an essential factor in hearing (for those who said this thought that 'the vacuum' was air). Now when air is disturbed it makes sound audible, provided that it is a single continuum such that a sound can be formed in it. For if sound is to be produced it requires a singleness and continuity in the air; therefore no sound occurs unless the sounding thing that is struck be smooth. A thing is smooth if no part of it juts out from the rest. A smooth surface, then, is a simple unity, upon which the air too exists in a single and uniform way. it is otherwise if the body in question has a rough surface; and since air is ‘unstable’, that is, easily broken up, it follows that neither will the air be a continuous unity, and therefore that no sound will be formed in it.

§ 452. It is clear then that nothing sounds, i.e. produces sound, unless it sets in motion a single continuum of air between itself and the hearing. It follows that those who said that the ‘vacuum’ was adapted to the sense of hearing said something to the point; for to be adapted to hearing is a property of air, which they called a vacuum. But they were not right in using the term ‘vacuum’ for that which is really full of air.

§ 453. Then, when he says ‘Hearing is naturally conjoined’, he concludes about the impression made on hearing by sound, so far as the organ is concerned. And he does three things here. First, he shows that air is adapted to the organ of hearing: secondly, he shows what sort of air this is (at ‘Of itself air’), and thirdly, he shows how hearing may or may not be obstructed by an impediment in the organ (at ‘On this account therefore’).

First, then, he says that hearing has a natural congruity with air; air is adapted to the organ of hearing as watery fluid to the organ of sight. And this because, air pertaining to the organ of hearing, the same effect of sound can exist in the moving air both inside and outside the organ—the air inside acting as the instrument of hearing. This is why hearing does not occur in every part of the body, nor the sounding air produce a sound in, or penetrate into, every part of the animate body. The latter has not air in each of its parts so that any part might be set in motion by sound; in the same way as the living body has a certain watery fluid only in one special part (the pupil of the eye), not everywhere.

§ 454. Then, at ‘Of itself air’, he shows what sort of air is instrumental in hearing. And he says that everything that sounds is by nature resistant to percussion. Obviously air is not of itself a sounding material, for it does not by nature resist what strikes it, but rather yields easily. However, its yielding or diffusion can be prevented by a solid body, and then the movement of the air gives out a sound. For we have seen that, for the production of sound, two solids must strike against each other and against air. But the air proper to hearing is ‘built into’, or firmly set in, the ears with a certain stillness, in order that the animal may perceive distinctly every one of its movements. For, as the watery matter in the pupil lacks colour in order to take in all differences of colour, so must the air in the tympanum of the ear lack motion that it may discern every difference bf sound.

§ 455. Next, at ‘On this account’, he shows how hearing may be hindered by an impediment in the organ. He states two impediments, according to the two conditions which, he says, are necessary to the organ of hearing. Of these, the first is air, and the second that this air be still. The first impediment, then, will be any elimination of the air. It follows therefore that hearing can take place in water, provided that the water does not penetrate to that special air which, as he says, is ‘built into’ the ear. But in fact water does not enter into the ear at all; because of the spirals which prevent its entry.

§ 456. But if water should happen to penetrate to this inner air, the animal would cease to hear, because the air needed for hearing would then have been eliminated; just as sight is prevented if the aqueous matter of the pupil is destroyed by the entry of some alien body. And not only is hearing impeded by the loss of this air, but also ‘if the ear-drum’, that is, the skin enclosing this air, or some adjoining portion, ‘is ailing’; just as in the case of sight, when the cornea of the pupil which holds the aqueous matter of the eye is injured.

§ 457. Now, certain books maintain that we do not hear in water. This is contrary to what has been said here (that we hear both in air and in water) and also to what the Philosopher says in the Historia Animalium, that animals hear in water. For though the water does not penetrate to the interior air, it can set it in motion, and thus impress upon it some sort of sound.

§ 458. He states the second impediment to hearing at ‘A test of good hearing’. This impediment would come from a lack of stability in the air of the inner ear: so he says that a sign of one’s good or bad hearing is whether one continually hears a ringing in the ear, like the sound heard when a horn is held up to the ear; which sound is due to the movement of air in the horn. One in this condition has poor hearing, for the air in his ears is continually moving by a motion of its own. Each sound ought to be adventitious to the organ of hearing, not intrinsic; just as the organ of sight should receive each colour from without, having none of its own. If it has any of its own, sight is impeded. And in the same way, if the air in the ear has a motion and sound ofits own, hearing is impeded. And it is because hearing thus comes about through air that some (thinking that air is a vacuum), say that we hear through a resounding vacuum; and indeed the organ by which we hear has its own special, motionless air, quite distinct from the air outside.

§ 459. Then, at ‘Is it that which strikes’ he raises a question about the origin of sound: whether the active cause of sound is the thing that strikes or that which is struck. He concludes that both are causes, though in different ways; because as sound follows upon motion, whatever is an efficient cause of motion is so also of sound. Sound originates in the movement with which a thing striking rebounds from the resistance of the thing struck; just as ‘bouncing’ or resilient bodies rebound from hard smooth objects, when one impels them violently against the latter. Clearly then the thing striking is a cause of movement; and also the object struck, inasmuch as it makes the latter rebound: and thus both are efficient causes of the motion.

§ 460. And, because to produce sound it is necessary that there be a rebound from a struck thing’s resistance, consequently not everything that strikes or is struck gives out sound (as was said to begin with): e.g. if one needle is struck against another. To produce sound what is struck must be ‘smooth’, that is, so disposed that the air spreads and moves at once when the thing struck resists. Such a movement will cause sound.

§ 461. Then, at ‘Differences’, he examines the differences of sounds. First, he shows how these differences are perceived; and secondly, how they are named (at ‘These terms are used’). He says first, then, that different things produce different sounds. But these varieties in sounding bodies’ capacity to produce sound are only manifested in act, not in potency. For as colours are not perceived without light, so high or low tones are not perceived until a sound is actual.

§ 462. Then, where he says ‘These terms are used’, he shows how differences of sound are named. And he does four things here. First, he states whence the names of sounds are taken, saying that they are taken by metaphor from tangible qualities; for obviously high and low are reckoned as tangible qualities.

§ 463. Next, at ‘A high note moves’, he explains these names, saying that a sound is ‘high’ which moves the sense of hearing much in a short time: while a ‘low’ sound is one which moves it little in a longer time.

§ 464. Thirdly, at ‘But this does not mean’, since the above descriptions would seem to apply to the fast and the slow (the fast being that which in a short time moves much, the slow that which in much time moves little), he shows how the high and low in sounds are related to the fast and slow in motions. The fast, he says, is not the same as the high-toned, nor the low-toned the same as the slow, any more than sound, differentiated by the high and the low, is the same as movement, differentiated by the fast and the slow. But, as movement causes sound, so speed of movement is the cause ofhigh tones, and slowness oflow; in the case of sounds caused by a single movement. But when sound is produced by many movements, it is frequency of movements that causes the high tones, whilst their slowness causes the low, as Boethius says in the De Musica. Hence the tauter is a string, the higher is its note; because at a single stroke it vibrates more frequently.

§ 465. Fourthly, at ‘So there seems to be’, he likens differences of sounds to the tangible qualities from which they are named: observing that these qualities do resemble the sharp or flat in sounds; for the high note ‘pierces’ the hearing, in that it disturbs it quickly; whilst the low tone ‘thuds’ on it, so to speak, because it takes a longer time to disturb it. So the one takes place rapidly, the other slowly. Concluding, he says that he has sufficiently examined sound.

TEXT

420b5–42a6

BOOK II, CHAPTER VIII, CONTINUED

VOICE

Voice is the sound of a living thing. No inanimate being utters voice, though, by analogy, the flute and the harp are said to ‘speak’; and so, too, other inanimate objects which sound with duration, harmony and significance. The resemblance arises from voice also having these qualities. §§ 466-9

Many animals have no voice, such as the bloodless, and, among those with blood, fish. And this is reasonable if, in fact, sound is a movement. But the fish that are said to have voice, such as those in the Achelous, make a sound through their gills, or in some other such way. §§ 470-1

Voice is a sound made by an animal, but not from any part of its frame. Since all things sound by something striking another in a medium. (which is air), it is reasonable that those only will have voice which inhale air. § 472

For Nature employs air, inhaled for two operations; as it does the tongue for both taste and speech; of which one, taste, is a necessity; whence it exists in more species; while the other, self-expression, is for well-being. So with breath: it [regulates] interior heat—and this is necessary to existence (the reason for this will be stated elsewhere); and it also serves voice, which is for well-being. § 473

Now the organ of respiration is the windpipe, and the purpose of this organ is to serve the lungs. Quadrupeds have more heat in this part than in others, so respiration is needed, and first of all around the heart. Hence it is necessary that air enter when [an animal] draws breath. Hence a striking by the soul (in these parts) upon air inhaled through the windpipe is voice. § 476

For not every animal sound is voice, as. we have said; there is clicking the tongue, and the noise made by coughing. There is needed a living being to utter the sound, and some accompanying phantasm. For voice is a significant sound; not that (merely) of air respired, as coughing is; rather, with it the air in the windpipe is struck against the windpipe. § 477

A sign of this is that we cannot produce voice while inhaling air nor while exhaling it, but only while retaining it. For what holds the air also sets it in motion. It is thus clear why fish have no voice; for they have no windpipe. They lack this member because they do not inhale air or breathe. Those who say otherwise are wrong. The cause of this, however, is another question. § 478

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO EIGHTEEN

§ 466. After discussing sound the Philosopher deals with voice which is a kind of sound. His treatment divides into two parts: first, he gives certain facts preliminary to a definition of voice; which he then defines, at 'Hence a striking'. In the former part he does.two things. First, he points out what things have voice: and secondly, what is the particular organ of voice, at 'Voice is a sound'. The former division subdivides: first, he shows that only animate beings have voice, and then states which of these have it, at 'Many animals'.

First, then, he observes that voice is a kind of sound,—the sound of the living being; and not of any, but of certain species, as will be explained later.

§ 467. No inanimate thing has a voice. And if sometimes such are said to have voice, this is by way of similitude, as when we speak of the voice of flutes and lyres and suchlike instruments. There are three respects in which the sounds made by these are comparable to voice. The first is prolongation; for while the sound of 'inanimate bodies is produced by a simple percussion, which is no sooner ended than the sound quickly passes away without continuing, voice, on the contrary, is produced by a percussion of air in the windpipe (as will be explained later), which can be maintained by the soul according to its desire, and so be prolonged and continued. The instruments mentioned above have, then, some likeness to voice in the relatively prolonged character of their sounds.

§ 468. The second respect in which they resemble voice is melody. The sound of an inanimate body, since it arises from simple percussion, is uniform, with no variations of high and low pitch; and therefore without harmony. But in voice the percussions occur differently according to the varying feelings of the animal that is producing it; hence it is diversified by high and low pitch. And something like this occurs in the melodies produced by the said instruments.

§ 469. The third resemblance their sounds bear to voice consists in a certain likeness to speech in the way these sounds are co-ordinated. Human speech is not a continuous sound (hence in the Predicaments it is counted as a species of 'discrete quantity'). Speech is divided into words, and words into syllables—and this by the separate percussions made upon air by the soul. In a similar way the said instruments, by means of separate strokes or breathings, etc., produce sounds successively.

§. 470. Next, at 'Many animals", he points out which animated beings have voice. Even many animals, he says, have none. These are the bloodless animals, of which there are the four genera enumerated in the De Animalibus, namely: the 'soft-bodied', having soft flesh externally, such as cuttlefish and molluscs; those with a soft shell, like crabs; those with a hard shell, like oysters; and those with anular bodies, like bees, ants, and so forth. None of these have voice.

§ 471. And even some sanguineous animals lack voice-namely fish. This is natural enough if sound is a movement of the air (as we have seen); for animals of this sort do not breathe air, and therefore produce no sound which could be their voice. And if it is asserted that certain fish, like those in the Achelous (the name of a river), have a voice, this is not true properly speaking; they merely make a sound with the gills by which they expel water and draw in air, or perhaps with some other moving instrument.

§ 472. Then, at 'Voice is a sound made by an animal', he points out the organ of voice. First, he shows that the organ of voice is the same as that of respiration. Secondly, he explains the use of respiration, at 'For Nature employs’. Thirdly, he shows what is the organ of respiration, at ‘Now the organ’.

He observes first, then, that, while voice is an animal sound, not any sound ofany part of the animal is voice. And since the production of sound requires the striking of something against something in something (i.e. in the air) it is understandable why those animals only have a voice which take in air by respiration, and that they have voice in the part through which they breathe.

§ 473. Then, at ‘For Nature employs air’, he says that Nature uses air inhaled for two operations, as it uses the tongue for both tasting and speech. Of these two last activities, tasting is a necessity, since by it the animal discerns the nutriment that maintains it in mere existence (which is why taste is found in most animals). But the expression of meaiiing by means of speech is for the sake of a more complete existence. In a similar way, Nature uses inhaled air both for the mitigation of natural heat, which is simply necessary (the cause of this is given in the De Respiratione et Expiratione) and also for the production of voice, which is for a more complete existence.

§ 474. Next, at ‘Now the organ of respiration’ he says that this organ is the windpipe, the function of which is to serve the lungs by enabling them to draw in air. It is necessary that air be taken into the lungs because animals that can move about have more heat in this part than in others. The lungs are connected with the heart, wherein lies the source of the natural warmth of the body; consequently the parts around the heart need to be cooled; and this is done by respiration.

§ 475. These parts he says need to be cooled ‘first’, either because the lungs come first after the heart as being next to it, or because the heart comes first among the animal’s parts, both in origin and in the process of causing movement: which is why it is necessary that air enter the lungs to cool the heart’s natural heat. Or indeed the comparison may be between ‘this part’ in animals that move upon feet, and the same parts in other animals. For it is clear that animals with blood have more natural heat than those without; and among those with blood, fishes have the least; which is why neither bloodless animals nor fishes breathe, as has been said.

§ 476. Then, at ‘Hence a striking’, he draws from the foregoing observations a definition of voice; first stating the definition and then, at

‘For not every animal’, explaining it. First, then, he says that, since voice. is the sound of the animate being, proceeding from the part through which it breathes air (for every sound implies some striking on air), it follows that voice is a striking upon air breathed in through the windpipe; which striking is caused by the soul as animating these parts, but especially the heart. For while the soul exists everywhere in the body of an animal (as its form), yet its motive power is principally in the heart. Note that he is defining in terms of the’cause of the thing defined; for voice is not in fact the striking itself, but a sound made by striking.

§ 477. Next, at ‘For not every animal sound’, he explains the definition with regard to his assertions (1) that the vocal impact came from the soul; and(2) that its material is breath, at ‘A sign of this’. Three factors have entered into his definition of voice: that which impels, i.e. the soul; that which is impelled, i.e. the air respired; and that in which the vocal impact occurs, i.e. the windpipe. The third of these he has explained above; So there remain the first two. He observes, then, first, that, as he has said, not every animal sound is a voice. Sometimes the tongue makes sounds which are not voice. Again, coughing is not voice. For voice to be produced it is required that what strikes the air should be something alive, or with a soul, and also, accompanying this, that an image be present which is meant to signify something. For voice must be a significant sound,—significant either by nature or conventionally. Hence the statement that vocal impact proceeds from the soul; for operations proceeding from imagination can be said to be from the soul. It is clear, then, that voice is not the mere impact bf breath such as occurs in coughing; and that the principal cause of the production of voice is the soul, using this air, i.e. air inhaled, to force against the windpipe the air within it. Not air, then, is the principal factor in the formation of voice, but the soul, which uses air as its instrument.

§ 478. Then, at ‘A sign of this’, he explains the other element in his definition, namely that voice is the impact of breath, saying that there are two signs of this. One sign is that no animal can produce voice either while inhaling air, or while expelling it, but only while it retains air; because while it retains air, this air, being withheld and striking against the air in the windpipe, causes a movement that results in voice. Another sign is that fishes have no voice; for they have no windpipe or vocal passage, and this because they neither inhale nor exhale air. Those who say that fishes breathe are mistaken; but why they do not breathe is another matter, belonging to the science which deals with the particular attributes of animals.

TEXT

421a6–421b7

BOOK II, CHAPTER IX

SMELL. ITS OBJECT

It is not so easy to come to conclusions about odour and the odorous as about the sense-objects already discussed. What odour is is less obvious than what sound is, or the visible or light; the reason being that our sense of smell lacks precision; it is inferior to that of many animals. For man smells but feebly, discerning nothing odorous save with some special pleasure or disgust, as though our organ for the perception of smells were defective. It is arguable indeed that, as hard-eyed animals see colour, yet so that delicate diffirences are not sharply defined to them, except as these cause fear or not, so are smells to the human species. §§ 479-80

For it seems that while smell has an analogy with taste, and the species of savour with odours, yet we have a sharper perception of taste, because this is a sort of touch,—the sense which man possesses to the highest degree of precision. Whereas in the other senses he is inferior to many animals, by touch he can discriminate with exactness far beyond the rest of the animal world. Hence man is the most sagacious of animals. A sign of this is that within the human race, men are gifted or not intellectually in virtue of this sense, and of no other. For coarse-bodied people are mentally inert, whilst the tenderly-fleshed are quick of understanding. §§ 481-6

As some flavours are sweet, some bitter, so with odours. But some things are analogously endowed with savour and odour: I mean, have a pleasant taste and pleasant smell. In others, however, these qualities are contrary.

Likewise odours are pungent, harsh, sharp or oily: but since, as we have said, odours are not very distinct, whereas flavours are, they take their names from the latter, according to resemblance. For a sweet smell comes from saffron and honey: a pungent smell from thyme; and so in other cases. §§ 487-9

Furthermore, as hearing (and the same obtains in each of the senses) bears on the audible and the inaudible (and sight on the visible and the invisible), so smell is of the odorous and the odourless. The odourless is either that which simply cannot have a smell at all, or that which has smell but a poor one and feeble in quality. The same can be said of the tasteless. § 490

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO NINETEEN

§ 479. Having dealt with the visible and the audible, the Philosopher now considers smell and its object. His treatment has two parts: he first examines this object as such, and then at 'Smelling also' the manner in which it impinges upon the sense. And as to the object as such, having considered it in itself, he turns, at 'Furthermore, as hearing' to consider a certain odourless object which falls within the range of smell. The former consideration again subdivides: first, he shows the difficulty of reaching defirifte conclusions about smell; secondly, he explains how we can come to know about the odorous, at 'For it seems that smell has an analogy'.

First then he observes that it is harder to reach conclusions about smell and its object than about the sense-objects discussed hitherto, the audible and the visible. For whit odour is is not as clear to us as what sound is, or the visible, or light, or other things of that sort.

§ 480. The reason, he says, is that our sense of smell is not so strong that we can distinctly and unerringly discern its object; for this stnse is weaker in us than in many other animals; the reason being that, as the sense-organ corresponds to the sense-object, and as smell is produced by the warm and dry, therefore a good organ of smell will be predominantly a warm, dry organ. Now the brain of man, close to which lies the organ of smell, is, as the Philosopher says in the De Animalibus, larger in proportion to his body than that of any other animal; and since the brain itself is cold and moist, the human sense of smell is proportionately the less. Man smells weakly—indeed only what is strongly odorous and causes pleasure or disgust; and this because his sense of smell is lacking in a keen and exact discernment of its object. Hence one may reasonably opine that human beings stand with respect to odours in the same case as hard-eyed animals, such as locusts and certain types of fish stand with respect to colours; for these animals, on account of their weak vision and ill-disposed organs, see only what is very obviously visible and as such is apt to frighten them, or the contrary.

§ 481. Then at ‘For it seems that’, he shows how differences of odour are made known to us. First, he shows how differences of odour are brought home to us by comparison with differences of taste. Secondly, he shows how differences of odour correspond to differences of taste, at ‘As some flavours’.

First, then, he remarks that the sense of smell in. man seems to have some relation and correspondence to taste; and, likewise, the varieties of flavour (i.e. savour) to those of odour. Now things hidden become known through what is more evident. Since, then, the varieties of flavour are clearly evident to us, those of smell, which are not so, but which have a certain affinity to those of flavour, are brought home to us through this resemblance.

§ 482. Now the varieties of flavour are especially evident to us because man has a more acute sense of taste than other animals, taste being a modality of touch and touch being possessed by man at a far higher degree of precision than by any other animal; although in respect of the other senses man falls short of some animals. For certain animals see and hear and smell better than man: but the touch of man is far superior to that of other animals in exactitude of apprehension.

§ 483. This pre-eminence of touch in man is the reason why man is the wisest of animals; moreover, among men it is in virtue of fineness of touch, and not of any other sense, that we discriminate the mentally gifted from the rest. Those whose bodily constitution is tough, and whose sense of touch is therefore poor, are slow of intellect; whilst those of a delicately balanced constitution with, in consequence, a fine sense of touch are mentally acute. This too is why the other animals have flesh of a coarser texture than man.

§ 484. Yet it might seem that mental capacity corresponded rather to excellence of sight than of touch, for sight is the more spiritual sense, and reveals better the differences between things. Still, there are two reasons for maintaining that excellence of mind is proportionate to fineness of touch. In the first place touch is the basis of sensitivity as a whole; for obviously the organ of touch pervades the whole body, so that the organ of each of the other senses is also an organ of touch, and the sense of touch by itself constitutes a being as sensitive. Therefore the finer one’s sense of touch, the better, strictly speaking, is one’s sensitive nature as a whole, and consequently the higher one’s intellectual capacity. For a fine sensitivity is a disposition to a fine intelligence. But an exceptionally good hearing or sight does not imply that the sensitivity as a whole is finer, but only that it is so in one respect.

§ 485. The other reason is that a fine touch is an effect of a good bodily constitution or temperament. For as the organ of touch is itself necessarily endowed with tangible qualities (being composed of the elements) it needs to be in a condition of potency to extremes of the tangible at least by itself constituting a mean between them. Now nobility of soul follows upon a well-balanced physical constitution; because forms are proportionate to their matter. It follows that those whose touch is delicate are so much the nobler in nature and the more intelligent.

§ 486. Another question that arises is why the differentiations of odour are named after those of taste, if it is touch that is the most exact of the senses. I answer that both the odorous and the tasty are caused to be so by some special combination of elemental qualities; consequently the former corresponds to the latter more than to the simple qualities which are the object of touch.

§ 487. Next, when he says ‘As some flavours are sweet etc.’, I he explains how the kinds of odour correspond to the kinds of flavour or taste, observing that as we distinguish these as sweet or bitter, so do we also with odours. But notice that, while some things reveal a harmony of flavour and odour, that is to say, they are sweet in both, others on the contrary have an agreeable flavour but a disagreeable smell, or the converse.

§ 488. The reason for this is that flavour pertains to an aqueous liquid partially digested; and odour to a dry gaseous matter partially modified by the surrounding atmosphere. Now it sometimes happens that both substances, the subtle gas and the grosser liquid, are each combined in a nice proportion; and then both odour and flavour are pleasing. But if in one this balance is found, and not in the other, then the one will be pleasing but the other not so.

And what has been said of sweet and bitter, the extremities in flavour, can be applied also to the sour, the pungent, i.e. astringent or harsh, the acid and the oily: these flavour-qualities can be transferred to the odorous.

§ 489. And although odours and flavours do not always and in all respects correspond, nevertheless because odours are, as I have said, only imperfectly distinct and evident, they are named after their resemblance to flavours; for on the whole there is a corresponaence. Thus saffron and honey have both a sweet taste and a sweet smell, and thyme and suchlike have a pungent taste and smell; and so with other flavours and odours.

§ 490. Then, at ‘Furthermore, as hearing’ he shows how odourless things are perceptible to smell. As hearing, he says, is of the audible and inaudible, and sight of the visible and invisible (because opposites are known by one and the same faculty, and a lack only by means of what is lacking), so smell is of the odorous and the odourless. There are two senses of the term odourless: it can mean what has no smell at all, such as all simple (i.e. uncompounded) bodies, or what has a little or a faint smell. And the same is true of the tasty and the tasteless.

TEXT

421b8–422a7

BOOK II, CHAPTER IX, CONTINUED

SMELL. HOW IT OCCURS

Smelling also takes place through a medium, which is either air or water. For aquatic animals seem also to perceive odours, both those with’blood and those without, like animals that live in the air; for some of them traverse long distances for their food, being drawn to it by smell. §§ 491-5

So there seems to be a difficulty. If operations of smell are of the same type, yet man smells by inhaling: when exhaling or holding his breath he smells nothing, neither from a distance, nor close at hand, not even if the object is placed inside the nose. (That a thing should be imperceptible when placed on the very organ of sensation, is indeed common to all, but to be unable to perceive without breathing is peculiar to man. This is evident to those who. make the experiment). Since then, bloodless animals do not breathe, they would seem to have some other sense besides those which have been spoken of. § 496

But this is impossible, if it is odour they perceive. For the sense for odours, good odours or bad, is smell. Furthermore, they seem to be overcome by the same strong odours as man, such as asphalt; brinitsone and the like. Therefore, even if they do not breathe, they must smell. §§ 497-8

Now this sense seems to differ as between man and other animals, as human eyes differ from the hard eyes of some animals. The former have a covering or protection, the eye-lids, and unless these are moved or withdrawn, one does not see. Hard-eyed animals have nothing like, this;

they see at once whatever happens to be present in the transparent medium. In the same way, then, the organ of smell is in some animals like an eye with no covering; in others, which inhale air, it has a covering that is withdrawn when they respire and so distend the veins and pores. And for this reason animals that breathe do not smell in water. For they must respire if they are to be affected by odour, and they cannot do this in a liquid. § 499

Odour is of dry things as savour of liquid; and the sense-organ of smell is such in potency. § 500

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWENTY

§ 491. After concluding about the odorous as such, the Philosopher now deals with its impact on the sense; and first, as to the medium; secondly, at 'Odour is of dry things', as to the organ of the sense of smell. As to the former point he does two things. First, he indicates the medium of the organ of smell; next, at 'So there seems to be a difficulty' he raises a question about the conclusion reached.

First then he observes that the organ of smell is affected by the odorous through a medium, i.e. air or water. That air is a medium of smell is obvious, for we smell through the air. So we need only prove that water is such a medium. This he shows by the fact that aquatic animals, and not only the sanguineous but the non-sanguineous also, perceive odours, like animals that live in the air. A sign of this is that some of them travel a long distance for their food, which could not happen unless they were attracted by smell—like vultures which are said to come long journeys to carrion: But just how smell is diffused to such a distance in space is not certain.

§ 492. An opinion which some have maintained should be noted here, that all sensation is consummated in a kind of touch: a contact, they said, must occur of sense and sense-object; but not in the same way in sight as in the other senses. For they said that from sight to the object seen certain 'visual lines' proceed; and that when these touch the object it is seen; whereas in the case of the other senses a reverse process takes place, and the sense-object comes to the faculty. This (they said) is particularly obvious in tasting and touching, which perceive by a sort of contact; and would seem to occur also in hearing, which implies a movement of air to the ear; and also in smelling;—for they maintained that odours are conveyed to the sense of smell by a kind of fume that bodies give off by evaporation.

§ 493. The cause of their drawing this distinction between two modes of sensation seems to have been that these early thinkers had no theory or perception of a spiritual modification of a medium, but only of a material one. Now a material modification of the medium is evident in all mediated sensations other than sight: for, obviously, odours and sounds are carried or impeded by the wind; which is certainly not the case with colour. Also, in one and the same section of air contrary colours can appear, as when one man sees white and another black at the same time and through the medium of the same air; which is not the case with odour, for contrary odours impede one another, even in the medium. Therefore, knowing nothing about the way the visible object affects the medium, these philosophers maintained that sight was conveyed to the thing seen; whereas, observing in other sensations the changes that took place in the medium, they believed that in these cases the sense-objects came to the sense.

§ 494. But it is clear that this cannot occur in smelling. When vultures smell carrion at a distance of fifty miles or more, this cannot be due to any bodily evaporation from the carrion being diffused over so great a space. This is the more evident if we consider that a sense-object affects its medium for the same distance in all directions, if not impeded. There would not be enough of the object to occupy so much space, even if the whole corpse were to evaporate; for there is a fixed limit of rarification for all natural bodies,—the rarity of fire; and in any case, and especially, the corpse can smell and be smelt in this way without being sensibly altered.

§ 495. We are therefore compelled to say that whatever gaseous vapour may come from an odorous substance, it does not reach as far as the point where the odour is perceived; but that beyond the point reached by this vapour the substance affects the medium ‘spiritually’. That such ‘spiritual’ modification of the medium is effected by the object of sight more than by that of the other senses is due to the fact that by their visible qualities corruptible bodies participate in the mode of being of incorruptible bodies; hence these qualities exist in a more formal and noble manner than do the other sense-objects which are proper to bodies precisely as corruptible.

§ 496. Then at ‘So there seems to be a difficulty’, he states a problem suggested by what he has been saying; bringing forward objections, first from one side and then, at ‘But this is impossible’ from the other; until, at ‘Now this sense seems’, he provides a solution.

First, then, he observes that it is doubtful whether all animals smell in the same way, as having identically the same sense of smell (aquatic animals, for instance, smell through water). It would seem not indeed. Man smells when he breathes in air, but when he is exhaling air or holding his breath he cannot smell at all either at a distance or close to the object, even if the latter is put into his nose. Now, that the object is imperceptible if it is placed right against the sense-organ is of course common to all the senses in all animals; but that odours are imperceptible without respiration is peculiar to man, as experience shows. And as non-sanguineous animals do not breathe, it would seem to follow that they had some sense other than smell and the other senses attributed to man.

§ 497. Then, at ‘But this is impossible, if it is odour that they perceive’, he adduces two arguments on the other side. (1) The senses are distinguished according to their objects; and since smell is the sense of odours, whether good or bad, and these are perceived both by the breathing and by the non-breathing animals, it follows that the sense of smell in man and these animals is the same.

§ 498. (2) The same things are destructive of the same senses: sight does not suffer from sounds nor hearing from colours. But the non-breathing animals seem to suffer in their senses from the same strong and oppressive odours as are grievous to man, e.g. from bitumen (a compound of thejuice of herbs), sulphur and the like. Hence other animals, even if they do not breathe, have a sense of smell like man.

§ 499. Next, at ‘Now this sense seems to differ’, he proposes his solution: this diversity in the mode of breathing is due, he says, not to a difference in the senses, but to different constitutions of the organ; the organ of smell in man being different from that it) other animals, as a man’s eyes differ from the hard eyes of certain beasts. The human eye has a protective covering or envelope called the eyelid, which must be withdrawn before a man can see. This is not the case with hard-eyed animals; they see at once whatever appears in the transparent medium. And so it is with non-breathing animals; their olfactory organ is uncovered; whereas that of breathing animals is covered over until the pores are dilated in the act of respiration. The latter therefore cannot smell through water; for they cannot breathe in it.

§ 500. Then at ‘Odour is etc.’, he indicates the organ of smell, saying that as the basis of odour is dryness (as that of taste is moisture) the organ of smell must be in potency to odour and dryness (as that of sight is to colours and light).

TEXT

422a8–422b17

BOOK II, CHAPTER X

TASTE. ITS MEDIUM, OBJECT, ORGAN, KINDS OF FLAVOUR

The tasteable is a sort of tangible; hence, it is not perceptible through an extraneous body as medium, any more than the object of touch. And the body in which is savour, i.e. the tasteable, is in liquid as its material, which is tangible. §§ 501-4

Hence, if we were in water, we should taste a sweet thing put into it; not that the sensation would then operate through a medium, but because the savour would be mixed with the water, as in a drink. (Colour, however, is not thus seen because of any mixture or efflux.) There is then nothing corresponding to a medium [in tasting]. As colour is the visible, so savour is the tasteable. §§ 505-7

It causes no sensation of taste except in liquid; but it must be moist, actually or potentially; as [with] saliva which is very liquid and moistens the tongue. § 508

As sight is of the visible and the invisible (for darkness is invisible, and sight discerns this also, as it does, in addition, the extremely bright, which is also invisible, but in quite another way); [and as] the same holds of hearing, which is of sound and silence, one being audible, the other inaudible, and [the latter includes] excess of sound, which is to hearing as brilliance is to sight; for as a feeble sound is in a way inaudible, so, in another way, is an extremely violent one. (‘Invisible’ indeed can mean either what is absolutely such, or [the term may also be used] as in other cases of ‘the impossible' where [this concept] is applied both to what lacks what it ought to have by nature, and to what has this defectively,—as we say of a footless [animal] that it is motionless.) So, in the same way, taste is of the savourable and the non-savourable, the latter being what has either only a faint savour, or one altogether destructive of the taste. It would seem that the principle of this is the drinkable or the non-drinkable; and taste is of both, but the latter as either a faint taste or one that destroys the sense: whilst the 'former is according to nature. The drinkable is common to taste and touch. §§ 509-11

Since what is tasteable is liquid, it is necessary that the sense-organ be neither liquid actually, nor incapable of becoming so. For taste is affected by the savourable thing as such. It is therefore necessary that the sensorium be moistened, yet in such a way that it keeps its potentiality thereto; the tasting sense being non-humid. § 512

There is a sign of this in that the tongue cannot perceive taste either when it is dry or when it is too moist. In the latter case contact takes place with the original moisture; as when one who has first tasted a very strong flavour then tastes another, or those burdened [with fever] taste all things as bitter because the tongue is saturated in a liquid of that sort. § 513

The species of savour are, like colours, the simple contraries; sweet and bitter. Adjoining these, however, are, with the former, the succulent, with the latter, the saline. Then there are the intermediary flavours: pungent, harsh, stringent and piquant. These seem to be about all the varieties of savour that exist; to which taste, as such, therefore, is in potency; the savourable being what reduces it to act. §§ 514-16

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWENTY-ONE

§ 501. Having dealt with the visible, the audible and the odorous, the Philosopher now treats of the tasteable; and this in two parts, first considering the tasteable in general, and then, at 'The species of savour', its division into flavours. As to the former point he does three things. First, he asks whether the tasteable is perceived through a medium; then he explains what is perceived by taste, i.e. the tasteable and the non-tasteable, at 'As sight etc.'; and thirdly, what is the organ of taste, at 'Since what is tasteable is liquid'. For he has explained these three points with regard to the other senses, namely the medium, the object sensed and the senseorgan. As regards the medium, he first shows that the tasteable is not perceived through any extraneous medium; then, at 'Hence, if we were in water', he answers an objection; and thirdly, at 'It causes no sensation', he shows us the necessary condition of actual tasting.

§ 502. First, then, he says that the tasteable is something tangible, i.e. discerned by touch. That is why it is not sensed through a medium extraneous to the body, i.e. which is not part of the living body—differing in this from the sense-objects hitherto treated of, which are perceived through air or water outside the animal's body. Touch does not perceive through an extraneous medium, but through one that is conjoined with the subject, i.e. through flesh, as we shall see. Therefore, as taste is a kind of touch, the tasteable is not perceived through any extraneous medium.

§ 503. That the tasteable is a sort of tangible he shows thus: flavour or savour exists in moisture as in the matter proper to it; and moisture is tangible.

§ 504. But if taste is a kind of touch, it would seem that it ought not to be placed in contrast to touch (for no species is opposed to its genus); and if so, then there are not five senses but only four. But, in truth, touch and taste can be considered in two ways: with regard to the mode ofperception, and thus taste is a kind of touch, for it apprehends by contact; and with regard to the object, and then we have to maintain that as the object of taste is to the object of touch, so the sense of taste is to the sense of touch. For flavour (the object of taste) is evidently not one of the qualities of those elemental bodies of which the animal is composed, which constitute the specific object of the sense of touch; yet it is caused by them, and exists in one of them as in its matter, i.e. in moisture. Clearly then, taste is not the same as touch, but is somehow founded on touch. So a distinction is commonly drawn between taste, as discriminative of flavours, and taste as a kind of touch discerning certain tangible qualities, namely those of nourishment, of which touch is the sense, as has been pointed out. Hence Aristotle's remark in the Ethics (Bk. III) that there is no such thing as temperance in the pleasures of taste understood in the former of these senses, but only as understood in the latter.

§ 505. Next, at ‘Hence, if we were in water’, he answers an objection. For it is obvious that if something tasty and soluble were placed in water (say, honey, or something of that kind) and we were in the water also, we would be aware of the thing’s flavour, even though at a distance from it. Taste, then, apparently perceives its object through an extraneous medium, water.

§ 506. To dispose, then, of this objection, Aristotle, arguing from the principle already stated, that taste does not use an extraneous medium, says that if we were in the water in the way described we should certainly perceive the sweet. thing in the water at a distance from us, but that the sensation would not in fact reach us through a medium; for the flavour would be mixed with the liquid as in a drink (as when honey or the like is mixed with water or wine) and the water itself would be affected by the sweet object. Taste then would not perceive the thing’s flavour at a distance except in so far as the water was affected by the thing.

§ 507. A sign of which is that the taste is not so strongly affected by such water as it naturally would be by the flavour of the thing that is at a distance, because the flavour is weakened by mixing with water. Colour, on the other hand, is not seen through its medium in such a way that the coloured body is mixed with the medium, or that anything from it flows to the eye, as Democritus supposed; it is seen rather through a spiritual modification of the medium. Hence, sight does not perceive colour as colour of the air or of water, but as colour of a distant coloured body, and to the same degree of intensity. Comparing, then, taste with sight, we cannot say that the medium of taste is like that of sight, but we can say that just as colour is the visible, i.e. the object of vision, so flavour is the tasteable, i.e. the object of taste.

§ 508. Then at ‘It causes no sensation of taste’, he shows what is required for taste in the place of a medium, observing that nothing tasty is tasted without moisture. As colour becomes actually visible in light, so flavour becomes actually tasteable in moisture; for which reason all that is tasteable is either actually liquid already, like wine, or is potentially liquid, like things taken as food. Hence the necessity of saliva in the mouth; being very liquid it moistens the palate, so that what is eaten may be liquefied and its savour perceived.

§ 509. Next, at ‘As sight is of the visible’, he treats of the object perceived by taste, comparing taste with sight and hearing. For sight perceives both the visible and the invisible, as has been said; the invisible being darkness, which is apprehended by sight. Also what is extremely bright, like the sun, is described as invisible, though in quite another way. For darkness is called invisible because of a lack of light, but brilliant objects on account of an excess of light which overcomes the sense. Similarly hearing is of the audible, i.e. sound, and of the inaudible, i.e. silence (the privation of sound) and also of the inaudible in the sense of what is heard with difficulty, either because of its excessive loudness or because it is too faint to affect the hearing sufficiently. And so it is with all things involving capacity and incapacity.

§ 510. For one can say of a thing that it is incapable, meaning either that it has not what it ought to have by nature, or that it has it only defectively, Thus an animal is described as unable to walk either because it lacks legs or because it is weak on its legs. And so it is with taste and the tasteable and non-tasteable. The latter means either what has little or poor flavour, or what is so violently flavoured as to overcome the sense.

As the tasteable pertains to moisture, i.e. the drinkable, and moisture is the basis of savour, it would appear that the drinkable and the non-drinkable are fundamental in the process of tasting. For taste perceives both, the one, i.e. the non-drinkable, as bad and destructive of taste, but the other, i.e. the drinkable, as appropriate and congenial to taste. Yet while the tasteable is perceived by taste, precisely as a sense distinct from touch, the drinkable and nondrinkable are perceived by it miasmuch as it is a species of touch. For the alrinkable is common to touch and taste, to touch in so far as it is hqu~id, to taste so far as it has savour.

§ 511. Obviously then, the pleasures afforded by food and drink, in so far as these are things perceptible and drinkable, accompany taste inasmuch as it is a kind of touch (see Book III of the Ethics).

§ 512. Then at ‘Since what is tasteable is liquid’ he examines the organ of taste, first stating the fact and then, at ‘There is a sign of this’, pointing out a sign of its truth.

First, then, he says that because the tasteable is liquid and has savour, the organ of taste must itself be neither actually moist nor actually flavoured. Yet it must be able to become moist—like the organ of sight, which must be colourless, but able to receive colour. This is because the taste is affected by the tasteable precisely as such, as any other sense by its proper object. Since then the tasteable as such is liquid, the organ of taste, in the act of receiving the savour, must become moist; and yet preserve its quality of being able to taste, when it is not actually, but only potentially, moist.

§ 513. Next, at ‘There is a sign’, he observes that an indication of the truth of the foregoing is that the tongue is able to taste nothing when it is either quite dry, or extremely liquid; for when it is excessively liquid through the presence and predominance of some liquid already tasted, then for the time being no new moisture can be tasted; as when after tasting a strong flavour one can taste nothing else, because the sensation of the former flavour remains on the tongue. Similarly to the ‘burdened’ or sick, all things taste bitter because their tongues are covered with a feverish or bitter moisture.

§ 54. Then at ‘The species of savour’ he concludes about the species of taste, observing that, as in the case of colour simple colours are contrary, such as white and black, so in flavours the simple are contrary, as the sweet and the bitter. Those ‘adjoining’, that is, those immediately following upon the simple species, are the succulent following on the sweet, and the salty following on the bitter. Intermediary are the sour, the pungent, the astringent and the acid, which two last are reducible to the same. To these seven species of flavour most of the others seem to be reducible.

§ 515. Note, with regard to these species, that whilst flavours are caused by the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, and although contraries connote terms furthest apart, yet the contraries in the species of flavour do not follow the maxillium differences of hot and cold or of moist and dry, but are related precisely to the natural capacity of the sense of taste to be affected by savour either to disgust or to delight. There is no need then for the sweet or the bitter to be particularly hot or cold or moist or dry, but much that it be in a state that corresponds somehow to the sense of taste. As for the origin of flavours, that is explained in the De Sensu et Sensato.

§ 50. He concludes, finally, that taste, i.e. the sense of taste, or its organ, is in potency to savour and the species of savour; and that the tasteable is.what can bring it into act.

TEXT

422b17–423a22

BOOK II, CHAPTER XI

TOUCH. ONE SENSE OR MANY? ITS MEDIUM

The same reasoning holds for the tangible and touch. If touch is not one sense, but several, then the tangible sense-objects must necessarily be several. But it is a problem whether it is one sense or several: and what the organ is—whether it is the flesh, or what corresponds to flesh in other [animals], or not; and if not, then this [flesh] would be the medium, while the primary sense organ would be something else within. §§ 517-18

For every sense seems to be of a single contrariety, as sight of white and black, hearing of high and low, taste of sweet and bitter. But in the tangible order there are several contrarieties, hot and cold, dry and wet, hard and soft, and the like. § 519

Here is a partial solution of this problem: that in other senses also there are several contraries; as in voice there is not only high and low but also loud and soft, smooth and rough, and other such qualities. There is also a like variety of differences in colour. § 520

But it is not clear what is the underlying unity of touch, as sound is of hearing. §§ 521-4

It is not evidence as to whether the sense-organ is interior or is the flesh, immediately, that the sensation arises simultaneously with contact. For if, as things are, one were to stretch a covering or membrane over the skin, a sensation would still arise immediately on making contact; yet it is obvious that the sense-organwas not in this membrane. And if it were ingrown the sensation would reach the sensorium even sooner. §§ 525-6

Therefore it appears that the relation of this part of the body [to the whole] is comparable to that which air would have if it formed a natural covering that grew all round our bodies. For then it would appear that we perceived sound and odour and colour through some one common medium, and even that there were but one sense for hearing, seeing and smelling. Since in fact, however, there exists something definite through which the motions [of these senses] are produced, it is evident that each of these senses is diverse. But in the case of touch, this is still far from clear. It is impossible that an animated body be constituted from air or water, for it must be solid. It can, then, only be a mixture from earth and the other elements, as flesh (or its counterpart) requires. Wherefore it is necessary that the medium of touch be a body conjoined [to the organism] through which its sensations, which are several, may come about. §§ 527-8

That they are several is proved by the fact that there is touch in the tongue; for that same member feels all kinds of tangible objects, as well as savours. If every part of the flesh perceived savours it would seem that touch and taste were one and the same. But we know that the are two, in that

one organ cannot be substituted for the other. § 529

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWENTY-TWO

§ 517. Having considered the objects of the other senses, the Philosopher finally treats of the object of touch, examining this ,sense last of all because it appears to be the least spiritual of the senses, though it is the foundation of all the others. This section divides into two parts: first he settles certain questions about touch; after which he states the truth about it, at ‘It would seem then in general’. The first part again divides into, first a statement, and, secondly, a solution, at ‘For every sense’, of the problems in question.

He observes then, first, that in the matters to be examined, the same reasoning holds whether we treat of the tangible or of touch. What is said of one holds good of the other; and if touch is not one sense but several, then the tangible must be, not one kind of sense-object, but several. This he says because, while his intention in general is to define the sense-object first, and after that the sense itself, in the case of touch he is going first to enquire into the sense; and this because the questions he wants to answer are more conveniently dealt with in this way than by treating first of the tangible object. So he prefaces his remarks with a kind of explanation, asserting that it does not matter whether we speak of the tangible or of touch.

§ 518. Of the two questions about touch and the tangible, the first is whether there are several senses of touch or only one; and the second is, what is the place or organ of feeling in touch? i.e. whether flesh is the touch-organ in animals that have flesh (which are those that have blood), and, in those that lack blood, something analogous to flesh; or, on the contrary, is flesh, or what corxesponds to flesh, merely the medium of the sense of touch, while its primary organ is something internal, close to the heart? The second opinion is the one maintained in the De Sensu et Sensato.

§ 519. Next, at ‘For every sense seems’, he begins to answer these questions. With regard to the first he does three things: (a) he gives an argument for the view that there are several senses of touch; (b) he presents a solution of the problem at ‘Here is a partial solution’; and (c) he criticises this solution at ‘But it is not’. The preliminary argument runs as follows: each single sense appears to bear upon a single pair of contraries, as sight upon white and black, hearing upon high and low, taste upon sweet and bitter; but included in the object of touch are several such pairs, hot and cold, moist and dry, hard and soft, and others of the same kind, besides heavy and light, sharp and blunt and so on. Therefore touch is not one sense, but several.

§ 520. Then, at ‘Here is etc.’, he gives what might seem to be a solution, saying that one might answer that even in the other senses there appear to be several contrarieties; e.g. in hearing; for in the voice one can observe not onlythe contrariety of high and low, but that also of loud and soft, rough and smooth, and the like. Similarly colour presents various differences besides the contrariety of black and white, as that one colour is intense, another dull, one beautiful, another ugly. Yet these facts do not mean that either vision or hearing is not a single sense; nor then need the tangible’s many contrarieties imply that touch is not a single sense.

§ 521. Then, at ‘But it is not clear’, he sets aside this solution, saying that all the contraries found in the audible have but one subject, sound; and so too with colour in the visible. But no common subject can be found of all the contraries connected with touch; hence there does not seem to be one genus of tangible, and one sense of touch.

§ 522. To understand this passage we must consider that there is a proportion involved in the distinction between potencies and objects: if a single sense is a single potency, the corresponding object must be a single genus. Now it is shown in the Metaphysics, Book X, that each genus includes one primary contrariety. Hence there must be one primary contrariety in the object of any one sense; and that is why the Philosopher says here that one sense is of one contrariety.

§ 523. However, it is possible for one genus to include several contrarieties beside the primary one, and this either by a process of subdivision—as in the genus body, the first contrariety is between animate and inanimate; and since animate bodies are divided into the sensitive and insensitive, and the sensitive yet again into rational and irrational, contrarieties multiply in the genus body;—or incidentally, as, to take the genus body again, we find the contrariety of white and black, not to mention all the other corporeal accidental qualities. It is thus therefore that we must understand, as regards sound and voice, that, besides the primary contrariety of high,and low, which is essential, there are other accidental contrarieties.

§ 524. Now in the genus of tangible things, there are several essential primary contrarieties, which can all in one way be reduced to a single subject, but in another way not; for in one way the subject of the contrariety can be found in the genus, which is related to the various contrary differences as potency to act. In another way the subject of the contraries can be found in the substance, which is itself the subject of the genus in which the contraries are included,—as when we call coloured body the subject of black or white. Speaking then of the subject which is the genus, it is plain that there is no one same subject of all tangible qualities. But speaking of the subject which is substance there is one subject of all these, i.e. the body that pertains to the substance of a given animal. And therefore Aristotle will say that tangible qualities belong to body precisely as body, i.e. they are the qualities by which the elements of body are distinguished from one another. For the sense of touch discriminates among the factors that combine to cowtitute the animal body. Hence, formally speaking and in the abstract, the sense of touch is not one sense, but several; but it is one substantially.

§ 525. Next, at ‘It is not evidence’, he deals with the second question; and this in two stages. First, he states the true answer; secondly, he comes to a conclusion that throws some light on the former question, at ‘Therefore it appears’. Note then, in the first place, that it might appear that flesh was the organ of sensation in touch, because we feel tangible things on the instant of contact.

§ 526. But, setting this argument aside, he remarks that to decide whether the organ of touch be interior or not (in the latter case the flesh would be the immediate organ of touch) it does not seem sufficient proof that, as soon as the flesh is touched, there occurs a tactual sensation, i.e. one feels; because if one were to extend a skin or tenuous web over the flesh the tangible would be felt immediately on contact with it; yet obviously the organ of touch would not be in the covering membrane. And again, if this web could become a part of one’s nature, one would feel all the sooner through it. Hence though at the touch of natural flesh the tangible is felt at once, still it does not follow that the flesh is the organ of touch, but only that it is a natural medium for it.

§ 527. Next, at ‘Therefore, it appears’ he comes to a conclusion that throws light on the first question, saying that, flesh being a medium adapted to the sense of touch, it would seem that this part of the body has the same sort of relation to sensation as the air around us would have if it were a natural part of us. For though this air is but the medium of sight, smell and hearing, it would appear in that case to be the organ of these senses; and thus it would seem to us that we saw and smelled and heard by a single organ and with a single sense. But in fact just because, as a medium for such sensations, it is ‘definite’. i.e. distinct from ourselves, we see clearly that it is not an organ. Moreover there are obviously diverse organs for the three senses aforesaid, and therefore a clear distinction of three senses. But it is not so clear in the case of touch; for here the medium is a natural part of us.

§ 528. And he gives a reason for this difference. Air and water, the media of the other senses, could not be a natural part of us, for a living body cannot be constituted of pure air or pure water. These substances, being watery and fluid, are not solid or definite by themselves; they need to be terminated by other things, whereas a living body must be solid and self-contained. Hence the latter needs to be composed of earth and air and water, as required, i.e. as flesh requires in animals that have flesh, and correspondingly for those that have it not. So the body which serves as the medium in touch, i.e. flesh, is able to be naturally conjoined or united with touch in such a way as to transmit the manifold sensations of touch.

§ 529. Then at ‘That they are several’, he states another fact in support of this. By the tongue also, he says, we obtain several tactile sensations; for by it we feel all the objects of touch that are felt in other parts of the body, and we feel, besides, the flavour or savour that is not perceived in other parts of the body. If the other parts of flesh perceived savours, we should not discriminate between taste and touch, just as we do not in fact discriminate between the touch that discerns hot and cold and that which discerns wet and dry. But it is quite clear that touch and taste are two senses, because they are not mutually transferable: taste does not occur in every part where touch can occur. And the reason why taste is not to be found wherever there is touch is that savours are not qualities of those elements which constitute the bodies of animals; hence they are not, like tangible qualities, of the very substance of an animal.

TEXT

423a23–424a15

BOOK II, CHAPTER XI, CONTINUED

THE MEDIUM OF TOUCH CONTINUED

ITS ORGAN AND OBJECT

A Problem arises, on the assumption that every body has depth, that is, the third dimension. Bodies having [between them] a medium which is a body cannot touch one another. Now every liquid involves body, and so does everything moistened; it must either be water or contain water. But things in contact with one another in water must necessarily have water as a medium covering their extremities, unless these last be dry. If this is true, it is impossible for one body to touch another in water. The same holds good of air (for air is to the things that are in it as water to things in water) although this fact is less evident to us, just as animals that live in water are unaware that bodies that touch in water are all wet. §§ 530-40

The question then is, whether there is one way of sensing for all objects of sense, or different ways for diverse objects. The latter at first sight seems to be the case,—taste and touch being effected by contact, the others from a distance. But this is not so: we perceive the hard and the soft through something intervening, just as we do the audible and the visible and the odorous. But of these objects, some operate at a distance, others close at hand. That is why the fact escapes us: we do perceive everything through a medium, but the fact is not evident in the latter cases. Indeed, as we said before, if we were to perceive all tangible objects through a membrane, not knowing what was interpolated, we should think we touched the objects themselves, as we now do in air and water: for in these cases we think we touch the objects and that there is no medium. §§ 541-2

But the tangible differs from the visible and the audible; for we perceive the latter in that the medium itself produces some effect in us; whereas the tangible does not affect us through the medium so much as with the medium, simultaneously, as when one is struck on a shield. For the shield does not strike its holder after it is itself struck; but the two are struck at once. §§ 543-4

It would seem in general that flesh and the tongue stand to the sense-organ presisely as water and air to sight and hearing and smell, each to its respective sense. When the sense organ is touched (as when one places a white object on the surface of the eye), no sensation is produced in either case. Hence the organ of the tangible is internal; for the same thing happens in this sense as in the others; what is placed on the organ they do not perceive. What, however, is placed on the flesh they do perceive; flesh, then, is the medium of touch. § 545

Tangible objects vary therefore with differences, of body as is such—I mean the differences by which the elements are distinguished,as hot and cold, wet and dry, as is stated in our work on the elements. The sense organ for these, the tactile, in which the sense called touch is principally lodged, is the part in potency to these qualities. For to perceive is to receive an impression. Hence whatever makes the organ to be such as itselfis actually, does so, the organ being in potency thereto. Hence we do not perceive what has heat, or cold or hardness or softness to an exact similitude of our own heat, and so forth, but rather the extremes of these: the sense being, as it were, in a mean state between the contrary extremes in the objects perceived; which is how it discriminates between them. For a mean is discriminative; in the presence of either extreme it becomes the contrary one. Hence, as whatever is to perceive black or white must have neither of these in itself actually, but both potentially (and so with the other sense-objects), so touch must be actually neither hot nor cold. §§ 546-8

Further: as sight is, in a way, of the visible and the invisible (and similary with the rest of such opposites), so touch is of both the tangible and the intangible. The intangible is that which has the distinguishing quality of tangibles to a very small extent,as air is affected; and also the excessively tangible, such as things destructive.

We have now said in outline something about each of the senses. §§ 549-50

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWENTY-THREE

§ 530. Having shown how the sense of touch requires a medium that is of the nature of the one who touches, the Philosopher goes on to ask whether it needs an extraneous medium. And his answer contains two points: first, he shows that touch does not occur without an, extraneous medium; next, at 'The question, then, is whether', he shows how touch and taste differ from other senses which perceive through an extraneous medium.

First, then, he remarks that in the case of touch one might doubt whether it has an extraneous medium, since we have seen that the medium of touch is a natural part of us. The doubt assumes that every body has depth, i.e. a third dimension. And indeed it is clear that every body has three dimensions, length, breadth and depth; whence it follows that whenever two bodies have another between them, the former bodies are not in direct contact; they must be divided by a dimension.

§ 531. It is also evident that wherever there is a liquid or wet medium, there must be a body of some sort. For wetness is a quality and must exist in a body as its subject. Either then it resides in a body essentially, and then there is a liquid., e.g. water; or it exists in virtue of some adventitious body, in which case there is something that is wet, i.e. having water either on its surface only, or on its surface and throughout as well; so he says that every humid or wet body must either be liquid or 'contain' liquid. Now it is clear that bodies which touch in water have water as a medium between them covering their outer surfaces—otherwise they would be dry in water, which is impossible; for whatever things are in water must be wet, in the sense that water covers their surfaces. Water, then, is the medium between two things touching in water; whence it follows that it is impossible that one body should touch another in water immediately. And the same holds good for air, which is a fluid like water.

§ 532. For the air flows round the things that are in the air as water around things which are in water; but it is much less noticeable to us that air is a medium of this kind than that water is, on account of our being continually in the air so that it envelops us imperceptibly. In the same way, animals that live in water are not aware that when two bodies touch one another their surfaces are wet; for, being habitually in water, they do not notice the water between them and the bodies they are touching. There is also this other reason why the fact is less evident to us in the case of air than water: that air is more subtle and less perceptible to sense. Whenever, then, we touch anything there is always a medium between ourselves and the thing touched, whether air or water.

§ 533. But a question suggests itself. The medium for any sense should be lacking in the sensible qualities perceived by it,—like the colourless diaphanum. But obviously air and water have tangible qualities; so it seems they cannot be the medium for touch.

§ 534. Averroes answers that we are not affected by pure air or pure water. Nothing is passively affected, he says, save by its opposite, in accordance with the principle of passivity; but air and water are not contrary to us, they are indeed akin to us, in the same way as place to what is located in it. Hence our touch is not affected by air and water, but by qualities extraneous to them. What tangible qualities are perceived in air and water are due to their combination with extraneous bodies. As fire never loses its heat, so water never loses the quality proper to water; and if we ever perceive heat, this is due to the admixture of some extraneous body.

§ 535. Now this reply contains several errors. First, it is false to assert that air and water do not affect our bodies, as being akin to these in the manner of a locality to what is placed in it. For, clearly, our bodies get their place in nature, as also their natural movement, from the element that predominates in them; and, consequently, are related to locality and material environment as elements located to elements locating. But contiguous elements mutually affect one another at the points of contact, as is shown in the Meteorologica, Book I. Our bodies therefore are naturally subject to the influence of the elements.

§ 536. Again, everything in potency is, as such, disposed to receive the influence of what is in act; and our bodies, being in a mean state between the extremes of the tangible qualities in the elements, are related to these qualities as potency to act. For, as we shall see, a mean is in potency to extremes. It is evident, then, that our bodies are disposed to be influenced by the elemental qualities, and to perceive them.

§ 537. This error of Averroes comes from his failing to distinguish between the elements as contrary to, and as akin to and containing (as the locality contains the located), one another.

§ 538. Note then that the elements can be considered in two ways: in one way, in terms of active and passive qualities, and in this sense they are contrary to one another and act upon one another at their points of contact; but in another way, in terms of their substantial forms derived from the influence of the heavenly bodies. Now the elements are formal in the degree that they are akin to the heavenly bodies; and since it is of the essence of form to have the character of an inclusive whole, it follows that a superior body as such contains its inferior, and stands to the latter as a whole to a part which, though a part, is yet a distinct being; which is precisely the relation of locality to the located. And therefore the function of locating and containing is derived to the elements from the primary locating principle, the heavenly body. Whence it follows too that localityand local motion pertain to the elements in virtue of their substantial forms, not of their active and passive qualities.

§ 539. Another error is this, that he says that air and water undergo no changes save by mixing with something extraneous. For it is evident that air and water are in some degree destructible; but destruction and, generation can take place in the elements without any mixing and yet involve change, as is proved in the De Generatione. Therefore, so long as water remains water, its natural quality can be changed without the admixture of anything extraneous. The case of fire is quite different; being the most formal and active of the elements, the rest are material in relation to it, as Aristotle says in Book IV of the Meteorologica.

§ 540. It may be said, then, that air and water are easily changeable by extraneous qualities, especially in small quantities such as the amount of air and water between two bodies that touch one another. This is why the sense of touch is not impeded by the medium of water or air. And, of the two, air is less an impediment than water, for its tangible qualities are scarcely perceptible at all. But an intensification of the tangible qualities of air or water, as when they become extremely hot or cold, does of course impede the sense of touch.

§ 541. Then, when he says ‘The question, etc.’, he shows the difference between touch and taste on the one hand, and the rest of the senses on the other: first rejecting a supposed ground of differentiation; secondly, stating the true difference, at ‘But the tangible differs.’ In the first place, then, he says that this question of the extraneous medium of touch leads one to ask whether the sensation of all sense objects occurs in the same way, or diversely for diverse objects—as, at first sight, it does seem that touch and taste perceive by immediate contact, whilst the other senses apprehend their objects at a distance.

§ 542. But this difference is illusory; we do in fact perceive the hard and the soft and other tangible qualities , ‘through something intervening’, an extraneous medium, like the objects of other senses, the audible, the visible and the odorous. But whilst the latter objects are sometimes a long way from the sense, the tasteable and tangible are so close that the medium is practically imperceptible and passes unnoticed. We perceive all sense-objects through an extraneous medium, but this is not noticeable in taste and touch; to repeat what we said before, if the medium of touch were a membrane that covered us without our noticing it, we should feel through a medium in a manner similar to the way we do actually feel in air or water. For as it is, we fancy we touch the sense objects themselves, and that there is no medium.

§ 543. Then at ‘But the tangible differs’, having rejected the false difference he states the true one, observing that tangible objects differ from visible and audible in that, whereas we perceive the latter because they set in motion the medium, and the medium in turn moves us, we perceive tangible objects, not because the medium has first moved us, but as being moved simultaneously with the medium, by the sense-object. It is as when a man is struck on his shield; the shield, being struck, does not then strike the man; man and shield are struck simultaneously.

§ 544. Nor is this simultaneity to be understood in the order of time only; for in sight the medium is affected by the visible and the eye by the medium, and yet sight occurs without succession in time. Smelling and hearing, however, take place with some temporal succession, as it is said in the De Sensu et Sensato. The succession is due to the way the cause of the action operates; for whereas in the other senses a change in the medium is itself the cause of the sense being affected, it is not so in touch; for in other sensations the medium is present of necessity, whilst it is only as it were an accidental accompaniment of touch, due to the fact, for example, that the bodies in contact are moist.

§ 545. Next, when he says ‘It would seem in general’, he concludes to the truth about the sense of touch: with regard (a) to the medium; (b) to the organ, at ‘Tangible objects vary’, and (c) to the object apprehended by this sense, at ‘Further: as sight etc.’ First, then, he observes that the flesh and the tongue seem to be related to the organ of touch as air and water to the organs of sight, hearing and smell. Now in none of these latter senses can sensation occur if the organ itself is touched; thus a white body placed on the surface of the eye is invisible. Whence it follows that the organ of touch is within; for this sense works in the same way as in others; and if animals can perceive sense-objects placed on their flesh, it is evident that if flesh is not precisely a sense-organ it is certainly a medium of sensation.

§ 546. Then, at ‘Tangible objects’, he explains the nature of the organ of touch. Tangible qualities, he says, are the differentiations of body precisely as body, i.e. those differences which diversify the elements, namely dry and wet, hot and cold, of which Aristotle treats in his work on the elements, the De Generatione et Corruptione.

§ 547. For it is clear that the organ of touch, wherein the sense called touch primarily resides, is a part of the body in potency to these differentiations. Every sense-organ is passive to its object, because sensation is a kind of receiving; if the sense-object, which is the agent in the operation, reduces the sense to a condition similar to itself, the sense was previously potentially such. This is why, in the degree that the organ of touch already actually has any quality, it does not perceive this quality. We do not feel a thing as hot or cold, hard or soft, in so far as these qualities are already present in the organ of touch; rather, we perceive such tangible qualities as exceed that mean state between contrasted tangibles in which this sense properly consists. For as a mean is potential to extremes, so the organ of touch can discern the extremes of tangible qualities. It can be affected by either extreme because, as compared with either, it has the nature of the other: e.g. as compared with heat the tepid is cool, but as compared with cold it is warm. Thus the mean is passive to both extremes, being in a way the opposite of each. As the organ that knows white and black has neither of these actually and both of them potentially (and the like is true of the other senses) so also is it, and nacessarily, in the sense of touch: its organ is neither hot nor cold, but in potency to both.

§ 548. But this occurs in a special way in touch. In sight, for instance, the organ in potency to black and white is quite free from both black and white, for it is quite colourless. But in the case of touch the organ cannot be completely deprived of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, for it is composed of elements having these qualities essentially. Rather, the organ of touch is in potency to its objects as a mean between extremes, potential to either extreme. Whence it follows that the closer an animal’s composition approaches the state of perfect balance, the finer will be its sense of touch; and that is why man, of all animals, has the finest touch, as we have seen.

§ 549. Next, at ‘Further: as sight’, he concludes about the object of touch. As sight, he says, is of the visible and invisible, and the other senses are also of opposites (as hearing of sound and silence), so touch is of both the tangible and the intangible. ‘Intangible’ is said in two ways: either of that which has a tangible quality to an excess which destroys the sense, like fire; or of that which has very slight tangibility, like air. Both are called intangible because both are hard to perceive by touch.

§ 550. Summing up, he says that he has treated ‘in outline’, that is, in a summary manner, of each of the several senses. For he deals with them more in detail in the De Sensu et Sensato.

TEXT

424a16–424b20

BOOK II, CHAPTER XII

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS ON SENSATION

It must be taken as a general rule that all sensation is the receiving of forms without matter, as wax receives a seal without the iron or gold of the signet-ring. It receives an imprint of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or bronze. Similarly the sense of any sense-object is acted upon by a thing having colour or flavour or sound; not, however, in respect of what each, is called as a particular thing, but in so far as each has a certain quality and according to its informing principle. §§ 551-4

The primary sensitive part is that in which a power of this sort resides. They [part and power] are indeed the same thing, but differ in mode of being. What receives sensation will be an extended magnitude, but neither being sensitive nor sensation is a magnitude. Each is, rather, a certain ratio and power of a magnitude. § 555

It is clear from these facts why the excess of sensible qualities destroys the sense-organs. For if the change is too violent for the sense-organ, the ratio [of the latter] is lost,—which [ratio] is the sense. It is as with tone and harmony when the strings are violently struck. Also it is plain why plants have no sensation, though they have some share in soul, and are affected by tangible objects to become hot or cold. The reason is that they lack a mean or principle of this kind, able to receive the forms of sense-objects; they are acted upon materially. §§ 556-7

It might be asked, is anything affected by odour if it cannot have the sense of smell—or by colour, if it is unable to see? And so in the other cases. § 558

But if what can be smelt is odour, whatever causes smell is odour.]. Hence things incapable of smelling cannot be affected by odour. The same argument holds for the other senses. And of subjects that can perceive, the ability belongs to them only in virtue of each being sensitive. § 559

The same is evident thus: neither light or darkness or sound or odour affect bodies; but only what they occur in does so; e.g. it is the air which accompanies thunder that smashes trees. § 560

But things tangible and savours do so affect things. If not, what is it that inanimate things are affected and changed by? § 561

Therefore, do not also the other sense-objects have a like effect? But not every body is affected by odour or sound,such recipients being only things indefinite and unstable like air: which may smell as though affected somehow. § 562

What then is to smell, save to be 'affected somehow'? But to smell is to sense. Air, however, being so affected, becomes rapidly sensible. § 563

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWENTY-FOUR

§ 551. Having examined each of the senses separately the Philosopher proceeds now to conclusions about sensitivity in general; and this in three stages: first he explains the nature of sense; then, at 'It is clear', he solves certain problems connected with that explanation; and thirdly, at 'It might be asked' he raises certain questions touching the way a sense is affected by its object. As regards the first point he explains (a) the nature of sense, and (b) the nature of sense-organs, at 'The primary sensitive part'.

First, then, he says that it must be maintained in general, as true of all the senses without exception, that the senses receive forms without matter, as wax receives the mark of a rig without the iron or gold. This, however, would seem to be common to all cases of passive reception; everypassive thing receives from an agent in so far as the agent is active; and since the agent acts by its form, not its matter, every recipient as such receives form without matter. Which indeed is sensibly apparent; e.g. air does not receive matter from fire acting upon it, but a form. So it would seem not to be peculiar to sensation that it receives form without matter.

§ 552. I answer that, while it is true that every recipient receives a form from an agent, there are different ways of receiving form. Form received in a patient from an agent sometimes has the same mode of existence in the recipient as in the agent; which occurs when the patient is disposed to the form in the same way as the agent. For whatever is received is received into the being of the recipient; so that, if the recipient is disposed as the agent is, the form comes to be in the recipient in the manner in which it exists in the agent. And in this case the form is not imparted without the matter. For although the numerically one and the same division of matter that is in the agent does not become the recipient's, the latter becomes, in a way, the same as the material agent, inasmuch as it acquires a material disposition like that which was in the agent. And it is in this way that air receives the influence of fire, and any other passive thing in Nature the action that alters its natural quality.

§ 553. Sometimes, however, the recipient receives the form into a mode of existence other than that which the form has in the agent; when, that is, the recipient's material disposition to receive form does not resemble the material disposition in the agent. In these cases the form is taken into the recipient 'without matter', the recipient being assimilated to the agent in respect of form and not in respect of matter. And it is thus that a sense receives form without matter, the form having, in the sense, a diffierent mode of being from that which it has in the object sensed. In the latter it has a material mode of being, but in the sense, a cognitional and spiritual mode.

§ 554. Aristotle finds an apt example of this in the imprint of a seal on wax. The disposition of the wax to the image is not the same as that of the iron or gold to the image; hence wax, he says, takes a sign, i.e. a shape or image, of what is gold or bronze, but not precisely as gold or bronze. For the wax takes a likeness of the gold seal in respect of the image, but not in respect of the seal's intrinsic disposition to be a gold seal. Likewise !he sense is affected by the sense-object with a colour or taste or flavour or sound, 'not in respect of what each is called as a particular thing', i.e. it is not affected by a coloured stone precisely as stone, or sweet honey precisely as honey, because in the sense there is no such disposition to the form as there is in these substances; but it is affected by them precisely as coloured, or tasty, or as having this or that ‘informing principle’ or form. For the sense is assimilated to the sensible object in point of form, not in point of the disposition of matter.

§ 555. Next, at ‘The primary sensitive part’, he concludes about the organ of sense. Since from his teaching that sense receives forms into cognition immaterially, which is true of the intellect also, one might be led to suppose that sense was an incorporeal faculty like the intellect, to preclude this error Aristotle assigns to sense an organ, observing that the ‘primary sensitive part’, i.e. organ of sense, is that in which a power of this sort resides, namely a capacity to receive forms without matter. For a senseorgan, e.g. the eye, shares the same being with the faculty or power itself, though it differs in essence or definition, the faculty being as it were the form of the organ, as was said above. So he goes on to say ‘an extended magnitude’, i.e. a bodily organ, is what receives sensation’, i.e. is the subject of the sense-faculty, as matter is subject of form; and yet the magnitude and the sensitivity or sense differ by definition, the sense being a certain ratio, i.e. proportion and form and capacity, of the magnitude.

§ 556. Then, when he says ‘It is clear etc.’, he infers from these premisses a reply to two questions which might arise. What has been said, he observes, explains why an excess in the object destroys the sense-organ; for, if sensation is to take place there must pre-exist in the organ of sense ‘a certain ratio’ or, as we have termed it, proportion. But if the impact of the sense-object is stronger than what the organ is naturally able to bear, the proportion is destroyed and the sense itself, which precisely consists, as has been said, in the formal proportion of the organ, is neutralised. It is just as though one were to twang cords too violently, destroying the tone and harmony of the instrument, which consists in a certain proportion.

§ 557. His analysis also gives us the answer to another question, namely why plants do not feel, though they have some share in soul and are affected by certain senso-objects, i.e. tangible things, as well as by heat and cold. The reason why they do not feel is that they lack the proportion needed for sensation, in particular that balance between extremes of.the tangible qualities which is a prequisite of the organ of touch, apart from which there can be no sensation. Hence they have no intrinsic principle for receiving forms ‘apart from matter’, that is to say, no sense. They are affected and undergo changes only materially.

§ 558. Next, when he says ‘It might be asked’, he raises a question touching the sense-object’s action on the senses. Having just remarked that plants are affected by certain sense-objects, he raises the question whether a subject can ever be affected by objects other than those of which it possesses the sense; say, by odour if it has no smell, or by colour, if it has no sight, or by sound, if it is without hearing.

§ 559. Then, at ‘But if what can be smelt is odour’, he brings two reasons against this suggestion. In the first place, it is proper to what can be smelt to cause smell; but odour is such; therefore if anything causes smell, it causes it by odour (or, according to another reading, odour causes smell). The proper action of odour as such is to cause a smell or occasion a smelling. Whence it follows that whatever receives the activity of odour as such has a sense of smell; and whatever lacks a sense of smell cannot be affected by odour. And the same argument holds of other beings that it is impossible that anything whatever might be affected by sense-objects; this can only happen in things endowed with sense.

§ 560. At ‘The same is evident thus’, he states the second reason, as follows. The above argument is confirmed by experience. Light and darkness, smell. and sound, produce no effect on sensible bodies, except incidentally, inasmuch as the bodies with those qualities do something, like the air that cleaves wood when it thunders; for it is not this sound that affects the wood, but the moving air.

§ 561. Then at ‘But things tangible and savours’ he shows that it is otherwise with tangible qualities; tangible things and ‘savours’, i.e. flavours, do indeed produce, he says, an effect on sensible objects. But this is to be understood of the flavours, not precisely as such, i.e. as tasteable, but just in so far as the tasteable is something tangible, and taste a kind of touch. For if (insensible) bodies were not affected by tangible qualities, there would be no question of inanimate bodies being affected and altered at all, these tangibles being the elemental active and passive qualities in virtue of which all bodily alterations take place.

§ 562. Next, at ‘Therefore, do not also’, he shows that other sense-objects act on inanimate things, though not on all. For in asking: Therefore, do not other sense-objects affect inanimate things as odour does?, he implies that they do. Yet not every body is affected by odour and sound, though all are by heat and cold. By such sense-objects are affected only unstable, impermanent bodies, such as air and water, which, being fluid, are not very self-contained; and that air can be affected by odour is obvious enough when it stinks. Another reading says ‘bears’, meaning that the phenomenon is carried or borne to the sense by sensible objects other than itself. The reason for this difference is that, as tangible qualities are productive of the other sensible qualities, they have more active power than the others, and can operate on bodies in general, whereas the other sense-objects, having less active power, can act only on things that are especially impressionable. The same principle applies to the light of the heavenly bodies, with its effect on terrestrial ones.

§ 563. Lastly, at ‘What then is to smell?’, he solves the problem raised by the argument stated above. If a thing, he asks, can be affected by odour and yet not smell it, what is there in smelling odour other than just being affected by it? And he answers that smelling happens when a thing is affected by odour in such a way as to perceive it. But air is not affected in this way, since it has no sensitive potency; it is affected only so as to become a sense-object, inasmuch as it affords a medium for sensation.

BOOK THREE

TEXT

424b22–425b10

BOOK III, CHAPTER I

IS THERE A SIXTH SENSE?

THE ‘COMMON’ SENSE-OBJECTS

That there is no other sense besides the five enumerated—I mean, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch—is tenable for the following reasons: §564-7

For if we have sensation of all the objects of the sense of touch (all varieties of the tangible being in fact perceptible by us through touch) then, if we lack some [class of] sensation, we must be lacking also in some sense-organ. Now whatever we perceive by contact is perceptible to us through that sense of touch which we do in fact possess. But whatever we perceive through a medium and without contact is perceived through intervening simple elements (I mean such as air and water); and [in this case] things are so disposed that if several sense-objects, differing generically from one another, are perceptible through one medium, then, necessarily, what has a sense-organ of this kind can perceive either object—e.g. if the organ is constituted of air, then air is medium for both colour and sound. But if there are several media for the same senseobject, as air and water are for colour (both being transparent), what is possessed of either [medium] alone will perceive what comes through either or both. §§ 568-70

The sense-organs are formed of these two simple bodies only, air and water. For the pupil is of water; the [organ of] hearing, of air; and smell of either. But fire is found in none, or is common to all; for nothing without heat is sensitive. Earth either belongs to none, or is especially involved in touch. Whence it remains that there is no sense-organ without air and water. Now these organs certain animals do in fact possess. All the senses therefore are found in animals neither incomplete or defective (for even the mole is observed to have eyes beneath its skin). Therefore, if there is no other kind of body, and no qualities other than those of the bodies here present, no sense will be lacking to any [such] animal. §§ 571-4

But there cannot be a sense proper to the common qualities which we perceive by any one sense, yet not incidentally merely: such as movement, rest, shape, size, number, unity. §§ 575-6

For we know all these by motion: that is, we know size by movement and from size, shape; for shape is itself a kind of size. § 577

What is at rest we know as not moving, and number as the negation of continuity and identity. For each sense perceives some one thing, so that it is impossible that there should be a sense specially adapted to any of these. § 578

The situation would, in that case, be as when we perceive what is sweet by sight. This happens because we take account of the sensation of both these, so that when they coincide we are aware of it. if it were not so, we should perceive this only incidentally, as when we see the son of Cleon not as the son of Cleon but as something white; with which object there happens to coincide the fact of being the son of Cleon. But we have a general sense for common qualities, And this not merely incidentally. Hence, there is not a proper sense [for them]. [If there were] we should never perceive them except in the way we have said that we see the son of Cleon. The senses perceive incidentally what is proper to one another; [perceiving] not in their specific capacity, but in so far as they form one sense,—as in the perception of bile as both reddish in colour and bitter. It does not pertain to either sense to judge that these are qualities of one thing. Hence arises the mistaken view that, if a thing is reddish, it is bile. §§ 579-81

One might ask why we have several senses and not one only. Is it in order that the common qualities, which are consequent on the proper, should be less obscure—movement, dimension, number? For if there were no sense but sight alone, and that only of white as an object, these qualities would certainly be very obscure to the apprehension, and all things would appear alike, because colour and dimension always accompany each other. But the fact that there are common qualities attained by various senses, makes it evident that each of them is a distinct object. §§ 582-3

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO ONE

§ 564. Here begins Book III in the Greek text; for the good reason, apparently, that it is here that Aristotle begins to examine the intellect. Now there have been philosophers who denied all difference between intellect and senses. But clearly,the intellect cannot be any one of the exterior senses already considered; for its apprehension is not restricted to any one particular class of sense-objects. So the question is whether sensitivity includes any other cognitive faculty such as might lend support to the view that intellect is somehow one of the senses.

§ 565. This section divides into three. First, he asks whether there is any other sense besides the five exterior senses. Next, at ‘Now, if the soul is defined’, he proves that the intellect is entirely distinct from the senses. Thirdly, at ‘As to the part of the Soul’, he examines the intellectual part of the soul, by now dearly distinguished from the senses. The first of these sections has two parts: (a) he shows that there are no other particular senses besides the five exterior ones; and (b) he shows that, besides these, there is a common sense,—this comes at ‘Since we perceive that we see’.4 With regard to (a), after proving that there are only five particular senses, he shows why there are several of them and not one only. The former proof itself divides into two: first he shows that only the five senses apprehend particular ‘sensibles’; and then at ‘But there cannot be’, that the same five are the only senses to apprehend common ‘sensibles’.

§ 566. To prove the first of these two points he argues thus. If a subject has a sense-organ in virtue of which a certain definite range of sensible objects is naturally perceptible, this organ is the medium by which it perceives those objects. But the higher animals are endowed with all the organs of sense; therefore they can perceive the entire range of sensible objects; and as these organs are only five in number, the whole range of particular sensible objects is covered by the five organic senses.

§ 567. In proposing this argument Aristotle begins by stating his purpose in using it, i.e. to convince anybody that there are no other senses besides the five aforesaid.

§ 568. Next at ‘For if’, he explains the major premiss of the argument: that a subject possessed of any sense organ can know all that can be known by that organ. This he shows from the sense of touch. There are obviously certain tangible qualities, namely (as has been said), the various modifications of elemental bodies as such; for what has been said about the four elements has made it clear that there are such modifications. And all thesetangible qualities, as such, fall within the range of our sensation.

§ 569. He then applies the same principle—that we are aware of precisely such objects as correspond to a given sense-organ in us—to the other senses. So he says: if we sense anything tactually perceptible, so that all tangible qualities, as such, are sensed by us, we can go on to argue in general that, if we do not in fact perceive a sensible quality, the reason must be that we lack the senseorgan to which it corresponds; precisely because if we have a sense-organ we do perceive certain sensible qualities. And this generalisation he then supports with particular examples.

§ 570. And first with respect to things we apprehend without any extrinsic medium; for he says that whatever we sense ‘by contact’, i.e. without an extrinsic medium, is reached by the organ of touch (under which he includes taste). But where, as in the other senses, certain extrinsic media, simple substances like air and water, come between us and the object, it is relevant to observe that one and the same organ may convey apprehensions of several objects different in kind; and in that case, the subject having the organ apprehends things different in kind. For example, if a senseorgan contains air, and air naturally retains and conveys both colour and sound, then a subject with an air-containing organ will be able to sense both colour and sound. If, on the contrary, several different organs can attain the same sensible object—as happens in the case of organs composed, the one of air, the other of water, which are both transparent and therefore both receptive of colour,—then a subject with any one of such organs is able to perceive whatever is perceptible through, or by means of, all of them. The reason for his saying this is that the sense-organs which function through an extrinsic medium always correspond to that medium; and the fact is that the same sensible object, for instance odour, can reach different animals through different media, e.g. through water as well as air.

§ 571. Thirdly, at ‘The sense-organs are formed’, he makes and explains a further statement: that the higher animals possess all the organs of sense. These organs, he says, are by nature composed of only two of the simple bodies, namely air and waterthese being the two most passive simple bodies, and a ready passivity to the sensible object being the condition required in a sense-organ. Thus the pupil of the eye contains water, enabling the eye to receive a likeness of the thing it sees; the organ of hearing contains air (as we have noted already); whilst the sense of smell is related by some to air and by some to water. Fire, on the other hand, by reason of its extreme activity, plays no part in the organs of sense, though in a certain way its presence is felt in all the senses; for sensitivity always presupposes warmth because it always presupposes life.

§ 572. Whilst earth as such has nothing to do with the senseorgans as such, it is in a special way a condition of touch: for it is mixed in with the body in a certain definite proportion which itself ‘aetermines that mean between tangible extremes which gives the body a sense of touch at all; whence it follows that the organ of touch contains all the elements imixed in a certain proportion. But precisely as sensitive the sense-organs are made of air and water and of these only; and the air or water-composed organs are found in those animals we call ‘higher animals’. So he concludes by saying that, apart from naturally inferior organisms, such as the immobile animals which have only the sense of touch, all animals are endowed with all the organs of sense.

§ 573. Apart, too, from the ‘defective’, i.e. animals lacking a sense which should be theirs by nature, like blind or deaf men. But moles, for example, are ‘higher animals’, having eyes under their skin. Living underground they do not need sight; and if their eyes were uncovered the soil would aggravate them.

§ 574. Clearly this argument assumes a definite number of elements. It infers that, because there are only so many elements, the sense-organs that reach their objects through an exterior medium must be composed exclusively of air and water. Again, it presumes a fixed number of elemental qualities which are also the tangible qualities; and infers that all the latter are known to us; and that therefore we are equipped with all the sense faculties that exist. These conclusions could only be disproved by showing, either that there was some other corporeal element besides the four known to us, or that there were other tangible qualities (in the things around us and known to us), other than those which we do in fact perceive by touch. But there is no need to entertain such hypotheses, and we can safely conclude that the five senses we possess are the only senses that exist.

§ 575. Then where he says, ‘But there cannot be’, he rejects the suggestion that the ‘common sensibles’ are the object of another and distinct sense. For the proper and direct object of any one sense is only known indirectly by any other sense; but the common sensibles are not known indirectly by any sense at all; rather, they are each directly known by several senses. Therefore they cannot be the proper objects of any one sense.

§ 576. Note how this argument proceeds. Aristotle first states the conclusion, that there cannot be any one organ specially adapted to the perception of the ‘common sensibles’ perceived directly, not indirectly, by all the senses, namely movement, rest and so forth.

§ 577. Then, at ‘For we know’, he shows that these common sensibles are directly, not indirectly, perceived. What enters sensation precisely by disturbing the sense-organ is directly, not indirectly, sensed; for to sense directly -is simply to receive an impression from a sensible object. Now all these common sensibles are sensed in this way, which is why he says that we apprehend them by ‘motion’, i.e. through some disturbance of the organ. Size, for example, is obviously sensed in this way: it is the subject of such sensible qualities as colour or savour, and no quality is able to act in separation from its subject. From which it follows that shape also is known in this way, for shape is an aspect of size; it is size as terminated. As Euclid says, shape is what is contained in a limit.

§ 578. Rest also is perceived by means of movement, as darkness by means of light, for rest is the lack of movement. Number also, since it comes from dividing a continuum or continuous magnitude, is apprehended as the latter’s negation, and its properties are known through those of the continuum; for as the contmuum. is infinitely &visible, so numbers can go on to infinity, as is shown in Book III of the Physics. Now it is clear that all the objects of any sense go to make up one single direct object of that sense, in so far as they concur in affecting the organ of that sense; whence it follows that these ‘common sensibles’ belong to the direct, not the indirect, objects of sensation; and further, that no one of them is the object of any distinct and special sense.

§ 579. Then, at ‘The situation etc.’, he shows that if they were the object of any special sense they would be also ‘indirectly sensed. This is what he means by saying that the hypothesis -in question would imply that we perceived the common sensibles in the same way as we see sweetness. For sweetness and (e.g.) whiteness each answer to a distinct and special sense; hence, when both qualities are found in the same thing each is known directly by its own special sense and indirectly by that of the other. By sight we know whiteness directly, sweetness indirectly.

§ 580. But if an object is not directly perceived by any special distinct sense it can never become the indirect object of any other sense through the concurrence of two senses or sensibles in the same thing; it must always, in every respect, be indirectly perceived. Thus I perceive indirectly that so and so is Cleon’s son, not because he is Cleon’s son, but because he is white; whiteness as such only happens to be connected with Cleon’s son. Being the son of Cleon is not (like sweetness) indirectly visible in such a way as to imply its being directly perceived by some other sense. On the other hand the common sensibles are not indirectly sensible at all; they are a common yet direct object of several distinct senses. It follows that they answer to no special and distinct sense; if they did, they would be indirectly sensed, like the fact that so and so was Cleon’s son.

§ 581. For the senses perceive each other’s special objects indirectly, as sight that of hearing, and vice versa. Sight does not perceive the audible as such, nor hearing the visible as such (for the eye takes no impression from the audible, nor the ear from the visible) but both objects are perceived by each sense only in so far as ‘one sense’, i.e. one actual sensation so to say, bears upon an object which contains both. I mean that both the senses in question are exercised at once upon one and the same sensible Ahing, as when bile is at once seen as red and tasted as bitter; so that as soon as we see that this thing is red we judge that it is bitter. But there is no special sense of the conjunction of redness and bitterness, for this conjunction is quite incidental, and what is incidental cannot be the object of any special faculty. And the fact that sight only indirectly knows savour helps us to understand why we are so often deceived in such cases, and jump to the conclusion that because a certain thing is, for example, red, it is therefore bile.

§ 582. Then at ‘One might ask’ he goes on to enquire why there are many senses. As this is a question about a species as a whole it must be answered in terms of final causality (as he explains towards the end of the De Generatione Animalium); not, like questions about individual peculiarities, in terms of material or efficient causality. So here he introduces the idea of purpose. The question might arise, he says, why we have several senses ,instead of only one; and he answers that it is to enable us to discern such things as movement, size and number, which are at once accompaniments of each distinct and proper sensible object and also common to them all. For suppose there were only the sense of sight, whose proper object is simply colour; then, since the impression of colour on the sense-organ immediately involves an impression of size, so that the two objects are inseparable, we should never be able to distinguish between colour and size; they would appear to us as exactly the same. But the fact that size is also perceived by a sense other than sight, whilst colour is not, is enough to show us that size and colour are not the same. And the same holds good for the other common sensibles.

§ 583. To this one might add also the following reason. Since every potency as such implies an object, there must be a diversity of sensitive potencies if, and in the manner that, there is a diversity of sensible objects. But objects become sensible by impressing a sense-organ; hence to the different kinds of such impressions will correspond a diversity of sensitive potencies. Now one way in which the sense-organ is impressed by objects is by physical contact, whence arise both the sense of touch, perceiving what composes the physical constitution of an animal, and the sense of taste, perceptive of those qualities which indicate the suitability of an animal’s nourishment for keeping its body in being. And another way by which the sense-organ can receive its impression is through a medium; and this involves either an intrinsic change in the object itself, as in the case of smell, which implies a certain disintegration of the thing smelt; or a change of place, as in the case of sound; or no change at all in the sensible object, but simply a spiritual impression upon the medium and the sense-organ, such as is made by colour and size; they would appear to us as exactly the same. But the fact that size is also perceived by a sense other than sight, whilst colour is not, is enough to show us that size and colour are not the same. And the same holds good for the other common sensibles.

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TEXT

425b11–426b8

BOOK III, CHAPTER II

SUBJECT AND OBJECT IN SENSATION

Since we perceive that we see and hear, we must see that we see either by sight or by another sense. § 584

And if by another sense, then either this is the sense by which we see, or another sense altogether. But [then] the same sense will bear on the coloured object and the sense of sight. Hence, either there will be two senses for one object, or one sense must be its own object. § 585

Further, if the sense perceptive of sight is other, either there is a process to infinity, or there must be some sense which takes account of its own operation: hence it is better to admit this in the first instance. § 586

Here is a problem: if to perceive by sight is to see, and colour, or what possesses it, is what is seen, then that which first sees must be coloured. § 587

It is clear, then, that ‘to perceive by sight’ has not only one meaning. For even when we are not seeing, it is by sight that we distinguish between light and dark, though not in the same way. § 588

Moreover, that which sees is, in a way, coloured; for each sensitive faculty is receptive of the sense-object without its material concomitant. Hence, in the absence of the sense-objects there remain sensation’s and phantasms in the sense-powers. The act of the sense-object and the sensation are one and the same: but these—I mean, for instance, sound in act or sight in act—are not identical in their being. For it happens that what has hearing does not hear all the time, and what has sound is not always sounding. But when that which is able to hear operates, and that which is able to sound sounds, both hearing in act and sound in act arise simultaneously. (of which two, one might call one ‘hearing’, the other ‘sounding’.) §§ 589-91

If then movement and action and passion are in that which is acted upon, it follows that sound and hearing in act reside in that which is these potentially. For the act of what moves or causes is realised in the recipient; hence it is not necessary that what moves be itself in motion. The act of the sound-producing is therefore sound or a sounding; and of the hearing faculty, is hearing or audition. For ‘hearing’ ‘and ‘sounding’ are both twofold. And the same reasoning applies to the other senses and their objects. For as the action and the reception are in the recipient, not in the agent, so the act of the sense-object and of the sense faculty are in the sensitive recipient. However, whereas both are named in some cases (as sounding and audition) in others one or the other is nameless. Vision is the act of seeing, but that of colour has no name; and tasting is the act of the tasting faculty, but the act of savour has no name. §§ 592-3

Since the act of the sense-object and of the sense faculty is one and the same (though each has its own being) it is necessary that they pass away or remain simultaneously, as in the above-mentioned case of hearing and sounding; and, therefore, of taste and flavour and the rest. It is not, however, necessary to hold this of the potency.

But on this point the earlier natural philosophers spoke erroneously, holding that there was no black or white without sight, no flavour without taste. In one way what they said was right, in another wrong. Inasmuch as both the sense-object and the sense-faculty exist in two ways, one in potency the other in act, what they alleged applies to the latter, but not to the former. But they made bald assertions about matters which call for distinctions. §§ 595-6

Now, if voice is a harmony of some sort, and voice and the hearing of it are somehow one, and also, somehow, not one and the same; and if harmony is a proportion; then the hearing must be a kind of proportion. For this reason anything excessively shrill or deep destroys the hearing; and the same in flavours destroys the taste; and in colours, the sight, whether the excessively brilliant or the dark; and in smell, a strong odour, whether sweet or bitter; as if the sense were a certain proportion. Hence, too, those [savours] become delectable which, from having been pure and unmixed (e.g. the bitter or sweet or saline) are brought into a proportion. Then indeed they give pleasure. And in general what is compounded is more of a harmony than the sharp or low [sounds] alone; or in the case of touch, what can be both heated and chilled. Sense is a ‘proportion’ which is hurt or destroyed by extremes. § 597-8

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO TWO

§ 584. Having shown that there are no more than five particular senses, the Philosopher next proceeds to ask whether these five senses spring from any one common potency. He is led to ask this by observing two activities which do not seem to be peculiar to any one’sense, but to spring from some more general potency: for (a) we have some perception of theactivities of the particular senses, e.g. we sense our own seeing and hearing; and (b) we distinguish between the objects proper to each of the different senses, between, for instance, sweet and white. So he enquires into the source of these two activities, first of the former, arid then, at ‘Each of the senses, then’, of the latter. The former enquiry divides into three parts. First, he states the problem, saying that the fact that we do perceive our own seeing and hearing and so forth implies either that sight (for example) is able to see its seeing, or that some other faculty has this power; and so also with the other senses.

§ 585. Next, at ‘And if, etc.’, he brings objections against both these alternatives. But first he proposes two arguments to show that it is sight that sees its own seeing. (1) If one perceives one’s seeing by a sense other than sight, then either that sense is a sense of colour, or the sense of colour and the sense of seeing colour are quite distinct. But if one and the same sense knows colour and the sight of colour, then the act of one and the same sense bears at once upon the sight of colour and the coloured thing. Whence follows one of two consequences. For if this sense of seeing and of colour is not the sense of sight, then there are two senses with the same object, namely the coloured thing; but if it is the same as sight, then sight is, after all, what perceives seeing-which is contrary to the hypothesis. Nor could it possibly be maintained that the perception of seeing is not a perception of colour; without perceiving colour one cannot possibly perceive seeing, for seeing is only sensing colour.

§ 586. (2) The second argument begins at ‘Further, if’. If the sense of seeing is other than sight, then the further question arises whether that sense of seeing also senses its own activity; and if it does not, then there must be a third sense which does this. And either this series goes on to infinity—which is impossible, both because no action could ever be completed which depended on an infinity of actions, and because no single subject can possess an infinite number of faculties—or we have to posit a sense which really does take account of itself, i.e. perceive its own sensation. But, by the same reasoning, there is no need to go beyond the first sense of all; there is no reason why sight should not sense its seeing. Therefore the sense of colour is the same as the sense of seeing colour.

§ 587. Then at ‘Here is a problem’ he puts an objection from the other side in the form of a difficulty, which he proceeds to answer at once, because he has already, with the arguments given above, gone a long way towards settling the whole question. The objection runs thus. If it is by sight that we sense our seeing, then we simply see our seeing. Now nothing is seen except colour or coloured things; if then one sees that one sees, the first seeing (that which is subsequently seen), must itself be coloured; which would seem to be false in view of the principle already laid down, that sight receives colour precisely in so far as it is colourless.

§ 588. Next, at ‘It is clear then’, he answers this difficulty in two ways. In the first place, it is clear from what has been said that to see can mean different things—a perception of our seeing and a perception of mere colour; and this gives two distinct senses of the word. To make this clearer, observe that when we say that we are seeing we sometimes mean that our sight is, at the present moment, actually being impressed by the visible object, namely colour; but we can also sometimes mean that we are aware of the difference, between light and dark even when we are not, at the moment, receiving an impression from an exterior sensible object. But ‘seeing’ does not mean the same in both cases. So what this solution comes to is this, that the act of seeing can be regarded either as the disturbance of a sense-organ by an exterior sensible object, and in this sense colour only is seen; or as the act by which, after the said disturbance, and even on the disappearance of the sensible object, we form a judgement on the reception of the object into the sense-organ; and in this sense not only colour is seen, but also the sight of colour.

§ 589. Then, with ‘Moreover, that which sees’, he proposes his second answer to the difficulty. This answer is required by the fact that colour has two modes of being: a material mode in the object, a spiritual mode in sensation. The former solution implied only the first of these modes; this one depends on the second. And here he does three things: (1) he sets out the solution; (2) at ‘If then there is movement’ he proves what the solution assumes; (3) at ‘Since the act’ he applies it to the solution of certain other problems.

§ 590. First, then, he says that while one solution of the difficulty was found by maintaining that the subject seeing colour was not coloured, another might be argued on the assumption that the subject seeing colour is in a certain sense coloured, inasmuch as, in seeing, it takes in a likeness of colour, becoming like the coloured object. This is why the power by which one sees one’s own seeing can still be strictly a power of sight. That the one who sees is, in a sense, coloured, he then proves from what was said above, i.e. that the sense-organ as such receives a form from the sensible object, but without matter; which is why, when the object passes away, we retain sensations and images, i.e. the appearances in and by which animals somehow sense things. So the one who sees becomes coloured in so far as he retains a likeness of colour and of the coloured thing; and not only sight, but any act of sense is identical in being with the act of the sensible object as such; although the mind can consider them apart.

§ 591. I say, the act of sense, meaning, for instance, actual hearing; and the act of the sensible object, meaning actual sound. For the two are not always in act: the hearer is not always hearing, nor the thing heard always sounding; but when the former goes into the appropriate act and the latter begins to sound, then together take place an actual sound and an actual hearing. Since, then, sight perceives an object and its actuality, and the one who sees is assimilated to the object, so that his act of seeing is the same being as the actuality of the object (though the mind can distinguish them), it follows that one and the same power in us sees colour, and the impression of colour on the sense-organ, and the visible actuality of the thing seen, and our sight of it. The power, then, by which we see our seeing is not really other than sight itself, though it can be thought of as distinct.

§ 592. (2) Next, where he says ‘If then movement’, he proves his assumption that the sensible object and the sentient subject are actually identical though they can be thought of apart; making use here of Book III of the Physics, in which it is proved that movement and action and passion exist in that upon which the action in question bears, i.e. ‘in the thing that is moved by and passive to the action.’ Now hearing is obviously passive with respect to sound. Therefore, the actual sound, no less than the actual hearing, exists on the side of the potency, in the organ of hearing; and this because the act of an active mover comes to full existence in what is passive to it, not in the agent as such. This is why it is not necessary that every mover be itself moved; for that is moved which has the movement; so that if the movement or action (which is a sort of movement) came to full existence in the mover, the mover would also be moved. And as in the Physics it was laid down that action and passion are one single actuality of the same subject, though they differ in thought, so here he says that the sensible object and sentient subject are actually identified in one subject, though they differ to thought. Hence the act of sound or of the sounding thing is the sensation of sound, while that of the hearer is hearing.

§ 593. For both hearing and sound can be regarded either as in act or as in potency; and what has been said of them in this connection is true also of the other senses and sensible objects, namely that, as the subject of both action and passion is not the agent but the thing that receives the action—the agent being only the source of the action—so the act of the sensible object, no less than the act of the sense-faculty, exists in the latter as in its subject. But sometimes a distinct word is used for each act, as when the act of the object is called ‘sounding’ and that of the faculty ‘hearing’; while sometimes only the act of the faculty has a special name. Thus the act of sight is called vision, but that of colour is nameless; and the act of taste is called tasting, but that of savour has no name in Greek.

§ 594. Then (3) at ‘Since the act’, he uses the foregoing solution to answer two more questions. (a) Do the sense-faculty and its object together cease and together remain in being? Answering which, he observes that, since the actualities of faculty and object are one actuality in one subject, though distinct to thought (as has been said), therefore actual hearing and actual sounding must together cease to be and together persist; and so also with savour and tasting and the rest. But the same is not necessarily true of the faculties and objects as in potency.

§ 595. Which leads him to reject an opinion of some early natural philosophers. They were wrong, he says, in supposing that nothing was white or black except when it was seen; or had savour except when it was tasted; and so forth. And because they thought that nothing existed except what was sensible, and that the only knowing was sensation, they concluded that the whole being and truth of things was a mere appearance; and further, that contradictories could both be true at the same time, if and because they seemed true to different people.

§ 596. Now this is partly true and partly false. Sense-faculty and sense-object can be taken in two ways, as in potency and as in act. From the point of view of act, what they said was correct: there is no sense-object without sensation. But it is not true from the point of view of potency. They made 'assertions', i.e. without distinguishing, in a matter which calls for distinctions.

§ 597. Then, where he says 'Now if voice', he applies these principles to solve another problem: (b) why are certain objects destructive of the senses, whilst others give, them pleasure? And he says that since every harmonious and well-balanced sound is, as a sound, identical somehow with the faculty of hearing, the fact that the sound is a kind of harmony implies that hearing is the same. Now harmony or proportion is destroyed by excess; an excessive sense-object is therefore destructive of the faculty. An excessively sharp or heavy sound can destroy hearing; an excessively tasty thing destroys taste; too much brightness or darkness destroys the sight; over-powerful smells destroy the sense of smell. As though the sense itself in each case were a kind of proportion.

§ 598. On the other hand, if several sensible objects are mixed in due proportion the effect is pleasant. Thus savours mingled to a due sourness or sweetness or saltiness are extremely enjoyable. There is always more pleasure to be gained from combinations than from simplicity. Harmony is more enjoyable than mere high notes or mere low notes. So too in touch, with the combinations of hot and cold. For the sense-faculty delights in proportion as in its like, being itself a kind of proportion.. But. excess destroys it, or at least is disagreeable to it.

TEXT

426b8–421a15

BOOK III, CHAPTER II, CONTINUED

THE COMMON SENSE

Each of the senses, then, is of a sensible object and in a sense-organ, precisely as such, and it discerns the differences within its object—for example sight, black and white; taste, sweet and bitter; and likewise with the other senses. §§ 599-600

Since we distinguish, however, between black and sweet, and any other of the sense-objects, comparing them and perceiving that they differ, there must be some sense for this operation too; for these objects are all in the sense-order. Hence it is also clear that flesh is not the ultimate sense-organ; for, in that case, this discrimination would have to be effected by touching. §§ 601-2

Nor could it be by divided [powers] that the sweet is discerned as other than the white: but both must be presented to some one faculty. For [otherwise] it would be like my perceiving one thing and you another: it would then certainly be evident that the two were different; but some one single [power] must say that they differ—i.e. sweet from white. Therefore it is one single power that asserts this; and as it asserts, so it understands and senses. It is patent that it is not possible to distinguish separate objects by faculties themselves separate. §§ 603-4

And the same holds with regard to separate points of time, as the following considerations show. For the faculty that says that good and bad differ says that they differ now, and this now is not extrinsic to the statement (I mean, as in saying now that they are different, but not that there is now a difference; whereas this [faculty] both says now and that the difference is now). Therefore they are discerned simultaneously; an undifferentiated principle distinguishes the two in an indivisible time. § 605

But it is impossible for one and the same thing, if indivisible, to be moved by contrary movements in an indivisible point of time. For if the object be sweet, it so affects the sense or the mind, but if bitter, contrariwise, and if white, in another way. § 606

Therefore [perhaps] what discriminates is, numerically indivisible and inseparable, yet in essence distinct. For it is in one way capable of multiplicity because it perceives things divided off from one another: but in another way, it is indivisible. Thus in its essence indeed it is divisible, but it is indivisible locally and numerically. § 607

But this is not possible; one and the same indivisible thing can be in contrary states potentially, but not in its very essence. It can divide in its activities indeed; but it cannot be black and white at the same time; and therefore neither can it receive the forms of both—if this is how sensation and understanding occur. § 608

But it is just as some speak of a point as one or as two, and in this sense as divisible. As indivisible [this faculty] is a unity making an instantaneous act of discernment. But as divisible, it is not a unity; for it uses the same point twice. In so far as it takes a third, as two, it takes account of two objects which are distinct, as in a separate principle. Yet in so far as it is one, it acts instantaneously and by a single act.

So much then by way of defining the principle by which we call any animal sentient. §§ 609-14

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO THREE

§ 599. So far the Philosopher’s approach to an examination of the ‘common sense’ has been by way of our perception of our own seeing and hearing. But his scrutiny of this perception has so far only led him to the conclusion that seeing is itself perceived by the faculty of sight, though not in the same way as exterior objects are perceived. He has not yet decided that there is any one common faculty that takes account of the activities of the particular senses. But now he takes his enquiry a step further by pointing to another activity of the soul as evidence of the existence of a faculty with a common relationship to all the five senses: the activity of discriminating between various sense-objects. And here he does two things: first, he shows how far the particular senses can so discriminate; next, he investigates that discrimination of sensible objects which exceeds the scope of any particular sense (this begins at ‘Since we distinguish’).

§ 600. He observes then, first, that we have seen that each sense is perceptive of its own proper object precisely in so far as a likeness of the object is formed within its own particular organ as such; for the organ of each sense is, directly, not indirectly, impressed by the proper object of that sense. And within this proper object each sense discerns its characteristic differences; sight, e.g. discerning white and black, taste sweet and bitter; and so with the others.

§ 600. Then, at ‘Since we distinguish’, he points out the faculty that discriminates, as the particular senses cannot discriminate, between the objects of the different senses. And here he does two things: first, he demonstrates his conclusion; then he puts and solves an objection (at ‘But it is impossible etc.’). The demonstration has three parts: (a) he shows that there is a sense that perceives the differences between black and white and sweet; (b) that this sense is one faculty, not two; and (c) that it simultaneously perceives both objects between which it discriminates. First, then, he observes that whereas we are able to distinguish not only between black and white, or sweet and bitter, but also between white and sweet, and indeed between any one sense-object and another, it must be in virtue of some sense that we do this, for to know sense-objects as such is a sensuous activity; the difference between white and sweet is for us not only a difference of ideas, which would pertain to the intellect, but precisely a difference between sense-impressions, which pertains only to some sense-faculty.

§ 602. If this be true, the most likely sense-faculty would seem to be touch, the first sense, the root and ground, as it were, of the other senses, the one which entitles a living thing to be called sensitive. But clearly, if this discrimination were a function of touch, then the fundamental organ of touch would not be flesh; if it were, then by the mere contact of flesh and a tangible object, this object would be discriminated from all other sense-objects. Now this discrimination cannot be attributed to touch precisely as a particular sense, but only as the common ground of the senses, as that which lies nearest to the root of them all. the ‘common sense’ itself.

§ 603. Then, at ‘Nor could etc.’, he shows that it is by one and the same sense that we distinguish white from sweet. For one might have supposed that we did it by different senses, by tasting sweetness and by seeing whiteness. But if this were true, he says, we could never perceive that white was other than sweet. If this difference is to appear it must appear to some one sense-faculty; so long as white and sweet are sensed by distinct faculties it is as though they were sensed by two different men, one perceiving sweet and another white; I this and you that. In this case sweet and white are obviously distinct, because I am impressed in one way by sweetness, and you in another by whiteness.

§ 604. But this would not show us their sensible difference. There must be one single faculty which ‘says’ that sweet is not white, precisely because this distinction is one single object of knowledge. The ‘saying’ is the expression of an inward knowing; and as the saying is a single act, it must spring from a single act of understanding and sensing that what is sweet is not white. He says ‘understands and senses’. either because he has not yet established the distinction between sense and intellect, or perhaps because both these powers know the difference in question. As then the man who judges white to be other than sweet must be one man aware of both objects, so he must do this by means of one faculty; for awareness is the act of a faculty. Hence Aristotle’s conclusion, that it is clearly impossible to perceive ‘separate objects’, i.e. that two things are distinct, by ‘separate’, i.e. by distinct, means; there must be one single power aware of both things.

§ 605. Next, at ‘And the same’, he proves that this awareness is of both things simultaneously, not at ‘separate’, i.e. distinct, moments. This will appear, he says, from what follows; for as a judgement on the difference between things is single with respect to what is discerned, for example that good is distinct from bad, so is it single with respect to the time in which it is discerned. One judges that such and such a difference exists when one is judging. Nor is the time only accidentally connected with the difference itself, as it would be if ‘when’ referred to the subject judging and the meaning was ‘he now judges that a difference exists’ (and not ‘...that now a difference exists’); in which case the ‘now’ would be merely incidental to the object. But the judgement of difference is in the present in the sense that there is difference at present; which necessarily implies a simultaneous apprehension of the two different objects; they are both known in the same instant as they are known to be different. Obviously, then, they are known at once and together. Hence, as one undivided faculty perceives the object's difference, so in one undivided moment both are apprehended.

606. However, he now puts an objection to himself;—concerning which he does four things. First, he states the objection, as follows. One and the same indivisible thing cannot move in different directions in one and the same indivisible moment of time. Now intellect and sense are moved by their objects, the one by an intelligible thing to understand it, the other by a sensible thing, to sense it. But distinct and mutually exclusive sense-objects cause distinct and mutually exclusive movements; therefore one and the same sensitive or intellectual faculty cannot know several distinct and mutually exclusive objects at the same time.

§ 607. Then, at 'Therefore what', he suggests the following solution. That which perceives the difference between mutually exclusive objects does so simultaneously and is numerically indivisible, i.e. it is one as a subject of actions; but in its essence, and therefore to thought, it is divided. So, then, it is in one way an indivisible subject which perceives 'divided', i.e. distinct objects; but in another way, the percipient subject is itself divisible, inasmuch as in essence, and to thought, it is divisible-even while it does not cease to be locally and numerically one indivisible subject of actions. He says 'locally' referring to the fact that different faculties are found in different parts of the body.

§ 608. Thirdly, at 'But this is not possible', he rejects this solution: because if a thing really is a self-identical and indivisible subject, even if it is not so in thought, it can indeed be in potency to diverse movements, but once it is actually 'in activity' or moving, it cannot do so in mutually exclusive ways; for this implies a real divisibility. One and the same indivisible thing cannot be white and black at the same time in the same respect; nor, for the same reason, can it receive simultaneous impressions from white and black objects. And the same is true of understanding and sensing, if these are a kind of reception of impressions.

§ 609. Fourthly, at 'But it is just as', he gives the true solution, using the simile of a point. Any point between the two ends of a line can be regarded either ‘as one or two’. It is one as continuing the parts of the line that lie on either side of it, and so forming the term common to both. It is two inasmuch as we use it twice over, to terminate one part and begin the other. Now sensitivity flows to the organs of all the five senses from one common root, to which in turn are transmitted, and in which are terminated, an the sensations occurring in each particular organ. And this common root can be regarded from two points of view: either as the common root and term of all sensitivity, or as the root and term of this or that sense in particular. Hence, what he means is that just as a point, under a certain aspect, is not one only but also two, or divisible, so the principle of sensitivity, if regarded as the root and term of seeing and of hearing, appears twice over under the same name, and in this way it is divisible.

§ 610. In so far then as this single principle receives and ‘takes account of two distinct’ and separate ‘objects’, these are known ‘as in a separate’, i.e. as by a divisible ‘principle’ of knowledge; ‘but in so far as’ it is single in itself it is able to know these objects and their differences together and simultaneously. It is a common sensitive principle, aware of several objects at once because it terminates several organically distinct sensations; and as such its functions are separate. But just because it is one in itself it discerns the difference between these sensations.

§ 611. Now all sensuous activity being organic, this common sensitive principle must have its organ; and since the organ of touch is all over the body it would seem to follow that, wherever the ultimate root of the organ of touch may be, there also is the organ of the common sensitive principle. It was with this in mind that Aristotle has said, that if flesh were the fundamental organ of touch, we should discriminate between various sense-objects by merely touching things with our flesh.

§ 612. We may note also that though this common principle is set in motion by the particular senses, all the impressions of which are transmitted to it as to their common term, this does not imply that the particular senses are nobler than the common sense; though certainly a mover or agent is, as such, nobler than what it moves or acts upon. Nor is the exterior sensible object nobler, strictly speaking, than the particular sense moved by it, though it is in a way nobler as having actually the white or sweet quality which the senses have only potentially; but of the two the sense is strictly the nobler thing, and this in virtue of sensitivity itself—hence in receiving the object immaterially it ennobles it, for things received take, as such, the mode of being of the receiver. And the common sense receives its object in a still nobler way because it lies at the very root of sensitivity, where this power has its point of greatest unity. Yet we must not suppose that the common sense appropriates actively the impressions received in the sense-organs; all sensitive potencies are passive; and no potency can be both active and passive.

§ 613. Observe too that each particular sense is able to discriminate between contrary sense-objects in virtue of its share in the power of the ‘common sense’; each is one of the terminal points for the various influences which reach us from mutually exclusive exterior sense-objects through a medium. But the final judgement and discrimination belong to the ‘common sense’.

§ 64. Concluding, he says that he has now discussed the principle according to which an animal is said to have, or be able to have, sensations.

TEXT

427a16–427b26

BOOK III, CHAPTER III

DISTINCTION OF SENSE FROM INTELLECT

ERROR

IMAGINATION AND OPINION

Now, if the soul is defined principally by two differences, by motion in place and by what it is to understand, discern and sense, it would seem that both to understand and to judge are a kind of sense-perception,—for in either case the soul discerns and knows reality. §§ 615-16

The early philosophers, indeed, said that rational judgement and sensation were the same thing, as when Empedocles says: ‘The will is increased in man in the present moment’, and in another place: ‘Whence it always affords them new objects of knowledge.’ To the same purport is that line of Homer: ‘The mind of mortals is such as the father of gods and men brings into light’. §§ 617-21

All these suppose the intellect to be something corporeal, like sensation, and that both sensing and judging are of ‘like by like’, as we explained at the beginning of this treatise. §§ 622-3

But they ought at the same time to have treated of error, which is a state more natural to animals [than truth], and in which the soul spends the greater part of its time. So it must follow, either that all that seems to be really is (as some maintain) or that error is a contact with what is unlike this being the contrary of knowing like by like. §§ 624-7

It would appear, however, that error and knowledge are the same with respect to contraries. § 628

Now it should be evident that rational judgement and sensation are not the same. The latter is in all animals, the former in but few. § 629

Nor again is understanding [the same as sensation]. It may be correct or incorrect,—correct as prudence, science and sound opinion; incorrect as the opposite of these. This is not the same as sensation. For sensation is always true of its own proper objects, and is found in all animals, whereas intelligence is sometimes accompanied by error, and is found in no species that lack reason. §§ 630-1

For imagination is other than both sensation and intellect. Yet it cannot occur without sensation, and without it there is no opinion. § 632

It is evident that opinion and imagination are not identical. The latter state arises in us at will, as a picture before our eyes, like the imagery employed by those who cultivate memory training. But opinion is not within our power in this way; it must express the true or the false, of necessity. § 633

Further, when we think that anything is arduous or fearful, we are at once emotionally affected; and likewise, if there be occasion for confidence. But in imagining, it is as though we were regarding in a picture things arduous or encouraging. §§ 634-5

These are, besides, the various modes of making a judgement: speculative science, opinion and prudence; with their contraries. Let the question of their differences be discussed elsewhere. § 636

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FOUR

§ 615. After showing that to perceive the acts of the particular senses, and to discriminate between their various objects, are activities not beyond the range of sensitivity as a whole, the Philosopher now addresses himself to the question whether rational judgement and understanding are beyond its range. And he does two things here: first, he proves that rational judgement and understanding are not activities of sense, which is the same as to show that sense and intellect are distinct faculties; secondly, at ‘For imagination is other etc.’, he shows that the image-forming faculty, which is a kind of sense, is other than the power to form opinions, which pertains to reason. The former argument subdivides into (1) a statement of the theory of the identity of sense and intellect, and (2) a refutation of this theory. To the statement itself he adds an explanation of the origin of this theory, and also some remarks of certain philosophers, which seemed relevant.

§ 616. First, then, he says that as the early philosophers defined the soul especially in terms of local motion and knowledge—which includes rational discernment and sensation—it would seem to have been their view that understanding and judging were the same sort of activity as sensing; for in both there is discernment and knowledge.

§ 617. Next, where he says ‘The early philosophers’, he shows that this is more than a mere inference from their general teaching, and that they explicitly taught that sensation and rational understanding were identically the same. But in order to understand the words which he quotes here of these philosophers, and their relevance to the present argument, we have to consider that no body can act directly upon what is purely incorporeal. Now the sense-faculties are in part corporeal, because of the bodily organs in which they exist. Therefore they are subject to the influence of the heavenly bodies,—though, even so, only indirectly, for neither the soul itself nor any of its powers is directly subject to the action of corporeal matter. Consequently, the imagination and sense-appetite are modified in various ways by the influence of the heavenly bodies. Brute animals are generally governed by this influence, since they are led entirely by their senses. Hence to suppose that heavenly bodies act directly upon the intellect and will is to admit that these faculties are corporeal. And this is what some of the early philosophers seem to have said.

§ 618. Empedocles, for instance, said that in man, no less than in other animals, the ‘will is increased’, i.e. prompted to act, ‘in the present moment’, i.e. according to its time-context; which itself depends on the disposition of the stars. It is the present moment that ‘always affords them’, i.e. to men and the other animals ‘new objects of knowledge’; for all the animals, men included, envisage things differently at different times.

§ 619. To the same effect Homer speaks of the mind of mortal man being ‘such as the father of gods and men’ (i.e. the sun) ‘brings into light’. He calls the sun the ‘father of men’ because of the part it plays in human procreation; for man is born from man and the sun. And the sun he calls the ‘father of gods’, either following the old view that made gods of the other stars which, the astronomers tell us, are governed somehow by the sun, or following the view that certain men are divine because generated by solar influence. And the sun is, of course, strongest in the daytime while it is visible and is moving across the upper hemisphere; hence the name of ‘day planet’ given it by astronomers. So what Homer is saying is that the sun is the cause of understanding in men, and that their knowledge of things varies with the movement, situation and appearance of the sun.

§ 620. In point of fact Aristotle quotes only the beginning of Homer’s line; neither the Greek text nor the Arabic gives us the rest of it. Aristotle relies on his readers remembering the whole of it from a part, as when one quotes the first words of a well-known verse of any author. But Boethius cites the whole of Homer’s line, for the sake of his Latin readers who were not familiar with that poet.

§ 62 1. What has been said, then, makes it quite clear that if the stars do have a direct influence on the intellect and will, then there is no difference between the intellect and the senses. There is no difficulty, however, about admitting an indirect stellar influence upon intellect and will, in so far as these faculties act in conjunction with the faculties of sense. Thus any injury to the bodily organ of the imagination will impede the intellect; and the will is incited towards choosing or not choosing by sensuous desire. But since the will is never drawn of necessity, but remains free to follow or not the promptings of desire, human actions are never completely determined by astral influences.

§ 622. Next, he states the reason why this opinion arose. If you take away that by which things differ, they are left the same; and if rationality is removed from man he is left simply an animal. Now the difference between intellectual and sensuous cognition is that the latter is corporeal. Sensation cannot occur apart from the act of a bodily organ, whereas understanding, as we shall prove later, does not take place by means of such an organ. But to the early philosophers understanding seemed a corporeal action like sensation; hence they supposed that intellect and sense were the same.

§ 623. And how they thought of both activities as corporeal he next explains, I saying that they maintained that the acts of discernment in both intellect and sensation arose from the presence of a likeness of an object (as it was said in Book I) in the knowing subject; and they thought this likeness was essentially corporeal, so that earth was known by earth and water by water, and so on with other objects. And consequently, sensing and understanding were both conceived of as functions of corporeal nature, and therefore as fundamentally the same.

§ 624. He goes on now, at 'But they ought', to criticise this opinion, first with regard to the premiss on which it depends, ,and then at 'therefore it is evident', directly in itself. So he remarks, first, that the philosophers who explained knowledge by the presence of a likeness should have also given some explanation of error; for error seems to be even more natural to animals, as they actually are, than knowledge. For experience proves that people easily deceive and delude themselves, whilst to come to true knowledge they need to be taught by others, Again, the soul is involved in error for a longer time than it spends in knowing truth, for to acquire this knowledge even a long course of study hardly suffices. (Now this argument is indeed valid against those early philosophers who regarded knowledge as natural to the soul in the sense that the soul, being constituted of the first principles of things, knew all that could be known, and knew it actually, not merely in potency.)

§ 625. But Aristotle's objection might be answered in two ways. One might say that since the early thinkers did not admit the existence of error (their view being, as we have seen, that all that seemed to be true was true) they did not need to explain error.

§ 626. Secondly, it might be answered that to explain knowledge as a contact of the soul with what is like itself is implicitly to explain error as the soul's contact with what is unlike itself. Hence, from the fact that the early thinkers did not explicitly render an account of error, he infers that either they identified truth with appearances, or that they held that the soul went astray into error by touching things unlike itself; since to touch the unlike seems the opposite of knowing the like.

§ 627. The first alternative is refuted in Book IV of the Metaphysics.

§ 628. So he proceeds to examine the second alternative, at 'it would appear'. The like and the unlike are obviously contraries. But in knowledge and in error the relation to either of two contraries is the same: if you know one, you know the other; if you err about one, you err about the other.

Hence he says that knowledge and error are apparently the same with respect to contraries. It follows that touching a like thing cannot cause true knowledge if touching an unlike thing causes error; for in that case one would know one of a pair of opposites and be mistaken about the other.

§ 629. Then, at ‘Now it should be evident’ he attacks the theory in question directly, and shows that neither rational judgement nor understanding is the same as sensing; they belong to intellectual knowledge. Now the intellect as judging is said to have wisdom, whilst as apprehending it is said to understand. Showing therefore that rational judgement and sensation differ, he argues thus: sensation belongs to all animals, but wisdom is found in only a few; therefore they differ. And he allows wise judgement to ‘a few animals’, and not exclusively to man, because even certain brute animals have a sort of prudence or wisdom, in that they instinctively form correct judgements on what they need to do.

§ 630. Secondly, at ‘Nor again’, he shows the difference between understanding and sensation; and this in two ways; the first being as follows. Understanding may be ‘correct or ‘incorrect’. ‘Correct’ understanding bears either upon speculative and necessary truths, and then it is called scientific; or upon a right ordering of practical action in the sphere of the contingent, and then it is part of prudence; or upon one of two alternatives, but without deciding finally in favour of this one, and while still admitting that the other might be the truth; in which. case it forms a reasonable opinion. ‘Incorrect’ understanding is in each case the opposite of correct understanding; it results in spurious science or imprudent decisions or foolish opinions. Sensation, on the other hand, can only be ‘correct’, for the senses are infallible with respect to their proper objects. Therefore sensation and understanding are different.

§ 631. And since it might be objected that ‘correct’ understanding, at least, is the same as sensation, he adds that sensation is found in ‘all animals’ whilst understanding is found only in rational animals, that is, in men. For it is proper to man to come to an understanding of intelligible truth by way of rational enquiry; whereas the immaterial substances, which are in a higher degree intellectual, apprehend truth immediately without having to reason about it. Therefore ‘correct’ understanding is not the same as sensation.

§ 632. Next, when he says ‘For imagination’, he shows the difference between opinion, which is of the intellect, and imagining, which is of the senses. And here he does two things: first, he shows that imagining is not opinion; then he studies the nature of imagining, at ‘Concerning understanding’. The former subdivides into three parts. First he states his aim, saying that another way to grasp the difference between sense and intellect is to consider that imagining differs from both, yet presupposes sensation (as will be shown later), and itself is presupposed by opinion. For it seems that, as imagining is to the senses, so is opinion to the intellect. When we sense any sensible object we affirm that it is such and such; but when we imagine anything we make no such affirmation, we merely state that such and such seems or appears to us. The word ‘imagining’ itself is taken from seeing or appearing. Similarly, when we understand an intelligible object we affirm that it is such and such; but when we form opinions, we say that such and such seems or appears to us. For, as understanding depends upon sensing, so opinion depends on imagining.

§ 633. In the second place, at ‘It is evident’, he proves by two arguments the difference between opinion and imagination. The first is this. Images can arise in us at will, for it is in our power to make things appear, as it were, before our eyes-golden mountains, for instance, or anything else we please, as people do when they recall past experiences and form them at will into imaginary pictures. But we are not free to form opinions as we please; one cannot form an opinion without resting it on some reason, true or false. Therefore opinion is not the same as imagination.

§ 634. The second argument at ‘Further, when’ is this. Opinion has an immediate effect on our affective nature; so soon as we opine that anything is disagreeable or frightening we feel sad or frightened. So also if anything is thought of as encouraging or promising, we at once feel hopeful or glad. But it is not so with imagining; for so long as anything appears merely imaginatively to us, it is as if we were merely looking at pictures of frightening or encouraging objects. Therefore opinion differs from imagining.

§ 635. Now the cause of this difference is that our affective nature is not impressed or swayed by the mere vision of things brought about by imagining; but only by things regarded as good or evil, useful or harmful; and this, in man, presupposes opinion with its positive or negative judgements as to the evil and terrible or the desirable and encouraging. Mere imagining passes no judgement on things. In brute animals, however, the affective power is swayed by natural instinct; which plays the same part in them as opinion in man.

§ 636. Thirdly, at ‘There are, besides’, he remarks that of the many forms of intellectual judgement, such as science, prudence and opinion, with their contraries, he does not intend to treat here. They are dealt with elsewhere, in the Ethics, Book VI.

TEXT

427b27–428b9

BOOK III, CHAPTER III, CONTINUED

IMAGINATION: WHAT IT IS NOT

Concerning understanding, since it is one thing and sensation another, while imagination seems to differ from both of these and from opinion also, let us settle first what imagination is, and then speak of the other matter [opinion]. § 637

If, then, imagination is that by which we say that some phantasm arises within us, it follows (if we are not speaking metaphorically) that it is one of the faculties or dispositions in virtue of which we perceive and pronounce either falsely or truly. Such faculties are sensation, opinion, knowlede, understanding. §§ 638-40.

That it is not sensation is evident. For sensation is either in potency or in act: the faculty of sight, or the actual seeing. But appearances occur when neither of these is present; as when we dream. § 641

Further, sensation is always to be found, in potency in all animals that are not defective. Not so imagination. § 642

But if they were the same in act, it would happen that imagination was present in all animals. But this apparently is not so—e.g. in the ant, the bee, the worm. §§ 643-4

Again, sensations are always true: but many phantasms are false. § 645

Again, we do not say, when we are functioning accurately with regard to sense-objects: ‘that seems to us a man; we say this rather when our sensation is indistinct; in which case it may be true or false. § 646

And, as we said before, such appearances come to men in their sleep. § 647

And it is certainly not one of the qualities which are always truthful, such as knowledge or understanding: or imagination can be true or false. § 648

It remains therefore to consider whether it is opinion. For opinion can be either true or false. But belief follows immediately on opinion, for one never finds a man not believing the opinion that seems to him to be true. But there is no such thing as belief amongst animals, although there is imagination in many. § 649

Further: belief attaches to all opinion, and is due to conviction, which in turn is due to reasoning. Now imagination is found in some beasts; but reason in none. § 650

It is therefore evident, on these grounds, that neither opinion accompanying sensation, nor through sensation, nor a combination of opinion and sensation, will constitute imagination. § 651

And it is clear that opinion would have simply the same objects as sensation. I mean, that an imagining of ‘white’ would be a combination of the sensed ‘white’ and the opinion that it is ‘white’. For it would not be produced by an opinion of ‘white’ and a sensation of ‘good’. To imagine, then, would be having an opinion of the same thing as what one senses—the same absolutely speaking. § 652

False appearances, however, are possible about which at the same time one holds a true opinion: and indeed the sun seems to be a foot across, yet is believed to be greater than the inhabited world. Therefore it comes about, either that one discards the true opinion which one had formed, the thing itself remaining, and one neither forgets nor ceases to hold [that opinion]: or, if one still retains it, the same must be both true and false. But a false [opinion] is produced if there is an unnoticed transformation in the facts. imagination therefore is neither one of these, nor constituted from these. §§ 653-4

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FIVE

§ 637. After saying that imagination is not the same as opinion he begins to examine it in itself, first stating the question to be treated before proceeding with it at ‘If then’. We have seen, he says, that understanding differs from sensation, and that opinion is akin to the former, but imagining to the latter; and now, having finished with the senses, it will be convenient to discuss imagination before tackling the quite distinct problems touching the intellect and opinion.

§ 638. Then, at ‘If then’, he begins to treat of imagination, and this in two main sections, first proving that the imagination is not to be numbered among those cognitive powers or dispositions by which we discriminate truth from falsehood, or judge things to be true or false; and then, at ‘But since it can happen’, explaining what in fact the imagination is. The former section subdivides into three. To begin with, he enumerates our various powers or modes of discernment; secondly, he shows that imagination is not one of these, and thirdly, that it is not even a combination of any of them—this part beginning at ‘It is therefore evident’.

First, then, he observes that if it is through imagination that we become conscious of phantasms or appearances (unless the term ‘phantasm’ is taken metaphorically) imagination would seem to be one of those cognitive dispositions or powers by which things are perceived together with their differences, or are judged according to this or that aspect, truly or falsely, i.e. with a correct or erroneous judgement. (Not that the appearance itself is the same as this discerning or judging.) Now there seem to be four powers or dispositions from which such discernment or judgement proceeds: sense, understanding, opinion and scientific knowledge. Imagination, then, is apparently one of these four.

§ 639. Aristotle mentions these four as being already familiar. Other factors (as they seem to be) in cognition were still, at the time he was writing, not defined with certainty. But having already, distinguished sensation from the intellect, he can enumerate here three factors distinct from sense: understanding, opinion and scientific knowledge. Nor is he, apparently, speaking of the understanding as a faculty (i.e. of the intellect); else it would not be set apart from science and opinion, which both belong to it as a faculty. But ‘understanding’ means here an infallible, immediate and intuitive grasp of such intelligible objects as the first principles of knowledge; while ‘scientific knowledge’ means certain knowledge obtained by rational investigation; and ‘opinion I means a knowing that falls short of scientific certainty.

§ 640. And in calling imagination one of these ‘dispositions or powers’ he implies that the cognitive factors here mentioned are either habits or powers. As to these four factors being the only principles of cognition known to the early philosophers, our evidence is the theory of Plato who reduced only these four to numbers—understanding to 1, science to 2, opinion to 3, sense to 4.

§ 641. Next, when he says ‘That it is not’, he distinguishes imagination from all the above four: first of all from sensation, then from understanding and science, and, finally from opinion. As to sensation, he begins by proving that imagination is not one of the senses, either potentially or actually. For imagination is active during sleep. This cannot be due to any sense as in potency, in which state the senses are aware of nothing at all; nor to any sense as in act, for in sleep the senses are not in act. Therefore imagination is neither a sense in potency nor a sense in act.

§ 642. Then, at ‘Further etc.’, he argues as follows to show that imagination is not a sense in potency. The latter is always found in animals, but imagination, which implies an awareness of appearances, is sometimes lacking. Therefore...

§ 643. Then, at ‘But if etc.’, he gives four reasons for distinguishing imagination from the senses as in act. (1) Sense as in act is found in all animals, i.e. irrational animals; so that if it were the same as imagination, this would be found in all irrational animals, which in fact is not true; for neither ants, nor bees, nor worms have imagination. Therefore...

§ 644. But note that all animals have imagination in some sense of the term; but the lower animals have it indeterminately, as Aristotle will explain later. And if ants and bees seem to differ in this respect from the rest of the lower animals, through their apparent exercise of a great deal of intelligence, the truth is, nevertheless, that ants and bees behave so cleverly, not because they are aware of definite images distinct from exterior sensations, but by a natural instinct; for they only imagine so long as they are actually receiving sensible impressions. Their purposeful and, as it were, provident activities do not arise from any image of what is going to happen in the future; their present activities alone are represented inwardly to them, and it is a natural instinct rather than any distinct apprehension which orders these activities to an end. On the other hand, says Aristotle, those animals have imagination in the precise sense of the term which retain a distinct image of things even while they are not actually sensing things.

§ 645. (2) This argument begins at ‘Again, sensations’. The senses in the act of sensing are always truthful; they cannot err about their proper objects. But phantasms are very often deceptive, when there is nothing real that corresponds to them. Therefore the imagination is distinct from every sense as in act.

§ 646. (3) This argument comes at ‘Again, we do not say’. When, we are moved by an actual sense-experience to act immediately and without hesitation, we never say e.g. ‘That seems to us a man’. We are more likely to speak thus when we are uncertain, as when we see things at a distance or in the dark. And in these cases the actual sensation is either true or false. For the senses (whatever sense it is which makes us aware of a man) are indeed sometimes deceived as to their indirect object. He adds this in order to show the affinity between imagination, which can also be either truthful or deceptive, and obscure sensations. But as soon as we are sure that we are only imagining, we say ‘it appears to be a man’, and that we do not know for certain that it is a man. Therefore imagination is distinct from any sense as in act.

§ 647. (4) Again, phantasms come during sleep when the senses are not in act. Therefore a phantasm is not an actual sensation.

§ 648. Next, when he says ‘And it is certainly’ he shows the difference between imagination and both simple understanding and science. Simple understanding bears upon first principles, and science upon demonstrated conclusions; and these are always true. But images are often false; therefore imagination is neither simple understanding nor science.

§ 649. Then at ‘It remains’ he shows that imagination is not on (which it might seem to be, for opinion too is sometimes false) by two arguments. (1) The result of opinion is belief, if it is natural to believe in one’s opinions. If belief is not found in brute animals, this is because they have no opinions. But many brute animals, as he has said, have imagination. Therefore imagination is not opinion.

§ 650. (2) (At, ‘Further, belief etc.’) Belief always follows opinion (as we have said) because one naturally believes in one’s opinions. And the state of being persuaded is the outcome of belief; we believe those things of which we are persuaded. Now persuasion is always accompanied by rational inference, for one must have some reason for being persuaded of anything; hence from first to last reasoning goes along with opinion. But while some brute animals have imaginations, none of them have reason. Imagination, then, is distinct from opinion. Obviously, this argument confirms what the previous one assumes, i.e. that brute animals lack belief.

§ 651. Then at ‘It is therefore evident’, he shows that imagination is not a combination of any of the factors mentioned above; and more particularly that it is not, as it might rather plausibly seem to be, a combination of sensation and opinion. And here he does three things. First, he states his conclusion, as a further inference from what has been said: that since imagination is neither one of the senses nor opinion, we can already see that it is neither opinion plus sensation—i.e. an opinion essentially, but with a concomitant sensation; nor opinion through sensation—i.e. an opinion essentially, but caused by sensation; nor a mixture of the two, as though both were of its essence. He does not say that imagination is not sensation plus opinion, because it has apparently more to do with opinion, which can be false, than with sensation which is always true.

§ 652. Secondly, at ‘And it is clear’, he shows what the term opinion would mean if it were true that imagination were a blend of sensation and opinion. For since an image is always of some definite thing, and of nothing else at the same time, then clearly the opinion which, conjoined to sensation, was an act of imagination, would bear simply and solely upon the one object presented to it by the sensation. It is as if one were to say, e.g. that imagination combined an opinion of whiteness and a sense of whiteness; it could not combine an opinion of whiteness and a sense of goodness; for, in that case, the object imagined would not be one and the same. Therefore, if to imagine is to combine opinion and sensation, to be aware of images is simply and solely to have as the object of one’s opinion the direct object of a sensation; not in any way the indirect object of that sensation.

§ 653. Thirdly, at ‘False appearances’, he refutes the above hypothesis. For it can happen that images derived from sensation present us with falsehoods of which, none the less, we form a true opinion. Thus our senses tell us that the sun measures only one foot across; which is false. But by our true opinion we believe that it is larger than ‘the inhabited world’, i.e. than the whole of our earth. Yet on the hypothesis that the image-appearances are only an opinion conjoined to sensation, one of two. consequences must follow. The first is that in the act of conjoining opinion and sensation we reject the true opinion which we held till then, while the thing itself, of which we form our opinion, ‘remains’, i.e. stays exactly the same; and we ourselves neither forget nor cease to be persuaded of that true opinion. But this is impossible; for there are only three ways in which a true opinion, once held, can be lost: (a) When the object itself changes,—as when we truly opine that Socrates is seated while he is seated; but if, when he ceases to sit, we retain that opinion, it changes from being a true opinion to being false; (b) When we cease to hold an opinion we once held because we forget it; and (c) When we cease to hold an opinion we once held because, for some new reason, we cease from thinking it to be true. It is impossible to lose an opinion if none of these conditions is realised; and yet this is what the first alternative involves.

§ 654. And there is only one other conceivable alternative; which is that the true opinion is retained along with the false one; which would mean that, since the image-appearance is identical with opinion (as it must be if imagining is opining), the same image-appearance is both true and false. And if from being true it becomes false then the ‘transformation’ of the object, i.e. its alteration from what it was before, must be hidden from him who holds the opinion; otherwise, as soon as the object altered the opinion would alter too, and thus would not be false. He adds this to explain his earlier remark, about the ‘remaining’ of the object. And his conclusion is that imagination is neither one of the aforesaid four factors in cognition, nor any combination of them.

TEXT

428b10–429a9

BOOK III, CHAPTER III, CONTINUED

IMAGINATION: WHAT IT IS

But since it can happen that, one thing moving, another is moved by it; and imagination seems to be a movement, and to arise only with sensation, and in sentient beings, and to be of such objects as are sensed; and since a motion may be caused by actual sensation, and such necessarily resembles sensation,-then imagination will be just this movement, never originated apart from sensation, incapable of existing in non-sentient beings, and enabling its possessor to act and to be affected in many ways, and being itself both true and false. §§ 655-9

This happens because sense-perception is true of its own proper objects, or has the least possible amount of falsehood; but secondarily it bears on that in which these qualities inhere, and here it can be deceived. Sensation is reliable as to whether a thing is white or not, but not as to whether it is this or that. Thirdly, there are the common qualities consequent on the accidents in which the proper qualities inhere. I mean, such as movement and dimension, which belong to sense-objects—and about these deception very easily arises in sensing. The movement derived from actual sensation differs from the sensations by which these three objects are perceived. Although the first [movement] is true, the sensation itself being present, the others can easily be false, whether sensation be present or not, and especially when the sense-object is distant. if, therefore, nothing except imagination possesses what has been described, then the statement is true, namely that imagination is a movement produced by sensation actuated. §§ 660-7

Since sight is the most prominent sense, [imagination] has taken its name from light, as there is no seeing without light. § 668

And since these images dwell within, and resemble sense experiences, animals do many things in accordance with them; some animals, as lacking reason, namely beasts; but some, i.e. men, when their intellect is veiled either by passion, or by sickness, or by sleep.

Let so much suffice, therefore, on imagination, its nature and its function. §§ 669-70

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SIX

§ 655. After showing that imagination is not one of those four activities into which the earlier philosophers divided knowledge, the Philosopher now asks: what is imagination in itself? And he does two things. First, he says what imagination is; secondly, he explains its properties, at 'This happens because'. And with a view to defining imagination he lays it down that anything moved may itself move something else (recalling the argument in the Physics, Book VIII, where it is shown that there are two kinds of mover, one that is itself without movement, and one that moves another through being moved itself).

§ 656. Then he suggests that imagination is a sort of movement: that just as the sensing subject is moved by sensible objects, so, in imagining, one is moved by certain appearances called phantasms.

§ 657. Next, he suggests an affinity between the imagination and the senses, in that imagination presupposes sensation and is found only in sentient beings or animals; and further, that it bears only upon things sensed, and in no way on things purely intelligible.

§ 658. Then he suggests that the act of sensation can give rise to a sort of movement, in accordance with the principle first laid down, that a thing moved may move another. Actual sensation is a being moved by a sensible object; and the movement of the actuated sense itself causes another movement which, as it proceeds from sensation, must resemble sensation;

for every agent as such is a cause of its own likeness. And that which, being moved, moves another, must cause a motion similar to its own.

§ 659. And this leads him to the conclusion that imagination is a certain movement caused by the senses in their act of sensing. It cannot exist without sensation, nor in insentient beings. If there is any movement caused by actual sensation, it must resemble sensation, and imagining is the only activity of this kind. Hence it must be the movement in question. And, being such, it can give occasion to the imagining subject for a variety of actions and passions. And it can be either true or false, as we shall see.

660. Next, at ‘This happens’, he gives reasons for the characteristic properties of imagination, using the above analysis: (a) he gives a reason for his assertion that imagination is sometimes true and sometimes false; (b) he explains why it is called by this name; and (c) he explains why he said that animals are largely governed by their imaginations.

(a) First, then, he notes that the reason why imagination is sometimes true and sometimes false is implicit in the statement that its source is the act of the exterior sense; for the latter is related to truth in different ways, according to its varying relation to objects.

§ 661. For, in the first place, sense-perception is always truthful with respect to its proper objects, or at least it incurs, with respect to these, the minimum of falsehood; for natural powers do not, as a general rule, fail in the activities proper to them; and if they do fail, this is due to some derangement or other. Thus only in a minority of cases do the senses judge inaccurately of their proper objects, and then only through some organic defect; e.g. when people sick with fever taste sweet things as bitter because their tongues are ill-disposed.

§ 662. But the senses have also their indirect objects, and with regard to these they can be deceived. What seems to be white is indeed white as the sense reports; but whether the white thing is this or that thing, is snow, e.g., or flour, is a question often answered badly by the senses, especially at a distance.

§ 663. Thirdly, there are the common sensibles’, found in things some of whose accidental qualities are ‘proper sensibles’. Thus size and movement accompany, as ‘common sensibles’, the sensible qualities of bodies. And these are very likely to give rise to error; for in their case our judgement has to adjust itself to differences of distance: things seen further away seem the smaller.

664. Now the movement of imagination, being derived from the actuated senses, differs from these three types of actual sensation as an effect from its cause. Thus, just because effects, as such, are weaker than their causes, and the power and impress of an agent is less and less evident the further away are its effects, therefore imagination is even more liable than are the senses to fall into the error which arises from a dissimilarity between the sense and its object. For falsehood in the senses consists in receiving a sensible form as other than it is in the sensible object. I mean other in kind, not in point of materiality (for example, if a sweet savour is tasted on the tongue as bitter); for in point of materiality there is always a difference between the form as received in the sense and the form as existing in the object. it follows too, from what we have said, that imagination is generally truthful when it arises from the action of the ‘proper sensibles’; I mean, at least so long as the sensible object is present and the image-movement is simultaneous with the sense-movement.

§ 665. But when the image-movement occurs in the absence of the exterior sense-object we can be deceived, even with regard to proper sensibles. We may imagine absent black things as white. On the other hand, the image-movements arising from perception of objects indirectly sensed, or of the common-sensibles, are liable to go astray whether the exterior object be present or not; although they are the more liable to error in the object’s absence.

§ 666. From this argument he then draws a conclusion touching his main contention: namely, if the foregoing remarks are true of nothing but the imagination, and are certainly true of it, then imagination must be the movement proceeding from the actuated senses.

§ 667. Whether this movement also presupposes some potency other than the exterior senses, is a question which Aristotle leaves unanswered. Since, however, diverse acts imply diverse potencies, and diverse movements connote diverse receivers of movement (for the moving thing moves something other than itself, it seems necessary to posit an imaginative potency distinct from the exterior senses.

§ 668. (b) Next, at ‘Since sight’, he explains the name phantasia. Note that phos is the Greek for light, whence comes phanos, i.e. ‘appearance’ or ‘enlightening’, and phantasia. He says, then, that, because sight is the principal sense, being more spiritual (as we have seen already) and knowing a wider range of objects than any other, therefore imagination, which arises from actual sensation, gets its name from light, without which nothing can be seen.

§ 669. (c) Then, at ‘And since these images’, he explains why the actions and passions of animals are governed by imagination. Images, he says ‘dwell within’ in the absence of sensible objects, as traces of actual sensations; therefore, just as sensations arouse appetitive impulses whilst the sensed objects are present, so do images when these are absent. And therefore images very largely determine the behaviour of animals. Nevertheless, this happens through their lack of intelligence; and where intelligence is present it is able, being a higher faculty, to make its own judgement prevail in practice.

§ 670. Hence, so long as the intellect is not in command animals are swayed by imagination; some animals because they simply lack intelligence (the beasts), and some in so far as their intellect is veiled (men). And men may be so swayed in three ways: (a) when they fall into some passion, such as anger, desire, fear etc.; (b) when they are of unsound mind, through delirium or insanity; and (c) when they are asleep and dreaming. In these cases the intellect ceases to control the imagination, with the result that men take their imaginary representations for the truth.

In conclusion, he says that he has now stated what the imagination is and whence it arises.

TEXT

429a10–429b4

BOOK III, CHAPTER, IV

THE INTELLECT IN GENERAL

As to the part. Of the soul by which it knows and is wise (whether separate spatially or only in idea) we must consider how it is differentiated and, further, how the operation of understanding arises. §§ 671-4

For if understanding is like sensing, it will be some kind of reception from an intelligible object, or some thing of that nature. It must then be impassible and yet receptive of a species, which it must already be potentially but not actually: And as the sense faculty stands to the sense-object, so will the intellective to the intelligible. §§ 675-6

It is also necessary, since its understanding extends to everything, that, as Anaxagoras says, it be uncompounded with anything so that it may command, i.e. know. For what appeared inwardly would prevent and impede what was without. Hence it has no nature and is not one, except in being potential. What then is called the 'intellect' of the soul (I mean that mind by which the soul forms opinions and understands) is not, before it understands, in act of any reality. §§ 677-83

Hence, it is a reasonable inference that it is not involved in the body. Were it so, it would also have some quality either hot or cold, and it would have an organ, like the sensitive faculties; but there is in fact none such. §§ 684-5

And they spoke to the point who said, that the soul was the place of forms—yet not the whole soul, but the intellectual part; nor actually, but only potentially, is it any form. § 686

That the impassibility of the sensitive faculty is not like that of the intellective faculty, is evident from the organs and from sensation itself. For the sense cannot receive an impression from too violent a sense-object—e.g. a sound from very great sounds, whilst from over-powerful odours there comes no smell, nor from over-strong colour any seeing. But when the intellect understands something highly intelligible, it does not understand what is inferior to these less than before, but more so. For whereas the sensitive faculty is not found apart from the body, the intellect is separate. §§ 687-99

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SEVEN

§ 671. Having treated of the sensitive part of the soul, and shown that to sense and to understand are quite distinct operations, the Philosopher now turns to the intellectual part. His treatment falls into two main divisions. First, he comes to certain conclusions on the intellectual part in general; after which, from what has been concluded about sense and intellect he deduces, at 'And now recapitulating' [L.13, §787], some necessary consequences with regard to the soul as a whole. The former division falls into two sections: one on the intellect as such, and one comparing intellect with the senses. The latter begins at 'And it seems that the sense-object' [L.12 §765]. The intellect as such is first treated in itself, and then, at 'Intelligence etc.' [L.11 §746], in its activity. The former part then subdivides again into three parts: (a) on the potential intellect; (b) on the agent intellect [L.10 §728]; and (c) on intellect as in act [L.10 §740]. After defining the potential intellect, he determines its object [L.8 §705], and then adduces an objection [L.9 §720]. The definition of potential intellect involves explanations (1) of its nature, and (ii) of the way it proceeds into act [L.8 §700]. And as to its nature, he first states the problems he is attempting to solve; after which, at 'For if understanding is like sensing' [§675], he propounds his own view.

§ 672. So he says that, having dealt 'With the sensitive part of the soul, and shown that judgement and understanding differ from sensation, it is now time to discuss that part of the soul 'by which it knows', i.e.

understands, and ‘is wise’. We have already distinguished between being wise and understanding; to be wise pertains to intellectual judgement, to understand pertains to intellectual apprehension.

§ 673. At this point an old problem emerges (which Aristotle for the time being sets aside), namely whether this part of the soul is a really separate being, distinct from the other parts, or is merely separable in thought. He refers to the former alternative when he speaks of being ‘spatially’ separable, and he uses this expression because Plato, who thought of the soul’s parts as really distinct entities, associated the latter with different organs of the body. This problem Aristotle sets aside.

§ 674. And he keeps two ends in view. One is to examine how this part of the soul differs from the others, if it can be separated from them in thought. And, as potencies are known from their acts, his second aim is to examine the act of understanding itself, i.e. how intellectual activity is completed.

§ 675. Next, at ‘For if understanding’, he sets down his own view in three stages: (1) he suggests a similarity between intellect and sense; (2) whence he argues, at ‘It is also necessary’, to a conclusion touching the nature of the potential intellect; (3) whence in turn he deduces a difference between intellect and sense, at ‘That the impassibility’.

First of all then, as a preliminary to the statement of his own theory, he suggests that the acts of understanding and of sensing are similar, in that, just as sensing is a kind of knowing, and as it may be either potential or actual, so understanding is a kind of knowing which may be either potential or actual. Whence it follows that, as sensing is a certain state of being passive to a sensible object (something like a passion in the strict sense of the term) so understanding is either a being passive to an intelligible object, or something else that resembles passion, in the strict sense.

§ 676. Of these alternatives the second is the more likely to be true. For even sensing, as we have seen, is not strictly a being passive to anything—for this, strictly, involves an object of a nature contrary to the passive subject. Yet sensing resembles a passion inasmuch as the sense is potential with respect to its object; for it receives sensible impressions. So far then as our understanding resembles sensation the intellect too will be impassible (taking passivity in the strict sense), yet will it show some likeness to what is passive, in its receptivity to intelligible ideas; for these it possesses only potentially, not actually. Thus, as sensitive life is to sensible objects, so is the intellect to intelligible objects, each being potential with respect to its object and able to receive that object.

§ 677. Then at ‘It is also necessary’ he proceeds to deduce the nature of the potential intellect. First he shows that this intellect is not a bodily thing nor compounded of bodily things; and then, at ‘Hence it is a reasonable’ that it has no bodily organ. As to the first point, we should note that there used to be two opinions about the intellect. Some—and this, as we have seen, was the view of Empedocles—thought that intellect was a composition of all the principles of things, and that this explained its universal knowledge. On the other hand Anaxagoras thought it was simple and pure and detached from all bodily things. And therefore, precisely because the intellect, as he has just said, is not in act of understanding, but in potency only, and in potency to know everything, Aristotle argues that it cannot be compounded of bodily things, as Empedocles thought, but must be separate from such things, as Anaxagoras thought.

§ 678. Now the reason why Anaxagoras thought this was that he regarded intellect as the principle that dominated and initiated all movement; which it could not be if it were either a composition of bodily things or identified with any one of such things; for in these cases it would be restricted to one course of action only. Hence Aristotle’s observation that, in Anaxagoras’ view, the intellect was detached ‘so that it might command’ and, commanding, initiate all movement.

§ 679. But, since we are not concerned at present with the all-moving Mind, but with the mind by which the soul understands, we require a different middle term to prove that the intellect is unmixed with bodily things; and this we find in its universal knowledge. That is why Aristotle adds ‘That it might know’, as if to say: as Anaxagoras maintained that intellect was unmixed because it commands, so we have to maintain that it is unmixed because it knows.

§ 680. The following argument may make this point clear. Anything that is in potency with respect to an object, and able to receive it into itself, is, as such, without that object; thus the pupil of the eye, being potential to colours and able to receive them, is itself colourless. But our intellect is so related to the objects it understands that it is in potency with respect to them, and capable of being affected by them (as sense is related to sensible objects). Therefore it must itself lack all those things which of its nature it understands. Since then it naturally understands all sensible and bodily things, it must be lacking in every bodily nature; just as the sense of sight, being able to know colour, lacks all colour. If sight itself had any particular colour, this colour would prevent it from seeing other colours, just as the tongue of a feverish man, being coated with a bitter moisture, cannot taste anything sweet. In the same way then, if the intellect were restricted to any particular nature, this connatural restriction would prevent it from knowing other natures. Hence he says: ‘What appeared inwardly would prevent and impede’ (its knowledge of) ‘what was without’; i.e. it would get in the way of the intellect, and veil it so to say, and prevent it from inspecting other things. He calls ‘the inwardly appearing’ whatever might be supposed to be intrinsic and co-natural to the intellect and which, so long as it ‘appeared’ therein would necessarily prevent the understanding of anything else; rather as we might say that the bitter moisture was an ‘inwardly appearing’ factor in a fevered tongue.

§ 681. From this he concludes, not that in fact the nature of the intellect is ‘not one’, i.e. that it has no definite nature at all; but that its nature is simply to be open to all things; and that it is so inasmuch as it is capable of knowing, not (like sight or hearing) merely one ‘particular class of sensible objects, nor even all sensible accidents and qualities (whether these be common or proper sense-objects) but quite generally the whole of sensible nature; Therefore, just as the faculty of sight is by nature free from one class of sensible objects, so must the intellect be entirely free from all sensible natures.

§ 682. He concludes further that what we call our intellect is not in act with respect to real beings until it actually understands. This is contrary to the early philosophers’ principle that intellect must be compounded of all things if it can know all things. But if it knew all things, as containing them all in itself already, it would be an ever-actual intellect, and never merely in potency. In the same way he has remarked already of the senses, that if they were intrinsically made up of the objects they perceive, their perceptions would not presuppose any exterior sensible objects.

§ 683. And lest anyone should suppose this to be true of any and every intellect, that it is in potency to its objects before it knows them, he adds that he is speaking here of the intellect by which the soul understands and forms opinions. Thus he excludes from this context the Mind of God, which, far from being potential, is a certain actual understanding of all things, and of which Anaxagoras said that it could command all because it was perfectly unmixed.

§ 684. Next, at ‘Hence it is a reasonable’, he shows that the intellect has no bodily organ; and then, at ‘They spoke to the point’, approves a saying of the early philosophers. First, then, he concludes from what has been said, that if the mind’s universal capacity for knowledge implies its intrinsic distinction from all the corporeal natures that it knows, for the same reason it can be argued that the mind is not ‘involved in the body’, i.e. that it has no bodily organ, as the sensitive part of the soul has. For if the intellect had, like the sensitive part, a bodily organ, it would necessarily be just one particular sensible nature among many. Therefore he says ‘some quality’ etc., meaning that a nature of this kind would have some particular sensible quality such as actual heat or cold; for it is obvious that, if the soul acts through a bodily organ, the soul itself must correspond to that organ as being in potency to its act.

§ 685. It makes no difference to the act of the potency whether it is the potency itself that has a particular sensible quality or the organ, since the act is not of the potency alone but of potency and organ together. In the same way sight would be impeded if it were the visual potency, not the pupil of the eye, that was coloured. So he says that it comes to the same to maintain that intellect has no bodily organ and that it has no particular bodily nature; and concludes that the intellectual part of the soul, unlike the sensitive, has no bodily organ.

§ 686. Next, where he says ‘And they spoke to the point’, he relates his view to an opinion of the early philosophers, saying that, granted intellect’s lack of a bodily organ, we can see the point of. the old saying that the soul is the ‘place’ of forms,—meaning that it receives these into itself. Now this saying would be false if every part of the soul had its bodily organ, for then the forms would be received into the composition of soul and body, not into the soul alone; for it is not sight that receives visible forms, but the eye. It follows that the soul as a whole is not the ‘place’ of forms, but only that part of it which lacks a bodily organ, i.e. the intellect; and even this part does not, as such, possess them actually, but potentially only.

§ 687. Then, at ‘That the impassibility’, he shows how the intellect and the senses differ with respect to impassibility. He has already observed that neither sensation nor understanding is a passion in the precise sense of a state of being passively affected; whence he had inferred that the intellect was impassible. But, lest it be supposed that sense and intellect were impassible in the same degree, he now distinguishes them in this respect. Though the senses as such are not, strictly speaking, passively affected by their objects, they are indirectly so affected, inasmuch as the equilibrium of the sense-organ is disturbed by any excess in its object. But the same is not true of the intellect, since it has no organ; it is therefore neither directly nor indirectly passible.

§ 688. This is what he means when he proceeds to say that the dissimilarity between sense and intellect in point of passibility appears from the organs and from sensation. For a very strong sense-object can stun the faculty of sense. One can be deafened by great sounds, blinded by strong colours, made powerless to smell anything by over-powering odours; and this because the organ in each case is injured. But since the intellect has no organ that could be injured by an excess of its appropriate object, its activity is not, in fact, weakened by a great intelligibility in its object; indeed it is rather strengthened thereby; and the same would be true of the senses, if they could exist without bodily organs. All the same, an injury to an organ of the body may indirectly weaken the intellect, in so far as the latter's activity presupposes sensation. The cause, then, of the difference is that sensitivity acts in the body, but the intellect acts on its own.

§ 689. All this goes to show the falsity of the opinion that intellect is the same as imagination, or as anything else in our nature that depends on the body's constitution. On the other hand, this same text has been, for some, an occasion of falling into the error of regarding the intellectual power as quite separated from the body, as a substance that exists on its own. Which is an utterly indefensible position.

§ 690. For it is clear that the actually intelligent being is this particular man. Whoever denies this implies that he himself understands nothing; and therefore that one need pay no attention to what he says. But if he does understand anything he must do so in virtue of some principle in him of this particular activity of understanding; which is the intellectual power (as potential) to which the Philosopher refers when he says: 'I mean that mind by which the soul understands and forms opinions'. The potential intellect then is precisely that by which this particular man understands. Now that in virtue of which, as a principle of activity, an agent acts may certainly exist in separation from the agent; as e.g. a king and his bailiff have separate existence, though the latter acts only as moved by the king. But it is quite impossible for the agent to exist separately from that by which, formally and immediately, he is an agent; and this because action only proceeds from an agent in ,so far as the latter is in a state of actuality. It follows that the agent and the proper and immediate principle of his activity must exist together in one act; which could not be if they were separate beings. Hence the impossibility of a separation in being of an agent from its formal principle of activity.

§ 691 With this truth in mind, those who maintained the opinion to which I refer tried to think out some way of so linking up and uniting the separated substance, which for them was the intellectual potency, with ourselves, as to identify its act of understanding with out own. They said then that the form of the potential intellect, that by which it is brought into act, was the intelligible idea; and that the subject possessed of this idea was a kind of phantasm produced by ourselves. In this way, they said, the potential intellect is linked with us through its form.

§692. But this theory entirely fails to prove any continuity between the intellect and ourselves. For the intellectual power is only united with an intelligible object in the degree that it is in act; just as we have seen that the senses cannot unite with their appropriate objects so long as these remain in potency. Therefore the intelligible idea cannot be the form of the intellectual power until it is actually understood; and this cannot happen until it is disengaged from phantasms by abstraction. Hence, precisely in the degree that it is joined to the intellect it is removed from phantasms. Not in this way therefore could an intellectual power be united with us.

§ 693. And obviously the upholder of this view was led astray by a fallacia accidentis. For his argument comes to this: phantasms are somehow united to intelligible ideas, and these to the potential intellect; and therefore the latter is united to the phantasms. But, as I say, it is clear that, in the degree that the intelligible idea is one with the intellectual power, it is abstracted from phantasms.

§ 694. But even granted that between the intellectual power and ourselves there existed some such union as this view supposes, it would not in fact cause us to understand, but rather to be understood. If the eye contains a likeness of a coloured. wall, this does not cause the colour to see, but, on the contrary, to be seen. Therefore if the intelligible idea in the intellect is a sort of likeness of our phantasms, it does not follow that we perceive anything intellectually, but rather that we-or more precisely our phantasms-are understood by that separated intellectual substance.

§ 695. Many other criticisms might be urged, such as I have set out in more detail elsewhere. Enough to note for the present that the. theory in question is an implicit denial of the existence of thinking in the human individual.

§ 696. Furthermore, it is also clearly contrary to the teaching of Aristotle. First, because he has explicitly said (at the beginning of the treatise) that the subject matter of his enquiry is a part of the soul, not any separated substance.

§ 697. Moreover, he has set out to examine the intellect leaving aside the question whether it is a being distinct from the rest of the soul; so that even if it be not distinct in this way, that does not affect his argument.

§ 698. Again, Aristotle calls the intellect that by which the soul understands. All these indications show that he did not assert that the intellect was a separate substance.

§ 699. Indeed it is astonishing how easily some have let themselves be deceived by his calling the intellect ‘separate’; for the text itself makes it perfectly clear what he means,—namely that, unlike the senses, the intellect has no bodily organ. For the nobility of the human soul transcends the scope and limits of bodily matter. Hence it enjoys a certain activity in which bodily matter has no share; the potentiality to which activity is without a bodily organ; and in this sense only is it a ‘separate’ intellect.

TEXT

429b5–429b22

BOOK III, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED

INTELLECTUAL ABSTRACTION

But when it becomes particular objects, as in a man, of science, the intellect is said to be in act. (This comes about as soon as such a one is able to operate of himself.) It is, then, in a way still in potency, but not in the way it was before it learned or discovered. And then, too, it is able to think itself. §§ 700-704

Now, as dimension is one thing and the being of dimension another, and as water is one thing and the being water another, and so with many other things (but not all things, for in certain things ‘flesh’ is the same as ‘being flesh’) accordingly it discriminates either by some other [faculty] or by the same faculty differently disposed. For flesh is not separable from matter; it is like the snub of a nose, one, [thing] existing in the other. There is discerned therefore by the sensitive faculty what is hot, what is cold, and anything else of which the flesh is a certain ratio. But either by another and separate faculty, or as if it were bent back upon itself (whereas it was previously straight), does it perceive the being of flesh. §§ 705-13

Again, in the abstract sphere the straight line is as the snub-nose; for it goes with the continuum. But its essence, if being [straight] is other than a straight line, is different. Let it be, for instance, Duality. Then [the mind] discerns either by another faculty or by the same differently disposed. In general, then, as things are separable from matter, so are intellectual operations. §§ 714-19

LECTIO EIGHT

§ 700. Having reached certain conclusions about the intellect as potential with respect to intelligible objects, the Philosopher now goes on to show how it is actualised. And first he shows that it is actualised intermittently; and then, at 'Now as dimension', what is the precise object of its actualisation.

He explains how the intellect is actualised thus. The intellectual soul is, we have said, only in potency to its ideas at first. 'But when it becomes particular objects', i.e. when the mind reaches the degree of actual apprehension of intelligibles that is found in the knowledge habitually possessed by a man of science, then it can already be called an intellect in act; and that degree is reached as soon as one is capable of producing, on one's own initiative, the intellectual activity called understanding. For the actual possession of any form is coincident with the ability to act accordingly.

§ 701. Yet though a mind is already, in a way, in act when it has intelligible notions in the manner of one who possesses a science habitually, none the less the mind then is still, in a way, in potency; though not in the same way as it was before it acquired the science, either by being taught it or by its own unaided efforts. Before it acquired the habit of a science—which is its first state of actuality—it could not actualise itself at will, it needed to be brought into act by the mind of another; but once such a habit is acquired, the intellect has the power to bring itself into action at will.

§ 702.What is said here disproves the un-aristotelian position of Avicenna touching intelligible ideas. Avicenna maintained that ideas are not retained by the potential intellect, but exist in it only so long as it is actually understanding. Whence it follows that, for this intellect to come to the act of understanding anything, it must have recourse to a separated active intellect, the source of intelligible ideas in the intellectual potency.

§ 703. But against this Aristotle is clearly saying that the manner in which the mind becomes actually possessed of ideas is that of one who, possessing a science habitually, is stiff in potency to a given act of understanding. Thus the mind actually understanding possesses its ideas in fullest actuality; and so long as it has the habit of a science, it possesses them in a manner half-way between mere potency and complete actuality.

§ 704. And having asserted that, once the mind has become partly actual with respect to certain ideas hitherto potentially apprehended, it is capable of understanding, whereas simply regarded in itself it lacks the capacity, because this might lead one to suppose that even as in act the mind never thinks of itself, Aristotle adds that, once in act, the mind is able to think not only of other things, but also of itself.

§ 705. Next at ‘Now, as dimension is one’, Aristotle elucidates the object of the intellect. To understand him here we must recall the problem stated in Book VII of the Metaphysics, namely whether the ‘whatness’ or quiddity or essence of a thing—whatever is signified by its definition—whether this is the same as the thing itself And whilst Plato had separated the quiddities (called by him ‘ideas’ or ‘species’) of things from things in their singularity, Aristotle was concerned to show that quiddities are only accidentally distinct from singular things. For example, a white man and his essence are distinct just in so far as the essence of man includes only what is specifically human, whereas the thing called one white man includes something else as well.

§ 706. And the same is true of anything whose form exists in matter; there is something in it besides its specific principle. The specific nature is individualised through matter; hence the individualising principles and individual accidents are not included in the essence as such. That is why there can be many individuals of the same specific nature—having this nature in common, whilst they differ in virtue of their individuating principles. Hence, in all such things, the thing and its essence are not quite identical. Socrates is not his humanity. But where the form does not exist in matter, where it exists simply in itself, there can be nothing except the essence; for then the form is the entire essence. And in such cases, of course, there cannot be a number of individuals sharing the same nature; nor can the individual and its nature be distinguished.

§ 707. This also should be considered, that things existing concretely in Nature—physical things—are not alone in having their essences in matter; the same is also true of mathematical entities. For there are two kinds of matter: sensible matter, which is intrinsic to physical things and from which the mathematician abstracts; and intelligible matter, intrinsic to mathematical entities. For it is clear that, whereas quantity pertains to a substance immediately, sensible qualities, like white and black or heat and cold, presuppose quantity. Now given two things ofwhich one is prior to the other, if you remove the second, the first remains; hence if only its sensible qualities are removed from a substance by a mental abstraction, continuous quantity still remains, in the mind, after the abstraction.

§ 708. For there are some forms which can only exist in a matter which is possessed of certain definite sensible qualities; and such are the forms of physical things; and such things therefore always involve sensible matter. But there are other forms which do not call for matter possessed of definite sensible qualities, yet do require matter existing as quantity. These are the so-called mathematical objects such as triangles, squares and the like; they are abstracted from sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter; for the mind retains the notion of a quantitative continuum after abstracting from sensible quality. Clearly then, both physical and mathematical objects have their forms in matter, and in both there is a difference between a thing and its essence; which is why in both cases many individual things are found to share the same nature: e.g. men and triangles.

§ 709. If these points are understood-, the text of Aristotle should present no difficulties. For he says ‘dimension, and the being of dimension’ differ, meaning a dimension and its essence-for by ‘the being of dimension’ he means its essence. So also ‘water’ and its ‘being’ are distinct; and similarly in the case of ‘many other things’, i.e. in all physical and mathematical objects. Hence his choice of these two examples: for dimension is a mathematical object and water a physical one.

§ 710. But this distinction is not verified in ‘all things’; for in perfectly immaterial substances the thing is identical with its essence. And as such substances are beyond the reach of the human mind, Aristotle could not assign proper names to them, as he could to physical and mathematical objects; so he describes them in terms drawn from physical objects. That is why he says that ‘in certain ‘ things flesh’ and ‘its being’ are identical.’ He does not mean this literally, else he would not have said ‘in certain things’, but would have absolutely identified flesh and its being. He means that ‘in certain things’, i.e. immaterial substances, the two factors which we distinguish as the concrete thing and what is predicated of it—for instance flesh and its being—are identical.

§ 711. And since diversity in objects known implies diversity in the knowing faculties, he concludes by saying that either the soul knows a thing with one faculty and its essence with another, or both with the same faculty functioning in different ways. For it is obvious that flesh can only exist in matter; its form being in a certain definite and particular sensible matter. The being, too, which has flesh is a definite sensible thing, e.g. a nose. Now this sensitive nature the soul knows through the senses; that is why he adds that it is by the sense-faculty that the soul discerns the hot and the cold and so forth, of which flesh is a certain 'ratio', i.e. proportion. For the form of flesh requires a certain definite proportion of heat and cold and so forth.

§ 712. But the 'being of flesh', i.e. its essence, must be 'discerned' by some other faculty. But the functioning of two distinct 'faculties' takes place in two ways. In one way flesh and its essence can be discerned by powers in the soul which are completely distinct; the essence discerned by the intellect, the flesh by the senses; and this happens when we know the individual in itself and the specific nature in itself. But in another way the flesh and its essence may be discerned, not by two distinct faculties, but by one faculty knowing in two distinct ways—knowing in one way flesh, in another the essence of flesh; and this happens when the knowing soul correlates the universal and the individual. For, just as it would be impossible for us (as we have seen) to distinguish sweetness from whiteness if we had not a common sense faculty which knew both at once, so also we could not make any comparison between the universal and the individual if we had not a faculty which perceived both at once. The intellect therefore knows both at once, but in different ways.

§ 713. It knows the specific nature or essence of an object by going out directly to that object; but it knows the individual thing indirectly or reflexively, by a return to the phantasms from which it abstracted what is intelligible. This Aristotle expresses by saying that the intellectual soul either knows flesh sensitively and discerns the 'being of flesh' with 'another' and 'separate' potency,—i.e. other than sensitivity, in the sense that intellect is a power distinct from the senses; or it knows flesh and the 'being of flesh' by one and the same intellectual power functioning diversely; in so far as it can 'bend back', so to say, 'upon itself'. As 'stretched out straight', and apprehending directly, it 'discerns' the 'being' or essence of flesh; but by reflection it knows the flesh itself.

§ 714. Next, at ‘Again, in the abstract sphere’, he applies what he had said of physical objects to mathematical objects, saying that ‘in the abstract sphere’, i.e. ‘in mathematics, where we abstract from sensible matter, the straight line is like the snub-nosed in the sphere of sensible matter. For line is a mathematical object, as a snub-nose is a physical one; and fine essentially involves a continuum, as what is snub-nosed a nose. But the continuum is intelligible matter, as what is snub-nosed is sensible matter. Therefore in mathematics also the thing and its essence, e.g. the straight fine and its straightness, are different; hence too, even in mathematics, things and essences must be objects of different kinds of knowing.

§ 715. As an instance of this let us suppose for a moment, with Plato, that the essence of straight line is duality (for Plato identified the essences of mathematical objects with numbers, so that a line was unity, a straight line duality, and so on). The soul then must know mathematical objects and their essences in different ways. Hence, just as it can be shown, in the case of physical objects, that the intellect knowing their essences is other than the senses which know them in their individuality, so too, in the case of mathematics, it can be shown that what knows the essences, i.e. the intellect, is distinct from what apprehends mathematical objects themselves, i.e. the imagination.

§ 716. And lest it be said that the mind works in the same way in mathematics and in natural science, he adds that the relation of things to the intellect corresponds to their separability from matter. What is separate in being from sensible matter can be discerned only by the intellect. What is not separate from sensible matter in being, but only in thought, can be perceived in abstraction from sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter. Physical objects, however, though they are intellectually discerned in abstraction from individual matter, cannot be completely abstracted from sensible matter; for ‘man’ is understood as including flesh and bones; though in abstraction from this flesh and these bones. But the singular individual is not directly known by the intellect, but by the senses or imagination.

§ 717. From this text of Aristotle one can go on to show that the intellect’s proper object is indeed the essence of things; but not the essence by itself, in separation from things, as the Platonists thought. Hence this ‘proper object’ of our intellect is not, as the Platonists held, something existing, outside sensible things; it is something intrinsic to sensible things; and this, even though the mode in which essences are grasped by the mind differs from their mode of existence in sensible things; for the mind discerns them apart from the individuating conditions which belong to them in the order of sensible reality. Nor need this involve the mind in any falsehood; for there is no reason why, of two conjoined things, it should not discern one without discerning the other; just as sight perceives colour without perceiving odour, though not without perceiving colour's necessary ground which is spatial magnitude. In like manner, the intellect can perceive a form apart from its individuating principles, though not apart from the matter required by the nature of the form in question; thus it cannot understand the snub-nosed without thinking of nose, but it can understand a curve without thinking of nose. And it was just because the Platonists failed to draw this distinction that they thought that mathematical objects and the essences of things were as separate from matter in reality as they are in the mind.

§ 718. Furthermore, it is clear that the intelligible ideas by which the potential intellect is actualised are not in themselves the intellect's object: for they are not that which, but that by which it understands. For, as with sight the image in the eye is not what is seen, but what gives rise to the act of sight (for what is seen is colour which exists in an exterior body), so also what the intellect understands is the essence existing in things; it is not its own intelligible idea, except in so far as the intellect reflects upon itself. Because, obviously, it is what the mind understands that makes up the subject-matter of the sciences; and all these, apart from rational science, have realities for their subject-matter, not ideas. Clearly then, the intellect's object is not the intelligible idea, but the essence of intelligible realities.

§ 719. From which we can infer the futility of an argument used by some to prove that all men have only one potential intellect in common. They argue from the fact that all men can understand one and the same object; and say that if there were really many human intellects they would necessarily have many intelligible ideas. But these intelligible ideas are not precisely what the mind understands; they are only the latter's likeness present in the soul; hence it is quite possible for many intellects to possess likenesses of one and the same object, so that one thing is understood by all. Besides, the separated substances must know the essences of the physical things which we know; and clearly their intellects are distinct. Hence, if the above argument were valid, its conclusion—that all men have only one intellect—would still involve a difficulty; for one cannot reduce all intellects to one.

TEXT

429b23-430a9

BOOK III, CHAPTER IV, CONTINUED

PROBLEMS ARISING

INTELLECT AS INTELLIGIBLE

One might well enquire (if the intellect is simple and impassible, having nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras said) how it understands, if understanding is a receiving. For it seems that one thing acts and another is acted on, only in so far as there is a factor common to the two. § 720

Again, if it is itself an intelligible: then either there is intellect in other intelligible things-(unless it is intelligible by virtue of some extrinsic principle) the intelligible being specifically one; or it will have, mixed with itself, something that makes it intelligible, as other things have. §§ 721-2

Or what about the receptivity in a general sense, already alluded to in making distinctions on this point? Before it makes ai; act of understanding, the intellect is its intelligible objects potentially, but not actually. It must be as with a tablet on which there is nothing actually written; and so indeed it is in the case of intellect. §§ 722-3

And it is itself an intelligible like other intelligible objects. For in things separated from the material, intellect and what is understood by it are identical. Speculative knowledge is the same as what is knowable in this way. §§ 724-6

The reason why there is not always understanding must be considered. In material things, each intelligible object exists only potentially. Hence in them is no intellect, for the mind that understands such things is an immaterial potency. The intelligible exists, however [in them]. § 727

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO NINE

§ 720. Having outlined the nature and object of the potential intellect, Aristotle now goes on to discuss some relevant difficulties; and this in two stages: first stating two problems and then, at 'Or what about the receptivity', answering them. The first of the two problems might be stated thus: if intellect is, as Anaxagoras said, something simple and impassible and removed from all else, how can it actually understand? For to understand is a kind of receiving, and every receiver, as such, would seem to be affected by an agent; and it is precisely through having something in common that two things are related as agent and patient, this mutual relationship implying a material factor in common, as is shown in Book I of the De Generatione.

§ 721. The second difficulty he states at 'Again, if it is'. This difficulty is occasioned by his earlier statement that once the mind is in act it can understand itself. Now if intellect itself is intelligible, it is so in either of two ways: either merely of itself, or by way of something else conjoined with it. If the first alternative be true, then, since the intelligible as such forms one species, and since this intelligible is an intellect, it seems to follow that other intelligibles are also intellects, and thus everything intelligible is also intelligent. Should we take the second alternative, however, it would follow that the mind was like other things that are understood in being conjoined with something which makes it intelligible, with the result, it might seem, here also, that that which is understood is always possessed of understanding.

§ 722. Then at 'Or what about the receptivity', he removes these difficulties. As to the first, relying on his earlier analysis of passivity, he reminds us that one can speak of passivity in a general sense which is common to two different kinds of change: to the mutual alteration of things which have their material factor in 'common and mutually exclusive, alternating formal determinations; and also to the change which implies nothing more than a reception of forms from outside the changed thing. The mind, then, is called passive just in so far as it is in potency, somehow, to intelligible objects which are not actual in it until understood by it. It is like a sheet of paper on which no word is yet written, but many can be written. Such is the condition of the intellect as a potency, so long as it lacks actual knowledge of intelligible objects.

§ 723. This is against, not only the early natural philosophers' view that the soul knows all things because it is composed of all things, but also Plato's opinion that the human soul is by nature in possession of a universal knowledge which only its union with the body has caused it to forget. (This theory is implicit in Plato's reduction of learning to remembering.)

§ 724. After this, at 'And it is itself', he answers the second difficulty; and then, at 'The reason why there is not', a fresh objection. First, then, he says that the potential intellect is itself intelligible, not indeed immediately, but like other intelligible things, through a concept. To prove this he has recourse to the principle that the actually understood object and the actually understanding subject are one being—just as he said earlier in this book, that the actually sensed object and the actually sensing subject are one being. Now the actually understood is so in virtue of an abstraction from matter; for, as we have seen, things become objects of the understanding just in the degree that they can be separated from matter. So he says 'in things separated from the material'. So the understanding and the understood are one being, provided the latter is actually understood; and the same is true of the object and subject of sensation. Speculative knowledge and what is knowable 'in this way' (i.e. in act) are identical. Therefore the concept of the actually understood thing is also a concept of the understanding, through which the latter can understand itself. That is why all the foregoing discussion of the potential intellect has been carried on in terms of the latter's act and object. For we only know the intellect through our knowledge that we are using it.

§ 725. The reason why the potential intellect cannot be known immediately, but only through a concept, is the fact that it is potential also as an intelligible object; for, as it is proved in Book IX of the Metaphysics, intelligibility depends upon actuality. And there is a like dependence in the field of sensible realities too. In this field what is purely potential, i.e. bare matter, cannot act of itself, but only through some form conjoined with it; whereas sensible substances, being compositions of potency. and act, can act, to some extent, of themselves. So, too, the potential intellect, being purely potential in the order of intelligible things, neither understands nor is understood except through its own concepts.

§ 726. But God who, among intelligible objects, is the one that is perfect actuality, and also the other immaterial substances midway between potency and act, know and are known simply of and in themselves.

§ 727. Next, at ‘The reason why’, he answers an objection to the above solution. For if our mind, like other things, is rendered intelligible by union with some principle of intelligibility which is not precisely itself, why should not any intelligible object be itself a subject which understands;—or, as he says, we still have to enquire into ‘the reason’ for ‘not always understanding’. Now the reason is that in any material thing the form is not actually intelligible; it is only potentially so; and only what is actually intelligible, not the merely potentially so, is identical with intellect; so that things whose form exists in matter are not themselves possessed of an intellect with which to understand. The ‘mind that understands such things’ (i.e. intelligible objects) is a certain immaterial potency. The material thing is indeed intelligible but only potentially, whereas what exists in an intellect is an actually intelligible form.

TEXT

430a10–430a25

BOOK III, CHAPTER V

THE AGENT INTELLECT

Now since in all nature there is a factor that is as matter in the genus, and is potentially all that is in the genus, and something else which is as cause and agent as making everything in it (thus art is related to its material): so there must be these differences in the soul. There is that intellect, which is such as being able to become everything; and there is that which acts upon everything, as a sort of state, like light; for light too, in a way, makes potential colours actual. §§ 728-31

And this is intellect separable, uncompounded and incapable of being acted on, a thing essentially in act. For the agent is always more excellent than the recipient, and the principle than its material. §§ 732-9

Knowledge in act is the same as the thing itself. But what is potential has temporal priority in the individual; yet this, is not true universally, even with respect to time. Mind does not know at one time and not know at another time. §§ 740-1

Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And this alone is immortal and perpetual. §§ 742-3

It does not remember, because it is impassible; the passive intellect is corruptible, and the soul understands nothing apart from this latter. § 744-5 [See NOTE.]

LECTIO TEN

§ 728. Having examined the potential intellect, the Philosopher now turns his attention to the agent intellect. He first shows by argument and illustration that there is such a thing as the agent intellect; and then, at ‘And this is intellect’, he explains its nature. The argument he uses is this. In any nature which alternates between potency and actuality we must posit (1) a factor akin to the matter which, in any given class of things, is potentially all the particulars included in the class; and (2,) another factor which operates as an active and productive cause, like art with respect to its material. Since then the intellectual part of the soul alternates between potency and act, it must include these two distinct principles: first, a potentiality within which all intelligible concepts can be actualised (this is the potential intellect already discussed); and then, also, a principle whose function it is to actualise those concepts. And this latter is the agent intellect,—being ‘a sort of state’.

§ 729. This last phrase has led some to suppose that the agent intellect is one with the ‘intellect’ which is a habitual apprehension of first principles. But it is not so; for the latter ‘intellect’ presupposes the actual presence in the mind of certain intelligible and understood objects, which are the terms in understanding which we apprehend the truth of first principles. So the view in question would imply that the agent intellect was not, as Aristotle here maintains, the primary source, for us, of the actual intelligibility of anything. Therefore I hold that the term ‘state’ is used here in the sense in which Aristotle often calls any form or nature a ‘state’, to distinguish it from a privation or a potency. In this case the agent intellect is called a state to distinguish it from the intellect in potency.

§ 730. So he calls it a state, and compares it to light which ‘in a way’ brings colours from potency to act;—’in a way’ because, as we have seen, colour is visible of itself; all that light does is to actualise a transparent medium which can then be modified by colour so that colour is seen. The agent intellect, on the other hand, actualises the intelligible notions themselves, abstracting them from matter, i.e. bringing them from potential to actual intelligibility.

§ 731. The reason why Aristotle came to postulate an agent intellect was his rejection of Plato’s theory that the essences of sensible things existed apart from matter, in a state of actual intelligibility. For Plato there was clearly no need to posit an agent intellect. But Aristotle, who regarded the essences of sensible things as existing in matter with only a potential intelligibility, had to invoke some abstractive principle in the mind itself to render these essences actually intelligible.

§ 732. Next, at ‘And this etc.’, he states four qualities or conditions of the agent intellect: first, its separation from matter; second, its impassibility; third, its purity, by which he means that it is neither made up of bodily natures nor conjoined with a bodily organ. Now these three qualities are also found in the potential intellect; but the fourth is proper to the agent intellect, and consists in its being essentially in act; whereas, the potential intellect is essentially potential and comes to act only by receiving an intelligible object.

§ 733. To demonstrate these qualities he argues as follows. What acts is nobler than what is acted on, an active principle is nobler than its material. Now the agent intellect, as we have said, is to the potential intellect as an active principle to its material; therefore it is the nobler of the two. if, then, the potential intellect be (as has been shown) free from matter and impassible and pure, a fortiori the agent intellect. Consequently the agent intellect is also essentially actual, for only in virtue of its actuality is an active principle nobler than a passive one.

§ 734. Now what is said here has led some to conceive of the agent intellect as a separated substance, subsisting apart from the potential intellect. But this does not seem to be true; for human nature would be a deficient nature if it lacked any one of the principles that it needs for its naturally appropriate activity of understanding; and this requires both the potential and the agent intellects. Hence, complete human nature requires that both of these be intrinsic to man. Moreover, just as the potential intellect’s function of receiving intelligible objects is attributed to the individual man as its subject, so also is the work of the agent intellect, the abstracting of such objects from matter. And this is only possible in so far as the formal principle of the latter activity is one in being with the individual man.

§ 735. Nor is it enough to say that the intelligible notions formed by the agent intellect subsist somehow in phantasms, which are certainly intrinsic to us; for as we have already observed in treating of the potential intellect, objects only become actually intelligible when abstracted from phantasms; so that, merely by way of the phantasms, we cannot attribute the work of the agent intellect to ourselves. Besides, the agent intellect is to ideas in act in the mind as art is to the ideas it works by; and obviously the things on which art impresses such ideas do not themselves produce the art; hence, even granted that we were the subjects of ideas made actually intelligible in us, it would not follow that it is we who produce them by means of an agent intellect in ourselves.

§ 736. Nor does the above theory agree with Aristotle who expressly states that these two distinct powers, the agent and the potential intellects, are in the soul; thus making it quite clear that he takes them to be parts or potencies of the soul, not distinct substances.

§ 737. The chief difficulty arises from the fact that, while the potential intellect is in potency to intelligible objects, the agent intellect stands to the latter as a being already in act. And it would seem impossible that one and the same thing should be at once in act and in potency to the same object; and therefore that these two intellects should belong to the one substance of the soul.

§ 738. But there is really no difficulty in this if we understand aright how the potential intellect is potential with respect to intelligible objects, and how the latter are potential with respect to the agent intellect. In the former case the potentiality is that of the indefinite to the definite; for the potential intellect is not, as such, endowed with any definite and particular sensible thing's nature. Yet only definite particular natures are, as such, intelligible—hence Aristotle's earlier comparison' of the intellectual power's relation to intelligible objects with that of a sheet of paper to particular definite pictures. And from this point of view the agent intellect is not in act.

§ 739. For if the agent intellect as such included the definite forms of all intelligible objects, the potential intellect would not depend upon phantasms; it would be actualised simply and solely by the agent intellect; and the latter's relation to intelligible objects would not be that of a maker to something made, as the Philosopher here says; for it would simply be identical with them. What makes it therefore in act with respect to intelligible objects is the fact that it is an active immaterial force able to assimilate other things to itself, i.e.. to immaterialise them. In this way it renders the potentially intelligible actually so (like light which, without containing particular colours, actually brings colours into act). And because this active force is a certain participation in the intellectual light of separated substances, the Philosopher compares it to a state and to light; which would not be an appropriate way of describing it if it were itself a separate substance.

§ 740. Next, at ‘Knowledge in act’ he states his conclusions concerning intellect as in act; and first he states its properties; and then, it ‘Only separated’ how the intellectual part of the soul in general differs from the rest of the soul. Regarding the former point, he states three properties of intellect in act. First, its actual knowledge is identical with the thing known; which is not true of intellect as potential. Secondly, though in one and the same thing potential knowledge is prior in time to actual knowledge, yet, speaking universally, potential knowledge is not prior either in nature or in time. In Book IX of the Metaphysics, Aristotle had said that act is by nature prior to potency, but not in time in one and the same thing; for a thing is first in potency and afterwards in act. But universally speaking act takes priority even in time; because no potency would ever be actualised unless something were already in act. So, even in the case of potential knowledge, no one ever comes to know anything actually, whether through his own effort or another’s teaching, except in virtue of some pre-existing actual knowledge, as it is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics.

§ 741. The third property of intellect as in act, differentiating it from the potential intellect and from intellect in habitual possession of knowledge, is that it is always in act; for it simply is the act of understanding. In the other cases intellect is sometimes in act and sometimes in potency.

§ 742. Next, at ‘Only separated’, he states the properties of the intellect as a whole; first stating the truth, and then refuting an objection. He says, then, that only the mind separated from matter is that which really is mind; and he speaks here, not of the agent or passive intellect in isolation, but of both together, since both have been described as separated from matter. And the whole intellect is so described because it operates without a bodily organ.

§ 743. And in line with what he said at the beginning of this book, that the soul might be separable from the body if any of its activities were proper to itself, he now concludes that the soul's intellectual part alone is immortal and perpetual. This is what he has said in Book II, namely that this 'kind' of soul was separable from others as the perpetual from the mortal,—perpetual in the sense that it survives for ever, not in the sense that it always has existed; for as he shows in Book XII of the Metaphysics, forms cannot exist before their matter. The soul, then (not all of it, but only its intellectual part) will survive its matter.

§ 744. Next, at 'It does not remember', he meets an objection. For we might suppose that knowledge would remain unchanged in the intellectual part of the soul which survives. But already in Book I he has disallowed this, where, he observed that the act of the intellect must cease when something else dies; and that after death the soul remembers and loves no more.

§ 745. So now he adds that what we have known in life is not recalled after death; because 'it is impassible', i.e. that part of the intellectual soul of which he speaks; which, therefore, is unaffected by passions such as love and hatred and reminiscence and so forth, which all depend on modifications of the body. For the 'passive intellect'—a part of the soul which depends on the aforesaid passions—is certainly mortal; for it belongs to our sensitive nature. Nevertheless, it is called 'intellect' and 'rational' because it has a certain share in reason: it obeys and is governed by reason (see Book I of the Ethics). And without the co-operation of this embodied part of the soul there is no understanding anything; for the intellect always requires phantasms, as we shall see. Hence, after the body's death the soul no longer knows anything in the same way as before. But how it does know anything then is not part of our present enquiry.

TEXT

430a26–431b4

BOOK III, CHAPTER VI

INTELLECTUAL OPERATIONS

SIMPLE AND COMPLEX ‘INTELLIGIBLES’

Intelligence of what is not complex is in a sphere where there can be no deception. But in matters where there is false or true, there is also some composition of things understood as of many brought to a unity. As Empedocles said, ‘The heads of many grew with no neck’, [but] concord afterwards brought them to unity; so in the same way these disjunct terms are combined, like ‘the diagonal’ and ‘the incommensurate’. If the composition be of things done, or of future events, time also is taken into the reckoning, as one of the component elements. Falsity is always in a combination, as for instance when one brings together ‘white’ and a not-white object, or ‘not-white’ with a white one. All these statements can also be divisions. It is not only, then, false or true that Cleon is white, but that this fact was true or will be true. It is the intellect which imposes a unity in each case. §§ 746-5 1

As the indivisible is twofold, the actual and the potential, there is nothing to prevent the intellect from apprehending an indivisible when it apprehends an extended length.

For this length is actually undivided, and is [understood] in an undivided space of time: for time is divided or undivided like the length. It is not right to say that [the mind] understands both by halving both; There is no half, save potentially, unless an actual division has been made. However, in apprehending separately each of the halves, it divides the time also, which is then [divided] like the length. But if this is considered as a whole made up of two halves, then there is something corresponding to each in the time also. §§ 752-4

But whatever is not indivisible quantitatively, but specifically, the mind apprehends both in an instant of time and by a single act of the soul; incidentally, however, [it apprehends division] not in so far as what the mind understands and the time in which it understands are divisible, but as they are indivisible; for there is in these something indivisible, but perhaps not separable, which gives unity to time and extension; and this holds of all that is continuous, whether by time or extension. §§ 755-6

A point, and anything separated out and thus incapable of further analysis, is shown as a privation. A similar principle holds in other matters, as in the way we know air or blackness. For in some way the knowledge is by contrariety; but the knowing faculty must be in potency, and one [of the contraries] be in it. But if there is some cause that includes no contrary, it is self-knowing, and in act, and separate. §§ 757-9

Now every utterance, e.g. an affirmation, is of something, about some subject; and is always either true or false. Yet not all understanding is thus; understanding is true about what anything is, in the sense of the quiddity of it; not as to every fact about a subject, but, as sight is always true about its proper object, yet it is not always true about a white thing being a man or not. So it stands with whatever is immaterial. §§ 760-3

CHAPTER VII

Knowledge in act is identical with the thing. But what is potential is prior in time in the individual; though universally it is not prior, even in time; for all that comes into existencecomes from an actual existent. § 764

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO ELEVEN

§ 746. Having come to conclusions about the intellect the philosopher now examines its activity; and this in two parts; first distinguishing two such activities, and then reaching conclusions about each of these. First, then, he says that the intellect, by one of its activities, understands things simply; understanding, for instance, man or ox, or any such thing, simply in itself And this operation involves no falsehood, both because objects considered simply in themselves are neither true nor false, and also because, as we shall see later on, the mind is infallible with respect to what things are in themselves.

§ 747. On the other hand, where truth and falsehood are found in the intelligible objects themselves, there must have been already a certain composition of these objects, i.e. of the things understood, joining several such objects together. He gives as an example the theory of Empedocles that A things originated by chance, not design; by merely following a process of division and conjunction through strife and love respectively. Thus Empedocles said that in the beginning many heads 'grew' without necks; and similarly that many other parts of animals grew up in separation from other parts; and he says 'grew' as though these things sprang from the elements, not from the seed of animals, as. grass grows from the earth. Only afterwards did these parts, thus differentiated, come together in harmony and make up the single animal with its various parts—head, hands, feet and so on. And if all the parts necessary for the animal's existence were present it could go on living and would beget its own kind; but not if any were lacking. So then, just as love (according to Empedocles), brought together the different parts of animals and formed of them one animal, so too the intellect is able to combine many simple and separate objects and make one intelligible object of them. And such combinations are sometimes true and sometimes false.

§ 748. They are true when they put together what are combined and united in reality, e.g. the diagonal and incommensurability for the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with its sides. And they are false when they put together what are not combined in reality, saying, e.g. that the diagonal of a square is commensurable with its sides.

§ 749. Now commensurability and the diagonal are sometimes understood separately, making two distinct intelligible objects; but when combined they make one object which the mind understands all together. But again, since the objects so combined are sometimes things past or future, not present, he adds that when the mind combines things ‘done’—i.e. past—or things to come, it should include the notion of time past or future; and in this way its combination will refer to past or future.

§ 750. And he proves this by saying that combinations concerning past or future may be false, and that the falsehood is always in the combination itself Again, there is falsehood if the not-white is combined with what is white, as when swans are said to be not white; or if white is combined with the not-white, as when crows are said to be white. And because all that can be affirmed can also be denied, he adds that all these combinations might also have been divisions.

§ 751. For the mind can always separate things, whether in the present, or past or future; and it can do this both truly and falsely. Clearly then, since combinations can be made with reference to time past and future as well as present, and since truth and falsehood are found precisely in combinations and separations (or divisions), it follows that not only are propositions about the present true or false—e.g. that Cleon is white—but also propositions about the past or future—e.g. that Cleon was or shall be white. Since, however, the combination that makes a proposition is a work of reason and understanding, not of nature, he subjoins that the agent of such propositions, composed of intelligible objects, is the mind. And since it is in combinations that truth and falsehood are found, he can say, in Book VI of the Metaphysics, that truth and falsehood are not in things but in the mind.

§ 752. Next, at ‘As the indivisible is twofold’, he comes to conclusions on both the aforesaid intellectual activities: (1) on the understanding of objects simply in themselves; (2) at ‘Now every utterance’ on the intellect’s combinations and divisions; after which (3) he states something common to both. Section (1) divides into three parts according to three ways of considering indivisibility—that is to say, unity which consists in indivision.

First of all, a thing may be one by continuity; hence the continuum is called an indivisible because it is actually undivided, though it is potentially divisible. So he says that, since anything may be divisible either potentially or actually, there is nothing to prevent, the mind thinking of a continuum or length as indivisible actually. And, so doing, its thought will also occur in an undivided time.

§ 753. This is against the view of Plato, that the understanding of things in space involved a sort of continuous movement. In fact spatial things can be understood in two ways: either as potentially divisible—and thus the mind considers one section of a line after another, and so understands the whole in a period of time; or as actually indivisible—and thus the whole line is considered as a unity made up of parts and understood simultaneously. lie adds therefore that, in the act of understanding, either both time and length are divided, or both are not divided.

§ 754. Consequently it cannot be said that the understanding involves dividing both by half, i.e. that half a line is understood in half the given time it takes to understand a whole one. This would be the case if the line were actually divided; but a line, as such, is only potentially divisible. If each of its halves, however, is understood separately, then the whole is actually divided mentally; and the time is divided also. But if the line is understood as a unity made up of two parts, the time also will be undivided or instantaneous—the instant being that which persists in every part of time. And if the mind’s consideration is prolonged in time, the instants will not be separated with respect to distinct parts of the line understood one after another; but the whole line will be understood at every instant.

§ 755. Next, at ‘But whatever’, he mentions another kind of unity, namely that which comes of a thing being one in kind, though made up of discontinuous parts, e.g. the unity of a man, or a house, or even of an army.

This is a specific, not a quantitative indivision; and the soul, he says, understands it by what is undivided in the soul and in an indivisible point of time—not, as Plato thought, by anything quantitative in the intellect. And though division may be contained in such unities, the divided parts are not understood—so far as the object and time of the understanding are concerned—as divided, but as united; for even though there be an actual division into parts, the species itself, as such, is indivisible; and this it is that is indivisibly understood. But if the parts are understood separately—e.g. the flesh and bones and so forth—the whole is not understood in an undivided time.

§ 756. Then he points out wherein this second kind of unity seems to resemble the former kind. For as the species is something indivisible unifying the parts of a whole, so perhaps there may be something indivisible in any period of time or spatial length,—the point perhaps or the instant, or perhaps the species itself of length and d time. But there is this difference that, while the indivisible in the continuum is one and the same in every continuum, whether temporal or spatial, the unity of species differs from one thing to another; for some things are made up of homogeneous and some of heterogeneous parts.

§ 757. Then at ‘A point etc.’ he goes on to show how the third sort of indivisibility, i.e. whatever seems to be entirely one, such as a point or unit, is understood. A point, he says, is a sort of sign of division between sections of a line, as an instant between periods of time; and all such—being, like the point, both actually and potentially indivisible,—are ‘shown’ to the mind ‘as privation’, i.e. as privations of the divisible continuum.

§ 758. The reason being that our mind has to start from sense data. Sensibles therefore are the first things intellectually apprehended; and these all have some magnitude; hence the point and the unit can be only negatively defined. For the same reason whatever transcends the sensibles which we apprehend is known by us only negatively. Of ‘separated’ substances we only know that they are immaterial and incorporeal and so forth.

§ 759. It is the same with things known by opposition, such as evil or black, which are privations of their opposites; for of two contraries one is always a lack or privation of the other. So he adds that the mind somehow knows each of these by its contrary: evil by good and black by white. Now if our mind thus knows one contrary by means of another, it must do so by moving from potency into act, and also by receiving into itself the likeness of one contrary, e.g. of white, and only after and in virtue of this, the likeness of the other, e.g. of black. But ff there exists a mind that does not have to move from one contrary to another, it must have itself for its primary and immediate object; and it must know all other things in knowing itself; and be always in act and entirely immaterial—even in its being; and such is the Divine Mind according to the teaching of Book XII of the Metaphysics.

§ 760. Then at ‘Now every utterance’, he states a conclusion about the mind’s second activity of combining and distinguishing. He says that whenever a statement is made about anything—as when a mind affirms anything—the statement must be either true or false. Understanding as such, however, need not be true or false; its proper object is a simple one, and therefore, as bearing on this object, the act of understanding is neither true nor false. For truth and falsehood consist in a certain adequation or comparison of one thing to another, as when the mind combines or distinguishes; but not in the intelligible object taken by itself.

§ 761. Yet though this latter object as such is neither true nor false, the mind understanding it is true in so far as it is conformed to a reality understood. So he adds that just so far as the mind bears on an essence, i.e. understands what anything is, it is always true; but not just in so far as it relates one thing to another.

§ 762. The reason for this is that, as he says, essence, is what the intellect first knows; hence, just as sight is infallible with respect to its proper object, so is the intellect with respect to essence. It cannot, for instance, be mistaken when it simply knows what man is; on the other hand, just as sight can be deceived in respect of what is joined with its proper object, e.g. in discerning that some white object is a man, so too the intellect sometimes goes astray in relating one object to another. But the totally immaterial substances understand in a manner corresponding to our human apprehension of essences; so that they are infallible.

§ 763. But note that even in knowing essences deception can occur indirectly, in two ways: (a) inasmuch as one thing’s definition becomes false when applied to another thing; e.g. the definition of a circle applied to a triangle; and (b) inasmuch as the parts of a definition do not agree together, in which case the definition is simply false; e.g. if one were to include ‘lacking sense-perception’ in-one’s definition of ‘animal’. Whence it follows that deception absolutely cannot occur where the definition involves no combining of parts; in this case one either understands truly or not at all (See Book IX of the Metaphysics).

§ 764. Finally, at ‘Knowledge in act he repeats what he has said of intellect in act, that actual knowledge is one with its actual object; and that in one and the same thing potential knowledge precedes actual knowledge in time; but that this is not true universally; for all actualities derive from one Actual Being, as was explained above.

TEXT

431a4–43lb19

BOOK III, CHAPTER VII, CONTINUED

SENSE AND INTELLECT COMPARED

THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT

ABSTRACTION AGAIN

And it seems that the sense-object [simply] brings the sense-faculty from a state of potency to one of act; for [the latter] is not affected or altered. Hence it is a specifically distinct kind of movement. For movement is the actuality of the incomplete; whereas in its plain meaning act is different, as being of the thing completed. §§ 765-6

Sensation therefore is like mere uttering and understanding; but, given a pleasant or painful object, the soul pursues or avoids with, so to say, affirmation or negation. To be 'pleased' or to feel pain is to act in the sensitive mean in relation to the good or the bad as such; and pursuit or avoidance are this operation in act. And the faculties of desire and avoidance are not distinct,—nor distinct from the sensitive faculty; though in essence they differ. §§ 767-9

Imaginative phantasms are to the intellective soul as sense- objects. But when it affirms or denies good or evil it pursues or avoids. Hence the soul never understands apart from phantasms. §§ 770-2

This is comparable to the way that air affects the pupil with such and such a quality, and this in turn affects another part with the same quality:

and the hearing operates likewise. The ultimate is one, a single common mean whose essence, however, is various. With what it discerns how the sweet differs from the hot has been stated already and must be reaffirmed here.

For it is a unity in the sense of a terminus; and this unity—according to analogy and number—is related to distinct objects as they to one another. (What difference indeed does it make whether the comparison be of qualities not homogeneous, or of contraries, like black and white?). Thus, as A (white) is to B (black) so is C to D; hence therefore, also, alternating the proportions. If then C and D pertain to one uniting principle, they are to each other as A and B: identical though distinct in essence; so too is the aforesaid [principle]. The same relation holds if A be the sweet and B the white. §§ 773-6

The intellectual faculty therefore understands forms in phantasms. And as in these [forms] what is to be pursued by it, or avoided, is marked out for it, so too when these are in the imagination apart from sensation, is it moved. [For in stance] when one sees something fearful [e.g. fire], seeing the fire move one knows in general that someone is fighting. Sometimes, however, it is by means of the phantasms or concepts in the soul that one calculates as if seeing, and that one deliberates on future or present matters; and when one has said that the pleasing or the disagreeable is present, then one pursues or avoids. §§ 777-8

And generally in practical affairs, and apart from action, true and false are in the same category, whether good or evil. But they differ in being absolute and relative. §§ 779-80

The mind understands by abstraction, so called, as one might understand a snub-nose: as snub-nose, not in separation; but as curved, then, if the understanding be actual, the mind thinks of the curve apart from the flesh in which it exists. Thus, understanding mathematical objects, the mind understands things not separated as separated. And in general, the mind in the act of understanding is the thing itself. §§ 781-4

Whether it is possible for a mind that is not itself separated from extension to understand anything separated or no, is to be considered later. §§ 785-6

§ 765. Here the Philosopher turns to consider the intellect as compared with the senses; first explaining the kind of movement that sensation involves; and secondly, showing how this movement resembles that of the intellect.

On the former point he observes that the sense-object appears to play an active part in sensation, in so far as sensitivity as a whole is, to start with, in potency. For the sense-object and the sense-faculty are not mutually exclusive things, as though, when one acted on the other it had to transform and alter the latter by destroying something within it. In fact, all that the object does to the faculty is to actualise it; so he adds that sensitivity is not passive to the change-producing activity of the sense-object in the ordinary sense of the terms 'passivity' and 'change', which generally connote the substitution of one, of two mutually exclusive qualities for the other.

§ 766. Since, as he shows in the Physics, changes of bodies are of this latter kind, it is clear that ifwe call sensation a change we mean a different sort of change. Movement from one mutually exclusive quality to another is the actuality of a thing in potency; for while the thing is losing one quality, and so long as it still has not the other, its movement is still incomplete and it is in potency. And because the potential as such is imperfect, this kind of movement is an actuality of the imperfect; whereas the kind we are concerned with here is an actuality of what is perfect,—the response of a sense-faculty already actualised by its object. Only the senses in act can have sensations. So their movement is quite different from physical movement. It is this movement also which, together with understanding and willing, is properly called an 'operation': and this also is what Plato referred to when he said that the soul moves itself through knowing and loving itself.

§ 767. Next, at 'Sensation therefore' he likens the intellect's movement to that of the senses;—first showing how the senses move, and then, at 'Imaginative phantasms', how a similar movement takes place in the intellect. As regards the former point he says that, since the sensible object actualises our sensitivity without any accompanying passion (properly so called) or alteration, and the like also happens in intellection, as we have already seen, therefore sensation resembles the act of the intellect—that is to say, mere sensation, with its sensuous apprehension and judgement, resembles mere intellection, with its intellectual apprehension and judgement. Pure sensuous apprehension and discernment resemble intellectual understanding and discernment. But when the senses affirm (so to say) pleasure or pain in their act of perceiving, then appetite comes into play, i.e. a desire or avoidance of the object perceived. And note the phrase ‘so to say’; for properly speaking affirmation and denial are acts of the intellect; but something like them occurs when pleasure or pain is experienced sensuously.

§ 768. And to show what pleasure and pain are, he observes further that the act of perceiving pleasure and pain takes place in the ‘sensitive mean’; that is to say, it is the act of a certain midway faculty of sense—so called because the common sense is a sort of medium between the particular senses, like the centre of a circle in relation to lines drawn from the circumference. But not every act of the sensitive part is a sense of pleasure or pain. This perception relates precisely to the good and the bad as such. For the good of the senses—i.e. what suits them—gives pleasure; while what is bad, i.e. repugnant and harmful to them, causes pain. And pain and pleasure are followed, respectively, by avoidance and appetite (or desire); and these are a sort of activity.

§ 769. Thus the movement from sense-object to sense passes through three stages, as it were. There is first an awareness of the object as being in harmony or out of harmony with the sense: then a feeling of pleasure or pain; and then desire or avoidance. And although desiring, avoiding and mere sensing are different acts, still they are all acts of identically the same subject, though they can be distinguished in thought. This is What he means by adding that the ‘desiring and avoiding’—i.e. that part of the soul which desires or avoids, is not divided in being nor distinct from the sensitivity; although in ‘essence’ they ‘differ’, i.e. are represented by different concepts. He says this against Plato in particular, who maintained that desire and sensation had distinct organs in different parts of the body.

§ 770. Next, at ‘Imaginative phantasms’, he compares the mind’s movement to the process of sense-knowledge as he has described it. And he does two things here: he shows how the mind is related (a) to sense-objects, and (b) at ‘The mind understands by abstraction’ to objects beyond the range of sense. (a) divides into (i) an explanation of the way the mind is related to sense-objects in practical activity; and (ii) at ‘And generally in practical affairs’ a comparison of the practical and speculative intellects. And with regard to the former point, he first states and then, at ‘This is comparable to the way’ illustrates the resemblance between the mind’s activity and that of the senses.

First, then, he observes that phantasms are to the intellectual part of the soul as sense-objects to the senses; as these last are affected by their objects, so is the intellect by phantasms. And as sensation of the pleasant or painful is succeeded by desire or avoidance, so also the intellect, when it affirms or desires goodness or badness in an object it apprehends, tends either towards or away from that object.

§ 771. But note that Aristotle’s use of terms here suggests a two-fold difference between intellect and senses. For in the first place, when the senses apprehend their good and evil, this awareness is not immediately succeeded by pursuit or avoidance, but by pleasure and pain,—after which the sensing subject pursues or withdraws. The reason is that as the senses are not aware of goodness in general, so sense appetition is not swayed by the good or the bad in general, but only by this or that particular good, pleasant to sense, or, by this or that particular evil, unpleasant to sense. The soul’s intellectual part, on the contrary, is aware of goodness and badness in general; hence its appetition at once and immediately responds to this apprehension.

§ 772. The other difference appears in Aristotle’s observing, unconditionally, that the intellect affirms or denies, whereas of the senses he only says that they affirm ‘so to say’. The reason for this has already been given. And from what has been said he draws the further conclusion that if intellect is related to phantasms as the senses to their object, then just as the senses cannot sense without an object, so the soul cannot understand without phantasms.

§ 773. Then, where he says ‘This is comparable’, he explains the resemblance still further: (a) as regards the likeness between phantasms and sense-objects in relation to the intellectual soul; and (b)—at ‘The, intellectual faculty therefore’—as regards the avoidance or pursuit that follows the affirmation or denial of goodness or badness.

First, then, he remarks that colour-affected air itself modifies the pupil of the eye in a particular way, i.e. it imprints on it a likeness of some colour, and that then the pupil, so modified, acts upon the common sense. Similarly our hearing, itself affected by the air, acts upon the common sense. And though there are several exterior senses, their reactions all come back to one point, which is a certain common medium between all the senses, like a centre upon which lines from a circumference all converge.

§ 774. And while this mid-point is a unity as a subject, its 'essence' is manifold, that is to say, the idea of it varies according as we relate it to the different senses. It is the faculty by which the soul sees the difference between the sweet and the hot, as we saw when we were considering it in itself; and now, relating it to the intellect, we may say that, as all sensible objects find a common terminus in the common sense, so do all phantasms in the intellect. And as in the one case many objects were said to be judged by a single principle, so in the other case also in a like proportion. Again, as to the number of objects judged: the intellect is related to both objects whose distinction it perceives as 'they' to one another, i.e. as the single common sense to the different sensibles whose differences it discerns.

§ 775. It makes no difference whether we speak of the non-homogeneous, i.e. of different sensibles differing in genus, for instance of white which is a colour, and sweet which is a savour; or of contrary qualities of the same genus, like black and white. For the common sense discriminates between both kinds of difference.

§ 776. For white, then, let us put A, and for black, B; so that, as A is to B, so is C to D; the latter standing for the phantasms of white and black respectively, Then, varying the proportions, A is to C as B to D: i.e., white is to the phantasm of white as black to the phantasm of black; and as the intellect is to C and D, so is the sense in question to A and B. If therefore C and D, the phantasms of white and black, are related to a unity in so far as they are judged by one intellect, they resemble in this A and B, namely white and black, which are judged by one sense; so that, just as the sense which discriminates these two is in itself one, but twofold in thought, so also is the intellect. And the same reasoning is valid if we take non-homogeneous objects—taking, for instance, A for sweet and B for white.

§ 777. Next, at 'The intellectual faculty', he explains what he said above, that in affirming or denying good or evil the mind either avoids or pursues; and so concludes that the intellectual part of the soul understands intelligible forms abstracted from phantasms. And just as, when sensible objects are actually present, the mind is impressed by whatever is congenial or abhorrent in them, so too, in the absence of such objects externally, the mind is induced to desire them or fly from them by their representations present in the imagination.

§ 778. And he gives examples. First, of the process that is started by sense-objects actually present—as when a man sees something fearful, for instance the confusion caused by a fire in a city; seeing the flames leaping he knows ‘in general’—i.e. by some common faculty of judging, or perhaps according to what commonly happens—that a conflict is raging; and thus the mind is moved to pursue or flee by objects present exteriorly. But sometimes phantasms or ideas presented inwardly cause the soul to deliberate about things future or present, reckoning them to be desirable or horrible,—as though they were actually seen here and now.

§ 779. Next at ‘And generally’,:’ he compares speculative with practical knowledge. Truth and falsehood, he says, i.e. true and false knowing, both in the sphere of action (the practical intellect) and outside that sphere (the speculative intellect), belong to the same category, whether good or evil. This can be taken in two ways: (1) That the thing understood, either speculatively or practically, may be either good or bad, and that it remains such from the point of view of either mode of understanding; or (2) that the knowing itself is, if true, a good for the intellect, whether it be speculative or practical; whereas if false, it is an evil for the intellect, again in both cases.

§ 780. Thus he is not reducing truth and falsehood to a common genus with good and evil, but truth and falsehood in action to a common genus with truth and falsehood in speculation. This is clear from his distinguishing ‘in-action’ and ‘not-in-action’ as ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’. For the speculative intellect considers a thing as true or false universally or ‘absolutely’, whereas the practical intellect relates its apprehensions to particular things to be done; for doing is always in the particular.

§ 781. Then, at ‘The mind understands’ having already said that there is no act of the intellect without a phantasm, and that phantasms derive from sensation, the Philosopher begins to explain how we understand things that are outside the range of sensation. Here he proceeds in two stages: (1) he explains how we understand mathematical objects abstracted from sensible matter; and (2) he enquires whether we understand anything that is immaterial in being at ‘Whether it is possible’. As regards the first point, note that of things joined in reality the mind may think, and think truly, of one without the other, provided that the concept of the one is. not included in that of the other. If Socrates is both white and musical his whiteness can be understood without regard to his musical character; but I cannot understand ‘man’ if I do not understand ‘animal’, for the concept of man includes animal. Thus it is possible to distinguish mentally things conjoined in reality, and yet not fall into error.

§ 782. But if the conjoined things were understood as separate things the mind would err,—as, to take our former example, if it judged that the musical person was not white. Certain aspects, however, of sense-objects the mind simply considers in separation or distinctly, without judging them to exist separately. This is what he. means by saying that what the mind understands by abstraction (even mathematical objects) it understands in the same way as, e.g., a snub-nose; understanding it precisely as a snub-nose, yet not in separation from sensible matter; for sensible matter, the nose, is included in the definition of a snub-nose.

§ 783. When, however, the mind understands actually anything precisely as curved, it abstracts from flesh; not that it judges the curved thing to be not flesh, but it understands ‘curved’ without regard to flesh; because flesh does not enter into the definition of a curve. And it is thus that we understand all mathematical objects, —as though they were separated from sensible matter, whilst in reality they are not so.

§ 784. But we do not so understand physical things; for in their definition (unlike mathematical objects) sensible matter is included. Yet in understanding them we still abstract a universal from particulars, in so far as the specific nature is understood apart from the individuating principles; for these do not enter into the definition. And the mind in act is its object; for precisely in the degree that the object is or is not material, it is or is not perceived by the mind. And just because Plato overlooked this process of abstraction he was forced to conceive of mathematical objects and specific natures as existing in separation from matter; whereas Aristotle was able to explain that process by the agent intellect.

§ 785. Next, at ‘Whether it is possible’, he puts a question about things that exist immaterially: whether, that is, our intellect, though conjoined with spatial magnitude (i.e. the body), can understand ‘anything separated’, i.e.

any substance separated from matter. He undertakes to pursue this enquiry later,—not at present, because it is not yet evident that any such substances exist nor, if they do, what sort of thing they are. It is a problem for metaphysics. In fact, we do not know Aristotle's solution of this problem, for we have not the whole of his Metaphysics; either because it is not yet all translated, or possibly because he died before he could complete it.

§ 786. We should note, however, that when he speaks of the intellect here as not 'separated' from the body he refers to the fact that it is one of the powers of the soul, which is the actuality of the body; whereas speaking, at an earlier stage, of the intellect as 'separated' he was referring to its non-organic mode of activity.

TEXT

431b20–432a14

BOOK III, CHAPTER, VIII

RECAPITULATION

INTELLECT. SENSE. IMAGINATION

Now, recapitulating what we have said about the soul, let us repeat that the soul is somehow all that exists; for things are either sensible or intelligible; and knowledge is in some way the knowable, and sensation is the sense object. But how this is so we must enquire. For knowledge and sensation are divided into realities: the potential answers to things that are really in potency, the actual to things really in act. In the soul the sensitive faculty and that which can know are these [things] in potency; the latter [faculty] the understandable, the former the sensible. §§ 787-8

Now they must be the things themselves or their forms. But they are certainly not the things themselves: no stone is in the soul, but only its form. Thus the soul is like a hand: the hand is the instrument that includes other instruments,, and the intellect is the form that includes other forms, and sense the form that includes sensible things. §§ 789-90

But since there are no real things apart from things sensible and extended (so it would seem), then in the sensible species are the intelligible, both what are predicated as a result of abstraction and whatever qualities and habits are found in sensible things. And on this account, what does not perceive by sensation acquires no knowledge or understanding at all; and when thinking occurs there must be at the same time a phantasm as its object; for phantasms are as sense objects save that they are without matter. §§ 791-2

Imagination is other than affirmation and negation: for the true and the false are a combining of intellectual concepts. § 793

What difference have the primary concepts that they should not be phantasms? But neither are the others phantasms, though they do not exist apart from phantasms. § 794

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO THIRTEEN

§ 787. After treating of its powers of sense and intellect the Philosopher goes on now to draw conclusions about the nature of the soul: showing first that the early philosophers were partly right and partly wrong about the soul; and then explaining how the intellect depends on the senses. As to the former point, he first explains how the soul, as the early philosophers said, is in a way all things; and then how it is not all things in the way they supposed. He says then, recapitulating, that one can admit that the soul is in a way all things; for everything is either sensible or intelligible, and sense and intellect (or science) are in the soul, sense being somehow the sensible, and intellect, or science, the intelligible or the scientifically knowable.

§ 788. But we must ask how this is so. For sense and intellectual knowledge are divided 'into realities', that is, their division into act and potency corresponds to a like division in reality; but in such a way that while potential intellectual or sensuous knowledge answers to things potentially understood or sensed, and actual intellectual or sensuous knowledge answers to things actually understood or sensed, there is a difference between the two relationships. For the sense in act and the intellect in act are the objects they actually sense or understand; but neither the sensitive nor the intellectual potency is actually its object; it is only so potentially. And that is how the soul is 'somehow' everything.

§ 789. Next, at 'Now they must be' he shows how the ancients misapplied this formula. He says that if the soul is indeed all things, it must be either simply identical with all things or a formal likeness of all things. The former view was that of Empedocles who made out that we, being earth, know earth, and being water we know water, and so on. But obviously the soul is not simply identical with the things it knows; for not stone itself, but its formal likeness exists in the soul. And this enables us to see how intellect in act is what it understands; the form' of the object is the form of the mind in act.

§ 790. Thus the soul resembles the hand. The hand is the most perfect of organs, for it takes the place in man of all the organs given to other animals for purposes of defence or attack or covering. Man can provide all these needs for himself with his hands. And in the same way the soul in man takes the place of all the forms of being, so that through his soul a man is, in a way, all being or everything; his soul being able to assimilate all the forms of being—the intellect intelligible forms and the senses sensible forms.

§ 791. Next, at 'But since there are': the doctrine just stated, namely that intellect is, in a way, the intelligible object as sense is the sensible object, might lead one to suppose that the intellect did not depend on the senses; as would be the case indeed if the intelligible objects attained by our mind had their existence apart from sensible things, as the Platonists thought. So he now shows the intellect's dependence on the senses; and then goes on (at 'Imagination is other') to show that it differs, none the less, from imagination which also depends on the senses First, then, he observes that, since all the objects of our understanding are included within the range of sensible things existing in space, that is to say, that none seems to have that sort of distinct existence apart from things of sense which particular things of sense have apart from one another, it follows that all these intelligible objects have their beings in the objects of sense; this being true not only of the objects studied by natural science, the properties and modifications of things of sense, but even of mathematical abstractions. It follows then that without some use of the senses we can neither learn anything new, as it were for the first time; nor bring before our understanding any intellectual knowledge already possessed. Whenever the intellect actually regards anything there must at the same time be formed in us a phantasm, that is, a likeness of something sensible.

§ 792.Phantasms, however, differ from things of sense by their immateriality. For as we have shown, the senses receive the forms of things immaterially; and phantasms are nothing but movements started by actual sensation.

It will be clear now that Avicenna erred in saying that once the mind had acquired knowledge it no longer needed the senses. For we know by experience that in order to reflect on knowledge already gained we have to make use of phantasms; and that any injury to the physical apparatus underlying these will tend to prevent our using the knowledge we already have.

§ 793. Then at ‘Imagination is other’ he distinguishes between intellect and imagination. (1) With respect to the normal activity of the intellect, which is by composing and dividing, he says that imagining is neither intellectual affirmation nor intellectual denial; for these immediately involve truth and falsehood; which is not the case with imagining. Only the intellect knows truth and falsehood.

§ 794. (2) He asks (at ‘What difference etc.) how the primary intellectual notions, the understanding of indivisible objects, differ from phantasms; and he replies that while these are always attended by phantasms, they differ from phantasms by their universality: they are abstracted from individuating conditions, whereas phantasms are always of particulars. Phantasms in fact are not actually, but only potentially, indivisible.

TEXT

432a15–433a8

BOOK III, CHAPTER IX

THE PRINCIPLE OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS

WHAT IT IS NOT

Since the soul is defined by two powers found in animate beings, the one, discernment, the work of intellect and sensation, the other, movement by local motion; and as a certain amount has been decided about sensation and understanding, we must now consider what can be the moving factor in the soul: whether this is a single part of it, separate either spatially or by definition, or the whole soul; and, if it is a part of the soul, whether it is a special part other than those generally acknowledged and already dealt with, or some one among these. § 795

A difficulty at once arises as to how it is possible to speak at all of parts of the soul, or to say how many they are. For in one way their number seems to be infinite and not merely, as some say, the reasoning, the irascible and the concupiscible [parts]; or as others say, the rational and irrational. §§ 796-7

For according to the differences by which these are distinguished, other parts seem to show greater diversity than [we see] in those just mentioned. In particular: the vegetative part, which is in plants and all living things; and the sensitive, which one cannot easily place among either the irrational or the rational elements. §§ 798-800

Further, there is the imaginative power, which seems in essence to be quite different from any other. With which of these others it is identical, or from which it differs, are difficult problems: if one is to suppose that parts of the soul are separate. § 801

Furthermore, there is the appetitive faculty, which, both by its notion and as a capacity, seems to be diverse from all others; and it would be unreasonable to split this up. For will operates in the rational part, desire and anger in the irrational; and if the soul is in three parts, appetition will be in each. §§ 802-6

But to come to the matter that is now before us: what is it that moves the animal by local motion? For the movement which is in all animals, by which they grow and decay, would certainly seem to be due to the principle of generation and nutrition. Of respiration and exhalation, sleep and waking, we must treat later on: these also raise many difficulties. § 807

But of local motion: what, we must consider, is it that moves an animal from place to place? It is obviously not the vegetative power. For a movement of this sort is always directed towards an end, and is accompanied by phantasm or desire. For nothing moves unless, with desire or dislike, except under compulsion. § 808

Further: plants would also move about, and would possess some organic part suitable for such movement. § 809

Likewise, it is not. the sensitive power. Many animals endowed with sensation are fixed and motionless all their lives. Yet if Nature does nothing in vain and is never deficient in what is necessary (save in imperfect or injured specimens; but such animals are complete and not defective, and there is proof of this in that they reproduce, grow and decay), it follows that they should also have the parts requisite for moving about. §§ 810-11

Nor is the reasoning faculty or what is called intellect the moving power; for the speculative function does not consider in view of action, and has nothing to say about the avoidable or the desirable. But movement is always the avoidance or the pursuit of something. Nor, even when it does consider something of this kind, does it at once command pursuit or avoidance—for instance, it often thinks about some object of terror or delight, but without enjoining fear; though the heart moves, or, in the case of something pleasant, some other part. §§ 812-15

Further; when the mind and the understanding do command avoidance or pursuit, the soul does not move [accordingly] but acts according to desire, as in the case of the incontinent. And in general we observe that one who knows the art of medicine does not [necessarily] heal,—as though it were the function of some power other than science to act according to science. § 816

But not even appetition imperates such movement as this. For the self-restrained do not act according to their desires even while they are actually wanting and desiring; instead they obey reason. § 817

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO FOURTEEN

§ 795. Having studied the soul in its vegetative, sensitive and intellectual parts, the Philosopher now considers it as a subject of movement. Introducing the problem, he observes first of all that the old philosophers defined the life-principle of animals in terms of two capacities: the capacity to discern or know, which is the function of intellect and sense; and the capacity to move from place to place. It is the latter capacity that we are concerned with now. We want to understand the principle of movement in relation to the soul: whether, if it is a part of the soul, it is really spatially separate from the other parts, so that it is located in a special part of the body, as the Platonists supposed; or, on the contrary, separable only in thought; whether perhaps it is not a part at all, but the entire soul; and whether, granted that it is only a part, it is or is not distinct from the parts usually enumerated, and distinct from those already studied in this treatise.

§ 796. Next, at 'A difficulty etc.', he begins a controversial section, which itself leads him, at 'It seems that there are two', to certain conclusions. This section contains two parts: (1) an argument against a certain division of the powers of the soul; and (2) an argument, at 'But of local motion', concerning especially the motive-principle as a part of the soul. As regards (1) he first states a division of the powers of the soul made by some philosophers, and then, at 'For according to', disputes it.

He begins then by saying that we are met at the outset of our enquiry by the problem of dividing the soul's powers. What sho d be the principle of this division, and how many powers are there? It has seemed to some that the number of these powers was infinite, i.e. quite indeterminable; and this would indeed be the truth if every act or movement in the soul had to be assigned to its own distinct part. Thus it would seem inadequate to divide the soul, as some do, into a rational part, an irascible part, and an appetitive (i.e. concupiscible) part; for these include only the motive powers of the soul.

§ 797. And if others make the dividing line fall between the powers that share in reason and those that do not, this division, though comprehensive enough in a sense, is not exactly relevant to the parts of the soul as such, but only to the parts of the rational soul; and so Aristotle uses it in the Ethics.

§ 798. Next, at ‘For according to the differences’, he brings several objections against these divisions. (1) Granted that the differences just mentioned between the various parts of the soul are truly differences, they are not the only ones; the soul has other parts, already mentioned in this Treatise, which differ even more from one another. For instance, in all plants and animals (and thus in all living things) exists the vegetative part; and in all animals the sensitive part; and these two obviously differ from each other, and also from the rational, irascible and concupiscible parts, more than these last two parts from each other. Yet neither is included in the divisions given above.

§ 799. Not, it is clear, in the first division: for neither vegetability nor sensitivity can be called either rational, irascible or concupiscible. Again, passing to the second division, Aristotle shows that neither vegetativity nor sensitivity are envisaged thereby. It is difficult, he says, to identify either with what shares or does not share in reason.

§ 800. That neither is rational in nature is obvious; but we can also show that neither is irrational. For the irrational means what is either anti-rational or lacking a rationality that it ought to possess; and neither of the aforesaid parts is such. Whereas if one were simply to call them non-rational they would not constitute, properly speaking, a classification of the soul’s powers. Clearly, then, the aforesaid divisions are inadequate.

§ 801. (2) Then, at ‘Further, there is’, he observes that it is very hard to decide whether imagination, which can certainly be distinguished in thought from the rest of the soul, is or is not really the same thing as any one of the powers already mentioned; especially if we were to follow those who say that the parts of the soul are really separate beings.

§ 802. (3) Then again, at ‘Furthermore, there is’, he remarks that the appetitive capacity seems distinct, both in thought and as a real potency, from other parts of the soul. Now, assuming that the soul was so divided into a rational and an irrational part that each was a thing distinct from the other, one would have to ‘split up’, i.e. to divide the appetitive capacity in the same way—a very questionable procedure; and yet this capacity is certainly in part rational or volitional, and in part irrational (the irascible and concupiscible parts). Similarly, if we add the irascible part as a distinct thing to the rational and irrational parts of the soul, we should have to posit a different appetitive force in each: in one a volitional force, in another an irascible force, and in the third a concupiscible force; making three distinct things of this kind.

§ 803. But the question now arises why the sensitive part of the soul has two appetitive capacities, the irascible and the concupiscible, whereas there is only one rational appetitive force, the will. I answer that potencies differ according to the objective terms of their acts; and the objective term of appetite is the good as apprehended.

§ 804. Now the intellect and the senses apprehend the good differently: the intellect apprehends it under a general idea of goodness; but the senses in this or that particular determination. And this is why there is only one kind of appetite following intellectual apprehension, whereas the desire arising from sensuous apprehension divides according to diverse kinds of apprehended good. For some things seem good to the senses simply as affording pleasure; and this kind of goodness is answered by the concupiscible appetite. But other things seem good and desirable as terminating in pleasure in so far as by means of them one is enabled freely to enjoy pleasant things; and to this good corresponds the irascible appetite; which fights, as it were, on behalf of the concupiscible. Thus animals only get angry and fight for things that will afford them pleasure, that is to say, when they are hunting or mating, as it says in Book VI of the Historia Animalium.

§ 805. Therefore every movement of the irascible appetite starts from and ends in a movement of the concupiscible appetite. Anger springs from a sadness and ceases in a pleasure; for the angry find their satisfaction in punishing. Hence some say that to overcome obstacles is the precise object of the irascible appetite.

§ 806. But it is quite unreasonable to say, as some do, that the specific function of this appetite is to avoid evils. For one and the same potency bears upon contraries—as sight upon both black and white; hence good and evil cannot by themselves differentiate the appetitive potency. Hence, just as loving some good pertains to the concupiscible appetite, so does hating an evil (as Aristotle says in Book, IX of the Ethics); and similarly both the hope of good and the fear of evil pertain to the irascible appetite.

§ 807. Then, at ‘But to come’, he observes that what we are at present concerned to elucidate (the principle of local movement in animals) does not seem to be accounted for by the aforesaid divisions; and that this is a further point against the latter. Now clearly the movements of growth and decline, common to all living things, spring from some common generative and vegetative principle; whereas certain other mutations, such as breathing in and out, or sleeping and waking, are not at all easy to explain and require to be treated of separately later.

§ 808. Then, at ‘But of local motion’ he asks what is the principle of local movement in animals. And he shows first that it is not the vegetative principle; secondly, at ‘Likewise’, that it is not sensitivity; thirdly, at ‘Nor is the reasoning faculty’, that it is not the intellect; and fourthly, at ‘But not even appetition’, that it is not the appetitive power.

That it is not the vegetative principle he proves by two arguments. The first is as follows. Local movement from place to place is always occasioned by something the animal imagines and desires; no animal moves (except under compulsion) unless it wants, or withdraws from, something. But since the vegetative principle is without imagination and desire, it cannot be the principle of this kind of local movement.

§ 809. The second argument at ‘Further: plants’, runs thus. If the vegetative part were this principle, all plants would move about in this way, and be equipped with the necessary organs for doing so: which they obviously do not and are not. Therefore...

§ 810. Next, at ‘Likewise’, he shows that sensitivity is not the principle we are seeking. For if it were, every animal would have the power to move from place to place. But many animals, though capable of sensation, are fixed in one place and motionless so long as they live.

§ 811. And to meet the objection that perhaps the reason why such animals are immobile is that they lack, not the principle, but the organs of movement, he adds that Nature is never purposeless: it never fails to provide what is necessary for a given animal, unless this animal is deformed or a monster; and such monsters are exceptions to the normal course of nature, being caused by some defect or other in the parental seed. Now these im. mobile animals are perfect in their own way, not deformed like monsters: they generate offspring in their own likeness and grow and decline quite normally. In them, therefore, Nature does not act without purpose or fail in what is necessary for life. If then they were endowed with a motive-principle they would also have organs of motion; otherwise this principle would be useless, being unequipped with the necessary instruments: Note that this reasoning implies that wherever a vital principle exists there also will be found a corresponding organic apparatus; and that the parts of a living body subserve the powers of its soul.

§ 812. Next, where he says ‘Nor is the reasoning faculty’, he shows that not even mind is the motive-principle we seek. His words, ‘nor is the reasoning faculty... called intellect’, indicate, by the way, that reason and intellect are not distinct parts of the soul. The intellect is called ‘reason’ in so far as it comes to intelligible truths by a process of enquiry.

§ 813. That intellect is not the principle of movement he first proves with regard to the speculative intellect. So far as the mind merely considers things which are simply objects of speculation, not things to be done (e.g. that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles) it is obviously not concerned with action and makes no judgement as to what should be avoided or pursued. In this state therefore the mind initiates no movement; for all movement is a pursuit of, or withdrawal from, something, by way of appetition.

§ 814. Again, the mind sometimes considers something to be done, yet not in a practical or effective way, but only speculatively,—considering it universally, not in view of an action in the particular. So he says that so far as the ‘speculative’ mind considers ‘something of this kind’, i.e. as the intellect regards even a practical affair in a merely speculative way, it makes no decision as yet about decision or flight. Thus we can often think of terrible or desirable things without commanding ourselves to fear or desire them; even if, for example, our hearts are moved by fear. And if, he adds, it is a desirable thing that moves us, it does so through some other organ than the heart.

§ 815. (This he adds with Plato in mind, who located the parts of the soul in different parts of the body, the irascible part, whence fear arises, in the heart; and the concupiscible in some other organ such as the liver.) Clearly then a merely speculative consideration, even of something practical, does not of itself move to action. As such the speculative intellect is in no way a motive power.

§ 816. Next at ‘Further, when’, he shows that not even the practical intellect moves to action. For when a man, he says, comes to a decision, understanding that something should be avoided or pursued, he may nevertheless fail to follow this intellectual decision and follow his feelings instead,—as incontinent people do, who know what ought to be done but fail to carry it out. It would seem therefore that mere intellect does not suffice to move us. Similarly, doctors may know quite well how to recover health yet not recover it, because they fail to put into practice their own prescriptions. Apparently then, to act according to knowledge involves something else besides even practical knowledge.

§ 817. Lastly, with ‘But not even appetition’, he shows that the appetitive part itself does not simply command our movements; for we may see continent people in a state of want and desire yet refusing to act according to their desires. And the converse is true of the incontinent, as he explains more clearly in the Ethics, Book VII. So it seems that neither is appetition the cause of movement.

TEXT

433a9–433b27

BOOK III, CHAPTER X

THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS CONTINUED

WHAT THEY ARE

It seems that there are two motive-forces, mind and appetency (if one is to account imagination a sort of mind. For many follow the imagination instead of intellectual knowledge, while in other animals there is no intellect or reason at all, but only imagination). Both of these effect movement in place then,—intellect and appetency. §§ 818-19

Now, the intellectual power which reasons to some purpose in view, and is practical, differs in its end from the speculative. Appetition also is always for a purpose; for that of which there is desire is the principle of the practical ‘intellect. The last end is the first principle of action. Hence, it seems reasonable to take these two as the motive forces, appetition, and the practical reason. For the object of appetite causes motion; and it is for this that reason also initiates movement, the desirable being its principle. And when imagination moves, it only does so with appetition. Therefore there is one single mover,—the object desired. For if there were two movers, intellect and appetition, they would move in virtue of some common principle. Now reason does not appear to cause movement apart from appetency; for will is an appetency. When there is movement by reason there is also movement by will. But appetition moves apart from reason, for concupiscence is a sort of appetition. §§ 820-5

All intellect, then, is right, but imagination and appetition may be right or not right. Hence, while the object of appetite is always what motivates, this can be either a good or only a seeming good. Not, however, every good, but the practical good. Now a practical object is that which is able to be other than it is. It is therefore evident that what moves the soul is a power of this kind called appetite. §§ 826-7

For those who divide the soul into parts, if they split it up by: distinguishing its powers, a great many parts result: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellective, the deliberative, and lastly the appetitive. These differ from one another much more than do the concupiscible and irascible. § 828

Since appetites may run counter to one another, this occurs when reason and desire are contrary (and only in beings possessing a time-sense. Reason commands restraint for the sake of some future thing, but desire is for what is now present. For what appears desirable at any given instant appears desirable without qualification and good without qualification, because the future is not apparent). § 829

The motive-force will therefore be specifically one,—the desirable, or the appetite itself; and first of all the desirable, for this is what causes motion without itself being moved, simply through being understood or imagined,—but numerically there are several moving factors. § 830

Since there are these three: the mover; secondly, that by which it moves; thirdly, that which is moved; and since the mover is double (the immobile one, and the mover that is also moved) the immobile mover is, accordingly, the practical good, whereas that which both moves and is moved is the appetite. For the subject desiring is moved in so far as it desires, and its desire is an act or movement of a certain kind. What receives the motion is the animal. But that by which it moves is an organ, already something corporeal. Hence, what pertains to it must be studied along with activities common to body and soul. § 831

Now, in short, organic movement arises where the principle and term are the same: as in the joint of a hinge are the convex and the concave,—the latter being the end, the former the beginning. Hence one is at rest while the other moves They are distinct in idea, but inseparable spatially. All things move by pushing and pulling. Hence there must, as in a circle, be something that stays still; from which [point] movement begins. §§ 832-5

LECTIO FIFTEEN

§ 818. So far the Philosopher has pursued his enquiry into the principle of local movement in animals by the method of refuting unsatisfactory solutions; but now he states the positive truth on the matter: first, showing in general what that principle is; and secondly, at 'Generally then', how it varies in different subjects. The first point again divides into (a) a statement of the motive principle in animals; and (b), at 'The motive-force will therefore', an analysis of the factors at work when this principle is in action. Again (a) subdivides into three points: (1) That there are two motive-principles; which (2) he reduces to one, at 'Now the intellectual power', while with (3) he answers an objection (at 'Since appetites.') already raised.

First, then, he says that the foregoing examination makes it clear that neither the vegetative nor the sensitive part is the motive-principle, since they are found in things that do not move. So it would seem that the moving principles are two: intellect and appetency. Note, however, that he includes imagination under intellect; for it resembles intellect in that it impels to action in the absence of sense-objects.

§ 819. For in their actions many people follow the changes in their imaginations rather than rational knowledge; for instance, those who act impulsively without reflection. Besides, other animals ate obviously only impelled to action through imagination, not through intellect or reason; but men through both intellect and imagination. Clearly, then, both these are motive-principles: intellect (including imagination) and appetition.

§ 820. Then at 'Now the intellectual,' he reduces the two to one; and this in three stages: (1) justifying the reduction; (2), at 'All intellect, then, is right,' using it to show the cause of a particular accidental factor in animal movements; and (3) refuting, at 'For those who divide' an early division of the powers of the soul.

First, then, he says that the mind as a motive-principle is the mind in so far as it reasons for some purpose other than mere reasoning; in other words, it is the practical reason, which differs from the speculative by a different finality; for while the latter regards truth for its own sake and nothing else, the practical reason relates its knowledge of truth to some deed to be done.

§ 821. Now obviously every appetition is for some end beyond itself. It is absurd to say that desire is for the sake of desiring; desire is essentially a tendency to ‘the other’. Moreover, an object of desire is always the practical reason’s starting point; what is first desired provides the end whence its deliberations begin. If we wish to weigh a course of action we first lay down some end and then deliberate about the means, moving back, so to say, from what is to come later on to what is immediately to be done at the beginning. So he adds that the last thing that the practical reason considers is the first thing that has to be done—i.e. the starting point of the whole action. This is why it is reasonable to assert that both appetition and the practical reason are motive-principles; for the object desired certainly incites to action, and it is also what the practical reason first considers; so that the latter is said to impel to action because the starting point of its deliberations, the object desired, does so.

§ 822. And what is said of the intellect may be applied to the imagination; if it moves it does so only in virtue of an object desired: of which it contains, like the intellect, a representation.

§ 823. So it is clear that there is ultimately one mover, the object desired. For this both moves appetition and affords a starting point for the practical intellect—the two motive-principles which have been assumed.

§ 824. And it is reasonable that these two principles should be reduced to unity in the object of desire; for if both intellect and appetition are principles with respect to one and the same movement they must, as such, share the same specific nature; since a single effect implies always a single cause of precisely that one effect. Now it cannot be said that appetite is a moving principle through sharing the specific nature of intellect, but rather e converso; for intellect only moves anything in virtue of appetition. It moves by means of the will, which is a sort of appetition.

§ 825. The explanation of this (given in Book IX of the Metaphysics) is that the practical reason is essentially balanced between alternatives; nor can it initiate movement unless appetition fixes it exclusively upon one alternative. Appetition, on the other hand, can move to action independently of reason, as we see in the case of the concupiscible desire which is a sort of appetite. He mentions this desire rather than the irascible because, unlike the irascible, it has no admixture of rationality (as he shows in Book VII of the Ethics). Clearly, then, the motive-principles are reducible to the one object of appetition.

§ 826. Next at ‘All intellect then’ he applies what has been said to a particular accidental factor in movement or action, explaining why we go amiss in our actions. ‘All intellect’, he says, ‘is right’, by which he means that we never err about the first principles of action, about such truths as ‘it is wrong to do harm to anyone’, or ‘injustice is never right’, and so on. Those principles correspond to the equally infallible first principles of the speculative reason. But as for the consequences of these first principles, if we apprehend them aright it is because our thought is consistent with our grasp of the principles, whereas if we deviate from the truth the fault lies in our reasoning. Appetition and imagination (motive-principles likewise) may be, on the other hand, either right or wrong. Hence if we act amiss it is, in the last analysis, because we fall short of what we intellectually know; and our previous conclusion stands, that the final motive-impulse comes from the object of desire.

§ 827. Now this object is either a real good or a seeming good: it is a real good if the mind’s original correct judgement is maintained; it is only a seeming good if appetite or imagination cause a deflection from that judgement. Yet not every good is desirable as a cause of action, but only the good-as-term-of-action, i.e. a good that is actually related to our actions. And precisely as such no such good is always good in the same way; for it must vary in relation to ourselves. That is why the ultimate and absolute good, regarded in its universality, does not, as such, move us to act. Clearly, then, the final motive force derives from the soul itself acting through the appetitive power.

§ 828. Then at ‘For those who divide’, he rejects an old division of the motive parts of the soul into the rational, irascible and concupiscible potencies. If, he says, the intention was to enumerate the potencies which are really distinct from each other, others should have been included, namely the vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, deliberative and appetitive powers. These last two are distinguished in the same way and for the same reason as, in the Ethics,2 Book VI, Aristotle distinguishes the ratiocinative faculty, which has to do with contingent matters, from the scientific faculty which has to do with necessary objects. All these parts of the soul differ more than the irascible and concupiscible, which are both included in the sensitive appetite. Hence that old division was incomplete.

§ 829. Next, at ‘Since appetites may’, he meets an objection already touched upon, namely that if desire were a motive force, nobody would be continent; the continent, by definition, do not follow their desires. But this difficulty vanishes if we consider that in man there are contrary appetites, of which the continent follow one and reject the rest. Contrariety of desires springs out of an opposition between reason and the concupiscible appetite; and this happens ‘in beings possessing a time-sense’, i.e. that are aware, not of the present moment only, but of past and future as well. For sometimes the mind forbids a man to indulge a desire in view of what will happen in the future if it is indulged: thus a man in a state of fever sees with his mind that he ought to abstain from drinking wine. But desire prompts one to take things for the sake of ‘what is now’ i.e. in the present moment. For what is here and now pleasant seems absolutely pleasant and good if it is not related to the future.

§ 830. Then at ‘The motive-force’ he analyses the process of the movements in question; and this in three stages. First, he shows how the factors in movement are at once many and one. Next, at ‘Since there are these three’, he explains how they are interrelated. Finally, at ‘Now, in short’, he briefly defines each of the factors on which movement depends. First, then, he observes that if the moving principles are considered formally and specifically they are reducible to one, to the object of desire or appetite; for this is the absolute starting point of movement, inasmuch as, being itself unmoved, it initiates movement through the mind or the imagination. And because the secondary motive-principles only move in virtue of their share in the primary one, therefore they all as such partake of the nature of this primary one. And yet, though specifically one, they are numerically many.

§ 831. Then at ‘Since there are these three’, he interrelates three factors in movement: (1) the mover, (2) the organ by which it moves, and (3) the thing moved. Now the mover is twofold: an unmoved mover, and a mover that moves through being moved itself. In the case of animals, the unmoved mover is some actual good influencing desire through the intellect or imagination. The mover moved is the desire itself, for whatever desires is moved inasmuch as it desires, desire itself being a certain act or movement in the sense that we give to the term ‘movement’ when we apply it to activities that are consequent upon actuality, such as sensing and understanding. Then the thing moved is the animal itself. And the organ by means of which desire issues into movement is a part of the body; it is the primary motor-organ; hence it has to be treated along with the activities common to body and soul (and is, in fact, examined in the De Causa Motus Animalium). But here and now we are concerned particularly with the soul.

§ 832. Next, at ‘Now, in short” he briefly states his view on the organ of local motion. He says that the primary organic motive-principle must be such that the movement starts and finishes in the same point, proceeding in a circle, as it were, and having a swelling out at the starting point and a concavity at the end. For the contractual movement draws the organ into concavity, while the expansive impulse, whence movement begins, follows a swelling out of the organ.

§ 833. Now, granted that this primary organ is both the starting point and term of movement, it must, as starting point, be motionless, and, as term, in movement; and both these at once. For in any movement the starting point itself does not move, all movement must proceed from the motionless,—as, for instance, while the hand is moving the arm is still, and while the arm moves the shoulder is still. However, these two factors in the organ, the motionless and the moved, though distinct in thought, are substantially and spatially inseparable.

§ 834. And that the organ is both starting point and term (and therefore both motionless and moved) is dear from the fact that all animal movements consist of impulsions and retractions. In impulsion the motive force comes from the starting point, for the impelling agent thrusts itself forward against what is impelled. But in retraction the motive force comes from the term, for the drawing power draws something back to itself Thus the first organ of local motion in animals must be at once both a starting point and a term.

§ 835. So then there must be in it something that stays still and yet initiates motion. And in this it resembles circular movement: for a body revolving in a circle is kept as a whole in the same place by the immobility of the centre and the poles. In thought it may move as a whole, but not in reality. In reality it keeps to one place. But its parts are changing their places really, and not only in thought. And so it is with the heart: it remains fixed in the same part of the body while it dilates and contracts and so gives rise to movements of impulsion and retraction. Thus it is, in a sense, both motionless and moving.

TEXT

433b27–434a21

BOOK III, CHAPTER X, CONTINUED

THE PRINCIPLES OF MOVEMENT IN LIVING BEINGS, CONTINUED

Generally, then an animal is self-moving inasmuch as it is appetitive, as we have said. But there is never appetition apart from imagination; and all imagination is either rational or sensitive. It is in the latter, then, that other animals also participate. §§ 836-7

CHAPTER XI

Now we must consider the motive force in those imperfect animals in which there exists no sense but touch; and whether or no they have imagination and desire. Pain and pleasure do seem to be present in them; and if these, then, necessarily, desire as well. But how can there be imagination in them? It may be that as they are moved indeterminately, so these qualities are present indeed in them, but only indeterminately. §§ 838-9

Sensitive imagination, then, is found in other animals, as we have said; but the deliberative only in rational beings. For [to deliberate] whether to do this or that is the work of reason, and there must be a single standard to measure by; for the agent follows the more excellent. Hence [reason] is able to make one phantasm out of several. And this is why the [irrational animals] are thought not to have opinion; they lack that which derives from reasoning; which, indeed, involves opinion. For this reason [the lower] appetite is without deliberation. §§ 840-2,

Appetite sometimes overcomes and moves deliberation. But sometimes the latter moves the former, like a heavenly sphere; one appetition governing another, as in continence. Naturally the higher principle always holds priority, and originates motion, so that movement occurs on three courses. §§ 843-4

The cognitive faculty does not move, but remains at rest. But since one judgement or conception is universal, while the other is particular, it is the former that dictates that such and such a man should perform such and such an action; whilst the latter says that this is such an action and I am such and, such a man. It is this opinion, not the universal, that causes movement; or both together; but the one as being more at rest, the other less so. §§ 845-6

ST. THOMAS'S COMMENTARY

LECTIO SIXTEEN

§ 836. The Philosopher now passes from a general consideration of the principle of local movement in itself to viewing it in relation to different types of animal. And he does three things here. First, he states what is common to all animals that move; then, at ‘Now we must consider’, he discusses the motive-principle of imperfect animals; and thirdly, at ‘Sensitive imagination’, that of the most perfect animal, man, in whom this principle exists in a unique way.

First, then, he observes that all animals have the power of self-movement inasmuch as they have appetition; for appetition is precisely the cause of movement. Now appetition connotes imagination, either rational or merely sensuous; and while the latter is found in other animals, the former is proper to man alone.

§ 837. Note, however, that, just as Aristotle has included imagination under the term ‘intellect’ so now he extends the term ‘imagination’ to denote something intellectual; and in this he is guided by the meaning of the term itself For imagination is a sort of appearance; and things ‘appear’ to both sense and intellect. Besides, imagination can function, like reason or intellect, in the absence of exterior sense-objects.

§ 838. Then, at ‘Now we must consider’, he points to the motive-principle in imperfect animals, that is, in those which have no sense but touch. We must ask, he says, what it is that moves these animals: can it be imagination and desire? They seem indeed to have desires, for they seem to feel joy and displeasure: they shrink back when touched by things that trouble them, but open out and extend themselves towards things that suit them, which implies a sense of pain and pleasure. And this in turn implies desire. And since desire springs from a sense of pleasure, it must involve some kind of image-representation.

§ 839. But of what kind is this? An answer, he says, may be gleaned from considering the movements of these animals. They do not move as with a definite end in view, as if intending to arrive at any particular spot, as do the animals that move from one place to another and that form an inward image of things at a distance, and so desire these things and move towards them. The imperfect animals form images only of objects actually present to their exterior sense—not of things at a distance. When they are hurt the image which they form conveys to them the exterior object as harmful, and thus they shrink from it. And as soon as anything affords them pleasure they reach out to it and cling to it. Thus both imagination and desire in them are indefinite, in the sense that they form images which warn or attract them without being images of any distinct thing in this or that definite place. They have a confused imagination and desire.

§ 840. Next, at ‘Sensitive imagination’, he points out the motive-principle in man; and this in three stages. He shows first how this principle is the deliberative reason; next, at ‘Appetite sometimes overcomes’, how it is sometimes overcome by desire; and thirdly, at ‘The cognitive faculty’, of what ‘reason’ he is speaking here. First, then, he says that while sensuous imagination exists also in other animals, deliberative imagination is proper to rational ones; to deliberate, that is to weigh alternatives, is a function of reason.

§841. And this deliberation requires some sort of rule or end by which to reckon what most needs to be done. Clearly, a man, will ‘follow’, i.e. seek for, the better and more suitable alternative: which is always measured by some standard. We need therefore, a measure for our actions, a criterion for discerning what is most worth doing. And this will be the middle term of the syllogism, of the practical reason issuing in a choice. It follows that reason, deliberating, can form several images into a unity—three, to be precise; for one object is preferred to another, and a third gives the standard of preference.

§ 842. We can see now why animals form no opinions, though they have images. They cannot prefer one thing to another by any process of reasoning. Rational deliberation, however, issues in opinion—else it would not unify a number of phantasms. Similarly, the lower appetite springing from imagination is non-deliberate: it moves at once into desire or repulsion following the sensuous imagination.

§ 843. Next, at ‘Appetite sometimes’, he explains how rational deliberation may yield to the lower desire, may be overcome by it and drawn away from its own decision. Again, conversely, the superior appetite that follows rational deliberation sometimes sways the lower one that follows sensuous images (as a higher heavenly body may impel a lower). This happens in the case of ‘continence’; for the continent are those in whom deliberation gets the better of passion.

§ 844. Note that it is according to nature that the higher appetite should sway the lower. We see this in the heavenly bodies; the higher sphere gives the first impetus, moving the lower which, in turn, has a three-fold local movement. For the sphere, e.g., of Saturn moves first in diurnal motion, turning about the poles of the Universe;.then in the contrary zodiacal motion; and thirdly, in its own proper motion. Likewise, the lower appetite, retaining something of its own proper movement, is also moved by another, and this naturally, following the impulse of the higher appetite and of rational deliberation. If the converse takes place, and the higher is in fact moved by the lower, this is contrary to the natural order of things.

§ 845. Then, at ‘the cognitive faculty’, he explains which reason it is that initiates movement. It is not the speculative reason (here called ‘cognitive’); for this remains quiet and still and makes no decisions about tending to or away from anything, as we have seen. And as for the practical reason, it is either universal or particular. By the universal practical reason we judge that such and such ought to be done, e.g. that children ought to honour their parents. By the particular practical reason we judge that this particular subject is such and such, e.g. that I am a son and I ought here and now to honour my parents.

§ 846. Now it is this latter judgement that moves to action, not the other universal one;—or, if both move, the universal moves ass a first. and motionless cause of movement, the particular as a, proximate cause already, to a certain extent, applied to the movement itself. For deeds and movements are in the particular, and if any movement is actually to take place, the universal opinion must be particularised. In the same way the commission of any sinful action implies that one’s good judgement as to what should be done in the particular is neutralised by a pleasure or emotion of some kind; one’s universal opinion remaining, however, unaltered.

TEXT

434a23–435a10

BOOK III, CHAPTER XII

SENSITIVITY AND LIFE

TOUCH IS THE FUNDAMENTAL SENSE

All living things have the vegetative soul; and this from generation to corruption. For everything generated must grow, maintain itself and then decay; and this is impossible without nutriment. Of necessity, then, a vegetative power is found in all that is born and dies. §§ 847-8

Sensation, however, is not necessarily found in everything that lives. Beings whose bodies are uncompounded even lack touch, without which no animal can exist at all; nor can those be animals which are unable to receive forms without matter. §§ 849-50

But if Nature does nothing in vain, animals must have sensation. For all things in Nature exist for a purpose, or accompany that which exists for a purpose. Every body that is able to move about, if it lacked sensation, would soon be destroyed, and would never attain its end, which is the purpose of Nature. For how would it be nourished? Immobile animals indeed find nourishment in that out of which they are produced. §§ 851-3

But a body, generated, not stationary, cannot possess a soul and intellectual discernment and yet not have sensation, (nor indeed can an ungenerated one). For why should it not have it? For the good [presumably] of either the soul or the body. But neither, surely. The soul would not thin better nor the body benefit on that account. No animal then, whose body is mobile, lacks sensation. §§ 965-7

But having sensation, a body must needs be either simple or compound. It cannot, however, be simple; for then it would lack touch, and it must have this sense. § 858

Which is evident from these considerations. Since an animal is an animate body, and every body is tangible, and the tangible is what is perceptible by touch, the animal’s body must be able to touch if it is to survive. For the other senses perceive through an extraneous medium; e.g. smell, sight, hearing. But if the animal that comes into contact [with other things] had no sense of touch it could not avoid certain things and seize upon others; and thus it could not preserve its existence. §§ 859-60

This is why taste is a kind of touch; for food is a tangible body. But sound and colour and smell do not nourish, or contribute to growth or, decay. Taste must then be a kind of touch, being a sense of the tangible and the nutritive. These senses then are necessary to the animal. Hence it is plain that no animal can exist without touch. § 86-1

The others exist for its greater good; and then not in every kind of animal, but in some, namely in those that need to move from place to place. For if [such] an animal is to survive it must perceive not only what is in contact with it, but also what is afar; and this will happen, if it perceives through a medium, this being affected and moved by the sense object, and the animal itself by the medium. § 862

It is [as when] a thing is moving locally: it operates till it affects a change and, impelling something else, causes another impulsion, so that movement traverses a medium. The first mover causes motion and is unmoved: the last is moved, moving nothing else; but the intermediary is both; or the many intermediaries. So it is with the alteration in question, except that what is changed remains in the same place. If one clips an object into wax, the wax moves to the extent that the object enters it; whereas a stone is not moved at all; but water a long way, and air most of all, giving and receiving motion, so long as it remains a unity. Hence, as regards reflection, it is better to say that the air is affected by shape and colour, so long as it retains unity, than to say that the sight proceeds out and is reflected back. On a smooth surface [air] has unity, and so in turn, moves the sight; as if a seal were to sink into and right through wax. §§ 863-4

§ 847. After taking the various parts of the soul in turn, and discussing each one separately, the Philosopher now shows how they are interrelated: explaining, first, that the vegetative part is common to all animate beings, and then, at ‘Sensation is not necessarily found’, that the sphere of sensitivity is more limited.

In the light, then, of his previous conclusions he observes, first, that all beings that participate in any way in soul must, from the first moment of their generation until their final corruption, have some share in the vegetative principle, indicating by these terms that he speaks especially of animate beings which come to being through generation and cease through corruption.

§ 848. And he proves the point thus. No animate and generated being can exist without passing through the stages of growth, maturity and decline. And these all presuppose food. Growth implies that more food is being absorbed by a subject than is needed to maintain its existing bulk. Maturity implies a balance of food and bulk; whilst in decline less food is being absorbed than,suffices to maintain the subject’s bulk. And as it pertains to the vegetative principle to make use of food, this principle must be common to everything that is born and that dies; and must be related to the other parts of soul as the foundation they all presuppose.

§ 849. Then, at ‘Sensation etc.’, he shows how sensitivity is related to living things: and first, that it is not found in all of them; secondly, at ‘But if Nature’, where it is found. First, then, he remarks that touch (die sense presupposed by all the other senses, and therefore by all animal life as such) need not exist wherever life exists. The organ of touch requires (as we have seen)’ a sort of balance of contrary qualities; hence it cannot exist in simple bodies, which are characterised by the predorminance of some one particular sensible quality—as heat in fire or cold in water.

§ 850. Similarly, whatever is unable to receive into itself forms free from matter cannot sense; for this way of receiving forms is, as we have seen essential to sensitivity. Now plants, because in them the earthy element predominates, so that they are near neighbours to the simple bodies, are unable to receive forms from outside, except with a material alteration. Not all living things. therefore, are sensitive.

§ 851. Then, at ‘But if Nature’, he shows that all animals are sensitive. He does this (1) with regard to animals that can move from place to place; and (2) with regard to all animals without exception, at ‘But having sensation’. As regards (1) he first proves his point; and then, at ‘But a body’, refutes a possible objection. To prove that all animals are sensitive he assumes as a principle that Nature does nothing in a purposeless way. Everything in Nature has a reason, exists to supply the needs of purposeful being. Thus in order that certain activities may be carried Out, things have a natural equipment of suitable organs. These organs, it is true, being composed in this or that way, have certain accidental qualities or adjuncts, e.g. hairs or colours, not to mention innate weaknesses, which are due rather to the matter of which they are composed than to the ends which they subserve. But since Nature always does act for an end, whatever natural thing simply could not reach a natural end would be quite out of place in Nature.

§ 852. Now Nature has adapted the bodies of mobile animals for movement; and they move for the sake of obtaining the food which keeps them alive. And to this end they require sense-awareness; otherwise they would not perceive the noxious things to which their movement sometimes brings them, and thus they would die and the very purpose of their movements would be frustrated. For they move about in order to get food, and could not get it otherwise.

§ 853. (The case of immobile animals is not relevant here, for the food they naturally require is joined to their substance; they do not have to seek it at a distance.) Clearly then, if mobile animal bodies lacked sense-awareness they could not reach the end for which Nature designs them. They would be futile; which is an unacceptable conclusion.

§ 854. Next, at ‘But a body etc.’, he removes a possible objection. It might be suggested that some moving animal bodies could reach their natural end through an intellectual awareness of things that would do them harm, even though they lacked sense-awareness. But Aristotle rejects this hypothesis with respect to mobile animals, whether these come into existence by generation or no. The point has been proved with regard to generated animals; for the only animate things that come into being by generation and are endowed with intellect are human beings, and the human mind presupposes sensation, as we have seen.

§ 855. But his rejection of the suggestion that intellect might exist without sensitivity in non-generated living things may seem at variance with Aristotle's own opinion. For it was his view that the heavenly bodies are both animate and intelligent, and yet lack sensitivity because their bodies are not organised into the distinct parts which alone make sensation possible. Hence some commentators make the sentence end at 'yet not have sensation'; and its meaning they take to be that no mobile body can be intelligent, lacking sensitivity, provided that it is a generated body. And what follows—'nor 'indeed etc.'—they take as the beginning of a new sentence, meaning that the case of non-generated bodies, is different.

§ 856. Hence, according to their view, what follows, namely 'Why should they not etc.', must not be understood as an interrogation, but as a relative clause inserted to explain why non-generated bodies, i.e. the heavenly bodies, lack a sense-apparatus even while they have intelligence: Aristotle's argument (they say) being that neither the body nor the soul of a heavenly body would get any benefit from its having senses;—not the soul, because it would not understand any better thereby, since its understanding, like that of spiritual substances, bears upon the purely intelligible; nor yet the body, because, being essentially incorruptible anyhow, its senses would play no part in maintaining its existence.

However, this interpretation hardly squares with the conclusion which follows, namely that no animate body which has the power to move from place to place lacks sensitivity (unless we choose to relate this conclusion to the previous statement; not to the immediately preceding one).

§ 857. Since, then, this seems a forced interpretation, it is better to understand by 'non-generated body', not any heavenly body, but the bodies of certain airy animate beings called by the Platonists demons. Apuleius, for instance, defined them as air-bodied animate beings, rational, passive, eternal. And it would be concerning these beings, then, that the Philosopher seeks to prove that the Platonists were wrong in allowing them intelligence without senses. So the 'Why should they not' ought to be taken interrogatively, as meaning 'why should such bodies as these lack senses? For, if they do lack them, this must be for the good either of their soul or their body; and neither reason is valid; for without senses their souls would understand no better, nor would their bodies be any the less corruptible. And the conclusion immediately follows, as given above, namely that no living bodies that are able to move about in space lack sensation. That this is indeed Aristotle's meaning appears from his immediately adding that no simple body can possibly be the body of an animal.

§ 858. Then at 'But having' he proves the absolute necessity, for all animals, of sensitivity; first proving the point, then at 'It is then evident', drawing a conclusion. The proof subdivides. Thus: (1) he puts forward his own view; (2) he proves it, at 'Which is evident from these considerations'. His own view contains two points, of which the first is that whatever body has sensation must be either simple or mixed. But it cannot be simple; for if it were it would lack the sense of touch; which he has already shown to be necessary for all animals, not only the mobile but also the immobile.

§ 859. Then, at 'Which is evident', he proceeds to show (1) that touch is found in all animals; (2) at 'It is clearly impossible', that no animal body can be a simple body. With regard to (1) he first shows the necessity of touch for all animals; and then, at 'The others exist', that the other senses are not found in all. As to this necessity, however, having shown it in the case of touch, he then, at 'This is why taste', proves that it belongs also to taste.

First, then, he observes that the necessary universality of touch in the animal world can be clearly shown. For every animal is a living body; and every body is tangible or sensible to touch. By body is here meant exclusively the generable and corruptible sort of body, not the non-generated, incorruptible heavenly bodies. These latter are not tangible; being outside the sphere of the elements they lack the elemental qualities which alone are tangible. But all corruptible bodies, being either simple elements or compounds of elements, are necessarily tangible.

§ 860. Whence he concludes to the necessity, for the preservation of the bodies of animals, that they be endowed with touch. For they are tangible, i.e. made up of tangible qualities; and so are the other bodies which actually touch them; and in the course of nature the animal's body might well be so affected by these latter bodies as to be destroyed by them. It is not the same with those senses whose medium of contact with their objects is not by touch, i.e. smell, sight and hearing; for their objects, being at a distance, do not actually touch the animal's body; they cannot therefore be a danger to its life, as tangible objects may be. Hence, unless the animal were able to touch, and touching to discriminate between objects harmful and congenial to it, it could not avoid the former and accept the latter, and so preserve its existence. Touch, then, is a necessity for animals.

§ 861. Then, at ‘This is why taste’, he shows that the same is true of taste. For taste is a kind of touch, discriminating, as it does, between the goodness or harmfulness of different foods. Now food is essentially tangible and bodily; it nourishes the body just because it has the bodily qualities of being hot, moist, cold, dry. Bodies are nourished by bodies,—not by sounds or colours or scents; for sounds, colours and scents have nothing to do with growth or decay. Savour, however, is connected with nourishment by way of the body’s natural disposition. Since then taste perceives food, and food is something tangible in the vegetative or nutritive order, taste is a kind of touch. Both these senses then are necessary; from which it is all the more evident that animals could not exist without touch.

§ 862. Next, at ‘The others exist’, he explains why the other senses are not found in all animals, but only in some; after which, at ‘It is as when’, he explains one of his own expressions. First, then, he observes that the other senses, sight, hearing and smell, are required for the well-being of certain animals, but not for their bare existence. Yet for some animals (not all), these senses are absolutely necessary—for those, namely that can move from place to place; for these need to be able to perceive objects at a distance as well as what immediately touches them. Now to sense things at a distance is only possible though a medium; the medium being affected and altered by the object, and the sense by the medium.

§ 863. And at ‘It is as when’ he proceeds to show this by a simile from local motion. Anything moving from place to place will cause a succession of changes which terminate at its destination; for what is first propelled forward is itself the cause of something else being propelled; so that the first agent disturbs a third thing through a medium—the first thing being a disturber itself undisturbed; the last, where the movement terminates, being disturbed but not itself a disturber; whilst the medium is both disturber and disturbed; and there may be many such media. And this order in local motion is observable also in changes by alteration: where there is a primary agent of change, a final recipient of change, and a medium both changing and changed.

§ 864. But with this difference, that, in the case of alteration, the agent of change is not moving from place to place as it changes, unlike the agent of propulsion. And he gives an example. If you touch soft wax it will be moved just so far as the warmth that accompanies your action makes the wax move. The hardness of stone would make it impervious to this kind of action; but water would be affected in this way, and still more air which is extremely mobile and has the maximum mobility at a distance from the moving agent. Air especially, then, is able to move and be moved as a medium, provided of course that it be continuous, i.e. not interrupted by any obstacle. With regard then to the impact of an object upon the senses, it is reasonable to hold (against the Platonists who said that sight emitted rays which the visible object reflected) that the intervening air is affected by the shape and colour of an object all the way between this object and the eye; provided of course that the air be uniform and continuous and smooth. Air, on this view, itself affected by shape and colour, affects sight; so that it is the visible object which modifies all the air between itself and the eye. It is as though the shape of a sea] were to modify a piece of wax right through from one side to the other.

TEXT

435a11-435b25

BOOK III, CHAPTER XIII

TOUCH, THE FUNDAMENTAL SENSE

It is clearly impossible for the body of an animal to be a simple element: to be, I mean, fire or air. For no other sense can exist without touch; since every animate body, as we have seen, is tactual. The sense organs, indeed, can be constituted of other elements (except earth) for they effect sensation by perceiving through some other thing, i.e. through a medium. But touch occurs by immediate contact with things; that is why it has this name. Other senses no doubt also perceive by contact, but through something else; touch alone, it would seem, through itself. Hence the body of an animal will not be of such elements as these; nor yet be earthy. For touch is a kind of mean between all tangible objects, and is receptive, not only of all the differences that characterise earth, but also heat and cold and all other tangible qualities. This is why we do not feel with the bones or hair or other such parts,—because they are earthy. Plants, too, have no sensation, for the same reason,—they are of earth; and without touch there can be no other sense; and this sense does not consist either of earth or of any other [single] element. §§ 865-8

It is then evident that animals must perish if they are deprived of this sense alone. For it is neither possible for what is not an animal to possess this, nor, to be an animal, is any other necessary. And this again is why no other sense-object (e.g. colour, smell and sound) will destroy the animal by excessive intensity, but only the [corresponding] faculty of sense;—except incidentally, as when, for example, together with a sound, a thrust and a blow take place; or when other [things] are set in motion, by objects seen or smelled, which destroy by contact; and flavour too, in so far as it happens also to be tangible, may destroy thus. But an excess of tangible qualities, of heat or cold or hardness, destroys the animal itself. For as every excess in a sense-object is destructive of the sense, so may the tangible destroy touch; and by touch life itself is defined. For it has been shown that without touch no, animal can exist. Hence an excess in the tangible destroys not the sense only, but the whole animal; for only this one sense is necessary to animals. §§ 869-71

As we have said, the animal has other senses, not for being, but for well-being. Thus [it has] sight so that [living] in, air, water, or generally in what is transparent, it may see. Taste it has on account of the pleasant or unpleasant, that it may perceive what it desires in food, and, be moved towards it. Hearing it has that it may receive signs, and a tongue to signify something to another. §§ 872-4

ST. THOMAS’S COMMENTARY

LECTIO EIGHTEEN

§ 865. After proving that touch must exist in all animals, the philosopher now sets out to show that no animate body can be made up of one simple element: of fire, for instance, or air,—as certain Platonists thought when they imagined animals made of air. He argues this from the fact that the other senses all presuppose touch and that therefore, as he has said already, no animal can be without this sense. Every body that is both animate and sensitive must be such as is able to sense by touching. Now all the elements, except earth, can be organs of, or the medium for, the other senses: air and water for instance are adapted to sensation at a distance, which takes place through something other than the sensitive body itself, namely the medium. But touch involves no medium, it occurs by direct contact with its object. That is why it is so named: it is ‘contact’ par excellence, whereas the other senses perceive by a sort of contact, indeed, with their objects, but through a medium, not immediately. Only touch perceives of and by itself, and with no medium.

§ 866. From which it is clear that the animal body must be, of and by itself, capable of touching. This necessity is not found in the case of sight or hearing; for these senses work through an extrinsic medium. That is why the animal body cannot be made of any one single element,—not of earth alone, for earth in any case is not sensitive; nor of any of those other elements presupposed by the other senses.

§ 867. The reason is that the organ of touch must be balanced midway between the various tangible qualities; otherwise it could not receive their impressions. For as we have seen already, touch is in potency to these qualities. And this is true with respect to all tangible qualities, not to those of earth alone. Now simple bodies cannot be thus balanced half-way; they have one or other of opposed qualities to an extreme degree. Hence no simple body, nor any body approximating to simplicity, can touch. This is why we do not feel with such parts of our bodies as bones and hair, and so on, in which the element of earth so predominates that there is no balance of tangible qualities such as the sense of touch requires.

§ 868. It is for the same reason that plants lack sensitivity. They contain too much earth for touch, and without touch no other sense can exist. No simple body, then, can be animated by the sensitive soul.

§ 869. Then, at ‘It is then evident’, as a conclusion from what has been said, he shows how all the senses are related to animals; first the sense of touch; then, at ‘As we have said, the animal’ the other senses. First, then, he observes that, touch being necessary for all animals, they would die if deprived of it alone. It is indeed convertible with animality: only the animal has touch, and all animals have it.

§ 870. And he goes on to say that, while excess in the object of the other senses can destroy these senses one by one (as excessive brightness is blinding, and excessive noise deafening) yet, because the animal can survive the loss of these senses, such excess in their objects only indirectly endangers its life—inasmuch, that is, as destructive tangible objects are brought into play, as when blasts and blows accompany noise, as in thunderstorms for instance. So also, if things seen endanger life it is not precisely as seen, but as somehow infecting the air with some poison or other. So also smells might affect the air. Similarly, a savour might harm an animal, not precisely as a savour, but as accompanied by some tangible quality in excess, for example heat or cold.

§ 871. On the other hand, tangible qualities can directly endanger an animal's life. For as any excess in the sense-object may injure the corresponding sense, an excess in the object of touch may destroy this sense; and it is on this sense that the animal's life depends. It survives just so long as it can touch. Only this sense is strictly necessary to animal fife; hence its destruction involves the death of the whole animal.

§ 872. Then at 'As we have said, the animal', he relates the other senses to the animal as a whole; they pertain, he says, to its greater perfection; they are not sheer necessities. Thus animals that live in air or water have sight in order that they may see things at a distance through air or water,—or indeed through any transparent medium, including the heavenly bodies. Similarly, animals have the sense of touch that they may find pleasure, or its contrary, in their food; and thus, taking pleasure in eating, may desire to eat, and so to look for the food they need.

§ 873. Notice that here Aristotle places taste among the senses which are not strictly necessary, whereas he had previously said that it was necessary for animals; but then he was considering taste as a kind of touch—the touch of nourishment—whereas now he is considering it as a discrimination between the savours which make nourishment agreeable or disagreeable, and thus the more readily taken or rejected. And the same applies to the sense of smell; its function is to draw the animal to its food from a distance, —though indeed in man, as Aristotle explains in the De Sensu et Sensato, smell has a different nature and utility.

§ 874. The purpose, too, of hearing is to provide communication between animals. It is necessary that animals transmit their experiences to one another; for they help one another to live; as is especially evident in the gregarious animals whose young are reared by the parent. Hence, too, the tongue is necessary that one animal may communicate, by sound, its feelings to another.

Let this suffice for the present concerning the soul.

FINIS

NOTE TO III, §§ 744-5 (LECTIO TEN)

A much-disputed passage. A safe rendering of the Greek is: ‘This alone is immortal and perpetual. We have however no memory of it because it is impassible, whereas the passive intellect (Or, the mind that can be affected) is perishable; and without it nothing thinks’—taking ‘it’ to refer to the agent intellect. The Latin translation, however, followed by St. Thomas, takes this ‘it’ to mean the ‘passive intellect’ and inserts anima, ‘the soul’, as subject of ‘thinks’. Hence St. Thomas takes the whole section to refer to the state of the intellect after death: it ‘does not remember’, etc., once the passive intellect has perished; the latter is only ‘called’ intellect and is really a pars animae corporalis. See Introduction, as follows:

(6) Bk. III, lectio 10 (430a 20-25); §§ 740-5. The text here has given rise, on various counts, to much perplexity. For reference in discussion it will be well to have before us the Greek text and Latin, version:

Τὸ δ᾽αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δ᾽οὐ χρονῳ· ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ, ὁτὲ δ᾽οὐ νοεῖ. Χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. Οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἀνευ τοῦτου οὐδὲν νοεῖ.

Idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei; quae vero, secundum potentiam, tempore prior in uno est. Omnino autem neque tempore. Sed non aliquando quidem intelligit, aliquando autem non intelligit. Separatus autem est solum hoc, quod vere est. Et hoc solum immortale et perpetuum est. Non reminiscitur autem, quia hoc quidem impassibile est; passivus vero intellectus, est corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit anima.

The English translation given above follows the version more closely than the latter follows the Greek. The main problems are (i) to find the antecedent of intelligit in the third sentence, (2) to find what separatus agrees with, and (3) to discover what Aristotle means by ‘the passive intellect’.

(i) This question was already familiar to St. Thomas. The alternatives can be seen in Summa Theologiae, I, 79, 4, obj. 2 and ad 2. The objection runs: ‘The Philosopher (de Anima, III) says of the active (i.e. agent) intellect, that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand. But out soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, and sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active (agent) intellect is not something in our soul.’ To which St. Thomas replies: ‘The Philosopher says those words not of the active (agent) intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: Knowledge in act is the same as the thing. Or, if we refer those words to the active (agent) intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the active (agent) intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.’ The conclusion of the objection shows the importance of the question for the Averroist thesis of the separated intellect. St. Thomas clearly shows his preference for taking intellect to refer right back to ‘knowledge in act’, though finding the Averroist conclusion not necessitated by the alternative of taking it to refer to the agent-intellect. Curiously, though the version does not give any help in deciding this point, the Greek seems fully to justify St. Thomas’s preference. The ἀλλά is the strongest particle in its sentence and would seem absolutely to demand that its antecedent should be all of the sentence which precedes it. Commentators have not always seen this, but de Corte is surely right in making it one of his main arguments for taking the passage in the sense preferred by St. Thomas in the Summa and adopted by him in the Commentary.

It is matter of less moment but worthy of remark, that St. Thomas shows his penetration in overcoming, correctly, a further obscurity which is absent from the Greek but introduced by the author of the version by his writing omnino for ὅλως. An early variant is ἅπλως which comes to the same thing. The contrast is between knowledge in potency considered in the individual and the same considered absolutely or universally, without qualification. Omnino does not give this sense unmistakably, but St. Thomas does so understand it in the Commentary.

(ii) Separatus is commonly taken as referring only to the agent intellect, the last aspect of the intellective soul to have been considered. St. Thomas, with at least as much probability in his favour, argues for its reference to the intellective soul without qualification, on the ground that the ‘possible’ as well as the ‘agent’ intellect has been characterised as ‘separate’ in the foregoing passage. De Corte insists that the same interpretation is imposed by the whole theory of the soul and its parts which Aristotle presents.

We may note that the version’s vere is one of its rare verbal additions to the text, admirably, however, bringing out the emphasis of the Greek. Its presence renders less objectionable St. Thomas’s transference of the adverb solum into an adjective; the transference is to be explained by his taking solum with separatus rather than with est hoc quod vere est. But the presence of vere does much to retain the emphasis on the clause in which it occurs. It would be possible, consonantly with St. Thomas’s principles, to translate: ‘By itself, the intellect, when separated, is that which it truly is’, the general sense being, in any case, that, in the state of separation from the body, intellective soul is purely intellective, the organic powers being necessarily in abeyance.

(iii) The Version turns μνημονεύομεν by reminiscitur, but without serious consequences. With what previously mentioned period is the verb co-ordinated? It can only be with that indicated by Χωρισθεὶς. In a state of separation from the body, the intellective soul no longer remembers. Memory has already been mentioned in 408b 24-29 as perishing with the compositum of body and soul; St. Thomas refers to that passage in § 744, supra dixit in primo quod intelligere corrumpitur, quodam interius corrupto. We have already seen that the commentary on that passage (§ 163 ss.) presents certain difficulties. This is the place to suggest that they may in part be caused by St. Thomas’s awareness that Aristotle could not possibly be saying, in accordance with his own principles, that intelligere in the normal sense of that word is an act of the compositum as such and perishable with it. Yet the version gave him the statement, to which he here refers, Intelligere igitur et considerare marcescunt alio quodam interius corrupto. This genuine difficulty may have been the reason for the commentator’s interpreting the passage as an argumentum ad hominem. But now in Book III, at the end of lectio 10 (§ 745) he has his finger on the solution: ...destructo corpore non remanet in anima separata scientia rerum secundum eundem modum quo modo intelligit. Sed quomodo tunc intelligat, non est praesentis intentionis discutere. The word turned by intelligere is διάνοια and its association in these two passages with memory and other acts of the compositum suggests that this term could be applied to other than distinctively spiritual acts of the mind. Indeed its being coupled with θεωρεῖν in 408b 24 is sufficient warrant for finding such another use, since θεωρεῖν is often used by Aristotle both for an act of sense and an act of mind. De Corte suggests that the preposition διά in composition with the verb may here, as in other cases, have the sense of 'penetration'. The act signified would then be intermediate between sense perception and understanding proper: that collaboration of intellect and sense which is inescapably necessary to intellectual activity, so long as the soul is united to the body. The total aptitude for such collaboration is the 'passive' intellect of which Aristotle here alone makes mention. It is certainly impossible to equate this with the 'possible', or knowing, intellect properly so called.

We may close our discussion of this difficult passage by expanding the translation in the sense which seems to be appropriate.

> Knowledge in act is the same as the thing (actually known). But (knowledge) that is potential is, in the individual, prior in time. Absolutely, however, not even in time. Whereas (knowledge in act) does not sometimes know and sometimes not know. When mind is separated (from the body) it is simply what it truly is. It does not (then) remember, because (mind) indeed is impassible; but the passive intellect is corruptible, and without it (in this life) the soul understands nothing.

Ivo Thomas, O.P.

COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS

BOOK I

THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL THINGS

LECTURE 1 (184 A 9-B 14)

THE MATTER AND THE SUBJECT OF NATURAL SCIENCE AND OF THIS BOOK. WE MUST PROCEED FROM THE MORE UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES WHICH ARE BETTER KNOWN TO US

1. Because this book, The Physics, upon which we intend to comment here, is the first book of natural science, it is necessary in the beginning to decide what is the matter and the subject of natural science.

Since every science is in the intellect, it should be understood that something is rendered intelligible in act insofar as it is in some way abstracted from matter. And inasmuch as things are differently related to matter they pertain to different sciences.

Furthermore, since every science is established through demonstration, and since the definition is the middle term in a demonstration, it is necessary that sciences be distinguished according to the diverse modes of definition.

2. It must be understood, therefore, that there are some things whose existence depends upon matter, and which cannot be defined without matter. Further there are other things which, even though they cannot exist except in sensible matter, have no sensible matter in their definitions. And these differ from each other as the curved differs from the snub. For the snub exists in sensible matter, and it is necessary that sensible matter fall in its definition, for the snub is a curved nose. And the same is true of all natural things, such as man and stone. But sensible matter does not fall in

the definition of the curved, even though the curved cannot exist except in sensible matter. And this is true of all the mathematicals, such as numbers, magnitudes and figures. Then, there are still other things which do not depend upon matter either according to their existence or according to their definitions. And this is either because they never exist in matter, such as God and the other separated substances, or because they do not universally exist in matter, such as substance, potency and act, and being itself.

3. Now metaphysics deals with things of this latter sort. Whereas mathematics deals with those things which depend upon sensible matter for their existence but not for their definitions. And natural science, which is called physics, deals with those things which depend upon matter not only for their existence, but also for their definition.

And because everything which has matter is mobile, it follows that mobile being is the subject of natural philosophy. For natural philosophy is about natural things, and natural things are those whose principle is nature. But nature is a principle of motion and rest in that in which it is. Therefore natural science deals with those things which have in them a principle of motion.

4. Furthermore those things which are consequent upon something common must be treated first and separately. Otherwise it becomes necessary to repeat such things many times while discussing each instance of that which is common. Therefore it was necessary that one book in natural science be set forth in which those things which are consequent upon mobile being in common are treated; just as first philosophy, in which those things which are common to being insofar as it is being, is set forth for all the sciences.

This, then, is the book, The Physics, which is also called On Physics, or Of the Natural to be Heard, because it was handed down to hearers by way of instruction. And its subject is mobile being simply.

I do not, however, say mobile body, because the fact that every mobile being is a body is proven in this book, and no science proves its own subject. And thus in the very beginning of the De Caelo, which follows this book, we begin with the notion of body.

Moreover, after The Physics there are other books of natural science in which the species of motion are treated. Thus in the De Caelo we treat the mobile according to local motion, which is the first species of motion. In the De Generatione, we treat of motion to form and of the first mobile things, i.e., the elements, with respect to the common aspects of their changes. Their special changes are considered in the book Meteororum. In the book, De Mineralibus, we consider the mobile mixed bodies which are non-living. Living bodies are considered in the book, De Anima and the books which follow it.

5. To this book, then, the Philosopher writes a preface in which he shows the order of procedure in natural science.

In this preface he does two things. First he shows that it is necessary to begin with a consideration of principles. Secondly, where he says, ‘The natural way of doing this...’ (184 a 16), he shows that among principles, it is necessary to begin with the more universal principles.

First he gives the following argument. In all sciences of which there are principles or causes or elements, understanding and science proceed from a knowledge of the principles, causes and elements. But the science which is about nature has principles, elements and causes. Therefore it is necessary in it to begin with a determination of principles.

When he says ‘to understand’he has reference to definitions, and when he says ‘to have science’ he has reference to demonstrations. For as demonstrations are from causes, so also are definitions, since a complete definition is a demonstration differing only by position, as is said in Posterior Analytics, I:8.

When, however, he speaks of principles or causes or elements, he does not intend to signify the same thing by each. For cause is wider in meaning than element. An element is a first component of a thing and is in it [i.e., in the composed], as is said in Metaphysics,V:3. Thus the letters, but not the syllables, are the elements of speech. But those things are called causes upon which things depend for their existence or their coming to be. Whence even that which is outside the thing, or that which is in it, though the thing is not first composed of it, can be called a cause. But it cannot be called an element. And thirdly principle implies a certain order in any progression. Whence something can be a principle which is not a cause, as that from which motion begins is a principle of motion, butis not a cause, and a point is a principle of a line but not a cause.

Therefore, by principle he seems to mean moving causes and agents in which, more than in others, there is found an order of some progression. By causes he seems to mean formal and final causes upon which things most of all depend for their existence and their coming to be. By elements he means properly the first material causes.

Moreover he uses these terms disjunctively and not copulatively in order to point out that not every science demonstrates through. all the causes. For mathematics demonstrates only through the formal cause. Metaphysics demonstrates through the formal and final causes principally but also through the agent. Natural science, however, demonstrates through all the causes.

He then proves from common opinion the first proposition of his argument. This is also proven in the Posterior Analytics I:2. For a man thinks that he knows something when he knows all its causes from the first to the last. The meaning here of causes, principles, and elements is exactly the same as we have explained above, even though the Commentator disagrees. Furthermore Aristotle says, '...as far as its simplest elements' (184 a 14), because that which is last in knowledge is matter. For matter is for the sake of form, and form is from the agent for the sake of the end, unless it itself is the end. For example, we say that a saw has teeth in order to cut, and these teeth ought to be made of iron so they will be apt for cutting.

6. Next where he says, 'The natural way of doing this...'(184 a 16), he shows that among principles it is necessary to treat the more universal ones first, And he shows this first by means of an argument, and secondly, by an "ample, where he says, for it is a whole (184 a 25 9).

First he gives the following argument. It is natural for us to proceed in knowing from those things which are better known to us to those which are better known by nature. But the things which are better known to us are confused, such as the universals. Therefore it is necessary for us to proceed from universals to singulars.

7. For purposes of clarifying the first proposition he makes the point that things which are better known to us and things which are better known according to nature are not the same. Rather those things which are better known according to nature are less known to us. And because the natural way or order of learning is that we should come to that which is unknown by us from that which is known by us, it is necessary for us to arrive at the better known in nature from the better known to us.

It must be noted, however, that that which is known by nature and that which is known simply mean the same. Those things are better known simply which are in themselves better known. But those things are better known in themselves which have more being, because each thing is knowable insofar as it is being. However, those beings are greater which are greater in act. Whence these are the most knowable by nature.

For us, however, the converse is true because we proceed in understanding from potency to act. Our knowledge begins from sensible things which are material and intelligible in potency. Whence these things are known by us before the separated substances, which are better known according to nature, as is clear in Metaphysics, II:2.

He does not, therefore, say known by nature as if nature knew these things, but because they are better known in themselves and according to their proper natures. And he says better known and more certain, because in the sciences not just any kind of knowledge is sought, but a certain knowledge.

Next in order to understand the second proposition, it must be known that those things are here called ‘confused’ which contain in themselves something potential and indistinct. And because to know something indistinctly is a mean between pure potency and perfect act, so it is that while our intellect proceeds from potency to act, it knows the confused before it knows the distinct. But it has complete science in act when it arrives, through resolution, at a distinct knowledge of the principles and elements. And this is the reason why the confused is known by us before the distinct.

That universals are confused is clear. For universals contain in themselves their species in potency. And whoever knows something in the universal knows it indistinctly. The knowledge, however, becomes distinct when each of the things which are contained in potency in the universal is known in act. For he who knows animal does not know the rational except in potency. Thus knowing something in potency is prior to knowing it in act. Therefore, according to this order of learning, in which we proceed from potency to act, we know animal before we know man.

8. It would seem, however, that this is contrary to what the Philosopher says in Posterior Analytics, I:2, namely, that singulars are better known to us, whereas the universals are better known by nature or simply.

But it must be understood that there he takes as singulars the individual sensible things themselves, which are better known to us because the knowledge of sense, which is of singulars, does precede in us the knowledge of the intellect, which is of universals. And because intellectual knowledge is more perfect, and because the universals are intelligible in act, whereas the singulars are not (since they are material), the universals are better known simply and according to nature.

Here, however, by singulars he means not the individuals themselves, but the species. And these are better known by nature, existing more perfectly, as it were, and being known with a distinct knowledge. But the genera are known by us first, being known, as it were, confusedly and in potency.

It should be known, however, that the Commentator explains this passage in another way. He says that in the passage beginning, ‘The natural way of doing this...’ (184 a 16), the Philosopher wishes to explain the method of demonstration of this science, namely, that this science demonstrates through the effect and what is posterior according to nature. Hence what is said here is to be understood of the progression in demonstration and not of the progression in determination. Then in the passage where Aristotle says, ‘Now what is plain to us...’(184 a 22), he intends to make clear (according to the Commentator) what things are better known to us and what is better known by nature, i.e., things which are composed of the simple, understanding ‘confused’ to mean ‘composed’. Finally, then, he concludes, as if to a corollary, that we must proceed from the more universal to the less universal.

It is clear that his explanation is not suitable, because he does not join the whole passage to one intention. Moreover the Philosopher does not intend to set forth the mode of demonstration of this science here, because he will do this in Book II according to his order of treatment. Furthermore, the confused should not be taken to mean composed, but rather to mean indistinct. For nothing could be concluded from such universals because genera are not composed of species.

9. Next, where he says, ‘... for it is a whole ...’ (184 a 25), he clarifies his position with three examples. The first of these is taken from the integral sensible whole. He says that since the sensible whole is better known to the sense, then, the intelligible whole is also better known to the intellect. But the universal is a sort of intelligible whole, because it comprehends many as

parts, namely, its inferiors. Therefore the universal is better known to us intellectually.

But it would seem that this proof is not effective, because he uses whole and part and comprehension equivocally.

However it must be said that the integral whole and the universal agree in that each is confused and indistinct. For just as he who apprehends a genus does not apprehend the species distinctly, but in potency only, so also he who apprehends a house does not yet distinguish its parts. Whence it is that a whole is first known to us as confused. This applies to both of these wholes. However, to be composed is not common to each whole. Whence it is clear that Aristotle significantly said ‘confused’ above and not ‘composed’.

10. Next where he says, ‘Much the same thing ...’ (184 b 9), he gives another example taken from the integral intelligible whole.

For that which is defined is related to the things defining it as a kind of integral whole, insofar as the things defining it are in act in that which is defined. But he who apprehends a name, for example, man or circle, does not at once distinguish the defining principles. Whence it is that the name is, as it were, a sort of whole and is indistinct, whereas the definition divides into singulars, i.e., distinctly sets forth the principles of that which is defined.

This, however, seems to be contrary to what he said above. For the things which define would seem to be more universal, and these, he said, were first known by us. Furthermore, if that which is defined were better known to us than the things which define, we would not grasp that which is defined through the definition, for we grasp nothing except through that which is better known to us.

But it must be said that the things which define are in themselves known to us before that which is defined, but we know the thing which is defined before we know that these are the things which define it. Thus we know animal and rational before we know man. But man is known confusedly before we know that animal and rational are the things which define man.

11. Next where he says, ‘Similarly a child ...’ (184 b 11), he gives the third example taken from the more universal sensible. For as the more universal intelligible is first known to us intellectually, for example, animal is known before man, so the more common sensible is first known to us

according to sense, for example, we know this animal before we know this man.

And I say first according to sense both with reference to place and with reference to time. This is true according to place because, when someone is seen at a distance, we perceive him to be a body before we perceive that he is an animal, and animal before we perceive him to be a man, and finally we perceive that he is Socrates. And in the same way with reference to time, a boy apprehends this individual as some man before he apprehends this man, Plato, who is his father. And this is what he says: children at first call all men fathers and all women mothers, but later they determine, that is, they know each determinately.

From this it is clearly shown that we know a thing confusedly before we know it distinctly.

LECTURE 2 (184 B 15-185 A 19)

THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURE AND OF BEINGS. IT DOES NOT PERTAIN TO NATURAL SCIENCE TO DISPROVE SOME OF THESE OPINIONS

12. Having completed the preface in which it was shown that natural science ought to begin with the more universal principles, here, according to the order already stated, he begins to pursue those matters which pertain to natural science.

This discussion is divided into two parts. In the first part he treats the universal principles of natural science. In the second part he treats mobile being in common (which is what he intends to treat in this book).' This is taken up in Book III, where he says, 'Nature has been defined ...' (200 b 12; L1).

The first part is divided into two parts. First he treats the principles of the subject of this science, that is, the principles of mobile being as such. Secondly he treats the principles of the doctrine. This he does in Book II, where he says, 'Of things that exist...' (192 b 8; L1).

The first part is divided into two parts. First he considers the opinions others have had concerning the common principles of mobile being. Secondly he seeks the truth concerning them, where he says, 'All thinkers, then, agree ...' (188 a 18; L10).

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he sets forth the different opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning the common principles of nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘Now to investigate ...’ (184 b 25 15), he shows that it does not pertain to natural science to pursue some of these opinions. Thirdly, where he says, ‘The most pertinent question...’ (185 a 20; L3), he considers these opinions, showing their falsity.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth the different opinions of the philosophers concerning the principles of nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘A similar inquiry is made ...’ (184 b 23 14), he shows that this same diversity exists with reference to the opinions of the philosophers concerning beings.

13. He says, therefore, first of all, that it is necessary that there be one principle of nature or many. And each position has claimed the opinions of the philosophers.

Some of them, indeed, held that there is one principle, others held that there are many. And of those who held that there is one principle, some hbld that it was immobile, as did Parmenides and Melissus, whose opinion he will examine below. Some, however, held that it was mobile, as did. the natural philosophers.

Of these, some held that air was the principle of all natural things, as Diogenes; others that it was water, as Thales; others that it was fire, as Heraclitus; and still others some mean between air and water, such as vapour.

But none of those who held that there was only one principle said that it was earth because of its density. For they held that principles of this sort were mobile, because they said that other things come to be through the rarefication and condensation of certain of these principles.

Of those who held the principles to be many, some held them to be finite, others held that they were infinite.

Of those who held that they were finite (although more than one) some held that there were two, i.e., fire and earth, as Parmenides will say below [L 10]. Others held that there were three, i.e., fire, air and water (for ‘they thought earth to be in some way composed because of its density). Others, however, held that there were four, as Empedocles did, or even some other number, because even Empedocles himself along with the four elements posited two other principles, namely, friendship and strife.

Those who held that there was an infinite plurality of principles had a diversity of opinions. For Democritus held that indivisible bodies which are called atoms are the principles of all things. And he held that bodies of this sort were all of one genus according to nature, but that they differed according to figure and form, and that they not only differed but even had contrariety among themselves. For he held three contrarieties: one according to figure, which is between the curved and the straight, another according to order, which is the prior and the posterior, and another according to position, namely, before and behind, above and below, to the right and to the left. And so he held that from these bodies existing of one nature different things come to be according to the diversity of the figure, position and order of the atoms. In this opinion, then, he gives us some basis for understanding the opposing opinion, namely that of Anaxagoras who held that the principles were infinite, but not of one genus according to nature. For he held that the principles of nature were the infinite, smallest parts of flesh and bone and other such things, as will be made clear below.

It must be noted, however, that he did not divide these many principles into mobile and immobile. For none of these who held that the first principles were many held that they were immobile. For since an place contrariety in the principles, and since it is natural for contraries to change, immobility could not stand with a plurality of principles.

14. Secondly, at the point where he says, ‘A similar inquiry is made...’ (184 b 23; L9), he shows that there is the same diversity of opinions concerning beings.

He says that in like manner the physicists, when inquiring about those things which are, i.e., about beings, wondered how many there are, i.e., whether there is one or many; and if many, whether finite or infinite.

And the reason for this is that the ancient physicists did not know any cause but the material cause (although they touched lightly upon the other causes). Rather they held that the natural forms were accidents, as the forms of artificial things are. Since, therefore, the whole substance of artificial things is their matter, so it followed, according to them, that the whole substance of natural things would be their matter.

Hence those who held one principle only, for example, air, thought that other beings were air according to their substance. And the same is true of the other opinions. Hence Aristotle says that the physicists seek what is in thatfrom which things are, i.e., in inquiring about principles they sought the material causes from which beings are said to be. Whence it is clear that when they inquire about beings, whether they are one or many, their inquiry concerns the material principles which are called elements.

15. Next where he says, ‘Now to investigate ...’ (184 b 25), he shows that it does not pertain to natural science to disprove some of these opinions.

And concerning this he makes two points. First he shows that it does not pertain’to natural science to disprove the opinion of Parmenides and Melissus. Secondly, where he says, ‘At the same time the holders of the theory...’ (185 a 18),2 he gives a reason why it is useful to the present work to disprove this opinion.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that it does not pertain to natural science to disprove the aforesaid opinion. Secondly, where he says, ‘... or like refuting ...’ (185 a 8 17), he shows that it does not pertain to natural science to resolve the arguments which are brought forth to prove this opinion.

He establishes his first point with two arguments, the second , of which begins where he says, ‘To inquire therefore ...’ (185 a 5 16).

He says, therefore, that it does not pertain to natural science to undertake a thorough consideration of the opinion whether being is one and immobile. For it has already been shown that there is no difference, according to the intention of the ancient philosophers, whether we hold one immobile principle or one immobile being.

And that it should not pertain to natural science to disprove this opinion he shows as follows. It does not pertain to geometry to bring forth reasons against an argument which destroys its principles. Rather, this either pertains to some other particular science (if, indeed, geometry is subalternated to some particular science, such as music is subalternated to arithmetic, to which it pertains to dispute against any position denying the principles of music), or it pertains to a common science such as logic or metaphysics. But the aforesaid position destroys the principles of nature. For if there is only one being, and if this being is immobile, such that from it others cannot come to be, then the very nature of a principle is taken away. For every principle is either a principle of some thing or of some things. Therefore, if we posit a principle, a multiplicity follows, because one is the principle and the other is that of which it is the principle.

Whoever, therefore, denies multiplicity removes principles. Therefore natural science ought not to argue against this position.

16. Next where he says, ‘To inquire therefore...’(185 a 5), he shows the sar

gp point with another argument. It is not required of any science that it bring forth arguments against manifestly false and improbable opinions. For to worry about one who offers positions contrary to the opinions of the wise is stupid, as is said in Topics, I:11.

He says, therefore, that to undertake a thorough consideration of the question whether being is one, and hence immobile, is like arguing against any other improbable position. For example, it is like arguing against the position of Heraclitus, who said that all things are always moved and that nothing is true; or against the position of one who would say that the whole of being is one man, which position, indeed, would be altogether improbable. And indeed whoever holds being to be only one immobile thing is forced to hold that the whole of being is some one thing. It is clear, therefore, that it does not belong to natural science to argue against this position.

17. Next when he says, ‘... or like refuting ...’ (185 a 8), he shows that it does not belong to natural science even to resolve the arguments of the aforementioned philosophers. And this for two reasons, the second of which begins where he says, ‘We physicists ...’ (185 a 13 18).

First he proves his position by pointing out that it is not incumbent upon any science to resolve sophistic arguments which have an obvious defect of form or matter. He says that to deal with improbable arguments is like solving a contentious or sophistic argument. But each argument of both Melissus and Parmenides is sophistic, for they err in matter, whence he says that they have accepted what is false, i.e., they assume false propositions, and they err in form, whence he says that they are not syllogizing. But the position of Melissus is much worse, i.e., more vain and foolish and does not cause any difficulty. This will be shown below [L 5]. Moreover, it is not inconsistent that given one inconsistency another should follow. Therefore it can be concluded that it is not required of the philosopher of nature that he resolve the arguments of this man.

18. He sets forth the second argument for this where he says, ‘We physicists...’ (185 a 13). The argument is as follows. In natural science it is

supposed that natural things are moved, either all or some of them. He says this because there is doubt whether some things are moved and how they are moved, for example, about the soul and the centre of the earth, and the pole of heaven, and about natural forms and other such things. But the fact that natural things are moved can be made clear from induction, for it is apparent to the sense that natural things are moved.

It is as necessary that motion be supposed in natural science as it is necessary that nature be supposed. For motion is placed in the definition of nature, for nature is a principle of motion, as will be said below [II, L1].

Having established this point, that motion is supposed in natural science, he proceeds further to prove his position as follows. Not A arguments must be resolved in any science, but only those which conclude to something false from the principles of that science. Any arguments which do not reach their conclusions from the principles of the science, but from the contraries of these principles, are not resolved in that science. He proves this by an example taken from geometry saying that it pertains to geometry to resolve the problem of squaring, i.e., the squaring of a circle by dissecting the circumference, because this method supposes nothing contrary to the principles of the science of geometry. For somebody wished to find a square equal to a circle by dividing the circumference of the circle into many parts and placing straight lines in each part. And so by finding some figure, which was rectilinear, equal to some of the figures which were contained by the dissections of the circumference and the cords (either many or all), he thought he had found a rectilinear figure equal to the whole circle, to which it was easy to find an equal square through the principles of geometry. And thus he thought that he was able to find a square equal to a circle. But he did not argue well enough, for although these dissections used up the whole circumference of the circle, the figures contained by the dissections of the circumference and the straight lines did not encompass the whole circular surface.

But to resolve the square of Antiphon does not pertain to geometry, because he used principles contrary to those of geometry. For he described in a circle a certain rectilinear figure, for example, a square. And he divided in half the arcs by which the sides of the square were subtended. And from the points of dissection he led straight lines to all the angles of the square. And then there resulted in the circle a figure of eight angles, which more closely approached equality with the circle than the square. Then he again divided in half the arcs by which the sides of the octagon were subtended, and thus by leading straight lines from the points of dissection to the angles of this figure there resulted a figure of sixteen angles, which still further approached equality with the circle. Therefore, by always dividing the arcs and leading straight lines to the angles of the figure already existing there will arise a figure very near to equality with the circle. He said, then, that it was impossible to proceed to infinity in the dissection of arcs. Therefore, it was necessary to arrive at some rectilinear figure equal to the circle to which some square could be equal.

But, because he supposed that an arc is not always divisible in half, which is contrary to the principles of geometry, it does not pertain to geometry to resolve an argument of this sort.

Therefore, because the arguments of Parmenides and Melissus suppose being to be immobile (as will be shown below [L5]), and since this is contrary to the principles supposed in natural science, it follows that it does not pertain to the natural philosopher to resolve arguments of this sort.

19. Next where he says, ‘At the same time ...’ (185 a 18), he states why he will argue against the aforementioned position. He says that because the philosophers mentioned above did speak of natural things, even though they did not create a problem (that is, in the sphere of natural science), it is useful for his present purpose to argue against opinions of this sort. For even though it does not pertain to natural science to argue against such positions, it does pertain to first philosophy.

LECTURE 3 (185 A 20-B 27)

THE ASSERTION OF PARMENIDES AND MELISSUS THAT ALL THINGS ARE ONE BEING IS REFUTED

20. After he has set forth the opinions of the philosophers concerning principles, here Aristotle argues against them.

First he argues against those who spoke unnaturally about nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘The physicists, on the other hand ...’ (187 a 11; L8 53), he argues against those who spoke of nature in a natural way.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he argues against the position of Melissus and Parmenides, and secondly against their arguments, where he says,’Further the arguments they use ...’ (186 a 5; L5 29). Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he argues against the position that ‘being is one’ by using an argument dealing with the ‘being’which is the subject in this proposition. Secondly, where he says, ‘Again, “one” itself . ..’(185 b 5 22), he uses an argument dealing with the ‘one’ which is the predicate.

21. He says first that that which should be taken primarily as a principle in arguing against the aforesaid position is the fact that that which is, i.e., being, is said in many ways. For we must ask of those who say that being is one how they are using ‘being’: whether they take it for substance, or for quality, or for one of the other genera. And because substance is divided into the universal and the particular, i.e., into first and second substance, and further into many species, we must ask the following questions. Do they say that being is one as one man or as one horse, or as one soul, or as

one quality, such as white or hot or some other such thing? For it makes a great difference which of these is said.

Hence, if being is one, it must either be substance and accident together, or it must be accident alone, or substance alone.

If, however, it is substance and accident together, then being will not be one only, but two. Nor does it differ with reference to this whether substance and accident are together in one thing as one or as different.

For even though they are together in one thing, they are not one simply, but one in subject. And so by positing substance with accident it follows that they are not one simply, but many.

If, however, it is said that being is accident only and not substance, this is altogether impossible. For accident can in no way be without sub~tance. For every accident is said of substance as of its subject, and the very definition of accident involves this.

If, however, it is said that being is substance only without accident, then it follows that it would not be a quantity, for quantity is an accident. And this is contrary to the position of Melissus. For he held that being was infinite, whence it follows that it is quantity, because the infinite, properly speaking, does not exist except in quantity. And substance and quality and the like are not said to be infinite except accidentally insofar as they are, for instance, together with quantity. Since, then, Melissus held being to be infinite, he cannot hold that it is substance without quantity. If, therefore, being is substance and quantity together, it follows that being is not one only, but two. If, however, it is substance alone, it is not infinite, because it will not have magnitude or quantity. Hence what Melissus says, namely, that being is one, can in no way be true.

22. Then where he says, ‘Again “one” itself...’ (185 b 5) he sets forth his second argument which deals with the ‘one’.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he gives the argument. Secondly, where he says, ‘Even the more recent ...’ (185 b 25; L4 25), he shows how some have erred in the solution of this question.

He says first that just as being is said in many ways, so also is one. And so we must consider in what way they say that all things are one.

For ‘one’is used in three ways: either as the continuous is one, such as a line or a body, or as the indivisible is one, such as a point, or as those things are said to be one whose nature [ratio] or definition is one, as drink and wine are said to be one.

First, therefore, he shows that we cannot say that all are one by continuity, because a continuum is in a certain respect many. For every continuum is divisible to infinity, and so contains many in itself as parts. Hence whoever holds that being is a continuum must hold that it is in a certain respect many.

And this is true, not only because of the number of the parts, but also because of the difference which seems to exist between the whole and the parts.

For there is a question whether the whole and the parts are one or many. And although this question, perhaps, does not pertain to the matter at hand, it is, nevertheless, worthy of consideration for its own sake. And here we consider not only the continuous whole, but also the contiguous whole whose parts are not continuous, such as the parts of a house which are one by contact and composition. It is clear that that which is a whole accidentally is the same as its parts. But this is not true of that which is a whole simply. For if that which is a whole simply the same as one of the parts, then for the same reason it would be the same as another of the parts. But things which are identical with the same thing are identical with each other. And thus it would follow that both parts, if they are held simply to be the same as the whole, would be identical with each other. Hence it would follow that the whole would be indivisible having no diversity of parts.

23. Next where he says, ‘But to proceed ...’ (185 b 18), he shows that it is impossible for all to be one as the indivisible is one. For that which is indivisible cannot be a quantity, since every quantity is divisible. As a’result of this it cannot be a quality, if it is understood that we are speaking of a quality which is founded upon quantity. And if it is not a quantity, it cannot be finite as Parmenides has said, nor can it be infinite as Melissus has said. For an indivisible terminus, such as a point, is an end and is not finite. For the finite and the infinite are found in quantity.

24. Next where he says, ‘But if all things...’ (185 b 19), he shows how it cannot be said that all things are one in definition [ratio]. For if this were true, three absurdities would follow.

The first is that contraries would be one according to definition [ratio), so that the definitions of good and evil would be the same, just as Heraclitus held the definitions of contraries to be the same,. as is made clear in Metaphysics, IV:3.

The second absurdity is that the definitions [ratio] of the good and the non-good would be the same, because non-good follows upon evil. And thus it would follow that the definitions of being and non-being would be the same. And it would also follow that all beings would not only be one being, as they hold, but also they would be non-being or nothing. For things which are one in definition are so related that they may be used interchangeably as predicates. Whence if being and nothing are one according to definition, then it follows, that if all are one being, all are nothing.

The third absurdity is that the different genera, such as quantity and quality, would be the same according to definition [ratio]. He sets forth this absurdity where he says '... "to be of such-and-such a quality" is the same as "to be of such-and-such a size"' (185 b 24).

We must note however, that, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics, IV:4, against those who deny principles there can be no unqualified demonstration which proceeds from what is more known simply. But we may use a demonstration to contradiction which proceeds from those things which are supposed by our adversary, which things are, for the time being, less known simply. And so the Philosopher, in this argument, uses many things which are less known than the fact that beings are many and not only one—the point about which he argues.

LECTURE 4 (185 B 27-186 A 4)

THE LATER PHILOSOPHERS ALSO WERE INVOLVED IN THIS SAME ERROR, NAMELY, THAT THE ONE AND THE MANY COULD NOT IN ANY WAY CONCUR

25. Having disproven the opinion of Parmenides and Melissus that being is one, the Philosopher here shows that certain later philosophers fell into difficulty on this very same problem.

Parmenides and Melissus erred because they did not know how to distinguish the uses of the term ‘one’. Thus, what is one in a certain respect, they said was one simply. But the later philosophers, also not knowing how to distinguish the uses of the term ‘one’, thought it absurd that one and the same thing should be in some way one and many. Yet, being convinced by the arguments, they were forced to believe it. And so Aristotle says that the later philosophers were ‘disturbed’ (that is, fell into a difficulty similar to that of the ancients, i.e., Parmenides and Melissus) lest they be forced to say that one and the same thing is one and many. Now this seemed absurd to both groups of philosophers. So the earlier philosophers, holding that all is one, rejected all multiplicity. The later philosophers, on the other hand, tried to remove multiplicity from anything they held to be one.

26. Thus some, such as Lycophron, removed the verb is from propositions. They said that we must not say ‘man is white’ but rather ‘white man’. For they thought that man and. white were in some way one, otherwise white would not be predicated of man. And it seemed to them

that the word ‘is’, since it is a verbal copula, must serve as a copula between two. And so, wishing to remove all multiplicity from that which is one, they said the verb ‘is’ must not be used.

But because such speech seemed to be imperfect, and because an imperfect understanding was produced in the soul of him who heard if names were spoken without the addition of any verb, some, wishing to correct this, changed the mode of speech. They did not say ‘white man’ because of the imperfection of this mode of speech. Nor did they say ‘man is white’ lest they give the impression that there is multiplicity. Rather they said ‘man whitened’,’ because by this expression ‘whitened’ [albari] a thing is not understood (as it seemed to them), but rather a certain change in the subject. And in like manner they said that we must not say ‘man is walking’ but ‘man walks’, lest by the addition of the verbal copula ‘is’ they make that which they thought to be one (i.e., white man) to be many, as if one and being were used in only one way and not in many.

27. But this is false, For that which is one in one respect can be many in some other respect, as what is one in subject can be many in definition [ratio]. Thus the white and the musical are the same in subject but many in definition [ratio]. Hence it can be concluded that the one may be many.

This may happen also in another way. That which is actually one as a whole may be many according to a division of parts. Whence the whole is one in its totality, but it has multiplicity of parts.

And although those who wished to remove the verb ‘is’ or alter it, as was said above [26], found some solution to the objection that things could be one in subject and many in definition [ratio], they failed altogether to answer the objection that a thing may be one as a whole but many in its parts. They still believed it to be something of an absurdity that the one should be many.

But it is not absurd if the one and the many are not taken as opposites. For the one in act and the many in act are opposed, but the one in act and the many in potency are not opposed. And because of this he adds that ‘one’ is said in many ways, i.e., one in potency and one in act. And so nothing prohibits the same thing from being one in act and many in potency, as is clear with regard to the whole and the parts.

28. Finally he draws the conclusion which he had uppermost in mind, namely, that it is clear from the foregoing arguments that it is impossible for

all beings to be one.

LECTURE 5 (186 A 5-22)

THE ARGUMENT OF MELISSUS IS ANSWERED

29. Having disproved the position of Parmenides and Melissus, here the Philosopher begins to answer their arguments.

Concerning this he makes three points. First he shows how their arguments are to be answered. Secondly, where he says, ‘The fallacy of Melissus ...’ (186 a 10 31), he answers the argument of Melissus. Thirdly, where he says,’The same kind of argument ...’ (186 a 23; L6 36), he answers the argument of Parmenides.

30. He says that it is not difficult to answer the arguments with which Parmenides and Melissus reasoned. For each syllogized sophistically both in that, they assumed false propositions and in that they did not observe the proper form of the syllogism. But the argument of Melissus is the more gross, that is, more vain and foolish, and does not cause any difficulty. For he assumed what is contrary to natural principles and what is manifestly false, namely, that being is not generated. And it is not a serious matter, granting one absurdity, if another should follow.

31. Next when he says, ‘The fallacy of Melissus ...’ (186 a 10), he answers the argument of Melissus, which argument is as follows.

What is made has a beginning. Therefore what is not made has no beginning. But being is not made. Therefore it has no beginning, and as a result has no end. But what has neither beginning nor end is infinite. Therefore being is infinite. But what is infinite is immobile, for it would not have outside itself that by which it would be moved. Furthermore what is infinite is one, because if there were many there must necessarily be something outside the infinite. Therefore being is one and infinite and immobile.

Furthermore, in order to show that being is not generated, Melissus used a certain argument which some natural philosophers also used. Aristotle gives this argument below, near the end of Book I [L14 120].

32. Aristotle disproves this argument of Melissus on four counts.

He argues first against the statement of Melissus that if what is made has a beginning, then what is not made has no beginning. This does not follow. Rather it is a fallacy of consequent. For he argues from the destruction of the antecedent to the destruction of the consequent, whereas the correct form of argumentation would be the converse. Whence it does not follow that if a thing which is made has a beginning, then that which is not made does not have a beginning. The correct conclusion would be that if a thing does not have a beginning, then it is not made.

33. Secondly, where he says, ‘Then this also is absurd ...’ (186 a 13), he disproves the argument under discussion with reference to the inference that if something has no beginning, then it is infinite.

For ‘beginning’ may be taken in two ways. In one way we speak of a beginning,.of time and of generation. And this meaning of beginning is taken when it is said that what is made has a beginning or what is not made has no beginning. In another sense, beginning is the beginning of a thing or a magnitude. And in this sense it would follow that if a thing has no beginning, then it is infinite.

Whence it is clear that Melissus uses the term ‘beginning’ as if it had one meaning only. Hence Aristotle says that it is absurd to say that every case of beginning is the beginning of a thing, that is, of a magnitude, so that the beginning of time and of generation is not another meaning of the term.

However a simple and instantaneous generation (which is the induction of a form in matter) does not have a beginning. For of a simple generation there is no beginning. But there is a beginning for a whole alteration whose terminus is a generation, since this would not be an instantaneous change. And because of this terminus this is sometimes called a generation.

34. Thirdly, where he says, ‘Again does it follow...’ (186 a 15), he disproves the above position with reference to its third inference, namely, that because being is infinite, it is immobile.

He shows in two ways that this does not follow. First it does not follow in regard to local motion. For a part of water could be moved with in water so that it is not moved to any extrinsic place. In this case it would be moved by a joining and separation of the parts. And likewise, if the whole infinite body were water, it would be possible for the parts of it to be moved within the whole and not proceed outside the place of the whole. Again he disproves this with reference to the motion of alteration. For nothing prevents the infinite from being altered either as a whole or in its parts, for it would not be necessary to posit something outside the infinite to account for this.

35. Fourthly, where he says,’But further...’(186 a 19), he disproves the given argument with reference to its fourth inference by which it is concluded that, if being is infinite, it is one. For it does not follow that it is one according to species, but rather that it is one according to matter, just as some of the philosophers of nature have held that all things are one according to matter, but not according to species. For it is obvious that man and horse differ in species, and in like manner contraries differ from each other in species.

` 6 (186 a 23-b 35)

THE ARGUMENT OF PARMENIDES IS ANSWERED IN A NUMBER OF WAYS

36. Having disproved the argument of Melissus, here the Philosopher disproves the argument of Parmenides.

First he disproves the argument. Secondly, where he says, ‘Some thinkers did...’(187 a 1; L7 47ff.), he rejects what has been said by some who have argued badly against Parmenides.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth the ways in which the argument of Parmenides is to be refuted. Secondly, where he says,’His assumption...’(186 a 24 39), he resolves the argument in these ways.

37. Concerning the first part it must be known that the argument of Parmenides was as follows, as is clear from Metaphysics, I:5. Whatever is other than being is non-being. But what is non-being is nothing. Therefore whatever is other than being is nothing. But being is one, therefore whatever is other than one is nothing. Therefore there is only one being. And from this he concluded that it would be immobile, because it would not

have anything by which it would be moved, nor would there be anything outside of it by which it would be moved.

It is clear, moreover, from their very arguments that Parmenides considered being under the aspect [secundum rationem] of being, and so held it to be one and finite; whereas Melissus considered being from the point of view of matter. For Melissus considered being insofar as it is made or not made. And so he held being to be one and infinite.

38. Aristotle says, therefore, that the same approach must be used against the argument of Parmenides that was used against the argument of Melissus. For as the argument of Melissus was answerdd on the basis that he assumed false propositions and did not draw his conclusions according to the correct form of the syllogism, so also the argument of Parmenides is answered partly because he assumed false propositions and partly because he did not draw his conclusions correctly.

He says, however, that there are also other appropriate ways of arguing against Parmenides. For it is possible to argue against Parmenides from the propositions which he assumed and which are in a certain respect true and probable. But Melissus proceeded from what was false and improbable, for example, that being is not generated. Because of this, Aristotle did not argue against Melissus from the propositions which he assumed.

39. Next where he says, ‘His assumption ...’ (186 a 24), he follows the procedures just mentioned. First according to the first way, and secondly according to the second way, where he says, ‘His conclusion does not follow ...’ (186 a 25 40).

He says, therefore, first that Parmenides assumed false propositions because he held that what is, i.e., being, is used simply, i.e., in one way. Whereas in fact it is used in many ways.

For being is used in one way for substance, in another way for accident; and the latter is used in many ways according to the different genera. Being also can be used commonly for substance and accident.

Hence it is clear that the propositions assumed by Parmenides are true in one sense and false in another. For when it is said that whatever is other than being is non-being, this is true if being is taken, as it were, commonly for substance and accident. If, however, being is taken for accident alone or for substance alone, this is false, as will be shown below [42-43].

Likewise when he says that being is one, this is true if being is taken for some one substance or for some one accident. But this will not be true in the sense that whatever is other than that being is non-being.

40. Next where he says, ‘His conclusion does not follow ...’ (186 a 25), he follows the second method of answering the argument, i.e., that the argument of Parmenides does not draw its conclusion according to proper form.

He shows this first in an example. And secondly, where he says, ‘It is necessary for him ...’ (186 a 33 41), he adapts this example to the problem at hand.

He says, therefore, first that it can be seen that the argument of Parmenides does not draw its conclusion properly because of the fact that the form of argumentation used is not efficacious in every matter. And this could not be true if a proper form of argumentation were used. For if we take ‘white’ in the place of ‘being’, and if we say that ‘white’ signifies one thing only and is not used equivocally, and if we say that whatever is other than white is non-white, and whatever is non-white is nothing, then it will not follow that white would be one only. For it will not be necessary that all white things are one continuum. Or, to put it differently, white will not necessarily be one by continuity, i.e., from the fact that white is a continuum, it will not be one simply. For a continuum is in a certain respect many, as was said above [L3 22].

And in like manner white will not be one in definition [ratio], for the white and that which is receptive of the white are different in definition [ratio]. Furthermore there will not be something other than white, as it were, separated from it. For the white is not other than that which is receptive of it because the white is separable from that which is receptive of it, but because the definitions [ratio] of the white and of that which is receptive of it are different. But. it was not yet known at the time of Parmenides that something could be one in subject and many in definition [ratio].

41. Next where he says, ‘It is necessary for him ...’ (186 a 33), he adapts this example to the matter at hand in order to show how what he has said of the white also applies to being.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows that it does not follow that being is one simply. For subject and accident are different according to definition [ratio]. Secondly, where he says, ‘In particular then...’ (186 b 13 44), he shows that this does not follow because of the multiplicity of parts. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that when it is said that ‘whatever is other than being is non-being’, this ‘being’ cannot be taken to mean accident alone. Secondly, where he says, ‘If, then, substance ...’ (186 b 4 43), he shows that this ‘being’ cannot be taken to mean substance alone.

42. He says, therefore, first that when it is said that ‘whatever is other than being is non-being’, if ‘being’ is said to signify one thing, then it will be necessary that it signify not some one being or what is predicated of some one thing. Rather it will signify what truly is, i.e., substance, and it will signify what is truly one, i.e., the indivisible. For if being were to signify accident, then, since accident would be predicated of a subject, the subject could not be that to which the accident, which is called being, occurs. For if whatever is other than being is non-being (i.e., other than accident), and if the subject is other than the accident, which is here said to be being, then it follows that the subject is nonbeing. And so when accident, which is being, is predicated of the subject which is non-being, it follows that being is predicated of non-being. Hence, Aristotle concludes, ‘Something, therefore, which is not win be’ (186 b 1), that is, it will follow that non-being is being. This, however, is impossible.. For what is first of all assumed in the sciences is that contradictories are not to be predicated of each other, as is said in Metaphysics, IV:7. Whence he concludes that if anything is truly being, as is supposed in the proposition ‘whatever is other than being is nonbeing’, it follows that it is not an accident inhering in something else. For in this case its subject would not be a being. That is, this subject would not have the nature [ratio] of being, unless being should signify many, so that each of the many would be a being. But it was assumed by Parmenides that being signifies one only.

43. Next where he says, ‘If, then, substance.. .’(186 b 4), after he has concluded that ‘being’ cannot refer to accident when it is said that ‘whatever is other than being is non-being’, he shows further that ‘being’ cannot refer to substance either. Whence he says that if what truly is does not happen to something, but other things happen to it, then in the proposition ‘whatever is other than being is non-being’, it is necesstuy that

‘what truly is’, i.e., substance, be signified by being rather than by non-being.

But this cannot stand. For let it be held that that which truly is, i.e., substance, is white. But white is not that which truly is. For it has already been said that that which truly is cannot happen to something. And this is so because what is not truly, i.e., what is not substance, is not that which is, i.e., is not being. But what is other than being, i.e., other than substance, is non-being. Hence it follows that white is non-being, not only in the sense that it is not this being, as a man is not this being which is an ass, but also in the sense that it is not in any way. For he says that whatever is other than being is non-being, and what is nonbeing is nothing. From this, therefore, it follows that non-being would be predicated of that which truly is, because white is predicated of substance, which truly is. And white does not signify being, as was said.

Whence it follows that being is non-being. And this indeed is impossible, because one contradictory is not predicated of another.

Whence, if in order to avoid this inconsistency, we say that true being signifies not only the subject, but also the white itself, it follows that being will signify many. And thus there will not be only one being, for subject and accident are many according to nature [ratio].

44. Next where he says, ‘In particular then ...’ (189 b 13), he shows, because of the multiplicity of parts, that it does not follow from the argument of Parmenides that there is only one being. He shows this first with reference to quantitative parts and secondly with reference to the parts of definition [ratio], where he says, ‘Substance is plainly divisible ...’ (186 b 14).1

He says, therefore, first that if being signifies only one thing, not only will it not be accident with subject, but neither will it be a, magnitude. For every magnitude is divisible into parts. But the natures [ratio] of each of the parts are not the same, but different. Whence it follows that this one being is not a corporeal substance.

45. Secondly, where he says, ‘Substance is plainly divisible ...’ (186 b 14), he shows that this being cannot be a definable substance.

For in a definition it is clear that that which truly is, i.e., the substance, is divided into many, each one of which is what truly is, i.e. substance, and each one of which has a different nature [ratio]. Let us suppose that man is one thing which truly is. Since man is a two-footed animal, it is necessary that animal be and that two-footed be. And each of these will be what truly is, i.e., substance. And if they are not substances, they are accidents, either of man or of some other thing. But it is impossible that they be accidents of man.

And to make this clear he assumes two things.

First he assumes that ‘accident’ is used in two ways. One type of accident is separable, and as such can be in something or not in it, for example, to sit. Another type of accident is inseparable and per se. And this latter is the accident in whose definition is placed the subject in which it is. For example, the snub is a per se accident of nose, because nose is placed in the definition of the snub. For the snub is a curved nose.

The second thing which he assumes is that if certain things are placed in the definition of that which is defined, or in the definition of the things on which the definition depends, then it is impossible that the whole definition of that which is defined be placed in the definition of these certain things. Thus two-footed is placed in the definition of man, and certain other things are placed in the definition of two-footed or animal, from which [i.e., from two-footed and animal] man is defined. Hence it is impossible that man be placed in the definition of two-footed or in the definition of any of the things which fall in the definition of two-footed or of animal. Otherwise we would have a circular definition, and one and the same thing would be both prior and posterior, better known and less known. For every definition is from the prior and the better known, as is said in Topics, VI:4. And for the same reason, when white is placed in the definition of white man, it is impossible for white man to be placed in the definition of white.

These things having been assumed, the argument is as follows. If twofooted is an accident of man, it must be either a separable accident (and thus it could happen that man is not two-footed, which is impossible) or an inseparable accident (and thus it will be necessary that man be placed in the definition of two-footed). But this also is impossible, because twofooted is placed in the definition of man. It is impossible, therefore, that two-footed be an accident of man. For the same reason animal cannot be an accident. If, however, it is said that both are accidents of something else, it would follow that man also would be an accident of something else. But this is impossible, for it has already been said above that that which truly is is an accident of nothing. But man was assumed to be that which truly is, as is clear from what was said above.

That it would follow that man would be an accident of another if animal and two-footed were accidents of another, he shows as follows. What is said of both animal and two-footed taken separately may be said of them taken together, i.e., two-footed animal. And what is said of two-footed animal may be said of that which is from them, i.e., man, ecause man is nothing other than a two-footed animal.

Therefore it is clear that if being is held to be one only, we cannot hold that there are quantitative parts, or parts of a magnitude, or parts of a definition. Therefore it follows that every being is numerically indivisible. Otherwise, while holding being to be one, we would be forced to posit a multiplicity because of the parts.

46. the Commentator, however, says that in the passage beginning, 'But we must assume ...' (186 b 33), Aristotle sets forth the second argument of Parmenides to show that being is one. And this argument is as follows. A being which is one is substance and not accident (and by substance he means body). If, however, that body is divided into two halves, it will follow that being is predicated of each half and of the union of the two. And this either proceeds to infinity, which is impossible in itself, or else the being is divided into points. But this also is impossible. Hence it follows that being is an indivisible one.

But this exposition is fabricated and contrary to the intention of Aristotle, as is sufficiently clear from an examination of the letter of the text according to the first explanation.

LECTURE 7 (187 A 1-10)

HE DISPROVES THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO SAID THAT NON-BEING IS SOMETHING

47. After the Philosopher has disproved the argument of Parmenides by bringing forth certain inconsistencies found in it, he here disproves the position of those who have conceded these inconsistencies.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he sets forth their position. Secondly, he disproves it where he says, ‘But obviously it is not...’ (187 a 3 50).

48. It must be noted first that the Philosopher used two arguments above [L6 36ff.] against the argument of Parmenides. He used one to show that, because of the diversity of subject and accident, it does not follow from the argument of Parmenides that all is one. This argument led to the absurdity that non-being is being, as is clear from what was said above. The other argument proceeded to show that the conclusion that an is one does not follow because, if it were a magnitude, it would follow that this magnitude is indivisible. For if it were divisible, there would be some sort of multiplicity.

49. The Platonists, however, gave in to each argument, conceding the impossibilities to which they led.

They accepted the first argument which led to the conclusion that non-being would be being. Suppose that someone were to say that being signifies one thing, either substance alone or accident alone, and because of this he might also wish to say that all things are one-in regard to this argument, I say, they accepted [the conclusion] that non-being would be being.

For Plato said that accident is non-being. And because of this it is said in Metaphysics, VI:2 that Plato held that sophistry dealt with nonbeing, because it treated most of all those things which are predicated per accidens. Therefore Plato, understanding being to be substance, conceded the first proposition of Parmenides who said that whatever is other than being is non-being. For Plato held that accident, which is other than substance, was non-being.

He did not, however, concede the second proposition, namely, that whatever is non-being is nothing. For although he would say that accident is non-being, he did not say that accident is nothing, but rather that it is something. And because of this, according to Plato, it does not follow that being is one only.

But Plato, when he made magnitudes to be indivisible by dissection, that is, when he said that a magnitude is terminated in indivisibles by division, did assent to the other argument which led to the conclusion that a magnitude would be indivisible. For he held that bodies are resolved into surfaces, and surfaces into lines, and lines into indivisibles, as is clear in De Caelo et Mundo, III:1.

50. Next where he says, ‘But obviously ...’ (187 a 3), he disproves the above position in regard to the point that Plato conceded, namely, that non-being is something. In regard to the other point, namely, that Plato held that there are indivisible magnitudes, this is disproved in its proper place in the following books of natural science [VI L1].

He disproves the first point in two ways. First he shows that it does not follow from the argument of Plato that non-being is something. Secondly, he disproves Plato’s remark that unless we hold this (i.e., that the non-being which is accident is something), it will follow that all is one. He does this where he says, ‘To say that all things ...’ (187 a 7 52).

51. He says, therefore, first that the argument by which Plato concluded that being signifies one clearly does not follow. For he held that being is a genus and is predicated univocally of all things by a participation in the first being. And further he held that contradictories cannot be true at the same time. From these two points he thought that it followed that non-being is not nothing, but something. For if being signifies the one, which is

substance, it will be necessary that whatever is not substance is non-being. For if it were being, then since being does not signify anything but substance, it would follow that it would be substance. And so it would at once be substance and non-substance, in which case contradictories would be true at the same time. If, therefore, it is impossible for contradictories to be true at the same time, and if being signifies the one, which is substance, it would follow that whatever is not substance is non-being. But there is something which is not substance, namely, accident. Therefore something is non-being. And so it is not true that non-being is nothing.

But Aristotle shows that this does not follow. For if being signifies principally the one, which is substance, there is nothing to prevent one from saying that accident, which is not substance, is not being simply. But because of this it is not necessary to say that that which is not something, i.e., not substance, is absolute non-being. Hence, although accident is not being simply, it cannot, indeed, be called absolute nonbeing.

52. Next where he says, ‘To say that all things ...’ (187 a 7), he shows further that, if the non-being which is accident is not something, it does not follow that all is one. For if being can mean only substance, which truly is, then he says that it is absurd to hold that it would follow that all things are one unless there is something outside of being. For if there is substance, there is nothing to prevent there being a multiplicity of substances, as has already been said [L6 45], even if magnitude and accident are removed. For the definition of substance is divided into the many things which are in the genus of substance, as man is divided into animal and two-footed. And further it follows that according to the diverse differentiae of a genus there are many substances in act. And finally he draws the conclusion which he had uppermost in mind, namely, that all things are not one, as Parmenides and Melissus said.

LECTURE 8 (187 A 11-26)

THE OPINIONS OF THE PHYSICISTS WHO SPOKE OF THE PRINCIPLES AS NATURAL PHILOSOPHERS

53. After the Philosopher has disproved the opinion concerning principles of those who did not speak of nature as natural philosophers, he here pursues the opinions of those who, not disregarding motion, spoke of the principles of nature as natural philosophers. And he calls these men physicists, i.e., natural philosophers.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he sets forth the diversity of their opinions. Secondly he examines one of these opinions, where he says, ‘The theory of Anaxagoras ...’ (187 a 28; L9 58).

54. He says first that according to the opinion of the natural philosophers there are two ways in which things are generated from principles. One of the opinions was advanced by the natural philosophers who held that there is only one material principle. This principle would be either one of three elements, i.e., fire, air, and water (for no one made earth alone the principle, as was said above [L2 13]) or else some intermediate between them, for example, that which would be more dense than fire and more subtle than air. Theythen said that all other things were generated from this one principle by rarity and density. For example, those who made air to be the principle said that fire was generated from air by rarefaction, and water by condensation. However, the dense and the rare are contraries and are reduced to excess and defect as to something more universal. For the dense is what has much matter, whereas the rare has little.

55. And thus they agreed in a certain respect with Plato who held that the great and the small are principles which also pertain to excess and defect. But they differed from Plato as follows. Plato held that the great and the small are on the side of matter, because he posited one formal principle which is a certain idea participated in by different things according to a diversity of matter; the ancient natural philosophers, on the other hand, maintained a contrariety on the part of form, because they held that the first principle is one matter from which many things were constituted in being according to different forms.

56. Other natural philosophers, however, held that things come to be from principles in such a way that contraries themselves and different things are drawn forth from one thing in which they already existed, as it were, mixed and confused.

But they differed as follows. Anaximander held that the principle is one confused state in which there are not many things mixed together. Thus he held one principle only. But Empedocles and Anaxagoras held rather that the principles are the very things which are mixed together in that one confused state. And so they held many principles, although they also held that this one confused state is in some way a principle.

57. But Anaxagoras and Empedocles differed on two points. First, Empedocles held that there is a certain cycle of mixing and separating. For he held that the world has been made and corrupted many times; that is to say, when the world has been corrupted by friendship gathering all into one, the world is then generated again by strife separating and distinguishing. And thus the distinction of things follows upon their being confused, and vice versa. But Anaxagoras held that the world was made only once, such that from the beginning all things were mixed into one. But mind, which began to draw out and to distinguish, will never cease to do this, so that all things never will be mixed into one.

They also differed in another way. Anaxagoras held that the principles are infinite parts which are alike and contrary. Thus there are infinite parts of flesh which are like each other and infinite parts of bone and other things which have similar parts, yet each has a contrariety to the others. Thus the contrariety of the parts of bone to the parts of blood is that of the dry to the moist. But Empedocles held as principles only those four things which are commonly called elements, i.e., fire, air, water, and earth.

LECTURE 9 (187 A 27-188 A 18)

THE OPINION OF ANAXAGORAS THAT THE PRINCIPLES ARE INFINITE IS REFUTED

58. Having set forth the opinions of the natural philosophers concerning the principles, he here pursues one of these opinions, namely, that of Anaxagoras. For this opinion seemed to assign a common cause for all the species of motion.

The discussion is divided into two parts. In the first part he sets forth Anaxagoras' argument; in the second part he raises objections against it, where he says, 'Now the infinite ...' (187 b 7 64).

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he sets forth those things which Anaxagoras supposed and from which he argues. Secondly, where he says, 'The one, they reasoned ...' (187 a 33 62)2 he sets forth the order of his argument. Thirdly, where he says, 'But things, as they say ...' (187 b 2 63), he sets forth Anaxagoras' response to a certain tacit objection.

59. Anaxagoras assumed two things from which he argued. The first of these is a point which is assumed by all of the natural philosophers, namely, that nothing comes to be from nothing. And Aristotle says that, because of this, Anaxagoras seemed to have held the opinion that the principles are infinite. For he accepted as true the common opinion of all philosophers of nature, namely, that what simply is not in no way comes to be. For they assumed this as a principle and then developed their different opinions.

60. Lest they would be forced to hold that something new comes to be which previously was in no way at all, some held that all things from the beginning existed together, either in some one confused state, as

Anaxagoras and Empedocles held, or in some natural principle, such as water, fire, and air, or some intermediate between these.

And in accordance with this they posited two modes of production.

Those who held that all things pre-existed together as in one material principle said that to come to be is nothing other than to be altered. For they said that all things come to be from that one material principle through its condensation and rarefaction.

Others, however, who held that all things pre-existed together in some one confused state and mixture of many, said that the coming to be of things is only a joining together and a separation.

All of these philosophers were deceived because they did not know how to distinguish between potency and act. For being in potency is, as it were, a mean between pure non-being and being in act. Therefore, those things which come to be naturally do not come to be from nonbeing simply, but from being in potency, and not, indeed, from being in act, as they thought. Hence things which come to be did not necessarily pre-exist in act, as they said, but only in potency.

61. Next where he says, ‘Moreover the fact that ...’ (187 a 32), he mentions the second thing which Anaxagoras assumed.

Anaxagorai said that contraries come to be from each other. For we see the cold come to be from the hot, and vice versa. And from this he concluded that, since nothing comes to be from nothing, one of the contraries pre-exists in the other.

And this is true, of course, in respect to potency. For the cold is in the hot in potency, but not in act, as Anaxagoras thought. For he was not aware of being in potency, which is a mean between pure non-being and being in act.

62. Next where he says, ‘The one, they reasoned ...’ (187 a 33), he sets forth the deductive order of the argument.

Anaxagoras proceeded as follows. If something comes to be, it is necessary that it should come to be either from being or from nonbeing. But he excluded one of these alternatives-namely, that something should come to be from non-being. He does this because of the common opinion of the philosophers mentioned above [59]. Whence he concluded that the remaining member was correct, namely, that a thing comes to be from being. For example, if air comes to be from water, then air pre-existed. For it cannot be said that air comes to be from water unless air pre-existed in water. Hence he wished to say that everything which comes to be from something pre-existed in that from which it comes to be.

But because this seemed to be contrary to what appears to the senses (for it is not apparent to the senses that that which is generated from something pre-exists in it), he forestalled this objection by holding that that which comes to be from something pre-exists in it as certain most minute parts which are not sensible to us because of their smallness. For example, if air comes to be from water, certain minute parts of air are in the water, but not in that quantity in which it is generated. And so he said that by the gathering together of these parts of air by themselves, and by their separation from the parts of water, air comes to be.

Having accepted, therefore, that everything which comes to be from something pre-exists in it, he further assumed that everything comes to be from everything. Whence he concluded that everything would be mixed in everything else as minute, non-sensible parts.

And because an infinite variety of things can come to be from another, he said that infinite minute parts were in each thing.

63. Next where he says, ‘But things, as they say ...’ (187 b 2), he excludes a certain tacit objection.

It is possible for someone to object as follows. If infinite parts of everything are in everything, it would follow that things neither differ from each other nor appear to differ from each other.

Therefore, as if he were answering this objection, Anaxagoras says that things appear to differ from each other and ‘are diversely named because of that which is dominant in them, even though there,is an infinite number of minute parts contained in’any mixture. And so nothing is purely and totally white or black or bone. Rather, that which abounds in each thing seems to be the nature of that thing.

64. Next where he says, ‘Now the infinite ...’ (187 b 7), Aristotle refutes the above mentioned position.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he disproves the position absolutely. Secondly, where he says, ‘... and it is better...’ (188 a 17), he compares it to the opinion of Empedocles.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth arguments to disprove the opinion of Anaxagoras. Secondly, where he says, ‘The statement that...’ (188 a 5 72), he disagrees with Anaxagoras’ way of understanding his own position.

Concerning the first part he gives five arguments.

The first of these is as follows. Every infinite thing, in that respect in which it is infinite, is unknown. He explains why he says ‘in that respect in which it is infinite’. If it is infinite in respect to multitude or magnitude, it will be unknown in respect to quantity. If, however, it is infinite in respect to species (for example, if it is composed of an infinite variety of species), then it will be unknown according to quality. And the reason for this is that what is known by the intellect is grasped by the intellect with respect to all that belongs to that thing. But this cannot happen with regard to something infinite. If, therefore, the principles of a thing are infinite, they must be unknown either in respect to quantity or in respect to species.

But if the principles are unknown, those things which are from the principles must be unknown. He proves this as follows. We think that we know any composite when we know from what and from how many [principles] it is composed, i.e., when we know both the species and the quantity of the principles. It follows, therefore, from first to last that, if the principles of natural things are infinite, then natural things are unknown either in respect to quantity or in respect to species.

65. At the point where he says, ‘Further if the parts ...’ (187 b 14), he gives the second argument, which is as follows.

If the parts of a whole do not have a determinate quantity, either great or small, but can be any size, either great or small, it is not necessarythat the whole have a determinate greatness or smallness. Rather the whole could have any size. This is so because the quantity of the whole comes from the parts. (But this must be understood of the parts existing in act in the whole, as flesh and nerve and bone exist in an animal. Hence he says, ‘... by parts I mean components into which a whole can be divided and which are actually present in it’ (187 b 15). And by this he excludes the parts of a continuous whole which are in the whole in potency.)

But it is impossible that an animal or a plant or some such thing be related indeterminately to any size, whether great or small. For there is some quantity so large that no animal exceeds it in size. So also there is some quantity so small that no animal is found to be smaller. And the same must be said of plants. Therefore by denying the consequent it follows that the parts are not of indeterminate quantity. For what is true of the whole is true of the parts. But flesh and bone and things of this sort are parts of an animal, and fruits are parts of plants. Therefore it is impossible that flesh and bone and such things should have an indeterminate quantity, either greater or smaller. Therefore it is not possible that there should be certain parts of flesh or bone which are non-sensible because of smallness.

66. It seems, however, that what is said here is contrary to the statement that a continuum is divisible to infinity. For if the continuous is divisible to infinity, and flesh is, indeed, a kind of continuum, it seems that flesh is divisible to infinity. Therefore, some part of flesh, according to a division to infinity, goes beyond every determinate smallness.

But it must be pointed out that although a body, considered mathematically, is divisible to infinity, the natural body is not divisible to infinity. For in a mathematical body nothing but quantity is considered. And in this there is nothing repugnant to division to infinity. But in a natural body the form also is considered, which form requires a determin.ate quantity and also other accidents. Whence it is not possible for quantity to be found in the species of flesh except as determined within some termini.

67. He gives the third argument where he says, ‘Again according to the theory ...’ (187 b 23).

Concerning this he makes two points. First he sets forth certain things which are the basis of the argument. Secondly, where he says, ‘For let flesh ...’ (187 b 28 68), he sets forth the deductive order of the argument.

Concerning the first part he proposes three things.

The first is that according to the position of Anaxagoras, as was said above [62], all things are together. And from this Aristotle wishes to reduce Anaxigoras’ argument to absurdity. For Anaxagoras said, as was pointed out [62ff], that all things which are of a certain kind, i.e., all things which are of like parts, such as flesh and bone and the like, are in each other, and do not come to be from nothing, but are separated from that in which they pre-exist. And each thing is named from that which abounds in it, i.e., from the largest number of parts existing in the thing.

The second point is that everything comes to be from everything, as water comes to be by separation from flesh, and in the same way flesh comes to be from water.

And the third point is that every finite body is reduced by a finite body. That is, if from some finite body, however large, a finite body, however small, is taken away, the smaller can be taken away from the larger until eventually the greater whole is consumed by the smaller through division.

And from these three points Aristotle concludes what he primiarily intended, namely, that each thing is not in each thing. And this is contrary to the first of these three points. For in arguments which lead to absurdity the denial of one of the premises is the final conclusion.

68. Next where he says, ‘For let flesh...’(187 b 28), he develops his argument and assumes what was concluded in the preceding argument.

He says that if flesh is removed from water (since flesh is generated from water), and if again another separation of flesh is made from the remaining water, then although there will always remain a smaller quantity of flesh in the water, still the size of that flesh is not less than a certain smallness, i.e., there happens to be a certain small measure of flesh than which there will not be any smaller flesh, as is clear from the argument given above.

Therefore, having established that there is some small particle of flesh than which there is no smaller, he proceeds as follows.

If from water flesh is separated, and again other flesh, the process of separation will either stop or it will not. If it stops, then there is no flesh in the remaining water, and everything will not be in everything. If it does not stop, then some part of flesh will always remain in the water. Thus in the second separation the remaining flesh is smaller than in the first, and in the third it is smaller than in the second. And since we cannot proceed to infinity in smallness of parts, as was said, then the smallest parts of flesh are equal and infinite in number in some finite body of water. Otherwise separation could not proceed to infinity. It follows, therefore, that if the separation does not stop, but flesh is always removed from water to infinity, then in some finite magnitude, e.g., water, there are certain things which are finite in respect to quantity, and equal to each other, and infinite in respect to number, namely, the infinite smallest parts of flesh. But this is impossible and contrary to what was said above, namely, that every finite body is reduced by some finite body. Therefore the first point, namely, that everything is in everything, as Anaxagoras held, is also impossible.

69. We must note that it is not without reason that the Philosopher used the term ‘equal’ in stating the last absurdity to which this position leads. For

if the nature of quantity is considered, it is not absurd that an infinity of unequal parts be in a finite body. For if a continuum is divided according to the same proportion, it will be possible to proceed to infinity, for example, if we take a third of a whole, and then a third of the third, and so on. In this case, however, the parts were not taken as equal in quantity. But if the division is made according to equal parts, we will not be able to proceed to infinity even if we consider only the nature [ratio] of quantity which is found in a mathematical body.

70. He gives his fourth argument where he says, ‘Another proof may be added ...’ (187 b 35). The argument is as follows.

Every body becomes a smaller one when something is taken from it, because every whole is greater than its parts. Since then the quantity of flesh is determinately great or small, as is clear from what was said above, there must be some smallest bit of flesh. Therefore from this nothing can be separated, because the remainingfiesh would be smaller than this smallest piece of flesh. Therefore it is impossible that everything comes to be from everything by separation.

71. At the point where he says, ‘Lastly in each ...’ (188 a 3), he gives his fifth argument, which is as follows. If infinite parts of each thing are in each thing, and everything is in everything, it follows that infinite parts of flesh and infinite parts of blood and brain are in an infinite number of bodies. And regardless of how much is separated, the same amount would always remain. Therefore it would follow that the infinite is in the infinite infinitely. But this is unthinkable.

72. Next where he says, ‘The statement that ...’ (188 a 5), he disproves the position of Anaxagoras according to Anaxagoras’ own understanding of it.

He does this in two ways. First he shows that Anaxagoras did not understand his own position. Secondly, where he says, ‘Nor is Anaxagoras...’(188 a 13),1 he shows that Anaxagoras did not have sufficient evidence for holding this position.

He says, therefore, first that although Anaxagoras has in a certain respect spoken the truth, he himself did not understand what he said when he held that the process of separation would never end. For accidents can never be separated from substance; yet he held that there was a mixture not only of bodies but also of accidents. When something becomes white, he said that this happened by an abstraction of white from the previously existing mixture. If then colours and other accidents of this sort are mixed together, as he said, and if someone on this supposition says all things that are mixed can be separated, it would follow that there would be white and healthy, and yet there would be no subject of which these are predicated and in which they are. But this is impossible. Therefore the truth is that if accidents are in the mixture it is impossible that all mixed things can be separated.

Another absurdity results from the following. Anaxagoras held that all things were mixed from the very beginning, but intellect began to separate them. Now any intellect which attempts to do what cannot be done is not worthy of the name intellect. Hence that intellect will be inconsistent, intending the impossible, if it truly wishes this, i.e., wishes to separate things completely. For this is impossible both from the point of view of quantity, because there is no smallest magnitude, as Anaxagoras said, for from any small quantity something can be subtracted, and from the point of view of quality, because accidents are not separable from their subjects.

73. Next where he says, ‘Nor is Anaxagoras ...’ (188 a 13), he disproves this position by reason of the fact that Anaxagoras did not have sufficient evidence.

Since Anaxagoras saw that a thing is made large by the coming together of many small parts which are similar, as a stream is made from many brooks, he believed this to be the case for all things. And thus Aristotle says that Anaxagoras did not correctly understand the generation of things of the same species, i.e., he did not understand that a thing is not always generated by things which are similar in respect to species. For some things are both generated from and are resolved into things like unto themselves, as clay is divided into bricks; in other instances, however, this is not so. For some things are generated from that which is dissimilar. And in these instances there is not merely one mode of production. For some things are made by alteration from that which is unlike, as the sides of a house are made from clay and not from sides; whereas other things are made by composition, as the house is not made of houses, but of sides. It is in this way that air and water come to be from each other, i.e., as from the unlike.

Another reading here is ‘as the sides are from the house’. And thus he sets forth a twofold way in which things come to be from the unlike, i.e., through composition, as the house is made of sides, and by resolution, as the sides come to be from the house.

74. Next where he says, ‘... and it is better ...’ (188 a 17), he disproves the position of Anaxagoras by comparing it with the opinion of Empedocles. He says that it is better to make the principles smaller in number and finite, as Empedocles does, than to make them many and infinite, as does Anaxagoras.

LECTURE 10 (188 A 19-189 A 10)

THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENTS CONCERNING THE CONTRARIETY OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLES

75. Having set forth the opinions of the ancient philosophers concerning the principles of nature, Aristotle here begins to seek the truth.

He seeks it first by way of disputation, proceeding from probable opinions. Secondly, where he says, ‘We will now give ...’ (189 b 30; L12 98), he determines the truth demonstratively. The Oxford English translation seems to be based upon this variant reading. LECTURE 12, 98.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he investigates the contrariety of the principles, secondly, where he says, ‘The next question is ...’ (189 a 11; L11 82), he inquires about their number.

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he sets forth the opinion of the ancients about the contrariety of the principles. Secondly, where he says, ‘And with good reason ...’ (188 a 27 77) he gives an argument in favour of this position. Thirdly he shows how the philosophers are related to each other in saying that the principles are contraries. He does this where he says, ‘Up to this point...’ (188 b 27 79).

76. He says, therefore, first that all of the ancient philosophers posited contrariety in the principles. And he makes this clear by citing three opinions of the philosophers.

For some philosophers have said that the whole universe is one immobile being. Of these, Parmenides said that all things are one according to reason, but many according to sense. And to the extent that there are many, he posited in them contrary principles, e.g., the hot and the cold. He attributed the hot to fire and the cold to earth.

Secondly there was the opinion of the natural philosophers who posited one material and mobile principle. They said that other things come to be from this principle according to rarity and density. Thus they held that the rare and the dense are principles.

A third opinion was advanced by those who posited many principles. Among them, Democritus held that all things come to be from indivisible bodies which are joined together. And in this contact with each other they left a sort of void. Such voids he called pores, as is clear in De Generatione, I:8. Therefore he held that all bodies are composed of the fixed and the empty, that is, composed of the plenum and the void. Hence he said that the plenum and the void are principles of nature. But he assdeiated the plenum with being and the void with non-being. And although all of these indivisible bodies are one in nature, he said that different things are composed of them according to a diversity of figure, position, and order. Thus he held that the principles are contraries in the genus of position, i.e., above and below, before and behind, and also contraries in the genus of figure, i.e., the straight, the angular, and the circular. The principles also are contraries in the genus of order, i.e., prior and posterior. (These last contraries are not mentioned in the text because they are obvious.) And thus Aristotle concludes, by a sort of induction, that all of the philosophers held that the principles are contraries in some way. He makes no mention of the opinion of Anaxagoras and Empedocles because he has already explained their position at length above [L8 56-57]. However, they also placed a certain contrariety in the principles when they said that all things come to be through joining and separating, which agree in genus with the rare and the dense.

77. Next where he says, ‘And with good reason’ (188 a 27), he gives a probable argument to show that the first principles are contraries. The argument is as follows.

Three things seem to belong to the very nature of principles. First, they are not from other things. Secondly, they are not from each other. Thirdly, all other things are from them. But these three notes are found in the primary contraries. Therefore the primary contraries are principles.

Now in order to understand what he means when he speaks of primary contraries, we must realize that some contraries are caused by other contraries, e.g., the sweet and the bitter are caused by the wet and the dry and the hot and the cold. Since, however, it is impossible to proceed to infinity, but one must come to certain contraries, which are not caused by other contraries, he calls these last contraries the primary contraries.

Now the three conditions proper to principles mentioned above are found in these primary contraries. For things which are first are manifestly not from others. Moreover things which are contraries are manifestly not from each other. For even though the cold comes to be from the hot, insofar as that which was previously hot is later cold, nevertheless coldness itself never comes to be from heat, as will be pointed out later [L11 90]. The third point —precisely how all things come to be from the contraries -we must investigate more carefully.

78. Now in order to clarify this latter point he states first that neither action nor passion can occur between things which are contingent in the sense of merely happening to be together, or between things which are contingent in the sense of being indeterminate. Nor does everything come to be from everything, as Anaxagoras said, except perhaps accidentally.

This is first of all seen clearly in simple things. For white does not come to be from musical except accidentally insofar as white or black happen to be in the musical. But white comes to be per se from the non-white, and not from just any non-white, but from that non-white which is black or some mean colour. And in like manner, the musical comes to be from the non-musical, and again not from just any nonmusical, but from its opposite, which is called the unmusical, i.e., from that which is disposed to be musical but is not, or from some mean between these two. And for the same reason, a thing is not corrupted primarily and per se into just any contingent thing (e.g., the white into the musical) except accidentally. Rather white is corruptedper se into the non-white, and not into just any non-white, but into black or some mean colour. And he says the same of the corruption of the musical and of other similar things. The reason for this is as follows. Whatever comes to be or is corrupted does not exist before it comes to be and does not exist after it is corrupted. Whence it is necessary that that which a thing comes to beper se and that intowhich a thing is corruptedper se be such that it includes in its nature [ratio] the non-being of that which comes to be or is corrupted.

And he shows that the same is true of composite things. He says that the situation is the same with composite things as with simple things, but is more hidden in composite things because the opposites of composite things have no names, as do the opposites of simple things. For the opposite of house has no name, although we give a name to the opposite of white. Hence if the composite is reduced to something with a name, it will be clear. For every composite consists of a certain harmony. Now the harmonious comes to be from the inharmonious, and the inharmonious from the harmonious. And in like manner, the harmonious is corrupted into the inharmonious (not any inharmonious, but the opposite). However, we can speak of the harmonious according to order alone, or according to composition. For some wholes consist of a harmony of order, e.g., an army; and other wholes consist of a harmony of composition, e.g., a house. And the nature [ratio] of each of these is the same. It is also clear that all composites come to be from the noncomposed, for example, a house comes to be from non-composed things, and the figured from the non-figured. And in all such things nothing is involved except order and composition.

Thus it is clear by induction, as it were, that everything which comes to be or is corrupted comes to be from contraries or from some intermediate between them, or is corrupted into them. Moreover, intermediates between contraries come to be from the contraries, as the intermediate colours come to be from black and white. Hence he concludes that whatever comes to be according to nature is either a contrary, such as white and black, or comes to be from the contraries, such as the intermediates between the contraries.

This, then, is the principal conclusion which he intended to draw, namely, thafall things come to be from contraries, which was the third characteristic of principles.

79. Next where he says, ‘Up to this point ...’ (188 b 27), Aristotle shows how the philosophers are related in holding that the principles are contraries. First he shows how they are related with reference to being moved toward this position. Secondly, where he says, ‘They differ, however...’(188 b 30 80), he shows howthey are related itirespect to the position itself.

He says, therefore, as was pointed out above [76] that many of the philosophers followed the truth to the point where they held that the principles are contraries. Although they indeed held this position, they did not hold it as though moved by reason, but rather as forced to it by the truth itself. For truth is the good of the intellect, toward which the intellect is naturally ordered. Hence as things which lack knowledge are moved to their ends without reason [ratio], so, at times, the intellect of man, by a sort of natural inclination, tends toward the truth, though it does not perceive the reason [ratio] for the truth.

80. Next where he says, ‘They differ, however, ...’ (188 b 30), he shows how the aforesaid philosophers are related in respect to the position itself.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows how they differ in holding that the principles are contraries. Secondly, where he says, ‘Hence their principles...’ (188 b 37 81), he shows how they both differ and agree.

He says, therefore, first that the philosophers who held that the principles are contraries differed in two ways. First, those who argued reasonably held that the principles are the primary contraries. Others, however, considering the matter less well, held that the principles are posterior [derived] contraries.

And of those who appealed to the primary contraries, some considered those contraries which were better known to reason, others those contraries which were better known to sense.

Or it could be said that this second difference explains the first. For those things which are better known to reason are prior simply, whereas those things which are better known to sense are posterior simply, and

are prior relative to us. However, it is clear that the principles must be prior. Thus, those who judged ‘prior’ according to what is better known to reason held that the principles are those contraries which are prior simply. On the other hand, those who judged ‘prior’ according to what is better known to sense held that the principles are those contraries which are posterior simply. Hence some held that the hot and the cold are first principles; others, the wet and the dry. And both of these are better known to sense. However the hot and the cold, which are active qualities, are prior to the wet and the dry, which are passive qualities, because the active is naturally prior to the passive.

Others, however, held principles which are better known to reason.

Among these, some held that the equal and the unequal are the principles. For example, the Pythagoreans, thinking that the substance of all things is numbers, held that all things are composed of the equal and the unequal as of form and matter. For they attributed infinity and

otherness to the equal because of its divisibility. Whereas to the unequal they attributed finiteness and identity because of its indivisibility.

Others, however, held that the cause of generation and corruption is strife and friendship, that is, the cycles of Empedocles, which are also better known to reason. Whence it is clear that the diversity mentioned above appears in these positions.

81. Next where he says, ‘Hence their principles ...’ (188 b 37), he shows how there is also a certain agreement within the differences of the aforementioned positions. He concludes from what he has said above that the ancient philosophers in a way called the same things principles and in a way called different things principles. For they differed insofar as different philosophers assumed different contraries (as was said above 80); yet they are the same insofar as their principles were alike according to analogy, i.e., proportion. For the principles taken by an of them have the same proportion.

And this is true in three respects. First, all the principles which they assumed are related as contraries. And thus Aristotle says that they all took their principles from the same columns, i.e., columns of contraries. For they all took contraries as their principles, even though the contraries differed. Nor is it remarkable that they took different principles from the columns of contraries. For among the contraries, some are containers, as the prior and more common; and others axe contained, as the posterior and less common. Hence one way in which they spoke alike is that all of them took their principles from the order of contraries.

Another way, in which they agree according to analogy is as follows. No matter what principles they accepted, one of these principles is better, and the other is worse. For example, friendship, or the plenum, or the hot, are better; but strife, or the void, or the cold, are worse. And the same thing is true of the other pairs of contraries. This is so because one of the contraries always has privation joined to it. For the source of contrariety is the opposition of privation and habit, as is said in Metaphysics, X:4.

Thixdly they agree according to analogy by reason of the fact that they all took principles which are better known. But some took principles which are better known to reason, others those which are better known to sense. Since reason treats the universal and sense treats the particular, universals (such as the great and the small) are better known to reason, whereas singulars (such as the rare and the dense, which are less common) are better known to sense.

Then as a final summary, he concludes with that which he had uppermost in mind, namely, the principles are contraries.

LECTURE 11 (189 A 11-B 29)

THERE ARE THREE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL THINGS, NO MORE, NO LESS

82. After the philosopher has investigated the contrariety of the principles, he here begins to inquire about their number.

Concerning this he makes three points. First, he raises the question. Secondly, where he says, ‘One they cannot be ...’ (189 a 12 83), he excludes certain things which are not pertinent to this question. Thirdly, he takes up the question, where he says, ‘Granted, then, that...’ (189 a 21 89).

He says, therefore, first that after an investigation into the contrariety of the principles, an inquiry about their number should follow, i.e., whether they are two, or three, or more.

83. Next where he says, ‘One they cannot be ...’ (189 a 12), he excludes those things which are not pertinent to this question. He shows first that there is not just one principle, and secondly, where he says, ‘Nor can they be ...’ (189 a 12 84), he shows that the principles are not infinite.

He says first that it is impossible for there to be only one principle. For it has been shown [L 10] that the principles are contraries. But contraries are not just one, for nothing is the contrary of itself; therefore, there is not just one principle.

84. Next where he says, ‘Nor can they be ...’ (189 a 12), he gives four arguments to show that the principles are not infinite. The first of these is as follows.

The infinite as such is unknown. If, therefore, the principles are infinite, they must be unknown. But if the principles are unknown, then those things which are from the principles are unknown. It follows, therefore, that nothing in the world could be known.

85. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘... and in any one genus...’ (189 a 13). The argument is as follows. The principles must be primary contraries, as was shown above [L10 77]. But the primary contraries belong to the primary genus, which is substance. But substance, since it is one genus, has one primary contrariety. For the first contrariety of any genus is that of the primary differentiae by which the genus is divided. Therefore, the principles are not infinite.

86. He gives the third argument where he says, also a finite number ...’ (189 a 15). The argument is as follows. It is better to say that what can come to be from finite principles comes from finite principles rather than from infinite principles. But all things which come to be according to nature are explained by Empedocles through finite principles,just as they are explained byAnaxagoras through infinite principles. Hence an infinite number of principles should not be posited.

87. He gives the fourth argument where he says, ‘Lastly, some con traries ...’ (189 a 17). The argument is as follows. Principles are contraries. If, therefore, the principles are infinite, it is necessary that all the contraries be principles. But all of the contraries are not principles. This is clear for two reasons. First, the principles must be primary contraries, but not all contraries are primary, since some are prior to others. Secondly, the principles ought not to be from each other, as was said above [L10 77]. But some contraries are from each other, as the sweet and the bitter, and the white and the black. Therefore, the principles are not infinite.

Thus he finally concludes that the principles are neither one nor infinite.

88. However, we must note that the Philosopher proceeds here by way of disputation from probable arguments. Hence he assumes certain things which are seen in many instances, and which cannot be false taken as a whole, but are true in particular instances. Therefore, it is true that in a certain respect contraries do come to be from each other, as was said above [L10 78], if the subject is taken along with the contraries. For that which is white later becomes black. However, whiteness itself is never changed into blackness. But some of the ancients, without including the subject, held that the primary contraries come to be from each other. Hence, Empedocles denied that the elements come to be from each other. And thus Aristotle significantly does not say in this place that the hot comes to be from the cold, but the sweet from the bitter and the white from the black.

89. Next where he says,’Granted then...’(189 a 21), he takes up the question under discussion, namely, what is the number of the principles. ‘Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows that there are not just two principles, but three. Secondly, where he says, ‘On the other hand ...’ (189 b 18 95), he shows that there are no more than three principles.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First, he shows through arguments that there are not just two principles, but that a third must be added. Secondly, where he says, ‘If, then, we accept ...’ (189 a 34 93), he shows that even the ancient philosophers agreed on this point.

90. Concerning the first part he gives three arguments. He says first that since it was shown that the principles are contraries, and so could not be just one, but are at least two, and further since the principles are not infinite, then it remains for us to consider whether there are only two principles or more than two. Since it was shown abovei that the principles are contraries, it seems that there are only two principles, because contrariety exists between two extremes.

But one might question this. For it is necessary that other things come to befrom the principles, as was said above [L10 77]. If, however, there are only two contrary principles, it is not apparent how all things can come to be from these two. For it cannot be said that one of them makes something from the other one. For density is not by nature such that it can convert rarity into something, nor can rarity convert density into something. And the same is true of any other contrariety. For friendship does not move strife and make something out of it, nor does the converse happen. Rather each of the contraries changes some third thing which is the subject of both of the contraries. For heat does not make coldness itself to be hot, but makes the subject of coldness to be hot. And conversely, coldness does not make heat itself to be cold, but makes the subject of heat to be cold. Therefore, in order that other things can come to be from the contraries, it seems that it is necessary to posit some third thing which will be the subject of the contraries.

It does not matter for the present whether that subject is one or many. For some have posited many material principles from which they prepare the nature of beings. For they said that the nature of things is matter, as will be said later in Book II [L2].

91. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘Other objections ...’(189 a 28). He says that, unless there is something other than the contraries which are given as principles, then there arises an even greater difficulty. For a first principle cannot be an accident which is predicated of a subject. For since a subject is a principle of the accident which is predicated of it and is naturally prior to the accident, then if the first principle were an accident predicated of a subject, it would follow that what is ‘of’ a principle would be a principle, and there would be something prior to the first. But if we hold that only the contraries are principles, it is necessary that the principles be an accident predicated of a subject. For no substance is the contrary of something else. Rather contrariety is found only between accidents. It follows, therefore, that the contraries cannot be the only principles.

Moreover, it must be noted that in this argument he uses ‘predicate’ for ‘accident’, since a predicate designates a form of the subject. The ancients, however, believed that all forms are accidents. Hence he proceeds here by way of disputation from probable propositions which were well known among the ancients.

92. He gives the third argument where he says, ‘Again we hold...’ (189 a 33). The argument is as follows. Everything which is not a principle must be from principles. If, therefore, only the contraries are principles, then since substance is not the contrary of substance, it follows that substance would be from non-substance. And thus what is not substance is prior to substance, because what is from certain things is posterior to them. But this is impossible. For substance which is being per se is the first genus of being. Therefore, it cannot be that only the contraries are principles; rather it is necessary to posit some other third thing.

93. Next where he says, ‘If, then, we accept ...’ (189 a 34), he shows how the position of the philosophers also agrees with this.

Concerning this he makes two points. First, he shows how they posited one material principle. Secondly, where he says, ‘All, however agree...’ (189 b 9 94), he shows how they posited two contrary principles besides this one material principle.

However, we must first note that the Philosopher in the preceding arguments seemed to be opposed, in the manner of those who dispute, to both sides of the question. For first he proved that the principles are contraries, and now he brings forth arguments to prove that the contraries are not sufficient for the generation of things. And since disputatious arguments do come to some kind of true conclusion, though it is not the whole [truth], he concludes one truth from each argument.

He says that if someone thinks that the first argument (which proves that the principles are contraries) is true, and that the argument just given (which proves that contrary principles are not sufficient) is also true, then to maintain both conclusions he must say that some third thing lies beneath the contraries, as was said by those who held that the whole universe is some one nature, understanding nature to mean matter, such as water, or fire or air, or some intermediate state between these, such as vapour, or some other thing of this sort.

This seems especially true in regard to an intermediate. For this third thing ietaken as the subject of the contraries, and as distinct from them in some way. Hence, that which has less of the nature of a contrary about it is more conveniently posited as the third principle beyond the contraries. For fire and earth and air and water have contrariety attached to them, e.g., the hot and the cold, the wet and the dry. Hence, it is not unreasonable that they make the subject something other than these and something in which the contraries are less prominent. After these philosophers, however, those who held that air was the principle spoke more wisely, for the contrary qualities found in air are less sensible. After these philosophers are those who held that water was the principle. But those who held that fire was the principle spoke most poorly, because fire has a contrary quality which is most sensible and which is very active. For in fire there is an excellence of heat. If, however, the elements are compared with reference to their subtlety, those who made fire the principle seem to have spoken better, as is said elsewhere,’ for what is more subtle seems to be more simple and prior. Hence no one held that earth was the principle because of its density.

94. Next where he says, ‘All, however, agree ...’ (189 b 9), he shows how they posited contrary principles with the one material principle.

He says that all who posited one material principle said that it is figured or formed by certain contraries, such as rarity and density, which are reducible to the great and the small and to excess and defect. And thus the position of Plato that the one and the great and the small are the principles of things was also the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, but in a different way. For the ancient philosophers, thinking that one matter was differentiated by diverse forms, held two principles on the part of form, which is the principle of action, and one on the part of matter, which is the principle of passion. But the Platonists, thinking that many individuals in one species are distinguished by a division of matter, posited one principle on the part of the form, which is the active principle, and two on the part of the matter, which is the passive principle.

And thus he draws the conclusion which he had uppermost in mind, namely, that by considering the above and similar positions, it seems reasonable that there are three principles of nature. And he points out that he has proceeded from probable arguments.

95. Next where he says, ‘On the other hand ...’ (189 b 18), he shows that there are no more than three principles. He uses two arguments, the first of which is as follows.

It is superfluous for that which can come to be through fewer principles to come to be through many. But the whole generation of natural things can be achieved by positing one material principle and two formal principles. For one material principle is sufficient to account for passion.

But if there were four contrary principles, and two primary contrarieties, it would be necessary that each contrariety have a different subject. For it seems that there is one primary subject for any one contrariety. And so, if, by positing two contraries and one subject, things can come to be from each other, it seems superfluous to posit another contrariety. Therefore, we must not posit more than three principles.

96. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘Moreover it is impossible ...’ (189 b 23). If there are more than three principles, it is necessary that there be many primary contrarieties. But this is impossible because the first contrariety seems to belong to the first genus, which is one, namely, substance. Hence all contraries which are in the genus of substance do not differ in genus, but are related as prior and posterior. For in one genus there is only one contrariety, namely, the first, because all other contrarieties seem to be reduced to the first one. For there are certain first contrary differentiae by which a genus is divided. Therefore it seems that there are no more than three principles.

It must be noted, however, that each of the following statements is probable: namely, that there is no contrariety in substances, and that in substances there is only one primary contrariety. For if we take substance to mean ‘that which is’, it has no contrary. If, however, we take substance to mean formal differentiae in the genus of substance, then contrariety is found in them.

97. Finally by way of summary he concludes that there is not just one principle, nor are there more than two or three. But deciding which of these is true, that is, whether there are only two principles or three, involves much difficulty, as is clear from the foregoing.

LECTURE 12 (189 B 30-190 B 15)

IN EVERY COMING TO BE THREE PRINCIPLES ARE TO BE FOUND: THE SUBJECT, THE TERMINUS OF THE PRODUCTION, AND ITS OPPOSITE

98. After the Philosopher has investigated the number of principles by means of disputation, he here begins to determine the truth. This section is divided into two parts. First he determines the truth. Secondly, where he says, ‘We will not proceed...’ (191 a 23; L14 120ff), he excludes from the truth already deterrained certain difficulties and errors of the ancients.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows that in any natural coming-to-be three things are found. Secondly, where he says, ‘Plainly, then ...’ (190 b 16; L13 110), he shows from this that these three things are principles.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he states his intention, and secondly he pursues his intention, where he says, ‘We say that ...’ (189 b 33 100).

99. Because he had said above [L11 97] that the question of whether there are only two principles of nature or three involves much difficulty, he concludes that he must first speak of generation and production as common to all the species of mutation. For in any mutation there is found a certain coming-to-be. For example, when something is altered from white to black, the non-white comes to be from the white, and the black comes to be from the non-black. And the same is true of other mutations. He also points out the reason for this order of procedure. It is necessary to speak first of those

things which are common, and afterwards to think of those things which are proper to each thing, as was said in the beginning of the Book [L1 6].

100. Next where he says, ‘We say that one thing ...’ (189 b 33), he develops his position. Concerning this he makes two points. First he sets forth certain things which are necessary to prove his position. Secondly, where he says, ‘These distinctions drawn ...’ (190 a 13 103),he proves his point.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets up a cerr tain division, secondly, where he says, ‘As regards one ...’ (190 a 5 102), he points out the differences among the parts of the division.

101. He says, therefore, first that in any coming-to-be one thing is said to come to be from another thing with reference to coming to be in regard to substantial being [esse], or one comes to be from another with reference to coming to be in regard to accidental being [esse]. Hence every change has two termini. The word ‘termini’, however, is used in two ways, for the termini of a production or mutation can be taken as either simple or composite.

He explains this as follows. Sometimes we say man becomes musical, and then the two termini of the production are simple. It is the same when we say that the non-musical becomes musical. But when we say that the non-musical man becomes a musical man, each of the termini is a composite. Yet when coming to be is attributed to man or to the nonmusical, each is simple. And thus, that which becomes, i.e., that to which coming to be is attributed, is said to come to be simply. Moreover, that in which the very coming to be is terminated, which is also said to come to be simply, is musical. Thus we say man becomes musical, or the non-musical becomes musical. But when each is signified as coming to be as composed (i.e., both what becomes, i.e., that to which the coming to be is attributed, and what is made, i.e., that in which the coming to be is terminated), then we say that the non-musical man becomes musical. For then there is composition on the part of the subject only and simplicity on the part of the predicate. But when I say that the nonmusical man becomes a musical man, then there is composition on the part of each.

102. Next where he says, ‘As regards one ...’ (190 a 5), he points out two differences in what was said above.

The first is that in some of the cases mentioned above we use a twofold mode of speech, i.e., we say ‘this becomes this’ and ‘from this, this comes to be’. For we say ‘the non-musical becomes musical’, and ‘from the non-musical, the musical comes to be’. But we do not speak this way in all cases. For we do not say’the musical comes to be from man’, but ‘man becomes musical’.

He points out the second difference where he says, ‘When a “simple”...’ (190 a 8). He says that when coming to be is attributed to two simple things, i.e., the subject and the opposite, one of these is permanent, but the other is not. For when someone has already been made musical, ‘man’ remains. But the opposite does not remain, whether it be the negative opposite, as the non-musical, or the privation or contrary, as the unmusical. Nor is the composite of subject and the opposite permanent, for the non-musical man does not remain after man has been made musical. And so coming to be is attributed to these three things: for it was said that man becomes musical, and the non-musical becomes musical, and the non-musical man becomes musical. Of these three, only the first remains complete in a production, the other two do not remain.

103. Next where he says, ‘These distinctions drawn ...’ (190 a 13), having assumed the foregoing, he proves his position, namely that three t . ngs are found in any natural production.

Concerning this he makes three points. First he enumerates two things which are found in any natural production. Secondly, where he says, ‘One part survives ...’ (190 a 17 105), he proves what he had supposed. Thirdly, where he says, ‘Thus, clearly, ...’ (190 b 10 109), he draws his conclusion.

104. He says, therefore, first that, if anyone, taking for granted what was said above, wishes to consider [coming-to-be] in all the things which come to be naturally, he will agree that there must always be some subject to which the coming to be is attributed, and that that subject, although one in number and subject, is not the same in species or nature [ratio]. For when it is said of a man that he becomes musical, the man is indeed one in subject, but two in nature [ratio]. For man and the non-musical are not the same according to nature [ratio]. Aristotle does not, however, mention here the third point, namely, that in every generation there must be something generated, for this is obvious.

105. Next where he says, ‘One part survives...’ (190 a 17), he proves the two things which he had assumed. He shows first that the subject to which the coming to be is attributed is two in nature [ratio]. Secondly, where he

says, ‘But there are different ...’ (190 a 32 107), he shows that it is necessary to assume a subject in every coming to be.

He shows the first point in two ways. First he points out that in the subject to which the coming to be is attributed there is something which is permanent and something which is not permanent. For that which is not an opposite of the terminus of the production is permanent, for man remains when he becomes musical, but the non-musical does not remain. And from this it is clear that man and the non-musical are not the same in nature [ratio], since the one remains, whereas the other does not.

106. Secondly, where he says, ‘We speak of ...’(190 a 2 1), he shows the same thing in another way. With reference to the non-permanent things, it is much better to say ‘this comes to be from this’ than to say ‘this becomes this’ (although this latter also may be said, but not as properly). For we say that the musical comes to be from the nonmusical. We also say that the non-musical becomes musical, but this is accidental, insofar as that which happens to be non-musical becomes musical. But in permanent things this is not said. For we do not say that the musical comes to be from man, rather we say that the man becomes musical.

Even in reference to permanent things we sometimes say ‘this comes to be from this’, as we say that a statue comes to be from bronze. But this happens because by the name ‘bronze’ we understand the ‘unshaped’, and so this is said by reason of the privation which is understood.

From this very fact, then, that we use different modes of speech with reference to the subject and the opposite, it is clear that the subject and the opposite, such as man and the non-musical, are two in nature [ratio].

107. Next where he says, ‘But there are different ...’ (190 a 32), he proves the other point which he had assumed, namely, that in every natural production there must be a subject.

The proof of this point by argumentation belongs to metaphysics. Hence this is proved in Metaphysics, VII:7. He proves it here only by induction. He does this first in regard to the things which come to be; secondly in regard to the modes of coming to be, where he says, ‘Generally things ...’ (190 b 5 108).

He says, therefore, first that since ‘to come to be’ is used in many ways, ‘to come to be simply’ is said only of the coming to be of substances, whereas other things are said to come to be accidentally. This is so because ‘to come to be’ implies the beginning of existing. Therefore, in order for something to come to be simply, it is required that it previously will not have been simply, which happens in those things which comer to be substantially. For when a man comes to be, he not only previously was not a man, but it is true to say that he simply was not. When, however, a man becomes white, it is not true to say that he previously was not, but that he previously was not such.

Those things, however, which come to be accidentally clearly depend upon a subject. For quantity and quality and the other accidents, whose coming to be is accidental, cannot be without a subject. For only substance does not exist in a subject.

Further, it is clear, if one considers the point, that even substances come to be from a subject. For we see that plants and animals come to be from seed.

108. Next where he says, ‘Generally things ...’ (190 b 5), he shows the same thing by induction from the modes of coming to be.

He says that of things which come to be, some come to be by change of figure, as the statue comes to be from the bronze, others come to be by addition, as is clear in all instances of increase, as the river comes to be from many streams, others come to be by subtraction, as the image of Mercury comes to be from stone by sculpture. Still other things come to be by composition, e.g., a house; and other things come to be by alteration, as those things whose matter is changed, either by nature or by art. And in all of these cases it is apparent that they come to be from some subject. Whence it is clear that everything which comes to be comes to be from a subject.

But it must be noted that artificial things are here enumerated along with those things which come to be simply (even though artificial forms are accidents) because artificial things are in some way in the genus of substance by reason of their matter. Or else perhaps he lists them because of the opinion of the ancients, who thought of natural things and artificial things in the same way, as will be said in Book II [L2 149].

109. Next where he says, ‘Thus clearly ...’ (190 b 10), he draws his conclusion. He says that it has been shown from what was said above that that to which coming to be is attributed is always composed. And since in any production there is that at which the coming to be is terminated and that

to which the coming to be is attributed, the latter of which is twofold, i.e., the subject and the opposite, it is then clear that there are three things in any coming to be, namely, the subject, the terminus of the production, and the opposite of this terminus. Thus when a man becomes musical, the opposite is the non-musical, the subject is the man, and musical is the terminus of the production. And in like manner, shapelessness and lack of figure and lack of order are opposites, while bronze and gold and stone are subjects in artificial productions.

LECTURE 13 (190 B 16-191 A 22)

THERE ARE TWO PER SE PRINCIPLES OF THE BEING AND OF THE BECOMING OF NATURAL THINGS, NAMELY, MATTER AND FORM, AND ONE PER ACCIDENS PRINCIPLE, NAMELY, PRIVATION

110. After the Philosopher has shown that three things are found in every natural coming to be, he intends here to show from the foregoing how many principles of nature there are.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he explains his position. Secondly, where he says, ‘Briefly, we explained ...’ (191 a 15 119), in recapitulation he explains what has already been said and what remains to be said.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that there are three principles of nature. Secondly he names them, where he says, ‘The underlying nature ...’ (191 a 8 118).

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he explains the truth about the first principles of nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘There is a sense ...’ (190 b 28 114) from this disclosure of the truth he answers the problems about the principles which were raised above. Thirdly, since the ancients had said that the principles are contraries, he shows whether or not contraries are always required, where he says, ‘We have now stated ...’ (191 a 3 115).

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that there are two per se principles of nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘Now the subject ...’ (190 b 23 112), he shows that the third principle is a per accidens principle of nature.

111. With reference to the first point he uses the following argument. Those things from which natural things are and come to be per se, and not per accidens, are said to be the principles and causes of natural things. Whatever comes to be exists and comes to be both from subject and from form. Therefore the subject and the form are per se causes and principles of everything which comes to be according to nature.

That that which comes to be according to nature comes to be from subject and form he proves as follows. Those things into which the definition of a thing is resolved are the components of that thing, because each thing is resolved into the things of which it is composed. But the definition [ratio] of that which comes to be according to nature is resolved into subject and form. For the definition [ratio] of musical man is resolved into the definition [ratio] of man and the definition [ratio] of musical. For if anyone wishes to define musical man, he will have to give the definitions of man and musical. Therefore, that which comes to be according to nature both is and comes to be from subject and form.

And it must be noted that he intends here to inquire not only into the principles of the coming to be but also into the principles of the being. Hence he says significantly that things both are and come to be from these first principles. And by ‘first principles’ he means per se and not per accidens principles. Therefore, the per se principles of everything which comes to be according to nature are subject and form.

112. Next where he says, ‘Now the subject ...’ (190 b 23), he adds the third per accidens principle. He says that although the subject is one in number, it is nevertheless two in species and nature [ratio], as was said above [L12 104]. For man and gold and any matter has some sort of number. This is a consideration of the subject itself, such as man or gold, which is something positive, and from which something comes to be per se and not per accidens. It is another thing, however, to consider that which happens to the subject, i.e., contrariety and privation, such as to be unmusical and unshaped. The third principle, then, is a species or form, as order is the

form of a house, or musical is the form of a musical man, or as any of the other things which are predicated in this way.

Therefore the subject and the form are per se principles of that which comes to be according to nature, but privation or the contrary is a per accidens principle, insofar as it happens to the subject. Thus we say that the builder is the per se active cause of the house, but the musician is a per accidens active cause of the house insofar as the builder also happens to be musical. Hence the man is the per se cause as subject of musical man, but the non-musical is a per accidens cause and principle.

113. However someone may object that privation does not belong to a subject while it is under some form, and thus privation is not a per accidens principle of being.

Hence it must be said that matter is never without privation. For when nagter has one form, it is in privation of some other form. And so while it is coming to be that which it becomes (e.g., musical man), there is in the subject, which does not yet have the form, the privation of the musical itself. And so the per accidens principle of a musical man, while he is coming to be musical, is the non-musical. For he is a non-musical man while he is coming to be musical. But when this latter form has already come to him, then there is joined to him the privation of the other form. And thus the privation of the opposite form is a per accidens principle of being.

It is clear, therefore, according to the opinion of Aristotle that privation, which is posited as a per accidens principle of nature, is not a capacity for a form, nor an inchoate form, nor some imperfect active principle, as some say. Rather it is the very absence of form, or the contrary of form, which occurs in the subject.

114, Next where he says, ‘There is a sense...’ (190 b 28), he resolves, in the light of the truth already determined, all the preceding difficulties.

He concludes from the foregoing that in a certain respect it must be said that there are two principles, namely, the per se principles, and in another respect that there are three, if we accept along with the per se principles the per accidens principle. And in a certain respect the principles are contraries, if one takes the musical and the non-musical, the hot and the cold, the harmonious and the inharmonious. Yet in another respect the principles, if they are taken without the subject, are not contraries, for contraries cannot be acted upon by each other, unless it be held that some subject is supposed for the contraries by reason of which they are acted upon by one another.

And thus he concludes that the principles are not more than the contraries, for there are only two per se principles. But there are not just two principles, for one of them according to its being [esse] is other, for the subject according to nature [ratio] is two, as was said [L12 104ff]. And thus there are three principles, because man and the non-musical, and bronze and the unshaped, differ according to nature [ratio].

Therefore it is clear that the early opinions which argued for a part of the truth were in a certain respect true, but not altogether true.

115. Next where he says, ‘We have now stated ...’ (191 a 3), he shows in what way two contraries are necessary, and in what way they are not necessary.

He says that from what has been said it is clear how many principles of the generation of natural things there are, and how it happens that there are this number. For it was shown that it is necessary that two of the principles be contraries, of which one is a per se principle and the other a per accidens principle, and that something be the subject of the contraries, which is also a per se principle. But in a certain respect one of the contraries is not necessary for generation, for at times it is sufficient if one of the contraries bring about the change by its absence and its presence.

116. As evidence of this we must note that, as will be said in Book V [L2 649ff], there are three species of mutation, namely, generation and corruption and motion. The difference among these is as follows. Motion is from one positive state to another positive state, as from white to black. Generation, however, is from the negative to the positive, as from the non-white to the white, or from non-man to man. Corruption, on the other hand, is from the positive to the negative, as from the white to the non-white, or from man to non-man. Therefore, it is clear that in motion two contraries and one subject are required. But in generation and corruption there is required the presence of one contrary and its absence, which is privation.

Generation and corruption, however, are found in motion. For when something is moved from white to black, white is corrupted and black comes to be. Therefore in every natural mutation subject and form and privation are required. However, the nature [ratio] of motion is not found in every generation and corruption, as is clear in the generation and corruption of substances. Hence subject and form and priv ‘ ation are found in every mutation, but not a subject and two contraries.

117. This opposition is also found in substances, which are the first genus. This, however, is not the opposition of contrariety. For substantial forms are not contraries, even though differentiae in the genus of substance are contrary insofar as one is received along with the privation of the other, as is clear in the animate and the inanimate.

118. Next where he says, ‘The underlying nature ...’ (191 a 8), he clarifies the above-mentioned principles.

He says that the nature which is first subject to mutation, i.e., primary matter, cannot be known of itself, since everything which is known is known through its form. Primary matter is, moreover, considered to be the subject of every form. But it is known by analogy, that is, according to proportion. For we know that wood is other than the form of a bench and a bed, for sometimes it underlies the one form, at other times the other. When, therefore, we see that air at times becomes water, it is necessary to say that there is something which sometimes exists under the form of air, and at other times under the form of water. And thus this something is other than the form of water and other than the form of air, as wood is something other than the form of a bench and other than the form of bed. This ‘something’, then, is related to these natural substances as bronze is related to the statue, and wood to the bed, and anything material and unformed to form. And this is called primary matter.

This, then, is one principle of nature. It is not one as a ‘this something’, that is, as some determinate individual, as though it had form and unity in act, but is rather called being and one insofar as it is in potency to form. The other principle, then, is the nature [ratio) or form, and the third is privation, which is contrary to the form. And how these principles are two and how they are three was explained above.’

119. Next where he says, ‘Briefly, we explained ...’ (191 a 15), he gives a r6sum6 of what has been said, and points out what remains to be said.

He says, therefore, that it was said first that the contraries are principles, and afterwards that something is subjected to them, and thus there are three principles. And from what was said just now it is clear what the difference is between the contraries: one of them is a per se principle, and the other a per accidens principle. And then it was pointed out how the principles are related to each other, since the subject and the contrary are one in number yet two in nature [ratio]. Then it was pointed out what the subject is insofar as this could be made clear. But it has n ‘ ot yet been decided which is the greater substance, form or matter, for this will be explained at the beginning of Book II [L2 153]. But it has been explained that the principles are three in number, how they are principles, and in what way. And he finally draws the conclusion he had uppermost in mind, namely, that it is clear how many principles there are and what they are.

LECTURE 14 (191 A 23-B 34)

THE PROBLEMS AND THE ERRORS OF THE ANCIENTS WHICH SPRING FROM AN IGNORANCE OF MATTER ARE RESOLVED BY THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES ALREADY DETERMINED

120. Having determined the truth about the principles of nature, the Philosopher here excludes certain difficulties of the ancients by means of what has been determined about the principles.

He considers first the problems or errors which stem from an ignorance of matter, and secondly, where he says, ‘Others indeed ...’ (191 b 35; L15 129), the problems or errors which stem from an ignorance of privation. Thirdly, where he says, ‘The accurate determination ...’ (192 a 34; L15 140), he reserves for another science the problems which arise with reference to form.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he states the problem and the error into which the ancients fell through their ignorance of matter. Secondly, where he says, ‘Our explanation ...’ (191 a 33 122) he answers their difficulty by means of those things which have already been determined.

121. He says, therefore, first that, after determining the truth about the principles, it must be pointed out that only in this way is every difficulty of the ancients solved. And this is an indication that what has been said about

the principles is true. For truth excludes every falsehood and difficulty. But given a position which is in some way false, some difficulty must remain.

Now the problem and error of the ancient philosophers was this. The first ones who philosophically sought the truth and the nature of things were diverted into a path other than the way of truth and the way of nature. This happened to them because of the weakness of their understanding. For they said that nothing is either generated or corrupted. This is contrary to truth and contrary to nature.

The weakness of their understanding forced them to hold this position because they did not know how to resolve the following argument, according to which it seemed to be proven that being is not generated. If being comes to be, it comes to be either from being or from non-being. And each of these seems to be impossible, i.e., that being comes to be from being or that it comes to be from non-being. It is clearly impossible for something to come to be from being, because that which is does not come to be, for nothing is before it comes to be. And being already is, hence it does not come to be. It is also clearly impossible for something to come to be from non-being. For it is always necessary that there be a subject for that which comes to be, as was shown above [L12 107]. From nothing, nothing comes to be. And from this it was concluded that there is neither generation nor corruption of being.

And those who argued in this fashion exaggerated their position to the point where they said that there are not many beings, but only one being. And they said this for the reason already given. Since they held that there is only one material principle, and since they said that nothing is caused from that one principle by way of generation and corruption, but only by way of alteration, then it follows that it would always be one according to substance.

122. Next where he says, ‘Our explanation...’ (191 a 33), he answers the objection just mentioned. Concerning this he makes two points. First, he answers the aforesaid objection in two ways. Secondly, where he says,’So as we said ...’ (191 b 30 128), he draws the conclusion which he has uppermost in mind.

The first point is divided into two parts according to the two solutions given, the second of which is found where he says, ‘Another consists in ...’ (191 b 28 127).

123. He says, therefore, first that as far as the mode of speaking is concerned, it makes no difference whether we say that something comes to be from being or from non-being, or that being or non-being does something or is acted upon, or anything else, or whether we say this same sort of thing about a doctor; namely, that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something is or comes to be from the doctor.

But to say that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, has two meanings. Therefore, to say that something comes to be from being or from non-being, or that being or non-being makes something, or is acted upon, has two meanings. And the same is true regardless of the terms which are used; e.g., it might be said that something comes to be from white, or that the white does something or is acted upon.

That there is a twofold meaning when we use expressions such as the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, he shows as follows.

We say that a doctor builds. But he does not do this insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is a builder. And in like manner we say that the doctor becomes white, but not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is black. However in another sense we say that the doctor heals insofar as he is doctor, and in like manner that the doctor becomes a nondoctor insofar as he is a doctor. Thus we say properly and per se that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from the doctor, when we attribute this to the doctor insofar as he is a doctor. But when something is attributed to him per accidens, it is not insofar as he is a doctor, but insofar as he is something else. Therefore, it is clear that when it is said that the doctor does something or is acted upon, or that something comes to be from doctor, this has two meanings, i.e., per se and per accidens.

Whence it is clear that when it is said that a thing comes to be from non-being, this is to be understood properly and per se if that thing should come to be from non-being insofar as it is non-being. And same argument applies to being.

But the ancients, failing to perceive this distinction, effed insofar as they thought that nothing comes to be. And they did not think that anything other than their first material principle had substantial existence. For example, those who said that air is the first material principle held that all other things signify a certain accidental existence. Thus they excluded every substantial generation, retaining only alteration. Because of the fact that nothing comes to be per se either from non-being or from being, they thought that it would not be possible for anything to come to be from being or non-being.

124. And we also say that nothing comes to be from non-being simply and per se, but only per accidens. For that which is,i.e., being, is not from privationper se. And this is so because privation does not enter into the essence of the thing made. Rather a thing comes to be per se from that which is in the thing after it has already been made. Thus the shaped comes to be from. the unshaped, not per se, but per accidens, because once it already has been shaped, the unshaped is not in it. But this is a remarkable way for a thing to come to be from non-being, and seemed impossible to the ancient philosophers. Therefore, it is clear that a thing comes to be from non-being not per se but per accidens.

125. In like manner, if it is asked whether a thing comes to be from being, we must say that a thing comes to be from being per accidens, but not per se. He shows this by the following example.

Let us suppose that a dog is generated from a horse. Granting this, it is clear that a certain animal comes to be from a certain animal, and thus animal would come to be from animal. However, animal would not come to be from animal per se, but per accidens. For it does not come to be insofar as it is animal, but insofar as it is this animal. For animal already is before the dog comes to be. For the horse already is, but is not a dog. Hence the dog comes to be per se from that which is not a dog. And if animal were to come to be per se, and not per accidens, it would be necessary for it to come to be from non-animal.

And the same is true of being. For a being comes to be from that non-being which is not that which the being comes to be. Hence a thing does not come to be per se from being or per se from non-being. For this expression per se signifies that a thing comes to be from non-being in the sense that it comes to be from non-being insofar as it is non-b,eing, as was said [123]. And thus when this animal comes to be from this animal, or when this body comes to be from this body, not all animal or nonanimal, nor all body or non-body, is removed from that from which the thing comes to be. And likewise not all being [esse] nor all non-being [non-esse] is removed from that from which this being comes to be. For ,that from which fire comes to be has some being, because it is air, and, also has some non-being, because it is not fire.

126. This, then, is one way of resolving the problem raised above. But this approach is not sufficient. For if being comes to be per accidens both from being and from non-being, it is necessary to posit something from which being comes to be per se. For every thing which is per accidens is reduced to that which is per se.

127. In order to designate that from which a thing comes to be per se, he adds a second approach where he says, ‘Another consists...’ (191 b 28).

He says that the same thing can be explained in terms of potency and act, as is clearly indicated in another place, i.e., in Metaphysics, IX:1. Thus a thing comes to be per se from being in potency; but a thing comes to be per accidens from being in act or from non-being.

He says this because matter, which is being in potency, is that from which a thing comes to be per se. For matter enters into the substance of the thing which is made. But from privation or from the preceding form, a thing comes to be per accidens insofar as the matter, from which the thing comes to be per se, happened to be under such a form or under such a privation. Thus a statue comes to be per se from bronze; but the statue comes to be per accidens both from that which does not have such a shape and from that which has another shape.

128. Finally, where he says, ‘So as we said ...’ (191 b 30), he draws the conclusion which he had uppermost in mind. He says that we can truly say that all the difficulties are answered by what has been said above. Driven on by certain difficulties, some of the ancients denied some of the things mentioned above, i.e., generation and corruption, and a plurality of substantially different things. But once matter is understood, all of their ignorance is removed.

LECTURE 15 (191 B 35-192 B 5)

MATTER IS DISTINGUISHED FROM PRIVATION. MATTER IS NEITHER GENERABLE NOR CORRUPTIBLE PER SE

129. Having excluded the problems and errors of the ancient philosophers which stem from their ignorance of matter, the Philosopher here excludes the errors which stem from their ignorance of privation.

Concerning this he makes three points. First, he sets forth the errors of those who wandered from the truth. Secondly, where he says, ‘Now we distinguish ...’ (192 a 2 132), he shows how this position differs from the truth determined by him above. Thirdly, where he says, ‘For the one which persists ...’ (192 a 13 134), he proves that his own opinion is true.

130. He says, therefore, first that some philosophers touched upon matter, but did not understand it sufficiently. For they did not distinguish between matter and privation. Hence, they attributed to matter what belongs to privation. And because privation, considered in itself, is non-being, they said that matter, considered in itself, is non-being. And so just as a thing comes to be simply and per se from matter, so they believed that a thing comes to be simply and per se from non-being.

And they were led to hold this position for two reasons. First they were influenced by the argument of Parmenides, who said that whatever is other than being is non-being. Since, then, matter is other than being, because it is not being in act, they said that it is non-being simply. Secondly, it seemed to them that that which is one in number or subject is also one in nature [ratio]. And Aristotle calls this a state of being one in potency, because things which are one in nature [ratio] are such that each has the same power. But things which are one in subject but not one in nature [ratio] do not have the same potency or power, as is clear in the white and the musical. But subject and privation are one in number, as for example, the bronze and the unshaped. Hence it seemed to them that they would be the same in nature [ratio] or in power. Hence this position accepts the unity of potency.

131. But lest anyone, because of these words, be in doubt about what the potency of matter is and whether it is one or many, it must be pointed out that act and potency divide every genus of beings, as is clear in Metaphysics, IX:1, and in Book III [L3] of this work. Hence, just as the potency for quality is not something outside the genus of quality, so the potency for substantial being is not outside the genus of substance. Therefore, the potency of matter is not some property added to its essence. Rather, matter in its very substance is potency for substantial being. Moreover, the potency of matter is one in subject with respect to many forms. But in its nature [ratio] there are many potencies according to its relation to different forms. Hence in Book Ills it will be said that to be able to be healed and to be able to be ill differ according to nature [ratio].

132. Next where he says, ‘Now we distinguish...’ (192 a 2), he explains the difference between his own opinion and the opinion just given.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he widens our understanding of his own opinion. Secondly, where he says, ‘They, on the other hand ...’ (192 a 6 133), he shows what the other opinion holds.

He says, therefore, first that there is a great difference between a thing’s being one in number or subject and its being one in potency or nature [ratio]. For we say, as is clear from the above [L12 104], that matter and privation although one in subject, are other in nature [ratio]. And this is clear for two reasons. First, matter is non-being accidentally, whereas privation is non-being per se. For ‘unshaped’ signifies non-being, but ‘bronze’does not signify non-being except insofar as ‘unshaped’ happens to be in it. Secondly, matter is ‘near to the thing’ and exists in some respect, because it is in potency to the thing and is in some respect the substance of the thing, since it enters into the constitution of the substance. But this cannot be said of privation.

133. Next where he says, ‘They, on the other hand ...’(192 a 6), he clarifies his understanding of the opinion of the Platonists.

He says that the Platonists also held a certain duality on the part of matter, namely, the great and the small. But this duality is different from that of Aristotle. For Aristotle held that the duality was matter and privation, which are one in subject but different in nature [ratio]. But the Platonists did not hold that one of these is privation and the other matter, but theyjoined privation to both, i.e., to the great and the small. They either took both of them together, not distinguishing in their speech between the great and the small, or else they took each separately. Whence it is clear that the Platonists, who posited form and the great and the small, held three completely different principles than Aristotle, who posited matter and privation and form.

The Platonists realized more than the other ancient philosophers that it is necessary to suppose some one nature for an natural forms, which nature is primary matter. But they made it one both in subject and in nature [ratio], not distinguishing between it and privation. For although they held a duality on the part of matter, namely, the great and the small, they made no distinction at all between matter and privation. Rather they spoke only of matter under which they included the great and the small. And they ignored privation, making no mention of it.

134. Next where he says, ‘For the one which persists ...’ (192 a 13), he proves that his opinion is true. Concerning this he makes two points. First he states his position, i.e., that it is necessary to distinguish privation from matter. Secondly, where he says, ‘The matter comes to be ...’ (192 a 25),1 he shows how matter is corrupted or generated.

He treats the first point in two ways, first by explanation, and secondly by reducing [the opposite opinion] to the impossible, where he says, ‘...the other such ...’ (192 a 18).

135. He says, therefore, first that this nature which is the subject, i.e., matter, together with form is a cause of the things which come to be according to nature after the manner of a mother. For just as a mother is a cause of generation by receiving, so also is matter.

But if one takes the other part of the contrariety, namely, the privation, we can imagine, by stretching our understanding, that it does not pertain to the constitution of the thing, but rather to some sort of evil for the thing. For privation is altogether non-being, since it is nothing other than the negation of a form in a subject, and is outside the whole being. Thus the argument of

Parmenides that whatever is other than being is non-being, has a place in regard to privation, but not in regard to matter, as the Platonists said.

He shows that privation would pertain to evil as follows. Form is something divine and very good and desirable. It is divine because every form is a certain participation in the likeness of the divine being, which is pure act. For each thing, insofar as it is in act, has form. Form is very good because act is the perfection of potency and is its good; and it follows as a consequence of this that form is desirable, because every thing desires its own perfection.

Privation, on the other hand, is opposed to form, since it is nothing other than the removal of form. Hence, since that which is opposed to the good and removes it is evil, it is clear that privation pertains to evil. Whence it follows that privation is not the same as matter, which is the cause of a thing as a mother.

136. Next where he says, the other such...’ (192 a 18), he proves the same thing by an argument which reduces [the opposite position] to the impossible.

Since form is a sort of good and is desirable, matter, which is other than privation and other than form, naturally seeks and desires form according to its nature. But for those who do not distinguish matter from privation, this involves the absurdity that a contrary seeks its own corruption, which is absurd. That this is so he shows as follows.

If matter seeks form, it does not seek a form insofar as it is under this form. For in this latter case the matter does not stand in need of being through this form. (Every appetite exists because of a need, for an appetite is a desire for what is not possessed.) In like manner matter does not seek form insofar as it is under the contrary or privation, for one of the contraries is corruptive of the other, and thus something would seek its own corruption. It is clear, therefore, that matter, which seeks form, is other in nature [ratio] from both form and privation. For if matter seeks form according to its proper nature, as was said, and if it is held that matter and privation are the same in nature [ratio], it follows that privation seeks form, and thus seeks its own corruption, which is impossible. Hence it is also impossible that matter and privation be the same in nature [ratio].

Nevertheless, matter is ‘a this’, i.e., something having privation. Hence, if the feminine seeks the masculine, and if the base seeks the good, this is not because baseness itself seeks the good, which is its contrary; rather it seeks it accidentally, because that in which baseness happens to be seeks to be good. And likewise femininity does not seek masculinity; rather that in which the feminine happens to be seeks the masculine. And in like manner, privation does not seek to be form; rather that in which privation happens to be, namely, matter, seeks to be form.

137. But Avicenna opposes this position of the Philosopher in three ways.

First, matter has neither animal appetite (as is obvious in itself) nor natural appetite, whereby it would seek form. For matter does not have any form or power inclining it to anything, as for example, the heavy naturally seeks the lowest place insofar as it is inclined by its heaviness to such a place.

Secondly, he objects that, if matter seeks form, this is so because it lacks every form, or because it seeks to possess many forms at once, both which are impossible, or because it dislikes the form which it has and seeks to have another form, and this also is meaningless. Hence it seems that we must say that matter in no way seeks form.

His third objection is as follows. To say that matter seeks form as the feminine seeks the masculine is to speak figuratively, i.e., as a poet, not as a philosopher.

138. But it is easy to resolve objections of this sort. For we must note that everything which seeks something either knows that which it seeks and orders itself to it, or else it tends toward it by the ordination and direction of someone who knows, as the arrow tends toward a determinate mark by the direction and ordination of the archer. Therefore, natural appetite is nothing but the ordination of things to their end in accordance with their proper natures. However a being in act is not only ordered to its end by an active power, but also by its matter insofar as it is potency. For form is the end of matter. Therefore for matter to seek form is nothing other than matter being ordered to form as potency to act.

And because matter still remains in potency to another form while it is under some form, there is always in it an appetite for form. This is not because of a dislike for the form which it has, nor because it seeks to be the contrary at the same time, but because it is in potency to other forms while it has some form in act.

Nor does he use a figure of speech here; rather, he uses an example. For it was said above [L13 118] that primary matter is knowable by way of proportion, insofar as it is related to substantial forms as sensible matters are related to accidental forms. And thus in order to explain primary matter, it is necessary to use an example taken from sensible substances. Therefore, just as he used the example of unshaped bronze and the example of the non-musical man to explain matter, so now to explain matter he uses the example of the appetite of the woman for the man and the example of appetite of the base for the good. For this happens to these things insofar as they have something which is of the nature [ratio] of matter. However, it must be noted that Aristotle is here arguing against Plato, who used such metaphorical expressions, likening matter to a mother and the feminine, and form to the masculine. And so Aristotle uses Plato's own metaphors against him.

139. Next where he says, 'The matter comes to be ... (192 a 25), he shows how matter is corrupted. He says that in a certain respect matter is corrupted and in a certain respect it is not. For insofar as privation is in it, it is corrupted when the privation ceases to be in it, as if we should say that unshaped bronze is corrupted when it ceases to be unshaped. But in itself, insofar as it is a certain being in potency, it is neither generated nor corruptible. This is clear from the following. If matter should come to be, there would have to be something which is the subject from which it comes to be, as is clear from what was said above [L12 7,10ff]. But that which is the first subject in generation is matter. For we say that matter is the first subject from which a thing comes to be per se, and not per accidens, and is in the thing after it has come to be. (And privation differs from matter on both of these points. For privation is that from which a thing comes to be per accidens, and is that which is not in the thing after it has come to be.) It follows, therefore, that matter would be before it would come to be, which is impossible. And in like manner, everything which is corrupted is resolved into primary matter.. Therefore, at the very time when primary matter already is, it would be corrupted; and thus if primary matter is corrupted, it will have been corrupted before it is corrupted, which is impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for primary matter to be generated and corrupted. But by this we do not deny that it comes into existence through creation.

140. Next where he says, ‘The accurate determination...’ (192 a 34), he indicates that since the errors about matter and privation have been eliminated, then the errors and problems about form should also be eliminated. For some have posited separated forms, i.e., ideas, which they reduced to one first idea.

And so he says that first philosophy treats such questions as whether the formal principle is one or many, and how many there are, and what kind there are. Hence these questions will be reserved for first philosophy. For form is a principle of existing, and being as such is the subject of first philosophy. But matter and privation are. principles of mutable being, which is considered by the natural philosopher. Nevertheless we shall treat of natural and corruptible forms in the following books on this discipline.

Finally he summarizes what has been said. It has been determined that there are principles, what the principles are, and how many there are. But it is necessary to make a new start in our study of natural science, inquiring, that is, into the principles of the science.

BOOK II

THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL SCIENCE

LECTURE 1 (192 B 8-193 A 8)

WHAT IS NATURE? WHAT THINGS HAVE A NATURE? WHAT THINGS ARE ‘ACCORDING TO NATURE’?

141. After the Philosopher has treated the principles of natural things in Book I, he here treats the principles of natural science.

Now the things which we ought to know first in any science are its subject and the method by which it demonstrates.

Hence Book II is divided into two parts. First he determines what things belong to the consideration of natural science, and secondly, where he says, ‘Now that we have established...’(194 b 16; L5 176ff), he points out the causes from which it demonstrates.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what nature is. Secondly, where he says, ‘We have distinguished ...’ (193 b 23; L3 157ff), he determines what things natural science considers.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what nature is. Secondly the number of ways [in which the name nature is used] is pointed out, where he says, ‘Some identify...’ (193 a 9; L2 149ff).

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what nature is. Secondly, where he says, ‘That nature exists ...’ (193 a 2 148), he refutes the position of those who attempt to demonstrate that nature exists.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he states what nature is. Secondly, where he says, ‘Things “have a nature” (192 b 33 146), he designates those things which are called ‘nature’.

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he inquires into the definition of nature. Secondly he arrives at the definition, where he says, ‘...

nature is ...’(192 b 22 145). Thirdly, he explains this definition, where he says, ‘I say ...’ (192 b 23 145).

142. He says, therefore, first that we say that of all beings some are from nature, whereas others are from other causes, for example, from art or from chance.

Now we say that the following things are from nature: every sort of animal, and their parts, such as flesh and blood, and also plants and simple bodies, i.e., the elements, such as earth, fire, air and water, which are nbt resolved into any prior bodies. For these and all things like them are said to be from nature.

All of these things differ from the things which are not from nature because all things of this sort seem to have in themselves a principle of motion and rest; some according to place, such as the heavy and the light, and also the celestial bodies, some according to increase and decrease, such as the animals and plants, and some according to alteration, such as the simple bodies and everything which is composed of them.

But things which are not from nature, such as a bed and clothing and like things, which are spoken of in this way because they are from art, have in themselves no principle of mutation, except per accidents, insofar as the matter and substance of artificial bodies are natural things. Thus insofar as artificial things happen to be iron or stone, they have a principle of motion in them, but not insofar as they are artifacts. For a knife has in itself a principle of downward motion, not insofar as it is a knife, but insofar as it is iron.

143. But it does not seem to be true that in every change of natural things a principle of motion is- in that which is moved. For in the alteration and the generation of simple bodies, the whole principle of motion seems to be from an external agent. For example, when water is heated, or air is converted into fire, the principle of the change is from an external agent.

Therefore, some say that even in changes of this sort an active principle of motion is in that which is moved, not perfectly, but imperfectly, which principle helps the action of the external agent. For they say that in matter there is a certain inchoateness of form, which they say is privation, the third principle of nature. And the generations and alterations of simple bodies are said to be from this intrinsic principle.

But this cannot be. Since a thing acts only insofar as it is in act, the aforesaid inchoate state of form, since it is not act, but a certain disposition for act, cannot be an active principle. And furthermore, even if it were a complete form, it would not act on its own subject by ‘changing it. For the form does not act, rather the composite acts. And the composite cannot alter itself unless there are two parts in it, one of which alters, the other of which is altered.

144. And so it must be said that a principle of motion is in natural things in the way in which motion belongs to them. Therefore in those things to which it belongs to move, there is an active priatiple of motion. Whereas in those things to which it belongs to be moved, there is a passive principle, which is matter. And this principle, insofar as it has a natural potency for such a form and motion, makes the motion to be natural. And for this reason the production of artificial things is not natural. For even though the material principle is in that which comes to be, it does not have a natural potency for such a form.

So also the local motion of the celestial bodies is natural, even though it is from a separated mover, inasmuch as there is in the celestial body itself a natural potency for such a motion.

However in heavy and light bodies there is a formal principle of motion. (But a formal principle of this sort cannot be called the active potency to which this motion pertains. Rather it is understood as a passive potency. For heaviness in earth is not a principle for moving, but rather for being moved.) For just as the other accidents are consequent upon substantial form, so also is place, and thus also ‘to be moved to place’. However the natural form is not the mover. Rather the mover is that which generates and gives such and such a form upon which such a motion follows.

145. Next where he says, ‘... nature is...’ (192 b 22), he concludes from the above the definition of nature in the following manner.

Natural things differ from the non-natural insofar as they have a nature. But they differ from the non-natural only insofar as they have in themselves a principle of motion. Therefore, nature is nothing other than a principle of motion and rest in that in which it is primarily and per se and not per accidens.

Now ‘principle’ is placed in the definition of nature as its genus, and not as something absolute, for the name ‘nature’ involves a relation to a principle. For those things are said to be born which are generated after having been joined to a generator, as is clear in plants and animals, thus the principle of generation or motion is called nature. Hence they are to be laughed at who, wishing to correct the definition of Aristotle, tried to define nature by something absolute, saying that nature is a power seated in things or something of this sort.

Moreover, nature is called a principle and cause in order to point out that in that which is moved nature is not a principle of all motions in the same way, but in different ways, as was said above [144].

Moreover, he says that nature is a principle ‘of motion and rest’. For those things which are naturally moved to a place, also or even more naturally rest in that place. Because of this, fire is naturally moved upward, since it is natural for it to be there. And for the same reason everything can be said to be moved naturally and to rest naturally in its place. This, however, must not be understood to mean that in everything which is moved naturally nature is also a principle of coming to rest. For a heavenly body is indeed moved naturally, but it does not naturally come to rest. But on the whole it can be said that nature is not only a principle of motion but also of rest.

Further he says ‘in which it is’ in order to differentiate nature from artificial things in which there is motion only per accidens.

Then he adds ‘Primarily’ because even though nature is a principle of the motion of composite things, nevertheless it is not such primarily. Hence that an animal is moved downwards is not because of the nature of animal insofar as it is animal, but because of the nature of the dominant element.

He explains why he says ‘per se and not per accidens’ where he says, ‘I say “not in virtue of...”‘ (192 b 24).

It sometimes happens that a doctor is the cause of his own health, and so the principle of his own coming to health is in him, but per accidens. Hence nature is not the principle of his coming to health. For it is not insofar as he is cured that he has the art of medicine, but insofar as he is a doctor. Hence the same being happens to be a doctor and to be cured, and he is cured insofar as he is sick. And so because these things are joined per accidens, they are also at times separated per accidens. For it is one thing to be a doctor who cures, and another thing to be a sick person who is cured. But the principle of a natural motion is in the natural body which is moved insofar as it is moved. For insofar as fire has lightness, it is carried upward. And these two things are not divided from each other so that the lightness is different than the body which is moved upward. Rather they are always one and the same. And all artificial things are like the doctor who cures. For none of them has in itself the principle of its own making. Rather some of them come to be from something outside, as a house and other things which are carved by hand, while others come to be through an intrinsic principle, but per accidens, as was said [142]. And so it has been stated what nature is.

146. Next where he says, ‘Things “have a nature”...’ (192 b 33), he defines those things which are given the name ‘nature’.

He says that those things which have in themselves a principle of their motion have a nature. And such are all subjects of nature. For nature is a subject insofar as it is called matter, and nature is in a subject insofar as it is called form.

147. Next where he says, ‘The term “according to nature” (192 b 35), he explains what is ‘according to nature’.

He says that ‘to be according to nature’ is said both of subjects whose existence is from nature and also of the accidents which are in them and caused by such a principle. Thus to be carried upward is not a nature itself, nor does it have nature, but it is caused by nature.

And thus it has been stated what nature is, and what it is that has nature, and what is ‘according to nature’.

148. Next where he says, ‘That nature exists...’ (193 a 2), he denies the presumptuous position of those who wish to demonstrate that nature exists.

He says that it is ridiculous for anyone to attempt to demonstrate that nature exists. For it is manifest to the senses that many things are from nature, which have in themselves the principle of their own motion. To wish, moreover, to demonstrate the obvious by what is not obvious is the mark of a man who cannot judge what is known in itself and what is not known in itself. For when he wishes to demonstrate that which is known in itself, he uses that which is known in itself as if it were not known in itself. And it is clear that some people do this. A man who is born blind may sometimes reason about colours. But that which he uses as a principle is not known to him per se, because he has no understanding of the thing. Rather he only uses names. For our knowledge has its origin from the senses, and he who lacks one sense, lacks one science. Hence those who are born blind, and who never sense colour, cannot understand any thing about colour. And so they use the unknown as if it were known. And the converse applies to those who wish to demonstrate that nature exists. For they use the known as if it were not known. The existence of nature is known per se, insofar as natural things are manifest to the senses. But what the nature of each thing is, or what the principle of its motion is, is not manifest.

Hence it is clear from this that Avicenna, who wished that it were possible to prove the existence of nature, unreasonably attempted to disprove what Aristotle has said. However Avicenna did not wish to prove this from natural things, for no science proves its own principles. But ignorance of moving principles does not mean that the existence of nature is not known per se, as was said.

LECTURE 2 (193.A 9-B 21)

NATURE IS BOTH MATTER AND FORM, BUT PRIMARILY FORM

149. Having shown what nature is, the Philosopher here points out the number of ways in which the name ‘nature’ is used. He shows first that nature is predicated of matter, secondly that it is predicated of form, where he says, ‘Another account ...’ (193 a 30 151).

Concerning the first point we must note that the ancient natural philosophers, being unable to arrive at primary matter, as was said above [I, L12 108], held that some sensible body, such as fire or air or water, is the first matter of all things. And so it followed that all forms come to matter as to something existing in act, as happens in artificial things. For the form of knife comes to iron already existing in act. And so they adopted an opinion’about natural forms similar to that which is true of artificial forms.

He says, therefore, first that it seems to some that that which is primarily in each thing and which considered in itself is unformed is the substance and nature of natural things, as if we would say that the nature of a bed is wood, and the nature of a statue is bronze. For wood is in the bed and is, when considered in itself, not formed. And Antiphon said that the following is a sign of this: if one should bury a bed in the earth and if the wood by rotting should acquire the potency to germinate something, that which is generated will not be a bed, but wood. Now since the substance is that which remains permanent, and since it belongs to nature to generate what is like itself, he concluded that every disposition in respect to any law of reason [ratio] or art is an accident. And that which remains permanent is substance, which continually undergoes change of dispositions of this sort.

Having supposed, therefore, that the forms of artificial things are accidents, and that matter is substance, Antiphon assumed the other proposition, namely, that just as the bed and statue are related to bronze and wood, so also each natural thing is related to some other thing which is its matter. Thus bronze and gold are related to water (because the matter of all liquifiable things seems to be water), and bone and wood are related to earth, and it is the same with all other natural things. Hence he concluded that the material things which subsist under natural forms are their nature and substance. And because of this some have said that earth is the nature and substance of all things, for example, the first theological poets; whereas the later philosophers chose fire or air or water, or some of these or all of them, as is clear from what was said above [I, L2 13; L8 54]. For they said that there are as many substances of things as there are material principles. And they said that all other things are accidents of these material principles, either as passions, or as habits, or as dispositions, or as anything else which is reducedto the genus of accident.

Thus one difference which they posited between material and formal principles is that they said that they differed as substance and accident.

There is, however, another difference, for they also said that these principles differ as the permanent and the corruptible. Since they held that each of the aforementioned simple bodies is a material principle, they said it was permanent, for they did not say that they were changed into each other. But they said that all other things come to be and are corrupted infinitely. For example, if water is the material principle, they said that water is never corrupted, but remains water in all things as their substance. But they said that bronze and gold and other things of this sort are corrupted and generated infinitely.

150. This position is in part true and in part false. With reference to the point that matter is the substance and the nature of natural things, it is true. For matter enters into the constitution of the substance of each natural thing. But insofar as they said that all forms are accidents, this position is false.

Whence from this opinion and from his argument, Aristotle concludes to that which is true, namely, that nature in one way is called matter, which underlies each natural thing which has in itself a principle of motion or of some sort of mutation. For motion is a species of mutation, as will be said in Book V [L2 649ff].

151. Next where he says, ‘Another account...’ (193 a 30), he shows that the form is also called nature.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he states his position, i.e., that form is nature. Secondly, where he says, ‘Shape and nature...’ (193 b 19 156), he explains the diversity of forms.

He explains the first point with three arguments. He says, therefore, first that nature is used in another way to refer to the form and species, from which the nature [ratio] of the thing is constituted. He proves this by the following argument.

Just as art belongs to a thing insofar as it is according to art and the artistic, so also nature belongs to a thing insofar as it is according to nature and the natural. But we do not say that that which is only in potency to that which is artistic has anything of art, because it does not yet have the species [e.g.] of a bed. Therefore in natural things that which is potentially flesh and bone does not have the nature of flesh and bone before it takes on the form in respect to which the definitive nature [ratio] of the thing is established (i.e. that through which we know what flesh and bone are). The nature is not yet in it before it has the form. Therefore the nature of natural things which have in themselves a principle of motion is in another way the form. And this form, although it is not separated from the matter in the thing, still differs from the matter by reason [ratio]. For as bronze and the shapeless, although one in subject, are different in reason [ratio], so also are matter and form.

He says this because unless form were other than matter according to reason [ratio], the ways in which matter is called nature and form is called nature would not be different.

152. Moreover one might believe that since both matter and form are called nature then the composite could also be called nature. For substance is predicated of form and of matter and of the composite.

But he denies this, saying,that the composite of matter and form, such as a man, is not the nature itself, but is some thing from nature. For nature [natura] has the nature [ratio] of a principle, but the composite has the nature [ratio] of ‘being from a principle’.

153. From the foregoing argument he proceeds further to show that form is nature more than matter. For a thing is said to be greater insofar as it is in act rather than insofar as it is in potency. Whence form, according to which

a thing is natural in act, is nature more than matter, according to which a thing is something natural in potency.

154. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘Again man is...’ (193 b 8). He says that although a bed does not come to be from a bed, as Antiphon said, man does come to be from man. Whence what they say is true, namely, that the form of bed is not the nature, but the wood is. For if wood should germinate, a bed would not come to be, but wood. Therefore, as this form, which does not arise through germination, is not nature but art, so the form which arises from generation is nature. But the form of a natural thing does arise through generation, for man comes to be from man. Therefore the form of a natural thing is nature.

155. He gives his third argument where he says, ‘We also speak...’ (193 b 13). Nature can be signified as a generation, for instance, if we should call it birth. Thus nature in the sense of generation, i.e., birth, is the way to nature. For the difference between actions and passions is that actions are named from their principles while passions are named from their terminations. For each thing is named from act, which is the principle of action and the termination of passion. But naming is not the same in passions and actions. For medication is not called the way to medicine, but the way to health. It is necessary for medication to proceed from medicine, not to medicine. But nature in the sense of generation, i.e., birth, is not related to nature as medication is related to medicine. Rather it is related to nature as to a termination, since it is a passion. For that which is born, insofar as it is born, comes from something to something. Hence that which is born is named from that to which it proceeds, and not from that from which it proceeds. That, however, to which birth tends is form. Therefore form is nature.

156. Next where he says, ‘Shape and nature ...’ (193 b 19), he shows that the nature which is form is used in two ways, i.e., of the incomplete form and the complete form. This is clear in accidental generation, for example, when something becomes white. For whiteness is a complete form, and the privation of whiteness is in some way a species, insofar as it is joined to blackness, which is an imperfect form. But whether or not in simple generation, which is the generation of substances, there is something which is a privation and also a contrary, so that substantial forms are contraries,

must be considered later in Book VI and in De Generatione et Corruptione I:3.

LECTURE 3 (193 B 22-194 A 11)

HOW PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS DIFFER IN THEIR CONSIDERATION OF THE SAME THING

157. After the Philosopher has explained what nature is and how many ways the name is used, he here intends to show what it is that natural science considers.

This section is divided into two parts. First he shows how natural science differs from mathematics. Secondly, where he says, ‘Since nature has...’ (194 a 12; L4 166), he designates that to which the consideration of natural science extends.

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he states the question. Secondly, where he says, ‘Obviously physical bodies ...’ (193 b 23 158), he gives his reasons for [raising] the question. Thirdly, he answers the question where he says, ‘Now the mathematician...’ (193 b 31 159).

He says, therefore, first that after the uses of the name ‘nature’ have been determined, it is necessary to consider how mathematics differs from natural philosophy.

158. Next where he says, ‘Obviously physical bodies ...’ (193 b 23), he gives his reasons for [raising] the question. The first of these is as follows.

Whenever sciences consider the same subjects, they are either the same science, or one is a part of the other. But the mathematical philosopher considers points and lines and surfaces and bodies, and so does the natural philosopher. (For he proves from the fact that natural bodies have planes, i.e., surfaces, and volumes, i.e., solidity, and lengths and points. Moreover the natural philosopher must consider all things that are in natural bodies.)

Therefore it seems that natural science and mathematics are either the same or that one is a part of the other.

He gives the second reason where he says, ‘Further, is astronomy...’ (193 b 25). In connection with this reason he raises the question whether astronomy is altogether other than natural philosophy or a part of it. For it is clear that astronomy is a part of mathematics. Whence, if it is also a part of natural philosophy, it follows that mathematics and physics agree at least in this part.

That astronomy is a part of physics he proves in two ways. First by the followiiig argument. To whomever it belongs to know the substances and natures of certain things, also belongs the consideration of their accidents. But it belongs to the natural philosopher to consider the nature and substance of the sun and the moon, since they are certain natural bodies. Therefore it belongs to the natural philosopher to consider their per se accidents.

He proves this also from the custom of the philosophers. For natural philosophers are found to have treated the shape of the sun and of the moon and of the earth and of the whole world. And these are topics which claim the attention of the astronomers. Therefore astronomy and natural science agree not only in [having] the same subjects but also in the consideration of the same accidents, and in demonstrating the same conclusions. Whence it seems that astronomy is a part of physics, and as a result physics does not differ totally from mathematics.

159. Next where he says, ‘Now the mathematician ...’ (193 b 3 1), he answers the question raised above. Concerning this he makes two points. First he gives his solution, and secondly he confirms it, where he says, ‘This becomes plain...’ (194 a 1 163).

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he answers the question. Secondly, where he says, ‘That is why he separates ...’ (193 b 33 161), he concludes to a sort of corollary from the above. Thirdly, where he says, ‘The holders of ...’ (193 b 35 162), he excludes an error.

160. He says, therefore, first that the mathematician and the natural philosopher treat the same things, i.e., points, and lines, and surfaces, and things of this sort, but not in the same way. For the mathematician does not treat these things insofar as each of them is a boundary of a natural body, nor does he consider those things which belong to them insofar as they are

the boundaries of a natural body. But this is the way in which natural science treats them. And, it is not inconsistent that the same thing should fall under the consideration of different sciences according to different points of view.

161. Next where he says, ‘That is why he separates ...’(193 b 33), he concludes to a sort of corollary from what he has just said. Because the mathematician does not consider lines, and points, and surfaces, and things of this sort, and their accidents, insofar as they are the boundaries of a natural body, he is said to abstract from sensible and natural matter. And the reason why he is able to abstract is this: according to the intellect these things are abstracted from motion.

As evidence for this reason we must note that many things are joined in the thing, but the understanding of one of them is not derived from the understanding of another. Thus white and musical are joined in the same subject, nevertheless the understanding of one of these is not derived from an understanding of the other. And so one can be separately understood without the other. And this one is understood as abstracted from the other. It is clear, however, that the posterior is not derived from the understanding of the prior, but conversely. Hence the prior can be understood without the posterior, but not conversely. Thus it is clear that animal is prior to man, and man is prior to this man (for man is had by addition to animal, and this man by addition to man). And because of this our understanding of man is not derived from our understanding of animal, nor our understanding of Socrates from our understanding of man. Hence animal can be understood without man, and man without Socrates and other individuals. And this is to abstract the universal from the particular.

In like manner, among all the accidents which come to substance, quantity comes first, and then the sensible qualities, and actions and passions, and the motions consequent upon sensible qualities. Therefore quantity does not embrace in its intelligibility the sensible qualities or the passions or the motions. Yet it does include substance in its intelligibility. Therefore quantity can be understood without matter, which is subject to motion, and without sensible qualities, but not without substance. And thus quantities and those things which belong to them are understood as abstracted from motion and sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter, as is said in Metaphysics, VII:10.

Since, therefore, the objects of mathematics are abstracted from motion according to the intellect, and since they do not include in their intelligibility sensible matter, which is a subject of motion, the mathematician can abstract them from sensible matter. And it makes no difference as far as the truth is concerned whether they are considered one way or the other. For although the objects of mathematics are not separated according to existence, the mathematicians, in abstracting them according to their understanding, do not lie, because they do not assert that these things exist apart from sensible matter (for this would be a lie). But they consider them without any consideration of sensible matter, which can be done without lying. Thus one can truly consider the white without the musical, even though they exist together in the same subject. But it would not be a true consideration if one were to assert that the white is not musical.

162. Next where he says, “The holders of the theory...’ (193 b 35), he excludes from what he has said an error of Plato.

Since Plato was puzzled as to how the intellect could truly separate those things which were not separated in their existence, he held that all things which are separated in the understanding are separated in the thing. Hence he not only held that mathematical entities are separated, because of the fact that the mathematician abstracts from sensible matter, but he even held that natural things themselves are separated, because of the fact that natural science is of universals and not of singulars. Hence he held that man is separated, and horse, and stone, and other such things. And he said these separated things are ideas, although natural things are less abstract than mathematical entities. For mathematical entities are altogether separated from sensible matter in the understanding, because sensible matter is not included in the understanding of the mathernaticals, neither in the universal nor in the particular. But sensible matter is included in the understanding of natural things, whereas individual matter is not. For in the understanding of man flesh and bone is included, but not this flesh and this bone.

163. Next where he says, ‘This becomes plain ...’ (194 a 1), he clarifies the solution he has given in two ways, first by means of the difference in the definitions which the mathematician and the natural philosopher assign, and secondly by means of the intermediate sciences, where he says, ‘Similar evidence ...’ (194 a 7 164).

He says, therefore, first that what has been said of the different modes of consideration of the mathematician and the natural philosopher will become evident if one attempts to give definitions of the mathematicals, and of natural things and of their accidents. For the mathernaticals, such as equal and unequal, straight and curved, and number, and line, and figure, are defined without motion and matter, but this is not so with flesh and bone and man. Rather the definition of these latter is like the definition of the snub in which definition a sensible subject is placed, i.e., nose. But this is not the case with the definition of the curved in which definition a sensible subject is not placed.

And thus from the very definitions of natural things and of the mathernaticals, what was said above [160ff] about the difference between the mathematician and the natural philosopher is apparent.

164. Next where he says, ‘Similar evidence...’ (194 a 7), he proves the same thing by means of those sciences which are intermediates betweenAmathernatics and natural philosophy.

Those sciences are called intermediate sciences which take principles abstracted by the purely mathematical sciences and apply them to sensible matter. For example, perspective applies to the visual line those things which are demonstrated by geometry about the abstracted line; and harmony, that is music, applies to sound those things which arithmetic considers about the proportions of numbers; and astronomy applies the consideration of geometry and arithmetic to the heavens and its parts.

However, although sciences of this sort are intermediates between natural science and mathematics, they are here said by the Philosopher to be more natural than mathematical, because each thing is named and takes its species from its terminus. Hence, since the consideration of these sciences is terminated in natural matter, then even though they proceed by mathematical principles, they are more natural than mathematical sciences.

He says, therefore, that sciences of this sort are established in a way contrary to the sciences which are purely mathematical, such as geometry or arithmetic. For geometry considers the line which has existence in sensible matter, which is the natural line. But it does not consider it insofar as it is in sensible matter, insofar as it is natural, but abstractly, as was said [160ff]. But perspective conversely takes the abstract line which is in the consideration of mathematics, and applies it to sensible matter, and thus treats it not insofar as it is a mathematical, but insofar as it is a physical thing.

Therefore from this difference between intermediate sciences and the purely mathematical sciences, what was said above is clear. For if intermediate sciences of this sort apply the abstract to sensible matter, it is clear that mathematics conversely separates those things which are in sensible matter.

165. And from this it is clear what his answer is to the objection raised above [158] concerning astronomy. For astronomy is a natural science more than a mathematical science. Hence it is no wonder that astronomy agrees in its conclusions with natural science.

However, since it is not a purely natural science, it demonstrates the same conclusion through another method. Thus, the fact that the earth is spherical is demonstrated by natural science by a natural method, e.g., because its parts everywhere and equally come together at the middle. But this is demonstrated by astronomy from the figure of the lunar eclipse, or from the fact that the same stars are not seen from every part of the earth.

LECTURE 4 (194 A 12-B 15)

PHYSICS CONSIDERS NOT ONLY MATTER BUT ALSO EVERY FORM EXISTING IN MATTER

166. Having shown the difference between natural science and mathematics, the Philosopher here designates that to which the consideration of natural science extends.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows that it pertains to natural science to consider both form and matter. Secondly, where he says, ‘How far then . (194 b 10 175), he points out the limits of natural science in its consideration of form.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he draws his conclusion from what has gone before. Secondly, where he says, ‘Here too indeed...’ (194 a 15 168), he raises difficulties against his own position.

167. He says, therefore, first that since ‘nature’ is used in two ways, i.e., of the matter and of the form, as was said above [L2 145ff], so must it be considered in natural science. Thus when we consider what the snub is, we consider not only its form, i.e., its curvature, but we also consider its matter, i.e., the nose. Hence in natural science nothing is considered, in respect to matter and also in respect to form, without sensible matter.

And it must be noted that this argument of Aristotle includes two approaches.

In one way we can argue as follows. The natural philosopher ought to consider nature. But nature is both form and matter. Therefore he ought to consider both matter and form.

The other way is as follows. The natural philosopher differs from the mathematician, as was said above [L3 163], because the consideration of the natural philosopher is like the consideration of the snub, whereas that of the mathematician is like the consideration of the curved. But the consideration of the snub is a consideration of the form and the matter. Therefore the consideration of the natural philosopher is a consideration of both.

168. Next where he says, ‘Here too indeed...’ (194 a 15), he raises a two-fold problem relative to what he has just said.

The first is as follows. Since ‘nature’ is used for matter and form, is natural science about the matter alone, or the form alone, or about that which is a composite of both?

The second problem is as follows. Supposing that natural science does consider both, is it the same natural science which considers form and matter, or are there different sciences which consider each?

169. Next where he says, ‘If we look at the ancients ...’ (194 a 19), he answets the above mentioned problems, and especially the second, showing that it pertains to the consideration of the same natural science to consider both form and matter. For the first question seems to have been adequately answered by what he has said, namely, that the consideration of natural science is the same as the consideration of what the snub is.

Concerning this, therefore, he makes two points. First he states what the ancients seem to have thought. He says that if one wishes to look at the sayings of the ancient natural philosophers, it seems that [for them] natural science is concerned only with matter. For they said either nothing about form, or some small bit, as when Democritus and Empedocles touched upon it insofar as they held that a thing comes to be from many according to a determinate mode of mixing or joining.

170. Secondly, where he says, ‘But if on the other hand...’(194 a 21), he proves his position with three arguments, the first of which is as follows.

Art imitates nature. Therefore natural science must be related to natural things as the science of the artificial is related to artificial things. But it belongs to the same science of the artificial to know the matter and the form up to a certain point, as the doctor knows health as a form, and bile and phlegm and such things as the matter in which health is. For health consists in a harmony of humours. And in like manner the builder considers the form of the house and also the bricks and the wood which are the matter of the house. And so it is in all the other arts. Therefore it belongs to the same natural science to know both the matter and the form.

171. The reason for saying that art imitates nature is as follows. Knowledge is the principle of operation in art. But an of our knowledge is through the senses and taken from sensible, natural things. Hence in artificial things we work to a likeness of natural things. And so imitable natural things are [i.e., are produced] through art, because all nature is ordered to its end by some intellective principle, so that the work of nature thus seems to be the work of intelligence as it proceeds to certain ends through determinate means. And this order is imitated by art in its operation.

172. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘Again “that for the sake of which”...’ (194 a 27).

It belongs to the same science to consider the end and those things which are for the end. This is so because the reason [ratio] for those things which are for the end is taken from the end. But nature, which is form, is the end of matter. Therefore it belongs to the same natural science to consider matter and form.

173. That form is the end of matter he proves as follows. In order for something to be the end of a continuous motion two things are required. First it must be the final stage of the motion, and secondly it must be that for the sake of which the thing comes to be. For something can be last, but not be that for the sake of which something comes to be, and hence not have the nature [ratio] of an end. And because it is of the nature [ratio] of an end that it be that for the sake of which something comes to be, the poet maintained that it would be a jest to say that the end is that for the sake of which something comes to be. This seemed to him to be a trifle, for just as if we were to say ‘man animal’ because animal is in the nature [ratio] of man, so also, that for the sake of which something comes to be is in the nature [ratio] of end. For the poet wished to say that not every last thing is an end, but rather only that which is last and best. This is that for the sake of which something comes to be.

And indeed that the form is last in generation is per se evident. But that it is that for the sake of which something comes to be with respect to matter is made clear by a simile taken from the arts. Certain arts make matter. And of these some make it simply, as the art of the moulder makes tiles which are the matter of a house, while others make it operative, i.e., they dispose matter pre-existing in nature for the reception of a form, as the art of the carpenter prepares wood for the form of a ship.

It must further be noted that we use all things which are made by art as though they exist for us. For we are in a sense the end of all artificial things. And he says ‘in a sense’ because, as is said in first philosophy [Metaph. XII:7], that for the sake of which something comes to be is used in two ways, i. e., ‘of which’ and ‘for which’. Thus the end of a house as ‘of which’ is the dweller, as ‘for which’ it is a dwelling.

From this, therefore, we can conclude that matter is ordered by two arts, that is, those that direct the arts which make matter, and those that pass judgment on the former. Thus there is one art which uses, and another art which is productive of the artifact, as it were, inducing the form. And this latter art is architectonic with reference to that which disposes matter. Thus the art of the ship builder is architectonic with respect to the art of the carpenter who cuts wood. Hence it is necessary that the art which uses be in a sense architectonic, i.e., the principal art, with respect to the productive art.

Therefore, although each is architectonic, i.e., the art which uses and the productive art, they nevertheless differ. For the art which uses is architectonic insofar as it knows and passes judgment on the form, whereas the other, which is architectonic as productive of the form, knows the matter, i.e., passes judgment on the matter. He makes this clear by an example. The use of a ship pertains to the navigator, and thus the art of the navigator is an art which uses, and hence it is architectoni6 with respect to the art of the ship builder, and knows and passes judgment on the form. He says that the navigator knows and judges what the shape of the rudder should be. The other art, however, i.e., the art of the ship builder, knows and judges from what wood and from what kind of wood the ship should be made.

It is clear, therefore, that the art which produces the form directs the art which makes or disposes the matter. However the art which uses the completed artifact directs the art which produces the form.

From this, then, we can conclude that matter is related to form as form is related to use. But use is that for the sake of which the artifact comes to be.

Therefore, form also is that for the sake of which matter is in artificial things. And so as in those things which are according to art we make matter for the sake of the work of art, which is the artifact itself, likewise matter is in natural things from nature, and not made by us; nevertheless it has the same ordination to form, i.e., it is for the sake of form.

Hence it follows that it belongs to the same natural science to consider the matter and the form.

174. He gives the third argument where he says, ‘Again matter is...’ (194 b 9). The argument is as follows.

Things which are related belong to one science. But matter is one of the things which are related, because it is spoken of in relation to form. However it is not spoken of as if matter itself were in the genus of relation, but rather because a proper matter is determined for each form. And he adds that there must be a different matter under a different form. Hence it follows that the same natural science considers form and matter.

175. Next where he says, ‘How far then ...’ (194 b 10), he shows to what extent natural science considers form.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he raises the question, i.e., to what extent should natural science consider the form and quiddity of a thing. (For to consider the forms and quiddities of things absolutely seems to belong to first philosophy.)

Secondly, he answers the question by saying that as the doctor considers nerves, and the smith considers bronze, up to a certain point, so also the natural philosopher considers forms. For the doctor does not consider nerve insofar as it is nerve, for this belongs to the natural philosopher. Rather he considers it as a subject of health. So also the smith does not consider bronze insofar as it is bronze, but insofar as it is the subject of a statue or something of the sort. So also the natural philosopher does not consider form insofar as it is form, but insofar as it is in matter. And thus, as the doctor considers nerve only insofar as it pertains to health, for the sake of which he considers nerve, so also the natural philosopher considers form only insofar as it has existence in matter.

And so the last things considered by natural science are forms which are, indeed, in some way separated, but which have existence in matter. And rational souls are forms of this sort. For such souls are, indeed, separated insofar as the intellective power is not the act of a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of an eye. But they are in matter insofar as they give natural existence to such a body.

That such souls are in matter he proves as follows. The form of anything generated from matter is a form which is in matter. For the generation is-terminated when the form is in matter. But man is generated from matter and by man, as by a proper agent, and by the sun, as by auniversal agent with respect to the generable. Whence it follows that the soul, which is the human form, is a form in matter. Hence the consideration of natural science about forms extends to the rational soul.

But how forms are totally separated from matter, and what they are, .or even how this form, i.e., the rational soul, exists insofar as it is separable and capable of existence without a body, and what it is according to its separable essence, are questions which pertain to first philosophy.

LECTURE 5 (194 B 16-195 A 27)

PHYSICS DETERMINES WHAT THE CAUSES ARE AND HOW MANY SPECIES OF CAUSES THERE ARE

176. Having shown what natural science considers, the Philosopher here begins to designate the causes from which it should demonstrate.

This section is divided into two parts. First he treats the causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘Now the causes...’ (198 a 23; L11 241), he points out the causes from which natural science should demonstrate.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows the need for treating the causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘In one sense...’ (194 b 23 177), he begins to treat the causes.

He says, therefore, first that after it has been determined what falls under the consideration of natural science, there remains to be considered the causes—what they are and how many there are.

This is so because the business of studying nature is not ordered to operation, but to science. For we are not able to make natural things, but only to have science of them.

Now we do not think that we know anything unless we grasp the ‘why’, which is to grasp the cause. Hence it is clear that we must observe generation and corruption and every natural change in such a way that we know the causes and that we reduce to its proximate cause each thing concerning which we seek the ‘why’.

He says this because the consideration of causes insofar as they are causes is proper to first philosophy. For a cause insofar as it is a cause does not depend upon matter for its existence, because the nature [ratio] of cause is found also in those things which are separated from matter. But the consideration of causes because of a certain necessity is taken up by the natural philosopher. However he considers causes only insofar as they are the causes of natural mutations.

177. Next where he says, ‘In one sense ...’ (194 b 23), he treats the causes.

Concerning this he makes three points. First he names the clearly diverse species of causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘But chance also (195 b 31; L7 198), he treats certain less obvious causes. Thirdly, where he says, ‘They differ ...’ (197 a 36; L10 226) he shows that the causes are neither more nor less.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he treats the species of causes. Secondly, where hip says, ‘Now the modes ...’ (195 a 27; L6 187), he treats the modes of diverse causes in each species.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth the different species of causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘All the causes... (195 a 15 184) he reduces them to four.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth the different causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘As the word ...’ (195 a 3 182), he points out certain consequences which follow from the above mentioned diversity.

178. He says, therefore, first that in one way a cause is said to be that from which something comes to be when it is in it, as bronze is said to be the cause of a statue and* silver the cause of a vase. The genera of these things, i.e., the metallic, or the liquifiable, and such things, are also called causes of these same things.

He adds ‘when it is in it’ in order to differentiate this cause from the privation and the contrary. For the statue, indeed, comes to be from bronze, which is in the statue when it is made. It also comes to be from the unshaped, which, however, is not in the statue when it is made. Hence bronze is a cause of statue, but the unshaped is not, since it is only’a per accidens principle, as was said in Book I [L13 112].

179. Secondly a cause is said to be the species and exemplar. This is called a cause insofar as it is the quidditative nature [ratio] of the thing, for this is that through which we know of each thing ‘what it is’.

And as was said above that even the genera of matter are called causes, so also the genera of a species are called causes. And he gives as an example that harmony of music which is called the octave. The form of an octave is a proportion of the double, which is a relation of two to one. For musical harmonies are constituted by the application of numerical proportions to sounds as to matter. And since two or the double is the form of that harmony which is the octave, the genus of two, which is number, is also a cause. Thus just as we say that the form of the octave is that proportion of two to one which is the proportion of the double, so also we can say that the form of the octave is that proportion of two to one which is multiplicity. And so all of the parts which are placed in the definition are reduced to this mode of cause. For the parts of the species are placed in the definition, but not the parts of the matter, as is said in Metaphysics, VII:10. Nor is this contrary to what was said above [L3 163] about matter being placed in the definitions of natural things. For individual matter is not placed in the definition of the species, but common matter is. Thus flesh and bones are placed in' the definition of man, but not this flesh and these bones.

The nature of the species, therefore, which is constituted of form and common matter, is related as a formal cause to the individual which participates in such a nature, and to this extent it is said that the parts which are placed in the definition pertain to the formal cause.

It must be noted, however, that he posits two things which pertain to the quiddity of the thing, i.e., the species and the exemplar. For there is a diversity of opinions concerning the essences of things.

Plato held that the natures of species are certain abstracted forms, which he called exemplars and ideas, and because of this he posited the exemplar or paradigm.

However those natural philosophers who said something about form placed the forms in matter, and because of this he named them species.

180. Next he says that that from which there is a beginning of motion or rest is in some way called a cause. Thus one who gives advice is a cause, and the father is a cause of the son, and everything which brings about a change is a cause of that which is changed.

It must be noted with reference to causes of this sort that there are four kinds of efficient cause, namely, the perfecting, the preparing, the assisting, and the advising causes.

The perfecting cause is that which gives fulfilment to motion or mutation, as that which introduces the substantial form in generation.

The preparing or disposing cause is that which renders matter or the subject suitable for its ultimate completion.

The assisting cause is that which does not operate for its own proper end, but for the end of another.

The advising cause, which operates in those things which act because of something proposed to them, is that which gives to the agent the form through which it acts. For the agent acts because of something proposed to him through his knowledge, which the advisor has given to him, just as in natural things the generator is said to move the heavy or the light insofar as he gives the form through which they are moved.

181. Further, he posits a fourth mode of cause. A thing is called a cause as an end. This is that for the sake of which something comes to be, as health is said to be a cause of walking. And this is evident because it answers the proposed question 'why'. For when we ask, 'Why does he walk?', we say, 'That he may become healthy'; and we say this thinking that we assign a cause. And thus he gives more proof that the end is a cause than that the other things are causes, because the end is less evident, inasmuch as it is last in generation.

And he adds further that all things which are intermediates between the first mover and the ultimate end are in some way ends. Thus the doctor reduces the body in order to produce health, and so health is the end of thinness. But thinness is produced by purgation~ and purgation is produced by a drug, and the drug is prepared by instruments. Hence all of these things are in some way ends, for the thinness is the end of the purging, the purging is the end of the drug, and the drug is the end of the instruments, and the instruments are the ends in the operation or in the seeking for the instruments.

And thus it is clear that these intermediate things -differ from each other insofar as some of them are instruments and some of them are operations performed by instruments. And he brings this out lest anyone think that only that which is last is a cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which'. For the name 'end' seems to refer to something which is last. Thus every end is last, not simply, but in respect to something.

He finally concludes that this is perhaps all the ways in which the name ‘cause’ is used. He adds ‘perhaps’ because of the causes which are per accidens, such as chance and fortune.

182. Next where he says, ‘As the word has ...’ (195 a 3), he makes clear three things which follow from what he has said about the different causes.

The first point is that since there are many causes, then one and the same thing has many causesper se, and notper accidens. Thus the art of the sculptor is a cause of a statue as an efficient cause, and bronze is a cause as matter. And so it is that many definitions of one thing are sometimes given in accordance with the different causes. But the perfect definition embraces all of the causes.

The second point is that some things are causes of each other in respect to different species of cause. Thus work is an efficient cause of a good habit, yet a good habit is a final cause of work. For nothing prevents a thing from being prior and posterior to another according to different aspects [ratio]. The end is prior according to reason [ratio], but posterior in existence; the converse is true of the agent. And in like manner, the form is prior to matter in respect to the nature [ratio] of being a complement, but the matter is prior to form in respect to generation and time in everything which is moved from potency to act.

The third point is that the same thing is, at times, the cause of contraries. Thus through his presence the navigator is the cause of the safety of the ship, through his absence, however, he is a cause of its sinking.

183. Next where he says, ‘All the causes.. .’(195 a 15), he reduces all the causes mentioned above to four species. He says that all the causes enumerated above are reduced to four modes, which are evident. For the elements, i.e., the letters, are causes of syllables, and in like manner earth is a cause of vases, and silver of a vial, and fire and such things, i.e., the simple bodies, are causes of bodies. And in the same way every part is a cause of the whole, and the propositions in a syllogism are a cause of the conclusion. And all of these things are understood as causes in the same way, namely, as that from which something comes to be is called a cause, for this is common to all the instances mentioned above.

However, of all the things just enumerated some are causes as matter, and some as form, which causes the quiddity of the thing. Thus all parts, such as the elements of syllables, and the four elements of mixed bodies, are causes as matter. But those things which imply a whole or a composition or some species are understood as form. Thus species is referred to the forms of simple things, and the whole and composition are referred to the forms of composites.

184. But there seems to be two difficulties here.

The first is the fact that he says that the parts are material causes of the whole, whereas above [179] he reduced the parts of the definition to the formal cause.

It can be said that he spoke above of the parts of the species which fall in the definition of the whole. But here he speaks of the parts of the matter in whose definition falls the whole. Thus circle falls in the definition of semicircle.

But it would be better to say that, although the parts of the species which are placed in the definition are related to the supposit of nature as a formal cause, they are, nevertheless, related to the very nature of which they are parts as matter. For all parts are related to the whole as the imperfect to the perfect, which is, indeed, the relation of matter to form.

Further a difficulty can be raised with reference to what he says about propositions being the matter of conclusions. For matter is in that of which it is the matter. Hence speaking of the material cause above [178] he said that it is that from which something comes to be when it is in it. But propositions are apart from the conclusion.

But it must be pointed out that the conclusion is formed from the terms of the propositions. Hence in view of this the propositions are said to be the matter of the conclusion insofar as the terms which are the matter of the propositions are also the matter of the conclusion, although they are not in the same order as they are in the propositions. In this same way flour is called the matter of bread, but not insofar as it stands under the form of flour. And so propositions are better called the matter of the conclusion than conversely. For the terms which are joined in the conclusion are posited separately in the premises. Thus we have two modes of cause.

185. Some things are called causes for another reason, i.e., because they are a principle of motion and rest. And in this way the seed which is active in generation is called a cause. Likewise the doctor is called a cause of health according to this mode; so also the adviser is a cause according to this mode, and everyone who makes something.

Another text has ‘and propositions’. For although propositions, insofar as their terms are concerned, are the matter of the conclusion, as was said above [184], nevertheless insofar as their inferential power is concerned, they are reduced to this genus of cause. For the principle of the discourse of reason to its conclusion is from propositions.

186. Another meaning of cause is found in other causes, i.e., insofar as the end or the good has the nature [ratio] of a cause. And this species of cause is the most powerful of all the causes, for the final cause is the cause of the other causes. It is clear that the agent acts for the sake of the end. And likewise it was shown above [L4 173] in regard to artificial things that the form is ordered to use as to an end, and matter is ordered to form as to an end. And to this extent the end is called the cause of causes.

Now since he has said that this species of cause has the nature of a good, while sometimes in those things which act by choice it happens that the end is evil, he forestalls this difficulty by saying that it makes no difference whether the final cause is a true or an apparent good. For what appears good does not move except under the aspect [ratio] of good.

And thus he finally concludes that the species of cause are as many as were mentioned.

LECTURE 6 (195 A 28-B 30)

CONCERNING THE DIFFERENT MODES OF CAUSING AND THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE CONSEQUENT UPON THESE DIFFERENT MODES OF CAUSING

187. After the Philosopher has distinguished the species of causes, he here distinguishes the various modes of causes in respect to the same species of cause.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he distinguishes the different modes of causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘The difference is ...’ (195 b 17 195), he treats certain consequences of this distinction.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he distinguishes the different modes of causes, and secondly, where he says, ‘An these various ...’ (195 b 13 194), he reduces them to a certain number.

Concerning the first part he distinguishes the modes of causes according to four divisions.

He says, therefore, first that the modes of causes are numerous, but if they are reduced to headings, either under some highest, or under some common aspect, they are found to be fewer. Or ‘headings’ may be taken as a combination, for it is obvious that combinations of the modes are fewer than the modes.

188. Therefore the first division or combination of modes is that in the same species of cause one cause is said to be prior to another, as when we understand that the more universal cause is prior. Thus the doctor is the

proper and posterior cause of health, whereas the artisan is the more common and prior cause. This is in the species of efficient cause. And the same thing is true in the species of formal cause. For the proper and posterior formal cause of the octave is the proportion of the double, whereas the more common and prior is the numerical proportion which is called multiplicity. And in like manner a cause which contains any cause in the community of its extension is a prior cause.

189. It must be noted, however, that the universal cause and the proper cause, and the prior cause and the posterior cause, can be taken either according to a commonness in predication, as in the example given about the doctor and the artisan, or according to a commonness in causality, as if we say the sun is a universal cause of heating, whereas fire is a proper cause. And these two divisions correspond to each other.

For it is clear that any power extends to certain things insofar as they share in one nature [ratio], and the farther that that power extends, the more common that nature [ratio] must be. And since a power is proportioned to its object according to its nature [ratio], it follows that a higher cause acts according to a form which is more universal and less contracted. And this can be seen in the order of things. For to the extent that among beings some things are superior, to that extent they have forms which are less contracted and more dominant over matter, which contracts the power of form. And so that which is prior in causing is found to be prior in some way under the aspect [ratio] of a more universal predication. For example, if fire is the first in heating, then the heavens are not only the first in heating but also the first in producing alteration.

190. He gives the second division where he says, ‘Another mode of causation ...’ (195 a 33).

He says that just as per se causes are divided into prior and posterior or common and proper, so also are per accidens causes.

For besides per se causes there are per accidens causes and their genera. Thus Polycletus is. a per accidens cause of the statue, while the sculptor is aper se cause. For Polycletus is a cause of statue insofar as he happens to be a sculptor. And in like manner those things which contain Polycletus in their commonness, e.g., man and animal, are per accidens causes of statue.

Moreover it must be noted that among per accidens causes some are closer to the per se causes and some are more removed. For everything which is joined to the per se cause but is not of its nature [ratio] is called a per accidens cause. Now a thing can be closer to the nature [ratio] of the [per se] cause or more removed from it, and to this extent the per accidens causes are closer or more removed. Thus, if a sculptor happens to be white and musical, the musical is closer, because it is in the same subject in respect to the same thing, i.e., in respect to the soul in which are both [the art of the] musician and the art of statue making. But the subject itself is still more closely related than the other accidents. Thus Polycletus is closer than white or musical, for these latter are not joined to this sculptor except through the subject.

191. He gives the third division where he says, ‘All causes...’ (195 b 4).

He says that besides the causes properly so called, i.e., the causesper se and the causes per accidens, some things are said to be causes in potency, as being able to operate, while other things are actually operating causes. Thus either the builder in habit or the builder in act can be called the cause of the building of a house.

192. And just as causes are distinguished according to the above mentioned modes, so also the things of which they are the causes are distinguished. For one thing is caused posteriorly and more properly, and another priorly and more commonly. Thus something might be called the cause of this statue, or of statue in general, or still more commonly it might be called the cause of an image. And likewise something might be called the moving cause of this bronze, or of bronze in the universal, or of matter.

So also, in per accidens effects, it can be said that one thing is more common and another less common. An effect is said to be per accidens when it is joined to a per se effect and is outside its nature [ratio]. Thus theper se effect of cooking is delectable food, but theper accidens effect is healthful food. However the converse is true of medicine.

193. He gives the fourth division where he says, ‘Again we may use...’ (195 b 10).

He says that sometimes per se causes are taken as a complex with per accidens causes, as when we say that neither Polycletus, who is a per accidens cause, nor the sculptor, who is the cause per se, is the cause of the statue, but rather that the sculptor Polycletus is the cause.

194. Next where he says, ‘All these various uses ...’ (195 b 13), he reduces the above mentioned modes to a certain number.

He says that the above mentioned modes are six in number, but each of them is used in two ways. These are the six modes: the singular and the genus, which above [188] he called the prior and the posterior, the accident and the genus of the accident, the simple and the complex. And each of these is divided by potency and act; and so all the modes become twelve. He distinguishes all the modes by potency and act because what is in potency is not simply.

195. Next where he says, ‘The difference is ...’ (195 b 17), he treats three things which follow from the distinction of modes just made.

The first point is that causes in act and causes in potency differ as follows. Causes operating in act exist and do not exist simultaneously with those things of which they are the causes in act. For example, if we take singular causes, i.e., proper causes, then this healer exists and does not exist simultaneously with him who becomes healed, and this builder exists simultaneously with that which is built. But this is not true if we take causes in act which are not proper causes. For it is not true that builder exists and does not exist simultaneously with that which is built. For it can happen that the builder is in act but this building is not being built, but some other. But if we take the one who is building this building, and if we take this building insofar as it is being built, then it is necessary that when one is posited, the other must be posited also, and when one is removed the other is removed. But this does not always happen in regard to causes which are in potency. For a home and the man who built it are not corrupted simultaneously.

And thus it follows that just as inferior agents, which are causes of the coining to be of things, must exist simultaneously with the things which come to be as long as they are coming to be, so also the divine agent, which is the cause of existing in act, is simultaneous with the existence of the thing in act. Hence if the divine action were removed from things, things would fall into nothingness, just as when the presence of the sun is removed, light ceases to be in the air.

196. He sets forth the second point where he says, ‘In investigating the cause...’ (195 b 21). He says that it is necessary to seek in natural things the first cause of each thing, just as we do in artificial things. So if we should ask why it is that a man builds, we answer ‘because he is a builder’. Likewise, if we ask why he is a builder, we answer,’because he possesses the builder’s art’. And here the inquiry stops, because this is the first cause

in this order. Hence in natural things we should proceed to the first cause. This is so because the effect is not known unless the cause is known. Hence if the cause of an effect is also the effect of some other cause, then it cannot be known unless its cause is known, and so on until we arrive at a first cause.

197. He sets forth the third point where he says, ‘Further generic effects ...’ (195 b 25). Effects should correspond proportionally to causes so that general effects be referred to general causes and singular effects to singular causes. For example, if it is said that the cause of statue is sculptor, then the cause of this statue is this sculptor. In like manner effects in potency should correspond to causes in potency and effects in act to causes in act.

And finally in summary he concludes that this is a sufficient treatment of the species and modes of causes.

LECTURE 7 (195 B 31-196 B 9)

DIFFERENT OPINIONS ABOUT FORTUNE AND CHANCE, THE HIDDEN CAUSES

198. Having treated the obvious species and modes of cause, the Philosopher here takes up certain hidden modes, namely, fortune and chance.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he states his intention. Secondly, he pursues his intention, where he says, ‘Some people even question ...’(195 b 36 198)

He says, therefore, first that fortune and chance are also reckoned among the causes, since many things are said to come to be or to exist because of fortune and chance.

And so with respect to fortune and chance three things must be considered; namely, how they are reduced to the causes mentioned above, then whether fortune and chance are the same or different, and finally what chance and fortune are.

Next where1e says, ‘Some people even question ...’ (195 b 36), he begins his treatment of fortune and chance.

First he sets forth the opinions of others. Secondly, where he says, ‘First then we observe ...’ (196 b 10; L8 207), he establishes the truth.

Concerning the first part he sets forth three opinions. The second begins where he says, ‘There are some ...’(196 a 25 203), and the third, where he says, ‘Others there are ...’ (196 b 5 206).

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he sets forth the opinions and arguments of those who deny fortune and chance. Secondly, where he says, ‘But there is a further circumstance.. .’(196 a 11 201), he argues about some of these reasons.

199. He says, therefore, first that some have questioned whether fortune and chance exist. They deny that they exist for two reasons.

The first argument is that all of those things which are said to come to be by chance or fortune are found to have some determinate cause other than fortune. He gives an example of this sort of thing. If someone coming to the market place should find some man whom he wished to find, but who he did not previously believe would be found, we say that his finding of this man was due to fortune. But the cause of this findingishis willto buy, forthe sake of whichhewent to the marketwhere the man whom he sought was. And the same is true of all other things which are said to be by fortune, for they have some cause other than fortune. And so fortune does not seem to be a cause of anything, and consequently is nothing. For we do not posit fortune except insofar as we hold that some things exist by fortune.

200. He gives the second argument where he says, for if chance were real ...’ (196 a 6).

He says that if fortune were something, it seems to be inconsistent (and that it is truly inconsistent is shown below 201) and puzzling why none of the ancient wise men who treated the causes of generation and corruption treated fortune. But, as it seems, those ancients thought that nothing exists by fortune. This second argument is taken from the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers.

201. Next where he says, ‘But there is a further circumstance...’ (196 a 11), he argues about this second proof, showing what he had assumed above, namely, that it is inconsistent that the ancient natural philosophers did not treat chance and fortune. He proves this with two arguments.

His first argument is as follows. It seems remarkable, and indeed it is, that’the ancient natural philosophers did not treat chance and fortune. For they assumed that they treated the causes of those things which come to be, yet there are many things which come to be by fortune and chance. Hence they should have treated fortune and chance. Nor are they to be excused by the argument given above [200] which denies fortune and chance. For although men know that every effect is reduced to some cause, as the above opinion which denies fortune and chance stated, nevertheless, regardless of this argument, these philosophers held that some things come to be by fortune, and other things do not. Hence these natural philosophers must make mention of fortune and chance at least in order to show that it is false that some things come to be by fortune and chance, and in order to point out the reason why some things are said to be by fortune and some not. Nor can they be excused by reason of the fact that chance and fortune would be reduced to one of the causes which they posited. For they did not think that fortune is one of the things which they thought to be causes, such as friendship or strife or some other such thing.

202. He gives his second argument where he says, ‘This is strange...’ (196 a 19).

He says that whether they thought that fortune existed or not, it is inconsistent that the ancient natural philosophers neglected to treat fortune. For if they thought that there was fortune, it is inconsistent that they did not treat it; if, however, they thought that there was no fortune, it is inconsistent that they sometimes used it. For example, Empedocles said that air is not always united on high above the earth, as if this were natural to it, but rather this happens by chance. For he says that when the earth was made by strife distinguishing the elements, it happened that air gathered together in this place, and as it came together then, it will hold this course so long as the world remains. But in other worlds, which he held come to be and are corrupted to infinity, as was said above [I, L10 76], air would be differently related in many ways to the parts of the universe. And likewise he said that the many parts of animals come to be by fortune, so that in the first production of the world, heads came to be without necks.

203. Next where he says, ‘These are some ...’ (196 a 25), he gives the second opinion.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he sets forth the opinion. Secondly, he disproves it where he says, ‘This statement might...’ (196 a 28 204).

He says, therefore first, that some have said that chance is the cause of the heavens and all the parts of the world. And they said that the revolution of the world, and the movement of the stars distinguishing and constituting the whole universe below according to this order, is by chance. This seems to be the opinion of Democritus, who says that the heavens and the whole world are constituted by chance through the movement of atoms which are per se mobile.

204. Next where he says, ‘This statement might ...’ (196 a 28), he disproves this position with two arguments.

The first argument is that it would seem to be worthy of great wonder that animals and plants are not from fortune but from intellect or nature or some other determinate cause. For it is clear that a thing is not generated from any seed whatsoever, but man from a determinate seed, and the olive from a determinate seed. And since these inferior things do not come to be by fortune, it is worthy of wonder that the heavens and those things which are more divine among the sensible things obvious to us, e.g. the sempiternal parts of the world, are by chance, and should not have any determinate cause, as do animals and plants. And if this is true, it would have been worthwhile to insist and to give a reason why this is so. But the ancients failed to do this.

205. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘For besides the other...’ (196 b 1). How can it be true that the celestial bodies are by chance, while inferior bodies are not? This seems to be inconsistent first from the fact that they are the nobler, and secondly it is even more inconsistent in the light of what is seen. For we see that in the heavens nothing comes to be by chance, whereas in inferior bodies, which are not said to be by chance, many things seem to happen by fortune. According to their position it would be more reasonable if the converse were true, so that in those things whose cause is chance or fortune, some things would be found to come to be by chance or by fortune, whereas in those things whose cause is not chance or fortune, these latter would not be found.

206. Next where he says, ‘Others there are...’ (196 b 5), he sets forth the third opinion about fortune.

He says that it seems to some that fortune is a cause, but it is hidden to the human intellect, as if it were something divine and above men. For they wanted to hold the position that all fortuitous events are reduced to some divine ordaining cause, as we hold that all things are ordered by divine providence.

But although this opinion has a radical truth, they did not use the name ‘fortune’ well. For that divine thing which orders cannot be called or named fortune, because to the extent that a thing participates in reason or order, it recedes from the nature [ratio] of fortune. Hence, the inferior cause, which of itself does not have an ordination to the fortuitous event, should much more be called fortune than the superior cause, if such a cause is the one which orders.

He omits an inquiry about this opinion, both because it exceeds the bounds of natural science, and because he shows below [L8 214] that fortune is not a per se cause, but a per accidens cause. Hence how he evaluates these opinions will be made more clear in what follows. And so he concludes that for the clarification of these opinions, we must consider what fortune and chance are, and whether they are the same or different, and how they are reduced to the causes mentioned above.

LECTURE 8 (196 B 10-197 A 7)

AFTER MAKING CERTAIN DIVISIONS AMONG EFFECTS AND CAUSES, HE CONCLUDES TO A DEFINITION OF FORTUNE

207. Having set forth the opinions of others about fortune and chance, the Philosopher here determines the truth.

This section is divided into three parts. First he shows what fortune is. Secondly, where he says, ‘They differ ...’ (197 a 36; L10 226), he shows how fortune and chance differ. Thirdly, where he says, ‘Both belong to ...’ (198 a 2; L10 236), he points out the genus of cause to which chance and fortune are reduced.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he shows what fortune is. Secondly, where he says, ‘It is necessary ...’ (197 a 8; L9 217), from the definition of fortune he explains the meaning [ratio] of those things which are said about fortune.

Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he sets forth certain divisions needed for the investigation of the definition of fortune. Secondly, where he says, ‘To resume then ...’ (196 b 29 215), he shows under which members of these divisions fortune is contained. Thirdly, where he says, ‘It is clear ...’ (197 a 5 216), he concludes to the definition of fortune.

Now since fortune is posited as a kind of cause, and since it is necessary, in order to understand a cause, to know that of which it is the cause, he first sets forth a division on the part of that of which fortune is the cause. Secondly, where he says, ‘Things of this kind ...’ (196 b 23 214), he sets forth a division on the part of the cause itself.

208. With reference to the first point he sets forth three divisions.

The first of these is that certain things always come to be, e.g., the rising of the sun; and certain things come to be frequently, e.g., man is born having eyes. But neither of these is said to be by fortune.

But certain other things occur in fewer instances, as when a man is born with six fingers or without eyes. And everyone says that things of this sort come to be by fortune. Hence, it is clear that fortune is something, since to be by fortune and to be in fewer instances are convertible. And he brings this up in opposition to the first opinion which denied fortune.

209. However, it seems that this division of the Philosopher is insufficient, for there are some happenings which are indeterminate. Therefore Avicenna said that in those things which are indeterminate a thing happens to be by fortune, as for example those things which are occasional. And it is no objection that it is not said that it is by fortune that Socrates sits, since this is indeterminate. For although this is indeterminate with respect to the moving potency, it is not indeterminate with respect to the appetitive potency which tends determinately to one thing. And if something should happen outside of this, it would be said to be fortuitous.

Now just as the moving potency, which is indeterminate, does not move to act unless it is determined to one thing by the appetitive potency, so also nothing which is indeterminate moves to act unless it is determined to one thing by something. For that which is indeterminate is, as it were, being in potency. However, potency is not a principle of action, but only act is such. Hence from that which is indeterminate nothing follows unless it is determined to one thing by something, either always or frequently. And because of this, he omitted things which are indeterminate from his discussion of things which come to be.

210. It must also be noted that some define the necessary as that which is never impeded and the contingent as that which occurs frequently but may be impeded in a few instances.

But this is unreasonable. For that is called necessary which has in its nature that which cannot not be, whereas the contingent, as happening frequently, has in its nature that which can not be. But to have or not have some impediment is itself contingent. For nature does not prepare an impediment for that which cannot not be, since this would be superfluous.

211. He gives the second division where he says, ‘But secondly...’ (196 b 17). He says that some things come to be for the sake of an end, and other things do not.

This division, however, raises a difficulty, because every agent acts for an end; it acts either by nature or by intellect.

But we must note that he is saying that those things which come to be for themselves do not come to be for the sake of something, insofar as they have in themselves a pleasure or perfection because of which they are pleasing in themselves.

Or else he is speaking of those things which do not occur for the sake of a deliberate end, for example, stroking the beard or some other such thing which takes place at times without deliberation solely from the movement of the imagination. Hence they have an imagined end, but not a deliberated end.

212. He gives the third division where he says, ‘Again, some of the former...’ (196 b 18). He says that of the things which come to be for the sake of an end, some happen in accordance with will and others do not. Both of these are found among those things which come to be for the sake of something. For not only those things which come to be by will, but also those things which come to be by nature, come to be for the sake of something.

213. Now since those things which come to be either necessarily or frequently come to be from nature or from that which is proposed [by the intellect], it is clear that both in those things which always happen and in those things which happen frequently there are some things which come to be for an end. For both nature and that which is proposed [by the intellect] act for the sake of an end.

And thus it is clear that these three divisions include each other. For those things which come to be from what is proposed [by the intellect] or from nature come to be for the sake of an end, and those things which come to be for the sake of an end come to be always or frequently.

214. Next where he says, ‘Things of this kind ...’ (196 b 23), he gives the division which is taken on the part of the cause.

He says that when things of this sort (i.e., things which are from what is proposed [by the intellect] for the sake of something, and which are in few instances) come to be through a per accidens cause, we say that they are by fortune. For as certain aspects of beings are per se and others per accidens, the same is true of causes. Thus the per se cause of a house is the builder’s art, while the per accidens cause is the white or the musical.

But it must be noted that per accidens cause is taken in two ways: in one way on the part of the cause, and in another way on the part of the effect.

On the part of the cause, that which is called a per accidens cause is joined to the per se cause. Thus if the white and the musical are called causes of a house,it is because they are accidentally joined to the builder.

On the part of the effect, we sometimes refer to something which is accidentally joined to the effect, as when we say that a builder is the cause of strife because strife arises from the building of a house.

In this sense fortune is said to be a per accidens cause when something is accidentally, joined to the effect, for example, if the discovery of a treasure is accidentally joined to the digging of a grave. Thus the per se effect of a natural cause is what follows according to the exigencies of its form, so that the effect of the agent who acts through something proposed [by the intellect] is that which happens because of the intention of the agent. Hence whatever takes place in the effect outside this intention is per accidens.

And I say that this is true if what is outside the intention follows in few cases. For what is always or frequently joined to the effect falls under the intention itself. For it is stupid to say that someone intends something but does not will that which is always or frequently joined to it.

Moreover, he points out a difference between the per se cause the per accidens cause. The per se cause is limited and determinate, whereas the per accidens cause is unlimited and indeterminate, because an infinity of things can happen to be united.

215. Next where he says, ‘To resume then...’(196 b 29), he points out those members of the above divisions under which fortune is contained, and what fortune is.

He says first that fortune and chance, as was said above [214], pertain to those things which happen for the sake of something. However, the difference between fortune and chance will be determined later [L10 226ff].

But now it should be clear that each of them is contained among those things which act for the sake of an end. Thus if one knows that he will receive money in the forum, and if he goes there to take it away, [this does not happen by fortune], but if he did not go there for this purpose, it is per accidens that his arrival should have this effect. And thus it is clear that fortune is a per accidens cause of things which are for the sake of something.

Further it is clear that fortune is a cause of things which occur in few instances. For carrying money away is said to be by fortune when he who takes money away comes to the house neither necessarily nor frequently.

Moreover, fortune pertains to those things which come to be because of what is proposed [by the intellect]. For taking money away, which is said to be by fortune, is the end of some causes, but not in itself, as in those things which happen by nature. Rather it is the end of those things which come to be as proposed by the intellect. But if someone acting under such a proposal should go in order to take money away, or if he always or frequently takes money away when he comes, this would not be said to be by fortune, just as if anyone frequently or always soaks his feet when he goes to a muddy place, it would not be said that this is due to fortune, even though he did not intend it.

216. Next where he says, ‘It is clear ...’ (197 a 5), lie concludes to a definition of fortune which is drawn from what was said above.

He says that it is clear from the foregoing that fortune is a per accidens cause in those things which come to be in a few instances according to what is proposed for the sake of an end. And from this it is clear that fortune and intellect pertain to the same thing. For only those who have an intellect act by fortune, for there is no proposal or will without intellect. And although only those who have an intellect act by fortune, still the more something is subject to the intellect, the less is it subject to fortune.

LECTURE 9 (197 A 8-35)

THE MEANING OF THE THINGS WHICH THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS AND THE COMMON MAN SAY ABOUT FORTUNE

217. Having given the definition of fortune, he establishes from this definition the meaning [ratio] of those things which are said about fortune.

First he considers those things which the ancient philosophers said about fortune. Secondly, where he says, ‘Thus to say...’ (197 a 18 219), he considers those things which the common man says about fortune. He has given above [L7 199ff] three opinions concerning fortune and chance. And he disproved the second of these opinions as being altogether false, for this position held that fortune is the cause of the heavens and of all worldly things.

Thus, having rejected the second opinion, he here shows that the third opinion, which holds that fortune is hidden to man, is true. Secondly, where he says, ‘... and why...’ (197 a 10 218), he shows how the first opinion, which holds that nothing comes to be by fortune or chance, might be true.

Since it was said above [L8 214] that per accidens causes are infinite, and since it was also said [L8 214] that fortune is a per accidens cause, he concludes from this that the causes of that which is by fortune are infinite. And since the infinite, insofar as it is infinite, is unknown, it follows that fortune is hidden to man.

218. Next where he says,’... and why...’(197 a 10), he shows how the first opinion might be true. He says that in a way it is true to say that nothing comes to be by fortune. For all of those things which others say about

fortune are in a certain respect true, because they have some meaning [ratio]. Since fortune is a per accidens cause, it follows that what is by fortune is something per accidens. But what is per accidens is not simply. Hence it follows that fortune is not the cause of anything simply.

And he clarifies what he has said about each of these opinions through an example. He says that as the builder is the per se cause of a house and is the cause simply, whereas flute player is a per accidens cause of the house; in like manner the fact that someone should come to a place with no intention of taking money away is a per accidens cause of carrying it away. But this per accidens cause is infinite, because it is possible for a man to'go to that place because of an infinity of other reasons, e.g.,if he cametovisit someone,or to pursue an enemy, or to escape from a pursuer, or to see a show of some sort. Now all these things and anything similar are causes of the taking of money which happens by chance.

219. Next where he says, 'Thus to say ...' (197 a 18), he explains the meaning [ratio] of those things which are commonly said about fortune.

First he explains why it is said that that which is by fortune is without reason [ratio]. Secondly, where he says, 'Chance, or fortune ...' (197 a 25 222), he explains why it is said that fortune is good or bad.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he proves his position. Secondly he raises a certain difficulty where he says, 'Yet in some cases...' (197 a 21 221).

220. He says, therefore, first that fortune is rightly said to be without reason [ratio]. For we can reason only about those things which happen always or in most instances. But fortune lies outside of both of these. And so since such causes, which occur in exceptional cases, are per accidens and infinite and without reason [ratio], it follows that causes by fortune are infinite and without reason [ratio]. For every per se cause produces its effect either always or in most cases.

221. Next where he says, 'Yet in some cases...' (197 a 21), he raises a certain difficulty. He says that although it may be said that fortune is aper accidens cause, some will question this.

The problem is whether everything which happens to be aper accidens cause ought to be called a cause of that which comes to be by fortune. Thus it is clear that the per se cause of health can be either nature or the art of the doctor. However, can all those things with which the coming to be of health

happens to be connected, such as the wind, and the heat, and shaving of the head, be called causes per accidens ? The question, therefore, is whether each of these is a cause per accidens.
Now since we said above [L8 214] that fortune is most properly called a per accidens cause on the part of the effect, since a thing is said to be a cause of that which happens to the effect, it is clear that a fortuitous cause produces something in the fortuitous effect although it does not intend that, but rather something else connected with the effect. According to this wind or heat can be called fortuitous causes of health insofar as they produce some change in the body, upon which change health follows. But removing the hair or some other such thing does not produce anything clearly related to health.

But among the per accidens causes, some are nearer [to the per se cause] and others are more remote. Those which are more remote seem less to be causes.

222. Next where he says, ‘Chance or fortune ...’ (197 a 25), he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad.

First he explains why fortune is said to be good or bad simply. He says that fortune is said to be good when something good happens and bad when something bad happens.

223. Secondly, where he says, ‘The terms “good fortune”...’ (197 a 26), he explains the meaning [ratio] of good fortune and misfortune.

He says that we refer to good fortune and misfortune when [the fortuitous event] has some great good or great evil. For an event is called good fortune when some great good follows; it is called misfortune when some great evil follows.

And since being deprived of a good is included in the notion [ratio] of evil, and being deprived of evil is included in the notion [ratio] of the good, then when one is a little removed from a great good, he is said to be unfortunate if he misses it. On the other hand, if one is close to a great evil and is freed from it, he is said to be fortunate. This is so because the intellect takes that which is only a little removed as if it were not removed at all, but already possessed.

224. Thirdly where he says, ‘Further, it is with reason ...’ (197 a 30), he explains why good fortune is uncertain. He says that this is so because good fortune is a kind of fortune. But fortune is uncertain because it pertains to

things which are neither always nor frequent, as was said.’ Hence it follows that good fortune is uncertain.

225. Finally where he says, ‘Both are then ...’ (197 a 33), he concludes as a sort of r6sum6 that each, i.e., chance and fortune, is a cause per accidens, and that each pertains to things which do not happen simply, i.e., neither always nor frequently, and that each pertains to things which come to be for the sake of something, as is clear from what was said above [L7 198ff].

LECTURE 10 (197 A 36-198 A 21)

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CHANCE AND FORTUNE. THE CAUSES ARE NEITHER MORE NOR LESS THAN FOUR

226. Having treated fortune and chance with reference to those aspects in which they are alike, the Philosopher here explains the difference between them.

This section is divided into two parts. First he explains the difference between fortune and chance. Secondly, where he says, ‘The difference between ...’ (197 b 32 235), he explains that in which this difference primarily consists.

The first part is divided into two parts. First he explains the difference between chance and fortune. Secondly, where he says, ‘Hence it is clear ...’ (197 b 18 235), he summarizes what he has said about each of them.

227. Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he explains the difference between chance and fortune. He says that they differ by reason of the fact that chance pertains to more things than fortune, because everything which is by fortune is by chance, but not conversely.

228. Secondly, where he says, ‘Chance and what results...’ (197 b 1), he clarifies the difference mentioned above.

First he designates the things in which fortune is found. Secondly, where he says, ‘The spontaneous ...’ (197 b 14 231), he shows thatchance is found in more things.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he designates the things in which fortune is found. Secondly, where he says, ‘Thus an inanimate thing ...' (197 b 6 230), he draws a conclusion about those things in which fortune is not found.

229. He says, therefore, first that fortune and that which is by fortune are found in those things in which something is said to happen well. For fortune is found in those things in which there can be good fortune and misfortune.

Now a thing is said to happen well for him to whom action belongs. However, action belongs properly to him who has dominion over his action. For what does not have dominion over its action is that which is acted upon rather than that which acts. And thus action is not in the power of that which is acted upon, but rather in the power of that which acts.

Now since the active or practical life pertains to those who have dominion over their acts (for here is where operation according to virtue or vice is found), it is necessary that fortune pertains to the practicgd.

A sign of this is the fact that fortune seems to be the same as happiness, or very nearly so. Hence the happy are commonly called the fortunate. For according to those who think that happiness consists in external goods, happiness is the same as fortune; according to those, however, who say that external goods, in which fortune plays a great part, help as instruments in the attainment of happiness, good fortune is close to happiness because it helps one attain it.

Hence, since happiness is a certain operation (for it is good operation, i.e., that of perfected virtue, as is said in Ethics, I:7, it follows that fortune pertains to the actions in which one happens to act well or is impeded from acting well. And this means that things turn out either well or badly. Hence, since one has dominion over his actions insofar as he acts voluntarily, it follows that in those actions alone where one acts voluntarily should something happen by fortune, but not in others.

230. Next where he says, 'Thus an inanimate thing...'(197 b 6), he draws from the above a conclusion about the things in which fortune is not found.

He says that since fortune is found only in those who act voluntarily, it follows that neither an inanimate thing, nor a child, nor a beast act by fortune, since they do not act voluntarily as having free choice (which is here called 'that which is proposed'). Hence, neither good fortune nor misfortune can happen to them except metaphorically. Thus, someone said that the stones from which altars are built are fortunate because honour and reverence are shown them, but the stones next to the altar stones are walked upon. This is said because of a certain likeness to men among whom the honoured seemed to be fortunate, whereas those stones which are walked upon are called unfortunate.

But although it follows from the foregoing that such things do not act by fortune, there is nothing to prevent them from being acted upon by fortune. For some voluntary agent may act upon them. Thus, we say that it is good fortune when a man finds a treasure, or it is a misfortune when he is struck by a falling stone.

231. Next where he says, ‘The spontaneous ...’ (197 b 14), he points out that chance is found also in other things.

Concerning this he makes three points. First, he shows that chance is found in other things. Secondly, where he says, ‘Hence it is clear ...’ (197 b 18 233), he draws a certain conclusion from what was said above. Thirdly, where he says, ‘This is indicated ...’ (197 b 23 234), he uses an example to clarify the point.

232. He says, therefore, first that chance is found not only in men, who act voluntarily, but also in other animals and even in inanimate things. He gives an example dealing with other animals. It is said that a horse comes by chance when his coming is conducive to his safety, although he did not come for the sake of safety. He gives another example taken from inanimate things. We say that a tripod falls by chance because, as it stands, it is suitable for sitting, although it did not fall for the sake of this, i.e., so that someone might sit on it.

233. Next where he says, ‘Hence it is clear...’ (197 b 18), he draws the following conclusion from the above. When things which come to be simply for the sake of something do not come to be for the sake of that which happens, but for the sake of something extrinsic, then we say that these things come to be by chance. But we say that among the things which come to be by chance, only those things which happen in those who have free choice come to be by fortune.

234. Next where he says, ‘This is indicated.. .’(197 b 23), he clarifies what he has stated in this conclusion, i.e., that chance occurs in those things which happen for the sake of something.

A sign of this is the fact that the word ‘vain’ is used, which in the Greek is close to chance. For we use the term ‘vain’ when that which is for the sake of something does not come to be because of that something, i.e., when that for the sake of which something is done does not occur. Thus if one should walk in order to evacuate the bowels, and if this should not occur to the walker, then he is said to have walked in vain, and his walking would be vain. Thus that which is suitable for the coming to be of something is vain and frustrated when it does not accomplish that for whose coming to be it is suitable.

He explains why he says ‘that for whose coming to be it is suitable’. If someone were to say that he bathed in vain because the sun was not eclipsed while he bathed, he would speak ridiculously, because bathing oneself is not apt for producing an eclipse of the sun.

Hence chance, which in the Greek is called ‘automatum’, i.e., per se vain, occurs in those things which are for the sake of something. This is also true of that which is frustrated or vain. For the name per se vain signifies the very thing which is frustrated, just as per se man signifies man himself and per se good signifies good itself.

He gives an example of things which happen by chance. Thus fit is chance] when it is said that a stone, which strikes someone when falling, did not fall for the purpose of striking him. Therefore it fen because of that which is per se vain or per se frustrated, for the stone does not naturally fall for this purpose. However at times a stone does fall as thrown by someone for the purpose of hitting another.

However, although chance and the vain are alike insofar as each is among the things which are for the sake of something, nevertheless they also differ. For a thing is called vain because of the fact that that which was intended does not follow, whereas a thing is called chance because of the fact that something else which was not intended does follow.

Hence sometimes a thing is vain and chance at the same time, for example, when that which was intended does not occur but something else does occur. However, sometimes there is chance but not the vain, as when both that which was intended and something else occur. And there is the vain and no chance when neither that which was intended nor anything else occurs.

235. Next where he says, ‘The difference ...’ (197 b 32), he explains that in which chance most of all differs from fortune.

He says that they differ most of all in the things which happen by nature, because chance has a place here but fortune does not. For when in the operations of nature something happens outside of nature, for example, when a six fingered person is born, we do not say that this happens by fortune, but rather because of that which is per se vain, i.e., by chance.

And so we can take as another difference between chance and fortune the fact that the cause of those things which are by chance is intrinsic, just as the cause of those things which are by nature is intrinsic.

But the cause of those things which are by fortune is extrinsic, just as the cause of those things which are from free choice is extrinsic.

And he finally concludes that he has now explained what the per se vain or chance is, what fortune is, and how they differ from each other.

236. Next where he says, ‘Both belong ...’ (198 a 2), he points out the genus of cause to which chance and fortune are reduced.

First he states his position. Secondly, where he says, ‘Spontaneity and chance...’(198 a 5 237), he disproves from this a certain opinion mentioned above [L7 203].

He says, therefore, first that both chance and fortune are reduced to the genus of the moving cause. For chance and fortune are causes either of those things which proceed from nature or of those things which proceed from intelligence, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, since nature and intelligence are causes as things from which motion begins, so fortune and chance also are reduced to the same genus. But since chance and fortune are per accidens causes, their number is indeterminate, as was said above [L9 217,220].

237. Next where he says, ‘Spontaneity and chance...’ (198 a 5), he refutes the opinion of those who maintain that fortune and chance are the causes of the heavens and of all worldly things.

He says that since chance and fortune are per accidens causes of those things of which intellect and nature are theper se causes, and since a per accidens cause is not prior to a per se cause, as nothing per accidens is prior to that which isper se, it follows that chance and fortune are causes which are posterior to intellect and nature. Hence if it should be held that chance is the cause of the heavens, as some maintained, as was said above [L7 203] it would follow that intellect and nature are first of all causes of some other things and afterwards causes of the whole universe.

Moreover, the cause of the whole universe seems to be prior to the cause of some part of the universe, since any part of the universe is ordered to the perfection of the universe. But it seems to be inconsistent that some other cause is prior to that which is the cause of the heavens. Hence it is inconsistent that chance is the cause of the heavens.

238. Furthermore we must consider that if those things which happen fortuitously or by chance, i.e., outside the intention of inferior causes, are reduced to some superior cause which orders them, then in relation to this latter cause they cannot be said to be fortuitous or by chance. Hence that superior cause cannot be called fortune.

239. Next where he says, ‘It is clear then ...’ (198 a 14), he shows that the causes are not more than those mentioned.

This is clarified as follows. The question ‘why’ asks for the cause. But only the above mentioned causes answer the question ‘why’. Therefore, the causes are not more than those which were mentioned. He says that the answers to the question ‘why’ are the same in number as the above mentioned causes.

For sometimes the ‘why’ is reduced finally to what the thing is, i.e., to the definition, as is clear in all immobile things. The mathematicals are of this sort, in which the ‘why’ is reduced to the definition of the straight or of the commensurate, or of some other thing which is demonstrated in mathematics. Since a right angle is defined as that angle which is formed by the falling of one line upon another which makes of both parts two equal angles, then if it should be asked why an angle is a right angle, the reply would be because it is formed by a line making two equal angles from each part. And it is the same in the other instances.

Sometimes the ‘why’ is reduced to the first moving cause. Thus, why does someone fight? Because he has stolen. For this is what brought on the fight.

Sometimes it is reduced to the final cause, as if we should ask for the sake of what does someone fight, and the answer is that he might rule.

Sometimes it is reduced to the material cause, as when it is asked why this body is corruptible, and the answer is because it is composed of contraries.

Thus it is clear that these are the causes and they are just so many.

240. Furthermore there must be four causes.

A cause is that upon which the existence of another follows. Now the existence of that which has a cause can be considered in two ways. First it is considered absolutely, and thus the cause of the existing is the form by,which something is in act. Secondly it is considered insofar as a being comes to be in act from being in potency. And since everything which is in potency is reduced to act by that which is a being in act, it is necessary that there be two other causes, namely the matter and the agent which reduces the matter from potency to act. However, the action of the agent tends toward something determinate, and thus it proceeds from some determinate principle. For every agent does that which is suitable to it. But that toward which the action of the agent tends is called the final cause. Therefore, there must be four causes.

But since the form is the cause of existing absolutely, the other three are causes of existence insofar as something receives existence. Hence in immobile things the other three causes are not considered, but only the formal cause is considered.

LECTURE 11 (198 A 22-B 9)

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY DEMONSTRATES FROM ALL OF THE FOUR GENERA OF CAUSES

241. Having treated the causes, the Philosopher here shows that the natural philosopher demonstrates from all the causes.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he states his intention. Secondly, where he says, ‘The last three ...’(198 a 25 241), he explains his position.

He says, therefore, first that inasmuch as there are four causes, as was said above [L10 239ff], it pertains to natural science both to know all of them and to demonstrate naturally through all of them by reducing the question ‘why’ to each of the aforementioned causes, i.e., the form, the moving cause, the end and the matter.

Nextwhere he says,’The last three...’(198 a 25), he explains his position. Concerning this he makes two points.

First he sets forth certain things which are necessary to clarify his position. Secondly, where he says, ‘The question ...’ (198 a 32 244), he proves his position.

Concerning the first point he sets forth two things which are necessary for the proof of what follows. The first of these deals with the relationship of the causes among themselves. The second deals with the consideration of natural philosophy, and is given where he says’... and so too in general ...’ (198 a 27 243).

242. He says, therefore, first that it often happens that three of the causes combine into one, such that the formal cause and the final cause are one in number.

This must be understood to apply to the final cause of generation, not, however, to the final cause of the thing generated. For the end of the generation of man is the human form, but this form is not the end of man. Rather through this form man acts for his end.

But the moving cause is the same as both of these according to species. And this is especially true in univocal agents in which the agent produces something like unto itself according to species, as man generates man. For in these cases the form of the generator, which is the principle of generation, is the same in species as the form of the generated, which is the end of the generation. However in non-univocal agents the species [ratio] is different. For in these cases the things which come to be cannot reach the point where they follow upon the form of the generator according to the same kind [ratio] of species. Rather they participate in some likeness to it, insofar as they are able, as is clear in those things which are generated by the sun. Therefore, the agent is not always the same in species with the form which is the end of generation, and furthermore, not every end is a form. And because of this it is significant that he said ‘often’.

The matter, however, is neither the same in species nor the same in number as the other causes. For matter as such is being in potency, whereas the agent as such is being in act, and the form or the end is act or perfection.

243. Next where he says, and so too ...’ (198 a 27), he makes his second point which deals with the things which natural philosophy should treat.

He says that it pertains to natural philosophy to consider any movers which move in such a way that they are moved. Things, however, which move, but are not themselves moved, do not belong within the consideration of natural philosophy which properly considers natural things which have in themselves a principle of motion. For movers which are not themselves moved do not have in themselves a principle of motion, since they are not moved but are immobile. Thus, they are not natural things, and as a result do not come under the consideration of natural philosophy.

Hence, it is clear that there are three branches of study, i.e., the study and intention of philosophy is threefold according to the three genera of things which are found.

For some things are immobile, and one philosophical study deals with them. Another philosophical study deals with things which are mobile but incorruptible, such as the celestial bodies. And there is a third philosophical study which deals with things which are mobile and corruptible, such as the inferior bodies.

The first of these studies pertains to metaphysics, while the other two pertain tp natural science which treats all mobile things, both corruptible and incorruptible.

Hence some have misunderstood this passage, desiring to reduce these three studies to the three parts of philosophy, namely, mathematics, metaphysics and physics. For astronomy, which seems to consider the incorruptible mobile things, belongs more to natural philosophy than to mathematics, as was said above [L3 164-5]. For insofar as it applies mathematical principles to natural matter, it considers mobile things. Therefore, this division is taken according to the diversity of things existing outside the mind and not according to the division of the sciences.

244. Next where he says, ‘The question “why” ...’ (198 a 32), he sets forth his position.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows that it pertains to natural philosophy to consider all the causes and to demonstrate through them. These are the two points he has proposed above [241]. Secondly, where he says, ‘We must explain ...’ (198 b 10; L12 250), he proves certain things which are assumed in this argument.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that natural philosophy considers all the causes. Secondly, where he says, ‘We must explain ...’ (198 b 4 246) he shows that it demonstrates through all of them.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that natural philosophy considers the matter and the form and the moving cause. Secondly, where he says, ‘... the essence of that ...’(198 b 3 246), he shows that it considers the end.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he states his intention, and secondly, he proves it, where he says, ‘For in respect of... (198 a 33 245).

First he concludes from what was said above that the ‘why’is assigned to natural things by reference to the matter, and to what the thing is, i.e., the form, and to the first mover.

245. Next where he says, ‘For in respect of ...’(198 a 33), he proves his position as follows.

It has been said [243] that natural philosophy considers those things which are moved, both the generable and the corruptible. Therefore, whatever should be considered about generation should be considered by natural philosophy. But with reference to generation one ought to consider the form, the matter, and the moving cause.

Those who wish to consider the causes of generation consider them as follows. First we consider what it is that comes to be after something, as fire come to be after air, since fire is generated from air. And in this way the form, through which the generated is what it is, is considered.

Next we consider what it is that first makes [this), that is, we consider that which first moves to generation. And this is the moving cause.

Next we consider what it is that undergoes this change. And this is the subject and the matter.

With reference to generation we consider not only the first mover and the first subject, but also those things which are consequent upon them. And thus it is clear that it pertains to natural philosophy to consider the form, the mover, and the matter.

However, natural philosophy does not consider every mover. For there are two kinds of moving principles, namely, the moved and the non-moved. Now a mover that is not moved is not natural, because it does not have in itself a principle of motion. And such is the moving principle which is altogether immobile and the first of all movers, as will be shown in Book VIII [L9 & 13].

246. Next where be says, the essence of that which ...' (198 b 3), he shows that natural philosophy also considers the end.

He says that the form and what the thing is also fall under the consideration of natural philosophy, insofar as the end is that for the sake of which the generation occurs. For it was said above [242] that the form and the end coincide in the same thing. And since nature acts for the sake of something, as will be proven below [L12 250], it must belong to natural philosophy to consider the form not only insofar as it is form but also insofar as it is the end. If, however, nature were not to act for the sake of something, then natural philosophy would consider form insofar as it is form, but not insofar as it is an end.

247. Next where he says, ‘We must explain ...’ (198 b 4), he shows how natural philosophy demonstrates through all the causes.

First he shows how it demonstrates through matter and the moving cause, which are the prior causes in generation. Secondly, where he says, '... that this must be so ...' (198 b 7 248), he shows how it demonstrates through the form. Thirdly, where he says, '... because it is better...' (198 b 8 249), he shows how it demonstrates through the end.

He says, therefore, first that in natural things the'why' must be elaborated fully, i.e., in every genus of cause. Thus if something has gone before, whether it be the matter or the mover, then something necessarily follows. For example, if something is generated from contraries, it is necessary that the latter be corrupted, and if the sun approaches the north pole, the days must become longer, and cold must diminish and heat increase for those who dwell in the northern part.

However, we must realize that it is not always necessary that something follows from a preceding matter or mover. Rather sometimes a thing follows simply or in every case, as in the things mentioned. But sometimes a thing follows in most instances, e.g., from human seed and a mover in generation, it follows in most instances that what is generated has two eyes, but at times this fails to happen. Similarly, because of the fact that matter is so disposed in the human body, it happens that a fever is frequently produced because of festering, but at times this is impeded.

248. Next where he says, that this must be so ...' (198 b 7), he shows how in natural things demonstration must be made through the formal cause.

In order to understand this, we must know that when something follows from the preceding causes in generation (i.e., from the matter and the mover) by necessity, then a demonstration can be established, as was said above [247]. However, a demonstration cannot be established when something follows in most instances. But then a demonstration should be founded upon that which is posterior in generation in order that something might follow of necessity from another, just as the conclusion follows from the propositions of a demonstration. Thus let us proceed in demonstration as follows: if this should come to be, then this and that are required, for example, if man should be generated, it is necessary that human seed be an agent in the generation.

If, however, we proceed conversely by saying that 'human seed is an agent in generation', then the proposition 'therefore man will be generated', does not follow as a conclusion follows from propositions. But that which ought to come to be, i.e., that in which the generation is terminated, was (as was said above 242,246) ‘what the thing was to be’, i.e., the form.

Hence, it is clear that when we demonstrate according to this mode, i.e., ‘that “this must be so if that is to be so”‘ (198 b 7), we demonstrate through the formal cause.

249. Next where he says, ‘...because it is better ...’ (198 b 8), he shows how natural philosophy demonstrates through the final cause.

He says that natural philosophy sometimes also demonstrates that something is true because it is better that it be so. For example, we might demonstrate that the front teeth are sharp because as such they are better for cutting food, and nature does what is better. Nature does not, however, do what is better simply, but what is better with reference to what belongs to each substance; otherwise nature would give a rational soul, which is better than an irrational soul, to each animal.

LECTURE 12 (198 B 10-33)

THE ARGUMENT OF THOSE WHO DENY THAT NATURE ACTS FOR AN END

250. Having shown that natural philosophy demonstrates from all the causes, the Philosopher here clarifies certain things which he had assumed,s namely, that nature acts for an end and that in some things necessity is not from the causes which are prior in being (which are the matter and the moving cause), but from the posterior causes, which are the form and the end.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he states his intention, and secondly, where he says, ‘A difficulty presents itself ...’ (198 b 17 251), he develops his position.

He says, therefore, first that it must be pointed. out that nature is among the number of causes which act for the sake of something. And this is important with reference to the problem of providence. For things which do not know the end do not tend toward the end unless they are directed by one who does know, as the arrow is directed by the archer. Hence if nature acts for an end, it is necessary that it be ordered by someone who is intelligent. This is the work of providence.

After this it must be pointed out how necessity is present in natural things. Is the necessity of natural things always from the matter, or is it sometimes from the matter and the mover, or sometimes from the form and the end.

It is necessary to make this inquiry for the following reason. All of the ancient natural philosophers, when giving the reason [ratio] for natural effects, reduced such effects to this cause, i.e., that it is necessary for these things to happen because of matter. For example, since heat is by nature what it is and naturally produces a certain effect (and in like manner cold and other similar things), then those things which are caused by them must come to be or exist. And if some of the ancient natural philosophers touched upon some cause other than the necessity of matter, they have no reason for taking any glory from the fact. For after such causes were posited by them, e.g., intellect which Anaxagoras posited, and friendship and strife which Empedocles posited, they did not use them except in certain general instances, such as in the constitution of the world. But they omitted such causes when discussing particular effects.

251. Next where he says, ‘A difficulty presents itself ...’ (198 b 17), he develops his position.

First he asks whether nature acts for the sake of something, and secondly, where he says, ‘As regards what is “of necessity” ...’ (199 b 34; L15 269ff), how necessity is found in natural things.

Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he gives the opinion and argument of those who hold that nature does not act for the sake of something. Secondly, he disproved this position, where he says, ‘Yet it is impossible...’ (198 b 34; L13 255ff).

252. Concerning the first point it must be noted that those who held that nature does not act for the sake of something tried to confirm their position by denying that in which nature is most clearly seen to act for the sake, of something. That which most strongly demonstrates that nature acts for the sake of something is the fact that in the operation of nature a thing is always found to come to be as good and as suitable as it can be. Thus, the foot is made in a certain way by nature so that it may be suitable for walking. Hence if it falls short of this natural disposition, it is not fit for this use. And the same is true of other instances.

And since they tried especially to oppose this point, Aristotle says that it can be objected that there is nothing to prevent nature from not acting for the sake of something nor from doing what is always better. For at times we find that from some operation of nature some utility results which nevertheless is not the end of that natural operation, but merely happens to occur. Thus, we might say that Jupiter rains, i.e., God or universal nature, but not for the purpose that grain should grow. Rather rain results from the necessity of matter. For it must be that in the lower regions, because of the closeness of the heat of the sun, vapours are drawn out from the water. Having been carried above because of the heat, when they arrive at the point where heat is lacking because of the distance from the place where the rays of the sun are reflected, it is necessary that the vaporized water which is going up freeze at that very point. When the freezing is completed, the vapours are changed into water. And when water has been generated, it must fall down because of its weight. And when this takes place, it happens that the grain grows. Now it does not rain so that grain might grow. For in the same way grain might be destroyed in some place because of rain, as when grain is gathered on a thrashing floor. Thus, rain does not fall in order to destroy grain, rather this happens by chance when rain falls.

And in the same way it seems to happen by chance that grain accidentally grows when rain falls.

Hence it seems that there is nothing to prevent this from being true also in regard to animals, which seem to be disposed for the sake of some end. For example, one might say that because of the necessity of matter some teeth, i.e., the front teeth, happen to be sharp and suitable for cutting food, and the molars happen to be broad and useful for grinding food. Nevertheless, nature did not make the teeth such and so for the sake of these utilities. Rather after teeth have been made by nature in such a way as they develop from the necessity of matter, it is accidental that they acquired such a form. And once this form exists, this utility follows. And the same thing can be said of all other parts which seem to have some determinate form for the sake of some end.

253. But one might say that such utilities follow always or in many cases, and what is always or in most cases suitable exists by nature. In order to forestall this objection they say that from the beginning of the formation of the world the four elements were joined in the constitution of natural things, and thus the many and varied dispositions of natural things were produced. And in all these things only that which happened to be suitable for some utility, as if it were made for that utility, was preserved. For such things had a disposition which made them suitable for being preserved, not because of some agent intending an end, but because of that which is per se vain, i.e., by chance. On the other hand, whatever did not have such a disposition was

destroyed, and is destroyed daily. Thus Empedocles said that in the beginning things which were part ox and part man were generated.

254. Therefore, because of this argument, or because of some other similar argument, some will have a difficulty on this point.

But in regard to this argument it must be noted that they use an unsuitable example. For although rain does have a necessary cause in regard to matter, it is nevertheless ordered to some end, namely, the conservation of things generable and corruptible. For in inferior things mutual generation and corruption are for this purpose: that perpetual existence be preserved in them. Hence the growth of grain is poorly taken as an example. For a universal cause is referred to a particular effect.

And it must also be noted that the growth and conservation of growing things on earth occur in most cases because of the rain, whereas their corruption occurs in few instances. Hence although rain is not for their destruction, it does not follow that it is not for their preservation and growth.

LECTURE 13 (198 B 34-199 A 33)

IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT NATURE ACTS FOR AN END

255. Having stated the opinion and argument of those who say that nature does not act for an end, he here disproves this position.

He does this first through appropriate arguments, and secondly, where he says, ‘Now mistakes come to pass...’ (199 a 33; L14), through argumonts taken from those things from which the opponents tried to prove the contrary position.

256. Concerning the first point he sets forth five arguments. The first is as follows. Everything which happens naturally either happens in every instance or in most instances. But nothing which happens by fortune or by that which is per se vain, i.e., by chance, happens in every instance or in most instances. For we do not say that in the winter it rains frequently by fortune or by chance. But if it rains frequently during the dog days, we would say that this happens by chance. And in like manner, we do not say that it happens by chance that there is heat during the dog days, but only if this should happen during the winter.

From these two points he argues as follows. Everything which happens either happens by chance or for the sake of an end. Now those things which happen outside the intention of an end are said to happen by chance. But it is impossible for those things which happen in every instance or in most instances to happen by chance. Therefore, those things which happen in every instance or in most instances happen for the sake of an end.

Now whatever happens according to nature happens either in every instance or in most instances, as even they admitted. Therefore, whatever happens by nature happens for the sake of something.

257. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘Further, where a series...’(199 a 9). He says that there is an end for all things. That which is prior and all of its consequences are done for the sake of the end.

Having assumed this he argues as follows. As something is done naturally, so is it disposed to be done. For ‘so disposed’ [aptum natum] means ‘naturally’. And this proposition is convertible, because as something is disposed to be done, so it is done. However, it is necessary to add this condition: unless it is impeded.

Therefore, let us agree that there is no impediment. Hence as something is done naturally, so is it disposed to be done. But things which happen naturally are done so that they lead to an end. Therefore, they are disposed to be done in such a way that they are for the sake of an end. And thus nature seeks an end, i.e., nature has a natural disposition for an end. Hence, it is clear that nature acts for the sake of an end.

He clarifies what he has said by an example.

One proceeds from the prior to the posterior in the same way in both art and nature. Thus if artificial things, e.g., houses, were made by nature, they would be made according to the order in which they now are made by art. Thus the foundation would be constructed first, and afterwards the walls would be erected, and finally the roof would be placed on top. For nature proceeds this way in the things which are rooted in the earth, i.e., in plants. Their roots, like a foundation, are fixed in the earth, the trunk, after the manner of a wall, is raised on high, and the branches are on top like a roof.

And in like manner if the things which are produced by nature were made by art, they would be made according to the way they are disposed to be produced by nature. This is clear in regard to health, which happens to be produced by art and by nature. For as nature heals by heating and cooling, so also does art.

Hence it is clear that in nature one thing is for the sake of another, i.e., the prior is for the sake of the posterior. And the same is true of art.

258. He gives the third argument where he says, ‘... and generally art ...’ (199 a 16). He says that art makes certain things which nature cannot make’ such as a house and things of this sort. However, in regard to those things which happen to be produced by art and by nature, art imitates nature, as is clear in regard to health, as was said above [257]. Hence, if things which are made according to art are for the sake of an end, it is clear that things

which are made according to nature also are made for an end, since in each case the prior and the posterior are similarly related.

However, it can be said that this is not a different argument from the one already given, but is complementary to it and a clarification of it.

259. He gives the fourth argument where he says, ‘This is most obvious ...’ (199 a 20). This argument is drawn from those things in nature which more obviously seem to act for the sake of something.

He says that it is most clear that nature acts for the sake of something when we consider animals which act neither through art, nor through inquiry, nor through deliberation. It is manifest in their operations that they act for the sake of something. Because of this some have wondered whether spiders and ants and animals of this sort act through intellect or through some other principle.

But because they always act in the same way, it is clear that they do not act by intellect, but by nature. For every swallow makes a nest in the same way, and every spider a web in the same way, which would not be the case if they acted by intellect and from art. For not every builder makes a house in the same way, because the artisan judges the form of the thing built and can vary it.

If we proceed beyond animals to plants, it is apparent among them that some things have been made and are useful for an end, as the leaves are useful as a covering for the fruit.

Hence, if these things are due to nature and not to art, i.e., that the swallow makes a nest, and the spider a web, and the plants produce leaves for the sake of the fruit, and the roots of plants are not above, but below, so that they might take nourishment from the earth, it is clear that a final cause is found in things which come to be and are by nature, i.e., by-nature acting for the sake of something.

260. He gives the fifth argument where he says, ‘And since nature means ...’ (199 a 30):

He says that nature is used in two ways, i.e., for the matter and for the form. The form is the end of generation, as was said above [L11 242]. And the nature [ratio] of an end is that other things come to be for the sake of it. Hence it follows that to be and to come to be for the sake of something should be found in natural things.

LECTURE 14 (199 A 34-B 33)

HE DEMONSTRATES THAT NATURE ACTS FOR AN END FROM THE EVIDENCE FROM WHICH SOME CONCLUDE TO THE OPPOSITE POSITION

261. After the Philosopher has shown by appropriate arguments that nature acts for the sake of something, he here intends to make this clear by destroying those things through which some embraced the contrary position.

This section is divided into three parts according to the three things by which some seem to be moved to deny that nature acts for an end. The second part begins where he says, ‘But the person...’ (199 b 14 267). The third part begins where he says, ‘It is absurd ...’ (199 b 26 268).

262. The first thing by which some seem to be moved to deny that nature acts for an end is the following. Sometimes we see things happen otherwise [than is customary], as happens in the case of monsters which are the errors of nature. Whence Empedocles held that at the beginning of the constitution of things certain things were produced which did not have this form and this order which is now commonly found in nature.

263. He brings forth four arguments to overcome this difficulty.

First he shows that although art acts for the sake of something, still in things which are made by art error occurs. For sometimes the grammarian does not write correctly, and the doctor prescribes a drink as a medicinal potion incorrectly.

Hence it is clear that error occurs also in things which are by nature, even though nature acts for the sake of something. Of the things which are made by art for the sake of something, some are made according to art and are made correctly. There are other things, however, in which the artisan fails, not acting according to his art, and in these cases error occurs, even though the art is acting for the sake of something. For if art does not act for a’determinate end, then there would be no error no matter how the art was performed. For the operation of the art would be equally related to all things. The very fact, then, that there happens to be error in art is a sign that art acts for the sake of something. The same thing also happens in natural things in which monsters are, as it were, the errors of nature acting for the sake of something insofar as the correct operation of nature is deficient. And this very fact that error occurs in natural things is a sign that nature acts for the sake of some thing.

The same thing is true of those substances which Empedocles said were produced at the beginning of the world, such as the ‘ox-progeny’, i.e., half ox and half man. For if such things were not able to arrive at some end and final state of nature so that they would be preserved in existence, this was not because nature did not intend this [a final state], but because they were not capable of being preserved. For they were not generated according to nature, but by the corruption of some natural principle, as it now also happens that some monstrous offspring are generated because of the corruption of seed.

264. He gives the second argument where he says, ‘Further, seed must have ...’ (199 b 8). The argument is as follows.

Wherever there are determinate principles and a determinate order of proceeding, there must be a determinate end for the sake of which other things come to be. But in the generation of animals there is a determinate order of proceeding. For it is necessary that seed come to be first, and there is no animal which exists immediately from the beginning. And the seed itself is not immediately hardened, but in the beginning it is soft and tends toward perfection in a certain order. Therefore, there is a determinate end in the generation of animals. Therefore, monsters and errors do not occur in animals because nature does not act for the sake of something.

265. He gives the third argument where he says, ‘Again in plants...’ (199 b 9). The argument is as follows.

Although nature acts for the sake of something in regard to plants as well as animals, this is less clear. Fewer things can be inferred from the operations of plants.

If, therefore, monsters and errors occur in animals because nature does not act for the sake of something, this should be even more true of plants. As the ‘man headed ox-progeny’ occurs in animals, does there also occur in plants an ‘olive-headed vine progeny’, i.e., half olive and half vine? It seems absurd to say that these things occur. Nevertheless this must be so if in regard to animals it is true that nature does not act for the sake of something. Therefore, in regard to animals it is not true that nature does not act for the sake of something.

266. Hegives the fourth argument where he says, ‘Moreover, among the seeds ...’ (199 b 13). The argument is as follows.

As animals are generated by nature, so also are the seeds of animals. If, therefore, what occurs in the generation of animals happens in any way whatsoever, and not by nature, as it were, acting for a determinate end, then the same would be true of seeds, i.e., that any sort of seed would be produced by any sort of thing. This is obviously false. Hence, the first [supposition) is also false.

267. Next where he says, ‘But the person...’ (199 b 14), he destroys the second point by which some were moved to hold that nature does not act for the sake of something.

This seemed true to some because things which happen naturally seem to proceed from the prior principles, which are the agent and the matter, and not from the intention for an end.

But Axistotle shows the contrary. He says that one who speaks in this manner, i.e., one who says that nature does not act for the sake of something, destroys nature and the things which are according to nature. For those things are said to be according to nature which are moved continuously by some intrinsic principle until they arrive at some end—not to some contingent end, and not from any principle to any end, but from a determinate principle to a determinate end. For progress is always made from the same principle to the same end, unless something impedes it. However, that for the sake of which something is done sometimes happens to occur by fortune, when [that which is done] is not done for the sake of this. For example, if some stranger should come and leave after he has bathed, we say this was by fortune. For he did not bathe himself as if he had come for this purpose, since he did not come for this. Hence his bathing is accidental (for fortune is a per accidens cause, as was said above; L8 214). But if this should happen always or in most instances to him who comes, it would not be said to be by fortune. But in natural things events occur not per accidens but always, unless something should impede. Hence, it is clear that the determinate end which follows in nature does not follow by chance, but from the intention of nature. And from this it is clear that it is contrary to the meaning [ratio] of nature to say that nature does not act for the sake of something.

268. Next where he says, ‘It is absurd...’(199 b 26), he destroys the third point by which some hold the opinion that nature does not act for the sake of something. For it seems to some that nature does not act for the sake of something because nature does not deliberate.

But the Philosopher says that it is absurd to hold this opinion. For it is obvious, that art acts for the sake of something, yet it is also obvious that art does not deliberate. Nor does the artisan deliberate insofar as he has the art, but insofar as he falls short of the certitude of the art. Hence the most certain arts do not deliberate, as the writer does not deliberate how he should form letters. Moreover, those artisans who do deliberate, after they have discovered the certain principles of the art, do not deliberate in the execution. Thus one who plays the harp would seem most inexperienced if he should deliberate in playing any chord. And from this it is clear that an agent does not deliberate, not because he does not act for an end, but because he has the determinate means by which he acts. Hence since nature has the determinate means by which it acts, it does, not deliberate. For nature seems to differ from art only because nature is an intrinsic principle and art is an extrinsic principle. For if the art of ship building were intrinsic to wood, a ship would have been made by nature in the same way as it is made by art. And this is most obvious in the art which is in that which is moved, although per accidens, such as in the doctor who cures himself. For nature is very similar to this art.

Hence, it is clear that nature is nothing but a certain kind of art, i.e., the divine art, impressed upon things, by which these things are moved to a determinate end. It is as if the shipbuilder were able to give to timbers that by which they would move themselves to take the form of a ship.

Finally, he concludes by saying that it is clear that nature is a cause and that it acts for the sake of some thing.

LECTURE 15 (199 B 34-200 B 9)

HOW NECESSITY IS FOUND IN NATURAL THINGS

269. Having shown that nature acts for an end, the Philosopher here proceeds to inquire into the second question, i.e., how necessity is found in natural things.

Concerning this he makes three points. First he raises the question. Secondly, where he says, ‘The current view...’ (199 b 35 271), he sets forth the opinion of others. Thirdly, where he says, ‘Whereas, though the wall ...’ (200 a 5 272), he determines the truth.

270. He asks, therefore, whether in natural things there is a simple necessity, i.e., an absolute necessity, or a necessary by condition or by supposition.

In order to understand this, it must be noted that the necessity which depends upon prior causes is an absolute necessity, as is clear from the the neeessity which depends upon matter. That an animal is corruptible is absolutely necessary. For to be composed of contraries is a consequence of being an animal.

In like manner, that which has necessity from the formal cause is also absolutely necessary. For example, man is rational, or a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, which is reduced to the definition of triangle.

Similarly, that which has necessity from the efficient cause is absolutely necessary. Thus because of the motion of the sun it is necessary that day and night alternate.

But that which has necessity from that which is posterior in existence is necessary upon condition, or by supposition. For example, it might be said that it is necessary that this be if this should come to be. Necessity of this kind is from the end and from the form insofar as it is the end of generation.

Therefore to ask whether in natural things there is a simple necessity or a necessity by supposition is nothing else than to ask whether necessity is found in natural things from the end or from the matter.

271. Next where he says, ‘The current view...’ (199 b 35), he gives the opinion of others.

He says that some are of the opinion that the generation of natural things arises from an absolute necessity of matter. For example, one might say that a wall or a house is such as it is by the necessity of matter because heavy things are disposed to move downward and light things to rise above. And because of this the heavy and hard stones remain in the foundation, while earth being lighter rises above the stones, as is clear in walls constructed of tiles which are made of earth. But the timbers which are the lightest are placed at the highest point, i.e., at the roof. Thus they thought that the dispositions of natural things have come to be such as they are from the necessity of matter. For example, it might be said that a man has feet below and hands above because of the heaviness or lightness of humours.

272. Next where he says, ‘Whereas, though the wall ...’ (200 a 5), he determines the truth.

Concerning this he makes two points. First he shows what sort of necessity there is in natural things. Secondly, where he says, ‘Necessity in mathematics ...’ (200 a 15 273), he compares the necessity of natural things to the necessity which is in the demonstrative sciences.

He says, therefore, first that granting that it seems absurd to say that there is such a disposition in natural things because of the matter, it also appears absurd to say that this is true of artificial things, an example of which has already been given [271]. However, such a disposition is not produced in natural things and in artificial things unless the material principles have an aptitude for such a disposition. For a house would not stand well unless the heavier materials were placed in the foundation and the lighter materials above.

However, it must not be said because of this that the house is so disposed that one part of it is below and another above. [I say] ‘because of this’, i.e., because of the heaviness or lightness of certain parts, (except insofar as the term ‘because of ‘refers to the material cause, which is for the sake of the form). Rather the parts of a house are so disposed for the sake of an end, which is to shelter and protect men from the heat and the rain.

And just as it is with a house, so it is with all other things in which something happens to act for the sake of something. For in all things of this sort the dispositions of what is generated or made do not follow without material principles, which have a necessary matter by which they are apt to be so disposed.

However, the things made or generated are not so disposed because the material principles are such, unless the term ‘because of ‘refers to the material cause. Rather they are so disposed because of the end. And the material principles seek to be apt for this disposition which the end requires, as is clear in a saw. For a saw has a certain disposition or form. And for this reason it must have such a matter. And it has a certain disposition or form because of some end. However, this end, which is cutting, could not be achieved unless the saw were of iron. Therefore, it is necessary that a saw be iron, if there must be a saw and if it must be for this end, which is its operation.

Thus it is clear that there is a necessity by supposition in natural things, just as there is such a necessity in artificial things, but not such that that which is necessary is the end. For that which is necessary is posited on the part of the matter, whereas on the part of the end the reason [ratio] for the necessity is posited. For we do not say that there must be such an end because the matter is such. Rather we say conversely that since the end and the future form are such, the matter must be such. And so the necessity is placed in the matter, but the reason [ratio] for the necessity is placed in the end.

273. Next where he says, ‘Necessity in mathematics ...’ (200 a 15), he compares the necessity which is in the generation of natural things to the necessity which is in the demonstrative sciences.

He does this first with reference to the order of necessity, and secondly with reference to that which is the principle of the necessity, where he says, ‘... and the end ...’ (200 a 34 274).

He says, therefore, first that in a certain respect necessity is found in the demonstrative sciences in the same way that it is found in things which are generated according to nature.

For an ‘a priori’ necessity is found in the demonstrative sciences, as when we say that since the definition of a right angle is such, it is necessary that a triangle be such and so, i.e., that it have three angles equal to two right angles. Therefore, from that which is first assumed as a principle the conclusion arises by necessity.

But the converse does not follow, i.e., if the conclusion is, then the principle is. For sometimes a true conclusion can be drawn from false propositions. But it does follow that if the conclusion is not true, then, neither is the given premise true. For a false conclusion is drawn only from a false premise.

But in things which are made for the sake of something, either according to art or according to nature, this converse does obtain. For if the end either will be or is, then it is necessary that what is prior to the end either will have been or is. If, however, that which is prior to the end is not, then the end will not be, just as in demonstrative sciences, if the conclusion is not true, the premise will not be true.

It is clear, therefore, that in things which come to be for the sake of an end the end holds the same order which the premise holds in demonstrative sciences. This is so because the end also is a principle, not indeed of action, but of reasoning. For from the end we begin to reason about those things which are the means to the end. In demonstrative sciences, however, a principle of action is not considered, but only a principle of reasoning, because there are no actions in demonstrative sciences, but only reasonings. Hence in things which are done for the sake of an end, the end properly holds the place which the premise holds in demonstrative sciences. Hence, there is a similarity on both sides, even though they seem to be related conversely because of the fact that the end is last in action, which does not pertain to demonstration.

Therefore, he concludes that if a house which is the end of a generation, is to come to be, it is necessary that the matter which is for the sake of this end come to be and pre-exist. Thus, tiles and stones must exist first if a house is to come to be. This does not mean that the end is for the sake of the matter, but rather that the end will not be if the matter does not exist. Thus, there will be no house if there are no stones, and there will be no saw if there were no iron. For just as in demonstrative sciences the premises are not true if the conclusion, which is similar to things which are for an end, is not true, so also is the beginning related to the end, as was said.

Thus it is clear that in natural things that is said to be necessary which is material or is a material motion. And the reason [ratio] for this necessity is taken from the end, for it is necessary for the sake of the end that the matter be such.

And one ought to determine both causes of a natural thing, i.e., both the material and the final cause, but especially the final cause, because the end is the cause of the matter, but not conversely. For the end is not such as it is because the matter is such, but rather the matter is such as it is because the end is such, as was said above [272].

274. Next where he says, ‘... and the end ...’ (200 a 34), he compares the necessity of natural generation to the necessity of the demonstrative sciences with respect to that which is the principle of the necessity.

It is clear that in demonstrative sciences the definition is the principle of the demonstration. And in like manner the end, which is the principle and reason [ratio] for necessity in things which come to be according to nature, is a sort of principle taken by reason and by definition. For the end of generation is the form of the species which the definition signifies.

This also is clear in artificial things. For as the demonstrator in demonstrating takes the definition as a principle, so also does the builder in building, and the physician in curing. Thus, because the definition of a house is such, this [what is in the definition] must come to be and exist in order that a house might come to be, and because this is the definition of health, this must come to be in order for someone to be cured. And if this and that are to be, then we must accomplish those things which must come to be.

However, in demonstrative sciences definition is threefold.

One of these is a principle of demonstration, for example, thunder is the extinguishing of fire in a cloud. The second is the conclusion of a demonstration, for example, thunder is a continuous sound in the clouds. The third is a combination of these two, for example, thunder is a continuous sound in the clouds caused by the extinguishing of fire in a cloud. This definition embraces within itself the whole demonstration without the order of demonstration. Hence it is said in Posterior Analytics, I:8, that definition is a demonstration differing by position.

Since, therefore, in things which come to be for the sake of an end the end is like a principle in demonstrative science, and since those things which are for the sake of the end are like the conclusion, there is also found in the definition of natural things that which is necessary because of the end. For if one wishes to define the operation of a saw (which is a division of a certain sort which will not occur unless the saw has teeth, and these teeth are not suitable for cutting unless they are of iron), it’ will be necessary to place iron in the definition of saw. For nothing prevents us from placing certain parts of matter in the definition, not individual parts, such as this flesh and these bones, but common parts, such as flesh and bones. And this is necessary in the definition of all natural things [cf. L5 179].

Therefore, the definition which comprises in itself the principle of the demonstration and the conclusion is the whole demonstration. Thus the definition which draws together the end, the form, and the matter comprises the whole process of natural generation.

BOOK III

MOBILE BEING IN GENERAL

LECTURE 1

NEED FOR DEFINING MOTION AND THINGS RELATED TO IT

275. Having settled the question of the principles of natural things (Book I), and that of the principles of this science (Book II), the Philosopher here begins to pursue his original plan, which is to arrive at conclusions concerning the subject of this science, mobile being taken absolutely.

The treatment, then, is divided into two parts:

In the first he concludes with respect to motion in itself (Books III-VI);

In the second he concludes with respect to motion in relation to movers [things moving others] and things movable [things which others move] (Book VII).

The first part is divided into two:

He concludes in regard to motion itself (Books III-IV);

He concludes in regard to its parts (Book V).

As to the first, he does two things:

He states what is under investigation;

He follows it out, at 279.

With reference to the first of these, he does two things:

He states that concerning which he intends to treat principally;

He sets down certain things which adjoin thereto, with which he will be subsequently concerned, at 277.

276. As to the first [189] he uses the following argument: Nature is the principle of motion and change, as is evident from the definition set down in Book II. (But how motion and change differ, will be shown in Book V.) And thus it is evident that if one does not know motion, one does not know nature, since the former [motion] is placed in the definition of the latter

[nature]. Since, therefore, we intend to present the science of nature, we must make motion understood.

277. Then [196] he adds certain things which accompany motion. And he employs two sets of reasons [for including them], the first of which is as follows [the second at no. 2778, below]:

Whoever determines something, must determine those things which follow upon it—for the subject and its accidents [Properties] are considered in a single science.

But the infinite follows upon motion intrinsically, as the following makes plain:

Motion is of the number of continuous things, as will be evident below in Book VI (l.6). But "infinite" enters into the definition of "continuum."

And he [Aristotle] adds "first of all," because the infinite which is found in the addition of number, is caused from the infinite which is in the division of the continuum. And that the infinite enters [first of all] into the definition of the continuum, he shows from the fact that those defining the continuum often use "infinite"—as, for example, when they say that the "continuum" is that which is"divisible to infinity."

And he [Aristotle] says "often," since there is also found another definition of the continuum, which is given in the Predicaments [or Categories]: the "continuum" is that "whose parts are joined at a common boundary."

Now these two definitions differ. For the continuum, since it is a certain whole, is properly defined through its parts. But parts are compared to the whole in a twofold way, namely, as its components, i.e., according to composition, insofar as the whole is composed out of the parts; and as its resolutes, i.e., according to resolution, insofar as the whole is divided into the parts.

The present definition, therefore, of the contintium , is given according to the mode of resolution [division into parts]; while that which is set down in the Predicaments is according to the mode of composition [composition out of parts].

Hence it is clear that the infinite follows upon motion intrinsically.

But there are some things which follow upon motion extrinsically, as certain external measures: such as place, and the void, and time.

For time is the measure of motion itself; while the measure of the mobile thing is indeed place according to truth, but the void according to the opinion of some. And therefore he adds that motion cannot be without place, the void, and time.

Nor does the fact that not all motion is local affect this; since nothing is moved which is not in place. For every sensible body is in place, and to it [sensible body] alone does it belong to be moved.

Likewise, local motion is the first of motions, which, when it is removed, the other motions are removed, as will be evident below in Book VIII (l.14).

It is thus clear that the four above-mentioned properties are consequent upon motion; whence they pertain to the consideration of the natural philosopher for the aforesaid reason.

278. This is also true for yet another reason which he [Aristotle] adds subsequently: namely, because the aforesaid are common to all natural things.

Accordingly, since it is the task of natural science to reach conclusions concerning all natural things, one must therefore first determine concerning each of these [four]. For the speculation which is directed toward proper things, comes after that which is of common things, as was stated in the beginning [Book I, l.1, no. 6]. But among all these common things, one must first reach conclusions concerning motion itself, because the other things follow upon it as was stated [in the preceding no].

279. Then [191] he puts his plan into execution:

He reaches conclusions concerning motion, and the infinite, which follows motion intrinsically;

He does the same for the other three, which follow moti§n extrinsically, and this he does in Book IV.

The first treatment is divided into two parts:

He concludes with respect to motion;

He does the same for the infinite, at 326.

With respect to the first of these, he does two things:

He prefaces his treatment with certain considerations requisite for investigating the definition of motion;

He defines motion, at 283.

As to the first of these, he does two things:

He sets down in advance certain divisions, since the most suitable path towards finding definitions is through division, as is clear from the Philosopher in Posterior Analytics II (l.14 ff.), and in Metaphysics VII (l.12);

He shows that motion falls within the aforesaid divisions, at 281.

280. With respect to the first of these, he sets down three divisions:

The first of these is that being is divided by potency and act. Now this division does not distinguish beings into genera—for potency and act are found in every genus.

The second division is of being as divided according to the ten genera: the first of these is "this something," i.e., substance; others are: how much [i.e., quantity], or how [quality], or some other of the Predicaments.

The third division is of one genus of beings, namely, of the one which is "to something" [relation]. For motion seems in a certain way to pertain to this genus, insofar as the mover is referred to the movable thing.

In order to understand this third division, one must consider that, since relation has the weakest existence—consisting alone, as it does, in the fact of being something referred to something else—it is necessary that it be grounded on some other accident. For the more perfect accidents are closer to the substance, and it is through them as intermediates that the other accidents inhere in the substance.

Now relation is founded chiefly upon two accidents which have an order to something else, namely, upon quantity and action. [or quantity may be a measure even of something external to it; while the agent transfuses its action into something other than itself.

Accordingly, certain relations are founded upon quantity; and especially upon that species of quantity which is number, to which the basic notion of measure pertains, as—is evident in "double and half," "multiple and submultiple [fraction]" and other such. Similarly, "same," "like," and "equal" are founded upon unity, which is the principle of number.

Still other relations are founded upon action and passion: either according to existing act [in the present], as something is said to be "heating" in relation to that which is heated; or according to "having acted" [in the past], as a father is referred to a son because he because he engendered him; or else according to the possibility of acting [in the future], as master is related to a servant because he is able to make him do something.

Now the Philosopher clearly explains this division in Metaphysics V (l.17); but he here touches on it briefly, saying that one sort of “to something” [relation] is that according to “excess and defect,” which sort, indeed, is founded on quantity, as in the case of “double and half”; while the other is according to “active and passive,” and “mover and movable,” which are referred to each other, as is self-evident.

281. Then [192] he shows how motion is reduced to the aforesaid [three] divisions.

And as to this he does two things:

He shows that motion is not outside the genera of things in which motion occurs;

He shows that motion is divided as the genera of things are divided, at 282.

As to the first of these, it should be observed that since motion, as will be evident below (lesson following, nos. 285, 287; l.3, no. 296), is an imperfect act, and since everything which is imperfect falls under the same genus with that which is perfect in respect to it—not, indeed, as a species, but by reduction (as prime matter is by reduction in the genus of “substance”) necessarily motion is not outside the genera of things in which motion occurs. And this is what he [Aristotle] states, namely, that motion is not “outside of things,” i.e., outside the genera of things in which motion is found, in such a way as to be something extraneous to, or something common to, these genera.

And he makes this plain by the fact that whatever is changed, is changed either according to substance, or quantity, or quality, or place, as will be shown in Book V.

Now there is not to be found in these genera some common univocal element which would not be found under some predicament but would be their genus; but being is common to them according to analogy, as will be shown in Metaphysics IV (l.1). Whence it is also plain that neither motion nor change is outside the aforesaid genera, since nothing is outside the latter and they sufficiently divide being. But, as to the question of how motion is related to the predicament of action or passion, this will be explained below (l.5).

282. Then [193] he shows that motion is divided as the genera of things are divided,

For it is plain that in all the genera a thing may be present in two ways, either as something perfect, or as something imperfect. The reason for this is that privation and possession is the prime contrariety, which is found in all the contraries, as is stated in Metaphysics X (l.6). Whence, since all the genera are divided through contrary differences, it is necessary that in all there be the perfect and the imperfect: as in “substance” something is as form and something is as privation; and in “quality” there is something such as white, which is perfect, and something such as black, which is, as it were, imperfect; and in “quantity” one thing is perfect quantity, another imperfect; and in “place” something is above, which is, as it were, perfect, and something is below, which is, so to speak, imperfect; or else there is light and heavy, which are placed in “where” [place] by virtue of the inclination [to a certain place] which is in them. Hence it is plain that according to the divisions of being, there are corresponding divisions of motion.

For the species of motion differ according to the different genera of being —as “increase,” which is motion in quantity, differs from “generation,” which is motion in substance.

The species of motion likewise differ according to perfect and imperfect in the same genus: for “generation” is motion in substance toward form, while “corruption” is motion toward privation; and in quantity, “increase” is toward perfect quantity, “diminution” toward imperfect. But as to the question of why there are not assigned two kinds in quality and where [place], this will be explained in Book V (l.4).

LECTURE 2

DEFINITION OF MOTION

283. After first setting down certain things necessary for investigating the definition of motion, the Philosopher now defines motion:

In general;

More specifically, at 325.

With regard to the first, he does two things:

He shows what motion is;

He inquires whether motion belongs to the mover or to the mobile thing, at 299.

As to the first of these, he does three things:

He gives the definition of motion;

He explains the parts of the definition, at 287.

He shows that it is a good definition, at 291.

As to the first, he does two things:

He gives the definition of motion;

He gives examples, at 286.

284. As to the first, one must understand that some have defined motion by saying that motion is “a going-out from potency to act which is not sudden.” But they are found to be in error, because they have placed in the definition certain elements that are posterior to motion: for a “going-out” is a species of motion; “sudden,” likewise, involves time in its definition—the “sudden” is that which occurs in the indivisible of time [i.e., the instant]; time, however, is defined in terms of motion.

285. Consequently it is entirely impossible to define motion in terms of what is prior and better known otherwise than the Philosopher here does. For it has been pointed out already that every genus is divided by potency and act. Now potency and act, since they are among the first differences of

being, are naturally prior to motion, and it is these that the Philosopher uses to define motion.

Consider, therefore, that something is in act only, something is in potency only, something else is midway between potency and act. What is in potency only is not yet being moved; what is already in perfect act is not being moved but has already been moved. Consequently, that is being moved which is midway between pure potency and act, which is partly in potency and partly in act—as is evident in alteration. [or when water is only potentially hot, it is not being moved; when it has now been heated, the motion of heating is finished; but when it possesses " some heat, through imperfectly, then it is being moved—for whatever is being heated gradually acquires heat step by step. Therefore this imperfect act of heat existing in a heatable object is motion—not, indeed, by reason of what the heatable object has already become, but inasmuch as, being already in act, it has an order to a further act. For should this order to a further act be taken away, the act already present, however, imperfect, would be the term of motion and not motion itself—as happens when something becomes half-heated. This order to a further act belongs to the thing that is in potency to it.

Similarly, if the imperfect act were considered solely as ordered to a further act, under its aspect of potency, it would not have the nature of motion but of a principle of motion—for heating can begin from either a cold or a lukewarm object.

The imperfect act, therefore, has the character of motion both insofar as is compared, as potency, to a further act, and insofar as it is compared, as act, to something more imperfect.

Hence, motion is neither the potency of a thing existing in potency, nor the act of a thing in act, but it is the act of a thing in potency; where the word "act" designates its relation to a prior potency, and the words "of a thing in potency" designates its relation to a further act.

Whence the Philosopher most aptly defines motion as the entelechy, i.e., the act, of a thing existing in potency insofar as it is in potency.

286. Then [195] he gives examples from all the species of motion—as, for example, alteration is the act of the alterable insofar as it is alterable.

And because motion in quantity and in substance does not have a single name in the same way as motion in quality is called "alteration," he gives two different names for the motions in quantity, and says that the act of the increasable, and of its opposite, i.e., the decreasable, for which two there is no common name, is “increase” and “decrease.” Similarly, the acts of the generable and of the corruptible are “generation” and “corruption”; and the act of what is mutable in regard to place is called “change of place.”

In this section the Philosopher uses the word “motion” for any kind of change and avoids the strict usage in which “motion” is distinct from “generation” and “corruption,” as will be said in Book V.

287. Then [196] he explains the several words of the definition:

He explains the use of the word “act”;

He explains “of a thing existing in potency,” at 288.

He explains “insofar as it is such,” at 289.

As to the first he uses this reasoning. That by which something previously existing in potency becomes actual is an act. But something becomes actual when it is being moved, although previously it was in potency. Therefore motion is an act.

He says therefore that it is plain that motion is an act from the fact that the “buildable” implies a potency to something, but when the “buildable” according to this potency which it implies, is being reduced to act, we then say it is “being built”—and this act is “building” taken passively. And the same thing is true in all other motions such as indoctrination, healing, rolling, jumping, youth (i.e., increase),old age (i.e., decrease).

For it must be remembered that before something is being moved it is in potency to two acts: to a perfect act which is the term of the motion, and to an imperfect act which is motion itself. Thus water, before it begins to be heated, is in potency to being heated and to having been heated: when it is being heated it is being reduced to the imperfect act which is motion but not yet to perfect act which is the term of the motion—rather, in respect to this it still remains in potency.

288. Then [1977 he shows that motion is the act “of a thing existing in potency.”

For every act is strictly the act of that in which it is always found—as light is never found but in the transparent, for which reason it is the act of the transparent. But motion is found always in a thing existing in potency. Therefore, motion is the act of a thing existing in potency.

To explain the second proposition he says that, since certain same things are both in potency and in act, although not at the same time, nor in the same respect—as, for example, something is hot actually and cold potentially it follows that many things mutually act and are acted upon insofar, namely, as both are in potency and in act with respect to the other under different aspects. And because all lower natural bodies share the same matter, there is therefore in each of them a potency to what is actual in another. Hence, in all such bodies something simultaneously acts and is acted upon, both moves and is moved.

This fact had led some to say absolutely that every mover is likewise being moved. This point will be cleared up in a later place. For it will be shown in Physics VIII (l.9 ff.) and in Metaphysics XII (l.7) that there exists an immobile mover, since it is not in potency but in act only.

But when that which is in potency, yet existing in a certain way in act, either acts itself or is acted upon by another so far as it is movable, i.e., is reduced to the act of motion, whether moved by itself or by another, at such time motion is its act. That is why things in potency, whether they act or are acted upon, are moved, since when acting they are acted upon and when moving they are being moved—just as fire, when it acts on logs, it acted upon, insofar as it becomes more dense through smoke, flame being nothing more than smoke afire.

289. Then [198] he explains this part of the definition, “insofar as it is such”:

By an example;

By giving a reason, at 290.

He says therefore first that the phrase, “insofar as it is such,” had to be added, because what is in potency is at the same time something in act. And although the subject which is both in potency and in act may be the same, nevertheless to be in potency and to be in act is not contained under the same notion. Thus, although brass is a statue in potency but is brass actually, nevertheless the notion of the brass as brass is not the same as the notion of the brass as it is in potency to a statue. Now motion is not an act of the brass insofar as it is brass but insofar as it is in potency to a statue; otherwise. during the whole time that it was brass it would be undergoing motion, which is clearly false. That is why it is necessary to add “insofar as it is such.

290. Then [199] he explains the same thing by using an argument based on the nature of contraries. For it is clear that a given subject is in potency

to contraries—as a humor or the blood is in potency to health and to sickness. But to be in potency to health is one thing and to be in potency to sickness is another, if one considers their objects. Otherwise, if to be able to be sick and to be able to be well were the same thing, it then would follow that being sick and being well would be the same. Hence to be able to be sick and to be able to be healthy are different notions, although their actual subject is one and the same thing.

It is plain, therefore, that there is not one and the same notion of the subject as it is a certain being, and as it is in potency to something else. Otherwise, potency to contrary things would fall under one and the same notion. In like manner, the notion of that which is “color” and that which is “visible” are not one and the same.

Thus it was necessary to say that motion is the act of the possible “insofar as it is possible”—to prevent supposing that it is the act of what is in potency insofar as it is merely some subject.

LECTURE 3

JUSTIFICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF MOTION

291. Having given the definition of motion and an explanation of each of the words in the definition, the Philosopher now shows it to be a good definition:

Directly;

Indirectly, at 293.

292. In regard to the first [200] he uses the following argument: Everything which is in potency may at some time be in act; butt he "buildable" is in potency. Therefore, there may . at some time be an act of the "buildable" insofar as it is buildable.

But this act is either the house itself or the building of it. But "house" is not the act of the "buildable" insofar as it is "buildable." Since the "buildable" as such is being reduced into act when the building is taking place, but when the house now exists, it is no longer being built. Hence, building is an act of the buildable as such. Building, however, is a certain motion. Motion, therefore, is the act of a thing existing in potency as such. The same is true of other motions.

It is clear, therefore, that motion is the type of act above-described, and that something is being moved only when it is in such an act, and neither before nor after—not before, since if it is only in potency the motion has not begun; nor after, since it has now completely ceased to be in potency, by virtue of being in perfect act.

293. Then [201] he shows indirectly that it is a good definition by showing that motion cannot be defined in any other way. In regard to this he does three things:

He proposes what he intends;

He presents definitions given by others and rejects them, at 294.

He explains why others defined motion as they did, at 295.

He says therefore that two things show why the definition given of motion is a good one:

First, because the definitions that others have given are unsuitable;

Secondly, because it is impossible to define motion otherwise than as Aristotle has defined it, the reason being that motion cannot be placed in any other genus but that of “act of a thing existing in potency.”

294. Then [202] he excludes the definitions of motion given by others. These followed a three-fold course in their definitions. For they said that motion is “otherness,” because the thing being moved constantly changes from one state to another. Similarly, they said motion is “unequalness,” because the thing being moved approaches its term always more and more. They also said that motion is “non-being,” because the thing being moved does not yet have that to which it is being moved as long as it is being moved—as that which is being moved toward whiteness is not yet white.

These definitions the Philosopher destroys in three ways.

He does so first by looking at the subject of motion. For if motion were “otherness” or “unequalness” or”non-being,” then whatever would possess any one of these three characteristics would of necessity be undergoing motion—in whatever this motion is, that thing is being moved. But things that are other are not necessarily being moved by the fact that they are “other,” nor by the fact that they are “unequal,” nor by the fact that they “do not exist.” It follows, therefore, that otherness and unequalness and non-being are not motion.

Secondly, he shows the same thing by looking at the term to which the motion is tending for motion and change do not tend more to “otherness” than to “likeness,” or to “unequalness” more than to “equality,” or to “non-being” more than to “being.” For generation is a change to “being”, and corruption to “non-being.” Hence motion is not “otherness” any more than “a likeness,” “unequalness” any more than “equalness,” “non-being”any more than “being.”

Thirdly, he shows the same thing by looking at the term from which the motion begins since just as some motions start from otherness and from unequalness and from non-being, so others start from their opposites. Hence there is no reason to place motion in the afore-mentioned genera any more than in their opposites.

295. Then [203] he points out why some defined motion in the aforesaid ways. In regard to this he does two things:

First he assigns the reason of what has already been stated.

Secondly, he explains a supposition he had made, at 296.

He says therefore that the reason why the older philosophers placed motion in the above-mentioned genera (namely, “otherness,” “unequalness” and “non-being”) is that motion seems to be something indeterminate, i.e., something incomplete and imperfect as though possessing no determinate nature. And because it is indeterminate, its proper place seemed to be in the genus of privation. For when Pythagoras laid down two ordinations of reality, in each of which he placed ten principles, the principles in the second group were said by him to be indeterminate because they were privative. They were not, indeed, determined by a form in the genus of substance, nor by the form of quality, or by any special form in either of these genera or by the form of any of the other predicaments.

In one of these groups the Pythagoreans placed ten things: finite, unequal, one, right, male, rest, straight, light, good, equilateral triangle; in the other they placed: infinite, equal, many, left, female, motion, oblique, dark, evil and scalene triangle.

296. Then [204] he gives the reason why motion is placed among the indeterminates. And he says that the reason for this is that motion cannot be placed either in potency or in act. For if it were placed under potency, whatever would be in potency, for example, to quantity, would be being moved according to quantity. If, on the other hand, it were included under act, then whatever things were actually quantified would be being moved according to quantity.

Now it is indeed true that motion is act, yet it is imperfect act, a medium between potency and act. And that it is imperfect act is clear from the fact that that of which it is an act is a being in potency as stated above (l.2, no.285). And that is why it is difficult to grasp what motion is. For at first sight It seems to be either entirely act or entirely potency or else to be contained under privation as it seemed to the ancients who called it “non-being” or “unequalness.” But none of these is possible, as we have shown above (no.294). Hence it follows that there is just one way to define motion;

namely, that it is the kind of act we have said, i.e., that of a thing existing in potency.

It is difficult to dwell on such an act on account of the commingling of act and potency; yet that there should be such an act is not impossible,.but contingent.

LECTURE 4

ACTION AND PASSION ARE THE SAME MOTION

297. After defining motion, the Philosopher now shows whose act motion is, i.e., whether it is the act of the mobile or of the mover. Also it may be said that he gives another definition of notion which is related to the previous one as material to formal and as a conclusion to its principle. And this is the definition: motion is “the act of the mobile inasmuch as it is mobile.” This definition is a conclusion from the previous one. For since motion is “the act of a thing existing in potency inasmuch as it is in potence,” and since that which exists in potency as such is the mobile and not the mover (for the mover as such is in act), it follows that motion is an act of the mobile as such.

298. In regard to the main question he does three things:

First he shows that motion is an act of the mobile;

Secondly, he shows how motion is related to the mover, at 303;

Thirdly, he raises a difficulty, at 308.

About the first he does two things:

He posits a definition of motion, namely, that motion is an act of the mobile;

He clears up a doubt, at 303.

In regard to (1) he does three things:

He investigates the definition of motion:

He concludes to the definition, at 302;

He explains it, at 302 bis.

In investigating the definition he shows that “to be moved” even occurs to the mover. In regard to this he does two things:

He shows that every mover is being moved;

He shows why that happens, at 301.

299. He shows in two ways that the mover is moved. This is so first of all because anything that is previously in potency and then in act is somehow being moved. But movers are found that are previously movers in potency and afterwards movers in act; therefore they are moved. He states, therefore, that every mover, since it is such that it is in potency to being a mover, is likewise moved. This is clear from what has been already said, for it was said that motion is an act of a thing existing in potency and this occurs in every natural mover; that is why it was said above that every physical mover is moved.

300. Secondly [206] he brings out the same point in another way: Whatsoever's immobility is its rest is capable of motion; for rest and motion, since they are opposites, happen to the same. But the immobility of a mover, i.e., its ceasing from moving, is called rest; for there are things which said to rest when they cease to act. Therefore every such mover, i.e., one whose immobility is rest, is moved.

301. Then [207] he shows why it happens that a mover is moved. For it does not happen precisely because it is a mover but because it is such by touching; because to move is to act in order to cause something to be moved and what is so acted upon by the mover is moved. But whatever acts does so by touching, for bodies act by touching; hence it follows that what acts is at the same time acted upon, because that which touches is acted upon. However, this must be understood of those cases where there is mutual touching; namely, when the thing touching is also touched, as happens in things which are material, where both of the things are acted upon when they touch one another. But heavenly bodies, because they do not have material like the lower bodies, so act on them that they are not acted upon in return and they touch without being touched as is stated in De Generatione I (l.18).

302. Then [208] he posits a definition of motion concluding from the aforesaid that although the mover is moved, motion nevertheless is not an act of the mover but of the mobile inasmuch as it is mobile. He shows this subsequently by the fact that "to be moved" is accidental to the mover and does not belong essentially to it. Whence, if something is moved precisely inasmuch as its act is motion it follows that motion is an act not of the

mover but of the mobile, not, indeed, insofar as it is a mover but insofar as it is a mobile.

That “to be moved” is accidental to the mover is clear from what was pointed out in the earlier part of this lecture; for the act of the mobile which is motion happens from its contact with the mover; from which it follows that at the same time that it is acting it is acted upon and thus “to be moved” is accidental to the mover.

That “to be moved” does not belong essentially to the mover is clear from the fact that some form is always seen to be the mover—as the form which is in the genus of substance is the mover in substantial change, and a form in the genus of quality is the mover in alteration, and a form in the genus of quantity in growth and decrease. Forms of this type are the causes and principles of motions, since every agent moves according to its form. For every agent acts inasmuch it is actual—as an actual man makes an actual man of man in potency. Hence, since it is through its form that a thing is actual it follows that form is the moving principle. Thus “to move” belongs to a thing inasmuch as it has a form through which it is actual. Wherefore, since motion. is the act of a thing existing in potency, as said above (l.2, no.285), it follows that motion belongs to a thing not insofar as it is a mover but insofar as it is mobile. For that reason the definition says that motion is an act of the mobile inasmuch as it is mobile.

303. Then [209] he shows a difficulty that arises from the aforesaid. For some wonder whether motion is in the mover or in the mobile. But this doubt is solved from what went before. For it is clear that an act of anything is in that thing of which it is the act. Thus, it is plain that the act of motion is in the mobile, since it is an act of the mobile, although caused in it by the mover.

304. Then [2167 he shows how motion and mover are related. And first of all he proposes his intention, saying that the act of the mover is not distinct from the act of the mobile. Hence since motion is an act of the mobile it is somehow also an act of the mover.

305. Secondly [211] he explains this. And in regard to this he does three things. First he shows that there is an act of the mover as well as of the mobile. For whatever is described according to potency and act has some act competent to it. Now just as that which is moved is called “mobile” in potency since it is capable of being moved, and is called “moved”

according to act inasmuch it is actually being moved, so on the part of the mover, a mover is described “potential mover” inasmuch as it is able to move, and “moves” in the act inasmuch as it actually acts. Therefore some act is competent to both, i.e., to mover and to mobile.

306. Secondly [212] he shows that the act of the mover and of the mobile is the same act. For something is called “mover” inasmuch as it acts and “moved” inasmuch as it is being acted upon. But what the mover causes by acting and what the moved receives is being acted upon are one and the same. thing. And this is what he means when he says that the mover actualizes the mobile, i.e., causes the act of the mobile. Wherefore, they must both, namely, mover and moved, have the same act; for what is from the mover as agent cause is the same as what is in the moved as patient and receiver.

307. Thirdly [213] he illustrates this by an example. For the distance from one to two is the same as that from two to one, but they differ according to conception; for in relating two to one we have “double,” but in relating one to two we have “one-half.” The same thing is true of the distance covered by one ascending and by one descending, but by reason of the diversity of starting point and term, one is called “ascent” and one “descent.” A parallel case is true of the mover and of the thing moved. For motion, inasmuch as it proceeds from the mover into the mobile, is an act of the mover, but inasmuch as it is in the mobile from the mover, it is an act of the mobile.

LECTURE 5

MOTION AS FROM THE AGENT AND IN THE PATIENT

308. After showing that motion is the act both of the mobile and of the mover, the Philosopher now raises a difficulty on this point.

First, he raises the difficulty:

Secondly, he solves it, at 314.

Regarding the first, he does two things:

First, he prefaces certain things to the difficulty;

Secondly, he builds up the difficulty, at 310.

309. He says therefore [214] that what has been said above now causes a “rational”, i.e., logical, “defect,” i.e., doubt—by virtue of there being probable reasons for both sides. In introducing the difficulty he says that there is an act in that which is active and there is an act in that which is passive, just as above (no. 305) there was stated to be an act of the mover and of the moved. As a matter of fact, the act of the active is called “action” and the act of the passive is called “passion”. This he proves by saying that the work and end of anything is its act and perfection; hence, since the work and end of the agent is action and that of the patient is passion (or undergoing), it follows that action is the act of the agent and passion that of the patient.

310. Then [215] he develops this doubt. For it is clear that both action and passion are motion; for each is the same as motion. Therefore, action and passion are either the same motion or diverse motions. If they are diverse, then each of them must be in some subject. Either both will be in the patient, i.e., the thing moved, or one of them (action) is in the agent and the other (passion) is in the patient. To say the opposite, i.e., that what is in

the agent is passion and what is in the patient is action is to speak equivocally, or it would be calling passion action and vice vers.& The fourth possibility, namely, that both are in the agent is left out, but this is because it has already been shown (nos. 302-303) that motion is in the mobile, which excludes the fourth possibility that neither be in the patient but both in the agent.

311. Of the two possibilities listed, he develops the second one first [216]. For if anyone says that action is in the agent and passion in the patient, then since action is a certain motion, as was stated (no. 310), it follows that motion is in the mover. For the same thing should be true both of the mover and of the moved, namely, that if motion is in either one it is being moved. Or else, that is true of the mover and of the moved which is true of the patient and of the agent. Now, if motion is in something, that thing is being moved; wherefore, it follows that either every mover is being moved or that something has motion but is not being moved; each of these seems unreasonable.

312. Then [217] he develops the second possibility given in 310. He says that if anyone should say that both of them, namely, action and passion, since they are two motions, are in the patient, which is equivalent to saying that teaching which is on the part of the teacher and learning which is on the part of the learner are both in the learner, then two conflicts arise. The first is that if what we said previously is true, namely, that action is an act of the agent, then if action is not in the agent but in the patient, it will follow that the proper act of each thing is not in the thing of which it is the act.

Then another conflict follows, namely, that one and the same thing is being moved according to two motions. For action and passion are now supposed to be two motions. Now in whatever thing there is a motion that thing is being moved according to that motion; if then action and passion are in the mobile, it follows that the mobile is being moved according to two motions. This would be tantamount to having two alterations in one subject both of them specifically the same; for example, one subject being moved to two whitenings, which is impossible. This does not mean that one subject could not be moved by two alterations tending toward two specifically different terms, for example, whitening and heating. Nevertheless, it is clear that action and passion terminate at the same specific term; for what the agent does and what the patient receives are one and the same.

313. Then [218] he develops the other possibility. For it could be said that action and passion are not two motions but one. But this leads to four difficulties. The first is that the act of things of different species would be the same. For it has been already pointed out (no. 309) that action is an act of the agent and passion ant act of the patient and that these are specifically diverse; but if action and passion are the same motion then the act of specifically different things will be the same. The second difficulty is that if action and passion are one motion, then action is the same as passion, so that teaching which is laid to the teacher is the same as learning which is in the learner. The third difficulty is that acting would be the same as being acted upon and teaching would be the same as learning. The fourth difficulty that follows from this is that every teacher would be learning and every agent would be being acted upon.

314. Then [2197] he solves the difficulty. From what was settled previously, (nos. 304,306) it is clear that action and passion are not two motions but one and the same motion; for insofar as motion is from the agent it is called “action,” and insofar as it is in the patient it is called “passion.”

315. Hence not all the conflicts which follow from the first case, in which it was supposed that action and passion are two motions, have to be solved. But one remains to be solved even on the supposition that action and passion are one motion: because since action is an act of the agent, then if action and passion are one motion, it follows that the act of the agent is somehow in the patient and thus the act of one thing will be in something else. This remaining difficulty together with the four listed in 313 leave five to be solved.

316. He says in the first place that there is nothing wrong with an act of one thing being in something else, for teaching is an act of the teacher, an act continuously tending from him into someone else without interruption; hence, this act which is the agent’s as being “from which” is the very one which is in the patient as received in him. But it would be wrong if the act of the one were the act of the other in precisely the same way.

317. Then [220] he solves another difficulty; namely, that there would be one and the same act for two diverse things. And he says that there is

nothing to prevent one act belonging to two things so long as it is not one and the same in aspect but only in reality, as was already explained above (no. 307) when it was pointed out that the distance from one to two and from two to one are the same; and of that which is in potency looking toward the agent and conversely. For in these cases the same one reality is assigned to two things according to different aspects: it is assigned to the agent inasmuch as it is from it and to the patient inasmuch as it is in it.

318. The three remaining difficulties of which one followed logically from the other he takes care of in reverse order. He disposes first of the last difficulty deduced, because it is so evidently improper. Thus he is now, thirdly, settling the fifth difficulty. He says that it is not necessary to say that one who is teaching is learning or that an agent is being acted upon just because to act and to be acted upon are the same, as long as we understand that they are not the same in the way that dress and clothing are the same (for these are the same in motion) but in the way, as said above (nos. 307,318), that the road from Thebes to Athens and from Athens to Thebes are the same, i.e., as being the same as to subject but differing as to notion. For it is not necessary that things which are somehow the same should be the same in all ways; that is true only of things that are the same in subject or reality and also in motion. And therefore even granting that to act and to be acted upon are the same, yet since they are not the same in notion, it will not follow that it is the same for an object to act and to be acted upon.

319. Then [221] he answers the fourth difficulty. And he says that even though teaching and the doctrine of the learner were the same, it does not follow that to teach and to learn are the same; because teaching and doctrine are abstract terms, whereas to teach and to learn are concrete. Hence they are being applied to ends or to terms which serve as the basis for the difference in notion between action and passion. For just as the distance between two points is one and the same space in the abstract, yet if we apply it to two concrete places it is not one and the same, as when we say that there is a distance between here and there and between there and here.

320. Then [222] he answers the third difficulty by destroying the inference that if action and passion are one motion, they are the same. And he says it necessary to say finally that it does not follow that action and passion are the same or that teaching and learning are, but rather that the motion in which both are is the same. This motion as a matter of fact is

action from one viewpoint and passion from another. For it is one thing as to notion to be an act of a thing as being in it and another to be the act of a thing as being from it. Now motion is called “action” inasmuch as it is an act of the agent as from the agent; it is called “passion” inasmuch as it is an act of the patient as in the patient. Thus it is clear that although the motion of the mover and of the moved is the same thing due to the fact that motion as such abstracts from these aspects, yet action and passion differ due to the fact that these aspects are included in their signification. From this it is also apparent that since motion abstracts from the notion of action and passion, it belongs neither in the predicament “action” nor in the predicament “passion,” as some supposed.

321. But two difficulties still remain with respect to this. The first is this: if action and passion are one motion, and they differ merely in thought, as said above (no. 317), it seems that they should not be listed as two distinct predicaments, since the predicaments are genera of things. Secondly, if motion is either action or passion, motion will not be found in substance, quality, quantity, and place, as said above (no. 286), but only in action and passion.

322. To settle this matter it must be remembered that being is divided into the ten predicaments not univocally, as a genus into its species, but according to the diverse manner of existing. Now the modes of existing are parallel to the modes of predicating. For in predicating something of something, we say that this is that; that is why the ten genera of being are called “predicaments.”

Now every predication takes place in one of three ways. One way is to predicate of a subject that which pertains to its essence, as when I say “Socrates is man” or “Man is animal.” According to this the predicament of “substance” is taken.

Another way is to predicate of a subject something that is not of its essence but yet inheres in the subject, This inherent thing may be traceable to the matter in the subject, in which case one has the predicament of “quantity” (for quantity is properly a result of matter; for which reason Plato traced the “large” to matter); or it is traceable to the form and in this case, there is the predicament of “quality” (for which reason qualities are founded on quality, as color in a surface, and figure in lines or in a plane); or the predication may be due to a relation existing between subject and something else and thus we have the predicament of “relation”, (for when I say, “The man is a father,” it is not something absolute that is predicated of the man but a relation in him to something without).

The third mode of predicating is when something outside the subject is predicated after the manner of denomination; this allows even extrinsic accidents to be predicated of substance; but yet we do not say that man is whiteness but that man is white. To be denominated by something extrinsic can occur, generally speaking, to all things in one way or another, and in a special way in those matters that refer only to man.

Speaking generally, a thing can be denominated by something extrinsic either according to the notion of cause or according to that of measure. For something is denominated “caused” or “measured” on account of its relationship to something extrinsic. Now there are four genera of causes, two of which are parts of the essence, namely, matter and form; hence any predication based on these two pertains to the predicament of “substance,” as when I say that man is rational and man is corporeal. In regard to the other two causes, the final cause does not cause separately from the agent; for the end is a cause only insofar as it influences the agent. Therefore, the only cause according to which a thing can be denominated something as based on something extrinsic is the agent cause. Consequently, when something is denominated from the agent cause, it is the predicament of “passion,” for to undergo (pati) is nothing but the undergoing of something from an agent; on the other hand, if the agent cause is denominated something on account of its effect, one has the predicament of “action,” for action is an act from the agent into something else, as stated above (no, 316).

In regard to measures, it will be either intrinsic or extrinsic. An intrinsic measure would be a thing’s own length and width and depth: in these cases a subject is being denominated something by reason of what inheres intrinsically; hence this Pertains to the predicament quantity. The extrinsic measures are time and place. It is the predicament “when”, whenever something is denominated by time; when it is denominated by place, it is the predicament “where” or the predicament “situs”, which adds to “where” the order of the parts in place. Such an order of parts is not considered in regard to the measure which is time, for the order of parts in time in time is already implied in the notion of time; for time is the number of motion according to the order of the “before” and the “after” [its parts]. Thus it is through denomination from time or place that something is said to be “when” or “where”.

There is a special predicament for men. For in other animals nature provided the requirements for preserving life, such as horns for defense, a tough and wooly hide as a covering, claws or the like for proceeding without harm. Hence, when by reason of this equipment animals are said to be “armed” or “covered” or “shod,” they are somehow so called not by reason of something; extrinsic but of something intrinsic, which is part of them. Hence, such are referred to the predicament of “substance,” as the same would be if man were said to be “endowed with hands” or “feet.” But the other things could not be endowed upon man by nature, both because they would be out of keeping with the subtlety of his complexion and because reason makes man capable of an enormous number of works for the performance of which nature could not have endowed him with specific instruments. In the place of all these instruments man has reason, which he can use to make for himself the things that are intrinsic to other animals. So when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, he is denominated thus by reason of something extrinsic to him that is neither a cause nor a measure; hence it is located in a special predicament called “habitus.” But we should not fail to note that this predicament is in certain matters used also for other animals not inasmuch as they are considered in their nature but insofar as they are put at the service of man: thus we that a horse is caparisoned or saddled or armed.

323. This makes it clear that although motion is one, yet there are two predicaments which are based on motion depending on the different external things according to which the predicamental denominations are made. For an agent is one thing from which as from something external the predicament of “passion” is taken; and the patient is some other thing from which something in denominated an agent. This solves the first difficulty (mentioned in 321).

324. The second doubt is easy to solve. For the idea of motion depends not only on that which pertains to motion in reality but also on that which reason apprehends. In reality, motion is nothing more than an imperfect act which is a sort of beginning of a perfect act in that which is being moved; thus, in that which is becoming white, some whiteness has begun to be. But

in order that what is imperfect have the aspect of motion it is further required that we understand it as a medium between two: the preceding one of them is compared to motion as potency to act (whence motion is called act); the consequent one is compared to motion as the perfect to the imperfect or as act to potency, wherefore motion is called “the act of a being that exists in potency,” as we said above (no. 285). But anything imperfect, if it is not considered to be tending on to something other as perfect, is called the terminus of motion and one will not have a motion according to which something is being moved; as, for example, if something should start to become white and then the alteration was immediately stopped.

Therefore, in regard to what there is of motion in external reality, motion is placed reductively in that genus which terminates the motion, as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as stated above (no. 281). But in regard to what reason apprehends about motion, namely, that it is midway between two-terms, here the notion of cause and effect are brought in; because for something to be reduced from potency to act an agent cause is required. From this aspect, motion pertains to the predicaments of “action” and “passion”; for these two predicaments are based on the notions of acting cause and of effect, as was said above (no. 322).

325. Then [223] he defines motion more particularly. He says that we have pointed out what motion is both in general and in particular—because from what was said about the definition of motion in general is clear how it can be defined in particular. For if motion is the act of the mobile as such, it follows that alteration is the act of the, alterable as alterable, and so on for other particular kinds of motion.

And because there was a doubt whether motion is an act of the mover or of the mobile and we showed(no. 320) that it is an act of the active as from it and of the passive as in it, then to remove any further doubts we can say somewhat more explicitly that motion is an act of the potency of that which is active and of that which is passive.

In this way we could have said that building is an act of the “builder” and. of the “buildable as buildable”; the same is true of healing and of other motions.

LECTURE 6

EARLY OPINIONS ON THE INFINITE

326. After settling motion, the Philosopher now begins to settle the infinite.

First he shows that natural science should settle the infinite;

Secondly, he begins to determine the infinite, at 336.

As to the first he does two things:

First he shows that it pertains to natural science to settle the infinite.

Secondly, he gives the opinions of the earlier philosophers concerning the infinite, at 329.

327. He proves the first point with an argument and a sign.

The argument is as follows: Natural science studies magnitudes and time and motion. But in such things the finite and infinite are necessarily found for every magnitude or motion or time is contained under one or the other, i.e., either the finite or the infinite. Therefore, it pertains ta natural science to consider the infinite, namely, as to whether it exists and as to what it is.

But because it could be objected that consideration of the infinite pertains to first philosophy, on account of its general character, he counters this by saying that not every being has to be either finite or infinite; for a point and a passion, i.e., passible [sensible] quality, are not contained under either, whereas the objects of consideration in first philosophy are things that follow upon being inasmuch as it is being and not upon some definite genus of being.

328. Then [225] he establishes the same point through a sign taken from tho. practice of the natural philosophers. For all who have treated this, namely, natural philosophy, according to reason, have mentioned the infinite. This fact is a probable argument, based on the authority of wise men, that it belongs to natural philosophy to settle the infinite.

329. Then [226] he gives the opinion of the earlier philosophers about the infinite.

First he shows in what they differ;

Secondly, he shows in what they all agreed, at 335.

As to the first he does two things:

First he gives the opinions on the infinite of those philosophers who were non-natural [i.e., disregarded sense], i.e., the Pythagoreans, and the Platonists;

Secondly, he gives the opinions of the natural philosophers, at 333.

As to the first he does two things:

First he dhows the points of agreement between the Pythagoreans and the Platonists;

Secondly, their points of disagreement, at 331.

330. He says therefore that while all the philosophers posited the infinite as a certain principle of things, only the Pythagoreans and Platonists asserted that the infinite is not something accidental to some nature but something existing of itself. This is not surprising, because it is in keeping with their claim that numbers and quantities are the substances of things. Now the infinite is found in quantity; hence they posited that the infinite exists of itself.

331. Then [227] he shows the difference between Plato and the Pythagorean, first, as to the laying down of the infinite; secondly, as to the basis thereof (no. 332).

Regarding the laying down of the infinite, Plato differed in two respects from the Pythagoreans. For the Pythagoreans did not lay down an infinite except in sensible things. Since the infinite belongs to quantity, and the first quantity is number, the Pythagoreans, not laying down number to be separated from sensible things, but stating number to be, rather, the substance of sensible things, consequently did not lay down any infinite except in sensible things.

Likewise Pythagoras considered that the sensible beings which are within the confines of the heavens are circumscribed by the heavens—whence the infinite cannot be in them—hence he laid down that the infinite was in the sensible things outside the heavens,

But Plato by contrast laid down that nothing is outside the heavens. For neither did he say that there was outside the heavens any sensible body, since he maintained that the heavens contained all sensible things; nor did he say that the ideas and species of things, which he laid down as being separated, were outside the heavens, since “inside of” and “outside of” signify place, while the ideas, according to him, are not in any place, place being of corporeal things.

Plato likewise said that the infinite is not only in sensible things, but also in “them”, i.e., the separated ideas, there being, even in the separated numbers something formal, such as unity, and something material, such as duality, out of which all numbers are composed.

332. Then [228] he shows the difference between them as to the basis of the infinite.

And he says that the Pythagoreans attributed the infinite to a basis which was “even number.” And they demonstrated this in two ways. The first was an argument. That which is enclosed by another, and is terminated by another has the nature of the infinite; whereas that which encloses and terminated has the nature of a term. Now even number is comprehended and included under odd number. For if some even number is proposed, it is seen as in every way divisible. But when by the addition of unity it is reduced to an odd number, it now takes on a certain indivisibility, as though even was compressed under odd. Hence it seems as though “even” is infinite in itself, and causes infinity in others.

Secondly, the same is shown by an example. To follow it one must know that in geometry a “gnomon” is the name for a square on the diameter with two supplements [i.e., three squares put together to form the shape of an “L”]. If a square is added to this gnomon, a square is constituted. From this likeness those numbers may be called “gnomons” which are added to certain numbers.

Here one should notice that if one takes the odd numbers according to the order of natural progression, and to unity, which is a square as to power (since one times one is one), one adds the first odd number, namely, three, there will be constituted four, which is a squared number since twice two is four. If now to this second square there is added the second odd number, namely, five, one obtains nine, which is the square of three, since three times three is nine. Then if to this third square there is added the third odd number, namely, seven, one obtains sixteen, which is the square of four.

And thus, following the ordered addition of odd numbers, there always arises the same form in those numbers, namely, a square.

By the addition of even numbers, however, there is always produced a different shape. For if the first even number, namely, two, be added to unity, there arises three, which has a triangular figure; if then to this there be added the second even number, namely, four, one has seven, which is in the shape of a heptagon. And thus, in this wise the figure of the resulting numbers constantly varies with the addition of even numbers.

And this appears to be a sign that uniformity belongs to odd number, while difformity and variation and the infinite belong to even number.

Hence he says, namely, that a sign of this, i.e., that infinity follows even number, is what occurs in numbers. For by the addition of gnomons, i.e., numbers, to one, i.e., to unity, and outside, i.e., to other numbers, sometimes there occurs another species, i.e., another natural form, namely, when one adds an even number; sometimes there occurs a single species, namely, when one adds an odd number. [rom this it is evident why Pythagoras attributed infinity to even number.

But Plato attributed it to two roots, namely, to the “large” and the “small.” Tor these two, according to him, belong to matter, to which in turn the infinite belongs.

333. Then [229] he gives the opinions of the natural philosophers about the infinite. He says that all the natural philosophers, those, namely, who gave natural [i.e., sensible principles for things, taught that the infinite does not subsist by itself, as said above (no. 330), but is an accident of some nature. Hence those who posited just one material principle (some member of the list of things called elements, i.e., air or water or something intermediate) said it was infinite. But of those who posited a finite number of principles, none supposed them to be infinite in quantity: for the very distinction of the elements seemed to conflict with the notion that they could be infinite. But those who posited. an infinitude of principles said that from all those infinites was formed one infinite through contact.

334. Those who taught this were Anaxagoraa and Democritus, who differed in two respects.

They differed first as to the nature of the infinite principles: for Anaxagoras taught that the infinite principles were infinite similar parts of flesh and of bone and so on; but Democritus taught that-they were indivisible bodies differing in figure. He said these bodies were the seeds of all of nature.

Another difference was as in the relation of these principles one to the other. For Anaxagoras said that each of these parts was a mixture of all the others, so that in each part of flesh there was bone and vice versa and the same for the other parts. He came to this opinion because he saw that anything came from anything; and, hence, since he believed that whatever comes to be from something is in it, he concluded that everything is in everything. And from this he seems to assert that at some time all things were commingled and nothing was distinct from anything else. Just as this flesh and this bone are commingled (which is proved by the generation of one from the other) so is everything else commingled. Therefore at one time all things were together. For it is necessary to posit a principle of separation not only in one single thing but in all things simultaneously. He proved this thus: Whatever comes to be from something other was previously commingled with it and is produced by being separated from it; but all things are produced, though not all at the same time; therefore, there must be some one principle generating not only each thing but all things. This one principle he called “intellect,” which alone has the capacity to separate and bring together because it is itself uncommingled.

Now whatever comes to be through intellect seems to have a principle; because intellect acts by starting from a definite principle. Therefore, if separation is brought about by intellect, separation must have a principle; hence, he concluded, at some time all things were together and the motion by which things were separated one from the other began in time, and did not previously exist. Thus Anaxagoras laid down one principle as producing another.

But Democritus said that one principle is not derived from another, but that the nature of body which is common to all indivisible bodies, though different in parts and figure, is the principle of all things according to magnitude, for he posited that all divisible magnitudes are composed of indivisibles.

And thus does Aristotle conclude that to consider the infinite pertains to the natural philosopher.

335. Then [230] he outlines four points of agreement among the early philosophers in regard to the infinite. The first of which is that all posited

the infinite as a principle, and this “reasonably” i.e., for the following reason: If the infinite exists, it is impossible for It to be in vain, i.e., that it lack some definite standing among the beings of reality. But it can have no power other than that of a principle. For all things in the world are either principles, or derived from principles. But it is not fitting for the infinite to have a principle, because what has a principle has an end. Hence it follows that the infinite is a principle. Note, however, that in ths reasoning, “principle” and “end” are both used equivocally; for that which is derived from a principle has a principle of origin whereas it is to have a principle and end of its quantity or size which is incompatible with infinite.

The second point of agreement is that they denied coming into existence and ceasing to exist to the infinite. This follows from the fact that it is a principle. For whatever is produced must have an ending just as it has a principle; and likewise any process of corruption has an end. But “end” and “infinite” are incompatible; hence the infinite can neither be generated nror corrupted. Hence it is clear that the infinite has no principle, but that the infinite is the principle of everything else.

This argument, too, uses “principle” and “end” equivocally, as above.

The third point of agreement is that they attributed to the infinite the prerogative of containing and governing all things, for this seems to belong to a first principle. And this was the opinion of those who did not grant in addition to matter, which they said was infinite, other causes, namely, agent causes, as Anaxagoras posited an intellect and Empedocles concord. For to contain and to govern pertain more to an active principle than to matter.

The fourth point of agreement was to attribute divinity to the infinite; for whatever is immortal or incorruptible they called divine. This was the doctrine of Anaximander and a number of the ancient natural philosophers.

LECTURE 7

ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE INFINITE

336. Having listed the opinions of the earlier philosophers on the infinite, Aristotle now begins to inquire into the truth of the matter.

First he objects to both sides of the question;

Secondly, he solves the objections, in LECTURE 10.

About the first he does two things:

First he gives reasons to show that the infinite exists;

Secondly, to show that it does not exist, at 342.

337. In regard to the first he gives five reasons to show that the infinite exists. The first of these is based on time, which according to the common opinion of the earlier philosophers was infinite [i.e., always was and always will be]. For Plato alone supposed that time was generated, as will be shown in Book VIII (l.2).

The first of these is taken from time, which, according to the common opinion of the ancients, was infinite. Indeed, Plato alone generated time, as will be said in Book VIII (l.2).

He says therefore first that tha infinite is shown to exist by five arguments. Abe first of these is taken from time, which is infinite according to those who held that time always was and always will be.

338. The second reason is taken from the infinite divisibility of magnitude. For even mathematicians use the infinite in their demonstrations. This, however, would not happen, if there were no infinite at all; hence the infinite exists.

339. The third reason is based on the perpetual processes of generation and. corruption according to the opinion of many; for if the infinite were

denied, generation and corruption could not endure indefinitely; hence, it would have to te admitted that generation would sometime cease, which is against the opinion of many. Therefore, it is necessary to posit the infinite.

340. The fourth reason is based on the apparent nature of the infinite, to many seems to consist in this that it is something always included by something else, because we observe that every finite reaches into something else. Let a body be pointed out; if it be infinite, then the infinite exists; if it be finite, it must be terminated at something else, and this latter, if it in turn be finite, at something else. We must either proceed thus to infinity or come to a body that is infinite. In either case, the infinite exists. Hence there can be no end to bodies, if every finite body is always included by some other.

341. The fifth reason is taken from the apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Hence, he says that that which chiefly constitutes the common difficulty which induces men to posit the infinite is that the intellect never is exhausted but can always add something to any given finite amount. Now the earlier philosophers supposed that things corresponded to the intellect’s or senses’ apprehension of them; hence because they said that whatever appeared to be is true, as stated in Metaphysics IV (l.11), they believed that even in reality there exists an infinite. Hence number seems to be infinite, because the intellect can always create a new number, simply by adding unity to a given number. For the same reason mathematical magnitudes, which exist in the imagination, seem to be infinite, because, given any definite magnitude, we can imagine a greater. And for the same reason there seems to be an infinite space beyond the heavens, because we can imagine certain dimensions existing beyond the heavens to infinity.

Now if there be infinite space beyond the heavens, it seems that there is an infinite body and even infinite worlds. This for two reasons. The first is that if the totality of space be considered infinite, that totality will be uniform; hence, there is no reason why that space should be devoid of body in one part rather than in another, Therefore, if there is found in one part of that space the bodily magnitude of this world, then there should be found in each part of that space some bodily magnitude comparable to that of this world. Thus body must be infinite in the same way as space or there must even exist infinite worlds, as Democritus supposed. Another reason proving the same point is that if there be infinite space, it is either empty or full. If it is full, we have our point that there is infinite body; but if it is empty, then since the empty is a place not filled with a body but capable of being so filled, it follows that if space is infinite, there is infinite place capable of being filled with body. Thus there must be infinite body, because in perpetual matters, there is no difference between what can be and what is. Hence, if infinite place can be filled with body, it must be admitted that it is fillee with infinite body. Therefore, it seems necessary to say that there is infinite body.

342. Then [232] he takes the opposite position. And in regard to this he does three things:

First, he shows that the matter is debatable, lest anyone suppose that the afore -mentioned reasons are unassailable;

Secondly, he gives the various meanings of the word "infinite," at 344;

Thirdly, he gives reasons showing that the infinite.,does not exist, at 345.

343. He says therefore [232] that there is a question about whether the infinite exists or not. For, on the one hand, many impossibilities follow upon holding that it does not; those, for example, listed in 337 ff. On the other hand, there are also difficulties attendant upon holding that the infinite does exist, as will be clear subsequently (no. 345 ff). There is doubt also as to its manner of existence. Does it exist as a substance does, or as an accident belonging essentially to some nature? Of if neither as a substance nor as an essential accident, but as an accident nevertheless, is there some infinite continuum and are there things infinite in number? Now it very much pertains to the philosopher of nature to discuss whether there exists such a thing as an infinite sensible magnitude, for a sensible magnitude is a natural magnitude.

344. Then [233] he shows in how many ways "infinite" is said, and lists two divisions of the infinite. The first division is con on to the infinite and to all things said privatively.

For "invisible" is said in three ways: either as denoting 1) what of its very nature 13 not apt to be seen, for example, a sound which is not in the genus of visible things; or 2) what is difficult to see, as what is seen in the dark or from a distance; 3) what is apt to be seen but is not, as something in total darkness. Correspondingly, what of its very nature is not apt to be passed over is called "infinite" (for the infinite is the same as that which cannot be passed over)—and this is because it belongs to the genus of intraversable things, as are indivisibles, such as a point and a form; this is the way that a sound was called invisible. In a second way, infinity is ascribed to what could be passed over but its passage is impossible for us; thus, we say that the depth of the sea is infinite; or if it could be passed through, it would be with difficulty, as if we should say that a trip to India is infinite. Both of these belong to that which is "difficultly traversable." In a third way, infinity is ascribed to what is passable but there is no passage to its terminus; for example, a line without an end or any other such quantity without limits; this is the proper cense of the word "infinite."

He then gives the other division of infinite, [233 bis], saying that infinity is spoken either by addition, as in numbers, or according to division, ai in magnitudes, or both ways, as in time.

345. Then [234] he lays down the arguments leading to an exclusion of the infinite:

First those excluding a separated infinite, such as laid down by the Platonists;

Secondly, those excluding the infinite from sensible things, at no. 349.

With respect to the first he lays down three reasons. As to the first of these he says that it is impossible for the infinite to be separated from sensible things, in such a way that the infinite should be something existing of itself, as the Platonists laid down. For if the infinite is laid down as something separated, either it has a certain quantity (namely, continuous, which is size, or discrete, which is number), or not. If it is a substance without either the accident of size or that of number, then the infinite must be indivisible—since whatever is divisible is either number or size. But if something is indivisible, it will not be infinite except in the first way, namely, as something is called "infinite" which is not by nature susceptible to being passed through, in the same way that a sound is said to be "invisible" [as not being by nature susceptible to being seen], but this is not what is intended in the present inquiry concerning the infinite, nor by those who laid down the infinite. For they did not intend to lay down the infinite as something indivisible, but as something that could not be passed through, i.e., as being susceptible to such, but with the passage having no completion.

If, however, the infinite should not only be a substance, but also should have an accident which is size or number to which the infinite belongs, in such a way that the infinite would be inherent in the substance in the manner of that accident, then the principle of existing things will not be infinite as such the ancients laid down, just as we do not say that the principle of speech is invisible, although such a thing is an accident of sound, which is the principle of speech.

346. The second reason [235] is as follows. A passion is less separable and able to exist of itself than a subject. But the infinite is a passion of size and number—which cannot be separated and exist of themselves, as is proved in the Metaphysics [XI, l.10]. Therefore neither can this be so of the infinite.

347. The third argument [236] is as follows. He [Aristotle] states that it is clear that the infinite cannot be laid down as being in act, and as being a certain substance, and as being the principle of things. For the infinite is either divisible, or indivisible.

If indeed it is divisible, every one of its parts will have to be infinite, on the supposition that the infinite is a substance. For if it is a substance, and is not predicated of any subject as an accident, then that which is infinite and the nature of the infinite, i.e., the essence and notion of the infinite, will have to be the same. For that which is white and the nature of white are not the same, but that which is man, and the nature of man, are. Whence it will be necessary that the infinite, if it be a substance, be either indivisible, or divided into parts which are infinite—which is impossible, since it is impossible to compose some same thing out of many infinities, as this would involve one infinite’s being terminated by another infinite.

It likewise appears not only from argument but also from an analogy that if the infinite is a substance and is divided, it is necessary that each and every part of it be infinite.

For just as every part of air is air, so too every part of the infinite will be infinite, if the infinite is a substance and a principle. For if it is a principle, the infinite has to be a simple substance, not composed out of differing parts, as in the case of man whose every part is not man. Since, therefore, it is impossible for every part of some infinite to be infinite, the infinite must then be unable to be reduced to parts, and indivisible. But what is indivisible cannot be infinite in act—since whatever is infinite in act is quantitified, and everything quantified is divisible. It follows, therefore, that if there be any infinite in act, it is not after the manner of substance, but has the reason of the accident which is quantity. And if this be infinite, it will not be a principle, but that to which the infinite occurs, whether it be some sensible substance, such as air; or some intelligible substance, such as “even,” as the Pythagoreans laid down.

Whence it is plain that the Pythagoreans did not speak sensibly, positing the infinite as a substance, and the same time holding it as divisible—since it follows that every part of it would be infinite, which is impossible, as said above.

348. Finally, he says that this question “whether there be an infinite in mathematical quantities and in intelligible things not having magnitude” is a more general one than the present question. For our question concerns sensible things about which natural science treats: “Whether among natural things there be a body infinite in size, such as the early philosophers posited.

LECTURE 8

NO SENSIBLE INFINITE

349. After rejecting the opinion of the earlier philosophers who spoke non-naturally of the infinite, separating it from sensible things, the Philosopher now shows there is no infinite even in the sense in which the natural philosophers laid it down.

First he shows this by logical reasons;

Secondly by natural reasons in 353.

The first set of reasons are called “logical,”not because they proceed logically from logical terms, but because they proceed in a logical manner, i.e., from common and probable propositions, which is the characteristic of the dialectical syllogism.

350. He gives therefore [237] two logical reasons. In the first of theseit is shown that there is no infinite body. For the definition of body is that it is determined by a surface, just as the definition of a line is that its terms are points. But no body determined by a surface is infinite. Therefore, no body is infinite, whether it be sensible, i.e., a natural body, or intelligible, i.e., a mathematical body. (The word “rational” [or dialectical] should be here expounded as “logical” indeed, logic is called “rational philosophy.”)

351. The second reason shows that there is no infinite multitude. For everything countable can be numbered and consequently passed through by counting. But every number and whatever has a number is countable. Therefore, every such thing can be passed over. If, therefore any number, whether separated or existing in sensible things, be infinite, it follows that the infinite can be passed through, which is impossible.

352. Notice that these reasons are probable and proceed from common premisses. For they do not conclude of necessity: in effect, whoever posits an infinite body would not concede that it would of its very nature be

terminated by a surface, except perhaps potentially; although this is probable and well-known. Similarly, whoever would posit an infinite multitude would not admit it to be a number or that it has a number. For number adds to multitude the notion of measure, because a number is "multitude measured by unity," as is said in Metaphysics X. For this reason number is considered to be a species of discrete quantity, but multitude is not; it is, rather, a transcendental.

353. Then [238] he produces natural reasons to show that there is no infinite body in act.

In connection with these reasons ane must consider that since Aristotle had not yet proved that the heavenly body was of another essence from that of the four elements, and the connon opinion of his time was that it was of the same nature as the four elements, he therefore proceeds in these reasonings as though there were no other sensible body outside of the four elements. This is in keeping with his custom, since he always, before proving that which is his own belief, proceeds from what is supposed by the common opinion of others. Hence, after he proved in De Caelo I (l.4) that the heavens are of another nature from the elements, he repeats, for the sake of the certitude of the truth, the consideration of the infinite, showing unqualifiedly that no sensible body is infinite.

Here, however, he first shows that there is no sensible infinite body on the supposition that the elements are finite in number; secondly he shows the same thing in a universal way, at no. 358.

He says therefore first that when one proceeds "naturally," i.e., according to the principles of natural science, one is better able, and with more certitude, to consider that there is no sensible infinite body from what will be said. For every sensible body is either simple or composite.

354. First therefore he shows that there is no composite sensible body that is infinite, supposing that the elements are finite according to multitude. For it cannot be that one of the elements is infinite and the others finite—because the composition of any compound body requires that there be a number of elements and that the contraries therein be somehow in equilibrium. If this were not so, the composition could not endure—for the strongest would destroy all the others, since the elements are contrary. But if one of the elements were infinite, no equilibrium would ensue as long as the other elements were finite, because there is no proportion between

infinite and finite. Therefore it cannot be that only one of the elements in the composite be infinite.

But someone could claim that the infinite element might have such weak energy in acting, that it would not destroy the finite elements which are stronger; for example, if the infinite one were air and the finite one fire. And therefore, to remove this objection he says that no matter how much less the energy of that one infinite body is than that of the finite body (for example, if fire be infinite and air finite) nevertheless an infinite accumulation of air would be equal in energy to the fire. For if the energy of the fire is one hundred times greater than an equal quantity of air, then if the air be multiplied a hundredfold, it will equal the fire in energy; and yet air multiplied a hundred times is multiplied according to a finite number and is exceeded by the power of the whole infinite amount of air. Hence, it is clear that even the energy of the fire will be overcome by the energy of infinite air: thus the infinite will excel and corrupt the finite, no matter how powerful its nature.

355. Similarly, it cannot be that any of the elements out of which a compound body is composed be infinite; because it is a property of a body that it have dimensions in every direction, and not in length only, as in a line, or in length and width only, as on a surface. But the nature of the infinite is to have infinite “distances” or dimensions. Therefore, the infinite body should have infinite dimensions in every direction. Thus, it cannot be that one body result from a number of infinite bodies, because each occupies the whole world, unless you posit that two bodies interpenetrate, which is impossible.

356. Therefore, having shown that a composite body cannot be infinite, he now proves that neither can a simple body, nor one of the elements, nor any medium among the elements(taking vapor as a medium between air and water) be infinite. For some posited this last as a principle stating other things to be generated from it. And they said that this was something infinite, but not air or water or any of the other elements; because the other elements would be corrupted by whichever one was supposed as infinite. For the elements have contrariety one to the other since air is humid, water cold, fire hot and earth dry. Hence if one of them were infinite, it would destroy the others, since one contrary is disposed to be corrupted by

another. And that is why they said that something other than the elements was infinite, from which, as from a principle, the elements arose.

Now he states this position to be impossible not only as to its maintaining such a mediate body to be infinite, since there will be applied a same common argument [in no. 35] to fire and air and water and likewise to the mediate body, but also as to its laying down some elemental principle in addition to the elements.

For there is found no sensible body outside of those things called the “elements,” namely, air, water, and the like. But this would have to be the case if anything besides the elements should enter into the composition of such bodies. If, therefore, anything else should enter into the composition of those bodies in addition to the four elements, it would follow that we should find here some simple body besides the elements, by the resolution of the above bodies into their elements. It follows therefore that the aforesaid position is false as to its positing of some simple body besides the known elements.

357. He further shows by a general argument that none of the elements can be infinite. For if any of the elements were infinite, it would be impossible for the whole universe to be anything but that element. It would likewise be necessary that all the other elements be changed into it, or to have already been changed into it, due to the excess of power of the infinite over other things, as Heraclitus says that at some future time all things will be converted into fire because of the excelling power of fire. And the same reason holds good for one of the elements and for come other body that some natural philosophers create besides the elements. For it is necessary that this other body have contrariety toward the elements, since other things are laid down as being generated from it, and change does not take place except from ;)ne contrary to another, as in the case of going from hot to cold, as shown above (I, l.10). This middle body would therefore in this way destroy, by reason of its contrariety, the other elements.

LECTURE 9

NO INFINITE BODY SHOWN ABSOLUTELY

358. After showing that there is no infinite sensible body on the assumption that the elements are finite, the Philosopher here shows the same absolutely, without assumptions of any kind.

First he declares his intention;

Secondly he carries out his proposal, at 359.

He says therefore first [239] that in what follows it is necessary to consider every body universally, without any suppositions, and ask whether any natural body can be infinite. And from the follwwing reasons it will be clear that none can. Then, he proves his proposition with four reasons, beginning at 359. The second reason begins at 367; the third at 368; the fourth at 369.

In regard to the first reason he does three things:

First he lays down certain facts presupposed to his reasoning;

Secondly he gives the reasoning itself, at 360.

Thirdly, he excludes a false opinion, at 364.

359. Therefore [240] he lays down three presuppositions. The first of these is that every sensible body has a natural aptitude to be in some definite place. Secondly, that every natural body has, among available places, some place that befits it. Thirdly, that the natural place of the whole and of the part is the same, i.e., of all earth and each clod, of all fire and each spark. A sign of this is that in whatever part of the place of the whole there is placed a part of some body, it is at rest there.

360. Then [24171 he gives the [first] reason, which is this. If an infinite body be supposed, it must have parts either of the same species, as water or

air, of parts of varying species, as a man or a plant has.

If all its parts are of the same species, it follows according to our presuppositions (no. 359) that it is either entirely immobile and is never moved, or is always being moved. But both of these are impossible: for in the second case, rest is excluded; and in the other, motion is excluded from natural things. Thus, in both cases there is denied the notion of nature, for nature is a principle of motion and of rest.

He proves that this body would be either entirely mobile or entirely at rest by the fact that no reason can be given for its being moved either up or down or in any direction whatsoever. He manifesto this by an example: for let us suppose that the entire infinite body which is similar throughout is earth. Then it will be impossible to say where any clod of earth should move or be at rest, because each part of infinite place would be occupied by some body related to it, i.e., of the same species. Can it be said that one clod of earth would be moved so as to occupy successively all the infinite places, as the sun is moved so as to be in each part of the zodiacal circle? And how could one clod of earth pass through all the parts of infinite place? Now nothing is moved toward the impossible: if therefore it is impossible for a clod of earth to be moved so as to occupy all the infinite places, in which place will it rest and in which will it be in motion? it will either always be at rest and thus never in motion or it will always be in motion and thus never at rest.

361. If we suppose the other possibility, namely, that the infinite body has parts that are unlike in species, it will then follow that there would be unlike places for the unlike parts, for the natural place of water is one thing and that of earth is another, But on this supposition it follows at once that the body of this infinite whole would not be one body simply but one through contact; and thus there will not be one infinite body as our supposition granted.

362. Because someone might not consider this impossible [i.e., an infinite body of dissimilar parts], he adds another reason against this, saying that if the infinite whole is composed of unlike parts, these parts will be either of a finite number of species or of an infinite number. It will not be the first, because it then follows that if the whole is infinite, then some of the parts will be finite and some infinite; otherwise we would be able to get an infinite composed all of finites. On this assumption it follows that those

which are infinite will corrupt the others, on account of contrariety, as was said in previous reasoning (nos. 354, 356). For this reason, no one of the early philosophers who posited one infinite principle, posited it to be fire or earth, which are extremes; rather they posited water or air or some medium between them, because the places of the former were evident, i.e., above and below, but it is not the same with the others, for earth is below in respect of them and fire above.

363. But if someone admits the other alternative, namely, that the parts of the body are infinite in species, it follows that their places also are infinite in species, and that the elements are infinite. But if it is impossible that the elements be infinite, as was already proved in Book I (l.11), and that places be infinite, since it is not possible to find infinite species of place, it is necessary to admit that the whole body is finite.

And because he had concluded to an infinity of places from the infinite of bodies, he adds that it is impossible not to equate body with place; for no place is greater than the body it contains, nor can a body be infinite if its place is not infinite, nor can in any way a body be greater than its place. This is so because if the place is greater than the body, there will be some empty place; if the body is greater than its place, then some part of the body is in no place.

364. Then [242] he excludes an error. First, he cites the error and says that Anaxagoras claimed that the infinite is at rest but gave an invalid reason for its rest. For he said that the infinite bears up, i.e., sustains itself since it exists in itself and not in something else, for nothing contains it. And thus it could not be moved outside itself.

365. Secondly [24R] he disproves this statement with two reasons. The first of which is that Anaxagoras so assigned his reason for the rest of the infinite as to suppose that wherever a thing is, that is its natural place, for the only reason he gave for saying that the infinite is at rest, is that it exists in itself. But it is not true that where a thing is, there it is always naturally disposed to be, because some things are somewhere by force and not by nature.

Now although it is true that an infinite whole is not moved, because it is sustained and remains in itself and for that reason is immobile, yet a reason should be given why it is not naturally disposed to be moved. one cannot evade this simply by saying that the infinite is not moved, since by the same reasoning there is nothing to prevent any other body from not being moved while it might be naturally disposed to be moved. Because oven if earth were infinite, just as now it will not be carried further when it is in the center, so even then no part in the center would move further: but this would not be because it had no other natural place except the center where it could be sustained but because it does not have a natural aptitude to be moved from the center. If, therefore, this is the case with earth, that the reason why it rests at the center is not that it is infinite but that it has gravity which accounts for its remaining in the center; similarly, in the case of any other infinite, the reason why it rests should be given, and this is not simply because it is infinite or that it supports itself.

366. He lays down another argument [244]. Thus he states that if the whole infinite is in repose because it remains within itself, it follows that any part thereof necessarily is necessarily at rest since it remains within itself. For the place of the whole and the part is the same, as was said (no. 359), e.g., that of fire and a spark upwards, that of earth and a clod of earth downward. If, therefore, the place of the whole infinite is itself, it follows that any part of the infinite will remain at rest within itself as in its proper place.

367. He gives a second reason against Anaxagoras [245] saying that it is clearly impossible to say that there is an actually infinite body and that there is some place for each body, if every sensible body is either heavy or light, as the ancients said who posited the infinite. Because if the body is heavy, it will be naturally carried to the center; if it is light, it will be carried upward. If, therefore, there be an infinite sensible body, there must be in it an “up” and a center. But it is impossible that the infinite body should sustain in itself either of these, i.e., either an “up” or a center, or even that it sustain both according to different centers. For how could the infinite be divided so that one part would be “up” and another “down” or how can there be in the infinite a boundary or a center? Therefore there is no infinite sensible body.

368. He gives the third reason [246] saying that every sensible body is in place. But the differences of place are six: above, and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left—and these are determined not only in relation to us but even in the whole universe itself.

For such positions are determined in themselves in those things in which there are determinate principles and terms of motion. Whence in living things “up” and “down” are determined according to the movement of food; “front” and “rear” according to the movement of sense; “right” and “left” according to forward motion, which begins from the right. But in inanimate things, in which there are no determinate principles of such motions, “right” and “left” are said with respect to us—for a column is said to be “at the right” which is to the right of a man, and “at the left” which is at his left.

But in the whole universe “up” and “down” are determined according to the movement of heavy and light things; while according to the motion of the heavens the rising sun determines “right,” the setting sun, “left”; “front” is determined by the upper hemisphere, “rear” by the lower hemisphere; “above” by the south, “below” by the north. Now such things cannot be determined in an infinite body. It is therefore impossible for the whole universe to be infinite.

369. Then [247] he gives the fourth reason, saying that if it is impossible that there be an infinite place because every body is in a place, it follows that there can be no infinite body. That an infinite place is impossible be proves thus: To be in place and to be in some place are convertible, just as to be man and to be some man or to be quantity and to be some quantity. Therefore, just as it is impossible that there be infinite quantity, because then it would follow that some quantity is infinite, e.g., two cubits or three cubits, which is impossible, so infinite place is impossible , because it would follow that some place is infinite (either up or down or some other place), which is impossible—since each of these implies a definite term as was said (in 368). Therefore no sensible body is infinite.

LECTURE 10

THE INFINITE AS EXISTING IN POTENCY

370. After discussing the infinite dialectically, the Philosopher now begins to determine the truth.

First he determines whether there is an infinite;

Secondly, what it is, at 382.

The first is divided into two parts:

In the first, he shows how the infinite exists;

In the second, he compares various infinites one to the other, at 374.

About the first he does three things:

First, he shows that the infinite in a way exists and in a way it does not;

Secondly, he shows that it is in potence and is not as a being in act, at 372;

Thirdly, he manifests how it is in potency, at 373.

371. Accordingly, he says first [246] that from the foregoing (ll.8.9) it is manifest that there is no infinite body in act. It is also clear from what has been said (l.7) that if the infinite absolutely does not exist, many impossibilities arise. One is that time will have a beginning and an end, considered impossible by those holding for the eternity of the world. Another is that it would follow that a magnitude would not be always divisible into further magnitudes, but eventually one would arrive through division of magnitudes at certain things which are not magnitudes. But every magnitude is divisible. Likewise, it would follow that number could not increase to infinity. Since therefore, according to what has been said (ll.7-9) neither seems to occur, i.e.,) either an infinite in act or no infinite at all, it must be said that the infinite somehow is and somehow is not.

372. Then [244] he shows that the infinite is as a being in potency. And he says that something is said to be in act and something is said to be in potency. Now the infinite is said to come about either by addition, as in numbers, or by subtraction, as in magnitudes. Now it has been shown that magnitude is not infinite in act; hence in magnitudes an infinite through addition is not found, but there is found in them an infinite through division. For it is easy to destroy the opinion that posits lines as indivisibles, or according to another letter, it is easy "to divide indivisible lines," i.e, to show that lines held indivisible by some, are divisible. Now the infinite, whether in addition or division, is spoken of to the extent of the ability [or potency] to add or divide. It therefore follows that the infinite is as a being in potency.

373. Then [256] he shows how the infinite exists in potency. For something is found to be in potency in two ways. In one way, in the sense that the whole can be reduced to act, as it is possible for this bronze to be a statue, because at some time it will be a statue. But the infinite in potency is not so meant as that which later will be entirely in act. In another way, something is said to be in potency in such a way that later it will be in act, not, indeed, all at once, but part after part. For there are many ways in which a thing is said to be: 1) because the whole exists at the same time, as in the case of a man or a house; or 2) because one part of it always comes to be after another part, in the way that a day is said to exist and a competition exists.

It is in this latter way that the infinite is said to be at once in potency and in act. For all successive things are at once in potency as to one part and in act as to another part. For the Olympic games, i.e., the festive contests held on Mt. Olympus, are said to be and to continue as long as the contests are scheduled and as long as the schedule is being carried out. For as long as those games lasted, one part of the schedule was taking place at the time and another was to take place later.

374. Then [251] he compares various infinites one to another:

First he compares the infinite of time and of generation to the infinite which is in magnitudes;

Secondly, he compares the infinite according to addition to the infinite according to division in the case of magnitudes, at 377.

In regard to the first he does three things:

First, he proposes his intention and says that the infinite in the generation of man, and in time, must be explained in a manner different from that of the infinite in the division of magnitudes.

375. Secondly [252] he shows what is common to all infinites, saying in all of them it is universally found that the infinite consists in always taking one thing followed by another according to some certain succession, in such away that the whole of whatever is taken, be finite. Hence one must not suppose the infinite to be some whole existing all at once, as a substance that can be pointed out, e.g.,a man or a house. Rather the infinite must be taken as in the case of successive things, such as a day or a tournament, whose existence is not that of a perfect substance actually existing as a complete whole all at once. Now, in generation and corruption, even though the process continue to infinity, whatever is taken in act is finite. For in the whole course of generation, even should it proceed to infinity, both all the men existing at a given time are finite in number, and this finite amount must be taken as other and other, accordingly as men succeed one another in time.

376. Thirdly, [253] he shows how they differ, saying that the finite actually present in magnitudes as a result of adding or of dividing is permanent and is not corrupted, but the finites considered in the infinite course of time and of human generation are corrupted, although in such a way that time and generation themselves do not fail.

377. Then [254] he compares the two types of infinite which are found in magnitudes; namely, the infinite according to addition and the infinite according to division. About this he does three things:

First he shows their points of agreement;

Secondly, he shows wherein they differ, at 379;

Thirdly, he draws a conclusion from what has been said, at 380.

In regard to the first, [254] he says that in some sense the infinite resulting from addition is the same as the one resulting from division, because the former comes to be as a converse of the latter. For it is accordingly as something is divided to infinity, that additions to infinity seem to be able to be made to some determinate quantity.

378. He demonstrates, therefore, how the infinite in division exists in magnitude.

Thus he states that if someone, in some infinite magnitude, having taken some determinate part by division, should then continue to take other parts by division, always maintaining the same ratio, I.e., proportion, he will not go through that finite magnitude by means of division.

For example, from a line of one cubit we may take one half, and from the remainder one-half again. We can proceed in this process to infinity. For the same proportion will be maintained in subtracting, but not the same amount of what is subtracted. The half of the half is less, according to quantity, than the half of the whole. But if we were to take away always the same amount, the proportion taken away would be continually growing. For example, if from a quantity of ten cubits, we take away one cubit, the ratio of the part removed to the original is one-tenth. If we take from the remainder another inch, the ratio between the part removed and that which remains will be in a greater proportion [i.e., one-ninth]. For one cubit is less exceeded by 9 than by 10. Just as, by preserving the same proportion throughout, the quantity subtracted is continually smaller, so, by taking away the same amount each time, the proportion gets continually larger. If, therefore, by so subtracting from some finite magnitude, we continually increase the proportion by taking away the sawe amount, the original magnitude will be exhausted. For example, if from a line of 10 cubits we always subtract one cubit. This will happen because every finite thing will be exhausted by continually removing the same finite amount.

The infinite that depends on division does not exist, therefore, except in potency, but with this potency there exists always something in act, as was said of a day or of a tournament. And since the infinite is always in potency, it is assimilated to matter, which likewise is always in potency; and it never exists in act in its entirety, the way that the finite is in act. And just as the infinite according to division is at once in potency and act, so too is the infinite according to addition, which has been shown to be in some sense the same as the infinite according to division, as was said (no. 377). And the reason why the infinite according to addition is in potency is that it can always grow through addition.

379. Then [2557he shows the difference between the infinite according to addition and the infinite according to division. And he says that the former does not exceed any given finite magnitude, whereas the latter diminishes beyond any pre-determined smallness. For If we take any predetermined

smallness, for example, the width of a finger, we can, by repeated halving of a line of 10 cubits, arrive at a remainder which is less than the width of a finger. But in adding to infinity, in distinction to division, there will exist some given finite quantity which will never be gone through. Take two magnitudes each of 10 cubits, and a third one of 20 cubits. If what I subtract to infinity from one magnitude of 10 cubits, always taking a half, is added to the other, which is also of 10 cubits, I shall never reach, by adding to infinity, the measure of the quantity of 20 cubits, since as much as remains in the quantity being divided will be lacking from the given measure in the quantity being added to.

380. Then [256] he draws a conclusion from the foregoing. First he draws it; secondly he explains it by a saying of Plato, at 381.

He says therefore first [256] that since addition to infinity never actually transcends every determined quantity, it is not possible, even in potency, to transcend every determined quantity by addition. For if there were in nature potency for addition transcending every quantity, it would follow that something actually infinite exists; such an infinite would be an accident of some nature, in the same way that the natural philosophers posit, outside the world we see, some sort of infinite, whose substance is air or something similar. But if, as was shown (ll.8,9), no infinite sensible body exists in act, it follows that there is in nature no potency to transcend every magnitude by addition, but only a potency to the infinite addition which is in contrast to [and derived from] division, as was said above (no. 379).

Why the existence of a potency to infinite addition transcending every magnitude would imply a body infinite in act, whereas in numbers infinite addition transcending every number does not imply an actually infinite umber will be explained below(in LECTURE 12).

381. Then [257] he confirms what he has said by a dictum of Plato, saying that because the infinite resulting from the addition of magnitudes is the reverse of division, Plato therefore posited two infinites: “the large,” which pertains to addition, and “the small,” which pertains to division—for the finite seems to excel both by addition unto increase, and by division unto decrease or towards nothing. Yet although Plato makes two infinites, he does not use them. For in number, which he posited to be the substance of all things, there is no infinite by division since there is among them something smallest, which is unity; nor is there according to him an infinite

according by addition, since he said that the species of number vary only up to ten and then a return is made to unity when we count eleven, twelve, and so on.

LECTURE 11

DEFINITION OF THE INFINITE

382. After showing how the infinite exists, the Philosopher now explains what it is. About this he does three things:

First he shows what the infinite is;

Secondly, from this he assigns the reason for the things said of the infinite, at 390 (l.12).

Thirdly, he solves the difficulties mentioned earlier, at 400 (l.13).

In regard to the first he does two things:

First he shows what the infinite is and rejects the false definition of some;

Secondly, he rejects a certain false opinion that follows from the above false definition, at 387.

About the first he does three things:

First, he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he explains the proposition, at 384;

Thirdly, he draws a conclusion, at 386.

383. He says therefore [258] that the infinite must be defined in a manner contrary to the way some have defined it. For some have said that infinite is ‘that outside of which there is nothing,” whereas, to the contrary, it should be defined as “that beyond which there is always something.”

384. Then [259] he explains his proposition.

First he shows that his description is good;

Secondly, that the description of the earlier philosophers is incompetent, at 385.

He shows therefore first by an example that the infinite is “that beyond which there is always something.” For some people say that a ring is infinite since, because it has a circular direction, one can always take part after part. But this is to speak analogously and not properly, because to be infinite requires this, namely, that beyond whatever part is taken there be some other part, in such a way, nevertheless, that one never take again a part taken previously. But in a circle this does not happen, because the part which is counted after another happens to be different from that immediately before it, but not from all the parts previously counted, because one part can be counted any number of times, as is evident in a circular motion. Therefore, if rings are called infinite according to this analogy, it follows that that which is truly infinite is something which always has something beyond, if one were to measure its quantity. For it is impossible to measure the quantity of the infinite; but if someone should desire to reckon it, he would take part after part to infinity, as said above.

385. Then [260] he proves that the definition of the earlier philosophers is since "that outside of which there is nothing" is a definition of the perfect and a whole thing. Here is his proof. Every whole is defined as "that to which nothing to lacking"—as we speak of a whole man, or of a whole box, if they lack nothing which they ought to have. And just as we speak thus in regard to some individual whole, as in the case of this or that particular, so too this notion holds in regard to what is truly and perfectly whole, namely, that outside of which there is absolutely nothing. But when something is lacking through the absence of something intrinsic, then such a thing is not a whole.

So it is evident that this is the definition of a whole: "a whole is that nothing of which is outside of it." But a whole thing and a perfect thing are either entirely the same or of a proximate nature. He says this, because "whole" is not found in simple things which have no parts; in which things, nevertheless, we use the word "perfect." This shows that the perfect is "that which has nothing of itself outside of it." But nothing that lacks an end is perfect, because the end is the perfection of each thing. For the end is the term of that of which it is the end. Nothing infinite, therefore, and unterminated, is perfect. Hence the definition of the perfect as that, namely, which has nothing of itself outside itself, does not apply to the infinite.

386. Then [261] he draws a conclusion from the foregoing. Since the definition of a "whole" does not apply to the infinite, it is clear that the position of Parmenides is better than that of Melissus. For Melissus said that the whole universe was infinite. Parmenides said the whole is terminated by what is "striving equally from the middle,"by which he

designated the body of the universe as spherical. For in a spherical figure, lines from the center to the term, i.e., the circumference, are drawn according to equality, as though "striving equally" with each other. And it is rightly stated that the whole universe is finite, for to be a whole and to be infinite are not reciprocally connected, i.e., not continuous as thread follows thread in spinning. For there was a proverb that things which follow one upon the other should be said to be continuous as thread following thread.

387. Then [262] he rejects a false opinion that arose from the aforesaid definition, and first in a general way, covering all variations; secondly the opinion of Plato, at 389.

He says therefore first that because some thought that whole and infinite were mutually connected, they consequently took it as a "dignity" [axium], i.e., something self-evident, that the infinite contains all things and that it has all things in itself. This was due to the fact that the infinite has a likeness to a whole, as what is in potency has a likeness to act. For the infinite, inasmuch as it is in potency, is as matter in respect to the perfection of magnitude, and it is as a whole in potency, not as a whole in act. This is proved by the fact that the infinite is based on the possibility of dividing things into what is smaller and of making, by a contrasting division, continual additions, as was said above (l.10). Consequently, the infinite in itself, according to its proper nature, is a whole in potency only; and it is something imperfect, comparable to matter not having perfection.

For it is not whole and infinite [or finished] according to itself, i.e., according to proper notion by which it is infinite, but according to something other, i.e., according to end and whole, to which it is in potency. For division, which is possible ad infinitum, is called "perfect" insofar as it is, whereas the division that goes on ad infinitum is imperfect. And it is clear, since it is the whole that contains but matter that is contained, that the infinite an such does not contain but is contained. This is true, insofar, namely, as whatever is in act of the infinite is always contained by something greater, accordingly as it is possible to take something beyond.

388. Now from the fact that the infinite is as a being in potency, not only does it follow that the infinite is contained and does not contain, but two other conclusions also follow. One is that the infinite, as such, is unknown, because it is as matter without species, i.e., form, and matter is not known except through form. The other conclusion, which has the same source, is

that the infinite has more the notion of a part than that of a whole, since matter is compared to the whole as a part. And it is not a surprise that the infinite conducts itself as a part, inasmuch as only a part of it is ever actual.

389. Then [263] he rejects an opinion of Plato who posited an infinite both in sensible and in intelligible things. And he states that from this it is plain also that if “the large” and “the small.” to which Plato attributed infinity, are in sensible and intelligible things as containing (by virtue of containment being attributed to the infinite), it follows that the infinite contains the intelligible things. But this seems unfitting and impossible, namely, that the infinite, since it is unknown and undetermined, should contain and determine intelligible things. For the known is not determined by the unknown, but rather the converse is true.

LECTURE 12

EXPLANATIONS IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEFINITION OF THE INFINITE

390. After giving a definition of the infinite, the Philosopher now assigns reasons for the things that are said about the infinite.

First, the reason for what is said about addition and division of the infinite;

Secondly, the reason for saying that the infinite is found in different things according to a certain order, at 397;

Thirdly, the reason for saying that mathematicians use the infinite, at 398;

Fourthly, the reason why the infinite is called a principle, at 399.

About the first he does two things:

First he presents the reason for what is said about the infinite in relation to division and addition in magnitudes;

Secondly, the reason for what is said of it in numbers by comparison to magnitudes, at 392.

391. It was said above (no. 379) that addition to infinity in magnitudes takes place in such a way that the resulting magnitude does not become greater than any given magnitude. But division to infinity in magnitudes results in reaching a quantity that is smaller than any pre-assigned quantity, as was expounded above (no. 379). However, he states [264] that this occurs reasonably, for since the infinite is like matter it is contained within just as matter is, while that which contains is the species and form. Now it is clear from what was said in Book II (l.5) that the whole is like form and the parts are like matter. Since, therefore, the division of a magnitude proceeds from the whole to the parts, it is reasonable that no limit be found there which is not transcended through infinite division. But the process of

addition goes from the parts to the whole, which is like a form that contains and terminates; hence it is reasonable that there be some definite quantity which infinite addition does not exceed.

392. Then [267] he explains infinity in numbers by comparison to magnitudes. For it was said that in number there is a smallest terminus below which division does not go; but there is no maximum limit which it cannot exceed, because it is possible through addition to exceed any given number. The opposite hcwever takes place in magnitudes, as was said (no. 391). The reason why is because every unity, inasmuch as it is a unity, is indivisible, as indivisible man is one man and not many men. Now every number can be resolved into unity, as is evident from the nature of number. For number signifies that there are more things than one, and any plurality exceeding one to a greater or lesser degree constitutes a definite species of number. Hence, since unity pertains to the notion of number and indivisibility pertains to the notion of unity, It follows that the division of number should halt at an indivisible terminus.

This statement that it is of the nature of number to be more than unity he explains by appealing to the species of number, because 2 and 3 and every other number is denominated by unity. Wherefore it is said in Metaphysics that the substance of 6 consists in its being six times one and not two times three, or three times two. Otherwise, it would follow that of the same thing there would be more than one definition and more than one nature, since, starting from different parts, a same number would come about in different ways.

393. Then [266] he gives the reason why in numbers addition exceeds any predetermined multitude. And he says that we can always think of a number greater than any given number, for the reason that magnitude is divided to infinity. For it is plain that division causes multidude; hence the more magnitude is divided the greater is the multitude that results, and upon the infinite division of magnitudes there follows the infinite addition of numbers. Therefore just as infinite division of magnitude is not in act but in potency, and exceeds every determinate quantity in smallness, as was said (nos.391,392), so the infinite addition of numbers is not in act but in potency, and exceeds every determinate multitude. But this number which is thus multiplied to infinity is not a number independent of the division of magnitudes.

394. On this point it must be remembered that division, as was stated (no.393), causes multitude. But division is of two kinds: one is formal, which is through opposites; the other is according to quantity. Now the first division causes that multitude which is a transcendental, accordingly as being is divided into “one” and “many”; but the division of continuous quantity causes number, which is a species of quantity, insofar as it has the notion of measure. And this number can grow to infinity, just as magnitude is divisible to infinity. But the multitude which arises from formal division cannot grow to infinity. For the species of things are determined, just as there is a determined quantity of the universe. That is why he says that the number which grows to infinity is not separated from the division of the continuum. Nor is this number infinite in the sense of something permanent. Rather it is as something always in a state of becoming, inasmuch as, to any given number, additions may be successively made, as is evident in the case of time and the number of time. For the number of time increases successively by the addition of day to day but not all days existed at once.

395. Then [267] he shows that the opposite occurs in magnitudes. For although a continuum be divided to infinity, as was said (nos. 393,394), the size cannot grow indefinitely even potentially. For as great as a thing is in potency, so great can it be in act. If, therefore, it were in the potency of nature that a magnitude grow to infinity, it would follow that there would actually be some infinite sensible magnitude—which is false, as stated (ll.8.9). The consequence is, therefore, that addition of magnitudes cannot go on to infinity so as to exceed every pre-determined quantity; for otherwise there would be something greater than the heavens.

396. [rom the foregoing it is plain that the claim of some that in primi matter there is a potency to every quantity is false; for in prime matter there is a potency only to determined quantity. It Is plain also from the foregoing why number does not have to be as great in act as it is potentially, as is said here of magnitude: for addition occurs in number as a consequence of the division of the continuum, by which one passes from a whole to what is in potency to number. Hence one need not arrive at some act terminating the potency. But the addition of magnitudes arrives at act, as was said (no. 391).

The Commentator [Averroes], however, assigns another reason: namely, that potency to addition in magnitude is in one and the same magnitude but the potency to addition in numbers is in various numbers inasmuch as to any number something can be added. But this reason has little value because just as addition produces varying species of number, so also varying species of measure, as, for example, “two cubits long” and “three cubits long” are called species of quantity. Moreover, whatever is added to a higher number is added to the lower. Accordingly, there is in one and the same number, e.g., two or three, a potency to infinite addition.

397. Then [260] he shows how the infinite is found in diverse ways in diverse things. And he says that the infinite is not found according to the same aspect in motion and magnitude and time, as if it were one nature being predicated univocally in all three cases. Rather it is said of the subsequent member in terms of its antecedent, for example, of motion by reference to the magnitude in which notion takes place (whether it be local motion, alteration or augmentation;) and of time by reference to notion. This happens because the infinite pertains to quantity, and notion is quantified by reference to magnitude, while time is quantified by reference to motion, as will be evident below (Bk. IV, l.17). And therefore he says that we are now mentioning these, but later what each of them is will be explained, as well as that every magnitude is divisible into magnitudes (Bk. VI, l.1).

398. Then [269] he explains how mathematicians make use of the infinite, and says that the argument that there is no actually infinite magnitude,(ll.8,9) does not destroy the consideration of the mathematicians, who use the infinite, as, for examplao when the geometer says, “Let this line be infinite.” For they do not need for their demonstrations the infinite in act,nor do they use it, but they need only some finite line of sufficient quantity for their needs, so as to be able to subtract from it so much as they wish. For their purpose it is enough that there exist some maximum magnitude which can be divided according to any proportion in respect to another given magnitude. Hence, for purposes of demonstration, it makes no difference whether this maximum magnitude be one way or the other, i.e., finite or infinite;but as to the being of things, it makes a great difference whether it is one or the other.

399. Then [270] he shows how the infinite is a principle. And he says that since there are four genera of causes, as was said above (Bk. II), the infinite is a cause in the manner of matter. For the infinite has being in potency, which is proper to matter. Now matter is sometimes under a form and

sometimes under privation. The infinite, however, has the notion of matter, not insofar as matter lies under a form but inasmuch as matter has privation—for the infinite implies the lack of perfection and term. That is why the Philosopher adds that the being of the infinite is privation, i.e., the notion of the infinite consists in privation.

And lest anyone suppose that the infinite is matter like prime matter, he adds that the per se subject of the privation which constitutes the nature of the infinite is the sensible continuum. That this is so is clear from the fact that the infinite found in numbers is caused from the infinite division of magnitude; and similarly, the infinite in time and notion are caused by magnitude. Hence, the first subject of the infinite in the continuum. And since really existing magnitude is not separated from sensible things, it follows that the subject of the infinite is sensible.

And on this point all the earlier philosophers agree who use the infinite as a material principle. Wherefore they improperly attributed to the infinite the capacity to contain, for matter does not contain but rather is contained.

LECTURE 13

SOLUTION OF ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXISTENCE OF THE INFINITE

400. After the Philosopher has used the definition of the infinite to explain the things attributed to it he now solves the argument presented above (l.7) to show the infinite existed.

First, he proposes his intention;

Then he follows it out, at 401.

He says therefore first [271] that after speaking of the nature of the it remains to settle the arguments which appeared to show that the infinite is not only something in potency, as we determined above (l. 10), but that was in act, as things are that are finite and determined. For some of the arguments do not conclude necessarily but are entirely false, while others are partially true.

401. Then [272] he solves the five reasons cited above (l.7) as proving that the infinite exists. And first he solves the one based on the fact of generation. For it concluded that if generation does not cease, then the infinite must be. Now this argument concludes truly insofar as the infinite is in a potency that is successively reduced to act. But it is not necessary that there be some sensible body which is infinite in act, in order to account for generation not ceasing, as the earlier philosophers supposed when they said that generation continues to infinity, supposing it to take place by extracting from some body, with the consequence that the process could not be infinite unless that body were infinite. But this is not necessary: for even supposing the whole of sensible body as finite, generation can endure ad infinitum by the fact that the corruption of one thing is the generation of another.

402. Then [273] he solves the argument based on the principle of contact, as though it were necessary for every finite body to touch some other body and so on to infinity. But he solves this by saying that it is one thing to be “touched” and another to be “terminated”, because to be “touched” and “enclosed” are said in respect to something else, for whatever touches, touches something else. To be “terminated,” however, is said absolutely and does not imply a relationship to something else, because a thing is made finite in itself by its own terminations. For it is incidental to the finite that it be touching something. Nevertheless, neither is it necessary that everything touched by something should touch something else and that this go on to infinity. Hence it is evident that this argument does not conclude anything of necessity.

403. Then [274] he solves the argument based on the intellect and the imagination, which latter the ancients did not distinguish from the intellect. This argument above (l.7) concluded that there was outside the universe an infinite space, and consequently a place and a body. But it is incorrect to “trust to thought,” i.e., believe that whatever is apprehended by the imagination or intellect is true, as some of the ancients thought, whose opinion is refuted in Metaphysics IV. For if I apprehend a thing as smaller or larger than it is, it does not thereby follow that there is such an abundance or defect in the object itself but only in the apprehension of the intellect or imagination. For one might understand some man to be a multiple of himself, i.e., two or three times larger than he really if, or any other amount to infinity, yet there will not be because of this a corresponding multiplication of him outside the intellect or outside a definite quantity or magnitude.

404. But while a thing remains what it is, one can conceive of it in such a manner. Then [275] he solves the difficulty based on time and motion. And he says that time and motion are not infinite in act, because nothing of time is actual but the “now,” and nothing of motion is actual except a kind of indivisible. But the intellect apprehends a continuity in time and in motion by apprehending an order of “prior” and “posterior,” in such a way, however, that what was first taken in time or in motion does not remain in the same state. Hence it is not necessary to say that the whole of motion is infinite, or that the whole of time is infinite.

405. Then [276] he solves the argument based on magnitude, and he says that magnitude is not infinite in act either as a result of division or of an intelligible increase, as is evident from what was said above (ll.8-10).

Finally he summarizes by saying that we have completed our study of the infinite.

BOOK IV

LECTURE 1

PLACE, ITS EXISTENCE

406. After treating in Book III of motion, and the infinite, which belongs intrinsically to motion insofar as it is in the genus of continuous things, the Philosopher now intends, in Book IV, to deal with the things that are extrinsically connected with motion.

First, of things that are connected with motion extrinsically as measures of mobile things:

Secondly, of time which is the measure of motion itself, at no.558 (L.15,1.

As to the first he does two things:

First, he studies place;

Secondly, the void, at no. 494 (L.9).

About the first he does two things:

First, he shows that it is the business of the natural philosopher to study place;

Secondly, he carries out his proposition, at no. 411.

As to the first he does two things:

First, [277] he proposes what he intends and says that just as it is the business of the natural philosopher to determine about the infinite; namely, whether it exists or not, and how it exists, and what it is, so also about place;

Secondly, at no. 407, he proves what he had said:

First from the viewpoint of place itself;

Secondly, from our viewpoint [i.e., that of the ones studying place] at no. 409.

407. About the first he gives two reasons, of which the following is the first [278]. Whatever things are common to all natural things pertain

especially to the considerations of the natural philosopher; but place is such, for all generally maintain that whatever exists is in some place. They prove it by a sophistic argument consisting of positing the consequent. They argue thus: What does not exist is nowhere, i.e., in no place, for there is no place where the goat-stag or the sphinx exist, which are certain fictions after the manner of chimeras. They argue therefore that if what is found in no place does not exist, then whatever exists is in a place.

But if to be in place belongs to all beings, it seems that place pertains rather to the consideration of metaphysics then that of physics.

And it must be said that Aristotle here argues from the opinion of those who posit that all beings are sensible, on account of their inability to go beyond their imaginations. According to them, natural science is first philosophy, common to all beings, as is mentioned in Metaphysics IV (L.5).

408. Then [279] he gives the second reason: The consideration of motion belongs to the natural philosopher; but the motion which is according to place and is called “change of place” is the most general of all motions. For some things namely, the heavenly bodies, are moved solely according to this motion and nothing is moved with other motions without being moved by this one. Moreover, this motion is more properly so because it alone is truly continuous and perfect, as will be proved in Book VIII. But notion according to place cannot be known without knowing place. The natural philosopher therefore should consider place.

409. Then [280] he arrives at the same conclusion from our viewpoint: Wise men should settle matters about which there is doubt; but there are many doubts about what place is. The cause of these doubts is twofold. One is based on place itself: because not all the properties of place lead to the same opinion about place, but from certain properties of place it seems that place is one thing and from other properties that it is something else. The other cause is based on men, for the ancients neither proposed their doubts about place well nor pursued the truth of the matter well.

410. Then [281] he begins to determine about place.

First in a dialectical manner;

Secondly, by determining the truth, at no. 434.

As to the first he does two things:

First he discusses dialectically whether place exists;

Secondly what it is at no. 422.

About the first he does two things:

First he gives reasons showing that place exists;

Secondly, showing that it does not exist, at no. 415.

As to the first he does two things:

First he shows that place exists, by using reasons based on the truth of things;

Secondly, by reasons based on the opinions of others, at no. 413.

411. In regard to the first, he gives two reasons. In the first of these he proceeds thus: That place is something, is clear from the very transmutation of bodies that are moved according to place. For just as the transmutation which is according to form led men to the knowledge of matter, because there had to be a subject in which the forms could succeed one another, so transmutation according to place led men to a knowledge of place, for there had to be something where bodies could succeed one another. And this is what he adds, namely, that when water goes out from where it now is, i.e., from some vessel, air re-enters. Since, therefore, another body sometimes occupies the same place, it is clear that place is something different from the things that are in place and which are moved according to place. For where air now is there was previously water, and this would not be if place were not something different from both the air and the water. Consequently, place is something: it is a sort of receptacle distinct from any of the things located in it, and it is the term "from which" and "unto which" of local motion.

412. He gives the second reason [282], saying that since the motion of any body whatsoever shows that place exists, as has been said, then the local motion of natural simple bodies, such as fire and earth, and such like heavy and light bodies, not only shows that place is something, but also that place has a certain power and force.

For we observe that each of these bodies is carried to its proper place when it is not prevented, i.e., the heavy are carried down and the light upward. This shows that place has a certain power of pre-serving the thing that is in place. For this reason, an object tends to its own place by a desire of self-preservation. This, however, does not prove that place has the power to attract, except in the sense in which the end is said to attract.

"Up" and "down" and the other directions, namely, "before" and "behind," "right" and "left," are the parts and species of place. These directions are determined in the universe according to nature and not merely in relation to ourselves. This is clear from the fact that when we speak of them in relation to ourselves, the same thing is not always "up" or "down," "right" or "left," but varies according to our various relations to it. Hence it frequently happens that an immobile object which was "on the right" comes to be "on the left." The same is true of the other directions, depending on our different relations to them.

But in nature there is a definite "up" and "down" according to the motion of heavy and light bodies, and the other [four] directions are determined by the movements of the heavens, as was said in Book III. It is not just any part of the universe that is "up" and just any part that is "down," but "up" is always whether light bodies are carried and "down" is whether heavy bodies tend. Now whatever things have according to themselves definite positions must have powers by which they are determined, for in an animal the power of the right is distinct from the power of the left. Accordingly, place exists and has definite powers.

Now, that in certain things the position is assigned only in relation to us is shown in mathematical objects, which, although they are not in place, yet have a position attributed to them solely in relation to ourselves. Hence they have no position according to nature but only according to the intellect, inasmuch as they are understood in some relation to ourselves, either as above or below, or to the right or left.

413. Then [283] he appeals to the opinions of others to show that place exists. First, to the opinion of those who posit a void. For whoever asserts that the void exists must admit that place exists, since the void is nothing more than a place devoid of body. And so from this and from the reasons given above, it is possible to conceive that place is something other than bodies and that all sensible bodies exist in place.

414. Secondly, [284] to confirm the same point he uses the opinion of Hesiod, who was one of the ancient theological poets. It was he who taught that the first thing made was chaos. For he said that the first of all things made was chaos, it being a sort of confusion and a receptacle for bodies; later the extended earth was made to receive various bodies—as if first a receptacle of things had to exist before the things themselves could exist. And he and others posited this because, with many others, they believed that all things that exist are in place. And if this is true, it follows that place

not only exists but that it has a remarkable power in that it is the first of all beings. For that can exist without other things but they not without it, seems to be first. But according to them place can exist without bodies—a conjecture they made by observing that place remains even when the things occupying it are destroyed. But things cannot exist without place. It follows, therefore, according to them, that place is the first among all beings.

LECTURE 2

SIX DIALECTICAL REASONS SHOWING PLACE DOES NOT EXIST

415. After giving reasons to show that place exists, the Philosopher now gives six reasons showing that place does not exist. Now the way to begin investigating the question "whether a thing exists" is to settle on "what it is," at least as to what its name means. Therefore he says [285] that although it has been shown that place exists, there is a difficulty, i.e., a question, about what it is, even if it does exist: Is it a bodily mass or a nature of some other kind?

416. Hence, he argues thus: If place is anything it must be a body; for place has three dimensions, namely, length, width and depth; and such things determine a body because whatever has three dimensions is body. But place cannot be a body, because, since place and the body in it are together, there would be two bodies together, which is unacceptable. Therefore, it is impossible for place to be anything.

417. He gives a second reason [286]: If the place of a body is a receptacle distinct from the body, then the place of its surface must be a receptacle distinct from this surface, and similarly for the other limits of quantity, such as the line and the point. He proves this conditional proposition in the following manner: Place was proved to be distinct from bodies on the ground that where the body of air now is, there was the body of water previously; but similarly where the surface of the water was, there is now the surface of the air; therefore the place of the surface is distinct from the surface and the same holds for the line and the point.

He argues therefore by the destruction of the consequent, starting from the fact that there can be no difference between the place of ths point itself.

For, since a place is not greater than the thing in place, the place of a point can be only an indivisible. Now two quantitative indivisibles, e.g., two points joined together, are just one point. For the same reason, therefore, neither the place of the surface will be different from the surface itself, nor the place of the body different from the body itself.

418. He gives a third reason [287]: whatever is, either in an element or composed of elements; but place is neither of these; therefore place does not exist. The middle [minor] premise he proves thus: Whatever is an element or composed of elements is either corporeal or incorporeal; but place is not incorporeal, for it has magnitude, nor is it corporeal, because it is not a body, as we have already shown. Therefore it is neither an element nor composed of elements.

Now since someone might say that even though it is not a body, it is nevertheless a bodily element, he excludes this by adding that all sensible bodies have corporeal elements, because the elements are not outside the genus of their compounds. For no magnitude results from intelligible principles which are incorporeal. Hence if place is not a body, it cannot be a corporeal element.

419. He gives the fourth reason [288]: Everything that exists is somehow a cause in relation to something else; but place cannot be a cause in any of the four ways. It is not a cause as matter, because things that exist are not composed out of place and that is implied in the very notion of matter, nor is it a formal cause, for then all things that have the same place would be of the same species, since the principle of the species is the form. It is not like the final cause in things, since places seem to be for the sake of the things in place rather than they for the sake of the places. Finally, it is not an efficient or moving cause, since place is the terminus of a motion. Therefore it seems place is nothing.

420. He gives the fifth reason [289], which is Zeno’s reason: Whatever exists is in place; hence if place is anything it follows that it is itself in place and that place in another place and so on ad infinitum. But this is impossible; consequently, place is not anything.

421. He gives the sixth reason [290]: Every body is in a place and in every place is a body (according to the opinion of many). From this it is taken that place is neither smaller nor larger than the thing in place. When therefore a thing in place grows, its place also should grow. However, this

seems impossible, for place is an immobile something. Therefore place is not anything.

In summary he says that for reasons of this sort doubts are raised not only as to the nature of place, but also as to its very existence. However, these reasons will be answered by what follows.

LECTURE 3

IS PLACE MATTER OR FORM?

422. Having inquired dialectically into the question of place’s existence, the Philosopher now attacks the question: what is place?

First he gives dialectical reasons showing that place is form or matter;

Secondly, he gives reasons to the contrary, at no. 429.

As to the first he does three things:

First he gives a reason showing that place is form;

Secondly, that place is matter, at no. 425.

Thirdly, from these he draws a corollary, at no. 428.

423. He says therefore first 52917 that just as in beings some are per se beings and others per accidens, so in regard to place, one place is common, in which all bodies exist, and another is proper and is called “place”, primarily and per se. Now common place is so called only per accidens and in relation to a previous place. He explains this thus: “I can say that you are in the heavens, because you are in the air which is in the heavens, and that you are in the air and in the heavens, because you are on earth and you are said to be on earth, because you are in a place containing nothing but you.”

424. Consequently, what contains a thing primarily and per se is its per se place. Now such a place is the boundary at which a thing is terminated. Therefore, place is properly and per se a boundary of a thing. But the boundary of each thing is its form, because it is through the form that the matter of anything is limited to its own existence and magnitude to a determinate measure. For the quantities of things follow upon their forms. According to this, therefore, it seems that place is the form.

However, it should be noted that in this argument there is the fallacy of consequent; for it is a syllogism in the second figure with two affirmative premises.

425. Then [292] he gives a reason of Plato through which it seemed to him that place is matter. To see this, one must note that the ancients thought that place was the space enveloped by the boundaries of the container, which has the dimensions of length, breadth, and depth. But this space did not seem to be the same as any sensible body, because the space remained the same even when various bodies successively entered it and left. Thus it follows that place is a set of separate dimensions.

426. From this Plato wished to demonstrate that place is matter. This is what he [Aristotle] says: Because some consider that place is the distance of the magnitude of space distinct from every sensible body, place would seem to be matter. For the distance or dimension of a magnitude is distinct from the magnitude. For magnitude signifies something terminated by some species [or form], as a line is terminated by points, and a surface by line, and a body by surface, and these are species of magnitude. But the dimension of space is contained under a determined form as a body is determined by a plane, i.e., by a surface, as, by a definite boundary. Now whatever is contained under boundaries seems to be in itself not determined. What is not determined in itself but by a form and boundary is matter which has the nature of the infinite. For were we to remove from some spherical body its sensible qualities and the boundaries by which the dimension of its magnitude acquires its definite figure, nothing would remain but the matter. Consequently the dimensions themselves, which are not determined by themselves but by something else, are matter.

This followed mainly from the underlying principles of Plato, who posited numbers and quantities as the substance of things.

427. Therefore, because place is dimensions and dimensions are matter, Plato said in the Timaeus that place and matter are the same. For he said that whatever is a receptacle of anything is a place (failing to distinguish between the receptiveness of place and of matter). Hence, since matter receives form, it follows that matter is place.

Yet it should be noted that Plato spoke in various ways about receptacles: for in the Timaeus he said that the receptacle is matter but in his “unwritten teaching,” i.e., his oral teaching in the schools, he said that the receptacle was “the large and the small,” which however he allied with matter, as we have said above. Yet no matter to what he attributed receptivity, he always said that the receptacle and place are the same. Therefore, while many did say that place is something, Plato alone endeavored to say what place is.

428. Then [293] he concludes from the foregoing that if place is either matter or form, it seems reasonable to say that it is difficult to know what place is: because both matter and form involve very lofty and difficult speculation; moreover, it is not easy to know either of them without the other.

429. Then [294] he gives five reasons to the contrary. In the first of these he says that it is not difficult to see that place is neither matter nor form. For form and matter are not separate from the thing of which they are components, whereas place can be separated—in the place where air was, water now is. In like manner, other bodies also mutually change place. Hence it is clear that place is not part of a thing, as matter or form. Nor is place an accident of a thing, because parts and accidents are nor separable from a thing, whereas place is separable. He shows this by an example: place seems to be related to the thing in place as a vessel, the only difference being that place is immobile and the vessel mobile, as will be explained below (L.6). Consequently, since place is separable, it is not form. But that place is not matter is shown not only by the fact that it is separable, but also by the fact that it contains, whereas matter does not contain but is contained.

430. He now gives a second reason [295]. Since he had shown that place is neither matter nor form on the ground that place is separated from the thing in place, he now wishes to show that even if place were never separated from the thing in place, yet the very fact that we say something is in place shows that place is neither form nor matter. For whatever is said to be anywhere seems both to be something and to be distinct from that in which it is. Hence, when something is said to be in place, it follows that place is outside the thing, whereas matter and form are not outside the thing. Therefore, neither matter nor form is place.

431. In the third reason [296] he makes a digression to argue specifically against the position of Plato. For it was said in Book III that Plato posited ideas and numbers as not in place. But logically, according to his opinion about place, they should be in place, because whatever is participated is in the participant—and he said that species and numbers are participated either by matter or by "the large and the small." Accordingly, species and number

exist in matter or in “the large and small,” Therefore, if matter or “the large and the small” are place, it follows that numbers and species are in place.

432. He gives the fourth reason [297]. In this regard he says that no good explanation could be given of how something could be moved according to place, if matter and form are place. For it is impossible to assign a place in things that are not moved up or down or in any direction of place; hence place must be sought in things that are moved according to place. But if place is something intrinsic to what is moved (which would be the case if matter or form were place), it follows that place will be in a place, for whatever is changed in respect to place is itself in place. Now whatever is in a thing, such as its species and the infinite, i.e., its matter, is moved with the thing, since they are not always in the same place, but are wherever the thing is. Therefore, matter and form must be in a place. Therefore, if either of them is place, it follows that place is in a place, which is unacceptable.

433. The fifth reason is then given [298]. Whenever anything is corrupted, the parts of its species are somehow corrupted. Now matter and form are the parts of the species. Therefore, when the thing corrupts, then, at least per accidens, the matter and form are corrupted. Consequently, if matter and form are place, it follows that place is corrupted, if place pertains to the species. Now the body which is generated would not be in the same place, if the place of air pertained to the species of the air, as when water is generated from air. But no explanation can be given of how place is corrupted; hence it cannot be said that matter or form are place.

Finally, he summarizes by asserting that we have stated why it seems place must exist and what causes doubt about its existence.

LECTURE 4

PREREQUISITES TO DETERMINING THE TRUTH ABOUT PLACE

434. After inquiring dialectically into the existence and nature of place, the Philosopher now proceeds to the task of determining the truth.

First he lays down certain things necessary to the consideration of the truth:

Secondly, he determines the truth, at no. 445.

As to the first he does three things:

First he points out the ways in which one thing is said to be in another;

Secondly, he asks whether anything can be in itself, at no. 437;

Thirdly, he settles some difficulties previously raised, at no. 443.

435. He lists [299] eight ways in which something is said to be in something.

The first of these is the way in which a finger is said to be in the hand and in general how any part is in its whole.

The second way is as the whole is said to be in the parts. And because this way is not so customary as the first, he explains it by adding that the whole is not something outside the parts, and thus must be understood as existing in the parts.

The third way is as "man" is said to be in "animal," and any species in its genus.

The fourth way is as the genus is said to be in the species. And lest this way seem out of place, he gives a reason for mentioning it: the genus is part of the definition of the species as is the difference; hence in some way both the genus and the difference are said to be in the species as parts in the whole.

The fifth way is as health is said to be in hot and cold things, the balance between which constitutes health; and in general as any other form is in matter or a subject, whether it be an accidental or a substantial form.

The sixth way is as the affairs of the Greeks are said to exist in the king of Greece, and generally as everything that is moved is in the first mover. According to this way, I can say that something is in me, because it is in my power to do it.

In the seventh way something is said to be in something as in something supremely loveable and desirable, and generally as in an end. in this way someone’s heart is said to be in what he desires and loves.

Finally in an eighth way something is said to be in something as in a vessel, and in general as a thing in place is in its place.

He seems to have skipped the way in which something is in something as in time. But this is reduced to the eighth way. For just as place is the measure of the mobile thing, so time is the measure of motion.

436. Then he says that it is according to the eighth way that something is in a very proper sense said to be in something. Hence, according to the rule given in Metaphysics IV and V, all the other modes must somehow be reduced to this eighth way, according to which, something is in something as in a place. This is done in the following way.

The thing in place is contained or included by its place and has rest and it has rest and immobility therein. Therefore the way closest to this one is that in which a part is said to be in the integral whole in which it is actually included. Accordingly, it will be said below that a thing in place is as a “separated” part, and a part as a “conjoined” thing in place.

The whole which is according to reason is like this whole; hence it is said that what is in the notion of something is in it, as “animal” in “man.”

Now just as it happens that the part of an integral whole is enclosed in a whole according to act, so the part of a universal whole is enclosed in a whole according to potency for the genus extends to more things potentially than the species does, although the species may have more elements in act. Consequently, species is also said to be in the genus.

And because, just as the species is contained in the potency of the genus, so form is contained in the potency of matter, it is further said that form is in the matter.

And because the whole has the notion of form in relation to the parts, as was said in Book II, consequently the whole is also said to be in the parts. But just as form is enclosed under the passive potency of matter, so the effect is enclosed under the active potency of the agent. Whence it is that something is said to be in a first mover.

Finally, it is clear that the appetite rests in the good it desires and loves and is, indeed, fixed in it, just as the thing in place is fixed in place. Hence the affection of the lover is said to be in the thing loved.

And thus it is evident that all the other ways are derived from the last, which is the most proper.

437. Then [302] he asks whether anything can be in itself, for Anaxagoras said above that the infinite exists in itself.

Therefore, he first raises the question: whether one and the same thing can be in itself; or whether nothing can, but all things either never are or are in something else.

438. Secondly [302] he answers this;

First he shows how something can be in itself;

Secondly, how it cannot, at no. 439.

He says first, therefore [301] that something may be understood to be in itself in two ways: in one way, primarily and per se; in another way, in relation to something else, i.e., in relation to a part. And it is in this second way that something may be said to be in itself. For when two parts of some whole are so related that one part is that in which the other exists and the other is that which is in the first, it follows that the whole is both that "in which" something exists (by reason of one part) and that which is "in this" (by reason of the other), and thus is the whole said to be in itself.

For we observe that something is said of something according to a part, for example, someone is called "white" because his surface is white, and a man is called "knowing" because science is in his rational part. If therefore we take a jug full of wine as a certain "whole" whose parts are jug and wine, neither of the parts will exist in itself, i.e., neither the jug nor the wine, but this whole, which is a jug of wine, will be in itself inasmuch as each is a part of it, i.e., both the wine which is in the jug and the jug in which the wine is. It is in this way, therefore, that one and the same thing can be in itself.

439. Then [302] he shows that nothing can be primarily in itself.

First he proposes what he intends, distinguishing both the way in which something is in itself and the way in which it is not;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at no. 440.

He says, therefore, that there is no case of anything being primarily in itself. And he makes clear what it is for something to be primarily in itself by citing an example of the opposite. For something white is said to be in a body, because the surface is in the body: hence the white is nor primarily in the body but in the surface. In like manner, science is said to be primarily in the soul, and not in the man, in whom science exists by reason of the soul. And it is according to this, i.e., according to the soul and the surface, that the appellations whereby a man is called “white” or “knowing” are verified, since the soul and the surface are as parts of man—not that the surface is a part, but it is like a part, inasmuch as it is something of the man, as The boundary of his body.

Now, if wine and jug are taken as separated one from the other, they are not parts; hence it belongs to neither of them to exist in itself. But when they are together, as when a jug is full of wine, then because both jug and wine are parts, the same thing will be existing in itself (as was explained above), not primarily but through its parts, just as white is not primarily in the man but is there through the body, and in the body through the surface. But it is not in the surface through anything else; hence it is said to be in the surface primarily. Nor is that in which something exists primarily, and that which is in it, the same, as in the case of white and surface. For surface and white are specifically different, and the nature and potency of each is different.

440. Then [303] having pointed out the difference between being primarily in something and not being primarily in something, he now shows that nothing is primarily in itself.

First he shows that nothing is primarily in itself per se;

Secondly, per accidens, at no. 442.

And he explains the first point in two ways: namely, inductively and with an argument. He says therefore first, that by considering inductively all the ways determined above in which something is said to be in itself, it is found that nothing exists in itself primarily and per se: for nothing is the totality of itself, [i.e., in itself as whole in part?], nor as part [in whole?] as genus [in species?], and so on. He lays this down by concluding from what has gone before, because just as it is clear in the case of the white and of the surface (which are related as form and matter) that they differ both in species and in power, the same thing can be considered in all the other modes.

441. Then [304] he proves the same thing with an argument and says that it is clear by reasoning that it is impossible for anything to be primarily and per se in itself. For if there be anything such, necessarily the same thing, in the same way, will have the notion both of that in which something is, and that which is in it. Hence, each would have to be both the container and the content; for example, the jug would be the vessel and the wine, and the wine both the wine and jug, if something could be primarily and per se in itself. Now on this assumption (namely, that the wine is both the jug and wine, and the jug both wine and jug), if anyone were to say that either is in the other, for example, that the wine is in the jug, it would follow that the wine is received into the jug not inasmuch it is wine, but inasmuch as wine is the jug. Wherefore, if to be in the jug primarily and per se is a property of the jug (on the assumption that something is primarily and ptr se in itself), it follows that nothing can be said to be in the jug except inasmuch as that something is the jug. And so, if the wine is said to be in the jug, it follows that to be in the jug belongs to the wine, not inasmuch as it is wine, but inasmuch as the wine is the jug.

For the same reason, if the jug receives the wine, it will receive it not inasmuch as the jug is jug but inasmuch as the jug is wine. Now this is unacceptable. Hence, it is clear that it is under different aspects that something is “that in which” and “that which is in.” For it is one thing to be that which is in something, and another to be that in which something is. Consequently, nothing can be primarily and per se in itself.

442. Then [305] he shows that nothing exists primarily in itself even according to accident. For something is said to be in something according to accident, when it is in it on account of something else existing in it; as, for example, when we say that a man is in the sea because he is in a boat which is in the sea: he is nevertheless said to be in the boat primarily, i.e., not according to a part. If therefore something could be in itself primarily, though not per se but per accidens, it would be in itself on account of something else being in it. And so it follows that two bodies are in the same thing; namely, the body which is in something and that same thing as existing in itself. In this way a jug will be in itself per accidens, if the jug

itself, whose nature it is to receive something, is in itself, and again that which it receives, i.e., the wine. Therefore, in the jug will exist both jug and wine, if, because the wine is in the jug it follows that the jug is in itself; and so two bodies would be in the same. Consequently, it is clearly impossible for anything to be primarily in itself.

Notice, however, that sometimes something is said to be "in itself" not according to an affirmation but according to a negation, inasmuch as to be in itself signifies nothing more than not to be in something else.

443. Then [306] he settles certain doubts. First he destroys Zeno's reason which was appealed to as proof that place does not exist on the assumption that, if it did, it must exist in something else and so on ad infinitum. But this, as he says, is not difficult to answer after one knows the various ways in which something is said to be "in" something else.

For there is nothing to prevent our saying that place is in something: for while it is not in something as in a place, it is in something in some other way, as form is in matter or an accident in a subject, inasmuch as place is a boundary of the container. And this is what he adds: as health is in the hot as a habit, and heat is in a body as a passion or accident. Hence it is not necessary to proceed to infinity.

444. Then [307] he also settles the doubts mentioned above about the nature of place (namely, whether it be form or matter) by appealing to his proof that nothing exists in itself primarily and per se. For it is clear from this proof that nothing can be the vessel or place of that which is contained in it after the manner of a part such as matter or form is: for that which is in something and that in which something is must be primarily and per se distinct, as we have shown. Hence, it follows that neither form nor matter is place; rather place is something entirely different from the thing in place, whereas matter and form belong to the thing in place as intrinsic parts thereof.

Finally he concludes that the things said above about place were said as contesting it. Some of these oppositions have now been solved; others will be solved after the nature of place is manifested.

LECTURE 5

NECESSARY PREVIOUS NOTIONS FOR THE DEFINITION OF PLACE

445. After setting forth a preliminary discussion about whether place exists and what it is, and after solving some doubtful points on these matters, the Philosopher now begins the task of determining the truth about place.

First he gives some presuppositions to be used in determining about place;

Secondly, he shows what qualities a definition of place should have, at no. 447;

Thirdly, he begins to determine about place, at no. 448.

446. He says first therefore [308] that it will be clear from the following just what place is. But we must first adopt as it were certain suppositions and self-evident principles, those namely, which appear intrinsic to place. Indeed, there are four such:

For all agree on this maxim, that place contains that of which it is the place, yet in such a way that place is not any part of the thing in place. He says this to exclude the containing force of form, which is part of a thing, but contains in a manner different from place.

The second supposition is that the primary place, i.e., that in which something exists primarily, is equal to, and neither greater nor less than, the thing in place.

The third supposition is that a place exists for everything in place, i.e., that everything in place has a place, but not in the sense that one and the same place is never lost by one and the same thing capable of being in a place; for a place can be separated from a thing in place. However, when one place is lost by a thing in place, it acquires another place.

The fourth supposition is that in all places there is found, as a [specific] difference of place, an “up” and a “down,” and that each body, when it is outside its proper place, naturally seeks it and, when it is in it, naturally remains there. Now the proper places of natural bodies are “up” and down,” to which they are naturally borne and in which they remain. But he says this in keeping with the opinion of those who posited no body other than the four elements: for he has not yet proved the heavenly body to be neither light nor heavy—which he will prove later in De Coelo, I . From these presuppositions he proceeds to the consideration of what remains.

447. He then [309] shows what qualities should be found in a definition of place. And he says that in defining place our attention should be focused on four things which indeed are necessary for a perfect definition:

First, that one show what place is, for a definition is an expression indicating what a thing is.

Secondly, that one resolve conflicting arguments about place: for the knowledge of truth involves the solution of doubts.

Thirdly, that the given definition reveal the properties of place, which inhere in it, because a definition is the middle term in a demonstration, by which the proper accidents are demonstrated of the subject.

Fourthly, that from the definition of place the cause will be clear why there is disagreement about place and of all the conflicting things said about it. Such a procedure is the most beautiful way of defining anything.

448. Then [310] he determines about place;

First he shows what place is;

Secondly, at no. 487, he settles the doubts previously mentioned;

Thirdly, he assigns the cause of the natural properties of place, at no. 492.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows what place is;

Secondly, how something exists in place, at no. 472(L.7).

As to the first he does two things:

First he mentions some facts preliminary to his hunt for the definition;

Secondly, he begins to investigate the definition of place, at no. 455 (L.6).

449. In regard to the first, be makes four preliminary statements, the first of which is that the question of place would never have arisen were there no motion in regard to place. For it was necessary to posit place as something

distinct from the object in place, because two bodies are found successively in the same place, and, in like manner, one body successively in two places. (Similarly, it was the successive change of forms in one and the same matter that led to the knowledge of matter). For this reason some are convinced that the heavens are in place, since they are always in motion. Now, of motions, one is according to place per se, namely, the change of place; another is consequently related to place, namely, increase and decline, because as a body grows or decreases, it acquires a larger or a smaller place.

450. He gives the second [311], saying that some things are moved, per se in act as in the case with every body, while others according to accident. This latter can occur in two ways. For some things that could be moved essentially are de facto moved accidentally, as the parts of a body while they are in the whole body are moved per accidens but when they are separated they are moved per se. Thus, a nail, when it is embedded in a ship, is moved per accidens, but when it is extracted it is moved per se. Other things are not be moved per se, but only per accidens, as is the case with whiteness and knowledge, which change place as that in which they are changes place. This point was brought up because things are apt to be in place per se or per accidens, actually or potentially in the same way as they are apt to be moved in those ways.

451. He gives the third [312] when he says that someone is said to be in the heavens as in a place because he is in the air which indeed is in the heavens. Yet we do not say that anyone is in the entire air primarily and per se, but by reason of the ultimate boundary of the air containing him he is said to be in the air. For if the whole air were anything’s place, e.g., a man’s, the place and the thing in place would not be equal—which is against what was supposed above. But that in which something exists primarily is seen to be the boundary of the containing body; and this is what primary place means, i.e., equal.

452. He gives the fourth reason [313]. First, he mentions it; secondly, he proves it, at no. 453.

He says therefore first that whenever the container is not separate from the thing contained but is continuous with it, the latter is not said to be in it as in a place, but as a part in a whole; as, for example, when we say that one part of the air is contained by the totality of air. And he concludes this from what went before, because where there is a continuum there is no ultimate boundary in act, something that is required for place, as was stated above. But when the container is separated, and contiguous to the thing contained, this latter is in place and exists in the ultimate boundary of the container primarily and per se, of a container, that is, which is not a part of the contained and neither greater nor less but equal in dimension. But how the container and the thing contained can be equal he shows by pointing out that the ultimate boundaries of things touching are together: whence, their ultimate boundaries must be equal.

453. Then he proves the fourth point by two arguments [314]. The first of these is that something contained that forms a continuum with the container is not moved in the container but with the container, as the part is moved simultaneously with the whole; but when it is separate from the container, then it can be moved in it, whether the container be moved or not—for a man is moved on a ship whether it be moving or at rest. Therefore, since something can be moved in a place, it follows that place is a separated container.

454. He gives a second argument for the fourth point [315], saying that when the thing contained is not separate from the container but continuous with it, then it is said to be in it as a part in a whole, as sight is in the eye as a formal part and the hand in the body as an organic part. But when the container and the thing contained are separate, then the latter is in it as in a vessel; as water in a barrel or wine in a cup. The difference between the example in the first case and in the second is that the hand is moved with the body, but not in the body, but the water is moved in the barrel.

Therefore, since we have said above that to be in place is to be there as in a vessel but not as a part in a whole, it follows that place is like a separated container.

LECTURE 6

THE DEFINITION OF PLACE

455. After positing the preliminary notions required for the search of the definition of place, the Philosopher now begins his search for the definition. About this he does three things:

First, he looks into each part of the definition;

Secondly, he shows that it is a good definition, at no. 471

As to the first he does two things:

First, he searches for the genus of place;

Secondly, for the differentia that will complete the definition, at no.467.

In searching for the genus of place he divides. In connection with this he does three things:

First he gives the division;

Secondly, he excludes three members of the division, at no. 457;

Thirdly, he concludes to the fourth member, at no. 466.

456. He says therefore first [316] that from the previous discussion the nature of place may already be clear. For it seems that according to what is ordinarily said of place that it is one of four things: namely, matter or form or the space between and within the boundaries of the container, or, if there is no space within the boundaries of the container which has its own dimensions over and above the dimensions of the body existing within the confines of the container, then it will be necessary to posit a fourth possibility, namely, that place is the boundary of the containing body.

457. Then [317] he excludes three members of this division.

First, he proposes what he intends, saying that it is clear from what follows that place is not any of these three;

Secondly, he pursues his intention, at no. 458.

First, that it is not form;

Secondly, that it is not space, at no. 460;

Thirdly, that it is not matter, at no. 464.

458, In regard to the first he does two things. First [318] he sets down why form seems to be place: it is because form is a container, and this seems to be a property of place. Now the boundaries of the containing body and those of the contained are together, since the container and the contained are contiguous. Thus it does not seem that the containing boundary, which is place, is separate from that of the body contained. Consequently, there does not seem to be any difference between place and form.

459. Secondly, [319], he shows that form is not place. For although place and form are alike in this, that each is a kind of boundary, nevertheless they are not the boundary of one and the same thing: for form is the boundary of the body of which it is the form, while place is not a boundary of the body of which it is the place, but of the body containing it. So, although the boundaries of the container and of the contained are together, they are not identical.

460. Then [320] he takes up the question of space.

First he sets down why space seems to be place;

Secondly, he shows that it is not place, at no. 461.

He says therefore first that frequently a body contained by place, and distinct from it, is changed from one place to another, and any number of bodies can succeed into its original place (but always in such a way that the container remains immobile) in the way that water goes out of a vessel. For this reason it seems that place is some middle space between the boundaries of the containing body, as though there were something there besides the body moved from one place to another. For if nothing were there besides the contained body, it would follow either that place is not distinct from the thing in place, or that what exists within the confines of the container’s boundaries cannot be place. Now just as place must be something over and above the contained body, so it must be something other than the containing body, due to the fact that place remains immobile, whereas the containing body and everything in it can be changed about. But in addition to the containing body and the contained body there is nothing present except the dimensions of space, which exist in no body. Consequently, because place is immobile, it seems that space is place.

461. Then [321] he shows that space is not place by two arguments. As to the first of these, he states it is not true that there is anything within the confines of the containing body other than the contained body which is transferred from place to place. Rather, within the confines of the containing body there happens a body of some kind, having, nevertheless, the following two characteristics: that it be a mobile body, and be naturally apt to touch the containing body. But if, in addition to the dimensions of the contained body, there were present a space which always remained in the same place, the embarrassing conclusion would follow that there would be infinite places together. The reason is because water and air have their own dimensions, and so does each body, and each part of a body. Now all these parts will do the same thing in the whole body that the whole water does in a vessel. According to those who hold the opinion that space is place, when the entire water is in the vessel there are present, in addition to the dimensions of the water, also other dimensions of space. Now every part of a whole is contained by the whole as a thing in place is contained by a vessel: the only difference being that the part is not separated from the whole, whereas the thing in place is separated frm place. If therefore a part be actually separated within the whole, it will follow that, in addition to the dimensions of the part, also other dimensions of the containing whole will be present.

But it cannot be said that such division would make new dimensions to exist: for division does not cause dimension; rather it divides dimension already existing. Therefore, before that part was divided in the whole, there were present other proper dimensions of the part, in addition to the whole's dimensions, which also penetrate that part. Now there will be as many sets of dimensions all distinct, some of which interpenetrate others, as there are parts obtainable by division of the whole, parts, namely, so divided that one contains another. But it is possible in a continuous whole to obtain ad infinitum parts which contain other parts, because a continuum can be divided ad infinitum, Consequently, we should have infinite dimensions mutually penetrating themselves. If, therefore, the containing body's dimensions, penetrating the thing in place, are place, it follows that there are infinite places together—which is impossible.

462. Then [322] he gives a second reason, which is the following. If the dimensions of the space which is between the boundaries of the containing

body are place, it follows that place can be transported. For it is clear that when a body is transported, as, for example, a jug, the space within the jug is transported, since that space can never be except where the jug is. Now whatever is transported to another place is penetrated (according to those who hold the doctrine of space as place) by the dimensions of the space into which it is transported. Therefore it follows that other dimensions enter the dimensions of the jug's space; consequently there would be another place of place, and many places would be existing together.

463. This unacceptable consequence arises from positing one place for the contained body, for example, the water; and another place for the vessel, for example, the jug. For according to the opinion we are discussing, the place of the water is the space within the boundaries of the jug, while the place of the whole jug is the space within the boundaries of the body containing the jug. We, however, do not assign a special place for the part, in which the part moves, as distinct from the whole, when the entire vessel is transported (by "part" he means the body contained in the vessel, as the water contained in the jug): because, according to Aristotle, the water is moved per accidens when the vessel is transported, and it changes place only inasmuch as the jug changes its place. Hence it is not necessary that the place into which the transfer is made, be the place of the part per se, but only inasmuch as it becomes the place of the jug. But according to those who hold the opinion about space as place, it follows that the new place would belong per se both to water and to the jug. Likewise, that space would be transported and would have a place per se, and not only per accidens.

Now although the containing body is sometimes moved, it does not follow according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the place is moved, or that there is a place of a place. For it does indeed happen that a containing body, in which something is contained, is sometimes moved, as are air or water or certain parts of the water, For example, if a boat is in a river, the parts of the water which surround the boat from below are in motion, but the boat's place is not moved. Hence, he adds, "but not that place where they occur,", i.e., that in which things occur as in a place is not moved.

How this is true he makes clear by adding, "which is a part of the place which is the place of the whole heavens." For although this container [e.g., the water surrounding the boat] be moved inasmuch as it is this body, yet in regard to its relation to the whole body of the heavens it is not moved: the body which succeeds it has the same order or position in relation to the whole heavens as had the body which previously flowed on. This therefore is what he says, namely, that although the water or the air be moved, not so the place, considered precisely as a certain part of the place of the whole heavens and as having a definite position in the universe.

464. Then [323] he continues by considering matter.

First he shows why matter seems to be place;

Secondly, that it is not place, at no. 465.

He says therefore first that matter appears to be place, should one consider the transmutation of the bodies which succeed each other in the same place, as this occurs in some, one subject that is at rest in a place, with attention being paid, not to the fact that place is separate, but only to the fact that the transmutation is occurring in one and the same continuum. For some continuous body, at rest according to place, when it is being altered in quality, now white, now black; now hard, while previously soft. Yet it remains one and the same in number. And on account of this transmutation of forms in the subject we say that matter is something that remains one whole change taken place with respect to forms. Because of this, place seems to be something, because in it as remaining different bodies succeed each other. Nevertheless we use different terminology when referring to these two cases: to designate matter or the subject, we say, “What is now water, was previously air”; to designate unity in place, we say, “Where water is now there was air previously.”

465. Then [324] he shows that matter is not place, because, as we said above, matter is not separated from the thing of which it is the matter, nor does it contain the latter: both of which characteristics belong to place. Place, therefore, is not matter.

466. Then [325], having eliminated the first three members, he concludes to the fourth. And he says that since place is not any of these three, i.e., neither form, nor matter, nor some space which is other than the internal distances of the things in place, it must be the fourth of the above named, i.e., the boundary of the containing body. And lest anyone understand that the thing contained or in place is some middle space, he adds that the contained body is what is apt to be moved in respect to change of place.

467. Then [326] he tracks down the specific difference of place; namely, that it is immobile. In regard to this he does two things:

First, he shows that an error arose from improperly considering this difference;

Secondly, how we must understand the immobility of place, at no. 468.

He says therefore that it is a large undertaking and a difficult one to understand what place is, both because some have thought it is matter or form, both of which involve lofty speculation, as was said above (L.3), and because the change that occurs when things change place, occurs in something both at rest and containing, Now, since nothing seems to be containing and immobile except space, it seems that place is a sort of middle space distinct from the magnitudes which are moved in respect to place. And the fact that air seems to be incorporeal helps to make this opinion credible: for where air is there appears to be no body but a certain empty space. Thus place seems to be not only the boundaries of a vessel but something between the boundaries as a vacuum or void.

468. Then [327], in order to exclude the aforesaid opinion, he shows how we must understand the immobility of place. And he says that a vessel and place are seen to differ in this, that a vessel can be transported but place cannot, Hence, just as a vessel can be called "a transportable place," so place can be called "an immobile (non-transportable) vessel." Therefore, when something is being moved in a body that is in motion, as a ship in a river, we speak of that in which it is being moved as a vessel rather than of a containing place, because place "wants to-be immobile," i.e., it is of the very nature and aptitude of the place to be immobile.. On this account it is better to speak of the whole river as being the place of the ship, because the river as a whole is immobile. Thus the whole river inasmuch as it is immobile is the common place.

However, since proper place is a part of common place, we must consider the proper place of the ship in flowing water, not the water inasmuch as it is flowing, but in its relation to the order or position which this flowing water has to the river as a whole: it is this order or position that remains constant, while the water flows on. Therefore, although the water materially passes on, yet, insofar as it has the motion of place, i.e. insofar as it is considered as having a certain order and position with respect to the whole river it does not change.

This also shows how we ought to consider how the boundaries of natural mobile bodies are place with respect to the entire spherical body of the heavens, which is fixed and immobile on account of the immobility of the center and of the poles. Therefore, although this part of air which contains, or this part of water, flow by and move as this water, yet, insofar as this water has the motion of place, viz., a position and order to the whole spherical body of the heavens, it always remains. This is like the same fire remaining as to its form, although as to its matter it is varied as wood is consumed and other wood added.

469. This removes an objection that could be lodged against positing place as the boundary of the container, for since the container is mobile, its boundary will also be mobile; consequently, a thing at rest will have diverse places. But this does not follow: because the boundary of the container is not place insofar as it is this surface of this particular mobile body, but by reason of the order or position it has in the immobile whole. From which it is evident that the whole notion of place in all containers is taken from the first container and locator, namely, the heavens.

470. Then [328] he concludes form the foregoing the definition of place, namely, that place is the immobile boundary of that which contains first. He says “first” to designate proper place and exclude common place.

471. Then [329] he shows that the definition is well assigned, because the things said about place concur with this definition. And he gives three such things: The first is that, since place is an immobile container, the middle of the heavens, i.e., the center, and the boundary of circular change of place, i.e., of the bodies moved in a circle, namely, the boundary as to us, i.e., te surface of the sphere of the moon, is (namely, the latter) seen as “up”, and the other (namely, the middle) as “down”.

Things absolutely in place, and things in place in a certain respect and this last named (the middle or center) is seen to be said most properly of all. For the center of a sphere is always at rest.

Now that which is the boundary in relation to us of the bodies moved in a circle [namely, the surface of the sphere of the moon], although it moves in a circle, nevertheless remains, insofar as it remains in the same way, i.e., at the same distance from us. Hence, since natural bodies are moved to their proper places, it follows that light bodies naturally move “up”, and heavy bodies “down”—for both the middle (center) and the containing boundary in the direction of the middle are called “down”; and likewise the boundary in the other sense [the surface of the sphere of the moon], and what is in the direction of that boundary, are called “up”. He uses this manner of speaking, because it is the center that is the place of the earth, which is simply heavy, while toward the center the place of water is found. In like manner, the place of fire, which is simply light, is the outermost, while the place of air is toward the outermost.

He gives the second [330], saying that because place is a boundary, place seems to be like a certain surface and like a containing vessel, but not like the space [or volume] of the containing vessel.

He gives the third [331] when he says that, because place is a boundary, the place and the thing in place are together; for the limits of the thing in place and the boundary of the container, which is place, are together (for the boundaries of things that touch are together). This also explains why place is equal to the thing in place: namely, because they are equated as to their boundaries.

LECTURE 7

HOW SOMETHING EXISTS IN PLACE

472. After defining place, the Philosopher now shows how something exists in place. About this he does two things:

First he shows how something is absolutely in place and how not;

Secondly, how a thing not absolutely in place. is in place in a certain respect, at 482.

473. He concludes therefore first [332] from the foregoing that, since place is the boundary of the container, whenever a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place absolutely and per se; if such a body does not have an external body containing it, it is not in place at all. The only body in the universe that exemplifies this second case is the outermost sphere, whatever it may be. Hence, according to this definition, it follows that the outermost orb is not in place.

474. But this seems to be impossible, because the outermost sphere is in motion in place and nothing is moved in place unless it is in place. Now this difficulty does not arise for those who hold the opinion that space is place. For they are not forced to say that, in order to be in place, the outermost sphere must have a body containing it; rather, the space penetrating the entire universe and all its parts is the place of the entire universe and of each of its parts, according to these Philosophers.

But this position is impossible, for one must admit either that place is not distinct from the thing in place, or that space has dimensions existing per se but yet penetrating the dimensions of sensible bodies—both of which positions are impossible.

475. Wherefore Alexander said that the outermost orb is not in place at all: for it is not necessary for every body to be in place, since place is not in

the definition of body. For this reason he held that the outermost sphere is not in motion in place, neither as a whole, nor as to its parts.

But since every motion must fit into one of the genera of motion, Avicenna, following him, said that the motion of the outermost sphere is not motion in place but motion in situs [position in place]. This is against Aristotle, who says in Book V (L. 4) that motion is present only in three genera, namely, quality, quantity, and "where."

Avicenna's position is untenable because it is impossible that motion strictly speaking be in a genus the notion of whose species consists in an indivisible. For the reason why there is not motion in the genus "substance" is that the nature of every species of substance consists in an indivisible, due to the fact that the species of substances do not admit of more or less; on this account, since motion is successive, a substantial form is not made existent by motion but by generation, which is the terminus of motion. The case is different with whiteness and like things, which can be participated according to more or less. But every species of situs has a nature that consists in an indivisible, so that if anything be added or taken away the original species does not remain. Hence it is impossible for motion to exist in the genus of situs.

Besides, the same difficulty remains. For situs taken as a predicament implies the order of parts in place; although if it be taken as a difference in the genus of quantity it implies merely an order of parts in a whole. Therefore, whatever is moved according to situs, must be moved according to place.

476. Others such as Avempace said that place should be assigned in one way to a body moving in a circle and in another way to a body moving in a straight line. For since a straight line is imperfect, since it can be added to, a body moving in a straight line requires a place externally containing it, but because a circular line is perfect within itself, a body moving in a circle does not require an external place to contain it, but merely a place about w1hich it may revolve; hence it is that circular motion is said to be motion about a center. So therefore they say that the convex surface of the sphere contained is the place of the first sphere. But this is against the common suppositions about place already laid down; namely, that place is a container, and that it is equal to the thing in place.

477. And therefore Averroes said that the outermost sphere is in place per accidens. To understand this, one should consider that everything which has fixity by means of something else, is said to be in place per accidens, due to the fact that that by means of which it is fixed is in place, as it evident in the case of a nail fixed in a ship and of a man at rest in a ship. Now it is clear that bodies moving rotationally are fixed because their center is immobile; hence the outermost sphere is said to be in place per accidens, insofar as the center about which it is revolving has existence in place, The fact that the lower spheres have a per se place in which they are contained is incidental and not essential to a body moving rotationally.

But against this it is objected that, if the outermost sphere is in place per accidens, then it is in motion in place per accidens, and so per accidens motion is prior to per se motion. To this the answer is given that for rotational motion it is not necessary for a body moving per se rotationally to be in place per se, although it is necessary for straight line motion.

But this seems to be against Aristotle’s definition, given above, of what is in place per accidens. For he said that some things exist or are in motion place per accidens, because that in which they exist is in motion. But nothing is said to be in place per accidens because something entirely outside it is in place. Now since the center is completely extrinsic to the outermost sphere, it seems ridiculous to say that the outermost sphere is in place per accidens because the center is in place.

478. And therefore I favor more the opinion of Themistius, who said that the outermost sphere is in place by means of its parts.

To understand this it must be recalled that Aristotle said above that there would be no discussion about place except for the act of motion, which reveals the existence of place from the fact that bodies succeed one another in the same place. Hence, although place is not of the essence of body, yet it is necessary for a body moved according to place. In the case of a body moving locally, the reason it is necessary to assign a place is because in that motion a succession of diverse bodies in the same place is considered. Therefore, in the case of bodies moving in a straight line it is clear that one body succeeds another in the same place according to their totality, for one whole body leaves one whole place which is then occupied by another whole body. Hence a body which is in motion in a straight line must be in place in its entirety.

But in the case of rotational motion, although the whole body comes to be in different places as distinguished by reason, nevertheless the whole body does not change its place as to subject: for the place remains ever the same as to subject; but varies only according to reason, as will be said in Book VI (L.2). Nevertheless the parts change place not only as to reason but as to subject also. Therefore in the case of rotational motion there is not a succession of whole bodies in the same place but of parts of the same body. Therefore a rotating body does not essentially require a place according to its totality but according to its parts.

479. But against this there seems to be the objection that the parts of a continuous body are neither in place nor moved in respect to place; rather, it is the whole that is both moved and in place. But it is clear that the outermost sphere is a continuous body; therefore, its parts are neither in place nor in motion in place. Consequently, it does not seem to be true that place should be attributed to the outermost sphere by reason of its parts.

The answer to this objection is that, although the parts of a continuous body are not actually in place, they are so potentially, insofar as the continuum is divisible. For a part, if it is separated, will be in the whole as in a place; hence, in this manner the parts of a continuum are moved in place. This is clearly evident in liquid continua which are easy to divide—for example, in the case of water, whose parts are found to be in motion within the whole water. Consequently, because something is said of a whole by reason of its parts, insofar as the parts of the outermost sphere are potentially in place the entire outermost sphere is in place per accidens by reason of its parts: and to be in place in that way is enough for rotational motion.

480. If a further objection is raised that what is in act is prior to what is in potency and that consequently it seems Improper that the first local motion be that of a body existing in place by means of its parts which are potentially in place, the reply is that this is most fitting to the first motion. For it is necessary that the descent from the one immobile being to the diversity which is found in mobile things be made step by step. Now the variation based on parts existing in place potentially, is less than that of wholes existing in place actually. Hence the first motion, which is rotational has less deformity and retains greater uniformity, being closer to the immobile substances. Now it is much better to say that the outermost sphere

is in place on account of its intrinsic parts, than an account of the center which is entirely extrinsic to its substance; and this is more in agreement with Aristotle’s opinion, as is clear if one considers the passage following, in which Aristotle shows how the heavens are in place.

481. For in regard to this he does two things:

First he shows how the outermost sphere is in place;

Secondly, he draws-a conclusion from what has been said, at 485.

About the first he does three things:

First, he shows that the outermost sphere is in place through its parts;

Secondly, how its parts are in place, at no. 481,

Thirdly, how the parts make the whole to be in place, at no. 434.

482. Therefore, because he had said that if a body does not have something outside of it containing it, it is not in place per se, he concludes [333] that if a body of this kind, such as the outermost sphere is, be water (which will more easily illustrate what we are about to say on account of its easy divisibility), its parts will be in motion inasmuch as one part contains another, thus making it exist in place after a fashion. But the entire water will be in motion in one sense and in another sense not. For it will not be in motion in such a way that the entire water will change its place as though being transferred to another place distinct as to subject, but it will be moved rotationally—a motion that requires place for the parts and not for the whole. And it will be moved, not up and down, but circularly: for some things are moved up and down and change place in their entirety, namely, rare and dense bodies, or light and heavy things.

483. Then [334] he indicates how the parts of the outermost sphere exist in place, saying that, as was mentioned above, some things are actually in place, others potentially. Hence in the case of a continuum of similar parts the parts are in place potentially, as in the case of the outermost sphere; but when the parts are separated and merely contiguous, as occurs in a pile of stones, the parts are in place actually.

484. Then [335] he shows how from this it follows that the entire sphere is in place. And he says that some things are per se in place—as any body that is per se in motion in place, whether it be in respect to local motion or increase, as was said above (L.5). But the heavens, i.e., the outermost sphere, are not in place in this manner, as was said, since no body contains them; but inasmuch as they are moved rotationally, with part succeeding

part, place is attributed to the parts potentially, as was said, inasmuch as one part-is “had,” i.e., is consecutive, with respect to another.

Certain things, indeed, are in place per accidens, e.g., the soul, and all forms; and in this manner the heavens, i.e., the outermost sphere, is in place insofar as all its parts are in place, since each of its parts is contained under another in the rotation of the sphere. For in a non-round body the outermost part remains uncontained and merely containing; but in a round body each part is both container and contained, potentially however. Hence it is by reason of all its parts that a found body is in place. And this Aristotle takes to per accidens, namely, what is true of the parts, as above when he said that the parts of a body are in motion per accidens in place.

485. Then [336] he draws a conclusion from the foregoing. For since he had said that a body in rotational motion need not be in place in its entirety but only per accidens by reason of its parts, he concludes that the outermost body is moved only rotationally, because the whole in question is not anywhere; what is somewhere is itself something, and has something outside of it by which it is contained; but there is nothing outside the whole. For this reason all things are said to be in the heavens as in the outermost container, because the heavens are probably the containing whole. He says “probably,” because it has not yet been proved that there is nothing outside the heavens. It is not to be thought that the very body of the heavens is a place; rather, it is a certain final surface of it turned toward us which is as a boundary in contact with the mobile bodies existing in it. For this reason we say that earth is in water which is in air, which is in either, i.e., fire, which is in the heavens, which are not in anything else.

486. However, according to the intention of Aristotle, this passage must be plained differently. For the example of water which he first adduced is not to be referred, according to him, to the outermost sphere only, but to the entire universe, which indeed is moved insofar as its parts are moved—some rotationally, as are the heavenly bodies; some up and down, as are the lower bodies. As to what he said later on, that some things are actually in place and other potentially, this is not to be referred to what he said previously but is to be taken independently. For since he had said that some things are in place according to their parts and others according to their totality, he adds after that, that some things are in place according to act and

others according to potency; finally, he says that some things are in place per se and others per accidens.

In this connection note that according to Aristotle "the heavens" are to be taken in two senses here: first, they are taken for the entire universe of bodies and especially of the heavenly; secondly, for the outermost sphere. He says therefore that those things are in place per se which are in motion according to place, whether they are in motion according to their totality or according to their parts, as are the heavens, i.e., the universe; in place per accidens are the soul and the heavens, i.e., the outermost sphere. For it is necessary to say that all the parts of the universe are somehow in place: the outermost sphere per accidens and other bodies per se, inasmuch as they are contained by a body outside of them. And he manifesto this up to the end.

LECTURE 8

THE DEFINITION OF PLACE IS USED TO SOLVE THE ORIGINAL PROBLEMS;

the properties of place are justified.

487. After explaining what place is, the Philosopher now uses his definition to resolve the doubts that were raised about place (L.2). Now there were mentioned above six reasons to show that place does not exist. Of these he bypasses two: the one in which it was asked whether place be an element or a composite of elements; the other in which it was shown that place cannot be reduced to any genus of cause. He bypasses them because no one who posited place took it either as an element or as a cause of things. Hence he makes mention only of the four remaining.

488. One of these was that, since place never lacks a body, and a body never lacks a place, it seemed to follow that if the body grew, the place would grow.

Now this would follow if it were supposed that place were a space coextensive with the dimensions of the body, so that, as the body increased, so would the space. But this does not follow from the aforesaid definition of place, namely, that it is the boundary of the container.

469. Another argument was that, if the place of a body be distinct from the body, then the place of a point would be distinct from the point; wherefore, it did not seem possible for place to be distinct from the body, since the place of a point is not distinct from the point. But this argument was based on the imagining of those who opined, that place, is the space coextensive with the volume of the body, so that a dimension of space would correspond to a dimension of the body and in like manner to each

point of the body, This, however, need not be said if we suppose that place is the boundary of the container.

490. Another argument was that, if place is anything, it must be a body, since it has three dimensions. Consequently, there would be two bodies in the same place. But according to those who agree that place is the boundary of the containing body it is not necessary to say that two bodies would be in the same place, or that there is some bodily space intervening between the boundaries of the containing body, but that there is some body there.

491. Likewise another argument was that, if everything that exists is in place, it will follow that even a place is in place. This argument is easy to answer, if we suppose that place is the boundary of the container, For according to this it is clear that place is in something; namely, in the containing body, but it is there, not as in a place, but as a boundary in a finite thing, just as a point is in a line and a surface in a body. For it is not required that everything that is, be in something as in a place; this is required only of a mobile body, for it is motion that led to distinguishing between the thing in place and the place itself.

492. Then [338] he uses his definition to give a reason for the properties of place.

First, as to the fact that a body is naturally borne to its proper place;

Secondly, as to the fact that a body naturally rests in its own place, at no. 493.

He says first therefore, that if place be taken to the boundary of the container, the reason why each body is naturally borne to its own place can be given: it is because the containing body (which is next to the contained and located body, and which is touched by it so that the boundaries of both are together not by compulsion) is akin to it in nature. For the order of situs in the parts of the universe follows upon the order of nature. For the heavenly body, which is supreme, is the most noble; after it, among the other bodies the noblest in nature is fire, and so on down to earth. Hence it is clear that the lower body which is situated according to position, next to the higher body, is akin to it in the order of nature. And therefore he adds, “not by compulsion,” in order to point out the natural order of situs to which the order of nature corresponds and to exclude a compulsive order of situs, as when by compulsion a body of earth is above air or water. Two such bodies next to one another in the natural order of situs and which, in the natural order of natures, are disposed to be together, do not affect each other; i.e., when they are made continuous to each other and become one—and for this they have an aptitude on account of the similarity of their natures—then they do not interact. But when distinct things are in contact, their mutually interact on account of the contrariety of their active and passive qualities. Therefore it is the kinship of nature existing between the container and the thing contained that explains why a body is naturally moved to its own place: because the rank in natural places must correspond to the rank in natures, as was said. But such a reason cannot be assigned if place is taken to be space: because in the separated dimensions of space no order of nature can be considered.

493. Then [330] he gives the reason why bodies naturally rest in their own place. And he says that this happens reasonably, if we grant that place is the boundary of the containing body: because according to this the contained body is related to the containing body after the manner of a part to a whole—a separated part, however. This is abundantly clear in bodies that are easy to divide, such as air or water: for their parts can be moved by something in the whole just as a thing in place is moved in a place. And this also is not only true according to the figure of containing one under the other, but even according to the properties of their nature. For air is related to water as the whole, because water is like matter and air like the form: water is as the matter of air, and air is as the form of water. This is so because water is in potency to air absolutely.

Now while it is true that in some other ways air is in potency to water, as will be explained later in De Generatione, it is necessary for the present to accept this in order that we may explain our proposition. Here it is not declared as a certainty, but in the De Generatione it will be proved with greater certainty. For it will be said there that, when air is generated from water, it is corruption secundum quid and generation simply, because a more perfect form is being introduced and a less perfect one is being put off. But when water is generated from air, it is corruption simply and generation secundum quid, because. a more perfect form is being put off and an imperfect one being introduced. Consequently, water is in potency to air absolutely as the imperfect to the perfect; but air is in potency in water as the perfect to the imperfect. Hence air is as the form, and as the whole which is like the form; water, however, is as the matter and as a part, which pertains to the notion of matter. Therefore, although the same thing is both matter and act, because the water contains both in itself; yet properly speaking, the latter, i.e., the water, is in potency as an imperfect thing, but the former, i.e., the air, in act as a perfect. Hence water will be related to air somewhat as part to whole. And therefore these things, the air and the water, when they are distinct things, they are in contact; but when they form a unity, by one passing into the nature of the other, then coupling, i.e., continuity occurs. Therefore, just as the part naturally is at rest in the whole, so also a body naturally rests in its natural place.

Note, however, that the Philosopher is speaking here of bodies according to the substantial forms which they have under the influence of the heavenly body which is the first place, and which gives to all other bodies the power to act as places. But if we consider active and passive qualities, there is contrariety among the elements and one tends to destroy another.

Finally he concludes in summary that it has been stated that place exists and what place is.

LECTURE 9

THE VOID—REASONS FOR AND AGAINST

494. Having discussed place, the Philosopher now begins to treat of the void. Concerning it he does two things:

First he manifests his intention:

Secondly, he executes it, at no. 497.

As to the first, he does too things:

First he shows that it is proper for the natural philosopher to deal with the void;

Secondly, he shows what order should be followed in determining the matter of the void, at no. 495.

He says therefore, first [346] that it is the task of the natural philosopher to determine about the void just as it was his task to determine about place: whether it exists, what it is. For the same reasons have led to belief or disbelief in the existence both of place and of the void. For those who posit a void think of it as a place and vessel, which vessel or place seems to be full when it has within it the mass of some body; but when it does not it is said to be a void. It is as though the same thing as to subject is place and void and full, any differing among them being only in the mind.

495. Then [341] he shows what order must be followed in determining about the void. And he says that we must begin by giving the reasons of those who claim that the void exists; then the opinions of those who claim it does not exist; and then the general opinions about the void; namely, what belongs to the notion of the void.

496. Then [342] he begins to follow this program:

First sets down preliminary notions that are necessary for discovering the truth about the void;

Secondly, he begins to search for the truth, at no. 520 (L.11).

About the first he does two things:

First he gives the reasons of those who posit or deny the existence of the void;

Secondly, the common opinion about the void, showing what is included in its notion, at no. 506 (L. 10).

As to the first he does two things:

First he gives the reason of those who deny the existence of the void;

Secondly, the reasons of those who affirm it, at no. 499.

497. He says first therefore [342] that some of the earlier philosophers desirous of demonstrating that the void does not exist erred by not arguing against the reasons given for the existence of the void. For they did not show that the void does not exist, but gave their reasons to show that something full of air is not a void, as is evident from Anaxagoras and others who reasoned like him. In order to destroy the void they wanted to demonstrate that air is something, and thus, since te void is that in which nothing exists, it followed that something full of air is not a void.

In debating with their adversaries, they showed that air is something by means of wine skins which, when inflated, could support a weight, and which would not happen unless air were something. This also showed that air has strength. Also they showed it by taking the air in clepsydras, i.e., in vessels that absorb water; in these vessels water is drawn in by drawing in air, or water is prevented from entering, unless the air be withdrawn.

It is clear therefore that they are not objecting against those who posit a void, because all such claim it is empty space in which no sensible body exists, for they assume that whatever exists is body perceptible to sense, and thus, where no sensible body exists, they believe nothing exists. Hence, since air is a body scarcely perceptible to sense, they thought that where there was nothing but air the void existed.

498. Therefore, to destroy their position it is not enough to show that air is something, but also one must show that there is no space without a sensible body. Space was supposed to be a void in two ways: first, as something separated from bodies, as though we were to say that the space within the confines of a house is a void; secondly, as something existing In

act between bodies, preventing them from being continuous, as Democritus and Leucippus and many of the other natural philosophers held. For they imagined that if the totality of being were continuous, all things would be one: for there would be no more reason for distinguishing bodies at one point rather than another.. Hence between all distinct bodies they posited intervals of empty sapce in whie~i no being existed. And since Democritus posited that bodies are composed of many indivisible bodies, he posited between those indivisibles certain empty places which he called "pores".- in this way he explained that all bodies are composed of the full and of the empty. Or if the entire body of the world are continuous and no such empty place existed between the parts of the universe, they yet posited a void existing outside the universe.

It is evident therefore that the aforementioned philosophers who tried to reject the void did not answer the problem as laid down by others. For they should have shown that the void does not exist in any of those ways.

499. Then [343] he sets forth the reasons of those who posited a void.

First, those who spoke of the void naturally;

Secondly, of those who spoke of it non-naturally, at no. 505.

As to the first he does two things:

First he mentions the reason given by those who held that the void is a space separated from bodies;

Secondly, by those who held for a void in bodies, at no. 502.

Concerning the first he does two things:

First he gives the reason of those who posited a void;

Secondly, how Melissus used that reason conversely, at no. 501.

500. He says therefore first [343] that those who affirmed the existence of the void gave more opposite reasons. One of which was that motion is respect of place, i.e., change of place and increase, as was said above, would not exist if there were no void. They showed this in the following manner: If something is in motion according to place, it cannot be moved into what is full because a place filled with one body cannot receive another. For, if it received it there would then be two bodies in the same place—and the same would follow for any [additional] body: for there is no reason why many bodies could not be in the same place if two could. And if that were to happen, i.e., that any number of bodies were in the same place, it would follow that the smallest place could receive the largest body—

because many small things form one large thing. Hence, if any small equal bodies could exist in the same place, then also many could. And so, having proved this conditional position that there is motion, there is a void, they argue (by positing the antecedent): “But there is motion; therefore, there is a void.”

501. Then [344] he shows how Melissus, supposing the same conditional, argued in a contrary manner from the denial of the consequent, and reasoned thus: if motion exists, there is a void; but there is no void; therefore motion does not exist. Consequently, the totality of being is immobile.

Thus the foregoing is one way in which some proved that the void exists after the fashion of something separate.

502. Then [345] he lists three reasons given by those who held that the void exists in bodies. The first of these is based on things that condense. For in the case of things that can be compressed it seems that the parts come together and fit in together and press down and compress each other so that, as is held, casks will hold as much wine with the wine skins as without, especially if the wine skins are thin, because in the wine skins the wine seems to become condensed. This condensation they believed to take place as though in the condensed body the parts entered into certain empty spaces.

503. The second reason he gives [346] is based on increase: For a body grows on account of food, which is a body. But two bodies cannot exist in the same place. Therefore there must be, in the body which has grown, certain voids in which the food may be received. Consequently, there must be a void in order that food be taken in,

504. The third reason [347] is based on a vessel full of ashes being able to absorb as much water as the empty vessel. This would not be the case unless there were empty spaces between the parts of the ashes.

505. Then [348] he gives the opinions of the non-natural philosophers about the void. And he says that the Pythagoreans also posited a void which entered into the parts of the universe from the heavens, on account of the infinite void which they supposed existed outside the heavens—a void like some infinite air or infinite spirit [i.e. breath]: just as a person who breathes divides by means of his breath certain things that are easy to divide, such as water or similar things, so it was that the things of this world became

distinct by some being as though through breathing. They did not understand this to except through a void, as was mentioned in regard to Democritus—as though the void were nothing other than the distinction between things. And because the first distinction and plurality is found in numbers, therefore they first of all posited a void in numbers, so that it is through the nature of the void that one unit would be distinct from another—so that number would not be continuous but would have a discrete nature. But because they spoke of the void in a quasi-equivocal manner, calling the distinction of things “a void” Aristotle does not discuss this opinion below.

Finally, in summary, he concludes that we have given the reasons why some posit a void and why some do not.

LECTURE 10

THE MEANING OF “VOID”—REFUTATION OF THOSE POSITING THE VOID

506. The Philosopher had said above that we I must start with three things. So now, having finished two of them, by giving, namely, the opinions of both of those who posited and of those who rejected the void, he now enters upon the third, by showing, namely, the general notions people have about the void.

Concerning this he does three things:

First he shows what is meant by the word “void”;

Secondly, how some thought that the void exists, at no. 513;

Thirdly, he rejects the reasons given by those who posit that a void exists, at no. 515.

As to the first he does two things:

First he reveals his intention;

Secondly, he executes it, at no. 509.

507. He says first, therefore [349], that since it was pointed out that some people affirmed a void and others denied it, in order to get at the truth we must begin by the meaning of the word “void.” For just as, when there is question about some property existing in a subject, we must begin by agreeing what the thing is, so when there is question about the existence of something, we must begin by taking as the middle form the meaning of the word. For the question of what something is comes after the question of whether it exists.

508. Then [350] he shows that it meant by the word “void”.

First he gives the more common meaning;

Secondly, what the Platonists took it to mean at no. 512.

As to the first he does three things:

First he shows what the word “void” means;

Secondly, what should be added to that meaning at no. 510;

Thirdly, he clears up a doubt, at no. 511.

509. He says therefore that according to common opinion, the void seems to signify nothing more than a place In which there is nothing. The reason for this is because properly that is said to be a void in which there is not any body, and since only a body can be in place, void seems to mean nothing more than a place without any thing in it. But because people suppose that every being is a body, it follows that according to their opinion where there is not body, there is nothing.

And further they believe that every body is tangible, i.e., that it has tactile qualities. And a body of this kind is heavy or light: for in their time it was not yet known that a heavenly body is different in nature from any of the four elements. Hence since it is the very nature of the void to be a place in which there is not a body, it follows that the void is that in which there is neither a light nor a heavy body. However, this is not to say that it belongs to the notion of the void according to the primary meaning of the word, but rather by reason of a certain syllogistic deduction that starts with the general opinion of people that every body is either heavy or light; just as the common opinion of people that every being is a body, leads to the conclusion that the void is that in which there is nothing.

Consequently, the meaning of this word “void” is three-fold: one is proper, namely, that the void is that in which there is not any body; the others come from the general opinion of people: the first is more common, namely, that the void is a place in which nothing exists; the second is more restricted, namely, that the void is a place in which there is neither a heavy nor a light body.

510. Then [351] he shows that must be added to this meaning. For he says that it is not correct to say that a point is a void, even though in a point there is no tangible body. So we must add that the void to a place in which there is not a tangible body, but which has in it space to receive a tangible body, just as a blind person is said to be one who lacks sight but to apt to have it. And so he concludes that in one way the void is called a space

which is not full of a body that is sensible by touch, i.e., a body that is heavy or light.

511. Then [352] he clears up the following difficulty; If there is color or sound in a certain space, should it be called a void or not? This question arises because the definition first given says that the void is that in which there is nothing. And he answers by saying that if the space in which there is just sound or color has room for a tangible body, it is a void; if not, not. The reason is that the proper definition of the void is not "that in which there is nothing," and such a definition is held only by people who believe that where no body is, nothing is.

512. Then [353] he gives the meaning of "void" as used by the Platonists. And he says that there is another meaning of the void: that in which there is no "this something" or any corporeal substance. Now a "this something" comes about on account of the form. Hence some claim that the matter of a body, insofar as it is apart from its form, is the void. These are the same who claim that matter is place, as was stated above (L.3). But this is poor judgment, for matter is not separable from the things of which it is the matter; whereas men inquire about place and the void as being separable from bodies in place.

513. Then [354] he tells how some posited existence of a void;

First, what they said the void was;

Secondly, why they posited it, at no. 514.

He says therefore first that since the void is a place without a body in it, and since we have already decided how place exists and how it does not (for we have said that place is not a space but the boundary of a container), it is clear that the void is neither a space separated from bodies nor intrinsic to them as Democritus supposed. This is so because those who suppose that space exists in either of those two ways, intend the void to be not a body, but the space of a body. For they thought that the void was something because place was something, and just as place seems to be space, so also the void. But if place is not a space outside of bodies, neither can the void be a space outside of bodies. And since it is the very nature of the void to be a bodily space existing outside of bodies, as was said above, it follows that the void does not exist.

514. Then [355] he shows why they posited a void. And he says that they admitted the existence of the void for the same reason that they admitted

place, namely, on account of motion, as we said above: for it comes about that local motion is saved, both for those who assert that place is something over and above the bodies which are in place and for those who claim that the void exists. But for those who deny place and the void, there cannot be local motion. Consequently, some believed that the void is a cause of motion in the way that place is, i.e., as that in which motion takes place.

515. Then [356] he rejects the arguments of those who posit existence of the void. He does not, however, intend here to give a true solution to the aforesaid arguments, but to bring an objection which at a glance shows that their arguments do not conclude with necessity.

First therefore he rejects the reasons given by those who posit a separated void;

Secondly, the arguments of those who posit a void existing in bodies, at no. 517.

516. He rejects the first reason in two ways: First, because even though motion exists, it does not necessarily follow that the void exists. And if we speak generally of any species of motion, it is clear that the void is not necessary at all. For nothing prevents the full from being altered [i.e., having motion in quality], since only local motion seems to be excluded if the void is not posited. Yet Melissus did not see this, for he believed that if there were no void, no motion of any kind could exist.

Secondly, he rejects the same reason on the ground that not even local motion is destroyed, if there is no void. For, assuming that there is no separable space over and above moving bodies, local motion can take place, if bodies make room for one another by contracting: thus they would be moving into the full rather than into the empty. This is evident in the generations of continuous bodies, especially in liquids, such as water. For if a stone is thrown into a large surface of water, circles appear around the place of entry as long as one part of the moving water agitates another part and enters it. Hence, because a small portion of water by a process of diffusion enters a larger section, the circles grow from small to large until they cease entirely.

517. Then [357] he rejects the reasons given by those who posit a void in bodies. And first of all the reason based an condensation. And he says that bodies happen to become condensed, and parts of a body mutually penetrate, not because the invading part is entering an empty place but

because there were certain openings, full of a more subtle body which escapes under condensation, just when water is compressed and contracted, the air that was present is expelled. This takes place manifestly in a sponge and other like porous bodies. Therefore this solution does not give the reason for condensation (he will give this later [L.14]: but it does show that also in this way, the need of a void can be clearly eliminated.

518. Secondly [358] he rejects the argument based on growth. And he says that growth occurs not only by the addition of some body invading the growing body so as to make the void necessary but also by alteration, as, when air comes to be from water, the quantity of air becomes greater than the quantity of water. This too is not the true solution of their argument but merely an objection showing that it is not necessary to posit a void. The true solution is given in the book “De Generatione, where it is shown that food does not pass into that which grows as to be a body distinct from it; rather it is converted into its substance, as wood added to fire is converted into fire.

519. Thirdly [351] he rejects together both the argument about increase [in growth] and that about water poured on ashes and says that each of these arguments blocks the other. This is evident as follows. For there is in respect to increase this difficulty: it seems either that the whole body is not being increased, or that increase does not come about by the addition of body but by the addition of something incorporeal, or that two bodies can be in the same place. Now it is this difficulty, which seems to be against both these who posit a void and against those who do not, that they wish to solve. But they do not show that the void exists, or, if increase is due to the void, then they would have to say that the whole body is a void, since the whole body is increased.

Likewise, in regard to the ashes: for if a vessel full of ashes can take as much water as the empty vessel, then one has to say that the whole container must be a void. Therefore this is not due to empty space but to being mixed in with the water. For when water is mixed with ashes it condenses and part of it evaporates; moreover, parts of the ash are condensed on account of the moisture, and a sign of this is that not as much water can be recovered as was put in.

Finally, he concludes that it is clearly easy to solve the arguments by which they prove the existence of a void.

LECTURE 11

FROM MOTION THERE IS SHOWN TO BE NO SEPARATED VOID

520. Having gone over others' opinions about the void and having indicated what is meant by the word "void," he now begins to search for the truth.

First, he shows that the void does not have a separate existence;

Secondly, that there is no void in bodies at no. 544 (L.14).

Concerning the first he does two things:

First he used motion to show that a separate void does not exist;

Secondly, by considering the void in itself, at no. 541.

As to the first he does two things:

First, from the fact of motion he shows there is no void;

Secondly from the fact of faster and slower motions, at no.527 (L.12).

521. In regard to the first point he gives six reasons. In regard to the first of which he says [360] that we must repeat that there is no separated void as some assert. He says "repeat," because this was already somewhat proved from the notion of place: for if place is not space, it follows that the void is nothing, as was said above. But now he proves the same point again from motion: for void was posited, as we said, on account of motion. But motion does not necessarily require a void. For it would seem especially to be the cause of local motion. But it is not necessary to posit a void in order to explain local motion, because all simple bodies have natural local motions, as the natural motion of fire is upward and that of earth downward toward the center. Thus it is clear that it is the nature of each body that causes its local motion and not the void. The latter would be the cause if any natural bodies were moved due to the necessity of a void. But if it is not set down as the cause of local motion, it cannot be considered the cause of any other

motion or of any other thing. The void therefore would exist without a purpose.

522. He then gives the second reason [361]. If a void be postulated, no reason can be assigned for natural motion and rest. For it is clear that a natural body is moved toward its own natural place and rests there naturally on account of the kinship it has with its place and because it has no kinship to the place from which it departs. But the void has no nature by which it could be akin or hostile to a natural body. Therefore, it there were a void, considered as a certain place without a body in it, one could not assign any part to which the body would be naturally moved. For we cannot say that it would be borne to just any part, because observation shows that this is wrong, for a body naturally goes from one place and naturally approaches another.

This same reason is valid against those who posit place as a separate space into which a mobile body is borne. For it would be impossible to explain how a body in such a place could either be moved or be at rest: for the dimensions of space have no nature to which a natural body could be similar or dissimilar. Deservedly, then, the same argument applies to the void as to “up” and “down,” i.e., to place, whose parts are “up” and “down”; for those who posit a void call it place.

Moreover, not only are those who posit a void and those who posit place to be space unable to explain how something is moved and at rest In respect to place, but also how something exists in place or in the void. For if place is supposed to be space, then the whole body would have to be enclosed inside that space, and not as happens with those who agree that place is the boundary of the containing body and that a thing is in place as in something separate and as in a body that contains and sustains it. Indeed, it seems to be of the very nature of place that something be in place as in something separated and existing apart from it: for if any part of a body is not laid down as separated from the body, it will exist in that body not as in a place but as in the whole. Therefore, it pertains to the very nature of place and of the thing in place that one be separated from the other. But this does not happen if place is space into whose entirety the entice body is immersed. Therefore space is not place. And if space is not place it is clear that no void is place.

523. He gives the third reason [362] saying that, whereas the early philosophers claimed that the void had to be, if motion existed, the very opposite is the case: for if there were a void there would be no motion. And this he proves by a simile. For some have said that earth comes to rest at the center on account of the likeness of the parts on the whole circumference: consequently, earth, having no reason to be moved toward one part of the circumference more than another, rests. The same reason would cause rest in a void. For there would be no reason for earth to be moved to one part rather than to another, since the void, as such, does not have differences among its parts—for non-being does not possess differences.

524. He gives the fourth reason [363]as follows. Natural motion is prior to compulsory since compulsory motion is only a departure from natural motion. Therefore, remove natural motion and all other motion is removed; for when the prior is removed, all that follows is removed. But if the void is posited, natural motion is removed; because the differences among the parts of place would be taken away and it is toward such parts that natural motions tend The same holds if the infinite be posited, as we said above.

There is, however, this difference between the void and the infinite, that after granting the infinite there is no way of positing "up" or "down" or "center," as we pointed out in Book III; but after granting a void, these places could be posited, but it would not be because they were mutually different: for no difference can be assigned in the realm of nothing and non-being and, consequently, of the void, which is a non-being and a privation. Yet natural changes of place do require difference of place, because diverse bodies are moved to diverse places. Consequently, natural places must be different one from the other. Therefore, if a void be posited, nothing could undergo a natural change of place; and if there is no natural change of place, there will be no change of place of any sort. Hence, if there is any change of place, there can be no void.

525. The fifth reason is then given [364]. in regard to this it should be considered that some question exists about projectiles: for the mover and the thing moved must be always together, as will be proved below in Book VII (1-3). Yet a projectile is found to be in motion even after it is separated from the projector, as is evident in the case of a stone that is thrown, or of an arrow shot from a bow. Now on the supposition that there is no void this difficulty is solved by attending to the air with which the medium [the field

of trajectory] is filled. And it is solved in two ways. For some assert that projectiles remain in motion even after they are no longer contact with what gave them impulse on account of antiperistasis, i.e., repercussion or counter-resistence: for the air that has been pushed, pushes against other air, and that against other air, and so on, and it is on account of this impact of air against air that the stone is moved.

The other explanation is that the continuum of air that received the impact from the projector pushes the impelled body with more speed than the speed of the motion by which the projectile is naturally borne to its proper place. Hence the speed of the air movement prevents the projectile, for example, the stone, or some other such, from falling downward; but it is carried along by the impulse of the air.

Now neither of these explanations could be alleged if there were a void; consequently, a projectile could be moved only as long as it was carried, for example, in the hand of the one casting it: but as soon as it was released from the hand it would fall. But it is the opposite that happens. Therefore, there is not a void.

526. He then gives the sixth reason [365]. If motion were in a void, no one could give a reason why the moving object should stop anywhere. For there is no reason why it should stop at one part of the void rather than another. This is true both in the case of objects that are moved naturally, because there is no difference among the parts of the void, as we have said, and in the case of objects moved by a compulsory motion. For now we say that a violent compulsory motion ceases when repercussions or impulsions of the air are lacking, on account of the two reasons already given. Therefore it will have to be admitted either that every body is at rest and nothing in motion or that, if anything be in motion, it will remain In motion to infinity unless it runs into a more powerful body that could impede its compulsory motion.

In support of this reasoning, he gives the reason why some posit motion in the void. It is because the void yields to and does not resist the mobile; hence since the void yields in the same way, in all directions, a mobile thing should be moved in all directions ad infinitum.

LECTURE 12

FROM THE FASTNESS AND SLOWNESS OF MOTION, A SEPARATED VOID IS DISPROVED

527. Here the Philosopher, arguing from the fast and slow in motion, shows that the void does not exist.

About this he does two things:

First he assigns the causes of fastness and slowness in motion;

Secondly, he uses these reasons to argue to his point, at no. 529.

He says therefore first that one and the same heavy body, and any other thing, for example, a stone or something of this sort, is in faster motion for two reasons: either on account of the medium in which it is being moved, e.g., air or earth or water; or on account of differences in the object, namely, that it is heavier or lighter, all other things being equal.

528. Then [367] he argues to his point from the aforesaid causes.

First from the differences of the medium;

Secondly, from the differences in the mobile object, at no. 539,

As to the first he does two things:

First he gives an argument;

Secondly, he recapitulates, at no. 533.

Concerning the first he does two things:

First he gives his argument;

Secondly, he shows that the conclusion follows from the premises, at no. 532.

529. Therefore, he first gives this argument: The ratio of motion to motion in regard to speed is equal to the ration of medium to medium in

respect of subtlety. But there is no ratio between empty space and full space. Therefore, motion in a void has no ratio to motion in the full.

First of all he explains the first proposition of this argument. And he says that the medium through which a body is in motion is the cause of its fastness or slowness because it acts as an obstacle to the body in motion. The greatest obstacle occurs when the medium is in a contrary motion, as is evident in the case of a ship whose movement is impeded by the wind. The medium is an obstacle in a secondary way even if it is not in motion, because if it were in motion with the object it would not be an obstacle but a help, as the water which carries a ship downstream. But among obstacles a greater impediment is offered by things that are not easy to divide, such as the grosser bodies. He explains this by an example. Let the body in motion be A, and let the space through which it is being moved be B, and the time in which A is being moved through B be C. Let us posit another space, D, of the same length as B, but let D be full of a subtler body than the one in B, so that a certain analogy, i.e., ratio, exists between the bodies which impede the motion (for example, let B be full of water and D full of air). Now to the extent that air is subtler than water and less condensed, to that extent will the mobile A be more quickly moved through D than through B. Therefore the ratio of the velocities will equal the ratio of the subtlety of air to the subtlety of water. And the greater the velocity, the less the time: because that motion is faster which covers the same interval in less time, as will be shown in Book VI (L.3). Hence if air is twice as subtle as water, the time it takes A to be moved through B (full of’ water) will be twice the time for A to pass through D (full of air). Consequently, the time C in which it travels the distance B will be twice the time it takes E to pass through D. Therefore, we can take it as a general rule that in whatever ratio the medium (in which something is in motion) is subtler and less resistant and more easily divisible, in that ratio will the motion be faster.

530. Then [368] he explains the second proposition, and says that the void is not exceeded by the full according to some certain ratio. And he proves this by the fact that a number does not exceed nothing [zero] by any ratio, for ratios can exist only between one number and another, or between a number and unity; as four exceeds three by one, and exceeds two by more yet, and one by still more. Hence there is said to be a greater ratio existing

between four and one, than between four and two, or four and three. But four does not exceed nothing according to any ratio.

This is so because anything exceeding is necessarily divided into that which is exceeded and into the excess, i.e., that in which it exceeds; for example, four can be divided into three, and into one, which latter is the amount by which four exceeds 3. But if four exceeds nothing, it will follow that four can be divided into so much and nothing; which is unacceptable. For a same reason one could not say that a line exceeds a point unless it were composed of points and divided into points. In like manner, it cannot be said that the void has any ratio to the full; because the void is not a part of the full.

531. Then [369] he concludes that there can be no ratio between a motion in the void and a motion in the full: but that if any body is in motion in the subtlest of mediums over such and such a distance for such and such a time, the motion in the void will exceed any given ratio.

532. Then [370], because he had deduced the above conclusion in direct line from the assumed principles, he now, lest any doubt arise about those principles, and to make the process more certain, proves the same conclusion by deducing to the impossible.

For if it be claimed that the speed of a motion taking place in the void has a ratio to the speed of a motion taking place in the full, then let the empty space be Z, which shall be equal in magnitude to the space B, full of water, and to the space D, full of air.

Now if it is supposed that a motion through Z has a certain ratio in respect of speed to the motions through B and D, then it must be admitted that the motion through Z (the void) takes place in some definite portion of time, because velocities are distinguished according to the quantities of the times consumed, as was said above. If therefore we say the object A passes through the empty space Z in a definite time, let that time be I, which must be less than the time E required for A to pass through D, which is full of air. Then the ratio of the motion through the empty to the motion through the full will equal the ratio of time E to time I. But during time I, the mobile A will pass through a definite space that is full of a subtler body than exists in D, i.e., than D. And this will happen, if one can find a body which differs in subtlety from air (of which D is full) in the ratio that the time E has to the time I. For example, say the space Z, which had been originally empty space, ir now full of fire. If the body of which Z is full is subtler than the body of which D is full, in the amount that the time E exceeds the time I, it will follow that the mobile A, if it is in motion through Z (which is the space now full of a most subtle body), and through D (which is the space full of air), it will pass through Z conversely at a greater speed in a time I. If therefore no body exists in Z but it is again considered to be empty space, as previously, it will have to move even faster. But this is against what was laid down, namely, that the motion through Z (empty space) required time I. Consequently, since in time I it passes over the same space when it is full of the most subtle of bodies, it follows that during the same time the same mobile passes through one and the same space, when that space is empty and when it is full.

It is clear therefore that if it took a definite time for the mobile to pass through an empty space, the impossibility follows that in equal time it will pass through full and empty space, because there will be some body having the same ratio to some other body as one time has to another time.

533. Then [371] he summarized that in which the force of the previous reasoning consists. And he says that we can now say in recapitulation that the reason why the conflict mentioned in the above occurs is clear: it is because every motion has a ratio to every other motion in respect to speed. For every motion requires time, and any two periods of time, if they are finite, have a ratio one to the other. But there is no ratio between the empty and the full, as we proved. Hence the supposition that motion occurs in the void leads to the conflict mentioned.

In a final summary [372] he concludes that the above mentioned conflicts occur if the different species of motion are taken according to differences of the media.

534. But several difficulties arise against this reasoning of Aristotle. The first is that it does not seem to follow that if motion takes place in the void that it has no ratio to motion in the full. For every motion has its definite velocity from the ratio of the motive energy to the mobile, even if no obstacle exists. And this is evident both from an example and from reason. From an example, indeed, in the heavenly bodies, whose motion encounters no obstacle and yet they have a definite velocity depending on the amount of time. From reason also: for, since it is possible to point out a “before” and “after” in the magnitude through which the motion takes place, so also

one can take a “before” and “after” in the motion from which it follows that motion is in a determined time. But it is true that this velocity can be diminished on account of an obstacle. Yet it is not necessary therefore to make the ratio of motion to motion in respect of velocity be as the ratio of obstacle to obstacle, so as to make the motion occur in no time, if there be no obstacle; rather, the ratio of one slowing up to another slowing up must correspond to the ratio of obstacle to obstacle.

Hence on the assumption that motion takes place in the void, it follows that no slowing up happens to the natural speed, but it does not follow that a motion in the void will have no ratio to motion in the full.

535. Averroes attempts to counter this objection in his commentary. First he tries to show that this objection proceeds from false imagination. For he says that those who make the above objection imagine that an addition in slowness of motion occurs just like an addition in the magnitude of a line, where the added part is distinct from the part to which the addition is made. For the above objection seems to proceed as though slowing up takes place by adding one motion to another motion in such a way that if you were to subtract the motion that was added through the obstacle which slows, the quantity of natural motion would then be left. But this is not the case, because when a motion is slowed up, each part of the motion becomes slower, whereas each part of a line does not become larger.

Then he attempts to show how Aristotle’s argument concludes with necessity. And he says that the speed or slowness of a motion does indeed arise from the proportion of the mover to the mobile; but the mobile must in some manner resist the mover, as the patient is in a certain way contrary to the agent. This resistance can arise from three sources: First, from the situs of the mobile; for from the very fact that the mover intends to transfer the mobile to some certain place, the mobile, existing in some other place, resists the intention of the mover. Secondly, from the nature of the mobile, as is evident in compulsory motions, as when a heavy object is thrown upwards. Thirdly, from the medium. All three are taken together as one resistance, to constitute one cause of slowing up in the motion. Therefore when the mobile, considered in isolation as different from the mover, is a being in act, the resistance of the mobile to the mover can be traced either to the mobile only, as happens in the heavenly bodies, or to the mobile and medium together, as happens in the case of animate bodies on this earth.

But in heavy and light objects, if you take away what the mobile receives from the mover, viz., the form which is the principle of motion given by the generator, i.e., by the mover, nothing remains but the matter which can offer no resistance to the mover. Hence in light and heavy objects the only source of resistance is the medium. Consequently, in heavenly bodies differences in velocity arise only on account of the ratio between mover and mobile; in animate bodies from the proportion of the mover to the mobile and to the resisting medium—both together. And it is in these latter cases that the given objection would have effect, viz., that if you remove the slowing up caused by the impeding medium, there still remains a definite amount of time in the motion, according to the proportion of the mover to the mobile. But in heavy and light bodies, there can be no slowing up of speed, except what the resistance of the medium causes—and in such cases Aristotle's argument applies.

536. But all this seems quite frivolous. First, because, although the quantity of slowing up is not parallel to the mode of continuous quantity, so that motion is added to motion, but parallel to the mode of intensive quantity, as when something is whiter than something else, yet the quantity of time from which Aristotle argues is parallel to the manner of continuous quantity—and time becomes greater by the addition of time to time. Hence if you subtract the time which was added on account of the obstacle, the time of the natural velocity remains.

Then, because if you remove the form which the generator gives to light and heavy bodies there still remains in the understanding "quantified body," which from the very fact that it is a quantified body existing in an opposite situs offers resistance to the mover. For we cannot suppose in heavenly bodies any other resistance to their movers. Hence, as he [Averroes] presents the case, even in the case of heavy and light bodies the reasoning of Aristotle would not follow.

Therefore it is better and briefer to say that the argument brought forward by Aristotle is an argument aimed at contradicting his opponent's position and not a demonstrative argument in the absolute sense. For those who posited a void did so in order that motion be not prevented. Thus, according to them, the cause of motion was on the part of a medium which did not impede motion. And therefore Aristotle argued against them as though the total cause of fastness and slowness derived from the medium, as he clearly shows above when he says that if nature is the cause of the motion of simple bodies, it is not necessary to posit the void as the cause of their motion. In this way he gives us to understand that they supposed the total cause of the motion to depend on the medium and not on the nature of the mobile.

537. The second difficulty against [Aristotle's] argument is that if the medium which is full impedes, as he says it does, then it follows that there will not be any pure unimpeded motion in this lower medium—and this seems unfitting. To this the Commentator replies that the impediment that arises from the medium is required by the natural motion of heavy and light bodies, so that there can be resistance of the mobile to the mover, at least on the side of the medium.

But it is better to say that every natural motion begins from a place that is not natural and tends to a natural place. Hence until it reaches its natural place it is not unfitting if something unnatural be attached to it. For it gradually departs from what is against its nature and tends to what is in keeping with its nature. And for this reason a natural motion accelerates as it nears its end.

538. The third objection is that since in natural bodies there is a fixed limit of rarity, it does not seem that one can keep supposing a rarer and rarer body according to any given proportion of time to time.

In reply it should be said that a fixed rarity in natural things is not due to the nature of the mobile body insofar as it is mobile, but to the nature of specific forms that require specific rareness and density. But in this book we are dealing with mobile body in general, and therefore Aristotle frequently uses in his arguments things which are false if the specific natures of bodies are considered, but possible if the nature of body in general is considered.

Or it can be replied that he is here also proceeding according to the opinion of the earlier philosophers who posited the rare and the dense as the first formal principles. According to them, rarity and density could be increased ad infinitum since these did not depend on other previous forms according to whose exigencies they would be determined.

539. Then [373] he shows there is no separated void, arguing from the speed and slowness of motion, insofar as the cause is taken entirely from the viewpoint of the mobile.

And he says that what he is about to say will follow logically, if we attend to the difference of speed and slowness insofar as bodies in motion exceed one another. For we see that over a given equal space, greater speed is shown by bodies having a greater inclination due either to heaviness or lightness, whether they are greater in quantity but equally heavy or light, or whether they are equal in quantity but unequal in heaviness or lightness. And I say this if they are similar in shape. For a wide body is moved more slowly if it be deficient in heaviness or size than a body with a pointed shape. And the ratio of the velocity corresponds to the ratio which the moving magnitudes have to one another in respect to their weight or in respect to their magnitude. And this will have to be true also if the motion occurs in the void, namely, that a heavier body or a lighter body or a more pointed body will be moved faster through an empty medium. But this cannot be, since it is impossible to explain why one body would be moved faster than another. For if the motion takes place within a space filled with some body, an explanation for the greater or lesser speed can be given—it will be due to any of the aforesaid causes. The explanation is that a greater body will on account of its strength divide the medium more quickly, either an account of its shape, because what is sharp has greater penetrating power; or on account of a greater inclination traceable either to the heaviness or lightness of the body; or even to the force imparted by that which projects it. But the void cannot be cleaved faster or slower. Hence it will be moved through a void with equal speed. But this clearly appears as impossible.

And so from a consideration of the velocity of motion, it is evident that the void does not exist.

It should be observed that in this reasoning process there exists the same difficulty as in the first one. For he seems to suppose that difference in velocity in motions is due only to the different ways in which the medium can be cleaved, whereas the fact is that there are differences of velocity among the heavenly bodies in which there is no full medium resisting which has to be cleaved by the motion of the heavenly body. But this difficulty should be solved as the above one was.

540. Finally [347] he summarizes, and concludes that from the foregoing it is clear that in regard to the philosophers who posit a void, the contrary of what they supposed as a reason for proving it occurs. For they proceeded on

the assumption that motion could not take place unless there was a void. But the contrary has been proved; namely, that if there be a void, there is no motion. Thus, therefore, those philosophers believe that the void is some distinct and separate thing—a space having separate dimensions—and they believed it was such a space that had to exist if local motion were to be possible. However, to posit such a separated void is the same as saying that place is a kind of space distinct from bodies—which is impossible, as was shown in the treatise on place.

LECTURE 13

NON-EXISTENCE OF THE VOID FROM THE VOID ITSELF

541. Now the Philosopher taking his arguments from the void itself, without any mention of motion, shows that the void does not exist. He shows this by three reasons. He says therefore first [375] that even considering the void on its own merits, without motion, it will be seen that the void spoken of by some is just what the name "void" implies. For "void" means something empty and non-existent—and the claim that it exists is vain and without reason and truth. And he shows this as follows.

If anyone places a cubic body in water (i.e., a body having six square surfaces) an amount of water equal to the quantity of the cube must be displaced. And what is true of water is true of air, although it is not so evident, because water is more perceptible to sense than air. By the same reasoning applied to the case of any body that can be displaced, in some part, it must, if the parts are not compressed, or enter into each other, be dislodged either (1) according to the state of a yielding body (when it has free exit); for example, if it is a heavy body such as earth it will yield downwards, and if it is a light body such as fire it will yield upwards, and if it is a body which is light in relation to one body and heavy in relation to another, it will yield in both directions, such as do air and water; or (2) because the body yields on account of the condition of the newly imposed body, i.e., when the yielding body is prevented by the imposed body, i.e., when the yielding body is prevented by the imposed body from being moved according to its demands but is moved according to the demands of the imposed body. And in general it can be held as true that a body must yield to an inserted one, lest two bodies be in the same place.

But this will not be true in the case of the void, i.e., that it must yield to the inserted body, since the void is not a body, whereas whatever is moved in any manner whatsoever is a body. But if there be empty space and a body inserted therein, then the inserted body must pass through that space which previously was empty and cohabit the same space as the void—just as if water or air were not to yield to a wooden cube, but were to pass into the cube in such a way that the air and water would penetrate that cubic body and cohabit with it.

But it is impossible for a wooden cube to exist with empty space; for the wooden cube has the same magnitude as the empty space, which is supposed to be a certain dimensional space without a sensible body. And even though the wooden cube be hot or cold, heavy or light, nevertheless the cubic body is other in notion from all the sensible qualities, that are its accidents, although it be not separable from them in reality. Now what is in conception distinct from the qualities is the body of a wooden cube, i.e., that which pertains to its corporeity. Now if this body be separated from whatever is distinct from it in notion, so that it is neither heavy nor light, it follows that it will occupy a volume of empty space equal to itself. Thus in the same part equal to it, which is part of the place and of the void, the body of the wooden cube will be.

On this assumption it does not seem possible to find a difference between the body of the cube and the dimensions of the place or void. For just as the dimensions of the place or void exist without sensible qualities, so too the dimensions of the cubic body, at least according to notion, are distinct from its sensible qualities. But two magnitudes of equal quantity can differ only in situs. For we cannot imagine one line as distinct from another of equal length, unless we imagine one in one situs and the other in another. Hence, if two magnitudes are imagined together, it does not seem that they can differ: consequently, if two bodies of equal dimensions are together, whether accompanied by their sensible qualities or not, it follows that two bodies are one, or if the cubic body and the space which is the place or void remain two, but are still together, there is no reason why any number of bodies cannot be there. In that case, just as the cubic body is together with the space of the place or void, along with both a third or even a fourth body ought to be able to be inserted. This, of course, is impossible. For we cannot say that it is because of matter that some other sensible body cannot exist together with the wooden cubic body, for place does not belong to a body because of its matter, except in the sense that the matter is contained under dimensions. Hence the impossibility for two bodies to be together is not on account of the matter or of the sensible qualities, but only on account of the dimensions, in which no diversity can be found if they are equal except a diversity based on situs, as was said. Wherefore since there are dimensions in empty space just as there are in a sensible body, then, just as two sensible bodies cannot be together, so neither can a sensible body be together with empty space. So this is one unacceptable result and impossibility that follows from the aforementioned premiss: namely, that two bodies would be in the same place.

542. He then gives the second reason [376], saying that it is clear that a cube which is transferred to an empty space has what all other bodies have, namely, dimensions. If therefore the dimensions of the cube do not differ from the dimensions of the place according to conception, why is it necessary to find for a body a place distinct from its own body, if place is nothing more than "impossible body," i.e., a body without sensible qualities? In view of the fact that a body has its own dimensions, there seems to be no necessity for it to be surrounded by other dimensions of a space equal to its own dimensions. Consequently if the void is presumed, or place as a certain separated space, it follows that bodies do not have to be in place.

543. He gives the third reason [377] when he says that if there were a void, it would have to be evident in mobile things. But there is no evidence of a void anywhere in the world, because what is full of air seems to be a void, though it to not. For air is something, although not perceptible to sight. Now if fish were made of iron and had the same appearance as water, our sight would not be able to distinguish them from water; but it would not follow that the water, or even the fish, were non-existent: for it is not only by sight but also by touch that we can discern what is touched. Consequently, it is evident that water is something, because touch can perceive whether it be hot or cold.

From all this it appears that there is no separate void either within or outside the universe.

LECTURE 14

THERE IS NO VOID WITHIN BODIES

544. Having shown that there is no separated void, the Philosopher here shows that there is no void inherent in bodies. As to this he does three things:

First he gives the reason proposed by those who posit such a void;

Secondly, he disproves their position, at no. 546;

Thirdly, he dissolves their argument, at no. 551.

545. He says therefore first [347] that there have been some philosophers who believed that there is a void in bodies, basing their argument on the existence of rarity and density. For they believed that rarefaction and condensation took place on account of a void inhering in bodies. If rarity and density did not exist, they say, the parts of bodies could not "go in," i.e., enter each other, and "harden," i.e., be compressed by condensation. But if this does not take place, they deduced certain difficulties both in respect to local motion, and in respect to the motions of generation and corruption, or alteration.

In respect to local motion, because it would be necessary to admit either that motion does not exist at all, or that the whole universe is moved with one motion, as says Xuthus, a philosopher. This would be because if a body were moved locally, when it approached a place full of another body, this body would have to be expelled, and tend toward another place and the body found there would have to go to yet another place, so that, unless there were condensation of bodies, all bodies would have to be in motion.

In regard to generation or alteration, this difficulty arises that there would also be an equal change of air into water and of water into air: for example, if air be generated from one cupful of water, it would be necessary that from a same amount of air as was generated, an amount of water be generated somewhere else. The reason is that there is now a greater amount [i.e. volume] of air than there previously was of water from which it was generated. The generated air therefore occupies a greater place than the water from which it was generated. Consequently, either the whole body of the universe would have to occupy a greater place, or else as much air in some other place would have to be converted into water, or else finally, it must be admitted that there is a void within bodies to allow them to be condensed, because these philosophers supposed that bodies could not become condensed and rarefied unless there was a void existing in them.

546. Then [379] he rejects this position:

First according to one interpretation;

Secondly, according to another interpretation, at no.547.

He says therefore that those who posit a void within bodies can give this two interpretations: the first is that in each body there are, as it were, many empty openings, each existing separate in respect to situs from the other full parts, as can be seen in a sponge or in pumice or things of this sort. The second interpretation is that the void is not separate in respect to situs from the other parts of the body; as if we should say that the dimensions, which they said were the void would penetrate all the parts of the body.

The refutation of their claim as to the first way of the void’s being in bodies is evident from what went before. For the very argument that shows there is not a separate void outside of bodies nor any place having such a space proper to itself over and above the dimensions of bodies. The same argument can be used to prove that there is no body so rarefied that it would have within itself any empty spaces distinct from the other parts of the body.

547. He then [380] disproves the aforesaid position as to the second interpretation and gives four reasons for rejecting it. He says, therefore, that if the void is not in bodies in such a way as to be separable and distinct from the other parts but is nevertheless present in bodies, the situation is less impossible, because the difficulties mentioned above against a separate void do not arise; yet against this also certain discrepancies do arise. First of all, the void will not be the cause of every local motion, as the maintained, but only of upward motion—for the void, according to them, is the cause of rarity, and the rare in turn is found to be light, as is evident in fire, and what

is light travels upwards; consequently, the void will be the cause only of upward motion.

548. He gives the second reason [381] when he says that according to those who posit a void in bodies the void is the cause of motion, not as that in which something is moved (in the way that those who held for a separate empty space posited the void as a cause of motion), but as the cause of motion in such a way that the empty space within the bodies transports them: it is analogous to the case of inflated wine-skins, which, due to the fact that they are carried upward on account of their lightness, also carry upward whatever is attached to them. And in this way the void inherent in bodies carries with it the body in which it is.

But this seems impossible: because then it would follow that the void would have to be subject to motion and that there would exist a certain place for the void. And since the void and place are the same, it will follow that of an interior void there will be an exterior void into which it is transported—which is impossible.

549. The third reason [382] is given when he says that if the cause of upward motion is the void carrying a body upward, then since there is nothing to carry the body down, there would be no explanation of why heavy bodies are carried downwards.

550. Be then gives the fourth reason [833], and says that if the rare causes upward motion on account of emptiness, then the rarer and more empty a thing is, the faster it should be carried upward. And if it were completely empty, it should move with a maximum speed.

But this is impossible, because what is completely empty cannot be moved, for the same reason by which it was shown above that motion is impossible in an empty space; for there is no way to compare the speeds of the empty and of the full (whether you consider the space or the mobile) according to some definite ratio, because there is no ratio between the full and the empty. Therefore the void cannot be the cause of upward motion.

551. Then [385] be answers a previous argument:

First he repeats it, explaining it more extensively;

Secondly, he solves it, at no. 552.

He says therefore first that because we do not admit a void either in bodies or outside of them, we must answer the arguments of our opponents, because they present a real difficulty.

First of all on the side of local motion: either (1) local motion will not be if there is not rarity and density, which they believed could not be produced without the void; or (2) we will be forced to say that whenever a body is moved, the very heavens or some part of them are borne outward, which he calls the “bulging” of the heavens.

Secondly, from the viewpoint of generation and corruption a transformation of water into air will always have to be balanced by an equal transformation of air into water somewhere else; for since more air is generated from water it is required (unless condensation takes place which they thought impossible without a void) either (1) that the body which was held to be outermost according to common opinion, namely, the heavenly body, be pushed outward by the swelling of lower bodies; or (2) that somewhere else there must be an equal amount of air converted into water, so that the entire bulk of the universe remain always equal.

But because one could in a certain way elude what he had said about local motion, he mentions this [evasion] again in order to exclude it. Thus he repeats, “Or it follows that nothing is moved.” Now according to the foregoing a disturbance of the heavens occurs whenever anything is transmuted. And this is true unless the motion is rotational: for example, let A be in motion to place B, and B to place C, and C to place D, and again D to place A. In this case, on the assumption of rotational motion, it will not be necessary, if one thing moves, that the whole universe be disturbed. But we do not see every local motion of natural bodies to be rotational, but many are in a straight line. Hence, there will be still disturbance of the heavens, unless condensation and the void be admitted.

This then is the argument which prompted some to posit the void.

552. Then 385] he answers this argument. Now the entire force of this argument consists in this, that rarefaction and condensation take place by means of the void. Accordingly, Aristotle meets this by showing that rarefaction and condensation can take place without a void.

First, he reveals his proposition;

Secondly, he introduces the conclusion be mainly intends, at no. 557.

As to the first he does three things:

First he explains his proposition by an argument;

Secondly, by examples, at no. 555;

Thirdly, by the effects of rarity and density, at no. 556.

As to the first he does two things:

First he premisses certain things necessary for his proposition;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at no. 554.

553. Now [385] he lays down four preliminary statements which he takes from the "subjects," i.e., the presuppositions of natural science, and which were already explained in Book I.

The first of these is that the matter of contraries is one; for example, of the hot and the cold, or of any other natural contrariety—for contraries are apt to affect the same thing.

The second is that whatever is in act had to come into being from what was in potency.

The third is that matter is not separable from contraries so as to exist without them—but yet, according to motion, the matter is distinct from the contraries.

The fourth is that matter is not, by virtue of being, now under one contrary, now under another, other and other, but numerically one.

554. Then [386] from these preliminaries he proves his point in this way: The matter of contraries is one in number. But the large and the small are contraries in respect of quantity. Therefore the matter of the large and the small to numerically the same.

And this is clear in substantial transmutation. For when air is generated from water, the same matter which previously was under the water, came to be under air, not receiving anything that it previously lacked, but rather that which was previously in potency in the matter was reduced to act. And the sam is true in reverse, when from air water is generated. But there is this difference: when air is generated from water, there is a change from small to large; because the quantity of air generated is larger than the quantity of water from which it was generated. But when, from air, water is made, there is produced contrariwise a transmutation from largeness to smallness. Therefore when a large amount of air is reduced to a smaller amount by condensation, or from a small amount to a larger amount by rarefaction, it is the same matter which becomes both in act, namely, large and small, while being previously in potency to them.

Therefore condensation does not take place by certain parts moving into others, or rarefaction by inhering parts being extracted, as those thought who posited a void within bodies. Rather it is because the matter of the same parts now has greater, now lesser, quantity: hence, to become rare is nothing other than for matter to receive greater dimensions by being reduced from potency to act; and the opposite for becoming dense. For just as matter is in potency to definite forms, so it is in potency to definite quantity. Hence rarefaction and condensation do not proceed ad infinitum in natural things.

555. Then [387] he makes the same thing clear from examples. And because rarefaction and condensation pertain to the motion of alteration, [i.e., change in quality] he gives an example of other alterations.

And he says that just as the same matter is changed from cold to hot and from hot to cold, because both were in the matter potentially, so also something passes from hot to hotter, not because some part of the matter previously not hot becomes hot which was not so when It was less hot, but because the entire matter is reduced into the act of being more or less hot.

He gives another example of a quality in the matter of quantity. And he says that if the circumference and convexity of a larger circle are brought in to that of a smaller circle, they become more curved. This happens not because an “ambit,” or curvature, begins to exist in some part that previously was not curved but straight, but because the same that was previously less curved, becomes more curved.

For in alterations of this sort things do not become more and less by “defect,” i.e., by subtraction, or addition but by the transmutation of one and the same thing from perfect to imperfect, or from imperfect to perfect. This is evident in the case of what is absolutely and uniformly “such and such”: it is impossible to find in it any part lacking that quality, just as it is impossible in a flame to find any part lacking heat and “whiteness,” i.e., clarity. So also prior heat comes to a later heat, not because a part previously not hot became hot, but because what was less hot became hotter.

So too the largeness and smallness of a sensible body is not extended or increased in rarefaction and condensation by the matter receiving some addition, but by the matter which was previously in potency to large and small being transmuted from one to the other. Therefore the rare and the dense are not produced by the addition of penetrating parts or by their removal, but by there being one matter of the rare and of the dense.

556. Then [388] he manifests his proposition by the effects of the rare and of the dense. For from a difference in rarity and density there follows a difference in other qualities; namely, in heaviness and lightness, hardness and softness. Consequently, rarity and density diversify qualities and not quantities.

He says therefore, that lightness follows rarity, and heaviness density. And with good reason: for rarity arises from matter receiving greater dimensions, density from matter receiving lesser dimensions. Consequently, if you take diverse bodies of equal quantity, one being rare and the other dense, then the dense has more matter. Now it was said above in the treatise on place that the contained body is related to the container, as is matter to form; consequently, a heavy body which tends toward the middle [i.e., center]contained is with good reason more dense because it has more matter. Just as, therefore, the circumference of a larger circle, when it is restricted to a smaller circle does not receive concavity in a part not previously concave, but rather a part previously concave was reduced to a greater concavity, and just as any part of fire that anyone may take will be hot, so also it is the whole body that becomes rare or dense by the "conduction," i.e., contraction, or expansion of one and the same matter, accordingly as it is moved to greater or smaller dimensions.

This is clear from what follows from rarity and density, namely, qualities. For the heavy and the hard follow from density. Why heaviness follows density has already been explained. Why hardness follows is easy to explain: that is hard which is better able to resist both pressure and cleavage; but what has more matter is less divisible, because it is less obedient to something acting upon it, on account of its being more remote from actuality. Contrariwise, lightness and softness follow upon rarity.

But the heavy and the hard fail to coincide in some things: for lead is heavier, but iron is harder. The reason for this is that lead has more of the element "earth" in it, but what there is of "water" in it is less perfectly congealed and distributed.

557. Then [389] he concludes his chief proposition. And he says it is clear from the foregoing that there is no separate empty space: it is not anything existing absolutely outside a body; or in a rarefied thing after the manner of empty holes; or in potency in a rarefied body, according to those who did not posit a void that exists in bodies as something separated from

the fullness of the body. Consequently, in no way is there a void, unless someone simply wants to call matter the void, since it is somehow the cause of heaviness and lightness, and consequently the cause of motion in respect of place. For density and rarity are causes of motion according to the contrariety of heavy and light; but in regard to the contrariety of hard and soft, passible and non-passible are the causes: for the soft is that which easily suffers division and the hard contrariwise, as was said. However, this does not pertain to local motion but rather to [the motion called] "alteration."

And so he concludes that it has been determined in what way the void exists and in what way it does not.

LECTURE 15

DOES TIME EXIST, AND IS THERE THE SAME “NOW” IN THE WHOLE OF TIME?

558. Having arrived at conclusions concerning Place and the Void, the Philosopher now concluded concerning Time.

First he tells what his intention is and the order he will follow;

Secondly, he carries out his proposal, at no. 559.

He says therefore first [390] that our plan now calls for us to “attack” time, by which he signifies how difficult the subject is. And as in previous discussions, so in the case of time one must begin by presenting extraneous reasons, i.e., the opinions of others, as well as sophistical arguments, dealing with the question of whether time exists or not and, if it does, what is its nature.

Then [391] he begins the discussion of time:

First by arguing against [existence of time];

Secondly, by presenting the truth, at no. 571 (L.17).

In regard to the first he does two things:

First he inquires whether time exists, arguing against it;

Secondly, what it is, at no. 565 (L.16).

As to the first he does two things:

First he gives two reasons which show that time does not exist;

Secondly, he inquires about the “now”: asking whether there is one “now” in the whole of time or several, at no. 561.

559. He says then [391] that two reasons could lead us to suppose either that time does not exist at all or that it is something that can scarcely and

only in an obscure way be conceived. Here is the first reason: anything that is composed of things which do not exist cannot have any existence or any substance; but time is composed of what does not exist—for part of time is the past which no longer exists, and the rest is the future, which does not yet exist (and these two things comprise the whole of time considered as infinite and everlasting). Therefore, it is impossible for time to be anything.

560. The second reason [392] is as follows: As long as any divisible thing is existing there must exist some part of it or a number of parts. But time does not meet these requirements—for some parts of time are already past and others are in the future, so that no divisible part of time is actually existing. And the "now" which is actual is not a part of time: for a part is either a measure of a whole, as two is the measure of six, or at least it is a component of the whole, as four is a part of six (although not its measure) since from it and two, six is composed. Time however does not have "nows" as its parts, as will be proved later (Book VI). Therefore, time is not anything.

561. Then [393] he inquires whether there be the same "now" through the whole of time. About this he does three things:

First, he raises the question;

Secondly, he objects to one side of the question, at no. 562;

Thirdly, he objects to the opposite side, at no. 563.

He says therefore first that it is not easy to be certain whether the "now" which is seen to distinguish the past from the future always remains identical with itself throughout the whole of time or whether it is other and other.

562. Then [394] he gives a reason to show that the "now" is not other and other. Two parts of time which are not the same cannot be existing together unless one contains the other, as a greater period of time contains a smaller, e.g., as a year contains the month and the month the day (for the day and the month and the year exist together). But one "now," since it is indivisible, does not contain another. If, therefore, we are to accept two "now's" in time, then that "now" which existed before the present one and no longer exists, ceased to be sometime, and so two "now's" are never together. However, anything that ceased to be, did so in some "now." But it cannot be that the prior "now" ceased to be in that prior "now," because the prior "now" was existing then, and nothing ceases to be while it is. Likewise, it

cannot be said that the prior “now” ceases to be in a later one: for it is impossible to have two “now’s” together as “had,” i.e., so as to follow immediately one upon the other, just as the same thing is impossible in the case of two points. (This is supposed now, but will be proved in Book VI). Thus, between any two “now’s” there are an infinity of “nows.” If, therefore, that prior “now” ceases to be in some later “now,” it follows that the prior “now” was existing along with all the intermediate “now’s”—which is impossible, as we have said. It is impossible, therefore, that the “now” be other and other.

563. Then [395] he gives two reasons to show that there cannot be just one “now.” The first is that no finite divisible thing can have just one boundary; whether it be a divisible of one dimension, as a line; or of more than one dimension, as a plane or a solid. For the boundaries of one finite line are two points and of a surface the boundaries are several lines, and of a body several planes. But the “now” is a boundary of time. Since therefore it is possible to conceive of a finite time there must be more than one “now.”

564. He gives a second reason [396].Those things are said to be together in time, and neither previously nor later, which are in the same “now.” If therefore it is the same “now” that persevere throughout time, it follows that things which existed a thousand years ago are together with things that exist today.

Summarizing, he concludes that these are the conflicting opinions about the “now’s” which exist in time.

LECTURE 16

DIALECTICAL INQUIRY INTO WHAT TIME IS, AND HOW RELATED TO MOTION

565. After inquiring whether time exists, the Philosopher now inquires dialectically what it is.

First he disproves the opinions of others;

Secondly, he inquires how time is related to motion, which seems to be something most akin to time, at no. 568.

About the first he does two things:

First he gives various opinions of others about time;

Secondly, he disproves them, at no. 566.

He says therefore first that what time is and what is the nature of time cannot be gathered from what is handed down from the earlier philosophers nor from any piecing together of what they concluded about it. For some said that time is a motion of the heavens; others that it is a heavenly sphere itself.

566. Then [398] he disproves their opinions, first of all, the first; then the second, at no. 567.

In regard to the first opinion he gives two counter-arguments, of which the first is: If a circular revolution in time then part of that revolution is a circular revolution, because a part of time is time. But part of a circular revolution is not a circular revolution. Therefore time is not a circular revolution.

Then [399] he gives a second argument: The number of motions corresponds to the number of mobiles; if therefore there are many heavens, there are many circular revolutions. And thus if a circular revolution is time, there are many times together—which is impossible. For no two parts of time are together unless one contains the other, as we have said. (Those who posited time as a circular revolution were led to do so because they observed that times occur over and over in a kind of cycle.

567. Then [400] he rejects the second opinion. And he says that some thought the sphere of the heavens in time, because all things are in time and all things are also in the sphere of the whole, because the heavens contain all things. Hence they wished to conclude that the sphere of the heavens is time. But there were two things wrong in their reasoning: first, because something is not said univocally as being in time and in place; secondly, because they were using two affirmative premises in a Second Figure syllogism. Therefore he says that their position is too foolish to consider the impossibilities that follow upon it. For it is clear that all the parts of the sphere exist simultaneously, whereas the parts of time do not.

568. Then [401] he inquires how time is related to motion.

First he shows that time is not motion;

Secondly that time does not exist independently of motion, at no. 570.

In regard to the first he gives two reasons to show that time is not a motion or a change (for it certainly seems to be such). Here is his reason: Every change and motion is certainly only in the thing being changed or in the place where the changer and changed are. The first of these is mentioned because of motion in substance and quantity and quality; the second because of motion in the predicament “where,” called motion in place.” But time is everywhere and exists among all things. Therefore time is not a motion.

569. He gives the second reason [402]: Every change and motion is either slow or fast; but time is not either. Therefore time is neither a motion nor a change. He explains the minor premise thus: Slow and fast are determined by time—because that is fast which is moved a great distance in a short time and that is slow which is moved a short distance in much time. But time is not determined by either according to its quantity or its quality, because nothing is its own measure. Therefore, time is neither slow nor fast. And since he had proposed that change is fast or slow, without mention of motion, he adds that for the present it does not matter whether one says “motion” or “change.” Their difference will be shown in Book V.

570. Then [403] he shows that although time is not motion, it is not independent of motion: for when men are not changing according to what they apprehend, they are changing without being aware of it, then it does not seem to them that time is passing. This is clear in the fable about the city in Asia called Sardo. In Sardo certain people were said to sleep among the Heroes,,i.e., among the gods. For they called the souls of the good and the great “Heroes,” and worshipped them as gods, as in the case of Hercules and Bacchus and the like. Certain ones were rendered insensible by means of incantations and said to sleep among the gods, because then they awoke they claimed to have seen marvelous things and foretold future events. These persons, returning to themselves, were not aware of the time which elapsed while they were thus absorbed; because that first instant in which they began to sleep they joined to the instant in which they awoke, as if it were one instant—but the time that elapsed escaped them. Therefore just as there would be no intervening time between “now’s,” if the “now” of time were always the same and not other and other, so also when two “now’s” are fused in our apprehension, the elapsed time is not apprehended, and there seems to have been no intervening time. If, then, we are apt to think that no time has elapsed when we do not perceive any changes, and that we are in one and the same indivisible “now,” but we then perceive time to be elapsing when we sense and determine, i.e., motion and change, it clearly follows that time is not independent of motion and change.

In summary he concludes that time is not motion, nor is it without motion.

LECTURE 17

THE DEFINITION OF TIME, GIVEN AND EXPLAINED

571. After treating of time dialectically, the Philosopher here begins to determine the truth.

First, he determines the truth concerning time;

Secondly, he brings up and solves some objections concerning the truth determined, at no. 625 (L.23).

In regard to the first he does two things:

First he determines concerning time absolutely.

Secondly, in relation to things measured by time, at no. 600 (L.20).

As to the first he does three things:

First he makes clear what time is;

Secondly, what the “now” of time is, at no. 582 (L.18);

Thirdly, from the definition he gives of time, he explains the things said about time, at no. 593 (L.19).

About the first he does two things:

First he gives the definition of time;

Secondly, he explains it, at no. 581.

The first point is divided into three parts according to the three parts which he investigates of the definition; The second part begins at no. 575; The third part at no. 580.

572. First [404] therefore he investigates this part: that time is “something of motion.” He says that since we are investigating what time is, we must begin by understanding what aspect of motion time is. That time is something of motion is manifested by the very fact that we sense motion and time together. For it happens that we perceive the flow of time

even though we are not sensing any particular sensible motion; for example, if we are in the dark and do not see any external object moving. And if while we are in this situation, we are not undergoing any bodily changes brought about by an external agent, then we are not sensing any motion of a sensible body. Yet if there is a motion within our soul, such as a succession of thoughts and imaginings, suddenly it appears to us that some time is elapsing. Thus by perceiving any sort of motion we perceive time and, vice-versa, when we perceive time we are simultaneously perceiving a motion. Hence, although time is not a motion, as we have already shown, yet it is somehow connected with motion.

573. What has been just said about the perceiving of time and of motion raises a difficulty. For if time follows upon some sensible motion outside the mind, it follows that whosoever does not sense that motion, does not sense time; whereas the opposite of that is said here. And if time depends upon some motion of the mind, it follows that things are not connected to time except through the medium of the mind: thus time will not be a thing of nature but a notion in the mind like the intention of genus and species. But if time follows upon any and every motion, then there are as many times as there are motions—which is impossible, for there cannot be two times together as we said above.

574. In order to clear up this difficulty it must be remembered that there is one first motion which is the cause of every other motion. Hence whatever is in a transmutable state possesses that state on account of the first motion, which is the motion of the first mobile being. Whosoever, therefore, perceives any motion, whether it exists in sensible things or in the mind, is perceiving transmutable being and consequently is perceiving the first motion, which time follows. Thus anyone who perceives any motion whatsoever is perceiving time, although time follows upon just the one first motion by which all other motions are caused and measured. Consequently, there remains only one time.

575. Then [405] he investigates the second particle placed in the definition of time. For supposing that time is something of motion, namely, that it follows upon motion, there still remains the task of investigating according to what does time follow upon motion; the answer being that it follows upon motion “according to before and after.” As to this then he does three things:

First he shows how “before and after” are found in motion;

Secondly, how they are related to motion, at no. 578;

Thirdly, he shows that time follows motion according to “before and after,” at no. 579.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that the continuity of time is due to the continuity of motion and magnitude;

Secondly, that the same is true of the “before and after” of time, at no.577.

576. He says therefore first that everything that is being moved is being moved. from something to something. But of motions the first is local motion, which is from place to place along a magnitude. But it is the first motion that time follows upon, and therefore, to investigate time, one must take local motion. Since, then, motion according to place is motion according to a magnitude from one place to another, and since every magnitude is continuous, motion must follow magnitude in regard to its continuity, so that, just as magnitude is continuous, so also is motion. Consequently time also is continuous: for the quantity of the first motion and the quantity of time correspond. For time is not measured according to the quantity of just any motion, since something is being moved over a small distance In a large amount of time, and a fast object, vice-versa. Time however corresponds only to the quantity of the first motion.

577. Then [406] he shows that the same order prevails in respect to “before and after,” saying that “before and after” are first of all in a place or in a magnitude. This is so, because a magnitude is a quantity having position; position, however, implies “before and after.” Hence from its position place has”before and after.” And because there is “before and after” in magnitude, it follows that there is a “before and after” in motion corresponding to the things which are there, i.e., in magnitude and place. Consequently, there is a prior and subsequent also in time: for motion and time are so related that the one always follows the other.

578. Then [407] he shows how “before and after” are related to motion. And he says that the “before and after” of these, namely, of time and of motion is, as to what it is, motion; yet in conception, it is distinct from motion and not motion. For it is the notion of motion that it be the act of a being in potency; but that there be in motion a “before and after” occurs in

it by reason of the order of the parts of the magnitude. Accordingly, “before and after” are the same as motion as to subject but they differ from it as to notion. Hence the task remains to inquire, since time follows motion, whether it follows upon it inasmuch as it is motion, or inasmuch as it has a “before and after.”

579. Then [408] he shows that motion follows upon time by reason of “before and after.” For it has been shown that the reason why time follows motion is that we recognize both simultaneously. Therefore time follows motion according to that which, when it is perceived in motion, time is perceived. But it is then that we perceive time, when we distinguish a “before” and “after” in motion; and it is then that we say time is passing when we have a sense of the “before” and “after” in motion. Consequently time follows motion according to “before and after.”

580. Then [409] he shows what aspect of motion time is, and says that it is “the number of motion.” He explains this by using the same means as before, namely, our knowledge of time and motion. For it is clear that when we take in motion something different from something other and understand that there is something between them, then it is that we determine that time exists. For when we perceive the differing boundaries of something and the mind calls them two “now’s,” one being before and the other after, as though the mind were counting the “before’s” and “after’s” in a motion, that is what we call time. For time seems to be determined by the “now.” (This statement is taken for granted at present, but later it will be explained). When therefore we sense one “now” but do not discern a “before” and “after” of motion, or when we in discerning a “before” and “after” take the same “now” as the end of the prior and the beginning of the subsequent, no time seems to exist because no motion seemed to exist. But when we discern a “before” and “after” and count them, then we say that time is produced. This is so because time is nothing less than “the numbering of motion according to before and after”: for we perceive time, as was said, when we count the “before and after” of motion. it is clear there fore that time is not motion, but accompanies motions inasmuch as it is counted. Hence time is the number of motion.

But if someone objects against this definition and says that “before and after” are determined by time, and consequently, that the definition is circular, he should remember that “before and after” are placed in the definition of time inasmuch as they are caused in motion by magnitude, and not inasmuch as they are measured out of time. That is why Aristotle had previously shown that “before and after” are present in magnitude before they are so in motion, and they are in motion before they are in time, to exclude this objection.

581. Then [410] he clarifies the aforesaid definition in two ways, and first by a sign. Now that which is a standard of judging something to be more and less is a number of it. But the standard for judging whether a motion is greater or smaller is time. Therefore, time is a number.

Secondly, [411] he makes clearer what has been stated by distinguishing number, saying there are two. First there is that which is actually numbered which can be, as when we say ten men or 100 horses, and this is called “number numbered,” because it is a number applied to the things that are numbered. Then there is the number by which we count, i.e., number considered absolutely, such as two, three, four [the counting numbers]. Now time is not a counting number; otherwise the number of anything would be time; rather it is a number numbered, because it is the number of before and after in motion that we call “time,” or else the things that are counted before and after.

Therefore, although number is discrete quantity, time is nevertheless a continuous quantity on account of the thing counted, just as ten measures of cloth is a continuous quantity, even though ten is a discrete quantity.

LECTURE 18

HOW THE SAME “NOW” IS OR IS NOT IN A WHOLE TIME

582. After explaining what time is, the Philosopher here explains the “now.”

First he determines whether the “now” in a whole time is always the same or other and other, which was brought up as a problem above;

Secondly, after settling this he gives the reason for what is said above the “now,” at no. 588.

As to the first he does three things:

First, he declares that the “now” is somehow always the same and somehow not;

Secondly, he explains this, at no. 584;

Thirdly, he proves it, at no. 585.

583. He says therefore first [412] that since time is the number of motion, then, just as the parts of motion are always other and other, so also the parts of time. But that which always exists throughout the whole of time is the same, namely, the “now,” which as to its nature is always the same. While in conception it varies accordingly as it is prior and subsequent. Thus the “now” measures time, not inasmuch as it is always the same thing, but inasmuch as in conception it is other and other, and “before” and “after”.

584. Then [413] he explains what he had just said and declares that the “now” is somehow always the same and somehow not. For insofar as it is always being considered as being in something other and other in the succession of time and of motion, in that sense it is other and not always the same. And this is what we stated above, namely, that “it is other in motion.” for this is the esse of the “now,” i.e., it is according to this that its notion is

taken, namely, as considered in the succession of time and motion. But insofar as the "now" is a certain being, from that viewpoint it is always the same thing.

585. Then [414] he proves what he has just said. First he proves that the "now" is always the same as to subject but other and other in conception; secondly, that it is the "now" that measures time, at no. 587.

He says therefore, first that, as was said above, in respect of continuity and in respect of "before" and "after", motion follows upon magnitude and time upon motion. Let us imagine, therefore, after the manner of geometers, that a point in motion is making a line: then, just as there is something that remains identical in this motion, so there must be something that remains identical throughout time. If the moving point should make a line, it is by the moving point that we discern the motion and the "before" and "after" in it. For motion is perceived only because the mobile thing is in other and other states: according to what pertains to the previous position of the mobile, we judge something as "before" in motion, and according to what pertains to a subsequent position, we judge something as "after" in motion. Therefore this thing which is being moved, by which we recognize that there is motion and by which we discern a "before" and "after" in it, whether it be a point or a stone or anything else, insofar as it is a certain being, whatever it may be, is the same, namely as to subject—but in conception it is other. And this is the way the Sophists use the term "other" when they say that Coriscus in the forum is other than Coriscus in the theater, arguing thus: according to the fallacy of accident: to be in the forum is other than to be in the theater; but Coriscus is now in the forum and now in the theater; therefore he is other than himself. In like manner, it is plain that that which is being moved is other according to conception insofar as it is now here, now there—while remaining the same as to subject.

Now just as time follows upon motion, so the "now" follows that which is being moved. This is so because it is through the mobile that we know the "before" and "after" in motion. For when we see the mobile in some certain part of a magnitude through which it is being moved, we judge that the motion which passed through one part of the magnitude has ceased to be before and that motion through another part will follow after. In like manner, in the counting of motion (which counting is done by time), that which distinguishes the "before." and "after" of time is the "now," which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Thus the “now” is related to time as the mobile in to motion. Therefore also, by commuting the proportion, we get that time is to motion as the “now” is to the mobile. Hence, if the mobile remains the same as to subject throughout the entire motion—though differing in conception—the same will be true of the “now”: it too will remain the same as to subject but will be other and other in conception. For that by which “before” and “after” are discerned in a motion is the same as to subject but differing in conception, the mobile; and that according to which “before” and “after” are counted in time is the “now.”

586. This train of thought makes easy an understanding of eternity. For the. “now,” insofar as it corresponds to a mobile that is continually other and other, distinguishes the “before” and “after” in time and by its flow makes time, just as a point makes a line. But if that varying status of the mobile be removed, the substance remains always in the same state; whence the “now” is then understood as always standing still and not as flowing nor as having a “before” and “after.” Therefore, just as the “now” of time is understood as the number of the mobile, so the “now” of eternity is understood as the number, or rather the unity of a thing always remaining in the same state.

587. Then [415] he shows whence the “now” derives its function of measuring time. And he says it is because that which is best known in time is the “now”, and what is best known in any genus is the measure of everything in that genus, as is said in Metaphysics X. He also shows this from the relation of motion to the mobile: for motion is perceived through something being moved and local motion is perceived through observing something being moved locally; after the manner of the better known manifesting the less known. This is so because that which is being moved is “this something,” i.e., a certain thing stable in itself—a characteristic which does not belong to motion. Hence the mobile is more known by us than the motion, and motion is known through the mobile object. In like manner., time is made known through the “now.” Thus, he reaches the conclusion principally intended: that what is called the “now” is always the same in one way, and in another way not, because it is similar to the mobile, as was said.

588. Then [416] he explains the reason for the things which are said of the "now":

First, why it is said that nothing of time exists but the "now";

Secondly, why the "now" is said to separate and continue the parts, of time, at no. 590;

Thirdly, why it is said that the "now" is not a part of time, at no. 592.

589. He says therefore first that it is plain that if there is no time, there will be no "now," and if no "now," no time. This is explained by the relation of motion to the mobile. For just as the change of place and that which is being changed are together, so the count of that which is being changed accompanies the count of the change of place. But time is the number of a local motion, while the "now" is related to what is being moved, not as its number (since the "now" is indivisible), but as the unit of number. It follows therefore that time and the "now" are not one without the other. Notice that time is always compared to a local motion, which is the first of all motions: for time is the number of the first motion, as was said.

590. Then [417] he explains why itis said that time is continued and, divided according to the "now."

First he explains it by considering motion and the mobile;

Secondly, by considering a line and a point, at no. 591.

He says therefore first that what we have already said makes clear that time is made continuous with the "now," i.e., by the "now," and is divided by the "now." This fact also follows from what is found in local motion (the number of which is time) and in the object that is being moved according to place which corresponds to the 'how"). For it is clear that every motion derives its unity from the object being moved, since that which is being moved remains one and the same throughout the whole course of the motion. And it is not a matter of indifference whether that which is moved, in the course of one motion, be any being at all, but rather it must be that same being which first began to be moved, for if it were another being that was later moved, the former motion would have failed and there would now be another motion of another mobile. So it is clear that it to the mobile that gives unity to the motion, which unity constitutes its continuity.

But it to true that the mobile is other and other according to conception. And it to in this way that it distinguishes the prior and the subsequent part of motion: because insofar as the mobile is considered under one aspect or disposition it is recognized that whatever disposition was in the mobile previous to its present state pertained to the prior part of the motion; whatever disposition will come after this state will pertain to the subsequent part of the motion. Thus it is that the mobile both continues the motion and distinguishes its parts. And the same holds for the "now" in relation to time.

591. Then [418] he explains a case of the same in the matter of line and point. And he says that the conclusion drawn about time and the "now" in the preceding section follows in a way from what is found in a line and a point; for the point continues the line and distinguishes its parts, inasmuch as it is the beginning of one part and the end of another.

But there is a difference in the case of line and point, and in the case of time and the "now". For both the point and the line are something stationary; whence a person can consider the same point twice and use it as two [give it two interpretations] namely, as both a beginning and an end. When we thus use the point as two, rest occurs, as is evident in a reflex motion, in which that which was the and of the first motion is the beginning of the second and reflected motion. It is on this basis that we shall prove in Book VIII that a reflex motion is not continuous but that an intermediate pause occurs.

But the "now" is not stationary, because it corresponds to the mobile which is always being carried along during the motion—which also accounts for the "now" having to be always other and other in conception as was said above. Therefore since time is the number of motion, it does not number motion in the sense that some same time is taken as the beginning of one and the end of another, but rather it numbers motion by taking two boundaries of time, namely, two "nows," which are nevertheless not parts of time.

The reason why this method of counting is used in numbering time, rather than the method used when a point numbers the parts of a line (where the same point is considered both a beginning and an end), is that, as was stated, in the latter method we use the point as two things and this brings about an intermediate pause, which cannot exist in time or in motion. Now this does not mean that the same "‘now" is not the beginning of the future and the end of the past, but that we do not perceive time by counting motion in terms of one "now" but in terms of two, as was said; otherwise, in our counting of motion the same "now" would be employed twice.

592. Then [419] he explains why it is said that the “now” is not a part of time. And he says it is plain that the “now” is not a part of time, just as what distinguishes a motion is not a part of the motion, namely, some disposition in the mobile itself, just as points are not parts of a line. For two lines are the parts of a line.

Now he manifests the properties of time from the properties of motion and of line because, as was said above, motion is continuous on account of the magnitude, and time on account of the motion.

He concludes, therefore, finally that the “now,” insofar as it is a certain boundary, is not time but it happens to time, as a boundary does to that which is bounded; but insofar as time or the “now” numbers other things, the “now” is the number of things other than time. The reason is because a boundary can only be of that of which it is the boundary; but a number can be applied to various thing, as the number of ten horses is also that of other things. Thus therefore the “now” is the boundary only of time, but it is the number of all mobiles that are being moved in time.

LECTURE 19

FROM THE DEFINITION OF TIME CERTAIN THINGS ARE CLARIFIED

593. Having defined time, the Philosopher now, in the light of the definition which he has given, gives an explanation of those things that are said about time. About which he does four things:

First, he shows in what sense there to found in time a smallest part, and in what sense there is not;

Secondly, why time is said to be “much” and “little,” “short” and “long”, but not “fast” and “slow,” at no. 595;

Thirdly, in what sense time is the saw, and in what sense it is not [ever the same again] at no. 596;

Fourthly, how time to known through motion and vice-versa, at no. 597.

594. He says therefore first [420] that the previously given definition of time makes clear that time is “the number of motion according to before and after,” as was expounded above, and that time is a type of continuum, as is likewise manifest from what has gone before. For although it does not have continuity insofar as it is a number, yet it has continuity by reason of that of which it is the number: for it is the number of a continuum, namely, of motion, as was said above. For time to not a number absolutely but a number of something numbered.

Among absolute numbers there is unequivocally a least to be found, namely, two. But if we consider owe certain number, namely, the number of something that is continuous, then there is in one sense a minimum and in one sense no minimum, because in the order of multitude [plurality] there is a least, but not in the order of magnitude. For example, in a plurality of lines there is a minimum according to plurality, i.e., one line or two lines (one if you consider what is the minimum in number absolutely; two if you mean that which is least in the genus of number, having the notion of number). But in respect of magnitude there is no minimum in lines, so that there would be namely, some smallest lines—because it is always possible to divide any line whatsoever.

A parallel situation is found in time, for there is a minimum according to multitude, namely, one or two, for example, one year or two years or two days or two hours. But in the order of magnitude there is no minimum, because of any given time there are parts into which it may be divided.

595. Then [421] he gives a reason why time is not said to be slow or fast, but great and small, short and long. For it has already been shown that time is both a number and a continuum. Insofar, therefore, as it is the latter, time, is said to be "long" and "short", insofar as it is a number, it is said to be "great" and "small." But to be "fast" and "slow" in no wise belongs to number, neither to number absolutely, as is plain, not to the number of some things. For to be "fast" or "slow" is said of something accordingly as it is numbered: for a motion is called "fast" insofar as it is counted off in a short time—and "slow" conversely. Hence it is clear that in no sense can time be called "fast" or "slow."

596. Then [422] he shows how time is the same and how not the same.

First, how it is the same or not the same absolutely;

Secondly, how it is the same in a certain respect, at no. 597.

He says therefore first that the time existing at a given moment is the same everywhere, i.e., it is the same in respect to everything that is being moved anywhere. For it is not diversified by reason of the diverse mobiles, but by reason of the diverse parts of the same motion. For which reason a prior time and a later time are not the same. Why? Because the first and present motion, of which time is primarily and principally the number, is one; but one part of this motion has already taken place and is past, and another will be in the future. Hence there is one time which is past, and another time which is future. This is so because time is not number absolutely but the number of something numbered; namely, of the "before" and "after" in motion. And this number always varies and is "before" and "after," because the "now's," as before and after, are always other. But if time were number absolutely, then the time corresponding to the change which is past and the time corresponding to the change which is to come would be the same, for number absolutely is one and the same of different things counted as, for example, in the case of 100 horses and 100 men. But number numbered varies with different things. For 100 horses are not the same as 100 men. Since time is the number of “before’s and “after” in motion; and since the “before” and “after” of a past motion are not the same as those of that which follow, therefore the past time and the future time are other and other.

597. Then [423] he shows how the same time returns in a certain respect. And he says that in the same way that one and the same motion may be repeated, so may one and the same time. For one and the same motion can be duplicated specifically, but not numerically; for it is from the same sign of the Ram that the sun first moves [at the vernal equinox] and later will move the following year; therefore, just as there has been winter or spring or summer or fall, so also there will be, not, indeed, the same one in number, but in species.

598. Then [424] he shows that just as we know motion from time, so also time from motion.

First, by reason of number and the thing numbered;

Secondly, from the likeness existing between magnitude and motion, at no. 599.

He says therefore first that we not only measure time by motion but motion by time, because each is defined in terms of the other. For one must take the quantity of the one according to the quantity of the other. Now that time should determine motion comes about because it is the number of motion; but conversely, as to us, motion determines time. For we sometimes perceive a quantity of time by means of motion, as when we declare a time to be long or short according to a measure of motion, certain to us; because sometimes we know a number through the things that can be counted, and conversely. For we know by this number a multitude of horses and likewise by one horse we know the number of horses. For we would not know how many thousands there were unless we know what a thousand was. The same holds for time and motion. For when a quantity of time is certain to us, but the quantity of motion unknown, then by the time we measure the motion; but we do the opposite when the motion is known and the time unknown.

599. Then [425] he shows the same thing by comparing motion and magnitude. And he says that what has been just said of time and motion

happens reasonably because just as motion imitates magnitude in quantity and continuity and divisibility, so also does time imitate motion; for the latter [quantity, continuity and divisibility] are found in motion on account of their presence in magnitude, and they are found in time on account of their presence in motion. For we measure magnitude by means of motion, and motion by means of magnitude. For we say that a road is long when we notice that our motion over it was long; and conversely, when we consider the magnitude of the road, we say that our motion was long. The same holds when relating time and motion, “ we said above.

LECTURE 20

HOW THINGS ARE, AND ARE NOT, IN TIME

600. After determining the question of time in itself, the Philosopher now discusses it in relation to things that are in time. As to this, he does two things:

First he compares time with things that exist in time;

Secondly, with things that exist in the "now," at no. 612 (L.21).

Concerning the first he does two things:

First he compares time to motion;

Secondly to other things that are in time, at no. 602.

601. In regard to the first, note that motion is related to time in a way different from the way other things are related to it. For motion is measured by time both as to what it is and as to its duration i.e., its existence. But other things, such as a man or a stone, are measured by time as to their existence or their duration insofar as they have a changeable existence; but as to what they are in themselves, they are not measured by time; rather it is the "now" of time that here corresponds, as was said above (L. 18).

He says therefore [426] that time is the measure of motion itself, and "of being moved," by which he means the duration of motion.

Now time measures motion by a certain part of the motion's being determined by time, which part then measures the whole motion. And this is necessary, because each thing is measured by something of the same genus, as is said in Metaphysics X. This is evident in the measures of lengths. For a cubit can measure the entire length of a piece of cloth or of a road, because the cubit determines some part of the length—which part then measures the whole. Likewise by means of a part of motion, time measures an entire motion: for by means of the motion of one hour, the motion of a whole day is measured, and by means of the daily motion the yearly motion is measured. Therefore, since motion is measured by times, for motion to be in time is, nothing more than for it to be measured by time, both as to what it is and as to its duration—because according to both aspects it is measured by time, as was said.

602. Then [427] he shows how it is related to other things:

First, how other things are in time;

Secondly, what things belong in time, at no. 603.

He says therefore first [427] that since for motion to be in time is for it to be measured by time, both as to itself and as to its existence, it is clear that it is likewise the same for other things to exist in time and to be measured by time, i.e., not as to what they are, but as to their existence: for motion is essentially measured by time but other things only insofar as they have motion.

He proves, in the following way, that for a thing to exist in time is to have its existence measured by time: To be in time can mean two things; first, as something is said to exist in time, because it co-exists with time; secondly, as something is said to exist in time in the way that things are said to exist in number. And this latter also has two meanings: for in a number something is present (1) as a part, as 2 is in 4; and as a property, such as even and odd, or whatever else that belongs to number; or (2) it can be there, not because it is anything pertaining to number, but because number belongs to it as numbered, as men may be said to be in such and such a number.

But because time is a number something can be present tn time in both ways. For the "now," and "before" and "after," and things of this sort, exist in time as unity exists in number, of which it is a part, and as do even and odd, which are properties of number, and as do "superfluous" and "perfect." (A number is called "perfect," if the sum of the parts measuring it equals the number; for example, six is measured by one, two, and three, which, added together, equal six. A number is called "superfluous" if its divisors total up to a number which exceeds it: for example, 12 is measured by one, two, three, four, and six, which, when added together equal 16.) And that is the way in which some things exist in time, namely, as being something of time . But things that are not something of time are said to be in time as things numbered exist in number. Consequently these latter things that are in time must be contained under time as under a number, just as things in place are contained under place as under a measure.

Then he explains the very first way of something's existing in time. And he says it is clear that it is not the same thing to exist in time, and to exist when time exists [i.e., to co-exist] just as it is not the same to be in motion and in place and to be in existence when place and motion exist. Otherwise, it would follow that all things would be in anything; for example, the heavens would be in a grain of millet, because when the millet exists, the heavens exist.

There are two differences between these situations: for when something is said to be when something else exists, it is incidental to the one that it exists at the same time as the other; but that in which something exists as in a measure follows necessarily [upon that which is in it], as time necessarily follows upon that which is in time, and motion upon that which is in motion, so that they are together.

603. Then [428] he shows to what things it belongs to be in time;

First he shows that not all beings exist in time;

Secondly, that not all non-beings do, at no. 611.

As to the first he does two things:

First he shows that things which are always do not exist in time;

Secondly, that nevertheless things that are at rest are, as such, in time, at no. 606.

As to the first he does two things:

First he mentions the facts from which he proceeds to the manifestation of his proposition;

Secondly, he concludes to the proposition, at no. 605.

Now he mentions two things. The first of these [428] is that, when something is in time as the numbered is in a number, then necessarily there is some time that can be taken larger than everything that exists in that time, just as it is possible to take a number larger than everything that is numbered. Consequently, all things that exist in time are of necessity contained under time and comprehended under it just as things in place are comprehended under place.

604. The second thing is then mentioned [429] and it is that whatever exists in time suffers something under time in tl;e- ie-nee of "suffering"

fpassic7 as what pertains to defect. And he proves this from the way people ordinarily speak. For we are wont to say that length of time “wastes things away,” i.e., decays and corrupts them, and again that on account of time all things that exist in time grow old, and that on account of time forgetting occurs - for things we have recently learned remain in the memory but with length of time they slip away.

And lest anyone should say that perfections also are attributed to time as well as defects, he subsequently forestalls this, giving, in effect, three reasons over and above the three aforesaid.

Complementing his statement that forgetting occurs on account of time, he add-s that no one learns on account of time; for if a person should neglect study for a long time, he does not on that account learn, while he does on account of time forget.

In keeping with his statement that all things grow old in time, he adds that nothing becomes new on account of time; for a thing is not renewed on account of a long existence; rather, it becomes antiquated.

To match his statement that time wastes things away, he adds that time does not make a thing good, i.e., whole, and perfect, but rather wasted and decayed. The reason for this is that time corrupts things even when there is no other manifest corrupting agents. All this is due to the very nature of time: for time is the number of motion—and it is of the nature of motion to put a distance between what now is and the condition it was in previously. Consequently, since time is the number of the first motion, which causes mutability in all things, it follows that length of time causes all things that exist to time to be removed from their former condition.

605. Then [430] he concludes to his proposition from the foregoing premises, and first of all, from the first. For it has been shown that whatever exists in time is contained under time while whatever things are always, are not contained under time as exceeding time. Neither is the being, i.e., the duration, of such things measured under time, since they endure to infinity, and the infinite cannot be measured. Therefore those things that exist forever, are not in time. But this is true insofar as they exist always. For the heavenly bodies exist forever according to the being of their substance, but not in regard to “where” they are; consequently, their duration is not measured by time, yet their local motion is.

Secondly [431] he proves the same point from the second of the points laid down before. And he says that a sign that those things which exist forever do not exist in time is that they do not suffer from time, as though not existing in time. For they neither waste away nor grow old, as was said of things that exist in time.

606. Then [432], because he had shown that those things which exist forever do not exist in time, while those things which are at rest also remain the same way someone might think that things at rest are, as such, not measured by time. Therefore to obviate this, he shows that time is also the measure of rest. And in regard to this he does five things:

First he proposes what he intends, and says that because time is the measure of motion per se, it will also be per accidens the measure of rest; for all rest is in time just as all motion is.

607. Secondly [433] he excludes something that might lead one to think that rest is not measured by time. For since time is the measure of motion, someone might suppose that a thing at rest, because it is not in motion, is not in time. Consequently, to exclude this, he says that not everything in time need be in motion, in the same way that everything in motion has necessarily to be moved. For time is not a motion but the number of motion. Now it occurs that not only what is being moved, but also what is at rest, may be in the number of motion.

608. Thirdly [434] he proves the proposition that a thing at rest is in the number of motion, as to be measured by time. To do this, he adduces that not every immobile thing, i.e., not every thing that is not in motion, is at rest; rather, a thing at rest is something deprived of motion, but which is nevertheless by nature disposed to be moved, as it was said above in Book III that that is moved whose immobility is rest—for rest is not the negation of motion, but its privation. Consequently, it is evident that the being [existence] of a thing at rest is the being of a mobile being. Hence, since the being [existence] of a mobile being is in time and is measured by time, the being of a thing at rest is measured by time. Now here we are saying that a thing is in time as in a number, because there is some number for that thing, and because its existence is measured by the number of time. Thus it is clear that a thing at rest exists in time and is measured by time, no insofar as it is rest but insofar as it is a mobile being. That is why he said in the

beginning that time is per se a measure of motion but per accidens a measure of rest.

609. Fourthly, [435] he shows in what sense a mobile and a thing at rest are measured by time. And he says that time measures what is moved and at rest not insofar as it is a stone or a man, but insofar as it is in motion and at rest. For measuring is properly due to quantity; therefore, time is properly the measure of that whose quantity is measured by time. Now, from the measuring done by time, are known both the quantity of motion and the quantity of rest, but not the quantity of the thing in motion. Hence the thing in motion is not measured by time according to its own proper quantity, but according to the quantity of its motion. From this it is clear that time properly is the measure of motion and of rest—of motion per se, but of rest per accidens.

610. Fifthly, [436], he adduces a certain corollary from the foregoing. For if nothing is measured by time except insofar as it is in motion or at rest, it follows that whatsoever things are neither in motion nor at rest, e.g., the separated substances, are not in time; for this is to be in time, namely, to be measured by time. But time is the measure of motion and of rest, as is clear from the foregoing.

611. Then [473] he shows that not all non-beings are in time. He says it is clear from the foregoing that neither is every non-being in time, as in the case of things that cannot be otherwise [whose contradictory cannot be], e.g., that a diagonal be commensurate with the side of a square: for this is impossible, because it can never be true. Now such things are not measured by time. And he proves it in this way: Time is primarily and per se the measure of motion, and anything else is measured by time only per accidens. Consequently whatever is measured by time must be capable of motion and rest. Hence things generable and corruptible, and all things that sometimes exist and sometimes do not, since they are “in motion and rest,” exist in time, for same time can be found that is greater than they are and which exceeds their duration, and for that reason measures their substances, not in regard to the nature of the substances, but in regard to their existence or duration.

But among things that do not exist but are nevertheless contained by time, some things existed at one time, as Homer; others will exist, as some future event; or, if they are contained both by past and present time, they both will be and were. But things that are in no way contained by time neither are, nor were, nor will be. Such are things that forever are not, and whose opposites forever are; for example, that a diagonal be not commensurable to the side, forever is; whence it is not measured by time. And for this reason neither is its contrary measured by time, i.e. that the diagonal is symmetrical, i.e., commensurable. The reason why it forever is not, is that it is the contrary of what forever is.

But of whatever things the contrary does not always exist, such things can exist and not exist, and are subject to generation and corruption; such things are measured by time.

LECTURE 21

THE MEANING OF “NOW” AND RELATED TERMS

612. After showing how time is related to things that exist in time, the Philosopher here shows how, in virtue of their relations to the “now,” certain words derived various meanings with respect to time. About this he does two things:

First he explains the meaning of “now”;

Secondly, the meaning of certain other words that are determined by the “now, “ at no. 615.

As to the first be does two things:

First be gives the proper and principal meaning of “now”;

Secondly, be gives a secondary meaning, at no. 614.

613. In regard to the first be says three things about “now.” The first of these [438] is that the “now” joins past time to the future, insofar as it is the boundary of time—the beginning of the future and the end of the past, although this is not so evident in the “now” as in a point. For a point is stationary and therefore can be considered twice: once as a beginning, and once as an end. But this does not occur with the “now,” as was said above.

Secondly [439], he says that time is divided according to the “now” as a line is divided according to the point. But yet the “now” divides time insofar as it, the “now,” is considered to be many in potency, i.e., as it is, namely, taken separately as the beginning of this time, and separately as the end of that time. And insofar as it is taken in this way, the “now” is taken as other and other; but insofar as it is taken as linking time and giving it continuity, it to taken as one and the same. And he shows this from a similar situation in mathematical lines, in which it is more evident. For in mathematical lines the point in the middle of a line is not always taken as the same: for insofar as the line is divided, there is understood one point which is the end of one line, and one point which is the end of the other. For lines, insofar as they are actually divided, are considered as contiguous—and contiguous things are those whose boundaries are together. But insofar as the point continues the parts of the line, it is one and the same—for continuous things are those whose boundary is the same. And this is the situation with the "now" in respect of time: for it can be taken in one way as potentially dividing time; in another way, as the common boundary of two times, uniting them, and making them continuous.

Thirdly [440], he says that the "now" that divides and continues time is one and the same as to subject, though differing in conception, as the foregoing has made clear. So much for the first meaning of "now."

614. Then [441] he gives a secondary meaning of "now," saying that "now" has another meaning, for it can be taken, not as the boundary of time continuing the past with the future, but as the time near to the present "now," whether that time is past or future, as when we say, "He will come not," because he will come today, or when we say, "He has come now," because he came today. But we do not say that the Trojan war has happened "now," nor that the Flood took place "now," because, although the whole of the time is continuous [with the present] nevertheless it is not close to the present "now."

615. Then [442] he explains certain things that are determined by the "now." And first, what "then" signifies. About this he does two things:

First he gives its meaning;

Secondly, he raises a difficulty, at no. 616.

He says therefore first (442) that "then" signifies a time determined by some previous "now," whether near or remote. For we can say that Troy was destroyed "then," and that the Deluge took place "then." For what is said to have taken place "then" must be included between some preceding "now" or instant [and the present]. For it will be necessary to say that there is a time period of definite quantity from the present time to that "now" which was in the past. In this wise it to evident that "then" differs from the second meaning of "now" in two ways: first, because "then" always refers to the past and it matters not whether it to the near past or the remote past; but "now" refers to the near, and it matters not whether it be past or future.

616. Then [443] he raises a difficulty in the light of the foregoing and solves it. For he had said that the time which is called “then” is included within a past “now” and the present: hence all time called “then” must be finite. But there is no time which cannot be called “then.” Therefore all time is finite. Now all finite time runs out. It seems therefore that one must say that time runs out. But if motion is always and time is the measure of motion, it follows that time will not run out. Therefore, we shall be forced to say, if all time is finite, either that time is always other and other, or that the same time is repeated over and over. And this situation must exist in time just as it is in notion. For if there is some eternally one and the same motion, then there will have to be one and the same time; but if there is not one and the same motion, there will not be one and the same time.

617. According to his opinion, as will be clear in Book VIII, motion never had a beginning, and will never end. Thus one and the same motion is being repeated, not numerically but specifically. For it is not numerically the same revolution that is taking place now and which took place in the past, but it is specifically the same one. Nevertheless, the whole notion is one in continuity, because one revolution is continuous with the next, as will be proved in Book VIII. And what was said of motion must also apply to time.

From this he shows that time will never fail. For it is evident from the foregoing that the “now” is both a beginning and an end, although not in relation to the same thing; but it is an end with respect to the past and a beginning with respect to the future. Accordingly, the situation with respect to the “now” is like that of the circle, in which its concavity and convexity are the same thing in reality, but differ according as they are related to diverse things. For convexity is had in a circle with respect to things outside it, and concavity with respect to things inside it. And because nothing of time can be taken but the “now” (as was said above) it follows that time is always at a beginning and at an end. And for this reason time seems to be other and other, for the “now” is not the beginning and end of the same time, but of different times; otherwise, opposite things would be true of the same thing according to the same aspect. For “beginning” and “end” have opposite notions; consequently, if the same thing were a beginning and an end with respect to the same, opposites would exist in the same thing according to the same aspect.

He further concludes from the foregoing that since the “now” is both a beginning and an end of time, time will never fail: for time cannot be understood without a “now,” and the “now” is the beginning of a time: hence time is always existing in a beginning of itself. But what is at its beginning is not failing; therefore time will not fail. By the same reasoning it can be proved that time did not commence from the point of view of the “now” which is the end of time.

But this reasoning proceeds on the supposition that motion is always, as he says. On this supposition, one would have to say that any “now” of time is a beginning and an end. But if it be said that motion had a beginning, or that it will cease, it follows that some “now” will be a beginning of a period of time and not an end, and some “now” will be an end but not a beginning, as happens also in a line. For if there were an infinite line, any point designated in it would be a beginning and an and. But if the line is finite, some point in it is a beginning only, or an end only. But this will be investigated more in detail in Book VIII.

618. Then [444] he shows what is meant by the words “presently” or “just”; and that they have the same meaning of “now.” For “presently” and “just” refer to what is near the present indivisible “now”, whether it is part of the future or part of the past. It refers to a part of the future, when I say: “When will he leave?” “Presently”—because the time in which this will take place is close. It refers to the past when I say “When are you going?” and it is answered,—”I have just gone”. However in regard to events that are distant, we do not say “presently” or “just”; for example, we do not say that Troy has “just” been destroyed, because this is very remote from the present “now.”

619. Then [445] he explains certain other words referring to time. And he says that “just now” [modo] signifies that a period of the past is near the present “now”, as when, if it is asked, “When did so-and-so come?” the answer is “just now,” if the past time is very close to the present. But we say “long ago”, when the time past is far from the present. Finally, we say that something occurs “suddenly”, when the time in which it takes place is imperceptibly small.

LECTURE 22

HOW CORRUPTION IS ATTRIBUTED TO TIME—ALL MOTION AND CHANGE ARE IN TIME

620. After comparing time and the “now” to things that exist in time, the Philosopher here explains some things that were touched upon above.

First, how corruption is attributed to time;

Secondly, how every motion and change exist in time, at no. 623.

Concerning the first he does two things:

First he makes his proposition clear by an argument;

Secondly, by a sign, at no. 622.

621. He says therefore first [446] that every change of its very nature removes from its natural disposition the thing that is changed: but both generation and corruption take place in time. And therefore some attributed generations in things to time, as in the case of learning and the like, saying that time is “very wise” because the generation of science takes place in time. But a certain philosopher by the name of Parus, a Pythagorean, claimed on the contrary that time was “wholly unteachable,” because with length of time comes forgetfulness. And he was more right: for, as was said above, time per se is more a cause of corruption than of generation. The reason is that time is the number of motion, and change is per se destructive and corruptive. It does not cause generation and existence except per accidens. For from the fact that something is moved, it departs from the state in which it was. But that it arrive at some disposition is not implied in the notion of motion insofar as it is motion but insofar as it is finished and perfect. And this perfection is brought about by motion on account of the

intention of the agent which moves to a predetermined end. Therefore corruption is attributed rather to change and time, whereas generation and being attributed to the agent and generator.

622. Then [447] he explains the same point with a sign, and he says that a sufficient sign of his claim is that nothing is found to come into being independently of an agent and a mover, but that a thing can corrupt without any mover in evidence. And such corruption we are accustomed to attribute to time, as when someone fails through old age from a corrupting internal cause that is not apparent; but when someone is killed with a sword, his corruption is not attributed to time. However, in generation the generator is always evident, because nothing is generated by itself. That is why generation is not attributed to time, as is corruption. Nevertheless, corruption is not laid to time in such a way as that time should cause it; but rather as occurring in time, while the corrupting influence is latent.

Finally [448], he asserts in a summary way that it has been explained that time exists, and what it is, and how “now” is used in various senses, and what are the meanings of “then” and “just now” and “presently” and “long ago” and “suddenly.”

623. Then [449] he above by two arguments that all change occurs in time. The first of these is that in every change is found the distinction of “faster” and “slower.” But these are determined by time—because that is said to be changed “faster,” which is changed first to a designated term, over a same distance, provided that both motions are subject to the same rule; e.g., in the case of local motion, if both motions are circular, or both in a straight line. But if one were along a circle and the other straight, the fact that one reached its terminus before the other would be no reason for saying that one moved “faster” than the other. And the same is to be understood of other types of change. It follows, therefore, that every change exists in time.

624. He then gives a second reason [450], but in this proof he makes use of the proposition that “before” and “after” exist in time. He manifests this proposition in the following way. “Before” and “after” are said according to the distance from the “now,” which is the boundary of the past and of the future. Both “now’s” exist in time; therefore both “before” and “after” exist in time, because that in which the “now” is, and that in which the distance from the “now” is, must be the same; just as it is in the same thing that there

are a point and the distance taken in relation to that point, for both are in a line.

And because he had said that “before” and “after” are determined by the distance to the “now,” he shows how this occurs in a contrary manner with the past and the future. For in the past, that is “before” which is farther from the “now” but “after” which is nearer; but in the future it is just the opposite. If therefore “before” and “after” exist in time, and “before” and “after” follow upon every motion, then necessarily every motion exists in time.

LECTURE 23

THE PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED AS TO THE EXISTENCE AND UNITY OF TIME

625. After determining the truth about time, the Philosopher now settles certain doubts about time:

First in regard to the existence of time;

Secondly, in regard to the unity of time, at no. 630.

As to the first he does two things:

First he raises the doubts;

Secondly, he solves them, at no. 626.

He says therefore first [451] that certain problems require diligent consideration: namely, that of how time is related to the soul; and that of how time seems to be everywhere, i.e., an earth, on the sea, and in the air.

626. Then [452] he answers these questions:

First he answers the second question, because it is easier;

Secondly, he answers the first one, at no. 627.

He says therefore [452] that time is a certain accident of motion, because it is its number (an accident is wont to be called a “possession” [habitus] and “property” [passio]: hence, wherever there is motion, time must be. Now all bodies are mobile, if not with other motions, at least with respect to local motion, because all things are in place.

And because someone could say that although they are mobile, they are not all being moved, but some are at rest, and thus time does not seem to be in all, to counter this he adds that time accompanies motion, whether motion be actual or potential. For things that are capable of motion, and are not actually being moved, are at rest. But time measures not only motion but rest as well, as was said above. Hence, wherever there is motion either actually or potentially, there time is.

627. Then [453] he answers the first question, and as to this he does three things:

First he raises the question;

Secondly, he gives an objection to the question, at no. 628;

Thirdly, he resolves the question, at no. 629.

The question, therefore, is this: Would time exist if no mind existed?

628. Secondly, [454] he objects, to say it would not. For if it were impossible for something able to count to exist, it would be impossible for some thing countable to exist, i.e., able to be counted. But if there is nothing countable, then there is no number, because number does not exist except in that which is being actually counted or which is potentially countable. Consequently, if there is no one able to count, there is no number. But only the soul is disposed by nature for counting, and among the parts of the soul only the intellect; for counting consists in comparing the things counted with one primary measure, and comparing is a function of reason. Consequently, if there is no intellective soul, there is no number. But time is a number, an was said. If therefore, there is no intellective soul, there is no time.

629. Then [455] he answers the question. And he says that it is necessary to say either that time is not, if the soul is not; or to say what is truer, that time is still some sort of being even without the soul's existing, similar to motion's existing without the soul's existing. For as motion is posited, so is it also necessary to posit time, because "before" and "after" exist in motion, and it is these things, namely, the "before" and "after" in motion, insofar as they are numberable, that are time.

To make this solution more evident it must be considered that once a series of numbered things is posited, it is necessary to posit number. Hence just as counted things depend on someone's counting, so also their count [or number]. However, the existence of counted things does not depend on an intellect, unless it be an intellect which is the cause of things, as is the divine intellect, It does not depend on the intellect of the same. Hence neither does the number of things depend on the intellect in the human soul; only the counting of them, which counting is an act of the soul, depends on the intellect in the soul. Consequently, just as there can be things perceptible to sense even though no sense exists, and intelligible even though no intelligence exists, so there can exist both numberable [countable] things, and number even though no counter exist.

But perhaps the conditional he first mentioned is true, namely, that if no counter could exist, nothing countable could exist, just as the proposition is true that if there could be no one to sense, there could be nothing sensible. For if there is something sensible, it can be sensed, and if it can be sensed, there can be something to sense it—although it does not follow that if there is something sensible, there is something sensing. In like manner, it follows that if there is something countable, there can be someone to count. Consequently, if no one to count could exist, nothing countable could exist. However, it does not follow that if there is no one counting, there is nothing countable, which is the objection raised by the Philosopher.

Therefore, if motion had a fixed existence in reality, as a stone or a horse has, one could say unqualifiedly that, just as with no soul existing there exists a number of stones, so also with no soul existing, there would exist a number of motion, which is time. However, motion does not have a fixed existence in reality, nor is anything actual of motion found in things but a certain indivisible of motion which divides motion; indeed, the totality of motion comes to be on account of the mind considering and comparing a previous state of the mobile to a subsequent state. According to this, then, time also has no existence outside the soul except according to its indivisible; while the totality of time is had by an ordering process of the mind enumerating the prior and subsequent in motion [i.e., “before” and “after”], as was said above. And therefore the Philosopher said significantly that with no soul existing time is a being “of a sort,” i.e., imperfectly; this is similar to the statement that motion exists imperfectly without a soul existing.

So this answers the arguments mentioned earlier, to show that time does not exist on the ground that it is composed of parts that do not exist. For it is clear from the foregoing that like motion it does not have perfect existence outside the soul.

630. Then [456] he raises a question about the oneness of time, or about the relation of time to motion. As to this he does three things:

First he raises the question;

Secondly, he answers it, at no. 631;

Thirdly, he explains something he took as a presupposition, at no. 637.

So he says first [456] that there is question, since time is the number of motion, of whose, or of what sort of, motion it is the number. Then [457] he answers the question.

First he rejects a false solution;

Secondly, he gives the true one, at no. 634;

In regard to the first he does three things:

First he gives the false answer;

Secondly he disproves it by leading to a discrepancy, at no. 632;

Thirdly, he shows that this discrepancy is really an Impossibility, at no. 633.

631. The first solution, therefore, is that time is the number of any motion whatsoever. To prove this he brings up that every motion exists in time; namely, generation, and increase, and alteration, and local motion. Now what is found in every motion belongs to motion as such. But to exist in time is to be numbered by time. Consequently, it seems that every motion as such has a number; hence, since time is the number of motion, it seems to follow that time is the number of each and every continuous motion and not of some definite motion.

632. Then [458] he disproves this solution. For let us assume two things that are moving together: if, therefore, time to the number of any motion at all, it will follow that of two simultaneous motions each will have its own time, and so it will further follow that two equal times exist at once—e.g., two days or two hours. Now it is not strange for two unequal times to exist at once, e.g., a day and an hour.

633. Then [459] he shows that it is impossible for two equal times to exist at once. For every time that is simultaneous and similar , i.e., equal, is one; but time that is not simultaneous is not numerically one, although it is one in species, as day with day and year with year.

And he explains this by a similarity in other things that are numbered. For if there are seven horses and seven dogs, there is no difference so far as the number is concerned, but the difference is due to the species of the things counted. In like manner, for all motions which have simultaneous terms both as to their beginning and as to their end, there is the same time; yet the motions differ according to their proper notions, in that, perchance, one is fast and the other slow, one is local motion and the other alteration.

But the time is the same if the number of the alteration and of the local motion is the same, supposing, of course, that they are simultaneous. Consequently, motions must be distinct from one another, but the time in all of them is the same— because there is one and the same number for all those that are equal and simultaneous, no matter where they occur.

634. Then [460] he gives the true solution. Concerning this he does three things:

First he prefaces certain facts required for the solution;

Secondly, from these he arrives at the solution, at no. 635;

Thirdly, he makes the solution clear by appealing to the statements of others, at no. 636.

In regard to the first he mentions three preliminary facts. The first of these is that among motions, the first and more simple and regular is local motion, and among these, circular motion, as will be proved in Book VIII. The second is that each thing is numbered by something near it, i.e., by something homogeneous with it, as units by a unit and horses by a horse, as is clear in Metaphysics X; hence time must be measured by some definite time, as we see that all times are measured by the day. The third presupposition is that time is measured by motion, and motion by time, as was said above. This is so because it is in terms of some definite motion and some definite time that the quantity of any motion and time is measured.

635. Then [461] he concludes from the foregoing that if something that is first is the measure of all things that are near it, i.e., of all the things in its genus, it is necessary that circular motion, which is regular above all, be the measure of all motions. Now a motion is called “regular,” if it is one and uniform. But such regularity cannot be found in alteration and growth, because they are not incessantly continuous or of equal [constant] speed. But regularity can be found in change of place, because there can be a local motion that is continuous and uniform, and the only such motion is circular motion, as will be proved in Book VIII.

Now among circular motions the most uniform and regular is the first motion which turns the whole firmament in a daily cycle; hence that revolution, as being the first and simplest and most regular, is the measure of all motions. But a regular motion must be the measure and number of the others, because every measure ought to be most certain—and those that are uniform are such. Consequently, from this we can gather that if the first circular motion measures every motion, and motions are measured by time insofar as they are measured by some motion, it has to be said that time is the number of the first circular motion, according to which time is measured, and in relation to which are measured all other motions that are timed.

636. Then [462] he corroborates his solution by appealing to the opinions of others, and first of all by the opinion of those who were led to assert that the movement of the heavenly sphere is time, on the ground that all other motions, and time itself, are measured by that movement; for it is evident that we speak of a complete day or year by reckoning from the motion of the heavens.

Secondly [463] from a common saying. And he says that because of this, namely, that time is the number of the first circular movement, it comes about that people are want to say that there is a cycle in human affairs, and in other things that move naturally and come into being and pass away. This is so because all such things are measured by time, and have a beginning and an end in time, as if time moved in a circle, because time itself seems to be a certain circle. And this again seems to be so because time is a measure of circular movement and is also measured by such a circular movement. And therefore, to say that of things which take place in time there is a certain circle, is nothing other than to say that time is a certain circle—which occurs because time is measured by a circular movement. For that which is measured is not seen to be different from its measure: but rather many measures are seen to make one whole, as many units make one number, and many measures of cloth one quantity of cloth. And this is true when a homogeneous measure is taken.

From all this it is clear that time first measures and numbers the first circular motion and through it measures all other motions. Consequently, there is but one time, due to the oneness of the first motion; and yet whoever perceives any motion whatever, perceives time, because from the first motion there is caused, mutability in all mobile- things, as was said above.

637. Then [464] he explains how something he mentioned above is to be understood. For he said that the number of seven dogs and seven horses is the same number. How this is true he now explains. And he says that it is

correct to say, if the number of certain different things is equal, for example, of sheep and dogs, that the number is the same—for example, if the sheep and the dogs are both 10. But it cannot be said that to be 10 is the same for the dogs and sheep, for 10 dogs are not the same 10 as 10 sheep. The reason for this is that a genus can be predicated, with the addition of unity or identity [i.e., as "one genus" or "the same genus"], of several individuals of the same species; and in like manner, the remote genus can be predicated of several species existing under one proximate genus; but neither can the species be predicated of individuals, nor the proximate genus of diverse species, with the addition of unity or identity.

And he then gives an example of what he means. For there are two species of triangle, equilateral, i.e., having three equal sides, and scalene, i.e., having three unequal sides. Now "figure" is the genus for "triangle." We therefore can not say that equilateral and scalene are the same "triangle," but we can say that they are the same "figure," because both are contained under "triangle" which is one species of "figure." He gives the reason for this, which is that since "identical," and "diverse" or "different," are opposed, we can speak of identity whenever no difference is found, but we cannot speak of identity where there is a difference. But it is clear that equilateral and scalene differ mutually by reason of a difference that divides "triangle," because they are diverse species of triangle. But "equilateral" and "scalene" do not differ in respect of the difference "figure"; rather, they are contained er one and the same difference that divides "figure."

And this is clear thus. If we divide "figure" into its species which are brought about by differences, it will be found that one species is a circle, another a triangle, and so on for the other species of figure. But if we divide "triangle," we will find that one species is "equilateral," another "scalene." It is clear, therefore, that equilateral and scalene are one "figure," because they are contained under the one species of "figure," the species "triangle," but they are not one "triangle," because they are diverse species of "triangle."

The same thing applies to our proposition. For number is divided into diverse species, one of which is 10. Therefore all things that are 10 are said to have one number, because they do not differ from the other in regard to the species of their number, since they are contained under one and the same species of number. But we cannot say that they are the same 10, because the things being called “10” are different, since some are dogs and some horses.

Aristotle seems to have brought up this point so that no one, in trying to uphold the unity of time, would be content with saying that there is one number for things that are equal in number, even though the things be diverse; for although one might have a same 10 or 3 on account of a unity of species, yet it is not the same 10 or 3 on account of the diversity in number as based on matter. Hence, according to this reasoning, it would follow that time would be specifically, but not numerically, one. Therefore to get at the true unity of time, we must have recourse to the unity of the first motion, which is the first thing measured by time, and by which time itself is measured.

Finally, in summary, he concludes that we have finished with our consideration of time, and of the things that are proper to a consideration of time.

BOOK V

LECTURE 1

PER SE NOTION IS DISTINGUISHED FROM PER ACCIDENS

638. After discussing motion and the things that accompany motion in general, the Philosopher now undertakes to give various divisions of motion. And his treatment falls into two parts:

In the first he divides motion into its species;

In the second he divides motion into quantitative parts in Book VI.

In the first he makes two parts:

First he divides motion into its species;

Secondly, he discusses unity and opposition of motion, at L. 5.

The first is divided into two sections:

In the first he distinguishes motion per se from per accidens;

In the second he divides motion into its species, at L. 2.

The first is divided into two parts:

In the first he distinguishes per se motion from per accidens;

In the second he shows that per accidens need not be discussed but that per se motion must, at 647.

In regard to the first he does two things:

First he distinguishes per se from per accidens motion;

Secondly, he makes a summary at 646.

In the first part he distinguishes per se motion from per accidens motion in three ways:

First, on the side of the mobile;

Secondly, on the side of the mover, at 640;

Thirdly, on the side of the termini of motion, at 641.

639. He says therefore first (465) that whatever changes, i.e., whatever is being changed, is described as doing so in three ways. First, per accidens, as when we say that a musician is walking, because the person who is walking happens to be a musician. Secondly, a thing is described as being changed without qualification even though only some part of it is changing, i.e., in statements which refer to part of the thing in question: thus the body is said to be restored to health, because the eye or the chest, which are parts of the body, are restored to health. Thirdly, there is the case of a thing that is in motion neither accidentally nor in respect of something that belongs to it as a part but in virtue of its being directly and per se in motion. And he says “directly” to exclude motion of a part, and per se to exclude motion that is per accidens. Now this per se mobile is a different thing according to the various kinds of motion: for example, it may be a thing capable of alteration—in which case it is called alterable—or it may be capable of growing—in which case it is called augmentable. Again, in the sphere of alteration it is called heal-able, if it is moved in respect of health, and heat-able, if it is moved in respect of heat.

640. Then at (466) from the side of the mover he distinguishes per se from per accidens motion, And he says that the preceding distinctions which were posed from the side of the mobile can be found in the mover. For a thing is described in three ways as causing motion. First, per accidens, as “the musician is building”. Secondly, by reason of a part (when some part of the mover causes motion), e.g., the man is said to strike, because his hand strikes. In a third way, something is described as acting or moving directly and per se, as “the healer heals”.

641. Then at (467) looking at the terminus of motion, he divides motion once more in the same manner.

First he lays down some presuppositions;

Secondly, he gives his division, at 645.

About the first he does three things:

First he declares how many things are required for motion;

Secondly, he mutually compares them, at 642;

Thirdly, he settles a question, at 644.

He says therefore (467) that five things are needed for motion, First, there must be a first mover, i.e., a source from which the motion originates; secondly, a mobile that is being moved; thirdly, a time in which the motion occurs. In addition to these three are required the two termini; one from which the motion starts and another into which the motion tends; for every motion is from something into something.

642. Then at (468) he compares these five things:

First he compares the mobile to the two termini;

Secondly, he compares one terminus with the other, at 643,

He says therefore (468) that whatever is being moved directly and per se is distinct from the terminus into which the motion tends and from the terminus from which the motion begins, as is evident in these three things: wood, hot and cold. For in the motion called heating, the wood is the mobile subject, whereas the hot which is the terminus into which, is something else, as is the cold, which is the terminus from which.

Now he says that what is moved directly is distinct from both termini, because there is nothing to prevent what is being moved per accidens from being either of the termini: for a subject, such as wood, is what becomes hot per se; but the privation, which is a contrary, namely, cold, is what becomes hot per accidens, as was explained in Book I.

That the mobile is distinct from each terminus he proves on the ground that motion is in its subject, for example, in the wood, and not in either of the termini, i.e., not in the species “white” or in the species “black”. This is clear from the fact that that in which the motion exists is what is being moved. But the terminus of motion neither moves nor is moved: whether the terminus be a quality, as in alteration, or a place, as in local motion, or quantity, as in the motion called growing and decreasing. However, the mover moves the subject, which is being moved, into the terminus ad quem, Therefore, since motion exists in the subject being moved but not in the termini, it is clear that the mobile subject is distinct from the termini of the motion,

643. Then at (469) he compares one terminus with the other. And he says that a change gets its name from the terminus ad quem rather than from the terminus a quo; for example, a change into non-being has the special name “corruption’, while, on the other hand, “generation” is the change into being, even though it starts from non-being. Consequently, the name “generation” pertains to being and “corruption” to non-being. The reason for this is that through change the terminus a quo is taken away, but a terminus ad quem is acquired: for which reason, motion seems to have a

repugnance for the terminus a quo and a kinship to the terminus ad quem—that is why it gets its name from the latter.

644. Then at (470) he settles a doubt, About which he does three things:

First, he mentions two things that are clear from the foregoing: first, that we have already pointed out in Book III what motion is; secondly, that in the immediately foregoing we have said that qualities and place and passible qualities that are the termini of motion are not themselves being changed, since there is no motion existing in them, as we have already said and as is clear from heat, which is a passible quality, and from science, which is a quality.

Secondly, at (471) he mentions a matter about which there is doubt, saying that someone may wonder whether passible qualities, such as heat and coldness and whiteness and blackness might not be types of motion, since none of them is a subject of motion.

Thirdly, at (472) he mentions a discrepancy that would arise if such a view were posited. For since whiteness is a terminus into which a motion tends, then if whiteness itself were a motion, it would follow that there is motion in the terminus of a motion, which cannot be, as will be proved later. And from this he arrives at the truth that it is not whiteness but whitening that is motion, But he adds “perhaps” because he has not yet proved that a motion cannot end up in a motion.

645. Then at (473) from the fact that termini of motion are distinct from the mover and from the mobile, he shows that in addition to the divisions of motion taken on the side of the mover and of the mobile, there is a third, i.e., one taken on the side of the terminus. And since it is from the terminus ad quem rather than from the terminus a quo that motions are named, he develops his division not on the side of the latter but of the former. And he says that even on the side of the termini it is possible to find in motion (1) a goal that is so per accidens or (2) partially, i.e., with reference to a part or to something other than itself or (3) directly and not with reference to something else.

And first of all, per accidens: when it is said of what is becoming white that it is being changed into something that can be understood or recognized by someone—that will be per accidens for it is accidental to the color white that it is recognized.

But if it is said of what is becoming white that it is being changed into a color—this will be according to a part: for it is said to be changing into a color because it is becoming white, which is a part of the genus color. Likewise, if I should say of someone who is going to Athens that he is going to Europe, for Athens is a part of Europe.

However, if it is said of what is becoming white that it is being changed into the color white, this will be directly and per se.

The Philosopher does not divide motion from the viewpoint of time (which was one of the five things required for motion) because time is related to motion as an extrinsic measure.

646. Then at (474) he summarizes what he has said. And he says that it is clear how something is in motion per se and how per accidens and how in respect of something not its entire self, i.e., in respect of a part, and again how what is referred to as directly and per se is found both in the mover and in the mobile, For it has been said what a direct and per se mover is and also what is being moved directly and per se. Finally, we have said that there is no motion in the quality which is the terminus of motion; rather motion is in what is being moved, i.e., in the actually mobile, which is the same thing.

647. Then at (475) he shows which kind of motion needs to be discussed.

First he states his proposition;

Secondly, he explains something he said, at 648.

He says therefore first that per accidens change will not be the subject of our discussion, whether it be per accidens on the side of the mover or of the mobile or of the terminus. The reason for this is that per accidens motion is indeterminate: for it is present in all things, in all termini, in all times, in all subjects and in all movers, and an infinity of things can be per accidens in something. But a change that is not per accidens is not found in all things; it is found only in situations (1) that involve contraries or the intermediate between contraries in respect to motions that affect quantity, quality and place, or (2) that involve contradictories, for example, generation and corruption, whose termini are being and non-being—and all this is evident by induction. Now art concerns itself only with things that are determinate, and there is no art to deal with the infinite.

648. Then at (476) he explains his statement that motion can be in the intermediates. And he says that an intermediate may be a starting point of

change and go to either of two contraries, inasmuch as we can take the intermediate as being contrary to both extremes. For the intermediate, inasmuch as it is akin to both extremes is in a sense either of them. Hence, we speak of the intermediate as in a sense contrary relatively to the extremes and of either extreme as a contrary relatively to the intermediate; for instance, the central note is low relatively to the highest and high relatively to the lowest, and grey is light relatively to black and dark relatively to white.

LECTURE 2

THE SPECIES OF CHANGE; WHICH ONE IS MOTION

649, After distinguishing per se from per accidens motion, the Philosopher now divides per se change and motion into its species.

Here it should be noted that in Book III when Aristotle defined motion, he took it as being common to all species of change. It is in this sense that he now uses the word “change”. And he is beginning to use the word “motion” in a stricter sense, i.e., for a certain species of change. Therefore, this section is divided into two parts:

In the first he divides change into its various species, of which one is motion;

In the second he subdivides motion into its species, at L. 3.

About the first he does two things:

First he gives his division of change;

Secondly, he explains the parts of the division, at 654.

About the first he does three things:

First he states certain things that must be mentioned before dividing change;

Secondly, from these he concludes to the division of change, 651;

Thirdly, he answers an objection at 652,

650. He says therefore first (477) that since every change is from something to something—as is clear from the very word “change” which denotes something after something else, i.e., something earlier and something later—it follows from all this that what changes must change in one of four ways. (1) For both termini might be affirmed, in which case something is said to be changed from subject to subject; or (2) the terminus

a quo is affirmed and the terminus ad quem negated, in which case something is changed from subject to non-subject; or (3) on the other hand, the terminus a quo is negated and the terminus ad quem affirmed, in which case something is moved from non-subject to subject. Finally (4), both termini might be negated, in which case something is said to be changed from non-subject to non-subject. (Here the word “subject” is not taken in the sense of that which sustains a form; rather, anything that is affirmatively expressed is here called a “subject”.

651. Then at (478) he derives from these premisses his division of change. And he says that it necessarily follows from these premisses that there are three kinds of change: one is from subject to subject, as when something is changed from white to black; another is from subject to non-subject, as when something is changed from being to non-being; the third is from non-subject to subject, as when something is changed from non-being to being,

652. Then at (479) he precludes a possible objection. For someone might object that since he mentioned four ways in which change can take place, he should have derived four kinds of change and not merely three. But he dismisses this objection by saying that there cannot be any kind of change from non-subject to non-subject, because every change takes place between opposites and two negations are not opposites. For they are neither contrary nor contradictory. A further proof of this is that any pair of negatives may chance to be true of one and the same thing at the same time; for example, a stone is neither healthy nor sick. Hence, since per se change occurs only between contraries and contradictories, as was pointed out above, it follows that there is no per se change from one negation to another. Such changes would always be per accidens, for when something changes from white to black, it changes at the same time, but per accidens, from non-black to non-white. This is the way that something is changed from non-subject to non-subject. However, what is per accidens in any genus cannot be a species of that genus. Therefore, there can be no species of change from non-subject to non-subject.

653. Then at (480) he explains the parts used in his division. About this he does three things:

First he explains the first two parts;

Secondly, he shows that neither of them is motion, at 656;

Thirdly, he concludes that the remaining part is motion, at 659.

About the first he does two things,,

First he explains one part of the division;

Secondly, he explains a second part, at 655.

654. He says therefore first (480) that the change from non-subject to subject takes place between contradictories and is called generation, which is the change from non-being to being. Now this can take place in two ways: one is unqualified generation, by which something comes to be in the strict sense of the word; the other is a particular kind of coming to be, i.e., in a qualified way, And he gives an example of both kinds. First of all, of the second kind, saying that when some thing is changed from non-white to white, it is not an unqualified coming to be of the whole thing, but a mere coming to be of its whiteness. Then he gives an example of the first: and he says that generation from non-being to being in the order of substance is generation in an unqualified way, in regard to which we say that a thing comes to be without qualification. And since generation is a change from non-being to being, a thing is said to be generated when it is changed from non-being to being.

However, when something passes from non-white to white, it is not being changed from absolute non-being to absolute being. For, speaking strictly, what is being changed is the subject, and the subject of white is an actually existing being. Hence, since the subject remains throughout the whole change, there already was an actually existing being at the beginning of the change, although it was not a being actually existing as white. Consequently, it was not a case of unqualified coming to be but a coming to be white. But the subject of substantial form is not an actual being but a merely potential one, namely, prime matter, which at the beginning of generation is under privation and at the end under forms And so, in the case of a substance being generated, it is said that something comes to be in an unqualified sense.

From this it can be concluded that when it is a case of the coming to be of a form that presupposes another form remaining in the matter, it is not unqualified generation but generation in a particular way; because each form makes a being actual.

655. Then at (481) he makes clear the other part of the division and states that that change which is from subject to non-subject is called “corruption”.

Rut there is a corruption which is so absolutely speaking and which, namely, is from substantial being to non-being; while there is a certain corruption which is into the opposite negation of any affirmation, as from white to non-white, which is the corruption "of this", as has already been said of generation.

656. Then at (482) he shows that neither of these cases is motion.

First that generation is not motion;

Secondly, that corruption is not motion, at 658.

He proves the first by two arguments. In the first of which he says: What is not unqualifiedly a "this something" cannot be moved, because what does not exist is not moved; but what is unqualifiedly generated is not a "this something" for it is strictly speaking a non-being. Therefore, what is unqualifiedly generated is not being moved. Hence, unqualified generation is not motion.

In explanation of the first premiss he says that non-being is spoken of in three senses: in the first two senses, non-being is not subject to motion, but in the third it is subject to per accidens motion.

In one sense, being and non-being refer to the affirmation and negation of a predicate in a proposition, where they refer to truth and falsity; in which sense being and non-being exist only in the mind, as is said in VI Metaphysics. Hence, they are not subject to motion.

In another sense, what is in potency is called non-being insofar as being in potency is the opposite of unqualified being in act. Taken in this sense no motion is possible,

In a third sense, that is called "non-being" which is in potency, in such a way as to exclude not unqualified actual existence, but actually being such-and-such; for example, when non-white is called nonbeing and non-good. Such non-being is subject to motion per accidens, inasmuch as such non-being is attached to an actually existing thing subject to motion; as when a man is said to be non-white.

Now, why is it that what is not unqualifiedly a "this something" is not subject to motion at all, i,e., neither per se nor per accidens? It is because it is impossible for the non-existent to be moved, Consequently, it is impossible for generation to be a motion; for generation concerns itself with what is not. And although it was said in Book I that something comes to be per accidens from non-being and per se from a being in potency, yet it is true to say of what is absolutely coming to be that, strictly speaking, it is non-being; hence, such a thing cannot be moved and, for the same reasons cannot be at rest. Hence, generation is neither motion nor rest,

But if anyone insists that generation is motion, he will be forced to admit the strange proposition that non-being can be moved and can be at rest.

657. At (483) he gives a second reason: Whatever is moved is in a place; but what does not exist is not in a place, otherwise its place could be pointed out, Therefore, what does not exist is not moved.

The truth of the first statement is evident from the fact that since local motion is the first of all motions, whatever is moved has to be moved in respect of place and, consequently, must be in a place. But if you remove the previous, you remove whatever depends upon it.

658. Then at (484) he proves that ceasing-to-be is not a motion, because nothing is contrary to a motion but motion and rest, whereas the contrary of ceasing-to-be is generation, which is neither motion nor rest, as we have shown. Therefore, ceasing-to-be is not a motion.

659. Then at (485) he concludes that the remaining member of the above-given division is motion: for since motion is a definite kind of change, because there is in it something following something (which pertains to the very idea of motion), whereas motion is neither generation nor ceasing-to-be (which are changes between contradictories), it follows of necessity, since there are only three species of change, that motion is from subject to subject.

By two subjects is understood two that are affirmative, whether they be contraries or intermediates; because even privation is a kind of contrary that is expressed affirmatively, as nude, which is a privation, and as white and black, which are contraries.

LECTURE 3

PER SE MOTION IS NOT IN OTHER PREDICAMENTS THAN QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND PLACE

660. After dividing change into generation, ceasing-to-be and motion, the Philosopher now subdivides motion into its parts. And because it is the same science that deals with a thing and with its opposite,

He first derives the species of motion;

Secondly, he explains the various senses of immobile, at 683,

About the first he does two things:

First he posits a conditional proposition in the light of which he deduces the parts of motion;

Secondly, he explains this conditional proposition, at 662.

661, He concludes therefore (487) from the previous lecture that, since motion goes from subject to subject, and subjects are involved in certain genera of the predicaments, the species of motion must be distinguished according to the genera of predicaments, especially since motions derive their nature and name from the terminus, as was said above. Therefore, if the predicaments are divided into ten genera of things; namely, substance, quality, etc. (as is explained in the book of Predicaments and in V Metaphysics) and motion is found in three of these genera, there must be three species of motion, i.e., in the genus of quantity and in the genus of quality and in the genus of where, which is motion in respect of place.

The way in which motion is present in these three genera as well as how it is related to the predicaments of action and passion has been explained in Book III. Hence it is enough to mention briefly that a motion is in the same genus as its terminus, not that the motion itself would be in the genus, for example of quality, but it is placed there by reduction. For just as potency is reduced to the same genus as its act, inasmuch as every genus is divided by potency and act; so it is necessary for motion, which is an imperfect act, to be reduced to the genus of its perfect act. But when motion is regarded as being in something, though originating from something else, or as originating from one thing and being in something else, then it belongs to the predicaments of action and passion.

662. Then at (487) he explains the conditional proposition.

First, that there is no motion in any but the three genera mentioned;

Secondly, how motion is present in those three genera, at 678.

About the first he does three things.,

First he shows that motion is not in the genus of substance,

Secondly, that it is not in the genus of relation, at 666;

Thirdly, that it is not in the genera of action and passion, 668.

He passes over the three predicaments of when, situs and habitus. For when expresses existence in time, which is the measure of motion, Hence for the same reason that there is no motion in action and passion which pertain to motion, there is no motion in when. Situs denotes order of parts, and order is a relation; in like manner, habitus bespeaks a relationship existing between a body and what is adjacent to it. Hence there can be no motion in situs and habitus any more than in relation.

That motion (487) is not found in the genus of substance he proves by saying that every motion is between contraries, as we have said; but nothing is contrary to substance. Therefore, there is no motion in re8pect of substance.

663. Now, there seems to be a disagreement between this doctrine of the Philosopher and what he says in the book On Generation, that fire is contrary to water. And again in the book On the Heavens he says that the heaven is capable neither of coming to be nor ceasing to be, because it does not have a contrary—which seems to imply that things which cease to be are either contrary or composed of contraries.

To reconcile this, some assert that one substance can be contrary to another, as fire to water, in respect to form but not in respect to their subject. But if that were so, Aristotle's proof at the end of 662 would be worthless; for then there would be motion in substance as long as the substantial forms were contrary. For motion is from form to form, because even in alteration subject is not contrary to subject, but form to form.

Consequently, another explanation must be given; namely, that fire is contrary to water in respect of their active and passive qualities, which are hot and cold, wet and dry, but not in respect of their substantial forms. For it cannot be said that heat is the substantial form of fire, since in other bodies it is an accident in the genus of quality. And substance cannot be an accident of something.

But even this answer presents a difficulty. For it is clear that properties originate from the principles of the subject, i.e., from matter and form. Now, if the properties of fire and water are contrary, then since the causes of contraries are themselves contrary, it seems that the substantial forms are contrary. Moreover, it is proved in X Metaphysics that every genus is divided by differences that are contrary, and differences are traced to the forms, as VIII Metaphysics explains. Therefore, it seems that there is contrariety between substantial forms.

664. Consequently, it must be asserted that contrariety of differences are all the genera is based on the common root of contrariety, which is excellence and defect, to which set of contraries all others are reduced, as was explained in Book I. For all differences that divide a genus are so related that one is like abundance and the other is like defect in relation to the first. For which reason Aristotle says in VIII Metaphysics that the definitions of things are like numbers in which the addition or subtraction of unity makes a different number. However, it is not necessary that there be in every genus the same detailed contrariety between species as exists in some genera; for a contrariety of excellence and deficiency is enough. For since contraries are things most distant, then in order to have contrariety in a genus there must be found two extremes that are most distant, so that between them fall all the things in that genus.

Yet that is not enough for positing motion in a genus, unless it is possible to pass without a break from one extreme to the other. Now these two conditions are lacking in some genera; for example, in numbers. For although all numbers differ according to excellence or defect, yet there cannot be found in that genus two extremes that are most distant; for it is possible to find a lowest number, i.e., 2, but not a greatest. In like manner, there are breaks between the species of number, for each number is formally constituted by unity, which is indivisible and not continuous with another unity.

Likewise, in the genus of substance. For the forms of diverse species differ in respect to excellence and defect, inasmuch as one form is more noble than another, for which reason diverse qualities can be caused by diverse forms, as the objection mentions.

Yet one form of a species is not contrary to another, if you consider it in regard to its own specific nature. First of all, because when you are speaking of substantial forms, there is no maximum distance between any two forms, such that you must pass through an orderly array of intermediate forms to go from the one extreme to the other. Rather, matter when it doffs one form can indiscriminately receive any other form in just any order. For which reason Aristotle says in II On Generation that when fire comes to be from earth, it is not necessary that the intermediate elements be involved at all.

Secondly, because, since the substantial essence of anything consists in an indivisible, no continuity can be found in substantial forms so as to make a continuous motion from one form to another by one form growing weak and the other growing strong.

Hence the proof by which Aristotle shows that there is no motion in substance because contrariety is absent is a demonstration and not merely a probability, as the Commentator seems to suggest, However, besides the reason given above, there is another which proves that in substance there is no motion, and it is this: that the subject of substantial form is merely a being in potency.

665. In qualities of the third species, the two above-mentioned characteristics of contraries (namely, continuity and maximum distance between the extremes) are clearly manifest: first, because qualities can be weakened and strengthened so as to make for a continuous motion from quality to quality, and, secondly, because there exists a maximum distance between two definite extremes of one genus, as black and white in the genus of color, and sweet and bitter in the genus of taste.

However, in quantity and place one of these two characteristics is evident; namely, continuity, but the other, which is max mum distance between definite extremes is not found in them, if you seize upon the general notion of quantity and place. But it is found, if you look for it in a definite thing. For example, in a definite species of animal or plant there is a minimum quantity at which the motion of growing begins and a maximum at which it is terminated. Likewise, in place there are involved two termini that are most distant in respect to some particular motion: from one of them motion begins and at the other it is terminated, and this happens whether the motion be natural or compulsory.

666. Then at (488) he shows that there is no motion in the genus to something, i,e., relation. For in any genus in which per se motion exists, nothing can newly arise in that genus without its being changed, just as new color is never found in a colored object without that object’s being changed. But it does happen that something can be newly said truly of one thing relative to another, where the latter is changed but the former not. Therefore, in relation motion is not found per se but only per accidens, inasmuch as a new relation follows upon some change; for example, equality or inequality accompany a quantitative change and resemblance or dissimilarity qualitative change.

667. What has just been said seems to offer difficulty in respect of some types of relation and not of others. For there are some relations that do posit no reality at all in the thing of which they are predicated. This happens sometimes on the side of both extremes, as when it is said that the same thing is the same to the same: for this relation of identity would be multiplied ad infinitum, if each thing were the same as itself through an added relation, since it is evident that each thing is the same as itself. Consequently, this relation exists only in the reasoning power, inasmuch as the reason takes one and the same thing as the two extremes of the relation. The same thing is true in many other relations.

But there are some relations in which one relation is really in one of the extremes but only according to reason in the other; for example, knowledge and the knowable. For “knowable” is a relative term, which is applied to an object not because it is related to something else by reason of a relationship existing in the object but because that something else is related to it, as is clear in V Metaphysics. In like manner, when a pillar is said to be on the right of an animal: for right and left are real relations in the animal (because animals possess definite energies on which these relations are based), but in the pillar they are not present in reality but only according to reason, for the pillar lacks the energies which are the basis of these relations.

Again, there are relationships in which both extremes possess a real relation; for example, in equality and resemblance, for both extremes possess the quantity or the quality, which serve as the root of the relationship. The same is apparent in many other relationships.

Now in those relations which put something real in only one of the extremes it is not hard to see that if the extreme in which the relation really exists undergoes a change, something new will be said correlatively of the other extreme, even though it remains unchanged, since nothing really happened to it. However, in those cases in which the relation is really found in both extremes, it is hard to see how something relative can be said of A if B changes but A does not, for nothing can be newly acquired by A without A being changed.

Hence it must be said that if some change in X makes him equal to me (even though I do not change at all), that equality was in a sense in me in advance as in its root, from which that equality has real existence: for since I have such and such a quantity, it belongs to me to be equal to anything having the same quantity. Hence, when X newly acquires that quantity, that common basis of equality reaches to him: that is why nothing new happens to me, when I begin to be equal to X, as he changes.

668. Then at (489) he proves that motion is not in the genera of action and passion. For action and passion do not differ really from motion, but they add to it something of reason, as we said in Book III. Hence, it is the same thing to say that motion is present in acting and being acted upon as to say that motion is present in motion, Therefore in regard to this he does 3 things:

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 669;

Thirdly, he posits a distinction that will explain the proposition, at 677.

Accordingly, he says at (489) that just as motion is not found in something relative, so also there is no motion of an agent or a patient and, strictly speaking, not even of the mover and moved: for there cannot be motion of motion or a coming-to-be of coming-to-be, which are types of change, nor even a change of change (which is the genus) or a ceasing-to-be of a ceasing-to-be.

669. Then at (490) he proves that there cannot be change of changes. And he does this with six arguments.

The first of which is that there are two ways of interpreting change of change. In one sense it means that there is a change of a change, i.e., of the subject which is being changed, as there is change of a man, because the man is being changed, for example, from white to black. In this interpretation there would be a motion or change of a change or motion as of a subject, in such a way that the motion or charge are changed; for example, that the change gets hot or cold or changes place or grows or decreases. This, however, is impossible, because change is not listed among the subjects of change, for it is not a substance existing by itself. So there cannot be change of change in this sense.

670. In another way it can be interpreted that there be change of change as of a terminus, so that subject A is moved from one type of change to another; for example, from getting hot to getting cold or healthy, so that two changes are understood to be the termini of one change, as sickness and health are taken as the two termini of a change when a man is changed from health to sickness. But it is not possible for a subject to be moved per se from one change to another but only per accidens. And that it is impossible per se, he proves in two ways: for every motion is a change from one definite form to another definite form. Even generation and ceasing-to-be, which are co-divided with motion, have their definite termini; but there is this difference, namely, that generation and ceasing-to-be are to opposite termini “thus”, i.e., according to contradiction, whereas motion tends to an opposite terminus “not in a like way” but according to contrariety.

Therefore, if a subject should be passing from one change to another, for example, from getting sick to getting white, while it is at the same time changing from health to sickness, it will be passing from one change into another change. For while the subject is still partially in the terminus a quo it is being moved to the terminus ad quem, just as while it still health it is being moved to sickness.

Now, if the very motion from health to sickness is the terminus a quo of some motion, then while that change (from health to sickness)is still going on, the subject is at the same time passing from this change into another change, which succeeds in the subject to the first change. But it is evident that when the first change shall have ended, i.e., when someone has now already changed from health to sickness, subsequently some other change could succeed it, And this is not strange: for after the first change is over, the subject might remain at rest or it might be affected by another change, Therefore, if there is a passing from the first to the second change, it will follow that the motion goes from the first change to an indeterminate goal. And this is against the true nature of per se motion, because every motion is from a definite terminus to a determinate goal, for a body does not change per se from white to just anything but to black or to something intermediate. It is evident, therefore, that two changes cannot be the per se termini of a change.

671. He proves this same point again with another argument: If the passing from a previous changing to a subsequent change were motion per se, it would not be necessary that the passing be always to a "contingent" change, i.e., one which could co-exist with the previous change: as becoming white can co-exist with becoming sick, but getting well cannot co-exist with getting sick, because these are contrary changes. But it is possible that just as becoming white can follow becoming sick in the same subject, so also could becoming well. And this is what he says: that the passing from one change to another will not always be to a contingent change, since it is sometimes to a non-contingent, and that non-contingent change proceeds from something to something else, that is, it is between two other termini, Hence that non-contingent change into which something passes from the change called "getting sick" will be "getting well", which is the opposite of "getting sick".

Now that this is strange is evident from what we have said above, that while the first change is still going on, it is being changed to the second change: therefore, while something is being moved to sickness, it will be changing to another change called "getting well". Hat the goal of getting well is health (for it is from something to something, as was said). Hence it remains that while something is being moved to sickness it is at the same time being moved to health, which means it is being moved toward two contraries at the same time and intends them at the same time—which is impossible. Consequently, it is clear that no change from one change to another is per se.

However, that such a thing can take place per accidens, as he had said before, he makes clear, when he says that this can happen per accidens, as when a subject is now affected by one change and later by another; for example, if someone is changed per accidens from remembering to forgetting or to any other change: because the subject of the change is sometimes changed to knowledge and sometimes to something else, for example, to health.

672. Before giving the second of the six reasons he promised, he presents (491) two conditional propositions: the first of which is that if there is change of change and generation of generation, in either case it would be necessary to go on ad infinitum; because, for the same reason the second generation will have another generation, and so on ad infinitum.

The second conditional is that if generations and changes are so arranged that there is change of change and generation of generation, then, if there is a last change or generation, there necessarily had to be a first.

This second conditional he now proves: Let fire be the thing that is unqualifiedly generated; if, then, there is a generation of generation, it is necessary to say that that unqualified generation was itself generated and that its coming-to-be came to be. When, however, that coming-to-be was being generated, the fire was not existing (for it is being assumed that the fire is being unqualifiedly generated): because a thing does not exist while it is coming to be, but it exists for the first time after it has come to be. Therefore, as long as the coming-to-be of fire was in the state of coming to be, the fire had not yet come to be; therefore, it was not yet existing. And again the very coming-to-be of its coming-to-be was itself (for the same reason) coming to be. Consequently, just as when the coming-to-be of the fire was coming to be, the fire did not exist, so also as long as the coming-to-be of the coming-to-be was taking place, the coming-to-be of the fire was not existing.

From this it is clear that coming-to-be of fire cannot exist till that coming-to-be is completed and, for the same reason, the previous coming-to-be of the coming-to-be of the fire and so on to the first. Consequently, if there was no first coming-to-be, there will be no last, i.e., no coming-to-be of the fire. But if an infinite process be posited in cases of coming-to-be, there will be no first change and no first coming-to-be, because in the realm of the infinite there is no first. Hence, it follows that there is no sequence at all among generations and among changes. But if there is no generation or change, nothing comes to be and nothing changes. Consequently, if there were coming-to-be of coming-to-be or change of change, nothing ever comes to be or changes.

Note, however, that this argument does not exclude the possibility of one change following another ad infinitum. per accidens: which has to be admitted according to the opinion of Aristotle, who posited eternal motion. But the argument intends to show that there is no per se change ad infinitum, for in that case a present change would depend on an infinitude of preceding changes and would never end.

673. He gives the third reason at (492) and it is this. One and the same motion has as its contraries both motion and rest; for example, both descending and rest in the lower place are contrary to ascending. In the same way are generation and ceasing-to-be contrary. But contraries are apt to affect the same thing. Therefore, whatever comes to be can cease to be. But if there is coming-to-be of coming-to-be, then coming-to-be must come to be. Therefore coming-to-be ceases to be. But what ceases to be must be: for just as it is what is not that comes to be, so it is what is that ceases to be. Therefore, it is necessary that when what comes to be comes to be, i.e., when something-comes to be and the coming-to-be exists, then the very coming-to-be ceases to be, not indeed as soon as the coming-to-be is finished or some time after it is finished, but during the coming to be-which seems absurd.

But it should be observed that coming-to-be is as a terminus of what comes to be as a substance does, because coming-to-be is a change tending to substance. But the subject of coming-to-be is not what comes to be but its matter. Hence Aristotle is not departing from his proposition that there is no change of change, as of a terminus.

674. At (493) he gives the fourth reason, In every coming to be there must be matter from which that which comes to be is generated, just as every change requires some matter or subject: for example, in alteration the subject is the body, if you are dealing with bodily qualities, or the soul, if you are dealing with soul qualities. If, therefore, coming-to-be comes to be, there must be some matter involved which passes into the form coming to be as the matter of generated fire passed into the form fire. However, such matter is not discoverable.

In the same vein he makes use of another medium: namely, that in every coming-to-be or change there must be involved a goal toward which something is moved. And this goal must be something definite and capable of being pointed out. But neither change nor coming-to-be is such a goal.

Therefore, it is not possible that there be either change of change or coming to be of coming-to-be.

675. At (494) he gives the fifth reason: Genus is to genus as species is to species. If, therefore, there is coming to be of coming-to-be, then the coming to be of teaching is itself teaching. But this is evidently false: for teaching is the generation of science and not of teaching. Therefore, neither can there be a coming to be of coming-to-be.

676. The sixth reason is given at (495) and it is this: If there is change of change, whether as of a subject or as of a terminus, then, since there are three species of motion, as was said above (motion to where and quantity and quality), it will follow that one of these species could be the subject and terminus of some other species or even of its own species. Therefore, it will follow that local motion can be altered or even be moved locally. Such a thing is more plainly absurd when you get down to cases than when you speak in general. Therefore, it cannot be admitted that there is change of change or coming to be of coming-to-be.

677. Then at (496) he shows in what sense there can be change of change. And he says that since there are three ways in which something can be moved, (namely, in respect to an accident or in respect to a part or per se, it is only per accidens that there could be change of change, i.e., only inasmuch as the subject of the change changes: for example, if someone, while he is becoming healthy, would run or learn; for then the healing process would be running or learning per accidens, just as a musician builds per accidens. But it is not our intention to treat of per accidens motion, for we have already decided to pass it by.

LECTURE 4

MOTION IS SOLELY IN QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND PLACE

678. Having shown that there is no motion in substance or in relation or in action and passion, the Philosopher now tells in which genera motion does exist. And about this he does three things:

First he arrives at the intended conclusion;

Secondly, he shows how motion is found in each of three genera, 679;

Thirdly, he answers a difficulty, at 682.

He says therefore first at (497) that since motion is neither in substance nor in relation nor in acting and being-acted-upon, as has been explained, there remain but three genera in which there is motion: quantity, quality and where, for in each of these genera there is apt to be the contrariety which motion requires.

He has already explained both why he omits the three genera of when, situs and habitus and how there is contrariety in the three genera in which motion is found.

679. Then at (498) he explains how motion is found in the three genera:

First in quality;

Secondly, in quantity, at 680;

Thirdly, in where, at 681.

He says therefore first that motion in the genus of quality is called “alteration”. And he refers to this genus a common name—alteration; for in Latin the word alterum (other) is customarily applied to things that differ in respect of quality. And we are speaking of quality not in the sense in which it is found in the genus of substance, where the substantial difference is said to be predicated in regard to that which qualifies, but in the sense of a passive characteristic (contained in the third species of quality) in virtue of which something is said to receive or not receive a quality such as hot and cold, black and white, and so on. It is in respect to these that things are said to be "altered", as will be shown in Book VII.

680. Then at (499) he shows how there is motion in quantity, And he says that motion in respect to quantity does not have a name for its genus, as quality has the generic name "alteration". Rather it is named according to its species, which are "growth" and "decrease". For the movement from imperfect size to perfect is called "growth"; the one from perfect size to imperfect is called "decrease".

681. Then at (500) he explains how there is motion in where. And he says that motion in respect of place has neither a common name for its genus nor a particular name for its species, yet he gives it the general name latio—although this is not the generic name of every type of local motion. For it is properly used of things which are so moved in respect of place that it is not due to their own power that their local motion stops; in other words, things that are moved not by themselves but by others.

The reason why the common name could be applied to motion in quality is that qualities are contrary in the very notion of their species according to which they are contained under the genus of quality. But quantities are contrary, not according to the very characteristics of their species, but according to "perfect" and "diminished"; and it is according to these that the species of quantity derive their name. However, in place the only contrariety that exists is founded on motion in respect to which two termini are most distant, Consequently, because such contrariety is based on something entirely foreign to place, no motion in this genus could possess a name based either on the genus, or the species under the genus.

682. Then at (501) he clears up a point about which there could be doubt and shows to which species of motion should be reduced a change from lesser to greater or greater to lesser; for example, when something white becomes less white or more white. For at first sight it might seem that it should be reduced to the motions called "increase" and "decrease". But he shows that it should be reduced to alteration, saying that any change within the same species of quality, for example, change to whiteness or to more or less whiteness, is alteration.

He proves this by the fact that alteration, which is change from one contrary to the other in respect of quality, can occur in two ways: first, unqualifiedly, as when something changes from white to black or vice versa; or secondly, qualifiedly, when something changes from more white to less white, and vice versa. And that such a change is a change from contrary to contrary he now proves: for when something is changed from more white to less white, such a thing is said to be changed from one contrary to its opposite, because it is approaching the true contrary, which is black. And when it is changed from less white to more white, it is as though it were changed from one contrary to its opposite, namely, from black to white. For it becomes more white by becoming further removed from black and acquiring more perfect possession of whiteness.

In order for there to be alteration, it makes no difference whether the change is unqualifiedly from contrary to contrary, or from more to less or less to more, except that in the former case the termini of the alteration must be two actual contraries; whereas the change in regard to more and less involves the subject’s having or not having in a greater or lesser degree one or another of the contraries.

At the end of (502) he concludes that it is now clear that there are only these three kinds of motion.

683. Then at (503) he explains the various senses of “immobile”, giving three. The term “immobile” is applied in the first place to what is absolutely incapable of being moved, as God; just as we correspondingly apply the word “invisible” to sound’, In a second sense, it is applied to what is moved with difficulty (in two ways) either because, after it has begun to be moved, it continues slowly and with great difficulty (as when we call a lame person “immobile”) or because it is difficult to get it started both on account of the labor and time involved, as when we say that a mountain or a large rook is immobile, In a third sense something is called “immobile”, when it is capable of being easily moved, but it is not in motion when and where and in the manner in which it is capable. This alone is called “rest”, because rest is the contrary of motion. Here “contrary” is used in a wide sense, i.e., in the sense that includes even privation. Hence he concludes that rest is privation of motion in that which is capable of motion. For “contrary” and “privation” are applied only to things that are susceptible of opposites.

Finally, at (504) he summarizes and says that it is now clear what motion is and what rest is and what are the varieties of change and which of them can be called motion.

LECTURE 5

THE DEFINITIONS OF “IN CONTACT,” “CONSECUTIVE,” “CONTINUOUS”

684. After dividing change and motion into its species, the Philosopher now begins to discuss the senses in which motion is said to be one, and the senses in which motions are said to be contrary. About this he does two things:

First he establishes a background of preliminary notions that will be of use;

Secondly, he pursues his main objective, at L. 6.

About the first he does three things:

First he states his intention;

Secondly, he pursues it, here at 684;

Thirdly, he makes a summary, at 694.

He says therefore first that we must now define the terms together, extraneous or separate, touching [in contact], intermediate [or between], consecutive to.

The reason for positing these definitions now is that they will be used in later demonstrations, just as in the beginning of Euclid are posited definitions that serve as principles of later demonstrations.

685. Then at (5o6) he carries out his plan.

First he defines the terms he mentioned;

Secondly, he compares one to the other, at 692.

About the first he does three things:

First he defines those that pertain to contact, i.e., touching;

Secondly, those which pertain to consecutiveness, at 686;

Thirdly, those that pertain to continuum, at 691.

Since “together” occurs in the definition of in contact, the Philosopher defines it first (506) and says that those things are said to be together in respect of place which are in one first place, where first place refers to proper rather than common place. For things are said to be together not because they are in one common place but in one proper place; otherwise, we should be able to say that all bodies are together, since they are all contained under the heavens.

He speaks of such things that are together in respect of place, in distinction to those that are said to be together in time—a point we are not now discussing, Conversely, whatever things are one in one place, and another in another place, are said to exist separate or apart.

But in contact is said of things whose termini are together. The termini of bodies are surfaces and of surfaces, lines, and of lines, points. Therefore, if two lines are in contact as to their termini, the two points of the two lines in contact will be contained under one point of the place containing them. From this, however, it does not follow that the thing in place is greater than the place, for point added to point does not make anything larger. And the same holds for the others.

686. Then at (507) he defines the things that pertain to consecutiveness, About this he does three things:

First he defines between, which is placed in the definition of consecutive to;

Secondly, he defines consecutive to, at 689;

Thirdly, he draws a corollary, at 690.

He says therefore first (507) that the between is what a naturally and uninterruptedly changing thing is apt to arrive at before it reaches the ultimate terminus of the motion, into which terminus it is being changed; for example, if something is changing from A to C through B, then, provided it is a continuous motion, it reaches B before C.

In some cases there are a number of “betweens” to be traversed as you pass from one extreme to the other, as from black to white there are many colors between; but there must be at least three things involved, two of which are extremes and one the between. Consequently, the between is what must be passed through before arriving at the terminus of a change: but the terminus of a change is a contrary; for it has already been stated that motion goes from contrary to contrary.

687. Because the definition of between made mention of continuity of motion, he now shows what continuous movement means. Now continuity of motion may be viewed from two aspects: first, from the time during which the movement occurs and, secondly, from the thing through which the motion takes place for example, the magnitude, in local motion.

For a motion to be continuous it is required that there be no interruptions in time, because even the slightest interruption of the motion as to time prevents the motion from being continuous.

But on the side of the magnitude through which the motion passes there can be slight variations without prejudice to the continuity of the motion. This is clear in crossings over streets, at which stones are placed slightly distant from each other, and over which a person passes from one side of the street to another without interrupting his motion. This, therefore, is what he says: that continuity of motion is present when there is no gap or only the slightest in the thing, i.e., when there is no interruption in the thing over which the motion passes or, if there is, it is very slight. But there cannot be the slightest interruption of time, if the motion is to be continuous.

How there can be a gap in continuous motion he explains by adding that a motion will be continuous even if there is a gap in the material, as long as there is no time-gap; for example, if in playing the harp one strikes the highest note immediately after having sounded the lowest and none of the intermediate ones. But this is not a gap in time, but in the material in which the motion takes place.

What has been said about the continuity of motion applies not only to local motion but to all the others as well.

688. But because it is not evident how the terminus of a local motion is a contrary, since one place does not seem to be contrary to another, he now gives an explanation. And he says that the contrary in respect of place is the greatest rectilinear distance, where greatest distance is taken in relation to the motion and the mobiles and the movers, for example, for the motion of heavy and light things the distance from the center of the earth to the extremity of the sky is the greatest distance, while in regard to my motion and your motion, the greatest distance is the interval between where we start and where we intend to arrive.

What he means by the phrase “in a straight line” he explains by adding “that the shortest line is definitely limited”. To understand this, consider that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line, for between any two points there is only one straight line. But there are any number of curved lines between two points, where by curved lines we mean the arcs of major or minor circles, Now since every measure should be finite (otherwise there would be no way of knowing the quantity of a thing—for that is the purpose of measuring), the greatest distance between two objects is not measured by a curved line but by a straight line which is finite and determinate.

689. Then at (508) he defines what is meant by consecutive to and a species of it, namely, contiguous. And he says that two things are required in order that something be called consecutive to another. One is that it be after the first and in a certain order: either according to position, as things that are in order in place; or according to species, as 2 comes after 11 or in any way in which things can be in order, as according to virtue, according to dignity, according to knowledge, and so on. The other requirement is that between that which is consecutive and that to which it is consecutive there not be anything of the same kind intervening; for example, one line is consecutive to another, if there is no line between—likewise from one unit to another and one house to another. However, this does not forbid something else intervening. For example, an animal could be found between two houses.

Why he said "to which it is consecutive" and "that it is after the first" he explains by adding that whatever is said to be consecutive is so in respect to something else, not as being prior to it but as following it. For 1 is not said to be consecutive to 2, or a new moon to a second new moon; rather, it is just the opposite.

Then he defines a certain species of consecutive called contiguous. And he says that not everything consecutive is also contiguous, but only when it is consecutive and in contact, so that there is nothing at all between, i.e., nothing of the same genus or of any other genus.

690. Then at (509) he concludes from the foregoing that since the between is that through which something is changed into what is final, and since every change is between opposites which are either contrary or contradictory, although there is no between in contradictories, it follows that it is between contraries that the between is found.

Then at (510) he shows what a continuum is and he says that it is a species of the contiguous. For when the terminus of two things in contact is one and the same, then something is continuous. And the very word "continuum" denotes this. For "continuum" is derived from "continere" (to hold together): when, therefore, many parts are held together in a unit and, as it were, keep themselves together, then there is a continuum. But this cannot be while the endings are two but only when they are one.

From this he further concludes that continuity can occur only in things from which a unity through contact is naturally apt to come about. For in whatever way a whole is naturally one and continuous in the same way is a continuous unity formed from many things, whether by riveting, by glueing or by any form of contact that makes one terminus for two parts, or even by being born of another, as fruit is born of a tree and forms a sort of continuum with it.

692. Then at (511) he compares three of the foregoing with one another; namely, the consecutive to the continuous, and the continuum. About this he does three things:

First he compares consecutiveness to contact;

Secondly, contact with continuum, at 693;

Thirdly, he draws a corollary, at 694.

He says therefore first (511) that it is clear why among these three, consecutiveness is naturally first in the order of nature, for in the cases of contact there is always consecutiveness, since there must be an order, at least of position, among things that are in contact. Bat not all cases of consecutiveness involve contact, for an order can exist among things in which there is no contact, as in substances separated from matter. Hence, consecutiveness is present in things that are prior in definition, for it is found in numbers, in which there is no contact, which is present only among continua. Numbers, however, are prior to continuous quantities in definition, for they are more simple and more abstract.

693. Then at (512) he compares in contact with continuous and says that for the same reason in contact is prior to continuous, because if a thing is continuous it must be in contact, but it does not necessarily follow that if it is in contact it is continuous,

And he proves this from the definitions of the two. For it is not necessary that the endings of things be one (which is implied in the notion of continuum), if they are together (which is implied in the notion of contact). But, on the other hand, if the endings are one, they must be together, for what is one is together unto itself.

However, if "together" implies a relationship between distinct things, then things that are together are not one: and according to this, continua are not in contact. But they are, if we do not speak so precisely. Hence he concludes that natural junction, i.e., continuity, in which one part is joined to another at one terminus, is last in coming to be, in the sense that what is specific comes to be after what is general, as animal comes to be before man. And, therefore, I say that natural junction is last, because things must mutually touch if their extremities are naturally united; however, it is not necessary that all things that touch be naturally joined to one another. But in regard to things which cannot touch, it is clear that continuity is impossible.

694. Then at (513) he draws a corollary from the preceding: i.e., if point and unit have an independent existence of their own, as some say who suppose a separated existence for mathematical objects), it follows that unity and point are not the same.

And this is clear for two reasons: first, because points are present in things that are capable of mutual contact and certain things touch at points; but in units contact is never found, but only consecutiveness. Secondly, because there must be something existing between two points, but between two unities there is not necessarily anything

between. For it is evident that between the two unities that form 2 and the very first unity, which is 1, there is nothing intermediate.

Finally, at (514) he makes a summary and says that we have defined what is meant by together and apart, contact, between, consecutiveness, contiguous and continuous. Also we have shown in which circumstances each of these terms is applicable,

LECTURE 6

GENERIC, SPECIFIC, AND NUMERICAL UNITY OF MOTION

695. After positing some definitions to be used later, the Philosopher now proceeds to discuss unity of motion and contrariety of motions.

First he treats of the unity and diversity of motion;

Secondly, of its contrariety, which is a kind of diversity, L.8,

About the first he does three things:

First he shows how motion is said to be generically one;

Secondly, how it is specifically one, at 697;

Thirdly, how it is numerically one, at 699.

696. He says therefore (515) that there are a number of ways in which a motion is one, just as one itself has many senses: i.e., generically, specifically and numerically. A motion is said to be generically one according to the different predicaments. For all motions that are assigned to one and the same predicament can be called generically one; thus every local motion is one generic motion, because each is in the predicament where, and differs generically from alteration, which is in the predicament quality, as has been said above.

697. Then at (516) he shows how motions are specifically one.

First he shows this;

Secondly, he raises a question, at 698.

He says therefore first (516) that a motion is called specifically one when, besides being a generic one, it also takes place in a species incapable of subdivision. For some species can be subdivided into other species, as color, which is a species of quality, is capable of differences that make for sub-species. Hence motions in regard to color can be diverse in species, as whitening and blackening; but all cases of whitening are specifically the same (just as all cases of blackening are), for there are no sub-species of whitening.

But when it happens that the species is at the same time a genus, then the motions found in a subalternate species are qualifiedly one, although, strictly speaking, they are not of the same species. Thus science is a species of knowledge, as well as a genus of the various types of science. Hence all indoctrination, which is a movement toward science, is in some sense specifically the same, although, strictly speaking, it is not, for the indoctrination by which grammar is taught is absolutely different in species from that by which geometry is taught.

Now it should be observed that in the foregoing the Philosopher has based the unity and diversity of motion on the genera and species in which motion can occur, because motion is in a certain way reduced to the genus in which the motion is.

698. Then at (517) he raises a question about the foregoing: Whether a motion is specifically one and the same when the same thing changes frequently from the same to the same, e.g., when a point (according to the geometers who imagine that a point can be moved) changes again and again from this place to that. Now according to the foregoing it seems that the answer should be Yes. For if all motions that tend to the same species, e.g., whiteness, are specifically the same, a fortiori two motions from the same origin to the same terminus should be specifically one. But if that were so, then it would follow that a rectilinear motion is specifically the same as a circular motion. For it is possible to pass from this place to that by means of a circular motion, i.e., by describing an arc, and after by going in a straight line. Likewise, it would follow that in the motions of animals, walking (which is in a straight line) would be specifically the same as whirling, which consists in turning oneself in circles.

However, he answers this difficulty in the light of the foregoing. For it has been decided that if that in which the motion takes place is specifically different (as in the present instance the circular path is specifically different from the straight), the motion itself is also different. Consequently, in order that two motions be specifically the same, not only must the goal be specifically the same but also that through which the motion passes. Now it is clear that a straight line is specifically different from the curved.

Consequently, a circular and a rectilinear motion, as well as walking and whirling, are not specifically the same, even though they tend to the same goal, because the paths are not specifically the same.

But if the goals are identical and the paths specifically the same, then the motions are specifically the same; and much more so, if the goals and the path are numerically the same, the same repeated motions will be specifically the same.

699. Then at (518) he posits the third way in which a motion is said to be one; namely, numerically. About this he does two things:

First he explains when a motion is numerically one;

Secondly, he raises some question on this point, at 700.

He says therefore first at (516) that in the first two senses motions are not unqualifiedly one, but they are one only in a sense, i.e., in genus and species. But in the third sense a motion is unqualifiedly one, i.e., when it is numerically one in its essence.

Which motion is one in this way will be clear, if we distinguish the things required for motion: for numerically there are three things on which the unity of a motion depends: first, the subject which is being moved; secondly, the genus or species of the motion; thirdly, the time in which the motion takes place. And he explains each of these individually.

A subject of motion is required, because in every case of motion there must be something that is being moved, as a man or gold or some body. Likewise the subject must be affected by some genus or species of motion, such as place or a passible quality. Again, the time must be considered, because whatever is moved is moved in time.

Now among these three things, the generic or specific unity of the motion can depend on the thing in which there is motion; for example, on the place or quality. But the time does not account for the generic or specific unity of the motion, for there is only one specific time; rather it accounts for the continuity of the motion, i.e., that it flows on without interruption.

But unity of motion, in the sense of unqualified unity, depends on all three. For that in which the motion exists must be one and indivisible in the way that a species incapable of further subdivision is said to be one. Further, the time during which the motion occurs must be continuous without any breaks. Thirdly, the subject in motion must be one.

However, there are two types of unity of subject which are not sufficient to guarantee that the motion is unqualifiedly one. The first type is accidental: for example, Coriscus and white are accidentally one, but the motion proper to Coriscus in not the same as the motion proper to white. For the proper motion of white is to become black and the motion proper to Corisicus is to walk; and these are different. The second type is generic and specific unity. For in order that a motion be numerically one, it is not enough that the subject be one as something common either generically or specifically. For it is possible that two men are being healed during the same period of time in regard to the same thing; for example, from inflammation of the eye, so that the time is one and the species of motion is one, and the subject is one in species. Yet these two healings are not one numerically but only specifically.

700. Then at (519) he raises a question. And about this he does three things:

First he mentions what at first glance seems to be a motion numerically one;

Secondly, he raises a question about this, at 701;

Thirdly, he gives the true solution, at 702.

He says therefore first (519) that it is possible for one mobile, e.g., Socrates, to be altered at two different times with respect to the same specific disease, for example, if he is twice healed of eye-inflammation. This repeated healing will at first sight be numerically one motion, if the health acquired is numerically the same in both cases. And this will be so, if it is possible for that which ceased to be to come again into being as the same numerical thing—which seems impossible. For the health acquired after the first alteration was later lost and the same numerical health cannot be regained.

But it seems that if the same numerical health were regained, the second alteration would be numerically the same motion as the first; whereas if the same numerical health is not regained, the motion will not be numerically the same but specifically.

701. Then at (520) he raises another difficulty on this point. It is this: if someone continually perseveres in health or any other accident, could the health, or any other habit or passion in bodies, be one? It seems not,

because certain philosophers believe that all subjects that possess certain qualities or habits are in continuous motion and flux.

If, therefore, in the case of a person who remains healthy, there is one and the same health at dawn and at noon and in the evening, there seems to be no reason why in the case of a person who gets sick and then recovers, the health recovered is not numerically the same as the one previously possessed.

Aristotle does not settle this question: first, because it is not ad rem, since it pertains to metaphysics, whose province is to consider the one and the many, the same and the diverse; and, secondly, because this difficulty is based on the false assumption that all things are in a state of continuous change and flux, as Heraclitus believed—an opinion which Aristotle refutes in IV Metaphysics. Moreover, the two cases are not the same: for as long as health remains in spite of fluctuations in degree, the original health is not interrupted, as it is in the case of one who completely loses his health.

?02. Then at (521) he determines the truth in regard to the case mentioned in 700. For he mentioned there that if it is the same quality that is recovered, the second alteration will be numerically the same motion as the first; if the same numerical quality is not recovered, then it is not numerically the same act.

Having presented a certain difficulty as though giving a reason for what was set down above, he adds that the reason for raising the difficulty was that at first sight it seemed that the same argument would hold good for the unity of quality and of motion.

But there is a difference: for it does follow that if two motions are the same in the manner in which a motion is said to be numerically one, then the habit, i.e., the quality, acquired by the motion is one; because numerically the same quality is produced by an act numerically one. However, if the quality that returns is one, not everyone would agree that the act is one; for if the terminus of two motions is numerically one, it does not mean that the motions were numerically one. This is evident in local motion. For when a person interrupts his walk, the act of walking ceases; but when he resumes, the act resumes. Now, if you were to say that the whole journey is one act of walking that ceases to be and is then revived, then it would follow that one and the same thing can exist and cease to exist any number of times—which is impossible. In like manner if the same numerical health is again and again recovered, it does not follow that the second healing was the same motion as the first, any more than a second walk is the same as a first, even though both go toward the same numerical goal.

Finally, he concludes that these difficulties lie outside the present enquiry and are for that reason to be passed over.

LECTURE 7

NUMERICAL UNITY OF MOTION (CONTINUED)

703. After positing that three things are required in order that a motion be unqualifiedly one, namely, unity of time, unity of that in which the motion takes place and unity of subject, the Philosopher now intends to prove this.

Now while there are a number of ways in which things are unqualifiedly one, one being the way in which an indivisible is one and another the way in which a continuum is one, no motion can be unqualifiedly one in the way that an indivisible is one, because no motion is indivisible. Consequently, it remains that a motion is one to the extent that it is continuous and that, insofar an a motion is concerned, to be continuous is to be unqualifiedly one, so that the very continuity of motion suffices for its unity. For if it is continuous, it is one. Accordingly, whatever is required to make a motion be continuous is also required to make it one.

704. Now, in order that a motion be continuous, three things are required. The first of these is oneness in species. For there will not be continuity between one motion and another indiscriminately any more than there is continuity between just any two continuous things chosen at random in any other sphere. There can be continuity only when the extremities of the two things are one—this is implied in the very notion of continuity, as was explained above. Now, some things have no extremities at all; for example, forms and all indivisibles. Therefore, in regard to such things there can be no continuity. Other things have extremities which are divisible and have quantity. Some such things are equivocal, i.e., not agreeing in name and notion. Such things afford no means of forming continuity; indeed, in many cases no contact is possible. For how could a line and walking be in contact,

or how could they possess a common extremity, so as to make continuity possible?

This shows that continuity is impossible with things that belong to genera or species that are diverse.

However, motions that differ generically or specifically can follow one upon the other, as a person immediately after running can start to get a fever—running and getting a fever being in diverse genera. And even in the same genus, e.g., in local motion, one change of place could follow upon another without the motion being continuous, as is evident in the spreading of the lamp (the torch-race), when the torch is passed from hand to hand. In this case we have diverse non-continuous motions. Or the phrase "spreading of the lamp" could refer to the local motion of the flame—which is signified by the word "lamp"—which is moved according to the local motion of the fuel that feeds the flame—such local motion being called spreading.

Therefore the changes mentioned in the preceding paragraph, since they differ either generically or specifically, are not continuous, since they cannot have one extremity, which is required for a continuum. Consequently, motions that differ generically or specifically may be consecutive and "had", i.e., in contact somehow without any time interruption, inasmuch as time is continuous and has its continuity in the same way that motion has, namely, because there is one extremity (joining two parts). Now there is nothing to prevent one motion from being ended and another of an entirely different kind from beginning at the same instant that two parts of time are being joined. In that case the two motions will be contiguous but not continuous. Therefore, according to our premises, it follows that in order that a motion be continuous, it is necessary that it be one in species: this unity of species being in the motion from the thing in which the motion is, insofar as it is incapable of division according to species.

705. In the second place, continuity of motion requires unity of subject, for the motions of diverse subjects cannot be continuous, though they can be contiguous, as was said about transferring a lamp from hand to hand.

706. Thirdly, in order that a motion be continuous and one, it must be one as regards the time, so that no period of immobility or rest intervene. For if there is a time in which it was not moving, then it was at rest during that

time, and if a state of rest intervenes, the motion is not one but many; for motions that are interrupted by rest are not one but many. Consequently, if a motion is interrupted by rest, it will be neither one nor continuous. But it is interrupted by rest, if there is a time in the middle of it, as was shown. Hence for continuity of motion, there must be one continuous time.

But mere continuity of time is not enough, because a motion that is not specifically one is not continuous, even though time is not interrupted: for although it be one in regard to time, it will be other in regard to species. In other words, in order that a motion be one and continuous, it must be specifically one; but it does not follow that a motion specifically one is unqualifiedly one,

Thus, it is clear that the three aforementioned things are required in order that a motion be unqualifiedly one. And so he concludes that we have now explained which motion is unqualifiedly one.

707. Then at (523) having posited the three principal ways in which a motion is one, he mentions two secondary ways, although these pertain more to a certain form of unity than to unity itself. The second of these is given at 708.

He says therefore first (523) that whether a motion be one in genus or in species or in substance, i.e., numerically one, it is also called one if it is perfect, just as in other things, “perfect” and “whole” pertain to the notion of unity. For we do not speak of one man or one shoe, unless they are whole.

However, there are times when we speak of something imperfect as being one, provided it is continuous. And the reason for this is that unity can be regarded from the viewpoint of quantity, in which sense mere continuity suffices for the unity of a thing, or from the viewpoint of the substantial form, which is the perfection of the whole. Thus, what is perfect and whole is said to be one.

708. Then at (524) he gives the other secondary way; that a motion is called one when it is regular, i.e., uniform, just as in other things an object is said to be one, if its parts are alike. About this he does three things:

First he posits this mode of unity in the sense that a regular motion is one;

Secondly, he shows in which motions regularity and irregularity are found, at 709;

Thirdly, he explains the modes of irregularity, at 710.

He says therefore that in addition to the above-mentioned rays of being one, a motion is called one, if it, is regular, i.e,,, uniform. For an irregular or non-uniform motion does not seem to be one, whereas a regular, i.e., uniform motion does (as a motion which is entirely straight is uniform).

The reason why an irregular motion does not seem to be one is that it can be divided into parts which are not alike, whereas indivisibility pertains to the notion of unity, because that which is one is undivided. However, an irregular motion is one in a sense. But the unity of irregular and regular motions seem to differ according to more and less: because a regular motion is more perfectly one than an irregular one; just as a body whose part's are alike is more perfectly one than a body of parts that are not alike.

709. Then at (525) he shows in which motions irregularity and regularity are found. And he says that they are found in every genus and species of motion: for some things can be altered in a regular manner, as when the entire alteration is uniform, and some things can be moved along a magnitude that is regular and uniform, as things that are in circular motion or in rectilinear motion. The same is true of growing and decreasing.

710. Then at (526) he approaches the task of deciding about irregular motion.

First he mentions ways of being irregular;

Secondly, he shows how an irregular motion is one, at 713.

About the first he does two things:

First he assigns two ways in which irregularity is present in motions;

Secondly, he draws certain conclusions from all this, at 712.

He says therefore first (526) that the variations that make for irregularity in motion are caused sometimes from the thing in respect to which there is motion, as is evident especially in local motions for it is impossible for a motion to be regular and uniform unless it passes over a magnitude that is regular, i.e., uniform. Now a magnitude is said to be regular or uniform when each part of it follows its neighbor in a uniform manner, so that any part could be superimposed upon any other, as is clear in the case of arcs or straight lines. But a magnitude is irregular, if one part does not uniformly follow another, as is evident in two lines that form an angle, of which one part does not fit perfectly over the other in the way that one part of a line fits perfectly over another, Therefore, a circular motion is regular and so is a rectilinear one: but reflexed or oblique motions, whose path forms an angle, are not regular and do not take place on a uniform magnitude; likewise any motion on a magnitude that is not such that any part of it taken at random fits on any other taken at random, For if the part (of the motion) that contains the angle is superimposed on a part that does not form an angle, they will not match,

711. The second difference that makes for irregularity is found neither in the place nor in the time nor in the goal (for the goal of a motion is not merely a place but also quality or quantity) but in the manner of the motion, For in some cases the motion is differentiated by swiftness and slowness; because a motion that has the same velocity throughout is said to be uniform, while one in which one part is swifter than another is said to be irregular.

712. Then at (527) he draws two conclusions from the foregoing. The first of which is that swiftness and slowness are neither species of motion nor specific differences, because they can be found in all types of motion, since they determine regularity and irregularity, which follow upon each species of motion, as was said above. And no species or difference is common to every species of a genus.

The second corollary is that swiftness and slowness are not the same as heaviness and lightness, because each of the latter has its own motion, for the motion of earth, which is heavy, is always toward a downward place and the motion of fire is always toward an upward. On the other hand, swiftness and slowness are common to diverse motions, as was said.

713. Then at (528) he shows how an irregular motion is one; Secondly, he draws a corollary at 714.

He says therefore first that an irregular motion can be said to be one insofar as it is continuous, but it is less perfectly one than a regular motion, just as a line having an angle is less perfectly one than a straight line. This is especially clear in a reflected motion, which seems to be, as it were, two motions.

Now, since an irregular motion is less perfectly one, it appears to share in the notion of multitude, for a thing is said to be less, because it has an admixture of the contrary, as what is less perfectly white has an admixture of black, at least in being closer to black than a perfectly white object is.

714. Then at (529) he concludes from the immediately foregoing the conclusion which he had previously proposed; namely, that motions which are specifically diverse cannot form a continuity. For every motion that is one can be either irregular or regular. But a motion that is composed of specifically distinct motions cannot be regular. For how could a regular motion be composed of alteration and local motion? For in order that a motion be regular its parts must agree. Consequently, the conclusion is that diverse motions that are consecutive but not all of the same species do not form a motion that Is one and continuous, as was stated above and explained by examples.

LECTURE 8

CONTRARIETY OF MOTIONS

715. After discussing unity and diversity of motions, the Philosopher now discusses contrariety of motions, which is a kind of diversity, as is evident from Book I of Metaphysics. His treatment is divided into two parts:

In the first he shows how to understand contrariety in motion and in rest;

In the second he raises some questions about such contrariety, at 742.

About the first he does two things:

First he settles the problem of contrariety of motion;

Secondly, about contrariety of states of rest, at 727.

About the first he does three things:

First he distinguishes diverse ways according to which contrariety of motion might be taken;

Secondly, he rejects some of these ways, at 717;

Thirdly, he assigns the true way in which motions and changes are contrary, at 722.

716. He says therefore first (530) that it is now time to decide how one motion is contrary to another, as well as how rest is contrary to motion and rest to rest.

But in this treatment we must first distinguish the ways according to which the idea of contrariety in motions can be taken universally. And he distinguishes five ways. The first of which is that one idea of contrariety in motions is based on one motion approaching a definite terminus and another departing from the name terminus. And this is what he says: “...whether contrary motions are motions respectively from and to the same thing, e.g., a motion from health and a motion to health”. According to this, generation and ceasing-to-be seem to be contrary, because generation is a motion to being, and ceasing-to-be from being.

The second way is that the idea of contrariety of motions is based on contrariety of the termini from which the motions begin. And this is what he says: “...or motions respectively from contraries, e.g., a motion from health and one from sickness”.

The third way is that contrariety of motions is based on the contrariety of the goals at which they are terminated. And this is what he says: “...or motions respectively to contraries, e.g., a motion to health and a motion to sickness”.

The fourth way is to take contrariety of motions according to the contrariety existing between the start of one and the goal of the other. This is what he says: “...or motions respectively one from a contrary and the other to a contrary, e.g., a motion from health and one to sickness”.

The fifth way is based upon contrariety on the part of both termini of each motion. This is what he says: “...or motions respectively from a contrary to its opposite and from the latter to the former, e.g., a motion from health to sickness and a motion from sickness to health”.

Now contrariety among motions is necessarily based either on one of these five ways or on more than one, for there is no other possible way of one motion being contrary to another.

717. Then at (531) he rejects two of these five:

First of all the fourth, which based contrariety on the opposition between the start of one and the goal of the other;

Secondly, the second, which based contrariety on the opposition between the start of one and the start of the other, at 716.

Thirdly, he concludes how two of the remaining ways are related, at 721.

He says therefore first (531) that a motion which begins at one contrary cannot be called contrary to a motion that tends to the opposite contrary, so as to say that a change from health is contrary to a change to sickness. For nothing is contrary to itself; but a motion from health is one and the same as a motion to sickness, although they differ in thought inasmuch as a change from health is not the same idea as a change to sickness—for one stresses the starting point and the other the goal of the same notion. Consequently, contrariety of motion must not be taken from the viewpoint of the contrariety existing between the start of one and the end of the other.

718. Then at (532) he shows that contrariety must not be taken from the contrariety existing between the two starting points of two motions: and this

for three reasons, of which the first is the following. Two motions that tend to the same goal are not contrary; but two motions that start from contraries can tend to one and the same goal, for a motion can go either to a contrary or to what is intermediate between the contraries, as will be said later. Thus two motions that start from contraries could terminate at the same intermediate. Consequently, motions are not contrary just because they start at terms that are contrary.

719. He gives the second reason at (533), which is this. The idea of contrariety in motion must be based on that which more evidently makes the motion contrary, but contrariety between goals at which motions end seems to be a greater cause of contrariety in motions than is contrariety between termini at which motions start. For when I say that motions begin at contrary terms, I am stressing the removal of contrariety, but when I say that motions are approaching contrary goals, I am stressing the receiving of contrariety. Therefore, contrariety of motions is not based solely on the termini at which they start.

720. He gives the third reason at (534) and it is this. Things receive contrariety from that from which they take their name and species, for contrariety is a difference based on form, as in clear in Book X of Metaphysics. But every motion gets its name and species from the goal more than from the starting point, as healing is a motion to health and getting sick is a motion to sickness. This point was mentioned before. Therefore, contrariety of motions is taken rather from the goal than from the terminus at which they start. Thus our conclusion is the same as before.

721. Then at (535) he concludes that having rejected the two ways that were based on the contrariety of termini, there remain two other ways, namely, the third and the fifth. Of these, one is based solely on the contrariety of goals and the other on the contrariety of both sets of termini. Way 1 was not based on any contrariety of termini but on approach and departure from the same terminus. He further concludes that perhaps these two remaining ways are really the same, because motions that tend to contrary goals also start at contraries; but perhaps they are not the same in conception, on account of the various relationships that exist between motions and their termini, as was said above. For example, a motion to health is really the same as a motion from sickness, but they differ in conception. The same is true for a motion from health and a motion to sickness.

722. Then at (536) he explains how to take contrariety in motion.

First, when the motion tends toward a contrary;

Secondly, when it tends toward the intermediate, at 726.

About the first he does two things:

First he explains what makes for contrariety in motions;

Secondly, in changes, at 724.

About the first he does two things:

First he explains his proposition with a syllogism;

Secondly, by induction, at 723.

As to the first, he gives this reason at (536): The contrariety of things is based on their specific nature and definition. But the specific definition of motion is that it is a change which takes place from a definite affirmed subject to a definite affirmed subject and that two termini are involved—on this point, motion differs from change, which does not always require two affirmed termini. Therefore, we are left with the fact that for contrariety of motion there must be contrariety on the side of both termini. In other words, a motion which goes from contrary to contrary is, strictly speaking, contrary to one that is from contrary to contrary; for example, one that is from health to sickness is contrary to one from sickness to health.

723. Then at (537) he proves the same by induction. And first of all in bodily alterations: for to fall ill is contrary to getting well. In these two examples the first is from health to sickness and the other from sickness to health. This is also evident in changes that occur in the soul: for to learn is contrary to being led into error (not by oneself but by another). These two motions are also from contraries to contraries, because learning is a motion from ignorance to knowledge, and being deceived is from knowledge to ignorance.

He says “not by oneself”, because just as, in the case of knowledge, it is possible for a person to acquire it by himself (and this is called “discovery) or with someone’s help (and this is called “learning”), so also it can happen that a person is led into error sometimes by himself and sometimes by another. It is the latter that is properly opposed to learning.

Continuing, we take an example from local motion: for an upward motion is contrary to a downward (and these are contraries in respect of length); a motion to the right is contrary to one to the left (and these are contrary in respect of breadth); and a motion to the fore is contrary to one to the rear (and these are contrary in respect of depth).

But notice that Aristotle is here speaking of differences of position as they apply to man: for up and down are measured in respect to man's length; left and right in respect to his breadth; fore and after in respect to his thickness, which is called height or depth.

Moreover, it should be noted that even in natural motions, there is a contrariety based on up and down; but in regard to right and left, or fore and aft, the contrariety is not according to nature but according to motions that originate from the soul, which has motions toward these contrary directions.

724. Then at (538) he shows how there is contrariety in changes.

First he explains how to take contrariety of change in things in which contrariety is found;

Secondly, how to take it in things in which there is no contrariety, at 725.

He says therefore first (538) that if contrariety is taken merely from the goal so that what tends to a contrary is said to be contrary, such a process does not make for contrariety of motion, but of change, which is generation and ceasing-to-be, as becoming white and becoming black are contrary. Now the contrariety of these instances of generation is not based on the contrariety of starting point; because in generation the starting point is not something affirmed but something negated, for the white comes to be from the non-white and not from something affirmed. For a change from subject to subject is not change but motion.

Then at (539) he shows that in things in which there is no contrariety, for example, in substances and the like, contrariety of change is based on approach and departure from the same terminus, as accession to the form of fire, which pertains to the generation of fire, and receding from the same form, which pertains to its ceasing-to-be, are contraries. Hence generation is contrary to ceasing-to-be and any loss is contrary to any gain, But these are changes, not motions.

It is evident, therefore, that of the five ways listed above, the second and fourth are of no use; one of the remaining is suitable for knowing contrariety of motions, and the other two are suitable for contrariety of changes.

726. Then at (540) he decides about contrariety of motion from the viewpoint of the intermediate between contraries. And he says that

wherever a pair of contraries admit of an intermediate, motions to that intermediate must be held to be somehow motions to one or other of the contraries, for the intermediate serves as a contrary for the purposes of motion, no matter in which direction the change may be. For example, grey in a motion from grey to white takes the place of black as starting point, but in a motion from white to grey, it takes the place of black as goal. For the middle is, in a sense, opposed to either of the extremes, as has been said above.

Finally, he concludes what he mainly intended; namely, that motions are contrary to one another, only when one is a motion from a contrary to the opposite contrary and the other is a motion from the latter to the former.

LECTURE 9

CONTRARIETY OF REST TO MOTION, AND OF REST TO REST

727. After discussing contrariety of motions, the Philosopher now determines about contrariety of states of rest.

First, in motions;

Secondly, in changes, at 732.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows how rest is contrary to motion;

Secondly, which is contrary to which, at 728.

He says first (541) that since not only motion but also rest seem to be contrary to motion, we have to decide how rest is contrary to motion, for, strictly speaking, it is motion that is perfectly contrary to motion. However, even rest is opposed to motion, since it is the privation of motion, and privation is somehow a contrary. For privation and possession form the fundamental contraries, as is said in Book X of Metaphysics, since the idea of privation and possession are involved in every type of contrary, inasmuch as in any set of contraries, one of them is as privation in respect of the other; for example, black in relation to white and sweet in relation to bitter.

728. Then at (542) he shows which rest is contrary to which motion. About this he does three things:

First he phrases the question;

Secondly, he determines the truth, at 729;

Thirdly, he proves it, at 731.

In the question which he proposes (542) he assumes that not any state of rest is indiscriminately opposed to just any state of motion, but a definite type of rest to a definite type of motion; for example, rest in place is opposed to motion in regard to place. But because the question here is a general one, there still remains another problem: whether the opposite of that rest which consists in possessing its goal, for example, whiteness, is the motion to whiteness, i.e., whitening, or the one from whiteness, namely, blackening.

729. Then at (543) he determines the truth.

First as to the contrariety of motion to rest;

Secondly, as to the contrariety of rest to rest, at 730.

He says therefore first (543) that since motion is between two affirmed termini, the contrary of a motion from A to its contrary B is rest in A; for example, the contrary of a motion from whiteness to blackness is rest in whiteness, while the contrary of a motion from the contrary B to A is rest in B. For example, the contrary of a motion from black to white is rest in black.

730. Then at (544) he treats of the contrariety of one state of rest to another. And he says that those states of rest which are in contrary termini are mutually contrary. For it is not suitable to have motions contrary to one another and states of rest not contrary. And how states of rest in opposites are opposite, he explains with the example that rest in health is the opposite of rest in sickness.

731. Then at (545) he proves what he had said about the contrariety of rest to motion. And he says that the opposition of a motion from health to sick is rest in health; for it is not reasonable that rest in health be the opposite of a motion from sickness to health. This he now proves: Rest in the very goal toward which something else is in motion is the consummation and perfection rather than the opposite of that motion. And that rest in the goal toward which there is motion is its perfection is evident from the fact that the state of rest is coming to be during the motion, because the very movement toward the goal means that rest is coming to be. Hence, since motion is the cause of that rest, it cannot be its opposite, because a thing is not the cause of its opposite. Now the contrary of a motion must be either rest in its goal or rest in the starting point. For it is not reasonable to say that rest in some other species is contrary to a given motion or rest, any more than rest in whiteness is contrary to rest in health or motion to health. Consequently, since rest in the goal is not contrary to

motion toward that goal, the only thing that remains is that it is contrary to rest in the starting point.

732. Then at (546) he determines about contrariety of rest in changes. About this he does three things:

First he repeats what has already been said about contrariety of changes;

Secondly, he shows that the opposite of change is not rest but non-change, at 733;

Thirdly, how non-change is contrary to change, at 736.

He repeats therefore first (546) that in changes that do not involve termini that are contrary, for example, in the generation and ceasing-to-be of substance, opposition is based on approach and departure from the same terminus. For a change from A is opposed to a change to A, as a change from existence, i.e., corruption, is opposed to a change to existence, i.e., generation. However, neither of these is called motion.

733. Then at (547) he shows that these changes do not have an opposing state of rest. About this he does three things:

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he interposes a question, at 734;

Thirdly, he proves his proposition, at,133-5.

He says therefore first (547) that changes which do not pass from contrary to contrary have no states of rest opposed to them; rather what is opposed to them in the way that rest is opposed to motion can be called non-change.

734. Then at (546) he interposes a question on this matter. For it has been said that a change to being is contrary to a change from being, which is really a change to non-being. Now the expression “non-being” has two senses: In one sense, it implies a subject, which is either an actual being, as when non-white is in a body, or a potential being, as when privation of substantial form is in first matter. In a second sense, non-being can imply that no subject is involved, i.e., that we are dealing with absolute non-being.

If non-being is taken in the first sense, i.e., that a subject. is implied, then it would be possible to find out how one non-change is contrary to another non-change: for it could be said that a non-change in being is opposed to a non-change in non-being. For, since non-being has a subject, there is nothing to prevent that subject from persevering in non-being, which is the same as not changing.

Rut if there is nothing which is not, i.e., if non-being has no subjects then the question remains: to which non-change is the non-change or rest in being contrary? For what does not exist at all cannot be said to be at rest or to be unchangeably permanent. And since some kind of non-change must be contrary to non-change or rest in existence, it follows that that non-existence from which generation begins and toward which ceasing-to-be tends is a nonbeing that has a subject.

735. Then at (549) he explains something he had supposed, namely, that the opposite of generation and of ceasing-to-be is not rest. For if it were, then either of two things would follow: first, that not every rest is contrary to motion, or, secondly, that generation and ceasing-to-be are motions. So it is clear that whatever it is that is opposed to generation and ceasing-to-be, it is not rest, unless generation and ceasing-to-be are motion—which they are not, as we have proved above.

736. Then at (550) he shows how non-change is contrary to change. And he says that there is a parallel between the contrariety of non-change to change and that of rest to motion: for a non-change An being is contrary, either to no non-change (which would be, if non-being has no subject) or to that non-change which is in nonbeing (if non-being has a subject). And this contrariety is like the opposition between one rest and another.

Or we can say that a non-change in being is the opposite of corruption, as rest is of motion. However, it is not the opposite of generation, because corruption departs from non-change and rest in being, whereas generation tends to it. And we already know that the opposite of motion and change is not rest in the goal but rest in the starting point.

LECTURE 10

CERTAIN DIFFICULTIES ARE RESOLVED

737. After discussing the contrariety of motions and of rests, the Philosopher now raises some questions concerning these matters, About this he does two things:

First he raises questions and solves them;

Secondly, he explains certain matters that may still be doubtful in regard to these questions, at 747.

The first part is divided into three sections, one for each question he raises. About the first point he does two things;

First he raises a question;

Secondly, he solves it, at 740.

738. Therefore he first (551) raises the question why it is that in the genus of local motion, but not in the other general there are found some motions and rests that are according to nature and some not according to nature. For example, why in it that there are alterations according to nature but none not according to nature? For getting well does not seem to be according to nature or not according to nature any more than getting sick, since each originates from a natural intrinsic principle. The same is true in regard to getting white and getting black or in growing and decreasing, for the former motions are not so contrary to one another that one is according to nature and the other not, since each is a natural process. Nor is growing contrary to growing in such a way that one is according to nature and the other not. The same is true of generation and ceasing-to-be: for generation cannot be said to be according to nature and ceasing-to-be not according to nature, for

growing old—which is the road to ceasing-to-be-is according to nature. Nor does it appear that one generation is according to nature and another not.

739. Now it seems that what he says here is opposed to a declaration in On the Heavens, that old age and every defect and ceasing-to-be are against nature. But it must be said that old age and ceasing-to-be and decreasing are against nature in one sense and according to nature in another. For if we consider the specific nature of anything, i.e., its particular nature, it is clear that all ceasing-to-be and all defects and decrease are against nature: because each thing's nature tends to preserve the subject in which it exists, whereas the contrary of this happens when the nature is weak or defective.

But if we consider nature in general, all these things are the result of a natural intrinsic principle, as the destruction of an animal results from the contrariety of hot and cold; and the same is true for all the others.

740. Then at (552) he answers this question by invalidating it. About this he does two things:

First he shows that things according to nature and not according to nature are found in every genus;

Secondly, how these two things are contrary when they occur in motions and it states of rest, at 742.

About the first he does two things:

First he determines the truth;

Secondly, he removes an objection, at 741.

He says therefore first (552) that since what takes place through compulsion is contrary to nature (because compulsion arises from a principle outside a thing in such a way that the thing suffering compulsion does not cooperate, whereas what is natural comes from an intrinsic principle) it follows that compulsive ceasing-to-be is contrary to natural ceasing-to-be, just as a ceasing-to-be that is outside of nature is opposed to one according to nature.

According to the same argument, he concludes that some generations are compulsory and not according to fate, i.e., not according to the order of natural causes (because the order of natural causes. can be called "fate"), as when a person grows roses or fruits by artificial means out of season or when the generation of frogs or other natural things is procured artificially. Consequently, since these generations are compulsory, they are outside of nature and are contrary to generations according to nature.

He shows the same for growing and decreasing. For some cases of growth are compulsory and unnatural, as is evident in persons who reach the state of puberty in an abnormally short time, on account of soft living or on account of the food, i.e., they are fed abundantly and delicately. The same is also apparent in the growing of wheat, for sometimes the grains grow unnaturally through abundance of moisture and are not compact, i.e., made thick and solid by normal digestion.

Likewise in alterations. Some are compulsory and some natural, as is especially evident in the process of getting well. For some recover from fever on the critical days and some not on the critical days. The former are cured according to nature and the latter not according to nature.

741. Then at (553) he raises an objection against the foregoing. For since what is outside the nature is contrary to what is according to nature, then if there are generations that are according to nature and some not, and the same for ceasing-to-be, it follows that instances of ceasing-to-be are contrary not to generation but to one another, because one thing cannot be contrary to two.

But he solves this by saying that there is nothing to prevent generation from being contrary to generation, and ceasing-to-be to ceasing-to-be. This is true, even if you were to abstract from the contrariety between what is according to nature and what is against nature. For if you take the case of something sweet coming to be and then ceasing to be, and the case of something sad coming to be and ceasing to be, the two cases of coming-to-be would be contrary and the two of ceasing-to-be would be contrary. (When he speaks of the coming to be and the ceasing to be of the “sweet”, he means when “something more noble comes to be from the less noble that has ceased to be, as when fire is generated from air; on the other hand, the coming to be and ceasing to be of the “sad” refers to the less noble coming to be from the ceasing-to-be of the more noble, as when air is generated from fire).

Now even though ceasing-to-be is contrary to ceasing-to-be, it does not follow that it is not opposed to coming-to-be, for ceasing-to-be is opposed to coming-to-be when both are taken generically, while ceasing-to-be is opposed to ceasing-to-be in a specific sense. For example, avarice is contrary to liberality in the way that a vice is contrary to a virtue, but it is opposed to prodigality as one species to another. So that what he concludes is this: ceasing-to-be is contrary to ceasing-to-be, not in a generic sense, but one ceasing-to-be is this and another that, i.e., compulsory and beyond nature, or sweet and sad.

742. Then at (554) he explains contrariety in motion and rest on the basis of their being outside nature and according to nature. And he says that not only coming-to-be is contrary to coming-to-bg and to ceasing-to-be from the viewpoint of being outside nature and according to nature, but in general all motions and rests are contrary in this way. For example, an upward motion is contrary to a downward one (because up and down are contrarieties of place) and each of these motions is natural to certain bodies: for fire is naturally carried upward and earth downward. And again in regard to each of these motions, one can take as contrary differences that which is according to nature and that which is outside the nature. And this is what he means when he says that "these contrarieties in motion are differences", or he might mean that in respect to the very bodies that are moved there are contrary differences in their motions, namely, according to nature and outside their nature. For an upward motion is natural to fire but a downward not. So it is clear that a motion which is according to nature is contrary to one that is outside nature.

Likewise for states of rest. For rest which is above is contrary to a downward movement. But rest above is not natural to earth, whereas a downward motion is. According to the foregoing then, it is clear that rest which is outside the nature is contrary to the natural motion of the body involved, for even in the same body, motions ate mutually contrary, in the sense that the natural motion of one body is contrary to an unnatural motion of the same body. The same is true of rest; for some contrary rests will be according to nature, as rest above for fire and rest down for earth; others are outside the nature? as down for fire and up for earth.

743. Then at (555) he raises the second question; Has every state of rest that is not eternal a becoming, which becoming is called a coming to a standstill? The answer seems to be "no" for two reasons. First of all, if there is coming-to-be of every state of rest that is not eternal, it will follow that there is coming-to-be for states of rest which are outside nature (as when earth is at rest above). Now rest can be produced only by a previous motion, and the motion preceding an unnatural state of rest is compulsory. Consequently, it follows that when earth is violently projected upwards, it is

then that rest comes to be. But this cannot be, because “the velocity of that which comes to a standstill seems always to increase”, i.e., when rest is being generated through motion, it is true that as the state of rest gets closer, the motion gets swifter. For since the perfection of coming-to-be is the thing produced, and since each thing gets stronger and more intense as it gets closer to its perfection, it follows that the motion through which rest is produced is swifter the more it approaches rest, as is abundantly clear in natural motions.

But in things that are moved by compulsion the contrary happens: for the motion grows less intense the closer it gets to the state of rest. Consequently, compulsory rest is not generated. This is what he means when he says that some things come to rest by compulsion “without having become so”, i.e., in such a way that their rest is not generated.

744. He gives the second reason at (556) and it is this: Coming to a standstill, i,e., the coming-to-be of rest, is either entirely the same as the natural motion by which something is carried to its natural place or it is something that happens to accompany it. Now it is clear that both are the same reality though differing in conception. For the goal of a natural motion is to be in a natural place, but to be in a natural place and to be at rest in it are really the same thing. Consequently, a natural motion and the coming-to-be of rest are the same thing in reality and differ only in conception. However, it is evident that compulsory rest is not brought about by a natural motion. Therefore, coming to a standstill is not present in compulsory states of rest, i.e., such states are not generated.

745. Then at (557) he raises a third question about a point mentioned in LECTURE 3, that rest in A is contrary to motion from A. Now this seems to be false, because when something is moved from A as from a place, or A is being abandoned, as in the case of a quality or quantity, while it is being moved it still seems to have that which is cast off or left behind. For a thing does not leave its entire place all of a sudden but successively; likewise, it is only gradually that it loses whiteness. Therefore, while it is being moved it still retains something of the starting point. If, therefore, the state of rest whereby something remains in a starting point is contrary to the motion by which departure is made therefrom, it follows that two contraries are together—which is impossible.

746. So at (558) he solves this difficulty. And he says that what is being moved by departing from its starting point is at rest therein not absolutely but in a certain sense only, i.e., in the sense that it is there not in its entirety but partly, because it is universally true that in all cases of motion, part of the mobile is in the terminus a quo and part in the terminus ad quem. Nor is it unacceptable that one contrary be mixed with another in a certain respect; but the less it is mixed, the more perfectly is it contrary. Therefore, a motion is more contrary to another motion (since they are never intermingled) than a rest is, which somehow intermingles.

Finally, in summary, he says that we have spoken about motion and rest and how unity and contrariety are found therein.

747. Then at (559) he states some things that will clarify the foregoing. (These passages are said not to be found in the Greek MSS. and, according to the Commentator, not even in the Arabic MSS.; consequently, these statements seem to have been lifted from the sayings of Theophrastus or some other expositor of Aristotle). Three things are here posited in an attempt to clarify the foregoing.

The first pertains to the question previously raised about the generation of unnatural rest. And he says that someone may wonder about “Coming to a standstill”, i.e., about the coming-to-be of rest, for if all motions that are outside nature have an opposing state of rest, i.e., an unnatural one, does that state of rest come to be? If it is held that there is no “coming to a standstill” in cases of compulsory rest, something unacceptable follows. For it is clear that a thing in compulsory motion will sometimes remain, i.e., come to rest, by compulsion. Consequently, it will follow that something will be at rest not eternally without having come to rest—which seems impossible. But it is plain that sometimes there is compulsory rest. For just as things are moved outside their nature, so also they rest outside their nature. Rut it should be observed that what is said here appears contrary to what was said above (at 743). Hence Averroes says that a solution is now being given to a question previously raised.

However, it is better to say that the previous doctrine contains more truth, although what is being said here is somehow true also. For compulsory rest is not, strictly speaking, generated in the sense that it proceeds from a cause that is essentially productive of rest, as happens when natural rests are generated. But compulsory rest is generated per accidens through lack of a productive force, because when the compulsion of the mover either ceases or meets an obstacle, the state of compulsory rest comes to be. This is why compulsory motions peter out at the end, whereas natural ones become more intense.

It should be noted also that there is found another text for this place, to which we should give our attention. For it reads., Someone may ask whether to a motion outside nature there is any contrary rest not according to nature? This does not inquire whether, properly speaking, a state of rest that is contrary to nature is opposed to a motion that is contrary to nature, as Aristotle taught above; rather, here one is now speaking in wide and loose terms in the sense of the general opposition between rest and motion. And he says that it seems unreasonable not to find unnatural states of rest. For it is clear that the violence of the mover will cease at some time and unless rest eventuates, the motion will not come to a standstill. Hence it is clear that. to compulsory motions are opposed compulsory states of rest, because to what is moved outside its nature there belongs to rest outside its nature.

748. Then at (560) he mentions a second fact to explain his doctrine on the contrariety of natural and compulsory motion. And he says that since certain things are subject to motions that are according to nature and outside their nature, as fire is moved upward according to nature and downward outside its nature, the question arises whether the natural upward motion of fire has for its contrary the compulsory downward motion of fire or the natural downward motion of earth.

He answers that both are contrary to the natural upward motion of fire but not in the same way. For the downward motion of earth is contrary to the upward motion of fire as something natural contrary to something natural, whereas a downward motion of fire is contrary to the upward motion of fire as something natural contrary to something compulsory. The same is true for the contrariety of states of rest.

749. Then at (561) he mentions a third point to explain what he previously said about contrariety of rest to motion. And he says that perhaps motion is not strictly opposed to rest, but only in some sense. For when someone is being moved from A, in which he was at rest, and is doffing it, it seems to retain something of A. Hence if rest in this place is contrary to a motion from this place to a contrary place, it follows that contraries are together. But yet a thing is somehow still at rest while it perseveres in A;

indeed, speaking generally of a thing in motion, part of it is in the terminus a quo and part in the terminus ad quem. Consequently, rest is less contrary to motion than a contrary motion is, as was explained above.

Finally, he sums up, as is clear of itself.

Now the fact that the same words that appeared in an earlier passage (see end of 246 above) are repeated, lends support to the possibility that they are not the words of Aristotle, but of some expositor.

BOOK VI

LECTURE 1

NO CONTINUUM IS COMPOSED OF INDIVISIBLES

750. After the Philosopher has finished dividing niotion into its species and discussing the unity and contrariety of motions and of states of rest, he proposes in this Sixth Book to discuss the things that pertain to the division of motion precisely as it is divisible into quantitative parts.

The whole book is divided into two parts.

In the first he shows that motion, as every continuum, is divisible;

In the second he shows how motion is divided, at L. 5.

The first part is subdivided into two sections:

In the first he shows that no continuum is composed solely of indivisibles; at L. 4.

In the second that no continuum is indivisible, near the end

The first is further subdivided into two parts:

In the first he shows that no continuum is composed of indivisibles only;

In the second (because the proofs for the first seem to be applicable mainly to magnitudes) he shows that the same proofs apply to magnitudes, to motion and to time, at L, 2.

In regard to the first part he does two things:

First he recalls some definitions previously given, with a view to using them in demonstrating his proposition;

Secondly, he proves the proposition, at 752.

751. He says therefore first (562) that if the previously given definitions of continuum, of that which is touched, of that which is consecutive to are correct (namely, that continua are things whose extremities are one; contigua are things whose extremities are together; consecutive things are

those between which nothing of the same type intervenes), then it would follow that it is impossible for any continuum to be composed solely of indivisibles; i.e., it is impossible, for example, for a line to be composed of points only, provided, of course, that a line is conceded to be a continuum and that a point is an indivisible. This proviso is added to prevent other meanings being attached to point and line.

752. Then at (563) he proves the proposition:

First he gives two proofs of the proposition;

Secondly, he explains things that might be misunderstood in his proofs, at 756.

In regard to the first proof he does two things:

First he shows that no continuum is composed solely of indivisibles, either after the manner of continuity or of contact;

Secondly, or after the manner of things that are consecutive, at 754.

In regard to the first he gives two reasons, of which the first is: Whatever things a unit is composed of, either after the manner of continuity or of contact, the extremities must either be one or they must be together. But the extremities of points cannot be one, because an extremity is spoken of in relation to a part, whereas in an indivisible it is impossible to distinguish that which is an extremity and something else that is a part. Similarly, it cannot be said that the extremities are together, because nothing can be the extremity of a thing that cannot be divided into parts, whereas an extremity must always be distinct from that of which it is the extremity. But in a thing that cannot be divided into parts, there is no way of distinguishing one thing and another. It follows therefore that a line cannot be composed of points either after the manner of continuity or after the manner of contact.

753. The second reason is given at (564). If a continuum is composed solely of points, they must be either continuous with one another or touch (and the same is true of all other indivisibles, i.e., that no continuum is composed solely of them).

To prove that they are not continuous with one another, the first argument suffices.

But to prove that they cannot touch one another, another argument is adduced, which is the following: Everything that touches something else does so either by the whole touching the other wholly, or by a part of one touching a part of the other or the whole of the other. But since an indivisible does not have parts, it cannot be said that part of one touches either a part or the whole of the other. Hence if two points touch, the whole point touches another whole point. But when a whole touches a whole, no continuum can be formed, because every continuum has distinct parts so that one part is here and another there, and is divisible into parts that are different and distinct in regard to place, i.e., position (in things that have-position)—whereas things that touch one another totally are not distinguished as to place or position, It therefore follows that a line cannot be composed of points that are in contact.

754. Then at (565) he shows that no continuum is composed of indivisibles after the manner of things that are consecutive. For no point will be consecutive to another so as to form a line; and no "now" is consecutive to another "now" so as to form a period of time, because consecutive things are by definition such that nothing of the same kind intervenes between any two. But between any two points there is always a line, and so, if a line is composed of points only, it would follow that between any two points there is always another, mediate, point. The same is true for the "now's'". if a period of time is nothing but a series of "now's", then between any two "now's" there would be another "now". Therefore, no line is composed solely of points, and no time is composed solely of "now's", after the manner of things that are consecutive.

755. The second reason is given at (566) and is based on a different definition of continuum—the one given at the beginning of Book III—that a continuum is "that which is divisible ad infinitum". Here is the proof: A line or time can be divided into whatsoever they are composed of. If, therefore, each of them is composed of indivisibles, it follows that each is divided into indivisibles. But this is false, since neither of them is divisible into indivisibles, for that would mean they would not be divisible ad infinitum. No continuum, therefore, is composed of indivisibles.

756. Then at (567) he explains two statements he made in the course of his proofs. The first of these was that between two points there is always a line and that between two "now's" there is always time. He explains it thus:

If two points exist, they must differ in position; otherwise, they would not be two, but one. But they cannot touch one another, as was shown above; hence they are distant, and something is between them. But no other intermediate is possible, except a line between two points, and time between “now’s”: for if the intermediate between two points were other than a line, that intermediate must be either divisible or indivisible. If indivisible, it must be distinct from the two points—at least in position—and, since it touches neither, there must be another intermediate between that indivisible and the original extremities and so on ad infinitum, until a divisible intermediate is found. However, if the intermediate is divisible, it will be divisible into indivisibles or into what are further divisible. But it cannot be divided into indivisibles only, because then the same difficulty returns—how a divisible can be composed solely of indivisibles. It must be granted, then, that the intermediate is divisible into what are further divisible. But that is what a continuum is. Therefore, that intermediate will be a continuum. But the only continuous intermediate between two points is a line. Therefore, between any two points there is an intermediate line. Likewise, between two “now’s” there is time; and the same for other types of continua.

757. Then at (568) he explains the second statement referred to at the beginning of 756, that every continuum is divisible into divisibles. For on the supposition that a continuum is divisible solely into indivisibles, it would follow that two indivisibles would have to be in contact in order to form the continuum. For continua have an extremity that is one, as appears from the definition thereof; moreover, the parts of a continuum must touch, because if the extremities are one, they are together, as was stated in Book V. Therefore, since it is impossible for two indivisibles to touch, it is impossible for a continuum to be divided into indivisibles.

LECTURE 2

MOTION COMPOSED OF INDIVISIBLES FOLLOWS A CONTINUUM COMPOSED OF INDIVISIBLES—IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE FORMER

758. Because the arguments presented in the previous lecture clearly apply to lines and other continua having position, in which continua contact is properly found, the Philosopher now wishes to show that the same reasoning applies to magnitudes and time and motion. And it is divided into two parts:

First he proposes his intention;

Secondly, he proves his proposition at 759.

He says therefore first (569) that any argument which shows that a magnitude is composed or not composed of indivisibles, and divided or not divided into indivisibles, applies also to time and motion; for whatever is granted in regard to any of them would necessarily be true of the others.

759. Then at (570) he proves this proposition:

First in regard to magnitude and motion;

Secondly in regard to time and magnitude, in L. 3.

About the first he does three things:

First he presents his proposition;

Secondly, he gives an example, at 760;

Thirdly, he proves his proposition, at 761.

The proposition is this: If a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, likewise the motion that traverses it will be composed of indivisible motions, equal in number to the indivisibles of which the magnitude is composed.

760. Of this he gives the following example at (571): Let the line ABC be composed of the 3 indivisibles A, B and C, and let 0 be an object in motion over the distance of the line ABC, so that DEZ is its motion. Now if the parts of the distance or of the line are indivisibles, then the parts of the motion are indivisibles.

Then at (572) he proves his proposition. About which he does three things:

First he lays down some premisses necessary for his proof;

Secondly, he proves that if a magnitude is composed of points, then the motion is composed not of motions but of moments, at 762;

Thirdly, he shows that it is impossible for motion to be composed of moments, at 763.

761. Therefore first he lays down two presuppositions. The first at (572) is that according to each part of the motion under consideration something must be in motion, and, conversely, if something is in motion, a motion must be in it. Now if this is true, then the mobile 0 is being moved through A which is part of the entire magnitude by means of that part of the motion that is D, and through B, another part of the magnitude) by that part of the motion that is E, and through C (the third part of the magnitude) by that part of the motion that is Z. In other words, single parts of motion correspond to single parts of the magnitude.

The second presupposition at (573) is that what is being moved from one terminus to another is not at the same time being moved and finished moving, any more than a man going to Thebes is, at the time while he is going, already there.

He presupposes these two statements as per se evident. For, as to the statement that when motion is present, something must be in the state of being moved, a like situation is apparent in all accidents and forms; for in order that something be white it must have whiteness, and, conversely, if whiteness exists, something is white. As to the statement that “being moved” and “having been moved” are not simultaneous, we appeal to the very successive nature of motion; for it is impossible that any two elements of time co-exist, as we explained in Book IV. Hence it is impossible that "having been moved", which is the terminus of motion, be simultaneous with "being in motion".

762. Then at (574) he uses these presuppositions to prove his proposition: For if it is true that whenever a part of motion is present, something has to be in motion, and if it is in motion, there must be motion present, then if the mobile 0 is in motion with respect to an indivisible part of the magnitude, namely, A, there is in 0 that part of the motion we called D. Accordingly, 0 is being moved through A and has completed its motion, either at the same time or not at the same time. If not at the same time but later, it follows that A is divisible; because while 0 was in motion, it was neither resting at A (with the rest preceding motion) nor had passed through the entire distance A—for then it would not still be in motion through A, since nothing is in motion through a distance it has already traversed. Consequently, it must be midway. Therefore, when it is in motion through A, it has already passed through part of A and is now in another part of A. Consequently, A is divisible —contrary to our supposition.

But if it is in motion through A and in the state of completed motion at the same time, it follows that it arrived while it was coming, and it will have completed its motion while it was being moved, which is against the second presupposition.

From this it is clear that no motion is possible when the magnitude is indivisible; for there are only two choices: either things can be in motion at the same time that their motion is over, or, the magnitude must be divisible.

Therefore, assuming that nothing can be in motion through the indivisible A, if someone should say that a mobile is in motion through the entire magnitude ABC and that the whole motion by which it is in motion is DEZ, and moreover, that nothing can be in motion but only in the state of completed motion through the indivisible A, it follows that the motion consists not of motions but of moments. Now the reason why we say that "it follows that the motion is not composed of motions" is that, since the part of the motion that is D corresponds to the part of the magnitude that is A, then if D were a motion, the mobile should be in motion through A, because when motion is present, the mobile is being moved. But it was proved that the mobile is not in motion through A as indivisible, but in the state of having completed its motion when it had traversed this indivisible. Consequently, what remains is that D is not a motion but a moment. (The state of completed motion is called “moment”, just as being moved is called “motion”; moreover, moment is related to motion as point is related to line). And the same holds for the other parts of the motion and of the magnitude. Consequently, it follows necessarily that if a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, then a motion is composed of indivisibles, i.e., of moments; and this is what he intended to show.

763. But since it is not possible for a motion to be composed of moments any more than a line be composed of points, then at (575) he exposes this impossibility by concluding to three impossibilities. The first of these is that if motion is composed of moments, and a magnitude of indivisibles, in such a way that through an indivisible part of a magnitude things are not in motion but in the state of completed motion, it will follow that something has completed a motion without having been in motion. For it was assumed that in regard to the indivisible, something arrived without going, because it was not able to be in motion at that indivisible. Hence it follows that something has finished a motion without previously being in motion. But this is no more possible than for an event to be past without having been present.

764. But because a person who claimed that motion is composed of moments might grant this strange state of affairs, Aristotle concludes to another impossibility, in the following argument: Anything capable of being in motion and at rest must be either in motion or at rest. But in our original example, while the mobile is in A, it is not being moved; likewise, when it is at B, and when it is at C; therefore, it must be at rest while at A and while at B and while at C. Therefore, it follows that a thing is at the same time continually at rest and continually in motion.

That this follows, he now proves; We have agreed that it is in motion throughout the entire length ABC and again that it is at rest in relation to each part. But what is at rest in relation to each and every part is at rest throughout the whole. Consequently, it is at rest throughout the entire length. Thus, it follows, that throughout the entire length it is continually in motion and continually at rest—which is wholly impossible.

765. He gives the third impossibility at (577): It has been shown that if a magnitude is composed of indivisibles, so also the motion. Now those indivisibles of motion, namely, D and E and Z, are such that each of them is either a motion or not. If each is a motion, then, since each of them

corresponds to an indivisible part of the magnitude (in which something is not in motion but in the state of completed motion), it will follow that a mobile is not in motion but at rest, even though a motion exists—which is against the first presupposition. If each is not a motion, it follows that motion is composed of non-motions, which is no more possible than that a line be composed of non-lines.

LECTURE 3

TIME FOLLOWS MAGNITUDE IN DIVISIBILITY AND CONVERSELY

766. After showing that it is for a same reason that a magnitude and a motion traversing it would be composed of indivisibles, the Philosopher shows the same for time and magnitude. And the treatment falls into two parts:

In the first he shows that division of time follows upon division of magnitude, and vice versa;

In the second that the infinity of one follows upon the infinity of the other, in L. 4.

About the first he does two things:

First he states his proposition;

Secondly, he demonstrates it, at 767.

He says therefore first (578) that time, too, is divisible and indivisible, and composed of indivisibles, just as length and motion are.

767. Then he proves his proposition, giving three reasons:

The first of which is based on things equally fast;

The second is based on the faster and the slower, at 769;

The third uses one and the same mobile, at 776.

He says therefore first (579) that a mobile which is as fast as another traverses a smaller magnitude in less time. Therefore, let us take a divisible magnitude which a mobile traverses in a given time. It follows that an equally fast mobile traverses part of that magnitude in less time. Consequently, the given time must be divisible. Conversely, if the time is given as divisible and a given mobile is in motion over a given magnitude, it follows that a mobile equally fast traverses a smaller magnitude in less time, urhich is part of the whole time. Consequently, the magnitude A is divisible.

768. Then at (580) he proves the same thing with two mobiles, one of which is faster and the other slower.

But first he lays down some presuppositions to be used in proving his proposition.

Secondly, he proves the proposition at 774.

About the first he does two things:

First he explains how the faster and the slower compare with regard to being moved over a larger magnitude;

Secondly, how they compare with regard to being moved over an equal magnitude, at 772.

About the first he does two things:

First he states his proposition, repeating something mentioned previously but needed for the demonstrations that follow;

Secondly, he demonstrates his proposition, at 770.

769. He repeats therefore (580) that every magnitude is divisible into magnitudes. And this is evident from a previous conclusion that it is impossible for a continuum to be composed of atoms, i.e., indivisibles; and every magnitude is a kind of continuum. From these it follows that a faster body is moved through a greater magnitude in equal time and even in less time. Indeed, that is the way in which some have defined the faster, that it is moved more in. equal and even in less time.

770. Then at (581) he proves his two presuppositions:

First, that a faster thing is moved a greater distance in equal time;

Secondly, that it is moved a greater distance in less time, at 771.

He says therefore first (581): Let A and B be two mobiles, of which A is faster than B, and let CD be the magnitude traversed by A in time ZI. Now let B, which is slower, and A, which is faster, pass over the same magnitude, and let them start together.

Therefore, under these conditions, the following argument is given: The faster is the one moved more in equal time; but A is faster than B. Therefore, when A shall have arrived at D, B will not have arrived at D (which is the terminus of the magnitude) but will be some distance from it; yet it will have covered part of tho magnitude. Now, since every part is less than the whole, what remains is that A is moved through a greater distance in time ZI than B, which in the same time has traversed part of the magnitude. Consequently, the faster traverses more distance in equal time.

77l. Then at (582) he shows that the faster traverses more space in less time. For it was said that at the time when A arrived at D, B, which is slower, was still distant from D. Let us grant, therefore, that B arrived at E when A arrived at D. Now, since every magnitude is divisible, let us divide the remaining magnitude ED (which is how much the faster exceeds the slower) at T. It is eviJent that the magnitude CT is less than CD. But one and the same mobile traverses a smaller magnitude in less time. Therefore, since A arrived at D in the total time ZI, it arrived at T in less time.

Let that less time be ZK. Then the argument continues: the magnitude CT which A traversed is greater than the magnitude CE which B traversed. But the time ZK in which A traversed CT is less than the whole time ZI, in which the slower B traversed CE. Therefore, it follows that the faster traverses a larger space in less time.

772. Then at (593) he shows how the faster compares with the slower in regard to being moved through an equal magnitude.

First he states his intention;

Secondly, he proves his proposition here at 772.

He says therefore first (583) that from the foregoing it could be clear that a faster thing traverses an equal space in less time. Then he proves this with two arguments, to the first of which he prefaces two facts: one of which has already been proved, namely, that a faster thing traverses a greater magnitude in less time than a slower. The second is per se evident, namely, that one and the same mobile traverses a greater magnitude in a given time than in a shorter time. For let the mobile A, which is faster, traverse the magnitude LM in time PR and the part LX of the magnitude in less time PS, which is less than PR in which it traverses LM just as LX is less than LM.

From the first supposition he takes it that the whole time PR in which A traverses the entire magnitude LM is less than time H in which B (which is slower) traverses the smaller magnitude LX. For it was said that a faster object traverses a greater magnitude in less time.

With this background he proceeds to his argument: The time PR is less than time H (in which B, which is slower, traverses magnitude LX); moreover, time PS is less than time PR. Therefore, it follows that time PS is less than time H, for what is less than the lesser is less than the greater.

Therefore, since it was granted that in the time PS the faster traverses magnitude LX and the slower traverses the same LX in time H, it follows that the faster traverses an equal magnitude in less time.

773. Then, after these preliminaries, he gives his second argument, which is this: A thing that traverses an equal magnitude along with another mobile is moved through that magnitude either in equal time or less or more. If it is moved through that equal magnitude in greater time, it is slower, as was proved above; if it is moved in equal time through the equal magnitude, it is equally fast, as is per se evident. Therefore, since what is faster is neither equally fast nor slower, it follows that it is moved through an equal magnitude neither in more time nor in equal time. Therefore, in less time.

Thus, we have proved that necessarily the faster traverses an equal magnitude in less time.

774. Then at (586) he proves the proposition that one and the same reason proves that both time and magnitude are always divided into divisibles, or are composed of indivisibles. About this he does three things:

First he lays down premisses to be used in the proof;

Secondly, he states his proposition at 775;

Thirdly, he proves it at 775,

Therefore (586) he lays down the premisses that every motion exists in time—this was proved in Book IV—and that motion is possible in any time—this is evident from the definition of time given in Book IV. Secondly, that whatever is being moved can be moved faster and slower, i.e., among mobiles some are moved faster and some slower. But this statement seems false, because the speeds of motions are fixed in nature; for there is one motion so fast that none could be faster, namely, the motion of the first mobile.

In reply it must be said that we can speak of the nature of anything in two ways: either according to its general notion or insofar as it is applied to its proper matter. Now, there is nothing to forbid something which is possible in the light of a thing’s general definition to be prevented from happening when application is made to some definite matter; for example, it is not the general definition of the sun that precludes many suns, but the fact that the total matter of this nature is contained under one sun, Likewise, it is not the general nature of motion that prevents the existence of a speed greater than any given speed; rather it is the particular powers of the mobiles and movers.

Now, Aristotle is here discussing motion from the viewpoint of its general nature without application to particular movers and mobiles. Indeed, he frequently uses such propositions in this Sixth Book and they are true, if you limit yourself to a general consideration of motion, but not necessarily true, if you get down to particular mobiles.

Likewise, it is not against the nature of magnitude that. every magnitude be divisible into smaller ones. Therefore, in this Book he goes on the assumption that it is possible to take a magnitude smaller than any given magnitude, even though in every particular nature there is always a minimum magnitude, since each nature has limits of largeness and smallness, as was mentioned even in Book I.

From these two premisses he concludes to a third one, namely, that in any given time, faster and slower motions than a given motion are possible.

775. Then at (587) from the foregoing he concludes to his proposition. And he says that since the foregoing are true, time must be a continuum, i.e., divisible into parts that are further divisible. For if that is the definition of a continuum, then if a magnitude is a continuum, time must be continuous, because the division of time follows upon division of magnitude, end vice versa.

Then at (588) he proves the proposition, namely, that time and magnitude are divided in a similar way. For since we have shown that a faster thing traverses an equal space in less time, let A be the faster and B the slower, and let B be moved more slowly through magnitude CB in time ZI.

It is plain that A, which is faster, traverses the same magnitude in less time ZT.

But again, since A, which is faster, has in time ZT traversed the entire magnitude CD, B, the slower, traversed a smaller magnitude CK in the same time. And because B, the slower, traversed the magnitude CK in time ZT, A, the faster, traversed the same magnitude in even less time. Thus the time ZT will be further divided. And when it is, the magnitude CK will also be divided, because the slower traverses less space in part of that time. And if the magnitude is divided, the time also is divided, because the faster will cover that part of the magnitude in less time. So we continue in this manner, taking a slower mobile after the motion of the faster, and after the slower taking the faster, and making use of the statement already proved that the faster traverses an equal space in less time and that the slower traverses a smaller magnitude in equal time. For by thus taking what is faster, we will divide the time, and by taking what is slower, we will divide the magnitude.

Therefore, it is true that such a conversion can be made by going from the faster to the slower and from the slower to the faster. And if such switching causes the magnitude and then the time to be divided, then it will be clear that time is continuous, i.e., divisible into times that are further divisible, and the same for magnitude; for both time and magnitude will receive the same and equal divisions, as we have already shown.

776. Then at (589) he gives a third reason to show that magnitude and time are correspondingly divided. But this time we shall consider one and the same mobile. And he says that it is clear from the ordinary reasons that if time is continuous, i.e,, divisible into parts that are further divisible, then a magnitude is likewise divisible: because one and the same mobile in uniform motion, since it traverses the whole magnitude in a given time, will traverse half in half the time, and a smaller part in less than half the time. And the reason why this happens is that time is divided as magnitude is.

LECTURE 4

PROOF THAT NO CONTINUUM IS INDIVISIBLE

777. After showing that magnitude and time are subject to similar divisions, the Philosopher now shows that if either is finite or infinite, so is the other. About this he does three things:

First he states the proposition;

Secondly, from this he settles a doubt at 779;

Thirdly, he proves the proposition at 780.

778. He says therefore first (590) that if either of these two, namely, time and magnitude, is infinite, so is the other; likewise, both will be infinite in the same manner.

He explains this by distinguishing two ways of being infinite, saying that if time is infinite in respect of its extremities, the magnitude, too, is infinite in that way. Now time and magnitude are said to be infinite in their extremities, because they lack extremities. It is as though we imagined that a line is not terminated at any points, or that time is not terminated at a first or final instant. Moreover, if time is infinite through division, so also is a length. And this is the second way in which something is infinite. But something is said to be infinite through division, because it can be divided ad infinitum; which, of course, pertains to the definition of a continuum, as was said. Consequently, if time is infinite both ways, so, too, is length.

It is fitting that these two ways of being infinite be set in contrast: for the first way is taken from the viewpoint of indivisible extremities that are absent; the second is taken from the viewpoint of the indivisibles which are intermediate, for a line is divided according to points within the line.

779. Then at (591) he uses these facts to refute Zeno, who tried to prove that nothing is woved from one place to another, for example, from A to B.

For it is clear that between A and B there is an infinitude of intermediate points, since a continuum is divisible ad infinitum. Therefore, if something were to be moved from A to B, it would have to bridge the infinite and touch each of the infinites, and this cannot be done in finite time. Therefore, nothing can be moved through even the smallest distance during a period of finite time, however great.

The Philosopher, therefore, says that this argument is based on a false opinion, for length and time and any magnitude are said to be infinite in two ways, as we have said; namely, according to division and according to their extremities. Accordingly, if there were things (namely, a mobile and a distance) infinite in regard to quantity, which is to be infinite at the extremities, they could not touch one another in finite time. But if they are infinite in respect of division, they will touch, because time also, which is finite in respect of quantity, is infinite in respect of division.

Hence two things follow: that the infinite can be traversed not in finite but in infinite time, and that the infinite points of a magnitude are traversed in the infinite “now’s” of time but not in the finite “now’s”.

But it should be noted that this solution is ad hominem and not ad veritatem, as Aristotle will explain in Book VIII, L. 17.

78C. Then at (592) he proves what he stated above as a proposition.

First he restates the proposition;

Secondly, he proves it at 781.

He says therefore first (592) that no mobile can traverse an infinite distance in finite time nor a finite distance in infinite time; rather, if the time is infinite, then the magnitude must be infinite, and vice versa.

Then at (593) he proves the proposition:

First that the time cannot be infinite, if the magnitude is finite;

Secondly, that if the length is infinite, the time cannot be finite at 784.

781. He proves the first part of the proposition with two reasons, the first of which (593) is this: Let AB be a finite magnitude and let G be an infinite time. Take GD as a finite part of this infinite time. Now, since the mobile traverses the entire magnitude AB in the entire time G, then in part of this time, which is GD, it will traverse the part BE of the magnitude. But since the magnitude AB is finite and greater than BE, which is finite and less,

then BE is either an exact measure of AB or it will be less or greater. (These are the only relationships that a lesser finite quantity can bear to a greater finite quantity, as is evident in numbers. For 3, which is less than 6, measures it twice, but 3 taken twice does not measure 5, which is greater than 3, but exceeds it, nor does it measure 7, but is less than 7. But if 3 were taken thrice, that product would exceed even 7). Now it makes no difference in which of these three ways BE is related to AB, for the same mobile will always traverse a magnitude equal to BE in a time equal to GD. But BE is either an exact measure of AB or will exceed it, if taken a sufficient number of times. Therefore, also GD should exactly measure the entire time G or exceed it, if GD is repeated frequently enough. Consequently, the whole time G (in which the entire finite magnitude was traversed) must be finite; because for every segment of magnitude there was a corresponding segment of time.

782. The second reason is given at (782). It is this: Although it be granted that a mobile traverse the finite magnitude AB in infinite time, it cannot be granted that it will traverse any magn1tude at random in infinite time, because we see finite magnitudes being traversed in finite times.

So let BE be the finite magnitude which is traversed In finite time. But BE, since it is finite, will measure AB, which is also finite. Now, the same mobile will traverse a magnitude equal to BE in a finite time equal to that in which it traversed BE. Thus the number of magnitudes equal to BE that will form AB corresponds to the number of equal times required to form the entire time consumed. Hence the entire time was finite.

?83. This second reason is different from the first, because in the first, BE was taken to be part of the magnitude AB, but here it is taken as a separate magnitude.

Then at (595) he shows the necessity of this second reason. For someone could cavil by saying that just as the whole magnitude AB is traversed in infinite time, so would every part of it, and thus the part BE would not be traversed in finite time. But because it cannot be granted that any magnitude at random is traversed in infinite time, it was necessary to present the second reason in which BE is a different magnitude which is traversed in finite time. For if the time in which BE is traversed is finite and less than the infinite time in which AB is traversed, then necessarily, BE is less than AB, and must be finite, since AB is finite.

784. Then at (596) he posits that the same proof leads to an impossibility if the length is said to be infinite and the time finite, because a part of the infinite length will be taker, as finite, just as a finite part of infinite time was taken,

785. Then at (597) he proves that no continuum is indivisible.

First he says that an inconsistency would otherwise follow;

Secondly, he gives the demonstrations that lead to that inconsistency, at 786.

He says therefore first (597) that it is clear from what has been said that no line or plane or any continuum is indivisible: first of all on account of the foregoing, namely, that it is impossible for any continuum to be composed of indivisibles, although a continuum can be composed of continua; secondly, because it would follow that an indivisible can be divided.

786. Then at (598) he gives the proof which leads to this inconsistency. In this proof he makes use of certain facts already established. One of these is that in any finite time the faster and the slower can be in motion. The second is that the faster will traverse more distance in equal time. The third is that there can be excess of speed over speed and of length traversed over length traversed according to varying proportions; for example, according to the proportion of 2 to 1, or 3 to 2, or any other proportion.

With these presuppositions he proceeds thus: Let this be the ratio of the faster to the fast, that the one is faster in the ratio of 3 to 2; and let the faster traverse one magnitude ABCD composed of 3 indivisible magnitudes AB, BC and CD. During the same time according to the given ratio, tae slower will traverse a magnitude of two indivisible magnitudes, which form the magnitude EZI. And because the time is divided as the magnitude, the time in which the faster traverses the 3 indivisible magnitudes must be divided into 3 indivisibles, because the equal magnitude must be traversed in equal time. So let the time be KLMN divided into 3 indivisibles. But because the slower, during that time, traverses EZI, which are 2 indivisible magnitudes, the time can be divided into 2 halves. Consequently, it follows that an indivisible has been divided. For the slower had to traverse one indivisible magnitude in 1 and a half indivisibles of time, since it cannot be said that it traverses one indivisible magnitude in one indivisible time, for then the faster would not have been moved ahead of the slower. Therefore what remains is that the slower traverses an indivisible magnitude in more than one indivisible and less than two indivisibles of time. Thus the indivisible time will have had to be divided.

In like manner, it follows that an indivisible magnitude is divided, if the slower manages to move through three indivisible magnitudes in three indivisible times. For the faster will in one indivisible time be moved through more than one indivisible of magnitude and less than two.

Therefore, it is clear that no continuum can be indivisible.

LECTURE 5

THE “NOW” AS THE INDIVISIBLE OF TIME. EVERYTHING THAT MOVES IS DIVISIBLE. DIFFICULTIES SOLVED

787. After showing that no continuum is composed of indivisibles and that no continuum is indivisible, thus making it seem that motion is divisible, the Philosopher now determines about the division of motion.

First he states certain facts necessary for the division of motion;

Secondly, he treats of the division of motion, L. 6.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that in an indivisible of time, there is neither motion nor rest;

Secondly, that an indivisible cannot be moved, at 796.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that the indivisible of time is the “now”;

Secondly that in the “now” nothing is being moved or is at rest, at 794.

About the first he does three things:

First he states his intention;

Secondly, he states facts from which his proposition can be reached, at 789.

Thirdly, he shows what follows from his proposition, ?90.

788. About the first (599) we must take into account that something is called “now” in relation to something else and not in relation to itself; for example, we say that what is being done in the course of a whole day is being done “now”, yet the whole day is not said to be present according to its entirety but according to some part of itself. For it is evident that part of

a whole day has passed and part is still to come, and neither of them is “now”. Thus it is evident that the entire present day is not a “now” primarily and per se but only according to something of itself—and what is true of the day is true of an hour or any period of time.

He says therefore that what is “now” primarily and per se and not according to something else is necessarily indivisible and present in every time.

789. Then at (600) he proves his proposition, For it is evident that it is possible in regard to any finite continuum to take an extremity outside of which there is existing nothing of that of which it is the extremity, just as nothing of a line is outside the point which terminates the line. But past time is a continuum which is terminated at the present. Therefore it is possible to take something as the extremity of the past, so that beyond it there is nothing of the past, and previous to it nothing of the future. In like manner, it is possible to take an extremity of the future, beyond which there is nothing of the past. Now that extremity will be the limit of both, i.e., of the past and of the future; for since the totality of time is a continuum, the past and the future must be joined at one term. And if the “now” fits the description just given, it is clear that it is indivisible.

790. Then he shows what follows from these premisses. About this he does two things:

First he shows that on the supposition that the “now” is indivisible, the limit of the past and the limit of the future must be one and the same “now”.

Secondly, that on the other hand, if each is the “now1l, then the 11now” must be indivisible, at 79-3.

About the first he does two things:

First at (601) he concludes from the foregoing that it must be the same “now” which is the limit of the past and of the future.

791. Secondly, at (602) he proves this statement with the following argument: If the “now” which is the beginning of the future is other than the “now” which is the end of the past, then either these two “now’s” are consecutive and immediately follow one upon the other or one is apart from and distinct from the other. But it cannot be that they are immediately consecutive, because then it will follow that time is composed of an aggregate of “now’s”—which cannot be, because no continuum is composed of indivisible parts, as was said above. Neither can it be that one

“now” is apart from the other and distant from it, because then there would have to be a time between those two “now’s”. For it is the very nature of a continuum that there is something continuous between any two given indivisibles, just as there is line between any two given points of a line.

But that this is impossible, he proves in two ways. First of all, because if there were a period of time between the two “now’s” in question, it would follow that something of the same kind would exist between the two, which is impossible, for it is not possible that between the extremities of two lines that touch or are consecutive, there be a line between. For that is against the nature of consecutive things, which were defined as things between which nothing like them occurs. And so, since future time is consecutive to past time, it is impossible that between the end of the past and the beginning of the future there be an intervening time.

He proves the same point in another way: Whatever is intermediate between the past and the future is called “now”. If, therefore, there is any time between the limits of the past and future, it will follow that that will also be called a “now.” But all time is divisible, as has been proved. Consequently, it would follow, that the “now” is divisible.

792. Although in the immediately foregoing he had laid down the principles from which it could be proved that the Now is indivisible, yet because he had not derived the conclusion from these principles, he now shows that the Now is indivisible at (603). And he does this with three arguments.

The first of these is that if Now be divisible, it will follow that something of the past is in the future and something of the future in the past. For since the Now is the extremity of the past and the extremity of the future, and every extremity is in that of which it is the extremity, as a point in a line, then necessarily the entire Now is both in the past as its end and in the future as its beginning. But if the Now be divided, that division must determine the past and the future. For any division made in time distinguishes past and future, since among any parts of time taken at random, one is related to the other as past to future. It will follow, therefore, that part of the Now is past and part future. And so, since the Now is in the past and in the future, it will follow that something of the future is in the past and something of the past in the future.

The second argument he gives at (604): If the Now be divisible, it will be such, not according to itself, but according to something else. For no divisible is the very division by which it is divided. But the division of time is the Now. For that by which a continuum is divided is nothing but a term common to two parts. But that is what we understand by the Now, that it is a term common to the past and future. Thus, therefore, it is clear that what is divisible cannot be the Now according to itself.

The third argument is given at (605): Whenever time is divided, one part is always past and the other future. If, therefore, the Now is divided, necessarily part of it will be past and part future. But past and future are not the same. It will follow, therefore, that the Now is not the same as itself, i.e., something existing as a whole all at once (which is against the definition of the Now: for when we speak of the Now, we consider it as existing completely in the present); rather there will be much diversity and even succession in the Now, just as there is in time, which can be divided any number of times.

793. Therefore, having thus shown that the Now is divisible (as a consequence of supposing that the Now which is the extremity of the past and of the future is not identical), and having rejected this consequent, he concludes to the rejection of the antecedent. And that is what he says: If it is impossible for the Now to be divisible, then it must be admitted that the Now which is the extremity of the past and of the future is one and the same.

Then at (606) he shows that conversely, if the Now of the past and of the future is the same, then it must be indivisible; because if it were divisible, all the aforementioned inconsistencies would follow, And so, from the fact that the Now cannot be admitted to be divisible (as though the Now of the past were something distinct from the Now of the future) and is indeed not divisible, if the Now of the present is the same as the Now of the future, he concludes from the foregoing that it is clear that in time there must be something indivisible which is called the Now.

794. Then at (607) he shows that in the Now there can be neither motion nor rest.

First he shows it for motion;

Secondly, for rest, at 795.

He says therefore first (607) that it is clear from what follows that in the Now nothing can be in motion, for if anything were in motion in the Now, two things could be in motion then, one of which is faster than the other. So let N be the Now, and let there be a faster body being moved in N through the magnitude AB. In an equal time, a slower body is moved a smaller distance. Therefore, in this instant, it traverses the smaller magnitude AG. But the faster will. cover the same distance in less time than the slower. Therefore, because the slower body traversed the magnitude AG in the very Now, the faster traversed the same magnitude in less than the Now. Hence the Now is divided. But it was already proved that the Now cannot be divided. Therefore, nothing can be moved in a Now.

795. Then at (608) he proves the same thing for rest, giving three arguments. The first of which is this: It was said in Book V that an object at rest is one that is naturally capable of being in motion, but is not in motion when it is capable of being in motion and in respect to the part by which it is capable of being in motion and in the manner in which it is apt to be in motion. For if a thing lacks what it is not naturally capable of having (as a stone lacks sight) or lacks it when it is not naturally due to have it (as a dog lacks sight before the ninth day) or in the part in which it is not naturally capable of having it (as sight in the foot or in the hand) or in the way in which it is not apt to have it (as for a man to have sight as keen as an eaglets), none of these reasons is sufficient for saying that a thing is deprived of sight. Now rest is privation of motion. Hence nothing is at rest except what is apt to be moved and when and as it is apt. But it has been shown that nothing is naturally capable of being moved in the very Now. Therefore, it is clear that nothing is at rest in the Now.

The second argument is given at (609): That which is being moved in an entire period of time is being moved in each part of that time, in which it is apt to be moved; likewise, what is at rest in a given period of time is at rest in each period of that time in which it is apt to be at rest. But the same Now is in two periods of time, in one of which the mobile is totally at rest and in the other of which it is totally in motion (as appears in that which is in motion after rest or at rest after motion). Therefore, if in the Now something is apt to rest and be in motion, it will follow that something is at once in motion and at rest which is impossible.

The third argument is given at (610): Rest is said of things which maintain themselves now just as they were previously, but in their entirety and in respect of all their parts. For it is on this account that a thing is said to be in motion, that now it is different from what it was previously, either in respect to place or quantity or quality. But in the Now itself, there is nothing previous; otherwise, the Now would be divisible, because the word “previous” refers to the past. Therefore, it is impossible to rest in the Now.

From this he further concludes that necessarily anything that is being moved and anything that is at rest, is being moved and is at rest in time.

796. Then at (611) he shows that whatever is in motion is divisible: For every change is from this to that. But when something is at the goal, it is no longer being changed but has been changed, for nothing can be at the same time in the state of being changed and having been changed, as was said above. But when something is at the starting-point of change both in its entirety and in regard to all its parts, then it is not being changed; for it was said above that whatever maintains itself constant in its entirety and in regard to all its parts is not being changed but is at rest. He adds “In regard to all its parts”, because when a thing is beginning to be changed, it does not emerge in its entirety from the place it previously occupied, but part emerges after part.

Moreover, it cannot be said that it is in both terms in its entirety and in regard to its parts, while it is being moved; for then something would be in two places at one time.

Nor, again, can it be said that it is in neither of the terms: for we are now speaking of the nearest goal into which a thing is being changed and not of the remotest; for example, if something is being changed from white to black, black is the remote goal, but grey is the nearer one. In like manner, if a line ABCD is divided into three equal parts, it is clear that a mobile, which in the beginning of the motion was in AB as in a place equal to itself, can during the motion be neither in AB nor in CD; for at some time it is in its entirety in BC.

Therefore, when it is said that what is being moved cannot happen to be in neither extremity while it is being moved, must be understood as referring not to the remotest extremity but to a nearer one.

What is left, therefore, is that whatever is being changed is, while it is being changed, partly in one and partly in the other; for example, when something is being changed from AB to BC, then during the motion, the part leaving the place AB is entering the place BC; likewise, when something is being moved from white to black, the part which ceases to be white becomes grey or light grey.

Consequently, it is clear that anything that is being moved, since it is partly in one and party in the other, is divisible.

797. But it should be mentioned that the Commentator here raises the problem that if Aristotle does not intend in this place to demonstrate that every mobile is divisible but only what is mobile in regard to motion (which he said is present in only three genera; namely, quantity, quality and where), then his demonstration will not be universal but particular; because even the subject of substantial change is found to be divisible. Hence, he seems to be speaking of what is subject to any and every type of change, including even generation and ceasing-to-be in the genus of substance. And this is evident from his very words: for he does not say “what is being moved”, but “what is being changed”.

But in that case his demonstration has no value, because some changes are indivisible, such as generation and ceasing-to-be of substance, which do not consume time. In such changes it is not true that what is being changed is partly in one extremity and partly in the other, for when fire is generated, it is not partly fire and partly non-fire.

798. In the face of this problem he proposes a number of solutions, one of which is Alexander’s, who says that no change is indivisible or in non-time, But this must be rejected, because it conflicts with an opinion that is held as probable and famous with Aristotle and all Peripatetics, namely, that certain changes are in non-time, such as illumination and the like.

He mentions also the solution of Themistius, who says that even if there be changes in non-time, they are hidden, whereas Aristotle appeals to what is evident, namely, that change occurs in time. But this he also rejects, because change and the changeable are divided in the same way, and the divisibility of a mobile is more hidden than the divisibility of change. Hence Aristotle’s demonstration would not be valid, because someone could say that although things which changed by changes evidently divisible are themselves divisible, yet there are some hidden changeable beings which are indivisible.

He mentions, too, the solution of Avempace [Ibn-Bajja], who says that the problem here is not about the quantitative division of the things capable of change but of that division whereby the subject is divided by contrary accidents, one of which is changed into the other.

799. Then the Commentator adds his own solution: namely, that those changes which are said to occur in non-time are the extremities of certain divisible motions, It happens, therefore, that something should be changed in non-time, insofar as every motion is terminated in an instant. And because what is accidental is ignored when it comes to demonstrating, for that reason Aristotle proceeds in this demonstration as though every change were divisible and in time.

800. But if you consider the matter correctly, you will see that this objection is not to the point. For in his demonstration Aristotle does not use as his principle the statement that every change is divisible (since he proceeds rather from the divisibility of the mobile to the division of change, as will be clear later, for as he says later, divisibility is first in the mobile, before it is in motion or change). Rather he uses principles that are evident and which must be conceded in any and every case of change; namely, (1) that what is being changed in regard to a certain matter is not being changed in regard to that matter as long as it is totally and according to all its parts still in the starting point, and (2) when it is in the goal, it is not being changed but has been changed, and (3) that it cannot be entirely in both terms or entirely in either of them, as was explained. Hence, it necessarily follows that in any change whatsoever, what is being changed is, during the change, partly in one extremity and partly in the other.

But this occurs in various ways in various changes. For in changes between whose extremities there is something intermediate, it can happen that the mobile is, during the change, partly in one extreme and partly in the other extreme, precisely as extremes. But in those between whose extremes there is nothing intermediate, that which is being changed does not have different parts in different extremities precisely as extremities, but by reason of something connected with the extremities. For example, when matter is being changed from privation of fire to the form of fire, then while it is in the state of being changed, it is indeed under privation as to itself, but yet it is partly under the form of fire, not inasmuch as it is fire, but according to something connected with it, i.e., according to the particular disposition for fire, which disposition it partly receives before it has the form of fire. That is why Aristotle will later prove that even generation and ceasing-to-be are divisible, because what is generated was previously being generated, and what ceases-to-be was previously ceasing-to-be.

Perhaps this was the sense in which Alexander understood the statement that every change is divisible; namely, either according to itself or according to a motion connected with it. So also Themistius understood by the statement that Aristotle took what was evident and abstracted from what was hidden, that the proper place for treating of the divisibility or indivisibility of changes would not be reached until later.

Nevertheless, in all divisibles and indivisibles, what Aristotle says here is true: because even changes that are called indivisible are in a sense divisible, not by reason of their extremities but by reason of something connected to them. And this is what Averroes wanted to say when he said that it is per accidens that some changes occur in non-time.

801. However, there is here another difficulty. For when it comes to alteration, it does not seem to be true that what is being altered is partly in one term and partly in the other, during the alteration. For the motion of alteration does not take place in such a way that first one part and then another is altered; rather the entire thing that was less hot becomes hotter. For which reason Aristotle even says in the book On Sense and the Thing Sensed that alterations are not like local motions. For in the latter, the subject reaches the intermediate before the goal, but such is not the case with things that are altered; for some things are altered all at once and not part by part, for it is the entire water that all at once freezes.

802. But to this it must be replied that in this Sixth Book Aristotle is treating of motion as continuous. And continuity is primarily and per se and strictly found only in local motion, which alone can be c;_ntinuous and regular, as will be shown in Book VIII. Therefore, the demonstrations given in Book VI pertain perfectly to local motion but imperfectly to other motions, i.e., only to the extent that they are continuous and regular.

Consequently, it must be said that what is mobile in respect of place always enters a new place part by part before it is there in its entirety; but in alteration, that is only partially true. For it is clear that every alteration depends on the power of the agent that causes the alteration—as its power is stronger it is able to alter a greater body. Therefore, since the cause of the alteration has finite power, a body capable of being altered is subject to its power up to a certain limit of quantity, which receives the impression of the agent all at once; hence the whole is altered all at once, and not part after part. Yet that which is altered can in turn alter something else conjoined to it, although its power in acting will be less forceful, and so on, until the power involved in the series of alterations is depleted. An example of this is fire which all at once heats one section of air, which in turn heats another, and thus part after part is altered. Hence in the book On Sense and the Thing Sensed, after the above-quoted passage, Aristotle goes on to say: “Yet if the object heated or frozen is large, part after part will be affected. But the first part had to be altered all at once and suddenly by the agent”.

Yet even in things that are altered all at once, it is possible to discover some kind of succession, because since alteration depends on contact with the cause which alters, the parts closer to the body that causes the alteration will more perfectly receive at the very beginning an impression from the agent: and thus the state of perfect alteration is reached successively according to an order of parts. This is especially true when the body to be altered has something which resists the power of the altering cause.

Consequently, the conclusion (that what is being changed, is, while it is being changed, partly in the terminus a quo and partly in the terminus ad quem, in the sense that one part reaches the terminus ad quem before another does) is unqualifiedly and absolutely true in local motion. But in alteration it is qualifiedly true, as we have said.

803. Some on the other hand have held that the present doctrine is truer when applied to alteration than when applied to local motion, For they hold that the statement “what is being changed is partly in the terminus a quo and partly in the terminus ad quem is not to be interpreted as meaning that one part of the thing in motion is in one term and another in the other, but that reference is being made to the parts of the termini, i.e., that what is being moved has part of the terminus a quo and part of the terminus ad quem, as something in motion from white to black, is at the very beginning neither perfectly white nor perfectly black, but imperfectly partakes of both; whereas in local motion this does not seem to be true, except in the sense that the thing in motion, while it is between the two extremities, somehow partakes of both extremities. For example, if earth were to be moved to the place normal to fire, then while it was in the region proper to air, it would

have a part of each extremity, (i.e., earth and fire), in the sense that the place of air is above that of earth, and below that of fire,

804. But this is a forced explanation and against Aristotle’s opinion. For in the first place we need only look at the very words of Aristotle. For he says as a conclusion: “it follows therefore that part of that which is being changed must be at the starting-point and part at the goal”. He is speaking therefore about the parts of the mobile and not about the parts of the termini.

In the second place it is against Aristotle’s intention, For Aristotle brings to light facts that will prove that what is being changed is divisible—a statement that could not be proved, if you held to the interpretation given. Hence Avempace said that Aristotle does not intend here to prove that a mobile can be divided into quantitative parts but according to forms, in the sense that what is being moved from contrary to contrary has, while it in being changed, something from each contrary. But the intention of Aristotle is expressly to show that a mobile can be divided into its quantitative parts, just as any continuum, for he makes use of that fact in the demonstrations that will follow.

Nor can we heed the opinion that such an interpretation will help to prove that a mobile can be divided on the basis of continuity. Because the very fact that a mobile, while it is being moved, partakes of each terminus and does not perfectly possess the terminus ad quem all at once, reveals that change is divisible on the basis of continuity. And thus, since a divisible cannot exist in an indivisible, it follows that the mobile also can be divided as a continuum. For in the matters to follow, Aristotle will clearly prove that motion is divisible, because the mobile is divisible. Hence, if he intended to conclude that a mobile is divisible because motion is divisible, he would be arguing in a circle.

Thirdly, such an interpretation appears to conflict with Aristotle’s own interpretation at (611 bis) where he says “here by ‘goal’ of change I mean that into which it is first changed during the process of change”. This shows that he does not intend to say that it is partly in the terminus a quo and partly in the terminus add quem just because it is midway and, as it were, sharing in both extremities, but because in regard to one part of itself it is in one extreme, and according to another part in what is midway.

805. But with respect to this explanation of Aristotle, one might wonder why he says “that into which it is first changed” for it seems impossible to discover that into which it is first changed, since a magnitude can be divided ad infinitum.

Therefore, it must be said that “That into which it is first changed” in local motion is the place next to but not part of the place from which the local motion starts. For if we took it to mean a place that included part of the original place, we would not be assigning the first place into which it is being moved. The following example will illustrate this: Let AB be the place whence a mobile is being moved, and let BC be the adjacent place equal to AB. Now, since AB can be divided, let it be divided at D and take a point G near C so that the place GC is equal to BD. It is clear that the mobile will arrive at DG before it reaches BC. Moreover, since AD can be divided, a place prior to DG can be take n, and so on ad infinitum.

Similarly, in regard to alteration, “the first into which something is changed” must be considered to be an intermediate; for example, when something is changed from white to black, the first into which the subject is changed is into grey, not into less white.

LECTURE 6

TWO MANNERS OF DIVIDING MOTION. WHAT THINGS ARE CO-DIVIDED WITH MOTION

806. Having established the facts needed for dividing motion, he now begins to treat of the division of motion. And the treatment is divided into two parts.

In the first he treats of the division of motion;

In the second he uses his conclusions to refute errors about motion, at L. 11.

The first part is divided into two sections:

In the first he discusses division of motion;

In the second, division of rest, at L. 10.

The first section is divided into two parts:

In the first he deals with division of motion;

In the second he discusses finite and infinite with respect to motion (for both, namely, “divisible” and “infinite” seem to belong to the continuum), at L. 9.

The first is divided into two parts:

In the first he shows how motion is divided;

In the second he treats of the order of the parts of motion, at L. 7.

In regard to the first he does two things:

First he lists two ways by which motion is divided;

Secondly, he mentions what else is divided when motion is divi-ded, at 812.

In regard to the first he does two things:

First he mentions the ways in which motion is divided;

Secondly, he explains them, at 808.

807. He says therefore first (612) that motion is divided in two ways. In one way it is divided according to time, because it has been shown that motion occurs not in the "now" but in time. In a second way, it is divided according to the motions of the parts of the mobile. For let the mobile AC be divided, for any mobile can be divided, as we have shown. If therefore the entire mobile AC is being moved, then each of its parts AB and BC is in motion,

But notice that the dividing of motion according to the parts of the mobile can be understood in two ways, First of all, that part is being moved after part—which is not possible in that which is in motion per se in its entirety, for in the case of such a mobile all the parts are moved together, not in isolation from the whole, but in the whole. In the second sense, the dividing of motion according to parts of the mobile can be taken in the same sense that the division of an accident whose subject is divisible depends on the division of that subject; for example, if a whole body is white, then as the body is divided, the whiteness will be divided per accidens. And it is in this sense that we are taking division of motion according to the parts of the mobile, i.e., just as both parts of the mobile are in motion at the same time as the whole is, so the motions of both parts occur at the same time. This shows that division of motion according to the parts of the mobile is different from, that which is according to time, in which division two given parts of a motion do not occur at the same time. But if we were to compare the motion of one part to that of another part not absolutely but according to a fixed stage to be reached, then the motion of one part, will precede in time the motion of another part. For if the mobile ABC is moved in the magnitude EFG, so that. EY is equal to length ABC of the mobile, it is clear that BC will reach F before AB does. According to this the division of motion according to the parts of time and according to the parts of the mobile will be concurrent.

808. Then at (613) he explains these ways of dividing motion:

First he shows that motion is divided according to the parts of the mobile;

Secondly, that it is divided according to the parts of time, 8-1.71.

The first he shows by three arguments, of which the first is this: Since the parts are in motion by the fact of the wholes being in motion, let DE be the motion of the part AB and EZ the motion of the part BC. Therefore, just as the whole mobile is composed of AB and BC, so the whole motion DZ is composed of DE and EZ. Since, therefore, both of the parts of the mobile are being moved in accordance with both of the parts of the motion in such a way that neither part of the mobile is being moved in accordance with the motion of the other part (because then the entire motion would be the motion of one part, which would be moved by its own motion and by the motion of the other part), then it must be admitted that the whole motion DZ is the motion of the whole mobile AC; and thus the motion of the whole is divided by means of the motion of the parts.

809. At (614) he gives the second argument, which is this: Every motion belongs to some mobile. But the entire motion DZ does not belong to either of the parts, because neither is being moved according to the entire motion, but both are being moved according to the parts of the motion, as we have said. Nor can it be said that the whole motion DZ is the motion of some other mobile separated from AC, because, if the whole of this motion were the motion of some other whole mobile, it would follow that the parts of this motion would belong to the parts of that mobile; whereas we have already agreed that the parts of the motion DZ belong to the parts of the original mobile, which are AB and BC, and to no other parts (for if they belonged to these and to others as well, it would follow that one motion would belong to several things, which is impossible), What remains, therefore, is that the entire motion belongs to the entire magnitude just as the parts of it belong to the parts of the magnitude. And thus the motion of the whole mobile is divided according to the parts off the mobile.

810. At (615) he gives the third argument, which is this: Everything that is being moved has a position. Therefore, if the whole motion DZ does not belong to the whole mobile AC, then some of the motion does, and let it be TI. Now, from this motion TI take away by division the motions of both parts, which must be equal to the motions that form DEZ, for the following reason: One mobile does not have but one motion, and, consequently, the parts' motions which are taken away from the motion TI (which is the motion of a whole) cannot be said to be greater or less than DE and EZ, which we agreed are the motions of those same parts. Now the motions of

the parts consume the whole motion TI or they are less or greater. If they consume the entire TI and are neither greater nor less, it follows that the motion TI is equal to the motion DZ (which is the motion of the parts) and does not differ from it. But if the motions of the parts are less than TI so that TI exceeds DZ by the amount KI, then the part KI of the motion does not belong to any mobile. For it is neither the motion of AC nor of any of its parts, because one thing has only one motion, and we have already assigned a different motion both to the whole AC and to its parts. Nor can we say that KI belongs to some other mobile, because the entire motion TI is one continuous motion and a continuous motion must belong to a thing that is continuous, as we have shown in Book V. Hence it cannot be that the part KI of this continuous motion belongs to a mobile not continuous with ABC.

A like difficulty follows, if it is said that the motion of the parts exceeds the divided motion TI, because it will follow that the parts exceed the whole —which is impossible. Consequently, if it is impossible that the parts either exceed or are less than to the whole, then necessarily the motion of the parts is equal to and is the same as the motion of the whole.

And so this division is based on the motions of the parts and such a partition must be found in motion, because everything that is being moved is capable of being divided into parts.

811. Then at (616) he shows in the following argument that motion is divided according to the division of time; Every motion occurs in time and every time is divisible, as we have proved. Therefore, since there is less motion in less time, every motion must be capable of being divided according to time.

812. Then at (617) he shows what other things are divided when motion is divided. About this he does three things:

First he mentions five things that are co-divided;

Secondly, he shows that if the finite or infinite is found in any of them, it is found in all the others, at 816;

Thirdly, he shows in which of them is first found division and infinite, at 817.

About the first he does two things:

First he states his proposition;

Secondly, he explains the proposition, at 813.

He says therefore first (617) that since everything that is being moved is being moved in respect to some genus or species as well as in time and, moreover, since every mobile is capable of some motion, then necessarily the following five things must be divided at the same time that any one of them is divided: time and motion and the very “act of being moved” and the mobile which is being moved and “the sphere of motion”, i.e., the genus or species in regard to which there is motion, i.e., place or quality or quantity.

Nevertheless, the divisions of the “spheres of motion” do not all occur in the same way but in some the division is per se and in others per accidens. The division is per se, if it is in the sphere of quantity, as it is in local motion and also in growth and decrease; but it is per accidens in the sphere of quality, as in the motion called “alteration”.

813. Then at (618) he explains what he has said:

First the statement that time and motion are co-divided;

Secondly, that motion and the t1act of being moved” are, at 814.

Thirdly, that motion and the sphere of motion are, at 815,

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that with division of time, motion is divided;

Secondly, vice versa, at 814.

He says therefore first (618): Let A be the time in which something Is being moved, and let B be the motion occurring in this time. Now it is evident that if something is being moved through an entire magnitude in the whole time A, then in half the time, it will be moved through a smaller magnitude. But to be moved through the entire motion is the same as being moved through the entire magnitude, just as to be moved through part of the motion is the same as being moved through part of the magnitude. Therefore, it is clear that if in the entire time it is moved through the whole motion, then in part of the time it will be moved through a smaller motion. And if the time be again divided, a smaller motion will be found, and so on indefinitely. And so it is evident that according to the division of time, motion is divided.

Then at (619) he shows that on the other hand, if the motion is divided, the time is divided. Because if it is being moved through the entire time, then through half the motion it will be moved through half the time and so on, as the motion is smaller, the corresponding time is also, provided of course that we are dealing with the same mobile or one equally fast.

814. Then at (620) he shows that motion and the “act of being moved” are co-divided. Regarding this he does two things:

First he shows that “being moved” is divided according to the division of motion;

Secondly, that motion is divided in accordance with the division of “being moved”, at 814.

He says therefore first (620) that in the same way, it is proved that “being moved” is divided in accordance with the division of time and motion. For let “being moved” be C. Now it is evident that a thing is not moved as much according to part of the motion as according to the whole of the motion. Therefore, according to half of the motion, part of the factor called “being moved” will be less than the whole factor and still less according to half of the half, and so on. Therefore, as time and motion are continually subdivided, so also the factor called “being moved”.

Then at (621) he proves that conversely motion is divided according to the division of “being moved”. For let DC and CE be two parts of a motion, according to both of which something is being moved. Then if the parts of the motion correspond to the parts of “being moved”, then the whole corresponds to the whole, because if there were more in one than in the other, then the same argument would apply here that applied when we proved that the motion of a whole can be divided into motions of the parts in such a way that there is neither excess nor defect. In like manner, the parts of “being moved” can neither be less nor greater than the parts of tho motion; for since we must admit a “being moved” for each part of the. motion, then necessarily the entire factor called “being moved” is continuous and corresponds to the entire motion. And thus, the parts of “being moved” correspond to the parts of the motion and the whole to the whole. Consequently, one is divided in accordance with the other.

815. Then at (622) he shows the same for the sphere of motion, i.e., for the genus or species in which the motion takes place. And he says that in the same way it can be demonstrated that the length in which something is moved locally can be divided according to the division of time and of motion and of “being moved”. And what we say of the length in local motion is to be understood of every sphere in which there is motion, except that in some spheres the division is per accidens, as in the case of qualities in the motion, of alteration, as was said. And hence it is that all those things

are divided, because the subject of change can be divided, as was explained above. Consequently, if one is divided, all the others must.

816. Then at (623) he says that just as the above-mentioned things follow upon one another in divisibility, so also in being finite or infinite, so that if one of them is finite, all the others are, and if one is infinite, so are all the others.

817. Then at (624) he shows in which of the five above-mentioned things divisibility and finite and infinite are first found. And he says that the subject of change is the first root from which the divisibility and finiteness and infinity of the others flow, because what is naturally first in motion is the mobile, which of its very nature has the properties called “divisibility”, “finiteness” and “infinity”. Hence from it divisibility and finiteness flow to the others.

But how the mobile is divisible and how the others are divided through it, we have already shown. How the mobile is infinite will be explained later in this Book VI.

LECTURE 7

THE TIME IN WHICH SOMETHING IS FIRST CHANGED IS INDIVISIBLE. HOW A FIRST MAY, AND MAY NOT, BE TAKEN IN MOTION

818, After explaining how motion is divided, the Philosopher now discusses the order of the parts of motion.

First he asks whether there is a first in motion;

Secondly, he shows how the factors involved in motion precede one another, in L. 8.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that that into which something is first changed is indivisible;

Secondly, how in motion a first can and cannot be found, 822.

About the first he does two things:

First he mentions facts to be used in explaining the proposition;

Secondly, he proves the proposition, at 821.

About the first he does two things:

First he mentions his proposition;

Secondly, he proves it, at 819.

819. He says therefore first (625) that because whatever is being changed is being changed from one term to the other, then when the subject of change has now been changed, it has to be in the terminus ad quem.

Then at (626) he proves this proposition with two arguments, the first of which is particular and the second universal.

The first argument is this: Everything being changed must either (1) be distant from the term at which the change starts, as is evident in local motion, in which the place from which the motion starts remains and the mobile gets to be distant from it; or (2) the terminus a quo must cease to be, as in the motion called alteration: for when something white becomes black, the whiteness ceases to be.

In order to explain this proposition he adds that either the process of being changed is the same as departing, or the latter is a consequence of change and, therefore, “to have departed” (from the terminus a quo) is a consequence of having been changed. But it is evident that they are the same in reality but different in conception. For “departing” is spoken of in relation to the terminus a quo, whereas “change” gets its name from the terminus ad quem. And in explanation of this, Aristotle adds that “both are related to both in a similar way”, i.e., as “departing” is related to “being changed”, so “having departed” is related to “having been changed”.

From these premisses he argues to the conclusion, using as his example the species of change that involves terms contradictorily opposed, where the transition is between being and non-being, as in generation and ceasing-to-be. For it is evident from the foregoing that whatever is being changed departs from the terminus a quo and that whatever has been changed has already departed. When, therefore, something has been changed from non-being to being, it has already departed from non-being. But of anything at all it is true to say that it either is or is not. Therefore, what has been changed from non-being to being is in being, when the change is over. Likewise, what has been changed from being to non-being must be in non-being. Therefore, it is evident that in the change which involves contradictories, the thing which has been changed exists in that into which it has been changed. And if it is true in that type of change, then for an equal reason it is true in other changes. From this the first proposition is clear.

820. Then at (627) the second argument, a general one, is given, And he says that the same conclusion can be proved by considering any change at all. And he picks local motion; Whatever has been changed must be somewhere, i.e., either in the terminus a quo or in some other. But since what has been changed has already departed from that from which it has been changed, it must be elsewhere. Therefore, it must be either in that in

which we are trying to prove it is, i.e., in the terminus ad quem or elsewhere. If it is in the former, our point is proved; if not, then let us suppose that something is being moved into B and when the change is finished the thing is not in B but in C. Then we must say that from C it is also changed into B, because B and C are not consecutive. For a change of the type under discussion is continuous, and in continua one part is not consecutive to another, because between two parts there occurs a part that is similar to those two, as was proved above. Hence, it will follow, if that which has been changed is in C when it has been changed and from C it is being changed to B (which is the terminus ad quem), that when it has been changed, it is also being changed into what it has already become—which is impossible, For "being changed" and "having been changed" are never simultaneous, as we have shown above. Now it makes no difference whether the termini C and B are applied to local motion or to any other change. Consequently, it is universally true that what has been changed is (when it has been changed) in that into which it has been changed, i.e., in the terminus ad quem.

From this he further concludes that what has been changed is, as soon as it has been changed, in that into which it has been changed. He added "as soon as", because after it has been changed into something, it could depart from it and not be there; but as soon as it has been changed, it must be there.

821. Then at (628) he shows that "to have been changed" is first and per se in an indivisible; and he says that that time in which what has been changed was first changed must be indivisible. 'Why he adds "first" he explains by saying that A is said to have been first changed as soon as it is not said to have been changed merely by reason of any of its parts. For example, if we say that a mobile has been changed in a day, because it was changed in some part of the day. in that case it was not first changed in the day.

But that the time in which something has been first changed is indivisible he now proves: If the said time were divisible, let it be AC and let it be divided at B. Now three things are possible: either (1) the change is over in each part or (2) it is going on in each part or (3) in one part it is going on and in the other it is over. Now, if in each part it is over, then it was first completely changed not in the whole but in the part; but if it is being changed in each part, then it is also being changed in the whole (for the reason why something is said to be changing in a whole period of time is that the change was going on during each part of the whole time). But this is against our assumption that in the whole of AC it had been changed.

On the other hand, if it be supposed that in one part of the time it is being changed and in the other part it has been changed, the same difficulty ensues; namely, that it was not first changed in the whole time, because since the part is prior to the whole and something is in motion in a part of time before it is moved in the entire time, it follows that there was something prior to the first, which is impossible. Consequently, it must be admitted that the time in which the thing was first completely changed is indivisible,

From this he further concludes that everything that has ceased to be and everything that has been completely made, was made and ceased to be in an indivisible of time, because generation and ceasing to be are the termini of alteration. Consequently, if a motion is terminated in an instant (for these two things are the same, i.e., the termination of a motion and to have been first changed), it follows that generation and ceasing-to-be occur in an instant.

822. Then at (629) he shows how to discern in a motion, that which is first. About this he does two things:

First he proposes the truth;

Secondly, he proves it at 823.

He says therefore first (629) that the expression “in which something has been first changed” has two interpretations: first, it can mean that in which the change is first complete or terminated —in which case it is true to say that something has been changed, when the change is now over. Secondly, it can mean that in which it first began to be changed, and not that in which it was first true to say that it has been changed.

Taken in the first sense, namely, according to the termination of the change, it is applied to instances of motion in which there exists a first in which something has been changed. For a change can be first terminated some time, because every change has a termination. It was in this sense that we understood that “that in which something was first changed” is an indivisible—which was proved on the ground that it is the end, i.e., the terminus, of the motion—and we know that every terminus of a continuum is an indivisible.

But if it is taken in the second sense, namely, according to the beginning of the change, i.e., according to the first part of the motion, then there is no first in which something has been changed. For no beginning of a change can be definitely pointed out, i.e., no part that is not preceded by some other part. In like manner, it is not possible to isolate a first time in which something is first being moved.

823. Then at (630) he proves that if one looks at the beginning of a motion, it is not possible to assign “a first in which something has been changed”.

First with an argument from time;

Secondly, with an argument from the mobile, at 824;

Thirdly, with an argument from the sphere in which the motion occurs, at 825.

As to the first he gives this reason: If there is any element of time in which something has been first changed, let it be AD. Now AD must be either divisible or indivisible. If the latter, two difficulties ensue. The first is that the “now’s” in time are consecutive. This difficulty follows from the fact that time is divided just like motion, as was shown above. But if any part of the motion was present in AD, then AD must have been a part of time and, consequently, time will be composed of indivisibles. However, the indivisibles of time are the “now’s”. It will follow, therefore, that the “now’s” are consecutive in time.

And there is a second difficulty. Let us suppose that in the time CA, which preceded AD, the same mobile that was being moved in time AD was entirely at rest. If, therefore, it was at rest in the entire time CA, it was at rest in A, which is an element of the time CA. If, therefore, (as we supposed) AD is indivisible, it’ will follow that a thing is at rest and in motion at the same time; for we have already concluded that it was at rest in A and assumed that it was in motion in AD. But if AD is indivisible, then A is the same as AD. It will follow, therefore, that a thing is at rest and in motion in the same time.

It should be noted, however, that if a thing was at rest throughout an entire time, it does not follow that it was at rest in the last indivisible of that time; for we have already shown that in the “now” things are neither at rest nor in motion. But Aristotle concludes this here by arguing from what his adversary has proposed, namely, that the element of time in which the object was first being moved is an indivisible. And if it can be in motion in an indivisible of time, there is no reason why it could not also be at rest.

Therefore, having rejected the indivisibility of time AD, we are left with the fact that it is divisible. And since it is in AD that the object is said to be first moved, then it is being moved in any part of AD. This he now proves:

Let AD be divided into two parts, Then the object is being moved either in neither part or in both parts or in one part only. If in neither part, then not in the whole time. If in both parts, then it could be granted that it is being moved in the whole time. But if in one part only, it will follow that it is being moved in the whole time but not first, but by reason of the part. Therefore, since it is agreed to be moving in the whole time, it has been in motion in each part of the whole time. But time is divided infinitely just like any continuum; consequently, it is possible always to consider a part smaller than a previous one; for example, a day before a month and an hour before the day. Therefore, it is evident that it is impossible to find a time in which it is first being moved so that a previous could not be found. For if you were to assume that it is in a day that the object is first moved, that assumption would not be true, because it would have been first moved in the first part of the day, before it was moved in the whole day.

824, Then at (631) he establishes the same point by considering the mobile, and he concludes from the foregoing that neither in that which is being changed is it possible to take something that is first changed. Now this is to be understood in the sense that some definite point is to be crossed ‘through ‘the motion of the whole or of the part: for it is evident that the first part of the mobile will first pass a given point, and a second part will pass it after that, and so on. Otherwise, if it were understood in the sense of the absolute nature of motion, what we have to say would not be ad rem: for it is clear that the whole is being moved at the same time as all the parts, but the whole does not pass a certain point all at once but part before part continuously. Hence, just as it is impossible to find a first part of the mobile than which there is not a previous smaller part, so also is it impossible to isolate a part of the mobile that would be first moved. And because time and mobile are correspondingly divided, as we have shown above, then what was concluded about time, he now concludes about the mobile. Here is his proof:

Let DE be a mobile and (because every mobile can be divided, as was proved above) let DZ be the part that is first being moved. And let DZ be moved so that it passes a definite point in the time TI. if, therefore, DZ has been changed in this whole time, it follows that what has been changed in half the time is both less than DZ and moved prior to DZ. And for the same reason there will be something prior to that and so on forever, because time can be divided infinitely, it is evident, therefore, that in the mobile one cannot find something that has been first changed.

Hence it is clear that a first cannot be found in motion, whether we consider the time or the mobile.

825. Then at (632) he proves the same thing by considering the sphere in which the motion occurs. But first he mentions that the situation with respect to the sphere in which the motion occurs is not exactly the same as it was with respect to time and the mobile. For since there are three things to be considered in change; namely, the mobile which is being changed (for example, a man) and that in which it is being changed, i.e., the time, and that into which it is being changed (for example, into white), two of these, namely, the time and the mobile are always divisible. But with white it is another story, because a white thing is not divisible per se, but it, and things like it, are divisible per accidens, inasmuch as the subject of whiteness or of any other quality is divisible.

Now the per accidens division of white can take place in two ways. In one way according to the quantitative parts, as when a white surface is split into two parts, the white will be divided per accidens. In another way, according to greater or less intensity, for the fact that one and the same part is whiter or less white is not due to the nature of whiteness (because if it existed in isolation, whiteness would be constant and never subject to more and less, any more than a substance is susceptible of more and less) but to the varying degrees in which a divisible subject participates whiteness. Therefore, neglecting what is divided per accidens in the sphere of motion and considering only what is divided per se in those spheres, it is impossible to find a first.

And he proves this first of all in magnitudes in which there is local motion. Let the magnitude AC be divided at B, and suppose that C is that into which something is first moved from B. Now BC is either divisible or indivisible. If the latter, it follows that an indivisible will be touching an indivisible, for there is no reason why the second part of the motion will not be into an indivisible, since we can divide a magnitude just as the motion was divided, and as time was.

But if BC is divisible, it is possible to take a stage nearer to B than to C, and so the thing will be changed from B into that stage before it is changed into C and into a stage prior to that one, and so on, because there is no limit to the division of a magnitude. It is therefore evident that it is impossible to find a first stage into which a thing has been changed in local motion.

The same is true in change of quantity, i.e., growing and decreasing. For even these changes are in terms of a continuum, i.e., in terms of added quantity or subtracted quantity, in which no first is to be found, since there can be division ad infinitum.

And so it is clear that it is only in qualitative change that something is per se indivisible. But inasmuch as in this per accidens divisibility is found, likewise no first is discernible in such change. This is true whether the succession consists in part being altered after part (for it is evident that no first part of white can be found any more than a first part of magnitude can) or whether the succession is based on one and the same thing becoming more and more white or less and less white, for a subject can be modified in an infinite number of ways with regard to degrees of whiteness, Thus the motion involved in alteration can be continuous and not possess a first.

LECTURE 8

BEFORE EVERY “BEING MOVED” IS A “HAVING BEEN MOVED,” AND CONVERSELY

826. After explaining how a first is to be taken in motion and how not, the Philosopher now explains the order of precedence among the things present in motion.

First he premises facts needed for explaining the proposition;

Secondly, he explains the proposition, at 828.

827. He says therefore first (633) that whatever is being changed is being changed in time, as we have explained. But something is being changed in a time in two ways: in one way, first and per se; in another way, by reason of something else, i.e., by reason of a part, as when something is said to be changed in a year, because it is being changed in a day.

With this distinction in mind, he states what he intends to prove: namely, that if something is being first moved in a time, it is necessarily being moved in some part of that time. This he proves in two ways:

First, from the definition of “first”, for here something is said to be in a thing “first”, if it belongs to it by reason of each and every part, as was said in the beginning of Book V.

Secondly, he proves the same thing with an argument: Let XR be the time in which something is being first moved and, since time is divisible, let XR be divided at K. Then of necessity in the part XK of the time, the object is either being moved or not, and likewise for the part KR. Now if it be said that it is being moved in neither of those parts, it follows that it is not being moved in the whole time but is at rest throughout that time, for it is impossible for a thing to be in motion in a time without being in motion in some part of it. But if it be supposed that it is being moved in just one part of the time, it will follow that it is not being first moved in the time called XR; because that would require motion in respect to both parts and not in respect to just one. Therefore, of necessity, it must be in motion in each part of the time XR. And that is what we want to demonstrate: namely, that if something is being first moved in a time, it is being moved in every part of it.

828. Then at (634) he sets about proving the main proposition. And about this he does two things:

First he introduces the proofs of the proposition;

Secondly, he concludes to the truth, at 838.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that before each state of being moved there was a state of completed motion;

Secondly, that, conversely, before each state of completed motion there was a state of being moved, at 832.

829. He proves the first with three arguments, of which the first is: Let KL be the magnitude through which a mobile has been moved in the first time XR. It is clear that an equally fast mobile, which began its motion with the first one, will have covered half the magnitude in half the time. Since the first mobile (which we have said covers the entire magnitude) is as fast as the second, it follows that even it has in half the time already been moved through, half the magnitude KL. It will follow, therefore, that what is being moved has been previously moved.

To get a better understanding of what we mean, it must be considered that just as “point” is a name for the terminus of a line, so “completed motion” is a name for the terminus of a motion. Now, no matter what line or what part of a line you take, it is always true that before the consummation of the whole line, you can take a point according to which the line can be divided. Likewise, before any motion or part of a motion, you can take a “state of completed motion”; because while the mobile is being moved to its terminus, it has already passed a certain stage in respect to which the mobile is said to have been already changed. But just as a point within a line is in potency before the line is actually divided (for a point is the very division of a line), so also the thing called “completed motion” (within a motion) is in potency as long as the motion does not stop there; but if it does stop there, it will be actual. And since what is in act is better known than what is in potency, therefore Aristotle proves his proposition (that what is being continually moved has already been moved) by referring to an equally fast mobile whose motion has already been completed. This is like proving that in a certain line there is a point in potency by showing that a like line has been actually divided.

830. The second argument, which he gives at (635), is this: In the whole time XR or in any other, something is said to have been changed by the very fact that a final “now” of the time is taken, not that something is being moved in that “now”, but that the motion is terminated then. Hence “having been moved” is taken here not for that which is at some time being moved but for the fact that the motion is ended. Now the reason why the motion must be terminated in the final “now” of the time that measures the motion is that that “now” terminates the time, just as a point terminates a line. And all time is midway between two “now’s”, just as a line is between two points. Therefore, since “being moved” occurs in time, it follows that “having been moved” occurs in the “now” which is the terminus of time. And if that is the case with a motion in a whole period of time, the same must be true of the parts of motion that occur in the parts of time. Now, we have already shown that if something is being first moved in the whole time, it is being moved in each part of the time. But whichever part of time you take, it is terminated at some “now”. For the terminus of half of the time is the “now” which divided the time into two parts. Therefore, it follows that what is being moved through the whole is previously moved at the middle of time, on account of the 11nowlt which determines the middle. And the same reasoning applies to any part of time. For no matter how the time is divided, it will always be found that each part of the time is determined by two “now’s”, and after the first “now” of the time measuring the motion, no matter which other “now” is taken, the object has already been moved in that part of the time, for that “now”—whichever it is—is the terminus of the time measuring the motion.

Now, because every period of time is divisible into times and each period exists between two “now’s”, and because in any “now” that happens to be the ending of a time measuring the motion, something has been moved, it follows that whatever is being changed has been changed an infinite number of times, because “having been changed” is the terminus of a motion, just as a point is of a line and a “now” is of a time.

Therefore, just as it is possible in any line to pick out point ahead of point ad infinitum and in any period of time “now” before “now” (because both line and time are divisible ad infinitum), so in any “being moved” it is possible to pick out infinitely many “having been moved’s”, because motion, too, is divisible ad infinitum, just as the line and time, as was previously proved.

831. The third argument is in (636): In the case of anything that is being changed (if it is not ceasing-to-be and does not cease to be moved, but is being continually changed), it is necessary that in each “now” of the time in which it is being moved, it is being changed or has been changed. But in the “now” nothing is being changed, as we have shown. Therefore, in each “now” of the time which measures continuous motion, the object has been changed, But in any portion of time there are an infinitude of “now’s”, because the “now” divides time, and time is infinitely divisible. Therefore, everything that is being changed has been changed an infinite number of times. And so it follows that before every state called “being moved” is a state called “having been moved”, which, however, does not exist outside the state of “being changed” but is in it and terminates a part of it.

832. Then at (637) he proves that on the other hand a state of “being changed” precedes each state of “having been changed”.

First he proves it from the viewpoint of the time;

Secondly, from the viewpoint of the sphere in which the motion occurs, at 836.

About the first he does three things:

First he states the proposition;

Secondly, he proves certain things needed for proving the proposition, at 833.

Thirdly, he gives the proof of the main proposition, at 835.

He says therefore first that not only is it true that whatever is being changed had already been changed, but that every state of “having been changed” must be preceded by a state of “being changed”, because the former is the terminus of the latter. Therefore, every “having been changed” must be preceded by a “being changed”.

633. Then at (638) he states something needed for his proof of the proposition, i.e., that whatever is being changed from something to something was changed in time. But note carefully that here the words, “was changed”, do not refer to the termination of motion, for it was explained above that the time in which a thing “was changed” is an indivisible. But here “was changed” signifies that something was previously being moved, as though he said: “Whatever was being moved was being moved in time”.

This he now proves: If our proposition is not true, then let there be something that was changed from A to B, i.e., from one term to another, in a “now”. From this it follows that when it is in A, i.e., in the terminus a quo in the same “now” it was not yet changed, because it has already been proved that what was changed, when it was being changed is not in the terminus a quo but more in he terminus ad quem. Otherwise, it would follow that it was at once in A and in B. Therefore, it is necessary to say that in one “now” it is in A, and in another it was being changed. But between two “now’s” there is a time, because two “now’s” cannot be immediately connected, as we have shown. What remains, therefore, is that whatever is being changed is being changed in time.

334. But it seems that this conclusion has no application in generation and ceasing-to-be, between whose two termini there is nothing intermediate. For if between the “now” in which something is at the terminus a quo and the “now” in which it is at the terminus ad quem a period of time occurs, it will follow that there is something between being and non-being, because in that intermediate time the subject of change would be neither being nor non-being.

Nevertheless, because the argument which Aristotle gives here is demonstrative, it must be said that it applies somehow even to generation and ceasing-to-be but in the sense that such changes are also instantaneous, since there can be no medium between the termini.

So it must be said that whatever is being changed from non-being to being or vice versa is not in being and non-being at the same time. But, as will be said in Book VIII, there is no final instant in which what is generated is a non-being, but there is a first instant in which it is a being, so that in the entire time preceding that instant, it is non-being. However, between that “now” and the time preceding, there is nothing intermediate, so that between being and non-being there is no medium. Now, since the time which precedes the instant in which something is generated first, is the measure of some motion, it follows that just as that instant in which something is first generated is the terminus of the preceding time that measures the motion, so the first instant of the being of the thing generated is the terminus of a preceding change. If, therefore, generation is said to be the very beginning of being, it must be the terminus of a motion, and thus it takes place in an instant, because a motion's being terminated—which is the same as having been changed—occurs in an indivisible of time, as we have shown.

However, if generation is taken as the very beginning of being plus the entire preceding motion of which it is the terminus, then it occurs not in an instant but in time, so that what is being generated is a non-being during the entire preceding time and a being in the final instant. And the same applies to ceasing-to-be.

835. Then at (639) he proves the main proposition with the following reason: Whatever has been changed was being changed in time, as we have proved; but time is divisible and whatever is being changed in time is being changed in part of time. Therefore, it is necessary to say that what has been changed in some entire period of time was previously being changed during half of the time and again during half of that half and so on, because time is divisible infinitely. Therefore, it follows that what has been changed was previously being changed. Consequently, before every state of "having been changed" there is a previous state of "being changed".

836. Then at (640) he proves the same point with an argument based on the sphere of motion.

First as to motions in quantity;

Secondly, as to other changes, at 837.

He says therefore first (640) that what was said, from the viewpoint of time, to be common to every change, becomes clearer from the viewpoint of magnitude, for magnitude is better known than time, and magnitude is continuous, as a line, and in it something is changed, namely, that which is according to place, or according to increase and decrease. Therefore, consider something changed from C to D. Now, it cannot be said that the whole of CD is indivisible, because CD has to be part of a magnitude, just as the motion from C to D is part of a whole motion, for there is a correspondence between division of magnitude and division of motion, as we have shown. But if an indivisible is a part of a magnitude, it follows that two indivisibles are immediate neighbors—which is impossible, as we have shown. Therefore, the whole CD cannot be an indivisible, Consequently, that which is between C and D is a magnitude and can be infinitely divided. And something is always first changed in part of a magnitude before it has been changed throughout the entire magnitude. Therefore, anything that has been changed was previously being changed, just as before any whole magnitude there are its parts.

837. Then at (641) he shows that the same point is true in those changes which do not take place in terms of a continuum; for example, alteration, which is between contrary qualities, and generation and ceasing-to-be, which are between contradictories. And although in those changes the demonstration is not derived from things in which the motion is, yet it is possible to take the time in which the changes occur, and then the demonstration will proceed the same way.

Thus in the three changes, which are alteration, generation and ceasing-to-be, only the first argument holds, while in the other three, namely, growth, decrease and local motion, both arguments hold.

838. Then at (642) he concludes to the main proposition:

First, in general;

Secondly, with special application to generation and ceasing-to-be, at 839.

He concludes therefore first (642) from the foregoing that everything which has been changed was previously being changed, and that everything which is being changed has previously been changed. Consequently, it is true that a state of "having been changed" preceded a state of "being changed", and vice versa. And so it is clear that a first something cannot be definitely pointed to.

The reason for this is that in motion an indivisible is not joined to an indivisible so as to make a motion be composed of indivisibles, because, if that were the case, we could discover a first. But it is not true, for motion is infinitely divisible just as a line is, which can be infinitely decreased by division and increased by addition opposite to the decrease, in the sense that what is taken from one is being added to another, as was shown in Book III. For it is evident that in a line, before each part of a line, one can take a point in its midst, and before that midpoint is a part of the line, and so on ad infinitum. However, the line is not infinite, because no part of the line is in front of the first point of the line.

Well, the same thing is true of motion. For since each part of motion is divisible, before each part of the motion there is in the midst of that part an indivisible, which is called “having been changed”, and before that indivisible there is a part of the motion, and so on ad infinitum. Yet it does not follow that the motion is infinite, cause in front of the first indivisible of motion there was no part of motion. But note that the first indivisible is not one called “having been changed”, any more than the first point of a line is a dividing point.

839. ‘Then at (643) he comes to the same conclusion with reference to generation and ceasing-to-be. And he makes a special point of these changes, because the relation of “having been changed” to “being changed” in generation and ceasing-to-be is not the same as it is in other changes.

For in the others, the state of “having been changed” and the state of “being changed” occur in respect to the same thing; for example, to whiteness, in the case of alteration. For “to be being altered” is to be being changed in respect to whiteness, and “to have been altered” is to have been changed in regard to whiteness; and the same is true in local motion, in growth and in decrease. But in generation “having been changed” refers to one thing and “being changed” to another. For the former is based on the form, but the latter, though not based on negation of a form (which is not of itself susceptible of more and less) is based on something joined to such a negation, something, that is, which is susceptible of more and less, namely, a quality. Therefore, “to have been generated” is the terminus of “being altered” and the same is true of “having been corrupted”. And because motions get their name from the terminus ad quem, as we have said in the beginning of Book V, “to be altered” (since it has two termini, namely, substantial form and quality) has two names: for it can be called “to be altered”, and “to come to be and cease to be”.

And this is the sense in which coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are substituted for “being altered”, i.e., because the alteration terminates at being or non-being. And consequently, Aristotle says that what has been made was previously being made, and what is being made must necessarily have been made, provided that divisible and continuous things are involved.

And Aristotle makes that addition (as the Commentator says) in order to exclude things that indivisibly come to be without continuous motion; for example, understanding and sensing, which are motions only in an analogous sense, as will be shown in Book III of On the Soul. But it could be that Aristotle made this addition in order to show that generation should include the entire continuous motion that precedes it.

840. But the statement “what is being made has been previously made” applies in different ways to different things. For some things, such as air and water, are simple and have simple generation—in these cases, part is not generated after part, but the whole and the parts are altered and generated at once. And it is in such that what has been made was previously being made and what is being made has been previously made, on account of the preceding alteration being continuous.

But other things are composites of unlike parts. In these cases, part is generated after part, as in an animal the heart is first generated, and in a house the foundation. In such things what is being made was not itself previously made, but a part was. And this is what he adds, namely, that it is not always so that what is being made has been itself previously made but something pertaining to it has been made, as the foundation of a house. But since we must come to a part that is entirely being made at once, then in some part, that which is being made has been made in relation to a terminus taken in the preceding alteration; for example, in the generation of an animal, the heart has already been made and while the heart is being generated, something has already been made—not indeed that there has been made some part of the heart, but some alteration ordained to the generation of the heart.

And what has been said of generation is to be understood with regard to ceasing-to-be. For immediately there is in something that is produced in being and is corrupted, something infinite, since it is continuous. For the very coming-to-be and the ceasing-to-be are continuous. Therefore, there is no “being produced in being”, unless something has been previously made, and nothing has been made unless it was previously being produced in being. And the same is true of ceasing-to-be and having ceased-to-be. For a “having-ceased-to-be” is always prior to a “ceasing-to-be” and a “ceasing-to-be” prior to a “having ceased-to-be”.

From this it is evident that whatever has been made was previously being made, and that all that is being made has in some way previously been made. And the reason is that every magnitude and every period of time are infinitely divisible. Consequently, in whatever period of time something comes to be, it is not coming to be in that time as in a first time, because it always possible to find a period previous. And what we have said of generation and ceasing-to-be is true also of illumination, which is the termination of the local motion of the illuminating body, just as generation and ceasing-to-be is the terminus of an alteration.

LECTURE 9

FINITE AND INFINITE ARE FOUND SIMULTANEOUSLY IN MAGNITUDE, TIME, MOBILE, AND MOTION

841. After determining the division of motion, the Philosopher now determines about the infinite and finite in motion; for just as division pertains to the notion of continuum, so also do finite and infinite. But just as above he said that division is found simultaneously in motion, magnitude, time and mobile, so now he shows that the same is true of the infinite. Hence about this he does three things:

First he shows that the infinite is found in the same way in magnitude and in time;

Secondly, that it is found in the same way in the mobile, 846;

Thirdly, and in motion, at 652.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that if a magnitude is finite, the time cannot be infinite;

Secondly, that if the time is finite, the magnitude cannot be infinite, at 845.

in regard to the first he does two things:

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 843.

842. First, therefore, (644) he repeats two things that are needed for proving the proposition. One of which is that whatever is being moved is being moved in time. The second is that in more time a greater magnitude is traversed by the same mobile. From these two suppositions he intends to prove a third, namely, that it is impossible to traverse a finite magnitude in

infinite time. This is to be understood in the sense that the thing in motion is not to retraverse the same magnitude repeatedly or any part of it, but must be moved through the entire magnitude in the entire time. And he added this to save himself from circular motion over a finite magnitude, which can occur in infinite time, as will be explained in Book VIII.

843. Then at (645) he proves his proposition:

First by assuming a mobile of equal speed being moved over the whole magnitude;

Secondly, if it is not being moved with a regular and uniform motion, at 844.

He says therefore first (645) that if a mobile of equal speed is traversing a whole, then if the whole is a finite magnitude, it must be traversed in finite time. For we can take one part of the magnitude and make it measure the whole; for example, a part that is one-third or one-fourth of the magnitude, If, therefore, a mobile is moved with equal speed over the whole and if the equally fast is what traverses an equal space in equal time, it follows that in a number of equal times that are determined by the number of parts into which the magnitude was divided, it will traverse the whole magnitude; for example, if one-fourth of the magnitude is taken, it will traverse it in a certain time and another fourth in an equal time, and so it will traverse the entire magnitude in four equal times.

Because, therefore, the parts of the magnitude are finite in number and each is finite in quantity, and in a given number of equal times the whole magnitude is traversed, it follows that the whole time in which the entire magnitude is traversed is finite. For it will be measured by a finite time, since it will be as many times as much as the time required to traverse one part, the whole magnitude being as many times as the quantity of each part. And thus the whole time will be the multiplication product of the length multiplied by the number of parts. But every multiplication product is measured by a denominator, as double is measured by half and triple by third, and so on. The time, however, required to traverse a part is finite, because if it were infinite, it would follow that the whole and the part were traversed in equal time, which is against the original assumption. Therefore, the whole time has to be finite, because nothing infinite can be measured by the finite.

844. But someone could say that although the parts of the magnitude are equal and measure the whole magnitude, it could happen that the parts of time are not equal, as when an equal speed is not maintained through the entire motion, and so the time required to traverse a part of the magnitude will not be a measure of the time required to traverse the whole.

Therefore at (646) He shows that this makes no difference to the proposition. For let AB be a finite space that has been traversed in infinite time CD. Now in every motion, one part must be traversed ahead of another and also one part of the magnitude is traversed in the prior part of time and another part in a subsequent part of time. And so, no two parts of the magnitude are ever traversed in one and the same part of time, and no two parts of time correspond to one and the same part of the magnitude. Consequently, if a certain part of the magnitude is traversed in a certain time, then in more time is traversed not only that part of the magnitude but that part and another. And this will happen whether the mobile maintains constant speed or not, for in natural motions the speed is continually increased, while in compulsory motions it is diminished.

With these suppositions in mind, let AE be a part of the space AB and let it be an exact measure, say, one third or one fourth of AB. Therefore, this part of space has been traversed in a finite time. For it cannot be assumed that it was traversed in infinite time, because the whole space was traversed in infinite time, whereas less time is required to traverse a part than to traverse the whole. Likewise, let us take another part of the space and let it equal the part AE. This part, too, must be traversed in finite time, for it is the whole space that is being traversed in infinite time. Proceeding in this manner, let us take, in accordance with the parts of the entire space, a corresponding number of such times. From these will be constituted the whole time in which the entire space is traversed.

Now it is impossible that a part of an infinite measure the whole, either in the case of a magnitude or in that of a multitude, because it is impossible for the infinite to be composed of a finite number of parts, each of which is finite in quantity, whether those parts are equal or unequal—for whatever things are measured by some one thing, either according to magnitude or multitude, must be finite.

Now, I say “magnitude and multitude”, because a thing of finite magnitude can still be measured, whether the measuring parts are of equal or unequal size. For when they are equal, then any part is a measure of the whole, whether the whole be a magnitude or a multitude; but when they are unequal parts, any part will measure a multitude but not a magnitude. So, therefore, it is evident that any time which has parts finite in number and quantity, whether they be equal or not, is finite. But a finite space is measured by as many finite parts as are necessary to form AB. Moreover, the parts of the time will be equal in number to the parts of the magnitude, and the parts will be finite in quantity. What remains, therefore, is that the entire space is traversed in finite time.

845. Then at (647) he shows that on the other hand, if the time is finite, so too the nagnitude, And he says that by the same reasoning it can be shown that infinite space cannot be traversed in finite time, and that rest cannot be infinite in finite time, no matter whether the motion is regular or not. For since the time posited is finite, it is possible to take as a measure of the whole time a part in which the mobile traverses a part of the magnitude but not the whole magnitude, which is traversed in the whole time. Then in an equal time it will traverse another part of the magnitude. And, in like manner, for each part of the time take a corresponding part of the magnitude, and let this be done whether the second part of the magnitude be equal to the first part (which happens when the speed is constant) or not equal to it (which happens when the speed varies). For whether they are equal or not makes no difference, as long as each part you take of the magnitude is finite, which it must be; otherwise as much will be traversed in a part of time as in the whole time. According to this procedure, it is clear that by dividing time the entire infinite space will be exhausted as the finite parts are used up. For since the time is divided into finite equal parts and the number of magnitudinal parts must equal the number of parts of time, it follows that the infinite space will be consumed by making finite subtractions, since the magnitude has to be divided according to the way the time is divided. But this is impossible. Therefore, it is clear that an infinite space cannot be traversed in finite time, whether the magnitude of space be infinite in one direction or more, because in either case the same reason would hold.

846. Then at (648) he shows that infinite and finite are found in the mobile in the same way as they are found in magnitude and time. About this he does three things:

First he shows that the mobile is not infinite, if the magnitude is finite and the time finite;

Secondly, that the mobile is not infinite, if the magnitude is infinite and the time finite, at 848;

Thirdly, that the mobile cannot be infinite, if the magnitude is finite and the time infinitel at 849.

He proves the first point with two arguments. In regard to the first of these he says that, since it has been demonstrated that a finite magnitude is not traversed in infinite time nor an infinite magnitude in finite time, it is clear from the same causes that an infinite mobile cannot traverse a finite magnitude in finite time. For if you take any part of finite time, then during that part of time the finite space will be traversed not by the whole mobile but by a part, and during another part, it will be traversed by another part of the mobile, and so on. And so, it will be necessary to take as many parts of the mobile as parts of time. But the infinite is not composed of finite parts. Therefore, the mobile that is moved in a whole finite time is finite.

847. The second argument is given at (649) and it differs from the first, because in the first he took as his principle the same medium that he used in the previous demonstrations, but here he takes as his principle the conclusion reached above. For it has been shown above that a finite mobile cannot traverse an infinite space in finite time, Hence it is clear that for the same reason neither can an infinite mobile traverse a finite space in finite time. For if an infinite mobile traverses a finite space, it follows that a finite mobile can traverse an infinite space, because both the mobile and the space have dimensions. Now when two things having dimensions are involved, it makes no difference which is in motion and which is at rest. For it is clear that whichever is assumed as being in motion, it follows that the finite traverses the infinite. For let A be the infinite that is in motion and let CD be a finite part of it. When the whole is being moved, this finite part will be at the part B of the space, and as the motion continues, another part of the infinite mobile will be at B and so on. Hence, just as the mobile traverses space, so space in a sense traverses the mobile, inasmuch as the various parts of the mobile are successively other and other in regard to the space. Hence it is evident that at the same time that an infinite mobile is being moved through a finite space, something finite is traversing something infinite. For there is no other possible way for an infinite to be moved

through finite space than for the finite to traverse infinite space, either by having the finite moved over the infinite, as when the mobile is finite and the space infinite, or by making something finite measure the infinite, as when the space is finite and the mobile infinite. For then, even though the finite is not being moved over the infinite, yet the finite is measuring the infinite, inasmuch as a finite space is placed opposite each of the parts of the infinite mobile. Therefore, because this is impossible, it follows that an infinite mobile does not traverse a finite space in finite time.

848. Then at (650) he shows that there cannot be an infinite mobile, if the space is infinite and time finite. And this is what he says: that an infinite mobile cannot traverse an infinite space in finite time. For in every infinite there is something finite. Therefore, if an infinite mobile should traverse an infinite space in finite time, it follows that it traverses a finite space in finite time, which is against a previous conclusion.

849. Then at (651) ae says that the same demonstration holds if the time be infinite and the space finite. Because if an infinite mobile traverses a finite space in infinite time, it follows that in a part of that time it will traverse a part of the space. Consequently, the infinite will be traversing the finite in finite time, which is also against a previous conclusion.

850. Then at (652) ha shows that finite and.infinite are found in motion in the way that they are found in mobile, space and time. And he says that a finite mobile does not traverse an infinite space, nor an infinite mobile finite space, nor an infinite mobile infinite space, in finite time, From these facts, it follows that there cannot be an infinite motion in finite time. For the quantity of motion depends on the quantity of space. Hence there is no difference between saying that the motion is infinite and that the magnitude is. For it is necessary that if either is infinite, so is the other, because no part of a local motion can exist outside of a place.

LECTURE 10

THINGS PERTAINING TO THE DIVISION OF “COMING TO A STAND” AND “REST”

851. After finishing the things that pertain to the division of motion, the Philosopher now determines about things that pertain to the division of rest. And because coming to rest is generation of rest, as we have said in Book V.

First he determines the things that pertain to coming to rest;
Secondly, the things that pertain to rest, at 856.
About the first he does three things:
First he shows that whatever is coming to rest is being moved!
Secondly, whatever is coming to rest does so in time, at 853;
Thirdly, how a first is spoken of in coming to rest, at 854.

852. He shows the first at (653): Everything apt to be moved must be either in motion or at rest at the time when it is apt to be moved and in the place in which it is apt to be moved and in the way in which it is apt to be moved. But what is coming to rest is not yet at rest—otherwise, it would happen that a thing would be at the same time tending to rest and actually resting. Therefore, whatever is coining to rest is in motion, when it is coming to rest.

853. Then at (654) he proves by two arguments that whatever is coming to rest is doing so in time. For whatever is being moved is being inoved in time, as has been proved. But whatever is coming to rest is being moved, as we have just proved. Therefore, whatever is coming to rest is coming to rest in time.

The second argument is that swiftness and slowness are determined according to time. But it can happen that something comes to rest either more swiftly or more slowly. Therefore, whatever is coming to rest does so in time.

854. Then at (655) he shows how “first” is spoken of in coming to rest. About this he does two things:

First he shows how something is said to be “first” coming to rest in a given time, where “first” is opposed to what is spoken of in reference to a part;

Secondly, he shows that in coming to rest, it is not possible to discern a first part, at 855.

Fe says therefore first (655) that if at a certain time something is said to be coming to rest first and per se and not by reason of a part, then it must be coming to rest in each part of that time. For time can be divided into two parts, and if it is said that it is coming to rest in neither, it will follow that it is not coming to rest in the whole time, in which it was assumed to be coming to rest. Therefore, something coming to rest is not coming to rest. Nor can it be said that it is coming to rest in only one of the parts, because then it would not be coming to rest first, but only by reason of a part. Hence it will remain that it is coming to rest in both. For it is said to be coming to rest in the whole time only because it is coming to rest in each part, as was said above about things in motion.

855. Then at (656) he shows that there is no first part in coming to rest. And he says that just as it is not possible to find in time a first part in which a mobile is being moved, so also in regard to coming to rest, because in neither case can there be a first part.

If this is denied, then let AB be the first part of time in which something is coming to rest. This part cannot be indivisible, because it has been shown above that motion does not occur in an indivisible of time (for it is always true that whatever is being moved has already been moved, as we have shown above) and, moreover, whatever is coming to rest is being moved, as we have just now proved. Hence AB must be divisible. Therefore, there is a coming to rest in each part of it, for we have just shown that when in a given time something is coming to rest first and per se and not by reason of a part, it is coming to rest in each part of that given time. Therefore, since the part is prior to the whole, AB was not, the first in which there was a coming to rest. And because that in which something is coming to rest is a time and all time is divisible ad infinitum, it follows that it is impossible to find a first in which something is coming to rest.

856. Then at (657) he shows the same thing is true for rest. About this he does two things:

First he shows that there is no first in rest;

Secondly, he gives a method to distinguish motion from rest,

And because it is for the same reason that no first is found in notion and in coming-to-rest and in rest, therefore, he concludes the same thing for rest as he concluded for motion and coming-to rest. And he says that there is no first in which a thing at rest has been at rest. To prove this he repeats something previously proved, namely, that nothing is at rest in an indivisible of time. Likewise, he repeats the two reasons he used when he proved this. The first of which is that there is no motion in an indivisible of time. But to rest and to be in motion are in the same: because we do not say that something is resting, unless what is capable of being moved is not being moved when it is apt to be moved and in the sphere in which it is apt to be moved; for example, quality or place or something of thls sort. Hence it remains that nothing is at rest in an indivisible of time.

The second reason is that it is then that we say something is at rest when it maintains itself as it was previously: as if to say that we do not judge rest by reason of one factor only but by comparing two things to one another and seeing that there is a aimilar situation in both. But it is impossible to find in something indivisible a “now” and something previous, or any two things. Therefore, that element of time in which something is at rest is not indivisible.

Having established this, he proceeds further to prove the main. proposition. For if that in which something is at rest is divisible into parts that possess a prior and a subsequent, it follows that it is a time; for this is the very nature of time. And if it is time, then it must be resting in each part of it. And this will be demonstrated in the same way that it was demonstrated in motion and in coming to rest; namely, that if it is not at rest in each part, it will be at rest in no part or in one only. If in no part, then not in the whole; if in one only, then in that part first and not in the whole first. But if it is at rest in each part of the time, it will not be possible to discover a first in rest any more than in motion.

The reason for this is that things are at rest and in motion in time. But in time there is no first any more than in a magnitude or in any continuum, for every continuum is divisible ad infinitum and, consequently, it is always possible to find a part smaller than another. And that is why there is no first in motion or in coming-to-rest or in rest.

857. Then at (658) he gives a way through which what is in motion is distinguished from what is at rest.

First he mentions it;

Secondly, he proves it, at 858.

In regard to the first he premises two suppositions, the first of which is that whatever is being moved is being moved in time. The second is that whatever is being changed is being changed from one terminus to another. From these two facts he intends to conclude a third; namely, that if you take a mobile, which is being moved first and per se and not by reason of its part only, it cannot remain one and the same with respect to that in which the motion is—for example, it cannot remain in one and the same place, or retain one and the same degree of whiteness—during a given period of time, provided that you take it as being in time according to itself and not according to something which is in time.

The reason why you must take a mobile which is being moved first and per se is that there is nothing to prevent a thing from being moved according to a part even though it remains in one and the same place throughout the entire time, as when a man sitting down moves his foot.

And the reason why he speaks of a time throughout which something is being moved per se and not by reason of some element of time is that while a thing is being moved it can be said that on such and such a day it is in one and the same place; but this would be said, because it was in that place not throughout the day but in some “now” of that day.

858. Then at (659) he proves the proposition. And he says that if what is being changed is throughout a definite period of time in one and the same state—for example, in one place—it follows that it is at rest, due to the fact that in that time there is present in one and the same place the entire mobile and each part of it; for we have already said that to be at rest means to be able to say of something that it and its parts are in one and the same state in different “now’s”, If, therefore, this is the definition of being at rest and if nothing can be at rest and in motion at the same time, it follows that the

whole which is being moved cannot be totally in one state, e.g., in one and the same place, during the whole time and not only in something of it.

Why this follows he now explains. Every period of time is divisible into diverse parts, of which one is prior to another. Hence if something is in one state throughout the entire period, it will be true to say that in one and in another part of the time the whole mobile and its parts are in one and the same state, e.g., place—and this is to be at rest. For if it is said to be in one and the same state not in different parts of time but throughout one "now", it does not follow that there is a time in which it is in one and the same state, but that there is a "now" in which it is in one and the same state.

For although from the fact that if something remains in one and the same state during a period of time, the conclusion can be drawnthat it is at rest, that conclusion cannot be drawn if it remains in one and the same state in just one "now". For whatever is being moved is always stable, i.e., existing, vis-a-vis something of that in which it is being moved in each "now" of the time in which it is being moved; for example, place or quality or quantity, Yet it is not for that reason at rest, because it has already been proved that neither rest nor motion can occur in a "now". But it is true to say that in the very "now" something is not being moved and that in the "now" even what is being moved is somewhere or according to something. But what is being moved in time cannot be under any aspect at rest, for then it would happen that something is at rest while it is in motion—which is impossible. What remains, therefore, is that whatever is being moved is never, as long as it is being moved, in one and the same state for two "now's" but for only one.

859. And this point is clear in local motion. For let AC be a magnitude divided in half at B and let 0 be a body equal to each half, i.e., to AB and to BC, and let that body be moved from AB to BC. If no part of one of these two places can be a part of the other, there will be only two places for that body on AC. But it is evident that 0 does not relinquish its first place and enter the second all at once but successively. Hence, because place is divisible ad infinitum, the places also are multiplied ad infinitum. For if the half part AB is again halved at D and the other half part BC at E, it is evident that DE will be a place distinct from both AB and BC. By continuing such divisions other and other places will be found.

The same point is clear in alteration. For what passes from white to black passes through an infinitude of shades of whiteness and blackness and intermediate colors.

However, it does not follow that since there are an infinitude of intermediates, the ultimate cannot be reached, because these intermediate places are infinite not in act but only in potency, just as a magnitude is not actually divided infinitely but is potentially divisible.

LECTURE 11

ZENO’S ARGUMENTS EXCLUDING ALL MOTION ARE RESOLVED

860. After finishing with the division of motion and of rest, the Philosopher now refutes certain opinions that have been the source of error in regard to motion. About this he does three things:

First he answers the arguments of Zeno who absolutely denies that motion exists;

Secondly, he shows that an indivisible is not moved, against Democritus, who said that they are always in motion, at L. 12;

Thirdly, he shows that all change is finite, against Heraclitus, who said that all things are eternally moved, at L. 13.

About the first he does two things:

First he gives and rejects one of Zeno’s arguments, which pertains to what Zeno had accepted about motion;

Secondly, he explains all his arguments in order, at 863.

861. He says therefore first (660) that Zeno reasoned badly and used what had only the appearance of a syllogism to show that nothing is being moved, even what seems to be in rapid motion, as an arrow in flight. And this was his argument: Anything that is in a place equal to itself is either being moved or is at rest. But whatever is being moved is at each instant in a place equal to itself. Therefore, even at each instant it is either in motion or at rest. But it is not in motion, Therefore, it is at rest. But if it is not in motion at any instant but at rest, as it seems, then throughout the entire time it is at rest and not in motion.

Now this argument could be answered by appealing to something already proved; namely, that in an instant there is neither motion nor rest. But such a solution would not cripple Zeno’s intention, for he is satisfied to show that through the entire time there is no motiona fact that seems to follow, if there is no motion at any instant of the time. Therefore Aristotle answers in a different manner and says that the conclusion is both false and does not follow from the premisses.

For in order that something be moved in a given period of time, it has to be moved in each part of the time. But instants are not parts of time, for time is not made up of instants any more than a magnitude is made of points, as we have already proved. Hence it does not follow that a thing is not in motion in a given time, just because it is not in motion in any instant of that time.

862. Then at (661) he lists in order all the arguments that Zeno used for destroying motion. About this he does three things:

First he shows how he destroyed local motion with his arguments;

Secondly, how he destroyed the other types of change, at 870;

Thirdly, how in particular he destroyed circular motiong at 871.

863- In regard to the first he lists four reasons, and this is what he says: Zeno used against motion four arguments which have caused difficulty for many of those1who tried to answer them. The first of which is this: If anything is being moved through a certain space, it must reach the middle before it reaches the end. But since the first half is divisible, half of it must be first traversed and so on indefinitely, since a magnitude can be divided ad infinitum. Infinites, however, cannot be traversed in finite time. Therefore, nothing can be moved.

Therefore Aristotle says that he has already answered this argument (in the beginning of this Book VI), when he proved that time is divided ad infinitum in the same way as a magnitude is. This answer is directed more to one who asks whether infinites can be traversed in finite time than to the question, as he will say in Book VIII, (L. 17) where he answers this argument by showing that a mobile does not use the infinites which exist in a magnitude as though they were actually existing, but only as existing potentially. For a thing in motion uses a point in space as actually existing, when it uses it as a beginning and as an end, and it is then that the mobile must be at rest, as will be explained in Book VIII. But if it had to traverse infinites that were actually existing, then it would never reach the end.

864. The second argument is given at (662) and he says that they called this one the “Achilles”, as though it were invincible and unanswerable. The argument was this: If anything is being moved, it follows that a slower thing, if it started earlier, will never be caught by anything moving most rapidly. And it was proved in the following way: If a slower object began to be moved for some time before a very swift one, then in that time it has traversed some distance. Therefore, before the very swift one in pursuit could reach the slower, which is still running, it must leave the place first left by the pursued and reach the place which the pursued reached during the time the pursuer was not in motion. But the very fast pursuer must traverse this space in some time, during which the slower has meanwhile traversed a certain space, and so on forever. Therefore, the slower always has “something ahead”, i.e., is always some distance ahead of the most swift pursuer, and so the swifter will never catch the slower. But this is unacceptable. Therefore, it is better to say that nothing is moved.

865. In solving this argument he says that it is the same as the first, which proceeded by dividing the distance into two halves and then continually halving one part of the remainder. But the difference between them is that in the second the given magnitude of space is not divided into halves but according to the difference between the swift and the slower motion. For in the first period of time in which only the slower was in motion, there is a greater magnitude involved; in the second period (in which the faster traversed the distance covered by the slower between its start and the start of the faster), which is a shorter time period, a smaller magnitude was traversed by the slower, and so on forever. Hence, the.time and the magnitude are always being divided and that seems to be the reason why the slower is never caught by the swifter,

But this tends to the same thing as what was said of the division of the magnitude into halves; because in both arguments it seems that the mobile cannot reach a certain goal on account of the magnitude’s being infinitely divided, no matter how it happens to be divided, i.e., whether according to halves, as happens in the first argument, or according to the excess of the faster over the slower, as in the second argument. However, in this second argument it is further added that the very swift cannot reach the slower, which it is pursuing. This “tragic” phraseology employs inflated language in order to excite wonder, but it does not do anything to the force of the argument.

Hence it is clear that the solution of the two arguments is the same. For just as a false conclusion was reached in the first argument, namely, that the mobile would never reach the end of the magnitude on account of the infinite division of the magnitude, so also what the second argument tries to conclude is false, namely, that the slower will never be,caught by the swifter, which is just another way of saying that a mobile will never reach its goal.

Now, it is true that as long as the slower is ahead, it is not yet reached by the swifter. But yet it will at some time be reached, if you concede that a finite magnitude can be traversed in finite time. For the swifter pursuing mobile will traverse the whole distance by which the slower is ahead and even more, in less time than the slower was meantime moving farther ahead. Proceeding in this way the swifter will not only catch but pass the slower. These therefore are the solutions to two of Zeno's arguments.

866. The third argument is given at (663) and he says that the third argument of Zeno was the one cited above (before he began to give the arguments): namely, that an arrow in flight is always at rest. And as was said above, this seems to happen, because Zeno supposed that time is made up of instants. For unless that be granted, the syllogism fails.

867. He sets out the fourth argument at (664). Concerning which he doea three things:

First he sets out the argument;

Secondly, the solution, at 868;

Thirdly, he explains it by an example, at 869.

First therefore he says that the fourth argument of Zeno proceeded from some bodies which move in a stadium so that there are two equal magnitudeE which are moved in an equal manner, that is, through a space in the stadium equal to both in quantity, and this motion is a contrary one, i.e., one of the equal magnitudes is moved through that space of the stadium toward one part, and the other toward the other part, in such a way, however, that one of the mobile magnitudes begins to move from the terminus of the stadium which is equal to it, and the other begins to move from the middle of the stadium or of a space in the given stadium; both move with equal velocity. This being given, Zeno held that it would result in a half time equalling a double time. Since this is impossible, he intended to infer further that it is impossible for anything to be moved.

868: Then at (665) he gives the solution. He says that Zeno was deceived in this, that he held that on the one hand the mobile is moved according to the moved magnitude, and on the other he held that it was moved according to a quiescent magnitude equal to the moved magnitude. Because an equal velocity of the moved bodies is supposed, he wanted to conclude that the motion of equally swift bodies in regard to equal magnitudes, one of which is in motion and the other standing still, is done in equal times This is seen to be false for the following reason:

When something is moved in relation to a quiescent magnitude, there is only one motion; but when something is moved in relation to a moving magnitude, there are two motions. If they are moving in the same direction it takes more, if they are moving in opposite directions it takes less time according to the amount of either motion. If the magnitude in relation to which something.mobile is moved, is moved in the same direction with an equal velocity or even a greater velocity, the other moving body can never pass it. If the magnitude moves with less speed, it will pass by it at a certain time, but it will take more time than if it were quiescent. It is quite the contrary if the magnitude is moved opposite the direction of the other body. The more swiftly the magnitude moves, the less time the other body takes to pass it, because both motions work together to pass each other.

869. Then at (666) he makes clear what he said in the latter part. Suppose that there are three magnitudes equal to each other, each designated as A, and these magnitudes are standing still; thus there might be a space of three cubits, each one of which is marked by an A. There are another three magnitudes all equal and designated as B, as there might be one moving unit of three cubits. These magnitudes begin to move from the middle of the space. There are also three other magnitudes, equal in number, size and velocity to B, and designated as 0. These begin to move from the last space, that is from the last A.

This being given, it occurs that the first R by its motion arrives at the last A and likewise the first C by its motion arrives at the first A, opposite the last. When this has been done, it is evident that this first C has passed all the A’s, but B has passed by only half. Since, therefore, R and C are equal in velocity, and an equal velocity passes by a smaller magnitude in less time, it follows that the time in which B travels to the last A is half the time in which C arrives at the first A opposite; in equal times C and B pass each section of A.

This being supposed, namely, that the time in which B arrives at the last A is half the time in which 0 arrives at the first A opposite, it must be further considered how Zeno wished to conclude that this half time is equal to its double, For from the supposition that the time of the motion of C is double the time of the motion of B, it is supposed that, in the first half of the time, B was still and C moved, and thus C in that half of the time arrived at the middle of the space, where B was; and then B began to move to one part and C to another. When Rarrived at the last A it had to pass all the C’s, because at the same time the first B and the first C are at contrary ultimates; namely, one at the first A and the other at the last, and as he said, C is next to each B, in the same amount of time as it takes to pass each one of the A’s. This is so, because both, namely Rand C, pass one A in the same interval of time. Thus it seems that if B covers a time equal to that in which it passes C, that C, in an equal interval of time, passes B and A. Therefore, the interval in which C passes all B’s is equal to the time in which it passed all the A’s. The time in which C passed all the B’s is equal to the time in which C or B passed the middle of the A’s, as was said. But it was proved that the time in which B passed the middle of the A’s is half the time in which C reached all the A’s. Therefore, it follows that the half is equal to the double, which is impossible.

This is the argument of Zeno. But he falls into the aforesaid error; namely, he assumes the fact that C in the same interval of time crosses B moving in a counter direction and A quiescent, which is false, as was said above.

[In this description of St. Thomas, since 0 is supposed to pass all the A’s, he is careful to have Cc first begin from the last A and come to the middle, while meanwhile B is motionless. This is not in the text of Aristotle.]

870, Then at (667) he gives the argument by which Zeno rejected change between contradictories. For he said: Whatever is being changed is in neither of the extremities while it is being changed, because while it is in the terminus a quo it is not yet being changed, and while it is in the terminus ad quem it has already been changed. Therefore, if something is being changed from one contradictory to another, as from non-white to white, it follows that while it is being changed, it is neither white nor black —which is impossible.

Now although this strange conclusion would follow for those who posit that an indivisible can be moved, yet for us who posit that whatever is being moved is divisible, nothing impossible follows. For even though it is not totally in one or other of the extremes, it is not for that reason neither white nor non-white, For one part could be white and the other non-white. For a thing is called white not only when all of it is white but also when very many or its main parts are white, i,e., the parts that are expected to receive whiteness, because it is one thing not to be something at all and another not to be entirely something, for example, white or non-white.

And what has been said of white and non-white is to be understood of unqualified being or non-being and of all things that are contradictorily opposed, as hot and non-hot and so on. For what is being changed must always be in one of the opposites, because it is described in terms of whichever opposite predominates in it, But it does not follow that it is always as a whole in neither of the extremities, as Zeno supposed.

Now it should be known that this answer is sufficient to refute Zeno’s argument and that is what Aristotle’s main intention is. But the truth of this matter will be more fully given in Book VIII. For it is not true in all cases that part is altered or generated after part, but sometimes the whole comes all at once, as was said above. In that case it is not this answer but the one in Book VIII that would apply.

871. Then at (668) he refutes the argument by which Zeno rejected spherical motion. For he said that it is not possible for anything to be moved circularly or spherically or in such a way that the motion is confined within the space occupied by the mobile. And he proved this with the following argument: Anything that is in its entirety and in respect of its parts in one and the same place for a period of time is not in motion but at rest. But all the above-mentioned fulfill these conditions, even when they are apparently in motion. Therefore, they are at once in motion and at rest—which is impossible.

The Philosopher attacks this argument on two points. First, as to the statement that the parts of the moving sphere are in the same place for some time. For Zeno was speaking of the place of the whole, and it is true that while the sphere is in motion, no part passes out of the place of the sphere, but Aristotle speaks of the particular place of each part, according as a part has a place. For it was said in Book IV that the parts of a continuum are in place potentially. But it is evident in spherical motion that a part does change its particular place, although it does not lose the place of the whole, because where one part was, another part succeeds.

Secondly, he attacks the statement that the whole remains in the same place for some time. Against this Aristotle says that even the whole is changing its place. For in order that two places be not the same, it is not required that one of them be entirely outside the other, but sometimes the second place is partly joined to part of the first and partly divided from it, as is clear in things moved in a straight line. For let a body of one cubit be moved from place AB to place BC—both places being one cubit each. While the mobile is being moved from one place to the other, it must partly desert one place and enter the other; for example, it could leave the portion AD of AB and enter the portion BE of BC. Therefore, it is clear that the place DE is distinct from AB, although not entirely, but only partly separated from it.

But if it were assumed that that part of the mobile which entered the second place re-entered part of the place deserted, there would be two places, yet in no way separated—they would differ not really but only in conception, i.e., in the sense that the beginning of the place might be successively called by different letters each time the mobile re-entered it, namely, where the beginning of the mobile is, i.e., some spot in the mobile which is taken as a beginning, Thus there would be two places conceptually but one and the same in reality.

This is how we must understand whatAristotle says here, namely, that it is not the same revolution, when it is taken as beginning at A and as beginning at B and as beginning at C or any other mark, unless you insist that it is the same revolution as to subject, as in the case of “musical man” and “man”, since one happens to the other. Hence it is clear that the mobile is always being moved from one circular place to another and is not at rest as Zeno tried to prove. And it is the same with the sphere and everything else whose motion is confined within the space it occupies, as in the case of a potter’s wheel and a (rotating) pillar or anything of that sort.

LECTURE 12

WHAT IS INDIVISIBLE ACCORDING TO QUANTITY IS MOVED ONLY PER ACCIDENS

872. After answering the arguments of Zeno who tried to disprove motion, the Philosopher now intends to show that a thing incapable of being divided into parts cannot be moved. This will answer the opinion of Democritus, who posited atoms that are per se mobile. About this he does two things:

First he proposes his intention;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 876.

He says therefore first (669) that assuming what we have proved above, it must be said that a thing incapable of being divided into parts cannot be moved, except perchance per accidens, as a point is moved in a whole body in which there is a point, for example, in a line or a surface.

873. To be in motion as a result of something else being in motion can occur in two ways. In one way, when what is moved as the result of something else being moved is not part of the latter, as what is on a ship is being moved when the ship is being moved, and as whiteness is moved with the motion of body, since it is not of the body. In a second way, as a part is moved when the whole is moved.

And because “what is incapable of being divided into parts” has many senses, just as what is capable of being divided into parts” has, he shows how he uses the phrase here and says that here it means what is indivisible in respect of quantity. For some things are indivisible according to species, as when we say that fire or air are indivisible, because they cannot be further resolved into several bodies that differ in species. But in regard to such an indivisible there is nothing to prevent it from being moved. Consequently, Aristotle intends to exclude motion from what is indivisible according to quantity.

874. Because he had said that the part is being moved when the whole is, and someone might say that the part is not moved at all, he adds that there are some motions of parts precisely as parts, that are diverse from the motion of the whole, as a motion of the whole.

This difference is particularly clear in the motion of a sphere, because the speed of the parts near the center is not the same as that of those outside, i.e,, on the exterior surface of the sphere, the speed of whose parts is considered to be the speed of the whole. It is as if there is not just one motion but the motions of many parts involved. For it is evident that whatever traverses a larger magnitude in an equal time is faster. Now, while the sphere is rotating, it is clear that an external part describes a larger circle than an interior part; hence the velocity of the external part is greater than that of an interior part. Yet the velocity of the whole sphere is the same as the velocity of the interior and exterior part.

But this diversity of motions is to be understood in the sense in which motion is ascribed to parts of a continuum, i.e., in a potential sense, Hence, actually there is one motion of the whole and of the parts, but potentially there are diverse motions: those of the parts being different from one another and from the motion of the whole. And so, when it is said that a part is being moved per accidens with the motion of the whole, it is a per accidens which is in potency per se—which is something not true of motion per accidens, when it is taken in the sense that accidents or forms are said to be moved per accidens.

875. Having made a distinction among things that are moved, he explains his intention. And he says that what is indivisible in respect of quantity can indeed be moved per accidens when something else is moved, but it is not moved as a part, for no magnitude is made up of indivisibles, as we have proved. Now, something not a part of another is moved along with the other in the same way that one sitting in a ship is moved along with the motion of a ship. But per se the indivisible cannot be moved.

He had proved this point previously, not as a main proposition but incidentally. Hence, in addition to the reason cited earlier, he now gives a further explanation of the truth and adds reasons that are strong enough to prove the proposition.

876. Then at (670) he proves his point with three arguments. The first of which is this: If it is insisted that an indivisible can be moved, let it be moved from AB into BC. (In this argument it makes no difference whether AB and BC are two magnitudes or two places, as in local motion and growth and decrease, or whether they are two qualities, as in the motion of alteration, or two things that are contradictorily opposed, as in generation and ceasing-to-be.) Let ED be the time in which something is changed from one terminus to the other first, i.e., not by reason of a part. In this time, then, it is necessary that what is being moved be either in AB, i.e., in the terminus a quo,or in BC, i.e., in the terminus ad quem; or else a part is in one terminus and a part in the other. For anything being moved must be in one of these three ways, as was said above.

Now the third situation is impossible; namely, that it be in each term according to its various parts, because then, the mobile would be divided into parts, and we have assumed that it is an indivisible mobile. Likewise, it cannot be the second alternative, i.e., that it be in BC, i.e., in the terminus ad quem, for when it is in the terminus ad quem, it has been already changed (as is clear from what we have said above), whereas we are assuming that it is being changed. What remains, therefore, is that in the entire time that the indivisible is being changed it remains at AB, i.e., in the terminus a quo, From which it follows that it is at rest, for resting is nothing more than to be in one and the same state throughout a definite period of time. For since there is a prior and a subsequent in time, if time is divisible, whatever for a period of time is in one and the same state keeps itself the same; namely, as it was previously—which is to rest. But it is impossible that a thing is at rest while it is being changed. Therefore, it cannot be that an indivisible is moved or changed in any way whatsoever.

The only way in which there could be motion of an indivisible thing is to have the time composed of “now’s”, because in the “now” there is always a condition called “having been moved” or “having been changed”.

And because what has been moved, precisely as such is not now being moved, it follows that in the “now” nothing is being moved, but has been moved. But if time were made up of “now’s”, there would be a way in which motion could be nosited in an indivisible, because it could be granted that in each of those “now’s” of which time is composed, it would be in one, and in the whole time, i.e., in all the “now’s”, it would be in many. And thus it would be in motion throughout the entire time, but not in one “now”.

But it has been proved above that it is impossible for time to be made up of “now’s”. Indeed, we have proved that neither is time composed of now’s nor a line of points, nor a motion of moments (where “moments” refers to states called “having been changed”). For anyone who says that an indivisible is being moved or that motion is composed of indivisibles is making time be composed of “now’s” or a magnitude of points—which is impossible. Therefore, it is also impossible that a thing incapable of being divided into parts be moved.

877. The second argument is given at (671). He says that if we look at the consequences, it is clear that neither a point nor any indivisible can be moved. And this special argument applies to local motion. For whatever is being moved according to place cannot traverse a distance greater than the mobile itself before traversing one that is equal to or less than it; rather, a mobile always traverses a magnitude equal to itself or less than itself before one greater than itself. If this is so, then it is clear that a point, if it is being moved will first traverse a length less than or equal to itself, before it traverses one greater than itself. But it is impossible for it to traverse something less than itself, since it is indivisible. So it has to traverse a length equal to itself. Consequently, it must number all the points in the line; for the point, since it is being moved through a motion equal to a line, is by that very fact being moved through the whole line, and, consequently, is always measuring the whole line—and this it does by counting all the points. Therefore, it follows that a line arises from points. Therefore, if this is impossible, it is impossible for an indivisible to be moved.

878. The third argument is at (672) and is this: Since motion is always in a period of time and never in a “now”, and since all time is divisible, as was shown above, then in every time in which something is . moved, there must be a lesser time in which a lesser mobile is moved. For, supposing the same speed, it is plain that in a lesser time the lesser mobile crosses a given mark than does a greater mobile, as in a lesser time the part than the whole, as is evident from what is above. If, therefore, a point is in motion, there must be a time less than that in which it is moved. But this is impossible, for it

would follow that in that lesser time something less than a point would be moved, and thus the indivisible would be divisible into something less, just as time is divisible. This would be the only condition under which the indivisible could be in motion, namely, if it were possible for something to be moved in an indivisible “now”, for just as there is nothing smaller than the “now” in time, so one cannot take a smaller mobile.

And so it is evident that in the two questions—that of motion in a “now” and that of an indivisible being moved—the same principle is involved. But it is impossible for motion to occur in a “now”. Therefore, it is impossible for an indivisible to be moved.

LECTURE 13

BY NATURE, NO CHANGE IS INFINITE. HOW MOTION MAY BE INFINITE IN TIME

878. After showing that things which cannot be divided into parts are not moved, the Philosopher now intends to show that no change is infinite, This is against Heraclitus, who supposed that things are always in motion. About this he does two things:

First he shows that no change is infinite according to its own species;

Secondly, how there can be infinites in time, at 883,

About the first he does two things:

First he shows for all changes except local motion that no change is infinite according to its species;

Secondly, he shows the same thing for local motion, at 881.

880. The first reason is this: Every change is from something to something. Indeed, in some changes, namely, those which occur between contradictories, as do generation and ceasing-to-be, or between contraries, as do alteration and growing and decreasing, it is evident that they have pre-defined termini. Hence in changes that occur between contradictory termini, the terminus is either affirmation or negation, as the terminus of generation is a being, and that of ceasing-to-be, non-being.

Likewise, in regard to changes that are between contraries, the contraries are termini at which, as at ultimate goals, changes of this kind are terminated. Hence it follows, since every alteration is from contrary to contrary, that every alteration has some terminus.

The same must be said for growth and decrease, for the terminus of growth is perfect magnitude (and I say “perfect” in respect of the nature, for a different perfection of magnitude befits man from the one that befits a horse), and the terminus of decrease is the one that happens to a definite nature to be most removed from perfect magnitude.

Consequently, it is evident that each of the above-mentioned changes has a goal at which it is terminated. But such a situation precludes the infinite. Therefore, none of these changes can be infinite.

881. Then at (674) he proceeds to local motion. And first he shows that the argument in regard to local motion is not the same as for the other changes. For it cannot be proved that local motion is finite (as we have proved other motions are finite), because it is terminated at something contrary or contradictory, for not every local motion is between strict contraries, where contraries refer to things most distant.

There is a maximum distance in the strict sense in the natural motions of heavy and light bodies, for the place of fire is at a maximum distance from the center of the earth, in accordance with the distance that nature determines for such bodies. Hence, such changes are between strict contraries, Hence, it can be proved of such changes that they are not infinite any more than the others were.

But maximum distance in compulsory or voluntary motions does not depend strictly on certain definite termini but on the intention or energy of the one causing the motion, who either does not desire to or cannot physically move something any farther. Hence, it is only in a qualified sense., ere is maximum distance and a consequent contrariety. Hence, if you stick with the termini, it cannot be proved that no local motion is infinite.

882. Consequently, this must be proved by another argument, which is this: What is impossible to exist divided cannot be divided, And because things are said to be impossible in many senses, name, what never can occur or what cannot occur except with great difficulty, he therefore explains his meaning of “impossible” here. And he means it in the sense of that which cannot happen at all. For the same reason, what is impossible to have been made, is impossible to make; for example, if it is impossible that contradictories be together, it is impossible that this be brought about. For the same reason, what is impossible to have been changed into something cannot be changed into it, because nothing tends toward the impossible. But

everything that is being changed according to place is being changed into something. Therefore, it is possible through that motion to arrive at something. But the infinite cannot be gone through. Therefore, nothing is moved through the infinite. Thus, therefore, no local motion is infinite.

And so it is universally evident that no change can be infinite in such a way that it be not terminated by definite termini from which it derives its species.

883. Then at (675) he shows how motion can be infinite in time. And he says that we must consider whether motion can be infinite in time in such a way that it remains numerically one and the same motion. For there is nothing to prevent motion from enduring through infinite time as long as it is not one and the same motion. But he leaves that matter in doubt when he adds “perhaps”, because he will settle the matter later. And he gives an example: Let us say that after a local motion there is an alteration, and after that a growing, and after that generation, and so on ad infinitum. In this way motion could always endure throughout infinite time. And it would not be one and the same numerical motion, because a series of such motions as are given in the example do not form one numerical motion, as we have proved in Book V. But that motion endure throughout infinite time in such a way that it remain one numerical motion can occur in only one species of motion, for a circular motion can endure as one and continuous throughout infinite time, as will be proved in Book VIII.

BOOK VII

LECTURE 1

IT IS NECESSARY THAT WHATEVER IS MOVED, BE MOVED BY ANOTHER

884. After discussing motion in itself, and the concomitants of motion, and the division of motion into parts, in the preceding books, the Philosopher now begins to treat of motion in its relationship to movers and things moved, i.e., the mobiles. The treatment falls into two parts;

In the first he shows that there is a first motion and a first mover;

In the second he investigates the properties of the first motion and of the first mover, in Book VIII.

The first part is divided into two sections:

In the first he shows that there is a first motion and a first mover.

And because things that belong to one order are mutually related, therefore in the second part he compares the various types of motion (L-7).

About the first he does three things:

First he mentions the pre-notes needed for proving the proposition;

Secondly, he proves the proposition (L. 2).

Thirdly, he proves something he took for granted (L. 3)

885. He proposes therefore first (676) that everything that is being moved is necessarily being moved by some other. In some cases this is indeed evident, for there are some things which do not possess in themselves the principle of their motion; rather the principle of their motion is from without, as in things which are being moved by compulsion. Therefore, if there is anything that does not have in itself the principle of its own motion but its principle of motion is from without, it is clear that it is being moved by some other. However, if there is a mobile which does have in itself the principle of its own motion, there could be doubt whether it too is being

moved by some other. Accordingly, he devotes himself to showing that this type of mobile is being moved by some other. Therefore, if it is supposed that such a mobile is not being moved by some other, let AB be a mobile capable of being moved primarily and according to itself and not in the sense that some part of it is being moved; for then it would not be being moved according to itself, but according to a part. Now it is necessary that if something moves itself without having been moved by some other, that it be moved primarily and per se; for example, if something is hot not from some other source, it must be primarily and per se hot.

With this in mind, he proceeds to prove his proposition in two ways:

First by excluding the most evident case in which it would appear that something is not being moved by some other;

Secondly, by proving directly that nothing can be moved by itself, at 886.

The most evident reason why it seems that something is not being moved by some other is that it is not being moved by something outside itself but by an intrinsic principle.

He says therefore first (676 bis) that to believe that AB is being moved by itself because the whole is being moved, and this without being moved by anything outside of it, is like saying that, when one part of a whole is being moved and another part causes it to be moved, it is moving itself, because it is not evident which part is the mover and which is being moved. Such would be the case if a mobile DEZ is such that one part DE moves the part EZ and it is not seen which part moves the other, and which is being moved.

When he speaks of the first mobile AB as being moved as a whole by an intrinsic principle of motion, he means a living body which is, as a whole, being moved by the soul; but when he speaks of the mobile DEZ he means some body that is not being moved as a whole but one bodily part of it is the mover and another the moved. In this latter case, it is evident that what is being moved is being moved by some other. From this latter case he wants to prove of a living body that seems to move itself that it too is being moved by some other. For it seems to move itself inasmuch as one part moves another, i.e., as the soul moves the body, as will be more fully explained in Book VIII.

886. Then at (677) he proves directly that whatever is being moved is being moved by some other. This is his argument: Nothing that is being

moved by itself rests from its motion on account of some other mobile’s resting. (He takes this as per se evident). From this he further concludes that if a mobile rests on account of the rest of another, then the mobile is moved by another. On this ground he concludes that. necessarily whatever is being moved is being moved by some other. And that this follows from the premisses, he now proves.

That mobile which we have supposed as being moved by itself, i.e., ABI must be divisible, for whatever is being moved is divisible, as was proved above. Hence, because it is divisible, nothing prevents it from being divided. Therefore, let it be divided at the point C so that one part of it is PC and the other part AC. Now, if PC is part, of AB, then when the part BC rests, the entire AB must rest. But if upon the part resting, the whole does not rest, let us grant that the whole is being moved and one part is at rest. But because we have assumed that one part is resting, the whole could not be granted as being moved except by reason of the other part. Therefore, when BC (which is one part) is at rest, the other part AC is being moved. But no whole of which one part only is being moved is being moved primarily and se. Therefore AB is not being moved primarily and per se, as we originally assumed. Therefore while BC is at rest, the entire AB must be at rest. Thus, what is being moved ceases to be moved upon the occasion of something else resting. But above we held that if something rests and ceases to be moved on the occasion of another’s resting, it is being moved by that other. Therefore, AB is being moved by some other.

The same argument applies to any other mobile, for whatever is being moved is divisible and, for the same reason, if the part rests the whole rests. Therefore, it is clear that whatever is moved is moved by some other.

887. Many objections are leveled against this argument of Aristotle. For Galen objects against the statement that if just one part of a mobile is being moved and the others are at rest, then the whole is not being moved per se. Galen says this is false, because things that are being moved according to a part are moved per se.

But Galen was deceived by playing on the phrase “per se”. For sometimes it is taken in opposition to per accidens, and then it is true that what is being moved according to a part is being moved per se, as Galen said. But sometimes per se is taken in opposition both to per accidens and to what is according to a part: and in this sense something is said to be not only per se, but also primarily so. And this is the sense in which it was being used by Aristotle in his proof. That he does so is clear, because after concluding, “therefore AB is not being moved per se,” he adds, “whereas it had been assumed that it was being moved primarily and per se.”

888. But a more serious objection is that of Avicenna who says against the argument that it proceeds from an impossible assumption, from which the impossible follows, and not from the assumption that something is being moved by itself. For if we assume that a mobile is being moved first and per se, it is natural that it be moved both according to the whole and according to the parts. Therefore, if it is then assumed that a part is at rest, that is the same as assuming what is impossible. And it is from this added assumption that there follows the impossibility which Aristotle deduces, namely, that the whole is not being moved first and per se, as was assumed.

One might obviate this objection by countering that although it is impossible for a part to rest if you confine yourself to a body of a definite kind, for example, the heaven or fire, yet it is not impossible, if you consider the general definition of body, for body as body is not prevented from being at rest or in motion.

However, Avicenna forestalled such a response. First, because for the same reason it could be said of a whole body that it is not being prevented from resting just because it is a body, just as it is said of the part. Thus it was superfluous to assume, in order to prove the proposition, the division of the mobile and the rest of a part. Secondly, because some propositions are rendered impossible absolutely, if the predicate is repugnant to the subject by reason of its specific difference even though it be not repugnant to it by reason of its genus. For it is impossible for man to be non-rational, although he is not prevented from being non-rational from the fact of his being animal. Thus, therefore, it is impossible absolutely that a part of a body moving itself be at rest, for this is against the nature of any particular body, even though it be not against the common notion of body.

889. With this possible answer rejected, Avicenna solves it in another way. He says that a conditional whose antecedent is impossible and whose consequent is impossible can be true; for example, “If man is a horse, he is a non-rational animal.” It should be conceded, therefore, that it is an impossible assumption that mobile be moving itself and yet have the whole or a part of itself at rest, just as it is impossible for fire not to be hot, for fire

is its own cause of its heat. Hence this conditional is true: “If a part of a mobile moving itself is at rest, the whole is at rest.” But Aristotle, if his words are carefully studied, does not speak of the rest of the part, except in a statement that has the force of a conditional. For he does not say, “Let BC be at rest,” but “If BC is at rest, AB must rest,” and “If the part rests, the whole rests”: and from this true conditional Aristotle proves his proposition.

But, says Averroes, that demonstration is not an absolute demonstration but one of the type called “demonstrating by a sign” or a demonstration “quia”, in which such conditionals are used.

However, this solution is agreeable in regard to what he says about the truth of a conditional but not in regard to the statement that it is a “quia” demonstration, for it seems to be a “propter quid’, because it contains the cause why it is impossible for a mobile to move itself.

To see this, recall that to move oneself is nothing more than to be the cause of one’s own motion. Whatever is its own cause of something must possess it primarily, i.e., first, because what is first in any group is the cause of what comes after it. Hence fire, the cause of heat for itself and for other things, is the first hot thing. But, in Book VII Aristotle showed that there is no first in motion, whether on the side of time or the magnitude or the mobile—for they are all divisible. Therefore, it is impossible to find a first whose motion does not depend on a prior, for the motion of the whole depends on the motions of the parts and is divided into those motions, as was proved in Book VI. Aristotle, therefore, thus shows the cause why no mobile moves itself: it is because there cannot be a first mobile whose motion does not depend on its parts any more than the first being can be a divisible, for the existence of any divisible depends on the parts. Hence this conditional is true “If the part is not being moved, neither is the whole,” just as this one is true “If the part does not exist, the whole does not.”

890. Hence even the Platonists, who assumed that some things move themselves, said that no body or divisible thing moves itself; rather to move itself is a prerogative of a spiritual substance which understands and loves itself (here all operations are being called “motions,” just as Aristotle in Book III of On the Soul calls sensing and understanding by the name of “motions” in the sense that motion is the act of a perfect thing). However, in this Book VII he takes motion as the act of an imperfect thing, i.e., of a thing existing in potency. It is in this sense of motion that no indivisible is

moved, as was proved in Book VI and is here taken for granted. And so it is clear that Aristotle, in stating that whatever is moved is moved by some other, and Plato, in stating that some things move themselves, are here not apart in their opinions but solely in their words.

LECTURE 2

NO PROCESS TO INFINITY IN MOVERS AND MOVED

One must arrive at a first mover unmoved.

891. After showing that whatever is moved is moved by some other, the Philosopher now turns to the proof of his main proposition, namelyq that there exists a first motion and a first mover. About this he does two things:

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 892.

He says therefore first (678) that since it has been proved for all cases that whatever is moved is moved by some other, it must be true even in regard to local motion that whatever is being moved with respect to place is being moved by something else. Now he applies to local motion in particular the very proposition which he proved universally true, because local motion is the first of the motions, as will be proved in Book VIII. Therefore, it is according to this motion that he now proceeds to demonstrate a first mover.

Therefore, let us take something that is being moved in regard to place. This thing is being moved by something else. Now that something else is in turn being moved by something else or it is riot. If it, is not, we have the proposition clinched; namely, that there exists a mover that is immovable, which is a property of the first mover. But if that something else is also being moved by something other, this other is being moved by still another which is itself being moved by yet another mover. This, however, cannot go on ad infinitum, but a halt must be made at some mover. Therefore, there will be a first mover which will be the first cause of the motion, and of such a nature that it is itself not being moved but moves the others.

892. Then at (679) he proves a statement not yet proved. About this he does three things:

First he gives the proof;

Secondly, he shows that the proof he gives is insufficient, at 893;

Thirdly, he supplies what was lacking in the insufficient proof, at 894.

He says therefore first (680) that if it is not granted that there is a first cause of the motion, then, since whatever is being moved is moved by some other, it follows that an infinite series of movers and moved is involved. And he shows that such a situation is impossible.

Let A, then, be something that is being moved in respect of place and let it be moved by B; let B be moved by C, and C by D, and so on ad infinitum in ascending order. Now it is evident that, when something moves by virtue of the fact that it is itself being moved by another, then both the mover and the mobile are being moved simultaneously, just as, when the hand by its motion moves a stick, the hand and the stick are moved at one and the same time. Therefore, B is being moved simultaneously with A, and C with B, and D with C. Therefore, the motion of A and that of all the others exist together and at the same time. And we could have considered one by one each of these infinite motions. Likewise, although each one of these mobiles is being moved by some mover—not in the sense that one is being moved by all, but one by another—nevertheless, even though there be an infinitude of movers and mobiles, yet the motion of each of the mobiles is numerically one motion. And although all the motions are infinite in number, they are not infinite in a privative sense, i.e., as though lacking a boundary, but the motion of each mobile is finite and has its own definite boundaries.

That the motion of each one of the infinite mobiles is numerically one and finite, he proves by the fact that since whatever is moved is moved between two termini, i.e., from something to something, then necessarily according to the diverse ways in which the termini are identical, the motion itself will be one in diverse ways, i.e., numerically, or specifically, or generically.

Motions are numerically the same when they are from the same terminus a quo into the same numerical terminus ad quem, provided that it takes place in the same numerical time and that the numerically same mobile is involved. To explain what he means, he adds that a motion that is numerically one is “from the same into the same”, for example, from this white, i.e., from the same numerical white, into this black, i.e., the same numerical black, and in this same numerical time— because if all the conditions but time were numerically the same, the motion would be not numerically, but specifically one.

But a motion is generically one, when it is in the same predicament, i.e., of substance or some other genus; for example, all generations of substance are generically the same, and all alterations likewise.

But a motion is specifically one, when it is from the same specific terminus to the same specific terminus; for example, every case of blackening, which is from white to black, is specifically the same, and every case of becoming depraved, i.e,, from good to bad, is specifically the same. All this was explained in Book V.

Keeping in mind, therefore, these two facts, namely, that the mover and the moved are being moved together, and that the motion of each of the mobiles can be taken as one and finite, let us take the motion of mobile A and call it motion E, and the motion of B and call it Z, and let the motion of C, D and of all the others following be called IT. Also let the time in which A is being moved be K. Now, since the motion of A is finite, then the time K of that motion is definite and not infinite, because we showed in Book VI that the finite in time corresponds to a finite in motion and an infinite in time corresponds to an infinite in motion. From what we have said, however, it is clear that in the very same time that A is being moved, B is being moved, and so for all the others; hence the motion of all, i.e., the motion EZIT, occurs in finite time. But this motion is infinite, since it is the motion of an infinite number. Therefore it will follow that an infinite motion occurs in finite time, which is impossible. Now why does our conclusion follow? Because in the very same time that A is being moved all the others are being moved and they are infinite in number.

It makes no difference, so far as our proposition is concerned, whether the motion of all the mobiles had equal velocity or not, or whether the lower mobiles move more slowly and in a greater time, because in any case it will follow that an infinite motion occurs in finite time—since each of the mobiles must have a finite rapidity and a finite slowness. However, it is impossible for an infinite motion to occur in finite time. Therefore, it is also impossible that we go to infinity in the series of mobiles and movers.

893. Then at (680) he shows that the foregoing argument is not conclusive. And he says that in the above way we seemed to have demonstrated the main proposition, namely, that one does not go to infinity in the series of movers and mobiles. Yet it is not an efficacious proof, because no impossibility flows from these premisses. For it is possible that there be an infinite motion in finite time, so long as the motion is not one and the same but other and other, insofar, namely, as an infinite number of things are being moved. For there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of things from being moved at once in finite time. And it was this that our argument concluded. For the infinite mobiles were diverse and so their motions were diverse, because for a motion to be one it is required not only that the time be one and that the termini be identical but also that the mobile be one, as was proved in Book V.

894. Then at (681) he shows how to make the argument efficacious.

First, how it can be made efficacious by making another assumption;

Secondly, how it is efficacious all by itself, at 895.

He says therefore first that what is locally and corporeally being moved first and immediately by a mobile mover must be touched by it, as a stick is touched by the hand, or must be continuous with it, as one part of the air is continuous with the next part, or as one part of an animal is continuous with another. And this seems to occur in all, i.e., that the mover is always in contact with the mobile in one of these ways.

Let us therefore take one of these ways, namely, that from all the infinite mobiles and movers there is formed one thing—namely, the whole universe—through some kind of continuity. Since this is something contingent, let us take it for granted and let that whole unit—which is a continuous magnitude—be called ABCD and its motion EZIT. And because someone could say that EZIT was the motion of finite mobiles and so not the motion of an infinite whole, he adds that, so far as our proposition is concerned, it makes no difference whether the magnitude is finite or infinite. For just as when A was being moved in a finite time K, each of the finite mobiles which are infinite in number were being moved at the same time, so also in the same time the entire infinite magnitude will be moved all at once. Therefore, an impossibility follows whichever one is taken, i.e., either a finite magnitude composed of magnitudes infinite in number, or an infinite magnitude whose motion occurs in finite time; for it has been proved above that an infinite mobile cannot be moved in finite time. Therefore the premiss from which this impossibility followed is itself impossible, i.e., that we go to infinity in the series of movers and things moved. It is clear, therefore, that the process of one thing being moved by another does not go on ad infinitum, but a halt must be made and there will exist a first mobile which is being moved by a mover that is immovable.

895. Since our proof depended on an assumption, namely, that all the infinite movers and moved form a continuum and constitute one magnitude, it might seem to someone that the conclusion is not absolute, Consequently, he adds that it makes no difference to the validity of this conclusion that it should have proceeded from this assumption. For an impossibility cannot follow from an assumption that is contingent, even if the assumption be false. Therefore, since the proof led to an impossibility, that impossibility did not follow from our contingent premiss but from some other cause which must be impossible, since an impossibility followed from it. So it is clear that in demonstrations that lead to an impossibility it makes no difference whether a false contingent assumption or something true be joined to what is impossible. For that is shown to be impossible which, by the addition of some false contingent statement, gives rise to an impossibility, just as if something impossible should follow from it by the addition of a true proposition. For just as an impossibility cannot follow from a true premiss, so neither can it from a contingent one.

896. But someone could say that for all mobiles to form one continuum is not contingent but impossible, for the elements cannot form a continuum with one another and with the heavenly bodies.

But it must be answered that “contingent” and “impossible” are taken in one sense when something is demonstrated about a genus and in another sense when something is demonstrated about a species. When a discussion is about the species, whatever is repugnant either to the genus or the specific difference, which forms the nature of the species, must be regarded as impossible. But when the discussion is about the genus, we can take as contingent anything to which the genus is not repugnant, even though the difference which constitutes a species of that genus is repugnant to it. For example, if I am speaking of animal, I can suppose as a contingent proposition that all animals are winged; but if I go a step further and consider man, it is impossible for this animal to have wings. Now since

Aristotle is here speaking about mobiles and movers in a general way without making applications to particular mobiles, and to be in contact or to be continuous is a matter of indifference if you consider the general nature of mover and mobile, therefore he takes it as contingent that all mobiles mutually form a continuum, even though this is impossible if you consider the mobiles in their specific natures.

LECTURE 3

IN LOCAL MOTION MOVER AND MOVED MUST BE TOGETHER

897. In the previous demonstration the Philosopher had assumed that a mover is continuous, or at least contiguous, with the mobile. This he now intends to prove.

First he proves his proposition;

Secondly, he proves something he had assumed in his proof, (L. 4)

About the first he does two things:

First he states his intention;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 898.

He says therefore first (682) that mover and moved are together. But something is said to be “moved” in two senses. In one sense as the end moves the agent, and such a mover is sometimes distant from the agent it moves; in another sense as that moves which is the actual beginner of the motion. It is of this latter that Aristotle speaks, and that is why he adds “not as that for the sake of which, but as that from which the source of motion is.”

Again, a mover as principle of motion can be immediate or remote. Aristotle speaks of what causes motion immediately and calls it the “first mover” which refers not to what is first in the series of movers but to a mover that is immediate to the mobile.

And because in Book V he had said that things in the same place are together, one might, conclude from that and from the statement that mover and moved are together, that when one body is moved by another they must both be in the same place. Therefore, to prevent this misunderstanding, he adds that “together” is not taken here in the sense of being in the same place, but in the sense that nothing is intermediate between the mover and the moved. It is in this sense that things in contact, or things that are continuous are together, because their extremities are together or are one and the same.

And because in the previous demonstration he proceeded solely along the line of local motion, this does not mean that his proposition is true only in cases of local motion. Therefore, to exclude this possible misunderstanding, he adds that the statement “mover and moved are together” must be taken in a sense common to all motions, for it is found in every kind of motion that mover and moved are together, in the sense explained.

898. Then at (683) he proves his proposition. About this he does two things:

First he enumerates the species of motion;

Secondly, he proves his proposition for each kind, at 899.

He says therefore first (683) that there are three kinds of motion: one is in respect to place and is called “local motion”; one is in respect of quantity and is called “growth and decrease; the third is in respect of quality and is called “alteration.” He makes no mention of generation and ceasing to-be, because they are not motions, as was explained in Book V. However, since generation and ceasing-to-be are the termini of a motion, i.e., of alteration, as was proved in Book VI, then if he proves his proposition inbregard to alteration, it will also be proved in regard to generation and ceasing-to-be.

Now just as there are three kinds of motion, so there are three kinds of mobile and also three kinds of mover. And in all it is true that the mover and the moved are together, as will be shown for each case. But first it must be proved for local motion: which is the first of motions, as will be shown in Book VIII.

899. Then at (684) he proves his proposition for each kind of motion:

First in local motion;

Secondly, in the motion of alteration, in L. 4;

Thirdly, in the motion of growth and decrease, also in L. 4.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows the proposition in cases that are evident;

Secondly, in less evident cases, at 900.

He says therefore first (684) that we must say that whatever is being moved in respect of place is moved either by itself or by something else. To say that something is “moved by itself” can be taken in two senses: first, by reason of the parts, as when we shall prove in Book VIII that in things that move themselves one part moves and another part is moved; secondly, first and per se, i.e., so that the whole moves itself according to itself and as a whole, as when he proved earlier that in this way nothing moves itself. But if it be granted that something is moved by itself in both ways, it is clear that the mover will be in what is being moved, either in the way that a same thing is in itself, or as a part is in a whole, as a soul is in an animal. Thus it will follow that the mover and the moved are together in such a way that nothing exists between them.

900. Then at (685) he proves the same, in regard to things that are moved according to place by something else, in those cases where it is less evident. About this he does three things:

First he distinguishes the ways in which something happens to be moved by something else;

Secondly, he reduces these ways to two ways, at 906 bis;

Thirdly, he proves his proposition for these two ways, at 907.

About the first he does two things:

First he divides the ways in which something is moved by something else into four: pushing, pulling, carrying and twirling. For all motions that are caused by something distinct from the moved are reduced to these four.

901. Secondly, he explains these four ways. First he explains pushing as that which occurs when the mover makes a mobile be distant from him by moving it. Pushing is of two kinds: pushing on and pushing off. Pushing on occurs when the mover pushes a mobile but does not desert it but rather accompanies it to the place it is going. Pushing off (expulsion) occurs when the mover moves a mobile in such a way that it deserts and does not accompany it to the very end of the motion.

902. Then at (687) he explains carrying as a motion based on three other motions; namely, pushing, pulling and twirling, in the same way that what is per accidens is based on what is per se. For that which is carried is not moved per se but per accidens, inasmuch as something in which it exists is being moved; as, for example, when someone is carried by a ship on which he is, or carried by a horse upon which he is. That which carries is moved per se, since one does not proceed ad infinitum in things that are moved per accidens. And thus the first vehicle is moved per se on account of some

motion which is either a push or a pull or a twirls. From this it is clear that carrying is contained in the other three motions.

903. Then at (688) he explains the third way, i.e., pulling. And note that pulling differs from pushing, because in the latter the mover is related to the mobile as terminus a quo of its motion, whereas in pulling he is related as the terminus ad quem. Therefore only what moves something to itself is said to "pull." However, the act of moving something to oneself in respect of place occurs in three ways: first in the way that an end moves, i.e., in the sense in which the poets declare that the end is said to pull, when they say that one's own desire pulls him. It is in this sense that a place may be said to pull what is naturally moved to a place.

In a second way something is said to pull something else, when it moves it to itself by altering it somehow, so that as a result the altered object is moved in respect of place. It is in this way that a magnet is said to pull iron. For just as the generator of a thing moves heavy and light things inasmuch as it gives them the form through which they are moved to their place, so the magnet confers some quality on the iron by which it is moved toward itself. That this is true he makes clear by three facts:

First, because a magnet does not draw iron from just any distance but within a certain limit of nearness. But if the iron were moved to the magnet only as to an end in the way that a heavy body is moved to its place, it should do so no matter how great the distance they are separated by.

Secondly, because if the magnet be covered with oil, it cannot draw the iron, because the oil impedes the altering quality or modifies it.

Thirdly, because in order that a magnet attract iron, the iron must first be rubbed by the magnet, especially if the magnet is weak. It is as though the iron receives from the magnet some power by which it is moved toward it. Thus a magnet pulls the iron not only as an end but as a moving cause and as an altering cause.

In a third way something is said to pull something else, because it moves it to itself in respect of local motion only. And it is in this sense that Aristotle here defines "pulling," i.e., in the sense that one body pulls another in such a way that the puller accompanies what it pulls.

904. This, therefore, is what he says, namely, that pulling occurs "when the motion of what pulls something toward itself or toward something else is swifter but not separated from what is pulled." And he says "toward itself

or toward something else," because a voluntary mover can use something else just as itself; hence such a mover can both push something from something else as from itself, and pull something toward something else as toward itself. However, this does not happen in natural motions, where a natural push is always away from the pusher and a natural pull is toward the puller.

He said, "when the motion is swifter," because sometimes what is pulled is being moved toward its objective by its own motion, but is compelled by the puller to move with a swifter motion. And since the puller acts by its own motion, the motion of the puller must be swifter than the natural motion of what is being pulled.

The reason for saying, "not separated from what is being pulled," is to distinguish it from a push. For in some pushes the pusher separates itself from the object pushed and in some not, whereas the puller is never separated from what is pulled; indeed, both the puller and the pulled are moved at once.

Finally he said, "to itself or to something else" because a pull can be toward the puller or toward something else, as was explained for voluntary motions.

905. Since there are motions in which the presence of a pull is not clearly evident, he shows that even those are reduced to the types mentioned, i.e., that they are directed toward the puller or toward something else. And this is what he says, namely, that all other types of pulling which are not called "pull" are reduced to these two types, because they are specifically the same as one or the other of these two, insofar as a motion derives its species from its terminus—for the motions he has in mind are either toward the puller or toward something else, as is evident in inhaling and exhaling. For "inhaling" is pulling air in, and "exhaling" is pushing it out; likewise, spitting is the pushing out of spittle. The same is to be said of all those other motions by which bodies are expelled or drawn inwards, because emitting is reduced to pushing out and receiving to pulling.

In like manner, spathesis is a type of pushing and kerkisis is a type of pulling. The former comes from the Greek word for sword; hence spathesis is to cut with a sword, which is done by pushing. Kerkisis, however, is from the Greek word "kerkis"—which refers to a weaver's tool which he pulls toward himself as he weaves, called in Latin “radius” (hence another text has “radiatio”).

These two motions, and indeed all cases of emitting or receiving are either a gathering, which pertains to drawing toward, the gatherer being one who moves something to something else, or a scattering, a scatterer being one who pushes, for a push is a motion of one thing from another. In this way it is clear that all local motion is either a gathering or a scattering, because every local motion is either from something or toward something. Consequently, all local motion is either a pushing or a pulling.

906. Then at (689) he explains twirling as a motion composed of a pull and a push, for when something is twirled, it is on the one hand pushed, and on the other being pulled.

906 bis. Then at (690) he shows that the four general ways are reduced to pushing or pulling, and that whatever can be said of all four is contained in these two. For, since carrying consists of the other three, and twirling is composed of a push and a pull, what remains is that every local motion caused by a mover is reduced either to a push or a pull. Hence it is evident that if the mover and moved are together in the motions of pulling and of pushing, so that the pusher is together with what is being pushed, and the puller with what is being pulled, then it is universally true that there is nothing between the mover, in respect of place, and what is moved.

907. Then at (691) he proves his proposition for these two motions;

First he presents two arguments that prove the proposition;

Secondly, he answers an objection, at 908.

The first argument is based on the definition of the two motions: for a “push” is a motion from the mover or from something else into something else; consequently, at the beginning of the motion the pusher must be together with what is being pushed, at least when the pusher removes from himself or from something else the object that is being pushed. A “pull,” however, is a motion toward the puller or toward something else, as we have said; a motion, I say, in which the puller is not separated from what is being pulled. Hence it is clear that in these two motions the mover and the moved are together.

The second argument is based on gathering and scattering. For it was said above that pushing is scattering and pulling is gathering. Now, no one gathers (synosis) or scatters (diosis) without being present to the things he is gathering or scattering. Therefore, it is clear that in pulling and in pushing the mover and the moved are together.

908. Then at (692) he answers an objection that could be lodged against the push. For it was said of pulling that the motion of the puller is not separated from what is being pulled. But in pushing it was said that the pusher is in certain cases removed from the object pushed. Such a case of pushing is called “projection,” which occurs when something is pushed with some force into the distance. Hence it seems that in this case the mover and the moved are not together.

To answer this he says that projecting occurs when the motion of what is thrown becomes faster than its natural motion on account of a strong impulse. For when something is projected by a strong push, the air is moved with a motion swifter than its natural motion, and with air’s motion the projected body is carried along. And so long as the air stays pushed, so long does the projectile remain in motion. This is what Aristotle says, namely, that when such a push is made, so long as there remains in the air a motion stronger than its natural motion, so long does the projectile remain in motion.

Thus, with this objection answered, he concludes that the mover and the moved are together, and that nothing intervenes between the two.

LECTURE 4

IT IS SHOWN IN ALTERATION, AND GROWTH AND DECREASE, THAT MOVER AND MOVED ARE TOGETHER

909. After showing that the mover and moved are together in local motion, he shows the same for alteration, i.e., that there is nothing between the thing altered and the cause of the alteration. This he proves first by induction at (693). For in all things that are altered, it is clear that the last thing altering, and the first thing altered, are together. However this seems to suggest a difficulty in certain alterations, e.g. when the sun heats the air without heating the intermediate orbs of the planets, or when a certain kind of fish held in a net shocks the hand of the one holding the net without shocking the net.

To this it must be said that things which are passive undergo the action of things that are active in their own special way, and therefore the intermediate between the first cause of an alteration and the last thing altered undergo something from the first cause, but perhaps not in the same way as the last thing affected. For the net undergoes something from the fish that causes the shock, but not a shock, because it is not capable of being shocked. And the intermediate orbs of the planets receive something from the sun, namely, its light, but not its heat.

910. Secondly, at (694) he proves the same thing by an argument, which is this: Every alteration is similar to an alteration which affects a sense. But in an alteration which affects a sense the cause of the alteration and the thing altered are together. Therefore, the same is true in every alteration.

To prove the major premiss, he says that every alteration takes place according to a sensible quality, which is the third species of quality. For bodies are apt to be altered in respect of those qualities by which bodies are primarily distinguished one from the other, i.e. in sensible qualities, such as heaviness, light-ness, hardness and softness, which are perceived by touch, sound and non-sound, which are perceived by hearing. (However, if sound is considered in act, it is a quality of the air, resulting from a local motion; consequently, it does not seem that there can be a primary and per se alteration according to a quality of this sort. But if sound is taken in an aptitudinal sense, then it is through some alteration that something becomes soundable or non-soundable.) There are also blackness and whiteness, which pertain to sight; sweetness and bitterness, which pertain to taste; dryness and wetness, density and rarity, which pertain to touch. The same goes for the contraries of these and for the intermediates. Likewise, there are others which are perceptible by sense, such as cold and heat, smoothness and roughness, which are apprehended by touch.

All these are passions contained within the genus of quality. And they are called “passions” because they produce a passion in the sense (i.e., the senses come to be in the state of being acted upon) or because they are caused by certain passions, as is explained in the Predicaments. But they are called “passions of sensible bodies” because it is in respect of these that sensible bodies differ, inasmuch as one is hot and another cold, one is heavy and another light, and so on, or inasmuch as someone of them is present in two things, more so in one thing and less so in another. Fire, for example, differs from water by reason of the difference of hot and cold, and from air according to more and. less hot. Again, the difference of sensible bodies is based on the ability of some of them to receive one or the other of these qualities, although it not be in them naturally; for example, we say that heated objects differ from cooled objects and sweetened things from things made bitter, not because they are so by nature, but because they have been acted upon by these qualities.

The capacity to be altered in respect of qualities of these kinds is common to all sensible bodies both living and non-living. And some parts of living bodies are animate, i.e., capable of sensing, as the eye and the hand, and some parts inanimate, i.e., incapable of sensing, as the hair and bones, yet in either case all these parts are altered by qualities of this sort, because even the senses in sensing are acted upon. For the acts of the senses, such as hearing and seeing, are motions through the body and involve the sense being acted upon. For the senses have no action independent of a bodily organ, which is a body that is apt to be moved and altered. Hence passion and alteration are more properly spoken of in regard to the senses than to the intellect, whose operation does not take place through a bodily organ.

Thus it is evident that according to whatever qualities and according to whatever ways inanimate bodies are altered, animate bodies are altered according to the same qualities and in the same ways. But not vice versa: for an alteration is found in animate bodies that is not found in inanimate bodies, i.e., the one according to sense. For inanimate bodies do not perceive the alterations they undergo—something that would not be, if they were altered in respect of sense.

Lest anyone believe that it is impossible for something to be altered with respect to a sensible quality without a sensation of the alteration, he adds that this is true not only in inanimate things but also in the animate. For there is nothing to prevent living bodies from not perceiving that they are being affected by a quality, as when something happens in them without the sense being affected; for example, when they are altered in regard to non-sensitive parts.

From this, therefore, it is evident that if the passions of the senses are such that there is nothing intermediate between the agent and the patient, and if it is true that every alteration takes place through passions by which senses are apt to be altered, it follows that the cause of an alteration (when it is producing a passion) and the object acted upon are together, and there is nothing intermediate between them.

911. Then at (695) he proves a second point, namely, that in alterations of the senses, the altering cause and the sense affected are together, because the air is continuous with the sense, for example, of sight, i.e., they are in immediate contacts just as the visible body is in contact with the air. Indeed, the visible body’s surface, which is the subject of color, is terminated at the light, i.e., at air which is illumined, which is terminated at the sense. And so it is evident that the altered air and what alters it are together, as are the altered sight and the air which alters sight. The same is true in hearing and in smelling, if you relate them to the first mover, namely, the sensible body,

for these two senses are affected by an extrinsic medium. Taste, however, and its object are together, for they are not joined by means of an extrinsic medium, and the same goes for touch. Consequently, it remains that inanimate and insensible things are related in the same way, i.e., the cause of alteration and the thing altered are together.

912, Then at (696) he proves the same thing for the motion of growth and decrease. First of all in the motion of growth. For the cause of increase and the very thing that is increased must be together, because growing is a kind of “adding to,” a quantity being increased by adding to it another quantity. The same is true of decrease, because the cause of decrease is the taking away of some quantity.

Now this proof can be understood in two ways. In one way, that the very quantity added or taken away is the immediate mover in these motions, for Aristotle says in On the Soul II that flesh increases because it is quantified. Thus it is clear that the mover and the moved are together, for nothing can be added or taken away from something unless it be together with it.

In another way, this argument can be understood in terms of the principal agent. For adding is a type of gathering and subtracting a type of scattering. But it was proved above that in the motions of gathering and scattering, the mover and the moved are together. Hence, what remains is that even in the motion of growth and decrease, they are together.

In this way, then, he concludes universally that between the last mover and the first moved there is nothing in between.

LECTURE 5

ALTERATION IS NOT FOUND IN THE FOURTH SPECIES OF QUALITY (FORM AND FIGURE),

nor in the first (habit and disposition)

913. Because the Philosopher had assumed in the preceding argument that every alteration takes place in respect of what is sensible, he now undertakes to prove this.

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves the proposition, at 914.

He says therefore first (697) that from what will follow it must be considered that all things that are altered, are altered according to sensible qualities, and that, consequently, to be altered belongs only to those things which are per se affected by such qualities.

914. Then at (698) he proves his proposition a majori.

First he posits the proposition;

Secondly, he proves certain things he assumed, at 915-

He says therefore first (698) that in addition to the sensible qualities (the third species of quality), alteration seems to occur especially in respect to the fourth species of quality, a quality concerned with quantity, namely, form and figure, and to the first species, which contains habits and dispositions. For when such qualities are freshly removed or newly acquired, alteration seems to be involved—for these things seem unable to occur without some changes and a change in respect of quality is alteration, as was said above.

But in the above-mentioned qualities of the first and fourth species, there is no alteration primarily and principally but only in a secondary sense, for such qualities follow upon alterations of the primary qualities, as is clear from the fact that when the underlying matter becomes dense or rare, a consequent change of figure results, In like manner, when it becomes hot or cold, there follows a change in regard to health and sickness, which pertain to the first species of quality. Rare and dense, hot and cold are sensible qualities, and so it is clear that there is not alteration in the first and fourth species of quality primarily and per se; rather the receiving or removing of them are a consequence of some alteration affecting sensible qualities.

From this is also plain why he makes no mention of the second species of quality, i.e., natural potency and impotency. For it is clear that these latter are not received or lost without a change in the nature, which takes place through alteration. That is why he did not mention them.

915. Then at (699) he proves what he had assumed:

First, that alteration does not occur in the fourth species of quality;

Secondly, that it does not occur in the first species, at 918.

In regard to the first he gives two reasons, the first of which (699) is based on the way people speak. Here it must be considered that form and figure mutually differ in this, that figure implies termination of quantity, for the figure is that which is confined by the terminus or termini; but form is something which gives artifacts a kind of species, for the forms of artifacts are accidents.

He says therefore that that from which the form of a statue comes to be is not called a form, i.e., the matter of the statue is not predicated of the statue in principali et recto, and the same for the figure of a pyramid or of a couch; rather in all such cases the matter is predicated denominatively. For we say that a triangle is wooden or golden or waxen. But in things that are altered, we predicate of the subject the quality received by the alteration, for we say that brass is wet and strong and hot, and conversely we say that the wet thing or the hot thing is brass, i.e., we predicate the matter of the quality and the quality of the matter, In fine, we say that a man is a white thing and that some white thing is a man. Therefore, because in forms and figures the matter is not predicated conversely with the figure, so that either could be said of the other in principali et recto, but rather the matter is predicated of the figure only in a denominative way, whereas in things that are altered the subject and the quality are mutually predicated, it follows that in forms and figures there is not alteration but only in sensible qualities.

916. He gives a second reason at (700) and it is based on a property of a thing. For it is foolish to say that a man or a house or anything else is altered just because it receives the end of its perfection. For example, if a house is made perfect when it gets a roof or when it is decorated or enclosed with walls, it is ridiculous to say that the house is being altered when it becomes roofed. It is also clear that alteration does not affect things that come to be, precisely as coming to be; rather a thing becomes perfect and comes to be inasmuch as it receives its own form and figure. Consequently, alteration is not involved in the receiving of figure and form.

917. In order to make these reasons clearer, we should consider that of all qualities in a thing, it is figure that both follows upon the species and indicates the species. This is particularly evident in animals and plants in which there is no more sure way to judge a diversity of species than by a diversity of figure. The reason for this is that just as quantity is the nearest of all the accidents to the substance, so the figure, which is a quality affecting quantity, is nearest to the substantial form. Hence, just as some philosophers supposed that dimensions were the substances of things, so they supposed that their figures were their substantial forms. It is for this reason that an image, which is an express representation of a thing, is based especially on the figure rather than on the color or something else. And since art imitates nature, and an artifact is an image of a natural thing, the forms of artificial things are the figure or something close to the figure. And therefore, on account of the similarity of forms and figures to substantial forms, the Philosopher says that the receiving of form and figure is not alteration but perfection. And that is also why the matter is not predicated of them except denominatively, similarly to the case of natural substances—for we do not say that a man is earth but of earth (terrenus).

918. Then at (701) he shows that there is not alteration in the first species of quality.

First in regard to habits and dispositions of the body;

Secondly, in regard to habits and dispositions of the soul, (L. 6).

In regard to the first, he gives this argument: Habits which are in the first species of quality, even if they be bodily, are called virtues and vices. For in general the virtue of a thing is what makes it good and renders its work good; hence a virtue of the body is that according to which it is well kept in itself and acts well, e.g. health; or, on the other hand, it is a vice, as is sickness.

Now every virtue and vice is spoken of in reference to something else. And this he makes clear by examples. For health, which is a virtue of the body, is a definite harmony of the hot and the cold, and I say that this harmony is in respect to the due proportion of the things beneath, i.e., of the humors, of which the body is composed, both in relation to themselves and to what contains them, i.e., to the whole body. For a proportion of humors that would be health in a lion, would be not health, but destruction, for a man, for his nature would not stand it.

The Commentator refers the phrase “to what contains them” to the surrounding air. But the first explanation is better, because the health of an animal is not considered in relation to the air; rather the disposition of the air is called healthy in relation to the animal.

Likewise, beauty and agility are said in relation to something (“agility” is taken here for the disposition whereby one is disposed for motion and action). For such dispositions are in a thing that is perfect in its nature in comparison to the best, i.e., to the end, which is operation. For, as it was said, such dispositions are called virtues because they make their possessor good and his work good,. Therefore these dispositions are described in reference to their due work, which is the best of a thing.

There is no use trying to explain “best” in terms of something extrinsic, as in the case of what is most beautiful or most healthy, as the Commentator does, for it is accidental to beauty and health that they be related to something extrinsic disposed in the best possible manner; rather what is per se is their relation to a good work.

And lest anyone understand by “perfect” a thing that has already attained its end, he says that “perfect” is here taken in the sense of what is healthy and disposed according to nature. But it must not be supposed here that such habits and dispositions are of their very nature relations, for otherwise they would not be in the genus of quality. The point is that their definition depends on a relation Of some sort.

Therefore, because habits of this kind imply a relation, and in relation there is neither motion nor generation nor alteration, as was proved in Book V, it is clear that in habits of this kind there is not alteration primarily and per se; rather a change follows upon a previous alteration of the hot and the cold or of something of this sort, just as relations begin to exist as a consequence of certain motions or changes.

LECTURE 6

NO ALTERATION IN THE FIRST SPECIES OF QUALITY AS TO HABITS OF THE SOUL

919. After showing that alteration does not occur in the first species of quality in respect of dispositions of the body, the Philosopher shows the same about the habits of the soul.

First as to the appetitive part of the soul;

Secondly, as to the intellectual part of the soul, at 923.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that there is no primary and per se alteration in changes that affect virtues and vices;

Secondly, that changes involving virtue and vice are consequences of other alterations, at 921.

920. He concludes therefore first (702) from the foregoing that with respect to virtues and vices which pertain to the appetitive part of the soul there is no primary and per se alteration. And he mentions this as a conclusion, because he will proceed to prove it with the same arguments as he proved the previous points.

Accordingly, in order to prove this he makes the assumption that virtue is a kind of perfection. And this he proves in the following manner: A thing is perfect when it can attain to its own virtue (or power); for example, a natural body is perfect when it can make something like unto itself, and this is a virtue (or power) of the nature. He also proves this by the fact that a thing is most according to nature when it has the virtue of its nature (for virtue in a nature is a sign that the nature is complete), and when a thing has its nature completely, it is said to be perfect. And this is true not only in natural things, but also in mathematical, where their form is taken as the nature, for it is then that a figure is a perfect circle, namely, when it is most according to nature, i.e., when it has the perfection of that form. In this way, then, it is evident that since the virtue of a thing follows upon the perfection of its form, a thing is perfect when it possesses its virtue. Consequently, virtue is a kind of perfection.

With the premiss proved thus, the Commentator says that the full argument will be this: Every perfection is simple and indivisible; but no alteration or motion can affect what is simple and indivisible; therefore, in respect of virtue there can be no alteration,

But this reasoning will not apply to what Aristotle adds about vices, which are the removal and ceasing-to-be of a perfection. For although a perfection is simple and indivisible, yet the departure from perfection is not simple and indivisible, but occurs in many different ways. Again, it is not the custom of Aristotle to ignore a fact on which the conclusion chiefly depends, unless that fact is implied by something else he mentions.

Therefore, it is better to say that the argument here must be like the one used above for form and figure. For nothing is said to be altered, when it is being made perfect, and for the same reason, when it is being corrupted. Hence, if virtue is a perfection and vice a corruption, there will be no alteration in respect of them any more than there is in respect of forms and figures.

921. Then at (703) he shows that a change in virtue and vice is a result of some alteration. And first he proposes what he intends and says that the receiving of virtue and the removal of a vice, or vice versa, take place when something is altered in such a way that on the occasion of that alteration, there follows the receiving and loss of virtue and vice. Nevertheless, neither of these is a primary and per se alteration.

Then at (704) he proves the proposition and says that it is clear from the following that something must be altered in order that it receive or lose a vice or a virtue.

This is seen to be proved in two ways. First, according to two opinions that men have about virtue and vice. For the Stoics declared that virtues are impassibilities and that no virtue can exist in the soul unless all the passions of the soul are first removed, i.e., fear, hope, and so on, For they said that such passions are disturbances and ailments of the soul, whereas virtue is a peaceful and healthy state of soul. Accordingly, they said that the very capacity to undergo emotion is an evil or vice of the soul.

However, the opinion of the Peripatetics, derived from Aristotle, is that virtue consists in a defined control of the passions. For a moral virtue establishes a mean in the passions, as is said in Ethics II. And according to this, even the vice opposed to a virtue is not any kind of passibility at all, but a certain inclination to the passions contrary to the virtue, which are reckoned in terms of excess and defect.

Now, whichever may be true, the reception of virtue depends on some modification in the realm of the passions, i.e., either that the passions be entirely removed or that they be controlled. But the passions themselves, since they exist in the sense appetite, are subject to alteration. What remains, therefore, is that the receiving and loss of virtue and vice occur as a result of an alteration.

922. Then at (705) he proves the same thing in this way: Every moral virtue consists in some delight or sadness—for a person is not just unless he enjoys just works and becomes sad at their contrary; and the same is true of the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that the activity of every appetitive power, in which moral virtue exists, is terminated at delight or sadness, since delight follows upon the attainment of what the appetite seeks and sorrow upon the attainment of what the appetite dislikes. Hence, a person who desires or hopes is delighted when he attains what he desires or hopes. In like manner, the angry person is delighted, when he punishes. On the other hand, one who fears or hates something becomes sad when the evil he sought to escape occurs. But all sadness and delight are caused either by the actual presence of a thing or by the memory of a past thing or by hope of a future thing. Therefore, if delight concerns an actual present thing, the cause of this delight is a sense, for an agreeable thing does not delight unless it be sensed. Likewise, if the delight is based on memory or on hope, it proceeds from a sense, as when we remember sense pleasures we experienced in the past, or ones we hope to experience in the future. From which it is clear that delight and sadness are based on the soul’s sensitive part, in which alteration occurs, as was said above. If, therefore, delight and sadness are involved in moral virtue and moral vice and it is possible to undergo alteration in respect of delight and sadness, then it

follows that the reception and loss of virtue and vice are consequent upon some alteration.

It is significant that he said the whole of moral virtue consists in delights and sadnesses, in order to distinguish it from intellectual virtues, which also have their own delight. But that delight is not according to sense. Consequently, it has no contrary, nor can there be alteration in respect to it, except in a metaphorical sense.

923. Then at (706) he shows that alteration is not found in the intellectual part of the soul.

First he proves this in general;

Secondly, more in detail, at 924.

In regard to the first (706) he gives this argument. Knowing is especially spoken of as in relation "to something else," i.e., to the knowable, the likeness of which, existing in the knower, is science. This he now proves: It is only in "to something" (relation), and in no other genus, that something happens to a thing without its being changed; for something can become "equal" to something else without itself being changed, the other alone having been changed. Now we can see that even though no change occurs in the intellectual power, knowledge begins to exist in it—for merely on the occasion of something existing in the sensitive part science comes to be. In effect, from experiencing particular things, which pertain to the sensitive part, we receive knowledge of the universal in the intellect, as is proved in Metaphysics I and in Posterior Analytics II. Therefore, since there is no motion in "to something," as was proved above, it follows that there is no alteration involved in receiving science.

924. Then at (707) he shows in detail that there is no alteration in the intellectual part.

First in the case of one who already has science and speculates upon it, which is to use science;

Secondly, in the case of one who receives fresh science, at 925

He says therefore first that, although there is no alteration in the intellectual part of the soul, it cannot be said that the use of science, which is to consider, is a type of generation, any more than we can say that when the eye externally regards an object or when one touches, there is generation. For just as seeing is the act of the visual, and touching is the act of the tactual, potency, so to consider is an act of the intellectual potency.

Now, act does not imply that a principle is being generated, but rather that there is a proceeding from some active principle. Consequently, to understand is neither generation nor alteration. However, there is nothing to prevent an act from following upon generation and alteration, as, subsequent to its generation, fire heats, In like manner, on the occasion of a sense being altered by the sensible, the act of seeing or touching occurs.

925. Then at (708) he shows that there is not generation and alteration when science is newly received.

For whatever accrues to a thing solely through the subsiding of certain disturbances and motions does not accrue through generation and alteration. But science, which is speculative knowledge, and prudence, which is practical reason, accrue to the soul through the subsiding of bodily motions and sensible passions. Therefore, neither science nor prudence accrue to the soul through generation and alteration.

To elucidate this argument he gives examples. For let us suppose that some person who possesses science is asleep or drunk or sick. It is clear that he cannot at such a time use his science and act according to it. But it is also clear that, when the disturbance subsides and the mind returns to its normal state, he can then use his science and act according to it, Yet, we do not say that when a sleeping person is awakened, or someone drunk becomes sober, or when the life of a sick person is restored to due order by health, that he then becomes a knower as though science were newly generated in him, for there already existed in him a habitual potency "to the congruousness of science," i.e., to be restored to a congruous state in which he could use his science.

Now, he says that something like that happens when a person newly acquires science. For this seems to take place on account of a certain quieting and subsiding of "turbulence," i.e., of disordered motions, which are present in boys both in respect of their bodies, because their whole nature is undergoing change by reason of growing, and in respect of their sensitive part, because in them the passions rule.

Hence when he says "quieting," he seems to be referring to disturbances of the body, which are calmed when nature arrives to full estate; and when he rays "subsiding," he seems to refer to the passions of the sensitive part, which are not completely at rest but subside by reason of their being controlled by reason to the extent that they do not disturb the reason. It is in this way that we say that certain liquids have subsided when the dregs descend to the bottom and what is pure remains at the top.

Why is it that youths cannot learn by taking in what is said by others, and why is it they cannot with their internal senses judge about what they hear or somehow comes to their knowledge, as well as older persons can? It is because the former are subject to many disturbances and many commotions, as we said. But disturbances of this sort can be entirely removed or at least mitigated, sometimes by nature, as when a person reaches old age, in which motions of this kind are put to rest, and sometimes by other causes such as by training and habit. It is then that they can learn and judge well. That is why the exercising of the moral virtues, through which passions of this kind are bridled, is of great value in acquiring science.

Therefore, whether the passions are made to subside by the exercise of virtue or by nature, an alteration is involved, since these passions are located in the sensitive part, just as an alteration takes place in the body when a sleeping person arises, and becomes awake, and starts to act.

From this it is clear that newly to acquire science is not an alteration but is a consequence of an alteration.

From this, however, he further concludes universally that alteration can occur in the external senses, in sensible bodies, and in the entire sensitive part of the soul (which he says on account of the interior passions), but in no other part of the soul, except per accidens.

926. What Aristotle says here about receiving science seems to agree with Plato’s opinion. For Plato taught that just as separated forms are the cause of the generation and existence of natural things, in the sense that corporeal matter participates these separated forms in some way, so also they are the cause of science in us, for our soul somehow participates of them, in such a way that it is the very participation of separated forms in our soul which is science. In this way, it will be true that science is newly acquired, not by its being generated in the soul, but merely by the subsiding of bodily and sensitive passions, which prevented the soul from using its science. And in this way it will also be true that even though no change occurs in the intellect, a man becomes a knower by the mere presence of the sensible things of which he has experience, as occurs in relative things. This means that sensible things are not required for knowledge except for the purpose of arousing the soul.

However, Aristotle’s opinion is that science comes to be in the soul through the intelligible species, abstracted by the agent intellect, being received in the possible intellect, as is said in On the Soul III. For which reason, he says in the same place that to understand is certain “undergoing” (passio), although the way the intellect “undergoes” differs from the way the senses do.

It is not unfitting that Aristotle should here make use of the opinion of Plato. For it is his custom to make use of the opinions of others before giving his own, just as in Book III he used Plato’s opinion that every sensible body has heaviness or lightness, the contrary of which he will prove in On the Heavens I.

927. Nevertheless, these arguments based on the opinion of Aristotle are saved. To make this clear it must be considered that a receiver can be related in three ways to a form that is to be received.

For sometimes the receiver is in the final disposition for the reception of the form and no impediments exist either in it or in anything else. Under these conditions, as soon as the active principle is present, the receiver accepts the form without any further alteration, as is evident when air is illumined, the sun being present,

But sometimes the receiver is not in the final disposition required for receiving the form. In that case a per se alteration is required to put into the matter a disposition for this particular form, as, for example, when fire comes to be from air.

Sometimes the receiver is in the final disposition for the form but an obstacle is present, as when air is prevented from receiving light either by closing a shutter, or by the presence of clouds. In these cases, an alteration or changed is required per accidens, i.e., the removal of the obstacle.

Now the possible intellect, considered in itself, is always in the final disposition for receiving the intelligible species. Therefore, if there be no obstacle, then, whenever there are present objects received through experience, there will arise in the intellect an intelligible species, just as an image will appear in a mirror when a body is present. It was on this basis that Aristotle took his first argument, in which he said that science is “to something.” However, if there be an obstacles as happens in youths, then these obstacles must be removed in order to allow the intelligible species to be received in the intellect. In this case an alteration is necessary per accidens.

LECTURE 7

THE COMPARING OF MOTIONS; WHAT IS REQUIRED

928. After the Philosopher has shown that it is necessary to posit a first in mobiles and movers, now, because things which are of one order seem capable of being compared, and because to be “prior” and “subsequent” implies a comparison, he wishes to inquire about comparison of motions. Concerning this he does two things:

First, he shows which motions can be mutually compared;

Secondly, how motions are mutually compared, (L. 9).

About the first he does three things:

First, he raises a question;

Secondly, he objects against both parts of the question, at 929;

Thirdly, he settles the question, at 933.

First he raises a general question (709) and asks whether just any motion at random may be compared to just any other motion or not. Then he raises a special question about motions in some one genus. Now if any motion at random may be compared to just any other motion with respect to swiftness and slowness (it having been said in Book VI that the equally swift is what is moved in equal time over an equal space), it will follow that a circular motion will be equal, or greater, or less, in swiftness than a rectilinear one, and further, that a curved line will be equal to a straight line in quantity, or larger or smaller, from the fact that the equally swift is that which traverses an equal distance in equal time.

Then he raises a question about motions in diverse genera. For if all motions may be compared with respect to speed, it will follow that if in an equal time A is altered, and B is moved locally, then a local motion is equal in swiftness to an alteration. Further, by virtue of the definition of the equally swift, it will follow that a passion, i.e., passible quality, in respect of which there is alteration, is equal to the length of the distance traversed by the local motion. But this is plainly impossibles because they do not agree in the same notion of quantity.

929. Then at (710) he raises objections against the question proposed:

First, he objects against comparing alteration with local motion;

Secondly, against comparing circular motion with rectilinear, at 930.

First (710), therefore, from the foregoing argument which leads to an impossibility, he concludes to the contrary of what he posited, as though saying that, since it has been said that it is not feasible for a passion to be equal to a length, while whenever something is moved through an equal space in equal time, it is said to be equally swift, therefore, since no passion is equal to a length, it follows that a local motion is not equal in swiftness to an alteration, or greater or less. From this it may be further concluded that not all motions can be compared.

930. Then at (711) he considers the other part of the question, i.e., concerning circular and rectilinear motion.

First he objects against a circular motion's being as equally swift as a rectilinear motion;

Secondly, he takes the contrary position, at 932.

About the first he does two things:

First he objects against the proposition;

Secondly, he dismisses a quibbling response, at 931.

He objects first (711) in the following manner. Circular motion and rectilinear are differences of local motion, just as upward and downward are. But as soon as something is moved upwards and something else downwards, it is at once necessary that one be being moved faster or slower than the other—the same is true if the same thing is moved now upwards and later downwards. It seems therefore that in like manner we must say that a rectilinear motion is swifter or slower than a circular one, whether it be the same thing that is being moved in a straight line and in a circular one, or two different things.

It should be noted that in this argument he makes no mention of the equally swift but of the swifter and slower, because this argument is based on the likeness of an upward motion—whose principle is lightness—to a motion which is downward—whose principle is heaviness. Some, indeed, have held that heaviness and lightness are the same as swiftness and slowness—an opinion he rejected in Book V.

931. Then at (712) he rejects a quibble. For someone could concede on account of the foregoing reason that a circular motion is either swifter or slower than a rectilinear ones but not equally swift.

This he rejects, saying that it makes no difference, so far as the present discussion is concerned, once someone grants that it is necessary for what is being moved circularly to be moved more swiftly or more slowly than what is being moved in a straight line. For according to this the circular motion will be faster or slower than the rectilinear. Hence it follows that it could also be equal.

That this follows he now proves. Let A be the time in which the swifter traverses B, which is a circles and let something slower traverse the straight line C in the same time. Now, since the swifter traverses more in the same time, it will follow that circle B is larger than the straight line—that is the way the swifter was defined in Book VI. But we also said in that place that the swifter traverses an equal distance in less time. Therefore, we can take of time A a part during which the circularly moving body will traverse a part of this circle B and during which it will traverse C, while the slower body is traversing C in the entire time A. It will follow, therefore, that that part of the circle is equal to the entire C, because one and the same object traverses an equal distance in equal time. And in this way, a circular line will be equal to a straight line and a circular motion will, consequently, be as fast as a rectilinear.

932. Then (713) he takes the contrary position. For if circular and rectilinear motions may be compared with respect to swiftness, it follows, as just said, that a straight line will be equal to a circular one, for the equally swift is what traverses an equal distance. But a circular line and a straight line cannot be compared, so as to be called equal. Therefore, neither can a circular motion be said to be as swift as a rectilinear.

933. Then at (714) he settles the difficulty he raised.

First he asks in general what may be compared to what;

Secondly, he adapts this to his proposition, (L. 8).

About the first he does three things:

First he states one thing that is required for comparison;

Secondly, a second thing, at 937.

Thirdly, he concludes a third requirement, (at 939)

About the first he does three things:

First he mentions what is required for comparisons;

Secondly, he takes the contrary position, at 935;

Thirdly, he settles the matter, at 936.

934. He says therefore first (714) that things seem to be capable of being compared so long as they are not equivocal, that is, in the line of things not predicated equivocally the subjects of predication may be compared. For example, “sharp” is an equivocal term: for in one sense it is applied to magnitudes, as when an angle is said to be “sharp” (acute) and when a pen-point is said to be “sharp”; in another sense it is applied to savors, as when wine is said to be “sharp” (dry); in a third sense it is applied to notes, as when the ultimate, i.e., highest, note in a melody, or a chord of a lyre is said to be “sharp.”

Now, the reason why no answer can be made to the question, “Which of these is sharpest, the point, the wine or the voice?” is because “sharp” is predicated of them in an equivocal sense. But the highest note can be compared with respect to sharpness to another which is next to it in the scale, because in this case “sharp” is not taken equivocally, but is predicated of both in the same sense.

Therefore, according to this, it could be replied to the proposed difficulty that the reason why a straight motion cannot be compared to a circular one is because the word “swift” is being used equivocally. And much less is the meaning of “swift” the same in respect to alteration and local motion. Consequently, these two are even less capable of being compared.

935. Then at (715) he objects against what was just said. And he says that at first sight it does not seem to be true that things may be compared so long as they are not equivocal. For there are some non-equivocal things which cannot be compared; for example, “much” is used in the same sense when applied to water and to air, yet water and air cannot be compared with respect to muchness.

Now if someone refuses to admit that “much” signifies the same thing on account of its general nature, he will at least grant that “double,” i.e., twice as much as, which is a species of muchness, signifies the same thing in regard to air and to water; for in both cases it signifies the ratio of 2 to 1.

Nevertheless, air and water cannot be compared in terms of double and half, so as to be able to say that the amount of water is double that of the air or vice versa.

936. Then at (716) he answers this objection. About this he does two things:

First he gives the solution;

Secondly, he confirms it by raising another question, at 937.

He says therefore first that it could be said that in “much” and “double” we discern the same reason for their inability to be compared, when they are applied to water and to air, as was discerned in “sharp” when it was applied to pen and wine and note; for “much” itself is equivocal.

Now, because someone could object against this on the ground that the same notion of “much” is referred to when it is applied to both, then in order to reject this, he states that even the notions, i.e., definitions, of certain things are equivocal. For example, if someone should say that the definition of “much” is that it is “this amount and yet more,” “to be this amount” and “to be equal,” which is the same thing, is equivocal, for “to be equal” is to have one quantity, but the definition of “one quantity” is not the same in all things. (The notion of “much,” as used here, implies a comparison in the sense that it is the opposite of “a little,” i.e., it is not taken in its absolute sense of being the opposite of “one.”)

And what he said of “much” he says consequently of “double.” For although the notion of “double” is that there is a ratio of 2 to 1, yet even that notion contains an equivocation, for it could be said that “one” is equivocal; and if “one” is equivocal, it follows that “two” is, because “two” is nothing more than “one” taken twice.

Now it should be observed that there are many things which, when considered in an abstract way in logic or mathematics, are not equivocal, but which are in a certain sense equivocal when they are taken in a concrete way, as the philosopher of nature takes them when he applies them to matter, for they are not taken according to the same aspect in all matter. For example, quantity, and unity (which is the principle of number) are not found according to the same aspect in the heavenly bodies, and in fire and air and water.

937. Then at (717) he confirms what has been said by raising a certain other question. For if it be held that there is one nature of “much” and of

"double" and of other like things which cannot be compared, as there is also one nature of things that are predicated univocally, the question still remains, why it is that among things having one nature some can be compared and some not. For it seems that when things are similar, there should be a same judgment about them.

Then at (718) he answers this question by positing the second requirement for things to be compared. About this he does two things:

First he mentions the second requirement;

Secondly, he shows that even that one is not enough, at 938.

He says therefore first (718) that the reason why some things possessing one nature can be compared, while other things having one nature cannot, could be that when some one nature is received according to one first subject in diverse things, they will be comparable, as horse and dog can be compared with respect to whiteness, one being able to be said "whiter" than the other, because not only is the same nature of whiteness in both, but there is one first subject in which whiteness is received, namely, the surface. In like manner, the magnitude of each may be compared, so that one can be called "larger" than the other, because there is one same subject of magnitude in each, namely, the substance of a mixed body. But water and a note cannot be compared with respect to magnitude so as to say that the note is "greater" than the water or vice versa, because although magnitude in itself is the same, the receiver of it is not the same. For when magnitude is said of water, its subject is a substance, but when it is said of a note, its subject is sound, which is a quality.

938. Then at (719) he shows that this second requirement does not complete the list of requirements, for two reasons. The first of these is this: If things were comparable just because there is a non-differing subject, it would follow that all things have one nature, for it could be said of all things whatsoever that they do not differ except insofar as they exist in some one or other first subject. And according to this, it would follow that "to be equal" and "to be sweet" and "to be white" are one and the same nature, differing only by reason of being received in one or another receiver. And this is seen to be unacceptable, namely, that all things have one nature.

But it should be noted that positing a diversity of things on the sole ground of diversity of subject is a Platonist opinion, which attributed unity to form and duality to matter, so that the entire reason of diversity came from the material principle. That was why he stated that “one” and “being” are predicated univocally, and that they signify one nature but that the species of things are diversified by reason of a diversity of receivers.

The second reason which he gives, at (720), is that not just anything is capable of receiving just anything else at random, but one is primarily the receiver of one; consequently, the form and what receives it are in proportion. Therefore, if there are many first receivers, there must necessarily be many natures capable of being received; or if one nature has been received, then necessarily there is one first receiver.

939. Then at (721) he concludes that there is a third requirement for things to be comparable. And he says that things which can be compared must be not only non-equivocal (which is the first requirement) but must also not possess any difference either on the side of the first subject in which something is received (which is the second requirement) or on the side of what is received, which is a form or a nature (and this is the third).

And he gives examples of this third requirement. For “color” is divided into various species of color; hence it cannot be compared solely on the ground that it is predicated of these colors, even though it be not predicated equivocally, and even though it have one first subject, which is a surface, and which is a first subject of the genus “color”, but not of any species of color. For we cannot say which is more colored, white or black, because this comparison would not be in terms of some definite species of color, but in terms of color in general. But in terms of whiteness, which is not divided into various species, all white things may be compared, so that it can be said which one is whiter.

LECTURE 8

WHICH MOTIONS MAY BE COMPARED

940. After pointing out in general what is required in order that things be able to be compared, the Philosopher now applies the truth found to the comparison of motions.

First in general;

Secondly, by comparing motions that belong to diverse genera, at 941;

Thirdly, by comparing one motion to another in the same genus, at 942.

He says therefore first (722) that just as in other matters the requirements for comparability are that the things compared be not equivocal, and that there be an identical first receiver, and that they be of the same species, so also in regard to motion, “equally swift” is said of things that are moved in equal time, through such-and-such an equal length, with respect to a change of the same kind.

941. Then at (723) he discusses the comparison of motions in diverse genera. And he asks, in keeping with what went before, “If one mobile be altered and another moved locally, can the alteration be said to be ‘as swift as’ the local motion?” To say “yes” would be unacceptable. The reason is that the two motions are of different species—and it has already been said that things not of the same species cannot be compared. Therefore, since local motion is not of the same species as alteration, the swiftness of the two cannot be compared.

942. Then at (724) he discusses the comparison of motions in some one species within some one genus.

First as to change of place;

Secondly, as to alteration, at 949;

Thirdly, as to generation and ceasing-to-be, at 954.

(He makes no mention of growth and decrease, because they share with local motion the common characteristic of being according to some magnitude,)

In regard to the first he does three things:

First he shows what is required in order that two local motions be able to be mutually compared;

Secondly, he shows that one factor which seems to be required is not, at 945;

Thirdly, he concludes to what he chiefly intended, at 946.

About the first he does two things:

First he concludes to the impossibility that would follow if all local motions could be compared;

Secondly, he tells why not all can be compared$ at 944.

943. He says therefore first (724) that if the equally swift are things moved locally through an equal magnitude in equal time, and if all local motions should be equally swift, it would follow that what is straight is equal to what is circular. Now, this statement may be understood in two senses: first, in respect to a rectilinear motion and a circular one, secondly, in respect to a straight line and a circular one. The latter is the better sense, because it follows from the foregoing. For if all rectilinear and circular motions are equally swift-and they are so when they traverse an equal magnitude in equal time—it follows that a straight line is equal to a circular one, a situation that must be rejected as impossible.

944. Then at (725) he investigates the reason why rectilinear motions cannot be compared with circular ones. For since he had concluded that if they are equal, then the magnitudes are equal—which is seen to be impossible—someone might wonder whether the reason for this inability to be compared is due to the motion or to the magnitude. And this is his question: “Is the reason why a straight motion is not as equally swift as a circular one due to the fact that change of place is a genus containing diverse species under it (for it was said above that things of diverse species are not comparable), or is it because line is a genus containing under it straight and circular as species?” Of course, time cannot be the reason, for all time is “atomic,” i.e., indivisible, as to species.

To this question. therefore, he responds that both reasons hold, because in both cases is found a difference of species, but in such a way, nevertheless, that the diversity of species it local motion is due to the diversity of species of the magnitudes in connection with which the motion takes place. And this is what he says, namely, that if that upon which the motion occurs has species, it follows that the local motion will have species.

945. Then at (726) he rejects a factor that might seem to be required for identity of species and comparability in local motions. And he says that sometimes changes of place are diversified by reason of "that in which," i.e., by reason of that through which, as through an instrument, a local motion takes place; for example, if the feet are the instruments of local motion, it is walking, but if wings are, it is called flying. Yet this does not make for diversity of species in local motions but for a diversity of figure, as the Commentator says.

However, it could possibly better be said that Aristotle here intends to say that changes of place are not diversified by reason of the instruments of motion but by reason of the figure of the magnitude traversed. For it is in this way that "straight" and "circular" differ. The reason is that motions are not diversified on account of the mobiles but on account of the things in respect to which the mobiles are moved. Now instruments lean more to the mobile, whereas figures are on the part of that in which the motion occurs.

946, Then at (727) he concludes his proposition. Concerning this he does three things:

First he concludes to the main proposition;

Secondly, he draws from the conclusion a fact to be considered, at 947;

Thirdly, he investigates the problem of diversity of species, at 948.

He concludes therefore first (727) that since motions are not comparable unless they are of the same species, and local motions are not of one species unless they traverse the same specific magnitude, it follows that those are equally swift which traverse the same magnitude in equal time, where "same" refers to what is not different in species. For it is in this way that motions, too, do not differ in species, And therefore the main thing to be considered in the question of the comparison of motions is their differences. For if they differ either in genus or in species, they cannot be compared. But if they differ in accidentals, they can be.

947. Then at (728) he draws from the foregoing a fact worthy of consideration, namely, that a genus is not something absolutely one, whereas a species is. This is made known first of all from the preceding

argument in which it was shown that things not of one genus are not comparable, whereas things of one species are; and secondly, from the preceding lecture, in which it was stated that the nature of comparable things is one. From this it can be gathered that a genus is not one nature, while a species is.

The reason for this is that the species is taken from the ultimate form, which is absolutely one in the universe of things, but the genus is not taken from a form that is one in the universe of things but from one that is so in conception only. For the form on account of which man is animal is not distinct from the one on account of which man is man. Therefore, all men who are of one species agree in the form which constitutes their species, because each has a rational soul. But there is not in man, horse, and ass, some common soul which makes them animal, over and above the soul that makes one a man, or a horse, or an ass. (If there were, then the genus would be one and comparable, just as the species.) But it is only in our mental consideration that a generic form is extracted, namely, it is brought about by the intellect's abstracting from the differences.

Consequently a species is one quiddity deriving from a unity of form existing in the universe of things. The genus, however, is not one, because according to the diverse forms existing in the universe of things, diverse species are capable of receiving a same genus as a predicate. Consequently, a genus is one thing logically but not physically.

Now, because a genus, although not purely one, is still in some sense one, the equivocation of many things is often masked on account of their likeness and their closeness to a unity of genus.

Now certain equivocal things are very unlike and possess in common only a name, as when a heavenly body, and the animal which barks, are called "dogs." Other things, however, have a certain likeness, as when the word "man" is applied to a real man, and to one that is in a painting, on account of the latter's likeness to a real man.

Still other equivocations are very close. This may be on account of agreement in genus. For example, when "body" is said of a heavenly body and of a corruptible body, it is equivocation, because naturally speaking the matter is not one. They agree, however, in logical genus, for which reason they appear not to be equivocal. Or it may be on account of some likeness. For example, one who teaches in the schools is called "master." and so is the head of a house, equivocally; this is by a close equivocation, however, on account of the likeness, for each is a ruler, one in the schools, the other in the house, Hence, on account of their close resemblance in genus or likeness things do not appear to be equivocal which nevertheless are.

948. Then at (749) because he had said that we must consider the question of the differences of motion, i.e., whether motions differ specifically, he now inquires how specific differences may be taken in motions and in other things as well. And because the definition designates the essence of the species, he poses two questions: one about the species, and one about the definition.

He first of all asks about species: “When is something to be reckoned of a different species from another? Is it only because the same nature is found in different receivers, as Plato held?” According to the foregoing this cannot be the case. For it has been said that a genus is not absolutely one; therefore a difference of species is not reckoned on the basis that some same thing is in one and another, except for the Platonists who posited that a genus is absolutely one. On this account, as though answering the question, Aristotle adds that a species is different, not because the same thing is in a different subject, but because a different nature is in a different subject.

The second question is about definition, and it is this: “What is a term, i.e., what is the definition which declares a species?” And because things that have the same definition are absolutely the same, he then, as if answering the question, adds that the proper definition of a thing is that by which we can discern whether some thing is the same or other, e.g. white or sweet. And “other” may be taken in two ways as before: in one way, as meaning that the white is said to be something other than the sweet, because in the white thing is found a subject nature other than the one in the sweet; in another way, as meaning that they differ not only in subject nature but that they are wholly not the same. These two are the same as the two he mentioned above, when he said: “If the same thing is found in things that are other, or if differing things are found in differing things.” For it is clear that there is a same reason of identity and diversity in species and in definition.

949. Then at (730) he discusses the comparison of alterations, About this he does two things:

First he shows that one alteration is as equally fast as another;

Secondly, he investigates from what aspect equality of quickness in alteration is considered, at 950.

He asks therefore first about alteration, how one alteration is as equally fast as another. And that two alterations are equally fast, he proves. For being healed is to be altered. But one can be healed swiftly and another slowly, and likewise some come to be healed at the same time. Therefore, one alteration is as equally swift as another, for what is moved in an equal time is said to be moved with equal speed.

950. Then at (731), because equality of speed in local motion requires not only equality of time but also of magnitude traversed, and assuming that in alteration equality of time is required for equality of speed, he asks what else is required. And this is what he says: “What is it that must be reached in equal time in order that an alteration be called equally swift?”

And the reason for this question is that in quality, with which alteration is concerned, equal is not found, so as to enable us to say that when an equal quantity is reached in equal time there is an equally fast alteration, as indeed happens in local motion, as well as in growth and decrease. But as equality is found in quantity, likeness is found in quality.

To this question he responds at (732). And first he answers the question, and says that alterations should be called equally swift if in an equal time it is the same thing which has been changed, i.e., altered.

951, Secondly, he raises a question about this answer. Since it has been said that there is an equally swift alteration, if it is the same thing that has been altered in an equal time, and since in that which has been altered there are two things to consider, namely, the quality with respect to which alteration occurred, and secondly, the subject in which the quality exists, the question arises: “Should a comparison of this sort be regarded from the viewpoint of the identity of the quality or of the identity of the subject in which the quality exists?”

952. Then at (734) he answers one part of the question and says that with respect to the quality received in alteration, two types of identity must be considered in order that alterations be equally swift. First, that the same specific quality be involved, for example, the same health, of the eye or of something similar; secondly, that the quality which is taken be present in the same way, and neither more nor less. But if the qualities in question differ specifically, e.g., if one alteration involves becoming white, and

another healthy, in these two cases nothing is the same; they are neither equal nor alike. Hence a diversity of these qualities causes a diversity in species of alteration, so that the alterations are not one, just as it was said above that a straight motion and a circular one are not one local motion. Consequently, whenever you wish to compare either local motions or alterations, you have to consider the species of alterations or of local motion to see whether they are the same or many. And this may be considered from the things in which motions occur, for if the things which are moved, i.e., in which motion occurs per se, and not per accidens, differ specifically, then the motions differ specifically; if they differ generically, so do the motions differ generically; if they differ numerically, then also the motions differ numerically, as was pointed out in Book V.

953. Thirdly, at (735), having determined one part of the question he raised, he now attacks the other. The question is this: “In order that alterations be adjudged similar or equally swift should regard be paid only to the quality to see if it is the same, or also to the subject which is altered; that is, if a certain portion of this body becomes white in a certain time and an equal part of another becomes white in the same or in equal time, should the alterations be judged equally swift?”

And he answers that attention must be paid to both, i.e., to the quality involved and to the subject, but in different ways. For from the viewpoint of the quality we judge an alteration to be the same or different according to whether the quality is the same or not; but we judge an alteration to be equal or unequal, if the part of the subject altered is equal or unequal: for if a large part of this body becomes white and a small part of another becomes white, the alterations will be specifically the same, but they will not be equal.

954. Then at (736) he shows how comparison should be made with respect to generation and ceasing-to-be.

First, according to his own opinion;

Secondly, according to the opinion of Plato, at 955.

He says therefore first (736) that in generation and ceasing-to-be, in order that a generation be called equally swift, we must consider whether in an equal time the same thing is generated and is something indivisible as to species; for example, if a man is begotten in equal time in both generations, they are equally swift. But generations are not equally swift just because an animal is generated in equal time, for some animals on account of their perfection require more time for being generated~ But generation is said to be swifter, if something else is generated in an equal time; for example, if in the time required for the generation of a dog, a horse should be generated, the generation of the horse would be swifter.

And because he had said that, in alteration, from the viewpoint of the quality involved, two things must be considered, namely, whether it is the same health and whether it exists in the same way and not more or less, while here he says that in generation only one thing has to be considered, namely, whether it is the same that is being generated, he now gives the reason for this difference, saying: “For we do not have two things in which there is an otherness called unlikeness.” It is as if he said: “The reason why in generation the only thing to be considered is whether it is the same that is being generated, is that in generation we do not have something that could vary with regard to two things, according to which a difference could be discerned, in the way that unlikeness occurs in alteration through the fact that one and the same quality can vary according to more and less. For a substance, which is the proper terminus of generation, is not capable of more and less.”

955. Then at (737) he discusses the comparison of generations according to the opinion of Plato, who supposed that number is the substance of a thing. For he thought that the “one” which is the principle of number is the substance of a thing. Now what is “one” is entirely of one nature and species. Therefore, if number, which is nothing more than an aggregate of units, is, according to Plato, the substance of things, it follows that a number will be called larger or smaller according to the species of quantity, but yet as to substance it will be of like species. And hence it is that Plato declared that one is the species, but that the contraries through which things differ are “the large and the small,” which are considered from the side of the matter. Accordingly, it will follow that just as one and the same health has two aspects, inasmuch as it receives more and less, so also substance, which is number, since it is of the same species on account of unity, will have two aspects according as the number is larger or smaller. But in substance no general word exists to signify both, i.e., the diversity which arises from the largeness and smallness of number, whereas in qualities, when more of one is in a subject or when it is in any way outstanding, the

quality is said to be “more”—for example, “more white” or “more healthy”, while in quantity, excellence is described as “greater,” as a “greater body” or a “greater surface.” But in this sense there is no common word to signify excellence in substance—which is due to the largeness of number, according to the Platonists.

LECTURE 9

RULES FOR THE COMPARISON OF MOTIONS

956. After showing which motions are mutually comparable, the Philosopher now teaches how they are compared:

First in local motions;

Secondly, in other motions, at 962.

About the first he does two things:

First he mentions the aspects according to which local motions ought to be mutually compared;

Secondly, he sets forth the rules of comparison in the light of the foregoing, at 957.

He says therefore first (738) that the mover in local motion always moves some mobile, in some definite time, and through some quantity of space. And this is required, because, as was proved in Book VI, something always moves and has moved, simultaneously. For it was proved there that whatever is being moved has already been moved through some part of a distance and through some part of time. Hence it follows that what is being moved is something quantitative and divisible, as are the distance and the time involved. However, not every mover is quantified, as will be proved in Book VIII; nevertheless, it is clear that some quantitative things are movers and it is in respect to those that he proposes the following rules of comparison,

957. Then at (739) he lays down the rules of comparison.

First according to division of the mobile;

Secondly, when the mover is divided, at 958.

He says therefore first (739): Let A be a mover, and B a mobile, and C the length of space traversed, and D the time in which A moves B through C. If therefore we take another moving power, equal to the power of A, it will follow that it will move half of the mobile B through a distance twice C in the same time; but in half the time D it will move half of mobile B through the entire length C,

From these statements of the Philosopher two general rules may be gathered. The first is that if some power moves a mobile through some certain distance in a given time, then it or an equal power will move half of that mobile through twice the distance in the same time or in an equal time.

The other rule is that an equal power will move half the mobile over the same distance in half the time. The reason behind these rules is that the same proportion is being kept. For it is clear that the swiftness of a motion results from the victory of the mover's power over the mobile, because the weaker the mobile the more the strength of the mover prevails over it and the more swiftly will it move the mobile. The swiftness of a motion cuts down on the time and increases the length traversed, for the swifter is what traverses a greater distance in an equal time or an equal distance in less time, as was proved in Book VI. Therefore, according to the same proportion by which the mobile is diminished, either the time is diminished or the length traversed is increased, provided, of course, that the mover is the same or an equal mover.

958. Then at (740) he teaches how motions are to be compared from the viewpoint of the mover,

First according to a division of the mover;

Secondly, and conversely, according to an assemblage of movers, at 9610

About the first he does three things:

First he sets forth a true comparison;

Secondly, he rejects some false comparisons, at 959;

Thirdly, from this he answers an argument of Zeno, at 960.

He says therefore first (740) that if a power moves the same mobile through a certain distance in a given time, it moves half the mobile the same distance in half the time, or it moves half the mobile through twice the distance in the given original time, as was said of an equal power. Further, if the power be divided, half the power will move half the mobile through the same distance in the given time. However, this must be understood of a mover that is not destroyed by division, for he has been speaking in a general way without making application to the particular natures involved. And he gives an example: Let E be half of power A and let Z be half of mobile B, then just as A moved B through C in time D, so E will move Z through the same distance in the same amount of time, because the same proportion of motive power to body mass moved is preserved. Hence, it follows that in an equal time the motion will traverse an equal distance, as was said.

959. Then at (741) he rejects two false comparisons. The first consists in adding to the mobile without adding to the motive power. Hence he says that if E, which is half the motive power, moves Z9 which is half the mobile, a distance C in time D, it is not necessarily true that the halved power E will move a mobile twice Z through half the distance in the given time, for it could happen that the halved power cannot move the doubled mobile at all. But if it can move it, the comparison will hold.

The second false comparison occurs when the mover is divided and the mobile is not divided. This he rejects at (742), saying that if the motive power A moves the mobile B through distance C in time D, it does not necessarily follow that half the motive power will move the entire mobile B in time D through a part of distance C such that this part of C is related to the entire distance C as A was related to Z in our other example. For when A was compared with Z, it was a suitable comparison, but in the present case it is not, for it can happen that half the motive power will not move the whole mobile any distance. For if some whole power moves some whole mobile, it does not follow that half of it will move the same mobile any distance, no matter how much time is allowed. Otherwise it would follow that a man by himself could move a whole ship a certain distance, if the combined power of the shiphaulers is divided by the number of haulers and the distance they haul it be so divided.

960. Then at (743) he uses the foregoing to answer an argument of Zeno who wished to prove that each grain of millet falling to the earth makes a sound, because an entire bushel of it, when poured to the earth, makes a sound. But Aritstotle says that this argument of Zeno is not true, i.e., that each grain of millet makes a sound when it falls to the earth. For there is no reason why any such part should in any length of time move the air to produce a sound, as does the whole bushel in falling.

And from this we can conclude that it is not necessary, if a part existing in a whole causes a motion, that this part, now existing in isolation from the whole, can cause a motion. For in the whole the part is not actual but potential, especially in continua. For a thing is a being in the same way that it is one, and “one” is that which is undivided in itself and divided from others. But a part, precisely as existing in a whole, is not actually divided from it but only potentially; hence it is not actually one but only potentially. For this reason, it is not the part but the whole that acts.

961. Then at (744) he sets forth a comparison based on an aggregate of movers and says that if there are two and each of them causes motion and if each by itself is moving its own mobile a certain distance in a given time, then when the two are united they will move the mobiles—which are now joined together—through an equal distance in the same time, because even in this case the same proportion is maintained.

962. Then at (745) he sets forth the same rules of comparison for other motions. About this he does three things:

First he shows that the things according to which the comparison of motions must be judged are divisible;

Secondly, he sets forth the true comparison, at 963;

Thirdly, he rejects some false comparisons, at 964.

He says therefore first (745), in respect to growth, that there are three things involved, namely, the cause of increase, the thing increased, and the time; and these three have a certain quantity. Also there is a fourth thing to be considered, namely, the quantity of increase produced by the cause and received by the growing thing. And these four things must be considered also in alteration, namely, the cause of alteration, the thing altered, the amount or degree of alteration (which is present according to more and less), and the amount of time. These four, of course, are the same as are involved in local motion.

963. Then at (746) he sets forth the true comparison and says that if a power moves something to a certain amount in a given time according to these motions, then it will move to twice the amount in twice the time; and if it moves to twice the amount, it will be in twice the time. Likewise, the same power will move to half the amount in half the time, or if it moves in half the time, then the motion will be to half the amount, Or if there is twice the power, it will move something to twice the amount in an equal time.

964. Then at (747) he dismisses a false comparison and says that if what causes alteration or increase causes a certain amount of increase or alteration respectively in a certain amount of time, it does not necessarily follow that half the force will alter or increase half the object or some given amount in half the time; for it may happen that there will be no alteration or increase at all, the case being the same as with the locally mobile that has weight.

It should be observed that when Aristotle says “half will be moved in half or double will be moved in an equal,” “double” and “half” (in the accusative case) refer, not to the mobile but to the sphere of motion, i.e., the quality or the quantity, which are related to alteration and growth as length of distance is related to local motion. For in local motion it was said that if a certain power moves a certain mobile, half will move half the mobile, but here it is said that half might not move anything. But it must be understood that we are speaking of an integral mobile whole, which will not be moved by a halved motive power to any amount of quantity or degree of quality, much less to half.

BOOK VIII

LECTURE 1

OPINIONS ON THE BEGINNING AND END OF MOTION

965. After showing in the preceding book that it is necessary to posit a first mobile, and a first motion, and a first mover, the Philosopher intends in this present book to inquire after a description of the first mover, and first motion, and first mobile, The book is divided into two parts:

In the first he premisses something necessary to the following investigation, namely, that motion is sempiternal;

In the second he proceeds to investigate what is proposed, (L. 5).

About the first he does three things:

First he raises a problem;

Secondly, he states the truth according to his own opinion, (L. 2);
Thirdly, he answers possible objections to the contrary, (L. 4)

In regard to the first he does three things:

First he proposes his problem;

Secondly, he gives opinions for both sides, at 968;

Thirdly, he shows the usefulness of this consideration, at 970.

About the first he does two things:

First he proposes the problem he intends to investigate;

Secondly, he responds to a tacit question, at 967.

966. In regard to the first it should be known that Averroes says that Aristotle in this book does not intend to inquire whether motion is sempiternal universally, but limits his question to the first motion.

But if one considers both the words and procedure of the Philosopher, this is entirely false. For the words of the Philosopher speak of motion in a universal sense. He says in effect: “Was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being and is it perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion?” From this it is clear that he is not inquiring about one definite motion but about motion universally, asking whether at any time there was no motion.

The falseness of Averroes’ statement appears also from the very procedure of Aristotle. First, it is Aristotle’s custom always to argue to his proposition from proper causes. Now, if anyone will consider the arguments he adduces, he will see that in none of them does Aristotle argue from a middle term that refers properly to the first motion, but he argues rather from a middle proper to motion in general. Hence this alone shows that he intends to inquire here about the sempiternity of motion in general.

Secondly, if he had already proved that there is one or a number of sempiternal motions, he would have been foolish to ask below whether anything is eternally in motion, for that question would have been already answered. It also is ridiculous to say that Aristotle would repeat from the start his consideration of a problem he had already settled, and act as though he had omitted something, as the Commentator pretends. For Aristotle had the opportunity to correct his book and fill in at the proper place any section he had omitted, so as not to proceed in a disorderly way. For if this chapter had been treated in the way charged by the Commentator, everything that follows would be confused and disorderly. This is not strange, for, having supposed an initial impossibility, others then follow.

Furthermore, the correctness of our view is shown by the fact that Aristotle later on uses what he proves here, as a principle to prove the eternity of the first motion. He would never have done this, had he already proved that the first motion is eternal.

The reason which moved Averroes is wholly frivolous. For he says that if Aristotle is here intending to inquire into the eternity of motion in common, it will follow that the consideration of Aristotle has been diminished, because it is not evident from what he proves in this place, how motions could be always continued one to the other.

But this has no weight, because it is enough for Aristotle to prove in this chapter in a general way that motion has always been. But how the eternity of motion is continued—whether it is because all things are always in motion, or because all things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest, or because some things are always in motion and others sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest—is a question he raises immediately after the present one.

Thus the present chapter must be explained according to this intention, namely, that he intends to inquire about motion in common. According to this, therefore, he asks: “Did motion in common begin to be at some time, so that previously there had never been any motion, and so that at some time it will perish so as to leave nothing in motion, or, on the other hand, did it never begin and will it never cease, so that it always was and always will be?

And he gives an example taken from animals, for some philosophers have said that the world is a certain large animal. For we see animals as alive so long as motion is apparent in them, but when all motion ceases in them they are said to be dead. Accordingly, motion in the whole universe of natural bodies is taken as a kind of life. If, therefore, motion always was and always will be, then this sort of life of natural bodies will be immortal and never-failing.

967. Then at (749) he answers a tacit question. For in the preceding books Aristotle had discussed motion in common, without applying it to things; but now, inquiring whether motion has always existed, he applies his general doctrine about motion to the existence it has in things. Therefore, someone could say that in this consideration the first question should have been about whether motion has existence in things rather than whether it is eternal, especially since there are some who have denied that motion exists.

To this he responds that all who have spoken about the nature of things admit that motion exists. This is evident from their statements that the world was made, and from their consideration of the generation and ceasing-to-be of things, which cannot occur without motion. It is therefore a common supposition in natural science that motion has existence in things. Hence there is no need to raise this question in natural science any more than in other sciences are raised questions about the suppositions of the science.

968. Then at (750) he presents opinions for both sides of the question he proposed.

First he gives the opinions which declare that motion is eternal;

Secondly, those who declare that motion is not eternal, at 969.

In explanation of the first part (750), therefore, it should be known that Democritus supposed that the first principles of things are bodies that are per se indivisible and always mobile and that the world came to be by the chance aggregation of these bodies—not only the world in which we exist but an infinitude of other worlds, since these bodies congregated to form worlds in diverse parts of infinite void. Still he did not posit these worlds as fated to endure forever; rather, some came into existence as a result of atoms combining, and others passed out of existence as a result of the same atoms scattering. Therefore all the philosophers who agree with Democritus assert the eternity of motion, because they say that the generation and ceasing-to-be of certain worlds i’s always going on-and that necessarily involves motion.

969. Then at (751) he gives the opinions of the other side. And he says that whoever declare that there is just one world which is not eternal, also declare what reasonably follows with respect to motion, namely, that it is not eternal.

Therefore, if there be supposed a time in which nothing was in motion, this could happen in two ways, just as it is in two ways that this world could be supposed not always to have been: in one way, that this world began in such a way that previously it never existed at all, as Anaxagoras held; in another way, that the world so began to be that it did not exist for some time previously, but that it again had existed before that time, as Empedocles held.

In like manner with respect to motion, Anaxagoras said that at one time all things were a mixture of one thing with another and nothing was segregated from anything else—in which mixture it was necessary to posit that all things were at rest, for motion does not occur without separation, since whatever is in motion separates from one terminus in order to tend to another. Therefore Anaxagoras posited the pre-existence of this mixture and rest in infinite time, in such a way that at no time before (the present world) had there been any motion at all, and that it was Mind, which alone was unmixed, that caused motion in the first instance and began to separate things one from another.

Empedocles, on the other hand, said that in one period of time some things are in motion, and again in another period all things are at rest. For he posited Friendship and Discord as the first movers of things:

Friendship's property was to make a unity of all things, and Discord's to make many things from the one. But because the existence of a mixed body requires a mingling of the elements so as to form one thing, whereas the existence of a world required that the elements be dispersed in orderly fashion, each to its respective place, he posited that Friendship is the cause of the coming-to-be of mixed bodies, and Discord the cause of their ceasing-to-be; but that, contrariwise, in the whole world Friendship was the cause of its ceasing-to-be and Discord the cause of its coming-to-be.

Accordingly, he posited that the whole world is being moved, when either Friendship makes one from the many or when Discord makes many of the one; but during the intermediate times, he supposed there was rest—not in the sense that there was no motion at all, but none with respect to the general change of the world.

Because Aristotle had mentioned the opinion of Empedocles, he also gave the very words, which are difficult to interpret because they are in metre.

Thus, therefore, did Empedocles express his opinion in this arrangement of words : "It has learned to be born," i.e., it is customary for something to be generated, "the one from the manifold"; "and again," i.e., in another way, "from the one commingled," i.e., composed of a mixture, "the manifold arises," i.e., the many come to be through separation—for some things are generated by combining with others, and others by separating.

And according to what we observe in regard to particular instances of coming-to-be, so "thus do things come to be," i.e., the same must be understood in the universal coming-t-o-be of things with respect to the whole world. "Nor is their era one," i.e., there is not just one period of duration of things; but at one time a world is generated, at another it is destroyed, and in between there is rest: for "era" is taken to mean the measure of the duration of a thing..

He expresses the distinction of these eras when he adds, "Thus are they changed," i.e., as though stating that the time in which things pass through the cycle of combining or separating is called one era. And lest anyone suppose that the generation of a world does not require an era, i.e., a period of time, but that the universe comes to be in an instant, Empedocles adds, "nor are they made perfect all at once," but after a long interval of time.

Then speaking of the other era he adds, “thus are they always immobile,” i.e., in the time between the generation and corruption cycle, he supposed that things are at rest.

And lest anyone believe that before there was always change, and that later there will be continual rest, he excludes this by saying “alternately,” i.e., as though saying that this happens in cycles, namely, that things change and then rest, and then change again, and so on ad infinitum.

Then the words of Aristotle are added to explain the foregoing words of Empedocles, especially the expression, “thus they change.” He says therefore that following the words, “thus they change,” must be understood the addition, “from then hence,”, i.e., from a definite beginning up to the present—not in the sense that motion always was, or that after it began it had been interrupted.

970, Then at (752) he shows the usefulness of considering the question he has proposed. And he says that we must consider just what is the truth about this question, for to know the truth about it is most necessary not only for natural science but the science of the first principle as well, since both here and in the Metaphysics he uses the eternity of motion to prove the first principle.

This method of proving the existence of a first principle is most efficacious and irresistible. For if on the supposition that both motion and the world existed forever, it is necessary to posit one first principle, then, if the eternity thereof should be rejected, it is all the more necessary, for it is clear that every new thing requires a principle bringing it into being. Now the only reason why it could seem that no first principle would be necessary, would be if things were ab aeterno. But if the existence of a first principle follows even on that supposition, i.e., that the world existed ab aeterno, it is clear that the existence of a first principle is absolutely necessary.

LECTURE 2

ARGUMENTS FOR THE ETERNITY OF MOTION

971. After raising the problem of the eternity of motion, the Philosopher now intends to show that motion is eternal. His treatment is divided into two parts:

In the first he explains his proposition;
In the second he solves objections contrary to his proposition, (L.4).
About the first he does two things:
First he presents arguments to show the eternity of motion;
Secondly, he answers opinions to the contrary, (L. 3).
About the first he does two things:
First he shows that motion always has been;
Secondly, that it always will be, at 895.
About the first he does two things:
First he explains his proposition with an argument from motion;
Secondly, with an argument from time, at 979.
About the first he does three things:
First he premisses something needed for his proposition;
Secondly, he presents a proof that manifests his proposition, at 976;
Thirdly, he shows that his argument proceeds necessarily, 977,

972. He says first (753) therefore, that in order to demonstrate the proposition we must begin with things determined at the very beginning of the Physics and use them as principles. By this he gives us to understand that the preceding books, in which he determined about motion in general and which for this reason are given the general title “About Natural

Things," are set off from this Book VIII, in which he begins to apply motion to things.

He assumes, therefore, what was said in Physics III, namely, that motion is the act of a mobile precisely as such. From this it appears that in order for motion to exist there must exist things which can be moved with some sort of motion, because an act cannot exist without the thing of which it is the act. Accordingly, from the definition of motion it is evident that there must be a subject of motion, if there is to be motion at all.

But even without the definition of motion that fact is per se evident from the general consent of all, for everyone admits as a necessary fact that nothing is moved except what can be moved—and this with reference to any and all motion; for example, nothing can be altered except what is alterable, or be moved with respect to place unless it be changeable with respect to place.

And because the subject is by nature prior to what is in the subject, we can conclude that in individual changes—both from the viewpoint of the mobile and of the mover—the combustible subject is prior to its being set afire, and the subject capable of setting it afire is prior to its setting afire, prior, I say, not always in time but in nature.

973. From this argument of Aristotle, Averroes took occasion to speak against what is held by faith about creation. For if coming-to-be is a kind of change and every change requires a subject, as Aristotle here proves, it is necessary that whatever comes to be does so from a subject, therefore, it is not possible for something to come to be from nothing.

He confirms this with another argument: When it is said that the black comes to be from the white, this is not to speak per se, in the sense that the white itself is converted into the black, but it is to speak per accidens, in the sense that upon the departure of the white, the black succeeds it. Now whatever is per accidens is reduced to what is per se. But that from which something comes to be per se, is the subject, which enters into the substance of what comes to be. Therefore, whatever is said to come to be from its opposite comes to be from it per accidens, but per se it comes to be from the subject. Accordingly, it is not possible for being to come to be from non-being absolutely.

In further support of his position Averroes adduces the common opinion of the early philosophers that nothing comes to be from nothing.

He also gives two reasons from which he considers that the position arose that something should come to be from nothing. The first is that ordinary people do not consider as existing anything but what is comprehensible by sight; therefore, because they see something visible come to be which previously was not visible, they think that it is possible for something to come to be from nothing.

The second reason is that among the common people it could be thought to be a weakening of the virtue of the agent that it should need matter in order to act, which condition, however, does not derive from the impotency of the agent, but from the very nature of motion. Therefore, because the first agent does not have a power which is in any way deficient, it follows that it should act without a subject.

974, But if one considers rightly, he was deceived by a cause similar to the cause by which he claimed we are deceived, namely, by considering particular things. For it is clear that a particular active power presupposes the matter which a more universal agent produces, just as an artisan uses the matter which nature makes. From the fact therefore, that every particular agent presupposes matter which it does not produce, one should not suppose that the first universal agent—which is active with respect to all being—should presuppose something not caused by it.

Nor, moreover, is this in keeping with the intention of Aristotle who in Metaphysics II proves that the supremely true and the supreme being is the cause of being for all existents. Hence the being which prime matter has—i.e., a being in potency—is derived from the first principle of being which is in a supreme way a being. Therefore, it is not necessary to presuppose for its action anything not produced by it.

And because every motion needs a subject—as Aristotle proves here, and as is the truth of the matter—it follows that the universal production of being by God is neither motion nor change, but a certain simple coming forth. Consequently, “to be made” and “to make” are used in an equivocal sense when applied to this universal production of being and to other productions.

Therefore, just as, if we should understand the production of things to be from God ab aeterno—as Aristotle supposed, and a number of the Platonists—it is not necessary, indeed, it is impossible, that there have been a pre-existing but unproduced subject of this universal production, so also, in accord with the tenets of our faith, if we posit that he did not produce things ab aeterno but produced them after they had not existed, it is not necessary to posit a subject for this universal production. It is evident, therefore, that what Aristotle proves here, namely, that every motion requires a mobile subject, is not against a tenet of our faith—for it has already been said that the universal production of things, whether ab aeterno or not, is neither a motion nor a change. For in order that there be motion or change, it is required that something be other now than previously, and thus there would be something previously existing, and consequently this would not be the universal production of things about which we are now speaking.

975. Similarly, Averroes' statement that something is said to come to be from its opposite per accidens and from a subject per se is true in particular productions according to which this or that being comes to be, e.g., a man or a dog, but is not true in the universal production of being.

This is clear from what the Philosopher said in Physics I. For he said there that if this animal comes to be inasmuch as it is this animal, it ought not come to be from "non-animal" but from "non-this-animal"—for example, if a man comes to be from non-man or a horse from non-horse. But if animal is produced precisely as animal, it must come to be from non-animal. Accordingly, if some particular being comes to be, it does not come to be from absolute non-being; but if the whole being comes to be, i.e., if being precisely as being comes to be, it must be made from absolute non-being—if, indeed, this process should be called "being made," for it is an equivocal way of speaking, as has been said.

What Averroes introduces about the early philosophers has no value, for they were unable to arrive at the first cause of all being but considered the causes of particular changes.

The first of these philosophers considered the causes solely of accidental changes, and posited all "being made" to be alteration. Those who succeeded them arrived at a knowledge of substantial changes, but those who came still later, such as Plato and Aristotle, arrived at a knowledge of the principle of all existence.

Consequently, it is clear that we are not moved to assert that something comes to be from nothing because we suppose only visible things to be beings; rather it is because we do not content ourselves with considering merely the particular productions of particular causes, but go on to consider the universal production of all being from the first principle of being. Nor do we assert that to need matter in order to act is due to a diminished power, in the sense of such a power's lacking its natural energy, rather, what we say is that this is proper to a particular power, which does not extend to all being but makes a particular being.

Hence one can say that it is characteristic of a "diminished power" to make something from something in the sense that we would say that a particular power is less than the universal power.

976. Then at (754), assuming that a mobile and a mover are required in order that there be motion, Aristotle argues in the following manner: If motion has not always existed, it is necessary to say either that mobiles and movers were at some time made, having previously not existed, or are eternal. If, therefore, it is held that each mobile has been made, it is necessary to say that previous to the change which is taken as the first, there was another change and motion according to which was made the very mobile which is able to be moved and to have been moved. This inference, indeed, depends on the preceding. For if it is granted that motion has not always been but that there is some first change before which there was none, it will follow that that first change involved a mobile, and that that mobile was made, for previously it did not exist—since it is being supposed that all mobiles have been made. Now, whatever comes to be after having previously not existed, comes to be through a motion or a change. But the motion or change through which a mobile comes to be, is prior to the change by which the mobile is moved. Therefore, prior to the change which was presumed to be first is another change and so on ad infinitum.

But if it is held that things which are mobile always pre-existed even when no motion existed, this seems to be unreasonable and a sign of ignorance. For it immediately appears that if mobiles exist, motion ought to exist, for natural mobiles are at once also movers, as is clear from Book III. But if natural mobiles and movers are existing, there must be motion.

But to enter more deeply into our search for the truth, it is necessary that this same thing happen—if mobiles and movers are assumed to be eternally existing prior to motion—that followed from the assumption that they were made, namely, that prior to the change supposed to be the first, there is other change ad infinitum. This is evident in the following way: If it be supposed that certain mobiles and certain movers exist, and yet the first mover begins at some time or other to cause motion and something is moved by it, and before this nothing is being moved but is at rest, it will be necessary to say that there was another change in the mover or mobile made prior to that which was assumed to be the first one produced by the mover beginning to cause motion, The truth of this is clear from the following:

Rest is the privation of motion. Privation, however, is not present in a thing capable of habit and form except on account of some cause. Therefore there was a cause—either on the part of the mover or on the part of the mobile—why there was rest. Therefore, as long as that cause prevailed, there was always rest. If, then, a mover begins at some time to cause motion, the cause of rest must be removed. But it cannot be removed except by a motion or change. Therefore, it follows that before that change which was said to be first, there is a prior change by which the cause of rest is removed.

977. Then at (755) he proves the necessity of the foregoing argument. For someone could say that it happens that things are at rest at some time and in motion at some time, without any pre-existing cause of rest to be removed. Hence he wishes to refute this. And about this he does two things:

First he premisses something needed for his proof;

Secondly, he presents the proposed proof, at 978.

He says therefore first that among movers, some move "singularly," i.e., in just one way, while others move with respect to motions that are contrary. Things that cause motion in just one way are natural things, as fire always heats and never cools. But beings that act through intellect are causes of motions that are contrary, for one and the same knowledge seems to deal with things and their contraries, as medicine is the science of health and of sickness. Hence one sees that a doctor by means of his science can cause motions that are mutually contrary.

Now Aristotle mentioned this distinction among movers, because in things that act through intellect it does not appear that what he had said is true, namely, that if something is moved when previously it had been at rest, the cause of the rest ought first be removed. For things that act according to intellect seem to be ready to move to opposites without any change of themselves being involved; hence it seems that they can cause motion and not cause it, without any change.

Therefore, lest his argument be forestalled by this objection, he adds that his reason holds both for things that act according to intellect and that act by nature. For things that act by nature do always per se move to one, but per accidens they sometimes move to the contrary, and in order that such an accident occur, some change is necessary; thus cold always per se causes coldness, but per accidens it produces warmth.

But that cold should per accidens cause warmth is due to some change affecting the cold object, either inasmuch as it is moved to another location, thus making it differently related to the object which is now made warm by it than it was when it was making it cold, or inasmuch as it completely departs.

For we say that cold is the cause of warmth by departing in the way that a captain is by his absence the cause of the sinking of a ship; again, cold becomes per accidens the cause of warmth either by moving farther away or by approaching closer, as in the winter the interior of animals is warmer, because their heat retreats inward on account of the surrounding cold.

The same applies to things that act by intellect, For knowledge, although it is one thing dealing with contraries, does not deal equally with them both but with one principally, as medicine is per se ordained to causing health. Therefore, if it happens that a doctor uses his knowledge for the contrary purpose of causing sickness, this will not be per se from this science but per accidens, on account of something else. And in order that that something else occur when previously it did not exist, some change is required.

978. Then at (756) he sets forth the proof which manifests his proposition. He says therefore that from the fact that things are such, i.e., that a similar situation prevails with respect to things that act by nature and things that act by intellect, then, speaking universally of all, we can say that whatever things are possible to make, or to be acted upon, or to cause motion, or to be moved, cannot cause motion or be moved in just any disposition in which they find themselves, but according as they are in some definite state and nearness with respect to each other.

And this he concludes from the premisses, because it has already been said that both in things that act according to nature and in things that act according to will, none is the cause of diverse things except as it is a different state. Accordingly, it is necessary that when the mover and the moved approach one another according to a suitable distance and likewise when they are in whatever disposition is required for one to cause motion and for the other to be moved, then the one must be moved and the other must cause motion.

If, therefore, there was not always motion, it is clear that existing things were not in that state that allowed for one to cause motion and another to be moved; rather, they were in the state of not being able to cause motion and of being moved at that time. But later they reached that state in which one moves and the other is moved. Therefore, one or the other of them changed.

For we see that in all things which are said to be "to something" it does not happen that a new relation arises except through a change affecting one or other or both, as, for example, if something which previously was not "double" has now become double, even though not both of the extremes were changed, yet at least one of them was. Accordingly, if there newly arises a relationship by which something causes motion and something is moved, then one or other or both had to be previously moved. Hence, it follows that there is a change prior to the one assumed to be the first.

979. Then at (757) he explains his proposition with an argument from time.

First he premisses two things necessary for his proposition. The first of these is that "prior" and "subsequent" cannot occur unless there is time, since time is nothing else than prior and subsequent precisely as numbered. The second is that time cannot be, unless there is motion. This, too, is clear from the definition—given in Book IV—describing time as the number of motion with respect to prior and subsequent.

980. Secondly, at (758) he concludes to a conditional proposition from statements made in Book IV, For there, according to his doctrine, he stated time to be the number of motion; according to the doctrine of the other philosophers time is a motion, as he there stated. But whichever of these is true, it follows that this conditional is true: If time always exists, it is necessary that motion be perpetual.

981. Thirdly, at (759) he proves in two ways the antecedent of this conditional. First, from the opinions of others. And he says that all the philosophers but one, namely, Plato, seem to be in accord with regard to the opinion that time is not begotten, i.e., that it did not begin to exist after previously not existing. Whence, Democritus also proved that it is impossible that all things should have been made in the sense of newly

beginning to be, because it is impossible that time have been so made that it begin newly to be.

Only Plato generates time, i.e., says that time was newly made. For he says that time was made at the same time as the heavenst and he supposed that the heavens were made, i.e., that they have a beginning of their duration, as Aristotle here claims, and as Plato's words seem at first glance to indicate—although Platonists say that Plato asserted that the heavens were made in the sense that they have an active principle of their existence but not as having a principle of their duration. Thus, therefore, does Plato alone seem to have conceived that time cannot be without motion, for he did not suppose that time existed before the motion of the heavens.

982. Secondly, at (760) he proves the same point by an argument, namely, from the fact that it is impossible to say or to understand time to exist without the "now," just as it is impossible that there be a line without a point, The "now," however, is something intermediate, having as part of its nature that it be at once a beginning and an end, i.e,, the beginning of a future time, but the end of a past. From this it appears that it is necessary for time always to be. For whatever time is taken, its boundary is a "now" in both senses. And this is clear from the fact that nothing is actual in time but the Itnow," because what is past has gone by, and what is future does not yet exist. But the "now" which is taken as the boundary of time, is both a beginning and an end, as has been said. Therefore it is necessary that from both aspects of whatever time is taken, time always be; otherwise the first "now" would not be an end, and the last not a beginning.

But from the fact that time is eternal, he concludes that motion too must be eternal; the reason for this conclusion being that time is a property of motion, for it is its number, as was said.

983- But the argument of Aristotle does not appear efficacious. For the "now" is to time as the point is to the line, as was explained in Book VI. But it is not necessary that a point be an intermediate, for some points are merely the beginnings of lines and others the ends, although every point would be both a beginning and an end if the line were infinite. One could not, therefore, prove that a line is infinite from the fact that every point is a beginning and an end; rather it is the other way around: from the fact of a line's being infinite, one would go on to prove that every point would be both a beginning and an end. Accordingly, it also appears that the claim that every “now” is a beginning and an end is not true, unless time is assumed to be eternal. Therefore in assuming this as a middle term, i.e., that every “now” is a beginning and an end, Aristotle seems to suppose the eternity of time—the very thing he ought to prove.

Now Averroes, in trying to save Aristotle’s argument, says that the attribute of always being both a beginning and an end belongs to the “now” inasmuch as time is not stationary like a line but flowing. But this does not pertain to the proposition. For from the fact that time is flowing and not stationary, it follows that one “now” cannot be taken twice in the way that one point is taken twice, but the flow of time has nothing to do with the “now” being at once a beginning and an end. For the notion of begining and end is the same in all continua whether they be permanent or flowing, as is clear from Book VI.

984. And therefore another explanation must be furnished in accord with the intention of Aristotle, which is that he wishes to derive the fact that every “now” is a beginning and an end from what he had first supposed, namely, that “prior” and “subsequent” would not be, if time did not exist. For he uses this principle which he supposes for no other purpose, but deduces from it that every “now” is a beginning and an end. For let us suppose that some “now” is the beginning of a time; but it is clear from the definition of a beginning, that the beginning of a time is that before which nothing of the time existed. Therefore, there must be taken something “before” or “prior” to the “now” which is assumed as the beginning of the time. “Prior,” however, does not exist without time. Therefore, the “now” which is taken as the beginning of a time is also the end of a time. In the same way, if a “now” be taken as the end of a time, it too will be a beginning, because an end is by definition that “after which” nothing of a thing exists; but “after” cannot be without time. Therefore, it follows that the “now” which is the end of a time is also a beginning.

985. Then at (761) he shows that motion will always be. And he shows this on the part of motion, because the argument from motion given above concluded only that motion never began, whereas the argument from time concluded both, i.e., that it never began and that it never ceases. He says therefore that the very argument by which it was proved that motion never began can prove that motion is indestructible, i.e., that it will never end. For just as from the assumption that motion began it followed that there was a

change prior to the change assumed to be first, so too, if it be supposed that motion at some time ceases, it follows that a change will occur after the one assumed to be the last,

How this follows he explains by abbreviating the more diffuse explanation he gave with regard to the beginning of motion. For he had supposed that if motion began, the mobiles and movers either began or always were. The same alternatives can be taken here, namely, that if motion should cease, the mobiles and movers will remain or they will not. But because he had previously shown that the same conclusion follows from either alternative, here therefore he uses only the one alternative, i.e., the supposition that motion ceases in such a way that the mobiles and movers also pass away.

Therefore, beginning with the assumption mentioned, he says that both the actual motion and the mobile do not pass away simultaneously, but just as the generation of a mobile is prior to its motion, so the ceasing-to-be of a mobile is subsequent to the passing away of its motion. This is so because something combustible can remain after combustion ceases.

And what was said of the mobile must also be said of the mover, because a mover in act does not in ceasing to be cease at the same time to be a mover in potency. Accordingly, it is evident that if even the mobile cease to be after the destruction of its motion, then there has to be a process by which the mobile passes out of existence.

And again, because we are supposing that all mobiles and motions are ceasing to be, it will be necessary later that even the cause of their ceasing-to-be cease to be. But because ceasing-to-be is a type of motion, it will follow that after the final change, other changes occur. But since this is impossible, it follows that motion endures forever.

986. These, therefore, are the arguments by which Aristotle intends to prove that motion always has been and will never cease, The first part of which, i.e., that motion always existed, conflicts with our faith, For our faith admits nothing as eternally existing but God alone, Who is utterly immobile—unless, of courset you wish to refer to the act of the divine intellect as a motion, but that would be an equivocal sense, and Aristotle is not here speaking of motion in that sense but of motion properly so called.

The other part of the conclusion is not entirely contrary to the faith, because, as was said above, Aristotle is not treating of the motion of the heavens in particular but of motion universally. Now we believe according to our faith that the substance of the world indeed began, yet so as never to cease. For we posit that some motions will always exist, especially in men who will always remaing living an unceasing life either of happiness or misery.

But some, vainly trying to show that Aristotle concluded nothing contrary to the faith, have said that Aristotle does not intend here to prove as a truth that motion is eternal but to allege reason for both sides of a question that is doubtful. Rut this is a foolish statement to anyone who investigates Aristotle’s procedure here. Moreover, he uses the eternity of time and of motion as a principle to prove the existence of a first principle both here in Physics VIII and in Metaphysics XII. That shows he considered it proved.

987. But if one rightly considers the arguments here given, the truth of the faith is not assailed by them, For they prove that motion did not begin through the way of nature, as some taught it did, but that it did not begin by things being created by a first principle of things, as our faith holds, cannot be proved by these arguments. And that will be evident to anyone who considers each of the inferences here drawn by Aristotle.

For when he asks whether, if motion did not always exist, the movers and mobiles always existed or not, the reply must be that the first mover always existed; other things—movers or mobiles—did not always exist, but began to exist from the universal cause of all existence. But it has been pointed out above that the production of all being by the first cause of being is not a motion, whether this coming-forth be taken to be ab aeterno or not. Accordingly, it does not follow that before the first change there was a previous change. But this would follow if the movers and mobiles were newly brought into existence by some particular agent acting upon some presupposed subject that would be changed from non-being to being, or from privation to form—and Aristotle’s argument concerns this way of coming into existence.

988. But because we posit that at least a first mover always existed, we need to give an answer to his subsequent deduction that, if movers and mobiles pre-exist, and motion begins newly to be in them, then the movers or mobiles could not have been previously in that disposition in which they are while there is motion, and therefore, some change must have preceded the first change.

Now, if we are speaking of the motion itself, the answer is easy: the mobiles were not previously in that disposition in which they now are, because previously they did not exist; hence they could not be moved. But, as it has been said, they received their existence not through a change or motion but through coming forth from the first principle of things; accordingly, it does not follow that before the first change there was a change. But there still remains the question about the first production of things. For if the first principle, which is God, is no different now than before, then neither does he produce things now any more than before; but if he is different, at least the change affecting him will be prior to the change which is supposed to be the first.

And indeed, if he were a cause that acts only through nature and not through intellect and will, this reason would conclude necessarily. But because he acts through will, he can through an eternal will produce an effect which is non-eternal, just as by his eternal intellect he can understand a thing that is non-eternal—the thing understood being in a certain way the principle of action in causes that act by intellect, as a natural form is in causes that act by nature.

989. But a further point must be pursued. For we do not say that a will postpones doing what it wants, unless something is expected in the future that does not yet exist in the present, as for example, when I will to make a fire not now but later, because in the future it is expected to be cold, on account of which I make the fire; or at least a presence of time is awaited. But that time succeeds time does not occur without motion. Therefore, it cannot be that a will, even if it be immutable, postpones doing what it wills, without some motion being involved, Accordingly, the new production of things cannot come forth from the eternal will except by means of motions succeeding one another ad infinitum.

Now those who raise this objection fail to see that it assumes a thing acting in time, i.e., something that acts on the assumption that time exists; for in this kind of action which occurs in time, one must consider some determinate relationship to this time or to things that exist in this time to explain why it be performed in this time rather than in some other time. But this reasoning has no place in the universal agent, which produces time itself at the same time that it produces other things.

For when we say that things have not always been produced by God, we do not understand that an infinite time preceded, in which God refrained from acting and that later, at a definite time, He began to act; rather, we understand that God produced at once both time and things after they did not exist. Accordingly, we must not consider in the divine will that it willed to make things not then but later, as though time were already existing; rather, we must solely consider the fact that he willed that things and the time of their duration should begin to be after they had no existed at all.

If it be asked why he willed this, it must be said without a doubt that it was for his own sake. For just as he made things because of himself, in order that in them the likeness of his goodness be manifested, so he willed that they not always be, in order to show his self-sufficiency, from the fact that, although nothing else existed, he in himself had all sufficiency of happiness and of power to produce things.

And this can indeed be said as far as human reason can grasp divine things, saving, of course, the secret of divine wisdom which cannot be comprehended by us.

990. Because the solution of this argument proceeded on the supposition that time did not always exist, there remains the problem of solving the argument which seems to prove that time always existed. And perhaps Aristotle, after the argument from motion, gave one from time, because he thought that the one from motion would be inefficacious, unless time was assumed to be eternal. His statement, therefore, that whenever there is time there must be a “now” existing, must be granted without demur. But the statement that every “now” is both a beginning and an end should not be conceded, unless it be also granted that motion always existed, so that every indivisible of motion (which is called a “moment”) should be both a beginning and an end of motion—for the “now” is to the moment as time is to motion. If, therefore, we suppose that motion has not always existed, but that we can take some first indivisible in motion before which nothing of motion existed, we can also take some “now” in time before which there was no time.

Now we have already shown, in explaining the text, that what Averroes says to bolster this argument is inefficacious. But neither is there any efficacy in what Aristotle cites to bolster his own position, namely, that “before” and “after” do not exist without time.

For when we say that a time’s beginning is “that before which nothing of the time existed,” we are not thereby compelled to say that the “now” which is the beginning of the time, is preceded by a time signified by the word “before,” any more than in magnitudes, if I say that the beginning of a magnitude is “that beyond which nothing exists of that magnitude,” it is necessary to say that the phrase, “beyond which beginning,” signifies some real place existing in nature—for it signifies an imaginary one only. Otherwise, it would be necessary to posit a place beyond the universe, whose magnitude is finite and has a beginning and an end.

Similarly, the first “now” which is the beginning of time is not preceded by a time existing in reality but only in our imagination. And this is the time that is described when one says that the first “now” is the beginning of time, “before which” nothing of time exists.

Or it may be said that in the expression, “the beginning of time is that before which nothing of time exists,” the word, “before,” is not affirmed but denied—and so it is not necessary to posit a time before the beginning of time. For in things which exist in time, it happens that some certain time precedes their beginning, as, when it is said that the beginning of youth is that before which there was nothing of youth, the word “before” can be taken in an affirmative sense, because youth is measured by time. But time is not measured by time; hence no time preceded its beginning; hence the word “before” in the definition of time is not taken affirmatively but negatively.

But before time there does exist a duration, namely, the eternity of God. But this eternity has no extension or any before or after as time does; rather, it is all at once—and is not of the same nature as time any more than the divine magnitude is of the same nature as a bodily magnitude.

Therefore, just as when we say that “outside” the universe there is nothing but God, we are not positing some dimension outside the world, so too, when we say that “before” the universe nothing existed, we are not positing any sort of successive duration before the universe.

LECTURE 3

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANAXAGORAS AND EMPEDOCLES

991. After presenting the reasons showing that motion always existed, the Phillosopher here gives arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles who posited the contrary. About this he does two things:

First he gives an argument against their position;

Secondly, against the argument they presupposed, at 992.

He says therefore first that since it has been shown that motion always exists, it is wrong to say, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras did, that at some time motion exists and at another time it does not; for to make such a claim is a figment, because it has no basis. Something stated without a reason or the support of divine authority seems, indeed, to be a fiction. However, divine authority has more value than human reason, much more indeed than the authority of a philosopher is more valuable than the weak argument some child might give. Therefore, what is held by faith, even though it be believed without an argument is not a figment of the mind, because we believe on the divine authority approved by miracles —works that God alone can produce.

992. Then at (763) he objects against the argument on which they rested. About this he does three things:

First he suggests that their argument is unsuitable;

Secondly, that it was more unsuitable to Anaxagoras' position than to that of Empedocles, at 993;

Thirdly, he shows that even according to Empedocles' opiniont it is unsuitable, at 994.

He says therefore first (763) that it also seems a fiction that anyone, positing that motion at one time exists and at another time does not, should give as his reason that this is so because it is natural for it to be that way, and then adds that this statement must be accepted as a principle. Now that is what Empedocles seems to say, namely, that the situation whereby during one period of time things maintain friendship, and during another are ruled by discord that sets things in motion, but in the interim are at rest, is due to a sort of necessity in things. That is like saying that the reason why heat warms is that it has to be that way, and that heat warms should then be accepted as a principle. This is exactly what Empedocles does, when he takes as a principle that it is due to an ordinance of nature that things are at one time being moved by friendship, and at another time by discord, and at another time are at rest.

Perhaps Anaxagoras, too, and others who posit one active principle would speak in a similar vein, namely, that we must accept as a principle that moti6n began to exist after not existing for an infinite period of time.

993. Then at (764) he shows that Anaxagoras used this argument in a more unsuitable way than did Empedocles. For it is clear that when something is laid down as a principle, it should be accepted as being according to the nature of a thing, i.e., that the nature of a thing is such that such a thing belongs to it. Thus we accept the principle that the whole is greater than its part, because it is the very reason and nature of a whole that it exceed the quantity of a part. Hence, when Empedocles says, “It is natural that it be that way,” he gives us to understand that it should be accepted as a principle. Anaxagoras would have said the same, although he did not express it.

But it is clear that no natural thing nor anything that belongs to things naturally, can exist without ordert because nature is a cause of order. For we see that nature in its works proceeds in an orderly fashion from one thing to another. Therefore, whatever does not possess order is not according to nature and cannot be called a principle.

But two infinites have no order, one to the other, because there is no ratio between one infinite and another, whereas every order is a kind of ratio. Accordingly, it is evidently not a work of nature that things rest for an infinite time and later begin to be moved for an infinite time without there being, between this time and that, any difference to explain why motion comes to be now rather than before; any more than it is a work of nature not to assign some other order between the two thingst so that when one fails the other begins and motion comes to be, as Anaxagoras posited. These are not works of nature, because whatever is in nature either is always the same and not sometimes this way and then that way—as fire always moves upwards—or there is some reason why it is not always the same, as for example, animals do not always continue growing but reach a point when they start to decrease—and for this there is a reason.

Accordingly, it does not seem to be according to nature that for an infinite time things be at rest and later begin to be moved, as Anaxagoras assumed.

Hence it is better to say, as Empedocles said—and those who believed as he—that the whole universe is at rest at one time and in motion at another, because at least in this case there would be order, for there can be a ratio between one finite and another.

It should, however, be considered that the tenet of our faith is not akin to Anaxagoras' position, for we do not assume before the world any infinite reaches of time that have to be related to a later time; rather, before the world began, only the simple eternity of God existed, and that is outside the genus of time.

994. Then at (765) he shows that the above-mentioned argument is not appropriate in Empedocles' situation either.

First he explains the proposition;

Secondly, he rejects a false interpretation, at 995.

He says therefore first (765) that even the holder of Empedocles' theory ought not to assert the fact only but also should explain the cause of his statement and not go beyond what is required by the cause he assigns. Nor should he accept anything as an axiom, i.e., as a principle without reason; rather, whatever is accepted as a principle should be explained either by induction, as is done in the case of natural principles based on sense experience, or by demonstration, as in the case of those principles which are proved by prior principles. But Empedocles does not do that. Granted that he posits friendship and discord as causes, yet it is not the property of friendship or hostility that one should cause motion after the other. For it is not the nature of friendship to be changed into hostility, or vice versa; though it is of the nature of friendship to gather and of hostility to scatter.

But if it is further determined that at one time the one gathers and that at another time the other scatters, it must be further made clear by definite instances in which this occurs. For example, that friendship gathers and discord scatters is manifested among men, because by the former men are united but by the latter they fly from one another. So Empedocles supposed that this is what happens in the whole universe, because it seems to happen in certain cases. But that according to equal periods friendship should move at one time and discord at another, needs to be supported by argument, since that is not seen to happen among men.

995. Then at (766) he rejects a false assumption. For someone could believe that whatever is eternal has no cause, since whatever we observe as being caused among us is something that begins newly to be. Consequently, it seemed to some that when a discussion reached something that always existed, there was no need to inquire any further for a cause or a reasons In this vein Empedocles could say that friendship and discord had always caused motion according to equal times and therefore no reason for it need be sought. But Aristotle disqualifies this by saying that it is a wrong assumption to suppose that we have an adequate first principle in virtue of the fact that something always is so or always happens so. In this way Democritus reduced all the causes that explain nature to something existing always: he assigned a principle for things that begin newly to be, but would not look for a principle of what has always been, Now this is true in some things and not in others. For it is clear that a triangle always has three angles equal to two right angles, but even of this eternal property there is a cause other than the fact. But some things are indeed eternal, such as principles, that do not have a cause.

996. Very special attention should be paid to what is here said, because, as is mentioned in Metaphysics II, the arrangement of things in existence and in truth is the same. Therefore, just as some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence.

From this it is evident that although Aristotle posited a world that was eternal, he did not believe that God is not the world’s cause of existence but of its motion only, as some maintained. Finally, he concludes his main proposition with a summary. And he says: “Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our claim that there never was a time when there was not motion and there will never be a time when there will not be motion.”

LECTURE 4

SOLUTION OF ARGUMENTS CONCLUDING MOTION WAS NOT ALWAYS

997. After giving arguments proving that motion always exists, the Philoper accidenssopher now intends to answer objections to the contrary. About this he does two things:

First he gives the arguments;

Secondly, he answers them, at 1000.

In regard to the first he gives three arguments, after first stating that it is not difficult to solve the objections contrary to his position. And he says that there are three main arguments from which it seems to follow that motion began to be at some time after previously not existing at all.

The first of these is that whereby he proved in Book VI that no change is infinite, because by the same argument it can be proved that no change is eternal. For no terminated change is eternal any more than it is infinite. But every change is terminated. For every motion is naturally from something to something, and these two are contraries; hence, of necessity, the termini of any change are the contraries within the sphere of that change. But because contrariety of termini is not evident in all cases of local motion, Aristotle adds something common to every motion, namely, that nothing is moved to infinity, because nothing is moved to what it cannot reach, as has been said in Book VI, Accordingly, it is clear that no motion is perpetual, just as it is not infinite. If, therefore, no motion is perpetual, it also seems possible to posit a time in which there is no change. This first argument is taken from motion.

998. The second argument is based on the mobile, at (768). It is this: If motion cannot newly come to be when previously it was not, it seems fitting to say of anything that either it is always in motion or never in notion; because if motion can sometimes be and sometimes not be in one particular mobile, why not for the whole universe? But we see that it is possible for something to be moved that previously was not moved as a whole, and that had no motion in itself with respect to any of its parts, as is apparent in non-living things, among which some mobile begins at one time to be moved when previously no part had been moved, nor the whole itself, but it was completely at rest. It remains, therefore, that in the whole universe there can be motion where previously there was none.

999. But because in non-living things, even though motion is seen to begin anew in something when previously there was none at all, yet motion appears to have been pre-existing in something external by which it is moved, he accordingly gives a third argument from animals, which are moved not from without but by themselves.

This argument is at (769). and it says that it is more evident in animals than in the non-living that motion begins after previously having not existed. For when we have rested for a time so that ho motion exists in us, we begin at a certain time to be moved and the principle of our motion is from our very selves even if nothing external moves us. This, however, does not happen in non-living things, because they are moved always by something external, such as the cause that generates them, or a cause that removes an obstacle, or a cause that subjects them to force. From this it follows, if an animal is at one time entirely at rest, that motion begins to exist in an immobile being after previously not existing in it, which motion does not originate from an external mover but from the very thing that is moved. And if this can occur in an animal, there is nothing to prevent its occuring in the universe. For an animal and especially man possesses a likeness to the world; wherefore it is said that man is a small world. Accordingly, if in this small world, motion can begin after previously not existing in it, it seems that the same can happen in the large world. And if this happens in the world, it can happen in the infinite whole, which some assumed exists beyond the world—provided, of course, that there is something infinite that can rest and be moved.

1000. Then at (770) he answers these arguments in order.

In answer, therefore, to the first he says that it is correct to say that motion which occurs between contraries cannot always endure as one and the same numerical motion, because perhaps this is necessary, as will be proved later—and he leaves this in doubt, because it has not yet been proved. But because someone could say that even motion which is between contraries can be always numerically the same on account of maintaining the same mobile which is repeatedly moved from one contrary to another—for example, if it is first moved from white to black, and then from black to white, and so on throughout time—he then adds that it is not possible that a motion which is always in one and the same mobile be kept one and the same by repetition. And he explains this by an example: Let the same chord be continually struck on a lyre and let the striker be unvarying in his striking; one may ask whether the motion and sound of the one chord struck twice is one and the same or continually other and other.

Yet whatever be the case with other mobiles, there is nothing to prevent a motion which is not between contraries, such as a circular motion, from being the same continual and perpetual motion. This will be made clearer from later development. Therefore, although every motion is finite with respect to its termini, yet by repetition some motion can be continuous and perpetual.

1001. Then at (771) he answers the second argument. And he says that it is nothing unusual for a non-living thing to begin to be moved when previously it was not being moved, provided that this occurs because an external mover is present at one time and not at another. For it is clear that motion must pre-exist on the part of a mover which at some time becomes near but previously was not so. However, this seems to be a point to be looked into as a problem, namely, whether, if a mover exists, the same object can be at one time moved by this mover and at another not—for he had previously said that such a thing cannot happen unless there intervenes some change affecting either the mover or the mobile. Accordingly, motion always pre-exists, whether or not a mover pre-exists. Now this point seems to need investigation, because whoever proposed this argument seems to be certain about everything but one factor, namely, whr it is that things at rest do not always rest, and mobiles are not always in motion.

1002. Then at (772) he answers the third argument, And he says that the third objection causes the greatest problem about whether motion can exist after previously not existing, based on what is seen to happen in living things. For it seems that an animal which previously was at rest, later begins to move about without any external cause of motion; accordingly, it seems that that motion of the animal was not preceded by any motion, either in the animal or in anything else, as happens in non-living things.

But it is false that the motion of the animal does not come to be from something external. For we always observe in animals something naturally moved, whicht namely, is not moved through will. And the cause of its be,ing moved naturally is not the animal through its appetite, but perhaps the cause of this natural change is its surroundings, i.e., the air, and beyond that the heavens, as is plainly the case when the body of an animal is altered by heat or coldness of air.

And he says, “perhaps,” because in an animal something is also moved naturally by an internal principle, as is evident in those changes which occur in the vegetal soul, such as are the digestion of food and the subsequent transmutations, which are called “natural” because they do not follow upon apprehension and appetite. And because this seems to be contrary to what is proper to an animal, which is to move itself, he adds that when we say that an animal “moves itself,” we do not understand this of any and every motion, but of local motion, according to which an animal moves itself through apprehension and appetite.

Accordingly, there is nothing to prevent—indeed, it is necessary—many changes from taking place in the body of an animal on account of its surroundings, i.e., the air and the heavens, some of which changes move the understanding or the appetite, by which in turn the whole animal is moved.

1003. It should be noted that Aristotle here declares the way in which heavenly bodies act upon us. For they do not act directly on our souls but on our bodies; but when our bodies are moved, then per accidens a change occurs in the powers of the soul, which are acts of bodily organs, but not necessarily in the intellect and the intellective appetite, which do not use bodily organs. Yet the intellect and will sometimes follow upon some of these changes, as when a person through his reason chooses either to pursue or to reject or to do something on account of a passion which began in the body or in the sensitive part. And therefore Aristotle does not say that all motions caused by the surroundings move the intellect or appetitet but that some of them do. In this way he excludes necessity from the intellective powers.

Of the things he said he gives an example from sleeping things, in which there seems to be maximum rest with respect to animal motions. But even though during sleep there be no motion that is sensible, i.e., proceeding from sense apprehensiong animals rise awakened by some motion existing within, due either to the work of the nutritive soul, as when, as a result of the food’s being digested, the vapors which caused sleep vanish and the animal is aroused, or when the body is altered by its surroundings, from heat or cold.

Thus it is clear to anyone who considers the matter diligently that no motion ever newly appears in us unless some other motion preceded. And he promises to give a fuller explanation of this later.

LECTURE 5

FIVE WAYS IN WHICH THINGS MAY BE DISPOSED WITH RESPECT TO MOTION OR REST

Two first excluded.

1004. Having shown in Book VII that there is not an infinite process in movers and in mobiles but that a first must be reached, and having now shown that motion has always been and always will be, the Philosopher goes on further to consider the condition of the first motion and of the first mover. And his treatment is divided into two parts.

In the first he shows that the first motion is eternal and that the first mover is entirely immobile;

Secondly, from this he proceeds to show the condition of the first motion and of the first mover, (L. 14).

The first is divided into three parts:

In the first he gives a division having five members;

In the second he excludes three members of this division, at 1006;

Thirdly, he investigates the two remaining members to see which of them is truer, because the truth of what he intends to settle depends on it, (L. 6).

1005. He says therefore first (773) that the reason for the following consideration, in which we intend to investigate about the first motion and the first mover, is that it pertains to a question he raised in answering the second argument (given in the preceding lecture), namely, that of whence it happens that certain things are at one time in motion and at another time at rest, and are not either always in motion or always at rest since motion in common is considered perpetual.

And he says that the ways in which things are disposed with respect to motion or rest are necessarily limited to three. The first of which is that all things be always at rest and nothing ever in motion; the second is that all things be always in motion and nothing at rest; the third way is that some things are in motion and others at rest.

But the third way is again divided into three ways. The first of these is that some things are in motion and some at rest in the sense that the ones in motion are always in motion and those at rest always at rest, and nothing is at one time in motion and at another time at rest.

The second way is the converse, ioeol that all things are apt to be in motion and to rest and that nothing is either always in motion or always at rest.

The third way is that certain things are always immobile and never in motion; others are always mobile and never at rest; still others may be taken with both, i.e., with motion and rest, so as to be in motion at one time and at rest at another.

This last member must be determined by us to be the truth, because in it are contained the solutions of all objections. And when we shall have shown this, we shall possess the end which we intend in this work, namely, to arrive at a first eternal motion and a first immobile mover.

Therefore, it is in the above manner that the third member of the first division is divided into three members, thus making a general division consisting of five members.

Now, it should be noticed that in three of these members all things are respectively put in one definite disposition; for example, in the first member all things are taken to be always at rest; in the second all things are always in motion; and in the fourth all things alternate between motion and rest. But in one member, namely, the third, beings are divided according to two dispositions, so that some are always in motion and others always at rest. Finally, in one member, the fifth, beings are divided according to three dispositions; namely, some are never in motion, others are never at rest, while the others are sometimes in motion and sometimes not. Notice, too, in this last member that it is not rest but immobility that is posited; because the first mover, who is never moved, can not strictly be said to be at rest, for, as was said in Book V, only what is apt to be moved, and is not being moved, is properly said to be at rest.

1006, Then at (774) he excludes three members of the division.

First he posits that not all things are always at rest;

Secondly, that not all things are always in motion, at 1007;

Thirdly, he excludes the third member, in which it was said that the things in motion are always in motion and those at rest are always at rest, (L. 6).

In regard to the first he posits three statements. The first of these is that it is due to a weakness of understanding that some affirm rest of all things and in support of their stand search for a sophistic reason without referring to sense. For it proceeds on the fact that the intellect is not capable of destroying sophistical arguments which conflict with things evident to sense. But it has been said in Topics I that there is no need to dispute against positions or problems that are in a mind which needs sense or punishment. Hence it is not necessary to dispute this position, due to its stupidity.

The second thing he says is that this problem does not concern a particular being but being in general. Nor does it affect natural science alone, but in a way all demonstrative sciences and all opinions, i.e., all the arts which use opinions, as do rhetoric and dialectics, for all the arts and sciences make use of motion. For the practical arts in a way direct certain motions, and natural philosophy speculates about the nature of motion and about mobile beings. Mathematicians, too, make use of motion, i.ee, of an imagined one, saying that a point in motion makes a line. The metaphysician, however, considers first principles. Accordingly, it is plain that to destroy motion conflicts with all sciences.

Now an error that affects all beings and all sciences is not to be reproved by the philosopher of nature but by the metaphysician. Thereforet it is not the business of natural philosophy to dispute this error.

The third thing he says is that unreasonable and inappropriate problems about the principles of mathematical sciences do not pertain to mathematics to be answered. The same is true in the other sciences. In like manner, it is not the business of the physicist to destroy an affirmation that is contrary to its principles. For in each science the definition of the subject is assumed as a principle; hence in the science which deals with nature, it is assumed as a principle that nature is a principle of motion. Accordingly, in the light of these three statements, it is apparent that it does not belong to natural philosophy to dispute this position.

1007. Then at (775) he excludes the second member, in which Heraclitus posited that all things are always being moved. And first he compares this opinion with the previous one which posited that all things are always at rest; and he says that to say that all things are always in motion, as Heraclitus said, is both false and contrary to the principles of natural science. Yet this position is not in as great conflict with the art as the first one is.

But that it does conflict with the art is clear, because it takes away the assumption of natural science that nature is principle not only of motien but also of rest, which supposition makes it clear that rest is something natural just as motion is. Hence, just as the first opinions which destroyed motion, was against natural science, so too is this one that destroys rest.

The reason why he says that this opinion is less against art is that rest is nothing more than the privation of motion. But it is less evident that there is no motion than that there is no privation of motion. For there are some motions so weak and insignificant that they can be scarcely noticed; for that reason it is easy to suppose that something is at rest when it really is not. But great and strong motions cannot be concealed; hence it cannot be said that the senses are deceived in perceiving motion as they are in perceiving rest.

Therefore, secondly, at (776) he shows how some posited this second opinion. And he says that some, such as Heraclitus and his supporters, have said that all things which exist are always in motion, and not some things only or just at some time, but this motion eludes our senses. Now, if they say this of some motions, they are correct; for some motions do elude us. But because they do not qualify their statement but speak of all motions, it is not hard to find arguments against them, for there are many motions which evidently could not have existed always.

1008. Thirdly, at (777) he forms the arguments against this position.

First with respect to the motion of growth;

Secondly, with respect to the motion of alteration, at 1009;

Thirdly, with respect to local motion, at 1012.

The reason he begins with growth is that Heraclitus was led to his doctrine as a result of considering growth. For he observed that a person grows a small amount in one year and, supposing that growth is continuous, he believed that in each part of that year he was increased with respect to part of that quantity; and yet that increase is not sensed, because it comes in a small portion of time, He reasoned, therefore, that the same thing happens in other things which seem to be at rest.

Against this Aristotle says that it is not possible for a thing to be continually increased or diminished so that the increased quantity can be divided according to time in such a way that in each part of time there is a corresponding increase. Rather, there is, after the increase of one part, a time in which there is no increase but a disposition is produced for the increase of the next part.

And this he explains with kindred examples. The first of these is that we see that the multiplication of drops of rain breaks a stone. The second example is that we see that things being born, i.e., that plants born in stones divide the stones. Now, we cannot say that, if the repeated drops dig out or remove a certain quantity of the stone in a given time, half of this number of drops in half the time would previously remove half of that quantity. But what happens here is what happens with regard to shiphaulars. For it does not follow, if 100 men pull a ship a certain distance in a given time, that fifty of them will move it half the distance in the same time or the full distance in twice the time—this was said in Book VII. So also it does not follow, if many drops cave in a stone, that some part of those drops had previously removed the half in some certain time.

The reason for this is that what is removed from the stone by many drops is indeed divisible into many parts, but none of them is removed separately from the stone, for all the parts are removed at once, in the sense that they are in the totality removed in potency.

And he is speaking here of the first total quantity that is removed, for there is nothing to prevent that, over a long period of time, such a large quantity, be removed from the stone by these drops that a certain part may have been removed previously by a part of these drops. But we must come to a removed quantity which is removed all together and not part after part. Therefore, in the removing of that whole, none of the preceding drops removed anything, but merely disposed for its removal. However, the last acts in virtue of all and removes what the others had disposed to be removed.

The same is true in the motion called decrease. For it is not necessary, if something decreases a certain amount in a given time (even though the quantity be divided ad infinitum), that in every part of that time a corresponding part of the removed quantity should depart; rather, at some time a given amount will depart all together. The same holds in increase. Consequently, it is not required that something be continuously increased or decreased.

1009. Then at (778) he contradicts the above-mentioned position of continuous motion with respect to alteration, and this with three arguments. First, he says that what was said about increase, applies also to alteration. For although a body that is being altered is infinitely divisible, that is no reason for supposing that alteration is divided ad infinitum, so that for each period of time a part of the alteration should occur. Rather, alteration very often takes place swiftly, i.e., many parts of the altered body are altered all at once, as happens when water is condensed or congealed. For a whole mass of water is congealed all at once and not part after part (although if it be a large mass of water, there is nothing to prevent part congealing after part).

It should be noticed that what Aristotle says here about alteration growth seems contrary to what was said in Book VI, where it was shown that motion is divided according to the division of the time, and of the mobile, and of the sphere of motion.

But it should be recognized that in Book VI Aristotle was talking about motion in common, without application to definite mobiles. Therefore, what he discussed there must be taken according to the requirements of motion’s continuity; but at present he is speaking of motion with application to definite mobiles, in which a motion can be interrupted and not be continuous, which, when viewed under the common aspect, could be continuous.

1010. He gives the second argument at (779), and he says that if a sick person is to get well, he has to become healed in a period of time and not in a terminus (an instant?) of the time. And it is further necessary that the very change, which is healing, tend to a definite terminus, ie., to health and not to anything else. Accordingly, every alteration requires a definite time and a definite terminus, because every alteration tends to a contrary, as was said in Book V. But no such change is always continuous. Therefore, to say that something is being always and continuously altered, is to speak against the facts.

1011. The third argument he gives at (780) and he says that a stone does not become harder or softer, even after a very great period of time; thus it is foolish to say that all things are always being altered.

1012. Then at (781) he contradicts the opinion at issue with respect to local motion, on two counts. First, indeed, because some local motions and rests are so evident that they cannot be hidden. For it would be strange if it were hidden from us when a stone is carried downwards or when it is at rest on the earth. Consequently, it cannot be said that, because of the concealment of local motions, all things should be supposed to be always being moved locally.

Tnl3. Secondly, at (782) he argues thus: Earth and any other natural body, when they are in their due placest rest from a necessity of nature and are not removed except by force. But it is evident that certain natural bodies are in their due place. Therefore, it is necessary to say that some things are at rest with respect to place and that not all things are being moved locally.

Finally, he concludes in summary that, from the foregoing and other things similar to the foregoing, anyone can know that it is impossible for all things always to be in motion, as Heraclitus said, or for all things always to be at rest, as Zeno and Parmenides and Melissus said,

LECTURE 6

A THIRD MEMBER OF THE DIVISION IS REJECTED

1014. Having disposed of two members of the foregoing division, the Philosopher now rejects a third, in which it was posited that things are divided into two dispositions only, in such a way, namely, that some things are always at rest and others always in motion, and there is not a third class of things that are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. He rejects this in two ways.

He does this first (783) in the same way that he rejected the two previous positions, namely, on the ground that they are contrary to sense observation. For we see by the senses not only that some things are in motion (which destroys the first position, namelyt of those who posit all things to be always at rest), and that some are at rest (by which is destroyed the second position, of those who maintain that all things are always in motion); but we also see that the aforementioned changes or variations from motion to rest, and from rest to motion, occur in the same things. This shows that there are some things which are sometimes moved and sometimes at rest.

1015. In a second way at (784) he rejects the same opinion on the ground that the one who would engender this doubt would be contrary to what is evident in nature. In the first place it would deny the motion of growth, for we see that growth takes place in things that are not always growing, because, were they always growing, they would be tending not to a definite quantity but to the infinite.

In the second place it would deny compulsory local motion, for a motion is not compulsory, unless something is moved not in keeping with its nature when previously it was naturally at rest; for a forced motion is nothing more than a departure from natural rest. If therefore nothing at rest can be moved, it will follow that what is naturally at rest cannot later be moved by compulsion.

In the third place generation and ceasing-to-be would be excluded by this opinion. For the former is a change from non-being to being, and the latter from being to non-being. Therefore, in order that a thing cease to be, it ought previously to have been existing for a time, and in order that a thing be generated, it ought previously not to have been existing for a time. But whatever is a being or a non-being for some time is at rest (where rest is taken in a very general sense), If, therefore, nothing at rest can be moved, it follows that nothing which is for some time a non-existent can be generated, and that nothing which exists for a time can cease to be.

In the fourth place this position destroys all motion universally, because every motion involves generation and ceasing-to-be either absolutely or in a qualified sense. For what is being moved toward something as toward a terminus is being made such-and-such, so far as alteration and growth are concerned, or being made to be in such-and-such, so far as local motion is concerned; for example, what is being changed from black to white, or from small to large, becomes white or large, but whatever is being moved to a place comes to exist in that place. But from the fact that something is changed from its terminus a quo, a “such and such” ceased to be, when it is a case of alteration and growth, and a “there” ceased to be, if it is a case of local motion. Therefore, because in every motion there is generation and ceasing-to-be, it consequently rejects all motion.

Because such things are impossible, it becomes clear that some things are being moved, but not always; and that some things are at rest, not always, but sometimes.

1016. Then at (785) he studies the other two members of his division.

First he reveals his intention;

Secondly, he pursues it, (L. 7).

About the first he does three things:

First he shows to which opinion the fourth member pertains;

Secondly, he summarizes what has been said in this chaptert at 1017;

Thirdly, he states what remains to be said, at 1020.

He says therefore first (785) that to posit that all things are sometimes at rest and sometimes in motion pertains to the ancient arguments which we touched upon in discussing the eternity of motion. For Empedocles seems to be the chief protagonist of this opinion that all things are at some time moved by friendship and by discord and in the meantime are at rest.

1017. Then at (786) he sums up what has been said in this chapter.

First he recalls the divisions previously made;

Secondly, he recalls the rejection of the first member which posited all things at rest, at 1018;

Thirdly, the rejection of the other two members, at 1019.

He says therefore first (786) that in order to make clearer the intention of what follows, we must begin with what has just been determined and use the same principle as before, namely, that beings must maintain themselves in one of three dispositions, i.e., either that all are at rest or all in motion or some at rest and some in motion. And this third is again divided into three members, for if all things are such that some are at rest and others in motion, then necessarily all must be at one time at rest and at another in motion, or some are always at rest and others always in motion, or to these two a third member may be added, namely, that there are others of which some are at rest not always but sometimes, while the others are in motion sometimes but not always.

l018. Then at (787) he rejects the first member and says that it was said above that it is not possible for all things to be always at rest; but something else must now be added. And he says two things against this position.

First, some motion must be posited at least in the soul. For should anyone want to say that according to truth it is a fact that nothing is being moved (as the followers of Melissus did, who posited that being is infinite and immobile), yet it is also a fact that this does not appear to be so according to sense, for many things appear to the senses to be moving.

If, therefore, anyone declares as false the opinion by which we believe that some things are in motion, it still follows that motion exists. For if there is false opinion, there is motion; and universally if there is opinion, there is motion and, likewise, if there is imagining, there is motion. The reason is that imagining is a motion of the sensitive part and is produced by the sense in act. Opinion also is a certain motion of the reason and proceeds from several acts of reasoning. But it follows even more strongly that there is motion in opinion and imagining, if things appear to be this at one time and that at another. This happens when things at one time seem to us to be at rest and at another time not to rest. Thus, it entirely follows that motion exists.

He says, secondly, against the opinion at issue, that to have the intention of destroying this opiniong and to look for an argument to prove those things that we ought to hold in a respect surpassing the need for proof, since they are accepted as self-evident. To do this, I say, is no different from judging poorly between what is better and what is worse in morals, and between what is credible and incredible in logical matters, and between a principle and a non-principle in matters of demonstration.

For whoever looks for arguments to prove things which are self-evident and, consequently, held as principles, does not recognize them for principles so long as he intends to prove them through other principles. Likewise, it seems that he does not recognize what is credible and what is incredible, because he is trying to prove what is per se credible through something else, as though it were not per se credible. Nor does he seem capable of distinguishing between the better and the worse who tries to prove the more evident by means of the less evident. But it is self-evident that some things are in motion. Therefore, we should not address ourselves to trying to prove this by arguments.

1019. Then at (788) he rejects two more members of his original division. And he says that just as it is impossible for all things to be always at rest, so too is it impossible that all things be always in motion, or that some things are always in motion and some always at rest, so as to leave nothing which is sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. Against all this, sufficient credence arises from one medium, namely, the fact that we see that some things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. Hence, it is clear that it is impossible to say that all things are continually at rest—which was the first member—and that all things are continually in motion—which was the second member—or that some are always in motion and the remainder always at rest without any mediate possibility.

1020. Then at (789) he shows what is left to be said, and he concludes from the foregoing that since three members of the division cannot stand, what remains is to consider which of the other two is the truer, whether, namely, all things are capable of both motion and rest, or whether some are capable of both motion and rest while still others are always at rest and others always in motion. This last is what we intend to demonstrate. In this way it will be shown that the first motion is eternal, and the first mover immobile.

LECTURE 7

UNIVERSALLY, WHATEVER IS MOVED IS MOVED BY ANOTHER

1021. After revealing his aim, the Philosopher now begins to execute it, namely, to establish that not all things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest, but that something is entirely immobile, and something always in motion. The treatment is divided into two parts.

In the first he shows that the first mover is immobile;

In the second that the first mobile is always being moved, (L. 13).

The first part is divided into two sections:

In the first he shows the immobility of the first mover from the order of movers and mobiles;

In the second, from the eternity of motion, (L. 13).

The first is divided into two parts:

In the first he shows that the first mover is immobile;

In the second that the first mover is eternal, (L. 12).

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that to prove what follows depends on showing that whatever is moved is moved by another;

Secondly, he shows the proposition, (L. 9).

He had indeed showed above, in the beginning of Book VII, that whatever is moved is moved by another, by a generic argument based on motion itself, but because he has now begun to apply motion to mobile things, he here shows that what was previously proved in a universal way is verified universally in all mobiles and movers. Hence the first part is divided into two parts:

In the first he gives a division of movers and mobiles;

In the second he explains his proposition in individual cases, at 1024.

About the first he does two things:

First he divides movers and mobiles;

Secondly, he explains the division, at 1023.

1022. He gives therefore first (790) three divisions of movers and mobiles. The first of these is that among movers and mobiles some move or are moved per accidens, and some per se. And he takes “per accidens” in a wide sense include what moves or is moved with respect to a part. Hence in explaining what he means by “per accidens, he adds that things cause motion or are moved per accidens in two ways. (1) Whatever things are said to cause motion by virtue of being present in things which move are said to cause it per accidens, as when it is said that a musician causes health, because a knowledge of music is present in the one who heals; and likewise things are said to be moved per accidens either on account of existing in what is being moved in the way that an object in place exists in a place, e.g., when we say that a man is being moved, because the ship on which he is is being moved, or on account of being an accident in a subjects as when we say that the white is being moved, because a body is being moved. (2) In another way, things are said to move or to be moved per accidens, because they move or are moved with respect to a part, as a man is said to strike or be struck, because his hand strikes or is struck.

But when these two per accidens ways of causing motion or being moved are eliminated, things are said to move or to be moved per se, i.e., when they are not said to cause motion or be moved by virtue of being in the cause of motion or in what is being moved, or because some part of them causes motion or is moved.

Therefore, leaving out what causes motion or is moved per accidens, he subdivides things that are moved per se into those which are moved by themselves, as are animals, and those moved by others, as are the non-living.

He gives a third division, namely, that some things are moved according to nature and some not according to nature.

1023. Then at (791) he explains how to discern what is according to nature and what is not according to nature, both in things that are moved by themselves and in things that are moved by something else.

First, with respect to things that are moved by themselves—such as are animals, which move themselves—he says that they are moved according to nature. And he proves this on the ground that they are moved by an intrinsic principle, and since things whose principle of motion is within are said to be moved by nature, it follows that an animal's motion, by which it moves itself, if it is compared to the whole animal, is natural, because that motion proceeds from the soul which is the nature and form of the animal. But if it be compared to the body, an animal's motion may be both natural and not according to nature. The difference depends on the type of motion and on the element of which the animal is composed. For if an animal consists of a predominant heavy element, as does the human body, and it is moved upwards, such a movement would be compulsory with respect to the body; but if it is moved downward, it will be a movement that is natural to the body. However, if there were animals whose bodies were composed of air, as Platonists held, then the contrary would be true.

Secondly, he explains how to discern compulsory and natural motions in things that are moved by another. Of these, some, he says, are moved according to nature, as fire upward and earth downward; others are moved outside their nature, as earth upward and fire downward, which is a compulsory motion.

Thirdly, he mentions another type of unnatural motion in animals, namelyt those in which the parts of animals are moved in an unnatural way, their positions and the character of the motion being abnormal. For example, a man's arms bend (at the elbow) facing forward, while his legs bend (at the knee) facing backward; but dogs and horses and the like, bend the forelegs facing backward and the hind legs facing forward. If motions contrary to these are made, they will be compulsory and not according to nature.

1024. Then at (792) he proves that everything that is moved is moved by another.

First he manifests it in cases that are evident;

Secondly, in cases about which there is doubt, at 1025.

Leaving aside things that are moved per accidens, because such things are not moved but are merely said to be moved when other things are moved, and confining ourselves to those which are moved per se, it is clear, especially in things moved by compulsion and outside their nature, that what is moved is moved by another.

For in the case of things moved by compulsion, it is clear from the very definition of compulsion that they are moved by another. For compulsion, as is said in Ethics III, is that whose principle is from without, with the thing suffering it contributing nothing.

After things that are moved by compulsion, it is clear that what is moved is moved by another if we consider things moved by themselves according to nature, as animals are said to move themselves. For in animals it is clear that something is being moved by something else—but there might yet be a question as to how to distinguish in them the mover and what is being moved. For at first glance it appears to many that what is true with respect to ships and other artifacts which do not exist according to nature, namely, that the part which causes motion is diverse from the part which is moved, applies to animals, for it seems that the soul which causes motion is related to its body which is moved, as the mariner is related to the ship, as is said in On the Soul II. In this way it seems that the whole animal moves itself insofar as one part moves another. But whether the soul is related to the body as a mariner to a ship he leaves to be investigated in his treatise On the Soul. However, the fact that a thing is said to move itself, insofar as one part thereof moves and another is moved, will be shown later.

1025. Then at (793) he explains his proposition in regard to things in which it is more doubtful. About this he does three things.

First he sets down those things in which it is more doubtful that whatever is moved is moved by another, namely, in the heavy and the light, when they are moved according to nature.

Secondly, he shows that they do not move themselves, at 1026;

Thirdly, he shows by what they are moved, (L. 8).

He says therefore first (793) that, since it is in things moved by compulsion, and after them in things which move themselves, that it is especially evident that whatever is being moved is moved by another, the greatest doubt appears to be in the remaining member of the last division, namely, in things that do not move themselves, but yet are moved naturally.

The “last” division to which he refers is that in which he divided things that are moved not by themselves but by another into those that are moved contrary to nature, and those that are moved according to nature. In these latter there is doubt as to what moves them: for example, heavy and light objects are moved to their proper places according to nature—i.e., the light upwards and the heavy downwards—and into contrary places by compulsion; but the source of their motion when they are moved according to nature is not clear, as it is when they are moved contrary to nature.

1026. Then at (794) he proves with four arguments that these things do not move themselves. The first of which is that to move itself pertains to the notion of life and is peculiar to living things; for it is through motions and sensations that we distinguish the animate from the inanimate, as is said in On the Soul I. But it is manifest that the heavy and light as such are not alive, or animate. Therefore, they do not move themselves.

1027. The second argument is given at (795); Things that move themselves can cause themselves to stop, as we see that animals are moved and stop by reason of their appetite, Therefore, if heavy and light things moved themselves with a natural motion, they could cause themselves to stop, in the way that a person who is the cause of his walking is so also of his ceasing to walk. But we see that this is false, because the heavy and the light do not stop outside their proper places, unless some external cause intervenes to halt their motion. Therefore, they do not move themselves.

But because someone could say that although such things are not the cause of their own stopping outside their proper places, yet they are the cause of stopping in their proper places, he adds a third argument at (796): it is unreasonable to say that things which move themselves are so moved according to one motion alone and not by many, because what moves itself does not have its motion determined by another but determines its own motion for itself, so that at one time it determines this motion and at another time that one. Hence it is in the power of what moves itself to determine for itself this or that motion. Therefore, if heavy and light things moved themselves, it would follow that if it were in the power of fire to be moved upward, it would also be in its power to be moved downward, which is something we never see occurring, unless from an extrinsic cause. Therefore, they do not move themselves.

It should be recognized that these two arguments are probable in respect to what appears in things among us that move themselves, which are found at one time to be moved with this motion and at another time with that motion, and at another time to be at rest. Hence he does not say, “It is impossible," but "It is unreasonable," which is his manner of speaking when he talks of what is probable. For he will show later that if something is moving itself and it is an entirely immobile mover, that it is always being moved and with one motion. Yet that could not be said in regard to heavy and light things, in which there is nothing that is not moved either per se or per accidens, and they are also generated and cease to be.

1028. He gives the fourth argument at (797): No continuum moves itself. But heavy and light bodies are continua. Therefore neither of these moves itself.

That no continuum moves itself he proves in the following manner: The mover is related to the moved as agent to patient. But since the agent is contrary to the patient, that which is apt to act must be divided from what is apt to be acted upon, Now, to the extent that things are not in mutual contact but are completely one and continuous in quantity and form, to that extent they can not be acted upon by one another, In this way, therefore, it follows that no continuum moves itself, but the mover must be divided from what is moved, as is evident when non-living things are moved by living things, as is a stone by the hand, Hence, too, in animals that move themselves, there is rather a connection of parts than a perfect continuity (for which reason one part can be moved by another), a situation that is not verified in the light and the heavy.

LECTURE 8

WHAT MOVES THE HEAVY AND LIGHT. EVERYTHING MOVED, MOVED BY ANOTHER

1029. After showing that the heavy and the light do not move themselves, he shows.by what they are moved.

First he shows by what they are moved;

Secondly, he concludes to his main intention, at 1036.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that they are naturally moved by something;

Secondly, he investigates by what they are moved, at 1030.

He says therefore first (798) that although the heavy and the light do not move themselves, they are nevertheless moved by something. And this can be made clear if we distinguish moving causes. For just as in things that are moved, we must take it that (1) some things are moved according to nature and some not, so also in movers, some move not according to nature, e.g., a stick, which is not naturally capable of moving a heavy body such as a stone; and that (2) some things move according to nature, as what is actually hot naturally moves what is according to its nature potentially hot, and similarly in other cases. And just as what is in act causes motion naturally, so what is in potency is naturally moved, with respect either to quantity or quality or where.

And because in Book II he had said that those things are moved naturally whose principle of motion exists in them per se and not by virtue of some concomitant attribute, which might lead one to suppose that what is only potentially hot is, when it becomes hot, not moved naturally in that it is being moved by an external active principle of its motion, he now adds, as though to preclude this objection, “since it has a principle of this kind in itself and not accidentally,” as if to say that in order that a motion be natural, it is enough that a principle of this kind, i.e., the potency, about which he made mention, exist in that which is moved per se and not per accidens, as a bench is potentially combustible, not precisely as bench but as wood.

Hence in explaining the expression “per accidens,” he adds that the same subject can be quantified and qualified, but one of these is related to the other per accidens; what is potentially of such and such a quality is also potentially quantified, but per accidens.

Therefore, because what is in potency is naturally moved by something else in act, and nothing is in potency and in act with respect to the same, it follows that neither fire nor earth nor anything else is moved by itself but by another. Fire and water are moved by another, but by compulsion, when their motion is outside their natural potency; but they are moved naturally when they are moved to their proper acts, to which they are in potency according to their nature.

1030. Then at (799) he shows by what they are moved. And because what is in potency is moved by something in act,

First he distinguishes potency;

Secondly, from this he shows by what such things are moved, at 1035.

About the first he does three things:

First he shows that it is necessary to know the ways in which something is said to be in potency;

Secondly, he explains this at 1031;

Thirdly, with this he solves a question, at 1033.

He says therefore that the reason why it is not evident by what heavy and light things are moved with respect to their natural motion (as fire upward and earth downward) is that the expression “being in potency” has many senses.

1031. Then at (800) he distinguishes “being in potency”:

First in the understanding;

Secondly, in quality, at 1032;

Thirdly, in local motion, at 1033.

He says therefore first that one who is learning and does not yet have the habit of science is not in potency to science in the same way as one who already has the science but is not using it by considering.

But something is reduced from the first potency to the second, when the active principle is united with the patient; and then the patient through the presence of the active principle comes to be with respect to such an act, but after that the patient is yet in potency: for example, a learner is through the action of the teacher reduced from potency to act, but when he is in this state of act, there is yet another potency present. Consequently, the thing existing in first potency comes to be in another state of potency; because one having science, and not considering, is in a sense in potency to an act of science, but not in the same way as he was before he learned. Therefore, from first potency he is reduced to an act to which is united a second potency, by some agent, namely, the teacher.

But when he is in the state of possessing the habit of science, it is not necessary that he be reduced to second act by some agent; rather he operates immediately by himself, just by considering, i.e., unless he is prevented by other occupations or by sickness or by his will. On the other hand, if he were not impeded and still could not consider, then he would not be in the habit of science but in its contrary, namely, ignorance.

1032. Then at (801) he manifests the same thing in qualities. And he says that what was said with respect to the potency of anything in the mind applies also to natural bodies. For when a body is actually cold, it is potentially hot, just as an ignorant person is potentially a knower. But when this body has been so modified that it has the form of fire, then it is now actually fire and has the power to burn; and it acts at once and burns, unless it is prevented by something acting to the contrary or somehow preventing its acting, as by removing the combustible material. This is similar to what was said above, that when someone after learning becomes a knower, he at once considers, unless prevented by something.

1033. Then at (802) he manifests the same thing in the local motion of the heavy and the light. And he says that a light thing comes to be from a heavy, as a hot thing comes to be from the cold, as, for example, when air which is light comes to be from water which is heavy. Therefore, this water is first potentially light and later becomes actually light, and then it has its own activity at once, unless something prevents. But now being light, it is related to a place as potency to act—for the act of the light as light is to be in some definite place, namely, above; but it is prevented from being up by the fact of being in a contrary place, namely, down, because it cannot be in two places at the same time. Hence, that which keeps a light thing down prevents it from being up. And what has been said of local motion is true also of motion with respect to quantity or quality.

1034. Then at (803) he uses the foregoing to answer a question. For although the act of the light is to be above, yet some ask why the heavy and the light are moved to their appropriate places. But the cause of this is that they have a natural aptitude for such places. For to be light is to have an aptitude for being above, and the nature of the heavy is to have an aptitude to be down. Hence, to ask why a heavy thing is moved downward is exactly the same as to ask why it is heavy. Accordingly, the very same thing that makes it heavy makes it be moved downward.

1035. Then at (804) he uses the foregoing to show what moves the heavy and the light. And he says that since what is in potency is moved by what is in act (as has been said), it must be considered that something is said in many senses to be potentially light or heavy.

For in one way, when something is yet water, it is in potency to lightness; in another way, when from the water air has now been made, it is still in potency to the act of what is light, which is to be above in the same way that one having the habit of science and not considering is said still to be in potency—for what is light can possibly be prevented from being up.

If, therefore, that obstacle be removed, it immediately acts for the purpose of being up by ascending, as it was said with respect to quality that when a thing is actually of such and such a quality, it immediately tends to its act, as a knower immediately considers, unless he be prevented. And the same is true with respect to the motion to quantity, for from the fact that an addition of quantity has been made to a quantitative thing, extension immediately follows in an increasable body, unless something prevents.

Accordingly, it is clear that what moves, i.e., what removes the obstacle preventing and sustaining does in some sense cause motion and in other senses does not; for example, if a pillar supports something heavy and thus keeps it from descending, the one who casts down the pillar is said somehow to move the heavy object that was supported by the pillar. In like manner, one who removes a stopper that was preventing water from flowing out of a container is said in some sense to move the water; for he is said to move per accidens and not per se. Also when a ball rebounds from a wall, it is moved per accidens by the wall but per se by the one who first threw it. For it was not the wall but the thrower that gave it the impetus for motion; but it was per accidens that, being prevented by the wall from continuing according to its impetus, it rebounded into a contrary motion, the original impetus remaining. In like manner, the one who casts down the pillar did not give the heavy object resting upon it the impetus or inclination to be downward, for it had that from the first generator, which gave it the form upon which that inclination follows. Consequently, the generator is the per se mover of the light and the heavy, whereas the remover of obstacles is a per accidens mover.

He concludes, thereforel that it is clear from the foregoing that none of these, i.e., of the heavy and the light, moves itself; yet their motion is natural, because they have in themselves the principle of their motion, not indeed a moving or active principle but a passive one, which is a potency to such-and-such an act.

From this it is evidently contrary to the intention of the Philosopher that in matter there be an active principle, which some declare is necessary for a natural motion; for a passive principle is sufficient, since it is a natural potency for act.

1036. Then at (805) he concludes to the conclusion chiefly intended in the whole chapter. And he says that if it is true that all things which are per se moved are moved either according to nature, or outside their nature and by compulsion, and if of those which are moved by compulsion it is true that all are moved not only by a mover but even by an external mover that is other; and, again, if among things that are moved according to nature, some are moved by themselves—in which things it is clear that they are moved by something not extrinsic but intrinsic—while others, such as heavy and light things are moved according to nature not by themselves but by some mover) as has been explained—for they are moved either per se by the generator which makes them be heavy and light, or they are moved per accidens by whatever removes what impedes or removes their natural motion—it is accordingly clear that all things which are moved are moved by something, i.e., either by an intrinsic or an extrinsic mover; which is to be moved by something other.

LECTURE 9

NO PROCESS TO INFINITY IN MOVERS. NOT EVERY MOVER NEED BE MOVED

1037. After showing that whatever is moved is moved by another, the Philosopher now begins to show that it is necessary to reach a first immobile mover. And his treatment is divided into two parts.

In the first he shows that it is necessary to reach a first that is either immobile or moves itself;

In the second he shows that even if a first that moves itself is reached, it is further necessary to reach a first mover that is immobile, (L.10).

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that it is not possible that things be moved by another ad infinitum;

Secondly, he shows that not every mover need be moved, at 1042.

About the first he does two things:

First he explains the proposition by ascending in the order of mobiles and movers;

Secondly, by descending, at 1041.

About the first he does two things:

First he premisses things needed for manifesting his proposition;

Secondly, he gives an argument that shows the proposition, 1040.

1038. Now he premisses two things, of which the first (806) is a division of movers. For since it has been said that whatever is moved is moved by something, a thing might be a mover in two senses. In one sense, when it moves not on its own account, i.e., not by its own power, but because it has been moved by some other mover. This is a second mover. In another sense, something moves on its own account, i.e., by its own power and not because it has been moved by another. Now, such a mover can cause motion in two ways: First, in such a way that the first mover moves the one next to the last, i.e., the one which is nearest to it after the second mover; this happens when the first mover moves a mobile through just one intermediate. Secondly, in such a way that the mover moves a mobile through a number of intermediates, as when a stick moves a stone and the stick is moved by a hand, which is moved by a man who does not move as being moved by something else. In this way the man is a first mover on his own account and he moves the stone through a number of intermediates; however, if he moved the stone with his hand, he would be moving the tone through one intermediate only.

1039. Secondly, at (807) he compares the first mover with the second. For since both the first mover and the ultimate are said to cause motion, we say that the first mover is more a mover than the ultimate mover. This is clear for two reasons: first, because the first mover moves the second

mover but not vice versa; secondly, because the second mover cannot cause motion independently of the first, but the first can cause it independently of the second. For example, the stick cannot move the stone unless it is moved by the man, but the man can move the stone without using the stick.

1040. Then at (808) he proves his proposition in the light of the foregoing. For it has been shown that whatever is being moved is being moved by another. But that by which it is moved is itself either moved or not moved; and if it is moved, it is either moved by another or not. Now these two, namely, being moved by another or not being moved by another, are such that if one is posited the other must be and not vice versa: that is, if there is something which is moved by another, it is necessary to come to a first that is not moved by another; but if such a first is posited, namely, a first that is not moved by another, it is not necessary further to posit another, namely, one that is moved by another.

This, indeed, is self-evidentt but there could be some doubt about the first one, namely, that if there be found something moved by another, there be found a first that is not moved by another. For this reason, he proves this in the following manner.

If something is moved by another and this in turn by another, and if something not moved by another is never reached, it follows that there is a process to infinity in movers and moved things. But this is impossible, as was proved in Book VII. However, he here proves it in a more certain way, from the fact that there is no first in an infinite series. Therefore, if movers and moved things go on ad infinitum, there will be no first mover. But it has already been said that if the first mover does not act, the last mover does not act and, consequently, there will be no mover, which is evidently false. Therefore, the process of something being moved by another cannot go on ad infinitum. If, therefore, it be conceded that whatever is being moved is being moved by another, as has been proved, and again, if it be supposed that the first mover is itself being moved but not by something else, it is necessarily being moved by itself.

It should be noted that this argument is not proving that the first mover is being moved, but he is supposing this according to the common opinion of the Platonists. As to the force of the argument, it does not conclude more that the first mover moves itself than that it is immobile. Hence he later presents this same conclusion under a disjunction, as will be clear below.

1041. Then at (809) he proves his proposition by descending. And it is the same argument as the preceding so far as its illative value is concerned, but differs with respect to the order of the process; he repeats it, however, for the sake of greater clarity.

He says therefore that the previous argument might be presented in another way. And he premisses propositions that have the same truth value as the previous ones, but in a different order. For above he had premissed that whatever is being moved is being moved by another and that that by which it is moved acts either on its own account or on account of something else previously moving it; and this was an ascending process.

But now he uses a descending process, saying that every mover moves something and moves by means of something, i.e., either by itself or by means of some lesser mover, as a man moves a stone either by himself or by means of a stick and the wind casts something to the earth either by its own impulse or by means of a stone which it moves.

Again, he had premised above that the last mover does not cause motion independently of the first mover, but vice versa. In place of that he here says that what a mover uses as an instrument in causing motion cannot itself cause motion without a principal mover moving it, as a stick cannot cause motion independently of the hand; but if something moves by itself as a principal mover, the addition of an instrument is not required. And this is more evident in instruments than in an ordered array of mobiles, although the same truth is present in both cases, because not every one would consider the second mover an instrument of the first. But as he deduced above that, if there is something that is being moved by another, there must be something that is not being moved, but not vice versa, so here in a descending process he says that if that by which the mover causes motion is another thing, as an instrument, there has to be something which causes motion not by an instrument but by itself. Otherwise, there is an infinite process with respect to instruments, which is the same as proceeding to infinity with respect to movers, and that is impossible, as has been proved above.

If, therefore, there exists a mover of that which is being moved, a halt must be made and the process cannot go to infinity. For if the stick causes motion because it is moved by the hand, it follows that the hand moves the stick; if, however, something else is moving the hand, it also follows conversely that a mover is moving the hand. Consequently, the same process that was valid with respect to moved instruments is valid for movers of instruments. But with respect to movers, as was shown, an infinite process must be avoided; therefore, it must be avoided with respect to instruments. Thereforet since it is always so that a thing being moved is moved by another which moves, and an infinite process must be avoided, it is necessary that there be a first mover that moves by itself and not through an instrument.

If, therefore, it be granted that this first which moves itself is indeed moved but there is no other moving it (because then it would be an instrument), it follows of necessity that it is moving itself—following the supposition of the Platonists that every mover is moved.

Hence also according to this argument, either what is being moved will be immediately moved by a mover that moves itself, or at some time such a mover that moves itself must be reached.

1042. Then at (810) he shows that not every mover is being moved, as was supposed in the preceding arguments. About this he does two things:

First he proves that not every mover is being moved;

Secondly, from this and from the previous arguments he concludes to his main proposition, at 1049.

He says therefore first that to the above-mentioned things may be added the following in order to show our proposition. About this he does three things:

First he premises a division;

Secondly, he rejects one member$ at 1043;

Thirdly, he rejects another, at 1046.

He says therefore first (830) that if whatever is being moved is being moved by another, which is tantamount to saying that every mover is moved, this can be in two ways: in one way, that it is per accidens in things that a mover is moved, i.e., the mover does not act in virtue of being moved (as if we should say that a musician is a builder not because he is a musician, but this is per accidens); or in a second way, that it is not per accidens but per se that a mover is moved.

1043. Then at (811) he rejects the first member in three ways. First, with this argument: Nothing per accidens is necessary, for what is in a thing per accidens is not present of necessity, but may happen not to be present, as musician in a builder. If, therefore, it is per accidens that movers are moved, it follows that it can happen that they not be moved. But once you posit that every mover is moved, it is a consequence, if movers are not moved, that they do not cause motion. It follows, therefore, that at some time, nothing is being moved. But this is impossible, for it has been proved above that it is necessary that motion always exist. This impossibility, however, does not follow from the supposition that movers are not moved; because if it is per accidens that a mover is moved, it will be possible for movers not to be moved, and if a possibility is posited, no impossibility follows. It remains, therefore, that the other statement from which it (the cessation of motion) followed is impossible, namely, the statement that every mover is moved.

1044. Secondly, at (812) he proves the same with another probable argument, which is this: Three things are found in motion: one is the mobile that is being moved; another is the mover, and the third is the instrument by which the mover causes motion. Now among these three, it is clear that the thing which is moved has to be moved, but it does not have to cause motion. The instrument, however, by which the mover causes motiont must both move and be moved—it is moved by the principal mover and it moves the last thing moved. For this reason, whatever “moves and is moved” has the character of an instrument.

Now, the reason why the instrument by which the mover causes motion both is moved and moves is that it partakes of both and exists in a sort of identity to what is moved. This is especially evident in local motion, for it is necessary that from the first mover to the last thing moved, all must touch one another. Accordingly, it is evident that an intermediate instrument is through contact the same as the mobile and is moved at once with it, insofar as it is in union with it. But it is also in union with the mover, because it is a mover—although under its aspect as the instrument by which the mover causes motion, it is not immobile.

Accordingly, thereforeo it appears from the premisses that the last thing moved is, indeed, being moved but it does not have in itself a principle for moving either itself or anything else, and it is moved indeed by something else and not by itself. Hence, it seems to be reasonable, i.e., probable (and in the present case we do not care to say that it is necessary) that there be a third thing which causes motion but is immobile.

For it is probable that if two things are joined per accidens, and one is found without the other, then the other might be found without it (but that it may be found without the other is necessary, because things joined per accidens may happen to be not joined); for example, if white and sweet are joined per accidens in sugar, and if white is found without sweet, as in snow, it is probable that sweet be found in some thing without white, as in cheese. If, therefore, it is per accidens that a mover be moved and something is found to be moved without moving something else, as happens in the last thing moved, it is probable that one may find moving without being moved, so that there would be a mover that is not moved.

From this it is evident that this argument does not have force in substance and accident, and in matter and form, and in like things, of which one is found without the other but not vice versa; for accident per se exists in a substance, and to matter it belongs per se to have existence through form.

1045, Thirdly, at (813) he proves the same point on the testimony of Anaxagoras. For since it may be that a mover be found that is not moved, Anaxagoras spoke aright when he said that Mind is impassible and unmingled. He said this because he posited Mind as the first principle of motion, and the only way it could cause motion and command, without itself being moved, was that it be unmingled—for what is mingled with something else is in a certain way moved when that something else is moved.

1046. Then at (814) he concentrates on the other part of the division, namely, that whatever is moved, is being moved by another which is moved per se and not according to an accident.

And he disproves this with two arguments, the first of which is: If it is not according to an accident but of necessity that a mover be moved and if it can never cause motion unless it is movedt this must happen in two ways: one of which is that the mover is moved according to the same species of motion as that which it causes; the other is that the mover moves according to one species of motion, and is moved according to another. He subsequently explains the first way at (815): We say that a mover is being moved according to the same species of motion if, for example, the thing that causes heating is heated, and the healer is healed, and something carrying locally is itself being carried locally.

He explains the second way when he says: “Or else the healer is carried along, or the thing carrying along is growing.” These are examples of “moving and being moved” according to different species of motion.

Then he shows the impossibility of the first way, at (816). For it is clearly impossible that a mover be moved according to the same species of motion. For it is not sufficient to stop at some subalternate species, but one Must divide until he reaches the “individuals,” i.e., the most special species. For example, if someone is teaching, it is not enough for him simply to be taught at the same time, but he must be teaching and being taught the same; e.g., if he is teaching geometry he must be at the same time being taught it; or if he is the cause of a local motion called throwing, he must himself be moved according to the same motion of throwing. This is clearly false.

Then he dismisses the second ways namely, that the mover not be moved according to the same species of motion, but that it move according to one species and be moved according to another; for example, if it moves with a local motion, and is being moved with respect to growth; and if what causes the growth is being moved by some thing else according to alteration; and if this mover in turn is being moved with respect to some other motion.

Now it is clear that motions are not infinite either in genus or species. For it was held in Book V that motions differ in genus and species according to the differences of the species in which motion occurs. But the genera and species of things are not infinite, as we proved elsewhere; accordingly, neither are the genera and species of motion. If, therefore, a mover is necessarily being moved according to some other genus or species of motion, one will not be able to proceed to infinity and there will be some first immobile mover.

1047. But because someone could say that when all the species of motion are exhausted, a return will be made to the first species, in such a way that if the first thing taken as moved was moved locally, and we distributed all the genera and species of motion to different movers until these genera and species were exhausted, the remaining mover will then be moved according to local motion, in order to exclude this he subsequently says that such a return is tantamount to saying that the cause of alteration is being moved locally (he uses this explanation because above in his example he mentioned local motion first and alteration last), the same, I say, as supposing from the very beginning that the mover according to local motion is being moved, and that the teacher is being taught not only generically but in the specific sense.

And that this means nothing more, he proves consequently. For whatever is being moved is moved more by the higher mover than by the lower one, and, consequently, much more so by the first mover. If, therefore, the thing posited as being moved locally is being moved by a neighboring mover that is being increased, and it by a mover that is being altered, and it further by one that is being moved according to place, what is being moved according to place will be more moved by the first one moved according to place than by the second one which is being altered or by the third one which is being increased.

Therefore it will be true to say that the mover according to place is being moved according to place, and the same for every sphere of motion. Now this is not only false, because it is seen to be belied in many cases, but it is also impossible. For it would follow that the teacher is learning while he is teaching—which is impossible. For this involves a contradiction, since it is the property of a teacher that he have science, and of a learner that he not have it. Accordingly, it is clear that it is not necessary for a mover to be moved.

1048. He gives a second argument at (817) which does not differ from the preceding one except in that the first leads to certain particular inconsistencies, for example, that a thrower would be thrown or that a teacher would be being taught. But this one leads to inconsistencies in general.

Hence he says that although it is inconsistent that a teacher be learning, there is something still more unreasonable, for it turns out that every mover is mobile, if nothing is moved except by what is being moved. For it will thus follow that every mover is mobile, if, for example, one says that whatever has thepower to heal, or is actually causing health, is healable, and that whatever has the power to build is buildable—which is more unreasonable than that a teacher be learning, for a teacher could have been learning before, but a builder was never built.

Now this follows in two ways. For if it be conceded that every mover is being moved with respect to the same species of motion, it follows that a builder is being built immediately (i.e., without intermediary) and that a healer is being healed immediately. But if it be conceded that the mover is not being moved according to the same species of motion, it follows that we shall finally come to this after passing through a number of intermediates. And he explains this: If every mover is being moved by another but not being moved immediately with respect to the same species in which he is causing motion but according to some other species—for example, if a healer is not at once being healed but is being moved according to the motion of discipline by learning—yet, since the species of motion are not infinite, by thus ascending from mobile to mover one will at length reach the same species of motion, as was explained above.

Therefore, of these two, one appears plainly impossible, e.g., that the builder be immediately being built, while the other is seen as a fancy, namely, that one come to the same thing through a number of intermediates. For it is unacceptable that what is apt to cause alteration is of necessity apt to be increased in size.

1049. Accordingly, (818) having considered the foregoing arguments, the first of which concluded that this process—that whatever is being moved is being moved by another—must not go on ad infinitum, and the second of which concluded that not every mover is being moved, we can conclude from all the foregoing arguments that it is not necessary ad infinitum that what is being moved be moved by another in such a way that it is always being moved by a mover that is being moved. Therefore, it is necessary to stop at some first. However, this first must either be immobile or be moving itself.

But if we are considering which is the first cause of motion in the genus of mobiles, whether it is something that moves itself or a mobile that is moved by another, it is held as probable among all that the first mover moves itself. For a per se cause is always prior to what is a cause through another. For this reason, the Platonists held that prior to things that are moved by another there is something that moves itself.

And therefore we must consider this thing that moves itself and make of this another beginning of our consideration, namely, that we consider that if something moves itself, how is this possible.

LECTURE 10

IN THAT WHICH MOVES ITSELF, ONE PART MOVES AND THE OTHER IS MOVED

1050. After showing that in mobiles and movers there is no going on to infinity, but that a first is reached with is either immobile or selfmoving, the Philosopher now shows that even if a first that moves itself is reached, it is nevertheless necessary to come to a first which is immobile. This treatment is divided into three parts.

In the first he shows that what moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which is mover and the other moved;

In the second how these parts are mutually related, (L. 11);

In the third that it is necessary to come to a first which is immobile, (end of L, 11).

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that in a thing that moves itself, one part is mover and the other is moved, because a whole cannot move its whole self;

Secondly, he rejects other ways in which a thing that moves itself might be thought to do so, at 1054.

About the first he does three things:

First he proposes that what moves itself does not totally move itself as a whole;

Secondly, he proves the proposition, at 1052;

Thirdly, he concludes to the main conclusion intended—end of 1053.

1051. Because whole and part have no place except in things that are divisible, Aristotle, therefore, from what he had proved in Book VI, concludes first that whatever is moved is necessarily divisible into parts that are always further divisible—for this pertains to the very notion of a continuum. Now, whatever is being moved is a continuum, if it is being moved per se (for it is not impossible for an indivisible, for example, a point or whiteness, to be moved per accidens). And this was shown previously in Book VI: for all the statements made prior to Book VIII he calls universals of nature, because in Book VIII he begins to apply to things the statements he previously made about motion in common. Accordingly, since what is moved is divisible, a whole and a part can be found in everything that is being moved. If, therefore, there is anything that moves itself, we shall be able to take a whole and a part in it; but a whole cannot move its whole self, i.e., in its entirety move itself.

1052. Then at (820) he proves his proposition with two arguments, the first of which is this: The motion of a thing that moves itself at one time and in one motion is numerically one; if, therefore, a thing should move itself in such a way that the whole moves the whole, it will follow that one and the same will be mover and moved with respect to one and the same motion, whether it bel local motion or alteration. But this is seen to be impossible: for mover and moved are mutually opposite, and opposites cannot exist in the same thing with respect to the same. It is therefore not possible that some same thing be mover and moved with respect to the same motion.

For when something is at once moving and being moved, the motion according to which it moves is different from the one according to which it is being moved, as when a stick, moved by the hand, moves a stone, the motion of the stick is numerically different from the motion of the stone. Accordingly, it will follow further that someone will be both teaching and be taught at the same time with respect to one and the same knowable thing, and, similarly, that someone will heal and be healed with respect to one and the same numerical health.

1053. He gives the second argument at (821) which is this: It has been determined in Book III that what is being moved is a mobile, i.e., something existing in a state of potency, since what is being moved is being moved precisely because it is in potency and not in act, for a thing is considered to be in motion when, being in potency, it is tending toward act. Howeverf that which is being moved is not in potency in such a way that it is in no wise in act, because the very motion is a kind of act of the mobile precisely as being moved; but it is an imperfect act, being the act of the mobile inasmuch as it is still in potency.

But what causes motion is already in act, for what is in potency is not reduced to act except by something in act, namely, the mover; for example, the hot causes heat and that generates which has the form to be generated, as one who has the human form generates a man, and so on for other things. If, thereforet the whole moves its whole self, it follows that the same thing is, with respect to the same, at once hot and not hot, because, insofar as it moves, it will be hot in act; insofar as it is moved, it will be hot in potency.

The same is true in all other cases in which the mover is univocal, i.e., agreeing in name and species with the thing moved, as when the hot makes the hot and a man generates a man.

And he says this because there are some agents which are not univocal and which do not agree in name and notion with their effects, as the sun generates a man. In such agents, nevertheless, even though they do not possess the form of the effect according to the same notion, they do so in a higher and more universal sense. Consequently, it is universally true that the mover is somehow actually what the mobile is potentially. If, therefore, the whole moves its whole self, it follows that the same thing is at once in potency and in act—which is impossible.

From this he concludes (822) the main proposition that, with respect to a thing that moves itself, one part is mover and the other part moved.

1054. Then at (823) he rejects certain ways that someone might suppose to take place in the motion of a thing that moves itself.

First he shows that with respect to a thing that moves itself, both parts are not moved by each other;

Secondly, that with respect to a thing which moves itselfg one part does not move itself, at 1059.

About the first he does two things:

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 1055..

He says therefore first (823) that it is clear from what follows that a thing can not move itself in such a way that each part is moved by the other; for example, if AB moves itself, that A move B, and B move A.

1055. Then at (824) he proves the proposition with four arguments. And it should be noted that for this conclusion he re-uses the reasons previously used to show that not every mover is being moved by another. Hence from the foregoing he here collects four abridged arguments.

The first of these he takes from the first argument presented above in a double (i.e., ascending and descending) order to show that the process of something else being moved by another does not go on always, ad infinitum, because then there would be no first mover—from whose non-existence would follow the non-existence of all coming after it. Hence in this place too, the Philosopher premises the same unacceptable outcome.

For he says that if, in the first thing moved which is supposed as moving itself, both parts are reciprocally being moved by each other, it will follow that there is no first mover. This follows because, as was said above, the prior mover is more the cause of motion, and moves more, than the subsequent mover. And this was proved above on the ground that something causes motion in two ways. In one wayf something moves by being moved by another, as a stick moves a stone, because it is being moved by the hand, and this is a second mover. In another way, something moves by being moved of itself, as a man moves, and this is a condition of a first mover. Now what causes motion independently of being moved by another is farther removed from the last thing moved, and nearer to the first mover, than an intermediate which causes motion as being moved by another.

This argument should be formulated in the following way: If both parts of a thing that moves itself move each other reciprocally, one is no more the cause of motion than the other. But the first mover is more a cause of motion than a second mover; therefore, neither of the parts will be a first mover. Now this is unacceptable, since it would then follow that what is moved of itself would be no nearer to the first principle of motion (whose existence would thereby be rejected) than what is moved by another, whereas it was proved above that a mover that moves itself is first in the genus of mobiles. Therefore, it is not true that both parts of a thing that moves itself are moved by each other.

1056. Then at (825) he presents two arguments for the same taken from one he used above when he showed that not every mover is being moved, in the sense that being moved is found per accidens in the mover. In this argument he drew two conclusions above, namely, first, that a mover can happen not to be moved, and secondly, that motion is not eternal. In the light of these two conclusions he now forms two arguments.

For he says first of all “it is not necessary for a mover to be moved except by itself according to accident,” the sense of this being that unless the first mover be taken as being moved by itself, it will not also be necessary that the first mover be moved according to an accidents as some posited that every mover is being moved but that its being moved is in it ptr accidens.

When therefore it is supposed that of a thing which moves itself, the part causing motion is equally being moved by the other, this will be only per accidens. But as we conceded above, whatever is per accidens is able not to be; therefore, it is possible for the part which causes motion, not to be moved. Thus, therefore, it remains that of a thing that moves itself one part is moved, and the other causes motion and is not moved.

1057. Then at (826) he gives another argument corresponding to the second conclusion that he inferred above, namely, that it follows that motion does not always exist, Here, however, he argues in reverse order. If it is necessary that motion always exist, it is not necessary that a mover, when it causes motion, be moved, but it is necessary that the mover be either immobile or that it be moved by itself.

The reason for this conditional is apparent from an argument given above. For if a mover does not cause motion unless it is being moved, and if being moved is only in it per accidens, it follows that it can happen not to be moved. Consequently, it can happen also not to cause motion, and as a result, there will be no motion. But motion was proved to be eternal. Therefore, it is not necessary for a mover to be moved, when it is causing motion, Consequently, it is not true that each part of a thing that moves itself is moved by the other.

1058. Then at (827) he presents the fourth argument, which is taken from the argument previously given to prove that it is not essential to a mover that it be moved, because it would follow that we must come to this, that a mover would be being moved by the same motion which it is causing, as explained above.

And now abridging this argument he says that, if each part is being moved by the other, it will follow that it causes motion and is being moved with respect to the same motion. Hence, it follows that the heater is heated —which is impossible.

Now, the reason why it follows that the same thing is causing motion and being moved with respect to the same motion, when it is posited that each part of a thing which moves itself is moved by the other is that there is in the thing that moves itself just one motion, and it is according to that motion that the part causing motion will itself have to be moved.

1059. Then at (828) he excludes another way, namely, the supposition that the part of a thing which moves itself does not move itself.

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 1060.

He says therefore first that if something that is first moving itself be assumed, it cannot be said either that one part of it moves itself or that a number of parts do so, in such a way that each of them moves itself.

1060. Then at (829) he proves this with two arguments, the first of which is that if the whole is being moved by itself, this belongs to it either by reason of a part that isbeing moved by itself or by reason of the whole.

If it belongs to it by reason of its part, then that part will be a first mover that moves itself, because that part separated from the whole will move itself, but then the whole will no longer be a first mover of itself, as was supposed.

But if it be said that the whole moves itself by reason of the whole, then it will be only per accidens that some parts move themselves. But what is per accidens is not necessary. Therefore in the mover that first moves itself, it is most important to presume that the parts are not moved by themselves, Therefore, one part of the first mover that moves itself will cause motion, since it is immobile, and the other will be moved. For those are the only two ways in which it is possible that a part which causes motion could be moved, namely, either because that part would be moved by another part which it moves, or because that part would move itself.

Hence it should be noticed that Aristotle in excluding these two ways intends to conclude that in a thing which moves itself, the part which causes motion is immobile, but not that what moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which causes motion and the other is moved; for this had been sufficiently concluded, when he first proved that the whole does not move itself as a whole.

Accordingly, it is clear that it was not necessary that Aristotle introduce a division of five members, as some claimed: one member of which is that the whole moves the whole; the second that the whole moves a part; the third that a part moves the whole; the fourth that two parts mutually move one another; the fifth that one part is a mover and the other moved. For if the whole does not move the whole, it follows for the same reason that the whole does not move the part, nor the part the.whole; because in either case it would follows that a moved part would be moving itself. Hence the fact that the whole does not move the whole suffices for concluding that one part is a mover and the other is moved. But in order to conclude that the part which causes motion is not moved, he proves two other things, namely, that the part causing motion is not moved by a moved part, and that it is not moved by itself.

1061. And to prove this last point he presents a second argument (830): If it be granted that the motion-causing part of a thing that moves itself moves itself as a whole, it follows through what was proved above that a part of that part causes motion and the other part is moved. For it has been already proved above that a whole does not move itself in any other way than by one of its parts causing motion and the other being moved, So, let AB be the motion-causing part of a thing that moves itself; then by the previous argument it follows that one part of it is a mover, namely A, and the other part, namely B, is moved. Therefore, if AB as a whole moves itself as a whole, as you say, it follows that the same thing would be moved by two movers, namely, by the whole AB and by the part A—which is impossible. It remains, therefore, that the motion-causing part of a thing which moves itself is entirely immobile,

LECTURE 11

HOW THE PARTS OF SOMETHING MOVING ITSELF ARE RELATED

1062. After showing that a thing which moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which causes motion and is not moved, and the other of which is moved, the Philosopher now shows how such parts are mutually related. About this he does three things:

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he shows his proposition, at 1063;

Thirdly, he reaches the conclusion chiefly intended by all the foregoing, at 1068.

He says therefore first (831) that since a mover is divided into two elements, one of which is also moved by something else, and the other of which is immobile, and again, since a mobile is divided into two, there being a mobile which also causes motion, and another which does not move anything, one must say that what moves itself is composed of two parts, one of which is such a mover as to be immobile, and the other of which is so moved as not to move anything else.

And when he says that the latter does not move anything “of necessity,” it can mean two things: If it is understood as though the moved part of a self-mover does not move anything that is part of the self-mover, the word “necessity” should be interpreted in an affirmative sense, referring to his calling it “non-moving,” as meaning that of necessity it does not move anything else. For he at once proves that it is impossible for a thing that moves itself to have a third part which is moved by the moved part. But if the words are interpreted as meaning that the moved part does not move anything extrinsic, then the phrase, “of necessity,” must be given a negative meaning; for it is not necessary in a thing which moves itself that its moved part move something extrinsicq but neither is it impossible.

1063. How this happens he shows at (832). About this he does two things:

First he explains his proposition;

Secondly, he solves a doubt, at 1066.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows how the parts of a thing that moves itself are related;

Secondly, how with respect to them a whole is said to move itself,1065.

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that in a thing which moves itself there are just two parts, one of which causes motion and is not moved, and the other of which is moved and does not cause any motion;

Secondly, how these two parts are joined to one another, at 1064.

He explains the first part in this way (832): If it be said that the moved part of a thing that moves itself does in turn move something else which is part of the very thing that moves itself, then let A be the first immobile part of this self-moving thing. Let B be the second part and let it be both the one moved by A and the mover of a third part C. which is so moved by B as to move nothing else that is a part of this self-moving thing. For it cannot be said that there is an infinite descent in the parts of a thing which moves itself, such that a moved part in turn moves anothert for then it would be moving itself ad infinitum, which is impossible, as was shown above. There will be, therefore, in that self-moving thing a part which is moved but is not a mover, i.e., the part C. And although it might be that it is through many intermediate moved movers that the last moved part C is reached, we can accept B as the one intermediate taken in place of all these intermediates. Thus, therefore, does this whole, which is ABC, move itself. If from this whole there be taken away the part C, AB will still move itself, because one of its parts is a mover, namely A, and the other moved, namely B, which was required for a thing to be able to move itself, as was shown above. But C will not move itself, or move any other part, as we have assumed.

Likewise, even BC does not move itself without A, because B does not cause motion except inasmuch as it is moved by something else, which is A, which is not a part of BC. It remains, therefore, that only AB moves itself first and per se. Hence a thing which moves itself must have two parts, one of which is an immobile mover, and the other of which is moved and necessarily does not move anything that is part of the whole thing that moves itself, for this was concluded by the foregoing argument.

Or else it “moves nothing of necessity”—since it is not a necessity of a self-mover that the moved part move anything else, even anything extrinsic.

1064. Then at (833) he shows how these two parts are mutually related.

Here it must be considered that Aristotle has not yet proved that the first mover has no magnitude, as will be proved later. But some of the earlier philosophers posited that no substance can exist without magnitude. Hence Aristotle is keeping with his custom when he leaves this matter doubtful until it is proved; and he says that the two parts of a self-mover, of which one is a mover and the other moved, must be somehow conjoined if they are to be parts of one whole. But not by continuation, because above he has said that a self-mover and a moved thing cannot form a continuum but are necessarily divided. Hence it remains that these two parts must be joined by contact: either by both parts touching one another, if they have magnitude; or by just one of the parts touching the other and not vice versa, which will be the case if the mover has no magnitude. For what is incorporeal can indeed touch a body by means of its power and so move it, but it is not touched in turn by the body; two bodies, however, touch each other.

1065. Then at (834) he shows by what reason a whole is said to move itself with one part causing motion and the other part being moved.

And let us suppose at first that each part is continuous, i.e., having a magnitude, because in Book VI it has been proved of anything that is moved that it is a continuum, and let the same thing be supposed at the present time for the mover, before the truth is proved.

Therefore, using this supposition, three things are attributed to this whole composed of two parts: it is moved, it causes motion, and it moves itself. But self-movement is attributed to it not because a part moves itself but because the entire whole move itself, while to cause motion, and to be moved, are attributed to the whole by reason of the part. For the whole neither moves nor is moved, but one part A moves, and the other part B is moved only; and it has already been shown that there is no third part C which is moved by B. For this is impossible, if we are dealing with a thing that moves itself primarily, as has been shown above.

1066. Then at (835) he raises a doubt about the foregoing.

First he raises it;

Secondly, he solves it, at 1067.

This doubt springs from what he had previously proved, namely, that in a thing that moves itself in a primary sense, there are but two partat of which one moves and the other is moved, on the ground that, if there were a third, even if this third were removed, the composite of the first two would still move itself, and thus the latter is the primary self-mover.

From this, therefore, the following doubt follows (835). Let us suppose that the immobile but motion-causing part A of a self-moving whole is a continuum. Now it is clear that its part B, which is the moved part, is a continuum, according to what has been previously proved. But every continuum is divisible. Therefore the doubt is this: If through division a part be removed from A or R, would the remaining part be a mover or a moved part? Because if it is either, the part of AB that remains will move itself andq accordingly, AB will not be some-thing that moves itself in a primary sense. Thus it further follows that nothing will be a self-mover in a primary sense.

1067. Then at (836) he resolves this doubt.

Now it should be remembered here that in Book VI Aristotle has proved that there is no first in motion, either on the part of the mobile, or of the time or of the sphere of motion, and that this is especially true in growth and local motion: the reason being that he was then speaking of motion in common and of the mobile as it is a certain continuum, without yet making application to particular natures. And according to this, it would follow that there would not be anything that is first moved and, consequently, no first mover, if the mover were a continuum. Likewise, there would also not be anything that is a first mover.

But now Aristotle is speaking of motion and applying his doctrine to definite natures and for that reason he posits that there is a first mover of self.

And he resolves the doubt in the following manner, stating, namely, that there is nothing to prevent the mover and moved from being divisible in potency, due to the fact that they are continua, i.e., if both are continua, or at least one of them, namely, the one that is moved, which necessarily is a continuum. But yet it is possible that some continuum, whether it be a mover or something moved, have such a nature that it cannot be actually divided, as is evident of the body of the Sun. And if it happens that some continuum is divided, it will not retain the same potency for causing motion or being moved as it had before—because such a potency follows upon the form, and a natural form requires a determinate quantity. Hence, if it is an incorruptible body, it cannot be actually divided. But if it is a corruptible one, then if it be divided, it will not retain the same potency, as is evident with respect to the heart. Hence, there is nothing to prevent, in things potentially divisible, there being one first.

1068, Then at (837) he infers the conclusion mainly intended from all this. And he says that from the foregoing it is clear that it is necessary to posit a first mover that is immobile. For since there is not an infinite process in movers and moved things, but a halt must be made at a first which is immobile or self-moving, then, whether the movers and moved stop at some first immobile or at some first that moves itself, in either case it turns out that the first mover is immobile, because one part even of a thing that moves itself is an immobile mover, as has just been proved.

LECTURE 12

THE FIRST MOVER IS NOT MOVED, BUT IS ONE AND PERPETUAL

1069. Having shown that in things moved by another there is not a process to infinity but a first must be reached which is either immobile or a mover of self, and having shown that, of a thing that moves itself, one part is an immobile mover, and that, consequently, in either case there is a first mover that is immobile, now, because among self-movers which exist among us, namely, perishable animals, it happens that the motion-causing part in the thing which moves itself is perishable and moved per accidens, namely, the soul, the Philosopher wishes to show here that the first mover is imperishable and is not moved either per ae or per accidens. About this he does two things:

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves it, at 1072.

About the first he does three things:

First he reviews what has been previously manifested;

Secondly, he omits something that seemed useful for his proposition, at 1070;

Thirdly, he explains his proposition, at 1071,

He says therefore first (838) that it was shown above that motion always exists and never fails. And since all motion is from a mover, and in movers there is not a process to infinity, it is necessary that there be a first mover. And since it has not yet been proved that the first mover is one, he accordingly lets it remain doubtful whether it is one or many. Further, it has been shown that the first mover is immobile, whether by ascending from moved to movers one imediately reaches a first immobile mover, or whether what is reached is a first mover that moves itself, one part of which is an immobile mover.

1070. Some have opined that all moving principles in things that move themselves are imperishable, for Plato posited all the souls of animals to be perpetual. And if this opinion were true, Aristotle would have his proposition clinched at once, so far as the first mover's being eternal is concerned. But the opinion of Aristotle is that among the parts of the soul, only the intellect is imperishable, even though other parts of the soul are movers.

Consequently he omits this at (839) where he says that as far as the present argument is concerned it is of no moment whether each of the principles that move themselves and are immobile is imperishable, even though some have posited this by positing that all souls are imperishable. And he says that this does not affect the present argument, because he will prove his proposition without using this supposition.

1071. Then at (840) he explains what he intends to prove. And he says that by considering the thitgs that follow, it can be plain that even though not every immobile mover is imperishable, there must,be something immobile in such a way that it is no way moved from without, either absolutely or per accidens, and yet is a mover of something else.

When he says "immobile with respect to any change from without," he does not mean to exclude a motion, i.e., an operation, which is in the one operating in the sense that to understand is called a "motion," and in the sense that the appetite is moved by the desirable object. A motion of this sort is not excluded from the first mover which Aristotle is discussing.

1072. Then at (841) he proves what he had said, namely, that there exists a first mover that is eternal and entirely immobile.

First he proves this through self-movers that at one time exist and at another time do not;

Secondly, through moving principles which sometimes are causing motion and sometimes not, (L. 13).

About the first he does three things:

First he shows that there must be a first mover that is eternal;

Secondly, that such a mover should be one rather than many, at 1075;

Thirdly, he shows both at once, i.e., that there is one first mover and that it is eternal, at 1076.

About the first he does two things:

First he rejects an argument by which some could try to prove this proposition;

Secondly, he goes on to explain his proposition, at 1074.

1073. Now, someone could proceed as follows (841): Whatever cannot at one time be and at another not be is eternal; but the first mover, since it is immobile, as has been shown above, cannot be at one time and not be at another time, for whatever is such is generated and ceases to be, which involves its being moved. Therefore, the first mover is eternal.

But Aristotle does not have any use for this argument, because someone could say, if he wants, that in some things it happens that at one time they exist and at another time they do not, without their being generated or ceasing to be, speaking per se, and consequently without their being moved per se. For if something not divisible into parts, which is, namely, not composed of matter and form, is at one time in a certain way, and at another time is not, then necessarily every such thing—without any self-change—does at one time exist and at another time not exist, as may be said of a point, and of whiteness, and of anything of this sort, for it has been shown in Book VI that whatever is moved can be divided into parts, and in Metaphysics VII that whatever is generated is composed of matter and form. Such non-divisible things, therefore, are neither generated nor changed per se, but per accidens, when other things are generated or changed.

From this it is also plain that if something is moved neither per se nor ar accidens, it is eternal; and that if it is eternal, it is moved neither per se nor per accidens, insofar as it is eternal. If, therefore, it is conceded to be contingent for something to exist at one time and not at another without its being generated or ceasing to be, then let it also be conceded to be contingent that certain immobile moving principles, which are yet mobile per accidens, exist at one time and do not exist at another. Nevertheless it is not at all possible that all such principles which are movers and immobile be such that they exist at one time and not exist at another.

1074. Then at (842) he proves his proposition. And he says that if some things which move themselves exist at one time and not at another, then there must be a cause of their generation and ceasing-to-be, by virtue of which they exist at one time and do not exist at another, because whatever is moved has a cause of its motion. But what exists at one time and not at another, if it is a composite, is generated and ceases-to-be. Now, a thing that moves itself must possess magnitude, since it is moved, and it has been shown in Book VI that nothing indivisible into parts is moved.

But from the foregoing it cannot be held that it is necessary for the mover to have magnitude, and thus it is not moved per se, if it exists at one time and does not exist at another. But if there is a cause of the generation and perishing of things that move themselves, then there must also be a cause to account for their generation and perishing being continued forever.

But it cannot be said that the cause of this continuity is one of those immobiles that do not always exist, nor can it be said that the cause of the eternal generation and perishing of some things that move themselves are certain immobile movers which do not always exist, and of that of others, certain others. And he explains this when he says that not one, nor all of them, can be the cause of this continuous and eternal generation.

That one of them cannot be the cause he thus proves: What does not exist forever cannot be the cause of what is forever perpetual and necessary. That all cannot be the cause he proves for the reason that all such perishable principles, if generation is perpetual, are infinite and do not all exist at once. But it is impossible for one effect to depend on an infinitude of causess

And again, things that do not exist at once cannot be the cause of one thing, although it could be said that when things do not exist all at once, some dispose and some cause, as is plain with respect to drops that fall successively and wear away a stone. But if a number of things are a direct cause of anything, they must exist all together.

Accordingly, therefore, it is manifest that if there are a million principles that are movers and immobile, and if there are many things that move themselves, of which some perish and others come to be, and among these, some are mobile and some movers, nevertheless there must be something above all of them that by its power contains all the things which are generated and perish in the above-mentioned way and which would be the cause of the continual change affecting them by which they sometimes are and sometimes are not and through which these latter are the cause of coming-to-be and of motion for others, and these for yet others. For every generator is a cause of generation to the thing generated, but it is from some imperishable first principle that perishable generators possess the characteristic of being causes of generation. If, therefore, the motion through which some things at one time exist and at another do not is perpetual, as has been shown above, and a perpetual effect cannot exist except from a perpetual cause, then, necessarily, the first mover is perpetual, if it is one; and if there are more than one first mover, they too are perpetual.

1075. Then at (843) he shows that one perpetual principle ought to be posited rather than many. And he says that just as finite principles ought to be preferred to infinite, so one first principle rather than many. For if the same effects happen or follow from positing finite principles as from positing infinite principles, one should assume that the principles are finite rather than infinite, because in things that are according to nature, the preference must be given to what is better, if it is possible, because things that are according to nature are disposed the best. Now, a finite principle is better than an infinite one, and one better than many. But one first immobile principle, if it is perpetual, is sufficient for causing the perpetuity of motion. Therefore, many first principles should not be posited.

1076. Then at (844) he concludes from the foregoing that it is necessary that there be one first mover which is imperishable.

And although this seems to be sufficiently proved from the foregoing, yet someone could cavil that the cause of the continuity of generation is a perpetual first mover of self, but the mover of that is not perpetual and one but moved by diverse movers, of which some cease to be and some come to be.

But this he intends to dismiss, because if motion is perpetual, as he had proved above, then necessarily the motion of the first mover of self, which is posited as the cause of the entire perpetuity of motion, is eternal and continuousq for if it were not continuous, it would not be eternal. However, what is successive is not continuous, whereas in order that a motion be continuous it must be one; and in order to be one, it must be from one mover and in one mobile. But if the mover is other and other, the motion will not be a whole continuous motion, but a successive one.

Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that the first mover be one and perpetual. But an immobile mover that is moved pjr accidens is not perpetual, as has been said above. It remains, therefore, that the first mover is utterly immobile, both per se and per accidens.

LECTURE 13

THE FIRST MOVER PERPETUAL AND WHOLLY UNMOVED, AS SHOWN FROM MOVING PRINCIPLES

1077. After showing that the first mover is perpetual and utterly immobile on account of the perpetuity of the generation and perishing of animals, which move themselvesl.the Philosopher now intends to prove the same with an argument based on the moving principles. About this he does three things:

First he reviews things said from the beginning of this treatise;

Secondly, from these he forms an argument for his proposition, at 1081;

Thirdly, he finishes the solution of a doubt mentioned above, at 1085.

1078. About the first he reviews three things: First (845), the destruction of certain improbable positions. And he says that anyone can know that there is a first immobile. mover not only from the foregoing, but also by considering the principles of motion. And as was said above, it is evident to sense that among natural things are found some that are at one time being moved and at another time at rest.

From this it was explained above that none of these three positions is true: the position that all things are always being moved; the position that all things are always at rest; and the position that all things which rest, always rest, and those being moved, are always being moved. The truth of this matter is demonstrated by the very things found under botht namely, under motion and under rest, since they have the potency to be moved at one time, and to be at rest at another.

1079, Secondly, he recalls the process he went through when investigating the first immobile mover. And he says that because things which at one time are being moved and at another time are at rest are plain to all, lest anyone follow a fourth position that all beings are such that they are at one time being moved and at another time at rest, we want to demonstrate two differing natures by showing, namely, that there are certain things that are always immobile, and certain things again that are always being moved.

And in dealing with this matter we proposed first that whatever is being moved is being moved by something and that this thing by which something is being moved is either immobile or is itself being moved, and if it is being movedt then either by itself or by another. And since one cannot proceed to infinity in the series of "being moved by another," we must come to this that there is some first principle of motion, such that in the genus of things that are moved there is a first principle which moves itself, and beyond that, absolutely among all, there is a first principle which is immobile. Nor ought it to be thought strange that something move itself, because we plainly see many such in the genus of living things and animals.

1080. Thirdly, at (847) he recalls an objection mentioned and solved above. For since he had proved the eternity of motiont he cited to the contrary an objection based on living things which after having been at rest begin at a certain time to be moved. And what he says here is that those living things which move themselves seem to foster the opinion that in the entire universe motion begins after previously not having been, on the ground that we see this happen in things, namely, that they at one time begin to be moved, when previously they were not being moved.

To solve this it is necessary to accept that animals move themselves with respect to one motion, namely, local motion; for only this motion, based on appetite, is found in animals. And yet animals do not properly move themselves even with respect to this motion as though another cause of this motion does not pre-exist. For no animal is of itself the first cause of being moved locally, but other motions precede—not voluntary but natural—either from within or from without, according to which the animals do not move themselves, as is plain in the motions of growth and decrease, and respiration, according to which animals are movedt although they rest with respect to local motion by which they are moved by themselves

The cause of these local motions is either an extrinsic container—namely, the heavens and air—by which the bodies of animals are changed externally, or something enters the bodies of animals, as air enters through breathing and as food enters through eating and drinking. And from such transmutations, caused either from within or from without, it happens that animals at a certain time begin to be moved, when previously they were not being moved, as is plain from the change which arises from food: for while the food is undergoing heat the animals sleep on account of the vapors being broken down, but when the food is now digested and dissolved, and the vapors are left, the animals awaken and get up and move themselves from place to place. In all this, nevertheless, the first principle of motion is something extrinsic to the nature of the animal that moves itself.

That is the reason why animals are not always moved by themselves, because with respect to any animal moving itself there is found some previous mover, which is being moved and causes motion. For if it were entirely immobile, it would always maintain itself in the same way in causing motion and, consequently, the motion also of the animal would be perpetual. But because this extrinsic mover that moves animals is itself moved, it does not always move in the same way.

Hence, neither do animals always move themselves in the same way, because in all these things the first mover which is the cause of the animal’s moving itself, such as the soul, causes motion in such a way that it is itself being moved not per se but per accidens, for the body is changed with respect to place, and when the body has been changed, that which exists in the body, namely, the soul, is also changed per accidens, And thus the whole that moves itself is changed of necessity, so that it does not maintain itself in the same disposition for causing motion.

1081. Then at (848) from the foregoing he proves his proposition.

First that the first mover is immobile;

Secondly, that the first motion is perpetual, at 1083.

About the first he does two things:

First he proves the proposition;

Secondly, he dismisses an objection, at 1082.

He says therefore first (848) that from the foregoing we can know that if some principle is an:bmobile mover nevertheless moved per accidens, it cannot cause a continuous and perpetual motion. For the reason assigned for saying that animals do not always move is that they are moved per accidens. But it has been shown above that the motion of the universe must be continuous and perpetual. Therefore, it is necessary that the first moving cause in the whole universe be immobile, in such a way as not to be moved even per accidens.

But, as was said above, in natural things a motion that is immortal and unceasing ought to be found, and the disposition of this universe should be maintained in its disposition and in the same state. For from the immobility of the principle that is set down as remaining immobile, it follows that the entire universe has an eternal permanence, insofar as it is joined to the first immobile principle and receives an influence from it.

1082. Then at (849) he excludes an objection. For he had said that if a mover is moved per accidens, it does not move with an undying motion. Now this seems to give rise to an objection, because, according to his positiont the motions of the inferior orbs, such as the sun and moon and other planets are eternal, and yet their movers seem to be moved per accidens, if we follow what he had just said. For he said that the reason why the soul of an animal is moved per accidens is that the animalts body is moved by an external principle, which is not from the soul; in like manner, it appears that the orb of the sun is moved by some other motion as though carried along by the motion of the first orb, insofar as it revolves from east to west; this is not the way it is moved by its proper movert but contrariwise, from west to east.

He dismisses this objection, saying that “being moved per accidens” can be attributed to something either with respect to itself or with respect to something else, and this is not the same. Now “being moved per accidens” can be attributed to the movers of the orbs of the planets, not in the sense that these movers are moved per accidens, but that the orbs moved by them are moved per accidens in being influenced by the motion of the superior orb. And this is what he says, that “to be moved per accidens from another,” i.e., by reason of another, is attributed to certain principles of heavenly motions, in the case of the movers of the orbs which are moved by more than one motion, namely, by their own and by that of the superior orb. But the other case, that a thing be moved per accidens with respect to itself is found only in perishable things, as in the souls of animals. The reason for this diversity is that the movers of the superior orbs are not constituted existents through being united to bodies, and their connection with the latter is unvarying; and therefore, although the bodies of the orbs are moved, the motors are not moved per accidens. But the souls which move animals depend for their existence on being united to their bodies, and they are connected in a way subject to variation, and accordingly, as the bodies are affected by change, the souls themselves are said to be changed per accidens.

1083. Then at (850) he proves that the first motion is perpetual. And he does this with two arguments, the first of which depends on the foregoing and is this: A motion which is not perpetual is found to be from a mover that is moved per se or per accidens, as is evident from above. Since, therefore, the first mover is immobile and perpetual, and is moved neither per se nor per accidens, then, necessarily, the first mobile, which is moved by this utterly immobile mover is moved with a perpetual motion.

Now, it should be noted that above he proved the immobility of the first mover by means of the perpetuity of motion, shown above. Here, on the contrary, through the immobility of the first mover he proves the perpetuity of motion, But this would be arguing in a circle, if the same motion were meant in both arguments.

Hence it must be said that above he proves the immobility of the first mover from the perpetuity of motion in general; that is why he said that among the things that exist, there is an unceasing and immortal motion. But here through the immobility of the first mover he proves the perpetuity of the first motion. From which it is plain that what the Commentator says is false, namely, that in the beginning of this Book VIII Aristotle proved that the first motion is perpetual.

1084. The second argument is given at (851) and is taken from the perpetuity of generation. And he says that the first motion is perpetual for another reason, namely, that the only way temporal generation and ceasing-tobe, and changes of this sort, can exist is that something move and be moved, for it has been proved above that every change is caused by some mover. Therefore, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be and change of this kind ought to be from a mover, But they cannot be immediately from the immobile mover, because the immobile will always cause the same motion and in the same way, for its relation to the mobile is not variable; and, given a relation between mover and moved that remains the same, the motion remains always the same, However, coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be are not always in the same state, but at one time something is generated and at another it ceases to be. Therefore, these changes are not immediately from the immobile mover but from a mobile mover. Now, whatever is moved by a moved mover which in turn is moved by the immobile mover can retain perpetuity in spite of the alternation of diverse motions, because, since the mobile mover stands in varying relation to the things moved, it will not always cause the same motion. Rather, since it occupies differing positions (if moved with local motion), or assumes differing forms (if moved with a motion of alteration), it will produce a contrary motion in other things and will cause them to be at one time at rest and at another time in motion. He says "in contrary positions or forms," because it has not yet been proved by what form of motion the first mobile is moved; but he will inquire into this later.

Thus, therefore, insofar as it is moved, it is a cause of the diversity of motions; but insofar as it is moved by the immobile mover, it is the cause of the perpetuity in this diversity of changes. Therefore, the very perpetuity of generation shows that the first motion is perpetual and brought about by the immobile mover.

But it should be understood that these arguments by which Aristotle tries to prove that the first motion is perpetual do not conclude of necessity, for it can happen without any change in the first mover that it not always cause motion, as was shown above in the beginning of this Book VIII.

1085. Then at (852) he draws a conclusion which he left unsettled above, namely, why some things are always in motion and some not always.

And he says that the cause of this is now plain from what has gone before: Things which are moved by an immobile and eternal mover are always in motion; things which are moved by a changed mover are not always in motion—for the immobile, as previously stated, since it remains absolutely alike and in the same state, will cause a motion that is one and simple.

LECTURE 14

MANY REASONS WHY LOCAL MOTION IS THE FIRST MOTION

1086. After showing that the first mover is immobile, and the first motion perpetual, the Philosopher here begins to show which motion is the first and what kind of being the first mover is. And it is divided into two parts:

In the first he shows which is the first motion;

In the second, what kind of being the first mover is, (L. 21).

About the first he does two things:

First he states his intention;

Secondly, he carries out his proposal, at l087.

He says therefore first that in order that the consideration of the foregoing be more certain, we must begin from another starting-point and consider whether there is any motion which may be infinitely continuous and, if so, which it is, and which is the first of all motions,

And lest anyone should think that the one which may be continuous and the one which is first are two different motions, in order to exclude this he adds that it is plain that since it is necessary for motion always to exist, and the first is forever continuous, for it is caused by the first immobile mover, then necessarily it is one and the same motion which is eternally continuous and which is first.

1087. Then at (854) he proves the proposition.

First with arguments;

Secondly, by referring to the sayings of the ancients, (L. 20).

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that local motion is the first;

Secondly, which local motion, (L. 15).

The first he proves in three ways:

First through the properties of motions;

Secondly, through the difference between rior and subsequent, 1090;

Thirdly, by reason of the order of mobiles, at 1096.

1088. With respect to the first he gives two arguments, in regard to the first of which he proceeds thus:

First he proposes what he intends, and says that since there are three species of motiong one with respect to quantity and called “growth and decrease,” another with respect to passible quality and called “alteration,” and a third with respect to place and called “local motion,” the last one must be the first of all.

Secondly, he proves this on the ground that it is impossible for growth to be the first motion, For growth cannot take place unless an alteration precedes it, because that by which something is increased is somehow unlike and somehow like, That it is unlike is plain, because that by which something is increased is food, which in the beginning4s contrary to what is nourished, on account of the diversity of disposition. But when it is added and causes increaset it is necessarily like. Now the transition from unlike to like does not take place except through alteration. Therefore, it is necessary that before growth, there must occur alteration through which food is changed from one contrary disposition to the other.

Thirdly, he shows that before every alteration there is a previous local motion, for if something is altered, it is necessary that there be something causing alteration, that makes the potentially hot come to be actually hot. But if this cause of alteration were always in the same way near at an equal distance to the thing altered, then it would not make it any hotter now than previously. Therefore, it is plain that the mover in alteration does not remain the same distance from what is altered, but is at one time closer and at another time farther away—and this cannot happen without a change of place. If, therefore, motion must always exist, then local motion must always exist, since it is the first of all motions. And if one local motion is prior to all other local motions, then, necessarily, if the foregoing is true, this first motion must be eternal,

1089. The second argument he gives at (855) and it is this: Alteration, as was proved in Book VII, occurs with respect to passions and passible qualities, among which, according to the opinions of the ancients, density and rarity seem to be a principle, because the heavy and the light, the soft and the hard, and the hot and the cold, seem both to result from, and to be distinguished by reason of, the dense and the rare (for among the elements the dense are found to be the heavy and the cold, and the rare the hot and the light). Now this opinion is true to a certain extent, if the passible qualities be ranged according to their proximity to the material principle, for the rare and the dense seem especially to pertain to matter, as is clear from what was said in Book IV. But density and rarity seem to be instances of commingling and separation, according to which the ancient philosophers explained the generation and ceasing-to-be of substances. This opinion Aristotle uses as probable before manifesting the truth about generation and ceasing-to-be in his book On Generation. But things commingled and separated seem by that very fact to be changed with respect to place. Hence, change of place is a principle of alteration.

It should be noted, however, that although the commingling and separation that affect bodies actually existing pertain to local motion, yet the commingling and separation according to which the same matter is contained under larger or smaller dimensions do not pertain to local motion but to the motion of alteration, And it is was in this sense that in Book IV Aristotle explained the nature of the dense and of the rare. But here he is speaking according to what is probable according to the opinion of other philosophers.

Yet, just as local motion is required for alteration, so also for growth. For it is necessary that the magnitude of what is increased or decreased be moved with respect to place, because what is increased expands into a larger place, and what decreases shrinks into a lesser place. Therefore, in this way it is plain that local motion is naturally prior to both alteration and growth.

Ane he says that from this consideration it will be clear that change of place is the first of motions, for, just as in other things, so too in motion, one thing is said to be “prior” to another in various ways. For in one way something is said to be “prior” in the sense that, if it does not exist, neither do the other thingst while it itself can exist without the others, as “one” is prior to “two,” because “two” cannot exist unless there is “one”, but “one” can exist, even if there are not two. In a second way, something is said to be “prior” in times namely, in the past, when something is more distant from the present “now,” or in the future, when something is closer to the present, as was said in Book IV. Thirdly, something is said to be “prior” according to substance, i.e., with respect to what completes a substance, as act is prior to potency, and the perfect to the imperfect.

1091. Secondly, at (857) he proves that local motion is the first among the three above-mentioned kinds of motion:

First, as to the first;

Secondly, as to the second, at 1092;

Thirdly, as to the third, at 1094.

He says therefore first (857) that since it is necessary for motion always to exist, as was proved previously, this can be understood in two ways: first, as meaning that there exists a continuous motion; secondly, as meaning that there are motions which exist one after the other, and nothing exists between them. Now, the perpetuity of motion is better saved if motion is continuous; moreover, it is a greater thing, if it be continuous rather than successive, because the former possesses more unity and perpetuity, and in nature we ought always to take what is more noble, if possible. But it is possible that there be a motion that is infinitely continuous, provided it be a local motion. (This is assumed for the presentg but later it will be proved.) From this it is plain that local motion must be taken to be the first motion.

For other motions are not required for the existence of local motion. For in order that a thing be moved with respect to place it need be neither increased nor altered, because a body that is in local motion does not have to be subject to generation and corruption, and we know that growth and alteration affect only things that are generated and cease to be. However, none of these motions can occur unless there is that eternal motion, caused by the first mover, the motion, namely, that is none other than local motion. Consequently, local motion can exist without the others but not they without it. Therefore, it is first according to the first way of being “prior.”

1092. Then at (858) he proves that it is prior in time, About this he does two things. First he shows that, absolutely speaking, it is prior in time, because what is perpetual is, absolutely speaking, prior in time to what is not perpetual. But only local motion can be perpetual, as has been said, therefore, absolutely speaking, it is first in time.

1093. Secondly, at (859) he dismisses an objection through which this seems to be made invalid. Because if we consider some one body that is newly generated, local motion seems to be the last change to affect it. For first it is generated, then it is altered and increased, and finally it undergoes local motion, when it is now perfect, as is clear in man and in many animals.

But this does not disprove the statement that, absolutely speaking, local motion is first in point of time, because before all those motions which are found in this generated thing, a local motion had to exist in some prior mobile, which is the cause of the generation for those that are generated, as the generator is the cause of what comes to be in such a way as not to be itself generated.

That the motion which precedes generation is a local motion and that, absolutely speaking, it is the first of motions, he proves on the ground that generation is seen to be the first of motions in things that are generated, because a thing must first be made before it is moved—and this is true in everything generated. But there must be something moved prior to what is generated and which is itself not generated, or if it is generated, then there was something prior to it. In this way we must go on ad infinitum, which is impossible, as was proved above, or come to some first.

But that first cannot be generation, for then it would follow that all changeable things are perishable, because everything that can be generated is able to perish. Therefore, if the first mobile is something generated, it follows that it is perishableg and as a consequence, all the subsequent mobiles. But if generation is not absolutely first, it is clear that none of the motions that follow it is absolutely first. And I say motions that follow, meaning growth, alteration, decrease and ceasing-to-be, all of which follow generation in time. If, therefore, generation is not prior to local change, it follows that none of the other changes can be absolutely prior to local change, And so, since some change must be absolutely first, it follows that local change is first.

1094. Then at (860) he proves that local motion is first in the order of perfection, And this he proves in two ways. First, in this way: Everything that is coming to be is, while it is coming to beg imperfect and tending to its principle, i.e., to a likeness to the principle that made it, and which is naturally first. From this it is clear that what is subsequent in the order of generation is prior in the order of nature. But in the process of generation, in all things generable, local change is found to be last, not only in one and the same thing, but also in the total progress of the nature of things that can be generated. Among theset some living things are completely immobile with respect to place on account of a lack of organ, as are plants, which do not have the organs required for progressive motion, and also many types of animals. But in the perfect animals local motion is found. If, therefore, local motion is present in things which comprehend nature in a higher degree, i.e., which attain to a greater perfection of nature, it follows that local motion is among all motions the first with respect to the perfection of substance.

1095. Secondly, at (861) he proves the same thing in this way; The less a motion takes away from the mobile, the more perfect is its subjeott and in this regard, a motion is somehow more perfect. But it is only according to local motion that nothing in the mobile subject is taken away: for in alteration, a transmutation with respect to a quality in the subject takes place, and in growth and decrease, a change with respect to the quantity of the subject takes place; moreover, the change involved in generation and ceasing-to-be affects the very form which constitutes the substance of the subject. But local motion is only with respect to place, which contains the subject externally. It remains, therefore, that local motion is the most perfect.

1096. Then at (862) from the side of the mobile he shows that local motion is first. For it is plain that what moves itself, most properly moves itself according to local motion. Since, therefore, it is something which moves itself that is the principle of other movers and mobiles and is consequently the first among all things that are moved, it follows that local motion, which is proper to it, is first among all motions.

In this way, therefore, he concludes from the foregoing that change of place is the first of all motions.

LECTURE 15

LOCAL MOTION ALONE CAN BE CONTINUOUS AND PERPETUAL

1097. After proving that local motion is the first of all motions, the Philosopher now shows which local motion is the first. And becauset as he said above, the motion must be the same which is continuous and first, this treatment is divided into two parts:

First he shows which motion can be always continuous;

Secondly, he shows that such a motion is the first, (L. 19).

The first part is divided into three sections:

In the first he shows that no motion but local can be continuous;

In the second that no local motion but a circular one can be continuous, (L. 16);

In the third that a circular motion can be continuous, (L. 19).

About the first he does two things;

First he proposes what he intends;

Secondly, he proves his propositiont at 1098.

He says therefore first that since it has been shown that change of place is the first among all types of motion, we must now show which change of place is first, because there are many types of it, as was proved in Book VII,

And at the same time, according to the same method, i.e., art, i.e., according to the same technical consideration, there will be plain what we have just said and what was also previously assumed at the beginning of Book VIIII namely, that there exists a motion which is continuous and perpetual. Now the first and the continuous must be the same, as was proved above. For that reason both of them fall under the same consideration.

That no other type of motion, however, but local motion can be continuous and perpetual will be clear from what will be said.

1098. Then at (864) he proves the proposition. And about this he does two things:

First he shows that no other species of change but local can be continuous and perpetual, remaining one and the same;

Secondly, that two changes which are opposite cannot suceed one another without an interval of rest, at 1103.

About the first he does two things:

First he proves the proposition;

Secondly, he excludes some objections, at 1100.

About the first he does two things:

First he proves the proposition in motions;

Secondly, in changes, at 1099.

He proposes therefore first (864) one proposition which is true in common both for changes and motions, namely, that all changes and motions are from opposites to opposites. But local motion is in alsense excluded from this generality, as was said at the end of Book VI. For generation and ceasing-to-be, which are changes, have, for their termini, existence and non-existence; the opposite termini of alteration are contrary passions, i.e., passible qualities, such as hot and cold, black and white; and the opposite termini of growth and decrease are large and small, or perfect and imperfect in magnitude, or quantity.

But it is plain from what was said in Book V that motions toward contrary termini are contrary. Therefore, a motion to white is contrary to a motion to black. But contraries cannot be together; therefore, while something is being moved to white, it cannot at the same time be undergoing a motion to back, Hence what begins to be moved from white to black by the motion of blackening, even though it should be moved by the motion of whitening while beeoming white, it could not simultaneously be moved by the motion of blackening, But what was existing previously, if it was not always being moved by some definite motion, must be considered as having been previously resting with a rest opposite to this motion, for whatever is apt to be moved is either at rest or being moved.

Therefore, it is plain that what is being moved to a contrary was at one time resting with a rest opposite to that motion. Hence no motion to a contrary can be continuous and perpetual.

If, therefore, to this conclusion be added what was first assumed, namely, that every motion of alteration, or growth or decrease is to a contrary, it follows that none of these motions can be continuous and perpetual.

1099. Then at (865) he proves the same thing for changes, i.e., for generation and ceasing-to-be: these, indeed, are opposed universally according to the common opposition of being and non-being, and also in the singular thing, as the generation of fire is opposed to the ceasing-to-be of fire, according to the opposition of its existence and its non-existence.

Hence, if opposite changes cannot co-exist, it will follow that no change is continuous and perpetual in the same way that it followed previously for motions, and that between two generations of the same thing, there must intervene a time in which ceasing-to-be occurred. In like manner, a time of generation interrupts instances of ceasing-to-be.

1100. Then at (866) he dismisses three objections. First of all, someone could say that since changes are opposed according to the opposition of their termini, whereas the termini of generation and ceasing-to-be are not contrary but contradictory, it seems to follow that generation and ceasing-to-be are not contrary; consequently, the same argument will not apply to them and to motions that are contrary.

To this objection he replies that it makes no difference whether changes which differ according to contradictory termini are contrary or not contrary, as long as this alone is true, that it is impossible for both to be in the same thing at the same time, For to be contrary or not contrary has no bearing on the argument given.

1101. The second objection he dismisses at (867). For someone could say that it is necessary for what is not always being moved to be previously at rest, because motion is the opposite of rest. But this does not occur in generation and ceasing-to-be, to which, properly speaking, rest is not opposed, as was said in Book V.

To this objection he responds that it makes no difference to the argument given whether there is rest in either of the contradictory termini or not, or whether change is not contrary to rest (because perhaps what does not exist cannot rest, and ceasing-to-be tends to non-existence, whence it seems that rest cannot occur in the terminus of a ceasing-to-be): but the proposition is sufficiently proved if an intermediate time exists between two generations or two instances of ceasing-to-be. For the consequence will be that neither of these changes is continuous.

After this he returns once more to the first objection and says that the reason why it makes no difference whether the changes between contradictory termini are contrary or not is that in the earlier discussions about motions likewise, it was not the question of contrariety that played a part in the proofs but the fact that the two changes could not occur at one and the same time. And this is not a peculiarity of contraries, but is common to all opposites.

1102. The-third objection he dismisses at (868). For he had said previously that motions which tend to contraries are contrary. Therefore, since motion is contrary to rest, it seems to follow that one thing has two contraries—which is impossible, as is proved in Metaphysics X.

In order to exclude this he says that there is no need to be disturbed about the fact that one thing seems to be contrary to two things, i.e., a motion contrary to rest and to the motion which is to a contrary. Rather, the only thing we ought to take is that one contrary motion is in some manner opposed both to another contrary motion and to restt to another contrary motion according to direct contrariety; but to restt more according to privative opposition. Yet this latter opposition has some contrariety, inasmuch as an opposite rest is the end and complement of a contrary motion, just as “equal and commensurable” is opposed in a way to two things, namely, to the excelling and to what is excelled, i.e., to the large and the small, to which two it is opposed rather according to privation, as is plain in Metaphysics X. And once more, what is important to grasp is that opposite motions or opposite changes do not occur at one and the same time.

1103. Then at (869) he shows that there must not only be a time between two motions or changes of the same species, and that no single change which tends to one of two opposites can be perpetual and continual, but also that it is impossible for opposite motions or changes so to follow one upon the other that there is no time between them. For it seems to be utterly at odds with generation and ceasing-to-be that when something has come to be and its generation is complete, that immediately it begin to cease to be, so that there would be no period of time in which the generated thing would be permanent. For a thing would be generated in vain, if the generated thing were not to remain in existence.

Hence from these changes of generation and ceasing-to-be, we can understand the others. For the natural is what occurs in a like way in all things, since nature always acts in the same way. Therefore, just as it seems unacceptable for something to cease to be as soon as it is generated, so, toot it seems unacceptable that a thing should start becoming black as soon as it became white, and..that a thing should begin to shrink as soon as it is grown. For in all these cases, the intention of nature would be frustrated.

LECTURE 16

NO CHANGE OF PLACE CAN BE CONTINUOUS AND PERPETUAL EXCEPT THE CIRCULAR

1104. After showing that no change but local can be continuous and perpetual, the Philosopher now shows that no local change can be continuous and perpetual, unless it be a circular one. About this he does two things:

First he proves his proposition by a demonstration;

Secondly, dialectically, (L. 18).

About the first he does two things:

First he proves his proposition;

Secondly, from the proven truth he solves some doubts, (L. 17).

About the first he does three things:

First he mentions what he chiefly intends. For he intends to prove that it is possible that there be a motion which, being one, might be continued ad infinitum, and that such a motion can be none but a circular one. This is the first thing he proves.

1105. Secondly, at (871) he shows how to proceed. And he says that whatever is moved locally is moved with either a circular motion or a straight one or in a motion that combines these two, e.g., a motion through a chord and an arc. Hence it is clear that if either of the two simple motions, namely, the circular or the rectilinear, cannot be infinitely continuous, much less their combination. Therefore one must omit the latter and attend to the simple ones.

1106. Thirdly, at (872) he shows that a rectilinear motion upon a straight and finite magnitude cannot be infinitely continuous and that consequently no rectilinear motion can be infinitely continuous unless an actually infinite magnitude is assumed—and this was proved impossible in Physics III above.

He proves his point with two arguments,, of which the following is the firstt If anything be moved ad infinitum upon a finite magnitude, it has to be done by reflexion. For it has been proved in Book VI that something will traverse a finite magnitude in finite time. When, therefore, the boundary of the finite magnitude is reached, the motion will cease, unless the mobile is returned by reflexion to the beginning of the magnitude whence the motion began. But what is reflected in a rectilinear motion is being moved with contrary motions. And this he now proves;

Contrary motions are ones whose terminal points are contrary, as was proved in Book V. But the contrarieties of place are up and down, ahead and behind, right and left. Now, whatever is reflected must be reflected according to one or other of these contrarieties. Therefore, whatever is reflected is moved with contrary motions.

But it was shown in Book V which motion is one and continuous: the one, namely, which is of one subject, in one time, and in the same category that does not differ specifically. For these three elements are considered in every motion: first, there is the time; secondly, the subject being moved, such as a man or a god, according to those who call the heavenly bodies “gods”; thirdly, there is that in which the motion occurs: in local motion it is a place; in alteration it is a passion, i.e., a passible quality; in generation and ceasing-to-be it is a form; in growth and decrease it is a magnitude.

Now it is clear that contraries differ with respect to species; hence contrary motions cannot be one and continuous, But the six things listed above are differences of place and, consequently, they must be contrary, because the differences of any genus are contrary. It remains, therefore, that it is impossible for that which moves by a reflected motion to be moved by one continuous motion.

1107. And because someone could doubt whether what is reflected is being moved with contrary motions, on the ground that there does not appear a manifest and determinate contrariety in place, such as does appear in the other genera in which motion occurs, as was said in Book V, he therefore, in order to show the same point, adds a certain sign over and above the argument above, which was based on the contrariety of termini.

And he says that the sign of this is that a motion from A to B is contrary to one from B to A, as happens in a reflex motiong because such motionst if they take place simultaneously, "arrest and stop each other," i.e., are such that one impedes the other and stops it.

And this happens not only in reflex straight motion but in reflex circular motions. For let three points A, B and C be designated on a circle. It is evident that if something begins to be moved from A to B and later is moved from A to C, there was reflexion and those two motions block one another and one arrests the other, i.e., causes the other to stop. But if something is moved without interruption from A to B and again from B to C, there is no reflexiono But the reason why reflex motions impede one anothert both in straight and in circular motions, is that it is the nature of contraries to impede and destroy one another.

Motions, however, that are diverse but not contraryt do not impede one another, as, for example, an upward motion and a motion to the side, i.e., to the right or left, do not obstruct one another; rather something can at the same time be moved upwards and to the right.

1108. Then at (873) he gives a second argument to show that reflex motions cannot be continuous ad infinitum, and it is an argument based on the pause that must intervene. He says, therefore, that it is above all the fact that what is reflected must rest between two motions which makes it clear that it is impossible for a rectilinear motion to be infinitely continuous. And this is true not only if something is moved through a straight line but also if it is carried along according to a circle.

And lest anyone suppose that being carried along "according to a circle" is the same as being carried along "circularly," to exclude this he adds that it is not the same to be carried along circularly according to the characteristics of a circle and to be carried along a circle, i.e., to traverse a circle. For sometimes it occurs that the motion of what is moved is according to a certain continuity, as, namely, it traverses part after part according to the order of parts of the circle, and this is "to be carried along circularly." But sometimes it occurs that what traverses a circle has not, when it returns to the point whence the motion began, travelled in an onward direction according to the order of the parts of the circle, but has returned backwards—and this is “to be reflected.” Whether, therefore, the reflexion occurs in a straight line or a circular line, a pause must intervene.

1109. Belief in this can be based not only on sense, for it is sensibly evident, but also on an argument.

The principle of this argument is that, since three things are involved in a magnitude that is traversed, namely, a beginning, a middle, and an end, the middle is both, when compared to both. For in respect to the end, the middle is a beginning, and in respect to the beginning, it is an end. Consequently, while it is one as to subject, it is two in conception. Another principle to be taken is that what is in potency is other than what is in act.

Keeping these things in mind, it should be considered, from what has been said, that each sign, i.e., each designated point between termini of a line ever which something is being moved, is potentially a middle, but it is not one unless a division with respect to the motion takes place in such a way that at a given point the thing in motion stops and then resumes its motion at that point. Now, in this way that middle will become an actual beginning and an actual end, i.e., the beginning of the subsequent (inasmuch as the mobile resumes its motion from it) and an end of the first motion (inasmuch as the first motion was terminated there by reason of rest).

For let there be a line at whose beginning is A, at whose middle is B, and at whose end is C. Then let something be moved from A to B and stop there; then let it begin to be moved from B and be carried along to C. In this example, it is plain that B is actually the end of the prior motion and the beginning of the subsequent one.

But if something be moved continuously from A to C without any interval of rest, it is not possible to say that the mobile has “come to be,” i.e., has arrived at, or has “ceased to be,” i.e., has left, either the point A or the point B. Only this can be said, namely, that it is in A or in B at a certain “now.” (But not at a certain time, unless we should perchance say that a thing is somewhere in time because it is there in some “now” of time. And so what is being moved continuously from A to C in some time will be in B at an instant which is a divider of time. In this way, it will be said to be in B in that entire time, in the sense that we speak of something being moved in a day because it is in motion in a part of that day.)

And because it seemed doubtful that what is in motion does not arrive at and leave each determinate point of a magnitude which is traversed by a continuous motion, he shows this. He says, then, that if someone grants that the mobile arrives at and then leaves some assigned point in the magnitude, it follows that it is at rest there. For it is impossible that in the same instant a mobile arrive at and leave this point B, because to arrive somewhere and to leave there are contraries, which cannot exist in the same instant.

Therefore, it must be at other and other "now's" that the mobile arrives at and leaves a given point of the magnitude. But between any two "now's" is an intermediate time. Therefore, it will follow that the mobile, A, rests in B. For anything that is somewhere for a time is there before and after. And the same must be said for all the other "signs" or points, because the same reasoning applies to all.

Hence it is plain that what is being carried along continuously over a magnitude is at no time arriving at, or departing from, any intermediate point. For when it is said that the mobile is "at" this point, or is "coming to be" in it or is "approaching" it, all these expressions imply that that point is a terminus of the motion. And when it is said that it "leaves" or "departs," a beginning of motion is implied. But a designated point of a magnitude is not actually a middle or a beginning or an end, because the motion neither begins nor ends there; rather, it is these potentially only, because the motion could begin or end there. Hence the mobile neither arrives at nor leaves an intermediate point, but it is said to be there absolutely in a "now." For the existence of a mobile at some point of the magnitude is compared to the whole motion as the "now" is compared to time.

1110. But when the mobile A uses B as an actual middle, beginning and end, then it must be at a stop there, because by moving and stopping it makes that one point to be two, namely, a beginning and an end, as happens also in understanding. For we can simultaneously understand one point as it is one in subject, but if we consider it separately as a beginning and separately as an end, this will not take place simultaneously. So too, when that which is being moved uses a point as one, it will be there only in the one "now." But if it uses it as two, namely, as a beginning and end in act, it will be there for two "now's," and, consequently, for a middle time between them. And so it will be at rest. Therefore, it is plain that what is being moved continuously from A to C was neither present nor away from the intermediate B, i.e., it neither arrived at it nor departed from it; but it was away from and left, the first point A, as the actual beginning; and it was present in, or arrived at, the final point C, because there the motion is finished, and the mobile rests.

It should be remarked that in the foregoing, “A” was sometimes taken as the mobile, and sometimes as the beginning of the magnitude.

1111. From all these things it is clear that a reflected motion, whether it occurs along a circular or a straight magnitude, cannot be continuous, but a rest intervenes, because the same point is actually the end of the first motion and beginning of the reflexed one. But in a circular motion the mobile does not use any point as an actual beginning and end, but each point is used as an intermediate. Therefore, a circular motion can be continuous, but a reflexed one cannot.

LECTURE 17

CERTAIN DOUBTS RESOLVED

1112. After showing that a reflex motion is neither continuous nor one, the Philosopher now settles some doubts on the basis of what has gone before. And it is divided into three parts according to the three doubts he resolves from the foregoing.

The second part begins at 1115;

The third, at 1119.

About the first he does two things:

First he sets forth the doubt;

Secondly, he solves it, at 1114.

1113. He says therefore first (874) that what was said in order to prove that a reflex motion is not continuous may be applied to solving a certain doubt, which is this: Assume two equal magnitudes, one called E, and the other Z. Let A and D be two equally swift mobiles, such that A is continuously moved from the beginning of the magnitude (E) to C, and D (along Z) to I, And let us assume that in the magnitude E there is an intermediate point B, which is as far from C as a like point Z on Z is distant from I. Let us further assume that at the same time that A in its continuous motion is approaching B, D in its continuous motion is receding from Z and going to I. Now, since these motions are regular and equally swift, it will follow that D will arrive at I before A arrives at C, because the one which starts first will first arrive to the end of an equal distance. But D left Z before A left B, because D left Z when A was arriving at B. Therefore, according to this, A did not simultaneously arrive at B and leave B, and it consequently follows that it departed after it arrived, because if it arrives and departs at the same time, it will not have begun to move later. And so it is necessary that A, while being carried along, rest in B. Therefore a continuous motion will be composed of periods of rest, as Zeno claimed in Book VI.

1114. Then at (875) he resolves this doubt in the light of the foregoing. For the objection supposed that A in its continuous motion arrives at a point B in the magnitude and that at the same time that A arrived at B, D left the point Z—which is against what was had above. For it was said above that when something is being moved continuously, it can neither arrive at, nor depart from, any intermediate point. Therefore, what the objection assumes must not be assumed, i.e., that when A was at, i.e., approached B, D was departing from Z, because if it be granted that A arrived at B, then for the same reason it should be granted that it left B, and that this did not occur simultaneously, but in two instants, so that in the intermediate time between the two instants it was at rest.

But as was said previously, when something was being continuously moved, it was neither departing fromt nor approaching, a given point, but was simply there—and this not for a time, because then it would have been resting, but in a division of time, i.e., in some "now," which divides time.

Therefore, what the objection assumed, namely, that A arrived at and that D left some intermediate point is impossible to state in a continuous motion. But in a reflex motion this must be stated. For if a mobile I is moved to the point D and is then rebounded, it is plain that the mobile uses the ultimate, which is D, as a beginning and as an end, i.e., the point is used for two things, hence it had to be at rest there.

Nor can it be said that it simultaneously arrived at and left D, because then it would have been, and not have been, there in the same instant. For whatever has been moved exists in the terminus to which it was being moved, and whatever begins to be moved is not in the terminus from which it begins to be moved. But when we use the expression "to be at" or "to approach," we mean that a motion is being terminated at that point, and when we say "to be away from" or "to depart," we mean that the motion is beginning. Hence, it is necessary that whatever arrives at, or is at, a point, be in it, while what is leaving it or is departing from it, be not in it. Since, therefore, it is impossible to be and not to be in a given point at the same time, it is consequently impossible to be at once at and away from the same, as the objection more than once assumed.

It should be noted that here he uses different letters from those used above. Here I is the mobile and D the terminus; above, it was the opposite.

But the solution given for continuous motion is not to be used with respect to a reflex motion. For it cannot be said that the mobile I is in the terminus D, from which it began to be reflected, only in the division of time, i.e., only during the "now," and that the mobile neither arrived at, nor departed from, the same, as was said with respect to a continuous motion. For in a reflex motion an end must be reached that is an actual end, and not merely a potential one, as the intermediate point in a continuous motion was only potentially a beginning and an end. Therefore, that which is an intermediate point of a continuous motion is only potentially a beginning and an end; but the point from which a reflex motion begins is actually a beginning and end. For example, it is the end of the downward motion of a stone, and the beginning of its upward motion, in the case of a stone falling to earth and bouncing upward.

Therefore, just as in the magnitude in which a motion is occuring, a point from which the motion is reflexed is both an actual beginning and end, so also in the motions themselves, there is actually an end of one and a beginning of the other. And this would not be so, unless an interval of rest occurred. Therefore, it is necessary that what is reflected in a straight line be at rest. And so it follows that on a straight magnitude there cannot be a continuous and perpetual motion, because no straight magnitude is infinite. And so there could not be perpetual continuous rectilinear motion, unless reflexion is involved.

1115. Then at (876) he presents the second doubt. About this he does three things:

First he mentions the doubt;

Secondly, he rejects a solution given in Book VI, at 1116;

Thirdly, he gives the true solution, at 1118.

He says therefore first (876) that by the same method, using the things shown above, one can block those who give the objection of Zeno and wish to argue in the following manner: Whatever is being moved must first cross what is intermediate before arriving at the end; but between any two termini there are infinite intermediates on account of a magnitude's infinite divisibility; and so it is impossible to traverse the intermediates, because infinites cannot be traversed. Therefore, nothing can by motion arrive at any terminus.

Again, the same difficulty can be presented under another form, as some do in fact propose it: Whatever traverses a whole must previously traverse the half; and since the half is again divided in half, half of the half must be first traversed. And thus, whatever is being moved counts off every half as it reaches it. But such halves can be multiplied ad infinitum. Therefore, it follows that if anything traverses an entire magnitude, it has counted off an infinite number, which is plainly impossible.

1116. Then at (877) he rejects the solution he had presented above in Book VI.

First he cites it;

Secondly, he sets it aside, at 1117.

He says therefore first that the foregoing objection was answered in Book VI, when motion in general was being discussed, on the ground that just as a magnitude is divided infinitely, so also is time. Consequently, time possesses infinities in itself in the same way as a magnitude. And so it is not unfitting if the infinites in a magnitude be traversed in the infinites which are in time. For it is not inconsistent for an infinite magnitude to be traversed in an infinite time. But, as shown in Book VI, the infinite is found in magnitude and in time in the same way.

1117. Then at (878) he sets aside this solution, And he says that this solution is sufficient to answer the questioner who asked whether it was possible in a finite time to traverse and count off infinites. This question was retorted by saying that a finite time possesses infinities in which the magnitudinal infinites can be traversed. But that solution does not reach the truth of the matter, because if someone should omit to ask about the magnitude and whether it is possible to traverse infinities in finite time, but asked rather this same question about time, namely, whether the infinites which are in time can be traversed—since time is divided ad infinitum—then the previous solution would not answer this question. Consequently, another solution must be sought.

1118. Then at (879) he gives the true solution in the light of his premises above. And he says that the true solution of the present doubt requires us to repeat what was premised in the immediately foregoing arguments, namely, that if someone divides a continuum into two halves, he then uses the one point at which the continuum is divided as two, because.he is making it serve both as the beginning of one part and as the end of the other. He does this by numbering, and by dividing into two halves.

But when a continuum has been divided in this manner, it is no longer a continuum, whether it be a magnitude, such as a line, that is divided, or a motion, for a motion cannot be continuous unless it is the motion of something continuous, namely, as to subjects and time and magnitude traversed. Therefore, the divided in effect counts and by counting breaks the continuity.

But so long as continuity endures in a continuum, there is an infinity of intermediates not in act but in potency, for if someone should make some middle actual, it will be due to division, as has been said, insofar as it is taken as the beginning of one and the end of the other. In that case, the continuum will not remain but will "stop," i.e., the intermediates that,are now in act will not be infinite but one will come to a stop in them. This shows up especially in the case of one who wishes to count the intermediates, because he will have to count one as two, inasmuch as it is the end of one half and the beginning of the other. And this, I say, takes place when the whole continuum is not counted as one, but two halves are counted in it, For if the whole continuum is taken as one, it has already been stated that then an intermediate point will not be taken as an actual end and beginning but potentially only.

With these facts in mind, the answer to be given to one who asks whether infinites in time or in a magnitude may be traversed is that in one sense it does happen, and in another it does not happen. For when one has infinites in act, it is impossible that they be traversed, but when they are potentially infinite, they can be traversed. And so, since the intermediates in a continuum are infinite only in potency, it does happen that infinites are traversed, because what is in continuous motion traverses per accidens what is infinite, namely, what is infinite in potency, But per se it has traversed a finite line which happens to have an infinitude of intermediates in potency. The line itself, however, in its nature and definition, is distinct from those infinite intermediates. For a line is not a composite of points, but points may be designated in a line insofar as it is divided.

1119. Then at (880) he resolves the third doubt. About this he does three things:

First he mentions the doubt and its solution;

Secondly, he explains each with an example, at 1120;

Thirdly, he draws a corollary from the foregoing, at 1122.

First therefore (880) he states the doubt that is wont to arise with respect to generation and ceasing-to-be. For what is generated ceases not to be, and begins to be. But the time assigned for the existence of a thing that is generated or has ceased to be, must be different from the one assigned to its non-existence. For example, if from air fire is generated, then in the whole time AB there was not fire but air, but in the entire time BC there is fire. Since, therefore, sign B of the whole time ABC is common to both times, it seems that in that common instant the fire both exists and does not exist.

The Philosopher therefore solves this doubtj saying that it is plain that, unless someone holds that the point of time which divides a prior time from a later one, "always belongs to the later," i,e., that in that instant the thing is in the state which it subsequently has, it follows that the same is simultaneously being and non-beingt and that when something has been produced, it is non-being. For it is then produced when generation terminates, namely, in that "now" which divides the prior time and the later. If, therefore, in the entire prior time it was non-being, in that "now" also when it has already been generated, it is also non-being, since this "now" is the end of the prior time.

How these impossibilities do not follow he explains by adding that one and the came sign as to number, i.e., the "now" is common to both times, namely, to the prior and to the subsequent. But although it be one as to subject, it is not one in conception but two, for it is the end of the prior time and beginning of the subsequent. But if we take the "now" as it is a thing, i.e., if it be taken as it is one in reality, it always belongs with the subsequent state (passion).

Or in other words: Although the "now" is the end of the prior time and the beginning of the subsequent, and is thus common to both, yet accordingly as it belongs to the thing, i.e., insofar as it is compared to the thing which is being moved, it always belongs to the subsequent passion, because the thing being moved is in that instant being subject to the passion of the subsequent time.

1120. Having given the objection and its solution, he explains both with examples. And first the objection, at (881). He says therefore: Let ACB be the time, and D the thing that is being moved, so that, in time A, D is white, and in B it is non-white. It seems therefore to follow that in C it is white and non-white. How this follows he now explains: If it is white in the entire time A, then at any time taken in A it is white; and likewise, if it is non-white in the entire time B, it follows that at any time taken in B it is non-white. Since, therefore, C is taken in both—being both the end of the former and the beginning of the latter—it seems to follow that in C it is white and non-white.

1121. Secondly, at (882) he illustrates the solution given above. And he says that we must not concede that it is white at any point of time in A, for the ultimate "now," which is C, must be excepted, for it is already "later," i.e., it is the ultimate terminus of the change. For example, if the white was coming to be or ceasing to be in the entire time A, in C it is not ceasing to be or becoming white, but already become or ceased to be. But what has already been made, exists, and what has already ceased to be, does not exist. Hence it is clear that in C it is first true to say this is white, if the generation of white has terminated there, or this is not white, if the ceasing-to-be of white has terminated there. Or, if that is not stated, the above-mentioned incompatibilities follow, namely, that when something has been already generated, it is still non-existent, and when it has ceased to be it is still a being. Or, it also follows that something is at once white and non-white, and, universally, being and non-being.

1122. Then at (883) he draws a certain corollary from the foregoing, namely, that time is not divided into indivisible times, because, should one suppose this, it would be impossible to solve the doubt previously mentioned.

He says therefore that it is necessary that whatever is first a non-being, and later is a being, come to be at some time; and again, it is necessary that when something is coming to be, it is not existing. Now, if these two aeoumptions are true, it is impossible for time to be divided into times that are indivisible. For let a time be divided into indivisible times. Then let A be the first indivisible time, and B the second and subsequent time. Now D, which was previously not white and later is white, was becoming white in time A, and at that time was not white. But one must suppose that it has been made white in some indivisible time which is "had,", i.e., subsequent, to A, namely, in time B in which it is now white. Now, if it was becoming white in A, it follows that in A it was not white; in B, however, it is white. Since, therefore, between non-existence and existence an instance of generation occurs, because nothing passes from non-existence to existence but by generation, it follows that an act of generation occurs between time A and time B. Therefore, there will be between A and B an intermediate time in which it was becoming white (since in time B, D is already generated).

And similarly, since in that intermediate indivisible time it is becoming white, it is not white: hence for the same reason it will be necessary to posit still another intermediate time and so on ad infinitum, because we cannot assume that it is becoming white and is white in the same period of time.

But the argument is not the same, if one states that the times are not divided into indivisible times. For according to this, we will say that it is one and the same time in which it was coming to be, and was produced. But it was coming to be, and was non-being, in the entire preceding time, and it was produced and a being in the final “now” of the time, which instant is not related to the preceding time as being “had” or subsequent, but as its terminus. But if one assumes indivisible times, they are necessarily (discrete and) consecutive.

But it is plain according to the foregoing that, if we do not assume indivisible times, then if something comes to be white in the entire time A, the time in which it was coming to be and was completely made, is no greater than the time in which it was coming to be alone. For it is coming to be in the entire time, but in the ultimate terminus of that time it was completely made. But time plus its terminus is not something greater than the time by itself, any more than a point adds any magnitude to a line. But if indivisible times are assumed, it is clear from the foregoing that there must be more time in coming to be and completely being, than in coming to be alone.

Finally, in summary, he concludes to his main intention, saying that the foregoing arguments, and ones like them, are the appropriate ones to convince us that a reflex motion is not continuous.

LECTURE 18

DIALECTICAL REASONS TO SHOW REFLEX MOTION IS NOT CONTINUOUS

1123. After proving with proper reasons that reflex motion is not continuous, the Philosopher now proves the same with common and logical reasons. About this he does two things:

First he expresses his intention;

Secondly, he proves his proposition, at 1124.

He says therefore first that if someone wishes to prove "reasonably," i.e., logically, the proposition in question, it will be seen from the reasons to be given that the same thing follows, namely, that reflex motion is not continuous.

1124. Then at (885) he proves the proposition.

First, for reflex local motion only;

Secondly, in common for all motions, at 1126.

The first argument is this: Everything in continuous motion has been, from the very beginning of its motion, in the process of being carried, as toward an end, to that at which it arrives according to change of place, unless there is some obstacle (because an obstacle could deflect it in another direction). He exemplifies this by saying that if something in local motion has arrived at B, it was being moved toward B not only when it was near B but at soon as it began to be moved. For there is no reason why it should be tending more toward B now than before. And the same is true in other motions.

But if a reflex motion should be continuous, it will be true to say that what is in motion from A to C, and is then reflected back to A, is in a continuous motion. Therefore, in the very first part of the motion from A to

C it was being moved to its final terminus in the part A; in this way, while it is being moved from A, it is being moved toward A. It follows, therefore, that it is being simultaneously moved with contrary motions, because in the sphere of rectilinear motions, to be moved from a thing and to be moved toward the same are contrary. But in circular motions this is not contrary. Now it is impossible for something to be moved simultaneously with contrary motions. Therefore, it is impossible for a reflex motion to be continuous.

1125. Then at (886) from the same middle he leads to another impossibility. For if something, while it is being moved from A, is being moved toward A, it cannot be moved toward A except from a counter-point C, in which the mobile was not yet present when it began to be moved from A. It follows, then, that something is being moved from a terminus at which it is not present—which is impossible. For it cannot leave a place in which it is not. Thus, it is impossible for a reflex motion to be continuous. And if this is impossible, then it is necessary that at the point of reflexion the mobile be at rest, i.e., in C. From which it is plain that it is not one motion, because a motion interrupted by rest is not one.

1126. Then at (887) he proves the same thing in a more universal way for every genus of motion, with three arguments. The first of them is this: Whatever is in motion is being moved with respect to one of the species of motion listed previously. In like manner, whatever is at. rest is so with respect to a rest that is opposite to one of the aforesaid species of motion. For it was shown above in Book V that no motions other than the ones listed are possible.

Let us, therefore, take a motion that is distinct from other motions, in the sense of being specifically distinct from others, as whitening is distinct from blackening—but not distinct in the way that one part of a motion is distinct from other parts of the same motion, as one part of the motion of whitening is distinct from other parts of the same whitening. Taking, therefore, one motion in the way described, it is true to say that whatever is not forever being moved with this motion, was before of necessity at rest with an opposite rest, as whatever is not being forever whitened was at some time at rest with a rest opposite to whitening. But this proposition would not be true if some definite part of the motion should be taken, for it is not necessary that what was not forever being moved in this part of the whitening was previously at rest with an opposite rest, because before the thing was becoming white in some other part of the whitening. And because of this he states significantly: “...not some particular part of the whole.”

This proposition he now proves: When one of two things that are in privative opposition is not in its recipient, the other must be. But rest is opposed to motion privatively. Therefore, if a mobile was existing at a time when motion was not in it, it follows of necessity that rest would then have been in it.

Accordingly, since this proposition has been provedg he takes the minor from the argument already presented above and says that, if rectilinear motions from A to C and from C to A are contrary, and contrary motions cannot coexist, it is plain that when something was being moved from A to C, it was not at the same time being moved from C to A. Consequently, it was not forever being moved with respect to the motion from C to A.

Hence, according to the previous proposition, it is necessary that the mobile first rest with an opposite rest. For it has been shown in Book V that to a motion from C is opposed rest in C. Therefore, it was at rest in C, Therefore the reflex motion was not one and continuous, since it was interrupted by the interposition of rest.

1127. He presents the second argument at (888), and it is this: Non-white ceases to be and white comes to be simultaneously; similarly, white ceases to be and non-white comes to be simultaneously. But if reflex motion in every genus is continuoust it will follow that an alteration is terminated at whiteness, and begins to depart from whiteness, in such a way as to form a continuous motion, and that it does not rest there for any time; for if rest should intervene, the alteration would not be continuous. But, as has been said, when the white comes to be, the non-white ceases to be, and when departure from white occurs, non-white comes to be. Therefore, it will follow that non-white is ceasing to be and coming to be at the same timeg for these three things are present at the same time, namely, the coming-to-be of white, the ceasing-to-be of non-white and the coming-to-be of non-white—that is, if the reflex motion is continuous without any interval of rest. This, however, is plainly impossible, namely, that non-white should be coming to be, and ceasing to be, at the same time. Therefore, a reflex motion cannot be continuous.

Now, this argument is seen to refer to generation and ceasing-to-be. For this reason he says that this argument is more proper than the previous ones, because it is more apparent in contradictories that they cannot be true at the same time. And yet, what is said in generation and ceasing-to-be applies to all motions, since in every motion there is a kind of generation and ceasing-to-be. For just as in the case of alteration, white is generated, and non-white ceases to be, so too in every other motion.

1128. At (889) he gives the third argument, which is this: As was had in Book V, it is not necessary, if the time is continuous, that a motion be on that account continuous. For motions of diverse kinds, even though they succeed one another in continuous time, are not on that account continuous, but are, rather, consequent upon one another, for continua must have one common terminus. But there cannot be one common terminus in things that are contrary and specifically different, such as whiteness and blackness. Since, therefore, a motion from A to C is contrary to one from C to A in any genus of motion, as was shown in Book Vt it is impossible that those two motions be continuous one to the other—even though the time be continuous—with no intervening rest. It remains, therefore, that a reflex motion can in no way be continuous.

It should be noted that the foregoing arguments are called “logical” because they proceed from certain common things, namely, from the property of contraries.

LECTURE 19

PROPER REASONS WHY CIRCULAR MOTION CAN BE CONTINUOUS, AND WHY IT IS THE FIRST

1129. After showing that no local motion but a circular one can be continuous, the Philosopher now shows that a circular motion can be continuous and first.

First of all he shows this with proper arguments;

Secondly, with logical and common arguments, (L. 20).

About the first he does two things:

First he shows that a circular motion is continuous;

Secondly, that it is the first, at 1134.

About the first he does two things:

First he gives two arguments to prove that circular motion can be continuous;

Secondly, from the same arguments he concludes that no other motion can be continuous, at 1132.

1130. But that a circular motion can be one continuous motion he proves at (890) with his first argument: That from which nothing impossible follows is said to be possible. But nothing impossible follows from the statement that a circular motion is forever continuous.

This is plain from the fact that, in a circular motion, that which is being moved from somewhere, e.g., from A, is at the same time being moved to the same point "according to the same position," i.e., according to the same progress of the mobile, the same order of parts having been maintained. This, however, does not happen in a reflex motion, because when something turns back, it is disposed according to a contrary order of parts in its motion. For either that part of the mobile to the fore in the first motion must be at the rear in the reflexion, or that part which was facing one difference of place, for example, the right or above, in reflexion must face a contrary direction. But in a circular motion the same position is maintained, while a thing is being moved toward the point from which it departed. Consequentlyt it could be said that even from the very beginning of its motion, while it was departing from A, it was being moved toward that which it would finally reach, namely, the very same A.

Nor does this lead to the impossibility of being moved with contrary or opposite motions at one and the same time, as followed in rectilinear motion. For not every motion to some terminal is contrary or opposite to one from the same terminal, but such contrariety is present in the straight line, according to which, contrariety in place is gauged. For contrariety between two termini is not forthcoming according to a circular line, whatever part of the circumference be taken, but according to the diameter. Contraries, indeed, are things most far apart; but the greatest distance between two termini is not measured according to a circular line, but according to a straight line. For between two points an infinit,e number of curves can be described but only one straight line, But the measure in any genus is that which is one.

Consequently, it is plain that if one takes a circle, and it be divided in half, and AB be its diameter, a motion through the diameter from A to B is contrary to a motion over the same diameter from B to A. But a motion over the semicircle from A to B is not contrary to a motion from B to A over the other semicircle. But it was contrariety that prevented a reflex motion from being continuous, as appears from the reasons given above. Nothing, therefore, once contrariety has been removed, prevents a circular motion from being continuous and also not failing at any time.

And the reason for this is that a circular motion is completed by the fact that it is from the same to the same, and thus its continuity is not impaired by this. But a rectilinear motion is completed by its being from one thing to another; hence, if it returns from that other to the same from which it began, it will be not one continuous motion, but two.

1131. Then at (891) he gives the second argument, saying that a circular motion does not exist in identical things, but a rectilinear motion is very often in identical things.

Now what this means is that, if something is moved from A to B across a diameter, and again from B to A across the same diameter, it has to return across the same middles through which it previously travelled, Consequently, it is being carried over the same middle a number of times. But if something is moved through a semicircle from A to B, and again from B to A through the other semicircle—and this is motion in the circular manner—it is clear that it does not return to the same point over the same middles.

Now, it is of the nature of opposites that they be considered with relation to the same thing. And thus it is clear that to be moved from the same to the same with a circular motion is without opposition, but to be moved from the same to the same with a reflex motion is with opposition.

In this way it is plain that a circular motion which does not return to the same over the same middles, but always goes over something other, can be one and continuous, because it does not have opposition. But that motion, namely, the reflex motion, which, in returning to the same, traverses more than once the same middles, cannot be forever continuous, because that would require something being moved with contrary motions at one and the same time, as was proved above.

And from the same argument it can be concluded that a motion confined to a semicircle, or to any portion of a circle, cannot be continuous in perpetuity, because such motions require repeated traversing of the same middles and involve being moved with contrary motions, as though a return to the beginning should be made. The reason is because the end is not joined to the beginning when you are dealing with a straight line, or a semicircle, or an arc of a circle; rather the beginning and end are apart. It is only in a circle that the end is joined to the beginning.

And for this reason only a circular motion is a perfect motion, since a thing is perfect from attaining its principle.

1132. Then at (892) he proves from the same argument that in no other genus of motion can there be continuous motion.

First he proves the proposition;

Secondly, he draws a corollary from what was said, at 1133.

He says therefore first (892) that also from this distinction between circular motion and other local motions, it is plain that neither in the other genera of motion can there be any infinitely continuous motions, because in all the other genera of motion if anything is to be moved from the same to the same, it follows that the same will be repeatedly traversed. For example, in alteration the intermediate qualities must be passed through—for the passage from hot to cold is through tepid, and if a return is to be made from cold to hot, tepid must be traversed again. The same is apparent in a motion according to quantity—for if that which is moved from large to small, should return again to large, the intermediate quantity must be traversed twice. Generation and corruption present a similar situation—for if air comes to be from fire, and then again fire from air, the intermediate dispositions must be traversed twice (for a middle may be placed in generation and ceasing-to-be, insofar as taken along with the dispositional changes).

And because the intermediates are traversed in different ways in changes that are diverse, he adds that it makes no difference whether many or few intermediates are introduced through which something is moved from one extreme to the other, or whether the intermediate is taken in a positive sense, as pallid between white and black, or in a remotive sense, as, between good and evil, that which is neither good nor evil-for, be they what they may, it always happens that the same are traversed a number of times.

1133. Then at (893) he concludes from the foregoing that the early natural philosophers did not phrase the matter well when they said that all sensible things are forever in motion, because that would necessitate their being moved with respect to one of the aforesaid motions, concerning which we have shown that they cannot be forever continuous; and especially because they said that the ever-continuous motion is alteration.

For they assert that all things are always perishing and ceasing to be, and yet they say that generation and ceasing-to-be are nothing more than alteration, and so in saying that all things are forever ceasing to be, they are saying that all things are forever being altered.

But it was proved in the argument given above that nothing can be moved forever except by a circular motion. Thus it remains that neither according to alteration, nor growth, can all things be forever in motion, as they said.

Finally, he concludes by way of summary to the chief proposition, namely, that no change can be infinite and continuous except a circular one.

1134. Then at (894) he proves with two arguments that circular motion is the first of motions. The first argument is this: Every local motion, as stated above, is either circular, or straight, or a combination of the two. But circular and straight are prior to the combination. which is composed of them. But between these two, the circular isprior to the straight, for the circular is simpler and more perfect than the straight. And this he proves as follows: Straight motion cannot go on infinitely. For this would occur in two ways: First in such a way that the magnitude traversed by the straight motion would be infinite—which is impossible. But even if there were some infinite magnitude, nothing would be moved to infinity. For what is impossible to be, never comes to be or is generated; but it is impossible to traverse the infinite; therefore, nothing is moved toward the end of traversing the infinite. Therefore, there cannot be an infinite straight motion over an infinite magnitude. In a second way, an infinite straight motion can be understood as being a reflex motion over a finite magnitude. But a reflex motion is not one, as was proved above, but is a composition of two motions.

But if a reflexion does not occur upon a finite straight line, the motion will be imperfect and destroyed: imperfect, because further addition can be made to it; destroyed, because when the terminus of the magnitude is reached, the motion will cease.

From all this it is clear that a circular motion which is not composed of two, and which is not destroyed when it comes to a terminus (for its beginning and terminus are identical), is simpler and more perfect than a straight motion. Now the perfect is prior to the imperfect, and likewise the imperishable is prior to the perishable, in nature and notion and time, as was shown above when it was proved that local change is prior to other motions. Therefore, it is necessary that circular motion be prior to straight.

1135. Then at (895) he gives the second argumentt which is this; A motion which can be perpetual is prior to one that cannot be perpetual, because the perpetual is prior to the non-perpetual, both in time and in nature. But a circular motion and no other can be perpetual, for the others must be followed by rest, and where rest intervenes, motion is destroyed. What is left, therefore, is that circular motion is prior to all the other motions. (The premisses of this argument are plain from what has been said previously.)

LECTURE 20

DIALECTICAL REASONS WHY CIRCULAR MOTION IS CONTINUOUS AND FIRST

Confirmation from the ancients

1136. After proving with proper reasons that a circular motion is continuous and first, the Philosopher now proves the same with certain logical and common reasons. And he gives three arguments.

With respect to the first (896) he says that it is reasonable that a circular motion but not a straight one be one and forever continuous. For in a straight motion there are determined a beginning, middle, and end, and all three of these can be designated in a straight line, Therefore in a straight line there exist that whence the motion begins, and where it ends, since all motion rests at its termini, namely, the terminus from which or to which (he having distinguished these two states of rest in Book V). But in a circular line the termini are not distinct, for there is no reason why in a circle some designated point should be a terminus more than another, since each and every one alike is a beginning and an intermediate and an end. Consequently, the things which are moved circularly are in a sense always in the beginning and in the endt insofar, namely, as any point at all in a circle may be taken as a beginning or end, while in another sense, they are never in the beginning or end, inasmuch as no point in the circle is a beginning or end in act.

Hence it follows that a sphere is in one sense in motion and in another sense at rest, because, as was said in Book VI, while the sphere is being moved it always keeps the same place as to subject, and in this respect it is at rest; but yet the place is always other and other in conception, and in this respect it is being moved.

Now, the reason why a beginning, intermediate and end are not distinguished in a circular line is that these three belong to the center, from which, as from a beginning, lines proceed to the circumference and at which lines drawn from the circumference end. Moreover, it is the middle of the entire magnitude by virtue of its equidistance to all the points of the circumference.

And therefore, since the beginning and end of a circular magnitude are outside its circularity—for they are in the center which is never reached by a thing moving circularly—no place can be assigned at which a thing in circular motion should be at rest, because anything in circular motion is always carried about the middle but not to what is ultimate, because it is not carried to the middle, which is the beginning and the ultimate.

On this account, a whole that is being moved in a spherical manner is in one sense always at rest and in another in continuous motion, as has been said.

From all this the following argument may be extracted: Every motion that is never in its beginning and end is continuous. But a circular motion is of this kind. Therefore, etc, And with this same middle term, it is proved that a straight motion cannot be continuous.

1137. Then at (897) he gives the second argument, saying that these two follow one another conversely, namely, that a circular motion is the measure of all motions and that it is the first of all motions—for all things are measured by what is first in their genus, as is proved in Metaphysics X. Accordingly, this is a convertible proposition: Whatever is a measure is the first in its genus; whatever is first is a measure. But circular motion is the measure of all other motions, as is clear from what was said at the end of Book IV. Therefore, circular motion is the first of motions. On the other hand, if one suppose that a circular motion is the first of motions on account of the arguments given above, it will be concluded that it is the measure of the other motions.

1138. The third argument he gives at (898), saying that only a circular motion can be regular, since things in motion in a straight line are being carried along in an irregular manner from beginning to end.

For, as was said in Book V, a motion is irregular which is not equally swift throughout, and this must occur in every straight motion, since in natural motions the further things in motion are distant from the first rest, from which the motion started, the swifter they are moved; and in a violent motion, the farther they are distant from the ultimate rest, at which the motion terminates, the swifter they travel. For every natural motion is more intense near the end, but a violent motion at the beginning.

But this has no place in a circular motion in place, because in a circle the beginning and end do not exist somewhere in the circling which occurs along the circumference, but outside it, i,e., in the center, as was explained. Hence, there is no reason why a circular motion should be intensified or weakened on account of a nearness to its beginning or end, since it is always equally approaching the center, which is the beginning and ends

Now, it is plain from what was said in Book V that a regular motion is more one motion than an irregular one. Consequently, a circular motion is naturally prior to a straight motion. For the more a thing is one, the more it is by nature prior.

1139. Then at (899) he shows through the opinions of the early philosophers that local motion is the first of motions. And he says that the statements of all the ancient philosophers who discussed motion attest to this truth, for they declare that the principles of things move with local motion.

He refers first to the opinion of Empedocles, who posited friendship and strife as the first moving principles, the former gathering and the latter separating—and gathering and separating are local motions.

Secondly, he shows the same thing through the opinion of Anaxagoras, who posited Intellect as the first moving cause, whose work, according to him, is to separate what is commingled.

Thirdly, he shows the same thing through the opinion of Democritus, who did not posit a moving cause but said that all things are moved on account of the nature of the void. But a motion that is due to the void is a local motion or one similar to local motion, for void and place differ only in conception, as was said in Book IV. And so, by posi ting that things are first moved on account of the void, they posit local motion as naturally first and none of the other motions, but they believe that the other motions follow upon local motion. For those who follow Democritus declare that being increased and corrupted and altered occur by a certain assembling and separating of indivisible bodies.

Fourthly, he shows the same thing through the opinions of the ancient philosophers of nature who posited only one cause, a material cause, namely, water, or air, or fire, or some intermediate. For from that one material cause they explain the generation and ceasing-to-be of things through condensation and rarefaction, which are completed by a kind of assembling and separation.

Fifthly, he shows the same through the opinion of Plato who posited soul as the first cause of motion. For Plato posited that that which moves itself, which is the soul, is the principle of all things that are moved. But self-movement belongs to animals and all animate things, according to autokinesis with respect to place, i.e., per se local transmutation.

Sixthly, he shows the same thing through what is commonly and popularly held, For we only say that to be moved in the proper sense which is moved with respect to place. Whereas, if something is at rest in place, but is moved with the motion of growth or decrease or alteration, it is said to be moved in a certain sense but not absolutely.

1140. Then at (900) he summarizes what he had said, namely, that motion always has been and always will be, and that there is some first principle of perpetual motions and what the first motion is, and which motion happens to be perpetual, and that the first mover is immobile. For all these things have been set forth in what has preceded.

LECTURE 21

LIMITATIONS OF A FINITE MOVER

114l. After describing the condition of the first motion, the Philosopher here describes the condition of the first mover. And it is divided into two parts:

First he mentions his intention;

Secondly, he carries out his proposal, at 1142.

He says first (901), then, that since it was said above that the first mover is immobile, now we must assert that the first mover is indivisible and has no magnitude, as being wholly incorporeal. But before we show this, certain things necessary for this proof must be settled in advance.

1142. Then at (902) he carries out his proposal:

First he premises things required for proving the main proposition; Secondly, he proves the main proposition, at the end of L. 23.

About the first he does three things:

First he shows that an infinite motion supposes an infinite power;

Secondly, that an infinite power cannot exist in a magnitude, at 1146;

Thirdly, that the first mover must be one which causes a continuous and undying motion, (L. 22).

He says therefore first (902) that among the things to be established before the main proposition, one is that it is impossible for anything of finite power to cause motion for an infinite time. This he now proves.

There are three things in every motion: one of which is what is moved, another is the mover, and the third is the time in which the motion occurs.

But all three must be infinite, or all three finite, or some finite and some infinite, i.e., either two only or one.

Suppose, therefore, that A is the mover, B the mobile, and C the infinite time. Then let D, a part of At move E, a part of B. Under these conditions, it could be concluded that D moves E in a time not equal to time C (in which A moved B) but in less time.

For it has been proved in Book VI that the entire mobile requires more time to pass a certain point than it takes for a part of it. Therefore, since the time C is infinite, it follows that the time in which D meves E will not be infinite but finite. So let that time be Z, so that just as A moves B in the infinite time C, D moves E in the finite time Z. But since D is part of A, then if we add to D by subtracting from A, the A will eventually be entirely taken away or used up, since it is finite, and every finite is used up by subtraction, if the same quantity is continually taken away, as said in Book III.

And likewise, B will be used up, if continual subtractions are made from it and added to E, because B is also finite. But no matter how much is taken from the time C—even if the same amount is continually taken away—all of C will not be used up, because it is infinite.

From this he concludes that the entire A moves the entire B in a finite time, which is part of C. And this does indeed follow from the premisses, because additions are made to the time of the motion in the same ratio as they are made to the mobile and to the mover, Since, therefore, by subtracting from the entire mobile and mover and by adding to their parts, the whole mobile the whole mover are at length used up, so that all that was in the whole is added to the part, it will follow that by proportional additions being made to the time, there will result a finite time in which the whole mover will move the whole mobile. Thus, if the mover is finite and the mobile also finite, the time too must be finite.

According to this, therefore, it is not possible that by a finite mover anything be moved with an infinite motion, namely, according to an infinite time. And so what was first proposed is now plain, namely, that it does not happen that a finite mover should cause motion for an infinite time.

1143. But Avicenna raises a difficulty about this demonstration of Aristotle. For it seems not to be universal, since there exists a finite mover and mobile from which nothing can be subtracted or taken away, such as a heavenly body, which nevertheless was not excluded from Aristotle’s proof. Hence it seems that the proof is either particular, or it proceeds from a false assumption.

To this objection Averroes in his Commentary answers that although nothing can be subtracted from the heavenly body, yet the conditional is true, that if a part be taken away from the body, that part will move or be moved in less time than the whole body. For there is nothing to prevent a conditional from being true, even if its antecedent be impossible, as is patent from this conditional: If a man flies, he has wings. But whatever takes away the truth of a true conditional is false, even though the antecedent of the conditional be false. Now the truth of the above conditional cannot stand with the statement that the finite moves for an infinite time, as is evident through Aristotle's deduction, Thus, therefore, from the truth of the foregoing conditional Aristotle concludes that it is impossible for a finite thing to cause motion for an infinite time.

However, it may be said more briefly that when Aristotle in his demonstrations speaks of removing or subtracting, it does not always have to be understood in the sense of destroying a thing's continuity, which is impossible in a heavenly body; rather, substraction can be understood in the sense of designating. For example, I can without disturbing the continuity of a piece of wood designate by touch or thought a certain point as though dividing the whole, and in this way I can remove a part from the whole and say that there is less whiteness in that part than in the whole. In like.manner, it can be said that there is less power to move in a part of a heavenly body — a part removed by designating it—than in the whole.

1144. But there is another and greater difficulty. For it does not seem to be against the prerogatives of a finite mover to cause motion for an infinite time, because if that finite thing is imperishable or impassible in its nature, and never loses its nature, it will maintain itself always in the same way with respect to causing motiong for a same thing, remaining in the same state, will always do the same. Hence, there would be no reason for its not being able to get later as it did before. This is evident to sense, for we observe that the sun can in an infinite time move lower bodies.

To settle this difficulty, we must investigate the sequence of demonstration set forth by Aristotle. For it should be certain that the conclusion is to be interpreted in the sense in which it follows from the premisses.

We should consider, therefore, that the time of a motion may be taken in two senses, especially in local motion: in one sense, according to the parts of the mobile; in another sense, according to the parts of the magnitude along which the motion passes. For it is plain that one part of the mobile passes a designated point of the magnitude, before the whole does, and that the whole traverses part of the magnitude before it traverses all of it. Now, it is plainly clear from the procedure of Aristotle's demonstration, that he is speaking of time of motion according to the parts of the mobile and not according to the parts of the magnitude. For in his demonstrations he assumes that part of the mover moves part of the mobile in less time than the whole moves the whole. But this could not be true, if we took time of motion according to the parts of the magnitude traversed by the motion; for the ratio of the part of the mover to the part of the mobile is the same as that of the whole mover to the whole mobile. Hence, a part will always move part with the same velocity as the whole moves the whole. Thus in an equal time part of the mobile moved by part of the mover will traverse some magnitude and the whole mobile moved by the whole mover will also.

Or perhaps the whole will be moved in less time than the part, because a united force is greater than a divided force, and the greater the force of the mover, the swifter the motion and the less the time. Therefore, this must be understood in the sense that the time of motion is taken according to parts of the mobile, because one part of the mobile will pass a definite point in less time than the whole will. In this sense, it is impossible for anything but an infinite mobile to be moved for an infinite time. But an infinite mobile cannot be moved by a finite mover, since the power of the mover is always greater than the power of the mobile. Hence an infinite mobile must be moved by an infinite power. Consequently, just as an impossibility follows from the assumption that a finite mover moves a finite mobile with an infinite motion according to the parts of the mobile, so, this incompatibility once removed, one must further conclude that an infinite motion belongs to an infinite mobile from an infinite mover.

1145. But against this, someone could object that Aristotle did not prove above that motion is infinite according to the parts of the mobile in the way that the motion of an infinite body is said to be infinite, for the entire corporeal universe is finite, as was proved in Book III and will be proved in On the Heavens I. Hence the demonstration of Aristotle does not seem to be verified as concluding to his proposition, namely, that the first mover, which causes an infinite motion, is infinite.

But it should be said that what is first cause of an infinite motion must be the per se cause of the infinity of the motion, because the cause which is per se is always prior to that which is so by virtue of something else, as has been said above. Now, the power of a per se cause is determined to a per se effect and not to a per accidens effect, for that is the way Aristotle taught causes are to be compared to their effects in Book II. But, because motion can be infinite in two ways, as has been said, namely, according to the parts of the mobile and according to the parts of the length along which the motion takes place, per se the infinite is in motion from the parts of the mobile, but per accidens according to the parts of the length—for the quantity of motion based on the parts of the mobile belongs to it by reason of its proper subject and so is present in it per se, whereas the quantity of motion based on the parts of the length is based on constant repetition of the mobile's motion, in the sense that a whole mobile, having completed its entire motion upon one part of the length, now successively traverses another. The first cause, therefore, of the infinity of motion has power over the infinity of motion which is per se, in such a way, namely, as to enable it to move an infinite mobile, should there be such. Hence, it must be infinite. And even though the first mobile be finite, it has, nevertheless, a certain likeness to the infinite, as was said in Book III. But in order that something be the cause of a motion that is infinite through repetition (which is per accidens) infinite power is not required, but an immobile finite power is enough, because, so long as the power remains the same, it will be able to repeat the same effect, as the sun has a finite energy yet can move the lower elements in an infinite time, should motion be, as Aristotle posits, eternal. For it is not the first cause of the infinity of motion but is something as though moved by another to move in an infinite time, according to the position stated above.

1146. Then at (903) he shows that the power in a magnitude must be proportional to the magnitude in which it exists.

First he shows that in a finite magnitude there cannot be an infinite power —and this is what he chiefly intends;

Secondly, that on the other hand, in an infinite magnitude there cannot be a finite power, at 1156.

That an infinite power cannot exist in a finite magnitude he proves at (903), but first he mentions two assumptions. The first is that a greater power produces an equal effect in less time than a lesser power, as a greater heating force raises a thing on which it acts to an equal temperature in less time, and the same is true of a sweetener, or a hurler, or any cause of motion.

And from this assumption he concludes that since an infinite power is greater than a finite power, then, necessarily, if there is a finite magnitude possessing an infinite power, one or a number of things will in the same time undergo from such an agent a greater change than from another having finite power, or, conversely, that which undergoes an equal change will do so from it in less time. Either interpretation suits what Aristotle says here, namely, “...to a greater extent than by anything else.”

The second assumption is that, since whatever is being moved is being moved in time, as was proved in Book VI, it cannot be that something undergoing is changed in no time by an agent of infinite power. Therefore, it is changed in time.

From this he proceeds in the following manner: Let A be the time in which an infinite power causes change by heating or throwing, and let the time in which a finite power is causing change be AB, which is longer than A. Now, no matter what a finite power may be, a still greater may be taken. If, therefore, we take another finite power greater than the first and which caused change in time AB, it will act in a shorter time. Again, a third and greater power will cause the change in still less time, And thus by always taking a finite power I will at length come to a finite power that will produce the change in time A, for when an addition is continually made to a finite power, any predetermined ratio will be exceeded. But as the power is increased, the time is decreased, because a greater power can cause a change in less time.

In this way, therefore, it will follow that a finite power will produce a change in a time equal to that used by the infinite power, which was assumed as acting in time A. But this is impossible. Therefore, no finite magnitude has an infinite power.

1147. Now, there are many doubts about this argument. First, it seems not to conclude in any way. For what belongs per se to a thing cannot be taken from it by any power however great, for it is not due to any lack of power, nor does it conflict with infinity of power, if it be said that it is impossible for man not to be an animal. But to exist in time belongs per se to motion, for motion is found in the definition of time, as was had above in Book IV. Therefore, if an infinite moving power is conceded to exist, it does not follow that motion exists in non-time as Aristotle here concludes.

Likewise, if the sequence of the argument of the Philosopher is considered, it will be seen that his conclusion that motion exists in non-time is inferred from the fact that the moving power is infinite; but an infinite moving power can also not be in a body. Therefore, for the same reason, it follows that such a power, if it is infinite, will move in non-time. Hence, from the impossibility of being moved in non-time it cannot be inferred that no infinite power exists in a magnitude, but absolutely that no moving power at all is infinite.

Again, two things seem to pertain to the magnitude of a power, namely, the swiftness of motion and its diuturnity; and any superabundance in the power causes a corresponding superabundance in each of these two things. But with respect to the superabundance of an infinite power, he showed above that a perpetual motion depends on an infinite power, but not that an infinite power does not exist in a magnitude. Therefore, here too, with respect to excess of swiftness, he ought not to conclude that no infinite power exists in a magnitude, but that the power which moves in an infinite time would, on account of its infinity, also move in non-time.

Again, the conclusion seems to be false. For the greater the power of a body, the longer it can endure. If, therefore, the power of no body were infinite, no body could endure ad infinitum. Now this is plainly false, both according to his own opinion and according to the tenets of the Christian faith, which posits that the substance of the world will endure ad infinitum.

It could also be objected that the division and addition which he uses have no correspondence in reality, but since this was sufficiently discussed previously, it can be passed over at the present time.

1148. Answering, therefore, these doubts in order, it must be said with respect to the first one, that the Philosopher in this place does not intend an ostensive demonstration but one that leads to an impossibility, in which, since from something given an impossibility follows, that which was given is concluded to be impossible. For it is not true that the first supposition can possibly co-exist with the conclusion. Thus the supposition that there was some power which could remove the genus from a species, would allow us to conclude that that power could make man not be animal; but because this is impossible, the supposition too is impossible. From this, then, it cannot be concluded that it is possible for a power to exist that could make man not be animal. So, too, from the fact that an infinite power exists in a magnitude, it follows of necessity that motion exists in non-time; but since this is impossible, it is impossible for an infinite power to exist in a magnitude; nor can it be concluded from this that it is possible for an infinite power to move in non-time.

1149. To the second doubt Averroes responds in his Commentary at this place that the argument of Aristotle here proceeds from power under the aspect of its infinity. But “finite” and “infinite” belong to quantity, as was proved in Book I. Hence, finite and infinite do not properly belong to a power that is not in a magnitude.

But this answer is contrary both to the intention of Aristotle, and to the truth. It is contrary to Aristotle’s intention, because in the preceding demonstration Aristotle proved that a power which causes motion for an infinite time is infinite, and from this he later concludes that the power moving the heavens is not a power existing in a magnitude.

It is also against the truth: for since every active power is according to some form, magnitude, and consequently its finiteness and infinity, belong to a power in the way it belongs to form. But magnitude belongs to form both per se and per accidens: it belongs per se, according to the perfection of the form, as a whiteness is called “great” even in a small amount of snow, according to the perfection of its proper notion; it belongs per accidens, according to the extension that a form has in a subject, as a whiteness can be called “great” on account of the size of its surface.

Now, this second magnitude cannot belong to a power not in a magnitude, but the first magnitude most truly does, because non-material powers, the less they are restricted through union with matter, the more perfect and more universal they are.

But swiftness of motion does not follow upon a magnitude of power which is per accidens, by extension with the magnitude of the subject; rather, it follows one that is per se, according to its proper perfection, because the more perfect a thing is in act, the more vehemently is it active. Hence it cannot be said that a power which does not exist in a magnitude, because it is not infinite with the infinity of magnitude which depends on the magnitude of the subject, therefore cannot cause an increase of swiftness ad infinitum, i.e., move in non-time.

Hence the same Commentator solves this same difficulty in another way in Metaphysics XI, where he says that a heavenly body is moved by a two-fold mover, i.e., by a conjoined mover, which is the soul of the heavens, and by a separated mover, which is not moved either per se or per accidens. And because that separated mover has infinite power, the movement of the heaven acquires from it a perpetual duration; but because the conjoined mover has finite power, the movement of the heaven acquires from it a determinate swiftness.

But even this answer is not sufficient. For since both seem to follow upon an infinite power, namely, that it act for an infinite time, as the preceding demonstration concluded, and that it act in non-time, as this demonstration seems to conclude, the doubt still remains why the soul of the heaven which acts in virtue of an infinite separated mover obtains from it the ability to act for an infinite time rather than the ability to act with infinite swiftness, i.e., in non-time.

1150, In answer to this doubt it must be said that every power not in a magnitude acts through intellect, for so the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics XI that the heaven is moved by its mover. But no power in a magnitude acts as though through intellect, for it was proved in On the Soul III that the intellect is not a power of any body.

Now this is the difference between an agent that acts through intellect and a material agent: the action of the material agent is proportioned to the nature of the agent, for a heating process proceeds in proportion to the heat, but the action of an intellectual agent is not proportioned to its nature but to the form apprehended, for a builder does not build as much as he can, but as much as the notion of the conceived form requires.

Consequently, if an infinite power existed in a magnitude, it would follow that the motion produced by it would be in proportion, to it, as the present demonstration shows. But if an infinite power is not in a magnitude, a motion does not proceed from that power in proportion to its power but according to the notion of the thing apprehended, i.e., according as it fits the end and nature of the subject.

Another point that should be noted is that, as was proved in Book VII only things having magnitude are moved; wherefore, the swiftness of motion is an effect received from the mover into something having magnitude. But it is plain that nothing having magnitude can receive an effect equal proportionately to the power which is not in a magnitude, because every corporeal nature is related to the incorporeal as a certain particular to what is absolute and universal, Hencet it cannot be concluded, if an infinite power is not in a magnitude, that from it there results in a body an infinite swiftness, which is the effect proportionate to such a power, as has been said.

But there is nothing to prevent a magnitude from receiving the effect of a power existing in a magnitude, because the cause is proportioned to the effect. Hence if it were supposed that an infinite power existed in a magnitude, it would follow that a corresponding effect would exist in a magnitude, namely, an infinite swiftness. But this is impossible; therefore, the first too is impossible.

1151. From this the resolution of the third doubt is clear. For to be moved for an infinite time is not repugnant to the notion of a moved magnitude, for it befits a circular magnitude, as was shown above. But to be moved with an infinite speed, i.e,, in non-time, is contrary to the notion of a magnitude, as was proved in Book VI. Hence the first mover, possessing infinite power, is, according to Aristotle, the cause of a motion that lasts an infinite time, but not one that has infinite speed.

1152. The fourth doubt is, according to Averroes in his Commentary, answered by Alexander’s saying that a heavenly body acquires eternity from a separated mover having infinite power, as well as perpetuity of motion. Hence, just as it is not from the infinity of a heavenly body that it is perpetually moved, so, too, it is not from the infinity of the heavenly body that it endures forever. Both are from the infinity of the separated mover.

Now Averroes tries to refute this answer, both in his Commentary on this passage and in Metaphysics XI, and says that it is impossible for something to acquire perpetuity of existence from another, because it would follow that something in se perishable could be eternal. Yet something can acquire perpetuity of motion from another, for motion is an act existing in a mobile but caused by a mover. He says therefore that in a heavenly body considered in itself there is no potency to non-existence, because its substance has no contrary, but there is a potency to rest, because rest is contrary to its motion. And that is why it does not have to acquire perpetuity of existence from another, but must acquire perpetuity of motion from another.

That a heavenly body has no potency to non-existence happens, he says, because a heavenly body is not composed of matter and form as though of potency and act. Rather, says he, such a body is matter existing in act, while its form is its soul, in such a way that it is not constituted in being through the form, but only in motion. Consequently, says he, there is present in it not a potency to existence, but solely a potency to "where" (place), as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics XI.

1153. But this solution conforms neither to the truth nor to the intention of Aristotle. It is not in conformity with truth on a number of counts: First, because he says that a heavenly body is not composed of matter and form—which is utterly impossible. For it is plain that a heavenly body is something actual, otherwise it would not be in motion—something that is in potency only is not a subject of motion, as was proved in Book VI. But, whatever is actual is either a subsisting form, as are the separated substances, or has form in something else, which is related to the form as matter, and as potency to act. Now, it cannot be said that a heavenly body is a subsistent form, because then it would be understood in act and neither sensible nor existing under quantity. Therefore, it must be a composite of matter and form, and of potency and act. Consequently, there is in it in some sense a potency to non-existence.

But even if a heavenly body were not a composite of matter and form, it would still be necessary to place in it, in some sense, a potency in respect of existence. For every simple self-subsisting substance is necessarily either its own existence or it shares in existence. But a simple substance which is self-subsistent existence itself cannot be but one, just as whiteness, if whiteness were a subsistent being, could be but one. Consequently, every substance after the first simple substance participates existence. But every participant is composed of the participant and what it participates, and the participant is in potency to what it participates. Therefore, in every substance, however simple, other than the first simple substance, there is a potency to existence.

Now he was deceived by the equivocation in "potency." For potency sometimes refers to what is open to opposites. In this sense, potency is excluded from a heavenly body and from separated simple substances, because, in Aristotle's opinion, they have no potency to non-existence, for simple substances are forms only, and it belongs per se to a form that it exist, while the matter of a heavenly body is not in potency to another form. For just as a heavenly body is related to its figure, of which it is the subject, as potency to act, and yet cannot not have such a figure, so the matter of the heavenly body is related to its form as potency to act, and yet it is not in potency to being deprived of this form or to non-being. For not every potency is open to opposites; otherwise possibility would not follow upon necessity, as is said in Perihermeneias II.

His position is also contrary to the intention of Aristotle, who in On the Heavens I, in a certain demonstration, uses the fact that a heavenly body has the potency or the virtue to exist always. Therefore, he cannot avoid the incompatibility by saying that in a heavenly body there is no potency to existing: for this is evidently false and contrary to the intention of Aristotle.

1154. Therefore, let us see whether he adequately refuted the solution of Alexander who says that a heavenly body acquires its perpetuity from something else. His refutation would indeed be good, if Alexander had posited that a heavenly body had of itself a potency to existence and non-existence, and that it acquired from something else its perpetual existence. This I say while keeping in mind his intention, and not excluding the omnipotence of God, by which "this corruptible can put on incorruptibility"—to discuss which now does not pertain to the present question. Still Averroes, even supposing his intention, cannot conclude against Alexander, who did not posit that the heavenly body acquires its perpetuity from something else, as though it had a potency to existence and non-existenoe, but as though not having its existence from itself. For whatever is not its own existence participates existence from the first cause that is its own existence. Hence, he himself professes in his book, On the Substance of the Orb, that God is the cause of the heavens not only with respect to its motion, but with respect to its substance as well, which would not be true unless it has its existence from something else. But the only existence it has from another is a perpetual one; consequently, its perpetuity is from another.

And this is in agreement with the teachings of Aristotle who, in Metaphysics V and in the beginning of this Book VIII of the Physics, says that there a some necessary things that have a cause of their necessity. In the light of this, the solution according to the intention of Alexander is plain, namely, that just as a heavenly body derives its motion elsewhere, so too its existence. Hence, just as a perpetual motion demonstrates the infinite power of the mover but not of the mobile, so too its perpetual duration demonstrates the infinite power of the cause from which it derives its existence.

1155. But the potency of a heavenly body to existence is not exactly the same as its potency to perpetual motiono However, the difference is not the one he assigns, namely, that in a heavenly body there is with respect to motion a potency to opposites, these being rest and motion; rather it is to opposites which are different “where’s” (places).

But they differ in respect of something else. For motion according to itself falls under time, whereas existence according to itself does not fall under time, but only according as it is subject to motion, Therefore, if there is an existence not subject to motion, it in no wise falls under time. Hence, the potency to be moved for an infinite time regards the infinity of time directly and per se. But a potency to exist for an infinite time, if that existence is transmutable, regards a quantity of time and, therefore, a greater power is required for something to endure in transmutable existence for a longer time, But a potency in respect to intransmutable existence has no relationship to a quantity of time. Hence the magnitude or infinity of time has nothing to do with the magnitude or infinity of the power in respect to such existence. Therefore, granting the impossible assumption that a heavenly body did not derive its existence elsewhere, its perpetuity would not be grounds for concluding that an infinite power exists in it.

1156. Then at (904) he proves that in an infinite magnitude there cannot exist a finite power, And this he does with two arguments, with respect to the first of which he does three things:

First he mentions the conclusion intended, namely, that just as there cannot be an infinite power in a finite magnitude, so neither can there be a finite power in an infinite quantity taken as a whole (for if a finite part of the infinite be taken, it will have a finite power). He mentions this conclusion not as though it were needed for proving his principal conclusion but as cohering with, and akin to, the conclusion previously demonstrated.

1157. Secondly, at (905) he mentions something that could lead someone to suppose that there is a finite power in an infinite magnitude. For we see some lesser magnitude that has greater energy than a larger magnitude, as a small amount of fire has more active power than a large amount of air. But that does not permit us to conclude that an infinite quantity has a finite power, because if a still greater magnitude is taken, it will have greater power; for example, even though a greater quantity of air has less power than a small fire, yet if the quantity of air be much increased, it will have more power than the small fire.

1158. Thirdly, at (906) he presents his intended demonstration: Let AB be an infinite quantity, and BC a finite magnitude of another kind, having a finite power; let D be a mobile that is being moved by the magnitude BC in time EZ. But because BC is a finite magnitude, it is possible to take a larger magnitude; let us therefore take one which is in double proportion.

Now, the greater the power of a moving cause, the more it moves in less time, as was proved in Book VII. Therefore, the double of BC will move the same mobile, namely, D in one-half the time, namely, ZT, so that the time EZ is bisected by the point T. By continually adding to BC, the time of the motion will be decreased, yet no matter how much is added to BC, it can never traverse AB, which exceeds BC beyond any proportion, as the infinite exceeds the finite. And since AB has finite power, it moves D in a finite time. Consequently, by continually lessening the time BC consumes in moving, we shall reach a time less than the time consumed by AB in its action of moving, because every finite is surpassed by dividing. It will follow, therefore, that the lesser power will move in less time, and this is impossible. What remains, therefore, is that there was an infinite power in the infinite magnitude, for the power of the infinite magnitude exceeded every finite power.

This has been proved by subtracting time, because every finite power must have some determinate time in which it causes motion. This is clear from the following consideration: If so much power acts in so much time, a greater power will move in a time smaller but yet definite, i.e., finite, according to an inverse proportion, such that, by as much as is added to the power, by so much is the time decreased. Consequently, no matter how much is added to a finite power, so long as the power remains finite, so will the time always remain finite, for a time will be reached that will be as much less than a previously given time as the power growing by addition is greater than a power previously given.

But an infinite power in causing motion surpasses every determinate time, just as happens in all other cases involving the infinite—for every infinite, such as that of number and magnitude, exceeds everything determinate in its genus. Thus it is plain that an infinite power exceeds every finite power, because the excess of power over power corresponds to the decrease of time from time, as has been said. Hence, it is evident that the above-stated conclusion, namely, that the power of an infinite magnitude is infinite, follows of necessity from the premisses.

1159. Then at (907) he cites for the same another proof, which differs from the first merely in this, that the first proceeds on the assumption of a finite power existing in a finite magnitude of another kind; but this second proof proceeds on the assumption of a certain other finite power, in another finite magnitude of the same genus as the infinite magnitude. For example, if air is the infinite magnitude having a finite power, we will assume a finite power existing in some finite magnitude of anothef specimen of air. On these grounds, it is clear that the finite power of the finite magnitude will, if sufficiently multiplied, measure the finite power in the infinite magnitude, because a finite thing is measured or even exceeded by a smaller finite thing taken a certain number of times. Since, therefore, in a magnitude of the same kind, the greater must have more power, as a greater amount of air has more power than a smaller amount, it will be necessary that that finite magnitude which will have the same proportion to the finite magnitude previously taken, as the finite power of the infinite magnitude has to the power of the finite magnitude previously taken, have a power equal to the power of the infinite magnitude. For example, if the finite power of an infinite magnitude were to be 100 times the finite power of a given finite magnitude, then the magnitude 100 times the size of that finite magnitude has a power equal to the power of the infinite magnitude, for in a thing of the same genus the magnitude and the power increase in proportion.

However, the conclusion we have reached is impossible, because either the finite magnitude would have to be equal to an infinite ones or a smaller magnitude of the same genus would have a power equal to a larger magnitude of the same genus. Therefore, the assumption from which this conclusion followed is also impossible, namely, that an infinite magnitude may have a finite power.

In summary, therefore, he concludes to two demonstrated conclusions, namely, that in a finite magnitude there cannot be infinite power, and that in an infinite magnitude there cannot be finite power.

LECTURE 22

DIVERSITY OF MOVERS ANNULS CONTINUITY OF MOTION

1160. After proving two of the things needed for demonstrating his proposition, namely, that a finite power cannot move in an infinite time, and that an infinite power cannot exist in a finite magnitude, the Philosopher now starts to prove the third, namely, the unity of the first mover. About this he does two things:

First he shows that on account of the diversity of movers, the continuity or unity of motion fails in certain mobiles that seem to be in continuous motion;

Secondly, he shows from this that the first mover is necessarily one, (L. 23).

About the first he does three things:

First he raises a doubt about projectiles;

Secondly, he resolves the doubt, at 1162;

Thirdly, from this he shows that the motion of a projectile is not continuous, at 1163.

About the first he does two things:

First he states the doubt;

Secondly, he rejects one solution, at 1161.

He proposes therefore first (909) a doubt about projectiles. It is this: It was proved above in the beginning of this Book that whatever is being moved is being moved by another, provided we are not referring to things that move themselves, such as animals, of which a projected stone is not one. Now a bodily thing causes motion through contact. Therefore there is doubt as to how projectiles remain in continuous motion even after contact with the mover ceases. For they seem to be moved without anything moving them.

1161. Then at (909) he rejects a solution attributed to Plato who said that the projector who first moves a stone moves not only the stone but something else, namely, the air, and the moved air moves the stone, even after contact by the projector.

But he rejects this solution, on the ground that it appears equally as impossible for the air to be moved when the first mover, namely, the projector, is no longer in contact with it, nor moving it, as it was for the stone. But rather it seems to be necessary that while the first mover is acting, all are being moved, and when the first mover rests,i.e., ceases to act, all rest, although also something moved by the first mover, such as the stone, may cause something to be moved, just as the original mover did.

1162. Then at (910) he gives his own solution. And he says that if the second mover causes motion insofar as it is moved by the first mover, then it is necessary to say that the first mover, namely, the thrower, gives to the second mover, namely, the air or water or any such body apt to move a thrown body, the ability both to cause motion and to be moved; for both of these are received into the air or water from the thrower, namely, to cause motion and to be moved. But since to cause motion, and to be moved, are not of necessity in the same thing—since there is found a mover that is not itself moved —the mover and moved do not pause simultaneously, i.e., the air moved by the thrower does not simultaneously cease causing motion and cease being moved, but as soon as the thrower ceases acting, the air ceases to be moved, but still moves.

And this is evident to the senses. For when a mobile has now arrived at the terminus of its motion, it is able to cause motion in the ultimate moment of its arrival, at which time it is no longer being moved but is in the state of having been moved. Now while the second mover moves, that which is “had,” i.e., which is next to it, is being moved. And the same applies to this third, for it remains a mover even when it is not being moved. And because a second mover has less power for acting than did the first, and the third less than the second, the motion called “projection” must cease, on account of the fact, namely, that the power for moving is less in the “had,” i.e., the subsequent, mover than in that in which it was first.

Thus at length, on account of the diminution of the power to move, a state is reached where that which was prior with respect to the one following will not confer upon the one following the power to cause motion but will solely cause it to be moved. And at that time it is necessary that when this last mover ceases to act upon the one following it, simultaneously that moved by it will cease being moved, Consequently, the entire motion will cease, because the last moved object is unable to cause motion in any other.

1163. Then at (911) he concludes from the foregoing that a motion of projection is not continuous.

He sayst therefore, that this motion, namely, that of projection, comes to be in bodies that are capable of being moved at one time and of resting at another time—if indeed there are bodies to which such a motion belongs. And this is evident from what was said; for the motion called “projection” ceases through a failing of the power to cause motion, as has been said.

It is also evident from the foregoing that this motion is not continuous, although it appears to be continuous. For it seems to be continuous, because there is one mobile involved; yet it is not continuous, because there are diverse movers, as has been said. For either that motion results from a series of consecutive movers or from a series of movers that are in contact—(how “consecutive” and “in contact” differ has been explained above in Books V and VI).

And it is plain to sense that in both cases the different movers can move one mobile inasmuch as they are moved by some first mover. For in things that are moved in a way that projectiles are moved, there is not just one mover but many “had” to each other (i.e., following each other), which are consecutive and in contact. And because diversity is not without division, the projection in question comes to be through a medium that is easy to divided namely, air and water, in which a diversity of movers can function on account of the easy divisibility of the medium.

This motion of projection is by some called antiperistasistasis, i.e., contra-resistance, on the ground that the surrounding air being set in motion somehow moves the projectile, as was said in Book IV. However, the problem under discussion can be solved in no other way than the way mentioned. Because, if the contra-resistance of the air is the cause of the projection, it follows that all the elements involved are moving and being moved simultaneously, i.e., that the entire air is simultaneously acting and being acted upon and, consequently, that all would cease simultaneously. But this is evidently false, For we see some one thing being moved continuously no matter what moves it. And I say this because it does not have one and the same determinate mover, but diverse movers.

LECTURE 23

THE FIRST MOVER CAN HAVE NO MAGNITUDE

1164. Having resolved the doubt he raised about the motion of projectiles, from the solution of which he concluded that a motion involving a number of movers is not one continuous motion, the Philosopher now turns to his main task, namely, to prove that the first mover is one. About this he does two things:

First he states his proposition;

Secondly, he raises a doubt and solves it, at 1170.

About the first he does three things:

First he proves the unity of the first mover through the continuity of motion;

Secondly, he shows how a continuous motion comes from one mover, 1166;

Thirdly, where the principle of a continuous motion is, at 1168.

1165. That there must be one movers he proves (912) through the continuity of motion, taking what he had previously proved, namely, that some continuous motion must always exist. But a continuous motion is one, as was said in Book V. Therefore, there must always be some motion that is one. But for a motion to be one it must be of one moved magnitude (because something not able to be divided into parts cannot be moved, as was proved in Book VI) and it must be moved by one mover. For if the mobiles are diverse or the movers are diverse, a motion will not be one, and consequently, not continuous; rather, it will be one motion divided from another—on account of the division of the mobile or mover—and one will have consecutive motions. It is necessary therefore that the mover be one and that it be either a moved mover or a mover that is immovable.

1166. Then at (913) he shows how from one mover there can be a continuous motion. About this he does two things:

First he shows how from one mover there can be a motion ever continuous;

Secondly, how it is regular, at 1167.

He says therefore (913) that one motion from one mover is, as has been said, either from a moved mover or a non-moved mover. If it is the former, it follows that it is moved by something, as was proved above. But this cannot go on ad infinitum, as was proved above. Therefore, the series of movers and mobiles must stop and a first mobile moved by an immobile mover be reached, which mover does not move of necessity, because it is not moved by another. For whatever is moved by another, moves of necessity, to the extent that necessity is imposed upon it by its mover. And because it is changed from its disposition, it cannot cause motion which is always uniform, for its disposition varies.

But nothing other imposes necessity on a non-moved mover, nor does its disposition vary. Hence it does not act of necessity,” but it can move always, because to move thus, namely, without change of self, is unwearying, For fatigue occurs to some movers in moving, because they are also simultaneously moved themselves, and from fatigue it occurs that they cannot always act as movers. Hence it remains that a non-moved mover can move with a perpetual continuous motion.

1167. And because perfect continuity and unity of motion require that a motion be regular and uniform, as was had in Book V, therefore at (914) he shows that a motion from an immobile mover is regular.

And he says that either solely the motion from an immobile mover is regular, or if any others are regular also, the former is the most regular. Now he uses this disjunction, because the disposition of a moved mover sometimes remains the same for some time, without variation, at least as far as any sensible perception thereof is concerned, and accordingly, such a mover seems for a time to cause a uniform motion. But that which is always such moves above all with a uniform motion, since such a mover is subject to no change whatsoever. He says this in order to show that there are some movers that are not moved with the same kind of motion as they cause, as a heavenly body is not moved by the motion of alteration but by some other, namely, local motion. But the first mover, being utterly immobile, is moved by no change.

In order that a motion be regular and uniform, it is required that the mover be wholly immobile; besides that, in order that the motion be "similar," i.e., uniform, it is required that what is moved not undergo any change other than that which the immobile mover causes in it, as a heavenly body is moved with local motion by an immobile mover and beyond that has no other change. For if it were altered, its disposition to the motion would not remain constant and, consequently, the motion would not be uniform.

1168. Then at (915) he shows where the beginning of the first continuous motion is. And because it was proved that the first motion is circular and belongs to a circular magnitude, the first beginning of this motion must be either in the middle, i.e., the center, or on the circle, because both are principles of a circular magnitude. For in a circular magnitude lines are extended from the center to the circumference. Hence, one of these must be taken as principle, and the other as terminus.

Then he shows, by the following argument, that the principle of the first motion is on the circle: Every motion, the closer it is to the moving principle, the swifter it is, because it receives a stronger impression from the mover. But we perceive in the motion of the whole firmament, which motion proceeds from the first immobile mover, that the closer some mobile approaches the outermost circumference, so much the swifter is its motion. Therefore, the mover is on the circle and not in the center.

The major of this argument is plain. But in order to make the minor plain, it must be considered that a twofold motion is found in heavenly bodies: one of which is the motion of the entire firmament in its daily revolution from east to west—and this is the first motion; the other is the motion by which the stars are moved contrariwise from west to east.

Now in this second motion the closer a heavenly body is to the center, the swifter its motion, as is evident from the calculations of astronomers, who assign one month for the motion of the Moon, one year for the motions of the Sun, Mercury and Venus, two years to Mars, twelve years to Jupiter, thirty to Saturn, and 36,000 years to the fixed stars [i.e., the. precession of the equinoxes, actually 26,000 years].

But with respect to the motion of the entire firmament it is the opposite. For the farther a heavenly body is from the earth, the swifter is its motion, because it traverses a larger magnitude in the same time. For the circumferences of circles are greater the farther they are from the center, and yet all the heavenly bodies are revolved with the motion of the whole in the same period of time. Consequently, the outermost bodies are swifter. Hence what remains is that the principle of the first motion is not in the center but on the circumference.

1169. But now a difficulty arises about this conclusion. For the first mover, as he will conclude below, is indivisible and has no magnitude, and its power does not exist in a magnitude. But whatever is such does not seem to have a definite position in a body. Hence it does not befit the first mover to be in one part of the first mobile more than in another.

But it should be stated that the first mover is said to be in some part of its mobile not through any determination of its substance but through its efficient causality of motion, because it begins to move at some part of the object it acts upon. And it is for that reason that the first mover is said to be in the heavens rather than in the earth, and rather in the east where the motion begins. And this is not to be understood as though the mover fixes itself to some definite part of the mobile, since there is no definite part of the mobile always in the east, but the part now in the east is later in the west. Thus it is clear that the power of the mover is said to be in the east by virtue of the inflow of motion, and not through any determination of its substance.

It should also be noted, with respect to the motion of a sphere, that simultaneously with its motion, it has a kind of immobility—for the parts are moved as to change of place both as to subject and as to conception, but the whole is moved as to change of place in conception but not as to subject, as was shown in Book VI. And these two (different) things are attributed to the two principles of the spherical magnitude he mentions here: for the principle of the motion has its seat on the circumference, while the principle of immobility derives from the fixity of the center.

1170. Then at (916) he raises a doubt about the foregoing.

First he raises it;

Secondly, he solves it, at 1171.

For he had said previously that an immobile mover can cause continuous motion and therefore here at (916) he subsequently asks whether a moved mover can cause a continuous motion, in such a way, namely, that it be truly continuous without any interruption, such as the interruption which occurs when someone pushes a body and then pushes it again. For it is clear that this motion, which is in this wise continuous from the standpoint of the mobile, is not truly continuous, because the movings are not continuous, but one follows the other; for the one pushing does not continually push but at intervals, in such a way that one push is consecutive to another.

1171. Then at (917) he resolves this difficulty and shows that no moved mover can cause a continuous motion.

For it is necessary to say that a mobile that is seemingly being moved continuously is being moved either immediately as to the whole motion by a moved mover, or else through many intermediates, one in contact with the other, as was said with respect to projection. And this division is valid whether the moved mover acts by pushing or pulling or both (as in twirling), as was explained in Book VII. Nor does it happen that a thing is moved locally by a moved mover in more than one way per so and not per accidens (for something being carried is being moved per accidens).

And because he had said that, in things that are projected, the mover is constantly other and other, and this seems to be false because the projected body seems to be continually moved by an air which remains one, he therefore, in order to refute this, adds that it is because air or water are easy to divide that, so to speak, now one, now another, mover acts, but yet it acts as if being continually moved, so long as the motion of the projectile lasts; and although the air seems one, nevertheless it is other and other through division.

But in either case, i.e., whether the moved mover acts by pushing or by pulling, the motion cannot be one but must be “had,” i.e., consecutive—for the reason given above, when the motion of projection was discussed, namely, on account of the diversity of movers.

What remains, therefore is that only the motion from an immobile mover can be forever continuous, because this mover, remains always “similar,” according to the same disposition in itself. For that reason it can maintain itself always and continuously in a similar way with respect to the mobile, so as, namely, to move it uniformly.

But it should be noted that the Philosopher here attributes eternity of continuous motion to the immobility of the mover, whereas above he attributed it to its infinite power. For eternity of continuous motion, if regarded with respect to the motion's repetition, looks to the immobility of the mover, since, if it always remains constant with itself, it can always repeat the same motion. But the infinite power of the mover regards the motion's whole perpetuity or infinity per se, was said above.

It should be noted, too, that because no moved mover can cause a perpetual continuous motion, he therefore, in Metaphysics XI, intends to prove a number of immobile movers according to the number of the heavenly movements, as though that consideration followed upon this.

1172. Then at (918) from the premisses already demonstrated he concludes to the main conclusion. And he says that from the foregoing it is plainly impossible for the first immobile mover to have any magnitude or to be a body or to be a power residing in a body. For if it had any magnitude, it would te either finite or infinite. But it was proved in Book III, when nature in common was discussed, that an infinite magnitude is not possible. What remains, therefore, is that, if it does have magnitude, it will have a finite magnitude. But that such is not so he proves on the ground that it is impossible for a finite magnitude to possess infinite power, such as the first immobile mover must necessarily have. Therefore, it cannot have a finite magnitude.

But that the first immobile mover must have infinite power he proves from something previously demonstrated, namely, that it is impossible for something to be moved for an infinite time by a finite power. Now, the first mover causes a motion that is perpetual and continuous, and is one and the same for infinite time, for otherwise this motion would not be continuous. Therefore, it has infinite power.

Thus it does not have a finite magnitude, and an infinite magnitude is impossible to be. It is plain, therefore, that the first mover is indivisible, both as having no part, as even a point is indivisible, and as wholly without magnitude, as though existing outside the genus of magnitude.

And thus does the Philosopher in his general consideration of natural things terminate at the first principle of the whole of nature, Who is the One above all things, the ever blessed God. Amen.

COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS

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COMMENTARY ON THE METAPHYSICS

PROLOGUE

When several things are ordained to one thing, one of them must rule or govern and the rest be ruled or governed, as the Philosopher, teaches in the Politics. This is evident in the union of soul and body, for the soul naturally commands and the body obeys. The same thing is true of the soul’s powers, for the concupiscible and irascible appetites are ruled in a natural order by reason. Now all the sciences and arts are ordained to one thing, namely, to man’s perfection, which is happiness. Hence one of these sciences and arts must be the mistress of all the others, and this rightly lays claim to the name wisdom; for it is the office of the wise man to direct others.

We can discover which science this is and the sort of things with which it deals by carefully examining the qualities of a good ruler; for just as men of superior intelligence are naturally the rulers and masters of others, whereas those of great physical strength and little intelligence are naturally slaves, as the Philosopher says in the aforementioned book in a similar way that science which is intellectual in the highest degree should be naturally the ruler of the others. This science is the one which treats of the most intelligible objects.

Now the phrase “most intelligible objects” can be understood in three ways. First, from the viewpoint of the order of knowing; for those things from which the intellect derives certitude seem to be more intelligible. Therefore, since the certitude of science is acquired by the intellect knowing causes, a knowledge of causes seems to be intellectual in the highest degree. Hence that science which considers first causes also seems to be the ruler of the others in the highest degree.

Second, this phrase can be understood by comparing the intellect with the senses; for while sensory perception is a knowledge of particulars, the intellect seems to differ from sense by reason of the fact that it comprehends universals. Hence that science is pre-eminently intellectual which deals with the most universal principles. These principles are being and those things which naturally accompany being, such as unity and plurality, potency and act. Now such principles should not remain entirely undetermined, since without them complete knowledge of the principles which are proper to any genus or species cannot be had. Nor again should they be dealt with in any one particular science, for, since a knowledge of each class of beings stands in need if such principles, they would with equal reason be investigated in every particular science. It follows, then, that such principles should be treated by one common science, which, since it is intellectual in the highest degree, is the mistress of the others.

Third, this phrase can be understood from the viewpoint of the intellect's own knowledge. For since each thing has intellective power by virtue of being free from matter, those things must be intelligible in the highest degree which are altogether separate, from matter. For the intellect and the intelligible object must be proportionate to each other and must belong to the same genus, since the intellect and the intelligible object are one in act. Now those things are separate from matter in the highest degree which abstract not only from signate matter (as the natural forms taken universally of which the philosophy of nature treats) but from sensible matter altogether; and these are separate from matter not only in their intelligible constitution (ratio), as the objects of mathematics, but also in being (esse), as God and the intelligences. Therefore the science which considers such things seems to be the most intellectual and the ruler or mistress of the others.

Now this threefold consideration should be assigned to one and the same science and not to different sciences, because the aforementioned separate substances are the universal and first causes of being. Moreover, it pertains to one and the same science to consider both the proper causes of some genus and the genus itself; for example, the philosophy of nature considers the principles of a natural body. Therefore, it must be the office of one and the same science to consider the separate substances and being in general (ens commune), which is the genus of which the aforementioned substances are the common and universal causes.

From this it is evident that, although this science (metaphysics or first philosophy) studies the three things mentioned above, it does not investigate any one of them as its subject, but only being in general. For the subject of a science is the genus whose causes and properties we seek, and not the causes themselves of the particular genus studied; for a knowledge of the causes of some genus is the goal to which the investigation of a science attains. Now although the subject of this science is being in general, the whole of it is predicated of those things which are separate from matter both in their intelligible constitution and in being. For it is not only those things which can never exist in matter that are said to be separate from matter in their intelligible constitution and being, such as God and the intellectual substances, but also those which can exist without matter, as being in general. This could not be the case, however, if their being depended on matter.

Therefore in accordance with the three things mentioned above from which this science derives its perfection, three names arise. It is called divine science or theology inasmuch as it considers the aforementioned substances. It is called metaphysics inasmuch as it considers being and the attributes which naturally accompany being (for things which transcend the physical order are discovered by the process of analysis, as the more common are discovered after the less common). And it is called first philosophy inasmuch as it considers the first causes of things. Therefore it is evident what the subject of this science is, and how it is related to the other sciences, and by what names it is designated.

BOOK I

ARISTOTLE’S INTRODUCTION

HISTORY OF METAPHYSICAL INQUIRY

LESSON 1

The Dignity and Object of This Science

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 980a 21-983a 3

1. All men naturally desire to know. A sign of this is the delight we take in the senses; for apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves, and most of all the sense which operates through the eyes. For not only that we may act, but even when we intend to do nothing, we prefer sight, as we may say, to all the other senses. The reason is that of all the senses this most enables us to know and reveals many differences between things.

2. Animals by nature, then, are born with sensory power.

3. Now in some animals memory arises from the senses, but in others it does not; and for this reason the former are prudent and more capable of being taught than those which are unable to remember. Those which cannot hear sounds are prudent but unable to learn, as the bee and any other similar type of animal there may be. But any which have this sense together with memory are able to learn.

4. Thus other animals live by imagination and memory and share little in experience, whereas the human race lives by art and reasoning.

5. Now in men experience comes from memory, for many memories of the same thing produce the capacity of a single experience. And experience seems to be somewhat like science and art.

6. But in men science and art come from experience; for “Experience causes art, and inexperience, luck,” as Polus rightly states. Art comes into being when from many conceptions acquired by experience a Single

universal judgment is formed about similar things. For to judge that this [medicine] has been beneficial to Callias and Socrates and many other individuals who suffer from this disease, is a matter of experience; but to judge that it has been beneficial to all individuals f a particular kind, as the phlegmatic, the bilious, or the feverish, taken as a lass, who suffer from this disease, is a matter of art.

7. In practical matters, then, experience seems to differ in no way from art. ut we see that men of experience are more proficient than those who have theory without experience. The reason is that experience is a knowledge of in singulars, whereas art is a knowledge of universals. But all actions and processes of generation are concerned with singulars. For the physician heals man only incidentally, but he heals Socrates or Callias, or some individual that can be named, to whom the nature man happens to belong. Therefore, if anyone has the theory without experience, and knows the universal but not the singulars contained in this, he will very often make mistakes; for it is rather the individual man who is able to be cured.

8. Yet we think that scientific knowledge and the ability to refute objections belong to art rather than to experience, and we are of the opinion that those who are proficient in art are wiser than men of experience, implying that it is more according to wisdom to know as one pursuing all things.

9. Now this is because the former know the cause whereas the latter do not. For those who have experience know that something is so but do not know why, whereas the others know the why and the cause. For this reason, too, we think that the master planners in each art are to be held in greater esteem, and that they know more and are wiser than the manual laborers, because they understand the reasons for the things which are done. Indeed, we think that the latter resemble certain inanimate things, which act but do not know what they do, as fire burns. Therefore inanimate things perform each of their actions as a result of a certain natural disposition, whereas manual laborers perform theirs through habit, implying that some men are wiser not insofar as they are practical but insofar as they themselves have the theories and know the causes.

10. In general a sign, of scientific knowledge is the ability to teach, and for this reason we think that art rather than experience is science. For those who have an art are able to teach, whereas the others are not.

11. Furthermore, we do not hold that any one of the senses is wisdom, since the cognition of singular things belongs especially to the senses. However, these do not tell us why a thing is so; for example, they do not tell us why fire is hot but only that it is so.

12 It is only fitting, then, that the one who discovered any art whatsoever that went beyond the common perceptions of men should be admired by men, not only because of some usefulness of his discoveries, but as one who is wise and as distinguishing [a thing] from others. And as more of the arts were discovered, some to supply the necessities of life, and others to introduce us [to the sciences], those who discovered the former were always considered to be wiser than those who discovered the former, because their sciences were not for the sake of utility. Hence, after all such arts had already been developed, those sciences were discovered which are pursued neither for the sake of pleasure nor necessity. This happened first in those places where men had leisure. Hence the mathematical arts originated in Egypt, for there the priestly class was permitted leisure. The difference between art and science and similar mental states has been stated in our work on morals.

13. Now the reason for undertaking this investigation is that all men think that the science which is called wisdom deals with the primary causes and principles of things. Hence, as we have said before (8, 9), the man of experience is considered to be wiser than one who has any of the senses; the artist wiser than the man of experience; the master planner wiser than the manual laborer and speculative knowledge wiser than practical knowledge. It is quite evident then, that wisdom is a science of certain causes and principles.

COMMENTARY

THREE REASONS WHY PEOPLE NATURALLY DESIRE TO KNOW

1. Aristotle first sets down an introduction to this science, in which he treats of two things. First (2), he points out with what this science is concerned. Second (53), he explains what kind of science it is (“That this is not a practical science”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the office of this science, which is called wisdom, is to consider the causes of things.

Second (36), he explains with what causes or kinds of causes it is concerned ("But since we are in search").

In regard to the first he prefaces certain preliminary considerations form which he argues in support of his thesis. Second (35), he draws a conclusion from these considerations ("Now the reason for undertaking").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he makes clear the dignity of scientific knowledge in general. Second (9), he explains the hierarchy in knowing ("Animals by nature").

Now he establishes the dignity of scientific knowledge from the fact that it is naturally desired as an end by all men. Hence, in regard to this he does two things. First, he states what he intends [to prove]. Second (1), he proves it ("A sign of this").

Accordingly, he says, first, that the desire to know belongs by nature to all men.

2. Three reasons can be given for this:

The first is that each thing naturally desires its own perfection. Hence matter is also said to desire form as any imperfect thing desires its perfection. Therefore, since the intellect, by which man is what he is, considered in itself is all things potentially, and becomes them actually only through knowledge, because the intellect is none of the things that exist before it understands them, as is stated in Book III of The Soul, so each man naturally desires knowledge just as matter desires form.

3. The second reason is that each thing has a natural inclination to perform its proper operation, as something hot is naturally inclined to heat, and something heavy to be moved downwards. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand, for by reason of this he differs from all other things. Hence the desire of man is naturally inclined to understand, and therefore to possess scientific knowledge.

4. The third reason is that it is desirable for each thing to be united to its source, since it is in this that the perfection of each thing consists. This is also the reason why circular motion is the most perfect motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics, because its terminus is united to its starting-point. Now it is only by means of his intellect that man is united to the separate substances, which are the source of the human intellect and that to which the human intellect is related as something imperfect to something perfect. It is for this reason, too, that the ultimate happiness of man consists

in this union. Therefore man naturally desires to know. The fact that some men do not devote any study to this science does not disprove this thesis; for those who desire some end are often prevented from pursuing it for some reason or other, either because of the difficulty of attaining it, or because of other occupations. And in this way, too, even though all men desire knowledge, still not all devote themselves to the pursuit of it because they are held back by other things, either by pleasures or the needs of the present life; or they may even avoid the effort that learning demands because they are lazy. Now Aristotle makes this statement in order to show that it is not pointless to search for a science that is not useful for anything else, as happens in the case of this science, since a natural desire cannot exist in vain.

5. Then he establishes his thesis by means of an example. Since our senses serve us in two respects: in knowing things and in meeting the needs of life, we love them for themselves inasmuch as they enable us to know and also assist us to live. This is evident from the fact that all men take the greatest delight in that sense which. is most knowing, i.e., the sense of sight, which we value not merely in order to do something, but even when we are not required to act at all. The reason is that this sense—that of sight—is the most knowing of all our senses and makes us aware of many differences between things.

6. In this part it is clear that he gives two reasons why sight is superior to the other senses in knowing. The first is that it knows in a more perfect way; and this belongs to it because it is the most spiritual of all the senses. For the more immaterial a power is, the more perfectly it knows. And evidently sight is a more immaterial sense, if we consider the modification produced in it by its object. For all other sensible objects change both the organ and medium of a sense by a material modification, for example, the object of touch by heating and cooling, the object of taste by affecting the organ of taste with some flavor through the medium of saliva, the object of hearing by means of motion in the body, and the object of smell by means of the evaporation of volatile elements. But the object of sight changes the organ and medium of sight only by a spiritual modification; because neither the pupil of the eye nor the air becomes colored, but these only receive the form of color in a spiritual mode of being. Therefore, because actual sensation consists in the actual modification of a sense by its object, it is

evident that that sense which is changed in a more immaterial and spiritual way is more spiritual in its operation. Hence sight judges about sensible objects in a more certain and perfect way than the other senses do.

7. The other reason which he gives for the superiority of sight is that it gives us more information about things. This is attributable to the nature of its object, for touch and taste, and likewise smell and hearing, perceive those accidents by which lower bodies are distinguished from higher ones. But sight perceives those accidents which lower bodies have in common with higher ones. For a thing is actually visible by means of light, which is common both to lower and higher bodies, as is said in Book II of The Soul. Hence the celestial bodies are perceptible only by means of sight.

8. There is also another reason. Sight informs us of many differences between things, for we seem to know sensible things best by means of sight and touch, but especially by means of sight. The reason for this can be drawn from the fact that the other three senses perceive those accidents which in a way flow from a sensible body and do not remain in it. Thus sound comes from a sensible body inasmuch as it flows away from it and does not remain in it. The same thing is true of the evaporation of volatile elements, with which and by which odor is diffused. But sight and touch perceive those accidents which remain in sensible bodies, such as color, warmth and coldness. Hence the judgment of sight and touch is extended to things themselves, whereas the judgment of hearing and smell is extended to those accidents which flow from things and not to things themselves. It is for this reason that figure and size and the like, by which a sensible being itself is disposed, are perceived more by sight and touch than by the other senses. And they are perceived more by sight than by touch, both because sight knows more efficaciously, as has been pointed out (C 6), and also because quantity and those [accidents] which naturally follow from it, which are seen to be the common sensibles, are more closely related to the object of sight than to that of touch. This is clear from the fact that the object of sight belongs in some degree to every body having some quantity, whereas the object of touch does not.

9. Animals by nature, then (2).

Here he considers the hierarchy in knowledge. He does this, first (9), with respect to brute animals; and, then (14), with respect to men (“Thus other animals”).

With respect to brute animals he mentions first what all animals have in common; and second (10), that by which they differ and surpass one another (“Now in some animals”).

Now all animals are alike in the respect that they possess by nature the power of sensation. For an animal is an animal by reason of the fact that it has a sentient soul, which is the nature of an animal in the sense in which the distinctive form of each thing is its nature. But even though all animals are naturally endowed with sensory power, not all animals have all the senses, but only perfect animals. All have the sense of touch, for this sense in a way is the basis of all the other senses. However, not all have the sense of sight, because this sense knows in a more perfect way than all the other senses. But touch is more necessary; for it perceives the elements of which an animal is composed, namely, the hot, cold, moist and dry. Hence, just as sight knows in a more perfect way than the other senses, in a similar way touch is more necessary inasmuch as it is the first to exist in the process of generation. For those things which are more perfect according to this process come later in the development of the individual which is moved from a state of imperfection to one of perfection.

10. Now in some animals (3).

Here he indicates the different kinds and three levels of knowing found among brute animals. For there are certain animals which have sensation, although they do not have memory which comes from sensation. For memory accompanies imagination, which is a movement caused by the senses in their act of sensing, as we find in Book II of The Soul. But in some animals imagination does not accompany sensation, and therefore memory cannot exist in them. This is found verified in imperfect animals which are incapable of local motion, such as shellfish. For since sensory cognition enables animals to make provision for the necessities of life and to perform their characteristic operations, then those animals which move towards something at a distance by means of local motion must have memory. For if the anticipated goal by which they are induced to move did not remain in them through memory, they could not continue to move toward the intended goal which they pursue. But in the case of immobile animals the reception of a present sensible quality is sufficient for them to perform their characteristic operations, since they do not move toward anything at a distance. Hence these animals have an indefinite movement as a result of confused [or indeterminate] imagination alone, as he points out in Book III of The Soul.

11. Again, from the fact that some animals have memory and some do not, it follows that some are prudent and some not. For, since prudence makes provision for the future from memory of the past (and this is the reason why Tully in his Rhetoric, Book II, makes memory, understanding and foresight parts of prudence), prudence cannot be had by those animals which lack memory. Now those animals which have memory can have some prudence, although prudence has one meaning in the case of brute animals and another in the case of man. Men are prudent inasmuch as they deliberate rationally about what they ought to do. Hence it is saidin Book VI of the Ethics, that prudence is a rationally regulated plan of things to be done. But the judgment about things to be done which is not a result of any rational deliberation but of some natural instinct is called prudence in other animals. Hence in other animals prudence is a natural estimate about the pursuit of what is fitting and the avoidance of what is harmful, as a lamb follows its mother and runs away from a wolf .

12. But among those animals which have memory some have hearing and some do not. And all those which cannot hear (as the bee or any other similar type of animal that may exist), even though they have prudence, are still incapable of being taught, i.e., in the sense that they can be habituated to the doing or avoiding of something through someone else’s instruction, because such instruction is received chiefly by means of hearing. Hence in The Senses and Their Objects it is stated that hearing is the sense by which we receive instruction. Furthermore, the statement that bees do not have hearing is not opposed in any way to the observation that they are frightened by certain sounds. For just as a very loud sound kills an animal and splits wood, as is evident in the case of thunder, not because of the sound but because of the violent motion of the air in which the sound is present, in a similar fashion those animals which lack hearing can be frightened by the sounding air even though they have no perception of sound. However, those animals which have both memory and hearing can be both prudent and teachable.

13. It is evident, then, that there are three levels of knowing in animals. The first level is that had by animals which have neither hearing nor memory, and which are therefore neither capable of being taught nor of

being prudent. The second level is that of animals which have memory but are unable to hear, and which are therefore prudent but incapable of being taught. The third level is that of animals which have both of these faculties, and which are therefore prudent and capable of being taught. Moreover, there cannot be a fourth level, so that there would be an animal which had hearing but lacked memory. For those senses which perceive their sensible objects by means of an external medium—and hearing is one of these—are found only in animals which have locomotion and which cannot do without memory, as has been pointed out (10).

14. Thus other animals (4).

Here he explains the levels of human knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (14), he explains how human knowing surpasses the knowing of the abovementioned animals. Second (17), he shows how human knowing is divided into different levels ("Now in men").

Accordingly, in the first part (4) he says that the life of animals is ruled by imagination and memory: by imagination in the case of imperfect animals, and by memory in the case of perfect animals. For even though the latter also have imagination, still each thing is said to be ruled by that [power] which holds the highest place within it. Now in this discussion life does not mean the being of a living thing, as it is understood in Book II of The Soul, when he says that "for living things to live is to be"; for the life of an animal in this sense is not a result of memory or imagination but is prior to both of these. But life is taken to mean vital activity, just as we are also accustomed to speak of association as the life of men. But by the fact that he establishes the truth about the cognition of animals with reference to the management of life, we are given to understand that knowing belongs to these animals, not for the sake of knowing, but because of the need for action.

15. Now, as is stated below (18), in men the next thing above memory is experience, which some animals have only to a small degree. For an experience arises from the association of many singular [intentions] received in memory. And this kind of association is proper to man, and pertains to the cogitative power (also called particular reason), which associates particular intentions just as universal reason associates universal ones. Now since animals are accustomed to pursue or avoid certain things as a result of many sensations and memory, for this reason they seem to

share something of experience, even though it be slight. But above experience, which belongs to particular reason, men have as their chief power a universal reason by means of which they live.

16. And just as experience is related to particular reason [in men], and customary activity to memory in animals, in a similar way art is related to universal reason. Therefore, just as the life of animals is ruled in a perfect way by memory together with activity that has become habitual through training, or in any other way whatsoever, in a similar way man is ruled perfectly by reason perfected by art. Some men, however, are ruled by reason without art; but this rule is imperfect.

17. Now in men (5).

Here he explains the different levels of human knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (17), he compares art with experience; and, second (31), he compares speculative art with practical art ("It is only fitting").

He treats the first point in two ways. First, he explains how art and experience originate. Second (20), he explains how one is superior to the other ("In practical matters").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how each of the above originates. Second (18), he makes this clear by means of an example ("For to judge").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he describes how experience originates, and second (18), how art originates ("But in men, science").

He says first (5), then, that in men experience is caused by memory. The way in which it is caused is this: from several memories of a single thing a man acquires experience about some matter, and by means of this experience he is able to act easily and correctly. Therefore, because experience provides us with the ability to act easily and correctly, it seems to be almost the same as science and art. For they are alike inasmuch as in either case from many instances a single view of a thing is obtained. But they differ inasmuch as universals are grasped by art and singular things by experience, as is stated later (18).

18. But in men science and art (6). Here he describes the way in which art arises. He says that in men science and art come from experience, and he proves this on the authority of Polus, whp says that "Experience causes art

and inexperience luck.” For when an inexperienced person acts correctly, this happens by chance. Furthermore, the way in which art arises from experience is the same as the way spoken of above in which experience arises from memory. For just as one experiential cognition comes from many memories of a thing, so does one universal judgment abour all similar things come from the apprehension of many experiences. Hence art has this [unified view] more than experience, because experience is concerned only with singulars, whereas art has to do with universals.

19. Thereupon he makes this clear by means of examples (“But in men”). For when a man has learned that this medicine has been beneficial to Socrates and Plato, and to many other individuals who were suffering from some particular disease, whatever it may be, this is a matter of experience; but when a man learns that this particular treatment is beneficial to A men who have some particular kind of disease and some particular kind of physical constitution, as it has benefited the feverish, both the phlegmatic and the bilious, this is now a matter of art.

20. In practical matters (7).

He compares art to experience from the viewpoint of pre-eminence; and in regard to this he does two things. First (20), he compares them from the viewpoint of action; and, second (23), from the viewpoint of knowledge (“Yet we think”).

He says then that in practical matters experience seems to differ in no way from art; for when it comes to acting, the difference between experience and art, which is a difference between the universal and the singular, disappears, because art operates with reference to singulars just as experience does. Therefore the aforesaid difference pertains only to the way in which they come to know. But even though art and experience do not differ in the way in which they act, because both act on singular things, nevertheless they differ in the effectiveness of their action. For men of experience act more effectively than those who have the universal knowledge of an art but lack experience.

21. The reason is that actions have to do with singular things, and all processes of generation belong to singular things. For universals are generated or moved only by reason of something else, inasmuch as this belongs to singular things. For man is generated when this man is generated. Hence a physician heals man only incidentally, but properly he

heals Plato or Socrates, or some man that can be individually named, to whom the nature man belongs, or rather to whom it is accidental inasmuch as he is the one healed. For even though the nature man belongs essentially to Socrates, still it belongs only accidentally to the one healed or cured; for the proposition “Socrates is a man” is an essential one, because, if Socrates were defined, man would be given in his definition, as will be said below in Book IV.” But the proposition “What is healed or cured is man” is an accidental one.

22. Hence, since art has to do with universals and experience with singulars, if anyone has the theoretical knowledge of an art but lacks experience, he will be perfect insofar as he knows the universal; but since he does not know the singular, because he lacks experience, he will very often make mistakes in healing. For healing belongs to the realm of the singular rather than to that of the universal, because it belongs to the former essentially and to the latter accidentally.

23. Yet we think (8).

Here he compares art with experience from the viewpoint of knowing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (23), he states how art is superior to experience; and second (24), he proves this (“Now this is because”).

He claims that art and science are superior to experience in three respects. First, they are superior from the viewpoint of scientific knowledge, which we think is attained by art rather than by experience. Second, they are superior from the viewpoint of meeting objections, which occurs in disputes. For in a dispute the one who has an art is able to meet the objections raised against that art, but one who has experience [alone] cannot do this. Third, they are superior from this point of view, that those who have an art come nearer to the goal of wisdom than men of experience, “Implying that it is,” i.e., happens to be, “more truly to know if wisdom pursues all things,” i.e., insofar as it pursues universals. For one who has an art is judged wiser than one who has experience, by reason of the fact that he considers universals. Or in another version: “Implying that it is more according to wisdom to know as one pursuing all things,” i.e., universals. Another reading has: “As more conformable to knowing, since wisdom pursues all things,” as if to say: “As more dependent upon knowing” than upon doing, “since wisdom pursues all things,” i.e., it seeks to reach each single thing; so that those are rather called wise who are more knowing, not those who are more men of action. Hence another reading expresses this meaning more clearly, saying: “Implying that all pursue wisdom more with respect to knowing.”

24. Now this is (9).

Then he proves the superiority of art and science mentioned above, and he does this by means of three arguments. The first runs thus: those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are more knowing and wiser than those who merely know that it is so but do not know why. Now men of experience know that something is so but do not know the reason, whereas men who have an art know not merely that something is so but also know its cause and reason. Hence those who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.

25. For this reason too (9).

Here he proves the first aspect of superiority, and this runs as follows. Those who know the cause and reason why a thing is so are compared to those who merely know that it is so as the architectonic arts are to the arts of manual laborers. But the architectonic arts are nobler. In a similar way, then, those who know the causes and reasons of things are more knowing than those who merely know that things are so.

26. The first part of this proof becomes clear from the fact that architects, or master artists, know the causes of the things that are done. In order to understand this we must note that architect means chief artist, from αρχος meaning chief, and τεχνη meaning art. Now that art is said to be a chief art which performs a more important operation. Indeed, the operations of artists are distinguished in this way; for some operations are directed to disposing the material of the artifact. Carpenters, for example, by cutting and planing the wood, dispose matter for the form of a ship. Another operation is directed to introducing this form into the matter, for example, when someone builds a ship out of wood which has been disposed and prepared. A third operation is directed to the use of the finished product, and this is the highest operation. But the first operation is the lowest because it is directed to the second and the second to the third. Hence the shipbuilder is a superior artist compared with the one who prepares the wood; and the navigator, who uses the completed ship, is a superior artist comparedwith the shipbuilder.

27. Further, since matter exists for the sake of form, and ought to be such as to befit the form, the shipbuilder knows the rea son why the wood should be shaped in some particular way; but those who prepare the wood do not know this. And in a similar way, since the completed ship exists in order to be used, the one who uses the ship knows why it should have some particular form; for the form should be one that befits its use. Thus it is evident that the reason for the operations which dispose the matter is taken from the design of the product in the artist's mind, and the reason for the operations which produce the form of the artifact is taken from the use [to which the artifact is put].

28. It is evident, then, that the master artists know the causes of the things which are done. In fact we judge and speak about the others, i.e., the manual laborers, as we do about certain inanimate things. This is not because they do not perform artful operations, but because the things which they do they do without knowing the cause; for they know that something is to be done but not why it is, just as fire burns without knowing why. Hence there is a likeness between inanimate things and manual laborers from this point of view, that, just as inanimate things act without knowing the causes, inasmuch as they are directed to their proper end by a superior intellect, so also do manual laborers. But they differ in this respect, that inanimate things perform each of their operations as a result of their nature, whereas manual laborers perform theirs through habit. And while habit is practically the same as nature inasmuch as it is inclined to one definite effect, still habit differs from nature inasmuch as it is open to opposites by reason of human knowledge. For we do not habituate natural bodies, as is stated in Book II of the Ethics; nor, indeed, is it possible to cause habits in things that lack knowledge. Now the statements that have been made, as is evident from the statements themselves, must be interpreted as meaning that some men are wiser, not insofar as they are "practical," i.e., men of action, as befits men of experience, but insofar as they have a plan for things to be done and know their causes, which are the basis of such a plan; and this befits master artists.

29. In general a sign of scientific knowledge (10).

Here he gives the second argument, which is as follows: a sign of knowledge is the ability to teach, and this is so because each thing is perfect in its activity when it can produce another thing similar to itself, as is said in Book IV of Meteors. Therefore, just as the possession of heat is indicated by the fact that a thing can heat something else, in a similar way the possession of knowledge is indicated by the fact that one can teach, that is, cause knowledge in another. But men who have an art can teach, for since they know causes they can demonstrate from these; and demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge, as is said in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. But men who have experience [only] cannot teach; for since they do not know the causes, they cannot cause knowledge in someone else. And if they do teach others the things which they know by experience, these things are not learned after the manner of scientific knowledge but after that of opinion or belief. Hence, it is clear that men who have an art are wiser and more knowing than those who have experience.

30. Furthermore, we do not hold (11).

Here he gives the third argument, which is as follows: knowing singular things is proper to the senses rather than to any other type of knowing [power], since our entire knowledge of singular things originates with the senses. Yet we do not hold that "any one of these," i.e., any one of the senses, is wisdom, because even though each sense knows that a thing is so, it does not know why it is so; for touch judges that fire is hot but does not know why it is hot. Therefore men of experience, who have a knowledge of singular things but do not know their causes, cannot be called wise men.

31. It is only fitting (12).

Here he compares practical art with speculative art; and in regard to this he does three things. First (20), he shows that a speculative art is wisdom to a greater degree than a practical art. Second (ibid.), he answers an objection ("The difference").

He proves his first statement by this argument: in any of the sciences or arts we find that men with scientific knowledge are more admired and are held in higher esteem than all other men, because their knowledge is held to be nobler and more worthy of the name of wisdom. Now the discoverer of any art at all is admired because he perceives, judges and discerns a cause beyond the perceptions of other men, and not because of the usefulness of his discoveries. We admire him rather "as being wise, and as distinguishing [a thing] from others." As being wise, indeed, in the subtle way in which he investigates the causes of his discoveries, and as distinguishing [a thing] from others insofar as he investigates the ways in which one thing differs from another. Or, according to another interpretation, “as being distinct from the others” is to be read passively, as being distinguished in this respect from others. Hence another text has “one who is different.” Some sciences, then, are more admirable and worthy of the name of wisdom because their observations are more outstanding, not because they are useful.

32. Therefore, since many useful arts have been discovered (some to provide the necessities of life, as the mechanical arts, and others to introduce us to the sciences, as the logical disciplines), those artists must be said to be wiser whose sciences were discovered not for the sake of utility but merely for the sake of knowing, that is to say, the speculative sciences.

33. That the speculative sciences were not discovered for the sake of utility is made clear by this fact, that after all sciences of this kind “had already been developed,” i.e., acquired or discovered, which can serve as introductions to the other sciences, or provide the necessities of life, or give pleasure (as those arts whose object is to delight man), the speculative sciences were discovered, not for this kind of end, but for their own sake. The fact that they were not discovered for the sake of utility becomes evident from the place in which they were discovered. For they originated in those places where men first applied themselves to such things. Another version reads, “And first in those places where men had leisure,” i.e., they had time for study because they were released from other occupations as a result of the abundance of things necessary [for life]. Hence the mathematical arts, which are speculative in the highest degree, were first discovered in Egypt by the priests, who were given time for study, and whose expenses were defrayed by the community, as we also read in Genesis (47:22)

34. But because the names “wisdom,” “science” and “art” have been used indifferently, lest someone should think that these terms are synonymous, he excludes this opinion and refers to his work on morals, i.e., to Book VI of the Ethics, where he has explained the difference between art, wisdom, science, prudence, and understanding. And to give the distinction briefly—wisdom, science and understanding pertain to the speculative part of the soul, which he speaks of in that work as the scientific part of the soul. But they differ in that understanding is the habit of the first principles of demonstration, whereas science has to do with conclusions drawn from

subordinate causes, and wisdom with first causes. This is the reason it is spoken of there as the chief science. But prudence and art belong to the practical part of the soul, which reasons about our contingent courses of action. And these also differ; for prudence directs us in actions which do not pass over into some external matter but are perfections of the one acting (which is the reason why prudence is defined in that work as the reasoned plan of things to be done), but art directs us in those productive actions, such as building and cutting, which pass over into external matter (which is the reason why art is defined as the reasoned plan of things to be made).

Wisdom deals with causes.

35. From what has been said he proves his major thesis, that is to say, that wisdom deals with the causes of things. He says that the reason "for undertaking this investigation," i.e., the above piece of reasoning, is that the science which is called wisdom seems to be about first causes and principles. This is evident from the foregoing; for the more a man attains to a knowledge of the cause, the wiser he is. This is also evident from the foregoing; because the man of experience is wiser than one who has sensation alone without experience; and the artist is wiser than any man of experience; and among artists the architect is wiser than the manual laborer. And similarly among the arts and sciences the speculative are more scientific than the practical. All these things are dear from the foregoing remarks. It follows, then, that that science which is wisdom in an absolute sense is concerned with the causes of things. The method of arguing would be similar if we were to say that that which is hotter is more afire, and therefore that that which is afire in an absolute sense is hot in an absolute sense.

LESSON 2

Wisdom Considers Universal First Causes and First Principles

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14. But since we are in search of this science, it will therefore be necessary to consider with what kind of causes and principles wisdom or science deals. This will perhaps become evident if we take the opinions which we have about the wise man. First of all, then, we think that the wise man is one who knows all things in the highest degree, as becomes him, without having a knowledge of them individually.

15. Next, we say that that man is wise who is capable of knowing things that are difficult and not easy for man to understand. For sensory perception is common to all, and is therefore easy and not a matter of wisdom.

16. Again, [we consider him wise who is] more certain.

17. And in every branch of science we say that he is wiser who is more capable of teaching us about the causes of things.

18. Again, among the sciences we think that that science which exists for itself and is desirable for the sake of knowledge is wisdom to a greater degree than one which is desirable for the sake of contingent effects.

19. And we think that a superior science which is rather the more basic comes nearer to wisdom than a subordinate science. For a wise man must not be directed but must direct, and he must not obey another but must be

obeyed by one who is less wise. Such then and so many are the opinions which we have about the wise and about wisdom.

20. Now of these attributes, that of knowing all things necessarily belongs to him who has universal knowledge in the highest degree, because he knows in which are subordinate.

21. But the things which are just about the most difficult for man to understand are also those which are most universal; for they are farthest removed from the senses.

22. Again, the most certain of the sciences are those which are most concerned with primary things. For sciences based on fewer principles are more certain than those which have additional principles, as arithmetic is more certain than geometry.

23. Moreover, that science which speculates about the causes of things is more instructive. For those who teach us are those who assign the causes of every single thing.

24. Again, understanding and scientific knowledge for their own sake are found in the highest degree in the science which has as its object what is most knowable. For one who desires scientific knowledge for itself will desire in the highest degree the science which is most truly science, and such a science has for its object what is most knowable. Now first principles and causes are most knowable; for it is by reason of these and from these that other things are known, and not these from things which are subordinate to them.

25. But that science is highest and superior to subordinate sciences which knows the reason why each single thing must be done. This is the good of every single thing, and viewed universally it is the greatest good in the whole of nature.

26. In view of everything that has been said, then, the term which we are investigating evidently falls to the same science. For this science must speculate about first principles and causes, because the good, or that for the sake of which something is done, is also one of the causes.

COMMENTARY

SIX OPINIONS ABOUT WHO IS WISE

36. Having shown that wisdom is a knowledge of causes, the Philosopher's aim here is to establish with what kinds of causes and what kinds of principles it is concerned. He shows that it is concerned with the most universal and primary causes, and he argues this from the definition of wisdom.

In regard to this he does three things. First, he formulates a definition of wisdom from the different opinions which men have about the wise man and about wisdom. Second (44), he shows that all of these are proper to that universal science which considers first and universal causes ("Now of these"). Third (50), he draws the conclusion at which he aims ("In view of everything"). In regard to the first he gives six common opinions which men have entertained about wisdom.

He states the first where he says "But since we are in search"; and this opinion is this: in general we all consider those especially to be wise who know all things, as the case demands, without having a knowledge of every singular thing. For this is impossible, since singular things are infinite in number, and an infinite number of things cannot be comprehended by the intellect.

37. Next, we say that (15).

Here he gives the second opinion, which is this: we hold that man to be wise who is capable, by reason of his intellect, of knowing difficult things, and those which are not easy for ordinary men to understand. For sensory perception, i.e., the knowing of sensible things, is common to all men, and is therefore easy and so not a matter of wisdom. That is to say, it is neither a mark nor the office of a wise man. Thus it is clear that whatever pertains properly to wisdom is not easily known by all.

38. Again, [we consider] (16).

Here he gives the third opinion, namely, that we say that he is wise who, regarding what he knows, is more certain than other men generally are.

39. And in every branch (17). Here he gives the fourth opinion, namely, that that man is said to be wiser in every science who can give the causes of anything that is brought into question, and can teach by means of this.

40. Again, among the sciences (18).

Here he gives the fifth opinion, which is this: among the many sciences that science which is more desirable and willed for its own sake, i.e., chosen for the sake of knowledge and for knowledge itself alone, is more of the nature of wisdom than one which is for the sake of any of the other contingent effects which can be caused by knowledge, such as the necessities of life, pleasure, and so forth.

41. And we think (19). Here he gives the sixth opinion, namely, that this wisdom, of which mention has been made, must be or is said to be “rather the more basic,” i.e., nobler, than “a subordinate science.” This can be understood from the foregoing. For in the field of the mechanical arts, subordinate artists are those who execute by manual operations the commands of superior artists, whom he referred to above as master artists and wise men.

42. That the notion of wisdom belongs to sciences which give orders rather than to those which take them, he proves by two arguments. The first is that subordinate sciences are directed to superior sciences. For subordinate arts are directed to the end of a superior art, as the art of horsemanship to the end of the military art. But in the opinion of all it is not fitting that a wise man should be directed by someone else, but that he should direct others The second is that inferior artists are induced to act by superior artists inasmuch as they rely upon superior artists for the things which they must do or make. Thus the shipbuilder relies upon the instructions of the navigator for the kind of form which a ship ought to have. However, it does not befit a wise man that he should be induced to act by someone else, but that he should use his knowledge to induce others to act.

43. These, then, are the kind of opinions which men have of wisdom and the wise; and from all of these a description of wisdom can be formulated, so that the wise man is described as one who knows all, even difficult matters, with certitude and through their cause; who seeks this knowledge for its own sake; and who directs others and induces them to act. And in this way the major premise of the syllogism becomes evident. For every wise man must be such, and conversely whoever is such is wise.

These six attributes are found in the metaphysician.

44. Now of these (20). Here he shows that all of the above attributes come together in the man who knows the first and universal causes of things; and he follows the same order as he did above. Thus he held first that knowledge of all things in the highest degree belongs to him who has universal knowledge. This was the first opinion, and it is made clear in this

way: Whoever knows universals knows in some respect the things which are subordinate to universals, because he knows the universal in them.’ But all things are subordinate to those which are most universal. Therefore the one who knows the most universal things, knows in a sense all things.

45. But the things (21).

Here he proves that the second attribute belongs to the same person, by the following argument. Those things which are farthest removed from the senses are difficult for men to know; for sensory perception is common to all men since all human knowledge originates with this. But those things which are most universal are farthest removed from sensible things, because the senses have to do with singular things. Hence universals are the most difficult for men to know. Thus it is clear that that science is the most difficult which is most concerned with universals.

46. But the statement which appears in Book I of the Physics seems to contradict this. For it is said there that more universal things are known first by us; and those things which are known first are those which are easier. Yet it must be said that those things which are more universal according to simple apprehension are known first; for being is the first thing that comes into the intellect, as Avicenna says, and animal comes into the intellect before man does. For just as in the order of nature, which proceeds from potentiality to actuality, animal is prior to man, so too in the genesis of knowledge the intellect conceives animal before it conceives man.

But with respect to the investigations of natural properties and causes, less universal things are known first, because we discover universal causes by means of the particular causes which belong to one genus or species. Now those things which are universal in causing are known subsequently by us (notwithstanding the fact that they are things which are primarily knowable according to their nature), although things which are universal by predication are known to us in some way before the less universal (notwithstanding the fact that they are not known prior to singular things). For in us sensory knowledge, which is cognitive of singular things, precedes intellective knowledge, which is about universals. And some importance must also be attached to the fact that he does not say that the most universal things are the most difficult absolutely, but “just about.” For those things which are entirely separate from matter in being, as immaterial substances, are more difficult for us to know than universals. Therefore, even though this science which is called wisdom is the first in dignity, it is still the last to be learned.

47. Again, the most certain (22).

Here he shows that the third attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: the more any sciences are prior by nature, the more certain they are. This is clear from the fact that those sciences which are said to originate as a result of adding something to the other sciences are less certain than those which take fewer things into consideration; for example, arithmetic is more certain than geometry because the objects considered in geometry are a result of adding to those considered in arithmetic. This becomes evident if we consider what these two sciences take as their first principle, namely, the point and the unit. For the point adds to the unit the notion of position, because undivided being constitutes the intelligible structure of the unit; and insofar as this has the function of a measure it becomes the principle of number. And the point adds to this the notion of position. However, particular sciences are subsequent in nature to universal sciences, because their subjects add something to the subjects of universal sciences. For example, it is evident that mobile being, with which the philosophy of nature deals, adds to being pure and simple, with which metaphysics is concerned, and to quantified being, with which mathematics is concerned. Hence that science which treats of being and the most universal things is the most certain. Moreover, the statement here that this science deals with fewer principles is not opposed to the one made above, that it knows all things; for the universal takes in fewer inferiors actually, but many potentially. And the more certain a science is, the fewer actual things it has to consider in investigating its subject-matter. Hence the practical sciences are the least certain, because they must consider the many circumstances attending individual effects.

48. Moreover, that science (23).

Here he proves that the fourth attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: that science is more instructive, or better able to teach, which is concerned to a greater degree with causes. For only those teach who assign the causes of every single thing, because scientific knowledge comes about through some cause, and to teach is to cause knowledge in another. But that science which considers universals considers the first of all the causes. Hence it is evidently the best fitted to teach.

49. Again, understanding (24).

Here he proves that the fifth attribute belongs to the same science, by this argument: it is the office of those sciences which deal with things that are most knowable, most properly to know and understand for their own sake, i.e., for the sake of those sciences themselves and not for something else. But it is the sciences that deal with first causes which consider the most knowable things. Therefore those sciences are desired most for their own sake. He proves the first premise thus: One who most desires knowledge for the sake of knowledge most desires scientific knowledge. But the highest kind of knowledge is concerned with things that are most knowable. Therefore those sciences are desired most for their own sake which have to do with things that are most knowable. He proves the second premise thus: Those things from which and by reason of which other things are known are more knowable than the things which are known by means of them. But these other things are known through causes and principles, and not vice versa, etc.

50. But that science (25).

Here he proves that the sixth attribute belongs to the same science, by the following argument: that science which considers the final cause, or that for the sake of which particular things are done, is related to the other sciences as a chief or master science is to a subordinate or ancillary one, as is evident from the foregoing remarks. For the navigator, to whom the use, or end, of the ship belongs, is a kind of master artist in relation to the shipbuilder who serves him. But the aforesaid science is concerned most with the final cause of all things. This is dear from the fact that that for the sake of which all particular things are done is the good of each, i.e., a particular good. But the end in any class of things is a good; and that which is the end of all things, i.e., of the universe itself, is the greatest good in the whole of nature. Now this belongs to the consideration of the science in question, and therefore it is the chief or architectonic science with reference to all the others.

51. In view of everything (26). Here he draws from the foregoing arguments his intended conclusion, saying that it is clear from everything that has been said that the name wisdom which we are investigating belongs to the same science which considers or speculates about first principles and causes. This is evident from the six primary conditions which clearly pertain to the science that considers universal causes. But because the sixth

condition touched on the consideration of the end, which was not clearly held to be a cause among the ancient philosophers, as will be said below (1177), he therefore shows in a special way that this condition belongs to the same science, namely, the one which considers first causes. For the end, which is a good and that for the sake of which other things are done, is one of the many causes. Hence the science which considers first and universal causes must also be the one which considers the universal end of all things, which is the greatest good in the whole of nature.

LESSON 3

The Nature and Goal of Metaphysics

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 982b 11-983a 23

27. That this is not a practical science is evident from those who first philosophized. For it is because of wonder that men both now and formerly began to philosophize, about less important matters, and then progressing little by little, they raised questions about more important ones, such as the phases of the moon and the courses of the sun and the stars and the generation of the universe. But one who raises questions and wonders seems to be ignorant. Hence the philosopher is also to some extent a lover of myth, for myths are composed of wonders. If they philosophized, then, in order to escape from ignorance, they evidently pursued their studies for the sake of knowledge and not for any utility.

28. And what has happened bears witness to this; for when nearly all the things necessary for life, leisure and learning were acquired, this kind of prudence began to be sought. It is evident, then, that we do not seek this knowledge for the sake of any other necessity.

29. But just as we say that a man is free who exists for himself and not for another, in a similar fashion this is the only free, science, because it alone exists for itself.

30. For this reason, too, it might rightly be thought that this science is not a human possession, since in many respects human nature is servile.

31. Hence, according, to Simonides, “Only God has this honor,” I and it is unfitting that a man should not seek a knowledge which befits him. Some

poets accordingly say that the deity is naturally envious; and it is most likely that it should happen in this case, and that all those who are imperfect are unfortunate. But it is not fitting that the deity should be envious, for as the proverb says: “The poets tell many lies.”

32. Nor must we think that any other science is more honorable than this. For what is most divine is most honorable. But then it alone will be such, and in two ways. For of all knowledge that which God most properly has is divine; and if there is any such knowledge, it is concerned with divine matters. But this science alone has both of these characteristics; for God seems to be a cause and in some sense a principle according to all men; and such [knowledge as this] God either alone has, or has in the highest degree. Therefore, all the other sciences are more necessary, but none is more excellent.

33. But it is necessary in a sense to bring to a halt the progression of this science at the contrary of our original questions. Indeed, as we have said, all men begin by wondering whether things are as strange as chance occurrences appear to those who do not yet know the cause; or by wondering about the changes in the course of the sun, or about the incommensurability of the diagonal [of a square]. For it would seem an object of wonder to all it something having the nature of number were immeasurable. But it is necessary to advance to the contrary view and, as the proverb says, the worthier one, as also happens in a sense in these matters when men have learned them. For nothing would surprise a geometrician more than if the diagonal [of a square] should become commensurable [with a side]. It has been stated, then, what the nature is of the science which we are seeking, and what its goal is for which our search and whole method must be undertaken.

COMMENTARY

WHY THIS SCIENCE IS CALLED SPECULATIVE

53. First, he gives this argument. No science in which knowledge itself is sought for its own sake is a practical science, but a speculative one. Bot that science which is wisdom, or philosophy as it is called, exists for the sake of knowledge itself. Hence it is speculative and not practical. He proves the minor premise in this way. Whoever seeks as an end to escape from

ignorance tends toward knowledge for itself. But those who philosophize seek as an end to escape from ignorance. Therefore they tend towards knowledge for itself.

54. That they seek to escape from ignorance is made clear from the fact that those who first philosophized and who now philosophize did so from wonder about some cause, although they did this at first differently than now. For at first they wondered about less important problems, which were more obvious, in order that they might know their cause; but later on, progressing little by little from the knowledge of more evident matters to the investigation of obscure ones, they began to raise questions about more important and hidden matters, such as the changes undergone by the moon, namely, its eclipse, and its change of shape, which seems to vary inasmuch as it stands in different relations to the sun. And similarly they raised questions about the phenomena of the sun, such as its eclipse, its movement and size; and about the phenomena of the stars, such as their size, arrangement, and so forth; and about the origin of the whole universe, which some said was produced by chance, others by an intelligence, and others by love.

55. Further, he points out that perplexity and wonder arise from ignorance. For when we see certain obvious effects whose cause we do not know, we wonder about their cause. And since wonder was the motive which led men to philosophy, it is evident that the philosopher is, in a sense, a philo-myth, i.e., a lover of myth, as is characteristic of the poets. Hence the first men to deal with the principles of things in a mythical way, such as Perseus and certain others who were the seven sages, were called the theologizing poets. Now the reason why the philosopher is compared to the poet is that both are concerned with wonders. For the myths with which the poets deal are composed of wonders, and the philosophers themselves were moved to philosophize as a result of wonder. And since wonder stems from ignorance, they were obviously moved to philosophize in order to escape from ignorance. It is accordingly evident from this that “they pursued” knowledge, or diligently sought it, only for itself and not for any utility or usefulness.

56. Now we must note that, while this science was first designated by the name wisdom, this was later changed to the name philosophy, since they mean the same thing. For while the ancients who pursued the study of

wisdom were called sophists, i.e., wise men, Pythagoras, when asked what he professed himself to be, refused to call himself a wise man as his predecessors had done, because he thought this was presumptuous, but called himself a philosopher, i.e., a lover of wisdom. And from that time the name “wise man” was changed to “philosopher,” and “wisdom” to “philosophy.” This name also contributes something to the point under discussion, for that man seems to be a lover of wisdom who seeks wisdom, not for some other reason, but for itself alone. For he who seeks one thing on account of something else, has greater love for that on whose account he seeks than for that which he seeks.

57. And what has happened (28).

Here he proves the same point by means of an example. The statement (he says) that wisdom or philosophy is not sought for any utility but for knowledge itself is proved by “what has happened,” i.e., by what has occurred in the case of those who have pursued philosophy. For when nearly all those [arts] were discovered which are necessary for life, “leisure” (i.e., for the sort of pleasure which consists in a life of ease), and learning, such as the logical sciences, which are not sought for themselves but as introductions to the other arts, then man began for the first time to seek this kind of prudence, namely, wisdom. And from this it is clear that wisdom is not sought because of any necessity other than itself but for itself a one; for no one seeks something which he already possesses. Hence, because wisdom was sought after all other knowledge had been discovered, it is evident that it was not sought for some reason other than itself but for itself.

Why this science is liberal

58. But just as (29).

Here he proves the second attribute, namely, that wisdom is free; and he uses the following argument: that man is properly said to be free who does not exist for someone else but for himself. For slaves exist for their masters, work for them, and acquire for them whatever they acquire. But free men exist for themselves inasmuch as they acquire things for themselves and work for themselves. But only this science exists for itself; and therefore among all the sciences only this science is free.

59. Now we must note that this can be understood in two ways. In one way, the expression “only this” may indicate every speculative science as a

class. And then it is true that only this class of science is sought for itself. Hence, only those arts which are directed to knowing are called free [or liberal] arts, whereas those which are directed to some useful end attained by action are called mechanical or servile arts.

Understood in another way, the expression may specifically indicate this philosophy or wisdom which deals with the highest causes; for the final cause is also one of the highest causes, as was stated above (51). Therefore this science must consider the highest and universal end of all things. And in this way all the other sciences are subordinated to it as an end. Hence only this science exists in the highest degree for itself.

Why this science is super-human

60. For this reason (30).

Here he proves the third attribute, namely, that this science is not a human [possession]. In regard to this he does two things. First, he proves his thesis. Second (61), he criticizes an erroneous view held by certain men (“Hence, according to Simonides”).

He proves his thesis by the following argument. A science which is free in the highest degree cannot be a possession of that nature which is servile and subordinate in many respects. But human nature is servile “in many respects,” i.e., in many ways. Therefore this science is not a human possession. Now human nature is said to be servile insofar as it stands in need of many things. And on this account it happens that man sometimes neglects what should be sought for its own sake because of the things necessary for life. Thus it is said in Book III of the Topics that it is better to philosophize than to become wealthy, although sometimes becoming wealthy is more desirable, that is, to one lacking life’s necessities. From this it is clear that that wisdom is sought for itself alone which does not belong to man as his proper possession. For man has as his possession what he can have at his command and use freely. But that science which is sought for itself alone, man cannot use freely, since he is often kept from it because of the necessities of life. Nor again is it subject to man’s command, because man cannot acquire it perfectly. Yet that very small part of it which he does have outweighs all the things known through the other sciences.

61. Hence, according to Simonides (31).

Here he rejects the error of a certain poet, Simonides, who said that it is proper to God alone to have the honor of desiring that knowledge which ought to be sought for its own sake and not for the sake of something else. But it is not fitting that man should not seek that knowledge which is in keeping with his own condition, namely, that which is directed to the necessities of life required by man.

62. Now Simonides’ error came from that of certain poets who said that the Deity is envious, and that since He is envious He does not desire that the things which pertain to His honor should be shared by all. And if God is envious of men in other things, He is rightly more so in this case, i.e., in the case of the science which is sought for its own sake, which is the most honorable of all the sciences. And according to the opinion of these men it follows that all who are imperfect are unfortunate’ for they said that men are fortunate as a result of the providence of the gods, who communicate their goods to men. Hence as a result of the envy of the gods, who are unwilling to communicate their goods, it follows that men, who remain outside the perfection of this science, are unfortunate.

63. But the basis of this opinion is most false, because it is not fitting that any divine being should be envious. This is evident from the fact that envy is sadness at someone else’s prosperity. But this can occur only because the one who is envious thinks that someone else’s good diminishes his own. Now it is impossible that God’ should be sad, because He is not subject to evil of any kind. Nor can His goodness be diminished by someone else’s goodness, since every good flows from His goodness as from an unfailing spring. Hence Plato also said that there is no envy of any kind in God.’ But the poets have lied not only in this matter but in many others, as is stated in the common proverb.

Why this science is most honorable

64. Nor must we think (32).

Here he proves the fourth attribute, namely, that this is the most honorable science, by the following argument. That science which is most divine is most honorable, just as God Himself is also the most honorable of all things. But this science is the most divine, and is therefore the most honorable. The minor premise is proved in this way: a science is said to be divine in two ways, and only this science is said to be divine in both ways. First, the science which God has is said to be divine; and second, the science which is about divine matters is said to be divine. But it is evident that only this science meets both of these requirements, because, since this science is about first causes and principles, it must be about God; for God is understood in this way by all inasmuch as He is one of the causes and a principle of things. Again, such a science which is about God and first causes, either God alone has or, if not He alone, at least He has it in the highest degree. Indeed, He alone has it in a perfectly comprehensive way. And He has it in the highest degree inasmuch as it is also had by men in their own way, although it is not had by them as a human possession, but as something borrowed from Him.

65. From these considerations he draws the further conclusion that all other sciences are more necessary than this science for use in practical life, for these sciences are sought least of all for themselves. But none of the other sciences can be more excellent than this one.

The relation between wonder and wisdom

66. But it is necessary (33).

He now gives the goal toward which this science moves. He says that its progression comes to rest, or is terminated, in the contrary of what was previously found in those who first sought this science, as also happens in the case of natural generations and motions. For each motion is terminated in the contrary of that from which the motion begins. Hence, since investigation is a kind of movement towards knowledge, it must be terminated in the contrary of that from which it begins. But, as was stated above (53), the investigation of this science began with man’s wonder about all things, because the first philosophers wondered about less important matters and subsequent philosophers about more hidden ones. And the object of their wonder was whether the case was like that of strange chance occurrences, i.e., things which seem to happen mysteriously by chance. For things which happen as if by themselves are called chance occurrences. For men wonder most of all when things happen by chance in this way, supposing that they were foreseen or determined by some cause. For chance occurrences are not determined by a cause, and wonder results from ignorance of a cause. Therefore when men were not yet able to recognize the causes of things, they wondered about all things as if they were chance occurrences; just as they wondered about changes in the course of the sun, which are two in number, namely, the solstices, that of winter and that of summer. For at the summer solstice the sun begins to decline toward the south, after previously declining toward the north. But at the winter solstice the opposite occurs. And they wondered also that the diagonal of a square is not commensurable with a side. For since to be immeasurable seems to belong to the indivisible alone (just as unity alone is what is not measured by number but itself measures all numbers), it seems to be a matter of wonder that something which is not indivisible is immeasurable, and consequently that what is not a smallest part is immeasurable. Now it is evident that the diagonal of a square and its side are neither indivisible nor smallest parts. Hence it seems a matter of wonder if they are not commensurable.

67. Therefore, since philosophical investigation began with wonder, it must end in or arrive at the contrary of this, and this is to advance to the worthier view, as the common proverb agrees, which states that one must always advance to the better. For what that opposite and worthier view is, is evident in the case of the above wonders, because when men have already learned the causes of these things they do not wonder. Thus the geometrician does not wonder if the diagonal is incommensurable with a side. For he knows the reason for this, namely, that the proportion of the square of the diagonal to the square of a side is not as the proportion of the square of a number to the square of a number, but as the proportion of two to one. Hence it follows that the proportion of a side to the diagonal is not as the proportion of number to number. And from this it is evident that they cannot be made commensurable. For only those lines are commensurable which are proportioned to each other as number to number. Hence the goal of this science to which we should advance will be that in knowing the causes of things we do not wonder about their effects.

68. From what has been said, then, it is evident what the nature of this science is, namely, that it is speculative and free, and that it is not a human possession but a divine one; and also what its aim is, for which the whole inquiry, method, and art must be conducted. For its goal is the first and universal causes of things, about which it also makes investigations and establishes the truth. And by reason of the knowledge of these it reaches this goal, namely, that there should be no wonder because the causes of things are known.

LESSON 4

Opinions about the Material Cause

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 983a 24-984a 16

34. It is evident, then, that one must acquire scientific knowledge of those causes which stand at the beginning, for we say that we have scientific knowledge of each thing when we think we comprehend its first cause. Now causes are spoken of in four ways. Of these we say that one is the substance or quiddity of a thing, for the first “why” of a thing is reduced to its ultimate intelligible structure, and the first why of a thing is a cause or principle; another is the matter or subject; a third is the source of motion; and a fourth is the cause which is opposite to this, namely, that for the sake of which, or the good; for this is the goal of every generation and motion. There has been sufficient consideration of these in our works on nature.

35. However, let us examine those who have undertaken an investigation of existing things and have philosophized about the truth before us. For evidently they too speak of certain principles and causes. Therefore, to us who come later [their views] will serve as an introduction to the study which we are now making; for we shall either discover some other class of cause, or be more convinced of those which have just been expounded.

36. Most of those who first philosophized thought that only the things which belong to the class of matter are the principles of all things. For that of which all things are composed, from which they first come to be, and into which they are finally dissolved, while their substance remains

although it is changed in its attributes—this they call the element and principle of existing things.

37. And for this reason they thought that nothing is either generated or corrupted, as if such a reality always remained in existence. And just as we do not say that Socrates comes to be in an unqualified sense when he becomes good or musical, or is corrupted when he loses these states, because the subject Socrates himself remains, in the same way they say that nothing else is generated or corrupted. For there must be some matter, either one or more than one, from which other things come to be, and which itself remains in existence. However, they do not all speak in the same way about the number and nature of such a principle.

38. Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, says that this principle is water; and this is why he also claimed that the earth rests upon water.

39. For presumably he took this position because he saw that the nutriment of all things is moist, that heat itself is generated from this, and that animal life comes from this. But that from which each thing comes to be is a principle of all things. He bases his opinion on this, then, and on the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, whereas water is by nature the principle of moist things.

40. Moreover, there are some who think that the ancients who lived long before the present generation and were the first to speculate about the gods held this view about the nature of things. For they made Oceanus and Tethys the parents of generation, and held the oath of the gods to be by a body of water, to which the poets gave the name Styx. For what is oldest is most honorable, and what is most honorable is that by which one swears. Whether this view of nature is in fact the ancient and primary one is perhaps uncertain. Thales is said to have expressed himself in this way about the first cause, but no one could say that Hippo is to be included in this group, because of the weakness of his understanding.

41. Anaximenes and Diogenes hold that air is prior to water and is the most fundamental of the simple bodies.

42. Hippasus of Metopontium and Heraclitus of Ephesus hold that fire [is the primary principle].

43. Empedocles holds that there are four [simple bodies], since he adds a fourth—earth—to those already mentioned. For he says that these always

remain and only become many or few in number by being combined into a unity and separated out of a unity.

44. Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, who was prior to Empedocles in years but later in his speculations, says that the principles of things are infinite in number. For he says that nearly all bodies which are made up of parts like themselves, such as fire or water, are generated or corrupted in this way, merely by combining and separating; but that otherwise they are neither generated nor corrupted but always remain in existence. From these views, then, one might think that the only cause is the one which is said to belong to the class of matter.

COMMENTARY

69. Having set f orth a preface in which he indicates the aim of this science, its dignity and goal, Aristotle begins to deal with this science; and this is divided into two parts. In the first (70), he explains what the first philosophers had to say about the causes of things. In the second (274), he begins to pursue the truth of this science. He does this in Book II ("Theoretical, i.e., speculative, knowledge").

The first part is divided into two members. First, he gives the opinions of the philosophers about the causes of things. Second (181), he criticizes them insofar as their statements are unsatisfactory ("Therefore all those").

In regard to the firsthe does two things. First, he takes up again the enumeration of causes which was treated in greater detail in Book II of the Physics. Second (72), he presents the opinions of the philosophers ("However, let us examine").

The four causes, & three characteristics of final cause

70. Accordingly, he says, first, that since it is evident that wisdom speculates about causes, we ought to begin by acquiring knowledge from the causes of things. This also seems to be in keeping with the intelligible structure of science, because we say that we know each thing scientifically when we think we are not ignorant of its cause. Now causes are spoken of in four ways. (1) One of these is the formal cause, which is the very substance of a thing by which we know what each thing is. For it is well known, as is stated in Book II of the Physics, that we do not say that anything has a nature before it has received a form. Now it is clear that a

form is a cause, because the question “Why is something so?” we reduce to its formal cause as its ultimate explanation, beginning with proximate forms and proceeding to the ultimate form. But evidently the “why?” asks about a cause and principle. Hence it is evident that a form is a cause. (2) A second cause is the material cause. (3) A third is the efficient cause, which is the source of motion. (4) A fourth is the final cause, which is opposite to the efficient cause as a goal is to a starting-point; for motion begins with the efficient cause and terminates with the final cause. This [latter] cause is also that for the sake of which a thing comes to be, and the good of each nature.

71. He makes the final cause known by three considerations: (1) It is the goal of motion, and thus is opposite to the source of motion, which is the efficient cause. (2) It is first in intention, and for this reason is said to be that for the sake of which [something is done]. (3) It is desirable of itself, and for this reason is called a good; for the good is what all desire.

Hence, in explaining how the final cause is opposite to the efficient cause, he says that it is the goal [or end] of every process of generation and motion, whose starting-point is the efficient cause. By these two types of change he seems to imply that there is a twofold goal: (1) For the goal of a process of generation is the form itself, which is a part of a thing. (2) But the goal of motion is something sought for outside the thing moved. He says that he has treated these causes at sufficient length in the Physics, lest he should be asked to make a more extensive treatment of them.

72. However, let us examine (35).

Here he states what the philosophers had to say about the causes; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the reasons why this must be done; and, second (36:C 73), he begins to carry out his plan (“Most of those”).

Accordingly, he says that even though there is a treatise on the causes in the Physics it is still necessary to consider the opinions of the philosophers who first undertook an investigation of the natures of existing things, and have philosophized about the truth before him; because they too set down causes and principles. Therefore, for us who have come later, a consideration of their opinions will be “a first [step],” or preamble, “to the investigation,” i.e., to the art which we are now seeking. Hence the text of Boethius also says: “Therefore as we enter upon the task of this science, their opinions will constitute a preamble to the road that is now to be travelled.” Another text has: “Therefore to us who are beginning this inquiry it will be a certain vital work in the investigation that now confronts us, “ and it must be read in this way: “Therefore, as we enter upon our present course,” i.e., upon the present study and art, it will be necessary to consider the opinion of these men “as a work of life,” that is to say, as necessary, like works which are done for the preservation of life, so that this reading is interpreted as a metaphorical way of speaking, meaning by “work of life” anything necessary. Now this is useful, because from the opinions of these men we will either discover another class of causes over and above those already enumerated, or be more convinced of the things that have just been stated about the causes, namely, that there are four classes of them.

73. Most of those (36).

Here he begins to deal with the opinions of the ancient philosophers; and in regard to this he does two things. First (36), he states their opinions; and, second (86:C 181) he finds fault with them (“Therefore all those”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states the opinions which each one of the philosophers held about the causes. Second (79:C 170, he summarizes the discussion (“We have examined”).

The first part is divided into two members. In the first (36:C 74), he gives the opinions of those who omitted the formal cause. In the second (69:C 151), he gives the opinion of Plato, who was the first to posit a formal cause (“After the philosophies”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of those who claimed that certain evident things are principles. Second (55:C , 12), he gives the opinions of those who devised extrinsic principles (“Leucippus”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he touches on the opinions which the ancient philosophers held about the material cause; and, second (45:C 93), on their opinions about the efficient cause (“But as men”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states in a general way the views of those who posited a material cause. Second (38:C 77), he examines their views in detail (“Thales, the originator”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states their opinions about the material cause. Second (37:C 75), he states their opinions about the generation of things, which follow from the first (“And for this reason”).

OPINIONS OF THOSE WHO GAVE ONLY MATERIAL CAUSE

FOUR CHARACTERISTICS OF MATTER

74. Accordingly he says, first (36), that most of those who first philosophized about the natural world held that the principles of all things are merely those which are referred to the class of material cause. In regard to this it must be said that they took the four conditions of matter which seem to belong to the notion of a principle. For, (1) that of which a thing is composed seems to be a principle of that thing. But matter is such a thing; for we say that a thing that has matter is of its matter, as a knife is of iron. (2) That from which a thing comes to be, being also a principle of the process of generation of that thing, seems to be one of its causes, because a thing comes into being by way of generation. But a thing first comes to be from matter, because the matter of things precedes their production. And a thing does not come from matter in an accidental way; for a thing is generated in an accidental way from its contrary or privation, as when we say that white comes from black. (3) Third, that into which all things are ultimately dissolved by corruption seems to be a principle of things. For just as principles are first in the process of generation, in a similar way they are last in the process of dissolution; and obviously this too pertains to matter. (4) Fourth, since a principle must remain in existence, then that which remains throughout the process of generation and corruption seems to be a principle. Now the matter which they said is the substance of a thing remains throughout every transmutation, although its attributes, such as its form and everything that accrues to it over and above its material substance, are changed. From all these considerations they concluded that matter is the element and principle of all beings.

Without material cause, no generation or corruption

75. And for this reason (37).

Then he gives, as a secondary point, what they held as following from the above, namely, that in the world nothing is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense. For when some change occurs with regard to a thing’s attributes, and its substance remains unchanged, we do not say that it is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one; for example, when Socrates becomes good or musical, we do not say that he simply comes to be, but comes to be this. And similarly when he loses a state of this kind, we do not say that he is corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one. But matter, which is the substance of things according to them, always remains; and every change affects some of a thing's accidents, such as its attributes. From this they concluded that nothing is generated or corrupted in an absolute sense, but only in a qualified one.

76. Yet even though they all agreed on this point, in positing a material cause, nevertheless they differed in their position in two respects: first, with respect to the number of material causes, because some held that there is one, and others many; and second, with respect to its nature, because some held that it is fire, others water, and so on. Similarly, among those who posited many material causes, some assigned certain ones as the material principles of things, and some the others.

77. Thales, the originator (38).

Here he begins to give the opinions of each of the philosophers about the material cause. First, he gives the opinions of those who posited one material cause; and second (88), the opinions of those who posited many ("Empedocles").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives the opinions of those who claimed that water is the principle of all things; second (86), he gives the opinion of those who made air the principle of things ("Anaximenes"); and third (87), the opinion of those who claimed that fire is the principle of things ("Hippasus").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Thales, who said that water is the principle of things; and second (79), the reason for this opinion ("For presumably").

He says then that Thales, the originator of this kind of philosophy, i.e., speculative philosophy, said that water is the first principle of all things. Thales is said to have been the originator of speculative philosophy because he was the only one of the seven wise men, who came after the theological poets, to make an investigation into the causes of things, the other sages being concerned with moral matters. The names of the seven wise men are as follows. The first was Thales of Miletus, who lived during the time of Romulus and when Achaz, King of Israel, was reigning over the Hebrews. The second was Pittacus of Mitylene, who lived when Sedecias was reigning over the Hebrews and when Tarquinius Priscus was reigning over the Romans. The other five sages were Solon of Athens, Chilo of Lacedaemon, Periander of Corinth, Cleobulus of Lydia, and Bias of Prienne, all of whom lived during the period of the Babylonian captivity. Hence, since Thales alone among these men investigated the natures of things and distinguished himself by committing his arguments to writing, he is described here as the originator of this science.

78. Nor should it be thought unfitting if he touches here on the opinions of those who have treated only the philosophy of nature; because according to the ancients, who knew no other substance except the corporeal and mobile, it was necessary that first philosophy be the philosophy of nature, as is stated in Book IV. And from this position Thales next adopted this one, that the earth rests upon water, as anything having a principle is based on its principle.

79. For presumably he took (39).

Here he gives the reasons by which Thales could be led to the above position. First, he shows how he was led to this position by his own reasoning; and second (82), by the authority of his predecessors ("Moreover, there are some").

Now he was led by two lines of reasoning; one is taken from the cause itself of a thing, and the other from a consideration of the generation of things ("And on the fact"). Therefore these premises are related. For the second follows from the first, because that which is a principle of being of other things is also the first principle from which things are generated. The third follows from the second, because by corruption each thing is dissolved into that from which it was generated. The fourth follows from the second and the third; for that which precedes the generation of things and remains after they have been corrupted must always remain in being.

80. In the first line of reasoning he uses three indications to show that water is the principle of being of things. The first of these is that the nutriment of living things must be moist. But living things derive nourishment and being from the same principle; and thus moisture appears to be the principle of being of things. The second indication is that the being of any physical thing, and especially of a living one, is conserved by its proper and natural heat. But heat seems to be generated from moisture, since moisture itself is in a sense the matter of heat. Hence from this it appears that moisture is a principle of being of things. The third indication

is that animal life depends on moisture. Hence an animal dies as a result of its natural moisture being dried up and is kept in existence as a result of its moisture being preserved. But in living things to live is to be. Hence it is also evident from this that moisture is a principle of being of things. These three indications also have a natural connection with one another. For an animal is nourished by moisture, because its natural heat is sustained by moisture. And from these two it follows that animal life is always due to moisture. But that from which a thing comes to be, i.e., from which a thing gets its being, is a principle of everything that derives being from it. And for this reason he adopted this opinion that moisture is the principle of all things.

81. In a similar way he also draws an indication of this from the generation of things, because the processes of generation of living things, which are the noblest of [natural] beings, come from seed. But the seed or spermata of all living things have a moist nature. Hence from this it also appears that moisture is a principle of generation of things. Again, if we add to all of the above points the fact that water is the principle of moisture, it follows that water is the first principle of things.

82. Moreover, there are (40).

Here he shows how Thales was led to the above position by the authority of the ancients. He says that prior to Thales and many years before the men of Aristotle’s time there were some men, the first to speculate about the gods, who seem to have held this opinion about nature, namely, that water is the principle of all things.

83. With a view to making this clear, we must bear in mind that among the Greeks the first who were famous for their learning were certain theological poets, so called because of the songs which they wrote about the gods. These poets, who were three in number, Orpheus, Museus and Linus, of whom Orpheus was the more famous, lived during the time when the judges ruled over the Jewish people. Hence it is dear that they lived long before Thales and much longer before Aristotle, who lived during the time of Alexander. These poets dealt to some extent with the nature of things by means of certain figurative representations in myths. For they said that Oceanus [i.e., the ocean], where the greatest aggregation of waters is found, and Tethys, which is the name they gave to the goddess of the waters, are

the parents of generation, implying by this, under the form of a myth, that water is the principle of generation.

84. They cloaked this view in another fabulous story, saying that the oath or vow of the gods was by a certain body of water, which the poets call Styx and describe as an underground swamp. And when they said that the gods swore by water, they implied that water was nobler than the gods themselves, because an oath or vow is taken on what is most honorable. Now that which is prior is more honorable; for the perfect is prior absolutely to the imperfect, both in nature and in time, although in a particular being imperfection is prior temporally to perfection. Hence, from this it is evident that they thought that water is prior to the gods themselves, whom they thought to be celestial bodies. And since these earliest thinkers said that water is the principle of things, if there was any opinion about natural bodies prior to theirs, we do not know what it was. Thus what Thales is said to have thought about the first cause of things is now clear.

85. A certain philosopher named Hippo was not credited with adding anything to those mentioned because of the imperfection of his knowledge or understanding. Hence, in The Soul, Hippo is placed among the ruder [thinkers]; for in that work it is stated that Hippo, basing his argument on the seeds of things, as was said here of Thales, held water to be the soul and principle of things. Hence it is clear that he adds nothing to Thales' view. Or the statement can mean that, since he spoke imperfectly, he did not make himself worthy to have his doctrine included here with the others.

86. Anaxinienes and Diogenes (41).

Here he gives the opinions of those who held that air is the principle of things, namely, Diogenes and Anaximenes, who held that air is naturally prior to water and is the principle of all simple bodies, i.e., of the four elements, and thus of all other things. Anaximenes is the third philosopher after Thales and the disciple of Anaximander, who was the disciple of Thales; and Diogenes is said to have been the disciple of Anaximenes. Yet there is this difference between the opinion of Diogenes and that of Anaximenes: Artaximenes held that air is the principle of things in an absolute sense, whereas Diogenes said that air could be the principle of things only if it possessed a divine nature. From this comes the opinion which is touched on in The Soul, Book I. Now the reason why he held that air is the principle of things could be taken from the process of respiration, by which the life of animals is conserved, and because the processes whereby things are generated and corrupted seem to be modified as a result of changes in the air.

87. Hippasus of Metopontium (42).

Here he states that the two philosophers, Hippasus and Heraclitus, held that fire is the material principle of things. And they could have been influenced by its subtileness, as is said below.

88. Empedocles (43).

Here he gives the opinions of those who posited many material principles. First, he gives the opinion of Empedocles, who held that there are a limited number of such principles; and second 90), that of Anaxagoras, who held that there are an infinite number (“Anaxagoras”).

First (43), he gives Empedocles’ opinion regarding the three elements mentioned above, water, air, and fire, which he says are the principles of things, adding to them a fourth, earth.

89. Second, he gives Empedocles’ opinion about the permanence of these elements; for, like those who hold that there is one material cause, he holds that these elements always remain and are neither generated nor corrupted. However, he said that other things are generated from and dissolved into these elements according as a greater or smaller number of them are combined or separated out, i.e., inasmuch as these four are united by the process of combination and lose their unity by the process of separation.

90. Anaxagoras (44).

Here he gives the opinion of Anaxagoras, who was the other disciple of Anaximenes and the classmate of Diogenes. A native of Clazomenae, he was prior to Empedocles in years but later in his activity or work, either because he began to philosophize later, or because his explanation of the number of principles is less satisfactory than that of Empedocles. For he said that there are an infinite number of material principles, whereas it is better to take a limited and smaller number, as Empedocles did, as is stated in Book I of the Physics. For Anaxagoras not only said that fire, water, and the other elements are the principles of things, as Empedocles did, but also claimed that all things having like parts, such as flesh, bones, marrow and so forth, whose smallest parts are infinite in number, are the principles of things. For he claimed that in each being there are an infinite number of parts of each type of thing, because he found that in the case of inferior things one of these can be generated from another. He said, in fact, that things could be generated only by being separated out from a mixture, as Aristotle has explained more fully in the Physics, Book I.

91. Second, Anaxagoras also agrees with Empedocles on this point, namely, that things are generated and corrupted only insofar as the parts of these infinite principles are combined or separated out, and that if this were not the case nothing would be generated or corrupted. But he said that the infinite number of principles of this kind, from which the substances of things are produced, always remain in being.

92. From the opinions of these philosophers, then, Aristotle concludes that the only cause which these men recognized was the one which belongs to the class of material cause.

LESSON 5

Opinions about the Efficient Cause

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45. But as men proceeded in this way, reality itself again opened up a path and forced them to make investigations. For if every process of generation and corruption is from some one thing or more than one, why does this occur, and what is the cause? For certainly the subject itself does not cause itself to change. I mean, for example, that neither wood nor bronze is the cause of the change undergone by either one of them; for wood does not produce a bed, or bronze a statue, but something else is the cause of the change. But to seek this is to seek another principle, as if one were to say that from which the beginning of motion comes.

46. Now in general those who have taken such a course from the very beginning, and who said that the subject is one, created no difficulty for themselves when they said that everything is one. [But some of those who say that it is one], being baffled, so to speak, by this question, say that this [one subject] and the whole of nature is immobile not only with respect to generation and

corruption (for this is an ancient opinion and one which all men confess to be true), but also with respect to every other change. This opinion is peculiar to them. Hence, of those who said that the [universe] itself is one, it occurred to none of them to conceive of such a cause, except perhaps Parmenides, and to him only insofar as he claims that there is not one cause but also in a sense two causes. But for those who make the elements of things many, such as the hot and cold, or fire and earth, a better explanation is possible, because they use fire as if it were a material principle which is active in nature, but water and earth and the like they use in the opposite way.

47. After these men and such principles, as if they were insufficient to generate the natures of existing things, men were again compelled (as we said [45]) by the truth itself to seek for the next principle. For perhaps it is unlikely that either fire or earth or anything else of this kind should be the cause of the good dispositions of things which are or come to be; nor was it consistent that they should think this to be the case. Nor again would it be right to attribute so important a matter to chance occurrence and fortune.

48. And when someone said that there is one intellect present in nature as in animals, and that this is the cause of the world and the arrangement of the whole, he seemed to atone for the untenable statements made by his predecessors.

We know that Anaxagoras expressed these views, although Hermotimus of Clazomenae was the first to speak of such a cause. Those, therefore, who held these opinions likewise posited a principle in existing things which is the cause of their goodness, and that sort of cause which is the source of motion in the world.

Chapter 4

49. Now someone might have suspected that Hesiod was the first to have investigated this sort of cause, or anyone else who held that love or desire is a principle in existing things, as Parmenides did. For in the place where he attempts to explain the generation of the universe, he says that “Love, the first of all the gods, was made.” And Hesiod says that “The first of all things to be made was chaos, then broad earth, and love, who is pre-eminent among the immortals”—as though there must be in the world some cause which moves things and brings them together. How one must arrange these thinkers in sequence will be decided later on.

COMMENTARY

93. Having given the philosophers opinions about the material cause, Aristotle now gives their opinions about the efficient cause, which is the source of motion. This is divided into two parts. First, he gives the opinion

of those who assigned without qualification a cause of motion and generation. Second (97), he examines the opinion of those who posited an efficient cause, which is also the principle of good and evil in the world (“After these men”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reasoning which compelled them to posit an efficient cause. Second (94), he shows the different positions which different men have held regarding this (“Now in general”).

He says (45), then, that some philosophers have proceeded in this way in positing a material cause, but that the very nature of reality clearly provided them with a course for understanding or discovering the truth, and compelled them to investigate a problem which led them to the efficient cause. This problem is as follows: no thing or subject changes itself; for example, wood does not change itself so that a bed comes from it, nor does bronze cause itself to be changed in such a way that a statue comes from it; but there must be some other principle which causes the change they undergo, and this is the artist. But those who posited a material cause, whether one or more than one, said that the generation and corruption of things come from this cause as a subject. Therefore there must be some other cause of change, and to seek this is to seek another class of principle and cause, which is called the source of motion.

94. Now in general (46).

He shows here that the philosophers have adopted three positions with respect to the foregoing issue. For those who adopted this course from the very beginning, and said that there is one material cause, were not greatly concerned with the solution of this problem. For they were content with their view of matter and neglected the cause of motion altogether.

95. But others, who said that all things are one, being defeated as it were by this issue, as they were unable to go so far as to assign a cause of motion, denied motion altogether. Hence they said that the whole universe is one immobile being. In this respect they differed from the first philosophers of nature, who said that one cause is the substance of all things although it is moved by rarefaction and condensation, so that in this way many things come to be in some measure from one principle. However, they did not say that this principle is subject to generation and corruption in an absolute sense. For the view that nothing was generated or corrupted

without qualification is an ancient one admitted by all of them, as is clear from what was said above (75). But it was peculiar to these later thinkers to say that the whole of reality is one immobile being, devoid of every kind of motion. These men were Parmenides and Melissus, as will be explained below (138). Hence it is evident that it was impossible for those who said that the whole is one immobile being to conceive of "such a cause," i.e., a cause of motion. For, by the very fact that they did away with motion, they sought in vain for a cause of motion. An exception was Parmenides; for even though he held that there is only one thing according to reason, he held that there are many things according to the senses, as will be stated below (101). Hence, inasmuch as Parmenides held that there are many things, it was in keeping with his position to hold that there are many causes, one of which would be a mover and the others something moved. For just as he held that there are many things according to the senses, in a similar way it was necessary for him to hold that there is motion according to the senses, because a plurality of things can be understood to be produced from one subject only by some kind of motion.

96. Third, there were those who, in making the substances of things many, assented to the aforesaid reasoning by positing a cause of motion. For they maintained that the hot or the cold, i.e., fire or earth, are causes; and of these they used fire as having a mobile, i.e., an active, nature, but water, earth and air they used in the opposite way, i.e., as having a passive nature. Thus fire was a sort of efficient cause, but the others a sort of material cause.

97. After these men (47).

Here he gives the opinion of those who posited an efficient cause, not only as a principle of motion, but also as a principle of good and evil in things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he expounds their views. Second (107), he shows in what respect they failed in assigning the causes of things ("These thinkers").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reasons for their position by which they were induced to posit another cause besides the foregoing one. Second (100), he shows how they posited this kind of cause in different ways ("And when someone").

He says first, then, that after the foregoing philosophers who held that there is only one material cause, or many bodies, one of which was active and the others passive, and after the other first principles given by them, men were again compelled by the truth itself ‘ “as we have said,” i.e., as was stated above (93), to seek the “next” principle, i.e., the one which naturally follows the foregoing one, namely, the cause of good, which is really the final cause, although it was held by them only incidentally, as will be see below (177). For they held that there is a cause of goodness in things only after the manner of an efficient cause. They were compelled to do this because the foregoing principles were not sufficient to account for the generation of the natural world, in which some things are found to be well disposed . The fact that bodies are conserved in their proper places and are corrupted outside of them proves this; and so do the benefits resulting from the parts of animals, which are found to be disposed in this manner according as this is in keeping with an animal’s good state of being.

98. But neither fire nor earth nor any such bodies were held to be adequate causes of this kind of good disposition or state of being which some things already have but others acquire by some kind of production. For these bodies act in one definite way according to the necessity of their proper forms, as fire heats things and tends upward, and water cools things and tends downward. But the aforesaid benefits and good states of being of things must have a cause which is not limited to one effect only, since the parts of different animals are found to be disposed in different ways, and in each one insofar as it is in keeping with its nature.

99. Hence, it is not reasonable that fire or earth or the like should be the cause of the aforesaid good state of being which things have, nor was it reasonable that these men should have thought this to be the case. Nor again would it be reasonable to say that these things are chance occurrences, i.e., that they are accidental or come about by chance, and that their causality is changed only fortuitously; although some of these thinkers had said this, as Empedocles and all those who posited a material cause, as is evident in Book II of the Physics. However, this is also seen to be false by reason of the fact that good dispositions of this kind are found either always or for the most part, whereas things that come about by chance or fortune do not occur always or for the most part but seldom. For this reason, then, it was necessary to discover besides the four elements some other principle which would account for the good dispositions of things. Another text has “Nor

would it be right that these should be attributed to chance occurrence and fortune," but this means the same as the above.

OPINIONS ON EFFICIENT CAUSE: intellect or love

100. And when someone said (48).

Here he gives in detail the opinions about the aforesaid principle. First, he gives the opinions of those who held that there is one [efficient] cause; and second (104), the opinions of those who held that there are two such causes ("But since there would seem").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the views of those who held that the first efficient cause is an intellect; and second (101), the opinions of those who held that it is love ("Now someone might").

He says, then, that after the foregoing doctrine someone appeared who said that there is an intellect present in nature at large, just as there is in animals, and that this is the cause of the world and the order of the whole, i.e., of the universe, in which order the good of the entire universe and that of every single part consists. And this man atoned for the first philosophers by reducing to pure truth those who said unreasonable things and did not mention this kind of cause. Now Anaxagoras clearly stated this doctrine, although another philosopher —Hermotimus of Clazomenae—first gave him the idea of proposing this opinion. Hence it is evident that those who held this opinion claimed at the same time that the principle by which things are well disposed and the one which is the source of motion in things, are one and the same.

101. Now someone might (49).

Here he gives the opinion of those who claimed that love is the first principle, although they did not hold this very explicitly or clearly. Accordingly, he says that some suspected that Hesiod had sought for such a principle to account for the good disposition of things, or anyone else who posited love or desire in nature. For when Parmenides attempted to explain the generation of the universe, he said that in the establishing of the universe "Love, the first of all the gods, was made." Nor is this opposed to his doctrine that there is one immobile being, of which Aristotle speaks here; because this man held that there are many things according to the senses, although there is only one thing according to reason, as was stated above and will be stated below. Moreover, he called the celestial bodies, or perhaps certain separate substances, gods.

102. But Hesiod said that first of all there was chaos, and then broad earth was made, to be the receptacle of everything else; for it is evident that the receptacle [or void] and place are principles, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. And he also held that love, which instructs all the immortals, is a principle of things. He did this because the communication of goodness seems to spring from love, for a good deed is a sign and effect of love. Hence, since corruptible things derive their being and every good disposition from immortal beings of this kind, this must be attributed to the love of the immortals. Furthermore, he held that the immortals are either the celestial bodies themselves, or material principles themselves. Thus he posited chaos and love as though there had to be in existing things not only a material cause of their motions, but also an efficient cause which moves and unites them, which seems to be the office of love. For love moves us to act, because it is the source of all the emotions, since fear, sadness and hope proceed only from love. That love unites things is clear from this, that love itself is a certain union between the lover and the thing loved, seeing that the lover regards the beloved as himself. This man Hesiod is to be numbered among the poets who lived before the time of the philosophers.

103. Now, as to which one of these thinkers is prior, i.e., more competent in knowledge, whether the one who said that love is the first principle, or the one who said hat intellect is, can be decided later on, that is, where God is discussed. He calls this decision an arrangement, because the degree of excellence belonging to each man is allotted to him in this way. Another translation states this more clearly: “Therefore, in what order it is fitting to go over these thinkers, and who in this order is prior, can be decided later on.”

LESSON 6

Love and Hate as Efficient Causes of Good and Evil

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 984b 32-985b 4

50. But since there would seem to be in nature things which are contrary to those that are good, and not only order and good but also disorder and what is base, and evil things more numerous than good ones, and base things more numerous than noble ones, for this reason another thinker introduced love and strife as causes, each of its own type of effects. For if anyone grasps what Empedocles said, taking it according to its meaning rather than according to its faltering expression, he will find that love is the cause of things which come to be by aggregation, and strife the cause of evil things. Hence, if anyone were to say that Empedocles, in a sense, both said and was the first to say that good and evil are principles, he would perhaps speak correctly, i.e., if the cause of all good things is good and that of all evil things is evil.

51. These thinkers, then, as we have said, to this extent have touched on two of the causes which we established in the Physics,—matter and the source of motion—though only obscurely and with no clarity, much as untrained men conduct themselves in battle. For the latter, though encircled, often deal telling blows, but without science. In the same way these thinkers do not seem to be aware of what they are saying. For it seems that they almost never make use of the causes except to a small degree.

52. Anaxagoras uses “intellect” in an artificial way in generating the world. For when he is in difficulty as to what is necessarily the cause of something, he drags in this intellect; but in other cases he makes everything but intellect the cause of what comes to be.

53. Empedocles, it is true, makes greater use of causes than Anaxagoras, though not sufficiently; nor does one find in his use of them what he professed. In many places he argues that love separates things, and that strife brings them together. For when being itself is separated into its elements by strife, then fire and each of the other elements are brought together into a unity. But when they are united by love, the particles must again be separated out from each element.

54. In contrast to the first philosophers, then, Empedocles was the first to introduce this cause, dividing it in such a way as to make the source of motion not a single principle but different and contrary ones. Moreover, he was the first to claim that the elements, which are said to belong to the class of matter, are four in number, although he does not use them as four but as two, taking fire by itself alone, and its opposites—earth, air, and water—as a single nature (46).

But anyone may see this by studying his basic sayings. This philosopher, then, as we have said, has spoken in this way about the principles of things and their number.

COMMENTARY

104. Here Aristotle gives the opinion of those who posited contrariety in beings of this kind, and the reason which moved them, which is as follows. There would seem to be in nature things which are contrary to those that are good, because in nature one finds not only things which are ordered and good, but sometimes things which are disordered and base. Now it cannot be said that evil things have no cause but happen by chance, because evil things are more numerous than good ones, and base things more numerous than those which are unqualifiedly noble. But those things which come to be by chance without a definite cause do not occur for the most part but in the smaller number of cases. Hence, since contrary effects have contrary causes, it was necessary to hold as a cause of things not only love, from which the order and good in things originate, but also hate, which is the

source of disorder and baseness or evil in things, so that in this way particular instances of evil and good have their own type of causes.

105. That this was the reason which moved Empedocles is evident if anyone grasps what he says, taking his statement according to its meaning rather than according to the words which he used imperfectly and, as it were, in a faltering way. For he said that it is the office of love to bring the elements together, and of hate to separate them. But since the generation of things is a result of the coming together [of the elements], by reason of which there is being and good in things, and their corruption a result of the separation [of the elements], which is the way to non-being and evil, it is now evident that he wanted love to be the cause of things which come to be by aggregation, i.e., of good things, and hate the cause of evil things. Thus if one were to say that Empedocles was the first to maintain that good and evil are principles, he would perhaps speak correctly.

106. That is to say, this would follow if Empedocles did hold that good is the cause of all good things, and evil the cause of all evil things. For it is evident that he posited evil as the cause of some evil things, namely, of corruption, and good as the cause of some good things, namely, of generation. But because it would not follow that all good things would be caused by friendship or all evil things by hate, since the parts of the world would be differentiated by hate and fused together by friendship, therefore he did not always hold that good is the cause of good things, and evil the cause of evil things.

107. These thinkers (51).

Here he shows that in giving these causes the philosophers treated them inadequately. First, he mentions them in a general way. Second (108), he treats each one individually (“Anaxagoras”).

He says first, then, that these philosophers—Anaxagoras and Empedocles—arrived at a doctrine of two of the causes which have been established in the Physics, namely, matter and the cause of motion, although they treated these obscurely and with no clarity, because they did not explain that those principles which they held to be the causes of things could be reduced to these classes of causes. But insofar as they posited two of these causes, they may be likened to untrained warriors who, though encircled by the enemy, sometimes strike good blows, not by art but by chance. This is evident from the fact that, even though they happen to do this sometimes, this does not occur always or for the most part. In like manner, too, these philosophers were not accustomed to express themselves accurately, nor was it their custom to speak with awareness, i.e., as men who know. Hence another translation has, “But these men neither have science, nor are they to be compared with men who realize what they are saying.” This is shown by the fact that, although they had proposed these causes, they hardly ever used them, because they employed them in few instances. Hence it seems that they introduced them not as a result of art but by accident, because they were moved to, do so by necessity.

108. Anaxagoras (52).

Here he shows in what particular respect the view of each is unsatisfactory. First, he speaks of Anaxagoras; and second (109), of Empedocles (“Empedocles”).

He says first, then, that Anaxagoras uses “intellect” to generate the world, and in so doing he seems to speak of it in an artificial way. For when he inquires about the causes of the world’s generation, he drags it in of necessity, i.e., he invents this intelligence only because he is unable to attribute the generation of the world to any other cause which would differentiate things except to one which is essentially distinct and unmixed, and intellect is a thing of this kind. But in all other cases he draws his causes from any other source rather than intellect, for example, in the case of the particular natures of things.

109. Empedocles (53).

Here he shows in what respect Empedocles’ doctrine is inadequate; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in what respect Empedocles’ doctrine is inadequate. Second (111), he explains what Empedocles himself held in contrast to the other philosophers (“In contrast”)

He says, first (53), that Empedocles, in dealing with the particular natures of things, “makes greater use of the causes” posited by him (the four elements, and love and hate) than Anaxagoras did, because he reduced the generation and corruption of particular things to these causes, and not to intelligence as Anaxagoras did. But Empedocles failed in two ways.

First, he failed because he does not treat causes of this kind adequately enough; for he uses things which are not self-evident as though they were self-evident axioms, as is stated in the Physics, Book W that is, insofar as he assumed that they are self-evident, because at one definite time strife has dominion over the elements and at another, love.

110. Second, he failed because in the matters which he investigates, one does not find what he has professed, i.e., what he held as a principle, namely, that love combines things and that strife separates them, because in many places love must on the contrary “separate” or divide things, and strife “bring them together,” i.e., unite them. For when the universe itself “is separated out,” i.e., divided into its parts, by hate, as occurs when the world is generated, all particles of fire are then combined into one whole, and so also are the individual particles of the other elements “brought together,” i.e., joined to each other. Hence, strife not only separates the particles of fire from those of air, but also brings together the particles of fire. But, on the other hand, when the elements come together through love, which occurs when the universe is destroyed the particles of fire must then be separated from each other, and so also must the particles of the other elements. For fire can be mixed with air only if the particles of fire are separated from each other; and the same is true of the particles of air only if these elements penetrate one another, so that love not only unites unlike things but also separates like things, according to what follows from his position.

111. In contrast (54).

Here he shows in what respect Empedocles’ own doctrine differs from that of the other philosophers. He says that Empedocles maintained two things in contrast to the others. First, he divided the cause which is the source of motion into two contrary parts. Second, he held the material cause to be constituted of four elements—not that he uses the four elements as four, but rather as two, because he contrasts fire with the other three, saying that fire is active in nature and the others passive in nature. Anyone can gather this from the elements of things treated by him, or from his “basic sayings” in the sense of the rudiments of the doctrine which he propounded. Another version reads “from his verses,” because he is said to have written his philosophy in meters. And still another version, which says “from his statements,” agrees with this. As has been stated, then, this philosopher was the first to stipulate in this way that the principles of things are so many in number, namely, four, and to speak of those which have been mentioned.

LESSON 7

The Views of the Atomists and the Pythagoreans

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 985b 4-986a 13

55. Leucippus and his colleague Democritus say that the elements of things are the full and the void, calling the one being and the other non-being. For this reason they say that the full or solid is being, and the void, non-being. For this reason too they say that being no more is than non-being, because the void no more is than body; and they hold that these are the material causes of things.

56. And just as those who make the underlying substance one generate other things from this by means of its attributes, holding that rarity and density are the principles of these attributes, in the same way these men say that the differences [of the atoms] are the causes of other things. These differences, they say, are three: shape, arrangement, and position. For they claim that what exists differs only by rhythm, inter-contact, and turning; and of these rhythm means shape, inter-contact arrangement, and turning position. For A differs from N in shape, and Z from N in position. But with regard to motion, from whence it comes or how it is present in things, these men carelessly dismissed this question as the other thinkers did. As we have said before, then, these two types of causes seem to have been investigated to this extent by the first thinkers.

Chapter 5

57. But during the time of these and prior to them, lived the group called the Pythagoreans who dealt with mathematics and were the first to develop it; and having been brought up in these sciences, they thought that their principles were the principles of all things. But since among these principles numbers are naturally first, they thought they saw in numbers, more than in fire and earth, many resemblances to things which are and come to be, because [according to them] this attribute of numbers is justice, another is soul and mind, and still another is opportunity. The case is the same, so to speak, with every other thing.

58. Moreover, since they considered the attributes and ratios of harmonies in terms of numbers, and since other things in their whole nature seemed to be likened to numbers, and since numbers are the first things in the whole of nature, they thought that the elements of numbers are the elements of all things, and that the whole heaven is a harmony and number. And whatever they had revealed in the case of numbers and harmonies [which they could] show [to be in agreement] with the motions and parts of the heavens, and its whole arrangement, they collected and adapted to these. And if anything was lacking anywhere, they called it in in order that their undertaking might be complete. I mean that since the number ten seems to be the perfect number and to comprise the whole nature of numbers, they said that the bodies which move in the heavens are ten in number; but as only nine are observable they therefore invented a tenth, the counter-earth. These things have been dealt with more exactly in another work [De Coelo, II, 13].

COMMENTARY

112. Here he begins to give the positions of those who held strange and obscure views about the principles of things. First, he gives the position of those who held that there are many principles of things; and second (134) the position of those who held that there is only one being (“But there are some”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Leucippus and Democritus, who held that the principles of things are corporeal. Second (119), he gives the opinion of the Pythagoreans, who held that the principles of things are incorporeal entities ("But during the time").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the opinion of Democritus and Leucippus about the material cause of things; and second (115), their opinion about the cause of diversity, that is, how matter is differentiated into many things. In this discussion the cause of the generation and corruption of things also becomes evident; and this is a point on which these men agreed with the ancient philosophers ("And just as those who"). He says, then, that two philosophers, Democritus and Leucippus, who are called friends because they followed each other in all things, held that the principles of things are the full and the void or empty, of which the full is being, and the void or empty, non-being.

113. Now in order to clarify this opinion we must recall what the Philosopher says in Book I of Generation, where he treats it more fully. For certain philosophers had held that everything is one continuous immobile being, because it seems that there cannot be motion without a void, or any distinction between things, as they said. And though they could not comprehend the privation of continuity, by reason of which bodies must be understood to be differentiated, except by means of a void, they claimed that the void existed in no way. Democritus, who came after them, and who agreed with their reasoning but was unable to exclude diversity and motion from things, held that the void existed, and that all bodies are composed of certain indivisible bodies [i.e., the atoms]. He did this because it seemed to him that no reason could be given why the whole of being should be divided in one part rather than another. And lest he should hold that the whole of being is continuous, he therefore chose to maintain that this whole is divided everywhere and in its entirety; and this could not be the case if anything divisible remained undivided. And according to him indivisible bodies of this kind can neither exist nor be joined together except by means of the void. For if the void did not come between any two of them, one continuous whole would result from the two; which he did not hold for the above reason. Hence he said that the continuous quantity of each body is constituted both of those indivisible bodies filling indivisible spaces and of certain empty spaces, which he called pores, coming between these indivisible bodies.

114. And since the void is non-being and the full is being, it is evident from this that he did not hold that a thing was constituted by being rather than non-being, because the [indivisible] bodies did not constitute things more than the void, or the void more than bodies; but he said that a body is composed at once of these two things, as is clear in the text. Hence he held that these two things are the causes of beings as their matter.

115. And just as those (56).

Here he shows in what respect these philosophers agreed with the ancients who claimed that there is only one matter. He indicates agreement in two respects.

First, just as the ancient philosophers held that there is one matter, and from that one matter generated something else according to the different attributes of matter (i.e., the rare and dense, which they accepted as the principles of all other attributes), in a similar way these philosophers—Democritus and Leucippus—said that there were different causes of different things (namely, of the bodies composed of these indivisible bodies), i.e., that different beings were produced as a result of certain differences of these indivisible bodies and their pores.

116. Now they said that these differences are, first, differences in shape, which is noted from this that things are angular, circular or square; second, differences in arrangement, i.e., insofar as the indivisible bodies are prior or subsequent; and, third, differences in position, i.e., insofar as these bodies are in front or behind, right or left, or above and below. Hence they said that one being differs from another “either by rhythm,” which is shape, “or by inter-contact,” which is arrangement, “or by turning,” which is position.

117. He illustrates this by using the letters of the Greek alphabet, which differ from each other in shape just as in our alphabet one letter also differs from another; for A differs from N in shape. Again, AN differs from NA in arrangement, because one letter is placed before the other. And one letter also differs from another in position, as Z from IN, just as in our language we also see that semivowels cannot stand after liquids preceded by mutes in the same syllable. Therefore, just as tragedy and comedy come from the same letters as a result of the letters being disposed in different ways because of this threefold difference, in a similar fashion different species of things are produced from the same indivisible bodies as a result of the latter being disposed in different ways.

118. The second respect in which these philosophers agreed with the ancients is this: just as the ancient philosophers neglected to posit a cause which accounts for motion in things, so also did these men, although they would say that these indivisible bodies are capable of self-motion. Thus it is evident that these philosophers mentioned only two of the causes, i.e., all of them spoke of the material cause) and some of the efficient cause.

119. But during the time of these (57).

Here he gives the opinions of the Pythagoreans, who held that numbers are the substances of things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he gives their opinions about the substance of things; and second (124), their opinions about the principles of things ("But the reason").

In regard to the first he gives two reasons by which they were led to assert that numbers are the substances of things. He gives the second reason (121) where he says "Moreover, since they considered."

He says that the Pythagoreans were philosophers who lived "during the time of these," i.e., they were contemporaries of some of the foregoing philosophers; "and prior to them," because they preceded some of them. Now it must be understood that there were two groups of philosophers. One group was called the Ionians, who inhabited the land which is now called Greece. This group originated with Thales, as was pointed out above (77). The other group of philosophers were the Italians, who lived in that part of Italy which was once called Greater Greece and is now called Apulia and Calabria. The leader of these philosophers was Pythagoras, a native of Samos, so called from a certain city of Calabria. These two groups of philosophers lived at the same time, and this is why he says that they lived "During the time of these and prior to them."

120. These Italian philosophers, also called Pythagoreans, were the first to develop certain mathematical entities, so that they said that these are the substances and principles of sensible things. He says that they were "the first" because the Platonists were their successors. They were moved to bring in mathematics because they were brought up in the study of these sciences, and therefore they thought that the principles of mathematics are the principles of all existing things. For men are wont to judge about things in terms of what they already know. And since among mathematical entities numbers are first, these men therefore tried to see resemblances of natural things, both as regards their being and generation, in numbers rather than in

the sensible elements—earth, water and the like. For just as the foregoing philosophers adapted the attributes of sensible things to those of natural things because of a certain resemblance which they bear to the properties of fire, water, and bodies of this kind, in a similar fashion these mathematicians adapted the properties of natural things to the attributes of numbers when they said that some one attribute of number is the cause of justice, another the cause of soul and intellect, and still another the cause of opportunity, and so on for other things. And in this way the attributes of numbers are understood to be the intelligible structures and principles of all things appearing in the sensible world, both in the realm of voluntary matters, signified by justice, and in that of the substantial forms of natural things, signified by soul and intellect, and in that of accidents, signified by opportunity.

STRANGE AND OBSCURE VIEWS ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES OF THINGS

HIDDEN PRINCIPLES: NUMBERS

121. Moreover, since they (58).

Here he gives the second reason which motivated them. For they thought of the attributes of harmonies, musical consonants and their ratios, i.e., proportions, in terms of the nature of numbers. Hence, since harmonious sounds are certain sensible things, they attempted by the same reasoning to liken all other sensible things, both in their intelligible structure and in their whole nature, to numbers, so that numbers are the first things in the whole of nature.

122. For this reason too they thought that the principles of numbers are the principles of all existing things, and they said that the whole heaven is merely a kind of nature and harmony of numbers, i.e., a kind of numerical proportion similar to the proportion found in harmonies. Hence, whatever they had “revealed,” i.e., had shown, which they could adapt to numbers and harmonies, they also adapted both to the changes undergone by the heavens, as its motion, eclipses and the like; and to its parts, as the different orbs; and to the whole arrangement of the heavens, as the different stars and different figures in the constellations.

LESSON 8

The Pythagorean Doctrine about Contraries

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 986a 13-986b 10

59. But the reason we have come [to examine these philosophers] is that we may also learn from them what they hold the principles of things to be, and how these principles fall under the causes already described. Now these men also seem to think that number is the principle of existing things both as their matter and as their attributes and states. According to them the elements of number are the even and odd, and of these the latter is limited and the former, unlimited. The unit is composed of both of these, since it is both even and odd, and number is derived from the unit. And number, as has been stated (58), constitutes the whole heaven.

60. But other members of the same school say that the principles of things are ten in number, which they give as co-elements: the limited and unlimited, even and odd, one and many, right and left, masculine and feminine, rest and motion, straight and curved, light and darkness, good and evil, square and oblong.

61. Alcmaeon of Croton seems to have formed his opinion in the same way, and either he derived the theory from them or they from him; for Alcmaeon (who had reached maturity when Pythagoras was an old man) expressed views similar to those of the Pythagoreans. For he says that many things in the realm of human affairs are in twos [i.e., pairs], calling them contrarieties, not distinguished as these men had distinguished them, but such as are taken at random, for example, white and black, sweet and bitter,

good and evil, small and great. It is true that this philosopher threw out vague remarks about the other contrarieties, but the Pythagoreans have declared both what the contrarieties are and how many there are.

62. From both of these, then, we can gather this much, that contraries are the principles of existing things; but how many they are and that they are these [determinate ones must be learned] from other thinkers. The way in which many principles can be brought together under the causes described is not clearly expressed by them, although they seem to allot their elements to the class of matter; for they say that substance is composed and moulded out of these as something inherent. From these remarks, then, it is possible to get an adequate understanding of the meaning of the ancient philosophers who said that the elements of things are many.

COMMENTARY

124. Here he states what the Pythagoreans had to say about the principles of things. In regard to this he does two things. First, he expounds their opinions about the principles of things; and second (132), he indicates to what class of cause the principles laid down by them are reduced ("From both of these").

In regard to the first he gives three opinions. The second (127) begins at the words "But other members"; and the third (131), where he says "Alcmaeon of Croton."

He says first (59), then, that the reason he came to examine the opinions of the Pythagoreans is that he might show from their opinions what the principles of things are and how the principles laid down by them fall under the causes given above. For the Pythagoreans seem to hold that number is the principle of existing things as matter,1 and that the attributes of number are the attributes and states of existing things. By "attributes" we mean transient accidents, and by "states," permanent accidents. They also held that the attribute of any number according to which any number is said to be even is justice, because of the equality of division, since such a number is evenly divided into two parts right down to the unit. For example, the number eight is divided into two fours, the number four into two twos, and the number two into two units. And in a similar way they likened the other accidents of things to the accidents of numbers.

125. in fact, they said that the even and odd, which are the first differences of numbers, are the principles of num hers. And they said that even number is the principle of unlimitedness and odd number the principle of limitation, as is shown in the Physics, Book III, because in reality the unlimited seems to result chiefly from the division of the continuous. But an even number is capable of division; for an odd number includes within itself an even number plus a unit, and this makes it indivisible. He also proves this as followswhen odd numbers are added to each other successively, they always retain the figure of a square, whereas even numbers change their figure. For when the number three is added to the unit, which is the principle of numbers, the number four results, which is the first square [number], because 2 x 2 = 4. Again, when the number five, which is an odd number, is added to the number four, the number nine results, which is also a square number; and so on with the others. But if the number two, which is the first even number, is added to the number one, a triangular number results, i.e., the number three. And if the number four, which is the second even number, is added to the number three, there results a septangular number, i.e., the number seven. And when even numbers are added to each other successively in this way, they do not retain the same figure. This is why they attributed the unlimited to the even and the limited to the odd. And since limitedness pertains to form, to which active power belongs, they therefore said that even numbers are feminine, and odd numbers, masculine.

126. From these two, namely, the even and odd, the limited and unlimited, they produced not only number but also the unit itself, i.e., unity. For unity is virtually both even and odd; because all differences of number are virtually contained in the unit; for all differences of number are reduced to the unit. Hence, in the list of odd numbers the unit is found to be the first. And the same is true in the list of even numbers, square numbers, and perfect numbers. This is also the case with the other differences of number, because even though the unit is not actually a number, it is still virtually all numbers. And just as the unit is said to be composed of the even and odd, in a similar way number is composed of units. In fact, [according to them], the heavens and all sensible things are composed of numbers. This was the sequence of principles which they gave.

127. But other members (60).

Here he gives another opinion which the Pythagoreans held about the principles of things. He says that among these same Pythagoreans there were some who claimed that there is not just one contrariety in principles, as the foregoing did, but ten principles, which are presented as co-elements, that is, by taking each of these principles with its co-principle, or contrary. The reason for this position was that they took not only the first principles but also the proximate principles attributed to each class of things. Hence, they posited first the limited and the unlimited, as did those who have just been mentioned; and subsequently the even and the odd, to which the limited and unlimited are attributed. And because the even and odd are the first principles of things, and numbers are first produced from them, they posited, third, a difference of numbers, namely, the one and the many, both of which are produced from the even and the odd. Again, because continuous quantities are composed of numbers, inasmuch as they understood numbers to have position (for according to them the point was merely the unit having position, and the line the number two having position), they therefore claimed next that the principles of positions are the right and left; for the right is found to be perfect and the left imperfect. Therefore the right is determined from the aspect of oddness, and the left from the aspect of evenness. But because natural bodies have both active and passive powers in addition to mathematical extensions, they therefore next maintained that masculine and feminine are principles. For masculine pertains to active power, and feminine to passive power; and of these masculine pertains to odd number and feminine to even number, as has been stated (125).

128. Now it is from active and passive power that motion and rest originate in the world; and of these motion is placed in the class of the unlimited and even, because it partakes of irregularity and otherness, and rest in the class of the unlimited and odd. Furthermore, the first differences of motions are the circular and straight, so that as a consequence of this the straight pertains to even number. Hence they said that the straight line is the number two; but that the curved or circular line, by reason of its uniformity, pertains to odd number, which retains its undividedness because of the form of unity.

129. And they not only posited principles to account for the natural operations and motions of things, but also to account for the operations of

living things. In fact, they held that light and darkness are principles of knowing, but that good and evil are principles of appetite. For light is a principle of knowing, whereas darkness is ascribed to ignorance; and good is that to which appetite tends, whereas evil is that from which it turns away.

130. Again, [according to them] the difference of perfection and imperfection is found not only in natural things and in voluntary powers and motions, but also in continuous quantities and figures. These figures are understood to be something over and above the substances of continuous quantities, just as the powers responsible for motions and operations are something over and above the substances of natural bodies. Therefore with reference to this they held that what is quadrangular, i.e., the square and oblong, is a principle. Now a square is said to be a figure of four equal sides, whose four angles are right angles; and such a figure is produced by multiplying a line by itself. Therefore, since it is produced from the unit itself, it belongs to the class of odd number. But an oblong is defined as a figure whose angles are all right angles and whose opposite sides alone, not all sides, are equal to each other. Hence it is clear that, just as a square is produced by multiplying one line by itself, in a similar way an oblong is produced by multiplying one line by another. Hence it pertains to the class of even number, of which the first is the number two.

131. Akmaeon of Croton (61).

Here he gives the third opinion of the Pythagoreans, saying that Alcmaeon of Croton, so named from the city in which he was raised, seems to maintain somewhat the same view as that expressed by these Pythagoreans, namely, that many contraries are the principles of things. For either he derives the theory from the Pythagoreans, or they from him. That either of these might be true is clear from the fact that he was a contemporary of the Pythagoreans, granted that he began to philosophize when Pythagoras was an old man. But whichever happens to be true, he expressed views similar to those of the Pythagoreans. For he said that many of the things “in the realm of human affairs,” i.e., many of the attributes of sensible things are arranged in pairs, understanding by pairs opposites which are contrary. Yet in this matter he differs from the foregoing philosophers, because the Pythagoreans said that determinate contraries are the principles of things. But he throws them in, as it were, without any order, holding that any of the contraries which he happened to think of are the principles of things, such as white and black, sweet and bitter, and so on.

132. From both of these (62).

Here he gathers together from the above remarks what the Pythagoreans thought about the principles of things, and how the principles which they posited are reduced to some class of cause.

He says, then, that from both of those mentioned above, namely, Alcmaeon and the Pythagoreans, it is possible to draw one common opinion, namely, that the principles of existing things are contraries; which was not expressed by the other thinkers. This must be understood with reference to the material cause. For Empedocles posited contrariety in the case of the efficient cause; and the ancient philosophers of nature posited contrary principles, such as rarity and density, although they attributed contrariety to form. But even though Empedocles held that the four elements are material principles, he still did not claim that they are the first material principles by reason of contrariety but because of their natures and substance. These men, however, attributed contrariety to matter.

133. The nature of the contraries posited by these men is evident from the foregoing discussion. But how the aforesaid contrary principles posited by them can be “brought together under,” i.e., reduced to, the types of causes described, is not clearly “expressed,” i.e., distinctly stated, by them. Yet it seems that such principles are allotted to the class of material cause; for they say that the substance of things is composed and moulded out of these principles as something inherent, and this is the notion of a material cause. For matter is that from which a thing comes to be as something inherent. This is added to distinguish it from privation, from which something also comes to be but which is not inherent, as the musical is said to come from the non-musical.

LESSON 9

The Opinions of the Eleatics and Pythagoreans about the Causes of Things

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 986b 10-987a 28

63. But there are some [the Eleatics] who spoke of the whole as if it were a single nature, although the statements which they made are not all alike either with regard to their acceptableness or their conformity with nature.

64. Therefore a consideration of these men pertains in no way to the present investigation of causes. For they do not, like certain of the philosophers [the early physicists] who supposed being to be one, still generate it from the one as matter; but they speak of this in another way. For the others assume motion when they generate this whole, whereas these thinkers say it is immobile.

65. Yet their opinion is relevant to the present investigation to some extent; for Parmenides seems to touch on unity according to intelligible structure and Melissus on unity according to matter. This is why the former says that it is limited, and the latter that it is unlimited. Xenophanes, the first of those to speak of the one (for Parmenides is said to have been his disciple), made nothing clear, nor does he seem to have touched on either of these. But with regard to the whole heaven he says that the one is God.

66. As we have stated, then, these men must be dismissed for the purposes of the present inquiry. In fact, two of them—Xenophanes and Melissus—are to be disregarded altogether as being a little too rustic.

Parmenides, however, seems to speak with more insight; for he thought that besides being there is only non-being, and this is nothing. This is why he thinks that being is necessarily one and nothing else. We have discussed this point more clearly in the Physics. But being compelled to follow the observed facts, and having assumed that what is one from the viewpoint of reason is many from the viewpoint of the senses, he postulates in turn two principles, i.e., two causes, the hot and cold, calling the one fire and the other earth; and of these he ranks the hot with being and the cold with non-being.

67. From what has been said, then, and from the wise men who have already agreed with this reasoning, we have acquired these things. From the first philosophers we have learned that the principle of things is corporeal, because water and fire and the like are bodies; and from some we have learned that there is one corporeal principle, and from others, many; although both suppose that these belong to the class of matter. And from others we have learned that in addition to this cause there is the source from which motion begins, which some claim to be one and others two. Down to the Italian philosophers, then, and independent of them, others have spoken of these things in a more trivial way, except that, as we have said, they have used two kinds of causes, and one of these—the source of motion—some thinkers consider as one and others as two.

68. Now the Pythagoreans have spoken of these two principles in the same way, but added this much, which is peculiar to them, that they did not think that the limited, unlimited and one are different natures, like fire or earth or anything else of this kind, but that the unlimited itself and the one itself are the substance of the things of which they are predicated. And this is why they considered number as the substance of all things. These thinkers, then have expres emselves thus with regard to these things, and they began to discuss and define the “what” itself of things, although they treated it far too simply. For they defined things superficially and thought that the substance of a thing is that to which a given definition first applies; just as if one supposed that double and two are the same because that to which the double first belongs is the number two. But perhaps “to be double” is not the same as “to be two”; and if they are not, then the one itself will be many. This, indeed, is the conclusion which they reached. From the first philosophers and others, then, this much can be learned.

COMMENTARY

UNITARIANS

134. Here he gives the opinions of those philosophers who spoke of the whole universe as one being; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the opinion which they held in common; and second (135), he shows how a consideration of this opinion is relevant to the present treatise, and how it is not (“Therefore a consideration”).

He says, then, that there were certain philosophers, other than those just mentioned, who spoke “of the whole,” i.e,, of the universe, as if it were of one nature, i.e., as if the whole universe were a single being or a single nature. However, not all maintained this position in the same way, as he will make clear below (138-49). Yet in the way in which they differ their statements are neither acceptable nor in conformity with nature. None of their statements are in conformity with nature, because they did away with motion in things. And none of them are acceptable, because they held an impossible position and used sophistical arguments, as is clear in Book I of the Physics.

135. Therefore a consideration (64).

Here he shows how a consideration of this position pertains to the present investigation and how it does not. He shows, first, that it has no bearing on this investigation if we consider their position itself; and, second (137), that it does have a bearing on this investigation if the reasoning or method behind their position is considered (“Yet their opinion”).

He says, then, that since these philosophers held that there is only one being, and a single thing cannot be its own cause, it is clear that they could not discover the causes. For the position that there is a plurality of things demands a diversity of causes in the world. Hence, a consideration of their statements is of no value for the purposes of the present study, which deals with causes. But the situation is different in the case of the ancient philosophers of nature, who held that there is only one being, and whose statements must be considered here. For they generated many things from that one principle as matter, and thus posited both cause and effect. But these men with whom we are now dealing speak of this in a different way. For they do not say that all things are one materially, so that all things are generated from one matter, but that all things are one in an absolute sense.

136. The reason for this difference is that the ancient philosophers of nature added motion to the view of those who posited one being and one principle, and said that this one being is mobile; and therefore different things could be generated from that one principle by a certain kind of motion, i.e., by rarefaction and condensation. And they said that the whole universe with respect to the diversity found in its parts is generated in this way. Yet since they held that the only change affecting substance is accidental, as was stated above (75), the conclusion then followed that the whole universe is one thing substantially but many things accidentally. But these thinkers [i.e., the Eleatics], said that the one being which they posited is immobile in an absolute sense; and therefore a diversity of things could not be produced from that one being. For since this being is immobile they could not posit any plurality in the world, either substantial or accidental.

137. Yet their opinion (65).

Here he shows how their opinion is relevant to the present inquiry. First, he deals with all of these thinkers in general; and second (142), with Parmenides in particular.

He says, first, that although they did away with diversity in the world, and consequently with causality, nevertheless their opinion is relevant to the present study to this extent, let us say: as regards the method by which they establish their position and the reason for their position.

138. Parmenides, who was a member of this group, seems to touch on unity according to intelligible structure) i.e., according to form; for he argued as follows: besides being there is only non-being, and non-being is nothing. Therefore besides being there is nothing. But being is one. Therefore, besides the one there is nothing.

In this argument he clearly considered the intelligible structure itself of being, which seems to be one, because nothing can be understood to be added to the concept of being by which it might be diversified. For whatever is added to being must be other than being. But anything such as this is nothing. Hence it does not seem that this can diversify being; just as we also see that differences added to a genus diversify it, even though these differences are outside the substance of that genus. For differences do not participate in a genus, as is stated in the Topics, Book IV, otherwise a genus would have the substance of a difference. And definitions would be nonsense if when a genus is given the difference were added, granted that the genus were the substance of the difference, just as it would be nonsense if the species were added. Moreover a difference would not differ in any way from a species. But those things which are outside the substance of being must be non-being, and thus cannot diversify being.

139. But they were mistaken in this matter, because they used being as if it were one in intelligible structure and in nature, like the nature of any genus. But this is impossible. For being is not a genus but is predicated of different things in many ways. Therefore in Book I of the Physics it is said that the statement “Being is one” is false. For being does not have one nature like one genus or one species.

140. But Melissus considered being in terms of matter. For he argued that being is one by reason of the fact that being is not generated from something prior, and this characteristic pertains properly to matter, which is ungenerated. For he argued in this way: whatever is generated has a starting-point. But being is not generated and therefore does not have a starting-point. But whatever lacks a starting-point lacks an end and therefore is unlimited. And if it is unlimited, it is immobile, because what is unlimited has nothing outside itself by which it is moved.

That being is not generated he proves thus. If being were generated, it would be generated either from being or from non-being. But it is not generated from non-being, because non-being is nothing and from nothing nothing comes. Nor is it generated from being, because then a thing would be before it came to be. Therefore it is not generated in any way.

In this argument he obviously treats being as matter, because it is of the very nature of matter not to be generated from something prior. And since limitation pertains to form, and unlimitedness to matter, Melissus, who considered being under the aspect of matter, said that there is one unlimited being. But Parmenides, who considered being under the aspect of form, said that being is limited. Hence, insofar as being is considered under the aspect of form and matter, a study of these men is relevant to the present investigation; because matter and form are included among the causes.

141. But Xenophanes, who was the first of those to say that everything is one (and therefore Parmenides was his disciple), did not explain by what reasoning he maintained that all things are one, either by arguing from the viewpoint of matter, or from that of form. Hence, with respect to neither

nature, i.e., neither matter nor form, does he seem “to come up to these men,” that is, to reach and equal them in their irrational manner of arguing.

But concerning the whole heaven he says that the one is God. For the ancients said that the world itself is God. Hence, seeing that all parts of the universe are alike insofar as they are bodies, he came to think of them as if they were all one. And just as the foregoing philosophers held that beings are one by considering those things which pertain either to matter or to form, in a similar way these philosophers maintained this position regarding the composite itself.

142. As we have stated (66).

His aim here is to explain in a special way how the opinion of Parmenides pertains to the present investigation. He concludes from the foregoing that, since these men did away with (~) diversity in the world and therefore with (~) causality, all of them must be disregarded so far as the present study is concerned. Two of them—Xenophanes and Melissus—must be disregarded altogether, because they are a little too “rustic,” i.e., they proceeded with less accuracy. But Parmenides seems to have expressed his views “with more insight,” i.e., with greater understanding. For he employs the following argument: besides being there is only non-being, and whatever is non-being “is thought to be nothing”; i.e., he considers it worthy to be nothing. Hence he thought that it necessarily followed that being is one, and that whatever is other than being is nothing. This argument has been treated more clearly in the Physics, Book I.

143. But even though Parmenides was compelled by this argument to hold that all things are one, yet, because there appeared to the senses to be many things in reality, and because he was compelled to accept what appeared to the senses, it was his aim to make his position conform to both of these, i.e., to what is apprehended both by the senses and by reason. Hence he said that all things are one according to reason but many according to the senses.

And inasmuch as he held that there is a plurality of things according to the senses, he was able to hold that there is in the world both cause and effect. Hence he posited two causes, namely, the hot and the cold, one of which he ascribed to fire, and the other to earth. And one of these—the hot or fire—seemed to pertain to the efficient cause, and the other—cold or earth—to the material cause. And lest his position should seem to contradict the conclusion of his own argument that whatever is besides being is nothing, he said that one of these causes—the hot—is being, and that the other cause—the one besides being, or the cold—is non-being, according to. both reason and the truth of the thing itself, and is a being only according to sensory perception.

144. Now in this matter he comes very close to the truth; for the material principle, which he held to be earth, is not an actual being.

And in a similar way, too, one of two contraries is a privation, as is said in Book I of the Physics. But privation does not belong to the intelligible constitution of being. Hence in a sense cold is the privation of heat, and thus is non-being.

145. From what has been said (67). Here he summarizes the remarks which have been made about the doctrines of the ancient philosophers; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he summarizes the remarks made about the doctrines of the ancient philosophers of nature; and second (147), those made about the doctrines of the Pythagoreans, who introduced mathematics.

Therefore from the above remarks he concludes, first, that from the foregoing philosophers, who adopted the same opinion, namely, that the material cause is the substance of things, and who were already beginning by the use of reason to know the causes of things by investigating them, we learn the causes which have been mentioned. For from the first philosophers it was learned that the principle of all things is corporeal. This is evident from the fact that water and the like, which are given as the principles of things, are bodies. However, they differed in this respect, that some, such as Thales, Diogenes and similar thinkers, claimed that there is only one corporeal principle, whereas others, such as Anaxagoras, Democritus and Leucippus, held that there are several corporeal principles. Yet both groups, i.e., both those who posited one principle and those who posited many, placed such corporeal principles in the class of material cause. And some of them not only posited a material cause but added to this the cause from which motion begins: some holding it to be one, as Anaxagoras did in positing intellect, and Parmenides, love, and others to be two, as Empedocles did in positing love and hate.

146. Hence, it is clear that these philosophers who lived down to the time of the Italians, or Pythagoreans, “and [were] independent of them,” i.e.,

who had their own opinions about reality and were unaware of those of the Pythagoreans, spoke obscurely about the principles of things; for they did not designate to what class of cause such principles might be reduced. Yet they made use of two causes, i.e., the source from which motion begins and matter: some saying that the former—the source from which motion begins—is one, and others two; as has been pointed out (145).

147. Now the Pythagoreans (68).

Here he summarizes the opinions expressed by the Pythagoreans, both what they held in common with the foregoing philosophers, and what was peculiar to themselves. Now the opinion common to some of the foregoing philosophers and to the Pythagoreans was this that they posited, in a sense, two principles in the same way as the foregoing philosophers did. For Empedocles held that there are two contrary principles, one being the principle of good things, and the other the principle of evil things, and the Pythagoreans did the same thing, as is clear from the co-ordination of contrary principles which they posited.

148. However, they did not do this in the same way; because Empedocles placed these contrary principles in the class of material cause, as was stated above (111), whereas the Pythagoreans added their own opinion to that of the other thinkers. The first thing that they added is this: they said that what I call the one, the limited and the unlimited are not (~) accidents of any other natures, such as fire or earth or the like, but claimed that what I call the one, the limited and the unlimited constitute the (+) substance of the same things of which they are predicated. From this they concluded that number, which is constituted of units, is the substance of all things. But while the other philosophers of nature posited the one, the limited and the unlimited, they nevertheless attributed these to another nature, as accidents are attributed to a subject, for example, to fire or water or something of this kind.

149. The second addition which they made to the views of the other philosophers is this: they began to discuss and to define “the whatness itself,” i.e., the substance and quiddity of things, although they treated this far too simply by defining things superficially. For in giving definitions they paid attention only to one thing; because they said that, if any given definition were to apply primarily to some thing, this would be the substance of that thing; just as if one were to suppose that the ratio “double”

is the substance of the number two, because such a ratio is found first in the number two. And since being was found first in the one rather than in the many (for the many is composed of ones), they therefore said that being is the substance itself of the one.

But this conclusion of theirs is not acceptable; for although the number two is double, the essence of twoness is not the same as that of the double in such a way that they are the same conceptually, as the definition and the thing defined. But even if their statements were true, it would follow that the many would be one. For some plurality can belong primarily to something one; for example, evenness and the ratio double belong first to the number two. Hence [according to them] it would follow that the even and the double are the same. And it would likewise follow that that to which the double belongs is the same as the number two, so long as the double is the substance of the number two. This, indeed, is also the conclusion which the Pythagoreans drew; for they attributed plurality and diversity to things as if they were one, just as they said that the properties of numbers are the same as the properties of natural beings.

150. Hence, Aristotle concludes that it is possible to learn this much from the early philosophers, who posited only one material principle, and from the later philosophers, who posited many principles.

LESSON 10

The Platonic Theory of Ideas

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69. After the philosophies described came the system of Plato, which followed them in many respects, but also had other [theses] of its own in addition to the philosophy of the Italians. For Plato agreeing at the very beginning with the opinions of Cratylus (362) and Heraclitus that all sensible things are always in a state of flux, and that there is no scientific knowledge of them, also accepted this doctrine in later years. However, when Socrates, concerning himself with moral matters and neglecting nature as a whole, sought for the universal in these matters and fixed his thought on definition, Plato accepted him because of this kind of investigation, and assumed that this consideration refers to other entities and not to sensible ones. For [according to him] it is impossible that there should be a common definition of any one of these sensible things which are always changing. Such entities, then, he called Ideas or Forms (species); and he said that all sensible things exist because of them and in conformity with them; for there are many individuals of the same name because of participation in these Forms. With regard to participation, he [merely] changed the name; for while the Pythagoreans say that things exist by imitation of numbers, Plato says that they exist by participation, changing the name. Yet what this participation or imitation of Forms is they commonly neglected to investigate.

70. Further, he says that besides sensible things and Ideas there are the objects of mathematics, which constitute an intermediate class. These differ from sensible things in being eternal and immobile; and from the Ideas in that there are many alike, whereas each Idea is itself only one.

71. And since the Forms [or Ideas] are the causes of other things, he thought that the elements of these are the elements of all existing things. Hence, according to him, the great and small are principles as matter, and the one as substance [or form]; for it is from these by participation in the one that the Ideas are numbers.

72. Yet Plato said that the one is substance and that no other being is to be called one, just as the Pythagoreans did; and like them too he said that numbers are the causes of real substance.

73. But to posit a dyad in place of the indeterminate one, and to produce the unlimited out of the great and small, is peculiar to him. Moreover, he says that numbers exist apart from sensible things, whereas they say that things themselves are numbers. Further, they do not maintain that the objects of mathematics are an intermediate class.

74. Therefore, his making the one and numbers to exist apart from things and not in things, as Pythagoreans did, and his introducing the separate Forms, were due to his investigation into the intelligible structures of things; for the earlier philosophers were ignorant of dialectic.

75. But his making the dyad [or duality] to be a different nature was due to the fact that all numbers, with the exception of prime numbers, are naturally generated from the number two as a matrix.

76. Yet what happens is the contrary of this. For this view is not a reasonable one; because the Platonists produce many things from matter but their form generates only once.

77. And from one matter one measure seems to be produced, whereas he who induces the form, even though he is one, produces many measures. The male is also related to the female in a similar way; for the latter is impregnated by one act, but the male impregnates many females. And such are the changes in these principles. Concerning the causes under investigation, then, Plato defines them thus.

78. From the foregoing account it is evident that Plato used only two causes: one being the the whatness of a thing, and the other, matter; for the Forms are the cause of the quiddity in other things, and the one is the cause

of the quiddity in the Forms. What the underlying matter is of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the one in the case of the Forms, is also evident, namely, that it is this duality, the great and small. Moreover, he assigned the cause of good and evil to these two elements, one to each of them; which is rather a problem, as we say (48), that some of the first philosophers, such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras, [have attempted] to investigate.

COMMENTARY

PLATO AND FORM

151. Having given the opinion of the ancient philosophers about the material and efficient cause, he gives a third opinion, that of Plato, who was the first to clearly introduce the formal cause. This is divided into two parts. First, he gives Plato’s opinion. Second (171), from all of the foregoing remarks he makes a summary of the opinions which the other philosophers expressed about the four classes of causes (“We have examined”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives Plato’s opinion about the substances of things; and second (159), his opinion about the principles of things (“And since the Forms”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives Plato’s opinion insofar as he posited Ideas; and second (157), insofar as he posited intermediate substances, namely, the separate mathematical entities (“Further, he says”).

He says, first, that after all the foregoing philosophers came the system of Plato, who immediately preceded Aristotle; for Aristotle is considered to have been his disciple. And even if Plato followed in many respects the natural philosophers who preceded him, such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras and the like, he nevertheless had certain other doctrines of his own in addition to those of the preceding philosophers, because of the philosophy of the Italians, or Pythagoreans. For insofar as he was devoted to the study of truth he sought out the philosophers of all lands in order to learn their teachings. Hence he came to Tarenturn in Italy, and was instructed in the teachings of the Pythagoreans by Archytas of Tarenturn, a disciple of Pythagoras.

152. Now Plato would seem to follow the natural philosophers who lived in Greece; and of this group some of the later members held that all sensible things are always in a state of flux, and that there can be no scientific knowledge of them (which was the position of Heraclitus and Cratylus). And since Plato became accustomed to positions of this kind from the very beginning, and agreed with these men in this position, which he acknowledged to be true in later years, he therefore said that scientific knowledge of particular sensible things must be abandoned. And Socrates (who was Plato's master and the disciple of Archelaus, a pupil of Anaxagoras), because of this position, which arose in his time, that there can be no science of sensible things, was unwilling to make any investigation into the nature of physical things, but only busied himself with moral matters. And in this field he first began to investigate what the universal is, and to insist upon the need for definition.

153. Hence, Plato, being Socrates' pupil, "accepted Socrates," i.e., followed him, and adopted this method for the purpose of investigating natural beings. He did so believing that in their case the universal in them could successfully be grasped and a definition be assigned to it, with no definition being given for any sensible thing; because, since sensible things are always "changing," i.e., being changed, no common intelligible structure can be assigned to any of them. For every definition must conform to each thing defined and must always do so, and thus requires some kind of immutability. Hence universal entities of this kind, which are separate from sensible things and that to which definitions are assigned, he called the Ideas or Forms of sensible things. He called them Ideas, or exemplars, inasmuch as sensible things are made in likeness to them; and he called them Forms inasmuch as [sensible things] have substantial being by participating in them. Or he called them Ideas inasmuch as they are principles of being, and Forms inasmuch as they are principles of knowledge. Hence all sensible things have being because of them and in conformity with them. They have being because of the Ideas insofar as the Ideas are the causes of the being of sensible things, and "in conformity with them" insofar as they are the exemplars of sensible things.

154. The truth of this is clear from the fact that "many individuals of the same name" are attributed to one Form alone, i.e., there are many individuals which have the same Form predicated of them, and predicated

by participation. For the Form or Idea [of man] is the specific nature itself by which there exists man essentially. But an individual is man by participation inasmuch as the specific nature [man] is participated in by this designated matter. For that which is something in its entirety does not participate in it but is essentially identical with it, whereas that which is not something in its entirety but has this other thing joined to it, is said properly to participate in that thing. Thus, if heat were a self-subsistent heat, it would not be said to participate in heat, because it would contain nothing but heat. But since fire is something other than heat, it is said to participate in heat.

155. In a similar way , since the separate Idea of man contains nothing but the specific nature itself, it is man essentially; and for this reason it was called by him man-in-itself. But since Socrates and Plato have in addition to their specific nature an individuating principle, which is designated matter, they are therefore said to participate in a Form, according to Plato.

156. Now Plato took this term participation from Pythagoras, although [in doing so] he made a change in the term. For the Pythagoreans said that numbers are the causes of things, just as the Platonists said that the Ideas are, and claimed that sensible things of this kind exist as certain imitations of numbers. For inasmuch as numbers, which have no position of themselves, received positions, they caused bodies. But because Plato held that the Ideas are unchangeable in order that there might be scientific knowledge of them, he did not agree that the term imitation could be used of the Ideas, but in place of it he used the term participation. However, it must be noted that, even though the Pythagoreans posited participation or imitation, they still did not investigate the way in which a common Form is participated in by individual sensible things or imitated by them. But the Platonists have treated this.

157. Further, he says (70).

Here he gives Plato’s opinion about the mathematical substances. He says that Plato posited other substances—the objects of mathematics—in addition to the Forms and sensible things. Moreover, he said that beings of this kind were an intermediate class among the three kinds of substances; or that they were above sensible substances and below the Forms, and differed from both. The mathematical substances differed from sensible substances, because sensible substances are corruptible and changeable, whereas the mathematical substances are eternal and immobile. The PIatonists got this idea from the way in which mathematical science conceives its objects; for mathematical science abstracts from motion. The mathematical substances also differed from the Forms, because the objects of mathematics are found to be numerically different and specifically the same, otherwise the demonstrations of mathematics would prove nothing. For unless two triangles belonged to the same class, geometry would attempt in vain to demonstrate that some triangles are alike; and the same thing is true of other figures. But this does not happen in the case of the Forms. For, since a Form is just the specific nature itself of a thing, each Form can only be unique. For even though the Form of man is one thing, and the Form of ass another thing, nevertheless the Form of man is unique, and so is the Form of ass; and the same thing is true of other things.

158. Now to one who carefully examines Plato's arguments it is evident that Plato's opinion was false, because he believed that the mode of being which the thing known has in reality is the same as the one which it has in the act of being known. Therefore, since he found that our intellect understands abstractions in two ways: in one way as we understand universals abstracted from singulars, and in another way as we understand the objects of mathematics abstracted from sensible things, he claimed that for each abstraction of the intellect there is a corresponding abstraction in the essences of things. Hence he held that both the objects of mathematics and the Forms are separate.

But this is not necessary. For even though the intellect understands things insofar as it becomes assimilated to them through the intelligible form by which it is put into act, it still is not necessary that a form should have the same mode of being in the intellect that it has in the thing known; for everything that exists in something else exists there according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore, considering the nature of the intellect, which is other than the nature of the thing known, the mode of understanding, by which the intellect understands, must be one kind of mode, and the mode of being, by which things exist, must be another. For although the object which the intellect understands must exist in reality, it does not exist there according to the same mode [which it has in the intellect]. Hence, even though the intellect understands mathematical entities without simultaneously understanding sensible substances, and understands universals without understanding particulars, it is not therefore necessary that the objects of mathematics should exist apart from sensible things, or that universals should exist apart from particulars. For we also see that sight perceives color apart from flavor, even though flavor and color are found together in sensible substances.

159. And since the Forms (159).

Here he gives Plato’s opinion concerning the principles of things; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he states the principles which Plato assigned to things; and second (169), the class of cause to which they are reduced (“From the foregoing”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he tells us what kind of principles Plato had assigned to things. Second (160), he shows in what respect Plato agreed with the Pythagoreans, and in what respect he differed from them (“Yet Plato”).

He says, first, that, since the Forms are the causes of all other beings according to Plato, the Platonists therefore thought that the elements of the Forms are the elements of all beings. Hence, they assigned as the material principle of things the great and small, and said that “the substance of things,” i.e., their form, is the one. They did this because they held these to be the principles of the Forms. For they said that just as the Forms are the formal principles of sensible things, in a similar way the one is the formal principle of the Forms. Therefore, just as sensible things are constituted of universal principles by participation in the Forms, in a similar way the Forms, which he said are numbers, are constituted “of these,” i.e., of the great and small. For the unit constitutes different species of numbers by addition and subtraction, in which the notion of the great and small consists. Hence, since the one was thought to be the substance of being (because he did not distinguish between the one which is the principle of number, and the one which is convertible with being), it seemed to him that a plurality of different Forms might be produced from the one, which is their common substance, in the same way that a plurality of different species of numbers is produced from the unit.

160. Yet Plato (72).

Here he compares the position of Plato with that of Pythagoras. First, he shows in what respect they agreed; and second (160), in what respect they differed (“But to posit”).

Now they agreed in two positions; (1) and the first is that the one is the substance of things. For the Platonists, like the Pythagoreans, said that what I call the one is not predicated’ of some other being as an accident is of a subject, but signifies a thing’s substance. They said this, as we have pointed out (159), because they did not distinguish between the one which is convertible with being and the one which is the principle of number.

161. (2) The second position follows from the first; for the Platonists, like the Pythagoreans, said that numbers are the causes of the substance of all beings; and they held this because [in their opinion] number is just a collection of units. Hence if the one is substance, number must also be such.

162. But to posit (73).

Here he shows in what respect they differed; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he states how they differed. Second (164), he gives the reason for this difference (“Therefore, his making”).

Now this difference involves two things. First, the Pythagoreans, as has already been stated, posited two principles of which things are constituted, namely, the limited and the unlimited, of which one, i.e., the unlimited, has the character of matter. But in place of this one principle—the unlimited—which the Pythagoreans posited, Plato created a dyad, holding that the great and small have the character of matter. Hence the unlimited, which Pythagoras claimed to be one principle, Plato claimed to consist of the great and small. This is his own opinion in contrast with that of Pythagoras.

163. The second difference is that Plato held that numbers are separate from sensible things, and this in two ways. For he said that the Forms themselves are numbers, as was pointed out above (159); and he also held, as was stated above (157), that the objects of mathematics are an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things, and that they are numbers by their very essence. But the Pythagoreans said that sensible things themselves are numbers, and did not make the objects of mathematics an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things; nor again did they hold that the Forms are separate from things.

164. Therefore, his making (74).

Here he gives the reason for the difference. First, he gives the reason for the second difference; and then (165), the reason for the first difference.

He says, then, that the Platonists adopted the position that both the one and numbers exist apart from sensible things and not in sensible things, as the Pythagoreans claimed; and they also introduced separate Forms because of the investigation “which was made into the intelligible structures of things,” i.e., because of their investigation of the definitions of things, which they thought could not be attributed to sensible substances, as has been stated (150). This is the reason they were compelled to hold that there are certain things to which definitions are assigned. But the Pythagoreans, who came before Plato, were ignorant of dialectic, whose office it is to investigate definitions and universals of this kind, the study of which led to the introduction of the Ideas.

165. But his making (75).

Here he gives the reason for the other difference, that is, the one concerning matter. First, he gives the reason for such a difference. Second (166), he shows that Plato was not reasonably motivated.

He accordingly says that the Platonists made the dyad [or duality] to be a number of a different nature than the Forms, because all numbers with the exception of prime numbers are produced from it. They called prime numbers those which are not measured by any other number, such as three, five, seven, eleven, and so on; for these are produced immediately from unity alone. But numbers which are measured by some other number are not called prime numbers but composite ones, for example, the number four, which is measured by the number two; and in general every even number is measured by the number two. Hence even numbers are attributed to matter, since unlimitedness, which belongs to matter, is attributed to them, as has been stated above (125). This is why he posited the dyad, from which as “a matrix,” or exemplar, all other even numbers are produced.

166. Yet what happens (76).

Here he proves that Plato made unreasonable assumptions; and in regard to this he does two things. For, first, he proves this by an argument from nature. Second (167), he gives the argument based on the nature of things, which led Plato to adopt this position (“And from one matter”).

He says that, although Plato posited a dyad on the part of matter, still what happens is the contrary of this, as the opinions of all the other natural philosophers testify; for they claimed that contrariety pertains to form and unity to matter, as is clear in Book I of the Physics. For they held that the material principle of things is air or water or something of this kind, from which the diversity of things is produced by rarefaction and condensation, which they regarded as formal principles; for Plato's position is not a reasonable one. Now the natural philosophers adopted this position because they saw that many things are generated from matter as a result of a succession of forms in matter. For that matter which now supports one form may afterwards support many forms as a result of one form being corrupted and another being generated. But one specifying principle or form "generates only once," i.e., constitutes the thing which is generated. For when something is generated it receives a form, and the same form numerically cannot become the form of another thing that is generated, but ceases to be when that which was generated undergoes corruption. In this argument it is clearly apparent that one matter is related to many forms, and not the reverse, i.e., one form to many matters. Thus it seems more reasonable to hold that unity pertains to matter but duality or contrariety to form, as the philosophers of nature claimed. This is the opposite of what Plato held.

167. And from one matter (77).

Here he gives an opposite argument taken from sensible things according to the opinion of Plato. For Plato saw that each thing is received in something else according to the measure of the recipient. Hence receptions seem to differ according as the capacities of recipients differ. But one matter is one capacity for reception. And Plato also saw that the agent who induces the form, although he is one, causes many things to have this form; and this comes about because of diversity on the part of matter. An example of this is evident in the case of male and female; for a male is related to a female as an agent and one who impresses a form on matter. But a female is impregnated by one act of a male, whereas one male can impregnate many females. This is why he held that unity pertains to form and duality to matter.

168. Now we must note that this difference between Plato and the philosophers of nature is a result of the fact that they considered things from different points of view. For the philosophers of nature considered sensible things only insofar as they are subject to change, in which one subject successively acquires contrary qualities.

Hence they attributed unity to matter and contrariety to form. But Plato, because of his investigation of universals, went on to give the principles of sensible things. Therefore, since the cause of the diversity of the many singular things which come under one universal is the division of matter, he held that diversity pertains to matter and unity to form. “And such are the changes of those principles” which Plato posited, i.e., participations, or, as I may say, influences in the things generated. For Pythagoras understands the word change in this way. Or Aristotle says “changes” inasmuch as Plato changed the opinion which the first philosophers of nature had about principles, as is evident from the foregoing. Hence it is evident from the foregoing that Plato dealt thus with the causes which we are investigating.

169. From the foregoing (78).

Here he shows to what class of cause the principles given by Plato are referred. He says that it is evident from the foregoing that Plato used only two kinds of causes. For he used as “one” cause of a thing the cause of its “whatness,” i.e., its quiddity, or its formal cause, which determines its quiddity; and he also used matter itself. This is also evident from the fact that the Forms which he posited “are the causes of other things,” i.e., the causes of the whatness of sensible things, namely, their formal causes, whereas the formal cause of the Forms themselves is what I call the one, which seems to be the substance of which the Forms are composed. And just as he holds that the one is the formal cause of the Forms, in a similar fashion he holds that the great and small are their material cause, as was stated above (159). And these causes—the formal and the material cause—are referred not only to the Forms but also to sensible substances, because [there is some subject of which] the one is predicated in the case of the Forms. That is to say, that which is related to sensible substances in the same way as the one is to the Forms is itself a Form, because that duality which relates to sensible things as their matter is the great and small.

170. Furthermore, Plato indicated the cause of good and evil in the world, and he did this with reference to each of the elements which he posited. For he made Form the cause of good and matter the cause of evil.

However, some of the first philosophers attempted to investigate the cause of good and evil, namely, Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who established certain causes in the world with this special end in view that by means of these causes they might be able to give the principles of good and evil. And in touching upon these causes of good and evil they came very close to positing the final cause, although they did not posit this cause directly but only indirectly, as is stated below (177).

LESSON 11

A Summary of the Early Opinions about the Causes

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 988a 18-988b 21

79. We have examined, then, in a brief and summary way those philosophers who’ have spoken about the principles of things and about the truth, and the way in which they did this. Yet we have learned from them this much: that none of those who have discussed principle and cause have said anything beyond the points established by us in the Physics.

80. Yet all have approached these causes obscurely.

81. For some speak of the [first] principle as matter, whether they suppose it to be one or many, and whether they assume it to be a body or something incorporeal, as Plato speaks of the great and small; the Italians of the unlimited; Empedocles of fire, earth, water and air; and Anaxagoras of an infinite number of like parts. All these have touched on this kind of cause, and so also have those who make the first principle air or fire or water or something denser than fire or rarer than air. For they have said that some such body is the primary element. These thinkers, then, have touched only on this cause.

82. But others [have introduced] the source of motion, for example, those who make friendship and strife, or intellect, or love, or something besides these, a principle of things.

83. But the quiddity or substance no one has presented clearly. Those who express it best are those who posit the Ideas and the intelligible natures inherent in the Ideas. For they do not think of the Ideas and the things inherent in them as the matter of sensible things; nor do they think of them as the source from which motion originates, for they say that these things are the causes rather of immobility and of that which is at rest. But [according to them] the Forms are responsible for the quiddity of all other things, and the one for the quiddity of the Forms.

84. That for the sake of which there are actions and changes and motions they affirm in some way to be a cause, but not in the way we are determining causes, or in the way in which it is truly a cause. For while those who speak of intellect or love posit these causes as good, they do not say that anything exists or comes to be because of them, but claim that the motion of things stems from them. In like manner those who say that the one or being is such a reality, say that it is the cause of substance, but not that things either are or come to be for the sake of this. Hence, it happens to them that in a way they both say and do not say that the good is a cause; for they do not speak of it in its principal aspect but in a secondary one.

85. Therefore all these philosophers, being unable to touch on any other cause, seem to bear witness to the fact that we have dealt correctly with the causes, both as to their number and their kinds. Moreover, it is evident that all principles must be sought in this way or in some similar one. As to the way in which each of these philosophers has spoken, and how they have raised possible problems about the principles of things, let us discuss these points next.

COMMENTARY

171. Here he makes a summary of everything that the early philosophers have said about causes* and in regard to this he does three’ things. First (79:C 171), he shows that the early philosophers were unable to add another kind of cause to the four classes of causes given above (34:C 70). Second (80:C 172), he indicates the way in which they touched upon these causes (“Yet all”). Third (85:C 180) he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims (“Therefore all these”).

He says, first (79), that in giving this brief and summary account he has stated who the philosophers are, and how they have spoken of the principles of things and of what is true of the substance itself of things. And from their statements this much can be learned: that none of those who have spoken about causes and principles were able to mention any causes other than those distinguished in Book II of the Physics.

172. Yet all (80).

Here he gives the way in which they dealt with each of the causes. He does this, first (80), in a general way: and, second (81:C 172), in a special Way (“For some speak”).

Accordingly be says, first, that they not only have not added anything, but in the way in which they approached these causes they proceeded obscurely and not clearly. For they have not stated to what class of cause the principles posited by them would belong; but they gave as principles things that can be adapted to some class of cause.

173. For some speak (81).

Here he shows in a special way how they touched on each of these causes. He shows, first (81), how they touched on the material cause; second (82:C 174), On the efficient cause (“But others”); third (83:C 175), on the formal cause (“But the quiddity”); and fourth (84:C 177), on the final cause (“That for the sake of which”).

He says, first (81), then, that those philosophers, i.e., the early ones, all agree insofar as they assign some material cause to things. Yet they differ in two respects. First, they differ in that some, such as Thales, Diogenes and the like, held that the material principle is one, whereas others, such as Empedocles, claimed that it is many; and second, they differ in that some, such as the first group above, held that the material principle of things is a body, whereas others, such as Plato, who posited a dyad, claimed that it is something incorporeal. For Plato posited the great and small, which the Platonists do not speak of as a body. The Italians, or Pythagoreans, posited the unlimited ; but neither is this a body. Empedocles, on the other hand, posited the four elements, which are bodies; and Anaxagoras also posited “an infinite number of like parts,” i.e.) [he claimed] that the principles of things are an infinite number of like parts. All of these thinkers have touched on “this kind of cause,” i.e., the material cause, and so also have those who said that the principle of things is air or water or fire or something midway between these elements, i.e., what is denser than fire and rarer than air. For all philosophers such as those just mentioned have claimed that some kind of body is the first element of things. Thus Aristotle's statement is evident, namely, that in the light of the foregoing remarks these philosophers have posited only the material cause.

174. But others (82).

Here he gives their opinions about the efficient cause. He says that some of the foregoing philosophers have posited, in addition to the material cause, a cause from which motion begins, for example, those who made love or hate or intellect a cause of things, or those who introduced some other active principle distinct from these, as Parmenides, who made fire an efficient cause.

175. But the quiddity (83)

Here he gives their opinions about the formal cause. He says that the cause through which a thing's substance is known, i.e., the formal cause, no one attributed to things with any clarity. And if the ancient philosophers touched on something that might pertain to the formal cause, as Empedocles did when he claimed that bone and flesh contain some proportion [of the elements], by which they are things of this kind, nevertheless they did not treat what belongs to the formal cause after the manner of a cause.

176. But among the other philosophers, those who posited the Forms and those intelligible aspects which belong to the Forms, such as unity, number and the like, came closest to positing the formal cause. For the Forms and everything that belongs to the Forms in the aforesaid way, such as unity and number, are not acknowledged or assumed by them to be the matter of sensible things, since they place matter rather on the side of sensible things; nor do they claim that the Forms are the causes from which motion originates in the world, but rather that they are the cause of immobility in things. For they said that whatever is found to be necessary in sensible things is caused by the Forms, and that these, i.e., the Forms, are immobile. For they claimed that the Forms, because immobile, are uniform in being, as has been said (69:C 156), so that definitions can be given of them and demonstrations made about them. But according to the opinion of these men the Forms are responsible for the quiddity of pparticular things after

the manner of a formal cause, and the one is responsible for the quiddity of the Forms.

All the foregoing weak on FINAL cause

177. That for the sake of which (84). Here he gives the opinions of certain thinkers about the final cause. He says that in one sense the philosophers say that the goal for the sake of which motions, changes and activities occur is a cause, and in another sense they do not. And they neither speak of it in the same way, nor in the way in which it is a true cause. For those who affirm that intellect or love is a cause, posit these causes as good. For they said that things of this kind are the causes of things being well disposed, since the cause of good can only be good. Hence it follows that they could make intellect and love to be causes, just as the good is a cause. But good can be understood in two ways: (1) in one way as a final cause, in the sense that something comes to be for the sake of some good; and (2) in another way as an efficient cause, as we say that the good man does good.

Now these philosophers did not say that the foregoing causes are good in the sense that they are the reason for the existence or coming to be of some beings, which pertains to the intelligibility of the final cause, but in the sense that there proceeds from these causes—intellect and will—a kind of motion toward the being and coming-to-be of things; and this pertains to the intelligibility of the efficient cause.

178. In a similar way the Pythagoreans and Platonists, who said that the substance of things is the one itself or being, also attributed goodness to the one or being. Thus they said that such a reality, i.e., the good, is the cause of the substance of sensible things, either in the manner of a formal cause, as the Platonists maintained, or in the manner of a material cause, as the Pythagoreans claimed.

However, they did not say that the being and coming-to-be of things exists for the sake of this, i.e., the one or being; and this is something that pertains to the intelligibility of the final cause.

Hence, just as the philosophers of nature claimed that the good is a cause in the manner of an (+) efficient cause and not in that of a (~) formal cause, in a similar way the Platonists claimed that the good is a cause in the manner of a (+) formal cause, and not in that of a (~) final cause. The

Pythagoreans, on the other hand, considered it to be a cause in the manner of a (+) material cause.

179. It is evident, then, that in one sense they happened to speak of the good as a cause and in another not. For they did not speak of it as a cause in its principal aspect but in a secondary one; because according to its proper intelligible structure the good is a cause in the manner of a final cause. This is clear from the fact that the good is what all desire. Now that to which an appetite tends is a goal. Therefore according to its proper intelligible structure the good is a cause in the manner of a goal.

Hence those who make the good a cause in its principal aspect claim that it is a final cause. But those who attribute a different mode of causality to the good claim that the good is a cause but only in a secondary way; because they do not hold that it is such by reason of being good, but by reason of that to which good happens to belong by reason of its being active or perfective.

Hence it is clear that those philosophers posited a final cause only incidentally, because they posited as a cause something that is fitting to be an end, namely, the good. However, they did not claim that it is a cause in the manner of a final cause, as has been stated.

Conclusion

180. Therefore all these (85).

Here he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims: that the things established about the causes, both as to their number and their kinds, are correct. For the foregoing philosophers seem to bear witness to this in being unable to add another class of cause to those discussed above. This is one of the useful pieces of information resulting from the account of the foregoing views.

Another is that evidently the principles of things must be investigated in this science, either all those which the ancient philosophers posited, and which have been established above, or some of them. For this science considers chiefly the formal and final cause, and also in a sense the efficient cause.

Now it is not only necessary that the above views be discussed, but after this examination it is also necessary to describe the way in which each of these men has spoken (both in what sense their statements are acceptable and in what sense not), and how the statements which have been made about the principles of things contain a problem.

LESSON 12

Criticism of the Views about the Number of Material Principles

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 988b 22-989b 24

86. Therefore all those who hold that the whole is one and say that there is a certain single nature as matter, and that this is corporeal and has measure, are clearly at fault in many ways. For they give only the elements of bodies and not those of incorporeal things, as if incorporeal things did not exist.

87. And in attempting to state the cause of generation and corruption, and in treating all things according to the method of natural philosophy, they do away with the cause of motion.

88. Furthermore, they did not claim that the substance or whatness of a thing is a cause of anything.

89. And they were wrong in holding that any of the simple bodies except earth is a principle, without considering how they are generated from each other.

90. I mean fire, earth, water and air; for some of these are generated from each other by combination and others by separation. Now it makes the greatest difference as to which of these is prior and which subsequent.

91. For in one way it would seem that the most basic element of all is that from which a thing first comes to be by combination. But such an element will be one which has the smallest parts and is the subtlest of bodies. Hence all those who posit fire as the first principle make statements that conform

most closely to this theory. But each of the other thinkers admits that the primary element of bodies is something of this kind.

92. For none of the later thinkers, and none of those who spoke about the one, wanted earth to be an element, evidently because of the size of its particles. But each of the other three elements finds some supporter, for some say that this primary element is fire, others water, and others air. But why do they not say that it is earth, as in a sense most men do? For they say that everything is earth. And Hesiod says that earth is the first of bodies to be generated; for this happens to be the ancient and common view. Therefore, according to this theory, if anyone says that any of these bodies with the exception of fire is the primary element of things, or if anyone holds that it is something denser than air but rarer than water, he will not speak the truth.

93. However, if that which is later in generation is prior in nature, and if that which is condensed and compounded is later in generation, then the reverse will be true—water will be prior to air, and earth to water. Let these points suffice, then, regarding those who posit one cause such as we have described.

94. The same consequence will also be true if anyone posits many elements, as Empedocles says that the four [elemental] bodies are the matter of things. For these same consequences must befall this man, as well as some which are peculiar to himself. For we see things being generated from each other in such a way that the same body does not always remain fire or earth. But we have spoken of these matters in our physical treatises.

95. And concerning the cause of things in motion, whether one or more than one must be posited, it must not be thought that what has been said is either entirely correct or reasonable.

96. And in general those who speak thus must do away with alteration, because the cold will not come from the hot, nor the hot from the cold. For what is it that undergoes these contraries and what is the one nature which becomes fire and water? Such a thing Empedocles does not admit.

97. But if anyone were to maintain that Anaxagoras speaks of two elements, they would acknowledge something fully in accord with a theory which he himself has not stated articulately, although he would have been forced to follow those who express this view. For to say, as he did, that in the beginning all things are mixed together is absurd, both because it would

be necessary to understand that things previously existed in an unmixed state, and because it is not fitting that anything should be mixed with just anything; and also because properties and accidents could be separated from substances (for there is both mixture and separation of the same things). Yet, if anyone were to follow him up and articulate what he means, his statement would perhaps appear more astonishing. For when nothing was distinct from anything else, evidently nothing would be truly predicated of that substance. I mean that it would neither be white nor black nor tawny, nor have any color, but would necessarily be colorless; for otherwise it would have one of these colors. And, similarly, it would be without humors. And for the same reason it would have no other similar attribute. For it could not have any quality or quantity or whatness, because, if it had, some of the attributes described as formal principles would inhere in it. But this is obviously impossible, since all things are mixed together; for they would already be distinct from each other. But he said that all things are mixed together except intellect, and that this alone is unmixed and pure.’ Now from these statements it follows for him that there are two principles, one being the intellect itself (for this is unmixed in an absolute sense), and the other being the kind of thing we suppose the indeterminate to be before it is limited and participates in a form. Hence, what he says is neither correct nor clear, although he intends something similar to what later thinkers said and what is now more apparent. But these thinkers are concerned only with theories proper to generation, corruption and motion; for usually it is only of this kind of substance that these men seek the principles and causes.

COMMENTARY

181. Having stated the opinions which the philosophers held about the principles of things, Aristotle begins here to criticize them; and this is divided into two parts. First, he criticizes each opinion. Second (272), he summarizes his discussion and links it up with what follows (“From the foregoing”).

The first is divided into two parts. First, he criticizes the opinions of those who have treated things according to the method of natural philosophy. Second (201), he criticizes the opinions of those who have not treated things according to the method of natural philosophy, i.e., Pythagoras and

Plato, because they posited higher principles than the natural philosophers did (“But all those”).

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he criticizes the opinions of those who posited one material cause; and second (190), the opinions of those who posited many (“The same consequence”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he criticizes the foregoing opinions in a general way; and second (183), in a special way (“And they were wrong”).

He criticizes these opinions in a general way by means of three arguments. The first (86) is this: in the world there are not only bodies but also certain incorporeal things, as is clear from The Soul. But these men posited only corporeal principles, which is clear from the fact that they maintained that “the whole is one,” i.e., that the universe is one thing substantially, and that there is a single nature as matter, and that this is corporeal and has “measure,” i.e., dimension. But a body cannot be the cause of an incorporeal thing. Therefore it is evident that they were at fault in this respect that they treated the principles of things inadequately. And they were at fault not only in this respect but in many others, as is clear from the following arguments.

182. And in attempting (87).

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: whoever feels obliged to establish the truth about motion must posit a cause of motion. But these philosophers felt obliged to treat motion, which is clear for two reasons: first, because they tried to state the causes of generation and corruption in the world, which do not occur without motion; and second, because they wanted to treat things according to the method of natural philosophy. But since a treatment of things according to this method involves motion (because nature is a principle of motion and rest, as is clear in Book II of the Physics), they should therefore have dealt with that cause which is the source of motion. And since they did away with the cause of motion by saying nothing about it, obviously they were also at fault in this respect.

183. Furthermore, they did not (88).

Here he gives the third argument: every natural being has “a substance,” i.e., a form of the part, “and whatness,” i.e., quiddity, which is the form of the whole.3 He says form inasmuch as it is a principle of subsistence, and whatness inasmuch as it is a principle of knowing, because what a thing is is known by means of this. But the foregoing philosophers did not claim that form is a cause of anything. They treated things inadequately, then, and were also at fault in neglecting the formal cause.

184. For none of the later (92).

Here he criticizes their opinions in a special way; and he does this with respect to two things. First, he criticizes them for maintaining that all the elements with the exception of fire are the principles of things. Second (187), he criticizes them for omitting earth ("However, if").

First (92), he takes up once more the position of those who claimed that each of the simple bodies except earth is the [primary] element of things. The reason which he gives for this position is that these men saw that the simple bodies are generated from each other in such a way that some come from others by combination or compacting, as grosser things come from more refined ones.

185. He also explains how to proceed against their opinions from their own arguments. For they claimed that one of these elements is the principle of things by arguing that other things are generated from it either by combination or by separation. Now it makes the greatest difference as to which of these two ways is prior and which subsequent, for on this depends the priority or posteriority of that from which something is generated. For, on the one hand, that seems to be prior from which something is produced by combination; and he gives this argument first. Yet, on the other hand, that seems to be prior from which something is produced by rarefaction; and he bases his second argument on this.

186. For the fact that the primary element is that from which something is produced by combination supports the opinion which is now held that the most basic element is that from which other things are produced by combination. This in fact is evident both from reason and from the things that they held. It is evident from reason, because that from which other things are produced by combination is the most refined type of body, and the one having the smallest parts; and this seems to be the simpler body. Hence, if the simple is prior to the composite, this body seems to be first. It is also evident from the things that they held, because all those who posited fire as the principle of things asserted that it is the first principle. Similarly, others have been seen to follow this argument, for they thought that the

primary element of bodies is the one having the finest parts. This is evident from the fact that none of the later philosophers followed the theological poets, who said that earth is the primary element of things. Evidently they refused to do this “because of the size of its parts,” i.e., because of the coarseness of its parts. However, it is a fact that each of the other three elements finds some philosopher who judges it to be the principle of things. But their refusal to make earth a principle is not to be explained by a refusal to reject a common opinion; for many men thought that earth is the substance of things. Hesiod, who was one of the theological poets, also said that earth is the first of all bodies to come into

being. Thus the opinion that earth is the principle of things is evidently an ancient one, because it was maintained by the theological poets, who preceded the philosophers of nature. It was also the common opinion, because many men accepted it. It follows, then, that the later philosophers

avoided the position that earth is a principle only because of the coarseness of its parts. But it is certain that earth has coarser parts than water, and water than air, and air than fire; and if there is any intermediate element, it is evident that it is grosser than fire. Hence by following this argument it is clear that none of them spoke correctly, except him who held that fire is the first principle. For as soon as some element is held to be a principle by reason of its minuteness, the most minute element must be held to be the first principle of things.

187. However, if that which (93).

Here he gives another argument, and according to it the opposite seems to be true, namely, that earth is the most basic element of things. For it is evident that whatever is subsequent in generation is prior in nature, because nature tends to the goal of generation as the first thing in its intention. But the denser and more composite something is, the later it appears in the process of generation; for the process of generation proceeds from simple things to composite ones, Just as mixed bodies come from the elements, and the humors and members [of a living body] from mixed bodies. Hence, whatever is more composite and condensed is prior in nature. In this way a conclusion is reached which is the opposite of that following from the first argument; i.e., water is now prior to air and earth to water as the first principle of things.

188. It should be noted, however, that it is a different thing to look for what is prior in one and the same entity and for what is prior without qualification. For if one seeks what is prior without qualification, the perfect must be prior to the imperfect, just as actuality is prior to potentiality; because a thing is brought from a state of imperfection to one of perfection, or from potentiality to actuality, only by something completely actual. Therefore, if we speak of what is first in the whole universe, it must be the most perfect thing. But in the case of one particular thing which goes from potentiality to. complete actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time, although it is subsequent in nature. It is also clear that the first of all things must be one that is simplest; for the composite depends on the simple, and not the reverse. It was necessary, then, that the ancient philosophers should attribute both of these properties (the greatest perfection along with the greatest simplicity) to the first principle of the whole universe. However, these two properties cannot be attributed simultaneously to any corporeal principle, for in bodies subject to generation and corruption the simplest entities are imperfect. They were Compelled, then, as by contrary arguments, to posit different principles. Yet they preferred the argument of simplicity, because they considered things only insofar as something passes from potentiality to actuality, and in this order it is not necessary that anything which is a principle should be more perfect. But this kind of opposition can be resolved only by maintaining that the first principle of things is incorporeal, because this principle will be the simplest one, as Aristotle will prove below (2548).

189. Last of all he concludes that for the purpose of the present discussion enough has been said about the positions of those who affirm one material cause.

190. The same consequence (94).

Here he gives the arguments against those who posited many material causes. First, he argues against Empedocles; and second (194), against Anaxagoras (“But if anyone”).

First (94), he says that the same consequence faces Empedocles, who held that the four [elemental] bodies are the matter of things, because he experienced the same difficulty with regard to the above contrariety. For according to the argument of simplicity fire would seem to be the most basic principle of bodies; and according to the other argument earth would seem to be such, as has been stated (187). And while Empedocles faced some of the same absurd conclusions as the preceding philosophers (i.e., he did not posit either a formal cause or

the aforesaid contrariety of simplicity and perfection in corporeal things), there is no argument against him for doing away with the cause of motion. But he did face certain other absurd conclusions besides those that confronted the philosophers who posited one material cause.

191. This is shown by three arguments, of which the first is as follows.

First principles are not generated from each other, because a principle must always remain in existence, as is pointed out in Book I of the Physics. But we perceive that the four elements are

generated from each other, and for this reason their generation is dealt with in natural philosophy. Hence his position that the four elements are the first principles of things is untenable.

192. And concerning the cause (95).

Here he gives the second absurdity, which has to do with the cause of motion. For to posit many and contrary causes of motion is not at all correct or reasonable; because if the causes of motion are understood to be proximate ones, they must be contraries, since their effects seem to be contraries. But if the first cause is understood, then it must be unique, as is apparent in Book XII (2492) of this work, and in Book VIII of the Physics. Therefore, since he intends to posit the first causes of motion, his position that they are contraries is untenable.

193. And in general (96).

Here he gives the third argument which leads to an absurdity: in every process of alteration it must be the same subject which undergoes contraries. This is true because one contrary does not come from another in such a way that one is converted into the other; for example, the cold does not come from the hot in such a way that heat itself becomes cold or the reverse, although the cold does come from the hot when the underlying subject is one only inasmuch as the single subject which is now the subject of heat is afterwards the subject of cold. But Empedocles did not hold that contraries have one subject. In fact he held that they are found in different subjects, as heat in fire and cold in water. Nor again did he hold that there is one nature underlying these two. Therefore he could not posit alteration in any way. Yet it is absurd that alteration should be done away with altogether.

194. But if anyone (97).

Here he deals with Anaxagoras' opinion; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in general in what respect Anaxagoras' opinion should be accepted as true, and in what respect not. Second (97), he explains each of these in particular ("For to say").

He says, first, that if anyone wishes to maintain that Anaxagoras' opinion is true insofar as he posited two principles, i.e., matter and efficient cause, let him understand this according to the reasoning which Anaxagoras himself seems to have followed, as if compelled by some need for truth, inasmuch as he would have followed those who expressed this theory. But "he himself has not stated it articulately"; i.e., he has not expressed it distinctly. Therefore, with reference to what he has not expressly stated his opinion is true; but with reference to what he has expressly stated his opinion is false.

195. This is made clear in particular as follows. If his opinion is taken in its entirety according to a superficial understanding of his statements, a greater absurdity will appear for four reasons. First, his opinion that all things were mixed together at the beginning of the world is absurd; for in Aristotle's opinion the distinction between the parts of the world is thought to be eternal. The second reason is this: what is unmixed is related to what is mixed as the simple to the composite. But simple bodies are prior to composite ones, and not the reverse. Therefore what is unmixed must be prior to what is mixed. This is the opposite of what Anaxagoras said. The third reason is this: in the case of bodies not anything at all is naturally disposed to be mixed with anything else, but only those things are naturally disposed to be mixed which are naturally inclined to pass over into each other by some kind of alteration; for a mixture is a union of the altered things which are capable of being mixed. But Anaxagoras held that anything is mixed with just anything. The fourth reason is this: there is both mixture and separation of the same things; for only those things are said to be mixed which are naturally disposed to exist apart. But properties and accidents are mixed with substances, as Anaxagoras said. Therefore it follows that properties and accidents can exist apart from substances. This

is evidently false. These absurdities appear then, if Anaxagoras' opinion is considered in a superficial way.

196. Yet if anyone were to follow him up "and articulate," i.e., investigate clearly and distinctly, the things which Anaxagoras "means," i.e., what he intended, although he did not know how to express this, his statement would appear to be more astonishing and subtler than those of the preceding philosophers. This will be so for two reasons. First, he came closer to a true understanding of matter. This is clear from the fact that in that mixture of things, when nothing was distinguished from anything else but all things were mixed together, nothing could be truly predicated of that substance which is so mixed, which he held to be the matter of things. This is clear in the case of colors; for no special color could be predicated of it so that it might be said to be white or black or have some other color; because, according to this, that color would necessarily be unmixed with other things. Nor, similarly, could color in general be predicated of it so that it might be said to be colored; because everything of which a generic term is predicated must also have a specific term predicated of it, whether the predication be univocal or denominative. Hence, if that substance were colored, it would necessarily have some special color. But this is opposed to the foregoing statement. And the argument is similar with respect to "humors," i.e., savors, and to all other things of this kind. Hence the primary genera themselves could not be predicated of it in such a way that it would have quality or quantity or some attribute of this kind. For if these genera were predicated of it, some particular species would necessarily belong to it. But this is impossible, if all things are held to be mixed together. For this species which would be predicated of that substance would already be distinguished from the others. And this is the true nature of matter, namely, that it does not have any form actually but is in potentiality to all forms. For the mixed body itself does not have actually any of the things which combine in its mixture, but has them only potentially. And it is because of this likeness between prime matter and what is mixed that he seems to have posited the above mixture; although there is some difference between the potentiality of matter and that of a mixture. For even though the elements which constitute a mixture are present in the mixture potentially, they are still not present in a state of pure passive potency; for they remain virtually in the mixture. This can be shown

from the fact that a mixture has motion and operations as a result of the bodies of which the Mixture is composed. But this cannot be said of the things which are present potentially in prime matter. And there is also another difference, namely, that even though a mixture is not actually any of the mixed bodies which it contains, yet it is something actual. This cannot be said of prime matter. But Anaxagoras seems to do away with this difference, because he has not posited any particular mixture but the universal mixture of all things.

197. The second reason is this: he spoke more subtly than the others, because he came closer to a true understanding of the first active principle. For he said that all things are mixed together except intellect, and that this alone is unmixed and pure.

198. From these things it is clear that he posited two principles: one of these he claimed to be the intellect itself, insofar as it is simple and unmixed with other things; and the other is prime matter, which we claim is like the indeterminate before it is limited and participates in a form. For since [prime] matter is [the subject] of an infinite number of forms, it is limited by a form and acquires some species by means of it.

199. It is clear, then, that, in regard to the things which he stated expressly, Anaxagoras neither spoke correctly nor clearly. Yet he would seem to say something directly which comes closer to the opinions of the later philosophers, which are truer (namely, to those of Plato and Aristotle, whose judgments about prime matter were correct) and which were then more apparent.

200. In concluding Aristotle excuses himself from a more diligent investigation of these opinions, because the statements of these philosophers belong to the realm of physical discussions, which treat of generation and corruption. For these men usually posited principles and causes of this

kind of substance, i.e., of material and corruptible substance. He says “usually,” because, while they did not treat other substances, certain of the principles laid down by them can also be extended to other substances. This is most evident in the case of intellect. Therefore, since they have not posited principles common to all substances, which pertains to this science, but only principles of corruptible substances, which pertains to the philosophy of nature, a diligent study of the foregoing opinions belongs rather to the philosophy of nature than to this science.

LESSON 13

Criticism of the Pythagoreans’ Opinions

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 8 & 9: 989b 24-99oa 34

98. But all those who make a study of all existing things, and who claim that some are sensible and others not, evidently make a study of both classes. And for this reason one should dwell at greater length on the statements they have made, whether they be acceptable or not, for the purposes of the present study which we now propose to make.

99. Therefore, those who are called Pythagoreans used principles and elements which are foreign to the physicists; and the reason is that they did not take them from sensible things. For the objects of mathematics, with the exception of those that pertain to astronomy, are devoid of motion. Nevertheless they discuss and treat everything that has to do with the physical world; for they generate the heavens and observe what happens in regard to its parts, affections and operations. And in doing this they use up their principles and causes, as though they agreed with the others, i.e., the physicists, that whatever exists is sensible and is contained by the so-called heavens. But, as we have stated, the causes and principles [of which they speak] are sufficient to extend even to a higher class of beings, and are better suited to these than to their theories about the physical world.

100. Yet how there will be motion if only the limited and unlimited and even and odd are posited as principles, they do not say. But how can there be generation or corruption, or the activities of those bodies which traverse the heavens, if there is no motion or change?

101. And further, whether one grants them that continuous quantities come from these things, or whether this is demonstrated, how is it that some bodies are light and others heavy? For from what they suppose and state, they say nothing more about mathematical bodies than they do about sensible ones. Hence they have said nothing about fire, earth and other bodies of this kind, since they have nothing to say that is proper to sensible things.

102. Further, how are we to understand that the attributes of number and number itself are [the causes] of what exists and comes to pass in the heavens, both from the beginning and now? And how are we to understand that there is no other number except that of which the world is composed? For when they [place] opportunity and opinion in one part of the heavens, and a little above or below them injustice and separation or mixture, and when they state as proof of this that each of these is a number, and claim that there already happens to be in this place a plurality of quantities constituted [of numbers], because these attributes of number correspond to each of these places, [we may ask] whether this number which is in the heavens is the same as that which we understand each [sensible] thing to be, or whether there is another kind of number in addition to this? For Plato says there is another. In fact, lie also thinks that both these things and their causes are numbers, but that some are intellectual causes and others sensible ones.

Chapter 9

Regarding the Pythagoreans, then, let us dismiss them for the present; for it is enough to have touched upon them to the extent that we have.

COMMENTARY

201. Here he argues dialectically against the opinions of Pythagoras and Plato, who posited different principles than those which pertain to the philosophy of nature. In regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that a study of these opinions rather than those mentioned above belongs to the present science. Second (202), he begins to argue dialectically against these opinions (“Therefore those who”).

He says, first (98), then, that those who “make a study,” i.e., an investigation, of all existing things, and hold that some are sensible and others non-sensible, make a study of both classes of beings. Hence an investigation of the opinions of those who spoke either correctly or incorrectly, belongs rather to the study which we now propose to make in this science. For this science deals with all beings and not with some particular class of being. Hence, the things which pertain to every class of being are to be considered here rather than those which pertain to some particular class of being.

202. Therefore those who (99).

Here he argues against the opinions of the foregoing philosophers. First (99), he argues against Pythagoras; and second (208), against Plato ("But those who posited Ideas").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows in what way Pythagoras agreed with the philosophers of nature, and in what way he differed from them. Second (204), he argues against Pythagoras' position ("Yet how").

We must understand (99), then, that in one respect the Pythagoreans agreed with the philosophers of nature, and in another respect they differed from them. They differed from them in their position regarding principles, because they employed principles of things in a way foreign to the philosophers of nature. The reason is that they did not take the principles of things from sensible beings, as the natural philosophers did, but from the objects of mathematics, which are devoid of motion, and are therefore not physical. And the statement that the objects of mathematics are devoid of motion must be referred to those sciences which are purely mathematical, such as arithmetic and geometry. Astronomy considers motion' because astronomy is a science midway between mathematics and natural philosophy. For astronomy and the other intermediate sciences apply their principles to natural things, as is clear in Book II of the Physics.

203. Now Pythagoras agreed with the philosophers of nature concerning the things whose principles he sought; for he discussed and treated all natural beings. He dealt with the generation of the heavens, and observed everything that happens to the parts of the heavens, by which are meant the different spheres, or also the different stars. He also considered what happens to its affections, or to the eclipses of the luminous bodies; and what happens to the operations and motions of the heavenly bodies, and their effects on lower bodies. And he used up causes on particular things of this

kind by applying to each one its proper cause. He also seemed to agree with’ the other philosophers of nature in thinking that that alone has being which is sensible and is contained by the heavens which we see. For he did not posit an infinite sensible body as the other philosophers of nature did. Nor again did he hold that there are many worlds, as Democritus did. He therefore seemed to think that there are no beings except sensible ones, because he assigned principles and causes only for such substances. However, the causes and principles which he laid down are not proper or limited to sensible things, but are sufficient for ascending to higher beings, i.e., intellectual ones. And they were better fitted to these than the theories of the natural philosophers which could not be extended beyond sensible things, because these philosophers claimed that principles are corporeal. But since Pythagoras posited incorporeal principles, i.e., numbers, although he only posited principles of sensible bodies, he came very close to positing principles of intelligible beings, which are not bodies, as Plato did later on.

204. Yet how (100).

Here he gives three arguments against the opinion of Pythagoras. The first is this: Pythagoras could not explain how motion originates in the world, because he posited as principles only the limited and unlimited and the even and odd, which he held to be principles as substance, or material principles. But he had to admit that there is motion in the world. For how could there be generation and corruption in bodies, and how could there be any activities of the heavenly bodies, which occur as a result of certain kinds of motion, unless motion and change existed? Evidently they could not exist in any way. Hence, since Pythagoras considered generation and corruption and the operations of the heavenly bodies without assigning any principle of motion, his position is clearly unsatisfactory.

205. And further (101).

Here he gives the second argument. For Pythagoras claimed that continuous quantities are composed of numbers. But whether he proves this or takes it for granted, he could not give any reason on the part of numbers as to why some things are heavy and others light. This is clear from the fact that his theories about numbers are no more adapted to sensible bodies than they are to the objects of mathematics, which are neither heavy nor light. Hence they obviously said nothing more about sensible bodies than they did about the objects of mathematics. Therefore, since sensible bodies, such as earth and fire and the like, considered in themselves, add something over and above the objects of mathematics, it is evident that they said nothing proper in any true sense about these sensible bodies. Thus it is also evident that the principles which they laid down are not sufficient, since they neglected to give the causes of those [attributes] which are proper to sensible bodies.

206. Further, how are we (102).

Here he gives the third argument, which is based on the fact that Pythagoras seemed to hold two contrary [positions]. For, on the one hand, he held that number and the attributes of number arc the cause both of those events which occur in the heavens and of all generable and corruptible things from the beginning of the world. Yet, on the other hand, he held that there is no other number besides that of which the substance of things is composed; for he held that number is the substance of things. But how is this to be understood, since one and the same thing is not the cause of itself? For Pythagoras says that the former position may be demonstrated from the fact that each one of these sensible things is numerical in substance; because in this part of the universe there are contingent beings, about which there is opinion, and which are subject to time inasmuch as they sometimes are and sometimes are not. But if generable and corruptible things were partly above or partly below, there would be disorder in the order of the universe: either after the manner of injustice, i.e., insofar as some being would receive a nobler or less noble place than it ought to have; or after the manner of separation, i.e., in the sense that, if a body were located outside its own place, it would be separated from bodies of a like nature; or after the manner of mixture and mingling, provided that a body located outside its proper place must be mixed with some other body, for example, if some part of water occupied a place belonging to air or to earth. In this discussion he seems to touch on two ways in which a natural body conforms to its proper place: one pertains to the order of position, according to which nobler bodies receive a higher place, in which there seems to be a kind of justice; and the other pertains to the similarity or dissimilarity between bodies in place, to which separation and mingling may be opposed. Therefore, insofar as things have a definite position, they are fittingly situated in the universe. For if their position were fitting would result, inasmuch as it has been stated and shown that all parts of the universe are arranged in a definite proportion; for every definite proportion is numerical. And it was from this that Pythagoras showed that all things would be numbers. But, on the other hand, we see that the continuous quantities established in different places are many and different, because the particular places in the universe correspond to the proper attributes by which bodies are differentiated. For the attributes of bodies which are above differ from those which are below. Hence, since Pythagoras by means of the above argument affirms that all sensible things are numbers, and we see that the difference in sensible bodies is attributable to difference in place, the question arises whether the number which exists "in the heavens" i.e., in the whole visible body which comprises the heavens, is merely the same as that which must be understood to be the substance of each sensible thing, or whether besides this number which constitutes the substance of sensible things there is another number which is their cause. Now Plato said that there is one kind of number which is the substance of sensible things, and another which is their cause. And while both Plato himself and Pythagoras thought that numbers are both sensible bodies themselves and their causes, Plato alone considered intellectual numbers to be the causes of things that are not sensible, and sensible numbers to be the causes and forms of sensible things. And since Pythagoras did not do this, his position is unsatisfactory.

207. In concluding Aristotle says that these remarks about the Pythagoreans' opinions will suffice; for it is enough to have touched upon them to this extent.

LESSON 14

Arguments against the Platonic Ideas

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 990a 34-991a 8

103. But those who posited Ideas, and were the first to seek an understanding of the causes of sensible things, introduced other principles equal in number to these—as though one who wishes to count things thinks that this cannot be done when they are few, but believes that he can count them after he has increased their number. For the separate Forms are almost equal to, or not fewer than, these sensible things in the search for whose causes these thinkers have proceeded from sensible things to the Forms. For to each thing there corresponds some homogeneous entity bearing the same name; and with regard to the substances of other things there is a one-in-many, both in the case of these sensible things and in those which are eternal.

104. Furthermore, with regard to the ways in which we Prove that there are Forms, according to none of these do they become evident. For from some no syllogism necessarily follows, whereas from others there does; and [according to these] there are Forms of things of which we do not think there are Forms.

105. For according to those arguments from [the existence of] the sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences; and according to the argument of the one-in-many there will also be Forms of negations.

106. Again, according to the argument that there is some understanding of corruption, there will be Forms of corruptible things; for of these there is some sensible image.

107. Again, according to the most certain arguments [for the Forms] some establish Forms of relations, of which they deny there is any essential class; whereas others lead to “the third man.”

108. And in general the arguments for the Forms do away with the existence of the things which those who speak of the Forms are more anxious to retain than the Forms themselves. For it happens that the dyad [or duality] is not first, but that number is; and that the relative is prior to that which exists of itself. And all the other [conclusions] which some [reach] by following up the opinions about the Ideas are opposed to the principles [of the theory].

109. Again, according to the opinion whereby we claim that there are Ideas [or Forms], there will be Forms not only of substances but also of many other things. For there is one concept not only in the case of substances but also in that of other things; and there are sciences not only of substance itself but also of other things. And a thousand other such [difficulties] face them.

110. But according to logical necessity and the opinions about the Ideas, if the Forms are participated in, there must be Ideas only of substances. For they are not participated in according to what is accidental. But things must participate in each Form in this respect: insofar as each Form is not predicated of a subject. I mean that if anything participates in doubleness itself, it also participates in the eternal, but only accidentally; for it is an accident of doubleness to be eternal. Hence the Forms will be substances.

111. But these things signify substance both here and in the ideal world; [otherwise] why is it necessary that a one-in-many appear in addition to these sensible things? Indeed, if the form of the Ideas and that of the things which participate in them are the same, there will be something in common. For why should duality be one and the same in the case of corruptible twos and in those which are many but eternal, rather than in the case of this [Idea of duality] and a particular two? But if the form is not the same, there will be pure equivocation; just as if one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood man, without observing any common attribute which they might have.

208. Here he argues disputatively against Plato’s opinion. This is divided into two parts. First (208), he argues against Plato’s opinion with reference to his position about the substances of things; and second (259), with reference to his position about the principles of things (“And in general”).

The first is divided into two parts. First, he argues against Plato’s position that the Forms are substances; and second (122:C 239), against the things that he posited about the objects of mathematics (“Further, if the Forms”).

In regard to the first he does two thinks. First, he argues against this position of Plato; and second (210), against the reasoning behind it (“Furthermore, with regard to”).

He says, first (103), that the Platonists, in holding that the Ideas are certain separate substances, seemed to be at fault in that, when they sought for the causes of these sensible beings, they neglected sensible beings and invented certain other new entities equal in number to sensible beings. This seems to be absurd, because one who seeks the causes of certain things ought to make these evident and not add other things, the premising of which only adds to the number of points which have to be investigated. For it would be similar if a man who wished to count certain things which he did not think he was able to count because they are few, believed that he could count them by increasing their number through the addition of certain other things. But it is evident that such a man has a foolish motive, because the path is clearer when there are fewer things; for it is better and easier to make certain of fewer things than of many. And the smaller a number is, the more certain it is to us, inasmuch as it is nearer to the unit, which is the most accurate measure. And just as the process of counting things is the measure we use to make certain of their number, in a similar fashion an investigation of the causes of things is the accurate measure for making certain of their natures. Therefore, just as the number of fewer numerable things is made certain of more easily, n a similar way the nature of fewer things is made certain of more easily. Hence, when Plato increased the classes of beings to the extent that he did with a view to explaining sensible things, he added to the number of difficulties by taking what is more difficult in order to explain what is less difficult. This is absurd.

209. That the Ideas are equal in number to, or not fewer than, sensible things, whose causes the Platonists seek (and Aristotle includes himself among their number because he was Plato’s disciple), and which they established by going from sensible things to the aforesaid Forms, becomes evident if one considers by what reasoning the Platonists introduced the Ideas. Now they reasoned thus: they saw that there is a one-in-many for all things having the same name. Hence they claimed that this one-in-many is a Form. Yet with respect to all substances of things other than the Ideas we see that there is found to be a one-in-many which is predicated of them univocally inasmuch as there are found to be many things which are specifically one. This occurs not only in the case of sensible things but also in that of the objects of mathematics, which are eternal; because among these there are also many things which are specifically one, as was stated above (157). Hence it follows that some Idea corresponds to each species of sensible things; and therefore each Idea is something having the same name as these sensible things, because the Ideas agree with them in name. For just as Socrates is called man, so also is the Idea of man. Yet they differ conceptually; for the intelligible structure of Socrates contains matter, whereas that of the ideal man is devoid of matter. or, according to another reading, each Form is said to be something having the same name [as these sensible things] inasmuch as it is a one-in-many and agrees with the things of which it is predicated so far as the intelligible structure of the species is concerned. Hence he says that they are equal to, or not fewer than, these things. For either there are held to be Ideas only of species, and then they would. be equal in number to these sensible things (granted that things are counted here insofar as they differ specifically and not individually, for the latter difference is infinite); or there are held to be ideas not only of species but also of genera, and then there would be more ideas than there are species of sensible things, because all species would be Ideas and in addition to these each and every genus [would be an Idea]. This is why he says that they are either not fewer than or more. Or, in another way, they are said to be equal inasmuch as he claimed that they are the Forms of sensible things. And he says not fewer than but more inasmuch as he held that they are the Forms not only of sensible things but also of the objects of mathematics.

210. Furthermore, with regard to (104).

Here he argues dialectically against the reasoning behind Plato’s position; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives a general account of the ways in which Plato’s arguments fail. Second (211), he explains them in detail (“For according to those”).

He says, first, that with regard to the ways in which we Platonists prove the existence of the Forms, according to none of these are the Forms seen to exist. The reason is that “no syllogism follows” necessarily from some of these ways, i.e., from certain arguments of Plato, because they cannot demonstrate with necessity the existence of the Ideas. However, from other arguments a syllogism does follow, although it does not support Plato’s thesis; for by certain of his arguments there are proved to be Forms of certain things of which the Platonists did not think there are Forms, just as there are proved to be Forms of those things of which they think there are Forms.

211. For according to (105).

Here he examines in detail the arguments by which the Platonists establish Ideas. First, he examines the second argument; and he does this by showing that from Plato’s argument it follows that there are Forms of some things for which the Platonists did not posit Forms. Second (225), he examines the first argument; and he does this by showing that Plato’s arguments are not sufficient to prove that Ideas exist (“But the most”).

In regard to the first member of this division he gives seven arguments. The first is this: one of the arguments that induced Plato to posit Ideas is taken from scientific knowledge; for since science is concerned with necessary things, it cannot be concerned with sensible things, which are corruptible, but must be concerned with separate entities which are incorruptible. According to the argument taken from the sciences, then, it follows that there are Forms of every sort of thing of which there are sciences. Now there are sciences not only of that which is one-in-many, which is affirmative, but also of negations; for just as there are some demonstrations which conclude with an affirmative proposition, in a similar way there are demonstrations which conclude with a negative proposition. Hence it is also necessary to posit Ideas of negations.

212. Again, according to the argument (106).

Here he gives the second argument. For in the sciences it is not only understood that some things always exist in the same way, but also that some things are destroyed; otherwise the philosophy of nature, which deals with motion, would be destroyed. Therefore, if there must be ideas of all the things which are comprehended in the sciences, there must be Ideas of corruptible things as such, i.e., insofar as these are singular sensible things; for thus are things corruptible. But according to Plato’s theory it cannot be said that those sciences by which we understand the processes of corruption in the world attain any understanding of the processes of corruption in sensible things; for there is no comprehension of these sensible things, but only imagination or phantasy, which is a motion produced by the senses in their act of sensing, as is pointed out in The Soul, Book II.

213. Again, according to the most (107).

Here he gives the third argument, which contains two conclusions that he says are drawn from the most certain arguments of Plato. One conclusion is this: if there are Ideas of all things of which there are sciences, and there are sciences not only of absolutes but also of things predicated relatively, then in giving this argument it follows that there are also Ideas of relations. This is opposed to Plato’s view. For, since the separate Ideas are things which exist of themselves, which is opposed to the intelligibility of a relation, Plato did not hold that there is a class of Ideas of relations, because the Ideas are said to exist of themselves.

214. The second conclusion is one which follows from other most certain arguments, namely, that there is “a third man.” This phrase can be understood in three ways. First, it can mean that the ideal man is a third man distinct from two men perceived by the senses, who have the common name man predicated of both of them. But this does not seem to be what he has in mind, even though it is not mentioned in the Sophistical Refutations, Book II; for this is the position against which he argues. Hence according to this it would not lead to an absurdity.

215. The second way in which this expression can be understood is this: the third man means one that is common to the ideal man and to one perceived by the senses. For since both a man perceived by the senses and the ideal man have a common intelligible structure, like two men perceived by the senses, then just as the ideal man is held to be a third man in addition to two men perceived by the senses, in a similar way there should be held to be another third man in addition to the ideal man and one perceived by the senses. But neither does this seem to be what he has in mind here, because

he leads us immediately to this absurdity by means of another argument. Hence it would be pointless to lead us to the same absurdity here.

216. The third way in which this expression can be understood is this: Plato posited three kinds of entities in certain classes of things, namely, sensible substances, the objects of mathematics and the Forms. He does this, for example, in the case of numbers, lines and the like. But there is no reason why intermediate things should be held to exist in certain classes rather than in others. Hence in the class of man it was also necessary to posit an intermediate man, who will be a third man midway between the man perceived by the senses and the ideal man. Aristotle also gives this argument in the later books of this work (2160).

217. And in general (108).

Here he gives the fourth argument, which runs as follows. Whoever by his own reason he does away with certain [principles] which are better known to him than the ones which he posits, adopts an absurd position. But these theories about the Forms which Plato held do away with certain principles whose reality the Platonists (when they said that there are Ideas) were more convinced of than the existence of the Ideas. Therefore Plato’s position is absurd. The minor premise is proved in this way. According to Plato the Ideas are prior both to sensible things and to the objects of mathematics. But according to him the Ideas themselves are numbers; and they are odd numbers rather than even ones, because he attributed odd number to form and even number to matter. Hence he also said that the dyad [or duality] is matter. Therefore it follows that other numbers are prior to the dyad, which he held to be the matter of sensible things, and identified with the great and small. Yet the Platonists asserted the very opposite of this, that is to say, that the dyad is first in the class of number.

218. Again, if, as has been proved by the above argument (213), there must be Ideas of relations, which are self-subsistent relations, and if the Idea itself is prior to whatever participates in the Idea, it follows that the relative is prior to the absolute, which is said to exist of itself. For sensible substances of this kind, which participate in Ideas, are said to be in an unqualified sense. And in like manner whatever those who follow the opinion about the Ideas say of all things is opposed to self-evident principles which even they themselves are most ready to acknowledge.

219. Again, according to the opinion (109).

Here he gives the fifth argument, which is as follows: Ideas were posited by Plato in order that the intelligible structures and definitions of things given in the sciences might correspond to them, and in order that there could be sciences of them. But there is “one concept,” i.e., a simple and indivisible concept, by which the quiddity of each thing is known, i.e., not only the quiddity of substances “but also of other things,” namely, of accidents. And in a similar way there are sciences not only of substance and about substance, but there are also found to be sciences “of other things,” i.e., of accidents. Hence according to the opinion by which you Platonists acknowledge the existence of Ideas, it evidently follows that there will be Forms not only of substances but also of other things, i.e., of accidents. This same conclusion follows not only because of definitions and the sciences, but there also happen to be many “other such” [reasons], i.e., very many .reasons why it is necessary to posit Ideas of accidents according to Plato’s arguments. For example, he held that the Ideas are the principles of being and of becoming in the world, and of many such aspects which apply to accidents.

220. But, on the other hand, according to Plato’s opinion about the Ideas and according to logical necessity, insofar as the Ideas are indispensable to sensible things, i.e., “insofar” s as they are capable of being participated in by sensible things, it is necessary to posit Ideas only of substances. This is proved thus: things which are accidental are not participated in. But an Idea must be participated in by each thing insofar as it is not predicated of a subject. This becomes clear as follows: if any sensible thing participates in “doubleness itself,” i.e., in a separate doubleness (for Plato spoke of all separated things in this way, namely, as self-subsisting things), it must participate in the eternal. But it does not do this essentially (because then it would follow that any double perceived by the senses would be eternal), but accidentally, i.e., insofar as doubleness itself, which is participated in, is eternal. And from this it is evident that there is no participation in things which are accidental, but only in substances. Hence according to Plato’s position a separate Form was not an accident but only a substance. Yet according to the argument taken from the sciences there must also be Forms of accidents, as was stated above (219).

221. But these things (111).

Then he gives the sixth argument, which runs thus: these sensible things signify substance both in the case of things perceived by the senses and in that of those in the ideal world, i.e., in the case of intelligible things, which signify substance; because they held that both intelligible things and sensible ones are substance. Therefore it is necessary to posit in addition to both of these substances—intelligible and sensible ones—some common entity which is a one-in-many. For the Platonists maintained that the Ideas exist on the grounds that they found a one-in-many which they believed to be separate from the many.

222. The need for positing a one apart from both sensible substances and the Forms he proves thus: the Ideas and the sensible things which participate in them either belong to one class or not. If they belong to one class, and it is necessary to posit, according to Plato’s position, one common separate Form for all things having a common nature, then it will be necessary to Posit some entity common to both sensible things and the Ideas themselves) which exists apart from both. Now one cannot answer this argument by saying that the Ideas, which are incorporeal and immaterial, do not stand in need of any higher Forms; because the objects of mathematics, which Plato places midway between sensible substances and the Forms, are similarly incorporeal and immaterial. Yet since many of them are found to belong to one species, Plato held that there is a common Form for these things, in which not only the objects of mathematics participate but also sensible substances. Therefore, if the twoness [or duality] which is the Form or Idea of twoness is identical with that found in sensible twos, which are corruptible (just as a pattern is found in the things fashioned after it), and with that found in mathematical twos, which are many in one class (but are nevertheless eternal) ‘ then for the same reason in the case of the same twoness, i.e., the Idea two , and in that of the other twoness, which is either mathematical or sensible, there will be another separate twoness. For no reason can be given why the former should exist and the latter should not.

223. But if the other alternative is admitted—that sensible things, which participate in the Ideas, do not have the same form as the Ideas—it follows that the name which is predicated of both the Ideas and sensible substances is predicated in a purely equivocal way. For those things are said to be equivocal which have only a common name and differ in their intelligible

structure. And it follows that they are not only equivocal in every way but equivocal in an absolute sense, like those things on which one name is imposed without regard for any common attribute, which are said to be equivocal by chance; for example, if one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood man.

224. Now Aristotle added this because someone might say that a name is not predicated of an Idea and of a sensible substance in a purely equivocal way, since a name is predicated of an Idea essentially and of a sensible substance by participation. For, according to Plato, the Idea of man is called "man in himself," whereas this man whom we apprehend by the senses is said to be a man by participation. However, such an equivocation is not pure equivocation. But a name which is predicated by participation is predicated with reference to something that is predicated essentially; and this is not pure equivocation but the multiplicity of analogy. However, if an Idea and a sensible substance were altogether equivocal by chance, it would follow that one could not be known through the other, as one equivocal thing cannot be known through another.

LESSON 15

The Destruction of the Platonists’ Arguments for Ideas

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112. But the most important problem of all that one might raise is what the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those which are eternal or to those which are generated and corrupted.

113. For they are not the cause of motion or of any change whatever in these things.

114. Nor are they of any assistance in knowing other things; for they are not the substance of other things, because if they were they would exist in them. Nor do they contribute anything to the being of other things; for they are not present in the things which participate in them. For if they were they would perhaps seem to be causes, as whiteness mixed with some white thing. But this theory, which was first stated by Anaxagoras and later by Hesiod and certain other thinkers, is easily disposed of. For it is easy to bring many absurd conclusions against such a view. In fact other things are not derived from the Forms in any of the customary senses.

115. Again, to say that they are exemplars, and that other things participate in them, is to speak with empty talk and to utter poetic metaphors.

116. For what is the work which looks towards the Ideas [as an exemplar]? For one thing may both be and become similar to another thing

and not be made in likeness to it. So whether Socrates exists or not, a man such as Socrates might come to be.

117. Similarly, it is evident that this will be the case even if Socrates is eternal. And there will be many exemplars of the same thing, and for this reason many Forms, as animal and two-footed and man-in-himself will be the Form of man.

118. Further, the Forms will be the exemplars not only of sensible things but also of the Forms themselves, as the genus of the species. Hence the same thing will be both an exemplar and a copy.

19. Again, it is thought to be impossible that the substance of a thing and that of which it is the substance should exist apart. Hence, if the Forms are the substances of things, how will they exist apart from them?

120. But in the Phaedo it is stated that the Forms are the causes both of being and of coming to be. Yet even if the Forms do exist, still the things which participate in them will not come to be unless there is something which produces motion.

121. And many other things come to be, such as a house and a ring, of which we do not say that there are any Forms. It is evident, then, that other things can exist and come to be because of such causes as those [responsible for the things] just mentioned.

COMMENTARY

225. Here Aristotle attacks the opinion of Plato insofar as he did not draw the conclusion which he intended to draw. For Plato intended to conclude that there are Ideas by this argument that they are necessary in some way for sensible things. Hence, Aristotle, by showing that the Ideas cannot contribute anything to sensible things, destroys the arguments by which Plato posits Ideas. Thus he says (112) that of all the objections which may be raised against Plato the foremost is that the Forms which Plato posited do not seem to contribute anything to sensible things, either to those which are eternal, as the celestial bodies, or to those which are generated and corrupted, as the elemental bodies. He shows (113) that this criticism applies to each of the arguments by which Plato posited Ideas (“For they are not”).

226. At this point in the text (113) he begins to present his five objections [against the Platonic arguments for Ideas] .

He argues, first (226), that they are useless in explaining motion; second (227), that they are use

less in explaining our knowledge of sensible things (“Nor are they”); third (231), that they are of no value as exemplars (“Again, to say”); fourth (236), that they are of no value as the substances of things (“Again, it is thought”); and fifth (237) that they are of no value as causes of generation (“But in the Phaedo”).

Accordingly, he says, first (113), that the Forms cannot contribute anything to sensible things in such a way as to be the cause of motion or of any kind of change in them. He does not give the reason for this here but mentioned it above (237), because it is clear that the Ideas were not introduced to explain motion but rather to explain immutability. For since it seemed to Plato that all sensible things are always in motion, he wanted to posit something separate from sensible things that is fixed and immobile, of which there can be certain knowledge. Hence, according to him, the Forms could not be held to be sensible principles of motion, but rather to be immutable things and principles of immutability; so that, undoubtedly, whatever is found to be fixed and constant in sensible things will be due to participation in the Ideas, which are immutable in themselves.

227. Nor are they of any assistance (114).

Second, he shows that the Forms do not contribute anything to the knowledge of sensible things, by the following argument: knowledge of each thing is acquired by knowing its own substance, and not by knowing certain substances which are separate from it. But these separate substances, which they call Forms, are altogether othef than sensible substances. Therefore a knowledge of them is of no assistance in knowing other sensible things.

228. Nor can it be said that the Forms are the substances of these sensible things; for the substance of each thing is present in the thing whom substance it is. Therefore, if then Forms were the substances of sensible things, they would be present in sensible things. This is opposed to Plato’s opinion.

229. Nor again can it be said that the Forms are present in these sensible substances as in things which participate in them; for Plato thought that

some Forms are the causes of sensible things in this way. For just as we might understand whiteness itself existing of itself as a certain separate whiteness to be mingled with the whiteness in a subject, and to participate in whiteness, in a similar way we . might say that man [in himself], who is separate, is mingled with this man who is composed of matter and the specific nature in which he participates. But this argument is easily “disposed of, ‘ i.e., destroyed; for Anaxagoras, who also held that forms and accidents are mingled with things, was the first to state it. Hesiod and certain other thinkers were the second to mention it. Therefore I say that it is easily disposed of, because it is easy to bring many absurd conclusions against such an opinion. For it would follow as he pointed out above (194) against Anaxagoras, that accidents and forms could exist without substances. For only those things can exist separately which are naturally disposed to be mixed with other things.

230. It cannot be said, then, that the Forms contribute in any way to our knowledge of sensible things as their substances. Nor can it be said that they are the principles of being in these substances by way of participation. Nor again can it be said that from these Forms as principles other things—sensible ones—come to be in any of the ways in which we are accustomed to

speak. Therefore, if principles of being and principles of knowledge are the same, the Forms cannot possibly make any contribution to scientific knowledge, since they cannot be principles of 1wing. Hence he says “in any of the customary ways” of speaking, because Plato invented many new ways of deriving knowledge of one thing from something else.

231. Again, to say (115).

Here he gives the third objection against the arguments for separate Forms. He says that the Forms are of no value to sensible things as their exemplars. First (115), he states his thesis; and, second (232), he proves it (“For what is the work”).

Accordingly he says, first (115), that to say that the Forms are the exemplars both of sensible things and the objects of mathematics (because the latter participate in causes of this kind), is untenable for two reasons. First, because it is vain and useless to posit exemplars of this kind, as he will show; and second, because this manner of speaking is similar to the metaphors which the poets introduce, which do not pertain to the philosopher. For the philosopher ought to teach by using proper causes. Hence he says that this manner of speaking is metaphorical, because Plato likened the generation of natural substances to the making of works of art, in which the artisan, by looking at some exemplar, produces something similar to his artistic idea.

232. For what is the work (116).

Here he proves his thesis by three arguments. For the work, i.e., the use, of an exemplar, seems to be this, that the artisan by looking at an exemplar induces a likeness of the form in his own artifact. But in the operations of natural beings we see that like things are generated by like, as man is generated by man. Therefore this likeness arises in things which are generated, either because some agent looks toward an exemplar or not. If not, then what is "the work," or utility, of the agent's so looking toward the Ideas as exemplars?—as if to say, none. But if the likeness results from looking at a separate exemplar, then it cannot be said that the cause of this likeness in the thing generated is the form of an inferior agent. For something similar would come into being with reference to this separate exemplar and not with reference to this sensible agent. And this is what he means when he says "and not be like it," i.e., like the sensible agent. From this the following absurdity results: someone similar to Socrates will be generated whether Socrates is held to exist or not. This we see is false; for unless Socrates plays an active part in the process of generation, no one similar to Socrates will ever be generated. Therefore, if it is false that the likeness of things which are generated does not depend on proximate agents, it is pointless and superfluous to posit separate exemplars of any kind.

233. However, it should be noted that, even though this argument does away with the separate exemplars postulated by Plato, it still does not do away with the fact that God's knowledge is the exemplar of all things. For since things in the physical world are naturally inclined to induce their likeness in things which are generated, this inclination must be traced back to some directing principle which ordains each thing to its end. This can only be the intellect of that being who knows the end and the relationship of things to the end. Therefore this likeness of effects to their natural causes is traced back to an intellect as their first principle. But it is not necessary that this likeness should be traced back to any other separate forms; because in

order to have the above-mentioned likeness this direction of things to their end, according to which natural powers are directed by the first intellect, is sufficient.

234. Similarly, it is evident (117).

Here he gives the second argument, which runs as follows: just as Socrates because he is Socrates adds something to man, in a similar way man adds something to animal. And just as Socrates participates in man, so does man participate in animal. But if besides this Socrates whom we perceive there is held to be another Socrates who is eternal, as his exemplar, it will follow that there are several exemplars of this Socrates whom we perceive, i.e., the eternal Socrates and the Form man. And by the same reasoning the Form man will have several exemplars; for its exemplar will be both animal and two-footed and also “man-in-himself,” i.e., the Idea of man. But that there should be several exemplars of a single thing made in likeness to an exemplar is untenable. Therefore it is absurd to hold that things of this kind are the exemplars of sensible things.

235. Further (118).

Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: just as a Form is related to an individual, so also is a genus related to a species. Therefore, if the Forms are the exemplars of individual sensible things, as Plato held, there will be also certain exemplars of these Forms, that is to say, their genus. But this is absurd, because then it would follow that one and the same thing, i.e., Form, would be an exemplar of one thing, namely, of the individual whom we perceive by the senses, and a copy made in likeness to something else, namely, a genus. This seems to be absurd.

236. Again, it is thought (119).

Here he proves his fourth objection, namely, that the Forms contribute nothing to sensible things as their substances or formal causes; because “It is thought by him,” that is to say, it is a matter of opinion (to put this impersonally), that it is impossible for a thing’s substance to exist apart from the thing whose substance it is. But the Forms exist apart from the things of which they are the Forms, i.e., apart, from sensible things. Therefore they are not the substances of sensible things.

237. But in the “Phaedo” (120).

Here he shows that the Forms are of no value in accounting for the coming to be of sensible things, although Plato said “in the Phaedo,” i.e., in one of his works, that the Forms are the causes both of the being and of the coming to be of sensible things.

But Aristotle disproves this by two arguments. The first is as follows: to posit the cause is to posit the effect. However, even if the Forms exist, the particular or individual things which participate in the Forms will come into being only if there is some agent which moves them to acquire form. This is evident from Plato's opinion that the Forms are always in the same state. Therefore, assuming that these Forms exist, if individuals were to exist or come into being by participating in them, it would follow that individual substances of this kind would always be. This is clearly false. Therefore it cannot be said that the Forms are the causes of both the coming to be and the being of sensible things. The chief reason is that Plato did not hold that the Forms are efficient causes, as was stated above (226). For Aristotle holds that the being and coming to be of lower substances proceeds from immobile separate substances, inasmuch as these substances are the movers of the celestial bodies, by means of which generation and corruption are produced in these lower substances.

238. And many other (121).

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: just as artifacts are related to artificial causes, so are natural bodies to natural causes. But we see that many other things besides natural bodies come into being in the realm of these lower bodies, as a house and a ring, for which the Platonists did not posit any Forms. Therefore "other things," namely, natural things, can both be and come to be because of such proximate causes as those just mentioned, i.e., artificial ones; so that, just as artificial things come to be as a result of proximate agents, so also do natural things.

LESSON 16

Arguments against the View that Ideas Are Numbers

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122. Further, if the Forms are numbers, in what way will they be causes? Will it be because existing things are other numbers, so that this number is man, another Socrates, and still another Callias? In what respect, then, are the former the cause of the latter? For it will make no difference if the former are eternal and the latter are not. But if it is because the things here are ratios of numbers, like a harmony, then clearly there will be one kind of thing of which they are the ratios. And if this is matter, evidently the numbers themselves will be certain ratios of one thing to something else. I mean that, if Callias is a numerical ratio of fire, water, earth and air, [his Idea will also be a ratio of certain things], and man-in-himself, whether it be a number or not, will still be a numerical ratio of certain things and not just a number; nor will it be any number because of these.

123. Again, one number will come from many numbers, but how or in what way can one Form come from [many] Forms?

124. But if one number is not produced from them but from the units which they contain, as the units in the number ten thousand, how are the units related? For if they are specifically the same, many absurdities will follow; and if they are not, neither will they be the same as one another nor all the others the same as all.

125. For in what way Will they differ, if they have no attributes? For these statements are neither reasonable nor in accord with our understanding.

126. Further, [if the Forms are numbers], it is necessary to set up some other class of number: that with which arithmetic deals. And all the things which an said to be intermediate, from what things or what principles in an absolute sense will they come, or why will they be [an intermediate class] between a the things at hand and those [in the ideal world]?

127. Again, each of the units which are contained in the number two will come from a prior two. But this is impossible.

128. Further, why is a number something composed of these?

129. And, again, in addition to what has been said, if the units are different, it will be necessary to speak of them in the same way as do those who say that the elements are four or two. For none of them designate as an element what is common, namely, body, but fire and earth, whether body is something in common or not. But now we are speaking of the one as if it were one thing made up of like parts, as fire or water. But if this is the case, numbers will not be substances. Yet it is evident that, if the one itself is something common and a principle, then the one is used in different senses; otherwise this will be impossible.

130. Now when we wish to reduce substances to their principles, we claim that lengths come from the long and short, i.e., from a kind of great and small; and the plane from the wide and narrow; and body from the deep and shallow.

131. Yet how will a surface contain a line, or a solid a line or surface? For the wide and narrow is a different class from the deep and shallow. Hence, just as number is not present in these, because the many and few differ from these, it is evident that no one of the other higher classes will be present in the lower. And the broad is not in the class of the deep, for then the solid would be a kind of surface.

132. Further, from what will points derive being? Plato was opposed to this class of objects as a geometrical fiction, but he called them the principle of a line. And he often holds that there are indivisible lines. Yet these must have some [limit]. Therefore any argument that proves the existence of the line also proves the existence of the point.

239. Here he destroys Plato’s opinion about the Forms inasmuch as Plato claimed that they are numbers. In regard to this he does two things. First, he argues dialectically against Plato’s opinion about numbers, and second (254), against his opinion about the other objects of mathematics (“Now when we wish”).

In regard to the first part he gives six arguments. The first (122) is this: in the case of things which are substantially the same, one thing is not the cause of another. But sensible things are substantially numbers according to the Platonists and Pythagoreans. Therefore, if the Forms themselves are numbers, they cannot be the cause of sensible things.

240. But if it is said that some numbers are Forms and others are sensible filings, as Plato literally held (as though We were to say that this number is man and another is Socrates and still another is Callias), even this would not seem to be sufficient; for according to this view the intelligible structure of number will be common both to sensible things and the Forms. But in the case of things which have the same intelligible structure, one does not seem to be the cause of another. Therefore the Forms will not be the causes of sensible things.

241. Nor again can it be said that they are causes for the reason that, if those numbers are Forms, they are eternal. For this difference, namely, that some things differ from others in virtue of being eternal and non-eternal in their own being considered absolutely, is not sufficient to explain why some things are held to be the causes of others. Indeed, things differ from each other as cause and effect rather because of the relationship which one has to the other. Therefore things that differ numerically do not differ from each other as cause and effect because some are eternal and some are not.

242. Again, it is said that sensible things are certain “ratios” or proportions of numbers, and that numbers are the causes of these sensible things, as we also observe to be the case “in harmonies,” i.e., in the combinations of musical notes. For numbers are said to be the causes of harmonies insofar as the numerical proportions applied to sounds yield harmonies. Now if the above is true, then just as in harmonies there are found to be sounds in addition to numerical proportions, in a similar way it was obviously necessary to posit in addition to the numbers in sensible

things something generically one to which the numerical proportions are applied, so that the proportions of those things which belong to that one genus would constitute sensible things. However, if that to which the numerical proportion in sensible things is applied is matter, evidently those separate numbers, which are Forms, had to be termed proportions of some one thing to something else. For this particular man, called Callias or Socrates, must be said to be similar to the ideal man, called “man-in-himself,” or humanity. Hence, if Callias is not merely a number, but is rather a kind of ratio or numerical proportion of the elements, i.e., of fire, earth, water and air, and if the ideal man-in-himself is a kind of ratio or numerical proportion of certain things, the ideal man will not be a number by reason of its own substance. From this it follows that there will be no number “apart from these,” i.e., apart from the things numbered. For if the number which constitutes the Forms is separate in the highest degree, and if it is not separate from things but is a kind of proportion of numbered things, no other number will now be separate. This is opposed to Plato’s view.

243. It also follows that the ideal man is a proportion of certain numbered things, whether it is held to be a number or not. For according to those who held that substances are numbers, and according to the philosophers of nature, who denied that numbers are substances, some numerical proportions must be found in the substances of things. This is most evident in the case of the opinion of Empedocles, who held that each one of these sensible things is composed of a certain harmony or proportion [of the elements].

244. Again, one number (123).

Here he gives the second argument which runs thus: one number is produced from many numbers. Therefore, if the Forms are numbers, one Form is produced from many Forms. But this is impossible. For if from many things which differ specifically something specifically one is produced, this comes about by mixture, in which the natures of the things mixed are not preserved; just as a stone is produced from the four elements. Again, from things of this kind which differ specifically one thing is not produced by reason of the Forms, because the Forms themselves are combined in such a way as to constitute a single thing only in accordance with the intelligible structure of individual things, which are altered in such a way that they can be mixed together. And when the Forms themselves of the numbers two and three are combined, they give rise to the number five, so that each number remains and is retained in the number five.

245. But since someone could answer this argument, in support of Plato, by saying that one number does not come from many numbers, but each number is immediately constituted of units, Aristotle is therefore logical in rejecting this answer (124) (“But if one number”).

For if it is said that some greater number, such as ten thousand, is not produced “from them,” namely, from twos or many smaller numbers, but from “units,” i.e., ones, this question will follow: How are the units of which numbers are composed related to each other? For all units must either conform with each other or not.

246. But many absurd conclusions follow from the first alternative, especially for those who claim that the Forms are numbers. For it will follow that different Forms do not differ substantially but only insofar as one Form surpasses another. It also seems absurd that units should differ in no way and yet be many, since difference is a result of multiplicity.

247. But if they do not conform, this can happen in two ways. First, they can lack conformity because the units of one number differ from those of another number, as the units of the number two differ from those of the number three, although the units of one and the same number will conform with each other. Second, they can lack conformity insofar as the units of one and the same number do not conform with each other or with the units of another number. He indicates this distinction when he says, “For neither will they be the same as one another (125),” i.e., the units which comprise the same number, “nor all the others the same as all,” i.e., those which belong to different numbers. Indeed, in whatever way there is held to be lack of conformity between units an absurdity is apparent. For every instance of non-conformity involves some form or attribute, just as we see that bodies which lack conformity differ insofar as they are hot and cold, white and black, or in terms of similar attributes. Now units lack qualities of this kind, because they have no qualities, according to Plato. Hence it will be impossible to hold that there is any non-conformity or difference between them of the kind caused by a quality. Thus it is evident that Plato’s opinions about the Forms and numbers are neither “reasonable” (for example, those proved by an apodictic argument), nor “in accord with our understanding” (for example, those things which are self-evident and

verified by [the habit of] intellect alone, as the first principles of demonstration).

248. Further, [if the Forms] (126).

Here he gives the third argument against Plato, which runs thus: all objects of mathematics, which Plato affirmed to be midway between the Forms and sensible substances, are derived unqualifiedly from numbers, either as proper principles, or as first principles. He says this because in one sense numbers seem to be the immediate principles of the other objects of mathematics; for the Platonists said that the number one constitutes the point, the number two the line, the number three surface, and the number four the solid. But in another sense the objects of mathematics seem to be reduced to numbers as first principles and not as proximate ones. For the Platonists said that solids are composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, lines of points, and points of units, which constitute numbers. But in either way it followed that numbers are the principles of the other objects of mathematics.

249. Therefore, just as the other objects of mathematics constituted an intermediate class between sensible substances and the Forms, in a similar way it was necessary to devise some class of number which is other than the numbers that constitute the Forms and other than those that constitute the substance of sensible things. And arithmetic, which is one of the mathematical sciences, evidently deals with this kind of number as its proper subject, just as geometry deals with mathematical extensions. However, this position seems to be superfluous; for no reason can be given why number should be midway “between the things at hand,” or sensible things, and “those in the ideal world,” or the Forms, since both sensible things and the Forms are numbers.

250. Again, each of the units (127).

Here he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: those things which exist in the sensible world and those which exist in the realm of mathematical entities are caused by the Forms. Therefore, if some number two is found both in the sensible world and in the realm of the objects of mathematics, each unit of this subsequent two must be caused by a prior two, which is the Form of twoness. But it is “impossible” that unity should be caused by duality. For it would be most necessary to say this if the units of one number were of a different species than those of another number, because then these units would acquire their species from a Form which is prior to the units of that number. And thus the units of a subsequent two would have to be produced from a prior two.

251. Further, why is (128).

Here he gives the fifth argument, which runs thus: many things combine so as to constitute one thing only by reason of some cause, which can be considered to be either extrinsic, as some agent which unites them, or intrinsic, as some unifying bond. Or if some things are united of themselves, one of them must be potential and another actual. However, in the case of units none of these reasons can be said to be the one "why a number," i.e., the cause by which a number, will be a certain "combination," ' i.e., collection of many units; as if to say, it will be impossible to give any reason for this.

252. And, again, in addition (129).

Here he gives the sixth argument, which runs thus: if numbers are the Forms and substances of things, it will be necessary to say, as has been stated before (245), either that units are different, or that they conform. But if they are different, it follows that unity as unity will not be a principle.

This is clarified by a similar case drawn from the position of the natural philosophers. For some of these thinkers held that the four [elemental] bodies are principles. But even though being a body is common to these elements, these philosophers did not maintain that a common body is a principle, but rather fire, earth, water and air, which are different bodies. Therefore, if units are different, even though all have in common the intelligible constitution of unity, it will not be said that unity itself as such is a principle. This is contrary to the Platonists' position; for they now say that the unit is the principle of things, just as the natural philosophers say that fire or water or some body with like parts is the principle of things. But if our conclusion against the Platonists' theory is true-that unity as such is not the principle and substance of things-it will follow that numbers are not the substances of things. For number is held to be the substance of things only insofar as it is constituted of units, which are said to be the substances of things. This is also contrary to the Platonists' position which is now being examined, i.e., that numbers are Forms.

253. But if you say that all units are undifferentiated, it follows that "the whole," i.e., the entire universe, is a single entity, since the substance of

each thing is the one itself, and this is something common and undifferentiated. Further, it follows that the same entity is the principle of all things. But this is impossible by reason of the notion involved, which is inconceivable in itself, namely, that all things should be one according to the aspect of substance. For this view contains a contradiction, since it claims that the one is the substance of all things, yet maintains that the one is a principle. For one and the same thing is not its own principle, unless, perhaps, it is said that "the one" is used in different senses, so that when the senses of the one are differentiated all things are said to be generically one and not numerically or specifically one.

254. Now when we wish (130).

Here he argues against Plato's position with reference to his views about mathematical extensions. First (130), he gives Plato's position; and second (255), he advances an argument against it ("Yet how will").

He says, first, that the Platonists, wishing to reduce the substances of things to their first principles, when they say that continuous quantities themselves are the substances of sensible things, thought they had discovered the principles of things when they assigned line, surface and solid as the principles of sensible things. But in giving the principles of continuous quantities they said that "lengths," i.e., lines, are composed of the long and short, because they held that contraries are the principles of all things. And since the line is the first of continuous quantities, they first attributed to it the great and small; for inasmuch as these two are the principles of the line, they are also the principles of other continuous quantities. He says "from the great and small" because the great and small are also placed among the Forms, as has been stated (217). But insofar as they are limited by position, and are thus particularized in the class of continuous quantities, they constitute first the line and then other continuous quantities. And for the same reason they said that surface is composed of the wide and narrow, and body of the deep and shallow.

255. Yet how will a surface (130).

Here he argues against the foregoing position, by means of two arguments. The first is as follows. Things whose principles are different are themselves different. But the principles of continuous quantities mentioned above are different, according to the foregoing position, for the wide and narrow, which are posited as the principles of surface, belong to a different class than the deep and shallow, which are held to be the principles of body. The same thing can be said of the long and short, which differ from each of the above. Therefore, line, surface and body all differ from each other. How then will one be able to say that a surface contains a line, and a body a line and a surface? In confirmation of this argument he introduces a similar case involving number. For the many and few, which are held to be principles of things for a similar reason, belong to a different class than the long and short, the wide and narrow, and the deep and shallow. Therefore number is not contained in these continuous quantities but is essentially separate. Hence, for the same reason, the higher of the above mentioned things will not be contained in the lower; for example, a line will not be contained in a surface or a surface in a body.

256. But because it could be said that certain of the foregoing contraries are the genera of the others, for example, that the long is the genus of the broad, and the broad the genus of the deep, he destroys this [objection] by the following argument: things composed of principles are related to each other in the same way as their principles are. Therefore, if the broad is the genus of the deep, surface will also be the genus of body. Hence a solid will be a kind of plane, i.e., a species of surface. This is clearly false.

257. Further, from what will (132).

Here he gives the second argument, which involves points; and in regard to this Plato seems to have made two errors. First, Plato claimed that a point is the limit of a line, just as a line is the limit of a surface and a surface the limit of a body. Therefore, just as he posited certain principles of, which the latter are composed, so too he should have posited some principle from which points derive their being. But he seems to have omitted this.

258. The second error is this: Plato seems to have held different opinions about points. For sometimes he maintained that the whole science of geometry treats this class of things, namely, points, inasmuch as he held that points are the principles and substance of all continuous quantities. And he not only implied this but even explicitly stated that a point is the principle of a line, defining it in this way. But many times he said that indivisible lines are the principles of lines and other continuous quantities, and that this is the class of things with which geometry deals, namely, indivisible lines. Yet by reason of the fact that he held that all continuous (quantities are composed of indivisible lines, he did not avoid the consequence that

continuous quantities are composed of points, and that points are the principles of continuous quantities. For indivisible lines must have some limits, and these can only be points. Hence, by whatever argument indivisible lines are held to be the principles of continuous quantities, by the same argument too the point is held to be the principle of continuous quantity.

LESSON 17

Arguments against the View that the Ideas Are Principles of Being and Knowledge

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133. And, in general, even though wisdom investigates the causes of apparent things, we have neglected this study. For we say nothing about the cause from which motion originates. And while we think that we are stating the substance of these sensible things, we introduce other substances. But the way in which we explain how the latter are the substances of the former is empty talk; for to participate, as we have said before (115), signifies nothing. Moreover, that which we see to be the cause in the sciences, that by reason of which all intellect and all nature operates, on that cause which we say is one of the principles the Forms do not touch in any way. But mathematics has been turned into philosophy by present-day thinkers (566), although they say that mathematics must be treated for the sake of other things.

134. Further, one might suppose that the underlying substance [which they consider] as matter is too mathematical, and that it is rather a predicate and difference of substance and matter, like the great and small; just as the philosophers of nature speak of the rare and dense (56), which they say are the primary differences of the underlying subject; for “ these are a kind of excess and defect.

135. And with regard to motion, if these entities [the great and small] are motion, evidently the Forms are moved; but if they are not, from what does motion come? For [if it has no cause], the whole study of nature is destroyed.

136. And what seems easy to show is that all things are not one; for from their position all things do not become one. But if someone should assert that all things are some one thing, not even this is true unless one grants that the universal is a class; and in certain other cases this is impossible.

137. For they do not have any theory about the lengths, widths, and solids which come after the numbers: either as to how they now exist or will exist, or what importance they have. For it is impossible that they should be Forms (since they are not numbers), or intermediate things (for those are the objects of mathematics), or corruptible things; but, on the contrary, it seems that they form a fourth class.

138. And, in general, to look for the elements of existing things without distinguishing the different senses in which things are said to be, makes it impossible to discover them. And [their view is unsatisfactory] in another way, i.e., in the way in which they seek for the elements of which things are composed. For it is impossible to understand of what things action or passion or straightness is composed. But if this is possible only in the case of substances, then to look for the elements of all existing things, or to think that we have found them, is a mistake.

139. But how will one acquire knowledge of the elements of all things? For it is clearly impossible to have prior knowledge of anything. For just as one acquiring knowledge of geometry must have a prior knowledge of other things, but not of the things which this science [investigates], and which he is to learn, so it is in the case of the other sciences. Hence, if there is a science of all things (and there must be a science of these), as some say, the one learning this science does not have any prior knowledge of it. But all learning proceeds from things previously known, either all or some of them, whether the learning be by demonstration or by definitions. For [the parts] of which definitions are composed must already be known beforehand and be evident. The same thing is true in the case of things discovered by induction.

140. But if this science were connatural, it is a wonder how we could be unconscious of having the most important of the sciences.

141. Again, how is anyone to know the elements of which things are composed, and how is this to be made evident? For this also presents a difficulty; because one might argue in the same way as one does about certain syllables. For some say that sma is made up of s, m and a, whereas others say that it is a totally different sound and not any of those which are known to us.

142. Again, how could one know the things of which a sense is cognizant without having that sense? Yet this will be necessary if they [i.e., sensible things] are the elements of which all things are composed, just as spoken words are composed of their proper elements.

Chapter 10

143. From the foregoing, then, it is evident that all [the early philosophers] seem to seek the causes mentioned in the Physics, and that we cannot state any other in addition to these. But they understood these obscurely; and while in one sense all causes have been mentioned before, in another sense they have not been mentioned at all. Indeed, the earliest philosophy seems to speak in a faltering way about all subjects inasmuch as it was new as regards principles and the first of its kind. For even Empedocles says that ratios are present in bone, and that this is the quiddity or substance of a thing. But [if this is true], there must likewise be a ratio of flesh and of every other thing or of nothing. For it is because of this that flesh and bone and every other thing exists, and not because of their matter, which he says is fire, earth, air and water. But if someone else had said this, he would have been forced to agree to the same thing. But he has not said this. Such things as these, then, have been explained before. So let us return again to whatever problems one might raise about the same subject; for perhaps in the light of these we shall be able to make some investigation into subsequent problems.

COMMENTARY

259. Here Aristotle destroys Plato’s opinion about the principles of things. First, he destroys Plato’s opinion about principles of being; and second (268), his opinion about principles of knowledge (“But how will one”).

In regard to the first part he gives six arguments. The first is based on the fact that Plato neglected to deal with the classes of causes. Thus he says that, “in general, wisdom,” or philosophy, has as its aim to investigate the causes “of apparent things,” i.e., things apparent to the senses. For men began to philosophize because they sought for the causes of things, as was stated in the prologue (53). But the Platonists, among whom he includes himself, neglected the principles of things, because they said nothing about the efficient cause, which is the source of change. And by positing the Ideas they thought they had given the formal cause of things. But while they thought that they were speaking of the substance of these things, i.e., sensible ones, they posited the existence of certain other separate substances which differ from these. However, the way in which they assigned these separate substances as the substances of sensible things “is empty talk,” i.e., it proves nothing and is not true. For they said that the Forms are the substances of sensible things inasmuch as they are participated in by sensible things. But what they said about participation is meaningless, as is clear from what was said above (225). Furthermore, the Forms which they posited have no connection with the final cause, although we see that this is a cause in certain sciences which demonstrate by means of the final cause, and that it is by reason of this cause that every intellectual agent and every natural one operates, as has been shown in the Physics, Book II. And just as they do not touch on that cause which is called an end [or goal], when they postulate the existence of the Forms (169), neither do they treat of that cause which is called the source of motion, namely, the efficient cause, which is the opposite, so to speak, of the final cause. But the Platonists by omitting causes of this kind (since they did omit a starting-point and end of motion), have dealt with natural things as if they were objects of mathematics, which lack motion. Hence they said that the objects of mathematics should be studied not only for themselves but for the sake of other things, i.e., natural bodies; inasmuch as they attributed the properties of the objects of mathematics to sensible bodies.

260. Further, one might (134).

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: that which is posited as the matter of a thing is the substance of a thing, and is predicable of a thing to a greater degree than something which exists apart from it. But a Form exists apart from sensible things. Therefore, according to the opinion of the Platonists, one might suppose that the underlying substance as matter is the substance of the objects of mathematics rather than a separate Form. Furthermore, he admits that it is predicated of a sensible thing rather than the above Form. For the Platonists held that the great and small is a difference of substance or matter; for they referred these two principles to matter, just as the philosophers of nature (115) held that rarity and density are the primary differences of the “underlying subject,” or matter, by which matter is changed, and spoke of them in a sense as the great and small. This is clear from the fact that rarity and density are a kind of excess and defect. For the dense is what contains a great deal of matter under the same dimensions, and the rare is what contains very little matter. Yet the Platonists said that the Forms are the substance of sensible things rather than the objects of mathematics, and that they are predicable of them to a greater degree.

261. And with regard (135).

Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: if those attributes which exist in sensible things are caused by separate Forms, it is necessary to say either that there is an Idea of “motion” among the Forms or there is not. If there is a Form or Idea of motion among the Forms, and there cannot be motion without something that is moved, it also follows that the Forms must be moved. But this is opposed to the Platonists’ opinion, for they claimed that the Forms are immobile. On the other hand, if there is no Idea of motion, and these attributes which exist in sensible things are caused by the Ideas, it will be impossible to assign a cause for the motion which occurs in sensible things; and thus the entire investigation of natural philosophy, which studies mobile things, will be destroyed.

262. And what seems easy (136).

Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: if unity were the substance of all things, as the Platonists assumed, it would be necessary to say that all things are one, just as the philosophers of nature also did in claiming that the substance of all things is water, and so on for the other elements. But it is easy to show that all things are not one. Hence the position that unity is the substance of all things is not held in high repute.

263. But let us assume that someone might say that it does not follow, from Plato’s position, that all things are one in an unqualified sense but in a qualified sense, just as we say that some things are one generically or specifically. And if someone wished to say that all things are one in this way, even this could be held only if what I call the one were a genus or

universal predicate of all things. For then we could say that all things are one specifically, just as we say that both a man and an ass are animal substantially. But in certain cases it seems impossible that there should be one class of all things, because the difference dividing this class would necessarily not be one, as will be said in Book III (432). Therefore, in no way can it be held that the substance of all things is one.

264. For they do not have (137).

Here he gives the fifth argument, which runs thus: Plato placed lengths, widths and solids after numbers as the substances of sensible things, i.e., that of which they are composed. But according to Plato’s position there seems to be no reason why they should be held to exist either now or in the future. Nor does this notion seem to have any efficacy to establish them as the causes of sensible things. For things which exist “now” must mean immobile things (because these always exist in the same way), whereas things which “will exist” must mean those which are capable of generation and corruption, which acquire being after non-being. This becomes clear thus: Plato posited three classes of things—sensible things, the Forms and the objects of mathematics, which are an intermediate class. But such lines and surfaces as those of which sensible bodies are composed cannot be Forms; for the Forms are essentially numbers, whereas such things [i.e., the lines and surfaces composing bodies] come after numbers. Nor can such lines and surfaces be said to be an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things; for the things in this intermediate class are the objects of mathematics, and exist apart from sensible things; but this cannot be said of the lines and surfaces of which sensible bodies are composed. Nor again can such lines and surfaces be sensible things; for the latter are corruptible, whereas these lines and surfaces are incorruptible, as will be proved below in Book III (466). Therefore these things are either nothing at all or they constitute a fourth class of things, which Plato omitted.

265. And, in general (138).

Here he gives the sixth argument, which runs thus: it is impossible to discover the principles of anything that is spoken of in many senses, unless these many senses are distinguished. Now those things which agree in name only and differ in their intelligible structure cannot have common principles; otherwise they would have the same intelligible structure, since the intelligible structure of a thing is derived from its own principles. But it is impossible to assign distinct principles for those things which have only the name in common, unless it be those whose principles must be indicated to differ from each other. Therefore, since being is predicated both of substance and the other genera in different senses and not in the same sense, Plato assigned inadequate principles for things by failing to distinguish beings from each other.

266. But since someone could assign principles to things which differ in their intelligible structure and have a common name, by adjusting proper principles to each without distinguishing the many senses of the common name, and since the Platonists have not done this, then “in another way,” i.e., by another argument, they assigned inadequate principles to things when they looked for the elements of which things are made, i.e., in the way in which they sought for them, inasmuch as they did not assign principles which are sufficient for all things. For from their statements it is impossible to understand the principles of which either action and passion, curvature and straightness, or other such accidents, are composed. For they only indicated the principles of substances and neglected accidents.

267. But if in defense of Plato someone wished to say that it is possible for the elements of all things to have been acquired or discovered at the moment when the principles of substances alone happen to have been acquired or discovered, this opinion would not be true. For even if the principles of substances are also in a sense the principles of accidents, nevertheless accidents have their own principles. Nor are the principles of all genera the same in all respects, as will be shown below in Book XI (2173) and Book XII (2455) of this work.

268. But how will one (139).

Here he argues dialectically against Plato’s position that the Ideas are the principles of our scientific knowledge. He gives four arguments, of which the first is this: if our scientific knowledge is caused by the Ideas themselves, it is impossible for us to acquire knowledge of the principles of things. But it is evident that we do acquire knowledge. Therefore our knowledge is not caused by the Ideas themselves. That it would be impossible to acquire knowledge of anything, he proves thus: no one has any prior knowledge of that object of which he ought to acquire knowledge; for example, even though in the case of geometry one has prior knowledge of other things which are necessary for demonstration, nevertheless the objects of which he ought to acquire knowledge he must not know beforehand. The same thing is also true in the case of the other sciences. But if the Ideas are the cause of our knowledge, men must have knowledge of all things, because the Ideas are the intelligible structures of all knowable things. Therefore we cannot acquire knowledge of anything) unless one might be said to acquire knowledge of something, which he already knew. if it is held, then, that someone acquires knowledge, he must not have any prior knowledge of the thing which he comes to know, but only of certain other things through which he becomes instructed; i.e., one acquires knowledge through things previously known, [either] “all,” i.e., universals, “or some of them,” i.e.,:singular things. One learns through universals in the case of those things which are discovered by demonstration and definition, for in the case of demonstrations and definitions the things of which definitions or universals are composed must be known first. And in the case of things which are discovered by induction singular things must be known first.

269. But if this, science (140).

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: if the Ideas are the cause of our knowledge, it must be connatural to us; for men grasp sensible things through this proper nature, because sensible things participate in Ideas according to the Platonists. But the most important knowledge or science is one that is connatural to us and which we cannot forget, as is evident of our knowledge of the first principles of demonstration, of which no one is ignorant. Hence there is no way in which we can forget the knowledge of all things caused in us by the Ideas. But this is contrary to the Platonists’ opinion, who said that the soul as a result of its union with the body forgets the knowledge which it has of all things by nature, and that by teaching a man acquires knowledge of something that he previously knew, as though the process of acquiring knowledge were merely one of remembering.

270. Again, how is anyone (141).

Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: in order to know things a man must acquire knowledge not only of the forms of things but also of the material principles of which they are composed. This is evident from the fact that occasionally questions arise regarding these; for example, with regard to this syllable sma, some raise the question whether it is composed of the three letters s, m and a, or whether it is one letter which is distinct from these and has its own sound. But only the formal principles of things can be known through the Ideas, because the Ideas are the forms of things. Hence the Ideas are not a sufficient cause of our knowledge of things when material principles remain unknown.

271. Again, how could (142).

Here he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: in order to know reality we must know sensible things, because sensible things are the apparent material element of which all things are composed, just as complex sounds (such as syllables and words) are composed of their proper elements. If, then, knowledge is caused in us by the Ideas, our knowledge of sensible things must be caused by the Ideas. But the knowledge which is caused in us by the Ideas is grasped without the senses, because we have no connection with the Ideas through the senses. Therefore in the act of perception it follows that anyone who does not have a sense can apprehend the object of that sense. This is clearly false; for a man born blind cannot have any knowledge of colors.

272. From the foregoing (143).

Here he summarizes the statements made by the ancient philosophers. He says that from what has been said above it is evident that the ancient philosophers attempted to investigate the cause which he [Aristotle] dealt with in the Physics, and that in their statements we find no cause in addition to those established in that work. However, these men discussed these causes obscurely; and while in a sense they have mentioned all of these causes, in another sense they have not mentioned any of them. For just as young children at first speak imperfectly and in a stammering way, in a similar fashion this philosophy, since it was new, seems to speak imperfectly and in a stammering way about the principles of all things. This is borne out by the fact that Empedocles was the first to say that bones have a certain ratio, or proportional mixture [of the elements], and that this is a thing’s quiddity or substance. But the same thing must also be true of flesh and of every other single thing or of none of them, for all of these things are mixtures of the elements. And for this reason it is evident that flesh and bone and all things of this kind are not what they are because of their matter, which he identified with the four elements, but because of this principle-their form. However, Empedocles, compelled as it were by the need for truth, would have maintained this view if it had been expressed more clearly by someone else, but he did not express it clearly. And just as the ancient philosophers have not clearly expressed the nature of form, neither have they clearly expressed the nature of matter, as was said above about Anaxagoras (90). Nor have they clearly expressed the nature of any other principles. Therefore, concerning such thing, as have been stated imperfectly, we have spoken of this before (190). And with regard to these matters we will restate again in Book III (423) whatever difficulties can be raised on both sides of the question. For perhaps from such difficulties we will discover some useful information for dealing with the problems which must be examined and solved later on throughout this whole science.

BOOK II

THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH AND CAUSES

LESSON 1

The Acquisition of Truth: Its Ease and Its Difficulty

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144. Theoretical, i.e., speculative, knowledge of truth is in one sense difficult and in another, easy.

145. An indication of this is found in the fact that, while no one can attain an adequate knowledge of it, all men together do not fail, because each one is able to say something true about nature.

146. And while each one individually contributes nothing or very little to the truth, still as a result of the combined efforts of all a great amount of truth becomes known.

147. Therefore, if the situation in the case of truth seems to be like the one which we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” then in this respect it will be easy to know the truth.

148. But the fact that we cannot simultaneously grasp a whole and its parts shows the difficulty involved.”

149. However, since the difficulty is twofold, perhaps its cause is not in things but in us; for just as the eyes of owls are to the light of day, so is our soul’s intellective power to those things which are by nature the most evident of all.

150. Now it is only right that we should be grateful not merely to those with whose views we agree but also to those who until now have spoken in

a superficial way; for they too have made some contribution because they have made use of the habit which we now exercise. Thus if there had been no Timotheus, we would not have a great part of our music; and if there had been no Phrynis, there would have been no Timotheus. The same is true of those who have made statements about the truth; for we have accepted certain opinions from some of them, and others have been the cause of them attaining their knowledge as they have been the cause of us attaining ours.

COMMENTARY

273. Having criticized the ancient philosophers’ opinions about the first principles of things, with which first philosophy is chiefly concerned, the Philosopher now begins to establish what is true.

First philosophy considers truth in a different way than the particular sciences do. Each of the particular sciences considers a particular truth out a definite class of beings; e.g., geometry deals with the continuous quantities of bodies, and arithmetic with numbers; whereas first philosophy considers what is universally true of things. Therefore, it pertains to this science to consider in what respects man is capable of knowing the truth.

274. First, he states what he intends to prove. He says that “theoretical knowledge,” i.e., the contemplative or speculative understanding of truth, is in one sense easy and in another, difficult.

275. An indication of this (145).

Second, he explains what he intends to prove: first, in what sense it is easy to know the truth; and second (278), in what sense it is difficult (“But the fact”). He shows in what sense it is easy to know the truth, by giving three indications:

The first is this: while no man can attain a complete knowledge of the truth, still no man is so completely devoid of truth that he knows nothing about it. This is shown by the fact that anyone can make a statement about the truth and the nature of things, which is a sign of intellectual reflection.

276. And while each one individually (146).

Here he gives the second indication. He says that, while the amount of truth that one man can discover or contribute to the knowledge of truth by his own study and talents is small compared with a complete knowledge of truth, nevertheless what is known as a result of “the combined efforts” of all, i.e., what is discovered and collected into one whole, becomes quite extensive. This can be seen in the case of the particular arts, which have developed in a marvelous manner as a result of the studies and talents of different men.

277. Therefore, if the situation (147).

Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, the situation in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house. For it is difficult to know what the interior of a house is like, and a man is easily deceived in such matters; but just as no one is mistaken about the entrance of a house, which is evident to all and is the first thing that we perceive, so too this is the case with regard to the knowledge of truth; for those truths through which we enter into a knowledge of others are known to all, and no man is mistaken about them. Those first principles which are naturally apprehended are truths of this sort, e.g., “It is impossible both to affirm and deny something at the same time,” and “Every whole is greater than each of its parts,” and so on. On the other hand, there are many ways in which error may arise with respect to the conclusions into which we enter through such principles as through an outer door. Therefore, it is easy to know the truth if we consider that small amount of it which is comprised of self-evident principles, through which we enter into other truths, because this much is evident to all.

278. But the fact that we cannot (148).

Here he explains in what sense it is difficult to know the truth. He says that our inability to grasp the whole truth and a part of it shows the difficulty involved in the search for truth. In support of this we must consider his statement that the truth through which we gain admission to other truths is known to all. Now there are two ways in which we attain knowledge of the truth.

The first is the method of analysis, by which we go from what is complex to what is simple or from a whole to a part, as it is said in Book I of the Physics that the first objects of our knowledge are confused wholes. Now our knowledge of the truth is perfected by this method when we attain a distinct knowledge of the particular parts of a whole.

The other method is that of synthesis, by which we go from what is simple to what is complex; and we attain knowledge of truth by this method when we succeed in knowing a whole. Thus the fact that man is unable to know perfectly in things a whole and a part shows the difficulty involved in knowing the truth by both of these methods.

279. However, since the difficulty is twofold (149).

He gives the reason for this difficulty. Here too it must be noted that, in all cases in which there is a certain relationship between two things, an effect can fail to occur in two ways, i.e., because of either one of the things involved. For example, if wood does not burn, this may happen either because the fire is not strong enough or because the wood is not combustible enough. And in a similar way the eye may be prevented from seeing a visible object either because the eye is weak or because the visible object is in the dark. Therefore, in like manner, it may be difficult to know the truth about things either (1) because things themselves are imperfect in some way or (2) because of some weakness on the part of our intellect.

280. (1) Now it is evident that we experience difficulty in knowing the truth about some things because of the things themselves; for since each thing is knowable insofar as it is an actual being, as will be stated below in Book IX (1894) of this work, then those things which are deficient and imperfect in being are less knowable by their very nature; e.g., matter, motion, and time are less knowable because of the imperfect being which they have, as Boethius says in his book The Two Natures.

281. Now there were some philosophers who claimed that the difficulty experienced in knowing the truth is wholly attributable to things themselves, because they maintained that nothing is fixed and stable in nature but that everything is in a state of continual change, as will be stated in Book IV (683) of this work. But the Philosopher denies this, saying that even though the difficulty experienced in knowing the truth can perhaps be twofold because of different things, i.e., our intellect and things themselves, still the principal source of the difficulty is not things but our intellect.

282. He proves this in the following way. If this difficulty were attributable principally to things, it would follow it we would know best those things which are most knowable by nature. But those things which are most knowable by nature are those which are most actual, i.e., immaterial and unchangeable things, yet we know these least of all.

Obviously, then, the difficulty experienced in knowing the truth is due principally to some weakness on the part of our intellect. From this it follows that our soul's intellectual power is related to those immaterial beings, which are by nature the most knowable of all, as the eyes of owls are to the light of day, which they cannot see because their power of vision is weak, although they do see dimly lighted things.

283. But it is evident that this simile is not adequate; for since a sense is a power of a bodily organ, it is made inoperative as a result of its sensible object being too intense. But the intellect is not a power of a bodily organ and is not made inoperative as a result of its intelligible object being too intelligible. Therefore, after understanding objects that are highly intelligible our ability to understand less intelligible objects is not decreased but increased, as is stated in Book III of The Soul.

284. Therefore it must be said that a sense is prevented from perceiving some sensible object for two reasons: first, (1) because a sensory organ is rendered inoperative as a result of its sensible object being too intense (this does not occur in the case of the intellect); second, (2) because of some deficiency in the ability of a sensory power to perceive its object; for the powers of the soul in all animals do not have the same efficacy. Thus, just as it is proper to man by nature to have the weakest sense of smell, in a similar way it is proper to an owl to have the weakest power of vision, because it is incapable of perceiving the light of day.

285. Therefore, since the human soul occupies the lowest place in the order of intellective substances, it has the least intellective power. As a matter of fact, just as it is by nature the actuality of a body, although its intellective power is not the act of a bodily organ, in a similar way it has a natural capacity to know the truth about corporeal and sensible things. These are less knowable by nature because of their materiality, although they can be known by abstracting sensible forms from phantasms. And since this process of knowing truth befits the nature of the human soul insofar as it is the form of this kind of body (and whatever is natural always remains so), it is possible for the human soul, which is united to this kind of body, to know the truth about things only insofar as it can be elevated to the level of the things which it understands by abstracting from phantasms. However, by this process it cannot be elevated to the level of knowing the quiddities of immaterial substances because these are not on the same level

as sensible substances. Therefore it is impossible for the human soul, which is united to this kind of body, to apprehend separate substances by knowing their quiddities.

286. For this reason the statement which Averroes makes at this point in his Commentary is evidently false, i.e., that the Philosopher does not prove here that it is just as impossible for us to understand abstract substances as it is for a bat to see the sun. The argument that he gives is wholly ridiculous; for he adds that, if this were the case, nature would have acted in vain because it would have made something that is naturally knowable in itself to be incapable of being known by anything else. It would be the same as if it had made the sun incapable of being seen.

This argument is not satisfactory for two reasons. First, the end of separate substances does not consist in being understood by our intellect, but rather the converse. Therefore, if separate substances are not known by us, it does not follow that they exist in vain; for only that exists in vain which fails to attain the end for which it exists. Second, even though the quiddities of separate substances are not understood by us, they are understood by other intellects. The same is true of the sun; for even though it is not seen by the eye of the owl, it is seen by the eye of the eagle.

287. Now it is only right (150).

He shows how men assist each other to know the truth; for one man assists another to consider the truth in two ways—directly and indirectly.

One is assisted directly by those who have discovered the truth; because, as has been pointed out, when each of our predecessors has discovered something about the truth, which is gathered together into one whole, he also introduces his followers to a more extensive knowledge of truth.

One is assisted indirectly insofar as those who have preceded us and who were wrong about the truth have bequeathed to their successors the occasion for exercising their mental powers, so that by diligent discussion the truth might be seen more clearly.

288. Now it is only fitting that we should be grateful to those who have helped us attain so great a good as knowledge of the truth. Therefore he says that “It is only right that we should be grateful,” not merely to those whom we think have found the truth and with whose views we agree by following them, but also to those who, in the search for truth, have made only superficial statements, even though we do not follow their views; for

these men too have given us something because they have shown us instances of actual attempts to discover the truth. By way of an example he mentions the founders of music; for if there “had been no Timotheus,” who discovered a great part of the art of music, we would not have many of the facts that we know about melodies. But if Timotheus had not been preceded by a wise man named “Phrynis,” he would not have been as well off in the subject of music. The same thing must be said of those philosophers who made statements of universal scope about the truth of things; for we accept from certain of our predecessors whatever views about the truth of things we think are true and disregard the rest. Again, those from whom we accept certain views had predecessors from whom they in turn accepted certain views and who were the source of their information.

LESSON 2

The Supreme Science of Truth, and Knowledge of Ultimate Causes

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 993b 19-994b 11

151. It is only right to call philosophy the science of truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, whereas that of practical knowledge is action; for even when practical men investigate the way in which something exists, they do not consider it in itself but in relation to some particular thing and to the present moment. But we know a truth only by knowing its cause. Now anything which is the basis of a univocal predication about other things has that attribute in the highest degree. Thus fire is hottest and is actually the cause of heat in other things. Therefore that is also true in the highest degree which is the cause of all subsequent things being true. For this reason the principles of things that always exist must be. true in the highest degree, because they are not sometimes true and sometimes not true. Nor is there any cause of their being, but they are the cause of the being of other things. Therefore insofar as each thing has being, to that extent it is true.

Chapter 2

152. Further, it is evident that there is a [first] principle, and that the causes of existing things are not infinite either in series or in species. For it is impossible that one thing should come from something else as from matter in an infinite regress, for example, flesh from earth, earth from air,

air from fire, and so on to infinity. Nor can the causes from which motion originates proceed to infinity, as though man were moved by the air, the air by the sun, the sun by strife, and so on to infinity. Again, neither can there be an infinite regress in the case of the reason for which something is done, as though walking were for the sake of health, health for the sake of happiness, and happiness for the sake of something else, so that one thing is always being done for the sake of something else. The same is true in the case of the quiddity.

COMMENTARY

289. Having shown how man is disposed for the study of truth, the Philosopher now shows that the knowledge of truth belongs pre-eminently to first philosophy. Regarding this he does two things... First (290), he shows that knowledge of the truth belongs pre-eminently to first philosophy. Second (290), that it belongs in the highest degree to this science (“But we know a truth”).

He proves these two propositions from two things established above in the prologue of this book, i.e., that wisdom is not a practical but a speculative science (53), and that it knows first causes (48).

290. He argues from the first of these to the first conclusion in this way. Theoretical, i.e., speculative, knowledge differs from practical knowledge by its end; for the end of speculative knowledge is truth, because it has knowledge of the truth as its objective. But the end of practical knowledge is action, because, even though “practical men,” i.e., men of action, attempt to understand the truth as it belongs to certain things, they do not seek this as an ultimate end; for they do not consider the cause of truth in and for itself as an end but in relation to action, either by applying it to some definite individual, or to some definite time. Therefore, if we add to the above the fact that wisdom or first philosophy is not practical but speculative, it follows that first philosophy is most fittingly called the science of truth.

291. But since there are many speculative sciences, which consider the truth, such as geometry and arithmetic, therefore it was necessary to show that first philosophy considers truth in the highest degree inasmuch as it has been shown above that it considers first causes (48). Hence he argues as

follows. We have knowledge of truth only when we know a cause. This is apparent from the fact that the true things about which we have some knowledge have causes which are also true, because we cannot know what is true by knowing what is false, but only by knowing what is true. This is also the reason why demonstration, which causes science, begins with what is true, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics.

292. Then he adds the following universal proposition. When a univocal predicate is applied to several things, in each case that which constitutes the reason for the predication about other things has that attribute in the fullest sense. Thus fire is the cause of heat in compounds. Therefore, since heat is predicated univocally both of fire and of compound bodies, it follows that fire is hottest.

293. Now he says “univocal” because sometimes it happens that an effect does not become like its cause, so as to have the same specific nature, because of the excellence of that cause; for example, the sun is the cause of heat in these lower bodies, but the form which these lower bodies receive cannot be of the same specific nature as that possessed by the sun or any of the celestial bodies, since they do not have a common matter. This is why we do not say that the sun is hottest, as we say fire is, but that it is something superior to the hottest.

294. Now the term truth is not proper to one class of beings only, but is applied universally to all beings. Therefore, since the cause of truth is one having the same name. and intelligible structure as its effect, it follows that whatever causes subsequent things to be true is itself most true.

295. From this he again concludes that the principles of things which always exist, i.e., the celestial bodies, must be most true. He does this for two reasons. First, they are not “sometimes true and sometimes not true,” and therefore surpass the truth of things subject to generation and corruption, which sometimes exist and sometimes do not. Second, these principles have no cause but are the cause of the being of other things. And for this reason they surpass the celestial bodies in truth and in being; and even though the latter are incorruptible, they have a cause not only of their motion, as some men thought, but also of their being, as the Philosopher clearly states in this place.

296. Now this is necessary, because everything that is composite in nature and participates in being must ultimately have as its causes those

things which have existence by their very essence. But all corporeal things are actual beings insofar as they participate in certain forms. Therefore a separate substance which is a form by its very essence must be the principle of corporeal substance.

297. If we add to this conclusion the fact that first philosophy considers first causes, it then follows, as was said above (291), that first philosophy considers those things which are most true. Consequently this science is pre-eminently the science of truth.

298. From these conclusions he draws a corollary: since those things which cause the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it follows that each thing is true insofar as it is a being; for things which do not always have being in the same way do not always have truth in the same way, and those which have a cause of their being also have a cause of their truth. The reason for this is that a thing’s being is the cause of any true judgment which the mind makes about a thing; for truth and falsity are not in things but in the mind, as will be said in Book VI (1230) of this work.

299. He rejects a position that would render the above proof untenable; for this proof proceeded on the supposition that first philosophy considers first causes. But if there were an infinite regress in causes, this proof would be destroyed, for then there would be no first cause. So his aim here is to refute this position. Concerning this he does two things. First (152), he points out what he intends to prove. Second (300, he proceeds to do so.

He says, first, that from what has been said it can clearly be shown that there is some [first] principle of the being and truth of things. He states that the causes of existing things are not infinite in number because we cannot proceed to infinity in a series of causes belonging to one and the same class, e.g., the class of, efficient causes. Nor again are causes infinite in species, as though the classes of causes were infinite in number.

300. Then he explains his statement about an infinite number of causes in a series. He does this, first, in regard to the class of material causes. For it is impossible to have an infinite series in the sense that one thing always comes from something else as its matter, e.g., that flesh comes from earth, earth from air, and air from fire, and that this does not terminate in some first entity but goes on to infinity.

Second, he gives an example of this in the class of efficient cause. He says that it is impossible to have an infinite series in the class of cause which we define as the source of motion; e.g., when we say that a man is moved to put aside his clothing because the air becomes warm, the air having been heated in turn by the sun, the sun having been moved by something else, and so on to infinity.

Third, he gives an example of this in the class of final causes. He says that it is also impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of “the reason for which” something is done, i.e., the final cause; for example, if we were to say that a journey or a walk is undertaken for the sake of health, health for the sake of happiness, happiness for the sake of something else, and so on to infinity.

Finally, he mentions the formal cause. He says that it is also impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of the “quiddity,” i.e., the formal cause, which the definition signifies. However, he omits examples because these are evident, and because it was shown in Book I of the Posterior Analytics that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the matter of predication, as though animal were predicated quidditatively of man, living of animal, and so on to infinity.

LESSON 3

The Existence of a First Efficient Cause and of a First Material Cause

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 994a 11-994b 9

153. For intermediate things in a series limited by some first and last thing must have as their cause the first member of the series, which they follow; because if we had to say which one of these three is the cause of the others, we would say that it is the first. What is last is not the cause, since what is last is not a cause of anything. Neither is the intermediate the cause, because it is the cause of only one; for it makes no difference whether one or several intermediates exist, or an infinite or finite number. Indeed, in series that are infinite in this way or in the infinite in general, all parts are intermediates to the same degree right down to the present one. Therefore, if there is nothing first in the whole series, nothing in the series is a cause.

154. Neither is it possible to proceed to infinity in a downward direction, where there is a starting-point in an upward direction, so that water comes from fire, earth from water, and some other class of things always being generated in this way.

155. Now there are two ways in which one thing comes from (ex) another. I do not mean from in the sense of after, as the Olympian games are said to come from the Isthmian, but either in the way in which a man comes from a boy as a result of a boy changing, or in the way in which air comes from water.

156. We say, then, that a man comes from a boy in the sense that what has come into being comes from what is coming into being, or in the sense that what has been completed comes from what is being completed. For generation is always midway between being and non-being, and thus whatever is coming into being is midway between what is and what is not. Now a learner is one who is becoming learned, and this is the meaning of the statement that the man of science comes from the learner. But water comes from air in the sense that it comes into being when the latter ceases to be.

157. This is why changes of the former kind are not reversible, and thus a boy does not come from a man. The reason is that the thing which comes into being does not come from generation but exists after generation. This is the way in which the day comes from the dawn, i.e., in the sense that it exists after the dawn; and this is why the dawn cannot come from the day. On the other hand, changes of the latter sort are reversible.

158. Now in neither way is it possible to proceed to infinity; for existing intermediaries must have some end, and one thing may be changed into the other because the corruption of one is the generation of the other.

159. At the same time it is impossible that an eternal first cause should be corrupted; for since generation is not infinite in an upward direction, then a first principle by whose corruption something else is produced could not be eternal.

COMMENTARY

301. Having assumed above that the causes of beings are not infinite in number, the Philosopher now proves this. First (153:C 300, he proves that there are not an infinite number of causes in a series; and second (170:C 330), that the classes of causes are not infinite in number (“Again, if the classes of causes”).

In regard to the first he does four things. First, he proves his assumption in the case of efficient or moving causes; second (154:C 305), in the case of material causes (“Neither is it possible”); third (160:C 316), in the case of final causes (“Again, that for the sake of which”); and fourth (164:C 320), in the case of formal causes (“Nor can the quiddity”).

In regard to the first he proceeds as follows. First, he lays down this premise: in the case of all those things which lie between two extremes, one of which is last and the other first, the first is necessarily the cause of those which come after it, namely, what is intermediate and what is last.

302. Then he proves this premise by a process of elimination. For if we had to say which of the three, i.e., the first, the intermediate, or the last, is the cause of the others, we would have to say that the first is the cause. We could not say that what is last is the cause of all the others, because it is not a cause of anything; for in other respects what is last is not a cause, since an effect follows a cause. Nor could we say that the intermediate is the cause of all the others, because it is the cause of only one of them, namely, what is last.

303. And lest someone should think that an intermediate is followed by only one thing, i.e., what is last (for this occurs only when there is a single thing between two extremes), in order to exclude this interpretation he adds that it makes no difference to the premise given above whether there is only one intermediate or several, because all intermediates are taken together as one insofar as they have in common the character of an intermediate. Nor again does it make any difference whether there are a finite or infinite number of intermediates, because so long as they have the nature of an intermediate they cannot be the first cause of motion. Further, since there must be a first cause of motion prior to every secondary cause of motion, then there must be a first cause prior to every intermediate cause, which is not an intermediate in any sense, as though it had a cause prior to itself. But if we were to hold that there is an infinite series of moving causes in the above way, then all causes would be intermediate ones. Thus we would have to say without qualification that all parts of any infinite thing, whether of a series of causes or of continuous quantities, are intermediate ones; for if there were a part that was not an intermediate one, it would have to be either a first or a last; and both of these are opposed to the nature of the infinite, which excludes every limit, whether it be a starting-point or a terminus.

304. Now there is another point that must be noted, i.e., that if there are several intermediate parts in any finite thing, not all parts are intermediate to the same degree; for some are closer to what is first, and some to what is last. But in the case of some infinite thing in which there is neither a first

nor last part, no part can be closer to or farther away from either what is first or what is last. Therefore all parts are intermediates to the same degree right down to the one you designate now. Consequently, if the causes of motion proceed to infinity in this way, there will be no first cause. But a first cause is the cause of all things. Therefore it will follow that all causes are eliminated; for when a cause is removed the things of which it is the cause are also removed.

305. Neither is it possible (154)

He shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of material causes. First (154:C 300, he states what he intends to prove. Second (155:C 308), he proceeds with his proof ("Now there are two ways").

In regard to the first it must be noted that a patient is subjected to the action of an agent. Therefore to pass from agent to agent is to proceed in an upward direction, whereas to pass from patient to patient is to proceed in a downward direction. Now just as action is attributed to the cause of motion, so is undergoing action attributed to matter. Therefore among the causes of motion the process is in an upward direction, whereas amon',g material causes the process is in a downward direction. Consequently, since he showed among moving causes that it is impossible to proceed to infinity, as it were, in an upward direction, he adds that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in a downward direction, i.e., in the process of material causes, granted that there is a starting-point in an upward direction among the causes of motion.

306. He illustrates this by way of the process of natural bodies, which proceeds in a downward direction, as if we were to say that water comes from fire, earth from water, and so on to infinity. He uses this example in accordance with the opinion of the ancient philosophers of nature, who held that one of these elements is the source of the others in a certain order.

307. However, this can also be explained in another way, inasmuch as we understand that in the case of moving causes there are evident to the senses certain ultimate effects which do not move anything else. Therefore we do not ask if there is an infinite regress in the lower members of that class, but if there is an infinite regress in the higher ones. But in regard to the class of material causes, he assumes that there is one first cause which is the foundation and basis of the others; and he inquires whether there is an

infinite regress in a downward direction in the process of those things which are generated from matter. The example which he gives illustrates this, because he does not say that fire comes from water and this in turn from something else, but the converse, i.e., that water comes from fire, and something else again from this. For this reason first matter is held to exist; and he asks whether the things that are generated from matter proceed to infinity.

308. Now there are two ways in which (155)

He proves his original thesis. Concerning this he does four things. First (155:C 308), he distinguishes between the two ways in which one thing comes from something else. Second (156:C 31o), he shows that these two ways differ in two respects ("We say, then, that a man"). Third (158:C 312), he shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in either of these ways ("Now in neither way"). Fourth (159:C 314), he shows in which of these ways other things come from the first material principle ("At the same time").

He says, first, that one thing "comes from" another properly and essentially in two ways. He speaks thus in order to exclude that way in which something is said in an improper sense to come from something else only by reason of the fact that it comes after it as when it is said that certain feasts of the Greeks called the Olympian come from those called the Isthmian, or as we were to say that the feast of Epiphany comes from the the Nativity. But this is an improper use of the word, because the process of coming to be is a change, and in a change it is not only necessary that an order exist between the two limits of the change but also that both limits have the same subject. Now this is not the case in the above example, but we speak in this way insofar as we think of time as the subject of different feasts.

309. Now properly speaking it is necessary to say that one thing comes from something else when some subject is changed from this into that. This occurs in two ways: first, as when we say that a man comes from a boy in the sense that a boy is changed from boyhood to manhood; second, as when we say that air comes from water as a result of substantial change.

310. We say, then, that a man (156).

He explains the twofold sense in which these two ways differ. First, we say that a man comes from a boy in the sense that what has already come into being comes from what is coming into being, or in the sense that what has already been completed comes from what is being completed. For anything in a state of becoming and of being completed is midway between being and non-being, just as generation is midway between existence and nonexistence. Therefore, since we reach an extreme through an intermediate, we say that what has been generated comes from what is being generated, and that what has been completed comes from what is being completed. Now this is the sense in which we say that a man comes from a boy, or a man of science from a learner, because a learner is one who is becoming a man of science. But in the other sense, i.e., the one in which we say that water comes from fire, one of the limits of the change is not related to the other as a passage or intermediate, as generation is to being, but rather as the limit from which a thing starts in order to reach another limit. Therefore one comes from the other when the other is corrupted.

311. This is why changes (157)

He infers another difference from the foregoing one. For since, in the first way, one thing is related to the other as generation is to being, and as an intermediate to a limit, it is evident that one is naturally ordained to the other. Therefore they are not reversible so that one comes from the other indifferently. Consequently we do not say that a boy comes from a man, but the reverse. The reason for this is that those two things, of which one is said to come from the other in this way, are not related to each other in the same way as the two limits of a change, but as two things one of which comes after the other in sequence. And this is what he means when he says that "what has come into being" (i.e., the terminus of generation or being) does not come from generation as though generation itself were changed into being, but is that which exists after generation, because it follows generation in a natural sequence; just as one's destination comes after a journey, and as what is last comes after what is intermediate. Therefore, if we consider these two things, i.e., generation and being, the way in which they are related does not differ from the one we have excluded, in which sequence alone is considered, as when we say that the day comes from the dawn because it comes after the dawn. Moreover, this natural sequence prevents us from saying in an opposite way that the dawn comes "from the day," i.e., after the day; and for the same reason a boy cannot come from a man. But in the other sense in which one thing comes from another, the process is reversible; for just as water is generated by reason of air being corrupted, in a similar way air is generated by reason of water being corrupted. The reason is that these two are not related to each other in a natural sequence, i.e., as an intermediate to a limit, but as two limits, either one of which can be first or last.

312. Now in neither way (158).

He shows that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in either of these ways. First, in the way in which we say that a man comes from a boy; for the thing from which we say something else comes as a man comes from a boy has the position of an intermediary between two limits, i.e., between being and non-being. But an infinite number of intermediates cannot exist when certain limits are held to exist, since limits are opposed to infinity. Therefore, it is impossible to have an infinite series in this way.

313. In like manner it is impossible to have an infinite series in the other way; for in that way one limit is con; verted into the other, because the corruption of one is the generation of the other, as has been explained. Now wherever a reversible process exists there is a return to some first thing in the sense that what was av first a starting-point is afterwards a terminus. This cannot occur in the case of things that are infinite, in which there is neither a starting-point nor a terminus. Consequently, there is no way in which one thing can come from another in an infinite regress.

314. At the same time it is impossible (159).

He shows in which of these ways something comes from first matter. Now it must be noted that in this place Aristotle uses two common suppositions accepted by all of the ancient philosophers: first, that there is a primary material principle, and therefore that in the process of generation there is no infinite regress on the part of the higher, i.e., of that from which a thing is generated; second, that matter is eternal. Therefore, from this second supposition he immediately concludes that nothing comes from first matter in the second way, i.e., in the way in which water comes from air as a result of the latter’s corruption, because what is eternal cannot be corrupted.

315. But since someone could say that the philosophers did not hold that the first material principle is eternal because it remains numerically one eternally but because it is eternal by succession (as if the human race were held to be eternal), he therefore excludes this from the first supposition. He

says that since generation is not infinite in an upward direction but stops at a first material principle, then if there is a first material principle by reason of whose corruption other things come into being, it must not be the eternal principle of which the philosophers speak. The reason is that the first material principle cannot be eternal if other things are generated by reason of its corruption, and it in turn is generated by the corruption of something else. It is evident, then, that a thing comes from this first material principle as something imperfect and potential which is midway between pure nonbeing and actual being, but not as water comes from air by reason of the latter’s corruption.

LESSON 4

The Existence of a First in Final and Formal Causes

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 994b 9-994b 31

160. Again, that for the sake of which something comes to be is an end. Now such a thing is not for the sake of something else, but other things are for its sake. Therefore, if there is such a thing as an ultimate end, there will not be an infinite regress; but if there is no ultimate end, there will be no reason for which things come to be.

161. Now those who posit infinity do away with the nature of the good without realizing it.

162. But no one will attempt to do anything unless he thinks he can carry it through to its term.

163. Nor will there be any intelligence in such matters, because one who has intelligence always acts for the sake of something since this limit is the end of a thing.

164. Nor can the quiddity be reduced to a definition which adds to the defining notes.

165. For a prior definition is always more of a definition, whereas a subsequent one is not; and where the first note does not apply, neither does a later one.

166. Again, those who speak in this way do away with science, because it is impossible to have science until we reach what is undivided.

167. Nor will knowledge itself exist; for how can one understand things which are infinite in this way?

168. This case is not like that of a line, whose divisibility has no limit, for it would be impossible to understand a line if it had no limits. This is why no one will count the sections, which proceed to infinity.

169. But it is necessary to understand that there is matter in everything that is moved, and that the infinite involves nothingness, but essence does not. But if there is no infinite, what essence [i.e., definition] does the infinite have?

170. Again, if the classes of causes were infinite in number, it would also be impossible to know anything; for we think that we have scientific knowledge when we know the causes themselves of things; but what is infinite by addition cannot be traversed in a finite period of time.

COMMENTARY

316. Having shown that there is no infinite regress either among the causes of motion or among material causes, the Philosopher now shows that the same thing is true of the final cause, which is called “that for the sake of which” something comes to be (160).

He proves this by four arguments. The first is as follows. That for the sake of which something comes to be has the character of an end. But an end does not exist for the sake of other things, but others exist for its sake. Now such a thing either exists or not. If there is something of such a kind that all things exist for its sake and not it for the sake of something else, it will be the last thing in this order; and thus there will not be an infinite regress. However, if no such thing exists, no end will exist; and thus the class of cause called “that for the sake of which” will be eliminated.

317. Now those who posit infinity (161).

He gives the second argurgent, which is derived from the foregoing one; for from the first argument he concluded that those who posit an infinite regress in final causes do away with the final cause. Now when the final cause is removed, so also is the nature and notion of the good; because good and end have the same meaning, since the good is that which all desire, as is said in Book I of the Ethics. Therefore those who hold that there is an infinite regress in final causes do away completely with the nature of the good, although they do not realize this.

318. But no one will attempt (162).

He gives the third argument, which is as follows. If there were an infinite number of final causes, no one could reach a last terminus, because there is no last terminus in an infinite series. But no one will attempt to do anything unless he thinks he is able to accomplish something as a final goal. Therefore, those who hold that final causes proceed to infinity do away with every attempt to operate and even with the activities of natural bodies; for a thing’s natural movement is only toward something which it is naturally disposed to attain.

319. Nor will there be (163).

He states the fourth argument, which is as follows. One who posits an infinite number of final causes does away with a limit, and therefore with the end for the sake of which a cause acts. But every intelligent agent acts for the sake of some end. Therefore it would follow that there is no intellect among causes which are productive; and thus the practical intellect is eliminated. But since these things are absurd, we must reject the first position, from which they follow, i.e., that there is an infinite number of final causes.

320. Nor can the quiddity (164).

He shows that there is not an infinite number of formal causes. In regard to this he does two things. First (164:C 320), he states what he intends to prove. Second (165:C 322), he proves it (“For a prior definition”).

Regarding the first we must understand that each thing derives its particular species from its proper form, and this is why the definition of a species signifies chiefly a thing’s form. Therefore we must understand that a procession of forms is consequent upon a procession of definitions; for one part of a definition is prior to another just as genus is prior to difference and one difference is prior to another. Therefore an infinite regress in forms and in the parts of a definition is one and the same thing. Now since Aristotle wishes to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of formal causes, he holds that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the parts of a definition. Hence he says that it is impossible for a thing’s quiddity to be reduced to another definition, and so on to infinity, so that the defining notes are always increased in number. For example, one who defines man gives animal in his definition, and therefore the definition of man is reduced to that of animal, and this in turn to the definition of something else, thereby increasing the defining notes. But to proceed to infinity in this way is absurd.

321. Now we do not mean by this that there are the same number of forms in each individual as there are genera and differences, so that in man there is one form by which he is man, another by which he is animal, and so on; but we mean that there must be as many grades of forms in reality as there are orders of genera and differences [in knowledge]. For we find in reality one form which is not the form of a body, another which is the form of a body but not of an animated body, and so on.

322. For a prior definition (165).

He proves his premise by four arguments. The first is this. Wherever there are a number of forms or defining notes, a prior definition is always “more of a definition.” This does not mean that a prior form is more complete (for specific forms are complete), but that a prior form belongs to more things than a subsequent form, which is not found wherever a prior form is found; e.g., the definition of man is not found wherever that of animal is found. From this he argues that if the first note [of a series] does not fit the thing defined, “neither does a later one.” But if there were an infinite regress in definitions and forms, there would be no first definition or definitive form. Hence all subsequent definitions and forms would be eliminated.

323. Again, those who speak (166).

He gives the second argument, which is as follows. It is impossible to have scientific knowledge of anything until we come to what is undivided. Now in this place “undivided” cannot mean the singular, because there is no science of the singular. However, it can be understood in two other ways. First, it can mean the definition itself of the last species, which is not further divided by essential differences. In this sense his statement can mean that we do not have complete knowledge of a thing until we reach its last species; for one who knows the genus to which a thing belongs does not yet have a complete knowledge of that thing. According to this interpretation we must say that, just as the first argument concluded that it is impossible to have an infinite regress in an upward direction among formal causes, in a similar fashion this second argument concludes that it is impossible to have an infinite regress in a downward direction, otherwise it would be impossible to reach a last species. Therefore this position destroys any complete knowledge.

324. Now a formal division exists not only when a genus is divided by differences (and when such division is no longer possible the last species can be said to be undivided), but also when the thing defined is divided into its definitive parts, as is evident in Book I of the Physics. Therefore in this place “undivided” can also mean a thing whose definition cannot be resolved into any definitive parts. Now according to this the supreme genus is undivided; and from this point of view his statement can mean that we cannot have scientific knowledge of a thing by definition unless we reach its supreme genera; because when these remain unknown it is impossible to know its subsequent genera. And according to this the second argument concludes, as the former one did, that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in an upward direction among formal causes.

325. Or, in order to reach the same conclusion, “undivided” can be explained in another way, i.e., in the sense that an immediate proposition is undivided. For if it were possi ‘ hie to proceed to infinity in an upward direction in the case of definitions, there would be no immediate proposition, and thus science as such, which is about conclusions derived from immediate principles, would be destroyed.

326. Nor will knowledge (167)

He gives the third argument, which proceeds to [show that such an infinite regress would] destroy not only science but any kind of human knowing whatsoever. In regard to this argument he does two things. First (167:C 326), he gives his argument. Second (168:C 327), he refutes an objection raised against it (“This case is not like”).

The argument is as follows. We know each thing by understanding its form. But if there were an infinite regress in forms, these forms could not be understood, because the intellect is incapable of understanding the infinite as infinite. Therefore this position destroys knowing in its entirety.

327. This case is not like (168).

He disposes of an objection; for someone could say that a thing having an infinite number of forms can be understood in the same way as a line which is divided to infinity. But he denies this. He says that this case is not the same as that of a line, whose divisions do not stop but go on to infinity. For it is impossible to understand anything unless some limit is set to it. Therefore a line can be understood inasmuch as some actual limit is given to it by reason of its extremes. However, it cannot be understood insofar as its division does not terminate. Hence no one can count the divisions of a line insofar as they are infinite. But as applied to forms “infinite” means actually infinite, and not potentially infinite as it does when applied to the division of a line. Therefore, if there were an infinite number of forms, there would be no way in which a thing could be known either scientifically or in any way at all.

328. But it is necessary (169).

He gives the fourth argument, which runs thus. Matter must be understood to exist in everything that is moved; for whatever is moved is in potentiality, and what is in potentiality is matter. But matter itself has the character of the infinite, and nothingness belongs to the infinite in the sense of matter, because matter taken in itself is understood without any of kind of form. And since nothingness belongs to the infinite, it follows contrariwise that the principle by which the infinite is a being is itself not infinite, and that it does not belong “to the infinite,” i.e., to matter, to be infinite in being. But things are by virtue of their form. Hence there is no infinite regress among forms.

329. However, it must be noted that in this place Aristotle holds that the infinite involves the notion of nothingness, not because matter involves the notion of privation (as Plato claimed when he failed to distinguish between privation and matter), but because the infinite involves the notion of privation. For a potential being contains the notion of the infinite only insofar as it comes under the nature of privation, as is evident in Book III of the Physics.

330. Again, if the classes (170).

He shows that the classes of causes are not infinite in number, and he uses the following argument. We think that we have scientific knowledge of each thing when we know all its causes. But if there were an infinite number of causes in the sense that one class of cause may be added to another continuously, it would be impossible to traverse this infinity in such a way that all causes could be known. Hence in this way too the knowing of things would be destroyed.

LESSON 5

The Method to Be Followed in the Search for Truth

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 994b 32-995a 20

171. The way in which people are affected by what they hear depends upon the things to which they are accustomed; for it is in terms of such things that we judge statements to be true, and anything over and above these does not seem similar but less intelligible and more remote. For it is the things to which we are accustomed that are better known.

172. The great force which custom has is shown by the laws, in which legendary and childish elements prevail over our knowledge of them, because of custom.

173. Now some men will not accept what a speaker says unless he speaks in mathematical terms; and others, unless he gives examples; while others expect him to quote a poet as an authority. Again, some want everything stated with certitude, while others find certitude annoying, either because they are incapable of comprehending anything, or because they consider exact inquiry to be quibbling; for there is some similarity. Hence it seems to some men that, just as liberality is lacking in the matter of a fee for a banquet, so also is it lacking in arguments.

174. For this reason one must be trained how to meet every kind of argument; and it is absurd to search simultaneously for knowledge and for the method of acquiring it; for neither of these is easily attained.

175. But the exactness of mathematics is not to be expected in all cases, but only in those which have no matter. This is why its method is not that of natural philosophy; for perhaps the whole of nature contains matter. Hence we must first investigate what nature is; for in this way it will become evident what the things are with which natural philosophy deals, and whether it belongs to one science or to several to consider the causes and principles of things.

COMMENTARY

331. Having shown that the study of truth is in one sense difficult and in another easy, and that it belongs preeminently to first philosophy, the Philosopher now exposes the proper method of investigating the truth. In regard to this he does two things. First (171:C 331), he gives the different methods which men follow in the study of truth. Second (335), he shows which method is the proper one ("For this reason one must").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how powerful custom is in the study of truth. Second (172:C 333), he makes this clear by an example ("The great force").

He says, first, that the way in which people are affected by what they hear depends upon the things to which they are accustomed, because such things are more willingly heard and more easily understood. For things spoken of in a manner to which we are accustomed seem to us to be acceptable; and if any things are said to us over and above what we have been accustomed to hear, these do not seem to have the same degree of truth. As a matter of fact they seem less intelligible to us and further removed from reason just because we are not accustomed to them; for it is the things which we are accustomed to hear that we know best of all.

332. Now the reason for this is that things which are customary become natural. Hence a habit, which disposes us in a way similar to nature, is also acquired by customary activity. And from the fact that someone has some special sort of nature or special kind of habit, he has a definite relationship to one thing or another. But in every kind of cognition there must be a definite relationship between the knower and the object of cognition. Therefore, to the extent that natures and habits differ, there are diverse kinds of cognition. For we see that there are innate first principles in men

because of their human nature, and that what is proper to some special virtue appears good to one who has this habit of virtue; and, again, that something appears palatable to the sense of taste because of its disposition. Therefore, since custom produces a habit which is similar to nature, it follows that what is customary is better known.

333. The great force (172)>

Here he makes his previous statement clear by giving a concrete case. He says that the laws which men pass are positive evidence of the force of custom; for the legendary and childish elements in these laws are more effective in winning assent than is knowledge of the truth. Now the Philosopher is speaking here of the laws devised by men, which have as their ultimate end the preservation of the political community. Therefore the men who have established these laws have handed down in them, in keeping with the diversity of peoples and nations involved, certain directives by which human souls might be drawn away from evil and persuaded to do good, although many of them, which men had heard from childhood and of which they approved more readily than of what they knew to be true, were empty and foolish.

But the law given by God directs men to that true happiness to which everything false is opposed. Therefore there is nothing false in the divine law.

334. Now some men (173).

Here he shows how men as a result of custom use different methods in the study of truth. He says that some men listen to what is said to them only if it is mathematical in character; and this is acceptable to those who have been educated in mathematics because of the habits which they have. Now since custom is like nature, the same thing can also happen to certain men (1) because they are poorly disposed in some respect, e.g., those who have a strong imagination but little intelligence. (2) Then there are others who do not wish to accept anything unless they are given a concrete example, either because they are accustomed to this or because their sensory powers dominate and their intellect is weak. (3) Again, there are some who think that nothing is convincing enough unless a poet or some authority is cited. This is also a result either of custom or of poor judgment, because they cannot decide for themselves whether the conclusion of an argument is certain; and therefore, having no faith in their own judgment, as it were, they require the judgment of some recognized authority. (4) Again there are others who want everything said to them with certitude, i.e., by way of careful rational investigation. This occurs because of the superior intelligence of the one making the judgment and the arguments of the one conducting the investigation, provided that one does not look for certitude where it cannot be had. (5) On the other hand there are some who are annoyed if some matter is investigated in an exact way by means of a careful discussion. This can occur for two reasons. (a) First, they lack the ability to comprehend anything; for since their reasoning power is poor they are unable to understand the order in which premises are related to conclusions. (b) Second, it occurs because of quibbling, i.e., reasoning about the smallest matters, which bears some resemblance to the search for certitude since it leaves nothing undiscussed down to the smallest detail. (c) Then there are some who think that, just as liberality is lacking when the smallest details are taken into account in estimating the fee for a banquet, in a similar way there is a lack of civility and liberality when a man also wishes to discuss the smallest details in the search for truth.

335. For this reason one must be trained (174).

He exposes the proper method of investigating the truth. Concerning this he does two things. First (335), he shows how a man can discover the proper method of investigating the truth. Second (336), he explains that the method which is absolutely the best should not be demanded in all matters (“But the exactness of mathematics”) .

He says, first, that since different men use different methods in the search for truth, one must be trained in the method which the particular sciences must use to investigate their subject. And since it is not easy for a man to undertake two things at once (indeed, so long as he tries to do both he can succeed in neither), it is absurd for a man to try to acquire a science and at the same time to acquire the method proper to that science. This is why a man should learn logic before any of the other sciences, because logic considers the general method of procedure in all the other sciences. Moreover, the method appropriate to the particular sciences should be considered at the beginning of these sciences.

336. But the exactness of mathematics (175).

He shows that the method which is absolutely the best should not be demanded in all the sciences. He says that the “exactness,” i.e., the careful and certain demonstrations, found in mathematics should not be demanded in the case of all things of which we have science, but only in the case of those things which have no matter; for things that have matter are subject to motion and change, and therefore in their case complete certitude cannot be had. For in the case of these things we do not look for what exists always and of necessity, but only for what exists in the majority of cases.

Now immaterial things are most certain by their very nature because they are unchangeable, although they are not certain to us because our intellectual power is weak, as was stated above (279). The separate substances are things of this kind. But while the things with which mathematics deals are abstracted from matter, they do not surpass our understanding; and therefore in their case most certain reasoning is demanded.

Again, because the whole of nature involves matter, this method of most certain reasoning does not belong to natural philosophy. However, he says “perhaps” because of the celestial bodies, since they do not have matter in the same sense that lower bodies do.

337. Now since this method of most certain reasoning is not the method proper to natural science, therefore in order to know which method is proper to that science we must investigate first what nature is; for in this way we will discover the things which natural philosophy studies. Further, we must investigate “whether it belongs to one science,” i.e., to natural philosophy, or to several sciences, to consider all causes and principles; for in this way we will be able to learn which method of demonstration is proper to natural philosophy. He deals with this method in Book II of the Physics, as is obvious to anyone who examines it carefully.

BOOK III

METAPHYSICAL PROBLEMS

LESSON I

The Need of Questioning Everything in the 8earch for Universal Truth

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 995a 24-995b 4

176. With a view to the science under investigation we must attack first those subjects which must first be investigated. These are all the subjects about which some men have entertained different opinions, and any other besides these which has been omitted.

177. Now for those who wish to investigate the truth it is worth the while to ponder these difficulties well. For the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier problems. For it is impossible to untie a knot without knowing it. But a perplexity on the part of the mind makes this evident in regard to the matter at hand; for insofar as the mind is perplexed, to that extent it experiences something similar to men who are bound; for in both cases it is impossible to move forward. For this reason, then, it is first necessary to consider all the difficulties and the reasons for them.

178. [This is also necessary] for another reason, namely, that those who make investigations without first recognizing the problem are like those who do not know where they ought to go.

179. Again, one would not even know when he finds the thing which he is seeking [and when not]; for the goal is not evident to such a man, but it is evident to one who previously discussed the difficulties.

180. Furthermore, one who has heard all the arguments of the litigants, as it were, and of those who argue the question, is necessarily in a better position to pass judgment.

COMMENTARY

338. Having indicated in Book II (331) the method of considering the truth, the Philosopher now proceeds with his study of the truth. First he proceeds disputatively, indicating those points which are open to question so far as the truth of things is concerned. Second (529), he begins to establish what is true, and he does this in Book IV, which begins: “There is a certain science.”

The first part is divided into two sections. In the first, he states what he intends to do. In the second (346), he proceeds to do it (“The first problem”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states what he intends to do. Second (339), he gives the reasons for this (“Now for those”).

He says first, then, that with a view to this science which we are seeking about first principles and what is universally true of things, we must attack, first of all, those subjects about which it is necessary to raise questions before the truth is established. Now there are disputed points of this kind for two reasons, either because the ancient philosophers entertained a different opinion about these things than is really true, or because they completely neglected to consider them.

339. Now for those (177).

Here he gives four arguments in support of this thesis:

First, he says that for those who wish to investigate the truth it is “worth the while,” i.e., worth the effort, “to ponder these difficulties well,” i.e., to examine carefully those matters which are open to question. This is necessary because the subsequent study of truth is nothing else than the solution of earlier difficulties. Now in loosening a physical knot it is evident that one who is unacquainted with this knot cannot loosen it. But a difficulty about some subject is related to the mind as a physical knot is to the body, and manifests the same effect. For insofar as the mind is puzzled about some subject, it experiences something similar to those who are tightly bound. For just as one whose feet are tied cannot move forward on an earthly road, in a similar way one who is puzzled, and whose mind is bound, as it were, cannot move forward on the road of speculative knowledge. Therefore, just as one who wishes to loosen a physical knot must first of all inspect the knot and the way in which it is tied, in a similar way one who wants to solve a problem must first survey all the difficulties and the reasons for them.

340. [This is also necessary] (178).

Here he gives the second argument. He says that those who wish to investigate the truth without first considering the problem are like those who do not know where they are going. This is true for this reason, that, just as the terminus of a journey is the goal intended by one who travels on foot, in a similar way the solution of a problem is the goal intended by one who is seeking the truth. But it is evident that one who does not know where he is going cannot go there directly, except perhaps by chance. Therefore, neither can one seek the truth directly unless he first sees the problem.

341. Again, one would (179).

Here he gives the third argument. He says that, just as one who is ignorant of where he is going does not know whether he should stop or go further when he reaches his appointed goal, in a similar way one who does not know beforehand the problem whose solution marks the terminus of his search cannot know when he finds the truth which he is seeking and when not. For he does not know what the goal of his investigations is, but this is evident to one who knew the problem beforehand.

342. Furthermore (180).

He gives the fourth argument, which is taken from the viewpoint of a judge. For a judge must pass judgment on the things which he hears. But just as one can pass judgment in a lawsuit only if he hears the arguments on both sides, in a similar way one who has to pass judgment on a philosophy is necessarily in a better position to do so if he will hear all the arguments, as it were, of the disputants.

343. Now it must be noted that it was for these reasons that Aristotle was accustomed, in nearly all his works, to set forth the problems which emerge before investigating and establishing what is true. But while in other works Aristotle sets down the problems one at a time in order to establish the truth about each one, in this work he sets forth all the problems at once, and

afterwards in the proper order establishes the things that are true. The reason for this is that other sciences consider the truth in a particular way, and therefore it belongs to them to raise problems of a particular kind about individual truths. But just as it belongs to this science to make a universal study of truth, so also does it belong to it to discuss all the problems which pertain to the truth. Therefore it does not discuss its problems one at a time but all at once.

344. There can also be another reason [why Aristotle proceeds in this way], namely, that those problems on which he touches are chiefly those about which the philosophers have held different opinions. However, he does not proceed to investigate the truth in the same order as the other philosophers did. For he begins with things which are sensible and evident and proceeds to those which are separate from matter, as is evident below in Book VII (1566), whereas the other philosophers wanted to apply intelligible and abstract principles to sensible things. Hence, because he did not intend to establish the truth in the same order as that followed by the other philosophers, and from whose views these problems arise, he therefore decided to give first all the problems in a separate section, and afterwards to solve these problems in their proper order.

345. Averroes gives another reason [for Aristotle’s procedure]. He says that Aristotle proceeds in this way because of the relationship of this science to logic, which will be touched on below in Book IV (588); and therefore he made dialectical discussion a principal part of this science.

LESSON 2

Questions Concerning the Method of This Science

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 995b 4-995b 27

181. The first problem concerns the things about which we raised questions in our introductory statements, i.e., whether it belongs to one science or to many to speculate about the causes.

182. And there is also the problem whether it belongs to this science to know only the principles of substance, or also the principles on which all sciences base their demonstrations, e.g., whether it is possible to affirm and deny one and the same thing at the same time or not; and other such principles. And if this science deals with substance, there is the question whether one science deals with all substances, or many sciences. And if many, whether all are cognate, or whether some should be called wisdom and others something else.

183. It is also necessary to inquire whether sensible substances alone must be said to exist, or whether there are other substances in addition to these; and whether they are unique, or whether there are many classes of substances, aswas claimed by those who created the Forms and made the objects of mathematics an intermediate class between these Forms and sensible substances. As we have said, then, it is necessary to examine these questions.

184. There is also the problem whether this speculation has to do with substances alone or also with the proper accidents of substances. And we must inquire about sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, contrariety, priority and posteriority, and all other such things which the dialecticians attempt to treat (basing their investigations only on probabilities); for to them too it belongs to theorize about all these things. Furthermore, we must investigate all those essential accidents of these same things; and not only what each one of them is, but also whether there is one contrary for each one.

COMMENTARY

Q. 1: DOES THIS SCIENCE MAKE USE OF ALL FOUR CAUSES?

346. Following out his announced plan, the Philosopher begins to set down the problems which are encountered in establishing the truth; and he divides this into two parts. In the first, he gives these problems; and in the second (369), he gives the reasons for these problems, by indicating the arguments on either side of the question (“Therefore let us discuss”).

Now it was stated in Book II (335) that it is necessary to seek the method of a science before seeking the science itself. Therefore he gives, first, the problems which pertain to this science’s method of investigation. Second (355), he gives the problems which pertain to the first principles with which this science deals, as has been stated in Book I (36) (“And we must inquire”).

Now a science is concerned with two things, as was said in Book II (336), namely, a study of the causes by which it demonstrates and the things with which it deals. Hence in regard to the first point he does two things. First, he presents a problem concerning the investigation of causes. Second (347), he presents several problems concerning the things with which this science deals (“And there is also the problem”)

He says, then, that the first problem is one which we proposed in the issues raised at the end of Book II (336), which is, so to speak, the prologue to the whole of science, i.e., whether a study of the four causes in their four classes belongs to one science or to many different sciences And this is to ask whether it belongs to one science, and especially to this science, to demonstrate by means of all the causes, or rather whether some sciences demonstrate by one cause and some by another.

Q. 2: DOES IT CONSIDER BOTH PRINCIPLES OF SUBSTANCE AND PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE?

347. And there is also the problem (182).

Here he raises problems about the things which this science considers. First, he inquires about the things which this science considers about substances; and second (350), about substances themselves ("It is also necessary"). In regard to the first he raises three questions. For if it is supposed, from what was said in Book I (35), that this science considers first principles, the first question here will be whether it belongs to this science to know only the first principles of substances, or also to consider the first principles of demonstration, by means of which all sciences demonstrate. For example, should this science consider whether it is possible to affirm and deny one and the same thing at the same time or not? And the same thing applies to the other first and self-evident principles of demonstration.

Q. 3: IS ITS SUBJECT ALL SUBSTANCES, OR DO DIFFERENT SCIENCES CONSIDER DIFFERENT SUBSTANCES?

348. And if this science considers substance as the primary kind of being, the second question is whether there is one science which considers all substances, or whether there are many sciences which consider different substances. For it seems that there should be many sciences which consider many substances.

Q. 4: IS IT DISTINCT FROM OTHER SCIENCES?

349. And if there are many sciences which consider many substances, the third question is whether all are "cognate," i.e., whether all belong to one class, as geometry and arithmetic belong to the class of mathematical science, or whether they do not, but some to the class of wisdom and some to another class, for example, to the class of natural philosophy or to that of mathematical science. For according to the first point of view it seems that

they do not belong to one class, since material and immaterial substances are not known by the same method.

Q. 5. ARE THERE IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES, AND OF WHAT KIND?

350. It is also necessary (183).

Here he adds to the number of questions about substance; and he does this by raising two questions. The first question is whether sensible substances alone must be held to exist, as the philosophers of nature claimed, or whether there are in addition to sensible substances other immaterial and intelligible substances, as Plato claimed.

351. And if there are some substances separate from sensible things, the second question is whether "they are unique," i.e., whether they belong only to one class, or whether there are many classes of such substances. For certain men, understanding that there is a twofold abstraction, namely, of the universal from the particular, and of the mathematical form from sensible matter, held that each class is self-subsistent. Thus they held that there are separate substances which are subsisting abstract universals, and between these and particular sensible substances they placed the objects of mathematics—numbers, continuous quantities, and figures—which they regarded as separate subsisting things. Concerning the questions which have now been raised, then, it is necessary to investigate them below. He does this, first, by arguing both sides of the question, and, second, by determining its truth.

Q. 6: DOES THIS SCIENCE CONSIDER ACCIDENTS OR PROPERTIES OF SUBSTANCE?

352. There is also the problem (184).

Here he asks whether this science's investigations extend to accidents; and he raises three questions. The first is whether this science, seeing that it is called the philosophy of substance, speculates about substance alone, or whether it also speculates about the proper accidents of substance; for it seems to be the office of the same science to consider a subject and the proper accidents of that subject.

Q. 7: HOW DOES IT DIFFER FROM LOGIC IN CONSIDERING THESE THINGS?

353. The second question is whether this science considers certain things which seem to be proper accidents of being and which belong to all beings, namely, sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, contrariety, priority, and posteriority, and all others of this kind which are treated by the dialecticians, who deal with all things. However, they do not examine such things according to necessary premises but according to probable ones. For from one point of view it seems that, since these accidents are common ones, they pertain to first-philosophy; but from another point of view it seems that, since they are considered by the dialecticians, whose office it is to argue from Probabilities, an examination of them does not belong to the consideration of the philosopher, whose office it is to demonstrate.

Q. 8: DOES IT CONSIDER HOW THESE ACCIDENTS ARE INTER-RELATED?

354. And since certain proper attributes naturally flow from these common accidents of being, the third question is whether it is the function of the philosopher to consider in regard to the common accidents only their quiddity or also their properties; for example, whether there is one opposite for each one.

LESSON 3

Questions Concerning the Things with Which This Science Deals

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185. And we must inquire whether it is genera that constitute the principles and elements of things, or the parts into which each existing thing is divided. And if it is genera, whether it is those that are predicated of individuals first or last. And we must also inquire whether animal or man is a principle, and exists more truly than the singular.

186. But most of all it is necessary to investigate and treat the question whether besides matter there is any cause in the proper sense or not; and whether it is separable or not; and whether it is numerically one or many. And we must ask whether there is anything besides the synolon (and by synolon I mean matter when something is predicated of it), or nothing; or whether this is true of some things but not of others, [and what these things are].

187. Further, we must inquire whether the principles of things are limited in number or in kind, both those in the intelligible structures of things and those in the underlying subject; and whether the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same or different; and whether they are all incorruptible, or whether those of corruptible things are corruptible. And the most difficult question of all, and the most disputed one, is whether unity and being are not something different from the substances of existing

things, as the Pythagoreans and Plato say, or whether this is not the case, but the underlying subject is something different," as Empedocles holds of love, another thinker of fire, another of water, and another of air. And we must inquire whether the principles of things are universals or singular things.

188. Again, we must inquire whether they exist potentially or actually. And also whether they are principles of things in some other way or in reference to motion; for these questions present great difficulty.

189. And in addition to these questions we must inquire whether numbers or lengths and points are somehow substances or not. And if they are substances, whether they are separate from sensible things or are found in them. Concerning all these matters it is not only difficult to discover what is true, but it is not even easy to state the problems well.

COMMENTARY

Q. 9: HOW ARE SUBSTANCES TO BE ANALYSED, INTO ELEMENTS OR INTO GENERA?

355. Having raised questions pertaining to the method of investigation which this science uses, the Philosopher now raises questions pertaining to the things which this science considers. And since this science considers first principles, as has been stated in Book I (35), he therefore raises here questions pertaining to the principles of things.

Now both the Forms and the objects of mathematics were held to be the first principles of things. Therefore, first, he raises questions concerning the Forms; and second (366), concerning the objects of mathematics ("And in addition to these").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he asks what things are principles; and second (361), what sort of beings they are ("Further, we must inquire").

And since separate universals were held to be the principles of things, he asks, first, whether universals are the principles of things; and second (357), whether separate entities are the principles of things ("But most of all").

Concerning the first he asks two questions. The first is whether genera constitute the principles and elements of things, or the ultimate parts into which each individual thing is dissolved. This question arises because an element is that of which a thing is first composed and into which it is ultimately dissolved. Now we find a twofold mode of composition and dissolution. One has to do with the intelligible constitution, in which species are resolved into genera, and according to this mode genera seem to be the principles and elements of things, as Plato claimed. The other mode of composition and dissolution has to do with the real order; for example, natural bodies are composed of fire, air, water and earth, and are dissolved into these. It was for this reason that the natural philosophers claimed that the elements constitute the first principles of things.

356. And assuming that genera are the principles of things, the second question is whether the principles of things are to be identified with the universals which are predicated of individual things, i.e., the lowest species, which he calls genera after the usage of the Platonists, because the lowest species contain under themselves many individuals just as genera contain many species; or whether it is rather the first and most common genera that constitute principles, for example, which of the two is more of a principle, animal or man; for man is a principle according to the Platonists, and is more real than any singular man. Now this problem arises because of two divisions which reason makes. One of these is that whereby we divide genera into species, and the other is that whereby we resolve species into genera. For it seems that whatever is the last term in a process of division is always the first principle and element in a process of composition.

Q. 10: IS THERE AN IMMATERIAL PRINCIPLE? IS IT ONE OR MANY?

357. But most of all (186).

Here he inquires whether separate entities are the principles of things; and he raises four questions. For since the first philosophers of nature posited only a material cause, the first question is whether besides matter there is anything else that is a cause in the proper sense or not.

358. And granted that there is some other cause besides matter, the second question is whether it is separable from matter, as Plato held, or as Pythagoras held.

359. And if there is something separable from matter, the third question is whether it is a single thing, as Anaxagoras claimed, or many, as Plato and Aristotle himself claimed.

360. The fourth question is whether there is anything “besides the synolon,” i.e., the concrete whole, or nothing; or whether there is something in certain cases and not in others; and what kind of things they are in those cases in which there is something else, and what kind of things they are in those in which there is not. And he explains what a synolon or concrete whole is; i.e., it is matter when something is predicated of it. Now in order to understand this we must note that Plato claimed that man and horse, and universals which are predicated in this way, are certain separate Forms; and that man is predicated of Socrates or Plato by reason of the fact that sensible matter participates in a separate Form. Hence Socrates or Plato is called a synolon or concrete whole, because each is constituted as a result of matter participating in a separate form. And each is, as it were, a kind of predicate of matter. Hence the Philosopher asks here whether the whatness of the individual thing is something else in addition to the individual thing itself, or not; or also whether it is something rise in the case of some things and not in that of others. The Philosopher will answer this question in Book VII (7356).

361. Further, we must inquire (187).

Here he raises questions about the way in which principles exist. And since being is divided by the one and many, and by act and potency, he asks, first, whether these principles are one or many; and second (365), whether they are actual or potential (“Again, we must inquire”). In regard to the first he asks four questions:

Q. 12 The first is whether the principles of things are limited in number or in kind; as we say, for example, that there are three principles of nature. Now the statement that they are limited in number can mean that the principle of nature is numerically a single form and a single matter and privation. And the statement that they are limited in kind can mean that there are many material principles which have in common the specific nature of material principle, and so on for the rest. And since some of the philosophers, such as the Platonists, attributed formal causes to things, while others, such as the ancient natural philosophers, attributed only material causes to things, he adds that this question is applicable both “in the intelligible structures,” i.e., in formal causes, “and in the underlying subject,” i.e., in material causes.

Q. 13: ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF CORRUPTIBLE AND INCORRUPTIBLE THINGS THE SAME OR DIFFERENT?

362. (2) The second question is whether the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same or different. And if they are different, whether all are incorruptible, or whether the principles of corruptible things are corruptible and those of incorruptible things are incorruptible.

Q. 14: ARE “ONE” AND “BEING” THE SAME AS OR DISTINCT FROM SPECIFIC NATURES?

363. (3) The third question is whether unity and being signify the very substance of things and not something added to the substance of things, as the Pythagoreans and Platonists claimed; or whether they do not signify the substance of things, but something else is the subject of unity and being, for example, fire or air or something else of this kind, as the ancient philosophers of nature held. Now he says that this question is the most difficult and most puzzling one, because on this question depends the entire thought of Plato and Pythagoras, who held that numbers are the substance of things.

364. The fourth question is whether the principles of things are “somehow universals or are in some sense singular things,” i.e., whether those things which are held to be principles have the character of a principle in the sense of a universal intelligible nature, or according as each is a particular and singular thing.

365. Again, we must inquire (188).

Here he asks whether these principles exist potentially or actually. This question seems to refer especially to material principles; for it can be a matter of dispute whether the first material principle is some actual body, such as fire or air, as the ancient philosophers of nature held, or something which is only potential, as Plato held. And since motion is the actualization of something in potency, and is, in a sense, midway between potentiality and actuality, he therefore adds another question: whether the principles of things are causes only in reference to motion, as the philosophers of nature posited only principles of motion, either material or efficient, or also whether they are principles which act in some other way than by motion, as Plato claimed that sensible things are caused by immaterial entities by a certain participation in these. Futhermore, he says that these questions have been raised because they present the greatest difficulty, as is clear from the manner in which the philosophers have disagreed about them.

366. And in addition to these (189).

Here he raises questions concerning the objects of mathematics, which are posited as the principles of things. He raises two questions. The first is whether numbers, lengths, figures and points are somehow substances, as the Pythagoreans or Platonists held, or whether they are not, as the philosophers of nature held.

367. And if they are substances, the second question is whether they are separate from sensible things, as the Platonists held, or exist in sensible things, as the Pythagoreans held.

368. Now these questions are raised as problems which must be debated and settled below, because in these matters it is not only difficult to discover the truth, but it is not even easy to debate the matter adequately by finding probable arguments for either side of the question.

LESSON 4

Are All the Classes of Causes Studied by One Science or by Many?

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190. Therefore let us discuss first the problem about which we first spoke (181): whether it is the office of one science or of many to study all the classes of causes.

191. For how will it be the office of one science to come to principles since they are not contrary?

192. Furthermore, in the case of many existing things not all the principles are present. For how can a principle of motion be present in all immobile things, or how can the nature of the good be found there? For everything which is a good in itself and by reason of its own nature is an end and thus a cause, because it is for its sake that other things come to be and exist. Further, the end and that for the sake of which something comes to be is the terminus of some action. But all actions involve motion. Therefore it would be impossible for this principle to be present in immobile things, nor could there be an autoagathon, i.e., a good in itself. Hence in mathematics too nothing is proved by means of this cause, nor is there any demonstration on the grounds that a thing is better or worse. Nor does anyone make any mention at all of anything of this kind. And for this reason some of the Sophists, for example, Aristippus, disregarded these. For in the other arts, even in the servile ones, such as building and cobbling, all

things are to be explained on the grounds that they are better or worse; but the mathematical sciences give no account of things which are good or evil.

193. But on the other hand, if there are many sciences of the causes, and different sciences for different principles, which of these must be said to be the one that is being sought, or which one of those who have them is best informed about the subject under investigation?

194. For it is possible for the same thing to have all the classes of causes; for example, in the case of a house the source of motion is the art and the builder, the reason for which is its function, the matter is earth and stones, and the form is the plan.

195. Therefore, from the things which were established a little while ago (14-26:C 36-51) as to which of the sciences one should call wisdom, there is reason for calling every one of them such. For inasmuch as wisdom takes precedence and is a more authoritative science, and one which the others, like slaves, have no right to contradict, then the science which deals with the end and the good is such a science, because other things are for the sake of this.

196. But insofar as wisdom has been defined (24:C 49) as the science of first causes and of what is most knowable, such a science will be about substance. For while a subject may be known in many ways, we say that he who knows what a thing is in its being knows it better than he who knows it in its nonbeing. And in the former case one knows better than another, especially he who knows what a thing is, and not how great it is or of what sort it is or anything that it is naturally disposed to do or to undergo. Further, in the case of other things too we think that we know every single thing, and those of which there are demonstrations, when we know what each is, for example, what squaring is, because it is finding the middle term. The same thing is true in other cases.

197. But with regard to processes of generation and actions and every change, we think that we know these perfectly when we know the principle of motion. But this differs from and is opposite to the end of motion. And for this reason it seems to be the province of a different science to speculate about each one of these causes.

COMMENTARY

Q 1: CAN ONE SCIENCE CONSIDER MANY CAUSES?

369. Having raised the questions which cause difficulty in this science, Aristotle begins here to treat them dialectically. This is divided into three parts. In the first part, he treats the questions which pertain to the method of investigation of this science. In the second (403), he treats the questions which pertain to substances ("Furthermore, there is"). In the third (423), he treats the questions which pertain to the principles of substances ("Concerning the principles").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he argues dialectically about this science's method of investigation, with reference to the causes by means of which it demonstrates; second (387), with reference to the first principles of demonstration ("But insofar"); and third (393), with reference to substances themselves ("And there is the problem").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he takes up again the question about which he plans to argue dialectically, concluding from the order in which the questions have been listed that it is necessary first to debate those issues which were stated first in the list of questions, namely, whether it is the function of one science or of many to investigate all the classes of causes; so that in this way the order of argument corresponds to the order in which the questions have been raised.

370. For how will it be (191).

Second, he gives the arguments relating to this question; and in regard to this he does three things. First (191), he gives an argument for the purpose of showing that it is not the office of a single science to consider all the classes of causes. Second (193:C 376), assuming that it belongs to different sciences to consider the different classes of causes, he asks which class of cause it is that is investigated by first philosophy. He argues on both sides of this question ("But on the other hand"). Third (197:C 386), he draws from this second dispute the conclusion of the first arguments ("But-with regard to").

In regard to the first (191) he gives two arguments. He says that since it belongs to one science to consider contraries, how will it belong to one science to consider principles since they are not contrary? This view, if it is considered superficially, seems to be of no importance; for it appears to follow from the destruction of the antecedent, as if one were to argue thus: if principles are contraries, they belong to one science; therefore, if they are not contraries, they do not belong to one science.

371. Therefore it can be said that in these disputes the Philosopher not only uses probable arguments but sometimes also uses sophistical ones when he gives arguments introduced by others. But it does not seem reasonable that in such an important matter so great a Philosopher would have introduced an argument which is both trifling and insignificant. Hence a different explanation must be given, namely, that if one rightly considers the nature of the various things which belong to the same science, some belong to a single science-insofar as they are different, but others insofar as they are reduced to some one thing. Hence many other different things are found to belong to one science insofar as they are reduced to one thing, for example, to one whole, one cause, or one subject. But contraries and all opposites belong essentially to one science by reason of the fact that one is the means of knowing the other. And from this comes this probable proposition that all different things which are contraries belong to one science. Therefore, if principles were different and were not contraries, it would follow that they would not belong to one science.

372. Furthermore, in the case of (192).

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus. In the case of different things which belong to one science, whatever science considers one also considers another. This is evident in the case of contraries, which are different and belong essentially to one science without being reduced to some other unity. But not every science which considers one cause considers all causes. Therefore the study of all the causes does not belong to a single science.

373. He proves the minor premise thus: Different sciences deal with different beings, and there are many beings to which all the causes cannot be assigned. He makes this dear, first, with regard to that cause which is called the source of motion; for it does not seem that there can be a principle of motion in immobile things. Now certain immobile things are posited, especially by the Platonists, who claim that numbers and substances are separate entities. Hence, if any science considers these, it cannot consider the cause which is the source of motion.

374. Second, he shows that the same thing is true of the final cause, which has the character of good. For it does not seem that the character of goodness can be found in immobile things, if it is conceded that everything which is good in itself and by reason of its own nature is an end. And it is a cause in the sense that all things come to be and exist because of it and for its sake. However, he says "everything which is good in itself and by reason of its own nature" in order to exclude the useful good, which is not predicated of the end but of the means to the end. Hence those things which are said to be good only in the sense that they are useful for something else arc not good in themselves and by reason of their own nature. For example, a bitter potion is not good in itself but only insofar as it is directed to the end, health, which is a good in itself. But an end, or that for the sake of which something comes to be, seems to be the terminus of an action. But all actions seem to involve motion. Therefore it seems to follow that this principle, i.e., the final cause, which has the character of goodness, cannot exist in immobile things. Further, since those things which exist of themselves apart from matter must be immobile, it therefore does not seem possible that "an autoagathon," i.e., a good-in-itself, exists, as Plato held. For he called all immaterial and unparticipated things entities which exist of themselves, just as he called the Idea of man, man-in-himself, as though not something participated in matter. Hence he also called the good-in-itself that which is its own goodness unparticipated, namely, the first principle of all things.

375. Moreover, with a view to strengthening this argument he introduces an example. For, from the fact that there cannot be an end in the case of immobile things, it seems to follow that in the mathematical sciences, which abstract from matter and motion, nothing is proved by means of this cause, as in the science of nature, which deals with mobile things, something is proved by means of the notion of good. For example, we may give as the reason why man has hands that by them he is more capable of executing the things which reason conceives. But in the mathematical sciences no demonstration is made in this way, that something is so because it is better for it to be so, or worse if it were not so; as if one were to say, for example, that the angle in a semi-circle is a right angle because it is better that it should be so than be acute or obtuse. And because there can be, perhaps, another way of demonstrating by means of the final cause (for

example, if one were to say that, if an, end is to be, then what exists for the sake of an end must first be), he therefore adds that in the mathematical sciences no one makes any mention at all of any of those things which pertain to the good or to the final cause. And for this reason certain sophists, as Aristippus, who belonged to the Epicurean school, completely disregarded any demonstrations which employ final causes, considering them to be worthless in view of the fact that in the servile or mechanical arts, for example, in the "art of building," i.e., in carpentry, and in that of "cobbling," all things are explained on the grounds that something is better or worse; whereas in the mathematical sciences, which are the noblest and most certain of the sciences, no mention is made of things good and evil.

376. But on the other hand (193).

Here he interjects another question. First, he states this question, which has two parts. The first part of the question is this. If different causes are considered by many sciences, so that a different science considers a different cause, then which of these sciences should be called the one "that is being sought," i.e., first philosophy? Is it the one which considers the formal cause, or the one which considers the final cause, or the one which considers one of the other causes? The second part of the question is this: If there are some things which have many causes, which one of those who consider those causes knows that subject best?

377. For it is possible (194).

He clarifies the second part of the question by the fact that one and the same thing is found to have every type of cause. For example, in the case of a house the source of motion is the art and the builder; the reason, for which, or the final cause of the house, "is its function," i.e., its use, which is habitation; its material cause is the earth, from which the walls and floor are made; and its specifying or formal cause is the plan of the house, which the architect, after first conceiving it in his mind, gives to matter.

378. Therefore from the things (195)

Here he takes up again the question as to which of the aforesaid sciences we can call wisdom on the basis of the points previously established about wisdom at the beginning of this work (14:C 36), namely, whether it is the science which considers the formal cause, or the one which considers the final cause, or the one which considers one of the other causes. And he gives in order arguments relating to each of the three causes, saying that there seems to be some reason why “every oxie of the sciences,” i.e., any one which proceeds by means of any cause at all, should be called by the name of wisdom. First, he speaks of that science which proceeds by means of the final cause. For it was stated at the beginning of this work that this science, which is called wisdom, is the most authoritative one, and the one which directs others as subordinates. Therefore, inasmuch as wisdom “takes precedence,” i.e., is prior in the order of dignity and more influential in its authoritative direction of the other sciences (because it is not right that the others should contradict it but they should take their principles from it as its servants), it seems that that science “which deals with the end and the good,” i.e., the one which proceeds by means of the final cause, is worthy of the name of wisdom. And this is true because everything else exists for the sake of the end, so that in a sense the end is the cause of all the other causes. Thus the science which proceeds by means of the final cause is the most important one. This is indicated by the fact that those arts which are concerned with ends are more important than and prior to the other arts; for example, the art of navigation is more important than and prior to the art of ship-building. Hence, if wisdom is pre-eminent and regulative of the other sciences, it seems that it proceeds especially by means of the final cause.

379. But insofar as wisdom (196).

Here he introduces the arguments relating to the formal cause. For it was said in the prologue of this work (26:C 51) that wisdom is concerned with first causes and with whatever is most knowable and most certain. And according to this it seems to be concerned with “substance,” i.e., it proceeds by means of the formal cause. For among the different ways of knowing things, we say that he who knows that something exists, knows more perfectly than he who knows that it does not exist. Hence in the Posterior Analytics the Philosopher proves that an affirmative demonstration is preferable to a negative demonstration. And among those who know something affirmatively, we say that one knows more perfectly than another. But we say that he knows more perfectly than any of the others who knows what a thing is, and not he who knows how great it is, or what it is like, or what it can do or undergo. Therefore, to know a thing itself in the most perfect way absolutely is to know what it is, and this is to know its substance. But even in knowing other things, for example, a thing’s properties, we say that we know best every single thing about which there are demonstrations when we also know the whatness of their accidents and properties; because whatness is found not only in substance but also in accidents.

380. He gives the example of squaring, i.e., squaring a surface of equally distant sides which is not square but which we say we square when we find a square equal to it. But since every rectangular surface of equally distant sides is contained by the two lines which contain the right angle, so that the total surface is simply the product of the multiplication of one of these lines by the other, then we find a square equal to this surface when we find a line which is the proportional mean between these two lines. For example, if line A is to line B as line B is to line C, the square of line B is equal to the surface contained by C and A, as is proved in Book VI of Euclid’s Elements.

381. This becomes quite evident in the case of numbers. For 6 is the proportional mean between 9 and 4; for 9 is related to 6 in the ratio of 11/2 to 1, and so also is 6 to 4. Now the square of 6 is 36, which is also produced by multiplying 4 by 9; for 4 x 9 = 36. And it is similar in all other cases.

382. But with regard to processes (197)

Here he gives an argument pertaining to the cause of motion. For in processes of generation and actions and in every change we see that we may say that we know a thing when we know its principle of motion, and that motion is nothing else than the actuality of something mobile produced by a mover, as is stated in the Physics, Book III. He omits the material cause, however, because that cause is a principle of knowing in the most imperfect way; for the act of knowing is not caused by what is potential but by what is actual, as is stated below in Book IX (805:C 1894)

383. Then after having given those arguments which pertain to the second question, he introduces an argument which is based on the same reasons as were given above (191:C 370 ff.) in reference to the first question, namely, that it is the office of a different science to consider all these causes by reason of the fact that in different subject-matters different causes seem to have the principal role, for example, the source of motion in mobile things, the quiddity in demonstrable things, and the end in things which are directed to an end.

384. However, we do not find that Aristotle explicitly solves this question later on, though his solution can be ascertained from the things which he

establishes below in different places. For in Book IV (533) he establishes that this science considers being as being, and therefore that it also belongs to it, and not to the philosophy of nature, to consider first substances; for there are other substances besides mobile ones.

But every substance is either a being of itself, granted that it is only a form; or it is a being by its form, granted that it is composed of matter and form. Hence inasmuch as this science considers being, it considers the formal cause before all the rest. But the first substances are not known by us in such a way that we know what they are, as can be understood in some way from the things established in Book IX (1904); and thus in our knowledge of them the formal cause has no place.

But even though they are immobile in themselves, they are nevertheless the cause of motion in other things after the manner of an end. Hence inasmuch as this science considers first substances, it belongs to it especially to consider the final cause and also in a way the efficient cause.

But to consider the material cause in itself does not belong to it in any way, because matter is not properly a cause of being but of some definite kind of being, namely, mobile substance. However, such causes belong to the consideration of the particular sciences, unless perhaps they are considered by this science inasmuch as they are contained under being; for it extends its analysis to all things in this way.

385. Now when these things are seen it is easy to answer the arguments which have been raised. For, first, nothing prevents the different causes in this science from belonging to a single existing thing, even though they are not contraries, because they are reducible to one thing—being in general—as has been stated (384).

And in a similar way, even though not every science considers all of the causes, still nothing prevents one science from being able to consider all of the causes or several of them insofar as they are reducible to some one thing. But to be more specific, it must be said that in the case of immobile things nothing prevents the source of motion and the end or good from being investigated. By immobile things I mean here those which are still causes of motion, as the first substances. However, in the case of those things which are neither moved cause motion there is no investigation of the source of motion, or of the end in the sense of the end of motion, although an end can be considered as the goal of some operation which does not involve motion. For if there are held to be intellectual substances which do not cause motion, as the Platonists claimed, still insofar as they have an intellect and will it is necessary to hold that they have an end and a good which is the object of their will. However, the objects of mathematics neither are moved nor cause motion nor have a will. Hence in their case the good is not considered under the name of good and end, although in them we do consider what is good, namely, their being and what they are. Hence the statement that the good is not found in the objects of mathematics is false, as he proves below in Book IX (1888) .

386. The reply to the second question is already clear; for a study of the three causes, about which he argued dialectically, belongs to this science.

LESSON 5

Are the Principles of Demonstration and Substance Considered by One Science or by Many?

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198. But with respect to the principles of demonstration there is also the problem whether they are studied by one science or by many. By principles of demonstration I mean the common axioms from which fall] demonstrations proceed, e.g., “everything must either be affirmed or denied,” and “it is impossible both to be and not to be at the same time,” and all other such propositions. Is there one science which deals with these principles and with substance or are there different sciences? And, if not one, which of the two must be called the one that is now being sought?

199. Now it would be unreasonable that these things should be studied by one science; for why should the study of these be proper to geometry rather than to any other science? In a similar way, then, if this study pertains to any science but cannot pertain to all, an understanding of these principles is no more proper to the science which studies substance than it is to any other science.

200. But at the same time how will there be a science of these principles? For we already know what each one of them is; and therefore the other arts use them as something known. However, if there is demonstration of them, there will have to be some subject-genus, and some of the principles will

have to be properties and others axioms. For there cannot be demonstration of all things, since demonstration must proceed from something, and be about something, and [be demonstration] of certain things. It follows, then, that there is a single genus of demonstrable things; for all demonstrative sciences use axioms.

201. But on the other hand, if the science which considers substance differs from the one which considers axioms, which of these sciences is the more important and prior one? For axioms are most universal and are the principles of all things. And if it does not belong to the philosopher to establish the truth and falsity [of these principles], to what other person will it belong?

COMMENTARY

Q. 2: IS THE SCIENCE OF SUBSTANCE ALSO THAT OF FIRST PRINCIPLES?

387. Having debated the first question which had to do with the study of causes, Aristotle’s intention here is to argue dialectically about the science which is concerned with the study of the first principles of demonstration; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he raises the question. Second (388), he argues one side of the question. Third (391), he argues on the other side of the question.

Accordingly, he states, first, the problem relating to the first principles of demonstration, namely, whether the study of these principles belongs to one science or to many. Further, he explains what the principles of demonstration are, saying that they are the common conceptions of all men on which all demonstrations are based, i.e., inasmuch as the particular principles of the proper demonstrated conclusions derive their stability from these common principles. And he gives an example of first principles, especially this one, that everything must either be affirmed or denied [of some subject]. Another principle which he mentions is that it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be at the same time. Hence the question arises whether these principles and similar ones pertain to one science or to many. And if they pertain to one science, whether they pertain to the science which investigates substance or to another science. And if to another science, then which of these must be called wisdom, or first philosophy, which we now seek.

388. Now it would be (199).

Here he argues one side of the question with a view to showing that it is not the office of one science to consider all first principles, i.e. the first principles of demonstration and substance. He gives two arguments, of which the first runs thus: since all sciences employ these principles of demonstration, there seems to be no reason why the study of them should pertain to one science rather than to another; nor again does it seem reasonable that they should be studied by all sciences, because then it would follow that the same thing would be treated in different sciences; but that would be superfluous. Hence it seems to follow that no science considers these principles. Therefore, for the very same reason that it does not belong to any of the other sciences to give us a knowledge of such principles, for this reason too it follows that it does not belong to the science whose function it is to consider substance.

389. But at the same time (200).

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus. In the sciences there are two methods by which knowledge is acquired. One is that by which the whatness of each thing is known, and the other is that by which knowledge is acquired through demonstration. But it does not belong to any science to give us a knowledge of the principles of demonstration by means of the first method, because such knowledge of principles is assumed to be prior to all the sciences. For “we already know” what each one of them is, i.e., we know from the very beginning what these principles signify, and by knowing this the principles themselves are immediately known. And since such knowledge of principles belongs to us immediately, he concludes that all the arts and sciences which are concerned with other kinds of cognitions make use of these pinciples as things naturally known by us.

390. But it is proved in the same way that a knowledge of these principles is not presented to us in any science by means of demonstration, because if there were demonstration of them, then three principles would have to be considered, namely, some subjectgenus, its properties and the axioms. In order to clarify this he adds that there cannot be demonstration of all things; for subjects are not demonstrated but properties are demonstrated of subjects. Concerning subjects, however, it is necessary to know beforehand whether they exist and what they are, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. The reason is that demonstration must proceed from certain

things as principles, which are the axioms, and be about something, which is the subject, and [be demonstration] of certain things, which are properties. Now according to this it is immediately evident of one of these three, i.e., the axioms, that they are not demonstrated, otherwise there would have to be certain axioms prior to the axioms; but this is impossible. Therefore, having dismissed this method of procedure as obvious, he proceeds to consider the subject-genus. For since one science has one subject-genus, then that science which would demonstrate axioms would have one subject-genus. Thus there would have to be one subjectgenus for all demonstrative sciences, because all demonstrative sciences use axioms of this kind.

391. But on the other hand (201).

Here he argues the other side of the question. For if it is said that there is one science which deals with sucn principles, and another which deals with substance, the problem will remain as to which of these sciences is the more important and prior one. For, on the one hand, since the axioms are most universal and are the principles of everything that is treated in any of the sciences, it seems that the science which deals with such principles is the most important one. Yet, on the other hand, since substance is the first and principal kind of being, it is evident that first-philosophy is the science of substance. And if it is not the same science which deals with substance and with the axioms, it will not be easy to state to which of the other sciences it belongs to consider the truth and falsity of these axioms, i.e., if it does not belong to first philosophy, which considers substance.

392. The Philosopher answers this question in Book IV (590) of this work. He says that the study of the axioms belongs chiefly to the [first] philosopher inasmuch as it pertains to him to consider being in general, to which first principles of this kind essentially belong, as is most evident in the case of the very first principle: it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not to be [at the same time]. Hence all the particular sciences use principles of this kind just as they use being itself, although it is the first philosopher who is chiefly concerned with this. And the first argument is solved in this way.

But the second argument is solved thus: the [first] philosopher does not consider principles of this kind in such a way as to make them known by defining them or by demonstrating them in an absolute sense, but by refutation, i.e., by arguing disputatively against those who deny them, as is stated in Book IV (608).

LESSON 6

Are All Substances Considered by One Science or by Many? Does the Science of Substance Consider the Essential Accidents of Substance?

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 997a 15-997a 34

202. And there is the problem whether there is one science which deals with all substances, or many sciences.

203. If there is not one science, then with what substances must this science deal?

204. But it is unreasonable that there should be one science of all substances; for then one science would demonstrate all essential accidents, i.e., if it is true that every demonstrative science speculates about the essential accidents of some subject by proceeding from common opinions. Hence it is the office of the same science to study the essential accidents of the same subject-genus by proceeding from the same opinions. For it belongs to one science to consider that something is so, and it belongs to one science to consider the principles from which demonstrations proceed, whether to the same science or to a different one. Hence it belongs to one science to consider accidents, whether they are studied by these sciences or by one derived from them.

205. Further, there is the problem whether this science is concerned only with substances or also with accidents. I mean, for example, that if a solid is a kind of substance, and also lines and surfaces, the question arises whether it is the function of the same science to know these and also the accidents of each class of things about which the mathematical sciences make demonstrations, or whether it is the concern of a different science.

206. For if it is the concern of the same science, a particular one will undertake these demonstrations and this will be the one which deals with substance. However, there does not seem to be any demonstration of the quiddity.

207. But if it is the concern of a different science, which science will it be that studies the accidents of substances? For to solve this is very difficult.

COMMENTARY

QQ. 3 & 6: DOES THE SCIENCE OF SUBSTANCE CONSIDER ALL SUBSTANCES AS WELL AS ACCIDENTS?

393. Having debated the questions the third question, which pertains to which pertain to the scope of investigation of this science, he now treats the study of substances and accidents. This is divided into two parts inasmuch as he discusses two questions on this point. The second (403) begins where he says, “Furthermore, there is.”

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he raises the question whether there is one science that considers all substances, or whether there are many sciences that consider different substances.

394. If there is not (203).

Second, he argues the first side of the question with a view to showing that there is one science of all substances. For if there were not one science of all substances, then apparently it would be impossible to designate the substance which this science considers, because substance as substance is the primary kind of being. Hence it does not seem that one substance rather than another belongs to the consideration of the basic science.

395. but it is unreasonable (204).

Third, he argues the other side of the question, saying that it is unreasonable to hold that there is one science of all substances. For it would follow that there would be one demonstrative science of all essential accidents. And this is true because every science which demonstrates certain accidents speculates about the essential accidents of some particular subject, and it does this from certain common conceptions. Therefore, since a demonstrative science considers the accidents only of some particular subject, it follows that the study of some subject-genus belongs to the same science that is concerned with the study of the essential accidents of that genus and vice versa, so long as demonstrations proceed from the same principles.

396. But sometimes it happens to be the function of some science to demonstrate from certain principles that a thing is so, and sometimes it happens to be the function of some science to demonstrate the principles from which it was demonstrated that a thing is so, sometimes to the same science and sometimes to a different one.

An example of its being the function of the same science is seen in the case of geometry, which demonstrates that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles in virtue of the principle that the exterior angle of a triangle is equal to the two interior angles opposite to it; for to demonstrate this belongs to geometry alone. And an example of its being the function of a different science is seen in the case of music, which proves that a tone is not divided into two equal semitones by reason of the fact that a ratio of 9 to 8, which is superparticular, cannot be divided into two equal parts. But to prove this does not pertain to the musician but to the arithmetician. It is evident, then, that sometimes sciences differ because their principles differ, so long as one science demonstrates the principles of another science by means of certain higher principles.

397. But if it is assumed that the principles are identical, sciences could not differ so long as the accidents are the same and the subject-genus is the same, as if one science considered the subject and another its accidents. Hence it follows that that science which considers a substance will also consider its accidents, so that if there are many sciences which consider substances, there will be many sciences which consider accidents. But if there is only one science which considers substances, there will be only one science which considers accidents. But this is impossible, because it would then follow that there would be only one science, since there is no science which does not demonstrate the accidents of some subject. Therefore it is not the function of one science to consider all substances.

398. This is treated in Book IV (546) of this work, where it is shown that the examination of substance as substance belongs to the first science, whose province it is to consider being as being; and thus it considers all substances according to the common aspect of substance. Therefore it belongs to this science to consider the common accidents of substance. But it belongs to the particular sciences, which deal with particular substances, to consider the particular accidents of substances, just as it belongs to the science of nature to consider the accidents of mobile substance. However, among substances there is also a hierarchy, for the first substances are immaterial ones. Hence the study of them belongs properly to first-philosophy, just as the philosophy of nature would be first philosophy if there were no other substances prior to mobile corporeal substances, as is stated below in Book VI (1170).

399. Further, there is the problem (205).

Here he raises another question regarding the study of substance and accidents. Concerning this he does three things. First, he raises the question whether the investigation of this science is concerned with substance alone or also with the attributes that are accidents of substances. For example, if we say that lines, surfaces and solids are substances of some sort, as some held, the question arises whether it belongs to the same science to consider such things and also their proper accidents, which are demonstrated in the mathematical sciences, or whether it belongs to another science.

400. For if it is the concern (206).

Second, he argues one side of the question. For if it belongs to the same science to consider accidents and substances, then, since a science which considers accidents demonstrates accidents, it follows that a science which considers substance demonstrates substances. But this is impossible; for the definition of a substance, which expresses the quiddity’ is indemonstrable. Hence it will belong to the same science to consider substances and accidents.

401. But if it is the concern (207).

Third, he argues the other side of the question: if different sciences consider substance and accident, it will not be possible to state which science it is that speculates about the accidents of substance; because the science which would do this would consider both, although this would seem to pertain to all sciences; for every science considers the essential accidents of its subject, as has been explained.

402. The Philosopher answers this question in Book IV (570) of this work, saying that it is also the office of that science which is concerned with the study of substance and being to consider the proper accidents of substance and being. Yet it does not follow that it would consider each in the same way, i.e., by demonstrating substance as it demonstrates accidents, but by defining substance and by demonstrating that accidents either belong to or do not belong to it, as is explained more fully at the end of Book IX (1895) of this work.

LESSON 7

Are There Certain Other Substances Separate from Sensible Things? Criticism of the Different Opinions Regarding the Objects of Mathematics

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 2 & 3: 997a 34-998a 21

208. Furthermore, there is the problem whether sensible substances alone must be said to exist, or others besides these. And whether there is one genus or many genera of substances, as is held by those who speak of the Forms and the intermediate entities with which they say the mathematical sciences deal.

209. Now the way in which we say that the Forms are both causes and substances in themselves has been treated in our first discussions concerning all of these things (69).

210. But while they involve difficulty in many respects, it is no less absurd to say that there are certain other natures besides those which exist in the heavens, and that these are the same as sensible things, except that the former are eternal whereas the latter are corruptible. For they [i.e., the Platonists] say nothing more or less than that there is a man-in-himself and horse-in-itself and health-in-itself, which differ in no respect [from their sensible counterparts]; in which they act like those who say that there are gods and that they are of human form. For just as the latter made nothing

else than eternal men, in a similar way the former make the Forms nothing else than eternal sensible things.

211. Furthermore, if anyone holds that there are intermediate entities in addition to the Forms and sensible substances, he will face many problems. For evidently there will be, in like manner, lines in addition to ordinary sensible lines, and the same will be true of other classes of things. Therefore, since astronomy is one of these [mathematical sciences], there will be a heaven in addition to the one we perceive, and a sun and moon, and the same will be true of the other celestial bodies. And how are we to accept these things? For it is unreasonable that a heaven should be immobile, but that it should be mobile is altogether impossible. The same thing is true of the things with which the science of perspective is concerned, and of harmonics in mathematics, because for the same reasons it is also impossible that these should exist apart from sensible things. For if there are intermediate sensible objects and senses, evidently there will be intermediate animals between animals-in-themselves and those which are corruptible.

212. Again, one might also raise the question as to what things these sciences must investigate. For if geometry, which is the art of measuring the earth, differs from geodesy, which is the art of dividing the earth, only in this respect that the latter deals with things which are perceptible by the senses, whereas the former deals with those which are imperceptible, evidently there will be, in addition to the science of medicine, another science midway between the science of medicine itself and this particular science of medicine; and this will be true of the other sciences. But how is this possible? For then there will be certain healthy things besides those which are sensible and besides health-in-itself.

213. Similarly, neither does it seem that geodesy is concerned with continuous quantities which are sensible and corruptible. For in this case it would be destroyed when they are destroyed.

214. Nor again will astronomy deal with sensible continuous quantities, or with this heaven. For the lines we perceive by the senses are not such as those of which geometry speaks, since none of the things perceived by the senses are straight or round in this way. For the circle does not touch the rule at a point, but in the way in which Protagoras spoke in arguing against the geometricians. Neither are the motions or revolutions of the heavens

similar to the things of which geometry speaks, nor do points have the same nature as the stars.

215. However, there are also some who say that these intermediate entities, which are below the Forms and above sensible things, do not exist outside of sensible things but in them. But to enumerate all the impossible consequences which follow from this theory would require too long a discussion. It will be sufficient to propose the following consideration.

216. It is unreasonable that this should be so only in the case of such things, but evidently it is also possible for the Forms to exist in sensible things, because both of these views depend on the same argument.

217. Furthermore, it would be necessary for two solids to occupy the same place.

218. And [the objects of mathematics] would not be immobile since they exist in sensible things, which are moved.

219. Moreover, on the whole, to what end would anyone hold that they exist but exist in sensible things? For the same absurdities as those described will apply to these suppositions. For there will be a heaven in addition to the one which we perceive, although it will not be separate but in the same place; but this is quite impossible.

Chapter 3

In these matters, then, it is difficult to see how it is possible to have any positive truth.

COMMENTARY

Q. 5: ARE THERE SUBSTANCES BESIDES SENSIBLE ONES?

403. Having debated the questions which pertain to the scope of this science, the Philosopher now treats dialectically the questions which pertain to the substances themselves with which this science is chiefly concerned. In regard to this he does three things. First, he raises the questions. Second (406), he indicates the source from which arguments can be drawn in support of one side of the question (“Now the way”). Third (407), he argues on the other side of the question (“But while they involve”).

In regard to the first part of this division he raises two questions. The first question is whether sensible substances alone are found in the universe, as certain of the ancient philosophers of nature claimed, or whether besides sensible substances there are certain others, as the Platonists claimed.

404. And assuming that besides sensible substances there are certain others, the second question is whether these substances belong to one genus, or whether there are many genera of substances. For he considers both opinions. For some thinkers held, that in addition to sensible substances there are only separate Forms, i.e., an immaterial man-in-himself and horse-in itself and so on for the other classes of things, whereas others held that there are certain other substances midway between the Forms and sensible things, namely, the objects of mathematics, with which they said the mathematical sciences deal.

405. The reason for this view is that they posited on the part of the intellect a twofold process of abstracting things: one whereby the intellect is said to abstract the universal from the particular, and according to this mode of abstraction they posited separate Forms, which subsist of themselves; and another [whereby the intellect is said to abstract] from sensible matter certain forms in whose definition sensible matter is not given, for example, the abstraction of circle from brass. And according to this mode of abstraction they posited separate objects of mathematics, which they said are midway between the Forms and sensible substances, because they have something in common with both: with the Forms inasmuch as they are separate from sensible matter, and with sensible substances inasmuch as many of them are found in one class, as many circles and many lines.

406. Now the way in which (209).

Then he shows how it is possible to argue one side of the question, saying that it has been stated “in our first discussions,” i.e., in Book I (69:C 151), how the Forms are held to be both the causes of sensible things and substances which subsist of themselves. Hence, from the things which have been said there in presenting the views of Plato, arguments can be drawn in support of the affirmative side of the question.

407. But while they involve (210).

Here he advances reasons for the negative side. He does this, first (210), for the purpose of showing that the Forms are not separate from sensible things; and, second (211:C 410), for the purpose of showing that the objects of mathematics are not separate (“Furthermore, if anyone”). Now above in Book I (103:C 208) he gave many arguments against those who posited separate Forms; and, therefore, passing over those arguments, he gives the line of reasoning which seems most effective. He says (210) that while the position of those who posit separate Forms contains many difficulties, the position of those which is now given is no less absurd than any of the others, i.e., that someone should say that there are certain natures in addition to the sensible ones which are contained beneath the heavens. For the heavens constitute the limit of sensible bodies, as is proved in Book I of The Heavens and the World. But those who posited the Forms did not place them below the heavens or outside of it, as is stated in Book III of the Physics. Hence, in accordance with this he says that they posited certain other natures in addition to those which exist in the heavens. And they said that these opposite natures are the same as these sensible things both in kind and in their intelligible constitution, and that they exist in these sensible things; or rather they said that those natures are the Forms of these sensible things. For example, they said that a separate man constitutes the humanity of this particular man who is perceived by the senses, and that a man who is perceived by the senses is a man by participating in that separate man. Yet they held that these differ in this respect, that those immaterial natures are eternal, whereas these sensible natures are corruptible.

408. That they hold those natures to be the same as these sensible things is clear from the fact that, just as man, horse, and health are found among sensible things, in a similar way they posited among these natures "a man-inhimself," i.e., one lacking sensible matter; and they did the same with regard to horse and health. Moreover, they claimed that nothing else existed in the class of separate substances except [the counterpart of] what existed materially in the sensible world. This position seems to be similar to that of those who held that the gods are of human form, which was the position of the Epicureans, as Tully states in The Nature of the Gods. For just as those who held that the gods are of human form did nothing else than make men eternal in nature, in a similar way those who claimed that there are Forms do nothing else than hold that there are eternal sensible things, such as horse, ox, and the like.

409. But it is altogether absurd that what is naturally corruptible should be specifically the same as what is naturally incorruptible; for it is rather the opposite that is true, namely, that corruptible and incorruptible things differ in kind to the greatest degree, as is said below in Book X (895:C 2137) Of

this work. Yet it can happen that what is naturally corruptible is kept in being perpetually by Divine power.

410. Furthermore, if anyone (211).

Then he argues against those who claimed that the objects of mathematics are midway between the Forms and sensible things. First (211:C 410), he argues against those who held that the objects of mathematics are intermediate entities and are separate from sensible things; and, second (215:C 417), against those who held that the objects of mathematics exist but exist in sensible things ("However, there are").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he introduces arguments against the first position. Second (214:C 416), he argues in support of this position ("Nor again").

He brings up three arguments against the first position. The first argument is this: just as there is a mathematical science about the line, in a similar way there are certain mathematical sciences about other subjects. If, then, there are certain lines in addition to the sensible ones with which geometry deals, by the same token there will be, in all other classes of things with which the other mathematical sciences deal, certain things in addition to those perceived by the senses. But he shows that it is impossible to hold this with regard to two of the mathematical sciences.

411. He does this, first, in the case of astronomy, which is one of the mathematical sciences and which has as its subject the heavens and the celestial bodies. Hence, according to what has been said, it follows that there is another heaven besides the one perceived by the senses, and similarly another sun and another moon, and so on for the other celestial bodies. But this is incredible, because that other heaven would be either mobile or immobile. If it were immobile, this would seem to be unreasonable, since we see that it is natural for the heavens to be always in motion. Hence the astronomer also makes some study of the motions of the heavens. But to say that a heaven should be both separate and mobile is impossible, because nothing separate from matter can be mobile.

412. Then he shows that the same view is unacceptable in the case of other mathematical sciences, for example, in that of perspective, which considers visible lines, and "in the case of harmonics," i.e., in that of music, which studies the ratios of audible sounds. Now it is impossible that there should be intermediate entities between the Forms and sensible things;

because, if these sensible things—sounds and visible lines—were intermediate entities, it would also follow that there are intermediate senses. And since senses exist only in an animal, it would follow that there are also intermediate animals between the Form animal, and corruptible animals; but this is altogether absurd.

413. Again, one might (212).

The second argument [which he uses against the possibility of the objects of mathematics being an intermediate class of entities separate from sensible things] is as follows. If in those classes of things with which the mathematical sciences deal there are three classes of things—sensible substances, Forms and intermediate entities, then since the intelligible structure of all sensible things and of all Forms seems to be the same, it appears to follow that there are intermediate entities between any sensible things at all and their Forms. Hence there remains the problem as to what classes of things are included in the scope of the mathematical sciences. For if a mathematical science such as geometry differs from geodesy, which is the science of sensible measurements, only in this respect that geodesy deals with sensible measurements, whereas geometry deals with intermediate things which are not sensible, there will be in addition to all the sciences which consider sensible things certain [other] mathematical sciences which deal with these intermediate entities. For example, if the science of medicine deals with certain sensible bodies, there will be in addition to the science of medicine, and any like science, some other science which will be intermediate between the science of medicine which deals with sensible bodies and the science of medicine which deals with the Forms. But this is impossible; for since medicine is about “healthy things,” i.e., things which are conducive to health, then it will also follow, if there is an intermediate science of medicine, that there will be intermediate health-giving things in addition to the health-giving things perceived by the senses and absolute health, i.e., health-in-itself, which is the Form of health separate from matter. But this is clearly false. Hence it follows that these mathematical sciences do not deal with certain things which are intermediate between sensible things and the separate Forms.

414. Similarly, neither (213).

Then he gives the third argument [against the possibility of the objects of mathematics being an intermediate class]; and in this argument one of the points in the foregoing position is destroyed, namely, that there would be a science of continuous quantities which are perceptible; and thus, if there were another science of continuous quantities, it would follow from this that there would be intermediate continuous quantities. Hence he says that it is not true that geodesy is a science of perceptible continuous quantities, because such continuous quantities are corruptible. It would follow, then, that geodesy is concerned with corruptible continuous quantities. But it seems that a science is destroyed when the things with which it deals are destroyed; for when Socrates is not sitting, our present knowledge that he is sitting will not be true. Therefore it would follow that geodesy, or geosophics as other readings say, is destroyed when sensible continuous quantities are destroyed; but this is contrary to the character of science, which is necessary and incorruptible.

415. Yet this argument can be brought in on the opposite side of the question inasmuch as one may say that he intends to prove by this argument that there are no sciences of sensible things, so that all sciences must be concerned with either the intermediate entities or the Forms.

416. Nor again will (214)

Here he argues in support of this position, as follows: it belongs to the very notion of science that it should be concerned with what is true. But this would not be the case unless it were about things as they are. Therefore the things about which there are sciences must be the same in themselves as they are shown to be in the sciences. But perceptible lines are not such as geometry says they are. He proves this on the grounds that geometry demonstrates that a circle touches “the rule,” i.e., a straight line, only at a point, as is shown in Book III of Euclid’s Elements. But this is found to be true of a circle and a line in the case of sensible things. Protagoras used this argument when he destroyed the certainties of the sciences against the geometricians. Similarly, the movements and revolutions of the heavens are not such as the astronomers describe them; for it seems to be contrary to nature to explain the movements of the celestial bodies by means of eccentrics and epicycles and other different movements which the astronomers describe in the heavens. Similarly, neither are the quantities of the celestial bodies such as the astronomers describe them to be, for they use stars as points even though they are still bodies having extension. It seems, then, that geometry does not deal with perceptible continuous quantities, and that astronomy does not deal with the heaven which we perceive. Hence it remains that these sciences are concerned with certain other things, which arc intermediate.

417. However, there are (215)

Here he argues against another position. First, he states the point at issue. Second (216:C 418), he brings in arguments germane to his purpose (“It is unreasonable”).

Accordingly, he says, first (215), that some thinkers posit natures midway between the Forms and sensible things, yet they do not say that these natures are separate from sensible things but exist in sensible things themselves. This is clear regarding the opinion of those who held that there are certain self-subsistent dimensions which penetrate all sensible bodies, which some thinkers identify with the place of sensible bodies, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics and is disproved there. Hence he says here that to pursue all the absurd consequences of this position is a major undertaking, but that it is now sufficient to touch on some points briefly.

418. It is unreasonable (216).

Then he brings four arguments against this position. The first runs as follows. It seems to be for the same reason that in addition to sensible things the Forms and objects of mathematics are posited, because both are held by reason of abstraction on the part of the intellect. If, then, the objects of mathematics are held to exist in sensible things, it is fitting that not only they but also the Forms themselves should exist there. But this is contrary to the opinion of those who posit [the existence of] the Forms. For they hold that these are separate, and not that they exist anywhere in particular.

419. Furthermore, it would be (217)

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus: if the objects of mathematics differ from sensible things yet exist in them, since a body is an object of mathematics, it follows that a mathematical body exists simultaneously with a sensible body in the same subject. Therefore “two solids,” i.e., two bodies, will exist in the same place. This is impossible not only for two sensible bodies but also for a sensible body and a mathematical one, because each has dimensions, by reason of which two bodies are prevented from being in the same place.

420. Furthermore, if anyone (211).

Then he argues against those who claimed that the objects of mathematics are midway between the Forms and sensible things. First (211:C 410), he argues against those who held that the objects of mathematics are intermediate entities and are separate from sensible things; and, second (215:C 417), against those who held that the objects of mathematics exist but exist in sensible things (“However, there are”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he introduces arguments against the first position. Second (214:C 416), he argues in support of this position (“Nor again”).

He brings up three arguments against the first position. The first argument is this: just as there is a mathematical science about the line, in a similar way there are certain mathematical sciences about other subjects. If, then, there are certain lines in addition to the sensible ones with which geometry deals, by the same token there will be, in all other classes of things with which the other mathematical sciences deal, certain things in addition to those perceived by the senses. But he shows that it is impossible to hold this with regard to two of the mathematical sciences.

421. He does this, first, in the case of astronomy, which is one of the mathematical sciences and which has as its subject the heavens and the celestial bodies. Hence, according to what has been said, it follows that there is another heaven besides the one perceived by the senses, and similarly another sun and another moon, and so on for the other celestial bodies. But this is incredible, because that other heaven would be either mobile or immobile. If it were immobile, this would seem to be unreasonable, since we see that it is natural for the heavens to be always in motion. Hence the astronomer also makes some study of the motions of the heavens. But to say that a

422. Now the Philosopher treats these questions below in Books XII, XIII and XIV of this work, where he shows that there are neither separate mathematical substances nor Forms. The reasoning which moved those who posited the objects of mathematics and the Forms, which are derived from an abstraction of the intellect, is given at the beginning of Book XIII. For nothing prevents a thing which has some particular attribute from being considered by the intellect without its being viewed under this aspect and yet be considered truly, just as a white man can be considered without white being considered. Thus the intellect can consider sensible things not

inasmuch as they are mobile and material but inasmuch as they are substances or continuous quantities; and this is to abstract the thing known from matter and motion. However, so far as the thing known is concerned, the intellect does not abstract in such a way that it understands continuous quantities and forms to exist without matter and motion. For then it would follow either that the intellect of the one abstracting is false, or that the things which the intellect abstracts are separate in reality.

LESSON 8

Are Genera Principles of Things? And If So, Does This Apply to The Most Universal Genera or to Those Nearest to Individuals?

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220. Concerning the principles of things there is the problem whether genera must be regarded as the elements and principles of things, or rather the first things of which each thing is composed inasmuch as they are intrinsic.

221. just as the elements and principles of a word seem to be those things of which all words are first composed, but not word in common. And just as we say that the elements of diagrams are those things whose demonstrations are found in the demonstrations of others, either of all or of most of them.

222. Furthermore, those who say that the elements of bodies are many, and those who say that they are one, call the things of which bodies are composed and constituted their principles, as Empedocles says that fire and water and those things which are included with these are the elements from which existing things derive their being; but he does not speak of them as the genera of existing things.

223. And again if anyone wished to speculate about the nature of other things, in finding out in regard to each (a bed, for example) of what parts it is made and how it is put together, he will come to know its nature. And

according to these arguments genera are not the principles of existing things.

224. But if we know each thing through definitions, and genera are the principles of definitions, genera must be the principles of the things defined.

225. And if in order to acquire scientific knowledge of existing things it is necessary to acquire scientific knowledge of their species, according to which they are said to be beings, then genera are the principles of species.

226. Moreover, some of those who say that the elements of existing things are the one or being or the great and small, seem to use these as genera.

227. But it is not possible to speak of principles in both ways; for the meaning of substance is one. Therefore a definition by means of genera will differ from one which gives the intrinsic constituents.

228. Again, if genera are the principles of things in the fullest sense, there is the question whether the first genera must be thought to be principles, or those which are lowest and are predicated of individual things. For this also raises a problem.

229. For if universals are the principles of things to a greater degree, evidently these must be the highest genera, because it is most properly these which are predicated of all existing things. Therefore there will be as many principles of existing things as there are first genera. Hence being and unity will be principles and substances, for it is these especially which are predicated of all existing things.

It is impossible, however, that unity or being should be a single genus of existing things; for it is necessary both that the differences of each genus exist and that each be one. But it is impossible either that species be predicated of the differences of their own genera, or that a genus be so predicated independently of its species. If, then, unity or being is a genus, no difference will be one and a being. But if unity and being are not genera, neither will they be principles, supposing that genera are principles.

230. Further, those things which are intermediate and are taken along with differences will be genera down to individuals. But some seem to be such, whereas others do not. Again, differences are principles to a greater degree than genera; and if they are principles, principles will be infinite in number, so to speak. And [this will appear] in another way also if one holds that the first genus is a principle.

231. But, on the other hand, if unity is a specific principle to a greater degree, and unity is indivisible, and everything indivisible is such either in quantity or in species, and what is indivisible in species is prior, and genera are divisible into species, then it will be rather the lowest predicate which is one. For man is not the genus of particular men.

232. Further, in the case of those things to which prior and subsequent apply, it is not possible in their case that there should be something which exists apart from them. For example, if the number two is the first of numbers, there will not be any number apart from the species of numbers; nor, likewise, any figure apart from the species of figures. But if the genera of these things do not [exist apart from the species], then in the case of other things the teaching will be that there are genera apart from the species; for of these things there seem especially to be genera. But among individual things one is not prior and another subsequent.

233. Further, where one thing is better and another worse, that which is better is always prior; so that there will be no genus of these things. From these considerations, then, it seems that it is the terms predicated of individuals, rather than genera, which are principles.

234. But again it is not easy to state how one must conceive these to be the principles of things..For a principle or cause must be distinct from the things of which it is the principle or cause, and must be able to exist apart from them. But why should one think that anything such as this exists apart from singular things, except that it is predicated universally and of all things? But if this is the reason, then the more universal things are, the more they must be held to be principles. Hence the first genera will be principles of things.

COMMENTARY

Q. 9: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN GENERA AND ELEMENTS?

423. Having debated the questions which were raised about substances, the Philosopher now treats dialectically the questions which were raised about principles. This is divided into two parts. In the first he discusses the questions which asked what the principles of things are; and in the second (456), the questions which asked what kind of things the principles are (“Again, there is the problem”).

In the first part of this division he discusses two questions: first, whether universals are the principles of things; and second (443), whether any principles are separate from matter (“But there is a problem”).

In regard to the first he discusses two questions, of which the first is whether genera are the principles of things. The second (431) asks which genera these are, whether the first genera or the others (“Again, if genera”).

In regard to the first he does two things: first, he raises the question; and second (424), he treats it dialectically (“Just as the elements”).

The first question has to do with the principles of things: whether it is necessary to accept or believe that those genera which are predicated of many things are the elements and principles of things, or rather that those parts of which every single thing is composed must be called the elements and principles of things. But he adds two conditions, one of which is “inasmuch as they are intrinsic,” which is given in order to distinguish these parts from a contrary and a privation. For white is said to come from black, or the non-white, although these are not intrinsic to white. Hence they are not its elements. The other condition is what he calls “the first things,” which is given in order to distinguish them from secondary components. For the bodies of animals are composed of flesh and nerves, which exist within the animal; yet these are not called the elements of animals, because they are not the first things of which an animal is composed, but rather fire, air, water and earth, from which flesh and nerves derive their being.

424. Just as the elements (221).

Here he treats this question dialectically; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that the first things of which anything is composed are its principles and elements. Second (224:C 427), he argues the opposite side of the question (“But if we know”). Third (227:C 430), he rejects one answer by which it could be said that both of these [i.e., genera and constituent parts] are the principles and elements of things (“But it is not”).

In regard to the first he gives three arguments. The first of these proceeds from natural phenomena, in which he makes his thesis evident by two examples. The first example which he gives if that of a word, whose principle and element is not said to be the common term word but rather the first constituents of which all words are composed, which are called letters. He gives as a second example, diagrams, i.e., the demonstrative descriptions of geometrical figures. For the elements of these diagrams are not said to be the common term diagram but rather those theorems whose demonstrations are found in the demonstrations of other geometrical theorems, either of all or of most of them, because the other demonstrations proceed from the supposition of the first demonstrations. Hence the book of Euclid is called The Book of Elements, because the first theorems of geometry, from which the other demonstrations proceed, are demonstrated therein.

425. Furthermore, those who (222).

Here he gives the second argument which also employs certain examples drawn from nature. He says that those who hold that the elements of bodies are either one or many, say that the principles and elements of bodies are those things of which bodies are composed and made up as intrinsic constituents. Thus Empedocles says~ that the elements of natural bodies are fire and water and other things of this kind, which along with these he calls the elements of things; and natural bodies are constituted of these first things inasmuch as they are intrinsic. Moreover, they [i.e., the philosophers of nature] held that in addition to these two principles there are four others—air, earth, strife and friendship—as was stated in Book I (50:C 104). But neither Empedocles nor the other philosophers of nature said that the genera of things are the principles and elements of these natural bodies.

426. And again if anyone (223).

Here he gives the third argument, which involves things made by art. He says that if someone wished to “speculate about their nature,” i.e., about the definition which indicates the essence of other bodies than natural ones, namely, of bodies made by human art, for example, if one wished to know a bed, it would be necessary to consider of what parts it is made and how they are put together; and in this way he would know the nature of a bed. And after this he concludes that genera are not the principles of existing things.

427. But if we know (224).

Here he argues the other side of the question. He gives three arguments, the first of which is as follows. Each thing is known through its definition. Therefore, if a principle of being is the same as a principle of knowing, it seems that anything which is a principle of definition is also a principle of the thing defined. But genera are principles of definitions, because definitions are first composed of them. Hence genera are the principles of the things defined.

428. And if in order to (225)

Here he gives the second argument, which runs thus. Scientific knowledge of each thing is acquired by knowing the species from which it gets its being, for Socrates can be known only by understanding that he is man. But genera are principles of species, because the species of things are composed of genera and differences. Therefore genera are the principles of existing things.

429. Moreover, some of those (226).

Here he gives a third argument, which is based on the authority of the Platonists, who held that the one and being are the principles of things, and also the great and small, which are used as genera. Therefore genera are the principles of things.

430. But it is not possible (227)

Here he excludes one answer which would say that both of these are principles. He says that it is impossible to say that both of these are "principles," i.e., both the elements, or the parts of which something is composed, and genera. He proves this by the following argument. Of each thing there is one definite concept which exposes its substance, just as there is also one substance of each thing. But the definitive concept which involves genera is not the same as the one which involves the parts of which a thing is composed. Hence it cannot be true that each definition indicates a thing's substance. But the definitive concept which indicates a thing's substance cannot be taken from its principles. Therefore it is impossible that both genera and the parts of which things are composed should be simultaneously and being cannot be genera of all the principles of things.

431. Again, if genera (228).

Then he treats the second question dialectically. First, he raises the question; and second (432), he brings up arguments relative to this question ("For if universals").

Accordingly, he says that if we hold that genera are the principles of things in the fullest sense which of these genera should be considered to be the principles of things to a greater degree? Must we consider those "genera" which are first in number, namely, the most common, or also the lowest genera, which are proximately predicated of the individual, i.e., the lowest species. For this is open to question, as is clear from what follows.

432. For if universals (229).

Here he argues about the question which was proposed; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he introduces arguments to show that the first genera cannot be principles. Second (231:C 436), he introduces arguments to show that the last species should rather be called the principles of things ("But, on the other hand"). Third (234:C 441), he debates the proposed question ("But again it is").

In regard to the first (229) he gives three arguments, of which the first runs thus: if genera are principles to the extent that they are more universal, then those which are most universal, i.e., those which are predicated of all things, must be the first genera and the principles of things in the highest degree. Hence there will be as many principles of things as there are most common genera of this kind. But the most common of all genera are unity and being, which are predicated of all things. Therefore unity and being will be the principles and substances of all things. But this is impossible, because unity and being cannot be genera of all things. For, since unity and being are most universal, if they were principles of genera, it would follow that genera would not be the principles of things. Hence the position which maintains that the most common genera are principles is an impossible one, because from it there follows the opposite of what was held, namely, that genera are not principles.

433. That being and unity cannot be genera he proves by this argument: since a difference added to a genus constitutes a species, a species cannot be predicated of a difference without a genus, or a genus without a species. That it is impossible to predicate a species of a difference is clear for two reasons. First, because a difference applies to more things than a species, as Porphyry says; ' and second, because, since a difference is given in the definition of a species, a species can be predicated essentially of a difference only if a difference is understood to be the subject of a species, as number is the subject of evenness in whose definition it is given. This, however, is not the case; but a difference is rather a formal principle of a species. Therefore a species cannot be predicated of a difference except, perhaps, in an incidental way. Similarly too neither can a genus, taken in itself, be predicated of a difference by essential predication. For a genus is

not given in the definition of a difference, because a difference does not share in a genus, as is stated in Book IV of The Topics; nor again is a difference given in the definition of a genus. Therefore a genus is not predicated essentially of a difference in any way. Yet it is predicated of that which "has a difference," i.e., of a species, which actually contains a difference. Hence he says that a species is not predicated of the proper differences of a genus, nor is a genus independently of its species, because a genus is predicated of its differences inasmuch as they inhere in a species. But no difference can be conceived of which unity and being are not predicated, because any difference of any genus is a one and a being, otherwise it could not constitute any one species of being. It is impossible, then, that unity and being should be genera.

434. Further, those things (230)

Then he gives the second argument, which runs thus: if genera are called principles because they are common and predicated of many things, then for a like reason all those things which are principles because they are common and predicated of many will have to be genera. But all things which are intermediate between the first genera and individuals, namely, those which are considered together with some differences, are common predicates of many things. Hence they are both principles and genera. But this is evidently false. For some of them are genera, as subaltern species, whereas others are not, as the lowest species. It is not true, then, that the first or common genera are the principles of things.

435. Further, if the first genera are principles, because they are the principles by which we know species, then differences will be principles to a greater degree, because differences are the formal principles of species; and form or actuality is chiefly the principle of knowing. But it is unfitting that differences should be the principles of things, because in that case there would be an infinite number of principles, so to speak; for the differences of things are infinite, so to speak; not infinite in reality but to us. That they are infinite in number is revealed in two ways: in one way if we consider the multitude of differences in themselves; in another way if we consider the first genus as a first principle, for evidently innumerable differences are contained under it. The first genera, then, are not the principles of things.

436. But on the other hand (231).

Then he shows that the lowest species are principles to a greater degree than genera. He gives three arguments, of which the first runs thus: according to the Platonists it is the one which seems to have “the nature,” 3 or character, of a principle to the greatest degree. Indeed, unity has the character of indivisibility, because a one is merely an undivided being. But a thing is indivisible in two ways, namely, in quantity and in species: in quantity, as the point and unit, and this is a sort of indivisibility opposed to the division of quantity; and in species, as what is not divided into many species. But of these two types of indivisibility the first and more important one is indivisibility in species, just as the species of a thing is prior to its quantity. Therefore that which is indivisible in species is more of a principle because it is indivisible in quantity. And in the division of quantity the genus seems to be more indivisible, because there is one genus of many species; but in the division of species one species is more indivisible. Hence the last term which is predicated of many, which is not a genus of many species, namely, the lowest species, is one to a greater degree in species than a genus; for example, man or any other lowest species is not the genus of particular men. Therefore a species is a principle to a greater degree than a genus.

437. Further, in the case of (232).

Then he gives the second argument, which is based on a certain position of Plato; for at one time Plato held that there is some one thing which is predicated of many things without priority and posteriority, and that this is a separate unity, as man is separate from all men; and at another time he held that there is some one thing which is predicated of many things according to priority and posteriority, and that this is not a separate unity. This is what Aristotle means when he says “in the case of those things to which prior and subsequent apply,” i.e., that when one of the things of which a common term is predicated is prior to another, it is impossible in such cases that there should be anything separate from the many things of which this common term is predicated. For example, if numbers stand in such a sequence that two is the first species of number, no separate Idea of number will be found to exist apart from all species of numbers. And on the same grounds no separate figure will be found to exist apart from all species of figures.

438. The reason for this can be that a common attribute is held to be separate so as to be some first entity in which all other things participate. If,

then, this first entity is a one applicable to many in which all other things participate, it is not necessary to hold that there is some separate entity in which all things participate. But all genera seem to be things of this kind, because all types of genera are found to differ insofar as they are more or less perfect, and thus insofar as they are prior and subsequent in nature. Hence, if in those cases in which one thing is prior to another it is impossible to regard anything common as a separate entity, on the supposition that there is a genus apart from species, then “in the case of other things the teaching” will [differ], i.e., there will be another doctrine and rule concerning them, and the foregoing rule will not apply to them. But considering the individuals of one species, it is evident that one of these is not prior and another subsequent in nature but only in time. And thus according to Plato’s teaching a species is separate. Since, then, these common things are principles inasmuch as they are separate, it follows that a species is a principle to a greater degree than a genus.

439. Further, where one thing (233)

Here he gives the third argument, which makes use of the notions “better or worse.” For in all those cases where one thing is better than another, that which is better is always prior in nature. But there cannot be held to be one common genus of those things which exist in this way. Hence there cannot be held to be one separate genus in the case of those things in which one is better and another worse; and thus the conclusion is the same as the above. For this argument is introduced to strengthen the preceding one, so to speak, i.e., with a view to showing that there is priority and posteriority among the species of any genus.

440. And from these three arguments he draws the conclusion in which he is chiefly interested, namely, that the lowest species, which are predicated immediately of individuals, seem to be the principles of things to a greater degree than genera.

441. But again it is not (234).

Here he argues the opposite side of the question, as follows: a principle and a cause are distinct from the things of which they are the principle and cause, and are capable of existing apart from them. And this is true, because nothing is its own cause. He is speaking here of extrinsic principles and causes, which are causes of a thing in its entirety. But the only thing that is held to exist apart from singular things is what is commonly and universally predicated of all things. Therefore the more universal a thing is, the more separate it is, and the more it should be held to be a principle. But the first genera are most universal. Therefore the first genera are the principles of things in the highest degree.

442. Now the solution to these questions is implied in this last argument. For according to this argument genera or species are held to be universal principles inasmuch as they are held to be separate. But the fact that they are not separate and self-subsistent is shown in Book VII (1592) of this work. Hence the Commentator also shows, in Book VIII, that the principles of things are matter and form, to which genus and species bear some likeness. For a genus is derived from matter and difference from form, as will be shown in the same book (720). Hence, since form is more of a principle than matter, species will consequently be principles more than genera. But the objection which is raised against this, on the grounds that genera are the principles of knowing a species and its definitions, is answered in the same way the objection raised about their separateness. For, since a genus is understood separately by the mind without understanding its species, it is a principle of knowing. And in the same way it would be a principle of being, supposing that it had a separate being.

LESSON 9

Do Any Universals Exist Apart from the Singular Things Perceived by the Senses and from Those Which Are Composed of Matter and Form?

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235. But there is a problem connected with these things, which is the most difficult of all and the most necessary to consider, with which our analysis is now concerned.

236. For if there is nothing apart from singular things, and singular things are infinite in number, how is it possible to acquire scientific knowledge of them? For insofar as there is something that is one and the same, and insofar as there is something universal [which relates to singular things], to that extent we acquire knowledge of them.

237. But if this is necessary, and there must be something apart from singular things, it will be necessary that genera exist apart from singular things, and they will be either the last or the first. But the impossibility of this has already appeared from our discussion.

238. Further, if there is something apart from the concrete whole (which is most disputable), as when something is predicated of matter, if there is such a thing, the problem arises whether it must exist apart from all

concrete wholes, or apart from some and not from others, or apart from none.

239. If, then, there is nothing apart from singular things, nothing will be intelligible, but all things will be sensible, and there will be no science of anything, unless one might say that sensory perception is science.

240. Further, neither will anything be eternal or immobile; for all sensible things perish and are subject to motion.

241. But if there is nothing eternal, neither can there be generation; for there must be something which has come to be and something from which it comes to be; and the last of these must be ungenerated, since the process of generation must have a limit, and since it is impossible for anything to come to be from non-being.

242. Further, since generation and motion exist, there must be a terminus; for no motion is infinite but every motion has a terminus. And that which is incapable of coming to be cannot be generated. But that which has come to be must exist as soon as it has come to be.

243. Further, if matter exists because it is ungenerated, it is much more reasonable that substance should exist, since that is what it (matter) eventually comes to be. For if neither the one nor the other exists, nothing at all will exist. But if this is impossible, there must be something besides the synolon, and this is the form or specifying principle.

COMMENTARY

Q. 10: IS THERE ANYTHING SEPARATE FROM SENSIBLE THINGS, WHICH IS THEIR PRINCIPLE?

443. Having debated the question whether universals are the principles of things, the Philosopher now raises a question about their separability, namely, whether there is anything separate from sensible things as their principle. In regard to this he considers two questions. The first (443) Of these is whether universals are separate from singular things. The second (447) is whether there is any formal [principle] separate from things which are composed of matter and form (“Further, if there is something”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he describes the problem. Second (444), he argues one side of the question (“For if there is nothing”). Third (445), he argues the other side of the question (“But if this is”).

Accordingly, this problem arises with regard to a point mentioned in the last argument of the preceding question, namely, whether a universal is separate from singular things, as the aforesaid argument supposed. He describes this problem as “the one with which our analysis is now concerned (235),” i.e., the one which immediately preceded the foregoing argument. And he speaks of it in this way: first, that “it is connected with,” i.e., is a consequence of, the foregoing one, because, as has already been stated, the consideration of the preceding question depends on this. For if universals are not separate, they are not principles; but if they are separate, they are principles. Second, he speaks of this problem as the most difficult of all the problems in this science. This is shown by the fact that the most eminent philosophers have held different opinions about it. For the Platonists held that universals are separate, whereas the other philosophers held the contrary. Third, he says that this problem is one which it is most necessary to consider, because the entire knowledge of substances, both sensible and immaterial, depends on it.

444. For if there is nothing (236).

Here he advances an argument to show that universals are separate from singular things. For singular things are infinite in number, and what is infinite cannot be known. Hence all singular things can be known only insofar as they are reduced to some kind of unity which is universal. Therefore there is science of singular things only inasmuch as universals are known. But science is only about things which are true and which exist. Therefore universals are things which exist of themselves apart from singular things.

445. But if this is (237)

Then he argues the other side of the question in this way: if it is necessary that universals be something apart from singular things, it is necessary that genera exist apart from singular things, either the first genera or also the last, which are immediately prior to singular things. But this is impossible, as is clear from the preceding discussion. Therefore universals are not separate from singular things.

446. The Philosopher solves this problem in Book VII (659:C 1592) Of this work, where he shows in many ways that universals are not substances which subsist of themselves. Nor is it necessary, as has often been said, that a thing should have the same mode of being in reality that it has when

understood by the intellect of a knower. For the intellect knows material things immaterially, and in a similar way it knows universally the natures of things which exist as singulars in reality, i.e., without considering the principles and accidents of individuals.

447. Further, if there is something (238).

Here he raises another question, namely, whether anything is separate from things composed of matter and form; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he raises the question. Second (239:C 448), he proceeds to deal with it ("If, then, there is").

In regard to the first it should be observed that he first raises the question whether a universal is separate from singular things. Now it happens to be the case that some singular things are composed of matter and form. But not all singular things are so composed, either according to the real state of affairs, since separate substances are particular because existing and operating of themselves, or even according to the opinion of the Platonists, who held that even among separate mathematical entities there are particulars inasmuch as they held that there are many of them in a single species. And while it is open to dispute whether there is anything separate in the case of those things which are not composed of matter and form, as the universal is separate from the particular, the problem is chiefly whether there is anything separate in the case of things which are composed of matter and form. Hence he says that the point which causes most difficulty is whether there is something "apart from the concrete whole," i.e., apart from the thing composed of matter and form. The reason why a composite thing is called a concrete whole he explains by adding "when something is predicated of matter." For Plato held that sensible matter participates in separate universals, and that for this reason universals are predicated of singular things. These participations in universal forms by material sensible things constitute a concrete whole inasmuch as a universal form is predicated of matter through some kind of participation. Now in regard to these things he raises a question which has three parts, namely, whether there is anything that exists apart from all things of this kind, or apart from some and not from others, or apart from none.

448. If, then, there is (239)

Here he proceeds to deal with this problem; and concerning it he does two things. First, he argues against the position that nothing can be held to be separate from things composed of matter and form. Second (244:C 454), he argues the other side of the question (“But again if anyone holds this”).

In regard to the first (239) he advances two arguments. First, he argues from the principle that those things which are composed of matter and form are sensible things; and therefore he proposes that those things which are composed of matter and form are singulars. However, singular things are not intelligible but sensible. Therefore, if there is nothing apart from singular things which are composed of matter and form, nothing will be intelligible but all beings will be sensible. But there is science only of things which are intelligible. Therefore it follows that there will be no science of anything, unless one were to say that sensory perception and science are the same, as the ancient philosophers of nature held, as is stated in Book I of The Soul. But both of these conclusions are untenable, namely, that there is no science and that science is sensory perception. Therefore the first position is also untenable, namely, that nothing exists except singular things which are composed of matter and form.

449. Further, neither will anything (240).

Second, he argues on the grounds that things composed of matter and form are mobile. He gives the following argument. All sensible things composed of matter and form perish and are subject to motion. Therefore, if there is nothing apart from beings of this kind, it will follow that nothing is eternal or immobile.

450. But if there is (241).

Here he shows that this conclusion is untenable, namely, that nothing is eternal and immobile. He does this, first, with respect to matter; and second (242:C 451), with respect to form (“Further, since generation”).

Accordingly, he says first (241) that if nothing is eternal, it is impossible for anything to be generated. He proves this as follows. In every process of generation there must be something which comes to be and something from which it comes to be. Therefore, if that from which a thing comes to be is itself generated, it must be generated from something. Hence there must either be an infinite regress in material principles, or the process must stop with some first thing which is a first material principle that is ungenerated, unless it might be said, perhaps, that it is generated from non-being; but this is impossible. Now if the process were to go on to infinity, generation could never be completed, because what is infinite cannot be traversed. Therefore it is necessary to hold either that there is some material principle which is ungenerated, or that it is impossible for any generation to take place.

451. Further, since generation (242).

Here he proves the same thing with respect to the formal cause; and he gives two arguments, the first of which is as follows. Every process of generation and motion must have some terminus. He proves this on the grounds that no motion is infinite, but that each motion has some terminus. This is clear in the case of other motions which are completed in their termini. But it seems that a contrary instance is had in the case of circular motion, which can be perpetual and infinite, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. And even though motion is assumed to be eternal, so that the entire continuity of circular motion is infinite insofar as one circular motion follows another, still each circular motion is both complete in its species and finite. That one circular motion should follow another is accidental so far as the specific nature of circular motion is concerned.

452. The things which he said about motion in general he proves specially in regard to generation; for no process of generation can be infinite, because that thing cannot be generated whose process of generation cannot come to an end, since the end of generation is to have been made. That its being made is the terminus of generation is clear from the fact that what has been generated must exist “as soon as it has come to be,” i.e., as soon as its generation is first terminated. Therefore, since the form whereby something is, is the terminus of generation, it must be impossible to have an infinite regress in the case of forms, and there must be some last form of which there is no generation. For the end of every generation is a form, as we have said. Thus it seems that just as the matter from which a thing is generated must itself be ungenerated because it is impossible to have an infinite regress, in a similar way there must be some form which is ungenerated because it is impossible to have an infinite regress in the case of forms.

453. Further, if matter exists (143).

He gives the second argument, which runs thus. If there is some first matter which is ungenerated, it is much more reasonable that there should be some substance, i.e., some form, which is ungenerated, since a thing has being through its form, whereas matter is rather the subject of generation and transmutation. But if neither of these is ungenerated, then absolutely nothing will be ungenerated, since everything which exists has the character of matter or form or is composed of both. But it is impossible that nothing should be ungenerated, as has been proved (24-2:C 452). Therefore it follows that there must be something else “besides the synolon,” or concrete whole, i.e., besides the singular thing which is composed of matter and form. And by something else I mean the form or specifying principle. For matter in itself cannot be separated from singular things, because it has being only by reason of something else. But this seems to be true rather of form, by which things have being.

454. But again if anyone (244).

Here he argues the other side of the question. For if one holds that there is some form separate from singular things which are composed of matter and form, the problem arises in which cases this must be admitted and in which not. For obviously this must not be held to be true in the case of all things, especially in that of those made by art. For it is impossible that there should be a house apart from this sensible house, which is composed of matter and form.

455. Now Aristotle solves this problem partly in Book XII (2488) of this work, where he shows that there are certain substances separate from sensible things and intelligible in themselves; and partly in Book VII (1503), where he shows that the forms or specifying principles of sensible things are not separate from matter. However, it does not follow that no science of sensible things can be had or that science is sensory perception. For it is not necessary that things have in themselves the same mode of being which they have in the intellect of one who knows them. For those things which are material in themselves are known in an immaterial way by the intellect, as has also been stated above (446). And even though a form is not separate from matter, it is not therefore necessary that it should be generated; for it is not forms that are generated but composites, as will be shown in Book VII (1417) of this work. It is clear, then, in what cases it is necessary to posit separate forms and in what not. For the forms of all things which are sensible by nature are not separate from matter, whereas the forms of things which are intelligible by nature are separate from matter. For the separate substances do not have the nature of sensible things, but are of a higher nature and belong to another order of existing things.

LESSON 10

Do All Things Have a Single Substance? Do All Things Have the Same or Different Principles?

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 999b 20-1000a

245. Again, there is the problem whether all things, for example, all men, have a single substance.

246. But this is absurd; for not all things whose substance is one are themselves one, but are many and different. But this too is untenable.

247. And at the same time there is the problem how matter becomes each of the many things and a concrete whole.

248. And again one might also raise this problem about principles. For if they are specifically one, there will be nothing that is numerically one. Nor again will unity itself and being be one. And how will there be science unless there is some unity in all things?

249. But, on the other hand, if they are numerically one, each of the principles will also be one, and not as in the case of sensible things, different for different things; for example, if the syllable ba is taken as a species, its principles in every case are specifically the same, for they are numerically different. However, if this is not so, but the things which are the principles of beings are numerically one, there will be nothing else besides the elements. For it makes no difference whether we say “numerically one” or “singular,” because it is in this way that we say each

thing is numerically one. But the universal is what exists in these. For example, if the elements of a word were limited in number, there would have to be as many letters as there are elements. Indeed, no two of them would be the same, nor would more than two.

COMMENTARY

Q. 11: ARE THERE ONE OR MANY FORMS AND PRINCIPLES OF THINGS?

456. Having asked what the principles are, and whether some are separate from matter, the Philosopher now asks what the principles are like. First (245:C 456), he asks whether the principles are one or many; second (287:C 519), whether they exist potentially or actually ("And connected with these problems"); and third (290:C 523), whether they are universals or singular things ("And there is also the problem").

In regard to the first he does two things. First (245:C 456), he inquires how the principles stand with respect to unity; and second (266:C 488), what relationship unity has to the notion of principle ("But the most difficult").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he inquires specially about the formal principle: whether all things that are specifically the same have a single form. Second (248:C 46o), he asks the same question of all principles in general ("And again one might"). Third (250:C 466), he asks whether corruptible and incorruptible things have the same principles or different ones ("Again there is the problem").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he introduces the problem. Second (246:C 457), he debates it ("But this is absurd").

The problem (245), then, is whether all things that belong to the same species, for example, all men, have a single substance or form.

457. But this is absurd (246).

Then he advances arguments on one side of the question, to show that all things belonging to one species do not have a single form. He does this by means of two arguments, the first of which runs thus. Things that belong to one species are many and different. Therefore, if all things that belong to one species have a single substance, it follows that those which have a single substance are many and different. But this is unreasonable.

458. And at the same time (247)

Then he gives the second argument , which runs thus. That which is one and undivided in itself is not combined with something divided in order to constitute many things. But it is evident that matter is divided into different singular things. Hence, if substance in the sense of form is one and the same for all things, it will be impossible to explain how each of these singular things is a matter having a substance of the kind that is one and undivided, so that as a singular thing it is a concrete whole having two parts: a matter and a substantial form which is one and undivided.

459. Now he does not argue the other side of the question, because the very same arguments which were advanced above regarding the separateness of universals are applicable in the inquiry which follows it against the arguments just given. For if a separate universal exists, it must be held that things having the same species have a single substance numerically, because a universal is the substance of singular things. Now the truth of this question will be established in Book VII (588:C 1356) of this work, where it is shown that the whatness or essence of a thing is not other than the thing itself, except in an accidental way, as will be explained in that place.

460. And again one might (248).

Here he raises a difficulty concerning the unity of principles in general: whether the principles of things are numerically the same, or only specifically the same and numerically distinct. And in regard to this he does two things. First, he advances arguments to show that they are numerically the same. Second (249:C 464), he argues on the other side of the question (“But, on the other hand”).

In regard to the first (248) he gives three arguments; and he introduces the problem, saying that the same question which was raised about substance can be raised about principles in general, i.e., whether the principles of things are numerically the same.

461. He introduces the first argument to show that they are numerically the same. For things composed of principles merely contain what they receive from these principles. Therefore, if principles are not found to be one numerically but only specifically, the things composed of these principles will not be one numerically but only specifically.

462. The second argument runs thus: unity itself or being itself must be numerically one. And by unity itself or being itself he means unity or being

in the abstract. Hence, if the principles of things are not one numerically but only specifically, it will follow that neither unity itself or being itself will subsist of themselves.

463. The third argument is this: science is had of things because there is found to be a one-in-many, as man in common is found in all men; for there is no science of singular things but of the unity [i.e., common attribute] found in them. Moreover, all science or cognition of things which are composed of principles depends on a knowledge of these principles. If, then, principles are not one numerically but only specifically, it will follow that there is no science of beings.

464. But, on the other hand (249).

Here he argues the opposite side of the question in the following fashion. If principles are numerically one so that each of the principles considered in itself is one, it will be impossible to say that the principles of beings exist in the same way as the principles of sensible things. For we see that the principles of different sensible things are numerically different but specifically the same, just as the things of which they are the principles are numerically different but specifically the same. We see, for example, that syllables which are numerically distinct but agree in species have as their principles letters which are the same specifically though not numerically. And if anyone were to say that this is not true of the principles of beings, but that the principles of all beings are the same numerically, it would follow that nothing exists in the world except the elements, because what is numerically one is a singular thing. For what is numerically one we call singular, just as we call universal what is in many. But what is singular is incapable of being multiplied, and is encountered only as a singular. Therefore, if it is held that numerically the same letters are the principles of all syllables, it will fd1low that those letters could never be multiplied so that there could be two of them or more than two. Thus a could not be found in these two different syllables ba or da. And the argument is the same in the case of other letters. Therefore, by the same reasoning, if the principles of all beings are numerically the same, it will follow that there is nothing besides these principles. But this seems to be untenable; because when a principle of anything exists it will not be a principle unless there is something else besides itself.

465. Now this question will be solved in Book XII (2464); for it will be shown there that the principles which things have, namely, matter and form or privation, are not numerically the same for all things but analogically or proportionally the same. But those principles which are separate, i.e., the intellectual substances, of which the highest is God, are each numerically one in themselves. Now that which is one in itself and being is God; and from Him is derived the numerical unity found in all things. And there is science of these, not because they are numerically one in all, but because in our conception there is a one in many. Moreover, the argument which is proposed in support of the opposite side of the question is true in the case of essential principles but not in that of separate ones, which is the class to which the agent and final cause belong. For many things can be produced by one agent or efficient cause, and can be directed to one end.

LESSON 11

Do Corruptible and Incorruptible Things Have the Same or Different Principles?

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1000a 5-1001a 3

250. Again, there is a problem which has been neglected no less by the moderns than by their predecessors: whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or different.

251. For if they are the same, how is it that some things are incorruptible and others corruptible? And what is the cause?

252. The followers of Hesiod and all those who were called theologians paid attention only to what was plausible to themselves and have neglected us. For,’ making the principles of things to be gods or generated from the gods, they say that whatever has not tasted nectar and ambrosia became mortal.

253. And it is clear that they are using these terms in a way known to themselves, but what they have said about the application of these causes is beyond our understanding. For if it is for the sake of pleasure that the gods partake of these things, nectar and ambrosia are not the cause of their being. But if they partake of them to preserve their being, how will the gods be eternal in requiring food?

254. But with regard to those who have philosophized by using fables, it is not worth our while to pay any serious attention to them.

255. However, from those who make assertions by means of demonstration it is necessary to find out, by questioning them, why some of the things which are derived from the same principles are eternal in nature and others are corrupted. But since these philosophers mention no cause, and it is unreasonable that things should be as they say, it is clear that the principles and causes of these things will not be the same.

256. For the explanation which one will consider to say something most to the point is that of Empedocles, who has been subject to the same error. For he posits a certain principle, hate, which is the cause of corruption.

257. Yet even hate would seem to generate everything except the one. For all things except God are derived from this. Hence he says: “From which have blossomed forth all that was and is [and will be]: trees, and men and women, and beasts and flying things, and water-nourished fish, and the long-lived gods.” And apart from these things it is evident that, if hate did not exist in the world, all things would be one, as he says: “For when they have come together, then hate will stand last of all.”

258. For this reason too it turns out that God, who is most happy, is less wise than other beings. For he does not know all the elements, because hate he does not have, and knowledge is of like by like. “For one knows earth by earth, water by water, affection by affection, and hate by mournful hate.”

259. But it is also clear (and this is where our discussion began) that hate no more turns out to be the cause of corruption than of being.

260. Nor, similarly, is love the cause of existence; for in blending things together into a unity it corrupts other things.

261. Moreover, he does not speak of the cause of change itself, except to say that it was naturally disposed to be so.

262. [He says]: “But thus mighty hate was nourished among the members and rose to a position of honor when the time was fulfilled, which being changeable dissolved the bond.” Hence change is a necessity, but he gives no reason for its necessity.

263. Yet he alone speaks expressly to this extent. For he does not make some beings corruptible and others incorruptible, but makes all things corruptible ex. cept the elements. But the problem that has been stated is why some things are corruptible and others are not, supposing that they come from the same principles. To this extent, then, it has been said that the principles of things will not be the same.

264. But if the principles are different, one problem is whether they will be incorruptible or corruptible. For supposing that they are corruptible, it is evident that they must also come from certain things, because all things that are corrupted are dissolved into those elements from which they come. Hence it follows that there are other principles prior to these principles. But this is also unreasonable, whether the process stops or goes on to infinity. Further, how will corruptible things exist if their principles are destroyed? But if they are incorruptible, why will corruptible things come from incorruptible principles, and incorruptible things from others? For this is unreasonable, and is either impossible or requires a great deal of reasoning.

265. Further, no one has attempted to say that these things have different principles, but [all thinkers] say that all things have the same principles. But they admit the first problem, considering it a trifling matter.

COMMENTARY

466. Having investigated in a general way whether all principles belonging to one species are numerically the same, the Philosopher inquires here whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are numerically the same. In regard to this he does three things. First (250:C 466), he raises the question. Second (25I:C 467), he introduces an argument to show that the principles of corruptible and those of incorruptible things arc not the same ("For if they are the same"). Third (264:C 483), he introduces arguments to show that they are not different ("But if the principles").

He says first (250), then, that there is a problem which has been neglected no less by the modern philosophers, who followed Plato, than by the ancient philosophers of nature, who also were puzzled whether the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things are the same or different.

467. For, if they are the same (251).

Here he advances an argument to show that the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are not the same. In regard to this he does three things. First (251:C 467), he gives the argument. Second (252:C 468), he criticizes the solution of the proposed argument which the theological poets gave ("The followers of Hesiod"). Third (255:C 472), he criticizes the solution which some philosophers of nature gave (“However, from those who”).

He says first (251), then, that if the principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are held to be the same, since from the same principles there follow the same effects, it seems that either all things are corruptible or all are incorruptible. Therefore the question arises how some things are corruptible and others incorruptible, and what the reason is.

468. The followers of Hesiod (252)

He criticizes the solution given by the theological poets. First (252:C 468), he gives their solution. Second (253:C 470), he argues against it (“And it is clear that”). Third (254:C 471), he gives the reason why he does not criticize this position with more care (“But with regard to those”).

Concerning the first (252) it Must be noted that there were among the Greeks, or philosophers of nature, certain students of wisdom, such as Orpheus, Hesiod and certain others, who were concerned with the gods and hid the truth about the gods under a cloak of fables, just as Plato hid philosophical truth under mathematics, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Categories.’ Therefore he says that the followers of Hesiod, and all those who were called theologians, paid attention to what was convincing to themselves and have neglected us, because the truth which they understood was treated by them in such a way that it could be known only to themselves. For if the truth is obscured by fables, then the truth which underlies these fables can be known only to the one who devised them. Therefore the followers of Hesiod called the first principles of things gods, and said that those among the gods who have not tasted a certain delectable food called nectar or manna became mortal, whereas those who had tasted it became immortal.

469. But some part of the truth could lie hidden under this fable, provided that by nectar or manna is understood the supreme goodness itself of the first principle. For all the sweetness of love and affection is referred to goodness. But every good is derived from a first good. Therefore the meaning of these words could be that some things are incorruptible by reason of an intimate participation in the highest good, as those which participate perfectly in the divine being. But certain things because of their remoteness from the first principle, which is the meaning of not to taste manna and nectar, cannot remain perpetually the same in number but only

in species, as the Philosopher says in Book II of Generation. But whether they intended to treat this obscurely or something else, cannot be perceived any more fully from this statement.

470. And it is clear (253).

He argues against the aforesaid position. He says that the meaning which these followers of Hesiod wished to convey by the terms nectar or manna was known to them but not to us. Therefore their explanation of the way in which these causes are meant to solve this question and preserve things from corruption is beyond our understanding. For if these terms are understood in their literal sense, they appear to be inadequate, because the gods who tasted nectar or manna did so either for the sake of pleasure or because these things were necessary for their existence, since these are the reasons why men partake of food. Now if they partook of them for the sake of pleasure, nectar and manna could not be the cause of their existence so as to make them incorruptible, because pleasure is something that follows on being. But if they partook of the aforesaid nourishment because they needed it to exist, they would not be eternal, having repeated need of food. Therefore it seems that gods who are first corruptible, as it were, standing as they do in need of food, are’made incorruptible by means of food. This also seems to be unreasonable, because food does not nourish a thing according to its species unless it is corrupted and passes over into the species of the one nourished. But nothing that is corruptible can be responsible for the incorruptibility of something else.

471. But with regard to those (254).

Here he gives his reason for not investigating this opinion with more care, He says that it is not worth our while to pay any attention to those who have philosophized “by using fables,” i.e., by hiding philosophical truth under fables. For if anyone argues against their statements insofar as they are taken in a literal sense, these statements are ridiculous. But if one wishes to inquire into the truth hidden by these fables, it is not evident. Hence it is understood that Aristotle, in arguing against Plato and other thinkers of this kind who have treated their own doctrines by hiding them under something else, does not argue about the truth which is hidden but about those things which are outwardly expressed.

472. However, from those who make assertions (255).

Then he argues against the answer given by some of the philosophers of nature; and in regard to this he does three things. First (255:C 472), he gives the argument. Second (256:C 473), he gives the answer ("For the explanation"). Third (257:C 474), he criticizes it ("Yet even hate").

Accordingly, he says, first (255), that, having dismissed those who treated the truth by using fables, it is necessary to seek information about the aforesaid question from those who have treated the truth in a demonstrative way, by asking them why it is that, if all beings are derived from the same principles, some beings are eternal by nature and others are corrupted. And since these men give no reason why this is so, and since it is unreasonable that things should be as they say (that in the case of beings having the same principles some should be corruptible and others eternal), it seems clearly to follow that corruptible and eternal things do not have the same principles or the same causes.

473. For the explanation (256).

Then he gives one solution. He says that the explanation given to the aforesaid question which seems to fit it best is the one which Empedocles gave, although he was subject to the same error as the others, because the explanation which he gave is no more adequate than theirs, as is about to be shown. For he maintained that corruptible and incorruptible things have certain common principles, but that a special principle, hate, causes the corruption of the elements in such a way that the coming together of this cause and another principle produces corruption in the world.

474. Yet even hate (257).

Here he criticizes Empedocles' argument, and he does this in three ways. First (257:C 474), he does this by showing that the argument which Empedocles gave is not in keeping with his position; second (261:C 478), by showing that it is not adequate ("Moreover, he does not"); third (263:C 481), by showing that it is not to the point ("Yet he alone speaks").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that Empedocles' argument does not agree with his other views about hate; second (258:C 476), that it does not agree with his view about God himself ("For this reason"); and third (26o:C 477), that it does not agree with his view about love ("Nor, similarly").

Accordingly, he says, first (257), that Empedocles' position that hate is the cause of corruption is untenable, because according to his position hate also seems to be the cause of the generation of all things except one. For he held that everything else is composed essentially of hate along with the other principles, with the exception of God alone, whom he claimed to be composed of the other principles without hate. Moreover, he called the heavens God, as was stated above in Book I (49:C 101), because Xenophanes, after reflecting upon the whole heaven, said that the one itself is God. And Empedocles, considering the indestructibleness of the heavens, held that the heavens are composed of the four elements and love, but not of strife or hatred. But in the case of other things he said that all those which are or were or will be, come, from hate, such as sprouting trees, and men and women, and beasts (which are terrestial animals), and vultures (which are flying and long-lived animals), and fish (which are nourished in the water), and the long-lived gods. And by the gods he seems to mean either the stars, which he held are sometimes corrupted, although after a long period of time, or the demons, which the Platonists held to be ethereal animals. Or by the gods he also means those beings whom the Epicureans held to be of human form, as was stated above (210:C 408). Therefore, from the fact that all living things except one are generated from hate, it can be said that hate is the cause of generation.

475. And in addition to this there is another reason [why hate can be said to be the cause of generation]; for according to Empedocles' position it is evident that, if hate did not exist in the world, all things would be one, since hate is the reason why things are distinct, according to Empedocles. Hence he quotes Empedocles' words to the effect that, when all things come together into a unity, for example, when chaos comes into being, hate will stand last of all, separating and dissolving things. Hence the text of Boethius says: "When it comes together, then chaos knows the ultimate discord." Thus it is clear that, since the being of the world consists in the distinction of things, hate is the cause of the world's generation.

476. For this reason (258).

Here he gives a second argument, which pertains to the deity. He says that, since Empedocles would hold that hate is not a constituent of the divine composition, it follows, according to his arguments, that God, who is said by all men to be most happy, and consequently most knowing, is less prudent than all other beings who have knowledge. For according to Empedodes' position it follows that God does not know the elements because He does not contain hate. Hence He does not know himself. And like knows like according to the opinion of Empedodes, who said that by earth we know earth, by water water, “and by affection,” i.e., love or concord, we know affection, or love or concord. And in a similar way we know “hate by hate,” which is sadness, whether unpleasant or evil, according to the text of Boethius, who says that “by evil discord we know discord.” It is evident, then, that Aristotle thought this untenable and contrary to the position that God is most happy because He himself would not know some of the things that we know. And since this argument seemed to be beside the point, therefore, returning to his principal theme, he says (259) that, in returning to the point from which the first argument began, it is evident, so far as Empedocles is concerned, that hate is no more a cause of corruption than of being.

477. Nor, similarly, is love (260).

Here he gives the third argument, which pertains to love. He says that in like manner love is noe the cause of generation or being, as Empedocles claimed, if another position of his is considered. For he said that, when all the elements are combined into a unity, the corruption of the world will then take place; and thus love corrupts all things. Therefore, with respect to the world in general, love is the cause of corruption, whereas hate is the cause of generation. But with respect to singular things, hate is the cause of corruption and love of generation.

478. Moreover, he does (261).

Here he shows that Empedocles’ argument is not adequate. For Empedodes said that there exists in the world a certain alternation of hate and friendship, in such a way that at one time love unites all things and afterwards hate separates them. But as to the reason why this alternation takes place, so that at one time hate predominates and at another time love, he said nothing more than that it was naturally disposed to be so.

479. And next he gives Empedocles’ words, which, because they are written in Greek verse, are difficult and differ from the common way of speaking. These words are (262): “But thus mighty hate was nourished among the members and rose to a position of honor when the time was fulfilled, which being changeable dissolved the bond.” But the text of Boethius runs thus: “But when mighty discord in the members was promoted to a place of honor, because it marched forward in a completed

year, which, when these things have been changed, returns to a full bond." Now in order to understand this it must be noted that he speaks poetically of the whole world as though it were a single living thing in whose members and parts there is found at first the greatest harmony, which he calls love or concord, and afterwards there begins to exist little by little a certain dissonance, which he calls discord. And, similarly, in the parts of the universe at first there was maximum concord, and afterwards hate was nourished little by little until it acquired "the place of honor," i.e., it acquired dominion over the elements. This comes about when a completed time is reached or a year is completed, as Empedocles held, "which" (hate or discord, or the year), being changeable, dissolves "the bond," i.e., the former union of the elements; or the year or hate returns to a full bond, because by a certain ability and hidden power it returns to predominate over things.

480. After these words of Empedodes, Aristotle, in giving the meaning of the word "changeable" which he used, adds the explanation as though change were necessary; for he says that Empedocles made the foregoing statements as though it were necessary that there should be an alternation of hate and love, but he gives no reason for this necessity. For in the case of this one living thing it is evident that what causes the alternation of hate and love is the motion of the heavens which causes generation and corruption in the world. But no such cause can be assigned why the whole should be changed in this way by love and hate. Hence it is clear that his argument was inadequate.

481. Yet he alone (263).

Here he shows that this argument of Empedocles is not to the point. He says that Empedocles seems to say 11 expressly," i.e., clearly, only that he does not hold that some of the things derived from these principles are corruptible and others incorruptible, but he holds that all things are corruptible with the exception of the elements alone. Thus he seems to avoid the foregoing problem inasmuch as the question remains why some things are corruptible and some not, if they come from the same principles. Hence it is also clear that his argument is not to the point, because he neglects the very point that requires explanation.

482. But it can be asked how he can say here that Empedocles held all things to be corruptible except the elements, since Empedocles has said

above that the one is God, i.e., what is composed of the other principles except hate. It must be noted, however, that Empedocles posited two processes of corruption in the world, as is clear from what was said above. He posited one with respect to the blending of the whole universe, which was brought about by love; and from this process he did not make even God immune, because in God he placed love, which caused other things to be mixed with God. And he posited another process of corruption for singular things, and the principle of this process is hate. But he excluded this kind of corruption from God, seeing that he did not posit hate in God. In summing up, then, Aristotle concludes that this much has been said for the purpose of showing that corruptible and incorruptible things do not have the same principles.

483. But if the principles (264)

Here he argues the other side of the question, with two arguments. The first is this: if the principles of corrup4le and incorruptible things are not the same, the question arises whether the principles of corruptible things are corruptible or incorruptible. If one says that they are corruptible, he proves that this is false by two arguments. The first runs thus: every corruptible thing is dissolved into the principles of which it is composed. If, then, the principles of corruptible things are corruptible, it will be necessary to hold also that there are other principles from which they are derived. But this is untenable, unless an infinite regress is posited. Now it was shown in Book II (152:C 299) that it is impossible to have an infinite regress in principles in any class of cause. And it would be just as untenable for someone to say that this condition applies in the case of corruptible principles, since corruption seems to come about as a result of something being dissolved into prior principles.

484. The second argument runs thus. If the principles of corruptible things are corruptible, they must be corrupted, because every corruptible thing will be corrupted. But after they have been corrupted they cannot be principles, for what is corrupted or has been corrupted cannot cause anything. Therefore, since corruptible things are always caused in succession, the principles of corruptible things cannot be said to be corruptible.

485. Again, if it is said that the principles of corruptible things are incorruptible, evidently the principles of incorruptible things are

incorruptible. Therefore the question remains why it is that from certain incorruptible principles corruptible effects are produced, and from certain others incorruptible effects are produced; for this seems to be unreasonable and is either impossible or requires considerable explanation.

486. Further, no one (265).

Then relative to his main thesis he gives his second argument, which is drawn from the common opinions of all men. For no one has attempted to say that corruptible and incorruptible things have different principles, but all say that all things have the, same principles. Yet the first argument, given in favor of the first part of the question, all pass over lightly, as though it were of little importance; but this is to acknowledge its truth. Hence the text of Boethius says: "But they swallow the first argument as though they considered it a minor matter."

Q. 13: Are the principles of corruptible and incorruptible things the same?

487. Now the solution to this problem is given in Book XII (2553), where the Philosopher shows that the first active or motive principles of all things are the same but in a certain sequence. For the first principles of things are unqualifiedly incorruptible and immobile, whereas the second are incorruptible and mobile, i.e., the celestial bodies, which cause generation and corruption in the world as a result of their motion. Now the intrinsic principles of corruptible and of incorruptible things are the same, not numerically but analogically. Still the intrinsic principles of corruptible things, which are matter and form, are not corruptible in themselves but only in reference to something else. For it is in this way that the matter and form of corruptible things are corrupted, as is stated in Book I of the Physics.

LESSON 12

Are Unity and Being the Substance and Principle of All Things?

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1001a 4-1001b 25

266. But the most difficult problem which has to be considered, and the one which is most necessary for a knowledge of the truth, is whether unity and being are the substance of existing things, and whether each of them is nothing else than unity and being. Or whether it is necessary to investigate what being and unity themselves are, as though there were some other nature which underlies them.

267. For some think that reality is of the former sort, and some of the latter. For Plato and the Pythagoreans thought that being and unity were nothing else [than themselves], and that this is their nature, their substance being simply unity and being. But among the other philosophers [there are different opinions] about the nature of unity. Empedocles, for example, as though reducing it to something better known, says that unity is being; for he would seem to say that this is love, since this is the cause why unity belongs to all things. Others say that this unity and being of which existing things consist and have been made is fire, and others say it is air. And those who hold that there are many elements say the same thing; for they must also speak of unity and being in as many ways as they say there are principles.

268. But if anyone holds that unity and being are not substances, it will follow that no other universals are such; for these are the most universal of all. But if there is no one-in-itself or being-in-itself, there will hardly be any other things that exist apart from what are called singular things. Further, if unity is not a substance, evidently number will not exist as another reality separate from existing things; for number is units, and a unit is truly something one. But if there is a one-in-itself and being-in-itself, the substance of these must be unity itself and being itself. For nothing else is predicated universally of all things but these two.

269. But, on the other hand, if there is to be a one-in-itself and being-in-itself, there is great difficulty in seeing how there will be anything else besides these. I mean, how will there be more beings than one? For that which differs from being does not exist, Hence according to Parmenides' argument it must follow that all beings are one, and that this is being.

270. But there is a difficulty in either case; for whether unity itself is not a substance, or whether there is a unity itself, it is impossible for number to be a substance. Now it has already been stated why this follows if unity is not a substance; but if it is, the same difficulty will arise with regard to being. For from something outside of being something else will be one; for it must be not one. But all beings are either one or many, each of which is a one.

271. Further, if unity itself is indivisible, according to Zeno's axiom it will be nothing. For that which when added does not make a thing greater or when subtracted does not make it smaller, this, he says, does not belong to the realm of existing things, as though it were evident that whatever has being is a continuous quantity.' And if it is a continuous quantity, it is corporeal; for this in every respect is a being. But other quantities, for example, a surface and a line, when added in one way will make a thing greater, but in another way they will not; and a point and a unit will do so in no way.

272. But this philosopher speculates clumsily, and it is possible for a thing to be indivisible in such a way that some answer may be made against him; for when something of this kind is added it will not make a thing greater but more.

273. Yet how will continuous quantity come from such a unity or from many of them? For this would be like saying that a line is made up of

points.

274. But even if someone were to think that the situation is such that number has come, as some say, from unity itself and from something else that is not one, none the less it would be necessary to inquire why and how the thing which has come to be would sometimes be a number and sometimes a continuous quantity, if that not-one were inequality and the same nature in either case. For it is not clear how continuous quantities would be produced from unity and this principle, or from some number and this principle.

COMMENTARY

Q. 14A: ARE "ONE" AND "BEING" SUBSTANCES OR PRINCIPLES OF THINGS?

488. Having asked whether the principles of things are the same or different, the Philosopher now asks how unity itself could have the nature of a principle; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he asks whether unity itself is a principle; second (502), he asks whether numbers, which arise or follow from unity, are the principles of things; and third (515), whether the Forms, which are certain separate unities, are the principles of things.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he raises the question. Second (489), he gives the opinions on both sides ("For some think"). Third (490), he advances arguments on both sides ("But if anyone").

He says, first (266), that of all the different questions which have been raised, one is more difficult to consider because of the weight of the arguments on both sides, and that this question is also one about which it is necessary to know the truth, because our decision about the substances of things depends on it. Now this question is whether unity and being are the substances of things, not so that either of them must be attributed to some other nature which would be informed, as it were, by unity and being, but rather so that the unity and being of a thing are its substance; or, in an opposite way, whether it is necessary to ask what that thing is to which unity and being properly belong, as though there were some other nature which is their subject.

489. For some think (267)

Here he gives the opinions on each side of the question. He says that some philosophers thought that reality was of one kind, and some of another. For Plato and the Pythagoreans did not hold that unity and being are the attributes of some nature, but that they constitute the nature of things, as though being itself and unity itself were the substance of things. But some philosophers, in speaking about the natural world, attributed unity and being to certain other natures, as Empedocles reduced the one to something better known, which he- said is unity and being; and this seems to be love, which is the cause of unity in the world. But other philosophers of nature attributed these to certain elementary causes, whether they posited one first principle, as fire or air, or more than one. For since they would hold that the material principles of things are the substances of things, it was necessary that each of these should constitute the unity and being of things; so that whichever one of these anyone might hold to be a principle, he would logically think that through it being and unity would be attributed to A things, whether he posited one principle or more than one.

490. But if anyone (268).

Here he gives arguments on both sides of the question. First, he gives arguments in support of the view of Plato and Pythagoras. Second (269:C 493), he gives arguments on the other side of the question, in support of the view of the philosophers of nature ("But, on the other hand").

In regard to the first (268), he makes use of elimination as follows. It is necessary to hold either that unity and being, separate and existing apart, are a substance, or not. Now if it is said that unity and being are not a substance, two untenable consequences will follow. The first of these is this: unity and being are said to be the most universal of all, and therefore, if unity and being are not separate in such a way that unity itself or being itself is a certain substance, it will then follow that no universal is separate. Thus it will follow that there is nothing in the world except singular things, which seems to be inappropriate, as has been stated in earlier questions (C 443).

491. The other untenable consequence is this. Number is nothing else than units, because number is composed of units; for a unit is nothing else than unity itself. Therefore, if unity itself is not separate as a substance existing of itself, it will follow that number will not be a reality separate from those things which are found in matter. This can be shown to be

inappropriate in view of what has already been stated above. Hence it cannot be said that unity and being are not a substance which exists by itself.

492. Therefore, if the other part of the division is conceded, that there is something which is unity itself and being itself, and that this exists separately, it must be the substance of all those things of which unity and being are predicated. For everything that is separate and is predicated of many things is the substance of those things of which it is predicated. But nothing else is predicated of all things in as universal a way as unity and being. Therefore unity and being will be the substance of all things.

493. But, on the other hand (269).

Then he argues the other side of the question; and he gives two arguments. The second (271:C 496) of use these begins where he says, “Further, if unity itself.”

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the argument. Second (270:C 494), he shows how the question is made difficult as a result of the argument given (“But there is a difficulty in either case”).

The first (269) argument, then, is as follows: if there is something which is itself being and unity as something ,existing separately, it will be necessary to say that unity is the very same thing as being. But that which differs from being is non-being. Therefore it follows, according to the argument of Parmenides, that besides the one there is only non-being. Thus all things will have to be one, because it could not be held that that which differs from the one, which is essentially separate, is a being.

494. But there is a difficulty (270).

Here he shows how this argument creates a difficulty in the case of the position of Plato, who held that number is the substance of things. He says that Plato faces a difficulty in either case, whether it is said that this separate one is a substance or not. For whichever view is held, it seems impossible that number should be the substance of things. For if it is held that unity is not a substance, it has already been stated (269:C 493) why number cannot be held to be a substance.

495. But if unity itself is a substance, the same problem will arise with respect to both unity and being. For either there is some other unity besides this unity which exists separately of itself, or there is not. And if there is no other, a multitude of things will not exist now, as Parmenides said. But if

there is another unity, then that other unity, since it is not unity itself, must have as a material element something that is other than unity itself, and, consequently, other than being. And that material element from which this second unity comes to be, will have not to be a being. Thus a multitude of beings cannot be constituted from this unity which exists apart from unity itself, because all beings are either one or many, each of which is a one. But this one has as its material element something that is neither unity nor being.

496. Further, if unity (271).

Here he gives the second argument; and in regard to this he does three things. First (271:C 496), he gives the argument. Second (272:C 498), he criticizes it ("But this"). Third (273:C 499), he shows that the difficulty remains ("Yet how will continuous quantity").

He says first (271), then, that if this separate unity is indivisible, there follows from this the other position, which Zeno assumed, that nothing exists. For Zeno supposed that that which when added does not make a thing greater and when taken away does not make it smaller, is nothing in the real order. But he makes this assumption on the grounds that continuous quantity is the same as being. For it is evident that this is not a continuous quantity—I mean that which when added does not make a thing greater and when subtracted does not make it smaller. Therefore, if every being were a continuous quantity, it would follow that that which when added does not make a thing greater and when subtracted does not make it smaller, is non-being.

497. And better still, if any particular thing were to bear this out, every being would have to be a corporeal continuous quantity. For anything added to or subtracted from a body in any one of its dimensions, makes the body greater or less. But other continuous quantities, such as lines and surfaces, become greater insofar as one dimension is added, whereas others do not. For line added to line in length causes increase in length but not in width; and surface added to surface causes increase in width and in length but not in depth. But a point and a unit do not become greater or less in any way. Hence according to Zeno's axiom it would follow that a point and a unit are non-beings in an absolute sense, whereas a body is a being in every respect, and surfaces and lines are beings in one respect and non-beings in another respect.

498. But this (272).

Here he criticizes the argument which has been given. He says that Zeno, by proposing such an axiom, speculated “clumsily,” i.e., in an unskilled and rude manner, so that according to him there cannot be anything indivisible. And for this reason some answer must be given to the foregoing argument; and if not to the point at issue, at least to the man. Now we say that even though a unity when added to something else does not make it larger, it does cause it to be more. And it is sufficient for the notion of being that in the case of what is continuous it should make a thing larger, and that in the case of what is discrete it should make it more.

499. Yet how will (273).

Then he states the difficulty which still faces the Platonists after the above solution. And he advances two difficulties. The Ifirst of these is that the Platonists held that the one which is indivisible is the cause not only of number, which is a plurality, but also of continuous quantity. Therefore, if it is granted that when a one is added it makes a thing more, as would seem to suffice for the one which is the cause of number, how will it be possible for continuous quantity to come from an indivisible one of this kind, or from many such ones, as the Platonists held? For this would seem to be the same thing as to hold that a line is composed of points. For unity is indivisible just as a point is.

500. But even if someone (274)

Here he gives the second difficulty. He says that if anyone were to think that the situation is such that number is the result of the indivisible one and of something else which is not one, but participates in the one as a kind of inaterial nature, as some say, the question would still remain why and how that which comrs from the one as form and from another material nature, which is called the not-one, is sometimes a number and sometimes a continuous quantity. The difficulty would be most acute if that material not-one were inequality, as is implied in the continuously extended, and were to be the same reality. For it is not clear how numbers come from this inequality as matter and from the one as form; nor again is it clear how continuous quantities come from some number as form and from this inequality as matter. For the Platonists held that number comes from a primary one and a primary two, and that from this number and material inequality continuous quantity is produced.

501. The solution of this problem is treated by Aristotle in the following books. For the fact that there is something separate, which is itself one and being, he will prove below in Book XII (2553), when he establishes the oneness of the first principle which is separate in an absolute sense, although it is not the substance of all things which are one, as the Platonists thought, but is the cause and principle of the unity of all things. And insofar as unity is predicated of other things it is used in two ways. In one way it is interchangeable with being, and in this way each thing is one by its very essence, as is proved below in Book IV (548); and unity in this sense adds nothing to being except merely the notion of undividedness. Unity is used in another way insofar as it has the character of a first measure, either in an absolute sense or with respect to some genus. And this unity if it is both a minimum in the absolute sense and indivisible, is the one which is the principle and measure of number. But if it is not both a minimum in an absolute sense and indivisible, it will not be a unit and measure in an absolute sense, as a pound in the case of weights and a half-tone in the case of melodies, and a foot in the case of lengths. And nothing prevents continuous quantities from being composed of this kind of unity. He will establish this in Book X (1940) of this work. But because the Platonists thought that the one which is the principle of number and the one which is interchangeable with being are the same, they therefore held that the one which is the principle of number is the substance of each thing, and consequently that number, inasmuch as it is composed of many substantial principles, makes up or comprises the substance of composite things. But he will treat this question at greater length in Books XIII and XIV of this work.

LESSON 13

Are Numbers and Continuous Quantities the Substances and Principles of Sensible Things?

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1001b 26-1002b 11

275. And connected with these is the question whether numbers and bodies and surfaces and points are substances, or not.

276. For if they are not, we are in a quandary as to what being is, and what the substances of things are. For affections and motions and relations and dispositions and their complex conceptions do not seem to signify substance; because all are predicated of some subject, and no one of them is a particular thing. And those things which seem to signify substance most of all, as fire, water, earth [and air], of which composite bodies are constituted, their heat and cold and similar affections, are not substances. And it is only the body which undergoes these that remains as a being and is a substance.

277. Yet a body is a substance to a lesser degree than a surface, and this than a line, and this in turn than a unit and a point; for a body is defined by means of these, and these seem to be capable of existing without a body, but that a body should exist without these is impossible.

278. For this reason many of the natural philosophers, including the first, thought that substance and being are bodies, and that other things are attributes of this kind of thing; and hence too that the principles of bodies

are the principles of beings. But the later philosophers, who were wiser than these, thought that the principles-of things are numbers. Therefore, as we have said, if these are not substance, there is no substance or being at all; for the accidents of these things are not worthy to be called beings.

279. But if it is admitted that lengths and points are substances to a greater degree than bodies, and we do not see to what sort of bodies these belong (because it is impossible for them to exist in sensible bodies), there will then be no substance at all.

280. Further, all of these seem to be dimensions of bodies, one according to width, another according to depth, and another according to length.

281. And, similarly, any figure whatever already exists in a solid. Hence if neither Mercury is in the stone, nor one half of a cube in a cube as something segregated, neither will surface exist in a solid; for if this were true of anything whatever, it would also be true of that which divides a thing in half. And the same argument would apply in the case of a line, a point and a unit. If, then, a body is substance in the highest degree, and these things are such to a greater degree than it is, and these do not exist and are not substances, it escapes our understanding as to what being itself is and what the substance of beings is.

282. For along with what has been said there happen to be certain unreasonable views about generation and corruption. For if substance, not existing before, exists now, or existing before, does not exist afterwards, it seems to suffer these changes through generation and corruption. But it is impossible for points and lines and surfaces either to come to be or to be destroyed, even though they sometimes exist and sometimes do not. For when bodies are joined or divided, at one time, when they are joined, they [i.e., the two surfaces] simultaneously become one, and at another time, when they are divided, two surfaces are produced; because it [i.e., one of the two surfaces in question] is not in the bodies which have been joined but has perished. And when bodies are divided surfaces exist which did not exist before. For the indivisible point is not divided into two, and if things are generated and corrupted, they are generated from something.

283. And it is similar with regard to the now in time, for this cannot be generated and corrupted. Yet it seems always to exist, although it is not a substance. It is also clear that this is true of points, lines and surfaces,

because the argument is the same; for they are all similarly either limits or divisions.

COMMENTARY

Q 14B: ARE NUMBERS AND CONTINUOUS QUANTITIES THE SUBSTANCES OR PRINCIPLES OF SENSIBLE THINGS?

502. Having inquired whether unity and being are the substances of sensible things, the Philosopher now asks whether numbers and continuous quantities are the substances of sensible things; and in regard to this he does three things. First (502), he presents the question. Second (503), he argues in support of one side of the question ("For if they are not"). Third (507), he argues on the other side ("But if it is admitted").

Accordingly he says, first, that "connected with these," i.e., following from the foregoing problem, there is the question whether numbers and continuous quantities, i.e., bodies, surfaces, and their extremities, such as points, are either substances that are separate from sensible things, or are the substances of sensible things themselves, or not. He says that this problem is a result of the foregoing one, because in the foregoing problem it was asked whether unity is the substance of things. Now unity is the principle of number. But number seems to be the substance of continuous quantity inasmuch as a point, which is a principle of continuous quantity, seems to be merely the number one having position, and a line to be the number two having position, and the primary kind of surface to be the number three having position, and a body the number four having position.

503. For if they are not (276).

Then he advances an argument to show that these are the substances of sensible things; and in regard to this he does two things. First (276:C 503), he introduces an argument to show that these are the substances of sensible things. Second (278:C 506), he shows how the early philosophers followed out the first arguments ("For this reason").

In regard to the first he does two things. For, first, he advances an argument to show that body is the substance of things; and second (277:C 504), to show that many other things are substances to an even greater degree ("Yet a body").

He says, first (276), that if these things are not substances, we are in a quandary as to what being is essentially, and what the substances of beings are. For it is evident that affections and motions and relations and dispositions or arrangements, and their complex conceptions ‘ according as they are put into words, do not seem to signify the substance of anything; because all things of this kind seem to be predicated of a subject as something belonging to the genus of quantity, and no one of them seems to signify “this particular thing,” i.e., something that is complete and subsists of itself. This is especially evident in regard to the foregoing things, which are not said to be complete things but things whose nature consists in a kind of relation. But of all things those which especially seem to signify substance are fire, earth, and water, of which many bodies are composed. But he omits air, because it is less perceptible; and this is the reason why some thought air to be nothing. But in these bodies there are found certain dispositions, namely, hot and cold and other affections and passible qualities of this kind, which are not substances according to what has been said. It follows, then, that body alone is substance.

504. Yet a body (277)

Here he proceeds to examine those things which appear to be substance to an even greater degree than a body. He says that a body seems to be a substance to a lesser degree than a surface, and a surface than a line, and a line than a point or a unit. He proves this in two ways, of which the first is as follows. That by which a thing is defined seems to be its substance, for a definition signifies substance. But a body is defined by a surface, a surface by a line, a line by a point, and a point by a unit, because they say that a point is a unit having position. Therefore surface is the substance of body, and so on for the others.

505. The second argument runs as follows. Since substance is the primary kind of being, whatever is prior seems to be substance to a greater degree. But a surface is naturally prior to a body, because a surface can exist without a body but not a body without a surface. Therefore a surface is substance to a greater degree than a body. The same reasoning can be applied to all the others in turn.

506. For this reason (278).

Then he shows how the earlier philosophers followed out the foregoing arguments. He says that it was because of the foregoing arguments that many of the ancient philosophers, especially the first, thought that body alone was being and substance, and that all other things were accidents of bodies. Hence when they wanted to study the principles of beings, they studied the principles of bodies, as was stated above in Book I (36:C 74) with regard to the positions of the ancient natural philosophers. But the other philosophers who came later, and were reputed to be wiser than the aforesaid philosophers inasmuch as they dealt more profoundly with the principles of things, i.e., the Pythagoreans and Platonists, were of the opinion that numbers are the substances of sensible things inasmuch as numbers are composed of units. And the unit seems to be one substance of things. Hence, according to the foregoing arguments and opinions of the philosophers, it seems that if these things—numbers, lines, surfaces, and bodies—are not the substances of things, there will be no being at all. For if these are not beings, it is unfitting that their accidents should be called beings.

507. But if it is (279).

Then he argues in support of the other side of the question; and he gives four arguments, the first of which is as follows. If anyone were to admit that lengths and points are substances to a greater degree than bodies, then supposing that things of this sort are not substances, it also follows that bodies are not substances. Consequently, no substance will exist, because the accidents of bodies are not substances, as has been stated above (C 503). But points,’lines and surfaces are not substances. For these must be the limits of some bodies, because a point is the limit of a line, a line the limit of a surface, and a surface the limit of a body. But it is not evident to what sort of bodies these surfaces, lines and points, which are substances, belong. For it is evident that the lines and surfaces of sensible bodies are not substances, because they are altered in the same way as the other accidents in reference to the same subject. Therefore it follows that there will be no substance whatever.

508. Further, all of these (280).

Here he gives the second argument, which is as follows. All of the abovementioned things seem to be certain dimensions of bodies, either according to width, as a surface, or according to depth, as a solid, or according to length, as a line. But the dimensions of a body are not substances. Therefore things of this kind are not substances.

509. And, similarly (281).

Here he gives a third argument, which is as follows. Any figure which can be educed from a solid body according to some dimension is present in that body in the same way, i.e., potentially. But in the case of a large piece of stone which has not yet been cut, it is evident that “Mercury,” i.e., the figure of Mercury, is not present in it actually but only potentially. Therefore, in like manner, “in a cube,” i.e., in a body having six square surfaces, one half of the cube, which is another figure, is not present actually; but it becomes actual in this way when a cube has already been divided into two halves. And since every eduction of a new figure in a solid which has been cut is made according to some surface which limits a figure, it is also evident that such a surface will not be present in a body actually but only potentially. For if each surface besides the external one were actually present in a solid body, then for the same reason the surface which limits one half of the figure would also be actually present in it. But what has been said of a surface must also be understood of a line, a point, and a unit; for these are actually present in the continuum only insofar as they limit the continuum, and it is evident that these are not the substance of a body. But the other surfaces and lines cannot be the substance of a body, because they are not actually present in it; for a substance is actually present in the thing whose substance it is. Hence he concludes that of all of these body especially seems to be substance, and that surfaces and lines seem to be substance to a great degree than bodies. Now if these are not actual beings or substances, it seems to escape our comprehension as to what being is and what the substances of things are.

510. For along with (282).

Here he gives the fourth argument. First, he states it, and second (283:C 513), he clarifies it by using a similar case (“And it is similar”).

Accordingly, he says, first (282), that along with the other untenable consequences mentioned there also happen to be certain unreasonable views about generation and corruption on the part of those who hold that lines and surfaces are the substances of sensible things. For every substance which at first did not exist and later does exist, or which first was and afterwards is not, seems to suffer this change by way of generation and corruption. This is most evident in the case of all those things which are caused by way of motion. But points and lines and surfaces sometimes are and sometimes are not. Yet they are not generated or corrupted. Neither, then, are they substances.

511. He then proves each assumption. The first of these, is that they sometimes are and sometimes are not. For it happens that bodies which were at first distinct are afterwards united, and that those which were at first united are afterwards divided. For when bodies which were initially separated are united, one surface is produced for the two of them, because the parts of a continuous body are united in having one common boundary, which is one surface. But when one body is divided into two, two surfaces are produced, because it cannot be said that when two bodies are brought together their surfaces remain intact, but that both "perish," i.e., cease to be. In like manner, when bodies are divided there begin to exist for the first time two surfaces which previously did not exist. For it cannot be said that a surface, which is indivisible according to depth, is divided into two surfaces according to depth; or that a line, which is indivisible according to width, is divided according to width; or that a point, which is indivisible in every respect, is divided in any respect whatsoever. Thus it is clear that two things cannot be produced from one thing by way of division, and that one thing cannot be produced from two of these things by way of combination. Hence it follows that points, lines and surfaces sometimes begin to be and sometimes cease to be.

512. After having proved this, he proves the second assumption, namely, that these things are neither generated nor corrupted. For everything that is generated is generated from something, and everything that is corrupted is dissolved into something as its matter. But it is impossible to assign any matter whatever from which these things are generated and into which they are dissolved, because they are simple. Therefore they are neither generated nor corrupted.

513. And it is similar (283).

Then he makes the foregoing argument clear by using a similar case. For the now in time stands to time as a point to a line. But the now in time does not seem to be generated and corrupted, because if it were its generation and corruption would have to be measured by some particular time or instant. Thus the measure of this now either would be another now and so on to infinity, or would be time itself. But this is impossible. And even though the now is not generated or corrupted, still each now always seems to differ, not substantially but existentially, because the substance of the now corresponds to the mobile subject. But the difference of the now in terms of existence corresponds to the variation in motion, as is shown in Book IV of the Physics. Therefore the same thing seems to be true of a point in relation to a line, and of a line in relation to a surface, and of a surface in relation to a body, namely, that they are neither corrupted nor generated, although some variation is observable in things of this kind. For the same holds true of all of these, because all things of this kind are, in like manner, limits if regarded as at the extremities, or divisions if they are found in between. Hence, just as the now varies existentially as motion flows by, although it remains substantially the same because the mobile subject remains the same, so also does the point vary. And it does not become different because of the division of a line, even though it is not corrupted or generated in an absolute sense. The same holds true of the others.

514. But the Philosopher will treat this question in Books XIII and XIV. And the truth of the matter is that mathematical entities of this kind are not the substances of things, but are accidents which accrue to substances. But this mistake about continuous quantities is due to the fact that no distinction is made between the sort of body which/belongs to the genus of substance and the sort which belongs to the genus of quantity. For body belongs to the genus of substance according as it is composed of matter and form; and dimensions are a natural consequence of these in corporeal matter. But dimensions themselves belong to the genus of quantity, and are not substances but accidents whose subject is a body composed of matter and form. The same thing too was said above (500) about those who held that numbers are the substances of things; for their mistake came from not distinguishing between the one which is the principle of number and that which is interchangeable with being.

LESSON 14

Are There Separate Forms in Addition to the Objects of Mathematics and Sensible Things?

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284. But in general one will wonder why, in addition to sensible things and those which are intermediate, it is necessary to look for certain other things which we posit as the specific essences (or Forms) of sensible things.

285. For if it is because the objects of mathematics differ in one respect from the things which are at hand, they do not differ in being many things that are specifically the same. Hence the principles of sensible things will not be limited in number but only in species; unless one were to consider the principles of this particular syllable or word, for these are limited in number. And this is likewise true of the intermediate entities; for in their case too there are an infinite number of things that are specifically the same. Hence, if in addition to sensible substances and the objects of mathematics there are not certain other things, such as some call the Forms, there will be no substance which is one both numerically and specifically. Nor will the principles of beings be limited in number, but only in species. Therefore, if this is necessary, it will also be necessary on this account that there should be Forms. And even if those who speak of the Forms do not express themselves clearly, although this is what they wanted to say, they must

affirm that each of the Forms is a substance, and that nothing accidental pertains to them.

286. But if we hold that the Forms exist, and that principles are one numerically but not specifically, we have stated the untenable conclusions that follow from this view.

COMMENTARY

Q14C: ARE FORMS SUBSTANCES OR PRINCIPLES OF THINGS?

515. Having inquired whether the objects of mathematics are the principles of sensible substances, the Philosopher now inquires whether in addition to the objects of mathematics there are certain other principles, such as those which we call Forms, which are the substances and principles of sensible things. In regard to this he does three things. First, he presents the question. Second (516), he argues one side of the question ("For if it is because"). Third (518), he argues the other side ("But if we hold").

Accordingly, he says, first, that if one assumes that the objects of mathematics are not the principles of sensible things and their substances, one will next have the problem why, in addition to both sensible things and the objects of mathematics (which are an intermediate class between sensible things and the Forms), it is necessary to posit a third class of entities, namely, the specific essences, i.e., the Ideas or separate Forms.

516. For if it is because (285)

Here he argues one side of the question. The reason why it is necessary to posit separate Forms over and above sensible substances and the objects of mathematics seems to be that the objects of mathematics differ in one respect "from the things at hand," i.e., from sensible things, which exist in the universe; for the objects of mathematics abstract from sensible matter. Yet they do not differ but rather agree in another respect. For just as we find many sensible things which are specifically the same but numerically different, as many men or many horses, in a similar way we find many objects of mathematics which are specifically the same but numerically different, such as many equilateral triangles and many equal lines. And if this is true, it follows that, just as the principles of sensible things are not limited in number but in species, the same thing is true "of the intermediate entities"—the objects of mathematics. For since in the case of sensible things there are many individuals of one sensible. species, it is evident that the principles of sensible things are not limited in number but in species, unless of course we can consider the proper principles of a particular individual thing, which are also limited in number and are individual. He gives as an example words; for in the case of a word expressed in letters it is clear that the letters are its principles, yet there are not a limited number of individual letters taken numerically, but only a limited number taken specifically, some of which are vowels and some consonants. But this limitation is according to species and not according to number. For a is not only one but many, and the same applies to other letters. But if we take those letters which are the principles of a particular syllable, whether written or spoken, then they are limited in number. And for the same reason, since there are many objects of mathematics which are numerically different in one species, the mathematical principles of mathematical science could not be limited in number but only in species. We might say, for example, that the principles of triangles are three sides and three angles; but this limitation is according to species, for any of them can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore, if there were nothing besides sensible things and the objects of mathematics, it would follow that the substance of a Form would be numerically one, and that the principles of beings would not be limited in number but only in species. Therefore, if it is necessary that they be limited in number (otherwise it would happen that the principles of things are infinite in number), it follows that there must be Forms in addition to the objects of mathematics and sensible things.

517. This is what the Platonists wanted to say, because it necessarily follows from the things which they held that in the case of the substance of sensible things there is a single Form to which nothing accidental belongs. For something accidental, such as whiteness or blackness, pertains to an individual man, but to this separate man, who is a Form, according to the Platonists, there pertains nothing accidental but only what belongs to the definition of the species. And although they wanted to say this, they did not “express themselves” clearly; i.e., they did not clearly distinguish things.

518. But if wehold that (286).

Then he counters with an argument for the other side of the question. He says that, if we hold that there are separate Forms and that the principles of things are limited not only in species but also in number, certain impossible consequences will follow, which are touched on above in one of the questions (464).

But the Philosopher will deal with this problem in Book XII (2450) and Book XIV of this work. And the truth of the matter is that, just as the objects of mathematics do not exist apart from sensible things, neither do Forms exist apart from the objects of mathematics and from sensible substances. And while the efficient and moving principles of things are limited in number, the formal principles of things, of which there are many individuals in one species, are not limited in number but only in species.

LESSON 15

Do First Principles Exist Actually or Potentially, and Are They Universal or Singular?

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287. And connected with these problems there is the question whether the elements of things exist potentially or in some other way.

288. If they exist in some other way, then there will be something else prior to [first] principles. For potentiality is prior to that cause, but the potential need not exist in that way.

289. But if the elements exist potentially, it is possible for nothing to exist; for even that which does not yet exist is capable of existing, because that which does not exist may come to be. But nothing that is incapable of existing may come to be. It is necessary, then, to investigate these problems.

290. And there is also the problem whether [first] principles are universals or singular things, as we maintain.

291. For if they are universals, they will not be substances, because a common term signifies not a particular thing but what sort of thing; and a substance is a particular thing.

292. But if it is a particular thing, and is held to be the common whatness which is predicated of things, Socrates himself will be many animals: [himself] and man and animal; i.e., if each of these signifies a particular

thing and a one. If, then, the first principles of things are universals, these consequences will follow.

293. However, if they are not universals but have the nature of singular things, they will not be knowable; for all scientific knowledge is universal. Hence, if there is to be any scientific knowledge of [first] principles, there will have to be different principles which are predicated universally and are prior to [first] principles.

COMMENTARY

Q 14D: ARE PRINCIPLES OF SUBSTANCES ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL?

519. Having inquired what the principles are, the Philosopher now asks how they exist. First, he asks whether they exist potentially or actually; and second (523), whether they are universals or singulars (“And there is also the problem”). In regard to the first he does three things. First, he raises the question. Second (520), he argues one side (“If they exist”). Third (501), he argues the opposite side (“But if the elements”).

His first question (287), then, is whether first principles exist potentially or “in some other way,” i.e., actually. This problem is introduced because of the ancient philosophers of nature, who held that there are only material principles, which are in potency. But the Platonists, who posited separate Forms as formal principles, claimed that they exist actually.

520. If they exist (288).

He proves that principles exist potentially. For if they were to exist “in some other way,” i.e., actually, it would follow that there would be something prior to principles; for potentiality is prior to actuality. This is clear from the fact that one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed; for if a thing exists, it follows that it can be, but it does not necessarily follow that, if a thing is possible, it will exist actually. But it is impossible for anything to be prior to a first principle. Therefore it is impossible for a first principle to exist in any other way than potentially.

521. But if the elements (289).

Here he argues the other side of the question. If the principles of things exist potentially, it follows that no beings exist actually; for that which exists potentially does not yet exist actually. He proves this on the grounds that that which is coming to be is not a being. For that which exists is not coming to be; but only that comes to be which exists potentially. Therefore everything that exists potentially is nonbeing. Hence if principles exist only potentially, beings will not exist. But if principles do not exist, neither will their effects. It follows, then, that it is possible for nothing to exist in the order of being. And in summing this tip he concludes that according to what has been said it is necessary to inquire about the principles of things for the reasons given.

522. This question will be answered in Book IX (1844) of this work, where it is shown that actuality is prior to potentiality in an unqualified sense, but that in anything moved from potentiality to actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time. Hence it is necessary that the first principle exist actually and not potentially, as is shown in Book XII (2500) of this work.

Q 14e: Are principles of substances universal or singular?

523. And here is also the problem (290).

Here he asks whether the principles of things exist as universals or as singular things; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he presents the question. Second (524), he argues one side (“For if they are universals”). Third (527), he argues the other side (“However, if they are not universals”). The problem (290), then, is whether principles are universals or exist in the manner of singular things.

524. For if they are (291).

Then he proves that principles are not universals, by the following argument. No predicate common to many things signifies a particular thing, but signifies such and such a thing or of what sort a thing is; and it does this not according to accidental quality but according to substantial quality, as is stated below in Book V (487:C 987) of this work. The reason for this is that a particular thing is said to be such insofar as it subsists of itself. But that which subsists of itself cannot be something that exists in many, as belongs to the notion of common. For that which exists in many will not subsist of itself unless it is itself many. But this is contrary to the notion of common, because what is common is what is onein-many. Hence it is clear that a particular thing does not signify anything common, but signifies a form existing in many things.

525. Further, he adds the minor premise, namely, that substance signifies a particular thing. And this is true of first substances, which are said to be substances in the full and proper sense, as is stated in the Categories; “ for substances of this kind are things which subsist of themselves. Thus it follows that, if principles are universals, they are not substances. Hence either there will be no principles of substances, or it will be necessary to say that the principles of substances are not substances.

526. But since it is possible for someone to affirm that some common predicate might signify this particular thing, he therefore criticizes this when he says “But if it is (292).”

He explains the untenable consequence resulting from this. For if a common predicate were a particular thing, it would follow that everything to which that common predicate is applied would be this particular thing which is common. But it is clear that both animal and man are predicated of Socrates, and that each of these—animal and man—is a common predicate. Hence, if every common predicate were a particular thing, it would follow that Socrates would be three particular things; for Socrates is Socrates, which is a particular thing; and he is also a man, which is a particular thing according to the above; and he is also an animal, which is similarly a particular thing. Hence he would be three particular things. Further, it would follow that there would be three animals; for animal is predicated of itself, of man, and of Socrates. Therefore, since this is impossible, it is also impossible for a common predicate to be a particular thing. These, then, will be the impossible consequences which follow if principles are universals.

527. However, if they are not (293).

He argues the other side of the question. Since all sciences are universal, they are not concerned with singulars but with universals. Therefore, if some principles were not universals but were singular things, they would not be knowable in themselves. Hence, if any science were to be had of them, there would have to be certain prior principles, which would be universals. It is necessary, then, that first principles be universals in order that science may be had of things; because if principles remain unknown, other things must remain unknown.

528. This question will be answered in Book VII (1584) of this work, where it is shown that universals are neither substances nor the principles of

things. However, it does not follow for this reason that, if the principles and substances of things were singulars, there could be no science of them, both because immaterial things, even though they subsist as singulars, are nevertheless also intelligible, and also because there is science of singulars according to their universal concepts which are apprehended by the intellect.

BOOK IV

THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS, DEMONSTRATIVELY

LESSON 1

The Proper Subject Matter of This Science: Being as Being, and Substance and Accidents

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294. There is a certain science which studies being as being and the attributes which necessarily belong to being.

295. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences; for none of the other sciences attempt to study being as being in general, but cutting off some part of it they study the accidents of this part. This, for example, is what the mathematical sciences do.

296. Now since we are seeking the principles and ultimate causes of things, it is evident that these must be of themselves the causes of some nature. Hence, if those who sought the elements of beings sought these principles, they must be the elements of beings not in any accidental way but inasmuch as they are beings. Therefore the first causes of being as being must also be understood by us.

Chapter 2

297. The term being is used in many senses, but with reference to one thing and to some one nature and not equivocally. Thus everything healthy is related to health, one thing because it preserves health, another because it causes it, another because it is a sign of it (as urine) and still another because it is receptive of it. The term medical is related in a similar way to the art of medicine; for one thing is called medical because it possesses the

art of medicine, another because it is receptive of it, and still another because it is the act of those who have the art of medicine. We can take other words which are used in a way similar to these. And similarly there are many senses in which the term being is used, but each is referred to a first principle. For some things are called beings because they are substances; others because they are affections of substances; others because they are a process toward substance, or corruptions or privations or qualities of substance, or because they are productive or generative principles of substance, or of things which are related to substance, or the negation of some of these or of substance. For this reason too we say that non-being is non-being.

298. Therefore, just as there is one science of all healthy things, so too the same thing is true in other cases. For it is the office of one and the same science to study not only those things which are referred to one thing but also those which are referred to one nature. For those too in a sense are referred to one thing.

299. It is evident, then, that it is the function of one science to study beings as beings.

299a. But in every respect a science is concerned with what is primary, and that on which other things depend, and form which they derive their name. Hence, if this is substance, it must be of substances that the philosopher possesses the principles and causes.

300. Now of every single class of things there is one sense and one science; for example, grammar, which is one science, studies all words. And for this reason too it belongs to a general science to study all species of being as being and the species of these species.

COMMENTARY

IT IS BEING AND ITS PROPERTIES

529. In the preceding book the Philosopher proceeded to treat dialectically the things which ought to be considered in this science. Here he begins to proceed demonstratively by establishing the true answer to those questions which have been raised and argued dialectically.

In the preceding book he treated dialectically both the things which pertain to the method of this science, namely, those to which the consideration of this science extends, as well as those which fall under the consideration of this science. And because it is first necessary to know the method of a science before proceeding to consider the things with which it deals, as was explained in Book II (335), this. part is therefore divided into two members. First, he speaks of the things which this science considers; and second (749), of those which fall under its consideration. He does this in Book V ("In one sense the term principle").

The first part is divided into two members. First, he establishes what the subject matter of this science is. Second (534), he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers ("The term being").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he submits that there is a science whose subject is being. Second (532), he shows that it is not one of the particular sciences ("But this science"); and third (533), he shows that it is the science with which we are now dealing ("Now since").

Now because a science should investigate not only its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, he therefore says, first, that there is a science which studies being as being, as its subject, and studies also "the attributes which necessarily belong to being," i.e., its proper accidents.

530. He says "as being" because the other sciences, which deal with particular beings, do indeed consider being (for all the subjects of the sciences are beings), yet they do not consider being as being, but as some particular kind of being, for example, number or line or fire or the like.

531. He also says "and the attributes which necessarily belong to being," and not just those which belong to being, in order to show that it is not the business of this science to consider those attributes which belong accidentally to its subject, but only those which belong necessarily to it. For geometry does not consider whether a triangle is of bronze or of wood, but only considers it in an absolute sense according as it has three angles equal to two right angles. Hence a science of this kind, whose subject is being, must not consider all the attributes which belong accidentally to being, because then it would consider the accidents investigated by all sciences; for all accidents belong to some being, but not inasmuch as it is being. For those accidents which are the proper accidents of an inferior thing are related in an accidental way to a superior thing; for example, the proper accidents of man are not the proper accidents of animal.

Now the necessity of this science, which considers being and its proper accidents, is evident from this, that such things should not remain unknown since the knowledge of other things depends on them, just as the knowledge of proper objects depends on that of common objects.

532. This science (295).

Then he shows that this science is not one of the particular sciences, and he uses the following argument. No particular science considers universal being as such, but only some part of it separated. from the others; and about this part it studies the proper accidents. For example, the mathematical sciences study one kind of being, quantitative being. But the common science considers universal being as being, and therefore it is not the same as any of the particular sciences.

533. Now since (296).

Here he shows that the science with which we are dealing has being as its subject, and he uses the following argument. Every principle is of itself the principle and cause of some nature. But we are seeking the first principles and utlimate causes of things, as was explained in Book I (57), and therefore these are of themselves the causes of some nature. But this nature can only be the nature of being. This is clear from the fact that all philosophers, in seeking the elements of things inasmuch as they are beings, sought principles of this kind, namely, the first and ultimate ones. Therefore in this science we are seeking the principles of being as being. Hence being is the subject of this science, for any science seeks the proper causes of its subject.

It applies analogically to the different categories.

534. The term “being” (297).

Then he proceeds to answer the questions raised in the preceding book about the things which this science considers, and this is divided into three parts. First, he answers the question whether this science considers substances and accidents together, and whether it considers all substances. Second (548), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider all of the following: one and many, same and different, opposites, contraries, and so forth (“Now although”). Third (588), he answers the question whether it belongs to this science to consider the principles of demonstration (“Moreover, it is necessary”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider both substances and accidents. Second (546), he shows that this science is chiefly concerned with substances ("But in every respect"). Third (547), he shows that it pertains to this science to consider all substances ("Now of every").

In regard to the first part he uses this kind of argument: those things which have one term predicated of them in common, not univocally but analogously, belong to the consideration of one science. But the term being is thus predicated of all beings. Therefore all beings, i.e., both substances and accidents, belong to the consideration of one science which considers being as being.

535. Now in this argument he gives, first (535), the minor premise; second (544), the major premise ("Therefore, just as"); and third (545), the conclusion ("It is evident, then").

He accordingly says, first, that the term being, or what is, has several meanings. But it must be noted that a term is predicated of different things in various senses. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to a meaning which is entirely the same, and then it is said to be predicated of them univocally, as animal is predicated of a horse and of an ox. Sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are entirely different, and then it is said to be predicated of them equivocally, as dog is predicated of a star and of an animal. And sometimes it is predicated of them according to meanings which are partly different and partly not (different inasmuch as they imply different relationships, and the same inasmuch as these different relationships are referred to one and the same thing), and then it is said "to be predicated analogously," i.e., proportionally, according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing.

536. It must also be noted that the one thing to which the different relationships are referred in the case of analogical things is numerically one and not just one in meaning, which is the kind of oneness designated by a univocal term. Hence he says that, although the term being has several senses, still it is not predicated equivocally but in reference to one thing; not to one thing which is one merely in meaning, but to one which is one as a single definite nature. This is evident in the examples given in the text.

537. First, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an end. This is clear in the case of the term healthy or healthful. For the

term healthy is not predicated univocally of food, medicine, urine and an animal; because the concept healthy as applied to food means something that preserves health; and as applied to medicine it means something that causes health; and as applied to urine it means something that is a sign of health; and as applied to an animal it means something that is the recipient or subject of health. Hence every use of the term healthy refers to one and the same health; for it is the same health which the animal receives, which urine is a sign of, which medicine causes, and which food preserves.

538. Second, he gives the example of many things being related to one thing as an efficient principle. For one thing is called medical because it possesses the art of medicine, as the skilled physician. Another is called medical because it is naturally disposed to have the art of medicine, as men who are so disposed that they may acquire the art of medicine easily (and according to this some men can engage in medical activities as a result of a peculiar natural constitution). And another is called medical or medicinal because it is necessary for healing, as the instruments which physicians use can be called medical. The same thing is also true of the things called medicines, which physicians use in restoring health. Other terms which resemble these in having many senses can be taken in a similar way.

539. And just as the above-mentioned terms have many senses, so also does the term being. Yet every being is called such in relation to one first thing, and this first thing is not an end or an efficient cause, as is the case in the foregoing examples, but a subject.

For some things are called beings, or are said to be, because they have being of themselves, as substances, which are called beings in the primary and proper sense. Others are called beings because they are affections or properties of substances, as the proper accidents of any substance. Others are called beings because they are processes toward substance, as generation and motion. And others are called beings because they are corruptions of substances; for corruption is the process toward non-being just as generation is the process toward substance. And since corruption terminates in privation just as generation terminates in form, the very privations of substantial forms are fittingly called beings. Again, certain qualities or certain accidents are called beings because they are productive or generative principles of substances or of those things which are related to substance according to one of the foregoing relationships or any other relationship.

And similarly the negations of those things which are related to substances, or even substance itself, are also called beings. Hence we say that non-being is non-being. But this would not be possible unless a negation possessed being in some way.

540. But it must be noted that the above-mentioned modes of being can be reduced to four.

(1) For one of them, which is the most imperfect, i.e., negation and privation, exists only in the mind. We say that these exist in the mind because the mind busies itself with them as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. In what respect negation and privation differ will be treated below (564).

541. (2) There is another mode of being inasmuch as generation and corruption are called beings, and this mode by reason of its imperfection comes close to the one given above. For generation and corruption have some admixture of privation and negation, because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality, as is stated in the Physics, Book III.

542. (3) The third mode of being admits of no admixture of non-being, yet it is still an imperfect kind of being, because it does not exist of itself but in something else, for example, qualities and quantities and the properties of substances.

543. (4) The fourth mode of being is the one which is most perfect, namely, what has being in reality without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid being inasmuch as it exists of itself. This is the mode of being which substances have. Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three.

544. Therefore, just as (298).

Here he gives the major premise of the first argument. He says that it is the office of one science to study not only those things which are referred “to one thing,” i.e., to one common notion, but also those which are referred to one nature according to different relationships. And the reason for this is that the thing to which they are referred is one; just as it is clear that one science, medicine, considers all health-giving things. The same thing holds true of other things which are spoken of in the same way.

545. It is evident (299).

Then he draws his intended conclusion. This is evident of itself.

546. But in every (299a).

Then he shows that this science, even though it considers all beings, is chiefly concerned with substances. He uses the following argument. Every science which deals with many things that are referred to one primary thing is properly and principally concerned with that primary thing on which other things depend for their being and from which they derive their name; and this is true in every case. But substance is the primary kind of being. Hence the philosopher who considers all beings ought to consider primarily and chiefly the principles and causes of substances. Therefore his consideration extends primarily and chiefly to substances.

547. Now of every (300).

Then he shows by the following argument that it is the business of the first philosopher to consider all substances. There is one sense and one science of all things belonging to one class; for example, sight is concerned with all colors, and grammar with all words. Therefore, if all beings somehow belong to one class, all species of being must belong to the consideration of one science which is a general science, and different species of being must belong to the different species of that science. He says this because it is not necessary for one science to consider all the species of one genus according to the special notes of every single species, but only inasmuch as they agree generically. But according to their specific notes the different species of one genus belong to the special sciences, as happens in the present case. For inasmuch as all substances are beings or substances, they belong to the consideration of this science; but inasmuch as they are a particular kind of substance, as a lion or an ox, they belong to the special sciences.

LESSON 2

This Science Considers Being and Unity. The Parts of Philosophy Based on the Divisions of Being and Unity

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1003b 22-1004a 9

301. Now although being and unity are the same and are a single nature in the sense that they are associated like principle and cause, they are not the same in the sense that they are expressed by a single concept. Yet it makes no difference even if we consider them to be the same; in fact this will rather support our undertaking.

302. For one man and human being and man are the same thing; and nothing different is expressed by repeating the terms when we say, “This is a human being, a man, and one man.” And it is evident that they are not separated either in generation or in corruption. The same holds true of what is one. Hence it is evident that any addition to these expresses the same thing, and that unity is nothing else than being.

303. Further, the substance of each thing is one in no accidental way; and similarly it is something that is.

304. Hence there are as many species of being as there are of unity, of which it is the office of the same general science to treat. I mean, for example, sameness and likeness and other such attributes. And almost all contraries may be referred to this starting point. But these have been studied by us in our selection, i.e., in our explanation or treatment, of contraries.

305. And there are just as many parts of philosophy as there are substances, so that there must be a first philosophy and one which is next in order to it. For being and unity are things which straightway have genera; and for this reason the sciences will correspond to these. For the term philosopher is used like the term mathematician; for mathematics too has parts, and there is a first and a second science and then others “ following these among the mathematical sciences.

COMMENTARY

METAPHYSICS ALSO TREATS OF “BEING-ONE”.

548. Here he proceeds to show that the study of common attributes such as one and many and same and different belongs to the consideration of one and the same science; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that this is true of each attribute taken separately by arguing from proper or specific principles. Second (570), he shows that this is true of all attributes taken together by arguing from common principles.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the philosopher ought to investigate all these attributes. Second (568), he tells us how to investigate them.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider unity and its species. Second (564), he shows that it is the office of one and the same science to consider all opposites.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider unity. Second (561), he shows that it also,belongs to it to examine the species of unity.

He therefore says, first, that being and unity are the same and are a single nature. He says this because some things are numerically the same which are not a single nature but different natures, for example, Socrates, this white thing, and this musician. Now the terms one and being do not signify different natures but a single nature. But things can be one in two ways: (1) for some things are one which are associated as interchangeable things, like principle and cause; and (2) some are interchangeable not only in the sense that they are one and the same numerically [or in subject] but also in the sense that they are one and the same conceptually, like garment and clothing.

549. Now the terms one and being signify one nature according to different concepts, and therefore they are like the terms principle and cause, and not like the terms tunic and garment, which are wholly synonymous. — Yet it makes no difference to his thesis if we consider them to be used in the same sense, as those things which are one both numerically and conceptually. In fact this will “rather support our undertaking,” i.e., it will serve his purpose better; for he intends to prove that unity and being belong to the same study, and that the species of the one correspond to those of the other. The proof of this would be clearer if unity and being were the same both numerically and conceptually rather than just numerically and not conceptually.

550. He proves that they are the same numerically by using two arguments. He gives the first where he says, “For one man,” and it runs as follows. Any two things which when added to some third thing cause no difference are wholly the same. But when one and being are added to man or to anything at all, they cause no difference. Therefore they are wholly the same. The truth of the minor premise is evident; for it is the same thing to say “man” and “one man.” And similarly it is the same thing to say “human being” and “the thing that is man;” and nothing different is expressed when in speaking we repeat the terms, saying, “This is a human being, a man, and one man.” He proves this as follows.

551. It is the same thing for man and the thing that is man to be generated and corrupted. This is evident from the fact that generation is a process toward being, and corruption a change from being to non-being. Hence a man is never generated without a human being being generated, nor is a man ever corrupted without a human being being corrupted; and those things which are generated and corrupted together are themselves one and the same.

552. And just as it has been said that being and man are not separated either in generation or in corruption, so too this is evident of what is one; for when a man is generated, one man is generated, and when a man is corrupted, one man is also corrupted. It is clear, then, that the apposition of these [i.e., of one or being to man] expresses the same thing, and that just because the term one or being is added to man it is not to be understood that

some nature is added to man. And from this it is clearly apparent that unity does not differ from being, because any two things which are identical with some third thing are identical with each other.

553. It is also evident from the foregoing argument that unity and being are the same numerically but differ conceptually; for if this were not the case they would be wholly synonymous, and then it would be nonsense to say, “a human being,” and “one man.” For it must be borne in mind that the term man is derived from the quiddity or the nature of man, and the term thing from the quiddity only; but the term being is derived from the act of being, and the term one from order or lack of division; for what is one is an undivided being. Now what has an essence, and a quiddity by reason of that essence, and what is undivided in itself, are the same. Hence these three—thing, being, and one—signify absolutely the same thing but according to different concepts.

554. Further, the substance (303).

Then he gives the second argument, which has to do with sameness or identity of subject. This argument is as follows. Any two attributes which are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing are the same in subject, or numerically. But unity and being are such that they are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing; for the substance of a thing is one in itself and not accidentally. Therefore the terms being and one signify the same thing in subject.

555. That the terms being and one are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing can be proved as follows. If being and one were predicated of the substance of each thing by reason of something added to it [i.e., accidentally], being would have to be predicated also of the thing added, because anything at all is one and a being. But then there would be the question whether being is predicated of this thing (the one added) either essentially or by reason of some other thing that is added to it in turn. And if the latter were the case, then the same question would arise once again regarding the last thing added, and so on to infinity. But this is impossible. Hence the first position must be held, namely, that a thing’s substance is one and a being of itself and not by reason of something added to it.

556. But it must be noted that Avicenna felt differently about this; for he said that the terms being and one do not signify a thing’s substance but

something added to it. He said this of being because, in the case of anything that derives its existence from something else, the existence of such a thing must differ from its substance or essence. But the term being signifies existence itself. Hence it seems that being, or existence is something added to a thing's essence.

557. He spoke in the same way of one, because he thought that the one which is interchangeable with being and the one which is the principle of number are the same. And the one which is the principle of number must signify a reality added to the substance, otherwise number, since it is composed of ones, would not be a species of quantity, which is an accident added to substance. He said that this kind of one is interchangeable with being, not in the sense that it signifies the very substance of a thing or being, but in the sense that it signifies an accident belonging to every being, just as the ability to laugh belongs to every man.

558. But in regard to the first point he does not seem to be right; for even though a thing's existence is (+) other than its essence, it should not be understood to be something added to its essence after the manner of an (~) accident, but (+) something established, as it were, by the principles of the essence. Hence the term being, which is applied to a thing by reason of its very existence, designates the same thing as the term which is applied to it by reason of its essence. [Existence is later clarified as the act of essence.]

559. Nor does it seem to be true that the one or unity which is interchangeable with being and that which is the principle of number are the same; for nothing that pertains to some special class of being seems to be characteristic of all beings. Hence the unity which is limited to a special class of being—discrete quantity—does not seem to be interchangeable with universal being. For, if unity is a proper and essential accident of being, it must be caused by the principles of being as being, just as any proper accident is caused by the principles of its subject. But it is not reasonable that something having a particular mode of being should be adequately accounted for by the common principles of being as being. It cannot be true, then, that something which belongs to a definite genus and species is an accident of every being.

560. Therefore the kind of unity which is the principle of number differs from that which is interchangeable with being; for the unity which is interchangeable with being signifies being itself, adding to it the notion of

undividedness, which, since it is a negation or a privation, does not posit any reality added to being. Thus unity differs from being in no way numerically but only conceptually; for a negation or a privation is not a real being but a being of reason, as has been stated (540).

However, the kind of unity which is the principle of number adds to substance the note of a measure, which is a special property of quantity and is found first in the unit. And it is described as the privation or negation of division which pertains to continuous quantity; for number is produced by dividing the continuous. Hence number belongs to mathematical science, whose subject cannot exist apart from sensible matter but can be considered apart from sensible matter. But this would not be so if the kind of unity which is the principle of number were separate from matter in being and existed among the immaterial substances, as is true of the kind of unity which is interchangeable with being.

561. Hence there are (304).

Then he concludes that it is the business of the philosopher to consider the parts of unity, just as it is to consider the parts of being. First, he proves this; and second (563), he shows that there are different parts of philosophy corresponding to the different parts of being and unity.

He says, first, that since being and unity signify the same thing, and the species of things that are the same are themselves the same, there must be as many species of being as there are of unity, and they must correspond to each other. For just as the parts of being are substance, quantity, quality, and so on, in a similar way the parts of unity are sameness, equality and likeness. For things are the same when they are one in substance, equal when they are one in quantity, and like when they are one in quality. And the other parts of unity could be taken from the other parts of being, if they were given names. And just as it is the office of one science, philosophy, to consider all parts of being, in a similar way it is the office of this same science to consider all parts of unity, i.e., sameness, likeness and so forth. And to this “starting point,” i.e., unity, “almost” all contraries may be referred.

562. He adds this qualification because in some cases this point is not so evident. Yet it must be true; for since one member of every pair of contraries involves privation, they must be referred back to certain primary privatives, among which unity is the most basic.

And plurality, which stems from unity, is the cause of otherness, difference and contrariety, as will be stated below. He says that this has been treated “in our selection,” or extract, “of contraries,” i.e., a treatise which is the part selected to deal with contraries, namely, Book X (2000-21) of this work.

563. And there are (305).

Here he shows that the parts of philosophy are distinguished in reference to the parts of being and unity. He says that there are as many parts of philosophy as there are parts of substance, of which being and unity chiefly are predicated, and of which it is the principal intention or aim of this science to treat.

And because the parts of substance are related to each other in a certain order, for immaterial substance is naturally prior to sensible substance, then among the parts of philosophy there must be a first part. (1) Now that part which is concerned with sensible substance is first in the order of instruction, because any branch of learning must start with things which are better known to us. He treats of this part in Books VII (1300) and VIII of this work. (2) But that part which has to do with immaterial substance is prior both in dignity and in the aim of this science. This part is treated in Book XII (2488) of this work.

Yet whatever parts are first must be continuous with the others, because all parts have unity and being as their genus. Hence all parts of this science are united in the study of being and unity, although they are about different parts of substance. Thus it is one science inasmuch as the foregoing parts are things which correspond to “these,”i.e., to unity and being, as common attributes of substance. In this respect the philosopher resembles the mathematician; for mathematical science has different parts, one of which is primary, as arithmetic, another secondary, as geometry, and others following these in order, as optics, astronomy and music.

LESSON 3

The Same Science Considers Unity and Plurality and All Opposites. The Method of Treating These

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306. Now since it is the office of a single science to study opposites, and plurality is the opposite of unity, it is also the office of a single science to study negation and privation, because in both cases we are studying the unity of which there is negation or privation. And this (negation or privation) is what is stated either absolutely because an attribute is not present in a thing or (not absolutely) because it is not present in some determinate class. Therefore this difference is present in unity over and above what is implied in negation; for negation is the absence of the thing in question. But in the case of privation there is an underlying subject of which the privation is predicated.

307. But plurality is the opposite of unity. Hence the opposites of the abovementioned concepts, otherness, unlikeness, and inequality, and any others which are referred to plurality or unity, must come within the scope of the science mentioned above. And contrariety is one of these; for contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference is a kind of otherness.

308. Hence, since the term one is used in many senses, the terms designating the foregoing opposites will also be used in many senses. Yet it is the business of one science to know them all. For even if some term is

used in many senses, it does not therefore follow that it belongs to another science. Hence if terms are not used with one meaning, and their concepts are not referred to one thing, then it is the office of a different science to study them. But since all things are referred to some primary thing, as all things which are one are referred to a primary one, the same thing must hold true of sameness, otherness, and the contraries. It is necessary, then to distinguish all the senses in which each term is used and then refer them back to the primary thing signified in each of the predicates in question to see how each is related to it. For one thing is given a particular predicate because it possesses it, another because it produces it, and others in other ways.

309. Hence it is evident, as has been stated in our problems, that it is the office of a single science to give an account of these predicates as well as of substance; and this was one of the problems (181:C 346; 202:C 393).

COMMENTARY

IT ALSO CONSIDERS “ONE-MANY”, “NEGATION-PRIVATION” ETC.

564. Here he shows that it is the office of this science to consider opposites; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider privation and negation; and second (567), to consider contraries (“But plurality”).

He accordingly says (306) that, since it pertains to one science to consider opposites (for example, it belongs to medicine to consider health and sickness, and to grammar to consider agreement and disagreement), and since plurality is the opposite of unity, the study of privation and negation must belong to that science which deals with unity and plurality. For the consideration “of both” involves unity; that is, the study of unity, whose concept entails negation and privation, depends on both of these. For, as has been said above (553), what is one is an undivided being, and division relates to plurality, which is the opposite of unity. Hence the study of negation and privation belongs to that science whose business it is to consider unity.

565. Now there are two kinds of negation: (1) simple negation, by which one thing is said absolutely not to be present in something else, and (2) negation in a genus, by which something is denied of something else, not

absolutely, but within the limits of some determinate genus. For example, not everything that does not have sight is said absolutely to be blind, but something within the genus of an animal which is naturally fitted to have sight.

And this difference is present in unity over and above “what is implied in negation”; i.e., it is something by which it differs from negation, because negation expresses only the absence of something, namely, what it removes, without stating a determinate subject. (1) Hence simple negation can be verified both of a non-being, which is not naturally fitted to have something affirmed of it, and of a being which is naturally fitted to have something affirmed of it and does not. For unseeing can be predicated both of a chimera and of a stone and of a man. (2) But in the case of privation there is a determinate nature or substance of which the privation is predicated; for not everything that does not have sight can be said to be blind, but only that which is naturally fitted to have sight. Thus since the negation which is included in the concept of unity is a negation in a subject (otherwise a non-being could be called one), it is evident that unity differs from simple negation and rather resembles the nature of privation, as is stated below in Book X (2069) of this work.

566. But it must be noted that, although unity includes an implied privation, it must not be said to include (~) the privation of plurality; for, since a privation is subsequent in nature to the thing of which it is the privation, it would follow that unity would be subsequent in nature to plurality. And it would also follow that plurality would be given in the definition of unity; for a privation can be defined only by its opposite. For example, if someone were to ask what blindness is, we would answer that it is the privation of sight. Hence, since unity is given in the definition of plurality (for plurality is an aggregate of units), it would follow that there would be circularity in definitions. (+) Hence it must be said that unity includes the privation of division, although not (~) the kind of division that belongs to quantity; for this kind of division is limited to one particular class of being and cannot be included in the definition of unity. (+) But the unity which is interchangeable with being implies the privation of formal division, which comes about through opposites, and whose primary root is the opposition between affirmation and negation. For those things are divided from each other which are of such a kind that one is not the other.

Therefore being itself is understood first, and then non-being, and then division, and then the kind of unity which is the privation of division, and then plurality, whose concept includes the notion of division just as the concept of unity includes the notion of undividedness. However, some of the things that have been distinguished in the foregoing way can be said to include the notion of plurality only if the notion of unity is first attributed to each of the things distinguished.

567. But plurality (307).

Here he shows that it is the business of the philosopher to consider contraries, or opposites; for plurality is the opposite of unity, as has been said (564), and it is the office of one science to consider opposites. Hence, since this science considers unity, sameness, likeness and equality, it must also consider their opposites, plurality, otherness or diversity, unlikeness and inequality, and all other attributes which are reduced to these or even to unity and plurality. And contrariety is one of these; for contrariety is a kind of difference, namely, of things differing in the same genus. But difference is a kind of otherness or diversity, as is said in Book X (2017). Therefore contrariety belongs to the consideration of this science.

568. Hence, since (308).

Then he deals with the method by which the philosopher ought to establish these things. He says that, since all of the above-mentioned opposites are derived from unity, and the term one is used in many senses, all of the terms designating these must also be used in many senses, i.e., same, other, and so on. Yet even though all of these are used in many senses, it is still the work of one science, philosophy, to know the things signified by each of these terms. For if some term is used in many senses, it does not therefore follow that it belongs to another or different science. For if the different things signified are not referred to “with one meaning,” or according to one concept, i.e., univocally, or are not referred to one thing in different ways, as in the case of analogous things, then it follows that it is the office of another, i.e., of a different, science, to consider them; or at least it is the office of one science accidentally, just as astronomy considers a star in the heavens, i.e., the dog star, and natural science considers a dog-fish and a dog. But all of these are referred to one starting point. For things signified by the term one, even though diverse, are referred back to a primary thing signified as one; and we must also speak in the same way of the terms same, other, contrary, and others of this kind.

Regarding each of these terms, then, the philosopher should do two things. (1) First, he should distinguish the many senses in which each may be used; and (2) second, he should determine regarding “each of the predicates,” i.e., each of the names predicated of many things, to what primary thing it is referred. For example, he should state what the first thing signified by the term same or other is, and how all the rest are referred to it; one inasmuch as it possesses it, another inasmuch as it produces it, or in other ways of this kind.

569. Hence it is evident (309).

He draws his conclusion from what has been said, namely, that it belongs to this science to reason about those common predicates and about substance; and this was one of the problems investigated in the questions treated dialectically in Book III (393).

LESSON 4

First Philosophy Considers All Contraries. Its Distinction from Logic

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310. And it is also evident that it is the function of the philosopher to be able to study all things. For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it that will investigate whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same person, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what a contrary is, or how many meanings it has? And the same applies to other questions of this kind. Therefore, since these same things are the essential properties of unity as unity and of being as being, but not as numbers or lines or fire, evidently it is the office of this science to know both the quiddities of these and their accidents. Therefore those who have been studying these things do not err by being unphilosophical, but because substance, to which they pay no attention, is first. Now there are properties of number as number, for example, oddness and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these belong to numbers either in themselves or in relation to one another. And similarly there are properties of the solid, and of what is changeable and what is unchangeable, and of what is heavy and what is light. And in a similar fashion there are properties of being as being; and these are the ones about which the philosopher has to investigate the truth.

311. An indication of this is the following. Dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistry is apparent wisdom,

and dialecticians dispute about all things, and being is common to all things. But evidently they dispute about these matters because they are common to philosophy. For sophistry and dialectics are concerned with the same class of things as philosophy.

312. But philosophy differs from the latter in the manner of its power, and from the former in the choice, i.e., selection, of a way of life. For dialectics is in search of knowledge of what the philosopher actually knows, and sophistry has the semblance of wisdom but is not really such.

313. Further, one corresponding member of each pair of contraries is privative, and all contraries are referred to being and to non-being and to unity and to plurality; for example, rest pertains to unity and motion to plurality.

314. And almost all men admit that substance and beings are composed of contraries; for all say that principles are contraries. For some speak of the odd and even, others of the hot and cold, others of the limited and unlimited, and others of love and hate.

315. And all the other contraries seem to be reducible to unity and plurality. Therefore let us take that reduction for granted. And all the principles which have to do with other things fall under unity and being as their genera.

316. It is clear from these discussions, then, that it is the office of one science to study being as being. For all beings are either contraries or composed of contraries, and the principles of contraries are unity and plurality. And these belong to one science, whether they are used in one sense or not. And perhaps the truth is that they are not. Yet even if the term one is used in many senses, all will be referred to one primary sense; and the same is true of contraries. Hence, even if unity or being is not a universal and the same in all things or is something separate (as presumably it is not), still in some cases the thing will be referred to unity and in others it will be referred to what follows on unity.

317. And for this reason it is not the province of geometry to examine what a contrary is, or what the perfect is, or what unity is, or what sameness or otherness is, but to assume them.

318. It is evident, then, that it is the office of one science to study both being as being and the attributes which belong to being as being. And it is evident too that the same science studies not only substances but also their

accidents, both those mentioned above, and prior and subsequent, genus and species, whole and part, and others such as these.

COMMENTARY

GENERAL REASONS FOR THAT (DIFFERENCE BETWEEN METAPHYSICS AND DIALECTICS OR SOPHISTRY).

570. Here he uses arguments based on common principles to prove what the philosopher ought to consider regarding all of the foregoing attributes. First, he proves his thesis; and second (587), he introduces his intended conclusion ("It is evident").

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he proves his thesis; and second (586), he draws a corollary from what has been said ("And for this reason").

He gives three arguments to prove his thesis. The second (572) begins where he says, "An indication of this"; and the third (578), at "Further, one corresponding."

The first argument is as follows. All questions that can be raised must be answered by some science. But questions are raised about the common attributes mentioned above, for example, that raised about sameness and otherness: whether Socrates and Socrates sitting are the same; and that raised about contraries: whether one thing has one contrary, and how many meanings the term contrary has. Hence these questions must be answered by some science which considers sameness and contrariety and the other attributes mentioned above.

571. That this is the job of the philosopher and of no one else he proves thus: that science whose office is to consider being as being is the one which must consider the first properties of being. But all of the above-mentioned attributes are proper accidents of unity and being as such. For number as number has properties, such as excess, equality, commensurability, and so on, some of which belong to a number taken absolutely, as even and odd, and some to one number in relation to another, as equality. And even substance has proper attributes, "as the resistant," or body, and others of this kind. And in a similar way being as being has certain properties, which are the common attributes mentioned above; and therefore the study of them belongs to the philosopher. Hence those dealing

with philosophy have not erred in their treatment of these things “by being unphilosophical,” i.e., by considering them in a way that does not pertain to the investigations of philosophy, but because in treating them they pay no attention to substance, as though they were completely unmindful of it despite the fact that it is the first thing which the philosopher ought to consider.

572. An indication (311).

Then he gives a second argument to prove the same point. This argument employs an example and runs thus: dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher inasmuch as they resemble him in some respect. But the dialectician and sophist dispute about the above-mentioned attributes. Therefore the philosopher should also consider them. In support of his first premise he shows how dialectics and sophistry resemble philosophy and how they differ from it.

573. Dialectics resembles philosophy in that it is also the office of the dialectician to consider all things. But this could not be the case unless he considered all things insofar as they agree in some one respect; because each science has one subject, and each art has one matter on which it operates. Therefore, since all things agree only in being, evidently the subject matter of dialectics is being and those attributes which belong to being; and this is what the philosopher also investigates. And sophistry likewise resembles philosophy; for sophistry has “the semblance of wisdom,” or is apparent wisdom, without being wisdom. Now anything that takes on the appearance of something else must resemble it in some way. Therefore the philosopher, the dialectician and the sophist must consider the same thing.

574. Yet they differ from each other. The philosopher differs from the dialectician in power, because the consideration of the philosopher is more efficacious than that of the dialectician. For the philosopher proceeds demonstratively in dealing with the common attributes mentioned above, and thus it is proper to him to have scientific knowledge of these attributes. And he actually knows them with certitude, for certain or scientific knowledge is the effect of demonstration. The dialectician, however, proceeds to treat all of the above-mentioned common attributes from probable premises, and thus he does not acquire scientific knowledge of them but a kind of opinion. The reason for this difference is that there are

two kinds of beings: beings of reason and real beings. The expression being of reason is applied properly to those notions which reason derives from the objects it considers, for example, the notions of genus, species and the like, which are not found in reality but are a natural result of the consideration of reason. And this kind of being, i.e., being of reason, constitutes the proper subject of logic. But intellectual conceptions of this kind are equal in extension to real beings, because all real beings fall under the consideration of reason. Hence the subject of logic extends to all things to which the expression real being is applied. His conclusion is, then, that the subject of logic is equal in extension to the subject of philosophy, which is real being.

Now the philosopher proceeds from the principles of this kind of being to prove the things that have to be considered about the common accidents of this kind of being. But the dialectician proceeds to consider them from the conceptions of reason, which are extrinsic to reality. Hence it is said that dialectics is in search of knowledge, because in searching it is proper to proceed from extrinsic principles.

575. But the philosopher differs from the sophist “in the choice,” i.e., in the selection or willing, or in the desire, of a way of life. For the philosopher and sophist direct their life and actions to different things. The philosopher directs his to knowing the truth, whereas the sophist directs his so as to appear to know what he does not.

576. Now although it is said that philosophy is scientific knowledge, and that dialectics and sophistry are not, this still does not do away with the possibility of dialectics and sophistry being sciences. For dialectics can be considered both from the viewpoint of theory and from that of practice. (1) From the viewpoint of theory it studies these conceptions and establishes the method by which one proceeds from them to demonstrate with probability the conclusions of the particular sciences; and it does this demonstratively, and to this extent it is a science. (2) But from the viewpoint of practice it makes use of the above method so as to reach certain probable conclusions in the particular sciences; and in this respect it falls short of the scientific method.

The same must be said of sophistry, because from the viewpoint of theory it treats by means of necessary and demonstrative arguments the method of arguing to apparent truth. From the viewpoint of practice, however, it falls short of the process of true argumentation.

577. But that part of logic which is said to be demonstrative is concerned only with theory, and the practical application of it belongs to philosophy and to the other particular sciences, which are concerned with real beings. This is because the practical aspect of the demonstrative part of logic consists in using the principles of things, from which proceeds demonstration (which properly belongs to the sciences that deal with real beings), and not in using the conceptions of logic.

Thus it appears that some parts of logic are at the same time scientific, theoretical, and practical, as exploratory dialectics and sophistry; and one is concerned with theory and not practice, namely, demonstrative logic.

578. Further, one corresponding (313).

Then he gives the third argument in support of his thesis. It runs as follows: everything that is reducible to unity and being should be considered by the philosopher, whose function is to study unity and being. But all contraries are reducible to unity and being. Therefore all contraries belong to the consideration of the philosopher, whose function is to study unity and being.

579. Then he proves that all contraries are reducible to unity and being. He does this, first, with regard to being; and he proceeds thus: of any two contraries which the philosophers posited as the principles of things, as is said in Book I (62:C 132), one contrary is always the correlative of the other and is related to it as its privation. This is clear from the fact that one of two contraries is always something imperfect when compared with the other, and thus implies some privation of the perfection of the other. But a privation is a kind of negation, as was stated above (306:C 564), and thus is a non-being. Hence it is clear that all contraries are reducible to being and non-being.

580. He also shows by an example that all contraries are reducible to unity and plurality. For rest or repose is reducible to unity, since that is said to be at rest which is in the same condition now as it was before, as is stated in Book VI of the Physics. And motion is reducible to plurality, because whatever is in motion is in a different condition now than it was before, and this implies plurality.

581. And almost all (314).

Then he uses another argument to show that contraries are reducible to being. Both the principles of things and the things composed of them belong to the same study. But the philosophers admit that contraries are the principles of being as being; for all say that beings and the substances of beings are composed of contraries, as was stated in Book I of the Physics and in the first book of this work (62:C 132). Yet while they agree on this point, that the principles of beings are contraries, still they differ as to the contraries which they give. For some give the even and odd, as the Pythagoreans; others the hot and cold, as Parmenides; others "the end" or terminus "and the unlimited," i.e., the finite and infinite, as did the same Pythagoreans (for they attributed limitedness and unlimitedness to the even and the odd, as is stated in Book I (59:C 124); and still others gave friendship and strife, as Empedocles. Hence it is clear that contraries are reducible to the study of being.

582. And all the other (315).

He says that the above-mentioned contraries are redudible not only to being but also to unity and plurality. This is evident. For oddness by reason of its indivisibility is affiliated with unity, and evenness by reason of its divisibility has a natural connection with plurality. Thus end or limit pertains to unity, which is the terminus of every process of resolution, and lack of limit pertains to plurality, which may be increased to infinity. Again, friendship also clearly pertains to unity, and strife to plurality. And heat pertains to unity inasmuch as it can unite homogeneous things, whereas cold pertains to plurality inasmuch as it can separate them. Further, not only these contraries are reducible in this way to unity and plurality, but so also are the others. Yet this "reduction," or introduction, to unity and plurality let us now accept or "take for granted," i.e., let us now assume it, because to examine each set of contraries would be a lengthy undertaking.

583. Next he shows that all contraries are reducible to unity and being. For it is certain that all principles, inasmuch as they have to do "with other things" i.e., the things composed of them, fall under unity and being as their genera, not in the sense that they truly are genera, but in the sense that they bear some likeness to genera by reason of what they have in common. Hence, if all contraries are principles or things composed of principles, they must be reducible to unity and being.Thus it is clear that he shows that contraries are reducible to being for two reasons: first, because of the nature of privation, and second, by reason of the fact that contraries are principles. He shows that they are reducible to unity by giving an example and by

using a process of reduction. Last, he shows that they are reducible to unity and being inasmuch as they have the character of genera.

584. It is clear (316).

Here he proves in a converse way that this science considers being because it considers the things mentioned above. His argument is this: all beings are reducible to contraries because they are either contraries or composed of contraries. And contraries are reducible to unity and plurality because unity and plurality are the principles of contraries. But unity and plurality belong to one science, philosophy. Therefore it is the office of this science to consider being as being. Yet it must be noted that all the contraries mentioned above fall under the consideration of one science whether they are used "in one sense," i.e., univocally, or not, as perhaps is the case. However, even if the term one is used in many senses, all the others, i.e., all the other senses, are reducible to one primary sense. Hence, even if unity or being is not one universal, like a genus, as was stated above (whether a universal is said to be a one-in-all, as we maintain, or something separate from things, as Plato thought, and as is presumably not the case), still each is used in a primary and a secondary sense. And the same holds true in the case of other terms, for some senses are referred to one primary sense, and others are secondary with respect to that primary sense. An adverb designating uncertainty is used inasmuch as we are now assuming things that will be proved below.

585. But nevertheless it must be borne in mind that the statement which he made, that all beings are either contraries or composed of contraries, he did not give as his own opinion but as one which he took from the ancient philosophers; for unchangeable beings are not contraries or composed of contraries. And this is why Plato did not posit any contrariety in the unchangeable sensible substances; for he attributed unity to form and contrariety to matter. But the ancient philosophers claimed that only sensible substances exist and that these must contain contrariety inasmuch as they are changeable.

586. And for this reason (317)

Then he draws a corollary from what has been said. He says that it is not the province of geometry to investigate the foregoing things, which are accidents of being as being, i.e., to investigate what a contrary is, or what the perfect is, and so on. But if a geometer were to consider them, he would “assume them,” i.e., presuppose their truth, inasmuch as he would take them over from some prior philosopher from whom he accepts them insofar as they are necessary for his own subject matter. What is said about geometry must be understood to apply also in the case of any other particular science.

587. It is evident (318).

He now summarizes the points established above. He says that obviously the consideration of being as being and the attributes which belong to it of itself pertain to one science. Thus it is clear that that science considers not only substances but also accidents since being is predicated of both. And it considers the things which have been discussed, namely, sameness and otherness, likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality, privation and negation, and contraries-which we said above are the proper accidents of being. And it considers not only those things which fall under the consideration of this science, about which demonstration was made individually by means of arguments based on proper principles, but it in like manner also considers prior and subsequent, genus and species, whole and part, and other things of this kind, because these too are accidents of being as being.

LESSON 5

Answers to Questions Raised in Book III about Principles of Demonstration

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1005a 19-1005b 8

319. Moreover, it is necessary to state whether it is the office of one science or of different sciences to inquire about those principles which are called axioms in mathematics, and about substance.

320. Now it is evident that it is the office of one science—that of the philosopher—to investigate these.

321. For these principles apply to all beings and not to some class distinct from the others. And all men employ them, because they pertain to being as being; for each class is being. But they employ them just so far as to satisfy their needs, i.e., so far as the class contains the things about which they form demonstrations. Hence, since it is evident that these principles pertain to all things inasmuch as they are beings (for this is what they have in common), the investigation of them belongs to him who considers being as being.

322. Hence no one who is making a special inquiry attempts to say anything about their truth or falsity, neither the geometer nor the arithmetician.

323. However, some of the philosophers of nature have done this, and with reason; for they thought that they alone were inquiring about the whole of nature and about being. But since there is one kind of thinker who is

superior to the philosopher of nature (for nature is only one class of being), the investigation of these principles will belong to him who studies the universal and deals with first substance. The philosophy of nature is a kind of wisdom, but it is not the first.

324. And whatever certain ones of 1 those who speak about the truth attempt to say concerning the way in which it must be accepted, they do this through ignorance of analytics. For they must know these principles in order to attain scientific knowledge and not be seeking them when they are learning a science.

325. It is evident, then, that it is also the business of the philosopher, i.e., of him who investigates all substance insofar as its nature permits, to investigate all syllogistic principles.

COMMENTARY

THIS SCIENCE CONSIDERS THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION.

588. Here he answers another question raised in Book III (387): whether it belongs to this science to consider the first principles of demonstration. This is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that it belongs to this science to make a general study of all these principles; and in the second (596) he shows that it also belongs to it to make a special study of the first of these principles (“And it is fitting”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he raises the question whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to consider substance and the principles which are called axioms in the mathematical sciences. He assigns these principles more to the mathematical sciences because such sciences have more certain demonstrations and use these self-evident principles in a more manifest way inasmuch as they refer all of their demonstrations to them.

589. Now it is evident (320).

Second, he answers this question by saying that a single science investigates both of the foregoing things, and that this is the philosophy with which we are now concerned.

590. For these principles (321).

Third, he proves his proposed answer, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he proves it. Second (595), he introduces his main conclusion

(“It is evident”).

Now he proves his proposed answer in two ways. He does this, first, by an argument; and second (592), by an example (“Hence no one”).

The argument is as follows: whatever principles pertain to all beings, and not just to one class of beings distinct from the others, belong to the consideration of the philosopher. But the above-mentioned principles are of this kind. Therefore they belong to the consideration of the philosopher. He proves the minor premise as follows. Those principles which all sciences use pertain to being as being. But first principles are principles of this kind. Therefore they pertain to being as being.

591. The reason which he gives for saying that all sciences use these principles is that the subject genus of each science has being predicated of it. Now the particular sciences do not use the foregoing principles insofar as they are common principles, i.e., as extending to all beings, but insofar as they have need of them; that is, insofar as they extend to the things contained in the class of beings which constitutes the subject of a particular science about which it makes demonstrations. For example, the philosophy of nature uses them insofar as they extend to changeable beings and no further.

592. Hence no one (322).

Then he proves what he had said by using an example. First, he introduces the proof; and second (593), he rejects a false notion held by some men (“However, some”).

He accordingly says, first, that no one whose chief intention is to hand down scientific knowledge of some particular being has attempted to say anything about the truth or falsity of first principles. Neither the geometer nor the arithmetician does this even though they make the greatest use of these principles, as was said above (588). Hence it is evident that the investigation of these principles belongs to this science.

593. However, some (323).

Here he rejects the false notion held by some men, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he rejects the false notion of those who occupied themselves with these principles even though they did not concern them. Second, (594), he rejects the false notion of those who wanted to deal with these principles in a different way than they should be dealt with.

He accordingly says, first, that even though none of the particular sciences ought to deal with the above-mentioned principles, nevertheless some of the natural philosophers have dealt with them; and they did so not without reason. For the ancients did not think that there was any substance besides the changeable corporeal substance with which the philosophy of nature is concerned. Hence they believed that they alone established the truth about the whole of nature and therefore about being, and thus about first principles, which must be considered along with being. But this is false, because there is still a science which is superior to the science of nature. For nature itself, i.e., natural being, which has its own principle of motion, constitutes in itself one class of universal being.

But not every being is of this kind, because it has been proved in the Physics, Book VIII, that an unchangeable being exists. Now this unchangeable being is superior to and nobler than changeable being, with which the philosophy of nature is concerned. And since the consideration of common being belongs to that science which studies the primary kind of being, then the consideration of common being belongs to a different science than the philosophy of nature. And the consideration of common principles of this kind will also belong to this science. For the philosophy of nature is a part of philosophy but not the first part, which considers common being and those attributes which belong to being as being.

594. And whatever (324).

Then he rejects the other false notion, which concerns the way in which such principles should be treated. For some men investigated these principles with the aim of demonstrating them. And whatever they said about the truth of these principles, i.e., how they must be accepted as true by force of demonstration, or how the truth found in all these principles must be reached, they did through ignorance of, or lack of skill in, “analytics,” which is that part of logic in which the art of demonstration is treated. For “they must know these principles in order to attain scientific knowledge”; i.e., every science acquired by demonstration depends on these principles.

But “those who are learning,” i.e., the pupils who are being instructed in some science, must not seek these principles as something to be demonstrated. Or, according to another text, “those who have scientific knowledge must attain science from these principles”; i.e., those who attain knowledge by demonstration must come to know common principles of this kind and not ask that they be demonstrated to them.

595. It is evident (325).

He draws the conclusion primarily intended, namely, that it will be the function of the philosopher to consider every substance as such and also the first syllogistic principles. In order to make this clear it must be noted that self-evident propositions are those which are known as soon as their terms are known, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. This occurs in the case of those propositions in which the predicate is given in the definition of the subject, or is the same as the subject. But it happens that one kind of proposition, even though it is self-evident in itself, is still not self-evident to all, i.e., to those who are ignorant of the definition of both the subject and the predicate. Hence Boethius says in De Hebdomadibus that there are some propositions which are self-evident to the learned but not to all. Now those are self-evident to all whose terms are comprehended by all. And common principles are of this kind, because our knowledge proceeds from common principles to proper ones, as is said in Book I of the Physics. Hence those propositions which are composed of such common terms as whole and part (for example, every whole is greater than one of its parts) and of such terms as equal and unequal (for example, things equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other), constitute the first principles of demonstration. And the same is true of similar terms. Now since common terms of this kind belong to the consideration of the philosopher, then it follows that these principles also fall within his scope. But the philosopher does not establish the truth of these principles (~) by way of demonstration, but (+) by considering the meaning of their terms. For example, he considers what a whole is and what a part is; and the same applies to the rest. And when the meaning of these terms becomes known, it follows that the truth of the above-mentioned principles becomes evident.

LESSON 6

First Philosophy Must Examine the First Principle of Demonstration. The Nature of This Principle. The Errors about It

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 3 & 4: 1005b 8-1006a 18

326. And it is fitting that the person who is best informed about each class of things should be able to state the firmest principles of his subject. Hence he who understands beings as beings should be able to state the firmest principles of all things. This person is the philosopher.

327. And the firmest of all principles is that about which it is impossible to make a mistake; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men make mistakes about things which they do not know) and not hypothetical. For the principle which everyone must have who understands anything about beings is not hypothetical; and that which everyone must know who knows anything must be had by him when he comes to his subject. It is evident, then, that such a principle is the firmest of all.

328. And let us next state what this principle is. It is that the same attribute cannot both belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time and in the same respect; and let us stipulate any other qualifications that have to be laid down to meet dialectical difficulties. Now this is the firmest of all principles, since it answers to the definition given; for it is impossible for anyone to think that the same thing both is and is not, although some are of the opinion that Heraclitus speaks in this way; for

what a man says he does not necessarily accept. But if it is impossible for contraries to belong simultaneously to the same subject (and let us then suppose that the same things are established here as in the usual proposition), and if one opinion which expresses the contradictory of another is contrary to it, evidently the same man at the same time cannot think that the same thing can both be and not be; for one who is mistaken on this point will have contrary opinions at the same time. And it is for this reason that all who make demonstrations reduce their argument to this ultimate position. For this is by nature the starting point of all the other axioms.

Chapter 4

329. Now as we have said (328), there are some who claimed that the same thing can both be and not be, and that this can be believed. And many of those who treat of nature adopt this theory. But now we take it to be impossible for a thing both to be and not be at the same time, and by means of this we shall show that this is the firmest of all principles.

330. But some deem it fitting that even this principle should be demonstrated, and they do this through want of education. For not to know of what things one should seek demonstration and of what things one should not shows want of education. For it is altogether impossible that there should be demonstration of all things, because there would then be an infinite regress so that there would still be no demonstration. But if there are some things of which it is not necessary to seek demonstration, these people cannot say what principle they think to be more indemonstrable.

331. But even in this case it is possible to show by refutation that this view is impossible, if only our opponent will say something. But if he says nothing, it is ridiculous to look for a reason against one who has no reason, on the very point on which he is without reason; for such a man is really like a plant. Now I say that demonstration by refutation is different from demonstration [in the strict sense], because he who would demonstrate this principle in the strict sense would seem to beg the question. But when someone argues for the sake of convincing another there will be refutation, not demonstration.

COMMENTARY

THIS SCIENCE CONSIDERS PARTICULARLY THE VERY FIRST PRINCIPLE, THAT OF CONTRADICTION.

596. He shows here that it is the first philosopher who is chiefly concerned with the first principle of demonstration; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that it is the business of the first philosopher to consider this principle; and second (611), he begins to examine this principle.

In regard to the first he does three things.. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider the first principle of demonstration. Second (597), he indicates what this principle is. Third (606), he rejects certain errors regarding this same principle.

In regard to the first point he uses the following argument. In every class of things that man is best informed who knows the most certain principles, because the certitude of knowing depends on the certitude of principles. But the first philosopher is best informed and most certain in his knowledge; for this was one of the conditions of wisdom, as was made clear in the prologue of this work (35), namely, that he who knows the causes of things has the most certain knowledge. Hence the philosopher ought to consider the most certain and firmest principles of beings, which he considers as the subject-genus proper to himself.

597. And the firmest (327).

Then he shows what the firmest or most certain principle is; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he states the conditions for the most certain principle; and then (600) he shows how they fit a single principle (“And let us”).

He accordingly gives, first, the three conditions for the firmest principle. (1) The first is that no one can make a mistake or be in error regarding it. And this is evident because, since men make mistakes only about those things which they do not know, then that principle about which no one can be mistaken must be the one which is best known.

598. (2) The second condition is that it must “not be hypothetical,” i.e., it must not be held as a supposition, as those things which are maintained through some kind of common agreement. Hence another translation reads “And they should not hold a subordinate place,” i.e., those principles which

are most certain should not be made dependent on anything else. And this is true, because whatever is necessary for understanding anything at all about being "is not hypothetical," i.e., it is not a supposition but must be self-evident. And this is true because whatever is necessary for understanding anything at all must be known by anyone who knows other things.

599. (3) The third condition is that it is not acquired (~) by demonstration or by any similar method, but (+) it comes in a sense by nature to the one having it inasmuch as it is naturally known and not acquired. For first principles become known through the natural light of the agent intellect, and they are not acquired by any process of reasoning but by having their terms become known. This comes about by reason of the fact that memory is derived from sensible things, experience from memory, and knowledge of those terms from experience. And when they are known, common propositions of this kind, which are the principles of the arts and sciences, become known.

Hence it is evident that the most certain or firmest principle should be such that there can be no error regarding it; that it is not hypothetical; and that it comes naturally to the one having it.

600. And let us next (328).

Then he indicates the principle to which the above definition applies. He says that it applies to this principle, as the one which is firmest: it is impossible for the same attribute both to belong and not belong to the same subject at the same time. And it is necessary to add "in the same respect"; and any other qualifications that have to be given regarding this principle "to meet dialectical difficulties" must be laid down, since without these qualifications there would seem to be a contradiction when there is none.

601. That this principle must meet the conditions given above he shows as follows: (1) It is impossible for anyone to think, or hold as an opinion, that the same thing both is and is not at the same time, although some believe that Heraclitus was of this opinion. But while it is true that Heraclitus spoke in this way, he could not think that this is true; for it is not necessary that everything that a person says he should mentally an opinion.

602. But if one were to say that it is possible for someone to think that the same thing both is and is not at the same time, this absurd consequence follows: contraries could belong to the same subject at the same time. And "let us suppose that the same things are established," or shown, here as in

the usual proposition established in our logical treatises. For it was shown at the end of the Peri hermineas I that contrary opinions are not those which have to do with contraries but those which have to do with contradictories, properly speaking. For when one person thinks that Socrates is white and another thinks that he is black, these are not contrary opinions in the primary and proper sense; but contrary opinions are had when one person thinks that Socrates is white and another thinks that he is not white.

603. Therefore, if someone were to think that two contradictories are true at the same time by thinking that the same thing both is and is not at the same time, he will have contrary opinions at the same time; and thus contraries will belong to the same thing at the same time. But this is impossible. It is impossible, then, for anyone to be mistaken in his own mind about these things and to think that the same thing both is and is not at the same time. And it is for this reason that all demonstrations reduce their propositions to this proposition as the ultimate opinion common to all; for this proposition is by nature the starting point and axiom of all axioms.

604. (2 & 3) The other two conditions are therefore evident, because, insofar as those making demonstrations reduce all their arguments to this principle as the ultimate one by referring them to it, evidently this principle is not based on an assumption. Indeed, insofar as it is by nature a starting point, it clearly comes unsought to the one having it and is not acquired by his own efforts.

605. Now for the purpose of making this evident it must be noted that, since the intellect has two operations, one by which it knows quiddities, which is called the understanding of indivisibles, and another by which it combines and separates, there is something first in both operations. In the first operation the first thing that the intellect conceives is being, and in this operation nothing else can be conceived unless being is understood.

And because this principle—it is impossible for a thing both to be and not be at the same time—depends on the understanding of being (just as the principle, every whole is greater than one of its parts, depends on the understanding of whole and part), then this principle is by nature also the first in the second operation of the intellect, i.e., in the act of combining and separating. And no one can understand anything by this intellectual operation unless this principle is understood. For just as a whole and its parts are understood only by understanding being, in a similar way the principle that every whole is greater than one of its parts is understood only if the firmest principle is understood.

606. Now as we have said (329).

Then he shows how some men erred regarding this principle; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he touches on the error of those who rejected the foregoing principle; and second (607) he deals with those who wished to demonstrate it (“But some”).

He accordingly says that some men as was stated above about Heraclitus (601), said that the same thing can both be and not be at the same time, and that it is possible to hold this opinion; and many of the philosophers of nature adopt this position, as will be made clear below (665). For our part, however, we now take as evident that the principle in question is true, i.e., the principle that the same thing cannot both be and not be; but from its truth we show that it is most certain. For from the fact that a thing cannot both be and not be it follows that contraries cannot belong to the same subject, as will be said below (663). And from the fact that contraries cannot belong to a subject at the same time it follows that a man cannot have contrary opinions and, consequently, that he cannot think that contradictories are true, as has been shown (603).

607. But some (330).

Then he mentions the error of certain men who wished to demonstrate the above-mentioned principle; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that it cannot be demonstrated in the strict sense; and second (608), that it can be demonstrated in a way (“But even”).

Thus he says, first , that certain men deem it fitting, i.e., they wish, to demonstrate this principle; and they do this “through want of education,” i.e., through lack of learning or instruction. For there is want of education when a man does not know what to seek demonstration for and what not to; for not all things can be demonstrated. For if all things were demonstrable, then, since a thing is not demonstrated through itself but through something else, demonstrations would either be circular (although this cannot be true, because then the same thing would be both better known and less well known, as is clear in Book I of the Posterior Analytics, or they would have to proceed to infinity. But if there were an infinite regress in demonstrations, demonstration would be impossible, because the conclusion of any demonstration is made certain by reducing it to the first principle of demonstration. But this would not be the case if demonstration proceeded to infinity in an upward direction. It is clear, then, that not all things are demonstrable. And if some things are not demonstrable, these men cannot say that any principle is more indemonstrable than the above-mentioned one.

608. But even in this case (331).

Here he shows that the above-mentioned principle can be demonstrated in a certain respect. He says that it may be demonstrated by disproof. In Greek the word is evlegktikw/j, which is better translated as by refutation, for an e;legkoj is a syllogism that establishes the contradictory of a proposition, and so is introduced to refute some false position. And on these grounds it can be shown that it is impossible for the same thing both to be and not be.

But this kind of argument can be employed only if the one who denies that principle because of difficulties “says something,” i.e., if he signifies something by a word. But if he says nothing, it is ridiculous to look for a reason against one who does not make use of reason in speaking; for in this dispute anyone who signifies nothing will be like a plant, for even brute animals signify something by such signs.

609. For it is one thing to give a strict demonstration of this principle, and another to demonstrate it argumentatively or by refutation. For if anyone wished to give a strict demonstration of this principle, he would seem to be begging the question, because any principle that he could take for the purpose of demonstrating this one would be one of those that depend on the truth of this principle, as is clear from what has been said above (330:C 607). But when the demonstration is not of this kind, i.e., demonstration in the strict sense, there will then be disproof or refutation at most.

610. Another text states this better by saying, “But when one argues for the sake of convincing another, there will then be refutation but not demonstration”; i.e., when a process of this kind from a less well known to a better known principle is employed for the sake of convincing another man who denies this, there will then be disproof or refutation but not demonstration; i.e., it will be possible to have a syllogism which contradicts his view, since what is less known absolutely is admitted by the opponent, and thus it will be possible to proceed to demonstrate the above-mentioned principle so far as the man is concerned but not in the strict sense.

LESSON 7

Contradictories Cannot Be True at the Same Time

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1006a 18-1007b 18

332. The starting point of all such discussions is not the desire that someone shall state that something either is or is not, for this might perhaps be thought to be begging the question, but that he shall state something significant both for himself and for someone else; for this he must do if he is to say anything. For if he does not, no discussion will be possible for such a person either with himself or with another. But if anyone will grant this, demonstration will be possible; for there will already be something definite. But this will not have the effect of demonstrating but of upholding, for he who destroys reason upholds reason.

333. First of all, then, it is evident that this at least is true, that the term to be or not to be signifies something, so that not everything will be so and not so.

334. Again, if the term man signifies one thing, let this be a twofooted animal.

335. Now by signifying one thing I mean this: granted that man is a twofooted animal, then if something is a man, this will be what being a man is. And it makes no difference even if someone were to say that this term signifies many things, provided that there are a definite number; for a different term might be assigned to each concept. I mean, for example, that

if one were to say that the term man signifies not one thing but many, one of which would have a single concept, namely, two-footed animal, there might still be many others, if only there are a limited number; for a particular term might be assigned to each concept. However, if this were not the case, but one were to say that a term signifies an infinite number of things, evidently reasoning would be impossible; for not to signify one thing is to signify nothing. And if words signify nothing, there will be no discourse with another or even with ourselves. For it is impossible to understand anything unless one understands one thing; but if this does happen, a term may be assigned to this thing. Let it be assumed, then, as we said at the beginning (332), that a term signifies something, and that it signifies one thing.

336. It is impossible, then, that being a man should mean not being a man, if the term man not only signifies something about one subject but also signifies one thing. For we do not think it fitting to identify signifying one thing with signifying something about one subject, since the terms musical, white and man would then signify one thing. And therefore all things would be one, because all would be synonymous. And it will be impossible to be and not to be the same thing, except in an equivocal sense, as occurs if one whom we call man others call not-man. But the problem is not whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man in name, but whether it can in fact.

337. Now if man and not-man do not signify something different, it is evident that not being a man will not differ from being a man. Thus being a man will be identical with not being a man, for they will be one thing. For being one means this: being related as clothing and garment are, if they are taken in the same sense. And if being a man and not being a man are to be one, they must signify one thing. But it has been shown that they signify different things.

338. Therefore, if it is true to say that something is a man, it must be a two-footed animal, for this is what the term man signifies. But if this is necessary, it is impossible for this very thing not to be a two-footed animal; for this is what to-be-necessary means, namely, unable not to be. Hence it cannot be true to say that the same thing is and is not a man at the same time. The same argument also applies to not being a man.

339. For being a man and not being a man signify different things, since being white and being a man are different; for there is much greater

opposition in the former case, so that they signify different things. And if one were to say also that white signifies the same thing as man and is one in concept, we shall say the same thing as was said before (335), namely, that all things are one, and not merely opposites. But if this is impossible, then what has been said will follow.

340. That is to say, it will follow if our opponent answers the question. And if in giving a simple answer to the question he also adds the negations, he is not answering the question. For there is nothing to prevent the same thing from being man and white and a thousand other things numerically. Still if one asks whether it is or is not true to say that this is a man, his opponent should reply by stating something that means one thing and not add that it is also white or black or large. Indeed, it is impossible to enumerate the accidents of being, which are infinite in number; so therefore let him enumerate either all or none. Similarly, even if the same thing is a thousand times a man and a not-man, he must not, in answering the question whether this is a man, add that it is also at the same time a not-man, unless he also gives all the other corresponding accidents, whatever are so or are not so. And if he does not do this, there will be no debate with him.

341. And those who say this do away completely with substance or essence, for they must say that all attributes are accidents, and that there is no such thing as being a man or being an animal. For if there is to be such a thing as being a man, this will not be being a not-man or not being a man; in fact these are the negations of it. For there was one thing which the term signified, and this was the substance of something. And to signify the substance of a thing is to signify that its being is not something else. And if being essentially a man is being essentially a not-man, then the being of man will be something else. Hence they are compelled to say that nothing will have such a concept as this, but that all attributes are accidental. For this distinguishes substance from accident; for white is an accident of man, because while some man is white he is not the essence of whiteness.

342. Moreover, if all attributes are accidental predicates, there will be no first universal. And if the accidental always implies a predication about some subject, the process must go on to infinity. But this is impossible; for not more than two terms are combined in accidental predication. For an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accidents of the

same subject. I mean, for example, that white is an accident of musical and musical of white' only because both are accidental to man; but Socrates is not musical in the sense that both are accidental to something else. Therefore, since some accidents are predicated in the latter and some in the former sense, all those that are predicated as white is predicated of Socrates cannot form an infinite series in an upward direction so that there should be another accident of white Socrates; for no one thing results from all of these. Nor again will white have another accident, such as musical; for this is no more an accident of that than that of this. And at the same time it has been established that some things are accidents in this sense and some in the sense that musical is an accident of Socrates. And whatever attributes are predicated accidentally in the latter sense are not accidents of accidents but only those predicated in the former sense. Not all attributes, then, are said to be accidents; and thus there must be some term which also signifies substance. And if this is so, then we have proved that contradictories cannot be predicated at the same time of the same subject.

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611. Here he begins to argue dialectically against those who deny the foregoing principle, and this is divided into two parts. In the first (332:C 611) he argues against those who say that contradictories are true at the same time; and in the second (383:C 720), against those who say that they are false at the same time ("Neither can there be").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues in a general way against those who make the aforesaid errors. Second (353:C 663), he shows how we must argue specifically against different positions ("But the same method").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues dialectically against the reasoning of those who deny the foregoing principle. Second (352:C 661), he shows that Protagoras' opinion is fundamentally the same as the one just mentioned ("The doctrine of Protagoras").

In regard to the first point he gives seven arguments. He gives the second (341:C 624) at the words "And those who"; the third (343:C 636) at "Furthermore, if all"; the fourth (347:C 642) at "Again, either this"; the fifth (348:C 652) at “Again, how”; the sixth (349:C 654) at “It is most evident”; and the seventh (351:C 65.9) at “Further, even if all.”

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he indicates the starting point from which one must proceed to argue against those who deny the first principle. Second (333:C 612), he proceeds to argue from that starting point (“First of all, then”).

He therefore says, first (332), that with respect to all such unreasonable positions there is no need for us to take as a starting point that someone `wishes to suppose that this thing definitely is “or is not”; i.e., it is not necessary to take as a starting point some proposition in which some attribute is either affirmed or denied of a subject (for this would be a begging of the question, as was said above [331:C 609]), but it is necessary to take as a starting point that a term signifies something both to the one who utters it, inasmuch as he himself understands what he is saying, and to someone else who hears him. But if such a person does not admit this, he will not say anything meaningful either for himself or for someone else, and it will then be idle to dispute with him. But when he has admitted this, a demonstration

will at once be possible against him; for there is straightway found to be something definite and determinate which is signified by the term distinct from its contradictory, as will become clear below. Yet this will not strictly be a demonstration of the foregoing principle but only an argument upholding this principle against those who deny it. For he who “destroys reason,” i.e., his own intelligible expression, by saying that a term signifies nothing, must uphold its significance, because he can only express what he denies by speaking and by signifying something.

612. First of all, then (333).

He proceeds from the assumption he had made to prove what he intends. First, he deals with one particular case; and second (334:C 612), he treats all cases in a general way (“Again, if the term”).

He accordingly says, first (333), that if a term signifies something, it will be evident first of all that this proposition will be true, and that its contradictory, which he denies, will be false; and thus this at least will be true, that not every affirmation is true together with its negation.

613. Now by signifying (535).

Then he shows that this applies universally to all cases, namely, that contradictories are not true at the same time. In regard to this he does four things. First, he makes certain assumptions which are necessary for drawing his intended conclusion. Second (338:C 620), he draws his conclusion ("Therefore, if it is true"). Third (339:C 622), he proves one assumption which he had made ("For being a man"). Fourth (340:C 623), he rejects a quibble ("That is to say").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that a term signifies one thing; and second (336:C 616), he shows from this that the term man signifies what being a man is, but not what it is not ("It is impossible, then"). Third (337:C 61g), he shows that the term man signifies one thing ("Now if man").

He accordingly says, first (335), that if the term man signifies one thing, let this be two-footed animal. For a term is said to signify this one thing which is the definition of the thing signified by the term, so that if "twofooted animal" is the being of man, i.e., if this is what the essence of man is, this will be what is signified by the term man.

614. But if one were to say that a term signifies many things, it will signify either a finite or an infinite number of them. But if it signifies a finite number, it will differ in no way, according to another translation, from the term which is assumed to signify one thing; for it signifies many finite concepts of different things, and different terms can be fitted to each single concept. For example, if the term man were to signify many concepts, and the concept two-footed animal is one of them, one term is assigned to the concept man. And if there are many other concepts, many other terms may be assigned so long as those concepts are finite in number. Thus he will be forced back to the first position, that a term signifies one thing.

615. But if a term does not signify a finite but an infinite number of concepts, evidently neither reasoning nor debate will be possible. This becomes clear as follows: any term that does not signify one thing signifies nothing. This is proved thus: terms signify something understood, and therefore if nothing is understood, nothing is signified. But if one thing is not understood, nothing is understood, because anyone who understands anything must distinguish it from other things. If a term does not signify one thing, then, it signifies nothing at all; and if terms signify nothing, discourse will be impossible, both the kind which establishes truth and the

kind which refutes an assertion. Hence it is clear that, if terms signify an infinite number of things, neither reasoning nor dispute will be possible. But if it is possible to understand one thing, a term may be given to it. So let it be held then that a term signifies something.

616. It is impossible (336).

He proves the second point, namely, that the term man does not signify not being a man; for a term that signifies one thing signifies not only what is one in subject (and is therefore said to be one because it is predicated of one subject) but what is one absolutely, i.e., in concept. For if we wanted to say that a term signifies one thing because it signifies the attributes which are verified of one thing, it would then follow that the terms musical, white and man all signify one thing, since all are verified of one thing. And from this it would follow that all things are one; for if white is predicated of man and is therefore identical with him, then when it is also predicated of a stone it will be identical with a stone; and since those things which are identical with one and the same thing are identical with each other, it would follow that a man and a stone are one thing and have one concept. Thus the result would be that all terms are univocal, i.e., one in concept, or synonymous, as another text says, i.e., meaning absolutely the same thing in subject and in concept.

617. Now although being and nonbeing are verified of the same subject according to those who deny the first principle, still being a man and not being a man must differ in concept, just as white and musical differ in concept even though they are verified of the same subject. Hence it is evident that being and non-being cannot be the same in concept and in subject in the sense that they are signified by one univocal term.

618. Now it must be noted that the expression being a man or to be a man or having the being of a man is taken here for the quiddity of man, and therefore it is concluded from this that the term man does not signify not being a man as its proper concept. But because he had said above (335:C 614) that the same term can signify many things according to different concepts, he therefore adds “except in an equivocal sense” in order to make clear that the term man does not signify in a univocal sense both being a man and not being a man, but it can signify both in an equivocal sense; i.e., in the sense that what we call man in one language others might call not-

man in another language. For we are not debating whether the same thing can both be and not be man in name, but whether it can in fact.

619. Now if man (337).

Then he proves the third point: that the terms man and not-man do not signify the same thing, and he uses the following argument. The term man signifies being a man or what man is, and the term not-man signifies not being a man or what man is not. If, then, man and not man do not signify something different, being a man will not differ from not being a man, or being a n6t-man, and therefore one of these will be predicated of the other. And they will also have one concept; for when we say that some terms signify one thing, we mean that they signify one concept, as the terms clothing and garment do. Hence, if being a man and not being a man are one in this way, i.e., in concept, there will then be one concept which will signify both being a man and not being a man. But it has been granted or demonstrated that the term which signifies each is different; for it has been shown that the term man signifies man and does not signify not-man. Thus it is clear that being a man and not being a man do not have a single concept, and therefore the thesis that man and not-man signify different things becomes evident.

620. Therefore, if it is true (338).

Here he proves his main thesis from the assumptions made earlier, and he uses the following argument. A man must be a two-footed animal, as is true from the foregoing, for this is the concept which the term man signifies. But what is necessary cannot not be; for this is what the term necessary means, namely, unable not to be, or incapable of not being, or impossible not to be. Hence it is not possible, or incapable, or impossible for man not to be a two-footed animal, and therefore it is evident that the affirmation and the negation cannot both be true; i.e., it cannot be true that man is both a two-footed animal and not a two-footed animal. The same reasoning based on the meanings of terms can be understood to apply to what is not-man, because what is not-man must be not a two-footed animal, since this is what the term signifies. Therefore it is impossible that a not-man should be a two-footed animal.

621. Now the things demonstrated above are useful to his thesis, because if someone were to think that the terms man and not-man might signify the same thing, or that the term man might signify both being a man and not

being a man, his opponent could deny the proposition that man must be a two-footed animal. For he could say that it is no more necessary to say that man must be a two-footed animal than to say that he is not a two-footed animal, granted that the terms man and not-man signify the same thing, or granted that the term man signifies both of these-being a man and not being a man.

622. For being a man (339)

Then he proves one of the assumptions which he had made; for in order to prove that the term man does not signify not being a man, he assumed that being a man and not being a man are different, even though they might be verified of the same subject. His aim here is to prove this by the following argument. There is greater opposition between being a man and not being a man than between man and white; but man and white have different concepts, although they may be the same in subject. Therefore being a man and not being a man also have different concepts. He proves the minor thus: if all attributes which are predicated of the same subject have the same concept and are signified by one term, it follows that all are one, as has been stated and explained (336:C 616). Now if this is impossible, the position we have maintained follows, namely, that being a man and not being a man are different. And for this reason the final conclusion given above will follow, namely, that man is a two-footed animal, and that it is impossible for him to be what is not a two-footed animal.

623. That is to say (340).

He rejects one quibble by which the foregoing process of reasoning could be obstructed. For when an opponent has been asked whether man must be a two-footed animal, he need not reply either affirmatively or negatively but could say that man must be both a two-footed animal and not a two-footed animal. But the philosopher rejects this here, saying that the foregoing conclusion follows so long as an opponent wishes to give a simple answer to the question. But if in giving a simple answer to the question on the side of the affirmative he also wishes to include in his answer the negative aspect, he will not be answering the question. He proves this as follows. One and the same thing can be both a man and white and a thousand other things of this kind. Yet if it is asked here whether a man is white, we must give in our answer only what is signified by one word, and not add all the other attributes. For example, if one asks whether this is a man, we must answer that it is a man, and not add that it is both a man and white and large and the like; for we must give either all of the accidents of a thing at once or not. But not all accidents can be given at once since they are infinite in number; for there are an infinite number of accidents belonging to one and the same thing by reason of its relationship to an infinite number of antecedents and consequents, and what is infinite in number cannot be traversed. In answering the question, then, we must not give any of the attributes which are accidental to the thing about which the question is raised but only the attribute which is asked for. Hence, even if it is supposed a thousand times that man and not-man are the same, still, when the question is asked about man, the answer must not include anything about not-man, unless all those things which are accidental to man are given. And if this were done, no dispute would be possible, because it would never reach completion, since an infinite number of things cannot be traversed.

624. And those who (341).

Then he gives the second argument, and it is based on the notion of substantial and accidental predicates. This is his argument: if an affirmation and a negation are verified of the same subject, it follows that no term will be predicated quidditatively, or substantially, but only accidentally; and therefore there will have to be an infinite regress in accidental predicates. But the consequent is impossible, and thus the antecedent must be impossible.

625. In this argument he does two things. First, he gives a conditional proposition. Second (342:C 629), he gives a proof that destroys the consequent (“Moreover, if all”).

Regarding the first part he proceeds as follows. He says that those who state that an affirmation ind a negation may lie true at the same time completely do away with “substance,” i.e., with a

substantial predicate, “or essence,” i.e., with an essential predicate; for they must say “that all attributes are accidents,” or accidental predicates, and that there is no such thing as being a man or being an animal, and that what the quiddity of man or the quiddity of animal signifies does not exist.

626. He proves this as follows: if there is something which is being a man, i.e., which is the substantial essence of man, which is predicated of man, it will not be not being a man or being a not-man; for these two, i.e.,

not being a man and being a not-man, are the negations of being a man. It is clear, then, that an affirmation and a negation are not verified of the same subject, for not being a man or being a not-man is not verified of being a man.

627. And the assumption made, namely, that if there is such a thing as being a man, this will not be not being a man or being a not-man, he proves in the following way. It was posited and proved above that the thing which a term signifies is one. And it was also posited that the thing which a term signifies is the substance of something, namely, a thing's quiddity. Hence it is clear that some term signifies a thing's substance, and that the thing which was signified is not something else. Therefore, if the essence or quiddity of man should be either not being a man or being a not-man, it is quite clear that it would differ from itself. It would be necessary to say, then, that there is no definition signifying a thing's essence. But from this it would follow that all predicates are accidental ones.

628. For substance is distinguished from accident, i.e., a substantial predicate is distinguished from an accidental one, in that each thing is truly what is predicated substantially of it. Thus it cannot be said that a substantial predicate is not one thing, for each thing exists only if It is one. But man is said to be white because whiteness or white is one of his accidents, although not in such a way that he is the very essence of white or whiteness. It is not necessary, then, that an accidental predicate should be one only, but there can be many accidental predicates. A substantial predicate, however, is one only; and thus it is clear that what being a man is is not what not being a man is. But if a substantial predicate is both, it will no longer be one only, and thus will not be substantial but accidental.

629. Moreover, if all (342).

He destroys the consequent. He shows that it is impossible that all predicates should be accidental and none substantial because, if all were accidental, there would be no universal predicate. (And universal predicate here means the same thing as it does in the Posterior Analytics, i.e., an attribute which is predicated of something in virtue of itself and in reference to what it itself is). But this is impossible; for if one attribute is always predicated of another accidentally, there will be an infinite regress in accidental predication; but this is impossible for this reason.

630. For there are only two ways in which accidental predication occurs. One way is had when one accident is predicated accidentally of another; and this happens because both are accidents of the same subject, for example, when white is predicated of musical because both are accidents of man. The other way is had when an accident is predicated of a subject (as when Socrates is said to be musical), not because both are accidents of some other subject, but because one of them is an accident of the other. Hence, even though there are two ways in which accidents may be predicated, in neither way can there be an infinite regress in predication.

631. For it is clear that there cannot be an infinite regress in that way in which one accident is predicated of another, because one must reach some subject. For it has been stated already that the essential note of this kind of predication is that both accidents are predicated of one subject. And thus by descending from a predicate to a subject, the subject itself can be found to be the terminus.

632. And there cannot be an infinite regress in an upward direction in the way of predicating in which an accident is predicated of a subject, as when Socrates is said to be white, by ascending from a subject to a predicate so as to say that white is an accident of Socrates and that some other attribute is an accident of white Socrates. For this could occur only in two ways. One way would be that one thing would come from white and Socrates; and thus just as Socrates is one subject of whiteness, in a similar way white Socrates would be one subject of another accident. But this cannot be so, because one thing does not come from all of these predicates. For what is one in an absolute sense does not come from a substance and an accident in the way that one thing comes from a genus and a difference. Hence it cannot be said that white Socrates is one subject.

633. The other way would be that, just as Socrates is the subject of whiteness, in a similar way some other accident, such as musical, would have whiteness as its subject. But neither can this be so, and for two reasons. First, there can be no special reason why musical should be said to be an accident of white rather than the reverse; neither white nor musical will be prior to the other, but they will rather be of equal rank. Second, in conjunction with this it has been established or determined at the same time that this way of predicating in which an accident is predicated of an accident differs from that in which an accident is predicated of a subject, as

when musical is predicated of Socrates. But in the way of which he is now speaking accidental predication does not mean that an accident is predicated of an accident; but it is to be so taken in the way we first described.

634. It is evident, then, that an infinite regress in accidental predication is impossible, and therefore that not all predications are accidental. And it is also evident that there will be some term which signifies substance; and again, that contradictories are not true of the same subject.

635. Now with regard to the argument given it must be noted that, even though one accident is not the subject of another, and thus one accident is not related to the other as its subject, still one is related to the other as cause and thing caused. For one accident is the cause of another. Heat and moistness, for example, are the cause of sweetness, and surface is the cause of color. For by reason of the fact that a subject is receptive of one accident it is receptive of another.

LESSON 8

Other Arguments Against the Foregoing Position

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343. Furthermore, if all contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, it is evident that all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme, a wall and a man, if it is possible either to affirm or to deny anything of everything.

344. And this is what must follow for those who agree with Protagoras’ view. For if it appears to anyone that a man is not a trireme, it is evident that he is not a trireme; so that he also is a trireme if contradictories are true. And thus there arises the view of Anaxagoras that all things exist together at the same time, so that nothing is truly one. Hence they seem to be speaking about the indeterminate; and while they think they are speaking about being, they are speaking about non-being; for the indeterminate is what exists potentially and is not complete.

345. But the affirmation and the negation of every predicate of every subject must be admitted by them; for it would be absurd if each subject should have its own negation predicated of it while the negation of something else which cannot be predicated of it should not be predicated of it. I mean that, if it is true to say that a man is not a man, evidently it is also true to say that he is not a trireme. Therefore, if the affirmation is predicable of him, so also must the negation be. But if the affirmation is not predicable

of him, the negation of the other term will be predicable of him to a greater degree than his own negation. If, then, the latter negation is predicable of him, the negation of trireme will also be predicable of him; and if this is predicable of him, the affirmation will be too. This is what follows, then, for those who hold this view.

346. And it also follows for them that it is not necessary either to affirm or to deny. For if it is true that the same thing is both a man and a not-man, evidently it will be neither a man nor a not-man; for of the two affirmations there are two negations. And if the former is taken as a single proposition composed of the two, the latter also will be a single proposition opposed to the former.

347. Again, either this is true of all things, and a thing is both white and not-white, and both being and not-being, and the same applies to other affirmations and negations; or it is not true of all but is true of some and not of others. And if not of all, the exceptions will be admitted. But if it is true of all, then either the negation will be true of everything of which the affirmation is, and the affirmation will be true of everything of which the negation is, or the negation will be true of everything of which the affirmation is, but the affirmation will not always be true of everything of which the negation is. And if the latter is true, there will be something that certainly is not, and this will be an unshakeable opinion.

And if that it is not is something certain and knowable, more known indeed will be the opposite affirmation than the negation. But if in denying something it is equally possible to affirm what is denied, it is necessary to state what is true about these things, either separately (for example, to say that a thing is white and that it is not-white), or not. And if it is not true to affirm them separately, then an opponent will not be saying what he professes to say, and nothing will exist. But how could non-existent things speak or walk, as he does? Again, [according to this view] all things will be one, as has been said before (336:C 616), and man and God and a trireme and their contradictories will be the same. Similarly, if this is true of each thing, one thing will differ in no respect from another; for if it differs, this difference will be something true and proper to it. And similarly if it is possible for each to be true separately, the results described will follow. And to this we may add that all will speak the truth and all speak falsely; and that each man will admit of himself that he is in error. And at the same time it is evident that up to this point the discussion is about nothing at all, because our opponent says nothing. For he does not say that a thing is so or is not so, but that it is both so and not so; and again he denies both of these and says that it is neither so nor not so. For if this were not the case there would already be some definite statement. Further, if when the affirmation is true the negation is false, and if when the negation is true the affirmation is false, it will be impossible both to affirm and to deny the same thing truly at the same time. But perhaps someone will say that this was the contention from the very beginning.

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636. Then he gives a third argument, which involves oneness and difference. The argument runs thus: if an affirmation and a negation are true of the same subject at the same time, all things will be one. But the consequent is false. Hence the antecedent must be false. In regard to this argument he does three things.

First (343:C 636), he lays down a conditional proposition and gives an example, namely, that if contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, it will follow that the same thing will be a trireme (i.e., a ship with three banks of oars), a wall and a man.

637. And this is what (344).

Then he shows that the same impossible conclusion follows with regard to two other positions. He does this, first, with regard to the opinion of Protagoras, who said that whatever seems so to anyone is wholly true for him; for if it seems to someone that a man is not a trireme, then he will not be a trireme; and if it seems to someone else that a man is a trireme, he will be a trireme; and thus contradictories will be true.

638. Second, he does this with regard to the opinion of Anaxagoras, who said that all things exist together, so that nothing which is truly one is distinguished from other things, but all are one in a kind of mixture. For he said that everything is found in everything else, as has been shown in Book I of the Physics. This is the position which Anaxagoras adopted because he seems to be speaking about indeterminate being, i.e., what has not been made actually determinate. And while he thought he was speaking about complete being, he was speaking about potential being, as will become

clear below (355:C 667). But the indeterminate is what exists potentially and is not “complete,” i.e., actual; for potency is made determinate only by actuality.

639. But the affirmation (345).

Third, he proves that the first conditional proposition is true. He does this, first, on the grounds that all things would have to be affirmed to be one; and second (346:C 640), on the grounds that affirmations would not be distinguished from their negations from the viewpoint of truth and falsity (“And it also follows”).

He accordingly says, first (345), that the first conditional proposition must be admitted by them inasmuch as they hold than an affirmation and a negation are true of the same subject at the same time because an affirmation and a negation are true of anything at all. For it is clear that the negation of some other thing seems to be predicable of each thing to a greater degree than its own negation. For it would be absurd if some subject should have its own negation predicated of it and not the negation of something else by which it is signified that this other thing is not predicable of it. For example, if it is true to say that a man is not a man, it is much truer to say that a man is not a trireme. Hence it is clear that anything of which a negation must be predicated must also have an affirmation predicated of it. Therefore a negation will be predicated of it since an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time; or if an affirmation is not predicated of it, the negation of the other term will be predicated of it to a greater degree than its own negation. For example, if the term trireme is not predicable of man, non-trireme will be predicated of him inasmuch as it may be said that a man is not a trireme. But if the affirmation is predicable, so also must the negation be, since they are verified of the same thing. A man, then, must be a trireme, and he must also be anything else on the same grounds. Hence all things must be one. Therefore this is what follows for those who maintain the position that contradictories are true of the same subject.

640. And it also follows (346).

He now draws the other impossible conclusion which follows from this view, namely, that a negation will not be distinguished from an affirmation as regards falsity, but each will be false. Thus he says that not only the foregoing impossible conclusions follow from the above-mentioned position, but also the conclusion that it is not necessary “either to affirm or to deny," i.e., it is not necessary that either the affirmation or the negation of a thing should be true, but each may be false; and so there will be no difference between being true and being false. He' proves this as follows.

641. If it is true that something is both a man and a not-man, it is also true that it is neither a man nor a not-man. This is evident. For of these two terms, man and not-man, there are two negations, not man and not not-man. And if one proposition were formed from the first two, for example, if one were to say that Socrates is neither a man nor a not-man, it would follow that neither the affirmation nor the negation is true but that both are false.

642. Again, either this (347).

Then he gives a fourth argument, and this is based on certitude in knowing. It runs thus. If an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, either this is true of all things, or it is true of some and not of others. But if it is not true of all, then those of which it is true will be "admitted"; i.e., they will be conceded simply and absolutely, or according to another translation "they will be certain," i.e., true with certainty; that is, in their case the negation will be true because the affirmation is false, or the reverse.

643. But if it is true in all cases that contradictories are verified of the same subject, this might happen in two ways. In one way anything of which affirmations are true, negations are true, and the reverse. In another way anything of which affirmations are true, negations are true, but not the reverse.

644. And if the second is true, this impossible conclusion will follow: there will be something that firmly or certainly is not; and so there will be an unshakeable opinion regarding a negative proposition. And this will be the case because a negation is always true since whenever an affirmation is true its negation is also true. But an affirmation will not always be true, because it was posited that an affirmation is not true of anything at all of which a negation is true; and thus a negation will be more certain and knowable than an affirmation. But this seems to be false because, even though non-being is certain and knowable, an affirmation will always be more certain than its opposite negation; for the truth of a negation always depends on that of some affirmation. Hence a negative conclusion can be drawn only if there is some kind of affirmation in the premises. But an affirmative conclusion can never be drawn from negative premises.

645. Now if one were to speak in the first way and say that of anything of which an affirmation is true the negation is also true, and similarly that of anything of which the negation is true the affirmation is also true, inasmuch as affirmation and negation are interchangeable, this might happen in two ways. For if an affirmation and a negation are both true at the same time, either it will be possible to state what is true of each separately, for example, to say that each of these propositions is true separately—”Man is white” and “Man is not white”; or it will not be possible to state that each is true separately but only both together. For example, if we were to say that this copulative proposition is true —”Man is white and man is not white.”

646. And if we were to speak in the second way and say that neither one is true separately but only both together, two impossible conclusions would then follow. The first is that “an opponent will not be saying what he professes to say,” i.e., he will assert neither the affirmation nor the negation of something, and “neither will exist,” i.e., both will be false; or according to another text, “nothing will exist,” i.e., it will follow that nothing is true, neither the affirmation nor the negation. And if nothing is true it will be impossible to understand or to express anything. For how can anyone understand or express non-being? Implied is the reply: in no way.

647. The second impossible conclusion would be that all things are one, as has been stated in a previous argument (345:C 639). For it would follow that a man and God and a trireme, and also their contradictories, a notman, not-God and not-trireme, are the same. Thus it is clear that, if an affirmation and a negation are true of any subject at the same time, one thing will not differ from another. For if one were to differ from another, something would have to be predicated of the one which is not predicated of the other; and so it would follow that something is definitely and properly true of this thing which does not fit the other. Therefore an affirmation and a negation will not be true of anything whatever. But it is clear that things which differ in no way are one. Thus it would follow that all things are one.

648. But if one were to speak in the first way and say that it is possible for an affirmation and a negation to be true, not only together but also separately, four impossible conclusions will follow. The first is that this position “indicates that this statement is true”; i.e., it proves that the statement just made is true. Hence another text reads, “the results described

will follow,” i.e., all things will be one, because it will then be possible both to affirm and to deny each thing, and one will not differ from the other.

649. A second impossible conclusion is that all will speak the truth, because anyone at all must make either an affirmation or a negation, and each will be true. And each man will also admit of himself that he is wrong when he says that the affirmation is true; for, since he says that the negation is true, he admits that he was in error when he made the affirmation.

650. A third impossible conclusion is that up to this point there obviously could not be any investigation or dispute. For it is impossible to carry on a dispute with someone who admits nothing, because such a person really says nothing since he does not say absolutely that something is so or is not so; but he says that it is both so and not so. And again he denies both of these, for he says that it is neither so nor not so, as is evident from the preceding argument. For if he does not deny all of these he will know that something is definitely true, and this is contrary to his original position. Or according to another translation which expresses this more clearly, “there would already be some definite statement.”

651. A fourth impossible conclusion will follow because of the definition of the true and the false. For truth exists when one says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not. But falsity exists when one says that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. Hence from the definition of the true and the false it is clear that, when an affirmation is true, its negation is false; for one then says that what is, is not. And when a negation is true, its affirmation is false; for what is not is then said to be. Therefore it is impossible both to affirm and to deny the same thing truly. But perhaps an opponent could say that this last argument is begging the questiofi; for he who claims that contradictories are true at the same time does not accept this definition of the false: the false is to say that what is not, is, or that what is, is not.

LESSON 9

Three Further Arguments Against Those Who Deny the First Principle

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1008b 2-1009a 16

348. Again, how is that man wrong who judges that a thing is so or is not so, and is he right who judges both? For if the second is right, what will his statement mean except that such is the nature of beings? And if he is not right, he is more right than the one who holds the first view, and beings will already be of a certain nature, and this will be true and not at the same time not true. But if all men are equally right and wrong, anyone who holds this view can neither mean nor state anything; for he will both affirm and not affirm these things at the same time. And if he makes no judgment but equally thinks and does not think, in what respect will he differ from plants?

349. It is most evident, then, that no one, either among those who profess this theory or any others, is really of this mind. For why does a man walk home 1 and not remain where he is when he thinks he is going there? He does not at dawn walk directly into a well or into a brook if he happens on such; but he seems to be afraid of doing so because he does not think that to fall in is equally good and not good. Therefore he judges that the one is better and the other not. And if this is so in the case of what is good and what is not good, it must also be so in the case of other things. Thus he must judge that one thing is a man and another not a man, and that one thing is sweet and another not sweet. For when he thinks that it is better to drink

water and to see a man and then seeks these things, he does not make the same judgment about all of them, though this would be necessary if the same thing were equally a man and not a man. But according to what has been said there is no one who does not seem to fear some things and not others. Hence, as it appears, all men make an unqualified judgment, and if not about all things, still about what is better or worse.

350. And if they do not have science but opinion, they ought to care all the more about the truth, just as one who is ill ought to care more about health than one who is well. For one who has opinion in contrast to one who has science is not healthily disposed towards the truth.

351. Further, even if all things are so and not so as much as you like, still difference of degree belongs to the nature of beings. For we should not say that two and three are equally even; and he who thinks that four is five is not equally as wrong as he who thinks that it is a thousand. Therefore, if they are not equally wrong, obviously one is less wrong and so more right. Hence, if what is truer is nearer to what is true, there must be some truth to which the truer is nearer. And even if there is not, still there is already something truer and more certain, and we shall be freed from that intemperate theory which prevents us from determining anything in our mind.

Chapter 5

352. The doctrine of Protagoras proceeds from the same opinion, and both of these views must be alike either true or not true. For if all things which seem or appear are true, everything must be at once true and false. For many men have opinions which are contrary to one another, and they think that those who do not have the same opinions as themselves are wrong. Consequently the same thing must both be and not be. And if this is so, it is necessary to think that all opinions are true; for those who are wrong and those who are right entertain opposite opinions. If, then beings are such, all men will speak the truth. Hence it is evident that both contraries proceed from the same way of thinking.

COMMENTARY

652. Here he gives a fifth argument, which is based on the notion of truth, and it runs as follows. It has been stated that both the affirmation and the

negation of something are held to be true at the same time. Therefore he who judges or thinks that “a thing is so,” i.e., that the affirmation alone is true, “or is not so,” i.e., that the negation alone is true, is wrong; and he who judges that both are true at the same time is right. Hence, since truth exists when something is such in reality as it is in thought, or as it is expressed in words, it follows that what a man expresses will be something definite in reality; i.e., the nature of beings will be such as it is described to be; so that it will not be at once the subject both of an affirmation and of a negation. Or according to another text, “beings will already be of a certain nature,” as if to say that since the statement is definitely true, it follows that a thing has such a nature. However, if one were to say that it is not he who judges that an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time that has a true opinion, but rather he who thinks that either the affirmation alone is true or the negation alone is true, it is evident that beings will already exist in some determinate way. Hence another translation says more clearly, “and in a sense this will be definitely true and not at the same time not true,” because either the affirmation alone is true or the negation alone is true.

653. But if all of those just mentioned, i.e., both those who affirm both parts of a contradiction and those who affirm one of the two, “are wrong,” and all are also right, it will be impossible to carry on a dispute with anyone who maintains this, or even to say anything that might provoke a dispute with him. Or according to another text, “such a man will not affirm or assert anything.” For, as another translation says, “he cannot assert or affirm anything of this kind,” because he equally affirms and denies anything at all. And if this man takes nothing to be definitely true, and similarly thinks and does not think, just as he similarly affirms and denies something in speech, he seems to differ in no way from plants; because even brute animals have certain definite conceptions. Another text reads, “from those disposed by nature,” and this means that such a one who admits nothing does not differ in what he is actually thinking from those who are naturally disposed to think but are not yet actually thinking. For those who are naturally disposed to think about any question do not affirm either part of it, and similarly neither do the others.

654. It is most evident (349).

Then he gives a sixth argument, which is based on desire and aversion. In regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the argument. Second

(350:C 658), he rejects an answer which is a quibble (“And if they”).

He accordingly says, first (349), that it is evident that no man is of such a mind as to think that both an affirmation and a negation can be verified of the same subject at the same time. Neither those who maintain this position nor any of the others can think in this way. For if to go home were the same as not to go home, why would someone go home rather than remain where he is, if he were of the opinion that to remain where he is is the same as to go home? Therefore, from the fact that someone goes home and does not remain where he is it is clear that he thinks that to go and not to go are different.

655. Similarly, if someone walks along a path which happens to lead directly to a well or a brook, he does not proceed straight along that path but seems to fear that he will fall into the well or brook. This happens because he judges that to fall into a well or a brook is not equally good and not good, but he judges absolutely that it is not good. However, if he were to judge that it is both good and not good, he would not avoid the above act any more than he would desire it. Therefore, since he avoids doing this and does not desire it, obviously he judges or thinks that the one course is better, namely, not to fall into the well, because fie knows that it is better.

656. And if this is true of what is good and what is not good, the same thing must apply in other cases, so that clearly one judges that one thing is a man and another not a man, and that one thing is sweet and another not sweet. This is evident from the fact that he does not seek all things to the same degree or make the same judgment about them, since he judges that it is better to drink water which is sweet than to drink that which is not sweet; and that it is better to see a man than to see something which is not a man. And from this difference in opinion it follows that he definitely desires the one and not the other; for he would have to desire both equally, i.e., both the sweet and the not-sweet, and both man and not-man, if he thought that contradictories were the same. But, as has been said before (349:C 655), there is no one who does not seem to avoid the one and not the other. So by the very fact that a man is differently disposed to various things inasmuch as he avoids some and desires others, he must not think that the same thing both is and is not.

657. It is evident, then that all men think that truth consists in affirmation alone or in negation alone and not in both at the same time. And if they do

not think that this applies in all cases, they at least are of the opinion that it applies in the case of things which are good or evil or of those which are better or worse; for this difference accounts for the fact that some things are desired and others are avoided.

658. And if they (350).

Then he rejects a quibble. For some one could say that men desire some things inasmuch as they are good and avoid others inasmuch as they are not good, not because they know the truth but because they are of the opinion that the same thing is not both good and not good, although this amounts to the same thing in reality. But if it is true that men do not have science but opinion, they ought to care all the more about learning the truth. This is made clear as follows: one who is ill cares more about health than one who is well. But one who has an untrue opinion, in comparison with one who has scientific knowledge, is not healthily disposed towards the truth, because he is in the same state with regard to scientific knowledge as a sick man is with regard to health; for a false opinion is a lack of scientific knowledge just as illness is a lack of health. Thus it is evident that men ought to care about discovering the truth. However, this would not be the case if nothing were definitely true, but only if something were both true and not true at the same time.

659. Further, even if all (351).

Then he gives a seventh argument, which is based on the different degrees of falsity. He says that even if it should be most true that everything is so and not so, i.e., that an affirmation and its negation are true at the same time, still it is necessary that different degrees of truth should exist in reality. For obviously it is not equally true to say that two is even and that three is even; nor is it equally false to say that four is five, and that it is a thousand. For if both are equally false, it is evident that one is less false, i.e., it is less false to say that four is five than to say that it is a thousand. But what is less false is truer, or nearer to the truth, just as that is also less black which is nearer to white. Therefore it is clear that one of them speaks more truly, i.e., he comes nearer to the truth; and this is the one who says that four is five. But nothing would be closer or nearer to the truth unless there were something which is absolutely true in relation to which the nearer or closer would be truer and less false. It follows, then, that it is necessary to posit something which is unqualifiedly true, and that not all things are both true and false, because otherwise it would follow from this that contradictories are true at the same time. And even if it does not follow from the foregoing argument that there is something which is unqualifiedly true, still it has been stated already that one thing is truer and firmer or more certain than another (351:C 659); and thus affirmation and negation are not related in the same way to truth and certitude. Hence as a result of this argument and the others given above we shall be freed or liberated from this theory, i.e., from this non-mixed opinion, or one that is not tempered (and for this reason another text has “intemperate”); for an opinion is well tempered when the predicate is not repugnant to the subject. But when an opinion involves opposite notions, it is not well tempered; and the position mentioned above, which says that contradictories can be true, is an opinion of this kind.

660. Further, this position prevents us from being able to define or settle anything in our mind. For the first notion of difference is considered in affirmation and negation. Hence he who says that an affirmation and a negation are one does away with all definiteness or difference.

661. The doctrine of Protagoras (352).

Here he shows that the opinion of Protagoras is reduced to the same position as the one mentioned above. For Protagoras said that everything which seems to be true to anyone is true. And if this position is true, the first one must also be true, namely, that an affirmation and its negation are true at the same time. Hence all things must be true and false at the same time inasmuch as this follows from this position, as has been shown above (351:C 659). He proves this as follows. Many men have opinions which are contrary to one another, and they think that those who do not have the same opinions as themselves are wrong, and vice versa. If, then, whatever seems so to anyone is true, it follows that both are wrong and both are right, because the same thing is and is not. Hence according to the opinion of Protagoras it follows that both parts of a contradiction are true at the same time.

662. Similarly, if it is true that both parts of a contradiction are true at the same time, the opinion of Protagoras must be true, namely, that all things which seem true to anybody are true. For it is clear that people have different opinions, and some of these are false and others are true because they have opinions which are opposed to each other. If, then, all opposites

are true at the same time (and this follows if contradictories are true at the same time), the result must be that all are right, and that what seems so to anyone is true. Thus it is clear that each position contains the same opinion, theory, or way of thinking, because one necessarily follows from the other.

LESSON 10

The Procedure Against Those Who Say that Contradictories Are True at the Same Time

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1009a 16-1009a 38

353. But the same method of discussion is not applicable in all of these cases, because some men need persuasion and others force. For the ignorance of those who have formed their opinions as a result of difficulties is easily cured, because refutation is directed not against their words but against their thought. But the cure for all of those who argue for the sake of argument consists in refuting what they express in speech and in words.

354. Those who have experienced difficulties have formed this opinion because of things observed in the sensible world, i.e., the opinion that contradictories and contraries can both be true at the same time, inasmuch as they see that contraries are generated from the same thing. Therefore, if it is impossible for nonbeing to come into being, the thing must have existed before as both contraries equally. This is Anaxagoras’ view, for he says that everything is mixed in everything else. And Democritus is of the same opinion, for he holds that the void and the full are equally present in any part, and yet one of these is non-being and the other being.

355. Concerning those who base their opinions on these grounds, then, we say that in one sense they speak the truth, and that in another they do not know what they are saying. For being has two meanings, so that in one sense a thing can come to be from non-being and in another sense it cannot.

Hence the same thing can both be and not be at the same time, but not in the same respect; for while the same thing can be potentially two contraries at the same time, it cannot in complete actuality.

356. Further, we shall expect them to believe that among beings there is also another kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs in any way.

COMMENTARY

663. Having raised arguments against those who deny the first principle, and having settled the issue, here the Philosopher indicates how one must proceed differently against various men who adopted different versions of the above-mentioned error. This is divided into two parts.

In the first (353:C 663) he shows that one must proceed differently against different men. In the second (354:C 665) he begins to proceed in a different way than he did above ("Those who").

He accordingly says, first (353), that the same method "of discussion," i.e., of popular address (or "of good grammatical construction," according to another translation, or of well ordered argument "or intercession," as is said in the Greek, i.e., of persuasion) is not applicable to all of the foregoing positions; that is, to the position that contradictories can be true, and to the position that truth consists in appearances. For some thinkers adopt the foregoing positions for two reasons. Some do so because of some difficulty; for since certain sophistical arguments occur to them, from which the foregoing positions seem to follow, and they do not know how to solve them, they accept the conclusion. Hence their ignorance is easily cured. For one must not oppose them or attack the arguments which they give, but must appeal to their thought, clearing up the mental difficulties which have led them to form such opinions; and then they will give up these positions.

664. Others adopt the foregoing positions, not because of any difficulty which leads them to such positions, but only because they want to argue "for the sake of argument," i.e., because of a certain insolence, inasmuch as they want to maintain impossible theories of this kind for their own sake since the contrary of these cannot be demonstrated. The cure for these men is the refutation or rejection "of what they express in speech and in words," i.e., on the grounds that the word in a statement has some meaning. Now

the meaning of a statement depends on the meaning of the words, so that it is necessary to return to the principle that words signify something. This is the principle which the Philosopher used above (332:C 611).

665. Those who (354).

Since the Philosopher met the difficulties above on this point by considering the meaning of words, he begins here to meet those who are in difficulties by solving their problems.

First (354), he deals with those who held that contradictories are true at the same time; and second (357:C 669), he deals with those who held that everything which appears so is true (“And similarly”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he sets forth the difficulty which led some men to admit that contradictories are true at the same time. Second (355:C 667), he clears up this difficulty (“Concerning those”).

He says, then, that the opinion on this point, that the parts of a contradiction may be true at the same time, was formed by some men as a result of a difficulty which arose with regard to sensible things, in which generation and corruption and motion are apparent. For it seemed that contraries were generated from the same thing; for example, air, which is warm, and earth, which is cold, both come from water. But everything which is generated comes from something that existed before; for non-being cannot come into being, since nothing comes from nothing. A thing therefore had to have in itself contradictories simultaneously, because if both the hot and the cold are generated from one and the same thing, then it turns out to be hot and not-hot itself.

666. It was because of such reasoning that Anaxagoras claimed that everything is mixed in everything else. For from the fact that anything at A seemed to come from anything else he thought that one thing could come from another only if it already existed in it. Democritus also seems to have agreed with this theory, for he claimed that the void and the full are combined in any part of a body. And these are like being and non-being, because the full has the character of being and the void the character of non-being.

667. Concerning those (355).

Here he solves the foregoing difficulty in two ways. First, he says that the opinion of those who have adopted the foregoing absurd views because of some difficulty must be met by appealing to their thought, as has been stated (353:C 663). Therefore “concerning those who base their opinions,” i.e., those who think that contradictories are true at the same time, “on these grounds,” i.e., on the reasoning mentioned above, we say that in one sense they speak the truth and in another they do not know what they are saying since their statements are absurd. For being has two meanings: actual being and potential being; and therefore when they say that being does not come from non-being, in one sense they are right and in another they are not. For being does not come from actual being but from potential being. Hence in one sense the same thing can be at the same time both being and non-being, and in another sense it cannot; for the same thing can be contraries potentially, but it cannot be both “in complete actuality,” i.e., actually. For if something warm is potentially both hot and cold, it still cannot be actually both.

668. Further, we shall (356).

Then he gives the second solution. He says that we deem it fitting that they should accept or think that there is some kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Now one could not conclude to the existence of this kind of substance by reason of what has been said above, namely, that contraries belong to it, because nothing is generated from them. This solution seems to be like the one reached by the Platonists, who, because of the changeable character of sensible things, were compelled to posit unchangeable separate Forms (i.e., those of which definitions are given, and demonstrations made, and certain knowledge is had) on the grounds that there could be no certain knowledge of sensible things because of their changeableness and the mixture of contrariety which they contain. But the first solution is a better one.

LESSON 11

The Reason Why Some Considered Appearances to Be True

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1009a 38-1009b 12

357. And similarly the theory that truth consists in appearances comes to some thinkers from sensible things. For they think that the truth should not be judged by the large or small number who uphold some view; and they point out that the same thing appears to be sweet to some when they taste it and bitter to others. Hence, if all men were ill or all were mad, and only two or three were healthy or in possession of their wits, the latter would appear ill or mad and not the former. Further, they say that the impressions made upon many of the other animals are contrary to those made upon us, and that to the senses of each person things do not always appear to be the same. Therefore it is not always evident which of these views is true or which is false, but both appear equally so. And it is for this reason that Democritus says that either nothing is true or it is not evident to us.

COMMENTARY

669. Having solved the difficulty which led the ancient philosophers to maintain that contradictories are true at the same time, the Philosopher now dispels the difficulty which led some thinkers to maintain that every appearance is true.

This part is divided into two. First (351:C 669), he gives the difficulties which led some thinkers to hold the position mentioned above. Second (363:C 685), he dispels these difficulties (“But in reply”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reason which led these men to maintain that every appearance is true. Second (358:C 672), he explains why they reasoned in this way (“In general”).

He therefore says, first (357), that, just as the opinion which maintained that contradictories are true at the same time came from certain sensible things in which it happens that contradictories come from the same thing, so too “the theory that truth consists in appearances,” or the opinion about the truth of appearances, is derived from certain sensible things; that is, by those who are not perverse but are drawn into this position because of difficulties. This occurs because they find that different men hold contrary opinions about the same sensible things; and they give three reasons in support of their position. First, they point out that the same thing appears to taste sweet to some atid bitter to others, so that men have contrary opinions about all sensible things. Second, they note that many animals make judgments about sensible things which are contrary to ours; for what seems tasty to the ox or to the ass is judged by man to be unpalatable. Third, they say that the same man at different times makes different judgments about sensible things; for what now appears to be sweet and palatable to him at another time seems bitter or tasteless.

670. And no certain reason can be given that clearly indicates which of these opinions is true or which is false, because one of these seems no truer to one person than the other does to another person. Therefore they must be equally true or equally false. Hence Democritus said that either nothing is definitely true or, if anything is true, it is not evident to us; for even though we acquire our knowledge of things through the senses, their judgment is not certain since they do not always judge in the same way. Hence we do not seem to have any certainty regarding the truth so that we can say that this opinion is definitely true and its contrary definitely false.

671. But someone could say, in opposing this position, that some rule can be adopted whereby a person can discern among contrary opinions the one that is true. That is, we might say that the judgment which healthy people make about sensible things is right, and the one which sick people make is not; and that the judgment which wise and intelligent people make in

matters of truth is right, and the one which foolish or ignorant people make is not. He rejects this reply at the very start on the grounds that no certain judgment about the truth of any theory can be fittingly based on the number, large or small, of persons who hold it, according to which that would be said to be true which seems so to many, and that to be false which seems so to a few; for sometimes what many believe is not simply true. Now health and sickness or wisdom and foolishness do not seem to differ only by reason of the greater or smaller number of people involved. For if all or most persons were like those who are now thought to be ignorant or foolish, they would be considered wise, and those who are now thought to be wise would be considered foolish. The same applies in the case of health and sickness. Hence the judgment regarding truth and falsity of one who is healthy and wise is no more credible than the judgment of one who is ill and foolish.

LESSON 12

Two Reasons Why Some Identify Truth with Appearances

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1009b 12-1010a 15

358. And in general it is because these philosophers think that discretion is sensory perception, and that this in turn is alteration, that they say that what appears to the senses is necessarily true.

359. For it is for these reasons that both Empedocles and Democritus and, we may probably say, every one of the other philosophers became involved in such opinions. For Empedocles also says that when men change their condition they change their knowledge, “for understanding varies in men in relation to what is seen,” according to him. And elsewhere he says, “Insofar as they are changed into a different nature, to that extent it is proper for them always to think other thoughts.” And Parmenides also speaks in the same way: “For just as each has his mixture of many-jointed limbs, so intellect is present in men; for it is the same thing, the nature of the limbs, which exercises discretion in men—in all and in each; for that which is more is intellect.” Anaxagoras is also recorded as saying to some of his companions that things were such to them as they thought them to be. And men also say that Homer maintained this view, because he made Hector, after he was stunned by the blow, think other thoughts; implying that people of sound and unsound mind both think but not the same thoughts. It is

evident, then, that if both of these states of mind are forms of knowledge, beings must also be so and not so at the same time.

360. Hence their conclusion happens to be the most serious one. For if those who have seen most clearly the truth which it is possible for us to have (and these are those who seek and love it most), maintain such opinions and express such views about the truth, how is it unfitting that those who are trying to philosophize should abandon the attempt? For to seek the truth will be like chasing birds.

361. Now the reason these men held this opinion is that, while they investigated the truth about beings, they thought that sensible things alone exist; and in these much of the nature of the indeterminate, i.e., the kind of being which we have described (355), is present. Hence, while they speak in a plausible way, they do not say what is true; for it is more plausible to speak as they do than as Epicharmus did to Xenophanes.

362. Again, since they saw that the whole of the natural world is in motion, and that we can say nothing true about what is undergoing change, they came to the conclusion that it is impossible to say anything true about what is always changing altogether. For it was from this view that the most extreme of the opinions mentioned above blossomed forth; that is, the opinion held by those who are said to Heraclitize, and such as Cratylus expressed, who finally thought that he should say nothing but only moved his finger, and criticized Heraclitus for saying that it is impossible to step into the same river twice; for he himself thought that this could not be done even once.

COMMENTARY

672. He gives the reason why these philosophers adopted the foregoing position. First (358:C 672), he shows how sensory perception provided one reason for adopting this position; and second (361:C 681), how sensible objects provided another (“Now the reason”).

In regard to the first part he does three things. First, he explains how sensory perception provided one reason for adopting this position. Second (359:C 674), he recounts the opinions of different men which have this reason as their common basis (“For it is”). Third (36o:C 680), he attacks these opinions (“Hence their conclusion”).

He accordingly says, first (158), that the ancients were of the opinion that discretion, i.e., wisdom or science, is merely sensory perception; for they did not make any distinction between sense and intellect. Now sensory perception comes about through a certain alteration of a sense with reference to sensible objects. And so the fact that a sense perceives something results from the impression which a sensible thing makes on the sense. Thus a sensory perception always corresponds to the nature of the sensible object as it appears. Hence, according to these thinkers, whatever appears to the senses is necessarily true; and since we must add that all knowing is sensory, it follows that whatever appears in any way at all to anyone is true.,

673. But this argument fails, not only because it holds that sense and intellect are the same, but also because it maintains that the judgment which a sense makes about sensible objects is never false. For while a sense may make a mistake about common and accidental sensible objects, it does not do this with regard to its proper sensible object, except perhaps when the sensory organ is indisposed. And even though a sense is altered by its sensible object, the judgment of a sense does not have to conform to the conditions of the sensible object; for it is not necessary that the action of an agent be received in the patient according to the mode of being of the agent but only according to that of the patient or subject. This is why a sense sometimes is not disposed to receive the form of a sensible object according to the mode of being which the form has in the sensible object, and it therefore sometimes judges a thing to be otherwise than it really is.

674. For it is (359).

He presents the opinions which different men held for the reasons stated above. Now all of the statements of these men which he adduces imply two things: first, that intellect is the same as sense, and, second, that every appearance is true. Thus he says that it is for the reasons mentioned above that Empedocles and Democritus and each of the other philosophers became involved in such opinions about reality “we may probably say,” i.e., we can conjecture on the basis of their statements.

675. For Empedocles said that those who change “their condition,” i.e., some bodily disposition, also change their understanding; implying that the intellect, to which knowledge belongs, depends on a condition of the body, just as a sense does. For understanding increases in men “in relation to what

is seen”; that is, an increase in knowledge takes place in a man by reason of the fact that something new begins to appear to him, and this comes about as a result of some change in a bodily disposition. Another translation states this more clearly, saying, “For purpose or decision develops in man in relation to what is at hand”; as if to say, according to the different dispositions which are actually present in men, new decisions or new purposes or new judgmerits develop in them. And the implication is that decision or purpose does not, depend on any intellective power in man over and above the senses but only on a disposition of the body, which is changed with the presence of different things. But in other works ‘ of his Empedocles says that, to the extent that alteration occurs, that is, to the extent that men are changed to another bodily disposition, to that extent, he says, there is always thoughtfulness in them; that is, thought, concern, or planning arises in them proportionately. This translation is a difficult one to understand, but another states this notion more clearly, saying, “to the extent that men have been changed, to that extent they are always determined to think other thoughts or even foolish ones.” Or according to another text, “It is proper for them [always to think other thoughts],” as if to say that, insofar as a man is changed in some bodily disposition, to that extent his basic outlook is different-implying that he has a different understanding and a different outlook.

676. Then he gives Parmenides’ opinion in this matter. He says that Parmenides speaks about the truth of things in the same way that Empedocles does, for Parmenides says ‘ that, just as each man has an arrangement of jointed members, or “of many-jointed limbs,” according to another text, so intellect is present in men; implying that there is a great deal of variety and circumvolution in the members of man in order that such an arrangement of members may be adjusted for the operation of the intellect, which depends on the way in which the members are combined, according to him. For he says that it is the same thing “which cares for,” i.e., which has the care or supervision of the members because of the nature of the members, and which is “in each,” i.e., in the individual parts of the universe, and “in all,” i.e., in the whole universe. Yet insofar as it is present in the whole universe and in its individual parts and in men, it is designated by different names. In the whole universe it is called God, in the individual parts it is called nature, and in men it is called thought. Thus it is present to

a greater degree in man than it is in the other parts of the universe; for in man this power thinks as a result of the determinate way in which his members are combined, but this does not apply in the case of other things. In this statement he also wants it understood that thought is a result of the way in which the body is composed, and thus does not differ from sensory perception. Another translation states this more clearly, saying, “For it is the same thing, the nature of the limbs, which exercises discretion in men-in all and in each; for that which is more is intellect.”

677. Then he gives the opinion of Anaxagoras, who expressed it to some of his companions and friends and had them commit it to memory, namely, that things are such to them as they take or believe them to be. This is the second point which is touched on in these statements of the philosophers, namely, that truth depends on opinion.

678. Then he gives the view of Homer, who seemed to be of the same opinion according to what people said of him. For in his story he made Hector lie, as it were, in a trance from the blow which he had been dealt, “lingering in another place,” i.e., to think other thoughts than he had thought before, or, according to another text, to be of a different opinion from the one which he had before; as if in lingering and not lingering, i.e., in the state in which he lay after being struck down, he would both think and not think, although not about the same thing. For he knew those things which then appeared to him, but not those which he had known before, and had then ceased to know. Another translation expresses the idea thus: “Implying that people of sound and unsound mind both think but not the same thoughts”; as if to say that, just as this is true of Hector, who had strange opinions after the blow, so too it is possible for others to have sound and foolish opinions at the same, although not about the same things but about different ones.

679. Now from all of the foregoing views of the philosophers he draws his intended conclusion that, if both of these states of mind constitute knowledge, i.e., those states in which a man thinks contrary things when he is changed from one state to another, it follows that whatever anyone thinks is true; for knowing would not consist in thinking what is false. Hence it follows that beings are equally so and not so.

680. Hence, their conclusion (360).

Here he attacks the above-mentioned philosophers. He says that the conclusion which they drew is the most serious one. For if those who have seen the truth most clearly, insofar as it is possible for man to see it (namely, the foregoing philosophers, who are also the ones that love and seek it most of all) offer such opinions and views about the truth, how is it unfitting that these philosophers should grieve about the ineffectualness of their study if truth cannot be found? Another text reads, "How is it unfitting that those who are trying to philosophize should give up or abandon the attempt?" i.e., that a man should not cling to those who want to philosophize but despise them. For, if a man can know nothing about the truth, to seek the truth is to seek something which he cannot attain. In fact he resembles someone who chases or hunts birds; for the more he pursues them the farther they get away from him.

681. Now the reason (361).

He indicates how sensible things influenced this opinion, i.e., how they provided a basis for the above-mentioned position. For, since sensible things are naturally prior to the senses, the dispositions of the senses must depend on those of sensible things. He gives two ways in which sensible things provided a basis for this position. The second (362) is treated at the words, "Again, since they."

He accordingly says, first, that the reason why the foregoing philosophers adopted this position is this: since they aimed to know the truth about beings, and it seemed to them that sensible things alone exist, they therefore based their doctrine about truth in general on the nature of sensible things. Now in sensible things much of the nature of the infinite or indeterminate is present, because they contain matter, which is not in itself limited to one form but is in potency to many; and in these the nature of being is also found just as we have pointed out: the being of sensible things is not determinate but is open to various determinations. It is not to be wondered at, then, if he does not assign a definite knowledge to the senses, but one kind of knowledge to one sense, and another kind to another sense.

682. And for this reason the abovementioned philosophers use the foregoing argument plausibly or fittingly, though they are not right in claiming that there is nothing definite in sensible things; for even though matter in itself is indeterminately disposed for many forms, nevertheless by a form it is, determined to one mode of being. Hence, since things are

known by their form rather than by their matter, it is wrong to say that we can have no definite knowledge of them. Yet, since the opinion of these philosophers has some plausibility, it is more fitting to speak as they do than as Epicharmus did to Xenophanes, who seems to have said that all things are immovable, necessary and known with certainty.

683. Again, since they (362).

He gives the second way in which sensible things provided a basis for this opinion. He says that the philosophers saw that the whole of the natural world, i.e., the sensible world, is in motion, and they also saw that no attribute can be predicated of anything that is being changed insofar as it is being changed; for whatever is being changed insofar as it is being changed is neither white nor black. Hence, if the nature of sensible things is being changed always and "altogether," i.e., in all respects, so that there is nothing fixed in reality, it is impossible to make any statement about them that is definitely true. Thus it follows that the truth of an opinion or proposition does not depend on some determinate mode of being in reality but rather on what appears to the knower; so that it is what appears to each individual that is true for him.

684. That such was their argument becomes clear as follows. For from this assumption or opinion there sprouted "the most serious or extreme" opinion of the philosophers of whom we have spoken, i.e., the opinion which is found to be the most serious or extreme in this class. And this is the one which he called "Heraclitizing," i.e., following the opinion of Heraclitus, or the opinion of those who were disciples of Heraclitus, according to another text, or of those who professed to follow the opinion of Heraclitus, who claimed that all things are in motion and consequently that nothing is definitely true. This opinion also was maintained by Cratylus, who finally arrived at such a pitch of madness that he thought that he should not express anything in words, but in order to express what he wanted he would only move his finger. He did this because he believed that the truth of the thing which he wanted to express would pass away before he had finished speaking. But he could move his finger in a shorter space of time. This same Cratylus also reprimanded or rebuked Heraclitus. For Heraclitus said that a man cannot step into the same river twice, because before he steps in a second time the water of the river already has flowed by. But Cratylus thought that a man cannot step into the same river even

once, because even before he steps in once the water then in the river flows by and other water replaces it. Thus a man is incapable not only of speaking twice about anything before his disposition is changed but even of speaking once.

LESSON 13

Change in Sensible Things Not Opposed to Their Truth

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1010a 15-1010b 1

363. But in reply to this theory we shall also say that there is some reason why these men should think that what is changing, when it is changing, does not exist.

364. Yet there is a problem here; for what is casting off some quality retains something of what is being cast off, and something of what is coming to be must already exist. And in general if a thing is ceasing to be, there must be something which is; and if a thing is coming to be, there must be something from which it comes to be and something by which it comes to be; and this process cannot proceed to infinity.

365. But setting aside these considerations, let us say that change in quantity and change in quality are not the same. Let it be granted, then, that a thing does not remain the same in quantity; but it is by reason of its form that we know each thing.

366. Again, those who hold this view deserve to be criticized, because what they saw in the case of a very small number of sensible things they asserted to be true also of the whole universe. For it is only that region of the sensible world about us which is always in process of generation and corruption. But this is, so to speak, not even a part of the whole, so that it would have been juster for them to have esteemed the changing because of

the whole than to misjudge as they did the whole because of its changing part.

367. Further, it is evident that in answering these men we shall say the same things as we said before (356); for we must show them and make them understand that there is a kind of nature which is immobile.

368. And those who say that the same thing both is and is not at the same time can also say that all things are at rest rather than in motion. For according to this view there is nothing into which anything may be changed, since everything is already present in everything.

COMMENTARY

685. He argues against the foregoing opinions. First (363:C 685), he argues against the views that were held about the changeable character of sensible things; and second (369:C 692), against the statements that were made regarding sensory appearances ("Now concerning the truth").

In regard to the first part (363) he gives six arguments. The first of these is as follows: he who thinks that what is not does not exist, has a true opinion and makes a true statement if he expresses this. But what is being changed, while it is being changed, is neither that to which it is being changed nor that from which it is being changed; and thus some true statement can be made about a thing that is undergoing change. Hence, in opposing the foregoing theory or "account" (i.e., the opinion that no true statement can be made about anything which is changing), we can say that there is some ground or valid reason "in their case," i.e., according to the opinion of the foregoing philosophers, for thinking "that what is changing," or what is being changed, "when it is changing," i.e., while it is undergoing change, does not exist; that is, there is some reason for thinking that it has no being.

686. Yet there is (364).

Then he gives the second argument, and it runs thus: everything which is being changed already has some part of the terminus to which it is being changed, because what is being changed, while it is being changed, is partly in the terminus to which it is being changed, and partly in the terminus from which it is being changed, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics (or, according to another text, "that which is casting off some quality retains sdmething of what is being cast off”). And by this statement we are given to understand that anything which is being moved retains some part of the terminus from which it is being moved, because so long as a thing is being moved it is casting off the terminus from which it is being moved; and it is possible only to cast off some quality which belongs to a mobile subject. And something of what is coming to be must already exist, because everything which is coming to be was coming to be, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics. And it is also evident that, if something is ceasing to be, there must be something which is; for if it did not exist in any way at all, it already would have ceased to be and would not be ceasing to be. Similarly, if something is coming to be, there must be a matter from which it is coming to be and an agent by which it is coming to be. But this cannot go on to infinity, because, as is proved in Book II (153:C 301), there cannot be an infinite regress either in the case of material causes or in that of efficient causes. Hence a major problem faces those who say that no true statement can be made about anything which is being moved or generated, both because each thing which is being moved or generated has some part of the terminus to which it is being moved, and because in every process of generation or motion there must be held to be something unproduced and unchangeable both on the part of the matter and on that of the agent.

687. But setting aside (365).

Then he gives the third argument, and this rejects the very ground on which these thinkers base their opinion that all sensible things are always in motion. For they were led to make this statement because of things which increase as a result of growth. For they saw that a thing increases in quantity to a very small degree during one year, and they thought that the motion of growth was continuous, so that quantity, in which increase is observed, might be divided in proportion to the parts of time. Thus an increase in some part of quantity would take place in some part of time, and this part of quantity would be related to a whole quantity as some part of a period of time to the whole of that period. And since this kind of motion is imperceptible, they also thought that things which appear to be at rest are being moved, although by an imperceptible motion.

688. In opposing these thinkers, then, he says that, even apart from the considerations which have been made, it is clear that change in quantity and in quality or form are not the same. And although they admit that change in

quantity is continuous in reality, and that all things are always being moved imperceptibly by this motion, it is not therefore necessary for this reason that all things should be being moved in quality or form. Hence it will be possible to have a definite knowledge of things, because things are known by their form rather than by their quantity.

689. Again, those who (366).

Then he gives the fourth argument. He says that “those who think in this way,’,’ i.e., those who entertain the opinion that all sensible things are always being moved because they find a small number of sensible things of which this is true, deserve to be criticized; for there are many sensible things which are capable. of being moved only from the viewpoint of local motion. For it is obvious that it is only the sensible things around us here in the sphere of active and passive things which are in process of generation and corruption. But this sphere or place amounts to nothing, so to speak, in comparison with the whole universe; for the entire earth has no sensible quantity in comparison with the outermost sphere. Hence this place is related to the universe as its central point, as the astronomers prove on the grounds that the six signs of the zodiac always appear above the earth. But this would not be the case if the earth were to hide from us some part of the heavens which are perceived by the senses. For it would be foolish to make a judgment about the whole sensible world in the light of these few things. Indeed, it would have been more acceptable if the whole sensible world had been judged according to the motion of the celestial bodies, which far surpass the others in quantity.

690. Further, it is evident (367).

He gives the fifth argument. He says that we must also use the same arguments against these men as were used above in this same book; that is, we must show them that there is a kind of nature which is immobile, namely, that of the primary mover, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. And this argument must be used against them, and they ought to accept it, as has been proved elsewhere (356:C 668). It is not true, then, that all things are always in motion, and that it is impossible to make any true statement about anything.

691. And those who say (368).

He gives the sixth argument. He says that their position that all things are being moved is opposed to their first position, that contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, because if something is and is not at the same time, it follows that all things are at rest rather than in motion. For nothing is being changed in terms of any attribute which already belongs to it; for example, what is already white is not being changed as regards whiteness. But if it is possible for the same thing both to be and not be at the same time, all attributes will be present in all things, as has been proved above (345:C 639), because all will be one. Hence there will not be anything to which a thing can be changed.

LESSON 14

Seven Arguments against the View that Truth Consists in Appearances

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1010b 1-1011a 2

369. Now concerning the truth that not everything which appears is true, the following points must be taken into consideration: first, that a sense is not false with regard to its proper object, but imagination is not the same as a sense.

370. Second, that it is surprising if some should raise the question whether continuous quantities are as great and colors really such as they appear to those who are at a distance or as they appear to those who are close at hand, and whether things are such as they appear to those who are healthy or to those who are ailing, and whether heavy things are such as they appear to those who are weak or to those who are strong, and whether those things are true which appear to those who are asleep or to those who are awake. For it is clear that they do not think so. Therefore no one who is in Lybia, having dreamed that he was in Athens, would go to the Odeon.

371. Again, concerning future things, as Plato says, the opinion of a physician and that of a person who is ignorant of the art of medicine are not of equal value as to whether someone will get well or not.

372. Again, in the case of the senses the perception of a foreign object and that of a proper object, or that of a kindred object and that of the object of the sense concerned, are not of equal value. In the case of colors it is

sight and not taste which passes judgment; and in the case of flavors it is taste and not sight which does this.

373. And no one of these senses ever affirms at the same time about the same subject that it is simultaneously both so and not so. Nor at another time does it experience any difficulty about a modification, but only about the object of which the modification is an accident. I mean, for example, that the same wine, either as a result of a change in itself or in the body, might seem at one time sweet and at another not, But sweetness, such as it is when it exists, has never changed; but one is always right about it, and sweetness itself is necessarily such as it is.

374. Yet all these theories destroy this, for just as things will have no substance, neither will they have any necessity; for that is necessary which cannot be in one way and in another. Hence, if anything is necessary, it will not be both so and not so.

375. And in general if only the sensible actually exists, there would be nothing if living things did not exist; for there would be no senses. Therefore the position that neither sensible objects nor sensory perceptions would exist is perhaps true, for these are modifications of the one sensing. But that the underlying subjects which cause perception should not exist apart from perception is impossible; for a perceptioii is not the perception of itself, but there is some other

thing besides the perception which must be prior to the perception. For that which causes motion is naturally prior to that which is moved, and this is no less true if they are correlative terms.

COMMENTARY

692. Here he begins to argue dialectically against the opinion that truth if equivalent to appearances; and in regard to this he does two things. First (369:C 718), he rejects this opinion. Second (381:C 718), he draws his intended conclusion (“Let this suffice”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues dialectically against those who held this opinion because of some theory or difficulty. Second (376:C 708), he argues against those who held this opinion because of insolence (“Now there are some”).

In regard to the first part (369) he gives seven arguments. The first of these is as follows: it has been shown (367:C 690) that not all things are changeable, and “concerning the truth that not everything which appears is true,” these points must be considered. First, the proper cause of falsity is not the senses but the imagination, which is not the same as the senses. That is to say, the diversity of judgments made about sensible objects is not attributable to the senses but to the imagination, in which errors are made about sensory perceptions because of some natural obstacle. Now imagination is not the same as perception, as is proved in Book III of The Soul, but is a motion produced as a result of actual sensing. Therefore in attributing to the senses this diversity of judgments by which one person is considered to have a false perception of a particular object about which another has a true perception, they do not proceed as they should. Another translation states this better, saying, “And, first, it must be understood that a sense is not false with regard to its proper object,” implying that no sense makes a mistake about its own proper object; for example, sight is not mistaken about colors. From this it is evident that the judgment which a sense makes about its proper sensible object is a definite one, so that there must be some definite truth in the world.

693. And if someone raises the objection that error sometimes arises even with regard to proper sensibles, his answer is that this is attributable not to the senses but to the imagination; for when the imagination is subject to some sort of abnormality, it sometimes happens that the object apprehended by a sense enters the imagination in a different way than it was apprehended by the sense. This is evident, for example, in the case of madmen, in whom the organ of imagination has been injured.

694. Second, that it is (370).

Then he gives his second argument, and it runs thus: it is surprising if some “should raise the question,” or “be puzzled,” as another text says, whether continuous quantities are such as they appear to those who are at a distance or to those who are close at hand. For it is just about self-evidently true that a sense judges quantities which are close at hand to be such as they are, and those which are far away to be smaller than they are, because what seems farther away appears small, as is proved in the science of optics.

695. The same thing applies if someone raises the question whether colors are such as they appear to those who are close at hand; for it is

evident that the farther an agent’s power is extended when it acts, the more imperfect is its effect; for fire heats those things which are far away to a lesser degree than those which are close at hand. And for the same reason the color of a perfect sensible body does not change that part of the transparent medium which is far away from it as completely as it changes that part which is close to it. Hence the judgment of a sense is truer about sensible colors in things close at hand than it is about those in things far away.

696. The same thing is also true if someone asks whether things are such as they appear to those who are healthy or “to those who are ailing,” i.e., those who are ill. For healthy people have sensory organs which are well disposed, and therefore the forms of sensible things are received in them just as they are; and for this reason the judgment which healthy people make about sensible objects is a true one. But the organs of sick people are not properly disposed, and therefore they are not changed as they should be by sensible objects. Hence their judgment about such objects is not a true one. This is clear with regard to the sense of taste; for when the organ of taste in sick people has been rendered inoperative as a result of the humors being destroyed, things which have a good taste seem tasteless to them.

697. The same thing also applies regarding the question whether things having weight are as heavy as they seem to those who are weak or to those who are strong; for it is clear that the strong judge about heavy things as they really arc. But this is not the case with the weak, who find it difficult to lift a weight not only because of the heaviness of it (and this sometimes happens even with the strong) but also because of the weakness of their power, so that even less heavy things appear heavy to them.

698. The same thing again applies if the question is raised whether the truth is such as it appears to those who are asleep or to those who are awake. For the senses of those who are asleep are fettered, and thus their judgment about sensible things cannot be free like the judgment of those who are awake and whose senses are unfettered. For it has been pointed out above that it would be surprising if they should be perplexed, because it appears from their actions that they are not perplexed, and that they do not think that all of the above-mentioned judgments are equally true. For if someone in Lybia seems in his dreams to be in Athens, or if someone in Paris seems in his dreams to be in Hungary, he does not when he awakens

act in the same way that he would if he were to perceive this when he is awake. For, if he were awake in Athens, he would go to the Odeon, i.e., a building in Athens; but he would not do this if he had merely dreamed it. It is clear, then, that he does not think that what appears to him when he is asleep and what appears when he is awake are equally true.

699. We can argue in the same way with regard to the other issues mentioned above; for even though men often raise questions about these issues, they are not in their own mind perplexed about them. Hence it is clear that their reason for holding to be true everything which appears, is invalid; for they held this position because of the impossibility of deciding which of several opinions is the truer, as has been stated above (353:C 663).

700. Again, concerning future (371).

Here he gives his third argument. He says that in the case of future events, as Plato points out, the opinion of a physician and that of a person who is ignorant of the art of medicine are not “of equal value,” i.e., equally important, certain, true or acceptable, as to the future possibility of some sick person being cured or not. For, while a physician knows the cause of health, this is unknown to someone who is ignorant of the art of medicine. It is clear, then, that the opinion which some held that all opinions are equally true is a foolish one.

701. Again, in the case (372).

He gives his fourth argument, which runs thus: in the case of sensible objects the judgment which a sense makes about some sensible object foreign to it and that which it makes about its proper sensible object are not of equal “value,” i.e., equally true and acceptable; for example, sight and taste do not make the same sort of judgment about colors and flavors, but in the case of colors the judgment of sight must be accepted, “and in the case of flavors,” or savors, the judgment of taste must be accepted. Hence, if sight judges a thing to be sweet and taste judges it to be bitter, taste must be accepted rather than sight.

702. And in the same way too the judgment which a sense makes about its proper sensible object and the one which it makes about something akin to its proper object are not of equal value. Now those things which are said here to be akin to proper sensible objects are called common sensibles, for example, size, number and the like, about which a sense is deceived to a greater degree than it is about its proper sensible object, although it is

deceived about them to a lesser degree than it is about the sensible objects of another sense or about things which are called accidental sensible objects. Hence it is clearly foolish to say that all judgments are equally true.

703. And no one (373).

He now gives his fifth argument. He says that no sense affirms at one instant of time that a thing is simultaneously both so and not so. For sight does not at the same moment affirm that something is white and not white or that it is two cubits and not two cubits or that it is sweet and not sweet. But while a sense's power of judging may seem at different times to form opposite judgments about the same thing, still from this judgment no difficulty ever arises about the sensible modification itself, but only about the subject of this modification. For example, if we take the same subject, wine, sometimes it appears to the sense to taste sweet and sometimes not. This happens either because of some change in the sentient body, i.e., in the organ, which is infected by bitter humors, so that whatever it tastes does not seem sweet to it, or else because of some change in the wine itself. But the sense of taste never changes its judgment without judging sweetness itself to be such as it considered it to be in the sweet thing when it judged it to be sweet; but about sweetness itself it always makes a true affirmation, and always does this in the same way. Hence, if the judgment of a sense is true, as these men claimed, it also follows that the nature of sweetness is necessarily such as it is; and thus something will be definitely true in reality. And it also follows that both an affirmation and a negation can never be true at the same time, because a sense never affirms that something is both sweet and not sweet at the same time, as has been stated.

704. Yet all these (374).

He gives the sixth argument. He says that, just as all of the above-mentioned theories or opinions destroy substantial predicates, as has been shown above (341:C 625), in a similar way they destroy all necessary predicates. For it follows that nothing could ever be predicated of anything else either substantially or necessarily. That nothing could be predicated of anything else substantially is clear from what has been stated above. That nothing could be predicated of anything else necessarily is proved as follows. That is necessary which cannot be otherwise than it is; therefore, if everything which is can exist in one way or in another way, as is held by those who say that contradictories and opposite opinions are true at the same time, it follows that nothing is necessary in the world.

705. And in general (375).

Then he gives the seventh argument. He says that, if everything which appears is true, and a thing is true only insofar as it appears to the senses, it follows that a thing exists only insofar as, it is actually being sensed. But if something exists only in this way, i.e., insofar as it is being sensed, then it follows that nothing would exist if the senses did not exist; and this would follow if there were no animals or living things. But this is impossible.

706. For this can be true, that sensibles under the aspect of their sensibility do not exist; i.e., if they are considered under the aspect of sensibles actualized, they do not exist apart from the senses, for they are sensibles actualized insofar as they are present in a sense. And according to this every actualized sensible is a certain modification of the subject sensing, although this would be impossible if there were no sensory beings. But that the sensible objects which cause this modification in a sense should not exist is impossible. This becomes clear as follows: when some subsequent thing is removed it does not follow that a prior thing is removed. But the thing producing the modification in a sense is not the perception itself, because a perception is not the perception of itself but of something else, and this must be naturally prior to the perception just as a mover is prior to the thing which is moved. For sight does not see itself but sees color.

707. And even if someone were to raise the objection that a sensible object and a sense are correlative and thus naturally simultaneous, so that when one is destroyed the other is destroyed, Aristotle’s thesis is still true; for what is potentially sensible is not said to be relative to a sense because it is referred to a sense, but because the sense is referred to it, as is stated in Book V of this work (496:C 1027)- It is dearly impossible, then, to say that some things are true because they appear to the senses; yet this is what those men maintain who claim that all appearances are true, as is evident from the foregoing statements.

LESSON 15

Refutation of the View that Contradictories Can Be Shown to Be True at the Same Time. Contraries Cannot Belong to the Same Subject at the Same Time

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1011a 3-1011b 22

376. Now there are some, both of those who have been convinced by theories of this kind and of those who merely state them, who raise a difficulty; for they ask who it is that judges a man to be healthy, and in general who it is that judges rightly in each particular case. But such difficulties are like wondering whether we are now asleep or awake; and all such difficulties amount to the same thing. For these people think it fitting that there should be a reason for everything; for they are seeking a starting point, and they think they can get this by demonstration. Yet that sometimes they are not convinced they make evident in their actions. But according to what we have said this is characteristic of them; for they are seeking a reason for things for which no reason can be given, because the starting point of demonstration is not demonstration. These men, then, might easily believe this truth, for it is not difficult to grasp.

377. But those who seek compulsion only in words are seeking the impossible. For they deem it right to speak as they do, and immediately say contrary things.

378. Yet if not all things are relative but some things are absolute, not everything which appears will be true; for that which appears appears to someone. Thus he who says that all things which appear are true, makes all things which are, relative. Hence, those who look for compulsion in words, and think it fitting to maintain this view at the same time, must be careful to add that it is not what appears that is true, but what appears for him to whom it appears, and at the time when it appears, and in the manner in which it appears, and so on. And if they maintain their view but not in this way, it will soon happen that they are saying contrary things. For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sense of sight but not to the sense of taste, and that, since we have two eyes, things will not appear the same to each if their sight is unequal. Now, as we have stated, there are some who say, for the reasons already given (357), that what appears is true, and that all things are therefore equally true and false, because they do not always appear the same to all men or to the same man (for they do not always happen to be the same) but often have contrary appearances at the same time. For touch says there are two objects when the fingers are crossed, but sight says there is one. And in answering these men we must say that what appears is true, but not for the same man and in the same way and at the same time, so that when these qualifications are added what appears will be true. But perhaps it is for this reason that those who argue thus, not because of some difficulty but for the sake of argument, must say that this is not true but true for this person.

379. And, as has been said before (378), they must make everything relative both to opinion and to perception, so that nothing has come to be or will come to be unless someone has first formed an opinion about it. But if something has come to be or will come to be, it is evident that not all things depend on opinion.

380. Further, if a thing is one, it is relative to one thing or to a determinate number; and if the same thing is both half and equal, still the equal is not relative to the double or the half to the equal. If, then, in relation to the thinking subject, man and the object of thought are the same, man will not be the thinking subject but the object of thought. And if each thing is relative to the thinking subject, the thinking subject will be relative to things infinite in species.

381. Let this suffice, then, regarding the points under discussion: that the firmest opinion of all is the one which asserts that opposite statements are not true at the same time; the conclusions that follow for those who say that they are true; and why they speak as they do.

382. But since it is impossible for contradictories to be true of the same subject at the same time, it is evident that contraries cannot belong to the same subject at the same time; for one of two contraries is a privation. But a privation is nothing less than the negation of substance from some determinate genus. Therefore, if it is impossible to affirm and deny something truly at the same time, it is also impossible for contraries to belong to the same subject at the same time; but either both belong in a certain respect, or the one in a certain respect and the other absolutely.

COMMENTARY

708. He argues against those who adopted the above-mentioned theory not because of any reason but merely because they are obstinate; and in regard to this he does two things. First (376:C 7o8), he shows how these men were moved to adopt this opinion; and second (377:C 711), how thit opinion must be dealt with ("But those who").

He accordingly says, first (376), that, besides the foregoing thinkers who adopted the above-mentioned opinion because of certain difficulties, there are some "among those who have been persuaded to accept these views," or opinions (i.e., those who continue to deceive themselves and have only these arguments to support their view), who raise a question. Another translation reads: "Now there are some, both of those who have been convinced by theories of this kind and of those who merely state them, who are puzzled or raise a question." And this statement means that some of those who are puzzled, i.e., some of those who hold the above-mentioned opinion, consider only these difficulties and use the arguments which are given below. For if someone says to them that in the case of contrary opinions we should believe those persons who are healthy rather than those who are ill, and those who are wise rather than those who are ignorant, and those who are awake rather than those who are asleep, they will immediately ask how it is possible to distinguish with certainty between a healthy person and a sick one, and one who is awake and one who is asleep, and one who is wise and one who is foolish. In short, regarding all differences of opinion they will ask how it is possible to decide which one of these judges rightly in each particular case; for a man may seem to be wise to some and foolish to others, and the same applies in other cases.

709. But these questions are foolish, for they are similar to the question whether we are now asleep or awake; for the distinction between all of these is not essential. Yet all of the foregoing difficulties amount to the same thing since they have a common root. For these sophists desire that demonstrative arguments should be given for all things; for it is obvious that they wanted to take some starting point which would be for them a kind of rule whereby they could distinguish between those who are healthy and those who are ill, and between those who are awake and those who are asleep. And they were not content to know this rule in just any way at all but wanted to acquire it by demonstration. That these men were in error, then, becomes evident from their actions, according to what has been said. And from these considerations it appears that their position is false; for if the judgments of one who is asleep and of one who is awake were equally good, then the same thing would result from each judgment when men act. But this is clearly false. Another text says, “But that sometimes they are not convinced they make evident in their actions”; and this statement is the clearer one in the light of the things laid down above. For although these men maintain this view and raise such questions, still they are not deceived in their own mind so that they believe the judgment of one who is asleep and the judgment of one who is awake to be equally true. And this is clear from their actions, as has been pointed out.

710. But even though they are not deceived so as to be perplexed in this matter, this “nevertheless is characteristic of them,” i.e., this weakness of mind that they should seek a demonstrative argument for things for which no demonstration can be given. For “the starting point of demonstration is not demonstration”; i.e., there can be no demonstration of it. And this is easy for them to believe, because this too is not difficult to grasp by demonstration; for a demonstrative argument proves that not all things can be demonstrated, otherwise there would be an infinite regress.

711. But those who (377).

He now argues against the other philosophers, i.e., against those who were not moved to maintain that all appearances are true on the grounds that no rule can be established demonstratively whereby it is possible to distinguish with certainty between those who judge rightly and those who do not, but who hold the above-mentioned theory or view only because they are insolent.

In regard to this he does three things. First (377:C 711), he shows that such insolence tends to lead to an impossible conclusion. Second (378:C 712), he indicates the way in which it seems necessary to oppose them ("Yet if not all things"). Third (379:C V6), he explains how we must meet their argument from the viewpoint of truth ("And, as has been").

He accordingly says, first (377), that those who seek "compulsion merely in words," i.e., those who are not moved by any reason or because of the difficulty involved in some problem or because of some failure in demonstration but depend solely on words and believe that they can say anything which cannot be disproved-such people as these want to argue to an impossible conclusion. For they want to adopt the principle that contraries are true at the same time on the grounds that all appearances are true.

712. Yet if not all (378).

Then he shows how we may oppose these men by using their own position and avoid the foregoing impossible conclusion. He says that, unless everything which is, is claimed to be relative, it cannot be said that every appearance is true. For if there are some things in the world which have absolute being and are not relative to perception or to opinion, being and appearing will not be the same; for appearing implies a relation to perception or to opinion, because that which appears appears to someone; and thus whatever is not an appearance must be true. It is clear, then, that whoever says that all appearances are true, makes all beings relative, i.e., to perception or to opinion. Hence, in opposing the foregoing sophists who seek compulsion in words, we may say that, if anyone thinks it fitting "to grant this view," i.e., to concede this opinion which they maintain, he must be careful, or observant, lest he be led to admit that contradictories are true at the same time; for it should not be said unqualifiedly that everything which appears is true, but that what appears is true for the one to whom it appears, and inasmuch as it appears, and when it appears, and in the manner in which it appears. We would be allowed to add these qualifications on the grounds that a thing does not have being in an absolute sense but only relatively.

713. Now this should be noted by those who want to adopt this position, because if someone were to grant them that every appearance is true, and thus not admit the above-mentioned qualifications, as has been stated, it would follow immediately that he is saying that contraries are true at the same time. For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sense of sight because its color resembles that of honey, and not appear to be honey to the sense of taste because it does not taste like honey. And similarly when two eyes are unlike, the vision which is had through each is not the same, or the visual impressions which we get through each eye do not seem the same. For example, if the pupil of one eye were infected by some gross or dark vapor, and the other were free of this, all things would seem dark or obscure through the infected eye but not through the good one. I say, then, that one must be careful, or observant, because this is necessary in confronting the foregoing sophists, who say, for the reasons given above (376:C 708), that every appearance is true.

714. And from this position it would also follow that all things are equally true and false, because they do not appear the same to all men or even the same to one man, since the same man very often makes contrary judgments about the same thing at the same time on the basis of different senses; for example, sight judges that thing to be one which touch judges to be two, because when the fingers are crossed it happens that the same tangible object is sensed by different organs of touch; that is, the contact through different fingers affects the tactual power as though there were two tangible objects. But it does not seem to the same man through the same sense and in the same way and at the same time that this is true namely, that contraries are true at the same time.

715. Therefore, it is perhaps necessary to use this answer against the above-mentioned sophists who argue thus not because of some difficulty but for the sake of argument (as though upholding this statement for its own sake because they are perverse), namely, that this is not true absolutely but true for this person. For it does not follow from this that contradictories are true at the same time, because it is not contradictory that something should be true for one person and not true for another.

716. And, as has been said (379).

He tells us that we should oppose the foregoing sophists from the standpoint of the truth and not just offer an argument ad hominem, namely, not by granting the false opinion which they maintain. And he does this by means of two arguments. The first is this: as has been stated before, if everything which appears is true, they must “make all things relative,” i.e., to perception or to opinion. Now from this the untenable position follows that nothing may exist or come to be if it is not thought of in some way. But if this is false (because’ many things are and come to be of which there is neither opinion nor knowledge, for example, things which exist in the depths of the sea or in the bowels of the earth), it is evident that not all things are relative, i.e., to perception or to opinion. Hence not every appearance is true.

717. Further, if a thing (380).

He gives the second argument. He says that what is one is relative only to one thing, and not to any one thing at all but to a determinate one. For example, it is clear that the half and the equal may be the same in their subject, yet the double is not said to be relative to the equal but rather to the half; but equal is said to be relative to equal. Similarly, if man himself as a thinking subject is also the object of thought, man is not relative to the thinking subject as a thinking subject, but as the object of thought. If, then, all beings are relative to a thinking sub iect as such, it follows that what I call the thinking subject is not one, since one is relative only to one, but it is an infinite number of things in species, since an infinite number of things are related to it. But this is impossible. Hence it cannot be said that all things are said to be relative to a thinking subject, or that everything which appears so, or is thought to be so, is therefore true.

718. Let this suffice (381).

He now draws his intended conclusion, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he draws his main conclusion; and second (382:C 719), he derives a corollary from it (“But since it is impossible”).

He accordingly says, first (381), that it is clear from the above statement that the most certain of all opinions or views is the one which states that opposite statements or propositions, i.e., contradictory ones, are not true at the same time. And the impossible conclusions which face those who say that they are true at the same time, and the reason which moved them to say this, have also been explained.

719. But since it is impossible (382).

He draws the corollary. He says that, since it is impossible, from what has been said, for two contradictories to be true of the same subject at the same time, it is also evident that contraries cannot belong to the same subject; for the privative character of one of two contraries is no less evident in the case of contraries than it is in the case of other opposites, although each of two contraries is a positive reality; for it does not consist in affirmation and negation or in privation and possession. For one of them is imperfect when compared with the other, as black when compared with white, and bitter with sweet; and thus it has a kind of privation added to it. But privation is negation of substance, i.e., in some determinate subject. And it is also the deprivation of some determinate genus; for it is a negation within a genus. For not everything which does not see is said to be blind, but only that which is found in the genus of seeing things. It is clear, then, that a contrary includes privation, and that privation is a kind of negation. Hence, if it is impossible both to affirm and to deny something at the same time, it is also impossible for contraries to belong absolutely to the same subject at the same time; but either "both belong to it," i.e., relatively, as when both are present potentially or partially, or one is present in a certain respect and the other absolutely; or one is present in many and the more important parts, and the other only in some part; for example, an Ethiopian is black absolutely and white as regards his teeth.

LESSON 16

No Intermediate between Contradictories. How Heraclitus and Anaxagoras Influenced This Position

ARISTOTLE'S TEXT Chapter 7: 1011b 23-1012a 28

383. Neither can there be an intermediate between contradictories, but of each subject it is necessary either to affirm or to deny one thing. This first becomes evident when people define what truth and falsity are; for to say that what is, is not, or that what is not, is, is false; and to say that what is, is, or that what is not, is not, is true. Hence he who affirms that something is or is not will say either what is true or what is false. But neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.

384. Further, an intermediate between contradictories will be such either in the way that green is an intermediate between white and black, or as what is neither a man nor a horse is an intermediate between a man and a horse. If it is of the latter sort, there will then be no change; for change is from what is good to what is not-good, or from the latter to the former. But that this now occurs is always apparent; for change takes place only between opposites and intermediates. But if it is a true intermediate, then in this case there will be a kind of change to something white, but not from what is not-white. However, this is not now apparent.

385. Further, the mind either affirms or denies every sensible and intelligible object. This is clear from the definition, because it expresses

what is true or what is false. Indeed, when the mind composes in this way by affirming or denying, it says what is true; and when it does it otherwise, it says what is false.

386. Again, there must be an intermediate in addition to all contradictories, unless one is arguing for the sake of argument. In that case one will say what is neither true nor false. And then there will be something else besides being and non-being; and therefore there will also be some kind of change besides generation and corruption.

387. Again, there will also be an intermediate in all those classes of things in which the negation of a term implies its contrary; for example, in the class of numbers there will be a number which is neither even nor odd. But this is impossible, as is evident from the definition.

388. Further, there will be an infinite regress, and there will be things which are related not only as half again as much but even more. For it will also be possible to deny the intermediate both with reference to its affirmation and to its negation; and this again will be something, for its substance is something different.

389. Again, when one answers “no” to the question whether a thing is white, he has denied nothing except that it is; and its not-being is a negation.

390. Now some men have formed this opinion in the same way that other unreasonable opinions have been formed; for when they cannot refute eristic arguments, they assent to the argument and claim that the conclusion is true. Some men hold this view, then, for this reason, and others because they seek an explanation for everything.

391. The starting point to be used against all of these people is the definition, and the definition results from the necessity of their meaning something; for the concept, of which the word is a sign, is a definition.

392. Now the statement of Heraclitus, which says that all things are and are not, seems to make all things true; and the statement of Anaxagoras that there is an intermediate between contradictories seems to make everything false; for when all things are mixed together, the mixture is neither good nor not good, so that it is impossible to say anything true.

COMMENTARY

720. Having argued dialectically against those who maintain that contradictories are true at the same time, Aristotle now argues against those who maintain that there is an intermediate between contradictories; for these thinkers do not always say that the one or the other part of a contradiction is true. In regard to this he does two things. First (383:C 720), he argues against this position. Second (393:C 736), he argues against certain other unreasonable questions which follow from this position and from the one above ("With these points").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises arguments against the position mentioned. Second (390:C 730, he gives the reason why some thinkers have been moved to hold this position ("Now some men").

In regard to the first part he gives seven arguments. He says, first (383), that, just as contradictories cannot be true at the same time, neither can there be an intermediate between contradictories, but it is necessary either to affirm or deny one or the other.

721. This first becomes evident from the definition of truth and falsity; for to say what is false is simply to say that what is, is not, or that what is not, is. And to say what is true is simply to say that what is, is, or that what is not is not. It is clear, then, that whoever says that something is, says either what is true or what is false; and if he says what is true, it must be so, because to say what is true is to say that what is, is. And if he says what is false, it must not be so, because to say what is false is simply to say that what is, is not. The same thing applies if he says that something is not; for if he says what is false, it must be; and if he says what is true, it must not be. Therefore, either the affirmation or the negation is necessarily true. But he who holds that there is an intermediate between contradictories does not claim that it is necessary to say that what is either is or is not; nor does he claim that it is necessary to speak in this way about what is not. Thus neither he who affirms nor he who denies need say what is true or what is false.

722. Further, an intermediate (384).

He gives the second argument, which runs thus: an intermediate between any two contradictories can be understood in one way as something that participates in each of the extremes, and this is an intermediate in the same genus, as green or yellow is an intermediate between white and black; or in another way as something that is the negation of each extreme, and such an intermediate is different in genus; for example, a stone, which is neither a man nor a horse, is an intermediate between a man and a horse. Therefore, if there is an intermediate between contradictories, it will be such either in the first way or in the second.

723. If it is an intermediate in the second way, there will be no change. This becomes clear as follows: every change is from what is not-good to what is good, or from what is good to what is not-good. Hence, since change is between contraries, for example, white and black, change must take place between things which are opposed as contradictories; for black is not white, as is clear from the above statements. But according to the foregoing position there cannot be change from what is not-good to what is good, or the reverse. Hence there will be no change. Yet it always appears or seems that change proceeds from what is not-good to what is good, or the reverse. That every change of this sort would be destroyed if the foregoing position is true ‘becomes clear as follows. Change can take place only between contraries and intermediates which belong to the same genus. But there can be a change from one extreme to another only through an intermediate. Therefore, if there is an intermediate between contradictories as the negation of both, i.e., as something belonging to a different genus, it will be impossible for change to take place between an extreme and an intermediate, and therefore between one extreme and another.

724. And if it is an intermediate in the first way, so that the intermediate between contradictories belongs to the same genus by participating in both, as yellow is an intermediate between white and black, ‘this impossible conclusion follows: there will be some process of generation which terminates in white and does not come from the not-white, because change proceeds not only from one extreme to another but also from an intermediate. But it does not seem to be true that there is any process of change terminating in the white which does not proceed from the not-white. Thus it is clear that there is no way at all in which there can be an intermediate between contradictories.

725. Further, the mind (385).

He gives the third argument, which runs thus: in every one of the conceptions by which the intellect knows or understands, it either affirms or denies something. Now from the definition of truth and falsity it seems that whether one affirms or denies he must say what is true or what is false;

because when the intellect composes in this way, either by affirming or denying as the matter stands in reality, it expresses what is true; but when it does it otherwise, it expresses what is false. Thus it is clear that a true statement must always be either an affirmation or a negation, because some opinion must be true, and every opinion is either an affirmation or a negation. Hence it must always be either an affirmation or a negation that is true; and thus there is no intermediate between contradictories.

726. Again, there must (386).

Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: if one maintains that there must be an intermediate between contradictories, then it is necessary to say that in the case of all contradictories there must be besides the contradictories themselves something true which is an intermediate between them, unless this person is arguing "for the sake of argument," i.e., without any real reason but only because it pleases him to speak in this way. But this cannot be true in all cases, because the true and the not-true are contradictories. Thus it would follow that there is someone who says what is neither true nor false. But the opposite of this was made clear from the definition of truth and falsity.

727. Similarly, since being and nonbeing are contradictories, it will follow that there is something besides being and non-being, and thus there will be some kind of change besides generation and corruption; for generation is a change to being, and corruption a change to non-being. Therefore there can be no intermediate between contradictories.

728. Again, there will (387).

He gives the fifth argument. He says that in some genera a negation takes the place of a contrary difference; or, according to another text, "negation supplies the contrary," because one of two contraries, which must be in the same genus, derives its definition from negation, as is clear in the case of the even and the odd, and the just and unjust. Therefore, if there is an intermediate between affirmation and negation, there will be some intermediate between all these contraries, since they obviously depend on affirmation and negation; for example, in the case of number, there will be some number which is neither even nor odd. But this is clearly impossible in the light of the definition of the even and the odd; for the even is what can be divided into equal numbers, and the odd is what cannot. Therefore it follows that there cannot be an intermediate between affirmation and negation.

729. Further, there will (388).

He now gives the sixth argument: those who claim that there is an intermediate between an affirmation and a negation hold some third thing besides these two, which all posit in common, saying that there is nothing intermediMe between them. But three is related it) two “as half again as much,” i.e., in a proportion of one and a half to one. Therefore, according to the opinion of

those who hold an intermediate between an affirmation and a negation it appears at first sight that all things “will be related as half again as much,” i.e., in a proportion of one and a half to one to the things which are given, because there will be not only affirmations and negations but also intermediates. And this is not the only conclusion that follows, but it also follows that there will be many more things in infinite regression. For it is evident that everything which can be affirmed can also be denied. But if it is possible to affirm that the following three things exist: an affirmation, a negation and an intermediate, it is then also possible to deny these three. And just as a negation differs from an affirmation, in a similar way there will also be some fourth thing which differs from the three mentioned; for it will have a different substance and intelligible structure than those just mentioned, in the same way that a negation has a different substance and intelligible structure from an affirmation. And it is possible to deny these four, and the negations of these will be true; and so on to infinity. Hence there will be infinitely more things than have just been posited. This seems absurd.

730. Again, when one (389).

He gives the seventh argument, and it runs as follows: if someone were to ask whether a man or some other thing is white, the one answering him must say either “yes” or “no.” If he says “yes,” it is plain that he says that the affirmation is true; but if he does not affirm this but says “no,” it is clear that he denies this. Now the only thing which he denies is what he was asked, and the negation of this is non-being because it is negative. Therefore it follows that, when he answers this question, he must of necessity either admit the affirmative or assert the negative. Hence there is no intermediate between these two.

731. Now some men (390).

He gives the reason why some men adopt this opinion, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows why some men have held this opinion. Second (391:C 733), he explains how one can argue dialectically against them (“The starting point”). Third (392:C 734), he notes the philosophical views on which the foregoing opinions depend (“Now the statement”)

He accordingly says, first (390), that the foregoing opinion, like other unreasonable opinions, is adopted by certain thinkers for one of two reasons. The first is this: when some men cannot refute “eristic arguments,” i.e., disputatious or sophistical arguments, which are presented to them either by others or by themselves, they agree with the one giving the argument and assent to the conclusion, saying that what has been shown is true. And then they try to confirm this by devising other arguments.

732. The second reason why men adopt this position is that some men want to discover an argument to prove everything, and therefore whatever cannot be proved they do not want to affirm but deny. But first principles, which are the common conceptions of all men, cannot be proved. Hence these men deny them and thereby adopt unreasonable views.

733. The starting point (391).

He indicates the starting point from which one must proceed to argue against such opinions. He says that the starting point is derived from the definitions of truth and falsity, or from the definitions of other terms, as is clear from the arguments given above. For men must admit the definitions of things if they hold that words signify something; for the intelligible expression of a thing which a word signifies is a thing’s definition. But if they do not admit that all words signify something, they do not differ from plants, as has been said above (348:C 652).

734. Now the statement (392).

Here he gives the opinion on which the foregoing opinions depend. He says that these opinions stem from the position of Heraclitus, who said that all things are in motion, and therefore that they both are and are not at the same time. And since what is being moved has non-being mixed with being, it follows that everything is true.

735. And from the position of Anaxagoras it follows that there is an intermediate between contradictories; for he held that everything is mixed

with everything, because everything comes from everything. But neither of the extremes can be predicated of the mixture; for example, intermediate colors are neither whiteness or blackness. Hence the mixture is neither good nor not-good, neither white nor not-white; and thus there is an intermediate between contradictories. It follows, then, that everything is false; for according to the common opinion we posit nothing but affirmation and negation. Hence, if both an affirmation and its negation are false, it follows that everything is false.

LESSON 17

Rejection of the opinions that Everything Is True and False, and that Everything Is at Rest and in Motion

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1012a 29-1012b 31

393. With these points settled it is evident that the theories which have been expressed univocally and about all things cannot be true as some affirm them to be. Now some say that nothing is true (for they say that there is nothing to prevent all statements from being like the statement that the diagnoal of a square is commensurable with one of its sides), and others say that everything is true. These views are almost the same as that of Heraclitus; for he who says that all things are true and all false admits both views apart from his own words. Hence, if those are impossible, these also must be impossible.

394. Further, it is evident that there are contradictories which cannot be true at the same time. Nor can they all be false, though this would seem more possible from what has been said.

395. But in opposing all such views it is necessary to postulate, as has been stated in the above discussion (332), not ‘ that something is or is not, but that a word signifies something. Hence it is necessary to argue from a definition, once we have accepted what truth and falsity mean. But if to say what is true is merely to deny what is false, not everything can be false. For one part of a contradiction must be true.

396. Again, if everything must be either affirmed or denied, both cannot be false; for one part of a contradiction is false.

397. And the view commonly expressed applies to all such theories—they destroy themselves; for he who says that everything is true makes the contrary of his own statement true, and thus makes his own not true; for the contrary denies that it is true. And he who says that everything is false makes his own statement false. But if the former makes an exception of the contrary statement, saying that it alone is not true, and the latter makes an exception of his own statement, saying that it is not false, still they will have to consider the truth and falsity of an infinite number of statements. For he who says that a true statement is true is right; and this process will go on to infinity.

398. Now it is evident that those who say that all things are at rest do not speak the truth, and neither do those who say that all things are in motion.

399. For if all things are at rest, the same thing will always be true and false; btit this seems to be something that changes, for he who makes a statement at mic time was not and again will not be.

400. And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true, and so everything will be false. But it has been shown that this is impossible.

401. Further, it must be some being which is changed; for change is from something to something.

402. But it is not true that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing always; for there is something which always moves the things that are being moved, and the first mover is itself immovable.

COMMENTARY

736. He argues dialectically against certain positions which stem from those mentioned above. First (393:C736), he argues against certain men who destroy the principles of logic; and second (398:C 744), against certain men who destroy the principles of natural philosophy (“Now it is evident”).

For first philosophy should argue dialectically against those who deny the principles of the particular sciences, because all principles are based on the principle that an affirmation and a negation are not true at the same time, and that there is no intermediate between them. Now these principles are the most specific principles of this science, since they depend on the concept of being, which is the primary subject of this branch of philosophy. But the true and the false belong specifically to the study of logic; for they depend on the kind of being which is found in the mind, with which logic deals; for truth and falsity exist in the mind, as is stated in Book VI of this work (558:C 1231). Motion and rest, on the other hand, belong properly to the study of natural philosophy, because nature is defined as a principle of motion and of rest. Now the error made about truth and falsity is a result of the error made about being and nonbeing, for truth and falsity are defined by means of being and non-being, as has been said above. For there is ‘truth when one says that what is, is, or that what is not, is not; and falsity is defined in the opposite way. And similarly the error made about rest and motion is a result of the error made about being and non-being; for what is in motion as such does not yet exist, whereas what is at rest already is. Hence, when the errors made about being and non-being have been removed, the errors made about truth and falsity and rest and motion will then also be removed.

737. Regarding the first part of this division he does two things. First (393:C 737), he gives the erroneous opinions about truth and falsity. Second (394:C 739), he criticizes these opinions (“Further, it is evident”).

Thus he says (393) that, “with these points settled,” i.e., with the foregoing points established which have to be used against the paradoxical positions mentioned above, it is obviously impossible that the views of some men should be true, namely, that we must form an opinion “univocally,” i.e., think in the same way, about all things, so that we should say that all things are equally true or equally false. For some thinkers said that nothing is true but everything false, and that there is nothing to prevent us from saying that all statements are just as false as the statement (which is false) that the diameter of a square is commensurate with one of its sides. But others have said that all things are true. Statements of the latter kind are a result of the opinion of Heraclitus, as has been pointed out (362:C 684); for he said that a thing is and is not at the same time, and from this it follows that everything is true.

738. And lest perhaps someone might say that besides these opinions there is also a third one, which states that everything is both true and false at the same time, he replies, as though meeting a tacit objection, that anyone who maintains this opinion also maintains both of the foregoing ones.

Hence, if the first two opinions are impossible, the third must also be impossible.

739. Further, it is evident (394).

Then he presents arguments against the foregoing opinions, and the first of these is as follows: it is evident that there are certain contradictories which cannot be true at the same time or false at the same time, for example, the true and not-true, being and non-being. This can be better understood from what has been said. Therefore, if one of these two contradictories must be false and the other true, not all things can be true or all false.

740. But in opposing (395).

He gives the second argument. He says that in opposing “these views,” or positions, “it is necessary to postulate,” or request, not that someone should admit that something either is or is not in reality, as has been stated above (332:C 611), because this seems to be begging the question, but that he should admit that a word signifies something. Now if this is not granted, the dispute comes to an end; but if it is granted, it is then necessary to give definitions, as has already been stated above (332:C 611). Hence we must argue against these thinkers by proceeding from definitions, and in the case of the present thesis we must do this especially by considering the definition of falsity. Now if truth consists merely in affirming what it is false to deny, and vice versa, it follows that not all statements can be false, because either the affirmation or the negation of something must be true. For obviously truth consists simply in saying that what is, is, or in saying that what is not, is not; and falsity consists in saying that what is, is not, or in saying that what is not, is. Hence it is clear that it is true to say that that is of which it is false that it is not, or to say that that is not of which it is false that it is; and it is false to say that that is of which it is true that it is not, or to say that that is not of which it is true that it is. Thus from the definition of truth and falsity it is clear that not all things are false. And for the same reason it is clear that not all things are true.

741. Again, if everything (396).

Here he gives the third argument, which runs thus: it is clear from what has been said above that we must either affirm or deny something of each thing since there is no intermediate between contradictories. It is impossible, then, for everything to be false. And by the same reasoning it is proved that it is impossible for everything to be true, i.e., by reason of the fact that it is impossible both to affirm and to deny something at the same time.

742. And the view (397).

He gives the fourth argument: all of the foregoing statements, or opinions, face this unreasonable result-they destroy themselves. This is "the view commonly expressed," i.e., a frequently heard statement made by all; and thus another text says, "It happens that it is commonly held." He proves this view as follows: anyone who says that everything is true makes the contrary of his own opinion true. But the contrary of his own opinion is that his own opinion is not true. Therefore he who says that everything is true says that his own opinion is not true; and thus he destroys his own opinion. Similarly it is evident that he who says that everything is false also says that his own opinion is false.

743. And because someone could say that he who claims that everything is true makes an exception of the one contrary to his own statement or bars it from what holds universaily (and the same thing applies to one who says that everything is false), he therefore

rejects this answer. He says that, if the one who says that everything is true makes his own contrary opinion an exception, saying that it alone is not true, and if the one who says that everything is false makes his own opinion an exception, saying that it alone is not false, none the less it follows that they will be able "to consider," or bring forward, an infinite number of true statements against those who hold that all are false, and an infinite number of false statements against those who hold that all are true. For granted that one opinion is true, it follows that an infinite number are true. And granted that one opinion is false, it follows that an infinite number are false. For if the position, or opinion, that Socrates is sitting is true, then the opinion that it is true that Socrates is sitting will also be true, and so on to infinity. For he who says that a true statement is true is always right; and he who says that a false statement is true is always wrong; and this can proceed to infinity.

744. Now it is (398).

He argues against those who destroy the principles of nature, i.e., motion and rest, and in regard to this he does three things.

First, he mentions the falsity of these opinions, saying that it is evident, from what has been said above, that neither the opinion which states that everything is in motion, nor the one which states that everything is at rest, is true.

745. For if all things (399).

Second, he shows that these opinions are false. First of all he shows that the opinion which holds that everything is at rest is false; for if everything were at rest,'nothing would then be changed from the state in which it sometimes is. Hence, whatever is true would always be true, and whatever is false would always be false. But this seems to be absurd; for the truth and falsity of a proposition is changeable. Nor is this to be wondered at, because the man who has an opinion or makes a statement at one time was not and now is and again will not be.

746. Second, he uses two arguments to show that the opinion which holds that all things are in motion is false. He gives the first (400) where he says, "And if all things." It is as follows. If all things are in motion and nothing is at rest, nothing will be true in the world; for what is true already exists, but what is in motion does not yet exist. Hence everything must be false. But this is impossible, as has been shown (395:C 740).

747. Further, it must be (401).

He gives the second argument, and it runs thus: everything that is undergoing change is necessarily a being, because everything that is being changed is being changed from something to something else, and everything that is being changed in something else belongs to the subject that is undergoing change. Hence it is not necessary to say that everything in the subject undergoing change is being changed, but that there is something which remains. Hence not everything is in motion.

748. But it is not (402).

He gives the third argument, and it disposes of a false opinion which could arise from what has been said above. For, since not all things are in motion nor all at rest, someone could therefore think that all things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest. In disposing of this opinion he says that, it is not true that all things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest, for there are certain movable things which are always being moved, namely, the celestial bodies above us, and there is a mover, namely, the first, which is always immovable and ever in the same state, as has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics.

BOOK V

DEFINITIONS

LESSON I

Five Senses of the Term “Principle.” The Common Definition of Principle

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1012b 34-1013a 23

403. In one sense the term principle [beginning or starting point] means that from which someone first moves something; for example, in the case of a line or a journey, if the motion is from here, this is the principle, but if the motion is in the opposite direction, this is something different. In another sense principle means that from which a thing best comes into being, as the starting point of instruction; for sometimes it is not from what is first or from the starting point of the thing that one must begin, but from that from which one learns most readily. Again, principle means that first inherent thing from which something is brought into being, as the keel of a ship and the foundation of a house, and as some suppose the heart to be the principle in animals, and others the brain, and others anything else of the sort. In another sense it means that non-inherent first thing from which something comes into being; and that from which motion and change naturally first begins, as a child comes from its father and mother, and a fight from abusive language. In another sense principle means that according to whose will movable things are moved and changeable things are changed; in states, for example, princely, magistral, imperial, or tyrannical power are all principles. And so also are the arts, especially the architectonic arts, called principles. And that from which a thing can first be known is also called a

principle of that thing, as the postulates of demonstrations. And causes are also spoken of in the same number of senses, for all causes are principles.

404. Therefore, it is common to all principles to be the first thing from which a thing either is, comes to be, or is known. And of these some are intrinsic and others extrinsic. And for this reason nature is a principle, and so also is an element, and mind, purpose, substance, and the final cause; for good and evil are the principles both of the knowledge and motion of many things.

COMMENTARY

PRINCIPLE

751. Now it should be noted that, although a principle and a cause are the same in subject, they nevertheless differ in meaning; for the term principle implies an order or sequence, whereas the term cause implies some influence on the being of the thing caused. Now an order of priority and posteriority is found in different things; but according to what is first known by us order is found in local motion, because that kind of motion is more evident to the senses. Further, order is found in three classes of things, one of which is naturally associated with the other, i.e., continuous quantity, motion and time. For insofar as there is priority and posteriority in continuous quantity, there is priority and posteriority in motion; and insofar as there is priority and posteriority in motion, there is priority and posteriority in time, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. Therefore, because a principle is said to be what is first in any order, and the order which is considered according to priority and posteriority in continuous quantity is first known by us (and things are named by us insofar as they are known to us), for this reason the term principle, properly considered, designates what is first in a continuous quantity over which motion passes. Hence he says that a principle is said to be “that from which someone first moves something,” i.e., any part of a continuous quantity from which local motion begins. Or, according to another reading, “Some part of a thing from which motion will first begin”; i.e., some part of a thing from which it first begins to be moved; for example in the case of a line and in that of any kind of journey the principle is the point from which motion begins. But the opposite or contrary point is “something different or other,” i.e., the end or

terminus. It should also be noted that a principle of motion and a principle of time belong to this class for the reason just given.

752. But because motion does not always begin from the starting point of a continuous quantity but from that part from which the motion of each thing begins most readily, he therefore gives a second meaning of principle, saying that we speak of a principle of motion in another way “as that from which a thing best comes into being,” i.e., the point from which each thing begins to be moved most easily. He makes this clear by an example; for in the disciplines one does not always begin to learn from something that is a beginning in an absolute sense and by nature, but from that from which one “is able to learn” most readily, i.e., from those things which are better known to us, even though they are sometimes more remote by their nature.

753. Now this sense of principle differs from the first. For in the first sense a principle of motion gets its name from the starting point of a continuous quantity, whereas here the principle of continuous quantity gets its name from the starting point of motion. Hence in the case of those motions which are over circular continuous quantities and have no starting point, the principle is also considered to be the point from which the movable body is best or most fittingly moved according to its nature. For example, in the case of the first thing moved [the first sphere] the starting point is in the east. The same thing is true in the case of our own movements; for a man does not always start to move from the beginning of a road but sometimes from the middle or from any terminus at all from which it is convenient for him to start moving.

754. Now from the order considered in local motion we come to know the order in other motions. And for this reason we have the senses of principle based upon the principle of generation or coming to be of things. But this is taken in two ways; for it is either “inherent,” i.e., intrinsic, or “non-inherent,” i.e., extrinsic.

755. In the first way, then, a principle means that part of a thing which is first generated and from which the generation of the thing begins; for example, in the case of a ship the first thing to come into being is the base or keel, which is in a certain sense the foundation on which the whole superstructure of the ship is raised. And, similarly, in the case of a house the first thing that comes into being is the foundation. And in the case of an animal the first thing that comes into being, according to some, is the heart,

and according to others, the brain or some such member of the body. For an animal is distinguished from a non-animal by reason of sensation and motion. Now the principle of motion appears to be in the heart, and sensory operations are most evident in the brain. Hence those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of motion held that the heart is the principle in the generation of an animal. But those who considered an animal only from the viewpoint of the senses held that the brain is this principle; yet the first principle of sensation is also in the heart even though the operations of the senses are completed in the brain. And those who considered an animal from the viewpoint of operation, or according to some of its activities, held that the organ which is naturally disposed for that operation, as the liver or some other such part is the first part which is generated in an animal. But according to the view of the Philosopher the first part is the heart because all of the soul's powers are diffused throughout the body by means of the heart.

756. In the second way, a principle means that from which a thing's process of generation begins but which is outside the thing. This is made clear in the case of three classes of things. The first is that of natural beings, in which the principle of generation is said to be the first thing from which motion naturally begins in those things which come about through motion (as those which come about through alteration or through some similar kind of motion; for example, a man is said to become large or white); or that from which a complete change begins (as in the case of those things which are not a result of motion but come into being through mutation alone). This is evident in the case of substantial generation; for example, a child comes from its father and mother, who are its principles, and a fight from abusive language, which stirs the souls of men to quarrel.

757. The second class in which this is made clear is that of human acts, whether ethical or political, in which that by whose will or intention others are moved or changed is called a principle. Thus those who hold civil, imperial, or even tyrannical power in states are said to have the principal places; for it is by their will that all things come to pass or are put into motion in states. Those men are said to have civil power who are put in command of particular offices in states, as judges and persons of this kind. Those are said to have imperial power who govern everyone without exception, as kings. And those hold tyrannical power who through violence

and disregard for law keep royal power within their grip for their own benefit.

758. He gives as the third class things made by art; for the arts too in a similar way are called principles of artificial things, because the motion necessary for producing an artifact begins from an art. And of these arts the architectonic, which “derive their name” from the word principle, i.e., those called principal arts, are said to be principles in the highest degree. For by architectonic arts we mean those which govern subordinate arts, as the art of the navigator governs the art of ship-building, and the military art governs the art of horsemanship.

759. Again, in likeness to the order considered in external motions a certain order may also be observed in our apprehensions of things, and especially insofar as our act of understanding, by proceeding from principles to conclusions, bears a certain resemblance to motion. Therefore in another way that is said to be a principle from which a thing first becomes known; for example, we say that “postulates,” i.e., axioms and assumptions, are principles of demonstrations.

760. Causes are also said to be principles in these ways, “for all causes are principles.” For the motion that terminates in a thing’s being begins from some cause, although it is not designated a cause and a principle from the same point of view, as was pointed out above (750).

761. Therefore, it is (404).

Then he reduces all of the abovementioned senses of principle to one that is common. He says that all of the foregoing senses have something in common inasmuch as that is said to be a principle which comes first (1) either with reference to a thing’s being (as the first part of a thing is said to be a principle) or (2) with reference to its coming to be (as the first mover is said to be a principle) or with reference to the knowing of it.

762. But while all principles agree in the respect just mentioned, they nevertheless differ, because some are intrinsic and others extrinsic, as is clear from the above. Hence nature and element, which are intrinsic, can be principles-nature as that from which motion begins, and element as the first part in a thing’s generation. “And mind,” i.e., intellect, and “purpose,” i.e., a man’s intention, are said to be principles as extrinsic ones. Again, “a thing’s substance,” i.e., its form, which is its principle of being, is called an intrinsic principle, since a thing has being by its form. Again, according to

what has been said, that for the sake of which something comes to be is said to be one of its principles. For the good, which has the character of an end in the case of pursuing, and evil in that of shunning, are principles of the knowledge and motion of many things; that is, all those which are done for the sake of some end. For in the realm of nature, in that of moral acts, and in that of artifacts, demonstrations make special use of the final cause.

LESSON 2

The Four Classes of Causes. Several Causes of the Same Effect. Causes May Be Causes of Each Other. Contraries Have the Same Cause

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1013a 24-1013b 16

405. In one sense the term cause means that from which, as something intrinsic, a thing comes to be, as the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet, and the genera of these. In another sense it means the form and pattern of a thing, i.e., the intelligible expression of the quiddity and its genera (for example, the ratio of 2: 1 and number in general are the cause of an octave chord) and the parts which are included in the intelligible expression. Again, that from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes is a cause; for example, an adviser is a cause, and a father is the cause of a child, and in general a maker is a cause of the thing made, and a changer a cause of the thing changed. Further, a thing is a cause inasmuch as it is an end, i.e., that for the sake of which something is done; for example, health is the cause of walking. For if we are asked why someone took a walk, we answer, “in order to be healthy”; and in saying this we think we have given the cause. And whatever occurs on the way to the end under the motion of something else is also a cause. For example, reducing, purging, drugs and instruments are causes of health; for all of these exist for

the sake of the end, although they differ from each other inasmuch as some are instruments and others are processes. These, then, are nearly all the ways in which causes are spoken of.

406. And since there are several senses in which causes are spoken of, it turns out that there are many causes of the same thing, and not in an accidental way. For example, both the maker of a statue and the bronze are causes of a statue not in any other respect but insofar as it is a statue. However, they are not causes in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as the source of motion.

407. And there are things which are causes of each other. Pain, for example, is a cause of health, and health is a cause of pain, although not in the same way, but one as an end and the other as a source of motion.

408. Further, the same thing is sometimes the cause of contraries; for that which when present is the cause of some particular thing, this when absent we sometimes blame for the contrary. Thus the cause of the loss of a ship is the absence of the pilot whose presence is the cause of the ship’s safety. And both of these—the absence and the presence—are moving causes.

COMMENTARY

THE FOUR CAUSES

763. Here the Philosopher distinguishes the various senses in which the term cause is used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he enumerates the classes of causes. Second (783), he gives the modes of causes (“Now the modes”).

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he enumerates the various classes of causes. Second (777), he reduces them to four (“All the causes”).

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he enumerates the different classes of causes. Second (773), he clarifies certain things about the classes of causes (“And since”).

He accordingly says, first, that in one sense the term cause means that from which a thing comes to be and is “something intrinsic,” i.e., something which exists within the thing. This is said to distinguish it from a privation and also from a contrary; for a thing is said to come from a privation or from a contrary as from something which is not intrinsic; for example, white is said to come from black or from not-white. But a statue comes from bronze and a goblet from silver as from something which is intrinsic; for the nature bronze is not destroyed when a statue comes into being, nor is the nature silver destroyed when a goblet comes into being. Therefore the bronze of a statue and the silver of a goblet are causes in the sense of matter. He adds “and the genera of these,” because if matter is the species of anything it is also its genus. For example, if the matter of a statue is bronze, its matter will also be metal, compound and body. The same holds true of other things.

764. In another sense cause means the form and pattern of a thing, i.e., its exemplar. This is the formal cause, which is related to a thing in two ways. (1) In one way it stands as the intrinsic form of a thing, and in this respect it is called the formal principle of a thing. (2) In another way it stands as something which is extrinsic to a thing but is that in likeness to which it is made, and in this respect an exemplar is also called a thing’s form. It is in this sense that Plato held the Ideas to be forms. Moreover, because it is from its form that each thing derives its nature, whether of its genus or of its species, and the nature of its genus or of its species is what is signified by the definition, which expresses its quiddity, the form of a thing is therefore the intelligible expression of its quiddity, i.e., the formula by which its quiddity is known. For even though certain material parts are given in the definition, still it is from a thing’s form that the principal part of the definition comes. The reason why the form is a cause, then, is that it completes the intelligible expression of a thing’s quiddity. And just as the genus of a particular matter is also matter, in a similar way the genera of forms are the forms of things; for example, the form of the octave chord is the ratio of 2:1. For when two notes stand to each other in the ratio of 2:1, the interval between them is one octave. Hence twoness is its form; for the ratio of 2:1 derives its meaning from twoness. And because number is the genus of twoness, we may therefore say in a general way that number is also the form of the octave, inasmuch as we may say that the octave chord involves the ratio of one number to another. And not only is the whole definition related to the thing defined as its form, but so also are the parts of the definition, i.e., those which are given directly in the definition. For just as two-footed animal capable of walking is the form of man, so also are animal, capable of walking and two-footed. But sometimes matter is given

indirectly in the definition, as when the soul is said to be the actuality of a physical organic body having life potentially.

765. In a third sense cause means that from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes, i.e., a moving or efficient cause. He says “of change or of rest,” because motion and rest which are natural are traced back to the same cause, and the same is true of motion and of rest which are a result of force. For that cause by which something is moved to a place is the same as that by which it is made to rest there. “An adviser” is an example of this kind of cause, for it is as a result of an adviser that motion begins in the one who acts upon his advice for the sake of safeguarding something. And in a similar way “a father is the cause of a child.” In these two examples Aristotle touches upon the, two principles of motion from which all things come to be, namely, purpose in the case of an adviser, and nature in the case of a father. And in general every maker is a cause of the thing made and every changer a cause of the thing changed.

766. Moreover, it should be noted that according to Avicenna, there are four modes of efficient cause, namely, perfective, dispositive, auxiliary and advisory.

An efficient cause is said to be perfective inasmuch as it causes the final perfection of a thing, as the one who induces a substantial form in natural things or artificial forms in things made by art, as a builder induces the form of a house.

767. An efficient cause is said to be dispositive if it does not induce the final form that perfects a thing but only prepares the matter for that form, as one who hews timbers and stones is said to build a house. This cause is not properly said to be the efficient cause of a house, because what he produces is only potentially a house. But he will be more properly an efficient cause if he induces the ultimate disposition on which the form necessarily follows; for example, man generates man without causing his intellect, which comes from an extrinsic cause.

768. And an efficient cause is said to be auxiliary insofar as it contributes to the principal effect. Yet it differs from the principal efficient cause in that the principal efficient cause acts for its own end, whereas an auxiliary cause acts for an end which is not its own. For example, one who assists a king in war acts for the king’s end. And this is the way in which a secondary cause is disposed for a primary cause. For in the case of all efficient causes which

are directly subordinated to each other, a secondary cause acts because of the end of a primary cause; for example, the military art acts because of the end of the political art.

769. And an advisory cause differs from a principal efficient cause inasmuch as it specifies the end and form of the activity. This is the way in which the first agent acting by intellect is related to every secondary agent, whether it be natural or intellectual. For in every case a first intellectual agent gives to a secondary agent its end and its form of activity; for example, the naval architect gives these to the shipwright, and the first intelligence does the same thing for everything in the natural world.

770. Further, to this genus of cause is reduced everything that makes anything to be in any manner whatsoever, not only as regards substantial being, but also as regards accidental being, which occurs in every kind of motion. Hence he says not only that the maker is the cause of the thing made, but also that the changer is the cause of the thing changed.

771. In a fourth sense cause means a thing’s end, i.e., that for the sake of which something is done, as health is the cause of walking. And since it is less evident that the end is a cause in view of the fact that it comes into being last of all (which is also the reason why this cause was overlooked by the earlier philosophers, as was pointed out in Book I (1771), he therefore gives a special proof that an end is a cause. For to ask why or for what reason is to ask about a cause, because when we are asked why or for what reason someone walks, we reply properly by answering that he does so in order to be healthy. And when we answer in this way we think that we are stating the cause. Hence it is evident that the end is a cause. Moreover, not only the ultimate reason for which an agent acts is said to be an end with respect to those things which precede it, but everything that is intermediate between the first agent and the ultimate end is also said to be an end with respect to the preceding agents. And similarly those things are said to be causes from which motion arises in subsequent things. For example, between the art of medicine, which is the first efficient cause in this order, and health, which is the ultimate end, there are these intermediates: reducing, which is the most proximate cause of health in those who have a superfluity of humors; purging, by means of which reducing is brought about; “drugs,” i.e., laxative medicine, by means of which purging is accomplished; and “instruments,” i.e., the instruments by which medicine

or drugs are prepared and administered. And all such things exist for the sake of the end, although one of them is the end of another. For reducing is the end of purging, and purging is the end of purgatives. However, these intermediates differ from each other in that (1) some are instruments, i.e., the instruments by means of which medicine is prepared and administered (and the administered medicine itself is something which nature employs as an instrument); and (2) some—purging and reducing—are processes, i.e., operations or activities.

772. He concludes, then, that “these are the ways in which causes are spoken of (405),” i.e., the four ways; and he adds “nearly all” because of the modes of causes which he gives below. Or he also adds this because the same classes of causes are not found for the same reason in all things.

773. And since (406).

Then he indicates certain points which follow from the things said above about the causes, and there are four of these. The first is that, since the term cause is used in many senses, there may be several causes of one thing not accidentally but properly. For the fact that there are many causes of one thing accidentally presents no difficulty, because many things may be accidents of something that is the proper cause of some effect, and all of these can be said to be accidental causes of that effect. But that there are several proper causes of one thing becomes evident from the fact that causes are spoken of in various ways. For the maker of a statue is a proper cause and not an accidental cause of a statue, and so also is the bronze, but not in the same way. For it is impossible that there should be many proper causes of the same thing within the same genus and in the same order, although there can be many causes providing that (1) one is proximate and another remote; or (2) that neither of them is of itself a sufficient cause, but both together. An example would be many men rowing a boat. Now in the case in point these two things are causes of a statue in different ways: the bronze as matter, and the artist as efficient cause.

774. And there are (407).

Then he sets down the second fact that may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. He says that it may also happen that any two things may be the cause of each other, although this is impossible in the same class of cause. But it is evident that this may happen when causes are spoken of in different senses. For example, the pain resulting from a wound is a cause of health as an efficient cause or source of motion, whereas health is the cause of pain as an end. For it is impossible, that a thing should be both a cause and something caused. Another text states this better, saying that “exercise is the cause of physical fitness,” i.e., of the good disposition caused by moderate exercise, which promotes digestion and uses up superfluous humors.

775. Now it must be borne in mind that, although four causes are given above, two of these are related to one another, and so also are the other two. (1) The efficient cause is related to the final cause, and (2) the material cause is related to the formal cause. The efficient cause is related to the final cause because the efficient cause is the starting point of motion and the final cause is its terminus. There is a similar relationship between matter and form. For form gives being, and matter receives it. Hence the efficient cause is the cause of the final cause, and the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause. The efficient cause is the cause of the final cause inasmuch as it makes the final cause be, because by causing motion the efficient cause brings about the final cause. But the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause, not in the sense that it makes it be, but inasmuch as it is the reason for the causality of the efficient cause. For an efficient cause is a cause inasmuch as it acts, and it acts only because of the final cause. Hence the efficient cause derives its causality from the final cause. And form and matter are mutual causes of being: form is a cause of matter inasmuch as it gives actual being to matter, and matter is a cause of form inasmuch as it supports form in being. And I say that both of these together are causes of being either in an unqualified sense or with some qualification. For substantial form gives being absolutely to matter, whereas accidental form, inasmuch as it is a form, gives being in a qualified sense. And matter sometimes does not support a form in being in an unqualified sense but according as it is the form of this particular thing and has being in this particular thing. This is what happens in the case of the human body in relation to the rational soul.

776. Further, the same thing (408).

Then he gives the third conclusion that may be drawn from the foregoing discussion. He says that the same thing can be the cause of contraries. This would also seem to be difficult or impossible if it were related to both in the same way. But it is the cause of each in a different way. For that which when present is the cause of some particular thing, this when absent “we blame,” i.e., we hold it responsible, “for the contrary.” For example, it is evident that by his presence the pilot is the cause of a ship’s safety, and we say that his absence is the cause of the ship’s loss. And lest someone might think that this is to be attributed to different classes of causes, just as the preceding two were, he therefore adds that both of these may be reduced to the same class of cause—the moving cause. For the opposite of a cause is the cause of an opposite effect in the same line of causality as that in which the original cause was the cause of its effect.

LESSON 3

All Causes Reduced to Four Classes

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1013b 16-1014a 25

409. All the causes mentioned fall under one of the four classes which are most evident. For the elements of syllables, the matter of things made by art, fire and earth and all such elements of bodies, the parts of a whole, and the premises of a conclusion, are all causes in the sense of that from which things are made. But of these some are causes as a subject, for example, parts, and others as the essence, for example, the whole, the composition and the species, whereas the seed, the physician, the adviser, and in general every agent, are all sources of change or of rest. But the others are causes as the end and the good of other things. For that for the sake of which other things come to be is the greatest good and the end of other things. And it makes no difference whether we say that it is a good or an apparent good. These, then, are the causes, and this the number of their classes.

410. Now the modes of causes are many in number, but these become fewer when summarized. For causes are spoken of in many senses; and of those which belong to the same class, some are prior and some subsequent. For example, both the physician and one possessing an art are causes of health, and both the ratio of 2:1 and number are causes of the octave chord; and always those classes which contain singulars. Further, a thing may be a cause in the sense of an accident, and the classes which contain these; for example, in one sense the cause of a statue is Polyclitus and in another a sculptor, because it is accidental that a sculptor should be Polyclitus. And

the universals which contain accidents are causes; for example, man is the cause of a statue, and even generally animal, because Polyclitus is a man and an animal. And of accidental causes some are more remote and some more proximate than others. Thus what is white and what is musical might be said to be the causes of a statue, and not just Polyclitus or man. Again, in addition to all of these, i.e., both proper causes and accidental causes, some are said to be causes potentially and some actually, as a builder and one who is building. And the distinctions which have been made will apply in like manner to the effects of these causes, for example, to this statue, or to a statue, or to an image generally, or to this bronze, or to bronze, or to matter in general. And the same applies to accidental effects. Again, both proper and accidental causes may be spoken of together, so that the cause of a statue may be referred to as neither Polyclitus nor a sculptor but the sculptor Polyclitus. But while all these varieties of causes are six in number, each is spoken of in two ways; for causes are either singular or generic; either proper or accidental, or generically accidental; or they are spoken of in combination or singly; and again they are either active or potential causes. But they differ in this respect, that active causes, i.e. singular causes, exist or cease to exist simultaneously with their effects, as this particular one who is healing with this particular person who is being healed, and as this particular builder with this particular thing which is being built. But this is not always true of potential causes; for the builder and the thing built do not cease to exist at the same time.

COMMENTARY

FOUR MODES OF CAUSES

777. Here the philosopher reduces all causes to the classes of causes mentioned above (409), saying that all those things which are called causes fall into one of the four classes mentioned above. For “elements,” i.e., letters, are said to be the causes of syllables; and the matter of artificial things is said to be their cause; and fire and earth and all simple bodies of this kind are said to be the causes of compounds. And parts are said to be the causes of a whole, and “premises,” i.e., propositions previously set down from which conclusions are drawn, are said to be the causes of the conclusion. And in all of these cases cause has a single formal aspect

according as cause means that from which a thing is produced, and this is the formal aspect of material cause.

778. Now it must be noted that propositions are said to constitute the matter of a conclusion, not inasmuch as they exist under such a form, or according to their force (for in this way they would rather have the formal aspect of an efficient cause), but with reference to the terms of which they are composed. For a conclusion is constituted of the terms contained in the premises, i.e., of the major and minor terms.

779. And of those things of which something is composed, some are like a subject, for example, parts and the other things mentioned above, whereas some are like the essence, for example, the whole, the composition and the species, which have the character of a form whereby a thing's essence is made complete. For it must be borne in mind that (1) sometimes one thing is the matter of something else in an unqualified sense (for example, silver of a goblet), and then the form corresponding to such a matter can be called the species. (2) But sometimes many things taken together constitute the matter of a thing; and this may occur in three ways. (a) For sometimes things are united merely by their arrangement, as the men in an army or the houses in a city; and then the whole has the role of a form which is designated by the term army or city. (b) And sometimes things are united not just by arrangement alone but by contact and a bond, as is evident in the parts of a house; and then their composition has the role of a form. (c) And sometimes the alteration of the component parts is added to the above, as occurs in the case of a compound; and then the compound state itself is the form, and this is still a kind of composition. And a thing's essence is derived from any one of these three—the composition' species, or whole—as becomes clear when an army, a house, or a goblet is defined. Thus we have two classes of cause.

780. But the seed, the physician and the adviser, and in general every agent, are called causes for a different reason, namely, because they are the sources of motion and rest. Hence this is now a different class of cause because of a different formal aspect of causality. He puts seed in this class of cause because he is of the opinion that the seed has active power, whereas a woman's menstrual fluid has the role of the matter of the offspring.

781. There is a fourth formal aspect of causality inasmuch as some things are said to be causes in the sense of the end and good of other things. For that for the sake of which something else comes to be is the greatest good “and the end” of other things, i.e., it is naturally disposed to be their end. But because someone could raise the objection that an end is not always a good since certain agents sometimes inordinately set up an evil as their end, he therefore replies that it makes no difference to his thesis whether we speak of what is good without qualification or of an apparent good. For one who acts does so, properly speaking, because of a good, for this is what he has in mind. And one acts for the sake of an evil accidentally inasmuch as he happens to think that it is good. For no one acts for the sake of something with evil in view.

782. Moreover, it must be noted that, even though the end is the last thing to come into being in some cases, it is always prior in causality. Hence it is called the “cause of causes”, because it is the cause of the causality of all causes. For it is the cause of efficient causality, as has already been pointed out (775); and the efficient cause is the cause of the causality of both the matter and the form, because by its motion it causes matter to be receptive of form and makes form exist in matter. Therefore the final cause is also the cause of the causality of both the matter and the form. Hence in those cases in which something is done for an end (as occurs in the realm of natural things, in that of moral matters, and in that of art), the most forceful demonstrations are derived from the final cause. Therefore he concludes that the foregoing are causes, and that causes are distinguished into this number of classes.

783. Now the modes (410).

Then he distinguishes between the modes of causes. And causes are distinguished into classes and into modes. For the division of causes into classes is based on different formal aspects of causality, and is therefore equivalently a division based on essential differences, which constitute species. But the division of causes into modes is based on the different relationships between causes and things caused, and therefore pertains to those causes which have the same formal aspect of causality. An example of this is the division of causes into proper and accidental causes, and into remote and proximate causes. Therefore this division is equivalently a division based on accidental differences, which do not constitute different species.

784. He accordingly says that there are many modes of causes, but that these are found to be fewer in number when “summarized,” i.e., when brought together under one head. For even though proper causes and accidental causes are two modes, they are still reduced to one head insofar as both may be considered from the same point of view. The same thing is true of the other different modes. For many different modes of causes are spoken of, not only with reference to the different species of causes, but also with reference to causes of the same species, namely, those which are reduced to one class of cause.

785. (1) For one cause is said to be prior and another subsequent; and causes are prior or subsequent in two ways: (1) In one way, when there are many distinct causes which are related to each other, one of which is primary and remote, and another secondary and proximate (as in the case of efficient causes man generates man as a proximate and subsequent cause, but the sun as a prior and remote cause); and the same thing can be considered in the case of the other classes of causes. (2) In another way, when the cause is numerically one and the same, but is considered according to the sequence which reason sets up between the universal and the particular; for the universal is naturally prior and the particular subsequent.

786. But he omits the first way and considers the second. For in the second way the effect is the immediate result of both causes, i.e., of both the prior and subsequent cause; but this cannot happen in the first way. Hence he says that the cause of health is both the physician and one possessing an art, who belong to the class of efficient cause: one possessing an art as a universal and prior cause, and the physician as a particular, or special, and subsequent cause. The same thing is true of the formal cause, since this cause may also be considered in two ways; for example, for an octave chord “double,” or the ratio of 2:1, or the number two, is a formal cause as one that is special and subsequent, whereas number, or the ratio of one number to another or to the unit, is like a universal and prior cause. And in this way too “always those classes which contain singulars,” i.e., universals, are said to be prior causes.

787. (2) Causes are distinguished in another way inasmuch as one thing is said to be a proper cause and another an accidental cause. For just as proper causes are divided into universal and particular, or into prior and subsequent, so also are accidental causes. Therefore, not only accidental causes themselves are called such, but so also are the classes which contain these. For example, a sculptor is the proper cause of a statue, and Polyclitus is an accidental cause inasmuch as he happens to be a sculptor. And just as Polyclitus is an accidental cause of a statue, in a similar way all universals "which contain accidents," i.e., accidental causes, are said to be accidental causes, for example, man and animal, which contain under themselves Polyclitus, who is a man and an animal.

788. And just as some proper causes are proximate and some remote, as was pointed out above, so also is this the case with accidental causes. For Polyclitus is a more proximate cause of a statue than what is white or what is musical. For an accidental mode of predication is more remote when an accident is predicated of an accident than when an accident is predicated of a subject. For one accident is predicated of another only because both are predicated of a subject. Hence when something pertaining to one accident is predicated of another, as when something pertaining to a builder is predicated of a musician, this mode of predication is more remote than one in which something is predicated of the subject of an accident, as when something pertaining to a builder is predicated of Polyclitus.

789. Now it must be borne in mind that one thing can be said to be the accidental cause of something else in two ways: (1) in one way, from the viewpoint of the cause; because whatever is accidental to a cause is itself called an accidental cause, for example, when we say that something white is the cause of a house. (2) In another way, from the viewpoint of the effect, i.e., inasmuch as one thing is said to be an accidental cause of something else because it is accidental to the proper effect. This can happen in three ways:

The first is that the thing has a necessary connection with the effect. Thus that which removes an obstacle is said to be a mover accidentally. This is the case whether that accident is a contrary, as when bile prevents coolness (and thus scammony is said to produce coolness accidentally, not because it causes coolness, but because it removes the obstacle preventing coolness, i.e., bile, which is its contrary); or even if it is not a contrary, as when a pillar hinders the movement of a stone which rests upon it, so that one who removes the pillar is said to move the stone accidentally.

In a second way, something is accidental to the proper effect when the accident is connected with the effect neither necessarily nor in the majority of cases but seldom, as the discovery of a treasure is connected with digging in the soil. It is in this way that fortune and chance are said to be accidental causes.

In a third way things are accidental to the effect when they have no connection except perhaps in the mind, as when someone says that he is the cause of an earthquake because an earthquake took place when he entered the house.

790. [Cross-division of all] And besides the distinction of all things into causes in themselves or proper causes and accidental causes, there is a third division of causes inasmuch as some things are causes potentially and some actually, i.e., actively. For example, the cause of building is a builder in a state of potency (for this designates his habit or office), or one who is actually building.

791. And the same distinctions which apply to causes can apply to the effects of which these causes are the causes. For effects, whether particular or universal, can be divided into prior and subsequent, as a sculptor may be called the cause of this statue, which is subsequent; or of a statue, which is more universal and prior; or of an image, which is still more universal. And similarly something is the formal cause of this particular bronze; or of bronze, which is more universal; or of matter, which is still more universal. The same things can be said of accidental effects, i.e., of things produced by accident. For a sculptor who is the cause of a statue is also the cause of the heaviness, whiteness or redness which are in it as accidents from the matter and are not caused by this agent.

792. (3) Again, he gives a fourth division of causes, namely, the division into simple causes and composite causes. A cause is said to be simple (a) when, for example, in the case of a statue, the proper cause alone is considered, as a sculptor, or when an accidental cause alone is considered, as Polyclitus. But a cause is said to be composite when both are taken together, for example, when we say that the cause of a statue is the sculptor Polyclitus.

793. (b) There is moreover another way in which causes are said to be composite, i.e., when several causes act together to produce one effect, for example, when many men act together in order to row a boat, or when many stones combine in order to constitute the matter of a house. But he omits the latter way because no one of these things taken in itself is the cause, but a part of the cause.

794. And having given these different modes of causes, he brings out their number, saying that these modes of causes are six in number, and that each of these have two alternatives so that twelve result. For these six modes are (1-2) either singular or generic (or, as he called them above, prior and subsequent); (3-4) either proper or accidental (to which the genus of the accident is also reduced, for the genus to which an accident belongs is an accidental cause); and again, (5-6) either composite or simple. Now these six modes are further divided by potency and actuality and thus are twelve in number. Now the reason why all these modes must be divided by potency and actuality is that potency and actuality distinguish the connection between cause and effect. For active causes are at one and the same time particulars and cease to exist along with their effects; for example, this act of healing ceases with this act of recovering health, and this act of building with this thing being built; for a thing cannot be actually being built unless something is actually building. But potential causes do not always cease to exist when their effects cease; for example, a house and a builder do not cease to exist at one and the same time. In some cases, however, it does happen that when the activity of the efficient cause ceases the substance of the effect ceases. This occurs in the case of those things whose being consists in coming to be, or whose cause is not only the cause of their coming to be but also of their being. For example, when the sun’s illumination is removed from the atmosphere, light ceases to be. He says “singular causes” because acts belong to singular things, as was stated in Book I of this work (21).

LESSON 4

The Proper Meaning of Element; Elements in Words, Natural Bodies, and Demonstrations. Transferred Usages of “Element” and Their Common Basis

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1014a 25-1014b 15

411. The inherent principle of which a thing is first composed and which is not divisible into another species is called an element. For example, the elements of a word are the parts of which a word is composed and into which it is ultimately divided and which are not further divided into other words specifically different from them. But if they are divided, their parts are alike, as the parts of water are water; but this is not true of the syllable. Similarly, people who speak of the elements of bodies mean the component parts into which bodies are ultimately divided and which are not divided into other bodies specifically different. And whether such parts are one or many, they call them elements. And similarly the parts of diagrams are called elements, and in general the parts of demonstrations; for the primary demonstrations which are contained in many other demonstrations are called the elements of demonstrations; and such are the primary syllogisms which are composed of three terms and proceed through one middle term.

412. People also use the term element in a transferred sense of anything which is one and small and useful for many purposes; and for this reason

anything which is small and simple and indivisible is called an element. Hence it follows that the most universal things are elements, because each of them, being one and simple, is found in many things, either in all or in most of them. And to some the unit and the point seem to be principles. Therefore, since what are called genera are universal and indivisible (for their formal character is one), some men call the genera elements, and these more than a difference, since a genus is more universal. For where the difference is present the genus also follows, but the difference is not always present where the genus is. And in all these cases it is common for the element of each thing to be the primary component of each thing.

COMMENTARY

ELEMENT

795. Here he distinguishes the different senses of the term element, and in regard to this lie does two things. First, he gives the different senses in which the term element is used. Second (807), he indicates what all of them have in common (“And in all these”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how the term element is used in its proper sense; and second (802), how it is used in transferred senses (“People also use”).

First, he gives a sort of description of an element, and from this one can gather the four notes contained in its definition. The first is that an element is a cause in the sense of that from which a thing comes to be; and from this it is clear that an element is placed in the class of material cause.

796. The second is that an element is the principle from which something first comes to be. For copper is that from which a statue comes to be, but it is still not an element because it has some matter from which it comes to be.

797. The third is that an element is inherent or intrinsic; and for this reason. it differs from everything of a transitory nature from which a thing comes to be, whether it be a privation or a contrary or the matter subject to contrariety and privation, which is transitory; for example, when we say that a musical man comes from a nonmusical man, or that the musical comes from the non-musical. For elements must remain in the things of which they are the elements.

798. The fourth is that an element has a species which is not divisible into different species; and thus an element differs from first matter, which has no species, and also from every sort of matter which is capable of being divided into different species, as blood and things of this kind.

Hence he says, as the first note, that an element is that of which a thing is composed; as the second, that it is that of which a thing is “first” composed; as the third, that it is “an inherent principle”; and as the fourth, that it is “not divisible into another species.”

799. He illustrates this definition of element in four cases in which we use the term element. For we say that letters are the elements of a word because every word is composed of them, and of them primarily. This is evident from the fact that all words are divided into letters as ultimate things; for what is last in the process of dissolution must be first in the process of composition. But letters are not further divided into other words which are specifically different. Yet if they should be divided in any way, the parts in which the division results would be “alike,” i.e., specifically the same, just as all parts of water are water. Now letters are divided according to the amount of time required to pronounce them, inasmuch as a long letter is said to require two periods of time, and a short letter one. But while the parts into which letters are so divided do not differ as the species of words do, this is not the case with a syllable; for its parts are specifically different, since the sounds which a vowel and a consonant make, of which a syllable is composed, are specifically different.

800. He gives as a second example natural bodies, certain of which we also call the elements of certain others. For those things into which all compounds are ultimately dissolved are called their elements; and therefore they are the things of which bodies of this kind are composed. But those bodies which are called elements are not divisible into other bodies which are specifically different, but into like parts, as any part of water is water. And all those who held for one such body into which every body is dissolved and which is itself incapable of being further divided , said that there is one element. Some said that it is water, some air, and some fire. But those who posited many such bodies also said there are many elements. Now it should be borne in mind that when it is set down in the definition of an element that an element is not divisible into different species, this should not be understood of the parts into which a thing is divided in a quantitative

division (for wood would then be an element, since any part of wood is wood), but in a division made by alteration, as compounds are dissolved into simple bodies.

801. As a third example he gives the order of demonstrations, in which we also employ the word element; for example, we speak of Euclid’s Book of Elements. And he says that, in a way similar and close to those mentioned, those things which “are parts of diagrams,” i.e., the constituents of geometrical figures, are called elements. This can be said not only of the demonstrations in geometry but universally of all demonstrations. For those demonstrations which have only three terms are called the elements of other demonstrations, because the others are composed of them and resolved into them. This is shown as follows: a second demonstration takes as its starting point the conclusion of a first demonstration, whose terms are understood to contain the middle term which was the starting point of the first demonstration. Thus the second demonstration will proceed from four terms the first from three only, the third from five, and the fourth from six; so that each demonstration adds one term. Thus it is clear that first demonstrations are included in subsequent ones, as when this first demonstration—every B is A, every C is B, therefore every C is A—is included in this demonstration—every C is A, every D is C, therefore every D is A; and this again is included in the demonstration whose conclusion is that every E is A, so that for this final conclusion there seems to be one syllogism composed of several syllogisms having several middle terms. This may be expressed thus: every B is A, every C is B, every D is C, every E is D, therefore every E is A. Hence a first demonstration, which has one middle term and only three terms, is simple and not reducible to another demonstration, whereas all other demonstrations are reducible to it. Hence first syllogisms, which come from three terms by way of one middle term, are called elements.

802. People also use (412).

Here he shows how the term element is used in a transferred sense. He says that some men, on the basis of the foregoing notion or meaning of element, have used the term in a transferred sense to signify anything that is one and small and useful for many purposes. For from the fact that an element is indivisible they understood that it is one; and from the fact that it is first they understood that it is simple; and from the fact that other things are composed of elements they understood that an element is useful for many purposes. Hence they set up this definition of an element in order that they might say that everything which is smallest in quantity and simple (inasmuch as it is not composed of other things) and incapable of division into different species, is an element.

803. But when they had set up this definition of element, it turned out that by using it in a transferred sense they had invented two senses of element. First, they called the most universal things elements; for a universal is one in definition and is simple (because its definition is not composed of different parts) and is found in many things, and thus is useful for many purposes, whether it be found in all things, as unity and being are, or in most things, as the other genera. And by the same reasoning it came about, second, that they called points and units principles or elements because each of them is one simple thing and useful for many purposes.

804. But in this respect they fell short of the true notion of a principle, because universals are not the matter of which particular things are composed but predicate their very substance. And similarly points are not the matter of a line, for a line is not composed of points.

805. Now with this transferred notion of element established, the solution to a question disputed in Book III (431-36) becomes clear, i.e., whether a genus or a species is more an element, and whether a genus or a difference is more an element; for it clearly follows that genera are elements to a greater degree because genera are more universal and indivisible. For there is no concept or definition of them which must be composed of genera and differences, but it is species which are properly defined. And if a genus is defined, it is not defined insofar as it is a genus but insofar as it is a species. Hence a species is divided into different parts and thus does not have the character of an element. But a genus is not divisible into different parts, and therefore they said that genera are elements more than species. Another translation reads, “For their formal character is one,” that is, indivisible, because even though genera do not have a definition, still what is signified by the term genus is a simple conception of the intellect which can be called a definition.

806. And just as a genus is more an element than a species is because it is simpler, in a similar way it is more an element than a difference is, even though a difference is simple, because a genus is more universal. This is

clear from the fact that anything which has a difference has a genus, since essential differences do not transcend a genus; but not everything which has a genus necessarily has a difference.

807. Last of all he says that all of the foregoing senses of element have this note in common, that an element is the primary component of each being, as has been stated.

LESSON 5

Five Senses of the Term Nature

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1014b 15-1015a 20

413. Nature means, in one sense, the generation of things that are born, as if one were to pronounce the letter u [in fusij] long. And in another sense it means the immanent principle from which anything generated is first produced. Again, it means the source of the primary motion in any beings which are by nature, and it is in each inasmuch as it is such. Now all those things are said to be born which increase through something else by touching and by existing together, or by being naturally joined, as in the case of embryos. But being born together differs from touching, for in the latter case there need be nothing but contact. But in things which are naturally joined together there is some one same thing in both, instead of contact, which causes them to be one, and which makes them to be one in quantity and continuity but not in quality. Again, nature means the primary thing of which a natural being is composed or from which it comes to be, when it is unformed and immutable by its own power; for example, the bronze of a statue or of bronze articles is said to be their nature, and the wood of wooden things, and the same applies in the case of other things. For each thing comes from these though its primary matter is preserved. For it is also in this sense that men speak of the elements of natural beings as their nature; some calling it fire, others earth, others water, others air, and others something similar to these, whereas others call all of them nature. In still another sense nature means the substance of things which are by nature,

as those who say that nature is the primary composition of a thing, as Empedocles says, “Of nothing that exists is there nature, but only the mixing and separating-out of what has been mixed. Nature is but the name men give to these. For this reason we do not say that things which are or come to be by nature have a nature, even when that from which they can be or come to be is already present, so long as they do not have their form or species. Hence that which is composed of both of these exists by nature, as animals and their parts.

414. Again, nature is the primary matter of a thing, and this in two senses: either what is primary with respect to this particular thing, or primary in general; for example, the primary matter of bronze articles is bronze, but in general it is perhaps water, if everything capable of being liquefied is water. And nature is also a thing’s form or substance, i.e., the terminus of the process of generation. But metaphorically speaking every substance in general is called nature because of form or species, for the nature of a thing is also a kind of substance.

415. Hence, from what has been said, in its primary and proper sense nature is the substance of those things which have within themselves as such the source of their motion. For matter is called nature because it is receptive of this. And processes of generation and growth are called nature because they are motions proceeding from it. And nature is the source of motion in those things which are by nature, and it is something present in them either potentially or in complete actuality.

COMMENTARY

NATURE

808. Here he gives the different meanings of the term nature. And even though an investigation of the term nature appears not to belong to first philosophy but rather to the philosophy of nature, he nevertheless gives the different meanings of this term here, because according to one of its common meanings nature is predicated of every substance, as he will make clear. Hence it falls under the consideration of first philosophy just as universal substance does.

In regard to the first he does two things. First (808), he distinguishes the different senses in which the term nature is used. Second (824), he reduces all of these to one primary notion (“Hence, from what”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives five principal senses in which the term, nature is used. Second (821), he gives two additional senses connected with the last two of these (“Again, nature”).

(1) He accordingly says, first, that in one sense nature means the process of generation of things that are generated, or, according to another text which states this in a better way, “of things that are born.” For not everything that is generated can be said to be born but only living things, for example, plants and animals and their parts. The generation of non-living things cannot be called nature, properly speaking, according to the common use of the term, but only the generation of living things inasmuch as nature may mean the nativity or birth of a thing... Yet even from this text it can be understood that the term nature means the generation of living things by a certain lengthening or extension of usage.

809. Again, from the fact that nature was first used to designate the birth of a thing there followed a second use of the term, so that nature came to mean the principle of generation from which a thing comes to be, or that from which as from an intrinsic principle something born is first generated.

810. And as a result of the likeness between birth and other kinds of motion the meaning of the term nature has been extended farther, so that in a third sense it means the source from which motion begins in any being according to its nature, provided that it is present in it insofar as it is such a being and not accidentally. For example, the principle of health, which is the medical art, is not present in a physician who is ill insofar as he is ill but insofar as he is a physician. And he is not healed insofar as he is a physician but insofar as he is ill; and thus the source of motion is not in him insofar as he is moved. This is the definition of nature given in Book II of the Physics.

811. And because he mentioned things that are born, he also shows what it means in the proper sense “to be born,” as another text says, and in place of which this text incorrectly says “to be generated.” For the generation of living things differs from that of non-living things, because a non-living thing is not generated by being joined or united to its generator, as fire is generated by fire and water by water. But the generation of a living thing comes about through some kind of union with the principle of generation. And because the addition of quantity to quantity causes increase, therefore in the generation of living things there seems to be a certain increase, as

when a tree puts forth foliage and fruit. Hence he says that those things are said to be born which “increase,” i.e., have some increase together with the principle of generation [i.e. multiply].

812. But this kind of increase differs from that class of motion which is called increase [or augmentation], by which things that are already born are moved or changed. For a thing that increases within itself does so because the part added passes over into the substance of that thing, as food passes over into the substance of the one nourished. But anything that is born is added to the thing from which it is born as something other and different, and not as something that passes over into its substance. Hence he says that it increases “through something distinct” or something else, as if to say that this increase comes about through the addition of something that is other or different.

813. But addition that brings about increase can be understood to take place in two ways: in one way, “by touching,” i.e., by contact alone; in another way, “by existing together,” i.e., by the fact that two things are produced together and naturally connected with each other, as the arms and sinews; “and by being joined,” i.e., by the fact that something is naturally adapted to something else already existing, as hair to the head and teeth to the gums. In place of this another text reads, more appropriately, “by being born together with,” and “by being connected with at birth.” Now in the generation of living things addition comes about not only by contact but also by a kind of joining together or natural connection, as is evident in the case of embryos, which are not only in contact in the womb, but are also bound to it at the beginning of their generation.

814. Further, he indicates the difference between these two, saying that “being fused,” i.e., being bound together, or “being connected at birth,” as another text says, differs from contact, because in the case of contact there need be nothing besides the things in contact which makes them one. But in the case of things which are bound together, whether naturally connected or born together and joined at birth, there must be some one thing “instead of contact,” i.e., in the place of contact, which causes them “to be naturally joined,” i.e., joined or bound together or born together. Moreover, it must be understood that the thing which causes them to be one makes them one in quantity and continuity but not in quality; because a bond does not alter the things bound from their own dispositions.

815. And from this it is evident that anything that is born is always connected with the thing from which it is born. Hence nature never means an extrinsic principle, but in every sense in which it is used it is taken to mean an intrinsic principle.

816. (4) And from this third meaning of nature there follows a fourth. For if the source of motion in natural bodies is called their nature, and it seemed to some that the principle of motion in natural bodies is matter, it was for this reason that matter came to be called nature, which is taken as a principle of a thing both as to its being and as to its becoming. And it is also considered to be without any form, and is not moved by itself but by something else. He accordingly says that nature is spoken of as that primary thing of which any being is composed or from which it comes to be.

817. He says this because matter is a principle both of being and of becoming. Hence he says that “it is without order,” i.e., form; and for this reason another text says “when it is unformed”; for in the case of some things their order (or arrangement) is regarded as their form, as in the case of an army or of a city. And for this reason he says that it is “immutable by its own power,” i.e., it cannot be moved by its own power but by that of a higher agent. For matter does not move itself to acquire a form but is moved by a higher and extrinsic agent. For instance, we might say that “bronze is the nature of a statue or of bronze vessels” or “wood of wooden,” as if such vessels were natural bodies. The same is true of everything else that is composed of or comes to be from matter; for each comes to be from its matter though this is preserved. But in the process of generation the dispositions of a form are not preserved; for when one form is introduced another is cast out. And for this reason it seemed to some thinkers that forms are accidents and that matter alone is substance and nature, as he points out in the Physics, Book II

818. They held this view because they considered the matter and form of natural bodies in the same way as they did the matter and form of things made by art, in which forms are merely accidents and matter alone is substance. It was in this sense that the philosophers of nature said that the elements are the matter of things which come to be by nature, i.e., water, air, or fire, or earth, which no philosopher has held to be the element of natural beings all by itself, although some of those who were not philosophers of nature did hold this, as was stated in Book I (134). And

some philosophers, such as Parmenides, held that some of these are the elements and natures of things; others, such as Empedocles, held that all four are the elements of things; and still others, such as Heraclitus, held that something different is the element of things, for he claimed that vapor plays this role.

819. (5) Now because motion is caused in natural bodies by the form rather than by the matter, he therefore adds a fifth sense in which the term nature is used: that in which nature means the form of a thing. Hence in another sense nature means “the substance of things,” i.e., the form of things, which are by nature. It was in this sense that some said that the nature of things is the composition of mixed bodies, as Empedocles said that there is nothing absolute in the world, but that only the alteration or loosening (or mixing, according to another text) of what has been mixed is called nature by men. For they said that things composed of different mixtures have different natures.

820. Now they were led to hold that form is nature by this process of reasoning: whatever things exist or come to be by nature are not said to have a nature, even though the matter from which they are naturally disposed to be or to come to be is already present, unless they have a proper species and a form through which they acquire their species. Now the term species seems to be given in place of substantial form and the term form in place of figure, which is a natural result of the species and a sign of it. Hence, if form is nature, a thing cannot be said to have a nature unless it has a form. Therefore, that which is composed of matter and form “is said to be by nature,” i.e., according to nature, as animals and the parts of animals, such as flesh and bones and the like.

821. Again, nature (414).

Then he gives two meanings of nature which are connected with the last two preceding ones, and the first of these is added to the fourth sense of nature, in which it means the matter of a thing. And he says that not every kind of matter is said to be the nature of a thing but only first matter. This can be understood in two senses: either with reference to something generic, or with reference to something that is first absolutely or without qualification. For example, the first matter generically of artificial things produced from bronze is bronze; but their first matter without qualification is water; for all things which are liquefied by heat and solidified by cold have the character of water, as he says in Book IV of the Meteors.

822. He links up the second of these additional meanings with the fifth sense of nature mentioned above, according to which nature means form. And in this sense not only the form of a part (forma partis) is called nature but the species is the form of the whole (forma totius). For example, we might say that the nature of man is not only a soul but humanity and the substance signified by the definition. For it is from this point of view that Boethius says that the nature of a thing is the specific difference which informs each thing, because the specific difference is the principle that completes a thing's substance and gives it its species. And just as form or matter is called nature because it is a principle of generation, which is the meaning of nature according to the original use of the term, in a similar way the species or substance of a thing is called its nature because it is the end of the process of generation. For the process of generation terminates in the species of the thing generated, which is a result of the union of matter and form.

823. And because of this every substance is called nature according to a kind of metaphorical and extended use of the term; for the nature which we spoke of as the terminus of generation is a substance. Thus every substance is similar to what we call nature. Boethius also gives this meaning of the term. Moreover, it is because of this meaning that the term nature is distinguished from other common terms. For it is common in this way just as substance also is.

824. Hence, from what (415).

Then he reduces all of the foregoing senses of the term nature to one common notion. But it must be noted that the reduction of the other senses to one primary sense can happen in two ways: in one way, with reference to the order which things have; and in another way, with reference to the order which is observed in giving names to things. For names are given to things according as we understand them, because names are signs of what we understand; and sometimes we understand prior things from subsequent ones. Hence something that is prior for us receives a name which subsequently fits the object of that name. And this is what happens in the present case; for since the forms and powers of things are known from their activities, the process of generation or birth of a thing is the first to receive the name of nature and the last is the form.

825. But with reference to the order which things have in reality the concept of nature primarily fits the form, because, as has been said (808), nothing is said to have a nature unless it has a form.

826. Hence from what has been said it is evident that “in its primary and proper sense nature is the substance,” i.e., the form, of those things which have within themselves as such the source of their motion. For matter is called nature because it is receptive of form; and processes of generation get the name of nature because they are motions proceeding from a form and terminating in further forms. And this, namely, the form, is the principle of motion in those things which are by nature, either potentially or actually. For a form is not always the cause of actual motion but sometimes only of potential motion, as when a natural motion is prevented by an external obstacle, or even when a natural action is prevented by a defect in the matter.

LESSON 6

Four Senses of the Term Necessary. Its First and Proper Sense. Immobile Things, though Necessary, Are Exempted from Force

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1015a 20-1015b 15

416. Necessary means that without which, as a contributing cause, a thing cannot be or live; for example, breathing and food are necessary to an animal because it cannot exist without them.

417. And it also means that without which the good for man cannot be or come to be, and that without which one cannot get rid of or remain free of some evil; for example, the drinking of some drug is necessary in order that one may not be in distress, and sailing to Aegina is necessary in order that one may collect money.

418. Again, it means what applies force and force itself, and this is something which hinders and prevents, in opposition to desire and choice. For that which applies force is said to be necessary, and for this reason anything necessary is also said to be lamentable, as Evenus says, “For every necessary thing is mournful.” And force is a kind of necessity, as Sophocles says, “But force compels me to do this.” And necessity seems to be something blameless, and rightly so, for it is contrary to motion which stems from choice and from knowledge.

419. Again, we say that anything which cannot be otherwise is necessarily so.

420. And from this sense of the term necessary all the other senses are derived. For whatever is forced is said either to do or to undergo something necessary when it cannot do something according to its inclination as a result of force, as if there were some necessity by reason of which the thing could not be otherwise. The same thing applies to the contributing causes of life and of good. For when in the one case good, and in the other life or being, is impossible without certain contributing causes, these are necessary; and this cause is a kind of necessity.

421. Further, demonstration belongs to the class of necessary things, because whatever has been demonstrated in the strict sense cannot be otherwise. The reason for this is the principles, for the principles from which a syllogism proceeds cannot be otherwise.

422. Now of necessary things some have something else as the cause of their necessity and others do not, but it is because of them that other things are necessary. Hence what is necessary in the primary and proper sense is what is simple, for this cannot be in more ways than one. Therefore it cannot be in one state and in another; otherwise there would be more ways than one. If, then, there are any beings which are eternal and immobile, in them nothing forced or contrary to nature is found.

COMMENTARY

NECESSARY

827. Having distinguished the different senses of the terms which signify causes, the Philosopher now gives the different senses of a term which designates something pertaining to the notion of cause, i.e., the term necessary; for a cause is that from which something else follows of necessity. In regard to this he does two things. First, he distinguishes the different senses of the term necessary. Second (836), he reduces all of these to one primary sense (“And from this sense”).

In the first part he gives four senses in which the term necessary is used:

First, it means that without which a thing cannot be or live; and even when this is not the principal cause of a thing, it is still a contributing cause. Breathing, for example, is necessary to an animal which breathes, because it cannot live without this. And while breathing is not the [principal] cause of life, nonetheless it is still a contributing cause inasmuch as it helps to restore what is lost and prevents the total consumption of moisture, which is a cause of life. Hence things of this kind are said to be necessary because it is impossible for things to exist without them.

828. And it also means (417).

Then he gives a second sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that in a second way those things are said to be necessary without which some good cannot be or come about, or some evil be avoided or expelled. For example, we say that "the drinking of some drug," i.e., a laxative medicine, is necessary, not because an animal cannot live without it, but because it is required to expel something, namely, an evil, illness, or even to avoid it. For this is necessary "in order that one may not be in distress," i.e., to avoid being ill. And similarly "sailing to Aegina," i.e., to a definite place, is necessary, not because a man cannot exist without this, but because he cannot acquire some good, i.e., money, without doing this. Hence, such a voyage is said to be necessary in order to collect a sum of money.

829. Again, it means (418).

Here he gives a third sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that anything which exerts force, and even force itself, is termed necessary. For force is said to be necessary, and one who is forced is said to do of necessity whatever he is compelled to do. He shows what is meant by something that exerts force both in the case of natural beings and in that of beings endowed with will. In natural beings there is a desire for or an inclination toward some end or goal, to which the will of a rational nature corresponds; and for this reason a natural inclination is itself called an appetite. For both of these, i.e., both the desire of a natural inclination and the intention of the will, can be hindered and prevented—hindered in carrying out a motion already begun, and prevented from initiating motion. Therefore, that is said to be forced "which is done in opposition to desire," ' i.e., against the inclination of a natural being; and it is "something that hinders choice," i.e., the end intended in executing a voluntary motion already begun, and also something that prevents it from beginning. Another text says, "and this is according to impetuousness," i.e., according to impulse. For force is found when something is done through the impulse of an external agent and is opposed to the will and power of the subject. And that is forced which is done as a result of an impulse applying force.

830. Now from this definition of the forced he draws two conclusions. The first is that everything forced is sad or mournful. He proves this by using the statement of a certain poet or teacher, saying that everything which is necessary or forced is sad or lamentable; for force is a kind of necessity, as the poet Sophodes says: “Force,” i.e., necessity, “compelled me to do this.” For it has been said that force is something which hinders the will; and things which are opposed to the will cause sorrow, because sorrow has to do with things which happen to us against our will.

831. The second conclusion is that anything which is necessary is rightly said to be without blame or reproach. For it is said that necessity deserves forgiveness rather than blame; and this is true because we deserve to be blamed only for the things which we do voluntarily and for which we may also be reasonably rebuked. But the kind of necessity which pertains to force is opposed to the will and to reason, as has been stated (829); and thus it is more reasonable to say that things done by force are not subject to blame.

832. Again, we say (419).

He gives a fourth sense in which things are said to be necessary. He says that being in such a state that it cannot be otherwise we also call necessary, and this is what is necessary in an absolute sense. Things necessary in the first senses, however, are necessary in a relative sense.

833. Now whatever is absolutely necessary differs from the other types of necessity, because absolute necessity belongs to a thing by reason of something that is intimately and closely connected with it, whether it be the form or the matter or the very essence of a thing. For example, we say that an animal is necessarily corruptible because this is a natural result of its matter inasmuch as it is composed of contraries; and we say that an animal is necessarily capable of sensing because this is a result of its form; and we also say that an animal is necessarily a living sensible substance because this is its essence.

834. However, the necessity of something which is necessary in a relative sense and not absolutely depends on an extrinsic cause. And there are two kinds of extrinsic causes—the end and the agent. The end is either existence taken absolutely, and the necessity taken from this end pertains to the first kind; or it is well disposed existence or the possession of some good, and necessity of the second kind is taken from this end.

835. Again, the necessity which comes from an external agent pertains to the third kind of necessity. For force exists when a thing is moved by an external agent to something which it has no aptitude for by its own nature. For if something is disposed by its own nature to receive motion from an external agent, such motion will not be forced but natural. This is evident in the motion of the celestial bodies by separate substances, and in that of lower bodies by higher ones.

836. And from this (420).

Here he reduces all of the senses in which things are necessary to one; and in regard to this he does three things. First (836), he shows that all the types of necessity found in reality pertain to this last type. Second (838), he shows that necessity in matters of demonstration is taken in this last sense (“Further, demonstration”). Third (839), he draws a corollary from what has been set down above (“Now of necessary things”).

He accordingly says, first, that all the other senses of the term necessary are somehow referred to this last sense. He makes this clear, first, with reference to the third way in which things are said to be necessary. For whatever is forced is said to do or to undergo something of necessity on the grounds that it cannot act through its own power because of the force exerted on it by an agent; and this is a kind of necessity by which it cannot be otherwise than it is.

837. Then he shows that the same thing is true of the first and second ways in which things are said to be necessary: in the first way with reference to the causes of living and being absolutely, and in the second with reference to the causes of good. For the term necessary was so used in these other ways: in one way to designate that without which a thing cannot be well off, and in the other to designate that without which a thing cannot live or exist. Hence that cause without which a thing cannot live or exist or possess a good or avoid an evil is said to be necessary; the supposition being that the primary notion of the necessary derives from the fact that something cannot be otherwise.

838. Further, demonstration (421).

Then he shows that the necessary in matters of demonstration is taken from this last sense, and this applied both to principles and to conclusions. For demonstration is said to be about necessary things, and to proceed from necessary things. At is said to be about necessary things because what is demonstrated in the strict sense cannot be otherwise. He says “demonstrated in the strict sense” in order to distinguish this from what is demonstrated by the kind of demonstration which refutes an opponent, and does not strictly demonstrate. In the fourth book (609) he called this an ad hominem argument. In demonstrations of this kind which refute an opponent we conclude to the impossible from certain impossible premises. But since in demonstrations the premises are the causes of the conclusion, for demonstrations in the strict sense are productive of science and this is had only by way of a cause, the principles from which a syllogism proceeds must also be necessary and thus cannot be otherwise than they are. For a necessary effect cannot come from a non-necessary cause.

839. Now of necessary things (422).

Here he draws three conclusions from the points set down above, one of which follows from the other. The first is that, since in demonstrations the premises are the causes of the conclusion and both of these are necessary, it follows that some things are necessary in one of two ways. For there are (1) some things whose necessity is caused by something else, and there are (2) others whose necessity has no cause; and such things are necessary of themselves. This is said against Democritus, who claimed that we must not look for the causes of necessary things, as is stated in Book VIII of the Physics.

840. The second conclusion is that, since there must be one first necessary being from which other beings derive their necessity (for there cannot be an infinite regress in causes, as was shown in the second book (301), this first necessary being, which is also necessary in the most proper sense because it is necessary in all ways, must be simple. For composite things are changeable and thus can be in more ways than one. But things which can be in more ways than one can be now in one way and now in another, and this is opposed to the notion of necessity; for that is necessary which cannot be otherwise. Hence the first necessary being must not be now in one way and now in another, and consequently cannot be in more ways than one. Thus he must be simple.

841. The third conclusion is that, since the forced is something which is moved by an external agent in opposition to its own nature, and necessary principles are simple and unchangeable, as has been shown (422:C 840), therefore if there are certain eternal and unchangeable beings, as the

separate substances are, in them there must be nothing forced or contrary to their nature. He says this lest a mistake should be made in the case of the term necessity, since it is predicated of immaterial substances without implying on this account that anything forced is found in them.

LESSON 7

The Kinds of Accidental Unity and of Essential Unity

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1015b 16-1016b 3

423. The term one is used both of what is accidentally one and of what is essentially one. A thing is said to be accidentally one, for example, when we say “Coriscus” and “musical” and “musical Coriscus.” For to say “Coriscus” and “musical” and “musical Coriscus” amounts to the same thing; and this is also true when we say “just” and “musical” and “just musical Coriscus.” For all of these are said to be accidentally one; just and musical because they are accidents of one substance, and musical and Coriscus because the one is an accident of the other. And similarly in a sense musical Coriscus is one with Coriscus, because one of the parts of this expression is an accident of the other. Thus musical is an accident of Coriscus and musical Coriscus is an accident of just Coriscus, because one part of each expression is an accident of one and the same subject. For it makes no difference whether musical is an accident of Coriscus [or whether just Coriscus is an accident of musical Coriscus]. The same thing also holds true if an accident is predicated of a genus or of any universal term, for example, when one says that man and musical man are the same; for this occurs either because musical is an accident of man, which is one substance, or because both are accidents of some singular thing, for example, Coriscus. Yet both do not belong to it in the same way, but one

perhaps as the genus and substance, and the other as a habit or modification of the substance. Therefore whatever things are said to be accidentally one are said to be such in this way.

424. But in the case of things which are said to be essentially one, some are said to be such by nature of their continuity; for example, a bundle becomes one by means of a binding, and pieces of wood become one by means of glue. And a continuous line, even if it is bent, is said to be one, just as each part [of the human body] is, for example, a leg or an arm. And of these things themselves those which are continuous by nature are one to a greater degree than those which are continuous by art. And that is said to be continuous whose motion is essentially one and cannot be otherwise. And motion is one when it is indivisible, i.e., indivisible in time.

425. Again, all those things are essentially continuous which are one not merely by contact; for if you place pieces of wood so that they touch each other, you will not say that they are one, either one board or one body or any other continuous thing. Hence those things which are continuous throughout are said to be one even though they are bent. And those which are not bent are one to an even greater degree; for example, the lower leg or the thigh is one to a greater degree than the leg, because the motion of the leg may not be one. And a straight line is one to a greater degree than a bent line. But what is bent and angular we refer to as either one or not one, because its motion may be either simultaneous or not. But the motion of a straight line is always simultaneous, and no part of it which has extension is at rest when another moves, as in a bent line.

426. Again, a thing is said to be one in another sense because its underlying subject is uniform in species; and it is uniform in species as those things whose form is indivisible from the viewpoint of sensory perception. And the underlying subject is either one that is primary or one that is last in relation to the end. For wine is said to be one and water is said to be one inasmuch as they are indivisible in species. And all liquids are said to be one, as oil, wine and fluids, because the ultimate subject of all is the same; for all of these are made up of water or of air.

427. And those things are said to be one whose genus is one and differs by opposite differences. And all these things are said to be one because the genus, which is the subject of the differences, is one; for example, man, dog and horse are one because all are animals; and it is such in a way closest to

that in which matter is one. And sometimes these things are said to be one in this way, and sometimes in their higher genus, which is said to be the same if those which are higher than these are the last species of the genus; for example, the isosceles and the equilateral triangle are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles.

428. Further, any two things are said to be one when the definition expressing the essence of one is indistinguishable from that signifying the essence of the other. For in itself every definition is divisible. And what has increased and what has decreased are one in this way, because their definition is one. An example of this is found in plane figures, which are one in species.

429. And those things are altogether one and in the highest degree whose concept, which grasps their essence, is indivisible and cannot be separated either in time or in place or in its intelligible structure; and of these, all those which are substances are especially such.

COMMENTARY

842. Having given the various senses of the terms which signify causes, the Philosopher now proceeds to do the same thing with those terms which signify in some way the subject of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (423:C 843) he gives or distinguishes the different senses of the terms which signify the subject of this science; and in the second (445:C 908) he distinguishes the different senses of the terms which signify the parts of this subject (“Things are said to be the same”).

Now the subject of this science can be taken either as that which has to be considered generally in the whole science, and as such it is unity and being, or as that with which this science is chiefly concerned, and this is substance. Therefore, first (423), he gives the different senses of the term one; second (435:C 885) of the term being (“The term being”); and third (440:C 898), of the term substance (“The term substance”).

In regard to the first part of this division he does two things. First, he makes a distinction between what is essentially one and what is accidentally one, and he also indicates the various senses in which things are said to be accidentally one. Second (42VC 848), he notes the various senses in which things are said to be essentially one (“But in the case”).

843. He says (423), then, that the term one signifies both what is essentially one and what is accidentally one. And he tells us that what is accidentally one we should consider first in the case of singular terms. Now singular terms can be accidentally one in two ways: in one way according as an accident is related to a subject; and in another way according as one accident is related to another. And in both cases three things have to be considered—one composite thing and two simple ones. For if what is accidentally one is considered to be such according as an accident is related to a subject, then there are, for example, these three things: first, Coriscus; second, musical; and third, musical Coriscus. And these three are accidentally one; for Coriscus and what is musical are the same in subject. Similarly when an accident is related to an accident, three terms must be considered: first, musical; second, just; and third, just musical Coriscus. And all these atle said to be accidentally one, but for different reasons.

844. For just and musical, which are two simple terms in the second way, are said to be accidentally one because both are accidents of one and the same subject. But musical and Coriscus, which are two simple terms in the first way, are said to be accidentally one because “the one,” namely, musical, “is an accident of the other,” namely, of Coriscus. And similarly in regard to the relationship of musical Coriscus to Coriscus (which is the relationship of a composite term to one of two simple terms), these are said to be accidentally one in the first way, because in this expression, i.e., in the complex term, musical Coriscus, one of the parts, namely, musical, is an accident of the other, which is designated as a substance, namely, Coriscus. And for the same reason it can be said that musical Coriscus is one with just Coriscus, which are two composites in the second way, because two of the parts of each composite are accidents of one subject, Coriscus. For if musical and musical Coriscus, and just and just Coriscus, are the same, then whatever is an accident of musical is also an accident of musical Coriscus; and whatever is an accident of Coriscus is also an accident of just Coriscus. Hence, if musical is an accident of Coriscus, it follows that musical Coriscus is an accident of just Coriscus. Therefore it makes no difference whether we say that musical Coriscus is an accident of just Coriscus, or that musical is an accident of Coriscus.

845. But because accidental predicates of this kind are first applied to singular things and then to universals (although the reverse is true of

essential predicates), he therefore makes clear that what he showed in the case of singular terms also applies in that of universal terms. He says that, if an accident is used along with the name of a genus or of any universal term, accidental unity is taken in the same way as it is in the above cases when an accident is joined to a singular term; for example, when it is said that man and musical man are accidentally one, although they differ in some respect.

846. For singular substances are neither present in a subject nor predicated of a subject, so that while they are the subject of other things, they themselves do not have a subject. Now universal substances are predicated of a subject but are not present in a subject, so that while they are not the subjects of accidents, they have something as their subject. Hence, when an accident is joined to a singular substance, the expression stating this can only mean that an accident belongs to a singular substance, as musical belongs to Coriscus when Coriscus is said to be musical.

847. But when we say musical man, the expression can mean one of two things: either that musical is an accident of man, by which substance is designated, and from this it derives its ability to be the subject of an accident; or it means that both of these, man and musical, belong to some singular thing, for example, Coriscus, in the way that musical was predicated of just, because these two belong to the same singular thing and in the same way, i.e., accidentally. But perhaps the one term does not belong to the other in the same way, but in the way that universal substance belongs to the singular as a genus, as the term animal, or if it is not a genus, it at least belongs to the substance of the subject, i.e., as an essential predicate, as the term man. But the other term, namely, musical, does not have the character of a genus or essential predicate, but that of a habit or modification of the subject, or whatever sort of accident it may be. He gives these two, habit and modification, because there are some accidents which remain in their subject, such as habits, which are moved with difficulty, and others which are not permanent but transient, such as modifications. It is clear, then, that these are the ways in which things are said to be accidentally one.

Kinds of unity

848. But in the case (424).

Then he gives the ways in which things are essentially one, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he indicates the different senses in which the term one is used; and second (880), the different senses in which the term many is used (“Moreover, it is evident”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the different senses in which things arc one from the viewpoint of nature, i.e., according to the conditions found in reality; and second (876), from the viewpoint of logic, i.e., according to the considerations of logic (“Further, some things”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he distinguishes the different senses in which things are said to be one. Second (872), he indicates a property which accompanies unity (“But the essence of oneness”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he sets down the different senses in which things are said to be one. Second (866), he reduces all of them to a single sense (“For in general”).

In the first part he gives five senses in which the term one is used.

849. (1) The first is this: some of the things which are said to be essentially one are such “by nature of their continuity,” i.e., by being continuous, or “because they are continuous,” as another translation says. But things are said to be continuous in two ways; for, as another text says, some things are continuous by reason of something other than themselves, and some in themselves.

850. First, he proceeds to deal with those things which are continuous (a) by reason of something other than themselves. He says that there are things which are continuous as a result of something else; for example, a bundle of sticks is continuous by means of a cord or binding; and in this way too pieces of wood which have been glued together are said to be one by means of the glue. Now there are also two ways in which this occurs, because the continuity of things which are fastened together (i) sometimes takes the form of a straight line, and (ii) sometimes that of a line which is not straight. This is the case, for example, with a bent line having an angle, which results from the contact of two lines in one surface in such a way that they are not joined in a straight line. And it is in this way that the parts of an animal are said to be one and continuous; for example, the leg, which is bent, and contains an angle at the knee, is said to be one and continuous; and it is the same with the arm.

851. But since this kind of continuity which comes about by reason of something else can exist or come to be both by nature and by art, (b) those

things which are continuous by nature are one to a greater degree than those which are continuous by art; for the unity that accounts for the continuity of things which are continuous by nature is not extrinsic to the nature of the thing which is made continuous by it, as happens in the case of things which are one by art, in which the binding or glue or something of the sort is entirely extrinsic to the nature of, the things which are joined together. Hence those things which are joined by nature hold the first place among those which are essentially continuous, which are one in the highest degree.

852. In order to make this clear he defines the continuous. He says that that is said to be continuous which has only one motion essentially and cannot be otherwise. For the different parts of any continuous thing cannot be moved by different motions, but the whole continuous thing is moved by one motion. He says "essentially" because a continuous thing can be moved in one way essentially and in another or others accidentally. For example, if a man in a ship moves against the motion of the ship essentially, he is still moved accidentally by the motion of the ship.

853. Now in order for motion to be one it must be indivisible; and by this I mean from the viewpoint of time, in the sense that at the same time that one part of a continuous thing is moved another is also moved. For it is impossible that one part of a continuous thing should be in motion and another at rest, or that one part should be at rest and another in motion, so that the motion of the different parts should take place in different parts of time.

854. Therefore the Philosopher defines the continuous here by means of motion, and not by means of the oneness of the boundary at which the parts of the continuous things are joined, as is stated in the Categories, and in the Physics; because from this definition he can consider different grades of unity in different continuous things (as will be made clear later on [856]), but he cannot do this from the definition given there.

855. Moreover, it should be noted that what is said here about the motion of a continuous thing being indivisible from the viewpoint of time is not opposed to the point proved in Book VI of the Physics, that the time of a motion is divided according to the parts of the thing moved. For here the Philosopher is speaking of motion in an unqualified sense, because one part of a continuous thing does not begin to be moved before another part does; but there he is speaking of some designation which is made in the

continuous quantity over which motion passes. For that designation, which is the first part of a continuous quantity, is traversed in a prior time, although in that prior time other parts of the continuous thing that is in motion are also moved.

856. Again, all those (425).

Then he proceeds to deal with things which are essentially continuous. He says that those things are essentially continuous which are said to be one not by contact. He proves this as follows: things which touch each other, as two pieces of wood, are not said to be one piece of wood or one body or any other kind of one which belongs to the class of the continuous. Hence it is evident that the oneness of things which are continuous differs from that of things which touch each other. For those things which touch each other do not have any unity of continuity of themselves but by reason of some bond which unites them; but those things which are continuous are said to be essentially one even though they are bent. For two bent lines are continuous in relation to one common boundary, which is the point at which the angle is formed.

857. Yet those things are one to a greater degree which are essentially continuous and without a bend. The reason is that a straight line can have only one motion in all of its parts, whereas a bent line can have one or two motions. For the whole of a bent line can be understood to be moved in one part; and it can also be understood that when one part is at rest, the other part, which makes an angle with the part at rest, can come closer by its motion to the unmoved part; for example, when the lower leg or shin is bent in the direction of the upper leg, which here is called the thigh. Hence each of these—the shin and thigh—is one to a greater degree "than the scelos," as the Greek text says, i.e. the whole composed of the shin and thigh.

858. Further, it must be noted that the text which reads "curved" instead of "bent" is false. For, since the parts of a curved line do not contain an angle, it is evident that they must be in motion together or at rest together, just as the parts of a straight line are; but this does not happen in the case of a bent line, as has been stated (857).

859. Again, a thing (426).

(2) Here he gives the second way in which things are one. He says that a thing is said to be one in a second way not merely by reason of continuous quantity but because of the fact that the whole subject is uniform in species.

For some things can be continuous even though they differ in species; for example, when gold is continuous with silver or something of this kind. And then two such things will be one if quantity alone is considered but not if the nature of the subject is considered. But if the whole continuous subject is uniform in species, it will be one both from the viewpoint of quantity and from that of nature.

860. Now a subject is said to be uniform in species when the same sensible form is not divided in such a way that there are different sensible forms in different parts of the subject, as it sometimes happens, for example, that one part of a sensible body is white and another black. And this subject, which does not differ in species, can be taken in two ways: in one way as the first subject, and in another as the last or ultimate subject which is reached at the end of a division. It is evident, for example, that a whole amount of wine is said to be one because its parts are parts of one common subject which is undifferentiated specifically. The same is true of water. For all liquids or moist things are said to be one insofar as they have a single ultimate subject. For oil and wine and the like are ultimately dissolved into water or air, which is the root of moistness in all things.

861. And those things (427).

(3) Then he indicates the third way in which things are said to be one. He says that those things are said to be one whose genus is one, even though it is divided by opposite differences. And this way resembles the preceding one; for some things were said to be one in the preceding way because their subject-genus is one, and now some things are said to be one because their genus, which is the subject of differences, is one; for example, a man and a horse and a dog are said to be one because they have animality in common as one genus, which is the subject of differences. Yet this way differs from the preceding, because in the preceding way the subject was one thing which was not differentiated by forms; but here the subject-genus is one thing which is differentiated by various differences, as though by various forms.

862. Thus it is evident that some things are said to be one in genus in a most proximate sense, and in a way similar to that in which some things are said to be one in matter. For those things which are said to be one in matter are also differentiated by forms. For even though a genus is not matter, because it would then not be predicated of a species since matter is part of a

thing, still the notion of a genus is taken from what is material in a thing, just as the notion of a difference is taken from what is formal. For the rational soul is not the difference of man (since it is not predicated of man), but something having a rational soul (for this is what the term rational signifies). Similarly, sensory nature is not the genus of man but a part. But something having a sensory nature, which the term animal Signifies, is the genus of man. In a similar fashion, then, the way in which things are one in matter is closely related to that in which they are one in genus.

863. But it must be borne in mind that to he one in generic character has two meanings. For sometimes some things are said to be one in genus, as has been stated, because they belong to one genus, whatever it may be. But sometimes some things are said to be one in genus only in reference to a higher genus, which, along with the designation “one” or “the same,” is predicated of the last species of a lower genus when there are other higher species in one of which the lower species agree. For example, figure is one supreme genus which has many species under it, namely, circle, triangle, square, and the like. And triangle also has different species, namely, the equilateral, which is called iso-pleural and the triangle with two equal sides, which is called equi-legged or isosceles. Hence these two triangles are said to be one figure, which is their remote genus, but not one triangle, which is their proximate genus. The reason for this is that these two triangles do not differ by any differences which divide figure, but by differences which divide triangle. And the term same means that from which something does not differ by a difference.

864. (4) He now describes the fourth way in which things are said to be one. He says that things such that the definition of one (which is the concept signifying its quiddity) is not distinguished from the definition of the other (which also signifies its quiddity) are also said to be one. For while every definition must be divisible or distinguishable in itself, or essentially, since it is composed of genus and difference, it is possible for the definition of one thing to be indistinguishable from that of another when the two have one definition. And this applies (a) whether those definitions signify the total [intelligible structure] of the thing defined, as tunic and clothing (and then things whose definition is one are one in an absolute sense), or (b) whether that common definition does not totally comprehend the intelligible structure of the two things which have it in common, as an ox and a horse

have in common the one definition of animal. Hence they are never one in an absolute sense, but only in a relative sense inasmuch as each is an animal. The same applies in the case of increase and decrease; for there is one common definition of the genus, because each is a motion relating to quantity. And the same thing is true of plane figures, for there is one definition of the species, plane figure.

865. And those things (429).

(5) He gives the fifth way in which things are one. He says that those things are "altogether" one, i.e., perfectly, and in the highest degree, whose concept, which grasps their quiddity, is altogether indivisible, like simple things, which are not composed of material and formal principles. Hence the concept which embraces their quiddity does not comprehend them in such a way as to form a definition of them from different principles, but (a) rather grasps them negatively, as happens in the case of a point, which has no parts; or (b) it even comprehends them by relating them to composite things, as happens, for example, when someone defines the unit as the principle of number. And because such things have in themselves an indivisible concept, and things which are divided in any way at all can be understood separately, it therefore follows that such things are indivisible both in time and in place and in their intelligible structure. Hence these things are one in the highest degree, and especially those which are indivisible in the genus of substance. For even though what is indivisible in the genus of accident is not composite in itself, nonetheless it does form a composite with something else, namely, the subject in which it inheres. But an indivisible substance is neither composite in itself nor does it form a composite with something else. Or the term substance can be taken in the ablative case, and then the sense is that, even though some things are said to be one because they are indivisible in time and in place and in definition, still those things in this class which are indivisible in substance are said to be one in the highest degree. This sense is reduced to the preceding one.

LESSON 8

The Primary Sense of One. One in the Sense of Complete. One as the Principle of Number. The Ways in Which Things Are One. The Ways in Which Things Are Many

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1016b 3-1017a 6

430. For in general those things which do not admit of division are said to be one insofar as they do not admit of division. Thus, if two things do not admit of division insofar as they are man, they are one man; and if they do not admit of division insofar as they are animal, they are one animal; and if they do not admit of division insofar as they have continuous quantity, they are one continuous quantity. Hence many things are said to be one because they do or undergo or have or are related to 1 some other thing which is one. But those things are said to be one in a primary sense whose substance is one; and they are one either by continuity or in species or in intelligible structure. For we count as many those things which are not continuous, or those whose form is not one, or those whose intelligible structure is not one.

431. Again, in one sense we say that anything at all is one by continuity if it is quantitative and continuous; and in another sense we say that a thing is not one unless it is a whole, i.e., unless it has one form. Thus in looking at the parts of a shoe which are put together in any way at all, we would not say that they are one, except by reason of their continuity; but if they are

put together in such a way as to be a shoe and to have a certain form, there would then be one thing. And for this reason, among lines the circular line is one in the highest degree because it is whole and complete.

432. But the essence of oneness is to be a principle of some number; for the first measure is a principle, because that by which we first come to know each class of things is its first measure. Unity, then, is the first principle of what is knowable about each class. But this unity or unit is not the same in all classes; for in one it is the lesser half tone, and in another it is the vowel or consonant; and in the case of weight the unit is different; and in that of motion different still. But in all cases what is one is indivisible either in quantity or in species. Thus a unit is indivisible in quantity as quantity in every way and has no position; and a point is indivisible in every way and has position. A line is divisible in one dimension; a surface, in two; and a body, in three. And conversely, that which is divisible in two dimensions is a surface; in one, a line; and quantitatively indivisible in every way, a point and a unit. If it has no position, it is a unit; and if it has position, it is a point.

433. Further, some things are one in number, some in species, some in genus, and some analogically or proportionally. Those things are one in number which have one matter; in species, which have one intelligible structure; in genus, which have the same figure of predication; and proportionally, which are related to each other as some third thing is to a fourth. And the latter types of unity always follow the former. Thus things which are one in number are one in species, but not all which are one in species are one in number; and all which are one in species are one in genus, but not all which are one in genus are one in species, although they are all one proportionally. And not all which are one proportionally are one in genus.

434. Moreover, it is evident that things are said to be many in a way opposite to that in which they are one. For some things are many because they are not continuous; others, because their matter, either the first or ultimate, is divisible in species; and others because they have many conceptions expressing their essence.

COMMENTARY

HOW THE KINDS OF UNITY INTER-RELATE

866. Here the Philosopher reduces all senses in which things are said to be one to one primary sense, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he makes this reduction; and second (870), to those senses in which things are said to be one, which have already been given, he adds another ("Again, in one sense").

He accordingly says, first, that it is evident from what precedes that things which are indivisible in every way are said to be one in the highest degree. For all the other senses in which things are said to be one are reducible to this sense, because it is universally true that those things which do not admit of division are said to be one insofar as they do not admit of division. For example, those things which are undivided insofar as they are man are said to be one in humanity, as Socrates and Plato; those which are undivided in the notion of animality are said to be one in animality; and those which are undivided from the viewpoint of extension or measure are said to be one in quantity, as continuous things.

867. And from this we can also derive number and the types of unity given above, because what is one is indivisible either in an absolute sense or in a qualified one. (5) If it is indivisible in an absolute sense, it is the last type of unity, which is a principle; but if it is indivisible in a qualified sense, it is so either in quantity alone or in nature. (1) If it is indivisible in quantity, then it is the first type. If it is indivisible in nature, it is so either in reference to its subject or to the division which depends upon the form. If it is divisible in reference to its subject, (2) it is so either in reference to a real subject, and then it is the second type, or (3) to a logical subject, and then it is the third type. (4) And indivisibility of form, which is indivisibility of intelligible structure, or definition, constitutes the fourth type.

868. Now from these senses of the term one certain others are again derived. Thus there are many things which are said to be one because they are doing one thing. For example, many men are said to be one insofar as they are rowing a boat. And some things are said to be one because they are subject to one thing; for example, many men constitute one people because they are ruled by one king. And some are said to be one because they possess one thing; for example, many owners of a field are said to be one in

their ownership of it. And some things are also said to be one because they are something which is one; for example, many men are said to be one because each of them is white.

869. But considering all of these secondary senses in which things are said to be one, which have already been stated in the five ways given above, we can say that those things are one in the primary sense which are one in their substance.(1) For a thing is one in substance either by reason of its continuity, as in the first way; or (2) because of the species of the subject, as in the second way; (3) and again in the third way because the unity of the genus is somewhat similar to the unity of the species; or also (4 & 5) because of the intelligible structure, as in the fourth and fifth ways. That some things are said to be one in these ways is clear from the opposite of one. For things are many in number, i.e., they are counted as many, either because they are continuous, or because they do not have one species, or because they do not have one common intelligible structure.

870. Again, in one sense (430

Then he gives an additional sense in which the term one is used, which differs from the preceding ones. This sense is not derived from thr- notion of indivision, as the foregoing are, but rather from the notion of division. He says that sometimes some things are said to be one because of continuity alone, and sometimes they are said to be one only if they constitute a whole and something complete. Now this happens when the thing has one form, not in the sense that a homogeneous subject is said to have one form, which pertains to the second type given above, but in the sense that the form consists in a kind of totality requiring a definite order of parts. Thus it is clear that we do not say that a thing is one, for example, some artifact such as a shoe, when we see the parts put together in any way at all (unless perhaps it is taken to be one insofar as it is continuous); but we say that all parts of a shoe are one when they are united in such a way that the thing is a shoe and has one form-that of a shoe.

871. And from this it is clear that a circular line is one in the highest degree. For a circular line is not only continuous like a straight line, but also has a totality and completeness which a straight line does not have; for that is complete and whole which lacks nothing. Now this characteristic belongs to a circular line; for nothing can be added to a circular line, but something can be added to a straight one.

872. But the essence (432).

Then he indicates a property which flows from oneness or unity. He says that the essence of one consists in being the principle of some number. This is clear from the fact that the unit is the primary numerical measure by which every number is measured. Now a measure has the character of a principle, because measured things are known by their measure, and things are known by their proper principles. And it is clear from this that unity is the first principle of what is known or knowable about each thing, and that it is the principle of knowing in all classes.

873. But this unity which is the principle of knowing is not the same in all classes of things. For in the class of musical sounds it is the lesser half tone, which is the smallest thing in this class; for a lesser half tone is less than a half tone since a tone is divided into two unequal half tones one of which is called a lesser half tone. And in the class of words the first and smallest unity is the vowel or consonant; and the vowel to a greater degree than the consonant, as will be stated in Book X (831:C 1971). And in the class of heavy things or weights there is some smallest thing which is their measure, i.e., the ounce or something of this kind. And in the class of motions there is one first measure which measures the other motions, namely, the simplest and swiftest motion, which is the diurnal motion.

874. Yet all of these have this feature in common that the first measure is indivisible in quantity or in species. Hence, in order that something be one and first in the genus of quantity it must be indivisible, and indivisible in quantity. It is called a unit if it is indivisible in every way and has no position, and a point if it is altogether indivisible in quantity but has position. A line is something divisible in one dimension only; a surface, in two; and a body, in all, i.e., in three dimensions. And these descriptions are reversible; for everything that is divisible in two dimensions is a surface, and so on with the others.

875. Again, it must be noted that being a measure is the distinctive characteristic of unity insofar as it is the principle of number. But this unity or one is not the same as that which is interchangeable with being, as has been stated in Book IV (303:C 557). For the concept of the latter kind of unity involves only being undivided, but that of the former kind involves being a measure. But even though this character of a measure belongs to the unity which is the principle of number, still by a kind of likeness it is

transferred to the unity found in other classes of things, as the Philosopher will show in Book X of this work (814:C 1921). And according to this the character of a measure is found in any class of things. But this character of a measure is a natural consequence of the note of undividedness, as has been explained (432:C 872). Hence the term one is not predicated in a totally equivocal sense of the unity which is interchangeable with being and of that which is the principle of number, but it is predicated of one primarily and of the other secondarily.

876. Further, some things (433).

Then he gives another way of dividing unity, and this division is rather from the viewpoint of logic. He says that some things are one in number, some in species, some in genus, and some analogically.

Those things are one in number whose matter is one; for insofar as matter has certain designated dimensions it is the principle by which a form is individuated. And for this reason a singular thing is numerically one and divided from other things as a result of matter.

877. Those things are said to be one in species which have one "intelligible structure," or definition; for the only thing that is defined in a proper sense is the species, since every definition is composed of a genus and a difference. And if any genus is defined, this happens in so far as it is a species.

878. Those things are one in genus which have in common one of the "figures of predication," i.e., which have one way of being predicated. For the way in which substance is predicated and that in which quality or action is predicated are different; but all substances have one way of being predicated inasmuch as they are not predicated as something which is present in a subject.

879. And those things are proportionally or analogically one which agree in this respect that one is related to another as some third thing is to a fourth. Now this can be taken in two ways: (1) either in the sense that any two things are related in different ways to one third thing (for example, the term healthy is predicated of urine because it signifies the relationship of a sign of health [to health itself]; and of medicine because it signifies the relationship of a cause to the same health); (2) or it may be taken in the sense that the proportion of two things to two other things is the same (for

example, tranquillity to the sea and serenity to the air; for tranquillity is a state of rest in the sea, and serenity is a state of rest in the air).

880. Now with regard to the ways in which things are one, the latter types of unity always follow the former, and not the reverse; for those things which are one in number are one in species, but not the other way about. The same thing is clear in the other cases.

881. Moreover, itis evident (434).

From the ways in which things are said to be one he now derives the ways in which things are said to be many. He says that things are said to be many in just as many ways as they are said to be one, because in the case of opposite terms one is used in as many ways as the other.

(1) Hence some things are said to be many because they are not continuous, which is the opposite of the first way in which things are one.

882. (2 & 3) Other things are said to be many because their matter is divisible in species, whether we understand by matter “the first,” i.e., their proximate matter, or the final or ultimate matter into which they are ultimately dissolved. Indeed, it is by the division of their proximate matter that wine and oil are said to be many, and by the division of their remote matter that wine and a stone are said to be many. And if matter be taken both for real matter and for conceptual matter, i.e., for a genus, which resembles matter, many in this sense is taken as the opposite of the second and third ways in which things are said to be one.

883. (4) And still other things are said to be many when the conceptions which express their essence are many. And many in this sense is taken as the opposite of the fourth way in which things are said to be one.

884. (5) But the opposite of the fifth way in which things are one does not have the notion of many except in a qualified sense and potentially; for the fact that a thing is divisible does not make it many except potentially.

LESSON 9

Division of Being into Accidental and Essential. The Types of Accidental and of Essential Being

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1017a 7-1017b 9

435. The term being (ens) signifies both accidental being (ens per accidens) and essential being (ens per se).

436. Accidental being is designated when we say, for example, that the just person is musical, and that the man is musical, and that the musician is a man. And the same thing applies when we say that the musician builds, because it is accidental to a builder to be a musician, or to a musician to be a builder. For to say that “this is that” means that this is an accident of that. And so it is in the cases given; for when we say that the man is musical, and that the musician is a man, or that what is musical is white, in the latter case we mean that both are accidents of the same thing, and in the former that the attribute is accidental to the being. But when we say that what is musical is a man, we mean that musical is an accident of this person. And in this sense too white is said to be, because the thing of which it is an accident is. Therefore those things which are said to be in an accidental sense are said to be such either because both belong to the same being, or because the attribute belongs to the being, or because the thing to which it belongs and of which it is predicated is.

437. On the other hand those things are said to be essentially which signify the figures of predication; 1 for being is signified in just as many ways as predications are made. Therefore, since some of these predications signify what a thing is, others what it is like, others how much, others how related, others what it does, others what it undergoes, others where, and others when, to each of these there corresponds a mode of being which signifies the same thing. For there is no difference between "the man is recovering" and "the man recovers," or between "the man is walking" or "cutting" and "the man walks" or "cuts." And the same is true in other cases.

438. Again, being signifies that something is true, and non-being signifies that something is not true but false. This also holds true of affirmation and negation. For example, to say that Socrates is musical means that this is true. Or to say that Socrates is not white means that this is true. But to say that the diagonal of a square is not incommensurable with a side means that this is false.

439. Again, to be, or being, signifies that some of the things mentioned are potentially and others actually. For in the case of the terms mentioned we predicate being both of what is said to be potentially and of what is said to be actually. And similarly we say both of one who is capable of using scientific knowledge and of one who is actually using it, that he knows. And we say that that is at rest which is already so or capable of being so. And this also applies in the case of substances; for we say that Mercury is in the stone, and half of the line in the line, and we call that grain which is not yet ripe. But when a thing is potential and when not must be settled elsewhere (773: C 1832).

COMMENTARY

KINDS OF BEING: THREE WAYS PER ACCIDENS

885. Here the Philosopher gives the various senses in which the term being is used, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides being into essential being and accidental being. Second (886), he distinguishes between the types of accidental being ("Accidental being"). Third (889), he distinguishes between the types of essential being ("On the other hand").

He says, then, that while things are said to be both essentially and accidentally, it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he later divides essential being into the ten predicaments, nine of which belong to the class of accident (889). Hence being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute sense; for example, whiteness considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But accidental being, in the sense in which it is taken here must be understood by comparing an accident with a substance; and this comparison is signified by the term is when, for example, it is said that the man is white. Hence this whole "the man is white" is an accidental being. It is clear, then, that the division of being into essential being and accidental being is based on the fact that one thing is predicated of another either essentially or accidentally. But the division of being into substance and accident is based on the fact that a thing is in its own nature either a substance or an accident.

886. Then he indicates the various senses in which a thing is said to be accidentally. He says that this occurs in three ways: (1) first, when an accident is predicated of an accident, as when it is said that someone just is musical: (2) second, when an accident is predicated of a subject, as when it is said that the man is musical; and (3) third, when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when it is said that the musician is a man. And since he has shown above (787) how an accidental cause differs from an essential cause, he therefore now shows that an accidental being is a result of an accidental cause.

887. He says that in giving an accidental cause we say that the musician builds, because it is accidental to a builder to be a musician, or vice versa; for it is evident that the statement "this is that," i.e., the musician is a builder, simply means that "this is an accident of that." The same is true of the foregoing senses of accidental being when we say that the man is musical by predicating an accident of a subject, or when we say that what is white is musical, or conversely that what is musical is white by predicating an accident of an accident. For in all of these cases is signifies merely accidental being: "in the latter case," i.e., when an accident is predicated of an accident, is signifies that both accidents are accidental to the same subject; "and in the former," i.e., when an accident is predicated of a

subject, is signifies “that the attribute is accidental to the being,” i.e., to the subject. But when we say that what is musical is a man, we mean “that musical is an accident of this person,” i.e., that musical, which holds the position of a subject, is an accident of the predicate. And the reason for making the predication is similar in a sense when a subject is predicated of an accident and when an accident is predicated of an accident. For a subject is predicated of an accident by reason of the fact that the subject is predicated of that to which the accident, which is expressed in the subject, is accidental; and in a similar fashion an accident is predicated of an accident because it is predicated of the subject of an accident. And for this reason the attribute musical is predicated not only of man but also of white, because that of which the attribute musical is an accident, i.e., the subject, is white.

888. It, is evident, then, that those things which are said to be in an accidental sense are said to be such for three reasons: (1) either “because both,” namely, the subject and predicate, belong to the same thing (as when an accident is predicated of an accident); or (2) “because the attribute,” namely, the predicate, such as musical, “belongs to the being,” i.e., to the subject which is said to be musical (and this occurs when an accident is predicated of a subject); or (3) “because the thing,” i.e., the subject which is expressed in the predicate, to which belongs the accident of which it (the subject) is itself predicated, itself is (and this occurs when a subject is predicated of an accident, as when we say that what is musical is a man).

Ten ways per se

889. On the other hand (437).

Here he distinguishes between the types of essential being; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides the kind of being which lies outside the mind, which is complete being, by the ten predicaments. Second (895), he gives another type of being, inasmuch as being exists only in the mind (“Again, being, signifies”). Third (897), he divides being by potentiality and actuality— and being divided in this way is more common than complete being, for potential being is being only imperfectly and in a qualified sense (“Again, to be”).

He says, first (437), that all those things which signify the figures of predication are said to be essentially. For it must be noted that being cannot be narrowed down to some definite thing in the way in which a genus is narrowed down to a species by means of (-) differences. For since a difference does not participate in a genus, it lies outside the essence of a genus. But there could be nothing outside the essence of being which could constitute a particular species of being by adding to being; for what is outside of being is nothing, and this cannot be a difference. Hence in Book III of this work (433) the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus.

890. Being must then be narrowed down to diverse genera on the basis of a (+) different mode of predication, which flows from a different mode of being; for "being is signified," i.e., something is signified to be, "in just as many ways" (or in as many senses) as we can make predications. And for this reason the classes into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating. Therefore, since some predicates signify what (i.e., substance); some, of what kind; some, how much; and so on; there must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication. For example, when it is said that a man is an animal, is signifies substance; and when it is said that a man is white, is signifies quality; and so on.

891. For it should be noted that a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways.

(1) This occurs in one way when the predicate states what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated.

892. (2) A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either (a) essentially and absolutely and (i) as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or (ii) as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or (b) it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation.

(3) A predicate is referred to a subject in a third, way when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. (a) In one way, that from which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the subject; and (i) if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of attire, as when it is said that Socrates is shod or clothed. (ii) But if it is a measure of the subject, then, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, (aa) the predicament is taken either in

reference to time, and so it will be when; or (bb) if it is taken in reference to place and the order of parts in place is not considered, it will be where; but if this order is considered, it will be position. (b) In another way, that from which the predicate is taken, though outside the subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject of which it is predicated. (i) And if it is from the viewpoint of the principle, then it is predicated as an action; for the principle of action is in the subject. (ii) But if it is from the viewpoint of its terminus, then it will be predicated as a passion; for a passion is terminated in the subject which is being acted upon.

893. But since there are some predications in which the verb is is clearly not used (for example, when it is said that a man walks), lest someone think that these predications do not involve the predication of being, for this reason Aristotle subsequently rejects this, saying that in all predications of this kind something is signified to be. For every verb is reduced to the verb is plus a participle. For there is no difference between the statements “the man is recovering” and “the man recovers”; and it is the same in other cases. It is clear, then, that “being” is used in as many ways as we make predications.

894. And there is no truth in Avicenna’s statement that predicates which belong to the class of accidents primarily signify substance and secondarily accidents, as the terms white and musical. For the term white, as it is used in the categories, signifies quality alone. Now the term white implies a subject inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the manner of an accident, so that it must by implication include the subject in its notion, because the being of an accident consists in being in something. For even though whiteness signifies an accident, it still does not signify this after the manner of an accident but after that of a substance. Hence it implies a subject in no way. For if it were to signify a subject primarily, then the Philosopher would not put accidental predicates under essential being but under accidental being. For the whole statement “the man is white” is a being in an accidental sense, as has been stated (886).

Logical being

895. Again, being signifies (438).

Then he gives another sense in which the term being is used, inasmuch as the terms being and is signify the composition of a proposition, which the intellect makes when it combines and separates. He says that being signifies the truth of a thing, or as another translation better expresses it, being signifies that some statement is true. Thus the truth of a thing can be said to determine the truth of a proposition after the manner of a cause; for by reason of the fact that a thing is or is not, a discourse is true or false. For when we say that something is, we signify that a proposition is true; and when we say that something is not, we signify that it is not true. And this applies both to affirmation and to negation. It applies to affirmation, as when we say that Socrates is white because this is true; and to negation, as when we say that Socrates is not white, because this is true, namely, that he is not white. And in a similar way we say that the diagonal of a square is not incommensurable with a side, because this is false, i.e., its not being incommensurable.

896. Now it must be noted that this second way in which being is used is related to the first as an effect is to a cause. For from the fact that something is in reality it follows that there is truth and falsity in a proposition, and the intellect signifies this by the term is taken as a verb copula. But since the intellect considers as a kind of being something which is in itself a non-being, such as a negation and the like, therefore sometimes being is predicated of something in this second way and not in the first. For blindness is said to be in the second way on the grounds that the proposition in which something is said to be blind is true. However, it is not said to be true in the first way; for blindness does not have any being in reality but is rather a privation of some being. Now it is accidental to a thing that an attribute should be affirmed of it truly in thought or in word, for reality is not referred to knowledge but the reverse. But the act of being which each thing has in its own nature is substantial; and therefore when it is said that Socrates is, if the is is taken in the first way, it belongs to the class of substantial predicates; for being is a higher predicate with reference to any particular being, as animal with reference to man. But if it is taken in the second way, it belongs to the class of accidental predicates.

Division by potency and act

897. Again, to be, or being (439).

Here he gives the division of being into the actual and the potential. He says that to be and being signify something which is expressible or utterable potentially or actually. For in the case of all of the foregoing terms which signify the ten predicaments, something is said to be so actually and something else potentially; and from this it follows that each predicament is divided by actuality and potentiality. And just as in the case of things which are outside the mind some are said to be actually and some potentially, so also is this true in the case of the mind's activities, and in that of privations, which are only conceptual beings. For one is said to know both because he is capable of using scientific knowledge and because he is using it; and similarly a thing is said to be at rest both because rest belongs to it already and because it is capable of being at rest. And this is true not only of accidents but also of substances. For "Mercury," we say, i.e., the image of Mercury, is present potentially in the stone; and half of a line is present potentially in a line, for every part of a continuum is potentially in the whole. And the line is included in the class of substances according to the opinion of those who hold that the objects of mathematics are substances—an opinion which he has not yet disproved. And when grain is not yet ripe, for example, when it is still in blade, it is said to be potentially. Just when, however, something is potential and when it is no longer such must be established elsewhere, namely, in Book IX of this work (1832).

LESSON 10

Meanings of Substance

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1017b 10-1017b 26

440. The term substance (substantia) means the simple bodies, such as earth, fire, water and the like; and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and demons and their parts. All of these are called substances because they are not predicated of a subject, but other things are predicated of them.

441. In another sense substance means that which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul in an animal.

442. Again, substance means those parts which, being present in such things, limit them and designate them as individuals and as a result of whose destruction the whole is destroyed; for example, body is destroyed when surface is, as some say, and surface when line is. And in general it seems to some that number is of this nature; for [according to them] if it is destroyed, nothing will exist, and it limits all things.

443. Again, the quiddity of a thing, whose intelligible expression is the definition, also seems to be the substance of each thing.

444. It follows, then, that the term substance is used in two senses. It means the ultimate subject, which is not further predicated of something else; and it means anything which is a particular being and capable of existing apart. The form and species of each thing is said to be of this nature.

COMMENTARY

KINDS OF SUBSTANCE

898. Aristotle now explains the various senses in which the term substance is used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term substance is used. Second (903), he reduces all of these to two (“It follows”).

In treating the first part he gives four senses of the term substance.

(1) First, it means particular substances, such as the simple bodies: earth, fire, water and the like. And in general it means all bodies, even though they are not simple, i.e., compound bodies of like parts, such as stones, blood, flesh and the like. Again, it means animals, which are composed of such sensible bodies, and also their parts, such as hands and feet and so on; “and demons,” i.e., the idols set up in temples and worshipped as gods. Or by demons he means certain animals which the Platonists claimed are capable of reasoning, and which Apuleius defines thus: demons are animals composed of an ethereal body, rational in mind, passive in soul, and eternal in time. Now all of the foregoing things are called substances because they are not predicated of another subject but other things are predicated of them. This is the description of first substance given in the Categories.

899. In another sense (411).

(2) He says that in another sense substance means the cause of the being of the foregoing substances which are not predicated of a subject; and it is not extrinsic to them like an efficient cause but is intrinsic like a form. It is in this sense that the soul is called the substance of an animal.

900. Again, substance (442).

(3) He gives a third meaning of substance, which is the one used by the Platonists and Pythagoreans. He says that all those parts of the foregoing substances which constitute their limits and designate them as individuals, according to the opinion of these thinkers, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, are also termed substances. For example, body is destroyed when surface is, as some say, and surface when line is. It is also clear that surface is the limit of body and line the limit of surface. And according to the opinion of the philosophers just mentioned the line is a part of surface and surface a part of body. For they held that bodies are composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines of points; and thus it

would follow that the point is the substance of the line, the line the substance of surface, and so on for the rest. And according to this position number seems to constitute the entire substance of all things, because when number is destroyed nothing remains in the world; for what is not one is nothing. And similarly things which are not many are non-existent. And number is also found to limit all things, because all things are measured by number.

901. But this sense of substance is not a true one. For that which is found to be common to all things and is something without which they cannot exist does not necessarily constitute their substance, but it can be some property flowing from the substance or from a principle of the substance. These philosophers also fell into error especially regarding unity and number because they failed to distinguish between the unity which is interchangeable with being and that which is the principle of number.

902. Again, the quiddity (443).

(4) He says that the quiddity of each thing, which the definition signifies, is also called its substance. Now the quiddity or essence of a thing, whose intelligible expression is the definition, differs from a form, which he identified with the second meaning of substance, just as humanity differs from a soul, for a form is part of a thing's essence or quiddity, but the essence or quiddity itself of a thing includes all its essential principles. It is in this last sense, then, that genus and species are said to be the substance of the things of which they are predicated; for genus and species do not signify the form alone but the whole essence of a thing.

903. It follows (444).

Then he reduces the foregoing senses of substance to two. He says that from the above-mentioned ways in which the term substance is used we can understand that it has two meanings. (1) It means the ultimate subject in propositions, and thus is not predicated of something else. This is first substance, which means a particular thing which exists of itself and is capable of existing apart because it is distinct from everything else and cannot be common to many. (2) And a particular substance differs from universal substance in these three respects: first, a particular substance is not predicated of inferiors, whereas a universal substance is; second, universal substance subsists only by reason of a particular substance, which subsists of itself; and third, universal substance is present in many things, whereas a particular substance is not but is distinct from everything else and capable of existing apart.

904. And the form and species of a thing also “is said to be of this nature,” i.e., substance. In this he includes the second and fourth senses of substance; for essence and form have this note in common that both are said to be that by which something is. However, form, which causes a thing to be actual, is related to matter, whereas quiddity or essence is related to the supposit, which is signified as having such and such an essence. Hence “the form and species” are comprehended under one thing—a being’s essence.

905. He omits the third sense of substance because it is a false one, or because it is reducible to form, which has the character of a limit. And he omits matter, which is called substance, because it is not substance actually. However, it is included in the first sense of substance, because a particular substance is a substance and is individuated in the world of material things only by means of matter.

LESSON 11

The Ways in Which Things Are the Same Essentially and Accidentally

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1017b 27-1018a 9

445. Things are said to be the same accidentally; for example, “white” and musical” are the same because they are accidents of the same subject. And “man” and “musical” are the same because the one is an accident of the other. And ,’musical” is the same as “man” because it is an accident of a man. And the composite is the same as each of these simple terms, and each the same as it. For both “man” and “musical” are said to be the same as “musical man,” and this the same as they. And for this reason none of these predications are universal. For it is not true to say that every man is the same as the musical; for universal predicates are essential, whereas accidental predicates are not ‘ but are said of singulars in an unqualified sense. For “Socrates” and “musical Socrates” seem to be the same because Socrates is not found in many. And for this reason we do not say “every Socrates” as we say “every man.” Some things, then, are said to be the same in this way.

446. And others are said to be the same essentially, and in the same number of ways in which they are said to be one. For those things whose matter is one in species or in number, and those whose substance is one, are said to be the same. Hence it is evident that sameness (identitas) is a kind of unity of the being of many things or of one thing taken as many; for

example, when a person says that something is the same as itself, he uses the same thing as though it were two.

COMMENTARY

906. Having given the various senses of the terms which signify the subject of this science, here the Philosopher gives those which signify the parts of such things as constitute the subject of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (445:C 906) he gives the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity; and in the second (467:C 954), those which signify the parts of being ("In one sense"). For substance, which is also posited as the subject of this science, is a single category which is not divided into many categories.

The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he gives the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity; and in the second (457:C 936), those which signify something that flows from the notion of unity, namely, prior and subsequent ("Things are said to be"). For to be one is to be a principle or starting point, as has been explained above (432:C 872).

907. The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he gives the various senses of the terms which signify the primary parts of unity and of its opposite, plurality; and in the second (451:C 922), he gives those which signify certain secondary parts of unity ("By opposites").

Now the parts of unity are sameness, which is oneness in substance; likeness, which is oneness in quality; and equality, which is oneness in quantity. And, opposed to these, the parts of plurality are otherness, unlikeness and inequality.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term same is used, and the senses of its opposite. Second (449:C q18), he gives the various senses of the term like, and of its opposite, unlike ("Things are said to be like"). He makes no mention here, however, of the term equal and its opposite, because in the case of these terms plurality is not so evident.

In regard to the first part he does three things. First, he gives the various senses of the term same; second (447:C 91D, of the term other, or diverse

("Those things are said to be other"); and third (448:C 916), of the term different ("Things are said to be different").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the ways in which things are said to be accidentally the same; and second (446:C 911), he gives those in which things are said to be essentially the same ("And others").

The "same", "per accidens" & "per se"

908. He says that things are said to be accidentally the same (idem per accidens) in three ways. (1) In one way they are the same in the sense that two accidents are; thus "white" and "musical" are said to be the same because they are accidents of the same subject. (2) Things are accidentally the same in a second way when a predicate is said to be the same as a subject inasmuch as it is predicated of it; thus when it is said that the man is musical, these (man and musical) are said to be the same because musical is an accident of a man, i.e., the predicate is an accident of the subject. (3) And things are accidentally the same in a third way when the subject is said to be the same as an accident inasmuch as it is predicated of it. For example, when it is said that the musical thing is a man, it is understood that the man is the same as the musical thing; for what is predicated of some subject is identified with that subject. And sameness in this sense means that the subject is an accident of the predicate.

909. Now besides these ways in which things are accidentally the same, in which an accident and a subject are taken in themselves, there are also others, i.e., those in which an accident is taken in conjunction with a subject. And when this occurs two senses of the term same have to be distinguished. (1) One of these is signified when an accident taken singly is predicated of the composite of subject and accident; and then the meaning is that the accident is the same as both of the simple terms taken together; for example, "musical" is the same as "musical man." (2) The other is signified when the composite of accident and subject is predicated of the subject taken singly, as when we say that the man is a musical man; and then both of these (the composite "musical man") are signified as being the same as this, i.e., as the subject taken singly. The same notion applies if an accident is taken singly and a subject is taken in combination with the accident. This would be the case, for example, if we were to say that what is musical is a musical man, or the reverse, for both "man" and "musical" are

said to be accidentally the same as “musical man,” which is the composite, when these two are predicated of that one thing, and vice versa.

910. From this he draws the further conclusion that, in all of the foregoing modes of predication in which things are said to be accidentally the same, no term is predicated universally. For it is not true to say that every man is the same as what is musical. This becomes clear as follows: Only those attributes which belong essentially to the same subject are predicated universally of universals; for a predicate is predicated essentially of a subject because the mode of predication, which is a universal one, agrees with the condition of the subject, which is universal. However, accidents are not predicated essentially of universals, but only by reason of singular things; and thus they are not predicated universally of universals. But while accidents are predicated in an unqualified sense of singular things (for Socrates and musical Socrates seem to be the same in subject), they are not predicated universally of singular things; for nothing can be predicated universally of something that is not universal. But Socrates is not universal, because he is not present in many. Hence nothing can be predicated of Socrates so that we should say “every Socrates” as we say “every man.” The things of which we have spoken, then, are said to be one in this way, i.e., accidentally, as has been stated.

911. And others (446).

Then he gives the ways in which things are said to be essentially the same (idem per se). He says that things are said to be essentially the same in the same number of ways in which they are said to be essentially one. Now all of the ways in which things are said to be essentially one are reduced to two. (1) Thus, in one sense, things are said to be essentially one because their matter is one, whether we take the matter to be the same in species or in number. The second and third ways in which things are one are reduced to this. (2) And, in another sense, things are said to be one because their substance is one, whether by reason of continuity, which pertains to the first way in which things are one, or by reason of the unity and indivisibility of their intelligible structure, which pertains to the fourth and fifth ways. Therefore some things are said to be the same in these ways too.

912. From this he further concludes that sameness (identitas) is a unity or union. For things which are said to be the same are either many in being, but are said to be the same inasmuch as they agree in some respect, or they

are one in being, but the intellect uses this as many in order to understand a relationship; for a relationship can be understood only between two extremes. This is what happens, for example, when we say that something is the same as itself; for the intellect then uses something which is one in reality as though it were two, otherwise it could not designate the relationship of a thing to itself. Hence it is clear that, if a relationship always requires two extremes, and in relations of this kind there are not two extremes in reality but only in the mind, then the relationship of sameness according to which something is said to be absolutely the same, will not be a real relation but only a conceptual relation. This is not the case, however, when any two things are said to be the same either in genus or in species. For if the relationship of sameness were something in addition to what we designate by the term same, then since this reality, which is a relation, is the same as itself, it would have to have for a like reason something that is also the same as itself; and so on to infinity. Now while it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the case of real beings, nothing prevents this from taking place in the case of things which have being in the mind. For since the mind may reflect on its own act it can understand that it understands; and it can also understand this act in turn, and so on to infinity.

LESSON 12

Various Senses of Diverse, Different, Like, Contrary, and Diverse in Species

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447. Things are said to be other or diverse (diversa) of which either the forms or the matter or the intelligible structure of the essence is many; and in general the term other has senses opposite to those of the same.

448. Things are said to be different (differentia) which, while being diverse, are the same in some respect, and not merely in number, but in species or in genus or proportionally. And so also are those things whose genus is not the same, and contraries, and all those things which have diversity or otherness in their essence.

449. Things are said to be like (similia) which undergo the same modifications; or undergo more of the same than of different modifications; or whose quality is one.

450. And whatever has a greater number or the more important of those contraries in reference to which alteration is possible is said to be like something else. And things are said to be unlike (dissimilia) in ways opposite to those in which they are like.

Chapter 10

451. By opposites (opposita) we mean contraries, contradictories, relatives, and privation and possession.

452. And opposites also mean the ultimate parts of which things are composed and into which they are dissolved, as in processes of generation and corruption. And those things which cannot be present at the same time in a subject which is receptive of them are called opposites: either they themselves or the things of which they are composed. Gray and white, for example, are not present at the same time in the same subject, and therefore the things of which they are composed are opposites.

453. By contraries (contraria) we mean those attributes which, differing in genus, cannot be present at the same time in the same subject; and also those which differ most in the same genus; and those which differ most in the same subject; and those which differ most among those which come under the same power; and things which differ most either absolutely or in genus or in species.

454. Other things are called contraries either because they have contrary attributes or because they are receptive of them; and others because they are capable of causing them or undergoing them, or because they are actually causing them or undergoing them, or because they are rejections or acquisitions or possessions or privations of such attributes.

455. But since the term being and the term one are used in many ways, all other terms which are used in relation to them must follow upon them; so that the terms same, diverse and contrary vary according to each category.

456. Those things are said to he diverse (or other) in species which belong to the same genus but are not subalternate. And so are those which belong to the same genus and have a difference; and also those which have contrariety in their substance. For contraries differ from each other in species, either all of them, or those which are called such in a primary sense; and so are those things whose intelligible structures differ in the lowest species of the genus (for example, man and horse do not differ in genus but their intelligible structures are different); and those attributes which belong to the same substance and have a difference. Things which are the same in species are said to be such in ways opposite to to those just given.

COMMENTARY

DIVERSE

913. Here he explains the various ways in which the term diverse (or other) is used, and he gives three senses. (1) Thus some things are said to be diverse in species because their species are many, as an ass and an ox; (2) others are said to be diverse in number because their matters differ, as two individuals of one species; (3) and others are said to be diverse because "the intelligible structure of the essence," i.e., the definition designating their substance, is different. For some things may be the same in number, i.e., from the viewpoint of matter, but diverse in their intelligible structure, as Socrates and this white man.

914. And since many modes of diversity can be considered (for example, diversity in genus, and the diversity resulting from the division of the continuous), he therefore adds that the term diverse means the very opposite of the same; for to every way in which things are the same there corresponds an opposite way in which they are diverse. Hence things are said to be diverse in the same number of senses in which they are said to be the same.

915. Yet the other ways in which things are said to be one, i.e., the same, can be reduced to those stated here. For diversity of genus is included in diversity of species, and diversity of quantity is included in diversity of matter, because the parts of a quantity have the character of matter in relation to the whole.

Different

916. Things are said to be "different" (448).

Then he gives the various senses in which the term different is used, and there are two of them. First, any two things are said properly to be different which, while being diverse, are "the same in some respect," i.e., they have some one thing in common. And this is so (1) whether they have some one thing in common numerically, as Socrates sitting and Socrates not sitting; or (2) whether they have some one thing in common specifically, as Socrates and Plato have man in common; or (3) whether they have a common genus, as man and ass share in the genus animal; or (4) whether they share in some one thing proportionally, as quantity and quality both share in being. And from this it is evident that everything different is diverse, but not the reverse. For diverse things which agree in no respect cannot properly be called different, because they do not differ in some other respect but only in themselves; but that is said to be different which differs in some particular respect.

The term different is used in a second way when it is taken commonly in place of the term diverse; and then those things are also said to be different which belong to diverse genera and have nothing in common.

917. Next he indicates the kind of things which admit of difference in the first way, which is the proper one. Now those things which are said properly to differ must agree in some respect. Those which agree in species differ only by accidental differences; for example, Socrates insofar as he is white or just differs from Plato insofar as he is black or musical. And those things which agree in genus and are diverse in species differ by substantial differences. And since this is so, then those things are said to differ most properly which are the same in genus and diverse in species. For (+) every genus is divided into contrary differences, but (-) not every genus is divided into contrary species. Thus the species of color, white and black, are contraries, and so are their differences, expanding and contracting. And the differences of animal, rational and irrational, are contraries; but the species of animal, such as man, horse, and the like, are not.

Therefore things which are said to differ most properly are either those which are contrary species, as white and black, or those species of one genus which are not contrary but have contrariety in their essence because of the contrariety of differences which belong to the essence of the species.

Similar

918. Things are said to be “like” (449).

Here he points out the various ways in which the term like is used, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he indicates the various ways in which this term is used; and second (922), he gives those senses in which the term unlike is used (“By opposites”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the ways in which the term like is used; and second (920), he explains how one thing is said to be most like another (“And whatever”).

He gives three ways in which things are like. Now it is evident that oneness in quality causes likeness. Further, undergoing or affection (passio) is associated with quality, because undergoing is most noticeable in the case of qualitative change or alteration; and thus one species of quality is called affection or possible quality. Hence things are observed to be like not only insofar as they have a common quality but also insofar as they undergo or suffer something in common. And this can be taken from two points of view: either from that of the affection or undergoing, or from that of the subject in which the affection is terminated.

919. Some things are like, then, for three reasons. (1) First, they undergo or suffer the same thing; for example, two pieces of wood which are consumed by fire can be said to be like. (2) Second, several things are like merely because they are affected or undergo something, whether this be the same or different; for example, two men, one of whom is beaten and the other imprisoned, are said to be like in that they both undergo something or suffer. (3) Third, those things are said to be like which have one quality; for example, two white things are alike in whiteness, and two stars in the heaven are alike in brightness or in power.

920. And whatever (450).

[more or less] Then he shows how one thing is said to be most like some other thing. For when there are several contraries of the sort which are observed to be alterable, whatever resembles some other thing in having the more important of these contraries is said to be more properly like that thing. For example, garlic, which is hot and dry, is said to be more properly like fire than sugar, which is hot and moist. The same holds true of any two things which are like some third thing in terms of only one quality; for whatever resembles some other thing in terms of some quality which is more proper to itself, is said to be more properly like that thing. For example, air is more properly like fire than earth; for air is like fire in reference to warmth, which is a quality proper to fire itself to a greater degree than dryness, in reference to which earth is like air.

Opposite

922. By “opposites” (451).

Here he distinguishes between the secondary parts of plurality, i.e., those contained under difference and diversity, which are its primary parts; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he gives the various ways in which the term opposite is used; second (925), those in which the term contrary is used (“By contraries”); and third (931), those in which things are said to be diverse or other in species (“Those things are said to be”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (451), he gives the various ways in which we speak of opposites; and there are four of these:

contradictories, contraries, privation and possession, and relatives. (1) For one thing is contraposed or opposed to another either by reason of dependence, i.e., insofar as one depends on another, and then they are opposed as relatives, or (2) by reason of removal, i.e., because one removes another. This occurs in three ways: (a) either one thing removes another entirely and leaves nothing, and then there is negation; or (b) the subject alone remains, and then there is privation; or the subject and genus remain, and then there is contrariety. For there are contraries not only in the same subject but also in the same genus.

923. And opposites (452).

Second, he gives two ways in which things can be recognized as opposites, (1) The first of these pertains to motion, for in any motion or change the terminus from which is the opposite of the terminus to which. Hence those things from which motion begins and those in which it ends are opposites. This is evident in processes of generation; for the white is generated from the not-white, and fire is generated from what is not-fire.

924. (2) The second pertains to the subject. For those attributes which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject must be the opposite of each other, either they themselves or the things in which they are present. For the same body cannot be at the same time both white and black, which are contraries; nor can the terms man and ass be predicated of the same thing, because their intelligible structures contain opposite differences, i.e., rational and irrational. The same holds true of gray and white, because gray is composed of black, which is the opposite of white. And we should note that he expressly says, “in the same subject”; for certain things cannot exist at the the same time in the same subject, not because they are opposed to each other, but because the subject is not receptive of the one or the other; for example, whiteness and music cannot exist at the same time in an ass, but they can exist at the same time in a man.

Contrary

925. By “contraries” (453).

Then he states the various ways in which the term contrary is used, and in regard to this he does three things.

First, he gives the principal ways in which things are said to be contrary. Among these he includes, first, one improper usage of the term, i.e., that whereby some attributes are called contraries which, while differing in genus, cannot belong at the same time to the same subject; for properly speaking contraries are attributes which belong to one genus. An example of this would be found if we were to say that heaviness and circular motion cannot belong to the same subject.

926. Then he gives a second usage of the term, which is a proper one, according to which contraries are said to be things that agree in some respect; for contraries agree in three respects, namely, in reference to the same genus, or to the same subject, or to the same power. Then he uses these three to expose the things which are real contraries. He says (1) that those attributes which differ most in the same genus are called contraries, as white and black in the genus of color; (2) and those which differ most in the same subject, as health and disease in an animal; (3) and those which differ most in reference to the same power, as what is correct and what is incorrect in reference to grammar; for rational powers extend to opposites. He says "most" in order to differentiate contraries from the intermediate attributes which lie between them, which also agree in the same genus, subject and power, yet do not differ to the greatest degree.

927. [e.g.] Hence he adds the universal notion involved in things which are designated as contraries, namely, that contraries are things which differ most either absolutely or in the same genus or in the same species. They differ "absolutely," for example, in the case of local motion, where the extremes are separated most widely, as the most easterly and westerly points of the whole universe, which are the limits of its diameter. And they differ "in the same genus," as the specific differences which divide a genus; and "in the same species," as contrary differences of an accidental kind by which individuals of the same species differ from each other.

928. [e.g.] Here he shows in what respect some things are said to be contraries in a secondary way because they are related to those things which are contraries in the primary way. For some things are contraries either because they actually possess contraries, as fire and water are called contraries because one is hot and the other cold; or because they are the potential recipients of contraries, as what is receptive of health and of disease; or because they are potentially causing contraries or undergoing them, as what is capable of heating and of cooling, and what is able to be heated and to be cooled; or because they are actually causing contraries or undergoing them, as what is heating and cooling or being heated and being

cooled; or because they are expulsions or rejections or acquisitions of contraries, or even possessions or privations of them. For the privation of white is the opposite of the privation of black, just as the possession of the former is the opposite of that of the latter.

929. It is evident, then, that he touches on a threefold relationship of contraries to things: (1) one is to a subject which is either in act or in potency; (2) another is to something that is active or passive in act or in potency; and (3) a third is to processes of generation and corruption, either to the processes themselves or to their termini, which are possession and privation.

930. But since the term (455).

He gives a third way in which the term contrary is used, and he also shows why the foregoing terms are used in many ways. For since the terms one and being have several meanings, the terms which are based upon them must also have several meanings; for example, same and diverse, which flow from one and many; and contrary, which is contained under diverse. Hence diverse must be divided according to the ten categories just as being and one are.

Diverse in species

931. Those things (456).

He now explains the various ways in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in species, and he gives five of these.

First, they belong to the same genus and are not subalternate; for example, science and whiteness both come under quality, yet they are not distinguished from each other by opposite differences.

932. Second, they belong to the same genus and are distinguished from each other by some difference, whether such differences are contrary or not, as two-footed and four-footed.

933. Third, their subjects contain contrariety; i.e., those things which are distinguished by contrary differences, whether the subjects are contrary themselves (as white and black, which are distinguished by the differences “expanding” and “contracting”) or not (as man and ass, which are distinguished by the differences “rational” and “irrational”). For contraries must differ in species, either all of them, or those which are called contraries in the primary sense.

934. Fourth, the lowest species are diverse and are the last in some genus, as man and horse. For those things which differ only in species are said more properly to differ in species than those which differ both in species and in genus.

935. Fifth, they are accidents in the same subject, yet differ from each other; for many accidents of one and the same kind cannot exist in the same subject. And things are said to be the same in species in ways opposite to those given above.

LESSON 13

The Ways in Which Things Are Prior and Subsequent

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457. Things are said to be prior and subsequent insofar as there is some primary thing or principle in each class; for prior means what is nearer to some principle determined either in an absolute sense and by nature, or relatively, or in reference to place, or in certain other ways.

458. For example, a thing is prior in place because it is nearer either to some naturally determined place, as the middle or last, or to one that depends on chance. And what is farther away is subsequent.

459. Other things are prior in time. For some are prior because they are farther away from the present, as in the case of things which have taken place. Thus the Trojan war is prior to that of the Medes because it is farther away from the present. And others are prior in time because they are nearer to the present, as in the case of future events; for the Nemean [games] are prior to the Pythian because they are nearer to the present, provided that the present is taken as the principle or primary point.

460. Other things are prior in motion; for what is nearer to a first mover is prior; for example, the boy is prior to the man. And this too is a kind of principle in an absolute sense. Other things are prior in power; for whatever surpasses another in power, or is more powerful, is prior. And such is that according to whose will another, i.e., a subsequent, thing necessarily

follows, because if the one does not move, the other is not moved, and if it does move, the other is moved; and will is a principle.

461. Other things are prior in arrangement, and these are the things which have a different place in relation to some one determinate thing according to some plan; for example, one who stands second is prior to one who stands third; and among the strings of the lyre the paranete is prior to the nete. For in the one case it is [the leader] who is taken as the principle or starting point; and in the other it is the middle string. These things, then, are said to be prior in this way.

462. In another way, whatever is prior in knowledge is considered to be prior in an absolute sense. And of such things some are prior in a different way, for some are prior in reference to reason, and others in reference to the senses. For universals are prior in reference to reason, but singulars in reference to the senses.

463. And in the intelligible structure the attribute is prior to the whole, as ,'musical" is prior to "musical man." For the intelligible structure is not complete without one of its parts, and "musical man" cannot exist unless there is someone who is musical.

464. Again, the attributes of prior things are said to be prior, as straightness is prior to smoothness; for the former is a property of a line considered in itself, and the latter a property of surface. Some things, then, are said to be prior and subsequent in this way.

465. But others are said to be prior in nature and in substance, namely, all those things which can exist without others, although others cannot exist without them; and this is the division which Plato used. And since the term being is used in many ways, the first subject is prior, and therefore substance is prior. And things which exist potentially and those which exist actually are prior in various ways. For some things are prior in being potential, and others in being actual; for example, potentially half a line is prior to the entire line, and a part is prior to the whole, and matter is prior to substance. But in reference to actuality they are subsequent; for when the whole has been dissolved into such parts they will exist actually.

466. In a sense, then, all things which are prior and subsequent are said to be such in this [last] way. For some things can exist without others so far as the process of generation is concerned (as the whole without the parts), and

some again without others so far as the process of corruption is concerned (as the parts without the whole). The same thing applies in other cases.

COMMENTARY

PRIOR & POSTERIOR

936. Having given the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity, here Aristotle gives those which signify order, namely, prior and subsequent. For unity implies a certain order, because the essence of unity consists in being a principle, as was stated above (872). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he indicates the common meaning of the terms prior and subsequent; and second (936), he gives the various senses in which these terms are commonly taken (“For example, a thing”).

He accordingly says, first, that the meaning of the term prior depends on that of the term principle (or starting point); for the principle in each class of things is what is first in that class, and the term prior means what is nearest to some determinate principle. Now the relationship between a principle of this kind and something which is near it can be considered from several points of view. For something is a principle or primary thing either in an absolute sense and by nature (as a father is a principle of a child), or “relatively,” i.e., in relation to some extrinsic thing (for example, something that is subsequent by nature is said to be prior in relation to something else). Things which are prior in this last sense are such either in reference to knowledge or to perfection or to dignity, or in some such way. Or a thing is also said to be a principle and to be prior in reference to place; or even in certain other ways.

937. Then he gives the various ways in which things are said to be prior and subsequent. And since the terms prior and subsequent are used in reference to some principle, and a principle is what is first either in being or in becoming or in knowledge (as has been stated above 1404:C 761]), this part is therefore divided into three sections.

In the first he explains how a thing is said to be prior in motion and in quantity, because the order found in motion flows from that found in quantity. For the prior and subsequent in motion depends on the prior and subsequent in continuous quantity, as is stated in Book IV of the Physics. Second (946), he shows how one thing is said to be prior to another in knowledge (“In another way”). Third (950), he explains how one thing is said to be prior to another in being, i.e., in nature (“But others”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how one thing is said to be prior and another subsequent in quantity in the case of continuous things; and second (944), how one thing is prior and another subsequent in the case of discrete things (“Other things are prior in arrangement”).

938. In treating the first member of this division he gives three ways in which things are prior.

(1) The first has to do with place; for example, a thing is said to be prior in place inasmuch as it is nearer to some determinate place, whether that place be the middle point in some continuous quantity or an extreme. For the center of the world, to which heavy bodies gravitate, can be taken as the principle (or starting point) of the order involving place, and then we put the elements in the following. order, saying that earth is first, water second, and so on. Or the outermost sphere can be taken as the principle, and then we say that fire is first, air second, and so on.

939. Now nearness to a principle of place, whatever it may be, can be taken in two ways: (a) in one way with reference to an order naturally determined, as water is naturally nearer to the middle of the universe than air, and air nearer to the extreme, i.e., the outermost sphere; (b) and in another way with reference to an order that depends “on chance,” i.e., insofar as some things have a certain order purely as a result of chance, or on some other cause than nature. For example, in the case of stones which lie on top of one another in a heap, the highest is prior according to one order, and the lowest according to another. And just as what is nearest to a principle is prior, in a similar way what is farther away from a principle is subsequent.

940. Other things are prior in time (459).

(2) Things are understood to be prior and subsequent in a second way with reference to the order in time. And he now describes this order, saying that other things are said to be prior in time, and this in various ways. For some things are prior because they are farther away from the present, as occurs “in the case of things which have taken place,” i.e., past events. For the Trojan wars are said to be prior to those of the Medes and the Persians (in which Xerxes, the king of the Persians and Medes, fought against the Greeks), because they are farther away from the present. And some things

are said to be prior because they are closer or nearer to the present; for example, Meneleus is said to be prior to Pyrrho because he is nearer to some present moment in reference to which each was future. But this text seems to be false, because both of them lived before the time of Aristotle, when these words were written. And it is said in the Greek that the Nemean are prior to the Pythian, these being two holidays or feasts one of which was nearer to the moment at which these words were written although both were future.

941. Now it is clear that in this case we are using the present as a principle or starting point in time, because we say that something is prior or subsequent on the grounds that it is nearer to or farther away from the present. And those who hold that time is eternal must say this; for, when this is supposed, the only principle or starting point of time which can be taken is one that relates to some present moment, which is the middle point between the past and the future, inasmuch as time might proceed to infinity in both directions.

942. Other thins are prior in motion (460).

(3) The term prior is used in a third way with reference to the order in motion; and (a) he first shows how this applies to natural things. He says that some things are said to be prior in the order found in motion; for what is nearer to a first cause of motion is prior. A boy, for example, is prior to a man because he is nearer to his primary mover, i.e., the one begetting him. And the latter is also said to be prior because of his nearness to some principle. For that—the one moving and begetting—is in a sense a principle, though not in just any way at all (as happened in the case of place), but in an absolute sense and by nature. (b) Second, he also mentions this order of motion in the realm of the voluntary, saying that some things are said to be prior in power, as men who are placed in positions of authority. For one who surpasses another in power, or is more powerful, is said to be prior. This is the order of dignity.

943. Now it is evident that this order also involves motion; for one who is more powerful, or surpasses another in power, is one “according to whose will,” i.e., intention, something necessarily follows, because it is through him that some subsequent thing is put in motion. Hence, when the more powerful or prior does not move, no subsequent thing moves; but when the former moves, the latter is also moved. This is the position of a prince in a

state; for it is by his authority that others are moved to carry out the things which he commands, and if he does not command them they do not move. And it is clear that the term prior is used here too because of the nearness of a thing to some principle. For “the will,” i.e., the intention, of the ruler is taken here as a principle, and those who are nearer to the ruler, and therefore prior, are the ones through whom his commands are made known to his subjects.

944. Other things are prior in arrangement (461).

He now explains how a thing is prior in the order found among discrete things. He says that some things are said to be prior in order only because they (the associated things) have some kind of arrangement, and not because of continuity, as happened in the previous cases. And things of this kind have a different place in relation to some one determinate thing from a given point of view, as one who stands second and one who stands third — the one who stands second being prior to the one who stands third. By one who stands second is meant one who stands next to someone, such as a king; and by one who stands third is meant one who stands third from the king. Hence another text reads, “The leader is prior to the one who stands third.” It is evident, then, that things are understood to have different places inasmuch as one is second and another third. And in a similar way the paranete is prior to the nete; for among the strings of the lyre the low-pitched string is called the hypate; the high-pitched, the nete; and the middle, the mese. And the paranete refers to that which is next to the nete and nearer to the mese.

945. It is also evident that something is said to be prior here because of its nearness to some principle, although this happens differently in both of the examples given above. For in the former case—that of one who stands second and one who stands third—the thing which is taken as a principle is a real starting point and extreme, namely, the one who is highest among them, or the chief of the others, as a king or some other person of this kind. But in the case of the strings of the lyre it is the middle one, i.e., the middle string, termed the mese, that is taken as the principle; and since those which are nearer to this are called the paranete, the paranete are therefore said to be prior to the nete. These things are said to be prior in this way, then, i.e., by the order in quantity, whether continuous or discrete.

946. In another way (462).

Here he shows how one thing is said to be prior to another in knowledge. Now what is prior in knowledge is also prior in an absolute sense and not in a qualified one, as was the case with place; for a thing is known through its principles. But since knowledge is twofold: intellectual or rational, and sensory, we say that things are prior in one way in reference to reason, and in another in reference to the senses.

947. He gives three ways in which something is prior in reference to reason or intellectual knowledge:

(1) First, there is the way in which universals are prior to singulars, although the opposite occurs in the case of sensory knowledge because there singulars are prior. For reason has to do with universals and the senses with singulars; and thus the senses know universals only accidentally inasmuch as they know the singular of which the universals are predicated. For a sense knows man inasmuch as it knows Socrates, who is a man; and in the opposite way the intellect knows Socrates inasmuch as it knows man. But what is essential is always prior to what is accidental.

948. And in the intelligible structure (463).

(2) Here he gives the second way in which a thing is prior in reference to reason. He says that in the intelligible structure "the attribute is prior to the whole," i.e., to the composite of subject and attribute; thus "musical man" cannot be known without grasping the meaning of the part "musical." And in the same way all other simple things are prior in intelligibility to the composite, although the opposite is true from the viewpoint of the senses; for it is composite things which are first offered to the senses.

949. Again, the attributes (464).

(3) Then he gives the third way. He says that the attributes of prior things are also said to be prior from the viewpoint of reason, as straightness is said to be prior to smoothness. For straightness is an essential property of a line, and smoothness a property of surface, and a line is naturally prior to surface. But from the viewpoint of the senses surface is prior to a line, and the attributes of composite things are prior to those of simple ones. These things, then, are said to be prior in this way, namely, according to the order in knowing.

950. But others (465).

He then gives the ways in which a thing is said to be prior according to the order in being, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives three ways in which a thing is said to be prior in being; and second (953), he reduces them to one (“In a sense, then”).

He says, first, that some things are said to be prior in being, i.e., “in nature and substance,” or according to the natural order in being. And this is so for three reasons:

(1) First, priority is attributed because of community or dependence; and according to this those things are said to be prior which can exist without others, although others cannot exist without them. And one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed, as is stated in the Categories. “This is the division,” i.e., the mode of division of prior and subsequent, which Plato used against others; for it was because of community or dependence that he wanted universals to be prior in being to singular things, surfaces prior to bodies, lines to surfaces, and numbers to all other things.

951. (2) Second, things are said to be prior in being because of the relationship of substance to accident. For since the term being is used in many senses and not univocally, all senses of being must be reduced to one primary sense, according to which being is said to be the subject of other things and to subsist of itself. Hence the first subject is said to be prior; and thus substance is prior to accident.

952. Third, things are said to be prior in being inasmuch as being is divided into the actual and the potential. For a thing is said to be prior in one way potentially and in another actually. A thing is said to be prior potentially in the sense that half a line is prior to an entire line, and any part to its whole, and matter “to substance,” i.e., to form. For all of the first things mentioned in these instances are related to the others, to which they are said to be prior, as something potential to something actual. However, from the viewpoint of actuality the first things mentioned are said to be subsequent, since they become actual only by the dissolution of some whole. For when a whole is dissolved into its parts, the parts then begin to exist actually.

953. In a sense, then (466).

Here he concludes that all of the ways in which the terms prior and subsequent are used can be reduced to the last one given; and especially to the first of these inasmuch as the term prior means something which can exist without other things, but not the reverse. For from the viewpoint of generation some things can exist without others, and it is in this way that a whole is prior to its parts; for when a whole has been generated its parts do not exist actually but only potentially. And from the viewpoint of corruption some things can exist without others; for example, the parts can exist without the whole after the whole has been corrupted and dissolved into its parts. And in the same way too the other senses of prior and subsequent can be reduced to this sense. For it is certain that prior things do not depend upon subsequent ones, but the reverse. Hence all prior things can exist without subsequent ones, but not the reverse.

LESSON 14

Various Senses of the Terms Potency, Capable, Incapable, Possible and Impossible

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 12: 1019a 15-1020a 6

467. In one sense the term potency or power (potestas) means the principle of motion or change in some other thing as other; for example, the art of building is a potency which is not present in the thing built; but the art of medicine is a potency and is present in the one healed, but not inasmuch as he is healed. In general, then, potency means the principle of change or motion in some other thing as other.

468. Or it means the principle of a thing’s being moved or changed by some other thing as other. For by reason of that principle by which a patient undergoes some change we sometimes say that it has the potency of undergoing if it is possible for it to undergo any change at all. But sometimes we do not say this by reason of every change which a thing can undergo but only if the change is for the better.

469. And in another sense potency means the ability or power to do this particular thing well or according to intention. For sometimes we say of those who can merely walk or talk but not well or as they planned, that they cannot walk or talk. And the same applies to things which are undergoing change.

470. Further, all states in virtue of which things are altogether unsusceptible to change or immutable, or are not easily changed for the

worse, are called potencies or powers. For things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed, not because they have a potency, but because they do not have one and are deficient in some way. And things are not susceptible to such processes when they are hardly or slightly affected by them because they have the potency and the ability to be in some definite state.

471. And since the term potency is used in these senses, the term capable or potent (possibilis) will be used in the same number of senses. Thus in one sense whatever has [within itself] the source of the motion or change which takes place in some other thing as other (for even something that brings another to rest is potent in a sense) is said to be capable. And in another sense that which receives such a potency or power from it is said to be capable.

472. And in still another sense a thing is said to be capable if it has the potency of being changed in some way, whether for the worse or for the better. For anything which is corrupted seems to be capable of being corrupted, since it would not have been corrupted if it had been incapable of it. But as matters stand it already has a certain disposition and cause and principle to undergo such change. Hence sometimes a thing seems to be such (i.e., capable) because it has something, and sometimes because it is deprived of something.

473. But if privation is in a sense a having, all things will be capable or potent by having something. But being is used in two different senses. Hence a thing is capable both by having some privation and principle, and by having the privation of this, if it can have a privation.

474. And in another sense a thing is capable because there is no potency or power in some other thing as other which can corrupt it.

475. Again, all these things are capable either because they merely might happen to come into being or not, or because they might do so well. For this sort of potency or power is found in inanimate things such as instruments. For men say that one lyre can produce a sound, and that another cannot, if it does not have a good tone.

476. Incapacity (impotentia), on the other hand, is a privation of capacity, i.e., a kind of removal of such a principle as has been described, either altogether, or in the case of something which is naturally disposed to have it, or when it is already naturally disposed to have it and does not. For it is

not in the same way that a boy, a man and an eunuch are said to be incapable of begetting.

477. Again, there is an incapacity corresponding to each kind of capacity, both to that which can merely produce motion, and to that which can produce it well.

478. And some things are said to be incapable according to this sense of incapacity, but others in a different sense, namely, as possible and impossible. Impossible means that of which the contrary is necessarily true; thus it is impossible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with a side, because such a statement is false of which the contrary is not only true but also necessarily so, i.e., that the diagonal is not commensurable. Therefore, that the diagonal is commensurable is not only false but necessarily false.

479. And the contrary of this, i.e., the possible, is when the contrary is not necessarily false. For example, it is possible that a man should be seated, because it is not necessarily false that he should not be seated. Hence the term possible means in one sense (as has been stated), whatever is not necessarily false; and in another sense, whatever is true; and in still another, whatever may be true.

480. And what is called "a power" in geometry is called such metaphorically. These senses of capable, then, do not refer to potency.

481. But those senses which do refer to potency are all used in reference to the one primary sense of potency, namely, a principle of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other. And other things are said to be capable [in a passive sense], some because some other thing has such power over them, some because it does not, and some because it has it in a special way. The same applies to the term incapable. Hence the proper definition of the primary kind of potency will be: a principle of change in some other thing as other.

COMMENTARY

POTENCY/CAPACITY

954. Having treated the various senses of the terms which signify the parts of unity, here Aristotle begins to treat those which signify the parts of being. He does this, first, according as being is divided by act and potency; and

second (977), according as it is divided by the ten categories “Quantity means”).

In regard to the first, he gives the various senses in which the term potency or power (potestas) is used. But he omits the term act, because he could explain its meaning adequately only if the nature of forms had been made clear first, and he will do this in Books VIII (1703) and IX (1823). Hence in Book IX he immediately settles the question about potency and act together.

This part, then, is divided into two members. In the first he explains the various senses in which the term potency is used; and in the second (975), he reduces all of them to one primary sense (“But those senses”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term potency is used; and second (967), the various senses in which the term incapacity is used (“Incapacity”).

In treating the first he does two things. First, he gives the senses in which the term potency is used; and second (961), those in which the term capable or potent is used (“And since the term”).

955. In dealing with the first part, then, he gives four senses in which the term potency or power is used:

First, potency means an [active] principle of motion or change in some other thing as other. For there is some principle of motion or change in the thing changed, namely, the matter, or some formal principle on which the motion depends, as upward or downward motion is a result of the forms of lightness or heaviness. But a principle of this kind cannot be designated as the active power on which this motion depends. For everything which is moved is moved by another; and a thing moves itself only by means of its parts inasmuch as one part moves another, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Hence insofar as a potency is a principle of motion in that in which motion is found, it is not included under active power but under passive potency. For heaviness in earth is not a principle causing motion but rather one which causes it to be moved. Hence active power must be present some other thing than the one moved, for example, the power of building is not in the thing being built but rather in the builder. And while the art of medicine is an active power, because the physician heals by means of it, it may also be found in the one who is healed, not inasmuch as he is healed, but accidentally, i.e., inasmuch as the physician and the one who is healed happen to be the same. So therefore generally speaking potency or power means in one sense a principle of motion or change in some other thing as other.

956. (2)Here he gives a second sense in which the term potency is used. He says that in another sense the term potency means the principle whereby something is moved or changed by another thing as other. Now this is passive potency, and it is by reason of it that a patient undergoes some change. For just as every agent or mover moves something other than itself and acts in something other than itself, so too every patient is acted upon by something other than itself, i.e., everything moved is moved by another. For that principle whereby one thing is properly moved or acted upon by another is called passive potency.

957. Now there are two ways in which we can say that a thing has the potency to be acted upon by another. Sometimes we attribute such a potency to something, whatever it may be, because it is able to undergo some change, whether it be good or bad. And sometimes we say that a thing has such a potency, not because it can undergo something evil, but because it can be changed for the better. For example, we do not say that one who can be overpowered has a potency [in this last sense], but we do attribute such a potency to one who can be taught or helped. And we speak thus because sometimes an ability to be changed for the worse is attributed to incapacity, and the ability not to be changed in the same way is attributed to potency, as will be said below (965).

958. Another text reads, “And sometimes this is not said of every change which a thing undergoes but of change to a contrary”; and this should be understood thus: whatever receives a perfection from something else is said in an improper sense to undergo a change; and it is in this sense that to understand is said to be a kind of undergoing. But that which receives along with a change in itself something other than what is natural to it is said in a proper sense to undergo a change. Hence such undergoing is also said to be a removing of something from a substance. But this can come about only by way of some contrary. Therefore, when a thing is acted upon in a way contrary to its own nature or condition, it is said in a proper sense to undergo a change or to be passive. And in this sense even illnesses are called undergoings. But when a thing receives something which is fitting to it by reason of its nature, it is said to be perfected rather than passive.

959. And in another sense (469).

(3) He now gives a third sense in which the term potency is used. He says that in another sense potency means the principle of performing some act, not in any way at all, but well or according to "intention," i.e., according to what a man plans. For when men walk or talk but not well or as they planned to do, we say that they do not have the ability to walk or to talk. And "the same thing applies when things are being acted upon," for a thing is said to be able to undergo something if it can undergo it well; for example, some pieces of wood are said to be combustible because they can be burned easily, and others are said to be incombustible because they cannot be burned easily.

960. Further, all states (470).

(4) He gives a fourth sense in which the term potency is used. He says that we designate as potencies all habits or forms or dispositions by which some things are said or made to be altogether incapable of being acted upon or changed, or to be not easily changed for the worse. For when bodies are changed for the worse, as those which are broken or bent or crushed or destroyed in any way at all, this does not happen to them because of some ability or potency but rather because of some inability and the weakness of some principle which does not have the power of resisting the thing which destroys them. For a thing is destroyed only because of the victory which the destroyer wins over it, and this is a result of the weakness of its proper active power. For those things which cannot be affected by defects of this kind, or can "hardly or only gradually" be affected by them (i.e., they are affected slowly or to a small degree) are such "because they have the potency and the ability to be in some definite state"; i.e., they have a certain perfection which prevents them from being overcome by contraries. And, as is said in the Categories, it is in this way that hard or healthy signifies a natural power which a thing has of resisting change by destructive agents. But soft and sickly signify incapacity or lack of power.

961. And since the term (471).

Here he gives the senses of the term capable or potent, which correspond to the above senses of potency. And there are two senses of capable which correspond to the first sense of potency.

(1) For according to its active power a thing is said to be capable of acting in two ways: in one way, because it acts immediately of itself; and in

another way, because it acts through something else to which it communicates its power, as a king acts through a bailiff.

Hence he says that, since the term potency is used in this number of senses, the term capable or potent must also be used in the same number of senses. Thus in one sense it means something which has an active principle of change in itself, as what brings another to rest or to a stop"; i.e., what causes some other thing to stand still is said to be capable of bringing something different from itself to a state of rest. And it is used in another sense when a thing does not act directly but another thing receives such power from it that it can act directly.

962. And in still another (472).

(2) Next, he gives a second sense in which the term capable is used, and this corresponds to the second sense of the term potency, i.e., passive potency. He says that, in a different way from the foregoing, a thing said to be capable or potent when it can be changed in some respect, whatever it may be, i.e., whether it can be changed for the better or for the worse. And in this sense a thing is said to be corruptible because "it is capable of being corrupted," which is to undergo change for the worse, or it is not corruptible because it is capable of not being corrupted, assuming that it is impossible for it to be corrupted.

963. And what is capable of being acted upon in some way must have within itself a certain disposition which is the cause and principle of its passivity, and this principle is called passive potency. But such a principle can be present in the thing acted upon for two reasons. First, this is because it possesses something; for example, a man is capable of suffering from some disease because he has an excessive amount of some inordinate humor. Second, a thing is capable of being acted upon because it lacks something which could resist the change. This is the case, for example, when a man is said to be capable of suffering from some disease because his strength and natural power have been weakened. Now both of these must be present in anything which is capable of being acted upon; for a thing would never be acted upon unless it both contained a subject which could receive the disposition or form induced in it as a result of the change and also lacked the power of resisting the action of an agent.

964. Now these two ways in which the principle of passivity is spoken of can be reduced to one, because privation can be designated as "a having."

Thus it follows that to lack something is to have a privation, and so each way will involve the having of something. Now the designation of privation as a having and as something had follows from the fact that being is used in two different ways; and both privation and negation are called being in one of these ways, as has been pointed out at the beginning of Book IV (564). Hence it follows that negation and privation can also be designated as "havings." We can say, then, that in general something is capable of undergoing because it contains a kind of "having" and a certain principle that enables it to be acted upon; for even to lack something is to have something, if a thing can have a privation.

965. An in another sense (474).

(3) Here he gives a third sense in which the term capable is used; and this sense corresponds to the fourth sense of potency inasmuch as a potency was said to be present in something which cannot be corrupted or changed for the worse. Thus he says that in another sense a thing is said to be capable because it does not have some potency or principle which enables it to be corrupted. And I mean by some other thing as other. For a thing is said to be potent or powerful in the sense that it cannot be overcome by something external so as to be corrupted.

966. Again, all these (475).

(4) He gives a fourth sense in which the term capable is used, and this corresponds to the third sense of potency inasmuch as potency designated the ability to act or be acted upon well. He says that according to the foregoing senses of potency which pertain both to acting and to being acted upon, a thing can be said to be capable either because it merely happens to come into being or not or because it happens to come into being well. For a thing is said to be capable of acting either because it can simply act or because it can act well and easily. And in a similar way a thing is said to be capable of being acted upon and corrupted because it can be acted upon easily. And this sense of potency is also found in inanimate things "such as instruments," i.e., in the case of the lyre and other musical instruments. For one lyre is said to be able to produce a tone because it has a good tone, and another is said not to because its tone is not good.

Incapacity

967. Incapacity (476).

Then he gives the different senses of the term incapacity, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which we speak of incapacity; and second (970), he treats the different senses in which the term impossible is used (“And some things”).

In treating the first part he does two things. First, he gives the common meaning of the term incapacity. Second (969), he notes the various ways in which it is used (“Again, there is”).

He accordingly says, first, that incapacity is the privation of potency.

Now two things are required in the notion of privation, (1) and the first of these is the removal of an opposite state. But the opposite of incapacity is potency. Therefore, since potency is a kind of principle, incapacity will be the removal of that kind of principle which potency has been described to be. (2) The second thing required is that privation properly speaking must belong to a definite subject and at a definite time; and it is taken in an improper sense when taken without a definite subject and without a definite time. For properly speaking only that is said to be blind which is naturally fitted to have sight and at the time when it is naturally fitted to have it.

968. And he says that incapacity, such as it has been described, is the removal of a potency, (1) “either altogether,” i.e., universally, in the sense that every removal of a potency is called incapacity, whether the thing is naturally disposed to have the potency or not; or (2) it is the removal of a potency from something which is naturally fitted to have it at some time or other or only at the time when it is naturally fitted to have it. For incapacity is not taken in the same way when we say that a boy is incapable of begetting, and when we say this of a man and of an eunuch. For to say that a boy is incapable of begetting means that, while the subject is naturally fitted to beget, it cannot beget before the proper time. But to say that an eunuch is incapable of begetting means that, while he was naturally fitted to beget at the proper time, he cannot beget now; for he lacks the active principles of begetting. Hence incapacity here retains rather the notion of privation. But a mule or a stone is said to be incapable of begetting because neither can do so, and also because neither has any real aptitude for doing so.

969. Again, there is (477).

Then he explains the various senses of incapacity by contrasting them with the senses of potency. For just as potency is twofold, namely, active and passive, and both refer either to acting and being acted upon simply, or to acting and being acted upon well, in a similar fashion there is an opposite sense of incapacity corresponding to each type of potency. That is to say, there is a sense of incapacity corresponding "both to that which can merely produce motion and to that which can produce it well," namely, to active potency, which is the potency to simply move a thing of to move it well, and to passive potency, which is the potency to simply be moved or to be moved well.

970. And some things (478).

Then he explains the various senses in which the term impossible is used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the various senses in which the term impossible is used; and then (975) he reduces them to one ("But those senses"). In regard to the first he does three things:

(1) First, he says that in one sense some things are said to be impossible because they have the foregoing incapacity which is opposed to potency. And impossible in this sense is used in four ways corresponding to those of incapacity.

971. (2) Accordingly, when he says "in a different sense, he gives another way in which some things are said to be impossible. And they are said to be such not because of the privation of some potency but because of the opposition existing between the terms in propositions. For since potency is referred to being, then just as being is predicated not only of things that exist in reality but also of the composition of a proposition inasmuch as it contains truth and falsity, in a similar fashion the terms possible and impossible are predicated not only of real potency and incapacity but also of the truth an falsity found in the combining or eparating of terms in propositions. ence the term impossible means that of which the contrary is necessarily true. For example, it is impossible that the diagonal of a square should be commensurable with a side, because such a statement is false whose contrary is not only true but necessarily so, namely, that it is not commensurable. Hence the statement that it is commensurable is necessarily false, and this is impossible.

972. And the contrary (479).

Here he shows that the possible is the opposite of the impossible in the second way mentioned; for the impossible is opposed to the possible in the second way mentioned. He says, then, that the possible, as the contrary of this second sense of the impossible, means that whose contrary is not necessarily false; for example, it is possible that a man should be seated, because the opposite of this—that he should not be seated—is not necessarily false.

973. From this it is clear that this sense of possible has three usages. (1) For in one way it designates what is false but is not necessarily so; for example, it is possible that a man should be seated while he is not seated, because the opposite of this is not necessarily true. (2) In another way possible designates what is true but is not necessarily so because its opposite is not necessarily false, for example, that Socrates should be seated while he is seated. (3) And in a third way it means that, although a thing is not true now, it may be true later on.

974. And what is called a “power” (480).

He shows how the term power is used metaphorically. He says that in geometry the term power is used metaphorically. For in geometry the square of a line is called its power by reason of the following likeness, namely, that just as from something in potency something actual comes to be, in a similar way from multiplying a line by itself its square results. It would be the same if we were to say that the number three is capable of becoming the number nine, because from multiplying the number three by itself the number nine results; for three times three makes nine. And just as the term impossible taken in the second sense does not correspond to any incapacity, in a similar way the senses of the term possible which were given last do not correspond to any potency, but they are used figuratively or in the sense of the true and the false.

975. But those senses (481).

He now reduces all senses of capable and incapable to one primary sense. He says that those senses of the term capable or potent which correspond to potency all refer to one primary kind of potency—the first active potency which was described above (955) as the principle of change in some other thing as other; because all the other senses of capable or potent are referred to this kind of potency. For a thing is said to be capable by reason of the fact that some other thing has active power over it, and in this sense it is said to be capable according to passive potency. And some things are said to be capable because some other thing does not have power over them as those which said to be capable because they cannot be corrupted by external agents. And others are said to be capable because they have it “in some special way,” i.e., because they have the power or potency to act or be acted upon well or easily.

976. And just as all things which are said to be capable because of some potency are reduced to one primary potency, in a similar way all things which are said to be incapable because of some impotency are reduced to one primary incapacity, which is the opposite of the primary potency. It is clear, then, that the proper notion of potency in the primary sense is this: a principle of change in some other thing as other; and this is the notion of active potency or power.

LESSON 15

The Meaning of Quantity. Its Kinds. The Essentially and Accidentally Quantitative

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 13: 1020a 7-1020a 32

482. Quantity [or the quantitative] means what is divisible into constituent parts, both or one of which is by nature a one and a particular thing.

483. Therefore plurality [or multitude] is a kind of quantity if it is numerable; and so also is magnitude [or continuous quantity] if it is measurable. Plurality means what is potentially divisible into non-continuous parts; and magnitude means what is divisible into continuous parts. Again, of the kinds of magnitude, what is continuous in one dimension is length; in two, breadth; and in three, depth. And of these, limited plurality is number; limited length, a line; limited breadth, a surface; and limited depth, a body [or solid].

484. Again, some things are said to be quantitative essentially and others accidentally; for example, a line is quantitative essentially, but the musical accidentally.

485. And of those things which are quantitative essentially, some are such by reason of their substance, as a line is quantitative quidditatively. For in the definition expressing its quiddity some kind of quantity is found. Others are properties and states of this kind of substance, as much and little, long and short, broad and narrow, deep and shallow, heavy and light, and the like. And large and small, and larger and smaller, whether they are spoken

of essentially or in relation to each other, are properties of quantity. And these terms are also transferred to other things.

486. But of things which are quantitative accidentally, some are said to be such in the sense in which the musical and the white are quantitative, i.e., because the subject to which they belong is quantitative. Others are said to be quantitative in the sense in which motion and time are, for these too are said to be in a sense quantitative and continuous because the things of which they are the properties are divisible. And I mean not the thing which is moved, but the space through which it is moved. For since space is quantitative, motion is also quantitative; and through it, i.e., motion, time is also quantitative.

COMMENTARY

QUANTITY

977. Since being is divided not only into potency and actuality but also into the ten categories, having given the different senses of the term potency (954-60), the Philosopher begins here to give the different senses of the terms which designate the categories.

First, he considers the term quantity; and second (987), the term quality ("Quality means"). Third (1001), he gives the different meanings of the term relative ("Some things"). He omits the other categories because they are limited to one class of natural beings, as is especially evident of action and passion, and of place and time.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives the meaning of quantity. He says that quantity means what is divisible into constituent parts. Now this is said to distinguish this kind of division from that of compounds. For a compound is dissolved into the elements, and these are not present in it actually but only virtually. Hence, in the latter case there is not just division of quantity, but there must also be some alteration by means of which a compound is dissolved into its elements. He adds that both or one of these constituents is by nature "a one," that is, something which is pointed out. He says this in order to exclude the division of a thing into its essential parts, which are matter and form; for neither one of these is fitted by nature to be a particular thing of itself.

978. Therefore plurality (483).

Second, he gives the kinds of quantity; and of these there are two primary kinds: plurality or multitude, and magnitude or measure. And each of these has the character of something quantitative inasmuch as plurality is numerable and magnitude is measurable. For mensuration pertains properly to quantity. However, plurality is defined as what is divisible potentially into parts which are not continuous; and magnitude as what is divisible into parts which are continuous. Now this occurs in three ways, and therefore there are three kinds of magnitude. For if inagnitude is divisible into continuous parts in one dimension only, it will be length; if into two, width; and if into three, depth. Again, when plurality or multitude is limited, it is called number. And a limited length is called a line; a limited width, surface; and a limited depth, body. For if multitude were unlimited, number would not exist, because what is unlimited cannot be numbered. Similarly, if length were unlimited, a line would not exist, because a line is a measurable length (and this is why it is stated in the definition of a line that its extremities are two points). The same things holds true of surface and of body.

979. Again, some things (484).

Third, he gives the different ways in which things are quantitative; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he draws a distinction between what is essentially quantitative, as a line, and what is accidentally quantitative, as the musical.

980. And of those (485).

Second, he gives the different senses in which things are essentially quantitative, and there are two of these. For some things are said to be such after the manner of a substance or subject, as line, surface or number; for each of these is essentially quantitative because quantity is given in the definition of each. For a line is a limited quantity divisible in length. The same is true of the other dimensions.

981. And other things belong essentially to the genus of quantity and are signified after the manner of a state or property of such substance, i.e., of a line, which is essentially quantitative, or of other similar kinds of quantity. For example, much and little are signified as properties of number; long and short, as properties of a line; broad and narrow, as properties of surface; and high and low or deep, as properties of body. And the same is true of heavy and light according to the opinion of those who said that having many

surfaces, or atoms, causes bodies to be heavy, and having few causes them to be light. But the truth of the matter is that heavy and light do not pertain to quantity but to quality, as he states below (993). The same thing is true of other such attributes as these.

982. There are also certain attributes which are common properties of any continuous quantity, as large and small, and larger and smaller, whether these are taken “essentially,” i.e., absolutely, or “in relation to each other,” its something is said to be large and small relatively, as is stated in the Categories. But these terms which signify the properties of quantity pure and simple are also transferred to other things besides quantities. For whiteness is said to be large and small, and so also are other accidents of this kind.

983. But it must be borne in mind that of all the accidents quantity is closest to substance. Hence some men think that quantities, such as line, number, surface and body are substances. For next to substance only quantity can be divided into distinctive parts. For whiteness cannot be divided, and therefore it cannot be understood to be individuated except by its subject. And it is for this reason that only in the genus of quantity are some things designated as subjects and others as properties.

984. But of things (486).

Then he gives the different senses in which things are said to be accidentally quantitative. These senses are two. (1) In one sense, things are said to be accidentally quantitative only because they are accidents of some quantity; for example, white and musical are said to be quantitative because they are accidents of a subject which is quantitative.

985. (2) In another sense, some things are said to be accidentally quantitative, not because of the subject in which they exist, but because they are divided quantitatively as a result of the division of some quantity; for example, motion and time (which are said to be quantitative and continuous because of the subjects to which they belong) are divisible and are themselves divided as a result of the division of the subjects to which they belong. For time is divisible and continuous because of motion, and motion is divisible because of magnitude—not because of the magnitude of the thing which is moved, but because of the magnitude of the space through which it is moved. For since that magnitude is quantitative, motion is also quantitative; and since motion is quantitative, it follows that time is

quantitative. Hence these can be said to be quantitative not merely accidentally but rather subsequently, inasmuch as they receive quantitative division from something prior.

986. However, it must be noted that in the Categories the Philosopher held that time is essentially quantitative, while here he holds that it is accidentally quantitative. There he distinguished between the species of quantity from the viewpoint of the different kinds of measure. For time, which is an external measure, has the character of one kind of measure, and continuous quantity, which is an internal measure, has a different one. Hence in the Categories time is given as another species of quantity, whereas here he considers the species of quantity from the viewpoint of the being of quantity.

Therefore those things which only receive their quantitative being from something else he does not give here as species of quantity, but as things which are accidentally quantitative, as motion and time. But motion has no other manner of measure than time and magnitude. Hence neither in this work nor in the Categories does he give it as a species of quantity. Place, however, is given there as a species of quantity. But it is not given as such here because it has a different manner of measure, although not a different quantitative being.

LESSON 16

The Senses of Quality

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 14: 1020a 33-1020b 25

487. Quality (the qualified or of what sort [quale]) means in one sense substantial difference; for example, How is man’s quiddity qualified? as a two-footed animal. How is a horse’s? as a four-footed animal. A circle’s? as a figure which is non-angular; as if substantial difference were quality. In this one sense, then, quality (qualitas) means substantial difference.

488. In another sense the term applies to immobile things and to the objects of mathematics, as numbers are of a certain type (quales), for example, those which are compound, and not only those of one dimension but also those of which surface and solid are the counterpart (for there are numbers which are so many times so much and so many times so many times so much). And in general it means what is present in substance besides quantity. For the substance of each number is what it is once; for example, the substance of six is not two times three but six taken once, for six times one is six.

489. Again, all the modifications of substances which are moved, such as heat and cold, whiteness and blackness, heaviness and lightness, and any other attributes of this sort according to which the bodies of changing things are said to be altered, are called qualities.

490. Further, the term quality is used of virtue and vice, and in general of good and evil.

491. The senses of quality, then, come down to two; and one of these is more basic than the other. For the primary kind of quality is substantial difference. And the quality found in number is a part of this, for this is a substantial difference, but either of things which are not moved, or not of them insofar as they are moved. The others, however, are the modifications of things which are moved inasmuch as they are moved, and are the differences of motions. And virtue and vice are parts of these modifications, for they indicate clearly the differences of the motion or activity according to which things in motion act or are acted upon well or badly. For what is capable of being moved or of acting in this way is good, and what cannot do so but acts in a contrary way is bad. And good and bad signify quality especially in the case of living things, and especially in those which have the power of choice.

COMMENTARY

QUALITY

987. Here he gives the various senses in which the term quality is used, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives four senses of the term quality; and second (966), he reduces them to two ("The senses of quality").

(1) He accordingly says, first, that the term quality is used in one sense as "substantial difference," i.e., the difference by which one thing is distinguished substantially from another and which is included in the definition of the substance. And for this reason it is said that a difference is predicated as a substantial qualification. For example, if one were to ask what sort of (quale) animal man is, we would answer that he is two-footed; and if one were to ask what sort of animal a horse is, we would answer that it is four-footed; and if one were to ask what sort of figure a circle is, we would answer that it is "non-angular," i.e., without angles; as if a substantial difference were quality. In one sense, then, quality means substantial difference. ,

988. Now Aristotle omits this sense of quality in the Categories because it is not contained under the category of quality,—which he deals with there. But here he is dealing with the meaning of the term quality.

989. In another sense (488).

(2) Here he gives a second sense in which the term quality is used. He says that the term quality or “qualified” is used in another sense insofar as immobile things and the objects of mathematics are said to be qualified in a certain way. For the objects of mathematics are abstracted from motion, as is stated in Book VI of this work (1161). Such objects are numbers and continuous quantities, and of both we use the term quality. Thus we say that surfaces are qualified as being square or triangular. And similarly numbers are said to be qualified as being compound. Those numbers are said to be compound which have some common number that measures them; for example, the number six and the number nine are measured by the number three, and are not merely referred to one as a common measure. But those which are measured by no common number other than one are called uncompounded or first in their proportion.

990. Numbers are also spoken of as having quality in a metaphor taken from surface and from “solid,” i.e., body. They are considered like a surface inasmuch as one number is multiplied by another, either by the same number or by a different one, as in the phrase “twice three” or “three times three.” And this is what he means by “so many times so much”; for something like one dimension is designated by saying “three,” and a sort of second dimension by saying “twice three” or “three times three.”

991. Numbers are considered like a solid when there is a twofold multiplication, either of the same number by itself, or of different numbers by one; as in the expression “three times three times three” or “two times three times two” or “two times three times four.” And this is what he means by “so many times so many times so much.” For we treat of three dimensions in a number in somewhat the same way as in a solid; and in this arrangement of litlinbers there is something which is treated as a substance, as three, or any other number that is multiplied by another. And there is something else which is treated as quantity, as the multiplication of one number by another or by itself. Thus when I say “twice three,” the number two is signified after the manner of a measuring quantity, and the number three after the manner of a substance. Therefore what belongs to the substance of number besides quantity itself, which is the substance of number, is called a quality of it, as what is meant in saying twice or three times.

992. Another text reads “according to quantity,” and then the substance of number is said to be the number itself expressed in an unqualified sense, as “three.” And insofar as we consider the quality of a quantity, this is designated by multiplying one number by another. The rest of the text agrees with this, saying that the substance of any number is what it is said to be once; for example, the substance of six is six taken once, and not three taken twice or two taken three times; and this pertains to its quality. For to speak of a number in terms of surface or solid, whether square or cubic,is to speak of its quality. And this type of quality is the fourth kind given in the Categories.

993. Again, all the modifications (489).

(3) Then he gives the third sense in which quality is used. He says that qualities also mean the modifications of mobile substances according to which bodies are changed through alteration, as heat and cold and accidents of this kind. And this sense of quality belongs to the third kind of quality given in the Categories.

994. (4) Next he gives the fourth sense in which quality is used. He says that quality or “qualified” is used in a fourth sense insofar as something is disposed by virtue or vice, or in whatever way it is well or badly disposed, as by knowledge or ignorance, health or sickness, and the like. This is the first kind of quality given in the Categories.

995. Now he omits the second of these senses of quality because it is contained rather under power, since it is signified only as a principle which resists modification. But it is given in the Categories among the kinds of quality because of the way in which it is named. However, according to its mode of being it is contained rather under power, as he also held above (960).

996. The senses of quality (491).

Then he reduces to two the four senses of quality so far given, saying that a thing is said to be qualified in a certain way in two senses, inasmuch as two of these four senses are reduced to the other two.

(1) The most basic of these senses is the first one, according to which quality means substantial difference, because by means of it a thing is designated as being informed and qualified.

997. The quality found in numbers and in other objects of mathematics is reduced to this as a part. For qualities of this kind are in a sense the

substantial differences of mathematical objects, because they are signified after the manner of substance to a greater degree than the other accidents, as was stated in the chapter on quantity (980). Further, qualities of this kind constitute substantial differences, “either of things which are not moved, or not of them insofar as they are moved”; and he says this in order to show that it makes no difference to his thesis whether the objects of mathematics are self-subsistent substances, as Plato claimed, and are separate from motion; or whether they exist in substances which are mobile in reality but separate in thought. For in the first sense they would not be qualities of things which are moved; but in the second sense they would be, but not inasmuch as they are moved.

998. (2) The second basic sense in which quality is used is that in which the modifications of things which are moved as such, and also the differences of things which are moved, are called qualities. They are called the differences of motions because alterations differ in terms of such qualities, as becoming hot and becoming cold differ in terms of heat and cold.

999. The sense in which virtue and vice are called qualities is reduced to this last sense, for it is in a way a part of this sense. For virtue and vice indicate certain differences of motion and activity based on good or bad performance. For virtue is that by which a thing is well disposed to act or be acted upon, and vice is that by which a thing is badly disposed. The same is true of other habits, whether they are intellectual, as science, or corporal, as health.

1000. But the terms well and badly relate chiefly to quality in living things, and especially in those having “election,” i.e., choice. And this is true because good has the role of an end or goal. So those things which act by choice act for an end. Now to act for an end belongs particularly to living things. For non-living things act or are moved for an end, not inasmuch as they know the end, or inasmuch as they themselves act for an end, but rather inasmuch as they are directed by something else which gives them their natural inclination, just as an arrow, for example, is directed toward its goal by an archer. And non-rational living things apprehend an end or goal and desire it by an appetite of the soul, and they move locally toward some end or goal inasmuch as they have discernment of it; but their appetite for an end, and for those things which exist for the sake of the end, is determined for them by a natural inclination. Hence they are acted upon rather than act; and thus their judgment is not free. But rational beings, in whom alone choice exists, know both the end and the proportion of the means to the end. Therefore, just as they move themselves toward the end, so also do they move themselves to desire the end and the means; and for this reason they have free choice.

LESSON 17

The Senses of Relative

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 15: 1020b 26-1021b 11

492. Some things are said to be relative (ad aliquid) directly, as double to half and triple to a third part; and in general what is multiplied to a part of what is multiplied, and what includes to what is included in it. And in another sense as what heats to what can be heated, and what cuts to what can be cut; and in general everything active to everything passive. And in another sense as what is measurable to a measure, and what is knowable to knowledge, and what is sensible to sense.

493. The first things which are said to be relative numerically are such, either without qualification, or in some definite relation to them, or to unity; as double is related to half as a definite number. And the multiple is related numerically to the unit, but not in a definite numerical relation such as this or that. But what is one and a half times as great as something else is related to it in a definite numerical relation to a number. And the superparticular is related to the subparticular in an indefinite relation, as what is multiple is related to a number. And what includes is related to what is included in it as something altogether indefinite in number, for number is commensurable. For what includes is related to what is included in it according to so much and something more; but this something more is indefinite. For whatever the case may be, it is either equal or not equal to it. Therefore all these relations are said to be numerical and are properties.of number.

494. Further, equal, like and same are said to be relative, but in a different way, because all these terms are referred to unity. For those things are the same whose substance is one; and those are alike whose quality is one; and those are equal whose quantity is one. And unity is the principle and measure of number. Hence all these are said to be relative numerically, yet not in the same way.

495. Active and passive things are relative in virtue of active and passive potencies and the operations of potencies; for example, what can heat is relative to what can be heated, because it can heat it; and what is heating is relative to what is being heated; and what is cutting to what is being cut, inasmuch as they are doing these things. But of those things which are relative numerically there are no operations, except in the sense stated elsewhere; and operations which imply motion are not found in them. Moreover, of things which are relative potentially, some are said to be relative temporally also, as what makes to what is made, and what will make to what will be made. For in this way a father is said to be the father of his son, because the former has acted, whereas the latter has been acted upon. Again, some things are said to be relative according to the privation of potency; for example, the incapable and other terms used in this way, as the invisible.

496. Therefore things which are said to be relative numerically and potentially are all relative because the subject of the reference is itself referred to something else, not because something else is referred to it. But what is measurable and knowable and thinkable are said to be relative because in each case something else is referred to them, not because they are referred to something else. For by what is thinkable is meant that of which there may be a thought. However, a thought is not relative to the one whose thought it is, for then the same thing would be expressed twice. And similarly sight is relative to that of which it is the sight and not to the one whose sight it is (although it is true to say this); but it is relative to color or to something of this sort. But then the same thing would be said twice, that sight is of the one whose sight it is. Things which are said to be relative directly, then, are spoken of in this way.

497. And other things are said to be relative because their genera are such; for example, medicine is relative because its genus, science, seems to be relative. Furthermore, of this type are all things which are said to be

relative by reason of their subject; for example, equality is said to be relative because equal is relative; and likeness, because like is relative.

498. But other things are said to be relative indirectly, as man is relative because he happens to be double, and this is relative; or the white is said to be relative because the same thing happens to be white and double.

COMMENTARY

RELATION

1001. Here the Philosopher establishes the meaning of the relative or relation; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the senses in which things are said to be relative directly; and second (1030), those in which things are said to be relative indirectly ("And other things").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he enumerates the senses in which things are said to be relative directly. Second (1006), he proceeds to deal with these ("The first things").

He accordingly gives, first, three senses in which things are said to be relative directly.

The first of these has to do with number and quantity as double to half and triple to a third, and "what is multiplied," i.e., the multiple, to a part "of what is multiplied," i.e., the submultiple, "and what includes to what is included in it." But what includes is here taken for what is greater in quantity. For everything which is greater in quantity includes within itself that which it exceeds. For it is this and something more; for example, five includes within itself four, and three cubits include two.

1002. The second sense is that in which some things are said to be relative according to acting and undergoing, or to active and passive potency; for example, in the realm of natural actions, as what can heat to what can be heated; and in the realm of artificial actions, as what can cut to what can be cut; and in general as everything active to everything passive.

1003. The third sense of relation is that in which something measurable is said to be relative to a measure. Here measure and measurable are not taken (-) quantitatively (for this pertains to the first sense, in which either one is said to be relative to the other, since double is said to be relative to half and half to double), but (+) according to the measurement of being and truth. For the truth of knowledge is measured by the knowable object. For it is because a thing is so or is not so that a statement is known to be true or false, and not the reverse. The same thing applies in the case of a sensible object and sensation. And for this reason a measure and what is measurable are not said to be related to each other reciprocally, as in the other senses, but only what is measurable is related to its measure. And in a similar fashion too an image is related to that of which it is the image as what is measurable is related to its measure. For the truth of an image is measured by the thing whose image it is.

1004. These senses are explained as follows: since a real relation consists in the bearing of one thing upon another, there must be as many relations of this kind as there are ways in which one thing can bear upon another. (3) Now one thing bears upon another either in being, inasmuch as the being of one thing depends on another, and then we have the third sense; or (2) according to active or passive power, inasmuch as one thing receives something from another or confers it upon the other, and then we have the second sense; or (1) according as the quantity of one thing can be measured by another, and then we have the first sense.

1005. But the quality as such of a thing pertains only to the subject in which it exists, and therefore from the viewpoint of quality one thing bears upon another only inasmuch as quality has the character of an active or passive power, which is a principle of action or of being acted upon. Or it is related by reason of quantity or of something pertaining to quantity; as one thing is said to be whiter than another, or as that which has the same quality as another is said to be like it.

But the other classes of things are a (+) result of relation rather than a (-) cause of it. For the category when consists in a relation to time; and the category where in a relation to place. And posture implies an arrangement of parts; and having (attire), the relation of the thing having to the things had.

1006. The first things (493).

Then he proceeds to deal with the three senses of relation which have been enumerated. First, he considers the first sense. Second (1023), he treats the second sense (“Active and passive”). Third (1026), he attends to the third sense (“Therefore, things”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he describes the relations which are based simply on number; and second (1022), he treats those which are based simply on unity (“Further, equal”).

He says, first, that the first way in which things are relative, which is numerical, is divided inasmuch as the relation is based on (a) the ratio of one number to another or (b) on that of a number to unity. And in either case it may be taken in two ways, for the number which is referred to another number or to unity in the ratio on which the relation is based is either definite or indefinite. This is his meaning in saying that the first things which are said to be relative numerically are said to be such “without qualification,” i.e., in general or indefinitely, “or else definitely.” And in both ways “to them,” namely, to numbers, “or to unity,” i.e., to the unit.

1007. Now it should be borne in mind that every measure which is found in continuous quantities is derived in some way from number. Hence relations which are based on continuous quantity are also attributed to number.

1008. It should also be borne in mind that numerical ratios are divided first into two classes, that of equality and that of inequality. And there are two kinds of inequality: the larger and smaller, and more and less.

And the larger is divided into five kinds.

1009. For a number is larger whenever it is multiple with respect to a smaller number, i.e., when it includes it many times, as six includes two three times. And if it includes it twice, it is called double; as two in relation to one, or four to two. And if it includes it three times, it is called triple; and if four times, quadruple; and so on.

1010. But sometimes a larger number includes a whole smaller number once and some part of it besides; and then it is said to be superparticular. If it includes a whole smaller number and a half of it besides, it is called sesquialteral, as three to two; and if a third part besides, it is called sesquitertian, as four to three; and if a fourth part besides, it is called sesquiquartan, as five to four; and so on.

1011. Sometimes a larger number includes a whole smaller number once and not merely one part but many parts besides, and then it is called superpartient. And if it includes two parts, it is called superbipartient, as five to three. Again, if it includes three parts, then it is called supertripartient, as seven to four; and if it includes four parts, it is superquadripartient, and then it is related as nine to five; and so on.

1012. Sometimes a larger number includes a whole smaller number many times and some part of it besides, and then it is called multiple superparticular. If it includes it two and a half times, it is called double sesquialteral, as five to two. If it includes it three and a half times, it is called triple sesquialteral, as seven to two. And if it includes it four and a half times, it is called quadruple sesquialteral, as nine to two. And the species of this kind of ratio can also be considered in the case of the superparticular, inasmuch as we speak of the double sesquitertian ratio when a greater number includes a smaller number two and a third times, as seven to three; or of the double sesquiquartan, as nine to four; and so on.

1013. Sometimes too a larger number includes a whole smaller number many times and many parts of it besides, and then it is called multiple superpartient. And similarly a ratio can be divided from the viewpoint of the species of multiplicity, and from that of the species of the superpartient, provided that we may speak of a double superbipartient, when a greater number includes a whole smaller number twice and two parts of it, as eight to three; or even of triple superbipartient, as eleven to three; or even of double supertripartient, as eleven to four. For it includes a whole number twice and three parts of it besides.

1014. And there are just as many species of inequality in the case of a smaller number. For a smaller number is called submultiple, subpartient, submultiple superparticular, submultiple superpartient, and so on.

1015. But it must be noted that the first species of ratio, namely, multiplicity, consists in the relation of one number to the unit. For any species of it is found first in the relation of some number to the unit. Double, for example, is found first in the relation of two to the unit. And similarly a triple ratio is found in the relation of three to the unit; and so on in other cases. But the first terms in which any ratio is found give species to the ratio itself. Hence in whatever other terms it is subsequently found, it is found in them according to the ratio of the first terms. For example, the double ratio is found first between two and the unit. It is from this, then, that the ratio receives its meaning and name; for a double ratio means the ratio of two to the unit. And it is for this reason too that we use the term in other cases; for even though one number is said to be double another, this happens only inasmuch as a smaller number takes on the role of the unit and a larger number the role of two; for six is related to three in a double ratio, inasmuch as six is to three as two is to one. And it is similar in the case of a triple ratio, and in all other species of multiplicity. Hence he says that the relation of double is a result of the fact that a definite number, i.e., two, “is referred to unity,” i.e., to the unit.

1016. But the term multiple implies the relation of a number to the unit, not of any definite number but of number in general. For if a definite number were taken, as two or three, there would be one species of multiplicity, as double or triple. And just as the double is related to two and the triple to three, which are definite numbers, so too the multiple is related to multiplicity, because it signifies an indefinite number.

1017. Other ratios, however, cannot be reduced to the relation of a number to the unit: either a superparticular ratio, or a superpartient, or a multiple superparticular, or a multiple superpartient. For all of these species of ratios are based on the fact that a larger number includes a smaller number once, or some part of it, and one or several parts of it besides. But the unit cannot have a part, and therefore none of these ratios can be based on the relation of a number to the unit but on the relation of one number to another. Thus the double ratio is either that of a definite number, or that of an indefinite number.

1018. And if it is that of a definite number, then “it is what is one and a half times as great,” i.e., sesquialteral, or “that which it exceeds,” i.e., supersesquialteral. For a sesquialteral ratio consists first in these terms: three and two; and in the ratio of these it is found in all other cases. Hence what is called one and a half times as great, or sesquialteral, implies the relation of one definite number to another, namely, of three to two.

1019. But the relation which is called superparticular is relative to the subparticular, not according to any definite number, as the multiple is relative also to the unit, but according to an indefinite number. For the first species of inequality given above (1008) are taken according to indefinite numbers, for example, the multiple, superparticular, superpartient, and so on. But the species of these are taken according to definite numbers, as double, triple, sesquialteral, sesquiquartan, and so on.

1020. Now it happens that some continuous quantities have a ratio to each other which does not involve any number, either definite or indefinite. For there is some ratio between all continuous quantities, although it is not a numerical ratio. For there is one common measure of any two numbers, namely, the unit, which, when taken many times, yields a number. But no common measure of all continuous quantities can be found, since there are certain incommensurable continuous quantities, as the diameter of a square is incommensurable with one of its sides. The reason is that there is no ratio between it and one of its sides like the ratio of one number to another or of a number to the unit.

1021. Therefore, when it is said in the case of quantities that this quantity is greater than that one, or is related to that one as what includes is related to what is included in it, not only is this ratio not considered according to any definite species of number, but it is not even considered according to number at all, because every number is commensurable with another. For all numbers have one common measure, which is the unit. But what includes and what is included in it are not spoken of according to any numerical measure; for it is what is so much and something more that is said to have the relation of what includes to what is included in it. And this is indefinite, whether it be commensurable or incommensurable; for whatever quantity may be taken, it is either equal or unequal. If it is not equal, then it follows that it is unequal and includes something else, even though it is not commensurable. Hence it is clear that all of the above-mentioned things are said to be relative according to number and to the properties of numbers, which are commensuration, ratio, and the like.

1022. Further, equal (494).

He now treats those relative terms which have a reference to unity or oneness and are not based on the relation of one number to another or to the unit. He says that equal, like and same are said to be relative in a different way than the foregoing. For these are called such in reference to unity. For those things are the same whose substance is one; and those are alike whose quality is one; and those are equal whose quantity is one. Now since unity is the principle and measure of number, it is also clear that the former terms are said to be relative "numerically," i.e., in reference to something belonging to the class of number. But these last terms are not said to be relative in the same way as the first. For the first relations seen are those of number to number, or of a number to the unit; but this relation has to do with unity in an absolute sense.

1023. Active and passive (495).

(2) Here he proceeds to treat the second type of relations, which pertains to active and passive things. He says that relative beings of this kind are relative in two ways: in one way according to active and passive potency; and in a second way according to the actualizations of these potencies, which are action and passivity; for example, what can heat is said to be relative to what can be heated in virtue of active and passive potency. For it is what is capable of heating that can heat, and it is what is capable of being heated that can become hot. Again, what is heating in relation to what is heated, and what is cutting in relation to what is being cut, are said to be relative according to the operations of the aforesaid potencies.

1024. Now this type of relation differs from those previously given; for those which are numerical are operations only figuratively, for example, to multiply, to divide, and so forth, as has also been stated elsewhere, namely, in Book II of the Physics, where he shows that the objects of mathematics abstract from motion, and therefore they cannot have operations of the kind that have to do with motion.

1025. It should also be noted that among relative terms based on active and passive potency we find diversity from the viewpoint of time; for some of these terms are predicated relatively with regard to past time, as what has made something to what has been made; for instance, a father in relation to his son, because the former has begot and the latter has been begotten; and these differ as what has acted and what has been acted upon. And some are used with respect to future time, as when what will make is related to what will be made. And those relations which are based on privation of potency, as the impossible and the invisible, are reduced to this class of relations. For something is said to be impossible for this person or for that one; and the invisible is spoken of in the same way.

1026. Therefore, things (496).

(3) Next he proceeds to deal with the third type of relations. He says that this third type differs from the foregoing in this way, that each of the foregoing things is said to be relative because each is referred to something else, not because something else is referred to it. For double is related to half, and vice versa; and in a similar way a father is related to his son, and vice versa. But something is said to be relative in this third way because something is referred to it. It is clear, for example, that the sensible and the knowable or intelligible are said to be relative because other things are

related to them; for a thing is said to be knowable because knowledge is had of it. And similarly something is said to be sensible because it can be sensed.

1027. Hence they are not said to be relative because of something which pertains to them, such as quality, quantity, action, or undergoing, as was the case in the foregoing relations, but only because of the action of other things, although these are not terminated in them. For if seeing were the action of the one seeing as extending to the thing seen, as heating extends to the thing which can be heated, then just as what can be heated is related to the one heating, so would what is visible be related to the one seeing. But to see and to understand and actions of this kind, as is stated in Book IX (1788) of this work, remain in the things acting and do not pass over into those which are acted upon. Hence what is visible or what is knowable is not acted upon by being known or seen. And on this account these are not referred to other things but others to them. The same is true in all other cases in which something is said to be relative because something else is related to it, as right and left in the case of a pillar. For since right and left designate starting points of motion in living things, they cannot be attributed to a pillar or to any nonliving thing except insofar as living things are related to a pillar in some way. It is in this sense that one speaks of a right-hand pillar because a man stands to the left of it. The same holds true of an image in relation to the original; and of a denarius, by means of which one fixes the price of a sale. And in all these cases the whole basis of relation between two extremes depends on something else. Hence all things of this kind are related in somewhat the same way as what is measurable and its measure. For everything is measured by the thing on which it depends.

1028. Now it must be borne in mind that, even though verbally knowledge would seem to be relative to the knower and to the object of knowledge (for we speak both of the knowledge of the knower and of the knowledge of the thing known), and thought to the thinker and to what is thought, nevertheless a thought as predicated relatively is not relative to the one whose thought it is as its subject, for it would follow that the same relative term would then be expressed twice. For it is evident that a thought is relative to what is thought about as to its object. Again, if it were relative to the thinker, it would then be called relative twice; and since the very existence of what is relative is to be relative in some way to something else, it would follow that the same thing would have two acts of existence. Similarly in the case of sight it is clear that sight is not relative to the seer but to its object, which is color, "or something of this sort." He says this because of the things which are seen at night but not by means of their proper color, as is stated in The Soul, Book II.

1029. And although it is correct to say that sight is of him who sees, sight is not related to the seer formally as sight but as an accident or power of the seer. For a relation has to do with something external, but a subject does not, except insofar as it is an accident. It is clear, then, that these are the ways in which some things are said to be relative directly.

1030. And other things (497).

He now gives three ways in which some things are said to be relative not directly but indirectly.

The first of these is that in which things are said to be relative because their genera are relative as medicine is said to be relative because science is relative. For medicine is called the science of health and sickness. And science is relative in this way because it is an accident.

1031. The second way is that in which certain abstract terms are said to be relative because the concrete things to which these abstract terms apply are relative to something else. For example, equality and likeness are said to be relative because the like and the equal are relative. But equality and likeness are not considered relative as words.

1032. The third way is that in which a subject is said to be relative because of an accident. For example, a man or some white thing is said to be relative because each happens to be double; and in this way a head is said to be relative because it is a part.

LESSON 18

The Senses of Perfect

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 16: 1021b 12-1022a 3

499. That thing is said to be perfect (or complete) outside of which it is impossible to find even a single part; for example, the perfect time of each thing is that outside of which it is impossible to find any time which is a part of it. And those things are perfect whose ability (virtus) and goodness admit of no further degree in their class; for example, we speak of a perfect physician and a perfect flute player when they lack nothing pertaining to the form of their particular ability. And thus in transferring this term to bad things, we speak of a perfect slanderer and a perfect thief, since we also call them good, as a good slanderer and a good thief. For any ability is a perfection, since each thing is perfect and every substance is perfect when, in the line of its particular ability, it lacks no part of its natural measure.

500. Further, those things are said to be perfect which have a goal or end worth seeking. For things are perfect which have attained their goal. Hence, since a goal is something final, we also say, in transferring the term perfect to bad things, that a thing has been perfectly spoiled and perfectly corrupted when nothing pertaining to its corruption and evil is missing but it is at its last point. And for this reason death is described metaphorically as an end; for both of these are final things. But an end is a final purpose.

501. Things which are said to be perfect in themselves, then, are said to be such in all of these senses: some because they lack no part of their goodness and admit of no further degree and have no part outside; others in

general inasmuch as they admit of no further degree in any class and have no part outside.

502. And other things are now termed perfect in reference to these, either because they make something such, or have something such, or know something such, or because they are somehow referred to things which are said to be perfect in the primary senses.

COMMENTARY

PERFECT

1033. Having treated the various senses of the terms which signify the causes, the subject and the parts of the subject of this science, here the Philosopher begins to treat the various senses of the terms which designate attributes having the character of properties. This is divided into two parts. In the first he gives the various senses of the terms which refer to the perfection or completeness of being. in the second (1128) he treats those which refer to a lack of being (“False means”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the different senses of the terms which designate attributes pertaining to the perfection of being; and second (1085), he treats those which designate the wholeness of being. For the terms perfect and whole have the same or nearly the same meaning, as is said in the Physics, Book III. He considers the second part of this division where he says, “To come from something.”

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he treats the various senses of the term perfect. Second (1044), he treats the various senses of the terms which signify certain conditions of that which is perfect (“The term limit”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he considers the senses in which things are said to be perfect in themselves; and second (1043), he treats those in which things are said to be perfect by reason of something else (“And other things”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives three senses in which a thing is said to be perfect in itself. Second (1040), he shows how, according to these senses, a thing is said to be perfect in different ways (“Things which are said”).

1034. (1) He accordingly says, first, that in one sense that thing is said to be perfect outside of which it is impossible to find any of its parts. For example, a man is said to be perfect when no part of him is missing; and a period of time is said to be perfect when none of its parts can be found outside of it. For example, a day is said to be perfect or complete when no part of it is missing.

1035. (2) A thing is said to be perfect in another sense with reference to some ability. Thus a thing is said to be perfect which admits of “no further degree,” i.e., excess or superabundance, from the viewpoint of good performance in some particular line, and is not deficient in any respect. For we say that that thing is in a good state which has neither more nor less than it ought to have, as is said in Book II of the Ethics. Thus a man is said to be a perfect physician or a perfect flute player when he lacks nothing pertaining to the particular ability by reason of which he is said to be a good physician or a good flute player. For the ability which each thing has is what makes its possessor good and renders his work good.

1036. And it is in this sense that we also transfer the term perfect to bad things. For we speak of a perfect “slanderer,” or scandal monger, and a perfect thief, when they lack none of the qualities proper to them as such. Nor is it surprising if we use the term perfect of those things which rather designate a defect, because even when things are bad we predicate the term good of them in an analogous sense. For we speak of a good thief and a good scandal monger because in their operations, even though they are evil, they are disposed as good men are with regard to good operations.

1037. The reason why a thing is said to be perfect in the line of its particular ability is that an ability is a perfection of a thing. For each thing is perfect when no part of the natural magnitude which belongs to it according to the form of its proper ability is missing. Moreover, just as each natural being has a definite measure of natural magnitude in continuous quantity, as is stated in Book II of The Soul, So too each thing has a definite amount of its own natural ability. For example, a horse has by nature a definite dimensive quantity, within certain limits; for there is both a maximum quantity and minimum quantity beyond which no horse can go in size. And in a similar way the quantity of active power in a horse has certain limits in both directions. For there is some maximum power of a horse which is not in fact surpassed in any horse; and similarly there is some minimum which never fails to be attained.

1038. Therefore, just as the first sense of the term perfect was based on the fact that a thing lacks no part of the dimensive quantity which itis naturally determined to have, in a similar way this second sense of the term is based on the fact that a thing lacks no part of the quantity of power which it is naturally determined to have. And each of these senses of the term has to do with internal perfection.

1039. Further, those things (500).

(3) Here he gives the third sense in which the term perfect is used, and it pertains to external perfection. He says that in a third way those things are said to be perfect “which have a goal,” i.e., which have already attained their end, but only if that end is “worth seeking,” or good. A man, for instance, is called perfect when he has already attained happiness. But someone who has attained some goal that is evil is said to be deficient rather than perfect, because evil is a privation of the perfection which a thing ought to have. Thus it is evident that, when evil men accomplish their will, they are not happier but sadder. And since every goal or end is something final, for this reason we transfer the term perfect somewhat figuratively to those things which have reached some final state, even though it be evil. For example, a thing is said to be perfectly spoiled or corrupted when nothing pertaining to its ruin or corruption is missing. And by this metaphor death is called an end, because it is something final. However, an end is not only something final but is also that for the sake of which a thing comes to be. This does not apply to death or corruption.

1040. Here he shows how things are perfect in different ways according to the foregoing senses of perfection. (1) He says that some things are said to be perfect in themselves; and this occurs in two ways. (a) For some things are altogether perfect because they lack absolutely nothing at all; they neither have any “further degree,” i.e., excess, because there is nothing which surpasses them in goodness; nor do they receive any good from outside, because they have no need of any external goodness. This is the condition of the first principle, God, in whom the most perfect goodness is found, and to whom none of all the perfections found in each class of things are lacking.

1041. (b) Some things are said to be perfect in some particular line because “they do not admit of any further degree,” or excess, “in their class,” as though they lacked anything proper to that class. Nor is anything that belongs to the perfection of that class external to them, as though they lacked it; just as a man is said to be perfect when he has already attained happiness.

1042. And not only is this distinction made with reference to the second sense of perfection given above, but it can also be made with reference to the first sense of the term, as is mentioned at the beginning of The Heavens. For any individual body is a perfect quantity in its class, because it has three dimensions, which are all there are. But the world is said to be universally perfect because there is absolutely nothing outside of it.

1043. And other things (502).

(2) He now gives the sense in which some things are said to be perfect by reason of their relation to something else. He says that other things are said to be perfect “in reference to these,” i.e., in reference to things which are perfect in themselves, (a) either because they make something perfect in one of the preceding ways, as medicine is perfect because it causes perfect health; or (b) because they have some perfection, as a man is said to be perfect who has perfect knowledge; or (c) because they represent such a perfect thing, as things which bear a likeness to those that are perfect (as, for example, an image which represents a man perfectly is said to be perfect); or in any other way in which they are referred to things that are said to be perfect in themselves in the primary senses.

LESSON 19

The Senses of Limit, of “According to Which,” of “In Itself,” and of Disposition

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 17 & 18: 1022a 4-1022a 36

503. The term limit (boundary or terminus) means the extremity of anything, i.e., that beyond which nothing of that being can be found, and that within which everything belonging to it is contained.

504. And limit means the form, whatever it may be, of a continuous quantity or of something having continuous quantity; and it also means the goal or end of each thing. And such too is that toward which motion and action proceed, and not that from which they proceed. And sometimes it is both, not only that from which, but also that to which. And it means the reason for which something is done; and also the substance or essence of each. For this is the limit or terminus of knowledge; and if of knowledge, also of the thing.

505. Hence it is clear that the term limit has as many meanings as the term principle has, and even more. For a principle is a limit, but not every limit is a principle.

Chapter 18

506. The phrase according to which (secundum quod) has several meanings. In one sense it means the species or substance of each thing; for example, that according to which a thing is good is goodness itself. And in another sense it means the first subject in ‘Whicl~ an attribute is naturally

disposed to come into being, as color in. surface. Therefore, in its primary sense, “that according to which” is the form; and in its secondary sense it is the matter of each thing and the first subject of each. And in general that according to which is used in the same way as a reason. For we speak of that according to which he comes, or the reason of his coming; and that according to which he has reasoned incorrectly or simply reasoned, or the reason why he has reasoned or reasoned incorrectly. Further, that according to which 1 is used in reference to place, as according [i.e., next] to which he stands, or according to [i.e., along] which he walks; for in general these signify position and place.

507. Hence the phrase in itself (secundum se) must be used in many senses. For in one sense it means the quiddity of each thing, as Callias and the quiddity of Callias. And in another sense it means everything that is found in the quiddity of a thing. For example, Callias is an animal in himself, because animal belongs to his definition; for Callias is an animal. Again, it is used of a thing when something has been manifested in it as its first subject or in some part of it; for example, a surface is white in itself, and a man is alive in himself. For the soul is a part of man in which life is first present. Again, it means a thing which has no other cause. For there are many causes of man, namely, animal and two-footed, yet man is man in himself. Further, it means any attributes that belong to a thing alone and inasmuch as they belong to it alone, because whatever is separate is in itself.

COMMENTARY

TERM/LIMIT

1044. Here Aristotle proceeds to examine the terms which signify the conditions necessary for perfection. Now what is perfect or complete, as is clear from the above, is what is determinate and absolute, independent of anything else, and not deprived of anything but having whatever befits it in its own line. Therefore, first, he deals with the term limit (boundary or terminus); second (1050), with the phrase in itself (“The phrase according to which”); and third (1062), with the term having (“Having means”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives the meaning of limit. He says that limit means the last part of anything, such that no part of what is first limited lies outside this limit; and all things which belong to it are contained within it. He says “first” because the last part of a first thing may be the starting point of a second thing; for example, the now of time, which is the last point of the past, is the beginning of the future.

1045. And limit means the form (504).

Second, he gives four senses in which the term limit is used:

The first of these applies to any kind of continuous quantity insofar as the terminus of a continuous quantity, or of a thing having continuous quantity, is called a limit; for example, a point is called the limit of a line, and a surface the limit of a body, or also of a stone, which has quantity.

1046. The second sense of limit is similar to the first inasmuch as one extreme of a motion or activity is called a limit, i.e., that toward which there is motion, and not that from which there is motion, as the limit of generation is being and not non-being. Sometimes, however, both extremes of motion are called limits in a broad sense, i.e., both that from which as well as that to which, inasmuch as we say that every motion is between two limits or extremes.

1047. In a third sense limit means that for the sake of which something comes to be, for this is the terminus of an intention, just as limit in the second sense meant the terminus of a motion or an operation.

1048. In a fourth sense limit means the substance of a thing, i.e., the essence of a thing or the definition signifying what a thing is. For this is the limit or terminus of knowledge, because knowledge of a thing begins with certain external signs from which we come to know a thing’s definition, and when we have arrived at it we have complete knowledge of the thing. Or the definition is called the limit or terminus of knowledge because under it are contained the notes by which the thing is known. And if one difference is changed, added, or subtracted, the definition will not remain the same. Now if it [i.e., the definition] is the limit of knowledge, it must also be the limit of the thing, because knowledge is had through the assimilation of the knower to the thing known.

1049. Hence it is clear (505).

Here he concludes by comparing a limit with a principle, saying that limit has as many meanings as principle has, and even more, because every principle is a limit but not every limit is a principle. For that toward which there is motion is a limit, but it is not in any way a principle, whereas that from which there is motion is both a principle and a limit, as is clear from what was said above (1046).

1050. The phrase “according to which” (506).

Here he deals with the phrase in itself; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he lays down the meaning of the phrase according to which, which is more common than the phrase in itself. Second (1054), he draws his conclusion as to the ways in which the phrase in itself is used (“Hence the phrase”). Third (1058), he establishes the meaning of the term disposition, because each of the senses in which we use the phrases mentioned above somehow signifies disposition. In regard to the first, he gives four senses in which the phrase according to which is used:

The first has to do with the “species,” i.e., the form, or “the substance of each thing,” or its essence, inasmuch as this is that according to which something is said to be; for example, according to the Platonists “the good itself,” i.e., the Idea of the Good, is that according to which something is said to be good.

1051. This phrase has a second meaning insofar as the subject in which some attribute is naturally disposed to first come into being is termed “that according to which,” as color first comes into being in surface; and therefore it is said that a body is colored according to its surface. Now this sense differs from the preceding one, because the preceding sense pertains to form, but this last sense pertains to matter.

1052. There is a third sense in which this phrase is used, inasmuch as any cause or reason in general is said to be “that according to which.” Hence the phrase “according to which” is used in the same number of senses as the term reason. For it is the same thing to ask, “According to what does he come?” and “For what reason does he come? “ And in like manner it is the same to ask, “According to what has he reasoned incorrectly or simply reasoned, and, for what reason has he reasoned?”

1053. This phrase according to which (secundum quid) is used in a fourth sense inasmuch as it signifies position and place; as in the statement, “according to which he stands,” i.e., next to which, and, “according to which he walks,” i.e., along which he walks; and both of these signify place and position. This appears more clearly in the Greek idiom.

1054. Hence the phrase (507).

From what has been said above he draws four senses in which the phrase in itself or of itself is used:

The first of these is found when the definition, which signifies the quiddity of each thing, is said to belong to each in itself, as Callias "and the quiddity of Callias," i.e., the essence of the thing, are such that one belongs to the other "in itself." And not only the whole definition is predicated of the thing defined in itself, but so too in a way everything which belongs to the definition, which expresses the quiddity, is predicated of the thing defined in itself. For example, Callias is an animal in himself. For animal belongs in the definition of Callias, because Callias is an individual animal, and this would be given in his definition if individual things could have a definition. And these two senses are included under one, because both the definition and a part of the definition are predicated of each thing in itself for the same reason. For this is the first type of essential predication given in the Posterior Analytics; and it corresponds to the first sense given above (1050) in which we use the phrase according to which.

1055. This phrase is used in a second sense when something is shown to be in something else as in a first subject, when it belongs to it of itself. This can happen in two ways: (a) for either the first subject of an accident is the whole subject itself of which the accident is predicated (as a surface is said to be colored or white in itself; for the first subject of color is surface, and therefore a body is said to be colored by reason of its surface); or (b) also the subject of the accident is some part of the subject, just as a man is said to be alive in himself, because part of him, namely, the soul, is the first subject of life. This is the second type of essential predication given in the Posterior Analytics, namely, that in which the subject is given in the definition of the predicate. For the first and proper subject is given in the definition of a proper accident.

1056. This phrase is used in a third sense when something having no cause is spoken of as in itself; as all immediate propositions, i.e., those which are not proved by a middle term. For in a priori demonstrations the middle term is the cause of the predicate's belonging to the subject. Hence, although man has many causes, for example, animal and two-footed, which are his formal cause, still nothing is the cause of the proposition "Man is man," since it is an immediate one; and for this reason man is man in himself.

And to this sense is reduced the fourth type of essential predication given in the Posterior Analytics, the case in which an effect is predicated of a cause; as when it is said that the slain man perished by slaying, or that the thing cooled was made cold or chilled by cooling.

1057. This phrase is used in a fourth sense inasmuch as those things are said to belong to something in themselves which belong to it alone and precisely as belonging to it alone. He says this in order to differentiate this sense of in itself from the preceding senses, in which it was not said that a thing belongs to something in itself because it belongs to it alone; although in that sense too something would belong to it alone, as the definition to the thing defined. But here something is said to be in itself by reason of its exclusiveness. For in itself signifies something separate, as a man is said to be by himself when he is alone.

And to this sense is reduced the third sense given in the Posterior Analytics, and the fourth sense of the phrase according to which, which implies position.

LESSON 20

The Meanings of Disposition, of Having, of Affection, of Privation, and of “To Have”

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 19-23: 1022b 1-1023a 25

508. Disposition means the order of what has parts, either as to place or as to potentiality or as to species. For there must be a certain position, as the term disposition itself makes clear.

Chapter 20

509. Having (possession or habit) means in one sense a certain activity of the haver and of the thing had, as a sort of action or motion. For when one thing makes and another is made, the making is intermediate. And likewise between one having clothing and the clothing had, the having is intermediate. It is accordingly clear that it is not reasonable to have a having; for if it were possible to have the having of what is had, this would go on to infinity. In another sense having means a certain disposition whereby the thing disposed is well or badly disposed, either in relation to itself or to something else; for example, health is a sort of having and is such a disposition. Again, the term having is used if there is a part of such a disposition. And for this reason any virtue pertaining to the powers of the soul is a sort of having.

Chapter 21

510. Affection (passio) means in one sense (modification), the quality according to which alteration occurs, as white and black, sweet and bitter,

heavy and light, and all other such attributes. And in another sense (undergoing), it means the actualizations and alterations of these; and of these, particularly harmful operations and motions; and most especially those which are painful and injurious (suffering). Again, great rejoicing and grieving are called affections (passions).

Chapter 22

511. The term privation is used in one sense when a thing does not have one of those attributes which it is suitable for some things to have, even though that particular thing would not naturally have it. In this sense a plant is said to be deprived of eyes. And it is used in another sense when a thing is naturally disposed to have something, either in itself or according to its class, and does not have it. A man and a mole, for example, are deprived of sight but in different ways: the latter according to its class and the former in itself. Again, we speak of privation which a thing is by nature such as to have a certain perfection and does not have it even when it is naturally disposed to have it. For blindness is a privation, although a man is not blind at every age but only if he does not have sight at the age when he is naturally disposed to have it. And similarly we use the term privation when a thing does not have some attribute which it is naturally disposed to have, in reference to where, and to what and to the object in relation to which, and in the manner in which it may have it by nature if it does not have it. Again, the removal of anything by force is called a privation.

512. And in all instances in which negations are expressed by the privative particle & [i.e., un- or in-], privations are expressed. For a thing is said to be unequal because it does not have the equality which it is naturally fitted to have. And a thing is said to be invisible either because it has no color at all or because its color is deficient; and a thing is said to be footless either because it lacks feet altogether or because its feet are imperfect. Again, we use the term privation of a thing when it has something to a very small degree, for example, “unignited,” and this means to have it in a deficient way. And privation also designates what is not had easily or well; for example, a thing is uncuttable not only because it cannot be cut but because it cannot be cut easily or well. And we use the term privation of what is not had in any way. For it is not only a one-eyed man that is said to be blind, but one who lacks sight in both eyes. And for this reason not every man is good or bad, just or unjust, but there is an intermediate state.

Chapter 23

513. To have (to possess or to hold) has many meanings. In one sense it means to treat something according to one’s own nature or to one’s own impulse; and for this reason a fever is said to possess a man, and tyrants are said to possess cities, and people who are clothed are said to possess clothing. And in another sense a thing is said to have something when this is present in the subject which receives it; thus bronze has the form of a statue, and a body, disease. And whatever contains something else is said to have or to hold it; for that which is contained is said to be held by the container; for example, we say that a bottle holds a liquid and a city men and a ship sailors. It is in this way too that a whole has parts. Again, whatever prevents a thing from moving or from acting according to its own impulse is said to hold it, as pillars hold the weight imposed on them. It is in this sense that the poets make Atlas hold the heavens, as if otherwise it would fall on the earth, as certain of the physicists also say. And it is in this sense that that which holds something together is said to hold what it holds together, because otherwise it would be separated, each according to its own impulse. And to be in something is expressed in a similar way and corresponds to the meanings of to have.

COMMENTARY

DISPOSITION

1058. Because the phrase according to which signifies in one sense position, the Philosopher therefore proceeds to examine next (1058) the term disposition. He gives the common meaning of this term, saying that a disposition is nothing else than the order of parts in a thing which has parts. He also gives the senses in which the term disposition is used; and there are three of these:

The first designates the order of parts in place, and in this sense disposition or posture is a special category.

1059. Disposition is used in a second sense inasmuch as the order of parts is considered in reference to potency or active power, and then disposition is placed in the first species of quality. For a thing is said to be disposed in this sense, for example, according to health or sickness, by reason of the fact that its parts have an order in its active or passive power.

1060. Disposition is used in a third sense according as the order of parts is considered in reference to the form and figure of the whole; and then disposition or position is held to be a difference in the genus of quantity. For it is said that one kind of quantity has position, as line, surface, body and place, but that another has not, as number and time.

1061. He also points out that the term disposition signifies order; for it signifies position, as the derivation itself of the term makes clear, and order is involved in the notion of position.

1062. “having” means (509).

He now proceeds to examine the term having. First, he gives the different senses of the term having. Second (1065), he gives the different senses of certain other terms which are closely connected with this one. He accordingly gives, first, the two senses in which the term having is used:

First, it designates something intermediate between the haver and the thing had. Now even though having is not an action, nonetheless it signifies something after the manner of an action. Therefore having is understood to be something intermediate between the haver and the thing had and to be a sort of action; just as heating is understood to be something intermediate between the thing being heated and the heater, whether what is intermediate be taken as an action, as when heating is taken in an active sense, or as a motion, as when heating is taken in a passive sense. For when one thing makes and another is made, the making stands between them. In Greek the term poi,hsij is used, and this signifies making. Moreover, if one goes from the agent to the patient, the intermediate is making in an active sense, and this is the action of the maker. But if one goes from the thing made to the maker, then the intermediate is making in a passive sense, and this is the motion of the thing being made. And between a man having clothing and the clothing had, the having is also an intermediate; because, if we consider it by going from the man to his clothing, it will be like an action, as is expressed under the form “to have.” But if we consider it in the opposite way, it will be like the undergoing of a motion, as is expressed under the form “to be had.”

1063. Now although having is understood to be intermediate between a man and his clothing inasmuch as he has it, nonetheless it is evident that there cannot be another intermediate between the having and the thing had, as though there were another having midway between the haver and the intermediate having. For if one were to say that it is possible to have the having “of what is had,” i.e., of the thing had, an infinite regress would then result. For the man has “the thing had,” i.e., his clothing, but he does not have the having of the thing had by way of another intermediate having. It is like the case of a maker, who makes the thing made by an intermediate making, but does not make the intermediate making itself by way of some other intermediate making. It is for this reason too ‘that the relations by which a subject is related to something else are not related to the subject by some other intermediate relation and also not to the opposite term; paternity, for example, is not related to a father or to a son by some other intermediate relation. And if some relations are said to be intermediate, they are merely conceptual relations and not real ones. Having in this sense is taken as one of the categories.

1064. In a second sense the term having means the disposition whereby something is well or badly disposed; for example, a thing is well disposed by health and badly disposed by sickness. Now by each of these, health and sickness, a thing is well or badly disposed in two ways: in itself or in relation to something else. Thus a healthy thing is one that is well disposed in itself, and a robust thing is one that is well disposed for doing something. Health is a kind of having, then, because it is a disposition such as has been described. And having (habit) designates not only the disposition of a whole but also that of a part, which is a part of the disposition of the whole. For example, the good dispositions of an animal’s parts are themselves parts of the good disposition of the whole animal. The virtues pertaining to the parts of the soul are also habits; for example, temperance is a habit of the concupiscible part, fortitude a habit of the irascible part, and prudence a habit of the rational part.

1065. “Affection”Here he proceeds to treat the terms which are associated with having. First, he deals with those which are associated as an opposite; and second (1080), he considers something which is related to it as an effect, namely, to have, which derives its name from having.

Now there is something which is opposed to having as the imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and this is affection (being affected). And privation is opposed by direct opposition. Hence, first (1065), he deals with affection; and second (1070), with privation (“The term privation”). He accordingly gives, first, four senses of the term affection.:

In one sense (modification) it means the quality according to which alteration takes place, such as white and black and the like. And this is the third species of quality; for it has been proved in Book VII of the Physics that there can be alteration only in the third species of quality.

1066. Affection is used in another sense (undergoing) according as the actualizations of this kind of quality and alteration, which comes about through them, are called affections. And in this sense affection is one of the categories, for example, being heated and cooled and other motions of this kind.

1067. In a third sense (suffering) affection means, not any kind of alteration at all, but those which are harmful and terminate in some evil, and which are lamentable or sorrowful; for a thing is not said to suffer insofar as it is healed but insofar as it is made ill. Or it also designates anything harmful that befalls anything at alland with good reason. For a patient by the action of some agent which is contrary to it is drawn from its own natural disposition to one similar to that of the agent. Hence, a patient is said more properly to suffer when some part of something fitting to it is being removed and so long as its disposition is being changed into a contrary one, than when the reverse occurs. For then it is said rather to be perfected.

1068. And because things which are not very great are considered as nothing, therefore in a fourth sense (passion) affection means not any kind of harmful alteration whatsoever, but those which are extremely injurious, as great calamities and great sorrows. And because excessive pleasure becomes harmful (for sometimes people have died or become ill as a result of it) and because too great prosperity is turned into something harmful to those who do not know how to make good use of it, therefore another text reads “great rejoicing and grieving are called affections.” And still another text agrees with this, saying, “very great sorrows and prosperities.”

1069. Now it should be noted that because these three—disposition, habit or having, and affection— signify one of the categories only in one of the senses in which they are used, as is evident from what was said above, he therefore did not place them with the other parts of being, i.e., with quantity, quality and relation. For either all or most of the senses in which they were used pertained to the category signified by these terms.

1070. The term “privation” (511).

Here he gives the different senses in which the term privation is used. And since privation includes in its intelligible structure both negation and the fitness of some subject to possess some attribute, he therefore gives, first, the different senses of privation which refer to this fitness or aptitude for some attribute. Second (1074), he treats the various senses of negation (“And in all instances”). In regard to the first he gives four senses of privation:

The first has to do with this natural fitness taken in reference to the attribute of which the subject is deprived and not in reference to the subject itself. For we speak of a privation in this sense when some attribute which is naturally fitted to be had is not had, even though the subject which lacks it is not designed by nature to have it. For example, a plant is said to be deprived of eyes because eyes are naturally designed to be had by something, although not by a plant. But in the case of those attributes which a subject is not naturally fitted to have, the subject cannot be said to be deprived of them, for example, that the eye by its power of vision should penetrate an opaque body.

1071. A second sense of the term privation is noted in reference to a subject’s fitness to have some attribute. For in this sense privation refers only to some attribute which a thing is naturally fitted to have either in itself or according to its class; in itself, for example, as when a blind person is said to be deprived of sight, which he is naturally fitted to have in himself. And a mole is said to be deprived of sight, not because it is naturally fitted to have it, but because the class, animal, to which the mole belongs, is so fitted. For there are many attributes which a thing is not prevented from having by reason of its genus but by reason of its differences; for example, a man is not prevented from having wings by reason of his genus but by reason of his difference.

1072. A third sense of the term privation is noted in reference to circumstances. And in this sense a thing is said to be deprived of something if it does not have it when it is naturally fitted to have it. This is the case, for example, with the privation blindness; for an animal is not said to be blind at every age but only if it does not have sight at an age when it is naturally fitted to have it. Hence a dog is not said to be blind before the ninth day. And what is true of the circumstance when also applies to other circumstances, as “to where,” or place. Thus night means the privation of light in a place where light may naturally exist, but not in caverns, which the sun’s rays cannot penetrate. And it applies “to what part,” as a man is not said to be toothless if he does not have teeth in his hand but only if he does not have them in that part in which they are naturally disposed to exist; and “to the object in relation to which,” as a man is not said to be small or imperfect in stature if he is not large in comparison with a mountain or with any other thing with which he is not naturally comparable in size. Hence a man is not said to be slow in moving if he does not run as fast as a hare or move as fast as the wind; nor is he said to be ignorant if he does not understand as God does.

1073. Privation is used in a fourth sense inasmuch as the removal of anything by violence or force is called a privation. For what is forced is contrary to natural impulse, as has been said above (829); and thus the removal of anything by force has reference to something that a person is naturally fitted to have.

1074. And in all (512).

Then he gives the different senses of privation which involve negation:

For the Greeks use the prefix av-, when compounding words, to designate negations and privations, just as we use the prefix in- or un-; and therefore he says that in every case in which one expresses negations designated by the prefix av-, used in composition at the beginning of a word, privations are designated. For unequal means in one sense what lacks equality, provided that it is naturally such as to have it; and invisible means what lacks color; and footless, what lacks feet.

1075. Negations of this kind are used in a second sense to indicate not what is not had at all but what is had badly or in an ugly way; for example, a thing is said to be colorless because it has a bad or unfitting color; and a thing is said to be footless because it has defective or deformed feet.

1076. In a third sense an attribute is signified privatively or negatively because it is had to a small degree; for example, the term avpu,rhnon i.e., unignited, is used in the Greek text, and it signifies a situation where the smallest amount of fire exists. And in a way this sense is contained under the second, because to have something to a small degree is in a way to have it defectively or unfittingly.

1077. Something is designated as a privation or negation in a fourth sense because it is not done easily or well; for example, something is said to be uncuttable not only because it is not cut but because it is not cut easily or well.

1078. And something is designated as a privation or negation in a fifth sense because it is not had in any way at all. Hence it is not a one-eyed person who is said to be blind but one who lacks sight in both eyes.

1079. From this he draws a corollary, namely, that there is some intermediate between good and evil, just and unjust. For a person does not become evil when he lacks goodness to any degree at all, as the Stoics said (for they held all sins to be equal), but when he deviates widely from virtue and is brought to a contrary habit. Hence it is said in Book II of the Ethics that a man is not to be blamed for deviating a little from virtue.

1080. "To have" (513).

Then he gives four ways in which the term to have (to possess or hold) is used:

First, to have a thing is to treat it according to one's own nature in the case of natural things, or according to one's own impulse in the case of voluntary matters. Thus a fever is said to possess a man because he is brought from a normal state to one of fever. And in the same sense tyrants are said to possess cities, because civic business is carried out according to the will and impulse of tyrants. And in this sense too those who are clothed are said to possess or have clothing, because clothing is fitted to the one who wears it so that it takes on his figure. And to have possession of a thing is also reduced to this sense of to have, because anything that a man possesses he uses as he wills.

1081. To have is used in a second way inasmuch as that in which some attribute exists as its proper subject is said to have it. It is in this sense that bronze has the form of a statue, and a body has disease. And to have a science or quantity or any accident or form is included under this sense.

1082. To have is used in a third way (to hold) when a container is said to have or to hold the thing contained, and the thing contained is said to be held by the container. For example, we say that a bottle has or "holds a liquid," i.e., some fluid, such as water or wine; and a city, men; and a ship, sailors.

It is in this sense too that a whole is said to have parts; for a whole contains a part just as a place contains the thing in place. But a place differs from a whole in this respect that a place may be separated from the thing which occupies it, whereas a whole may not be separated from its parts. Hence, anything that occupies a place is like a separate part, as is said in Book IV of the Physics.

1083. To have is used in a fourth way (to hold up) inasmuch as one thing is said to hold another because it prevents it from operating or being moved according to its own impulse. It is in this sense that pillars are said to hold up the heavy bodies placed upon them, because they prevent these bodies from falling down in accordance with their own inclination. And in this sense too the poets said that Atlas holds up the heavens; for the poets supposed Atlas to be a giant who prevents the heavens from falling on the earth. And certain natural philosophers also say this, holding that the heavens will at some time be corrupted and fall in dissolution upon the earth. This is most evident in the opinions expressed by Empedocles, for he held that the world is destroyed an infinite number of times and comes into being an infinite number of times. And the fables of the poets have some basis in reality; for Atlas, who was a great astronomer, made an accurate study of the motion of the celestial bodies, and from this arose the story that he holds up the heavens.

But this sense of the term to have differs from the first. For according to the first, as was seen, the thing having compels the thing had to follow by reason of its own impulse, and thus is the cause of forced motion. But here the thing having prevents the thing had from being moved by its own natural motion, and thus is the cause of forced rest.

The third sense of having, according to which a container is said to have or hold the thing contained, is reduced to this sense, because the individual parts of the thing contained would be separated from each other by their own peculiar impulse if the container did not prevent this. This is clear, for example, in the case of a bottle containing water, inasmuch as the bottle prevents the parts of the water from being separated.

1084. In closing he says that the phrase to be in a thing is used in the same way as to have, and the ways of being in a thing correspond to those of having a thing. Now the eight ways of being in a thing have been treated in Book IV of the Physics. Two of these are as follows: (1&2) that in which an integral whole is in its parts, and the reverse of this. Two others are: (3&4) the way in which a universal whole is in its parts, and vice versa. (8) And another is that in which a thing in place is in a place, and this corresponds to the third sense of having, according to which a whole has parts, and a place thas the thing which occupies it. (6) But he way in which a thing is said to be in something as in an efficient cause or mover (as the things belonging to a kingdom are in the king) corresponds to the first sense of having given here (1080). (7) And the way in which a thing is in an end or goal is reduced to the fourth sense of having given here (1083), or also to the first, because those things which are related to an end are moved or at rest because of it. [(5) The way health is in a balance of temperature, and any form is in matter or a subject, whether the form be accidental or substantial.]

LESSON 21

The Meanings of “To Come from Something,” Part, Whole, and Mutilated

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 24-27: 10:23a 26-1024a 28

514. To come from something (esse or fieri ex aliquo) means in one sense to come from something as matter, and this in two ways: either in reference to the first genus or to the ultimate species; for example, all liquefiable things come from water, and a statue comes from bronze. And in another sense it means to come from a thing as a first moving principle; for example, From what did the fight come? From a taunt; because this was the cause of the fight. In another sense it means to come from the composite of matter and form, as parts come from a whole, and a verse from the Iliad, and stones from a house. For the form is an end or goal, and what is in possession of its end is complete. And one thing comes from another in the sense that a species comes from a part of a species, and man from two-footed, and a syllable from an element. For this is different from the way in which a statue comes from bronze, because a composite substance comes from sensible matter, but a species also comes from the matter of a species. These are the senses, then, in which some things are said to come from something. But other things are said to come from something if they come from a part of that thing in any of the aforesaid senses. For example, a child comes from its father and mother, and plants come from the earth, because they come from some part of them. And some things come from others only

because they come one after the other in time, as night comes from day, and a storm from a calm. And some of these are so described only because they admit of change into each other, as in the cases just mentioned. And some only because they follow one another in time, as a voyage is made from the equinox because it takes place after the equinox. And feasts come one from another in this way, as the Thargelian from the Dionysian, because it comes after the Dionysian.

Chapter 25

515. Part means in one sense that into which a quantity is divided in any way; for what is subtracted from a quantity is always called a part of it. For example, the number two is said in a sense to be a part of the number three. And in another sense part means only such things as measure a whole. And for this reason the number two is said in a sense to be a part of the number three, and in another, not. Again, those things into which a species is divided irrespective of quantity are also called parts of this species; and it is for this reason that species are said to be parts of a genus. Again, parts mean those things into which a whole is divided or of which a whole is composed, whether the whole is a species or the thing having the species, as bronze is a part of a bronze sphere or of a bronze cube (for this is the matter in which the form inheres). An angle also is a part. And those elements contained in the intelligible expression, which manifests what each thing is, are also parts of a whole. And for this reason the genus is also called a part of the species, although in another respect the species is called a part of the genus.

Chapter 26

516. Whole means that from which none of the things of which it is said to consist by nature are missing; and that which contains the things contained in such a way that they form one thing.

517. But this occurs in two ways: either inasmuch as each is the one in question, or inasmuch as one thing is constituted of them.

518. For a whole is a universal or what is predicated in general as being some one thing as a universal is one, in the sense that it contains many things, because it is predicated of each, and all of them taken singly are that one thing, as man, horse and god, because all are living things.

519. A whole is something continuous and limited when one thing is constituted of many parts which are present in it, particularly when they are

present potentially; but if not, even when they are present in activity.

520. And of these same things, those which are wholes by nature are such to a greater degree than those which are wholes by art, as we also say of a thing that is one (424:C 848), inasmuch as wholeness is a kind of unity.

521. Again, since a quantity has a beginning, a middle point and an end, those quantities to which position makes no difference we designate by the term all; but those to which position makes a difference we designate by the term whole; and those to which both descriptions apply we designate by both terms—all and whole. Now these are the things whose nature remains the same in being rearranged but whose shape does not, as wax and a garment; for both all and whole are predicated of them since they verify both. But water and all moist things and number have all applied to them, although water and number are called wholes only in a metaphorical sense. But those things of which the term every is predicated with reference to one, have the term all predicated of them with reference to several, for example, all this number, all these units.

Chapter 27

522. It is not any quantity at all that is said to be mutilated, but it must be a whole and also divisible. For two things are not mutilated when one is taken away from the other, because the mutilated part is never equal to the remainder. And in general no number is mutilated, for its substance must remain. If a goblet is mutilated it must still be a goblet; but a number is not the same when a part is taken away. Again, all things composed of unlike parts are not said to be mutilated. For a number is like something having unlike parts, as two and three. And in general those things to which position makes no difference, such as water and fire, are not mutilated; but they must have position in their substance. And they must be continuous; for a harmony is made up of unlike parts and has position but is not mutilated.

523. Further, neither is every whole mutilated by the privation of every part. For the parts which are removed must not be things which are proper to the substance or things which exist anywhere at all; for example, a goblet is not mutilated if a hole is made in it, but only if an ear or some extremity is removed; and a man is not mutilated if his flesh or spleen is removed, but only if an extremity is removed. And this means not any extremity whatever, but those which, when removed from the whole, cannot regenerate. Hence to have one’s head shaven is not a mutilation.

COMMENTARY

PART

1085. Here he begins to treat the things which pertain to the notion of whole and part. First, he deals with those which pertain to the notion of part; and second (1098), with those which pertain to the notion of whole ("Whole means").

And because a whole is constituted of parts, he therefore does two things in dealing with the first member of this division. First, he explains the various ways in which a thing is said to come from something; and second (1093), he considers the different senses in which the term part is used ("Part means").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he considers the ways in which a thing is said to come from something in the primary and proper sense. Second (1090), he indicates the ways in which one thing comes from another but not in the primary sense ("But other things"). Third (1091), he considers the ways in which one thing comes from another but not in the proper sense ("And some things"). In dealing with the first part he gives four ways in which a thing is said to come from something:

First, a thing is said to come from something as from matter, and this can happen in two ways: (a) In one way, inasmuch as matter is taken to be "the matter of the first genus," i.e., common matter; as water is the matter of all liquids and liquables, all of which are said to come from water. (b) In another way, "in reference to the ultimate species," i.e., the lowest species; as the species statue is said to come from bronze.

1086. In a second way a thing is said to come from something as "from a first moving principle," as a fight comes from a taunt, which is the principle moving the soul of the taunted person to fight. And it is in this way too that a house is said to come from a builder, and health from the medical art.

1087. In a third way one thing is said to come from another as something simple "comes from the composite of matter and form." This pertains to the process of dissolution; and it is in this way that we say parts come from a whole, "and a verse from the Iliad" (i.e., from the whole treatise of Homer about Troy); for the Iliad is divided into verses as a whole is divided into parts. And it is in the same way that stones are said to come from a house. The reason for this is that the form is the goal or end in the process of generation; for it is what has attained its end that is said to be perfect or complete, as was explained above (500:C 1039). Hence it is evident that that is perfect which has a form. Therefore, when a perfect whole is broken down into its parts, there is motion in a sense from form to matter; and in a similar way when parts are combined, there is an opposite motion from matter to form. Hence the preposition from, which designates a beginning, applies to both processes: both to the process of composition, because it signifies a material principle, and to that of dissolution, because it signifies a formal principle.

1088. In a fourth way a thing is said to come from something as “a species comes from a part of a species.” And part of a species can be taken in two ways: either in reference to the conceptual order or to the real order. (a) It is taken in reference to the conceptual order when we say, for example, that two-footed is a part of man; because while it is part of his definition, it is not a real part, otherwise it would not be predicated of the whole. For it is proper to the whole man to have two feet. (b) And it is taken in reference to the real order when we say, for example, that “a syllable comes from an element,” or letter, as from a part of the species. But here the fourth way in which the term is used differs from the first; for in the first way a thing was said to come from a part of matter, as a statue comes from bronze. For this substance, a statue, is composed of sensible matter as a part of its substance. But this species is composed of part of the species.

1089. For some parts are parts of a species and some are parts of matter. Those which are called parts of a species are those on which the perfection of the species depends and without which it cannot be a species. And it is for this reason that such parts are placed in the definition of the whole, as body and soul are placed in the definition of an animal, and an angle in the definition of a triangle, and a letter in the definition of a syllable. And those parts which are called parts of matter are those on which the species does not depend but are in a sense accidental to the species; for example, it is accidental to a statue that it should come from bronze or from any particular matter at all. And it is also accidental that a circle should be divided into two semi-circles; and that a right angle should have an acute angle as part of it. Parts of this sort, then, are not placed in the definition of the whole species but rather the other way around, as will be shown in Book VII of this work (1542). Hence it is clear that in this way some things are said to come from others in the primary and proper sense.

1090. But some things are said to come from something not in the (~) primary sense but (+)according to a part of that thing in “any of the aforesaid senses.” For example, a child is said to come from its father as an efficient principle, and from its mother as matter; because a certain part of the father causes motion, i.e., the sperm, and a certain part of the mother has the character of matter, i.e., the menstrual fluid. And plants come from the earth, although not from the whole of it but from some part.

1091. And in another way a thing is said to come from something in an improper sense, namely, from the fact that this implies order or succession alone; and in this way one thing is said to come from another in the sense that it comes after it, as “night comes from day,” i.e., after the day, “and a storm from a calm,” i.e., after a calm. And this is said in reference to two things. For in those cases in which one thing is said to come from another, order is sometimes noted in reference to motion and not merely to time; because either they are the two extremes of the same motion, as when it is said that white comes from black, or they are a result of different extremes of the motion, as night and day are a result of different locations of the sun. And the same thing applies to winter and summer. Hence in some cases one thing is said to come from another because one is changed into the other, as is clear in the above examples.

1092. But sometimes order or succession is considered in reference to time alone; for example, it is said that “a voyage is made from the equinox,” i.e., after the equinox. For these two extremes are not extremes of a single motion but pertain to different motions. And similarly it is said that the Thargelian festival [of Apollo and Artemis] comes from the Dionysian because it comes after the Dionysian, these being two feasts which were celebrated among the gentiles, one of which preceded the other in time.

1093. “Part” means (515).

He now gives four senses in which something is said to be a part:

In one sense part means that into which a thing is divided from the viewpoint of quantity; and this can be taken in two ways. (a) For, in one way, no matter how much smaller that quantity may be into which a larger quantity is divided, it is called a part of this quantity. For anything that is taken away from a quantity is always called a part of it; for example, the number two is in a sense a part of the number three. (b) And, in another way, only a smaller quantity which measures a larger one is called a part. In this sense the number two is not a part of the number three but a part of the number four, because two times two equals four.

1094. In a second sense parts mean those things into which something is divided irrespective of quantity; and it is in this sense that species are said to be parts of a genus. For a genus is divided into species, but not as a quantity is divided into quantitative parts. For a whole quantity is not in each one of its parts, but a genus is in each one of its species.

1095. In a third sense parts mean those things into which some whole is divided or of which it is composed, whether the whole is a species or the thing having a species, i.e., the individual. For, as has been pointed out already (1089), there are parts of the species and parts of matter, and these (species and matter) are parts of the individual. Hence bronze is a part of a bronze sphere or of a bronze cube as the matter in which the form is received, and thus bronze is not a part of the form but of the thing having the form. And a cube is a body composed of square surfaces. And an angle is part of a triangle as part of its form, as has been stated above (1099).

1096. In a fourth sense parts mean those things which are placed in the definition of anything, and these are parts of its intelligible structure; for example, animal and two-footed are parts of man.

1097. From this it is clear that a genus is part of a species in this fourth sense, but that a species is part of a genus in a different sense, i.e., in the second sense. For in the second sense a part was taken as a subjective part of a universal whole, whereas in the other three senses it was taken as an integral part. And in the first sense it was taken as a part of quantity; and in the other two senses as a part of substance; yet in such a way that a part in the third sense means a part of a thing, whether it be a part of the species or of the individual. But in the fourth sense it is a part of the intelligible structure.

Whole

1098. “Whole” means (516).

He proceeds to treat the things which pertain to a whole. First, he considers a whole in a general way; and second (1119), he deals with a particular kind of whole, namely a genus.

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he proceeds to deal with the term whole; and second 1109), with its opposite, mutilated.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he states the common meaning of whole, which involves two things. (1) The first is that the perfection of a whole is derived from its parts. He indicates this when he says “a whole means that from which none of the things,” i.e., the parts, “of which it is said to consist by nature,” i.e., of which the whole is composed according to its own nature, “are missing.” (2) The second is that the parts become one in the whole. Thus he says that a whole is “that which contains the things contained,” namely, the parts, in such a way that the things contained in the whole are some one thing.

1099. But this occurs. (517).

Second, he notes two ways in which a thing is a whole. He says that a thing is said to be a whole in two ways: (1) either in the sense that each of the things contained by the containing whole is “the one in question,” i.e., the containing whole, which is in the universal whole that is predicated of any one of its own parts; or (2) in the sense that it is one thing composed of parts in such a way that none of the parts are that one thing. This is the notion of an integral whole, which is not predicated of any of its own integral parts.

1100. For a whole (518).

Third, he explains the foregoing senses of whole. First, he explains the first sense. He says that a whole is a universal “or what is predicated in general,” i.e., a common predicate, as being some one thing as a universal is one, in the sense that it is predicated of each individual just as the universal, which contains many parts, is predicated of each of its parts. And all of these are one in a universal whole in such a way that each of them is that one whole; for example, living thing contains man and horse and god, because “all are living things,” i.e., because living thing is predicated of each. By a god he means here a celestial body, such as the sun or the moon, which the ancients said were living bodies and considered to be gods; or he means certain ethereal living beings, which the Platonists called demons, and which were worshipped by the pagans as gods.

1101. A whole is something (519).

Second, he explains the meaning of whole in the sense of an integral whole; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the common meaning of this kind of whole, and particularly of that which is divided into quantitative parts, which is more evident to us. He says that a whole is something “continuous and limited,” i.e., perfect or complete (for what is unlimited does not have the character of a whole but of a part, as is said in Book III of the Physics when one thing is composed of many parts which are present in it. He says this in order to exclude the sense in which one thing comes from another as from a contrary.

1102. Now the parts of which a whole is composed can be present in it in two ways: in one way potentially, and in another actually. Parts are potentially present in a whole which is continuous, and actually present in a whole which is not continuous, as stones are actually present in a heap. But that which is continuous is one to a greater degree, and therefore is a whole to a greater degree, than that which is not continuous. Hence he says that parts must be present in a whole, especially potential parts, as they are in a continuous whole; and if not potentially, then at least “in activity,” or actually. For “activity” means interior action.

1003. Now although a thing is a whole to a greater degree when its parts are present potentially than when they are present actually, nonetheless if we look to the parts, they are parts to a greater degree when they exist actually than when they exist potentially. Hence another text reads, “especially when they are present perfectly and actually; but otherwise, even when they are present potentially.” And it also adds the words given above: “particularly when they are present potentially; but if not, even when they are present in activity.” Hence it seems that the translator found two texts, which he translated, and then made the mistake of combining both so as to make one text. This is clear from another translation, which contains only one of these statements; for it reads as follows: “And a whole is continuous and limited when some one thing, is composed of many intrinsic parts, especially when they are present potentially; but if not, when they are present actually.”

1104. And of these same things (520).

Second, he indicates two differences within this second sense of whole. The first is that some continuous things are such by art and some by nature. Those which are continuous by nature are “such,” i.e., wholes, to a greater degree than those which are such by art. And since we spoke in the same way above (848) about things which are one, saying that things which are continuous by nature are one to a greater degree, as though wholeness were oneness, it is clear from this that anything which is one to a greater degree is a whole to a greater degree.

1105. Again, since a quantity (521).

He gives the second difference. For since it is true that there is an order of parts in quantity, because a quantity has a beginning, a middle point and an end, and the notion of position involves these, the positions of the parts in all these quantities must be continuous. But if we consider the position of the parts, a whole is found to be continuous in three ways. (1) For there are some wholes which are unaffected by a difference of position in their parts. This is evident in the case of water, for it makes no difference how the parts of water are interchanged. The same thing is true of other liquids, as oil and wine and the like. And in these things a whole is signified by the term all and not by the term whole. For we say all the water or all the wine or all the numbers, but not the whole, except metaphorically. This perhaps applies to the Greek idiom, but for us it is a proper way of speaking.

1106. (2) And there are some things to which the position of the parts does make a difference, for example, a man and any animal and a house and the like. For a thing is not a house if its parts are arranged in just any way at all, but only if they have a definite arrangement; and of these we use the term whole and not the term all. And similarly a thing is not a man or an animal if its parts are arranged in just any way at all. For when we speak of only one animal, we say the whole animal and not all the animal.

1107. (3) And there are some things to which both of these apply, because in a sense the position of their parts accounts for their differences; and of these we use both terms—all and whole. And these are the things in which, when the parts are interchanged, the matter remains the same but not the form or shape. This is clear, for example, in the case of wax; for no matter how its parts are interchanged the wax still remains, but it does not have the same shape. The same is true of a garment and of all things which have like parts and take on a different shape. For even though liquids have like parts, they cannot have a shape of their own, because they are not limited by their own boundaries but by those of other things. Hence when their parts are interchanged no change occurs in anything that is proper to them.

1108. The reason for this difference is that the term all is distributive and therefore requires an actual multitude or one in proximate potency to act;

and because those things have like parts, they are divided into parts entirely similar to the whole, and in that manner multiplication of the whole takes place. For if every part of water is water, then in each part of water there are many waters, although they are present potentially, just as in one number there are many units actually. But a whole signifies a collection of parts into some one thing; and therefore in those cases in which the term whole is properly used, one complete thing is made from all the parts taken together, and the perfection of the whole belongs to none of the parts. A house and an animal are examples of this. Hence, "every animal" is not said of one animal but of many.

Therefore at the end of this part of his discussion he says that those wholes of which the term every is used, as is done of one thing when reference is made to a whole, can have the term all (in the plural) used of them, as is done of several things when reference is made to them as parts. For example, one says "all this number," and "all these units," and "all this water," when the whole has been indicated, and "all these waters" when the parts have been indicated.

1109. It is not any quantity (522).

Here he clarifies the issue about the opposite of "whole," which is mutilated, in place of which another translation reads "diminished (or reduced) by a member"; but this does not always fit. For the term mutilated is used only of animals, which alone have members. Now mutilated seems to mean "cut off," and thus Boethius translated it "maimed," i.e., "defective." Hence the Philosopher's aim here is to show what is required in order that a thing may be said to be mutilated: and first, what is required on the side of the whole; and second (1117), what is required on the side of the part which is missing ("Further, neither").

1110. Now in order that a whole can be said to be mutilated, seven things are required.

First, the whole must be a quantified being having parts into which it may be divided quantitatively. For a universal whole cannot be said to be mutilated if one of its species is removed.

1111. Second, not every kind of quantified being can be said to be mutilated, but it must be one that is "divisible into parts," i.e., capable of being separated, and be "a whole," i.e., something composed of different parts. Hence the ultimate parts into which any whole is divided, such as flesh and sinew, even though they have quantity, cannot be said to be mutilated.

1112. Third, (~) two things are not mutilated, i.e., anything having two parts, if one of them is taken away from the other. And this is true because a “mutilated part,” i.e., whatever is taken away from the mutilated thing, is never equal to the remainder, but the remainder must always be larger.

1113. Fourth, no (~) number can be mutilated no matter how many parts it may have, because the substance of the mutilated thing remains after the part is taken away. For example, when a goblet is mutilated it still remains a goblet; but a number does not remain the same no matter what part of it is taken away. For when a unit is added to or subtracted from a number, it changes the species of the number.

1114. Fifth, the thing mutilated must have unlike parts. For those things which have like parts cannot be said to be mutilated, because the nature of the whole remains verified in each part. Hence, if any of the parts are taken away, the others are not said to be mutilated. Not all things having unlike parts, however, can be said to be mutilated; for a number cannot, as has been stated, even though in a sense it has unlike parts; for example, the number twelve has the number two and the number three as parts of it. Yet in a sense every number has like parts because every number is constituted of units.

1115. Sixth, none of those things (~) in which the position of the parts makes no difference can be said to be mutilated, for example, water or fire. For mutilated things must be such that the intelligible structure of their substance contains the notion of a determinate arrangement of parts, as in the case of a man or of a house.

1116. Seventh, mutilated things must be continuous. For a musical harmony cannot be said to be mutilated when a note or a chord is taken away, even though it is made up of low and high pitched sounds, and even though its parts have a determinate position, it is not any low and high pitched sounds arranged in any way at all that constitute such a harmony.

1117. Further, neither is (523).

Then he indicates the conditions which must prevail with regard to the part cut off in order that a thing may be mutilated; and there are three of these. He says that, just as not every kind of whole can be said to be mutilated, so neither can there be mutilation by the removal of every part.

For, first, the part which is removed must not be a (~) principal part of the substance, that is, one which constitutes the substance of the thing and without which the substance cannot be, because the thing that is mutilated must remain when a part is removed, as has been stated above (1113). Hence a man cannot be said to be mutilated when his head has been cut off.

1118. Second, the part removed should not be everywhere, but in some extremity. Thus, if a goblet is perforated about the middle by removing some part of it, it cannot be said to be mutilated; but this is said if someone removes “the ear of a goblet,” i.e., a part which is similar to an ear, or any other extremity. Similarly a man is not said to be mutilated if he loses some of his flesh from his leg or from his arm or from his waist, or if he loses his spleen or some part of it, but if he loses one of his extremities, such as a hand or a foot.

1118a. Third, a thing is not said to be mutilated if just any part that is an extremity is removed, but if it is such a part which does not regenerate if the whole of it is removed, as a hand or a foot. But if a whole head of hair is cut off, it grows again. So if such parts are removed, the man is not said to be mutilated, even though they are extremities. And for this reason people with shaven heads are not said to be mutilated.

LESSON 22

The Meanings of Genus, of Falsity, and of Accident

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524. The term genus (or race) is used if there is a continuous generation of things having the same species; for example, “as long as the genus of man lasts” means “while there is continuous generation of men.” And the term also designates that from which things are first brought into being. For it is in this way that some men are called Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former come from Hellen and the latter from Ion as the ones who begot them. Again the term is applied to the members of the genus more from the begetter than from the material principle. For some people are also said to derive their race from the female, as those who come from Pleia. Further, the term is used in the sense that the plane is called the genus of plane figures, and the solid the genus of solid figures. For each of the figures is either a plane of such and such a kind or a solid of such and such a kind; and this is the subject underlying the differences. Again, genus means the primary element present in definitions, which is predicated quidditatively of the thing whose differences are called qualities. The term genus, then, is used in all these senses: in one as the continuous generation of a species; in another as the primary mover of the same species; and in another as matter. For that to which the difference or quality belongs is the subject which we call matter.

525. Things are said to be diverse (or other) in species whose first subject is diverse and cannot be resolved one into the other or both into the same thing. For example, form and matter are diverse in genus. And all things which are predicated according to a different categorical figure of being are diverse in genus. For some signify the quiddity of beings, others quality, and others something else, in the sense of our previous distinctions. For they are not analyzed into each other or into some one thing.

Chapter 29

526. False means in one sense what is false as a thing, and that either because it is not combined or is incapable of being combined. For example, the statement that the diagonal is commensurable or that you are sitting belong to this class; for the former is always false and the latter is sometimes so; for it is in these senses that these things are non-beings. But there are things which exist and are fitted by nature to appear either other than they are or as things that do not exist, as a shadowgraph and dreams. For these in fact are something, but not that of which they cause an image in us. Therefore things are said to be false either because they do not exist or because the image derived from them is not of something real.

527. A false notion inasmuch as it is false is the notion of something non-existent. Hence every notion is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; for example, the notion of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. Now of each thing there is in a sense one notion, which is its essence; but there are also in a sense many, since the thing itself and the thing with a modification are in a sense the same, as Socrates and musical Socrates. But a false notion is absolutely speaking not the notion of anything. And it is for this reason that Antisthenes entertained a silly opinion when he thought that nothing could be expressed except by its proper notion—one term always for one thing. From this it would follow that there can be no contradiction and almost no error. It is possible, however, to express each thing not only by its own notion but also by that which belongs to something else not only falsely but also truly, as eight may be said to be double through the notion of two. These are the ways, then, in which things are said to be false.

528. A false man is one who chooses such thoughts not for any other reason but for themselves; and one who is the cause of such thoughts in

others; just as we say that those things are false which produce a false image or impression.

529. Hence, the speech in the Hippias, which says that the same man is true and false, is refuted; for it assumes that that man is false who is able to deceive, even though he is knowing and prudent.

530. And further it assumes that one who is capable of willing evil things is better. And this false opinion is arrived at by way of induction. For one who limps voluntarily is better than one who does so involuntarily; and by limping we mean imitating a limp. For if a man were to limp voluntarily, he would be worse in this way, just as he would be in the case of moral character.

Chapter 30

531. An accident is what attaches to anything and which it is true to affirm is so, although not necessarily or for the most part; for example, if someone discovers a treasure while digging a hole for a plant, the discovery of the treasure is an accident to the digger. For the one does not necessarily come from the other or come after it, nor does it happen for the most part that someone will find a treasure when he digs a hole to set out a plant. And a musician may be white; but since this does not happen necessarily or for the most part, we say that it is accidental. But since something belongs to something, and some belong somewhere and at some time, then whatever attaches to a subject, but not because it is now or here,' will be an accident. Nor does an accident have any determinate cause, but only a contingent or chance cause, i.e., an indeterminate one. For it was by accident that someone came to Aegina; and if he did not come there in order to get there, but because he was driven there by a storm or was captured by pirates, the event has occurred and is an accident; yet not of itself but by reason of something else. For the storm is the cause of his coming to the place to which he was not sailing, and this was Aegina. And in another sense accident means whatever belongs to each thing of itself but not in its substance; for example, it is an accident of a triangle to have its angles equal to two right angles. And these same accidents may be eternal, but none of the others can be. But an account of this has been given elsewhere.

COMMENTARY

GENUS

1119. Here he gives his views about a particular kind of whole, namely, a genus. First, he gives the different senses in which the term genus is used; and second (1124), he treats the different senses in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in genus ("Things are said"). He accordingly says, first, that the term genus is used in four senses:

First, it means the continuous generation of things that have the same species; for example, it is said, "as long as 'the genus of man' will exist," i.e., "while the continuous generation of men will last." This is the first sense of genus given in Porphyry, i.e., a multitude of things having a relation to each other and to one principle.

1120. In a second sense genus (race) means that from which "things are first brought into being," i.e., some things proceed from a begetter. For example, some men are called Hellenes by race because they are descendants of a man called Hellen; and some are called Ionians by race because they are descendants of a certain Ion as their first begetter. Now people are more commonly named from their father, who is their begetter, than from their mother, who produces the matter of generation, although some derive the name of their race from the mother; for example, some are named from a certain woman called Pleia. This is the second sense of genus given in Porphyry.

1121. The term genus is used in a third sense when the surface or the plane is called the genus of plane figures, "and the solid," or body, is called the genus of solid figures, or bodies. This sense of genus is not the one that signifies the essence of a species, as animal is the genus of man, but the one that is the proper subject in the species of different accidents. For surface is the subject of all plane figures. And it bears some likeness to a genus, because the proper subject is given in the definition of an accident just as a genus is given in the definition of a species. Hence the proper subject of an accident is predicated like a genus. "For each of the figures," i.e., plane figures, is such and such a surface. "And this," i.e., a solid figure, is such and such a solid, as though the figure were a difference qualifying surface or solid. For surface is related to plane (surface) figures, and solid to solid figures, as a genus, which is the subject of contraries; and difference is predicated in the sense of quality. And for this reason, just as when we say rational animal, such and such an animal is signified, so too when we say square surface, such and such a surface is signified.

1122. In a fourth sense genus means the primary element given in a definition, which is predicated quidditatively, and differences are its qualities. For example, in the definition of man, animal is given first and then two-footed or rational, which is a certain substantial quality of man.

1123. It is evident, then, that the term genus is used in so many different senses: (1) in one sense as the continuous generation of the same species, and this pertains to the first sense; (2) in another as the first moving principle, and this pertains to the second sense; (3&4) and in another as matter, and this pertains to the third and fourth senses. For a genus is related to a difference in the same way as a subject is to a quality. Hence it is evident that genus as a predicable and genus as a subject are included in a way under one meaning, and that each has the character of matter. For even though genus as a predicable is not matter, still it is taken from matter as difference is taken from form. For a thing is called an animal because it has a sentient nature; and it is called rational because it has a rational nature, which is related to sentient nature as form is to matter.

1124. Things are said (525).

Here he explains the different senses in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in genus; and he gives two senses of this corresponding to the last two senses of genus. For the first two senses are of little importance for the study of philosophy.

In the first sense, then, some things are said to be diverse in genus because their first subject is diverse; for example, the first subject of color is surface, and the first subject of flavors is something moist. Hence, with regard to their subject-genus, flavor and color are diverse in genus.

1125. Further, the two different subjects must be such that one of them is not reducible to the other. Now a solid is in a sense reducible to surfaces, and therefore solid figures and plane figures do not belong to diverse genera. Again, they must not be reducible to the same thing. For example, form and matter are diverse in genus if they are considered according to their own essence, because there is nothing common to both. And in a similar way the celestial bodies and lower bodies are diverse in genus inasmuch as they do not have a common matter.

1126. In another sense those things are said to be diverse in genus which are predicated “according to a different figure of the category of being,” i.e., of the predication of being. For some things signify quiddity, some quality, and some signify in other ways, which are given in the division made above where he dealt with being (889-94). For these categories are not reducible one to the other, because one is not included under the other. Nor are they reducible to some one thing, because there is not some one common genus for all the categories.

1127. Now it is clear, from what has been said, that some things are contained under one category and are in one genus in this second sense, although they are diverse in genus in the first sense. Examples of this are the celestial bodies and elemental bodies, and colors and flavors. The first way in which things are diverse in genus is considered rather by the natural scientist and also by the philosopher, because it is more real. But the second way in which things are diverse in genus is considered by the logician, because it is conceptual.

False

1128. “False” means (526).

Here he gives the various senses of the terms which signify a lack of being or incomplete being. First, he gives the senses in which the term false is used. Second (1139), he deals with the various senses of accident.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows how the term false is used of real things; and second (1130), how it is used of definitions (“A false notion”); and third (1135), how men are said to be false (“A false man”).

He accordingly says, first, that the term false is applied in one sense to real things inasmuch as a statement signifying a reality is not properly composed. And there are two ways in which this can come about:

In one way by forming a proposition which should not be formed; and this is what happens, for instance, in the case of false contingent propositions. In another way by forming a proposition about something impossible; and this is what happens in the case of false impossible propositions. For if we say that the diagonal of a square is commensurable with one of its sides, it is a false impossible proposition; for it is impossible to combine “commensurable” and “diagonal.” And if someone says that you are sitting while you are standing, it is a false contingent proposition;

for the predicate does not attach to the subject, although it is not impossible for it to do so. Hence one of these—the impossible—is always false; but the other—the contingent is not always so. Therefore those things are said to be false which are non-beings in their entirety; for a statement is said to be false when what is signified by the statement is nonexistent.

1129. The term false is applied to real things in a second way inasmuch as some things, though beings in themselves, are fitted by nature to appear either to, be other than they are or as things that do not exist, as "a shadowgraph," i.e., a delineation in shadow. For sometimes shadows appear to be the things of which they are the shadows, as the shadow of a man appears to be a man. The same applies to dreams, which seem to be real things yet are only the likenesses of things. And one speaks in the same way of false gold, because it bears a resemblance to real gold. Now this sense differs from the first, because in the first sense things were said to be false because they did not exist, but here things are said to be false because, while being something in themselves, they are not the things "of which they cause an image," i.e., which they resemble.

It is clear, then, that things are said to be false (1) either because they do not exist or (2) because there arises from them the appearance of what does not exist.

1130. A "false" notion (527).

He indicates how the term false applies to definitions. He says that "a notion," i.e., a definition, inasmuch as it is false, is the notion of something non-existent. Now he says "inasmuch as it is false" because a definition is said to be false in two ways:

It is either a false definition in itself, and then it is not the definition of anything but has to do entirely with the nonexistent; or it is a true definition in itself but false inasmuch as it is attributed to something other than the one properly defined; and then it is said to be false inasmuch as it does not apply to the thing defined.

1131. It is clear, then, that every definition which is a true definition of one thing is a false definition of something else; for example, the definition which is true of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. Now for one thing there is, in one sense, only one definition signifying its quiddity; and in another sense there are many definitions for one thing. For in one sense the subject taken in itself and "the thing with a modification," i.e., taken in conjunction with a modification, are the same, as Socrates and musical Socrates. But in another sense they are not, for it is the same thing accidentally but not in itself. And it is clear that they have different definitions. For the definition of Socrates and that of musical Socrates are different, although in a sense both are definitions of the same thing.

1132. But a definition which is false in itself cannot be a definition of anything. And a definition is said to be false in itself, or unqualifiedly false, by reason of the fact that one part of it cannot stand with the other; and such a definition would be had, for example, if one were to say "inanimate living thing."

1133. Again, it is clear from this that Antisthenes' opinion was foolish. For, since words are the signs of things, he maintained that, just as a thing does not have any essence other than its own, so too in a proposition nothing can be predicated of a subject but its own definition, so that only one predicate absolutely or always may be used of one subject. And from this position it follows that there is no such thing as a contradiction; because if animal, which is included in his notion, is predicated of man, non-animal can not be predicated of him, and thus a negative proposition cannot be formed. And from this position it also follows that one cannot speak falsely, because the proper definition of a thing is truly predicated of it. Hence, if only a thing's own definition can be predicated of it, no proposition can be false.

1134. But his opinion is false, because of each thing we can predicate not only its own definition but also the definition of something else. And when this occurs in a universal or general way, the predication is false. Yet in a way there can be a true predication; for example, eight is said to be double inasmuch as it has the character of duality, because the character of duality is to be related as two is to one. But inasmuch as it is double, eight is in a sense two, because it is divided into two equal quantities. These things, then, are said to be false in the foregoing way.

1135. Then he shows how the term false may be predicated of a man; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives two ways in which a man is said to be false. (1) In one way a man is said to be false if he is ready to think, or takes pleasure in thinking, thoughts of this kind, i.e., false ones, and chooses such thoughts not for any other reason but for themselves. For anyone who has a habit finds the operation relating to that habit to be pleasurable and readily performed; and thus one who has a habit acts in accordance with that habit and not for the sake of anything extrinsic. For example, a debauched person commits fornication because of the pleasure resulting from coition; but if he commits fornication for some other end, for instance, that he may steal, he is more of a thief than a lecher. And similarly one who chooses to speak falsely for the sake of money is more avaricious than false.

1136. (2) In a second way a man is said to be false if he causes false notions in others, in much the same way as we said above that things are false which cause a false image or impression. For it is clear from what has been said that the false has to do with the non-existent. Hence a man is said to be false inasmuch as he makes false statements, and a notion is said to be false inasmuch as it is about something nonexistent.

1137. Hence, the speech (529).

Second, he excludes two false opinions from what has been laid down above. He draws the first of these from the points made above. He says that, since a false man is one who chooses and creates false opinions, one may logically refute or reject a statement made in the Hippias, i.e., one of Plato’s works, which said that the same notion is both true and false. For this opinion considered that man to be false who is able to deceive, so that, being able both to deceive and to speak the truth, the same man is both true and false. And similarly the same statement will be both true and false, because the same statement is able to be both true and false; for example, the statement “Socrates sits” is true when he is seated, but is false when he is not seated. Now it is evident that this is taken unwarrantedly, because even a man who is prudent and knowing is able to deceive; yet he is not false, because he does not cause or choose false notions or opinions, and this is the reason why a man is said to be false, as has been stated (1135).

1138. And further (530).

Then he rejects the second false opinion. This opinion maintained that a man who does base things and wills evil is better than one who does not But this is false. For anyone is defined as being evil on the grounds that he is ready to do or to choose evil things. Yet this opinion wishes to accept this sense of false on the basis of a sort of induction from a similar case. For one who voluntarily limps is better and nobler than one who limps involuntarily: Hence he says that to do evil is like limping inasmuch as the same notion applies to both. And in a sense this is true; for one who limps voluntarily is worse as regards his moral character, although he is more perfect as regards his power of walking. And similarly one who voluntarily does evil is worse as regards his moral character, although perhaps he is not worse as regards some other power. For example, even though that man is more evil, morally speaking, who voluntarily says what is false, still he is more intelligent than one who believes that he speaks the truth when he in fact speaks falsely, though not wilfully.

Accident

1139. An “accident” (531).

Here, finally, he gives the different senses in which the term accident is used; and there are two of these:

(1) First, an accident means anything that attaches to a thing and is truly affirmed of it, although not necessarily or “for the most part,” i.e., in the majority of cases, but in a minority; for example, if one were to find a treasure while digging a hole to set out a plant. Hence, finding a treasure while (digging a hole is an accident. For the one is not necessarily the cause of the other so that the one necessarily comes from the other. Neither do they necessarily accompany each other so that the latter comes after the former as day follows night, even though the one is not the cause of the other. Neither does it happen for the most part, or in the majority of cases, that this should occur, i.e., that one who sets out a plant finds a treasure. And similarly a musician is said to be white, although this is not necessarily so nor does it happen for the most part. Hence our statement is accidental. But this example differs from the first; for in the first example the term accident is taken in reference to becoming, and in the second example it is taken in reference to being.

1140. Now just as something belongs to some definite subject, so too it is considered “to belong somewhere,” i.e., in some definite place, “and at some time,” i.e., at some definite time. And therefore it happens to belong to all of these accidentally if it does not belong to them by reason of their own nature; for example, when white is predicated of a musician, this is accidental, because white does not belong to a musician as such. And similarly if there is an abundance of rain in summer, this is accidental, because it does not happen in summer inasmuch as it is summer. And again if what is heavy is high up, this is accidental, for it is not in such a place inasmuch as the place is such, but because of some external cause.

1141. And it should be borne in mind that there is no determinate cause of the kind of accident here mentioned, “but only a contingent cause,” i.e., whatever one there happens to be, or “a chance cause,” i.e., a fortuitous one, which is an indeterminate cause. For example, it was an accident that someone “came to Aegina,” i.e., to that city, if he did not come there “in order to get there,” i.e., if he began to head for that city not in order that he might reach it but because he was forced there by some external cause; for example, because he was driven there by the winter wind which caused a tempest at sea, or even because he was captured by pirates and was brought there against his will. It is clear, then, that this is accidental, and that it can be brought about by different causes. Yet the fact that in sailing he reaches this place occurs “not of itself,” i.e., inasmuch as he was sailing (since he intended to sail to another place), but “by reason of something else,” i.e., another external cause. For a storm is the cause of his coming to the place “to which he was not sailing,” i.e., Aegina; or pirates; or something else of this kind.

1142. (2) [property] In a second sense accident means whatever belongs to each thing of itself but is not in its substance. This is the second mode of essential predication, as was noted above (1055); for the first mode exists when something is predicated essentially of something which is given in its definition, as animal is predicated of man, which is not an accident in any way. Now it belongs essentially to a triangle to have two right angles, but this does not belong to its substance. Hence it is an accident.

1143. This sense of accident differs from the first, because accidents in this second sense can be eternal. For a triangle always has three angles equal to two right angles. But none of those things which are accidents in the first sense can be eternal, because they are always such as occur in the minority of cases. The discussion of this kind of accident is undertaken in another place, for example in Book VI of this work (1172), and in Book II of the Physics. Accident in the first sense, then, is opposed to what exists in itself; but accident in the second sense is opposed to what is substantial. This completes Book V.

BOOK VI

THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATING BEING

LESSON 1

The Method of Investigating Being as Being. How This Science Differs from the Other Sciences

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532. The principles and causes of beings are the object of our search, and it is evident that [we must investigate the principles and causes of beings] as beings. For there is a cause of health and of its recovery; and there are also principles and elements and causes of the objects of mathematics; and in general every intellectual science, to whatever degree it participates in intellect, deals with principles and causes: either with those which are more certain or with those which are simpler.

533. But all these sciences single out some one thing, or some particular class, and confine their investigations to this, but they do not deal with being in an unqualified sense, or as being. Nor do they make any mention of the whatness itself of things. But proceeding from this, some making it evident by means of the senses, and others taking it by assuming it [from some other science], they demonstrate with greater necessity or more weakly the essential attributes of the class of things with which they deal. For this reason it is evident that there is no demonstration of a thing’s substance or whatness from such an inductive method, but there is another method of making it known. And similarly they say nothing about the existence or non-existence of the class of things with which they deal,

because it belongs to the same science to show what a thing is and whether it exists.

534. And since the philosophy of nature is concerned with some class of being (for it deals with that kind of substance in which there is a principle of motion and rest), it is evident that it is neither a practical nor a productive science. For the principle of productive sciences is in the maker, whether it be intellect or art or some kind of power; but the principle of practical sciences is prohaeresis in the agent, for the object of action and that of choice are the same. Thus if every science is either practical, productive or theoretical, the philosophy of nature will be a theoretical science. But it will be theoretical of that kind of being which is subject to motion, and of that kind of substance which is inseparable from matter in its intelligible structure for the most part only.

535. Now the essence and the conceptual expression of the way in which a thing exists must not remain unknown, because without this our investigation will be unfruitful. And regarding things defined, or their whatness, some are like snub and others like concave. And these differ, because snub is conceived with sensible matter (for snub is a concave nose), whereas concave is conceived without sensible matter. But all physical things are spoken of in a way similar to snub, for example, nose, eye, face, flesh, bone and animal in general; leaf, root, bark and plant in general (for the definition of none of these is without motion but always includes matter). Thus it is clear how we must investigate and define the essence in the case of physical things, and why it also belongs to the natural philosopher to speculate about one kind of soul-that which does not exist without matter. From these facts, then, it is evident that the philosophy of nature is a theoretical science.

536. But mathematics is also a theoretical science, although it is not yet evident whether it deals with things which are immobile and separable from matter. However, it is evident that mathematics speculates about things insofar as they are immobile and insofar as they are separable from matter.

537. Now if there is something which is immobile, eternal and separable from matter, evidently a knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science. However, it does not belong to the philosophy of nature (for this science deals with certain mobile things), or to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For the philosophy of nature deals with things which are

inseparable from matter but not immobile. And some mathematical sciences deal with things which are immobile, but presumably do not exist separately, but are present as it were in matter. First philosophy, however, deals with things which are both separable from matter and immobile. Now common causes must be eternal, and especially these; since they are the causes of the sensible things visible to us.

538. Hence there will be three theoretical philosophies: mathematics, the philosophy of nature, and theology.

539. For it is obvious that, if the divine exists anywhere, it exists in this kind of nature.

540. And the most honorable of the sciences must deal with the most honorable class of things. Therefore the theoretical sciences are more desirable than the other sciences.

541. But someone will raise the question whether first philosophy is universal or deals with some particular class, i.e., one kind of reality; for not even in the mathematical sciences is the method the same, because both geometry and astronomy deal with a particular kind of nature, whereas the first science is universally common to all.

542. Therefore, if there is no substance other than those which exist in the way that natural substances do, the philosophy of nature will be the first science; but if there is an immobile substance, this substance will be prior, and [the science which investigates it will be] first philosophy, and will be universal in this way. And because it will be first and about being, it will be the function of this science to investigate both what being is and what the attributes are which belong to it as being.

COMMENTARY

HOW IT DIFFERS FROM OTHER SCIENCES IN TREATING OF BEING

1144. Having shown in Book IV (535) of this work that this science considers being and unity and those attributes which belong to being as such, and that all of these are used in several senses; and having distinguished the number of these in Book V (843; 885) of this work, here the Philosopher begins to establish the truth about being and those attributes which belong to being.

This part is divided into two sections. In the first he explains the method by which this science should establish what is true about being. In the second (1247) he begins to settle the issue about being. He does this at the beginning of Book VII ("The term being is used in many senses").

The first part is divided into two sections. In the first he explains the method of treating beings, which is proper to this science, by showing how it differs from the other sciences. In the second (1170 he excludes certain senses of being from the investigation of this science, namely, those senses which are not the chief concern of this science ("Being in an unqualified sense").

The first part is again divided into two sections. In the first he shows how this science differs from the others because it considers the principles of being as being. In the second (1152) he shows how this science differs from the others in its method of treating principles of this kind ("And since the philosophy of nature"). In regard to the first he does two things.

1145. First, he shows how this science agrees with the other sciences in its study of principles. He says that since being is the subject of this kind of science, as has been shown in Book IV (529-30), and every science must investigate the principles and causes which belong to its subject inasmuch as it is this kind of thing, we must investigate in this science the principles and causes of beings as beings. And this is also what occurs in the other sciences. For there is a cause of health and of its recovery, which the physician seeks. And similarly there are also principles, elements and causes of the objects of mathematics, as figure and number and other things of this kind which the mathematician investigates. And in general every intellectual science, to whatever degree it participates in intellect, must always deal with causes and principles. This is the case whether it deals with purely intelligible things, as divine science does, or with those which are in some way imaginable or sensible in particular but intelligible in general; or even if it deals with sensible things inasmuch as there is science of them, as occurs in the case of mathematics and in that of the philosophy of nature. Or again whether they proceed from universal principles to particular cases in which there is activity, as occurs in the practical sciences, it is always necessary that such sciences deal with principles and causes.

1146. Now these principles are either (1) more certain to us, as occurs in the natural sciences, because they are closer to sensible things, or (2) they are simpler and prior in nature, as occurs in the mathematical sciences. But cognitions which are only sensory are not the result of principles and causes but of the sensible object itself acting upon the senses. For to proceed from causes to effects or the reverse is not an activity of the senses but only of the intellect. Or "more certain principles" means those which are better known and more deeply probed, and "simple" means those which are studied in a more superficial way, as occurs in the moral sciences, whose principles are derived from those things which occur in the majority of cases.

1147. But all these (533).

Second, he shows how the other sciences differ from this science in their study of principles and causes. He says that all these particular sciences which have now been mentioned are about one particular class of being, for example, number, continuous quantity or something of this kind; and each confines its investigations to "its subject genus,"‘ i.e., dealing with this class and not with another; for example, the science which deals with number does not deal with continuous quantity. For no one of the other sciences deals "with being in an unqualified sense," i.e., with being in general, or even with any particular being as being; for example, arithmetic does not deal with number as being but as number. For to consider each being as being is proper to metaphysics.

1148. And since it belongs to the same science to consider both being and the whatness or quiddity, because each thing has being by reason of its quiddity, therefore the other particular sciences make "no mention of," i.e., they do (~) not investigate, the whatness or quiddity of a thing and the definition signifying it. But (+) they proceed "from this," i.e., from the whatness itself of a thing, to other things, using this as an already established principle for the purpose of proving other things.

1149. Now some sciences make the whatness of their subject evident by means of the senses, as the science which treats of animals understands what an animal is by means of what "is apparent to the senses," i.e., by means of sensation and local motion, by which animal is distinguished from non-animal. And other sciences understand the whatness of their subject by assuming it from some other science, as geometry learns what continuous quantity is from first philosophy. Thus, beginning from the whatness itself of a thing, which has been made known either by the senses or by assuming it from some other science, these sciences demonstrate the proper attributes which belong essentially to the subject-genus with which they deal; for a definition is the middle term in a causal demonstration. But the method of demonstration differs; because some sciences demonstrate with greater necessity, as the mathematical sciences, and others "more weakly," i.e., without necessity, as the sciences of nature, whose demonstrations are based on things that do not pertain to something always but for the most part.

1150. Another translation has "condition" in place of "assumption," but the meaning is the same; for what is assumed is taken, as it were, by stipulation. And since the starting point of demonstration is definition, it is evident that from this kind of inductive method "there is no demonstration of a thing's substance," i.e., of its essence, or of the definition signifying its whatness; but there is some other method by which definitions are made known, namely, the method of elimination and the other methods which are given in the Posterior Analytics, Book IV.

1151. And just as no particular science settles the issue about the whatness of things, neither does any one of them discuss the existence or nonexistence of the subject-genus with which it deals. This is understandable, because it belongs to the same science to settle the question of a thing's existence and to make known its whatness. For in order to prove that a thing exists its whatness must be taken as the middle term of the demonstration. Now both of these questions belong to the investigation of the philosopher who considers being as being. Therefore every particular science assumes the existence and whatness of its subject, as is stated in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. This is indicated by the fact that no particular science establishes the truth about being in an unqualified sense, or about any being as being.

1152. And since the philosophy of nature (534).

Here he shows how this science differs from the other sciences in its method of considering the principles of being as being. And since the philosophy of nature was considered by the ancients to be the first science and the one which would consider being as being, therefore, beginning with it as with what is more evident, he shows, first (534), how the philosophy of nature differs from the practical sciences; and second (535), how it differs from the speculative sciences, showing also the method of study proper to this science.

He says, first (534), that the philosophy of nature does not deal with being in an unqualified sense but with some particular class of being, i.e., with natural substance, which has within itself a principle of motion and rest; and from this it is evident that it is neither a practical nor a productive science. For action and production differ, because action is an operation that remains in the agent itself, as choosing, understanding and the like (and for this reason the practical sciences are called moral sciences), whereas production is an operation that passes over into some matter in order to change it, as cutting, burning and the like (and for this reason the productive sciences are called mechanical arts).

1153. Now it is evident that the philosophy of nature is not a (~) productive science, because the principle of productive sciences is in the maker and not in the thing made, which is the artifact. But the principle of motion in natural bodies is within these natural bodies. Further, the principle of things made by art, which is in the maker, is, first, the intellect which discovers the art; and second, the art which is an intellectual habit; and third, some executive power, such as the motive power by which the artisan executes the work conceived by his art. Hence it is evident that the philosophy of nature is not a productive science.

1154. And for this reason it is evident that it is not a (~) practical science; for the principle of practical sciences is in the agent, not in the actions or customary operations themselves. This principle is “prohaeresis,” i.e., choice; for the object of action and that of choice are the same. Hence it is evident that the philosophy of nature is neither a practical nor a productive science.

1155. If, then, every science is either practical, productive or theoretical, it follows that the philosophy of nature is a (+) theoretical science. Yet “it is theoretical,” or speculative, of a special class of being, namely, that which is subject to motion; for mobile being is the subject matter of the philosophy of nature. And it deals only with “that kind of substance,” i.e., the quiddity or essence of a thing, which is for the most part inseparable from matter in its intelligible structure. He adds this because of the intellect, which comes in a sense within the scope of the philosophy of nature, although its substance is separable from matter. Thus it is clear that the philosophy of nature deals with some special subject, which is mobile being, and that it has a special way of defining things, namely, with matter.

1156. Now the essence (535).

Here he shows how the philosophy of nature differs from the other speculative sciences in its method of defining things; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he explains this difference. Second (1166), he draws a conclusion about the number of theoretical sciences. ("Hence there will be").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he exposes the method of definings things which is proper to the philosophy of nature. He says that, in order to understand how the speculative sciences differ from each other, the quiddity of a thing and the way in which "the conceptual expression," i.e., the definition signifying it, should be expressed in each science, must not remain unknown. For in seeking the aforesaid difference "without this," i.e., without knowing how to define things, our search would be unfruitful. For since a definition is the middle term in a demonstration, and is therefore the starting-point of knowing the difference between the speculative sciences must depend on the different ways of defining things.

1157. Now concerning things which are defined it must be noted that some are defined like snub and others like concave. And these two differ because the definition of snub includes sensible matter (since snub is merely a curved or concave nose), whereas concavity is defined without sensible matter. For some sensible body, such as fire or water or the like, is not included in the definition of concave or curved. For that is said to be concave whose middle curves away from the ends.

1158. Now all natural things are defined in a way similar to snub, as is evident both of those parts of an animal which are unlike, for example, nose, eye and face; and of those which are alike, for example, flesh and bone; and also of the whole animal. And the same is true of the parts of plants, for example, leaf, root and bark; and also of the whole plant. For no one of these can be defined without motion; but each includes sensible matter in its definition, and therefore motion, because every kind of sensible matter has its own kind of motion. Thus in the definition of flesh and bone it is necessary that the hot and cold be held to be suitably mixed in some way; and the same is true of other things. From this it is evident what the method is which the philosophy of nature uses in investigating and defining the quiddity of natural things; i.e., it involves sensible matter.

1159. And for this reason the philosophy of nature also investigates one kind of soul—the kind that is (+) not defined without sensible matter. For in Book II of The Soul he says that a soul is the first actuality of a natural organic body having life potentially. But if any soul can exist (~) separately from a body, then insofar as it is not the actuality of such a body, it does not fall within the scope of the philosophy of nature. Therefore it is evident from the above that the philosophy of nature is a theoretical science, and that it has a special method of defining things.

1160. But mathematics (536).

Second, he exposes the method proper to mathematics. He says that mathematics is also a speculative science; for evidently it is neither a practical nor a productive science, since it considers things which are devoid of motion, without which action and production cannot exist. But whether those things which mathematical science considers are immobile and separable from matter in their being is not yet clear. For some men, the Platonists, held that numbers, continuous quantities and other mathematical objects are separate from matter and midway between the Forms and sensible things, as is stated in Book I (157) and in Book III (350). But the answer to this question has not yet been fully established by him, but will be established later on.

1161. However, it is evident that mathematical science studies some things insofar as they are immobile and separate from matter, although they are neither immobile nor separable from matter in being. For their intelligible structure, for example, that of concave or curved, does not contain sensible matter. Hence mathematical science differs from the philosophy of nature in this respect, that while the philosophy of nature considers things whose definitions contain sensible matter (and thus it considers what is not separate insofar as it is not separate), mathematical science considers things whose definitions do not contain sensible matter. And thus even though the things which it considers are not separate from matter, it nevertheless considers them insofar as they are separate.

1162. Now if there is something (537).

Third, he exposes the method proper to this science. He says that, if there is something whose being is immobile, and therefore eternal and separable from matter in being, it is evident that the investigation of it belongs to a theoretical science and not to a practical or productive one, whose investigations have to do with certain kinds of motion. However, the study of such being does not belong to the philosophy of nature, for the philosophy of nature deals with certain kinds of beings, namely, mobile ones. Nor likewise does the study of this being belong to mathematics, because mathematics does not consider things which are separable from matter in being but only in their intelligible structure, as has been stated (1161). But the study of this being must belong to another science which is prior to both of these, i.e., prior to the philosophy of nature and to mathematics.

1163. For the philosophy of nature deals with things which are inseparable from matter and mobile, and mathematics deals with certain immobile things although these are not separate from matter in being but only in their intelligible structure, since in reality they are found in sensible matter. And he says “presumably” because this truth has not yet been established. Further, he says that some mathematical sciences deal with immobile things, as geometry and arithmetic, because some mathematical sciences are applied to motion, as astronomy. But the first science deals with things which are separable from matter in being and are altogether immobile.

1164. Now common causes must be eternal, because the first causes of beings which are generated must not themselves be generated, otherwise the process of generation would proceed to infinity; and this is true especially of those causes which are altogether immobile and immaterial. For those immaterial and immobile causes are the causes of the sensible things evident to us, because they are beings in the highest degree, and therefore are the cause of other things, as was shown in Book II (290). From this it is evident that the science which considers beings of this kind is the first of all the sciences and the one which considers the common causes of all beings. Hence there are causes of beings as beings, which are investigated in first philosophy, as he proposed in Book I (36). And from this it is quite evident that the opinion of those who claimed that Aristotle thought that God is not the cause of the substance of the heavens, but only of their motion, is false. [against Ibn-Rushd]

1165. However, we must remember that even though things which are separate from matter and motion in being and in their intelligible structure belong to the study of first philosophy, still the philosopher not only investigates these but also sensible things inasmuch as they are beings. Unless perhaps we may say, as Avicenna does, that common things of the kind which this science considers are said to be separate from matter in being, not because they are always without matter, but because they do not necessarily have being in matter, as the objects of mathematics do.

1166. Hence there will be (538).

He draws a conclusion as to the number of theoretical sciences. And in regard to this he does three things. First, he concludes from what has been laid down above that there are three parts of theoretical philosophy: mathematics, the philosophy of nature, and theology, which is first philosophy.

1167. For it is obvious (539).

Second, he gives two reasons why this science is called theology.

The first of these is that "it is obvious that if the divine exists anywhere," i.e., if something divine exists in any class of things, it exists in such a nature, namely, in the class of being which is immobile and separate from matter, which this science studies.

1168. And he most honorable (540).

He gives the second reason why this science is called theology; and the reason is this: the most honorable science deals with the most honorable class of beings, and this is the one in which divine beings are contained. Therefore, since this science is the most honorable of the sciences because it is the most honorable of the theoretical sciences, as was shown before (64)—and these are more honorable than the practical sciences, as was stated in Book I (35)—it is evident that this science deals with divine beings; and therefore it is called theology inasmuch as it is a discourse about divine beings.

1169. But someone will (541).

[objection] Third, he raises a question about a point already established. First, he states the question, saying that someone can inquire whether first philosophy is universal inasmuch as it considers being in general, or whether it investigates some particular class or a single nature. Now this does not seem to be the case. For this science and the mathematical sciences do not have one and the same method; because geometry and astronomy, which are mathematical sciences, deal with a special nature, whereas first philosophy is universally common to all. Yet the reverse seems to be true, namely, that it deals with a special nature, because it is concerned with things which are separable from matter and immobile, as has been stated (1163).

1170. Therefore, if (542).

Second, he answers this question, saying that if there is no substance other than those which exist in the way that natural substances do, with which the philosophy of nature deals, the philosophy of nature will be the first science. But if there is some immobile substance, this will be prior to natural substance, and therefore the philosophy of nature, which considers this kind of substance, will be first philosophy. And since it is first, it will be universal; and it will be its function to study being as being, both what being is and what the attributes are which belong to being as being. For the science of the primary kind of being and that of being in general are the same, as has been stated at the beginning of Book IV (533).

LESSON 2

The Being Which This Science Investigates

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543. Being in an unqualified sense has various meanings, of which one is the accidental, and another the true (and non-being may signify the false); and besides these there are the categorical figures, for example, the what, of what sort, how much, where, when, and anything else which signifies in this way; and besides all of these there is the potential and the actual.

544- Since being is used in many senses, then, we must speak first of the accidental, because there is no speculation about it. And this is indicated by the fact that there is no science, either practical or speculative, that investigates it. For one who builds a house does not simultaneously cause all traits that are accidental to the completed house, since these are infinite in number. For nothing prevents the completed house from being pleasant to some, harmful to others, useful to others, and different, as I may say, from all other things, none of which the art of building produces. And similarly neither does the geometrician speculate about things which are accidents of figures in this way, nor whether a triangle differs from a triangle having two right angles.

545. And this is understandable, because the accidental is in a sense being only in name.

546. Hence in a way Plato was not wrong when he said that sophistry deals with non-being. For the arguments of the sophists, as I may say, are concerned chiefly with the accidental; [for example, they ask] whether the

musical and the grammatical are the same or different; and whether musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same; and whether everything which is but has not always been has come to be, so that if one who is musical has become grammatical, then one who is grammatical has become musical; and all other such arguments. For the accidental seems to be close to non-being.

547. Now this is also clear from these arguments: there is generation and corruption of those things which are in another way, but not of those things which are by accident.

548. Yet concerning the accidental it is necessary to state further, so far as it is possible, what its nature is and by what cause it exists; and perhaps at the same time it will also become evident why there is no science of it.

549. Therefore, since there are some beings which always are in the same way and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion, but in the sense of that which cannot be otherwise), and others which are neither of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the accidental.

550. For that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call the accidental. For example, if there should be cold and wintry weather during the dog days, we say that this is accidental; but not if the weather is sultry and hot, because the latter occurs either always or for the most part, whereas the former does not. And it is accidental for a man to be white, for this is so neither always nor for the most part; but it is not accidental for him to be an animal. And it is accidental if a builder produces health, because it is not a builder but a physician who is naturally fitted to do this; but it is accidental for a builder to be a physician. Again, a confectioner, aiming to prepare something palatable, may produce something health-giving; but not according to the confectioner's art. Hence we say that it was accidental. And while there is a sense in which he produces it, he does not produce it in a primary and proper sense. For there are other powers which sometimes are productive of other things, but there is no art or determinate power which is productive of the accidental; for the cause of things which are or come to be by accident is also accidental.

551. Hence, since not all things are or come to be of necessity and always, but most things occur for the most part, the accidental must exist; for example, a white man is neither always nor for the most part musical.

But since this occurs only occasionally, it must be accidental; otherwise everything would be of necessity. Hence matter is the contingent cause of the accidental, which happens otherwise than usually occurs. And we must take as our starting point this question: Is there nothing that is neither always nor for the most part, or is this impossible? There is, then, besides these something which is contingent and accidental. But then there is the question: Does that which occurs for the most part and that which occurs always, have no existence, or are there some beings which are eternal? These questions must be investigated later (1055)

552. However, it is evident that there is no science of the accidental, for all scientific knowledge is of that which is always or for the most part; otherwise how could one be taught or teach anyone else? For a thing must be defined either as being so always or for the most part; for example, honey-water is beneficial in most cases to those with a fever. But with regard to what happens in the other cases, it will be impossible to state when they occur, for example, at the new moon; for whatever happens at the new moon also happens either always or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to this. We have explained, then, what the accidental is, and by what cause it exists, and that there is no science of it.

COMMENTARY

THIS SCIENCE IS NOT ABOUT ACCIDENTAL BEING.

1171. Here Aristotle indicates with what beings this science chiefly intends to deal; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he recalls the ways in which things are said to be; second (1172), he establishes the nature of the two kinds of being with which he is not chiefly concerned (“Since being”); and third (1241), he shows that it is not his chief aim to consider these two kinds of being (“But since combination”).

Accordingly he says, first, that being in an unqualified sense, i.e., in a universal sense, is predicated of many things, as has been stated in Book V (885). In one sense being means what is accidental; and in another sense it means the same thing as the truth of a proposition (and non-being the same as the falseness of a proposition); and in a third sense being is predicated of the things contained under the categorical figures, for example, the what, of what sort, how much, and so on; and in a fourth sense, in addition to all of the above, being applies to what is divided by potentiality and actuality [modes].

1172. Since being (544).

Here he deals with the senses of being which he intends to exclude from this science. First (1172), he deals with accidental being; and second (1223), with being which is, identical with the true [logical].

In regard to the first he does two things. First he shows that there can be no science of the accidental. Second (1180), he establishes the things that must be considered about accidental being ("Yet concerning the accidental").

He says, first, that since being is used in many senses, as has been stated (1170), it is necessary first of all to speak of accidental being, so that anything which has the character of being in a lesser degree may first be excluded from the study of this science. And with regard to this kind of being it must be said that no speculation of any science can be concerned with it; and he proves this in two ways.

1173. He does this first by giving a concrete indication. He says that the impossibility of there being any speculation about accidental being is indicated by the fact that no science, howsoever "investigative" it may be, or "thoughtful" as another translation says, i.e. no matter how carefully it investigates the objects which come within its scope, is found to deal with accidental being. No practical science (and this is divided into the science of action and productive science, as was said above [1152]) is concerned with it, nor even any speculative science.

1174. He makes this evident, first, in the case of the practical sciences; for one who builds a house, granted that he builds it, is only an accidental cause of those things which are accidental to the completed house, since these are infinite in number and thus cannot come within the scope of art. For nothing prevents the completed house from being "pleasant," or delightful, to those who dwell there happily; "harmful" to those who suffer some misfortune occasioned by it; "useful" to those who acquire some profit from it; and also "different" from and unlike all other things. But the art of building does not produce any of the things which are accidental to a house, but only produces a house and the things which are essential to it.

1175. Then he shows that the same thing is true in the case of the speculative sciences, because similarly neither does geometry speculate about those things which are accidents “of figures in this way,” i.e., accidentally, but only about those attributes which belong essentially to figures. For it speculates about a triangle being a figure having “two right angles,” i.e., having its three angles equal to two right angles; but it does not speculate whether a triangle is anything else, such as wood or something of the sort, because these things pertain to a triangle accidentally.

1176. And this is understandable (545)

Second, he proves the same thing by means of an argument. He says it is reasonable that no science should speculate about accidental being, because a science studies those things which are being in a (+) real sense, but (~) accidental being is in a sense being only in name, inasmuch as one thing is predicated of another. For each thing is a being insofar as it is one. But from any two things which are accidentally related to each other there comes to be something that is one only in name, i.e., inasmuch as one is predicated of the other, for example, when the musical is said to be white, or the converse. But this does not happen in such a way that some one thing is constituted from whiteness and the musical.

1177. Hence in a way (546).

He proves in two ways that accidental being is in a sense being only in name. He does this, first, on the authority of Plato; and second (1179), by an argument.

He says that since accidental being is in a sense being only in name, Plato in a way was not wrong when, in allotting different sciences to different kinds of substance, he assigned sophistical science to the realm of non-being. For the arguments of the sophists are concerned chiefly with the accidental, since hidden paralogisms have the fallacy of accident as their principal basis.

1178. Therefore in the first book of the Sophistical Refutations it is said that in arguing against wise men the sophists construct syllogisms that are based on the accidental. This is evident, for example, in these paralogisms in which the question is raised whether the musical and the grammatical are the same or different. Let us construct such a paralogism. The musical differs from the grammatical; but the musical is the grammatical; hence the musical differs from itself. For the musical differs from the grammatical essentially speaking, but the musical is the grammatical by accident. Little wonder then that an absurd conclusion follows, for what is accidental is not distinguished from what is essential. And it would be similar if we were to speak thus: Coriscus differs from musical Coriscus; but Coriscus is musical Coriscus; therefore Coriscus differs from himself. Here too no distinction is drawn between what is accidental and what is essential. And it would be the same if we were to say: everything which is and has not always been, has come to be; but the musical is grammatical and has not always been so; therefore it follows that the musical has become grammatical and that the grammatical has become musical. But this is false, because no process of generation terminates in the grammatical being musical, but one process of generation terminates in a man being grammatical and another in a man being musical. It is also evident that in this argument the first statement is true of something that has being essentially, whereas in the second something is assumed that has being only by accident. And it is similar in all such argument based on the fallacy of accident. For accidental being seems to be close to non-being; and therefore sophistics, which is concerned with the apparent and nonexistent, deals chiefly with the accidental.

1179. How this is also clear (547).

Second, he proves the same thing by an argument. He says that it is also evident, from these arguments which the sophists use, that the accidental is close to non-being; for there is generation and corruption of those things which are beings in a different way than the accidental is, but there is neither generation nor corruption of the accidental. For the musical comes to be by one process of generation and the grammatical by another, but there is not one process of generation of the grammatical musical as there is of two-footed animal or of risible man. Hence it is evident that accidental being is not called being in any true sense.

1180. Yet concerning te accidental (548).

He now establishes the truth about accidental being insofar as it is possible to do so. For even though those things which are properly accidental do not come within the scope of any science, still the nature of the accidental can be considered by some science. This is also what happens in the case of the infinite; for even though the infinite as infinite remains unknown, still some science treats of the infinite as infinite.

In regard to this he does two things. First, he settles the issue regarding those points which should be investigated about accidental being. Second

(1191), he rejects an opinion that, would abolish accidental being ("Now it is evident").

1181. In regard to the first he does two things. First (548), he says that there are three points which must be discussed about accidental being, insofar as it is possible to treat of it, namely, (1) what its nature is, and (2) what causes it; and from this the third will become evident, (3) why there can be no science of it.

1182. Therefore, since there are (549).

He discusses these three points. (2) First, he shows what the cause of the accidental is. He says that there are some beings which always are in the same way and of necessity (not in the sense in which necessity is taken to mean compulsion, but in the sense of that which cannot be otherwise than it is, as "Man is an animal"); and there are other beings which are neither always nor of necessity, but for the most part, i.e., in the majority of cases, and "this," i.e., what occurs in the majority of cases, is the principle and the cause of the accidental. For in the case of those things which always are there can be nothing accidental, because only that which exists of itself can be necessary and eternal, as is also stated in Book V (839). Hence it follows that accidental being can be found only in the realm of contingent things.

1183. But that which is contingent, or open to opposites, cannot as such be the cause of anything. For insofar as it is open to opposites it has the character of matter, which is in potency to two opposites; for nothing acts insofar as it is in potency. Hence a cause which is open to opposites in the way that the will is, in order that it may act, must be inclined more to one side than to the other by being moved by the appetible object, and thus be a cause in the majority of cases. But that which takes place in only a few instances is the accidental, and it is this whose cause we seek. Hence it follows that the cause of the accidental is what occurs in the majority of cases, because this fails to occur in only a few instances. And this is what is accidental.

1184. For that which (550).

Second (1), he exposes the nature of accidental being; and he speaks thus: that which exists for the most part is the cause of the accidental, because we call that accidental which is neither always nor for the most part. And this is the absence of what occurs for the most part; so that "if there should be wintry weather," i.e., a period of rain and cold, "during the dog days," i.e., in the days of the dog star, we say that this is accidental. But we do not say this “if the weather is sultry” during that time, i.e., if there is a period of drought and heat; for the latter occurs always or almost always, but the former does not. Similarly we say that it is accidental for a man to be white, because this is so neither always nor for the most part. But we say that man is an animal essentially, not accidentally, because this is so always. And similarly a builder causes health accidentally, because a builder inasmuch is he is a builder is not naturally fitted to cause health, but only a physician can do this. However, a builder may cause health inasmuch as he happens to be a physician. Similarly a confectioner, or cook is “aiming,” i.e., intending, to prepare something palatable,” or delightful in the line of food, may make something health-giving when he prepares a tasty dish. For food which is good and delightful sometimes promotes health. But it is not according to the “confectioner’s art,” i.e., the culinary art, that he produces something health-giving, but something delightful. And for this reason we say that this is accidental.

1185. And it should be noted that in the (1) first example the accidental came about insofar as two things happen to occur at the same time; in the second, (2) insofar as two things happen to be present in the same subject, as white and man; in the third, (3) insofar as the same efficient cause happens to be a twofold agent, as a builder and a physician; and in the fourth, insofar as the effect happens to be twofold, as health and pleasure in the case of food; for while a cook prepares a pleasing dish, nevertheless this happens to be health-giving by accident. In fact a cook prepares something health-giving only in a secondary sense but not in a primary and proper sense, because an art operates through knowledge. Hence whatever lies outside the knowledge of an art is not produced primarily and properly by that art. Therefore the accidental, which lies outside the knowledge of an art, is not produced by art. For there are certain determinate powers which sometimes are productive of other beings which have being in the proper sense of the term, but there is no art or determinate power which is productive of beings in an accidental sense. Now the cause of those things which are or come to be by accident must be an accidental cause and not a proper cause. For effect and cause are proportionate to each other; and therefore whatever is an accidental effect has only an accidental cause, just as an effect in the proper sense has a cause in the proper sense.

1186. And since he had said above (1182) that the cause of the accidental is what occurs for the most part, therefore when he says “Hence, since not all,” he shows how the accidental exists as a result of what occurs for the most part. He says that, since not all things are or come to be always and of necessity, “but most things happen for the most part,” i.e., in the majority of cases, therefore () the accidental must exist; and this is what does not occur always or for the most part, as when I say “The white man is musical.” Yet because this sometimes happens, although not always or in the majority of cases, it follows that this comes about by accident. For if that which occurs only occasionally were never to occur, then that which occurs in the majority of cases would never fail to occur but would be always and of necessity. Thus all things would be eternal and necessary. But this is false. And since that which occurs in the majority of cases fails to occur because of matter (which is not completely subject to the active power of the agent, as happens in the majority of cases), then matter is the cause of that which happens to be otherwise “than usually occurs,” i.e., of what happens only occasionally. This cause, I say, is not a necessary cause but a contingent one.

1187. Granted that not all things are necessary but that there is something which is neither always nor for the most part, then we must take as our starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is neither always nor for the most part. But obviously this is impossible; for since that which occurs for the most part is the cause of the accidental, then both that which always is and that which is for the most part must exist. Hence anything besides the things just mentioned is an accidental being.

1188. However, the question whether that which occurs for the most part is found in some being, and whether that which occurs always is not found in any being, or whether there are some things which are eternal, must be dealt with later in Book XII (2488), where he will show that there are some substances which are eternal. Hence in the first question he asks whether all things are accidental; and in the second, whether all things are contingent and nothing is eternal.

1189. Here he establishes the third point, namely, that there is no science of the accidental. He says that this is evident from the fact that every science is concerned with what is either always or for the most part. Therefore, since the accidental occurs neither always nor for the most part, there will be no science of it. He proves the first thus: one cannot be taught by another or teach another about something which does not occur either always or for the most part; for anything that may be taught must be defined on the grounds that it is so either always or for the most part; for example, that “honey-water” (a mixture of honey and water) is beneficial to those with a fever, is defined as something that occurs for the most part.

1190. But with regard to “what happens in the other cases,” i.e., in the case of things which are neither always nor for the most part, it cannot he said when they will occur, for example, at the time of the new moon; for whatever is destined to happen at that time also happens either always or for the most part. Or his statement about the new moon can be another example of something that is defined as occurring always; and he adds the phrase “or for the most part” because of the way in which the accidental differs, because it does not occur in either of these ways. Hence he adds that “the accidental is contrary to this,” i.e., contrary to what occurs always or for the most part. And this is the minor premise of the principal argument used above. In bringing his discussion to a close he mentions the points which have been explained, namely, what the accidental is, and what its cause is, and that there can be no science of it.

LESSON 3

Refutation of Those Who Wished to Abolish the Accidental

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553. Now it is evident that there are principles and causes which are generable and corruptible without generation and corruption; for if this were not the case, everything would be of necessity, i.e., if there must be some cause, and not an accidental one, of that which is generated and corrupted. For if we ask: “Will this thing exist or not?” It will if some second thing happens; but if the latter does not, neither will the former. And this second thing will happen if some third thing does. And thus it is evident that when time is continually taken away from a limited period of time, one will finally come to the present moment. Hence this man will die either from illness or violence if he goes out; and he will do this if he gets thirsty; and this will happen if something else does. And in this way one will come to what exists now, or to something that has already happened; for example, he will go out if he gets thirsty, and this will happen if he eats highly seasoned food, and this is either the case or not. Therefore it will be from necessity that he dies or does not die. And similarly if one jumps back to something that has already happened, the same argument applies; for this—I mean what has already happened—is already present in something. Therefore everything that will be, will be of necessity; for example, one who lives shall die; because some part of the process has already been

completed, as the presence of contraries in the same body. But whether he will die from illness or violence has not yet been determined, unless something else will have happened.

554. It is evident, then, that this process goes back to some principle, but that this does not go back to anything else. Therefore this will be the principle of everything that happens by chance, and there will be no cause of its generation.

555. But to what kind of principle and what kind of cause such a process of reduction leads, whether to matter or to a final cause or to a cause of motion, must be given careful consideration. Let us dismiss accidental being, then, for it has been dealt with at sufficient length.

COMMENTARY

CHANCE AND PROVIDENCE

1191. Having drawn his conclusions concerning accidental being, the Philosopher now rejects an opinion that would completely abolish this kind of being. For some men held that whatever comes to pass in the world has some proper cause, and again that given any cause its effect necessarily follows. Hence, as a result of the connection between causes it would follow that everything in the world happens of necessity and nothing by chance. Therefore the Philosopher's aim is to destroy this position; and in regard to this he does three things.

First, he destroys this position. Second (1201), he draws a conclusion from his discussion ("It is evident"). Third (1202), he poses a question that arises out of this discussion ("But to what kind of principle").

He says, first, that it will be evident from the following remarks that the principles and causes of the generation and corruption of some things "are generable and corruptible," i.e., they are capable of being generated and corrupted, "without generation and corruption, i.e., generation and corruption taking place. For if the generation or corruption of one thing is the cause of the generation or corruption of another, it is not necessary that the generation or corruption of the effect necessarily follows when the generation or corruption of the cause takes place, because some causes are active only for the most part. Therefore, granted that these causes exist, their effect can be hindered accidentally, either because the matter is not disposed, or because an opposing agent interferes, or because of some such reason.

1192. Yet it must be noted that Avicenna proves in his Metaphysics that no effect is possible in relation to its own cause but only necessary. For if when the cause is posited it is possible for its effect not to follow, and it does follow (and the potential as such is made actual by some actual being), then something else besides this cause will have to cause the actual effect to follow. Therefore this cause was not sufficient. This appears to be contrary to what the Philosopher says here.

1193. But it must be noted that Avicenna's statement should be understood to apply only if we assume that no obstacle interferes with the cause. For given the cause its effect must follow unless there is some obstacle, and sometimes this occurs accidentally. Hence the Philosopher says that generation and corruption need not follow when the causes of generation and corruption are posited.

1194. For if this statement were not true, it would follow that all things would be of necessity, granted that along with this statement: given the cause the effect must follow, another position is also maintained, namely, that there must be some proper cause, and not merely an accidental one, of each thing which is generated and corrupted. For from these two propositions it follows that all things are of necessity. He proves this as follows.

1195. If it is asked whether a thing will be or not, it follows from the above remarks that one or the other is true of necessity; because if everything that is generated has a proper cause which produces it, and if given the cause its effect must ensue, then it follows that that thing about which it was asked whether it will exist or not, will come to be if its cause is held to exist; and if that cause will not exist, neither will its effect. And similarly it will be necessary to say that this cause will exist if some other thing which is its cause will exist.

1196. Further, it is evident that regardless of the amount of future time that may be taken, whether after a hundred or a thousand years, the amount of time beginning from the present moment up to that point is limited. However, since the generation of a cause is prior in time to the generation of its effect, then by proceeding from effect to cause we must subtract some part of future time and come closer to the present. But every limited thing is used up by having some part of it constantly taken away. Thus by proceeding from an effect to its cause and again from that cause to its cause and so on in this way, it follows that the whole period of future time is used up, since it is limited, and in this way the present moment is reached.

1197. This is clear in the following example. If every effect has some proper cause from which it follows of necessity, then this man must die of necessity, either from illness or violence, if he leaves the house. For his leaving the house is found to be the cause of his death by either violence (for example, if on leaving the house he is discovered by robbers and is killed), or illness (for example, if on leaving the house because he is hot he contracts a fever and dies). And in the same way it will also happen of necessity that he leaves the house in order to draw water from a well if he is thirsty; for thirst is the cause of his leaving the house in order to draw water. And similarly by the same argument it will also happen of necessity that he is thirsty if there is something else which causes his thirst; and thus by proceeding from effect to cause in this way one comes to “something which exists now,” i.e., to some present thing or to “something that has already happened,” i.e., to some past event. For example, if we were to say that a man will be thirsty if he eats highly seasoned or salty food which makes him thirsty, his eating or not eating salty food is in the present. Thus it follows that “the aforesaid future event,” namely, that this man will die or not die, will happen of necessity.

1198. For since every conditional proposition is a necessary one, then granted the antecedent the consequent must follow; for eaxmple, this conditional proposition is true: “If Socrates runs, he moves.” Therefore, granted that he runs, he must be moving so long as he runs. But if any effect has a proper cause from which it follows of necessity, then that conditional proposition must be true of which the antecedent is the cause and the consequent is the effect. And although there are sometimes several intermediates between a cause which exists at the present moment and an effect which will exist in the future (each of which is an effect in relation to those preceding it and a cause in relation to those following it), nevertheless it follows from first to last that any conditional proposition is true whose antecedent is present and whose consequent exists at some future time, for example, the proposition: “If a man eats salty food, he will be killed.” Now the antecedent refers to what is present, and therefore it will be by necessity that he is killed. And in this way all other future events whose proximate or remote causes exist in the present will be necessary.

1199. The same argument applies if one in proceeding from effects to causes "jumps back to something that has already happened," or to past events, that is to say, if one traces future effects back to some past cause that is not present; for that which is past nevertheless still is in some sense. I say this insofar as it has occurred, or is past. For even though Caesar's life is not now, in the present, nevertheless it is in the past, because it is true that Caesar has lived. Thus it is possible to hold as true now the antecedent of a conditional proposition in whose antecedent clause there is a past cause and in whose consequent clause there is a future effect. And thus since all future effects must be traced back to such present or past causes, it follows that all future events happen of necessity. For example, we say that it is absolutely necessary that one now living is going to die, because this follows of necessity in reference to something that has already come to pass, namely, that there are two contraries in the same body by reason of its composition; for this conditional proposition is true, "If a body is composed of contraries, it will be corrupted."

1200. But it is impossible that all future events should happen of necessity. Therefore the two premises from which this conclusion would follow are impossible, namely, that any effect has a proper cause, and that given the cause its effect must follow. For from this would follow the position already mentioned, namely, that there are some causes already posited for any future effect; for example, some causes have already been posited for the corruption of an animal. But no cause has yet been posited from which it will follow of necessity that this man will die either from illness or violence.

1201. It is evident (554).

He draws a conclusion from the foregoing discussion. He says that, since not everything which comes to be has a proper cause, it is therefore evident that in the case of future contingent events the reduction of a future effect to some proper cause goes back to some principle, and that this principle is not reduced to some other proper principle but will be the cause of "everything that happens by chance," i.e., an accidental cause, and that there will be no other cause of that accidental cause; just as we have already said (1184) that accidental being has no cause and is not generated. For example, the cause of this man being killed by robbers is a proper cause, because he is wounded by robbers; and this also has a proper cause, because he is found by the robbers; but this has only an accidental cause. For if on his way to work this man is wounded by robbers, this is accidental, as is evident from the foregoing; and therefore it is not necessary to posit a cause for this. For that which is accidental is not generated, and thus it is not necessary to look for some proper cause which produces it, as was said above.

1202. But to what kind of principle (555).

Here he poses a question arising out of the foregoing discussion; for he has just said above that the causes of those beings which are accidental are ultimately reduced to some principle for which it is impossible to give another cause. Hence he inquires here about this process of reduction or avnagwgh,, which means the same as "to what kind of principle and what kind of cause it should be reduced,", i.e., to what class of cause or principle, whether to some first cause which is a material cause, or to one which is a final cause (or that for the sake of which a thing comes to be), or to one which is a mover. He omits the formal cause because the question here involves the cause responsible for the generation of things that come to be by accident. But in the process of generation a form has no causal role except that of an end, because in the process of generation the end and the form are identical. Now he does not answer the question which is raised here, but assumes its solution from what has been established in Book II of the Physics; for it was shown there that fortune and chance, which are the causes of things that come to be by accident, are reduced to the class of efficient cause. Hence he concludes from the above that we must omit any discussion of accidental being, because the truth concerning it has been established as completely as it is possible to do so.

1203. It must be noted, however, that the doctrine of the Philosopher set forth here seems to do away with certain things which some thinkers hold in philosophy, namely, fate and providence. For here the force of the Philosopher's argument is that not all that occurs may be traced back to some proper cause from which it follows of necessity, otherwise it would follow that everything in the world would be of necessity and nothing by accident. But those who posit fate say that the contingent events occurring here, which appear to be accidental, can be traced back to some power of a celestial body, whose activity produces in a certain order those things which, viewed in themselves, seem accidental. And similarly those who posit providence say that whatever occurs here is ordained by the order of providence.

1204. From both of these positions, then, there seem to follow two conclusions which are opposed to what the philosopher establishes here. (1) The first is that nothing in the world happens accidentally either by fortune or by chance; for those things which occur in a certain order are not accidental, since they occur either always or for the most part. (2) The second is that all things happen of necessity. For if all those things whose cause is placed in the present or has been placed in the past occur of necessity, as the Philosopher's argument maintains, and if the cause of those things which come under providence or fate is placed in the present or has already been placed in the past (because providence is unchangeable and eternal, and the motion of the heavens is also invariable), it seems to follow that those things which come under providence or fate happen of necessity. Thus if everything that occurs here is subject to fate and providence, it follows that everything happens of necessity. Therefore according to the mind of the Philosopher it seems impossible to posit either fate or providence.

1205. In clearing up this difficulty it must be noted that the higher a cause the more extensive is its causality, for a higher cause produces its own proper higher effect, which is more general and extends to many things. For example, in the case of the arts it is evident that the political art, which is higher than the military art, has jurisdiction over the entire political community, whereas the military art has jurisdiction only over those things which fall within the military sphere. But the order found in the effects of a cause extends only so far as the causality of that cause extends, for every cause in the proper sense has definite effects which it produces in a certain order. It is evident, then, that (a) when effects are referred to lower causes they seem to be unrelated and to coincide with each other accidentally, but (b) that when they are referred to some higher common cause they are found to be related and not accidentally connected but to be produced simultaneously by one proper cause.

1206. For example, if the blossoming of one plant is referred to a particular power in this plant and the blossoming of a second plant is referred to a particular power in that plant, there seems to be no reason (indeed it seems to be accidental) why the first plant should blossom when the second does. And this is true, because the cause of the power of the first plant extends to the blossoming of this plant and not to that of the second, so that while it causes the first plant to blossom, it does not cause it to blossom at the same time as the second. But if this is attributed to the power of a celestial body, which is a universal cause, then we find that the first plant blossoms when the second does, not by accident, but by the direction of some first cause, which ordains this and moves each plant to blossom at the same time.

1207. Now we find three grades of causes in the world. (1) First, there is a cause which is incorruptible and immutable, namely, the divine cause; (2) second, beneath this there are causes which are incorruptible but mutable, namely, the celestial bodies; and (3) third, beneath this there are those causes which are corruptible and mutable.

Therefore causes in this (3) third grade are particular causes and are determined to proper effects of the same kind; for example, fire generates fire, man generates man, and plants generate plants.

1208. Now a cause belonging to the (2) second grade is in one sense universal and in another particular. It is particular because it extends to some special class of beings, namely, to those which are generated by motion; for it is both a cause of motion and something that is moved. And it is universal because its causality extends not only to one class of changeable things but to everything that is altered, generated and corrupted; for that which is first moved must be the cause of everything that is subsequently moved.

1209. But the cause belonging to the (1) first grade is universal without qualification, because its proper effect is existence. Hence whatever exists, and in whatever way it exists, comes properly under the causality and direction of that cause.

1210. If, then, we attribute all contingent events here to particular causes only, many things will be found to occur accidentally. This will be so for a number of reasons. (1) First, because of the conjunction of two causes one of which does not come under the causality of the other, as when robbers attack me without my intending this; for this meeting is caused by a twofold motive power, namely, mine and that of the robbers. (2) Second, because of some defect in the agent, who is so weak that he cannot attain the goal at which he aims, for example, when someone falls on the road because of fatigue. (3) Third, because of the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the form intended by the agent but another kind of form. This is what occurs, for example, in the case of the deformed parts of animals.

1211. But if these contingent events are traced back further to a celestial body, we find that many of them are not accidental; because even though particular causes are not contained under each other, they are nevertheless contained under one common celestial cause. Hence their concurrence can be attributed to one definite celestial cause. Again, since the power of a celestial body is incorruptible and impassible, no effect can escape from the sphere of its causality because of any defect or weakness of its power. But since it acts by moving, and since every agent of this kind requires a matter which is properly determined or disposed, then in the case of natural beings it can happen that the power of a celestial body fails to produce its effect because the matter is not disposed; and this will be accidental.

1212. Therefore, even though many things which seem to be accidental when traced back to these particular causes are found not to be accidental when traced back to a common universal cause, namely, to a celestial body, yet even when this reduction has been made some things are found to be accidental, as the Philosopher stated above (1201). For when an agent produces its effect for the most part but not always, it follows that it fails in a few instances; and this is accidental. If, then, the celestial bodies cause their effects in these lower bodies for the most part but not always, because the matter is not properly disposed, then it follows that, when the power of a celestial body fails to produce its effect, this happens accidentally.

1213. There is also another reason why things happen accidentally even if causality is traced back to a celestial body. It is that in the sphere of lower bodies there are some efficient causes which can act of themselves without the influence of a celestial body. These causes are rational souls, to which the power of a celestial body does not extend (since they are not forms subjected to bodies), except in an accidental way, i.e., inasmuch as the influence of a celestial body produces some change in the [human] body, and accidentally in the powers of the soul which are actualities of certain parts of the body, by which the rational soul is disposed to act. However, no necessity is involved, since the soul's dominion over the passions is free inasmuch as it may not assent to them. Therefore in the sphere of lower bodies whatever things are found to happen accidentally when reduced to these causes, i.e., rational souls, insofar as they do not follow the inclination produced by the influence of a celestial body, will not be found to be generated in any essential way by being traced back to the power of a celestial body.

1214. Thus it is evident that to posit fate, which is a certain disposition present in lower bodies as a result of the activity of a celestial body, is not to do away with everything that happens by chance.

1215. But if these contingent events are traced back further to the highest, divine cause, it will be impossible to find anything that lies outside its sphere of influence, since its causality extends to all things insofar as they are beings. Hence its causal activity cannot be thwarted as a result of the matter being indisposed, because matter itself and its dispositions do not lie outside the domain of this agent, since He is the agent who gives things their being and not merely moves and changes them. For it cannot be said that matter is presupposed as the subject of being as it is presupposed as the subject of motion; it is rather part of the essence of a thing. Therefore, just as the power of changing and moving is not hindered by the essence of motion or its terminus but by the subject which is presupposed, in a similar fashion the power of the one giving being is not hindered by matter or anything which accrues in any way to the being of a thing. From this it is also evident that in the sphere of lower bodies no efficient cause can be found which is not subject to the control of this first cause.

1216. It follows, then, that everything which occurs here insofar as it is related to the first divine cause, is found to be ordained by it and not to be accidental, although it may be found to be accidental in relation to other causes. This is why the Catholic faith says that nothing in the world happens by chance or fortuitously, and that everything is subject to divine providence. But in this place Aristotle is speaking of those contingent events which occur here as a result of particular causes, as is evident from his example.

1217. It now remains to see how the affirming of fate and providence does not eliminate contingency from the world, as though all things were to happen of necessity. From the things that have been said above it is evident that fate does not do away with contingency. For it has been shown already that, even though the celestial bodies and their motions and activities are necessary, nevertheless their effects in these lower bodies can fail either because the matter is not disposed or because the rational soul may freely choose to follow or not follow the inclinations produced in it by the influence of a celestial body. Thus it follows that effects of this sort do not happen of necessity but contingently; for to posit a celestial cause is not to posit a cause of such a kind that its effect follows of necessity, as the death of an animal is a result of its being composed of contraries, as he mentions in the text.

1218. But there is greater difficulty with regard to providence, because divine providence cannot fail; for these two statements are incompatible, namely, that something is foreknown by God, and that it does not come to pass. Hence it seems that, once providence is posited, its effect follows of necessity.

1219. But it must be noted that an effect and all of its proper accidents depend on one and the same cause; for just as a man is from nature, so also are his proper accidents, such as risibility and susceptibility to mental instruction. However, if some cause does not produce man in an absolute sense but such and such a man, it will not be within the power of this cause to produce the proper attributes of man but only to make use of them. For while the statesman makes man a citizen, he does not make him susceptible to mental instruction. Rather he makes use of this property in order to make a citizen of him.

1220. Now, as has been pointed out (1215), being as being has God himself as its cause. Hence just as being itself is subject to divine providence, so also are all the accidents of being as being, among which are found necessity and contingency. Therefore it belongs to divine providence not only to produce a particular being but also to give it contingency or necessity; for insofar as God wills to give contingency or necessity to anything, He has prepared for it certain intermediate causes from which it follows either of necessity or contingently. Hence the effect of every cause is found to be necessary insofar as it comes under the control of providence. And from this it follows that this conditional proposition is true: “If anything is foreknown by God, it will be.”

1221. However, insofar as any effect is considered to come under its proximate cause, not every effect is necessary; but some are necessary and some contingent in proportion to their cause. For effects are likened in their nature to their proximate causes, but not to their remote causes, whose state they cannot attain.

1222. It is evident, then, that when we speak of divine providence we must say that this thing is foreseen by God not only insofar as it is but also insofar as it is either contingent or necessary. Therefore, just because divine providence is held to exist, it does not follow, according to the argument which Aristotle gives here, that every effect happens of necessity, but only that it must be either contingent or necessary. In fact this applies solely in the case of this cause, i.e., divine providence, because the remaining causes do not establish the law of necessity or contingency, but make use of this law established by a higher cause. Hence the only thing that is subject to the causality of any other cause is that its effect be. But that it be either necessary or contingent depends on a higher cause, which is the cause of being as being, and the one from which the order of necessity and of contingency originates in the world.

LESSON 4

The True and the False as Being and Non-Being. Accidental Being and Being in the Sense of the True Are Excluded from This Science

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1027b 17-1028a 6

556. Again, being in the sense of the true and non-being in the sense of the false [are not to be considered] since such being depends on combination and separation, and these taken together form both parts of a contradiction. For truth resides in the affirmation of one side of a contradiction when there is combination, and in the negation when there is separation. But falsity consists in the reverse of this division.

557. But how [the intellect] happens to understand [things which are combined and separated, whether] together or separately, pertains to another discussion; and by understanding things together or separately I mean understanding them not successively but insofar as they form a unity.

558. For what is true and what is false are not in things themselves, so that what is good is true and what is evil is false, but only in the mind. And with regard to simple concepts and the whatness of things there is neither truth nor falsity in the mind. Hence the things which must be investigated about being and non-being in this sense must be considered later on (806).

559. But since combination and separation exist in thought and not in things, and being in this sense is different from being in the proper senses (for these are either what a thing is, or of what sort, or how much, or anything else that the mind combines or separates), then being in the sense of what is accidental and being in the sense of what is true must be omitted from this science. For the cause of the former is the indeterminate, and of the latter some positive state of mind; and both of these pertain to the remaining class of being and do not indicate the existence of any definite kind of being outside of the mind. For this reason, then, let us exclude them from our study, and let us look for the causes and principles of being as being. Now from our discussions of the different meanings of words it is evident that being is used in several senses (435).

COMMENTARY

THE "BEING" OF PROPOSITIONS IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF THIS SCIENCE.

1223. Having drawn his conclusions about accidental being, the Philosopher now settles the issue about the being which signifies the truth of a proposition; and in regard to this he does two things. First (556:C 1223), he determines the meaning of this kind of being. Second (1241), he excludes it from the principal study of this science ("But since combination").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he determines the meaning of this kind of being. Second (1227), he answers a question ("But how [the intellect]"). Third (1230) he clarifies a statement which he had made ("For what is true") .

He says, then, that "in one sense being means what is true," i.e., it signifies nothing else than truth; for when we ask if man is an animal, the answer is that he is, by which it is meant that this proposition is true. And in the same way non-being signifies in a sense what is false; for when one answers that he is not, it is meant that the statement made is false. Now this 'being which means what is true, and non-being which means what is false, depend on combination and separation; for simple terms signify neither truth nor falsity, whereas complex terms have truth and falsity through affirmation or negation. And here affirmation is called combination because it signifies that a predicate belongs to a subject, whereas negation is called separation because it signifies that a predicate does not belong to a subject.

1224. Further, since words are the signs of concepts, we must speak in the same way about the concepts of the intellect; for those which are simple do not have truth and falsity, but only those which are complex through affirmation or negation.

1225. And since the being and non-being just mentioned—the true and the false—depend on combination and separation, they therefore also depend on the division of a contradiction; for each part of a contradiction separates the true and the false from each other so that one part is true and the other is false. For since a contradiction is constituted of an affirmation and a negation, and each of these is constituted of a predicate and a subject, then a predicate and a subject can be related to each other in two ways; because they are either connected in reality, as man and animal, or are unconnected, as man and ass.

1226. Hence, if two contradictions are formed, one from connected terms, as “Man is an animal” and “Man is not an animal,” and another from unconnected terms, as “Man is an ass” and “Man is not an ass,” then truth and falsity divide each contradiction between themselves, so that the true on its side “resides in affirmation when there is combination,” i.e., in connected terms, and “in negation when there is separation,” i.e., in unconnected terms. For these two propositions “Man is an animal” and “Man is not an ass” are true. But the false on its side resides in the reverse of this division, i.e., in the contradictory of those statements which fall on the side of the true, because it consists in the negating of connected terms and in the affirming of unconnected terms; for these two propositions “Man is not an animal” and “Man is an ass” are false.

1227. But how [the intellect] (557).

Here he dismisses a problem that could arise from the foregoing remarks. For he said that the true and the false consist secondarily in the combination and separation of words, but primarily and properly in the combination and separation which the intellect makes. Now every combination and separation involves a plurality, and therefore the problem can arise how the intellect understands things which are combined and separated, whether together or separately. But he says that this pertains to another discussion, namely, to The Soul.

1228. Now together is used in two senses. (1) For sometimes it signifies a unity, as when we say that those things which exist at one and the same instant are together in time; and (2) sometimes it signifies the connection and proximity of things which succeed each other, as when we say that two men are together in place when their places are joined and next to each other, and in time when their times succeed each other. And since this is so, he therefore answers the proposed question which asks whether the intellect understands things which are combined or separated, together or separately, by saying that it does not understand them together according as some things are said to be together (~) insofar as they succeed each other, but (+) according as they are said to be together insofar as they form one thing.

1229. And in this way he indicates the solution of this question. For (1) if the intellect understands a man and an animal as they are in themselves, as two distinct things, it understands them successively by two simple concepts without forming an affirmation or a negation from them. But (2) when it combines or separates them, it understands them both as one thing, i.e., according as one thing is constituted from them; just as the intellect also understands the parts of a whole as one thing by understanding the whole itself. For the intellect does not understand a house by understanding first the foundation and then the walls and then the roof, but it understands all of these together insofar as one thing is constituted from them. And in a similar way it understands a predicate and a subject together insofar as one judgment is constituted from them, namely, an affirmation or a negation.

1230. For what is true (558).

He explains a statement which he had made to the effect that truth and falsity consist in combination and separation; and he proves this by means of the process of elimination. For some of the things signified by a word are found in things outside of the mind, but others are found only in the mind. For white and black are found outside of the mind, but their concepts are found only in the mind. Now someone might think that the true and the false are also found in things, just as good and evil are, so that the true is a kind of good and the false a kind of evil; for this would be necessary if truth and falsity were found in things, since truth signifies a certain perfection of nature, and falsity a defect. Moreover, every perfection existing in things pertains to the perfection and goodness of their nature, whereas every defect and privation pertains to evil.

1231. But he denies this, saying that the true and the false are not found in things in such a way that what is true on the part of reason is a kind of natural good, and what is false a kind of evil, but “they are found only in the mind,” or intellect.

1232. The intellect, however, has two operations. One of these is called the understanding of indivisibles, and this is the operation by which the intellect forms simple concepts of things by understanding the whatness of each one of them. The other operation is that by which the intellect combines and separates.

1233. Now while truth and falsity are in the mind, they do not pertain to that operation by which the mind forms simple concepts and the whatness of things. This is what he means when he says “with regard to simple concepts and the whatness of things there is neither truth nor falsity in the mind.” Hence as a result of this process of elimination it follows that since truth and falsity are neither in things nor in the mind when it apprehends simple concepts and the whatness of things, they must pertain primarily and principally to the combination and separation which the mind makes, and secondarily to that of words, which signify the mind’s conceptions. Further, he concludes that everything which must be considered about being and non-being in this sense, namely, insofar as being signifies the true, and non-being the false, “must be considered later on,” i.e., at the end of Book IX (1895), and also in The Soul, and in his works on logic. For the whole of logic seems to be devoted to the being and non-being spoken of in this way.

1234. Now it must be noted that any kind of knowing attains its completion as a result of the likeness of the thing known existing in the knowing subject. Therefore, just as the completion of the thing known depends upon this thing having the kind of form which makes it to be such and such a thing, in a similar fashion the completion of the act of knowing depends upon the knowing subject having the likeness of this form.

Moreover, just as the thing known is said to be good because it has the form which it ought to have, and evil because it is defective in some way, in a similar fashion the knowledge of the knowing subject is said to be true because this subject possesses a likeness of the thing known, and false because its knowledge falls short of such a likeness.

Therefore, just as good and evil designate perfections of things, in a similar way truth and falsity designate perfections of knowledge.

1235. But even though in sensory perception there can be a likeness of the thing known, nevertheless it does not belong to the senses to know the formality of this likeness but only to the intellect. Hence, even though the senses can be true in relation to sensible objects, they still cannot know the truth, but only the intellect can do this. And this is why it is said that truth and falsity are in the mind.

1236. And although the intellect has within itself a likeness of the things known according as it forms concepts of incomplex things, it does not for that reason make a judgment about this likeness. This occurs only when it combines or separates. For when the intellect forms a concept of mortal rational animal, it has within itself a likeness of man; but it does not for that reason know that it has this likeness, since it does not judge that "Man is a mortal rational animal." There is truth and falsity, then, only in this second operation of the intellect, according to which it not only possesses a likeness of the thing known but also reflects on this likeness by knowing it and by making a judgment about it. Hence it is evident from this that truth is not found in things but only in the mind, and that it depends upon combination and separation.

1237. And if a thing is sometimes said to be false, and the same applies to a definition, this will be so in reference to affirmation and negation. For a false thing, as is said at the end of Book V (1128), means (a) one that does not exist in any way (for example, the commensurability of a diagonal) or (b) one that exists but is naturally disposed to appear otherwise than it is.

Similarly a definition is said to be false either because it is not the definition of any existing thing or because it is assigned to something other than that of which it is the definition. For it is evident that falsity is said to be in things or in definitions in all of these ways by reason of a false statement made about them.

1238. The same thing is evident in the case of truth. For a thing is said to be true when it has the proper form which is shown to be present in it; and a definition is said to be true when it really fits the thing to which it is assigned.

1239. It is also evident that nothing prevents truth from being a kind of good insofar as the knowing intellect is taken as a thing. For just as every other thing is said to be good because of its perfection, in a similar fashion the intellect which knows is said to be good because of its truth.

1240. It is also evident from the statements made here that the true and the false, which are objects of knowing, are found in the mind, but that good and evil, which are the objects of appetite, are found in things. And it is also evident that, just as the act of knowing attains its completion as a result of the things known existing in the knowing subject, in a similar fashion every appetite attains its completion as a result of the ordering of the appetitive subject to its appetible objects.

1241. But since combination (559).

Here he excludes being in the sense of the true and being in the sense of the accidental from the principal consideration of this science. He says that combination and separation, on which truth and falsity depend, are found in the mind and not in things; and that if any combination is also found in things, such combination produces a unity which the intellect understands as one by a simple concept. But that combination or separation by which the intellect combines or separates its concepts is found only in the intellect and not in things. For it consists in a certain comparison of two concepts, whether these two are identical or distinct in reality. For sometimes the intellect uses one concept as two when it forms a combination, as when we say “Man is man”; and it is clear from this that such a combination is found only in the intellect and not in things. Therefore whatever is a being in the sense of the true, and consists in such a combination, differs from those things which are beings in the proper sense and are realities outside of the mind, cach of which is “either what a thing is,” i.e., substance, or of what sort, or how much, or any of the simple concepts which the mind combines or separates.

1242. Therefore both being in the sense of the accidental and being in the sense of the true must be excluded from this science. For the cause of the former—being in the sense of the accidental—is the indeterminate, and therefore it does not come within the scope of art, as has been shown (1174);

and the cause of the latter—being in the sense of the true—is “some positive state of mind,” i.e., the operation of the intellect combining and separating, and therefore it belongs to that science which studies the intellect.

1243. Another reason for excluding them is that, while “both of these,” namely, being in the sense of the true and accidental being, (+) belong to some class of being, (~) they do not belong to being in the proper sense, which is found in reality. Nor do they designate another kind of being distinct from beings in the proper sense. For it is evident that accidental being is a result of the coincidental connection of beings which exist outside the mind, each of which is a being of itself. For even though the grammatical musical has being only accidentally, nevertheless both grammatical and musical are beings in the proper sense, because each of these taken by itself has a definite cause. Similarly the intellect combines and separates those things which are contained in the categories.

1244. If, then, the class of being contained in the categories is sufficiently dealt with, the nature of accidental being and being in the sense of the true will be evident. And for this reason we must exclude these types of being and investigate the causes and principles of beings as beings in the proper sense. This is also evident from what has been established in Book V (885), where, in discussing the different senses of such terms, it was stated that being is used in many senses, as follows below at the beginning of Book VII (1240).

BOOK VII

SUBSTANCE

LESSON 1

The Primacy of Substance. Its Priority to Accidents

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 1028a 10-1028b 32

560. The term being is used in many senses, as we have explained in our discussions on the different meanings of words (435). For in one sense it signifies the whatness of a thing and this particular thing; and in another sense it signifies of what sort a thing is or how much or any one of the other things which are predicated in this way. But of all the senses in which being is used, it is evident that the first of these is the whatness of a thing, which indicates substance.

561. For when we state of what sort a thing is, we say that it is good or evil, and not that it is three cubits long or a man; but when we state what a thing is, we do not say that it is white or black or three cubits long, but that it is a man or a god. And other things are called beings because they belong to such a being; for some are qualities of it, others quantities, others affections, and so on.

562. Hence one may even be puzzled whether each of the following terms, namely, to walk, to be healthy and to sit, is a being or a non-being. And it is similar in the case of other things such as these; for no one of them is fitted by nature to exist of itself or is capable of existing apart from substance. But if anything is a being, it is rather the thing that walks and sits and is healthy. Now these appear to be beings to a greater degree because

there is some subject which underlies them; and this is substance and the individual, which appears in a definite category; for the term good or sitting is not used without this. Evidently then it is by reason of this that each of the other categories is a being. Hence the first kind of being, and not being of a special sort but being in an unqualified sense, will be substance.

563. Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; but substance is first in every respect: in definition, in the order of knowing, and in time; for none of the other categories can exist separately, but only substance. And it is first in definition, because in the definition of each thing it is necessary to include the definition of substance. And we think that we know each thing best when we know what it is (for example, what a man is or what fire is) rather than when we know of what sort it is or how much it is or where it is; for we know each of these things only when we know what the quality or quantity is.

564. And the question which was raised formerly and is raised now and always, and which always causes difficulty, is what being is; and this is the question what substance is. For some say that it is one, and others more than one; and some say that it is limited, and others unlimited. And for this reason we must investigate chiefly and primarily and solely, as we might say, what this kind of being is.

Chapter 2

565. Now it seems that substance is found most evidently in bodies. Hence we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth and particular things of this kind, and all things which are either parts of these or composed of these, either of parts or of all, for example, the heaven and its parts, such as the stars, the moon and the sun. But whether these alone are substances, or other things also are, or none of these but certain other things, must be investigated.

566. Again, it seems to some that the limits of a body, such as surface, line, point and unit, are substances to a greater degree than a body or solid. And some are of the opinion that there is nothing of this sort apart from sensible substances, while others think that there are eternal substances which are more numerous and possess being to a greater degree. Thus Plato claimed that there are two kinds of substances: the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics, and a third kind: the substances of sensible bodies.

And Speusippus admitted still more kinds of substances, beginning with the unit; and he posited principles for each kind of substance: one for numbers, another for continuous quantities, and still another for the soul; and by proceeding in this way he increases the kinds of substance. And some say that the separate Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that other things, such as lines and surfaces, depend on these; and so on until one comes to the substance of the heavens and sensible bodies.

567. Regarding these matters, then, it is necessary to investigate which statements are true and which are not; and what things are substances; and whether there are or are not any ‘substances in addition to sensible ones; and how these exist; and whether there is any separable substance (and if so, why and how), or whether there is no such substance apart from sensible ones. This must be done after we have first described what substance is.

COMMENTARY

1245. Having dismissed both accidental being and being which signifies the true from the principal study of this science, here the Philosopher begins to establish the truth about essential being (ens per se), which exists outside the mind and constitutes the principal object of study in this science. This is divided into two parts; for this science discusses both being as being and the first principles of being, as has been stated in Book VI (532:C 1145). Thus in the first part (560:C 1245) he establishes the truth about being; and in the second (1023:C 2-416), about the first principles of being. He does this in Book XII (“The study”).

But since being and unity accompany each other and come within the scope of the same study, as has been stated at the beginning of Book IV (301:C 548), the first part is therefore divided into two sections. In the first he establishes the truth about being as being; and in the second (814:C 1920), about unity and those attributes which naturally accompany it. He does this in Book X (“It was pointed out”).

Now essential being, which exists outside the mind, is divided in two ways, as has been stated in Book V (437:C 889); for it is divided, first, into the ten categories, and second, into the potential and the actual. Accordingly, the first part is divided into two sections. In the first he establishes the truth about being as divided into the ten categories; and in the second (742:C 1768), about being as divided into the potential and the actual. He does this in Book IX (“We have dealt”).

1246. The first part is divided again into two sections. In the first he shows that in order to establish the truth about being as divided into the ten categories, it is necessary to establish the truth about substance; and in the second (568:C 1270), he begins to do this (“The term substance”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (560:C 1247), he shows that it is necessary to settle the issue about substance. Second (565:C 1263), he indicates the things that have to be discussed about substance (“Now it seems”).

In regard to the first he does two things. He shows that one who intends to treat being should investigate substances separately; and he does this, first, by giving an argument; and second (564:C 1260), by considering what others have been accustomed to do (“And the question”).

Hence in the first part his aim is to give the following argument. That which is the first among the kinds of being, since it is being in an unqualified sense and not being with some qualification, clearly indicates the nature of being. But substance is being of this kind. Therefore to know the nature of being it suffices to establish the truth about substance.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that substance is the first kind of being; and second (563:C 1257), he shows in what way it is said to be first (“Now there are several”). In regard to the first he does two things.

Metaphysics is about substance

1247. First, he explains his thesis. He says that the term being is used in many senses (as has been stated in Book V (885) where he distinguished the different senses in which terms of this kind are used); for (1) in one sense being signifies (a) the whatness of a thing and (b) this particular thing, i.e., substance, inasmuch as by “the whatness of a thing” is meant the essence of a substance, and by “this particular thing,” an individual substance; and the different senses of substance are reduced to these two, as has been stated in Book V (440:C 898). And in another sense (2) it signifies quality or quantity or any one of the other categories.

And since being is used in many senses, it is evident that being in the primary sense is the whatness of a thing, i.e., the being which signifies substance.

1248. For when we state (561).

Second, he proves his thesis by using the following argument: in every class of things that which exists of itself and is a being in an unqualified sense is prior to that which exists by reason of something else and is a being in a qualified sense. But substance is a being in an unqualified sense and exists of itself, whereas all classes of beings other than substance are beings in a qualified sense and exist by reason of substance. Therefore substance is the primary kind of being.

1249. He makes the minor premise clear in two ways. He does this, first, by considering the way in which we speak or make predications. He says that it is evident from this that substance is the primary kind of being, because when we state of what sort a thing is we say that it is either good or evil; for this signifies quality, which differs from substance and quantity. Now three cubits long signifies quantity and man signifies substance. Therefore when we state of what sort a thing is, we do not say that it is three cubits long or a man. And when we state what a thing is, we do not say that it is white or hot, which signify quality, or three cubits long, which signifies quantity, but we say that it is a man or a god, which signifies substance.

1250. From this it is clear that terms signifying substance express what a thing is in an unqualified sense, whereas those signifying quality do not express what a thing is in an unqualified sense, but what sort of thing it is. The same is true of quantity and the other genera.

1251. From this it is clear that substance itself is said to be a being of itself, because terms which simply signify substance designate what this thing is.

But other classes of things are said to be beings, not because they have a quiddity of themselves (as though they were beings of themselves, since they do not express what a thing is in an unqualified sense), but because “they belong to such a being,” i.e., because they have some connection with substance, which is a being of itself. For they do not signify quiddity, since some of them are clearly qualities of such a being, i.e., of substance, other quantities, other affections, or something of the sort signified by the other genera.

1252. Hence one may (562).

Second he proves the same point by means of an example. The other kinds of beings are beings only inasmuch as they are related to substance. Therefore, since other beings when signified in the abstract do not designate any connection with substance, the question can arise whether they are beings or non-beings, for example, whether to walk, to be healthy, and to sit, and any one of these things which are signified in the abstract, is a being or a non-being. And it is similar in the case of other things such as these, which are signified in the abstract, whether they designate some activity, as the foregoing do, or whether they do not, as is the case with whiteness and blackness.

1253. Now accidents signified in the abstract seem to be non-beings, because no one of them is fitted by nature to exist of itself. In fact the being of each of them consists in their existing in something else, and no one of them is capable of existing apart from substance. Therefore when they are signified in the abstract as though they were beings of themselves and separate from substance, they seem to be non-beings. The reason is that words do not signify things directly according to the mode of being which they have in reality, but indirectly according to the mode in which we understand them; for concepts are the likenesses of things, and words the likenesses of concepts, as is stated in Book I of the Peri hermenias.

1254. Moreover, even though the mode of being which accidents have is not one whereby they may exist of themselves but only in something else, still the intellect can understand them as though they existed of themselves; for it is capable by nature of separating things which are united in reality. Hence abstract names of accidents signify beings which inhere in something else, although they do not signify them as inhering. And non-beings would be signified by names of this kind, granted that they would not inhere in something else.

1255. Further, since these accidents signified in the abstract appear to be non-beings, it seems rather to be the concrete names of accidents that signify beings. And “if anything is a being,” it seems rather to be “the thing that walks and sits and is healthy,” because some subject is determined by them by reason of the very meaning of the term, inasmuch as they designate something connected with a subject. Now this subject is substance. Therefore every term of this kind which signifies an accident in the concrete “appears in a definite category,” i.e., it seems to involve the category of substance, not in such a way that the category of substance is a part of the meaning of such terms (for white in the categorical sense indicates quality alone), but so that terms of this sort signify accidents as inhering in a substance. And we do not use the terms “good or sitting without this,” i.e., without substance; for an accident signifies something connected with substance.

1256. Again, since accidents do not seem to be beings insofar as they are signified in themselves, but only insofar as they are signified in connection with substance, evidently it is by reason of this that each of the other beings is a being. And from this it also appears that substance is “the first kind of being and being in an unqualified sense and not being of a special sort,” i.e., with some qualification, as is the case with accidents; for to be white is not to be in an unqualified sense but with some qualification. This is clear from the fact that when a thing begins to be white we do not say that it begins to be in an unqualified sense, but that it begins to be white. For when Socrates begins to be a man, he is said to begin to be in an unqualified sense. Hence it is obvious that being a man signifies being in an unqualified sense, but that being white signifies being with some qualification.

1257. Now there are several (563).

Here he shows in what respect substance is said to be first. He says that, since the term first is used in several senses, as has been explained in Book V (936), then substance is the first of all beings in three respects: in the order of (1) knowing, in (2) definition, and in (3) time.

(3) He proves that it is first in time by this argument: none of the other categories is capable of existing apart from substance, but substance alone is capable of existing apart from the others; for no accident is found without a substance, but some substance is found without an accident. Thus it is clear that an accident does not exist whenever a substance does, but the reverse is true; and for this reason substance is prior in time.

1258. (2) It is also evident that it is first in definition, because in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include the definition of substance; for just as nose is given in the definition of snub, so too the proper subject of any accident is given in the definition of that accident. Hence just as animal is prior to man in definition, because the definition of animal is given in that of man, in a similar fashion substance is prior to accidents in definition.

1259. (1) It is evident too that substance is first in the order of knowing, for that is first in the order of knowing which is better known and explains a thing better. Now each thing is better known when its substance is known rather than when its quality or quantity is known; for we think we know each thing best when we know what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know of what sort it is or how much it is or where it is or when we know it according to any of the other categories. For this reason too we think that we know each of the things contained in the categories of accidents when we know what each is; for example, when we know what being this sort of thing is, we know quality; and when we know what being how much is, we know quantity. For just as the other categories have being only insofar as they inhere in a substance, in a similar way they can be known only insofar as they share to some extent in the mode according to which substance is known, and this is to know the whatness of a thing.

1260. And the question (564).

Here he proves the same point, namely, that it is necessary to treat substance separately, by considering what other philosophers have been accustomed to do. He says that when one raises the question what being is (and this is a question which has always caused difficulty for philosophers both "formerly," i.e., in the past, and "now," i.e., in the present), this is nothing else than the question or problem what the substance of things is.

1261. For some men, such as Parmenides (65:C 138) and Melissus (65:C 140), said that "this being," i.e., substance, is one and immobile, whereas others, such as the ancient philosophers of nature, who maintained (67:C 145) that there is only one material principle of things, said that it is mobile. And they thought that matter alone is being and substance. Hence when they claimed that there is one being because there is one material principle, they obviously understood by one being, one substance. Other men maintained that there are more beings than one, namely, those who posited (67:C 145) many material principles, and consequently, many substances of things. And some of this group held that these principles are limited in number, for example, Empedocles, who posited (68:C 148) four elements; and others held that they are unlimited in number, for example, Anaxagoras, who posited (44:C go) an unlimited number of like parts, and Democritus, who posited (55:C 113) an unlimited number of indivisible bodies.

1262. If, then, the other philosophers in treating of beings paid attention to substances alone, we too should investigate “what this kind of being is,” i.e., what substance itself is. And this we must do, I say, chiefly, because this is our principal aim; and primarily, because by means of it the other kinds of being are known; and solely, as we might say, because by establishing what is true about substance by itself, one acquires a knowledge of all the other kinds of being. Thus in one sense he deals with substance separately, and in another sense not. He indicates this when he says “as we might say” or inasmuch as we might speak in this way, as we are accustomed to say of things which are not true in every respect.

1263. Now it seems (565).

Here he indicates the things that have to be discussed about substance; and in regard to this he does two things. First (565:C 1263), he gives the opinions that other men have held about substance. Second (567:C 1268), he states that it is necessary to determine which of their opinions are true (“Regarding these matters”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (565), he indicates the things that are evident about substance. He says that substantial being is found most obviously in bodies. Thus we say that animals and plants and their parts are substances, and also natural bodies such as fire, earth, water, “and particular things of this kind,” i.e., such elemental bodies as earth and fire, according to the opinion of Heraclitus (42:C 87), and other intermediate entities, according to the opinions of others. We also say that all parts of the elements are substances, as well as the bodies composed of the elements, whether of some of the elements, as particular compounds, or “of all the elements,” i.e., the whole of the various elements, as this whole sphere of active and passive beings; and as we also say that “a heaven,” which is a natural body distinct from the elements, is a substance, and also its parts, such as the stars, the moon and the sun.

1264. But whether these sensible substances are the only substances, as the ancient philosophers of nature claimed, or whether there are also some substances which differ from these, as the Platonists claimed, or whether these too are not substances but only certain things which differ from these, must be investigated.

1265. Again, it seems (566).

Second, he describes the philosophers’ opinions about those substances which are not evident. He says that it seems to some philosophers that the limits of bodies are the substances of things, i.e., that surface, line, point and unit are substances to a greater degree than a body or solid. And those who held this opinion differed in their views; because some, the Pythagoreans, thought that no limits of this kind are separate from sensible bodies, while others thought that there are certain eternal beings which are separate from and more numerous than sensible things and have being to a greater degree. I say “have being to a greater degree,” because they are incorruptible and immobile, whereas sensible bodies are corruptible and mobile; and “more numerous,” because while sensible bodies belong only to one order, these separate beings belong to two, inasmuch as “Plato claimed that there are two kinds of separate substances,” or two orders of separate substances, namely, the separate Forms or Ideas and the objects of mathematics; and he also posited a third order—the substances of sensible bodies.

1266. But Speusippus, who was Plato’s nephew and his successor, posited many orders of substances, and in each order he also began with the unit, which he posited as the principle in each order of substance. But he posited one kind of unit as the principle of numbers, which he claimed to be the first substances after the Forms, and another as the principle of continuous quantities, which he claimed to be second substances; and finally he posited the substance of the soul. Hence by proceeding in this way he extended the order of substances right down to corruptible bodies.

1267. But some thinkers differed from Plato and Speusippus, because they did not distinguish between the Forms and the first order of mathematical objects, which is that of numbers. For they said that the Forms and numbers have the same nature, and that “all other things depend on these,” i.e., are related successively to numbers, namely, lines and surfaces, right down to the first substance of the heavens and the other sensible bodies which belong to this last order.

1268. Regarding these matters (567).

Here he explains what should be said about the foregoing opinions. He says that it is necessary to determine which of the above opinions are true and which are not; and what things are substances; and whether the objects of mathematics and the separate Forms are substances in addition to sensible ones, or not; and if they are substances, what mode of being they have; and if they are not substances in addition to sensible ones, whether there is any other separate substance, and [if so], why and how; or whether there is no substance in addition to sensible substances.

1269. For he will settle this issue below and in Book XII (1055:C 2488) of this work. Yet before this is done it is first necessary to posit and explain what it is that constitutes the substance of these sensible bodies in which substance is clearly found. He does this in the present book (568:C 1270) and in Book VIII (696:C 1687), which follows.

LESSON 2

Substance as Form, as Matter, and as Body. The Priority of Form. The Procedure in the Investigation of Substance

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568. The term substance is used chiefly of four things, if not of more; for the essence (or quiddity) and the universal and the genus seem to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the subject. Now the subject is that of which the others are predicated, while it itself is not predicated of anything else. And for this reason it is first necessary to establish the truth about this, because this first subject seems in the truest sense to be substance.

569. Now in one sense matter is said to be the subject, and in another, the form, and in still another, the thing composed of these. By matter I mean the bronze, and by form the specifying figure, and by the thing composed of these the whole statue.

570. If, then, the specifying principle is prior to the matter and is being to a greater degree, for the same reason it will also be prior to the thing composed of these. We have now sketched what substance is, namely, that it is not what is predicated of a subject, but that of which all other things are predicated. However, it must not be considered merely in this way; for this is not enough, since this is evident.

571. And from this point of view matter is substance; for if it is not, it eludes us to say what else is. For when everything else is taken away,

nothing but matter appears to remain, because the other things are affections, activities and potencies of bodies. And length, width and depth are quantities and not substances; for quantity is not substance, but substance is rather the first thing to which these belong. But when length, width and depth are taken away, we see that nothing remains unless there is something which is limited by them. Hence to those who consider the situation in this way, matter alone must seem to be substance.

572. And by matter I mean that which in itself is neither a quiddity nor a quantity nor anything expressed by any of the other categories by which being is made determinate. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the other categories, because the others are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter. Therefore the ultimate subject is in itself neither a quiddity nor a quantity nor anything else. Nor again is it the negations of these, for they too will be accidental to it. Therefore for those who ponder the question it follows from these arguments that matter is substance.

573. But this is impossible; for to exist separately and to be a particular thing seem to belong chiefly to substance; and for this reason it would seem that the specifying principle and the thing composed of both the specifying principle and matter are substance to a greater degree than matter.

574. Yet that substance which is now composed of both (I mean of form and matter) must be dismissed; for it is subsequent and open to view. And matter too is in a sense evident. But it is necessary to investigate the third kind of substance, for this is the most perplexing.

575. Now some admit that among sensible things there are substances, and therefore these must be investigated first.

Chapter 4

576. Since we have established at the very beginning (568) the different senses into which we have divided the term substance, and that one of these seems to be the essence of a thing, this must be investigated.

577. For this is a preparatory task in order that one may pass to what is more knowable, because learning is acquired by all in this way, by proceeding from things which are less knowable by nature to those which are more knowable. And just as in practical matters one’s task is to proceed from things which are good for each individual to those which are totally good and good for each, in a similar fashion our task now is to proceed

from things which are more knowable to us to those which are more knowable by nature. But what is knowable and first to individual men is often only slightly knowable and has little or nothing of being. Yet starting from what is only slightly knowable but knowable to oneself, we must try to acquire knowledge of things which are wholly knowable, by proceeding, as has been said, by way of the very things which are knowable to us.

COMMENTARY

DIFFERENT MEANINGS OF SUBSTANCE

1270. Having shown that the chief aim of this science is to study substance, he now begins to establish the truth about substance. This part is divided into two members. In the first (1270) he explains the method and order to be followed in treating of substance. In the second (1306), he goes ahead with his treatment of substance ("And first let us make").

He explains the method and order to be followed in treating of substance by distinguishing its different senses; and by explaining which of these senses must be dealt with primarily and principally, which of them must be omitted, and which must be considered to be prior or subsequent. Hence the first part is divided into three members, according to the divisions and subdivisions of substance which he gives. This second part (1276) begins where he says, "Now in one sense." The third (1297) begins where he says, "Now some."

Accordingly he says, first, that the term substance is used at least of four things, if not "of more," i.e., in more senses. For there are several senses in which some speak of substance, as is clear in the case of those who said that the limits of bodies are substances, which sense he dismisses here.

(1) Now the first of these senses is that in which a thing's essence, i.e., its quiddity, essential structure, or nature, is called its substance.

1271. (2) The second sense is that in which "the universal" is called the substance of a thing, according to the opinion of those who maintain that the Ideas are separate Forms, which are the universals predicated of particular things and the substances of these particular things.

1272. (3) The third sense is that in which "the first genus seems to be the substance of each thing"; and in this sense they claim that unity and being are the substances of all things and their first genera.

1273. (4) The fourth sense is that in which "the subject," i.e., a particular substance, is called a substance. Now a subject means that of which other things are predicated, either as superiors are predicated of inferiors, for example, genera, species and differences; or as common and proper accidents are predicated of a subject, for example, as man, animal, rational, capable of laughter and white are predicated of Socrates. However, a subject is not itself predicated of anything else, and this must be understood essentially. For nothing prevents Socrates from being predicated accidentally of this white thing or of animal or of man, because Socrates is the thing of which white or animal or man is an accident. For it is evident that the subject which is spoken of here is what is called first substance in the Categories, for the definition of subject given here and that of first substance given there are the same.

1274. Hence he concludes that it is necessary to establish the truth "about this," i.e., about this subject or first substance, because such a subject seems in the truest sense to be substance. Therefore in the Categories it is said that such substance is said to be substance properly, principally and chiefly. For substances of this kind are by their very nature the subjects of all other things, namely, of species, genera and accidents; whereas second substance, i.e., genera and species, are the subjects of accidents alone. And they also have this nature only by reason of these first substances; for man is white inasmuch as this man is white.

1275. Hence it is evident that the division of substance given here is almost the same as that given in the Categories, for by subject here is understood first substance. And what he called the genus and the universal, which seem to pertain to genus and species, are contained under second substances.

However, the essence, which is given here, is omitted in that work, because it belongs in the predicamental order only as a principle; for it is neither a (~) genus nor a (~) species nor (~) an individual thing, but is (+) the formal principle of all these things.

1276. Now in one sense (569).

Here he subdivides the fourth sense of substance given in his original division, i.e., substance in the sense of a subject; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he gives this subdivision. Second (570:C 1278) he compares the parts of this subdivision with each other ("If, then"). Third

(574:C 1294), he shows how the parts of this division must be treated ("Yet that substance").

Accordingly he says, first (569), that a subject in the sense of a first or particular substance is divided into three parts, i.e., into matter, form, and the thing composed of these. This division is not one of genus into species, but of an analogous predicate, which is predicated in a primary and in a derivative sense of those things which are contained under it. For both the composite and the matter and the form are called particular substances, but not in the same order; and therefore later on (573:C 1291) he inquires which of these has priority as substance.

1277. To clarify this part of his division he draws an example from the field of artifacts, saying that bronze is as matter, the figure as "the specifying form," i.e., the principle which gives a thing its species, and the statue as the thing composed of these. This example must not be understood to express the situation as it really is but only according to a proportional likeness; for figure and other forms produced by art are not substances but accidents. But since figure is related to bronze in the realm of artifacts as substantial form is to matter in the realm of natural bodies, he uses this example insofar as it explains what is unknown by means of what is evident.

1278. If, then (570).

Here he compares the parts of the foregoing division with each other; and in regard to this he does three things. First (570), he explains that the form is substance to a greater degree than the composite. Second (571:C 1281), he explains that some men were of the opinion that matter constitutes substance in the truest sense ("And from this"). Third (573:C 1291), he shows that the form and the composite are substance to a greater degree than matter ("But this is impossible").

He accordingly says, first (570), "that the specifying principle," i.e., the form, is prior to matter. For matter is a potential being, and the specifying principle is its actuality; and actuality is prior to potentiality in nature. And absolutely speaking it is prior in time, because the potential is brought to actuality only by means of something actual; although in one and the same subject which is at one time potential and at another actual, potentiality is prior to actuality in time. Hence it is clear that form is prior to matter, and that it is also a being to a greater degree than matter; because that by reason of which anything is such, is more so, But matter becomes an actual being only by means of form. Hence form must be being to a greater degree than matter.

1279. And from this it again follows for the same reason that form is prior to the thing composed of both, inasmuch as there is something having the nature of matter in the composite. Thus the composite shares in something which is secondary in nature, i.e., in matter. And it is also clear that matter and form are principles of the composite. Now the principles of a thing are prior to that thing. Therefore, if form is prior to matter, it will be prior to the composite.

1280. And since it might seem to someone, from the fact that the Philosopher gives all the senses in which the term substance is used, that this suffices for a knowledge of what substance is, he therefore adds that “we have now merely sketched” what substance is; i.e., stated only in a universal way that substance is not what is predicated of a subject, but that of which other things are predicated. But one must not merely understand substance and other things in this way, namely, by means of a universal and logical definition; for this is not a sufficient basis for knowing the nature of a thing, because the very formula which is given for such a definition is evident. For the principles of a thing, on which the knowledge of a thing depends, are not mentioned in a definition of this kind, but only some common condition of a thing by means of which such acquaintance is imparted.

1281. And from this point (571).

He examines the view that matter is in the truest sense substance; and in regard to this he does two things. First (571), he gives the argument by which the ancient philosophers maintained that matter most truly and solely is substance. Second (572:C 1285), he explains what matter is (“And by matter”).

Hence he says, first, that not only the form and the composite are substance but so also is matter, according to the argument mentioned above, for if matter itself is not substance, it eludes us to say what other thing besides matter is substance. For if the other attributes, which clearly are not substance, are taken away from sensible bodies, in which substance is clearly apparent, it seems that the only thing which remains is matter.

1282. For in these sensible bodies, which all men admit to be substances, there are certain attributes such as the affections of bodies, for example, hot and cold and the like, which are evidently not substances. And in these bodies there are also “certain activities,” i.e., processes of generation and corruption and motions, which are clearly not substances. And in them there are also potencies, which are the principles of these activities and motions, i.e., potencies of acting and being acted upon, which are present in things; and it is also clear that these are not substances, but that they rather belong to the genus of quality.

1283. And, after all of these, we find dimensions in sensible bodies, namely, length, width and depth, which are quantities and not substances. For it is evident that quantity is not substance, but that substance is that to which the foregoing dimensions belong as their first subject. But when these dimensions are taken away, nothing seems to remain except their subject, which is limited and differentiated by dimensions of this kind. And this subject is matter; for dimensive quantity seems to belong immediately to matter, since matter is divided in such a way as to receive different forms in its different parts only by means of this kind of quantity. Therefore, from a consideration of this kind it seems to follow not only that matter is substance, but that it alone is substance.

1284. Now it was their ignorance of substantial form that misled the ancient philosophers into giving this argument; for as yet they had not progressed in knowledge to the point where their mind might be elevated to something over and above sensible bodies. Hence they considered only those forms which are proper or common sensibles; and it is clear that such attributes as white and black, great and small, and the like, are accidents of this kind. But a substantial form is perceptible only indirectly, and therefore they did not acquire g knowledge of it so that they might know how to distinguish it from matter. In fact they said that the whole subject, which we maintain is composed of matter and form, is first matter, for example, air or water or something of the kind. And they called those things forms which we call accidents, for example, quantities and qualities, whose Proper subject is not first matter but the composite substance, which is an actual substance; for it is by reason of this that every accident is something inhering in a substance, as has been explained (562:C 1254-56).

1285. And by matter I mean (572).

Now since the foregoing argument which shows that matter alone is substance seems to have come from their ignorance of matter, as has been pointed out, be therefore next states what matter really is, as is made clear in Book I of the Physics. For matter can be adequately known by itself only by means of motion, and the study of it seems to belong chiefly to the philosophy of nature. Hence the Philosopher also accepts here the characteristics of matter investigated in his physical treatises, saying that "by matter I mean that which in itself," i.e., considered essentially, "is neither a quiddity," i.e., a substance, "nor a quantity nor any of the other categories into which being is divided or by which it is made determinate."

1286. This is especially evident in the case of motion; for, properly speaking, the subject of change and motion must differ from each of the limits of motion, as is proved in Book I of the Physics. Now matter is the first subject which underlies not only those motions which are qualitative and quantitative, and those which pertain to the other accidents, but also those which are substantial. Hence it must differ essentially from all substantial forms and their privations, which are the limits of generation and, corruption, and not just quantitatively or qualitatively or according to the other accidents.

1287. Yet the Philosopher does not use motion to prove that matter differs from all forms (for this proof belongs to the philosophy of nature); but he uses the method of predication, which is proper to dialectics and is closely allied with this science, as he says in Book IV (311:C 574). Hence he says that there must be some subject of which all terms are predicated, yet in such a way that the being of that subject of which they are predicated differs from the being of each of the things which "are predicated of it"; i.e., they have a different quiddity or essence.

1288. Now it must be noted that what has been said here cannot be understood to apply to univocal predication, according to which genera are predicated of the species in whose definitions they are given, because man and animal do not differ essentially; but this must be understood to apply to denominative predication, as when white is predicated of man, for the quiddity of white differs from that of man. Hence he adds that the other genera are predicated of substance in this way, i.e., denominatively, and that substance is predicated of matter denominatively.

1289. It must not be understood, then, that actual substance (of which we are speaking here) is predicated of matter univocally or essentially; for he had already said above that matter is neither a quiddity nor any of the other categories. But it must be understood to be predicated denominatively, in the way in which accidents are predicated of substance. For just as the proposition “Man is white” is true, and the proposition “Man is whiteness” or “Humanity is whiteness” is not, in a similar way the proposition “This material thing is a man” is true, and the proposition “Matter is man” or “Matter is humanity” is not. Concretive or denominative predication, then, shows that, just as substance differs essentially from accidents, in a similar fashion matter differs essentially from substantial forms. Hence it follows that the ultimate subject, properly speaking, “is neither a quiddity,” i.e., a substance, nor a quantity nor any of the other things contained in any genus of beings.

1290. Neither can negations themselves be predicated essentially of matter. For just as forms are something distinct from the essence of matter, and thus in a certain measure are related to it accidentally, in a similar way the different negations of forms, which are themselves privations, also belong to matter accidentally. For if they should belong essentially to matter, forms could never be received in matter without destroying it. The Philosopher says this in order to reject the opinion of Plato, who did not distinguish between privation and matter, as is said in Book I of the Physics.’ Last, he concludes that for those who ponder the question according to the foregoing arguments it follows that matter alone is substance, as the preceding argument also concluded.

1291. But this is impossible (573)He now proves the contrary of this conclusion, saying that matter alone cannot be substance or substance in the highest degree. For there are two characteristics which seem to belong most properly to substance. The first is that it is capable of separate existence, for an accident is not separated from a substance, but a substance can be separated from an accident. The second is that substance is a determinate particular thing, for the other genera do not signify a particular thing.

1292. Now these two characteristics—being separable and being a particular thing—do not fit matter; for matter cannot exist by itself without a form by means of which it is an actual being, since of itself it is only potential. And it is a particular thing only by means of a form through which it becomes actual. Hence being a particular thing belongs chiefly to the composite.

1293. It is clear, then, “that the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, and “the thing composed of both,” namely, of matter and form, seem to be substance to a greater degree than matter, because the composite is both separable and a particular thing. But even though form is not separable and a particular thing, it nevertheless becomes an actual being by means of the composite itself; and therefore in this way it can be both separable and a particular thing.

1294. Yet that substance (574).

He shows how one must proceed to deal with the parts of this division of substance which has been followed, i.e., the division of substance into matter, form and composite. He says that even though both the form and the composite are substance to a greater degree than matter, still it is now necessary to dismiss the kind of substance which “is composed of both,” i.e., of matter and form; and there are two reasons for doing this.

1295. One reason is that it is subsequent to both in nature, namely, to matter and form, just as the composite is subsequent to the simple elements of which it is composed. Hence a knowledge of matter and form precedes a knowledge of the composite substance.

1296. The other reason is that this kind of substance “is open to view,” i.e., evident, since it is the object of sensory perception; and therefore it is not necessary to dwell on the knowledge of it. And even though matter is not subsequent but is in a sense prior, still in a sense it is evident. Hence he says “in a sense,” because it does not of itself have any traits by which it may be known, since the principle of knowing is form. But it is known by means of an analogy; for just as sensible substances of this kind are related to artificial forms, as wood is related to the form of a bench, so also is first matter related to sensible forms. Hence it is said in the Physics, Book I, that first matter is known by an analogy. It follows, then, that we must investigate the third kind of substance, namely, form, because this is the most perplexing.

1297. Now some admit (575).

Here he explains the method and order and way in which the parts of the third division of substance must be dealt with, in which substance is distinguished into those which are sensible and those which are not. In regard to this he does three things.

1298. First, he shows what has to be done at the very beginning with regard to sensible substances, because sensible substances of this kind are admitted by all; for all admit that some sensible things are substances. But not all admit that there are substances which are not sensible. Hence it is first necessary to consider sensible substances as better known.

1299. Since we have established (576).

Second, he shows what has to be established about sensible substances. He says that since substance has been divided above according to the different senses in which the term is used, of which one is the essence of a thing, i.e., its quiddity or essential structure, it is therefore first necessary to investigate this by showing what it is that constitutes the quiddities of sensible substances.

1300. For this is (577).

Third, he gives the reason for the order of treatment mentioned above. He says that we must speak first of the essences of sensible substances, because this is “a preparatory task,” i.e., a work preparatory to and necessary for our undertaking, inasmuch as we pass from sensible substances, which are more evident to us, to what “is more knowable in an unqualified sense and by nature,” i.e., to intelligible substances, in which we are chiefly interested. For knowledge is acquired in all matters, or by all men, by proceeding from those things which are less knowable by nature to those which are more knowable by nature.

1301. For since all learning proceeds from those things which are more knowable to the learner, who must have some prior knowledge in order to learn, we must proceed to learn by passing from those things which are more knowable to us, which are often less knowable by nature, to those which are more knowable by nature but less knowable to us.

1302. For with regard to the knowledge of those things which begins from the senses, it is those things which are closer to the senses that are more knowable. But those things are more knowable by nature which by reason of their own nature are capable of being known. Now these are the things which are more actual and are beings to a greater degree. And these lie outside the scope of sensation. But sensible forms are forms in matter.

1303. In matters of learning, then, it is necessary to proceed from things which are less knowable by nature to those which are more knowable. “And one’s task is” the same here, i.e., it is necessary to act in the same way here, “as in practical matters,” i.e., in the arts ‘ and active potencies, in which we go “from things which are good for each individual,” i.e., from things which are good for this person and for that person, so as to reach those things which “are” totally good, or universally good, and therefore good for each individual. For the military art attains the victory of the whole army, which is a certain common good, from the victories of this and of that particular man. And similarly the art of building by combining particular stones succeeds in constructing a whole house. And so too in speculative matters we must proceed from those things which are more knowable to oneself, namely, to the one learning, in order to reach those which are knowable by nature, which also finally become known to the one learning.

1304. Now this does not occur because the things which are more knowable to this person or to that person are more knowable in an unqualified sense; for those things which are “knowable to individual men,” i.e., to this or to that particular man, and are first in the process of knowing, are often only slightly knowable by nature. This happens because they have little or nothing of being; for a thing is knowable to the extent that it has being. For example, it is evident that accidents, motions and privations have little or nothing of being, yet they are more knowable to us than the substances of things; for they are closer to the senses, since of themselves they fall under sensory perception as proper or common sensibles. But substantial forms do so only accidentally.

1305. And he says “often” because sometimes the same things are more knowable both to us and by nature, for example, the objects of mathematics, which abstract from sensible matter. Hence in such cases one always proceeds from things which are more knowable by nature, because the same things are more knowable to us. And while those things which are more knowable to us are only slightly knowable by nature, still from things of the kind which are only slightly knowable by nature (although they are more knowable to the one learning), one must attempt to know the things which are “wholly,” i.e., universally and perfectly, knowable, by advancing to a knowledge of such things by way of those which are only slightly knowable by nature, as has already been explained.

LESSON 3

What Essence is. The Things to Which It Belongs

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578. And first let us make some dialectical comments about the essence of a thing, because the essence of each thing is what each is said to be essentially (per se). For being you is not being musical, because you are not musical essentially. Therefore your essence is what you are said to be essentially.

579. But not even all of this is the essence of a thing; for the essence of a thing is not what is predicated of it essentially in the way that white is predicated of surface, because being a surface is not being white. Nor is the essence of a thing the composite of the two, namely, being a white surface. Why? Because white inheres in surface. Therefore the concept (or formula) which expresses what each thing is but does not contain the thing itself is the concept of its essence. Hence, if being a white surface is always being a smooth surface, then being white and being smooth will be one and the same thing.

580. Now since there are also composites in the case of the other categories, for there is some subject of each, for example, of quantity, quality, when, where and motion, it is therefore necessary to inquire whether there is a concept of the essence of each one of them, and whether this essence is found in them, for example, whether the essence of white

man is found in white man. Now let the name of this composite be garment. What is the essence of garment?

581. But neither is this one of those terms which are predicated essentially. Now there are two ways in which a term can be predicated in a non-essential way of a subject: one of these is by addition, and the other is not. For in one case the term is predicated of the thing defined because the term is added to something else. For example, if in defining white one might give the concept of white man. And in the other case it is so predicated because some other term is added to the subject; for example, if the word garment were to signify white man, and someone were to define a garment as white, then a white man would be something white, yet his essence does not consist in being white, but in being a garment. Therefore the essence is what a thing of a definite sort is, whether it expresses that thing wholly or not. Now a thing’s essence is what a thing is. But when something is predicated of another this is not some definite thing; for example, white man is not really a definite thing, i.e., if being a definite thing belongs to substances alone. Hence essence belongs to those things whose concept is a definition. Now there is not a definition if the name signifies the same thing as the concept; for then all concepts would be limiting terms, because the name of any concept would be the same. Hence even the Iliad will be a definition. But there is a definition if the concept is of some primary thing. And such things are those which are predicated without predicating something else of the subject. Thus essence will not be found in any of those things which are not species of a genus, but in these alone; for it seems that these things arc not predicated according to participation and affection, or as an accident. But of each of the other things, if it has a name, there will be a concept of what it means, namely, that this accident inheres in this subject; or in place of a simple term one will be able to give a more definite one; but there will be no definition or essence.

COMMENTARY

1306. Having settled the issue about the order to be followed in treating of substances, the Philosopher now begins to settle the issue about sensible substances, as he had said he would; and this is divided into two parts. In the first part (578:C 1308) he settles the issue about the essence of sensible substances, by using dialectical and common arguments; and in the second (691:C 101), by considering the principles of sensible substances. He does this in Book VIII ("It is necessary, then").

The first part is divided into two members. In the first he indicates the kind of essence which sensible substances have. In the second (682:C 1648) he shows that this kind of essence has the role of a principle and cause ("But let us state").

The first part is divided into two. In the first he settles the issue about the essences of sensible substances. In the second (650:C 1566) he shows that universals are not the substances of sensible things, as some said ("But since our investigation").

1307. The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows what kind of substances sensible things have. In the second (622:C 1460) he shows what parts constitute their substance ("But since the definition").

The first part is divided into two. In the first he investigates the kind of essence which sensible substances have. In the second (598:C 1381) he inquires into the causes of their generation ("Now of those things").

The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows what constitutes the essence of sensible substances; and in the second (588:C 1356) he shows how essence is related to sensible substances, i.e., whether it is the same as these substances or different ("Moreover, it is necessary").

The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows what essence is. In the second (580:C 1315) he indicates to what things it belongs ("Now since there are").

In regard to the first he does two things. First (578), he dismisses from the essence of a thing any term that is predicated accidentally; and second (579:C 1311), any term that is predicated essentially (per se) in the way that properties are predicated of a subject ("But not even all").

1308. He says, first (578), then, that it is first necessary to speak of sensible substances and to show what their essence is. Therefore, let us first make some dialectical comments about the essence of a thing; for this science has a connection with dialectics, as was stated above (311:C 574), because both are universal. Hence the dialectical method is proper to this science, and it is fitting that it should begin with the dialectical method. But he says that he is going to treat of essence in a way that is chiefly dialectical inasmuch as [in so doing] he investigates what essence is from the manner of predicating terms of a subject; for this belongs properly to dialectics.

1309. Regarding essence it should first of all be borne in mind that it must be predicated of a thing essentially; for those things which are predicated of a thing accidentally do not belong to its essence. For by the essence of a thing we mean the proper answer which can be given to the question asking what it is. And when we ask what a thing is we cannot give a proper answer by mentioning attributes which belong to it accidentally; for when someone asks what man is, one cannot answer that he is white or sitting or musical. Hence none of those attributes which are predicated of a thing accidentally belong to its essence; for being you is not being musical.

1310. Now throughout the whole of the following discussion it must be noted that by the phrase to be this or being this he understands the essence of a thing; for example, by to be man or being man he understands what pertains to the essence of man. Now the whatness of "being musical," i.e., the very essence of musical, has nothing to do with your whatness. For if one were to ask what you are, one could not answer that you are musical. Hence it follows that being you is not being musical, because those things which pertain to the quiddity of music are extrinsic to your quiddity, although musical may be predicated of you. And this is so because "you are not musical essentially," since musical is not predicated of you essentially but accidentally. Therefore what you are "essentially" pertains to your whatness, because it is predicated of you essentially and not accidentally; for example, man, animal, substance, rational, sensible, and other attributes of this kind, all of which belong to your whatness, are predicated of you essentially.

1311. But not even (579).

He excludes from the quiddity of a thing any attribute that is predicated essentially as properties are predicated of subjects. He says that not even everything that is predicated essentially of a thing belongs to its essence. For a property is predicated essentially of its proper subject as color is predicated of surface. Yet the essence of a thing is not something that is found in a thing essentially in the way that white is found in surface; because "being a surface" is not "being white"; i.e., the quiddity of surface is not that of whiteness; for the quiddity of surface differs from that of whiteness.

1312. And not only is being white not the quiddity of surface, but neither is the combination of the two, namely, of surface and whiteness, i.e., to be a white surface, or being a white surface. For the quiddity or essence of white surface is not the quiddity or essence of surface. And if we were asked why, we could answer, “Because white inheres in surface,” i.e., because when I say “white surface” I mean something which adheres to surface as extrinsic to its essence and not as intrinsic to its essence. Hence this whole which is white surface is not identical with the essence of surface.

1313. Now properties are predicated of their proper subjects in this way because their proper subjects are given in their definitions, as nose is given in the definition of snub and number in the definition of equal. And certain attributes are predicated essentially in such a way that subjects are not included in their definitions, as animal is predicated essentially of man, but man is not included in the definition of animal. Therefore since those attributes which are predicated accidentally do not belong to a thing’s quiddity, and neither do those which are predicated essentially in whose definitions subjects are given, it follows that those attributes belong to a thing’s quiddity in whose definitions subjects are not given. Hence he draws his conclusion, saying that the concept “which expresses what each thing is,” i.e., which describes the predicate, “but does not contain the thing itself,” i.e., the subject, will be the concept of the essence in each particular thing. Hence animal belongs to the essence of man.

1314. By a reduction to absurdity he proves that those things which are predicated essentially of a thing as a property is predicated of a subject, do not pertain to the whatness of a thing. For many different properties may be predicated essentially of the same subject, as the properties colored, rough and smooth, which are proper attributes of surface, are predicated essentially of a subject. And it is for the same reason that all predicates of this kind pertain to the quiddity of their subject. Therefore if whiteness pertains to the quiddity of surface, so also for a like reason will smoothness; for things identical with some third thing are identical with each other. “Hence, if being a white surface is always being a smooth surface,” i.e., if it is true always and universally that the quiddity of a property is the same as that of its proper subject, it follows that being white and being smooth will be “one and the same thing,” i.e., the quiddity of whiteness and that of smoothness will be one and the same. But this is obviously false. Therefore it follows that the essence of a property and that of its subject are not one and the same thing.

1315. Now since there are (580).

He inquires to what things essence belongs. First, he raises the question; and second (581:C 1318) he answers it ("But neither").

He accordingly says, first (580), that there are certain composites in the case of the other categories and not merely in that of substance. He says this because he is investigating the quiddity of sensible substances, which are composite. For just as composite sensible substances have matter, which is the subject of substantial forms, so also do the other categories have their own subject. For there is some subject of each of them, namely, of quality, quantity, when, where, and also of motion, in which are included both action and being acted upon. Hence just as fire is a composite of matter and substantial form, in a similar way there is a kind of composition of substance and accidents.

1316. Therefore, since there is a definition of substances which are composed of matters and forms, we must also inquire whether there is "a concept of the essence" of all those things which are composites of accidents and subjects, i.e., whether they have a definition which is a concept signifying their essence; and also whether "this essence," which the definition signifies, is intrinsic to them, i.e., whether they have a quiddity or something that can answer the question "What?" For example, white man is a composite of subject and accident. The question, then, is whether there is an essence of white man as such.

1317. And since someone might perhaps say that white man is two things and not one, he therefore adds that white man might have one name, say, garment. The question about this one thing, then, i.e., garment, will be whether it has any whatness, so that we can ask, "What is the essence of a garment?" For then just as this word man signifies some composite, namely, rational animal, in like manner the word garment signifies some composite, namely, white man. And thus just as man has a definition, in a similar way it seems that garment can have a definition.

1318. But neither is this (581).

Here he answers the preceding question; and this part is divided twofoldly inasmuch as he gives two solutions. The second part (582:C 1331) begins where he says, "Or another solution."

He says, first (581), then, that white man, or garment, which is supposed to stand for “white man,” is not one of those terms which are predicated essentially, but is rather one of those which are predicated accidentally; for the quiddity “white man” is one thing accidentally and not essentially, as was stated above (C 1313-14).

1319. Now there are two ways in which a thing is said to be one accidentally or non-essentially: first, in the sense that we say “Man is white,” and second, in the sense that we say “This white thing is man”; because one of these is defined by addition, whereas the other is not. For in the definition of man it is not necessary to include the definition of white or the word white, but in the definition of white it is necessary to include man, or the word man, or his definition, provided that man is the proper subject of white, or whatever its proper subject happens to be.

1320. Now in order to explain this he adds that when one thing is predicated of another in a non-essential way, it is added to the other, because an accident is added to the subject given in the definition of that accident when it is defined; for example, if someone were to define white thing, he would have to express the concept white man, because in the definition of an accident it is necessary to include its subject. And then the definition includes white man; and thus it will be, as it were, the concept of white man and not the concept of white alone. This must be understood to be the case, as has already been said, if man is the proper and essential subject of white. But the one is added to the other accidentally, not because it is added to the definition of the other, but because the other is added to it in its own definition, as white is added to man accidentally, not because it is placed in the definition of man, but because man is placed in the definition of white. Hence, if by supposition the word garment signifies white man, then anyone who defines garment must define it in the same way that white is defined; for just as man and white must be given in the definition of garment, so also must each be given in the definition of white.

1321. It is clear, then, from what has been said, that white is predicated of man; for this proposition “A white man is white” is true, and vice versa. Yet the essence of white man is not that of white; and neither is the essence of garment, which signifies the composite white man, as has been stated. Thus it is evident that the essence of white and that of white man, or “garment,” cannot be the same, by reason of the fact that, if white is also predicated of white man, it is still not its whatness.

1322. It is also evident that, if white has an essence and definition, it does not have a different one from that which belongs to white man; for since a subject is included in the definition of an accident, white must be defined in the same way that white man is, as has been stated. This is made clear as follows: white does not have a quiddity but only the thing of which it is predicated, man or white man. And this is what he means when he says: “Therefore the essence is what a thing of a definite sort is, whether it expresses that thing wholly or not”; i.e., from what has already been said it follows that essence belongs only to some definite thing, whether it expresses “that thing wholly,” i.e., the composite, as white man, or not, as man. But white does not signify that it is sonic definite thing, but that it is of some sort.

1323. The fact that essence belongs only to some definite thing is shown as follows: the essence of a thing is what that thing is; for to have an essence means to be some definite thing. Hence those things which do not signify some definite thing do not have an essence. But when something is predicated of another as an accident is predicated of a subject, this is not some definite thing. For example, when I say “Man is white” I do not signify that it is some definite thing, but that it is of some special sort. For to be some definite thing belongs to substances alone. Hence it is clear that whiteness and the like cannot have an essence.

1324. But because someone might say that there are concepts of words signifying accidents as well as concepts of words signifying substance, he therefore concludes that essence does not belong to all things which have any kind of concept at all that explains their name, but only to those whose concept is a definition.

1325. Now the concept of a thing is not definitive if it is merely a concept of the sort which signifies the same thing as a name, as one bearing arms signifies the same thing as arms-bearer, because it would then follow that all concepts are “limiting terms,” i.e., definitions. For a name can be given to any concept (for example, a name can be given to the concept walking man or writing man), yet it does not follow for this reason that these are definitions, because according to this it would follow that “even the Iliad,” i.e., the poem written about the Trojan war, would be one definition; for that whole poem is a single account depicting the Trojan war. It is clear, then, that not every concept signifying the same thing as a name is a definition of it, but only if the concept “is of some primary thing,” i.e., if it signifies something that is predicated essentially. For that which is predicated essentially is first in the order of predication.

1326. But such things, i.e., primary ones, are all those which are predicated essentially, and such things do not involve predicating one thing of another; for example, white is not predicated essentially of man as though what white is and what man is are the same; but they are predicated of each other accidentally. For animal is predicated of man essentially, and in a similar way rational is predicated of animal. Hence the expression rational animal is the definition of man.

1327. Thus it is clear that essence will not be found in any of those things which are not classed among the species of some genus, but “in these alone,” i.e., in the species alone. For species alone may be defined, since every definition is composed of genus and difference. But that which is contained under a genus and is constituted of differences is a species, and therefore definition pertains only to species. For species alone seem not to be predicated according to participation and affection or as an accident.

1328. In this statement he rejects three things which seem to make it impossible for anything to be defined by a genus. For, in the first place, those things of which a genus is predicated by participation cannot be defined by means of that genus, unless it belongs to the essence of the thing defined; for example, a fiery iron, of which fire is predicated by participation, is not defined by fire as its genus, because iron by its very essence is not fire but only participates to some degree in fire. However, a genus is not predicated of its species by participation but essentially; for man is an animal essentially and not merely something participating in animal, because man is truly an animal. Moreover, subjects are predicated of their properties, as nose is predicated of snub, yet the essence of nose is not the essence of snub; for species are not related to a genus as a property of that genus, but as something essentially the same as that genus. And white can be predicated of man accidentally, but the essence of man is not the essence of white, as the essence of a genus is the essence of its species. Hence it seems that only the concept of the species, which is constituted of genus and difference, is a definition.

1329. But if a name is given to other things, there can be a concept expressing what that name signifies, and this may occur in two ways. First, this occurs when a name that is less meaningful is explained by one that is more meaningful and is predicated of it, for example, when the name philosophy is explained by the name wisdom. And this is the meaning of his statement that “this accident inheres in this subject,” namely, that sometimes the concept explaining the name is taken from a more meaningful term which is predicated of it.

1330. And, second, this occurs when a more meaningful phrase is used to explain a simple term; for example, a when the phrase lover of wisdom is taken to explain the term philosopher. And this is what he means when he says “or in place of a simple term,” as if in order to explain a simple term one might take “a more definite one.” Yet such a concept will not be a definition, nor will the thing signified by it be an essence.

LESSON 4

The Analogous Character of Definition. Its Applicability to Accidents

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582. Or another solution is that definition, like the whatness of a thing, is used in many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies the substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies any of the categories, such as quantity, quality, and others such as these. For just as being is found in all things, although not in the same way, but in one thing primarily and in the others secondarily, so too whatness is found in an unqualified sense in substance, but in another sense in the other categories. For we might even speak of the whatness of quality, so that quality is also one of those things which have whatness; not in an unqualified sense, however, but just as some say, in a logical sense, that non-being is, not in an unqualified sense, but insofar as it is nonbeing; and this is also the case with quality.

583. Therefore it is also necessary to consider how we must predicate it of each particular thing, yet not more than the condition of each warrants. Hence, too, since what is said is evident, essence (or whatness) will also be found in like manner primarily and unqualifiedly in substance, and then in the other categories, not as essence in an unqualified sense, but as the essence of quality and quantity. For these things must be said to be beings either equivocally or by adding or removing something, just as it is said that the unknowable is known. For the truth of the matter is that this word is

used neither equivocally nor according to the same meaning, but just as the word medical is used in reference to one and the same thing, although not according to one and the same meaning or equivocally; for a body and an operation and an instrument are called medical neither equivocally nor according to one meaning, but in reference to one thing. It makes no difference, then, as to the way in which one wishes to express this.

584. Now it is evident that definition and essence in the primary and unqualified sense belong to substances. And they belong not only to these but also to other things as well, although not in the primary sense. For if we maintain this, it is not necessary that there be a definition of any word which means the same thing as any concept, but it must mean the same thing as any determinate concept. And this will be the case if it is the concept of some one thing, not because it is continuous, like the Iliad, or one of the things which are one by being linked together, but if it is one according to one of the many meanings of that term. But the word one is used in the same number of senses as being is; and in one sense being signifies a particular thing, and in another, quantity, and in another (Itiality. And for this reason there will be a definition and concept of white man, but in a different sense from that of whiteness and of substance.

Chapter 5

585. Now if one denies that a concept which involves the addition of something else is a definition, the problem arises how there can be a definition of things which are not simple but compound; for this must come about by way of addition. I mean, for example, that there is nose and concavity and snubness, which is a word compounded of the two, because the one is found in the other; and neither concavity nor snubness is an accidental attribute of nose, but an essential one. Nor do they belong to nose as white belongs to Callias or to man (because Callias, who happens to be a man, is white), but as male belongs to animal and equal to quantity, and as all those attributes which are said to belong to something else essentially. Now these attributes are those in which is found either the concept or name of the subject to which each one belongs, and which cannot be explained apart from it; for example, it is impossible to explain white apart from man, but not female apart from animal. Hence there is either no essence and definition of any of these things,,or if there is, it is in the way we have described (582-84).

586. And there is also a second difficulty about them. For if snub nose and concave nose are the same, snub and concave will be the same; but if they are not, then, since it is impossible to use the word snub without the thing of which it is a proper attribute (because snub is concavity in a nose), either it is impossible to speak of a snub nose, or the same term is used twice-a concave nose nose. For a snub nose will be a concave nose nose. Hence it is absurd that such things should have an essence. And if they have, there will be an infinite regression; because some other nose will be found in the nose of snub-nose. It is clear, then, that there is definition of substance alone; for if the other categories also had a definition, this would have to be a result of adding something, just as there is no definition of equal and odd without number or of female without animal. And by "adding something" I mean those expressions in which the same thing happens to be said twice. And if this is true, there will not be any definition of those things which are compounded, for example, odd number.

587. But this is hidden from us, because the concepts of these things are not expressed exactly. But if these things also have formulae, either they have such in a different way-or, as we have said (582-84), definition and essence must be used in many senses. Hence in one sense there will be no definition of anything, and definition and essence will be found only in substance; and in another sense the other things will have a definition and essence. It is evident, then, that a definition is a concept of the essence of a thing, and that essence belongs to substances either alone, or chiefly, primarily, and without qualification.

COMMENTARY

1331. Here he gives the second solution to the question which was raised; and in regard to this he does three things. First (582:C 1331), he gives the solution. Second (584:C 1339), he proves it ("Now it is evident"). Third (585:C 1342), he dispels certain difficulties which could arise from the previous discussion ("Now if one denies").

He accordingly says, first (582), that it is necessary to say, as was stated in the foregoing solution (581:C 1325) that there is no definition and whatness of accidents but only of substances; or according to another solution it is necessary to say that the terms definition and whatness are used in many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies each of the other categories, such as quantity, quality and the like. Moreover, just as being is said to belong to all the other categories, although not in the same way, but primarily to substance and secondarily to the others, similar fashion whatness belongs in an unqualified sense to substance, "but in another sense to the other categories," i.e., in a qualified sense.

1332. For the fact that it belongs to the others "in another sense," i.e., in a qualified sense, is clear from the fact that in each of the other categories some reply may be made to the question "What is it?" For we ask of what sort a thing is, or what its quality is, as "What is whiteness?" And we answer, "Color." Hence it is evident that quality is one of the many things in which whatness is found.

1333. However, quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense but the whatness of quality. For when I ask what man is, and one answers ' "Animal," the term animal, since it belongs in the genus of substance, not only designates what man is, but also designates a what, i.e., a substance, in an unqualified sense. But when one asks what whiteness is, and someone answers, "Color," this word, even though it signifies what whiteness is, (foes not signify what something is in an unqualified sense, but of what sort it is. Hence quality (foes not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but with some qualification. For this kind of whatness is found in quality, as when we say that color is the whatness of whiteness; and this kind of whatness is substantial rather than substance.

1334. For by reason of the fact that all the other categories get the notion of being from substance, the mode of being of substance, i.e., being a what, is therefore participated in by all the other categories according to a certain proportional likeness; for example, we say that, just as animal is the whatness of man, in a similar fashion color is the whatness of whiteness, and number the whatness of double; and in this way we say that quality has whatness, not whatness in an unqualified sense, but a whatness of this particular kind; just as some say, for example, in speaking of non-being from a logical point of view, that non-being is, not because non-being is in an unqualified sense, but because non-being is non-being. And in a similar way quality does not have whatness in an unqualified sense, but the whatness of quality.

1335. Therefore it is also (583).

He now shows that whatness and definition are predicated of the nature found in substance and in accidents. He says that, since definition and whatness are found in some way both in substance and in accidents, therefore one must try to consider how we should "predicate it," i.e., predicate the definition, of each thing, yet no more than its condition warrants; so that, namely, we do not say that those predicates are applied univocally which do not have one essential character in reality.

1336. And for this reason the things which have been said about definition and whatness in regard to substance and accidents is clear, namely, that whatness will belong primarily and unqualifiedly to substance, and secondarily to the other categories, not, of course, so as to be whatness in an unqualified sense, but the whatness of this or that particular category, namely, of quantity or quality. For it is evident that definition and whatness must be predicated of substance and accidents either equivocally or by adding or removing something to a greater or lesser degree; or in a primary or secondary way, as being is predicated of substance and accident, and as we say that "the unknowable is known" in a qualified sense, i.e., secondarily, because so far as the unknowable is concerned we can know that it is not an object of knowledge; and thus we can also say of non-being that it is not.

1337. For the truth is that whatness and definition are not predicated of substance and accidents either equivocally or unqualifiedly and according to the same meaning, i.e., univocally, but as the term medical is predicated of different particulars in reference to one and the same thing, although it does not signify one and the same thing in the case of all the things of which it is predicated; nor is it also predicated equivocally. For, a body is said to be medical because it is the subject of the art of medicine, and an activity is said to be medical because it is performed by the art of medicine, as purging; and an instrument, such as a syringe, is said to be medical because it is used by the art of medicine. Thus it is clear that the term medical is not used in a purely equivocal sense of these three things, since equivocal things have no relationship to some one thing. Nor again it is used univocally according to the same meaning, for the term medical is not predicated in the same sense of one who uses the art of medicine and of something that assists the art of medicine to produce its effect, but it is predicated analogically in reference to one thing, namely, to the art of medicine. And similarly whatness and definition are not predicated of substance and accident either equivocally or univocally, but in reference to one thing. For they are predicated of an accident in relation to substance, as has been explained.

1338. And since he had given two solutions, he adds that it makes no difference as to the way in which one wishes to answer the above question, i.e., whether one says that accidents do not have a definition, or that they have one in a secondary and qualified sense. However, the statement made in the first solution, to the effect that accidents do not have a definition, is to be understood in a primary and unqualified sense.

1339. Now it is evident (584).

Second he proves the solution which was given. He says that it is evident that definition and essence belong primarily and unqualifiedly to substances, yet not to substances alone since in a sense accidents also have a definition and essence, though not in the first way. This is made clear as follows: not every concept by which a word is explained is the same as a definition, nor is the word explained by each concept always something defined; but it is proper that there should be a definition of any determinate concept, namely, of one that signifies one thing. For if I say that Socrates is white and musical and curly-headed , this concept does not signify one thing, except perhaps accidentally, but signifies many; and therefore such a concept is not a definition.

1340. However, it is not enough that the thing signified by a concept should be one thing from the viewpoint of continuity in order that there may be a definition of it; for then the “Iliad,” i.e., the poem about the Trojan war, would be a definition, because that war was waged over a continuous period of time. Nor again is it enough that the thing should be one by connection; for example, if I were to say that a house is stones and mortar and wood, this concept would not be a definition of a house. But a concept that signifies one thing will be a definition if it signifies in some one of those senses in which the term one is predicated essentially; for the term one is used in as many senses as being is. And in one sense being signifies this particular thing, and in another, quantity, and in another, quality, and so on for the other categories. Yet it is predicated primarily of substance and secondarily of the other categories. Therefore the term one in an unqualified sense will apply primarily to substance and secondarily to the other categories.

1341. If, then, it is characteristic of the notion of definition that it should signify one thing, it follows that there will be a definition of white man, because white man is in a sense one thing. But the concept of white will be a definition in a different sense than the concept of substance, because the concept of substance will be a definition in a primary sense, and the concept of white will be a definition in a secondary sense, just as the term one is predicated of each in a primary and in a secondary sense.

1342. Now if one denies (585).

He clears up some of the difficulties pertaining to the point established above; and this is divided into two parts corresponding to the two difficulties which he removes. The second (586:C 1347) begins where he says "And there is also."

Now there are two things which have to be noted first of all in order to make the first part of this division evident. The first is that some said that no definition comes about "by way of addition," i.e., no definition contains anything extrinsic to the essence of the thing defined. And they seemed to have in mind the fact that the definition signifies the essence of a thing. Hence it would seem that whatever is extrinsic to the essence of a thing should not be given in its definition.

1343. The second thing which has to be noted is that some accidents are simple and some compound. Those are said to be simple which have no determinate subject included in their definition, for example, curved and concave and other mathematical entities; and those are said to be compound which have a determinate subject without which they cannot be defined.

1344. Hence a problem arises if someone wants to say that a concept which is formed by addition is not a definition of those accidents which are simple, but of those which are compound; for it seems that none of these can have a definition. It is clear, then, that if compound accidents are defined, their definition must be formed by addition, since they cannot be defined without their proper subject. For example, if we take the following three things: nose, concavity, and snubness, then concavity is an accident in an unqualified sense, especially in relation to nose, since nose is not contained in the concept of concavity. And snubness is a compound accident, since nose is a part of its concept. Thus snubness will be an expression of both inasmuch as it signifies that “the one is found in the other,” i.e., a definite accident in a definite subject, and neither concavity nor snubness is an attribute of nose in an accidental way, as white belongs accidentally to Callias and to man, inasmuch as Callias, who happens to be a man, is white. But snubness is an essential quality of nose, for it is proper to nose as such to be snub. Another translation has aquiline in place of concave, and its meaning is more evident, because nose is given in the definition of aquiline just as it is in the definition of snub. Concavity or snubness, then, belongs to nose essentially, just as male belongs to animal essentially, and equality to quantity, and all other things which are said to be present essentially in something else, because the concept of all is the same; and “these attributes are those in which,” i.e., in the concepts of which, there is found either the name of the thing “to which this attribute belongs,” namely, substance, or its concept. For in definitions the concept can always be given in place of the name; for example, when we say that man is a mortal rational animal, the definition can be given in place of the term animal, just as it may be said that man is a mortal rational sensory animated substance. And similarly if I say that a male is an animal capable of generating in another, I can also say that a male is a sensory animated substance capable of generating in another.

1345. Thus it is clearly impossible “to explain” this, i.e., to convey knowledge of, one of the accidents mentioned above which we called compound, apart from its subject, as it is possible to convey knowledge of whiteness without giving man in its definition or concept. But it is not possible to convey knowledge of female without mentioning animal, because animal must be given in the definition of female just as it must be given in the definition of male. Hence it is evident that none of the compound accidents mentioned above have a whatness and real definition if there is no definition by way of addition, as happens in the definitions of substances.

1346. Or if they have some kind of definition, since they can be defined only by way of addition, they will have a definition in a different way than substances do, as we said in the second solution. Hence in this conclusion he states the solution to the foregoing difficulty; for the statement which he made there, namely, that there is no definition by way of addition, is true of definition insofar as it applies to substances. Hence the accidents mentioned above do not have a definition in this way but differently, i.e., in a secondary sense.

1347. And there is (586).

Here he states the second difficulty; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he raises the difficulty; and second (587:C 1350, he gives its solution ("But this is hidden").

He accordingly says, first (586), that there is another problem concerning the points discussed above. For to say "snub nose" and "concave nose" is either to say the same thing or not. If it is the same, it follows that snub and concave are the same; but this is clearly false since the definition of each is different.

1348. But if to say snub nose and concave nose is not to say the same thing, because snub cannot be understood "without the thing of which it is a proper attribute," i.e., without nose, since snubness is concavity in a nose (although concave can be spoken of without nose being involved), and if what I call snub involves more than concave, then it follows that this thing which I call nose either cannot be called a snub nose, or if it is called such, the word will be used twice, namely, inasmuch as we might say that a snub nose is "a concave nose nose"; for the definition of a word can always be given in place of that word. Hence when the word snub nose is used, the word snub can be removed and the definition of snub, which is a concave nose, can be added to the definition of nose. Thus it would seem that to speak of a snub nose is merely to speak of a concave nose nose, which is absurd. And for this reason it would seem absurd to say that such accidents have an essence.

1349. For if it is not true that they do not have an essence, the same word may be repeated an infinite number of times when the definition of the word is put in place of that word. For it is obvious that, when I say "concave nose," the word snub can be understood in place of concave, because snubness is merely concavity in a nose; and the term concave nose can also be understood in place of snub; and so on to infinity.

1350. Hence it would seem to be evident that only substance has a definition; for if the other categories also had a definition, this would have to be a result of adding something to their subject, as the definition of equal and that of odd must be derived from the definition of their subjects. For there is no definition of odd without number, or of female, which signifies a certain quality of animal, without animal. Therefore if some things are defined by way of addition, it follows that the same words may be used twice, as was shown in the example given above. Hence if it is true that this absurd conclusion would result, it follows that compound accidents do not have a definition.

1351. But this is hidden (587).

He solves the problem raised above. He says that anyone who raises the above question is ignorant of the fact that these concepts are not expressed exactly, i.e., with exactness, as those which are used univocally, but are employed in a primary and secondary way, as was stated above (582:C 1331). But if the compound accidents mentioned above have a formula, or conceptual expression, they must have such in a different way than definitions do, or definition and essence, which is signified by definition, must be used in different senses.

1352. Hence "in one sense," i.e., primarily and without qualification, only substance will have a definition, and only substance will have an essence. "And in another sense," i.e., secondarily and with some qualification, the other categories will also have a definition,

For substance, which has a quiddity in the absolute sense, does not depend on something else so far as its quiddity is concerned. An accident depends on its subject, however, although a subject does not belong to the essence of its accident (in much the same way as a creature depends on the creator, yet the creator does not belong to the essence of the creature), so that an extrinsic essence must be placed in its definition. In fact, accidents have being only by reason of the fact that they

inhere in a subject, and therefore their quiddity depends on their subject. Hence a subject must be given in the definition of an accident at one time directly and at another, indirectly.

1353. Now a subject is given directly in the definition of an accident when an accident is signified concretely as an accident fused with a subject, as when I say that snubness is a concave nose; for nose is given in the definition of snub as a genus in order to signify that accidents subsist only in a subject. But when an accident is signified in the abstract, after the manner of a substance, then the subject is given in its definition indirectly, as a difference, as it is said that snubness is the concavity of a nose.

1354. Hence it is clear that when I say snub nose, it is not necessary to understand concave nose in place of nose; because nose is not included in the definition of snub as though it were part of its essence, but as something added to its essence. Hence snub and concave are essentially the same. But snub adds over and above concave a relation to a determinate subject; and thus in this determinate subject, nose, snub differs in no way from concave, nor is it necessary that any word should be put in place of snub except the word concave. Thus it will not be necessary to use concave nose in place of snub, but only concave.

1355. In bringing his discussion to a close he draws the conclusion which follows as obvious, namely, that a definition, which is the concept of a thing's essence and the essence itself, belongs to substances alone, just as the first solution maintained. Or substances are defined in a primary and unqualified sense, and accidents in a secondary and qualified sense, as has been stated in the second solution.

LESSON 5

The Relation of Essence to Thing in Essential and in Accidental Predication

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588. Moreover, it is necessary to inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different; for this is a kind of preamble to the inquiry about substance.

589. For each thing seems not to be different from its own substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.

590. Now in the case of accidental predications each thing would seem to be different from its essence, as a white man would seem to be different from the being of a white man. For if it were the same, then the being of a man and that of a white man would be the same; for a man and a white man are the same, as they say, and therefore the being of a white man is the same as that of a man. Or [perhaps] it is not necessary that all those things which are predicated accidentally should be the same. For the extreme terms of a syllogism do not become the same in an absolute sense. But perhaps it might seem to follow that extreme terms which are accidental become the same, as the being of white and the being of musical. However, this does not seem to be the case.

591. But in the case of essential predications a thing and its essence must always be the same. And this must be the case if there are substances which have no other substances or natures prior to them, such as some affirm the

Ideas to be. For if the being of the good differs from the good-itself, and the being of animal from animal-itself, and the being of being from being-itself, there will be certain substances and natures and Ideas in addition to those mentioned, and these will be prior to substance, if essence belongs to substance.

592. And if they are separated from each other, there will be no understanding of them, and they will not be beings. Now by separated is meant, if the being of the good is not present in the good-itself, and being good does not belong to this. For there is understanding of each thing by reason of the fact that its being is known; and the same thing applies to the good and to other things. Hence if the being of the good is not good, neither is the being of being being, nor the being of the one one. Now all essences are alike or none of them are. Hence if the essence of being is not being, neither will this be so in the case of other things. Furthermore, anything in which the being of the good is not found is not good.

593. It is necessary, then, that the good be one with the being of the good, and that the amicable be one with the being of the amicable, and the same is true of all those things which are not predicated of something else, but are predicated primarily and essentially. For it is enough if this is so, even if they are not separate Forms; and perhaps even more if they are. It is also evident at the same time that, if the Ideas are such as some claim their subject will not be substance; for the Ideas must be substances but not be predicable of a subject; for if they were, they would exist only by participation in it. It is clear from these arguments, then, that each thing is one and the same as its essence, but not in an accidental way; and that to know each of these things is to know its essence. Hence according to this exposition both must be one thing.

594. But it is not true to say that a term which is predicated accidentally, as musical or white, is the same as its essence, in view of its twofold meaning; for both the subject to which the accident belongs and the accident itself are white. Hence in a sense an accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they are not; for the essence of white is not the same as the essence of white man, but it is the same as the attribute white.

595. Now the absurdity will become apparent if a name is given to the essence of each one of these; for there will also be another essence besides the original essence; for example, besides the essence of horse there will be

another essence of horse. And what will prevent some things from already being the same as their essence, if the essence of a thing is its substance? Indeed, they are not only one, but their intelligible structure is also the same, as is clear from what has been said; for the unity of the essence of the one and the one is not accidental.

596. Again, if they are different, there will be an infinite regress; for the one will be the essence of the being of the one, but the other will be the one itself. Hence the same reasoning will apply in the case of other things. It is clear, then, that in the case of those predications which are primary and essential, each thing and its being are identical.

597. Moreover, it is evident that the sophistical arguments raised against this position, and the question whether Socrates and the being of Socrates are the same, are answered in the same way; for there is no difference either in the things from which one asks the question, or in those from which one solves it. Hence it has now been stated how the essence of each thing is the same as that thing, and how it is not.

COMMENTARY

1356. Having established what essence is, and to what things it belongs, the Philosopher next inquires how essence is related to the thing of which it is the essence, i.e., whether it is the same as that thing or different; and in regard to this he does three things. First (588:C 1356), he presents the problem. Second (589:C 1357), he gives its solution ("For each thing"). Third (597:C 1377,), he shows that the sophistical arguments which arise with regard to these matters can be met by using the above solution ("Moreover, it is evident").

He accordingly says, first (588), that it is necessary to inquire whether the essence of each thing and the thing of which it is the essence are the same or different, for example, whether the essence of a man and a man are the same or different; and it is the same in the case of other things. For to investigate this and make it evident is a "preamble to," i.e., a basic requirement for, "the inquiry about substance," which we intend to make in the following discussions. For it is his aim to investigate below whether universals are the substances of things, and whether the parts of things defined enter into their definition; and this inquiry which he now proposes to make is useful in solving that problem.

1357. For each thing (589).

Then he gives the solution to the problem which has been raised; and in regard to this he does three things. First (589), he gives the solution to this problem. Second (591:C 1362), he proves it ("But in the case"). Third (595:C 1373), he shows that the opposite of the solution given above is absurd and impossible ("Now the absurdity").

In regard to the first he does two things. First (589:C 1357), he indicates what seems to be true at first glance with regard to the proposed problem. Second (590:C 1358), he shows what follows from the contrary of this problem ("Now in the case").

He accordingly says, first (589), that it seems necessary at first glance, i.e., at once, to say that there is no case in which a particular thing differs from its own substance; and the reason is that the essence of a thing is the substance of the very thing of which it is the essence. Hence according to this argument it seems at first glance that the essence of a thing is the same as the thing itself and that one does not differ from the other.

1358. Now in the case (590).

Then he indicates the things to which the above premise does not apply. He says that insofar as the essence of a thing does not seem to differ from the thing of which it is the essence, since it is its substance, then in the case of accidental predications, which do not express the substance of their subject, the essence of the predicate seems to differ from the subject. For "the being of a white man," i.e., the essence of a white man, differs from a white man.

1359. This seems to be the case because, when someone says "white man," man is presupposed, for a man and a white man are the same, as they say. For if white had a different being than its subject, something might be predicated of the composite by means of the concept white, or it could be predicated of the composite because it was not opposed to the concept white. For whatever is predicated of a white man is so predicated only because it is predicated of a man; for an accident is a subject only by reason of a substance. Hence, insofar as man is understood in what is white, man and white are the same; and insofar as they are the same, then whatever constitutes the being of a white man will also constitute the being of a man.

Hence if the essence of a white man is the same as a white man, it will also be the same as a man. But it is not the same as a man; and thus the essence of a white man is not the same as a white man. Therefore in the case of those things which are accidental, the essence of a thing and the thing itself are not the same.

1360. Now it is evident that the essence of a white man is not the same as a man, because not everything that is predicated accidentally of a subject is necessarily the same as that subject. For a subject is in a sense a mean between two accidents which are predicated of it, inasmuch as these two accidents are one only because their subject is one; for example, white and musical are one because the man of whom they are predicated is one. Therefore man is a mean, and white and musical are extremes. Now if white were essentially the same as man, then by the same argument musical would also be the same as man. Thus the two extremes, white and musical, would be essentially the same, because two things that are identical with some other thing are themselves identical. But it is false that these two extreme terms are essentially the same, although perhaps it might seem to be true that they are accidentally the same. Now it is certain that white and musical are accidentally the same.

1361. But according to this someone might think that, just as the white and the musical are accidentally the same, in a similar fashion "the being of white" and "the being of musical," i.e., the essences of both, are accidentally the same. However, this does not seem to be true; for the white and the musical are accidentally the same because each is accidentally the same as a man. Now the being of white and the being of musical are not the same as the being of man. Hence the being of white and the being of musical are not accidentally the same, but only the white and the musical.

1362. But in the case (590).

Then he explains the proposed solution; and in regard to this he does two things. First (590, he explains the solution with reference to essential predications; and second (594:C 1372), with reference to accidental predications ("But it is not true").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains the proposed solution with reference to essential predications; and second (593:C 1367), he draws the conclusion at which he aims ("It is necessary").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that in the case of essential predications the essence of a thing does not differ from the thing of which it is the essence; and second (592:C 1363), that it is not separated from it ("And if").

He accordingly says, first (591), that in the case of essential predications the essence of a thing and the thing itself must always be the same. This becomes clear if one holds that there are substances which are separate from these sensible substances and have no other separated substances or natures prior to them; for the Platonists say that abstract ideas are substances of this kind. For if the essence of a thing differs from the thing itself, this will have to be true of all things which have an essence. Now every substance has an essence. Therefore the essence of every substance will differ from that substance. Hence the essence of an ideal substance will also differ from that substance. Thus "if the good itself," i.e., the Idea of good, differs from "the being of the good," i.e., from the essence of this Idea, and if animal-itself also differs from the being of an animal and if being-itself differs from the being of being, and so on in the case of the other Ideas, it follows that, just as there are held to be Ideas apart from sensible substances, in a similar fashion there will also be other substances and natures and Ideas apart from those mentioned by the Platonists. And these other substances will constitute the essence of these Ideas and will be prior to them. Now I say that this follows "if essence belongs to substance," i.e., if each substance has an essence, as has been stated; or [in other words] if this essence belongs to the substance of the thing; for that on which a substance depends is prior to it.

1363. And if (592).

He shows that the essence of a thing is not separated from the thing of which it is the essence. He says, "And if they are separated from each other," i.e., if the essence of a thing and the thing itself are not only different but also separated from each other, two absurdities follow. The first is that there will be no understanding of those things whose essence is separated from them; and the second is that these same things will not be beings.

1364. He also explains what he means by "separated," namely, that "the being of the good," i.e., the essence of the good, which the Platonists posit, "is not present in the good-itself," i.e., in the Idea of good; and again that "being good," i.e., the quiddity of good, is not present in this good; as if to say that the foregoing separation must be understood to mean the separation of the quiddity of the good both from the Idea of good and from a particular good, which is called such through participation in the Idea of good. Or according to another text, "And being good does not belong to this," i.e., this essence is not proper to the being of the good in such a way that the essence of the good may be separated from the good, and vice versa.

1365. It is evident that the untenable conclusions mentioned above follow from the position described, because the understanding of each thing consists in a knowledge of its essence; and this applies in like manner both to the good and to all other things. Hence it follows that, if good is not present in "the being of the good," i.e., its essence, neither is being present in "the being of being," i.e., the essence of being, nor similarly is unity present in the being of the one, because either all of them alike or none of them are the same as their quiddities. If, however, by reason of the above-mentioned separation good is not present in the being of the good, then in an opposite way neither is the being of the good present in the good. Hence, too, neither will the essence of being be the same as being, nor will any other things have within themselves a single whatness. Thus if each thing is understood by means of its whatness, it follows that nothing can be known. This was the first absurdity mentioned.

1366. It is also evident that "the second absurdity follows"—that nothing will be a being or a good or an animal or anything of this kind; because that cannot be good in which "the being of the good," i.e., the whatness of the good, is not present. Hence if the whatness of the good is separated from the good, and the whatness of being is separated from being, it follows that the things which are said to be good and to be beings are neither good nor beings. This was the second absurdity mentioned.

1367. It is necessary (593).

The Philosopher now draws the conclusion in which he is chiefly interested. He says that, since it follows, as a result of the difference and separation of essence from things, that things are not understood and are not beings, and this is absurd, "it is necessary that the amicable be one with the being of the amicable," or the whatness of the amicable, "and that the good be one with the being of the good," i.e., the quiddity of the good. He gives these two examples: the amicable, pertaining to particular goods, which the

Platonists said were good by participation; and the good, pertaining to the Idea of good. And it is similar in the case of all other predications which are essential and primary and which do not involve one thing being predicated of something else, i.e., accidental predications; for the latter type of predication is of a different nature, as has been stated (579:C 1313). For in order that things may both be understood and be beings, it is enough “if this is so,” i.e., if this is true, namely, that the quiddity of a thing is the same as the thing itself, even though the Ideal Forms which the Platonists posited do not exist.

1368. Now the Platonists claimed that there are separate Forms only for this reason, that certain knowledge of sensible things might be had by means of these Forms, inasmuch as sensible things would exist by participating in them. But perhaps it is sufficient for the foregoing position that the whatness of a thing should be the same as the thing itself rather than the Form, even if it is true that there are Forms, because the Forms exist apart from things. Moreover, a thing is understood and has being by means of something which is connected with it and is the same as itself, rather than by means of something which is separated from it.

1369. And from this consideration the Philosopher wants us to understand that separate Forms are destroyed. For if the Forms are held merely to account for our understanding of things and their being, and another position sufficiently accounts for this when it is held and the Platonic position is not, it follows that it is pointless to posit separate Forms.

1370. Similarly, the same point of the non-existence of separate Forms is evident from another consideration. If there are Ideas, it follows that the thing which is their subject, namely, this particular sensible thing, is not a substance. For the Platonists adopted the position that Ideas must be substances and so not belong to any subject; for it is proper for a substance not to inhere in a subject. But if the subjects hereabout, i.e., the sensible things about us, are substances, they must be such by participating in these separate Forms. Hence these Forms will inhere in a subject.

1371. From these arguments, then, it is evident that each thing and its whatness are one and the same in no accidental way; and similarly that in the act of understanding to know a particular thing is the same as to know its essence. “Hence according to this exposition” inasmuch as those things are said to be one which are one both from the viewpoint of being and that of being understood, it is necessary that both of these, i.e., a thing and its essence, should be one.

1372. But it is not true (594).

He explains the foregoing solution with reference to accidental predications. He says that in the case of accidental predications it is not true to say that the essence of a thing and the thing of which it is the essence are the same. This is so because of the twofold meaning of the term; for when a man is said to be white, something can be attributed to the subject either by reason of the subject or by reason of the accident. Hence if we were to say that the whatness of a white man is the same as a white man, two things could be meant: that it is either the same as a man or the same as white; for it can designate both the subject "to which the accident white belongs and the accident itself." Hence it is clear that in one sense the whatness of a white man is the same as a white man, and in another it is not. For it is not the same as a man or even the same as white man as regards the subject, but it is the same as "the attribute," i.e., white; for the essence of white and white itself are the same. However, it cannot be said that it is the same as a white man, lest it should be understood to be the same as the subject.

1373. Now the absurdity (595).

He shows that the opposite of the solution mentioned is absurd; and it was necessary to do this because he had proved that the solution given above is true when separate Forms are posited; which is a position that he afterwards destroyed. Hence he had to repeat his proof, showing that what he had proved about the Forms also applies to a thing's essence. In regard to this he gives two arguments.

1374. In the first of these arguments he says that to affirm that the essence of a thing and the thing itself are different will appear absurd if anyone gives a name to the essence of each of these; for by the same argument both the thing and its essence will then be different from its essence; for example, a horse is something having the essence of a horse. Now if this differs from a horse, this will have a different name, and let us call it A. Therefore, since A is a thing, it will have an essence different from itself, just as horse does. Thus this thing which constitutes the being of a horse will have a different essence. But this is clearly false. Now this argument proceeds in the same way with regard to the quiddity as the first argument did with regard to the Ideas. And if someone were to say that the essence of a horse is the substance itself, which is the quidditv of a horse, what will prevent us from saying right now at the very start that some things are their own essence? By this he implies the answer, “Nothing.”

1375. But it must be understood that a thing and its essence are one in every respect, even in their intelligible structure, as can be made clear from what has been said. For the one and the essence of the one are one not in an accidental way but essentially; and thus they are one in their intelligible structure.

1376. Again, if they are (596).

Then he gives the second argument, which runs as follows: if the essence of a thing and the thing itself are different, there will be an infinite regress; for we must say that there are two things, one of which is the one, and the other the essence of the one; and by the same argument there will be a third thing, which would be the essence of the essence of the one, and so on to infinity. Now since an infinite regress is impossible, it is evident that, in the case of predications which are primary and essential and not accidental, each thing and its being are one and the same.

1377. Moreover, it is evident (597).

He says that the sophistical arguments which are raised against this position in order to show that the essence of a thing and the thing itself are not the same, are clearly met by means of the same solution which was given to the first problem. For example, the Sophists ask if Socrates and the being of Socrates are the same, and they show that they are not by saying that, if Socrates and the being of Socrates are the same, and Socrates is white, it follows that white and the being of Socrates, and so on, are the same. Now the solution is clear from what has been said above. “For there is no difference either in the things from which one asks the question, or in those from which one solves it,” i.e., it makes no difference from what things one proceeds to argue, or to what questions one adapts the answer, inasmuch as the solution is basically the same. Hence from what has been said it is evident when the essence of each thing is the same as each thing and when it is not; for it is the same in the case of essential predications, but not in that of accidental ones.

Distinction between abstract and concrete essence

1378. In support of the statements which he has made it must also be noted that the whatness of a thing is what its definition signifies. Hence when a definition is predicated of the thing defined, the whatness of that thing must also be predicated of it. Therefore, (~) humanity, which is not predicated of man, is not the whatness of man, but (+) mortal rational animal is; for the word humanity does not answer the question, “What is man?” But mortal rational animal does.

Yet humanity is taken as the formal principle of the essence, just as animality is taken as (+) the principle of the genus and not as (~) the genus, and as rationality is taken as the (+) principle of the difference and not as (~) the difference.

1379. Now to this extent humanity is not absolutely the same as man, because it implies only the essential principles of man and excludes all accidents. For humanity is that by which man is man. But none of the accidents of a man is that whereby he is a man. Hence all accidents of man are excluded from the meaning of humanity.

Now it is the particular thing itself, namely, a man, which contains the essential principles and is that in which accidents can inhere. Hence although a man’s accidents are not contained in his intelligible expression, still man does not signify something apart from his accidents. Therefore man signifies as a whole and humanity as a part.

1380. Moreover, if there is some thing in which no accident is present, then this thing the abstract must differ in no way from the concrete. This is most evident in the case of God. [N.B.]

LESSON 6

Becoming-by Nature, by Art, and by Chance. The Source and Subject of Becoming

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598. Now of those things which come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, and some spontaneously.

599. And everything which comes to be comes to be by something and from something and becomes something. And this something which I say it comes to be may be in any category; for it may come to be either a this or so much or of such a sort or at some time.

600. Now natural generations are those which come about by nature.

601. And that from which a thing comes to be is what we call matter; and that by which it comes to be is one of those things which exist by nature. And this something which it comes to be is a man or a plant or some other one of those things which we chiefly claim to be substances.

602. Now all things which come to be either by nature or by art have matter; for it is possible for each one of them to be and not to be, and this possibility is the matter of each.

603. And in general both that from which they come to be and that according to which they come to be is nature; for the thing generated, such as a plant or an animal, has a nature. And that by which they are generated, i.e., the so-called specific nature, which is specifically the same, is also

nature (although this is found in something else); for man begets man. The things which come to be by nature, then, are produced in this way.

604. But the other kinds of generation are called “productions”; and all productions are a result either of art, of power, or of mind. And some of these are a result of chance and fortune in the same way as things which come to be by nature; for some of these same things are generated both from seed and without seed. Therefore we shall have to investigate these later on (619).

605. Now those things are produced by art whose form exists in the mind; and by form I mean the essence of each thing and its first substance. For even contraries have in a sense the same form; for the substance of a privation is the same as the substance of its opposite, as health is the substance of sickness, for sickness is made apparent by the absence of health; and the health which exists in the mind is the concept in scientific knowledge.

606. Health comes about, then, as a result of thinking in this manner: since health is such and such, if health is to exist, such and such a condition must exist, for example, regularity; and if this is to exist there must be heat; and the physician continues to think in this way until he eventually comes to some final tiling which he is capable of doing. Hence, the motion which begins from this, which is ordained to the acquisition of health, is called production. Hence it turns out that in a sense health comes from health, and a house from a house, and what has matter from what is without matter; for the medical art and the building art are the form of health and the form of a house. And by substance without matter I mean the essence.

607. Now of generations and motions one part is called thinking and the other producing; for that which proceeds from the principle and the form is thinking, and that which proceeds from the terminus of thinking is producing. And each of the other, intermediate, things is produced in the same way. I mean that if health is to be restored a balance must be achieved. What, then, does a balance involve? Some particular thing. And this will occur if the body is heated. And what does this involve? Something else. And this exists potentially; and it is present already in the physician himself. The thing which produces the effect, then, and that from which the restoration of health begins if it comes to be by art, is the form in the mind.

608. But if it comes to be by chance, the thing which produces it is the starting point of production for the one who acts by art. For instance, in the restoration of health the starting point may perhaps be the production of heat, which the physician causes by rubbing. The heat in the body, then, is either a part of health, or it is followed by some such thing as is a part of health, or it comes about through several intermediaries. Now this last thing is the one producing health, and what is such is a part of health, as stones are parts of a house and other materials are parts of other things.

609. Hence, as is said, it is impossible for anything to be produced if nothing pre-exists. Therefore that some part will necessarily pre-exist is evident; for the matter is a part, since it exists in the product and becomes something. Hence it is also one of those things which are contained in the intelligible expression of a thing. And we describe what brazen circles are in both ways, saying about the matter that it is bronze, and about the specifying principle that it is such and such a figure. And this is the genus in which circle is first placed. Hence a brazen circle has matter in its intelligible expression.

610. Now as for that from which as matter a thing, is produced, some things when they are produced are hot said to be that but of that kind; for instance, a statue is not stone but of stone. And a man who is recovering his health is not said to be that from which he has come. The reason is that, although a thing comes both from its privation and from its subject, which we call matter (for example, what becomes healthy is both a man and one who is sick), we say that it comes rather from its privation (for example, a healthy person comes from a sick one rather than from a man). And for this reason a healthy person is not said to be a sick one, but to be a man, and the man is said to be healthy. However, as regards those things of which the privation is not evident and is nameless (for example, the privation of some particular figure in bronze or in the bricks and timbers of a house), the thing produced seems to come from these just as a healthy person comes from a sick one. Hence, just as in the former case a thing is not said to be that from which it comes to be, so too in this case the statue is not said to be wood but wooden, not bronze but brazen, not stone but of stone; and a house is not said to be bricks but of bricks. For if someone were to examine the question carefully, he would not say without qualification either that the statue comes from wood or the house from bricks, because there must be change

in that from which something comes to be without remaining. It is for this reason, then, that we speak in this way.

COMMENTARY

1381. Having shown what essence is and to what things it belongs, and that it does not differ from the thing to which it belongs, the Philosopher now aims to show that the essences and forms present in these sensible things are not generated by any forms existing apart from matter, but by forms present in matter. And this will be one of the ways in which the position of Plato is destroyed; for Plato claimed that there are separate Forms, and that these are necessary both in order that an understanding of sensible things may be had, and that sensible things may exist by participating in them, and and that these Forms may be responsible for the generation of sensible things. Now he has already shown, in the preceding chapter (593:C 1368), that separate Forms are not necessary either to account for our understanding of sensible things or their being, since these can be adequately explained on the grounds that the whatness of a sensible thing is both present in that thing and identical with it. Hence it remains to show that separate Forms are not required for the generation of sensible things; and he proves this in this chapter.

This undertaking is accordingly divided into two parts. In the first (598:C 1381) he prefaces his discussion with certain points required for the proof of his thesis. In the second (611:C IV7), he proves his thesis (“Now since”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proposes certain divisions regarding the processes of generation which take place in the natural world. Second (600:C 1385), he explains these (“Now natural generations”).

He gives two divisions. The first his to do with things that are generated and with their mode of generation; and the second (599:C 1383), with the conditions necessary for generation (“And everything”).

He accordingly says, first (598), that of things which come to be, some come to be by nature, some by art, and some by chance, or “spontaneously,” i.e., by itself without purpose. The reason for this division is that the cause of generation is either a proper cause or an accidental one. For if it is a proper cause, it is either the principle of motion intrinsic to a thing, and then it is nature, or it is extrinsic to the thing, and then it is art; for nature is a principle of motion in that in which it exists, but art does not exist in the thing produced by art but in something else.

1382. But if it is an accidental cause, then it is chance or fortune. It is fortune in reference to those things which act by mind, but chance occurs in other things also; and both of these come under “the spontaneous,” i.e., what is of itself without purpose; for that is without purpose which is directed to a goal and does not reach it. And both chance and fortune are found among those things which are done for the sake of some goal, when some effect results besides the one intended by some definite proper cause. Hence an effect is said to be proper inasmuch as it has a definite cause, and to be without purpose inasmuch as it occurs apart from the intention of the agent.

1383. And everything (599).

Then he gives the second division, which involves the conditions of generation; for everything which comes to be is brought about by some agent, and is produced from something as its matter, and also becomes something, which is the terminus of generation. And since he had said above that this something belongs in the class of substances) he therefore now informs us that this must be understood in a more general way, inasmuch as by something is meant any category in which generation can occur, in an unqualified or qualified sense, essentially or accidentally. For the something of which he spoke is either “a this,” i.e., a substance, or a quantity or quality or time or some other category.

1384. And the reason for this division is that in every generation something which was formerly potential becomes actual. Now a thing can be said to go from potency to actuality only by reason of some actual being, which is the agent by which the process of generation is brought about. Now potency pertains to. the matter from which something is generated: and actuality pertains to the thing generated.

1385. Now natural generations (600).

Then he explains that these three conditions required for generation are found in the three types mentioned; and in regard to this he does two things. First (600:C 1385), he explains his thesis. Second (609:C 1412), he introduces the conclusion which he chiefly intends to draw (“Hence, as is said”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he makes this clear in the case of natural generations; and second (604:C 1394), in the case of generations resulting from art (“But the other”); and third (608:C 1410, in the case of those generations which come about by chance (“But if it comes).

In regard to the first he does four things. First (600), he indicates what generations are natural. He says that those generations are natural whose principle is nature and not art or any mind, for example, when fire or a plant or an animal is generated as a result of the natural power inherent in things.

1386. And that from which (601).

Having posited these three conditions he now gives examples of natural generations. He says that in natural generation there is something from which any natural thing is generated, and this is called matter; and something by which it is generated, and this is called the agent; and there is this particular thing, namely, the thing generated, such as a man or a plant or something of this sort, which “we chiefly claim to be substances,” i.e., particular composite substances, which are more evidently substances, as was stated above. But matter and the form, which is the principle of action in the agent, are substances only insofar as they are principles of composite substances.

1387. Now of these three conditions, two have the nature of principles of generation, namely, matter and the agent, and the third has the nature of a terminus of generation, i.e., the composite which is generated. And since nature is a principle of generation, both the matter as well as the form, which is the principle of generation in the agent, are called nature, as is evident in Book II of the Physics. And the composite which is generated is said to be by nature or according to nature.

1388. Now all things (602).

Here he proves that one of these three conditions—the principle from which a thing comes to be—is found in every kind of generation, not only in natural generations but also in artificial ones (for the nature of the other two conditions is evident). He says that all the things which come to be by nature or by art have a matter from which they come to be; for everything that is generated by nature or by art is capable both of being and of not being. For since generation is a change from non-being to being, the thing generated must at one time be and at another not be, and this would be true only if it were possible for it both to be and not to be. Now the potential element which each thing has both for being and not being is matter; for it is in potentiality to the forms by which things have being, and to the privations by which they have non-being, as is clear from what was said above. Therefore it follows that there must be matter in every kind of generation.

1389. And in general (603).

Here he shows how the three conditions mentioned above are related to nature. He says that in general each of the three conditions mentioned above is in a sense nature. For the principle from which natural generation proceeds, namely, matter, is called nature; and for this reason the generations of simple bodies are said to be natural ones, even though the active principle of their generation is extrinsic to them. This seems to be contrary to the very notion of nature, because nature is an intrinsic principle having a natural aptitude for such a form; and processes of generation which proceed from this principle are said to be natural.

1390. Again, the principle according to which generation comes about, namely, the form of the thing generated, is said to be its nature, as a plant or an animal; for a natural generation is one which is directed towards nature just as the act of whitening is one which is directed towards whiteness.

1391. Again, the principle by which generation comes about, as by an agent, is the specific nature, which is specifically the same as the nature of the thing generated, although it exists in something else; for man begets man. However, the thing generated and the one generating it are not numerically the same but only specifically the same.

1392. And for this reason it is said in Book II of the Physics that the form and the goal of the process of generation coincide in one and the same individual. Now the agent coincides with these insofar as it is specifically the same but not insofar as it is numerically the same. But the matter is neither specifically the same nor numerically the same.

1393. Another text states that the principle by which a thing comes to be is the so-called specific nature or one conforming to it; for the thing generated and the one generating it are not always specifically the same, although they do have some conformity, as when a horse begets a mule. Finally, he concludes that the things generated by nature are generated in the manner described.

1394. But the other kinds (604).

He now settles the issue about the things generated by art; and in regard to this he does two things. First (604), he distinguishes processes of generation arising from art from other processes of generation, namely, natural ones. Second (605:C 1404), he shows how generation comes about by art (“Now those things”).

He accordingly says, first, that those processes of generation which differ from natural ones are called productions. For even though in the case of natural things we can use the word production, which is equivalent to praxis in Greek (as when we say that what is actually hot produces something which is actually hot), still we use the word properly in reference to those things which come about as a result of mind, in which the mind of the agent has dominion over the thing which he makes inasmuch as he can make it in this way or in that. But this does not occur in the case of natural things, for they rather act with a view to some effect in the definite manner provided for them by a superior agent. Moreover , productions of this kind are a result of art, of power, or of mind.

1395. Now the tern, power used here seems to be taken in the sense of violence; for certain of those things which do not come about by nature are produced by virtue of the agent’s power alone, in which a minimum of art is required and a minimum of activity directed by mind. This occurs especially in pulling or throwing or casting out bodies.

1396. Moreover, when the direction of mind is required, at one time this comes about by art, and at another by mind alone, as when one does not yet have an artistic habit perfectly. For just as one person may argue by art, and another without art, as an unlearned person, so too in reference to those things which are made by art one can produce an artistic work by art, and someone else without art.

1397. Furthermore, of those processes of generation which are a result either of art, of power, or of mind, some are a result of chance and fortune, for example, when an agent by use of intelligence aims at some goal to be attained by his own activity, and ‘a goal is reached which the agent did not intend. For example, someone intends to rub himself vigorously and health comes of it, as is said later (C 1403).

1398. And the same thing occurs in the case of things produced by art as in those produced by nature; for the power contained in the seed, as is said below (619:C 1451), is similar to art, because just as art through certain definite intermediates attains the form at which it aims, so also does the formative power in the seed. And just as an effect produced by art may also occur apart from the intention of art or of mind, and then it is said to happen by chance, so too in the case of these things, i.e., natural ones, some things are generated both from seed and without seed. And when they are generated from seed, they are generated by nature; but when they are generated without seed, they are generated by chance. These things must also be investigated in this same chapter.

1399. Now the words used here give rise to two problems. The first is that, since every natural thing has a definite mode of generation, those things which are generated from seed and those which are generated from decay do not seem to be the same. This is what Averroes seems to feel in his commentary on Book VIII of the Physics, for he says that an animal which is generated from seed and one which is generated from decay cannot be specifically the same. Avicenna, however, feels that all things which are generated from seed can be generated in the same species without seed from decay, or by some method of blending terrestrial matters.

1400. Aristotle's view seems to be a mean between these two opinions, namely, that some things can be generated both from seed and without seed, but not all things, as he says below (610:C 1454); just as in the case of things produced by art not all things can be produced by art and without art, but some are produced by art alone, as a house. For perfect animals seem to be capable of being generated from seed, whereas imperfect animals, which are akin to plants, seem to be capable of being generated both from seed and without seed. For instance, plants are sometimes produced without seed by the action of the sun on the earth when it is rightly disposed for this effect; yet plants generated in this way produce seed from which plants of a similar kind are generated.

1401. And this is reasonable, because the more perfect a thing is the more numerous are the things required for its completeness. And, for this reason, in the generation of plants and imperfect animals it is sufficient that the power of the heavens alone should act. But in the case of perfect animals the power of the seed is also needed along with the power of the heavens. Hence it is said in Book II of the Physics that man and the sun beget man.

1402. The second problem is that animals which are generated without seed from decay do not seem to be produced by chance but by some definite agent, namely, by the power of the heavens, which supplies in the generation of such animals the energy of the generative power found in the seed. The Commentator is also of this opinion in his commentary on Book IX of this work.

1403. But it must be noted that nothing prevents a process of generation from being a proper process when referred to one cause, and yet be an accidental or chance affair when referred to another cause, as is evident in the Philosopher’s example. For when health results from a vigorous rubbing quite apart from the aim of the one doing the rubbing, the process of restoring health, if it is referred to nature, which governs the body, is not accidentally but properly aimed at. However, if it is referred to the aim of the one doing the rubbing, it will be accidental and a matter of chance. Similarly, if the process of generation of an animal generated from decay is referred to the particular causes acting here below, it will also be found to be accidental and a matter of chance; for heat, which causes decay, is not inclined by nature to have as its goal the generation of this or that particular animal which results from decay, as the power in the seed has as its goal the generation of something of a particular type. But if it is referred to the power of the heavens, which is the universal power regulating generation and corruption in these lower bodies, it is not accidental but is directly aimed at, because its goal is that all forms existing potentially in matter should be brought to actuality. Thus Aristotle has correctly compared here the things which come to be by art with those which come to be by nature.

1404. Now those things (605).

He now explains the way in which things are generated by art; and he does this chiefly with reference to the efficient principle, for the material principle has already been discussed where he spoke about natural generation. In regard to this he does two things. First, he shows what the active principle is in a process of generation resulting from art. Second (606:C 1406), he shows how the process of generation proceeds from this principle (“Health comes about”).

He accordingly says, first (605), that those things which come to be by art are those of which the productive form exists in the mind. And by form he means the essence of anything made by art, for example, the essence of a house, when it is a house that is made. He also calls this the “first substance,” i.e., the first form; and he does this because the form present in the matter of things made by art proceeds from the form present in the mind. In the case of natural things, however, the opposite is true.

1405. Now the form present in the mind differs from the one present in matter; for in matter the forms of contraries are different and opposed, but in the mind contraries have in a sense the same form. And this is true because forms present in matter exist for the sake of the being of the things informed, but forms present in the mind exist according to the mode of what is knowable or intelligible. Now while the being of one contrary is destroyed by that of another, the knowledge of one contrary is not destroyed by that of another but is rather supported by it. Hence the forms of contraries in the mind are not opposed, but rather “the substance,” i.e., the whatness, “of a privation,” is the same as the substance of its contrary, as the concepts of health and of sickness in the mind are the same; for sickness is known by the absence of health. Further, the health which exists in the mind is the concept by which health and sickness are known; and it is found “in the scientific knowledge” of both, i.e., in knowing both.

1406. Health comes about (606).

He now shows how health is produced by this principle; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows how the health which exists in the mind is the principle (or starting point) for the restoring of health; and second (607:C 1408), how the term principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activity of art (“Now of generations”).

He accordingly says (606) that, since the health present in the mind is the principle of the health produced by art, health is brought about in a subject as a result of someone thinking in this manner: since health is such and such, i.e., either regularity or the balance of heat, cold, moisture and dryness, if health is to exist, it is necessary that this exist, i.e., regular or the balance of humors; and if regularity or balance must exist, there must be heat, by which the humors are balanced; and thus by always going from what is subsequent to what is prior he thinks of the thing which is productive of heat, and then of the thing which is productive of this, until he reaches some final thing which he himself is immediately capable of doing, for example, the dispensing of some particular medicine; and finally the motion beginning from the thing which he can do immediately is said to be the activity directed to the production of health.

1407. Hence it is evident that, just as in the case of natural things man is generated from man, so too in the case of artificial things it turns out that health comes to be in a sense from health, and a house from a house; i.e., from what exists in the mind without matter there is produced something which has matter. For the medical art, which is the principle of health, is nothing else than the form of health existing in the mind; and this form or substance which exists without matter is the one which he speaks of above as the essence of the thing produced by art.

1408. Now of generations (607).

He shows how the word principle is taken in different ways in regard to the activities of art. He says that in artificial generations and motions there is one activity which is called thinking and another which is called producing. For the artist’s planning, which begins from the principle which is the form of the thing to be made by his art, is itself called thinking; and this activity extends, as was said above, right down to what is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution. Therefore the activity which begins from this last thing in which the activity of thinking terminates, is called producing, and this is then a motion affecting matter.

1409. And what we have said about the activity of art in reference to the form, which is the ultimate goal of artificial generation, also applies in the case of all other intermediate things; for example in order that one may be healed the humors of the body must be balanced. Hence this process of balancing is one of the intermediate things which is nearest to health. And just as the physician when he aims to cause health must begin by considering what health is, so too when he intends to produce a balance he must know what a balance is, namely, that it is “some particular thing,” i.e., the proportion of humors appropriate to human nature. “And this will occur if the body is heated”—supposing that someone is sick because of a lack of heat. And again he must know what this is, i.e., what being heated is, as if one might say that being heated consists in being changed by a hot medicine. And “this, namely, the administering of a hot medicine, is immediately within the physician’s power; and “this is already present in the physician himself,” i.e., it is within his power to administer such a medicine.

1410. Hence it is evident that the principle causing health, from which the process of restoring health begins, is the form existing in the mind, either of health itself, or of other intermediate things by means of which health is produced. And I say that this is the case if the process of restoring health comes about by art. But if it comes about in some other way, the principle of health will not be a form existing in the mind; for this is proper to artificial operations.

1411. But if it (608).

He shows how chance generations take place. He says that, when the restoring of health comes about by chance, the principle of health is the same as the one from which health comes about for him who causes health by art. But this must be understood of the principle of production, which is last in the order of intention and first in the order of execution, just as in the process of restoring health the principle of health may at times begin with the patient’s being heated. And the process of restoring health also begins here when someone is healed by chance, because someone may produce heat by rubbing but not intend this as the goal of the rubbing. Thus the heat produced in the body by rubbing or by a medication either is a part of health, inasmuch as it is something entering into the substance of health, as when by itself the alteration of being heated is sufficient to promote health; or something which is a part of health may result from heat, as when health is produced as a result of the heat dissolving certain congested humors, the dissolution of which thereupon constitutes health. Or it can also be produced by several intermediates, as when heat consumes certain superfluous humors blocking some passage in the body, so that when these have been removed the proper movement of spirits to some parts of the body then begins; and this final step is the one then causing health. “And what is such,” namely, the proximate cause of health, “is a part of health,” i.e., something entering into the make-up of health. And it is the same with other things produced by art; for the parts of a house are the stones whose bonding in the course of construction goes to constitute a house.

1412. Hence, as is said (609).

Then he draws the conclusion at which he chiefly aims; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he introduces this conclusion; and second (610:C 1414), he dispels a difficulty (“Now as for that”).

He says, first (609), that, since everything which comes to be is generated from matter and is also generated by something like itself, it is impossible for anything to be generated unless something pre-exists, as is commonly said; for the common opinion of the philosophers of nature was that nothing comes to be from nothing. Further, it is evident that the thing which preexists must be part of the thing generated, and this can be shown from the fact that matter is present in the thing generated and becomes the thing generated when it is brought to actuality. And not only the. material part of a thing pre-exists, as is clear from the explanation given, but so also does the part which exists in the mind, namely, the form; for these two principles, matter and form, are parts of the thing generated.

1413. For we can describe what brazen circles are in both ways, or, according to another text, what many circles are, i.e., particular and distinct circles, by stating the matter, which is bronze, and “by stating the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, which is such and such a figure. And he is right in saying many particular circles; for a circle is one thing specifically and formally, but it becomes many and is individuated by matter. And this, the figure, is the genus in which brazen circle is first placed. Hence it is evident, from what has been said, that brazen circle has matter in its definition. And the fact that the form of the thing generated pre-exists has been made clear above both in reference to natural generations and to artificial productions.

1414. Now as for that (610).

Here he dispels. a certain difficulty; for that from which a thing comes to be as its matter is sometimes predicated of it not abstractly but denominatively; for some things are not said to be “that,” i.e., the matter, “but of that kind”; for instance, a statue is not said to be stone but of stone. And a man who is recovering his health “is not said to be that f rom which ‘ “ i.e., one does not predicate of him the thing from which, he is said to come to be; for a person who is recovering his health comes from a sick person. But we do not say that a person who is recovering his health is a sick one.

1415. Now the reason for this kind of difficulty is that one thing is said to come from something else in two ways, namely, from a privation and from a subject, which is matter, for example, when it is said that a man recovers his health, and that a sick person recovers his health. But a thing is said to come from a privation rather than from a subject; for example, a healthy person is said to come from a sick one rather than from a man. But when one thing becomes another we say this in reference to the subject rather than to the privation; for properly speaking we say that a man rather than a sick person becomes healthy. Therefore a healthy person is not said to be a sick one, but rather a man; and in the opposite way it is a man that is said to be healthy. Hence the thing that comes to be is predicated of the subject, not of the privation.

1416. But in some cases the privation is not evident and is nameless; for example, the privation of any particular figure in bronze does not have a name, and neither does the privation of house in the stones and timbers. Therefore we use the term matter simultaneously to designate both the matter and the privation. Hence just as we say in the one case that a healthy person comes from a sick one, so too we say in the other case that a statue comes from bronze, and a house from stones and timbers. And for this reason, too, just as in the one case the thing that comes to be from something taken as a privation is not predicated of the subject, because we do not say that a healthy person is a sick one, neither do we say in the other case that a statue is wood; but the abstract term is predicated concretely by saying that it is not wood but wooden, not bronze but brazen, not stone but of stone. And similarly a house is not bricks but of bricks. For if someone were to examine the question carefully, he would not say in an unqualified sense either that the statue conics froin wood or the house from bricks, litit that it conics to be as a result of some change. For the former comes from the latter taken as something which is changed and not as something which remains, because bronze does not stay formless while it is being made into a statue, nor do bricks stay unbonded while a house is being built. And for this reason “we speak in this way,” i.e., Predication is made in this way, in the cases mentioned above.

LESSON 7

The Composite and Not the Form is Generated. The Ideas Are neither Principles of Generation nor Exemplars

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1033a 24-1034a 8

611. Now since that which comes to be comes to be by something (and by this I mean the principle of generation), and from something (and by this let us understand not the privation but the matter; for this has already been defined [601] in our discussion about these things), and becomes something (i.e., a sphere or a circle or whatever else it may be), just as the agent does not produce the underlying subject, i.e., the bronze, neither does he produce a sphere, except accidentally, because a brazen sphere is a sphere and he produces the former. For to make this particular thing is to make it out of the subject totally. I mean that to make the bronze round is not to make round or sphere but something else, i.e., to cause this form in something else. For if he makes a form he makes it out of something else (this was assumed above); for example, he makes a brazen sphere. And he makes this in the sense that he makes this thing which is a sphere out of this thing which is bronze. Hence if he also produces the underlying subject itself, evidently he will produce it in the same way, and processes of generation will then proceed to infinity. Hence it is evident that neither the form nor anything else which we term the form in a sensible thing comes to be; i.e.,

the form or essence is not generated, for this is what comes to be in some thing else either by art, by nature or by power.

612. But he does make a brazen sphere to be. For he makes it from bronze and and a sphere, because he causes this form in this matter, and this constitutes a brazen sphere; and this is the being of a sphere. But if the being of sphere in general is to be produced, something will be produced from nothing; for that which comes to be must be divisible, and this is this and that is that. And by this I mean the matter, and by that the form. Therefore, if a sphere is a figure everywhere equidistant from a center, one part of this will be that in which the thing produced exists, and the other will be what exists in this. But this is all that has been produced, as in the case of a brazen sphere. It is evident from what has been said, then, that it is not the thing which is called the form or substance that is generated, but the concrete whole which gets its name from this; and there is matter in everything which is generated; and that this is this and that is that.

613. The problem, then, is as follows: is there a. sphere apart from these particular spheres, or a house apart from bricks, or one that has never been produced? Now if this were true, no particular thing would exist. But since house means what is such and such, it is not a definite thing, yet the agent makes and generates something that is such and such from this. And when this has been generated it is such and such a particular thing; and this whole particular thing, such as Callias or Socrates, is like a brazen sphere, but man and animal are like brazen sphere in general. It is evident, then, that the cause which consists of the Forms, in the sense in which some are accustomed to speak of them, i.e., supposing that they do exist apart from singular things, is useless so far as processes of generation and substances are concerned. Nor will the Forms be, for this reason, substances existing by themselves.

614. And in some cases it is evident that the thing which generates is of the same kind as the thing which is generated, although they are not the same numerically but specifically, for example, in the case of natural generations (for man begets man), unless something contrary to nature is generated, as when a horse begets a mule. And even these cases are alike; for what is common both to horse and ass as their proximate genus has no name, but perhaps both might be something like mule. Hence there is evidently no need to furnish a Form as an exemplar; for men would have

searched for Forms especially in sensible things, since these are substances in the highest degree. But the thing which generates is adequate for producing the thing and for causing the form in the matter. And when the whole is such and such a form in this flesh and these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they differ in their matter (for the matter of each is different) but are the same in form, because form is indivisible.

COMMENTARY

1417. The Philosopher posited above certain points about processes of generation in the world as prerequisites for proving his thesis, namely, to show that the causes of the generation of things must not be held to be separate Forms. And since two of these have already been made clear in the foregoing discussion, i.e., that every process of generation is from matter, and that everything which is generated is generated by something similar to itself, he now aims to prove his thesis from the questions which were investigated above.

This is divided into two parts. In the first (611:C 1417) he shows what things are generated. In the second (613:C 1427) he shows that the cause of generation is not a separate Form (“The problem, then”). In the third (615:C 1436) he clears up certain things which could be considered as problems pertaining to the points already established (“However, someone”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (611), he shows that a form is generated only accidentally; and second (612:C 1424), that it is a composite thing which is generated (“But he does make”).

He accordingly says, first (611), that the points explained above are true. The first of these is that everything which comes to be, comes to be by something, and this is the agent or generator, which is the principle of generation; and the second is that everything which comes to be, comes to be from something, and by this something from which generation takes place we mean the matter and not the privation. For it was said above that something comes to be from matter in a different way than it does from a privation. The third point is that in every process of generation there must be something which comes to be; and this is either a sphere or a circle or something else.

1418. From the things which have been posited it ought to be evident that, just as an agent does not produce the matter or subject of generation, for example, the bronze, when he generates something, so too “neither does he produce the form,” namely, the thing itself which is a sphere, except perhaps accidentally; for he makes a brazen sphere, which is a composite. And since a brazen sphere is also a sphere, he therefore accidentally produces a sphere.

1419. Now the fact that the agent does not produce the matter is evident of itself, because matter is prior to the act of making. Hence it was not necessary for Aristotle to prove that matter is not generated. However, regarding forms there could be a difficulty, because a form is found only at the termination of an activity; and therefore it was necessary for him to prove that a form is produced only accidentally. And the reason is that forms do not have being, properly speaking, but are rather the principles by which things have being. Hence if the, process of coming to be is the way to being, only those things properly come to be which have being by their forms; and forms begin to be in the sense that they exist in the things generated, which have being by these forms.

1420. The proof that forms are not generated is as follows. To make this particular thing is to make it from a subject, and this is “totally,” i.e., universally, true of every generation. For to make what is bronze round is not to make “round” itself, i.e., roundness, or “sphere” itself, namely, the form of a sphere, but to make “something else,” namely, a form, not in any way whatever, “but in something else,” namely, in matter; and this is to make the composite. This is made evident as follows. If an agent makes something, he must make it from something else as its matter. And “this was assumed above,” namely, that every process of generation is from matter, because of the proof adduced above; as an agent, for example, is said to make a brazen sphere. And this is true because he makes the thing which is a brazen sphere from bronze. Hence, if he also makes the form itself, it is clear that he will make it in the same way, namely, from some matter. And thus just as a brazen sphere will be composed of matter and form, so also will the form of brazen sphere be composed of matter and form; and the same question will be raised in turn about the form of this form, and so on to infinity; and in this way processes of generation will proceed to infinity, because everything generated has matter and form. It is evident, then, that the form of the thing generated does not come to be; and neither does any other thing, whatever it may be, which must be called a form in sensible things, for example, order, combination and shape, which has the character of a form in some things, especially in those made by art.

1421. And since generation pertains to the thing generated, it is evident that it is not the form that is generated but the composite. And so too the essence of the thing generated is not itself generated, except accidentally; for the form or essence "is what comes to be in something else," i.e., in matter, but not of itself. And I say that it comes to be either by art, by nature "or by power," i.e., by anything that acts by violence (C 841).

1422. Now he says that the essence of a thing is not generated, even though it is the same as the thing generated; for it was shown above (591:C 1362) that each thing is the same as its own essence. But the essence of a thing refers properly to its form. Hence individual conditions, which pertain to a form accidentally, are excluded from it. And species and other universals are generated only accidentally when singular things are generated.

1423. Yet it must be noted that even though it is said in the text that form comes to be in matter, this is not a proper way of speaking; for it is not a form that comes to be, but a composite. For a form is said to exist in matter, although a form does not [properly] exist, but a composite exists by its form. Thus the proper way of speaking is to say that a composite is generated from matter according to such and such a form. For forms are not generated, properly speaking, but are brought from the potency of matter, inasmuch as matter, which is in potentiality to form, becomes actual under some form; and this is to produce a composite.

1424. But he does make (612).

Here he shows that it is composite things which are generated. He says that an agent does make a sphere to be; for he makes it from bronze, which is the matter, as the principle of generation, and from sphere, which is the form and terminus of generation. For he causes "this form," i.e., the figure of a sphere, "in this," i.e., in the matter, in the sense that he changes this bronze into a sphere, and this is a brazen sphere, or the form of a sphere in bronze.

1425. "But this," namely, the figure of a sphere, "is the being of a sphere," i.e., the whatness of a sphere. "But of the being of sphere in general,” i.e., of the whatness of the form, there is no generation whatever, because if it were generated it would have to be generated from something as its matter. For everything which comes to be must be divisible, so that “this is this,” i.e., one part of it is this, “and that is that,” i.e., another part is that. He explains this by saying that one part of it is matter and the other, form. Hence, if the whatness of a sphere in reference to the form itself is “that it is a figure everywhere equidistant from a center,” i.e., that it is a certain solid figure of which all lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, then “one part,” i.e., the matter “of this,” namely, of a brazen sphere, must be that in which “the thing produced will exist,” namely, the matter, and the other will be what exists in this, namely, the form, which is the figure everywhere equidistant from a center, and “this is all,” i.e., the whole, “that has been produced,” namely, a brazen sphere.

1426. Hence it is evident from our remarks that, if everything which comes to be must be divisible, the part which is called the form or “substance,” i.e., the essence, does not come to be; but it is “the concrete whole,” or the composite, which is spoken of and gets its name from such a form or quiddity or whatness which comes to be. Again, it is evident that matter is found in everything which is generated, and that of everything which is generated “this is this and that is that,” i.e., one part is matter and the other is form.

1427. The problem, then (613).

Since it is not forms which are generated but composite things, he shows that it is not necessary to posit separate Forms as the causes of generation in these lower bodies. And it must be understood that the Platonists claimed that separate Forms cause generation in two ways: first, after the manner of a generator, and, second, after the manner of an exemplar.

Hence he shows, first (613), that separate Forms are not causes of generation after the manner of a generator; and second (614:C 1432), that they are not causes after the manner of an exemplar (“And in some cases”).

He accordingly says, first (613), that it is necessary to consider whether there is a form “which is universal’ and exists apart from singular forms of this kind,” i.e., whether there is a sphere without matter apart from these spheres found in matter; or again whether there is a universal house without matter apart from the bricks of which these particular houses are made. Now he raises the question with reference to artificial things in order to throw light on natural ones, whose forms the Platonists claimed to be separate from matter; so that the question is understood to be whether there is a universal man apart from the flesh and bones of which individual men are composed.

1428. And for the purpose of answering this question he posits here that, if any substance is produced in this way, it will not be a particular thing in any sense, but will only signify such and such a thing, which is not a definite individual. For Socrates signifies this particular thing and a definite individual, but man signifies such and such a thing, because it signifies a common and indefinite form, since it signifies without the definiteness of a this or a that. Hence, if there should be a man separate from Socrates and Plato and other individuals of this kind, it will still be a particular or definite thing. But in processes of generation we see that the thing which makes and generates something “from this,” i.e., from some particular matter, is “such and such a particular thing,” i.e., this definite thing having a definite form; for just as the thing generated must be a particular thing, so also must the thing which generates it be a particular thing, since the thing generated is similar to the thing which generates it, as was proved above (603:C 1390. Now that the thing generated is a particular thing is clear from the fact that it is a composite. “And this being,” i.e., the composite, when it is “such and such a thing,” i.e., a definite thing, is like Callias or Socrates, just as when we speak of this brazen sphere. But man and animal do not signify this matter from which generation proceeds, and neither does brazen sphere, taken universally. Therefore, if the composite is generated, and it is generated only from this matter whereby it is this particular thing, then what is generated must be a particular thing. And since the thing generated is similar to the one generating it, the latter must also be a particular thing. Hence there is no universal form without matter.

1429. It is therefore evident from what has been said that, if there are any forms separate from singular things, they are of no use for the generations and substances of things, just as some are accustomed to speak of “the cause which consists of the Forms,” intending thus to posit such forms. For one reason why the Platonists posited separate Forms was that they might be the cause of processes of generation in the world. Hence, if separate Forms cannot be the cause of generation, it is evident that forms will not be certain substances existing by themselves.

1430. And it must be noted that all those who have failed to consider what the Philosopher proved above-that forms do not come to be-face the same difficulty with regard to the production of forms, because it was for this reason that some men were compelled to say that all forms are created; for while they held that forms come to be, they could not hold that they come from matter since matter is not a part of form; and therefore they concluded that forms come from nothing, and, consequently, that they are created. But because of this difficulty, on the other hand, some men claimed that forms actually pre-exist in matter, and this is to suppose that forms are hidden, as Anaxagoras maintained.

1431. Now the view of Aristotle, who claimed that forms are not generated but only composite things, excludes both of these other opinions. For it is not necessary to say that forms are caused by some external agent, or that they will always be present in matter actually, but only potentially, and that in the generation of the composite they are brought from potentiality to actuality.

1432. And in some cases (614).

He shows that separate Forms cannot be the cause of the generation of things after the manner of an exemplar. He says that even though in some cases one may encounter the problem whether the generator is similar to the thing generated, still in the case of some things it is evident that the generator is of the same kind as the thing generated: not numerically the same but specifically, as is clear in the case of natural beings; for man begets man, and similarly a horse begets a horse, and each natural thing produces something similar to itself in species, unless something beyond nature happens to result, as when a horse begets a mule. And this generation is beyond nature, because it is outside of the aim of a particular nature.

1433. For the formative power, which is in the sperm of the male, is designed by nature to produce something completely the same as that from which the sperm has been separated; but its secondary aim, when it cannot induce a perfect likeness, is to induce any kind of likeness that it can. And since in the generation of a mule the sperm of a horse cannot induce the form of a horse in the matter, because it is not adapted to receive the form of a horse, it therefore induces a related form. Hence in the generation of a mule the generator is similar in a way to the thing generated; for there is a proximate genus, which lacks a name, common to horse and to ass; and mule is also contained under that genus. Hence in reference to that genus it can be said that like generates like; for example, if we might say that that proximate genus is beast of burden, we could say that, even though a horse does not generate a horse but a mule, still a beast of burden generates a beast of burden.

1434. Hence it is evident that everything which is generated receives the likeness of its form from the power of the thing generating it. And for this reason it is obviously not necessary to posit some separate Form, as the exemplar of the things which are generated, from whose image the things generated receive a similar form, as the Platonists claimed. For exemplars of this kind are especially necessary in the case of the natural substances mentioned above, which are substances to a greater degree when compared with artificial things. Now in the case of the foregoing substances the generator is sufficient to cause a likeness of form; and it is enough to maintain that the generator causes the form in the matter, i.e., that the thing which causes the thing generated to receive such a form is not some form outside of matter but a form in matter.

1435. “And every form” which is in the matter, namely, “in this flesh and these bones,” is some singular thing, such as Callias or Socrates. And this form which causes a likeness in species in the process of generation, also differs numerically from the form of the thing generated because of difference in matter; for material diversity is the principle of diversity among individuals in the same species; for the matter containing the form of the man who begets and that of the man who is begotten are different. But both forms are the same in species; for the form itself is “indivisible,” i.e., it does not differ in the one who generates and in the one who is generated. Hence it follows that it is not necessary to posit a form apart from singular things, which causes the form in the things generated, as the Platonists claimed.

LESSON 8

Generation by Art and by Nature or by Art Alone. Generation of Composites, Not Substantial or Accidental Forms

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1034a 9-1034b 19

615. However, someone might raise the question why some things come to be both by art and by chance, as health, while others do not, as a house.

616. And the reason is that in some of these the matter, which is the principle of generation in the making and producing of everything which comes to be by art, and in which some part of the thing made is present, the matter of these, I say, is such that it can set itself in motion, whereas the matters of others cannot. And of the former kind some can set itself is motion in a special way, and some cannot; for many things can move themselves but not in some special way, as in dancing. Those things, then, whose matter is of such a kind, for instance, stones, can only be moved by something else. Yet in another way they can move themselves, as in the case of fire. And for this reason some things will not exist apart from one who possesses an art, while others will; for they will be moved either by those things which do not have art or by those which have it in part.

617. And it is evident from what has been said that in a sense all things come from something which is univocal (as natural things), or from something which is univocal in part (as a house comes from a house, or by

means of mind; for art is a form), or from a part or from something having a part, unless it comes to be accidentally.

618. For the first and proper cause of the production of anything is a part of the thing produced; for the heat in the motion produces heat in the body; and this is either health or a part of health, or some part of health or health itself follows from it. Hence it is said to cause health, because it causes that from which health follows, and of which health is an accident. Hence, just as in syllogisms the basis of everything is substance (for a syllogism proceeds from the whatness of a thing), so too in this case processes of generation proceed from it.

619. And those things which are constituted by nature are similar to these; for the seed produces something in the same way as things which operate by art; for it contains the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes [and the thing which it generates] are in a sense univocal, for it is not necessary to inquire about all things in the same way as we do when we say that a man comes from a man; for a woman also comes from a man. Hence a mule does not come from a mule, unless there should be some defect. And whatever things arise by chance, as some artificial things do, are those whose matter can be moved by itself by the very motion by which the seed moves. But those things whose matter does not possess this capacity cannot be generated in any other way than by the agents themselves.

620. Now it is not only with reference to substance that our argument proves that the specifying principle does not come to be, but the common reasoning also applies in a similar way to all the primary genera, such as quantity, quality and the other categories. For a brazen sphere as such comes to be, but not the sphere or the bronze, but if it does come to be, it comes to be in the bronze (because it is always necessary that the form and the matter pre-exist). This must also be the case with the quiddity, with quality, with quantity, and also with the other categories; for quality does not come to be, but wood of such a quality; and quantity does not come to be, but so much wood or so large an animal.

621. But from these remarks it is possible to learn a property of substance, namely, that there must always pre-exist another actual substance which produces it; for example, an animal must pre-exist if an animal is generated. But quantity and quality must pre-exist only potentially.

1436. Having shown that separate forms are not the cause of generation in these lower bodies, the Philosopher now clears up certain things which could be regarded as problems relating to the points already established. This is divided into three parts insofar as there are three problems which he intends to clear up. The second part (617:C 1443) begins where he says “And it is evident”; and the third (620:C 1458), at the words, “Now it is not only.” In regard to the first he does two things. First (615:C 1436), he states the problem. Second (616:C 1437), he solves it (“And the reason”).

Now the first problem stems from a statement which he had made above (609:C 1412) to the effect that, when the principle of health is the form in the mind, health is then a result of art; but when health is not a result of this principle but only of the act of heating, health then comes about by chance, for example, when health happens to result from a vigorous rubbing. But this cannot be true of everything that comes to be by art; for a house is never produced by any principle except the form of a house in the mind, and thus it will always come to be by art and never by chance. Hence the problem is why some things, for instance, health, sometimes come to be by art and sometimes by chance, while others, for instance, a house, come to be only by art and never by chance.

1437. And the reason (616).

He then solves the problem. He says that the reason for the above-mentioned difference in the case of artificial things lies in the fact that the matter from which generation begins, inasmuch as it is the basis of the making and producing any of the things which come about by art, is such as to contain some part of the thing generated. For the matter must have some aptitude for form, because not any artifact can be produced from any matter, but each from some definite matter; for example, a saw is not produced from wool but from iron. Hence the aptitude itself of the artifact for a form, which is in the matter, is already some part of the artifact which is in the matter; because without this aptitude the artifact cannot exist; for instance, there cannot be a saw without hardness, by which the iron is disposed for the form of a saw.

1438. But this part is found in matter in two ways: sometimes in such a way that the matter can move itself by this part, i.e., by the part of the form existing within it, and sometimes not. For example, in the case of the human body, which is the matter of health, there is an active power by which the body can heal itself, but in the case of stones and timbers there is no active power by which the matter can be moved to receive the form of a house.

1439. And if the matter can be so moved to receive a form by a part of the form which exists in it, this can occur in two ways. For sometimes it can be moved by an intrinsic principle, which is the part mentioned above, in the same way in which it is moved by art, as occurs in the restoration of health; for the nature of the human body acts in the same way with regard to health as art does. But sometimes the matter cannot be moved by an intrinsic principle in the same way in which it is moved by art, although it can be moved by itself in some way. For there are many things which can be moved by themselves, but not in the same way in which they are moved by art, as is clear in the case of dancing. For men who do not have the art of dancing can move about tut not in the way in which those men do who have this art.

1440. Therefore those artificial things which have this kind of nature, such as a house made of bricks, cannot set themselves in motion; for they cannot be moved unless they are moved by something else. This is true not only of artificial things but also of natural ones; for in this way too the matter of fire cannot be moved to receive the form of fire unless it is moved by something else. And it is for this reason that the form of fire is generated only by something else. Hence it follows that some artificial things cannot come to be unless there is something which possesses art, i.e., those which do not have in their matter any principle which can move their matter to receive a form, or which cannot cause motion in the way in which art does.

1441. And those things which can be moved by some extrinsic principle which is not possessed of art, can both be and come to be without the intervention of art; for the matters of these are moved by things which do not possess art. He makes this clear in two ways: first, by pointing out that this can happen insofar as they can be moved by certain other extrinsic principles which do not possess art; and second, when “the matter is moved by a part” [i.e., of the composite] namely, by some intrinsic principle, which is some part of the form, for example, when health is restored to the human body by some intrinsic principle which is a part of the form.

1442a. Now it must be noted that some persons, because of the words which are used here, claim that in every natural generation the matter contains some active principle, which is the form pre-existing potentially in the matter and a kind of beginning of form; and thus it is called a part of the form. And they try to establish this, first, from the statements made here; for Aristotle seems to say here that those things whose matter contains no active principle are produced by art alone; and therefore they think that some active principle must be present in the matter of things which are generated by nature.

1442b. Second, they try to establish this from the fact that every motion whose principle is not intrinsic to the thing moved but extrinsic to it is a violent motion and not a natural one. For if there were no active principle in the matter of those things which are generated by nature, the process of generation of these things would not be natural but violent; or, in other words, there would be no difference between artificial generations and natural ones.

1442c. And when one argues against them that, if the generation of those things which come about by nature is from an intrinsic principle, such things do not therefore stand in need of any extrinsic generator, their answer is: just as an intrinsic principle is not a perfect form but a kind of beginning of form, neither is it a perfect active principle in the sense that it can act of itself so as to bring about generation; but it bears some likeness to an active power inasmuch as it cooperates with an extrinsic agent. For if the mobile object contributes nothing to the motion produced by an external agent, the motion is violent; because violence exists when the thing undergoing the change is moved by an extrinsic principle and does not itself contribute anything to the change, as is stated in Book III of the Ethics.

1442d. Now this opinion seems to resemble the one expressed by those who claim that forms lie hidden; for since a thing acts only insofar as it is actual, if the parts or beginnings of the forms which exist in matter have some active power, it follows that they are actual to some degree; and this is to maintain that forms lie hidden. Furthermore, since being is prior to action, a form cannot be understood to act before it actually exists.

1442e. Therefore it must be said that, just as living things alone are found to move themselves locally, whereas other things are moved by an extrinsic principle, i.e., either by one which generates or which removes some obstacle, as is stated in Book VIII of the Physics, so too only living things are found to move themselves with the other motions. This is because they are found to have different parts, one of which can be a mover and the other something moved; and this must be true of everything that moves itself, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Hence in the generation of living things we find an intrinsic efficient principle, which is the formative power in the seed. And just as living things have a power of growth, which is responsible for the motion of increase and decrease, in a similar fashion they have an intrinsic motive principle responsible for the qualitative change of being healed. For since the heart is not subject to disease, the natural power which is present in it, as in something healthy, changes the whole body to a state of health.

1442f. Hence the Philosopher is speaking here of such matter as has an efficient principle within itself, and not of inanimate things. This is clear from the fact that he compares the matter of fire with the matter of a house in this respect, that both are moved to receive their form by an extrinsic principle. It does not follow, however, that the process whereby inanimate bodies are generated is not natural; for in order to have natural motion it is not necessary that the principle of motion present in the thing moved should always be an active and formal principle; but sometimes it is passive and material. Hence in Book II of the Physics nature is distinguished into matter and form. And the natural generation of simple bodies is said to proceed from this principle, as the Commentator says in his commentary on Book II of the Physics. Yet there is a difference between the matter of natural things and that of things made by art, because in the matter of natural things there is a natural aptitude for form, and this can be brought to actuality by a natural agent; but this does not occur in the matter of things made by art.

1443. And it is evident (617).

Then he clears up the second problem which could arise from the foregoing discussion; for he had said above (614:C 1432) that everything which is generated is generated by something having a similar form. Now this does not apply in the same way to all things, and therefore he intends here to clarify how this applies in a different way to different things.

In regard to this he does two things. First, he distinguishes the different ways in which the thing generated is like the thing which generates it. Second (618:C 1448), he explains these ways (“For the first”).

With regard to the first (617) it must be noted that everything which is generated by something is generated by it either properly or accidentally. Now whatever is generated by something accidentally is not generated by it according as it is a thing of some special kind. Hence in the generator there does not have to be any likeness of the thing generated; for example, the discovery of a treasure has no likeness in him who, when he digs in order to plant something, discovers the treasure accidentally. But a generator in the proper sense generates something of the same kind as itself. Hence in a proper generator the likeness of the thing generated must exist in some way.

1444. But this comes about in three ways: First, when the form of the thing generated pre-exists in the generator according to the same mode of being, and in a similar matter, as when fire generates fire or man begets man. This type of generation is wholly univocal.

1445. Second, when the form of the thing generated pre-exists in the generator, neither according to the same mode of being, nor in a substance of the same kind; for example, the form of a house pre-exists in the builder, not with the material being which it has in the stones and timbers, but with the immaterial being which it has in the mind of the builder. This type of generation is partly univocal, from the standpoint of form, and partly equivocal, from the standpoint of the being of the form in the subject.

1446. Third, when the whole form of the thing generated does not preexist in the generator, but only some part of it or a part of a part; as in the medicine which has been heated there pre-exists the heat which is a part of health, or something leading to a part of health. This type of generation is not univocal in any way.

1447. Hence he says, “It is evident from what has been said that in a sense all things come from something which is totally univocal, as natural things,” for example, fire comes from fire, and a man from a man; or it comes from something which is univocal “in part,” in reference to the form, and equivocal in part, in reference to the being which the form has in the subject; for example, a house comes from the house which is the art in the builder, “or by means of mind,” or by a habit of art; for the building art is the form of the house. Or in a third way some things come from the form pre-existing in the generator, or from the generator himself who possesses a part of the above-mentioned form. For the process of generation can be said to be a result either of the form or of a part of the form, or of something having the form or a part of the form; but it comes from something having the form as from a generator, and from the form or a part of the form as from something by which the generator generates; for it is not the form that generates or acts, but the thing having the form generates and acts by means of it. By this I mean that a thing is generated by something like itself in the ways mentioned above, unless it comes about in an accidental way; for then it is not necessary that any likeness of this kind should be observed, as has been explained (C 1443).

1448. For the first (618).

Here he explains the ways mentioned above in which one thing comes from something else. He does this first in the case of artificial things; and second (619:C 1451), in the case of natural ones ("And those things which").

He accordingly says, first (618), that the thing produced must come from some part, because the first and proper cause of the production of anything produced is the part of it which preexists in the one producing it, and which is either the form itself of the producer or a part of the form. For when heat is caused by motion, heat is present in a sense in the motion itself as in an active power; for the power of causing heat which is in the motion is itself something belonging to the genus of heat; and the heat which is present virtually in the motion causes the heat in the body, not by a univocal generation but by an equivocal one; for the heat in the motion and that in the heated body are not of exactly the same nature. But heat is either health itself or some part of health, or it is accompanied by some part of health or health itself.

1449. Now by these four alternatives which he gives he wants us to understand the four modes in which the form of the thing causing generation can be referred to the form of the thing generated. The first of these is found when the form of the thing generated is totally in the thing which causes generation; as the form of a house is in the mind of the master builder, and the form of the fire which is generated is in the fire which generates it. The second mode is found when a part of the form of the thing generated is in the thing causing generation, as when a hot medicine restores health by heating; for the heat produced in the one who is being healed is a part of health. The third mode is found when part of the form is in the thing causing generation, not actually but virtually, as when motion restores health by heating; for heat is present in the motion virtually but not actually. The fourth mode is found when the whole form itself is present virtually but not actually in the thing which causes generation; for example, the form of numbness is in the eel which makes the hand numb. And it is similar in the case of other things which act by means of the whole form. Therefore he refers to the first mode by the words “Either health”; to the second mode, by the words “or a part”; to the third, by the words “or some part of health follows from it”; and to the fourth, by the words “or health itself.” And since motion causes the heat from which health follows, for this reason too motion is said to cause health, because that causes health from which health follows or ensues. Or better “that which follows from and happens as a result of motion,” namely, heat, causes health.

1450. Hence it is evident that, just as in syllogisms the basis of all demonstrations “is substance,” i.e., the whatness (for demonstrative syllogisms proceed from the whatness of a thing, since the middle term in demonstrations is a definition), “so too in this case,” namely, in matters of operation, processes of generation proceed from the quiddity. In this statement the likeness of the speculative intellect to the practical intellect is shown; for just as the speculative intellect proceeds to demonstrate the properties of subjects from a study of their quiddity, in a similar fashion the intellect proceeds from the form of the work, which is its quiddity, as was stated above.

1451. And those things (619).

Here he explains his statement about artificial things in their application to natural things. He says that those things which are constituted by nature are similar to those which come to be by art; for the seed acts for the purpose of generating, and this is what happens in the case of things which come to be by art; for just as a master builder is not a house actually and does not possess the form which constitutes a house actually but only potentially, so too the seed is not an animal actually, nor does it possess a soul actually, which is the form of an animal, but only potentially. For in the seed there is a formative power which is related to the matter of the thing conceived in the same way in which the form of the house in the mind of the builder is related to the stones and timbers; but there is this difference: the form of an art is wholly extrinsic to the stones and timbers, whereas the power of the seed is present in the seed itself.

1452. Now although the generation of an animal from seed does not proceed from the seed as from something univocal, since the seed is not an animal, still that from which the seed comes is in some measure univocal with the thing which comes from it; for the seed comes from an animal. And in this respect natural generation bears no likeness to artificial generation; because it is not necessary for the form of the house in the mind of the master builder to come from a house, although this sometimes happens, as when someone makes a plan of one house from that of another. But it is always necessary for seed to come from an animal.

1453. Moreover, he explains what he meant by the phrase "in a sense univocal," because in natural generations it is not necessary that there should always be univocity in every respect, as there is when a man is said to come from a man, "for a woman comes from a man" as an agent; and a mule does not come from a mule, but from a horse or an ass, and in this case there is some likeness, as he said above (614:C 1433)Further, since he had said that there must be univocity to some degree because of that from which the seed comes, he adds that this must be understood "unless there should be some defect," i.e., unless there is some shortcoming of natural power in the seed; for then the generator produces something which is not similar to itself, as is evident in the birth of monsters.

1454. And "just as in those," ' i.e., in artificial things, some come to be not only by art but also by chance, when the matter can be moved by itself by the same motion according to which it is moved by art (but when it cannot be moved in this way, then that which comes to be by art cannot be produced by anything else than art), so too in this case some things can come to be by chance and without seed, whose matter can be moved by itself in this way "by the motion by which the seed moves," i.e., with the aim of generating an animal. This is evident in the case of those things which are generated from decay, and which are said in one sense to be a result of chance, and in another not, as was explained above (C 1403). But those things whose matter cannot be moved by itself by that very motion by which the seed is moved, are incapable of being generated in another way than from their own seed; and this is evident in the case of man and horse and other perfect animals. Now it is clear from what is said here that not all animals can be generated both from seed and without seed, as Avicenna claims, and that none can be generated in both ways, as Averroes claims.

1455. Now it must be observed that from what has been said here it is possible to solve the problems facing those who claim that the forms generated in these lower bodies do not derive their being from natural generators but from forms which exist apart from matter. For they seem to maintain this position chiefly because of those living things which are generated from decay, whose forms do not seem to come from anything that is similar to them in form. And again since even in animals which are generated from seed the active power of generation, which is in the seed, is not a soul, they said that the soul of the animal which is generated cannot come from the seed. And they proceed to argue thus because they think that no active principle of generation is found in these lower bodies except heat and cold, which are accidental forms, and it does not seem that substantial forms can be generated by means of these. Nor does it seem that the argument which the Philosopher used against those who posited separate exemplars, holds in all cases, so that the forms in things causing generation are sufficient to account for the likeness of form in the things which are generated.

1456. But all these difficulties are solved by the text of Aristotle if it is examined carefully. For it is said in the text that the active power in the seed, even though it is not an animal actually, is nevertheless an animal virtually. Hence just as the form of a house in matter can come from the form of house in the mind, so too a complete soul can come from the power in the seed, exclusive of the intellect, which is from an extrinsic principle, as is said in Book XVI of Animals. And this is true inasmuch as the power in the seed comes from a complete soul by whose power it acts; for intermediate principles act by virtue of primary principles.

1457. Now in the matter of those things which are generated from decay there also exists a principle which is similar to the active power in the seed, by which the soul of such animals is caused. And just as the power in the seed comes from the complete soul of the animal and from the power of a celestial body, in a similar fashion the power of generating an animal which exists in decayed matter is from a celestial body alone, in which all forms of things which are generated are present virtually as in their active principle. And even though active qualities are operative, they do not act by their own power but by virtue of their substantial forms to which they are related as instruments; as it is said in Book II of The Soul that the heat of fire is like an instrument of the nutritive soul.

1458. Now it is not only (620).

Then he clears up the third problem that could arise from his remarks; for he had proved above that it is not forms which are generated but composite things, and someone could be puzzled whether this is true only of substantia I forms or also of accidental forms. So his aim here is to meet this problem, and therefore he does two things. First, he shows that this is true of both types of forms. He says that the argument given above "with reference to substance," i.e., the category of substance, not only shows that the "specifying principle," or form, does not come to be, but is common in a similar way "to all genera," i.e., to the categories, such as quantity and quality and so on. "For a brazen sphere as such comes to be," i.e., a composite such as a brazen sphere, "but not the sphere," i.e., what has the character of a form, "or the bronze," i.e., what has the character of matter. And if a sphere does come to be in some manner of speaking, it does not come to be in itself, but comes to be in bronze; because, in order for generation to take place the matter and the form must pre-exist, as was shown above (599-602:C 1383-88). Thus it is "a brazen sphere as such," namely, the composite, which comes to be, "and this must also be the case with the quiddity," i.e., the category of substance, and with quality and quantity, and also with the other categories. For "quality" does not come to be, i.e., quality itself, but this whole which is "wood of such a quality"nor does "quantity" come to be, i.e.: quantity itself, but so much wood or so large an animal.

1459. But from these remarks (621).

He shows what the difference is between substance and accidents. He says that we must take this characteristic to be a property of substance as compared with accidents, namely, that when a substance is generated there must always exist another substance which causes its generation; for example, in the case of animals generated from seed, if an animal is generated, another animal which generates it must pre-exist. But in the case of quantity and quality and the other accidents it is not necessary that these pre-exist actually but only potentially, and this is the material principle and subject of motion. For the active principle of a substance can only be a substance; but the active principle of accidents can be something which is not an accident, namely, a substance.

LESSON 9

Parts of the Quiddity and Definition. Priority of Parts to Whole

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622. But since the definition is the intelligible expression of a thing, and every intelligible expression has parts, and just as the intelligible expression is related to the thing, so is a part of the intelligible expression to a part of the thing, the problem now arises whether the intelligible expression of the parts must be present in the intelligible expression of the whole or not; for in some cases they seem to be and in others they do not, for the intelligible expression of a circle does not include that of its segments [but the intelligible expression of a syllable includes that of its letters], yet a circle is divided into segments as a syllable is into elements.

623. Further, if parts are prior to a whole, and an acute angle is a part of a right angle, and a finger a part of a man, an acute angle will be prior to a right angle, and a finger prior to a man. However, the latter seem to be prior; for in the intelligible expression the parts are explained from them; and wholes are prior because they can exist without a part.

624. Or perhaps it happens that the term part is used in many senses, one of which is what measures a thing quantitatively. But let us dismiss this sense of the term and inquire about those things which constitute the parts of which substance is composed. Now if matter is one of these, and form another, and the thing composed of these a third, then there is one sense in

which even matter is called a part of a thing, and there is another in which it is not, but only those things of which the intelligible expression or specifying principle consists. For example, flesh is not a part of concavity, because flesh is the matter in which concavity is produced; but it is a part of snubness. And bronze is a part of the whole statue, but it is not a part of the statue in the sense of form; for predications must be made according to a thing's form and insofar as each thing has a form, but the material principle should never be predicated of a thing essentially. And this is why the intelligible expression of a circle does not contain that of its segments, whereas the intelligible expression of a syllable does contain that of its letters; for the letters are parts of the intelligible expression of the form, and are not matter. But segments of this kind are parts of the matter in which the form is produced, yet they are more akin to the form than bronze is when roundness is produced in bronze. However, not all the elements of a syllable will be contained in its intelligible expression; for example, the letters inscribed in wax or produced in the air; for these are already parts of the syllable as its sensible matter. For even if a line when divided is dissolved into halves, or a man into bones and sinews and flesh, it does not follow for this reason that they are composed of these as parts of their substance, but as their matter; and these are parts of the concrete whole, but not of the specifying principle, or of that to which the intelligible expression belongs. Hence they are not included in the intelligible expression of these things. Therefore in some cases the intelligible expression of a thing will include that of such parts as those mentioned, but in other cases it need not include them unless taken together they constitute the intelligible expression of the thing. For it is by reason of this that some things are composed of these as the principles into which they are dissolved, while others are not. Hence all things which are matter and form taken together, as snub and brazen circle, are dissolved into these parts, and matter is one of them. But all things which are not conceived with matter but without it, as the intelligible expression of form alone, are not corrupted either in an unqualified sense or in such a way as this. Hence these material parts are the principles and parts which come under these, but they are neither parts nor principles of the form. Therefore a statue made of clay is dissolved into clay, and a sphere into bronze, and Callias into flesh and bones; and again a circle is dissolved into its segments, because it is something conceived with matter. For the term circle is used equivocally both of that which is called such without qualification and of an individual circle, because there is no proper name for individual circles.

COMMENTARY

1460. Having shown what the quiddity (or essence) of a thing is, and to what things it belongs, and how it is related to the things to which it belongs, and that it is not necessary to posit separate quiddities in order to account for the generation of things, here the Philosopher's aim is to expose the principles of which a thing's quiddity is composed. This is divided into two parts. In the first (622:C 1460) he describes the principles of which a thing's quiddity is composed; and in the second (640:C 1537) he explains how the thing which comes into being from these principles is one ("And now").

The first part is divided into two. In the first he raises a difficulty. In the second (624:C 1467) he solves it ("Or perhaps").

The first part is divided into two insofar as he raises two difficulties about the same point. The second (623:C 1464) is treated where he says, "Further, if parts."

He accordingly says, first (622), that every "definition is the intelligible expression of a thing," i.e., a certain combination of words arranged by reason. For one word cannot constitute a definition, because a definition must convey a distinct knowledge of the real principles which come together to constitute a thing's essence; otherwise a definition would not adequately expose a thing's essence. And for this reason it is said in Book I of the Physics that a definition divides "the thing defined into its separate elements," i.e., it expresses distinctly each of the principles of the thing defined, and this can be done only by means of several words. Hence one word cannot be a definition, but it can give us information about something in the same way that a word which is better known can give us information about a word which is less well known. Now every intelligible expression has parts, because it is a composite utterance and not a simple word. Therefore it seems that, just as the intelligible expression of a thing is related to the thing, so also are the parts of the intelligible expression related to the parts of the thing. And for this reason the problem arises whether the intelligible expression of the parts must be given in that of the whole or not.

1461. This difficulty is confirmed by the fact that in some intelligible expressions of wholes the intelligible expressions of the parts seem to be present, and in some not; for in the definition of a circle the definition "of the segments of a circle" is not present, i.e., the definition of the parts which are separated from the circle, as the semicircle and quarter circle; but in the definition of a syllable the definition "of its elements," i.e., its letters, is present. For if a syllable is defined it is necessary to say that it is a sound composed of letters; and so we give in the definition of a syllable the letter and, consequently, its definition, because we can always substitute the definition for the word. Yet a circle is divided into segments as its parts, just as a syllable is divided "into its elements," or letters.

1462. Now his statement here that a part of the definition of a thing is related to a part of the thing as the definition is related to the thing, seems to involve a difficulty; for the definition is the same as the thing. Hence it seems to follow that the parts of the definition are the same as the parts of the thing; and this seems to be false. For the parts of the definition are predicated of the thing defined, as animal and rational are predicated of man, but no integral part is predicated of a whole.

1463. But it must be remarked that the parts of a definition signify the parts of a thing inasmuch as the parts of a definition are derived from the parts of a thing, yet not so that the parts of a definition are the parts of a thing. For neither animal nor rational are parts of man, but animal is taken from one part and rational from another; for an animal is a thing having a sentient nature, and a rational being is one having reason. Now sentient nature has the character of matter in relation to reason. And this is why genus is taken from matter and difference from form, and species from both matter and form together; for man is a thing having reason in a sentient nature.

1464. Further, if parts (623).

Then he gives the second difficulty; and this has to do with the priority of parts. For all parts seem to be prior to a whole as simple things are prior to what is composite, because an acute angle is prior to a right angle, since a right angle is divided into two or more acute angles, and in the same way a finger is prior to a man. Hence it seems that an acute angle is naturally prior to a right angle, and a finger prior to a man.

1465. But, on the other hand, the latter seem to be prior; namely, a right angle seems to be prior to an acute angle, and a man to a finger, and this seems to be so for two reasons. First, they are prior in meaning; for in this way those things which are given in the intelligible expression of other things are said to be prior to them, and not the other way around; “For in their intelligible expression an acute angle and a finger are explained from these,” i.e., they are defined in reference to these, namely, to man and to right angle, as we have stated. Hence it seems that a man and a right angle are prior to a finger and to an acute angle.

1466. Second, some things are said to he prior because they can exist without others, for those things which can exist without others, and not the reverse, are said to be prior, as is stated in Book V (465:C 950); for example, the number one can exist without the number two. Now a man can exist without a finger, but not a finger without a man, because a finger which has been severed from the body is not a finger, as is stated below (626:C 1488). Hence it seems that a man is prior to a finger; and the same reasoning applies to a right angle and to an acute angle.

1467. Or perhaps (624).

Then he solves the difficulties which were raised; and this is divided into two parts. In the first he gives the solution. In the second (625:C 1482) he explains it (“The truth, then”). In the third (629:C 1501), he settles a problem that could arise from the foregoing solution (“Now the problem”).

In support of what has been said in this chapter it should be noted that there are two opinions about the definitions of things and their essences. Some say that the whole essence of a species is the form; for example, the whole essence of man is his soul. And for this reason they say thaf in reality the form of the whole, which is signified by the word humanity, is the same as the form of the part, which is signified by the word soul, but that they differ only in definition; for the form of the part is so designated inasmuch as it perfects the matter and makes it to be actual, but the form of the whole is so designated inasmuch as the whole which is constituted by it is placed in its species. And for this reason they think that no material parts are given in the definition which designates the species, but only the formal principles of the species. This appears to be the opinion of Averroes and of certain of his followers.

1468. But this seems to be opposed to the opinion of Aristotle; for he says above, in Book VI (535:C 1158), that natural things have sensible matter in their definition, and in this respect they differ from the objects of mathematics. Now it cannot be said that natural substances are defined by something that does not pertain to their being; for substances are not defined by addition but only accidents, as was stated above (587:C 1352). Hence it follows that sensible matter is a part of the essence of natural substances, and not only of individuals but also of species themselves; for it is not individuals that are defined but species.

1469. And from this arises the other opinion, which Avicenna entertains. According to this opinion the form of the whole, which is the quiddity of the species, differs from the form of the part as a whole differs from a part; for the quiddity of a species is composed of matter and form, although not of this individual matter and this individual form; for it is an individual, such as Socrates or Callias, that is composed of these. This is the view which Aristotle introduces in this chapter in order to reject Plato's opinion about the Ideas; for Plato said that the forms of natural things have being of themselves without sensible matter, as though sensible matter were in no way a part of their species. Therefore, having shown that sensible matter is a part of the species of natural things, he now shows that there cannot be species of natural things without sensible matter; for example, the species man cannot exist without flesh and bones; and the same is true in other cases.

1470. Now this will constitute the third method by which the Ideas are rejected; for Aristotle rejected them, first, on the grounds that the essence of a thing does not exist apart from the thing to which it belongs; second, on the grounds that forms existing apart from matter are not causes of generation either in the manner of a generator or in that of an exemplar. And now in this third way he rejects Plato's thesis on the grounds that the intelligible expression of a species includes common sensible matter.

1471. Hence in solving this difficulty (624) he says that the word part is used in several senses, as was explained in Book V (515:C 1093); for example, in one sense it means a quantitative part, i.e., one which measures a whole quantitatively, as half a cubit is part of a cubit, and the number two is part of the number six. But this type of part is at present omitted, because it is not his aim here to investigate the parts of quantity, but those of a definition, which signifies a thing's substance. Hence it is necessary to investigate the parts of which a thing's substance is composed.

1472. Now the parts of substance are matter and form and the composite of these; and any one of these three—matter, form and the composite—is substance, as was stated above (569:C 1276). Therefore in one sense matter is part of a thing, and in another sense it is not, but this is true "of those things of which the intelligible expression or specifying principle consists," i.e., the form; for we understand concavity as form and nose as matter, and snub as the composite. And according to this, flesh, which is the matter or a part of the matter, is not a part of concavity, which is the form or specifying principle; for flesh is the matter in which the form is produced. Yet flesh is some part of snub, provided that snub is understood to be a composite and not merely a form. Similarly, bronze is a part of the whole statue, which is composed of matter and form; but it is not a part of' the statue insofar as statue is taken here in the sense of the specifying principle, or form.

1473. And to insure an understanding of what the specifying principle is and what the matter is, it is necessary to point out that anything which belongs to a thing inasmuch as it has a specific form belongs to its specific form; for example, inasmuch as a thing has the form of a statue, it is proper for it to have a shape or some such quality. But what is related to a form as its matter must never be predicated essentially of a form. Yet it must be noted that no kind of matter, be it common or individual, is related essentially to a species insofar as species is taken in the sense of a form, but insofar as it is taken in the sense of a universal; for example, when we say that man is a species, common matter then pertains essentially to the species, but not individual matter, in which the nature of the form is included.

1474. Hence it must be said that the definition of a circle is not included in "the definition of its segments," i.e., the parts divided from a circle, whether they be semicircles or quarter circles. But the definition of a syllable includes that "of its elements," or letters; and the reason is that "the elements," or letters, are parts of a syllable with reference to its form, but not to its matter; for the form of a syllable consists in being composed of letters. The divisions of a circle, however, are not parts of a circle taken formally, but of this part of a circle, or of these circles, as the matter in which the form of a circle is produced.

1475. This can be understood from the rule laid down above; for he had said that what belongs essentially to each thing having a form pertains to the form, and that what belongs to the matter is accidental to the specific form; but it belongs essentially to a syllable, which is composed of letters. Now the fact that a circle may be actually divided into semicircles is accidental to a circle, not as a circle, but as this circle, of which this line, which is a material part of it, is a division. Hence it is clear that a semicircle is part of a circle in reference to individual matter. Therefore this matter, i.e., this line, is more akin to the form than bronze is, which is sensible matter, when roundness, which is the form of a circle, is produced in bronze; because the form of a circle never exists apart from a line, but it does exist apart from bronze. And just as the parts of a circle, which are accidents in reference to individual matter, are not given in its definition, in a similar fashion not all letters are given in the definition of a syllable, i.e., those which are parts along with matter, for example, those inscribed in wax or produced in the air, since these are already parts of a syllable as sensible matter.

1476. For not all the parts into which a thing is corrupted, when it is dissolved must be parts of its substance; because even if a line when divided is dissolved into two parts, or a man into bones, sinews, and flesh, it does not therefore follow, if a line is thus composed of halves, or a man of flesh and bones, that these are parts of their substance; but these things are constituted of these parts as their matter. Hence these are parts of “the concrete whole,” or composite, “but not of the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, or “of that to which the intelligible expression belongs,” i.e., of the thing defined. Therefore no such parts are properly given in the intelligible expressions of these things.

1477. Still it must be noted that in the definitions of some things the intelligible expressions of such parts are included, i.e., in the definitions of composite things, of which they are the parts. But in the definitions of other things this is not necessary, i.e., in the definitions of forms, unless such forms are taken along with matter.

For even though matter is not part of a form, it must be given in the definition of a form, since the mind cannot conceive of a form without conceiving matter; for example, organic body is included in the definition of soul. For just as accidents have complete being only insofar as they belong to a subject, in a similar fashion forms have complete being only insofar as they belong to their proper matters. And for this reason, just as accidents are defined by adding their subjects, so too a form is defined by adding its proper matter. Hence when matter is included in the definition of a form, there is definition by addition, but not when it is included in the definition of a composite.

1478. Or his statement "unless taken together they constitute the intelligible expression of the thing" exemplifies his remark that "in other cases it need not include them." For in such cases it is not necessary that the material parts should be included in the definition, i.e., in the case of those things which are not taken together with matter, or which do not signify something composed of matter and form. This is evident; for since matter is not included in the intelligible expression of some things but is included in that of others, there can be some things which "are composed of these as the principles into which they are dissolved," i.e., the parts into which things are dissolved by corruption. And these are the things whose definitions include matter. But there are some things which are not composed of the foregoing material parts as principles, as those in whose definitions matter is not included.

1479. And since matter is included in the definitions of those things which are taken together with matter but not in those of others, "hence all things which are matter and form taken together." i.e., all things which signify something composed of matter and form, such as snub or brazen circle, such things are corrupted into material parts, and one of these is matter. But those things which are not conceived by the mind with matter but lack matter altogether, as those which belong to the notion of the species or form alone, these are not corrupted "in such a way as this," i.e., by being dissolved into certain material parts. For some forms are corrupted in no way, as the intellectual substances, which exist of themselves, whereas others which do not exist of themselves are corrupted accidentally when their subject is corrupted.

1480. Hence it is evident that material parts of this kind are the principles and parts of those things "which come under these," i.e., which depend on these, as a whole depends on its component parts; yet they are neither parts nor principles of the form. And for this reason when a composite, such as a statue made of clay, is corrupted, “it is dissolved into its matter,” i.e., into clay, as a brazen sphere is dissolved into bronze, and as Callias, who is a particular man, is dissolved into flesh and bones. Similarly a particular circle depending on these divided lines is corrupted into its segments; for just as Callias is a man conceived with individual matter, so too a circle whose parts are these particular segments is a particular circle conceived with individual matter. Yet there is this difference, that singular men have a proper name, and therefore the name of the species is not applied equivocally to the individual, but the term circle is applied equivocally to the circle “which is called such in an unqualified sense,” i.e., in a universal sense, and to singular particular circles. And the reason is that names are not given to several particular circles but they are given to particular men.

1481. Moreover it must be noted that the name of the species is not predicated of the individual in the sense that it refers the common nature of the species to it, but it is predicated of it equivocally, if it is predicated in such a way that it signifies this individual as such; for if I say “Socrates is a man,” the word man is not used equivocally. But if this word man is imposed as a proper name on some individual man, it will signify both the species and this individual equivocally. It is similar in the case of the word circle, which signifies the species and this particular circle equivocally.

LESSON 10

Priority of Parts to Whole and Their Role in Definition

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625. The truth, then, has now been stated; but let us state it even more clearly by repeating the same discussion. For all things which are parts of a thing’s inintelligible expression and that into which its intelligible expression is divided, are prior to it, either all or some of them. But the intelligible expression of a right angle is not divided into that of an acute angle, but the intelligible expression of an acute angle is divided into that of a right angle; and one who defines an acute angle uses a right angle, for an acute angle is less than a right angle. And the same thing is true of a circle and a semicircle; for a semicircle is defined by means of a circle, and a finger is defined by means of the whole man, because a finger is such and such a part of man. Hence all parts which have the nature of matter and are that into which the whole is divided as matter are subsequent [to the whole]. But all things which are parts of the intelligible expression and of the substance according to its intelligible expression are prior, either all or some of them.

626. And since the soul of animals (for this is the substance of living things) is their form according to the intelligible expression, and is the substance, species, or essence of such a body (for if a part of each animal is properly defined, it will not be defined without its function, and this will not

be possible without sensation), therefore parts of this kind, either all or some of them, are prior to the concrete whole, the animal; and this is likewise true of every individual thing. But the body and parts of this kind are subsequent to this substance; and it is not substance but the concrete whole which is divided into these as its matter. Therefore in a sense these are prior to the concrete whole and in a sense they are not; for they cannot exist apart, because a finger is not a part of an animal when it is disposed in just any way at all; for a dead finger is called a finger equivocally. But some parts are simultaneous with the whole, and these are the principal parts in which the intelligible expression and substance are present, for example, the heart or the brain, because it makes no difference which of them is such. But man and horse and those terms which are applied in this way to singular things, but are taken universally, are not substance, but a certain concrete whole composed of this matter and this intelligible expression taken universally. Socrates, however, is already a singular thing by reason of ultimate matter; and it is similar in other cases. Hence a part is a part of the species (which means the essence of a thing) and of the concrete whole which is composed of species and matter itself.

627. But only the parts of the species ire parts of the intelligible expression, and the intelligible expression is of the universal; for the being of a circle is the same as a circle, and the being of a soul the same as a soul. But in the case of a concrete whole, for example, this circle, or any singular thing, either sensible or intelligible (by sensible circles I mean those made of bronze and wood, and by intelligible, such as are the objects of mathematics), of these there is no definition; but they are known by intellect or by sense, i.e., when they are actually seen. And when they are removed from a state of actuality, it is not clear whether they exist or not; but they are always known and expressed by a universal formula. Now matter is unknowable in itself. And in one respect matter is sensible, and in another it is intelligible; sensible matter being such as brass and wood and anything mobile, and intelligible matter being what is present in sensible things but not as sensible, such as the objects of mathematics. How this applies to whole and part and to the prior and subsequent has therefore been stated.

628. But when anyone asks whether a right angle and a circle and an animal are prior to the parts into which they are divided and of which they are composed, the answer must be that these are not parts without

qualification. For if the soul is the same as an animal or a living thing, or the soul of each individual is the same as each individual, and if a circle is the same as the being of a circle, and a right angle is the same as the being of a right angle, the thing must be said to be subsequent to that by which it is, for example, to those parts which are included in its intelligible expression and to those in the universal right angle. For both the right angle which is found in matter, which is a bronze right angle, and that found in these particular lines, are subsequent to their parts; but the right angle which is immaterial is subsequent to the parts found in the intelligible expression, but is prior to those found in a particular thing. But to this question an unqualified answer must not be given. However, if the soul is something different and is not the same as an animal, even if this is so, in one sense it must be said that the parts are prior, and in another sense it must not, as has been stated.

COMMENTARY

1482. Since the foregoing solution was not always clear, for he had not yet shown how parts are prior, and subsequent or even distinguished the universal composite from the particular or the species from the form, he therefore now explains the foregoing solution. This is divided into two parts. In the first (625:C 1482) he explains the foregoing solution. In the second (628:C 1498) he tells us how the solution should be applied to this question (“But when anyone”).

The first part is divided into two sections. First, he answers the question about the priority of parts; and second (627:C 1492), the question whether the parts of the thing defined enter into its definition (“But only”).

The first part is again divided into two sections. First, he shows how parts are prior to wholes. Second (626:C 1484), he clarifies this by an example (“And since the soul”).

He accordingly says, first (625), that while the explanation given above in the solution advanced is true in itself, it is still necessary to go over it again so that it may become more evident in reference to the present discussion. For all parts of a thing’s intelligible expression, i.e., those into which the intelligible expression is divided, must be prior to the thing defined, either all or some of them. This is said because sometimes the parts of the form are not necessarily parts of the species, but relate to the perfection of a thing; for example, sight and hearing, which are parts of the sentient soul, are not integral or necessary parts of an animal, inasmuch as there can exist an animal which does not have these senses. They nevertheless belong to the perfection of animal, because perfect animals do have these senses. Thus it is universally true that those parts which are given in the definition of anything are universally prior to it.

1483. But even though an acute angle is part of a right angle, it is still not given in its definition; but the opposite is true, for the intelligible expression of a right angle is not dissolved into the definition of an acute angle, but the reverse. For he who defines an acute angle uses right angle in its definition, because an acute angle is less than a right angle. The same is true of a circle and a semicircle, which is defined by means of a circle, because it is a half of a circle. And the same thing holds true of a finger and a man, who is given in the definition of a finger; for a finger is defined as such and such a part of man. For it was stated above that the parts of the form are parts of the intelligible expression but not those of the matter. Therefore, if only the parts of the intelligible expression are prior and not those of the matter, it follows that all things which are material parts of the thing defined, into which it is dissolved in the same way that a composite is dissolved into its material principles, are subsequent. “But all things which are parts of the intelligible expression and of the substance according to its intelligible expression,” i.e., the parts of the form according to which the intelligible expression of the thing is understood, are prior to the whole, either all or some of them, according to the argument given above.

1484. And since (626).

Here he explains what he has said, by using an example. He says that since the soul of living things is their substance according to its intelligible expression, i.e., the form from which they derive their intelligible expression, then the soul of an animal “is the substance,” i.e., the form or specifying principle or essence “of such a body,” namely, of an organic body; for an organic body can be defined only by means of a soul. And from this point of view a soul is said to be the essence of such a body.

1485. The truth of this is shown by the fact that, if anyone properly defines a part of any animal at all, he can define it properly only by means of its proper operation, as, for example, if someone were to say that an eye is that part of an animal by which it sees. But the operation itself of the parts does not exist without sensation or motion or the other operations of the soul’s parts; and thus one who defines some part of the body must use the soul.

1486. And since this is so, its parts, i.e., those of the soul, must be prior (either all of them, as happens in the case of perfect animals, or some of them, as happens in the case of imperfect animals) “to the concrete whole,” i.e., to the composite of body and soul. The same thing is true of every other individual thing, because the formal parts must always be prior to any composite.

1487. But the body and its parts are subsequent “to this substance,” i.e., to the form, which is the soul, since the soul must be given in the definition of the body, as has already been stated (C 1485); and what is divided into the parts of the body as its matter is not “the substance itself,” but “the concrete whole,” i.e., the composite. It is clear, then, that in a sense the parts of the body are prior to “the concrete whole,” i.e., to the composite, and in a sense they are not.

1488. In fact they are prior in the way in which the simple is prior to the complex, inasmuch as the composite animal is constituted of them. However, they are not prior in the sense in which prior means something that can exist without something else; for the parts of the body cannot exist apart from the animal. Thus a finger is not a finger under all conditions, because one that is severed or dead is called such only equivocally, for example, the finger of a statue or that in a painting. But from this point of view parts of this kind are subsequent to the composite animal, because an animal can exist without a finger.

1489. But there are certain parts which, even though they are not prior to the whole animal with this sort of priority, are nevertheless simultaneous with the whole, from this point of view; because, just as the parts themselves cannot exist without the entire body, neither can the entire animal exist without them. And parts of this kind are the principal parts of the body in which “the form,” i.e., the soul, first exists, namely, the heart or the brain. Nor does it make any difference to his thesis what things may be such.

1490. Yet it must be borne in mind that this composite, animal or man, can be taken in two ways: either as a universal or as a singular. An example of a universal composite would be animal and man, and of a singular composite, Socrates and Callias. Hence he says that man and horse and those predicates which are used in this way in reference to singular things but are taken universally, as man and horse, "are not substance," i.e., they are not just form alone, but are concrete wholes composed of a determinate matter and a determinate form (i.e., insofar as these are taken not individually but universally). For man means something composed of body and soul, but not of this body and this soul, whereas a singular man means something composed of "ultimate matter," i.e., individual matter: for Socrates is something composed of this body and this soul, and the same is true of other singular things.

1491. Hence it is clear that matter is a part of the species. But by species here we mean not just the form but the essence of the thing. And it is also clear that matter is a part of this whole which "is composed of species and matter," i.e., the singular, which signifies the nature of the species in this determinate matter. For matter is part of a composite, and a composite is both universal and singular.

1492. But only the parts (627).

Here he explains what parts should be given in a definition. For since it was shown (622:C 1463) which parts are parts of the species as well as which are parts of the individual (because matter taken commonly is part of the species, whereas this definite matter is part of the individual), it is evident that only those parts which are parts of the species are parts of the intelligible expression, and not those which are parts of the individual; for flesh and bones, and not this flesh and these bones, are given in the definition of man; and the reason is that the definitive expression is applied only universally.

1493. For since the essence of a thing is the same as the thing of which it is the essence, as was shown above (591:C 1362), there will be a definition which is the intelligible expression or essence only of that which is the same as its own essence. Now things of this kind are universal and not singular; for a circle and the being of a circle are the same, and it is similar in the case of a soul and the being of a soul. But there is no definition of those things which are composed of a form and individual matter, as of this circle or of any other singular thing.

1494. Nor does it make any difference whether the singulars are sensible or intelligible; sensible singulars being such things as brazen and wooden circles, and intelligible singulars being such as mathematical circles. Now that some singulars are considered among the objects of mathematics is clear from the fact that in this order many things of the same species are observed~ as many equal lines and many similar figures. And such singulars are said to be intelligible insofar as they are grasped without the senses by means of imagination alone, which is sometimes referred to as an intellect, according to the statement in Book III of The Soul: "The passive intellect is corruptible."

1495. Therefore there is no definition of singular circles, because those things of which there is definition are known by their own definition. But singulars are known only as long as they come under the senses or imagination, which is called an intellect here because it considers things without the senses just as the intellect does. But "when" singular circles of this kind "are removed from a state of actuality," i.e., when they are no longer considered by the senses (in reference to sensible circles) and by imagination (in reference to mathematical circles), it is not evident whether they exist as singulars; yet they are always referred to and known by their universal formula. For even when they are not actually being perceived, these sensible circles are known inasmuch as they are circles, but not inasmuch as they are these circles.

1496. The reason for this is that matter, which is the principle of individuation, is unknowable in itself and is known only by means of the form, from which the universal formula is derived. Therefore when singular things are absent, they are known only by their universals. Now matter is the principle of individuation not only in singular things but also in the objects of mathematics; for there are two kinds of matter, one sensible and the other intelligible. And by sensible matter is meant such things as bronze and wood, or any changeable matter, such as fire and water and all things of this sort; and singular sensible things are individuated by such matter. But by intelligible matter is meant what exists in things which are sensible but are not viewed as sensible, as the objects of mathematics. For just as the form of man exists in such and such Matter, which is an organic body, in a similar way the form of a circle or of a triangle exists in this matter, which is a continuum, whether surface or solid.

1497. He therefore concludes that he has explained the relationship of whole and part, and the sense in which there is priority and posteriority, i.e., how a part is a part of the whole, and how it is prior and how subsequent. For the parts of individual matter are parts of the singular composite but not of the species or form, whereas the parts of universal matter are parts of the species but not of the form. And since universals and not singulars are defined, the parts of individual matter are therefore not given in a thing's definition, but only the parts of common matter together with the form or parts of the form.

1498. But when anyone (628).

He now adapts the proposed solution to the question previously noted. He says that when someone asks whether a right angle and a circle and an animal are prior to their parts, or the reverse: whether the parts into which these things are divided and of which they are composed are prior, we must meet this question by using the foregoing solution. Now in reply to this an un qualified answer cannot be given; for there are two opinions on this point. Some say that the whole species is the same as the form so that man is the same as his soul, and others say that they are not, but that man is a composite of body and soul. And it is necessary to answer each opinion in a different way.

1499. For if a soul is the same as an animal or a living thing, or in a similar way, if each thing is the same as its form (for example, a circle is the same as the form of a circle, and a right angle the same as the form of a right angle), we must answer by establishing which is subsequent and in what way it is subsequent; because from this point of view the parts of the matter are subsequent to those in the intelligible expression, and to those "in some right angle," i.e., in the universal right angle, but they are prior to those in a particular right angle. For this right angle which is bronze has sensible matter, and this right angle which is contained in singular lines has intelligible matter; but that right angle which is "immaterial," i.e., common, will be subsequent to the parts of the form present in the intelligible expression, and it will be prior to the parts of the matter which are the parts of singular things. And according to this opinion it will not be possible to distinguish between common matter and individual matter. Yet an unqualified answer must not be given to this question, because it will be necessary to distinguish between the parts of the matter and those of the form.

1500. If, however, the other opinion is true, namely, that the soul is different from the animal, it will be necessary both to say and not to say that the parts are prior to the whole, as was previously established; because with regard to this opinion he instructed us above to distinguish not only between matter and form, but also between common matter, which is part of the species, and individual matter, which is part of the individual.

LESSON 11

What Forms Are Parts of the Species and of the Intelligible Expression

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629. Now the problem rightly arises as to what parts are parts of the species, and which are not parts of the species but of the concrete whole. For if this is not clear it is impossible to define anything, because definition refers to the universal and the species. Hence, if it is not evident as to what parts are mate rial and what are not, the intelligible expression of the thing will not be clearly known.

630. Therefore in the case of all those things which seem to be produced in specifically different matters, as a circle in bronze and in stone and in wood, it seems to be evident that none of these, either bronze or stone or wood, belong to the substance of a circle, because it can be separated from them. And with regard to those things which do not seem to be separable, nothing prevents them from being similar to these, as, for instance, if all sensible circles were of bronze; for none the less the bronze would be no part of the species. But it is difficult to separate it in the mind; for example, the species of man always appears in flesh and bones and such parts. Hence the question arises whether these are parts of the species and intelligible expression of man, or are not but have the character of matter. But since such species do not occur in other matters, we cannot separate them.

631. Now since this seems to be possible, but it is not clear when, some thinkers are puzzled even in the case of a circle and a triangle, as if it were not right to define these by lines and by what is continuous, but that all these should be predicated in a way similar to the flesh and bones of a man and the bronze and stone of a circle. And they refer all things to numbers and say that the intelligible expression of a line is that of the number two. And of those who speak of Ideas, some claim that the number two is the line itself, and others claim that it is the Form of a line; for some say that a Form and the thing of which it is the Form are the same, for example, the number two and the Form of twoness; but this is not so in the case of a line.

632. It follows, then, that there is one Form of many things whose Form appears to be different; and this is a conclusion that also faced the Pythagoreans (68).

633. And it is possible [according to this view] to make one Form proper to all things, and to maintain that nothing else is a Form at all.

634. However, in this way all things will be one. Therefore that the questions about definitions constitute a problem, and why, has been stated.

635. Hence to reduce all things in this way and to do away with matter is superfluous; for perhaps some things are a this in this, or are things having these two principles. And the analogy of the animal, which the younger Socrates was accustomed to state, is not a good one; for it leads us away from the truth and makes us suppose that it is possible for man to exist without parts, as a circle exists without bronze. But this case is not similar; for an animal is something sensible and cannot be defined without motion, and therefore it cannot be defined without its parts being disposed in some way. For it is not a hand in any condition which is part of a man, but when it is capable of performing the function of a hand. Hence it is a part when it is animated, but it is not a part when it is not animated.

636. And with regard to the objects of mathematics the question arises why the intelligible structures of the parts are not parts of the intelligible structure of the whole (for example, why semicircles are not parts of the intelligible structure of a circle), for they are not sensible. But perhaps this makes no difference; for there will be matter of certain things and of those which are not sensible. And this will be true of everything which is not an essence or species considered in itself, but a particular thing. Therefore the semicircle will not be part of the circle which is universal, but semicircles

will be parts of singular circles, as was said before (627); for some matter is sensible and some intelligible.

637. And it is also evident that the soul is a primary substance, and that the body is matter, and that man or animal is the composite of both taken universally. And Socrates and Coriscus are composed of soul and body taken individually, i.e., if the term soul is taken in two senses; for some take soul as soul and others as the whole. But if soul and body without qualification mean this individual soul and this individual body, each term is used both as a universal and as a singular.

638. But whether there are besides the matter of such substances other substances as well, and whether it is necessary to look for some different substance in these, such as numbers or something of this kind, must be examined later (Books XIII & XIV); for it is for the sake of these too that we are trying to define sensible substances, since in a sense the study of sensible substances constitutes the work of the philosophy of nature, or second philosophy. For the philosopher of nature must have scientific knowledge not only of matter but of the part which is intelligible, and the latter is the more important. And with regard to definitions the philosopher must know how the parts in the intelligible expression are disposed, and why the definition is one intelligible expression; for it is evident that a thing is one. But how a thing having parts is one must be examined later (733).

639. We have stated, then, what the essence of a thing is and how it is predicated essentially of all things (582), as well as why the intelligible expression of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, and why that of others does not. And we have also stated that those parts which have the nature of matter are not found in the intelligible expression of substance; for they are not parts of that substance, but of the whole. And in one sense there is an intelligible expression of this and in another sense there is not; for there is no intelligible expression that involves matter, because this is indeterminate. But there is an intelligible expression of the whole with reference to primary substance; for example, in the case of man there is an intelligible expression of the soul; for the substance of a thing is the specifying principle intrinsic to it, and the whole substance is composed of this along with matter. Concavity, for example, is such a principle, for from this and from nose snubnose and snubnesss are derived. For nose is also contained twice in these expressions; but in the

whole substance or in snubnose or in Callias matter is also present. And we have also stated that in some cases the essence of the thing is the same as the thing itself, as in the case of primary substances; for curvature and the essence of curvature are the same, if curvature is primary. And by primary I mean what does not refer to something as existing in something else as its subject or matter. But all things which have the nature of matter or are conceived with matter, are not the same-not even if they are one accidentally, as Socrates and musician, for they are accidentally the same (590).

COMMENTARY

1501. In this part he solves a problem which could arise from the answer to the foregoing question; for in answering that question he had distinguished the parts of the species from those of the individual thing, which is composed of species and matter. Hence he now inquires as to what parts are parts of the species and what are not.

This part is therefore divided into three sections. In the first (629:C 1501) he solves the problem. In the second (638:C 1525) he shows what remains to be discussed ("But whether"). In the third (639:C 1529) he summarizes the points discussed ("We have stated").

He accordingly says, first (629), that since it has been stated that the parts of the species are given in definitions, but not the parts of the thing composed of matter and species, there is a real problem as to what parts are parts of the species, and what are not parts of the species "but of the concrete whole," i.e., the individual thing, in which the nature of the species is taken along with individuating matter.

1502. For if this is not evident, we will be unable to define anything correctly, because definition never pertains to the singular but only to the universal, as was stated above (627:C 149397). And among universals the species is properly included, and this is constituted of genus and difference, of which every definition is composed; for a genus is defined only if there is also a species. Hence it is clear that unless we know what part has the nature of matter, and what part does not but pertains to the species itself, it will not be evident as to what definition should be assigned to a thing, since it is assigned only to the species. And in the definition of the species it is necessary to give the parts of the species and not those which are subsequent to it.

1503. Therefore in the case (630).

He solves the proposed problem; and in regard to this he does three things. First (630:C 1503), he gives the solution according to the opinion of the Platonists. Second (632:C 1512), he rejects it ("It follows"). Third (635:C 196), he solves it by giving his own opinion ("Hence to reduce").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he solves the proposed difficulty in reference to sensible things; and second (631:C 1507), in reference to the objects of mathematics ("Now since this seems").

He says, first (630), then, that In the case of some things it is evident that matter is not part of the species, for example, all those which appear to be produced in specifically different matters, as a circle is found to be produced in bronze, in stone and in wood. Hence it is evident that neither bronze nor stone nor wood is part of the substance of circle, as though it were a part of the form, circle. And this is evident by reason of the fact that circle may be separated from each of these matters, and nothing can be separated from something which is a part of its form.

1504. But there are some things whose species do not occur as produced in specifically different matters, but always in the same matters; for example, the species of man insofar as it is apparent to the sense of sight is found only in flesh and bones. However, nothing prevents those things which do not seem to be separate from their proper matter from also being related in the same way to their own matters as those things which can exist in different matters and be separated from each of them.

1505. For if we were to maintain that some circles would not be apparent to the senses unless they were composed of bronze, none the less bronze would not be in this way a part of the form of circle. And even though circle would not then be actually separate from bronze, it would still be separable in thought, since the species of circle can be understood without bronze, since bronze is not part of the form of circle, although it is difficult to mentally separate and isolate from each other those things which are not actually separate; for this belongs only to those things which can be raised above the sensible order by the intellect.

1506. And similarly, if the species of man always appears in flesh and bones and such parts, it is necessary to ask whether these are parts of man's species “and of the intelligible expression,” or definition, of man; or whether they are not the species’ parts, but only the matter of the species, as bronze is the matter of a circle. But because such a species does not arise in other material parts than these, therefore we cannot by means of our intellect easily separate man from flesh and bones; for the reasoning seems to be the same in this case as in that of a circle, if all circles were of bronze.

1507. Now since this (631).

Then he continues his discussion by examining the opinion just touched on insofar as it relates to the objects of mathematics, He says that in some cases it seems possible for matter not to be a part of the species, although the species occurs only in matter, but it is not evident when and in what instances this is possible or not possible. Therefore some thinkers are puzzled about this, not only in reference to natural things but also in reference to the objects of mathematics, such as circles and triangles.

1508. For it seems to them that, just as sensible matter is not a part of the species of natural beings, in a similar fashion intelligible matter is not a part of the species of mathematical entities. Now the intelligible matter of mathematical figures is continuous quantity, such as lines and surfaces. Hence it was thought that a line is not part of the species of a circle or triangle (as if it were not right that a triangle and a circle should be defined by lines and by continuous quantity, since they are not parts of the species), but that all those things are related to a circle and a triangle in the same way that flesh and bones are related to man, and bronze and stones to circles.

1509. But when the continuous quantity, line, is removed from triangles and circles, the only thing that remains is the unit and number, because a triangle is a figure having three lines, and a circle is a figure having one. Therefore, not holding that lines are parts of the species, they refer all species to numbers, saying that numbers are the species of all mathematical entities; for they say that the intelligible structure of the number two is that of a straight line, because a straight line is terminated by two points.

1510. But among the Platonists, who posit Ideas, there is a difference of opinion on this matter; for some of them, i.e,, those who did not make the objects of mathematics an intermediate class between the Forms and sensible things but claimed that the Forms are numbers, said that the line is the number two, because they did not hold that there is an intermediate line differing from the Form of a line.

1511. But others said that the number two is not a line but the Form of a line; for according to them the line is a mathematical intermediate between the Forms and sensible things; and they said that the number two is the Form itself of the number two. And according to them there are some things in which the Form and the thing of which it is the Form do not differ, for example, numbers. Hence they said that the number two and the Form of twoness are the same. But this is not the case with a line, in their opinion, because a line already expresses something participating in a Form, since there are found to be many lines in one species; and this would not be so if the line itself were a separate Form.

1512. It follows, then (632).

He now rejects the solution given above; and he gives three arguments, of which the first is this: if numbers alone are separate Forms, all things which participate in one number will participate in one Form. But there are many specifically different things which participate in one number; for one and the same number is present in a triangle because of its three lines, and in a syllogism because of its three terms, and in a solid because of its three dimensions. Hence it follows that there is one Form of many things which are specifically different. This was the conclusion which faced not only the Platonists but also the Pythagoreans, who also claimed that the nature of everything consists in numbers.

1513. And it is possible (633).

Then he gives the second argument, which is as follows: if flesh and bones are not parts of the Form of man, and lines not parts of the Form of triangle, then for a like reason no matter is part of a Form. But in the case of numbers, according to the Platonists, the number two is attributed to matter and unity to Form. Therefore only unity constitutes Form. But the number two, and therefore all other numbers, inasmuch as they imply matter, will not be Forms. Hence there will only be one Form of all things.

1514. However, in this way (634).

Here he gives the third argument, which is as follows: those things are one whose Form is one. Hence if there is only one Form of all things, it follows that all things are one formally, and not just those which seem to be different [but in reality are not]. Yet it can be said that this third argument does not differ from the second one, but that it is an absurdity which follows as a conclusion of the second argument.

1515. Therefore having given the arguments on which the foregoing solution is based, and having given two arguments against this solution, he concludes that the questions about definitions constitute a problem, and that the reason for this has been stated. Thus it is evident that he wishes to use everything which has been set down to expose the difficulty connected with the foregoing problem.

1516. Hence to reduce (635).

He now gives the real solution of the foregoing problem based on his own doctrine. He does this first with regard to natural things; and second (636-.C 1520), with regard to the objects of mathematics (“And with regard”).

He accordingly says, first (635), that since the absurdities mentioned above plague those removing from the species of a thing all material parts, whether they are sensible or not, it is evident from what has been said that it is futile to reduce all species of things to numbers or to the unit and to do away completely with sensible and intelligible matter as the Platonists did.

1517. For some forms of things are not forms without matter, but are “a this in this,” i.e., a form in matter, in such a way that what results from the form existing in matter is the species. Or if they are not like a form in matter, they are like things which have a form in matter; for properly speaking natural things have form in matter, and the objects of mathematics also resemble these in a way inasmuch as the figure of a circle or a triangle is related to lines as the form of man is related to flesh and bones. Therefore just as man’s species is not a form without flesh and bones, neither is the form of a triangle or of a circle a form without lines. Hence the analogy of animal, which the younger Socrates was accustomed to use, is not a good one.

1518. Now it seems that Plato himself is called the younger Socrates, because in all his works he introduces Socrates as the speaker, since Socrates was his master. And Plato’s opinion about the materiality of natural species he calls an analogy, because it is similar to fables, which are devised for the purpose of conveying some opinion by means of a metaphor; and this is why he said above in Book III (254:C 471; 257:C 474), that this opinion resembles the opinion of those who assume that there are gods and that their forms are like human ones. Hence the view expressed above is not a good one, because it leads us away from the truth insofar as it makes us think that it is possible for man to exist without flesh mid bones, just as it is possible for a circle to exist without bronze, which clearly does not belong to the species of a circle.

199. But this case is not similar; for a man is not related to flesh and bones in the same way that a circle is related to bronze, because a circle is not something sensible in its own intelligible expression; for it can be understood without sensible matter. Hence, bronze, which is sensible matter, is not part of the species of a circle. But an animal seems to be a sensible thing since it cannot be defined without motion; for an animal is distinguished from something that is not an animal by means of sensation and motion, as is clear in Book I of The Soul. Therefore an animal cannot be defined without including bodily parts, which are disposed in a proper way for motion; for the hand is not a part of man when it exists in every state, but when it is disposed in such a way that it can perform the proper work of a hand; and this it cannot do without the soul, which is the principle of motion. Hence it is necessary that the hand be a part of man insofar as it is animated, but it is not a part of man insofar as it is not animated, like the hand of a corpse or that in a painting. Therefore such parts as are required for the carrying out of the proper operation of the species must be parts of the species; both those which pertain to the form and those which pertain to matter.

1520. And with regard to (636).

Next he answers the question with regard to the objects of mathematics; for though the solution has been given above with regard to natural things, it seems that the difficulty still remains with regard to the objects of mathematics; for he had said above that since an animal is sensible it cannot be defined without sensible parts, as a circle can be defined without bronze, which is sensible matter. Therefore “with regard to the objects of mathematics the question arises why the intelligible expressions of the parts,” i.e., the definitions of the parts, “are not parts of the intelligible expression of the whole,” e.g., why semicircles, or half-circles, are not given in the definition of a circle-, for it cannot be said that these, namely, semicircles, are sensible things, as bronze is sensible matter.

1521. But he answers that it makes no difference to his thesis whether the material parts are sensible or not, because there is intelligible matter even in things which are not sensible. And such matter—the kind which is not a part of the species—belongs to everything whose essence or species is not the same as itself "but is a particular thing," i.e., a determinate particular, as if to say that in everything which is not its own species but is a definite individual determined in species there must be certain material parts which are not parts of the species. For since Socrates is not identical with his own humanity but has humanity, for this reason he has in himself certain material parts which are not parts of his species but of this individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, for example, this flesh and these bones.

1522. And, similarly, in this particular circle there are these particular lines which are not parts of the species. Hence it is clear that parts of this kind are not parts of the universal circle but of singular circles, as was stated above (627:C 1492). And for this reason semicircles are not included in the definition of the universal circle, because they are parts of singular circles and not of the universal circle. This is true both of sensible and intelligible matter; for matter is found in both modes, as is evident from what has been said. But if there were some individual which was the same as its own species, for example, if Socrates were his own humanity, there would be no parts in Socrates which would not be parts of humanity.

1523. And it is also (637).

He now sums up the solution given above by using animal as an example. He says that it is evident that the soul "is a primary substance," i.e., the form of animal, and that the body is matter, and that "man is the composite of both," i.e., insofar as they are taken universally; but that Socrates or Coriscus is the composite of both taken particularly, because "soul is taken in two senses," i.e., universally and particularly, as soul and as this soul. Hence what is signified as a whole must be taken both universally and singularly, in the way in which soul is taken in two senses, because this is in keeping with both views which men take of the soul. For, as was said above (624:C 1467), some claim that a man or an animal is its soul, whereas others say that a man or an animal is not its soul "but the whole," i.e., the composite of soul and body.

1524. It is evident, then, according to the opinion which affirms that man is his soul, that the term soul is taken both universally and singularly, as soul and this soul; and the term man is also taken both universally and particularly, i.e., singularly, as man and as this man. And similarly, too, according to the opinion which affirms that man is a composite of body and soul, it follows that, if simple things may be taken both universally and singularly, composites may also be taken both universally and singularly; for example, if the soul is this thing and the body is this thing, which are referred to in an unqualified sense as parts of the composite, it follows that the terms universal and particular, or singular, may be applied not only to the parts but also to the composite.

1525. But whether (638)

He explains what still remains to be established about substances; and he gives the two issues which have to be dealt with. The first is this: when it has been established that the substance and whatness of sensible and material things are parts of the species, the next thing that has to be established is whether there is some substance besides the matter "of such substances," i.e., of material and sensible substances, so that it is necessary to look for some other substance of these sensible things besides the one which has been dealt with; as some affirm that there are numbers existing apart from matter, "or something of the kind," i.e., that separate Forms or Ideas are the substances of these sensible things. This must be investigated later on (Books XIII and XIV).

1526. For this investigation is the one proper to this science, because in this science we attempt to establish something about sensible substances "for the sake of these," i.e., for the sake of immaterial substances, because the study of sensible and material substances belongs in a sense to the philosophy of nature, which is not first philosophy, but second philosophy, as was stated in Book IV (323:C 593). For first philosophy is concerned with the first substances, which are immaterial ones, which it studies not only inasmuch as they are substances but inasmuch as they are such substances, namely, inasmuch as they are immaterial. But it does not study sensible substances inasmuch as they are such substances but inasmuch as they are substances, or also beings, or inasmuch as we are led by such substances to a knowledge of immaterial substances. But the philosopher of nature, on the other hand, deals with material substances, not inasmuch as they are substances, but inasmuch as they are material and have a principle of motion within themselves.

1527. And because someone might think that the philosophy of nature should not treat of material and sensible substances in their entirety, but only of their matters, he therefore rejects this, saying that the philosophy of nature must consider not only matter but also the part “which is intelligible,” namely, the form. And it must also consider form more than matter, because form is nature to a greater degree than matter, as was proved in Book II of the Physics.

1528. Second, it remains to be established how “the parts in the intelligible expression,” i.e., in the definition, are disposed: whether they are parts of the substance actually. And it also remains to be established why the definition, when it is composed of many parts, is one intelligible expression; for it is evident that the definition of a thing must be only one intelligible expression, because a thing is one, and a definition signifies what a thing is. But how a thing having parts is one must be investigated later (733:C 1755).

1529. We have stated (639).

Next he sums up the points which have been established. He says that it has been stated what the essence of a thing is, and how it is predicated of all things, and that it is predicated essentially. And it has also been stated why the intelligible expression signifying the essence of some things contains in itself the parts of the thing defined, just as the definition of a syllable contains its letters, and “why that of others does not,” as the definition of a circle does not contain semicircles. And again it has also been stated that those parts which are material parts of substance are not given “in the intelligible expression of substance,” i.e., of form, because such parts are not “parts of that substance,” i.e., of the form, but are parts of the whole composite.

1530. Now in one sense there is a definition of this kind of composite, and in another sense there is not; for if it is taken “with matter,” namely, the individual, there is no definition of it, since singulars are not defined, as was stated above (627: C 1493). The reason is that such individual matter is something unlimited and indeterminate; for matter is limited only by form. But if composite is taken “with reference to the primary substance,” i.e., to form, it has a definition; for the composite is defined when taken specifically, but not when taken individually.

1531. And just as the individual is individuated by matter, in a similar fashion each thing is placed in its proper species by its form; for man is man, not because he has flesh and bones, but because he has a rational soul in this flesh and these bones. It is necessary, then, that the definition of the species should be taken from the form, and that only those material parts should be given in the definition of the species, in which the form has the primary and chief role, as the intelligible expression of man is one which contains soul; for man is man because he has such a soul. And for this reason, if man is defined, he must be defined by his soul, yet in his definition one must include the parts of the body in which the soul is first present, such as the heart or the brain, as was said above (626:C 1489).

1532. For the substance, of which matter is not a part, "is the specifying principle," i.e., the form, which is present in matter; and from this form and matter "the whole substance" is derived, i.e., made determinate and defined; for example, concavity is a form of this kind, for from this and from nose snubnose and snubness are derived. And in the same way man and humanity are derived from soul and body. For if nose, which plays the part of matter, were part of curvature, then when curved nose is referred to, the term nose would be expressed twice; for it is expressed once by its own name, and it is included again in the definition of the curved. However, this would be the case if nose were placed in the definition of the curved as part of the essence of curvature, and not by addition, as was stated above (624:C 1472). And even though matter is not present in the essence of form, it is nevertheless present in the whole composite substance; for example, curvature is present in snub nose, and individual matter is also present in Callias.

1533. It was also said above (591:C 1362) that the essence of each thing is the same as the thing of which it is the essence. This is true without qualification in some cases, "as in the case of primary substances," i.e., in that of immaterial substances, just as curvature itself is the same as the essence of curvature, provided that curvature belongs to primary substances. He says this because curvature seems to be a form in matter, though not in sensible matter but in an intelligible matter—continuous quantity. Or, according to another text, "which is first"; for there is a primary curvature, like the curvature which exists among the separate Forms, according to the Platonists, and of these Forms it is universally true that each is the same as its own essence. But the other curvature which is present in sensible things or in the objects of mathematics is not a primary one. Hence it is not the same as its essence.

1534. And in explaining this he says that he does not use the term primary substance here to mean a particular substance, as he does in the Categories, but to mean something which does not exist in something else “as in a subject or matter,” i.e., those things which are not forms in matter, such as the separate substances. But all those which have the nature of matter or are conceived with matter, such as composites, which have matter in their intelligible expression, are not the same as their essence. Nor do those predications which are accidental form a unity, as Socrates and musician are the same accidentally.

1535. Now it must be noted that from the opinion which he expressed here that each thing and its essence are the same, he now excludes two kinds of things: (1) things which are accidental, and (2) substances which are material, although above he excluded only those things which are said to be accidental. And it is necessary not only to exclude the former but also to exclude material substances; for, as was said above (622:C 1460), what the definition signifies is the essence, and definitions are not assigned to individuals but to species; and therefore individual matter, which is the principle of individuation, is distinct from the essence. But in reality it is impossible for a form to exist except in a particular substance. Hence if any natural thing has matter which is part of its species, and this pertains to its essence, it must also have individual matter, which does not pertain to its essence. Therefore, if any natural thing has matter, it is not its own essence but is something having an essence; for example, Socrates is not humanity but something having humanity. And if it were possible for a man to be composed of body and soul and not be this particular man composed of this body and this soul, he would still be his own essence, even though he contained matter.

1536. Now even though man does not exist apart from singular men in reality, nevertheless man is separable in his intelligible expression, which pertains to the domain of logic. Therefore, above (578:C 1308), where he considered essence from the viewpoint of logic, he did not exclude material substances from being their own essence; for man as a universal is the same as his essence, logically speaking. And now having come to natural principles, which are matter and form, and having shown how they are related to the universal in different ways, and to the particular thing which subsists in nature, he now excludes material substances, which exist in reality, from the statement which he had made above to the effect that the essence of a thing is the same as the thing of which it is the essence. Moreover it follows that those substances which are subsistent forms alone do not have any principle individuating them which is extrinsic to the intelligible expression (of the thing or of the species) which signifies their whatness. Concerning these things, then, it is true that each is unqualifiedly the same as its own essence.

LESSON 12

The Unity of the Thing Defined and of the Definition

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640. And now let us speak first of definition insofar as it has not been discussed in the Analytics; for the problem mentioned there constitutes a preamble to the arguments about substance. And by this problem I mean: for what reason is that thing one whose intelligible expression we call a definition? For example, two-footed animal is the definition of man; for let this be his intelligible expression. Why, then, is this one thing and not many, namely, animal and two-footed?

641. For man and white are many since the latter is not present in the former; but they are one when the latter is present in the former, and the subject, man, is the recipient of some attribute; for then one thing is produced, and this is white man. But in this case one does not participate in the other; a genus does not participate in its differences, for then the same thing would participate in contraries; for the differences by which a genus is distinguished are contraries.

642. And even if it does not participate in them, the same argument applies if the differences are many, for example, capable of walking, two-footed and wingless. For why are all these one and not many? It is not because they are found in one thing, because then one thing will he composed of all differences.

643. But all the elements of a definition must be one, because a definition is one intelligible expression and one substance. Hence it must be the intelligible expression of some one particular thing; for substance signifies one thing and a particular thing, as we have said (582).

644. Now it is necessary first to examine those definitions which are attained by the process of division. For there is nothing in a definition except the primary genus and the differences; and the other genera consist of the so-called primary genus and the differences included in this; for example, the primary genus is animal, and the next is two-footed, and the next is two-footed animal without wings. And the same thing also applies if a definition is expressed by many terms. And on the whole it makes no difference whether it is expressed by many or by few, or whether it is expressed by few or by two. Of the two, then, the one is the difference and the other the genus; for example, in the expression “two-footed animal,” animal is the genus and the other term is the difference. Hence, if a genus in an unqualified sense does not exist apart from those things which are its species, or if it has the nature of matter (for the spoken word is both a genus and matter, and the differences make the species, i.e., the letters, out of this), it is clear that the definition is the intelligible expression composed of the differences.

645. Again, it is necessary too that a difference should be divided by a difference, as “having feet” is a difference of animal; and it is necessary also to know the difference of animal having feet, inasmuch as it has feet. Therefore, if someone is to speak correctly of something having feet, he must not say that one kind is winged and another wingless; and if he does say this it will be because of incompetence. But he will speak correctly only if he says that one kind has cloven feet and the other not; because these are the differences of the difference having feet, since a cloven foot is a certain kind of foot. And one always wants to proceed in this way until he comes to the species which have no differences; and then there will be as many species of foot as there are differences, and the species of animals having feet will be equal in number to the differences.

646. If these things are so, then, it is evident that the ultimate difference will be the substance and definition of the thing, if the same thing is not to be expressed many times over in definitive expressions, because this is superfluous. However, this sometimes happens, for when one says “two-

footed animal having feet,” he has said nothing more than animal having feet and having two feet. And if he divides this by its proper difference, he will express the same thing many times, and equal in number to the differences. If, then, a difference of a difference may be produced, the one which is the ultimate difference will be the specific form and substance.

647. But if the division is made according to what is accidental, as if one were to divide what has feet into what is white and what is black, there will be as many differences as there are divisions.

648. Hence it is evident that the definition is an intelligible expression composed of differences, and that it is composed of the last of these if the definition is formed correctly.

649, Moreover, this will be evident if we change the order of the words in such definitions, for example, in the definition of man by saying “two-footed animal having feet”; for having feet is superfluous when two-footed has been stated. But there is no sequence of parts in substance, for how are we to understand that one part is subsequent and the other prior? Therefore with regard to those definitions which are formed by the process of division, let this much be a preliminary statement of the kind of things they are.

COMMENTARY

1537. After having shown what parts are given in definitions, here the Philosopher inquires how a definition, being composed of parts, can be one thing; and in regard to this he does three things. First (640:C 1537), he raises a question. Second (641:C 1538), he argues on one side (“For man”). Third (644:C 1542), he answers the question (“Now it is necessary”).

He accordingly says that with regard to definition we should speak now for the first time of the things which have not been stated about it “in the Analytics,” i.e., in the Posterior Analytics. For in that work a certain difficulty was raised about definition and left unsolved, and this must be answered here “because it constitutes a preamble to the arguments about substance,” i.e., because the answer to this question is a prerequisite for establishing certain things about substance, which is the chief concern of this science. This difficulty is why the thing of which the intelligible expression, namely, the quiddity, is a definition, “is one thing.” For a definition is an intelligible expression signifying a quiddity; for example, the definition of man is “two-footed animal,” for let us assume that this is his definition. Therefore the question is: why is this thing which is called two-footed animal one thing and not many?

1538. For man (641).

Then he raises arguments on both sides of the question; and he does this, first (641:C 1538), in order to show that one thing is not produced from them; and second (643:C 1540, to show that the contrary is true (“But all the elements”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that one thing is not produced from a genus and a difference. Second (642:C 1539), he shows that one thing is not produced from many differences (“And even if”).

He accordingly says, first (641), that these two things, man and white, are many when one of them is not present in the other; for, if white does not belong to man, then man and white are one in no way. But they are one when one of them is present in the other, and when the subject, man, “is the recipient of the other,” i.e., when it receives the modification, white; and then something accidentally one is produced from these two things, namely, a white man. Now from these remarks it is understood that one thing is not produced from two things when one does not exist in the other. But “in this case,” namely, when one speaks of two-footed animal, “one,” i.e., animal, does not participate “in the other,” namely, in two-footed, as white man participates in white. And this is so because animal is a genus and two-footed is a difference. But a genus does not seem to participate in differences, for it would follow that the same thing would participate in contraries at the same time; for differences are the contraries “by which a genus is distinguished,” i.e., by which a genus is divided; and for the same reason that it participates in one it will participate in the other. But if it is impossible for the same thing to participate in contraries, it will be impossible for one thing to be produced from a genus and a difference.

1539. And even if (642).

Then he shows that one thing cannot be produced from many differences. He says that, even if it is admitted that a genus participates in some way in a difference (as, for example, animal is not taken under its common aspect but insofar as it is restricted to a species by a difference, and then one thing is produced from a genus and a difference), the same argument can still be used to show that a definition does not signify one thing, if many differences are given in the definition; for example, if in the definition of man these three differences are given: first, capable of walking or having feet, second, two-footed, and third, wingless; for it cannot be said why these things are one and not many.

1540. For to explain this it is not enough to give as a reason that they exist in one thing (as in the animal, man), because in this way it would follow that all accidents which inhere in any subject would be essentially one thing; for we do speak of one accident in relation to another accident as well as to the subject. And since those things which are accidents of one subject may also be accidents of another subject, it would follow that those two subjects would be one, for example, snow and a swan, in both of which whiteness is found. And thus by inference it would follow that all things would be one. Hence it cannot be said that one thing is produced from many differences, even though one thing is produced from a genus and a difference. Hence it seems that a definition does not signify one thing composed of two parts.

1541. But all the elements (643).

Here he argues one side of the question, showing that a definition does signify one thing. He says that all the attributes which are given in a definition must be one. And this is so because a definition is one intelligible expression, and what it signifies is the substance of a thing. Hence a definition must be an intelligible expression signifying one thing, because the substance of a thing, which the definition signifies, is one quiddity. And it was also stated above (582:C 1330, where definition was shown to belong properly to substances, that a definition signifies a particular thing.

1542. Now it is necessary (644).

He answers the foregoing question by showing that a definition signifies one thing; and in regard to this he does two things. First (644), he shows how one thing is produced from a genus and a difference; and second (645:C 1551), how one thing is produced from many differences (“Again, it is”).

He accordingly says, first (644), that in order to investigate the unity of definitions it is necessary, first, to examine definitions which are based on the division of genus into differences. For those are true definitions which contain nothing but the primary genus and differences, because some definitions are based on certain accidents, or on certain properties, or also on certain extrinsic causes, which do not signify the substance of a thing. Hence such definitions are not to the point, since here he is treating of definitions with a view to investigating the substances of things.

1543. Therefore I say that in a definition there is a primary genus with differences, because, even if one sometimes gives in definitions certain intermediate genera between the primary genus, which is the most general, and the last species which are defined, nevertheless those intermediate genera are nothing but the primary genus and the differences included in the understanding of the intermediate genus "along with this," i.e., along with the primary genus; as when animal, which is an intermediate genus, is given in the definition of man, it is evident that animal is nothing but substance, which is the primary genus, along with certain differences; for an animal is a living sensible substance. And the case is the same when we understand the primary genus to be animal "having feet"; and again when we understand the third genus to be "two-footed animal without wings." And the same thing is true when any genus is limited by many differences; for a subsequent genus always includes a prior genus along with some difference. Hence it is evident that every definition is dissolved into a primary genus and certain differences.

1544. And in general it makes no difference whether the thing defined is defined by many terms or by few. Hence it makes no difference whether it is defined by few or by two, so long as one of these is a genus and the other a difference; for animal is the genus of two-footed animal, and the other term, namely, two-footed, is the difference. Therefore it must shown, first, how one thing is produced from these. This becomes clear as follows.

1545. A genus does not exist apart from the things which are its species, for no animal is found which is not a man or an ox or some other animal of this kind. Or if there is something which is a genus apart from its species, taken in the sense that it exists apart from its species, it is not a genus but matter, because it is possible for something to be both the genus and matter of certain things, as the vocal sound is both the genus of letters and their matter. That it is a genus is evident from the fact that differences added to the vocal sound make the species of articulate sounds; and that it is matter is evident because the differences “make the elements,” i.e., the letters, “out of this,” namely, out of the vocal sound, as something is made out of matter.

1546. Moreover, it must be understood that while genus and matter can be the same in name, they nevertheless do not mean the same thing; for matter is an integral part of a thing, and thus cannot be predicated of a thing, for it cannot be said that man is flesh and bones. But a genus is predicated of its species, and therefore it must in some way signify the whole thing, just as matter along with its privation is sometimes designated by the simple name of the matter in view of the namelessness of privations, as it was said above (610:C 1416) that bronze is taken for formless bronze when we say that a statue is made of bronze; and in a similar fashion when the form is nameless, the composite of matter and form is designated by the simple name of the matter-not common matter, but some determinate matter. And in this way it is taken as a genus; for just as a species is a composite of matter and a determinate form, so too a genus is a composite of matter and a common form.

1547. This becomes evident in many ways. For body can be taken both as the matter and as the genus of animal, because, if we understand in the notion of body a substance completed by its ultimate form, having in itself three dimensions, then body is a genus and its species arc the complete substances determined by these ultimate forms, as that of gold, of silver, of olive, or of man. But if one considers in the notion of body only that it is a thing having three dimensions with an aptitude for an ultimate form, then body is matter.

1548. And the same thing applies in the case of a vocal sound; for if in the intelligible expression of vocal sound one includes the formation of sound in common according to the form which is subdivided into the different forms of the letters and syllables, then vocal sound is a genus. But if in the intelligible expression of vocal sound one understands only the substance of sound, to which the foregoing formation can accrue, then vocal sound will be the matter of the letters. From this it is also evident that vocal sound, which is a genus, cannot exist without species; for a sound can be formed only if it has the definite form of this or that letter. But if it lacked altogether the form of a letter insofar as it is matter, then it would be found without letters, just as bronze is found without the things which are produced from it.

1549. If the foregoing statements are true, then, it is evident that a definition is an intelligible expression having unity from its differences in such a way that the whole essence of the definition is included in a certain way in the difference. For animal, which is a genus, cannot exist without species, because the forms of the species, the differences, are not different forms from the form of the genus but are the forms of the genus lacking determination; for example, it is evident that an animal is a thing having a sentient soul, that man is one having "such and such" a sentient soul, viz., with reason, and that a lion is one having "such and such" a soul, namely, with an abundance of daring. And it is the same in other cases. Hence, when a difference is added to a genus it is not added as though it were an essence distinct from the genus, but as though it were contained implicitly in the genus, as the determinate is contained in the indeterminate, for example, white in the thing colored.

1550. And in the light of this the problem raised above (640:C 1537) is solved, since nothing prevents one and the same genus from containing within itself various differences, as the indeterminate contains within itself various determinate things. And in addition it is solved by reason of the fact that a difference does not accrue to a genus as constituting an essence distinct from it, as white accrues to man.

1551. Again, it is (645).

He next shows that a multitude of differences does not prevent a definition from being one; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows in what way a multitude of differences should be taken in a definition. Second (646:C 1555), he shows that, if differences are taken in the right way, a multitude of differences does not prevent a definition from being one ("If these things").

He accordingly says, first (645), that in the case of those definitions which include many differences not only should the genus be divided by a difference but the first difference should also be divided by the second difference; for example, footed is the difference of animal according to which animal is said to have feet or to be capable of walking; but since this difference is also found to have many forms, it is again necessary to know the difference of such an animal, i.e., what its difference is, "inasmuch as it has feet," i.e., inasmuch as it is considered essentially and not accidentally.

1552. Therefore, since it is accidental to a thing having feet to have wings, it must not be said, in dividing the difference, that among those things which have feet, one kind is winged and another wingless, if a man wants to express correctly the division of the differences. Yet when someone in dividing differences “does this,” in such a way that he divides it by means of those attributes which are accidental, this is why he cannot find proper and essential differences. For sometimes necessity compels us to use accidental differences in place of essential differences inasmuch as accidental differences are the signs of certain essential differences unknown to us.

1553. But this difference “having feet” must be divided in this way, namely, so that among animals of this kind one kind has cloven feet and another has not; for these, namely, cloven and uncloven, “are the differences of foot.” Therefore having cloven feet divides essentially the difference having feet; for a cloven foot “is a certain kind of foot,” i.e., the difference having cloven feet is something contained under the difference having feet; and they are related to each other as the determinate to the indeterminate, as we said of genus and difference.

1554. And it is always necessary to proceed in this way in the division of differences until the one making the division “comes to the species which have no difference,” i.e., to ultimate differences, which are not divided further into other differences; and then there will be as many species of foot as there are differences, and the species of animals having feet will be equal in number to the differences; for any individual difference constitutes one ultimate species.

1555. If these things (646).

He shows here, from the things which have been set down, that a multitude of differences does not prevent a definition from being one. And in regard to this he does two things. First (646:C 1555), he proves his thesis. Second (648:C 1561), he draws the conclusion at which he aims (“Hence, it is evident”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proves how one thing is produced from many differences, if differences are understood essentially. Second (647:C 1560), he shows that this cannot be the case if the differences are understood accidentally (“But if the division”).

He accordingly says, first (646), that if the differences taken in a definition are such “as has been indicated,” i.e., so that differences are always taken essentially and not accidentally, it is obvious that the ultimate difference will constitute the whole substance of the thing and its entire definition; for it includes in itself all preceding parts.

1556. For on the grounds that a genus does not exist without differences it has been shown that a genus is included in its differences. But that the ultimate difference includes all preceding differences is evident from the fact that unless this were affirmed to be so, it would follow that “in the definitive expressions of things,” i.e., in their definitions, the same thing would have to be expressed many times. This would be superfluous and meaningless.

1557. And this absurd conclusion follows because, if someone were to define an animal by saying “two-footed having feet” (as he must do if two-footed is a difference distinct from having feet and does not include it), when he defines it in this way he has said nothing but animal having feet having two feet; for two-footed is nothing but having two feet, in which the difference having feet is obviously included. Hence it is evident that, if both are used, we get nonsense.

1558. Moreover, if someone divides two-footed “by its proper difference,” i.e., by those things which are essential and not accidental, it follows further that the same thing is expressed many times, and as many times is the number of differences used, so that, if I say that one kind of two-footed animal is one which has a foot divided into five toes, and another kind is one which has a foot divided into four toes, anyone wishing to give all intermediate differences in defining man would express the same thing many times, and as often as he added differences; for he would say that man is an animal having feet, having two feet, having feet divided into five toes.

1559. Now since these things are unacceptable, it is evident that, if differences are taken in a definition there will be one ultimate difference, namely, the one “which will be the specific form and substance,” i.e., which comprises the substance and specific form of the thing defined; and as a result of the unity of this difference the definition will be one.

1560. But if the division (647).

Here he shows that the definition cannot be said to be one if the differences which are taken are accidental. He says that, if someone in dividing and defining were to take an accidental difference (for example, if things having feet were divided, one into black and another into white), there would be as many ultimate differences as the divisions which have been made, because one of them would not include another. And concerning differences taken in this way the argument introduced above was directed against the unity of the definition; for differences of this kind taken accidentally in this way would be one only in their subject, and this is not enough to account for the unity of the definition.

1561. Hence it is evident (648).

He now concludes to his thesis; and in regard to this he does two things. First he gives his conclusion. He says that it is evident from the above discussions that, even though a genus and a difference are given in a definition, still a definition is an intelligible expression composed only of differences, because a genus is not something apart from its differences, as was stated above (644:C 1549). And even though many differences are given in a definition, still the entire definition depends on and is constituted by the ultimate difference, when the division is made “correctly,” i.e., by descending from more common to less common essential differences, and not by bringing in accidental differences from the side, so to speak.

1562. Moreover, this will be evident (649).

Second, he clarifies by means of an example the conclusion which was drawn, saying “moreover this will be evident,” namely, that the entire definition consists in the ultimate difference, on the grounds that if anyone changes the parts of such definitions an absurdity results. Thus someone might say that the definition of man is a two-footed animal having feet. But as soon as two-footed has been expressed, it is superfluous to add having feet. But if one were to say first “having feet,” it would still be necessary to ask whether it was two-footed, by dividing the difference having feet.

1563. From this it is evident that insofar as those differences are many they have a definite order among themselves. But this cannot mean that there is any order in the substance of a thing; for it cannot be said that this part of a substance is prior and another subsequent, because substance is complete all at once and not successively, except in the case of those things which are deficient in being, such as motion and time.

1564. Hence it is evident that a multiplicity of parts in a definition does not signify a multiplicity of essential parts of which the essence is constituted as if they were distinct things; but all signify one thing which is made determinate by an ultimate difference. It is also evident from this that there is one substantial form for every species. Thus there is one form of lion by which it is a substance, a body, a living body, an animal, and a lion; for if there were many forms corresponding to all the differences mentioned above, all could not be included under one difference, nor could one thing be composed of them.

1565. Lastly he brings his discussion to a close with a summary. He says that with regard to definitions which are based on the divisions of genera into differences and of difference into differences, these points should constitute a preliminary statement "of the kinds of things they are": they are composed of essential predicates, they contain in themselves the parts of the specific form, and each is also a unity. He says "preliminary" because in the following discussions certain points are established about definitions and quiddities.

LESSON 13

Rejection of Universals as Substances

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650. But since our investigation has to do with substance, let us return to it. And just as the subject and the essence and the composite of these are called substance, so also is the universal. Two of these, then, have been discussed already, namely, the essence (576-597; 622-649) and the subject (568-575); and it has been stated that a thing is a subject in two ways: either as this particular thing (as an animal is the subject of its attributes), or as matter is the subject of actuality. But according to some thinkers the universal also seems to be in the fullest sense a cause and principle. Therefore let us treat of this.

651. For it seems impossible that any of those things which are predicated universally should be substance. For, first, the substance of each thing is the substance which is proper to it and belongs to nothing else, whereas the universal is common; for that is said to be universal which is suited by its nature to be found in many things. Of what particular thing, then, will it be the substance? For it is either the substance of all or of one. But it cannot be the substance of all. And if it is the substance of one, all things will also be that one; for those things whose substance is one have one essence and are themselves one.

652. Furthermore, substance means what is not predicated of a subject, whereas a universal is always predicated of some subject.

653. But while a universal cannot be a substance in the way in which the essence of a thing is, it is found in this in the way in which animal is found in man and in horse. Therefore it is evident that it has some kind of intelligible expression. However, it makes no difference if there is no definitive expression of all those things which are present in substance; for none the less this will be the substance of something, as man is the substance of the particular man in whom it is present. Hence the same thing will happen again, for substance will be the substance of that thing, as animal will be the substance of that in which it is present as its proper form.

654. Furthermore, it is both impossible and absurd that this particular thing, or substance, if it is composed of certain parts, should not be composed of substances or of a particular thing but of quality; for that which is not substance, i.e., quality, will then be prior both to substance and to the particular thing itself. But this is impossible; for accidental attributes cannot be prior to substance either in intelligibility or in time or in the process of generation; for they would then be separable from it.

655. Furthermore, Socrates will have a substance in his substance, and therefore it will be the substance of two things. And in general it follows, if man and all terms used in this way are substance, that no one of the parts in the intelligible expression is the substance of anything, nor does it exist apart from the species or in anything else. And I mean that there is no animal existing apart from particular ones, and the same is true of everything contained in the intelligible expressions of things. From these considerations it is evident to those who study the matter that no universal is a substance, and that none of the categories signify particular things but things of such and such a kind.

656. And if this is not the case, many absurdities will follow, among them the third man (107).

657. Furthermore it is also evident in this way that a substance cannot be composed of substances which are actually present in it, for what is actually two can never be actually one; but if something is potentially two, it will be actually one; for example, the whole line consists of two halves existing potentially. For actuality separates. Hence, if substance is one it will not consist of substances present in it. And in this sense Democritus is right; for he says that it is impossible for one thing to be produced from two, or two from one; because he makes indivisible continuous quantities substances. It

is evident, then, that the same thing will also be true of numbers if a number is a composite of units as some say, because either the number two is not one or the unit is actually present in it.

658. But the result involves a difficulty; for if no single substance can consist of universals (because a universal signifies such and such a thing but not a particular thing), and if no single substance can be composed of actual substances, then every substance will lack composition. Hence no substance will have an intelligible expression. But it appears to all, and this has already been stated (587), that it is either substance alone or chiefly substance that is defined. But now it seems that not even this kind of substance is defined. Hence there will be no definition of anything, or in one sense there will be and in another there will not. The meaning of this will become clearer from what follows (669-676; 733-741).

COMMENTARY

1566. Having settled the issue about substance in the sense of quiddity, the Philosopher now comes to certain conclusions about substance insofar as the universal is considered by some thinkers to be a substance; and in regard to this he does two things. First (650:C 1566), he links up this discussion with the preceding one. Second (651:C 1569), he carries out his plan ("For it seems").

He therefore says, first (650), that since this science is chiefly concerned with the study of substance, we must return again to the division of substance in order to see what has been said and what remains to be said. Now it is clear from the preceding discussion that substance has the following meanings. First, it means what has the nature "of a subject," namely, matter, which is related to substantial form in the same way as a subject, which is a complete substance, is related to accidental form; second, it means the essence of a thing, which refers to its form; third, it means "the composite of these," i.e., the composite of matter and form; and fourth, it means the universal, according to some thinkers.

1567. Now the division of substance given here is the same as that given at the beginning of Book VII (568:C 1270), although it seems to differ; for there he gave four senses of substance: the subject, the essence, the universal and the genus. And he divided subject into three meanings:

matter, form, and the composite. And since it has already been made clear that essence derives from form, he puts essence in place of form; and again since a common genus is said to be substance on the same grounds as a universal is, as will be shown, he concludes that both belong in the same class; and thus there remain only the four senses in which substance is spoken of here.

1568. Two of these, then, have been discussed already; for essence has been treated (576:C 1299) and also the subject (568:C 1270), which is taken in two senses. For, first, it means a particular thing and an actual being, as animal is the subject of its predicates, and as any particular substance is the subject of its accidents. Second, it means primary matter, which is "the subject of actuality," i.e., of substantial form. These things were discussed where it was shown (629:C 1501) how the parts of matter pertain to the form and to the individual. But since not only the matter and the quiddity seem to be causes, but also the universal, because "according to some thinkers," i.e., the Platonists, this seems to be in the fullest sense a cause and principle, we will therefore -treat "of this," i.e., the universal, in this same seventh book. And in Book VIII (691:C 1681) we will treat of composite and sensible substances, to which the things treated in this seventh book are related as principles.

1569. For it seems (651).

Here he begins to investigate whether universals are substances, and this is divided into two parts. In the first (651) he shows that universals are not substances, as some thinkers claimed. In the second (681:C 1642) he shows to what extent the statements of those making this claim are true and to what extent they are false ("But those who").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows in a general way that universals are not substances. Second (678:C 1637), he shows this in a special way with regard to being and unity, which were assumed to be the substances of thinars in the highest degree ("And since").

The first is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that universals are not substances; and in the second (659:C 1592), he shows that they are not separate entities ("And from these").

in regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that universals cannot be substances on the grounds that they are predicated of many things; and second (654:C 1579), on the grounds that species are composed of universals as parts of their definition (“Furthermore, it is”). For he had said above, in Book V (524:C 1119), that in one sense a genus is a whole inasmuch as it is predicated of several things, and in another sense it is a part inasmuch as a species is composed of a genus and a difference.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that a universal is not a substance on the grounds that it is predicated of many things. Second (653:C 1577), he rejects a captious answer (“But while a universal”).

1570. For the clarification of this chapter it must be noted that the term universal can be taken in two senses. First, it can be taken to mean the nature of the thing to which the intellect attributes the aspect of universality, and in this sense universals such as genera and species signify the substances of things inasmuch as they are predicated quidditatively; for animal signifies the substance of the thing of which it is predicated, and so also does man. Second, a universal can be taken insofar as it is universal, and insofar as the nature predicated of a thing falls under the aspect of universality, i.e., insofar as animal or man is considered as a one-in-many. And in this sense the Platonists claimed that animal and man in their universal aspect constitute substances.

1571. This is what Aristotle aims to disprove in this chapter by showing that animal in general or man in general is not a substance in reality, but that the form animal or man takes on this generality insofar as it exists in the mind, which understands one form as common to many inasmuch as it abstracts it from all individuating principles. Hence in support of his thesis he gives two arguments.

1572. Concerning the first of these (651) he says that in the light of the succeeding arguments it seems impossible that any one of those attributes which are predicated universally should be a substance, i.e., insofar as it is taken in its universality. This is proved, first, by the fact that while the substance of each thing is proper to each and does not belong to something else, a universal is common to many; for that is said to be universal which belongs by nature to many things and is predicated of many. Hence, if a universal is substance it must be the substance of some thing. Of what thing, then, will it be the substance? For it must either be the substance of all the things to which it belongs or of one. But it is impossible for it to be the substance of all things, because one thing cannot be the substance of many, since those things are many whose substances are many and distinct.

1573. But if it is held to be the substance of one of the things in which it is found, it follows that all other things in which it is found, and of which it is held to be the substance, are that one thing; because it must also be their substance for the same reason, since it is found in all in the same way. Now those things of which the substance and essence are one must also be one themselves. Hence, since a universal cannot be the substance of all the things of which it is predicated or of any one of them, it follows that it is not the substance of anything.

1574. Now it should be noted that he describes a universal as what is naturally disposed to exist in many, and not as what exists in many; because there are some universals which contain under themselves only one singular thing, for example, sun and moon. But this is not to be understood in the sense that the very nature of the species, considered in itself, is not naturally disposed to exist in many things; but there is something else which prevents this, as the fact that all the matter of the species is included in one individual, and the fact that it is not necessary that a species which can last forever in a single individual should be numerically many.

1575. Furthermore, substance (652).

Here he gives his second reason. He says that substance refers to something which is not predicated of a subject. But a universal is something which is always predicated of some subject. Therefore a universal is not a substance. But this argument seems not to be cogent, for it is said in the Categories ‘ that it belongs to the notion of substance not to exist in a subject. But to be predicated of a subject is not opposed to the notion of substance. Hence in that place second substances are posited, and these are predicated of a subject.

1576. But it must be said that in the Categories the Philosopher is speaking from the viewpoint of logic. Now a logician considers things insofar as they exist in the mind, and therefore he considers substances insofar as they take on the character of universality from the way in which the intellect understands them. Hence in reference to predicating, which is an act of reason, he says that substance is predicated “of a subject,” i.e., of a substance subsisting outside of the mind. But the first philosopher considers things insofar as they are beings, and therefore in his view of the matter there is no difference between existing in a subject and being predicated of a subject. For he takes something to be predicated of a subject which is something in itself and belongs to some actually existing subject. And it is impossible that this be a substance, for then it would have to exist in a subject. But this is contrary to the notion of substance, as is also stated in the Categories.

1577. But while a universal (653).

Here he rejects the captious answer by which someone might oppose his first argument, in which he had said that all things are one whose substance and quiddity are one. For someone might say that a universal is not a substance in the sense of the essence of a thing, which is proper to one thing. Therefore with a view to rejecting this the Philosopher says “But while” it might be said, in opposition to the first argument introduced, that it is impossible for a universal to be a substance in the way in which an essence is, it is substance only as something existing in these particular things, as animal exists in man anti in horse. For the nature of animal is not found in man in such a way that it is proper to him, because it is also found in horse—as if to say that the argument cannot be answered in this way.

1578. For if animal in common is a substance, it follows that there is an intelligible expression of this substance. And it makes no difference to his thesis if there is no definitive expression of all those things “which are present in substance,” i.e., which are given in the definition, test there be an infinite regress in definitions, but all parts of any definition must be further defined. For this substance must be the substance of something, even though it does not have a definition, no less than if it has. Thus we might say that, although man in common does not have a definition, it must nevertheless be the substance of the man in whom it is present, namely, of man in common. Hence the same conclusion follows as before, because, even though this common substance is not held to be proper to any one of its inferiors, it must still be proper to that common substance in which it is first found. For example, if animal in common is a substance, animal will be predicated primarily of that common substance and will signify its proper substance, whether it be definable or not. Hence, since this substance is proper to one thing, it will be impossible for it to be predicated of many things.

1579. Furthermore, it is (654).

He now shows that the universal is not a substance by basing his arguments on the grounds that the universal is part of the definition and essence. In regard to this he does two things. First (654:C 1579), he gives the arguments in support of his thesis. Second (658:C 1590), he disposes of a difficulty ("But the result").

In regard to the first part he gives four arguments. First, he says that it is both impossible and untenable that a particular thing and a substance should not be composed of substances or particular things but of those things which signify quality—if it is composed of anything (which he adds to allow for simple substances). For since those parts of which a thing is composed are prior to it, it follows that what is not substance but quality is prior both to substance and to this particular thing. But this is impossible, because it is impossible for modifications and qualities and accidents to be prior to substance either in intelligibility or in time or in generation.

1580. For it has been shown above (563:C 1253) that they are not prior in intelligibility, because substance is given in the definition of accidents, and not the reverse. And from this it has also been proved above (563:C 1257) that they are not prior in time. From this in turn he further proves here that it would follow that attributes would be capable of existing apart from substances; and this is impossible. And priority in generation comes under priority in time, although the reverse is not true. For even though things which are not related to the generation of something are prior in time, they are' still not prior in generation; for example, a horse is not prior in generation to a lion which exists at this moment, even though it is prior to it in time. However, the parts of which a thing is composed are prior in the process of generation and therefore in time, and sometimes also in intelligibility, as was shown above (570:C 1278). Hence it is impossible that substances should be composed of things which are not substances. But universals do not signify particular things, but of what sort things are, as was said about second substances in the Categories. It is evident, then, that singular things, which are particulars, cannot be composed of universals if these are some kind of things which exist apart from singulars.

1581. But it seems that this argument is not a satisfactory one; for even though second substances, which are genera and species in the genus of substance, do not signify particular things but of what sort things are, nevertheless they do not signify of what sort things are in the same way in which attributes that signify accidental quality do, but they signify substantial quality. However, he argues here as if they signified accidental quality.

1582. But it must be said that if universals are things, as the Platonists claimed, we shall have to say that they signify not only substantial quality but also accidental quality; for every quality which is distinct from the thing of which it is the quality, is accidental. For example, whiteness differs from the body of which it is a quality, and it inheres in the body of which it is the quality as its subject; and therefore it is an accident. Hence, if universals as universals are things, they must be distinct from singulars, which are not universals. Therefore, if they signify the quality of those things, they must inhere in them as in substances and thus must signify accidental quality.

1583. However, for those who claim that genera and species are not things or natures distinct from singulars but are the singular things themselves (for example, that there is no man who is not this man), it does not follow that second substance signifies an accident or modification.

1584. Furthermore, Socrates (655).

He gives the second argument. He says that if universals are substances, it follows that Socrates will have a substance in his substance; for if all universals are substances, then just as man is the substance of Socrates, in a similar fashion animal will be the substance of man; and thus these two substances, one of which is man and the other animal, will exist in Socrates. His conclusion is “and therefore it will be the substance of two things,” i.e., it therefore follows that animal is the substance not only of man but also of Socrates. Hence one substance will belong to two things. Yet it has been shown above that one thing has only one substance.

1585. And the result mentioned applies not only in the case of Socrates but universally in all cases. For if man and the other things which are called species in this way are substances, it also follows that no one of the parts in the intelligible structure of a species is substance, and that it cannot exist without the species in whose definitions it is given or exist in anything else; just as there is no animal “apart from particular animals,” i.e., apart from the species of animal. And the same thing applies to all other predicates which are given in definitions, whether they are genera or differences. And this is true because, if those parts which are given in the definitions of species are substances, then since species are substances there will be many substances in singular things, and many things will have one substance; as was said about Socrates. From what has been said, then, it is evident that no universal is a substance, and that common predicates do not signify a particular thing but of what sort a thing is.

1586. And if this (656).

Then he gives the third argument. He says that, if the preceding conclusion is not admitted, many absurdities will follow, and one of these will be the need to posit a third man. This can be explained in two ways. First, it can mean that besides the two singular men, Socrates and Plato, there is a third man, who is common to both. This is not absurd according to those who posit Ideas, although it seems absurd from the viewpoint of right reason.

1587, Second, it can be explained as meaning that there is posited a third man besides a singular man and man in common, since they have a common name and intelligible expression, just as do two singular men in addition to whom a third common man is posited; and the reason is that they have a common name and definition.

1588. Furthermore, it is (657).

He gives the fourth argument. He says that universals are not substances for this reason that it is impossible that a substance should be composed of many substances actually present in it; for two actual things are never one actual thing, but two which are in potentiality are one actually, as is clear of the parts of a continuous quantity. The two halves of one line, for instance, exist potentially in the whole line, which is one actually. And this is because actuality has the power of separating and distinguishing; for one thing is distinguished from another by its proper form. Hence in order that many things may become one actual thing, it is necessary that all should be included under one form, and that each one should not have its own form by which it would exist in act. Hence it is evident that if a particular substance is one, it will not be composed of substances actually present in it; and thus if it is composed of universals, universals will not be substances.

1589. And in this sense Democritus is right when he says that it is impossible for one thing to be produced from two, and two from one; for it must be borne in mind that two actual existents never make one. But in failing to distinguish between the potential and the actual, he claimed that indivisible continuous quantities are substances; for he thought that, just as one thing does not contain many things actually, neither does it contain them potentially; and thus any continuous quantity is indivisible. Or this might be explained differently. I mean that Democritus was right if we assume his own position to be true, in which he claimed that indivisible quantities are the substances of things and thus are always actual, and in this way no one thing is produced from them. And just as this is true in the case of continuous quantities, in a similar way it is true in the case of numbers, if number is composed of units, as some thinkers claimed. For either the number two (or any other number) is not one thing, or the unit is not actually present in it. Thus the number two will not be two units, but something composed of units; otherwise a number would not be a unity, essentially and properly, but only accidentally, like a heap.

1590. But the result (658).

He poses a difficulty about the above answer. He says that the result of the foregoing discussion gives rise to a difficulty; for first (as was said), a substance cannot be composed of universals, because a universal does not signify a particular thing but of what sort a thing is; and second, a substance cannot be composed of actual substances; and thus it seems to follow that substances cannot be composed or made up of substances. It follows, then, that all substances lack composition. And thus, since no definitions are given of substances which lack composition (and this is clear from the fact that the definition is an intelligible expression having parts, as was shown above [622:C 1460]), it follows that no substance has a definition. But it seems to everyone, as was shown above (582:C 1331), that a definition is either of substance alone or chiefly of substance, and it has now been concluded that there is no definition of substance; hence it follows that there is no definition of anything.

1591. Now the answer to the above difficulty is that in one sense substance is composed of substances and in another it is not. But this will become clearer from the following discussions in this book (669:C 1606) and in Book VIII; for substance is composed of potential substances, not of actual ones.

LESSON 14

Rejection of Universals as Separate Substances

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659. And from these facts it is evident what consequences face those who say that the Ideas are substances and are separable, and who also at the same time make the form out of genus and difference. For if there are Forms, and if animal exists in man and in horse, it is either one and the same numerically or different.

66o. For it is evident that they are one in their intelligible expression, for one will express the same notion in speaking of each. Therefore, if there is a man-in-himself, who is a particular thing and is separate, the things of which he is composed, such as animal and two-footed, must also signify particular things and be separable and be substances. Hence animal will also be such.

661. If, then, the animal in horse and in man is one and the same, as you are in yourself, how can one thing be present in many things which exist separately?

662. And why will this animal not exist apart from itself?

663. Again, if it participates in two-footed and in many-footed, an impossible conclusion follows, for contrary attributes will belong at the same time to this thing which is one and a particular being. And if it does not, what mode of being is meant when one says that an animal is two-

footed or is capable of walking? But perhaps they are combined or joined together or mixed. Yet all such views are untenable.

664. But what will happen if there is a different animal in each? There will then be an infinite number of things whose substances is animal, for man does not come from animal accidentally.

655. Again, animal-in-itself will be many things; for the animal in each will be substance, since it is not predicated of anything else. But if this is not so, man will consist of that other thing, and that will be the genus of man.

666. Further, all the things of which man is composed will be Ideas. Hence no one of them will be the Idea of one thing and the substance of something else, for this is impossible. Therefore animal-in-itself will be each of these things which are contained in animals.

667. Again, from what is it derived? And how is it derived from animal-in-itself? Or how is it possible that the animal which is a substance should exist apart from animal-in-itself?

668. Again, these are the conclusions which follow in the case of sensible things, and there are others more absurd than these. If it is impossible, then, that this should be so, it is evident that there is no Idea of these sensible things, as some affirm.

COMMENTARY

1592. Having shown that universals are not substances in an unqualified sense, here the Philosopher shows that they are not substances existing apart from sensible things. This is divided into two parts. In the first (659:C 1592) he shows that universals are not substances existing apart from sensible things. In the second (677:C 1630 he clears up a point which had remained a problem in the above discussion ("It is also").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that universals are not separate substances. Second (669:C 1606), he shows that if they are separate they are not definable ("But since there are").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows the absurd consequences facing those who claim that universals are separate substances, by comparing genus with species; and second (668:C 1605), by comparing genus with individuals ("Again, these are").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he presents a division. Second (66o:C 1593), he proceeds to treat the first member of this division ("For it is evident"). Third (664:C 1600), he proceeds to treat the second member ("But what will happen").

He therefore says, first (659), that from what has been said above it is also possible to indicate the absurd conclusions facing those who say that the Ideas, which are said to be universal forms, are substances and are separable, and at the same time claim that a specific form is composed of genus and difference; for these two positions, when taken together, i.e., that forms are composed of genus and difference, and that universal forms are separate substances, called Ideas, lead to absurd consequences. For if forms are assumed to be separate, it follows that one genus exists in many species at the same time, as animal in man and in horse. Therefore, either this animal present in man and in horse is one and the same thing numerically, or there is one animal present in man and a different one present in horse. And he introduces this division because Plato claimed that there are Ideas of species but not of genera, even though he made the general claim that universals are substances.

1593. For it is evident (66o).

He proceeds to treat the first member of this division. First, he shows that the animal present in man and that present in horse are one and the same. Second (661:C 1594), he explains the absurdities which follow from this position ("If, then").

He accordingly says, first (660), that it is evident that the animal present in man and that present in horse are one and the same in their intelligible expression; for if one states the intelligible expression of animal insofar as it is predicated of each, namely, of man and of horse, the same intelligible expression—living sensible substance—will be assigned to each of them; for a genus is predicated univocally of a species just as a species is also predicated univocally of individuals. Hence, if, because of the fact that species are predicated of all individuals according to one intelligible expression, there is a common man, who is man-in-himself, existing by himself, "and who is a particular thing," i.e., something subsistent which can be pointed to and is separable from sensible things, as the Platonists maintained, then for a similar reason the things of which a species consists, namely, genus and difference, such as animal and two-footed, must also signify particular things and be separable from their own inferiors, and be substances existing by themselves. Hence it follows that animal will be one individual and subsistent thing, which is predicated of man and of horse.

1594. If, then, the animal (661).

Then he points out the absurdities which follow from this position; and there are three of them.

The first is that since a genus is present in a species as something signifying the substance of a thing, then animal will be present in horse as you are in yourself, who are your own substance. Now in this way it is not possible for some one thing to be present in many things which exist separately. For you are present only in yourself, since you are not in many things which exist separately, as in flesh and bones, which are your parts. Therefore, if animal is one and the same, it will be incapable of existing in many species, as in man and in horse, since the separate Forms, according to the Platonists, are substances which are distinct from each other.

1595. And why will (662).

Then he gives the second absurdity. For since man is one thing predicated of many, according to the Platonists, man is assumed not to be present in particular things but to exist outside of them. Hence, if there is one animal which is predicated of all species of animals, why will this universal animal-in-itself not exist apart from itself, namely, apart from horse or any other species of animal, as something existing separately by itself? No suitable explanation of this can be given by them.

1596. Again, if it participates (663).

He gives the third absurdity. He says that it is evident that a species is constituted of a genus and a difference. Therefore this is explained by the fact that a genus participates in a difference just as a subject participates in an accident. Thus we understand that man is made up of animal and two-footed in the same way that white man is made up of white and man. Or it is explained in some other way.

1597. And if a species comes to be because a genus participates in a difference, so that animal by participating in two-footed becomes a man, and by participating in many-footed becomes a horse or an octopus, an impossible conclusion follows. For when a genus which is predicated of different species is held to be one substance, it follows that contrary attributes will be present at the same time in the same animal, which is one thing in itself and a particular being, namely, something capable of being pointed to; for the differences by which a genus is divided are contraries.

1598. However, if man is not composed of animal and two-footed by way of participation, then when someone says that animal is two-footed or capable of walking, what will be the way in which one thing is constituted from these two? The implication is that the reason cannot be easily given. Therefore he adds “But perhaps they are combined,” which is equivalent to saying: will it be possible to affirm that one thing arises from these two as a result of their combination, as a house arises from stones; or by being joined together, as a chest comes from pieces of wood being fitted together; or by being mixed, as a lozenge comes from the alteration of different kinds of medications? For these are the three ways in which one thing is found to come from two or more things which exist as independent substances.

1599. But all of these ways are unacceptable. For genus and difference could not be predicated of species, as parts which are combined, joined together and mixed are not predicated of their wholes. Furthermore, one thing does not enter as a whole into the composition of different things, but its parts exist separately, so that one part of it enters into the composition of this thing and another into the composition of something else, as one part of wood enters into the composition of a house and another into the composition of a chest. Hence if man and bird were to come from animal and from two-footed in the foregoing ways, it would follow that the whole nature of animal would not be present in man and in bird, but different parts would be present in each. And so, again, animal would not be the same in each.

1600. But what will happen (664).

He now treats the second member of the division. He says that an absurdity follows if animal is not assumed to be one in all species of animals; and this leads to four impossible consequences. He gives the first by speaking as follows: the consequences facing those who claim that universals are substances when animal is assumed to be one in all species of animals, has been made clear. But because of this someone can say that there is a different animal in each species of animal; hence there will be an infinite number of things whose substance is animal, inasmuch as this follows from the statement of the foregoing position; for animal is the substance of any species contained under animal, since it cannot be said that man comes from animal accidentally but essentially. And thus animal pertains to the substance of horse and of ox and to that of the other species, which arc almost infinite in number. But that some one thing should be present in the substance of an infinite number of things seems absurd.

1601. Again, animal-in-itself (665).

Then he gives the second absurdity. He says that it also follows that "animal-in-itself," i.e., the universal substance animal, will be many, because animal, which is present in each species of animal, is the substance of the species of which it is predicated; for it is not predicated of the species as of something else substantially different from itself. And if the term animal is not predicated of man as something different, it will be proper to say that man will be made up of it, i.e., have animal within himself as his own substance, and that the thing being predicated, i.e., animal, is also his genus, which is predicated of him quidditatively. Hence it follows that, just as those things of which animal is predicated are many, in a similar way the universal animal is itself many.

1602. Further, all the things (666).

He gives the third absurdity. He says that it also follows, from the things said above, that all the things of which man consists, namely, the higher genera and species, are Ideas; and this is opposed to the position of the Platonists, who claimed that only species are Ideas of particular things, and that genera and differences are not Ideas of species. They did this because an Idea is the proper exemplar of the thing produced from the Idea so far as the form of the thing is concerned. Now the form of a genus is not proper to that of its species as the form of a species is proper to its individuals, which are formally the same and materially different.

1603. But if there are different animals for the different species of animals, then something in the substance of the genus of each species will correspond to each as its proper Idea; and thus genera also will be Ideas, and so will differences. Therefore it will not be characteristic of one of the universals to be an Idea and of another to be a substance, as the Platonists claimed when they said that genera are the substances of species and species the Ideas of individuals; for it is impossible that this should be so, as has been shown. From what has been said above, then, it follows "that animal in-itself," i.e., the universal substance animal, is each of these things “which are contained in animals,” i.e. which are contained among the species of animal.

1604. Again from what (667).

Here he gives the fourth absurdity. He says that there also seems to be a difficulty about the parts of which this thing, man, is composed; and how it is derived from “animal-in-itself,” namely, the universal animal; or “how is it possible that the animal which is a substance should exist apart from animal-in-itself,” i.e., how is it possible for man to be something apart from animal as a substance existing by itself and for it still to be true that animal is this very thing which is man? For these two views seem to be opposed, namely, that man exists apart from animal, and that animal is this very thing is man.

1605. Again, these are (668).

Then he rejects the foregoing position by comparing genera to singular things. He says that the same absurd conclusions which face those who claim that genera and universals are the substances of species, also face those who hold genera to be the substances of singular sensible things (and there are even more absurd conclusions than these). And their claim is absurd inasmuch as the nature of a genus is more removed from sensible, material singulars than from intelligible and immaterial species. Hence, if it is impossible that this should be the case, it is clear that there is no Idea of these sensible things, as the Platonists said.

LESSON 15

Three Arguments Why Ideas Cannot be Defined

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669. But since there are two kinds of substance, the concrete whole and the intelligible structure of a thing (and I say that the former is substance taken as the intelligible structure conceived with matter, and the latter is the intelligible structure in general), then all things which are called substance in the former way are subject to corruption; for these are also subject to generation. But the intelligible structure is not subject to corruption in such a way that it perishes, since it is not subject to generation; for it is not the being of house that is produced, but the being of this house. But they both are and are not without generation and corruption; for it has been shown (611) that no one generates or produces these. And for this reason, too, there is neither definition nor demonstration of singular sensible substances, because they have matter whose nature is such that it is possible for them both to be and not to be; and for this reason all singular instances of these are corruptible. Now demonstration is of necessary things, and definition is scientific. And just as scientific knowledge cannot sometimes be scientific knowledge and sometimes ignorance, but what is such is opinion, so too neither can it be admitted that demonstration or definition is such (but it is opinion then which is concerned with something that can be otherwise than it is). But if this is true, it is evident that there will not be demonstration or

definition of these things. For corruptible things are not evident to those having scientific knowledge; and when they have been removed from the sphere of sensory perception, even though their intelligible expressions remain the same in the mind, there will be neither demonstration nor definition of them. And for this reason when anyone, eager for setting the limits of things, defines one of these singulars, he must not ignore the fact that it is always possible to overthrow his definition; for it is not possible to define such a thing. Nor is it possible, then, to define any of the Ideas; for an Idea is of singular things (as they say), and is separable.

670. And it is necessary that the intelligible expression of a thing should be composed of words; and one who forms a definition will not coin a word (for it would be unknown), but the attributes which are posited are common to all things. It is necessary, then, that these also apply to other things; for example, if anyone were to define you, he would say that you are an animal capable of walking or white or having some other attribute which is found in something else.

671. But if anyone were to say that nothing prevents all things considered separately from being present in many things, but that taken together they are present together only in this one thing, it is first necessary to say that they belong to both; e.g., two-footed animal belongs both to animal and to two-footed. And this must be the case with eternal things.

672. It is also necessary that they be prior existents and parts of the composite. And even more, they must be separable if man is separable; for either neither or both will be such. If, then, neither is separable, a genus will not exist apart from species; but if both are, so also will a difference be.

673. Again, because they are prior to being itself, they will therefore not be destroyed.

674. And, again, if the Ideas are composed of Ideas, less composite things are the elements of others.

675. It will, moreover, be necessary that those things of which an Idea is composed should be predicated of many things, as animal and two-footed. But if this is not true, how will they be known? For there will be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more things than one. However, this does not seem to be the case, but every Idea is capable of being participated.

676. Therefore, as was stated (671), the fact that it is impossible to give definitions of eternal things, and especially of any singular instances of

these, as the sun and the moon, is hidden from these people. For people err by adding such attributes as can be removed and let the sun remain, for example, going around the earth or being hidden at night; (for according to them) if it stands still or is visible at night, it will no longer be the sun; but it is absurd if it is not so (for the sun means a certain substance); and they also err by adding attributes which are capable of belonging to something else; for example, supposing that another such thing should come into being, it would evidently be a sun. Therefore the definitive expression is common. But the sun was taken to be a singular thing, like Cleon and Socrates. For why do none of these thinkers offer any fixed limits of an Idea? For to those attempting this it would become evident that what has been said just now is true.

COMMENTARY

1606. In this place the Philosopher shows that the Ideas, which the Platonists claimed to be separate, are incapable of being defined. And he does this because the Platonists posited Ideas chiefly in order that they might apply them both to definitions and demonstrations, which have to do with what is necessary, since all these sensible substances seemed to be in motion.

In regard to this he does two things. First (669:C 16o6), he uses arguments to show that the Ideas cannot be defined. Second (676:C 1627), he uses an example (“Therefore, as was stated”).

In the first member of this division (669) he presents three arguments, and the first of these he states as follows: one kind of substance is “the intelligible structure,” i.e., the essence and form, and another is the composite of matter and form, which is the concrete whole made up of matter and form. And I say that these differ; i.e., “that the latter,” which is substance in the sense of the concrete whole, is substance taken as something having its intelligible structure conceived with matter; but the former, which is the form or intelligible structure or essence of a thing, is the intelligible structure or form in general, and this does not have individual matter connected with it.

1607. Therefore all those things which are called substance in the sense of a composite are capable of being corrupted; for it was shown above

(611:C 1423) that only those things which are composed of matter and form are subject to generation; and generation and corruption belong to the same subject.

1608. And substance in the sense of the intelligible structure or whatness of a thing is incapable of being corrupted in such a way that it is corrupted in itself. For it was shown above (611:C 1417-23) that this kind of substance is not generated but only the composite; for it is not the essence of a house that is produced (as was shown above), but what is peculiar to this house; because it is this particular house and not the intelligible structure of a house that is produced. Yet forms and quiddities of this kind sometimes are and sometimes are not "without generation and corruption," i.e., without being generated or corrupted in themselves, for they begin to be and not to be when other things are generated and corrupted. For it was shown above (611:C 1420) that in the case of natural things no one "generates these," namely, their forms and quiddities; nor does this happen even in the case of artificial things; but this singular agent generates and produces this singular thing.

1609. And because singular things are generated and corrupted there can be neither definition nor demonstration of singular sensible substances; for they contain individual matter whose nature is such that anything constituted of it is capable both of being and of not being. For matter itself, considered in itself, is in potentiality to form, by means of which the material thing exists, and to privation, by reason of which the material thing does not exist. Hence all singular things included among these sensible substances whose matter is in potentiality to being and non-bcing are corruptible. However, the celestial bodies do not have that kind of matter which is in potentiality to being and non-being, but that which is in potentiality to place; therefore they are not corruptible.

1610. Hence, if demonstration is of necessary things, as was proved in the Posterior Analytics, and definition is also "scientific," i.e., productive of science, because it serves as the middle term in a demonstration, which is a syllogism producing science, then just as it is impossible for scientific knowledge sometimes to be scientific knowledge and sometimes ignorance, because what is known scientifically must always be true, "but what is such," i.e., what can sometimes be true and sometimes false, is opinion, in the same way it is impossible that there should be demonstration or definition of those things which can be otherwise than they are; but about contingent things of this kind there is only opinion.

1611. If this is so, I say, it is evident that there will be neither definition nor demonstration of these singular, sensible, corruptible things. For corruptible things of this kind cannot be clearly known by those who have scientific knowledge of them when they have passed outside the scope of the senses, through which they are known. Hence, "even though the intelligible expressions" or forms of these singular things, by which they can be known, "remain in the soul," there will be neither definition nor demonstration of them. And for this reason when anyone, "eager for setting the limits of things," i.e., the definition of anything, defines a singular thing, he must not ignore the fact that it is always possible to remove the singular while the intelligible expression as such which he forms in his mind remains. And this is true because it is impossible to give a genuine definition of a singular; for in the case of those things which are truly defined the knowledge of the thing defined remains as long as the knowledge of the definition remains in the mind.

1612. Therefore, if a singular thing cannot be defined, it is impossible to define an Idea; for an Idea must be a singular thing, according to those who posit Ideas, since they claim that an idea is something which subsists of itself apart from all other things; and this is what singular thing means.

1613. And it is necessary (670).

Then he gives the second argument; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the argument; and second (671:C 1619), he rejects an answer which avoids the question ("But if").

Now it was necessary that he should add this argument to the foregoing one, since the argument given has already proved that the singular is not definable because it is corruptible and material, and the Platonists did not assign these two properties to the Ideas. Hence, lest his proof should be rendered ineffective, he adds another argument (670), and states it as follows.

1614. It is necessary that every definitive expression should be composed of several words; for one who defines a thing does not convey its meaning by giving only one word, because if he were to give only one the thing defined would still remain unknown to us. For when a single better known word is given it is possible to know the name of the thing defined but not the thing defined, unless its principles are given; for it is by its principles that everything becomes known.

1615. Now the resolving of the thing defined into its principles—which those forming definitions intend to do—is possible only when several words are given. Therefore he says that, if only one word is given, the thing defined will still remain unknown; but if many words are given, they must be common to all things [of their class].

1616. For if in the definition of any singular thing certain words are given which are proper only to that thing itself, they will be synonymous names of the same singular thing. Hence it is not the thing which will be made known when words of this kind are given, but perhaps a less well known word. For example, if we were to ask who Tullius is, and one were to answer, Marcus and Cicero, it would not be an apt definition.

1617. Therefore, if a singular thing is defined, certain words must be given which are applicable to many things. Hence the definition must fit not only the singular thing whose definition is under investigation but also other things; and this is opposed to the notion of a true definition; for example, if someone intended to define you, and said that you are an animal capable of walking or a white animal or anything else that applies to you, this definition would not only fit you but other things as well.

1618. It is evident, then, that a singular thing lacks a definition not only because it is corruptible and material but also because it is singular. Hence, neither is an Idea defined. The reason for this is the one which the Philosopher gives here: if the words taken to define a thing express the individual in terms of the things by which it is individuated, the words will be synonymous. But if they express the nature and common attributes without individuation, the definition will not be a proper definition of the thing defined, because all forms, accidental or substantial, which do not subsist of themselves, are, when considered in themselves, common to many. And if some are found in only one thing, as the form of the sun, this does not come from the form, inasmuch as it is of itself suited to be in many things, but from the matter; for the whole matter of the species is collected in one individual. Or this comes from its final cause, because one sun is sufficient for the perfection of the universe.

1619. But if anyone (671).

Then he rejects an answer which is evasive. For someone could say that while any of those attributes given in the definition of a singular Idea are proper to many individually, yet taken together they are proper to only one thing, viz., to the one whose definition is under investigation.

He rejects this answer in two ways. First (671:C 1619), with reference to the Ideas themselves; and second (675:C 1624), with reference to those things of which they are the Ideas ("It will, moreover").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he rejects the answer mentioned above, showing that it still does not follow that the definition belongs only to the thing defined; and second (672:C 1620), that it does not belong to it primarily ("It is also necessary").

Hence he says (671) that in opposing this answer it must be said, first, that the definition assigned to any Idea also belongs to other Ideas; for example, if the definition of the Idea of man is two-footed animal, these two belong "to animal and to two-footed," i.e., to the Idea of animal and to the Idea of two-footed; for those two Ideas combined would also be two-footed animal. Hence this definition, two-footed animal, will not be proper to the Idea of man. And this absurdity also follows ,,in the case of eternal things," i.e., if we consider the definition of an Idea, which is an eternal singular, from the Platonists' point of view, and if we consider that the definition given to one Idea is proper to the others.

1620. It is also (672).

Then he exposes the second consequence, namely, that the definition assigned to the Idea of man does not belong primarily to this Idea; and this is opposed to the notion of a definition, for a definition is shown to be true primarily of the thing defined.

He proves this in three ways. First, he says that it is necessary not only that the definition given to man should belong to animal and to two-footed, but also that these—animal and two-footed—should be prior to man and be his parts inasmuch as man is composed of both.

1621. But according to the position of the Platonists it would rather follow that both of these—animal and two-footed—are separable from man and from other animals, if man is assumed to be separable from individuals; because just as man is above individuals, in a similar fashion genus and difference are above man. For it is necessary either that nothing common be separable, or that both of these—animal and two-footed—be separable from man. Now if nothing common is separable, it follows that a genus will not exist apart from its species, and thus the genus will not signify substance. But if a genus exists apart from its species, then for a like reason a difference will also exist apart, for this is more common than a species. But if both animal and two-footed are separable from man, it follows that they are prior in the way in which the separate man is prior to the individual. And thus it further follows that the definition assigned to man belongs to certain prior things-to animal and to two-footed.

1622. Again, because (673).

Second, he proves the same point by means of another argument. He says that it is evident from the following consideration that animal and two-footed are prior to man in being; for those things are prior in being which are not destroyed when other things are destroyed, although when they are destroyed other things are destroyed. For example, the number one is prior to the number two because, when the number one is destroyed, the number two is destroyed; but not the reverse. And when animal and two-footed are destroyed, man is destroyed, although when man is destroyed the former—animal and two-footed—are not destroyed. Hence animal and two-footed are evidently prior to man.

1623. And again (674).

He then proves the same point by a third argument. He says that the same conclusion is evident if we maintain not only that animal and two-footed are separable from man, as being Ideas of man, as was proved above in the first argument (671:C 1621), but also that man is composed of them, insomuch that in this way a separate Idea turns out to be composed of separate Ideas. For it is evident that animal and two-footed, of which man is composed, would be less composite than man, who is composed of them. But what is less composite is prior. Hence it follows again that animal and two-footed are prior to man, not only because they are separate, as the first argument advanced, but also because man is composite, as this third argument advanced.

1624. It will, moreover (675).

Then he gives an additional argument to reject the answer given above. He says that it not only follows that the definition assigned to the Idea of man is common to other prior Ideas, namely, to animal and to two-footed, of which the Idea of man is supposed to be composed, but also that these very things—animal and two-footed—will be predicated of many things and not just of man. And this will occur not only when they are taken in themselves, as the foregoing answer of these men stated, but also when they are taken together.

1625. For if these elements of which the Idea of man is composed, animal and two-footed, are not predicated of many things, how is it known that they belong to the Idea of man, as was concluded above (644:C 1542-50)? For it would follow that there is some Idea which cannot be predicated of more things than one, since it is evident that the Idea of animal can be predicated of many individuals. Hence, if these two together—animal and two-footed—can be predicated of only one thing, it follows that two-footed restricts animal to one thing so that some Idea, two-footed, is predicated of only one thing. But this does not seem to be true, since every Idea is capable of being participated in by many things; for from one exemplar there arise many things which resemble that exemplar. Therefore the foregoing answer cannot be true.

1626. Moreover, it must be understood that by the same argument it can also be adequately shown that no singular thing among these sensible things can be defined by any properties or united forms, whatever they may be. For any Idea, and also any form, taken in itself, is naturally disposed to exist in many things; and thus no matter how they may be combined there will be an exact definition of this singular thing only accidentally, inasmuch as it is possible for all of these forms taken together to be found in only one thing. It is obvious, then, that the principle of individuation is not a collection of accidents (as some said), but designated matter, as the Philosopher has stated (627:C 1496).

1627. Therefore, as was stated (676).

Then he gives the third and chief argument to show that Ideas cannot be defined. He says that, since it has been stated above (669:C 1609) that individuals cannot be defined because of their corruptibility, as the first argument advanced, and since those attributes which are included in definitions are common ones, as the second argument advanced, the truth of the statement that it is impossible to define singulars among eternal things is not apparent, especially in the case of those which are unique in one species, as the sun and the moon. For since the things in question are eternal, the argument based on the corruptibility of singular things does not seem to be conclusive when applied to them. And because these things are unique in their species, the argument from the commonness of the parts of a definition does not seem to be conclusive in their regard; for in this case all attributes proper to one species alone are proper to one individual alone.

1628. But those who think that these things are definable are deceived to such an extent that they make many errors in defining such things. They err in one respect inasmuch as they add in the definitions of these things such attributes as can be removed and let the things themselves remain, namely, the sun and the moon; for example, in defining the sun they say that it is something “going around the earth,” i.e., revolving around the earth, or “hidden at night,” i.e., invisible during the night. For if the sun were to stand still and not revolve around the earth, or if it appeared without being invisible at night, it would not be the sun if it had been defined properly. However, it would be absurd if it were not the sun when these attributes were removed, for the sun signifies a substance; but these things by which it is defined are certain of its accidents.

1629. And they not only err in this way but also make a further mistake when they define the sun by an attribute which is suited to belong to something else; for supposing that “another such thing should come into being,” i.e., some body having such a form, or the same form and species, it is evident that it would be a sun, inasmuch as sun signifies a species; and in this way it can be defined. Hence, “the definitive expression is common,” i.e., the intelligible expression of the species sun. But this sun would be a singular thing like Cleon or Socrates. Thus it is certain that even though the Ideas are also claimed to be eternal and unique in their species, they still cannot be defined.

1630. Hence none of those who posit Ideas reveal “any fixed limits,” i.e., definition, of an Idea. For if they were to give the definition of some Idea, as that of man or horse, it would become evident, in opposition to those attempting to define an Idea, that what has just been said is true: an Idea is indefinable.

LESSON 16

Composition in Sensible Substances. Non-Substantiality of Unity and Being. Plato's Doctrine of Ideas

ARISTOTLE'S TEXT Chapter 16: 1040b 5-1041a 5

677. It is also evident that many of the things which are thought to be substances are potential, as the parts of animals; for none of them are separate. But when they have been separated, all are then like matter, for example, earth, fire and air; for none of them constitute a unity but they are like a heap of things before they are arranged and some one thing is produced from them. But someone might very easily suppose that the parts of living things and the parts of the soul which are close to them exist in actuality as well as in potency, because they have principles of motion consisting in something in their joints; and for this reason some animals live when they have been divided. Yet all parts exist potentially when they are one and continuous by nature, not by compulsion or by being joined together; for such a thing is a mutilation.

678. And since the term one is used in the same senses as the term being, and the substance of unity is one, and those things whose substance is one are numerically one, it is evident that neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, as neither can the being of an element or a principle. But we look for the principle in order to reduce the thing to something

better known. Therefore, among these unity and being are substance to a greater degree than principle, element or cause.

679. But neither are these substance, if nothing that is common is substance; for substance is not present in anything else but itself and in that which has it, of which it is the substance.

68o. Furthermore, unity will not be present in many things at the same time; but what is common is present in many things at the same time. Hence it is evident that nothing universal exists apart from singular things.

681. But those who speak of the Forms are right in a sense when they make them separate, if they are substances; but in a sense they are wrong, because they say that a Form is one in many things. And the reason for this is that they cannot explain what are the incorruptible substances of this kind which exist apart from singular, sensible substances. Therefore they make them specifically the same as corruptible things (for we know these things); i.e., they invent a man himself and a horse itself by adding the word itself to sensible things. Hence, even if we did not see the stars, none the less, as I should presume, there would be eternal substances besides those which we see. Hence, even if we do not now know what they are, perhaps it is still necessary that there should be some. It is evident, then, that no universal predicates are substance, and that one substance is not composed of substances.

COMMENTARY

1631. Here the Philosopher clears up a point which remained a difficulty above, namely, how a substance is composed of parts, when he showed above (518:C 1318) that a substance could be composed neither of its accidental attributes nor of actually existing substances (657:C 1588). Therefore he shows here (677) that the parts of which substances are composed are not actually existing substances but potential ones. He says that, since it was stated above (565:C 1263) that there are some things which are thought by all to be substances, namely, sensible substances and their parts, it is evident that most substances of this kind are potential and not actual, as is clear of the parts of animals and all other parts.

1632. He says that the parts of these substances are many, because since each whole is composed of many parts, there must be more component parts than composite wholes. And it is evident that parts exist potentially, because none of them are separate, but all parts as parts are rather united in the whole.

1633. For everything which is actual must be distinct from other things, because one thing is distinguished from another by its own actuality and form, as was stated above (658:C 1588). But when those things which are assumed to be parts have been separated from each other when the whole is dissolved, they are then actual beings, not as parts but as matter existing under the privation of the form of the whole. This is evident, for example, of earth, fire and air, which, when they are parts of a compound, are not actually existing things but exist potentially in the compound; but when they are separated, they are then actually existing things and not parts. For none of the elements “before they are arranged,” i.e., before they reach their proper state of mixture by way of alteration, and before one compound comes from them, together form a unity, except in the sense that a heap of stones is one in a qualified sense and not in an unqualified one. Or better “none of them,” i.e., they do not constitute a unity before some one thing is produced from them by arrangement.

1634. For even though all parts exist potentially, someone might very readily suppose that the parts of living things and those of the soul which are close to them are actual as well as potential, i.e., they are in potentiality close to actuality; and the reason is that living bodies are organic bodies having parts which are formally distinct. Hence they most of all are close to being actual; and this is because they have a principle of motion in some determinate part, since one part moves another. This is clear, for instance, in the case of their joints, in which the principle of motion of one of the two connected parts seems to be found, since one can be moved and another at rest, as is stated in The Motion of Animals.

1635. And since not only the parts of the body are in potentiality close to actuality, but also the parts of the soul, therefore some animals live after they have been divided, as segmented animals. And this is possible because in the whole animal there is one soul actually and there are many souls potentially. But when division is made the several souls become actual. This happens because of the imperfection of such animals which require very little diversity in their parts, for they have a soul with imperfect ability to function and incapable of acting in different ways, for which a number of different organs. are necessary.

1636. Yet even though these parts of the soul and the parts of living things are close to actuality, nevertheless they are all potential when the whole is one and continuous by nature. But this would not be the case if one thing came into being by force, as, for example, when the parts of one living thing are tied to those of another; or by grafting, as happens in the case of plants. For before the scion which is to be inserted is united with the plant, it is actual, but afterwards it is potential. “For such a thing,” namely, to be one by force or grafting, “is a mutilation,” i.e., something injurious to nature and opposed to nature.

1637. And since (678).

Here he shows in a special way that unity and being are not substances; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he states his thesis. He says that unity is predicated of things in the same way that being is, since they are interchangeable, and unity is predicated of a thing because of its substance. For one thing has one substance, and those things are numerically one whose substance is numerically one. And it is also evident that a thing is called a being because of its own substance.

1638. Since this is true, I say, it is clear that neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, but they are predicated rather of substance as their subject. And in a similar way neither does “the being of an element or a principle,” i.e., the very notion of a principle or element, express the substance of the thing called a principle or element. But we look for the principle or element in order to refer it to something better known, namely, to the substance of the subject.

1639. Yet being and unity are substance to a greater degree than a principle, element and cause, since they are closer to the substance of things; for principle, element and cause signify only the relationship of one thing to another, but being and unity signify something proper to a thing by reason of its own substance. Yet neither being nor unity is the substance itself of a thing.

1640. But neither (679).

Second, he proves his thesis by two arguments. He gives the first of these when he says that since these—unity and being—are common attributes, they cannot be substances if nothing common is substance, as has been proved (655:C 1585). That nothing common is substance is clear from the fact that substance can only be present in the thing to which it belongs and of which it is the substance. Hence it is impossible that substance should be common to several things.

1641. Furthermore, unity (680).

Here he gives the second argument. He says that unity itself cannot be present in many things at the same time; for this is opposed to the notion of unity even though it is maintained that there is a unity which exists by itself as a substance. But what is common is present in many things at the same time, for common means what may be predicated of many things and be present in many things. Hence it is clear that a common unity cannot be one in the sense that it is one substance. Furthermore, it is evident from all the points already discussed above in this chapter that no universal—either being or unity or genera or species—has a separate being apart from singular things.

1642. But those who (681).

He shows in what sense Plato's statements are true, and in what sense they are not. He says that the Platonists, who assume that there are certain ideal forms, are right insofar as they claim that these are separate, because they hold that they are the substances of singular things; for by definition a substance is something that exists of itself. Now unity cannot be something that exists of itself if it exists in some singular thing, and the reason is that if it does exist in one singular thing it cannot exist in others; for, as has already been stated (680:C 1641), no self-subsistent unity can be present in many things. Hence considering Plato's doctrine that the separate Forms are substance, he was right insofar as he maintained that they are separate.

1643. But the Platonists were not right when they said that there is one form in many things; for these two statements seem to be opposed, namely, that something may be separate and exist of itself, and that it may still have being in many things. The reason why the Platonists were led to posit separate substances of this kind, yet have them existing in many things, is that they discovered through the use of reason that there must be some incorruptible and incorporeal substances, since the notion of substance is not bound up with corporeal dimensions. But "they cannot explain" which substances are of this kind which are incorruptible and exist apart from these singular and sensible substances, i.e., they cannot describe and make them known, because our knowledge begins from the senses and therefore we can ascend to incorporeal things, which transcend the senses, only insofar as we may be guided by sensible substances.

1644. Therefore in order that they might convey some knowledge of incorporeal, incorruptible substances, “they make,” i.e., they suppose, them to be specifically the same as corruptible substances, just as they find among these corruptible substances a singular corruptible man and similarly a singular corruptible horse. Hence they claimed that among those separate substances there is a substance which is man, and another which is horse, and so on for other things, but in a different way; because according to the doctrine of the Platonists we know these separate substances on the grounds that we speak of “man himself,” i.e., man-in-himself, “and horse itself,” i.e., horse-in-itself. And thus in order to designate separate substances “we add this word,” i.e., the term “itself,” or in itself, to each sensible substance.

1645. From this it appears that the Platonists wanted those separate substances to be specifically the same as these sensible substances; and to differ only in that they gave to separate substances the name of a form in itself, but not to sensible substances. The reason for this is that singular substances contain many things which are not parts of the form, and they said that separate substances contain only those elements which pertain to the specific form and to the nature of the specific form. Hence this separate man was called man-in-himself, because he contained only those elements which pertain to the nature of the form; but this singular man contains many other things besides those which pertain to the form, and for this reason he is not called man-in-himself.

1646. Now there is a defect in this position comparable to that of maintaining that we do not see the stars and other incorruptible bodies but that it was nevertheless certain by reason that there existed incorruptible bodies, and then maintaining that incorruptible bodies were specifically the same as the bodies of corruptible things; as if we were to say that ox and man and horse and other substances of this kind were incorruptible bodies, as the poets imagined a ram (Aries) and a bull (Taurus) and the like to be present in the stars. Therefore even if we did not see the stars, none the less, “as I should presume,” there would be “eternal corporeal substances,” i.e., the stars, in addition to those substances which we did then see, namely, corruptible bodies of this kind, and they would be of a different species than these. And in a similar way, even if we do not now know how to express what separate substances are and of what nature they are, perhaps it is still necessary that there should be some separate substances in addition to sensible ones, and of a different species than these. And he says “Perhaps” because he has not yet proved that there are any separate substances apart from matter. However, he will prove this in later books (XII & XIII).

1647. Last of all he draws the conclusion at which he aims throughout the whole chapter. He says that two things are evident from what has been said: first, that no universal predicates are substances; and second, that no substance consists of substances having actual existence, or according to another text, “one substance is not composed of substances.” For he has shown above (655:C 1584-5) that substance in the sense of this particular thing does not consist of common attributes which signify of what sort a thing is.

LESSON 17

The Role of Nature and Substance in the Sense of Essence as Principle and Cause

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682. But let us state both what and what kind of thing it is necessary to say substance is, as though we were making a fresh start; for perhaps from these things we shall come to an understanding of that kind of substance which is separate from sensible substances. Hence, since substance is a principle and cause, let us proceed from this starting point.

683. Now the why of a thing is always investigated in the following way: why does one thing belong to something else? For to ask why a musical man is a musical man, is either to ask (as has been said) why the man is musical, or to ask about something else. Therefore to ask why a thing is itself is to make no inquiry at all; for both the fact that a thing is such and its existence must be evident from the first; and I mean, for example, that the moon undergoes an eclipse. And in the case of all things there is one reason and one cause of the fact that a thing is itself, for example, why a man is a man, or why the musical is musical—unless one were to say that each thing is indivisible in relation to itself. But this is what being one really is. However, this is common to all things and is small. But someone might ask, “Why is man such and such an animal?” This, then, is evident, that he is not asking why he who is a man is a man. Therefore one is asking why something is predicated of something else; for if this were not so, the

inquiry would be about nothing, for example, “Why does it thunder?” The answer is, “because sound is produced in the clouds.” For what is being investigated is one thing as predicated in this way of something else. And “Why are these things,” for example, bricks and stones, “a house?” It is evident, then, that he is asking about the cause. And this—to speak logically—is the quiddity. Now in the case of some things this is that for the sake of which a thing exists [its end or goal], as, say, in the case of a house or a bed. But in the case of other things it is the thing which first moves them, for this also is a cause. Such a cause is sought in the process of generation and corruption, while the other is also sought in the case of being.

684. Now the object of our inquiry is most obscure in cases concerned with things not predicated of others, as when we ask what man is; because a single term is used and it is not said definitely that he is this or that.

685. But in dealing with this question corrections must be; for if this is not done, it will turn out that asking something and asking nothing will have something in common. But since it is necessary to assume that the thing exists, it is clear that the question is why the matter is such and such, for example, why are these materials a house? Because these are the ones that constitute the being of a house. And why is this individual a man? or why is a thing having such and such a body a man? Hence what is being sought is the cause of the matter, and this is the specifying principle by reason of which something exists; and this is substance.

686. Hence it is evident that there is no inquiry or teaching as regards simple things, but that there is a different method of investigating such things.

687. Now since what is composed is composed of something in such a way that the whole is one, though not as a heap of things, but as a syllable is, a syllable is not the same as its letters i.e., ba is not the same as the letters b and a; nor is flesh the same as fire; for when these are dissociated, they no longer exist, for example, flesh and the like; but the elements exist, and fire and earth exist. Hence a syllable is a determinate thing, and not merely the elements of speech, as the vowel and the consonant, but something else as well. And flesh is not merely fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, but something else as well.

688. Therefore, if something must either be an element or composed of elements, then if it is an element the same argument will again apply; for

flesh will consist of this and fire and earth and something else besides, so that there will be an infinite regress. But if it is composed of elements, it is evident that it is not composed of one (otherwise it would be that very thing itself), but of many. Hence we use the same argument in this case as we did in that of a syllable or of flesh.

689. Now it would seem that this something else exists, and that it is an element and the cause of being, i.e., that it is the cause of this being flesh and of this being a syllable; and it is similar in other cases. But this element is the substance of each thing and the first cause of being.

69o. And since certain things are not substances, although all those which are according to nature and are constituted such by nature are substances, it is evident that in some cases this substance is a nature which is not an element but a principle. Now an element is something into which a thing is divided and which is intrinsic as matter; for example, a and b are the elements of a syllable.

COMMENTARY

1648. At the beginning of this seventh book the Philosopher had promised that he would treat of the substance of sensible things in the sense of their essence, which he has explained from the viewpoint of logic by showing that those attributes which are predicated essentially pertain to the whatness of a thing, since it was not yet evident what it is that constitutes substance in the sense of essence. Now the Platonists said that this substance is the universals, which are separate Forms. But this doctrine Aristotle rejected immediately above. Hence it remained for him to show what substance in the sense of essence really is. And in order to do this he also sets down as a premise that substance in the sense of essence has the character of a principle and cause. nis is the purpose of this chapter.

Hence it is divided into two parts. In the first (691:C 1648) he explains what his aim is. In the second (683:C 1649) he proceeds to carry out his aim ("Now the why").

He accordingly says, first (682), that, since it has been shown that no universal predicate is a substance, as the Platonists claimed, let us state what the real truth of the matter is about substance, viz., that which is essence, "and what kind of thing" this substance is, i.e., whether it is form or matter or something of this kind. He says “Let us state this,” as if we were introducing or announcing a starting point different from the dialectical one with which we began in the beginning of this seventh book to investigate the above-mentioned substance; for perhaps from the things which are to be said about the quiddities of sensible substances it will also be possible to understand that kind of substance which is separate from sensible substances. For even though separate substances are not of the same species as sensible ones, as the Platonists claimed, still a knowledge of these sensible substances is the road by which we reach a knowledge of those separate substances. And he adds what that other starting point is from which one must enter upon the proposed investigation. He says that one must proceed from this starting point in order to show what the above-mentioned kind of substance is, so that we may understand that in substance itself there is a principle and cause.

1649. Now the why (683).

Here he shows that substance in the sense of essence is a principle and cause; and in regard to this he does two things. ‘ First (683), he shows that it is a principle and cause. Second (687:C 1672), he shows what kind of principle it is (“Now since what”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains his aim. Second (684:C 1662), he rejects an interpretation which could seem opposed to the argument he has given (“Now the object”).

Now the point of his argument is as follows: whatever is such that one does not ask why it is, but is that to which the other things under investigation are reduced, must be a principle and cause; for the question why is a question about a cause. But substance in the sense of essence is a thing of this kind; for one does not ask why man is man, but why man is something else; and it is the same in other cases. Therefore the substance of a thing in the sense of its essence is a principle and cause.

1650. Hence he says, first (683), that “the why of a thing is always investigated in the following way,” i.e., we use the question why when we ask why one thing belongs to something else, and not why a thing is itself. “For to ask why a musical man is a musical man is either to ask (as has been said) why the man is musical, or to ask about something else.” This is equivalent to saying that, when we ask why a musical man is a musical man, this question can be interpreted in two ways: first, that the thing which has been stated and posited is under investigation, i.e., the thing being investigated, namely, the whole, musical man, is asked about the whole, musical man. Second, that one thing is asked about another; i.e., about a man who is musical what is asked is not why he is a man, but why he is musical.

1651. And he immediately rejects the first interpretation, saying that to ask why a thing is itself, for example, why man is man, is to make no inquiry at all; for every time we ask the question why, there must be something which is evident, and something which is not evident and has to be investigated. For there are four questions which may be asked, as is stated in Book 11 of the Posterior Analytics, namely, (i) "Is it?" (2.) "What is it?" (3) "Is it a fact that it is such?" and (4) "Why is it such?" Now two of these questions, namely, "What is it?" and "Why is it such?" basically coincide, as is proved in that work. And just as the question "What is it?" is related to the question "Is it?" so too the question "Why is it such?" is related to the question "Is it a fact that it is such?" Hence, when one asks the question why, these two points must be evident; for inasmuch as the question "Why is it such?" bears on the same point as the question "What is it?" the fact of the thing's existence must be evident. And inasmuch as the question "Why is it such?" is distinguished from the question "What is it?" the fact that it is such must be evident. Hence he says that, when one asks why, these two things must be evident, namely, the fact that it is such, and its existence, which pertains to the question "Is it?" for example, when we ask, "Why does the moon undergo an eclipse?" it must be evident that the moon does undergo an eclipse; for if this were not evident, it would be pointless to inquire why this is so. And by the same reasoning, when one asks "What is man?" it must be evident that man exists. But this could not happen if one were to ask why a thing is itself, for example, "Why is man man?" or "Why is the musical musical?" for in knowing that a man is a man it is known why he is a man.

1652. For in the case of all things there is one reason and one cause which cannot remain unknown, just as other common notions, which are called the common conceptions of the intellect, cannot remain unknown. And the reason is that each is one with itself. Hence each is predicated of itself.

1653. Now it might be that someone should want to give another cause, saying that the reason a man is a man, and the musical is musical, and so on in other cases, is that each is indivisible in relation to itself; and thus it cannot be denied of itself so that we should say that a man is not a man. Hence it must be affirmed of itself. But this argument does not differ from the first which we gave, namely, that each thing is one with itself. For "this is what being one really is"; i.e., we maintained above that unity signifies indivisibility. Therefore it is the same thing to say that each thing is one with itself and that it is indivisible in relation to itself.

1654. But even supposing that this argument differed from the preceding one, this too is still a characteristic common to all things, namely, that each thing is indivisible in relation to itself "and is something small," i.e., it has the nature of a principle, which is small in size and great in power. Hence one cannot inquire about it as about something unknown, any more than about other common principles. Another translation reads "And it is like a tone," as if to say that it is in harmony with the truth in all things. But another text has "And it is true," and we must understand by this "self-evident." Thus it is obvious that there can be no investigation as to why a thing is itself.

1655. It follows, then, that one always asks why this thing is something else. Hence he makes this clear next. He says that, if someone might ask "Why is man such and such an animal?" it is evident that he is not asking why man is man. Thus it is clear that he is asking why one thing is predicated of something else, and not why the same thing is predicated of itself. But when someone asks why something is predicated of something else, the fact that it exists must be evident; "for if this were not so," i.e., if it were not evident that it existed, "the inquiry would be about nothing"; for one is possibly inquiring about what is not. Or it may be taken in another way as referring to the point mentioned before; "for if this were not so," i.e., if one did not inquire about one thing as predicated of something else but as predicated of itself, the inquiry would be about nothing, as has been shown.

1656. Now in asking the why of something, sometimes we are asking about the cause taken as form in matter. Hence when we ask "Why does it thunder?" the answer is, "because sound is produced in the clouds"; for here it is clear that what is being asked is one thing of another, for sound is in the clouds, or thunder in the air.

1657. But sometimes we are asking about the cause of the form in the matter, either the efficient cause or final cause; for when we ask “Why are these materials (bricks and stones) a house?” the question concerns one thing as predicated of something else, namely, bricks and stones of a house. Hence the Philosopher did not say without qualification that the question is “What is a house?” but “Why are things of this kind a house?” It is evident, then, that this question asks about a cause.

1658. Now the cause which he has been investigating is the essence, logically speaking; for the logician considers the way in which terms are predicated and not the existence of a thing. Hence he says that whatever answer is given to the question “What is this thing?” pertains to the quiddity, whether it is intrinsic, as matter and form, or extrinsic, as the agent and final cause. But the philosopher, who inquires about the existence of things and their final and efficient cause, does not include them under the quiddity since they are extrinsic. If we say, then, that a house is something which protects us from cold and heat, the quiddity is signified from the viewpoint of logic, but not from that of the philosopher. Hence he says that the thing which is being investigated as the cause of the form in the matter is the quiddity, logically speaking. Yet according to the truth of the matter and from the point of view of natural philosophy, in the case of some things (for example, a house and a bed) this cause is “that for the sake of which a thing exists,” i.e., its goal [or end].

1659. He draws examples from the sphere of artificial things because it is most evident that these exist for the sake of some goal; for even though natural things also exist for some goal, this was nevertheless denied by some thinkers. Therefore, when someone asks why stones and timbers are a house, one can answer by stating the final cause: to shelter ourselves from cold and heat. But in certain cases the thing under investigation, as the cause of the form in the matter, “is that which first moves a thing,” i.e., the agent; for this also is a cause, for example, if we ask “Why are stones and timbers a house?” one can answer, “because of the art of building.”

1660. Yet there is this difference between the efficient and the final cause: such a cause (the efficient) is investigated as the cause of the process of generation and corruption. But the other cause (the final) is investigated not merely as the cause, of the process of generation and corruption but also of being. The reason for this is that the agent causes the form in the matter by changing the matter over to that form, as takes places in the process of generation and corruption. And inasmuch as the goal moves the agent through his intending it, it is also a cause of generation and corruption. And inasmuch as the thing is directed to its goal by means of its form, it is also a cause of being. Hence, when it is said that stones and timbers are a house as a result of the art of building, it is understood that the art of building is the cause of the production of the house. But when it is said that stones and timbers are a house in order to shelter us from cold and heat, it can be understood that the house has been built for this reason, and that it is useful for this reason.

1661. Now the Philosopher is speaking here of natural substances. Hence his statement here must be understood to apply only to a natural agent, which acts by means of motion. For the Divine agent, who communicates being without motion, is the cause not only of becoming but also of being.

1662. Now the object (684).

Since he had said above that when one asks why, one always inquires about something as predicated of something else, and this seems in a way to give rise to a problem, therefore in this Place he raises the problem about this point and solves it.

Now in regard to this he does three things. First, he raises the problem. Second (685:C 1664), he solves it (“But in dealing”). Third (686:C 1669), he draws a corollary from his discussion (“Hence it is evident”).

He accordingly says, first (684), that “the object of our inquiry,” i.e., what is investigated in Any inquiry pertaining to one thing as predicated of something else, “is most obscure,” or puzzling, “in cases concerned with things not predicated of others,” i.e., where the inquiry is about something not predicated of something else but is about a single thing; for when one inquires “What is man?” this, I say, is obscure “because a single term is used,” but it is “not said definitely that he is this or that”; i.e., the cause of the difficulty is that in such cases one single thing is expressed, as man, and in that inquiry the things to which it belongs to be a man as parts, or also the particular supposit, are not expressed.

1663. But this difficulty does not seem to have anything to do with the point at issue; for the Philosopher spoke above about the question “Why is a thing such?" and not "What is it?" and this difficulty has to do with the question "What is it?" But it must be said that the questions "What is it?" and "Why is it?" bear on the same point, as has been stated (C 1651). Hence the question "What is it?" can be changed into the question "Why is it such?" for the question "What is it?" asks about the quiddity by reason of which that thing about which one asks this question, is predicated of any of its own subjects and is proper to its own parts; for Socrates is a man because the answer to the question "What is man?" is pertinent to him. And for this reason flesh and bones are man, because the whatness of man is contained in these flesh and bones. Therefore it is the same thing to ask "What is man?" and, "Why is this (Socrates) a man?" or "Why are these things (flesh and bones) a man?" And this is the same as the question which was raised above "Why are stones and timbers a house?" Therefore he also says here that this causes a difficulty, because in this investigation this and that are not added; for if they were added it would be evident that the answer to the question which asks about the quiddity of man and to the other questions of which he spoke above would be the same.

1664. But in dealing (685).

He now solves the foregoing problem. He says that in order to dispose of the problem relating, to the foregoing question "corrections must be made," i.e., it is necessary to correct the question given, so that in place of the question "What is man?" we will substitute the question "Why is Socrates a man?" or "Why are flesh and bones a man?" And if this question is not corrected, the absurd consequence will be that asking something and asking nothing will have something in common. For it was said above that to ask something about a thing in terms of itself is not to make any inquiry at all; but to ask something about something else is to ask about something. Therefore, since the question why (in which we ask something about something else) and the question what (in which we do not seem to ask something about something else) have something in common, unless they are corrected in the way mentioned above, it follows that a question asking nothing and a question asking something have something in common.

1665. Or to state it in another way—if this question is not corrected, it follows that those cases in which no question at all is asked and those in which a question is asked have something in common. For when a question is asked about that which is, something is asked, but when a question is asked about that which is not, nothing is asked. Hence, if in asking what a thing is we need not assume anything and ask anything else of it, this question applies both to being and to non-being. Thus the question "What is it?" would apply in common both to something and to nothing.

1666. But since in the question "What is man?" it is necessary to know the truth of the fact that man exists (otherwise there would be no question), as when we ask why there is an eclipse, we must know that an eclipse exists, it is evident that one who asks what man is, asks why he is. For in order that one may ask what a thing is, the existence of the thing has to be presupposed, because it is assumed by the question why. Thus, when we ask "What is a house?" it would be the same as asking "Why are these materials (stones and timbers) a house?" because of these, i.e., "because the parts of a house constitute the being of a house," i.e., the quiddity of a house is present in the parts of a house.

1667. For it was said above that in such cases the question why sometimes asks about the form and sometimes about the agent and sometimes about the goal of a thing. And similarly when we ask what man is, it is the same as asking "Why is this (Socrates) a man?" because the quiddity of man belongs to him. Or it would also be the same as asking "Why is a body, which is disposed in this way (organically) a man?" For this is the matter of man, as stones and bricks are the matter of a house.

1668. Hence in such questions it is evident that we are asking about "the cause of the matter," i.e., why it is made to be of this nature. Now the thing under investigation which is the cause of the matter is "the specifying principle," namely, the form by which something is. And this "is the substance," i.e., the very substance in the sense of the quiddity. Thus it follows that his thesis has been proved, i.e., that substance is a principle and cause.

1669. Hence it is (686).

He then draws a corollary from his discussions. He says that, since in all questions one asks about something as predicated of something else, as the cause of the matter, which is the formal cause, or the cause of the form in matter, as the final cause and the agent, it is evident that there is no inquiry about simple substances, which are not composed of matter and form. For, as has been stated, in every inquiry there must be something which is known and some investigation about something which we do not know.

Now such substances are either totally known or totally unknown, as is stated in Book IX (810:C 1905). Hence there is no inquiry about them.

1670. And for this reason there also cannot be any teaching concerning them, as there is in the speculative sciences. For teaching produces science, and science arises in us by our knowing why a thing is; for the middle term of a demonstrative syllogism, which causes science, is why a thing is so.

1671. But lest the study of such substances should seem to be foreign to the philosophy of nature, he therefore adds that the method of investigating such things is different; for we come to an understanding of these substances only from sensible substances, of which these simple substances are, in a measure, the cause. Therefore we make use of sensible substances as known, and by means of them we investigate simple substances, just as the Philosopher investigates below (Book XII) the immaterial substances, which cause motion, by means of motion. Hence in our teaching and investigations of them we use effects as the middle term in our investigations of simple substances whose quiddities we do not know. And it is also evident that simple substances are related to sensible ones in the process of teaching as the form and other causes are related to matter; for just as we inquire about the form of sensible substances and about their goal and their efficient causes as the causes of matter, in a similar fashion we inquire about simple substances as the causes of material substances.

1672. Now since what (687).

Here he shows what kind of cause and principle substance is when taken as the quiddity of a thing; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he premises a certain distinction necessary for the proof of his thesis. Second (688:C 1675), he raises a difficulty (“Therefore, if something”). Third (689:C 1678), he solves it (“Now it would seem”).

In regard to the first (687) he distinguishes one kind of composition from several others; for sometimes composition involves many things in such a way that the whole is one thing composed of many, as a house is composed of its parts and a compound is composed of elements. But sometimes a composite results from many things in such a way that the whole composite is not one thing in an unqualified sense but only in a qualified one, as is clear of a heap or pile of stones when the parts are actual, not being continuous. Hence it is many in an unqualified sense, but is one only in a qualified sense, inasmuch as many things are grouped together in place.

1673. Now it is characteristic of the notion of this kind of diversity that the composite sometimes derives its species from some one thing, which is either the form (as in a compound) or combination (as in a house) or arrangement (as in a syllable or in a number). And then the whole composite must be one without qualification. But sometimes the composite derives its species from the very multitude of collected parts, as in a heap of things and a group of people and so forth; and in such cases the whole composite is not a unity in an unqualified sense but only with qualification.

1674. Hence the Philosopher says that, since one kind of composite is constituted of something in this way "as a whole"—i.e., the whole is one—and not in the way in which a heap of stones is one but as a syllable is one (without qualification), in all such cases the composite must not be identical with its components, as a syllable is not its letters; for this syllable ba is not the same as these two letters b and a, nor is flesh the same as fire and earth. He proves this as follows. "When these are dissociated," i.e., when the things of which the composite is made up are separated from each other, "this"—the whole—does not remain after its dissolution. For when the elements have been actually separated, flesh does not remain; and when its letters have been separated, the syllable does not remain. "But the elements," i.e., the letters, remain after the dissolution of the syllable, and fire and earth remain after the dissolution of flesh. Therefore the syllable is something over and above its elements, and it is not only its elements, which are vowels and consonants, but there is also something else by which a syllable is a syllable. And in a similar way flesh is not merely fire and earth, or the hot and the cold, by whose power the elements are mixed, but there is also something else by which flesh is flesh.

1675. Therefore, if something (688).

He raises a problem relating to his principal thesis; for it was shown that there is something else in flesh and in a syllable besides their elements; for it seems that everything which is, is either an element or composed of elements. If, then, it is necessary that this additional something which is present in flesh and in a syllable over and above their elements should be either an element or composed of elements, this absurdity results.

1676. For if this is an element, the same argument will apply again both to this and to other elements, because it will have to be numbered with the others. For flesh will be composed both of this thing, which we said was something over and above the elements, and which we now claim to be an element, and of fire and earth. And since it has already been proved that in every composite which is one there must be something in addition to its elements, the same question will then apply to this something else, because, if it is an element, flesh will again be composed both of the other original element, and of the elements, and then of something else. Hence in this way there will be an infinite regress; but this is absurd.

1677. Therefore, if this something else when found is not an element but is composed of elements, it is evident that it is not composed of one element only but of many; because if it were not composed of many but of only one, it would follow that that element

would be the same as the whole; for what is composed of water only is truly water. Hence, if it is composed of many elements, the same argument will again apply to this thing as applies to flesh and a syllable, because it will contain something else besides the elements of which it is composed. And the same question will again apply to this. Thus once more there will be an infinite regress.

1678. Now it would seem (689).

Then he solves the problem which he raised; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he solves it with reference to the way in which it first appears. Second (690:C 1679), he corrects this solution and gives the true one (“And since some”).

He accordingly says, first (689), that the thing which is present in composites over and above their elements would seem at first glance not to be something composed of elements, but to be an element and cause of the being of flesh and a syllable and similarly of other things. Moreover, it would seem that it is the substance of each of them in the sense of their quiddity; for substance in the sense of quiddity is the first cause of being.

1679. And since certain things (690).

He now corrects the above solution in two ways: first, insofar as he had said that this something else which is present in composite things over and above their elements is the substance of each; for this is true of things which are substances, but not of things which are not substances, since the form of a syllable is not a substance; second, insofar as he had said that this very thing is an element and a cause of being; for it cannot be called an element but a principle, because elements pertain to the material cause of a thing.

1680. Therefore he says that, since some things are not substances, as is c1car especially of artificial things, but just those are true substances that are “according to nature,” with reference to being, “and are constituted such by nature,” with reference to becoming, it will be made clear that this nature which we are investigating is substance “in some cases,” i.e., in that of natural beings, and not in all. And it will also be made clear that this nature is not an element but a formal principle; for that is called an element into which something is divided and which is “intrinsic” as matter; for example, the elements of the syllable ba are b and a. Hence, since the principle in question is not a material principle but a formal one, it will not be an element. And thus it is evident at the same time both what kind of principle substance is, and that it is neither an element nor composed of elements. The foregoing problem is solved in this way.

BOOK VIII

PRINCIPLES OF SENSIBLE SUBSTANCES

LESSON 1

Sensible Substances Have Different Kinds of Matter

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691. It is necessary, then, to argue from the points which have been made, and after making a summary, to bring our investigations to a close.

692. It has been stated that it is the causes, principles and elements of substances which are being sought (564).

693. Now some substances are admitted by all; but there are others about which some thinkers have expressed views peculiar to themselves. Those which are admitted by all are physical substances, such as fire, earth, water and the other simple bodies; plants and their parts; animals and the parts of animals; and finally the heaven and its parts. But certain other thinkers make the peculiar claim that the Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances (566).

694. From other arguments it also follows that there are other substances, i.e., the essence and the underlying subject. Again, from another point of view a genus is substance to a greater degree than species, and a universal to a greater degree than singular things (568). And the Ideas have a connection with the universal and the genus, for they seem to be substances on the same grounds.

695. Further, since the essence is substance, and the definition is the intelligible expression of the essence, for this reason we have examined

both the definition and everything that is predicated essentially (576-597). And since the definition of a thing is its intelligible expression, and the intelligible expression has parts, then concerning the notion of part it was also necessary to consider what things are parts of substance and what are not, and whether these are necessary to the definition (625-649). Further, neither the universal nor the genus is substance (650-681). Related questions concerning the Ideas and the objects of mathematics must be examined later on; for some say that these are substances in addition to sensible ones. But now we must treat those things which all admit to be substances, and these are sensible substances.

696. All sensible substances have matter. And the underlying subject is substance; in one sense the matter (by matter I mean that which is not a particular thing actually but potentially); and in another sense the intelligible structure or form, which is a particular thing and is separable in thought; and in a third sense the thing composed of these, which alone is subject to generation and corruption, and is separable in an absolute sense. For according to the intelligible structure of substances, some are separable and others are not.

697. Now it is evident that matter is substance; for in every process of change between contraries there is something which underlies these changes. For example, in change of place, there is something which is now here and afterwards somewhere else; and in change of size, that which is now of such a size and afterwards smaller or greater; and in change of quality, that which is now healthy and afterwards diseased. And similarly in change of substance there is something which is now in the process of generation and afterwards in the process of corruption, and which is now a subject and this particular thing and afterwards a subject of privation.

698. And the other changes follow upon this change, but this change does not follow upon one or two of the others. For if a thing has matter which is subject to change of place, it is not necessary that it also have matter which is generable and corruptible. The difference between coming-to-be in an absolute sense and coming-to-be in a qualified sense has been explained in the Physics.

COMMENTARY

1681. Having dealt with substance by means of the dialectical method in Book VII, i.e., by examining the definition and its parts and other things of this kind which are considered from the viewpoint of dialectics, the Philosopher now intends in Book VIII to deal with sensible substances through their proper principles, by applying to those substances the things that were investigated above by means of the dialectical method.

This is divided into two parts. In the first (691:C 1681), he links up this discussion with the preceding one; and in the second (696:C 1686), he carries out his intention ("All sensible substances").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he states in a general way what he intends to do. Second (692:C 1682), he repeats some of the statements which have been made ("It has been stated"). Third (695:C 1685), he links up the foregoing discussion with the one that is to come ("Further, since the essence").

He says first (691), then, that since many of the statements made about substance in Book VII belong to the consideration of dialectics, we must reason from the statements which have been made in order that the things stated from the viewpoint of dialectics may be applied to things existing in reality. And "after making a summary," i.e., after bringing these together again in a brief and summary way, we must bring our investigation to a close by completing the treatise on substance. He does this by discussing those things which were omitted from the foregoing treatise.

1682. It has been stated (692).

Here he repeats some of the statements which have been made, because it was stated in Book VII (564:C 1260) that the principal objects of our search in this science are the causes, principles and elements of substances. For since this science investigates as its proper subject being in general, and this is divided into substance and the nine classes of accidents, and a knowledge of accidents depends upon substance, as was shown in Book VII (585-6:C 1342-50), it follows that this science is principally concerned with substances. And since we know each thing only when we know its principles and causes, it also follows that this science must be principally concerned with the principles, causes and elements of substances. The way in which these three differ has been shown above in Book V (403-12:C 751-807).

1683. Now some substances (693).

Then he repeats one of the points discussed above, i.e., the various senses in which substance is used. First, he gives the things which are said to be real substances. Among these there are some whose existence is admitted by all thinkers, namely, sensible substances, such as earth, water and the other elements; and above these, in the order of their nobility and perfection, plants and animals and their parts; and lastly the heaven and its parts, as the orbs and the stars, which surpass in nobility the other sensible substances. However, there are some substances whose existence is not admitted by all but only by certain particular thinkers, who claim that the Forms and the objects of mathematics have separate existence. They adopted this position because they thought that for every abstraction of the intellect there is a corresponding abstraction in reality. Thus, because the intellect considers the universal apart from particular things, as “man” apart from Socrates and Plato, they held that the Forms have separate existence of themselves. And since the intellect considers some forms apart from sensible material things, as curvature (whose concept does not contain nose as does the concept of pugnose) and a line and other things of this kind, which we call the objects of mathematics, they also held that the objects of mathematics have separate existence.

1684. From other arguments (694).

Here he gives the different ways in which substance is considered from the viewpoint of its intelligible structure; and there are two of these. The first is that substance means the quiddity of any natural substance, and this is merely the whatness of a natural being. In the second way substance is considered in a different sense, that is, in the sense that a genus is said to be substance to a greater degree than species, and a universal to a greater degree than singular things, as some men held according to what was treated in the questions in Book III (220-234:C 423-442). And with this way of considering substance, according to which both a genus and a universal are called substances, is connected the theory of Ideas, or Forms as Aristotle called them above (693:C 1683); for this theory maintains that both Ideas and universals are substances on the same grounds.

1685. Further, since the essence (695).

He links up this discussion with the preceding one by stating what has been solved and what remains to be solved. He says that, since the essence is substance, and the intelligible expression which signifies it is the definition, for this reason it was necessary in the preceding book to deal with definition. And since a definition is composed of those attributes which are predicated of a thing essentially, for this reason it was also necessary in that book to settle the issue about essential predication (576-597:C 1299-1380). Further, since the definition of a thing is its intelligible expression, and this is made up of parts, then concerning the parts of a definition it was also necessary to determine what parts are parts of the thing defined and what are not; and whether the parts of the definition and those of the thing defined are the same (625-649:C 1482-1565). Another text has "Whether the parts of the definition must be defined," but the first version is better. In Book VII (650-681:C 1566-1647) it was shown also that neither the universal nor the genus is substance. Thus the entire study which may be made of definitions and substance was carried out in Book VII. But of those substances which exist in reality, it will be necessary to examine later the Ideas and the objects of mathematics, which one school of thinkers claim to subsist by themselves apart from sensible substances. This is done in the last books of this work. But now it is necessary to treat at once of those substances which all men admit to exist, namely, sensible substances, so that we may proceed from what has been made evident to what as yet remains unknown.

Sensible substance is matter, form, composite.

1686. All sensible substances (696).

Having linked up the foregoing discussion with the one that is to come, the Philosopher begins here to treat of sensible substances by investigating their principles. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1686) he establishes what is true concerning matter and form, which are the principles of sensible substances. In the second (1755) he considers the way in which they are united to each other ("It seems that we must").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that matter and form are principles of sensible substances. Second (1705), he deals with those points which must be investigated about each of these principles ("And we must not").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that matter is a principle of sensible substances; and second (1691), that the same is true of form ("But since that which has the character of a subject").

In regard to the first he does three things. First he shows what matter is by distinguishing it from the other ways in which substance is considered. Hence he says that all sensible substances have matter; and the reason is that all are in motion, and motion does not exist without matter.

1687. But it must be noted that in one sense substance means (1) matter, and in another (2) form, and in still another (3) the thing composed of these.

For matter is called substance, not as though it were a being considered to have actual existence in itself, but as something capable of being actual (and this is said to be a particular thing).

And form, which is also termed the intelligible structure because the intelligible structure of the species is derived from it, is called substance (1) inasmuch as it is something actual, and (2) inasmuch as it is separable from matter in thought but not in reality.

And the thing composed of these is called substance inasmuch as it is something "separable in an absolute sense," i.e., capable of existing separately by itself in reality; and it alone is subject to generation and corruption. For form and matter are generated and corrupted only by reason of something else.

And although the composite is separable in an absolute sense, yet some of the other things which are called substances are separable in thought and some are not. For a form is separable in thought because it can be understood without understanding individuating sensible matter; but matter cannot be understood without understanding form, since it is apprehended only inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form.

Or the, statements can mean that "according to the intelligible structure of substances," i.e., of forms, some are separable in their intelligible structure, as the objects of mathematics, and some are not, as natural forms.

Or again it may mean that there are certain separate forms existing without matter, about which he will establish the truth later on (2447-2454).

1688. Now it is evident (697).

Second, he says that in sensible substances we must posit matter as substance and subject. For in every change between contraries, there must be a subject common to the termini of the change. For example, in change of place there is a common subject which is now here and afterwards somewhere else; and in growth there is a common subject which now has so much quantity and afterwards is smaller (if the change is decrease) or greater (if it is increase). And in alteration there is a common subject which is now healthy and afterwards diseased. Hence, since there is substantial change, that is, generation and corruption, there must be a common subject which underlies the opposite changes of generation and corruption. And this is the subject for the termini that have been given, i.e., form and privation, so that sometimes this subject is actual by reason of a form, and sometimes it is the subject of the privation of that form.

1689. Now from this argument of Aristotle it is clear that substantial generation and corruption are the source from which we derive our knowledge of prime matter. For if prime matter by nature had a form of its own, it would be an actual thing by reason of that form. Hence, when an additional form would be given [to prime matter], such matter would not exist in an absolute sense by reason of that form but would become this or that being; and then there would be generation in a qualified sense but not in an absolute sense. Hence all those who held that this first subject is a body, such as air or water, claimed that generation is the same as alteration. But it is clear from this argument what we must hold prime matter to be; for it is related to all forms and privations as the subject of qualitative change is to contrary qualities.

1690. And the other changes (698).

Here he shows that matter is not present in the same way in all sensible substances. He says that the other changes follow upon matter which is subject to generation and corruption; for if matter is subject to generation and corruption, it follows that it is subject to alteration and change of place. But this matter, i.e., one which is subject to generation and corruption, does not follow upon all the other changes, especially change of place. For if something has “matter which is subject to change of place,” i.e., by which it is potentially in a place, it does not follow that it also has “matter which is generable and corruptible,” namely, one which is subject to generation and corruption. For this kind of matter is lacking in the celestial bodies, in which there is a kind of alteration inasmuch as they are illuminated and deprived of light, but neither generation nor corruption. Hence he said one” because of change of place, or two” because of the kind of alteration just mentioned, although this is really not alteration, because illumination is not motion but the terminus of motion. Thus we must posit matter for every change according as there is in everything that changes a coming-to-be either in an absolute sense or in a qualified one. The difference between coming-to-be in an absolute sense and in a qualified one has been explained in the Physics, Book 1; 4 for coming-to-be in an absolute sense belongs to substance, and coming-to-be in a qualified sense belongs to accidents.

LESSON 2

Form Inferred from Accidental Differences in Sensible Substances. Threefold Definition of All Things

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699. But since that which has the character of a subject or matter has been admitted by all to be substance, and this is what is in potentiality, it remains to explain what it is that constitutes the substance of sensible things in the sense of actuality.

700. Now Democritus is like one who thinks that there are three differences in things. For he holds that the underlying body, as matter, is the same for all things, but that it differs in contour, which is shape; or in disposition, which is position; or in distribution, which is arrangement.

701. However, there seem to be many differences inasmuch as some things are said to be by reason of the way in which their material parts are combined; for example, some things are combined by mixture, as honey-water; others by a binding, as the binding around a head; others by birdlime, as a book; others by a nail, as a chest; and others in several of these ways. Others differ by position, as a threshold and a lintel, for these differ in a sense according to their position; others differ in point of time, as dinner and breakfast; others with respect to place, as the air currents; others by reason of sensible properties, as hardness and softness, density and rarity,

dryness and moistness. And some things differ by some of these differences and others by all taken together; some by excess and others by defect.

702. For this reason it is evident that being is also used in the same number of ways; for a threshold is such because it is placed in this particular position, and to be a threshold means to be placed in such and such a position; and to be ice means to be congealed in such and such a way. However, the being of some things will be defined in all of these ways: one by being mixed; others by being combined; others by being tied together; others by being condensed; and others by other differences, as a hand and a foot.

703. Further, we must consider the classes of differences, for these will be the principles of being of things, as differences in degree, or in density and rarity, and others such as these; for all are instances of excess and defect. Indeed, if [anything differs] either in figure or in smoothness and roughness [these are reducible to differences] in straightness and curvature. Further, the being of some things will consist in being mixed, and their non-being will consist in the opposite state.

704. It is evident, then, from these instances that, if substance is the cause of the being of each thing which is composed of these differences, we must look for the cause of the being of each one of these among these differences. Now substances is none of these differences nor any combination of them; yet it is found analogously in each. And just as in the case of substance that which is predicated of matter is the actuality itself, in a similar way this is most true in the case of other definitions. Thus if a threshold has to be defined, we shall say that it is a piece of wood or stone placed in such and such a position; and we shall say that a house is bricks and timbers placed in such and such a position. (Or again in some cases there is also the final cause). And if ice is to be defined, we shall say that it is water frozen or condensed in such and such a way; and we shall say that a harmony is such and such a combination of high and low notes. [And we must proceed] in the same way too in other things.

705. From these instances, then, it is evident that different matters have a different actuality and intelligible structure; for of some things it is combination, of others mixing, and of others some of those differences mentioned above.

706. Therefore, among those who give definitions, those who state what a house is by saying that it is stones, bricks and timbers, are speaking of a potential house; for these are its matter. But those who say that it is a shelter for protecting goods and bodies, or by adding some other such property, speak of its actuality. And those who speak of both of these together speak of the third kind of substance, which is the thing composed of these. For the intelligible structure which is expressed by means of differences seems to be that of the form or actuality of a thing, but that which is expressed by a thing's intrinsic parts is rather that of its matter. The same thing is true of the definitions of which Archytas approved, for they are both of these together. For example, What is stillness? Rest in a large expanse of air, where air is as matter and rest as actuality or substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of the sea, where the sea is as subject or matter, and smoothness as actuality or form.

707. From what has been said, then, it is evident what sensible substance is and how it exists; for in one sense it has the character of matter, and in another the character of form (because it is actuality), and in a third sense it is the thing composed of these.

COMMENTARY

1691. Having investigated the material principle in sensible substances, the Philosopher examines their formal principle.

First (699:C 1691), he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, saying that, since all recognize substance in the sense of matter and subject (for even the oldest philosophers held that matter is the substance of material things), and this kind of substance is something potential, it now remains to explain what form is, which is the actuality of sensible things.

1692. Now Democritus is like one (700).

Then he carries out his intention; and in regard to this he does two things. First (700:C 1692), he examines the differences in sensible things which indicate a formal principle. Second (705:C 1699), he draws some conclusions (“From these instances”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he examines certain accidental differences of sensible things. Second (704:C 1696), he shows how these differences are related to substantial differences (“It is evident”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he investigates the accidental differences of sensible things. Second (702:C 1694), he shows how these differences are related to those things whose differences they are (“For this reason”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (700), he gives Democritus’ opinion about the differences of things. He says that Democritus is like one who thinks “that there are three differences in things,” i.e., according to the principles which he gives he seems to think that all differences of things are reduced to three classes. For he held that the material principles of things are indivisible bodies, which, being of the same nature, are similar to each other; but that they constitute a diversity of things because they differ in position, shape and arrangement. Thus he seems to hold that the underlying body, as a material principle, is one and the same in nature even though it is divided into an infinite number of parts, and that it differ’s, i.e., is divided into different things, because of differences in shape, position and arrangement. For things differ in figure by being straight or curved; in position by being above or below, right or left; and in arrangement by being before or after.

1693. However, there seem to be (701).

Second, he shows that the position of Democritus is unsatisfactory, because there seem to be many other differences of things which are not reducible to the foregoing ones. For some things differ by reason of the different way in which their material parts are combined: in some things the material parts are combined by being mixed, as honey-water; in others, by being tied together by some bond, as the binding around a woman’s’ head; in others by glue or birdlime, as occurs in books; in others by a nail, as occurs in a chest; and in others the parts are united in several of the aforesaid ways. On the other hand, some things differ from each other by their position, as a lintel and a threshold, which differ because they are placed in such and such a way-one being above and the other below. Again, some differ in point of time, as dinner, which is the late meal, from breakfast, which is the early morning meal. Others differ with respect to place, as “the air currents,” i.e., the winds, of which the Aquilonian comes from the north, the Favonian from the west, the Austerian from the south, and the Subsolian from the east. Others differ “by reason of the qualities of sensible bodies,” i.e., by hardness or softness and other characteristics of this kind; and some things differ in several of these ways, and others in all of them. And some differ by excess and some by defect. He adds this because the ancient philosophers held that all qualities of sensible bodies are reduced to excess or defect.

1694. For this reason (702).

He shows the way in which these differences are related to those things whose differences they are. In regard to this he does two things. First (702), he shows that these differences constitute the being of the things whose differences they are. Second (703:C 1695), he concludes that in order to grasp the principles of being we must reduce these differences to certain primary classes of differences (“Further, we must consider”).

First, then, he says that, because these differences are constitutive of the things we have mentioned above, it is evident that the being of the aforesaid realities is diversified according to these differences; for a difference completes the definition, which signifies the being of a thing. Thus a threshold is this particular thing “because it is placed in such and such a position,” and its being, i.e., its proper intelligible structure, consists in being placed in such and such a position. Similarly, being ice is being condensed in such and such a way. And by each of the differences mentioned the being of things of a certain type is differentiated: some by being mixed; others by being combined; and others by other differences, as a hand and a foot and other parts of this kind which have peculiar differences of their own inasmuch as they are directed to certain definite operations.

1695. Further, we must consider (703).

He concludes that, since the being of things consists in their differences and has to be known in this way, it will be worth our while to grasp the classes of differences by reducing the secondary differences of a class to the primary differences; because common and proper differences of this kind will be the principles of being of a whole class. This is evident in differences of degree, of rarity and density, and in other things of this kind; for density and rarity and the like are reduced to the class of the great and small, because all these signify excess and defect. Similarly, if things differ in figure or in roughness or smoothness, these are reduced to differences of straightness and curvature, which are the primary differences of figure. Again, it is necessary that some be reduced to being mixed or not being mixed; for the being of some things consists in the fact that they are mixed, and their non-being in just the opposite state.

1696. It is evident, then (704).

He shows how these differences are related to the substances of things. He says that it is now evident from the foregoing that we must try to discover in these differences the formal cause of the being of each thing, if it is in this way that substance in a formal sense, or the whatness of a thing, is the cause of the being of each thing, as was clear in Book VII (682-90:C 1648-80). For these differences signify the form or whatness of the above-mentioned things. However, none of these differences are substance or anything akin to substance, as though belonging to the genus of substance; but the same proportion is found in them as in [the genus of] substance.

1697. For just as in the genus of substance the difference, which is predicated of the genus and qualifies it in order to constitute a species, is related to the genus as actuality or form, so also is this true in other definitions.

(~) For we must not understand that difference is form or that genus is matter, since genus and difference are predicated of the species but matter and form are not predicated of the composite. (+) But we speak in this manner because a thing's genus is derived from its material principle, and its difference from its formal principle.

The genus of man, for example, is animal, because it signifies something having a sensory nature, which is related as matter to intellectual nature from which rational, the difference of man, is taken. But rational signifies something having an intellectual nature.

It is for this reason that a genus contains its differences potentially, and that genus and difference are proportionate to matter and form, as Porphyry says . And for this reason too it is said here that "actuality," i.e., difference, is predicated "of matter," i.e., of the genus; and the same thing occurs in other genera.

1698. For if one wishes to define a threshold, he shall say that it is a piece of stone or wood placed in such and such a position; and in this definition stone or wood is as matter and position as form. Similarly, in the definition of a house stones and timbers are as matter, and being combined in such and such a way as form. And again in the definitions of some things there is also added its end, on which the necessity of the form depends. And similarly in the definition of ice, water is as matter and being frozen is as form. So too in the definition of a harmony the high and low notes are as matter and the way in which they are combined is as form. The same thing applies in all other definitions.

1699. From these instances (705).

He draws two additional conclusions from the above. First, there are different actualities or forms for different matters. For in some things the actuality consists in being combined; in others in being mixed, or in some of the aforesaid differences.

1700. Therefore, among those who (706).

He states the second conclusion; since in a definition one part,is related to the other as actuality to matter, some people in defining things give an inadequate definition by stating only their matter, as those who define a house by means of cement, stones and timbers, which are the material of a house; because such a definition does not signify an actual house but a potential one. Those who say that a house is a shelter for goods and living bodies state the form of a house but not its matter. However, those who state both define the composite substance, and therefore their definition is a complete definition. But the conceptual element which is derived from the differences pertains to the form, whereas that which is derived from the intrinsic parts pertains to the matter.

1701. The definitions which Archytas accepts are similar to these. E.g., stillness, which signifies the state of the atmosphere when it is windless, is rest in a large expanse of air; for if only the smallest amount of air in a vessel is at rest we do not speak of stillness. In this definition air is as matter and rest as form. Similarly, when a calm is defined as the smoothness of the sea, the sea is as matter and smoothness as form. Now in these definitions the matter is substance and the form is an accident; but in the definition of a house the matter is its parts and the actuality is the form of the whole.

1702. From what (707).

He summarizes the things said about form. The text is clear here.

LESSON 3

The Nature of Form as Part of a Thing’s Essence. The Resemblance between Numbers and Forms

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708. And we must not disregard the fact that sometimes it is not apparent whether a name signifies the composite substance or the actuality or form; for example, whether house signifies both the form and the matter together, i.e., a shelter composed of bricks, timbers and stones arranged in such and such a way, or whether it signifies the actuality or form—a shelter; and whether line signifies twoness in length or twoness; and whether animal signifies a soul in a body or a soul, for the latter is the substance or actuality of some body.

709. Now animal will also apply to both, not in the sense that both are expressed by one meaning, but insofar as they are related to some one thing.

71o. These distinctions make a difference with regard to something else, but not to the investigation of sensible substances, because the essence of this other thing consists of form or actuality. For a soul and the essence of a soul are the same, but a man and the essence of a man are not the same, unless a man is also called a soul. And in some things essence and thing are identical and in others not.

711. Accordingly, to those who make investigations it does not seem that a syllable consists of letters and their combination, nor does a house consist

of bricks and their combination. And this is true, because a combination or mixture does not consist of the things of which it is the combination or mixture. Nor likewise do any of the other differences. If a threshold, for example, is constituted by its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold, but rather the latter by the former. Nor is man animal and two-footed, but there must be something else in addition to these, if these are matter. Now this is neither an element nor a combination of the elements, but the substance; but omitting this they speak only of matter. Therefore, if this is the cause of a thing's being, and this is its substance, they will not be stating its substance.

712. Now this must be either eternal or corruptible without being in the process of corruption, and generated without being in the process of generation. But it has been demonstrated and made clear elsewhere (611) that no one produces a form, nor is it generated; but it is this particular thing which is produced and comes to be from these principles.

713. But whether the substances of corruptible things are separable or not is not yet clear.

714. It is evident, however, that this may not occur in the case of some things, i.e., in the case of all those that are incapable of existing apart from particular things, for exatnple, a house or a vessel.

715. Indeed, perhaps neither these particular things nor any of the others which are not produced by nature are substances. For at least one might hold that only the nature of corruptible things is substance.

716. For this reason the problem which confronted Antisthenes and other uninstructed people is applicable here, i.e., that one cannot define what a thing is (for according to them the definition is a lengthy statement), but one can say what it is like; for example, one cannot say what silver is, but one can say that it is like tin. Hence, of one kind of substance there can be a limit or definition, i.e., of the composite, whether it be sensible or intelligible. But this cannot be true of the primary parts of which it is composed, since the definitive concept designates something as determining something else, and one of these must have the character of matter and the other that of form.

717. Further, it is also clear that if numbers are in any sense substances, they are such in this way and not (as groups) of units, as some claim. For a definition is like a number and is divisible into indivisible parts, because

definitions are not made up of an unlimited number of parts; and this is also true of numbers.

718. And just as when any part constituting a number is subtracted or added it is no longer the same number that remains but a different one, even though the minimum is subtracted or added, so too neither the definition nor the essence will any longer be the same when anything is subtracted or added.

719. And there must be something by reason of which a number is one thing, although they cannot say what makes it to be one thing; i.e., if it is one thing. For either it is not one thing but like a heap, or if it is one thing it is necessary to state what makes it to be one thing out of many. And a definition is one thing; but they are also unable to say what makes it to be one thing; and this follows as a natural consequence. For by the same argument substance is also one thing in the way we have explained, but not, as some claim, as being a kind of unit or point, but as an actuality and a kind of nature.

720. And just as number does not admit of more or less, neither does substance in the sense of form; but if this were the case [it would be that substance which is joined] to matter.

721. In regard to the generation and corruption of the foregoing substances, in what way this is possible and in what way it is impossible, and in regard to the likeness which they have to numbers, we have established these things this far.

COMMENTARY

1703. Having investigated the principles of sensible substances~ and having shown that sensible substances are composed of matter and form, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about the formal and material principles of things by investigating the points which must be considered about each.

This is divided into two parts. In the first (708:C 1705), he investigates the things which must be considered about the formal principle. In the second (722:C 1729), he investigates the things which must be considered about the material principle (“Concerning material substances”).

1704. And since Plato was the one who devoted special treatment to the formal principle, therefore Aristotle deals with the formal principle in reference to those things which Plato posited. Now Plato claimed that species [i.e., separate Forms or Ideas] and numbers are the forms of things. Hence the first part is divided into two sections. In the first (708:C 1705), he deals with the formal principle in relation to the species [or Ideas]; and in the second (717:C 1722), in relation to numbers ("Further, it is also clear").

Now Plato held four things about forms in relation to the species [or Ideas]. The first of these is that specific names signify form alone and not form with matter. The second is that form is something besides the material parts. The third is that form can neither be generated nor corrupted. The fourth is that forms are separate from sensible things.

The first part is divided into four sections inasmuch as Aristotle investigates the four points just mentioned. The second (711:C 1712) begins where he says "Accordingly, to those." The third (712:C 1715) begins where he says "Now this must." The fourth (713:C 1717) begins where he says "But whether."

1705. In regard to the first he does three things. First (708) he raises a question. We must understand, he says, that for some men there is the problem whether a specific name signifies the composite substance or only the form or something having the status of actuality; for example, whether the word house signifies both matter and form together so that a house means a shelter made of bricks and stones properly arranged (for shelter is as form, and bricks and stones as matter), or whether this word signifies only the actuality or form, a shelter.

1706. Similarly, there is the problem whether the word line signifies twoness and length or twoness alone. He mentions this because the Platonists claimed that numbers are the forms of continuous quantities; for they said that a point is merely the number one having position, so that position is a sort of material principle, and the number one a formal principle. They likewise claimed that the number two is the form of a line, so that a line is merely twoness in length. Therefore the Philosopher asks whether the word line signifies twoness alone as form, or twoness grounded in length as form in matter. And again, there is the problem whether the word animal signifies a soul in a body as a form in matter, or only a soul, which is the form of an organic body.

1707. Now animal will also apply (709).

He shows what follows if one says that specific names are used in both senses, so that they sometimes signify form alone and sometimes form in matter. And the result is that animal will be taken of either in either meaning, not univocally, as though it were predicated with one meaning, but analogically, as happens in the case of those things which have one name because they are related to one thing. For the specific name will be predicated of the composite only by reason of relationship to that which is predicated according to form alone, as the Platonists held. For they maintained that man, who is a composite of matter and form, is so named because he participates in the Idea man, which is only a form.

1708. These distinctions (710).

Then the Philosopher shows the result to which the aforesaid search leads. He says that, while the question whether a specific name signifies the composite substance or only the form, (+) makes a difference in regard to something else, (~) it makes no difference to the investigation of sensible substance. For it is evident that a sensible substance is composed of matter and form.

1709. (+) Now to what kind of thing it makes a difference, whether to those in this state or in another, he makes clear next. For it is obvious that if there is something which is only form or actuality, its essence "consists of this," i.e., the thing and its essence will be identical, as a soul is identical with its essence, or is its own quiddity.

But if a thing is composed of matter and form, then in this case the thing itself and its essence will not be the same; for example, a man and the essence of a man are not the same, unless perhaps a man is said to be only a soul, as was held by those who say that specific names signify only the form. Thus it is evident that something does exist whose essence is the same as itself, namely, whatever is not composed of matter and form but is only a form.

1710. The reason for this position is that essence is what the definition signifies, and the definition signifies the nature of the species. But if there is something which is composed of matter and form, then in that thing there must be some other principle besides the nature of the species. For since matter is the principle of individuation, then in anything composed of matter and form there must be certain individuating principles distinct from the nature of the species. Hence such a thing is not just its own essence but is something in addition to this. But if such a thing exists which is only a form, it will have no individuating principles in addition to the nature of its species. For a form that exists of itself is individuated of itself. Therefore this thing is nothing else than its own essence.

1711. It is clear, then, that if the specific name signifies only the form, the essence of anything will be (+) the same as its being, as a man will be his essence, and a horse its essence, and so also will all other things of this kind.

But if specific names signify things composed of matter and form, then such things will (~) not be the same as their essence.

1712. Accordingly, to those who (711).

Here he deals with the second point mentioned above, namely, that the form is something in addition to the material parts. He says that for the Platonists, in raising this question, it does not seem that a syllable consists of its elements and their combination, as if combination, which is the form of a syllable, were a material part of a syllable like its elements or letters. Nor does it seem to them that a house consists of stones and their combination, as if a house were constituted of these as material parts.

1713. And on this point their remarks are true, because, if the form were one of the material parts, it would depend on matter. But we see that this is false; for combination or mixture, which are formal principles, are not constituted of those things which are combined or mixed; nor is any other formal principle constituted of its matter, but the reverse. For a threshold is constituted by position, which is its form, and not the reverse.

1714. Therefore, if one holds that animal and two-footed are the matter of man, man will not be animal and two-footed but will be something else in addition to these. And this will not be an element or anything composed of the elements but will be only a form as the Platonists claim, who omit matter from definitions. But it seems that we must hold, in opposition to this position, that, if form alone apart from matter is the substance or principle of being of a thing, they will not be able to say that this particular thing is that separate substance; i.e., they will not be able to say that this man as a sensible entity is composed of matter and form, but that man is only a form

1715. Now this must (712).

He considers the third point mentioned above, namely, the Platonists' position that forms are eternal and Incorruptible. Hence he concludes, from what has been said, that either a form must be eternal, as the Platonists held when they claimed that the Ideas, which they called the forms of things, are eternal; or a form must be corruptible by reason of something else without being corrupted in itself, and similarly it must come to be by reason of something else without coming to be in itself. This is in agreement with the position of Aristotle, who does not hold that forms are separate but that they exist in matter.

1716. Further, the statement that forms can neither be corrupted nor generated in themselves (710-12:C 1708-15), on which each of the aforesaid points depends, Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate by reason of what was shown above, namely, that no one makes or produces a form, nor is a form generated or produced in itself; but it is this particular thing which comes to be or is generated in itself. And the reason is that everything which comes to be comes to be from matter. Hence, since this particular thing is composed of matter and form, it comes to be or is generated "from these principles," i.e., from its material and individuating principles. But it was stated above (71I:C 1714) that a form is not an element or anything composed of the elements. Therefore it follows that a form neither comes to he nor is generated in itself.

1717. But whether the substances (713).

He examines the fourth point given above, namely, Plato's position that forms are separate from matter. In regard to this he does three things. First, he exposes what the problem is in this position, saying that it is not clear whether "the substances," i.e., the forms, of corruptible things are separable as the Platonists claimed.

1718. It is evident, however (714).

Second, he indicates what seems to be evident on this point. He says that it is evident that the forms of some corruptible things are not separate, namely, "all those" which are incapable of existing apart from their matters, as house or vessel, because neither the form of a house nor that of a vessel can exist apart from its proper matter.

1719. Indeed, perhaps (715).

Third, he precludes an objection, saying that perhaps the forms of artifacts are not substances or anything in their own right, and so cannot have separate existence. Nor similarly can other artificial forms, which have no natural existence, because in artifacts the matter alone is held to be substance, whereas the forms of artifacts are accidents. Natural forms, however, belong to the class of substance; and this is why Plato did not hold that the forms of artifacts exist apart from matter but only substantial forms.

1720. For this reason (716).

He advances arguments that are clearly opposed to Plato’s position. He says that if one holds that there are separate forms, as the Platonists maintained, the problem which the followers of Antisthenes raised, even though they seem to be uninstructed, may be used against the Platonists. For they argued that it is impossible to define a thing by means of a definition which signifies its quiddity, since a thing’s quiddity is simple and is not fittingly expressed by a statement composed of many parts. For we see that “the limit,” or definition, which is given to a thing, is a lengthy statement made up of many words. Therefore it does not signify what a thing is but “what it is like,” i.e., something to which it is similar; as if one were to say that the definition of silver does not signify silver but signifies something like lead or tin.

1721. Hence in order to solve this problem we must say that the substance which is defined, whether it be intellectual or sensible, must be one that is composite. But since the primary parts of which a definition is composed are simple, they are incapable of definition. For it was stated above (706:C 1700) that the definitive statement joins one part to another, one of which is as form and the other as matter, because genus is derived from matter and difference from form, as was pointed out above (704:C 1696-8). Hence, if the species of things were forms only, as the Platonists held, they would be indefinable.

1722. Further, it is also clear (717).

Having determined what is true of forms in relation to the Ideas introduced by Plato, Aristotle now ‘determines what is true of forms in relation to numbers. For Plato held that numbers are the forms and substances of things by establishing a kind of likeness between forms and numbers. This is divided into four parts inasmuch as there are four ways in which he likens forms to numbers.

First, he says that, if numbers are in any sense the substances or forms of things, it is evident that they are such in this way, as can be understood from the foregoing, but not as numbers of units as the Platonists said. Now a number of units is called a simple and absolute number [i.e., an ab9tract number], but the number applied to things is called a concrete number, as four dogs or four men; and in this way the substances of things, which are Signified by a definition, can be called numbers. For a definition is divisible into two parts, one of which is as form and the other as matter, as was pointed out above (706:C 1700). And it is divisible into indivisible parts; for since definitions cannot proceed to infinity, the division of a definition must terminate in certain indivisible parts. For example, if the definition of man is divided into animal and rational, and the definition of animal into animated and sensible, this will not go on to infinity. For it is impossible to have an infinite regress in material and formal causes, as was shown in Book II (152:C 299). Hence he explains that the division of a definition is not like the division of a continuous quantity, which is divisible to infinity, but is like the division of a number, which is divisible into indivisible parts.

1723. And just as when (718).

He gives the second way in which the substance that the definition signifies is like number. He says that, if anything is added to or subtracted from any number, even if it is a bare minimum, the resulting number will not be specifically the same. For in the case of numbers the minimum is the number one, which, when added to the number three, gives rise to the number four, which is a specifically different number; but if it is subtracted from the same number, the number two remains, which is also a specifically different number. And this is true because the ultimate difference gives to a number its species.

1724. And it is similar in the case of definitions and of the essence, which the definition signifies; because, howsoever small a part has been added or subtracted, there results another definition and another specific nature. For animated sensible substance alone is the definition of animal, but if you also add rational to this, you establish the species man. And in a similar way if you subtract sensible, you establish the species plant, because the ultimate difference also determines the species.

1725. And there must be (719).

He gives the third way in which forms are like numbers. He says that a number is one thing. For a number is an essential unity inasmuch as the ultimate unity gives to a number its species and unity, just as in things composed of matter and form a thing is one and derives its unity and species from its form. And for this reason those who speak about the unity of a number as though a number were not essentially one cannot say what makes it to be one thing, i.e., if it is one. For since a number is composed of many units, either it is not one thing in an absolute sense but its units are joined together in the manner of a heap, which does not constitute a unity in an absolute sense, and therefore not a being in any class of things (and thus number would not be a class of being); or if it is one thing in an absolute sense and a being in itself, it is still necessary to explain what makes it one thing out of a plurality of units. But they are unable to assign a reason for this.

1726. Similarly, a definition is one thing essentially, and thus they do not have to assign anything which makes it one. This is understandable, because the substance which the definition signifies is one thing for the very same reason that a number is, i.e., essentially, because one part of it is related to the other as form [to matter]. And it is one, not as being something indivisible such as a unit and a point, as some men claimed, but because each of them is one form and a kind of nature.

1727. And just as number (720).

He gives the fourth way in which forms are like numbers. He says that just as a number does not admit of (~) more or less, neither does substance in the sense of form, although perhaps substance in the sense of matter does admit of such difference. For just as the concept of number consists in some limit to which neither addition nor subtraction may be made, as has been pointed out (1723), so also does the concept of form.

But things admit of (+) more or less because of the fact that matter participates in a form in a more or less perfect way. Hence too whiteness does not differ in terms of more or less, but a white thing does.

1728. In regard to the generation (721).

He summarizes the points discussed. He says that he has dealt with “the generation and corruption of such substances,” or forms, both as to the way in which this is possible, namely, by reason of something else; and as to the way in which this is impossible, i.e., essentially; and also with the likeness which forms have to numbers, i.e., by reducing them to numbers by way of a likeness.

LESSON 4

What We Must Know about Matter. How Matter Is Found in All Things

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1044a 15-1045a

722. Concerning material substance we must not remain ignorant of the fact that, even though all things come from the same first [principle] or from the same [principles] or first [causes], and even though the same matter is the first principle of things which come to be, still there is some proper matter of each thing; for example, the first matter of phlegm is the sweet or the fat, but of bile the bitter or something else. But perhaps these come from the same matter.

723. Further, there are several matters of the same thing when one comes from another, as phlegm comes from the fat and the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet. And something comes from bile by dissolving bile into its first matter. For one thing comes from another in two ways: either because it is prior to the other [in the process of development] or because it comes from the dissolving of a thing into its first principle.

724. Now when there is one matter it is possible for different things to come into being by virtue of the cause of motion, as a chest and a bed come from wood. But of certain things the matter is necessarily different when the things are different; e.g., a saw cannot be made from wood, and it is not within the power of the cause of motion to do this; for he is incapable of making a saw from wool or from wood. But if the same thing can be made

from different matters, it is clear that the art and the principle which acts as a mover are the same. For if both the matter and the cause of motion are different, so also will be the thing that is made.

725. Hence, when one asks what the cause of anything is, it is necessary to mention all the causes concerned, since causes are spoken of in several senses. For example, What is a man’s material cause? The menstrual fluid. What is his moving cause? The seed. What is his formal cause? His essence. What is his final cause? His end. But perhaps both of these are the same.

726. It is necessary also to give the proximate causes. What is the matter of man? Not earth or fire, but his proper matter.

727. Indeed, concerning natural substances which are generable it is necessary to proceed in this way, if one is to proceed correctly, granted that these are the causes, that they are of this number, and that it is necessary to know the causes.

728. In the case of natural substances which are eternal there is another procedure. Perhaps some of them do not have matter or do not have this kind of matter but only that which is subjected to change of place.

729. Thus all those things which are by nature but are not substances do not have matter, but the underlying subject is their substance. For example, What is the matter of an eclipse? There is none, but it is the moon that is the patient. What is the efficient cause destroying the light? The earth. What is the final cause? Perhaps there is none. What is the formal cause? The definition. But this will not be clear if it does not include the [efficient] cause. For example, What is an eclipse? A privation of light. And if one adds, as a result of the earth intervening, this definition is one which includes the [efficient] cause. However, in the case of sleep it is not clear what the primary subject is, although it is clear that the animal is also a primary subject. But it is such in a qualified sense. And what is the primary subject, the heart or some other part? Then, by what [is this modification produced]? And what is this modification which pertains to that [part] and not to the whole? Is this a special kind of immobility? It is, but it belongs [to the animal] by reason of some primary subject.

Chapter 5

730. But since some things are and are not, without generation and corruption, such as points, if they do in fact exist, and in general the forms

and specifying principles of things, then all contraries do not come from each other. For whiteness does not come to be but white wood does; and everything which comes to be comes from something and becomes something. And white man comes from black man and white from black in different ways. Nor do all things have matter but only those which may be generated and changed into each other. There is no matter in those things which are and are not without undergoing change.

731. Again, there is the problem how the matter of each thing is related to contraries. For example, if the body is potentially healthy and the opposite of health is disease, is the body potentially both? And is water potentially wine and vinegar? Or is it related to one as matter to its form or actuality, and to the other as the privation and natural corruption [of its form or actuality] ?

732. Now this raises the problem why wine is not the matter of vinegar, even though vinegar comes from it, and why the living is not the potentially dead; or whether this is not the case, but the corruptions of these occur in virtue of something else. As a matter of fact the matter of a living body is by corruption the potency and matter of a dead body, and water is the matter of vinegar; for they come from each other as night comes from day. Hence whatever things are changed into each other in this way must return to their matter. For example, if a living body is to come from a dead one [the latter must return] to its first matter, and then a living body comes into being. And vinegar [must return] to water, and then wine comes into being.

COMMENTARY

1729. Having treated those points which had to be considered about the formal principle of substance, Aristotle now establishes what is true regarding the material principle. This is divided into three parts. First (7:22:C 1729), he deals with the material principle in relation to the things which come from matter; second (724:C 1733), in relation to the other causes ("Now when there is one matter"); and third (730:C 1746), in relation to the change of generation and corruption, whose subject is matter ("But since some things").

In regard to the first he does two things. First (722), he shows whether there is one or several kinds of matter that there are several matters of the for all things. And in regard to the material principle he says that one must not remain ignorant of the fact that, even though all things come from the same first material principle, namely, first matter, which has no form of its own, or from the same material principles “or first [causes],” (which is added because of the four elements, the material principles common to all generable and corruptible things), and even though the same matter is “the first principle of things which come to be,” (which he adds because of the fact that matter is not only a principle of being but also of coming-to-be), i.e., even though first matter and the elements are universally related to things composed of the elements, there is still some proper matter of each thing. For example, the proper matter of phlegm (not in an absolute sense but generically) is the fat and the sweet, since these have a certain relationship to phlegm by reason of their moistness. But the first matter of bile is bitter things or certain others of this kind; for in bitter things heat seems to have absolute dominion over moistness even to the extent of destroying it. Thus by reason of dryness and warmth the bitter has a relationship to bile. But perhaps these two matters, namely, the bitter and the sweet, come from some prior material principle. He adds “perhaps” because certain things have different matters, since their matters are not reducible to any prior matter, for example corruptible and incorruptible bodies.

1730. From the things which are said here then it is evident that there is one first matter for all generable and corruptible things, but different proper matters for different things.

1731. Further, there are several matters (723).

Second, he points out how in an opposite sense there are several matters for one and the same thing. He says that there are several matters of the same thing when one of these is the matter of another, as the matter of phlegm is the fat and the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet. For the savor of fat is reckoned among the intermediate savors, and these are produced from extremes, which are the sweet and the bitter. But the fat is nearest to the sweet. Now in these examples we must bear in mind that he takes as the matter of each thing that from which the thing comes to be, even though it is not permanent but transitory.

1732. Therefore, lest someone should think that a thing is always said to come from a material principle, and not the reverse, he adds that something is also said to come from bile by the dissolution of bile into its first matter, and in reverse order bile is said to come from first matter. For one thing is said to come from another in two ways: either because the thing from which it comes is naturally its starting point in the process of generation (for this kind of thing is a material principle); or because the process of coming-to-be is the dissolving of a thing into its material principle, namely, in the sense that a material principle is said to come from a composite by dissolution. For a mixed body comes from the elements by the process of composition, whereas the elements come from a mixed body by the process of dissolution.

1733. Now when there is one matter (724).

He establishes what is true of matter in relation to the other causes. First, in relation to the agent cause alone, which produces something from matter; and this relationship pertains to matter according as it is a principle of coming-to-be. Second (725:C 1737), in relation to all the causes, according as matter constitutes a principle of knowing ("Hence, when one asks").

But since he had said above (722:C 1729) that there was one first matter of all things, one can inquire how a diversity of things could come from one common matter. For the ancient Philosophers of nature attributed this to chance when they disregarded the agent cause and claimed that the diversity of things comes from one matter by a process of rarefaction and condensation.

1734. Therefore in rejecting this the Philosopher says, first (724), that when there is one matter it is possible for different things to come into being by reason of the cause of motion, either because there are different causes of motion, or because one and the same cause of motion is disposed in a different way for producing different effects. This is most evident in the case of things made by art. For we see that a chest and a bed are made from wood by one craftsman in virtue of the different art-forms which he himself possesses.

1735. But even though there is a first matter common to all things, nevertheless the proper matters of different things are different. Therefore, lest someone should attribute the diversity of things in their entirety to the cause of motion and in no way to the material principle, he adds that in some of the things that are different the matter is necessarily different, namely, the proper matter. For not anything at all is naturally disposed to come into being from any matter, as a saw does not come from wood. Nor is it within the power of the craftsman to bring this about; for he never assigns one matter to each work, because he is unable to make a saw either from wood or from wool, which, on account of their softness, are not suitable for the work of a saw, which is to cut.

1736. It is evident, then, that the diversity of things is a result of the efficient cause and of matter. Hence, if it is fitting that something specifically the same should be produced from a different matter, as a bowl from gold and from silver, it is obvious that the efficient principle, i.e., the art, must be the same. For if both the matter and the cause of motion were different, the thing produced would have to be different.

1737. Hence, when one asks (725). He deals with matter in relation to the other causes according as matter is a principle of knowing. In regard to this he does two things. First (725), he shows that in the case of generable and corruptible things we must assign matter along with the other causes. Second (728:C 1740), he shows how matter is found in natural substances which are eternal ("In the case of natural substances"). Third (729:C 1743), he explains how matter is ascribed to accidents ("Thus all those things").

In regard to the first he does three things. For, first (725), since the ancient philosophers of nature assigned only the material cause, he says that when one asks what the cause of anything is, it is necessary to state all the causes "concerned," i.e., all which contribute to the being of the thing in question, since causes are spoken of in several senses. For not all things have all the causes, although natural beings, and especially generable and corruptible ones, have all the causes. For example, in the generation of man his material cause is the menstrual fluid; his active cause is the seed, in which the active power is contained; his formal cause is his essence, which is signified by the definition; and his final cause is his end [or goal]. But perhaps these two causes, namely, the end and the form, are numerically the same. He says this because in some things they are the same and in some not. For the goal of a man's generation is his soul, whereas the goal of his operations is happiness.

1738. It is necessary also (726).

Second, he shows that it is not only necessary to assign all the causes but also to state the proximate causes, so that by beginning with the first causes we may reach the proximate ones. For the knowledge had of a thing through first causes is only a general and incomplete knowledge, whereas that had of a thing through proximate causes is a complete knowledge. For example, if one asks about the material cause of man, one should not assign as his cause fire or earth, which are the common matter of all generable and corruptible things, but should state his proper matter, such as flesh and bones and the like.

1739. Indeed, concerning natural substances (727).

Third, he summarizes the foregoing. He says that it is necessary to proceed thus in regard to natural and generable substances if one is to consider the causes correctly, giving all the causes including the proximate ones. This is necessary in view of the fact that the causes are of this number, as has been explained (725:C 1737). And it is necessary to grasp the causes of a thing in order that it may be known scientifically, because science is a knowledge of the cause.

1740. In the case of natural substances (728).

He shows how there is matter in natural substances which are eternal, namely, in the celestial bodies. He says that the matter in natural substances which are eternal, namely, in the celestial bodies, is not the same as that in bodies subject to generation and corruption. For perhaps such substances do not have matter, or if they do have matter, they do not have the sort that generable and corruptible bodies have, but only that which is subjected to local motion.

1741. For, as was said above (725:C 1737), in the case of generable and corruptible things generation and corruption bring us to a knowledge of matter; because in the process of generation and corruption there must be one subject common to both privation and form. Hence, since in a celestial body there is no potentiality for privation of form but only for different places, it does not have a matter which is in potentiality to form and privation but one which is in potentiality to different places.

1742. However, a body is related to place not as matter to form but rather as subject to accident. And although in one respect a subject is related to an accident as matter is to form, still a subject is not to be identified with matter, as is stated below (729:C 1743). Thus a celestial body as such does not have matter in any way, if subject does not imply matter; or it has matter as regards place, if subject implies matter.

Matter

1743. Thus all those (729).

He shows how matter is ascribed to accidents. He says that those things which exist by nature yet are not substances but accidents, (~) do not have a matter from which they come to be, but (+) they have a subject, which is the substance. Now a subject bears some likeness to matter inasmuch as it is receptive of an accident. But it differs from matter in this respect, that while matter has actual being only through form, a subject is not constituted in being by an accident.

1744. Therefore, if one asks what is the cause of an eclipse, one cannot give its (~) matter, but the moon is the (+) subject undergoing this modification.

And the efficient cause which extinguishes the light is the earth placed directly between the sun and the moon.

But perhaps it is impossible to give the final cause; for those things which pertain to defect do not exist because of some end but are rather a result of natural necessity or of the necessity of the efficient cause. However, he says “perhaps” because an investigation of the causes of particular events which take place in celestial movements is especially difficult.

And the formal cause of an eclipse is its definition. But this definition is not clear unless the [efficient] cause is given therein. Thus the definition of a lunar eclipse is the privation of light in the moon. But if one adds that this privation is caused by the earth being placed directly between the sun and the moon, this definition will contain the [efficient] cause.

1745. This is evident also in regard to the accident sleep. But in the case of sleep it is not clear what the primary subject is that undergoes this modification, although it is clear that the animal is the subject of sleep. However, it is not clear to what part of the animal sleep primarily belongs-whether to the heart or some other part; for some men hold that the primary organ of sensation is the brain and some the heart. However, sleep is the cessation of sensory operation. Then, having come to an agreement on the subject of sleep, it is necessary to consider from what, as its efficient cause, sleep comes—whether from the evaporation of food or physical labor or something of this kind. Next we must consider what modification sleep is, [defining] its primary subject, which will be some part of the animal and not the whole animal. For sleep is a kind of immobility. But it belongs primarily to an animal by reason of some part which is the subject of such a modification. Now in the definition of sleep we must state this primary subject, just as in the definition of every accident we must state its primary and proper subject. For color is defined by surface but not by body.

1746. But since some things (730).

He deals with matter in relation to the process whereby one thing is changed into something else. Therefore, first (730), he shows how change comes about in different ways in different things. Second (731:C 1748), he proposes certain problems (“Again, there is the problem”).

He says, first (730), that certain things sometimes are and sometimes arc not but “without generation and corruption,” i.e., without being gencrated and corrupted in themselves, for example, points and all specifying principles and forms generally, whether substantial or accidental. For properly speaking, white does not come to be, but white wood does; for everything which comes to be comes “from something,” i.e., from matter, and comes to be that in which the process of coming to be is terminated, which is form. Thus everything which comes to be is composed of matter and form. Hence those things which are forms only cannot come to be in themselves. Therefore, when it is said that contraries come to be from each other, this has one meaning in the case of composite things and another in the case of simple things. For white man comes from black man in a different way than white from black, because white man signifies a composite and can therefore come to be in itself. But white signifies a form only, and therefore it comes to be from black only by reason of something else.

1747. From the above, then, it is clear that matter does not exist in everything but only in those things which are generated or transformed essentially into each other. However, those things which sometimes are and sometimes are not, without being changed essentially, are such that their matter is not that from which they come, but they have as their matter the subject in which they exist.

1748. Again, there is the problem (731).

He raises two questions in regard to the above. The first of these pertains to the way in which matter is related to contraries, namely, whether in all things which seem to have contrariety or opposition matter is in potentiality to each contrary equally and in the same order. For health is a certain equality of humors, whereas disease is their inequality. But both inequality and equality are related to their subject in the same order. Therefore it seems that water, which is the matter of humors, is in potentiality to wine and vinegar as contraries, and is disposed equally to both.

1749. But in solving this problem the Philosopher says that this is not true. For the form of wine is a certain positive state and nature, whereas the form of vinegar is the privation and corruption of wine. Hence matter is disposed first to wine as a positive state and form, but to vinegar as the privation and corruption of wine. And thus it is related to vinegar only through the medium of wine.

1750. Now this raises the problem (732).

He proposes a second problem, which is as follows. That from which a thing comes to be seems to be the matter of that thing; for example, mixed bodies come to be from the elements, which constitute their matter. Therefore, since vinegar comes from wine and a dead body from a living one, the problem arises why wine is not the matter of vinegar and a living body the matter of a dead one, since one is related to the other as potentiality is to actuality.

1751. But the answer to this is that vinegar is the corruption of wine itself, and a dead body the corruption of a living one. Hence vinegar does not come from wine as matter, or a dead body from a living one; but one is said to come from the other in virtue of something else inasmuch as it comes from its matter. Hence the matter of a bowl is not a goblet but silver. Similarly, a living body is not the matter of a dead body, but the elements are.

1752. But because a dead body is said to come from a living one or vinegar from wine, this preposition from will signify order if reference is made to the form itself of wine or living body; for in the same matter after the form of wine there is vinegar, and after the form of a living body there is a dead one. An(] it is in this way that

we say that night comes from day. Therefore, in all things that come from each other in this way, as vinegar from wine and a dead body from a living one, the process of change is reversed only when these things are dissolved into their matter. For example, if a living body must come from a dead one, the latter must first be dissolved into its primary matter inasmuch as a dead body is dissolved into the elements; and from the elements again in due order a living body is constituted. It is the same in regard to vinegar and wine.

1753. The reason for this is that, whenever matter is disposed to different forms in a certain order, it cannot be brought back from a subsequent state to one that is prior in that order. For example, in the generation of an animal, blood comes from food; and the semen and menstrual fluid, from which the animal is generated, come from blood. But this order cannot be reversed so that blood comes from semen and food from blood, unless these are resolved into their first matter; because for each thing there is a definite mode of generation. And it is the same [in the other case], because the matter of wine is related to vinegar only through the medium of wine, namely, inasmuch as it is the corruption of wine. The same is also true of a dead body and a living one, of a blind man and one who has sight, and so on. Therefore from such privations there can be a return to a prior form only when such things are dissolved into first matter.

1754. However, if there is some privation to which matter is immediately disposed, and this signifies nothing else than the non-existence of form in matter which lacks a disposition for form, then the process of reverting from such a privation to a [prior] form, as from darkness to illumination, will be possible because this [i.e., darkness] is nothing else than the absence of light in the transparent medium.

LESSON 5

Why Definitions and Matters Are Unities. The Union of Matter and Form

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6: 1045a 7-1045b 23

733. It seems that we must discuss next the problem which was mentioned with regard to definitions and numbers: what it is that causes them to be one. For all things which have several parts, and of which the whole is not a kind of heap but is something over and above the parts, have some cause that makes them one. For in some bodies contact is the cause of their unity, and in others stickiness or some other such quality. But a definition is one intelligible structure not by the connection of its parts, like the Iliad, but by being one thing. What is it, then, that makes man to be one; and why is he one thing and not many, for example, animal and two-footed?

734. And if, in a different way, as some claim, there is an animal-itself and a two-footed-itself, why is man not these two things? And if this were the case, men would not be such by participating in man, i.e., by participating in one thing, but in two, namely, in animal and two-footed. Hence in general man will not be one thing but many, i.e., animal and two-footed.

735. It is evident, then, that those who accept this position and discuss and define things in the way they have been accustomed to do, cannot find an answer or solution to this problem. But if (as we say) one part is as

matter and the other as form, or one is in potency and the other in act, the problem with which we are dealing will no longer appear to be a difficulty.

736. For this problem is just the same as we should have if the definition of cloak were round bronze. Now let us suppose that this term is the sign of this definition. Then when one asks what causes round and bronze to be one thing, there will no longer be a problem, because one is as matter and the other as form. What is it, then, apart from the efficient cause, that causes the potential to become actual in the case of things which are generated? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere being an actual sphere; but this was the essence of each.

737. Further, some matter is intelligible and some sensible. And one part of a definition is always as matter and the other as actuality; for example, a circle is a plane figure.

738. But each of those things which do not have matter, either intelligible or sensible, is at once one thing, just as it is a being: a particular thing, a quality, or a quantity; and for this reason neither being nor unity is expressed in their definitions. And their essence is at once one thing just as it is also a being. For this reason there is not some other cause of each of these being one or of being something; for each is at once a being and a unity, not as belonging to the class of being or unity, nor because these distinctions exist separately from singular things.

739. And it is because of this difficulty that some men speak of participation, and raise the question as to what causes participation and what it is to participate. For some speak of the coexistence of the soul, as Lycophron, who says that knowledge is the coexistence of the act of knowing and the soul; and others say that life is the composition or connection of soul with body.

740. The same argument applies in all cases. For being healthy will be either the coexistence or conjunction or composition of soul and health; and being a bronze triangle will be the composition of bronze and triangle; and being white will be the composition of surface and whiteness.

741. Now the reason for this position is that these thinkers are looking for some unifying principle and difference of potentiality and actuality. But, as we have pointed out (736), both the ultimate matter and form are the same, one potentially and the other actually. Hence to ask what the cause of their unity is, is the same as to ask what makes them one; for each particular

thing is a unity, and what is potential and what is actual are in a sense one thing. Hence there is no other cause except that which causes motion from potentiality to actuality. And all those things which do not have matter are simply one.

COMMENTARY

1755. Having dealt with the material and formal principles, Aristotle now intends to settle the question about the way in which they are united to each other; and in regard to this he does three things. First (733:C 1755), he raises the question. Second (735:C 1758), he answers it ("It is evident"). Third (739:C 1765), he rejects the false opinions about this question ("And it is because").

In regard to the first, he gives two reasons for saying that this question involves a difficulty. He says (733) that, in regard to the question which was touched on above about definitions and numbers as to what makes each of them one, it must be noted that all things which have several parts (and of which the whole is not merely a heap of parts but is something constituted of parts and is over and above the parts themselves) have something that makes them one. For in some bodies which have unity in this way, contact is the cause of their unity, and in others stickiness or something else of this kind.

1756. Now it is evident that, while a defining concept is one thing composed of many parts, it is not one thing merely by the addition of its parts, "like the Iliad," i.e., the poem written about the history of the Trojans, which is one thing only by way of aggregation. But a definition is one thing in an absolute sense, for it signifies one thing. It is reasonable, then, to ask what makes both the definition of man to be one thing, and man himself, whose intelligible structure is the definition. For since man is animal and two-footed, and these seem to be two things, it is reasonable to ask why man is one thing and not many.

1757. And if, in a different way (734).

Then he gives the reason why this question is a problem. For if what some men claim is true, i.e., if animal itself is a particular thing which exists of itself and is separate, and the same is true of two-footed, as the Platonists held, then it is reasonable to ask why man is not these two things connected together, so that particular men are such only by participating in man, and not by participating in one thing but in two, animal and two-footed. And according to this man will not be one thing but two, namely, animal and two-footed.

1758. It is evident (735).

He solves the above problem; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he offers an explanation that seems to provide a solution to the problem. He says that, if some men accept the things which have been said about Plato's position, and change the natures of things in this way because they hold that universals are separate as the Platonists were accustomed to define and speak of them, it will evidently be impossible to give the cause of a man's unity or solve the foregoing problem. But if, as is stated above (706:C 1700), one holds that in definitions one part is as matter and the other as form, i.e., one as potentiality and the other as actuality, then it will be easy to solve the question, because there does not seem to be a problem.

1759. For this problem (736).

Second, he solves this problem in the aforesaid way. First, he solves it in the case of natural substances which are generated and corrupted. He says that this problem would be the same as if we were to ask why bronze is round. For let us assume that the definition of the term cloak is round bronze, and that this term signifies this definition. Then when one asks why the definition round bronze is one, there does not seem to be any problem, because bronze is as matter and round as form. For there is no other cause of these being one except that which makes what is in potency to become actual. And in everything in which there is generation this is the agent. Hence, since this (what is in potentiality to become actual) is the essence signified by the definition, then in the case of things subject to generation and corruption it is evidently the agent which causes the definition of the essence to be one.

1760. Further, some matter (737).

Then he solves the above problem in regard to the objects of mathematics. He says that matter is of two kinds, sensible and intelligible.

Sensible matter is what pertains to the sensible qualities, hot and cold, rare and dense and the like; and with this matter natural bodies are concreted. Now the objects of mathematics abstract from this kind of matter.

But intelligible matter means what is understood without sensible qualities or differences, for example, what is continuous. And the objects of mathematics do not abstract from this kind of matter.

1761. Hence, whether in the case of sensible things or in that of the objects of mathematics, their definitions must always contain something as matter and something as form; for example, in the definition of a mathematical circle, a circle is a plane figure, plane is as matter and figure as form. For a mathematical definition and a natural definition are each one thing on the same grounds (even though there is no agent in the realm of mathematical entities as there is in the realm of natural entities), because in both cases one part of the definition is as matter and the other as form.

1762. He solves the above problem in regard to the things that are wholly separate from matter. He says that in the case of all those things which do not have intelligible matter, as the objects of mathematics have, or sensible matter, as natural bodies have, that is to say, in the case of the separate substances, each one of these is at once one thing [individuated by form].

For each of those things which have matter is not at once one thing, but they are one because unity comes to their matter. But if there is anything that is only a form, it is at once one thing, because it is impossible to posit in it anything prior in any order whatever that must await unity from a form.

1763. He gives this example: the ten categories do not derive being by adding something to being in the way that species are established by adding differences to genera, but each is itself a being. And since this is true, it is evident that being does not await something to be added to it so that it may become one of these, i.e., either a substance or quantity or quality; but each of these from the very beginning is at once either a substance or quantity or quality.

This is the reason why neither unity nor being is given as a genus in definitions, because unity and being would have to be related as matter to differences, through the addition of which being would become either substance or quality.

1764. Similarly, that which is wholly separate from matter and is its own essence, as was stated above (1708), is at once one thing, just as it is a being; for it contains no matter that awaits a form from which it will derive being and unity. In the case of such things, then, there is no cause that makes them one by means of motion.

However, some of them have a cause which supports their substances without their substances being moved [separate simple substances depend on God for existence], and not as in the case of things subject to generation, which come to be through motion. For each of them is at once a particular being and a one, but not so that being and unity are certain genera or that they exist as individuals apart from singular things, as the Platonists held.

1765. And it is because (739).

Then he rejects the false opinion which some men held about this question; and in regard to this he. does three things.

First, he states their position. He says that it is because of this problem that some, namely, the Platonists, posited participation, by which inferior beings participate in superior ones; for example, this particular man participates in man, and man in animal and two-footed. And they asked what the cause of participation is and what it is to participate, in order that it might become clear to them why this thing which I call two-footed animal is one thing. And others held that the cause of a man’s unity is a certain consubstantiality or coexistence of the soul with the body, as if soul’s being with body were signified in the abstract; as if we were to speak of animation as Lycophron said that knowledge is a mean between the soul and the act of knowing; and others said that life itself is the mean whereby soul is joined to body.

1766. The same argument (740).

He rejects these positions. He says that if the statement made about the soul and the body is correct, i.e., that there is some mean uniting them, the same argument will apply in all things which are related as form and matter. For, according to this, being healthy will be a mean as a kind of consubstantiality or a kind of connection or bond between the soul, by which the animal subsists, and health. And being a triangle will be a mean combining figure and triangle. And being white will be a mean by which whiteness is connected with surface. This is obviously false. Hence it will be false that animation is a mean by which the soul is joined to the body, since animation means merely being ensouled.

1767. Now the reason (740).

He gives the reasons for the error in the above positions. He says that the reason why these thinkers held such views is that they sought for some principle which makes potentiality and actuality one thing, and looked for the differences of these as though it were necessary for them to be brought together by some one mean like things which are actual and diverse. But, as has been stated, both the ultimate matter, which is appropriated to a form, and the form itself are the same; for one of them is as potentiality and the other as actuality. Hence to ask what causes a thing is the same as to ask what causes it to be one, because each thing is one to the extent that it is a being. And potentiality and actuality are also one in a certain respect, for it is the potential that becomes actual; and thus it is not necessary for them to be united by some bond like those things which are completely different. Hence there is no other cause that produces the unity of things which are composed of matter and form except that cause which moves things from potentiality to actuality. But those things which simply do not have matter are some one thing of themselves just as they are something existing. These explanations will suffice for Book VIII.

BOOK IX

POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY

LESSON I

The Division of Potency into Active and Passive. The Nature of Incapacity and Privation

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1045b 27-1046a 35

742. We have dealt then with the primary kind of being and the one to which all the other categories of being are referred, namely, substance. For it is in reference to the concept of substance that the other categories are called beings, i.e., quantity, quality, and others which are spoken of in this way; for all involve the concept of substance, as we have stated in our first discussions (562). And since being is used in one sense of quiddity or quantity or quality, and in another sense of potency and actuality and activity, let us now establish the truth about potency and actuality. And first let us consider potency in the most proper sense of the term, although not the one most useful for our present purpose; for potency and actuality are found in more things than those which are referred merely to motion. But when we have spoken about this sense of potency we shall, in our discussions about actuality, also explain the other senses of potency.

743. That the terms potency and can are used in many senses we have made evident elsewhere (467). And all of those senses of potency which are equivocal may be dismissed; for some senses of potency [or power] are merely figurative, as in geometry. And we say that things are possible or impossible because they either are or are not in some particular way. But all

those potencies belonging to the same species are principles and are referred to one primary kind of potency, which is the principle of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other. For one kind is a potency for being acted upon, which is in the patient and is the principle of its being passively moved by another inasmuch as it is other; and another kind of potency is the state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to corruption by some other thing inasmuch as it is other, i.e., by a principle of change. And the intelligible character of the primary kind of potency is found in all of these terms. Again, these potencies are said to be potencies either just for acting or for being acted upon, or for acting or being acted upon well, so that in these latter kinds of potencies the notes of the prior kind are somehow present.

744. It is evident, then, that in one sense the potency for acting and for being acted upon are one; for a thing is potential both because it itself has the potency for being acted upon, and because something else can be acted upon by it. And in another sense these potencies are different; for the one is in the patient, since it is because it has a principle, and because matter is a principle, that the patient is acted upon and changed by something else. For what is oily is capable of being burnt, and what is yielding in some way is capable of being broken (and the supposit is capable of being expressed);' and the same is true in other cases. And another kind of potency is in the agent, as the potency to heat and the potency to build-the former in the thing capable of heating, and the latter in the person capable of building. Hence, inasmuch as a thing is by nature a unity, it cannot be acted upon by itself; for it is one thing and not also something else.

745. And incapacity or impossibility is the privation contrary to such potency, so that every potency and incapacity belong to the same subject and refer to the same attribute. And there are various kinds of privation; for there is one kind of privation when a thing does not have some attribute which it is naturally disposed to have, either in general, or when it is naturally disposed to have it. And this is so either in a particular way, for example, completely, or even in any way at all. And in some cases if things are naturally disposed to have some attribute and do not have it as a result of force, we say that they are deprived of it.

COMMENTARY

DIFFERENT KINDS OF POTENCY

1768. Having established the truth about being as divided into the ten categories, the Philosopher's aim here is to establish the truth about being as divided into potency and actuality. This is divided into two parts. In the first he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, and explains what he intends to do in this book. In the second (1773) he carries out his announced plan.

He accordingly points out, first, that he has already discussed above the primary kind of being to which all the other categories of being are referred, namely, substance. And he explains that all the other categories are referred to substance as the primary kind of being, because all other beings—quantity, quality, and the like—involve the concept of substance. For being is said of quantity because it is the measure of substance; and of quality because it is a certain disposition of substance; and the same thing applies in the case of the other categories. This is evident from the fact that all accidents involve the concept of substance, since in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for example, in the definition of snub it is necessary to include nose. This was made clear at the beginning of Book VII (1347).

1769. But being is variously divided. (1) One division is based on its designation as whatness (i.e., substance), quantity or quality, which is its division into the ten categories.

(2) Another is its division into potency and actuality or activity, from which the word actuality [or act] is derived, as is explained later on (1805). And for this reason it is now necessary to deal with potency and actuality.

1770. It is first necessary to speak of potency in its most proper sense, although not the one which is most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality are referred in most cases to things in motion, because motion is the actuality of a being in potency. But the principal aim of this branch of science is to consider potency and actuality, not insofar as they are found in mobile beings, but insofar as they accompany being in general. Hence potency and actuality are also found in immobile beings, for example, in intellectual ones.

1771. And when we shall have spoken about the potency found in mobile things, and about its corresponding actuality, we will also be able to explain potency and actuality insofar as they are found in the intelligible things classed as separate substances, which are treated later on (1867). This order is a fitting one, since sensible things, which are in motion, are more evident to us, and therefore by means of them we may attain a knowledge of the substances of immobile things.

1773. That the terms (743).

Then he deals with potency and actuality; and this is divided into three parts. In the first he discusses potency; and in the second (1823), actuality; and in the third (1844), the relationship of actuality to potency.

The first is divided into two parts. In the first of these he discusses potency itself. In the second (1787) he discusses potency in relation to the things in which it is found.

The first is divided into two parts. In the first he deals with potency; and in the second (1784), with incapacity.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains the different senses of potency. Second (1781), he makes evident a truth about potency from the things previously laid down.

He accordingly says, first, that it has been shown elsewhere, i.e., in Book V of this work (954) that the words potency and can have a multiplicity of meanings. But in some cases this multiplicity is a multiplicity of equivocation, and in others it is a multiplicity of analogy.

For (1) some things are said to be capable or incapable because they have some principle (+) within themselves, and this refers to those senses in which all potencies are said to be such not equivocally but analogously. (2) But other things are not said to be capable or able because of some principle which they have (~) within themselves; and in their case the term potency is used equivocally.

1774. Therefore, with regard to those senses in which the term potency is used equivocally, he says that these must be dismissed for the present. For the term potency is referred to some things, not because of some principle which they have, but in a figurative sense, (1) as is done in geometry; for the square of a line is called its power (potentia), and a line is said to be capable of becoming its square. (2) And similarly in the case of numbers it can be said that the number three is capable of becoming the number nine, which is its square; because when the number three is multiplied by itself the number nine results, for three times three makes nine; and when a line, which is the root of a square, is multiplied by itself, a square results. And the same thing applies in the case of numbers. Hence the root of a square bears some likeness to the matter from which a thing is made; and for this reason the root is said to be capable of becoming its square as matter is capable of becoming a thing.

1775. And (3) similarly in the considerations of logic we say that some things are possible or impossible, not because of some potency, but because they either are or are not in some way; for those things are called possible whose opposites can be true, whereas those are called impossible whose opposites cannot be true. This difference depends on the relationship of predicate to subject, because sometimes the predicate is repugnant to the subject, as in the case of impossible things, and sometimes it is not, as in the case of possible things.

1776. Passing over these senses of potency, then, we must consider those potencies which are reduced to one species, because each of these is a principle. And all potencies spoken of in this sense are reduced to some principle from which all the others derive their meaning; and this is an active principle, which is the source of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other. He says this because it is possible for an active principle to be at the same time in the mobile or patient, as when something moves itself; although it is not mover and moved, or agent and patient, in the same respect. Hence the principle designated as active potency is said to be a principle of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other; because, even though an active principle can be found in the same thing as a passive principle, this still does not happen insofar as it is the same, but insofar as it is other.

1777. That the other potencies are reduced to this principle which is called active potency is evident; for in one sense passive potency means the principle by which one thing is moved by some other thing inasmuch as it is other. He says this because, even if the same thing might be acted upon by itself, this still does not happen insofar as it is the same, but insofar as it is other. Now this potency is reduced to a first active potency, because when anything undergoes change this is caused by an agent. And for this reason passive potency is also reduced to active potency.

1778. In another sense potency means a certain state of insusceptibility (or impossibility) “to change for the worse,” i.e., a disposition whereby a thing is such that it cannot undergo change for the worse; i.e., that it cannot undergo corruption as a result of some other thing “inasmuch as it is other,” namely, by a principle of change which is an active principle.

1779. Now it is evident that both of these senses of potency imply something within us which is referred to the undergoing of a change. For (1) in the one sense the term designates a principle by reason of which someone cannot be acted upon; and (2) in the other sense it designates a principle by reason of which someone can be acted upon.

Hence, since the state of being acted upon depends on action, the definition “of the primary kind of potency,” namely, active potency, must be given in the definition of both senses of potency. Thus these two senses of potency are reduced to the first, namely, to active potency, as to something prior.

1780. Again, in another sense potencies are spoken of not only in relation to acting and being acted upon but in relation to what is done well in each case. For example, we say that someone is capable of walking, not because he can walk in any way at all, but because he can walk well; and in an opposite sense we say of one who limps that he cannot walk. Similarly, we say that wood is capable of being burned because it can be burned easily; but we say that green wood is incapable of being burned because it cannot be burned easily. Hence it is clear that in the definitions of those potencies which are described as potencies for acting and being acted upon well, there are included the concepts of those primary potencies which were described as potencies for acting and being acted upon without qualification; for example, to act is included in to act and to be acted upon is included in to be acted upon well.

Hence it is obvious that all of these senses of potency are reduced to one primary sense, namely, to active potency; and therefore it is also evident that this multiplicity is not the multiplicity of equivocation but of analogy.

1781. It is evident, then (744).

From what has been said he now indicates something that is true about the foregoing potencies. He says that in one sense the potency for acting and that for being acted upon are one, and in another sense they are not. (1) They are one potency if the relationship of the one to the other is considered; for one is spoken of in reference to the other. For a thing can be said to have a potency for being acted upon, either because it has of itself a potency by which it may be acted upon, or because it has a potency by which something else may be acted upon by it. And in this second sense active potency is the same as passive potency; for by reason of the fact that a thing has active potency it has a power by which something else may be acted upon by it.

1782. (2) However, if these two potencies—active and passive—are taken in reference to the subject in which they are found, then in this sense active and passive potency are different; for passive potency exists in a patient, since a patient is acted upon by reason of some principle existing within itself; and matter is of this sort. Now passive potency is nothing but the principle by which one thing is acted upon by another; for example, to be burned is to undergo a change, and the material principle by reason of which a thing is capable of being burned is the oily or the fat. Hence the potency itself is present as a passive principle in the thing capable of being burned. And similarly what yields to the thing touching it so that it receives an impression from it, as wax or something of this sort, is capable of doing so inasmuch as it is impressionable. "And the supposit," i.e., the male, is the proper subject of the modification resulting in an eunuch. The same is true of other things which are acted upon insofar as they have within themselves a principle for being acted upon, which is called passive potency. But active potency is in the agent, as heat in the thing which heats and the art of building in the builder.

1783. And since active potency and passive potency are present in different things, it is obvious that nothing is acted upon by itself inasmuch as it is naturally disposed to act or to be acted upon. However, it is possible for something to be acted upon by itself accidentally, as a physician heals himself not inasmuch as he is a physician but inasmuch as he is ill. But in this case a thing is not acted upon by itself, because, properly speaking, one of the aforesaid principles is present in one and the same thing, and not the other. For the principle of being acted upon is not present in the one having the principle of action except accidentally, as has been said (1782).

1784. And incapacity (745).

Here he establishes the truth about incapacity, saying that incapacity (which is the contrary of the above-mentioned potency or capacity) or impossibility (which is referred to incapacity of this sort) is the privation of the potency in question.

However, he says this to distinguish it from the impossible which signifies some mode of falsity, which is not referred to any incapacity, just as the possible is also not referred to any potency. For since privation and possession belong to the same subject and refer to the same attribute, potency and incapacity must belong to the same subject and refer to the same attribute.

Hence there are as many senses of incapacity as there are of potency, to which it is opposed.

1785. But it must be noted that the term privation is used in many senses. For in one sense whatever does not have some attribute can be said to be deprived of it, as when we say that a stone is deprived of sight because it does not have sight; and in another sense a thing is said to be deprived only of what it can have and does not have. And this may happen in two ways: in one way when the thing does not have it at all, as a dog is said to be deprived of sight when it does not have it; and, in another way, if it does not have it when it is naturally disposed to have it. Hence a dog is not said to be deprived of sight before the ninth day. This sense of privation is again divided. For in one sense a thing is said to be deprived of some attribute because it does not have it in a particular way, namely, completely and well; as when we say that someone who does not see well is blind. And in another sense a thing is said to be deprived of some attribute when it does not have it in any way at all; for example, we say that a person is deprived of sight who does not have sight at all. But sometimes force is included in the notion of privation, and then we say that some things are deprived of certain attributes when those which they are naturally disposed to have are removed by force.

LESSON 2

Rational and Irrational Potencies

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2:1046a 36-1046b 28

746. And since some such principles are present in non-living things, and others in living things and in the soul, and in the soul having reason, it is evident that some potencies will be devoid of reason and others will be rational. And for this reason all the arts and productive sciences are potencies; for they are principles of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other.

747. And all those potencies which are rational are open to contrary determinations, and those which are irrational are each determined to one thing; for example, what is hot is capable of heating, whereas the medical art is concerned with both sickness and health.

748. And the reason of this is that science is a conception [or rational plan], and the same conception explains both a thing and its privation, though not in the same way. And in one sense it is a conception of both, and in another it applies rather to the existent thing. Hence it is necessary that such sciences should deal with contraries, but with one directly and with the other indirectly; for the conception applies to one essentially, but to the other in a kind of accidental way, because it explains the contrary by negation and removal. For the contrary is the primary privation, and this is the removal of the other term.

749. Moreover, since contraries do not exist in the same subject, and since a science is a potency in a being which possesses a rational plan, and

the soul has a principle of motion, it follows that, while what is healthful produces only health, and what is capable of heating produces only heat, and what is capable of cooling produces only cold, one who has a science may be occupied with both contraries. For reason extends to both but not in the same manner, and it exists in a soul which possesses a principle of motion Hence the soul will initiate both by the same principle by joining both to the same rational plan. And for this reason those things whose potency is rational produce effects contrary to those whose potency is irrational; for one principle of contrary determinations is contained in the rational plan.

750. It is also evident that a potency for doing something well involves the potency of merely doing something or undergoing some change. But the latter does not always involve the former; for he who does a thing well must do it, but he who does something need not do it well.

COMMENTARY

SUBJECTS OF POTENCY

1786. Having explained the different senses in which the term potency is used, here the Philosopher establishes the truth about potency in relation to the things in which it is found. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1786) he shows how these potencies differ from each other on the basis of a difference in their subjects. In the second (1795) he shows how potency and actuality are simultaneous or not in a substance.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows how potencies differ on the basis of a difference in their subjects. He says that, since potencies are principles both for acting and being acted upon, some of these principles are in non-living things and some in living ones. And since living things are composed of body and soul, and the principles for acting and being acted upon which are present in the body of living things do not differ from those in non-living ones, he therefore adds “and in the soul,” because the principles of action which are present in the soul clearly differ from those present in non-living things.

1787. Again, there are several kinds of souls, and many of these do not differ to any great extent both in acting and in being acted upon from non-living things which act by natural instinct; for the parts of the nutritive and sentient soul act by natural impulse. Now only the rational part of the soul has dominion over its acts, and it is in this respect that it differs from non-living things. Therefore, having pointed out the difference between souls, he adds “and in the soul having reason,” because those principles of living things which are found in the rational part of the soul differ specifically from those of non-living things. Hence it is evident that some powers of the soul are irrational and others rational.

1788. He explains what he means by those which are rational, when he adds that (1) “all the productive arts,” as the building and constructive arts and the like, whose actions pass over into (+) external matter, and (2) all sciences which do not perform actions that pass over into (~) external matter, as the moral and logical sciences—all arts of this kind, I say, are powers. And this is concluded from the fact that they are principles of change in some other thing inasmuch as it is other. This is the definition of active power, as is clear from what was said above.

1789. And all those (747).

Second, he gives the difference between the above-mentioned potencies. He says that the same rational potencies are (+) open to contrary determinations as the art of medicine, which is a potency, as has been explained (1404-7), can produce both health and sickness.

But irrational potencies are not (~) open to contrary determinations, but properly speaking each is determined to one thing; for example, the heat of the sun has as its proper effect to heat, although it can be the cause of coldness inasmuch as by opening the pores it causes the loss of internal heat; or by absorbing the matter of a hot humor it destroys the heat and thereby cools.

1790. And the reason (748).

Then the Philosopher gives the reason for the aforesaid difference, and it is as follows: a science, which is a rational potency, is a conception of the thing known existing in the mind. Now the same conception explains both the thing and its privation, although not in the same way, because it first makes known the existing thing and subsequently its privation; for example, the power of sight itself is known properly by means of the notion of sight, and then blindness is known, which is nothing but the very lack of sight in a thing naturally disposed to have it. Hence, if science is a conception of the thing known existing in the mind, the same science must deal with contraries—with one primarily and properly, and with the other secondarily; for example, the art of medicine is cognitive and productive primarily of health and secondarily of sickness, because, as has been pointed out, this art has to do with the conception of the thing known in the mind, and this conception is of one of the contraries directly and of the other indirectly.

1791. And since the remarks which the Philosopher had made above about privation he afterwards transferred to contraries, he shows that the same conception applies to a contrary and to a privation; for just as a privation is explained by negation and removal (for example, the removal of sight explains blindness), in a similar fashion a contrary is explained by negation and removal; because privation, which is merely the removal of some attribute, is a sort of first principle among contraries.

For in the case of all contraries one stands as something perfect and the other as something imperfect and the privation of the former; black, for example, is the privation of white, and cold is the privation of heat. Thus it is evident that the same science extends to contraries.

1792. Moreover, since (749).

He next develops this point, and he begins to give the reason for the aforesaid difference. For it is clear that natural things act by reason of the forms present in them. But contrary forms cannot exist in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for the same natural thing to produce contrary effects.

But science is a potency for acting and a principle of motion, because a person has an idea of the thing to be made and this principle of motion is in the mind. And since this is so it follows that natural things produce only one effect; for example, what is healthful produces only health, and what is capable of heating produces only heat, and what is capable of cooling produces only cold.

But one who acts by science may be occupied with both contraries, because the conception of both contained in the soul is the same; for the soul possesses the principle of such motion, although not in the same way, as has been explained.

1793. Therefore, just as a natural activity proceeds to bring about its effect as though it were united to its form, which is the principle of action whose likeness remains in the effect, in a similar fashion the soul by its activity proceeds to bring about both opposites “by the same principle,” i.e., by the conception which is one for the two opposites, uniting both motions to this principle and causing both to terminate in it inasmuch as the likeness of this principle is verified in both of the opposites brought into being.

Therefore it is evident that rational powers produce an effect opposite to irrational powers, because a rational power produces contrary effects, whereas an irrational power produces only one effect. The reason is that a single principle of contrary effects is contained in the conception belonging to a science, as has been explained.

1794. It is also evident (750).

He explains the relationship of some of the senses of potency mentioned above to those which come under them. For it was stated above that a thing is said to have active or passive potency, sometimes only because it can act or be acted upon, and sometimes because it can act or be acted upon well. Therefore he says that the potency for acting or being acted upon well involves the potency for acting or being acted upon, but not the reverse. For it follows that someone acts if he acts well, but the opposite of this is not true.

LESSON 3

Rejection of the View That a Thing Has Potency Only When It Is Acting. Rejection of the View That All Things Are Possible

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 3 & 4: 1046b 29-1047b 30

751. There are some, such as the members of the Megaric school, who say that a thing has a potency for acting only when it is acting, and that when it is not acting it does not have this potency; for example, one who is not building does not have the power of building, but only one who is building when he is building; and it is the same in other cases.

752. It is not difficult to see the absurd consequences of this position. For it is evident, according to this view, that a man will not be a builder if he is not building, because to be a builder is to be able to build. The same is true in the case of the other arts. Therefore, if it is impossible to have such arts unless one has at some time learnt and acquired them, and if it is impossible not to have them unless one has at some time lost them (either through forgetfulness or through some change or through the passage of time; for this cannot occur as a result of the object being destroyed, since it always exists), when one will have ceased to use an art he will not have it; and yet he will be able to build forthwith, thus somehow getting it back again.

753. And the same thing will be true in the case of non-living things; for neither the cold nor the hot nor the sweet nor the bitter nor any sensible

thing will exist in any way at all if they are not being sensed. Hence they will have to maintain the theory that Protagoras did.

754. In fact nothing will have senses unless it is sensing or acting. Therefore, if that is blind which does not have the power of sight, though it is designed by nature to have it, and when it is designed by nature to have it, and so long as it exists, the same persons will be blind many times during the day; and deaf as well.

755. Further, if what is deprived of a potency is incapable, it will be impossible for that to come into being which has not yet been generated; but he who says that what cannot possibly be generated either is or will be, is in error; for this is what impossible or incapable means. Hence these theories do away with both motion and generation; for what is standing will always stand, and what is sitting will always sit, because if it is sitting it will not get up, since it is impossible for anything to get up which has no possibility of doing so.

756. Therefore, if it is impossible to maintain this, it is evident that potency and actuality are distinct. But these views make potency and actuality the same, and for this reason it is no small thing which they seek to destroy. Hence it is possible for a thing to be capable of being and yet not be, and for a thing not to be and yet be capable of being. And it is similar in the case of the other categories; for example, a thing may be capable of walking and yet not walk, and be capable of not walking and yet walk.

757. Moreover, a thing has a potency if there is nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the potency. I mean, for example, that if a thing is capable of sitting, and it turns out to be sitting, there will be nothing impossible in its having a sitting position; and it is similar if it is capable of being moved or of moving something, or of standing or causing a thing to stand, or of being or coming to be, or of not being or not coming to be.

758. And the word actuality, which is combined with entelechy, is extended chiefly from motion to other things; for actuality seems to be identified mainly with motion. And for this reason they do not assign motion to non-existent things, but they do assign the other categories. For example, non-existent things are considered the objects of intellect and desire but not to be in motion. And the reason is that they would have to exist actually even though they did not exist actually; for some non-existent

things are potential. Yet they do not exist, because they do not exist in complete actuality.

Chapter 4

759. Now if what has been called potential or possible is such because something follows from it, it is evident that it cannot be true to say that a thing is possible but will not be, because things which cannot possibly be would then disappear. An example would be if someone, thinking that nothing is impossible, were to affirm that it is possible for the diagonal of a square to be commensurate, even though it is not commensurate; because nothing prevents a thing that is capable of being or of coming to be from not being or not coming to be. But this conclusion necessarily follows from the things laid down above. And if we suppose that which is not but is capable I of being, to be or to have come into being, nothing would be impossible. But in this case something impossible will occur; for it is impossible that a diagonal be commensurate. For to be false and to be impossible are not the same; for while it is false that you are now standing, it is not impossible.

760. And at the same time it is evident that, if when A exists B must exist, then if A is possible B must be possible; for if it is not necessary that B be possible, there is nothing to prevent its not being possible. Therefore, let A be possible. And if A is possible, then when A is possible, if A is assumed to exist, nothing impossible follows, but B necessarily exists. But this was supposed to be impossible. Therefore, let B be impossible. Then if B must be impossible, A must be so. But the first was supposed to be impossible; therefore so also is the second. Hence, if A is possible, B will be possible also, i.e., if they are so related that, when A exists, B must exist. Therefore, if when A and B are so related, B is not possible, then A and B will not be related in the way supposed. On the other hand, if, when A is possible, B must be possible, then if A exists, B must exist. For to say that B must be possible if A is possible, means that, if A exists both when it exists and in the way in which it is possible for it to exist, then B must also exist and exist in that way.

COMMENTARY

OBJECTION 1: A THING HAS POTENCY ONLY WHEN IT IS ACTING

1795. Having compared one kind of potency with another in the above discussion, here the Philosopher begins to explain how potency and actuality are found in the same subject. This is divided into two parts. In the first he rejects the false opinions of some men. In the second (1815) he establishes the truth (“And since among”).

The first is divided into two parts. In the first part he rejects the opinion of those who said that a thing is possible or potential only when it is in a state of actuality. In the second part (1810) he rejects the opinion of those who maintain the reverse of this: that all things are potential or possible, even though they are not in a state of actuality (“Now if what”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he rejects the erroneous opinion referred to. Second (1804), he explains what it is to be potential or possible, and what it is to be actual (“Moreover, a thing”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives this opinion. Second (1796), he destroys it (“It is not difficult”). Third (1803), he draws his intended conclusion (“Therefore, if it”).

He accordingly says, first, that some said that a thing is in a state of potency or capability only when it is acting; for example, a man who is not actually building is incapable of building, but he is capable of building only when he is actually building; and they speak in a similar way about other things.

The reason for this position seems to be that they thought that all things come about necessarily because of some connection between causes.

Thus if all things come about necessarily, it follows that those things which do not, are impossible.

1796. It is not difficult (752).

Then he adduces arguments against the above opinion, and these reduce it to its absurd consequences. The first is as follows: to be building is to have the power or capability of building. Therefore, if no one has the power or capability of acting except when he is acting, no one is a builder except when he is building. And the same thing will be true of the other arts; for all arts are certain capabilities or potencies, as has been pointed out (1786). It follows, then, that no one will have an art except when he is exercising it.

1797. But this is shown to be impossible if two assumptions are made. The first is this: if someone did not at first have an art, it would be impossible for him to have it later unless he had learned it or acquired it in some way, i.e., by discovery.

1798. The second assumption is that if someone had an art it would be impossible for him not to have the same art later unless he lost it in some way, either through forgetfulness or through some illness or through the passage of a long time during which the knowledge was not exercised; for this is the cause of forgetfulness. Now it cannot be that someone should lose an art as a result of the destruction of its object, as it sometimes happens that true knowledge is lost when a thing is changed; for example, when someone makes a true judgment that Socrates is sitting, his true judgment is destroyed when Socrates stands up. But this cannot be said about an art; for an art is not a knowledge of what exists, but of what is to be made; and so long as the matter from which an art can produce something continues to exist, the object of that art always exists. Hence an art cannot be lost when its object is destroyed, except in the ways mentioned.

1799. Now from these two assumptions the Philosopher argues as follows: if a man does not have an art except when he is exercising it, then when he begins to exercise it he has it anew. Therefore he must either have learned it or acquired it in some other way. And similarly when he ceases to exercise an art it follows that he lacks that art, and thus he loses the art which he previously had either through forgetfulness or through some change or through the passage of time. But both of these are clearly false; and therefore it is not true that someone has a potency only when he is acting.

1800. And the same (753).

Here he gives the second argument, which now has to do with the irrational principles present in non-living things, namely, hot and cold, sweet and bitter, and other qualities of this kind, which are active principles changing the senses and thus are potencies. Now if potency is present in a thing only when it is acting, it follows that nothing is hot or cold, sweet or bitter, and so forth, except when it is being sensed through a change in the senses. But this is clearly false; for if it were true it would follow that Protagoras’ opinion would be true, since he said that all the properties and natures of things have existence only in being sensed and in being thought.

And from this it would follow that contradictories would be true at the same time, since different men have contradictory opinions about the same thing. Now the Philosopher argued dialectically against this position above in Book IV (636). Therefore it is false that potency exists only when there is activity.

1801. Here he gives the third argument, which is as follows: sense is a kind of potency. Therefore, if potency exists only when there is activity, it follows that a man has sensory power only when he is sensing, for example, the power of sight or hearing. But one who does not have the power of sight although he is naturally disposed to have it is blind; and one who does not have the power of hearing is deaf. Hence he will be blind and deaf many times on the same day. But this is clearly false, for a blind man does not afterwards regain sight nor a deaf man hearing.

1802. Further, if what (755).

Here he gives the fourth argument, which is as follows: it is impossible for a thing to act which does not have the power to act. Therefore, if one has a potency or power only when he is acting, it follows that when he is not acting it is impossible for him to act. But whoever says that something incapable of happening either is or will be, is mistaken. This is evident from the meaning of the word impossible; for the impossible is said to be false because it cannot happen. It follows, then, that something which is not is incapable of coming to be in any way. And thus potency so understood will do away with motion and generation, because one who is standing will always stand, and one who is sitting will always sit. For if anyone is sitting, he will never stand afterwards, because so long as he is not standing he does not have the power to stand. Hence it is impossible for him to stand, and consequently it is impossible for him to get up. Similarly what is not white will be incapable of being white, and thus could not be made white. The same holds true in the case of all other things.

1803. Theefore, if (756).

He draws his intended conclusion, saying that, if the absurdities mentioned above cannot be admitted, it is obvious that potency and actuality are distinct. But those who hold the foregoing position make potency and actuality the same insofar as they say that something has potency only when it is in a state of actuality. And from this it is evident that they wish to remove from nature something of no little importance, for they eliminate motion and generation, as has been stated (1802). Hence, since this cannot be admitted, it is obvious that something is capable of being which yet is not, and that something is capable of not being which yet is. And “it is similar in the case of the other categories,” or predicaments, because it is possible from someone who is not walking to walk, and conversely it is possible from someone who is walking not to walk.

1804. Moreover, a thing (757).

Here he explains what it is to be potential and what it is to be actual. First, he explains what it is to be potential. He says that that is said to be potential from which nothing impossible follows when it is assumed to be actual; for example, if one were to say that it is possible for someone to sit if nothing impossible follows when he is assumed to sit. And the same holds true of being moved and of moving something, and other cases of this kind.

1805. And the word “actuality” (758).

Second, he explains what it is to be actual. He says that the word actuality is used to signify entelechy and perfection, namely, the form, and other things of this kind, as any action at all, is derived properly from motion, so far as the origin of the word is concerned. For since words are signs of intellectual conceptions, we first give names to those things which we first understand, even though they may be subsequent in the order of nature. Now of all acts which are perceived by us in a sensible way, motion is the best known and most evident to us; and therefore the word actuality was first referred to motion, and from motion the word was extended to other things.

1806. And for this reason motion is not attributed to (~) non-existent things, although certain of the other categories mentioned above are attributed to non-existents; for we say that non-existent things are intelligible, or thinkable, or even desirable, but we do not say that they are moved. For, since to be moved means to be actual, it follows that things which do not exist actually would exist actually; but this is obviously false. For even if some non-existent things are potential, they are still not said to be, since they are not actual.

Objection 2: All things are possible.

1807. Now if what (759).

Having destroyed the opinion of those who claim that nothing is possible except when it is actual, the Philosopher now destroys the opposite opinion of those who claim that all things are possible; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he destroys this opinion. Second (1810), he establishes a truth about the succession of possible things.

He accordingly says, first, that if it is true that a thing is said to be possible because something follows from it, inasmuch as the possible has been defined as that from which nothing impossible follows if it is assumed to exist, it is evident that the statements of some thinkers that anything is possible even if it never will be, cannot be true, since as a result of this position impossible things will be eliminated. For example, if one were to say that the diagonal of a square can be commensurate with a side, even though it is not commensurate with it (and one might speak in the same way about other impossible things), and not think that it is impossible for the diameter of a square to be commensurate with a side, those who maintain this position, I say, speak truly in one sense and in another they do not.

1808. For there are some things which nothing will prevent us from designating as capable or possible of coming to be, even though they never will be or ever come to be; but this cannot be said of all things. Yet according to the doctrine laid down above, and which we are now to assume, only those things are capable of being or coming to be, even though they are not, from which nothing impossible follows when they ate posited. However, when it is posited that the diagonal of a square is commensurate, an impossible conclusion follows. Thus it cannot be said that it is possible for the diagonal to be commensurate, for it is not only false but impossible.

1809. Now some things are false only but not impossible, as that Socrates sits or that he stands. For to be false and to be impossible are not the same; for example, it is false that you are now standing, but it is not impossible.

Therefore the foregoing opinion is true of some things, because some are possible even though they are false. However, it is not true of all things, because some are both false and impossible.

1810. And at the same (760).

And since he had said that a thing is judged possible because nothing impossible follows from it, he indicates the way in which there are possible consequents. He says that not only is the position in question destroyed by the definition of the possible given above, but it is also evident at the same time that, if the antecedent of a conditional proposition is possible, the consequent will also be possible; for example, if this conditional proposition “If when A is, B is,” is true, then if A is possible, B must be possible.

1811. Now in order to understand this we must note that the word possible is used in two senses: (1) It is used, first, in contradistinction to the necessary, as when we call those things possible which are capable either of being or not being. And when possible is taken in this way, the foregoing remarks do not apply. For nothing prevents the antecedent from being capable of being or not being, even though the consequent is necessary, as is clear in this conditional proposition, “If Socrates laughs, he is a man.”

1812. (2) The word possible is used in a second sense inasmuch as it is common both to those things which are necessary and to those which are capable of being or not being, according as the possible is distinguished from the impossible. And the Philosopher is speaking of the possible in this way here when he says that the consequent must be possible if the antecedent was possible.

1813. For let it be assumed that this conditional proposition is true: If A is, then B is; and let it be assumed that the antecedent, A, is possible. Then it is necessary that B either be possible or not. Now if it is necessary, then the assumption follows. But if it is not necessary, nothing prevents the opposite from being assumed, namely, that B is not possible. But this cannot stand; for A is assumed to be possible, and when it is assumed to be possible, it is at the same time assumed that nothing impossible follows from it; for the possible was defined above as that from which nothing impossible follows. But B follows from A, as was assumed, and B was assumed to be impossible; for to be impossible is the same as not to be possible. Therefore A will not be possible if B, which was held to be impossible, follows from it. Therefore let B be assumed to be impossible, and if it is impossible and given A, B must exist, then both the first and the second, namely, A and B will be impossible.

1814. In which place it must be noted that the following proposition is correct: (+) if the consequent is impossible, the antecedent is impossible; but (~) the reverse is not true. For nothing prevents something necessary from being a consequence of the impossible, as in this conditional proposition, “If man is an ass, he is an animal.”

Therefore what the Philosopher says here must not be understood as meaning that, if the first, i.e., the antecedent, were impossible, then the second, i.e., the consequent, would also be impossible. But it must be understood to mean that, if the consequent is impossible, both will be impossible.

Therefore it is obvious that, if A and B are so related that, when A is, B must be, it necessarily follows that, if A is possible, B will be possible; and if B is not possible when A is possible, then A and B are not related in the way supposed, namely, that B follows from A. But it is necessary that when A is possible B must be possible, if when A exists it is necessary that B exist. Therefore when I say “If A is, B is,” this means that B must be possible if A is possible, in the sense that it is possible for B to exist at the same time and in the way in which A is possible; for it is not possible that it should exist at any time and in any way.

LESSON 4

The Relative Priority of Actuality and Potency. The Reduction of Natural Potencies to Actuality

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761. And since among all potencies some are innate, as the senses, and some are acquired by practice, as the power of playing the flute, and some by learning, as artistic powers, those which are acquired by practice and by the use of reason must be acquired by previous exercise. But this is not necessary in the case of those which are not such and which involve passivity.

762. Now that which is capable is capable of something at some time and in some way, and has all the other qualifications which must be included in the definition; and some things can cause motion according to a rational plan and their potencies are rational, whereas other things are devoid of any rational plan and their potencies are irrational. And the former potencies must exist in living things, whereas the latter exist in both kinds of things.

763. And since this is so, then in the case of the latter potencies, when the thing that is capable of acting and the one that is capable of being acted upon come close to each other, the one must act and the other be acted upon; but in the case of the former potencies this is not necessary.

764. For the latter are all productive of one effect, whereas the former are productive of contrary effects. Hence they would produce contrary effects at

the same time, that is, if they were to act on a proximate patient without something determining them. But this is impossible.

765. Therefore there must be some other thing which is the proper cause of this, and by this I mean appetite or choice. For whatever a thing chiefly desires this it will do, when, insofar as it is potential, it is present and comes close to the thing which is capable of being acted upon. Hence every potency endowed with reason, when it desires something of which it has the potency and insofar as it has it, must do this thing. And it has this potency when the thing capable of being acted upon is present and is disposed in a definite way; but if it is not, it will not be able to act.

766. For it is unnecessary to add this qualification: when nothing external hinders it; for the agent has the potency insofar as it is a potency for acting. But this is not true of all things but only of those which are disposed in a definite way, in the case of which external obstacles will be excluded; for they remove some of the qualifications which are given in the definition of the capable or possible.

767. And for this reason if such things wish or desire to do two things or contrary things at the same time, they will not do them; for they do not have the potency for doing both at the same time, nor is it possible to do them at the same time, since it is those things which they have the capacity of doing that they do.

COMMENTARY

HOW POTENCY PRECEDES OR FOLLOWS ACT

1815. Having rejected the false opinions about potency and actuality the Philosopher now establishes the truth about them; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows how actuality is prior to potency in the same subject; and second (1816), how potency, when it is prior to actuality, is brought to a state of actuality.

He accordingly says, first, that, since (1) some potencies are innate in the things of which they are the potencies, as the sensory powers in animals; and (2) some are acquired by practice, as the art of flute-playing and other operative arts of this kind; and some are acquired by teaching and learning, as medicine and other similar arts; all of the abovementioned potencies which we have as a result of practice and the use of reason must first be exercised and their acts repeated before they are acquired. For example, one becomes a harpist by playing the harp, and one becomes a physician by studying medical matters.

But (1) other potencies which are not acquired by practice but which belong to us by nature and are passive, as is evident in the case of sensory powers, are not a result of exercise; for one does not acquire the sense of sight by seeing but actually sees because he has the power of sight.

1816. Now that which (762).

Here he shows how those potencies which are prior to actuality are brought to actuality; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows how different potencies—rational and irrational potencies—differ from each other in this respect. Second (1820), he shows how rational potencies are brought to a state of actuality ("Therefore, there must").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he lays down certain conditions required for the study of the aforesaid differences, and (1) one of these is that it is necessary to consider several qualifications in the definition of the capable or potential. For the capable does not refer to just anything at all but to something definite. Hence the capable must be capable of something, such as to walk or to sit. And similarly what can act or be acted upon cannot act or be acted upon at any time whatever; for example, a tree can bear fruit only at some definite time.

Therefore, when it is said that something is capable, it is necessary to determine when it is capable. And it is also necessary to determine in what way it is capable, for that which is capable can neither act nor be acted upon in every way; for example, one can walk in this way, namely, slowly, but not rapidly. And the same thing is true of the other qualifications which they are accustomed to give in the definitions of things, for example, by what instrument, in what place, and the like.

1817. Another qualification which he lays down is that (a) some things are capable of something because of a rational plan, and the potencies for these capabilities are rational. (b) But some capabilities are irrational, and the potencies for these are irrational. Again, rational potencies can exist only in living things, whereas irrational potencies can exist in both, i.e., in both living and nonliving things. And they exist not only in plants and in brute animals, which lack reason, but also in men themselves, in whom are found certain principles both of acting and of being acted upon which are irrational; for example, the powers of nutrition and growth, and weight, and other accidents of this kind.

1818. And since (763).

(2) Second, he gives the difference between the potencies in question.

He says that in the case of irrational potencies when the thing capable of being acted upon comes close to the thing which is capable of acting, then in accordance with that disposition whereby that able to be acted upon can be acted upon and that capable of acting can act, it is (+) necessary that the one be acted upon and that the other act. This is clear, for instance, when something combustible comes in contact with fire.

But in the case of rational potencies this is not necessary; for no matter how close some material may be brought to a builder, it is not (~) necessary that he build something.

1819. For the latter (764).

(3) Third, he gives the reason for the difference pointed out. (a) He says that irrational potencies are such that each is productive of only one effect, and, therefore, when such a potency is brought close to something that is capable of being acted upon, it must produce the one effect which it is capable of producing.

(b) But one and the same rational potency is capable of producing contrary effects, as was said above (1789-93). Therefore, if, when it is brought close to something capable of being acted upon, it would be necessary for it to bring about the effect which it is capable of producing, it would follow that it would produce contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible. For example, it would follow that a physician would induce both health and sickness.

1820. Therefore there must (765).

He then shows what is necessary in order for rational potencies to begin to act, seeing that closeness to the thing capable of being acted upon is not sufficient. In regard to this he does three things.

First, he reveals the principle by which a rational potency is made to act. He concludes from the above discussions that since a rational potency has a common relationship to two contrary effects, and since a definite effect proceeds from a common cause only if there is some proper principle which determines that common cause to produce one effect rather than the other, it follows that it is necessary to posit, in addition to the rational power which is common to two contrary effects, something else which particularizes it to one of them in order that it may proceed to act. And this “is appetite or choice,” i.e., the choosing of one of the two, or the choice which involves reason; for it is what a man intends that he does, although this occurs only if he is in that state in which he is capable of acting and the patient is present. Hence, just as an irrational potency which is capable of acting must act when its passive object comes close to it, in a similar fashion every rational potency must act (a) when it desires the object of which it has the potency, and (b) in the way in which it has it. And it has the power of acting when the patient is present and is so disposed that it can be acted upon; otherwise it could not act.

1821. For it is unnecessary (766).

Second, he answers an implied question. For since he had said that everything capable of acting as a result of a rational plan, when it desires something of which it is the potency, acts of necessity on the patient before it, someone could ask why he did not add this qualification, namely, “when nothing external hinders it”; for it has been said that it must act if it has sufficient power to act. But this does not occur in any and every way, but only when the thing having the potency is disposed in some particular way; and in this statement external obstacles are excluded. For the things which hinder it externally remove some of it desires, and assuming that some the qualifications laid down in the common definition of the capable or possible, so that it is not capable at this time or in this way or the like.

1822. And for this (767).

Third, he instructs us to avoid the absurd conclusions which he first said would follow, namely, that a rational potency would produce contrary effects at the same time. For if it is necessary that a rational potency should do what it should wish either by reason or by sense appetite, and granted that it should wish to do two different or contrary things at the same time, it does not follow for this reason that they will do them. For they do not have power over contrary effects in such a way that they may do contrary things at the same time; but they act according to the way in which they have a potency, as has been explained (1816-20).

LESSON 5

Actuality and Its Various Meanings

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768. Since we have dealt with the kind of potency which is related to motion, let us now determine about actuality both what it is and what kind of thing it is. For in making our distinctions it will become evident at the same time with regard to the potential not only that we speak of the potential as that which is disposed by nature to move something else or be moved by something else, either in an unqualified sense or in some special way, but also that we use the word in a different sense as well. And for this reason we will also come upon these points in making our investigations.

769. Now actuality is the existence of a thing not in the sense in which we say that a thing exists potentially, as when we say that Mercury is potentially in the wood, and a half in the whole, because it can be separated from it, or as we say that one who is not theorizing is a man of science if he is able to theorize; but in the sense in which each of these exists actually.

770. What we mean becomes evident in particular cases by induction, and we should not look for the boundaries of every thing, but perceive what is proportional; for it is as one who is building to one capable of building, and as one who is awake to one who is asleep, and as one who sees to one whose eyes are closed but who has the power of sight, and as that which is separated out of matter to matter, and as that which has been worked on to that which has not; and let actuality be defined by one member of this division and potency by the other.

771. However, things are not all said to be actual in the same way, but proportionally, as this is in that or to that; indeed, some are as motion to potency, and others as substance to some matter.

772. But the infinite and the void and all other such things are said to exist potentially and actually in a different sense from that which applies to many beings, for example, from that which sees or walks or is visible. For these things can be verified, and verified without qualification; for what is visible is so designated sometimes because it is being seen and sometimes because it is capable of being seen. But the infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever have actual separate existence, but it exists potentially only in knowledge. For since the process of division never comes to an end, this shows that this actuality exists potentially, but not that it ever exists separately.’ Therefore, regarding actuality, both what it is and what kind of thing it is will be evident to us from these and similar considerations.

COMMENTARY

KINDS OF ACT

1823. Having drawn his conclusions about potency, Aristotle now establishes the truth about actuality; and this is divided into two parts. In the first he establishes what actuality is. In the second (1832) he establishes what is true when something is in potency to actuality.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he links this up with the preceding discussion. He says that, since we have dealt with the kind of potency which is found in mobile things, i.e., the kind which is an active or passive principle of motion, we must now explain what actuality is and how it is related to potency; because when we will have distinguished the kinds of actuality, the truth about potency will become evident from this at the same time. For actuality is found not only in mobile things but also in immobile ones.

1824. And since potency is referred to actuality, it is evident from this that capability or potency taken in reference to action is attributed not only (1) to something that is naturally disposed (+) to move something else actively or be moved by something else passively, either in an unqualified sense, inasmuch as potency is referred alike to acting and being acted upon, or in some special way, inasmuch as potency is referred to what is able to act or be acted upon well; but (2) capability or potency is also referred to that actuality which is devoid of (~) motion. For although the word actuality is derived from motion, as was explained above (1805), it is still not motion alone that is designated as actuality. Hence, neither is potency referred only to motion. It is therefore necessary to inquire about these things in our investigations.

1825. Now actuality (769).

Second, he establishes the truth about actuality. First, he shows what actuality is; and second (1828), how it is used in different senses in the case of different things (“However, things”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows what actuality is. He says that a thing is actual when it exists but not in the way in which it exists when it is potential. (a) For we say that the image of Mercury is in the wood potentially and not actually before the wood is carved; but once it has been carved the image of Mercury is then said to be in the wood actually. (b) And in the same way we say that any part of a continuous whole is in that whole, because any part (for example, the middle one) is present potentially inasmuch as it is possible for it to be separated from the whole by dividing the whole; but after the whole has been divided, that part will now be present actually. (c) The same thing is true of one who has a science and is not speculating, for he is capable of speculating even though he is not actually doing so; but to be speculating or contemplating is to be in a state of actuality.

1826. What we mean (770).

Here he answers an implied question; for someone could ask him to explain what actuality is by giving its definition. And he answers by saying that it is possible to show what we mean (i.e., by actuality) in the case of singular things by proceeding inductively from examples, “and we should not look for the boundaries of everything,” i.e., the definition. For simple notions cannot be defined, since an infinite regress in definitions is impossible. But actuality is one of those first simple notions. Hence it cannot be defined.

1827. And he says that we can see what actuality is by means of the proportion existing between two things. For example, we may take the proportion of one who is building to one capable of building; and of one who is awake to one asleep; and of one who sees to one whose eyes are closed although he has the power of sight; and “of that which is separated out of matter,” i.e., what is formed by means of the operation of art or of nature, and thus is separated out of unformed matter, to what is not separated out of unformed matter. And similarly we may take the proportion of what has been prepared to what has not been prepared, or of what has been worked on to what has not been worked on. But in each of these opposed pairs one member will be actual and the other potential.

And thus by proceeding from particular cases we can come to an understanding in a proportional way of what actuality and potency are.

1828. However, things (771).

Then he shows that the term actuality is used in different senses; and he gives two different senses in which it is used. (1) First, actuality means action, or operation. And with a view to introducing the different senses of actuality he says, first, that we do not say that all things are actual in the same way but in different ones; and this difference can be considered according to different proportions. For a proportion can be taken as meaning that, just as one thing is in another, so a third is in a fourth; for example, just as sight is in the eye, so hearing is in the ear. And the relation of substance (i.e., of form) to matter is taken according to this kind of proportion; for form is said to be in matter.

1829. There is another meaning of proportion inasmuch as we say that, just as this is related to that, so another thing is related to something else; for example, just as the power of sight is related to the act of seeing, so too the power of hearing is related to the act of hearing. And the relation of motion to motive power or of any operation to an operative potency is taken according to this kind of proportion.

1830. But the infinite (772).

(2) Second, he gives the other sense in which the word actuality is used. He says that the infinite and the empty or the void, and all things of this kind, are said to exist potentially and actually in a different sense from many other beings; for example, what sees and what walks and what is visible. For it is fitting that things of this kind should sometimes exist in an unqualified sense either only potentially or only actually; for example, the visible is only actual when it is seen, and it is only potential when it is capable of being seen but is not actually being seen.

1831. But the infinite is not said to exist potentially in the sense that it may sometimes have separate actual existence alone; but in the case of the infinite, actuality and potentiality are distinguished only in thought and in knowledge. For example, in the case of the infinite in the sense of the infinitely divisible, actuality and potentiality are said to exist at the same time, because the capacity of the infinite for being divided never comes to an end; for when it is actually divided it is still potentially further divisible. However, it is never actually separated from potentiality in such a way that the whole is sometimes actually divided and is incapable of any further division.

And the same thing is true of the void; for it is possible for a place to be emptied of a particular body, but not so as to be a complete void, for it continues to be filled by another body; and thus in the void potentiality always continues to be joined to actuality.

The same thing is true of motion and time and other things of this kind which do not have complete being.

Then at the end he makes a summary of what has been said. This is evident in the text.

LESSON 6

Matter Is Potential When Ultimately Disposed for Actuality. The Use of the Term Matter in an Extended Sense

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1048b 37-1049b 3

773. However, we must determine when each thing is in a state of potency and when it is not; for a thing is not potential at just any time at all; for example, in the process of generation is earth. potentially a man? Or is it not, but rather when it has become seed? But perhaps even this is not true in an unqualified sense.

774. Therefore, in like manner, it is not everything which will be healed by the art of medicine or by chance, but there is something which is capable of being healed, and this is what is potentially healthy. And the intelligible expression of what comes to exist actually after existing potentially as a result of intellect is that it is something which when willed comes to be if no external impediment hinders it. And in the other case, namely, in that of the thing which gets well by itself, health exists potentially when nothing within the thing hinders it. The same is true of those things which are potentially a house; for if there is nothing in these things, i.e., in the matter, which prevents them from becoming a house, and if there is nothing which must be added or taken away or changed, this is potentially a house. The same is true of all other things which have an external principle of generation. And in the case of those things which have their principle of

change within themselves, a thing will also be potentially any of those things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders this. For example, seed is not yet such, because it must be present in some other thing and be changed. But when it is already such as a result of its own principle, it is now this thing potentially; but in the other state it needs another principle; for example, earth is not yet a statue potentially, but when changed it becomes bronze.

775. Now it seems that the thing of which we are speaking is not a that but a “thaten”; for example, a chest is not wood but wooden; and wood is not earth but earthen. And the same thing would be true if earth were not something else but a “thaten.” And that other thing is always potentially (in an unqualified sense) the thing which follows it, as a chest is not earth or earthen but wooden; for this is potentially a chest and the matter of a chest; and wood in an unqualified sense is the matter of a chest in an unqualified sense; but this wood is the matter of this chest. And if there is some first thing which is not said to be “thaten” as regards something else, this is prime matter; for example, if earth is of air, and air is not fire but of fire, then fire is prime matter, and is a particular thing. For a universal and a subject differ in this respect that a subject is a particular thing.

776. For example, the subject of modifications is man, body and animal, whereas the modification is musical or white. And when music comes to a subject, the subject is not called music but musical; and a man is not called whiteness but white; and he is not called walking or motion but what walks or is moved, like a “thaten.”

777. Therefore all those modifying attributes which are predicated in this way have substance as their ultimate subject; whereas those which are not predicated in this way, but the predicate is a form or a particular thing, have matter and material substance as their ultimate subject. Therefore it is only fitting that the term “thaten” happens to be predicated of matter and the modifying attributes; for both are indeterminate. It has been stated, then, when a thing is said to exist potentially, and when it is not.

COMMENTARY

POTENCY PROXIMATE TO ACT

1832. Having shown what actuality is, here the Philosopher intends to show both when and in virtue of what sort of disposition a thing is said to be in a state of potency for actuality. In regard to this he does two things.

First (1832), he states what he intends to do. He says that it is necessary to determine when a thing is in potency and when it is not. For it is not at just any time and when disposed in just any way that a thing can be said to be in potentiality even to what comes from it; for it could never be said that earth is potentially a man, since obviously it is not; but it is rather said to be potentially a man when the seed has already been generated from a preceding matter. And perhaps it never is potentially a man, as will be shown below.

1833. Therefore, in like manner (774).

Second, he answers the question which was raised; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he explains the sort of disposition which matter must have in order to be said to be in potency to actuality. Second (1839), he shows that it is only what is in matter that gets its name from matter disposed in some particular way.

In regard to the first it must be understood, as he said above in Book VII (1411), that the effects of certain arts may also come about without art; for while a house is not produced without art, health may be produced without the art of medicine through the operation of nature alone. And even though what comes to be by nature may not be fortuitous or a result of chance, since nature is an efficient cause in the proper sense, whereas fortune or chance is an efficient cause in an accidental sense, nevertheless, because the one who is healed by nature is healed without the application of any art, he is said to be healed by chance. For nothing prevents an effect which is not fortuitous in itself from being said to be fortuitous in relation to someone who does not consider the proper cause of such an effect.

1834. Hence he says that it is not just anyone at all or anyone disposed in any way at all who is healed by medicine or by chance; but it is someone having the capability by reason of a definite disposition who is healed either by nature or by art; for to all active principles there correspond definite passive principles. And it is the thing having this capability, which nature or art can bring to a state of actual health by a single action, that is potentially healthy.

1835. And in order that this kind of capability or potency may be more fully known he adds its definition both with reference to the operation of art and to that of nature. (1) Hence he says that the capable or potential is what comes to exist actually from existing potentially as a result of intellect or art. For “the intelligible expression,” or definition, of the capable is this: it is something which the artist immediately brings to actuality when he wills it if no external impediment hinders it. And the patient is then said to be potentially healthy, because he becomes healthy by a single action of art. (2) However, in the case of those who are healed by nature, each is said to be potentially healthy when there is nothing hindering health which has to be removed or changed before the healing power within the patient produces its effect in the act of healing.

1836. Now what we have said about the act of healing, which is brought about by the art of healing, can also be said about the other activities produced by the other arts. For matter is potentially a house when none of the things present in the matter prevent the house from being brought into being immediately by a single action, and when there is nothing that should be added or taken away or changed before the matter is formed into a house, as clay must be changed before bricks are made from it; and as something must be taken away from trees by hewing them and something added by joining them so that a house may be brought into being. Clay and trees, then, are not potentially houses, but bricks and wood already prepared are.

1837. And the same holds true in the case of other things whether their principle of perfection is outside of them, as in the case of artificial things, or within them, as in the case of natural things. And they are always in potency to actuality when they can be brought to actuality by their proper efficient principle without any external thing hindering them.

However, seed is not such, for an animal must be produced from it through many changes; but when by its proper active principle, i.e., something in a state of actuality, it can already become such, it is then already in potency.

1838. But those things which have to be changed before they are immediately capable of being brought to actuality require a different efficient principle, namely, the one preparing the matter, which is sometimes different from the one finishing it off, which induces the final form. For example, it is obvious that earth is not yet potentially a statue, for it is not brought to actuality by a single action or by a single agent; but first it is changed by nature and becomes bronze, and afterwards it becomes a statue by art.

1839. Now it seems (775).

Here he shows that a compound derives its name from such matter which is in potency to actuality; and in regard to this he does three things.

First, he shows how a compound derives its name from matter, saying that what is produced from matter is not called a that but a that-en (ecininum). This expression is not used in the Latin but it is used according to the custom of the Greeks to designate what comes from something else as from matter, as if to say that matter is not predicated abstractly of what comes from it, but derivately, as a chest is not wood but wooden; and as wood is not earth but earthen. And, again, if earth should have another matter prior to it, earth would not be that matter but “that-en,” i.e., it will not be predicated of earth abstractly but derivatively.

1840. Yet such predication is made, because what is potential in a definite way is always predicated of the thing which immediately comes after it. For example, earth, which cannot be said to be potentially a chest, is not predicated of a chest either abstractly or derivatively; for a chest is neither earth nor earthen but wooden, because wood is potentially a chest and the matter of a chest. Wood in general is the matter of a chest in general, and this particular wood is the matter of this particular chest.

1841. But if there is some first thing which is not referred to something else as a “that-en,” i.e., something which does not have something else predicated of it derivatively in the above way, this will be first matter. For example, if air is the matter of earth, as some have said (86), air will be predicated derivatively of earth, so that earth will be said to be of air (or airy). And similarly air will be said to be of fire and not fire, if fire is its matter. But if fire does not get its name from any prior matter, it will be first matter according to the position of Heraclitus (87). But here it is necessary to add “if it is something subsistent” in order to distinguish it from a universal; for a universal is predicated of other things but other things are not predicated of it—yet it is not matter, since it is not something subsistent. For a universal and a subject differ in that a subject is a particular thing whereas a universal is not.

1842. For example (776).

Second, he gives an example of derivative predication, saying that just as the subject of modifications, for example, man, body, or animal, has modifications predicated of it derivatively, in a similar fashion matter is predicated derivatively of that which comes from matter. Now “the modification is musical and white”; but the subject to which music accrues is not called music in the abstract, but is called musical derivatively; and man is not called whiteness but white. Nor again is man called walking or motion in the abstract, but what walks or is moved “as a that-en,” i.e., what gets a name [from something else].

1843. Therefore all (777).

Third, he compares both methods of giving names to things. He says that all those names which are predicated derivatively in this way, as the accidents mentioned, have substance as the ultimate subject which sustains them; but in all those cases in which the predicate is not derivative but is a form or a particular thing, such as wood or earth, in such predications the ultimate subject sustaining the rest is matter or material substance. And it is only fitting “that the term ‘that-en’ happens to be predicated” derivatively “of matter and the modifying attributes,” i.e., accidents, both of which are indeterminate. For an accident is both made determinate and defined by means of its subject, and matter by means of that to which it is in potency. Lastly he summarizes his remarks, and this part is evident.

LESSON 7

The Conceptual and Temporal Priority of Actuality to Potency and Vice Versa

ARISTOTLE'S TEXT Chapter 8: 1049b 4-1050a 3

778. Since we have established the different senses in which the term prior is employed (457), it is evident that actuality is prior to potency. And by potency I mean not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle of change in another thing inasmuch as it is other, but in general every principle of motion or rest. For nature also belongs to the same thing, since it is in the same genus as potency; for it is a principle of motion, although not in another thing but in something inasmuch as it is the same. Therefore actuality is prior to all such potency both in intelligibility and in substance; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another it is not.

779. It is evident, then, that actuality is prior to potency in intelligibility; for what is potential in a primary sense is potential because it is possible for it to become actual. I mean, for example, that it is what is capable of building that can build, and what is capable of theorizing that can theorize, and what is capable of being seen that can be seen. And the same reasoning also applies in the case of other things; and therefore it is necessary that the conception or knowledge of the one should precede that of the other.

780. And actuality is prior to potency in time in the sense that an actuality which is specifically but not numerically the same as a potency is prior to it. I mean that the matter and & seed and the thing capable of seeing, which

are a man and grain and seeing potentially but not yet actually, are prior in time to this man and to grain and to the act of seeing which exist actually. But prior to these are other actually existing things from which these have been produced; for what is actual is always produced from something potential by means of something which is actual. Thus man comes from man and musician from musician; for there is always some primary mover, and a mover is already something actual. And in our previous discussions (598; 611) concerning substance it was stated that everything which comes to be is produced from something, and this is specifically the same as itself.

781. And for this reason it seems to be impossible that anyone should be a builder who has not built something, or that anyone should be a harpist who has not played the harp. And the same holds true of all others who are learning; for one who is learning to play the harp learns to play it by playing it. And the same holds true in other cases.

782. From this arose the sophistical argument that one who does not have a science will be doing the thing which is the object of this science; for one who is learning a science does not have it.

783. But since some part of what is coming to be has come to be, and in general some part of what is being moved has been moved (as became evident in our discussions on motion), perhaps one who is learning a science must have some part of that science. Hence it is also clear from this that actuality is prior to potency both in the process of generation and in time.

COMMENTARY

PRIORITY OF ACT IN TIME

1844. Having established the truth about potency and actuality, the Philosopher now compares one with the other; and this is divided into two parts. In the first part he compares them from the viewpoint of priority and posteriority; in the second (1883), in terms of being better or worse; and in the third (1888), in reference to knowledge of the true and the false.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains his aim, saying that, since it has been established above, in Book V (936), that the term prior is used in different senses, it is evident that actuality is prior to potency in different ways. And we are now speaking of potency not only inasmuch as it is a principle of motion in some other thing as other, as active potency was defined above (1776), but universally of every principle, whether it be a principle that causes motion or a principle of immobility or rest or a principle of action devoid of motion (e.g., understanding), because nature also seems to belong to the same thing as potency.

1845. For nature is in the same genus as potency itself because each is a principle of motion, although nature is not a principle of motion in some other thing but in the thing in which it is present as such, as is made clear in Book Il of the Physics. However, nature is a principle not only of motion but also of immobility.

Hence actuality is prior to all such potency both in intelligibility and in substance. And in one sense it is also prior in time, and in another it is not.

1846. It is evident (779).

Second he proves his thesis. First, he shows that actuality is prior to potency in intelligibility. Second (1847), he shows how it is prior in time, and how it is not. Third (1856), he shows how it is prior in substance.

The first is proved as follows: anything that must be used in defining something else is prior to it in intelligibility, as animal is prior to man and subject to accident. But potency or capability can only be defined by means of actuality, because the first characteristic of the capable consists in the possibility of its acting or being actual. For example, a builder is defined as one who can build, and a theorist as one who can theorize, and the visible as what can be seen; and the same is true in other cases. The concept of actuality must therefore be prior to the concept of potency, and the knowledge of actuality prior to the knowledge of potency. Hence Aristotle explained above what potency is by defining it in reference to actuality, but he could not define actuality by means of something else but only made it known inductively.

1847. And actuality (780).

Then he shows how actuality is prior to potency in time, and how it is not. In regard to this he does two things. First, he makes this clear in the case of passive potencies; and second (1850), in the case of certain active potencies.

He accordingly says, (+) first, that actuality is prior to potency in time in the sense that in the same species the agent, or what is actual, is prior to what is potential; but (~) in numerically one and the same thing what is potential is prior in time to what is actual.

1848. This is shown as follows: if we take this man who is now actually a man, prior to him in time there was a matter which was potentially a man. And similarly seed, which is potentially grain, was prior in time to what is actually grain. And “the thing capable of seeing,” i.e., having the power of sight, was prior in time to the thing actually seeing. And prior in time to the things having potential being there were certain things having actual being, namely, agents, by which the former have been brought to actuality. For what exists potentially must always be brought to actuality by an agent, which is an actual being. Hence what is potentially a man becomes actually a man as a result of the man who generates him, who is an actual being; and similarly one who is potentially musical becomes actually musical by learning from a teacher who is actually musical. And thus in the case of anything potential there is always some first thing which moves it, and this mover is actual.

It follows, then, that even though the same thing numerically exists potentially prior in time to existing actually, there is still also some actual being of the same species which is prior in time to the one that exists potentially.

1849. And because someone could be perplexed about some of the statements which he had made, he therefore adds that these have been explained above; for it was pointed out in the foregoing discussions about substance—in Book VII (1383; 1417)—that everything which comes to be comes from something as matter, and by something as an agent. And it was also stated above that this agent is specifically the same as the thing which comes to be. This was made clear in the case of univocal generations, but in the case of equivocal generations there must also be some likeness between the generator and the thing generated, as was shown elsewhere (1444-47).

1850. And for this reason (781).

He explains the temporal sequence of actuality and potency in the case of certain active potencies; and in regard to this he does three things.

First, he explains what he intends to do. For it was said above (1815) that there are certain operative potencies whose very actions must be understood to be performed or exercised beforehand, as those acquired by practice or instruction. And with regard to these he says here that in those things which are numerically the same, actuality is also prior to potency. For it seems impossible that anyone should become a builder who has not first built something; or that anyone should become a harpist who has not first played the harp.

1851. He draws this conclusion from the points laid down above; for it was said above (1848) that one who is potentially musical becomes actually musical as a result of someone who is actually musical—meaning that he learns from him; and the same thing holds true of other actions. Now one could not learn an art of this kind unless he himself performed the actions associated with it; for one learns to play the harp by playing it. This is also true of the other arts. It has been shown, then, that it is impossible to have potencies of this sort unless their actions are also first present in one and the same subject numerically.

1852. From this arose (782).

Second, he raises a sophistical objection against the above view. He says that "a sophistical argument arose," i.e., an apparently cogent syllogism which contradicts the truth, and it runs as follows: one who is learning an art exercises the actions of that art. But one who is learning an art does not have that art. Hence one who does not have a science or an art is doing the thing which is the object of that science or art. This seems to be contrary to the truth.

1853. But since some (783).

Third, he answers this objection by stating a position which was discussed and proved in the Physics, Book VI; for there he proved that being moved is always prior to having been moved, because of the division of motion. For whenever any part of a motion is given, since it is divisible, we must be able to pick out some part of it which has already been completed, while the part of the motion given is going on. Therefore whatever is being moved has already been partly moved.

1854. And by the same argument, whatever is coming to be has already partly come to be; for even though the process of producing a substance, with reference to the introduction of the substantial form, is indivisible, still if we take the preceding alteration whose terminus is generation, the process is divisible, and the whole process can be called a production. Therefore, since what is coming to be has partly come to be, then what is coming to be can possess to some degree the activity of the thing in which the production is terminated. For example, what is becoming hot can heat something to some degree, but not as perfectly as something that has already become hot. Hence, since to learn is to become scientific, the one learning must already have, as it were, some part of a science or an art. It is not absurd, then, if he should exercise the action of an art to some degree; for he does not do it as perfectly as one who already has the art.

1855. But in reason itself there are also naturally inherent certain seeds or principles of the sciences and virtues, through which a man can pass to some degree into the activity of a science or a virtue before he has the habit of the science or the virtue; and when this has been acquired he acts perfectly, whereas at first he acted imperfectly. Lastly he summarizes the above discussion, as is evident in the text.

LESSON 8

Priority of Actuality to Potency in Substance

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1050a 4-1050b 6

784. But actuality is also prior in substance; (1) because those things which are subsequent in generation are prior in form and substance; for example, man is prior to boy, and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, but the other has not.

785. And (2) because everything which comes to be moves toward a principle, namely, its goal [or end]. For that for the sake of which a thing comes to be is a principle; and generation is for the sake of the goal. And actuality is the goal, and it is for the sake of this that potency is acquired.

786. For animals do not see in order that they may have the power of sight, but they have the power of sight in order that they may see.

787. And similarly men have the science of building in order that they may build, and they have theoretical knowledge in order that they may speculate; but they do not speculate in order that they may have theoretical knowledge, unless they are learning by practice. And these latter do not speculate [in a perfect way], but either to some degree or because they do not need to speculate.

788. Further, matter is in potency up to the time at which it attains its form; but when it exists actually, it then possesses its form. And the same holds true in the case of other things, even of those whose goal is motion. And for this reason, just as those who are teaching think that they have

reached their goal when they exhibit their student performing, so it is with nature.

789. For if this were not so, Pauson’s Mercury would exist again, because it would not be more evident whether scientific knowledge is internal or external, as is the case with the figure of Mercury. For the activity is the goal, and the actuality is the activity. And for this reason the term actuality is used in reference to activity and is extended to completeness.

790. But while in the case of some things the ultimate effect is the use (as, for example, in the case of sight the ultimate effect is the act of seeing, and no other work besides this results from the power of sight), still from some potencies something else is produced; for example, the art of building produces a house in addition to the act of building. Yet in neither case is the act any less or any more the end of the potency; for the act of building is in the thing being built, and it comes into being and exists simultaneously with the house. Therefore in those cases in which the result is something other than the use, the actuality is in the thing being produced; for example, the act of building is in the thing being built, and the act of weaving in the thing being woven. The same holds true in all other cases. And in general, motion is in the thing being moved. But in the case of those things in which nothing else is produced besides the activity, the activity is present in these, as the act of seeing is in the one seeing, and the act of speculating in the one speculating, and life in the soul. Accordingly, happiness is in the soul, for it is a kind of life.

791. It is evident, then, that substance or form is actuality. Hence it is clear according to this argument that actuality is prior to potency in substance. And, as we have said (780), one actuality is always prior to another in time right back to that actuality which is always the first principle of motion.

COMMENTARY

PRIORITY OF ACT SUBSTANTIALLY

1856. Having shown that actuality is prior to potency in intelligibility and in one sense in time, the Philosopher now shows that it is prior in substance. This was the third way given above (1845) in which actuality is prior to potency.

This is divided into two parts. In the first part he proves his thesis by arguments taken from things which are sometimes potential and sometimes actual. In the second part (1867) he proves his thesis by comparing eternal things, which are always actual, with mobile things, which are sometimes actual and sometimes potential ("But actuality").

And since to be prior in substance is to be prior in perfection, and since perfection is attributed to two things, namely, to the form and to the goal [or end], therefore in the first part he uses two arguments to prove his thesis. The first of these pertains to the form, and the second (1857) to the goal, given at the words, "And because."

He accordingly says, first, that actuality is prior to potency not only in intelligibility and in time "but in substance," i.e., in perfection; for the form by which something is perfected is customarily signified by the term substance. This first part is made clear by this argument: those things which are subsequent in generation are "prior in substance and form," i.e., in perfection, because the process of generation always goes from what is imperfect to what is perfect; for example, in the process of generation man is subsequent to boy, because man comes from boy; and human being is subsequent to seed. The reason is that man and human being already have a perfect form, whereas boy and seed do not yet have such a form.

Hence, since in numerically one and the same subject actuality is subsequent to potency both in generation and in time, as is evident from the above, it follows that actuality is prior to potency in substance and in intelligibility.

1857. And (2) because (785).

Here he proves the same point by an argument involving the goal of activity. First, he sets forth the argument. Second (1858), he explains one of the principles assumed in his argument ("For animals"). Third (1862), he settles an issue which could cause difficulty in the above argument ("But while").

He accordingly says, first, that everything which comes to be when it moves towards its goal moves towards a principle. For a goal, or that for the sake of which a thing comes to be, is a principle because it is the first thing intended by an agent, since it is that for the sake of which generation takes place. But actuality is the goal of potency, and therefore actuality is prior to potency and is one of its principles.

1858. For animals (786).

He now explains the position which he maintained above, namely, that actuality is the goal of potency. He makes this clear, first, in the case of natural active potencies. He says (~) that animals do not see in order that they may have the power of sight, but (+) they rather have the power of sight in order that they may see. Thus it is clear that potency exists for the sake of actuality and not vice versa.

1859. And similarly (787).

Second, he makes the same thing clear in the case of rational potencies. He says that men have the power of building in order that they may build; and they have "theoretical knowledge," or speculative science, in order that they may speculate. However, they do not speculate in order that they may have theoretical knowledge, unless they are learning and meditating about those matters which belong to a speculative science in order that they may acquire it. And these do not speculate perfectly but to some degree and imperfectly, as has been said above (1853-55), because speculation is not undertaken because of some need but for the sake of using science already acquired. But there is speculation on the part of those who are learning because the need to acquire science.

1860. Further, matter (788).

Third he makes the same point clear in the case of passive potencies. He says that matter is in potency until it receives a form or specifying principle, but then it is first in a state of actuality when it receives its form. And this is what occurs in the case of all other things which are moved for the sake of a goal. Hence, just as those who are teaching think they have attained their goal when they exhibit their pupil whom they have instructed performing those activities which belong to his art, in a similar fashion nature attains its goal when it attains actuality. Hence it is made evident in the case of natural motion that actuality is the goal of potency.

1861. For if this were not (789).

Fourth, he proves his thesis by an argument from the untenable consequences. He says that if a thing's perfection and goal do not consist in actuality, there would then seem to be no difference between someone wise, as Mercury was, and someone foolish, as Pauson was. For if the perfection of science were not in the one acting, Mercury would not have exhibited it in his own science, if he had "internal scientific knowledge," i.e., in reference to its internal activity, “or external,” i.e., in reference to its external activity, as neither would Pauson. For it is by means of the actual use of scientific knowledge, and not by means of the potency or power, that one is shown to have a science; because activity is the goal of a science, and activity is a kind of actuality.

And for this reason the term actuality is derived from activity, as has been stated above (1805); and from this it was extended to form, which is called completeness or perfection.

1862. But while (790).

He explains a point which could cause a difficulty in the foregoing argument. For since he had said that some product is the goal of activity, one could think that this is true in all cases. But he denies this, saying that the ultimate goal or end of some active potencies consists in the mere use of those potencies, and not in something produced by their activity; for example, the ultimate goal of the power of sight is the act of seeing, and there is no product resulting from the power of sight in addition to this activity. But in the case of some active potencies something else is produced in addition to the activity; for example, the art of building also produces a house in addition to the activity of building.

1863. However, this difference does not cause actuality to be the goal of potency to a lesser degree in the case of some of these potencies and to a greater degree in the case of others; for the activity is in the thing produced, as the act of building in the thing being built; and it comes into being and exists simultaneously with the house. Hence if the house, or the thing built, is the goal, this does not exclude actuality from being the goal of potency.

1864. Now it is necessary to consider such a difference among the aforesaid potencies, because (1) when something else is produced besides the actuality of these potencies, which is activity, the activity of such potencies is in the thing being produced and is their actuality, just as the act of building is in the thing being built, and the act of weaving in the thing being woven, and in general motion in the thing being moved.

And this is true, because when some product results from the activity of a potency, the activity perfects the thing being produced and not the one performing it. Hence it is in the thing being produced as an actuality and perfection of it, but not in the one who is acting.

1865. But (2) when nothing else is produced in addition to the activity of the potency, the actuality then exists in the agent as its perfection and does not pass over into something external in order to perfect it; for example, the act of seeing is in the one seeing as his perfection, and the act of speculating is in the one speculating, and life is in the soul (if we understand by life vital activity). Hence it has been shown that happiness also consists in an activity of the kind which exists in the one acting, and not of the kind which passes over into something external; for happiness is a good of the one who is happy, namely, his perfect life. Hence, just as life is in one who lives, in a similar fashion happiness is in one who is happy. Thus it is evident that happiness does not consist either in building or in any activity of the kind which passes over into something external, but it consists in understanding and willing.

1866. It is evident (791).

Lastly he retraces his steps in order to draw the main conclusion which he has in mind. He says that it has been shown from the above discussion that a thing’s substance or form or specifying principle is a kind of actuality; and from this it is evident that actuality is prior to potency in substance or form. And it is prior in time, as has been stated above (1848), because the actuality whereby the generator or mover or maker is actual must always exist first before the other actuality by which the thing generated or produced becomes actual after being potential.

And this goes on until one comes to the first mover, which is actuality alone; for whatever passes from potency to actuality requires a prior actuality in the agent, which brings it to actuality.

LESSON 9

The Substantial Priority of Actuality in Incorruptible Things

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792. But actuality is prior to potency in a more fundamental sense; for eternal things are prior in substance to corruptible ones, and nothing eternal is potential.

793. The reason of this is that every potency is at the same time a potency for opposite determinations. For what is incapable of existing does not exist in any way; and it is possible for everything that is capable of existing not to exist actually. Therefore whatever is ca able of existinly may either be or not be, and thus the same thing is capable both of being and of not being. But what is capable of not being may possibly not be; and what may possibly not be is corruptible: either absolutely, or in the sense in which it is said to be possible for it not to be, either according to place or to quantity or to quality. And the term absolutely means in reference to substance.

794. Therefore nothing that is incorruptible in an absolute sense is potential in an absolute sense. But there is nothing that hinders it from being so in other respects, for example, in reference to quality or to place. Therefore all incorruptible things are actual.

795. And none of those things which exist necessarily are potential. In fact such things are the first; for if they did not exist, nothing would exist.

796. Nor is eternal motion potential, if there be such a thing; and if anything is moved eternally, it is not moved potentially except in reference to whence and whither. And nothing prevents the matter of this sort of thing from existing.

797. And for this reason the sun and the stars and the entire heaven are always active, and there is no need to fear, as the natural philosophers do, that they may at some time stand still. Nor do they tire in their activity; for in them there is no potency for opposite determinations, as there is in corruptible things, so that the continuity of their motion should be tiresome. For the cause of this is that their substance is matter and potency and not actuality.

798. Moreover, incorruptible things are imitated by those which are in a state of change, such as fire and earth; for these latter things are always active, since they have motion in themselves and of themselves.

799. But all other potencies which have been defined are potencies for opposite determinations; for what is capable of moving something else in this way is also capable of not moving it in this way, i.e., all those things which act by reason. And irrational potencies will also be potencies for opposite determinations by being absent or not.

800. If, then, there are any natures or substances such as those thinkers who in their theories proclaim the Ideas to be, there will be something much more scientific than science itself, and something much more mobile than motion itself; for the former will rather be the actualities and the latter the potencies of these. Hence it is evident that actuality is prior to potency and to every principle of change.

COMMENTARY

ACT PRIOR IN INCORRUPTIBLE THINGS

1867. Aristotle proved above that actuality is prior to potency in substance, definition and perfection, by arguments drawn from corruptible things themselves; but here he proves the same point by comparing eternal things with corruptible ones.

This part is divided into two members. In the first (1867) he proves his thesis; and in the second (1882), by the thesis thus proved, he rejects a certain statement made by Plato (“If, then”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proves his thesis. This he does by the following argument: eternal things are compared to corruptible ones as actuality to potency; for eternal things as such are not in potency, whereas corruptible things as such are in potency. But eternal things are prior to corruptible ones in substance and perfection; for this is evident (1856). Hence actuality is prior to potency both in substance and perfection. He says that his thesis is proved in a more proper way by this argument, because actuality and potency are not considered in the same subject but in different ones, and this makes the proof more evident.

1868. The reason (793).

Second, he proves one assumption which he made, namely, that nothing eternal is in potency; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives an argument to prove this, and it runs as follows: every potency is at one and the same time a potency for opposite determinations. Now he does not say this about active potency, for it has already been shown (1789) that irrational potencies are not potencies for opposite determinations; but he is speaking here of passive potency, on the basis of which a thing is said to be capable of being and not being either absolutely or in a qualified sense.

1869. Now the claim which he made he proves by an argument to the contrary; because where such potency does not exist, neither of the opposite determinations is possible; for what is incapable of being never exists in any way. For if a thing is incapable of being, it is impossible for it to be, and it is necessary for it not to be. But what is capable of being may possibly not be actual. Hence it is evident that what is capable of being may either be or not be; and thus the potency is at one and the same time a potency for opposite determinations, because the same thing is in potency both to being and non-being.

1870. But what is capable of not being may possibly not be, for these two statements are equivalent ones. Moreover, what may possibly not be is corruptible either absolutely or in a qualified sense inasmuch as it is said to be possible for it not to be. For example, if it is possible for some body not to be in place, that body is corruptible as far as place is concerned; and the same applies to quantity and quality. But that is corruptible in an absolute sense which is capable of not existing substantially. Therefore it follows that everything potential inasmuch as it is potential is corruptible.

1871. Therefore nothing (794).

Second, he draws from the foregoing the conclusion at which he aims; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he concludes to this thesis about eternal things, inferring from the observations made above that, if everything potential is corruptible, it follows that nothing which is incorruptible in an absolute sense is a potential being, provided that we understand incorruptible things in an absolute sense and potential being (~) in an absolute sense in reference to substance.

1872. But nothing prevents something that is incorruptible in an absolute sense from being potential (+) in a qualified sense, in reference either to quality or to place. For example, the moon is in a state of potency to being illuminated by the sun; and when the sun is in the east it is in a state of potency with regard to being in the west. It is evident from what has been said, then, that all eternal things as such are actual.

1873. And none (795).

Second, he comes to the same conclusion about necessary things as he did about eternal things, because even in corruptible things there are certain necessary aspects; for example, man is an animal, and every whole is greater than its part. Hence he says that nothing necessary is potential; for necessary things are always actual and incapable of being or not being. And those things which are necessary are the first of all things, because if they ceased to exist, none of the others would exist; for example, if essential predicates, which are referred to a subject necessarily, were taken away, accidental predicates, which can be present and not present in some subject, could not be present in any subject. It follows, then, that actuality is prior to potency.

1874. Nor is (796).

Third, he comes to the same conclusion about eternal motion as he did about eternal substances; and in regard to this he does three things. First, from what has been said above he concludes to his thesis. He says that, if some motion is eternal, that motion is not potential; nor is anything that is moved eternally in a state of potency to motion, but it is in a state of potency to this or to that place, i.e., inasmuch as it goes from this place to that place. For since motion is the actuality of something in potency, everything which is being moved must be in potency to the goal of that motion, not however as regards motion itself, but as regards some place to which it tends by its motion.

1875. And since what is being moved must have matter, he adds that nothing prevents a thing which is being moved by an eternal motion from having matter; because, even though it is not in potency to motion in an absolute sense, it is nevertheless in potency to this or to that place.

1876. And for this (797).

Second, he draws a corollary from the above discussion. For since what is being moved by an eternal motion is not in potency to motion itself (and the motion of the heavens is eternal according to the discussion in Book VIII of the Physics), it follows that the sun and the moon and the stars and the entire heaven are always active, because they are always being moved and are acting by means of their motion.

1877. Nor is it to be feared that at some time the motion of the heavens may cease, as "some of the natural philosophers feared it would," namely, Empedocles and his followers, who held that at times the world is destroyed by discord and is restored again by friendship. Hence he says that this is not to be feared, because they are not potentially immobile.

1878. And for this reason too incorruptible things insofar as they are being moved do not tire in their activity, because "the potency for opposite determinations" is not found in them, namely, the ability to be both moved and not moved, as is found in corruptible things, which have these as a result of motion. And thus in this way continuous motion becomes laborious for them. For corruptible things labor insofar as they are moved; and the reason is that they are in a state of potency both for being moved and not being moved, and it is not proper to them by reason of their substantial nature always to be undergoing motion. Hence we see that the more laborious any motion is, the nearer also does the nature of the thing come to immobility; for example, in the case of animals it is evident that motion in an upward direction is more laborious.

1879. Now what he says here about the continuity of celestial motion is in keeping with the nature of a celestial body, which we know by experience.

But this is not prejudicial to the divine will, on which the motion and being of the heavens depend.

1880. Moreover, incorruptible things (798).

Third, he compares corruptible bodies with incorruptible ones from the viewpoint of activity. First, he does this insofar as they are alike. He says that the bodies of those things whose being involves change resemble incorruptible bodies insofar as they are always acting; for example, fire, which of itself always produces heat, and earth, which of itself always produces proper and natural activities. And this is true because they have motion and their own proper activity of themselves— inasmuch, namely, as their forms are principles of such motions and activities.

1881. But all the other (799).

Second, he compares them insofar as they are unlike. He says that in contrast with eternal things, which are always actual, the other potencies of mobile things, about which the truth has been established above, are all potencies for opposite determinations. But this is verified in a different way; for (1) rational potencies are potencies capable of opposite determinations because they can move in this way or not, as has been said above (1789); whereas (2) irrational potencies, though acting in one way, are themselves also potencies of opposite determinations in view of the fact that they can be present in a subject or not; for example, an animal can lose its power of vision.

1882. If, hen (800).

As a result of what has been said he rejects a doctrine of Plato. For Plato claimed that there are certain separate Forms, which he held to have being in the highest degree; say, a separate science, which he called science-in-itself; and he said that this is foremost in the class of knowable entities. And similarly he maintained that motion-in-itself is foremost in the class of mobile things. But according to the points made clear above, something else besides science-in-itself will be first in the class of knowable things; for it was shown that actuality is prior to potency in perfection, and science itself is a kind of potency. Hence speculation, which is the activity of science, will be more perfect than science is; and the same will apply in the case of other things of this kind. Lastly he summarizes his discussion, saying that actuality is prior to potency and to every principle of motion.

LESSON 10

The Relative Excellence of Actuality and Potency

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801. Furthermore, that actuality is also better and more excellent and more honorable than good potency is evident from the following: all things which are spoken of as potential are alike capable of contrary determinations; for example, what is said to be capable of being well is the same as what is capable of being ill, and simultaneously has both capabilities; for it is the same potency that is capable of being well and being ill, and of being at rest and in motion, and of building and demolishing, and of being built and being demolished. Therefore the capacity for contrary determinations belongs to the same thing at the same time; but it is impossible for contrary determinations to belong to the same thing at the same time, for example, being well and ailing. Hence one of these must be good; but the potency may be both alike or neither; and therefore the actuality is better.

802. And also in the case of evil things the goal or actuality must be worse than the potency; for it is the same potency that is capable of both contraries.

803. It is clear, then, that evil does not exist apart from things; for evil is by its very nature subsequent to potency.

804. Hence in those things which exist from the very beginning and are eternal, there is neither evil nor wrong nor corruption; for corruption

belongs to evil things.

805. And it is also by activity that geometrical constructions are discovered, because they are discovered by dividing. For if they had already been divided, they would be evident; but they are now present potentially. Why, for example, are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? Because the angles grouped around one point are equal to two right angles. Hence, if the line next to the one side were extended, the answer would be clear to anyone seeing the construction. Again, why is an angle in a semicircle always a right angle? Because, if its three lines are equal, two of which form the base and the other rests upon the middle point of the base, the answer will be evident to anyone who sees the construction and knows the former proposition. Hence, it is evident that constructions which exist potentially are discovered when they are brought to actuality; and the reason is that the intellectual comprehension of a thing is an actuality. Hence the potency proceeds from an actuality, and it is because people make these constructions that they attain knowledge of them. For in a thing numerically one and the same, actuality is subsequent in the order of generation.

COMMENTARY

ACT IS BETTER IN GOOD THINGS

1883. Having compared actuality and potency from the viewpoint of priority and posteriority, the Philosopher now compares them from the viewpoint of good and evil; and in regard to this he does two things.

First, he says that in the case of good things actuality is better than potency; and this was made clear from the fact that the potential is the same as what is capable of contrary determinations; for example, what can be well can also be ill and is in potency to both at the same time. The reason is that the potency for both is the same—for being well and ailing, and for being at rest and in motion, and for other opposites of this kind. Thus it is evident that a thing can be in potency to contrary determinations, although contrary determinations cannot be actual at the same time. Therefore, taking each contrary pair separately, one is good, as health, and the other evil, as illness. For in the case of contraries one of the two always has the character of something defective, and this pertains to evil.

1884. Therefore what is actually good is good alone. But the potency may be related “to both” alike, i.e., in a qualified sense—as being in potency. But it is neither in an absolute sense—as being actual. It follows, then, that actuality is better than potency; because what is good in an absolute sense is better than what is good in a qualified sense and is connected with evil.

1885. And also (802).

Second, he shows on the other hand that in the case of evil things the actuality is worse than the potency; and in regard to this he does three things.

First, he proves his thesis by the argument introduced above; for what is evil in an absolute sense and is not disposed to evil in a qualified sense is worse than what is evil in a qualified sense and is disposed both to evil and to good. Hence, since the potency for evil is not yet evil, except in a qualified sense (and the same potency is disposed to good, since it is the same potency which is related to contrary determinations), it follows that actual evil is worse than the potency for evil.

1886. It is clear, then (803).

Second, he concludes from what has been said that evil itself is not a nature distinct from other things which are good by nature; for evil itself is subsequent in nature to potency, because it is worse and is farther removed from perfection. Hence, since a potency cannot be something existing apart from a thing, much less can evil itself be something apart from a thing.

1887. Hence in those (804).

Third, he draws another conclusion. For if evil is worse than potency, and there is no potency in eternal things, as has been shown above (1867), then in eternal things there will be neither evil nor wrong nor any other corruption; for corruption is a kind of evil. But this must be understood insofar as they are eternal and incorruptible; for nothing prevents them from being corrupted as regards place or some other accident of this kind.

1888. And it is (805).

Having compared potency and actuality from the viewpoint of priority and posteriority and from that of good and evil, be now compares them with reference to the understanding of the true and the false. In regard to this he does two things. First (805:C 1888), he compares them with reference to the act of understanding; and second (806:C 1895), with reference to the true and the false ("Now the terms").

He accordingly says, first (805), that "geometrical constructions," i.e., geometrical descriptions, "are discovered," i.e., made known by discovery in the actual drawing of the figures. For geometers discover the truth which they seek by dividing lines and surfaces. And division brings into actual existence the things which exist potentially; for the parts of a continuous whole are in the whole potentially before division takes place. However, if all had been divided to the extent necessary for discovering the truth, the conclusions which are being sought would then be evident. But since divisions of this kind exist potentially in the first drawing of geometrical figures, the truth which is being sought does not therefore become evident immediately.

1889. He explains this by means of two examples, and the first of these has to do with the question, "Why are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles?" i.e., why does a triangle have three angles equal to two right angles? This is demonstrated as follows.

Let ABC be a triangle having its base AC extended continuously and in a straight line. This extended base, then, together with the side BC of the triangle form an angle at point C, and this external angle is equal to the two interior angles opposite to it, i.e., angles ABC and BAC. Now it is evident that the two angles at point C, one exterior to the triangle and the other interior, are equal to two right angles; for it has been shown that, when one straight line falls upon another straight line, it makes two right angles or two angles equal to two right angles. Hence it follows that the interior angle at the point C together with the other two interior angles which are equal to the exterior angle, i.e., all three angles, are equal to two right angles.

1890. This, then, is what the Philosopher means when he says that it may be demonstrated that a triangle has two right angles, because the two angles which meet at the point C, one of which is interior to the triangle and the other exterior, are equal to two right angles. Hence when an angle is constructed which falls outside of the triangle and is formed by one of its sides, it immediately becomes evident to one who sees the arrangement of the figure that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.

1891. The second example has to do with the question, "Why is every angle in a semicircle a right angle?" This is demonstrated as follows.

Let ABC be a semicircle, and at any point B let there be an angle subtended by the base AC, which is the diameter of the circle. I say, then, that angle B is a right angle. This is proved as follows: since the line AC is the diameter of the circle, it must pass through the center. Hence it is divided in the middle at the point D, and this is done by the line DB. Therefore the line DB is equal to the line DA, because both are drawn from the center to the circumference. In the triangle DBA, then, angle B and angle A are equal, because in every triangle having two equal sides the angles above the base are equal. Thus the two angles A and B are double the angle B alone. But the angle BDC, since it is exterior to the triangle, is equal to the two separate angles A and B. Therefore angle BDC is double the angle B alone.

1892. And it is demonstrated in the same way that angle C is equal to angle B of the triangle BDC, because the two sides DB and DC are equal since they are drawn from the center to the circumference, and the exterior angle, ADB, is equal to both. Therefore it is double the angle B alone. Hence the two angles ADB and BDC are double the whole angle ABC. But the two angles ADB and BDC are either right angles or equal to two right angles, because the line DB falls on the line AC. Hence the angle ABC, which is in a semicircle, is a right angle.

1893. This is what the Philosopher means when he says that the angle in a semicircle may be shown to be a right angle, because the three lines are equal, namely, the two into which the base is divided, i.e., DA and DC, and the third line, BD, which is drawn from the middle of these two lines and rests upon these. And it is immediately evident to one who sees this construction, and who knows the principles of geometry, that every angle in a semicircle is a right angle.

1894. Therefore the Philosopher concludes that it has been shown that, when some things are brought from potency to actuality, their truth is then discovered. The reason for this is that understanding is an actuality, and therefore those things which are understood must be actual. And for this reason potency is known by actuality. Hence it is by making something actual that men attain knowledge, as is evident in the constructions described above. For in numerically one and the same thing actuality must be subsequent to potency in generation and in time, as has been shown above.

LESSON 11

The Reference of Truth and Falsity to Actuality. The Exclusion of Falsity from Simple and Eternal Things

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806. Now the terms being and non-being are used in one sense with reference to the categorical figures; and in another with reference to the potentiality or actuality of these or their contraries; and in still another sense they are referred most properly to truth and falsity.

807. And in things this consists in being combined or being separated. Hence he who thinks that what is separated is separated, and that what is combined is combined, is right; but he who thinks about things otherwise than as they are, is wrong. And it is necessary to consider what we mean when we say that truth and falsity exist or do not exist. For it is not because we are right in thinking that you are white that you are white, but it is because you are white that in saying this we speak the truth.

808. Therefore, if some things are always combined and it is impossible for them to be separated, and others are always separated and it is impossible for them to be combined, and others admit of both contraries, then being consists in being combined and being one, and non-being consists in not being combined and being many. Therefore with regard to contingent things the same opinion or statement becomes true and false, and it is possible for it at one time to be true and at another to be false. But with

regard to those things which are incapable of being otherwise than as they are, an opinion is not sometimes true and sometimes false, but one. is always true and the other always false.

809. However, with regard to things which are not composite, what is being and non-being, and what is truth and falsity? For such things are not composite so as to exist when combined and not exist when separated; for example, the proposition “The wood is white,” or the proposition “The diagonal is incommensurable.” Nor will truth and falsity still be present in them in the same way as in other things. And just as truth is not the same in these things, in a similar fashion neither is being the same.

810. But truth or falsity is as follows: to come in contact with a thing and to express it is truth (for expression is not the same as affirmation), and not to come in contact with a thing is ignorance. For it is impossible to be deceived about a thing’s quiddity, except in an accidental sense; and the same holds true in the case of incomposite things, for it is impossible to be deceived about them.

811. And they are all actual and not potential, for otherwise they would be generated and corrupted. But being itself is neither generated nor corrupted; otherwise it would be generated out of something. Therefore, regarding all those things which are really quiddities and actualities, it is impossible to be deceived about them, but one must either know them or not. But concerning them we may ask what they are, namely, whether they are such and such or not.

812. Now considering being in the sense of truth and non-being in the sense of falsity, in the case of composite beings there is truth if the thing is combined with the attribute attributed to it; in the case of simple beings the thing is just simply so. And if a thing is truly a being, it is so in some particular way; but if it is not, it does not exist at all. Again, truth means to know these beings, and there is neither falsity nor deception about them but only ignorance; but not ignorance such as blindness is, for blindness is as if one did not have intellective power at all.

813. And concerning immobile things it is also evident that there is no deception about them as regards time, if one assumes that they are immobile. For example, if one assumes that a triangle does not change, he will not be of the opinion that at one time its angles are equal to two right angles and that at another time they are not; for otherwise it would change.

But he might assume that one thing has such and such a property and that another has not; for example, one might assume that no even number is a prime number, or that some are and some are not. But this is impossible as regards one single number; for one will not assume that one thing is such and another is not; but whether he speaks truly or falsely, a thing is always disposed in the same way.

COMMENTARY

TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD

1895. Here the Philosopher compares actuality to potency with reference to truth and falsity; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he claims that truth and falsity are chiefly referred to actuality. Second (1896), he explains what he aims to do (“And in things”). Third (1917), he draws a corollary (“And concerning”).

He accordingly says, first, that, since being and non-being, which is its opposite, are divided in two ways: first, into the different categories—substance, quantity, quality and so forth; and second, into the potency and actuality of one or the other of contraries (since either one of two contraries may be actual or potential), it follows that true and false are most properly predicated of what is actual.

1896. And in things (807).

He now proves his thesis; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he makes this clear in the case of continuous substances; and second (1901), in that of simple substances (“However, with regard”). Third (1914), he summarizes both of these (“Now considering”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains his thesis, saying that in things “this,” i.e., being true or false, consists merely in being combined or being separated. Hence one who thinks that to be separated which is separated in reality, has a true opinion—for example, one who thinks that man is not an ass. And the same is true of one who thinks that to be combined which is combined in reality—for example, one who thinks that man is an animal. But, on the other hand, one who relates things in thought in a different way than they are in their own proper nature has an erroneous opinion—for example, one who thinks that man is an ass, or that he is not an animal—because when a thing is or is not, it is then said to be true or false.

1897. This must be understood as follows: you are not white because we think truly that you are white; but conversely we think you are white because you are white. Hence it has been shown that the way which a thing is disposed is the cause of truth both in thought and in speech.

1898. He adds this in order to clarify what he said above, namely, that in things truth and falsity consist in being combined and being separated. For the truth and falsity found in speech and in thought must be traced to a thing's disposition as their cause. Now when the intellect makes a combination, it receives two concepts, one of which is related to the other as a form; hence it takes one as being present in the other, because predicates are taken formally.

Therefore, if such an operation of the intellect should be traced to a thing as its cause, then in composite substances the combination of matter and form, or also the combination of subject and accident, must serve as the foundation and cause of the truth in the combination which the intellect makes in itself and expresses in words. For example, when I say, "Socrates is a man," the truth of this enunciation is caused by combining the form humanity with the individual matter by means of which Socrates is this man; and when I say, "Man is white," the cause of the truth of this enunciation is the combining of whiteness with the subject. It is similar in other cases. And the same thing is evident in the case of separation.

1899. Therefore (808).

Second, he concludes from what has been said that, if the combining and separating of a thing is the cause of the truth and falsity in thought and in speech, the difference between truth and falsity in thought and in speech must be based on the difference between the combining and separating of what exists in reality. Now in reality such difference is found to involve combination and separation, because (1) some things are always combined and it is impossible for them to be separated; for example, sentient nature is always united to the rational soul, and it is impossible for the latter to be separated from the former in such a way that the rational soul may exist without the power of sensation, although on the other hand a sentient soul can exist without reason. Again, (2) some things are separated and it is impossible for them to be combined, for example, black and white, and the form of an ass and that of a man. Again, (3) some things are open to contraries, because they can be combined and separated, as man and white and also running.

1900. However, the being in which the intellect’s act of combining consists, inasmuch as there is affirmation, indicates a certain composition and union; whereas non-being, which negation signifies, does away with composition and union and indicates plurality and otherness. Hence it was shown that in the case of things which may be combined and separated one and the same statement is sometimes true and sometimes false; for example, the statement “Socrates is sitting” is true when he is sitting; but the same statement is false when he gets up. And the same holds true in the case of thought.

But with regard to those things which cannot be otherwise than they are, i.e., those which are always combined or separated, it is impossible for the same thought or statement to be sometimes true and sometimes false; but what is true is always true, and what is false is always false; for example, the proposition “Man is an animal” is true, but the proposition “Man is an ass” is false.

1901. However, with regard (809).

He now explains how truth and falsity can be present in simple things; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that truth is not present in the same way in simple things and in composite ones. He says that in the case of things which are not composite but simple, such as immaterial substances, truth or falsity is not present in them (~) as a result of any combination or separation which occurs in reality, but (+) arises because their quiddity is known or not known. For when we acquire knowledge of the quiddity of any simple being, the intellect seems to be true; and when we fail to acquire knowledge of its quiddity, but attribute something else to it, the intellect is then false.

1902. For there is no composition in simple beings as a consequence of which it could be said that, when the thing is combined, the intellect in making a combination is then true; or that, when that is separated in reality which the intellect combines, the intellect is then not true. Or to express this in a different way, there is no composition in simple things by reason of which, when we express affirmatively that it is so, its composition is signified; and when we express negatively that it is not so, its separation is signified; as, for example, in the case of composite things, when it is said that a piece of wood is white, its composition is signified, or when it is said that it is not white, or that the diagonal is not commensurable, its separation is signified.

1903. Thus it is evident that truth and falsity are not present in simple things in the same way as in composite things. Nor is this surprising, since being also is not the same in both; but the being of composite things results from their components, whereas that of simple things does not. Now truth follows being, because, as was said in Book II (298) of this work, the structure of things in being and in truth is the same.

Hence those things which are not similar in being are not similar in truth.

1904. But truth (810).

Second, he shows how truth and falsity are present in simple things. He says that in the case of simple things truth and falsity are such as will be explained; for to come in contact with a simple thing through the intellect, in such a way as to apprehend what it is “and to express it,” i.e., to signify this simple thing by a word, constitutes the truth present in simple things. And since sometimes the word “to express” is taken for affirmative predication, which involves composition, he rejects this interpretation. He says that affirmation and expression are not the same, because affirmation occurs when one thing is predicated of something else, and this implies combination, whereas expression is the simple utterance of something.

1905. Therefore to come in contact with simple things through the intellect and to express them constitutes truth; but not to come in contact with them is not to know them at all. For whoever does not grasp the quiddity of a simple thing is completely ignorant of it; because one cannot both know and not know something about it, since it is not composite.

1906. Moreover, since he had said that to come in contact with simple things is to express their truth, it would seem that not to come in contact with them is (~) to be false or in error. He did not say this, however, but said that not to come in contact with them is (+) not to know them.

Hence he gives the reason why not to come in contact with them is not to be in error about them, saying that it is possible to be in error about their quiddity only accidentally; and this must be understood as follows.

1907. It was said above in Book VII (1362) and in Book VIII (1710) that in the case of simple substances the thing itself and its quiddity are one and the same. Hence, since a simple substance is its own quiddity, the judgment about the knowledge of a simple substance and the judgment about the knowledge of its quiddity are one and the same. But the intellect is deceived about a quiddity only accidentally; for either a person comes in contact with a thing's quiddity through his intellect, and then he truly knows what that thing is; or he does not come in contact with it, and then he does not know what it is. Hence, with regard to such a thing the intellect is neither true nor false. This is why Aristotle says in Book III of The Soul that, just as a sense is always true with regard to its proper object, in a similar fashion the intellect is always true with regard to its proper object—quiddity.

And the fact that the intellect is not deceived about a thing's quiddity applies not only in the case of simple substances but also in that of composite ones.

1908. Now it is necessary to consider how one may be accidentally deceived about a quiddity. For a person is deceived about a quiddity only as a result of combining or separating; and with regard to composite substances this may occur in two ways. (1) First, it may occur by combining a definition with something defined or by separating them; for example, if someone were to say that an ass is a mortal rational animal, or that a man is not a mortal rational animal, both would be false. (2) Second, insofar as a definition is composed of parts which are incompatible with each other; for example, if someone were to give this definition—man is a non-sensible animal. Thus a definition is said to be false in the first way because it is not the definition of this thing; and in the second way it is said to be false in itself, as the Philosopher has instructed us above in Book V (1132).

1909. Now we can be deceived accidentally about the quiddity of simple substances only in the first way; for their quiddity is not composed of many parts in the combining and separating of which falsity can arise.

1910. And they are (811).

He adapts his remarks about simple substances to his main thesis, in which he shows that truth involves actuality rather than potency. Indeed, he had shown this to be true in the case of composite substances insofar as their truth embodies combination and separation, which designate actuality. But he shows that this is true in the case of simple substances from the fact that they do not contain falsity but only truth. And for this reason they are not potential but actual.

1911. He accordingly says that all simple substances are actual beings and are never potential ones; for if they were sometimes actual and sometimes potential, they would be generated and corrupted. But this cannot be the case, as has been shown above (1715), for substances of this kind are forms alone, and for this reason they are also beings of themselves. Now what exists of itself is neither generated nor corrupted, for everything that is generated is generated from something.

But being in an absolute sense cannot be generated from anything; for there is nothing apart from being but only apart from some particular being, just as there is some being apart from man. Hence this being can be generated in a qualified sense, but being in an absolute sense cannot.

Hence what is a being of itself, because it is a form, from which being naturally follows, cannot be generated; and for this reason it is not sometimes potential and sometimes actual.

1912. Therefore, since truth consists chiefly in actuality, it is unfitting that there should be error or falsity in all those things which are actual only and are what something truly is, since they are quiddities or forms; but they must either be understood if they are grasped by the intellect, or not be understood at all if they are not grasped by the intellect.

1913. But even though it is impossible to be (~) deceived about these things as regards their essence, this is nevertheless (+ possible when "we ask what they are," i.e., whether they are of such and such a nature or not. Hence it is possible to be deceived about them accidentally, as someone might ask whether a simple substance is fire or a corporeal substance or not, because if it is held to be a corporeal substance, there will be falsity accidentally as a result of combination.

1914. Now considering (812).

He summarizes the statements he has made about truth and falsity both with reference to composite things and to simple ones. He says that this being which signifies truth and non-being which signifies falsity (because he who says that a man is white signifies this to be true; and he who says that a man is not white signifies this to be false), being and non-being in this sense, I say, are used (1) in one way in the case of the composition of things. That is, there is truth if what the intellect combines is combined in reality, but there is falsity if what the intellect combines when it understands or forms a proposition is not combined in reality.

1915. (2) And truth exists in a different way in the case of simple things, if what is truly a being," i.e., the quiddity or substance of a simple thing, is as it is understood to be; but if it is not as it is understood to be, no truth exists in the intellect. Thus truth consists in understanding these things; but concerning them there is neither falsity nor error in the intellect, as has been explained (1912), but ignorance; for if one does not grasp the quiddity of a thing, one does not know that thing in any way at all. In the case of composite things, however, one can know one of their properties and be deceived about the others.

1916. Furthermore, he shows what sort of ignorance this is when he says that this ignorance is not "a privation such as blindness," which is the privation of the power of sight. Hence that ignorance would be similar to blindness if one did not have the intellective power of acquiring knowledge of simple substances.

And from this it is evident that according to the opinion of Aristotle the human intellect can acquire an understanding of simple substances. This is a point which he seems to have left unsolved in The Soul, Book III:3.

1917. And concerning (813).

Here he introduces a corollary. He says that it is evident from what has been said that there is no error about (~) immobile things as regards time. But in the case of (+) contingent things, which are not always so, it is possible to be in error about them as regards time; for example, if Socrates is going to sit down and someone were to judge this to be so, he could be deceived insofar as he might judge that Socrates is going to sit down when he is not. The same thing would be true if someone were to think that an eclipse will occur when it will not. But in the case of immobile things and those which always are, the above can occur only in one way, i.e., if someone were to think that these things are mobile and that they do not always exist; for he is then in error about them, but he would not be in error as regards time. Hence he says that, if someone thinks that they are immobile, he will not be deceived about them as regards time.

1918. He says this, then, because, if someone assumes that they are immobile, he will not think that they sometimes are and sometimes are not, and thus he is not deceived about them as regards time. For example, if someone thinks that a triangle is unchangeable, he will not be of the opinion that the sum of its angles will sometimes equal two right angles and sometimes will not, for it would then be both changeable and unchangeable.

1919. But in the case of immobile things it is possible to consider under one common aspect one thing that has such and such a property and another that has not; for example, it is possible to understand that under triangle some triangles are equilateral and others are not. And it is possible to ask whether no even number is prime, or whether some are and some are not—a prime number being one which the unit alone measures. Hence among even numbers only the number two is a prime number, but none of the others.

And regarding what is numerically one, in the case of immobile things it is impossible to be in error or to be deceived even in this [taking one thing that has and another that has not a certain property]. For in the case of something numerically one it is impossible for anyone to think that one individual can be so and another not be so; for what is numerically one is not divided into many. Hence he will have to say what is true or false in an unqualified sense, since what is numerically one always exists in the same way and is incapable of being diversified either in point of time or of subjects. From this it is clear that truth has to do with actuality; for immobile things as such are always actual.

BOOK X

UNITY

LESSON 1

The Kinds of Unity and the Common Meaning of Unity

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814. It was pointed out before (423), where we distinguished the different meanings of terms, that the term one is used in many senses. But while this is true, there are four principal senses in which things are said to be one primarily and essentially and not accidentally. For that is said to be one which is continuous, either in an unqualified sense, or in the fullest sense by nature and not by contact or by a binding. And of these that is one to a greater degree and before all else whose motion is more indivisible and simpler (415).

815. And not only is that which is such said to be one, but so also and to a greater degree that which is a whole and has some form or specifying principle; and a thing is one to the greatest degree if it is such by nature and not by force (as those things which are united by glue or by a nail or by being tied together) and has in itself the cause of its own continuity.

816. And a thing is such because its motion is one and indivisible as to place and to time; so that if a thing has by nature a first principle of the primary kind of motion—I mean circular motion—it is evident that it is a primary continuous quantity. Some things are one, then, in the sense that they are continuous or whole.

817. And other things are one if their intelligible structure is one; and such are those whose concept is one, that is, whose concept is indivisible; and it is indivisible if the thing is specifically or numerically indivisible. Now what is numerically indivisible is the singular thing, and what is specifically indivisible is what is knowable and is the object of scientific knowledge. Hence whatever causes the unity of substances must be one in the primary sense.

818. The term one, then, is used of all these things, namely, of what is continuous by nature, of a whole, of the singular thing, and of the universal. And all these are one because they are indivisible. And some are indivisible in motion, and others in their concept or intelligible structure.

819. Now it must be borne in mind that the questions as to what sort of things are one, and what the essence of oneness is, and what its intelligible structure is, should not be assumed to be the same; for the term one is used in these various senses, and each of the things to which some one of these senses applies will be one. But the essence of oneness will apply sometimes to one of these senses, and sometimes to something else (819), which is nearer to the meaning of the word; but the others are potentially one. This is like what is found in regard to element and cause by anyone who has to designate them in things and define terms. For in a sense fire is an element (and perhaps this is true of the indeterminate itself or something else of this sort), and in a sense it is not; for the essence of fire and that of an element are not the same, but fire is an element inasmuch as it is a thing and a nature. But the term signifies something which is accidental to it, namely, that something is composed of it as a primary constituent. The same is also true of cause and one and of all such terms. Hence the essence of oneness consists in being indivisible, i.e., in being an individual thing, and in being inseparable [i.e., not separated from itself] either as place or to form or to thought, or to being a whole and something determinate.

COMMENTARY

KINDS OF ONE

1920. Above in Book IV of this work the Philosopher showed (548) that this science has for its subject being and the kind of unity which is interchangeable with being. Therefore, having drawn his conclusions about accidental being (1172) and about the kind of being which signifies the truth of a proposition, which he does in Book VI (1223), and about essential being as divided into the ten categories, which he does in Books VII (1245) and VIII (1681), and as divided into potency and actuality, which he does in Book IX (1768), his aim in this tenth book is to settle the issue about unity or oneness and the attributes which naturally accompany it. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1920) he establishes what is true of unity in itself; and in the second (1983) he considers unity in relation to plurality.

The first part is divided into two members. In the first he explains the different senses in which the term one is used. In the second (1937) he establishes a property of unity or oneness.

The first part is divided into three members. In the first he establishes the different senses in which the term one is used. In the second (1932) he reduces all these to one common meaning. In the third (1933) he explains the different ways in which the term one is used of the things of which it is predicated.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives two senses in which the term one is used. Second (1927), he exposes the notion of unity contained in these two senses. Third (1929), he gives two other senses of the term one.

1921. In treating the first member of this division he gives, first, the primary senses in which the term one is used. He says that he has explained in Book V (749) the different meanings of the terms which pertain to the study of this science; for it was pointed out there (842) that the term one is used in many senses. And while this is true, there are four principal senses in which it is employed. But let us speak of those senses in which the term one is used primarily and essentially and not accidentally; for what is accidentally one has different modes of its own.

1922. (1) Now one of the senses in which things are said to be essentially one is that in which the continuous is said to be one; and this can be taken in two ways: either (a) the continuous in general (i.e., anything continuous in any way at all) is called one; or only the continuous (b) by nature is called one by continuity. And this latter is what is continuous in the fullest sense of the term, and not that which is continuous by force or by art or by any kind of contact (as is evident in the case of pieces of wood), or by any kind of continuity (as is evident in the case of things which are continuous or held together by a nail or by any other bond).

1923. And the phrase continuous by nature designates two things: what is a (+) uniform whole, as a straight line or even a circular one, and what is not a (~) uniform whole, as two lines which constitute the angle in which they are connected.

And of these, lines which are said to be straight and those which are said to be circular are one to a greater degree than those which form an angle, and they are one anteriorly. For a straight line must have one motion, since one part cannot be moved and another at rest, or one be moved in this way and another in that; but the whole must be moved simultaneously and by one motion. The same holds true of a circular line.

1924. But this does not apply to two continuous quantities which form an angle; for we can imagine either that one line is at rest and the other is moved closer to it so as to form a smaller angle, or that it is moved away from it so as to form a larger angle, or even that both lines are moved in opposite directions. Hence he says that a continuous quantity whose motion is more indivisible and simpler is one to a greater degree.

1925. And not only (815).

(2) Then he gives a second sense in which things are said to be essentially one; and here we must consider that what “is such,” i.e., continuous, is not only said to be one but also has something more; i.e., it is a whole having some form or specifying principle, just as an animal is one, and a triangular surface is one. Hence this sense of one adds to the oneness of continuity the kind of unity which comes from the form by which a thing is a whole and has a species.

1926. And since one thing is a whole by nature and another by art, he added that “a thing is one to the greatest degree” if it is such by nature and not by force. For example, all those things which are united by glue or by some such bond so as to become a whole are joined by force. But whatever is joined by nature is one to the greatest degree, because it is clearly the cause of its own continuity; for it is such by its very nature.

1927. And a thing is such (816).

Then be clarifies the meaning of unity contained in these two senses of the term one. He says that a thing is such, i.e., continuous and one, because its motion is one and indivisible both as to place and to time; as to place, because whithersoever one part of a continuous thing is moved another part is also moved; and as to time, because when one part is moved another is also moved.

1928. Hence, if a thing that is continuous and whole by nature is said to be one because its motion is one, then it is evident that, if anything continuous and whole has within itself a principle of the primary kind of motion, this will be the primary kind of one in the realm of continuous quantity; for example, of all motions the primary kind is local motion, and of local motions the primary kind is circular motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. And of bodies which are moved by circular motion there is one which contains the principle of such motion, i.e., the body which is moved circularly and causes the circular motion of other bodies by a daily motion. It is evident, then, that this is, the one primary continuous quantity which contains the first principle of the primary kind of motion.

Hence two senses of the term one are evident, namely, that in which the continuous is called one, and that in which a whole is called one.

1929. And other things (817).

Then he gives the other ways in which things are said to be one. He says that certain other things are said to be one, not because their motion is one, but because their intelligible structure is one. And things of this kind whose concept is one are those which are apprehended by a single intellectual act. And such things as are said to be apprehended by a single intellectual act are those of which there is a single apprehension of an undivided object.

1930. This can be so for two reasons: either (3) because the undivided, object apprehended is specifically one, or (4) because it is numerically one.

Now what is numerically undivided is the singular thing itself, which cannot be predicated of many things; and what is specifically one is undivided because it is a single object of knowledge and acquaintance.

For in distinct singular things there is no nature numerically one which can be called a species, but the intellect apprehends as one that attribute in which all singulars agree. Hence the species, which is distinct in distinct individuals in reality, becomes undivided when apprehended by the intellect.

1931. And since substance is prior in intelligibility to all the other genera, and the term one is used in these senses because it has one meaning, then it follows that the primary sort of one in these senses is what is one in substance, i.e., what causes substance to be one, just as in the first two senses the primary sort of one was the continuous quantity which is moved circularly.

1932. The term one (818).

Here he reduces the senses of one given above to a single meaning by summarizing what he had said above. He says that the term one is used of four things: first, (1) of what is continuous by nature; (2) second, of a whole; (3) third, of a singular thing; and (4) fourth, of the universal, for example, a species.

And all of these are said to be one because of one common aspect, namely, being indivisible; for properly speaking, a one is an undivided being.

But the term one is used in the first two senses because a motion is undivided, and in the latter two senses because an intelligible structure or concept is undivided, inasmuch as the apprehension of a particular thing is also included under this.

1933. Here he shows how the term one is predicated of things which are said to be one. He says that it must be borne in mind that the term one should not be taken to mean the same thing when a thing is said to be one and when someone expresses the essence of oneness, which is its intelligible structure; just as wood too is not said to be white in the sense that whiteness is the essence of wood, but in the sense that it is an accident of it.

1934. Then he gives the following explanation of a statement which he had made, saying that, since the term one is used in many senses (as has been stated), a thing is said to be one because some one of these senses applies to it, i.e., continuous, whole, species, or singular thing. But the essence of oneness sometimes applies to something that is one in some one of the foregoing senses, as when I say that what is one in continuity is one (and the same holds true of the others); and sometimes it is attributed to something which is nearer to the nature of one, for example, what is undivided but contains within itself potentially the senses of one given above; because what is undivided as regards motion is continuous and whole, and what is undivided in meaning is singular or universal.

1935. He adds to this the example of elements and causes, viewed in the problem of identifying them in things, as when we say that such and such a thing is an element or cause by defining the term; for example, we say that that is a cause which has the essence of a cause. And in this way we say that fire is an element or “the indeterminate itself,” i.e., what is unlimited in itself (which the Pythagoreans posited as a separate entity and the element of all things), or anything else of this sort for whatever reason it can be called an element. But in a sense fire is not an element, and neither is the indeterminate; for fire does not constitute the essence of an element, because the notion of fire is not the same as that of an element. It is an element, however, as existing in reality or in the natural world. But when the term element is predicated of fire, it signifies that something “has become accidental to fire,” i.e., that fire is that of which something is composed as a primary constituent, and this is the formal note of an element. He says “constituent” in order to exclude privations.

1936. What has been said about an element also applies to cause and to one and to all such terms; because the things of which they are predicated are not the very things which the terms signify; for example, white man is not the very thing which the term white signifies, for white signifies a quality.

Hence the essence of oneness consists in being undivided, i.e., in being an individual thing; and this is proper to a thing which is inseparable as to place or to form or in whatever other way it is inseparable.

LESSON 2

Unity as a Measure

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820. But the essence of oneness or unity consists especially in being the first measure of each genus, and most properly of quantity; because it is from this genus that it is transferred to the others. For a measure is that by which quantity is first known; and quantity as quantity is known either by unity or by a number, and every number is known by unity. Hence all quantity as quantity is known by unity.

821. And that by which quantity is first known is unity itself; and for this reason unity is the principle of number as number.

822. And the measure of other things is also that by which each is first known. And the measure of each is a unit: in length, in breadth, in depth, and in heaviness and in rapidity. For the terms heavy and rapid are common to both contraries, since each of them has two meanings. Thus heavy is said both of what has any amount of inclination towards the center and of what has an excessive inclination; and rapid is said both of what has any amount of motion, and of what has an excessive motion. For even what is slow has a certain speed, and what is light a certain heaviness.

823. And in all these cases the measure and principle is something one and indivisible, since even in the case of lines we use the foot measure as something indivisible. For everywhere men seek as a measure something one and indivisible, and this is what is simple Either in quality or in quantity. Hence wherever it seems impossible to. add or to subtract

anything, there the most certain measure is found. The measure of number, then, is the most certain; for men claim that the unit is indivisible in every respect. And in other cases they imitate such a measure; for any addition or subtraction might more easily escape our notice in the case of a furlong or of a talent or of anything which is always a larger measure than in that of something which is a smaller measure. Hence it is the first thing from which no perceptible subtraction can be made that all men make a measure, whether of liquids or of solids or of weight or of size; and they think they know the quantity of a thing when they know it by this measure.

824. And they also measure motion by that motion which is simple and most rapid; for this takes the least time. Hence in astronomy this kind of unit is the principle and measure; for astronomers suppose the motion of the heavens to be uniform and most rapid, and they judge the other motions by this motion. And in music the diesis is the measure, because it is the smallest interval; and in speech, the letter. And all of these are one, not in the sense that there is something common to all which is one, but in the sense that we have explained.

825. However, a measure is not always numerically one, but sometimes many; for example, there are two dieses not discernible by car but differing in their ratios. And the words by which we measure speech are many; and the diagonal of a square is measured by two quantities, and so also is a side; and so are all continuous quantities. Therefore all things have as their measure some unit, because we come to know the things of which substance is composed by dividing it either in regard to quantity or to species. Hence the unit is indivisible, because what is first in each class of things is indivisible. But not every unit is indivisible in the same way, for example, the foot and the unit; but the latter is indivisible in every respect, whereas the former belongs to that class of things which are indivisible from the viewpoint of the senses, as has already been stated (823); for perhaps every continuous thing is divisible.

826. And a measure is always of the same kind as the thing measured; for the measure of continuous quantities is a continuous quantity; and in particular the measure of length is a length; and of breath a breadth; and of width a width; and of vocal sounds a vocal sound; and of weight a weight; and of units a unit. For this is the view which must be taken, but not that the measure of numbers is a number. We should indeed have to speak in this

way if we were to use parallel forms, but the meaning does not require such parallels: it would be as if the measure of units had to be designated as units and not as a unit. But number is a plurality of units.

827. And for the same reason we say that knowledge and perception are the measure of things, because we know something by them; yet they are measured rather than measure. But in our own case it is as though someone else were measuring us, and we learned how big we are by means of the cubit measure being applied to so much of us. But Protagoras says that man is the measure of all things, as if he were saying the man who knows or the man who perceives; and these because the one has intellectual knowledge and the other sensory perception, which we say are the measures of the things that are placed before them. Hence, while these men say nothing extraordinary, they seem to be saying something important.

828. It is evident, then, that unity in the strictest sense, according to the definition of the term, is a measure, and particularly of quantity and then of quality. And some things will be such if they are indivisible in quantity, and others if they are indivisible in quality. Therefore what is one is indivisible either in an unqualified sense or inasmuch as it is one.

COMMENTARY

ONE AS A MEASURE

1937. Having explained the various senses in which unity is predicated of things, and having stated what its essential note is, to which all its usages are reduced, i.e., being indivisible, here the Philosopher infers a property of unity from its essential note, namely, that it is a measure. This is divided into two parts. In the first he shows how the notion of a measure belongs to unity and to the various classes of accidents. In the second (1961) he shows how unity in the sense of a measure is found in substances (“It is necessary”).

In regard to the first part of this division he does two things. First, he indicates the class of things in which unity in the sense of a measure is primarily found, and how it is transferred from this class to the others with the proper notion of a measure. Second (1956), he explains how it is transferred figuratively to the other classes (“And for the same reason”).

In treating the first part he does two things. First, he indicates the class of things in which unity in the sense of a measure is first found, and how it is transferred from this class to the others. Second (1950), he makes a study of measures ("However, a measure").

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows how unity as a measure is found in quantity, and how it is transferred from this category to the others. Second (1939), he indicates the species of quantity in which it is first found ("And that by which"). Third (1940), he shows how it is transferred to other species of quantity ("And the measure").

1938. He accordingly says, first, that, since the essential note of unity consists in being indivisible, and what is indivisible in each genus is somehow the measure of that genus, unity must be said to be in the highest degree the first measure of each genus. This is said to apply most properly to quantity, and it is from this class that the notion of a measure is transferred to other classes of things. Now a measure is nothing else than that by which a thing's quantity is known, and this is known by the unit or by a number: by a unit, as when we say one furlong or one foot; and by a number, as when we say three furlongs or three feet. Again, every number is known by the unit because the unit taken a certain number of times gives a number. It follows, then, that every quantity is known by unity. To "quantity" he adds "as quantity," intending that this be referred to the measure of quantity; for the properties and other accidents of quantity are known in a different way.

1939. And that by which (821).

Then he indicates in what species of quantity unity or measure is primarily found. First, he makes it clear that the notion of a measure is primarily found in discrete quantity, which is number. He says that that by which quantity is first known is "unity itself," i.e., the unit which is the principle of number. For in other species of quantity the unit is not unity itself but something of which unity is an attribute, as when we speak of one hand or of one continuous quantity. Hence it follows that unity itself, which is the first measure, is the principle of number as number.

1940. And the measure (822).

Second, he shows how unity is transferred to other species of quantity; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he indicates the species of quantity to which it is transferred. He says that it is from this class, i.e., from number and from the unit, which is the principle of number, that the notion of a measure is transferred to other quantities as that by which each of them is first known. And whatever is the measure in each class of things is the unit in that class.

1941. He gives examples of this in three classes of things, i.e., in dimensions—length, breadth and width; in weight, or in what he calls heaviness; and in speed, or in what he calls rapidity, which refers to the measure of time.

In the case of dimensions no one doubted that they were quantities and that they were properly susceptible to measurement, but in the case of weight and of speed there could be a difficulty because these seem to be qualities rather than quantities.

1942. He therefore explains how these pertain to the genus of quantity, and how they are susceptible to measurement. He says that heaviness and rapidity have something in common with their contraries because one contrary is found in the other; for what is heavy is in some sense light, and the reverse; and what is rapid is in some sense slow. For each of these terms is used in two senses. (1) In one sense the term heavy is used without qualification of anything that has an inclination to be borne towards the center of the earth, without taking into consideration how great its inclination is; and in this sense heavy does not refer to the category of quantity, and it is not susceptible to measurement. (2) In the other sense it is used of one thing in comparison with something else, namely, of what exceeds something else in terms of the abovementioned inclination; for example, we say that earth is heavy in comparison with water, and that lead is heavy in comparison with wood. Therefore it is by reason of this excess that some notion of quantity and measure is found.

The term rapid is similarly used in two senses. In one sense it is used without qualification of anything that has any motion; and in a second sense it is used of anything that has an excessive motion. And in one respect the notions of quantity and measure properly apply to it, and in another respect they do not.

1943. With a view to clarifying his statement about the condition of heaviness and rapidity in reference to contraries he adds that rapidity is found in something that is slow inasmuch as what is simply and unqualifiedly slow is more rapid in comparison with something that is slower than itself. And in a similar way heaviness is found in light things; for example, air is light in comparison with earth, and heavy in comparison with fire.

1944. And in all cases (823).

Then he shows how the notion of a measure is transferred from number to other kinds of quantity. He immediately makes this clear, first, in the case of dimensions and in that of weights; and second (1947), in that of the rapidity of motions ("And they also measure").

He accordingly says, first, that the notion of a measure is transferred from number to the other kinds of quantity in this way that, just as the unit which is the measure of number is indivisible, so too all the other kinds of quantity have something that is one and indivisible as their measure and principle. For example, in measuring lines men use "the foot measure," i.e., the measure of one foot, as something indivisible; for wherever something indivisible is sought as. a measure, there is something simple either in quality or in quantity; in quality, as whiteness in the case of colors, which is in a sense the measure of colors, as will be mentioned below (1968); and in quantity, as the unit in the case of numbers, and the foot measure in the case of lines.

1945. Further, he points out why a measure must be something indivisible. The reason is that an exact measure must be something which can be neither added to nor subtracted from. Thus the unit is the most exact or certain measure, because the unit which is the principle of number is altogether indivisible, and whatever unity is not susceptible either to addition or to subtraction remains one. The measures of the other classes of quantity resemble this unit which is indivisible inasmuch as men take some smallest thing as a measure to the extent that this is possible. For if anything large were taken, as the furlong among distances and the talent among weights, it would escape our notice if some small portion were subtracted from or added to it. And this would always be more true of a larger measure than of a smaller one.

1946. Hence all men take this as a measure both in the case of liquids, such as oil and wine, and in that of solids, such as grain and barley; and also in that of weights and dimensions, which are designated as heaviness and continuous quantity. And this is first found to be such that nothing perceptible can be subtracted from it or added to it that might escape our notice. And men think they know the quantity of a thing exactly when they know it by the smallest measure of this kind.

1947. And they also (824).

Then he makes the same thing clear with regard to the rapidity of motions. He says that men also measure motion "by that motion which is simple," i.e., the motion which is uniform and quickest, because it takes the least time. Hence in astronomy they take such motion as the basis of measurement; for they take the motion of "the first heaven," i.e., the daily motion, which is regular and quickest, and they judge and measure all other motions by this.

1948. And because the low and high pitch of sounds results from the quickness and slowness of motions, as is established in the science of music, he adds as an example the measurement of sounds. He says that in music the first measure is the "diesis," i.e., the difference between two half tones; for a tone is divided into two unequal half tones, as is proved in the science of music. And similarly in speech the measure is the letter, because the shortness or length of a word is a natural consequence of the quickness or slowness of a motion.

1949. Now all these something one, not in measures are the sense that some measure is common to all, but in the sense that any measure in itself is something one, as has been pointed out.

1950. However, a measure (825).

After having shown in what class of things unity as a measure is primarily found, here the Philosopher clears up certain points that have to be investigated about measures.

The first of these is that, although a measure is understood to be one thing inasmuch as it comes close to being indivisible, it is not necessary that a measure be something numerically one; but sometimes many things are measures; for example, in the case of musical sounds "there are two dieses," i.e., two half tones. However, because of their smallness they are not distinguished by the sense of hearing, for the senses do not perceive the difference between two things that are very small; but their difference is perceived "in their ratios," i.e., in the different ratios which comprise their proportions, because they are caused by different numerical proportions.

1951. Similarly the things by which we measure words are also many; for the quantity of one meter or of one foot is measured by different syllables, some of which are short and some long.

The same thing is true of the diameter of a circle and of the diagonal of a square, and also of the side of a square.

And any continuous quantity is measured by two things, for an unknown quantity is found only by means of two known quantities.

1952. Having said this he brings this part of his discussion to a close by summarizing what has been said above, namely, that unity constitutes the measure of all things. The reason for this is that unity is the term of division. And those principles which constitute the substance of each thing are known by the division or dissolution of the whole into its component parts, whether they are quantitative parts or specific parts such as matter and form and the elements of compounds. Therefore what is one in itself must be indivisible since it is the measure by which a thing is known, because in the case of singular things whatever is first in the process of composition and last in the process of dissolution is indivisible, and it is by means of this that the thing is known, as has been explained.

1953. Yet indivisibility is not found in all things in the same way. (1) Some things are altogether indivisible, such as the unit which is the basis of number, whereas (2) others are not altogether indivisible but only to the senses, according as the authority of those who instituted such a measure wished to consider something as a measure; for example, the foot measure, which is indivisible in proportion [to the things measured] but not by nature. “For perhaps everything continuous is divisible”; and he says “perhaps” because of the difficulty facing those men who claimed that continuous quantity is composed of indivisible elements, or that natural continuous quantities are not infinitely divisible, but only mathematical quantities. For it is possible to find the smallest amount of flesh, as is mentioned in Book I of the Physics.

1954. And a measure (826).

Then he gives the second point that has to be investigated about a measure. He says that “the meter,” i.e., the measure, should always be of the same kind as the thing measured, i.e., of the same nature or measure as the thing measured; for example, a continuous quantity should be the measure of continuous quantities; and it is not enough that they have a common nature, as all continuous quantities do, but there must be some agreement between the measure and the thing measured in the line of their special nature. Thus a length is the measure of lengths, a width of widths, a vocal sound of vocal sounds, a weight of weights, and a unit of units.

1955. “For this is the view which must be taken” in order that we may speak without being criticized, “but not that number is the measure of numbers.” Now number does not have the notion of a first measure but unity does; and if unity is a measure, then in order to signify the agreement between the measure and the thing measured it will be necessary to say that unity is the measure of units and not of numbers. Yet if the truth of the matter be taken into consideration, it will be necessary to admit also that number is the measure of numbers or even that the unit may be taken in a similar way as the measure of numbers. But it does not seem equally fitting to say that the unit is the measure of units and number of number or unity of number, because of the difference which appears to exist between the unit and number. But to observe this difference is the same as if someone were to say that it is fitting for units to be the measure of units but not the unit, because the unit differs from units as things expressed in the singular differ from those expressed in the plural. And the same argument applies to number in relation to the unit, because a number is nothing else than a plurality of units. Hence to say that the unit is the measure of number is merely to say that the unit is the measure of units.

1956. And for the same reason (827).

Then he shows how the term measure is transferred in a figurative way to another class of things. He says that, since it has been stated that a measure is that by which the quantity of a thing is known, we may say that intellectual knowledge is the measure of that which is knowable intellectually, and that sensory perception is the measure of that which is perceptible; because we know something by means of them, namely, sensible objects by means of perception and intelligible objects by means of intellectual knowledge; but we do not know them in the same was as we do by a measure. For something is known by a measure as a principle of knowledge, whereas in sensation and knowledge we are measured by things that are outside ourselves.

1957. Therefore they are called measures figuratively, because in reality they are measured rather than measure. For it is not because we perceive or know a thing that it is so in reality; but it is because it is so in reality that we have a true knowledge or perception of it, as is said in Book IX (807:C

1896). Thus it follows that in perceiving and knowing something we measure our knowledge by means of the things which exist outside the mind.

1958. However, in knowing and measuring ourselves by some other measure we know how much bodily quantity we have by applying the cubit measure to ourselves. Hence, just as the external cubit is offered as a measure of our bodily quantity, in a similar way the things known or sensuously apprehended are the measures whereby we can know whether we truly apprehend something by our senses or by our intellect.

1959. And if there is a science which is the cause of the. thing known, it must be this science which measures that thing, just as the science of the master planner is the measure of things made by art, because anything made by art is complete insofar as it attains a likeness to the art. It is in this way that the science of God is related to all things. But Protagoras said that man is the measure of all things inasmuch as he knows or perceives them, because knowledge and perception are the measure of substances, i.e., of things which are intelligible and perceptible. For the followers of Protagoras, as has been stated in Book IV (344:C 637), said that things are such because we so perceive them or judge about them. Therefore, although they say nothing extraordinary or important, they nevertheless seem to be saying something of consequence, because they covertly insinuate their doctrine.

1960. It is evident (828).

Then he sums up the points discussed, namely, that the notion of unity involves being a measure; and this applies most properly to quantity, and then to quality and to the other genera, because anything that is a measure should be indivisible either in quantity or in quality. Thus it follows that unity is indivisible, “either in an unqualified sense” as the unit which is the basis of number, or “in a qualified sense,” i.e., to the extent that it is one, as was stated with regard to the other measures.

LESSON 3

The Nature of Unity

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829. It is necessary to inquire how unity is related to the substance and nature of things. In a sense this is a problem which we have examined (266) in the questions regarding the nature of unity, and how it must be taken: whether it must be taken to be a substance, as the Pythagoreans first claimed, and later Plato, or rather whether there is some nature that underlies it, and it is necessary to describe it more meaningfully and more in the terms of those who speak of nature; for one of them said that unity is friendship, another air, and another the indeterminate.

830. If, then, it is impossible for a universal to be a substance, as has been stated in our treatment of substance and being (651), and being itself cannot be a substance in the sense of one thing existing apart from the many (for it is common to all of them), but it is only a predicate, it is evident that unity cannot be a substance; for being and unity are the most universal of all predicates. Hence genera are not certain natures and substances which are separable from other things; and unity cannot be a genus, for the same reasons that being and substance cannot be such (229).

831. Further, the same thing must be true of unity in all categories of things. Now unity and being are used in an equal number of ways. Hence, since in the category of qualities there is something which is one and a certain nature, and since the same thing is true of quantities, it is evident that we must investigate in a general way what unity is, just as we must

investigate what being is, inasmuch as it is not sufficient to say that its nature is just itself. But in the sphere of colors unity is a color, for example, white; and then the other colors seem to be produced from this and from black; and black is the privation of white as darkness is of light; for it is the absence of light. If, then, all beings were colors, they would be a number. But of what? Evidently, of colors. And unity itself would be some one color, for example, white. Similarly if beings were tunes, they would be a number of minor half tones; but their substance would not be a number; and unity would be something whose substance is not unity but a minor half tone. Similarly if beings were sounds, they would be a number of elements, and unity would be a vowel. And if beings were rectilinear figures, there would be a number of figures, and unity would be a triangle. The same reasoning applies to the other genera. Therefore if in all affections, qualities, quantities and motions there are numbers and unity, and if the number is a number of particular things, and the unity is a particular unity, but unity is not its substance, then the same thing must be true of substances, because the same is true of all things. It is evident, then, that in every genus unity is a determinate nature, and that in no case is the nature of its unity merely unity. But just as in the case of colors the unity for which we must look is one color, in a similar fashion in the case of substances the unity must be one substance.

832. That unity and being somehow signify the same thing is evident from the fact that they have meanings corresponding to each of the categories and are contained in none of them: neither in quiddity nor in quality, but unity is related to each in the same way that being is; and from the fact that “one man” does not express something different from “man,” just as being does not exist apart from quiddity or from quality or from quantity; and because to be one is just the same as to be a particular thing.

COMMENTARY

1961. After having shown how unity in the sense of a measure is found first in quantity and then is transferred to the other categories, here the Philosopher deals with the relationship of unity to substance, i.e., whether unity constitutes the very substance of a thing. This is divided into three parts. In the first (829:C ig6i) he raises the question and gives the different opinions regarding it. In the second (830:C 1963) he answers the question by showing that unity and being are not the substance of the things of which they are predicated (“If, then”). In the third (832:C 1974) he compares unity with being (“That unity and being”).

He accordingly says, first (829), that, since it has already been shown how unity in the sense of a measure belongs to quantity and to the other classes of things, it is now necessary to ask how unity relates to the substances and natures of things. This question was asked above in Book III (266:C 488), in which different problems were raised.

1962. The question is whether the very thing which is called unity is a substance, i.e., something which subsists of itself, as the Pythagoreans first claimed, and as the Platonists, who followed them, later held; or rather whether there is some subsistent nature which underlies unity, in terms of which the quiddity of the thing designated as one should be more meaningfully and adequately expressed. The philosophers of nature presupposed this entity, one of them saying that unity is love, namely, Empedocles, who claimed that there are four material principles, the four elements, to which the active principles posited by him, love and hate, are said to be prior. And of these the most important is love, inasmuch as it is perfect and the principle of good things. Therefore, if the first principle is called unity, it follows according to him that unity is love. And this fits the case inasmuch as it indicates a certain union of the lover and the thing loved. Another philosopher, Diogenes, who claimed that air is the principle of all things (41:C 86), said that unity is air. And still another philosopher said that unity is the indeterminate, namely, Melissus, who claimed that there was one infinite and unchangeable being, as is clear in Book I of the Physics.

1963. If, then (830).

Here he answers the question which was raised. He says that unity is not a subsisting substance, of which one may predicate the term one. He proves this in two ways. First (830:C 1963), by an argument; and second (831:C 1967), by a comparison (“Further, the same”).

He says, then, that it was proved above in Book VII (651:C 1572), where he treats of being, and especially of substance, that no universal can be a substance which subsists of itself because every universal is common to many. A universal also cannot be a subsisting substance because otherwise it would have to be one thing apart from the many, and then it could not be common but would be in itself a singular thing.

1964. Unity might, it is true, be said to be common as a cause is. But the common aspect of a universal differs from that of a cause; for a cause is not predicated of its effects, since the same thing is not the cause of itself. But a universal is common in the sense of something predicated of many things; and thus it must be in some way a one-in-many, and not something subsisting apart from them.

1965. But being and unity must be predicated of all things in the most universal and common way. Hence those things which are called being and unity are not themselves subsisting substances, as Plato maintained.

1966. From this argument he concludes that no genera are natures and substances which subsist of themselves as though separable from the things of which they are predicated. This too was one of the questions debated above (229:C 432). Yet this is not said in the sense that unity is a genus; for unity cannot be a genus for the very same reason that being cannot, since it is not predicated univocally. This is also true in the light of the other reasons given in Book III (269-74:C 493-501). And for the same reason unity and being cannot be subsisting substances.

1967. Further, the same thing (831).

Here he proves the same point by a comparison. He says that unity must be found in the same way in all categories of things, because being and unity are predicated in an equal number of ways of all genera. But in each genus of things we look for something that is one (implying that unity is not the very nature of what is said to be one), as is evident in the case of qualities and in that of quantities. It is clear, then, that in no genus is it sufficient to say that the nature of what is said to be one is just unity itself, but we must inquire what unity and being are.

1968. That it is necessary to investigate what unity is in the category of qualities and in that of quantities he makes clear by examples. He does this first in the case of colors; for we look for something which is one, such as whiteness, which is the primary color. Hence, if what is primary in each class of things is its unity, whiteness must constitute the unity in the class of color; and it must be in a sense the measure of the other colors, because the more perfect a thing's color the closer it comes to whiteness. He shows that whiteness is the primary color by reason of the fact that intermediate colors are produced from white and from black, and are therefore subsequent. Black is subsequent to white because it is the privation of white as darkness is of light. But this must not be understood to mean that black is pure privation in the same way that darkness is (for black is a species of color, and thus possesses the nature of color), but that blackness contains the least amount of light, which causes colors; and thus it is compared to white as the absence of light is compared to light.

1969. And because in colors we look for something that is first and one, namely white, it is clear that if all beings were colors, they would have some number, not in the sense, however, that number would constitute subsisting things themselves, but in the sense that there would be a number of subsisting things of a particular sort, i.e., colors. And then there would be something that is the subject of unity, namely, that which is white.

1970. The same thing would be true if all things were tunes; because beings would be of a certain number, that is, a number of minor half tones or tones. Yet number is not the very substance of beings, and consequently it would be necessary to look for something which is one, namely, the minor half tone; but not in such a way that unity itself would be a substance.

1971, In a similar way too if all beings were sounds, they would be a number of beings, because there are a number of particular subjects of number, namely, “of elements,” or letters. Hence the vowel, which is the primary letter (since consonants cannot be pronounced without vowels) would constitute their unity.

And in a similar way if all figures were rectilinear figures, there would be a number of subjects, namely, figures; and the triangle, which is the primary rectilinear figure, would constitute their unity; for all such figures are reducible to the triangle. The same reasoning applies to every category.

1972. If it is in this way, then, that number and unity are found in all other categories: in affections, qualities, and quantities, and in motion; and if number and unity are not the substance of the things of which they are predicated, but number is predicated of certain substances, and if unity similarly requires some subject which is said to be one, the same thing must be true of substances, because being and unity are predicated in the same way of all things. It is evident, then, that in any category of things there is some nature of which the term one is predicated, not because unity itself is the nature of a thing, but because it is predicated of it.

1973. And just as when we speak of unity in the case of colors we are looking for some color which is said to be one, so too when we speak of unity in the case of substances we are looking for some substance of which unity may be predicated. And this is predicated primarily and chiefly of what is first among substances (which he investigates below, 2553-66), and subsequently of the other classes of things.

1974. That unity and being (832).

Since he had given the same argument for being and for unity, he now shows that unity and being somehow signify the same thing. He says "somehow" because unity and being are the same in their subject and differ only in meaning. For unity adds to being the note of undividedness, because what is one is said to be an indivisible or undivided being. He gives three reasons why unity signifies the same thing as being.

1975. (1) The first is that unity naturally belongs to all of the different categories and not just to one of them; that is, it does not pertain just to substance or to quantity or to any other category. The same thing is also true of being.

1976. (2) The second reason is that, when a man is said to be one, the term one does not express a different nature from man, just as being does not express a different nature from the ten categories; for, if it did express a different nature, an infinite regress would necessarily result, since that nature too would be said to be one and a being. And if being were to express a nature different from these things, an infinite regress would also follow; but if not, then the conclusion of this argument must be the same as that of the first one.

1977. (3) The third reason is that everything is said to be one inasmuch as it is a being. Hence when a thing is dissolved it is reduced to non-being.

1978. [Objection] Now in this solution of the question the Philosopher seems to contradict himself; for he first said that unity and being are not the substance of the things of which they are predicated, but here he says that unity and being do not express a nature different from the things of which they are predicated.

1979. Hence it must be noted that the term substance is used in two senses. (1) In one sense it means a supposit in the genus of substance, which is called first substance and hypostasis, to which it properly belongs to subsist. (2) In a second sense it means a thing’s quiddity, which is also referred to as a thing’s nature. Therefore, since universals are subsistent things according to the opinion of Plato, they signify substance not only in the second sense but also in the first. But Aristotle proves in Book VII (1572) that universals are not subsistent things, and therefore it follows that universals are not substances in the first sense but only in the second. And for this reason it is said in the Categories that second substances, which are genera and species, do not signify particular things, which are subsisting substances, but “they signify the quiddity of a thing,” i.e., a nature in the genus of substance.

1980. The Philosopher accordingly proved above that unity and being do not signify substance in the sense of this particular thing, but it is necessary to look for something that is one and a being, just as we look for something that is a man or an animal, as Socrates or Plato.

Later he shows that these terms signify the natures of the things of which they are predicated and not something added, like accidents. For common attributes differ from accidents in this respect (although they agree in not being particular things), that common attributes signify the very nature of supposits, whereas accidents do not, but they signify some added nature.

1981. And Avicenna, who did not take this into account, claimed that unity and being are accidental predicates, and that they signify a nature added to the things of which they are predicated. For he was deceived by the equivocal use of the term one, because the unity which is the principle of number and has the role of a measure in the genus of quantity signifies a nature added to the things of which it is predicated, since it belongs to a class of accident. But the unity which is interchangeable with being extends to everything that is, and therefore it does not signify a nature which is limited to one category.

1982. He was also deceived by the equivocal use of the term being; for being as signifying the composition of a proposition is predicated accidentally, since composition is made by the intellect with regard to a definite time. Now to exist at this or at that particular time is to be an accidental predicate. But being as divided by the ten categories signifies the very nature of the ten categories insofar as they are actual or potential.

LESSON 4

Ways in Which One and Many Are Opposed

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1054a 20-1055a 2

833. One and many are opposed in many ways, and one of these is the opposition between one and many as between something indivisible and something divisible; for many means either what is divided or what is divisible, and one means either what is undivided or what is indivisible.

834. Hence, since we speak of four modes of opposition, and one of these two opposites is expressed privatively, they will be contraries and not contradictories or relative terms (313).

835. And what is one is described and made known in reference to its contrary, and what is indivisible in reference to what is divisible; for what is many and is divisible is better known to the senses than what is indivisible. Hence what is many is prior in intelligibility to what is indivisible, because of sensory perception.

836. And as we have already indicated in our division of contraries, same, like and equal relate to what is one; but diverse, unlike and unequal relate to what is many.

837. Now things are said to be the same in several ways; for in one way we say that a thing is numerically the same; and in another way we say that it is the same if it is one both in its intelligible structure and numerically; for example, you are the same as yourself in both form and matter. Again, things are the same if the intelligible structure of their primary substance is

one, as equal straight lines are the same, and equal quadrangles which are equiangular, and also many other things; but in these cases equality is unity.

838. Things are like if, while being the same in an unqualified sense or without a difference as regards their substance, they are the same in species; for example, a larger square is like a smaller one. And this likewise holds true of unequal straight lines, for these are like but not the same in an unqualified sense. And some things are said to be like if, while having the same form and admitting of difference in degree, they do not differ in degree. And other things are like if the same affection belongs to both and is one that is the same in species; for example, both what is whiter and what is less white are said to be like because they have one species. And other things are said to be such if they have more of sameness than diversity, either absolutely, or in regard to those attributes which are more important; for example, tin is like silver in being white, and gold is like fire in being red or yellowish.

839. It is evident, then, that the terms diverse and unlike are used in many senses; and that other or diverse is used in a way opposite to the same. Hence everything in relation to everything else is either the same or diverse. And things are diverse in another sense if their matter and intelligible structure are not one; thus you and your neighbor are diverse. A third meaning of this term is that found in mathematics. Hence for this reason everything is either diverse or the same as everything else, i.e., everything of which men predicate unity and being. For other is not the contradictory of the same, and this is why it is not predicated of non-beings (but they are said to be “not the same”), but it is predicated of all beings; for whatever is by nature a being and one is either one or not one. Hence diverse and same are opposed in this way.

840. But different and diverse are not the same. For that which is diverse and that from which it is diverse need not be diverse in some particular respect, because every being is either diverse or the same. But that which is different differs from something in some particular respect. Hence there must be some same thing by which they differ. Now this same thing is either a genus or a species; for everything that differs, differs either generically or specifically: generically, if they have no common matter and are not generated from each other, like those things which belong to a different figure of predication (60), and specifically, if they have the same

genus. Genus means that by which both of the things that differ are said to be without difference in substance. But contraries are different, and contrariety is a kind of difference.

841. That this assumption is correct becomes clear by an induction; for all these contraries seem to be different, and they are not merely diverse, but some are generically diverse and others belong to the same category, so that they are contained in the same genus and in the same species. The kinds of things which are generically the same and those which are generically diverse have been established elsewhere (445).

COMMENTARY

WAYS ONE AND MANY ARE OPPOSED

1983. After having treated of one considered in itself, here the Philosopher deals with one in comparison with many; and this is divided into two parts. In the first (1983) he treats one and many and their concomitant attributes. In the second (2023) he establishes what is true about the contrary character of one and many; for the investigation of this involves a special difficulty.

The first member of this division is divided into two parts. In the first part he shows how one and many are opposed. In the second (1999) he considers their concomitant attributes.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he indicates how we should understand the opposition between one and many. He says that, although one and many are opposed in many ways, as will be made clear below, none the less one of these ways, and the most important one, concerns one and many insofar as they are opposed as something indivisible is opposed to something divisible, because this mode of opposition pertains to the proper notion of each.

1984. For the essential note of plurality consists in things being divided from each other or in being divisible. He says “divided” because of the things which are actually separated from each other and which are for this reason said to be many. He says “divisible” because of the things which are not actually separated from each other but come close to being separated, for example, moist things such as air and water and the like, of which we use the term much because they are easily divided; thus we speak of much water and much air.

1985. But the formal constituent of unity or oneness consists in being indivisible or in being undivided; for the continuous is said to be one because it is not actually divided, although it is divisible.

1986. Hence, since (834).

Second, he makes clear to what kind of opposition the aforesaid manner of being opposed is ultimately reduced. He says that, since there are four kinds of opposition, one of which is based on privation, it is evident that one and many are not opposed as contradictories or as relative terms, which are two kinds of opposition, but as contraries.

1987. That they are not opposed as (~) contradictories is evident because neither of them applies to non-being, for non-being is neither one nor many. But the second member of the contradiction would have to apply to being as well as to non-being. That they are not opposed as relative terms is likewise evident, for the terms one and many are used in an absolute sense.

1988. And although he had said that one and many are opposed as what is indivisible and what is divisible, and these appear to be opposed as privation and possession, none the less he concludes that one and many are opposed as contraries; for the opposition between privation and possession is the basis of the opposition between contraries, as will be made clear below (2036). For one of the two contraries is always a privation, but not a pure privation; otherwise it would not share in the nature of the genus, since contraries belong to the same genus. Each of the two contraries, then, must be a positive reality, even though one of them shares in the nature of the genus with a certain deficiency, as black in relation to white, as has been stated above (1967). Therefore, since unity does not signify a pure privation, for it does not designate the mere lack of division but the very being which is undivided, it is evident that one and many are opposed not as pure privation and possession but as contraries.

1989. And what is one (835).

[Objection] Third, he answers an implied question. Because he had said that one is related to many as what is indivisible to what is divisible, and what is indivisible seems to be the privation of what is divisible since privation is subsequent to possession or form, it seems to follow that one is subsequent to many, although he had said above (1939) that one is the principle of many, from which it becomes known.

1990. In order to see the solution of this difficulty, then, it must be borne in mind that things which are prior and better known by nature are subsequent and less well known to us, because we derive our knowledge of things from the senses. Now the first things to be perceived by us are composite and confused things, as is said in Book I of the Physics; and this is why the first things to be known by us are composite things. But simpler things, which are prior and more intelligible by nature, are known by us only derivatively; and this is why we define the first principles of things only by the negations of subsequent things; for example, we say that the point is what has no parts; and we know God by way of negations inasmuch as we say that God is incorporeal, unchangeable and infinite.

1991. Accordingly, even though what is one is prior by nature to what is many, yet in our knowledge it is defined and gets its name from the privation of division. This is why the Philosopher says that "what is one is described," i.e., named, "and made known," i.e., understood, "in reference to its contrary," just as the indivisible is known from the divisible. And for this reason many things are able to be perceived more easily than one thing; and what is divisible is able to be perceived more easily than what is indivisible, not in the order of nature but because of sensory perception, which is the foundation of our knowledge.

1992. [Objection] But a twofold difficulty arises with regard to those things which the Philosopher is expounding. The first concerns his statement that one and many are opposed as contraries. For this appears to be impossible, because unity is the basis of plurality, whereas one of two contraries does not ground the other but rather destroys it.

1993. Hence it must be noted that, since contraries differ formally, as is said below (2120), when we say that things are contraries, each of them is to be taken (+) insofar as it has a form, but not (~) insofar as it is a part of something having a form.

(+) For insofar as body is taken without the soul, as something having a form, it is opposed to animal as the non-living is opposed to the living. (~) But insofar as it is not taken as something complete and informed, it is not opposed to animal but is a material part of it.

We see that this is likewise true of numbers; for insofar as the number two is a kind of whole having a determinate species and form, it differs specifically from the number three; but if it is taken insofar as it is not made complete by a form, it is a part of the number three.

1994. Therefore insofar as unity itself is considered to be complete in itself and to have a certain species, it is opposed to plurality; because what is one is not many, nor is the reverse true. But insofar as it is considered to be incomplete as regards form and species, it is not opposed to plurality but is a part of it.

1995. [Objection] The second difficulty has to do with the statement that plurality is prior in intelligibility to unity; for, since the concept of plurality or multitude involves unity, because a plurality is nothing else than an aggregate of units, if unity is subsequent in intelligibility to plurality, it follows that the notions of unity and plurality involve circularity, i.e., in the sense that unity is intelligible in terms of plurality and vice versa. But circularity of definition is not admissible in designating the intelligible structures of things, because the same thing would then be known both to a greater and to a lesser degree. This is impossible.

1996. The answer to this difficulty, then, must be that nothing prevents one and the same thing from being prior and subsequent in intelligibility according to different traits which are considered in it. For in multitude it is possible to consider both multitude as such and division itself.

Thus from the viewpoint of division multitude is prior in intelligibility to unity; for that is one which is undivided. But multitude as multitude is subsequent in intelligibility to unity, since a multitude means an aggregate of units or ones.

1997. Now the division which is implied in the notion of that kind of unity which is interchangeable with being is not (~) the division of continuous quantity, which is understood prior to that kind of unity which is the basis of number, but is (+) the division which is caused by contradiction, inasmuch as two particular beings are said to be divided by reason of the fact that this being is not that being.

1998. Therefore what we first understand is being, and then division, and next unity, which is the privation of division, and lastly multitude, which is a composite of units.

For even though things which are divided are many, they do not have the formal note of a many until the fact of being one is attributed to each of the particular things concerned. Yet nothing prevents us from also saying that the notion of multitude depends on that of unity insofar as multitude is measured by one; and this already involves the notion of number.

1999. And as we have (836).

Here he indicates the attributes which stem from unity and plurality; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives the attributes which naturally stem from unity and plurality. He says that sameness, likeness and equality flow from unity, as has been pointed out above in Book V (911), where he divided or distinguished the various senses in which things are said to be contrary; for those things are the same which are one in substance; those are like which are one in quality; and those are equal which are one in quantity.

2000. And the contraries of these, diverse, unlike and unequal, pertain to plurality. For those things are diverse whose substance is not one; those are unlike whose quality is not one; and those are unequal whose quantity is not one.

2001. Now things (837).

He now explains the various senses in which these terms are used; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows how the modes of those attributes which accompany unity differ from each other. Second (2013) he does the same thing for those attributes which accompany plurality (“It is evident”).

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he explains the various ways in which things are said to be the same; and second (2006), those in which they are said to be like (“Things are like”). He does not make any distinctions as regards equality, however, because there are not many ways in which things are said to be equal, unless perhaps in reference to the various kinds of quantity.

2002. He accordingly gives three ways in which the term same is used. For since same means one in substance, and substance is used of two things, namely, of the supposit itself and of the nature or species of a thing, the term same is used of three things: either (1) of the supposit alone, as this white thing or this musical man, assuming that Socrates is white or musical; or (2) of the nature of the supposit alone, that is, its intelligible expression or species, as Socrates and Plato are the same in terms of humanity; or (3) of both together, as Socrates is the same as Socrates.

2003. Hence, the Philosopher, in giving these three ways in which the term is used, says that the term same is used in many senses. (1) In one sense it means what is numerically the same, which we sometimes express by the term itself, as when we say that Socrates is a man and that he himself is white. For since the pronoun itself is reflexive, and a reflexive term brings back the same supposit, wherever the term itself is used it signifies that the supposit is numerically one and the same.

2004. (2) A thing is said to be the same in another sense if it is one not only by the oneness of the supposit, as this wood and this white thing, but if it is the same both in its intelligible structure and in number, as you are the same as yourself both specifically and materially, inasmuch as matter, which is the principle of individuation is taken for the supposit, and species is taken for the nature of the supposit.

2005. (3) Things are said to be the same in a third sense when “the intelligible structure of the primary substance,” i.e., of the supposit, is one, even though there is not one supposit. And these things are the same specifically or generically but not numerically. He gives an example of this in the case of quantity, according to the opinion of those who claimed that quantities are the substances of things; and according to this opinion many straight lines are regarded as many supposits in the genus of substance, and the measure of a line is considered to be its species. This opinion maintains, then, that many straight lines are one, just as distinct supposits are one which have one specific nature in common. And since mathematicians speak of lines in the abstract, for them many equal straight lines are considered as one. And in a similar fashion many “equal quadrangles,” i.e., figures which have four angles and are equal in size and “equiangular,” i.e., having equal angles, are considered to be the same. And in such things as these equality provides the unity of their specific nature.

2006. Things are “like” (838).

Here he reveals the different ways in which things are said to be like, and there are four of these.

(1) The first corresponds to the third way in which things are the same; for since that is the same which is one in substance, and that is like which is one in quality, the basis of likeness must be related to the basis of sameness as quality to substance. And since he has used equality to designate oneness of substance, he uses figure and proportion to designate quality.

2007. It should also be noted that, since quality and quantity are rooted in substance, it follows that wherever there is oneness of substance there is oneness of quantity and quality, although this oneness or unity does not derive its name from quantity and quality but from something more basic, namely, substance. Hence, wherever there is oneness of substance we do not speak of likeness or of equality but only of identity.

2008. Diversity of substance, then, is required for likeness or equality. This is why he says that some things are said to be like even though they are not absolutely the same as to the species of their substance (provided that they are also not without difference in their underlying subject, which is called the supposit) but are specifically the same in some way. Thus a larger quadrangle is said to be like a smaller one when the angles of one are equal to those of the other and the sides containing the angles are proportional. It is evident, then, that this likeness is viewed from the standpoint of oneness of figure and proportion. And in a similar way many unequal straight lines are not the same in an absolute sense even though they are like.

2009. It can also be noted here that, when there is unity in regard to the complete concept of the species, we speak of identity. But when there is no unity in regard to the whole concept of the species, we speak of likeness; so that if someone says that things which are generically one are like, then those which are specifically one are the same, as the examples given above would seem to indicate. For he said that equal straight lines and equal quadrangles are identical with each other, whereas unequal quadrangles and unequal straight lines are said to be like.

2010. (2) Things are said to be like in a second sense when they have in common one form which admits of difference in degree although they participate in that form without difference in degree; for example, whiteness admits of greater and lesser intensity, so that, if some things are equally white without any difference in degree, they are said to be like.

2011. (3) Things are said to be like in a third sense when they have in common one form or affection but to a greater or lesser degree; for example, a thing which is whiter and one which is less white are said to be like because they have “one form,” i.e., one quality.

2012. (4) Things are said to be like in a fourth sense when they have in common not merely one quality but many, as those things which are said to be like because they agree in more respects than they differ, either in an absolute sense, or in regard to certain particular attributes; for example, tin is said to be like silver because it resembles it in many respects. And similarly fire is like gold, and saffron like red.

2013. It is evident (839).

Here he treats the attributes which naturally accompany plurality. First, he considers unlikeness and diversity; and second (2017), he treats difference ("But different").

He accordingly says, first, that, since the terms same and diverse and like and unlike are opposed to each other, and since the terms same and like are used in many senses, it is evident that the terms diverse and unlike are used in many senses; for when, one of two opposites is used in many senses, the other is also used in many senses, as is said in the Topics, Book I.

2014. But omitting the many senses in which the term unlike is used, since it is quite apparent how the senses of this term are taken in contrast to those of the term like, he gives three senses in which the term diverse, or other, is employed. (1) First, the term diverse refers to everything that is other in contrast to the same; for just as everything that is itself is said to be the same, and this is the relation of identity, in a similar fashion everything that is diverse is said to be other, and this is the relation of diversity. Hence everything is either the same as or other than everything else. (2) Second, the term diverse, or other, is used in another sense when the matter and intelligible structure of things are not one; and in this sense you and your neighbor are diverse. (3) The term is used in a third sense in mathematics, as when unequal straight lines are said to be diverse.

2015. [Objection] And since he had said that everything is either the same as or other than everything else, lest someone think that this is true not only of beings but also of non-beings, he rejects this by saying that everything is either the same as or other than everything else in the case of those things of which the terms being and unity are predicated, but not in the case of those things which are non-beings. For same and diverse are not opposed as contradictory terms, of which one or the other must be true of any being or non-being; but they are opposed as contraries, which are only verified of beings. Hence diversity is not predicated of non-beings. But the phrase not the same, which is the opposite of the same in a contradictory sense, is also used of non-beings. However, same or diverse is used of all beings; for everything that is a being and is one in itself, when compared with something else, is either one with it, and then it is the same, or it is capable of being one with it but is not, and then it is diverse. Diverse and same, then, are opposites.

2016. But if someone were to raise the objection that diversity and sameness do not apply to all beings, since sameness is a natural consequence of oneness of substance, and diversity is a natural consequence of plurality of substance, we should have to answer that, since substance is the root of the other genera, whatever belongs to substance is transferred to all the other genera, as the Philosopher pointed out above regarding quiddity in Book VII (1334).

2017. But "different" (840).

Then he shows how difference and diversity differ. He says that diverse and different mean different things; for any two things which are diverse need not be diverse in some particular respect, since they can be diverse in themselves. This is evident from what has been said above, because every being is either the same as or other than every other being.

2018. But that which differs from something else must differ from it in some particular respect. Hence that by which different things differ must be something that is the same in things which do not differ in this way. Now that which is the same in many things is either a genus or a species. Therefore all things that differ must differ either generically or specifically.

2019. Those things differ generically which have no common matter; for it has been said above, in Book VIII (1697), that although matter is not a genus, still the essential note of a genus is taken from a thing's material constituent; for example, sensory nature is material in relation to the intellectual nature of man. Hence anything that does not possess sensory nature in common with man belongs to a different genus.

2020. And since those things which do not have a common matter are not generated from each other, it follows that those things are generically diverse which are not generated from each other. It was also necessary to add this because of the things which do not have matter, such as accidents, so that those things which belong to different categories are generically diverse, for example, a line and whiteness, neither one of which is produced from the other.

2021. Now those things are said to be specifically diverse which are the same generically and differ in form. And by genus we mean that attribute which is predicated of two things which differ specifically, as man and horse. Moreover, contraries differ, and contrariety is a type of difference.

2022. That this assumption (841).

Then he proves by an induction what he had said above about the formal note whereby things differ, because all things that are different seem to be such that they are not merely diverse but diverse in some particular respect. Some things, for instance, are diverse in genus; some belong to the same category and the same genus but differ in species, and some are the same in species. What things are the same or diverse in genus has been established elsewhere, namely, in Book V of this work (931).

LESSON 5

Contrariety Is the Greatest and Perfect Difference

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842. But since it is possible for things which differ from each other to differ to a greater or lesser degree, there is a greatest difference.

843. And I call this difference contrariety. That this is the greatest difference becomes clear by induction; for things which differ generically cannot pass into each other, but they are too far apart and cannot be compared; and those things which differ specifically arise from contraries as their extremes. But the distance between extremes is the greatest; therefore the distance between contraries is the greatest.

844. Now what is greatest in each class is perfect (or complete); for that is greatest which nothing exceeds, and that is perfect beyond which it is impossible to find anything else; for the perfect difference is an end, just as other things are said to be perfect because they have attained their end. For there is nothing beyond the end, since in every case it is what is ultimate and contains everything else. There is nothing beyond the end, then, and what is perfect needs nothing else. It is therefore clear from these remarks that contrariety is the perfect or complete difference. And since things are said to be contrary in many ways, it follows that difference will belong to contraries perfectly in proportion to the different types of contrariety.

845. Since this is so, it is evident that one thing cannot have many contraries; for there can be nothing more extreme than the extreme (since, if there were, it would be the extreme); nor can there be more than two extremes for one distance.

846. And in general this is evident if contrariety is difference, and difference must be between two things. Hence this will also be true of the perfect difference.

847. And the other formulations of contraries must also be true. For the perfect difference is the greatest, since in the case of things which differ generically it is impossible to find any difference greater than in those which differ specifically; for it has been shown (843) that there is no difference between things in a genus and those outside it, and for those specifically different the perfect difference is the greatest. And contraries are things which belong to the same genus and have the greatest difference; for the perfect difference is the greatest difference between them. And contraries are things which have the greatest difference in the same subject; for contraries have the same matter. And contraries are things which come under the same potency and have the greatest difference; for there is one science of one class of things, and in these the perfect difference is the greatest.

COMMENTARY

2023. Having settled the issue about the one and the many, and about the attributes which naturally accompany them, of which one is contrariety, which is a kind of difference, as has been pointed out (840:C 2021), here the Philosopher explains contrariety, because the investigation of it involves a special difficulty. This is divided into two parts. In the first (842:C 2023) he shows that contrariety is the greatest difference. In the second (887:C 2112) he inquires whether contraries differ generically or specifically (“That which is “).

The first part is divided into two. In the first he settles the issue about contraries. In the second (878:C 2097) he deals with their intermediates (“And since”).

The first part is divided into two. In the first he settles the issue about the nature of contraries. In the second (857:C 2059) he raises certain difficulties about the points which have been established (“But since one thing”).

The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows what contrariety is. In the second (848:C 2036) he establishes what is true of contrariety as compared with the other kinds of opposition (“The primary contrariety”).

In treating the first part he does two things. First, he gives a definition of contrariety. Second (847:C 2032), he reduces all the other definitions which have been assigned to contraries to the one given (“And the other”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the definition of contrariety. Second (844:C 2027), he draws a corollary from this definition (“Now what is”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (842), he shows that there is a greatest difference, as follows: there is some maximum in all things which admit of difference in degree, since an infinite regress is impossible. But it is possible for one thing to differ from something else to a greater or lesser degree. Hence it is also possible for two things to differ from each other to the greatest degree; and therefore there is a greatest difference.

Contrary

2024. And I call (843).

Second, he shows by an induction that contrariety is the greatest difference; for all things which differ must differ either generically or specifically.

Now those things which differ generically cannot be compared with each other, being too far apart to admit of any difference of degree between them. This is understood to apply to those things which are changed into each other, because a certain process or way of change of one thing into another is understood from the fact that at first they differ more and afterwards less, and so on until one is changed into the other. But in the case of things which differ generically we do not find any such passage of one thing into another. Hence such things cannot be considered to differ in degree, and so cannot differ in the highest degree. Thus in things which differ generically there is no greatest difference.

2025. However, in the case of things which differ specifically there must be a greatest difference between contraries, because:’reciprocal processes of generation arise from contraries as their extremes. And an intermediate arises from an extreme or vice versa, or an intermediate also arises from an intermediate, as gray is produced from black or from red. Yet generations of this kind do not arise from two things as extremes; for when something passes from black to gray in the process of generation, it can still pass farther to some color which differs to a greater degree. But when it has already become white, it cannot continue farther to any color which differs to a greater degree from black, and there it must stop as in its extreme state. This is why he says that processes of generation arise from contraries as extremes. But it is evident that the distance between extremes is always the greatest. Hence it follows that contraries have the greatest difference among things which differ specifically.

2026. And since we have shown that things which differ generically are not said to have a greatest difference, although there is a greatest difference, it follows that contrariety is nothing else than the greatest difference.

2027. Now what is greatest (844).

He draws two corollaries from what has been said. The first is that contrariety is the perfect difference. This is proved as follows. What is greatest in any class is the same as what is perfect. This is clear from the fact that that is greatest which nothing exceeds; and that is perfect to which nothing can be added. Hence the difference of the greatest and that of the perfect [from a common referent] are seen to be the same.

2028. That that is perfect to which nothing external can be added is evident, because all things are said to be perfect when they go up to the end. Now there is nothing beyond the end, because the end is what is ultimate in every case and contains the thing. Hence nothing lies beyond the end, nor does what is perfect need anything external, but the whole is contained under its own perfection. Thus it is evident that the perfect difference is one which goes up to the end.

2029. Therefore, since contrariety is the greatest difference, as has already been proved (843:C 2024), it follows that it is the perfect difference. But since things are said to be contrary in many ways, as will be stated later (849:C 2039), not all contraries are said to differ perfectly; but it follows that all contraries differ perfectly in the way in which contrariety belongs to them, i.e., to some primarily and to others secondarily.

2030. Since this is so (845).

Here he gives the second corollary. He says that, since the foregoing remarks are true, it is evident that one thing cannot have many contraries. He proves this in two ways. He does this, first, on the grounds that contrariety is the greatest and perfect difference between extremes. But there can be no more than two extremes of one distance; for we see that one straight line has two end points. Further, there is nothing beyond the extreme. If, then, contrariety is one distance, it is impossible for two things to be equally opposed as extremes to one contrary, or for one to be more contrary and another less so, because whatever is less contrary will not be an extreme but will have something beyond it.

2031. And in general (846).

He now proves the same thing in another way. He says that since contrariety is a kind of difference, and every difference is a difference between two things, then the perfect difference must also be a difference between two things. Thus one thing has only one contrary.

2032. And the other (847).

Next he shows that all the definitions of contraries which have been given are seen to be true on the basis of the definition of contrariety posited above (842:C 2023). He gives “four formulations,” i.e., definitions, of contraries assigned by other thinkers. The first is that contraries are things which have the greatest difference. Now this is seen to be true on the basis of the foregoing definition, since contrariety is the perfect difference, and this causes things to differ most. For it is evident from what has been said that in the case of things which differ generically nothing can be found which differs more than things which differ specifically, because there is no difference as regards those things which lie outside the genus, as has been stated. And of things which differ specifically the greatest difference is between contraries. Hence it follows that contraries are things which differ most.

2033. The second definition is that contraries are attributes which differ to the greatest degree in the same genus. This is also seen to be true on the basis of the foregoing definition, because contrariety is the perfect difference. But the greatest difference between things which belong to the same genus is the perfect difference. Hence it follows that contraries are attributes which have the greatest difference in the same genus.

2034. The third definition is that contraries are attributes which have the greatest difference in the same subject. This is also seen to be true on the basis of the foregoing definition; for contraries have the same matter since they are generated from each other.

2035. The fourth definition is that contraries are attributes which have the greatest difference “under the same potency,” i.e., the same art or science; for science is a rational potency, as has been stated in Book IX (746:C 1789). This definition is also seen to be true on the basis of the foregoing definition, because there is one science of one class of things. Therefore, since contraries belong to the same genus, they must come under the same potency or science. And since contrariety is the perfect difference in the same genus, contraries must have the greatest difference among those things which come under the same science.

LESSON 6

Contrariety Based on Privation and Possession

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848. The primary contrariety is between possession and privation, not every privation (for privation has several meanings), but any which is perfect.

849. And the other contraries are referred to these: some because they possess them, others because they produce or can produce them, and others because they are the acquisitions or losses of them or of other contraries.

850. If, then, the modes of opposition are contradiction, privation, contrariety and relation, and the first of these is contradiction, and there is no intermediate between contradictories whereas there is between contraries, then it is evident that contradiction is not the same as contrariety.

851. And privation is a kind of contradiction; for that which suffers privation, either totally or in some determinate way, is either that which is totally incapable of having some attribute, or that which does not possess it even though it is naturally fitted to do so; for we have already used this term in many senses, which have been distinguished elsewhere (511). Hence privation is a kind of contradiction which is found either in a determinate potency or is conceived along with something that is susceptible of it. And for this reason there is no intermediate in contradiction, although there is an intermediate in one kind of privation; for everything is either equal or not

equal, but not everything is equal or unequal; but this is so only in the ca§e of something susceptible of equality.

852. If, then, the processes of generation in matter start from contraries, and these are produced -either from the form and the possession of the form, or from the privation of some form or specifying principle, it is evident that every contrariet~ will be a kind of privation.

853. But perhaps not every privation is contrariety. And the reason is that whatever suffers privation does so in many ways; for it is the things from which change proceeds as extremes that are contraries.

854. This also becomes evident by induction; for every contrariety has privation as one of its contrary terms, but not all in the same way; for inequality is the privation of equality, unlikeness the privation of likeness, and vice the privation of virtue.

855. And privation differs in the ways we have stated (850); for it has one meaning if a thing is merely deprived of some attribute, and another if it is deprived at a certain time or in a certain part (for example, if this happens at a certain age or in the most important part) or entirely. Hence in some cases there is an intermediate (there is a man who is neither good nor evil) and in others there is not (a number must be either even or odd). Again, some have a definite subject, and others do not. Hence it is evident that one of two contraries is always used in a privative sense.

856. But it is enough if this is true of the primary or generic contraries-one and many; for the others may be reduced to them.

COMMENTARY

2036. Having defined contrariety the Philosopher now compares it with the other kinds of opposition. In regard to this he does two things. First (848:C 2036), he states his thesis, namely, that the basis of contrariety is the opposition between privation and possession. Second (850:C 2040), he proves it (“If, then”).

In regard to the first he does two he states that the basis of contrariety is privation and possession. He says that the primary contrariety is privation and possession because privation and possession are included in every contrariety.

2037. But lest someone should think that the opposition between privation and possession and that between contraries are the same, he adds that not every privation is a contrary; for, as has been pointed out above, the term privation is used in several ways. Sometimes a thing is said to be deprived of something when it does not have in any way what it is naturally fitted to have. However, such privation is not a contrary, because it does not presuppose a positive reality which is opposed to possession, though it does presuppose a definite subject. But it is only that privation which is perfect that is said to be a contrary.

2038. And since privation by its very nature does not admit of difference in degree, a privation can be said to be perfect only by reason of some positive reality which is farther removed from possession. For example, not every privation of white is its contrary, but only that which is farthest removed from white, which must be rooted in some nature of the same genus and farthest removed from white. And according to this we say that black is the contrary of white.

2039. And the other contraries (849).

Second, he explains how the other contraries are derived from this first contrariety. He says that other contraries "are referred to these," namely, to privation and possession, in different ways. For some things are called contraries because they have in themselves privation and possession, for example, such things as white and black, hot and cold; others because they actually cause privation and possession, as things which cause heat and cold, or because they are virtually the active causes of privation and possession, as things capable of heating and cooling. And others are called contraries because they are acquisitions of the attributes mentioned, as the processes of becoming hot and becoming cold, or because they are the losses of these, as the destruction of heat and cold. And others again are called contraries not only because they express the aforesaid relationships to the primary contraries but also because they have the same relationships to subsequent contraries; for example, if we were to say that fire and water are contraries because they have heat and cold, which are called contraries themselves, as we have seen, because they include privation and possession.

Other kinds of opposition

2040. If, then, the modes (850).

Then he proves his thesis, namely, that the primary contrariety is privation and possession; and he does this in two ways: first, by a syllogism; second (2054), by an induction (“This also”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that contrariety is not contradiction. He says that among the four kinds of opposition between two things—(1) contradiction, as sitting is opposed to not-sitting; (2) privation, as blindness is opposed to sight; (3) contrariety, as black is opposed to white; and (4) relation, as a son is opposed to his father—the first is contradiction.

2041. The reason is that contradiction is included in all the other kinds of opposition as something prior and simpler; for in any kind of opposition it is impossible that opposites should exist simultaneously. This follows from the fact that one of two opposites contains the negation of the other in its notion; for example, the notion of blind contains the fact of its not seeing, and the notion of black, of its not being white. And similarly the notion of son contains his not being the father of him of whom he is the son.

2042. Moreover, it is evident that there is no intermediate in contradiction; for one must either affirm or deny, as has been shown in Book IV (725). However, it belongs to contraries to have an intermediate; and thus it is clear that contrariety and contradiction are not the same.

2043. And privation (851).

Then he shows how privation is related to contradiction by indicating the way in which they are alike and that in which they differ. He says that privation is a kind of contradiction; for the term privation is used in one sense when a thing does not have in any way some attribute which it is capable of having, for example, when an animal does not have sight. And this occurs in two ways: (a) first, if it does not have it in any way at all; and (b) second, if it does not have it in some definite respect, for example, at some definite time or in some definite manner, because privation is used in many senses, as has been stated in Books V (1070) and IX (1784).

2044. It is evident from what has been said, then, that privation is a kind of contradiction; and this is shown from the fact that a thing is said to be deprived of something because it does not have it.

2045. That it is not a simple contradiction but one of a sort is evident from the fact that according to its meaning a contradiction requires neither (~) the aptitude nor the existence of any subject; for it may be truly affirmed of any being or non-being whatsoever. Thus we say that an animal does not see, and that wood does not see, and that a non-being does not see.

A privation, however, necessarily (+) requires some subject, and sometimes it also requires aptitude in a subject; for that which is a non-being in every respect is not said to be deprived of anything.

2046. He says, then, that privation "is found either in a determinate potency," i.e., one with a capacity for possessing something, or at least "is conceived along with something that is susceptible of it," i.e., along with a subject, even though it has no capacity for possessing something. This would be the case, for example, if we were to say that a word is invisible, or that a stone is dead.

2047. (~) Contradiction, then, cannot have an intermediate, whereas in a sense (+) privation has an intermediate; for everything must be either equal or not equal, whether it is a being or a non-being. However, it is not necessary to say that everything is either equal or unequal, but this is necessary only in the case of something that is susceptible of equality.

2048. Hence the opposition of contradiction has no intermediate whatsoever, whereas the opposition of privation has no intermediate in a determinate subject; but it is not without an intermediate in an absolute sense. And from this it is evident that contrariety, which is such as to have an intermediate, is closer to privation than to contradiction. Yet it still does not follow that privation is the same as contrariety.

2049. If, then, the processes (852).

Third, it remains to be shown that contrariety is privation, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows by a syllogism that contrariety is privation. He argues as follows: everything from which a process of generation arises is either a form (i.e., the possession of some form) or the privation of some specifying principle (i.e., some form). He says "everything" because generation is twofold. For things are generated absolutely in the genus of substance, but in a qualified sense in the genus of accidents; for generations arise from contraries in matter. Hence it is evident that every contrariety is a privation; for if in any process of generation one of the two extremes is a privation, and each of the contraries is an extreme in the process of generation (because contraries are generated from each other, as white from black and black from white), then one of the two contraries must be a privation.

2050. But perhaps (853).

Here he proves another assertion made above, that not every privation is a contrariety. He says that the reason for this is that there are many ways of being deprived; for a thing that is capable of having a form and does not have it in any way can be said to be deprived of it, and it makes no difference whether it is proximately or remotely disposed for that form.

Now a contrary is always remotely disposed; for contraries are the sources, in the sense of extremes from which changes arise. Hence it was said above (2038) that they are farthest removed from each other. For whether a thing is yellowish or of some other color, it is said to be deprived of whiteness if it is not white. But it is not on that account called a contrary except when it is farthest removed from whiteness, namely, when it is black. Thus it is clear that not every privation is a contrariety.

2051. And since privation requires nothing else than the absence of form (merely presupposing a disposition in a subject without conferring upon that subject any definite disposition through which the subject is close to a form or distant from it), it is evident that privation does not designate any positive reality in a subject, but presupposes a subject with an aptitude. But a contrary requires a definite disposition in a subject, by which it is farthest removed from a form. Therefore it necessarily designates in a subject some positive reality which belongs to the same class as the absent form, as black belongs to the same class as white.

2052. It should also be noted that privation is of two kinds. (1) There is one which has an immediate relationship to the subject of the form (as darkness has an immediate relationship to the transparent medium), and between a privation of this kind and its opposite form there is (+) reciprocal change; for the atmosphere passes from a state of illumination to one of darkness, and from a state of darkness to one of illumination. (2) And there is another kind of privation which is related to the subject of the form only by means of the form, since it has the nature of a corruption of form; for example, blindness is the corruption of sight, and death the corruption of life. In such cases there is no (~) reciprocal change, as has been pointed out in Book IX (1785).

2053. Therefore, since it has been shown here that contrariety is the privation arising from reciprocal change which involves contraries and privation and form, it is clear that contrariety is not the type of privation which is the corruption of a form, but that which has an immediate relation to the subject of the form. Hence the objection raised in the Categories, that it is impossible to revert from privation to possession, does not apply here. But contraries are changed into each other.

2054. This also becomes (854).

Then he shows by induction that contrariety is privation, and he does this in two ways. First, by making an induction from each type of contrary; and second (856:C 2058), by reducing them to a primary kind of contrary ("But it is").

In regard to the first (854) he does two things. First, he shows by an induction that contrariety is privation. He says that the point proved above by a syllogistic argument is also made clear by an induction; for every contrariety is found to include the privation of one of the two contraries, since one of the two is always lacking in the other. Yet one contrary is not found to be the privation of the other in the same way in all types of contraries, as will be stated below (855:C 2055). That one of two contraries is the privation of the other is evident from the fact that inequality is the privation of equality, and unlikeness the privation of likeness, and evil the privation of virtue.

2055. And privation differs (855).

Then he shows that one contrary is the privation of the other in various ways; for this is relative to different types of privation. Now this difference may be considered from two points of view. First, privation can mean either that a thing has been deprived of something in any way at all; or, that it is deprived at some definite time or in some definite way. For example, it is deprived at some definite time if this occurs at some definite age; and it is deprived in some definite part if the privation is found in some important part. Or it may also be "entirely," i.e., in the whole. For a man is said to be senseless if he lacks discretion at a mature age but not as a child. And similarly a person is said to be naked, not if any part of him is uncovered, but if many of his parts or the principal ones are left uncovered.

2056. And because of the various kinds of privation which are included under contrariety it is possible for some contraries to have an intermediate and for some not. For there is an intermediate between good and evil, since a man may be neither good nor evil. For a man is said to be good by reason of virtue, because virtue is what causes its possessor to be good. However, not everyone who lacks virtue is evil; for a boy lacks virtue, yet he is not said to be evil. But if one does not have virtue at an age when he ought to have it, he is then said to be evil. Or if someone also lacks virtue as regards certain insignificant actions and those which, so to speak, make no difference to life, he is not said to be evil, but only if he lacks virtue as to the important and necessary acts of life. But the even and the odd in numbers do not have an intermediate; for a number is said to be odd in the sense that it lacks evenness in any way at all.

2057. The second way in which privations differ is this: one kind of privation has a definite subject of its own, and another kind has not. For it was said above that everything which lacks an attribute, even though it is not naturally such as to have it, is sometimes said to be deprived of it. And according to this difference between privations it is possible for some contraries to have an intermediate or not. For example, we might say that, since man is said to be good with respect to political virtue, if evil, which includes the privation of good, requires a determinate subject, then a rustic who does not participate in civic affairs is neither good nor evil with respect to civic goodness or evil. Hence it is evident from what has been said that one of two contraries is used in a privative sense.

2058. But it is enough (856).

He proves the same point by reducing the other contraries to the primary ones. He says that in order to show that one of two contraries is a privation it is enough if this is found to be true in the case of the primary contraries, which are the genera of the others, for example, one and many.

That these are the primary contraries is evident from the fact that all other contraries are reduced to them; for equal and unequal, like and unlike, same and other, are reduced to one and many. Moreover, difference is a kind of diversity, and contrariety is a kind of difference, as has been said above (2017; 2023). Hence, it is evident that every contrariety is reducible to one and many. But one and many are opposed as the indivisible and the divisible, as has been pointed out above (1983). Therefore it follows that all contraries include privation.

LESSON 7

Opposition of the Equal to the Large and the Small

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 5: 1055b 30-1056b 2

857. But since one thing has one contrary, someone might raise the question how the one is opposed to the many, and how the equal is opposed to the large and the small.

858. For we always use the term whether antithetically, for example, whether it is white or black, or whether it is white or not white. But we do not ask whether it is white or man, unless we are basing our inquiry on an assumption, asking, for example, whether it was Cleon or Socrates that came; but this is not a necessary antithesis in any one class of things. Yet even this manner of speaking came from that used in the case of opposites; for opposites alone cannot exist at the same time. And this manner of speaking is used even in asking the question which of the two came. For if it were possible that both might have come at the same time, the question would be absurd; but even if it were possible, the question would still fall in some way into an antithesis, namely, of the one or the many, for example, whether both came, or one of the two.

859. If, then, the question whether something is such and such always has to do with opposites, and one can ask whether it is larger or smaller or equal, there is some opposition between these and the equal. For it is not

contrary to one alone or to both; for why should it be contrary to the larger rather than to the smaller?

860. Again, the equal is contrary to the unequal. Hence it will be contrary to more things than one. But if unequal signifies the same thing as both of these together, it will be opposed to both.

861. And this difficulty supports those who say that the unequal is a duality.

862. But it follows that one thing is contrary to two; yet this is impossible.

863. Further, the equal seems to be an intermediate between the large and the small; but no contrariety seems to be intermediate, nor is this possible from its definition; for it would not be complete if it were intermediate between any two things, but rather it always has something intermediate between itself and the other term.

864. It follows, then, that it is opposed either as a negation or as a privation. Now it cannot be opposed as a negation or a privation of one of the two; for why should it be opposed to the large rather than to the small? Therefore it is the privative negation of both. And for this reason whether is used of both, but not of one of the two; for example, whether it is larger or equal, or whether it is equal or smaller; but there are always three things.

865. But it is not necessarily a privation; for not everything that is not larger or smaller is equal, but this is true of those things which are naturally capable of having these attributes. Hence the equal is what is neither large nor small but is naturally capable of being large or small; and it is opposed to both as a privative negation.

866. And for this reason it is also an intermediate. And what is neither good nor evil is opposed to both but is unnamed; for each of these terms is used in many senses, and their subject is not one; but more so what is neither white nor black. And neither is this said to be one thing, although the colors of which this privative negation is predicated are limited; for it must be either gray or red or some other such color.

867. Hence the criticism of those people is not right who think that all terms are used in a similar way, so that if there is something which is neither a shoe nor a hand, it will be intermediate between the two, since what is neither good nor evil is intermediate between what is good and what is evil, as though there were an intermediate in all cases. But this does not

necessarily follow. For one term of opposition is the joint negation of things that are opposed, between which there is some intermediate and there is naturally some distance. But between other things there is no difference, for those things of which there are joint negations belong to a different genus. Hence their subject is not one.

COMMENTARY

2059. After having shown what contrariety is, here the Philosopher settles certain difficulties concerning the points established above. In regard to this he does two things. First (857:C 2059), he raises the difficulties; and second (858:C 2060), he solves them (“For we always”).

Now the difficulties (857) stem from the statement that one thing has one contrary; and this appears to be wrong in the case of a twofold opposition. For while the many are opposed to the one the few are opposed to the many. And similarly the equal also seems to be opposed to two things, namely, to the large and to the small. Hence the difficulty arises as to how these things are opposed. For if they are opposed according to contrariety, then the statement which was made seems to be false, namely, that one thing has one contrary.

2060. For we always (858).

Then he deals with the foregoing difficulties; and, first, he examines the difficulty about the opposition between the equal and the large and the small. Second (868:C 2075), he discusses the difficulty about the opposition between the one and the many (“And one might”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues the question dialectically. Second (864:C 2o66), he establishes the truth about this question (“It follows”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues on one side of the question in order to show that the equal is contrary to the large and to the small. Second (862:C 2o64), he argues on the opposite side of the question (“But it follows”).

In regard to the first he gives three arguments. In the first of these he does two things. First, he clarifies a presupposition of the argument by stating that we always use the term whether in reference to opposites; for example, when we ask whether a thing is white or black, which are opposed as contraries; and whether it is white or not white, which are opposed as contradictories. But we do not ask whether a thing is a man or white, unless we assume that something cannot be both a man and white. We then ask whether it is a man or white, just as we ask whether that is Cleon or Socrates coming, on the assumption that both are not coming at the same time. But this manner of asking about things which are not opposites does not pertain to any class of things by necessity but only by supposition. This is so because we use the term whether only of opposites by necessity, but of other things only by supposition; for only things which are opposed by nature are incapable of coexisting. And this is undoubtedly true if each part of the disjunction "whether Socrates or Cleon is coming" is not true at the same time, because, if it were possible that both of them might be coming at the same time, the above question would be absurd. And if it is true that both cannot be coming at the same time, then the above question involves the opposition between the one and the many. For it is necessary to ask whether Socrates and Cleon are both coming or only one of them. And this question involves the opposition between the one and the many. And if it is assumed that one of them is coming, then the question takes the form, whether Socrates or Cleon is coming.

2061. If, then, the question (859).

From the proposition which has now been made clear the argument proceeds as follows: those who ask questions concerning opposites use the term whether, as has been mentioned above. But we use this term in the case of the equal, the large and the small; for we ask whether one thing is more or less than or equal to another. Hence there is some kind of opposition between the equal and the large and the small. But it cannot. be said that the equal is contrary to either the large or the small, because there is no reason why it should be contrary to the large rather than to the small. And again, according to what has been said before, it does not seem that it is contrary to both, because one thing has one contrary.

2062. Again, the equal (860).

He now gives the second argument, which runs thus: the equal is contrary to the unequal. But the unequal signifies something belonging to both the large and the small. Therefore the equal is contrary to both.

2063. And this difficulty (861).

Then he gives the third argument, and this is based on the opinion of Pythagoras, who attributed inequality and otherness to the number two and to any even number, and identity to an odd number. And the reason is that the equal is opposed to the unequal; but the unequal is proper to the number two; therefore the equal is contrary to the number two.

2064. But it follows (862).

Next, he gives two arguments for the opposite opinion. The first is as follows: the large and the small are two things. Therefore, if the equal is contrary to the large and to the small, one is contrary to two. This is impossible, as has been shown above (861:C 2o63).

2065. Further, the equal (863).

He now gives the second argument, which runs thus: there is no contrariety between an intermediate and its extremes. This is apparent to the senses, and it is also made clear from the definition of contrariety, because it is complete difference. But whatever is intermediate between any two things is not completely different from either of them, because extremes differ from each other more than from an intermediate. Thus it follows that there is no contrariety between an intermediate and its extremes. But contrariety pertains rather to things which have some intermediate between them. Now the equal seems to be the intermediate between the large and the small. Therefore the equal is not contrary to the large and to the small.

Equal, large, small

2066. It follows, then (864).

Here he establishes the truth about this question; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that the equal is opposed to the large and to the small in a way different from that of contrariety; and he draws this conclusion from the arguments given above on each side of the question. For the first set of arguments showed that the equal is opposed to the large and to the small, whereas the second showed that it is not contrary to them. It follows, then, that it is opposed to them by some other type of opposition. And after having rejected the type of opposition according to which the equal is referred to the unequal but not to the large and the small, it follows that the equal is opposed to the large and to the small either (1) as their negation or (2) as their privation.

2067. He shows in two ways that in the latter type of opposition the equal is opposed to both of the others (the large and the small) and not merely to one of them. First, he says that there is no reason why the equal should be the negation or the privation of the large rather than of the small, or vice versa. Hence it must be the negation or the privation of both.

2068. He also makes this clear by an example, saying that, since the equal is opposed to both, then when we are making inquiries about the equal we use the term whether of both and not merely of one; for we do not ask whether one thing is more than or equal to another, or whether it is equal to or less than another. But we always give three alternatives, namely, whether it is more than or less than or equal to it.

2069. But it is not necessarily (865).

Second, he indicates the type of opposition by which the equal is opposed to the large and to the small. He says that the particle not, which is contained in the notion of the equal when we say that the equal is what is neither more nor less, does not designate a (~) negation pure and simple but necessarily designates a (+) privation; for a negation pure and simple refers to anything to which its own opposite affirmation does not apply; and this does not occur in the case proposed. For we do not say that everything which is not more or less is equal, but we say this only of those things which are capable of being more or less.

2070. Hence the notion of equality amounts to this, that the equal is what is neither (~) large nor (~) small, but is (+) naturally capable of being either large or small, just as other privations are defined. Thus it is evident that the equal is opposed to both the large and the small as a privative negation.

2071. Third, in concluding his discussion, he shows that the equal is intermediate between the large and the small. In regard to this he does two things. First, he draws his thesis as the conclusion of the foregoing argument. For since it has been said that the equal is what is neither large nor small but is naturally capable of being the one or the other, then anything that is related to contraries in this way is intermediate between them, just as what is neither good nor evil is opposed to both and is intermediate between them. Hence it follows that the equal is intermediate between the large and the small. But there is this difference between the two cases: what is neither large nor small has a name, for it is called the equal, whereas what is neither good nor evil does not have a name.

2072. The reason for this is that sometimes both of the privations of two contraries coincide in some one definite term; and then there is only one intermediate, and it can easily be given a name, as the equal. For by the fact that a thing has one and the same quantity it is neither more nor less. But sometimes the term under which both of the privations of the contraries fall is used in several senses, and there is not merely one subject of both of the privations taken together; and then it does not have one name but either remains completely unnamed, like what is neither good nor evil, and this occurs in a number of ways; or it has various names, like what is neither white nor black; for this is not some one thing. But there are certain undetermined colors of which the aforesaid privative negation is used; for what is neither white nor black must be either gray or yellow or some such color.

2073. Hence the criticism (867).

Then he rejects the criticism which some men offered against the view that what is neither good nor evil is an intermediate between good and evil. For they said that it would be possible on the same grounds to posit an intermediate between any two things whatsoever. Hence he says that, in view of the explanation that things having an intermediate by the negation of both extremes as indicated require a subject capable of being either extreme, it is clear that the doctrine of such an intermediate is unjustly criticized by those who think that the same could therefore be said in all cases (say, that between a shoe and a hand there is something which is neither a shoe nor a hand) because what is neither good nor evil is intermediate between good and evil, since for this reason there would be an intermediate between all things.

2074. But this is not necessarily the case, because this combination of negations which constitute an intermediate belongs to opposites having some intermediate, between which, as the extremes of one genus, there is one distance. But the other things which they adduce, such as a shoe and a hand, do not have such a difference between them that they belong to one distance; because the things of which they are the combined negations belong to a different genus. Negations of this kind, then, do not have one subject; and it is not possible to posit an intermediate between such things.

LESSON 8

Opposition between the One and the Many

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 6:1056b 3-1057a 17

868. And one might raise similar questions about the one and the many. For if the many are opposed absolutely to the one, certain impossible conclusions will follow.

869. For one will then be few or a few; for the many are also opposed to the few. Further, two will be many, since the double is multiple, and the double is so designated in reference to two. Hence one will be few; for in relation to what can two be many, except to one, and therefore few? For nothing else is less than this.

870. Further, if much and little are in plurality what long and short are in length, and if what is much is also many, and what is many is much (unless perhaps there is some difference in the case of an easily-bounded continuum), few will be a plurality. Hence one will be a plurality, if it is few; and this will be necessary if two are many.

871. But perhaps, while many is said in a sense to be much, there is a difference; for example, there is much water but not many waters. But many designates those things which are divided.

872. In one sense much means a plurality which is excessive either absolutely or comparatively; and in a similar way few means a plurality which is deficient; and in another sense it designates number, which is opposed only to one. For it is in this sense that we say one or many, just as if we were to say “one” and in the plural “ones,” as white or whites, or to

compare what is measured with a measure, that is, a measure and the measurable. And it is in this sense that multiples are called such; for each number is called many because it is made up of ones and because each number is measurable by one; and number is many as the opposite of one and not of few. So therefore in this sense even two is many; but it is not such as a plurality which is excessive either absolutely or comparatively; but two is the first few absolutely, for it is the first plurality which is deficient.

873. For this reason Anaxagoras was wrong in speaking as he did when he said that all things were together and unlimited both in plurality and in smallness. He should have said in fewness instead of in smallness; for things could not have been unlimited in fewness, since few is not constituted by one, as some say, but by two.

874. The one is opposed to the many, then, as a measure is opposed to things measurable, and these are opposed as things which are not relative of themselves. But we have distinguished elsewhere (495) the two senses in which things are said to be relative; for some are relative as contraries, and others as knowledge is relative to the knowable object, because something else is said to be relative to it.

875. But nothing prevents one thing from being fewer than something else, for example, two; for if it is fewer, it is not few. And plurality is in a sense the genus of number, since number is many measured by one. And in a sense one and number are opposed, not as contraries but in the way in which we said that some relative terms are opposed; for they are opposed inasmuch as the one is a measure and the other something measurable. And for this reason not everything that is one is a number, for example, anything that is indivisible.

876. But while knowledge is similarly said to be relative to the knowable object, the relation is not similar. For knowledge might seem to be a measure, and its object to be something measured; but the truth is that while knowledge is knowable, not all that is knowable is knowledge, because in a way knowledge is measured by what is knowable.

877. And plurality is contrary neither to the few (though the many is contrary to this as an excessive plurality to a plurality which is exceeded), nor to the one in every sense; but they are contrary in the way we have described, because the one is as something indivisible and the other as

something divisible. And in another sense they are relative as knowledge is relative to the knowable object, if plurality is a number and the one is a measure.

COMMENTARY

2075. Having treated the question which he had raised regarding the opposition of the equal to the large and to the small, here the Philosopher deals with the question ‘concerning the opposition of the one to the many. In regard to this he does two things. First (868:C 2075), he debates the question. Second (871:C 2080), he establishes the truth (“But perhaps”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he gives the reason for the difficulty. He says that, just as there is a difficulty about the opposition of the equal to the large and to the small, so too the difficulty can arise whether the one and the many are opposed to each other. The reason for the difficulty is that, if the many without distinction are opposed to the one, certain impossible conclusions will follow unless one distinguishes the various senses in which the term many is used, as he does later on (871:C 2080).

2076. For one will (869).

He then proves what he had said; for he shows that, if the one is opposed to the many, the one is few or a few. He does this by two arguments, of which the first is as follows. The many are opposed to the few. Now if the many are opposed to the one in an unqualified sense and without distinction, then, since one thing has one contrary, it follows that the one is few or a few.

2077. The second argument runs thus. Two things are many. This is proved by the fact that the double is multiple. But the many are opposed to the few. Therefore two are opposed to few. But two cannot be many in relation to a few except to one; for nothing is less than two except one. It follows, then, that one is a few.

2078. Further, if much (870).

Then he shows that this—one is a few—is impossible; for one and a few are related to plurality as the long and the short are to length; for each one of these is a property of its respective class. But any short thing is a certain length. Hence every few is a certain plurality. Therefore if one is a few, which it seems necessary to say if two are many, it follows that one is a plurality.

2079. The one, then, will not only be much but also many; for every much is also many, unless perhaps this differs in the case of fluid things, which are easily divided, as water, oil, air and the like which he calls here an easily-bounded continuum; for fluid things are easily limited by a foreign boundary. For in such cases the continuous is also called much, as much water or much air, since they are close to plurality by reason of the ease with which they are divided. But since any part of these is continuous, that is said to be much (in the singular) which is not said to be many (in the plural). But in other cases we use the term many only when the things are actually divided; for if wood is continuous we do not say that it is many but much; but when it becomes actually divided we not only say that it is much but also many. Therefore in other cases there is no difference between saying much and many, but only in the case of an easily-bounded continuum. Hence, if one is much, it follows that it is many. This is impossible.

2080. But perhaps (871).

Here he solves the difficulty which he had raised; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that much is not opposed to one and to a few in the same way. Second (874:C 2087), he shows how the many and the one are opposed ("The one").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he solves the proposed difficulty; and second (873:C 2o84),in the light of what has been said he rejects an error ("For this reason").

And since he had touched on two points above, in the objection which he had raised, from which it would seem to follow that it is impossible for much to be many and for many to be opposed to a few, he therefore first of all makes the first point clear. He says that perhaps in some cases the term many is used with no difference from the term much. But in some cases, namely, in that of an easily-bounded continuum, much and many are taken in a different way, for example, we say of one continuous volume of water that there is much water, not many waters. And in the case of things which are actually divided, no matter what they may be, much and many are both used indifferently.

Many & few, one & many

2081. In one sense (872).

Then he explains the second point: how the many and the few are opposed. He says that the term many is used in two senses. First, it is used in the sense of a plurality of things which is excessive, either (1) in an absolute sense or in comparison with something.

(a) It is used in an absolute sense when we say that some things are many because they are excessive, which is the common practice with things that belong to the same class; for example, we say much rain when the rainfall is above average. It is used in comparison with something when we say that ten men are many compared with three. And in a similar way a few means “a plurality which is deficient,” i.e., one which falls short of an excessive plurality.

2082. (b) The term much is used in an absolute sense in a second way when a number is said to be a plurality; and in this way many is opposed only (+) to one, but not (~) to a few. For many in this sense is the plural of the word one; and so we say one and many, the equivalent of saying one and ones, as we say white and whites, and as things measured are referred to what is able to measure. For the many are measured by one, as is said below (2087). And in this sense multiples are derived from many. For it is evident that a thing is said to be multiple in terms of any number; for example, in terms of the number two it is double, and in terms of the number three it is triple, and so on. For any number is many in this way, because It is referred to one, and because anything is measurable by one. This happens insofar as many is opposed to one, but not insofar as it is opposed to few.

2083. Hence two things, which are a number, are many insofar as many is opposed to one; but insofar as many signifies an excessive plurality, two things are not many but few; for nothing is fewer than two, because one is not few, as has been shown above (2078). For few is a plurality which has some deficiency. But the primary plurality which is deficient is two. Hence two is the first few.

2084. For this reason (873).

In the light of what has been said he now rejects an error. For it should be noted that Anaxagoras claimed that the generation of things is a result of separation. Hence he posited that in the beginning all things were together in a kind of mixture, but that mind began to separate individual things from that mixture, and that this constitutes the generation of things. And since, according to him, the process of generation is infinite, he therefore claimed that there are an infinite number of things in that mixture. Hence he said that before all things were differentiated they were together, unlimited both in plurality and in smallness.

2085. And the claims which he made about the infinite in respect to its plurality and smallness are true, because the infinite is found in continuous quantities by way of division, and this infinity he signified by the phrase in smallness. But the infinite is found in discrete quantities by way of addition, which he signified by the phrase in plurality.

2086. Therefore, although Anaxagoras had been right here, he mistakenly abandoned what he had said. For it seemed to him later on that in place of the phrase in smallness he ought to have said in fewness; and this correction was not a true one, because things are not unlimited in fewness. For it is possible to find a first few, namely, two, but not one as some say. For wherever it is possible to find some first thing there is no infinite regress. However, if one were a few, there would necessarily be an infinite regress; for it would follow that one would be many, because every few is much or many, as has been stated above (870:C 2078). But if one were many, something would have to be less than one, and this would be few, and that again would be much; and in this way there would be an infinite regress.

2087. The one (874).

Next, he shows how the one and the many are opposed; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that the one is opposed to the many in a relative sense. Second (2096), he shows that an absolute plurality is not opposed to few.

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that the one is opposed to the many relatively. He says that the one is opposed to the many as a measure to what is measurable, and these are opposed relatively, but not in such a way that they are to be counted among the things which are relative of themselves. For it was said above in Book V (1026) that things are said to be relative in two ways: for some things are relative to each other on an equal basis, as master and servant, father and son, great and small; and he says that these are relative as contraries; and they are relative of themselves, because each of these things taken in its quiddity is said to be relative to something else.

2088. But other things are not relative on an equal basis, but one of them is said to be relative, not because it itself is referred to something else, but because something else is referred to it, as happens, for example, in the case of knowledge and the knowable object. For what is knowable is called such relatively, not because it is referred to knowledge, but because knowledge is referred to it. Thus it is evident that things of this kind are not relative of themselves, because the knowable is not said to be relative of itself, but rather something else is said to be relative to it.

2089. But nothing prevents (875).

Then he shows how the one is opposed to the many as to something measurable. And because it belongs to the notion of a measure to be a minimum in some way, he therefore says, first, that one is fewer than many and also fewer than two, even though it is not a few. For if a thing is fewer, it does not follow that it is few, even though the notion of few involves being less, because every few is a certain plurality.

2090. Now it must be noted that plurality or multitude taken absolutely, which is opposed to the one which is interchangeable with being, is in a sense the genus of number; for a number is nothing else than a plurality or multitude of things measured by one.

Hence one, (1) insofar as it means an indivisible being absolutely, is interchangeable with being; but (2) insofar as it has the character of a measure, in this respect it is limited to some particular category, that of quantity, in which the character of a measure is properly found.

2091. And in a similar way (1) insofar as plurality or multitude signifies beings which are divided, it is not limited to any particular genus. But (2) insofar as it signifies something measured, it is limited to the genus of quantity, of which number is a species.

Hence he says that number is plurality measured by one, and that plurality is in a sense the genus of number.

2092. He does not say that it is a genus in an (~) unqualified sense, because, just as being is not a genus properly speaking, neither is the one which is interchangeable with being nor the plurality which is opposed to it. But it is (+) in some sense a genus, because it contains something belonging to the notion of a genus inasmuch as it is common.

2093. Therefore, when we take the one which is the principle of number and has the character of a measure, and number, which is a species of quantity and is the plurality measured by one, the one and the many are not opposed as contraries, as has already been stated above (1997) of the one which is interchangeable with being and of the plurality which is opposed to it; but they are opposed in the same way as things which are relative, i.e., those of which the term one is used relatively. Hence the one and number are opposed inasmuch as the one is a measure and number is something measurable.

2094. And because the nature of these relative things is such that one of them can exist without the other, but not the other way around, this is therefore found to apply in the case of the one and number. For wherever there is a number the one must also exist; but wherever there is a one there is not necessarily a number. For if something is indivisible, as a point, we find the one there, but not number.

But in the case of other relative things, each of which is said to be relative of role of something measured; for in a itself, one of these does not exist without the other; for there is no master without a servant, and no servant without a master.

2095. But while (876).

Here he explains the similarity between the relation of the knowable object to knowledge and that of the one to the many. He says that, although knowledge is truly referred to the knowable object in the same way that number is referred to the one, or the unit, it is not considered to be similar by some thinkers; for to some, the Protagoreans, as has been said above (1800), it seemed that knowledge is a measure, and that the knowable object is the thing measured. But just the opposite of this is true; for it has been pointed out that, if the one, or unit, which is a measure, exists, it is not necessary that there should be a number which is measured, although the opposite of this is true. And if there is knowledge, obviously there must be a knowable object; but if there is some knowable object it is not necessary that there should be knowledge of it. Hence it appears rather that the knowable object has the role of a measure, and knowledge the sense knowledge is measured by the knowable object, just as a number is measured by one; for true knowledge results from the intellect apprehending a thing as it is.

2096. And plurality (877).

Then he shows that an absolute plurality or multitude is not opposed to a few. He says that it has been stated before that insofar as a plurality is measured it is opposed to the one as to a measure, but it (~) is not opposed to a few. However, much, in the sense of a plurality which is excessive, (+) is opposed to a few in the sense of a plurality which is exceeded.

Similarly a plurality is not opposed to one in a single way but in two. (1) First, it is opposed to it in the way mentioned above (2081), as the divisible is opposed to the indivisible; and this is the case if the one which is interchangeable with being and the plurality which is opposed to it are understood universally. (2)Second, plurality is opposed to the one as something relative, just as knowledge is opposed to its object. And this is the case, I say, if one understands the plurality which is number, and the one which has the character of a measure and is the basis of number.

LESSON 9

The Nature of Contraries

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878. And since there can be an intermediate between contraries, and some contraries admit of intermediates, intermediates must be composed of contraries

879. For all intermediates and the things of which they are the intermediates belong to the same genus. For we call those things intermediates into which some thing undergoing change must first change; for example, if one should pass from the top-string note to the bottom-string note, assuming that the passage is made through the intervening register, he will first come to the intermediate sounds. And the same thing is true in the case of colors; for if one will pass from white to black, he will first come to purple and to gray before he comes to black; and it is similar in the case of other things. But it is not possible except accidentally for a change to take place from one genus to another, for example, from color to figure. Hence intermediates and the things of which they are the intermediates must belong to the same genus.

880. But all intermediates are intermediates between certain things that are opposed; for it is only from these that change in the strict sense can arise. And for this reason there cannot be intermediates between things that are not opposed; for otherwise there would be a change which is not from opposites.

881. For the opposites involved in contradiction admit of no intermediates, for this is what contradiction is: an opposition of which one or the other part applies to anything whatever and which does not have an intermediate. But of other opposites some are relative, some privative, and some contrary. And between those terms that are relative and not contrary there is no intermediate. The reason is that they do not belong to the same genus; for what is the intermediate between knowledge and the knowable object? There is an intermediate, however, between the large and the small.

882. Now if intermediates belong to the same genus, as we have shown (879), and are intermediates between things that are contrary, they must be composed of these contraries.

883. For there will be some genus of these contraries or there will not. And if there is some genus such that it is something prior to the contraries, there will be contrary differences prior to the species, constituting them as contrary species of the genus; for species are composed of genus and differences. Thus, if white and black are contraries and the one is an expanding color and the other a contracting color, the differences “expanding” and “contracting” will be prior. Hence these things that are contrary to each other will be prior. But contrary differences are more truly contrary [than contrary species].

884. And the other species, the intermediate ones, will be composed of genus and differences; for example, all colors intermediate between white and black must be defined by a genus (which is color) and by differences. But these differences will not be the primary contraries; and if this were not the case, every color would be either white or black. Hence the intermediate species are different from the primary contraries.

885. And the primary differences will be “expanding” and “contracting,” because these are primary. Moreover, it is necessary to investigate those contraries which belong to the same genus and to discover the things of which their intermediates are composed. For things belonging to the same genus must either be composed of things that are incomposite in the same genus, or must be incomposite in themselves. For contraries are not composed of each other, and thus are principles; but either all intermediates are incomposite, or none of them are. But something comes about from contraries. Hence change will affect this before reaching the contraries, for it will be less than one contrary and greater than the other, and thus this will

be an intermediate between the contraries. All the other intermediates, then, are composites; for that intermediate which is greater than one contrary and less than the other is composed in a sense of these contraries of which it is said to be greater than one and less than the other. And since there are no other things belonging to the same genus which are prior to the contraries, all intermediates will be composed of contraries. All inferiors, then, both contraries and intermediates, must be composed of the primary contraries.

886. Hence it is evident that all intermediates belong to the same genus; that they are intermediates between contraries; and that they are composed of contraries.

COMMENTARY

2097. Having expressed his views about contraries, the Philosopher now does the same thing with regard to the intermediates between contraries; and concerning this he does two things. First (878:C 2097), he indicates what his plan is. He says that, since there can be an intermediate between contraries, as has been shown above (850:C 2042), and some contraries have an intermediate, it is necessary to show that intermediates are composed of contraries. He not only does this but also proves certain points needed for this proof.

INTERMEDIARIES OF CONTRARIES

2098. For all intermediates (879).

Then he carries out his plan; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that intermediates belong to the same genus as contraries. Second (2101), he shows that there are intermediates only between contraries ("But all intermediates"). Third (2098), he establishes his main thesis, that intermediates are composed of contraries ("Now if intermediates").

He accordingly says, first, that all intermediates belong to the same class as the things of which they are the intermediates. He proves this by pointing out that intermediates are defined as that into which a thing undergoing change from one extreme to another first passes.

2099. He makes this clear by two examples. First, he uses the example of sounds; for some sounds are low and some are high and some are intermediate. And strings on musical instruments are distinguished by this distinction of sounds; for those strings which yield low pitched sounds are called “top-strings” because they are the basic ones, and those which yield high pitched sounds are called “bottom-strings.” Hence, if a musician wishes to proceed step by step from low sounds to high ones, and so to pass through an intermediate register, he must first come to the intermediate sounds. Second, he makes this clear by using colors. For if a thing is changed from white to black, it must first pass through the intermediate colors before it reaches black. The same thing is true of other intermediates.

2100. It is evident, then, that change passes from intermediates to extremes and the reverse. But things belonging to diverse genera are changed into each other only accidentally, as is clear with regard to color and figure; for a thing is not changed from color to figure or vice versa, but from color to color, and from figure to figure. Hence intermediates and extremes must belong to the same genus.

2101. But all intermediates (880).

Here he shows that intermediates stand between contraries; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that intermediates must stand between opposites. Second (881:C 2102), he indicates the kind of opposites between which they stand, namely, contraries (“For the opposites”).

He accordingly says, first (880), that all intermediates must stand between opposites. He proves this as follows: changes arise, properly speaking, only from opposites, as is proved in Book I of the Physics; for properly speaking a thing changes from black to white; and what is sweet comes from black only accidentally inasmuch as it is possible for something sweet to become white. But intermediates stand between things which are changed into each other, as is evident from the definition of intermediates given above (879:C 2098). Therefore it is impossible that intermediates should not stand between opposites; otherwise it would follow that change would not proceed from opposites.

2102. For the opposites (881).

Then he indicates the kinds of opposites that can have intermediates. He says that there cannot be any intermediates whatsoever between the opposite terms of a contradiction; for contradictory opposition is such that one part of it must belong to any type of subject, whether it be a being or a non-being. For we must say that any being or non-being either is sitting or is not sitting. Thus it is evident that contradictories have no intermediate.

2103. But in the case of other opposites some involve relations, some privation and form, and some contraries. Now of opposites which are relative, some are like contraries which are related to each other on an equal basis, and these have an intermediate. But some do not have the character of contraries, for example, those which are not related to each other on an equal basis, as knowledge and a knowable object; and these do not have an intermediate. And the reason is that intermediates and extremes belong to the same genus. But these things do not belong to the same genus, since the one is related in itself, as knowledge, but the other is not, as the knowable object. How, then, can there be an intermediate between knowledge and the knowable object? But there can be "an intermediate" between the large and the small, and this is the equal, as has been stated above (881:C 2io2). The same thing is true of those things which are related to each other as contraries. He does not mention how things which are opposed privatively have an intermediate or how they do not, and how this opposition somehow pertains to contrariety, because he has explained these points above (851-3:C 2043-53).

2104. Now if intermediates (882).

Third, he proves the point that constitutes his main thesis. He says that, if intermediates belong to the same genus as extremes, as has been shown (879:C 2098), and if again there are intermediates only between contraries, as has also been shown (882:C 2104), then intermediates must be composed of the contraries between which they stand.

2105. For there will (883).

Then he proves his thesis; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he proves that contrary species have prior contraries of which they are composed. He proceeds as follows: there must either be a genus of contraries or not. But if there is no genus of contraries, contraries will not have an intermediate; for there 4 an intermediate only between those things which belong to one genus, as is evident from what has been said. But if those contraries which are assumed to have an intermediate have some genus which is prior to the contraries themselves, there must also be different contraries prior to contrary species, which make and constitute contrary species from this one genus. For species are constituted of genus and differences.

2106. He makes this clear by an example. If white and black belong to contrary species and have one genus, color, they must have certain constitutive differences, so that white is a color capable of expanding vision, and black is a contracting color. Therefore the differences “contracting” and “expanding” are prior to white and to black. Hence, since in each case there is a contrariety, it is evident that some contraries are prior to others; for contrary differences are prior to contrary species; and they are also contrary to a greater degree because they are causes of the contrariety in these species.

2107. However, it must be understood that, while “expanding” and “contracting” as referred to vision are not true differences which constitute white and black, but rather are their effects, still they are given in place of differences as signs of them, just as differences and substantial forms are sometimes designated by accidents. For the expansion of vision comes from the strength of the light, whose fullness constitutes whiteness. And the contraction of vision has as its cause the opposite of this.

2108. And the other (884).

He shows too that intermediate species have prior intermediates of which they are composed. He says that, since intermediates are species of the same genus, and all species are constituted of genus and differences, intermediates must be constituted of genus and differences; for example, any colors that are intermediate between white and black must be defined by their genus, color’ and by certain differences; and these differences of which intermediate colors are composed cannot be the immediate “primary contraries,” i.e., the differences which constitute the contrary species of white and black. Again, any color must be intermediate between white and black; for black is a contracting color and white an expanding color. Hence the differences which constitute intermediate colors must differ according to the different contraries which are constitutive of contrary species. And since differences are related to differences as species are to species, then just as intermediate colors are intermediate species between contrary species, in a similar fashion the differences which constitute them must be intermediate between the contrary differences which are called primary contraries.

2109. And the primary (885).

Then he shows that intermediate differences are composed of contrary differences. He says that primary contrary differences are those which can expand and contract sight, so that these differences constitute a primary type of which we compose every species of a genus. But if certain contraries did not belong to the same genus, we would still have to consider of which of these contraries the intermediates would be composed. This is not difficult to understand in the case of those things which belong to the same genus, because all things belonging to the same genus "must either be incomposite," i.e., simple things, or they must be composed "of incomposites," i.e., of simple things, which belong to the same genus. For contraries are not composed of each other, because white is not composed of black, nor black of white; nor is the contracting composed of the expanding or the reverse. Hence contraries must be principles, because the simple things in any genus are the principles of that genus.

2110. But it is necessary to say that all intermediates are composed either "of simple things," i.e., of contraries, or they are not, because the same reasoning seems to apply to all. But it cannot be said that they are not, because there is an intermediate which is composed of contraries, and according to this it is possible for change to first affect intermediates before it affects extremes. This becomes evident as follows: that in which change first occurs admits of difference in degree in relation to the two extremes; for something becomes slightly white or slightly black before it becomes completely white or completely black; and it is what is less white that becomes plain white, and what is less black that becomes plain black. And it also comes closer to white than to plain black, and closer to black than to plain white. Thus it is evident that the thing which change first affects admits of difference in degree in relation to both extremes; and for this reason contraries must have an intermediate. It follows, then, that all intermediates are composed of contraries; for the same intermediate which is more and less in relation to both extremes must be composed of both unqualified extremes, in reference to which it is said to be more and less. And since there are no extremes which are prior to contraries in the same genus, it follows that the two contrary differences which constitute intermediates are composed of contrary differences. Thus intermediates must come from contraries. This is evident because "all inferiors," i.e., all species of a genus, both contraries and intermediates, are composed of primary contraries, i.e., differences.

2111. Hence it is evident (886).

He brings his discussion to a close by summarizing what has been said above about intermediates. This part of the text is clear.

LESSON 10

How Contraries Differ in Species

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1057b 35-1058a 28

887. That which is differentiated specifically differs from something, and it must be in both of the things which differ; for example, if animal is differentiated into species, both must be animals (840). Hence those things which differ specifically must belong to the same genus; for by genus I mean that by which both things are said to be one and the same, and which does not involve an accidental difference, whether it is conceived as matter or in some other way. For not only must the common attribute belong to both, for example, that both are animals, but animal itself must also be different in such things; for example, the one must be a horse and the other a man. This common attribute, then, must be specifically different in each. Therefore the one will be essentially this kind of animal and the other that kind of animal; for example, the one will be a horse and the other a man. Thus it is necessary that this difference be a difference of the genus; for by a difference of a genus I mean the difference which makes the genus itself different.

888. Therefore this will be contrariety; and this also becomes clear by an induction; for all things are distinguished by opposites.

889. And it has been shown (843) that contraries belong to the same genus; for contrariety was shown to be the perfect difference (844). And every difference in species is something of something. Hence this is the same for both and is their genus. Thus all contraries which differ

specifically and not generically are contained in the same order of the categories (840, and they differ from each other to the greatest degree; for the difference between them is a perfect one, and they cannot be generated at the same time. The difference, then, is contrariety; for this is what it means to differ specifically, namely, to have contrariety and to belong to the same genus while being undivided. And all those things are specifically the same which do not have contrariety while being undivided; for contrarieties arise in the process of division and in the intermediate cases before one reaches the things which are undivided.

890. It is evident, then, regarding what is called the genus, that none of the things which agree in being species of the same genus are either specifically the same as the genus or specifically different from it; for matter is made known by negation, and the genus is the matter [of that of which it is considered to be the genus]; not in the sense that we speak of the genus (or race) of the Heraclidae, but in the sense that genus is found in a nature (524); nor is it so with reference to things that do not belong to the same genus; but they differ from them in genus, and things that differ specifically differ from those that belong to the same genus. For a contrariety must be a difference, but it need not itself differ specifically. To differ specifically, however, pertains only to things that belong to the same genus.

COMMENTARY

2112. Because the Philosopher has shown above (840:C 2107) that contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference is either generic or specific, his aim here is to show how contraries differ generically and specifically. This is divided into two parts. In the first (887:C 2112) he shows that difference in species is contrariety. In the second (891:C 2127) he shows how this does not apply in the case of some contraries (“But someone”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he shows that the difference which causes difference in species belongs essentially to the same genus as the attribute which divided the nature itself of the genus into different species. Second (888:C 2120), he shows that this is proper to contrariety ("Therefore this will"). Third (890:C 2124), he draws a corollary from what has been said ("It is evident").

He accordingly says, first (887), that wherever there is difference in species two things must be considered, namely, that one thing differs from something else, and that there is something which is differentiated by these two. And that which is differentiated by these two must belong to both; for example, animal is something divided into various species, say, man and horse; and both of these, man and horse, must be animals. It is evident, then, that things which differ specifically from each other must belong to the same genus.

2113. For that which is one and the same for both and is not predicated of each accidentally or differentiated into each accidentally is called their genus. Hence it must have a difference which is not accidental whether the genus is assumed to have the nature of matter or is taken in some other way.

2114. Now he says this because matter is differentiated in one way by form, and genus is differentiated in another way by differences; for form is not matter itself but enters into composition with it. Hence matter is not the composite itself but is something belonging to it. But a difference is added to a genus, not as part to part, but as whole to whole; so that the genus is the very thing which is the species, and is not merely something belonging to it. But if it were a part, it would not be predicated of it.

2115. Yet since a whole can be named from one of its own parts alone, for example, if a man is said to be headed or handed, it is possible for the composite itself to be named from its matter and form. And the name which any whole gets from its material principle is that of the genus. But the name which it gets from its formal principle is the name of the difference. For example, man is called an animal because of his sensory nature, and he is called rational because of his intellective nature. Therefore, just as "handed" belongs to the whole even though the hand is a part, in a similar way genus and difference refer to the whole even though they are derived from the parts of the thing.

2116. If in the case of genus and difference, then, one considers the principle from which each is derived, the genus is related to differences as matter is to forms. But if one considers them from the viewpoint of their designating the whole, then they are related in a different way. Yet this is common to both, namely, that just as the essence of matter is divided by forms, so too the nature of a genus is divided by differences. But both differ in this respect, that, while matter is contained in both of the things divided, it is not both of them. However, the genus is both of them; because matter designates a part, but the genus designates the whole.

2117. Therefore in explaining his statement that a genus is that by which both of the things which differ specifically are said to be one and the same, he adds that, not only must the genus be common to both of the things which differ specifically (as, for instance, both are animals) as something which is undivided is common to different things, just as a house and a possession are the same, but the animal in both must differ, so that this animal is a horse and that animal is a man.

2118. He says this against the Platonists, who claimed that there are common separate natures in the sense that the common nature would not be diversified if the nature of the species were something else besides the nature of the genus. Hence from what has been said he concludes against this position that whatever is common is differentiated specifically. lience the common nature in.itself, for example, animal, must be this sort of animal with one difference, and that sort of animal with another difference, so that the one is a horse and the other is a man. Thus if animal in itself is this and that sort of animal, it follows that the difference which causes difference in species is a certain difference of the genus. And he explains the diversification of a genus which makes a difference in the generic nature itself.

2119. Now what the Philosopher says here rules out not only the opinion of Plato, who claimed that one and the same common nature exists of itself, but also the opinion of those who say that whatever pertains to the nature of the genus does not differ specifically in different species, for example, the opinion that the sensory soul of a man does not differ specifically from that in a horse.

2120. Therefore this will (888).

Then he shows that the difference which divides the genus essentially in the foregoing way is contrariety. He says that, since the specific difference divides the genus essentially, it is evident that this difference is contrariety.

He makes this clear, first, by an induction; for we see that all genera are divided by opposites. And this must be so; for those things which are not opposites can coexist in the same subject; and things of this kind cannot be different, since they are not necessarily in different things. Hence anything common must be divided by opposites alone.

2121. But the division of a genus into different species cannot come about by way of the other kinds of opposites. For things which are opposed as contradictories do not belong to the same genus, since negation posits nothing. The same is true of privative opposites, for privation is nothing else than negation in a subject. And relative terms, as has been explained above (881:C 2103), belong to the same genus only if they are in themselves relative to each other and are in a sense contraries, as has been stated above (ibid.). It is evident, then, that only contraries cause things belonging to the same genus to differ specifically.

2122. And it has (889).

Then he proves the same point by an argument. He says that contraries belong to the same genus, as has been shown (883:C 2105). For it has been pointed out (844:C 2027-29) that contrariety is the perfect difference; and it has also been stated (889) that difference in species is "something of something," i.e., from something. And besides this it has been noted (887:C 2112) that the same genus must belong to both of the things which differ specifically. Now from these two considerations it follows that all contraries are contained in the same "order of the categories," i.e., in the same classification of predicates, yet in such a way that this is understood of all contraries which differ specifically but not generically. He says this in order to preclude the corruptible and the incorruptible, which are later said to differ generically.

2123. And contraries not only belong to one genus but they also differ from each other. This is evident, for things which differ perfectly as contraries are not generated from each other at the same time. Therefore, since difference in species requires identity of genus and the division of the genus into different species, and since both of these are found in contrariety, it follows that difference in species is contrariety. This is evident because in order for things in the same genus to differ specifically they must have contrariety of differences "while being undivided," i.e., when they are not further divided into species, as the lowest species. And these are said to be undivided inasmuch as they are not further divided formally. But particular things are said to be undivided inasmuch as they are not further divided either formally or materially. And just as those things are specifically different which have contrariety, so too those things are specifically the same which do not have contrariety, since they are not divided by any formal difference. For contrarieties arise in the process of division not only in the highest genera but also in the intermediate ones, “before one reaches the things which are undivided,” i.e., the lowest species. It is accordingly evident that, even though there is not contrariety of species in every genus, there is contrariety of differences in every genus.

2124. It is evident (890).

Here he draws a corollary from what has been said, namely, that none of the things which agree in being species of the same genus are said to be either specifically the same as the genus or specifically different from it; for things which are said to be specifically the same have one and the same difference, whereas things which are said to be specifically different have opposite differences. Hence, if any species is said to be specifically the same as the genus or specifically different from it, it follows that the genus will contain some difference in its definition. But this is false.

2125. This is made evident as follows: matter “is made known by negation, i.e., the nature of matter is understood by negating all forms. And in a sense genus is matter, as has been explained (887:C 2113-15); and we are now speaking of genus in the sense that it is found in the natures of things, and not in the sense that it applies to men, as the genus (or race) of the Romans or of the Heraclidae. Hence it is clear that a genus does not have a difference in its definition.

2126. Thus it is evident that no species is specifically different from its genus, nor is it specifically the same as its genus. And similarly things that do not belong to the same genus do not differ specifically from each other, properly speaking, but they do differ generically. And things that differ specifically differ from those that belong to the same genus; for a contrariety is the difference by which things differ specifically, as has been explained (888:C 2120)—not that the contrariety itself of the differences need differ specifically, even though contraries differ specifically; but contrariety is found only in those things that belong to the same genus. It follows, then, that to differ specifically does not properly pertain to things that belong to different genera.

LESSON 11

The Nature of Specific Difference

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1058a 2-9-1058b 26

891. But someone might raise the question why woman does not differ specifically from man, since male and female are opposites, and their difference is a contrariety; and why a female and a male animal do not differ specifically, although this difference belongs to animal in itself, and not as whiteness or blackness does; but it is both male and female inasmuch as it is animal. And this question is almost the same as the question why one contrariety causes things to differ specifically and another does not, for example, why “capable of walking” and “capable of flying” do this, but whiteness and blackness do not.

892. And the reason may be that the former are proper affections of the genus and the latter are less so. And since one [principle of a thing] is its intelligible structure and the other is matter, all those contrarieties in the intelligible structur’e of a thing cause difference in species, whereas those which are conceived with matter do not. And for this reason neither the whiteness nor blackness of man causes this. Nor do white man and black man differ specifically, even if each is designated by a single name. For inasmuch as man is considered materially, matter does not cause a difference; for individual men are not species of man for this reason, even though the flesh and bones of which this man and that man are composed are distinct. The concrete whole is other but not other in species because there is no contrariety in its intelligible structure. This is the ultimate and

indivisible species. But Callias is the intelligible structure with matter; and a white man is also, because it is Callias who is white. But man is white accidentally. Hence a brazen circle and a wooden one do not differ specifically; for a brazen triangle and a wooden circle differ specifically not because of their matter but because there is contrariety in their intelligible structure. And the question arises whether matter, differing in a way itself, does not cause specific difference, or there is a sense in which it does. For why is this horse specifically different from this man, even though matter is included in their intelligible structure? Is it because contrariety is included in their intelligible structure? For white man and black horse differ specifically, but they do not do so inasmuch as the one is white and the other is black, since even if both were white they would still differ specifically.

893. However, male and female are proper affections of animal, but are not such according to its substance but in the matter or body. It is for this reason that the same sperm by undergoing some modification becomes a male or a female.

894. What it is to be specifically different, then, and why some things are specifically different and others not, has been stated.

COMMENTARY

2127. Since the Philosopher has already shown that contrariety constitutes difference in species, here he indicates the kinds of things in which contrariety does not constitute difference in species; and this is divided into two parts. In the first (891:C 2127), he shows that there are contraries which do not cause difference in species but belong to the same species. In the second (895:C 2136), he indicates what the contraries are which cause things to differ in genus and not merely in species (“But since contraries”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises a question. Second (892:C 2131), he answers it (“And the reason”).

He accordingly says, first (891), that the question arises why woman does not differ specifically from man, since female and male are contraries, and difference in species is caused by contrariety, as has been established (887:C 2112).

2128. Again, since it has been shown that the nature of a genus is divided into different species by those differences which are essential to the genus, the question also arises why a male and a female animal do not differ spegifically, since male and female are essential differences of animal and are not accidental to animal as whiteness and blackness are; but male and female are predicated of animal as animal just as the even and the odd, whose definition contains number, are predicated of number; so that animal is given in the definition of male and female.

2129. Hence the first question presents a difficulty for two reasons: both because contrariety causes difference in species, and because the differences that divide a genus into different species are essential differences of the genus. Both of these points have been proved above (887:C 2112).

2130. And since he had raised this question in certain special terms, he reduces it to a more general form. He says that this question is almost the same as asking why one kind of contrariety causes things to differ in species and another does noi; for capabilities of walking and of flying, i.e., having the power to move about and to fly, cause animals to differ specifically, but whiteness and blackness do not.

2131. And the reason (892).

Here he answers the question that was raised, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he answers the question in a general way with reference to the issue to which he had reduced the question. Second (893:C 2134), he adapts the general answer to the special terms in which he had first asked the question ("However, male and female").

He accordingly says (892) that one kind of contrariety can cause difference in species and another cannot, because some contraries are the proper affections of a genus, and others are less proper. For, since genus is taken from matter, and matter in itself has a relation to form, those differences which are taken from the different forms perfecting matter are the proper differences of a genus. But since the form of the species may be further multiplied to become distinct things by reason of designated matter, which is the subject of individual properties, the contrariety of individual accidents is related to a genus in a less proper way than the contrariety of formal differences. Hence he adds that, since the composite contains matter and form, and the one "is the intelligible structure," i.e., the form, which constitutes the species, and the other is matter, which is the principle' of individuation, all those “contraries in the intelligible structure,” i.e., all which have to do with the form, cause difference in species, whereas those contrarieties which have to do with matter and are proper to the individual thing, which is taken with matter, do not cause difference in species.

2132. Hence whiteness and blackness do not cause men to differ specifically; for white man and black man do not differ specifically, even if a one-word name were given to each of them, say, “white man” were called A and “black man” were called B. He adds this because “white man” does not seem to be one thing, and the same is true of “black man.” Hence he says that “white man” and “black man” do not differ specifically, because man, i.e., a particular man, to whom both white and black belong, serves as matter; for man is said to be white only because this man is white. Thus since a particular man is conceived along with matter, and matter does not cause difference in species, it. follows that this particular man and that particular man do not differ specifically. For many men are not many species of man on the grounds that they are many, since they are many only by reason of the diversity of their matter, i.e., because the flesh and bones of which this man and that man are composed are different. But “the concrete whole,” i.e., the individual constituted of matter and form, is distinct; yet it is not specifically different because there is no contrariety as regards form. But this, namely, man, is the ultimate individual from the viewpoint of species, because the species is not further divided by a formal division. Or this, namely, the particular thing, is the ultimate individual, because it is not further divided either by a material difference or a formal one. But while there is no contrariety in distinct individuals as regard form, nevertheless there is a distinction between particular individuals; because a particular thing, such as Callias, is not a form alone but a form with individuated matter. Hence, just as difference of form causes difference of species, so too otherness in individual matter causes difference of individuals. And white is predicated' of man only by way of the individual; for man is said to be white only because some particular man, such as Callias, is said to be white. Hence it is evident that man is said to be white accidentally, because a man is said to be white, not inasmuch as he is man, but inasmuch as he is this man. And this man is called “this” because of matter. Thus it is clear that white and black do not pertain to the formal difference of man but only to his material difference. Therefore “white man” and “black man” do not differ specifically, and neither do a bronze circle and a wooden circle differ specifically. And even those things which differ specifically do not do so by reason of their matter but only by reason of their form. Thus a bronze triangle and a wooden circle do not differ specifically by reason of their matter but because they have a different form.

2133. If one were to ask, then, whether matter somehow causes difference in species, the answer would seem to be that it does, because this horse is specifically different from this man, and it is no less evident that the notion of each contains individual matter. Thus it appears that matter somehow causes difference in species.—But on the other hand it is also evident that this does not come about by reason of any difference in their matter, but because there is contrariety with regard to their form. For “white man” and “black horse” differ specifically, yet they do not do so by reason of whiteness and blackness; for even if both were white they would still differ specifically. It appears, then, that the kind of contrariety which pertains to form causes difference in species, but not the kind which pertains to matter.

2134. However, male and female (893).

Next he adapts the general answer which he has given to the special terms in reference to which he first raised the question, namely, male and female. He says that male and female are proper affections of animal, because animal is included in the definition of each. But they do not pertain to animal by reason of its substance or form, but by reason of its matter or body. This is clear from the fact that the same sperm insofar as it undergoes a different kind of change can become a male or a female animal; because, when the heat at work is strong, a male is generated, but when it is weak, a female is generated. But this could not be the case or come about if male and female differed specifically; for specifically different things are not generated from one and the same kind of sperm, because it is the sperm that contains the active power, and every natural agent acts by way of a determinate form by which it produces its like. It follows, then, that male and female do not differ formally, and that they do not differ specifically.

2135. What it is (894).

Here he sums up what has been said. This is clear in the text.

LESSON 12

The Corruptible and the Incorruptible Differ Generically

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1058b 26-1959a 14

895. But since contraries differ (or are other) specifically, and since corruptible and incorruptible are contraries (for privation is a definite incapacity), the corruptible and incorruptible must differ generically.

896. Now we have already spoken of these general terms. But, as will be seen, it is not necessary that every incorruptible thing should differ specifically from every corruptible thing, just as it is not necessary that a white thing should differ specifically from a black one. For the same thing can be both at the same time if it is universal; for example, man can be both white and black. But the same thing cannot be both at the same time if it is a singular; for the same man cannot be both white and black at the same time, since white is contrary to black.

897. But while some contraries belong to some things accidentally, for example, those just mentioned and many others, some cannot; and among these are the corruptible and the incorruptible. For nothing is corruptible accidentally. For what is accidental is capable of not belonging to a subject; but incorruptible is a necessary attribute of the things in which it is present; otherwise one and the same thing will be both corruptible and incorruptible, if it is possible for corruptibility not to belong to it. The corruptible, then, must either be the substance or belong to the substance of each corruptible

thing. The same also holds true for the incorruptible, for both belong necessarily to things. Hence insofar as the one is corruptible and the other' incorruptible, and especially on this ground, they are opposed to each other. Hence they must differ generically.

898. It is clearly impossible, then, that there should be separate Forms as some claim; for in that case there would be one man who is corruptible and another who is incorruptible. Yet the separate Forms are said to be specifically the same as the individuals, and not in an equivocal sense; but things which differ generically are different to a greater degree than those which differ specifically.

COMMENTARY

2136. After having shown what contraries do not cause things to differ specifically, here the Philosopher explains what contraries cause things to differ generically. In regard to this he does three things. First (895:C 2136), he establishes the truth. Second (896:C 2138), he rejects the false opinion of certain men ("Now we have already"). Third (898:C 214.3), he draws a corollary from his discussion ("It is clearly"). He accordingly first of all (895) lays down two premises necessary for the proof of his thesis. The first of these is that contraries are formally different, as was explained above (888:C 2.120).

Corruptible & incorruptible are generically different.

2137. The second premise is that the corruptible and the incorruptible are contraries. He proves this from the fact that the incapacity opposed to a definite capacity is a kind of privation, as has been stated in Book IX (1784). Now privation is a principle of contrariety; and therefore it follows that incapacity is contrary to capacity, and that the corruptible and the incorruptible are opposed as capacity and incapacity.

But they are opposed in a different way. For if capacity is taken (1) according to its general meaning, as referring to the ability to act or to be acted upon in some way, then the term corruptible is used like the term capacity, and the term incorruptible like the term incapacity. (2) But if the term capacity is used of something inasmuch as it is incapable of undergoing something for the worse, then contrariwise the term incorruptible is referred to capacity, and the term corruptible is referred to incapacity.

2137a. But although it seems necessary from these remarks to conclude that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ specifically, he concludes that they differ generically. And this is true because, just as form and actuality pertain to the species, so too matter and capacity pertain to the genus. Hence, just as the contrariety which pertains to form and actuality causes difference in species, so too the contrariety which pertains to capacity or potency causes difference in genus.

2138. Now we have already (896).

Here he rejects the false opinion of certain men; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives this opinion. Second (997:C 213()), he shows that it is false ("But while some").

He accordingly says, first (896), that the proof which was given above regarding the corruptible and the incorruptible is based on the meaning of these universal terms, i.e., inasmuch as one signifies a capacity and the other an incapacity. But, as it seems to certain men, it is not necessary that the corruptible and the incorruptible should differ specifically, just as this is not necessary for white and black, because it is admissible for the same thing to be both white and black, although in different ways. For if what is said to be white and black is something universal, it is white and black at the same time in different subjects. Thus it is true to say that man is at the same time both white, because of Socrates, and black, because of Plato. But if it is a singular thing, it will not be both white and black at the same time (although it can now be white and afterward black) since white and black are contraries. Thus some say that some things can be corruptible and some incorruptible within the same genus, and that the same singular thing can sometimes be corruptible and sometimes incorruptible.

2139. But while some (897).

Here he rejects the foregoing opinion. He says that some contraries belong accidentally to the things of which they are predicated, as white and black belong to man, as has been mentioned already (892:C 2131); and there are many other contraries of this kind in reference to which the view stated is verified, i.e., that contraries can exist simultaneously in the same species and successively in the same singular thing. But there are other contraries which are incapable of this, and among these are the corruptible and the incorruptible.

2140. For corruptible does not belong accidentally to any of the things of which it is predicated, because what is accidental is capable of not belonging to a thing. But corruptible belongs necessarily to the things in which it is present. If this were not so it would follow that the very same thing would sometimes be corruptible and sometimes incorruptible; but this is naturally impossible. (However, this does not prevent the divine power from being able to keep some things which are corruptible by their very nature from being corrupted.)

2141. Since the term corruptible, then, is not an accidental predicate, it must signify either the substance of the thing of which it is predicated or something belonging to the substance; for each thing is corruptible by reason of its matter, which belongs to its substance. The same argument applies to incorruptibility, because both belong to a thing necessarily. Hence it is evident that corruptible and incorruptible are opposed as essential predicates, which are predicated of a thing inasmuch as it is a thing of this kind, as such and primarily.

2142. And from this it necessarily follows that the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically; for it is evident that contraries which belong to one genus do not belong to the substance of that genus; for "rational" and "irrational" do not belong to the substance of animal. But animal is the one or the other potentially. And whatever genus may be taken, corruptible and incorruptible must pertain to its intelligible make-up. It is impossible, then, that they should have a common genus. And this is reasonable, for there cannot be a single matter for both corruptible and incorruptible things. Now speaking from the viewpoint of the philosophy of nature, genus is taken from the matter; and thus it was said above (890:C 2125) that things which do not have a common matter are other or different in genus. But speaking from the viewpoint of logic, nothing prevents them from having the same common genus inasmuch as they have one common definition, either that of substance or of quality or of quantity or something of this sort.

2143. It is clearly impossible (898).

Next he draws a corollary from his discussion, namely, that there cannot be separate Forms as the Platonists claimed; for they maintained that there are two men: a sensible man who is corruptible, and a separate man who is incorruptible, which they called the separate Form or Idea of man. But the separate Forms or Ideas are said to be specifically the same as individual things, according to the Platonists. And the name of the species is not predicated equivocally of the separate Form and of singular things, although the corruptible and the incorruptible differ even generically. And those things which differ generically are more widely separated than those which differ specifically.

2144. Now it must be observed that although the Philosopher has shown that some contraries do not cause things to differ specifically, and that some cause things to differ even generically, none the less all contraries cause things to differ specifically in some way if the comparison between contraries is made with reference to some definite genus. For even though white and black do not cause difference in species within the same genus of animal, they do cause difference in species in the genus of color. And male and female cause difference in species in the genus of sex. And while living and nonliving cause difference in genus in reference to the lowest species, still in reference to the genus which is divided essentially into living and non-living they merely cause difference in species. For all differences of a genus constitute certain species, although these species can differ generically.

2145. But corruptible and incorruptible divide being essentially, because that is corruptible which is capable of not being, and that is incorruptible which is incapable of not being. Hence, since being is not a genus, it is not surprising if the corruptible and the incorruptible do not have a common genus. This brings our treatment of Book X to a close.

BOOK XI

RECAPITULATION ON THE NATURE AND SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS. MOTION

LESSON 1

Metaphysics Is the Science of Principles

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1059a 18-1060a 2

899. That wisdom is a science of principles, then, is evident from the first chapters (45-143) of this work, in which problems were raised concerning the statements of other philosophers about the principles of things.

900. But one might raise the question whether wisdom must be understood to be one science or many (181, 190). For if it is one, then the objection might be raised that one science always deals with contraries; but principles are not contraries. And if it is not one but many, what kind of sciences must they be assumed to be (190-197)?

901. Further, one might raise the question whether it is the office of one science or of many to study the principles of demonstration? For if it is the office of one science, why should it be the office of this science rather than of another? And if it is the office of many, what kind of sciences must these be admitted to be (198-201)?

902. Further, there is the question whether it is the office of wisdom to deal with all substances or not (182)? And if not with all, it is difficult to say with what kind it does deal. But if there is one science of all substances, the problem arises how one science can deal with many subjects (202-204).

903. Again, there is the question whether this science is a demonstration of substances alone, or also of accidents (184, 205-207); for if it is a demonstration of accidents, it is not a demonstration of substances. But if there is a different science of accidents, what is the character of each, and

which of the two is wisdom? For a demonstrative science of accidents is wisdom; but that which deals with primary things is the science of substances.

904. But the science which we are seeking must not be assumed to be the one which deals with the causes mentioned in the Physics. For it does not deal with the final cause, because such is the good, and this is found in the sphere of practical affairs and in things which are in motion. And it is the first thing which causes motion (for the end is such a nature); but there is no first mover in the realm of immobile things (192).

905. And in general there is the question whether the science which is now being sought is concerned with sensible substances, or whether it is not concerned with these but with certain others (183). For, if it deals with other substances, it must be concerned with either the separate Forms or with the objects of mathematics. Now it is evident that separate Forms do not exist.

906. But nevertheless even if one were to assume that these separate Forms exist, the problem would arise why the same thing should not be true of the other things of which there are Forms as is true of the objects of mathematics. I mean that they place the objects of mathematics between the Forms and sensible things as a kind of third class of entities besides the Forms and the things which exist here. But there is no third man or horse over and above man-in-himself and horse-in-itself and singular men and horses.

907. If, however, the situation is not as they say, with what kind of things must the mathematician be assumed to deal? For he is not concerned with the things which exist here, because none of these are the kind of things which the mathematical sciences study. Nor is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the objects of mathematics; for no one of these is capable of existing separately. Nor does it deal with sensible substances, for these are corruptible (208-219).

9o8. And in general one might raise the question to what science it belongs to consider the problem about the matter of the mathematical sciences (627). It is not the office of the philosophy of nature, for this science is wholly concerned with things which have in themselves a principle of rest and of motion. Nor is it the office of the science which investigates demonstration and scientific knowledge, for it is about this class of things that it makes its investigations. It follows, then, that it pertains to the philosophy which we have proposed to investigate these things.

909. And one might raise the question whether the science which is now being sought must deal with the principles which are called elements by some thinkers (184). But all men suppose these to be present in composite things. And it would seem rather that the science which is now being sought ought to deal with universals, for every intelligible nature and every science is of universals and not of extremes (228), so that in this way they would deal with the primary genera.

910. And these would become being and unity; for these most of all might be thought to contain all existing things and to be principles in the highest degree, because they are first by nature; for when they have been destroyed, everything else is destroyed, since everything is a being and one. But if one supposes them to be genera, then inasmuch as it is necessary for differences to participate in them, and no difference participates in a genus, it would seem that they must not be regarded either as genera or as principles.

911. Further, if what is more simple is more of a principle than what is less simple, and the ultimate members resulting from the subdivision of different genera are more simple than the genera themselves (for these members are indivisible, whereas genera are divided into many different species), it would seem that species are principles to a greater degree than genera. But since species are involved in the destruction of their genera, genera are like principles to a greater degree; for whatever involves something else in its destruction is a principle of that thing (229-234). These and other such points, then, are the ones which cause difficulties.

COMMENTARY

2146. Because the particular sciences disregard certain things which should be investigated, there must be a universal science which examines these things. Now such things seem to be the common attributes which naturally belong to being in general (none of which are treated by the particular sciences since they do not pertain to one science rather than to another but to all in general) and to the separate substances, which lie outside the scope of every particular science. Therefore, in introducing us to such knowledge, Aristotle, after he has investigated these attributes, begins to deal particularly with the separate substances, the knowledge of which constitutes the goal to which the things studied both in this science and in the other sciences are ultimately directed.

Now in order that a clearer understanding of the separate substances may be had, Aristotle first (899:C 2146) makes a summary of the points discussed both in this work and in the Physics' which are useful for knowing the separate substances. Second (1055:C 2488), he investigates the separate substances in themselves (in the middle of the following book: "Since there are").

The first part is divided into two. In the first he summarizes the points which act as a preface to the study of substances. In the second (1023:C 2416) he restates the things that pertain to the study of substances (at the beginning of the following book: "The study here").

He prefaced his study of substances by doing three things. First, he raised the questions given in Book 111, which he now restates under the first point of discussion. Second (924:C 2194), he expressed his views about the things that pertain to the study of this science. These are given in Book IV and are restated here under the second point of discussion ("Since the science"). Third (963:C 2268), he drew his conclusions about imperfect being, i.e., accidental being, motion, and the infinite, about which he had partly established the truth in Books II (152:C 299) and VI (543-59:C 1171-1244) of this work, and partly in Book III of the Physics; and he gives a summary restatement of these under the third point of discussion ("Since the term being").

The first part is divided into two. First, he raises a question about the study of this science; and second (912:C 2173), about the things established in this science ("Further, there is").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he asks in what way the study of this science is concerned with principles and substances. Second (904: C 2156), he asks with what principles and what substances it deals ("But the science").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises questions about the study of the principles of this science; and second (902:C 2152), about this science's study of substances ("Further, there is the question").

In treating the first point (899) he does three things. First, he assumes that the inveselgations of this science are concerned with principles. He says that it is evident from Book I (45-143:C 93-272), in which he argued against the statements that other philosophers have made about the first principles of things, that wisdom is a science of principles. For it was shown in the Prologue to this work that wisdom considers the highest and most universal causes, and that it is the noblest of the sciences.

2147. But one might (900).

Second, he raises a question about the study of the principles by this science which is called wisdom. He says that one can ask whether wisdom, which considers principles, must be one science or many.

2148. However, if we say that it is one, this seems to be inconsistent, because many of the things studied in one science are contraries, since one contrary is the basis for knowing the other, and thus both contraries seem to fall under one art. But since the principles of things are many, they are not contraries, otherwise they could not be combined in one subject. Hence, wisdom, which is concerned with principles, does not seem to be one science. And if it is not one science but many, it is impossible to state what these sciences are.

2149. Now the truth of the matter is that, while wisdom is one science, it considers many principles inasmuch as they are reduced to one genus, because contraries fall under one science since they belong to one genus.

2150. Further, one might (901).

Third, he raises a question about the study which this science makes of the principles of demonstration. He says that it is still a problem whether the study of the principles of demonstration (for example, every whole is greater than one of its parts, and the like) belongs to the study of one science or many. If one claims that such a study belongs to one science, it seems difficult to explain why it belongs to this science rather than to another, since all sciences make common use of these principles. But if one claims that it belongs to many sciences, it seems difficult to give many sitch sciences.

2151. Now the truth of the matter is that there is one science which is chiefly concerned with these principles, and this is the one which investigates the common terms involved in these principles, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and the like; and the other sciences receive such principles from this science.

2152. Further, there is (902).

Then he raises questions about this science's study of substances; and there are two of these. First, he asks whether or not this science considers all substances. If one claims that it does not, it is difficult to indicate what substances it does consider and what not. And if one claims that it considers all substances, the question remains how one and the same science can deal with many substances, since each science treats of one thing.

2153. The truth is that, although this science deals especially with the separate substances, it does treat all substances inasmuch as all belong to one common class of essential being.

2154. Again, there is (903).

Second, he asks whether there is demonstration only with regard to substances or also with regard to accidents; for, if demonstration, properly speaking, were concerned with accidents, there would be no demonstration with regard to substances, since it is the function of demonstration to infer the essential accidents of substances. But if one claims that there is one demon. strative science of substances and an. other of essential accidents, the question remains as to which science each of these is, and whether each is worthy of the name of wisdom. For, on the one hand, it does seem that the science which deals with accidents is wisdom, because demonstration is properly concerned with accidents, and demonstrative science is the most certain. Thus it seems that wisdom, which is a demonstrative science, deals with accidents But, on the other hand, it seems to deal with substances; for since substances are the primary kind of being, it seems that the science which treats of them is the primary science.

2155. Now the truth is that wisdom considers both substances and accidents inasmuch as they have being in common, which constitutes the subject of wisdom; but its demonstrations are concerned chiefly with substances, which are the primary kind of essential beings, and of these it demonstrates the accidents.

2156. But the science (904).

Then he raises more specific questions about the study of this science. First (904:C 2156), he asks about the substances which this science considers; and second (909:C 2166), about the principles which it considers ("And one might").

In treating the first point he raises four questions. The first (904) has to do with the causes of sensible substances. He says that it does not seem that we should hold that the science which we are seeking is concerned with the four classes of causes discussed in the Physics, because it seems to deal especially with the final cause, which is the most important of all. But this science does not seem to deal with "the final cause," or goal, because an end or goal has the nature of the good. Now the good relates to operations and to things which are in motion. Hence in the case of immovable things, such as the objects of mathematics, nothing is demonstrated by way of the final cause. It is also evident that the end is what first moves a thing, for it moves the efficient cause. But there does not seem to be a first cause of motion in the case of immovable things.

2157. Now the truth of the matter is that this science considers the classes of causes mentioned, especially the formal and final cause. And furthermore, the end, which is the first cause of motion, is altogether immovable, as will be shown below (1069:C 2526).

2158. And in general (905).

Second, he raises a question about the study of sensible substances. He asks whether this science is concerned with sensible substances or not. For if it is concerned with them, it does not seem to differ from the philosophy of nature. But if it is concerned with other substances, it is difficult to state what these substances are. For it must deal with either "the separate Forms," i.e., the Ideas, which the Platonists posited, or with the objects of mathematics, which some supposed to exist as an intermediate class of things between the Ideas and sensible substances, for example, surfaces, lines, figures and the like. But it is evident from the previous books that "separate Forms do not exist," i.e., separate Ideas; and so he immediately raises the question about the objects of mathematics.

2159. Now the true answer to this question is that this science deals with sensible substances inasmuch as they are substances, but not inasmuch as they are sensible and movable; for this latter belongs properly to the philosophy of nature. But the proper study of this science has to do with substances which are neither Ideas nor separate mathematical entities but primary movers, as will be seen below (1055:C 2488).

2160. But nevertheless (906).

Third, he raises a third difficulty as a secondary issue. For, since he had said that there are evidently no separate Forms, he poses the question whether the objects of mathematics are separate. First, he shows that they are not. For if one claims that there are separate Forms and separate mathematical entities over and above sensible substances, why is not the same thing true of all things which have Forms as is true of the objects of mathematics? So that just as the objects of mathematics are assumed “ to be intermediate between the separate Forms and sensible substances as a third class of things over and above the separate Forms and the singular things which exist here (for example, a mathematical line over and above the Form of a line and the perceptible line), in a similar fashion there should be a third man and a third “horse over and above man-in-himself and horse-in-itself” (i.e., the ideal man and the ideal horse, which the Platonists called Ideas) and individual men and horses. But the Platonists did not posit intermediates in such cases as these but only in that of the objects of mathematics.

2161. If, however (907).

Then he argues on the other side of the question; for, if the objects of mathematics are not separate, it is difficult to indicate the things with which the mathematical sciences deal. For they do not seem to deal with sensible things as such, because no lines and circles such as the mathematical sciences investigate are found in sensible things. It seems necessary to hold, then, that there are certain separate lines and circles.

2162. Now the truth of the matter is that the objects of mathematics are not separate from sensible things in being but only in their intelligible structure, as has been shown above in Book VI (537:C 1162) and will be considered below (919:C 2185).

2163. And since he had interjected as a secondary issue this difficulty about the separateness of the objects of mathematics because he had said that forms evidently are not separate, therefore when he says, “Nor is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the objects of mathematics,” he returns to the main question that was raised, namely, with what kind of substances this science deals. And since he had shown that it does not deal with separate Forms (for there are no separate Forms), he now shows by the same reasoning that it does not deal with the objects of mathematics; for neither are they separate in being. And it does not seem to deal with sensible substances, because these are destructible and in motion.

2164. The true answer to this question is the one given above.

2165. And in general one might (908).

Then he gives a fourth difficulty by asking to what science it belongs "to consider the problems about the matter of the mathematical sciences," i.e., to investigate the things with which the mathematical sciences are concerned. This does not pertain to the philosophy of nature, because it is wholly concerned with those things which have in themselves a principle of rest and of motion and are called natural beings. Therefore he does not examine this problem. Similarly, the investigation of this problem does not seem to belong to that science which is called mathematical, which has as its aim the demonstration and knowledge of mathematical entities; for this kind of science presupposes matter of this sort or a subject of this sort, and some science does investigate this subject. It follows, then, that it is the business of this philosophical science to consider the things of which the mathematical sciences treat.

2166. And one might (909).

Then he asks what kind of principles this science investigates. In regard to this he raises three questions. First, he asks whether this science studies the principles which are called elements by some thinkers. This question seems to refer to the common supposition that principles of this kind are present in, i.e., intrinsic to, the composite, so that in order to know composite things these principles must be known. But from another point of view it seems that this science is concerned with more universal things, because every intelligible nature and every science seems to be "of universals and not of extremes," i.e., not about the particular things in which the division of common genera terminates. Thus it seems that this science has to do especially with the first genera.

2167. But the truth is that this science deals chiefly with common attributes, yet without making the common factors principles in a Platonic sense. However, it does consider the intrinsic principles of things—matter and form.

2168. And these would (910).

Second, he raises the second problem. For, on the one hand, it seems that unity and being are principles and genera, because these most of all seem to contain all things within their general ambit. And they seem to be principles because they are first by nature; for when they are destroyed, other things are too; for everything is a being and one. Hence, if being and unity are destroyed, everything else is destroyed, but not the other way around.

2169. But, on the other hand, it seems that unity and being are not genera, and therefore they are not principles if genera are principles. For no difference participates actually in a genus, because difference is derived from form and genus from matter; for example, rational is taken from intellective nature, and animal from sensory nature. Now form is not included actually in the essence of matter, but matter is in potentiality to form. And similarly difference does not belong to the nature of a genus, but a genus contains differences potentially. And for this reason a difference does not participate in a genus, because, when I say “rational,” I signify something having reason. Nor does it belong to the intelligibility of rational that it should be animal. Now that is participated in which is included in the intelligibility of the thing which participates; and for this reason it is said that a difference does not participate in a genus. But there cannot be any difference whose intelligibility does not contain unity and being. Hence unity and being cannot have any differences. Thus, they cannot be genera, since every genus has differences.

2170. Now the truth of the matter is that unity and being are not genera but are common to all things analogically.

2171. Further, if what (911).

Then he raises the third question. The problem now is whether genera are principles to a greater degree than species. First, he shows that species are principles to a greater degree than genera; for what is more simple is a principle to a greater degree. But species seem to be more simple, for they are the indivisible things in which the formal division of a genus terminates. But genera are divided into many different species, and therefore species seem to be principles to a greater degree than genera. But in view of the fact that genera constitute species, and not vice versa, genera seem to be principles to a greater degree; for the intelligible structure of a principle is such that, when it is destroyed, other things are destroyed.

2172. Now the truth is that universals are principles, namely, of knowing; and thus genera are principles to a greater degree because they are simpler. The reason why they are divided into more members than species are is that they contain more members potentially. But species contain many members actually. Hence they are divisible to a greater degree by the method of dissolving a composite into its simple constituents.

LESSON 2

Are There Non-Sensible Substances and Principles?

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 2: 1060a 3-1060b 3

912. Further, there is the question whether or not we must posit the existence of something besides singular things; and if not, then the science which we are now seeking must deal with these things. But they are infinite in number. And what exists apart from singular things are genera and species; but the science which we are now seeking deals with neither of these. The reason why this is impossible has already been stated (909-911).

913. And in general the problem is whether one must suppose that there is some substance which is separable from sensible substances (i.e., the things which exist here and now), or that the latter are beings and the things with which wisdom deals. For we seem to be looking for another kind of substance, and this constitutes the object of our study: I mean, to know whether there is something which is separable in itself and belongs to no sensible thing.

914. Further, if there is another kind of substance apart from sensible substances, from what kind of sensible substances must it be assumed to be separate? For why should we suppose that it exists apart from men and from horses rather than from other animals or non-living things generally? Yet to devise various eternal substances equal in number to sensible and corruptible ones would seem to be unreasonable.

915. But if the principle we are now seeking is not separable from bodies, what could be more of a principle of things than matter? Yet matter does not exist actually but only potentially; and thus it would seem rather that the specifying principle or form is a more important principle than matter. But the form is corruptible [according to some]; and so in general there is no eternal substance which is separate and exists of itself. But this is absurd; for such a principle and substance seems to exist and is sought by almost all accomplished thinkers as something that exists. For how will there be order in the world if there is not a principle which is eternal, separable and permanent (235-246)?

916. Again, if there is some substance and principle of such a nature as that now being sought, and this one principle belongs to everything and is one and the same for both corruptible and eternal things, the question arises why it is, if this principle is the same for all, that some of the things which come under it should be eternal and some not; for this is absurd. But if all corruptible things have one principle, and eternal things another, we shall face the same problem if the principle of corruptible things is eternal; for if it is eternal, why are not the things which fall under this principle also eternal? But if it is corruptible, it in turn must have some other principle, and this again must have another, and so on to infinity (250-265).

917. But on the other hand, if one were to posit those principles which are thought to be the most unchangeable, namely, being and unity, then, first, if each of these does not signify a particular thing or a substance, how will they be separable and exist of themselves? Yet the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking must be such. But if each of these does signify a particular thing or a substance, all beings will be substances; for being is predicated of all things, and unity is predicated of some. But it is false that all beings are substances.

918. Again, how can the statement of those be true who say that unity is the first principle and a substance, and who generate number as the first thing produced from the unit and matter and say that it is substance? For how are we to understand that the number two and each of the other numbers composed of units is one? For they say nothing about this, nor is it easy to do so.

919. But if someone maintains that lines and what is derived from these (I mean surfaces) are the first principles of things, these are not separable

substances but sections and divisions; the former of surfaces, and the latter of bodies (and points are the sections and divisions of lines); and further they are the limits of these same things. And all of these exist in other things, and none are separable.

920. Again, how are we to understand that the unit and the point have substance. For every substance is generated but not the point; for the point amounts to a division (266-283).

921. There is also the problem that, while every science must be about universals and about such and such a universal, a substance is not a universal but is rather a particular and separable thing. Hence, if there is a science of principles, how are we to understand substance to be a principle (288-293) ?

922. Again, the question arises whether or not there is any principle apart from the concrete whole? And by this I mean the matter and what is joined to it. For if not, then everything that is in matter is corruptible. But if there is some principle, it must be the specifying principle or form. Therefore it is difficult to determine in what cases this exists apart and in what not; for in some cases it is evident that the form is not separable, for example, in that of a house (235-247).

923. Again, there is the question whether principles are the same specifically or numerically? For if they are the same numerically, all things will be the same (248-249).

COMMENTARY

2173. Having raised a question about the study of this science, Aristotle now raises a question about the things which are considered in this science. He does this, first (912:C 2173), with regard to substances; and second (916:C 2180), with regard to principles (“Again, if”).

In treating the first issue he raises two questions. First, he asks whether or not it is necessary to posit the existence of something else in reality over and above singular things. Now if one claims that it is not, then it seems to follow that the science which we are now investigating must be concerned with singular things. But this seems to be impossible, because singular things are infinite in number, and the infinite is unknowable. And if one claims that it is necessary to posit the existence of something apart from singular things, they must be genera or species; and then this science would deal with genera and species. First, he explains why this is impossible; for it seems that neither genera nor species are principles, yet this science deals with principles.

2174. The truth of the matter is that in reality there are only singular things, and that anything else exists only in the consideration of the intellect, which abstracts common attributes from particular ones.

2175. And in general (913).

Then he states the second question: whether there is some substance which exists apart from sensible substances existing here and now. This question must be raised here because, if there is nothing apart from sensible substances, only sensible substances are beings. And since wisdom is the science of beings, wisdom must be concerned only with sensible substances, even though we seem in this science to be looking for some other separate reality. It belongs to this science, then, to investigate whether or not there is something apart from sensible substances. And whichever alternative is taken, another question arises.

2176. Further, if there (914).

He therefore poses the question which seems to arise if one claims that there is something separate from sensible substances. The question is whether this separate thing exists apart from all sensible substances or only apart from some. And if only apart from some, it is hard to explain why we should posit a separate substance apart from some sensible substances and not from others. For there does not seem to be any reason why there should be a separate man and a separate horse apart from the men and horses we perceive by the senses, and why this should not be true also of other animals and other non-living things. But if there is some separate substance apart from all sensible substances, it follows that we must posit the existence of certain separate substances which are eternal and equal in number to sensible and corruptible substances. Thus, just as there is a corruptible man, in a similar way there would be an incorruptible man, and the same with horse and ox, and also with other natural bodies. This seems to be absurd.

2177. But if the principle (915).

Then he raises another question which seems to follow if there is no substance separate from sensible substances. This question asks what the first principle is, whether matter or form; for sensible substances are composed of these two principles. For at first glance it seems that nothing can be more of a principle of things than matter, which is the first subject and always continues to exist, as the first philosophers of nature claimed. Yet it would seem that matter cannot be a principle, because it is not an actuality but a potentiality. Hence, since actuality is naturally prior to potentiality, as has been pointed out in Book IX (785:C 1856), the specifying principle or form, which is an actuality, seems to be this principle.

2178. But it seems that form cannot be a principle because a sensible form appears to be corruptible. If a sensible form were the first principle, then, it would seem to follow that there would be no eternal substance, separable and existing of itself. But this is clearly absurd because some such principle, eternal and separate, and some such substance, is sought by [almost all] the famous philosophers. This is reasonable, for there would not be a perpetual order of things in the world if there were no separate and eternal principle which causes things to be perpetual.

2179. The true answer to this question is that there are certain substances which are separate from sensible substances; and these are not the Forms of sensible things, as the Platonists claimed, but the primary movers, as will be shown below (1056:C 2492).

2180. Again, if there (916).

Then he raises the question about principles. First, he asks what kinds of principles there are; second (917:C 2182), what they are (“But on the other hand”); and third (918:C :2184), how they are related to one another (“Again, how can”).

He accordingly asks (916) whether or not, if there is some separate substance and principle such as we are now seeking, it is the principle of all things, corruptible and incorruptible. Now if there is such a principle of all things, the question arises why some of the things which come from the same principle are eternal and some ire not. But if there is one principle for corruptible things and another for incorruptible ones, there remains the question why, if the principle is eternal the things coming from it are not themselves eternal. But if the principle of things is corruptible, and every corruptible thing is capable of being generated, and everything capable of being generated has a principle, it follows that the corruptible principle will have a principle, and that this will have another, and so on to infinity, as has been made clear above in Book II (153:C 301).

2181. The truth of the matter is that the first principle of all things is incorruptible, and that some things are corruptible because of their great distance from that principle. These are the things in which generation and corruption are caused by an intermediate cause which is incorruptible as regards its substance but changeable as regards place.

2182. But on the other hand (917).

Then he asks what the principles of things are. First, he examines the opinions of those men who claimed that the principles are unity and being because these are the most unchangeable. For no matter how a thing varies, it always remains one.

2183. But the opinion of these men gives rise to two questions. The first is whether unity and being signify a particular thing, i.e., a substance; for, if they do not, they cannot be separable and exist of themselves. But we are looking for such principles which are eternal and exist separately. Yet if they do signify a particular thing or substance, it follows that all things are substances, and that nothing is an accident; for being is predicated of any existing thing at all, and unity is predicated of some. Now there are some things which involve multiplicity in their being, and the different ways in which unity is predicated truly of these is clear enough. But it is false that all things are substances; and therefore it seems that unity and being do not signify substance.

2184. Again, how can (918).

The second question or problem which he raises runs as follows: those who maintain that unity, or the unit, is the principle and substance of things say that number is generated as a first product from the unit and matter. And this, i.e., number, they call substance. But evidently this is not true, because, if a number is composed of the unit and matter, it must be something one, just as what is composed of a living principle and matter must be something living. But in what way is the number two or any other number, which is composed of units, one, as the Platonists claimed? This is not easy to explain, inasmuch as it can be said that they neglected to account for this as though it were easy to understand.

2185. But if someone (919).

Second, he examines another opinion about the principles of things. For sonic claimed that “lines and what is derived from them,” namely, surfaces, are principles, because they held that bodies are composed of surfaces, and surfaces of lines. But it is clear that such things are not separate substances which exist of themselves; for such things are sections and divisions: lines being sections and divisions of surfaces, surfaces of bodies, and points of lines. They are also the limits of these things, i.e., points are the limits of lines, and so forth; for a point, which is at the extremity of a line, is the limit of a line. Now what is signified as actually within a line is a section of the line. The same thing is true of, a line in relation to a surface, and of a surface in relation to a body; for it is evident that limits and sections are entities which exist in other things as their subjects. Hence they cannot exist apart. Lines and surfaces, then, are not principles of things.

2186. Again, how are we (920).

Then he introduces another argument. He says that it cannot be understood that the unit and the point have a substance, because substance begins to exist only by way of generation. But when a line is actually divided, the division itself is a point.

2187. The correct answer to these questions is that neither units nor lines nor surfaces are principles.

2188. There is also the problem (921).

After the question about unity and being and dimensions he now raises the question about substances. First, he asks whether substances are principles. The answer seems to be that they are not; for every science is concerned with universals and with “such and such a universal,” i.e., some definite universal subject. Now a substance is not included among universals, but is rather a particular thing which exists of itself. Hence it seems that there is no science of substances. But a science is concerned with principles. Therefore substances are not principles.

2189. The truth is that, although universals do not exist of themselves, it is still necessary to consider universally the natures of things which subsist of themselves. Accordingly, genera and species, which are called second substances, are put in the category of substance; and of these there is scientific knowledge. And certain things which exist of themselves are principles; and these, because they are immaterial, pertain to intelligible knowledge, even though they surpass the comprehension of our intellect.

2190. Again, the question (922).

Second, he asks whether or not there is any “principle apart from the concrete whole,” i.e., the natural whole or composite. He explains that by concrete whole he means matter, or the thing composed of matter. For if there is no principle apart from the composite of matter and form, and those principles which are said to be in matter are corruptible, it follows that nothing is eternal. And if there is some principle apart from the composite, it must be the specifying principle or form. Then the question arises in which cases the form is separate and in which it is not. For it is obvious that in some cases the form is not separate; the form of a house, for example, is not separate from matter. It was for this reason that the Platonists did not posit Ideas or Forms of artificial things, because the forms of such things are actualities which cannot exist of themselves.

2191. The correct answer to this question is that there is some principle apart from matter, and this is not the form of sensible things.

2192. Again, there is (923).

He now asks how the principles of all things are related to one another: whether they are the same numerically or only specifically. For, if they are the same numerically, it follows that all things -are the same numerically. But if they are not the same numerically, this difference will have to be accounted for.

2193. The truth is that, if one is speaking of the extrinsic principles of things, they are the same numerically, since the first principle of all things is an agent and final cause. But the intrinsic principles of things-matter and form-are not the same numerically but only analogically, as will be shown below (1049-54:C 2474-87).

LESSON 3

All Beings Reduced to Being and Unity

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 3: 1060b 31-1061b 17

924. Since the science of the philosopher treats of being as being in general and not of some part of it, and the term being is used in many senses and not merely in one, it follows that, if being is used equivocally and not with a common meaning, being does not fall under one science (for such terms do not have a common class). But if the term is used according to one common meaning, being will fall under one science.

925. Therefore the term seems to be used in the way mentioned, like the terms medical and healthy; for each of these is used in many senses. Now the term is used in each of these ways because of some kind of reference. Thus the former is used in reference to the science of medicine; the latter, to health; and still another, to something else; yet in each case the term is referred to the same thing. For both a discussion and a knife are called medical: the one because it comes from the science of medicine, and the other because it is useful to it. The same is true of the term healthy; for one thing is called healthy because it is a sign of health, and another because it produces it. The same is true of other terms. Hence the same thing is true of every instance of being; for each thing is called a being because it is either a modification or a state or a disposition or a motion or something else of this kind which belongs to being as being.

926. And since every being is referred to something one and common, each of the contrarieties may also be referred to the primary differences and

contrarieties of being,.whether the primary differences are plurality and unity, likeness and unlikeness, or any others; for these have been considered (304).

927. And it makes no difference whether an existing thing is referred to being or to unity. For even if they are not the same but different, they are nevertheless interchangeable; for what is one is somehow a being, and what is a being is somehow one.

928. Now since it is the office of one and the same science to study all contraries, and one of each pair involves privation (though one might be puzzled how some contraries are predicated privatively, i.e., those which have an intermediate, as just and unjust), in all such cases it is necessary to hold that the privation of the one is not the privation of the whole notion of the other, but only of the last species. For example, if a man is just because of some habitual tendency to obey the laws, the unjust man will not always be deprived of the perfection completely but will fail to obey the laws in some respect; and in this respect privation will belong to him. The same holds true in other cases.

929. Now the mathematician in a sense studies things which are gotten by taking something away; for he speculates by removing from things all sensible qualities, such as heaviness and lightness, hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and other sensible contrarieties, and leaves only the quantified and the continuous (some things being such in one, some in two, and some in three dimensions). And he studies the properties of the quantified and the continuous as such and not in any other respect. And of some he considers the relative positions and attributes, and of others the commensurability and incommensurability, and of others the ratios; yet we claim that there is only one science of all these things, namely, geometry. The same holds true of being.

930. For an investigation of the attributes of being as being, and of the contrarieties of being as being, belong to no other science than [first] philosophy; for one would not assign to the philosophy of nature the study of things insofar as they are beings but rather insofar as they participate in motion. For dialectics and sophistry are concerned with the accidents of existing things, but not as beings, nor do they deal with being as being. It follows, then, that it is the philosopher who speculates about the things which we have mentioned, insofar as they are beings.

931. And since every being is referred to some one common meaning, which is used in many senses, and the same applies to contraries (for they are referred to the primary differences and contrarieties of being), and such things can fall under one science, the difficulty which was stated at the beginning of this work (900-904) is solved in this way. I mean the question how there can be one science of things which are many and different in genus.

COMMENTARY

2194. Having raised the foregoing questions, Aristotle now begins to assemble the things that belong to the consideration of this science. This is divided into two parts. In the first (924:C 2194) he indicates the things which this science considers. In the second (956:C 2247) he compares this science with the others ("Every science").

The first part is divided into two members. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider all beings; and second (932:C 2206), that it has to consider the principles of demonstration ("And since the mathematician").

In considering the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all things are somehow reduced to one. Second (929:C 2202), he shows that the study of this science extends to all things insofar as they are somehow reduced to some one thing ("Now the mathematician").

In treating the first part he does two things. First, he shows that in view of the goal of our present study it is necessary to ask whether all things are somehow reduced to one. He says that, since the science of philosophy treats being as being in such a way as to consider being in terms of its universal character and not merely in terms of the intelligible character of any particular being, and since the term being is used in many senses and not just in one, if the many senses of being were purely equivocal without any common meaning, not all beings would fall under one science, because they would not in any way be reduced to one common class. And one science must deal with one class of things. But if the many senses of being have one common meaning, all beings can then fall under one science. Hence, in order to answer the question that was raised as to whether this science is one even though it treats many different things, we must consider whether or not all beings are reduced to some one thing.

2195. Therefore the term (925).

Here he shows that all things are reduced to some one thing. In treating this he does two things. First (925:C 2195), he explains his thesis. Second (928:C 2200), he clears up a point that might present a difficulty ("Now since").

The first is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that all things are reduced to one. In the second (92-7:C 219q), he explains what this one thing is to which all things are reduced ("And it makes no difference") -

In regard to the first part he does two things. First, he shows that all beings are reduced to one common being; and second (926:C 2198), that all contrarieties are reduced to one contrariety ("And since every").

He accordingly says, first (925), that the term being is used in the way mentioned above; i.e., it is used of many things according to some common meaning. He makes this clear by means of two examples: the terms medical and healthy.

2196. For both of these terms are used variously, yet in such a way that they are reduced or referred to some one thing. The term medical is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to a medicine and in another to something else. And similarly the term healthy is used in many ways inasmuch as it is referred in one sense to health and in another to something else. Yet in both cases the various senses have reference to the same thing, though in different ways. For example, a discussion is called medical because it comes from the

science of medicine, and a knife is called medical because it is an instrument that is used by the same science. Similarly one thing is called healthy because it is a sign of health, as urine, and another because it causes health, as a medication. The same applies to other terms which are used in a similar way.

2197. It is evident that terms which are used in this way are midway between univocal and equivocal terms. In the case of univocity one term is predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning; for example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox, signifies a living, sensory substance. In the case of equivocity the same term is predicated of various things with an entirely different meaning. This is clear in the case of the term dog, inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species of animal. But in the case of those things which are spoken of in the way mentioned previously, the same term is predicated of various things with a meaning that is partly the same and partly different—different regarding the different modes of relation, and the same regarding that to which it is related; for to be a sign of something and to be a cause of something are different, but health is one. Terms of this kind, then, are predicated analogously, because they have a proportion to one thing. The same holds true also of the many ways in which the term being is used; for being in an unqualified sense means what exists of itself, namely, substance; but other things are called beings because they belong to what exists of itself, namely, modifications or states or anything else of this kind. For a quality is called a being, not because it has an act of existence, but because a substance is said to be disposed by it. It is the same with other accidents. This is why he says that they belong to a being (or are of a being). It is evident, then, that the many senses of the term being have a common meaning to which they are reduced.

2198. And since (926).

Next he shows that all contrarieties are reduced to one first contrariety. Since all beings are reduced to one common meaning, and the contrarieties of beings, which are opposite differences, are in themselves a natural consequence of beings, it follows that contrarieties must be reduced to some primary contrariety, whatever it may be, whether it is plurality and unity, likeness and unlikeness, or whatever else are primary differences of beings. And contrarieties of this kind have to be considered in the science which establishes what is true about beings.

2199. And it makes (927).

Then he indicates what this common thing is to which all things are reduced. He says that it makes no difference whether things are reduced to being or to unity; for if it is said that being and unity are not the same conceptually but differ inasmuch as unity adds the note of indivisibility to being, none the less it is evident that they are interchangeable; for everything that is one is somehow a being, and everything that is a being is somehow one; because, just as a substance is a being properly and of itself, so too it is one properly and of itself. The way in which unity is related to being has been explained above in Book IV (301-04:C 548-60) and in Book X (832:C 1974).

2200. Now since (928).

Then he removes a difficulty. He says that, since all contraries are investigated by one science (and the most cogent reason seems to be that in each pair of contraries one contrary is used privatively, and this is known from its opposite term), the difficulty arises how contraries which have an intermediate can be predicated as privations, since in the case of opposites which are privatively opposed there is no intermediate.

2201. The answer to this must be that in the case of such contraries one opposite is not posited as a privation removing all the intelligible notes of the other but as the privation of the last species inasmuch as it detracts from the complete intelligible constitution of the whole species. For instance, if someone is said to be just because he habitually obeys the laws, he will not always be said to be unjust, as if he were deprived of the entire notion of justice, which would be the case if he obeyed the laws in no way—but rather because he fails to obey them in some respects. Hence the privation of justice will be found in him to the extent that he falls short of the perfection of justice. It is for this reason that he can be in an intermediate state, because not everyone who lacks justice is completely deprived of it but only of some part of it. And this intermediate state is one that differs in degree. The same holds true of other contraries. The privation of sight, however, is said to consist in the total lack of sight, and therefore there is no intermediate state between blindness and sight.

2202. Now the mathematician (929).

Here he shows that the investigations of this science extend to all beings insofar as they are reduced to one thing. In treating this he makes a tripartite division. First, he shows by an example from geometry that it is the office of one science to consider all things which are reduced to being. He says that the science of mathematics studies “those things which are gotten by taking something away,” i.e., abstract things. It makes this abstraction, not because it supposes that the things which it considers are separate in reality from sensible things, but because it considers them without considering sensible qualities. For the science of mathematics carries on its investigations by removing from the scope of its study all sensible qualities, such as lightness, heaviness, hardness, softness, heat and cold, and all other sensible qualities, and retains as its object of study only the quantified and the continuous, whether it is continuous in one dimension, as a line, or in two, as a surface, or in three, as a body. And it is primarily interested in the properties of these inasmuch as they are continuous and not in any other respect; for it does not consider the properties of surface inasmuch as it is the surface of wood or of stone. Similarly it considers the relationships between its objects. And in considering figures it also studies their accidents, and how quantities are commensurable or incommensurable, as is clear in Book X of Euclid, “and their ratios,” or proportions, as is clear in Book V of the same work. Yet there is one science of all these things, and this is geometry.

2203. Now what was true for the mathematician is also true for the philosopher who studies being. He passes over a study of all particular beings and considers them only inasmuch as they pertain to being in general. And though these are many, there is nevertheless a single science of all of them inasmuch as all are reduced to one thing, as has been pointed out.

2204. For an investigation (930).

Second, he indicates what science it is that considers the above-mentioned things. He says that the study of the attributes of being as being does not belong to any other science but only to this branch of philosophy. If it did belong to another science, it would mostly seem to belong to the philosophy of nature or to dialectics, which seemingly are the most common of the sciences. Now according to the opinion of the ancient philosophers who did not posit any substances other than sensible ones, it would seem to be the philosophy of nature that is the common science. In this way it would follow that it is the function of the philosophy of nature to consider all substances, and consequently all beings, which are reduced to substance.-But dialectics would seem to be the common science, and also sophistry, because these consider certain accidents of beings, namely, intentions and the notions of genus and species and the like. It follows, then, that it is the philosopher who has to consider the above-mentioned things, inasmuch as they are accidents of being.

2205. And since every (931).

Third, from what has been said, he draws his thesis as his chief conclusion. He says that, since being is used in many senses in reference to some one thing, and since all contrarieties are referred to the first contrariety of being, such things organized in this way can fall under one science, as has been pointed out. Thus he solves the question previously raised: whether there is one science of things which are many and generically different.

LESSON 4

This Science Considers the Principles of Demonstration

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 4: 1061b 17-1061b 33

932. And since the mathematician uses the common axioms in a particular way, it must be the office of first philosophy to study principles of this kind. For the axiom or principle that “when equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal” is common to all quantities. But mathematics, assuming [principles of this kind], makes a study of some part of the quantified as its proper subject matter, for example, lines or angles or number or some of the other kinds of quantity. Yet it does not consider them inasmuch as they are beings but inasmuch as each is continuous in one, two or three dimensions. Philosophy, however, does not investigate those things which are in some part of matter insofar as each has some attribute, but it considers each of these particular things from the standpoint of being insofar as it is being.

933. Now what applies in the case of the science of mathematics is also true of the philosophy of nature; for the philosophy of nature studies the attributes and principles of beings inasmuch as they are moved, not inasmuch as they are beings. But, as we have said, the primary science considers these attributes and principles insofar as their subjects are beings, and not in any other respect. For this reason it is necessary to hold that this

science and the science of mathematics are parts of wisdom (319-23; 900-01).

COMMENTARY

2206. Having shown how the investigations of this science are concerned with beings and with the attributes which belong to being as being, the Philosopher now shows how the investigations of this science are concerned with the first principles of demonstration.

This is divided into two parts. In the first (932:C 2206) he shows that it is the office of this science to consider these first principles of demonstration. In the second (934:C 2211) he draws his conclusions about one principle of demonstration which is prior to the others (“There is a principle”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (932:C 22o6), he clarifies his thesis by considering the science of mathematics; and second (933:C 2209), by considering the philosophy of nature (“Now what applies”).

In the first part he uses the following argument: all the common axioms which are used by the particular sciences in a way peculiar to themselves and not in their common aspect belong to the consideration of this science. But the first principles of demonstration are used by the science of mathematics and by other particular sciences in a way peculiar to themselves. Therefore an investigation of these principles insofar as they are common belongs to the science which considers being as being.

2207. He accordingly says that, since the mathematician uses “the common axioms in a particular way,” i.e., insofar as they are adapted to his subject matter, it must be the function of first philosophy to consider such principles in their common aspect. For these principles are taken as principles of the sciences insofar as they are adapted to some particular subject matter. He clarifies his statement by an example.

2208. The principle that “when equals are subtracted from equals the remainders are equal” is common to all instances of quantity which admit of equality and inequality. But the science of mathematics presupposes principles of this kind in order to make a special study of that part of quantity which constitutes its proper subject matter; for there is no mathematical science which considers the attributes common to quantity as quantity, because this is the work of first philosophy. The mathematical sciences rather consider those attributes which belong to this or to that quantity; for example, arithmetic considers the attributes that belong to number, and geometry considers those that belong to continuous quantity. Thus the arithmetician uses the above-mentioned principle only inasmuch as it has to do with numbers, and the geometer uses it inasmuch as it has to do with lines and with angles. The geometer, however, does not consider this principle inasmuch as it relates to beings as beings but inasmuch as it relates to being as continuous, whether it is continuous in one dimension, as a line; or in two, as a surface; or in three, as a body. But first philosophy does not study the parts of being inasmuch as each has certain accidents; but when it studies each of these common attributes, it studies being as being.

2209. Now what applies (933).

Then he makes the same thing clear by considering the philosophy of nature. He says that what applies in the case of the science of mathematics is also true of the philosophy of nature; for while the philosophy of nature studies the attributes and principles of beings, it does not consider beings as beings but as mobile. The first science, on the other hand, deals with these inasmuch as they are being, and not in any other respect. Hence, the philosophy of nature and the science of mathematics must be parts of first philosophy, just as any particular science is said to be a part of a universal science.

2210. The reason why common principles of this kind belong to the consideration of first philosophy is this: since all first self-evident propositions are those of which the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, then in order that propositions may be self-evident to all, it is necessary that their subjects and predicates should be known to all. Common notions of this type are those which are conceived by all men, as being and non-being, whole and part, equal and unequal, same and different, and so on. But these belong to the consideration of first philosophy; and therefore common propositions composed of such terms must belong chiefly to the consideration of first philosophy.

LESSON 5

The Principle of Non-Contradiction

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 5 & 6: 1061b 34-1062b 19

934. There is a principle in existing things about which it is impossible to make a mistake, but of which one must always do the contrary, I mean acknowledge it as true, namely, that the same thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time; and the same is also true of other things which are opposed in this way (326-328).

935. And while there is no demonstration in the strict sense of such principles, one may employ an argument ad hominem; for it is impossible to construct a syllogism from a more certain principle than this one. But this would be necessary if there were demonstration of it in the strict sense (329-330).

936. Now anyone who wants to prove to an opponent making statements opposite to one’s own that he is wrong must take some such principle which is the same as this one—that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time—but apparently is not the same. For this will be the only method of demonstration that can be used against one who says that opposite statements can be truly made about the same subject.

937. Accordingly, those who are to join in some discussion must understand each other to some extent. And if this does not happen, how will they join in a common discussion? Therefore each of the terms used must be understood and must signify something, and not many things but only one. But if a term does signify many things, it must be made clear to which

of these it refers. Hence, one who says that this is and is not, totally denies what he affirms, and thus denies that the term signifies what it signifies. But this is impossible. Hence, if to be this has some meaning, the contradictory cannot be said to be true of the same subject (332-340).

938. Again, if a term signifies something and this is affirmed truly, it must necessarily be so; and what is necessarily so cannot not be. Hence opposite affirmations and negations cannot be true of the same subject (337-338).

939. Again, if the affirmation is in no way truer than the negation, it will not be truer to say that something is a man than to say that it is not a man. And it would also seem that it is either more or not less true to say that a man is not a horse than to say that he is not a man. Hence one will also be right in

saying that the same thing is a horse; for it was assumed that opposite statements are equally true. Therefore it follows that the same thing is a man and a horse, or any other animal (343-345). Hence, while there is no demonstration in the strict sense of these principles, there is still a demonstration ad hominem against one who makes these assumptions.

940. And perhaps if one had questioned Heraclitus himself in this way, he would quickly have forced him to admit that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects. But he adopted this view without understanding his own statement (328). And in general if what he said is true, not even this statement will be true—I mean that the same thing can both be and not be at one and the same time. For just as when they are separated the affirmation will not be truer than the negation (346), in a similar way when both are combined and taken together as though they were one affirmation, the negation will not be truer than the whole statement regarded as an affirmation.

941. Again, if it is possible to affirm nothing truly, even this statement-that no affirmation is true-will be false (396-397). But if there is a true affirmation, this will refute what is said by those who raise such objections and completely destroy discussion.

Chapter 6

942. The statement made by Protagoras is similar to those mentioned; for he said that man is the measure of all things, meaning simply that whatever appears so to anyone is just as it appears to him. But if this is true, it follows

that the same thing is and is not, and is good and evil, and that other statements involving opposites are true; because often a particular thing appears to be good to some and just the opposite to others, and that which appears to each man is the measure.

COMMENTARY

2211. Having shown that a study of the common principles of demonstration belongs chiefly to the consideration of this philosophical science, the Philosopher now deals with the first of these principles (934:C 2212). For just as all beings must be referred to one first being, in a similar fashion all principles of demonstration must be referred to some principle which pertains in a more basic way to the consideration of this philosophical science. This principle is that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time. It is the first principle because its terms, being and non-being, are the first to be apprehended by the intellect.

2212. This part is divided into two members. In the first (934:C 2211) he establishes the truth of this principle. In the second (936:C 22T4) he rejects an error ("Now anyone who").

In reference to the first part he does two things regarding this principle. First, he says that in regard to beings there is a principle of demonstration "about which it is impossible to make a mistake" (i.e., so far as its meaning is concerned), but of which we "must always do the contrary," namely, acknowledge it as true. This principle is that the same thing cannot both be and not be at one and the same time, granted of course that the other conditions which it is customary to give in the case of a contradiction are fulfilled, namely, in the same respect, in an unqualified sense, and the like. For no one can think that this principle is false, because, if someone were to think that contradictories may be true at the same time, he would then have contrary opinions at the same time; for opinions about contradictories are contrary. For example, the opinion that "Socrates is sitting" is contrary to the opinion that "Socrates is not sitting."

2213. And while (935).

Second, he says that, while there cannot be demonstration in the strict sense of the above-mentioned principle and other similar ones, one may offer an argument ad hominem in support of it. That it cannot be demonstrated in the strict sense he proves thus: no one can prove this principle by constructing a syllogism from some principle which is better known. But such would be necessary if that principle were to be demonstrated in the strict sense. However, this principle can be demonstrated by using an argument ad hominem against one who admits some other statement, though less known, and denies this one.

2214. Now anyone who (936).

Then he rejects the opinion of those who deny this principle; and this is divided into two parts. First (936:C 2214), he argues against those who deny this principle. Second (943:C 2225), he shows how one can meet this opinion ("Now this difficulty").

In regard to the first he does two things. First (936:C 2214), he argues against those who unqualifiedly deny this principle. Second (940:C 2221), he turns his attention to certain particular opinions ("And perhaps").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the method of arguing against this error. He says that in arguing against an opponent who claims that contradictory propositions may be true, anyone who wants to show that this opinion is false ought to take some such principle which is the same as this one—that the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time—but apparently is not the same. For, if it were evidently the same, it would not be admitted by an opponent. Yet if it were not the same, he could not prove his thesis, because a principle of this kind cannot be demonstrated from some principle which is better known. Hence, it is only in this way that a demonstration can be made against those who say that contradictories may be true of the same subject, namely, by assuming as a premise what is in fact the same as the conclusion but apparently is not.

2215. Accordingly (937).

Second, he begins to argue dialectically against the above-mentioned error; and in regard to this he gives three arguments, First, he argues as follows: if two men are to join in a discussion in such a way that one may communicate his view to the other in a dispute, each must understand something that the other is saying. For if this were not the case, no statement would be understood by both of them; and thus an argument with an opponent would be pointless.

2216. However, if one of them is to understand what the other is saying, each of the terms used must be understood according to its proper meaning and must therefore signify some one thing and not many things. And if it should signify many, it will be necessary to make clear which of the many things it signifies; otherwise one would not know what the other person means.

2217. Now granted that a term signifies one thing, it is evident that one who says both that this is and that this is not, for example, that Socrates is a man and that he is not a man, denies the one thing which he attributed to Socrates, namely, that he is a man, when he adds that he is not a man; and thus he denies what he first signified. Hence it follows that a word does not signify what it signifies. But this is impossible. Consequently, if a term signifies some definite thing, the contradictory cannot be truly affirmed of the same subject.

2218. Again, if a term (938).

Then he gives the second argument, which runs as follows: if a term signifies some attribute, and the attribute signified by the term is truly affirmed of the same subject of which the term is first predicated, this attribute must belong to the subject of which the term is predicated so long as the proposition is true. For this conditional proposition, “If Socrates is a man, Socrates is a man,” is clearly true. Now every true conditional proposition is a necessary one. Hence, if the consequent is true, the antecedent must be true. But what is, cannot sometimes not be, because to be necessary and to be incapable of not being are equivalent. Therefore so long as the proposition “Socrates is a man” is true, the proposition “Socrates is not a man” cannot be true. Thus it is evident that opposite affirmations and negations cannot be true of the same subject at the same time.

2219. Again, if the affirmation (939).

Then he gives the third argument, which is as follows: if an affirmation is not truer than the negation opposed to it, one who says that Socrates is a man does not speak with greater truth than one who says that Socrates is not a man. But it is evident that one who says that a man is not a horse speaks either with greater or with no less truth than one who says that a man is not a man. Hence, according to this argument, he who says that a man is not a horse will speak with equal or no less truth. But if contradictory opposites are true at the same time, for example, if the proposition “Man is not a horse” is true, and the proposition “Man is a horse” is also true, then it follows that a man is a horse and also any other animal.

2220. But because someone could criticize the foregoing arguments on the grounds that the things assumed in them are less known than the intended conclusion, he therefore answers this by saying that no one of the foregoing arguments is demonstrative in the strict sense, although there can be an argument ad hominem against an opponent who gives this argument, because the things assumed must be admitted to be true even though they are less known, absolutely than what he denies.

2221. And perhaps (940).

Then he rejects the above error by considering certain particular thinkers. He does this, first (940:C 2221), with regard to Heraclitus; and second (942:C 2224), with regard to Protagoras (“The statement”).

Now Heraclitus posited two things: first, that an affirmation and a negation may be true at the same time (and from this it would follow that every proposition, affirmative as well as negative, is true); and second, that there may be an intermediate between affirmation and negation (and from this it would follow that neither an affirmation nor a negation can be true). Consequently every proposition is false.

2222. First (940:C 2222), he raises an argument against Heraclitus’ first position; and second (941:C 2223), against his second position (“Again, if it is possible”).

He accordingly says, first (940), that by giving an argument ad hominem in this way one may easily bring even Heraclitus, who was the author of this statement, to admit that opposite propositions may not be true of the same subject. For he seems to have accepted the opinion that they may be true of the same subject because he did not understand his own statement. And he would be forced to deny his statement in the following way: if what he said is true, namely, that one and the same thing can both be and not be at one and the same time, it follows that this very statement will not be true; for if an affirmation and a negation are taken separately, an affirmation is not truer than a negation; and if an affirmation and a negation are taken together in such a way that one affirmation results from them, the negation will not be less true of the whole statement made up of the affirmation and the negation than of the opposite affirmation. For it is clearly possible for some copulative proposition to be true, just as for some simple proposition;

and it is possible to take its negation. And whether the copulative proposition be composed of two affirmative propositions, as when we say “Socrates is sitting and arguing,” or of two negative propositions, as when we say “It is true that Socrates is not a stone or an ass,” or of an affirmative proposition and a negative proposition, as when we say “It is true that Socrates is sitting and not arguing,” nevertheless a copulative proposition is always taken to be true because one affirmative proposition is true. And he who says that it is false takes the negation as applying to the whole copulative proposition. Hence he who says that it is true that man is and is not at the same time, takes this as a kind of affirmation; and that this is not true is the negation of this. Hence, if an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, it follows that the negation which states that this is not true, i.e., that an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, is equally true. For if any negation is true at the same time as the affirmation opposed to it, every negation must be true at the same time as the affirmation opposed to it; for the reasoning is the same in all cases.

2223. Again, if it is possible (941).

Then he introduces an argument against the second position of Heraclitus: that no affirmation is true. For if it is possible to affirm that nothing is true, and if one who says that no affirmation is true does affirm something, namely, that it is true that no affirmation is true, then this statement will be false. And if some affirmative statement is true, the opinion of people such as those who oppose all statements will be rejected. And those who adopt this position destroy the whole debate, because if nothing is true, nothing can be conceded on which an argument may be based. And if an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time, it will be impossible to signify anything by a word, as was said above (937:C 2215), and then the argument will cease.

2224. The statement (942).

Here he considers the opinion of Protagoras. He says that the statement made by Protagoras is similar to the one made by Heraclitus and by others who claim that an affirmation and a negation are true at the same time. For Protagoras says that man is the measure of all things, i.e., according to the intellect and the senses, as has been explained in Book IX (753:C 1800), as if the being of a thing depended upon intellectual and sensory apprehension. And one who says that man is the measure of all things merely says that whatever appears so to anyone is true. But if this is maintained, it follows that the same thing both is and is not and is both good and evil at the same time. The same thing is also true of other opposites, because often something seems to be good to some and just the opposite to others, and the way in which things seem or appear is the measure of all things according to the opinion of Protagoras; so that, inasmuch as a thing appears, to that extent it is true.

LESSON 6

Contradictories Cannot Be True at the Same Time

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943. Now this difficulty may be solved by considering the origin of this view.

944. For it seems to have arisen in some cases from the opinion of the philosophers of nature, and in others from the fact that not all men apprehend the same thing in the same way, but something appears pleasant to some and the opposite to others (352).

945. For the view that nothing comes from non-being but everything from being is a doctrine common to nearly all those who have dealt with nature. Thus, since the not-white comes from what is actually white, and not from the not-white, should the not-white have come to be, what becomes not-white will have come to be from what is not not-white. Hence whiteness must come from non being according to them, unless the white and the not-white are the same. But it is not hard to solve this difficulty; for we have stated in our physical treatises in what sense things which come to be come from non-being, and in what sense they come from being (355-356).

946. But it is also foolish to occupy oneself equally with both opinions and with the fanciful statements of those who argue against themselves, because i is evident that one or the other of them must be wrong. This is

clear from the facts of sensory perception; for the same thing never appears sweet to some and the opposite to others unless in some the organ of the sense which distinguish the above-mentioned savors has been impaired or injured. And such being the case, some must be taken as the measure and the others not. And I say that th same thing applies in the case of good and evil, of beautiful and ugly, and o other attributes of this kind. For to maintain this view is not different from maintaining that what appears to those who push their finger under their eye an make one object appear to be two must therefore be two because it appears to be so many, and yet that it must be one because to those who do not move their eye the one object appears to be one (369-375).

947. And in general seeing that things here are subject to change and never remain the same, it would be unfitting to base our judgment of the truth on this. For in pursuing the truth one must start with those things which are always the same and never undergo a single change. Such things are those which contain the world; for they do not appear at one time to be such and at another different but they are always the same and admit of no change (365).

948. Further, if there is motion, there is also something that is moved; and everything is moved from something and to something. Therefore that which is moved must be in that from which it is moved, and yet not be in it; and it must be moved to this and come to be in it; but contradictories cannot be true at the same time, as they claim.

949. And if things here are in a state of continuous change and motion as regards quantity, and one were to suppose this even though it is not true, why should they not be permanent as regards quality? For the view that contradictories may be predicated of the same subject seems to be based largely on the assumption that the quantity of bodies does not remain constant; and for this reason they say that the same thing is and is not four cubits long. But a thing’s substance involves quality, and this is of a determinate nature, whereas quantity is of an indeterminate nature (365).

950. Further, when a physician orders them to take some particular food, why do they take it? For why is this particular food bread rather than not bread? Hence it would make no difference whether they ate it or not. But they take the food prescribed as though they know the truth about it and that it is the food prescribed. Yet they should not do this if there is no nature

which remains fixed in the sensible world, but everything is always in a state of motion and flux (349).

951. Again, if we are always undergoing change and never remain the same, what wonder is it if to us, as to those who are ill, things never appear the same? For to them also, since they are not in the same condition as when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear to be the same; yet sensible things themselves need not for this reason undergo any change, but they cause different, and not the same, impressions in those who are ill. And perhaps the same thing must happen to those who are well if the above-mentioned change takes place (950). However, if we do not change but always remain the same, there will be something permanent (357-359).

952. Hence, in the case of those who raise the foregoing difficulties as a result of reasoning, it is not easy to meet their arguments unless they assume something and do not demand a reason for it; for every argument and demonstration comes about in this way. For those who admit nothing destroy discussion and reasoning in general, and thus there is no reasoning with such men. But in the case of those who are puzzled by the usual problems, it is easy to meet them and to reject the arguments which cause their difficulty. This becomes clear from what has been said above (943-951).

953. It is evident from these considerations, then, that opposite statements cannot be verified of the same subject at one time (353; 376-377), nor can contrary ones, because every contrariety involves privation. This becomes clear if we reduce the definitions of all contraries to their principle (382). Similarly no intermediate can be predicated of one and the same subject. For if the subject is white, those who say that it is neither white nor black are wrong, for it then follows that it is white and is not white; for the second of the two terms which we have combined is true of it, and this is the contradictory of white (383-391).

954. One cannot be right, then, in holding the views either of Heraclitus (940) or of Anaxagoras; and if this were not so it would follow that contraries would be predicated of the same subject. For when Anaxagoras says that there is a part of everything in everything else, he says that nothing is sweet any more than it is bitter, and so on with any of the other pairs of contraries, since everything is present in everything else, not potentially, but actually and separately.

955. And similarly all statements cannot be true or all false, both because of many other difficulties which might be brought forward on the basis of this position, and because, if all statements are false, anyone who says this will not speak the truth; and if all are true, it will not be false to say that all are false (392).

COMMENTARY

2225. Having argued against those who claim that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time, the Philosopher now shows how these men can be persuaded to abandon this theory. His discussion is divided into two parts. In the first (943:C 2225) he explains his thesis. In the second (953:C 2243) he draws a corollary from what has been said ("It is evident").

The first part is divided into two members. In the first he explains how it is possible in some cases to deal with the above-mentioned theory. In the second (952:C 2241) he indicates in what cases it can be refuted and in what not ("Hence, in the case").

In treating the first (943) he does three things. First, he describes the way in which the foregoing theory can be disqualified in some cases. He says that the above-mentioned difficulty which led some people to adopt the position that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time can. be dispelled if one considers its source.

2226. For it seems (944).

Second, he gives two sources of this position. He says that this position seems to have arisen in some cases from the opinion of the philosophers of nature, who claimed that nothing comes to be from non-being, and in others from the fact that not all men make the same judgments about the same things, but something appears pleasant to some and just the opposite to others. For if one were to believe that whatever appears is true, it would follow from this that opposites are true at the same time.

2227. For the view (945).

Third, he shows how the abovementioned position might follow from the two sources just given; and he points out how it may be dealt with. First, he shows how it might follow from the opinion of the philosophers of nature;

and second (946:C 2227), from the belief that every appearance is true ("But it is also foolish").

He accordingly says, first (945), that the doctrine common to nearly all of the thinkers who have dealt with nature is that nothing comes to be from non-being, but everything from being. It is clear that something becomes not-white from what is actually white; but what is not-white does not come from what is not-white. Further, it is also evident that what is not-white comes from what is not not-white. Consequently, it is evident that what is not not-white becomes not-white, just as what is not-black becomes black. It is clear, then, that that from which the not-white comes to be is the white, and it is not not-white. This cannot be understood in the sense that the not-white is entirely non-being, because it would then seem to follow that something comes to be from non-being absolutely. For example, if we were to say that fire comes from what is not-fire, there would be the question how they think that that from which fire comes to be is entirely not-fire. For it would then seem to follow, according to them, that something comes to be from non-being. Hence they claimed that fire lay hidden in that from which fire comes to be, as is evident from the opinion of Anaxagoras, which is given in Book I of the Physics. Similarly, they believed that, if something comes to be not-white from what is not not-white, the not-white must have preexisted in that from which it comes to be, as has been explained. Thus it would follow, according to them, that that from which the not-white comes to be is both white and not-white at the same time, unless it is assumed that something comes to be from non-being.

2228. But this difficulty is not hard to solve, as the Philosopher points out; for it has been explained in Book I of the Physics how a thing comes to be from being and how from nonbeing; for it has been stated that something comes to be from what is a nonbeing in act, though it is incidentally a being in act. But it comes to be properly from matter, which is in potency; for it is accidental to the process of making that the matter from which a thing comes to be should be the subject of form and of privation. Thus it is not necessary that that from which a thing comes to be should be at the same time both a being and a nonbeing in act, but that it should be of itself in potency both to being and to non-being, i.e., both to form and to privation.

2229. But it is also foolish (946).

Then he rejects the foregoing opinion inasmuch as it might be derived from the other source, i.e., from the view that every appearance is judged to be true. First, he rejects this source; and second (947:C 2232), its cause ("And in general").

He accordingly says, first (946), that, just as it is foolish to think that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time, so too "it is also foolish to occupy oneself with," i.e., to accept, both of the foregoing opinions of the philosophers who argue against themselves; for it is obvious that one or the other of them must be in error.

2230. This is evident from the facts of sensory perception; for the same thing never appears sweet to some and bitter to others, unless in some the sense organ and the power which discriminates between savors, has been impaired or injured. But since this does happen in some cases, "some must be taken as the measure," i.e., the judgment of those whose senses are not impaired in this way must be taken as the rule and measure of truth. But this should not be understood to apply to those whose senses are impaired.

2231. And what is evident in the case of sensory perception must also be said to apply in the case of good and evil, of beautiful and ugly, and of all attributes of this kind which are apprehended by the intellect. For if some conceive a thing to be good and others evil, the judgment of those whose intellect has not been impaired by some bad habit or by some bad influence or by some other cause of this kind must be the norm. For if someone were to hold that it is not less fitting to believe the one group rather than the other, this would not differ in any way from saying that things are as they appear "to those who push their finger under their eye," i.e., who move their eye with their finger, and thereby make one thing appear as two, and say that it must be two because it appears to be so many, and again that it must be one because it appears to be one to those who do not move their eye with their finger. For it is obvious that we must base our judgment about the oneness of things on the judgment which the eye makes when it does not receive some strange impression, and not on the judgment which it makes when it receives such an impression. Now a man judges one visible object to be two because the form of the visible object is made to appear as two to the organ of vision when it is moved; and this double impression reaches the organ of the common sense as though there were two visible objects.

2232. And in general (947).

Then he rejects the basis of the position that every appearance is true. For some held this because they thought that all things are in a state of continuous flux, and that there is nothing fixed and determinate in reality; and thus it would follow that a thing is such only when it is seen.

2233. He therefore presents five arguments against this position. He says, first, that it is altogether unfitting to base our judgment about the whole truth on the fact that these sensible things which are near or close to us are undergoing change and are never permanent. But the truth must be based rather on those things which are always the same and never undergo any change as regards their substance, though they do appear to be subject to local motion. For such things are those "which contain the world," i.e., the celestial bodies, to which these corruptible bodies are compared as things that have no quantity, as the mathematicians prove. Now the celestial bodies are always the same and do not at one time appear to be such and at another different, for they admit of no change which affects their substance.

2234. Further, if there (948).

Then he gives the second argument against this position. The argument runs thus: if there is motion in these lower bodies, there must be something that is moved, and it must also be moved from something and to something. Hence that which is moved must already be in that from which it is moved and yet not be in it, and this must be moved to something else and be continuously coming to be in it. Thus some definite affirmation, as well as some negation, must be true. And it will not be necessary that a contradiction be true of the same subject, because according to this nothing would be moved. For if the same thing might be at the extreme to which it is moved and not be at it, there would be no reason why a thing which has not yet reached an extreme should be moved thereto, because it would already be there.

2235. And if things (949).

He gives the third argument; and with a view to making this clear it should be borne in mind that, when Heraclitus saw that a thing increased in size according to some definite and very small quantity over a long period of time (for example, a year), he thought that some addition would be made in any part of that time, and that it would be imperceptible because of the very small quantity involved. And because of this he was led to believe that all things, even those which seem to be static, are also being moved continuously by an imperceptible motion, and that after a long time their motion would become apparent to the senses. But his opinion about increase is false; for increase does not take place continuously in such a way that something grows in any part of time, but a body is disposed to increase during some time and then grows, as Aristotle makes quite clear in Book VIII of the Physics.

2236. Hence he says that, if the bodies around us here are in a continuous state of flux and motion as regards quantity, and one wishes to admit this even though it is not true, there is no reason why a thing cannot be unchanging as to its quality. For the opinion that contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time seems to be based largely on the assumption that the quantitative aspect of bodies does not remain constant; and thus some thought that the same thing is and is not four cubits long. But a thing's substance is defined in terms of some quality, i.e., some form; and quality is of a determinate nature in things, although quantity is of an indeterminate nature because of change, as has been pointed out.

2237. Further, when a physician (950).

Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: if there is nothing fixed in the world as regards being or non-being, why do they take this kind of bread which the physician prescribes and not that? For according to the position given above, why is this bread rather than not-bread? He implies that the answer cannot be in the affirmative any more than in the negative. And thus it would make no difference whether one ate the bread or did not. But we see that they take the bread which the physician prescribes, implying that they form a true judgment about bread itself, and that this kind of bread is really the one which the physician prescribes. Yet this would not be the case if no nature remained fixed in the sensible world but all things are always in a state of motion and flux.

2238. Again, if we (951).

Then he presents the fifth argument: since the above-mentioned position assumes that there is no fixed truth in things because of the continuous change which they undergo, if the truth is identical with appearance it is necessary to say that we men, who make judgments about other things, are either in motion or are not.

2239. For if we are always undergoing change and never remain the same, it is not surprising that things never appear the same to us; and this is the case with those who are ill. For since they have been changed and are not in the same state as when they were well, the sensible qualities which they perceive by way of the senses will not seem the same to them as they did before they became ill. For to those whose sense of taste has been impaired sweet things seem bitter or tasteless; and the same is true of other sensible qualities. Yet sensible qualities themselves are not changed for this reason, but they cause different impressions in those who are ill because their senses are differently disposed. Therefore, if we men, who are continuously undergoing change, make different judgments about other things, this should not be attributed to things but to us.

2240. However, if we are not changing but always remain the same, there will therefore be something permanent in the world and consequently some fixed truth about which we can make positive judgments. For we make judgments not only about other things but also about human nature.

2241. Hence, in the case (952).

Then he indicates who can be disabused of the above opinion and who can not. He says that, if those who adopt the foregoing opinions do so not because of any reasoning, in the sense that they do not assume anything because they are obstinate, and do not inquire into the reasons for the things that they say but stubbornly adhere to the opinions which they hold, it is not easy for them to give up an opinion of this kind. For every argument and every demonstration comes about in this way, namely, by admitting the truth of some statement and investigating the reason for it. But those who admit nothing destroy discussion and every rational argument; and thus no appeal of reason can be addressed to them whereby they can be dislodged from their error.

2242. But if there are any who are perplexed because of certain deficiencies (for example, because they do not understand some things well), it is easy to dispel such an error by removing the difficulties which puzzle them. This is evident from the previous discussion in which he deals with the difficulties that could lead to the above-mentioned opinion.

2243. It is evident (953).

Then he draws three corollaries from what has been said. First, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that opposite statements cannot be verified of the same subject at one and the same time. Consequently it is clear from this that contraries cannot be verified of the same subject at the same time. And this is true because every contrariety involves privation; for one of two contraries is always a priv4on. This becomes evident if one wishes to reduce the definitions of contraries to their first principle; for contained in the notion of black is the privation of white. Since a privation, then, is a kind of negation having a determinate subject, it is evident that, if contraries were true of the same subject, both an affirmation and a negation would have to be true of the same subject at the same time.

2244. Now, it is not only impossible for two contraries to be true of the same subject at the same time, but it is also impossible for an intermediate to be predicated of one and the same subject of which one of two extremes is predicated; for from what has been said in Book X (880-86-.C 2101-10 it is evident that an intermediate between contraries involves the privation of both extremes, whether it is designated by one word or by many or is nameless. Hence an intermediate between white and black, such as red or yellow, contains in its definition the fact that it is neither white nor black. Therefore, if one says that some subject is red when it is really white, he is saying at the same time that it is neither white nor black. Hence he is in error; for it would follow that that subject is both white and not white at the same time; because if it is true that that subject is neither white nor black, the other part of the copulative proposition may be verified of the same subject, and this is the contradictory of being white. Thus it follows that, if an intermediate and an extreme are true of the same subject, contradictories must be true of the same subject.

2245. One cannot (954).

He gives the second corollary. He concludes that, if an affirmation and a negation are not true at the same time, neither the opinion of Heraclitus nor that of Anaxagoras is true. That this is so regarding the opinion of Heraclitus is evident from what has been said. Hence he shows that the same thing applies with respect to the opinion of Anaxagoras. He says that, if Anaxagoras’ opinion is not false, it follows that contraries may be predicated of the same subject, and therefore that contradictories may also be predicated of the same subject. This is shown as follows. Anaxagoras claimed that anything at all comes to be from anything at all, and everything which comes to be comes from something. Hence he was not compelled to maintain that something comes to be from nothing, and thus he claimed that everything is present in everything else. Therefore, since he posited that there is a part of everything in everything else (for example, a part of flesh in bone, and a part of whiteness in blackness, and vice versa), it follows that the whole is no more sweet than bitter. The same holds true of other contrarieties. And this is so if a part of anything is present in any whole not only potentially but actually and separately. And he added this because whatever comes to be from something else must pre-exist in it potentially and not actually. Hence contraries must preexist in the same subject potentially and not actually. This does not mean that contraries exist separately in something, because the potency for contraries is the same. But Anaxagoras did not know how to distinguish between potency and actuality.

2246. And similarly (955).

He gives the third corollary. He concludes from what has been said that both opinions are false, i.e., the opinion of those who said that all statements are true, and the opinion of those who said that all are false. This is evident because of the many difficult and serious conclusions which result from these opinions which have been brought together here and above in Book IV (332402:C 611-748); and especially “because if all statements are false,” he who says that every statement is false makes a statement and thus does not speak the truth. And similarly if all statements are true, he who says that all are false will not say what is false but will speak the truth. And for this reason the position of one who claims that all statements are true is destroyed.

LESSON 7

Metaphysics Differs from All the Other Sciences

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956. Every science seeks certain principles and causes of each of the knowable objects which comes within its scope; for example, medicine and gymnastics do this, and so does each of the other sciences, productive as well as doctrinal. For each of these marks off for itself some class of things and occupies itself with this as with something that is real and a being, though not as being; but there is a certain other science distinct from these which does this.

957. And each of the sciences mentioned somehow assumes the quiddity in some class of things and tries to prove the rest, with greater or lesser certainty. Some derive the quiddity from sensory perception, and some by assuming it from some other science. Hence from such a process of induction it becomes evident that there is no demonstration of the substance and of its quiddity.

958. Now since there is a science of nature, it is evident that it must differ from both the practical and the productive sciences. For in the case of a productive science the source of motion is in the maker and not in the thing made, and it is either the art or some kind of potency. And similarly in the case of a practical science the motion is not in the thing done but rather in the agents. But the science of the philosopher of nature is concerned with

things which have a source of motion in themselves. It is evident from these considerations, then, that the philosophy of nature must be neither practical nor productive but speculative; for it must fall in one of these classes.

959. And since it is necessary that each one of the sciences have some knowledge of the quiddity and must use it as a starting point, we must not fail to consider how the philosophy of nature should define things, and how it should consider the intelligible structure of the substance: whether in the same way as the term snub or rather as the term concave. For of these the notion of snub includes the matter of the object, but that of concave is expressed without matter. For snubness comes into being in a nose, and for this reason its intelligible structure includes matter; for snub is a concave nose. It is evident, then, that the intelligible structure of flesh and of eye and of the other parts of the body must always be given along with matter.

960. And since there is a science of being as being and as separable, one must consider whether this science should be held to be the same as the philosophy of nature or rather a science distinct from it. The philosophy of nature deals with things which have a principle of motion in themselves, and mathematics is speculative and is concerned with things which are permanent but are not separable. Therefore there is a science distinct from both of these, which treats of what is separable and immovable; that is to say, if there is some such substance, and I mean one which is separable and immovable, as we shall attempt to prove (1055-76). And if there is some such nature among existing things, this will exist somewhere and will be divine, and it will be the primary and highest principle. It is evident, then, that there are three classes of speculative science: the philosophy of nature, mathematics and theology.

961. The class of speculative sciences, then, is the highest, and of these the last mentioned is highest of all. For it is concerned with the noblest of beings, and each science is said to be higher or lower by reason of its proper object.

962. However, one might raise the question whether the science of being as being is universal or not. For each of the mathematical sciences deals with some one determinate class of things, but a universal science is common to all. If, then, natural substances are the primary beings, the philosophy of nature must be the primary science. But if there is another nature and substance which is separable and immovable, the science which

treats of this must be different from and prior to the philosophy of nature, and must be universal because it is prior (902).

COMMENTARY

2247. Having shown with what things this science is concerned, here the Philosopher compares this science with the others. In regard to this he does three things. First (956:C 2247), he indicates what is proper to the particular sciences. Second (958:C 2252), he shows how the particular sciences differ from one another ("Now since"). Third (960:C 2259), he compares this science with the others ("And since there is").

In treating the first member of this division he does two things, insofar as there are two characteristics which he says pertain to the particular sciences. He accordingly says, first (956), that every particular science seeks certain principles and causes of the proper object of knowledge which comes within its scope. He says certain principles and causes because not every science considers every class of cause.

2248. He gives as an example the science of medicine, whose object is health, and the art of gymnastics, whose object is physical exercise directed to the well-being of the body. The same thing holds true of any of the other sciences, whether they are "productive," i.e., practical, or "doctrinal," i.e., theoretical; because each of these particular sciences marks off and takes as its own some determinate class of being inasmuch as it confines itself to that class and deals with it alone. For it is concerned with that class of being as a certain kind of being, though not as being. But to consider this, namely, being as being, belongs to a science which differs from all of the particular sciences.

2249. And each (957).

Second, he gives another characteristic of the particular sciences. He says that each of the above-mentioned particular sciences somehow assumes the quiddity in whatever class of things is considered. Hence it has been stated at the beginning of the Posterior Analytics that it is necessary to assume both the existence and quiddity of the subject. And having assumed this, i.e., the quiddity, which every science uses as a middle term to demonstrate certain things, such as properties and the like, it tries to demonstrate these with greater or lesser certainty; because some sciences have a more certain method of demonstrating, as the mathematical sciences, and others a less certain one, as the natural sciences.

2250. And since he had said that other sciences somehow assume the quiddity, he therefore adds that some sciences derive the quiddity from sensory perception inasmuch as they acquire a knowledge of a thing's essence from sensible accidents, and that others derive the quiddity by assuming it from other sciences, as particular sciences from universal ones.

2251. Thus it is evident that in the particular sciences there is no demonstration of the substance or the quiddity of a thing. Hence both of the things with which the particular sciences do not concern themselves, i.e., a consideration of the substance or being and its quiddity, pertain to a universal science.

2252. Now since (958).

Then he shows how the particular sciences differ from one another. First (958:C 2252), he shows how the philosophy of nature differs from the productive sciences; and second (959:C 2256), how the mathematical sciences differ from the philosophy of nature ("And since it is necessary").

He accordingly says, first (958), that, since there is a particular science of nature, it must be different "from the practical," i.e., from the sciences which govern activity and from those which govern production; for every practical science is either a science of action or a science of production.

2253. In order to understand this difference we must consider a distinction which was made above in Book IX (790:C 1864), namely, that to act and to make differ; for to act is said properly of an operation which remains in the agent and does not pass over into some external matter, for instance, to understand and to perceive and so on. But to make or produce is said of an operation which passes over into some external matter which is changed, for example, to heat and to cut and the like. Hence there is a science of activity by which we are instructed how to perform correctly those operations which are called actions; and moral science is such. But that science by which we make something correctly is a productive science. The art of carpentry and the like belong to this class.

2254. Now the philosophy of nature differs from each of these sciences which govern operations; for the productive sciences do not have a principle of motion in the thing made but in the maker, and this principle is either the art, which is a directive principle, or some potency which is the principle executing the work. Similarly “the practical sciences,” i.e., those governing activity, do not have a principle of motion in that upon which the activity is exercised but rather in the agents.

2255. But those things which belong to the consideration of the philosophy of nature have their principles of motion in themselves, since nature is a principle of motion in the thing in which it exists. It is evident, then, that the philosophy of nature is a science neither of action nor of production but is speculative. For the philosophy of nature must fall into one of these classes, i.e., active, productive or speculative science. Hence, if it is a science neither of action nor of production, it follows that it must be speculative.

2256. And since (959).

Then he shows how the mathematical sciences differ from the philosophy of nature. He says that, since each of the sciences must somehow come to know the quiddity and must use this as a starting point with a view to demonstrating, the sciences must be distinguished on the basis of a different method of defining. Hence in order to understand how the philosophy of nature differs from the other sciences we must not neglect to consider the method which the philosophy of nature uses in defining things, and how the definition should be considered in the philosophy of nature; that is, whether a thing should be defined in the way that snub is or in the way that concave is.

2257. Now the definition of snub includes sensible matter, but that of concave does not; for since snubness is found only in a definite sensible matter, because it is found only in a nose, the intelligible structure of snub must therefore include sensible matter; for snub is defined thus: snub is a concave nose. Sensible matter, however, is not included in the definition of concave or curved. Hence, just as sensible matter is included in the definition of snub, so too it must be included in the definition of flesh and of eye and of the other parts of the body. The same holds true of other natural beings.

2258. The difference between the philosophy of nature and mathematics is taken from this, because the philosophy of nature deals with those things whose definitions include sensible matter, whereas mathematics deals with those things whose definitions do not include sensible matter, although they have being in sensible matter.

2259. And since there is (960).

Then he compares this science with the other particular sciences; and in regard to this he does three things. First (960:C 2259), he compares this science with the different particular sciences in reference to the way in which their objects are separate from matter. Second (961:C 2265), he compares them from the viewpoint of nobility ("The class of speculative sciences"). Third (962:C 2265), he compares them from the viewpoint of universality ("However, one").

He accordingly says, first (960), that there is a science of being insofar as it is separable; for it is the office of this science not only to establish the truth about being in common (and this is to establish the truth about being as being) but also to establish the truth about things which are separate from matter in being. Hence it is necessary to consider whether this science whose function is to consider these two things is the same as the philosophy of nature or differs from it.

2260. That it differs from the philosophy of nature he makes clear as follows: the philosophy of nature is concerned with things which have a principle of motion in themselves; therefore natural things must have a definite matter, because only that which has matter is moved. But mathematics studies immovable things; for those things whose intelligible structure does not include sensible matter must likewise not have motion in their intelligible structure, since motion is found only in sensible things.

2261. But those things which mathematics considers are not separable from matter and motion in being but only in their intelligible structure. Hence the science which treats that kind of being which is separable from matter and from motion and is immovable in every respect must be one which differs both from mathematics and from the philosophy of nature.

2262. He says here, "if there is some such substance" apart from sensible substances which is immovable in every respect. He says this because the existence of some such substance has not yet been proved, although he intends to prove this.

2263. And if there is some such nature among existing things, i.e., one which is separable and immovable, it is necessary that "such a nature exist somewhere," i.e., that it be attributed to some substance. And whatever has this nature must be something that is divine and the highest of all; because the simpler and more actual a being is, the nobler it is and the more it is prior and a cause of other things. Thus it is evident that the science which considers separate beings of this kind should be called the divine science and the science of first principles.

2264. From this he again concludes that there are three classes of speculative science: the philosophy of nature, which considers things that are movable and have sensible matter in their definition; mathematics, which considers immovable things that do not have sensible matter in their definition yet exist in sensible matter; and theology, which considers beings that are entirely separate from matter.

2265. The class (961).

Next he compares this science with the others from the viewpoint of nobility. He says that the speculative sciences are the noblest, because of all the sciences the speculative seek knowledge for its own sake, whereas the practical seek knowledge for the sake of some work. And among the speculative sciences there is one that, is highest, namely, theology, since a science which deals with more noble beings is itself more noble; for a science is more noble in proportion to the greater nobility of its object.

2266. However, one might (962).

Then he compares this science with the others from the viewpoint of universality. He says that one might raise the question whether or not the science which deals with separate beings must be held to be a universal science of being as being; and that it must be such he shows by a process of elimination.

2267. For it is evident that the foregoing sciences which deal with operations are not universal sciences, and he therefore omits them. In the case of the speculative sciences it is evident that every mathematical science is concerned with some one determinate class of things. But a universal science deals with all things in common. No mathematical science, then, can be the one which treats all beings in common. Regarding the philosophy of nature it is evident that, if natural substances, which are perceptible and movable, are the primary beings, the philosophy of nature must be the primary science; because the order of the sciences corresponds with that of their subjects, as has been stated already (961:C 2265). But if there is a different nature and substance over and above natural substances, which is separable and immovable, there must be a science which differs from the philosophy of nature and is prior to it. And because it is first, it must be universal; for it is the same science which treats of primary beings and of what is universal, since the primary beings are the principles of the others.

LESSON 8

No Science of Accidental Being

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1064b 15-1065b 4

963. Since the term being in its unqualified sense has many meanings, and one of these is the accidental, it is first necessary to consider this sense of being.

964. Now it is evident that none of the traditional sciences are concerned with the accidental. The science of building does not consider what will happen to the occupants of a house, for example, whether they will dwell there unhappily or in the opposite way; nor is the art of weaving or of shoemaking or of cooking concerned with it. But each of these sciences considers only what is proper to itself, and this is its particular end.

965. Further, no science considers a man insofar as he is a musician or also a grammarian; nor does any science consider the quibble that “when one who is a musician has become a grammarian he will be both at the same time, although he was not so before; but that which is and has not always been, must have come to be; and therefore he must have at the same time become both a musician and a grammarian.” None of the known sciences are concerned with this except sophistry, and thus Plato was not wrong in saying that sophistry is concerned with non-being.

966. That it is impossible to have a science of the accidental will be evident to those who are trying to learn what the accidental is. Accordingly, we say of all things that some are always and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of what is done by force but with the meaning used in matters of

demonstration); others are for the most part; and others are neither for the most part nor always and of necessity, but are such as occur by chance. For example, there might be cold weather during the dog days, but this occurs neither always and of necessity nor for the most part, though it might happen sometimes. Hence the accidental is what occurs, but neither always and of necessity nor for the most part. What the accidental is, then, has been stated; and it is evident that there is no science of it. For every science deals with what is always or for the most part, but the accidental belongs to neither of these.

967. It is also evident that there are no causes and principles of accidental being such as there are of essential being; for if there were, everything would be of necessity. For if one thing exists when another does, and this again when something else does, and if this last thing is not a matter of chance but exists of necessity, then that of which it was the cause will also exist of necessity, and so on right down to the last thing said to be caused. But this was assumed to be accidental. Hence everything will be of necessity, and the possibility of anything happening by chance or being contingent and of coming to be or not coming to be will be entirely removed from the sphere of things which are generated. And if the cause is assumed not to exist but to be something which is coming to be, the same results will follow; for everything will come to be of necessity. For tomorrow’s eclipse will occur if something else does, and this again if some other thing occurs, and the latter if still another thing occurs. And if time is subtracted in this way from the limited time between the present and tomorrow, we shall at some point reach something which exists now. Therefore, since this exists, everything which comes after it will occur of necessity, so that everything will occur of necessity.

968. Regarding being in the sense of what is true and accidental being, the former depends upon the combination which the mind makes and is a modification of it. It is for this reason that it is not the principles of this kind of being that are sought but of that which exists outside the mind and is separable; and the latter kind of being is not necessary but indeterminate (and by this I mean the accidental); and the causes. of this kind of being are indeterminate and unordered (543-59).

969. And that for the sake of which something exists is found both in things which come to be by nature and in those which are a result of mind.

It is luck when one of these comes about accidentally; for just as a being is either essential or accidental, so also is a cause. And luck is an accidental cause of those things which come to be for some end as a result of choice.

970. And for this reason both luck and mind are concerned with the same thing; for there is no choice without mind.

971. However, the causes from which some lucky result comes to be are indeterminate; and for this reason luck is uncertain for human knowledge and is an accidental cause, although in an absolute sense it is a cause of nothing.

972. There is good or bad luck when the result is good or bad, and prosperity or misfortune when this occurs on a large scale.

973. And since nothing accidental is prior to things which are essential, neither are accidental causes prior. Therefore, if luck or chance is the cause of the heavens, mind and nature are prior causes.

COMMENTARY

2268. After having restated in a summary way the points that were discussed before with regard to this science's field of study, here the Philosopher begins to summarize the things that were said about imperfect being both in Book VI (543-559:C 1171-1244) of this work and in the Physics. He does this, first (963:C 2268), with regard to accidental being; and second (974:C 2289), with regard to motion ("One thing").

In treating the first member of this division he does two things. First, he states the things that have been said about accidental being. Second (969:C 2284), he states those that pertain to an accidental cause ("And that for the sake").

In regard to the first he does two things. First (963), he points out what he intends to do. He says that, since, "being in its unqualified sense," i.e., taken in general, has many meanings, of which one is the accidental (as when we say, for example, that the musician is white), and these have been explained above in Book V (435-39:C 885-97), we ought to consider accidental being before we deal with essential being, so that when this kind of being has been disposed of we may speak in a more positive way of essential being.

2269. Now it is evident (964).

Second, he proceeds to carry out his plan; and in regard to this he does two things. First (964:C 2269), he shows that the consideration of accidental being belongs to no science. Second (968:C 2283), he excludes both this kind of being and the being which signifies the truth of a proposition from this science's field of study ("Regarding being").

In treating the first he does two things. First, he shows that no science considers accidental being; and second (966:C 2276), that none can do so ("That it is impossible").

In regard to the first he does two things. First (964), he shows by a process of elimination that no science considers accidental being. He says that no one of the sciences treated by us is concerned with the accidental.

2270. Now accidental here does not mean something in one of the categories of accidents, in the sense that whiteness is an accident; for there are many sciences which deal with accidents of this kind, because such accidents have a certain species of themselves and certain determinate causes in their subject. And they are called accidents because they do not have being of themselves but exist in something else.—But here accidental means what happens accidentally; for example, it is accidental that a musician is white. For accidents of this kind do not have any species or any determinate cause. And no science is concerned with this kind of being. He proves this by induction.

2271. For the art of building does not consider what happens accidentally to the occupants of the house which it builds, whether they happen to experience some unhappiness there or live there "in the opposite way," i.e., happily; for this is accidental to a house. Similarly, the art of weaving does not consider what happens to those who use the cloth which has been woven; nor does the art of shoemaking consider what happens to those who use shoes; nor does the art of cooking consider what happens to the food, for example, whether someone uses too much of it or just what is necessary. But each of these sciences considers only what is proper to itself, i.e., its subject and the properties of its subject. This is the goal of any science.

2272. Further, no science (965).

Second, he gives the reason why no science considers things which are accidental. It is because the accidental is not a being in the proper sense but is rather a non-being inasmuch as it is not essentially and properly one; for one and being are convertible. Now every science deals with being, and therefore it follows that no science is concerned with the accidental.

2273. Hence he says that a musician is also a grammarian, but not inasmuch as he is a musician. And if it happens that one who is a musician becomes a grammarian, he has become both at the same time, i.e., both a grammarian and a musician, although he was not so before. But if some being exists now and was not always a being, it must have come to be. Therefore, if “a musician grammarian” is a kind of being, since it did not always exist it must have become both at the same time, i.e., both a musician and a grammarian, because any being admits of some generation. Hence, since these have not come to be at the same time, it is evident that this whole—a musician-grammarian—is not one being.

2274. Nor should it be urged that matter, which is ungenerated, has existence prior to the generation of substances; for it is not the form that properly comes to be but the composite, as has been proved in Book VII (611:C 1423). Now matter does not have prior existence as an actual being but only as a potential one. But here the musician has actual prior existence. Therefore, since he who was a musician has become a grammarian, only a grammarian has come to be, and not the whole-a grammarian musician. Hence this whole is not one being.

2275. For this reason no science that is truly a science and attains certainty is concerned with accidental being. Only sophistry deals with it; and it uses the accidental as though it were something of itself in order to deceive. From this there arises the fallacy of accident, which is most effective in deceiving even those who are wise, as is stated in Book I of the Sophistical Refutations. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that sophistry is concerned with non-being, because it deals with the accidental.

2276. That it is impossible (966).

He shows that it is impossible for any science to consider accidental being, and he does this in two ways. First, he proceeds from the definition of accidental being. He says that, if we consider what accidental being is, it will be evident that there can be no science of it. With a view to proving his point he makes a tripartite division. He says that of things which are said to be there are some which are always and of necessity (not necessity in the sense of force, but in the sense used in demonstrations, as when we say that a triangle necessarily has three angles equal to two right angles; for we use the term necessary in this way to mean what cannot be otherwise). There are others which are for the most part; for example, a man is born with five fingers on each hand. This does not happen always, since it does happen that some are born with six fingers, but it does happen for the most part. And there are others which are neither always and of necessity nor for the most part but are such as occur by chance; for example, “there might be cold weather during the dog days,” i.e., during the days of the dog-star. This occurs neither always and of necessity nor for the most part, though even this kind of being sometimes occurs. But since it happens rarely, and not always and of necessity or for the most part, it is called accidental being.

2277. For things which occur either always or for the most part are such that one is the cause of the other or both are referred to one cause which is the proper cause of each. And they occur in both ways. If a cause produces its effect without fail, the effect will be one that is said to be of necessity. But if a cause can fail because of some obstacle, the effect will be one that occurs for the most part.

2278. But if it so happens in the case of two things that one is not the cause of the other and there is no single common proper cause which links them together, they will seldom be combined. Such is the case, for example, when we say “the musician builds”; for the cause of building is not the art of music but that of building, which differs completely from the art of music. The same thing is true of the previous example; for excessive heat during the dog days is a result of the sun moving closer to the earth; but that there should be cold weather at this time is a result of some other cause, such as Saturn’s being somehow connected with the sun. Hence, if there is cold weather during the dog days, which are caused by the sun, this is accidental.

2279. It is evident, then, that the accidental is what occurs neither always nor for the most part. But every science is concerned with what occurs either always or for the most part, as has been proved in Book I of the Posterior Analytics. Thus it is clear that there can be no science of the accidental.

2280. It is also evident (967).

Second, with a view to making the same point he says that accidental being has no causes and principles such as essential being has; and thus there can be no science of it, since every science is concerned with principles and causes.’He proves this as follows: if accidental being should have proper causes, everything would happen of necessity; for essential beings have a cause such that when it is placed the effect necessarily follows. And if there were some cause from which an effect did not follow of necessity but only for the most part, this would be a result of some obstacle, which can be accidental. If, then, accidental being had a necessary proper cause, so that when this cause is placed its effect necessarily follows (although perhaps it is not necessary to place it), the result would be that everything happens of necessity. He proves this as follows.

2281. Let us suppose that something past or present is the cause of a future effect, and that this cause has already been placed. But when the cause has been placed, as you say, the effect necessarily follows. Therefore, if this past or present thing which has already been placed is the cause of this future effect, and this in turn is the cause of another, the effect will follow not in just any way at all but necessarily. For once the cause has been placed, that whose cause has been placed will necessarily follow, and so on right down to the last thing caused. But this was assumed to be accidental. Therefore that which was assumed to be accidental will happen of necessity. Consequently, everything will happen of necessity; and “the possibility of anything happening by chance,” i.e., any fortuitous event, “or being contingent,” i.e., being accidental, and “of coming to be or not coming to be,” i.e., the possibility of anything being or not being, or being generated or not being generated, will be completely removed from the world.

2282. But because one can meet this argument by saying that the cause of future contingent events has not yet been placed as either present or past but is still contingent and future, and that for this reason its effects are still contingent, he therefore throws out this objection (“And if the cause”). He points out that the same unreasonable conclusion follows if it is held that the cause of future contingent events is not something that already exists in the present or in the past but is something that is coming to be and is future, because it will follow that everything happens of necessity, as has been stated before. For if that cause is future, it must be going to be at some definite time, tomorrow say, and must be quite distinct from the present. Therefore, if an eclipse, which is the proper cause of certain future events, will occur tomorrow, and everything that occurs is a result of some cause, tomorrow’s eclipse must occur “if something else does,” i.e., because of something that existed before, and this in turn because of something else. Thus by always anticipating or subtracting causes some part of the time between the present moment and the future eclipse will be removed. And since that time is limited, and every limited thing is used up when some part of it is removed, we shall therefore reach at some point some cause which exists now. Hence, if that cause is already posited, all future effects will follow of necessity; and thus everything will occur of necessity. But since this is impossible, it is therefore evident that things which are accidental have no determinate cause from which they necessarily follow once it has been placed. Everything that can be said about this has been given in Book VI (543-552:C 1171-90).

2283. Regarding being (968).

Then he shows that accidental being and the being which signifies the truth of a proposition must be omitted from this science. He says that there is one kind of being, “being in the sense of what is true,” or being as signifying the truth of a proposition, and it consists in combination; and there is accidental being.’ The first consists in the combination which the intellect makes and is a modification in the operation of the intellect. Hence the principles of this kind of being are not investigated in the science which considers the kind of being that exists outside of the mind and is separable, as has been stated. The second, i.e., accidental being, is not necessary but indeterminate. Hence it does not have a related cause but an infinite number of causes that are not related to one another. Therefore this science does not consider such being.

2284. And that for the sake (969).

Here he summarizes the things that have been said about an accidental cause, or luck, in Book II of the Physics. There are four points. First, he states what it is; and with a view to investigating this he prefaces his remarks with the statement, “And that for the sake of which,” i.e., what exists for the sake of some end, is found both in those things which exist by nature and in those which are a result of mind. This is evident in Book II of the Physics. He adds that luck is found in those things which occur for the sake of some end, but that it is accidental. For just as we find both essential being and accidental being, so too we find essential causes and accidental causes. Luck, then, is an accidental cause “of those things which come to be for the sake of some end," i.e., some goal, not by nature but by choice. For example, when someone chooses to dig in a field in order to plant a tree and thereupon discovers a treasure, we say that this is accidental because it is unintended. And this happens by luck.

2285. And for this reason (970).

Second, he shows in what instances luck exists. He says that, since there is choice only where there is mind or thought, luck and thought must be concerned with the same thing. Hence luck is not found in those things which lack reason, such as plants, stones and brute animals, or in children who lack the use of reason.

2286. However, the causes (971).

Third, he shows that luck is uncertain. He says that there are an infinite number of causes by which something can happen by luck, as is evident in the examples given; for one can find a treasure by digging in the earth either to plant something or to make a grave or for an infinite number of other reasons. And since everything infinite is unknown, luck is therefore uncertain for human knowledge. And it is called an accidental cause, although absolutely and of itself it is the cause of nothing.

2287. There is good (972).

Fourth, he explains why luck is said to be good or bad. He points out that luck is said to be good or bad because the accidental result is good or bad. And if the accidental result is a great good, it is then called prosperity; and if a great evil, it is then called misfortune.

2288. And since nothing (973).

Fifth, he shows that luck is not the primary cause of things; for nothing that is accidental is prior to things that are essential. Hence an accidental cause is not prior to a proper cause. Thus, if luck and chance, which are accidental causes, are the causes of the heavens, mind and nature, which are proper causes, must be prior causes.

LESSON 9

The Definition of Motion

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1065b 5-1066a 34 1

974. One thing is actual only, another potential, and others both actual and potential; and of these one is a being, another a quantity, and another one of the other categories. Motion is not something apart from things themselves; for a thing is always changed according to the categories of being, and there is nothing that is common to these and in no one category. And each belongs to all its members in a twofold way, for example, this particular thing; for sometimes this is the form of a thing and sometimes its privation. And with regard to quality, one thing is white and another black; and with regard to quantity, one is perfect and another imperfect; and with regard to motion in space, one thing tends upwards and another downwards, or one is light and another heavy. Hence there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are of being.

975. Now since each class of things is divided by potentiality and actuality, I call motion the actualization of what is potential as such.

976. That our account is true becomes evident as follows: when the buildable in the sense in which we call it such actually exists, it is being built; and this is the process of building. The same is true of learning, walking, healing, dancing and bereaving. And motion occurs when something is in this very act, and neither before nor after. Motion, then, belongs to what is potential when it is actual and is engaged in activity, not inasmuch as it is itself, but inasmuch as it is movable.

977. And by the phrase inasmuch as I mean this: bronze is potentially a statue, but the actuality of bronze inasmuch as it is bronze is not motion; for to be bronze and to be some potentiality are not the same. If they were absolutely the same in meaning, the actuality of bronze would be a kind of motion; but they are not the same. This is evident in the case of contraries; for the potentiality of being healed and that of being ill are not the same, because being). healed would then be the same as being ill. But it is the subject which is both healed and ill, whether it be moisture or blood, that is one and the same. And since they are not the same, just as color and the visible object are not the same, it is the actualization of what is potential insofar as it is potential that is motion.

978. That motion is this, and that a thing is being moved when it is actual in this way, and neither before nor after, is evident. For each thing is capable of being at one time actual and at another not, for example, the buildable as buildable; and the actualization of the buildable as buildable is the process of building. For the actuality is either the process of building or this particular house. But when the house exists, it will no longer be buildable; but what is being built is what is buildable. Therefore the process of building must be its actualization; and the process of building is a kind of motion. The same reasoning also applies to other motions.

979. That this account is true is evident from what others say about motion, and because it is not easy to define it otherwise. For one cannot place it in another class.

98o. This is evident from what some say; for they call it otherness and inequality and non-being.

981. However, no one of these is necessarily moved, and change is not to these or from these anymore than to or from their opposites.

982. The reason for putting motion in this class is that it seems to be something indefinite; and the principles in one of the columns of opposites (60) are indefinite because they are privative, for no one of them is either a this or such or any of the other categories.

983. The reason why motion seems to be indefinite is that it cannot be identified either with the potentiality or with the actuality of existing things; for neither what is capable of having a certain quantity nor what actually has it is necessarily being moved. And motion seems to be an actuality, but an incomplete one; and the reason for this is that the potentiality of which it

is the actuality is incomplete. Hence it is difficult to grasp what motion is; for it must be put under privation or under potentiality or under simple actuality; but none of these appear to be possible. It remains, then, that it must be as we have said, i.e., both an actuality and a non-actuality as explained, which is difficult to see but capable of existing.’

984. That motion belongs to the thing moved is evident; for it is the actualization of the thing moved by what is capable of causing motion.

985. And the actuality of what is capable of causing motion is no other than this; for it must be the actuality of both.

986. And a thing is capable of causing motion because of its power, but it is a mover because of its activity.

987. But it is on the thing moved that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality of both alike is one.

988. And it is one just as the distance from one to two and that from two to one are the same, and just as what goes up and what comes down are the same, although their being is not one. The same applies in the case of the mover and the thing moved.

COMMENTARY

2289. Having settled the issue about accidental being, the Philosopher now states his views about motion; and this is divided into three parts. First (974:C 2289), he deals with motion in itself; second (989:C 2314), with infinity, which is a property of motion and of other continuous things (“The infinite”); and third (1005:C 2355), with the division of motion into its species (“Everything which is changed”).

The first is divided into two parts. First, he explains what motion is; and second (984:C 2308), he points out what the subject of motion is (“That motion”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he prefaces his discussion with some points which are necessary for defining motion. Second (975:C 2294), he defines’ motion (“Now since each”). Third (979:C 2299), he proves that the definition of motion is a good one (“That this account”).

In treating the first member of this division he gives four points from which he infers a fifth. The first is that being is divided by actuality and by potentiality. He says that one kind of being is actual only, such as the prime mover, which is God; another is potential only, such as prime matter; and others are both potential and actual, as all intermediate things. Or by the phrase actual only he means what already has a form completely, as what is now completely white; and by potential only, what does not have a form, as what is not white in any way; and by potential and actual, what does not yet have a form completely but is being moved to a form.

2290. The second point is that being is divided by the ten categories, as is implied when he says that there is one kind of being which exists of itself, i.e., substance, and another is quantity, and another is quality, and so on for the other categories.

2291. The third point is that motion does not have a distinct nature separate from other things; but every form insofar as it is in a state of becoming is an imperfect actuality which is called motion. For to be moved to whiteness is the same as for whiteness to begin to become actual in a subject; but it need not be in complete actuality. This is his meaning in saying that motion is not something apart from things themselves; for everything which is being changed is being changed according to the categories of being. And just as the ten categories have nothing in common as their genus, in a similar way there is no genus common to all the kinds of motion. Hence motion is not a category distinct from the others but is a natural concomitant of the other categories.

2292. The fourth point is that a thing is found in any genus in two ways, namely, perfectly and imperfectly; for example, in the genus of substance one thing has the character of a form, and another the character of a privation; and in the genus of quality there is one thing which is perfect, as a white thing, which has a perfect color, and another which is imperfect, as a black thing, which is imperfect in the genus of color. And in the genus of quantity one thing is perfect, and this is called “great,” and another is imperfect, and this is called “small”; and in the genus of place, in which “motion in space” is found, i.e., local motion, one thing tends upwards and another downwards, or one is light and another heavy inasmuch as that is called light which actually rises upwards, and that heavy which actually sinks downwards; and one of these has the character of something perfect and the other the character of something imperfect. The reason is that all the categories are divided by contrary differences; and one contrary always has the character of something perfect, and the other the character of something imperfect.

2293. From these four points he infers a fifth, namely, that there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are of being. He does not say this because there is motion in every genus of being, but because, just as being is divided by actuality and potentiality and by substance and accident and the like, and in terms of perfect and imperfect, so also is motion. This follows from his assertion that motion is not something apart from things. The way in which change and motion differ will be explained below.

2294. Now since each (975).

Next, he defines motion. First, he gives its definition, saying that, since in each genus of being, being is divided by potentiality and actuality, motion is said to be the actualization of what is potential insofar as it is such.

2295. That our account (976).

Second, he explains the definition which has been given; and in regard to this he does two things. First (976:C 2295), he explains what was given in the definition with regard to the subject of motion; and second (978:C 2297), what was given as the genus of motion (“That motion is this”).

In regard to the first member of this division he does two things. First, he explains the part of the definition, what is potential; and second (977:C 2296), the part, insofar as it is such (“And by the phrase”).

He accordingly says, first (976), that it is evidently true from this that motion is as we have described it to be. For it is clear that the term buildable signifies something in potentiality, and that the potentiality in question is presented as being brought to actuality by what is designated as being built; and this actuality is called the process of building. The same thing is also true of other motions, such as walking, altering, and the like. And a thing is said to be being moved when it is coming to be such and such actually and has been such and such potentially, and neither before nor after. If this is so, then, it follows that motion belongs to a thing in potentiality when it is being brought to actuality; and by this I mean that it is being brought to actuality insofar as it is movable; for a thing is said to be movable because it is in potentiality to motion. Hence a potentiality of this kind is being brought to actuality when it is actually being moved; but what is potential “inasmuch as it is itself,” i.e., in reference to what it actually is and in itself, does not have to be brought to actuality by motion. For it actually is this before it begins to be moved. And neither is it being brought to actuality by motion insofar as it is in potentiality to the terminus of motion, because so long as it is being moved it still remains in potentiality to the terminus of motion. But a thing is being brought from potentiality to actuality by motion only in the case of that potentiality which is signified when a thing is said to be movable, i.e., capable of being moved.

2296. And by the phrase (977).

Then he explains a phrase which was given in the definition of motion, namely, insofar as it is such, or inasmuch as it i’s of this kind. With a view to making this clear he says that bronze is in potentiality to being a statue, and thus the subject bronze and bronze in potentiality to being a statue are the same, although they are not the same in their meaning; for the concept of bronze as bronze and that of bronze insofar as it has some potentiality are different; and this is what he means when he says that to be bronze and to be some potentiality are not the same. For if they were the same in their meaning, then just as motion is an actuality of bronze insofar as it is bronze in potentiality, in a similar way motion would be the actuality of bronze insofar as it is bronze. But bronze and the potentiality of bronze do not have the same meaning. This is evident in the case of the potentiality for contraries, because the potentiality “of being healed and that of being ill” do not have the same meaning; for the concept of a potentiality is derived from that of the actuality. Hence, if the potentiality of being healed and that of being ill were the same in meaning, it would follow that being healed and being ill are the same. But this is impossible. Therefore the potentiality for each of two contraries is not the same in meaning, although it is the same in subject. For it is the same subject which can be healed or be ill; and whether that subject is any one at all of the humors in the animal’s body, or the blood, which is more natural and proper to the life and nourishment of the animal, it can be a cause of its being healed or being ill. Since, then, the potentiality of being healed and that of being ill are not the same in meaning, it is evident that neither of these is the same as its subject in meaning, because any two things which are essentially the same as some third thing are themselves essentially the same. Hence, since bronze and bronze in potentiality to being a statue are not the same in meaning, just as color and the visible object are not the same, the phrase insofar as it is such must be added to the statement that motion is the actualization of what is potential.

2297. That motion is this (978).

Then he explains the term which was given as the genus in the definition of motion. That motion is this is evident, he says, because the said motion then exists "when it" (the actuality of what is potential) "is actual in this way," and neither before nor after. For obviously every movable thing can be at one time in a state of actualization and at another not; for the buildable as buildable at one time is in a state of potentiality and at another time is in a state of actualization. He says "the buildable as buildable" because the matter of a house is in potentiality to two things, namely, to the form of a house, and to the process of being built. And it is possible for it at one time to be in a state of potentiality to both and at another to be in a state of actuality. But the potentiality which the matter of a house has for being built is signified by the term buildable. Therefore the buildable as buildable becomes actual when it is being built; and thus the process of building is the actuality of the buildable as buildable.

2298. He proves this as follows: the matter of a house is in potentiality to only two actualities, namely, the act of building the house and the form of the house. But the term buildable signifies a potentiality belonging to the matter of the house. Therefore, since there is some actuality corresponding to every potentiality, the potentiality signified by the term buildable must correspond to one of these two actualities, namely, either to the form of the house or to the act of building. But the form of the house is not the actuality of the buildable as buildable, because when the form of the house develops, the house is no longer buildable but is already built. But the buildable is in a state of actuality when the house is actually being built. Therefore the act of building must be the actuality of the buildable. Now the act of building is a kind of motion; and thus motion is the actuality of the buildable. The same explanation holds for all other motions. It is evident, then, that motion is the actuality of what is potential.

2299. That this account (979).

Then he proves that the definition given is a good one. First, he gives a general proof. He says that it is evident that this definition of motion is a good one if we consider what others have said about motion when they defined it; and also because it cannot easily be defined in a different way. For it cannot be put in any other class than in that of actuality.

2300. This is evident (980).

Second, he states what others have said about motion. He says that some have said that motion is otherness, others inequality, and others non-being. And perhaps they spoke of it thus because the thing being moved gradually loses its initial state, and so long as it is being moved it is always in different states and comes closer to its goal.

2301. However, no one (981).

Third, he shows that the definitions given above are not suitable ones; for they do not fit motion so far as its subject is concerned, i.e., the thing moved. For if motion were non-being or inequality or otherness, it would follow that every non-being or whatever is other or unequal is moved, but it is not necessary that any of these should be moved. Hence motion is not as they have described it to be. The same thing is also apparent with regard to the termini of motion, which are the limits from which and to which there is motion. For motion is not to non-being or inequality or otherness rather than to their opposites, nor is motion from these rather than from their opposites. For there can be motion from nonbeing to being and vice versa, and from otherness to likeness, and from inequality to equality and vice versa.

2302. The reason (982).

Fourth, he shows why some defined motion in the foregoing way. He says that the reason why they put motion in the above-mentioned class is that motion seems to be something indefinite, and things which are privative are indefinite. Hence they assumed that motion is a kind of privation.

2303. It should also be noted, as has been pointed out in Book I (60:C 127) of this work, that the Pythagoreans posited two orders of things, and in one of these, which they called the order of good things, they placed things which seem to be perfect, for example, light, right, male, rest, and the like; and in the other order, which they listed under evil, they placed darkness, left, female, motion and the like. And they said that all such things are indefinite and privative because no one of them seems to signify “either a this,” i.e., substance, “or such,” i.e., quality, or any of the other categories.

2304. The reason why (983).

Fifth, he points out why motion is placed in the class of the indefinite. The reason for this, he says, is that motion can be placed neither in the class of the potential nor in that of the actual; for if it were placed in the class of the potential, it would follow that whatever is in potentiality to something, for example, to have some quantity, would be moved to that quantity. But this is not necessary, because, before a thing begins to be moved to some quantity, it is in potentiality to that quantity. Moreover, it is not being moved when it already actually has that quantity to which it was in potentiality, but the motion has then already been terminated.

2305. But motion must be a kind of actuality, as has been proved above (975:C 2294), although it is an imperfect one. The reason for this is that the thing of which it is the actuality is imperfect, and this is a possible or potential being; for if it were a perfect actuality, the whole potentiality for some definite actuality which is in the matter would be eliminated. Hence perfect actualities are not actualities of something in potentiality but of something in actuality. But motion belongs to something that is in potentiality, because it does not eliminate the potentiality of that thing. For so long as there is motion, the potentiality for that to which it tends by its motion remains in the thing moved. But only the previous potentiality for being moved is eliminated, though not completely; for what is being moved is still in potentiality to motion, because everything which is being moved will be moved, because of the division of continuous motion, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics. It follows, then, that motion is the actuality of what is potential; and thus it is an imperfect actuality and the actuality of something imperfect.

2306. It is because of this that it is difficult to grasp what motion is; for it seems necessary to place motion either in the class of privation, as is evident from the definitions given above, or in the class of potentiality, or in that of simple and complete actuality—none of which may be moved. It follows, then, that motion is as we have described it to be, namely, an actuality, and that it is not called a perfect actuality. This is difficult to grasp, although it can nevertheless be true, because when this is admitted nothing untenable follows.

2307. Some have defined motion by saying that it is the gradual passage from potentiality to actuality. But they erred, because motion must be given in the definition of a passage, since it is a kind of motion. Similarly, time is placed in the definition of the gradual, and motion in the definition of time.

2308. That motion belongs (984).

Then he explains what the subject of motion is. First, he shows that it is the thing moved; because every actuality is found in the thing whose actuality it is. But motion is the actuality of the movable by what is capable of causing motion. Hence it follows that motion is found in the movable or thing moved; and that it is the actualization of this is clear from the above discussion.

2309. And the actuality (985).

Second, he shows how motion is related to a mover; and he gives two points, namely, that motion is the actuality of what is capable of causing motion, and that the actuality of the thing capable of causing motion and that of the thing moved do not differ; for motion must be the actuality of both.

2310. And a thing is capable (986).

Third, he proves the first of these two points, namely, that motion is the actuality of what is capable of causing motion. For the actuality of a thing is that by which it becomes actual. But a thing is said to be capable of causing motion because of its power of moving, and it is said to be a mover because of its activity, i.e., because it is actual. Hence, since a thing is said to be a mover because of motion, motion will be the actuality of what is capable of causing motion.

2311. But it is (987).

Fourth, he proves the second of these points, namely, that the actuality of what is capable of causing motion and the actuality of what is capable of being moved are one and the same motion. He does this as follows: it has been stated that motion is the actuality of what is capable of causing motion inasmuch as it causes motion; and a thing is said to be movable inasmuch as motion is caused in it; but the thing capable of causing motion causes that motion which is found in the thing moved and not a different one. This is what he means when he says that it is on what is movable that the mover is capable of acting. It follows, then, that the actuality of the mover and that of the thing moved are one and the same motion.

2312. And it is one (988).

Fifth, he clarifies this by an example. He says that the distance from one to two and from two to one are the same, although they differ conceptually; and for this reason the distance is signified differently, namely, by the terms double and half. Similarly, the path of an ascent and that of a descent are one, but they differ conceptually; and for this reason some are called ascenders and others descenders. The same applies to a mover and to the thing moved; for the actuality of both is essentially one motion, although they differ conceptually. For the actuality of a mover functions as that from which motion comes, whereas the actuality of the thing moved functions as that in which motion occurs. And the actuality of the thing moved is not that from which motion comes, nor is the actuality of the mover that in which motion occurs. Hence the actuality of the thing causing motion is called action, and that of the thing moved is called undergoing or suffering.

2313. But if action and undergoing are essentially the same thing, it seems that they should not be different categories. However, it should be borne in mind that the categories are distinguished on the basis of a different way of predicating; and thus inasmuch as the same term is differently predicated of different things, it belongs to different categories; for inasmuch as place is predicated of a thing that locates, it belongs to the genus of quantity, but inasmuch as it is predicated denominatively of the located thing it constitutes the category where. Similarly, inasmuch as motion is predicated of the subject in which it is found, it constitutes the category of undergoing; but inasmuch as it is predicated of that from which it comes, it constitutes the category of action.

LESSON 10

The Infinite

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1066a 35-1067a 37[1]

989. The infinite is either what cannot be spanned because it is not naturally fitted to be spanned (just as the spoken word is invisible); or what is imperfectly spanned; or what is spanned with difficulty; or what is not actually spanned, although it admits of being spanned or of having a terminus.

990. Further, a thing may be infinite either by addition or by subtraction or by both.

991. That the infinite should be a separate entity and be perceptible is impossible. For if it is neither a continuous quantity nor a plurality, and is a substance and not an accident, it will be indivisible; for what is divisible is either a continuous quantity or a plurality. But if it is indivisible, it is not infinite, except in the sense in which the spoken word is invisible. But people do not use the term in this sense, nor is this the sense of the infinite which we are investigating, but the infinite in the sense of what cannot be spanned.

992. Further, how can the infinite exist of itself if number and continuous quantity, of which the infinite is an attribute, do not exist of themselves?

993. Again, if the infinite is an accident, it cannot, inasmuch as it is infinite, be an element of existing things, just as the invisible is not an element of speech although the spoken word is invisible.’ It is also evident that the infinite cannot be actual; for any part of it which might be taken

would be infinite, since infinity and the infinite are the same if the infinite is a substance and is not predicated of a subject. Hence it is either indivisible, or if it is divisible, the parts into which it is divided are infinite in number. But it is impossible that the same thing should be many infinites; for, just as a part of air is air, so too a part of the infinite must be infinite if the infinite is a substance and principle. Therefore it cannot be divided into parts, and so is indivisible. But this cannot apply to the actually infinite, for it must be a quantity. Hence it is an accidental attribute. But if this is so, then, as we have said, it cannot be it that is a principle, but that of which it is an accident, for example, air or the even This investigation, then, is universal.

994. That the infinite does not exist in sensible things is made clear as follows: if it is the nature of a body to be bounded by surfaces, then no body, whether it is perceptible or intelligible, can be infinite.

995. Nor can there be any separate and infinite number; for a number or that which has a number is numerable.

996. This is evident from the following argument drawn from nature: the infinite can be neither composite nor simple. It cannot be a composite body if the elements are limited in number; for the contraries must be equal, and no one of them must be infinite; for if the active power of one of two elemental bodies is inferior to that of the other, the finite body will be destroyed by the infinite body. And that each should be infinite is impossible, because a body is what is extended in all directions, and the infinite is what is extended without limit; so if the infinite is a body, it must be infinite in all directions.

997. Nor can the infinite be a single simple body: neither, as some say, something apart from the elements, from which they generate these (for there is no such body apart from the elements, because everything can be dissolved into that of which it is composed; but there does not appear to be anything apart from the simple bodies), nor fire, nor any of the other elements. For unless some of them are infinite, the whole, even though it is finite, could not be or become any one of them, as Heraclitus says that all things at one time become fire. The same reasoning also applies to “the one,” which the philosophers of nature posited as an entity over and above the elements (997). For everything is changed from a contrary, for example, from hot to cold.

998. Again, a sensible body is somewhere, and the place of the whole and that of a part (of the earth, for example) is the same.

999. Hence, if the infinite is composed of like parts, it will be immovable or will always be undergoing motion. But this is impossible. For why should it be moved upwards rather than downwards or in some other direction? For example, if it were a clod of earth, where would it move to or where remain at rest? For the place of the body naturally fitted to this will be infinite. Will it then occupy the whole place? And how will it do this? And what then will be its place of rest and of motion? For if it rests everywhere, it will not be in motion. And if it is moved everywhere, it will not be at rest.

1000. And if the whole is composed throughout of unlike parts, their places will also be unlike. And, first, the body of the whole will be one only by contact; and, second, the parts will be either finite or infinite in species. But they cannot be finite, for some would then be infinite and some not (if the whole is infinite), for example, fire or water. But such an infinite element would necessitate the destruction of contrary elements (996). But if the parts are infinite and simple, their places will be infinite, and the elements will be infinite in number. And since this is impossible, their places will be finite and the whole finite.

1001. And in general there cannot be an infinite body and a place for bodies if every sensible body has either heaviness or lightness; for it will tend either to the center or upwards. But the infinite-either the whole or a half of it-is incapable of any of these motions. For how can you divide it? Or how can one part tend upwards and another downwards, or one part tend to the extreme and another to the center?

1002. Further, every sensible body is in a place, and there are six kinds of place, but these cannot pertain to an infinite body.

1003. And in general if a place cannot be infinite, neither can a body be infinite; for to be in a place is to be somewhere, and this means to be either down or up or in some one of the other places, and each of these is a limit.

1004. And the infinite is not the same in the case of continuous quantity, of motion, and of time, as though it were a single reality; but the secondary member is said to be infinite inasmuch as the primary one is; for example, motion is said to be infinite in reference to the continuous quantity in which it is moved or altered or increased, and time is said to be such in reference to motion.

COMMENTARY

2314. Having given his views about motion, here the Philosopher deals with the infinite, which is an attribute of motion and of any quantity in general. In regard to this he does three things. First (989:C 2314), he distinguishes the various senses in which the term infinite is used. Second (991:C 2322), he shows that the actually infinite does not exist ("That the infinite"). Third (1004:C 2354), he explains how the infinite is found in different things ("And the infinite").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains the different senses in which the term infinite is used; and second (990:C 2319), the various senses in which things are said to be potentially infinite ("Further, a thing").

In regard to the first (989) part it should be borne in mind that every finite thing may be spanned by division. Hence the infinite, properly speaking, is what cannot be spanned by measurement; and therefore the term infinite is used in the same number of senses as the term untraversable.

2315. Now each of these is used in four ways. First, the infinite or untraversable means what cannot be spanned by measurement because it does not belong to the class of things which are naturally fitted to be spanned; for example, we say that the point or the unit or something which is not a quantity and is not measurable is infinite or untraversable; and in this sense the spoken word is said to be invisible because it does not belong to the class of things which are visible.

2316. Second, the infinite or untraversable means what has not yet been spanned although it has begun to be spanned. This is his meaning in saying "what is imperfectly spanned."

2317. Third, the infinite or untraversable means what is spanned with difficulty. Thus we may say that the depth of the sea or the height of the sky is infinite, or that any long distance is immeasurable or untraversable or infinite, because it surpasses our powers of measurement although in itself it is capable of being spanned.

2318. Fourth, the infinite or untraversable means what belongs to the class of things which are naturally fitted to be spanned, or to have some limit set to them, but are not actually spanned; for example, if a line is limitless. This sense of the infinite is the true and proper one.

2319. Further, a thing (990).

Second, he explains the various senses in which things are said to be potentially infinite. He says that in one sense a thing is said to be infinite by addition, as a number; for it is always possible to add a unit to any number, and in this respect number is capable of infinite increase.

2320. In another sense a thing is said to be infinite by subtraction or division inasmuch as a continuous quantity is said to be infinitely divisible.

2321. In a third sense it is possible for a thing to be infinite from both points of view; for example, time is said to be infinite both as regards division, because it is continuous, and as regards addition, because it is a number. It is in a similar way that the infinite is found in motion.

2322. That the infinite (991).

Then he shows that the actually infinite does not exist; and in regard to this it should be noted that the Platonists held that the infinite is separate from sensible things and is a principle of them, whereas the philosophers of nature held that the infinite exists in sensible things, not in the sense that it is a substance, but rather in the sense that it is an accident of some sensible body. He therefore shows, first (991:C 2322), that the infinite is not a separate entity; and second (994:C 2327), that the actually infinite does not exist in sensible things ("That the infinite does not").

In treating the first member of this division he gives three arguments. The first is as follows: if the infinite is a substance which exists of itself and is not an accident of some subject, the infinite must lack continuous quantity and plurality, because continuous quantity and number constitute the subject of the infinite. But if it lacks continuous quantity and plurality, it must be indivisible, because everything divisible is either a continuous quantity or a plurality. But if it is indivisible, it is infinite only in the first sense of the term, as a spoken word is said to be invisible. However, we are not investigating this sense of the term here, nor did they use the term in this sense; but we are considering the fourth sense, i.e., what is untraversable. Therefore, all things considered, if the infinite were an independently existing substance, it would not be truly infinite. This position destroys itself in this way.

2323. Further, how can (992).

Then he gives the second argument, which runs thus: infinity is an attribute of number and of continuous quantity. But number and continuous quantity are not things which have separate existence, as has been shown in Book I (122:C 239) and will be shown below (993:C 2324). Therefore much less is the infinite a separate substance.

2324. Again, if the infinite (993).

Here he gives the third argument, which runs as follows. Let us suppose that the infinite is either a substance which is separate from sensible things or an accident belonging to some separate subject, for example, to continuous quantity or to number-which are separate according to the Platonists. Now if the infinite is assumed to be an accident, it cannot be the infinite as infinite that is a principle of existing things, but rather the subject of the infinite; just as what is invisible is not said to be a principle of speech, but the spoken word, although the spoken word is invisible in this sense.

2325. And if the infinite is assumed to be a substance and is not predicated of a subject, it is also evident that it cannot be actually infinite; for it is either divisible or indivisible. But if the infinite itself as infinite is a substance and is divisible, any part of it which might be taken would necessarily be infinite; because infinity and the infinite are the same “if the infinite is a substance,” i.e., if infinity expresses the proper intelligible structure of the infinite. Hence, just as a part of water is water and a part of air is air, so too any part of the infinite is infinite if the infinite is a divisible substance. We must say, then, that the infinite is either indivisible or divisible into many infinites. But many infinite things cannot possibly constitute one finite thing; for the infinite is not greater than the infinite, but every whole is greater than any of its parts.

2326. It follows, then, that the infinite is indivisible. But that any indivisible thing should be actually infinite is impossible, because the infinite must be a quantity. Therefore it remains that it is not a substance but an accident. But if the infinite is an accident, it is not the infinite that is a principle, but the subject of which it is an accident (as was said above), whether it be air, as some of the natural philosophers claimed, or the even, as the Pythagoreans claimed. Thus it follows that the infinite cannot be both a substance and a principle of beings at the same time. Last, he concludes that this investigation is a general one which goes beyond the study of natural things.

2327. That the infinite does not exist (994).

Then he proves that the actually infinite does not exist in sensible things. First (994:C 2327), he proves this by probable arguments; and second (996:C 2330), by arguments drawn from nature (“This is evident”).

He accordingly says, first (994), that it is obvious that the actually infinite is not found in sensible things; and he proves two points. First, he says that there is no infinite body in the sensible world, for it is the nature of a body to be bounded by surfaces. But no body with a definite surface is infinite. Therefore no body is infinite, “whether it be perceptible,” i.e., a natural body, “or intelligible,” i.e., a mathematical one.

2328. Nor can there be (995).

Second, he shows in the following way that there is no infinite number in sensible things. Every number and everything which has a number is numerable. But nothing numerable is infinite, because what is numerable can be spanned by numeration. Therefore no number is infinite.

2329. Now these arguments do not pertain to natural philosophy, because they are not based on the principles of a natural body but on certain principles which are common and probable and not necessary. For anyone who would claim that a body is infinite would not maintain that its surface has limits, for this characteristic belongs to the nature of a finite body. And anyone who would claim that there is an infinite multitude would not hold that it is a number, because number is multitude measured by one, as has been explained in Book X (875-C 2090). But nothing measured is infinite.

2330. This is evident (996).

Next, he proves that the actually infinite does not exist within sensible things, by using arguments drawn from nature. He does this, first (996:C 2330), with reference to the active and passive powers of bodies; and second (998:C 2339), with reference to place and the thing in place (“Again, a sensible body”).

Now active and passive powers, Place and thing in place are proper to natural bodies as such; and therefore he says that these arguments are drawn from nature. He accordingly says, first (996), that, if a body is perceptible and infinite, it wilt be either a simple body or a composite body or compound.

2331. First, he shows that a composite body cannot be infinite, if we assume that simple bodies, which are the elements of composite bodies, are finite in number. He proves this as follows: either all the elements must be infinite in quantity, or one must be infinite and the others finite, otherwise an infinite body could not be composed of elements which are finite in number.

2332. But that one of the elements should be infinite and the rest finite is impossible; because in the case of a compound contraries must somehow be equalized in order that the compound may be preserved in being, for otherwise that contrary which exceeds the others will destroy them. But if one contrary is infinite and the rest finite, no equality will be established, since there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite. A compound, then, could not exist, for the infinite element would destroy the others.

2333. And since someone might say that a body which is finite in quantity has greater power, and that equality is achieved in this way (for example, if someone were to say that in a compound air is infinite and fire finite), he therefore adds that, even if we suppose that the active power of one body which is assumed to be infinite falls short of the active power of any one of the others, because these are assumed to be finite, the finite element will be destroyed by the infinite one; for a finite body must have a finite power, and then finite fire will have a finite power. Hence, if from infinite air a portion of air equal to the fire is taken out, its power will be less than that of the whole infinite air, but proportioned to the power of fire. Let us suppose, then, that the power of fire is a hundred times greater than that of air. Hence, if we take away a hundredfold of air from infinite air it will be equal to fire in power; and thus the whole infinite air will have a greater infinite power than fire and will destroy it. It is impossible, then, that one element of a compound should be infinite and the rest finite.

2334. Similarly, it is impossible that all should be infinite, because a body is what is extended in every dimension. But the infinite is what is infinite in dimension. Hence an infinite body must have an infinite dimension in every direction. But two bodies cannot be in the same place. Therefore two infinite bodies cannot be combined into one.

2335. Nor can the infinite (997).

Second, he proves that the infinite cannot be a simple body. There cannot be a simple body apart from the elements, from which all of them are generated, as some claimed air to be, because each thing is dissolved into the elements of which it is composed. But we see that compounds are dissolved only into the four elements; and therefore there cannot be a simple body apart from the four elements.

2336. Nor can fire or any of the other elements be infinite, because no element could possibly exist except the one which is infinite, since it would fill every place. Again, if there were some finite element it would have to be changed into that infinite element because of the very great power of the latter; just as Heraclitus claimed that at some time all things must be changed into the element fire because of its very great power.

2337. And the same argument therefore applies to the one simple body which the natural philosophers posited as an entity over and above the elements themselves; for it would have to be opposed to the other elements as a kind of contrary, since according to them there is change from that one body alone into the others. But every change in things is from one contrary to another. Therefore, since one of two contraries destroys the other, it follows that, if that body which is supposed to exist apart from the elements is infinite, it will destroy the others.

2338. The philosopher omits the celestial body here, because, while it is something apart from the four elements, it is not contrary or repugnant to them in any way, nor are these bodies naturally derived from it. For the philosophers of nature who posited an actually infinite body did not attain any knowledge of this fifth essence or nature. Yet in The Heavens Aristotle proves that even a celestial body, which moves circularly, is not actually infinite.

2339. Again, a sensible body (998).

Then he proves that a sensible body is not infinite; and he does this by means of arguments based upon place and a thing in place. He gives three arguments. As a sort of preamble to the first he considers two points necessary for its development. The first is that every sensible body is in a place. He emphasizes sensible in order to distinguish this kind of body from a mathematical one, to which place and contact are attributed only figuratively.

2340. The second point is that the natural place of a whole and that of a part are the same, i.e., the place in which it naturally rests and to which it is naturally moved. This is clear, for instance, in the case of earth and of any part of it, for the natural place of each is down.

2341. Hence, if the infinite (999).

After giving these two points he states his argument, which runs as follows. If a sensible body is assumed to be infinite, either its parts will all be specifically the same, as is the case with bodies having like parts, such as air, earth, blood, and so on, or they will be specifically different.

2342. But if all of its parts are specifically the same, it will follow that the whole will always be at rest or always in motion. Each one of these is impossible and incompatible with the facts of sensory perception.

2343. For why should it (ibid.).

Then he shows that the other alternative has to be accepted; for it has already been assumed that the natural place of a whole and that of a part are the same. And it is evident that every body is at rest when it is in its natural place, and that it naturally moves to its natural place when it is outside of it. If, then, the whole place occupied by a body having an infinite number of like parts is natural to it, this place must be natural to each part, and thus the whole and each of its parts will be at rest. But if it is not natural to it, the whole and each of its parts will then be outside their proper place; and thus the whole and any part of it will always be in motion.

2344. For it cannot be said that some part of a place is natural to the whole and to its parts, and that some part of a place is not; because, if a body were infinite and every body were in a place, its place would also have to be infinite. But in infinite place there is no dividedness by reason of which one part of it is the natural place of the body and another is not, because there must be some fixed proportion and distance between a place which is natural and one which is not, and this cannot apply to an infinite place. This is what he means when he says that an infinite body or one of its parts will not be moved downwards rather than upwards or in some other direction, because in an infinite place it is impossible to find any fixed proportion between these parts.

2345. He gives an example of this. If we assume that the earth is infinite, it will be impossible to give any reason why it should be in motion or at rest in one place rather than in another, because the whole infinite place will be equally fitted by nature to the infinite body which occupies this place. Hence, if some part of a place is naturally fitted to a clod of earth, the same will apply to another part; and if one part is not naturally fitted to a Place, neither will another be. If, then, an infinite body is in a place, it will fill the whole of that infinite place. Yet how can it be at rest and in motion at the same time? For if it rests everywhere, it will not be in motion ; or if it is in motion everywhere, it follows that no part of it will be at rest.

2346. And if the whole (1000).

Then the Philosopher examines the other alternative, namely, the supposition that the whole is not composed of like parts. He says that it follows, first, that, if “the body of the whole,” i.e., of the universe, is composed of specifically unlike parts, it will be one only by contact, as a pile of stones is one. But things specifically different, such as fire, air and water, cannot be continuous; and this is not to be one in an absolute sense.

2347. Again, if this whole is composed of parts which are specifically unlike, they will be either infinite in species, i.e., so that the different parts of the whole are infinite in species; or they will be finite in species, i.e., so that the diversity of species found among the parts amount to some fixed number.

2348. But that the elements cannot be finite in species is clear from what was proposed in the preceding argument; for it would be impossible for an infinite whole to be composed of parts which are finite in number, unless either all parts were infinite in quantity, which is impossible, since an infinite body must be infinite in any of its parts, or at least unless some part or parts were infinite. Therefore, if a whole were infinite and its parts were different species infinite in number, it would follow that some of them would be infinite and some finite in quantity—for example, if one were to assume that water is infinite and fire finite. But this position introduces corruption among contraries, because an infinite contrary would destroy other contraries, as has been shown above (996:C 2332). Therefore they cannot be finite in number.

2349. But if the parts of the universe were infinite in species, and these must be assumed to be simple, it would follow that places would be infinite and that the elements would be infinite. But both of these are impossible; for since each simple body has a place naturally fitted to it which is specifically different from the place of another body, if there were an infinite number of simple bodies which are different in species, it would also follow that there are an infinite number of places which are different in species. This is obviously false; for the species of places are limited in number, and these are up and down, and so on. It is also impossible that the elements should be infinite in number, because it would then follow that they would remain unknown; and if they were unknown, all things would be unknown. Therefore, if the elements cannot be infinite, places must be finite, and consequently the whole must be finite.

2350. And in general (1001).

Here he gives the second argument. He says that, since every sensible body has a place, it is impossible for any sensible body to be infinite, granted the assumption that every sensible body has heaviness and lightness-which would be true according to the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who claimed that bodies are actually infinite. Aristotle, however, is of the opinion that there is a sensible body which does not have heaviness or lightness, namely, a celestial body, as he proved in The Heavens. He introduces this circumstantially, as admitted by his opponents, but not in the sense that it is unqualifiedly true. If every sensible body, then, is either heavy or light and some sensible body is infinite, it must be heavy or light; and therefore it must be moved upwards or towards the center; for a light thing is defined as one that rises upwards, and a heavy thing as one that tends towards the center. But this cannot apply to the infinite, either to the whole of it or to a part; for the center of a body is found only when a proportion is established between the boundaries by dividing the whole. But the infinite cannot be divided according to any proportion; and therefore neither up and down nor boundary and center can be found there.

2351. This argument must be understood to apply even if one assumes that there is a third kind of body which is neither heavy nor light; for such a body is naturally moved around the center, and this could not be the case with an infinite body.

2352. Further, every sensible body (1002).

The Philosopher now gives the third argument, which runs thus: every sensible body is in a place. But there are six kinds of place: up and down, right and left, before and behind; and it is impossible to attribute these to an infinite body, since they are ihe limits of distances. Thus it. is impossible that a place should be attributed to an infinite body; and therefore no sensible body is infinite. However, in saying that there are six kinds of place he does not mean that these places are distinguished because of the elements (for their motions are distinguished merely in terms of up and down) but only because, just as up and down are out of the question so far as an infinite body is concerned, so are all the other differences of place.

2353. And in general if (1003).

He gives the fourth argument, which is as follows. Every sensible body is in a place; but it is impossible for a place to be infinite; and therefore it is impossible for a body to be infinite. The way in which it is impossible for a place to be infinite he proves thus: whatever has a common term predicated of it must also have predicated of it any of the things which fall under that common term; for example, whatever is an animal must belong to some particular species of animal, and whatever is man must be some particular man. Similarly, whatever occupies an infinite place must be "somewhere," i.e., it must occupy some place. But to occupy some place is to be up or down or to be in some one of the other kinds of place. However, none of these can be infinite because each is the limit of some distance. It is impossible, then, that a place should be infinite, and the same applies to a body.

2354. And the infinite (1004).

Then he shows how the potentially infinite is found in different things. He says that it is found in continuous quantity, in motion, and in time, and it is not predicated of them univocally but in a primary and a secondary way. And the secondary member among them is always said to be infinite inasmuch as the primary member is; for example, motion is said to be infinite in reference to the continuous quantity in which something is moved locally or increased or altered; and time is said to be infinite in reference to motion. This must be understood as follows: infinite divisibility is attributed to what is continuous, and this is done first with reference to continuous quantity, from which motion derives its continuity. This is evident in the case of local motion because the parts of local motion are considered in relation to the parts of continuous quantity. The same thing is evident in the case of the motion of increase, because increase is noted in terms of the addition of continuous quantity. However, this is not as evident in the case of alteration, although in a sense it also applies there; because quality, which is the realm of alteration, is divided accidentally upon the division of continuous quantity. Again, the intensification and abatement of a quality is also noted inasmuch as its subject, which has continuous quantity, participates in some quality to a greater or lesser degree.

And motion is referred to continuity, and so is a continuous time; for since time in itself is a number, it is continuous only in a subject, just as ten measures of cloth are continuous because the cloth is continuous. The term infinite, then, must be used of these three things in the same order of priority as the term continuous is.

LESSON 11

Motion and Change

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1005. Everything which is changed is changed either accidentally, as when we say that a musician walks; or it is changed without qualification because something belonging to it is changed, as what is changed in some of its parts; for example, the body is said to be healed because the eye is. And there is some primary thing which is moved of itself, and this is what is essentially movable.

1006. The same division applies to a mover, for it causes motion either accidentally or in some part of itself or essentially.

1007. And there is a primary mover and something which is moved. And there is also a time in which it is moved, and something from which it is moved, and something to which it is moved. But the forms and modifications and place to which things in motion are moved are immovable, as science and heat. Heat is not motion, but heating is.

1008. Now change which is not accidental is not found in all things, but between contraries and between their intermediates and between contradictories. We may be convinced of this by induction. Whatever is changed is changed either from a subject to a subject, or from a non-subject to a non-subject, or from a subject to a non-subject, or from a non-subject to a subject. And by subject I mean what is expressed by an affirmative term. Hence there must be three changes; for to go from a non-subject to a non-subject is not change, because, since the limits are neither contraries nor contradictories, there is no opposition (1008).

1009. The change from a non-subject to a subject which is its contradictory is generation; and if it is unqualified, it is generation in an unqualified sense, and if in a part, partial generation; and the change from a subject to a non-subject is destruction.

1010. If non-being has several different meanings, then neither that which involves a combination or separation of terms, nor that which refers to potentiality and is opposed to being in an unqualified sense, is capable of being moved (for what is not-white or not-good can be moved only accidentally, since what is not-white may be a man). But non-being in an unqualified sense cannot be moved in any way, because it is impossible for non-being to be moved. And if this is so, generation cannot be motion, because non-being is generated. For even if it is most certainly generated accidentally, it will still be true to say that what is generated in an unqualified sense is non-being. The same argument applies to rest. These are the difficulties, then, which result from this view. And if everything moved is in a place, though non-being is not in a place, it would have to be somewhere. Nor is destruction motion; for the contrary of motion is motion or rest, but the contrary of destruction is generation.

1011. And since every motion is a kind of change, and the three changes are those described (1008), and of these those which refer to generation and destruction are not motions, and these are changes between contradictories, only change from a subject to a subject must be motion. And the subjects are either contraries or their intermediates—for privation is given as a contrary—and they are expressed by an affirmative term, for example, naked or toothless or black.

COMMENTARY

2355. Having explained what motion is, and having dealt with the infinite, which is a certain attribute of motion, here the Philosopher establishes the truth about the parts of motion. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1005:C 2355) he distinguishes the parts of motion; and in the second (1021:C :2404) he explains the connection between motion and its parts (“Things which are”).

The first is divided into three members, corresponding to the three divisions which he makes in motion, although one of these is included under the other as a subdivision of the preceding division.

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he divides motion with regard to the thing moved; and second (ioo6:C 2358), with regard to a mover ("The same division").

He accordingly says, first (1005), that a thing may be changed in three ways. In one way a thing may be changed only accidentally, as when something is said to be changed because the thing to which it belongs is changed, whether it belongs to it as an accident to a subject, as when we say that a musician walks, or as a substantial form to matter, as the soul belongs to the body which is moved; or as a part is said to be moved when the whole is moved, or also as something contained is moved when its container is moved, as a sailor is said to be in motion when his ship is in motion.

2356. In a second way a thing is said to be changed without qualification because some part of it is changed, as those things which are moved in some part; for example, the body of a man is said to be healed because the eye is; and this is to be moved essentially but not in the first instance.

2357. In a third way a thing is said to be moved primarily and of itself; as when some whole is moved in its totality, for example, when a stone is moved downwards.

2358. The same division (1006).

He then gives the same division with regard to a mover; for a thing is said to be a mover in three ways. First, a thing is said to cause motion accidentally; as when a musician builds.

2359. Second, a thing is said to be a mover in regard to some one of its parts; as when a man strikes and injures someone with his hand.

2360. Third, a thing is said to be a mover essentially; as when fire heats and a physician heals.

2361. And there is (1007).

Then he gives a second division of motion or change, and in regard to this he does three things. First (1007:C 2361), he prefaces his discussion with certain points which are necessary for an understanding of the division of motion. Second (1008:C 2363), he divides motion ("Now change"). Third (1009:C 2366), he explains the division of change ("The change").

He says, first, that there are five things found in every change. First, there is a primary mover; second, something which is moved; third, a time during which the motion takes place, because every motion occurs in time; fourth, a starting point from which motion begins; and fifth, a terminus to which the motion proceeds. However, motion or change is not divided into species either on the basis of the mover or of the thing moved or of time, because these are common to every change; but it is divided on the basis of the starting point from which it begins and the terminus to which it proceeds.

2362. He therefore explains the last two, saying that “the forms,” i.e., specifying principles, “modifications,” i.e., qualities, and “place,” are limits of motion, because those things which are movable are moved with respect to these. He uses the term forms, because of generation; modifications, because of alterations; and place, because of local motion. He gives examples of modifications by using science and heat. And because it might seem to some that heat is the sam6 as alteration, and then it would follow that heat is motion and not a limit or terminus of motion, he therefore says that heat is not motion but heating is.

2363. Now change (1008).

Then, passing over two parts of the first division, he takes the third, namely, change which is neither accidental nor in a part, and subdivides it according to its limits. He says that change which is not accidental is not found between just any limits whatever; but its limits must either be contraries, as change from white to black, or intermediates, as change from black to red and from red to gray; or there is change between contradictories, as from white to not-white, and vice versa. He says nothing of privative opposites because they are found between contradictories and contraries and are understood to come under these.

2364. He shows by induction that change takes place only between the above-mentioned limits; for the limits of change admit of four possible combinations: first, when both limits are affirmative or positive terms, as when something is said to be changed from white to black, and this change he describes as one from subject to subject; second, when both limits are negative terms, as when something is said to be changed from not-white to not-black, or in his words, from non-subject to non-subject; third, when the starting point from which change begins is a positive term and the terminus to which it proceeds is a negative one, as when a thing is said to be changed from white to not-white, or as he says, from subject to non-subject; fourth, when the starting point of change is a negative term and the terminus to which it proceeds is a positive one, as when a thing is said to be changed from not-white to white, or as he says, from a non-subject to a subject. He explains the meaning of the term subject which he had used, as what is signified by an affirmative or positive term.

2365. Now one of these four combinations is useless; for there is no change from a non-subject to a non-subject, because two negative terms, such as not-white and not-black, are neither contraries nor contradictories since they are not opposites; for they can be affirmed truly of the same subject because there are many things which are neither white nor black. Hence, since change is between opposites, as is proved in Book I of the Physics, it follows that there is no change from a non-subject to a non-subject. Therefore there must be three kinds of change, two of which relate to contradiction and the other to contrariety.

2366. The change (1009).

Then he shows what these three changes are; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that generation and destruction are two of these. Second (1010:C 2368), he shows that neither of these is motion ("If non-being"). Third (1011:C 2375), he draws his conclusion as to which change is called motion ("And since every").

He accordingly says, first (1009), that of the three changes mentioned above, that which is from a non-subject to a subject, or between contradictory terms, is called generation. And this is twofold; for there is change either from non-being in an unqualified sense to being in an unqualified sense (generation in an unqualified sense), and this occurs when a movable subject is changed substantially; or there is change from non-being to being, not in an unqualified sense but in a qualified one, for example, change from not-white to white (generation in a qualified sense).

2367. But that change which proceeds from a subject to a non-subject is called destruction; and in this change we also distinguish between destruction in an unqualified sense and in a qualified one, just as we did in the case of generation.

2368. If non-being (1010).

Then the Philosopher shows that neither of these changes is motion. First (1010:C 2368), he shows that this is true of generation; and second (ibid.), that it is true of destruction (“Nor is destruction”).

He accordingly says, first (1010), that the term non-bring is used in the same number of senses as being is. One meaning is the combination and separation found in a proposition; and since this does not exist in reality but only in the mind, it cannot be moved.

2369. Being and non-being are used in another sense with reference to actuality and potentiality. That which is actual is a being in an unqualified sense, but that which is potential only is a non-being. He therefore says that even that sort of non-being which is a being potentially but not actually cannot be moved.

2370. He explains why he had said that actual non-being is opposed to being in an unqualified sense, when he adds “for what is not-white.” For potential being, which is opposed to actual being and is not being in an unqualified sense, can be moved, because what is not not-white actually or not-good actually can be moved, but only accidentally. For what is moved is not the not-white itself, but the subject in which this privation is found, and this is an actual being. For that which is not white may be a man, but that which is an actual non-being in an unqualified sense, i.e., in substance, cannot be moved at all. Now if all of these statements are true, I say, it is impossible for non-being to be moved. And if this is the case, generation cannot be motion, because non-being is generated. For generation, as has been pointed out (1009:C 2366), proceeds from non-being to being. Hence, if generation in an unqualified sense were motion, it would follow that non-being in an unqualified sense would be moved.

2371. But one can raise an objection to this process of reasoning by saying that non-being is generated only accidentally; for “the subject of generation,” i.e., a being in potentiality, is generated essentially. But non-being signifies privation in a matter. Hence it is generated only accidentally.

2372. For even if (ibid.).

Then he refutes this objection. He says that, even if a being is generated only accidentally, nevertheless it is true to say that what is generated in an unqualified sense is non-being. And of each of these it is true to say that it cannot be moved. Similarly it cannot be at rest, because non-being in an unqualified sense is neither in motion nor at rest. These are the untenable results if one maintains that generation is motion.

2373. In order to show that nonbeing is not moved, he adds that everything which is moved is in a place because local motion is the first of all motions, whereas non-being in an unqualified sense is not in a place; for [were it moved] it would then be somewhere. Hence it cannot be moved; and therefore generation is not motion.

2374. Nor is destruction (ibid.).

From these considerations he further shows that destruction is not motion; for the only thing that is opposed to motion is motion or rest. But destruction is opposed to generation. Therefore, if destruction were motion, generation would have to be either motion or rest. But this cannot be true, as has been shown.

2375. And since every motion (1011).

Next he shows which change is said to be motion. He says that every motion is a kind of change. But there are only three changes, and two of these, which involve contradictories, i.e., generation and destruction, are not motion. It follows, then, that only change from a subject to a subject is motion. And since the subjects between which motion takes place must be opposed to each other, they must be contraries or intermediates; for even though a privation is expressed by an affirmative term, such as naked, toothless, and black, it is regarded as a contrary, because privation is the primary contrariety, as has been pointed out in Book X (852:C 2049). And he says that black is a privation not in an unqualified sense but inasmuch as it participates deficiently in the nature of its genus.

LESSON 12

Motion Pertains to Quantity, Quality and Place

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1012. If the categories are divided into substance, quality, place, action, passion, relation and quantity, there must be three kinds of motion, namely, of quality, of quantity and of place.

1013. There is no motion of substance, because substance has no contrary.

1014. Nor is there motion of relation; for it is possible that, when one of two relative things has undergone a change, the other may be truly referred to under a new term even though it has not been changed in any way. Hence the motion of these relative things will be accidental.

1015. Nor is there motion of agent or of patient as of mover and thing moved, because there is no motion of motion or generation of generation. There are two ways in which there might be motion of motion. First, motion might be of the subject moved, as a man is moved because he is changed from white to black. Thus motion might be heated or cooled or might change its place or might increase. But this is impossible, for change is not a subject. Or, second, some other subject might be changed from change to some other form of being, as a man might be changed from sickness to health. But this is possible only accidentally; for every motion is a change from one thing to something else. The same applies to generation and destruction; although the opposites involved in these changes are different from those of motion. Therefore a man changes at the same time from health to sickness, and from this change itself to another. And it is evident that, if a man has become ill, he will be changed into something else whatever it may be (for he can come to rest); and further this will always be to some opposite which is not contingent; and that change will be from something to something else. Hence, its opposite will be becoming healthy; but this will happen accidentally; for example, there is a change from recollection to forgetting, because the subject to which forgetting belongs is changed, sometimes to a state of knowledge and sometimes to one of ignorance.

1016. Further, the process will go on to infinity if there is change of change and generation of generation. Therefore, if the latter comes to be, the former must also; for example, if generation in an unqualified sense at one time was coming to be, that which is coming to be something was also coming to be. Hence that which was coming to be in an unqualified sense did not yet exist, but there was something which was coming to be, or which has already come to be. Therefore, if this also at one time was coming to be, then at that time it was not coming to be something. However, since there is no first term in infinite things, neither will there be a subsequent one. Hence it is impossible for anything to come to be or be moved or be changed in any way.

1017. Further, of the same thing of which there is contrary motion and rest there is also generation and destruction. Hence when that which is coming to be becomes that which is coming to be, it is then being destroyed; for it is not destroyed as soon as it is generated or afterwards; for that which is being destroyed must be.

1018. Further, there must be some matter underlying the thing which is coming to be or being changed. What then will it be that becomes motion or generation in the same way that a body or a soul or something else of this kind is alterable? Further, what is the thing to which motion proceeds; for motion must be of this particular thing from this to that, and yet the latter should not be a motion at all. In what way then is this to take place? For there can be no learning of learning, and therefore no generation of generation (1008-9).

1019. And since there is no motion of substance or of relation or of action or of passion, it follows that there is motion of quality, of quantity and of location; for each of these admits of contrariety. By quality I mean, not that which comes under the category of substance (for even difference is quality), but the passive power in virtue of which a thing is said to be acted upon or to be incapable of being acted upon.

1020. The immovable is what is totally incapable of being moved, or what is moved with difficulty over a long period of time or begins to be moved slowly, or what is naturally fit to be moved but is not capable of being moved when it is so fit, and where, and in the way in which it would naturally be moved. And this is the only kind of immobility which I call rest; for rest is contrary to motion. Hence it will be the privation of what is receptive of motion.

COMMENTARY

2376. Having divided change into generation, destruction and motion, here he subdivides the other member of this division, Le, motion, on the basis of the categories in which it takes place. In regard to this he does two things. First (1012:C 2376), he indicates the categories in which motion can be found. Second (1020:C 2401), he explains the different senses in which the term immovable is used (“The immovable”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he sets forth his thesis. Second (1013:C 2378), he proves this (“There is no motion”). Third (1019:C 2399), he draws his main conclusion (“And since”).

He accordingly says, first (1012), that, since the categories are divided into substance, quality and so on, and since there cannot be motion in the other categories, there are therefore three categories of being in which motion can be found; that is, quality, quantity and location, for which he substitutes the term place, because location merely signifies being in a place; and to be moved with respect to place is merely to be moved with respect to one’s location. For motion with respect to place is not attributed to a subject in which place inheres but to the thing in place.

2377. Now it should be noted that he seems to omit three categories, namely, temporal situation (quando), posture and accoutrement; for since temporal situation signifies being in time, and time is the measure of motion, the reason why there is no motion in the category of temporal situation or in that of action and of passion, which signify motion itself under special aspects, is the same. And posture adds nothing to location except a definite arrangement of parts, which is nothing else than a definite relationship of parts to each other. And accoutrement implies the relation of one clothed to his clothing. Hence the reason why there does not seem to be motion with respect to posture and to accoutrement and to relation seems to be the same.

2378. There is no motion (1013).

Next, he proves his thesis; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1013:C 2378) he shows that there is no motion with respect to substance; second 0014:C 2385), that there is no motion with respect to relation ("Nor is there motion"); and third (1015:C 2386), that there is no motion with respect to action and passion ("Nor is there motion of agent").

He accordingly proves, first (1013), that there cannot be motion with respect to substance because motion is a change from subject to subject. Therefore the two subjects between which there is motion are either contraries or intermediates. Hence, since nothing is contrary to substance, it follows that there cannot be motion with respect to substance, but only generation and destruction, whose limits are opposed to each other as contradictories and not as contraries, as has been stated above (1009:C 2366).

2379. Now it seems that his statement that "substance has no contrary" is false, because fire clearly appears to be contrary to water, and because Aristotle had proved in Book I of The Heavens that the heavens are not destructible since they do not have a contrary, whereas other bodies, which are corruptible, have a contrary.

2380. Hence some said that there is nothing contrary to the whole composite substance because the subject of contraries must be one; but nothing prevents a substantial form from having a contrary. For they said that heat is the substantial form of fire. But this cannot be true, because substantial forms are not perceptible of themselves. And again it is evident that in other bodies heat and cold are accidents. But what belongs to the category of substance cannot be an accident in anything.

2381. Others have said that heat and cold are not the substantial forms of fire and water, but that their substantial forms are contraries differing in degree, and are, so to speak, intermediate between substance and accidents. But this is wholly unreasonable; for, since form is the principle of a species, if the forms of fire and of water are not truly substantial, neither are fire and water true species in the category of substance. It is impossible, then, that there should be an intermediate between substance and accidents, because they belong to different categories, and between such things an intermediate does not fall, as has been shown above in Book X (881:C 2102); and also because the definitions of substance and accident have no intermediate. For a substance is a being of itself, whereas an accident is not a being of itself but has being in something else.

2382. It is necessary then to say that substantial forms cannot be contraries, because contraries are extremes of a certain definite distance, and in a sense they are continuous, since motion is i one contrary to another. In those categories, then, in which no such continuous and definite distance is found, it is impossible to find a contrary, as is clear in the case of numbers. For the distance between one number and another does not mean continuity but the addition of units. Hence number is not contrary to number, nor similarly is figure contrary to figure.

2383. The same thing applies to substances because the intelligible structure of each species consists in a definite unity. But since form is the basis of difference, if substantial forms are not contrary to each other, it follows that contrariety cannot be found between differences.

2384. It is necessary to say, then, that a substantial form, considered in itself, constitutes a species in the category of substance; but according as one form implies the privation of another, different forms are the principles of contrary differences. For in one respect a privation is a contrary, and living and non-living, rational and irrational, and the like are opposed in this way.

2385. Nor is there motion of relation (1014).

Next, he shows that there is no motion in the proper sense in the category of relation except accidentally. For just as a thing is moved accidentally when motion takes place in it only as a result of something else being moved, in a similar way motion is said to be accidental to a thing when it takes place in it only because something else is moved. Now we find this in the category of relation; for unless something else is changed, it is not true to say that change occurs in relation; for example, the unequal comes from the equal only when there has been change in quantity. Similarly the like comes from the unlike only when there has been a change in quality. Thus we see that one of two relative things is said to be changed when change affects the other one of them; for example, a thing which is unmoved of itself changes from left to right when some other thing changes its place. Hence it follows that there is motion in the category of relation only accidentally.

2386. Nor is there motion of agent (1015).

Here he shows that motion does not occur with respect to either action or passion. He proves this by four arguments, of which the first is as follows: action and passion constitute motion and designate it. If, then, motion were to occur in action and in passion, it would follow that there would be motion of motion and generation of generation and change of change. But this is impossible. Therefore it is also impossible that there should be motion in action and in passion. That it is impossible for motion to be moved he proves thus: there are two ways in which there might be motion of motion: first, there might be motion of motion as of a subject which is moved, or, second, as of the limit of motion. And motion might be the subject of motion, as we say that there is motion of a man because a man is moved since he is changed from white to black. In a similar way motion would be moved, and would either be heated or cooled, or changed with respect to place, or increase. But this is impossible; because motion cannot be the subject of heat or of cold or of similar attributes. It follows, then, that there cannot be motion of motion if motion is regarded as a subject.

2387. But neither can there be motion of motion as of a limit, some other subject being changed from one species of change to another, as a man might be changed from sickness to health; for this is possible only accidentally.

2388. Hence he shows next that it is impossible for motion to be moved essentially because every motion is a change from one thing to something else. Similarly generation and destruction are a change from one thing to something else, even though in their case the limits of change are not opposed to each other as they are in that of motion, as has been said above (1008:C 2363). If, then, there is change from one change to another, as from becoming sick to some other process of change, it will follow that, while a thing is being changed from health to sickness, it is being changed at the same time from that change to another; because, while one of the limits of a change is arising, a change from one limit to another occurs. Thus if two processes of change are the limits of one change, it follows that while the original change is occurring, a change into another takes place. And so at the same time that a thing is being moved from health to sickness it will be being changed from becoming healthy to some other change.

2389. But this seems to be true only inasmuch as one change succeeds another. And it is possible that any other change may succeed this one by which something is being moved from health to sickness, for example, becoming white or becoming black or change of place or any other change. Hence it is evident that, if someone is becoming ill because he is being moved from health to sickness, he can be changed from this change to any other. Nor is this surprising, because he can even be changed from this change to a state of repose; for it is possible that someone might come to rest after this change.

2390. But since every change is "always to an opposite which is not contingent," i.e., an opposite which cannot be true at the same time as the opposed term, it follows that, if there is a change from change to change, it will always be to an opposite change, which he calls not contingent. And that change in which the transition takes place will have to be from one thing to something else. Hence the transition from a change of becoming ill will only be to the opposite change, which is called becoming healthy.

2391. And so two contrary positions seem to follow, namely, that an opposite change passes from one change to any other, and only to its opposite. And from this it further follows that, at the same time that something is being changed to one of its opposites, it is also being changed to a change as if it were another opposite. This seems to be impossible, for it would follow that nature inclines to opposite effects at the same time. Hence it cannot be that anything is changed essentially from one change to another.

2392. But this can happen accidentally; for example, a person may change from recollection to forgetfulness because the subject is changed, sometimes in relation to one extreme and sometimes to the other-not that it may be the mover's intention that at the same time that he is being changed to one extreme he is at the same time intending to move to the other.

2393. Further, the process (1016).

Then he gives the second argument, which runs thus: if there is change of change, as limit of limit, or generation of generation, one change must be reached only by another change, as one quality is reached only by a preceding alteration; and thus it will be possible to reach that preceding change only by a prior change, and so on to infinity.

2394. But this cannot be the case, because, if it is assumed that there are an infinite number of changes related in such a way that one leads to the other, the preceding must exist if the following does. Let us suppose that there is a particular instance of the generation of a generation in an unqualified sense, which is the generation of substance. Then, if the generation in an unqualified sense sometimes comes to be, and again if the coming to be of generation in an unqualified sense itself at one time came to be, it will follow that that which is coming to be in an unqualified sense did not yet exist, but there was generation in one respect, namely, the very generation of the process of generation. And if this generation also came to be at some time, since it is not possible to have either an infinite regress or any first term among infinite things, it is impossible ever to come to any first process of generation. But if the preceding member in a series does not exist, there will be no succeeding member, as has been pointed out above, and the consequence will be that “there will not be a subsequent one,” i.e., one which follows it. It follows, then, that nothing can come to be or be moved or be changed. But this is impossible. Hence change of change is impossible.

2395. Further, of the same thing (1017)

Then he gives the third argument, which is as follows. Contrary motions, and rest and motion, and generation and destruction, belong to the same subject, because opposites are suited by nature to come to be in the same subject. Therefore, if some subject is being changed from generation to destruction, at the same time that it is being generated it will be undergoing change leading to destruction, which is to be changed into non-being; for the terminus of destruction is non-being, Now what is being changed into non-being is being destroyed. Hence it follows that a thing is being destroyed at the same time that it is being generated.

2396. But this cannot be true; for while a thing is coming to be it is not being destroyed, nor is it corrupted immediately afterwards. For since destruction is a process from being to nonbeing, that which is being destroyed must be. And thus there will have to be an intermediate state of rest between generation, which is a change to being, and destruction, which is a change to non-being. Hence there is no change from generation to destruction.

2397. Further, there must be (1018).

Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs as follows. In everything that is being generated two things must be present: first, the matter of the thing which is generated, and, second, that in which the generation is terminated. If, then, there is generation of generation, both generation and motion will have to have some matter, such as an alterable body or a soul or something of this kind. But it is impossible to assign matter of this kind to generation and to motion.

2398. Similarly, there must also be something in which the process of change is terminated, because some part, namely, the matter of the thing generated, must be moved from one attribute to another, and that in which motion is terminated cannot be motion but is the terminus of motion. For of the kind of change which we call learning there is not some other learning which is terminated in it, which is a learning of learning. Hence there is nothing to conclude but that there is no generation of generation.

2399. And since (1019).

Here he draws as his conclusion his main thesis. He says that, since there cannot be motion either in the category of substance or in that of relation or in that of action and passion, it follows that motion belongs to quality, quantity and location; for in these categories there can be contrariety, which stands between the termini of motion, as has been pointed out.

2400. But since quality is sometimes used to mean substantial form, he adds that, when there is said to be motion in quality, it is not understood to signify substance, in view of the fact that substantial difference is predicated as something qualitative; but it refers to the kind of quality by which something is said to be acted upon or to be incapable of this. For there is alteration, properly speaking, only in terms of susceptible qualities, as is proved in Book VII of the Physics.

2401. The immovable (1020).

Then he explains the different senses in which the term immovable is used; and he gives three of these. First, the immovable means what is completely incapable of being moved; for example, God is immovable.

2402. Second, it means what can be moved with difficulty, as a huge boulder.

2403. Third, it means what is naturally fit to be moved but cannot be moved when it is fit, and where, and in the way in which it is fit to be moved. And only this kind of immobility is properly called rest, because rest is contrary to motion. Hence rest must be the privation of motion in what is susceptible of motion.

LESSON 13

Concepts Related to Motion

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 12: 1068b 26-1069a 14

1021. Things which are in one primary place are together in place, and those which are in different places are separate, and those whose extremities are together are in contact. And an intermediate is that at which something continuously changing according to its nature naturally arrives before it reaches the limit to which it is changing. That is contrary in place which is most distant in a straight line. That is subsequent which comes after a starting point (the order being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has nothing in the same genus between itself and that which it follows; for example, lines in the case of a line, and units in the case of a unit, or a house in the case of a house. But there is nothing to prevent something else from coming between. For that which follows something is subsequent and comes after something else; for one does not follow two, nor does [the first day of] the new moon follow the second. Again, what is subsequent and in contact is contiguous. And since every change is between opposites, and these are contraries and contradictories, and since there is no intermediate between contradictories, it is evident that an intermediate is between contraries. The continuous has something of the nature of the contiguous; and I call two things continuous when both have the same extremity in which they are in contact and are uninterrupted.

1022. It is evident, then, that the continuous belongs to those things from which one thing results in virtue 6f their contact. And it is evident that the subsequent is the first of these; for things which are subsequent are not necessarily in contact, but what is in contact is subsequent. But if it is in contact it is not necessarily continuous. And in things in which there is no contact there is no natural coherence. The point, then, is not the same as the unit; for contact belongs to the former but not to the latter, but only successiveness, and there is an intermediate between the former but not between the latter.

COMMENTARY

2404. He explains the terms which apply to motion, especially local motion. First (T021:C 2404), he explains them. Second (1022:C 2413), he draws a corollary from his remarks ("It is evident").

He accordingly says, first (1021), that things which are "in one primary place," i e., a proper place, are said to be together in place; for if some things are in one common place, they are not for this reason said to be together, for then all things which are contained in the circumference of the heavens would be said to be together.

2405. Things which are in different places are said to be separate.

2406. And those whose extremities are said to touch one another are said to be in contact; for example, two bodies whose surfaces are joined.

2407. And an intermediate between two things is that at which it is natural for something that continuously changes to arrive before it reaches its limit; for example, if there is continuous motion from a to c, the thing being changed first arrives at b before it reaches c.

2408. Again, that which is most distant in a straight line is contrary in place; for that which is most distant cannot be measured by a curved line, because an infinite number of unlike sections of circles can be drawn between two points, but there can be only one straight line between two points. Now a measure must be definite and fixed. And that which is most distant as to place admits of being above and below, which are the extremity and the center of the universe.

2409. That is said to be subsequent which comes after some starting point, whether the order is determined by position or by form or in some other way; for example, two comes after one. And there must also be nothing of the same genus between that which is subsequent and that which it follows, as lines are subsequent to a line and units to a unit and a house to a house. But nothing prevents something of another genus from being an intermediate between two things one of which follows the other; for example, there may be one intermediate horse between two houses. In order to make the above distinction clear he adds that what is said to follow something must be subsequent and come after something. For one does not come after two, since it is first; nor does the first day of the new moon follow the second, but the other way around.

2410. Then he says that the contiguous means what is subsequent and in contact with something else-for example, if two bodies are so related that one touches the other.

2411. Then he says that, since every change is between opposites, and the opposites between which there is change are either contraries or contradictories, as has been shown (1008:C 2363), and since there is no intermediate between contradictories, it is evident that there is an intermediate only between contraries; for that which is intermediate is between the limits of a motion, as is clear from the definition given above. His introduction of this is timely; for since he said that those things are subsequent between which there is no intermediate, it was fitting that he should indicate between what things it is possible to have an intermediate.

2412. Then he shows what the continuous is. He says that the continuous adds something to the contiguous; for there is continuity when both of those things which are in contact and together have one and the same extremity, as the parts of a line are continuous in relation to a point.

2413. It is evident (1022).

Then he draws three corollaries from what has been said. The first is that continuity belongs to those things from which one thing naturally results in virtue of their contact; and this is because the continuous requires identical extremities.

2414. The second corollary is that, of these three things—the subsequent, the contiguous and the continuous—the first and most common is the subsequent; for not everything that is subsequent is in contact, but everything which is in contact is subsequent or consecutive. For things which are in contact are arranged according to their position, and no one of them is an intermediate. Similarly, the contiguous is prior to and more common than the continuous, because, if a thing is continuous, there must be contact. For what is one must be together, unless perhaps plurality is understood in the phrase being together. For in that case the continuous would not involve being in contact. But the continuous must involve contact in the way in which something one is together. Yet if there is contact it does not follow that there is continuity; for example, if certain things are together it does not follow that they are one. But in things in which there is no contact "there is no natural coherence," i.e., natural union, which is a property of the continuous.

2415. The third corollary is that the point and the unit are not the same, as the Platonists claimed when they said that the point is the unit having position. That they are not the same is evident for two reasons: first, because there is contact between points but not between units, which only follow each other; second, because there is always some intermediate between two points, as is proved in Book V of the Physics. But it is not necessary that there should be an intermediate between two units.

BOOK XII

Mobile and Immobile Substance

The Prime Mover

LESSON I

Metaphysics Studies Substance

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 1: 1069a 18-1069a 30

1023. The study here is concerned with substance; for it is the principles and causes of substances which are being investigated.

1024. For if the totality of things is a kind of whole, substance is its first part; and if things constitute a whole by reason of succession, substance is also first, and then quality or quantity.

1025. And in like manner the latter are not to be regarded as beings in an unqualified sense, but as qualities and motions of being. Otherwise the not-straight and not-white would be beings; for we say that they are, for example, “the not-white is.”

1026. Again, none of the other genera can exist separately.

1027. The ancient philosophers testify to this in practice, for it was of substance that they sought the principles, elements and causes. Present-day thinkers [Platonists] however, maintain that universals are substances; for genera are universals, and they say that these are principles and substances to a greater degree because they investigate the matter dialectically. But the ancient philosophers regarded particular things as substances, for example, fire and earth, and not a common body.

COMMENTARY

2416. Having summarized in the preceding book the points that were previously made regarding imperfect being both in this work and in the Physics, in this book the Philosopher aims to summarize the things that have been said about being in its unqualified sense, i.e., substance, both in Books VII and VIII of this work and in Book I of the Physics, and to add anything that is missing in order to make his study of substances complete. This is divided into two parts. First (1023:C 2416), he shows that this science is chiefly concerned with substances. Second (1028:C 2424), he gives his views about the classes of substances ("Now there are three").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states his thesis. He says that in this science "the study," i.e., the principal inquiry, has to do with substances. For since this science, being the first and the one called wisdom, investigates the first principles of beings, the principles and causes of substances must constitute its main object of study; for these are the first principles of beings. The way in which principle and cause differ has been pointed out in Book V (403:C 760).

2417. For if the totality (1024)

He proves his thesis in four ways. The first proof runs thus. Since substance is prior to the other kinds of beings, the first science should be one that is chiefly concerned with the primary kind of being. He shows that substance is the primary kind of being by using an analogous case in the realm of sensible things, among which order is found in two ways. One kind of order is found among sensible things inasmuch as the parts of any whole have a certain natural arrangement; for example, the first part of an animal is the heart, and the first part of a house the foundation. Another kind of order is found among sensible things inasmuch as some follow others and one thing is not constituted from them either by continuity or by contact. It is in this sense that one speaks of the first and second lines of an army. Hence, just as there is some first part in any whole, and also some first entity among things that follow one another, so too substance is the first of all other beings. This is what he means when he says "For if the totality," i.e., the universe of beings, is a kind of whole, substance is its first part, just as the foundation is the first part of a house. And if beings are like things that follow one another, substance again will be first, and then quantity, and then the other categories.

2418. But Averroes, failing to consider that this statement is analogical because he considered it impossible for anyone to think that all the other genera of beings should be parts of one continuous whole, departs from the obvious sense of the text and explains it in a different way. He says that by these two orders Aristotle meant the twofold relationship which can be conceived between things. The first is that beings are related as things having one nature and one genus, which would be true if being were their common genus, or in whatever way it might be common to them. He says that this is Aristotle's meaning when he says "If the totality of things is a kind of whole." The second is that beings are related as things having nothing in common. He says that this is Aristotle's meaning when he says "And if things constitute a whole by reason of succession"; for in either case it follows that substance is prior to the other kinds of being.

2419. But in like manner (1025).

Then he gives a second proof of his thesis. He says that quantity and quality and the like are not beings in an unqualified sense, as will be said below. For being means something having existence, but it is substance alone that subsists. And accidents are called beings, not because they are but rather because by them something is; for example, whiteness is said to be because by it the subject is white. Hence Aristotle says that accidents, as quality and motion, are not called beings in an unqualified sense, but beings of a being.

2420. Nor is it surprising if accidents are called beings even though they are not beings in an unqualified sense, because even privations and negations are called beings in a sense, for example, the not-white and the not-straight. For we say that the not-white is, not because the not-white has being, but because some subject is deprived of whiteness. Accidents and privations have this in common, then, that being is predicated of both by reason of their subject. Yet they differ in this respect that, while a subject has being of some kind by reason of its accidents, it does not have being of any kind by reason of privations, but is deficient in being.

2421. Therefore, since accidents are not beings in an unqualified sense, but only substances are, this science, which considers being as being, is not chiefly concerned with accidents but with substances.

2422. Again, none (1026).

Then he gives a third proof of his thesis that the other kinds of beings cannot exist apart from substance. For accidents can exist only in a subject, and therefore the study of accidents is included in that of substance.

2423. The ancient philosophers (1027).

He gives a fourth proof of his thesis. He says that the ancient philosophers also testify to the fact that the philosopher is concerned with substances, because in seeking the causes of being they looked for the causes only of substance. And some of the moderns also did this, but in a different way; for they did not seek principles, causes and elements in the same way, but differently. For the moderns—the Platonists—claimed that universals are substances to a greater degree than particular things; for they said that genera, which are universals, are principles and causes of substances to a greater degree than particular things. They did this because they investigated things from the viewpoint of dialectics; for they thought that universals, which are separate according to their mode of definition from sensible things, are also separate in reality, and that they are the principles of particular things. But the ancient philosophers, such as Democritus and Empedocles, claimed that the substances and principles of things are particular entities, such as fire and earth, but not this common principle, body.

LESSON 2

Three Classes of Substances

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 1 & 2: 1069a 30-1069b 32

1028. Now there are three classes of substances. One is sensible, and of this class one kind is eternal and another perishable. The latter, such as plants and animals, all men recognize. But it is the eternal whose elements we must grasp, whether they are one or many. Another class is the immovable, which certain thinkers claim to have separate existence, some dividing it into two kinds, others maintaining that the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics are of one nature, and still others a holding that only the objects of mathematics belong to this class. The first two classes of substance belong to the philosophy of nature since they involve motion; but the last belongs to a different science if there is no principle common to these three.

Chapter 2

1029. Sensible substance is capable of being changed. And if change proceeds from opposites or from intermediates, yet not from all opposites (for the spoken word is not white) but only from a contrary, then there must be some underlying subject which can be changed from one contrary to another; for contraries themselves are not changed (730). Further, this subject remains, whereas a contrary does not remain. Therefore there is some third thing besides the contraries, and this is matter.

1030. If, then, there are four kinds of change: either in substance or in quality or in quantity or in place, and if change in substance is generation and destruction without qualification, and change in quantity is increase and decrease, and change in attribute is alteration, and change in place is local motion, then the changes occurring in each case must be changes to contrary states. Therefore it must be the matter which is capable of being changed to both states.

1031. And since being is twofold, every change is from potential being to actual being, for example, from potentially white to actually white. The same is true of increase and decrease. Hence not only can a thing come to be accidentally from nonbeing, but all things come to be from being, i.e., from potential being, not from actual being.

1032. And this is the "One" of Anaxagoras; for it is better to maintain this view than to claim that "all things were together." And this is the "Mixture" of Empedocles and Anaximander, and it recalls the statement of Democritus that all things were together potentially but not at all actually.s Hence all these thinkers were touching upon matter.

1033. Now all things which undergo change have matter, but different things have different matters; and of eternal things, those which are incapable of being generated but can be moved by local motion have matter. Yet they do not have that kind of matter which is subject to generation, but only such as is subject to motion from one place to another (697).

1034. And one might raise the question from what kind of non-being generation could come about; for non-being is spoken of in three senses. If, then, one kind of non-being is potentiality, still it is not from anything at all that a thing comes to be, but different things come from different things. Nor is it enough to say that "all things were together," since they differ in their matter, for otherwise why would an infinite number of things be generated and not just one thing? For mind is one, so that if matter were also one, only that could come to be actually whose matter was in potentiality.

COMMENTARY

2424. Having explained that philosophy is concerned chiefly with substances, here the Philosopher begins to deal with substances. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1028:C 2424) he makes a division of substance; and in the second (1029:C 2428) he treats the parts of this division ("Sensible substance").

He accordingly says, first (1028), that there are three classes of substances. One is sensible, and this is divided into two kinds; for some sensible substances are eternal (the celestial bodies) and others perishable. Sensible and perishable substances, such as animals and plants, are recognized by all.

2425. But it is "the other class of sensible substance," i.e., the eternal, whose principles we aim to discover in this book, whether their principles are one or many. He will investigate this by considering the separate substances, which arc both the sources of motion and the ends of the celestial bodies, as will be made clear below (1086:C 2590-92). He uses elements in the broad sense here in place of principles; for strictly an element is only an intrinsic cause.

2426. The third class of substance is the immovable and imperceptible. This class is not evident to all, but some men claim that it is separate from sensible things. The opinions of these men differ; for some divide separate substances into two kinds—the separate Forms, which they call Ideas, and the objects of mathematics. For just as a twofold method of separating is found in reason, one by which the objects of mathematics are separated from sensible matter, and another by which universals are separated from particular things, in a similar way they maintained that both universals, which they called separate Forms, and also the objects of mathematics, are separate in reality. But others reduced these two classes—the separate Forms and the objects of mathematics—to one nature. Both of these groups were Platonists. But another group, the Pythagoreans, did not posit separate Forms, but only the objects of mathematics.

2427. Among these three classes of substances there is this difference, namely, that sensible substances, whether they are perishable or eternal, belong to the consideration of the philosophy of nature, which establishes the nature of movable being; for sensible substances of this kind are in motion. But separable and immovable substances belong to the study of a different science and not to the, same science if there is no principle common to both kinds of substance; for if there were a common principle, the study of both kinds of substance would belong to the science which considers that common principle. The philosophy of nature, then, considers sensible substances only inasmuch as they are actual and in motion. Hence this science (first philosophy) considers both sensible substances and immovable substances inasmuch as both are beings and substances.

2428. Sensible substance (1029).

Then he establishes the truth about the above-mentioned substances. He does this, first (1029:C 2429), with regard to sensible substances; and second (1055:C 2488), with regard to immovable substances ("And since there are three").

The first is divided into two parts. First, he investigates the principles of sensible substances; and second (1042:C 2455), he inquires whether the principles of substances and those of the other categories are the same ("In one sense").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he investigates the nature of matter; and second (1035:C 2440, the nature of form ("The causes or principles").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he states his views about matter. Second (1034:C 2437), he meets a difficulty ("And one might raise the question").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that there is matter in sensible substances; and he also shows what kind of being matter is. Second (1033:C 2436), he shows how matter differs in different kinds of sensible substances ("Now all things").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he proceeds as described. Second (1031:C 2432), he meets an argument by which some of the ancient philosophers denied generation ("And since being is twofold").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that there is matter in sensible substances. Second (1030:C 431), he shows what kind of being matter is ("If, then, there are").

He accordingly says, first (1029), that sensible substance is changeable, as has been pointed out, and every change is either from opposites or from intermediates, as has been shown above (384:C 723-24). Yet change does not proceed from any opposites whatever; for the white comes from the not-white, but not from just any not-white; for a word is not-white, yet a body does not become white from a word, but from a not-white which is black or some intermediate color. Hence he says that change proceeds from an opposite which is a contrary. And there can be no rejoinder based on change in substance on the ground that there is nothing contrary to substance. For in substance there is privation which is included in a sense among contraries, as has been shown in Book X (853:C 2050-53).

2429. Hence, since every change is from one contrary to another, there must be some underlying subject which can be changed from one contrary to another. The Philosopher proves this in two ways. First, he argues on the ground that one contrary is not changed into another; for blackness itself does not become whiteness, so that, if there is a change from black to white, there must be something besides blackness which becomes white.

2430. He proves the same point in another way, namely, from the fact that throughout every change something is found to remain. For example, in a change from black to white a body remains, whereas the other thing —the contrary black—does not remain. Therefore it is evident that matter is some third entity besides the contraries.

2431. If, then, there are (1030).

He now shows what kind of being matter is. He says that there are four kinds of change: simple generation and destruction, which is change in substance; increase and decrease, which is change in quantity; alteration, which is change in affections (and constitutes the third species of quality); and "local motion," or change of place, which pertains to the where of a thing. Now it has been shown that all of these changes involve the contrarieties that belong to each of these classes; for example, alteration involves contrariety of quality, increase involves contrariety of quantity, and so on for the others. And since in every change there is besides the contraries some third entity which is called matter, the thing undergoing the change, i.e., the subject of the change, considered just in itself, must be in potentiality to both contraries, otherwise it would not be susceptible of both or admit of change from one to the other. Thus, just as a body which is changed from white to black, qua body, is in potentiality to each of the two contraries, in a similar way in the generation of substance the matter, as the subject of generation and destruction, is of itself in potentiality both to form and to privation, and has actually of itself neither form nor privation.

2432. And since being (1031).

Here the Philosopher establishes the truth about matter itself, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he meets a difficulty. Second

(1032:C 2435), he shows how some of the ancient philosophers offered a solution similar to the one mentioned above (“And this is the ‘One’”).

He meets the difficulty of the ancient philosophers who did away with generation because they did not think that anything could come from non-being, since nothing comes from nothing, or that anything could come from being, since a thing would then be before it came to be.

2433. The Philosopher meets this difficulty by showing how a thing comes to be both from being and from non-being. He says that being is twofold—actual and potential. Hence everything which is changed is changed from a state of potential being to one of actual being; for example, a thing is changed from being potentially white to being actually white. The same thing holds true of the motion of increase and decrease, since something is changed from being potentially large or small to being actually large or small. In the category of substance, then, all things come to be both from being and from non-being. A thing comes to be accidentally from non-being inasmuch as it comes to be from a matter subject to privation, in reference to which it is called non-being. And a thing comes to be essentially from being—not actual being but potential being—i.e., from matter, which is potential being, as has been shown above (1030:C 2431).

2434. Now it should be borne in mind that certain later thinkers wanted to oppose the above-mentioned principle of the ancient philosophers of nature (who denied generation and destruction and claimed that generation is merely alteration) when they said that generation comes about through detachment from some mixture or confused mass.

2435. Hence, when the Philosopher in the third part of his division says “And this is the one (1032),” he shows that all who expressed this view wanted to adopt a position similar to the one mentioned above, but did not succeed in doing so. Therefore he says that this, namely, matter, which is in potentiality to all forms, is the “One” of which Anaxagoras spoke; for Anaxagoras said that everything which is generated from something else is present in that thing from which it comes to be. And so, not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and actuality, he said that in the beginning all things were mixed together in one whole. But it is more fitting to posit a matter in which all things are present potentially than to posit one in which all things are present actually and simultaneously, as seems to be the case from what Anaxagoras said. This is what Empedocles also claimed, namely, that in the beginning all things were mixed or mingled together by friendship and later were separated out by strife. Anaximander similarly held that all contraries originally existed in one confused mass. And Democritus said that everything which comes to be first exists potentially and then actually. Hence it is evident that all these philosophers touched upon matter to some extent but did not fully comprehend it.

2436. Now all things (1033).

He shows that matter is not present in all sensible substances in the same way. He says that all things which undergo change must have matter, but of a different kind. For things which "are changed substantially," i.e., generated and destroyed, have a matter which is subject to generation and destruction, i.e., one which is in itself in potentiality both to forms and to privations. But the celestial bodies, which are eternal and not subject to generation, yet admit of change of place, have matter—not one which admits of generation and destruction or one which is in potentiality to form and to privation, but one which is in potentiality to the termini of local motion, i.e., the point from which motion begins and the point to which it tends.

2437. And one might raise (1034).

Then he meets a difficulty that pertains to the points established above. He says that, since generation is a change from non-being to being, one can ask from what sort of non-being generation proceeds; for non-being is said of three things. First, it is said of what does not exist in any way; and from this kind of non-being nothing is generated, because in reality nothing comes from nothing. Second, it is said of privation, which is considered in a/,subject; and while something is generated from this kind of non-being, the generation is accidental, i.e., inasmuch as something is generated from a subject to which some privation occurs. Third, it is said of matter itself, which, taken in itself, is not an actual being but a potential one. And from this kind of non-being something is generated essentially; or in his words, if one kind of non-being is potentiality, then from such a principle, i.e., non-being, something is generated essentially.

2438. Yet even though something is generated from that kind of non-being which is being in potentiality, still a thing is not generated from every kind of non-being, but different things come from different matters. For everything capable of being generated has a definite matter from which it comes to be, because there must be a proportion between form and matter. For even though first matter is in potentiality to all forms, it nevertheless receives them in a certain order. For first of all it is in potency to the forms of the elements, and through the intermediary of these, insofar as they are mixed in different proportions, it is in potency to different forms. Hence not everything can come to be directly from everything else unless perhaps by being resolved into first matter.

2439. This view is opposed to that of Anaxagoras, who claimed that anything at all comes to be from anything else. Nor is his assumption that all things were together in the beginning sufficient to support this view. For things differ by reason of matter inasmuch as there are different matters for different things. For if the matter of all things were one, as it is according to the opinion of Anaxagoras, why would an infinite number of things be generated and not just one thing? For Anaxagoras claimed that there is one agent, mind; and therefore, if matter too were one, only one thing would necessarily come to be, namely, that to which matter is in potentiality. For where there is one agent and one matter there must be one effect, as has been stated in Book X.

2440. This argument holds good against Anaxagoras inasmuch as he claimed that mind needs matter in order to produce some effect. And if he claims that the first principle of things is mind, which produces matter itself, the first principle of the diversity of things will proceed from the order apprehended by the above-mentioned mind, which, inasmuch as it aims to produce different things, establishes different matters having an aptitude for a diversity of things.

LESSON 3

Characteristics of Forms

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 2 & 3: 1069b 32-1070a 30

1035. The causes or principles of things, then, are three. Two of these are the pair of contraries, of which one is the formal determinant or specifying principle, and the other the privation, and the third, matter.

Chapter 3

1036. It should be noted next that neither matter nor form comes to be, and I mean the last matter and form. For everything which changes something else changes it from something to something. That by which it is changed is the first [i.e., immediate] mover; that which is changed is the matter; and that to which it is changed is the form. Hence there will be an infinite regress if not only the bronze becomes round but also roundness itself or bronze comes to be. Therefore there must be some stopping point.

1037. Again, it should be noted that every substance comes to be from something having the same name; for both things which are by nature as well as other things are substances. For things come to be either by art or by nature or by luck or spontaneously. Art is a principle in another, but nature is a principle in the subject itself; for man begets man. The remaining causes are the privations of these.

1038. There are three kinds of substance. First, there is matter, which is a particular thing in appearance; for whatever things are one by contact and not by natural union are matter and subject. Second, there is the nature [i.e., the form], which is a determinate thing inasmuch as it is a kind of positive state; and third, there is the singular thing which is composed of these, such as Socrates or Callias.

1039. Now in some cases the “this” [i.e., the form] does not exist apart from the composite substance; for example, the form of a house, unless it is the art. Nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in a different sense that house apart from matter, and health, and everything which comes to be by art, do and do not exist. But if the “this” does exist apart from matter, it is only in the case of those things which are by nature. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that the Forms are things which exist by nature, i.e., if there are separate Forms different from these other things, such as fire, flesh and head. For all of these are matter, and they are the ultimate matter of substance in the fullest sense.

1040. Hence efficient causes are causes as things which are prior to their effects; but those things which are causes in the sense of the formal determinant are simultaneous with their effects. For it is when a man becomes healthy that health also exists; and the shape of the bronze sphere comes to be at the same time as the bronze sphere. But whether any form continues to exist afterwards is a question that requires investigation. For nothing prevents this from being so in certain cases, for example, if the soul is of this sort, not every soul but the intellectual; for perhaps it is impossible that every soul should continue to exist.

1041. It is evident, then, that it is not necessary on these grounds that the Ideas should exist; for man begets man, and the singular man begets a singular man. The same thing also holds true in the case of the arts; for the art of medicine is the formal determinant of health.

COMMENTARY

2441. Having stated his views about matter, the Philosopher now considers form, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1035:C 2440, he deals with form in itself; and second (1038:C 2446), with form in relation to the composite (“There are three kinds”).

In regard to the first part he does three things. First, he points out that form is a principle. He says that there are three causes, or three principles, of changeable substances. Two of these are contraries: one being “the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, the other privation, which is in a sense a contrary, and the third, matter. For it has been shown already (1029:C 2428-29) that in every change there must be a subject and two contraries, and therefore these are required in the generation of substance.

2442. It should be noted (1036).

Second, he shows that neither matter nor form is generated. He says that neither matter nor "form comes to be," or is generated.—But this must be understood of the last matter and the last form; for some matter is generated, namely, the subject of alteration, since it is a composite substance.

2443. That neither the last matter nor the last form is generated he proves thus. In every change there must he some subject of the change, which is matter; and something by which it is changed, which is the principle imparting motion; and something to which it is changed, which is the specifying principle or form. Hence if both the form and the matter are generated, for example, if not only this whole—bronze sphere—is generated, but also the sphericity and the bronze, it follows that both form and matter have matter and form; and thus there will be an infinite regress in matters and forms. This is impossible. Hence, in the process of generation there must be some stopping point, so that the last matter and last form are not generated.

2444. Again, it should be (1037).

Third, he points out that things acquire their form from agents like themselves. He says that every substance comes to be "from an agent having the same name," i.e., an agent similar in form. For all substances which are generated come to be either by nature or by art or by luck or "spontaneously," namely, by chance; i.e., they are not directly an object of design. Art differs from nature, because art is a principle of action in something other than the thing moved, whereas nature is a principle of action and motion in the thing in which it is present. Now things produced by art obviously come to be from something similar to themselves in form; for it is by means of the form of the house in his mind that the builder causes the house which exists in matter. The same thing is also apparent in the case of natural things, for man begets man. However, this does not seem to be true in some cases, for some things are not generated by agents similar to themselves in species; for example, the heat found in lower bodies is generated by the sun, not by heat. Yet while there is no likeness in species, there must still be some kind of likeness, even though it is an imperfect one, because the matter of lower bodies cannot acquire perfect likeness to a higher agent. And since this is true in the case of things which come to be both by art and by nature, it is evident that each thing is generated by its like.

2445. For “the remaining causes,” luck and chance, are defects and privations as it were of nature and of art; for luck is intellect producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims; and chance is nature producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims. Hence those things which come to be by luck and by chance are not similar to their agents in form, since luck and chance are not causes in the strict sense but only accidentally. Therefore in a sense animals which are generated from decomposed matter seem to come into being by chance inasmuch as they are not generated by agents similar to themselves in species. Nor do they have a definite efficient cause in the realm of lower bodies, but only a higher efficient cause.

2446. There are three kinds (1038).

Then he establishes what is true of form in relation to the composite substance, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides substance into matter, form and composite. He says that there are three kinds of substance. First, according to appearances, matter seems to be substance and a determinate thing; and it was for this reason that the first natural philosophers claimed that matter alone is substance. They did this because they saw that in the case of artifacts, which come to be by contact and not by natural union, only the matter or underlying subject seems to be substance; for artificial forms are accidents. Second, the nature of a thing also seems to be substance and a determinate thing—the nature of a thing being that in which the process of natural generation is terminated, i.e., the form, which is as it were a kind of permanent state. The third kind of substance is the composite of matter and form, for example, singular things such as Callias and Socrates.

2447. Now in some cases (1039).

Second, he says that some forms evidently do not exist apart from the composite substance, for example, the form of a house does not exist apart from matter; for the form of a house is an accident, and the matter of a house is a substance, and an accident exists only in a substance.

2448. 1 say that this is true unless the form of the house should be taken “as the art,” i.e., as existing in the mind of the artisan, for in this way it does exist apart from matter. But there is neither generation nor destruction of these artificial forms as existing in the mind of the artisan; for the house which exists in the mind without matter, and health, and all things of this kind, begin to be and cease to be in a different way from those things which come to be by generation and destruction, i.e., by teaching or by discovery.

2449. But if any forms do exist apart from composite substances, this will be true of those natural forms which are substances. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying “that the Forms,” i.e., the separate Forms, are things which exist by nature. But I say that he was not wrong, not in an unqualified sense, but only if there are other forms which differ from sensible ones, such as flesh, head and the like, which are the last matter of a particular composite substance, which is substance in the fullest sense.

2450. Hence efficient causes (1040).

Third, he shows that there are no universal forms apart from composite substances. In regard to this he does two things. First, he makes his purpose clear by differentiating between formal and efficient causes. He says that efficient causes are prior to their effects; and this must be so because efficient causes are the source of the motion which terminates in the thing made. But the formal cause, which is a cause in the sense of the intelligible structure of a thing, begins to be when the thing of which it is the form begins to be. For health begins to be when a man is healed, and the shape of a bronze sphere begins to be when the bronze sphere comes into being. It is evident, then, that forms are not separate from composite substances; for if they were separate, they would have to be eternal, since of such things there is directly neither generation nor destruction, as has been shown (611:C 1420; 696:C 1687); and thus they would be prior to the substances of which they are the forms.

2451. But even though forms are not prior to composite substances, it is still necessary to investigate whether any form remains after the composite substance has been destroyed. For nothing prevents some forms from continuing to exist after the composite ceases to exist; for example, we might say that the soul is of this sort—not every soul but only the intellective. For perhaps it is impossible that every soul should be such that it continues to exist after the body has been destroyed, because the other parts of the soul do not operate without bodily organs, whereas the intellect does not operate by way of a bodily organ. He says “perhaps” because it is not his present intention to demonstrate this point; but this belongs to the science which treats of the soul. And just as the parts of the soul other than the intellect do not continue to exist after the composite substance has been destroyed, in a similar fashion neither do other forms of perishable things.

2452. Now we should observe that it is Aristotle’s view regarding the intellective soul that it did not exist before the body as Plato claimed, and also that it is not destroyed when the body is, as the ancient philosophers held inasmuch as they failed to distinguish between intellect and sense. For he did not exclude the intellective soul from the generality of other forms as regards their not existing prior to composite substances, but only as regards their not continuing to exist after the composite substances have been destroyed.

2453. From this consideration it is also evident that one cannot degrade the intellective soul as some men attempt to do, saying that the possible intellect alone or the agent intellect alone is imperishable. For these men claim not only that the intellect which they say is imperishable (whether it be the possible or the agent intellect) is a separate substance and thus not a form, but also that, if it is a form of the kind which remains after the body has perished, it must exist prior to the body. And in this respect there would be no difference between those who hold that a separate intellect is the form of man and those who hold that separate Forms are the forms of sensible things. This is the view which Aristotle aims to reject here.

2454. It is evident (1041).

Second, he rejects the argument by which they maintained that there are separate Ideas. For the Platonists said that it was necessary to posit Ideas in order that particular things might be formed in likeness to them. But this is not necessary, because in the realm of lower bodies one finds an adequate cause of the formation of everything that comes to be. For a natural agent produces something like itself. For man begets man; but it is not the universal man who begets a singular man, but the singular man begets a singular man. Hence it is not necessary to hold that there is a separate universal man by reason of which the singular man here receives, or shares in, the form of the species. The same thing is evident of those things which come to be by art, because the medical art is the formal determinant and likeness of health in the mind, as has also been shown above (1040:C 2450).

LESSON 4

The Principles of Movable Substances

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapters 4 & 5: 1070a 31-1071b 2

1042. In one sense the causes and principles of different things are different; but in another sense they are not, for, if one speaks universally and proportionally, they are the same for all.

1043. And one might raise the question whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations are the same or different; and the same question may be asked of each of the other categories.

1044. But it would be absurd if the principles and elements of all things were the same; for then substance and relations would be derived from the same principles. How then will this be [common]? For there is nothing common existing apart from substance and the other categories; and an element is prior to the things of which it is the element. But substance is not an element of relations, nor is any of these an element of substance.

1045. Further, how is it possible for the elements of all things to be the same? For none of the elements can be the same as a composite of elements; for example, neither b nor a is the same as ba; nor can any of the intelligibles, such as being and unity, be an element; for these belong to each composite thing. Hence none of them can be either a substance or a relation. But it must be one or the other. Therefore the elements of all things are not the same.

1046. Or, as we say, there is a sense in which they are the same and a sense in which they are not; for example, perhaps the elements of sensible bodies are the hot as form, the cold as privation, and that which primarily and of its own nature is potentially both of these as matter. And not only these are substances, but so also are the things of which they are the principles. And so also is any unity which comes to be from the hot and the cold, as flesh and bone; for the thing produced from these must differ from them. The elements and principles of these things, then, are the same, although the elements of different things are different. However, it cannot be said that the elements of all things are the same in this sense, but only proportionally, just as if one were to say that there are three principles, form, privation and matter. But each of these is different in each class of things; for example, in the case of colors there is white, black and surface; and there is darkness, light and air, from which day and night are derived.

1047. And since not only the things which are intrinsic to a being are its causes, but also certain external things, as the moving cause, it is evident that principle and element differ, although both are causes. And principle is divided into these two kinds; and whatever causes motion or makes it cease is a kind of principle. Hence analogically there are three elements and four causes or principles; but they differ in different things, and the first cause of motion is different in different things: for example, health, sickness and body, and the moving cause is the art of medicine. form, a certain kind of disorder, and bricks, and the moving cause is the art of building. Principle is also divided into these.

1048. And since in the case of physical things the moving cause of man is man, while in the case of objects of thought the moving cause is the form or its contrary, in one sense there will be three causes and in another sense four. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of a house, and man begets man.

1049. And besides these there is that which as the first of all things imparts motion to all things.

Chapter 5

1050. Since some things are separable and some are not, it is the former which are substances. And for this reason these (substances) are the causes of all things, because without substances there can be no affections and motions.

1051. Next, all of these causes are perhaps soul and body, or intellect, appetite and body.

11052. Again, there is another sense in which the principles of things are proportionally the same, i.e., as actuality and potentiality; but these are different for different things and apply to them in different ways. For in some cases the same thing is at one time actual and at another time potential, as wine, flesh or man. Now these principles fall into the classes of causes mentioned; for a form is an actuality if it can exist apart, and so also is the thing composed of matter and form, and so also is a privation, such as darkness and suffering; but matter is in potentiality, for it is what is capable of becoming both. But it is in another way that the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies to those things of which the matter is not the same, and the form is not the same but different. For example, the cause of man is his elements—fire and earth as matter, and his proper form—and if there is anything external, such as his father; and besides these there is the sun and the oblique circle, which are neither matter nor species nor privation nor form, but are moving causes.

1053. Further, we must note that some of these causes can be expressed universally and some. not. The first principles of all things are those first “this, one actually, one potentially. Therefore these principles are not universals, for the principle of a singular thing is a singular thing. For while man taken universally is a principle of man, there is no universal man, but Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father is the cause of you; and b and a taken either absolutely or particularly are the causes of the syllable ba. Further, there are different causes and elements of different things, as has been stated (1046), and the causes of things which do not belong to the same genus, as colors, sounds, substances and quantity, are different, except in a proportional way. And the causes of things which belong to the same species are different, not specifically, but in the sense that the causes of singular things are different; that is, your matter and form and moving cause are different from mine, although they are the same in their universal intelligibility.

1054. And to ask whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations and of qualities are the same or different, is clearly to raise questions about terms that are used in many senses. But the principles of different things are not the same but different, except that in a sense they are the same for all. They are the same for all proportionally because each thing has matter, form, privation and a moving cause. And the causes of substances may be regarded as the causes of all things because when they are destroyed all things are destroyed, And again that which is first in complete reality is the cause of all things. However, in a sense the primary [i.e., proximate] causes of things are different, i.e., all the contraries which are not predicated either as genera or as terms having many meanings. And again the matter of different things is different. We have stated what the principles of sensible things are, then, and how many there are, and how they are the same and how different.

COMMENTARY

2455. Having stated his position regarding the principles of sensible substances, the Philosopher's aim here is to investigate whether the principles of substances and those of the other classes of things are the same or different. For if they are the same, it is evident that, when the principles of substances are given, the principles of all the other classes of things are also given. In regard to this be does three things. First (1042:C 2455), he states what is true. Second (1043:C 2456), he introduces a question relating to the answer proposed ("And one might"). Third (1054:C 2484), he gives a summary of what is true ("And to ask").

He says, first, that in one sense the principles and causes of different things are different, and in another sense they are the same for all things, i.e., universally and proportionally.

2456. And one might (1043).

Then he examines the true answer given above, by raising a question; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1043:C 2456), he raises the question. Second (1044:C 2458), he argues on one side of the question ("But it would be"). Third (1046:C 2464), he settles the issue ("Or, as we say").

He accordingly says, first (1043), that one might raise the question whether the principles of substances and those of relations, and also those of the other categories, are the same or different.

2457. He makes special reference to relations because they seem to be farther removed from substance than the rest of the categories are inasmuch as they have a more imperfect mode of being. And for this reason they inhere in substance by means of the other categories; for example, equal and unequal, double and half, inhere in substance by way of quantity; and mover and thing moved, father and son, master and slave, inhere in substance by way of action and passion. The reason is that, while substance is something which exists of itself, and quantity and quality are things which exist in something else, relations are things which not only exist in something else but also have being in reference to something else.

2458. But it would be (1044).

Then he argues on one side of the question mentioned above. He gives two arguments to show that the principles of substance and those of the other classes of things are not the same. The first argument is as follows. If the principles of substance and those of the other classes of things are the same, the same principles must either exist apart from substance and from the other categories, or they must belong to the category of substance or to some other category.

2459. But it cannot be said that they exist apart from substance and from the other categories, because then they would have to be prior both to substance and to the other categories; for a principle is prior to the things which come from it. Therefore, since what is prior is found to be more common, as animal is prior to man, it follows that, if some principle is prior both to substance and to the other categories, there must be some principle which is common both to substance and to the other categories. This applies especially to the opinion of the Platonists, who claimed that universals are principles—particularly being and unity as the most common principles of all things.

2460. Neither can it be said that the most common principles of all categories belong either to the category of substance or to that of relation or to any other category. For since principles are of the same kind as the things which come from them, it seems impossible that substance should be a principle of relations, or vice versa. Therefore the principles of substance and those of the other categories are not the same.

2461. Further, how is it (1045).

He gives a second argument, which runs thus: no element is the same as a composite of elements, for nothing is the cause or element of itself; for example, an element of this syllable ba is the letter b or the letter a.

2462. And since there would seem to be a rejoinder to this based on the principles laid down by Plato, namely, being and unity, since each thing composed of principles is one and a being, he therefore next rejects this argument. He says that it is also impossible that any of the intelligible elements—unity and being—should be the same as the things which are derived from them. He calls them intelligible, both because universals are grasped by the intellect, and because Plato claimed that they are separate from sensible things.

2463. He proves that elements of this kind differ from the things of which they are the elements, because "elements of this kind," i.e., unity and being, are found in each of the things composed of them, whereas no one of the things composed of them is found in other things. Hence it is evident that these elements also differ from the things composed of them. If it is true, then, that elements are not the same as the things composed of them; and if the elements of substances and those of the other classes of things are the same, it follows that none of them belong either to the category of substance or to any other category. But this is impossible, because everything which exists must belong to some category. Hence it is impossible that all the categories should have the same principles.

2464. Or, as we say (1046).

Then he solves the question which was raised, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1046:C 2464), shows that the principles of all categories are proportionally the same; and second (1053:C 2482), that they are universally the same ("Further, we must note"). For he laid down these two qualifications above (1042:C 2455) when he said that there are the same first principles for all things universally and proportionally.

The first part is divided into two members inasmuch as he gives two ways in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same. He begins to treat the second (1052:C 2477) where he says, "Again, there is."

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows how the principles of all things are proportionally the same. Second (1049:C 2474), he shows how they are the same without qualification ("And besides").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the principles of all things are proportionally the same as regards their intrinsic causes; and second (1047:C 2468), as regards both their intrinsic and their extrinsic causes ("And since not only").

He accordingly says, first (1046), that in one respect it is true to say that the principles of all things are the same, and in another respect it is not.

2465. He explains this by saying that it would be the same as if we were to hold that the principle of sensible bodies in the line of specifying principle or form is the hot and in the line of privation is the cold, and that the matter of sensible bodies is what is of itself in potentiality to these two; for matter taken in itself is a principle that is susceptible both of form and of privation. He says “perhaps” because, while heat is not a substantial form of sensible bodies and cold is not a privation but both are qualities, still he uses them as form and privation in the category of substance in order to make the case more evident. Hence he adds that principles of this kind are substances, not as species in a genus, but as principles.

2466. Again, we say that things which are composed of these, i.e., the things of which these are the principles, namely, fire and water, are substances, granted that we understand fire to be composed of hot as a form and of its own matter, and water of cold as a privation and of matter; or again, granted that some one thing comes to be from the mixture of hot and cold, the above-mentioned contraries, hot and cold, and matter are the principles of these things; because that which comes to be from hot and cold must be something different from hot and cold, i.e., from the first bodies of which we imagine these to be the forms.

2467. Therefore the principles and elements of these things, i.e., of the simple bodies and the things composed of them, are the same. But other things have different proximate principles. However, the principles and elements of all these things are the same only proportionally. We might, for example, say that, just as the three things mentioned above—hot, cold, and their subject—have the character of form, privation and matter respectively in the generation of simple bodies, so too in every other genus there are three things which are proportioned to each other as form, privation and matter. But these three differ for different classes of things. For example, in the genus of color, white has the character of form, black the character of privation, and surface the character of matter or subject; and in the genus of distinctions of time, light has the character of form, darkness the character of privation, and air the character of matter or subject; and from these three principles day and night come to be.

2468. And since not only (1047).

Then he shows that the same thing is true of intrinsic and extrinsic causes, and in regard to this he does two things. First (1047:C 2468), he shows that, when we enumerate the intrinsic and extrinsic causes together, there are four causes proportionally of all things. Second (1048:C 2473), he shows how they are reduced to three ("And since in the case").

He accordingly says, first (1047), that, since not only what is intrinsic is a cause, but also what is extrinsic, i.e., a mover, it is evident that principle and element differ. For principle in the strict sense means an extrinsic cause, as a mover, since it is from this that motion proceeds; whereas element in the strict sense means an intrinsic cause, of which a thing is composed.

2469. Yet both are called causes, i.e., both extrinsic principles and intrinsic ones. And in a sense principle is divided into these, i.e., into intrinsic causes and extrinsic causes. For there are certain intrinsic principles, as has been shown in Book V (403:C 755-56); for example, the foundation of a house is a principle of it in the sense of matter, and a soul is a principle of a man in the sense of form. But that which causes motion or makes it cease, i.e., which brings it to rest, is a principle but not an element; because an element is an intrinsic principle from which a thing comes to be, as has been stated in Book V (411:C 795-98).

2470. It is clear, then, that analogously, or proportionally, the elements of all things are three in numbermatter, form and privation. For privations are called elements not essentially but accidentally, i.e., because. the matter to which a privation is accidentally related is an element. For matter existing under one form contains within itself the privation of another form. But the causes and principles of things are four in number inasmuch as we may add the moving cause to the three elements. Aristotle does not mention the final cause, however, because a goal is a principle only inasmuch as it is present in the intention of the moving cause.

2471. Therefore the causes and principles of all things analogously are four in number—matter, form, privation, and the source of motion. Yet they are not the same in all cases, but differ in different things. For just as it has been said above (1046:C 2467) that matter form and privation differ in different things, so too the first of the causes, which has the character of a mover, differs in different cases.

2472. He clarifies this by giving examples. In the case of things healed, health has the character of form, sickness the character of privation, the body the character of matter, and the art of medicine the character of a mover; and in the case of things built, the shape of a house is the form, "a certain kind of disorder," i.e., the opposite of the order which the house requires, is the privation, bricks are the matter, and the art of building is the mover. Principles, then, are divided into these four kinds.

2473. And since in the case (1048).

He now reduces these four kinds of causes to three on the ground that in the case of artifacts and in that of natural things the mover and the form are specifically the same. He accordingly says that this is clear because (a) in the case of natural things man is a mover inasmuch as he has a form; and (b) in the case of things which are made by mind or intellect the cause of motion is the form conceived by the mind, or even the contrary of the form through whose removal the form is induced. Therefore it is evident that in one sense there are three causes, inasmuch as the mover and the form are specifically the same, and in another sense there are four, inasmuch as these two causes differ numerically. For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building is the form of the house, i.e., inasmuch as the art itself is a kind of likeness and intelligible representation of the form which is in the matter. And similarly in the case of things which come to be through generation the generator is similar in form to the thing generated; for man begets man.

2474. And besides these (1049).

Then he shows that, although first principles are not identically the same beings in all things but only proportionally the same, none the less the first principles of all things are the same in an unqualified sense. He proves this by three arguments. First, he shows that the moving cause is the first of the causes which have been given because it is the one which makes the form or the privation exist in matter. Now in the class of movers it is possible to reach a single cause, as has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Therefore this first mover, which is one and the same for all, is the first principle of all things.

2475. Since some things (1050).

Second, he proves the same point in a different way. For some beings (substances) are capable of separate existence, and others (accidents) are not, because modifications and motions and accidents of this kind cannot exist apart from substances. It is evident, then, that the first principles in the category of substance are also the causes of all the other categories. This applies not only to the first moving cause but also to intrinsic causes; for the matter and form of a substance are the causes of its accidents.

2476. Next, all of these (1051).

Third, he shows that we must also reach certain first principles in the category of substance; for first principles in the category of substance are living animated substances according to the thought of Aristotle, who claimed that the celestial bodies are animated. Hence in the category of substance the first principles which have the character of form and matter will be soul and body, or also body and intellect or appetite; for assuming that a celestial body is animated, its soul has none of the different parts of the soul except intellect and appetite; for the other parts of the soul are directed to the preservation of bodies which are capable of being generated and destroyed. Intellect and appetite also have the character of a mover.

2477. Again, there is another sense (1052).

Then he gives a second way in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same. He says that the principles of all things are proportionally the same in another sense inasmuch as we say that actuality and potentiality are the principles of all things.

2478. But in this case two differences are to be observed. The first is that a different potentiality and a different actuality are principles in different things. The second is that potentiality and actuality are found in different things in different ways.

2479. Then the second difference is first clarified. He says that in some cases the same thing is at one time actual and at another time potential, as is evident of all things which admit of generation and destruction and are movable and contingent; for example, wine, flesh and man are at one time actual and at another potential. But some things are always actual, as the eternal substances.

2480. And since he had said that the way in which the principles of all things are proportionally the same differs from the one previously given, he next shows how these principles (actuality and potentiality) are reduced to the.same class. He says that these principles (actuality and potentiality) fall under the classes of causes mentioned above, which are form, privation, matter and mover; because form is an actuality, whether it is separable from the composite, as the Platonists claimed, or whether there is something composed of both, i.e., of form and matter. And similarly privation is in a sense an actuality, for example, darkness or "suffering," i.e., sickness. But matter is in potentiality, because of itself it is capabie of receiving both form and privation. It is evident, then, that actuality and potentiality amount to the same thing as matter, form and privation; and that in a sense actuality and potentiality differ in different things, because they are not present in all things in the same way but in different ways.

2481. And since he had said that actuality and potentiality not only apply to different things in different ways but also differ for different things, he next explains this by saying that it is in a different way that the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies to different things of which the matter, which is in potentiality, is not the same, and the form, which is actuality, is not the same but different. For example, the material cause of a man is his elements, namely, fire and the like, and his formal cause is "his proper form," i.e., his soul, and his moving cause is something extrinsic—his father being a proximate efficient cause, and the sun and "the oblique circle," or zodiac, through which the sun moves together with the other planets which cause generation in lower bodies by their motion, being remote efficient causes. But extrinsic causes of this sort are neither matter nor form nor privation nor anything conforming to or specifically the same as these so that it could be said that they are reduced to these causes as actuality and potentiality. They are reduced to a different class of cause because they are movers, and these are also reduced to actuality. But things which differ from man have a different proper matter anA a different proper form and some proper agent.

2482. Further, we must note (1053).

Since it has been shown already (1046:C 2467) how the principles of all things are proportionally the same, Aristotle now wishes to show how the principles of all things are universally the same; for both of these points were mentioned above (1046:C 2464). He accordingly says that we must see how some principles are predicated universally and how some are not. The first principles which are understood to be most universal are actuality and potentiality, for these divide being as being. They are called universal principles because they are signified and understood in a universal way, but not so that universals themselves are subsisting principles, as the Platonists claimed, because the principle of each singular thing can only be a singular thing; for the principle of an effect taken universally is a universal, as man of man. But since there is no subsisting universal man, there will be no universal principle of universal man, but only this particular man will be the principle of this particular man; for example, Peleus is the father of Achilles, and your father is the father of you. And this particular letter b is a principle of this particular syllable ba, but b taken universally is a principle of ba taken universally. Therefore principles signified universally are the same for all things.

2483. Then he introduces a third way in which the principles of substances are universally the principles of all things, i.e., inasmuch as accidents are caused by substances. Now just as actuality and potentiality are the universal principles of all things because they flow from being as being, so also, to the extent that the community of things caused is lessened, the community of the principles must also be lessened. For things which do not belong to the same genus, as colors, sounds, substance and quantity, have different causes and elements, as has been pointed out (1046:C 2467), even though these are proportionally the same for all things. And things which belong to the same genus but are numerically different have different principles, not formally, but numerically. For example, your matter and form and moving cause are one thing and mine are another, but in their universal intelligibility they are the same; for soul and body are the form and matter of man, but this soul and this body are the form and the matter of this man.

2484. And to ask (1054).

Here he summarizes what has been said in this chapter. He says that to ask whether the principles and elements of substances and of relations and of qualities and of the other categories are the same or different is to raise questions about terms which are used in various senses, because the principles of different things are not the same except in a certain respect but different.

2485. For the principles of all things are the same in a certain respect, either proportionally, as when we say that in each class of things we find certain principles which have the character of matter, form, privation and moving cause; or in the sense that the causes of substances are the causes of all things, because when they are destroyed other things are destroyed; or because the principles are “complete reality,” i.e., actuality, and potentiality. The principles of all things, then, are the same in these three ways.

2486. But in another respect the principles are different, because contraries, which are principles of things, and matter itself are not predicated in the same way; for they are not genera, nor are they even predicated of things in many ways as though they were equivocal. Hence we cannot say that they are the same without qualification but only analogously.

2487. Last, he concludes by saying that he has shown the number of principles which sensible substances have and how they are the same or different.

LESSON 5

An Eternal Immovable Substance Must Exist

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1055. Since there are three classes of substance (1028), two of which are physical and one immovable, concerning the latter it is necessary to affirm that an eternal immovable substance must exist. For substances are the primary kind of beings, and if all of them are perishable, all things are perishable. But it is impossible either that motion should have come to be or that it should perish, for it always existed; and the same is true of time, for there cannot be a before and an after if there is no time. Motion is continuous, then, in the sense that time is; for time is either the same as motion or a property of it. Now the only continuous motion is that which pertains to place, and of this only that which is circular.

1056. But even if there is something which is capable of imparting or producing motion, but is not actually doing so, motion will still not exist; for that which has a potentiality may possibly not exercise it. Hence nothing is to be gained if we invent certain eternal substances, as do those who posit the separate Forms, unless there is some principle among them which is capable of causing change (83). This is not sufficient, then, nor is another substance besides the separate Forms sufficient; for if it does not act, there will be no eternal motion.

1057. And even if it does act this will still not be sufficient, if its essence is a potentiality; for there will be no eternal motion, since what is potential may possibly not be. Hence there must be a principle of the kind whose substance is an actuality.

1058. Further, such substances must also be immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything else is. Hence they are actualities.

COMMENTARY

2488. After having shown what the principles of sensible substances are, here the Philosopher begins to establish the truth about the immovable substances, which are separate from matter. This topic is divided into two parts. First (1055:C 2488), he treats substances of this sort by giving his own opinion. Second, he treats them by giving the opinions of other thinkers. He does this in the following book (“Concerning the substance of sensible things”).

The first part is divided into two members. First, he proves that there is a substance which is eternal, immovable and separate from matter. Second (1067:C 2519) he investigates the attributes of this substance (“Now the first mover”).

In regard to the first he does three things. First, he proves that an eternal substance must exist. Second (1059:C 2500), he deals with a question arising from the foregoing discussion (“There is a difficulty, however”); and third (1064:C 2508), from the answer given to the question which was raised he proceeds to clarify a truth previously ,established (“Hence, Chaos or Night”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is necessary to posit an eternal substance. Second (1056:C 2492), he shows what kind of substance it must be (“But even if there is”).

He accordingly says, first (1055), that it has been pointed out above (1028:C 2424) that there are three classes of substances. Two of these are natural substances, because they undergo motion—one being eternal, as the heavens, and the other perishable, as plants and animals. And besides these there is a third class, which is immovable and not natural; and of this kind of substance it is now necessary to speak. With a view to investigating this kind of substance it is first necessary to prove that an eternal immovable substance must exist. He proceeds as follows.

2489. Substances are the primary kind of beings, as has been shown above (1024:C 2417-23), and when primary things are destroyed none of the others remain. Therefore, if no substance is eternal but all are perishable, it follows that nothing is eternal but that "all things are perishable," i.e., they do not always exist. But this is impossible. Hence there must be an eternal substance.

2490. That it is impossible for nothing to be eternal he proves from the fact that motion cannot have come to be or "perish," i.e., it cannot have come to be anew or at some time totally cease to be. For it has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics that motion is eternal without qualification. It also seems impossible that time should not be eternal; for if time began to be at some time or will cease to be at some time it would follow that prior to time there was the non-being of time, and also that there will be time after the non-being of time. But this seems to be impossible, because there could be no before or after if time did not exist, since time is nothing else than the measure of before and after in motion. Thus it would follow that time existed before it began to be, and that it will exist after it ceases to be. Hence it seems that time must be eternal.

2491. And if time is continuous and eternal, motion must be continuous and eternal, because motion and time are either the same thing, as some claimed, or time is a property of motion, as is really the case. For time is the measure of motion, as is evident in Book IV of the Physics. However, it must not be thought that every motion can be eternal and continuous, since this can be true only of local motion; and among local motions this is true only of circular motion, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics.

2492. But even if (1056).

Then he shows what kind of substance this eternal substance must be, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he shows that in order to account for the eternity of motion it is necessary to posit an eternal substance which is always moving or acting. He says that, since it is necessary, on the assumption that motion is eternal, that there be an eternal substance which is capable of imparting or producing motion, it is also necessary that this be a mover or agent which is always acting, because if it were "capable of imparting or producing motion," i.e., if it had the power to produce or cause motion, and was not actually doing so, it would follow that there would be no actual motion. For that which has the power of causing motion may possibly not be causing it, since that which has the power of acting may possibly not act; and thus motion would not be eternal. Assuming, then, that motion is eternal, it is necessary to posit an eternal substance which is actually moving or acting.

2493. Next, he concludes from this that nothing is to be gained by accepting the opinion of Plato, who posited eternal substances, since this is not sufficient to account for the eternity of motion. For the assumption that there are certain separate and eternal substances is not sufficient to account for this unless there is some principle among them which can ~ause change; but this does not seem to fit the separate Forms. For Plato claimed that the separate Forms are nothing else than universals existing apart from matter. But universals as such do not cause motion; for every active or motive principle is a singular thing, as has been pointed out above (1053:C 2482). Neither the separate Forms, then, nor any other separate substances besides the Forms, such as the separate mathematical entities posited by some, are sufficient to account for the eternity of motion, because even the objects of mathematics as such are not principles of motion. And if there is no eternal active substance, there will be no eternal motion, because the principle of motion is an eternal substance which is a mover or agent.

2494. And even if (1057).

Second, be shows that, in order for motion to be eternal it is necessary not only that an eternal substance exist, which is a mover or agent, but also that its essence be an actuality. Hence he says that the eternity of motion is not adequately accounted for even if it is supposed that an eternal substance does act yet is potential in essence. For example, it would not be sufficient to hold that the first principles are fire or water, as the ancient natural philosophers did, because then motion could not be eternal. For if a mover is such that its essence contains potentiality, it can possibly not be, because whatever is in potentiality may possibly not be. Hence it would be possible for motion not to be, and so it would not be necessary and eternal. Therefore it follows that there must be a first principle of motion of the sort whose essence is not in potentiality but is only an actuality.

2495. Further, such substances (1058).

Third, he further concludes that this kind of substance must be immaterial. He says that it also follows from the foregoing (1055-57:C 2488-94) that substances of this kind, which are the principles of eternal motion, must be free from matter; for matter is in potentiality. Therefore they must be eternal if something else is eternal, as motion and time. Thus it follows that they are actualities.

2496. He concludes in this way last because of the question which be will next raise. From this reasoning, then, it is evident that here Aristotle firmly thought and believed that motion must be eternal and also time; otherwise he would not have based his plan of investigating immaterial substances on this conviction.

2497. Yet it should be noted that the arguments which he introduces in Book VIII of the Physics, which he assumes as the basis of his procedure here, are not demonstrations in the strict sense but only dialectical arguments; unless perhaps they are arguments against the positions of the ancient natural philosophers regarding the beginning of motion, inasmuch as he aims to destroy these positions.

2498. And aside from the other arguments which he does not touch upon here, it is evident that the argument which he does give here to prove that time is eternal is not demonstrative. For if we suppose that at some moment time began to be, it is not necessary to assume a prior moment except in imaginary time; just as when we say that there is no body outside of the heavens what we mean by "outside" is merely an imaginary something. Hence, just as it is not necessary to posit some place outside of the heavens, even though "outside" seems to signify place, so too neither is it necessary that there be a time before time began to be or a time after time will cease to be, even though before and after signify time.

2499. But even if the arguments which prove that motion and time are eternal are not demonstrative and necessarily conclusive, still the things which are proved about the eternity and immateriality of the first substance necessarily follow; for, even if the world were not eternal, it would still have to be brought into being by something that has prior existence. And if this cause were not eternal, it too would have to be produced by something else. But since there cannot be an infinite series, as has been proved in Book II (153:C 301-4), it is necessary to posit an eternal substance whose essence contains no potentiality and is therefore immaterial.

LESSON 6

Eternal Motion Requires An Eternal Mover

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1059. There is a difficulty, however; for it seems that, while everything which is acting is able to act, not everything which is able to act is acting; so potentiality is prior.

1060. But if this is so, no beings will exist; for everything may be capable of being, but still not be. And if we take what the theologians say, who generate everything from Night, or what the— philosophers of nature say, who affirm that “all things were together,” they express the same impossible view. For how will things be moved, if there is no actual cause? Matter will not move itself, but technical knowledge will move it; nor will menstrual blood or earth move themselves, but semen or seed will move them.

1061. This is the reason why some men, such as Leucippus and Plato, posit something which is always actual; for they say that motion always exists. But they do not say why it exists, or what it is, or how this is so, or what its cause is. For nothing is moved by chance, but there must always be something existing which moves it. Now things are moved in one way by nature, and in another by force or by mind or by some other agent. What kind of motion, then, is prior? For this makes the greatest difference. Plato cannot explain what it is that he sometimes thinks is the source of motion, i.e., what moves itself; for according to him the soul is later than motion and simultaneous with the heavens.

1062. Now to think that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another not; and we have explained how this is so (1059).

1063. That actuality is prior is affirmed by Anaxagoras (for mind is an actuality), and by Empedolces in his theory of love and strife (50), and by those who say that motion always existed, as Plato and Leucippus.

1064. Hence Chaos or Night did not exist for an infinite time, but the same things have always existed, either in a cycle or in some other way, granted that actuality is prior to potentiality.

1065. Therefore, if something is always moved in the same cycle, there must be something which always continues to act in the same way. But if there is to be generation and destruction, there must be something else " which acts in different ways. Hence this must act in one way of itself, and in another way in virtue of something else, i.e., either in virtue of some third agent or of the first. Now it must be in virtue of the first; for this is the cause both of the second and of the third. The first is preferable, then; for it was the cause of that whose being is always to be the same, and something else was the cause of that whose being is to be different; and obviously both of these account for eternal diversity. Therefore, if motion always exhibits these characteristics, why is it necessary to look for other principles?

Chapter 7

And since this is a possible account of the matter, and if this is not so all things will come from Night (1060) or "all things were together" (1060) or something comes from non-being (1034), these difficulties are solved. And there is something which is always being moved with an unceasing motion, and this is circular motion. This is evident not only in theory but in fact; and for this reason the first heaven will be eternal.

1066. Therefore there is also something which causes it to move. And since that which is moved and causes motion is intermediate, there must be something which causes motion and is unmoved, which is eternal and both a substance and an actuality.

COMMENTARY

2500. He raises a question about a point already dealt with. The question is whether actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality so that the first principle of things can be held to be one whose substance is actuality. In regard to this he does three things. First (1059:C 2500), he gives an argument to show what is false, namely, that potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality. Second (1060:C 2501), he argues on the other side of the question (“But if this is so”). Third (1062:C 25o6), he answers the question (“Now to think”).

He accordingly says, first (1059), that it has been pointed out that an eternal substance is an actuality, although there is a difficulty regarding this. For potentiality seems to be prior to actuality, since one thing is prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed (465:C 950)Now potentiality seems to be related to actuality in this way, because everything which is acting seems to be able to act, but not everything which is able to act is acting; and so it seems that potentiality is prior to actuality.

2501. But if this is so (1060).

Then he argues on the opposite side of the question, and in regard to this he does two things. First, he gives an argument reducing the counter-position to absurdity. He says that, if potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality, it follows that at some time nothing may exist; for the contingent is what can come to be but has not yet done so. Hence, if the first beings are potential, it follows that they do not exist actually; and so no other being will exist.

2502. This can be taken in two ways. First, according to the opinion of certain of the ancients, who were called the theological poets, such as Orpheus and certain others, who claimed that the world “is generated from Night,” i.e., from a simple pre-existent privation. Second, according to the later physicists, i.e., philosophers of nature and their followers, who, when they saw that nothing comes from nothing in the natural world, claimed that all things were together in a kind of mixture, which they called Chaos. (Anaxagoras, for example, held this view.) Thus they held that all things exist potentially and not actually.

2503. But whether this position is stated in the former or in the latter way the same impossible conclusion follows, provided that potentiality is prior absolutely to actuality. For those things which are in potentiality only, or which come entirely under privation, or belong to some confused mass, cannot be moved so as to be brought to actuality unless there is some moving cause which is existing actually. For in things made by art the matter does not move itself, but an agent moves it, i.e., “technical knowledge,” or art. Neither does the menstrual blood, which is the matter from which an animal is generated, move itself, but “semen,” i.e., the sperm of the animal, moves it. Nor does earth, which is the material from which plants are generated, move itself, but “the seed,” i.e., the seeds of plants, move it.

2504. This is the reason (1061).

Second, he shows how some of the philosophers of nature agreed with this argument. He says that this is the reason why some philosophers—Leucippus, the companion of Democritus, and Plato—claimed that something actual always exists. For they said that motion had always existed even before the world; Leucippus attributed motion to the atoms, which are mobile of themselves, from which he supposed the world to be composed; and Plato attributed it to the elements, which he said were moved by disorderly motions before the formation of the world, and afterwards were brought into order by God.

2505. Now they seem to be right in claiming that motion has always existed. But they were wrong in failing to point out which kind of motion has always existed; nor did they give the cause of motion, either by stating this in an absolute sense or by giving the reason for their own position. Yet “nothing is moved by chance,” i.e., without some fixed cause, but there must always be something existing which is the cause of motion. For example, we now see that some things are moved in this way by nature or by force or by mind or by some other agent. Hence they should also have stated what the first cause of motion is, whether nature or force or mind; for it makes a great deal of difference which of these is held to be the cause of motion.—Plato cannot be excused on the ground that he held the principle of motion to be something that moves itself, which he asserted to be a soul, since the soul did not exist of itself before the formation of the world, but only existed after the disorderly state of motion. For according to him the soul was created at the same time as the heavens, which he claimed to be animated; and thus it could not be the principle of that disorderly motion.

2506. Now to think (1062).

Then he answers the question which was raised, and concerning this he does two things. First, he returns to the points established in Book IX regarding the relationship of potentiality to actuality. He says that the opinion that potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in another not. The sense in which it is right has been explained in Book IX

(778-80:C 1844-49); for it was stated there that actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality. But in one and the same subject which is being moved from potentiality to actuality, potentiality is prior to actuality in time, although actuality is prior both in nature and in perfection.

2507. That actuality is prior (1063).

Second, he strengthens his answer by giving the opinions of some of the philosophers. He says that the absolute priority of actuality is asserted by Anaxagoras, because he claimed that the first principle of motion is an intellect; for intellect is a kind of actuality. The same thing is also asserted by Empedocles, who claimed that love and strife are the causes of motion; and also by Leucippus and Plato, who claimed that motion has always existed.

2508. Hence Chaos or Night (1064).

Then he uses the answer to the question given above to clarify a point previously established, and in regard to this he does three things. First (1064:C 25o8), in the light of the things established above he concludes that generation must be eternal. Second (1065:C 2510), on the ground that generation is eternal he concludes that the motion of the heavens must be eternal (“Therefore, if something”). Third (1066:C 2517), on the ground that the motion of the heavens is eternal he concludes that the first unmoved mover must be eternal (“Therefore there is”).

He accordingly says, first (1064), that, if actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality, it follows that it is false to hold, with the ancient philosophers of nature, who thought potentiality to be prior absolutely to actuality, that all things pre-existed potentially for an infinite time in a kind of confused mass, which they called Chaos. And false also is the opinion of the theological poets, who claimed for the same reason that the simple privation of things had existed for an infinite time before things began to be actually. Some called this privation of things “Night,” and perhaps the reason for their doing so is that among qualities and simple forms light is found to be more common and prior (since they thought that nothing exists except sensible things), and night is the privation of light. Both opinions are false, then, if actuality is prior to potentiality.

2509. But since we see that things which are generated and destroyed pass from potentiality to actuality, it will be necessary to say that the same things which begin to be actually after being potentially have always existed in some way. Either the very things which begin to be actually after being potentially have always existed according to circular generation, inasmuch as they claimed that things which are generated were formerly the same specifically but not numerically, and this is what occurs 2 in circular generation. For from the moist earth vapors are derived, and these turn into rain, by which the earth is again made moist. Similarly sperm comes from a man, and from sperm a man again comes to be. Thus things which come to be are brought back the same in species by reason of circular generation. Or again those things which come to be actually after being potentially have always been the same things in a different way, as Anaxagoras claimed that they had actual prior existence in the things from which they are generated.

2510. Therefore, if something (1065).

Then he concludes that the motion of the celestial bodies must be eternal on the ground that generation is eternal. Therefore, granted that there is no other motion by which things that pass from potentiality to actuality have always been the same except that which proceeds according to the cycle of generation, he concludes from what has been shown in the philosophy of nature (especially in Book II of Generation) that, if something remains the same throughout the cycle of generation, something must also remain numerically the same, which will act in the same way so as to cause the eternal motion of things. For none of the things which are generated and destroyed can be the cause of the eternality which is found in generation and destruction, because no one of them always exists, nor even all of them, since they do not exist at the same time, as has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics. It follows, then, that there must be some eternal, agent which always acts in a uniform way so as to cause the eternal motion of things. This is the first heaven, which is moved and causes all things to be changed by its daily motion.

2511. But that which always acts in the same way only causes something that is always in the same state; and obviously those things which ~re generated and destroyed do not remain in the same state, for at one time they are generated and at another destroyed. This being so, if generation and destruction are to occur in the realm of lower bodies, it is necessary to posit some agent which is always in different states when it acts. He says that this agent is the body [the sun] which is moved in the oblique circle called the zodiac. For since this circle falls away on either side of the equinoctial circle, the body which is moved circularly through the zodiac must be at one time nearer and at another farther away; and by reason of its being near or far away it causes contraries. For we see that those things which are generated when the sun comes closer to the earth are destroyed when the sun recedes (for example, plants are born in the spring and wither away in the autumn); for both the sun and the other planets are moved in the circle of the zodiac. But the fixed stars are also said to be moved over the poles of the zodiac and not over the equinoctial poles, as Ptolemy proved. And the coming to be and ceasing to be of everything which is generated and destroyed is caused by the motion of these stars, but more evidently by the motion of the sun.

2512. Therefore this mover which acts in different ways must be one that “acts in one way of itself,” i.e., by its own power, inasmuch as it causes the diversity found in generation and destruction. And it must act “in another way in virtue of something else,” i.e., by the power of some other agent, inasmuch as it causes eternal generation and destruction. Hence this second agent must act either “in virtue of some third agent,” i.e., by the power of some other agent, “or of the first,” i.e., by the power of the first agent, which always acts in the same way. And since it is not possible to assign some other agent by whose power this first agent brings about the eternal motion of things, it is therefore necessary according to this “that it act in the same way”; that is, that by its power it causes the eternal generation and destruction of things. For it—the first agent—which always acts in the same way, is the cause of that which acts in different ways. For that which acts in different ways acts eternally, and that which acts in the same way is the cause of the eternality of any motion. Hence it is the cause of the eternality of that which acts in different ways inasmuch as the latter acts eternally in this way; and it is also the cause of that which is produced by it, namely, eternal generation and destruction. From this it is also evident that the second agent, which acts in different ways, acts by the power “of the first agent,” i.e., the first heaven or first orb, which always acts in the same way.

2513. Hence it is clear that the first agent, which always acts in the same way, is more powerful and nobler, because it is the cause of that “whose being is always to be the same,” i.e., of eternality. But the cause of that whose being is to be different is another agent, which acts in different ways. And it is evident that both of these combined, i.e., both the first agent, which always acts in the same way, and the second agent, which acts in different ways, are the cause of that which both always is and is in different states, namely, the fact that generation and destruction are eternal.

2514. Again, he concludes from this that, if the motions of the heavens are such that eternal generation and destruction in the realm of lower bodies can be caused by them, it is not necessary to look for any other principles (such as the Ideas, which the Platonists posited, or love and hate, which Empedocles posited), because it is possible to account for the eternal generation and destruction of things in the above way.

2515. And if this way is not accepted, the untenable conclusions to which the first philosophers were led will follow namely, that all things “will come from Night,” i.e., from a simple privation, or “all things were together,” or something comes from non-being.

296. Therefore it is evident that, if the above-mentioned position is accepted, i.e., that eternal generation and destruction are caused by the eternal motion of the heavens, the foregoing untenable conclusions are eliminated. And it will follow that something is always being moved in an unceasing motion, which is circular motion. This becomes apparent not only by reasoning but from the effect itself and by perception. Hence, since the first heaven always causes motion by means of this motion, it must be eternal.

2517. Therefore, there is (1066).

From what has been said above he next infers that there is an eternal unmoved mover. For since everything which is being moved is being moved by something else, as has been proved in the Physics, if both the heavens and their motion are eternal, there must be an eternal mover. But since three classes are found among movers and things moved: the lowest of which is something that is merely moved, the highest something that moves but is unmoved, and the intermediate something that both moves and is moved, we must assume that there is an eternal mover which is unmoved. For it has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics that, since there cannot be an infinite number of movers and things moved, we must come to some first unmoved mover. For even if one might come to something that moves itself, it would again be necessary for the above reason to come to some unmoved mover, as has been proved in that work.

2518. Again, if the first mover is eternal and unmoved, it must not be a potential being (because any potential being is naturally fitted to be moved) but an independent substance whose essence is actuality.—This is the conclusion which he drew above (1058:C 2499). But it was necessary to raise this question, which was discussed among the ancients, in order that when it has been solved the course to be followed in reaching a first being whose substance is actuality will be made more evident.

LESSON 7

How the First Mover Causes Motion

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1072a 26-1072b 14

1067. Now the first mover causes motion as something intelligible and something appetible; for these alone cause motion without being moved. And what is first in the class of the appetible and in that of the intelligible is the same; for it is the apparent good which is the object of concupiscible appetite, and the real good which is the primary object of will. For we desire a thing because it seems good rather than consider it good because we desire it; for understanding is the principle of desire. And the intellect is moved by an intelligible object.

1068. And one of the two columns of opposites (60) is the intelligible in itself; and in this class primary substance is first, and in substance that which is simple and exists actually. However, one and simple are not the same; for one signifies a measure (432; 825), and simple signifies a state.

1069. But that which is good and that which is desirable in itself are in the same column of opposites; and that which is first in each class is always best, or analogous to the best. That the final cause belongs to the class of immovable things is shown by a process of division; for the final cause of a thing is either that which exists or that which does not.

1070. And it causes motion as something loved, whereas by that which is [first] moved other things are moved. Therefore, if a thing is moved, it is possible for it to be other than it. is. Hence, local motion, which is the primary kind of motion, is also the actuality of that which is [first] moved;

and in this respect the thing first moved can differ in place though not in substance. But since there is something which moves yet is itself immovable and exists actually, this can in no way be other than it is. For the primary kind of change is local motion, and of local motion the first is circular motion; and this is the motion which the first mover causes. Hence the first mover necessarily exists; and insofar as it is necessary it is good, and thus is a principle. For necessary has all of these meanings: that which seems to be done by force; that without which something does not fare well; and that which cannot be other than it is, but is absolutely necessary (416-22). It is on such a principle, then, that the heavens and the natural world depend.

COMMENTARY

299. After having shown that there is an eternal, immaterial, immovable substance whose essence is actuality, the Philosopher now proceeds to investigate the attributes of this substance. In treating this he does three things. First (1061:C 2519), he considers the perfection of this substance. Second (1078:C 2553), he asks whether it is one or many ("We must not"). Third (1089:C 2600), he considers its operation ("The things which pertain").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows the perfection of this substance. Second (1076:C 2548), he proves that it is incorporeal ("And it has been shown").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows its perfection. Second (1075:C 2545), he rejects a contrary opinion ("And all those").

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he explains how the unmoved mover causes motion; and second (1068:C 2523), he infers from this what is comprised in its perfection ("And one of the two").

He accordingly says, first (1067), that, since it has been shown that the first mover is unmoved, it must cause motion in the way in which the desirable and the intelligible do; for only these, the desirable and the intelligible, are found to cause motion without being moved.

2520. He proves this as follows. Motion is twofold: natural and voluntary, or according to appetite. Now that which causes motion by means of natural motion necessarily undergoes motion, since a natural mover is one that begets and alters things. For both heavy and light bodies are moved locally directly by their begetter. But that which begets and alters things directly must exist in different states. Hence it has also been pointed out above (1065:C 2510) that the cause of generation and destruction acts in different ways. Now in the case of voluntary and appetitive motion, will and appetite have the character of moved movers, as is evident in Book III of The Soul. Hence it remains that only that which causes motion as something appetible is an unmoved mover.

2521. Now it is said that the first mover causes motion as something appetible because the motion of the heavens has this mover as its end or goal, for this motion is caused by some proximate mover which moves on account of the first unmoved mover in order that it may be assimilated in its causality to the first mover and bring to actuality whatever is virtually contained in it. For the motion of the heavens does not have the generation and destruction of lower bodies as its end, since an end or goal is nobler than the things ordained to it. Therefore the first mover causes motion as something appetible.

2522. But in our own case that which causes motion as a desirable good differs from that which causes motion as an intelligible good, though each causes motion as an unmoved mover. This is particularly evident in the case of an incontinent person; for according to his reason he is moved by an intelligible good, but according to his concupiscible power he is moved by something pleasant to the senses, which, while it seems to be good, is not good absolutely but only with some qualification.—However, this kind of difference cannot be found in the first intelligible and the first desirable good. But the first intelligible and the first desirable good must be the same. The reason is that a concupiscible good, which is not an intelligible good, is merely an apparent good; but the first good “must be an object of will,” i.e., an object desired by intellectual appetite. For will belongs to the intellectual order and not merely to that of concupiscible appetite. And this is so because what is desired by the concupiscible power seems to be good because it is desired; for concupiscence perverts the judgment of reason insofar as something pleasant to sense seems to be good to reason. But what is desired by intellectual appetite is desired because it seems to be good in itself. For “understanding” as such, i.e., the act of intellection, which is moved in a way by an intelligible object, “is the principle of desire.”

Therefore it is evident that the object of concupiscible appetite is good only when it is desired through a dictate of reason. Hence it cannot be the first good, but only that which, because it is good, moves desire and is at once both appetible and intelligible.

2523. And one of the two (1068).

Since he has proved that the first mover is both intelligible and appetible, it now remains to show from this how perfection is found in the first mover. In regard to thi8 he does three things. First (1068:C 2523), he shows the perfection of the first mover in itself by considering the formal character of the intelligible and the appetible; second (1070:C 2529), in relation to the first sphere ("And it causes motion"); and third (107:C 2536), in relation to the thing that desires and understands it ("And its course of life").

In treating the first part he does two things. First, he proves that the first mover is perfect on the ground that it is intelligible; and second (106g:C 2526), on the ground that it is appetible ("But that which is good").

He says, first (1068), that, just as movers and things moved are related to one another, so also are intelligible things. He calls this latter relationship an intelligible column of opposites because one intelligible is the first principle for understanding another, just as one mover is also the cause of the motion of another.

2524. Therefore, just as it has been shown (1066:C 298) from the series of movers and things moved that the first mover is a simple substance and an actuality, in a similar fashion the same thing is found to be true from the series of intelligible things. For it is evident that substance is the first of intelligible things, because we understand accidents only by means of substance, through which they are defined; and among substances a simple intelligible substance is prior to a composite one; for simple things are included in the concept of composite things. And of the simple entities contained in the class of substance the actually intelligible are prior to the potentially intelligible; for potentiality is defined by means of actuality. It follows, then, that the first intelligible entity is a simple substance which is an actuality.

2525. And lest he should seem to be adopting the opinion of Plato, who claimed that the first principle of things is the intelligible one-in-itself, he therefore explains the difference between being one and being simple. He says that one and simple do not signify the same thing, but one signifies a measure, as has been pointed out in Book X (825:C 1950-52), and simple signifies that state whereby something is such as not to be composed of many things.

2526. But that which is good (1069).

Then he proves the same point from the formal character of the appetible. He says that that which is good and that which is desirable in itself belong to the same class. For that which is prior in the class of intelligible things is also a greater good in the class of appetible things, or is something analogous to it. He says this because intelligible things are actual insofar as they exist in the intellect, whereas appetible things are actual insofar as they exist in reality; for good and evil are in things, as has been pointed out in Book VI (558:C 1240).

2527. Hence, just as the concept of intelligible substance is prior to that of intelligible accidents, the same relationship holds for the goods which correspond proportionally to these concepts. Therefore the greatest good will be a simple substance, which is an actuality, because it is the first of intelligible things. It is evident, then, that the first mover is identical with the first intelligible and the first appetible good, which is the greatest good.

2528. But since what is appetible and what is good have the character of an end or goal, and there does not seem to be an end in the realm of immovable things, as has been explained in the dialectical discussions in Book III (192:C 374-75), he therefore removes this difficulty. He says that the division in which the various senses of end or goal are distinguished shows that a final cause can be found in a way in the realm of immovable things. Now one thing can be the goal of another in two ways: first, as something having prior existence, as the center of the world is said to be a goal which is prior to the motion of heavy bodies; and nothing prevents a goal of this kind from existing in the realm of immovable things. For a thing can tend by its motion to participate in some degree in something immovable; and the first mover can be a goal in this way. Second, one thing is said to be the goal of another, not as something that exists actually, but only as existing in the intention of the agent by whose activity it is produced, is health is the goal of the activity of the medical art. An end or goal of this kind does not exist in the realm of immovable things.

2529. And it causes motion (1070).

He now relates the first unmoved mover to the first sphere. He says that, since the first unmoved mover causes motion as something loved, there must be something which is first moved by it, through which it moves other things. This is the first heaven. Therefore, since we suppose motion to be eternal, the first sphere must be moved eternally, and it in turn must move other things. And it is better to speak of it as something loved rather than as something desired, since there is desire only of something that is not yet possessed, but there is love even of something that is possessed.

2530. And if it must be moved eternally, it must be incapable of being other than it is but must always remain substantially the same. Hence the primary kind of motion, by which "the first sphere" is moved, necessarily "is local motion," i.e., motion as regards place; because that which is moved "according to the other kinds of motion," i.e., generation and destruction, increase and decrease, and alteration, must differ as regards something intrinsic, namely, substance, quantity or quality. But that which is moved with local motion differs as regards place, which is extrinsic to the thing in place, but not as regards substance or any intrinsic disposition of substance.

2531. Therefore, since the first sphere differs as regards place but not as regards substance, the first mover, which is immovable and always actual, can in no way be other than it is, because it cannot be moved. For if it were moved, it would be moved especially with the primary kind of motion, which is local motion, of which the first type is circular. But it is not moved with this motion, since it moves other things with this motion. For the first mover is not moved with that kind of motion by which it imparts motion, just as the first cause of alteration is not itself altered. Hence it is not moved circularly, and so cannot be moved in any way. Therefore it cannot be other than it is; and thus it follows that the primary kind of motion exists in that which is moved of necessity; for that is necessary which cannot not be. But it is not necessary in the sense in which things forced are necessary, but its necessity consists in its good state. And the thing which moves it is a principle of motion as an object of desire, or a goal.

2532. That its necessity is such becomes evident from the different meanings of the term necessary, for it is used in three senses. First it means that which happens by force, i.e., what cannot fail to happen because of the power exerted by the thing applying force. Second, it means that without which a thing does not fare well—either that without which a goal cannot be attained at all (as food is necessary for the life of an animal), or that without which something is not in a perfect state (as a horse is necessary for a journey in the sense that it is not easy to make a journey without one). Third, it means that which cannot be other than it is, but is necessary absolutely and essentially.

2533. Therefore, when it is said that an orb is moved of necessity, such necessity cannot be called necessity of force; for in imperishable things there is not found anything that is outside their nature, but in the case of things which are forced what occurs is not natural. Similarly such necessity cannot be absolute necessity, because the first thing which is moved moves itself, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics, and what moves itself has within itself the power to move or not move. It follows, then, that the necessity of the first motion is necessity from the end, inasmuch as there cannot be a fitting order to the end unless such motion is eternal.

2534. Hence it is on this principle, i.e., the first mover viewed as an end, that the heavens depend both for the eternality of their substance and the eternality of their motion. Consequently the whole of nature depends on such a principle, because all natural things depend on the heavens and on such motion as they possess.

2535. It should also be noted that Aristotle says here that the necessity of the first motion is not absolute necessity but necessity from the end, and the end is the principle which he later calls God inasmuch as things are assimilated to God through motion. Now assimilation to a being that wills and understands (as he shows God to be) is in the line of will and understanding, just as things made by art are assimilated to the artist inasmuch as his will is fulfilled in them. This being so, it follows that the necessity of the first motion is totally subject to the will of God.

LESSON 8

The Perfection of the First Substance

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 7: 1072b 14-1073a 13

1071. And its course of life is like the best which we enjoy for a short time; for it is always in that state, though this is impossible for us.

1072. For its operation is also pleasure. This is why being awake, sensing and understanding are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them. Now understanding in itself has to do with what is best in itself, and the highest type of understanding has to do with what is best in the highest degree.

1073. And an intellect understands itself insofar as it takes on its intelligible object; for it becomes intelligible by attaining and understanding its object, so that an intellect and its intelligible object are the same. For that which is receptive of something intelligible and of substance is an intellect; and it is actual when it possesses this. Hence it is the latter rather than the former state which seems to constitute the divine state of intellect; and its act of understanding is the most pleasant and best. Therefore, if God is in that pleasurable state in which we sometimes are, this is wondrous; and if He is in that state in a higher degree, this is even more wondrous; and He is in that state.

1074. Life, then, also belongs to Him; for intellectual activity is life, and God is that activity; and the essential activity of God is the life which is best and eternal. And we say that God is an animal, eternal and most excellent.

Hence life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God; for this is what God is.

1075. And all those, such as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, who think (1109:C 2644) that the greatest good and excellence are not found in the [first] principle (because they are of the opinion that, while the principles of plants and animals are causes, it is in the things that come from these that goodness and perfection are found) are in error. For seed comes from other things which are prior and perfect, and it is not seed that is first but the perfect being. For example, one might say that the man is prior to the seed, not the man who comes from the. seed, but another man from whom the seed comes (780). Therefore it is evident from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things.

1076. And it has been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible; for it causes motion for an infinite time, and nothing finite has an infinite power. And since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, this substance cannot have finite magnitude; and it cannot have infinite magnitude, because there is no infinite magnitude at all.

1077. It has also been shown (1066) that it lacks potentiality and is unalterable; for all the other kinds of motion are subsequent to local motion. It is clear, then, that these things are of this sort.

COMMENTARY

2536. Here the Philosopher relates the first being, which causes Motion as something intelligible and something desirable, to that which understands and desires it. For if the first mover causes motion inasmuch as it is the first thing understood and desired, the first thing moved by it must understand and desire it. This is true according to the opinion of Aristotle inasmuch as he considered a heaven to be animated by a soul which understands and desires.

In regard to this he does three things. First (1071:C 2536), he shows that pleasure naturally belongs to the soul of a heaven, which desires and understands, as a result of its understanding and desiring the first mover. He says that “its course of life,” i.e., the pleasurable state of the thing understanding and desiring the first intelligible being, is like the best which we can enjoy for a short time. For that which understands and desires this being is always in such a pleasurable state, though this is impossible for us, i.e., that we should always be in that state which is pleasant and best.

2537. For its operation (1072).

Then he proves his statement. Pleasure attends the activity of the thing that understands and desires the first principle, for pleasure follows upon the operation connatural to anything that understands and desires, as is evident in Book X of the Ethics. A sign of this is that pleasure is greatest when a person is awake and actually sensing and understanding. For intellect and sense in actual use are to intellect and sense in potential use as being awake is to being asleep.—That these states are the most pleasant is clear from the fact that other states are pleasant only because of these; for hope and memory are pleasant inasmuch as they bring past or future pleasant activities into consciousness as present.

2538. Hence, since pleasure consists in the actual use of intellect and sense, it is evident “that understanding,” i.e., the activity of the intellect as such, is concerned with what is best in itself; for an intelligible good surpasses a sensible good just as an unchangeable and universal good surpasses a changeable and particular good. It also follows that the pleasure experienced in intellectual activity is of a higher kind than that experienced in sensory activity. Hence the best and most perfect intellectual activity is concerned with what is best in the highest degree, so that the greatest pleasure follows. Therefore it is evident that the greatest pleasure is experienced in those intellectual activities by which the first mover is understood, who is also the first intelligible object.

2539. And an intellect (1073).

Then he shows that the act of understanding and the pleasure found in the first intelligible object are even more perfect than those found in the thing that understands and desires it. He says that it is characteristic of an intellect to understand itself inasmuch as it takes on or conceives within itself some intelligible object; for an intellect becomes intelligible by reason of the fact that it apprehends something intelligible. Hence, since the intellect becomes intelligible by conceiving some intelligible object, it follows that the intellect and its intelligible object are the same.

2540. He explains how an intellect attains its intelligible object. For an intellect is related to an intelligible object as potentiality is to actuality, and as something perfectible to its perfection. And just as something perfectible is receptive of a perfection, so too an intellect is receptive of its intelligible object. Now its proper intelligible object is substance, since the object of the intellect is a quiddity. Hence he says that the intellect is receptive of something intelligible and of substance. And since each thing becomes actual inasmuch as it attains its own perfection, it follows that the intellect becomes actual inasmuch as it receives its intelligible object. Now to be intelligible is to be actual in the class of intelligible things. And since each thing is active to the extent that it is actual, it follows that the intellect becomes active or operative, i.e., understanding, to the extent that it attains its intelligible object.

2541. But it should be borne in mind that material substances are not actually intelligible but only potentially; and they become actually intelligible by reason of the fact that the likenesses of them which are gotten by way of the sensory powers are made immaterial by the agent intellect. And these likenesses are not substances but certain intelligible forms received into the possible intellect. But according to Plato the intelligible forms of material things are self-subsistent entities. Hence he claimed that our intellect becomes actually understanding by coming in contact with separate self-subsistent forms of this kind. But in Aristotle’s opinion the intelligible forms of material things are not substances which subsist of themselves.

2542. Yet there is an intelligible substance which subsists of itself, and it is of this that he is now speaking. For the first mover must be a substance which is both understanding and intelligible. Hence it follows that the relationship between the intellect of the first sphere and the first intelligible substance, which causes motion, is similar to the relationship which the Platonists posited between our intellect and the separate intelligible Forms, inasmuch as our intellect becomes actual by coming in contact with and participating in these Formi, as Plato himself says. Hence the intellect of the first sphere becomes actually understanding through some kind of contact with the first intelligible substance.

2543. Further, since the cause of some attribute of a thing has that attribute in a higher degree, it follows that anything that is divine and noble, such as understanding and taking pleasure, which is found in the intellect having the contact, is found in a much higher degree in the first intelligible object with which it is in contact. Hence its intellectual activity is most pleasant and best. But the first intelligible object of this kind is God. Therefore, since the pleasure which we experience in understanding is the highest, although we can enjoy it only for a short time, if God is always in that state in which we sometimes are, His happiness is wondrous. But if He is always in that state (which we enjoy for only a short time) in a higher degree, this is even more wondrous.

2544. Life, then, also belongs (1074).

Third, since he has said that intellectual activity is proper to God, he shows how this applies to Him. He says that God is life itself, and he proves this as follows. “Intellectual activity,” i.e., understanding, is a kind of life; and it is the most perfect kind of life that there is. For according to what has been shown, actuality is more perfect than potentiality; and therefore an intellect which is actually understanding leads a more perfect life than one which is potentially understanding, just as being awake is more perfect than being asleep. But the first being, God, is actuality itself; for His intellect is His intellectual activity; otherwise He would be related to His intellectual activity as potentiality to actuality. Moreover, it has been shown (1066:C 2517) that His substance is actuality. Thus it follows that the very substance of God is life, and that His actuality is His life, and that it is the life which is best and eternal and subsists of itself. This is why common opinion holds that God is an animal which is eternal and best; for around us life is clearly apparent only in animals, and therefore God is called an animal because life belongs to Him. Hence, from what has been said it is evident that life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God, because God is identical with His own eternal life; for He and His life are not different.

2545. And all those (1075).

Then he rejects the opinion of those who attributed imperfection to the first principle. He says that the opinion of all those who claim that goodness and excellence are not found in the first principle are false. He cites as examples the Pythagoreans and Speusippus (1109:C 2644), who acted on the supposition that, while the principles of plants and animals are causes of goodness and perfection, goodness and perfection are not found in these principles but in the things produced from them. Thus seeds, which are imperfect principles of plants and animals, come from other individual things which are prior and perfect.

2546. He rejects this opinion by disposing of the view which influenced these thinkers. For it is not seed that is first absolutely, but the perfect being. Hence, if someone says that the man is prior to the seed, it is not the man who is said to be born from the seed in question, but a different man from whom the seed comes. For it has been proved above (1059-60:C 2500-03) that actuality is prior absolutely to potentiality, though in one and the same subject potentiality is prior to actuality in the order of generation and of time.

2547. In view of the points established he terminates his discussion by concluding that it is evident that there is a substance which is eternal and unchangeable and separate from sensible things.

2548. And it has been shown (1076).

Then he proceeds to examine certain points which still remain to be considered about the above-mentioned substance. First, he shows that it is incorporeal. He says that it has been proved in Book VIII of the Physics that this kind of substance can have no magnitude but is without parts and indivisible.

2549. He briefly restates the proof, saying that a substance of this kind moves in infinite time, since the first mover is eternal, as he said above (1075:C 2547). And from this it follows that its power is infinite. For we see that the more powerful any inferior mover is, the more capable it is of acting for a longer time. But nothing finite can have an infinite power. Hence it follows that the above-mentioned substance is not finite in magnitude. Moreover, it cannot be infinite in magnitude because an infinite magnitude is impossible, as has been proved above (1076:C 2548). Therefore, since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it follows that the above-mentioned substance lacks magnitude in every way.

2550. Moreover, the power of this substance is not said to be infinite in a privative sense, in the way that infinity pertains to quantity; but the term is used in a negative sense, i.e., inasmuch as it is not limited to some definite effect. It cannot be said of a heavenly body, however, that its power is infinite even though it may move inferior bodies in an infinite time, because it causes motion only by being moved, and thus its influence is from the first mover. Nor can it be said that the power of a heavenly body is infinite even though it has being in infinite time, because it has no active power of being but only the ability to receive. Hence its infinite duration points to the infinite power of an external principle. But in order to receive indestructible existence from an infinite power a heavenly body must not have any principle of destruction or any potentiality to non-existence.

2551. It has also been shown (1077).

Second, since he has shown above (1066:C 2517) that the first mover is not moved with local motion, he next shows that it is not moved with the other kinds of motion. He says that it is also impossible for the first mover to be alterable, for it has been shown above (1066:C 2517) that it is not moved with local motion. But all other motions are subsequent to such motion, which pertains to place. Therefore, when the former is removed, so also must the latter be. Hence whatever is found to be moved with the other kinds of motion is moved with local motion.

2552. Last, he concludes that the things discussed above are evidently such as he has established them to be.

LESSON 9

The Number of Primary Movers

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1073a 14-1073b 17

1078. We must not neglect the question whether it is necessary to posit one such substance or more than one, and if the latter, how many; and we must also recall the lack of statements on this point by other philosophers, because they have said nothing about the number of these substances which can be clearly stated. The theory of Ideas makes no proper study of this problem; for the proponents of the Ideas say that the Ideas are numbers, and they speak of numbers sometimes as unlimited and sometimes as limited to the number ten. But as to the reason why there should be so many numbers, nothing is said apodictically.

1079. However, we must discuss this question by beginning with what has already been laid down and established. For the first principle and primary being is both essentially and accidentally immovable, but it causes the primary motion, which is eternal and unique. And since that which is moved must be moved by something else, the first mover must be essentially immovable, and eternal motion must be caused by an eternal mover, and a single motion by a single thing.

io8o. Now we see that, besides the simple local motion which we say the first immovable substance causes, there are other local motions—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which is moved in a circle is eternal and never stands still, as has been proved in our treatises on nature) . Each of these motions, then, must also be caused by a substance which is essentially immovable and eternal. For the nature of the stars is eternal, being a kind of substance; and that which causes motion is eternal and prior to that which is moved; and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. Hence it is evident that there must be as many substances as there are motions of the stars, and that these substances are eternal in nature, essentially immovable, and without magnitude, for the reason given above (1076). It is evident, then, that these movers are substances, and that one of these is first and another second according to the same order as the motions of the stars.

1081. But it is now necessary to discover the number of these motions from that branch of the mathematical sciences which is most akin to philosophy, namely, astronomy. For this science studies the kind of substance which is sensible but eternal, whereas the other mathematical sciences, such as the science of numbers and geometry, are not concerned with any kind of substance. That there are many motions belonging to the bodies which are moved is evident even to those who have given little consideration to the matter; for each of the wandering stars has more than one motion. As to the number of these motions, in order that we may have some definite number in mind for the purpose of understanding this point, let us now state what some of the mathematicians say; but for the rest, this we must investigate partly for ourselves and partly accept the opinion of other investigators. And if anyone in treating this subject should be found to form a different opinion from the one stated here, we must respect both views but accept the more certain.

COMMENTARY

2553. Having shown what it is that constitutes the perfection of an immaterial substance, here the Philosopher asks whether this substance is one or many; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1078:C 2553), he indicates that it is necessary to treat this question because nothing definite has teen said about it by other thinkers. Second (1079:C 2555), he shows that there are many such substances (“However, we must discuss”). Third (1081:C 2563), he shows how many there are (“But it is now necessary”).

He accordingly says, first (1078), that we must not neglect the question whether it is necessary to posit only one such substance which is eternal and immaterial or many; and if the latter, how many. But we must also “recall the lack of statements on this point by other philosophers,” i.e., the fact that others have said nothing that is clear and evident about the number of these substances.

2554. This is made clear as follows. Those who made a special claim for immaterial substances were the proponents of the Ideas. Now the opinion about the nature of the Ideas contains no theory about any definite number, because there are assumed to be Ideas of all things which share in a common name. But since those who posited Ideas said that they are numbers, it would seem that we could get some notion about how many numbers there are. However, they did not always say the same thing on this point. Sometimes they said that the species of numbers are unlimited. This is true of numbers by reason of their proper nature, because whenever a unit is added it always produces a different species of number. Hence, since in the case of numbers infinite additions can be made, the species of numbers may increase to infinity. At other times they said that the species of numbers are limited to the number ten. This refers to the naming of numbers, for the names of all numbers after ten seem to repeat in some way the name of a primary number. But they cannot show by any definite argument why there should be just so many numbers, i.e., ten, and not more or fewer. Nor is this to be wondered at, since this limitation of the species of numbers is not a real limitation but a nominal one. Other thinkers offer the argument that the number ten is generated from the progression of numbers up to the number four, which is the first square number. For one plus two equals three; and when three is added to this, the number six results; and when four is added to this, the number ten results.

2555. However, we must discuss (1079).

He now shows that there must be many substances of this kind; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he returns to the points established about the first principle. He says that, since other thinkers have said nothing demonstrative about the number of separate substances, we must discuss this question by beginning with what has already been laid down and established. For it has been said above that, while the first principle of beings is one which is neither essentially nor accidentally moved, it still causes a single motion, which is the first and eternal motion. For since everything which is moved must be moved by something else, as has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics, the first mover must be altogether immovable, and eternal motion must be caused by an eternal mover, and a single motion by a single mover.

2556. Now we see (1080).

Second, he shows that after the first principle it is necessary to posit a number of eternal substances. He says that besides the simple local motion of the universe (one that lasts a day —during which the entire heavens revolve—and is uniform and the most simple), which the first immovable substance causes, we observe the local motions of the planets, which are also eternal; because the circular body, i.e., a heaven, is also eternal. Therefore the eternity of motion is no; destroyed as a result of the destruction of a movable being. And "it never stands still," i.e., it is incapable of coming to rest. Hence this motion is not broken by rest. These points have been proved in the philosophy of nature, both in the Physics as well as in The Heavens. Each of these motions, then, must be caused by a mover which is essentially unmoved and an eternal substance.

2557. Now this must be so because the stars are eternal and are substances. Hence their mover must also be eternal and a substance; for a mover is prior to the thing moved, and that which is prior to a substance must be a substance. It is clear, then, that there must be as many substances as there are motions of the stars, and that these substances must be by nature eternal and essentially immovable and without magnitude, for the reason given above (1076:C 2548-50), i.e., because they move in infinite time and therefore have infinite power. Hence it is evident that there are immaterial substances which are as numerous as the motions of the stars, and that they also have the same order as the motions of the stars.

2558. Now it must be borne in mind that after the first motion Aristotle computes only the motions of the planets, because at his time the motion of the fixed stars had not been detected. Hence he thought that the eighth sphere, in which the fixed stars are located, was the first one to be moved, and that its mover was the first principle. But later on astronomers perceived that the motion of the fixed stars was in an opposite direction to the first motion, so that above the sphere of the fixed stars it was necessary to posit another sphere, [This "ninth" orb or sphere of which St. Thomas speaks was postulated by the astronomers in order to account for the motion which the celestial pole was discovered to be describing every 36,ooo years. Since it encompassed all the other spheres, it was considered to be a ninth or outermost sphere, and therefore the first in order of all the spheres.] which surrounds the entire heavens and turns the whole in its daily motion. This is the first sphere, which is moved by the first mover of which Aristotle spoke.

2559. But Avicenna claimed that the first sphere is moved directly, not by the first principle, but by an intelligence which is caused by the first principle. For since the first mover is absolutely one, Avicenna thought that only one thing could be caused by it; and this is the first intelligence, in which a plurality of potentiality and actuality is found inasmuch as it derives being from the first principle. For it is related to that on which it depends for its existence as something potential to something actual. Hence the first intelligence can immediately cause many things; for inasmuch as it understands itself as having some potentiality, it causes the substance of the orb which it moves, but insofar as it understands itself as possessing actual existence from some other cause, it causes the soul of its orb. Again, inasmuch as it understands its own principle, it causes the next intelligence, which moves a lower orb, and so on down to the sphere of the moon.

2560. But this is not necessary. For an efficient cause in the realm of superior substances does not act like an Acient cause in the realm of material things, in the sense that a single effect is produced by a single cause, because among higher substances cause and thing caused have intelligible existence. Hence insofar as many things can be understood by a single superior substance, many effects can be produced by a single superior substance. And it seems quite fitting that the first motion of corporeal things, on which all other motions depend, should have as its cause the principle of immate:ial substances, so that there should be some connection and order between sensible and intelligible things. A problem can arise, however, regarding the Philosopher’s statement that the order of separate substances corresponds to the order of motions and bodies moved. For of all the planets the sun is the largest in size, and its effect is more evident in lower bodies; and even the motions of the other planets are arranged in accordance with the motion of the sun, and in a sense are subsequent to it. Hence it seems that the substance which moves the sun is nobler than the substances which move the other planets, even though the sun is not located above the other planets. But since among bodies one which contains is more formal, and is thereby nobler and more perfect, and is related to a contained body as a whole to a part, as is said in Book IV of the Physics; and since the sphere of a superior planet contains that of an inferior planet, therefore a superior Planet, to which its whole sphere is subordinated, must have a higher and more universal power than an inferior planet, and must produce more lasting effects because it is nearer to the first sphere, which by its motion causes the eternality of things, as has been pointed out above (1065:C 2510). And this is the reason, as Ptolemy says in the Quadripartitum, why the effects of Saturn correspond to universal places and times, and those of Jupiter to years, and those of Mars, the sun, Venus and Mercury to months, and those of the moon to days.

2561. This is also the reason why the effects of the planets appear in lower bodies in accordance with the order among the planets. For the first three highest planets seem to be directed to effects which pertain to the existence of a thing taken in itself; for the very stability of a thing’s act of being is attributed to Saturn, and its perfection and state of well-being to Jupiter, and the power by which it protects itself from what is harmful and drives it away, to Mars. The other three planets seem to have as their proper effects the motion of a being. The sun is a universal principle of motion, and for this reason its operation is most evident in the case of lower motions. For Venus seems to have as its proper effect a more limited one, namely, the process of generation, by which a thing attains its form, and one to which all the other motions among lower bodies are directed. Mercury seems to have as its proper effect the multiplication of things, i.e., the distinction of individuals in the same species; and for this reason it has various motions. It is also mixed with the natures of all the planets, as the astronomers say. The changing of matter and the disposing of it to receive all celestial impressions belongs properly to the moon; and for this reason it seems that it is the planet which transmits celestial impressions and applies them to inferior matter.

2562. Hence the higher a celestial body, the more universal, lasting, and powerful its effect. And since the celestial bodies are the instruments, so to speak, of the separate substances which cause motion, it follows that a substance which moves a higher orb has a more universal knowledge and power, and must therefore be nobler.

2563. But it is now necessary (1081).

Then he investigates the number of these substances; and this is divided into two parts. In the first part (1081:C 2563) he first investigates the number of celestial motions; and in the second (1084:C 2586), he infers from this the number of substances which cause motion (“Hence it is reasonable”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he indicates the source from which we must derive the number of celestial motions. Second (1082:C 2567), he gives the different opinions about this (“Now Eudoxus”).

He says, first (1081), that we must use the science of astronomy in studying the number of revolutions or celestial motions, which is a subject that belongs particularly to this branch of the mathematical sciences. For of these sciences only astronomy speculates about sensible and eternal substances, i.e., celestial bodies. But the other mathematical sciences do not consider any substance, as is clear in the case of arithmetic, which treats of numbers, and in the case of geometry, which treats of continuous quantity. Number and continuous quantity are accidents.

2564. That there are many motions belonging to the bodies which move about in the heavens, i.e., the planets, is evident even to those who have little acquaintance with the science of astronomy; for “each of the wandering stars,” i.e., the planets, is moved by several motions and not just by one. Now the planets are called “wandering stars,” not because their motions are irregular, but because they do not always maintain the same pattern and position in relation to the other stars, as these do among themselves and for this reason are called “fixed.”

2565. That there are many motions of stars of this kind is detected in three ways. There is one motion which is perceived by plain sight. There is another which is perceived only by instruments and calculation; and of these motions, some are grasped after a very long period of time, and others after a short one. There is also a third motion, which is demonstrated by reason; for the motion of the wandering stars is found at one time to be more rapid and at another slower; and sometimes a planet seems to be moving forward, and sometimes backward. And because this cannot be in keeping with the nature of a celestial body, whose motion ought to be regular in all respects, it has been necessary to posit different motions by which this irregularity might be reduced to a fitting order.

2566. As to the number of planetary motions, let us now state what the mathematicians say about this, so that with this in mind we may conceive some definite number. But as to the other things which have not been stated, we must either investigate these for ourselves or in this matter accept the opinion of those who do investigate the problem. The same thing applies if some view should appear later on in addition to" those which are now stated by men who treat this kind of problem. And since in choosing or rejecting opinions of this kind a person should not be influenced either by a liking or dislike for the one introducing the opinion, but rather by the certainty of truth, he therefore says that we must respect both parties, namely, those whose opinion we follow, and those whose opinion we reject. For both have diligently sought the truth and have aided us in this matter. Yet we must "be persuaded by the more certain," i.e., we must follow the opinion of those who have attained the truth with greater certitude.

LESSON 10

The Number of Unmoved Movers

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 8: 1073b 17-1074b 14

1082. Now Eudoxus claimed that the motion both of the sun and of the moon involves for each three spheres. The first of these is the sphere of the stars whose positions remain unchapged; the second, the one which passes through the middle of the zodiac; and the third, the one which moves obliquely in the latitude of the animals in the zodiac. But the circle in which the moon is moved is inclined at a greater angle than that in which the sun is moved. He also claimed that the motion of the wandering stars involves four spheres for each. The first and second of these are the same as those mentioned above. The sphere of the fixed stars is the one which imparts motion to all of the spheres, and the sphere which is situated below this and moves through the middle of the zodiac is common to all of the planets. The third sphere for each of the planets has its poles in the circle which passes through the middle signs of the zodiac; and the motion of the fourth sphere is in a circle which is inclined at a greater angle to the middle of this sphere; and while the poles of the third sphere are peculiar to each of the other planets, those of Venus and of Mercury are the same.

1083. And Callippus assumed the position of the spheres to be the same as Eudoxus did, i.e., as regards the arrangement of their distances, and he gave the same number of spheres to Jupiter and to Saturn as Eudoxus did. But he thought that two spheres should be added both to the sun and to the moon if appearances are to be saved. And to each of the other planets he added one sphere. However, if all spheres taken together are to account for appearances, there must be additional spheres for each of the other planets, one less in number than those mentioned above, which revolve the planets and always restore to the same place the first sphere of the star which is next in order below. For only in this way can all the spheres account for the motion of the planets. Therefore, since, as regards the spheres in which the planets themselves are carried along, some are eight in number and others twenty-five in number, and of these only those in which the lowest planet is carried along do not need to be revolved, then the spheres which revolve the first two planets will be six in number, and those which revolve the last four will be sixteen in number. The total number of spheres, then, both those which carry the planets along and those which revolve them, will be fifty-five. And if one has not added to the moon and to the sun the motions which we have mentioned (1083), the total number of spheres will be forty-seven. Let the number of the spheres, then, be so many.

1084. Hence it is reasonable to suppose that there are as many substances and immovable principles and perceptible principles. Therefore the statement of necessity is to be left to more powerful thinkers.

1085. However, if there can be no celestial motion which is not related to the motion of a star, and further if every nature and substance which is unchangeable and has in itself reached the highest good must be thought to be an end, there will be no other nature besides these; but this must be the number of substances. For if there were others, they would cause motion as being ends of local motion.

1086. But there cannot be other motions besides those mentioned. And it is reasonable to suppose this from the bodies that are moved. For if everything which moves exists by nature for the sake of that which is moved, and all motion is the motion of something moved, no motion will exist for itself or for the sake of another motion, but all motions will exist for the sake of the stars. For if one motion should exist for the sake of another, the latter must also exist for the sake of another. Hence, since an infinite regress is impossible, the end of every motion must be one of the divine bodies which move about in the heavens.

1087. And it is evident that there is only one heaven. For if there were many heavens, as there are many men, the principle of each would be one in species but many in number. But all things which are many in number have matter; fhr many individuals have one and the same intelligible structure, for example, man, whereas Socrates is one; but the primary quiddity 4 has no matter, for it is complete reality. Therefore the first mover, which is immovable, is one botfi in its intelligible structure and in number; and therefore what is moved eternally and continuously is only one. Hence there is only one heaven.

1088. Now traditions have been handed down from our predecessors and the ancient thinkers, and left to posterity in the form of a myth, that these heavenly bodies are gods, and that the divine encompasses the whole of nature. But the rest of the traditions have been added later in the form of a myth for the persuasion of the multitude, the general welfare, and the passing of laws (172). For they say that the gods have human form and are similar to some of the other animals; and they add other statements which follow upon these and are similar to the ones mentioned. Now if anyone will separate these statements and accept only the first, that they thought the first substances to be gods, this will be considered to he a divine statement. And though every art and every philosophy has often been discovered and again lost, the opinions of these early thinkers have been preserved as relics to the present day. Therefore the opinions of our forefathers and those which have come down to us from the first thinkers are evident only to this extent.

COMMENTARY

2567. Aristotle states the opinions which the Astronomers of his time held about the number of planetary motions. First (1082:C 2567), he gives the opinion of Eudoxus; and second (1083:C 2578), that of Callippus (“And Callippus”).

Now in regard to the first opinion it must be understood that Plato, in attributing unfailing circularity and order to the celestial motions, made mathematical hypotheses by which the apparent irregular motions of the planets can be explained; for he claimed that the motions of the planets are circular and arranged in an orderly way. And the Pythagoreans, with a view to putting into due order the irregularity which appears in the planetary motions on account of their standing still and moving backwards, and their rapidity and slowness, and their apparent differences in size, claimed that the motions of the planets involve eccentric spheres and small circles which they called epicycles; and Ptolemy 1 also subscribes to this view.

2568. However, something contrary to the points demonstrated in the philosophy of nature seems to follow from this hypothesis; for not every motion will be either towards or away from or around the center of the world. Furthermore it follows that a sphere containing an eccentric sphere either is not of equal density, or there is a vacuum between one sphere and another or there is some body besides the substance of the spheres that lies between them which will not be a circular body and will have no motion of its own.

2569. Further, from the hypothesis of epicycles it follows either that the sphere by which the epicycle is moved is not whole and continuous, or that it is divisible, expansible and compressible in the way in which air is divided, expanded and compressed when a body is moved. It also follows that the body itself of a star is moved by itself and not merely by the motion of an orb; and that from the motion of the celestial bodies there will arise the sound about which the Pythagoreans agreed.

2570. Yet all conclusions of this kind are contrary to the truths established in the philosophy of nature. Therefore Eudoxus, seeing this and seeking to avoid it, claimed that for each planet in the world there are many concentric spheres, each of which has its proper motion and that as a result of all of these motions the observable motion of the planets is accounted for. Hence Eudoxus held that the motion of the sun as well as that of the moon involves three spheres.

2571. For the first motion of the sun as well as that of the moon, which is the daily motion, is that by which they are moved from east to west; and he calls this motion “that of the stars whose positions remain unchanged,” i.e., of the stars which do not wander, namely, the fixed stars; for, as was said above (C 2558), since the motion of the fixed stars, which is from west to east, was not yet discovered to be contrary to the first motion, it was thought that the daily motion was proper to the eighth sphere, which is the sphere of the fixed stars. It was not thought, however, that the first sphere alone might be sufficient to move all the spheres of the planets by a daily motion, as Ptolemy assumed; but he thought that each planet had its own sphere which would move it by a daily motion. Therefore with. a view to explaining this motion he posited a first sphere for both the sun and the moon.

2572. He also posited a second sphere to account for the motion of the sun and the moon. This passes through the middle of the zodiac with what is called “longitudinal motion,” according to which both the sun and the moon are moved from west to east in an opposite direction to the motion of the firmament.

2573. He posited a third sphere to account for the oblique motion across the latitude of the animals symbolized in the zodiac, inasmuch as a planet sometimes seems to be farther south and sometimes farther north of the middle line of the zodiac. But this motion is more apparent and has a broaderspread in the case of the moon than in that of the sun. Hence he adds that the motion by which the moon is carried along is inclined at a greater angle than the sun’s motion. And Ptolemy attributed latitudinal motion to the moon but not to the sun. Hence Eudoxus posited a third motion, as Simplicius says, because he thought that the sun also deviated from the middle line of the zodiac towards the two poles; and he made this assumption because the sun does not always rise in the same place during the summer solstice and during the winter solstice. But if it returned in latitude and in longitude at the same time by means of the declination of the great circle [i.e., the ecliptic] along which the sun travels, one sphere would suffice for this. Since this is not the case, however, but it passes through its course in longitude at one time and returns in latitude at another time, for this reason it was necessary to posit a third sphere. And he claimed that this third sphere of the sun is moved in the same direction as the second sphere, but about a different axis and on different poles. He also claimed that this third sphere of the moon is moved in the same direction as the first sphere. But in each case he claimed that the motion of this third sphere was slower than that of the second.

2574. And he claimed that the motion of each of the other five planets involves four spheres, with the first and second sphere of each planet having the same function as the first and second sphere of the sun and of the moon; because the first motion, which he assumed to be that of the fixed stars, and the second motion, which passes in longitude through the middle line of the zodiac, appear to be common to all the planets.

2575. Next, he posited a third sphere for each of the planets in order to account for their latitudinal motion, and he assumed that the poles about which it is revolved were located in the middle line of the zodiac. But since he claimed that all spheres are concentric, it would follow from this that the zodiac would pass through the poles of the great circle of the third sphere, and it would follow in the opposite way that the great circle of the third sphere would pass through the poles of the zodiac. Hence it would follow that the motion of the third sphere would carry a planet right up to the poles of the zodiac, which is never seen to occur.

2576. Therefore he had to posit a fourth sphere, which is the one that would carry the planet, and it would revolve in an opposite direction to the third sphere, namely, from east to west, in equal time, so as to prevent the planet from being diverted farther in latitude from the zodiac. This is what Aristotle means when he says that Eudoxus claimed that the fourth motion of the star is in a circle inclined at an angle to the middle of the third sphere, i.e., to its great circle.

2577. Therefore, if he posited four spheres for each of the five planets, it follows that there would be twenty spheres for these five planets. And if the three spheres of the sun and the three spheres of the moon a~e added to this number, there will be twentysix spheres in all, granted that the body of each planet is understood to be fastened to the last of its own spheres.

2578. And Callippus assumed (1083).

Then he gives the opinion of Callippus about the number of spheres. Now Callippus, as Simplicius tells us, was associated with Aristotle at Athens when the discoveries of Eudoxus were corrected and supplemented by him. Hence Callippus maintained the same theory of the spheres as Eudoxus did; and he explained the positions of the spheres by the arrangetpent of their distances, because he gave to the planets and to their motions and spheres the same order as Eudoxus did.

2579. And he agreed with Eudoxus as to the number of spheres of Jupiter and Saturn, because he assigned four spheres to each of these; but Callippus thought that two spheres must be added both to the sun and to the moon, if one wants to adopt a theory about them which accords with their motions. He seems to have added these two spheres in order to account for the rapidity and slowness which appears in their motions. The sun would then have five spheres, and the moon likewise would have five. He also added one sphere to each of the remaining planets—Mars, Venus and Mercury—thus giving each of them also five spheres. Perhaps they added this fifth sphere to account for the backward motion and the standing still which appear in these stars. These spheres are called deferent spheres, then, because the body of a planet is carried along by them.

2580. But in addition to these spheres they posited others, which they called revolving spheres. It would appear that they were led to posit these because the last sphere of a higher planet, for example, of Saturn, must share in the motion of all the higher planets, so that its motion gets away somewhat from that of the first sphere. Hence the first sphere of Jupiter, whose poles are fastened in some way to the highest sphere of Saturn, shared to some extent in the motion of the spheres of Saturn, and thus it was not moved uniformly by the daily motion like the first sphere of Saturn. Therefore it seemed necessary to posit another sphere which revolves this first sphere in order to restore the speed which it loses because of the higher planets. And by the same reasoning it was necessary to posit another sphere which revolves the second sphere of Jupiter, and a third sphere which revolves the third sphere of Jupiter. But it was unnecessary to posit another sphere which revolves the fourth sphere, because the motion of the first sphere, to which the star is fixed, must be composed of all the higher motions. Hence Jupiter has four deferent spheres and three revolving spheres. And in a similar way the other planets have as many revolving spheres, minus one, as deferent spheres.

2581. Therefore he says that, if all spheres taken together must account for and explain the apparent motion of the planets, it is necessary to posit, in addition to the deferent spheres mentioned above, other spheres, one less in number, which revolve and restore to the same place the first sphere of the star next in order below; for only in this way can the motions of the planets accord with all appearances.

2582. Therefore, since the deferent spheres which belong to Saturn and to Jupiter are eight in number, because each is assumed to have four spheres; and since those which belong to the other five planets are twenty-five in number, because each of these has five spheres, and of these only those at the end which carry and regulate the star are not revolved, it follows that the revolving spheres of the first two planets, i.e., of Saturn and Jupiter, are six in number, and that those of the last four planets are sixteen in number. But since after Saturn and Jupiter there are five other planets, he evidently omits one of them, i.e., either Mars or Mercury, so that his statement regarding the last four refers to the four lowest; or he omits the moon, so that he refers to the four planets immediately following. Now he omits this either by error, which sometimes happens in the case of numbers, or for some reason which is unknown to us; because the writings of Callippus are not extant, as Simplicius tells us. Hence the total number of deferent spheres and of revolving spheres together is fifty-five.

2583. But because the difficulty could arise whether it is necessary to add two spheres to the sun and two to the moon, as Callippus did, or whether only two spheres must be given to each, as Eudoxus claimed, he therefore says that, if one does not add two motions to the sun and two to the moon, as Callippus did, it follows that the total number of spheres will be forty-seven; for four deferent spheres would then be subtracted from the above numbertwo for the sun and two for the moon —and also the same number of revolving spheres; and when eight is subtracted from fifty-five, forty-seven remains.

2584. But it must be noted that, if above (1083:C 2582), when he said that the revolving spheres of the last four planets are sixteen in number, he omitted the moon, then if two deferent spheres are subtracted from the moon and two from the sun, four revolving spheres are not subtracted but only two, granted that the spheres of the moon do not have revolving spheres; and thus six spheres are subtracted from the first number of spheres, i.e., four deferent and two revolving spheres; and then it follows that the total number of spheres is forty-nine. Hence it seems that Aristotle did not wish to omit the moon but rather Mars, unless one says that Aristotle had forgotten that he had assigned revolving spheres to the moon, and that this is the reason the mistake was made, which does not seem likely.

2585. Last, he draws his conclusion that the number of spheres is that mentioned.

2586. Hence it is reasonable (1084).

Then he infers the number of immaterial substances from the number of celestial motions; and in regard to this he does three things. First (1084:C 2586), he draws the conclusion at which he aims. Second (1085:C 2587), he rejects certain suppositions which could weaken the foregoing inference

(“However, if there can be”). Third (1088:C 2597), he compares the points demonstrated about separate substance with the opinions of the ancients and with the common opinions held about these things during his own time (“Now traditions have”).

He says, first (1084), that, since the number of celestial spheres and the number of celestial motions is as has been stated, it is reasonable to suppose that there are the same number of immaterial substances and immobile principles, and even the same number of “perceptible principles,” i.e., celestial bodies. He uses the term reasonable in order to imply that this conclusion is a probable one and not one that is necessary. Hence he adds that he is leaving the necessity of this to those who are stronger and more capable of discovering it than he is.

2587. However, if there can be (1085).

Here the Philosopher rejects those suppositions by which the conclusion given above could be weakened; and there are three of ihese. The first is that one could say that there are certain separate substances to which no celestial motion corresponds.

2588. In order to reject this he says that, if there can be no celestial motions which are not connected with the motion of some star, and again if every immutable substance which has reached “in itself the highest good,” i.e., which has reached its own perfection without motion, must be considered an end of some motion, there wilt be no immutable and immaterial nature besides those substances which are the ends of celestial motions; but the number of separate substances will correspond necessarily to the number of celestial motions.

2589. Yet the first assumption is not necessary, namely, that every immaterial and immutable substance is the end of some celestial motion. For it can be said that there are separate substances too high to be proportioned to the celestial motions as their ends. And this is not an absurd supposition. For immaterial substances do not exist for the sake of corporeal things, but rather the other way around.

2590. But there cannot be (1086).

Then he rejects the second supposition which could weaken the inference mentioned above. For one could say that there are many more motions in the heavens than have been counted, but that these cannot be perceived because they produce no diversity in the motion of one of the celestial bodies which are perceived by the sense of sight and are called stars.

2591. And in order to reject this he had already equivalently said that there can be no celestial motion which is not connected with the motion of some star. His words here are that there cannot be other motions in the heavens besides those which produce the diversity in the motions of the stars, whether they be the motions mentioned or others, either the same in number or more or fewer.

2592. This can be taken as a probable conclusion from the bodies which are moved; for if every mover exists for the sake of something moved, and every motion belongs to something which is moved, there can be no motion which exists for itself or merely for the sake of another motion, but all motions must exist for the sake of the stars. For otherwise, if one motion exists for the sake of another, then for the same reason this motion also must exist for the sake of another. Now since an infinite regress is impossible, it follows that the end of every motion is one of the celestial bodies which are moved, as the stars. Hence there cannot be any celestial motion as a result of which some diversity in a star cannot be perceived.

2593. And it is evident (1087).

Then he rejects a third supposition by which the above inference could be weakened. For someone might say that there are many worlds, and that in each of these there are as many spheres and motions as there are in this world, or even more, and thus it is necessary to posit many immaterial substances.

2594. He rejects this position by saying that there is evidently only one heaven. If there were many numerically and the same specifically, as there are many men, a similar judgment would also have to be made about the first principle of each heaven, which is an immovable mover, as has been stated (1079:C 2555). For there would have to be many first principles which are specifically one and numerically many.

2595. But this view is impossible, because all things which are specifically one and numerically many contain matter. For they are not differentiated from the viewpoint of their intelligible structure or form, because all the individuals have a common intelligible structure, for example, man. It follows, then, that they are distinguished by their matter.

Thus Socrates is one not only in his intelligible structure, as man, but also in number.

2596. However, the first principle, “since it is a quiddity,” i.e., since it is its own essence and intelligible structure, does not contain matter, because its substance is “complete reality,” i.e., actuality, whereas matter is in potentiality. It remains, then, that the first unmoved mover is one not only in its intelligible structure but also in number. Hence the first eternal motion, which is caused by it, must be unique. It therefore follows that there is only one heaven.

2597. Now traditions (1088).

He shows how the points discovered about an immaterial substance compare with both the ancient and common opinions. He says that certain traditions about the separate substances have been handed down from the ancient philosophers, and these have been bequeathed to posterity in the form of a myth, to the effect that these substances are gods, and that the divine encompasses the whole of nature. This follows from the above points, granted that all immaterial substances are called gods. But if only the first principle is called God, there is only one God, as is clear from what has been said. The rest of the tradition has been introduced in the form of a myth in order to persuade the multitude, who cannot grasp intelligible things, and inasmuch as it was expedient for the passing of laws and for the benefit of society, that by inventions of this kind the multitude might be persuaded to aim at virtuous acts and avoid evil ones. He explains the mythological part of this tradition by adding that they said that the gods have the form of men and of certain other animals. For they concocted the fables that certain men as well as other animals have been turned into gods; and they added certain statements consequent upon these and similar to the ones which have just been mentioned. Now if among these traditions someone wishes to accept only the one which was first noted above, namely, that the gods are immaterial substances, this will be considered a divine statement, and one that is probably true. And it is so because every art and every philosophy has often been discovered by human power and again lost, either because of wars, which prevent study, or because of floods or other catastrophes of this kind.

2598. It was also necessary for Aristotle to maintain this view in order to save the eternity of the world. For it was evident that at one time men began to philosophize and to discover the arts; and it would seem absurd that the human race should be without these for an infinite period of time. Hence he says that philosophy and the various arts were often discovered and lost, and that the opinions of those ancient thinkers are preserved as relics up to the present day.

2599. Last, he concludes that “the opinion of our forefathers,” i.e., the one received from those who philosophized and after whom philosophy was lost, is evident to us only in this way, i.e., in the form of a myth, as has been stated above (1088:C 2597).

LESSON 11

The Dignity of the First Intelligence

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 9: 1074b 15-1075a 10

1089. The things which pertain to intellect (or mind) involve certain difficulties; for of the things apparent to us it seems to be the most divine; but how it is so gives rise to certain difficulties.

1090. For if it is not actually understanding, but is in a sense like one asleep, what dignity will it have? Or if it is understanding, but its chief good is different from itself, then, since its essence is not an act of understanding but a potentiality, it will not be the best substance; for it is by reason of its act of understanding that dignity belongs to it.

1091. Furthermore, whether its substance is its power to understand or its act of understanding, what does it understand? For it understands either itself or something else; and if something else, either the same thing always or something different.

1092. Does it make any difference or not, then, whether it understands what is good or what is contingent? Or is it absurd that it should ponder about certain things?

1093. Hence it is evident that it understands what is most divine and honorable, and that it does not change; for a change would be for the worse, and this would already be motion.

1094. Therefore, if the first mover is not its act of understanding but a potency, it is reasonable to assume, first, that the continuity of its act of understanding is laborious to it (797).

1095, Second, that there is evidently something else more honorable than intellect, namely, what it understands. For both the power to understand and understanding itself belong even to one who understands the basest thing. This must accordingly be avoided; for there are some things which it is better not to see than to see. But this will not be so if the act of understanding is the best of things. Therefore, if there is a most powerful intellect, it must understand itself.

1096. And its act of understanding is an understanding of understanding. But science, perception, opinion and thought always seem to be about something else and only indirectly about themselves.

1097. Again, if understanding is something different from being understood, from which of these does the intellect derive its goodness? For the essence of understanding and that of being understood are not the same.

1098. But in certain cases is not understanding identical with the thing understood? For in the productive sciences the object is the substance or quiddity without matter; and in the theoretical sciences the intelligible structure is both the object and the understanding of it. Therefore, since the object of understanding does not differ from the act of understanding in the case of things which have no matter, they will be the same; and the act of understanding will be identical with the thing understood.

1099. Yet the difficulty still remains whether the thing that it understands is composite; for if it is, the intellect will be changed in passing from one part of the whole to another.

1100. Now whatever does not have matter is indivisible, for example, the human mind.

1101. And the act of understanding composite things involves time. For it does not possess its goodness at this or at that moment but attains the greatest good over a whole period of time, and this is something different from itself. And an intellect which understands itself is in this state through all eternity.

COMMENTARY

2600. Having settled the issue about the perfection and oneness of this immaterial substance, the Philosopher now meets certain difficulties concerning its activity; for it has been shown above (1067-70:C 2519-35) that the first immaterial substance causes motion as an intelligible object and a desirable good. This is divided into two parts. In the first (1089:C 2600) he settles certain difficulties about the first immaterial substance insofar as it is an intelligible good and an intellect; and in the second (1102:C 2627), insofar as it is a desirable good (“We must also inquire”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reason for the difficulty concerning the intellect of the first substance. Second (1090:C 2901), he raises and meets this difficulty (“For if it is not”).

He accordingly says, first (1089), that, the things which pertain to the intellect of the first immaterial substance involve certain difficulties, and these seem to arise as follows. The Philosopher has shown that the intellect which understands and desires the first mover, which causes motion as an object of understanding and of desire, has something nobler than itself, namely, what is understood and desired by it. He has also shown that the first intelligible object itself is also an intellect. Hence for a like reason it could appear that the first intellect also has something nobler and higher than itself, and that it therefore is not the highest and best thing. But this is contrary to the truths which are apparent about the first principle; and so he says here that it seems evident to all that this principle is the noblest. Yet certain difficulties emerge if one wishes to explain how it is “noblest,” i.e., best and most perfect.

2601. For if it is not (1090).

Then he clears up these difficulties; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he raises the difficulties. Second (1093:C 2606), he prefaces his discussion with certain prerequisites for meeting all the questions raised (“Hence it is evident”). Third (1094:C 2608), he solves these difficulties (“Therefore, if the first mover”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First (1090), he raises the questions in which he is chiefly interested. Second (1092:C 2604), he introduces an additional question whose solution is necessary for solving the questions raised (“Does it make”).

First of all he raises two questions. He asks, first, how the intellect of the first mover is related to its own act of understanding; and second (1091:C 2603), how it is related to its own intelligible object (“Furthermore, whether”).

Now it should be noted that an intellect can be related to its own act of understanding in three ways: first, actual understanding does not,belong to it but only potential or habitual understanding; second, actual understanding does belong to it; and third, it is identical with its own act of understanding or its own knowledge, which are the same thing.

2602. He accordingly says, first (1090), that, if the intellect of the first mover is not actually understanding but only potentially or habitually understanding, it will have no dignity; for the goodness and nobility of an intellect consists in its actually understanding, and an intellect that is only potentially or habitually understanding is like one asleep. For one asleep has certain powers which enable him to perform vital optrations even though he is not using them, and thus he is said to be half alive; and during sleep there is no difference between happiness and unhappiness or between virtue and vice. But if the intellect of the first intelligence is actually understanding, yet its chief good, which is its activity, is something different from itself because its "act of understanding," i.e., its intellectual activity, is not identical with its own essence, then its essence is related to its act of understanding as potentiality to actuality, and as something perfectible to its perfection. It accordingly follows that the first intellect is not the best substance; for it is by reason of its act of understamling that lionor and nobility belong to it, and nothing that is noble in comparison with something else is noblest in itself. It seems to follow, then, that the essence of the first intellect is not the best, whether it understands only potentially or actually, unless one assumes along with this that its very essence is identical with its act of understanding, as he will establish later on (1094:C 2608).

2603. Furthermore, whether its substance (1091).

Before he answers the questions raised he asks another about the intelligible object of the first mover. He says that, whether the essence of the first mover is its power to understand or its "act of understanding," i.e., its intellectual activity or thought (this was the first question raised), we must still ask what it understands? For it understands either itself or something else. And if it understands something else, it must understand either the same thing always or something different, i.e., sometimes one thing and sometimes another.

2604. Does it make any difference (1092).

So before he answers the foregoing questions, he introduces another question whose solution is useful in giving the answer; that is, whether it makes any difference or none at all to the nobility or perfection of the intellect that it should understand what is good and noble or what is contingent.

26o5. By using an instance he shows that it does make a difference, because it seems incongruous and unreasonable that anyone should ponder or employ the operation of his intellect on things that are base. That this should not be the case would demand that the nobility of the intellect be independent of the nobility of its object, and that the understanding of base things be no different from the understanding of good things. But this is quite impossible, since activities are evidently specified by their proper objects. Hence the nobler an object, the nobler must be the operation.

2606. Hence it is evident (1093).

He prefaces his discussion with certain points necessary for answering the main questions. First, he gives two points. He infers the first of these from the solution of the question which he interjected. For, if it does make a difference to the nobility of the intellect whether it understands what is good or what is contingent, as has been stated (1092:C 2605), then, since the first intellect is the noblest, it obviously knows what is most divine and most honorable.

2607. The second point is the solution given to the last part of the second main question. The question was whether the intellect of the first mover changes from one intelligible object to another. Now it is evident that it does not change from one object to another. For, since it understands what is most divine, if it were to change from one object to another, it would change to a less noble one; but this is fitting only to something tending to defect and destruction. Moreover, this change from one intelligible object to another would be a kind of motion; and therefore it could not be fitting to the first mover, since he is immovable in every respect.

2608. Therefore, if the first mover (1094).

He nows answers the questions first raised. First, he gives the correct solution to the first question; and second (1095:C 2611), the solution to the second question (“Second, that”).

He answers the first question as follows. If the substance of the first mover “is not its act of understanding,” i.e., its own intellectual activity, but an intellective potency, “it is reasonable,” i.e., it seems to follow as a probable conclusion, that “the continuity of its act of understanding,” i.e., of its intellectual operation, is laborious to it. For whatever is in potentiality to something else is related hoth to this something else and to its opposite, because what can be can also not be. Hence, if the substance of the first mover is related to its act of understanding as potentiality to actuality, then according to the nature of its own substance it will be able both to understand and not to understand. Therefore continuous understanding will not be proper to it by reason of its own substance.

2609. In order not to be sometimes like one asleep it must derive the continuity of its intellectual activity from something else. Now whatever a thing acquires from something else and does not have by its own nature is probably laborious to it, because this is true in our case; for when we act continuously we labor. But this conclusion is not necessary, because that which one thing acquires from something else is laborious to it only if the thing acquired or something connected with it is contrary to its nature. Therefore, even though the continuity of the motion of the heavens depends on some external principle, such motion is not laborious.

2610. Hence Aristotle was content here to reduce to absurdity the probable conclusion which follows, because the untenable conclusion which necessarily follows is evident, namely, that the goodness and perfection of the first mover will depend on some higher entity; for then it would not be the first and best.

2611. Second, that there is (1095).

He now answers the second question; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he establishes the correct answer to the second question. Second (1096:C 2617), he argues on the opposite side of the question (“And its act of understanding”). Third (1098:C 2619), he answers the arguments given (“But in certain cases”).

He accordingly says, first (1095), that, since it has been shown (1094:C 2608) that the substance of the first mover is not an intellective potency but is itself an act of understanding, it is evident from this that, if the first mover does not understand itself but something else, it follows that this other thing, i.e., what is understood by it, is nobler than the first mover.

2612. He proves this as follows. Actual understanding itself, i.e., thinking, also belongs to one who understands the basest thing. Hence it is evident that some actual understanding must be avoided, because there are some things which it is better not to see than to see. But this would not be the case if the act of understanding were the best of things, because then no act of understanding would have ic, be avoided. Therefore, since some act of understanding must be avoided because of the baseness of the thing understood, it follows that the nobility of the intellect, which is found in its understanding, will depend on the nobility of its object. Hence the intelligible object is nobler than the act of understanding.

2613. Since it has been shown that the first mover is its own act of understanding, it follows that if it understands something different from itself, this other thing will be nobler than it is. Therefore, since the first mover is the noblest and most powerful, it must understand itself; and in its case intellect and thing understood must be the same.

2614. Now we must bear in mind that the Philosopher’s aim is to show that God does not understand something else but only himself, inasmuch as the thing understood is the perfection of the one understanding and of his activity, which is understanding. It is also evident that nothing else can be understood by God in such a way that it would be the perfection of His intellect. It does not follow, however, that all things different from Himself are not known by Him; for by understanding Himself He knows all other things.

2615. This is made clear as follows. Since God is His own act of understanding and is the noblest and most powerful being, His act of understanding must be most perfect. Therefore He understands Himself most perfectly. Now the more perfectly a principle is known, the more perfectly is its effect known in it; for things derived from principles are contained in the power of their principle. Therefore, since the heavens and the whole of nature del pend on the first principle, which is God, God obviously knows all things by understanding Himself.

2616. And the baseness of any object of knowledge does not lessen His dignity; for the actual understanding of anything more base is to be avoided only insofar as the intellect becomes absorbed in it, and when in actually understanding that thing the intellect is drawn away from the understanding of nobler things. For if in understanding some noblest object base things are also understood, the baseness of the things understood does not lessen the nobility of the act of understanding.

2617. And its act of understanding (1096).

Then he raises two objections against the correct solution. The first is as follows. The first mover understands himself, as has been shown above (1095:C 2615); and he is his own act of understanding, as has also been shown (1094:C 2608). Hence his act of understanding does not differ f rom his act of understanding his own thought. But this is contrary to what seems to be true, because perception, science, opinion and thought always seem to be about something else. And if they are sometimes about themselves, as when someone perceives that he perceives, or knows that he knows, or is of the opinion that he has an opinion, or thinks that he is thinking, this seems to be something in addition to the principal act or operation; for the principal act here seems to be that whereby someone understands an intelligible object. But that someone should understand that he is understanding something intelligible seems to be accessory to the principal act. Thus if the first mover's act of understanding consists solely in his understanding his own thought, it seems to follow that his act of understanding is not the most important thing.

2618. Again, if understanding (1097).

Then he raises a second objection against the correct solution. He says that the act of understanding and the thing understood are obviously different; and even if it were possible for an intellect and its object to be the same in reality, they would not be the same in their formal structure. Hence, if the first mover is himself both his act of understanding and the object that is being understood, which is the best of things, there still seems to be the problem as to which of these confers goodness on him, namely, his act of understanding or the thing understood.

2619. But in certain cases (1098).

He now answers the objections raised. He says that in certain cases the thing understood is the same as the knowledge of it. This becomes clear when we draw a distinction between the sciences; for one kind of science is productive and another is speculative. In the case of a productive science the thing understood, taken without matter, is the science of that thing; for example, it is clear that a house without matter, insofar as it exists in the mind of the builder, is the very art of building; and similarly health in the mind of the physician is the medical art itself. Thus a productive art is evidently nothing else than the substance or quid, dity of the thing made;

for every artist proceeds to his work from a knowledge of the quiddity which he intends to produce.

2620. In the case of the speculative sciences it is evident that the concept, which defines the thing itself, is the thing understood and the science or knowledge of that thing. For an intellect has knowledge by reason of the fact that it possesses the concept of a thing. Therefore, since in the case of all those things which do not have matter the intellect when actually understanding does not differ from the thing understood, then in the case of the first substance, which is separate from matter in the highest degree, the act of understanding and the thing understood are evidently the same in the highest degree. Hence there is just one act of understanding pertaining to the thing understood; that is, the act of understanding the thing understood is not distinct from that of understanding the act of understanding.

2621. Yet the difficulty (1099).

Here he raises a third question in addition to the two dealt with above. For since it has been shown (1074:C 2544) that the first mover understands himself, and a thing is understood in two ways: first, by way of a simple understanding, as we understand a quiddity, and second, by way of a composite understanding, as we know a proposition, the question therefore arises whether the first mover understands himself by way of a simple understanding, or by way of a composite one. This is what he refers to when he says that the difficulty still remains whether the object of God's understanding is composite.

2622. Now he shows that it is not composite when he says (1099) "for if it is"; and he gives three arguments in support of this. The first goes as follows. In every composite object of understanding there are several parts, which can be understood separately. For even though this composite object of understanding Man runs, insofar as it is one composite object, is understood all at once, none the less its parts can be understood separately. For the term man can be understood by itself, and so also can the term runs. Hence, whoever understands some composite object can be changed when his act of understanding passes from one part to another. Therefore, if the first intelligible object is composite, it follows that the intellect can change when its act of understanding passes from one part of this object to another. But the contrary of this has been proved above (1098:C 2619).

2623. Now whatever (1100).

Then he gives the second argument. Whatever does not have matter is Simple and indivisible. But the first intellect does not have matter. Therefore it is simple and indivisible.

2624. He gives as an example the human intellect, and this example can be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken as a comparison, meaning that the human intellect is indivisible in its own essence, because it is an immaterial form in every respect.

2625. It can also be taken in a second and better way as a contrast, meaning that the human intellect knows composite things because it derives its intelligible objects from material things. And this is not true of the first intellect.

2626. And the act (1101).

He gives the third argument. An act of understanding which is concerned with composite things does not possess its perfection always but attains it over a period of time. This is clear from the fact that it does not attain its good in knowing one part or another, but its greatest good is something else, which is a kind of whole. Hence the truth (which is the good of the intellect), is not found in simple things but in a composite one. Further, simple things are prior to composite things as regards both generation and time, so that whatever does not possess its own good in knowing parts which can be understood separately but in knowing the whole which is constituted of them, attains its good at some particular moment and does not always possess it.—However, the first mover’s act of understanding, which is of himself, is eternal and always in the same state. Therefore the thing understood by the intellect of the first mover is not composite.

LESSON 12

God Is the Final Cause of All Things. The Order of the Universe

ARISTOTLE’S TEXT Chapter 10: 1075a 11-1076a 4

1102. We must also inquire how the nature of the whole [universe] contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and self-subsisting or as the order of its parts.

1103. Or is it in both ways, as an army does? For the good of an army consists both in its order and in its commander, but mainly in the latter; for he does not exist for the sake of the order, but the order exists for him.

1104. And all things, both plants and animals (those that swim and those that fly), are ordered together in some way, but not alike; and things are not such that there is no relation between one thing and another, but there is a connection. For all things are ordered together to one end, but in the same way as in a household, where the children are not permitted to do just as they please, but all or most of the things done are arranged in an orderly way, while the slaves and livestock do little for the common good but act for the most part at random. For the nature of each of these constitutes such a principle. I mean that by it all must be able to be distinguished. And there are other activities which all have in common for the sake of the whole.

1105. And we must not fail to consider all the impossible and incongruous conclusions that confront those who explain things differently, and what sort of views are expressed by the more popular thinkers, among whom the fewest difficulties appear.

1106. For all these thinkers derive all things from contraries. But neither “all things” (1055) nor “from contraries” (1029) is correct; nor do they explain how the things in which contraries are present come from contraries.

1107. For contraries cannot be acted upon by one another. But this difficulty is solved by us in a reasonable way on the ground that there is a third element. Some thinkers make one of the contraries matter, as those who make the unequal the matter of the equal, or the many the matter of the one. But this is also met in the same way; for matter, as one, is contrary to nothing.

1108. Further, [according to them] all things except the one will exist by participating in evil; for evil itself is one of the two elements (78).

1109. For other thinkers consider neither good nor evil as principles, even though the good is in the fullest sense a principle of things.

1110. The former are right in holding that the good is a principle, but they do not say how it is a principle: whether as an end or as a mover or as a form.

1111. And Empedocles’ doctrine (50) is also unreasonable; for he identifies the good with friendship, although the latter is a principle both as a mover (for it combines things), and as matter (for it is a part of the mixture 4). Therefore, even if it happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as a mover, still their being is not the same. In what respect, then, is friendship a principle? And it is also unreasonable that strife should be indestructible; for the essence of evil, for him, is precisely this strife.

1112. Again, Anaxagoras makes the good a principle as a mover; for his “Intellect” causes motion. But it causes motion for the sake of some goal, and therefore there must be something other than intellect (84), unless it is as we say; for the art of medicine is in a sense health (6o6). It is also unreasonable not to provide something that is contrary to the good (78) or to intellect.

1113. But all who speak of contraries fail to make use of them as such, except that some make use of imagery. And none of them explain why some things are destructible and others are not; for they derive all things from the same principles (250-263). Again, some derive beings from non-being, while others (63) lest they be driven to this, make all things one.

1114. Further, no one explains why there is always generation, and what its cause is.

1115. And those who posit two principles of things must assume a first principle which is superior. This also holds for those who posit separate Forms, because there is another principle which is more important; for why has matter participated in the Forms or why does it participate in them?

1116. And for other thinkers there must be something contrary to wisdom or the noblest science; but this is not so in our case. For there is nothing contrary to what is primary, since all contraries involve matter, and things having matter are in potentiality; and ignorance is contrary to the particular knowledge which is the contrary into which it can pass. But there is nothing contrary to what is primary.

1117. Further, if nothing exists except sensible things, there will be no principle, no order, no generation, no heavenly bodies; but every principle will have a principle, as is maintained by all the theologians and natural philosophers.

1118. Now if there are separate Forms and numbers, they will not be causes of anything; but if they are, they will certainly not be causes of motion.

1119. Again, h6w will extension or continuous quantity be composed of parts which are unextended? For number cannot either as a mover or as a form produce a continuum.

1120. Further, no one of the contraries will be a productive principle and a mover, because it would be possible for it not to be. And in any case its activity would be subsequent to its potentiality. No beings, then, would be eternal. But some are. Therefore one of these premises must be rejected. How this may be done has been explained (1057).

1121. Again, as to the way in which numbers, or soul and body, or forms and things in general are one, no one states anything; nor is it possible to do so unless he says, as we do, that a mover makes them one (733-41).

1122. And those who say that mathematical number is the primary reality and that there is always one substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe itself a group of substances unrelated to each other (for one substance confers nothing upon another, either by being or not being), and give us many principles. But beings do not want to be badly disposed.—”Many rulers are not good; therefore let there be one ruler.”

COMMENTARY

2627. Having shown how the first mover is both an intelligence and an intelligible object, here the Philosopher aims to investigate how the first mover is a good and an object of desire; and in regard to this he does two things. First (1102:C 2628), he shows how the good is present in the universe, according to his opinion; and second (1105:C 2638), according to the opinions of other philosophers (“And we must not fail”).

In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises a question. Second (1103:C 2629), he answers it (“Or is it”).

Now this question arises because of a statement which was made above to the effect that the first mover causes motion as something good and desirable; for good, inasmuch as it is the end or goal of a thing, is twofold. For an end is extrinsic to the thing ordained to it, as when we say that a place is the end of something that is moved locally. Or it is intrinsic, as a form is the end of the process of generation or alteration; and a form already acquired is a kind of intrinsic good of the thing whose form it is. Now the form of any whole which is one through the arrangement of its parts is the order of that whole. Hence it follows that it is a good of that whole.

2628. Therefore the Philosopher asks whether the nature of the whole universe has its good and highest good, i.e., its proper end, as something separate from itself, or whether this consists in the ordering of its parts in the way in which the good of any natural being in its own form.

2629. Or is it (1103).

Then he answers the question raised; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that the universe has both a separate good and a good of order. Second (1104:C 2632), he shows the ways in which the parts of the universe contribute to its order (“And all things”).

He accordingly says, first (1103), that the universe has its good and end in both ways. For there is a separate good, which is the first mover, on which the heavens and the whole of nature depend as their end or desirable good, as has been shown (1067:C 2520. And since all thiiigs having one end must agree in their ordination to that end, some order must be found in the parts of the universe; and so the universe has both a separate good and a good of order.

2630. We see this, for example, in the case of an army; for the good of the army is found both in the order itself of the army and in the commander who has charge of the army. But the good of the army is found in a higher degree in its commander than in its order, because the goodness of an end takes precedence over that of the things which exist for the sake of the end. Now the order of an army exists for the purpose of achieving the good of its commander, namely, his will to attain victory. But the opposite of this is not true, i.e., that the good of the commander exists for the sake of the good of order.

2631. And since the formal character of things Which exist for the sake of an end is derived from the end, it is therefore necessary not only that the good of the army exist for the sake of the commander, but also that the order of the army depend on the commander, since its order exists for the sake of the commander. In this way too the separate good of the universe, which is the first mover, is a greater good than the good of order which is found in the universe. For the whole order of the universe exists for the sake of the first mover inasmuch as the things contained in the mind and will of the first mover are realized in the ordered universe. Hence the whole order of the ~niverse must depend on the first mover.

2632. And all things (1104).

Here he shows the ways in which the parts of the universe contribute to its order. He says that all things in the universe are ordered together in some way, but not all are ordered alike, for example, sea animals, birds, and plants. Yet even though they are not ordered in the same way, they are still not disposed in such a way that one of them has no connection with another; but there is some affinity and relationship of one with another. For plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men. That all things are related. to each other is evident from the fact that all are connected together to one end.

2633. That all are not ordered in the same way is made clear by an example; for in an ordered household or family different ranks of members are found. For example, under the head of the family there is a first rank, namely, that of the sons, and a second rank, which is that of the slaves, and a third rank, which is that of the domestic animals, as dogs and the like. For ranks of this kind have a different relation to the order of the household, which is imposed by the head of the family, who governs the household. For it is not proper for the sons to act in a haphazard and disorderly way, but all or most of the things that they do are ordered. This is not the case with the slaves or domestic animals, however, because they share to a very small degree in the order which exists for the common good. But in their case we find many things which are contingent and haphazard; and this is because they have little connection with the ruler of the household, who aims at the common good of the household.

2634. And just as the order of the family is imposed by the law and precept of the head of the family, who is the principle of each of the things which are ordered in the household, with a view to carrying out the activities which pertain to the order of the household, in a similar fashion the nature of physical things is the principle by which each of them carries out the activity proper to it in the order of the universe. For just as any member of the household is disposed to act through the precept of the head of the family, in a similar fashion any natural being is disposed by its own nature. Now the nature of each thing is a kind of inclination implanted in it by the first mover, who directs it to its proper end; and from this it is clear that natural beings act for the sake of an end even though they do not know that end, because they acquire their inclination to their end from the first intelligence.

2635. However, not all things are disposed to this end in the same way. For there is something common to all things, since all things must succeed in being distinguished; that is, they must have discrete and proper operations, and must also be differentiated essentially from each other; and in this respect order is lacking in none of them. But there are some things which not only have this but are also such that all their activities “participate in the whole,” i.e., are directed to the common good of the whole. This is found to be true of those things which contain nothing contrary to their nature, nor any element of chance, but everything proceeds according to the right order.

2636. For it is evident, as has been pointed out (1104:C 2632-34), that each natural being is directed to the common good by reason of its proper natural activity. Hence those things which never fail in their proper natural activity have all their activities contributing to the whole. But those which sometimes fail in their proper natural activity do not have all their activities contributing to the whole; and lower bodies are of this kind.

2637. The answer briefly stated, then, is that order requires two things: a distinction between the things ordered, and the contribution of the distinct things to the whole. As regard the first of these, order is found in all things without fail; but as regards the second, order is found in some things, and these are the things which are highest and closest to the first principle, as the separate substances and the heavenly bodies, in which there is no element of chance or anything contrary to their nature. But order is lacking in some things, namely, in [lower] bodies, which are sometimes subject to chance and to things which are contrary to their nature. This is so because of their distance from the first principle, which is always the same.

2638. And we must not (1105).

Then he deals with the end and order of the universe according to the opinion of other philosophers. In regard to this he does two things. First, he explains what he aims to do. He says that we must state all the impossible or incongruous conclusions facing those who express views different from our own about the good and order of the universe; and we must also state the kind of views held by those men who give a better explanation of things and in whose statements fewer difficulties appear.

2639. For all these (1106).

He then carries out his plan. In regard to this he does two things. First (1106:C 2639), he gives the opinion of those who held that the principles of things are contraries; and second (1117:C 2656), the opinion of those who held that the principles of things are separate natures (“Further, if nothing”).

In treating the first point he does two things. First (1106), he explains in what way those men are wrong who say that the principles of things are contraries. He says that all the ancient philosophers held that all things come from contraries as their principles; and they were wrong on three counts. First, they were wrong in holding that things come from contraries; and second, in saying that all things come from contraries; and third, in failing to explain how things are produced from contraries.

2640. For contraries (1107).

Second, he indicates how they were wrong in the three ways mentioned above. He explains how they erred, first, in holding that things come from contraries; and second (1108:C 2643), in claiming that all things come from contraries (“Further, [according to them]”); and third (1113:C 2650), in failing to show how things come from contraries (“But all who speak”).

He accordingly says, first (1107), that they were wrong in saying that things comes from contraries, because contraries taken in themselves cannot be acted upon by one another; for whiteness is not acted upon by blackness or vice versa, and one thing could come from them only if they were influenced by one another and so were reduced to an intermediate state.

2641. But in Aristotle’s opinion this difficulty is easily solved, because besides the two contraries he also posited a third principle, matter. Hence one of the two contraries can be acted upon by the other in the sense that matter, which is the subject of one contrary, can be acted upon by the other contrary.

2642. But others claimed that matter is one of the two contraries and not something distinct from them, as is evident in the case of those who held that the contraries, the unequal and the equal, and the one and the many, are principles. For they attribute inequality and plurality to matter, and equality and unity to form, as is found in Plato’s opinion, although the natural philosophers held the opposite. But this statement of theirs is met in the same way, because matter, which is one thing as the common subject of contraries, is contrary to nothing.

2643. Further, [according to them] (1108).

Then the Philosopher explains how these thinkers were wrong in saying that all things come from contraries; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows the unreasonable conclusion which follows from this view. For it is evident that the primary contraries are good and evil, because one of two contraries is always the privation of the other and so has the character of evil. Therefore, if all things come from contraries, it follows that all things participate in evil as well as in unity, i.e., good, which is a principle; for good is posited as one of the two elements, and everything else is supposed to come from these two principles. But this is not true, because destruction and evil are not found in the heavenly bodies or in the nature of the separate substances.

2644. For other thinkers (1109).

Second, he shows that the position of all those who held that all things come from contraries is not in agreement with the position of certain of the philosophers. For if all things come from contraries, it follows, as has been pointed out, that good and evil are the first principles of things. But some did not claim that good and evil are principles but said that the good is the principle of all things.

2645. The former (1110).

Third he indicates the error made even by those who claimed that the good is a principle of things. He makes this clear, first, in a general way. He says that, even though some philosophers are right in holding that the good is a principle of all things, they are still wrong in failing to show how it is a principle, i.e., whether as an end or as a form or as a mover. For these things are characterized by perfection and goodness, whereas matter which is perfected only by form, does not have the character of something good and perfect; and therefore he makes no mention of it.

2646. And Empedocles' doctrine (1111).

Next, he turns to certain particular opinions. First, he considers the opinion of Empedocles. He says that Empedocles made the unreasonable assumption that the good is a principle of things; for he claimed that love is a principle, identifying it with the good. However, he said that love is a principle in two ways. For he claimed that it is a moving principle inasmuch as its function is to unite things and bring them together; and he also claimed that it is a material principle inasmuch as he asserts that love is a part of compounds, since he assumed that bodies are compounds of the four elements and of friendship and strife. And even though the same principle can be both matter and a mover, it is not such under the same formal aspect. For fire can be a mover according to its form, and a material principle according to its matter; but it cannot be both in the same respect, because a mover as such is actual, whereas matter as such is potenial. Hence it must still be explained in what respect love has the character of a material principle, and in what respect it has the character of a moverand this he fails to do.

2647. Another incongruity which follows from Empedocles' opinion is his positing strife as a first indestructible principle; for strife in itself seems to be essentially evil, and evil, in the opinions of those who are right, is not set down as a principle, but only the good, as has been stated (1109:C 2644).

2648. Again, Anaxagoras (1112).

Third, he turns to the opinion of Anaxagoras. He says that Anaxagoras makes the good to be a first principle of things as a mover; for he said that an intellect moves all things. But it is evident that "an intellect always causes motion for the sake of some goal," i.e., an end. Hence Anaxagoras must posit some other principle by reason of which this intellect causes motion, unless perhaps he should say, as we have, that an intellect and its intelligible object can be the same; and that an intellect moves for its own sake; which is true in a sense of those things which act by intellect, according to our view. For the art of medicine acts for the sake of health, and health is in a sense the art of medicine itself, as has been pointed out above (C 2619; 606:C 1407).

2649. Another unreasonable consequence which is contrary to the opinion of Anaxagoras also seems to follow if the common view is maintained, namely, that contraries are the principles of all things. For according to this view it would be absurd for him not to make some principle contrary to the good and to intellect.

2650. But all who speak (1113).

He explains the third error which he noted above (1106-07:C 2639-40), namely, that those who held the principles to be contraries did not explain how things come from contraries as their principles. He says that all those who speak of contraries as principles fail to make use of them in accounting for what appears in the world, unless "some make use of imagery," i.e., unless someone wishes to indulge his fancy or to speak figuratively.

2651. And none of them (ibid.).

First, he shows that they cannot account for the differences between destructible and indestructible things. He accordingly says that none of the ancient philosophers give any reason why some beings are destructible and some are not. Some of them claimed that all things are derived from the same principles, namely, contraries; and this is the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers. Others, the theological poets, held that all things come from non-being. Hence he said above (1065: C 2515) that they generate the world from non-being. And so although both groups assign the origin of all things, they cannot explain why things are distinguished into destructible and indestructible. Hence others, in order not to be driven to this, i.e., to posit that all things come from non-being or to account for the difference between things, held that all things are one, thereby entirely doing away with the distinction between things. This is the view of Parmenides and Melissus.

2652. Further, no one (1114).

Second, he shows that they were also wrong in another respect, namely, in being unable to explain why generation is eternal or to state what the universal cause of generation is; for neither of the contraries is a universal cause of generation.

2653. And those who (1115).

Third, he states how those men were wrong who claimed that the principles of things are contraries; for they must maintain that one of two contraries is a superior principle, since one contrary has the character of a privation. Or he means that it is necessary to posit some principle, which is more important than both contraries, by which it is possible to explain why certain things are attributcd to one of the contraries as their principle and why certain others are attributed to the other contrary; for example, why at one time strife will cause the elements to separate and why at another time friendship will cause them to combine.

2654. This difficulty also faces those who posit separate Forms; for they must assign some principle which is superior to the Forms, since it is evident that things which are generated and destroyed do not always participate in a form in the same way. Hence it is necessary to posit some principle by which it is possible to explain why this individual formerly participated or now participates in a form.

2655. And for other thinkers (1116).

Here he gives a fourth incongruity which faces these thinkers. He says that the philosophers who claim that the principles of things are contraries must admit that there is something contrary to the primary kind of wisdom or noblest science, because wisdom is concerned with the first principle, as has been shown in Book I (13:C 35). Therefore, if there is nothing contrary to the first principle (for all pairs of contraries have a nature which is in potentiality to each pair), and according to us the first principle is immaterial, as is clear from what has been said (1058:C 2495), then it follows that there is nothing contrary to the first principle, and that there is no science which is contrary to the primary science, but merely ignorance.

2656. Further, if nothing (1117).

Next, he turns to the opinion of those who posited separate substances. First, he points out that an incongruity faces those who fail to posit such substances. He says that, if nothing exists except sensible things, there will be no first principle, as has been noted (1055:C 2489), no order of things such as has been described, no eternal generation, and no principles of the kind which we have posited above (1060:C 2503); but every principle will always have a principle, and so on to infinity. Thus Socrates will be begotten by Plato and the latter by someone else and so on to infinity, as was seen to be the view of all of the ancient philosophers of nature. For they did not posit a first universal principle over and above these particular and sensible principles.

2657. Now if there (1118).

Then he shows that an unreasonable consequence faces those who posit certain separate natures. He does this, first, with regard to those who posited a certain connection in origin among natures of this kind; and second (1122:C 2661), with regard to those who did not hold this position ("And those who say").

Concerning the first he draws out four untenable consequences. The first (1118) of these is that the separate Forms and numbers, which some posited over and above sensible things, seem not to be causes of anything. But if they are causes of something, it seems that nothing will be a cause of motion, because things of this kind do not seem to have the character of a moving cause.

2658. Again, how will (1119).

Second, he brings forward another incongruity. For number is not continuous quantity, but continuous quantity is constituted only of continuous quantities. Hence it seems impossible to explain how continuous quantity or extension comes from numbers, which are not continuous. For it cannot be said that number is the cause of continuous quantity either as a moving cause or as a formal cause.

2659. Further, no one (1120).

Then he gives the third untenable consequence. He says that, if the separate Forms and numbers are first principles, it follows, since contrariety is not found in forms and numbers, that first principles will not be contraries, because they are not held to be productive principles or movers. Hence it will follow that there is no generation or motion; for if the first principles are not efficient causes of motion but are subsequently caused from first principles, it will follow that they are contained in the potency of prior principles; and what can be can also not be. The conclusion, then, is that generation and motion are not eternal. But they are eternal, as has been proved above (1055:C 2490-91). Therefore one of the premises must be rejected, namely, the one holding that first principles are not movers. The way in which the first principles are movers has been stated in Book I (25-26:C 50-51).

2660. Again, as to the way (1121).

He gives the fourth incongruity. He says that none of these philosophers can state what it is that makes number, or soul and body, or in general form and the thing to which form belongs, a unity, unless he says that a mover does this, as we explained above in Book VIII (736:C 1759). Forms and numbers, however, do not have the character of a mover.

2661. And those who say (1122).

Here he indicates the unreasonable consequence facing those who claim that natures of this kind are unrelated things. He says that those who claim that mathematical number is the primary reality, as the Pythagoreans did, and “that there is always one substance after another” in this way, i.e., consecutively (so that after number comes continuous quantity, and after continuous quantity come sensible things), and who say that there is a different principle for each nature, so that there are certain principles for numbers, others for continuous quantity, and others for sensible things—those who speak in this way, I say, make the substances of the universe a group of substances unrelated to each other, i.e., without order, inasmuch as one part confers nothing on any other part whether it exists or does not. And they likewise make their many principles to be unrelated.

2662. Now this cannot be the case, because beings do not want to be badly disposed; for the disposition of natural things is the best possible. We observe this in the case of particular things, because each is best disposed in its own nature. Hence we must understand this to be the case to a much greater degree in the whole universe.

2663. But many rulers are not good. For example, it would not be good for different families which shared nothing in common to live in a single home. Hence it follows that the whole universe is like one principality and one kingdom, and must therefore be governed by one ruler. Aristotle’s conclusion is that there is one ruler of the whole universe, the first mover, and one first intelligible object, and one first good, whom above he called God (1074:C 2544), who is blessed for ever and ever. Amen.

COMPENDIUM OF THEOLOGY

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THE COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE BREAKS OFF AT THIS POINT. DEATH PREVENTED ST. THOMAS FROM FINISHING THE BOOK. HIS OPUSCULUM, EXPOSITIO ORATIONIS DOMINICAE, THOUGH PROBABLY A REPORTATIO, GIVES US AN IDEA OF THE PLAN HE VERY LIKELY WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED IN COMPLETING PART II OF THE COMPENDIUM. PART III, ON THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY, WAS TO HAVE DEVELOPED THE THEME INDICATED IN THE OPENING CHAPTER OF THE PRESENT WORK, THAT WE SHOULD CARRY OUT GOD’S WILL THROUGH LOVE.

COMPENDIUM OF THEOLOGY

CHAPTER 1

SCOPE OF THE PRESENT WORK

To restore man, who had been laid low by sin, to the heights of divine glory, the Word of the eternal Father, though containing all things within His immensity, willed to become small. This He did, not by putting aside His greatness, but by taking to Himself our littleness. No one can say that he is unable to grasp the teaching of heavenly wisdom; what the Word taught at great length, although clearly, throughout the various volumes of Sacred Scripture for those who have leisure to study, He has reduced to brief compass for the sake of those whose time is taken up with the cares of daily life. Man's salvation consists in knowing the truth, so that the human mind may not be confused by divers errors; in making for the right goal, so that man may not fall away from true happiness by pursuing wrong ends; and in carrying out the law of justice, so that he may not besmirch himself with a multitude of vices.

Knowledge of the truth necessary for man's salvation is comprised within a few brief articles of faith. The Apostle says in Romans 9:2 8: "A short word shall the Lord make upon the earth"; and later he adds: "This is the word of faith, which we preach" (Rom. 15:8). In a short prayer Christ clearly marked out man's right course; and in teaching us to say this prayer, He showed us the goal of our striving and our hope. In a single precept of charity He summed up that human justice which consists in observing the law: "Love therefore is the fulfilling of the law" (Rom. 13:15). Hence the Apostle, in 1 Corinthians 13:13, taught that the whole perfection of this present life consists in faith, hope, and charity, as in certain brief headings outlining our salvation: "Now there remain faith, hope, and charity." These are the three virtues, as St. Augustine says, by which God is worshiped [De doctrina christiana, 1, 35]

Wherefore, my dearest son Reginald, receive from my hands this compendious treatise on Christian teaching to keep continually before your eyes. My whole endeavor in the present work is taken up with these three virtues. I shall treat first of faith, then of hope, and lastly of charity. This is the Apostle’s arrangement which, for that matter, right reason imposes. Love cannot be rightly ordered unless the proper goal of our hope is established; nor can there be any hope if knowledge of the truth is lacking. Therefore the first thing necessary is faith, by which you may come to a knowledge of the truth. Secondly, hope is necessary, that your intention may be fixed on the right end. Thirdly, love is necessary, that your affections may be perfectly put in order.

PART ONE

FAITH

CHAPTER 2

ARRANGEMENT OF TOPICS CONCERNING FAITH

Faith is a certain foretaste of that knowledge which is to make us happy in the life to come. The Apostle says, in Hebrews 11:1, that faith is “the substance of things to be hoped for,” as though implying that faith is already, in some preliminary way, inaugurating in us the things that are to be hoped for, that is, future beatitude. Our that this beatific knowledge has to do with Lord has taught us two truths, namely, the divinity of the Blessed Trinity and the humanity of Christ. That is why, addressing the Father, He says: “This is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom You sent” (John 17:3). All the knowledge imparted by faith turns about these two points, the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ. This should cause us no surprise: the humanity of Christ is the way by which we come to the divinity. Therefore, while we are still wayfarers, we ought to know the road leading to our goal. In the heavenly fatherland adequate thanks would not be rendered to God if men had no knowledge of the way by which they are saved. This is the meaning of our Lord’s words to His disciples: “And where I go you know, and the way you know” (John 14:4).

Three truths must be known about the divinity: first the unity of the divine essence, secondly the Trinity of persons, and thirdly the effects wrought by the divinity.

CHAPTER 3

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Regarding the unity of the divine essence, we must first believe that God exists. This is a truth clearly known by reason. We observe that all things that move are moved by other things, the lower by the higher. The elements are moved by heavenly bodies; and among the elements themselves, the stronger moves the weaker; and even among the heavenly bodies, the lower are set in motion by the higher. This process cannot be traced back into infinity. For everything that is moved by another is a sort of instrument of the first mover. Therefore, if a first mover is lacking, all things that move will be instruments. But if the series of movers and things moved is infinite, there can be no first mover. In such a case, these infinitely many movers and things moved will all be instruments. But even the unlearned perceive how ridiculous it is to suppose that instruments are moved, unless they are set in motion by some principal agent. This would be like fancying that, when a chest or a bed is being built, the saw or the hatchet performs its functions without the carpenter. Accordingly there must be a first mover that is above all the the rest; and this being we call God.

CHAPTER 4

THE IMMOBILITY OF GOD

We clearly infer from this that God, who moves all things, must Himself be immovable. If He, being the first mover, were Himself moved, He would have to be moved either by Himself or by another. He cannot be moved by another, for then there would have to be some mover prior to Him, which is against the very idea of a first mover. If He is moved by Himself, this can be conceived in two ways: either that He is mover and moved according to the same respect, or that He is a mover according to one aspect of Him and is moved according to another aspect. The first of these alternatives is ruled out. For everything that is moved is, to that extent, in potency, and whatever moves is in act. Therefore if God is both mover and moved according to the same respect, He has to be in potency and in act according to the same respect, which is impossible. The second alternative is likewise out of the question. If one part were moving and another were moved, there would be no first mover Himself as such, but only by reason of that part of Him which moves. But what is per se is prior to that which is not per se. Hence there cannot be a first mover at all, if this perfection is attributed to a being by reason of a part of that being. Accordingly the first mover must be altogether immovable.

Among things that are moved and that also move, the following may also be considered. All motion is observed to proceed from something immobile, that is, from something that is not moved according to the particular species of motion in question, Thus we see that alterations and generations and corruptions occurring in lower bodies are reduced, as to their first mover, to a heavenly body that is not moved according to this species of motion, since it is incapable of being generated, and is incorruptible and unalterable. Therefore the first principle of all motion must be absolutely immobile.

CHAPTER 5

THE ETERNITY OF GOD

The further conclusion is evident that God is eternal. For everything that begins to be or that ceases to be, is affected in this way through motion or change. But we have just shown that God is absolutely immobile. Consequently He is eternal.

CHAPTER 6

NECESSITY OF GOD’S EXISTENCE

The same line of reasoning clearly shows that God necessarily exists. For everything that has the possibility of being and of not being, is mutable. But God is absolutely immutable, as has been demonstrated. Therefore it is impossible for God to be and not to be. But anything that exists in such a way that it is impossible for it not to exist, is necessarily Being itself, ipsum esse. Necessary existence, and impossibility of nonexistence, mean one and the same thing. Therefore God must necessarily exist.

Moreover, everything that has a possibility of being and of not being, needs something else to make it be, for, as far as it itself is concerned, it is indifferent with regard to either al. ternative. But that which causes another thing to be, is prior to that thing. Hence something exists prior to that which has the possibility of being and of not being. However, nothing is prior to God. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be and not to be; of necessity, He must be. And since there are some necessary things that have a cause of their necessity, a cause that must be prior to them, God, who is the first of all, has no cause of His own necessity. Therefore it is necessary for God to be through Himself.

CHAPTER 7

THE EVERLASTING EXISTENCE OF GOD

From all this it is evident that God exists always. For whatever necessarily exists, always exists; it is impossible for a thing that has no possibility of not being, not to be. Hence such a thing is never without existence. But it is necessary for God to be, as has been shown.” Therefore God exists always.

Again, nothing begins to be or ceases to be except through motion or change. But God is absolutely immutable, as has been proved. Therefore it is impossible for Him ever to have begun to be or to cease to be.

Likewise, if anything that has not always existed begins to be, it needs some cause for its existence. Nothing brings itself forth from potency to act or from non-being to being. But God can have no cause of His being, since He is the first Being; a cause is prior to what is caused. Of necessity, therefore, God must always have existed.

Furthermore, whatever pertains to anyone in some other way than by reason of an external cause, pertains to him of himself. But existence does not come to God from any external cause, since such a cause would have to be prior to Him. Therefore God has existence of Himself, per se ipsum. But what exists per se exists always and necessarily. Therefore God exists always.

CHAPTER 8

ABSENCE OF SUCCESSION IN GOD

Clearly, therefore, no succession occurs in God. His entire existence is simultaneous. Succession is not found except in things that are in some way subject to motion; for prior and posterior in motion cause the succession of time. God, however, is in no sense subject to motion, as has been shown. Accordingly there is no succession in God. His existence is simultaneously whole.

Again, if a being’s existence is not simultaneously whole, something can be lost to it and something can accrue to it. That which passes is lost, and what is expected in the future can be acquired. But nothing is lost to God or accrues to Him, since He is immutable. Therefore His existence is simultaneously whole.

From these two observations the proper meaning of eternity emerges. That is properly eternal which always exists, in such a way that its existence is simultaneously whole. This agrees with the definition proposed by Boethius: “Eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of endless life.”

CHAPTER 9

SIMPLICITY OF GOD

A similar course of reasoning clearly shows that the first mover must be simple. For any composite being must contain two factors that are related to each other as potency to act. But in the first mover, which is altogether immobile, all combination of potency and act is impossible, because whatever is in potency is, by that very fact, movable. Accordingly the first mover cannot be composite.

Moreover, something has to exist prior to any composite, since composing elements are by their very nature antecedent to a composite. Hence the first of all beings cannot be composite. Even within the order of composite beings we observe that the simpler things have priority. Thus elements are naturally prior to mixed bodies. Likewise, among the elements themselves, the first is fire, which is the simplest of all. Prior to all elements is the heavenly body, which has a simpler construction, since it is free from all contrariety. Hence the truth remains that the first of beings must be absolutely simple.

CHAPTER 10

IDENTITY OF GOD WITH HIS ESSENCE

The further conclusion follows that God is His own essence. The essence of anything is that which its definition signifies. This is identical with the thing of which it is the definition, unless per accidens something is added to the thing defined over and above its definition. Thus whiteness is added to man, over and above the fact that he is a rational and mortal animal. Hence rational and mortal animal is the same as man; but whiteness, so far as it is white, is not the same as man. In any being, therefore, in which there are not found two factors whereof one is per se and the other per accidens, its essence must be altogether identical with it. In God, however, since He is simple, as has been shown, there are not found two factors whereof one is per se and the other per accidens. Therefore His essence must be absolutely the same as He Himself.

Moreover, whenever an essence is not absolutely identical with the thing of which it is the essence, something is discerned in that thing that has the function of potency, and something else that has the function of act. For an essence is formally related to the thing of which it is the essence as humanity is related to man. In God. however, no potency and act can be discerned: He is pure act. Accordingly He is His essence.

CHAPTER 11

IDENTITY OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN GOD

God's essence cannot be other than His existence. In any being whose essence is distinct from its existence, what it is must be distinct from that whereby it is. For in virtue of a thing's existence we say that it is, and in virtue of its essence we say what it is. This is why a definition that signifies an essence manifests what a thing is. In God, however, there is no distinction between what He is and that whereby He is, since there is no composition in Him, as has been shown. Therefore God's essence is nothing else than His existence.

Likewise, we have proved that God is pure act without any admixture of potentiality. Accordingly His essence must be the ultimate act in Him; for any act that has a bearing on the ultimate act, is in potency to that ultimate act. But the ultimate act is existence itself, ipsum esse. For, since all motion is an issuing forth from potency to act, the ultimate act must be that toward which all motion tends; and since natural motion tends to what is naturally desired, the ultimate act must be that which all desire. This is existence. Consequently the divine essence, which is pure and ultimate act, must be existence itself, ipsum esse.

CHAPTER 12

GOD NOT CONTAINED UNDER ANY GENUS

We infer from the above that God is not contained as a species within any genus. Species is constituted by specific difference added to genus. Hence the essence of any species possesses something over and above its genus. But existence itself, ipsum esse, which is God's essence, does not comprise within itself any factor that is added to some other factor. Accordingly God is not a species of any genus.

Furthermore, since genus potentially contains specific differences, in every being composed of genus and differences, act is commingled with potency. But we have shown that God is pure act without any commingling of potency. (Cf. chap. 9.) Therefore His essence is not composed of genus and differences; and so He is not in any genus.

CHAPTER 13

GOD NOT A GENUS

We go on to show that God cannot be a genus. What a thing is, but not that it is, comes from its genus; the thing is established in its proper existence by specific differences. But that which God is, is very existence itself. Therefore He cannot be a genus.

Moreover, every genus is divided by some differences. But no differences can be apprehended in very existence itself. For differences do not share in genus except indirectly, so far as the species that are constituted by differences share in a genus. But there cannot be any difference that does not share in existence, since non-being is not the specific difference of anything. Accordingly God cannot be a genus predicated of a number of species.

CHAPTER 14

GOD NOT A SPECIES PREDICATED OF INDIVIDUALS

God cannot be, as it were, a single species predicated of many individuals. Various individuals that come together in one essence of a species are distinguished by certain notes that lie outside the essence of the species. For example, men are alike in their common humanity but differ from one another in virtue of something that is outside the concept of humanity. This cannot occur in God, for God Himself is His essence, as has been shown. Therefore God cannot be a species that is predicated of several individuals.

Again, a number of individuals comprised under one species differ in their existence, and yet are alike in their one essence. Accordingly, whenever a number of individuals are under one species, their existence must be different from the essence of the species. But in God existence and essence are identical, as has been demonstrated. Therefore God cannot be a sort of species predicated of many individuals.

CHAPTER 15

THE UNICITY OF GOD

The conclusion is evident that there can be but one God. If there were many gods, they would be called by this name either equivocally or univocally. If they are called gods equivocally, further discussion is fruitless; there is nothing to prevent other peoples from applying the name “god” to what we call a stone. If they are called gods univocally, they must agree either in genus or in species. But we have just shown that God can be neither a genus nor a species comprising many individuals under Himself. Accordingly a multiplicity of gods is impossible.

Again, that whereby a common essence is individuated cannot pertain to many. Although there can be many men, it is impossible for this particular man to be more than one only. So if an essence is individuated by itself, and not by something else, it cannot pertain to many. But the divine essence is individuated by itself, since God’s essence is not distinct from His existence; for we have shown that God is His essence. Hence God cannot be more than one only.

Another consideration is the following. A form can be multiplied in two ways: first, by specific differences, as in the case of a generic form;.in this way color is differentiated into the various species of color; secondly, by the subjects in which it inheres, for example, whiteness. Therefore any form incapable of being multiplied by specific differences cannot be multiplied at all, if it is a form that does not exist in a subject. Thus whiteness, if it were to subsist without a subject, would not be more than one. But the divine essence is very existence, ipsum esse, which does not admit of specific differences, as we have shown. Since, therefore, the divine existence is a quasi-form subsisting by itself, seeing that God is His existence, the divine essence cannot be more than one. Accordingly a plurality of gods is impossible.

CHAPTER 16

GOD NOT A BODY

It is evident, further, that God Himself cannot be a body. For in every body some composition is found, since a body has parts. Hence that which is absolutely simple cannot be a body.

Moreover, we find that a body does not move anything else unless it is first moved itself, as will appear clearly to anyone who examines the matter fully. So if the first mover is absolutely immovable, that being cannot be a body.

CHAPTER 17

GOD NEITHER THE FORM OF A BODY NOR A FORCE IN A BODY

God cannot be the form of a body or any kind of force existing in a body. For, since all bodies are found to be mobile, whatever is present in a body must be moved, at least per accidens or concomitantly, if the body itself is moved. The first mover, however, cannot be moved either per se or per accidens, for it must be absolutely immobile, as has been shown. Therefore God cannot be a body or a force in a body.

Again, in order to move an object, every mover must have dominion over the thing that is moved. For we observe that motion is more rapid in proportion as the motive force exceeds the resisting force of the mobile object. Therefore that which is the very first among all movers, must predominate supremely over all the things moved. But this would be impossible if the mover were in any way attached to the mobile object, as it would have to be if it were the form or motive power of the latter. Consequently the first mover cannot be a body or a force in a body or a form in a body. This is why Anaxagoras postulated an intelligence liberated from matter, that it might rule and move all things.”

CHAPTER 18

THE INFINITY OF GOD ACCORDING TO ESSENCE

This leads to the question of God’s infinity. God is not infinite by way of privation, according to which infinity is a passion of quantity; in this sense whatever lacks limits, but is nevertheless capable of having limits by reason of its genus, is said to be infinite. Rather, God is infinite negatively, in the sense that a being that is unlimited in every way is infinite. No act is found to be limited except by a potency that is receptive of the act; thus we observe that forms are limited in accordance with the potency of matter. Hence, if the first mover is an act without any admixture of potency, as not being the form of any body or a force inhering in a body, it must be infinite.

The very order perceived in things is a proof of this. The higher the position occupied in the scale of being, the greater are things found to be in their own way. Among the elements, nobler things are found to be greater in quantity, as also in simplicity. Their generation demonstrates this: as the proportion of the respective elements is increased, fire is generated from air, air from water, and water from earth. And a heavenly body clearly exceeds the total quantity of the elements. Necessarily, therefore, that which is the first among beings and which has nothing above it, must in its own fashion be of infinite quantity.

Nor is there anything to wonder at if what is simple and lacks corporeal quantity is said to be infinite and to exceed in its immensity all quantity of body. For our own intellect, which is incorporeal and simple, exceeds the quantity of all bodies in virtue of its knowledge, and embraces all things. Much more, then, that which is the very first of all exceeds the universe of beings in its immensity, and embraces them all.

CHAPTER 19

INFINITE POWER OF GOD

The further inference is drawn that God is infinite in power. For power is consequent upon a thing’s essence; anything whatever possesses a power of activity consonant with its manner of being. Therefore, if God is infinite in His essence, His power must be infinite.

This is clear to anyone who will inspect the order of things. Whatever is in potency, is thereby endowed with receptive and passive power; and so far as a thing is in act, it possesses active power. Hence what is exclusively in potency, namely, prime matter, has an unlimited power of receptivity, but has no part in active power. And in the scale of being above matter, the more a thing has of form, the more it abounds in the power of acting. This is why fire is the most active of all the elements. Therefore God, who is pure act without any admixture of potency, infinitely abounds in active power above all things.

CHAPTER 20

ABSENCE OF IMPERFECTION IN GOD'S INFINITY

Although the infinity discerned in quantities is imperfect, the infinity predicated of God indicates supreme perfection in Him. The infinity that is in quantities pertains to matter, in the sense that matter lacks limits. Imperfection occurs in a thing for the reason that matter is found in a state of privation. On the other hand, perfection comes exclusively from form. Consequently, since God is infinite because He is exclusively form or act and has no admixture of matter or potentiality, His infinity pertains to His supreme perfection.

This can also be gathered from a consideration of other things. Although in one and the same being that evolves from imperfect to perfect, something imperfect precedes the perfect stage, as, for example, the boy is prior to the man, everything imperfect must derive its origin from what is perfect. The child is not begotten except by a man and the seed does not receive existence except from an animal or a plant. Accordingly that which is by nature prior to all other things and sets them all in motion, must be more perfect than all the rest.

CHAPTER 21

EMINENT EXISTENCE IN GOD OF ALL PERFECTIONS FOUND IN CREATURES

The further inference clearly follows that all perfections found in anything at all must originally and superabundantly be present in God. Whatever moves something toward perfection, must first possess in itself the perfection it confers on others. Thus a teacher has in his own mind the knowledge he hands on to others. Therefore, since God is the first mover, and moves all other beings toward their perfections, all perfections found in things must pre-exist in Him superabundantly.

Besides, whatever has a particular perfection but lacks another perfection, is contained under some genus or species. For each thing is classed under a genus or a species by its form, which is the thing’s perfection. But what is placed under species and genus cannot be infinite in essence; for the ultimate difference whereby it is placed in a species necessarily closes off its essence. Hence the very ratio or description that makes a species known is called its definition, or even finis. Therefore, if the divine essence is infinite, it cannot possess merely the perfection of some genus or species and be lacking in other perfections; the perfections of all genera or species must be in God.

CHAPTER 22

UNITY OF ALL PERFECTIONS IN GOD

If we gather together the various points established thus far, we perceive that all perfections in God are in reality one. We have shown above that God is simple. But where there is simplicity, there can be no distinction among the perfections that are present. Hence, if the perfections of all things are in God, they cannot be distinct in Him. Accordingly they are all one in Him.

This will become evident to anyone who reflects on our cognitive powers. A higher faculty has a unified knowledge of all that is known through the lower faculties according to diverse aspects. All that the sight, the hearing, and the other senses perceive, the intellect judges with the one, simple power that belongs to it. Something similar appears in the sciences. The lower sciences are multiplied in accord with the various classes of beings that constitute their objects. Yet one science which holds the primacy among them is interested in all classes of beings. This is known as first philosophy. The same situation is observed in civil power; in the royal power, which is but one, are included all the powers that are distributed through various offices within the jurisdiction of the kingdom. In the same way perfections, which in lower things are multiplied according to the diversity of these things, must be united in the pinnacle of being, that is, in God.

CHAPTER 23

ABSENCE OF ACCIDENTS IN GOD

It is also clear that there can be no accident in God. If all perfections are one in Him, and if existence, power, action, and all such attributes pertain to perfection, they are necessarily all identical with His essence. Therefore none of these perfections is an accident in God.

Furthermore, a being to whose perfection something can be added, cannot be infinite in perfection. But if a being has some perfection that is an accident, a perfection can be added to its essence, since every accident is super-added to essence. Hence infinite perfection will not be found in its essence. But, as we have shown, God is of infinite perfection according to essence. Consequently there can be in Him no accidental perfection; whatever is in Him, is His substance.

The same truth can be easily inferred from God's supreme simplicity, and from the fact that He is pure act and is the first among beings. For some sort of composition obtains between an accident and its subject. Likewise, that which is a subject of this kind cannot be pure act, since an accident is a certain, form or act of the subject. Similarly, what is per se always precedes what is per accidens. From all this we can infer, in keeping with the truths established above, that nothing can be predicated of God as an accident.

CHAPTER 24

GOD'S SIMPLICITY NOT CONTRADICTED BY THE MULTIPLICITY OF NAMES APPLIED TO HIM

This enables us to perceive the reason for the many names that are applied to God, even though in Himself He is absolutely simple. Since our intellect is unable to grasp His essence as it is in itself, we rise to a knowledge of that essence from the things that surround us. Various perfections are discerned in these things, the root and origin of them all being one in God, as has been shown. Since we cannot name an object except as we understand it (for names are signs of things understood), we cannot give names to God except in terms of perfections perceived in other things that have their origin in Him. And since these perfections are multiple in such things, we must assign many names to God. If we saw His essence as it is in itself, a multiplicity of names would not be required; our idea of it would be simple, just as His essence is simple. This vision we hope for in the day of our glory; for, according to Zacharias 14:9, "In that day there shall be one Lord, and His name shall be one."

CHAPTER 25

THE NAMES OF GOD NOT SYNONYMOUS

In this connection three observations are in order. The first is that the various names applied to God are not synonymous, even though they signify what is in reality the same thing in God. In order to be synonymous, names must signify the same thing, and besides must stand for the same intellectual. conception. But when the same object is signified according to diverse aspects, that is, notions which the mind forms of that object, the names are not synonymous. For then the meaning is not quite the same, since names directly signify intellectual conceptions, which are likenesses of things. Therefore, since the various names predicated of God signify the various conceptions our mind forms of Him, they are not synonymous, even though they signify absolutely the same thing.

CHAPTER 26

IMPOSSIBILITY OF DEFINING GOD

A second point is this: since our intellect does not adequately grasp the divine essence in any of the conceptions which the names applied to God signify, the definitions of these terms cannot define what is in God. That is, any definition we might formulate of the divine wisdom would not be a definition of the divine power, and so on regarding other attributes.

The same is clear for another reason. A definition is made up of genus and specific differences, for what is properly defined is the species. But we have shown that the divine essence is not included under any genus or species. Therefore it cannot be defined.

CHAPTER 27

ANALOGY OF TERMS PREDICATED OF GOD AND OF OTHER BEINGS

The third point is that names applied to God and to other beings are not predicated either quite univocally or quite equivocally. They cannot be predicated univocally, because the definition of what is said of a creature is not a definition of what is said of God. Things predicated univocally must have the same definition.

Nor are these names predicated in all respects equivocally. In the case of fortuitous equivocation, a name is attached to an object that has no relation to another object bearing the same name. Hence the reasoning in which we engage about one cannot be transferred to the other. But the names predicated of God and of other things are attributed to God according to some relation He has to those things; and in their case the mind ponders what the names signify. This is why we can transfer our’ reasoning about other things to God.

Therefore such terms are not predicated altogether equivocally about God and about other things, as happens in fortuitous equivocation. Consequently they are predicated according to analogy, that is, according to their proportion to one thing. For, from the fact that we compare other things with God as their first origin, we attribute to God such names as signify perfections in other things. This clearly brings out the truth that, as regards the assigning of the names, such names are primarily predicated of creatures, inasmuch as the intellect that assigns the names ascends from creatures to God. But as regards the thing signified by the name, they are primarily predicated of God, from whom the perfections descend to other beings.

CHAPTER 28

THE INTELLIGENCE OF GOD

We must go on to demonstrate that God is intelligent. We have already proved that all perfections of all beings whatsoever pre-exist in God superabundantly. Among all the perfections found in beings, intelligence is deemed to possess a special pre-eminence, for the reason that intellectual beings are more powerful than all others. Therefore God must be intelligent.

Moreover, we pointed out above that God is pure act without any admixture of potentiality. On the other hand, matter is being in potency. Consequently God must be utterly free from matter. But freedom from matter ii the cause of intellectuality. An indication of this is that material forms are rendered intelligible in act by being abstracted from matter and from material conditions. Therefore God is intelligent.

We proved, further, that God is the first mover. This very perfection appears to be a property of intellect, for the intellect, we observe, uses all other things as instruments, so to speak, in producing movement. Thus man, through his intellect, uses animals and plants and inanimate objects as instruments, of a sort, to cause motion. Consequently God, the first mover, must be intelligent.

CHAPTER 29

GOD’S INTELLIGENCE NOT POTENTIAL OR HABITUAL BUT ACTUAL

Since in God nothing is in potency but all is in act, as has been shown. God cannot be intelligent either potentially or habitually but only actually. An evident consequence of this is that He undergoes no succession in understanding. The intellect that understands a number of things successively is able, while actually understanding one thing, to understand another only potentially. But there is no succession among things that exist simultaneously. So, if God understands nothing in potency, His understanding is free from all succession. Accordingly, whatever He understands, He understands simultaneously. Furthermore, He does not begin to understand anything. For the intellect that begins to understand something, was previously in potency to understanding.

It is likewise evident that God’s intellect does not understand in discursive fashion, proceeding from one truth to a knowledge of another, as is the case with our intellect in reasoning. A discursive process of this sort takes place in our intellect when we advance from the known to a knowledge of the unknown, or to that which previously we had not actually thought of. Such processes cannot occur in the divine intellect.

CHAPTER 30

GOD’S ESSENCE THE ONLY SPECIES IN HIS UNDERSTANDING

The foregoing exposition makes it clear that God understands through no other species than through His essence.

The reason is, that any intellect which understands through a species other than itself, is related to that intelligible species as potency to act. For an intelligible species is a perfection of the intellect, causing it to understand in act. Therefore, if nothing in God is in potency, but He is pure act, He must understand through His own essence, and not through any other kind of species.

In consequence of this, He directly and principally understands Himself. For the essence of a thing does not properly and directly lead to the knowledge of anything else than of that being whose essence it is. Thus man is properly known through the definition of man, and horse is known through the definition of horse. Therefore, if God understands through His essence, that which is directly and principally understood by Him must be God Himself. And, since God is His own essence, it follows that, in Him, understanding and that whereby He understands and that which is understood are absolutely identical.

CHAPTER 31

IDENTITY BETWEEN GOD AND HIS INTELLIGENCE

God must be His own intelligence. Since “to understand” is second act, for example, to consider, whereas the corresponding first act is the intellect or knowledge, any intellect that is not its own understanding is related to its understanding as potency to act. For in the order of potencies and acts, what is first is always potential with respect to what follows, and what is last is perfective. This is true only with reference to one and the same being, for among different beings the converse obtains; thus a mover and an agent are related to the thing moved and actuated as act to potency. In God, however, who is pure act, there is nothing that is related to anything else as potency to act. Accordingly God must be His own intelligence.

Furthermore, the intellect is related to its act of understanding as essence is related to existence. But God understands through His essence, and His essence is His existence. Therefore His intellect is His act of understanding. And thus no composition is attributed to Him by the fact that He understands, since in Him intellect and understanding and intelligible species are not distinct; and these in turn are nothing else than His essence.

CHAPTER 32

THE VOLITION OF GOD

We perceive, further, that God must have volition. For He understands Himself, who is perfect good, as is clear from all that has been hitherto established. But good as apprehended is necessarily loved, and love operates through the will. Consequently God must have volition.

Moreover, we showed above that God is the first mover. But the intellect, assuredly, does not move except through the intermediacy of appetite, and the appetite that follows intellectual apprehension is the will. Therefore God must have volition.

CHAPTER 33

IDENTITY OF GOD’S WILL WITH HIS INTELLECT

Evidently God’s will cannot be anything other than His intellect. For, since a good that is apprehended by the intellect is the object of the will, it moves the will and is the will’s act and perfection. In God, however, there is no distinction between mover and moved, act and potency, perfection and perfectible, as is clear from the truths we have already gained. Also, the divine intellect and the divine essence are identical. Therefore the will of God is not distinct from the divine intellect and God’s essence.

Another consideration: among the various perfections of things, the chief are intellect and will. A sign of this is that they are found in the nobler beings. But the perfections of all things are one in God, and this is His essence, as we showed above.” In God, therefore, intellect and will are identical with His essence.

CHAPTER 34

IDENTITY BETWEEN GOD’S WILL AND HIS WILLING

Hence it is also clear that the divine will is the very act of willing in God. As has been pointed out, God’s will is identical with the good willed by Him. But this would be impossible if His willing were not the same as His will; for willing is in the will because of the object willed. Accordingly God’s will is His willing.

Again, God’s will is the same as His intellect and His essence. But God’s intellect is His act of understanding, and His essence is His existing. Therefore His will must be His act of willing. And so we see clearly that God’s will is not opposed to His simplicity.

CHAPTER 35

THE FOREGOING TRUTHS EMBRACED IN ONE ARTICLE OF FAITH

From all the details of doctrines thus far discussed, we can gather that God is one, simple, perfect, and infinite, and that He understands and wills. All these truths are assembled in a brief article of our Creed, wherein we profess to believe “in one God, almighty.” For, since this name “God” (Deus), is apparently derived from the Greek name Theos, which comes from theasthai, meaning to see or to consider, the very name of God makes it clear that He is intelligent and consequently that He wills. In proclaiming that He is one, we exclude a plurality of gods, and also all composition; for a thing is not simply one unless it is simple. The assertion that He is almighty is evidence of our belief that He possesses infinite power, from which nothing can be taken away. And this includes the further truth that He is infinite and perfect; for the power of a thing follows the perfection of its essence.

CHAPTER 36

PHILOSOPHICAL CHARACTER OF THIS DOCTRINE

The truths about God thus far proposed have been subtly discussed by a number of pagan philosophers, although some of them erred concerning these matters. And those who propounded true doctrine in this respect were scarcely able to arrive at such truths even after long and painstaking investigation. But there are other truths about God revealed to us in the teaching of the Christian religion, which were beyond the reach of the philosopher. These are truths about which we are instructed, in accord with the norm of Christian faith, in a way that transcends human perception. The teaching is this: although God is one and simple, as has been explained, God is Father, God is Son, and God is Holy Spirit. And these three are not three gods, but are one God. We now turn to a consideration of this truth, so far as is possible to us.

CHAPTER 37

THE WORD IN GOD

We take from the doctrine previously laid down that God understands and loves Himself; likewise, that understanding and willing in Him are not something distinct from His essence. Since God understands Himself, and since all that is understood is in the person who understands, God must be in Himself as the object understood is in the person understanding. But the object understood, so far as it is in the one who understands, is a certain word of the intellect; we signify by an exterior word what we comprehend interiorly in our intellect. For words, according to the Philosopher, are signs of intellectual concepts [De interpretatione, I, 1, 16 a 3]. Hence we must acknowledge in God the existence of His Word.

CHAPTER 38

THE WORD AS CONCEPTION

What is contained in the intellect, as an interior word, is by common usage said to be a conception of the intellect. A being is said to be conceived in a corporeal way if it is formed in the womb of a living animal by a life-giving energy, in virtue of the active function of the male and the passive function of the female, in whom the conception takes place. The being thus conceived shares in the nature of both parents and resembles them in species.

In a similar manner, what the intellect comprehends is formed in the intellect, the intelligible object being, as it were, the active principle, and the intellect the passive principle. That which is thus comprehended by the intellect, existing as it does within the intellect, is conformed both to the moving intelligible object, of which it is a certain likeness, and to the quasi-passive intellect, which confers on it intelligible existence. Hence what is comprehended by the intellect is not unfittingly called the conception of the intellect.

CHAPTER 39

RELATION OF THE WORD TO THE FATHER

But here a point of difference must be noted. What is conceived in the intellect is a likeness of the thing understood and represents its species; and so it seems to be a sort of offspring of the intellect. Therefore, when the intellect understands something other than itself, the thing understood is, so to speak, the father of the word conceived in the intellect, and the intellect itself resembles rather a mother, whose function is such that conception takes place in her. But when the intellect understands itself, the word conceived is related to the understanding person as offspring to father. Consequently, since we are using the term “Word” in the latter sense, that is, according as God understands Himself, the Word itself must be related to God, from whom the Word proceeds, as Son to Father.

CHAPTER 40

GENERATION IN GOD

Hence in the rule of Catholic faith we are taught to profess belief in the Father and Son in God by saying: “I believe in God the Father, and in His Son.” And lest anyone, on hearing Father and Son mentioned, should have any notion of carnal generation, by which among us men father and son receive their designation, John the Evangelist, to whom were revealed heavenly mysteries, substitutes “Word” for “Son,” (John 1: 14) so that we may understand that the generation is intellectual.

CHAPTER 41

THE SON EQUAL TO THE FATHER IN EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE

Since natural existence and the action of understanding are distinct in us, we should note that a word conceived in our intellect, having only intellectual existence, differs in nature from our intellect, which has natural existence. In God, however, to be and to understand are identical. Therefore the divine Word that is in God, whose Word He is according to intellectual existence, has the same existence as God, whose Word He is. Consequently the Word must be of the same essence and nature as God Himself, and all attributes whatsoever that are predicated of God, must pertain also to the Word of God.

CHAPTER 42

THIS TEACHING IN CATHOLIC FAITH

Hence we are instructed in the rule of Catholic faith to profess that the Son is “consubstantial with the Father,” a phrase that excludes two errors. First, the Father and the Son may not be thought of according to carnal generation, which is effected by a certain separation of the son’s substance from the father. If this were so in God, the Son could not be consubstantial with the Father. Secondly, we are taught not to think of the Father and the Son according to intellectual generation in the way that a word is conceived in our mind. For such a word comes to our intellect by a sort of accidental accretion, and does not exist with the existence proper to the essence of the intellect.

CHAPTER 43

THE DIVINE WORD NOT DISTINCT FROM THE FATHER IN TIME, SPECIES, OR NATURE

Among things that are not distinct in essence, there can be no distinction according to species, time, or nature. Therefore, since the Word is consubstantial with the Father, He cannot differ from the Father in any of these respects.

There can be no difference according to time. The divine Word is present in God for the reason that God understands Himself, thereby conceiving His intelligible Word. Hence, if at any time there were no Word of God, during that period God would not understand Himself. But God always understood Himself during His whole existence, for His understanding is His existence. Therefore His Word, also, existed always. And so in the rule of Catholic faith we say that the Son of God "is born of the Father before all ages."

According to species, too, it is impossible for the Word of God to differ from God, as thouch He were inferior; for God does not understand Himself to be less than He is. The Word has a perfect likeness to the Father, because that whereof He is the Word is perfectly understood. Therefore the Word of God must be absolutely perfect according to the species of divinity. Some beings, it is true, that proceed from others, are found not to inherit the perfect species of those from whom they proceed. One way in which this can happen is in equivocal generations: the sun does not generate a sun, but an animal of some kind. To exclude imperfection of this sort from divine generation, we proclaim that the Word is born "God of God." The same thing occurs in another way when that which proceeds from another differs from the latter because of a defect in purity; that is, when something is produced from what is simple and pure in itself by being applied to extraneous matter, and so turns out to be inferior to the original species. Thus, from a house that is in the architect’s mind, a house is fashioned in various materials; and from light received in the surface of a body, color results; and from fire, by adding other elements, a mixture is produced; and from a beam of light, by interposing an opaque body, shadow is caused. To exclude any imperfection of this kind from divine generation, we add: “Light of Light.” In yet a third way, what proceeds from another can fail to equal the latter’s species, because of a deficiency in truth. That is, it does not truly receive the nature of its original, but only a certain likeness thereof; for example, an image in a mirror or in a picture or in a statue; also, the likeness of a thing in the intellect or in one of the senses. For the image of a man is not said to be a true man, but is a likeness of a man; and a stone is not in the soul, as the Philosopher notes [De anima, III, 8, 431 b 29], but a likeness of the stone is in the soul. To exclude all this from divine generation, we subjoin: “True God of true God.”

Lastly it is impossible for the Word to differ from God according to nature, since it is natural for God to understand Himself. Every intellect has some objects which it naturally understands. Thus, our intellect naturally understands first principles. Much more does God, whose intellectual activity is His existence, naturally understand Himself. Therefore His Word proceeds from Him naturally, not in the way that things proceed otherwise than by natural origin, that is, not in the way that artificial objects, which we are said to make, take shape from us. On the other hand, whatever proceeds from us naturally we are said to generate, for example, a son. Accordingly, to preclude the error of thinking that the Word of God proceeds from God, not by way of nature, but by the power of His will, the phrase is added: “Begotten, not made.”

CHAPTER 44

CONCLUSION FROM THE FOREGOING

As is clear from the foregoing, all the characteristics of divine generation we have been discussing lead to the conclusion that the Son is consubstantial with the Father. Therefore, by way of summing up all these points, the words, “Consubstantial with the Father,” are subjoined.

CHAPTER 45

GOD IN HIMSELF AS BELOVED IN LOVER

As the object known is in the knower, to the extent that it is known, so the beloved must be in the lover, as loved. The, lover is, in some way, moved by the beloved with a certain interior impulse. Therefore, since a mover is in contact with the object moved, the beloved must be intrinsic to the lover. But God, just as He understands Himself, must likewise love Himself; for good, as apprehended, is in itself lovable. Consequently God is in Himself as beloved in lover.

CHAPTER 46

LOVE IN GOD AS SPIRIT

Since the object known is in the knower and the beloved is in the lover, the different ways of existing in something must be considered in the two cases before us. The act of understanding takes place by a certain assimilation of the knower to the object known; and so the object known must be in the knower in the sense that a likeness of it is present in him. But the act of loving takes place through a sort of impulse engendered in the lover by the beloved: the beloved draws the lover to himself. Accordingly the act of loving reaches its perfection, not in a likeness of the beloved, in the way that the act of understanding reaches perfection in a likeness of the object understood, but in. a drawing of the lover to the beloved in person.

The transferring of the likeness of the original is effected by univocal generation whereby, among living beings, the begetter is called father, and the begotten is called son. Among such beings, moreover, the first motion occurs conformably to the species. Therefore, as within the Godhead the way whereby God is in God as the known in the knower, is expressed by what we call “Son,” who is the Word of God, so the way by which God is in God as the beloved is in the lover is brought out by acknowledging in God a Spirit, who is the love of God. And so, according to the rule of Catholic faith, we are directed to believe in the Spirit.

CHAPTER 47

HOLINESS OF THE SPIRIT IN GOD

Another point to consider is this. Since good that is loved has the nature of an end, and since the motion of the will is designated good or evil in terms of the end it pursues, the love whereby the supreme good that is God is loved must possess the supereminent goodness that goes by the name of holiness. This is true whether “holy” is taken as equivalent to “pure,” according to the Greeks, the idea being that in God there is most pure goodness free from all defect, or whether “holy” is taken to mean “firm,” in the view of the Latins, on the score that in God there is unchangeable goodness. In either case, everything dedicated to God is called holy, such as a temple and the vessels of the temple and all objects consecrated to divine service. Rightly, then, the Spirit, who represents to us the love whereby God loves Himself, is called the Holy Spirit. For this reason the rule of Catholic faith proclaims that the Spirit is holy, in the clause, “I believe in the Holy Spirit.”

CHAPTER 48

LOVE IN GOD NOT ACCIDENTAL

Just as God’s understanding is His existence, so likewise is His love. Accordingly God does not love Himself by any act that is over and above His essence, but He loves Himself by His very essence. Since God loves Himself for the reason that He is in Himself as the beloved in the lover, God the beloved is not in God the lover in any accidental fashion, in the way that the objects of our love are in us who love them, that is, accidentally. No, God is substantially in Himself as beloved in lover. Therefore the Holy Spirit, who represents the divine love to us, is not something accidental in God, but subsists in the divine essence just as the Father and the Son do. And so in the rule of Catholic faith He is exhibited as no less worthy of adoration and glorification than the Father and the Son are.

CHAPTER 49

PROCESSION OF THE HOLY Spirit FROM THE FATHER AND THE SON

We should recall that the act of understanding proceeds from the intellectual power of the mind. When the intellect actually understands, the object it understands is in it. The presence of the object known in the knower results from the intellectual power of the mind, and is its word, as we said above. Likewise, what is loved is in the lover, when it is actually loved. The fact that an object is actually loved, results from the lover's power to love and from the lovable good as actually known. Accordingly the presence of the beloved object in the lover is brought about by two factors: the appetitive principle and the intelligible object as apprehended, that is, the word conceived about the lovable object. Therefore, since the Word in God who knows and loves Himself is the Son, and since He to whom the Word belongs is the Father of the Word, as is clear from our exposition, the necessary consequence is that the Holy Spirit, who pertains to the love whereby God is in Himself as beloved in lover, proceeds from the Father and the Son. And so we say in the Creed: "Who proceeds from the Father and the Son."

CHAPTER 50

THE TRINITY OF DIVINE PERSONS AND THE UNITY OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE

We must conclude from all we have said that in the Godhead there is something threefold which is not opposed to the unity and simplicity of the divine essence. We must acknowledge thatGod is, as existing in His nature, and that He is known and loved by Himself.

But this occurs otherwise in God than in us. Man, to be sure, is a substance in his nature; but his actions of knowing and loving are not his substance. Considered in his nature, man is indeed a subsisting thing; as he exists in his mind, however, he is not a subsisting thing, but a certain representation of a subsisting thing; and similarly with regard to his existence in himself as beloved in lover. Thus man may be regarded under three aspects: that is, man existing in his nature, man existing in his intellect, and man existing in his love. Yet these three are not one, for man’s knowing is not his existing, and the same is true of his loving. Only one of these three is a subsisting thing, namely, man existing in his nature.

In God, on the contrary, to be, to know, and to love are identical. Therefore God existing in His natural being and God existing in the divine intellect and God existing in the divine love are one thing. Yet each of them is subsistent. And, as things subsisting in intellectual nature are usually called persons in Latin, or hypostases in Greek, the Latins say that there are three persons in God, and the Greeks say that there are three hypostases, namely, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

CHAPTER 51

A SEEMING CONTRADICTION IN THE TRINITY

A certain contradiction, arising from truths previously established, seemingly makes its appearance at this point. If threefold personality is assumed in God, then, since number always follows division, some division will have to be acknowledged in God, whereby the three may be distinguished from one another. Thus supreme simplicity will be lacking in God. If three agree in some respect and differ in another, composition must be present; which is contrary to what was set forth above.” Again, if God must be strictly one, as was shown above, 118 and if one and the same thing cannot originate or proceed from itself, it seems impossible for God to be begotten or to proceed. Wrongly, therefore, the names of Father and of Son and of proceeding Spirit are given place in the Godhead.

CHAPTER 52

SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTY: DISTINCTION IN GOD ACCORDING TO RELATIONS

The principle for solving this difficulty must be derived from the fact that, among different classes of beings, the various ways in which one thing may arise or proceed from another, depend on the diversity of their natures. Among lifeless beings, which do not move themselves and are capable of being moved only from outside, one thing arises from another by being, as it were, outwardly altered and changed. In this way fire is generated from fire and air from air.

But among living beings, which have the property of moving themselves, something is generated within the parent; for example, the young of animals and the fruits of plants. Moreover, the different manner of procession in living beings must be viewed according to their different powers and kinds of proceeding. Among such beings, there are certain powers whose operations extend only to bodies, so far as they are material. This is clear with regard to the powers of the vegetative soul, which serve nutrition, growth, and generation. In virtue of this class of the soul's powers, there proceeds only what is corporeal and what is bodily distinct although, in the case of living beings, somehow joined to that from which it proceeds.

There are other powers whose operations do not transcend the limits of bodies and yet extend to the species of bodies, receiving them without their accompanying matter. This is the case with all the powers of the sensitive soul. For sense is capable of receiving species without matter, as the Philosopher says [De anima, III, 4, 429 b 21]. But such faculties, although they are receptive of the forms of things in a sort of immaterial way, do not receive them without a bodily organ. If procession takes place within these powers of the soul, that which proceeds will not be something corporeal, nor will it be distinct or joined to that faculty whence it proceeds in a corporeal way, but in a certain incorporeal and immaterial fashion, although not entirely without the help of a bodily organ. Thus the representations of things imagined, which exist in the imagination not as a body in a body, but in a certain spiritual way, proceed in animals. This is why imaginary vision is called spiritual by Augustine [De Genesi ad litteram, XII, vii, 16; xxiv, 50].

But if something proceeds in a way that is not corporeal when the imagination is in action, this will be the case much more in the operation of the intellectual faculty, which can act without any bodily organ at all; its operation is strictly immaterial. For in intellectual operation a word proceeds in such a way that it exists in the very intellect of the speaker, not as though contained therein locally, nor as bodily separated therefrom, but as present there in a manner that is conformable to its origin. The same is true in that procession which is observed to take place in the operation of the will, so far as the thing loved exists in the lover, in the sense described above. However, although the intellectual and sensitive powers are nobler in their own scale of being than the powers of the vegetative soul, nothing that subsists in the nature of the same species proceeds either in men or in other animals according to the procession of the imaginative or sensitive faculties. This occurs only in that procession which takes place through the operation of the vegetative soul.

The reason for this is that in all beings composed of matter and form, the multiplication of individuals in the same species is effected by a division of matter. Hence among men and other animals, composed as they are of form and matter, individuals are multiplied in the same species by the bodily division which ensues in the procession that is proper to the operation of the vegetative soul, but that does not take place in other operations of the soul. In beings that are not composed of matter and form, no distinction can be discerned other than that of the forms themselves. But if the form, which is the reason for the distinction, is the substance of a thing, the distinction must obtain between subsistent things. Of course, this is not the case if the form in question is not the substance of the thing.

As is clear from our discussion, every intellect has this in common, that what is conceived in the intellect must in some way proceed from the knower, so far as he is knowing; and in its procession it is to some extent distinct from him, just as the conception of the intellect, which is the intellectual likeness, is distinct from the knowing intellect. Similarly the affection of the lover, whereby the beloved is in the lover, must proceed from the will of the lover so far as he is loving. But the divine intellect has this exclusive perfection: since God's understanding is His existence, His intellectual conception, which is the intelligible likeness, must be His substance; and the case is similar with affection in God, regarded as loving. Consequently the representation of the divine intellect, which is God's Word, is distinct from Him who produces the Word, not with respect to substantial existence, but only according to the procession of one from the other. And in God considered as loving, the same is true of the affection of love, which pertains to the Spirit.

Thus it is plain that nothing prevents God's Word, who is the Son, from being one with the Father in substance, and that, nevertheless, the Word is distinct from the Father according to the relation of procession, as we have said. Hence it is also evident that the same thing does not arise or proceed from itself; for the Son, as proceeding from the Father, is distinct from Him. And the same observation holds true of the Holy Spirit, relative to the Father and the Son.

CHAPTER 53

NATURE OF THE RELATIONS WHEREBY THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY SPIRIT ARE DISTINGUISHED

The relations by which the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinguished from one another are real relations, and not merely mental relations. Those relations are purely mental which do not correspond to anything found in the nature of things, but depend on intellectual apprehension alone. Thus right and left in a stone are not real relations, but only mental relations; they do not correspond to any real disposition present in the stone, but exist only in the mind of one who apprehends the stone as left, because it is, for instance, to the left of some animal. On the other hand, left and right in an animal are real relations, because they correspond to certain dispositions found in definite parts of the animal. Accordingly, since the relations whereby the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished really exist in God, the relations in question must be real relations, and are not merely mental relations.

CHAPTER 54

RELATIONS IN GOD NOT ACCIDENTAL

These relations cannot inhere in God accidentally, because the operations on which the relations follow directly are the very substance of God, and also because, as was shown above ‘48 there can be no accident in God. Hence, if the relations are really in God, they cannot be accidentally inherent, but must be subsistent. How it is that what is an accident in other things, can exist substantially in God, is clear from the doctrine previously set forth.

CHAPTER 55

PERSONAL DISTINCTION IN GOD THROUGH THE RELATIONS

Since distinction in the Godhead is accounted for by relations that are not accidental but are subsistent, and since among beings subsisting in an intellectual nature personal distinction is discerned, it necessarily follows that personal distinction in God is constituted by the relations in question. Therefore the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are three persons, and also three hypostases, since hypostasis means something that is subsistent and complete.

CHAPTER 56

IMPOSSIBILITY OF MORE THAN THREE PERSONS IN GOD

There cannot be more than three persons in God. For the divine persons cannot be multiplied by a division of their substance, but solely by the relation of some procession; and not by any sort of procession, but only by such as does not have its term in something outside of God. If the relation had something external as its term, this would not possess the divine nature, and so could not be a divine person or hypostasis. But procession in God that does not terminate outside of God must be either according to the operation of the intellect, whereby the Word proceeds, or according to the operation of the will, whereby love proceeds, as is clear from our exposition. Therefore no divine person can proceed unless He proceeds as the Word, whom we call the Son, or as love, whom we call the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, since God comprehends everything in His intellect by a single act of intuition, and similarly loves everything by a single act of His will, there cannot be several words or several loves in God. If, then, the Son proceeds as Word, and if the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, there cannot be several Sons or several Holy Spirits in God.

Again: the perfect is that beyond which there is nothing. Hence a being that would tolerate anything of its own class to be outside itself, would fall short of absolute perfection. This is why things that are simply perfect in their natures are not numerically multiplied; thus God, the sun, the moon, and so on. But both the Son and the Holy Spirit must be simply perfect, since each of them is God, as we have shown. Therefore several Sons or several Holy Spirits are impossible.

Besides, that whereby a subsistent thing is this particular thing, distinct from other things, cannot be numerically multiplied, for the reason that an individual cannot be predicated of many. But the Son is this divine person, subsisting in Himself and distinct from the other divine persons by sonship; just as Socrates is constituted this human person by individuating principles. Accordingly, as the individuating principles whereby Socrates is this man cannot pertain to more than one man, so sonship in the Godhead cannot pertain to more than one divine person. Similar is the case with the relation of the Father and the Holy Spirit. Hence there cannot be several Fathers in God or several Sons or several Holy Spirits.

Lastly, whatever is one by reason of its form, is not numerically multiplied except through matter; thus whiteness is multiplied by existing in many subjects. But there is no matter in God. Consequently whatever is one in species and form in the Godhead, cannot be multiplied numerically. Such are paternity and filiation and the procession of the Holy Spirit. And thus there cannot be several Fathers or Sons or Holy Spirits in God.

CHAPTER 57

PROPERTIES OF THE FATHER

Such being the number of persons in God, the properties whereby the persons are distinguished from one another must be of some definite number. Three properties are characteristic of the Father. The first is that whereby He is distinguished from the Son alone. This is paternity. The second is that whereby the Father is distinguished from the other two persons, namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit. And this is innascibility; for the Father is not God as proceeding from another person, whereas the Son and the Holy Spirit do proceed from another person. The third property is that whereby the Father along with the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit. This is called their common spiration. But a property whereby the Father may be distinguished from the Holy Spirit alone is not to be assigned, for the reason that the Father and the Son are a single principle of the Holy Spirit, as has been shown.

CHAPTER 58

PROPERTIES OF THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

Two properties must pertain to the Son: one whereby He is distinguished from the Father, and this is filiation; another whereby, along with the Father, He is distinguished from the Holy Spirit; and this is their common spiration. But no property is to be assigned whereby the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit alone, because as we said above, the Son and the Father are a single principle of the Holy Spirit. Similarly, no single property is to be assigned whereby the Holy Spirit and the Son together are distinguished from the Father. For the Father is distinguished from them by one property, namely, innascibility, inasmuch as He does not proceed. However, since the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed, not by one procession, but by several, they are distinguished from the Father by two properties. The Holy Spirit has only one property by which He is distinguished from the Father and the Son, and this is called procession. That there cannot be any property by which the Holy Spirit may be distinguished from the Son alone or from the Father alone, is evident from this whole discussion.

Accordingly five properties in all are attributed to the divine persons: innascibility, paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession.

CHAPTER 59

WHY THESE PROPERTIES ARE CALLED NOTIONS

These five properties can be called notions of the persons, for the reason that the distinction between the persons in God is brought to our notice through them. On the other hand, they cannot be called properties, if the root meaning of a property is insisted on, so that a property is taken to mean a characteristic pertaining to one individual alone; for common spiration pertains to the Father and the Son. But if the word “property” is employed in the sense of an attribute that is proper to some individuals as setting them off from others, in the way that “two-footed,” for example, is proper to man and bird in contradistinction to quadrupeds, there is nothing to prevent even common spiration from being called a property. Since, however, the persons in God are distinguished solely by relations, and distinction among the divine persons is manifested by the notions, the notions must in some sense pertain to relationship. But only four of the notions are real relations, whereby the divine persons are related to one another. The fifth notion, innascibility, pertains to relation as being the denial of relation; for negations are reduced to the genus of affirmations, and privations are reduced to the genus of habits, as, for example, not man is reduced to the genus of man, and not white is reduced to the genus of whiteness.

We should note that among the relations whereby the divine persons are related to one another, some have definite names, such as paternity and filiation, which properly signify relationship. But others lack a definite name: those whereby the Father and the Son are related to the Holy Spirit, and the Holy Spirit is related to them. So for these we use names of origin in place of relative names. We perceive clearly that common spiration and procession signify origin, but not relations that follow origin. This can be brought out in the case of the relations between the Father and the Son. Generation denotes active origin, and is followed by the relation of paternity; and nativity signifies the passive generation of the Son, and is followed by the relation of filiation. In like manner, some relation follows common spiration, and the same is true of procession. But as these relations lack definite names, we use the names of the actions instead of relative names.

CHAPTER 60

THE NUMBER OF RELATIONS AND THE NUMBER OF PERSONS

We must realize that, although the relations subsisting in the Godhead are the divine persons themselves, as was stated above, we are not to conclude that there are five or four persons corresponding to the number of relations. For number follows distinction of some sort. just as unity is indivisible or undivided, so plurality is divisible or divided. For a plurality of persons requires that relations have power to distinguish by reason of opposition, since formal distinction necessarily entails opposition. If, then, the relations in question are closely examined, paternity and filiation will be seen to have relative opposition to each other; hence they are incompatible in the same suppositum. Consequently paternity and filiation in God must be two subsistent persons. Innascibility, on the other hand, although opposed to filiation, is not opposed to paternity. Hence paternity and innascibility can pertain to one and the same person. Similarly, common spiration is not opposed either to paternity or to filiation, nor to innascibility. Thus nothing prevents common spiration from being in both the person of the Father and the person of the Son. Accordingly common spiration is not a subsisting person distinct from the persons of the Father and the Son. But procession has a relation of opposition to common spiration. Therefore, since common spiration pertains to the Father and the Son, procession must be a person distinct from the persons of the Father and the Son.

Accordingly the reason is clear why God is not called “quiune,” quinus, on account of the notions, which are five in number, but is called triune, on account of the Trinity of persons. The five notions are not five subsisting things, but the three persons are three subsisting things. Although several notions or properties may pertain to a single person, only one of them constitutes the person. For a divine person is constituted by the properties, not in the sense that He is constituted by several of them, but in the sense that the relative, subsisting property itself is a person. If several properties were understood as subsisting in themselves apart, they would be several persons, and not one person. Hence we must understand that, of the several properties or notions belonging to a single person, the one that precedes according to the order of nature constitutes the person; the others are understood as inhering in the person already constituted.

Thus it is evident that innascibility cannot be the first notion of the Father, constituting His person, because nothing is constituted by a negation, and also because affirmation naturally precedes negation. Further, common spiration presupposes paternity and filiation in the order of nature, just as the procession of love presupposes the procession of the Word.

Hence common spiration cannot be the first notion of the Father, or of the Son either. The first notion of the Father is paternity and the first notion of the Son is filiation, whereas procession alone is the notion of the Holy Spirit.

Accordingly the notions constituting persons are three in number: paternity, filiation, and procession. And these notions must be strict properties. For that which constitutes a person must pertain to that person alone; individuating principles cannot belong to several individuals. For this reason the three notions in question are called personal properties, in the sense that they constitute the three persons in the manner described. The remaining notions are called properties or notions of the persons, but not personal properties or notions, because they do not constitute a person.

CHAPTER 61

DEPENDENCE OF THE HYPOSTASES ON THE PERSONAL PROPERTIES

This makes it clear that if we were to remove the personal properties by intellectual abstraction, the hypostases could not remain. If a form is removed by intellectual abstraction, the subject of the form remains. Thus if whiteness is removed, the surface remains; if the surface is removed, the substance remains; if the form of the substance is removed, prime matter remains. But if the subject is removed, nothing remains. In the case of God, the personal properties are the subsisting persons themselves. They do not constitute the persons in the sense that they are added to pre-existing supposita; for in the Godhead nothing that is predicated absolutely, but only what is relative, can be distinct. Therefore, if the personal properties are removed by intellectual abstraction, no distinct hypostases remain. But if non-personal notions are thus removed, distinct hypostases do remain.

CHAPTER 62

EFFECT OF INTELLECTUAL REMOVAL OF PERSONAL PROPERTIES ON THE DIVINE ESSENCE

If the question were to be asked whether, in consequence of the removal of the personal properties by intellectual abstraction, the divine essence would remain, the answer is that in one respect it would remain, but in another it would not. Intellectual abstraction can take place in two ways. The first is by abstracting form from matter. In this abstraction the mind proceeds from the more formal to the more material; the first subject remains until the end, and the ultimate form is removed first. The second way of abstracting is by the abstraction of the universal from the particular, and this proceeds according to an order that is, in a sense, the opposite; the individuating material conditions are first removed, so that what is common may be retained.

In God, of course, there are neither matter and form, nor universal and particular. Nevertheless there is in the Godhead something that is common, and something that is proper and that supposes the common nature; for, in our human way of thinking, the divine persons are to the divine essence what individual supposita are to a common nature. According to the first type of intellectual abstraction, therefore, if we remove the personal properties, which are the subsisting persons themselves, the common nature does not remain. But in the second type of abstraction it does remain.

CHAPTER 63

PERSONAL ACTS AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES

We can perceive from this discussion the nature of the order between the personal acts and the personal properties. The personal properties are subsistent persons. But a person subsisting in any nature whatsoever, acts in virtue of his nature when he communicates his nature; for the form of a species is the principle for generating a product that is of like species. Consequently, since personal acts in God have to do with communicating the divine nature, a subsisting person must communicate the common nature in virtue of the nature itself.

Two conclusions follow from this. The first is, that the generative power of the Father is the divine nature itself; for the power of performing any action is the principle in virtue of which a thing acts. The second conclusion is that, according to our way of conceiving, the personal act of generation presupposes both the divine nature and the personal property of the Father, which is the very hypostasis of the Father. This is true even though such property, regarded as a relation, follows from the act. Thus, in speaking of the Father, if we attend to the fact that He is a subsistent person, we can say that He generates because He is the Father. But if we are thinking of what pertains to relationship, it seems we should say, contrariwise, that He is the Father because He generates.

CHAPTER 64

GENERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE FATHER AND WITH RESPECT TO THE SON

However, we should understand that the order of active generation, with reference to paternity, is to be taken in one way, and that the order of passive generation, or nativity, with reference to filiation, is to be taken in another way. In the order of nature, active generation presupposes the person of the begetter. But in the same order of nature, passive generation, or nativity, precedes the begotten person, for the begotten person owes his existence to his birth. Hence active generation, according to our way of representing the matter, presupposes paternity, understood as constituting the person of the Father. Nativity, however, does not presuppose filiation, understood as constituting the person of the Son but, according to our manner of conceiving, precedes it in both respects, that is, both as being constitutive of the person and as being a relation. And whatever pertains to the procession of the Holy Spirit is to be understood in a similar way.

CHAPTER 65

NATURE OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN NOTIONAL ACTS AND NOTIONAL PROPERTIES

In thus indicating the order between the notional acts and the notional properties, we do not mean to imply that the notional acts differ from the personal properties in objective reality, for they are distinct only according to our manner of conceiving. just as God’s act of understanding is God Himself understanding, so the Father’s act of begetting is the begetting Father, although the modes of signifying are different. Likewise, although one divine person may have several notions, there is no composition in Him. Innascibility cannot cause any composition, since it is a negative property. And the two relations in the person of the Father, namely, paternity and common spiration, are in reality identical as referring to the person of the Father; for, as the paternity is the Father, so common spiration in the Father is the Father, and in the Son is the Son. But these two properties differ according to the terms to which they refer; for by paternity the Father is related to the Son, and by common spiration He is related to the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the Son is related to the Father by filiation, and to the Holy Spirit by common spiration.

CHAPTER 66

IDENTITY BETWEEN THE RELATIVE PROPERTIES AND THE DIVINE ESSENCE

The relative properties must be the divine essence itself. For the relative properties are precisely the subsistent persons. But a person subsisting in the Godhead cannot be something other than the divine essence; and the divine essence is God Himself, as was shown above. Therefore the relative properties are in all reality identical with the divine essence.

Moreover, whatever is in a being besides its essence, is in it accidentally. But there cannot be any accidents in God, as was pointed out above. Accordingly the relative properties are not really distinct from the divine essence.

CHAPTER 67

THE DIVINE PROPERTIES NOT EXTERNALLY AFFIXED

The view proposed by Gilbert de la Porrée and some of his followers, that the properties under discussion are not in the persons, but are external to them, cannot be defended. Real relations must be in the things that are related. This is evident in the case of creatures, for real relations are in them as accidents in their subjects. But the relations whereby the persons are distinguished within the Godhead are real relations, as was demonstrated above.” Hence they must be in the divine persons; but not, of course, as accidents. Other perfections, too, which in creatures are accidents, cease to be accidents when transferred to God, as was shown above; such are wisdom, justice, and the like.

Besides, there can be no distinction in God except through the relations; all perfections that are predicated absolutely are common. Therefore, if the relations were external to the persons, no distinction would remain among the persons themselves. And so there are relative properties in the persons; but they are the persons themselves, and also the divine essence it~elf. In the same way wisdom and goodness are said to be in God, and are God Himself, as well as the divine essence, as was said above.

CHAPTER 68

THE EFFECTS PRODUCED BY GOD

After considering the truths which pertain to the unity of the divine essence and to the Trinity of persons, we turn to a study of the effects produced by the Trinity. The first effect wrought by God in things is existence itself, which all other effects presuppose, and on which they are based. Anything that exists in any way must necessarily have its origin from God. In all things that are arranged in orderly fashion, we find universally that what is first and most perfect in any order, is the cause of whatever follows in that order. Thus fire, which is hot in the highest degree, is the cause of heat in all other heated bodies. Imperfect objects are always found to have their origin from perfect things; seeds, for instance, come from animals and plants. But, as we proved above, God is the first and most perfect Being. Therefore He must be the cause of being in all things that have being.

Again, whatever has some perfection by participation, is traced back, as to its principle and cause, to what possesses that perfection essentially. Thus molten iron has its incandescence from that which is fire by its essence. We showed above that God is existence itself; hence existence belongs to Him in virtue of His essence, but pertains to all other things by way of participation. The essence of no other thing is its existence, for being that is absolute and per se subsistent cannot be more than one, as was brought out above. Therefore God must be the cause of existence of all things that are.

CHAPTER 69

CREATION FROM NOTHING

This makes it clear that, in creating, God has no need of pre-existing matter from which to fashion things. No agent needs, prior to his action, what he produces by his action; he needs only what he is unable to produce by his action. The builder requires stones and lumber before he can set to work, because he is unable to produce these materials by his action. On the other hand, he does not presuppose a house, but produces it by his activity. But matter must be produced by God’s action since, as has just been proved, everything that exists in any way at all has God as the cause of its existence. Therefore the conclusion follows that God does not presuppose matter in His activity.

Besides, act naturally precedes potency, and hence the notion of principle primarily befits act. But any principle that in creating would presuppose some other principle, would verify the concept of principle only in a secondary way. Accordingly, since God is the principle of things as the first act, whereas matter is a principle as a being in potency, it is unthinkable that matter should be presupposed before God can act.

Furthermore, the more universal a cause is, the more universal its effect is. Particular causes make use of the effects of universal causes for something determinate; and such determination is related to a universal effect as act to potency. Hence any cause that causes something to be in act, utilizing pre-existing material that is in potency to that act, is a particular cause with respect to some more universal cause. But this sort of procedure cannot pertain to God, since He is the first cause, as we showed above. Consequently God does not need matter as a prerequisite to His action. Therefore He has the power to bring things into existence from nothing or, in other words, to create. This is why the Catholic faith professes that He is the Creator.

CHAPTER 70

CREATION POSSIBLE FOR GOD ALONE

From this it appears, further, that God alone can be Creator. For to create is the prerogative of that cause which does not presuppose another cause that is more universal, as we saw in the preceding chapter. But such causality pertains to God alone. He alone, therefore, is Creator.

Besides, the more remote a potency is from act, the greater must be the power that reduces it to act. But whatever distance may be imagined between potency and act, the distance will ever be still greater if the very potency itself is withdrawn. To create from nothing, then, requires infinite power. But God alone is infinite in power, since He alone is infinite in essence. Consequently God alone can create.

CHAPTER 71

MATTER NOT THE CAUSE OF DIVERSITY IN THINGS

The foregoing exposition shows clearly that the cause of diversity in things is not diversity on the part of matter. For, as we have proved, the divine action which brings things into being does not suppose the pre-existence of matter. The cause of diversity in things could not be on the side of matter unless matter were needed prior to the production of things, so that the various forms induced would follow diversity in matter. Therefore the cause of diversity in the things produced by God is not matter.

Again, the plurality or unity of things is dependent on their existence. For, to the extent that anything is a being, it is also one. But forms do not possess existence on account of matter; on the contrary, matter receives existence from form. For act is more excellent than potency; and that which is the reason for a thing’s existence must be the more excellent component. Consequently forms are not diverse in order that they may befit various types of matter, but matter is diversified that it may befit various forms.

CHAPTER 72

THE CAUSE OF DIVERSITY

If the unity and multiplicity of things are governed by their being, and if the entire being of things depends on God, as has been shown to be the case the cause of plurality in things must be sought in God. How this comes about, must now be examined.

Any active cause must produce its like, so far as this is possible. The things produced by God could not be endowed with a likeness of the divine goodness in the simplicity in which that goodness is found in God. Hence what is one and simple in God had to be represented in the produced things in a variety of dissimilar ways. There had to be diversity in the things produced by God, in order that the divine perfection might in some fashion be imitated in the variety found in things.

Furthermore, whatever is caused is finite, since only God's essence is infinite, as was demonstrated above. The finite is rendered more perfect by the addition of other elements. Hence it was better to have diversity in created things, and thus to have good objects in greater number, than to have but a single kind of beings produced by God. For the best cause appropriately produces the best effects. Therefore it was fitting for God to produce variety in things.

CHAPTER 73

DIVERSITY IN THINGS ACCORDING TO DEGREE AND ORDER

Diversity among things was rightly established according to a definite order, so that some things might be more excellent than others. For this pertains to the lavishness of the divine goodness, that God should communicate a likeness of His goodness to created things, so far as possible. God is not only good in Himself, but exceeds other beings in goodness, and guides them toward goodness. Consequently, that the likeness which created beings bear to God might be heightened, it was necessary for some things to be made better than others, and for some to act upon others, thus leading them toward perfection.

The basic diversity among things consists chiefly in diversity of forms. Formal diversity is achieved by way of contrariety; for genus is divided into various species by contrary differences. But order is necessarily found in contrariety, for among contraries one is always better than the other. Therefore diversity among things had to be established by God according to a definite order, in such a way that some beings might be more excellent than others.

CHAPTER 74

INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCES REQUISITE FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE

A being is noble and perfect in the measure that it approaches likeness to God, who is pure act without any admixture of potency. Therefore beings that are supreme among entities must be more in act and must have less of potency, whereas inferior beings must be more in potency. How this is to be understood, we must now examine.

Since God is eternal and immutable in His being, those things are lowest in the scale of being, as possessing less likeness to God, which are subject to generation and corruption. Such beings exist for a time, and then cease to be. And, since existence follows the form of a thing, beings of this kind exist while they have their form, but cease to exist when deprived of their form. Hence there must be something in them that can retain a form for a time, and can then be deprived of the form. This is what we call matter. Therefore such beings, which are lowest in degree among things, must be composed of matter and form. But beings that are supreme among created entities approach most closely to likeness with God. They have no potency with regard to existence and non-existence; they have received everlasting existence from God through creation. Since matter, by the very fact that it is what it is, is a potency for that existence which is imparted through form, those beings which have no potency for existence and nonexistence, are not composed of matter and form, but are forms only, subsisting in their being which they have received from God. Such incorporeal substances must be incorruptible. For all corruptible beings have a potency for non-existence;

but incorporeal beings have no such potency, as we said. Hence they are incorruptible.

Furthermore, nothing is corrupted unless its form is separated from it, for existence always follows form. Since the substances in question are subsisting forms, they cannot be separated from their forms, and so cannot lose existence. Therefore they are incorruptible.

Between the extremes mentioned, there are certain intermediate beings which have no potency for existence and nonexistence, but which have a potency for ubi, or presence in place. Such are the heavenly bodies, which are not subject to generation and corruption, since contrarieties are not found in them. However, they are changeable according to local presence. Thus in some beings there is found matter as well as motion. For motion is the act of a being in potency. Accordingly such bodies have matter that is not subject to generation and corruption, but is subject only to change of place.

CHAPTER 75

INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES

The substances mentioned above, which are called immaterial, must also be intellectual. A being is intellectual for the reason that it is free from matter. This can be perceived from the very way it understands. The intelligible in act and the intellect in act are the same thing. But it is clear that a thing is intelligible in act because it is separated from matter, we cannot have intellectual knowledge of material things except by abstracting from matter. Accordingly we must pronounce the same judgment regarding the intellect; that is, whatever is immaterial, is intellectual.

Furthermore, immaterial substances hold the first place and are supreme among beings; for act naturally has precedence over potency. But the intellect is clearly superior to all other beings; for the intellect uses corporeal things as instruments. Therefore immaterial substances must be intellectual.

Moreover, the higher a thing is in the scale of being, the closer it draws to likeness with God. Thus we observe that some things, those pertaining to the lowest degree, such as lifeless beings, share in the divine likeness with respect to existence only; others, for example, plants, share in the divine likeness with respect to existence and life; yet others, such as animals, with respect to sense perception. But the highest degree, and that which makes us most like to God, is conferred by the intellect. Consequently the most excellent creatures are intellectual. Indeed, they are said to be fashioned in God’s image for the very reason that among all creatures they approach most closely to likeness with God.

CHAPTER 76

FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES

This fact shows that such beings have freedom of choice. The intellect does not act or desire without forming a judgment, as lifeless beings do, nor is the judgment of the intellect the product of natural impulse, as in brutes, but results from a. true apprehension of the object. For the intellect perceives the end, the means leading to the end, and the bearing of one on the other. Hence the intellect can be the cause of its own judgment, whereby it desires a good and performs an action for the sake of an end. But what is a cause unto itself, is precisely what we call free. Accordingly the intellect desires and acts in virtue of a free judgment, which is the same as having freedom of choice. Therefore the highest substances enjoy freedom of choice.

Furthermore, that is free which is not tied down to any one definite course. But the appetite of an intellectual substance is not under compulsion to pursue any one definite good, for it follows intellectual apprehension, which embraces good universally. Therefore the appetite of an intelligent substance is free, since it tends toward all good in general.

CHAPTER 77

ORDER AND DEGREE AMONG INTELLECTUAL BEINGS

Intellectual substances are superior to other substances in the scale of perfection. These same substances must also differ from one another in degree. They cannot differ from one another by material differentiation, since they lack matter; if any plurality is found among them, it must be caused by formal distinction, which establishes diversity of species. In beings that exhibit diversity of species, the degree and order existing in them must be taken into consideration. The reason is that, just as addition or subtraction of a unit causes variation of species in numbers, so natural entities are found to vary in species by the addition or subtraction of differences. For instance, what is merely alive, differs from what is both alive and endowed with sense perception; and the latter differs from what is alive, endowed with sense, and rational. Therefore the immaterial substances under discussion must be distinct according to various degrees and orders.

CHAPTER 78

ORDER AND DEGREE IN INTELLECTUAL OPERATION

Since the nature of a being’s activity is in keeping with its substance, the higher intellectual substances must understand in a more perfect way, inasmuch as they have intelligible species and powers that are more universal and are more unified. On the other hand, intellectual substances that are less perfect must be weaker in intelligence, and must have species that are more numerous and less universal.

CHAPTER 79

INFERIORITY OF MAN’S INTELLECTUAL NATURE

Infinite progression is impossible in any series. Among intellectual substances, one must ultimately be found to be supreme, namely, the one which approaches most closely to God. Likewise, one must be found to be the lowest, and this will be the most intimately associated with corporeal matter.

This can be explained in the following way. Understanding is proper to man beyond all the other animals. Evidently, man alone comprehends universals, and the relations between things, and immaterial objects, which are perceptible only to the intelligence. Understanding cannot be an act performed by a bodily organ, in the way that vision is exercised by the eye. No faculty endowed with cognitive power can belong to the genus of things that is known through its agency. Thus the pupil of the eye lacks color by its very nature. Colors are recognized to the extent that the species of colors are received into the pupil; but a recipient must be lacking in that which is received. The intellect is capable of knowing all sensible natures. Therefore, if it knew through the medium of a bodily organ, that organ would have to be entirely lacking in sensible nature; but this is impossible.

Moreover, any cognitive faculty exercises its power of knowing in accord with the way the species of the object known is in it, for this is its principle of knowing. But the intellect knows things in an immaterial fashion, even those things that are by nature material; it abstracts a universal form from its individuating material conditions. Therefore the species of the object known cannot exist in the intellect materially; and so it is not received into a bodily organ, seeing that every bodily organ is material.

,The same is clear from the fact that a sense is weakened and injured by sensible objects of extreme intensity. Thus the ear is impaired by excessively loud sounds, and the eye by excessively bright lights. This occurs because the harmony within the organ is shattered. The intellect, on the contrary, is perfected in proportion to the excellence of intelligible objects; he who understands the higher objects of intelligence is able to understand other objects more perfectly rather than less perfectly. Consequently, if man is found to be intelligent, and if man’s understanding is not effected through the medium of a bodily organ, we are forced to acknowledge the existence of some incorporeal substance whereby man exercises the act of understanding. For the substance of a being that can perform an action by itself, without the aid of a body, is not dependent on a body. But all powers and forms that are unable to subsist by themselves without a body, cannot exercise any activity without a body. Thus heat does not by itself cause warmth; rather a body causes warmth by the heat that is in it. Accordingly this incorporeal substance whereby man understands, occupies the lowest place in the genus of intellectual substances, and is the closest to matter.

CHAPTER 80

DIFFERENT KINDS OF INTELLECT AND WAYS OF UNDERSTANDING

Since intellectual being is superior to sentient being, just as intellect is superior to sense, and since lower beings imitate higher beings as best they may, just as bodies subject to generation and corruption imitate in some fashion the circulatory motion of heavenly bodies, it follows that sensible beings resemble, in; their own way, intellectual beings. Thus from the resemblance of sense to intellect we can mount to some knowledge of intellectual beings.

In sensible beings a certain factor is found to be the highest; this is act, that is, form. Another factor is found to be the lowest, for it is pure potency; this is matter. Midway between the two is the composite of matter and form.

We expect to find something similar in the intellectual world. The supreme intellectual being, God, is pure act. Other intellectual substances have something of act and of potency, but in a way that befits intellectual being. And the lowest among intellectual substances, that whereby man understands, has, so to speak, intellectual being only in potency. This is borne out by the fact that man is at first found to be only potentially intelligent, and this potency is gradually reduced to act in the course of time. And this is why the faculty whereby man understands is called the possible intellect.

CHAPTER 81

RECEPTION OF INTELLIGIBLE FORMS IN THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

As was stated above, the higher an intellectual substance is in perfection, the more universal are the intelligible forms it possesses. Of all the intellectual substances, consequently, the human intellect, which we have called possible, has forms of the least universality. This is the reason it receives its intelligible forms from sensible things.

This can be made clear from another point of view. A form must have some proportion to the potency which receives it. Therefore, since of all intellectual substances man’s possible intellect is found to be the closest to corporeal matter, its intelligible forms must, likewise, be most closely allied to material things.

CHAPTER 82

MAN’S NEED OF SENSE FACULTIES FOR UNDERSTANDING

However, we must realize that forms in corporeal things are particular, and have a material existence. But in the intellect they are universal and immaterial. Our manner of understanding brings this out. That is, we apprehend things universally and immaterially. This way of understanding must conform to the intelligible species whereby we understand. Consequently, since it is impossible to pass from one extreme to another without traversing what lies between, forms reaching the intellect from corporeal objects must pass through certain media.

These are the sense faculties, which receive the forms of material things without their matter; what lodges in the eye is the species of the stone, but not its matter. However, the forms of things received into the sense faculties are particular; for we know only particular objects with our sense faculties. Hence man must be endowed with senses as a prerequisite to understanding. A proof of this is the fact that if a man is lacking in one of the senses, he has no knowledge of sensible objects that are apprehended by that sense. Thus a person born blind can have no knowledge of colors.

CHAPTER 83

NECESSITY OF THE AGENT INTELLECT

This discussion brings out the truth that knowledge of things in our intellect is not caused by any participation or influence of forms that are intelligible in act and that subsist by themselves, as was taught by the Platonists and certain other philosophers who followed them in this doctrine. No, the intellect acquires such knowledge from sensible objects, through the intermediacy of the senses. However, since the forms of objects in the sense faculties are particular, as we just said, they are intelligible not in act, but only in potency. For the intellect understands nothing but universals. But what is in potency is not reduced to act except by some agent. Hence there must be some agent that causes the species existing in the sense faculties to be intelligible in act. The possible intellect cannot perform this service, for it is in potency with respect to intelligible objects rather than active in rendering them intelligible. Therefore we must assume some other intellect, which will cause species that are intelligible in potency to become intelligible in act, just as light causes colors that are potentially visible to be actually visible. This faculty we call the agent intellect, which we would not have to postulate if the forms of things were intelligible in act, as the Platonists held.

To understand, therefore, we have need, first, of the possible intellect which receives intelligible species, and secondly, of the agent intellect which renders things intelligible in act. Once the possible intellect has been perfected by the intelligible species, it is called the habitual intellect (intellectus in habitu), for then it possesses intelligible species in such a way that it can use them at will; in other words, it possesses them in a fashion that is midway between pure potency and complete act. But when it has these species in full actuality, it is called the intellect in act. That is, the intellect actually understands a thing when the species of the thing is made the form of the possible intellect. This is why we say that the intellect in act is the object actually understood.

CHAPTER 84

INCORRUPTIBILITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL

A necessary consequence of the foregoing doctrine is that the intellect whereby man understands is incorruptible. Every being acts in a way that is conformable to its existence. The intellect has an activity which it does not share with the body, as we have proved. This shows that it can act by itself. Hence it is a substance subsisting in its own being. But, as was pointed out above, intellectual substances are incorruptible.” Accordingly the intellect whereby man understands is incorruptible.

Again, the proper subject of generation and corruption is matter. Hence a thing is immune to corruption to the extent that it is free from matter. Things composed of matter and form are per se corruptible; material forms are corruptible indirectly (per accidens), though not per se. Immaterial forms, which are above material conditions, are wholly incorruptible. The intellect by its very nature is elevated completely beyond matter, as its activity shows: we do not understand anything unless we separate it from matter. Consequently the intellect is by nature incorruptible.

Moreover, corruption cannot take place without contrariety; for nothing is corrupted except by its contrary. This is why the heavenly bodies, which do not admit of contrariety, are incorruptible. But all contrariety is far removed from the nature of the intellect, so much so that things which are contraries in themselves, are not contraries in the intellect. The intelligible aspect of contraries is one, inasmuch as one thing is understood in terms of another. Thus it is impossible for the intellect to be corruptible.

CHAPTER 85

UNITY OF THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

An objector may say: the intellect is indeed incorruptible, but there is only one intellect in all men; and so what remains after the corruption of all men is but one. That there is only one intellect for all men, the objector may continue, can be established on many grounds.

First, on the part of the intelligible species. If I have one intellect and you have another, there will have to be one intelligible species in me and another in you, and consequently there will be one object that I understand and another that you understand. Hence the intelligible species will be multiplied according to the number of individuals, and so it will not be universal but individual. The conclusion would then seem to follow that it is understood not in act, but only in potency; for individual species are intelligible in potency, not in act.

Moreover, since the intellect, as we have seen, is a substance subsisting in its own being, and since intellectual substances that are numerically many do not belong to one species, as we have also seen, it follows that if I have one intellect and you have another that is numerically different, the two must differ specifically. And so you and I would not belong to the same species.

Furthermore, since all individuals share in one specific nature, there must be something besides specific nature whereby individuals may be distinguished from one another. Accordingly, if there is one specific intellect in all men, but many intellects that are numerically distinct, something must be found that will make one intellect differ numerically from another. This cannot be anything pertaining to the substance of the intellect, since the intellect is not composed of matter and form. Consequently any difference that might be admitted ,on the part of the substance of the intellect, would be a formal difference that would cause diversity in the species. The only possibility left is that the intellect of one man cannot differ numerically from the intellect of another man except by reason of the diversity of their bodies. Therefore, when the various bodies corrupt, it seems that only one intellect, and not a plurality of intellects, would remain.

The absurdity of this whole position is easily perceived. To make this clear, let us proceed as one would proceed against those who deny fundamental principles. That is, let us establish a truth that simply cannot be denied. Let us suppose that this man, for example, Socrates or Plato, understands. Our adversary could not deny that the man understands, unless he knew that it ought to be denied. By denying he affirms, for affirmation and denial are intelligent actions. If, then, the man in question understands, that whereby he formally understands must be his form, since nothing acts unless it is in act. Hence that whereby an agent acts, is his act; just as the heat by which a heated body causes warmth, is its act. Therefore the intellect whereby a man understands is the form of this man, and the same is true of another man. But the same numerical form cannot belong to numerically different individuals, for numerically different individuals do not possess the same existence; and yet everything has existence by reason of its form. Accordingly the intellect whereby a man understands cannot be but one in all men.

Perceiving the force of this difficulty, some endeavor to find a way of escaping it. They say that the possible intellect, of which there was question above, receives the intelligible species by which it is reduced to act. These intelligible species are, in some way, in the phantasms. Hence the possible intellect is continuous and is joined to us so far as the intelligible species is both in the possible intellect and in the phantasms that are in us. It is thus that we are able to understand through the agency of the possible intellect.

Unfortunately for this solution, it is utterly valueless. In the first place, the intelligible species, as it exists in the phantasms, is a concept only in potency; and as it exists in the possible intellect, it is a concept in act. As existing in the possible intellect, it is not in the phantasms, but rather is abstracted from the phantasms. Hence no union of the possible intellect with us remains. Secondly, even granting that there may be some sort of union, this would not suffice to enable us to understand. The presence of the species of some object in the intellect does not entail the consequence that the object understands itself, but only that it is understood; a stone does not understand, even though a species of it may be in the possible intellect. Hence, from the fact that species of phantasms present in us are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that we thereupon understand. It only follows that we ourselves, or rather the phantasms in us, are understood.

This will appear more clearly if we examine the comparison proposed by Aristotle in Book III of De anima [7, 431 a 14], where he says that the intellect is to phantasm what sight is to color. Manifestly, the fact that the species of colors on a wall are in our vision does not cause the wall to see, but to be seen. Likewise, the fact that the species of the phantasms in us come to be in the intellect, does not cause us to understand, but to be understood. Further, if we understand formally through the intellect, the intellectual action of the intellect must be the intellectual action of the man, just as the heating action of fire and of heat are the same. Therefore, if intellect is numerically the same in me and in you, it follows that, with respect to the same intelligible object, my action of understanding must be the same as yours, provided, of course, both of us understand the same thing at the same time. But this is impossible, for different agents cannot perform one and the same numerical operation. Therefore it is impossible for all men to have but a single intellect. Consequently, if the intellect is incorruptible, as has been demonstrated many intellects, corresponding to the number of men, will survive the destruction of their bodies.

The arguments advanced to support the contrary view are easily answered.

The first argument has many defects. First of all, we concede that the same thing may be understood by all. By the thing understood I mean that which is the object of the intellect. However, the object of the intellect is not the intelligible species, but the quiddity of the thing. The intellectual sciences are all concerned with the natures of things, not with intelligible species; just as the object of sight is color, not the species of color in the eye. Hence, although there may be many intellects belonging to different men, the thing understood by all may be but one; just as a colored object which many look at is but one. Secondly, the consequence does not necessarily follow that, if a thing is individual, it is understood in potency and not in act. This is true only of things that are individuated by matter. Of course, what is understood in act must be immaterial. Accordingly immaterial substances, even though they may be individuals existing by themselves, are understood in act. The same holds for intelligible species, which are immaterial; although they differ numerically in me and in you, they do not on that account lose their property of being intelligible in act. The intellect that understands its objects by means of them reflects upon itself, thereby understanding its very action of understanding as well as the species whereby it understands. Moreover, we should realize that, even if we admit but one intellect for all men, the difficulty is still the same. There would still remain many intellects, because there are many separate substances endowed with intelligence. And so it would follow, pursuing our adversaries’ line of reasoning, that the objects understood would be numerically different, hence individual and not understood in first act. Obviously, therefore, if the objection under discussion had any cogency, it would do away with a plurality of intellects simply as such, and not merely in men. Since this conclusion is false, the argument manifestly does not conclude with necessity.

The second argument is readily answered, if we but consider the difference between an intellectual soul and separate substances. In virtue of its specific nature, the intellectual soul is meant to be united to some body as the latter’s form; the body even enters into the definition of the soul. For this reason, souls are numerically differentiated according to the relation they have to different bodies; which is not the case with separate substances.

This also indicates how the third argument is to be answered. In virtue of its specific nature, the intellectual soul does not possess the body as a part of itself, but has only an aptitude for union with the body. Therefore it is numerically differentiated by its capacity for union with different bodies. And this remains the case with souls even after their bodies have been destroyed: they retain a capacity for union with different bodies even when they are not actually united to their respective bodies.

CHAPTER 86

THE AGENT INTELLECT NOT ONE IN ALL MEN

There were also some philosophers who argued that, even granting the diversification of the possible intellect in men, at any rate the agent intellect was but one for all. This view, while less objectionable than the theory discussed in the preceding chapter, can be refuted by similar considerations.

The action of the possible intellect consists in receiving the objects understood and in understanding them. And the action of the agent intellect consists in causing things to be actually understood by abstracting species. But both these functions pertain to one particular man. This man, for example, Socrates or Plato, receives the objects understood, abstracts the species, and understands what is abstracted. Hence the possible intellect as well as the agent intellect must be united to this man as a form. And so both must be numerically multiplied in accord with the number of men concerned.

Moreover, agent and patient must be proportionate to each other. Examples are matter and form, for matter is reduced to act by an agent. This is why an active potency of the same genus corresponds to every passive potency; for act and potency pertain to one genus. But the agent intellect is to the possible intellect what active potency is to passive potency, as is clear from this discussion. Hence they must both pertain to one genus. Therefore, since the possible intellect has no separate existence apart from us, but is united to us as a form and is multiplied according to the number of men, as we have shown,[80] the agent intellect must likewise be something that is united to us as a form, and must be multiplied according to the number of men.

CHAPTER 87

THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT AND THE AGEN,T INTELLECT AS RESIDING IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL

Since the agent intellect and the possible intellect are united to us as form, we must acknowledge that they pertain to the same essence of the soul. Whatever is formally united to another thing, is united to it either in the manner of a substantial form or in the manner of an accidental form. If the possible intellect and the agent intellect were united to man after the fashion of a substantial form, we would have to hold that they share in the one essence of that form which is the soul, since one thing cannot have more than one substantial form. On the other hand, if they are united to man after the fashion of an accidental form, neither of them, evidently, can be an accident of the body. Besides, the fact that their operations are performed without a bodily organ, as we proved above, shows that each of them is an accident of the soul. But there is only one soul in one man. Therefore the agent intellect and the possible intellect must inhere in the one essence of the soul.

Furthermore, every action that is proper to a species proceeds from principles that emanate from the form which confers the species. But the action of understanding is an operation proper to the human species. Therefore the agent intellect and the possible intellect, which are principles of this action, as has been shown, emanate from the human soul, whence man has his species. However, they do not issue from the soul in such a way as to extend to the body, because, as we have said, the operation in question takes place independently of a bodily organ. Since, therefore, action pertains to the same subject as does potency, the possible intellect and the agent intellect inhere in the one essence of the soul.

CHAPTER 88

THE WAY THESE TWO FACULTIES ARE UNITED IN THE SAME ESSENCE OF THE SOUL

We have still to consider how this union is possible. Some difficulty may seem to arise in this matter. The possible intellect is in potency with respect to all that is intelligible, whereas the agent intellect causes what is intelligible in potency to be intelligible in act, and so must be related to what is intelligible as act to potency. But the same thing, seemingly, cannot be both in potency and in act with respect to the same object. Thus it would appear that the possible intellect and the agent intellect cannot be united in the same substance of the soul.

This doubt is easily resolved if we examine how the possible intellect is in potency with respect to intelligible objects, and how the agent intellect renders them actually intelligible. The possible intellect is in potency with regard to intelligible objects in the sense that it does not contain within its nature any determinate form of sensible things. In the same way the pupil of the eye is in potency with regard to all colors. To the extent, then, that phantasms abstracted from sensible things are likenesses of definite sensible things, they are related to the possible intellect as act to potency. Nevertheless the phantasms are in potency with regard to something that the intellectual soul possesses in act, namely, being as abstracted from material conditions. And in this respect the intellectual soul is related to the phantasms as act to potency. No contradiction is involved if a thing is in act and potency with regard to the same object according to different points of view. Thus natural bodies act upon each other and are acted upon by each other, for each,is in potency with respect to the other. The same intellectual soul, therefore, can be in potency with regard to al I intelligible objects and nevertheless, without any contradiction, can be related to them as act, if both a possible intellect and an agent intellect are acknowledged in the soul.

This will be seen more clearly from the way the intellect renders objects actually intelligible. The agent intellect does not render objects actually intelligible in the sense that the latter flow from it into the possible intellect. If this were the case, we would have no need of phantasms and sense in order to understand. No, the agent intellect renders things actually intelligible by abstracting them from phantasms; just as light, in a certain sense, renders colors actual, not as though it contained the colors within itself, but so far as it confers visibility on them. In the same way we are to judge that there is a single intellectual soul that lacks the natures of sensible things but can receive them in an intelligible manner, and that renders phantasms actually intelligible by abstracting intelligible species from them. The power whereby the soul is able to receive intelligible species is called the possible intellect, and the power whereby it abstracts intelligible species from phantasms is called the agent intellect. The latter is a sort of intelligible light communicated to the intellectual soul, in imitation of what takes place among the higher intellectual substances.

CHAPTER 89

RADICATION OF ALL THE FACULTIES IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL

Not only the agent intellect and the possible intellect, but also all the other powers that are principles of the soul’s operations, are united in the essence of the soul. All such powers are somehow rooted in the soul. Some of them, indeed, such as the powers of the vegetative and sensitive parts, are in the soul as in their principle, but in the composite as in their subject, because their activities pertain to the composite, not to the soul alone; for power and action belong to the same subject. Some of them, on the other hand, are in the soul both as principle and as subject, for their operations pertain to the soul apart from any bodily organ. These are the powers of the intellectual part. But a man cannot have several souls. Accordingly all the powers must pertain to the same soul.

CHAPTER 90

UNICITY OF THE SOUL

That there cannot be several souls in one body is proved as follows. The soul is evidently the substantial form of any being possessing a soul, because a living being is constituted in genus and species by its soul. But the same thing cannot have several substantial forms. A substantial form differs from an accidental form in this, that a substantial form causes a particular thing simply to be, whereas an accidental form is added to a particular being already constituted as such, and determines its quality or quantity or its mode of being. Hence, if several substantial forms belong to one and the same thing, either the first of them causes it to be this particular thing or it does not. If it does not, the form is not substantial; if it does, then all the subsequent forms accrue to what is already this particular thing. Therefore none of the subsequent forms will be the substantial form, but only some accidental form.

Clearly, therefore, one and the same thing cannot have several substantial forms; and so one and the same person cannot have several souls.

Furthermore, it is evident that a man is said to be living because he bas a vegetative soul, that he is called an animal because he has a sensitive soul, and that he is a man because he has an intellectual soul. Consequently, if there were three souls in man, namely, vegetative, sensitive, and rational, man would be placed in a genus because of one of his souls, and in a species because of another. But this is impossible. For thus genus and specific difference would constitute, not what is simply one, but what is one per accidens, or a sort of conglomeration, such as musical and white; but such is not a being that is simply one. Accordingly a man can have only one soul.

CHAPTER 91

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED TO SHOW A MULTIPLICITY OF SOULS IN MAN

Certain considerations seem opposed to our doctrine. In the first place, specific difference is to genus what form is to matter. Animal is the genus of man, and rational is the difference that makes man what he is. Accordingly, since animal is a body animated by a sensitive soul, it seems that a body animated by a sensitive soul is still in potency with respect to the rational soul. Thus the rational soul would be distinct from the sensitive soul.

Moreover, the intellect does not possess a bodily organ. But the sensitive and nutritive powers do possess bodily organs. Hence it seems impossible for the same soul to be both intellectual and sensitive, because the same thing cannot both be separated and not separated from another thing.

Furthermore, the rational soul is incorruptible, as was shown above. On the other hand, the vegetative and the sensitive souls are corruptible, as they are acts of corruptible organs. Therefore the rational soul is not the same as the vegetative and the sensitive souls, for the same thing cannot be both corruptible and incorruptible.

Besides, in the generation of man the life conferred by the vegetative soul appears before the fetus is observed to be an animal from its sense activity and motion; and this same beina, is discerned to be an animal through its sense activity and movement before it has an intellect. Therefore, if the soul by which the fetus first lives the life of a plant, then the life of an animal, and thirdly the life of a man, is the same, it would follow that the vegetative, sensitive, and rational principles come from an outside source, or else that the intellectual soul arises from the energy in the semen. Both of these alternatives are inadmissible. On the one hand, since the operations of the vegetative and sensitive soul are not exercised apart from the body, their principles cannot be without a body. On the other hand, the operation of the intellectual soul is exercised without a body; and so, apparently, no bodily energy can be its cause. Therefore the same soul cannot be vegetative, sensitive, and rational.

CHAPTER 92

REFUTATION OF THE PRECEDING OBJECTIONS

To set aside such quibbles, we should reflect that, in material things, one species surpasses another in perfection, in the way that, in numbers, species are diversified by adding one to another. Whatever perfection is found in lifeless bodies, plants also possess, and more besides. Again, whatever plants have, animals have too, and something else in addition. And thus we proceed until we come to man, the most perfect of bodily creatures. All that is imperfect is related as matter to what is more perfect. This is clear in the various classes of beings.

The elements constitute the matter of bodies that are composed of similar parts; and again, bodies having similar parts are matter with respect to animals. And this is likewise to be observed in one and the same being. Among natural things, that which is endowed with a higher degree of perfection has, in virtue of its form, whatever perfection is found in lower nature, and in virtue of the same form has, besides, its own added perfection. Through its soul, the plant is a substance, and is corporeal, and besides is an animated body. Through its soul, an animal has all these perfections, and moreover is sentient. In addition to all this, man is intelligent through his soul. Thus, in any object, if we consider what pertains to the perfection of a lower grade of being, this will be material when compared with what pertains to the perfection of a higher grade. For example, if we observe that an animal has the life of a plant, this life is in some fashion material with respect to what pertains to sensitive life, which is characteristic of an animal.

Genus, of course, is not matter, for then it would not be predicated of the whole. But it is something derived from matter; for the designation attaching to a thing in terms of what is material in it, is its genus. Specific difference is derived from the form of a thing in the same way. This is the reason why living or animated body is the genus of animal, and sensitive is the specific difference that constitutes it. Similarly, animal is the genus of man, and rational is the difference that constitutes him. Therefore, since the form of a higher grade of being comprises within itself all the perfections of a lower grade, there is not, in reality, one form from which genus is derived, and another from which specific difference is derived. Rather, genus is derived from a form so far as it has a perfection of lower degree, and specific difference is derived from the same form so far as it has a perfection of higher degree.

Thus, although animal is the genus of man and rational is the specific difference constituting him, there need not be in man a sensitive soul distinct from the intellectual soul, as was urged in the first argument.

This indicates the solution of the second difficulty. As we have pointed out, the form of a higher species comprises within itself all the perfections of lower classes of being. We must note, however, that the species of a material being is higher in proportion as it is less subject to matter. And so the nobler a form is, the more it must be elevated above matter.

Hence the human soul, which is the noblest of all forms of matter, attains to the highest level of elevation, where it enjoys an activity that is independent of the concurrence of corporeal matter. Yet, since the same soul includes the perfection of lower levels, it also has activities in which corporeal matter shares. However, an activity is exercised by a thing in accordance with the thing’s power. Therefore the human soul must have some powers or potentialities that are principles of activities exercised through the body, and these must be actions of certain parts of the body. Such are the powers of the vegetative and sensitive parts. The soul has also certain powers that are the principles of activities exercised without the body. Such are the’powers of the intellectual part, whose actions are not performed by any organs. For this reason both the possible intellect and the agent intellect are said to be separate; they have no organs as principles of their actions, such as sight and hearing have, but inhere in the soul alone, which is the form of the body. Hence we need not conclude, from the fact that the intellect is said to be separate and lacks a bodily organ, whereas neither of these is true of the senses, that the intellectual soul is distinct from the sensitive soul in man.

This also makes it clear that we are not forced to admit an intellectual soul distinct from the sensitive soul in man on the ground that the sensitive soul is corruptible whereas the intellectual soul is incorruptible, as the third objection set out to prove. Incorruptibility pertains to the intellectual part so far as it is separate. Therefore, as powers that are separate, in the sense mentioned above, and powers that are not separate, are all rooted in the same essence of the soul, there is nothing to prevent some of the powers of the soul from lapsing when the body perishes, while others remain incorruptible.

The points already made lead to a solution of the fourth objection. All natural movement gradually advances from imperfect to perfect. The same quality is receptive of greater and less; hence alteration, which is movement in quality, being unified and continuous in its progress from potency to act, advances from imperfect to perfect. But substantial form is not receptive of greater and less, for the substantial nature of each being exists indivisibly. Therefore natural generation does not proceed continuously through many intermediate stages from imperfect to perfect, but at each level of perfection a new generation and corruption must take place. Thus in the generation of a man the fetus first lives the life of a plant through the vecetative soul; next, when this form is removed by corruption it acquires, by a sort of new generation, a sensitive soul and lives the life of an animal; finally, when this soul is in turn removed by corruption, the ultimate and complete form is introduced. This is the rational soul, which comprises within itself whatever perfection was found in the previous forms.

CHAPTER 93

PRODUCTION OF THE RATIONAL SOUL

This ultimate and complete form, the rational soul, is brought into existence, not by the power that is in the semen, but by a higher cause. For the power that is in the semen is a bodily power. But the rational soul exceeds the whole nature and power of the body, since no body can rise to the heights of the soul’s intellectual activity. Nothing can act in a way that surmounts its species, because the agent is nobler than the patient, and the maker excels his product. Hence the power possessed by a body cannot produce the rational soul, nor, consequently, can the energy inherent in the semen do so.

Moreover, a thing that has new existence must also have a new becoming; for that which is, must first become, since a thing becomes in order that it may be. Thus things which have being in their own right must have becoming in their own right; such are subsistent beings. But things that do not possess being in their own right do not properly have a becoming; such are accidents and material forms. The rational soul has being in its own right, because it has its own operation, as is clear from our previous discussion. Therefore becoming is properly predicated of the rational soul. Since the soul is not composed of matter and form, as was shown above, it cannot be brought into being except by creation. But God alone can create, as we said above. Consequently the rational soul is produced by God alone.

We can readily understand why this should be so. In all arts that are hierarchically related to one another, we observe that the highest art induces the ultimate form, whereas the lower arts dispose matter for the reception of the ultimate form. The rational soul, evidently, is the ultimate and most perfect form that the matter of beings subject to generation and corruption can achieve. Therefore natural agents, which operate on lower levels, appropriately cause preliminary dispositions and forms, whereas the supreme agent, God, causes the ultimate form, which is the rational soul.

CHAPTER 94

THE RATIONAL SOUL NOT DERIVED FROM GOD’S SUBSTANCE

However, we are not to imagine that the rational soul is derived from the substance of God, as some have erroneously thought. We demonstrated above that God is simple and indivisible. Therefore He does not join the rational soul to a body as though He had first severed it from His own substance.

Furthermore, we pointed out above that God cannot be the form of any body. But the rational soul is united to the body as the latter’s form. Hence it is not derived from the substance of God.

Besides, we showed above that God is not moved either in Himself or by reason of some other thing that is moved. But the contrary of this is observed to take place in the rational soul, which is moved from ignorance to knowledge, from vice to virtue. Accordingly the soul is not of the substance of God.

CHAPTER 95

IMMEDIATE CREATION BY GOD

The doctrine established above necessarily leads to the conclusion that things that cannot be brought into existence except by creation, come immediately from God. Thus the heavenly bodies ‘92 as is manifest, cannot be produced except by creation. They cannot be said to be made from some preexisting matter, for then they would be capable of generation and corruption, and would also be subject to contrariety. But they are not, as their motion proves. For they move in circles, and circular motion has no contrary. Consequently the heavenly bodies were produced immediately by God.

Similarly the elements, regarded as complete units, do not come from any pre-existing matter. Anything that would thus pre-exist would have some form. And thus some body, other than the elements, would exist prior to them in the order of material cause. But if the matter existing prior to the elements had a distinct form, one of the elements would have to be prior to the others in the same order, supposing that the pre-existing matter had the form of an element. Therefore the very elements must have been produced immediately by God.

It is even more impossible for incorporeal and invisible substances to be created by some one else, for all such substances are immaterial. Matter cannot exist unless it is subject to dimension, whereby it is capable of being marked off, so that many things can be made from the same matter. Hence immaterial substances cannot be made from pre-existing matter. Consequently they can be produced only by God through creation. For this reason the Catholic faith professes that God is the “Creator of heaven and earth, and of all things visible,” and also “of all things invisible.”

CHAPTER 96

VOLUNTARINESS OF GOD’S ACTIVITY

The truth set forth in the preceding chapter also discloses the fact that God has brought things into existence not through any necessity of His nature but by His will. A single natural agent produces immediately but one effect, whereas a voluntary, agent can produce a variety of effects. The reason for this is that every agent acts in virtue of its form. The natural form, whereby a cause operates naturally, is limited to one for each agent. But intellectual forms, whereby an agent operates through his will, are many. Therefore, since many things are immediately produced by God, as we have just shown, God evidently produces things by His will, and not under the impulse of natural necessity.

Besides, in the order of causes, an agent operating through intellect and will is prior to an agent operating by the necessity of its nature. For an agent operating through his will predetermines for himself the end for the sake of which he acts, whereas a natural cause operates on account of an end predetermined for it by another. But, as is clear from all that has gone before, God is the first agent. Hence He acts through His will, and not by a necessity of His nature.

Moreover, we demonstrated above that God is infinite in power. Consequently He is not determined to this or that effect, but is undetermined with regard to all effects. But what is undetermined regarding various effects, is determined to produce one of them by desire or by the determination of the will. Thus a man who is free to walk or not to walk, walks when he wills. Hence effects proceed from God according to the determination of His will. And so He acts, not by a necessity of His nature, but by His will. This is why the Catholic faith calls the omnipotent God not only “Creator,” but also “Maker.” For making is properly the action of an artificer who operates by his will. And since every voluntary agent acts in virtue of the conception of his intellect, which is called his word, as we indicated above, and since the Word of God is His Son, the Catholic faith professes that “all things were made” by the Son.

CHAPTER 97

IMMUTABILITY OF GOD IN HIS ACTIVITY

The fact that God produces things by His will clearly shows that He can produce new things without any change in Himself. The difference between a natural agent and a voluntary agent is this: a natural agent acts consistently in the same manner as long as it is in the same condition. Such as it is, thus does it act. But a voluntary agent acts as he wills. Accordingly it may well be that, without any change in himself, he wishes to act now and not previously. For there is nothing to prevent a person from willing to perform an action later, even though he is not doing it now; and this without any change in himself. Thus it can happen, without any change in God, that God, although He is eternal, did not bring things into existence from eternity.

CHAPTER 98

QUESTION OF THE ETERNITY OF MOTION

We might imagine that, although God can produce a new effect by His eternal and immutable will, some sort of motion would have to precede the newly produced effect. For we observe that the will does not delay doing what it wishes to do, unless because of some motive that is operative now but will cease later, or because of some motive that is inoperative now but is expected to become operative in the future. In summer a man has the will to clothe himself with a warm garment, which, however, he does not wish to put on at present, but in the future; for now the weather is warm, although it will cease to be warm with the advent of a cold wave later in the year.

Accordingly, if God wished from eternity to produce some effect, but did not produce it from eternity, it seems either that something was expected to happen in the future that had not yet occurred, or else that some obstacle had to be removed that was then present. Neither of these alternatives can take place without motion. Thus it seems that a subsequent effect cannot be produced by a preceding will unless some motion previously occurs. And so, if God's will relative to the production of things was eternal, and nevertheless things were not produced from eternity, their production must have been preceded by motion, and consequently by mobile objects. And if the latter were produced by God, but not from eternity, yet other motions and mobile objects must have preceded, and so on, in infinite recession.

The solution to this objection readily comes to mind if we but attend to the difference between a universal and a particular agent. A particular agent has an activity that conforms to a norm and measure prescribed by the universal agent. This is clear even in civil government. The legislator enacts a law which is to serve as a norm and measure. Any particular judge must base his decisions on this law. Again, time is the measure of actions which occur in time. A particular agent is endowed with activity regulated by time, so that he acts for some definite reason now, and not before. But the universal agent, God, instituted this measure, which is time, and He did so in accord with His will. Hence time also is to be numbered among the things produced by God. Therefore, just as the quantity and measure of each object are such as God wishes to assign to it, so the quantity of time is such as God wished to mete out; that is, time and the things existing in time began just when God wished them to begin.

The objection we are dealing with argues from the standpoint of an agent that presupposes time and acts in time, but did not institute time. Hence the question, why God’s eternal will produces an effect now and not earlier, presupposes that time exists; for “now” and “earlier” are segments of time. With regard to the universal production of things, among which time is also to be counted, we should not ask: “Why now and not earlier?” Rather we should ask: “Why did God wish this much time to intervene?” And this depends on the divine will, which is perfectly free to assign this or any other quantity to time. The same may be noted with respect to the dimensional quantity of the world. No one asks why God located the material world in such and such a place rather than higher up or lower down or in some other position; for there is no place outside the world. The fact that God portioned out so much quantity to the world that no part of it would be beyond the place occupied in some other locality, depends on the divine will. However, although there was no time prior to the world and no place outside the world, we speak as if there were. Thus we say that before the world existed there was nothing except God, and that there is no body lying outside the world. But in thus speaking of “before” and “outside,” we have in mind nothing but time and place as they exist in our imagination.

CHAPTER 99

CONTROVERSY ON THE ETERNITY OF MATTER

However, even though finished products were not in existence from eternity, we might be inclined to think that matter had to exist from eternity. For everything that has being subsequent to non-being, is changed from non-being to being. Therefore if created things, such as heaven and earth and the like, did not exist from eternity, but began to be after they had not been, we must admit that they were changed from non-being to being. But all change and motion have some sort of subject; for motion is the act of a thing existing in potency. However, the subject of the change whereby a thing is brought into existence, is not the thing itself that is produced, because this thing is the terminus of the motion, and the terminus and subject of motion are not the same. Rather, the subject of the change is that from which the thing is produced, and this is called matter. Accordingly, if things are brought into being after a state of non-being, it seems that matter had to exist prior to them. And if this matter is, in turn, produced subsequent to a period of non-existence, it had to come from some other, pre-existing matter. But infinite procession along these lines is impossible. Therefore we must eventually come to eternal matter, which was not produced subsequent to a period of non-existence.

Again, if the world began to exist after it had first not existed, then, before the world actually existed, it was either possible for the world to be or become, or it was not possible. If it was not possible for the world to be or to become, then, by equipollence, it was impossible for the world to be or to become. But if it is impossible for a thing to become, it is necessary for that thing not to become. In that case we must conclude that the world was not made. Since this conclusion is patently false, we are forced to admit that if the world began to be after it had first not been, it was possible for it to be or to become before it actually existed. Accordingly there was something in potency with regard to the becoming and being of the world. But what is thus in potency to the becoming and existence of something, is the matter of that something, as we see exemplified in the case of wood relative to a bench. Apparently, therefore, matter must have existed always, even if the world did not exist always.

As against this line of reasoning, we showed above that the very matter of the world has no existence except from God.96 Catholic faith does not admit that matter is eternal any more than it admits that the world is eternal. We have no other way of expressing the divine causality in things themselves than by saying that things produced by God began to exist after they had previously not existed. This way of speaking evidently and clearly brings out the truth that they have existence not of themselves, but from the eternal Author.

The arguments just reviewed do not compel us to postulate the eternity of matter, for the production of things in their totality cannot properly be called change. In no change is the subject of the change produced by the change, for the reason rightly alleged by the objector, namely, that the subject of change and the terminus of the change are not identical. Consequently, since the total production of things by God, which is known as creation, extends to all the reality that is found in a thing, production of this kind cannot properly verify the idea of change, even though the things created are brought into existence subsequently to non-existence. Being that succeeds to non-being, does not suffice to constitute real change, unless we suppose that a subject is first in a state of privation, and later under its proper form. Hence “this” is found coming after “that” in certain things in which motion or change do not really occur, as when we say that day turns into night. Accordingly, even though the world began to exist after having not existed, this is not necessarily the result of some change. In fact, it is the result of creation, which is not a true change, but is rather a certain relation of the created thing, as a being that is dependent on the Creator for its existence and that connotes succession to previous non-existence. In every change there must be something that remains the same although it undergoes alteration in its manner of being, in the sense that at first it is under one extreme and subsequently under another. In creation this does not take place in objective reality, but only in our imagination. That is, we imagine that one and the same thing previously did not exist, and later existed. And so creation can be called change, because it has some resemblance to change. ,

The second objection, too, lacks cogency. Although we can truly say that before the world was, it was possible for the world to be or to become, this possibility need not be taken to mean potentiality. In propositions, that which signifies a certain modality of truth, or in other words, that which is neither necessary nor impossible, is said to be possible. What is possible in this sense does not involve any potentiality, as the Philosopher teaches in Book V of his Metaphysics [12, 1019 b 19]. However, if anyone insists on saying that it was possible for the world to exist according to some potency, we reply that this need not mean a passive potency, but can mean active potency; and so if we say that it was possible for the world to be before it actually was, we should understand this to mean that God could have brought the world into existence before He actually produced it. Hence we are not forced to postulate that matter existed before the world. Thus Catholic faith acknowledges nothing to be co-eternal with God, and for this reason professes that He is the “Creator and Maker of all things visible and invisible.”

CHAPTER 100

FINALITY OF GOD’S CREATIVE ACTIVITY

We showed above that God has brought things into existence, not through any necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and Will. Any agent that works in this way, acts for an end: the end is a principle for the operative intellect. Accordingly everything that is made by God necessarily exists for an end.

Moreover, things were produced by God in a supremely excellent way; for the most perfect Being does everything in the most perfect way. But it is better for a thing to be made for an end than to be made without the intention of achieving an end; for the goodness that is in things which are made comes from their end. Hence things were made by God for an end.

An indication of this is seen in effects produced by nature. None of them is in vain, all are for an end. But it is absurd to say that things produced by nature are in better order than is the very constituting of nature by the first Agent, since the entire order of nature is derived from the latter. Clearly, therefore, things produced by God exist for an end.

CHAPTER 101

The Divine Goodness as the Ultimate End

The ultimate end of things is necessarily the divine goodness. For the ultimate end of things produced by one who works through his will is that which is chiefly and for its own sake willed by the agent. It is for this that the agent does all that he does. But the first object willed by the divine will is God’s goodness, as is clear from a previous discussion. Hence the ultimate end of all things made by God must necessarily be the divine goodness.

Furthermore, the end of the generation of everything that is generated is its form. Once this is achieved, generation ceases. For everything that is generated, whether by art or by nature, is in some way rendered similar to the agent in virtue of its form, since every agent produces an effect that has some resemblance to the agent himself. Thus the house that is realized in matter proceeds from the house existing ideally in the mind of the architect. In the realm of nature, likewise, man begets man. And if anything that is generated or effected by natural processes is not like its generating cause according to species, it is at any rate likened to its efficient causes as imperfect to perfect. The fact that a generated product is not assimilated to its generating cause according to species, is explained by its inability to rise to perfect likeness with its cause; but it does participate in that cause to some extent, however imperfectly. This occurs, for example, in animals and plants that are generated by the power of the sun. Hence in all things that are made, the end of their generation or production is the form of their maker or generator, in the sense that they are to achieve a likeness of that form. But the form of the first agent, who is God, is nothing else than His goodness. This, then, is the reason why all things were made: that they might be assimilated to the divine goodness.

CHAPTER 102

THE REASON FOR DIVERSITY IN THINGS

This enables us to grasp the reason for diversity and distinction in things. Since the divine goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, on account of the distance that separates each creature from God, it had to be represented by many creatures, so that what is lacking to one might be supplied by another. Even in syllogistic conclusions, when the conclusion is not sufficiently demonstrated by one means of proof, the means must be multiplied in order to make the conclusion clear, as happens in dialectic syllogisms. Of course, not even the entire universe of creatures perfectly represents the divine goodness by setting it forth adequately, but represents it only in the measure of perfection possible to creatures.

Moreover, a perfection existing in a universal cause simply and in a unified manner, is found to be multiple and discrete in the effects of that cause. For a perfection has a nobler existence in a cause than in its effects. But the divine goodness is one, and is the simple principle and root of all the goodness found in creatures. Hence creatures must be assimilated to the divine goodness in the way that many and distinct objects are assimilated to what is one and simple. Therefore multiplicity and distinction occur in things not by chance or fortune but for an end, just as the production of things is not the result of chance or fortune, but is for an end. For existence, unity, and multiplicity in things all come from the same principle.

The distinction among things is not caused by matter; for things were originally constituted in being by creation, which does not require any matter. Moreover, things which issue purely from the necessity of matter have the appearance of being fortuitous.

Furthermore, multiplicity in things is not explained by the order obtaining among intermediate agents, as though from one, simple first being, there could proceed directly only one thing that would be far removed from the first being in simplicity, so that multitude could issue from it, and thus, as the distance from the first, simple being increased, the more numerous a multitude would be discerned. Some have suggested this explanation. But we have shown that there are many things that could not have come into being except by creation, which is exclusively the work of God, as has been proved. Hence we conclude that many things have been created directly by God Himself. It is likewise evident that, according to the view under criticism, the multiplicity and distinction among things would be fortuitous, as not being intended by the first agent. Actually, however, the multiplicity and distinction existing among things were devised by the divine intellect and were carried out in the real order so that the divine goodness might be mirrored by created things in variety, and that different things might participate in the divine goodness in varying degree. Thus the very order existing among diverse things issues in a certain beauty, which should call to mind the divine wisdom.

CHAPTER 103

THE DIVINE GOODNESS AS THE END OF ALL ACTION AND MOVEMENT IN CREATURES

The divine goodness is not only the end of the creation of things; it must also be the end of every operation and movement of any creature whatever. The action of every being corresponds to its nature; for example, what is hot, causes heat. But every created thing has, in keeping with its form, some participated likeness to the divine goodness, as we have pointed out. Therefore, too, all actions and movements of every creature are directed to the divine goodness as their end.

Besides, all movements and operations of every being are seen to tend to what is perfect. Perfect signifies what is good, since the perfection of anything is its goodness. Hence every movement and action of anything whatever tend toward good. But all good is a certain imitation of the supreme Good, just as all being is an imitation of the first Being. Therefore the movement and action of all things tend toward assimilation with the divine goodness.

Moreover, if there are many agents arranged in order, the actions and movements of all the agents must be directed to the good of the first agent as to their ultimate end. For lower agents are moved by the higher agent, and every mover moves in the direction of his own end. Consequently the actions and movements of lower agents must tend toward the end of the first agent. Thus in an army the actions of all the subordinate units are directed, in the last instance, to victory, which is the end intended by the commander-in-chief. But we showed above that the first mover and agent is

God, and that His end is nothing else than His goodness. Therefore all the actions and movements of all creatures exist on account of the divine goodness, not, of course, in the sense that they are to cause or increase it, but in the sense that they are to acquire it in their own way, by sharing to some extent in a likeness of it.

Created things attain to the divine likeness by their operations in different ways, as they also represent it in different ways conformably to their being. For each of them acts in a manner corresponding to its being. Therefore, as all creatures in common represent the divine goodness to the extent that they exist, so by their actions they all in common attain to the divine likeness in the conservation of their being and in the communication of their being to others. For every creature endeavors, by its activity, first of all to keep itself in perfect being, so far as this is possible. In such endeavor it tends, in its own way, to an imitation of the divine permanence. Secondly, every creature strives, by its activity, to communicate its own perfect being, in its own fashion, to another; and in this it tends toward an imitation of the divine causality.

The rational creature tends, by its activity, toward the divine likeness in a special way that exceeds the capacities of all other creatures, as it also has a nobler existence as compared with other creatures. The existence of other creatures is finite, since it is hemmed in by matter, and so lacks infinity both in act and in potency. But every rational nature has infinity either in act or in potency, according to the way its intellect contains intelligibles. Thus our intellectual nature, considered in its first state, is in potency to its intelligibles; since these are infinite, they have a certain potential infinity. Hence the intellect is the species of species, because it has a species that is not determined to one thing alone, as is the case with a stone, but that has a capacity for all species. But the intellectual nature of God is infinite in act, for prior to every consideration it has within itself the perfection of all being, as was shown above. Accordingly intellectual creatures occupy a middle position between potency and act. By its activity, therefore, the intellectual creature tends toward the divine likeness, not only in the sense that it preserves itself in existence, or that it multiplies its existence, in a way, by communicating it; it also has as its end the possession in act of what by nature it possesses in potency. Consequently the end of the intellectual creature, to be achieved by its activity, is the complete actuation of its intellect by all the intelligibles for which it has a potency. In this respect it will become most like to God.

CHAPTER 104

THE END OF THE INTELLECTUAL CREATURE

A thing may be in potency in two ways: either naturally, that is, with respect to perfections that can be reduced to act by a natural agent; or else with respect to perfections that cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent but require some other agent. This is seen to take place even in corporeal beings. The boy grows up to be a man; the spermatozoon develops into an animal. This is within the power of nature. But that lumber becomes a bench or that a blind man receives sight, is not within the power of nature.

The same is the case with our minds. Our intellect has a natural potency with regard to certain intelligible objects, namely, those that can be reduced to act by the agent intellect. We possess this faculty as an innate principle that enables us to understand in actuality. However, we cannot attain our ultimate end by the actuation of our intellect through the instrumentality of the agent intellect. For the function of the agent intellect consists in rendering actually intelligible the phantasms that of themselves are only potentially intelligible. This was explained above. These phantasms are derived from the senses. Hence the efficacy of the agent intellect in reducing our intellect to act is restricted to intelligible objects of which we can gain knowledge by way of sense perception. Man’s last end cannot consist in such cognition.

The reason is that, once the ultimate end has been reached, natural desire ceases. But no matter how much we may advance in this kind of understanding, whereby we derive knowledge from the senses, there still remains a natural desire to know other objects. For many things are quite beyond the reach of the senses. We can have but a slight knowledge of such things through information based on sense experience. We may get to know that they exist, but we cannot know what they are, for the natures of immaterial substances belong to a different genus from the natures of sensible things and excel them, we may say, beyond all proportion.

Moreover, as regards objects that fall under sense experience, there are many whose nature we cannot know with any certainty. Some of them, indeed, elude our knowledge altogether; others we can know but vaguely. Hence our natural desire for more perfect knowledge ever remains. But a natural desire cannot be in vain.

Accordingly we reach our last end when our intellect is actualized by some higher agent than an agent connatural to us, that is, by an agent capable of gratifying our natural, inborn craving for knowledge. So great is the desire for knowledge within us that, once we apprehend an effect, we wish to know its cause. Moreover, after we have gained some knowledge of the circumstances investing a thing, our desire is not satisfied until we penetrate to its essence. Therefore our natural desire for knowledge cannot come to rest within us until we know the first cause, and that not in any way, but in its very essence. This first cause is God. Consequently the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the vision of God in His essence.

CHAPTER 105

KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE BY THE CREATED INTELLECT

The possibility of such knowledge must be investigated. Manifestly, since our intellect knows nothing except through an intelligible species of the thing known, the species of one thing cannot disclose the essence of another thing. In proportion as the species, whereby the mind knows, is remote from the thing known, the less perfect is the knowledge our intellect has of that thing's essence. For example, if we should know an ox by the species of an ass, we would have an imperfect knowledge of the essence of the ox, for our concept would be limited to its genus. Our knowledge would be still more defective if we were to know the ox through the medium of a stone, because then we would know it by a more remote genus. And if our knowledge were gained through the species of a thing that did not agree with the ox in any genus, we could not know the essence of the ox at all.

Previous discussion has brought out the fact that no creature is associated with God in genus. Hence the essence of God cannot be known through any created species whatever, whether sensible or intelligible. Accordingly, if God is to be known as He is, in His essence, God Himself must become the form of the intellect knowing Him and must be joined to that intellect, not indeed so as to constitute a single nature with it, but in the way an intelligible species is joined to the intelligence. For God, who is His own being, is also His own truth, and truth is the form of the intellect.

Whatever receives a form, must first acquire the disposition requisite to the reception of that form. Our intellect is not equipped by its nature with the ultimate disposition looking to that form which is truth; otherwise it would be in possession of truth from the beginning. Consequently, when it does finally attain to truth, it must be elevated by some disposition newly conferred on it. And this we call the light of glory, whereby our intellect is perfected by God, who alone by His very nature has this form properly as His own. In somewhat the same way the disposition which heat has for the form of fire can come from fire alone. This is the light that is spoken of in Psalm 35: 10: “In Your light we shall see light.”

CHAPTER 106

FRUITION OF NATURAL DESIRE IN THE BEATIFIC VISION

Once this end is reached, natural desire must find its full fruition. The divine essence thus united to the intellect of the one who sees God, is the adequate principle for knowing everything, and is the source of all good, so that nothing can remain to be desired. This, too, is the most perfect way of attaining likeness with God: to know God in the way He knows Himself, by His own essence.

Of course, we shall never comprehend Him as He comprehends Himself. This does not mean that we shall be unaware of some part of Him, for He has no parts. It means that we shall not know Him as perfectly as He can be known, since the capacity of our intellect for knowing cannot equal His truth, and so cannot exhaust His knowability. God’s knowability or truth is infinite, whereas our intellect is finite. But His intellect is infinite, just as His truth is; and so He alone knows Himself to the full extent that He is knowable; just as a person comprehends a demonstrable conclusion if he knows it through demonstration, but not if he knows it only in an imperfect way, on merely probable grounds..

This ultimate end of man we call beatitude. For a man’s happiness or beatitude consists in the vision whereby he sees God in His essence. Of course, man is far below God in the perfection of his beatitude. For God has this beatitude by His very nature, whereas man attains beatitude by being admitted to a share in the divine light, as we said in the previous chapter.

CHAPTER 107

BEATITUDE ESSENTIALLY IN THE ACT OF THE INTELLECT

We should note that, since advance from potency to act is motion, or at least is similar to motion, the process of arriving at beatitude has points of resemblance with natural motion or change. In natural motion we may consider, first, a certain property whereby the mobile object has a proportion to such and such an end, or is inclined in its direction. We observe this, for instance, in the earth's gravity with respect to whatever is borne downward. No object would move naturally toward a definite end unless it had a proportion to that end. We may consider, secondly, the motion itself toward its end; thirdly, the form or place toward which there is motion; and fourthly, the repose in the form educed or in the place reached.

Similarly, with regard to intellectual movement toward an end, there is, first, the love inclining toward the end; secondly, the desire which is a sort of motion toward the end, and the actions issuing from such desire; thirdly, the form which the intellect receives; and fourthly, the resulting delight, which is nothing else than the repose of the will in the end as reached.

In the same way, the end of natural generation is a form and the end of local motion is a place. However, repose in a form or a place is not the end, but follows upon the attainment of the end; and much less does the end consist in motion or in proportion to the end. Likewise the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the direct vision of God, but not delight in God. Such delight accompanies attainment of the end and, as it were, perfects it. Much less can desire or love be the ultimate end, because they are present even before the end is reached.

CHAPTER 108

THE ERROR OF PLACING HAPPINESS IN CREATURES

Clearly, therefore, they are in error who seek happiness in various things outside of God. Some look for happiness in carnal pleasures, which are shared even by brute animals. Others seek happiness in wealth, which is rightly directed to the sustenance of those who have such possessions; this is an end common to every created being. Others place their happiness in power, which is ordained to the communication of one’s own perfection to others; this, too, we said, is common to all beings. Yet others seek happiness in honors or reputation, which are due to a person because of the end he has already reached, or because of the noble dispositions which equip him to reach an end. Finally, happiness does not consist in the knowledge of any created things whatever, even though they may be far above man; for man’s desire comes to rest in the knowledge of God alone.

CHAPTER 109

THE ESSENTIAL GOODNESS OF GOD AND THE PARTICIPATED GOODNESS OF CREATURES

All this brings to light the different relationship that God and creatures have to goodness. We may examine this difference from the standpoint of the two kinds of goodness discerned in creatures. Since the good has the nature of perfection and of end, the twofold perfection and end of the creature disclose its twofold goodness. A certain perfection is observed in the creature inasmuch as it persists in its nature. This perfection is the end of its generation or formation. The creature has a further perfection which it reaches by its motion or activity. This perfection is the end of its movement or operation.

In both kinds of perfection the creature falls short of the divine goodness. The form and existence of a thing are its good and perfection when considered from the standpoint of the thing’s nature. But a composite substance is neither its own form nor its own existence; and a simple substance, although it is its own form, is not its own existence. God, however, is His own essence and His own existence, as was shown above.

Likewise, all creatures receive their perfect goodness from an end extrinsic to them. For the perfection of goodness consists in attainment of the ultimate end. But the ultimate end of any creature is outside the creature. This end is the divine goodness, which is not ordained to any ulterior end. Consequently God is His own goodness in every way and is essentially good. This cannot be said of simple creatures, because they are not their own existence, and also because they are ordained to something external as to their ultimate end. As for composite substances, clearly they are not their own goodness in any way. Hence God alone is His own goodness, and He alone is essentially good. All other beings are said to be good according as they participate, to some extent, in Him.

CHAPTER 110

GOD’S GOODNESS INCAPABLE OF BEING LOST

The foregoing account clearly shows that God cannot in any way be deficient in goodness. For what is essential to a being cannot be lacking; animality, for instance, cannot be dissociated from man. Hence it is impossible for God not to be good. We can use a more appropriate example to illustrate this: as it is impossible for a man not to be a man, so it is impossible for God not to be perfectly good.

CHAPTER 111

INSECURITY OF THE CREATURE’S GOODNESS

Let us consider how goodness may be wanting in creatures. In two respects goodness is clearly inseparable from the creature: first, goodness pertains to the creature’s very essence; secondly, the creature’s goodness is something determinate.

As regards the first point of view, the goodness which is the form of simple substances is inseparable from them, since they are essentially forms. As regards the second point of view, such substances cannot lose the good which is existence. For form is not like matter, which is indifferent to existence and nonexistence. On the contrary, form goes with existence, even though it is not existence itself.

Therefore simple substances cannot lose the good of nature wherein they subsist, but are immutably established in such good. But composite substances, which are neither their own forms nor their own existence, possess the good of nature in such a way that they can lose it. This is not true, however, of those things whose matter is not in potency to various forms or to being and non-being; such is the case with heavenly bodies.

CHAPTER 112

DEFECTIBILITY OF THE CREATURE’S GOODNESS IN ACTIVITY

The goodness of a creature may also be regarded otherwise than as the creature’s subsistence in its nature; for the perfection of its goodness is realized in its destiny to its end. And since creatures are to attain their end by their activity, we have still to inquire how creatures may be lacking in goodness from the point of view of their actions, whereby they are destined to attain their end.

In this connection we should first note that a judgment concerning natural operations is equivalent to a judgment concerning the nature which is the principle of these operations. Therefore in beings whose nature cannot suffer defect, no defect in natural operations can develop; but in beings whose nature can admit of defect, a defect in activity can occur.

Hence in incorruptible substances, whether incorporeal or corporeal, no defect in natural activity can take place. Thus angels forever retain their natural power of exercising their proper activity. Likewise the movements of heavenly bodies are found never to leave their appointed orbits. But in lower bodies many defects in natural activity result from the corruptions and defects incidental to their natures. Thus from a defect in some natural principle come the sterility of plants, monstrosities in the generation of animals, and other such disorders.

CHAPTER 113

THE TWOFOLD PRINCIPLE OF ACTIVITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFECT THEREIN

There are certain actions whose principle is not nature but the will. The object of the will is the good, which consists primarily in the end, secondarily in whatever leads to the end. Voluntary action is related to the good as natural action is related to the form by which a thing acts. Consequently, just as a defect in natural activity cannot ensue in things that do not admit of defect in their forms, but can occur only in corruptible things whose forms are defectible, so voluntary actions can be deficient only in beings whose will can deflect from their proper end. Hence, if the will cannot deflect from its proper end, deficiency in voluntary action is clearly impossible.

The will cannot be deficient with regard to the good which is the very nature of the being that wills; for every being seeks in its own way its perfection, which is each one’s good. But as regards an external good the will can be deficient, by resting content with a good connatural to it. Therefore if the nature of the being that wills is the ultimate end of its will, no deficiency in voluntary action can arise.

Such is the case with God alone. For His goodness, which is the ultimate end of things, is His very nature. But the nature of other beings endowed with will is not the ultimate end of their will. Hence a defect in voluntary action can occur in them, if their will remains fixed on their own good and does not push on to the supreme good, which is the last end. Therefore in all created intellectual substances a deficiency in voluntary action is possible.

CHAPTER 114

THE MEANING OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THINGS

A question worthy of consideration arises at this point. As the term “good” signifies perfect being, so the term “evil” signifies nothing else than privation of perfect being. In its proper acceptation, privation is predicated of that which is fitted by its nature to be possessed, and to be possessed at a certain time and in a certain manner. Evidently, therefore, a thing is called evil if it lacks a perfection it ought to have. Thus if a man lacks the sense of sight, this is an evil for him. But the same lack is not an evil for a stone, for the stone is not equipped by nature to have the faculty of sight.

CHAPTER 115

IMPOSSIBILITY OF AN EVIL NATURE

Evil cannot be a nature. Every nature is either act or potency or a. composite of the two. Whatever is act, is a perfection and is good in its very concept. And what is in potency has a natural appetite for the reception of act; but what all beings desire is good. Therefore, too, what is composed of act and potency participates in goodness to the extent that it participates in act. And potency possesses goodness inasmuch as it is ordained to act; an indication of this is the fact that potency is esteemed in proportion to its capacity for act and perfection. Consequently no nature is of itself an evil.

Likewise, every being achieves its fulfillment according as it is realized in act, for act is the perfection of a thing. However, neither of a pair of opposites achieves fulfillment by being mixed with the other, but is rather destroyed or weakened thereby. Therefore evil does not realize its full capacity by sharing in good. But every nature realizes its full capacity by having existence in act; and so, since to be good is the object of every being's natural tendency, a nature achieves fulfillment by participating in good. Accordingly no nature is an evil.

Moreover, any nature whatever desires the preservation of its being, and shuns destruction to the full extent of its power. Consequently, since good is that which all desire, and evil, on the contrary, is that which all shun, we must conclude that for any nature existence is in itself good, and non-existence is evil. To be evil, however, is not good; in fact, not to be evil is included in the notion of good. Therefore no nature is an evil.

CHAPTER 116

GOOD AND EVIL AS SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES AND AS CONTRARIES

We have next to inquire how good and evil may be regarded as contraries and genera of contraries and differences constituting species of a sort, namely, moral habits. Each member of a pair of contraries is some kind of nature. For non-being can be neither genus nor specific difference, since genus is predicated of a thing according to what it is (in eo quod quid) and difference according to what sort of thing it is (in eo quod quale quid).

We must note that, as physical entities receive their species from their form, so moral entities receive their species from the end which is the object of the will and on which all morality depends, In physical entities, moreover, the presence of one form entails the privation of another, as, for instance, the form of fire entails the privation of the form of air. In moral entities, similarly, one end involves the privation of another end. Since the privation of a due perfection is an evil in physical entities, the reception of a form which implies the privation of the form that ought to be possessed, is an evil; not, indeed, because of the form itself, but because of the privation its presence involves. In this sense, to be on fire is an evil for a log of wood. In the field of morality, likewise, the pursuit of an end that entails the privation of the right end is an evil, not on account of the end itself, but because of the privation necessarily implied. It is in this way that two moral actions, directed to contrary ends, differ as good and evil. Consequently the corresponding contrary habits differ in good and evil as by specific differences, and as being contrary to each other. This is so, not on account of the privation from which evil receives its designation, but on account of the end which involves the privation.

This is the sense in which some philosophers understand Aristotle’s assertion, that good and evil are genera of contraries [Categories, XI, 14 a 25], namely, of moral contraries. But if we examine the matter closely, we shall find that in the sphere of morals, good and evil are differences rather than species. Hence it seems better to say that good and evil are called genera according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who reduced everything to good and evil as to supreme genera. This position does, ind eed, contain some truth, in the sense that in all contraries one member is perfect, whereas the other is deficient. This is clear in the case of white and black, sweet and bitter, and so on. But invariably, what is perfect, pertains to good, and what is deficient, pertains to evil.

CHAPTER 17

IMPOSSIBILITY OF ESSENTIAL OR SUPREME EVIL

Knowing that evil is the privation of a due perfection, we can easily understand how evil corrupts good; this it does to the extent that it is the privation of good. Thus blindness is said to corrupt sight because it is the privation of sight. However, evil does not completely corrupt good, because, as we remarked above, not only form, but also potency to form, is good; and potency is the subject of privation as well as of form. Therefore the subject of evil must be good, not in the sense that it is opposed to evil, but in the sense that it is a potency for the reception of evil. This brings out the fact that not every good can be the subject of evil, but only such a good as is in potency with respect to some perfection of which it can be deprived. Hence in beings which are exclusively act, or in which act cannot be separated from potency, there can, to this extent, be no evil.

As a result, nothing can be essentially evil, since evil must always have as its foundation some subject, distinct from it, that is good. And so there cannot be a being that is supremely evil, in the way that there is a being that is supremely good because it is essentially good.

Further, we see clearly that evil cannot be the object of desire, and that it cannot act except in virtue of the good connected with it. For only perfection and end are desirable; and the principle of action is form. However, since a particular perfection or form involves the privation of some other perfection or form, it can happen incidentally that privation or evil may be desired and may be the principle of some action; not precisely because of the evil, but because of the good connected with it. An example of what I here mean by “incidentally” is the musician who constructs a house, not in his capacity of musician, but in the capacity of being also a builder.

From this we may also infer that evil cannot be a first principle, for a principle per accidens is subsequent to a principle that is such per se.

CHAPTER 118

FOUNDATION OF EVIL IN GOOD AS ITS SUBSTRATUM

Some may feel impelled to lodge a difficulty against this presentation: good cannot be the substratum of evil, for one of a pair of opposites cannot be the substratum of the other, nor do extremes ever exist together in other kinds of opposition. But let such quibblers reflect that other kinds of opposition belong to some definite genus, whereas good and evil are common to all genera. Every being, as such, is good; and every privation, as such, is evil. The substratum of a privation must be a being, hence good. But the subject of a privation need not be white or sweet or endowed with sight, because none of these predicates belongs to being as such. And so black is not in white, nor blindness in the person who sees; but evil is in good, just as blindness is in the sense that is the subject of sight. The reason why the subject of sight, in the case of a blind man, is not called “seeing,” is that “seeing” is not a predicate common to every being.

CHAPTER 119

TWO KINDS OF EVIL

Since evil is privation and defect, and since defect, as is clear from what we said above, can occur in a thing both as regarded in its nature and as regarded in its relation to an end by its action, we may speak of evil in both senses: that is, by reason of a defect in the thing itself (thus blindness is a certain evil in an animal), and by reason of a defect in a creature’s action (thus lameness connotes action with a defect). Evil in an action that is directed to an end in such a way that it is not rightly related to the end, is called fault (peccatum) both in voluntary agents and in natural agents. A physician is faulty (peccat) in his action, when he does not proceed in such a way as to procure health. Nature, too, is faulty in its activity when it fails to advance a generated being , to its proper disposition and form; this is why monsters occur in nature.

CHAPTER 120

THREE KINDS OF ACTION, AND THE EVIL OF SIN

We should observe that sometimes action is in the power of the agent. Such are all voluntary actions. By voluntary action I mean an action that has its principle in an agent who is conscious of the various factors constituting his action. Sometimes actions are not voluntary. In this class are violent actions, whose principle is outside the agent; also natural actions, and actions performed in ignorance. These do not proceed from a conscious principle. If a defect occurs in non-voluntary actions that are directed to an end, it is called simply a fault (peccatum). But if such a defect occurs in voluntary actions, it is called not only fault, but sin (culpa). For in this case the voluntary agent, being master of his own action, deservedly draws blame and punishment on himself. If actions are mixed, that is, are partly voluntary and partly involuntary, the sin is diminished in proportion to the admixture of the involuntary element.

Since natural action follows the nature of a being, a fault in natural activity clearly cannot occur in incorruptible things, for their nature is incapable of change. But the will of an intellectual creature can suffer defect in voluntary action, as was shown above. Consequently freedom from evil in nature is common to all incorruptible things. But freedom, in virtue of natural necessity, from the evil of sin, of which rational nature alone is capable, is found to be an exclusive property of God.

CHAPTER 121

THE EVIL OF PUNISHMENT

Just as defect in voluntary action constitutes fault and sin, so the withdrawing of some good, in consequence of sin, against the will of him on whom such privation is inflicted, has the character of punishment. Punishment is inflicted as a medicine that is corrective of the sin, and also to restore right order violated by the sin. Punishment functions as a medicine inasmuch as fear of pqnishment deters a man from sinning; that is, a person refrains from performing an inordinate action, which would be pleasing to his will, lest he have to suffer what is opposed to his will. Punishment also restores right order; by sinning, a man exceeds the limits of the natural order, indulging his will more than is right. Hence a return to the order of justice is effected by punishment, whereby some good is withdrawn from the sinner’s will. As is quite clear, a suitable punishment is not assigned for the sin unless the punishment is more galling to the will than the sin was attractive to it.

CHAPTER 122

PUNISHMENT VARIOUSLY OPPOSED TO THE WILL

Not all punishment is opposed to the will in the same way. Some punishments are opposed to what man actually wills; and this kind of punishment is felt most keenly. Some punishments are opposed not to the actual but to the habitual tendency of the will, as when a person is deprived of something, for instance, his son or his property, without his knowledge. In this case, nothing actually thwarts his will; but the withdrawal of the good would be against his will if he were aware of what was happening. At times a punishment is opposed to the will according to the very nature of that faculty. For the will is naturally turned to what is good. Thus if a person is lacking in a virtue, this need not always be opposed to his actual will, for he may, perhaps, despise this virtue; nor need it be against his habitual will, for he may, perhaps, have a habitual disposition of will toward what is contrary to the virtue. Nevertheless such a privation is opposed to the natural rectitude of the will, whereby man naturally desires virtue.

Consequently, as is evident, the degrees of punishment may be measured by two standards: first, by the quantity of the good of which a man is deprived for his punishment; secondly, by the greater or less opposition it arouses in the will. For the withdrawal of a greater good is more opposed to the will than the withdrawal of a lesser good.

CHAPTER 123

THE UNIVERSALITY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE

We can see from the foregoing that all things are governed by divine providence. Whatever is set in motion toward the end intended by any agent, is directed by that agent to the end. Thus all the soldiers in an army are subordinated to the end intended by the commander, which is victory, and are directed by him to that end. We showed above that all things tend by their actions to the divine goodness as their end. Hence all things are directed to this end by God Himself, to whom this end pertains. To be thus directed is the same as to be ruled and governed by providence. Therefore all things are ruled by divine providence.

Moreover, things that are subject to failure and that do not always remain constant, are found to be under the direction of beings that do remain constant. Thus all the movements of lower bodies, being defectible, are regulated in accordance with the undeviating movement of a heavenly body. But all creatures are changeable and defectible. As regards intellectual creatures, their very nature is such that deficiency in voluntary action can develop in them. Other creatures have some part in movement, either by way of generation and corruption, or at least according to place. God Himself is the only being in whom no defect can arise. Consequently all creatures are kept in order by Him.

Furthermore, whatever has existence by way of participation, is traced back, as to its cause, to that which exists in virtue of its own essence; for example, what is on fire has, in some way or other, fire as the cause that ignited it. Since God alone is good by His very essence, and all other things receive their complement of goodness by some sort of participation, all beings must be brought to their complement of goodness by God. This, again, involves rule and government; for things are governed or ruled by being established in the order of good. And so all things are governed and ruled by God.

CHAPTER 124

GOD’S PLAN OF RULING LOWER CREATURES BY HIGHER CREATURES

We can see from this that lower creatures are ruled by God through the agency of higher creatures. Some creatures are said to be higher, because they are more perfect in goodness. Creatures receive their order of good from God, inasmuch as they are under His rule. Consequently higher creatures have a greater share in the order of divine government than lower creatures. But what has a greater share in any perfection is related to what has a smaller share in that perfection, as act is related to potency, and agent to patient. Therefore higher creatures are related to lower creatures in the order of divine providence as agent is related to patient. Accordingly lower creatures are governed by higher creatures.

Divine goodness has this characteristic, that it communicates a likeness of itself to creatures. This is the sense in which God is said to have made all things for the sake of His goodness, as is clear from a previous chapter. The perfection of divine goodness entails the double truth that God is good in Himself, and that He leads other beings to goodness. He communicates goodness to creatures under both aspects: they are good in themselves, and some lead others to goodness. In this way God brings some creatures to goodness through ‘cither creatures. The latter must be higher creatures; for what receives a likeness of both form and action from some agent, is more perfect than what receives a likeness of form but not of action. Thus the moon, which not only glows with light but also illuminates other bodies, receives liaht from the sun more perfectly than do opaque bodies, which are merely illuminated but do not illuminate. Accordingly God governs lower creatures by higher creatures.

Likewise, the good of many is better than the good of an individual, and so is more representative of the divine good. ness, which is the good of the whole universe. If a higher creature, which receives more abundant goodness from God, did not cooperate in procuring the good of lower creatures, that abundance of goodness would be confined to one individual. But it becomes common to many by the fact that the more richly endowed creature cooperates in procuring the good of many. Hence the divine goodness requires that God should rule lower creatures by higher creatures.

CHAPTER 125

THE GOVERNMENT OF LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES BY HIGHER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES

Since intellectual creatures excel other creatures, as is clear from what was said above, we can readily understand that God governs all other creatures through the agency of intellectual creatures. Likewise, since some intellectual creatures excel others, God rules the lower through the higher. Accordingly men, who occupy the lowest place in the order of nature amono, intellectual substances, are governed by the higher spirits. These are called angels, that is, messengers, because they announce divine messages to men. Among angels, too, the lower are directed by the higher. For they are distributed among various hierarchies, or sacred principalities; and each hierarchy is divided into different orders.

CHAPTER 126

RANK AND ORDER OF THE ANGELS

Since every action of an intellectual substance, as such, proceeds from the intellect, diversity of operation, of prelature, and of order among intellectual substances follows diversity in their manner of understanding. In proportion to its eminence or dignity, the intellect can contemplate the natures of effects in their higher and more universal cause. Also, as we remarked above, the intelligible species of a higher intellect are more universal.

The first way of understanding suitable to intellectual substances is the knowledge imparted to them of effects, and hence of their own works, in the first cause itself, namely in God; for it is through them that God carries out lower effects. This knowledge is proper to the first hierarchy, which is divided into orders corresponding to the three characteristics discerned in any operative art. The first of these is the end from which the exemplars of the works are derived; the second is the exemplars of the works as existing in the mind of the artificer; the third is the application of the work to the effects. Consequently the first order has the privilege of being instructed about the effects of things in the supreme Good itself, regarded as the last end. For this reason angels of the first order are called seraphim, as though they were aflame or on fire, with reference to the fire of love; for the object of love is the good. The second order has the function of contemplating God’s effects in their intelligible exemplars as they exist in God. Hence angels of this order are called cherubim, from the fullness of their knowledge. The third order has the office of meditating, in God Himself, how creatures share in intelligible exemplars as adapted to effects. And so angels of this order are called thrones, from the fact that God resides in them.

The second way of understanding is to contemplate the exemplars of effects as they exist in universal causes. This is suitable to the second hierarchy, which is likewise divided into three orders, corresponding to the three characteristics that pertain to universal causes, especially such as operate under the guidance of the intellect. The first of these characteristics is to plan beforehand what is to be done. Thus among artificers the highest arts are directive, and are called architectonic. From this fact angels belonging to the first order of this hierarchy are known as dominations; for direction and planning are functions of a master or dominus. The second characteristic observed in universal causes is the initiating of action for an undertaking, with authority to oversee its execution. For this reason angels belonging to the second order of this hierarchy are called principalities, according to Gregory [In Evangelia, 11, hom. xxxiv, 7], or virtues, according to Dionysius [Coel. hierarch., VIII, 1], understanding virtues in the sense that to take the initiative in action is virtuosity in a high degree. The third characteristic discerned in universal causes is the removal of obstacles to execution. And so the third order of this hierarchy is that of the powers, whose office is to constrain whatever could impede the execution of the divine command; hence, also, the powers are said to hold demons in check.

The third way of understanding is to contemplate the exemplars of effects in the effects themselves. And this is proper to the third hierarchy, which is placed in immediate charge of us, who obtain knowledge of effects from effects themselves. This hierarchy, too, has three orders. The lowest of these is that of the angels, who are so called because they announce to men details that pertain to their government; hence they are also called guardians of men. Above this order is that of the archangels. The office of this order is to announce to men matters that transcend reason, such as the mysteries of faith. The highest order of this hierarchy is said by Gregory to be that of the virtues, for the reason that they perform deeds beyond the power of nature, in proof of the messages, transcending reason, they announce to us. Consequently the working of miracles is said to pertain to the virtues. According to Dionysius, however, the highest order of this hierarchy is that of the principalities; in his reckoning we are to understand that the princes are they who have charge over individual peoples, while the angels have charge over individual men, and the archangels announce to individual men those affairs that pertain to the salvation of all.

Since a lower power acts in virtue of a higher power, a lower order performs actions proper to a higher order by acting in virtue of that higher power. But the higher orders possess in a more eminent way whatever is proper to the lower orders. Thus all things are in a certain sense common to the various orders. However, they receive their proper names from properties that are characteristic of each order. Nevertheless the lowest order of all retains the common name of angels for itself, for the reason that it acts, as it were, in virtue of all the rest. Furthermore, since the higher naturally influences the lower, and since intellectual action consists in instructing or teaching, the higher angels, in instructing the lower angels, are said to purify, illuminate, and perfect them.

Higher angels purify the lower angels by removing what is wanting to their knowledge. They illuminate them by fortifying the intellects of the lower angels with their own light, thus enabling them to comprehend higher objects. And higher angels perfect lower angels by guiding them to the perfection of higher knowledge. These three operations pertain to the acquisition of knowledge, as Dionysius remarks.

This inequality does not prevent all the angels, even the lowest, from seeing the divine essence. Even though each of the blessed spirits sees God in His essence, some may behold Him more perfectly than others. This should be clear from a previous chapter. However, the more perfectly a cause is known, the more numerous are the effects discerned in it. The divine effects which the higher angels perceive in God more clearly than the other angels, constitute the subject matter in which they instruct the lower angels. But higher angels do not instruct lower angels concerning the divine essence, which they all perceive directly.

CHAPTER 127

CONTROL OF LOWER BODIES, BUT NOT OF THE HUMAN INTELLECT, BY HIGHER BODIES

Among intellectual substances, therefore, some are divinely governed by others, that is, the lower by the higher. Similarly lower bodies are controlled, in God’s plan, by higher bodies. Hence every movement of lower bodies is caused by the movements of heavenly bodies. Lower bodies acquire forms and species from the influence thus exercised by heavenly bodies, just as the intelligible exemplars of things descend to lower spirits through higher spirits.

However, since an intellectual substance is superior to all bodies in the hierarchy of beings, the order of providence has suitably disposed matters in such a way that no intellectual substance is ruled by God through a corporeal substance. Accordingly, since the human soul is an intellectual substance, it cannot, so far as it is endowed with intelligence and will, be subject to the movements of heavenly bodies. Heavenly bodies cannot directly act upon or influence either the human intellect or the human will.

Again, no body acts except by movement. Hence whatever is acted upon by a body, is moved by it. But the human soul, regarded as intellectual, according as it is the principle of the will, cannot be moved by bodily movement, since the intellect is not the act of any bodily organ. Therefore the human soul cannot be subject, in its intellect or will, to any influence emanating from heavenly bodies.

Furthermore, impressions left in lower bodies from the impact of heavenly bodies are natural. Therefore, if the operations of the intellect and will resulted from the impression made by heavenly bodies, they would proceed from natural instinct. And so man would not differ in his activity from other animals, which are moved to their actions by natural instinct. And thus free will and deliberation and choice and all perfections of this sort, which distinguish man from other animals, would perish.

CHAPTER 128

INDIRECT INFLUENCE OF HEAVENLY BODIES ON THE HUMAN INTELLECT THROUGH THE SENSES ‘

Nevertheless we should not lose sight of the fact that the human intellect is indebted to the sense powers for the origin of its knowledge. This is why intellectual knowledge is thrown into confusion when the soul’s faculties of phantasm, imagination, or memory are impaired. On the other hand, when these powers are in good order, intellectual apprehension becomes more efficient. Likewise, a modification in the sensitive appetite tends to bring about a change in the will, which is a rational appetite, as we know from the fact that the object of the will is the good as’apprehended. According as we are variously disposed in the matter of concupiscence, anger, fear and other passions, a thing will at different times appear to us as good or evil.

On the other hand, all the powers of the sensitive part of our soul, whether they are apprehensive or appetitive, are the acts of certain bodily organs. If these undergo modification, the faculties themselves must, indirectly, undergo some change. Therefore, since change in lower bodies is influenced by the movement of the heavens, the operations of the sensitive faculties are also subject to such movement, although only per accidens. And thus heavenly movement has some indirect influence on the activity of the human intellect and will, so far as the will may be inclined this way or that by the passions.

Nevertheless, since the will is not subject to the passions in such a way as necessarily to follow their enticement, but on the contrary has it in its power to repress passion by the judgment of reason, the human will is not subject to impressions emanating from heavenly bodies. It retains free judgment either to follow or to resist their attractions, as may seem to it expedient. Only the wise act thus; the masses follow the lead of bodily passions and urgings. For they are wanting in wisdom and virtue.

CHAPTER 129

MOVEMENT OF MAN’S WILL BY GOD

Everything that is changeable and multiform is traced back, as to its cause, to some first principle that is immobile and is one. Since man’s intellect and will are clearly changeable and multiform, they must be reduced to some higher cause that is immobile and uniform. The heavenly bodies are not the cause to which they are reduced, as we have shown; therefore they must be reduced to yet higher causes.

In this matter the case of the intellect differs from that of the will. The act of the intellect is brought about by the presence of the things understood in the intellect; but the act of the will is accounted for by the inclination of the will toward the things willed. Thus the intellect is adapted by its nature to be perfected by something external that is related to it as act to potency. Hence man can be aided to elicit an act of the intellect by anything external that is more perfect in intelligible being: not only by God but also by an angel or even by a man who is better informed; but differently in each instance. A man is helped to understand by a man when one of them pro. poses to the other an intelligible object not previously contemplated; but not in such a way that the light of the intellect of one man is perfected by the other, because each of these natural lights is in one and the same species.

But the natural light of an angel is by nature of a higher excellence than the natural light of man, and so an angel can aid a man to understand, not only on the part, of the object proposed to him by the angel, but also on the part of the light that is strengthened by the angel’s light. However, man’s natural light does not come from an angel, for the nature of the rational soul, which receives existence through creation, is produced by God alone.

God helps man to understand, not only on the part of the object proposed by God to man, or by an increase of light, but also by the very fact that man’s natural light, which is what makes him intellectual, is from God. Moreover, God Himself is the first truth from which all other truth has its certitude, just as secondary propositions in demonstrative sciences derive their certitude from primary propositions. For this reason nothing can become certain for the intellect except through God’s influence, just as conclusions do not achieve certitude in science except in virtue of primary principles.

With regard to the will, its act is a certain impulse flowing from the interior to the exterior, and has much in common with natural tenderfcies. Accordingly, as natural tendencies are placed in natural things exclusively by the cause of their nature, the act of the will is from God alone, for He alone is ‘the cause of a rational nature endowed with will. Therefore, if God moves man’s will, this is evidently not opposed to freedom of choice, just as God’s activity in natural things is not contrary to their nature. Both the natural inclination and the voluntary inclination are from God; each of them issues in action according to the condition of the thing to which it pertains. God moves things in a way that is consonant with their nature.

This exposition brings out the fact that heavenly bodies can exert an influence on the human body and its bodily powers, as they can in the case of other bodies. But they cannot do the same with regard to the intellect, although an intellectual creature can. And God alone can touch the will.

CHAPTER 130

GOVERNMENT OF THE WORLD BY GOD

Second causes do not act except through the power of the first cause; thus instruments operate under the direction of art. Consequently all the agents through which God carries out the order of His government, can act only through the power of God Himself. The action of any of them is caused by God, just as the movement of a mobile object is caused by the motion of the mover. In such event the mover and the movement must be simultaneous. Hence God must be inwardly present to any agent as acting therein whenever He moves the agent to act.

Another point: not only the action of secondary agents but their very existence is caused by God, as was shown above. However, we are not to suppose that the existence of things is caused by God in the same way as the existence of a house is caused by its builder. When the builder departs, the house still remains standing. For the builder causes the existence of the house only in the sense that he works for the existence of the house as a house. Such activity is, indeed, the constructing of the house, and thus the builder is directly the cause of the becoming of the house, a process that ceases when he desists from his labors. But God is directly, by Himself, the cause of very existence, and communicates existence to all things just as the sun communicates light to the air and to whatever else is illuminated by the sun. The continuous shining of the sun is required for the preservation of light in the air; similarly God must unceasingly confer existence on things if they are to persevere in existence. Thus all things are related to God as an object made is to its maker, and this not only so far as they begin to exist, but so far as they continue to exist. But a maker and the object made must be simultaneous, just as in the case of a mover and the object moved. Hence God is necessarily present to all things to the extent that they have existence. But existence is that which is the most intimately present in all things. Therefore God must be in all things.

Moreover, whoever, through the agency of intermediate causes, carries out the order he has foreseen, must know and arrange the effects of these intermediate causes. Otherwise the effects would occur outside the order he has foreseen. The prearranged plan of a governor is more perfect in proportion as his knowledge and design descend to details. For if any detail escapes the advertence of the governor, the disposition of that detail will elude his foresight. We showed above that all things are necessarily subject to divine providence; 130 and divine providence must evidently be most perfect, because whatever is predicated of God must befit Him in the highest possible degree. Consequently the ordinations of His providence must extend to the most minute effects.

CHAPTER 131

IMMEDIATE DISPOSING OF ALL THINGS BY GOD

In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that, although God’s government of things is effected through the agency of secondary causes, as far as the carrying out of His providence is concerned, yet the plan itself or ordination of divine providence extends directly to all details. In arranging all matters from first to last, God does not turn over to others the disposal of the final particulars. Men act thus because of the limitations of their knowledge, which cannot at any one time take in many items. This is why higher rulers personally take charge of great concerns, and entrust the management of unimportant affairs to others. But God can take cognizance of a multitude of things simultaneously, as was indicated above.131 Hence the fact that He attends to the slightest details does not keep Him from organizing the weightiest matters.

CHAPTER 132

OBJECTIONS TO GOD’S PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE

Some may think that details are not regulated by God. For no one disposes anything in his planning unless he has knowledge thereof. But knowledge of particulars may well seem to be lacking in God, for the reason that particulars are known, not by the intellect, but by the senses. God, who is wholly incorporeal, can have no sense knowledge, but only intellectual knowledge. Consequently details may seem to lie outside the scope of divine providence.

Moreover, details are infinite, and knowledge of infinity is impossible, since the infinite as such is unknown. Therefore details seemingly escape the divine knowledge and providence.

Again, many particulars are contingent. But certain knowledge of such objects is out of the question. Accordingly, since God’s knowledge must be absolutely certain, it seems that details are not known or regulated by God.

Besides, particulars do not all exist simultaneously, for some things decay only to have others take their place. But there can be no knowledge of non-existent things. Hence, if God has knowledge of details, there must be some things which He begins and ceases to know, and this involves the further consequence that He is mutable. Apparently, therefore, He does not know and dispose particulars.

CHAPTER 133

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS

These objections are easily answered if we but penetrate to the truth of the matter. God knows Himself perfectly, and therefore He must have knowledge of all that exists in Himself in any manner whatever. Since every essence and power of created being is from Him, and since whatever comes from anyone exists virtually in him, we necessarily conclude that in knowing Himself He knows the essence of created being and whatever is virtually contained in the latter. And thus He knows all particulars that are virtually in Himself and in all His other causes.

The knowledge possessed by the divine intellect is not like our knowledge, as the first objection urged. Our intellect derives knowledge of things through the species it abstracts, and these are the likenesses of forms and not of matter or of material dispositions, which are principles of individuation. Therefore our intellect cannot know particulars, but only universals. But the divine intellect knows things through its own essence, in which, as in the first principle of being, is virtually contained not only form, but matter. And so God knows not only universals but also particulars.

Likewise God is able to know an infinite number of objects, even thouoh our intellect cannot know the infinite. Our intellect cannot actually contemplate many things at the same time. Hence, if it knew an infinite number of objects, it would have to review them one after another as it contemplated them, which is contrary to the very notion of infinity. However, our intellect can know infinity virtually and potentially, for example, it can know all the species of numbers or of proportions, seeing that it possesses an adequate principle for knowing all things. But God can know many things simultaneously, as was indicated above; and that whereby He knows all things, namely, His essence, is an adequate principle for knowing, not only all that is, but all that can be. Therefore, as our intellect potentially and virtually knows those infinite objects for which it has a principle of cognition, so God actually contemplates all infinities.

Furthermore, although corporeal and temporal particulars do not exist simultaneously, God surely has simultaneous knowledge of them. For He knows them according to His manner of.being, which is eternal and without succession. Consequently, as He knows material things in an immaterial way, and many things in unity, so in a single glance He beholds objects that do not exist at the same time. And so His knowledge of particulars does not involve the consequence that anything is added to, or subtracted from, His cognition.

This also makes it clear that He has certain knowledge of contingent things. Even before they come into being, He sees them as they actually exist, and not merely as they will be in the future and as virtually present in their causes, in the way we are able to know some future things. Contingent things, regarded as virtually present in their causes with a claim to future existence, are not sufficiently determinate to admit of certain knowledge about them; but, regarded as actually possessing existence, they are determinate, and hence certain knowledge of them is possible. Thus we can know with the certitude of ocular vision that Socrates is sitting while he is seated. With like certitude God knows, in His eternity, all that takes place throughout the whole course of time. For His eternity is in present contact with the whole course of time, and even passes beyond time. We may fancy that God knows the flight of time in His eternity, in the way that a person standing on top of a watchtower embraces in a single glance a whole caravan of passing travelers.

CHAPTER 134

GOD’S DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF CONTINGENT FUTURES

To know contingent futures in this way, as being actually in. existence, that is, to have certitude about them, is evidently restricted to God alone, of whom eternity is truly and properly predicated. For this reason, certain prediction of future events is accounted a proof of divinity. This accords with Isaiah 41:23: “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.” Knowledge of future events in their causes is, indeed, possible for others. Such knowledge, however, is not certain, but is rather conjectural, except as regards effects that necessarily flow from their causes. In this way a physician foretells future illnesses, and a sailor predicts storms.

CHAPTER 135

GOD’S EXISTENCE IN ALL THINGS BY POWER, ESSENCE, AND PRESENCE

Thus there is no reason why God should not have knowledge of individual effects, or why He should not directly regulate them by Himself, even though He may carry them out through intermediate causes. However, in the very execution He is, in some fashion, in immediate touch with all effects, to the extent that all intermediate causes operate in virtue of the firs~cause, so that in a certain way He Himself appears to act in them all. Thus all the achievements of secondary causes can be attributed to Him, as the effect produced by a tool is ascribed to the artisan; when we say that a smith makes a knife, we are more correct than when we say that a hammer did it. God is also in immediate contact with all effects so far as He is per se the cause of their existence, and so far as everything is kept in being by Him.

Corresponding to these three immediate modes of influence, God is said to be in everything by essence, power, and presence. He is in everything by His essence inasmuch as the existence of each thing is a certain participation in the divine essence; the divine essence is present to every existing thing, to the extent that it has existence, as a cause is present to its proper effect. God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things operate in virtue of Him. And God is in all things by His presence, inasmuch as He directly regulates and disposes all things.

CHAPTER 136

THE WORKING OF MIRACLES PROPER TO GOD ALONE

The entire order of secondary causes, as well as their power, comes from God. He Himself, however, produces His effects not out of necessity, but by free will, as was shown above. Clearly, then, He can act outside the order of secondary causes, as when He cures those who are incurable from the standpoint of natural causality, or when He does something else of this kind that is not within the sphere of natural causes but is nevertheless consonant with the order of divine providence. What God occasionally does in this way, independently of the order of natural causes, is designed by Him for a definite end. When effects are thus wrought by divine power outside the order of secondary causes, they are called miracles; for when we perceive an effect without knowing its cause, our wonder is excited (mirum est). God is a cause that is completely hidden from us. Therefore, when some effect is wrought by Him outside the order of secondary causes known to us, it is called simply a miracle. But if an effect is produced by some other cause that is unknown to this or that person, it is not a miracle simply as such, but only with regard to him who is ignorant of the cause. Thus an event may appear marvelous to one person without seeming marvelous to another who is acquainted with its cause.

To act in this way, outside the order of secondary causes, is possible for God alone, who is the founder of this order and is not confined to it. All other beings are subject to this order; and so God alone can work miracles, as the Psalmist says: “Who alone doth wonderful things” (Ps. 71:18). Therefore, when miracles are apparently worked by some creature, either they are not true miracles, but are effects produced by the power of natural agents, which may be concealed from us, as happens in the case of miracles wrought by demons with their magical arts; or else, if they are true miracles, someone obtains the power to work them by praying to God. Since such miracles are wrought exclusively by divine power, they are rightly appealed to in proof of the faith, which has God alone as its author. For a pronouncement issued by a man with a claim to divine authority, is never more fittingly attested than by works which God alone can perform.

Although such miracles occur outsidelthe order of secondary causes, we should not simply say that they are against nature. The natural order makes provision for the subjection of the lower to the activity of the higher. Thus effects brought about in lower bodies in consequence of the influence emanating frorn4the heavenly bodies, are not said to be simply against nature, although they may at times be against the particular nature of this or that thing, as we observe in the movement of water in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is produced by the action of the moon. In the same way, effects produced in creatures by the action of God may seem to be against some particular order of secondary causes; yet they are in accord with the universal order of nature. Therefore miracles are not contrary to nature.

CHAPTER 137

FORTUITOUS EVENTS

Although all events, even the most trifling, are disposed according to God's plan, as we have shown,134 there is nothing to prevent some things from happening by chance or accident. An occurrence may be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a lower cause when an effect not intended is brought about, and yet not be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a higher cause, inasmuch as the effect does not take place apart from the latter's intention. For example, a master may send two servants to the same place, but in such a way that neither is aware of the mission of the other. Their meeting is accidental so far as each of them is concerned, but not as regards the master.

So, when certain events occur apart from the intention of secondary causes, they are accidental or fortuitous with respect to those causes; and they may be said without further ado to be fortuitous, because effects are described simply in terms of their proximate causes. But if God's point of view is considered, they are not fortuitous, but foreseen.

CHAPTER 138

FATE AND ITS NATURE

This suggests what we ought to think of fate. Many effects are found to occur haphazard if they are regarded from the standpoint of secondary causes. Some thinkers are unwilling to refer such effects to a higher cause that ordains them. In consequence, they must utterly reject fate. On the other hand, others have desired to trace back these seemingly accidental and fortuitous effects to a higher cause that plans them. But, failing to rise above the order of corporeal entities, they attributed such devising to the highest bodies, namely, the heavenly bodies. And so they contended that fate is a force deriving from the position of the stars, and that this accounts for happenings of this kind. But we showed above that the intellect and will, which are the true principles of human acts, are not in any proper sense subject to heavenly bodies. Hence we cannot maintain that events which seemingly occur at random and by chance in human affairs, are to be referred to heavenly bodies as to the cause that charts them.

There seems to be no place for fate except in human affairs, in which hazard has a part to play. It is only about such events that men are accustomed to inquire in their craving to know the future, and it is also about these that an answer is usually given by fortunetellers. Hence fate (fatum) is a word formed from the Latin verb fari, to foretell. To acknowledge fate thus understood is opposed to faith. Since, however, not only natural things but also human affairs are under divine providence, those events that seem to happen at random in men’s lives must be referred to the ordination of divine providence. Consequently those who hold that all things are subject to divine providence, must admit the existence of fate. Fate taken in this sense is related to divine providence as a real effect of tke latter. For it is an explanation of divine providence as applied to things, and is in agreement with the definition given by Boethius, who says that fate is a “disposition,” that is, an unchangeable ordination, “inherent in changeable things” [De consolatione philosophiae, IV, pros. 6].

Yet, since we ought not to have even words in common with infidels, so far as possible, lest an occasion for going astray be taken by those who do not understand, it is more prudent for the faithful to abstain from the word “fate,” for the reason that fate is more properly and generally used in the first sense. Therefore Augustine says that if anyone believes in the existence of fate in the second sense, he may keep to his opinion but should correct his language [De civitate Dei, V, 1].

CHAPTER 139

CONTINGENCY OF SOME EFFECTS

The order of divine providence as carried out in things is certain. This is why Boethius could say that fate is an unchangeable disposition inherent in changeable things [De consolatione philosophiae, IV, pros. 6]. But we may not conclude from this that all things happen of necessity. For effects are said to be necessary or contingent according to the condition of proximate causes. Evidently, if the first cause is necessary and the second cause is contingent, a contingent effect will follow. Thus in the case of lower bodies, the first cause of generation is the movement of a heavenly body; although this movement takes place necessarily, generation and corruption in those lower bodies occur contingently, because the lower causes are contingent and can fail. As we demonstrated above, God carries out the order of His providence through the intermediacy of lower causes. Therefore some of the effects of divine providence will be contingent, in keeping with the condition of the lower causes.

CHAPTER 140

DIVINE PROVIDENCE COMPATIBLE WITH CONTINGENCY

The contingency of effects or of causes cannot upset the certainty of divine providence. Three things seem to guarantee the certainty of providence: the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, the efficaciousness of the divine will, and the wisdom. of the divine management, which discovers adequate ways of procuring an effect. None of these factors is opposed to the contingency of things.

God’s infallible knowledge embraces even contingent futures, inasmuch as God beholds in His eternity future events as actually existing. But we dealt with this question above.

Moreover, God’s will, since it is the universal cause of things, decides not only that something will come to pass, but that it will come about in this or that manner. The efficaciousness of the divine will demands not only that what God wishes will happen, but that it will happen in the way He wishes. But He wills that some things should happen necessarily and that other things should happen contingently; both are required for the perfection of the universe. That events may occur in both ways, He applies necessary causes to some things and contingent causes to others. In this manner, with some thincs happenipg necessarily and other things happening contingently, the divine will is efficaciously carried out.

Furthermore, it is clear that the certainty of providence is safeguarded by the wisdom of the divine dispensation, without prejudice to the contingency of things. Even the providence exercised by man can enable him so to bolster up a cause which can fail to produce an effect that, in some cases, the effect will inevitably follow. We find that a physician acts thus in exercising his healing art, as also does the vine-dresser who employs the proper remedy against barrenness in his vines. Much more, then, does the wisdom of the divine economy bring it about that, although contingent causes left to themselves can fail to produce an effect, the effect will inevitably follow when certain supplementary measures are employed; nor does this do away with the contingency of the effect. Evidently, therefore, contingency in things does not exclude the certainty of divine providence.

CHAPTER 141

PROVIDENCE AND EVIL

The same process of reasoning enables us to perceive that, without prejudice to divine providence, evil can arise in the world because of defects in secondary causes. Thus in causes that follow one another in order, we see that evil finds its way into an effect owing to some fault in a secondary cause, although this fault is by no means the product of the first cause. For example, the evil of lameness is caused by a curvature in the leg, not by the motive power of the soul. Whatever movement there is in the progress of a lame man, is attributed to the motive power as to its cause; but the unevenness of the progress is caused by the curvature of the leg, not by the motive power. Similarly the evil that arises in things, so far as it has existence or species or a certain nature, is referred to God as to its cause; for there can be no evil unless it resides in something good,. as is clear from what we said above. But with regard to the defect that disfigures it, the evil is referred to a lower, defectible cause. Accordingly’ although God is the universal cause of all things, He is not the cause of evil as evil. But whatever good is bound up with the evil, has God as its cause.

CHAPTER 142

GOD’S GOODNESS AND THE PERMISSION OF EVIL

God’s permission of evil in the things governed by Him is not inconsistent with the divine goodness. For, in the first place, the function of providence is not to destroy but to save the nature of the beings governed. The perfection of the universe requires the existence of some beings that are not subject to evil, and of other beings that can suffer the defect of evil in keeping with their nature. If evil were completely eliminated from things, they would not be governed by divine providence in accord with their nature; and this would be a greater defect than the particular defects eradicted.

Secondly, the good of one cannot be realized without the suffering of evil by another. For instance, we find that the generation of one being does not take place without the corruption of another being, and that the nourishment of a lion is impossible without the destruction of some other animal, and that the patient endurance of the just involves persecution by the unjust. If evil were completely excluded from things, much good would be rendered impossible. Consequently it is the concern of divine providence, not to safeguard all beings from evil, but to see to it that the evil which arises is ordained to some good.

Thirdly, good is rendered more estimable when compared with particular evils. For example, the brilliance of white is brought out more clearly when set off by the dinginess of black. And so, by permitting the existence of evil in the world, the divine goodness is more emphatically asserted in the good, just as is the divine wisdom when it forces evil to promote good.

CHAPTER 143

GOD’S SPECIAL PROVIDENCE OVER MAN BY GRACE

Accordingly, divine providence governs individual beings in keeping with their nature. Since rational creatures, because of the gift of free will, enjoy dominion over their actions in a way impossible to other creatures, a special providence must be exercised over them in two respects. First, with regard to the aids God gives to rational creatures in their activity, secondly, with regard to the recompense allotted for their works. God gives to irrational creatures only those aids by which they are naturally moved to act. But to rational creatures are issued instructions and commands regulating their lives. A precept is not fittingly given except to a being that is master of his actions, although in an analogous sense God is said to give commands to irrational creatures also, as is intimated in Psalm 148:6: “He made a decree, and it shall not pass away.” But this sort of decree is nothing else than the dispensation of divine providence moving natural things to their proper actions.

The deeds of rational creatures are imputed to them in blame or in praise, because they have dominion over their acts. The actions of men are ascribed to them not only by a man who is placed over them, but also by God. Thus any praiseworthy or blameworthy action that a man performs is imputed to him by the person to whose rule he is subject. Since good actions merit a reward and sin calls for punishment, as was said above, rational creatures are punished for the evil they do and are rewarded for the good. they do, according to the measure of justice fixed by divine providence. But there is no place for reward or punishment in dealing with irrational creatures, just as there is none for praise or blame.

Since the last end of rational creatures exceeds the capacity of their nature and since whatever conduces to the end must be proportionate to the end according to the right order of providence, rational creatures are given divine aids that are not merely proportionate to nature but that transcend the capacity of nature. God infuses into man, over and above the natural faculty of reason, the light of grace whereby he is internally perfected for the exercise of virtue, both as regards knowledge, inasmuch as man’s mind is elevated by this light to the knowledge of truths surpassing reason, and as regards action and affection, inasmuch as man’s affective power is raised by this light above all created things to the love of God, to hope in Him, and to the performance of acts that such love imposes.

These gifts or aids supernaturally given to man are called graces for two reasons. First, because they are given by God gratis. Nothing is discoverable in man that would constitute a right to aids of this sort, for they exceed the capacity of nature. Secondly, because in a very special way man is made gratus, or pleasing to God, by such gifts. Since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things and is not called forth by any pre-existing goodness, as our love is, a special intensity of divine love must be discerned in those whom He showers with such extrsordinary effects of His goodness. Therefore God is said chiefly and simply to love those whom He endows with these effects of His love by which they are enabled to reach their last end, which is He Himself, the fountainhead of all goodness.

CHAPTER 144

REMISSION OF SIN BY THE GIFTS OF GRACE

Sins arise when actions deflect from the right course leading to the end. Since man is conducted to his end not only by natural aids, but by the aids of grace, the sins men commit must be counteracted not by natural aids alone, but also by the as helps which grace confers. Contraries exclude each other; therefore, as the aids of grace are taken from man by sin, so sins are forgiven by the gifts of grace. Otherwise man's malice in committing sin would be more powerful in banishing divine grace than the divine goodness is in expelling sin by the gifts of grace.

Furthermore, God's providence over things is in harmony with their mode of being. Changeable things are so constituted that contraries can succeed each other in them; examples are generation and corruption in corporeal matter, and white and black in a colored object. Man is changeable in will as long as he lives his earthly life. Hence man receives from God the gifts of grace in such a way that he is able to forfeit them by sin; and the sins man commits are such that they can be remitted by the gifts of grace.

Besides, in supernatural acts, possible and impossible are regarded from the standpoint of divine power, not from the standpoint of natural power. The fact that a blind man can be made to see or that a dead man can rise, is owing not to natural power but to divine power. But the gifts of grace are supernatural. Therefore a person's capacity to receive them depends on divine power. To say that, once a person has sirmcd, he cannot receive the gifts of grace, is derogatory to the power of God. Of course, grace cannot co-exist with sin; for by grace man is rightly ordered to his end, from which he is turned away by sin. But the contention that sin is irremissible, impugns the power of God.

CHAPTER 145

NO SIN UNFORGIVABLE

The suggestion might be put forward that sins are unforgivable, not through any lack of power on God's part, but because divine justice has decided that anyone who falls from grace shall never more be restored to it. But such a position is clearly erroneous. There is no provision in the order of divine justice to the effect that, while a person is on the road, he should have assigned to him what belongs to the end of the journey, But unyielding adherence to good or to evil pertains to the end of life's course; immobility and cessation from Activity are the terminus of movement. On the other hand, the whole of our present life is a time of wayfaring, as is shown by man's changeableness both in body and in soul. Accordingly divine justice does not determine that after sinning a man must remain immovably in the state of sin.

Moreover, divine benefits do not expose man to danger, particularly in affairs of supreme moment. But it would be dangerous for man, while leading a life subject to change, to accept grace if, aftenreceiving grace, he could sin but could not again be restored to grace. This is so especially in view of the fact that sins preceding grace are remitted by the infusion of grace; and at times such sins are more grievous than those man commits after receiving grace. Therefore we may not hold that man's sins are unforgivable either before or after they are committed.

CHAPTER 146

REMISSION OF SIN BY GOD ALONE

God alone can forgive sin. For only the one against whom an offense is directed can forgive the offense. Sin is imputed to man as an offense not only by another man, but also by God, as we said above. However, we are now considering sin as imputed to man by God. Accordingly, God alone can forgive sin.

Again, since by sin man is deflected from his last end, sins cannot be forgiven unless man is again rightly ordered to his end. This is accomplished through the gifts of grace which come from God alone, since they transcend the power of nature. Therefore only God can remit sin.

Further, sin is imputed to man as an offense because it is voluntary. But only God can effect a change in the will. Consequently He alone can truly forgive sins.

CHAPTER 147

SOME ARTICLES OF FAITH ON THE EFFECTS OF DIVINE GOVERNMENT

This, then, is the second of God’s effects, namely, the government of things, and especially of rational creatures, to whom God gives grace and whose sins He forgives. This effect is touched on in the Creed. When we profess that the Holy Spirit is God, we imply that all things are ordained to the end of divine goodness, since it belongs to God to order His subjects to their end. And the words of the Creed which express our belief that the Holy Spirit is “the Life-giver,” suggest that God moves all things. For, as the movement flowing from the soul to the body is the life of the body, so the movement, whereby the universe is moved by God is, so to speak, a certain life of the universe.

Further, since the entire process of divine government is derived from the divine goodness, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, the effects of divine providence are fittingly thought of in connection with the person of the Holy Spirit.

As regards the effect of supernatural knowledge, which God produces in men through faith, the Creed proclaims: “I believe in... the Holy, Catholic Church”; for the Church is the congregation of the faithful. Concerning the grace which God communicates to men the Creed states: “I believe in... the communion of saints.” And with respect to the remission of sin it says: “I believe in... the forgiveness of sins.”

CHAPTER 148

ALL CREATION FOR MAN

All things are directed to the divine goodness as to their end, as we have shown.146 Among things ordained to this end, some are closer to the end than others, and so participate in the divine goodness moft abundantly. Therefore lesser creatures, which have a smaller share in the divine goodness, are in some way subordinated to higher beings as to their ends. In any hierarchy of ends, beings that are closer to the ultimate end are also ends with respect to beings that are more remote. For instance, a dose of medicine is administered to procure a purge, the purge is designed to promote slimness, and slimness is desirable for health; and thus slimness is, in a sense, the purpose of the purgingi as the purging is the purpose of the medicine. And such subordination is reasonable. As in the order of efficient causes, the power of the first agent reaches the ultimate effects through intermediate causes, so in the order of ends, whatever is farther removed from the end attains to the ultimate end through the intermediacy of beings that are closer to the end. Thus, in our example, the medicine has no relation to health except through purging. Similarly, in the order of the universe, lower beings realize their last end chiefly by their subordination to higher beings.

The same conclusion is manifest if we turn our attention to the order of things in itself. Things that come into being by a natural process, act as they are equipped by nature to act. As we observe, however, imperfect beings serve the needs of more noble beings; plants draw their nutriment from the earth, animals feed on plants, and these in turn serve man’s use. We conclude, then, that lifeless beings exist for living beings, plants for animals, and the latter for men. And since, as we have seen, intellectual nature is superior to material nature, the whole of material nature is subordinate to intellectual nature. But among intellectual natures, that which has the closest ties with the body is the rational soul, which is the form of man. In a certain sense, therefore, we may say that the whole of corporeal nature exists for man, inasmuch as he is a rational animal. And so the consummation of the whole of corpbreal. nature depends, to some extent, on man’s consummation.

CHAPTER 149

THE ULTIMATE END OF MAN

Man’s consummation consists in the attainment of his last end, which is perfect beatitude or happiness, and this consists in the vision of God, as was demonstrated above. The beatific vision entails immutability in the intellect and will. As regards the intellect, its questing ceases when at last it comes to the first cause, in which all truth can be known. The will’s variability ceases, too; for, when it reaches its last end, in which is contained the fullness of all goodness, it finds nothing further to be desired. The will is subject to change because it craves what it does not possess. Clearly, therefore, the final consummation of man consists in perfect repose or unchangeableness as regards both intellect and will.

CHAPTER 150

CONSUMMATION OF MAN IN ETERNITY

We showed in an earlier chapter that the idea of eternity involves immutability. As motion causes time, in which priority and posteriority are discerned, so the cessation of motion puts a stop to priority and posteriority; and so nothing remains but eternity, which is simultaneously whole. Therefore in his final consummation man attains eternal life, not only in the sense that he lives an immortal life in his soul, for this is a property of the rational soul by its very nature, as was shown above, but also in the sense that he is brought to the perfection of immobility.

CHAPTER 151

REUNION WITH THE BODY REQUISITE FOR THE SOUL’S PERFECT HAPPINESS

We should note that the disquiet of the will cannot be wholely overcome unless natural desire is completely satisfied. Elements that are by nature destined for union, naturally desire to be united to each other; for any being seeks what is suited to it by nature. Since, therefore, the natural condition of the human soul is to be united to the body, as was pointed out above,lrl it has a natural desire for union with the body. Hence the will cannot be perfectly at rest until the soul is again joined to the body. When this takes place, man rises from the dead.

Besides, final perfection requires possession of a being’s original perfection. But the first perfection of anything requires that it be perfect in its nature, and final perfection consists in attainment of the last end. In order, therefore, that the human soul may be brought to complete perfection with regard to its end, it must be perfect in its nature. This is impossible unless the soul is united to the body. For by nature the soul is a part of man as his form. But no part is perfect in its nature unless it exists in its whole. Therefore man’s final happiness requires the soul to be again united to the body.

Moreover, the accidental and all that is contrary to nature cannot be everlasting. But a state wherein the soul is separated from the body is surely per accidens and contrary to nature, if naturally and per se the soul has a longing for union with t,he body. Therefore the soul will not be forever separated from the body. Accordingly, since the soul’s substance is incorruptible, as was shown above, we conclude that the soul is to be reunited to the body.

CHAPTER 152

SEPARATION OF THE BODY FROM THE SOUL BOTH NATURAL AND CONTRARY TO NATURE

We may have a suspicion that separation of the soul from the body is not per accidens but is in accord with nature. For man’s body is made up of contrary elements. Everything of this sort is naturally corruptible. Therefore the human body is naturally corruptible. But when the body corrupts the soul must survive as a separate entity if the soul is immortal, as in fact it is. Apparently, then, separation of the soul from the body is in accord with nature.

In view of these considerations, we must take up the question, how this separation is according to nature, and how it is opposed to nature. We showed above that the rational soul exceeds the capacity of all corporeal matter in a measure impossible to other forms. This is demonstrated by its intellectual activity, which it exercises without the body. To the end that corporeal matter might be fittingly adapted to the soul, there had to be added to the body some disposition that would make it suitable matter for such a form. And in the same way that this form itself receives existence from God alone through creation, that disposition, transcending as it does corporeal nature, was conferred on the human body by God alone, for the purpose of preserving the body itself in a state of incorruption, so that it might match the soul’s perpetual existence. This disposition remained in man’s body as long as man’s soul cleaved to God.

But when man’s soul turned from God by sin, the human body deservedly lost that supernatural disposition whereby it was unrebelliously subservient to the soul. And hence man incurred the necessity of dying.

Accordingly, if we regard the nature of the body, death is natural. But if we regard the nature of the soul and the disposition with which the human body was supernaturally endowed in the beginning for the sake of the soul, death is per accidens and contrary to nature, inasmuch as union with the body is natural for the soul.

CHAPTER 153

THE SOUL’S RESUMPTION OF THE SAME BODY

Since the soul is united to the body as its form, and since each form has the right matter corresponding to it, the body to which the soul will be reunited must be of the same nature and species as was the body laid down by the soul at death. At the resurrection the soul will not resume a celestial or ethereal body, or the body of some animal, as certain people fancifully prattle [Origen, Peri Archon, III, 6]. No, it will resume a human body made up of flesh and bones, and equipped with the same organs it now possesses.

Furthermore, just as the same specific form ought to have the same specific matter, so the same numerical form ought to have the same numerical matter. The soul of an ox cannot be the soul of a horse’s body, nor can the soul of this ox be the soul of any other ox. Therefore, since the rational soul, that survives remains numerically the same, at the resurrection it must be reunited to numerically the same body.

CHAPTER 154

MIRACULOUS NATURE OF THE RESURRECTION

When substances corrupt, the survival of the species, but not the restoration of the individual, is effected by the action of nature. The cloud from which rain is produced and the cloud which is again formed by evaporation from the fallen rain water, are not numerically the same. Accordingly, since the human body substantially dissolves in death, it cannot be restored to numerical identity by the action of nature. But the concept of resurrection requires such identity, as we have just shown. Consequently the resurrection of man will not be brought about by the action of nature, as some philosophers [Empedocles] have held in their theory that, when all bodies return to the position formerly occupied after untold cycles of years, then also men will return to life in the same numerical identity. No, the restoration of all who rise will be effected solely by divine power.

Moreover, it is clear that senses once destroyed, and anything possessed as a result of generation, cannot be restored by the activity of nature, for the simple reason that the same numerical being cannot be generated several times. If any such perfection is restored to anyone, for example, an eye that has been torn out or a hand that has been cut off, it will be through divine power which operates beyond the order of nature, as we said above. Therefore, since all the senses and all the members of man corrupt in death, a dead man cannot be brought back to life except by divine action.

The fact that, as we hold, the resurrection will be effected by divine power, enables us to perceive readily how the same numerical body will be revived. Since all things, even the very least, are included under divine providence, as we showed above, the matter composing this human body of ours, whatever form it may take after man’s death, evidently does not elude the power or the knowledge of God. Such matter remains numerically the same, in the sense that it exists under quantitative dimensions, by reason of which it can be said to be this particular matter, and is the principle of individuation. If then, this matter remains the same, and if the human body is again fashioned from it by divine power, and if also the rational soul which remains the same in its incorruptibility is united to the same body, the result is that identically the same man is restored to life.

Numerical identity cannot be impeded, as some object, by the consideration that the humanity is not numerically the same as before. In the view of some philosophers, humanity, which is said to be the form of the whole, is nothing else than the form of a part, namely, the soul, and they admit that humanity is the form of the body also, in the sense that it confers species on the whole.”““ If this is true, evidently the humanity remains numerically the same, since the rational soul remains numerically the same.

Humanity, however, is that which is signified by the definition of man, as the essence of anything whatever is that which is signified by its definition. But the definition of man signifies not form alone but also matter, since matter must be comprised in the definition of material things. Hence we shall do better to say, with others, that both soul and body are included in the notion of humanity, although otherwise than in the definition of man. The notion of humanity embraces only the essential principles of man, prescinding from all other factors. For, since humanity is understood to be that whereby man is man, whatever cannot truly be said to constitute man as man, is evidently cut off from the notion of humanity. But when we speak of man, who has humanity, the fact that he has humanity does not exclude the possession of other attributes, for instance, whiteness, and the like. The term “man” signifies man’s essential principles, but not to the exclusion of other factors, even though these other factors are not actually, but only potentially, contained in the notion of man. Hence “man” signifies as a whole, per modum totius, whereas “humanity” signifies as a part, per modum partis, and is not predicated of man. In Socrates, then, or in Plato, this determinate matter and this particular form are included. just as the notion of man implies composition of matter and form, so if Socrates were to be defined, the notion of him would imply that he is composed of this flesh and these bones and this soul. Consequently, since humanity is not some third form in addition to soul and body, but is composed of both, we see clearly that, if the same body is restored and if the same soul remains, the humanity will be numerically the same.

The numerical identity in question is not frustrated on the ground that the corporeity recovered is not numerically the same, for the reason that it corrupts when the body corrupts. If by corporeity is meant the substantial form by which a thing is classified in the genus of corporeal substance, such corporeity is nothing else than the soul, seeing that there is but one substantial form for each thing. In virtue of this particular soul, this animal is not only animal, but is animated body, and body, and also this thing existing in the genus of substance. Otherwise the soul would come to a body already existing in act, and so would be an accidental form. The subject of a substantial form is something existing only in potency, not in act. When it receives the substantial form it is not said to be generated merely in this or that respect, as is the case with accidental forms, but is said to be generated simply, as simply receiving existence. And therefore the corporeity that is received remains numerically the same, since the same rational soul continues to exist.

If, however, the word “corporeity” is taken to mean a form designating body (corpus), which is placed in the genus of quantity, such a form is accidental, since it signifies nothing else than three-dimensional existence. Even though the same numerical form, thus understood, is not recovered, the identity of the subject is not thereby impeded, for unity of the essential principles suffices for this. The same reasoning holds for all the accidents, the diversity among which does not destroy numerical identity. Consequently, since union is a kind of relation, and therefore an accident, its numerical diversity does not prevent the numerical identity of the subject; nor, for that matter, does numerical diversity among the powers of the sensitive and vegetative soul, if they are supposed to have corrupted. For the natural powers existing in the human composite are in the genus of accident; and what we call “sensible” is derived, not from the senses according as sense is the specific difference constituting animal, but from the very substance of the sensitive soul, which in man is essentially identical with the rational soul.

CHAPTER 155

RESURRECTION TO NEW LIFE

Although men will rise as the same individuals, they will not have the same kind of life as before. Now their life is corruptible; then it will be incorruptible. If nature aims at. perpetual existence in the generation of man, much more so does God in the restoration of man. Nature’s tendency toward never-ending existence comes from an impulse implanted by God. The perpetual existence of the species is not in question in the restoration of risen man, for this could be procured by repeated generation. Therefore what is intended is the perpetual existence of the individual. Accordingly risen men will live forever.

Besides, if men once risen were to die, the souls separated from their bodies would not remain forever deprived of the body, for this would be against the nature of the soul, as we said above. Therefore they would have to rise again; and the same thing would happen if they were to die again after the second resurrection. Thus death and life would revolve around each man in cycles of infinite succession; which seems futile. Surely a halt is better called at the initial stage, so that men might rise to immortal life at the first resurrection.

However, the conquest of mortality will not induce any diversity either in species or in number. The idea of mortality contains nothing that could make it a specific difference of man, since it signifies no more than a passion. It is used to serve as a specific difference of man in the sense that the nature of man is designated by calling him mortal, to bring out the fact that he is composed of contrary elements, just as his proper form is designated by the predicate “rational”; material things cannot be defined without including matter. However, mortality is not overcome by taking away man’s proper matter. For the soul will not resume a celestial or ethereal body, as was mentioned above; it will resume a human body made up of contrary elements. Incorruptibility will come as an effect of divine power, whereby the soul will gain dominion over the body to the point that the body cannot corrupt. For a thing continues in being as long as form has dominion over matter.

CHAPTER 156

CESSATION OF NUTRITION AND REPRODUCTION AFTER THE RESURRECTION

When an end is removed, the means leading to that end must also be removed. Therefore, after mortality is done away with in those who have risen, the means serving the condition of mortal life must cease to have any function. Such are food and drink, ‘which are necessary for the sustenance of mortal life, during which what is dissolved by natural heat has to be restored by food. Consequently there will be no consumption of food or drink after the resurrection.

Nor will there be any need of clothing. Clothes are necessary for man so that the body may not suffer harm from heat or cold, which beset him from outside. Likewise, exercise of the reproductive functions, which is designed for the generation of animals, must cease. Generation serves the ends of mortal life, so that what cannot be preserved in the individual may be preserved at least in the species. Since the same individual men will continue in eternal existence, generation will have no place among them; nor, consequently, will the exercise of reproductive power.

Again, since semen is the superfluous part of nourishment, cessation of the use of food necessarily entails cessation of the exercise of the reproductive functions. On the other hand, we cannot maintain with propriety that the use of food, drink, and the reproductive powers will remain solely for the sake of pleasure. Nothing inordinate will occur in that final state, because then all things will receive their perfect consummation, each in its own way. But de-ordination is opposed to perfection. Also, since the restoration of man through resurrection will be effected directly by God, no de-ordination will be able to find its way into that state; whatever is from God is well ordered. But desire for the use of food and the exercise of the reproductive powers for pleasure alone, would be inordinate; indeed, even during our present life people regard such conduct as vicious. Among the risen, consequently, the use of food, drink, and the reproductive functions for mere pleasure, can have no place.

CHAPTER 157

RESURRECTION OF ALL THE BODILY MEMBERS

Although risen men will not occupy themselves with activities of this sort, they will not lack the organs requisite for such functions. Without the organs in question the risen body would not be complete. But it is fitting that nature should be completely restored at the renovation of risen man, for such renovation will be accomplished directly by God, whose works are perfect. Therefore all the members of the body will have their place in the risen, for the preservation of nature in its entirety rather than for the exercise of their normal functions.

Moreover, as we shall bring out later, men will receive punishment or reward in that future state for the acts they perform now. This being the case, it is no more than right that men should keep the organs with which they served the reign of sin or of justice during the present life, so that they may be punished or rewarded in the members they employed for sin or for merit.

CHAPTER 158

ABSENCE OF DEFECTS IN THE RESURRECTION

In like manner, it is fitting that all natural defects should be corrected in the risen body. Any defect of this sort is prejudicial to the integrity of nature. And so, if human nature is to be completely renewed by God at the resurrection, such defects must be rectified.

Besides, these defects arose from a deficiency in the natural power which is the principle of human generation. But in the resurrection there will be no active causality other than the divine, which does not admit of deficiency. Therefore such defects as are found in men naturally begotten, will have no place in men restored by the resurrection.

CHAPTER 159

RESURRECTION RESTRICTED TO WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR TRUE HUMAN NATURE

These remarks about the integrity of risen men should be understood as referring to whatever pertains to the true state of human nature. What is not required for the reality of human nature, will not be resumed by risen man. Thus, if all the accretion of matter from the food that has been changed into flesh and blood were to be resumed, the size of risen man would exceed all bounds. The proper condition of any nature is regulated by its species and form. Accordingly all the parts that are consonant with the human species and form will be integrally present in risen man: not only organic parts, but other parts of like nature, such as flesh and sinews, which enter into the composition of the various organs. Of course, not all the matter that was ever contained in those parts during man's natural life will again be taken up, but only so much as will be enough to constitute the species of the parts in integrity.

Even though not all the material elements ever possessed by man will arise, we cannot say on this account that man will not be the same individual, or that he will not be complete. During the course of the present life, man evidently remains numerically the same from birth to death. Nevertheless the material composition of his parts does not remain the same, but undergoes gradual flux and reflux, in somewhat the way that the same fire is kept up although some logs are consumed and others are fed to the blaze. Man is whole when his species and the quantity due to his species are preserved intact.

CHAPTER 160

GOD’S ACTION IN SUPPLYING WHAT IS LACKING IN THE BODY

For the same reason that God, in restoring the risen body, does not reclaim all the material elements once possessed by man’s body, He will supply whatever is wanting to the proper amount of matter. Nature itself has such power. In infancy we do not as yet possess our full quantity; but by assimilating food and drink we receive enough matter from outside sources to round out our perfect quantity; nor on this account does a man cease to be the same individual he was before. Surely, then, divine power can do the same thing much more easily, so that those who do not have sufficient quantity may be supplied from outside matter with whatever was lacking to them in this life as regards integrity of natural members or suitable size. Consequently, although some may have lacked certain of their members during this life, or may not have attained to perfect size, the amount of quantity possessed at the moment of death makes no difference; at the resurrection they will receive, through God’s power, the due complement of members and quantity.

CHAPTER 161

SOLUTION OF POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS

This enables us to answer the objections that some raise against the resurrection. For instance, they say that a cannibal may have eaten human flesh, and later, thus nourished, may beget a son, who eats the same kind of food. If what is eaten is changed into the substance of the eater's flesh, it seems impossible for both to rise in their full integrity, for the flesh of one has been changed into the flesh of the other. The difficulty apparently grows if semen is the product of surplus food, as the philosophers teach [Aristotle, De generatione animalium, I, 18, 726 a 26; for the semen whereby the son is begotten would then be derived from the flesh of another person. And so it seems impossible for a boy begotten from such seed to rise, if the men whose flesh the father and the son himself devoured rise intact.

But this state of affairs is not incompatible with a general resurrection. As was pointed out above, not all the material elements ever present in any man need be resumed when he rises; only so much matter is required as suffices to keep up the amount of quantity he ought to have. We also pointed out that if anyone is lacking in the matter required for perfect quantity, divine power will supply what is needed.

We should note, moreover, that the material elements existing in man's body are found to pertain to true human nature in various degrees. First and foremost, what is received from one's parents, is brought to perfection within the reality of the human species, as its purest element ‘ by the parents' formative causality. Secondly, what is contributed by food, is necessary for the proper quantity of the body's members and lastly, since the introduction of a foreign substance always weakens a thing's energy, growth must eventually cease and the body must become old and decay, just as wine eventually becomes watery if water is mixed in with it.

Furthermore, certain superfluities are engendered in man’s body from food. Some of these are required for special purposes, for instance, semen for reproduction and hair for covering and adornment. But other superfluities serve no useful end, and these are expelled through perspiration and other eliminating processes, or else are retained in the body, not without inconvenience to nature.

At the general resurrection all this will be adjusted in accord with divine providence. If the same matter existed in different men, it will rise in that one in whom it fulfilled the higher function. If it existed in two men in exactly the same way, it will rise in him who had it first; in the other, the lack will be made up by divine power. And so we can see that the flesh of a man that was devoured by another, will rise not in the cannibal, but in him to whom it belonged originally. But as regards the nutritive fluid present in it, it will rise in the son begotten of semen formed from that flesh. The rest of it will rise in the first man in this series, and God will supply what is wanting to each of the three.

CHAPTER 162

THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD AS AN ARTICLE OF FAITH

That we may give expression to our faith in the resurrection, we are instructed to say in the Apostles’ Creed: “I believe... in the resurrection of the body.” The word “body” was inserted not without reason: even in the age of the Apostles there were some who denied the resurrection of the body, and admitted no more than a spiritual resurrection, whereby a man rises from the death of sin. Therefore the Apostle, in 2 Timothy 2:18, has occasion to refer to certain individuals: “Who have erred from the truth, saying that the resurrection is past already, and have subverted the faith of some.” To abolish this error, so that belief in the future resurrection may be professed, the Creed of the Fathers proclaims: “I look for the resurrection of the dead.”

CHAPTER 163

NATURE OF RISEN MAN’S ACTIVITY

We go on to consider the nature of the activity exercised by risen men. Each living being must have some activity that mainly engrosses its attention, and its life is said to consist in this occupation. Thus those who cultivate pleasure more than anything else, are said to lead a voluptuous life; those who give their time to contemplation, are said to lead a contemplative life; and those who devote their energies to civil government, are said to lead a political life. We have shown that risen men will have no occasion to use food or the reproductive functions, although all bodily activity seems to tend in the direction of such use. But, even if the exercise of bodily functions ceases, there remain spiritual activities, in which man’s ultimate end consists, as we have said; and the risen are in a position to achieve this end once they are freed from their former condition of corruption and changeableness. Of course, man’s last end consists, not in spiritual acts of any sort whatever, but in the vision of God according to His essence, as was stated above. And God is eternal; hence the intellect must be in contact with eternity. Accordingly, just as those who give their time to pleasure are said to lead a voluptuous life, so those who enjoy the vision of God possess eternal life, as is indicated in John 17:3: “This is eternal life: that they may know you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you sent.”

CHAPTER 164

THE VISION OF GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

The created intellect will see God in His essence, and not in any mere likeness. In the latter kind of vision, the object understood may be at a distance from the present intellect; for example, a stone is present to the eye by its likeness, but is absent in substance. But, as was shown above, God’s very essence is in some mysterious way united to the created intellect, so that God may be seen just as He is. Thus, when we arrive at our last end, what was formerly believed about God will be seen, and what was hoped for as absent will be closely embraced as present. This is called comprehension, according to the expression used by the Apostle in Philippians 3:12: “I press on, that I may grasp it.” This is not to be understood in the sense that comprehension implies all-inclusive knowledge, but in the sense that it denotes the presence and a certain clasping of what is said to be comprehended.

CHAPTER 165

SUPREME PERFECTION AND HAPPINESS IN THE VISION OF GOD

We should further understand that delight is engendered by the apprehension of a suitable good. Thus sight rejoices in beautiful colors, and taste in sweet savors. But this delight of the senses can be prevented if the organ is indisposed; the same light that is charming to healthy eyes is annoying to sore eyes. However, since the intellect does not understand by employing a bodily organ, as we showed above, no sorrow mars the delight that consists in the contemplation of truth. Of course, sadness can indirectly attend the mind’s contemplation, when the object of truth is apprehended as harmful. Thus knowledge of truth may cause pleasure in ‘the intellect, while at the same time the object known may engender sorrow in the will, not precisely because the object is known, but because its action is pernicious. God, however, by the very fact that He exists, is truth. Therefore the intellect that sees God cannot but rejoice in the vision of Him.

Besides, God is goodness itself, and goodness is the cause of love. Hence God’s goodness must necessarily be loved by all who apprehend it. Although an object that is good may fail to call forth love, or may even be hated, the reason is not that it is apprehended as good, but that it is apprehended as harmful. Consequently in the vision of God, who is goodness and truth itself, there must be love or joyous fruition, no less than comprehension. This accords with Isaiah 66:14: “You shall see and your heart shall rejoice.”

CHAPTER 166

CONFIRMATION IN GOOD IN THE BEATIFIC VISION

This enables us to understand that the soul which sees God—and the same is true of any other spiritual creature—has its will firmly fixed in Him, so that it can never turn to what is opposed to Him. For, since the object of the will is the good, the will cannot incline to anything whatever unless it exhibits some aspect of good. Any particular good may be wanting in some perfection, which the knower is then free to seek in another quarter. Therefore the will of him who beholds some particular good need not rest content with its possession, but may search farther afield beyond its orbit. But God, who is universal good and very goodness itself, is not lacking in any good that may be sought elsewhere, as was shown above. And so those who enjoy the vision of God's essence cannot turn their will from Him, but must rather desire all things in subordination to Him.

Something similar is observed in the process of understanding. Our mind, when in doubt, can turn this way and that, until it reaches a first principle; then the intellect must come to a halt. Since the end has the same function in the field of desire that a principle has in the matter of understanding, the will can veer in opposite directions until it comes to the knowledge or fruition of the last end, in which it must rest. The nature of perfect happiness would be contradicted if man, after achieving it, could turn to what is opposed to it. For then fear of losing happiness would not be wholly excluded, and so desire would not be completely satisfied. Hence the Apocalypse 3:12 says of the blessed person, that "he shall go out no more."

CHAPTER 167

COMPLETE SUBJECTION OF THE BODY TO THE SOUL

The body is for the soul, as matter is for form and a tool for the craftsman. At the resurrection, therefore, when the life we have been speaking of is attained, God will join to the soul a body such as befits the beatitude of the soul; for whatever exists for the sake of an end, must be duly disposed in accord with the demands of the end. A soul that has arrived at the peak of intellectual activity cannot appropriately have a body that would in any way prove an impediment or a burden to it. But the human body, by reason of its corruptibility, does obstruct and slow down the soul, so that the soul can neither devote itself to uninterrupted contemplation nor reach the heights of contemplation.

This is why men are able to grasp divine truths more readily when they rise above the bodily senses. And so prophetic revelations are made to men when asleep, or when they are lost in mental ecstasy, as we read in Numbers 12:6: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” Therefore the bodies of risen saints will not be corruptible and will not burden down the soul, as they do now. On the contrary, they will be incorruptible and will be wholly obedient to the soul, so as not to resist it in any way whatever.

CHAPTER 168

QUALITIES OF THE GLORIFIED BODY

This doctrine gives us an insight into the condition of the bodies of the blessed. The soul is both the form and the motive force of the body. In its function as form, the soul is the principle of the body, not only as regards the body's substantial being, but also as regards its proper accidents, which arise in the subject from the union of form with matter. The more dominant the form is, the less can any outside cause interfere with the impression made by the form on matter. We see this verified in the case of fire, whose form, generally accounted the noblest of all elementary forms, confers on fire the power of not being easily diverted from its natural disposition by the influence emanating from any cause.

Since the blessed soul, owing to its union with the first principle of all things, will be raised to the pinnacle of nobility and power, it will communicate substantial existence in the most perfect degree to the body that has been joined to it by divine action. And thus, holding the body completely under its sway, the soul will render the body subtle and spiritual. The soul will also bestow on the body a most ,noble quality, namely, the radiant beauty of clarity. Further, because of the influence emanating from the soul, the body's stability will not be subject to alteration by any cause; which means that the body will be impassible. Lastly, since the body will be wholly submissive to the soul, as a tool is to him who plies it, it will be endowed with agility. Hence the properties of the bodies belonging to the blessed will be these four: subtlety, clarity, impassibility, and agility.

This is the sense of the Apostle's words in 1 Corinthians 15:42 ff.: In death the body "is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption;" this refers to impassibility. "It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory;" this refers to clarity. "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power," and hence will have agility. “It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body;” in other words, it will be endowed with subtlety.

CHAPTER 169

RENOVATION OF MAN AND OF MATERIAL NATURE

It is manifest that all things existing for some definite end are disposed in an order required by the end. Therefore, if that to which other things are related as means can vary from perfect to imperfect, the means subordinated to it must be subject to parallel variation, so as to serve the end in either state. Food and clothing, for instance, are prepared otherwise for a child than for a grown man. We have already called attention to the fact that material creation is subordinated to rational nature as to its end. Consequently, when man is admitted to his final perfection after the resurrection, material creation must take on a new condition. This is why we are told that the world is to undergo renovation when man rises, as is taught in the Apocalypse 21:1: “I saw a new heaven and a new earth,” and in Isaiah 65:17: “For behold, I create new heavens and a new earth.”

CHAPTER 170

RENOVATION RESTRICTED TO CERTAIN CLASSES OF CREATURES

However, we should remember that the different kinds of material creatures are subordinated to man in different ways. Plants and animals serve man by aiding him in his weakness, in the sense that they supply him with food and clothing and transportation and like conveniences, whereby human feebleness is strengthened. But in the final state that comes after the resurrection all such defects will be eliminated from man. Men will no longer need food to eat, since they will be incorruptible, as we have pointed out. Nor will men need garments to cover their nakedness, because they will be clothed with the radiance of glory. Nor will they require animals to carry them, as they will be endowed with agility. Nor will they need medicines to keep them in health, since they will be impassible. In that state of final consummation, therefore, as we should expect, there will be no material creatures of this kind, namely, plants and animals and other like mixed bodies.

But, the four elements, fire, air, water, and earth are for man not only as regards the utility of bodily life, but also as regards the composition of his body. The human body is made up of these elements. And so the elements have an essential ordination to the human body. Hence, when man is glorified in body and soul, the elements have to remain also, although they will be changed to a better condition of existence.

As for the heavenly bodies, their substance is not utilized for the support of man’s corruptible life, and does not enter into the substance of the human frame. However, they serve man in the sense that by their beauty and enormous size they show forth the excellence of their Creator. For this reason man is often exhorted in Sacred Scripture to contemplate the heavenly bodies, so as to be moved by them to sentiments of reverence toward God. This is exemplified in Isaiah 40:26: “Lift up your eyes on high, and see who hath created these things.” And although, in the state of consummated perfection, man is not brought to the knowledge of God by a consideration of sensible creatures, since he sees God as He is in Himself, still it is pleasing and enjoyable for one who knows the cause to observe how the likeness of the cause shines forth in the effect. Thus a consideration of the divine goodness as mirrored in bodies, and particularly in the heavenly bodies, which appear to have a pre-eminence over other bodies, gives joy to the saints. Moreover, the heavenly bodies have some sort of essential relationship with the human body under the aspect of efficient causality, just as the elements have under the aspect of material causality: man generates man, and the sun, too, has some part in this operation. This, then, is another reason why the heavenly bodies should remain in existence.

The doctrine here advocated follows, not only from the relationship which various bodies have with man, but also from an examination of the natures of the material creatures we have been discussing. No object wanting in an intrinsic principle of incorruptibility ought to remain in the state that is characterized by incorruption. The heavenly bodies are incorruptible in whole and in part. The elements are incorruptible as wholes, but not as parts. Man is incorruptible in part, namely, in his rational soul, but not as a whole because the composite is dissolved by death. Animals and plants and all mixed bodies are incorruptible neither in whole nor in part. In the final state of incorruption, therefore, men and the elements and the heavenly bodies will fittingly remain, but not other animals or plants or mixed bodies.

We can argue reasonably to the same conclusion from the nature of the universe. Since man is a part of the material universe, the material universe should remain when man is brought to his final consummation; a part would seem to lack its proper perfection if it were to exist without the whole. On the other hand, the material universe cannot remain in existence without its essential parts. But the essential parts of the universe are the heavenly bodies and the elements, for the entire world machine is made up of them. Other bodies do not, apparently, pertain to the integrity of the material universe, but contribute rather to its adornment and beauty. They befit its changeable state in the sense that, with a heavenly body acting as efficient cause, and with the elements as material causes, animals and plants and minerals are brought into being. But in the state of final consummation another kind of adornment will be given to the elements, in keeping with their condition of incorruption. In that state, accordingly, there will remain men, elements, and heavenly bodies, but not animals or plants or minerals.

CHAPTER 171

CESSATION OF MOTION IN THE HEAVENLY BODIES

Since the heavenly bodies are in constant motion, so far as we can judge, it may seem that if their substance remains, they will keep on moving also in the state of consummation. And, indeed, if motion were possessed by heavenly bodies for the same reason as that for which it is possessed by elements, such an assertion would be logical. Motion is found in heavy or light elements to promote the perfection they are to attain: by their natural motion they tend to the place that suits them, where they are in a better condition. Hence in the ultimate state of consummation each element and each part thereof will be in its own proper place.

But this cannot be maintained of the motion of heavenly bodies, for a heavenly body does not come to rest in any place it may occupy; as it travels naturally to any particular place, it no less naturally departs thence. Therefore heavenly bodies suffer no loss if they are deprived of motion, because motion is riot found in them for their own perfection. Also, it would be ridiculous to contend that a heavenly body is moved in circles by its nature as an active principle, in the way that a light body is impelled upward by its nature. For, as is evident, nature tends invariably in the direction of unity; and therefore that which by its very concept opposes unity cannot be the ultimate goal of nature. But motion is opposed to unity, in the sense that what moves varies in its mode of being by the very fact that it is in motion. Therefore nature does not produce motion just for the sake of motion, but in causing motion has in view the terminus to be reached by motion.

For instance, a body that is naturally light seeks an elevated place in its ascent; and so of other bodies. Consequently, since the circular motion of a heavenly body does not tend to a definite position, we cannot say that the active principle of a heavenly body's circular motion is nature, in the sense that nature is the principle of the motion of heavy and light bodies. Accordingly there is no reason wh y heavenly bodies should not come to rest, without any change in their nature, even though fire, if its nature is to remain constant, cannot cease from its restlessness as long as it exists outside its proper sphere. Nevertheless we say that the motion of a heavenly body is natural; but it is natural not by reason of an active principle of motion in it, but by reason of the mobile body itself that has an aptitude for such motion. We conclude, therefore, that motion is communicated to a heavenly body by some intellect.

However, since an intellect does not impart movement except in view of some end, we must inquire what is the end of the motion of heavenly bodies. The motion itself cannot be said to be this end. For motion is the way leading to perfection, and so does not verify the concept of end, but rather pertains to that which is tending toward an end. Likewise we cannot maintain that a succession of locations is the term of the movement of a heavenly body, as though a heavenly body moved for the purpose of actually occupying every position for which it has a potency; this would entail endless wandering, and what is endless contradicts the notion of end.

We ought to think of the end of the heaven's motion somewhat as follows. Any body set in motion by an intellect is evidently an instrument of the latter. But the end of an instrument's motion is a form conceived by the principal agent, a form that is reduced to act by the motion of the instrument. The form conceived by the divine intellect, to be realized by the motion of the heavens, is the perfection of things. as achieved by way of generation and corruption. But the ultimate end of generation and corruption is the noblest of all forms, the human soul; and the soul's ultimate end is eternal life, as we said above. Accordingly the ultimate end of the movement of the heavens is the multiplication of men, who are to be brought into being for eternal life.

Such a multitude cannot be infinite; the intention to be realized by any intellect comes to rest in something definite. Consequently, once the number of men who are to be brought into being for eternal life is filled out, and they are actually established in the possession of eternal life, the movement of the heavens will cease, just as the motion of any instrument ceases after a project has been carried through to completion. And when the movement of the heavens ceases, all movement in lower bodies will cease by way of consequence, excepting only the movement that will be in men as flowing from their souls. And thus the entire material universe will have a different arrangement and form, in accordance with the truth proclaimed in 1 Corinthians 7:31: “The shape of this world passes away.”

CHAPTER 172

MAN’S REWARD OR MISERY ACCORDING TO HIS WORKS

This leads to our next point. If there is a definite way of reaching a fixed end, they who travel along a road leading in the opposite direction or who turn aside from the right road, will never reach the goal. A sick man is not cured by using the wrong medicines, forbidden by the doctor, except, perhaps, quite by accident.

There is such a definite way of arriving at happiness, namely, the practice of virtue. Nothing will reach its end unless it performs well the operations proper to it. A plant will not bear fruit if the procedure natural to it is not followed. A runner will not win a trophy or a soldier a citation, unless each of them carries out his proper functions. To say that a man discharges his proper office is equivalent to saying that he acts virtuously; for the virtue of any being is that which makes its possessor good and also makes his work good, as is stated in the second book of the Ethics [II, 6, 1106 a 15]. Accordingly, since the ultimate end of man is eternal life, of which we spoke previously, 182 not all attain it, but only those who act as virtue requires.

Besides, as we said above, not natural things alone, but also human affairs, are contained under divine providence, and this not only in general but in particular. But He who has care of individual men has disposal of the rewards to be assigned for virtue and of the punishments to be inflicted for sin. For punishment has a medicinal value with regard to sin and restores right order when violated by sin, as we stated above; and the reward of virtue is happiness, to be granted to man by God’s goodness. Therefore God will not grant happiness to those who act against virtue, but will assign as punishment the opposite of happiness, namely, extreme wretchedness.

CHAPTER 173

REWARD AND MISERY POSTPONED TO THE NEXT WORLD

In this matter we should note that contrary causes beget contrary effects. Thus action that proceeds from malice is contrary to action that proceeds from virtue. Accordingly wretchedness, in which evil action issues, is the opposite of happiness, which virtuous action merits. Furthermore, contraries pertain to the same genus. Therefore, since final happiness, which is reached by virtuous action, is a good that belongs not to this life but to the next life, as is clear from an earlier discussion, final wretchedness, also, to which vice leads, must be an evil belonging to the next world.

Besides, all goods and ills of this life are found to serve some purpose. External goods, and also bodily goods, are organically connected with virtue, which is the way leading directly to beatitude, for those who use such goods well. But for those who use these goods ill, they are instruments of vice, which ends up in misery. Similarly the ills opposed to such goods, as sickness, poverty, and the like, are an occasion of progress in virtue for some but aggravate the viciousness of others, according as men react differently to such conditions. But what is ordained to something else cannot be the final end, because it is not the ultimate in reward or punishment. Therefore neither ultimate happiness nor ultimate misery consists in the goods or ills of this life.

CHAPTER 174

WRETCHEDNESS FLOWING FROM THE PUNISHMENT OF LOSS

Since the wretchedness to which vice leads is opposed to the happiness to which virtue leads, whatever pertains to wretchedness must be understood as being the opposite of all we have said about happiness. We pointed out above that man's ultimate happiness, as regards his intellect, consists in the unobstructed vision of God. And as regards man's affective life, happiness consists in the immovable repose of his will in the first Good. Therefore man's extreme unhappiness will consist in the fact that his intellect is completely shut off from the divine light, and that his affections are stubbornly turned against God's goodness. And this is the chief suffering of the damned. It is known as the punishment of loss.

However, as should be clear from what we said on a previous occasion, evil cannot wholly exclude good, since every evil has its basis in some good. Consequently, although suffering is opposed to happiness, which will be free from all evil, it must be rooted in a good of nature. The good of an intellectual nature consists in the contemplation of truth by the intellect, and in the inclination to good on the part of the will. But all truth and all goodness are derived from the first and supreme good, which is God. Therefore the intellect of a man situated in the extreme misery of hell must have some knowledge of God and some love of God, but only so far as He is the principle of natural perfections. This is natural love. But the soul in hell cannot know and love God as He is in Himself, nor so far as He is the principle of virtue or of grace and the other goods through which intellectual nature is brought to perfection by Him; for this is the perfection of virtue and glory.

Nevertheless men buried in the misery of hell are not deprived of free choice, even though their will is immovably attached to evil. In the same way the blessed retain the power of free choice, although their will is fixed on the Good. Freedom of choice, properly speaking, has to do with election. But election is concerned with the means leading to an end. The last end is naturally desired by every being. Hence all men, by the very fact that they are intellectual, naturally desire happiness as their last end, and they do so with such immovable fixity of purpose that no one can wish to be unhappy. But this is not incompatible with free will, which extends only to means leading to the end. The fact that one man places his happiness in this particular good while another places it in that good, is not characteristic of either of these men so far as he is a man, since in such estimates and desires men exhibit great differences. This variety is explained by each man's condition. By this I mean each man's acquired passions and habits; and so if a man's condition were to undergo change, some other good would appeal to him as most desirable.

This appears most clearly in men who are led by passion to crave some good as the best. When the passion, whether of anger or lust, dies down, they no longer have the same estimate of that good as they had before.

Habits are more permanent, and so men persevere more obstinately in seeking goods to which habit impels them. Yet, so long as habit is capable of change, man's desire and his judgment as to what constitutes the last end are subject to change. This possibility is open to men only during the present life, in which their state is changeable. After this life the soul is not subject to alteration. No change can affect it except indirectly, in consequence of some change undergone by the body.

However, when the body is resumed, the soul will not be governed by changes occurring in the body."" Rather, the contrary will take place. During our present life the soul is infused into a body that has been generated of seed, and therefore, as we should expect, is affected by changes experienced in the body. But in the next world the body will be united to a pre-existing soul, and so will be completely governed by the latter's conditions. Accordingly the soul will remain perpetually in whatever last end it is found to have set for itself at the time of death, desiring that state as the most suitable, whether it is good or evil. This is the meaning of Ecclesiastes 11:3: "If the tree fall to the south or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be.” After this life, therefore, those who are found good at the instant of death will have their wills forever fixed in good. But those who are found evil at that moment will be forever obstinate in evil.

CHAPTER 175

FORGIVENESS OF SIN IN THE NEXT WORLD

This enables us to perceive that mortal sins are not forgiven in the next world. But venial sins are forgiven. Mortal sins are committed by turning away from our last end, in which man is irrevocably settled after death, as we have just said. Venial sins, however, do not regard our last end, but rather the road leading to that end.

If the will of evil men is obstinately fettered to evil after death, they forever continue to desire what they previously desired, in the conviction that this is the best. Therefore they are not sorry they have sinned; for no one is sorry he has achieved what he judges to be the best.

But we should understand that those who are condemned to final misery cannot have after death what they craved as the best. Libertines in hell will have no opportunity to gratify their passions; the wrathful and the envious will have no victims to offend or obstruct; and so of all the vices in turn. But the condemned will be aware that men who have lived a virtuous life in conformity with the precepts of virtue obtain what they desired as best. Therefore the wicked regret the sins they have committed, not because sin displeases them, for even in hell they would rather commit those same sins, if they had the chance, than possess God; but because they cannot have what they have chosen, and can have only what they have detested. Hence their will must remain forever obstinate in evil, and at the same time they will grieve most agonizingly for the sins they have committed and the glory they have lost. This anguish is called remorse of conscience, and in Scripture is referred to metaphorically as a worm, as we read in Isaiah 66:24: “Their worm shall not die.”

CHAPTER 176

PROPERTIES OF THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED

As we said above, in speaking of the saints, the beatitude of the soul will in some manner flow over to the body. In the same way the suffering of lost souls will flow over to their bodies. Yet we must observe that suffering does not exclude the good of nature from the body, any more than it does from the soul. Therefore the bodies of the damned will be complete in their kind, although they will not have those qualities that go with the glory of the blessed. That is, they will not be subtle and impassible; instead, they will remain in their grossness and capacity for suffering, and, indeed, these defects will be heightened in them. Nor will they be agile, but will be so sluggish as scarcely to be maneuverable by the soul. Lastly, they will not be radiant but will be ugly in their swarthiness, so that the blackness of the soul may be mirrored in the body, as is intimated in Isaiah 13:8: “Their countenances shall be as faces burnt.”

CHAPTER 177

SUFFERING COMPATIBLE WITH INCORRUPTIBILITY IN THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED

Although the bodies of the damned will be capable of suffering, they will not be subject to corruption. This is a fact we have to admit, even though it may seem to disagree with present experience, according to which heightened suffering tends to deteriorate substance. In spite of this, there are two reasons why suffering that lasts forever will not corrupt the bodies undergoing it.

First, when the movement of the heavens ceases, as we said above, all transformation of nature must come to a stop. Nothing will be capable of alteration in its nature; only the soul will be able to admit some alteration. In speaking of an alteration of nature, I mean, for instance, a change from hot to cold in a thing, or any other such variation in the line of natural qualities. And by alteration of the soul, I mean the modification that takes place when a thing receives a quality, not according to the quality's natural mode of being, but according to its own spiritual mode of being; for example, the pupil of the eye receives the form of a color, not that it may be colored itself, but that it may perceive color. In this way the bodies of the damned will suffer from fire or from some other material agent, not that they may be transformed into the likeness or quality of fire, but that they may experience the effects characteristic of its qualities. And this experience will be painful, because the effects produced by the action of fire are opposed to the harmony in which the pleasure of sense consists. Yet the action of hell-fire will not cause corruption, because spiritual reception of forms does not modify bodily nature, except, it may be, indirectly.

The second reason is drawn from a consideration of the soul, in whose perpetual duration the body will be forced, by divine power, to share. The condemned person’s soul, so far as it is the form and nature of such a body, will confer never-ending existence on the latter. But because of its imperfection, the soul will not be able to bestow on the body immunity from suffering. Consequently the bodies of the damned will suffer forever, but will not undergo dissolution.

CHAPTER 178

PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED PRIOR TO THE RESURRECTION

This discussion makes it clear that both happiness and wretchedness are experienced chiefly in the soul. They affect the body secondarily and by a certain derivation. Hence the happiness or misery of the soul will not depend on the well-being or suffering of the body; rather, the reverse is true. Souls remain in existence after death and prior to the resumption of the body, some adorned with the merit of beatitude, others disfigured by deserved wretchedness. Therefore we can see that even before the resurrection the souls of some men enjoy the happiness of heaven, as the Apostle indicates in 2 Corinthians 5:1: “For we know, if our earthly house of this habitation is dissolved, that we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in heaven.” A little below, in verse 8, he adds: “But we are confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body and to be present with the Lord.” But the souls of some will live in torment, as is intimated in Luke 16:22: “The rich man also died, and he was buried in hell.”

CHAPTER 179

SPIRITUAL AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED

We should realize that the happiness enjoyed by the souls of the saints will consist exclusively in spiritual goods. On the other hand, the punishment inflicted on the souls of the damned, even before the resurrection, will not consist solely in spiritual evils, as some have thought; lost souls will also undergo corporal punishment.

The reason for this difference is as follows. When the souls of the saints were united to their bodies here in this world, they observed right order, not subjecting themselves to material things but serving God alone. And so their whole happiness consists in the enjoyment of Him, not in any material goods. But the souls of the wicked, in violation of the order of nature, set their affections on material things, scorning divine and spiritual goods. In consequence, they are punished not only by being deprived of spiritual goods, but by being subjected to the tyranny of material things. Accordingly, if Sacred Scripture is found to promise a reward of material goods to the souls of the saints, such passages are to be interpreted in a mystical sense; for spiritual things are often described in Scripture in terms of their likeness to material things. But texts that portend the corporal punishments of the souls of the damned, specifying that they will be tormented by the fires of hell, are to be understood literally.

CHAPTER 180

THE SOUL AND CORPOREAL FIRE

The assertion that a soul separated from its body can be tortured by corporeal fire should not seem nonsensical when we reflect that it is not contrary to the nature of a spiritual substance to be confined to a body. This happens in the ordinary course of nature, as we see in the union of the soul with the body. The same effect is sometimes produced by the arts of black magic, by which a spirit is imprisoned in images or amulets or other such objects. The power of God can undoubtedly bring it about that spiritual substances, which are raised above the material world by their nature, may nevertheless be tied down to certain bodies, such as hell-fire; not in the sense that they animate the body in question, but that they are in some way fettered to it. And this very fact, brought home to the consciousness of a spiritual substance, namely, that it is thus subjected to the dominion of a lowly creature, is grievous to it.

Inasmuch as this awareness is distressing to the spiritual substance, the contention that the soul “burns by the very fact that it perceives itself to be in fire” [Dialogi, IV, 29], is substantiated. Thus understood, the fire is plainly spiritual, for what directly causes the distress is the fire apprehended as imprisoning. But inasmuch as the fire in which the spirit is incarcerated is corporeal fire, the further statement made by Gregory is borne out, namely, that “the soul is in agony not only because its perceives, but also because it experiences, the fire.”

Furthermore, since this fire has the power of imprisoning the spiritual substance, not of its own nature, but by the might of God, the view is fittingly expressed by some that the fire acts on the soul as an instrument of God’s vindictive justice. This does not mean that the fire acts on the spiritual substance as it acts on bodies, by heating, parching, and consuming; its action is restrictive, as we said. And since that which directly afflicts the spiritual substance is the awareness that the fire incarcerates it for its punishment, we can reasonably suppose that the suffering does not cease even if, by God’s dispensation, the spiritual substance should happen for a time to be released from the fire. In the same way a criminal who has been sentenced to perpetual irons feels no dimunition of his unremitting pain even though the chains should be struck off for an hour.

CHAPTER 181

PUNISHMENTS OF PURGATORY FOR UNEXPIATED MORTAL SINS

Although some souls may be admitted to eternal beatitude as soon as they are released from their bodies, others may be held back from this happiness for a time. For it sometimes happens that during their lives people have not done full penance for the sins they have committed, but for which they have been sorry in the end. Since the order of divine justice demands that punishment be undergone for sins, we must hold that souls pay after this life the penalty they have not paid while on earth. This does not mean that they are banished to the ultimate misery of the damned, since by their repentance they have been brought back to the state of charity, whereby they cleave to God as their last end, so that they have merited eternal life. Hence we conclude that there are certain purgatorial punishments after this life, by which the debt of penalty not previously paid is discharged.

CHAPTER 182

PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY FOR VENIAL SINS

It also happens that some men depart this life free from mortal sin but nevertheless stained with venial sin. The commission of such sins does not, indeed, turn them from their last end; but by committing them they have erred with regard to the means leading to the end, out of undue attachment to those means. In the case of some perfect men sins of this kind are expiated by the fervor of their love. But in others these sins must be atoned for by punishment of some sort; no one is admitted to the possession of eternal life unless he is free from all sin and imperfection. Therefore we must acknowledge the existence of purgatorial punishment after this life.

Such punishments derive their cleansing power from the condition of those who suffer them. For the souls in purgatory are adorned with charity, by which their wills are conformed to the divine will; it is owing to this charity that the punishments they suffer avail them for cleansing.

This is why punishment has no cleansing force in those who lack charity, such as the damned. The defilement of their sin remains forever, and so their punishment endures forever.

CHAPTER 183

ETERNAL PUNISHMENT FOR MOMENTARY SIN NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH DIVINE JUSTICE

The suffering of eternal punishment is in no way opposed to divine justice. Even in the laws men make, punishment need not correspond to the offense in point of time. For the crime of adultery or murder, either of which may be committed in a brief span of time, human law may prescribe lifelong exile or even death, by both of which the criminal is banned forever from the society of the state. Exile, it is true, does not last forever, but this is purely accidental, owing to the fact that man's life is not everlasting; but the intention of the judge, we may assume, is to sentence the criminal to perpetual punishment, so far as he can. In the same way it is not unjust for God to inflict eternal punishment for a sin committed in a moment of time.

We should also take into consideration the fact that eternal punishment is inflicted on a sinner who does not repent of his sin, and so he continues in his sin up to his death. And since he is in sin for eternity, he is reasonably punished by God for all eternity. Furthermore, any sin committed against God has a certain infinity when regarded from the side of God, against whom it is committed. For, clearly, the greater the person who is offended, the more grievous is the offense. He who strikes a soldier is held more gravely accountable than if he struck a peasant; and his offense is much more serious if he strikes a prince or a king. Accordingly, since God is infinitely great, an offense committed against Him is in a certain respect infinite; and so a punishment that is in a certain respect infinite is duly attached to it. Such a punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, for nothing created can be infinite in this way. Consequently a punishment that is infinite in duration is rightly inflicted for mortal sin.

Moreover, while a person is still capable of correction, temporal punishment is imposed for his emendation or cleansing. But if a sinner is incorrigible, so that his will is obstinately fixed in sin, as we said above is the case with the damned, his punishment ought never to come to an end.

CHAPTER 184

THE ETERNAL LOT OF OTHER SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES COMPARABLE WITH THAT OF SOULS

In his intellectual nature man resembles the angels, who are capable of sin, as also man is. We spoke of this above. Hence all that has been set forth about the punishment or glory of souls should be understood also of the glory of good angels and the punishment of bad angels. Men and angels exhibit only one point of difference in this regard: the wills of human souls receive confirmation in good or obstinacy in evil when they are separated from their bodies, as was said above; whereas angels were immediately made blessed or eternally wretched as soon as, with full deliberation of will, they fixed upon God or some created good as their end. The variability found in human souls can be accounted for, not only by the liberty of their wills, but also by the modifications their bodies undergo; but in the angels such variability comes from the freedom of will alone. And so angels achieve immutability at the very first choice they make; but souls are not rendered immutable until they leave their bodies.

To express the reward of the good, we say in the Creed: “I believe... in life everlasting.” This life is to be understood as eternal not because of its duration alone, but much more because it is the fruition of eternity. Since in this connection there are proposed for our belief many other truths that concern the punishments of the damned and the final state of the world, the Creed of the Fathers 1” sums up the whole doctrine in this proposition: “I look for... the life of the world to come.” This phrase, “the world to come,” takes in all these points.

SECOND TREATISE ON FAITH

THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST

CHAPTER 185

FAITH IN THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST

As was remarked in the beginning of this work, the Christian faith revolves about two main doctrines: the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ., In the foregoing treatise we reviewed the truths that pertain to the divinity and its effects. We now turn to a consideration of matters pertaining to the humanity of Christ.

Since, however, as the Apostle remarks in 1 Timothy 1:15, “Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners,” we shall do well to inquire first how the human race fell into sin, so that we may understand more clearly how men are freed from their sins through Christ’s humanity.

CHAPTER 186

THE COMMANDS LAID ON THE FIRST MAN, AND HIS PERFECTION IN THE PRISTINE STATE

We saw above that man was originally constituted by God in such a condition that his body was completely subject to his Soul. Further, among the faculties of the soul, the lower powers were subject to reason without any rebelliousness, and man's reason itself was subject to God. In consequence of the perfect subjection of the body to the soul, no passion could arise in the body that would in any way conflict with the soul's dominion over the body. Therefore neither death nor illness had any place in man. And from the subjection of the lower powers to reason there resulted in man complete peace of mind, for the human reason was troubled by no inordinate passions. Finally, owing to the submission of man's will to God, man referred all things to God as to his last end, and in this his justice and innocence consisted.

Of these three subordinations, the last was the cause of the other two. Surely man's freedom from dissolution or from any suffering that would be a threat to his life, did not come from the nature of his body, as we see if we regard its component parts; for the body was made up of contrary elements. Similarly, the fact that man's sense faculties were subservient to reason without any rebelliousness did not come from the nature of the soul, since the sense powers naturally tend toward objects that cause pleasure in the senses, even when, as often happens, delights of this sort are at odds with right reason.

This harmony came from a higher power, the power of God. It was God who, in the first instance, united to the body the rational soul that so immeasurably surpasses the body and the bodily faculties, such as the sense powers. Likewise it was God who gave to the rational soul the power to control the body itself in a manner that exceeded the natural condition of the body, and also to govern the sense faculties so that they would function in a way befitting a rational soul. In order,.therefore, that reason might firmly hold the lower faculties' under its sway, reason itself had to be firmly kept under the dominion of God, from whom it received this power so greatly surpassing the condition of nature. Accordingly man was so constituted that, unless his reason was subservient to God, his body could not be made subject to the beck of the, soul, nor his sense powers be brought under the rule of reason. Hence in that state life was in a certain way immortal and impassible; that is, man could neither die nor suffer, so long as he did not sin. Nevertheless he retained the power to sin, since his will was not yet confirmed in good by the attainment of the last end; in the event that this happened, man could suffer and die.

It is precisely in this respect that the impassibility and immortality possessed by the first man differ from the impassibility and immortality to be enjoyed after the resurrection by the saints, who will never be subject to suffering and death, since their wills will be wholly fixed upon God, as we said above. There is another difference: after the resurrection men will have no use for food or the reproductive functions; but the first man was so constituted that he had to sustain his life with food, and he had a mandate to perform the work of generation; for the human race was to be multiplied from this one parent. Hence he received two commands, in keeping with his condition. The first is that mentioned in Genesis 2:16: “Of every tree of Paradise may eat.” The other is reported in Genesis 1:28: “Increase and multiply and fill the earth.”

CHAPTER 187

THE STATE OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

This wonderfully ordered state of man is called original justice. By it man himself was subject to God on high, and all lower creatures were subordinate to man, as is indicated in Genesis 1:26: “Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air.” And among the component parts of man, the lower were subservient to the higher without any conflict. This state was granted to man, not as to a private individual, but as to the first principle of human nature, so that through him it was to be handed down to his descendants together with human nature.

Moreover, since every one ought to have a habitation befitting his condition, man thus harmoniously constituted was placed in a most temperate and delightful region, so that all inconvenience, not only of internal annoyance, but also of external surroundings, might be far removed from him.

CHAPTER 188

THE TREE OF KNOWLEDGE OF GOOD AND EVIL

This state enjoyed by man depended on the submission of the human will to God. That man might be accustomed from the very beginning to follow God’s will, God laid certain precepts on him. Man was permitted to eat of all the trees in Paradise, with one exception: he was forbidden under pain of death to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Eating of the fruit of this tree was prohibited, not because it was evil in itself, but that at least in this slight matter man might have some precept to observe for the sole reason that it was so commanded by God. Hence eating of the fruit of this tree was evil because it was forbidden. The tree was called the tree of knowledge of good and evil, not because it had the power to cause knowledge, but because of the sequel: by eating of it man learned by experience the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience.

CHAPTER 189

SEDUCTION OF EVE BY THE DEVIL

The devil, who had already fallen into sin, saw that man was so equipped that he could arrive at everlasting happiness, from which the devil himself had been cast out. Yet, as he knew, man could still sin. So he sought to lead man astray from the straight path of justice, by attacking him on his weaker side; that is, he tempted the woman, in whom the gift of light or wisdom shone with a lesser brilliance. The more easily to induce her to break the command, he lyingly drove from her mind the fear of death, and promised her what man naturally desires, namely, the overcoming of ignorance. “Your eyes shall be opened,” he said (Gen. 3:5) ; and in adding: “You shall be as gods,” he held out to her the excellence of greatness. He further promised perfect knowledge, with the words: “knowing good and evil.” On the part of his intellect man naturally shuns ignorance and desires knowledge; and on the part of his will, which is naturally free, he desires high station and perfection, so that he may be subject to no one, or at any rate to as few as possible.

CHAPTER 190

THE WOMAN’S SIN

The woman craved both the promised exaltation and the perfection of knowledge. Added to this were the beauty and sweetness of the fruit, which attracted her to eat of it. And so, scorning the fear of death, she violated God’s command, and ate of the forbidden tree.

Upon analysis, her sin is found to have many aspects. First, there was a sin of pride, whereby she inordinately desired her own excellence. Her second sin was one of curiosity, whereby she coveted knowledge beyond the limits fixed for her. The third sin was that of gluttony, whereby the sweetness of the fruit enticed her to eat. A fourth sin was infidelity, growing out of a false estimate of God, so that she believed the words of the devil who gave the lie to God. Fifthly, there was a sin of disobedience, consisting in a transgression of God’s command.

CHAPTER 191

THE MAN’S SIN

The sin came to the man through the woman’s blandishments. He, however, as the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 2:14, “ was not seduced,” as the woman was. That is, he did not believe the words the devil spoke against God. The thought could not cross his mind that God would utter a lying threat or that He would forbid the use of a thing for no good purpose. Yet he was drawn by the devil’s promise to an undue desire of excellence and knowledge. As a result, his will fell away from the right pursuit of justice and, consenting to his wife’s importunities, he followed her in transgressing the divine command, and ate of the fruit of the forbidden tree.

CHAPTER 192

EFFECT OF THE SIN AS REGARDS THE REBELLION OF THE LOWER FACULTIES AGAINST REASON

The harmonious integrity of the original state depended entirely on the submission of man’s will to God. Consequently, as soon as the human will threw off the yoke of subjection to God, the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason and of the body to the soul likewise disintegrated. As a result, man experienced in his lower, sensitive appetite the inordinate stirrings of concupiscence, anger, and all the other passions. These movements no longer followed the order set by reason but rather resisted reason, frequently darkening the mind and, so to speak, throwing it into confusion. This is that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit which Scripture mentions. For, since the sensitive appetite, like all the other sense powers, operates through a bodily instrument, whereas reason functions without any bodily organ, what pertains to the sensitive appetite is rightly ascribed to the flesh, and what pertains to reason is attributed to the spirit. This is why substances that are without bodies are commonly called spiritual substances.

CHAPTER 193

THE PUNISHMENT AS REGARDS THE NECESSITY OF DYING

A further consequence was that the defect which consists in corruption was experienced in the body, and so man incurred the necessity of dying; his soul was no longer able to sustain the body forever by conferring life on it. Thus man became subject to suffering and death, not only in the sense that he was capable of suffering and dying as before, but in the sense that he was now under the necessity of suffering and dying.

CHAPTER 194

EVILS AFFECTING INTELLECT AND WILL

Many other defects began to appear in man. Inordinate stirrings of passion quickly followed one another in the lower appetites, and at the same time the light of wisdom, which supernaturally illuminated man as long as his will was submissive to God, grew dim in his intellect. The result of this was that man turned his love to sensible objects. Immersed in these, he wandered far from God and fell into repeated sins.

Furthermore, he gave his allegiance to unclean spirits who he thought would help him to live a life of sensual pleasure and to acquire material goods. Through this process, idolatry and various kinds of sins arose in the human race. The more man yielded to their baneful influence, the farther he left behind him the knowledge and desire of spiritual and divine goods.

CHAPTER 195

TRANSMISSION OF THESE EVILS TO POSTERITY

The blessing of original justice was conferred by God on the human race in the person of its first parent, in such a way that it was to be transmitted to his posterity through him. But when a cause is removed, the effect cannot follow. Therefore, when the first man stripped himself of this good by his sin, all his descendants were likewise deprived of it. And so for all time, that is, ever since the sin of the first parent, all men come into the world bereft of original justice and burdened with the defects that attend its loss.

This is in no way against the order of justice, as though God were punishing the sons for the crime of their first father. For the punishment in question is no more than the withdrawing of goods that were supernaturally granted by God to the first man for transmission, through him, to others. These others had no right to such goods, except so far as the gifts were to be passed on to them through their first parent. In the same way a king may reward a soldier with the grant of an estate, which is to be handed on by him to his heirs. If the soldier then commits a crime against the king, and so is adjudged to forfeit the estate, it cannot afterwards pass to his heirs. In this case the sons are justly dispossessed in consequence of their father’s crime.

CHAPTER 196

PRIVATION OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE AS SIN IN ADAM’S DESCENDANTS

But there remains a more pressing question: whether the privation of original justice can have the nature of sin in those who descend from the first parent. The notion of sin seems to require, as we said above, that the evil known as culpable should be in the power of him to whom it is imputed as fault. No one is blamed for that which is beyond his power to do or not to do. But it is not in the power of the person begotten, to be born with original justice or without it. Hence we might be inclined to judge that such a privation cannot have the character of sin.

This question is easily solved if we but distinguish between person and nature. As there are many members in one person, so there are many persons in one human nature. Thus, by sharing in the same species, many men may be thought of as one man, as Porphyry remarks. In this connection we should note that in the sin of one man different sins are committed by different members. Nor does the notion of sin require that the various sins be voluntary by the wills of the members whereby they are committed, for it is enough that they be voluntary by the will of that which is most excellent in man, that is, his intellectual part. For the hand cannot but strike and the foot cannot help walking, when the will so commands.

In this way, then, the privation of original justice is a sin of nature, in the sense that it has its origin in the inordinate will of the first principle in human nature, namely, of the first parent. Thus it is voluntary with respect to nature, that is, by the will of the first principle of nature. And so it is transmitted to all who receive human nature from him, for they are all, as it were, his members.

This is why it is called original sin, for it is transferred from the first parent to his descendants by their origin from him. Other sins, that is, actual sins, pertain immediately to the person who commits them; this sin directly touches nature. The first parent infected nature by his sin, and nature thus contaminated thereupon infects the persons of the children who receive their nature from the first parent.

CHAPTER 197

NOT ALL SINS TRANSMITTED TO POSTERITY

It does not follow, however, that all other sins, either of the first parent or of other parents, are handed down to posterity. For only the first sin of the first parent extirpated in its entirety the gift that had been supernaturally granted to human nature in the person of the first father. This is the reason why sin is said to have corrupted or infected nature. Subsequent sins do not encounter anything of this sort that they can uproot from the whole of human nature. Such sins do, indeed, take away from man, or at least tarnish, some particular good, namely, a personal good; but they do not corrupt nature except so far as nature pertains to this or that person. Since man begets his like not in person but only in nature, the sin that defiles the person is not handed down from a parent to his descendants. Only the first sin that defiled nature as such, is thus transmitted.

CHAPTER 198

INSUFFICIENCY OF ADAM’S MERIT TO RESTORE NATURE

Although the sin of the first parent infected the whole of human nature, neither his repentance nor any merit of his was able to restore nature in its entirety. Adam’s repentance or any other merit of his was clearly the act of an individual person. But no act of any individual can affect the entire nature of the species. Causes that can affect a whole species are equivocal causes, not univocal. The sun is a cause of generation in the whole human species, but a man is only the cause of the generation of a particular man. Hence the individual merit of Adam, or of any other mere man, could not suffice to re-establish the whole of nature. True, all nature was defiled by a single act of the first man; but this effect followed only indirectly, in the sense that, once the state of innocence had been devastated in him, it could not be conveyed through him to others.

Even though Adam were to recover grace through penance, he could not return to his pristine innocence, in view of which God had granted the gift of original justice. Moreover, the state of original justice was manifestly a very special gift of grace. Grace, however, is not acquired by merits, but is given gratis by God. Therefore the original justice which the first man had from the beginning was not the result of his merit, but was a gift of God. Much less, after his sin, could Adam merit it by his repentance, or by the performance of any other work.

CHAPTER 199

THE REPARATION OF HUMAN NATURE BY CHRIST

Nevertheless in the plan of divine providence it was decreed that human nature, which had been ravaged in the manner described, should be restored. It could not be admitted to perfect beatitude unless it were freed of its defilement. Beatitude, being a perfect good, tolerates no defect, especially the defect of sin; for sin is, in its own way, opposed to virtue, which is the path leading to beatitude, as was established above. And so, since man was made for beatitude, seeing that beatitude is his ultimate end, one might conclude that God's work in creating so noble a being was doomed to frustration. But this the Psalmist holds to be inadmissible, for he says in Psalm 88:48: "Hast You made all the children of men in vain?" Accordingly it was fitting that human nature should be restored.

Furthermore, divine goodness exceeds the creature's capacity for good. As long as man leads a mortal life in this world, we know that his condition is such that he is neither immovably confirmed in good nor immovably obstinate in evil. Hence the very condition of human nature implies that it is capable of being cleansed from the contamination of sin. Surely the divine goodness would hardly allow this capacity to remain forever unrealized; but this would have been so had God not provided a remedy devised for man's restoration.

CHAPTER 200

RESTORATION OF MAN BY GOD THROUGH THE INCARNATION

We indicated above that the reparation of human nature could not be effected either by Adam or by any other purely human being. For no individual man ever occupied a position of pre-eminence over the whole of nature; nor can any mere man be the cause of grace. The same reasoning shows that not even an angel could be the author of man’s restoration. An angel cannot be the cause of grace, just as he cannot be man’s recompense with regard to the ultimate perfection of beatitude, to which man was to be recalled. In this matter of beatitude angels and men are on a footing of equality. Nothing remains, therefore, but that such restoration could be effected by God alone.

But if God had decided to restore man solely by an act of His will and power, the order of divine justice would not have been observed. justice demands satisfaction for sin. But God cannot render satisfaction, just as He cannot merit. Such a service pertains to one who is subject to another. Thus God was not in a position to satisfy for the sin of the whole of human nature; and a mere man was unable to do so, as we have just shown. Hence divine Wisdom judged it fitting that God should become man, so that thus one and the same person would be able both to restore man and to offer satisfaction. This is the reason for the divine Incarnation assigned by the Apostle in 1 Timothy 1:15: “Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.”

CHAPTER 201

OTHER REASONS FOR THE INCARNATION

There are also other reasons for the divine Incarnation. Man had withdrawn from spiritual things and had delivered himself up wholly to material things, from which he was unable by his own efforts to make his way back to God. Therefore divine Wisdom, who had made man, took to Himself a bodily nature and visited man immersed in things of the body, so that by the mysteries of His bodily life He might recall man to spiritual life.

Furthermore, the human race had need that God should become man to show forth the dignity of human nature, so that man might not be subjugated either by devils or by things of the body.

At the same time, by willing to become man, God clearly displayed the immensity of His love for men, so that henceforth men might serve God, no longer out of fear of death, which the first man had scorned, but out of the love of charity.

Moreover, the Incarnation holds up to man an ideal of that blessed union whereby the created intellect is joined, in an act of understanding, to the uncreated Spirit. It is no longer incredible that a creature’s intellect should be capable of union with God by beholding the divine essence, since the time when God became united to man by taking a human nature to Himself.

Lastly, the Incarnation puts the finishing touch to the whole vast work envisaged by God. For man, who was the last to be created, returns by a sort of circulatory movement to his first beginning, being united by the work. of the Incarnation to the very principle of all things.

CHAPTER 202

THE ERROR OF PHOTINUS CONCERNING THE INCARNATION

This mystery of the divine Incarnation, Photinus set aside, so far as he could. Following Ebion, Cerinthus and Paul of Samosata, he asserted that our Lord Jesus Christ was no more than a man and that He did not exist before the Virgin Mary, but earned the glory of divinity by the merit of a blessed life and by patiently enduring death; and thus He was called God, not on account of His nature, but by the grace of adoption. In this event no union of God with man would have been effected; only a man would be deified by grace. Elevation of this sort is not peculiar to Christ, but is common to all the saints, although some may be considered more highly endowed with such grace than others.

This error contradicts the authority of Sacred Scripture. In John 1:1 we read: “In the beginning was the Word.” Shortly after the Evangelist adds: “And the Word was made flesh.” Hence the Word that in the beginning was with God assumed flesh. But Scripture does not say that a man who lacked previous existence was deified by the grace of adoption.

Likewise, in John 6:38 the Lord says: “I came down from heaven, not to do My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me.” According to the error of Photinus, Christ could not come down from heaven, but could only go up to heaven. Against him is the Apostle, who says in Ephesians 4:9: “That He ascended, what is it but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?” This enables us to understand clearly that the Ascension would have no place in Christ unless His descent from heaven had preceded.

CHAPTER 203

ERROR OF NESTORIUS ABOUT THE INCARNATION

Nestorius wished to avoid this contradiction. In part he disagreed with the error of Photinus; for Nestorius held that Christ was the Son of God not only by the grace of adoption, but by the divine nature in which He existed coeternal with the Father. In part, however, he sided with Photinus, because he taught that the Son of God was united to man by mere habitation in him, but not in such a way that there was only one person who was both God and man. And so that man who, according to Photinus, is called God through grace alone, is called the son of God by Nestorius, not because he is truly God, but because the Son of God dwells in him through the inhabitation effected by grace.

This error is likewise opposed to the authority of Sacred Scripture. For the union of God with man is called by the Apostle an "emptying"; in Philippians 2:6 he says of the Son of God: "Who, being in the form of God, thought is not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant." But there is no emptying of God when He dwells in a rational creature by grace. Otherwise the Father and the Holy Spirit would be emptied out also, since they too dwell in the rational creature by grace. Thus in John 14:23 our Lord says of Himself and the Father: "We will come to him and will make our abode with him." And in 1 Corinthians 3:16 the Apostle says of the Holy Spirit: "The Spirit of God dwells in you."

Moreover, the man in question could hardly use words signifying divinity unless He were personally God. He would have been guilty of supreme presumption in saying, as He does in John 10:30: "I and the Father are one," and also in 8:58: "Before Abraham was made, I am." For the pronoun

“I” indicates the person of the speaker; but He who uttered these words was a man. Hence the person of God and this man are one and the same.

To preclude such errors, both the Apostles’ Creed and the Creed of the Nicene Fathers, after mentioning the person of the Son, add that He was conceived of the Holy Spirit, was born, suffered, died, and rose. Surely what pertains to the man would not be predicated of the Son of God unless the person of the Son of God and of the man were the same. What is proper to one person is, by that very fact, not said of another person; for example, what is proper to Paul is, for that precise reason, not predicated of Peter.

CHAPTER 204

THE ERROR OF ARIUS ABOUT THE INCARNATION

In their eagerness to proclaim the unity of God and man in Christ, some heretics went to the opposite extreme and taught that not only was there one person, but also a single nature, in God and man. This error took its rise from Arius. To defend his position that those scriptural passages where Christ is represented as being inferior to the Father, must refer to the Son of God Himself, regarded in His assuming nature, Arius taught that in Christ there is no other soul than the Word of God who, he maintained, took the place of the soul in Christ’s body. Thus when Christ says, in John 14:28, “The Father is greater than I,” or when He is introduced as praying or as being sad, such matters are to be referred to the very nature of the Son of God. If this were so, the union of God’s Son with man would be effected not only in the person, but also in the nature. For, as we know, the unity of human nature arises from the union of soul and body.

The falsity of this position, so far as regards the assertion that the Son is less than the Father, was brought out above, when we showed that the Son is equal to the Father. And with respect to the theory that the Word of God took the place of the soul in Christ, the absurdity of this error can be shown by reverting to a point previously set forth. For, as we demonstrated above, the soul is united to the body as the latter’s form. But God cannot be the form of a body, as we also demonstrated above.’s Arius could not counter by maintaining that this is to be understood of God the Father on high, since the same can be proved even of the angels, namely, that they cannot, of their very nature, be united to a body in the manner of a form, seeing that by nature they are separated from bodies. Much less, then, can the Son of

God, by whom the angels were made, as even Arius admits, be the form of a body.

Besides, even if the Son of God were a creature, as Arius falsely teaches, He nevertheless excels all created spirits in beatitude, according to the heresiarch himself. But the beatitude of the angels is so great that they can suffer no sadness. Their happiness would not be true and complete if anything were wanting to their desires, since the very notion of beatitude requires that it be the ultimate and perfect good wholly satisfying all desire. Much less can the Son of God be subject to sadness or fear in His divine nature. Yet we read that He was sad: “He began to fear and to be heavy,” “and to be sad” (Mark 14:33; Matt. 26:37). And He Himself gave witness of His sorrow, saying, “My soul is sorrowful even unto death” (Mark 14:34). Sadness, assuredly, pertains not to the body, but to some substance capable of apprehension. Therefore, besides the Word and the body, there must have been in Christ another substance that could suffer sadness; and this we call the soul.

Moreover, if Christ assumed what is ours for the purpose of cleansing us of sin, and if our greater need was to be cleansed in soul, from which sin arises and which is the subject of sin, we must conclude that He assumed not a body without a soul, but a body together with its soul, since the soul was the more important part for Him to assume.

CHAPTER 205

THE ERROR OF APOLLINARIS IN REGARD TO THE INCARNATION

These considerations also refute the error of Apollinaris,who at first followed Arius in refusing to admit any soul in Christ other than the Word of God. However, he did not follow Arius in teaching that the Son of God was a creature; for many things are narrated of Christ which cannot be ascribed to the body, and which are inadmissible in the Creator, such as sadness, fear, and the like. He was, then, at length driven to acknowledge the existence in Christ of some soul which gave sense life to the body and could be the subject of such passions. Yet this soul was without reason and intellect, and the Word Himself took the place of intellect and reason in the man Christ.

This theory is shown to be false on many grounds. In the first place, the very concept of nature is incompatible with the opinion that a non-rational soul is the form of man, whose body nevertheless must have some form. But nothing monstrous or unnatural can be thought of in connection with Christ’s incarnation. Secondly, this hypothesis would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, namely, the reparation of human nature. Above all, human nature needs to be restored in the intellectual sphere, for that which can have part in sin is precisely the rational soul. Hence it chiefly befitted God’s Son to assume man’s intellectual nature. Besides, Christ is said to have marveled. But surprise cannot be experienced without a rational soul, and of course is wholly inadmissible in God. Therefore, as the sorrow Christ experienced forces us to admit that He had a sensitive soul, so the wonderment He expressed compels us to acknowledge the existence of a rational soul in Him.

CHAPTER 206

THE ERROR OF EUTYCHES REGARDING UNION IN NATURE

To some extent, Eutyches embraced the error of these heresiarchs. He taught that there was one nature common to both God and man after the Incarnation. However, he did not hold that Christ was lacking in soul or in intellect or in anything pertaining to the integrity of nature.

The erroneousness of this theory is plainly apparent. The divine nature is perfect in itself, and is incapable of change. But a nature that is perfect in itself cannot combine with another nature to form a single nature unless it is changed into that other nature (as food is changed into the eater), or unless the other nature is changed into it (as wood is changed into fire), or unless both natures are transformed into a third nature (as elements are when they combine to form a mixed body). The divine immutability excludes all these alternatives. For neither that which is changed into another thing, nor that into which another thing can be changed, is immutable. Since, therefore, the divine nature is perfect in itself, it can in no way combine with some other nature to form a single nature.

Moreover, as we see if we reflect on the order of things, the addition of a greater perfection causes variation in the species of a nature. Thus a thing that not only exists but lives, for example, a plant, differs in species from a thing that merely exists. And that which exists and lives and feels, for instance, an animal, differs in species from the plant, which merely exists and lives. Likewise a being that exists, lives, feels, and understands, namely, a man, differs in species from the brute animal, which merely exists, lives, and feels. Accordingly, if the single nature which the Eutychean theory ascribes to Christ has the perfection of divinity in addition to all these other perfections, that nature necessarily differs in species from human nature, in the way that human nature differs specifically from the nature of a brute animal. On this supposition, consequently, Christ would not be a man of the same species as other men, a conclusion shown to be false by Christ’s descent from men according to the flesh. This is brought out by Matthew in his Gospel, which begins with the words: “The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham,” and so on.

CHAPTER 207

REFUTATION OF THE MANICHAEAN ERROR CONCERNING THE NATURE OF CHRIST’S BODY

Photinus emptied the mystery of the Incarnation of all meaning by denying Christ’s divine nature. The Manichaean did the same by denying Christ’s human nature. He held that the whole of material creation was the work of the devil and that the Son of the good God could not becomingly take to Himself a creature of the devil. Therefore he taught that Christ did not have real flesh but only phantom flesh. Consequently he asserted that everything narrated in the Gospel as pertaining to the human nature of Christ, was done in appearance only and not in very truth.

This theory plainly gives the lie to Sacred Scripture, which relates that Christ was born of the Virgin, that He was circumcised, that He was hungry, that He ate, and that He had other experiences common to the nature of human flesh. Hence in recording such things of Christ, what is written in the Gospels would be false.

Besides, Christ says of Himself: “For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth” (John 18:37). If He had displayed in Himself what really did not exIst, He would have been a witness not of truth but rather of error; especially since He foretold that He would suffer that which He could not suffer without a body, namely, that He would be betrayed into the hands of men, that He would be spat upon, scourged, and crucified. Accordingly, to say that Christ did not have true flesh and that He suffered such indignities not in truth but only in appearance, is to accuse Him of lying.

Furthermore, to banish true conviction from men’s minds is the act of a liar. Christ did expel a certain notion from the minds of His disciples. After His resurrection He appeared to the disciples, who thought that He was a spirit or a specter. To banish suspicion of this kind from their hearts, He said to them: “Handle and see: for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have” (Luke 24:39). On another occasion, when He was walking on the sea, to the consternation of His disciples who thought He was an apparition, our Lord said: “It is I, fear ye not” (Matt. 14:27). If the opinion entertained by the disciples about a spectral body is true, we have to concede that Christ was deceitful. But Christ is the Truth, as He testified of Himself. Therefore the Manichaean theory is false.

CHAPTER 208

THE REALITY OF CHRIST’S EARTHLY BODY, AGAINST VALENTINUS

Valentinus admitted that Christ had a real body. However, he insisted that our Lord did not take flesh from the Blessed Virgin, but rather brought down with Him a body formed of celestial matter. This body passed through the Virgin without receiving anything from her, much as water passes through a canal.

This hypothesis, too, contradicts the truth of Scripture. In Romans 1:3 the Apostle says that God’s Son “was made to Him of the seed of David, according to the flesh.” And in Galatians 4:4 St. Paul writes: “God sent His Son, made of a woman.” Matthew likewise relates: “And Jacob begot Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ” (Matt. 1:16). A little later Matthew refers to her as Christ’s mother: “When His mother Mary was espoused to Joseph,” etc. None of this would be true if Christ had not received His flesh from the Virgin. Accordingly the doctrine that Christ brought with Him a celestial body is false.

True, in 1 Corinthians 15:47 the Apostle states that “the second man” [Christ, as contrasted with Adam, the first man] was “from heaven, heavenly.” But this is to be understood in the sense that He came down from heaven in His divinity, not according to the substance of His body.

Moreover, there would be no reason why the Son of God, bringing His body from heaven, should have entered the Virgin’s womb, if He were to receive nothing from her. Such a procedure would seem to be a kind of deceit if, coming forth from His mother’s womb, He were to intimate that He had received from her a body which in fact He had not received. Since, therefore, all falsehood is foreign to Christ, we must acknowledge without reservation that He came forth from the Virgin’s womb in such a way that He really took His flesh from her.

CHAPTER 209

THE TEACHING OF FAITH ABOUT THE INCARNATION

We can gather together the various points established in the foregoing chapters and assert that, according to the true teaching of Catholic faith, Christ had a real body of the same nature as ours, a true rational soul, and, together with these, perfect deity. These three substances are united in one person, but do not combine to form one nature.

In undertaking to explain this truth, some theologians have taken the wrong path. Persuaded that every perfection accruing to a being subsequent to its complete existence is joined to it accidentally, as a garment is joined to a man, certain theologians taught that humanity was joined to divinity in the person of the Son by an accidental union, in such a way that the assumed nature would be related to the person of God's Son as clothing is related to a man. To bolster up this view, they brought forward what the Apostle says of Christ in Philippians 2:7, that He was "in habit found as a man." Likewise, they reflected that from the union of soul and body an individual possessed of rational nature is formed, and that such an individual is called a person. If, therefore, the soul was united to the body in Christ, they were unable to see how they could escape the conclusion that a person would be constituted by such a union. In this event there would be two persons in Christ, the person who assumes and the person who is assumed. On the other hand, there are not two persons in a man who is clothed, because clothing does not possess what is required for the notion of a person. If, however, the clothes were a person, there would be two persons in a clothed man. To avoid this conclusion, therefore, some proposed that

Christ’s soul was never united to His body, but that the person of God’s Son assumed soul and body separately.

This view, while trying to escape one absurdity, falls into a greater, for it entails the necessary consequence that Christ would not be true man. Surely true human nature requires the union of soul and body; a man is a being made up of both. A further consequence is that Christ would not be true flesh, and that none of His members would be a true member. For if the soul is taken away, there is no eye or hand or flesh and bone, except in an equivocal sense, as when these parts of the body are depicted in paint or fashioned in stone. Further, it would follow that Christ did not really die. Death is the privation of life. Obviously the divinity could not be deprived of life by death, and the body could not be alive if a soul were not united to it. A final consequence would be that Christ’s body could not experience sensation; for the body has no sensation except through the soul united to it.

This theory falls back into the heresy of Nestorius, which it set out to overthrow. The error of Nestorius consisted in holding that the Word of God was united to Christ the man by the indwelling of grace, so that the Word of God would reside in that man as in His temple. It makes no difference, with regard to the doctrine proposed, whether we say that the Word is in the man as in a temple, or whether we say that human nature is joined to the Word as a garment to the person wearing it, except that the second opinion is the worse, inasmuch as it cannot admit that Christ was true man. Accordingly this view is condemned, and deservedly so. Moreover, the man who is clothed cannot be the person of the clothes or garment, nor can he in any way be said to be in the species of clothing. If, therefore, the Son of God took human nature to Himsel ‘ f, He cannot in any sense be called the person of the human nature, nor can He be said to pertain to the same species as the rest of men. Yet the Apostle says of Him that He was “made in the likeness of men” (Phil. 2:7). Clearly, therefore, this theory is to be utterly rejected.

CHAPTER 210

EXCLUSION OF TWO SUPPOSITA IN CHRIST

Other theologians, wishing to avoid these absurdities, proposed that in Christ the soul was indeed united to the body, and that this union constituted a certain man who, they maintained, was assumed by the Son of God in unity of person. By reason of this assumption they said that the man in question was the Son of God and that the Son of God was that man. Further, since this assumption had unity of person as its terminus, they admitted that in Christ there was one person of God and man. But since this man who, they maintain, is composed of soul and body, is a certain suppositum or hypostasis of human nature, they place two supposita and two hypostases in Christ: one of human nature, created and temporal; the other of divine nature, uncreated and eternal.

As far as words go, this view appears to recede from the error of Nestorius. But if we examine it a little more closely, we find that it slips into the heresy identified with Nestorius. For a person, clearly, is nothing else than an individual substance possessed of rational nature. But human nature is rational. Therefore by the very fact that a hypostasis or suppositum of human nature, temporal and created, is admitted in Christ, a person that is temporal and created is also admitted in Him. This is precisely what the name of suppositum. or hypostasis signifies, namely, an individual substance. Accordingly, if these people understand what they are saying, they must place two persons in Christ when they place two supposita or two hypostases in Him.

Another consideration is the following. Things that differ as supposita exist in such a way that what is proper to one cannot belong to another.

Therefore, if the Son of God is not the same suppositum as the son of man, it follows that what belongs to the son of man cannot be attributed to the Son of God, and vice versa. Hence we could not say that God was crucified or born of the Virgin: which is characteristic of the Nestorian infamy.

If anyone should undertake to protest, in reply to this, that what pertains to the man in question is ascribed to the Son of God, and conversely, because of the unity of person, even though the supposita may be different, his answer simply cannot stand. Evidently the eternal suppositum of the Son of God is nothing else than His very person. Hence whatever is said of the Son of God by reason of His person, would also be said of Him by reason of His suppositum. But what pertains to the man is not said of Him by reason of His suppositum, for the Son of God is represented as differing from the son of man in suppositum. Therefore what is proper to the son of man, such as his birth from the Virgin, his death, and the like, cannot be said of the Son of God by reason of the person.

Furthermore, if the name of God is predicated of a temporal suppositum, this will be something recent and new. But any being that is recently and newly called God, is not God unless he has been made God. What is made God, however, is God not by nature, but only by adoption. Consequently the man in question would be God, not in fact and by nature, but merely by adoption: which, again, pertains to the error of Nestorius.

CHAPTER 211

ONE SUPPOSITUM AND ONE PERSON IN CHRIST

Accordingly we must say that in Christ there is not only one person of God and man, but also that there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. There is not, however, only one nature, but two natures.

To see that this is so, we have but to reflect that the names "person," "hypostasis," and "suppositum" signify a whole of a certain kind. We cannot say that a hand or flesh or any of the other parts is a person or a hypostasis or a suppositum; but this whole, which is this man, is such. But names that are common to individuals in the line of substance and accident, such as "individual" and "singular," can be applied both to a whole and to its parts. Parts have something in common with accidents, in the sense that they do not exist by themselves, but inhere in other things, although in a different way. We can say that the hand of Socrates or Plato is a certain kind of individual or singular thing, even though it is not a hypostasis or a suppositum or a person.

Furthermore, we should note that sometimes a union of various ingredients, considered just in itself, constitutes an integral whole, although in another being it does not constitute an integral whole, because the addition of some other component is needed. Thus in a stone the combination of the four elements constitutes an integral whole; and so the object composed of the elements can, in the stone, be called a suppositum or hypostasis, which is this stone. It cannot, of course, be called a person, because it is not a hypostasis endowed with rational nature. But the combination of elements in an animal constitutes, not an integral whole, but only a part, namely, the body. Something else must be added to make up the complete animal, and this is the soul. Hence the combination of elements in an animal does not constitute a suppositum or hypostasis; rather, this whole animal is the hypostasis or suppositum. Nevertheless the combination~ of the elements is not, on this account, any less effectual in an animal than in a stone, but is rather more so, because it is ordained to the formation of a nobler being.

In all men save one the union of soul and body constitutes a hypostasis and suppositum, beause in their case the hypostasis or suppositum is nothing else but these two components. But in our Lord Jesus Christ, besides soul and body, a third substance enters in, namely, the Godhead. In Him, therefore, the composite of body and soul is not a separate suppositum or hypostasis, nor is it a person. The suppositum, hypostasis, or person is that which is made up of three substances, namely, the body, the soul, and the divinity. In Christ, accordingly, just as there is but one person, so there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But the way His soul is joined to His body differs from the way His divinity is united to both. His soul comes to the body as its self-existing form, so that one nature, which is called human nature, is composed of these two. But the Godhead does not come to the soul and body as a form or as a part; this is against the very concept of divine perfection. Therefore the divinity and the soul and the body do not constitute one nature; but the divine nature, complete in itself and existing in its purity, took to itself, in a way that is incomprehensible and indescribable, the human nature composed of soul and body. This called for an exercise of God’s infinite power. For we know from experience that, in proportion to an agent’s power, the more effectively he avails himself of the instrument he uses to carry out an undertaking. Therefore, as the divine power, because of its infinity, is infinite and incomprehensible, the way Christ united human nature to Himself, as a sort of organ to effect man’s salvation, is beyond human expression and surpasses every other union of God with creatures.

We pointed out above that person, hypostasis, and suppositum signify an integral whole. Hence if the divine nature in Christ had the function of a part, like the soul in the composition of a man, and were not something whole, then the one person of Christ would not be accounted for by the divine nature alone, but would be a certain composite of three elements, just as in man the person, hypostasis, and suppositum is a composite of soul and body. However, since the divine natuie is an integral whole that took human nature to itself by a mysterious, ineffable union, the person is accounted for by the divine nature, as also is the hypostasis and suppositum. Yet the soul and body are drawn to the personality of the divine person, so that He is the person of the Son of God and is likewise the person and the hypostasis and suppositum of the Son of man.

Some sort of example of this can be found in creatures. Thus subject and accident are not united in such a way that some third thing is formed from them. In a union of this kind, the subject does not have the function of a part, but is an integral whole, which is a person, hypostasis, and suppositum. But the accident is drawn to the personality of the subject, so that the person of the man and of the color of whiteness is one and the same, and the hypostasis or suppositum is likewise the same. In a somewhat similar fashion the person, hypostasis, and suppositum of the Son of God is the person, hypostasis, and suppositum of the human nature in Christ. Influenced by comparisons of this sort, some theologians went so far as to say that the human nature in Christ deteriorates into an accident and is accidentally united to the Son of God; they were unable to discriminate between literal truth and analogy.

In any case, the foregoing exposition makes it clear that there is no other person in Christ but the eternal person, who is the person of the Son of God. Nor is there any other hypostasis or suppositum. Hence when we say, “this man,” pointing to Christ, we mean the eternal suppositum. Nevertheless the name “man” is not for that reason predicated equivocally of Christ and of other men. Equivocation does not follow diversity of supposition, but follows diversity of signification. The name of man, as attributed to Peter and to Christ, signifies the same thing, namely, human nature. But it does not have the same supposition; for in the one case it stands for the eternal suppositum of the Son of God, in the other case it stands for a created suppositum.

Since, however, we can predicate of a suppositum of any nature all that is proper to that nature to which the suppositum pertains, and since in Christ the suppositum of the human nature is the same as the suppositum of the divine nature, it is evident that everything belonging to the divine nature and everything belonging to the human nature can be predicated indifferently of this suppositum which pertains to both natures. This is true both when the name we use signifies the divine nature or person, and when it signifies the human nature. We can say, for example, that the Son of God is eternal, and that the Son of God was born of the Virgin. Likewise we can say that this man is God, that He created the stars, and that He was born, died, and was buried.

What is predicated of a suppositum, is predicated of it according to some form or matter. Thus Socrates is white according to the whiteness of his skin and is rational according to his soul. But, as we pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, in Christ there are two natures and one suppositum. Therefore, if reference is made to the suppositum, human and divine attributes are to be predicated indifferently of Christ. Yet we must heed the sense in which each attribute is predicated; that is, divine attributes are predicated of Christ according to His divine nature, and human attributes are predicated of Him according to His human nature.

CHAPTER 212

UNITY AND MULTIPLICITY IN CHRIST

Since there are in Christ one person and two natures, we have to examine the relationship between them to determine what is to be spoken of as one, and what is to be spoken of as multiple in Him.

Whatever is multiplied in accord with the diversity of Christ’s natures, must be acknowledged to be plural in Him. -In this connection we must consider, first of all, that nature is received by generation or birth. Consequently, as there are two natures in Christ, there must also be two generations or births: one that is eternal, whereby He received divine nature from His Father, and one that occurred in time, whereby He received human nature from His mother. Likewise, whatever is rightly attributed to God and man as pertaining to nature, must be predicated of Christ in the plural. To God are ascribed intellect and will and their perfections, such as knowledge or wisdom, and charity, and justice. These are also attributed to man as pertaining to human nature; for’ will and intellect are faculties of the soul, and their perfections are wisdom, justice, and the like. Therefore we must acknowledge two intellects in Christ, one human and one divine, and likewise two wills, as well as a double knowledge and charity, namely, the created and the uncreated.

But whatever belongs to the suppositum or hypostasis, must be declared to be one in Christ. Hence if existence is taken in the sense that one suppositum has one existence, we are forced, it appears, to assert that there is but one existence in Christ. Of course, as is evident, when a whole is divided, each separate part has its own proper existence; but according as parts are considered in a whole, they do not have their own existence, for they all exist with the existence of the whole. Therefore, if we look upon

Christ as an integral suppositum having two natures, His existence will be but one, just as the suppositum, too, is one.

Since actions belong to supposita, some have thought that, as there is but one suppositum in Christ, so there is only one kind of action in Him. But they did not rightly weigh the matter. For many actions are discerned in any individual, if there are many principles of activity in him. Thus in man the action of understanding differs from the action of sense perception, because of the difference between sense and intellect. Likewise in fire the action of heating differs from the action of soaring upward, because of the difference between heat and lightness. Nature is related to action as its principle. Therefore it is not true that Christ has only one kind of activity because of the one suppositum. Rather, there are two kinds of action in Him, because of the two natures, just as, conversely, there is in the Holy Trinity but one activity of the three persons because of the one nature.

Nevertheless the activity of Christ’s humanity has some part in the activity proper to His divine power. For of all the factors that come together in a suppositum, that which is the most eminent is served by the rest in an instrumental capacity, just as all the lesser faculties of man are instruments of his intellect. Thus in Christ the human nature is held to be, as it were, the organ of His divine nature. But it is clear that an instrument acts in virtue of the principal agent. This is why, in the action of an instrument, we are able to discern not only the power of the instrument, but also that of the principal agent. A chest is made by the action of an axe, but only so far as the axe is directed by the carpenter. In like manner the activity of the human nature in Christ received a certain efficacy from the divine nature, over and above its human power. When Christ touched a leper, the action belonged to His human nature; but the fact that the touch cured the man of his leprosy, is owing to the power of the divine nature. In this way all the human actions and sufferings of Christ were efficacious for our salvation in virtue of His divinity. For this reason Dionysius calls the human activity of Christ “theandric,” that is, divine-human, because actions of this sort proceeded from His human nature in such a way that the power of the divinity was operative in them.

A doubt is raised by some theologians concerning sonship, whether there is only one filiation in Christ because of the oneness of the suppositum, or two filiations because of the duality of His nativity. It may seem that there are two filiations; for when a cause is multiplied the effect is multiplied, and the cause of sonship is nativity. Since, therefore, there are two nativities of Christ, the consequence may seem to follow that there are also two filiations.

This view is not rejected by the fact that filiation is a personal relation, that is, that it constitutes a person. In the case of Christ, this is true of the divine filiation; the human filiation does not constitute a person, but comes to a person already constituted as such. In the same way there is no reason why one man should not be related to his father and mother by a single filiation; he is born of both parents by the same nativity. Wherever the cause of a relation is the same, the relation is in reality but one, even though it may have many respects. There is nothing to prevent a thing from having a reference to another thing, even though no relation is really in it. Thus the knowable is referred to knowledge, although no relation exists in it. So, too, there is no reason why a single real relation should not have a number of respects. just as a relation depends on its cause for its existence as a certain thing, so it also depends on its cause for the fact that it is one or multiple. Therefore, since Christ does not proceed from His Father and His mother by the same nativity, there may seem to be in Him two real filiations because of the two nativities.

But there is one reason why several real filiations cannot be attributed to Christ. Not everything that is generated by another can be called a son; only a complete suppositum can be called a son. Not a man’s hand or foot, but the whole individual, Peter or John, is called son. Hence the proper subject of filiation is the suppositum itself. But we have shown that the only suppositum in Christ is the uncreated suppositum, which cannot receive any real relation beginning in time; as we intimated above, every relation of God to creatures is purely mental. Consequently the filiation whereby the eternal suppositum of the Son is related to His virgin mother cannot be a real relation, but must be a purely mental relation.

However, this does not prevent Christ from being really and truly the Son of His virgin mother, because He was truly born of her. In the same way God is really and truly the Lord of His creatures, because He possesses real power to coerce them; yet the relation of dominion is attributed to God only by a mental operation. Of course, if there were several supposita in Christ, as some theologians have taught,87 there would be nothing to keep us from admitting two filiations in Christ, for in that case the created suppositum would be subject to temporal sonship.

CHAPTER 213

PERFECTION OF GRACE AND WISDOM IN CHRIST

As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, the humanity of Christ is related to His divinity as a sort of organ belonging to it. The disposition and quality of organs are gauged chiefly by the purpose, though also by the dignity, of the person using them. Consequently we are to esteem the quality of the human nature assumed by the Word of God in accord with these norms. The purpose the Word of God had in assuming human nature was the salvation and reparation of human nature. Therefore Christ had to be of such excellence in His human nature that He could fittingly be the author of man's salvation. But the salvation of man consists in the enjoyment of God, whereby man is beatified; and so Christ must have had in His human nature a perfect enjoyment of God. For the principle in any genus must be perfect. But fruition of God has a twofold aspect: it requires the satisfaction of the will and of the intellect. The will must adhere unreservedly to God by love, the intellect must know God perfectly.

Perfect attachment of the will to God is brought about by love and by grace, whereby man is justified, according to Romans 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace." For man is made just by union with God through love. Perfect knowledge of God is effected by the light of wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine truth. Therefore the incarnate Word of God had to be perfect in grace and in the wisdom of truth. Hence we read in John 1:14: "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

CHAPTER 214

THE FULLNESS OF CHRIST’S GRACE

First we shall deal with the question of the fullness of grace in Christ. In this matter we should observe that the term, grace, may be understood in two senses. According to one usage, it means to be pleasing (gratum): we say that someone is in the good graces of another because he is pleasing to him. In another sense, it means that something is given gratis: a person is said to grant a grace to another when he confers gratis a benefit on that other.

These two meanings of grace are not wholly unconnected. A thing is given gratis to another because he to whom it is given is pleasing (gratus) to the giver, either simply or in some respect. The recipient is simply pleasing to the giver, when he is pleasing to such an extent that the giver associates him with himself in some way. For those whom we hold dear (quos gratos habemus) we attract to ourselves as far as we can, according to the quantity and degree in which they are dear to us. But the recipient is pleasing to the giver only in some respect when he is pleasing to the extent that he receives something from him, although not to the extent that he is taken into association by the donor. Clearly, therefore, everyone who has favor (qui habet gratiam) with another, has something given to him gratis; but not everyone who has something given to him gratis is pleasing (gratus) to the donor. Hence we ordinarily distinguish between two kinds of grace: one, namely, which is only given gratis, and the other which, in addition, makes pleasing (gratum facit). A thing is said to be given gratis if it is in no way due.

A thing may be due in two ways, either according to nature or according to operation. According to nature, whatever the natural order of a thing requires, is due to it; thus the possession of reason and hands and feet is due to man. According to operation, a thing is due in the way that a recompense is due to a worker. Therefore those gifts are given gratis by God to men, which exceed the order of nature and are not acquired by merits; although even gifts that are conferred by God because of merits sometimes retain the name and character of grace, because the principle of meriting comes from grace, and also because rewards are given over and above what human merits require, as we learn from Romans 6:23: “The grace of God, life everlasting.”

Among such gifts, some exceed the capacity of human nature and are not given for merits. However, the fact that a man has these gifts does not prove that he is thereby rendered pleasing to God. Examples are the gifts of prophecy, of working miracles, of knowledge, of teaching, or any other such gifts divinely conferred. By these and like gifts man is not united to God, except, perhaps, by a certain similarity, so far as he shares to some extent in His goodness; but everything is assimilated to God in this way. Yet some gifts do render man pleasing to God, and join man to Him. Such gifts are called graces, not only because they are given gratis, but also because they make man pleasing to God.

The union of man with God is twofold. One way is by affection, and this is brought about by charity, which in a certain sense makes man one with God in affection, as is said in 1 Corinthians 6:17: “He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.” Through this virtue God dwells in man, according to John 14:23: “If anyone love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him and will make Our abode with him.” It also causes man to be in God, according to I John 4: 16: “He who abides in charity abides in God, and God in him.” By receiving this gratuitous gift, therefore, man is made pleasing to God, and he is brought so far that by the love of charity he becomes one spirit with God: he is in God and God is in him. Hence the Apostle teaches, in 1 Corinthians 13:1-3, that without charity the other gifts do not profit men: they cannot make men pleasing to God unless charity is present.

This grace is common to all the saints. And so the man Christ, when asking for this grace for His disciples in prayer, begs: “That they may be one,” namely, by the bond of love, as We also are one” (John 17:22).

There is another conjunction of man with God that is brought about, not only by affection or inhabitation, but also by the unity of hypostasis or person, so that one and the same hypostasis or person is both God and man. And this conjunction of man with God is proper to Jesus Christ. We have already spoken at length of this union. In truth, this is a singular grace of the man Christ, that He is united to God in unity of person. Clearly the grace was given gratis, for it exceeds the capacity of nature, and besides, there were no merits to precede this gift. But it also makes Him supremely pleasing to God, so that the Father says of Him in a unique sense: “This is My beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased” (Matt. 3: 17; 17: 5),

The difference between these two graces seems to be as follows. The grace whereby man is united to God by affection exists in the soul as something habitual. For that union is accomplished through an act of love, and perfect acts issue from habit; consequently some habitual grace is infused into the soul to produce that eminently perfect habit whereby the soul is united to God by love. On the other hand, personal or hypostatic being is constituted, not by any habit, but by the natures to which the hypostases or persons pertain. Therefore the union of human nature with God in unity of person is brought about, not by some habitual grace, but by the conjunction of the natures themselves in one person.

The closer any creature draws to God, the more it shares in His goodness, and the more abundantly it is filled with gifts infused by Him. Thus he who comes closer to a fire, shares to a greater extent in its heat. But there can be no way, nor can any be imagined, by which a creature more closely adheres to God, than by being united to Him in unity of person. Therefore, in consequence of the very union of His human nature with God in unity of person, Christ’s soul was filled with habitual gifts of graces beyond all other souls. And so habitual grace in Christ is not a disposition for union, but is rather an effect of union.

This appears clearly in the very way of speaking used by the Evangelist when he says, in words previously quoted: “We saw [Him as it were] the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth” (John 1:14). The man Christ is, indeed, the only-begotten of the Father, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh. The very fact that the Word was made flesh entailed the consequence that He was full of grace and truth. But among things that are filled with any goodness or perfection, the one from which goodness or perfection flows out upon other things is found to be filled to greater repletion; for example, what can shed light on other objects, shines more brilliantly than they. Therefore, since the man Christ possessed supreme fullness of grace, as being the only-begotten of the Father, grace overflowed from Him to others, so that the Son of God, made man, might make men gods and sons of God, according to the Apostle’s words in Galatians 4:4 ff.: “God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law, that He might redeem them who were under the law: that we might receive the adoption of sons.”

Because of the fact that grace and truth come to others from Christ, it is fitting that He should be the head of the Church. Sensation and movement are, in a way, conveyed from the head to the other members that are conformed to the head in nature. In like manner grace and truth are conveyed from Christ to other men. Hence we are told in Ephesians 1:22 ff., that God “made Him head over all the Church, which is His body.” Christ is not the head of men alone; He can also be called the head of the angels, at least with respect to His excellence and influence, if not with respect to conformity of nature in the same species. This is why, before the words just quoted, the Apostle says that God set Him, namely Christ, “on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion.”

In accord with this doctrine, a threefold grace is usually pointed out in Christ. The first is the grace of union, whereby the human nature, with no merits preceding, received the gift of being united in person to the Son of God. The second is the singular grace whereby the soul of Christ was filled with grace and truth beyond all other souls. The third is the grace of being head, in virtue of which grace flows from Him to others. The Evangelist presents these three kinds of grace in due order (John 1:14, 16). Regarding the grace of union he says: “The Word was made flesh.” Regarding Christ’s singular grace he says: “We saw [Him as it were] the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” Regarding the grace of head he adds: “And of His fullness we all have received.”

CHAPTER 215

INFINITUDE OF CHRIST’S GRACE

The possession of infinite grace is restricted to Christ. According to the testimony of John the Baptist, “God doth not give the Spirit by measure” to the man Christ (John 3:34). But to others the Spirit is given in measure, as we read in Ephesians 4:7: “To everyone of us is given grace ‘according to the measure of the giving of Christ.” If this refers to the grace of union, no doubt can arise about what is here stated. To other saints is given the grace of being gods or sons of God by participation, through the infusion of some gift. Such a gift, being created, must itself be finite, just as all other creatures are. To Christ, on the contrary, is given, in His human nature, the grace to be the Son of God not by participation, but by nature. But natural divinity is infinite. Through that union, therefore, He received an infinite gift. Hence beyond all doubt the grace of union is infinite.

Concerning habitual grace, however, a doubt can be raised as to whether it is infinite. Since such grace is a created gift, we have to acknowledge that it has a finite essence. Yet it can be said to be infinite for three reasons.

First, on the part of the recipient. The capacity of any created nature is evidently finite. Even though it is able to receive an infinite good by way of knowledge and fruition, it does not receive that good infinitely. Each creature has a definite measure of capacity in keeping with its species and nature. This does not prevent the divine power from being able to make another creature with a greater capacity; but such a creature would no longer be of the same nature with regard to species. Thus if one is added to three, a different species of number will result. Consequently, when the divine goodness that is bestowed on anyone does not completely exhaust the natural capacity of his nature, we judge that what is given to him has been apportioned according to some measure. But when the whole of his natural capacity is filled up, We conclude that what he receives is not parceled out to him according to measure. For although there is a measure on the part of the recipient, there is no measure on the part of the giver, who is ready to give all; if a person, for instance, takes a pitcher down to the river, he finds water at hand without measure, although he himself receives with measure because of the limited size of the vessel. In this way Christ's habitual grace is finite in its essence, but may be said to be given infinitely and not according to measure, because as much is given as created nature is able to receive.

Secondly, grace may be said to be infinite on the part of the gift itself that is received. Surely we realize that there is nothing to prevent a thing that is finite in its essence, from being infinite by reason of some, form. Infinite according to essence is that which possesses the whole fullness of being; this, of course, is proper to God alone, who is being itself. But if we suppose that there is some particular form not existing in a subject, such as whiteness or heat, it would not, indeed, have an infinite essence, for its essence would be confined to a genus or species; but it would possess the entire fullness of that species. With respect to the species in question, it would be without limit or measure, because it would have whatever could pertain to that species. But if whiteness or heat is received into some subject, the latter does not always possess everything that necessarily and invariably pertains to the nature of that form, but does so only when the form is possessed as perfectly as it can be possessed, that is, when the manner of possessing is equal to the thing's capacity for being possessed. In this way, then, Christ's habitual grace was finite in its essence; but it is said to have been without limit and measure because Christ received all that could pertain to the nature of grace. Other men do not receive the whole: one man receives grace in this measure, another in that. "There are diversities of graces," as we learn from 1 Corinthians 12:4.

In the third place, grace may be called infinite on the part of its cause. For in a cause is contained, in some way, its effect. Therefore, if a cause with infinite power to influence is at hand, it is able to influence without measure and, in a certain sense, infinitely; for example, if a person had a fountain capable of pouring forth water infinitely, he could be said to possess water without measure and, in a sense, infinitely. In this way Christ's soul has grace that is infinite and without measure, owing to the fact that it possesses, as united to itself, the Word who is the inexhaustible and infinite principle of every emanation of creatures.

From the fact that the singular grace of Christ's soul is infinite in the ways described, we readily infer that the grace which is His as head of the Church is likewise infinite. For the very reason that He possesses it, He pours it forth. And since He has received the gifts of the Spirit without measure, He has the power of pouring forth without measure all that pertains to the grace of the head, so that His grace is sufficient for the salvation, not of some men only, but of the whole world, according to 1 John 2:2: "And He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world"; and, we may add, of many worlds, if such existed.

CHAPTER 216

FULLNESS OF CHRIST’S WISDOM

We treat next of the fullness of wisdom in Christ. In this matter, the first point that comes up for consideration is the truth that, since Christ has two natures, the divine and the human, whatever pertains to both natures must be twofold in Christ, as was stated above. But wisdom appertains to both the divine nature and the human nature. The assertion of Job 9:4: “He is wise in heart and mighty in strength,” is spoken of God. At times Scripture also calls men wise, whether with reference to worldly wisdom, as in Jeremiah 9:23: “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom,” or with reference to divine wisdom, as in Matthew 23:34: “Behold, I send to you prophets and wise men and scribes.” Hence we must acknowledge a twofold wisdom in Christ, conformably with His two natures: uncreated wisdom, which pertains to Him as God, and created wisdom, which pertains to Him as man.

Inasmuch as Christ is God and the Word of God, He is the begotten Wisdom of the Father, as is indicated in 1 Corinthians 1:24: “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.” For the interior word of any intellectual being is nothing else than the conception of wisdom. And since, as we said above, the Word of God is perfect and is one with God, He must be the perfect conception of the wisdom of God the Father. Consequently, whatever is contained in the wisdom of God the Father as unbegotten, is contained wholly in the Word as begotten and conceived. And so we are told, in Colossians 2:3, that in Him, namely, in Christ, “are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”

Indeed, even as man, Christ has a twofold knowledge. The one is godlike, whereby He sees God in His essence, and other things in God, just as God Himself, by knowing Himself, knows all other things. Through this vision

God Himself is happy, as is every rational creature admitted to the perfect fruition of God. Therefore, since we hold that Christ is the author of man’s salvation, we must also hold that such knowledge as befits the author of salvation pertains to the soul of Christ. But a principle must be immovable and must also be pre-eminent in power. Hence that vision of God in which men’s beatitude and eternal salvation consist, ought to be found to be more excellent in Christ than in others, and, indeed, ought to be found in Him as in an immovable principle. The difference between what is movable and what is immovable comes to this: movable things, so far as they are movable, do not possess their proper perfection from the beginning, but acquire it in the course of time; but immovable things, as such, always possess their perfections from the first moment of their existence. Accordingly Christ, the author of man’s salvation, should rightly have possessed the full vision of God from the very beginning of His incarnation; propriety would not allow Him to have attained to it in the course of time, as other saints do.

It was also appropriate that that soul which was united to God more closely than all others, should be beatified by the vision of God beyond the rest of creatures. Gradation is possible in this vision, according as some see God, the cause of all things, more clearly than others. The more comprehensively a cause is known, the more numerous are the effects that can be discerned in it. For a more perfect knowledge of a cause entails a fuller knowledge of its power, and there can be no knowledge of this power without a knowledge of its effects, since the magnitude of a power is ordinarily gauged from its effects. This is why, among those who behold the essence of God, some perceive more effects in God Himself or more exemplars of the divine works than do others who see less clearly. It is because of this fact that lower angels are instructed by higher angels, as we have previously observed.

Accordingly the soul of Christ, possessing the highest perfection of the divine vision among all creatures, clearly beholds in God Himself all the divine works and the exemplars of all things that are, will be, or have been; and so He enlightens not only men, but also the highest of the angels. Hence the Apostle says, in Colossians 2:3, that in Christ “are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge” of God; and in Hebrews 4:13 he points out that “all things are naked and open to His eyes.”

Of course the soul of Christ cannot attain to a comprehension of the divinity. For, as we said above, a thing is comprehended by knowledge when it is known to the full extent that it is knowable. Any object is knowable to the degree that it is a being and is true; but the divine being is infinite, as likewise is its truth. Therefore God is infinitely knowable. But no creature can know infinitely, even if what it knows is infinite. Hence no creature can comprehend God by seeing Him. But Christ's soul is a creature, and whatever in Christ pertains exclusively to His human nature is created. Otherwise the nature of Christ's humanity would not differ from the nature of His divinity, which alone is uncreated. However, the hypostasis or person of the Word of God, which is one in two natures, is uncreated. For this reason we do not call Christ a creature, speaking absolutely, because the hypostasis is connoted by the name of Christ. But we do say that the soul of Christ or the body of Christ is a creature. Therefore Christ's soul does not comprehend God, but Christ comprehends God by His uncreated wisdom. Our Lord had this uncreated wisdom in mind when, speaking of His knowledge of comprehension, He said in Matthew 11:27: "No one knows the Son but the Father; neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son."

In this connection we may note that comprehension of a thing's essence and comprehension of its power are of the same nature; a thing is able to act so far as it is a being in act. Therefore, if Christ's soul is incapable of comprehending the essence of the divinity, as we have shown is the case, it cannot comprehend the divine power. But it would comprehend the divine power if it knew all that God is able to accomplish and the ways in which He can produce His effects. But this is impossible. Therefore Christ's soul does not know all that God can do, nor all the modes of activity open to Him.

However, since Christ, even as man, is placed by God the Father over every creature, it is fitting that in His vision of the divine essence He should perceive with full knowledge all things that in any way have been wrought by God. In this sense the soul of Christ is said to be omniscient, for it has complete knowledge of all things that are, will be, or have been. Among the other creatures that see God, some enjoy, in their vision of God, a more perfect knowledge, others a less perfect knowledge, of these effects.

In addition to this knowledge, whereby things are known by the created intellect in the vision of the divine essence itself, there are other kinds of cognition by which a knowledge of things comes to creatures. The angels, besides “morning” knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word, also have “evening” knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures. This kind of knowledge pertains to men in one way, in keeping with their nature, and to angels in another way. For men, consistent with the order of nature, derive the intelligible truth of things from their senses, as Dionysius observes [De divinis nominibus, VII, 3], in such a way that the intelligible species in their intellects are abstracted from phantasms under the action of the agent intellect. But angels acquire knowledge of things through an influx of divine light; in the same way that things themselves come forth into being from God, representations or likenesses of things are imprinted on the angelic intellect by God. In men and angels alike, however, over and above the knowledge of things they have by nature, there is found a certain supernatural knowledge of divine mysteries, about which angels are enlightened by angels, and men, for their part, are instructed by prophetic revelation.

Accordingly, since no perfection vouchsafed to creatures may be withheld from Christ’s soul, which is the most excellent of creatures, a threefold knowledge is fittingly to be attributed to Him, in addition to the knowledge whereby He beholds the essence of God and all things in that essence. One kind of knowledge is experimental, as in other men, so far as Christ knew some things through the senses, in keeping with His human nature. A second knowledge is divinely infused, granted to Christ so that He might know all truths to which man’s natural knowledge extends or can extend. The human nature assumed by the Word of God ought not to have been lacking in any perfection whatever, since through it the whole of human nature was to be restored. But everything that exists in potency is imperfect before it is reduced to act. Thus the human intellect is in potency to the intelligibles which man can know naturally. Hence the soul of Christ received knowledge of all such objects through species divinely infused: the entire potency of His human intellect was reduced to act. Furthermore, since Christ in His human nature was not only the restorer of our nature, but was also the fountainhead of grace, He was endowed with a third knowledge whereby He knew most perfectly all that can pertain to the mysteries of grace, which transcend man’s natural knowledge, although they are known by men through the gift of wisdom or through the spirit of prophecy. The human intellect is in potency with regard to the acquisition of such knowledge, even though an agency belonging to a higher sphere is required to reduce it to act. When there is question of knowing natural things, the mind is reduced to act by the light of the agent intellect; but it acquires knowledge of these mysteries through divine light.

This discussion clearly shows that the soul of Christ reached the highest degree of knowledge among all creatures, as regards the vision of God, whereby the essence of God is seen, and other things in it; likewise as regards knowledge of the mysteries, and also as regards knowledge of things naturally knowable. Consequently Christ could not advance in any of these three kinds of knowledge. But obviously He knew sensible things more and more perfectly with the passing of time, as He gained experience of them through the bodily senses. Therefore Christ could advance only with respect to experimental knowledge. That He actually did so we learn from Luke 2:52: the boy “advanced in wisdom and age.” However, this can be understood also in another way, so that Christ’s increase of wisdom would mean, not that He Himself became wiser, but that wisdom increased in others, in the sense that they were more and more instructed by His wisdom. This was done for a good reason: that He might show that He was like other men. If He had made a display of His perfect wisdom at a tender age, the mystery of the Incarnation might well have seemed phantastic.

CHAPTER 217

THE MATTER OF CHRIST’S BODY

The foregoing exposition clearly indicates the way the formation of Christ’s body ought to have taken place. God could, indeed, have fashioned Christ’s body from the dust of the earth or from any other matter, in the way He fashioned the body of our first parent. But this would not have been in keeping with the restoration of man, which is the reason why the Son of God assumed flesh, as we have pointed out. The nature of the human race, which was derived from the first parent and which was to be healed, would not have been so well restored to its pristine honor if the victor over the devil and the conqueror of death, under which the human race was held captive because of the sin of the first father, had taken His body from some other source. The works of God are perfect, and what He means to restore He brings to perfection. He even adds more than had been taken away: through Christ the grace of God has abounded more than the offense of Adam, as the Apostle teaches in Romans 5:15, 20. Hence it was fitting that the Son of God should assume a body from the nature propagated by Adam.

Moreover, the mystery of the Incarnation becomes profitable to men by faith. Unless men believed that He who appeared in the guise of a man was the Son of God, they would not follow Him as the author of salvation. This was the case with the Jews, who drew upon themselves damnation rather than salvation from the mystery of the Incarnation, because of their unbelief. In order, therefore, that this ineffable mystery might more readily be believed, the Son of God disposed all things in such a way as to show that He was a true man. This would not have seemed to be so if He had taken His bodily nature from some other source than from human nature. Fittingly, therefore, He assumed a body stemming from the first parent.

Furthermore, the Son of God, made man, brought salvation to the human race, not only by conferring the remedy of grace, but also by giving an example that cannot be ignored. Doubts may be raised about the teaching and the life of any other man because of a defect in his human knowledge and his mastery of truth. But what the Son of God teaches is believed without hesitation to be true and what He does is accepted without misgiving as good. In Him we ought to have an example of the glory we hope for and of the virtue whereby we may merit it. In both instances the example would have been less telling if He had taken His bodily nature from another source than that from which the rest of men receive theirs. Otherwise, if we tried to persuade a man that he should endure sufferings as Christ endured them, and that he should hope to rise as Christ rose, he could allege as an excuse the different condition of his body. Therefore, to give greater effectiveness to His example, Christ ought to have assumed His bodily nature from no other source than from the nature that comes down from the first parent.

CHAPTER 218

FORMATION OF CHRIST'S BODY

Nevertheless the body of Christ could not becomingly have been fashioned in human nature in the same way as the bodies of other men are formed. Since He assumed this nature for the purpose of cleansing it from sin, He ought to have assumed it in such a way that He would incur no contagion of sin. Men incur original sin by the fact that they are begotten through the active human power residing in the male seed; which implies pre-existence, according to seminal principle, in Adam the sinner. just as the first man would have transmitted original justice to his posterity along with the transmission of nature, so he actually transmitted original sin by transmitting nature; and this is brought about by the active power of the male seed. Hence the body of Christ ought to have been formed without male seed.

Moreover, the active power of the male seed operates naturally, and so man, who is begotten of male seed, is brought to perfection, not at once, but by definite processes. For all natural things advance to fixed ends through fixed intermediary stages. But Christ's body ought to have been perfect and informed by a rational soul at its very assumption; for a body is capable of being assumed by the Word of God so far as it is united to a rational soul, even though it was not at first perfect with regard to its full measure of quantity. Accordingly the body of Christ ought not to have been formed through the power of the male seed.

CHAPTER 219

THE CAUSE OF THE FORMATION OF CHRIST’S BODY

Since the formation of the human body is naturally effected by the male seed, any other way of fashioning the body of Christ was above nature. God alone is the author of nature, and He works supernaturally in natural things, as was remarked above. Hence we conclude that God alone miraculously formed that body from matter supplied by human nature. However, although every action of God in creation is common to the three divine persons, the formation of Christ’s body is, by a certain appropriation, attributed to the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son, who love each other and us in Him. Since God decreed that His Son should become incarnate because of “His exceeding charity with which He loved us,” as the Apostle says in Ephesians 2:4, the formation of Christ’s flesh is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Spirit.

Besides, the Holy Spirit is the author of all grace, since He is the first in whom all gifts are given gratis. But the taking up of human nature into the unity of a divine person was a communication of superabundant grace, as is clear from what was said above. Accordingly, to emphasize the greatness of this grace, the formation of Christ’s body is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

Another reason for the appropriateness of this teaching is the relationship between the human word and spirit. The human word, as existing in the heart, bears a resemblance to the eternal Word as existing in the Father. And as the human word takes voice that it may become sensibly perceptible to men, so the Word of God took flesh that it might appear visibly to men. But the human voice is formed by man’s breath or spirit. In the same way the flesh of the Word of God ought to have been formed by the Spirit of the Word.

CHAPTER 220

EXPLANATION OF THE ARTICLE IN THE CREED ON THE CONCEPTION AND BIRTH OF CHRIST

To exclude the error of Ebion and Cerinthus, who taught that Christ’s body was formed from male seed, the Apostles’ Creed states: “Who was conceived by the Holy Spirit.” In place of this, the Creed of the Nicene Fathers has: “He was made flesh by the Holy Spirit,” so that we may believe that He assumed true flesh and not a phantastic body, as the Manichaeans claimed. And the Creed of the Fathers adds: “For us men,” to exclude the error of Origen, who alleged that by the power of Christ’s passion even the devils were to be set free. In the same Creed the phrase, “for our salvation,” is appended, to show that the mystery of Christ’s incarnation suffices for men’s salvation, against the heresy of the Nazarenes, who thought that faith was not enough for human salvation apart from the works of the Law. The words, “He came down from heaven” were added to exclude the error of Photinus, who asserted that Christ was no more than a man and that He took His origin from Mary. In this heresy the false teaching that Christ had an earthly beginning and later ascended to heaven by the merit of a good life, replaces the truth that He had a heavenly origin and descended to earth by assuming flesh. Lastly, the words, “And He was made man,” were added to exclude the error of Nestorius, according to whose contention the Son of God, of whom the Creed speaks, would be said rather to dwell in man than to be man.

CHAPTER 221

CHRIST’S BIRTH FROM A VIRGIN

Since, as we have shown, the Son of God was to take flesh from matter supplied by human nature, and since in human generation the woman provides matter, Christ appropriately took flesh from a woman. This is taught by the Apostle in Galatians 4:4: “God sent His Son, made of a woman.” A woman needs the cooperation of a man in order that the matter she supplies may be fashioned into a human body. But the formation of Christ’s body ought not to have been effected through the power of the male seed, as we said above. Hence that woman from whom the Son of God assumed flesh conceived without the admixture of male seed. Now the more anyone is detached from the things of the flesh, the more such a person is filled with spiritual gifts. For man is raised up by spiritual goods, whereas he is dragged down by carnal attractions. Accordingly, since the formation of Christ’s body was to be accomplished by the Holy Spirit, it behooved that woman from whom Christ took His body to be filled to repletion with spiritual gifts, so that not only her soul would be endowed with virtues by the Holy Spirit, but also her womb would be made fruitful with divine offspring. Therefore her soul had to be free from sin, and her body had to be far removed from every taint of carnal concupiscence. And so she had no association with a man at the conception of Christ; nor did she ever have such experience, either before or after.

This was also due to Him who was born of her. The Son of God assumed flesh and came into the world for the purpose of raising us to the state of resurrection, in which men “shall neither marry nor be married, but shall be as the angels of God in heaven” (Matt. 22:30). This is why He inculcated the doctrine of continence and of virginal integrity, that an image of the glory that is to come might, in some degree, shine forth in the lives of the faithful. Consequently He did well to extol purity of life at His very birth, by being born of a virgin; and so the Apostles' Creed says that He was "born of the Virgin Mary." In the Creed of the Fathers He is said to have been made flesh of the Virgin Mary. This excludes the error of Valentinus and others, who taught that the body of Christ was either phantastic or was of another nature and was not taken and formed from the body of the Virgin.

CHAPTER 222

THE MOTHER OF CHRIST

The error of Nestorius, who refused to acknowledge that Blessed Mary is the Mother of God, is likewise excluded. Both Creeds assert that the Son of God was born or was made flesh of the Virgin Mary. The woman of whom any person is born is called his mother, for the reason that she supplies the matter for human conception. Hence the Blessed Virgin Mary, who provided the matter for the conception of the Son of God, should be called the true mother of the Son of God. As far as the essence of motherhood is concerned, the energy whereby the matter furnished by a woman is formed, does not enter into the question. She who supplied matter to be formed by the Holy Spirit is no less a mother than a woman who supplies matter that is to be formed by the energy latent in male seed. If anyone insists on maintaining that the Blessed Virgin ought not to be called the Mother of God because flesh alone and not divinity was derived from her, as Nestorius contended, he clearly is not aware of what he is saying. A woman is not called a mother for the reason that everything that is in her child is derived from her. Man is made up of body and soul; and a man is what he is in virtue of his soul rather than in virtue of his body. But no man's soul is derived from his mother. The soul is either created by God directly, as the true doctrine has it, or, if it were produced by transplanting, as some have fancied, it would be derived from the father rather than from the mother. For in the generation of other animals, according to the teaching of philosophers, the male gives the soul, the female gives the body.

Consequently, just as any woman is a mother from the fact that her child's body is derived from her, so the Blessed Virgin Mary ought to be called the Mother of God if the body of God is derived from her. But we have to hold that it is the body of God, if it is taken up into the unity of the person of God’s Son, who is true God. Therefore all who admit that human nature was assumed by the Son of God into the unity of His person, must admit that the Blessed Virgin Mary is the Mother of God. But Nestorius, who denied that the person of God and of the man Jesus Christ was one, was forced by logical necessity to deny that the Virgin Mary was the Mother of God.

CHAPTER 223

THE HOLY SPIRIT NOT THE FATHER OF CHRIST

Although the Son of God is said to have been made flesh and to have been conceived by the Holy Spirit and of the Virgin Mary, we are not to conclude that the Holy Spirit is the father of the man Christ, even though the Blessed Virgin is called His mother.

The first reason for this is that everything pertaining to the idea of mother is verified in the Blessed Virgin Mary. She furnished the matter to be formed by the Holy Spirit for the conception of Christ, as the idea of motherhood requires. But not all the elements required for the idea of fatherhood are found on the part of the Holy Spirit. The idea of fatherhood requires that the father produce from his nature a son who is of like nature with himself. Therefore if some agent would make a thing that is not derived from its own substance, and would not produce such a thing unto the likeness of its own nature, that agent could not be called the thing’s father. We do not say that a man is the father of things he makes by plying an art, unless perhaps in a metaphorical sense. The Holy Spirit is, indeed, connatural with Christ as regards the divine nature; in this respect, however, He is not the father of Christ, but rather proceeds from Him. With respect to the human nature, the Holy Spirit is not connatural with Christ. For the human nature in Christ is other than the divine nature, as we said above. Nor is anything of the divine nature changed into human nature, as we also said above. Consequently the Holy Spirit cannot be called the father of the man Christ.

Moreover, that which is of greater moment in any son comes from his father, and what is secondary comes from his mother. Thus in other animals the soul is from the father, and the body from the mother. In man, of course, the rational soul does not come from the father, but is created by God; yet the power of the paternal seed operates dispositively toward the form. But that which is the greater in Christ, is the person of the Word, who is in no way derived from the Holy Spirit. We conclude, therefore, that the Holy Spirit cannot be called the father of Christ.

CHAPTER 224

SANCTIFICATION OF CHRIST’S MOTHER

As appears from the foregoing exposition, the Blessed Virgin Mary became the mother of God’s Son by conceiving of the Holy Spirit. Therefore it was fitting that she should be adorned with the highest degree of purity, that she might be made conformable to such a Son. And so we are to believe that she was free from every stain of actual sin-not only of mortal sin but of venial sin. Such freedom from sin can pertain to none of the saints after Christ, as we know from 1 John 1:8: “If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.” But what is said in the Canticle of Canticles 4:7, “You are all fair, my love, and there is no spot in you,” can well be understood of the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God.

Mary was not only free from actual sin, but she was also, by a special privilege, cleansed from original sin. She had, indeed, to be conceived with original sin, inasmuch as her conception resulted from the commingling of both sexes. For the privilege of conceiving without impairment of virginity was reserved exclusively to her who as a virgin conceived the Son of God. But the commingling of the sexes which, after the sin of our first parent, cannot take place without lust, transmits original sin to the offspring. Likewise, if Mary had been conceived without original sin, she would not have had to be redeemed by Christ, and so Christ would not be the universal redeemer of men, which detracts from His dignity. Accordingly we must hold that she was conceived with original sin, but was cleansed from it in some special way.

Some men are cleansed from original sin after their birth from the womb, as is the case with those who are sanctified in baptism. Others are reported to have been sanctified in the wombs of their mothers, in virtue of an extraordinary privilege of grace. Thus we are told with regard to Jeremiah: “Before I formed you in the womb of you mother I knew you; and before you came forth out of the womb I sanctified you” (Jer. 1:5). And in Luke 1:15 the angel says of John the Baptist: “He shall be filled with the Holy Spirit even from his mother’s womb.” We cannot suppose that the favor granted to the precursor of Christ and to the prophet was denied to Christ’s own mother. Therefore we believe that she was sanctified in her mother’s womb, that is, before she was born.

Yet such sanctification did not precede the infusion of her soul. In that case she would never have been subject to original sin, and so would have had no need of redemption. For only a rational creature can be the subject of sin. Furthermore, the grace of sanctification is rooted primarily in the soul, and cannot extend to the body except through the soul. Hence we must believe that Mary was sanctified after the infusion of her soul.

But her sanctification was more ample than that of others who were sanctified in the wombs of their mothers. Others thus sanctified in the womb were, it is true, cleansed from original sin; but the grace of being unable to sin later on, even venially, was not granted to them. The Blessed Virgin Mary, however, was sanctified with such a wealth of grace that thenceforth she was preserved free from all sin, and not only from mortal sin, but also from venial sin. Moreover venial sin sometimes creeps up on us unawares, owing to the fact that an inordinate motion of concupiscence or of some other passion arises prior to the advertence of the mind, yet in such a way that the first motions are called sins. Hence we conclude that the Blessed Virgin Mary never committed a venial sin, for she did not experience such inordinate motions of passion. Inordinate motions of this kind arise because the sensitive appetite, which is the subject of these passions, is not so obedient to reason as not sometimes to move toward an object outside the order of reason, or even, occasionally, against reason; and this is what engenders the sinful impulse. In the Blessed Virgin, accordingly, the sensitive appetite was rendered so subject to reason by the power of the grace which sanctified it, that it was never aroused against reason, but was always in conformity with the order of reason. Nevertheless she could experience some spontaneous movements not ordered by reason.

In our Lord Jesus Christ there was something more. In Him the lower appetite was so perfectly subject to reason that it did not move in the direction of any object except in accord with the order of reason, that is, so far as reason regulated the lower appetite or permitted it to go into action of its own accord. So far as we can judge, a characteristic pertaining to the integrity of the original state was the complete subjection of the lower powers to reason. This subjection was destroyed by the sin of our first parent, not only in himself, but in all the others who contract original sin from him. In all of these the rebellion or disobedience of the lower powers to reason, which is called concupiscence (fomes peccati), remains even after they have been cleansed from sin by the sacrament of grace. But such was by no means the case with Christ, according to the explanation given above.

In the Blessed Virgin Mary, however, the lower powers were not so completely subject to reason as never to experience any movement not preordained by reason. Yet they were so restrained by the power of grace that they were at no time aroused contrary to reason. Because of this we usually say that after the Blessed Virgin was sanctified concupiscence remained in her according to its substance, but that it was shackled.

CHAPTER 225

PERPETUAL VIRGINITY OF CHRIST’S MOTHER

If Mary was thus strengthened against every movement of sin by her first sanctification, much more did grace grow in her and much more was concupiscence weakened or even completely uprooted in her, when the Holy Spirit came upon her, according to the angel’s word, to form of her the body of Christ. After she had been made the shrine of the Holy Spirit and the tabernacle of the Son of God, we may not believe that there was ever any inclination to sin in her, or that she ever experienced any pleasurable feeling of carnal concupiscence. And so we must view with revulsion the error of Helvidius who, while admitting that Christ was conceived and born of the Virgin, asserted that she later bore other sons to Joseph.

Certainly this error finds no support in Matthew’s statement that Joseph “knew her not” namely, Mary, “till she brought forth her first-born Son” (Matt. 1:25); as though he knew her after she gave birth to Christ. The word “till” in this text does not signify definite time but indicates indeterminate time. Sacred Scripture frequently asserts with emphasis that something was done or not done up to a certain time, as long as the issue could remain in doubt. Thus we read in Psalm 109:1: “Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies your footstool.” There could be some doubt whether Christ would sit at the right hand of God as long as His enemies did not seem to be subject to Him; but once we know that they are, no room for doubt could remain. Similarly there could be some doubt as to whether Joseph knew Mary before the birth of God’s Son. The Evangelist took pains to remove this doubt, thus giving us to understand beyond all question that she was not known after giving birth.

Nor does the fact that Christ is called Mary’s first-born give any support to the error, as though she bore other sons after Him. For in scriptural usage the son before whom no other is born is called the first-born, even though no other should follow him. This is clear from the case of the first-born sons who according to the Law were consecrated to the Lord and offered to the priests.

Again, the error of Helvidius receives no support from the Gospel narrative that certain individuals are called the brethren of Christ, as though His mother had other sons. Scripture is accustomed to apply the name brethren to all who belong to the same relationship. For example, Abraham called Lot his brother, although Lot was his nephew. In the same way Mary’s nephews and other relatives are called Christ’s brethren, as also are the relatives of Joseph, who was reputed to be the father of Christ.

Accordingly the Creed states: “Who was born of the Virgin Mary.” And, indeed, she is called a virgin without any qualification, for she remained a virgin before the birth, at the birth, and after the birth of Christ. That there was no impairment of her virginity before and after Christ’s birth, is clear from what has been said. More than that: her virginity was not violated even in the act of giving birth. Christ’s body, which appeared to the disciples when the doors were closed, could by the same power come forth from the closed womb of His mother. It was not seemly that He, who was born for the purpose of restoring what was corrupt to its pristine integrity, should destroy integrity in being born.

CHAPTER 226

DEFECTS ASSUMED BY CHRIST

In assuming human nature for the salvation of man, the Son of God appropriately showed in the nature He assumed, by the perfection of its grace and wisdom, what was to be the goal of human salvation. No less appropriately was the human nature assumed by the Word of God characterized by certain conditions befitting the most suitable way of redeeming the human race. The most suitable way was that man, who had perished through his iniquity, should be restored by satisfying justice. But the order of justice requires that the one who has become liable to some punishment by sinning, should be freed by paying the penalty. Since, however, what we do or suffer through our friends, we ourselves are considered in some fashion to do or to suffer, inasmuch as love is a mutual force that in a way makes two lovers one, the order of justice is not violated if a person is set free by the satisfaction his friend offers for him.

By the sin of the first parent ruin had come upon the entire human race. No punishment undergone by any man could suffice to liberate the whole human race. No worthy satisfaction was available; no satisfaction offered by any mere man was great enough in value to free all men. Similarly, justice would not be fully met if even an angel, out of love for the human race, were to offer satisfaction for it. An angel does not possess infinite dignity, and hence any satisfaction he offered would not be capable of sufficing for indefinitely many people and their sins. God alone is of infinite dignity, and so He alone, in the flesh assumed by Him, could adequately satisfy for man, as has already been noted. Therefore it behooved Him to assume a human nature so constituted that in it He could suffer for man what man himself deserved to suffer on account of his sin, and thus offer satisfaction on man’s behalf.

However, not every punishment incurred for sin is suitable for making satisfaction. Man’s sin comes from the fact that in turning to transient goods he turns away from God. And man is punished for sin on both counts. He is deprived of grace and the other gifts by which union with God is effected, and besides this he deserves to suffer chastisement and loss with respect to the object for whose sake he turned away from God. Therefore the order of satisfaction requires that the sinner should be led back to God by punishments that are to be endured in transient goods.

Unfortunately the punishments which keep man back from God continue to stand in the way of such recall. No one offers satisfaction to God by being deprived of grace, or by being ignorant of God, or by the fact that his soul is in a state of disorder, even though such afflictions are punishment for sin; man can satisfy only by enduring some pain in himself and by undergoing loss in external goods.

Accordingly Christ ought not to have assumed those defects which separate man from God, such as privation of grace, ignorance, and the like, although they are punishment for sin. Defects of this kind would but render Him less apt for offering satisfaction. Indeed, to be the author of man’s salvation, He had to possess fullness of grace and wisdom, as we pointed out above. Yet, since man by sinning was placed under the necessity of dying and of being subjected to suffering in body and soul, Christ wished to assume the same kind of defects, so that by undergoing death for men He might redeem the human race.

Defects of this kind, we should note, are common to Christ and to us. Nevertheless they are found in Christ otherwise than in us. For, as we have remarked, such defects are the punishment of the first sin. Since we contract original sin through our vitiated origin, we are in consequence said to have contracted these defects. But Christ did not contract any stain in virtue of His origin. He accepted the defects in question of His own free will. Hence we should not say that He contracted these defects, but rather that He assumed them; for that is contracted (contrahitur) which is necessarily drawn along with (cum trahitur) some other thing. Christ could have assumed human nature without such defects, just as He actually did assume it without the defilement of sin; and indeed the order of reason would seem to demand that He who was free from sin should also be free from punishment. Thus it is clear that defects of this sort were not in Him by any necessity either of vitiated origin or of justice. Therefore in Him they were not contracted but were voluntarily assumed.

Yet, since our bodies are subject to the aforesaid defects in punishment for sin—for prior to sin we were immune from them—Christ, so far as He assumed such defects in His flesh, is rightly deemed to have borne the likeness of sin, as the Apostle says in Romans 8:3: “God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh.” Hence Christ’s very passibility or suffering is called sin by the Apostle, when he adds that God “hath condemned sin in the flesh,” and observes in Romans 6:10: “In that He died to sin, He died once.” For the same reason the Apostle uses an even more astonishing expression in Galatians 3:13, saying that Christ was “made a curse for us.” This is also why Christ is said to have assumed one of our obligations, that of punishment, in order to relieve us of our double burden, namely, sin and punishment.

We should call to mind, further, that the penal defects afflicting our bodies are of two kinds. Some are common to all men, such as hunger, thirst, weariness after labor, pain, death, and the like. Others, however, are not common to all, but are peculiar to certain individuals, such as blindness, leprosy, fever, mutilation of the members, and similar ills. The difference between these defects is this: common defects are passed on to us from another, namely, our first parent, who incurred them through sin, but personal defects are produced in individual men by particular causes. But Christ had no cause of defect in Himself, either in His soul, which was full of grace and wisdom and was united to the Word of God, or in His body, which was excellently organized and disposed, having been fashioned by the omnipotent power of the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, He took upon Himself certain defects by the free decision of His own will, with a view to procuring our salvation.

Accordingly, Christ judged it well to take upon Himself those defects that are handed down from one man to others, namely, the common defects, but not the special defects that arise in individuals from particular causes. Again, since He came chiefly to restore human nature, He fittingly assumed those defects that are found universally in nature. The doctrine thus set forth also makes it clear that, as Damascene points out, Christ assumed our irreprehensible defects, that is, those which are not open to slander. If Christ had taken to Himself a deficiency in knowledge or in grace, or such ills as leprosy or blindness, this would seem to detract from His dignity, and might provide men with an occasion for defaming Him. But no such occasion is given by defects attaching to the whole of nature.

CHAPTER 227

WHY CHRIST WILLED TO DIE

Evidently, therefore, as we see from this discussion, Christ took some of our defects on Himself, not out of necessity, but for a definite purpose, namely, for our salvation. But every potency and every habit or capacity are ordained toward act as their end. Hence capacity to suffer is not enough for satisfaction or merit apart from actual suffering. A person is called good or evil, not because he is able to perform good or evil actions, but because he performs them; praise and blame are duly rendered not for power to act but for acting. To save us, consequently, Christ was not content merely to make our passibility His portion, but He willed actually to suffer that He might satisfy for our sins. He endured for us those sufferings which we deserved to suffer in consequence of the sin of our first parent. Of these the chief is death, to which all other human sufferings are ordered as to their final term. "For the wages of sin is death," as the Apostle says in Romans 6:23.

Accordingly Christ willed to submit to death for our sins so that, in taking on Himself without any fault of His own the punishment charged against us, He might free us from the death to which we had been sentenced, in the way that anyone would be freed from a debt of penalty if another person undertook to pay the penalty for him. Another reason why He wished to die was that His death might be for us not only a remedy of satisfaction but also a sacrament of salvation, so that we, transferred to a spiritual life, might die to our carnal life, in the likeness of His death. This is in accord with 1 Peter 3:18: "Christ also died once for our sins, the just for the unjust, that He might offer us to God, being put to death in deed in the flesh, but enlivened in the spirit."

Christ also wished to die that His death might be an example of perfect virtue for us. He gave an example of charity, for "greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John 15:13). The more numerous and grievous are the sufferings a person does not refuse to bear for his friend, the more strikingly his love is shown forth. But of all human ills the most grievous is death, by which human life is snuffed out. Hence no greater proof of love is possible than that a man should expose himself to death for a friend.

By His death Christ also gave an example of fortitude, which does not abandon justice in the face of adversity; refusal to give up the practice of virtue even under fear of death seems to pertain most emphatically to fortitude. Thus the Apostle says in Hebrews 2:14 ff., with reference to Christ’s passion: “That through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil, and might deliver them who through the fear of death were all their lifetime subject to servitude.” In not refusing to die for truth, Christ overcame the fear of dying, which is the reason men for the most part are subject to the slavery of sin.

Further, He gave an example of patience, a virtue that prevents sorrow from overwhelming man in time of adversity; the greater the trials, the more splendidly does the virtue of patience shine forth in them. Therefore an example of perfect patience is afforded in the greatest of evils, which is death, if it is borne without distress of mind. Such tranquillity the prophet foretold of Christ: He “shall be dumb as a lamb before his shearer, and He shall not open His mouth” (Is. 53:7).

Lastly, our Lord gave an example of obedience; for the more difficult are the precepts one obeys, the more praiseworthy is the obedience. But the most difficult of all the objects of obedience is death. Hence, to commend the perfect obedience of Christ, the Apostle says, in Philippians 2:8, that He was obedient to the Father even unto death.

CHAPTER 228

THE DEATH OF THE CROSS

The same reasons reveal why Christ willed to suffer the death of the cross. In the first place, such a death was suitable as a salutary means of satisfaction. Man is fittingly punished in the things wherein he has sinned, as is said in Wisdom 1:17: “The things by which a man sins, by the same also he is tormented. But the first sin of man was the fact that he ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, contrary to God’s command. In his stead Christ permitted Himself to be fastened to a tree, so that He might pay for what He did not carry off, as the Psalmist says of Him in Psalm 58:5.

Death on the cross was also appropriate as a sacrament. Christ wished to make clear by His death that we ought so to die in our carnal life that our spirit might be raised to higher things. Hence He Himself says, in John 12:32: “I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to Myself.”

This kind of death was likewise fitting as an example of perfect virtue. Sometimes men shrink no less from a disgrace ful kind of death than from the painfulness of death. Accordingly, the perfection of virtue seems to require that a person ‘should not refuse to suffer even a disgraceful death for the good of virtue. Therefore, to commend the perfect obedience of Christ, the Apostle, after saying of Him that He was “obedient unto death,” added: “even to the death of the cross” (Phil. 2:8). This sort of death was looked on as the most ignominious of all, in the words of Wisdom 2:20: “Let us condemn him to a most shameful death.”

CHAPTER 229

THE DEATH OF CHRIST

In Christ three substances, the body, the soul, and the divinity of the Word, are joined together in one person. Two of these, the soul and the body, are united to form one nature. Accordingly at the death of Christ the union between body and soul was dissolved. Otherwise the body would not have been truly dead, since death of the body is nothing else than the separation of the soul from it.

But neither soul nor body was separated from the Word of God, as far as union with the person is concerned. Human nature results from the union of soul and body; hence Christ could not be said to be a man during the three days of His death, when His soul remained separated from His body by death. However, as was shown above, on account of the union of the human nature with the Word of God in one person, whatever is said of the man Christ can rightly be predicated also of the Son of God. Consequently, since the personal union of the Son of God both with the soul and with the body of Christ remained in death, whatever is said of either of them could be predicated of the Son of God. Hence the Creed asserts that the Son of God was buried, for the reason that the body united to Him lay in the tomb, and likewise that He descended into hell, because His soul descended.

We should also recall that the masculine gender designates a person, and that the neuter gender designates nature. Thus in speaking of the Trinity we say that the Son is another person (alius) than the Father, but not that He is another thing (aliud). Accordingly, during the three days of His death the whole (totus) Christ was in the sepulcher and in hell and in heaven, because of His person which remained united to His flesh reposing in the tomb and to His soul which was emptying hell, and which continued to subsist in the divine nature reigning in heaven. But we cannot say that the whole (totum) of Christ was in the sepulcher or in hell, because only a part of the human nature and not the whole of it was in the sepulcher or in hell.

CHAPTER 230

VOLUNTARY CHARACTER OF CHRIST’S DEATH

Christ’s death was like our death as regards the essence of death, which consists in the separation of the soul from the body. But in another respect the death of Christ was different from ours. We die for the reason that we are subject to death by a necessary law of nature, or in consequence of some violence done to us. But Christ did not die because of any necessity. He gave up His life by His power and His own will, as He Himself attested: “I have power to lay it [My life] down, and I have power to take it up again” (John 10:18).

The reason for this difference is that physical things are not subject to our will. But the joining of the soul to the body is physical. Hence the fact that the soul remains united to the body or that it is separated from the body, is not subject to our will, but must be brought about by the power of some agent. But whatever was physical in Christ as regards His human nature, was completely subject to His will, because of the power of His divinity, to which all nature is subject. Therefore Christ had it in His power that so long as He willed, His soul would remain united to His body, and that the instant He willed, the soul would depart from the body. The centurion standing near the cross of Christ felt the presence of this divine power when he saw Him expire with a loud cry. By this Christ clearly showed that He was not dying like other men, from the breaking down of nature. For men cannot send forth their last breath with a loud cry; in the moment of death they can scarcely move their tongue in a quavering whisper. Hence the fact that Christ died uttering a loud cry gave evidence of the divine power in Him. It was for this reason that the centurion said: “Indeed, this was the Son of God” (Matt. 27:54).

Yet we may not aver that the Jews did not kill Christ, or that Christ took His own life. For the one who brings the cause of death to bear on a person is said to kill him. But death does not ensue unless the cause of death prevails over nature, which conserves life. Christ had it in His power either to submit His nature to the destructive cause or to resist that influence, just as He willed. Thus Christ died voluntarily, and yet the Jews killed Him.

CHAPTER 231

THE PASSION OF CHRIST AS REGARDS HIS BODY

Christ wished to suffer not only death, but also the other ills that flow from the sin of the first parent to his posterity, so that, bearing in its entirety the penalty of sin, He might perfectly free us from sin by offering satisfaction. Of these ills, some precede death, others follow death. Prior to the death of the body come natural sufferings, such as hunger, thirst, and weariness, and also sufferings inflicted by violence, such as wounding, scourging, and the like. Christ wished to endure all these sufferings, since they stem from sin. If man had not sinned, he would not have experienced the affliction of hunger or of thirst or of fatigue or of cold, and he would not have had to undergo the suffering caused by external violence. Christ bore these sufferings for a different reason from that on account of which other men endure them. In other men there is nothing that can resist these sufferings. But Christ had at His disposal means to withstand evils of this sort: not only the uncreated power of His divinity, but also the beatitude of His soul, which is so powerful that, as Augustine says [Epist. CXVIII, ad Dioscorum, 3], its happiness in its own way flows over into the body. Thus after the resurrection, by the very fact that the soul will be glorified by the vision of God in unrestricted and full fruition, the body united to the glorified soul will be rendered glorious, impassible, and immortal. Therefore, since the soul of Christ enjoyed the vision of God in the highest degree of perfection, His body should in consequence, so far as the power of this vision is concerned, have been rendered impassible and immortal by an overflowing of glory from the soul to the body. But divine wisdom so disposed matters that Christ's body would suffer at the very time His soul was enjoying the vision of God, with no overflow of glory from the soul to the body. For, as we have said, all that was physical in Christ's human nature was subject to His Will. Hence at His good pleasure He could prevent natural redundance from His higher to His lower parts, and so could allow any part to suffer or do whatever would be proper to it without interference from any other part. This, of course, is impossible in other men.

This also accounts for the fact that during His passion Christ suffered most excruciating pain of body. For His bodily pain was in no way lessened by the higher joy of His rational soul, just as, conversely, pain of body did not obstruct the joy of His rational soul.

This reveals, too, that Christ alone was both a viator and a comprehensor. He enjoyed the vision of God, which characterizes the comprehensor, but in such a way that His body remained subject to sufferings, which characterizes the wayfarer. And since a wayfarer has power to merit, either for himself or for others, by the good works he performs from the motive of charity, Christ too, although He was a comprehensor, merited both for Himself and for others by His works and sufferings.

I For Himself Christ merited, not indeed glory of soul, which He had from the first instant of His conception, but glory of body, which He won by suffering. For us, too, each of His sufferings and actions was profitable unto salvation, not only by way of example, but also by way of merit; owing to the abundance of His charity and grace, He could merit grace for us, so that thus the members might receive of the fullness of the head.

Any suffering of His, however slight, was enough to redeem the human race, if the dignity of the sufferer is considered. For the more exalted the person on whom suffering is inflicted, the greater is the injury judged to be; for instance, a greater outrage is committed if one strikes a prince than if one strikes a common man of the people. Consequently, since Christ is a person of infinite dignity, any suffering of His has an infinite value, and so suffices for the atonement of infinitely many sins. Yet the redemption of the human race was accomplished, not by this or that slight suffering, but by Christ's death, which, for reasons listed above, He chose to endure to redeem the human race from its sins. For in any purchasing transaction there is required, not only a stipulated amount of appreciable commodity, but also the application of the price to the purchase.

CHAPTER 232

THE PASSIBILITY OF CHRIST’S SOUL

Since the soul is the form of the body, any suffering undergone by the body must in some way affect the soul. Therefore in that state in which the body of Christ was passible, His soul was passible also.

We may note that the suffering of the soul is of two kinds. One kind of suffering arises from the body, the other from the object that causes suffering, and this can be observed in any one of the faculties. For the soul is related to the body in the same way that a part of the soul is related to a part of the body. Thus suffering may be caused in the faculty of sight by some object, as when vision is dimmed by an excessively bright light; suffering can also arise from the organ itself, as when vision is dulled because of an injured pupil.

Accordingly, if the suffering of Christ’s soul is regarded as arising from the body, the whole soul suffered when the body suffered. For the soul in its essence is the form of the body, and the faculties, too, are all rooted in the essence of the soul. Consequently, if the body suffers every power of the soul suffers in some way. But if the suffering of the soul is considered as arising from an object, not every power of Christ’s soul suffered, understanding suffering in the proper sense as connoting harm. For nothing that arose from the object of any of these powers could be harmful, since, as we saw above, the soul of Christ enjoyed the perfect vision of God. Thus the higher reason of Christ’s soul, which is immersed in the contemplation and meditation of eternal things, embraced nothing adverse or repugnant that could cause it to suffer any harm.

But the sense faculties, whose objects are material things, could receive some injury from the suffering of the body; and so Christ experienced pain of sense when His body suffered. Furthermore, just as laceration of the body is felt by the senses to be injurious, so the inner imagination apprehends it as harmful; hence interior distress follows even when pain is not felt in the body. We assert that suffering of such distress was experienced by the soul of Christ. More than this: not the imagination alone, but also the lower reason apprehends objects harmful to the body; and so, as a result of such apprehension by the lower reason, which is concerned with temporal affairs, the suffering of sorrow could have place in Christ, so far as the lower reason apprehended death and other maltreatment of the body as injurious and as contrary to natural appetite.

Moreover, in consequence of love, which makes two persons, as it were, one, a man may be afflicted with sadness not only on account of objects he apprehends through his imagination or his lower reason as harmful to himself, but also on account of objects he apprehends as harmful to others whom he loves. Thus Christ suffered sadness from His awareness of the perils of sin or of punishment threatening other men whom He loved with the love of charity. And so He grieved for others as well as for Himself.

However, although the love of our fellow men pertains in a certain way to the higher reason, inasmuch as our neighbor is loved out of charity for God’s sake, the higher reason in Christ could not experience sorrow on account of the defects of His fellow men, as it can in us. For, since Christ’s higher reason enjoyed the full vision of God, it apprehended all that pertains to the defects of others as contained in the divine wisdom, in the light of which the fact that a person is permitted to sin and is punished for his sin, is seen to be in accord with becoming order. And so neither the soul of Christ nor of any of the blessed who behold God can be afflicted with sadness by the defects of their neighbors. But the case is otherwise with wayfarers who do not rise high enough to perceive the plan of wisdom. Such persons are saddened by the defects of others even in their higher reason, when they think that it pertains to the honor of God and the exaltation of the faith that some should be saved who nevertheless are damned.

Thus, with regard to the very things for which He was suffering in sense, imagination, and lower reason, Christ was rejoicing in His higher reason, so far as He referred them to the order of divine wisdom. And since the referring of one thing to another is the proper task of reason, we generally say that Christ’s reason, if it is considered as nature, shrank from death, meaning that death is naturally abhorrent, but that if it is considered as reason, it was willing to suffer death.

Just as Christ was afflicted with sadness, so He experienced other passions that stem from sadness, such as fear, wrath, and the like. Fear is caused in us by those things whose presence engenders sorrow, when they are thought of as future evils; and when we are grieved by someone who is hurting us, we become angry at him. Such passions existed otherwise in Christ than in us. In us they frequently anticipate the judgment of reason, and sometimes pass the bounds of reason. In Christ they never anticipated the judgment of reason, and never exceeded the moderation imposed by reason; His lower appetite, which was subject to passion, was moved just so far as reason decreed that it should be moved. Therefore Christ's soul could desire something in its higher part that it shrank from in its lower part, and yet there was no conflict of appetites in Him or rebellion of the flesh against the spirit, such as occurs in us owing to the fact that the lower appetite exceeds the judgment and measure of reason. In Christ this appetite was moved in accord with the judgment of reason, to the extent that He permitted each of His lower powers to be moved by its own impulse, in keeping with propriety.

In the light of all this we see clearly that Christ's higher reason was completely happy and full of joy in respect to its proper object. On the part of this object, nothing that might engender sorrow could arise in Him. But on the part of the subject it was full of suffering, as we indicated in the beginning of this chapter. Yet that enjoyment did not lessen the suffering, nor did the suffering prevent the enjoyment, since no overflowing from one power to another took place; each of the powers was allowed to exercise the function proper to it, as we mentioned above.

CHAPTER 233

THE PRAYER OF CHRIST

Since prayer manifests desire, the nature of the prayer Christ offered when His passion was upon Him may be gathered from the different desires He expressed. In Matthew 26:39 He begs: “My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me. Nevertheless, not as I will, but as You wilt.” In saying, “Let this chalice pass from Me,” He indicates the movement of His lower appetite and natural desire, whereby all naturally shrink from death and desire life. And in saying, “Nevertheless not as I will, but as You wilt,” He gives ,expression to the movement of His higher reason, which looks on all things as comprised under the ordinations of divine wisdom. The same is the bearing of the added words, “If this chalice may not pass away” (Matt. 26:42), whereby He showed that only those events can occur which take place according to the order of the divine will.

Although the chalice of the passion did not pass from Him, but He had to drink it, we may not say that His prayer went unheard. For, as the Apostle assures us in Hebrews 5:7, in all things Christ “was heard for His reverence.” Since prayer, as we have remarked, is expressive of desire, we pray unconditionally for what we wish unconditionally; and so the very desires of the just have the force of prayer with God, according to Psalm 9:17: “The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.” But we wish unconditionally only what we desire with our higher reason, which alone has the power of assenting to an undertaking. Christ prayed absolutely that the Father’s will might be done, for this was what He wished absolutely. But He did not thus pray that the chalice might pass from Him, because He wished this, not absolutely, but according to His lower reason, as we have stated.

CHAPTER 234

THE BURIAL OF CHRIST

In consequence of sin, other defects, both on the part of the body and on the part of the soul, overtake man after death. With regard to defects on the part of the body, the body returns to the earth from which it was taken. This defect on the part of the body has two phases in the case of ourselves: it is laid away and it corrupts. It is laid away, inasmuch as the dead body is placed beneath the earth in burial; and it corrupts, inasmuch as the body is resolved into the elements of which it was composed.

Christ wished to be subject to the first of these defects, namely, the placing of His body beneath the earth. But He did not submit to the other defect, the dissolving of His body into dust. Thus Psalm 15:10 says of Him: “Nor will you let your holy one to see corruption,” that is, decay of the body. The reason for this is plain:.although Christ’s body received matter from human nature, its formation was accomplished not by any human power but by the power of the Holy Spirit. Accordingly, the substance of His matter being what it was, He wished to be subject to the place beneath the earth usually given over to dead bodies; for that place which is in keeping with the matter of the predominant element in bodies is rightly assigned to them. But He did not wish the body that had been formed by the Holy Spirit to undergo dissolution, since in this respect He was different from other men.

CHAPTER 235

DESCENT OF CHRIST INTO HELL

On the part of the soul, death among men is followed, in consequence of sin, by descent into hell, not only as a place, but as a state of punishment. However, just as Christ's body was buried beneath the earth regarded as a place but not with respect to the common defect of dissolution, so His soul went down to hell as a place, not to undergo punishment there, but rather to release from punishment others who were detained there because of the sin of the first parent for which He had already made full satisfaction by suffering death. Hence nothing remained to be suffered after death, and so without undergoing any punishment He descended locally into hell that He might manifest Himself as the Savior of the living and the dead. For this reason He alone among the dead is said to have been free, since His soul was not subject to punishment in hell and His body was not subject to corruption in the grave.

When Christ descended into hell He freed those who were detained there for the sin of our first parent, but left behind those who were being punished for their own sins. And so He is said to have bitten into hell but not to have swallowed it, for He freed a part and left a part.

The Creed of our faith touches on the various defects of Christ when it states: "He suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, died and was buried; He descended into hell."

CHAPTER 236

THE RESURRECTION OF CHRIST

Since the human race was freed by Christ from the evils flowing from the sin of our first parent, it was fitting that, as He bore our ills to free us from them, the first fruits of man's restoration effected by Him should make their appearance in Him. This was done that Christ might be held up to us as a sign of salvation in two ways. First, we learn from His passion what we brought down on ourselves by sin and what suffering had to be undergone for us to free us from sin. Secondly, we see in His exaltation what is proposed to us to hope for through Him.

In triumph over death, which resulted from our first parent's sin, Christ was the first of all men to rise to immortal life. Thus, as life first became mortal through Adam's sin, immortal life made its first appearance in Christ through the atonement for sin He offered. Others, it is true, raised up either by Christ or by the prophets, had returned to life before Him; yet they had to die a second time. But "Christ rising again from the dead, dies now no more" (Rom. 6:9). As He was the first to escape the necessity of dying, He is called "the first begotten of the dead" (Apoc. 1:5) and "the first fruits of those who sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20). Having thrown off the yoke of death, He was the first to rise from the sleep of death.

Christ's resurrection was not to be long delayed, nor, on the other hand, was it to take place immediately after death. If He had returned to life immediately after death, the fact of His death would not have been well established; and if the resurrection had been long delayed, the sign of vanquished death would not have appeared in Him, and men would not have been given the hope that they would be rescued from death by Him. Therefore He put off the resurrection until the third day, for this interval was judged sufficient to establish the truth of His death, and was not too long to wither away the hope of liberation. If it had been delayed for a longer time, the hope of the faithful might have begun to suffer doubt. Indeed, on the third day, as though hope were already running out, some were saying: “We hoped that it was He that should have redeemed Israel” (Luke 24:21).

However, Christ did not remain dead for three full days. He is said to have been in the heart of the earth for three days and three nights, according to that figure of speech whereby a part is often taken for the whole. For, since one natural day is made up of a day and a night, Christ is said to have been dead during the whole of any part of a day or a night that is counted while He was lying in death.

Moreover, in the usual practice of Scripture, night is figured in with the following day, because the Hebrews reckon time by the course of the moon, which begins to shine in the evening. Christ was in the sepulcher during the latter part of the sixth day, and if this is counted along with the preceding night, it will be more or less one natural day. He reposed in the tomb during the night following the sixth day, together with the whole of the Sabbath day, and so we have two days. He lay dead also during the next night, which preceded the Lord’s Day, on which He rose, and this occurred either at midnight, according to Gregory [In Evangelia, II, hom. 21], or at dawn, as others think [Augustine, De Trinitate, IV, 6]. Therefore, if either the whole night, or a part of it together with the Lord’s Day following, is taken into our calculation, we shall have the third natural day.

The fact that Christ wished to rise on the third day is not without mysterious significance; for so He was able to show that He rose by the power of the whole Trinity. Sometimes the Father is said to have raised Him up, and sometimes Christ Himself is said to have risen by His own power. These two statements do not contradict each other, for the divine power of the Father is identical with that of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Another purpose was to show that the restoration of life was accomplished, not on the first day of the world, that is, under the natural law, nor on the second day, that is, under the Mosaic law, but on the third day, that is, in the era of grace.

The fact that Christ lay in the sepulcher for one whole day and two whole nights also has its meaning: by the one ancient debt Christ took on Himself, that of punishment, He blotted out our two ancient debts, sin and punishment, which are represented by the two nights.

CHAPTER 237

QUALITIES OF THE RISEN CHRIST

Christ recovered for the human race not merely what Adam had lost through sin, but all that Adam could have attained through merit. For Christ's power to merit was far greater than that of man prior to sin. By sin Adam incurred the necessity of dying, because he lost the power which would have enabled him to avoid death if he had not sinned. Christ not only did away with the necessity of dying, but even gained the power of not being able to die. Therefore His body after the resurrection was rendered impassible and immortal. Thus Christ's body was not like that of the first man, which had the power not to die, but was absolutely unable to die. And this is what we await in the future life for ourselves.

Another consideration: Christ's soul before His death was capable of suffering in company with the suffering of His body. Consequently, when His body became incapable of suffering, His soul also became incapable of suffering.

Furthermore, the mystery of man's redemption was now accomplished. To enable Christ to achieve that end, the glory of fruition had, in God's dispensation, been restricted to the higher regions of His soul, so that no overflowing to the lower parts and to the body itself would occur, but each faculty would be allowed to do or suffer what was proper to it. But now the body and the lower powers were wholly glorified by an overflow of glory from the higher regions of the soul. Accordingly Christ, who before the passion had been a comprehensor because of the fruition enjoyed by His soul and a wayfarer because of the passibility of His body, was now, after the resurrection, no longer a wayfarer, but exclusively a comprehensor.

CHAPTER 238

ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATING CHRIST'S RESURRECTION

As we stated above, Christ anticipated the general resurrection in order that His resurrection might bolster up our hope of our own resurrection. To foster our hope of resurrection, Christ's resurrection and the qualities of His risen nature had to be made known by suitable proofs. He manifested His resurrection, not to all alike, in the way that He manifested His human nature and His passion, but only "to witnesses preordained by God" (Acts 10:41), namely, the disciples whom He had selected to bring about man's salvation. For the state of resurrection, as was mentioned above, belongs to the glory of the comprehensor, and knowledge of this is not due to all, but only to such as make themselves worthy. To the witnesses He had chosen Christ revealed both the fact of His resurrection and the glory of His risen nature.

He made known the fact of His resurrection by showing that He, the very one who had died, rose again both in His nature and in His suppositum. As regards nature, He showed that He had a true human body when He offered Himself to be touched and seen by the disciples, to whom He said: "Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have" (Luke 24:39). He gave further evidence of the same by performing actions that belong to human nature, eating and drinking with His disciples, and often conversing with them and walking about. These are the actions of a living man. Of course such eating was not dictated by necessity. The incorruptible bodies of the risen will have no further need of food, for there occurs in them no deterioration that has to be repaired by nourishment. Hence the food consumed by Christ did not become nourishment for His body but was dissolved into pre-existing matter. Yet He proved that He was a true man by the very fact that He ate and drank.

As regards His suppositum, Christ showed that He was the same person who had died, by displaying to His disciples the marks of His death on His body, namely, the scars of His wounds. In John 20:27 He says to Thomas: “Put your finger here and see My hands; and bring your hand here and put it into My side.” And in Luke 24:39 He says: “See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself.” It was by divine dispensation that He kept the scars of His wounds in His body, so that the truth of the resurrection might be demonstrated by them; for complete integrity is the proper condition of the incorruptible risen body, although we may say that in the case of the martyrs some indications of the wounds they bore will appear with a certain splendor, in testimony of their virtue. Christ further showed that He was the same suppositum by His manner of speech and by other familiar actions whereby men are recognized. Thus the disciples knew Him “in the breaking of bread” (Luke 24:35). Also, He openly showed Himself to them in Galilee, where He was accustomed to converse with them.

Christ manifested the glory of His risen nature when He came among them, “the doors being shut” (John 20:26), and when “He vanished out of their sight” (Luke 24:31). For the glory of risen man gives him the power to be seen in glorious vision when he wishes, or not to be seen when he so wishes. The reason why Christ demonstrated the truth of His resurrection and the glory of His risen body by so many proofs, was the difficulty that faith in the resurrection presents. If He had displayed the extraordinary condition of His glorified body in its full splendor, He would have engendered prejudice against faith in the resurrection: the very immensity of its glory would have excluded belief that it was the same nature. Further, He manifested the truth not only by visible signs, but also by proofs appealing to the intellect, as when “He opened their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures” (Luke 24:45), and showed that according to the writings of the prophets He was to rise again.

CHAPTER 239

THE TWOFOLD LIFE RESTORED IN MAN BY CHRIST

As Christ destroyed our death by His death, so He restored our life by His resurrection. Man has a twofold death and a twofold life. The first death is the death of the body, brought about by separation from the soul; the second death is brought about by separation from God. Christ, in whom the second death had no place, destroyed both of these deaths in us, that is, the bodily and the spiritual, by the first death He underwent, namely, that of the body.

Similarly, opposed to this twofold death, we are to understand that there is a twofold life. One is a life of the body, imparted by the soul, and this is called the life of nature. The other comes from God, and is called the life of justice or the life of grace. This life is given to us through faith, by which God dwells in us, according to Habakkuk 2:4: “The just shall live in his faith.”

Accordingly, resurrection is also twofold: one is a bodily resurrection, in which the soul is united to the body for the second time; the other is a spiritual resurrection, in which the soul is again united to God. This second resurrection had no place in Christ, because His soul was never separated from God by sin. By His bodily resurrection, therefore, Christ is the cause of both the bodily and the spiritual resurrection in us.

However, as Augustine says in his commentary on St. John [In Joannis Evangelium, XIX, 15], we are to understand that the Word of God raises up souls, but that the Word as incarnate raises up bodies. To give life to the soul belongs to God alone. Yet, since the flesh is the instrument of His divinity, and since an instrument operates in virtue of the principal cause, our double resurrection, bodily and spiritual, is referred to Christ’s bodily resurrection as cause. For everything done in Christ’s flesh was salutary for us by reason of the divinity united to that flesh. Hence the Apostle, indicating the resurrection of Christ as the cause of our spiritual resurrection, says, in Romans 4:25, that Christ “was delivered up for our sins and rose again for our justification.” And in 1 Corinthians 15:12 he shows that Christ’s resurrection is the cause of our bodily resurrection: “Now if Christ be preached, that He rose again from the dead, how do some among you say that there is no resurrection of the dead?”

Most aptly does the Apostle attribute remission of sins to Christ’s death and our justification to His resurrection, thus tracing out conformity and likeness of effect to cause. As sin is discarded when it is remitted, so Christ by dying laid aside His passible life, in which the likeness of sin was discernible. But when a person is justified, he receives new life; in like manner Christ, by rising, obtained newness of glory. Therefore Christ’s death is the cause of the remission of our sin: the efficient cause instrumentally, the exemplary cause sacramentally, and the meritorious cause. In like manner Christ’s resurrection was the cause of our resurrection: the efficient cause instrumentally and the exemplary cause sacramentally. But it was not a meritorious cause, for Christ was no longer a wayfarer, and so was not in a position to merit; and also because the glory of the resurrection was the reward of His passion, as the Apostle declares in Philippians 2:9 ff.

Thus we see clearly that Christ can be called the first-born of those who rise from the dead. This is true not only in the order of time, inasmuch as Christ was the first to rise, as was said above, 85 but also in the order of causality, because His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of other men, and in the order of dignity, because He rose more gloriously than all others.

This belief in Christ’s resurrection is expressed in the words of the Creed: “The third day He arose again from the dead.”

CHAPTER 240

THE TWOFOLD REWARD OF CHRIST'S HUMILIATION: RESURRECTION AND ASCENSION

According to the Apostle, the exaltation of Christ was the reward of His humiliation. Therefore a twofold exaltation had to correspond to His twofold humiliation.

Christ had humbled Himself, first, by suffering death in the passible flesh He had assumed; secondly, He had undergone humiliation with reference to place, when His body was laid in the sepulcher and His soul descended into hell. The exaltation of the resurrection, in which He returned from death to immortal life, corresponds to the first humiliation. And the exaltation of the ascension corresponds to the second humiliation. Hence the Apostle says, in Ephesians 4:10: "He who descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens."

However, as it is narrated of the Son of God that He was born, suffered and was buried, and rose again, not in His divine nature but in His human nature, so also, we are told, He ascended into heaven, not in His divine nature but in His human nature. In His divine nature He had never left heaven, as He is always present everywhere. He indicates this Himself when He says: "No man has ascended into heaven but He who descended from heaven, the Son of man who is in heaven" (John 3:13). By this we are given to understand that He came down from heaven by assuming an earthly nature, yet in such a way that He continued to remain in heaven. The same consideration leads us to conclude that Christ alone has gone up to heaven by His own power. By reason of His origin, that abode belonged by right to Him who had come down from heaven. Other men cannot ascend of themselves, but are taken up by the power of Christ, whose members they have been made.

As ascent into heaven befits the Son of God according to His human nature, so something else is added that becomes Him according to His divine nature, namely, that He should sit at the right hand of His Father. In this connection we are not to think of a literal riaht hand or a bodily sitting. Since the right side of an animal is the stronger, this expression gives us to understand that the Son is seated with the Father as being in no way inferior to Him according to the divine nature, but on a par with Him in all things. Yet this same prerogative may be ascribed to the Son of God in His human nature, thus enabling us to perceive that in His divine nature the Son is in the Father Himself according to unity of essence, and that together with the Father He possesses a single kingly throne, that is, an identical power. Since other persons ordinarily sit near kings, namely, ministers to whom kings assign a share in governing power, and since the one whom the king places at his right hand is judged to be the most powerful man in the kingdom, the Son of God is rightly said to sit at the Father’s right hand even according to His human nature, as being exalted in rank above every creature of the heavenly kingdom.

In both senses, therefore, Christ properly sits at the right hand of God. And so the Apostle asks, in Hebrew 1: 13: “To which of the angels said He at any time: Sit on My right hand?”

We profess our faith in this ascension of Christ when we say in the Creed: “He ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of God the Father.”

CHAPTER 241

CHRIST AS JUDGE

We clearly gather from all this, that by the passion and death of Christ and by the glory of His resurrection and ascension, we are freed from sin and death, and have received justice and the glory of immortality, the former in actual fact, the latter in hope. All these events we have mentioned (the passion, the death, the resurrection, and also the ascension) were accomplished in Christ according to His human nature. Therefore we must conclude that Christ has rescued us from spiritual and bodily evils, and has put us in the way of spiritual and eternal goods, by what He suffered or did in His human nature.

He who acquires goods for people also, in consequence, distributes the same to them. But the distribution of goods among many requires judgment, so that each may receive what corresponds to his degree. Therefore Christ, in the human nature in which He has accomplished the'mysteries of man's salvation, is fittingly appointed by God to be judge over the men He has saved. We are told that this is so, in John 5:27: "He [the Father] hath given Him [the Son] power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man." There is also another reason. Those who are to be judged ought to see the judge. But the sight of God, in whom the judicial authority resides, in His own proper nature, is the reward that is meted out in the judgment. Hence the men to be judged, the good as well as the wicked, ought to see God as judge, not in His proper nature, but in His assumed nature. If the wicked saw God in His divine nature, they would be receiving the very reward of which they had made themselves unworthy.

Furthermore, the office of judge is a suitable recompense by way of exaltation, corresponding to the humiliation of Christ, who was willing to be humiliated to the point of being unjustly judged by a human judge. To give expression to our belief in this humiliation, we say explicitly in the Creed, that He suffered under Pontius Pilate. Therefore this exalted reward of being appointed by God to judge all men, the living and the dead, in His human nature, was due to Christ, according to Job 36:17: “Your cause hath been judged as that of the wicked. Cause and judgment You shalt recover.”

Moreover, since this judicial power pertains to Christ’s exaltation, as does the glory of His resurrection, Christ will appear at the judgment, not in humility, which belonged to the time of merit, but in the glorious form that is indicative of His reward. We are assured in the Gospel that “they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with great power and majesty” (Luke 21:27). And the sight of His glory will be a joy to the elect who have loved Him; to these is made the promise, in Isaiah 33:17, that they “shall see the King in His beauty.” But to the wicked this sight will mean confusion and lamentation, for the glory and power of the judge will bring grief and dread to those who fear damnation. We read of this in Isaiah 26: 11: “Let the envious see and be confounded, and let fire devour your enemies.”

Although Christ will show Himself in His glorious form, the marks of the Passion will appear in Him, not with disfigurement, but with beauty and splendor, so that at the sight of them the elect, who will perceive that they have been saved through the sufferings of Christ, will be filled with joy; but sinners, who have scorned so great a benefit, will be filled with dismay. Thus we read in the Apocalypse 1:7: “Every eye shall see Him, they also who pierced Him. And all the tribes of the earth shall mourn because of Him.”

CHAPTER 242

ALL JUDGMENT GIVEN TO THE SON

Since the Father “has given all judgment to the Son,” as is said in John 5:22, and since human life even at present is regulated by the just judgment of God—for it is He who judges all flesh, as Abraham declared in Genesis 18:25—we cannot doubt that this judgment, by which men are governed in the world, pertains likewise to the judicial power of Christ. To Him are directed the words of the Father reported in Psalm 109:1: “Sit at my right hand, until I make your enemies your footstool.” He sits at the right hand of God according to His human nature, inasmuch as He receives His judicial power from the Father. And this power He exercises even now before all His enemies are clearly seen to lie prostrate at His feet. He Himself bore witness to this fact shortly after His resurrection, in Matthew 28:18: “All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth.”

There is another judgment of God whereby, at the moment of death, everyone receives, as regards his soul, the recompense he has deserved. The just who have been dissolved in death remain with Christ, as Paul desired for himself; but sinners who have died are buried in hell. We may not suppose that this division takes place without God’s judgment, or that this judgment does not pertain to the judicial power of Christ, especially as He Himself tells His disciples in John 14:3: “If I shall go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and will take you to Myself, that where I am, you also may be.” To be taken in this way means nothing else than to be dissolved in death, so that we may be with Christ; for “while we are in the body we are absent from the Lord,” as is said in 2 Corinthians 5:6.

However, since man’s recompense is not confined to goods of the soul, but embraces goods of the body which is again to be resumed by the soul at the resurrection, and since every recompense requires judgment, there has to be another judgment by which men are rewarded for what they have done in the body as well as for what they have done in the soul. This judgment, too, belongs rightfully to Christ, in order that, as He rose and ascended into heaven in glory after dying for us, He may also by His own power cause the bodies of our lowliness to rise again in the likeness of His glorified body, and may transport them up to heaven where He has preceded us by His ascension, thus opening the way before us, as had been foretold by Micah. This resurrection of all men will take place simultaneously at the end of the world, as we have already indicated. Therefore this judgment will be a general and final judgment, and we believe that Christ will come a second time, in glory, to preside at it.

In Psalm 35:7 we read: “Your judgments are a great deep”; and in Romans 11:33 the Apostle exclaims: “How incomprehensible are His judgments!” Each of the judgments mentioned contains something profound and incomprehensible to human knowledge. In the first of God’s judgments, by which the present life of mankind is regulated, the time of the judgment is, indeed, manifest to men, but the reason for the recompenses is concealed, especially as evils for the most part are the lot of the good in this world, while good things come to the wicked. In the other two judgments of God the reason for the requitals will be clearly known, but the time remains hidden, because man does not know the hour of his death, as is noted in Ecclesiastes 9:12: “Man does not know his own end”; and no one can know the end of this world. For we do not foreknow future events, except those whose causes we understand. But the cause of the end of the world is the will of God, which is unknown to us. Therefore the end of the world can be foreseen by no creature, but only by God, according to Matthew 24:36: “Of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, but the Father alone.”

In this connection, some have found an occasion for going astray in the added words, “nor the Son,” which are read in Mark 13:32. They contend that the Son is inferior to the Father, on the score that He is ignorant of matters which the Father knows. The difficulty could be avoided by replying that the Son is ignorant of this event in His assumed human nature, but not in. His divine nature, in which He has one and the same wisdom as the Father or, to speak with greater propriety, He is wisdom itself intellectually conceived. But the Son could hardly be unaware of the divine judgment even in His assumed nature, since His soul, as the Evangelist attests, is full of God's grace and truth, as was pointed out above. Nor does it seem reasonable that Christ, who has received the power to judge "because He is the Son of man" (John 5:27), should be ignorant in His human nature of the time appointed for Him to judge. The Father would not really have given all judgment to Him, if the judgment of determining the time of His coming were withheld from Him.

Accordingly this text is to be interpreted in the light of the usual style of speech found in the Scriptures, in which God is said to know a thing when He imparts knowledge of that thing, as when He said to Abraham, in Genesis 22:12: "Now I know that you fear God." The meaning is not that He who knows all things from eternity began to know at that moment, but that He made known Abraham's devotedness by that declaration. In a similar way the Son is said to be ignorant of the day of judgment, because He did not impart that knowledge to the disciples, but replied to them, Acts 1:7: "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." But the Father is not ignorant in this way, since in any case He gave knowledge of the matter to the Son through the eternal generation. Some authors extricate themselves from the difficulty in fewer words, saying that Mark's expression is to be understood of an adopted son.

However that may be, the Lord wished the time of the future judgment to remain hidden, that men might watch with care so as not to be found unprepared at the hour of judgment. For the same reason He also wished the hour of each one's death to be unknown. For each man will appear at the judgment in the state in which he departs from this world by death. Therefore the Lord admonishes us in Matthew 24:42: "Watch ye therefore, because you know not what hour your Lord will come."

CHAPTER 243

UNIVERSALITY OF THE JUDGMENT

According to the doctrine thus set forth, Christ clearly has judicial power over the living and the dead. He exercises judgment both over those who are living in the world at present and over those who pass from this world by death. At the Last judgment, however, He will judge the living and the dead together. In this expression the living may be taken to mean the just who live by grace, and the dead may be taken to mean sinners who have fallen from grace. Or else by the living may be meant those who will be found still alive at the Lord's coming, and by the dead those who have died in previous ages.

We are not to understand by this that certain of the living will be judged without ever having undergone death of the body, as some have argued. For the Apostle says clearly, in 1 Corinthinans 15:51: "We shall all indeed rise again." Another reading has: "We shall indeed sleep," that is, we shall die; or, according to some books, "We shall not indeed all sleep," as Jerome notes in his letter to Minervius on the resurrection of the body. But this variant does not destroy the force of the doctrine under discussion. For a little previously the Apostle had written: "As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive" (1 Cor. 15:22). Hence the text which reads: "We shall not all sleep," cannot refer to death of the body, which has come down to all through the sin of our first parent, as is stated in Romans 5:12, but must be interpreted as referring to the sleep of sin, concerning which we are exhorted in Ephesians 5:14: "Rise, you who sleep, and arise from the dead: and Christ shall enlighten you."

Accordingly those who are found alive at the Lord's coming will be marked off from those who have died before, not for the reason that they will never die, but because in the very act by which they are taken up "in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air” (1 Thessalonians 4: 16), they will die and immediately rise again, as Augustine teaches.

In discussing this matter, we must take cognizance of the three phases which, apparently, constitute a judicial process. First, someone is haled into court; secondly, his cause is examined; and thirdly, he receives sentence.

As to the first phase, all men, good and evil, from the first man down to the very last, will be subject to Christ’s judgment, for, as we are told in 2 Corinthians 5:10, “We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ.” Not even those who have died in infancy, whether they were baptized or not, are exempt from this universal law, as the Glossary on this text explains.

With regard to the second phase, namely, the examination of the case, not all, either of the good or of the wicked, will be judged. A judicial investigation is not necessary unless good and evil actions are intermingled. When good is present without admixture of evil, or evil without admixture of good, discussion is out of place. Among the good there are some who have wholeheartedly despised temporal possessions, and have dedicated themselves to God alone and to the things that are of God. Accordingly, since sin is committed by cleaving to changeable goods in contempt of the changeless Good, such souls exhibit no mingling of good and evil. This is not to imply that they live without sin, for in their person is asserted what we read in 1 John 1: 8: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Although certain lesser sins are found in them, these are, so to speak, consumed by the fire of charity, and so seem to be nothing. At the judgment” therefore, such souls will not be judged by an investigation of their deeds.

On the other hand, those who lead an earthly life and in their preoccupation with things of this world use them, not indeed against God, but with excessive attachment to them, have a notable amount of evil mixed up with the good of faith and charity, so that the element predominating in them cannot easily be perceived. Such souls will undergo judgment by an examination of their merits.

Similarly, with reference to the wicked, we should recall that the principle of approach to God is faith, according to Hebrews 11:6: “He that cometh to God must believe.” Therefore in him who lacks faith there is found nothing of good which, mixed with evil, might render his damnation doubtful. And so such a one will be condemned without any inquiry into merits. Again, he who has faith but has no charity and, consequently, no good works, possesses, indeed, some point of contact with God. Hence an examination of his case is necessary, so that the element predominating in him, whether good or evil, may clearly emerge. Such a person will be condemned only after an investigation of his case. In the same way an earthly king condemns a criminal citizen after hearing him, but punishes an enemy without any hearing.

Lastly, with regard to the third phase of a judgment, that is, the pronouncement of the sentence, all will be judged, for all will receive glory or punishment in accord with the sentence. The reason is given in 2 Corinthians 5: 10: “That every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.”

CHAPTER 244

PROCEDURE AND PLACE OF THE JUDGMENT

We are not to suppose that judicial examination will be required in order that the judge may receive information, as is the case in human courts; for “all things ate naked and open to His eyes,” as we are told in Hebrews 4:13. The examination is necessary for the purpose of making known to each person, concerning himself and others, the reasons why each is worthy of punishment or of glory, so that the good may joyfully acknowledge God’s justice in all things and the wicked may be roused to anger against themselves.

Nor should we imagine that this examination is to be conducted by oral discussion. Endless time would be required to recount the thoughts, words, and deeds, good or evil, of each person. Therefore Lactantius was deceived when be suggested that the day of judgment would last a thousand years. Even this time would scarcely be enough, as several days would be required to complete the judicial process for a single man in the manner proposed. Accordingly the divine power will bring it about that in an instant everyone will be apprised of all the good or evil he has ever done, for which he is to be rewarded or punished. And all this will be made known to each person, not only about himself, but also about the rest. Hence, wherever the good is so much in excess that the evil seems to be of no consequence or vice versa, there will seem, to human estimation, to be no conflict between the good and the evil. This is what we meant when we said that such persons will be rewarded or punished without examination.

Although all men will appear before Christ at that judgment, the good will not only be set apart from the wicked by reason of meritorious cause, but will be separated from them in locality. The wicked, who have withdrawn from Christ in their love of earthly things, will remain on earth; but the good, who have clung to Christ, will be raised up into the air when they go to meet Christ, that they may be made like Christ, not only by being conformed to the splendor of His glory, but by being associated with Him in the place He occupies. This is indicated in Matthew 24:28: “Wheresoever the body shall be, there shall the eagles also (by which the saints are signified) be gathered together.” According to Jerome [In Evangelium Matthaei, IV], instead of “body” the Hebrew has the significant word “joatham,” which means corpse, to commemorate Christ’s passion, whereby Christ merited the power to judge, and men who have been conformed to His passion are admitted into the company of His glory, as we are told by the Apostle in 2 Timothy 2:12: “If we suffer, we shall also reign with Him.”

This is the ground for our belief that Christ will come down to judge somewhere near the place of His passion, as is intimated in Joel 3:2: “I will gather together all nations and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat; and I will plead with them there.” This valley lies at the foot of Mount Olivet, from which Christ ascended into heaven. For the same reason, when Christ comes for the judgment, the sign of the cross and other signs of the Passion will be displayed, as is said in Matthew 24:30: “And then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven,” so that the wicked, looking upon Him whom they have pierced, will be distressed and tormented, and those who have been redeemed will exult in the glory of their Redeemer. And as Christ is said to sit at God’s right hand according to His human nature, inasmuch as He has been lifted up to share in the most excellent goods of the Father, so at the judgment the just are said to stand at Christ’s right, as being entitled to the most honorable place near Him.

CHAPTER 245

ROLE OF THE SAINTS IN THE JUDGMENT

Christ will not be the only one to judge on that day; others will be associated with Him. Of these, some will judge only in the sense of serving as a basis for comparison. In this way the good will judge the less good, or the wicked will judge the more wicked, according to Matthew 12:41: “The men of Nineveh shall rise in judgment with this generation and shall condemn it.” And some will judge by giving their approval to ‘the sentence; in this way all the just shall judge, according to Wisdom 3:7 ff: “The just... shall judge nations.” But some will judge with a certain judicial power delegated to them by Christ, having “two-edged swords in their hands,” as is indicated in Psalm 149:6.

This last kind of judicial power the Lord promised to the apostles, in Matthew 19:28, when He said: “You who have followed Me, in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit on the seat of His majesty you also shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.” We are not to conclude from this that only the Jews who belong to the twelve tribes of Israel will be judged by the apostles, for by the twelve tribes of Israel are understood all the faithful who have been admitted to the faith of the patriarchs. As for infidels, they will not be judged, but have already been judged.

Similarly, the twelve apostles who walked with Christ during His earthly life are not the only ones who will judge. Judas assuredly will not judge, and Paul, on the other hand, who labored more than the rest, will not lack judicial power, especially as he himself says, 1 Corinthians 6:3: “Know you not that we shall judge angels?” This dignity pertains properly to those who have left all to follow Christ, for such was the promise made to Peter in answer to his question in Matthew 19:27: “Behold, we have left all things and have followed Thee; what therefore shall we have?” The same thought occurs in Job 36:6: “He giveth judgment to the poor.”

And this is reasonable, because, as we said, the investigation will deal with the actions of men who have used earthly things well or ill. Correctness of judgment requires that the mind of the judge should be unswayed by those matters about which he has to judge; and so the fact that some have their minds completely detached from earthly things gives them a title to judicial authority.

The announcing of the divine commandments also contributes to the meriting of this dignity. In Matthew 25:31 we read that Christ will come to judge accompanied by angels, that is, by preachers, as Augustine suggests in a work on penance [Sermo 351, De utilitate agendae poenitentiae]. For they who have made known the precepts of life ought to have a part in examining the actions of men regarding the observance of the divine precepts.

The persons mentioned will judge by cooperating in the task of revealing to each individual the cause of the salvation or damnation both of himself and of others, in the way that higher angels are said to illuminate the lower angels and also men.

We profess that this judicial power belongs to Christ when we say, in the Apostles’ Creed: “From thence He shall come to judge the living and the dead.”

CHAPTER 246

THE FOREGOING TEACHINGS COMPRISED IN ARTICLES OF FAITH

Having reviewed the doctrines pertaining to the truth of the Christian faith, we should advert to the fact that all the teachings thus set forth are reduced to certain articles: twelve in number, as some think, or fourteen, according to others.

Faith has to do with truths that surpass the comprehension of reason. Hence, whenever a new truth incomprehensible to reason is proposed, a new article is required. One article pertains to the divine unity. For, even though we prove by reason that God is one, the fact that He governs all things directly or that He wishes to be worshiped in some particular way, is a matter relating to faith. Three articles, are reserved for the three divine persons. Three other articles are formulated about the effects produced by God: creation, which pertains to nature; justification, which pertains to grace; and reward, which pertains to glory. Thus seven articles altogether are devoted to the divinity.

Concerning the humanity of Christ, seven more are proposed. The first is on the incarnation and conception of Christ. The second deals with the nativity, which involves a special difficulty because of our Lord’s coming forth from the closed womb of the Virgin. The third article is on the death, passion, and burial; the fourth on the descent into hell; the fifth on the resurrection; the sixth on the ascension; and the seventh treats of Christ’s coming for the judgment. And so there are fourteen articles in all.

Other authorities, reasonably enough, include faith in the three persons under one article, on the ground that we cannot believe in the Father without believing in the Son and also in the Holy Spirit, the bond of love uniting the first two persons. However, they distinguish the article on the resurrection from the article on eternal reward. Accordingly, there are two articles about God, one on the unity, the other on the Trinity. Four articles deal with God’s effects: one with creation, the second with justification, the third with the general resurrection, and the fourth with reward. Similarly, as regards belief in the humanity of Christ, these authors comprise the conception and the nativity under one article, and they also include the passion and death under one article. According to this way of reckoning, therefore, we have twelve articles in all.

And this should be enough on faith.

PART TWO

HOPE

CHAPTER 1

NECESSITY OF THE VIRTUE OF HOPE

The Prince of the Apostles has left us an admonition urging us to render an account not only of our faith, but also of the hope that is in us [1 Pet 3:15]. In the first part of the present work we have briefly set forth the teaching of Christian faith. We now turn to the task of undertaking, in compendious fashion, an exposition of the truths pertaining to hope.

We should recall that in one kind of knowledge, man's desire can come to rest. We naturally desire to know truth, and when we do know it, our craving in this direction is satisfied. But in the knowledge of faith man's desire never comes to rest. For faith is imperfect knowledge: the truths we accept on faith are not seen. This is why the Apostle calls faith "the evidence of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1).

Accordingly, even when we have faith, there still remains in the soul an impulse toward something else, namely, the perfect vision of the truth assented to on faith, and the attainment of whatever can lead to such truth. As we pointed out above, among the various teachings of faith there is one according to which we believe that God exercises providence over human affairs. In consequence of this belief, stirrings of hope arise in the soul of the believer that by God's help he may gain possession of the goods he naturally desires, once he learns of them through faith. Therefore, as we mentioned at the very beginning, next after faith, the virtue of hope is necessary for the perfection of Christian living.

CHAPTER 2

PRAYER AND HOPE

in the order of divine providence, each being has assigned to it a way of reaching its end in keeping with its nature. To men, too, is appointed a suitable way, that befits the conditions of human nature, of obtaining what they hope for from God. Human nature inclines us to have recourse to petition for the purpose of obtaining from another, especially from a person of higher rank, what we hope to receive from him. And so prayer is recommended to men, that by it they may obtain from God what they hope to secure from Him.

But the reason why prayer is necessary for obtaining something from a man is not the same as the reason for its necessity when there is question of obtaining a favor from God. Prayer is addressed to man, first, to lay bare - the desire and the need of the petitioner, and secondly, to incline the mind of him to whom the prayer is addressed to grant the petition. These purposes have no place in the prayer that is sent up to God. When we pray we do not intend to manifest our needs or desires to God, for He knows all things. The Psalmist says to God: “Lord, all my desire is before You” (Psalm 37:10); and in the Gospel we are told: “Your Father knows that you have need of all these things” (Matt. 6:32). Again, the will of God is not influenced by human words to will what He had previously not willed. For, as we read in Numbers 23:19, “God is not a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed”; nor is God moved to repentance, as we are assured in 1 Samuel 15:29. Prayer, then, for obtaining something from God is necessary for man on account of the very one who prays, that he may reflect on his shortcomings and may turn his mind to desiring fervently and piously what he hopes to gain by his petition. In this way he is rendered fit to receive the favor. Yet a further difference between the prayer offered to God and that addressed to man is to be marked. Prayer addressed to a man presupposes a certain intimacy that may afford the petitioner an opportunity to present his request. But when we pray to God, the very prayer we send forth makes us intimate with Him, inasmuch as our soul is raised up to God and converses with Him in spiritual affection, and adores Him in spirit and truth. The familiar affection thus experienced in prayer begets an inducement in the petitioner to pray again with yet greater confidence. And so we read in Psalm 16:6: “I have cried to You,” that is, in trusting prayer, “for You, O God, have heard me”; as though, after being admitted to intimacy in the first prayer, the Psalmist cries out with all the greater confidence in the second.

For this reason, in prayer to God, perseverance or repetition of our supplication is not unseemly, but is regarded as acceptable to God. Indeed, “we ought always to pray and not to faint,” as we learn from Luke 18: 1. Our Lord, too, invites us to pray, for He said: “Ask, and it shall be given you... knock, and it shall be opened to you” (Matt. 7:7). But in prayer addressed to man, persistence in begging becomes irritating.

CHAPTER 3

THE LORD’S PRAYER

Since, in addition to faith, hope is also necessary for our salvation, our Savior, who inaugurated and perfected our faith by instituting the heavenly sacraments, thought it well to carry us on to a living hope by giving us a form of prayer that mightily raises up our hope to God. Thus we are taught by God Himself what we ought to request from Him. He would not urge us to pray unless He were determined to hear us; no one asks another for a favor unless he has hope in him, and he asks only what he hopes for. Therefore, in teaching us to ask God for benefits, Christ exhorts us to hope in God, and He shows us what we ought to hope for from Him by making known to us what to request.

Accordingly, we shall go through the petitions contained in the Lord’s Prayer, and shall point out all that may relate to the hope of Christians. We shall indicate the person in whom we ought to place our hope, and why, and what we should expect from Him. Our hope ought to be anchored in God to whom we are to pray, as we are told in Psalm 61:9: “Trust in Him,” namely, in God, “you people, at all times; pour out your hearts to Him,” that is, in prayer.

CHAPTER 4

WHY WE MUST PRAY TO GOD FOR WHAT WE HOPE

The reason why we must hope in God is chiefly the fact that we belong to Him, as effect belongs to cause. God does nothing in vain, but always acts for a definite purpose. Every active cause has the power of producing its effect in such a way that the effect will not be wanting in whatever can advance it toward its end. This is why, in effects produced by natural causes, nature is not found to be deficient in anything that is necessary, but confers on every effect whatever goes into its composition and is required to carry through the action whereby it may reach its end. Of course, some impediment may arise from a defect in the cause, which then may be unable to furnish all this.

A cause that operates intellectually not only confers on the effect, in the act of producing it, all that is required for the result intended, but also, when the product is finished, controls its use, which is the end of the object. Thus a smith, in addition to forging a knife, has the disposition of its cutting efficiency. Man is made by God somewhat as an article is made by an artificer. Something of this sort is said in Isaiah 64:8: “And now, Lord, You art our Father and we are clay, and You art our Maker.” Accordingly, just as an earthen vessel, if it were endowed with sense, might hope to be put to good use by the potter, so man ought to cherish the hope of being rightly provided for by God. Thus we are told in Jeremiah 18:6: “As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand, O house of Israel.”

The confidence which man has in God ought to be most certain. As we just intimated, a cause does not refrain from rightly controlling its product unless it labors under some defect. But no defect or ignorance can occur in

God, because “all things are naked and open to His eyes,” as is said in Hebrews 4:13Nor does He lack power, for “the hand of the Lord is not shortened that it cannot save,” as we read in Isaiah 59:1. Nor is He wanting in good will, for “the Lord is good to those who hope in Him, to the soul that seeks Him,” as we are reminded in Lamentations 3:25. Therefore the hope with which a person trusts in God does not confound him that hopes, as is said in Romans 5:5.

We should also bear in mind that, while Providence watches solicitously over all creatures, God exercises special care over rational beings. For the latter are exalted to the dignity of God’s image, and can rise to the knowledge and love of Him, and have dominion over their actions, since they are able to discriminate between good and evil. Hence they should have confidence in God, not only that they may be preserved in existence in keeping with the condition of their nature—for this pertains also to other creatures—but that, by avoiding evil and doing good, they may merit some reward from Him. We are taught a salutary lesson in Psalm 35:7: “Men and beasts You will preserve,” that is God bestows on men and irrational creatures alike whatever pertains to the sustaining of life. And then the Psalmist adds, in the next verse: “But the children of men shall put their trust under the cover of your wings,” indicating that they will be protected by God with special care.

We should observe, further, that when any perfection is conferred, an ability to do or acquire something is also added. For example, when the air is illuminated by the sun, it has the capacity to serve as a medium for sight, and when water is heated by fire it can be used to cook, and it could hope for this if it had a mind. To man is given, over and above the nature of his soul, the perfection of grace, by which he is made a partaker in the divine nature, as we are taught in 2 Peter 1:4. As a result of this, we are said to be regenerated and to become sons of God, according to John 1:12: “He gave them power to be made the sons of God.” Thus raised to be sons, men may reasonably hope for an inheritance, as we learn from Romans 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.” In keeping with this spiritual regeneration, man should have a yet higher hope in God, namely, the hope of receiving an eternal inheritance, according to 1 Peter 1:3 f.: “God... has regenerated us into a lively hope, by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, into an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled and that cannot fade, reserved in heaven for you."

Through this "spirit of adoption" that we receive, we cry: "Abba, (Father)," as is said in Romans 8:15. Hence our Lord began His prayer by calling upon the Father, saying, "Father," to teach us that our prayer must be based on this hope. By uttering the name, "Father," man's affection is prepared to pray with a pure disposition, and also to obtain what he hopes for. Moreover, sons ought to be imitators of their parents. Therefore he who professes that God is his Father ought to try to be an imitator of God, by avoiding things that make him unlike God and by earnestly praying for those perfections that make him like to God. Hence we are commanded in Jeremiah 3:19: "You shalt call Me Father and shalt not cease to walk after Me." If, then, as Gregory of Nyssa reminds us [De oratione dominica, II], you turn your gaze to worldly affairs, or seek human honor or the filth of passionate craving: how can you, who lead such a corrupt life, call the source of incorruption your Father?

CHAPTER 5

WHY WE ARE TO SAY “OUR FATHER,” NOT “MY FATHER”

He who looks on himself as a son of God, ought, among other things, to imitate our Lord especially in His love, as we are urged to do in Ephesians 5:1 ff.: “Be therefore followers of God as most dear children, and walk in love.” God’s love is not restricted to any individual, but embraces all in common; for God loves “all things that are,” as is said in Wisdom 11:25. Most of all He loves men, according to Deuteronomy 33:3: “He loved the people.” Consequently, in Cyprian’s words, “our prayer is public and is offered for all; and when we pray, we do not pray for one person alone, but for the whole people, because we are all together one people” [Liber de oratione dominica, VIII]. Or, as Chrysostom says, “Necessity forces us to pray for ourselves, but fraternal charity impels us to pray for others” [Pseudo-Chrysostom, In Evangelium Matthaei, hom. XIV]. This is why we say, “Our Father,” and not simply “My Father.”

At the same time we should remember that, although our hope rests chiefly on God’s help, we can aid one another to obtain more easily what we ask for. St. Paul says, in 2 Corinthians 1:10 ff.: God will “deliver us, you helping withal in prayer for us.” And in James 5:16 we are exhorted: “Pray one for another, that you may be saved.” For, as Ambrose reminds us, “many insignificant people, when they are gathered together and are of one mind, become powerful, and the prayers of many cannot but be heard” [Ambrosiaster, In epistolam ad Romanos, XV]. This agrees with Matthew 18: 19: “If two of you shall consent upon earth concerning anything whatsoever they shall ask, it shall be done to them by My Father who is in heaven.” Therefore we do not pour forth our prayers as individuals, but with unanimous accord we cry out, “Our Father.”

Let us also reflect that our hope reaches up to God through Christ, according to Romans 5:1 ff.: “Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom also we have access through faith into this grace wherein we stand, and glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God.” Through Him who is the only-begotten Son of God by nature, we are made adopted sons: “God sent His Son... that we might receive the adoption of sons,” as is said in Galatians 4:4 ff. Hence, in acknowledging that God is our Father, we should do so in such a way that the prerogative of the Only-begotten is not disparaged. In this connection Augustine admonishes us: “Do not make any exclusive claims for yourself. In a special sense, God is the Father of Christ alone, and is the Father of all the rest of us in common. For the Father begot Him alone, but created us” [really Ambrose, De sacramentis, V. 19]. This, then, is why we say: “Our Father.”

CHAPTER 6

GOD’S POWER TO GRANT OUR PETITIONS

When hope is abandoned, the reason is usually to be found in the powerlessness of him from whom help was expected. The confidence characteristic of hope i’s not wholly grounded on the mere willingness to help professed by him on whom our hope rests: power to help must also be present. We sufficiently express our conviction that the divine will is ready to help us when we proclaim that God is our Father. But to exclude all doubt as to the perfection of His power, we add: “who art in heaven.” The Father is not said to be in heaven as though He were contained by heaven; on the contrary, He encompasses heaven in His power, as is said in Sirach 24:8: “1 alone have compassed the circuit of heaven.” Indeed, God’s power is raised above the whole immensity of heaven, according to Psalm 8:2: “Your magnificence is elevated above the heavens.” And so, to strengthen the confidence of our hope, we hail the power of God which sustains and transcends the heavens.

This same phrase removes a certain obstacle that may stand in the way of our prayer. Some people act as though human affairs were subjected to a deterministic fatalism imposed by the stars, contrary to what is commanded in Jeremiah 10:2: “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear.” If this error had its way, it would rob us of the fruit of prayer. For if our lives were subjected to a necessity decreed by the stars, nothing in our course could be changed. In vain we should plead in our prayer for the granting of some good or for deliverance from evil. To prevent this error from undermining confidence in prayer, we say: “who art in heaven,” thus acknowledging that God moves and regulates the heavens. Accordingly the assistance we hope to obtain from God cannot be obstructed by the power of heavenly bodies.

In order that prayer may be efficacious at the court of God, man must ask for those benefits which he may worthily expect from God. Of old some petitioners were rebuked: “You ask and receive not, because you ask amiss” (James 4:3). Anything suggested by earthly wisdom rather than by heavenly wisdom, is asked for in the wrong spirit. And so Chrysostom assures us that the words, “who art in heaven,” do not imply that God is confined to that locality, but rather indicate that the mind of him who prays is raised up from the earth and comes to rest in that celestial region [In Matthaeum, hom. XIX, 4].

There is another obstacle to prayer or confidence in God that would deter one from praying. This is the notion that human life is far removed from divine providence. The thought is given expression, in the person of the wicked, in Job 22:14: “The clouds are His cover; He does not consider our things, and He walks about the poles of heaven”; also in Ezekiel 8: 12: “The Lord does not see us, the Lord has forsaken the earth.”

But the Apostle Paul taught the contrary in his sermon to the Athenians, when he said that God is “not far from every one of us; for in Him we live and move and are” (Acts 17:27 f.). That is, our being is preserved, our life is governed and our activity is directed by Him. This is confirmed by Wisdom 14:3: “Your providence, Father, governs all things from the beginning. Not even the most insignificant of living things are withdrawn from God’s providence, as we are told in Matthew 10:29 f.: “Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.” Men are placed under the divine care in a yet more excellent way, so that in comparison with them the Apostle could ask: “Does God take care of oxen?” (1 Cor. 9:9). The meaning is not that God has no concern at all for such animals, but that He does not take care of them in the same way He does of men, whom He punishes or rewards in accordance with their good or evil actions, and whom He foreordains to eternal life. This is why, in the words quoted from Matthew, our Lord says: “The very hairs of your head are all numbered,” thus indicating that everything belonging to man is to be recovered at the resurrection.

Consequently all diffidence should be banished from our lives. For, as our Lord adds, in the same context: “Fear not, therefore; better are you than many sparrows” (Matt. 10:31). This clarifies the passage we called attention to above: “The children of men shall put their trust under the cover of your wings” (Ps. 35:8).

Although God is said to be near to all men by reason of His special care over them, He is exceptionally close to the good who strive to draw near to Him in faith and love, as we are assured in James 4:8: “Draw near to God, and He will draw near to you.” Confirmation of this is found in Psalm 144: 18: “The Lord is near to all who call upon Him: to all who call upon Him in truth.” Indeed, He not only draws near to them: He even dwells in them through grace, as is intimated in Jeremiah 14:9: “You, O Lord, are among us.”

Therefore, to increase the hope of the saints, we are bidden to say: “who art in heaven,” that is, in the saints, as Augustine explains [De sermone Domini in monte, II, 5]. For, as the same doctor adds, the spiritual distance between the just and sinners seems to be as great as the spatial distance between heaven and earth. To symbolize this idea, we turn toward the east when we pray, because it is in that direction that heaven rises. The hope of the saints and their confidence in prayer are increased by the divine nearness, and also by the dignity they have received from God, who through Christ has caused them to be heavens, as is indicated in Isaiah 51:16: “That You might plant the heavens and found the earth.” He who has made them heavens will not withhold heavenly goods from them.

CHAPTER 7

OBJECTS OF HOPE

Having treated of the truths that lead men to hope in God, we must go on to inquire what are the blessings we ought to hope to receive from Him. In this connection we should observe that hope presupposes desire. Before a thing can be hoped for, it must first be desired. Things that are not desired are not said to be objects of hope; rather they are feared or even despised. Secondly, we must judge that what is hoped for is possible to obtain; hope includes this factor over and above desire. True, a man can desire things he does not believe he is able to attain; but he cannot cherish hope with regard to such objects. Thirdly, hope necessarily implies the idea that the good hoped for is hard to get: trifles are the object of contempt rather than of hope. Or, if we desire certain things and have them, as it were, to hand, we are not deemed to hope for them as future goods, but to possess them as present to us.

We should further note that among the difficult things a person hopes to obtain, there are some he hopes to get through the good offices of another, and some that he hopes to acquire through his own efforts. The difference between these two classes of goods seems to come to this: to obtain the things he hopes to acquire by himself, a man employs the resources of his own power; to obtain what he hopes to receive from another, he has recourse to petition. If he hopes to receive such a benefit from a man, his request is called simple petition; if he hopes to obtain a favor from God, it is called prayer, which, as Damascene says, “is a petition addressed to God for suitable goods” [De fide orthodoxa, III, 24].

However, the hope a man places in his own powers or in another man does not pertain to the virtue of hope; that virtue is limited to the hope he has in God. Hence we are told in Jeremiah 17:5: “Cursed be the man who trusts in man, and makes flesh his arm”; and a little farther on: “Blessed be the man who trusts in the Lord, and the Lord shall be his confidence.” This shows us that the goods our Lord teaches us to ask for in His prayer are to be regarded as possible, yet not easy to get; access to them is afforded by God’s help and not by human power.

CHAPTER 8

FIRST PETITION: DESIRE FOR PERFECT KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

In this connection we must heed the order of desire, as regulated by charity, so that a corresponding order of goods to be hoped and asked for from God may be established. The order of charity requires us to love God above all things. And so charity moves our first desire in the direction of the things that are of God. But desire has to do with future good, and nothing in the future can accrue to God, considered as He is in Himself, since He is eternally the same. Therefore our desire cannot bear on things that belong to God, as they are considered in themselves: we may not entertain the idea that God can acquire some goods He does not already possess. Rather, our love regards these goods in such a way that we love them as existing. However, we can desire, with respect to God, that He who exists forever great in Himself, may be magnified in the thoughts and reverence of all men.

This is not to be dismissed as impossible. For, since man was made for the very purpose of knowing God's greatness, he would seem to have been created in vain if he were unable to attain to the perception of this attribute, contrary to what is said in Psalm 88:48: "Did You made all the children of men in vain?" If this were the case, the desire of nature, whereby all men naturally desire to know something of the divine perfections, would be fruitless. Indeed, no man is completely deprived of knowledge of God, as we are taught in Job 36:25: "All men see Him." Yet such knowledge of God is hard to obtain; indeed, it is beyond all human power, according to Job 36:26: "Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge."

Accordingly knowledge of God’s greatness and goodness cannot come to men except through the grace of divine revelation, as we are told in Matthew 11:27: “No one knows the Son but the Father; nor does any one know the Father but the Son, and he to whom it pleases the Son to reveal Him.” Hence Augustine says, in his commentary on John, that no one knows God unless He who knows manifests Himself” [In Joannis Evangelium, LVIII, 3].

To some extent God makes Himself known to men through a certain natural knowledge, by imbuing them with the light of reason and by giving existence to visible creatures, in which are reflected some glimmerings of His goodness and wisdom, as we read in Romans 1:19: “That which is known of God,” that is, what is knowable about God by natural reason, “is manifest in them,” namely, is disclosed to pagan peoples. “For God hath manifested it to them,” through the light of reason and through the creatures He has put in the world. The Apostle adds: “For the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and divinity.”

But this knowledge is imperfect, because not even creatures can be perfectly comprehended by man, and also because creatures are unable to represent God perfectly, since the excellence of the cause infinitely surpasses its effect. Therefore in Job 11:7 the question is put: “Can you claim to fathom the depths of God, can you reach the limit of Shaddai?” And in Job 36:25, after affirming, “All men see Him,” the speaker adds, “every one gazes from afar.”

As a result of the imperfection of this knowledge, it happened that men, wandering from the truth, erred in various ways concerning the knowledge of God, to such an extent that, as the Apostle says in Romans 1:21 ff., some “became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened; for, professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man and of birds and of four-footed beasts and of creeping things.” To recall men from this error, God gave them a clearer knowledge of Himself in the Old Law, through which men were brought back to the worship of the one God. Thus the truth is announced in Deuteronomy 6:4: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord.” But this information about God was wrapped up in the obscurities of figurative language, and was confined within the limits of one nation, the Jewish people, as is indicated in Psalm 75:2: “In Judea God is known; His name is great in Israel.”

In order that true knowledge of God might spread throughout the whole human race, God the Father sent the only-begotten Word of His majesty into the world, that through Him the entire world might come to a true knowledge of the divine name. Our Lord Himself began this work among His disciples, as He tells us in John 17:6: “I have manifested Your name to the men whom You gave Me out of the world.” But His intention in imparting knowledge of the Deity was not limited to the disciples; He wished this knowledge to be promulgated through them to the whole world. This is why He adds the prayer: “That the world may believe that You sent Me” (John 17:21). He carries on His task without intermission through the apostles and their successors; by their ministry men are brought to the knowledge of God, to the end that the name of God may be held in benediction and honor throughout the entire world, as was foretold in Malachi 1:11: “From the rising of the sun even to the going down, My name is great among the Gentiles, and in every place there is sacrifice, and there is offered to My name a clean oblation.”

When we say in our prayer, “Hallowed be Your name,” we ask that the work thus begun may be brought to completion. “In making this petition,” says St. Augustine, “we do not mean to imply that the name of God is not holy, but we ask that it may be regarded by all men as holy; that is, that God may become so well known that men will not judge anything to be holier” [De sermone Domini in monte, II, 5]. Among the various indications that make the holiness of God known to men, the most convincing sign is the holiness of men, who are sanctified by the divine indwelling. Gregory of Nyssa asks: “Who is so bereft of the finer sensibilities as not, on beholding the spotless life of believers, to glorify the name that is invoked by those who lead such a life?” [De oratione dominica, III]. The Apostle speaks in like vein, in 1 Corinthians 14:24 ff. After saying: “If all prophesy, and there comes in one who does not believe, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all,” he adds: “And so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed.”

Therefore, as Chrysostom points out, in teaching us the words, “Hallowed be Your name,” our Lord also bids us, when we pray, to ask that God may be glorified by our lives [In Matthaeum, hom. XIX, 4]. The sense of the prayer is this: “Grant us so to live, that all men may glorify You through us.” God is sanctified or hallowed in the minds of other men through us, to the extent that we are sanctified by Him. Hence when we say: “Hallowed by Your name,” we pray, as Cyprian remarks, that God’s name may be hallowed in us [Liber de oratione dominica, XII].19 Following the lead of Christ, who says: “Be holy, because I am holy,” we beg that we, who have been sanctified in baptism, may persevere in the state in which we began. Furthermore we pray daily to be sanctified in order that we, who daily fall, may wash away our sins by a constant process of purification.

This petition is put first because, as Chrysostom observes, he who would offer a worthy prayer to God should ask for nothing before the Father’s glory, but should make everything come after the praise of Him.

CHAPTER 9

SECOND PETITION: PRAYER FOR PARTICIPATION IN GOD’S GLORY

After desiring and praying for the glory of God, man is led to desire and ask that he may be given a share in divine glory. And so the second petition is worded: “Your kingdom come.” In discussing this petition, we shall follow the same procedure as we observed in treating of the preceding petition. We shall consider, first, that we do right to desire the kingdom of God; secondly, that man can attain to the possession of this kingdom; thirdly, that he can attain to it not by his own powers, but only with the help of divine grace. And then, in the fourth place, we must inquire into the sense in which we pray that the kingdom of God may come.

As to the first point, we should note that to every being its own good is naturally desirable. Hence good is conveniently defined as that which all desire. The proper good of any being is that whereby it is brought to perfection. We say that a thing is good inasmuch as it reaches its proper perfection. On the other hand, a thing lacks goodness so far as it is lacking in its proper perfection. Consequently each thing seeks its own perfection, and so man, too, naturally desires to be perfected. And, since there are many degrees of human perfection, that good chiefly and primarily comes under man’s desire which looks to his ultimate perfection. This good is recognized by the sure sign that man’s natural desire comes to rest in it. For, since man’s natural desire always inclines toward his own good which consists in some perfection, the consequence is that as long as something remains to be desired, man has not yet reached his final perfection.

Something can thus remain to be desired in two ways. First, when the thing desired is sought for the sake of something else; when it is obtained, desire cannot cease, but must be borne along toward that other object. Secondly, when a thing does not suffice to provide what man desires; for instance, a meager portion of food is not enough to sustain nature, and so does not satisfy natural appetite.

Consequently that good which man chiefly and mainly desires must be of such a nature that it is not sought for the sake of something else and that it satisfies man. This good is commonly called happiness, inasmuch as it is man’s foremost good: we say that certain people are happy because we believe that everything goes well with them. It is also known as beatitude, a word that stresses its excellence. It can also be called peace, so far as it brings quiet; for cessation of appetite appears to imply interior peace. This is indicated in the words of Psalm 147:14: “Who has placed peace in your borders.”

We see clearly that man’s happiness or beatitude cannot consist in material goods. The first reason for this is that such goods are not sought for their own. sake, but are naturally desired because of something else. They are suitable for man by reason of his body. But man’s body is subordinated to his soul as to its end. For the body is the instrument of the soul that moves it, and every instrument exists for the good of the art that employs it. Furthermore, the body is related to the soul as matter is related to form. But form is the end of matter, just as act is the end of potency. Consequently man’s final happiness does not consist in riches or in honors or in health and beauty or in any goods of this kind.

The second reason why happiness is not to be found in material goods is that such goods cannot satisfy man. This is clear on many scores. In the first place, man has a twofold appetitive power, one intellectual, the other sensitive. Consequently he has a twofold desire. But the desire of the intellectual appetite veers chiefly toward intelligible goods, which exceed the competency of material goods. Secondly, material goods, as being the lowest in the order of nature, do not contain all goodness but possess only a portion of goodness, so that one object has this particular aspect of goodness, for example, the power to give pleasure, while another object has a different advantage, for instance, the power to cause bodily well-being, and so on of the rest. In none of them can the human appetite, which naturally tends toward universal good, find complete satisfaction. Nor can full satisfaction be found even in a large number of such goods, no matter how much they may be multiplied, for they fall short of the infinity of universal good. Thus we are assured in Ecclesiastes 5:9 that “a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money.” Thirdly, since man by his intellect apprehends the universal good that is not circumscribed by space or time, the human appetite, consistently with the apprehension of the intellect, desires a good that is not circumscribed by time. Hence man naturally desires perpetual stability. But this cannot be found in material things, which are subject to corruption and to many kinds of change. Therefore the human appetite cannot find the sufficiency it needs in material goods. Accordingly man’s ultimate happiness cannot consist in such goods.

Moreover, since the sense faculties have bodily activities, inasmuch as they operate through bodily organs which exercise their functions on corporeal objects, man’s ultimate happiness cannot consist in the activities of his sensitive nature, for example, in certain pleasures of the flesh. The human intellect, too, has some activity with reference to corporeal things, for man knows bodies by his speculative intellect and manages corporeal things by his practical intellect. And so man’s ultimate happiness and perfection cannot be placed in the proper activity of the speculative intellect or of the practical intellect that deals with material things.

Likewise, such happiness is not found in that activity of the human intellect whereby the soul reflects on itself. There are two reasons for this. In the first place the soul, considered in its own nature, is not beatified. Otherwise it would not have to labor for the attainment of beatitude. Therefore it does not acquire beatitude from the mere contemplation of itself. In the second place, happiness is the ultimate perfection of man, as was stated above. Since the perfection of the soul consists in its proper activity, its ultimate perfection is to be looked for on the plane of its best activity, and this is determined by its best object, for activities are specified according to their objects. But the soul is not the best object to which its activity can tend. For it is aware that something exists that is better than itself. Hence man’s ultimate beatitude cannot consist in the activity whereby he makes himself or any of the other higher substances the object of his intellection, as long as there is something better to which the action of the human soul can turn. Man’s activity may extend to any good whatever, for the universal good is what man desires, since he apprehends universal good with his intellect. Therefore, whatever may be the degree to which goodness extends, the action of the human intellect, and hence also of the will, reaches out toward it in some way. But good is found supremely in God, who is good by His very essence, and is the source of every good. Consequently man’s ultimate perfection and final good consist in union with God, according to Psalm 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to my God.”

This truth is clearly perceived if we examine the way other things participate in being. Individual men all truly receive the predication “man,” because they share in the very essence of the species. None of them is said to be a man on the ground that he shares in the likeness of some other man, but only because he shares in the essence of the species. This is so even though one man brings another to such participation by way of generation, as a father does with regard to his son. Now beatitude or happiness is nothing else than perfect good. Therefore all who share in beatitude can be happy only by participation in the divine beatitude, which is man’s essential goodness, even though one man may be helped by another in his progress toward beatitude. This is why Augustine says in his book, De vera religione, that we are beatified, not by beholding the angels, but by seeing the Truth in which we love the angels and are happy along with thein [LV, 110].

Man’s spirit is carried up to God in two ways: by God Himself, and by some other thing. It is borne up to God by God Himself when God is seen in Himself and is loved for Himself. It is raised up by something else when the soul is elevated to God by His creatures, according to Romans 1:20: “The invisible things of Him... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

Perfect beatitude cannot consist in a person’s movement toward God through the agency of something else. For, first, since beatitude denotes the ultimate term of all human actions, true and perfect happiness cannot be found in that which is of the nature of change in the direction of the end rather than of a final term. Knowledge and love of God through the medium of something other than God is brought about by a certain movement of the human mind, as it advances through one stage to another. True and perfect beatitude, therefore, is not discovered in this process.

Secondly, if man’s beatitude consists in the adhering of the human mind to God, perfect beatitude must require a perfect adhering to God. But the human mind cannot adhere perfectly to God through the medium of any creature, whether by way of knowledge or by way of love. All created forms fall infinitely short of representing the divine essence. Objects pertaining to a higher order of being cannot be known through a form belonging to a lower order. For example, a spiritual substance cannot be known through a body, and a heavenly body cannot be known through one of the elements. Much less can the essence of God be known through any created form. Yet, just as we gain a negative insight into higher bodies from a study of lower bodies, thus learning, for instance, that they are neither heavy nor light, and just as we conceive a negative idea about ange'ls from a consideration of bodies, judging that they are immaterial or incorporeal, so by examining creatures we come to know, not what God is, but rather what He is not. Likewise, any goodness possessed by a creature is a definite minimum in comparison with the divine goodness, which is infinite goodness. Hence the various degrees of goodness emanating from God and discerned in things, which are benefits bestowed by God, fail to raise the mind to a perfect love of God. Therefore true and perfect beatitude cannot consist in the adherence of the mind to God through some alien medium.

Thirdly, according to right order, things that are less familiar become known through things that are more familiar. Likewise, things that are less good are loved because of their connection with things that possess greater goodness. Consequently, as God is the first truth and supreme goodness, and is eminently knowable and lovable in Himself, the order of nature would require that all things should be known and loved through Him. Therefore, if the mind of any person has to be brought to the knowledge and love of God through creatures, this results from his imperfection. Accordingly such a one has not yet achieved perfect beatitude, which excludes all imperfection.

We conclude, therefore, that perfect beatitude consists in the direct union of the spirit with God in knowledge and love. In the same way that a king has the office of directing and governing his subjects, that tendency is said to predominate in man which is the norm for regulating everything else in him. This is the reason for the Apostle's warning in Romans 6:12: "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body." Accordingly, since the notion of perfect beatitude requires that God be known and loved in Himself, so that the soul embraces other objects only through Him, God reigns truly and perfectly in the good. Hence we are told in Isaiah 49:10: “He that is merciful to them shall be their shepherd, and at the fountains of waters He shall give them drink.” In other words, by Him they shall be refreshed with all the most excellent goods, of whatever kind they may be.

We should recall, further, that the intellect understands all it knows by means of a certain likeness or form; in a similar way the external organ of sight perceives a stone by means of a form of the stone. Consequently the intellect cannot behold God as He is in His essence by means of a created likeness or form that would represent the divine essence. For we are aware that an object belonging to a higher order of being cannot be represented, so far as its essence is concerned, by a likeness pertaining to a lower order. Thus a spiritual substance cannot, if there is question of its essence, be understood by means of any bodily likeness. And so, as God transcends the whole order of creation much more than a spiritual substance excels the order of material things, He cannot be seen in His essence through the medium of a corporeal likeness.

The same truth is quite evident if we but reflect on what the vision of a thing in its essence implies. He who apprehends some property pertaining essentially to man does not perceive the essence of man, just as a person who knows what an animal is, but does not know what rationality is, fails to understand the essence of man. Any perfection predicated of God belongs to Him essentially. But no single created likeness can represent God with respect to all the perfections predicated of Him. For in the created intellect the likeness whereby man apprehends the life of God differs from the likeness whereby he apprehends God’s wisdom, and so on with regard to justice and all the other perfections that are identical with God’s essence. Therefore the created intellect cannot be informed by a single likeness representing the divine essence in such a way that the essence of God can be seen therein. And if such likenesses are multiplied, they will be lacking in unity, which is identical with God’s essence..Consequently the created intellect cannot be raised so high by a single created likeness, or even by many of them, as to see God as He is in Himself, in His own essence. In order, therefore, that God may be seen in His essence by a created intellect, the divine essence must be perceived directly in itself, and not through the medium of some likeness.

Such vision requires a certain union of the created intellect with God. Dionysius observes, in the first chapter of his book, De divinis nominibus, that when we arrive at our most blessed end and God appears, we shall be filled with a superintellectual knowledge of God [I, 4]. The divine essence, however, has this exclusive characteristic, that our intellect can be united to it without the medium of any likeness. The reason is that the divine essence itself is its own existence or esse, which is true of no other form.

Knowledge always requires the presence of some form in the intellect; and so, if any form that exists by itself, for example, the substance of an angel, cannot inform an intellect, and yet is to be known by the intellect of another, such knowledge has to be brought about by some likeness of the thing informing the intellect. But this is not necessary in the case of the divine essence, which is its own existence.

Accordingly the soul that is beatified by the vision of God is made one with Him in understanding. The knower and the known must somehow be one. And so, when God reigns in the saints, they too reign along with God. In their person are uttered the words of the Apocalypse 5: 10: “(You) hast made us to our God a kingdom and priests, and we shall reign on the earth.” This kingdom, in which God reigns in the saints and the saints reign with God, is called the kingdom of heaven, according to Matthew 3:2: “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” This is the same manner of speaking as that whereby presence in heaven is ascribed to God, not in the sense that He is housed in the material heavens, but to show forth the eminence of God over every creature, in the way that heaven towers high above every other material creature, as is indicated in Psalm 112:4: “The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens.”

The beatitude of the saints is called the kingdom of heaven, therefore, not because their reward is situated in the material heavens, but because it consists in the contemplation of super-celestial nature. This is also the reason for the statement about the angels in Matthew 18:10: “Their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father who is in heaven.” Hence Augustine, in his explanation of the passage in Matthew 5:12, “Your reward is very great in heaven,” says in his book, De sermone Domini in monte: “I do not think that heaven here means the loftier regions of this visible world. For our reward... is not to be in evanescent things. I think that the expression, ‘in heaven,’ refers rather to the spiritual firmament, where eternal justice dwells” [I, 5].

This ultimate good, which consists in God, is also called eternal life. The word is used in the sense in which the action of the animating soul is called life. Hence we distinguish as many kinds of life as there are kinds of action performed by the soul, among which the action of the intellect is supreme; and, according to the Philosopher, the action of the intellect is life [Metaphysics, XII, 7, 1072 b 27]. Furthermore, since an act receives species from its object, the vision of the divinity is called eternal life, as we read in John 17:3: “This is eternal life: that they may know You, the only true God.”

The ultimate good is also known as comprehension (comprehensio), a word suggested by Philippians 3:12: “I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend” (comprehendam). The term is not, of course, used in the sense according to which comprehension implies enclosing; for what is enclosed by another is completely contained by it as a whole. The created intellect cannot completely see God’s essence, in such a way, that is, as to attain to the ultimate and perfect degree of the divine vision, and so to see God to the extent that He is capable of being seen. For God is knowable in a way that is proportionate to the clarity of His truth, and this is infinite. Hence He is infinitely knowable. But infinite knowledge is impossible for a created intellect, whose power of understanding is finite. God alone, therefore, who knows Himself infinitely well with the infinite power of His intellect, comprehends Himself by completely understanding Himself.

Nevertheless comprehension is promised to the saints, in the sense of the word, comprehension, that implies a certain grasp. Thus when one man pursues another, he is said to apprehend (dicitur comprehendere) the latter when he can grasp him with his hand. Accordingly, “while we are in the body,” as the matter is put in 2 Corinthians 5:6 ff., “we are absent from the Lord; for we walk by faith and not by sight.” And so we press on toward Him as toward some distant goal. But when we see Him by direct vision we shall hold Him present within ourselves. Thus in Canticles 3:4, the spouse seeks him whom her soul loves; and when at last she finds him she says: “I held him, and I will not let him go.”

The ultimate good we have been speaking of contains perpetual and full joy. Our Lord was thinking of this when He bade us, in John 16:24: “Ask and you shall receive, that your joy may be full.” Full joy, however, can be gained from no creature, but only from God, in whom the entire plenitude of goodness resides. And so our Lord says to the faithful servant in Matthew 25:21: “Enter into the joy of thy Lord,” that you may have the joy of your Lord, as is indicated in Job 22:26: “Then shalt thou abound in delights in the Almighty.” Since God rejoices most of all in Himself, the faithful servant is said to enter into the joy of his Lord inasmuch as he enters into the joy wherein his Lord rejoices, as our Lord said on another occasion, when He made a promise to His disciples: “And I dispose to you, as My Father has disposed to Me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom” (Luke 22:29 ff.). Not that the saints, once they have been made incorruptible, have any use for bodily foods in that final state of good; no, by the table is meant rather the replenishment of joy that God has in Himself and that the saints have from Him.

This fullness of joy must be understood not only of the object of the rejoicing, but also with reference to the disposition of him who rejoices. In other words, the object of the rejoicing must be present, and the entire affection of the joyful person must be centered on the cause of the joy. As we have shown, in the vision of the divine essence the created spirit possesses God as present; and the vision itself sets the affections completely on fire with divine love. If any object is lovable so far as it is beautiful and good, as Dionysius remarks in De divinis nominibus [IV, 10], surely God, who is the very essence of beauty and goodness, cannot be gazed at without love. Therefore perfect vision is followed by perfect love. Gregory observes in one of his homilies on Ezekiel: “The fire of love which begins to burn here on earth, flares up more fiercely with love of God when He who is loved is seen” [In Ezechielem homiliae, II, 2]. Moreover, joy over an object embraced as present is keener the more that object is loved; consequently that joy is full, not only because of the object that gives joy, but also on the part of him who rejoices. This joy is what crowns human beatitude. Hence Augustine writes in his Confessions that happiness is joy in truth [X, 23].

Another point to consider is this: as God is the very essence of goodness, He is the good of every good. Therefore all good is beheld when He is beheld, as the Lord intimated when He said to Moses: “I will show you all good” (Exod. 33:19). Consequently, if God is possessed all good is possessed, as is suggested in Wisdom 7: 11: “All good things came to me together with her” [i.e., with Wisdom]. In that final state of good, when we see God, we shall have a full abundance of all goods; and so our Lord promises the faithful servant in Matthew 24:47 that “He shall place him over all His goods.”

Since evil is opposed to good, the presence of all good requires the utter banishment of evil. justice has no participation with injustice, and light has no fellowship with darkness, as we are told in 2 Corinthians 6:14. In that final state of good, therefore, those who possess all good will not only have a perfect sufficiency, but they will enjoy complete serenity and security as a result of their freedom from all evil, according to Proverbs 1:33: “He who hears me, shall rest without terror and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils.”

A further consequence is that absolute peace will reign in heaven. Man’s peace is blocked either by the inner restlessness of desire, when he covets what he does not yet possess, or by the irksomeness of certain evils which he suffers or fears he may suffer. But in heaven there is nothing to fear. All restlessness of craving will come to an end, because of the full possession of all good. And every external cause of disturbance will cease, because all evil will be absent. Hence the perfect tranquillity of peace will be enjoyed there. This is alluded to in Isaiah 3 2: 18: “My people shall sit in the beauty of peace,” by which the perfection of peace is meant. To show forth the cause of peace the Prophet adds: “And in the tabernacles of confidence,” for confidence will reign when the fear of evils is abolished; “and in wealthy rest,” which refers to the overflowing abundance of all good.

The perfection of this final good will endure forever. It cannot fail through any lack of the goods which man enjoys, for these are eternal and incorruptible. We are assured of this in Isaiah 33:20: “Your eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be removed.” The cause of this stability is given in the next verse: “Because only there our Lord is magnificent.” The entire perfection of that state will consist in the enjoyment of divine eternity.

Similarly, that state cannot fail through the corruption of the beings existing there. These are either naturally incorruptible, as is the case with the angels, or they will be transferred to a condition of incorruption, as is the case with men. “For this corruptible must put on incorruption,” as we are informed in 1 Corinthians 15:53. The same is indicated in the

Apocalypse 3:12: “He who overcomes, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God.”

Nor can that state fail by reason of the turning away of man’s will in disgust. The more clearly God, the essence of goodness, is seen, the more He must be loved; and so enjoyment of Him will be desired ever more keenly, according to Sirach 24:29: “They that eat Me shall yet hunger, and they that drink Me shall yet thirst.” For this reason the words of 1 Peter 1:12, “on whom the angels desire to look,” were spoken of the angels who see God.

That state will not be overthrown by the attack of an enemy, for no disturbing interference of any evil will be found there, as we read in Isaiah 35:9: “No lion shall be there,” that is, no assaulting devil, “nor shall any mischievous beast, that is, any evil man, “go up by it nor be found there.” Hence our Lord says of His sheep, in John 15:28: “They shall not perish forever, and no man shall pluck them out of My hand.”

Furthermore, that state cannot come to an end as a result of the banishment of some of its inhabitants by God. No one will be expelled from that state on account of sin, which will be simply non-existent in a place where every evil will be absent; hence we are told in Isaiah 60:21: “Your people shall be all just.” Again, none will be exiled for the purpose of urging them on to greater good, as happens at times in this world, when God withdraws spiritual consolations even from the just and takes away other of His benefits, in order that men may seek them with greater eagerness and may acknowledge their own powerlessness; that state is not one of correction or progress, but is a life of final perfection. This is why our Lord says in John 6:37: “Him that cometh to Me, I will not cast out.” Therefore that state will consist in the everlasting enjoyment of all the goods mentioned, as is said in Psalm 5:12: “They shall rejoice forever, and You shall dwell in them.” Consequently the kingdom we have been discussing is perfect happiness, for it contains all good in changeless abundance. And, since happiness is naturally desired by men, the kingdom of God, too, is desired by all.

CHAPTER 10

POSSIBILITY OF REACHING THE KINGDOM

We must go on to show that man can reach that kingdom. Otherwise it would be hoped for and prayed for in vain. In the first place, the divine promise makes this possibility clear. Our Lord says, in Luke 12:32: “Fear not, little flock, for it hath pleased your Father to give you a kingdom.” God’s good pleasure is efficacious in carrying out all that He plans, according to Isaiah 46: 10: “My counsel shall stand, and all My will shall be done.” For, as we read in Romans 9: 19: “Who can resist His will?” Secondly, an evident example shows that attainment of the kingdom is possible.

THE COMPENDIUM THEOLOGIAE BREAKS OFF AT THIS POINT. DEATH PREVENTED ST. THOMAS FROM FINISHING THE BOOK. HIS OPUSCULUM, EXPOSITIO ORATIONIS DOMINICAE, THOUGH PROBABLY A REPORTATIO, GIVES US AN IDEA OF THE PLAN HE VERY LIKELY WOULD HAVE FOLLOWED IN COMPLETING PART II OF THE COMPENDIUM. PART III, ON THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY, WAS TO HAVE DEVELOPED THE THEME INDICATED IN THE OPENING CHAPTER OF THE PRESENT WORK, THAT WE SHOULD CARRY OUT GOD’S WILL THROUGH LOVE.

DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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DE MEMORIA ET REMINISCENTIA

LESSON ONE

298, As the Philosopher says in the seventh book On the Histories of Animals nature proceeds little by little from the inanimate to the animate, so that the genus of inanimate things is found prior to the genus of plants. When the genus of plants is compared to other bodies, it seems to be animate, but compared to the genus of animals, inanimate. (Nature) similarly proceeds from plants to animals in a certain continuous order; for certain immobile animals, which cling to the earth, appear to differ little from plants. Likewise in the progression from animals to man, there are found certain animals in which some likeness of reason appears. Although prudence is a virtue proper to man (for prudence is right reason concerned with things to be done, as is said in the seventh book of the Ethics), yet some animals are found to participate in a kind of prudence. The possession of reason is not the cause of this; it is rather that these animals are moved to perform certain works by a natural instinct (working) through the apprehension of the senses, as if they were operating by reason. Moreover it pertains to prudence to direct one by a consideration not only of the present circumstances, but also of past events, in those courses of action which are at hand. For this reason, Cicero, in his Rhetoric, proposes as the parts of prudence not only foresight, by which the future is planned, but also understanding, by which the present is considered, and memory, by which the past is apprehended. Hence it is necessary that there be also in other animals, which show a participated likeness of prudence, not only a sense for the present, but also a memory of the past. Therefore the Philosopher, in the beginning of the Metaphysics, says that in certain animals memory is formed out of the senses, and on this account they are prudent.

299. But as animals have an imperfect prudence compared to man, so also they have an imperfect memory. For other animals only remember, but men both remember and recollect. Therefore Aristotle, going step by step, treats of memory and recollection after the book in which he considered the

senses which are common to all animals. One of these (recollection) is found in man alone, but the other (memory) is found both in men and in perfect animals.

300. This book is divided into two parts: first he (Aristotle) gives a preface in which he shows what he proposes to do; then he proceeds to treat those things which he has in mind, at the words, "First, therefore, etc."

Concerning the first point he says that two things ought to be discussed. The first to be discussed is memory, and remembering, which is its act. Concerning memory and remembering he promises to discuss three points: first, what is memory and what is remembering, then, what is its cause; and finally, to what part of the soul does the passion of remembering pertain. For all the operations of the senses are certain passions insofar as to sense something is to suffer it.

301. Then, he says that he will discuss recollection. But lest recollection and remembering appear to be the same thing, he adds a certain sign of their difference taken from man in whom both are found. For the same men are not good at remembering and at recollecting. Rather, as it often happens, those who are better at remembering are slow at discovery and learning; those, however, who are quick at discovering for themselves and at learning from others, are better at recollecting.

302. The reason for this is that the divers aptitudes which men have for the works of the soul depend on divers dispositions of the body. Thus we see in physical things that those which receive an impression slowly and with difficulty, retain it well; e.g., stone; but those which receive it easily do not retain it well; e.g., water. Now since remembering is nothing other than conserving well what has once been received, therefore, those who are slow at receiving retain well what they have received, and this is to remember well. But those receiving easily lose the greater part easily. Recollection, however, is a certain rediscovery of something previously received but not conserved. Therefore, those who are good at discovering and receiving instruction are also good at recollecting.

303. Then, when he says, "First, indeed, etc." he carries out his proposal. First he explains remembering; then, recollecting, at the words, "About recollection", what is left to say is, etc." Concerning the former he makes three points: he shows what remembering is; then; to which part of the soul it belongs, at the words, "For of the imagination, etc."; and finally, the

cause on account of which it operates, at the words, “However, one might question, etc.”

Now since powers, habits, and operations are specified by their objects, he makes a twofold. consideration concerning the first subject; namely, memory. First he inquires into the object of memory; then he concludes by defining it, at the words, “Memory, therefore, is, etc.” Concerning the object of memory he discusses two things. First he gives his intention; then he shows what he proposed to do, where he says , “Neither the future, etc.” He says, therefore, that to attain knowledge about memory it is necessary first to discover what sorts of things are objects of memory. (He follows this order) because objects are prior to acts, and acts to powers as has been said in the second book On the Soul. It is necessary to attain this knowledge because deception frequently occurs on this point, since some people say that memory is about things of which it is not.

304. Then when he says, “For neither, etc.”, he shows what he proposed to do (namely, to determine the object of memory.) First he says that memory is not of future things, and then that it is not of things present, at the words, “Nor of the present, etc.” Finally (he determines that memory) is of things past, at the words, “Memory is of what has been completed, etc.”

He says that remembering is not of future things. Rather we have opinion of future things on the part of the knowing faculties, when, for instance, someone opines that something is going to happen. On the part of the appetitive faculties, then, there is hope, since hope tends to some future event at some time. He says, moreover, that there may even be a certain science of future events which would be a science which foretells. Some people call this divination because they can know by it what might happen in the future, concerning which there is expectation. But since hope is of future things which man can obtain, while the future events of which we are speaking are future contingencies, and of these there can be no science, it seems that there can be no science which foretells the future.

305. We ought to add that there can be no science of future contingencies considered in themselves, but when these future contingencies are examined in their causes, there can be a science of them, inasmuch as some sciences know that certain things are confined (to produce) given effects. This is the mode in which natural science considers generable and corruptible things. In a similar manner astrologers by their science can

make predictions about expected future events. For example, (they can make predictions) about fertility or sterility, because of the positions of the heavenly bodies bearing on such effects .

306. Then when he says, “Nor of the present, etc.”, he shows that memory is not of the present. But he says that the present pertains to the senses, by which we know neither the future, nor what is completed; i.e. the past, but only the present.

307. Then when he says, “Memory, however, etc.”, he explains that memory is of things past. The proof for this he takes from the common use of language. When some object is present; e.g., when someone is presently seeing a white object, no one would say that he remembers the white object a Likewise no one says that he remembers what he is actually considering intellectually, when he is actually considering and understanding it. But commonly when men see a white object, they say that they sense it, and actually considering something is called only knowing. But when someone has habitual knowledge and a sense faculty without its operations or acts, he is then said to remember past acts; when, for instance, he grasps intellectually that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles and perhaps sensibly sees the outline of the figure. On the part of the intellectual operation, he remembers because he has learned from another or because he has thought it out for himself; on the part of the sensible apprehension he remembers because he has heard, or seen, or perceived by some other sense. For in every instance in which the soul remembers, it asserts that it has first heard, or sensed, or understood something.

308. From the preceding exposition it is evident that the Philosopher does not intend to say that memory cannot be of things which are themselves in the present, as if it were only of those things which were in the past. For men can remember not only those persons who have died, but also living persons; and one can even be said to recollect himself, as Virgil wrote, “Ulysses brooked, nor was the Ithacan in that sore strait forgetful of himself.” By this he wishes it to be understood that he remembered himself. So, the intention of the Philosopher is to affirm that memory is of the past in reference to our apprehension; i.e., previously we either sensed or understood some objects, and it makes no difference whether these things considered in themselves are in the present or not.

309. Then, when he says, “Memory is, therefore, etc.”, he concludes from the foregoing what memory is. Memory is neither sense, because sense is of the present alone, nor opinion, which can pertain to the future. However, memory must pertain to something of these, either through the mode of a habit; e.g., if it is some permanent power, or through the mode of a passion; e.g., if it is a transient impression. Now this is the way memory pertains to sense, or opinion: when some period of time intervenes between the prior apprehension of the senses or of the intellectual opinion and the subsequent memory of them, then, it is possible to have memory of the past apprehension. For as we have said, a thing which is apprehended now cannot be remembered in the ‘now’. It is sense which is of the present, hope, of course, of the future, and memory of the past. Thus it is necessary that, for everything remembered, there be some time intervening between the memory and the prior apprehension.

310. From the foregoing analysis he concludes that only animals which sense time can remember; and they remember by the part of the soul by which they sense time. Concerning this he inquires in the following section.

LESSON TWO

311. After the Philosopher has shown what memory is, he now explains to what part of the soul it pertains. Concerning this he does two things. First he prefaces a certain point which is necessary for what he proposes to do, at the words, “Magnitude and movement, however, etc.”

Concerning the former, he makes the intended introduction; then he exemplifies it, where he says, “For the same passion happens, etc.”; finally he shows what aspect of this is to be explained elsewhere, at the words, “Therefore, for this reason, etc.” Therefore, he first notes that in the book On the Soul he has explained what the imagination is, namely, a movement made by the sense in act. In the same book he has also shown that men do not understand without a phantasm.

312. Then when he says, “For the same passion happens, etc.”, he proves what he just said. It might seem incongruous to someone that a man cannot understand without a phantasm, since the phantasm is the likeness of the physical thing, while understanding is of universals, which are abstracted from particulars. Therefore, to manifest this he gives the following example. It happens that the intellect needs a phantasm, just as it happens in the drawing of a geometrical figure in which a triangle is drawn that it must be of some determinate quantity, although the geometrician in his demonstration does not use a determinate quantity of triangle. Likewise a man wishing to understand some object sets before his eyes (recalls to mind) a phantasm of some determinate quantity, insofar as it is singular; for instance, wishing to understand man, the imagination proposes (an image of) some man three feet in height; but the intellect understands man insofar as he is man, not insofar as he has this particular quantity.

313. However, because the intellect can understand the nature of quantity, he notes that if the objects to be understood are by nature quantified, e.g., line, surface, and number—yet not definite, i.e., limited by a determination of singularity—nevertheless, he must present to himself an image of a

determined quantity. There occurs, for instance, to a man desiring to understand ‘line’, a phantasm of a two-foot line, but the intellect understands ‘line’ only according to the nature of quantity, and not as it is ‘of two feet’.

314. Then when he says, “For this reason, etc.”, he makes clear why this point is reserved, and he says that there is another reason which shows why man can understand nothing without the continuum and time, insofar as man can understand nothing without a phantasm. For a phantasm must be connected with the extended and time, from the very fact that it is a likeness of a singular thing which is ‘here and now’, and this cannot be understood without a phantasm. The reason why man cannot understand without a phantasm can be easily given in the case of the first reception of the intelligible species, which are abstracted from phantasms, according to the doctrine of Aristotle in the third book On the Soul. But it is also evident from experience that he who has already acquired intelligible knowledge through species grasped in understanding cannot actually consider what he knows unless he has some phantasm, For this reason also, an injury to the organ of imagination impedes man not only from understanding something new, but also from considering what he previously understood, as is evident in the insane.

315. However someone could object here that the intelligible species do not remain in the human possible intellect, except as long as a person is actually understanding. Then, after a person is no longer actually understanding, the intelligible species pass away and cease to be in the intellect, in the manner in which light ceases to be in the air when an illuminating body is absent. Thus it is necessary, if the intellect would understand anew, to turn again to phantasms to acquire intelligible species.

316. This (objection) is expressly contrary to the words of Aristotle found in the third book On the Soul. He says there, that since the possible intellect becomes the divers intelligible objects through their species, it is then in potency to actually understand them. (The above statement) is also unreasonable since the intelligible species are actually received in the possible intellect immovably according to its own mode; and so the possible intellect has intelligible species even when not actually understanding.

This is not the same as in the sensitive faculties in which, as a result of the composition of the physical organ, it is one thing to receive an impression, which is to sense actually; and another to retain, when the things are not actually being sensed, as Avicenna objects. (The fact that the possible intellect has intelligible species even when not actually understanding) is an effect of the divers grade of being of the intelligible forms, which may be either in pure potency, as in discovery or learning; or in pure act, as when one is actually understanding; or, finally, midway between potency and act, which is to be in the state of a habit.

The human possible intellect, therefore, needs a phantasm not only that it might acquire intelligible species, but also that it might inspect them in a certain way in the phantasms. This is what is said in the third book On the Soul. Therefore, the intellect understands species in phantasms.

317. The reason for this (mode of understanding) is that operation is proportioned to faculty and essence. Man's intellect, however, is in the sensitive part, as is said in the second book On the Soul. Thus its proper operation is to understand intelligible objects in phantasms, just as the (proper) operation of the intellect of a separated substance is to understand objects intelligible in themselves. The cause of the different modes of understanding is given by the metaphysician, who considers the divers grades of intellect.

318. Then when he says, “Magnitude and motion, however, etc.”, he shows to which part of the soul memory belongs: first, by a reason, then, by signs, where he says, “Hence in others, etc.”; finally he concludes what he proposed to do, where he says, “Of which part, therefore, etc.” He states first, that it is necessary that magnitude and motion be known by the same part of the soul by which time is known. For these three are connected both in their division and in that which constitutes the infinite and finite, as is proved in the sixth book of the Physics.

319. Magnitude, however, is known by the senses, for it is one of the common sensibles. In a like manner motion, especially local motion, is known insofar as the distance of a magnitude is known. But time is known insofar as the prior and posterior in motion are known. For this reason these three can be perceived by the senses. Now a thing is perceived by the senses in two ways. In one way (a thing is perceived) through a change worked in the senses by a sensible object; and thus the proper as well as the common sensibles are known by the proper senses and the common sense. In another way, something is known by a secondary movement which remains after

the first change worked in the senses by the sensible object. This movement remains at times even after the sensible objects are gone and pertains to the phantasm, as has been considered in the book On the Soul. But the fantasy insofar as it appears through this secondary movement is a passion of the common sense, for it follows the whole change wrought in the senses which begins from the proper sensibles and is terminated at the common sense. Consequently, it is clear, that these three, namely, magnitude, motion and time, insofar as they are in a phantasm, are comprehended and known by the common sense.

320. Moreover, memory is not only of sensible objects for instance, when someone remembers that he has sensed; but it also of intelligible objects, for instance, when someone remembers that he understood. This is not, however, without a phantasm. For sensible objects, after they have passed away, are not perceived by the senses except in a phantasm; understanding also is not without a phantasm, as was noted above. For this reason he concludes that memory belongs to the intellectual part of the soul, but only accidentally; it belongs essentially to the first sensitive element, the common sense. Now it has been said above, that a man understanding represents to himself a determined quantity in the phantasm, even though the intellect in itself considers an absent thing.

But the apprehension of time pertains to memory according to a certain determination, namely, a distance in the past from the present instant. Hence, memory pertains essentially to the appearance of phantasms; accidentally to the judgment of the intellect.

321. It may seem to someone from what has been said here that the imagination and memory are not faculties distinct from the common sense, but are certain passions of it. However, Avicenna reasonably shows that the faculties are divers. Since sensitive faculties are acts of physical organs, it is necessary that the reception of sensible forms, which pertains to the senses, and their conservation, which belongs to the imagination or fantasy, pertain to divers faculties. As we see in physical things, reception pertains to one principle and conservation to another, for humid things are quite receptive, but dry and hard things are more conservative. Likewise it pertains to one principle to receive a form, to another to conserve the form received by the senses, and to still another to perceive some signification not apprehended by the senses. Although the estimative faculty perceives (the signification)

even in other animals, the memorative faculty retains (it). It functions by remembering a thing, not absolutely, but as it was apprehended in the past by the senses or the intellect.

322. Thus it happens among divers faculties that one is as the root and origin of the others, and their very acts presuppose the act of the first faculty. For instance, the nutritive function is as the root of the functions of growth and reproduction; each of which uses nutriment. Likewise the common sense is the root of the fantasy and the memory, which presuppose the act of the common sense.

323. Then when he says, “Hence in others, etc.”, he manifests what he said by two signs. The first sign is taken from the case of animals possessing memory. Because memory is essentially of the first sensitive element, he says, it is found in certain other animals having senses and lacking an intellect, and not only in man and in certain others having opinion, which can pertain to the speculative intellect, and prudence, which pertains to the practical intellect. If memory were something intellectual, it would not be in many other animals, in which it is certain that there is a memory, and nevertheless, no intellect.

324. He says, moreover, “perhaps” because some people have wondered whether certain animals besides man possess an intellect, because of certain actions resembling works of reason, such as the actions of apes and certain similar animals.

325. The second sign he presents, where he says, “Since, not etc.”, and it is taken from animals not possessing a memory. He says that it is clear that memory belongs essentially to the sensitive part, because even now when we suppose that man alone among mortals has an intellect, memory is not in all animals, but those alone have memory which sense time. For certain animals perceive nothing unless they are in the presence of sensible things, as certain immobile animals, which for this reason have an indeterminate imagination, as is said in the second and third book On the Soul.

For this reason they cannot know the prior and posterior, and consequently do not have a memory. For whenever the soul acts by memory, as was said before, it senses at the same time that it previously saw, or heard, or learned this thing. Now, the prior and posterior pertain to time.

326. Then when he says, “Of which part, therefore, etc.”, he concludes what he proposed to do. He says that the part of the soul to which memory pertains is clear from what has been said, because it pertains to that part to which the imagination belongs, and because the things which are essential objects of memory are those of which we have phantasms, namely, sensible objects, while intelligible things, which are not apprehended by man without the imagination, are accidental objects of memory. For this reason we cannot remember well those things which have a subtle and spiritual consideration; those objects that are gross and sensible are better objects of memory. It is necessary, if we wish to facilitate the remembering of intelligible reasons to bind them to certain phantasms, as Cicero teaches in his Rhetoric. Nevertheless memory is placed by some in the intellectual part, insofar as memory is understood to be every habitual conservation of those things which pertain to the intellectual part of the soul.

LESSON THREE

327. Now that the Philosopher has shown what memory is, and to which part of the soul it belongs, he shows here the cause of remembering.

Concerning this he does two things: first he mentions a doubt; then he solves it, where he says, “Either it is, as it happens, etc.”

Concerning the first he does three things: first he mentions the doubt; then he indicates something which the doubt supposes, where he says, “For it is clear, since it is necessary, etc.”; finally he brings forth reasons pertaining to the question, at the words, “But if such occurrences, etc.”

Therefore, he says first, that someone may wonder why in remembering we remember the thing which is not present and do not remember the present passion, for in remembering a certain passion affects the soul in the present, but the things remembered are absent.

328. Then when he says , “For it is clear, since it is necessary, etc.”, he makes clear the thing which he had presupposed; namely, that a certain passion is in the soul while we are remembering. First he manifests this through a cause; then, through signs, where he says, “For which reason, in those, etc.”

He says first, therefore, that it is obviously necessary to understand some such passion to have been made by the senses in the soul and in the organ of the animated body. For we say that the memory of the soul is a kind of habit and that the passion is like a picture, because, the sensible thing imprints its likeness on the senses and this likeness remains in the imagination, even when the sensible thing is absent., Therefore, he adds that the movement made on the senses by the sensible thing impresses something like a sensible figure on the imagination, which remains even in the absence of the sensible thing, in the same way as those who seal with rings impress a certain figure in wax, which remains even when the seal or ring has been removed.

329. He says, “In the soul and in part of the body”, because the passion, which is an act of the organic body, pertains to the sensitive part; it does not pertain to the soul alone but to the composite. Moreover he calls memory a habit of this part because memory is in the sensitive part, and we retain, as it were, habitually those things which we conserve in the memory, when we are not actually apprehending.

330. Then when he says, “For this reason, in those, etc.”, he manifests what he proposed, through signs, namely, that in remembering, the above mentioned passion is present. He says that since such an experience is necessary to memory, it happens that certain people do not have a memory because they are involved in great movement, whether this is because of an afflicted state of the body, as in the infirm or the inebriated, or, because of the soul, as in those aroused to anger or concupiscence. This also happens if one is at an age marked by growth or decline. For through such causes the body of man is in a certain flux; and, therefore, cannot retain an impression which is made from the movement of a sensible thing, as would happen if some movement or even a seal is imprinted on flowing water. The figure would disappear immediately because of the flow.

331. Moreover in some others the previously mentioned impression is not received. At times it happens because of frigidity congealing the humors, as in those who are in great fear; for on account of frigidity nothing can be impressed on their souls. He gives (herein) the example of old buildings. The wall, when it is new and before the cement has hardened, can easily be changed, but not after it has hardened. It does not happen, at times, because of frigidity, but because of the natural hardness of what should receive the passion. For earthy bodies are hard even if they are hot, but watery bodies are hardened through being frozen. For the reasons given above, those who are very young, as boys, and also the old, are deficient in memory, because the bodies of boys are in constant movement because of growth; the old, on the other hand, because of decline. Therefore, an impression is well retained in neither (group).

332. Yet it happens that things which one receives in boyhood are firmly held in the memory because of the vehemence of the movement, just as it happens that things about which we wonder are imprinted more in the memory. We wonder especially, however, at the new and unusual: hence a greater wondering about things, as if they were unusual, affects the young

who are going about the world for the first time; for this reason they remember firmly. However, because of the disposition of their changing body, it is their lot to be weak in memory; He adds, moreover, that similarly for the reasons given previously, neither those who are especially swift at apprehending, nor those who are too slow are good at remembering.

Those who are especially quick are more humid than they ought to be, for it is easy for the humid to receive impressions. But those who are slower are also harder, and, therefore, the impression of the phantasm does not remain as readily in the soul. “However, it does not touch the hard”; i.e., they do not receive the impression of the phantasm.

333. What has been said can be explained in another way, so that one would read, first, that he has designated the supervening movement as the cause for the defect of memory, which, afterwards, he manifested by the example of the young and old. Then, secondly, he designated a cause from a natural disposition, for the watery humor, which is cold and moist, abounds in some, and, therefore, the impressions of the phantasms are easily dispelled in them, as old buildings easily collapse; while in others the earthy humor abounds, and so they do not receive the impression because of its hardness. Afterwards he manifests this through the example of those who are swift and slow (at apprehending).

334. It must also be considered that he previously said that the impression of the phantasm is made in the soul and in part of the body, so that afterwards he might show that men are related differently towards an impression of this kind because of divers dispositions of the body.

.335. Then, when he says, “But if such occurrences, etc.”, he argues about the previously raised question. First, having manifested what he supposed, he resumes the question. He says that if this happens with regard to memory, namely, that there is a certain present passion in it, as in a picture, it must be asked whether a person remembers this passion which is present in himself when remembering, or the sensible thing from which that impression was made.

336. Then, where he says, “If the former, etc.”, he raises the objection to the one solution, saying, that if someone should say that man remembers the present passion it would follow that he would remember nothing of the absent (things), which is against what has already been decided.

337. Finally, at the words, “If the latter, etc.”, he raises three objections to the other solution. He gives the first, saying, that if someone remembers that thing from which a passion has been elicited, it would seem incongruous that a man would sense what is present; namely, the passion, and simultaneously remember what is absent, which he is unable to sense. For it has been said that memory pertains to the first sensitive element (common sense); and thus it does not, seem that sense is of one thing and memory of another.

338. He gives the second objection where he says, “And if it is like, etc.” He says that if a passion of this kind, which is present to the one remembering, is in us as a certain figure or picture of the senses themselves by way of their representing the first change worked in the senses by the sensible object, why will memory be of another; namely, of the thing and not of the picture or figure itself? For since the sense is the figure, it is plain that it can be apprehended. Moreover, it is also evident from experience that he who remembers speculates intellectually on this passion, and he senses (it too) by the sensitive part. It seems incongruous, however, that when a thing is present which falls under apprehension, it itself should not be apprehended, but something else.

339. He offers the third objection at the words, “How then, etc.” He asks how someone could remember what is not present by an internal Sense. Since the external senses are conformed to the internal senses, it would follow that the external senses would be dealing with a thing which is not present, so that, for instance, one would see and hear a thing not present, and this seems objectionable.

340. Then, when he says, “Either it is as it happens, etc.”, he solves the question raised. First he shows the cause of remembering; then he shows what causes something to be well preserved in the memory, where he says, “Exercises, however, etc.”; finally he gives a summary, at the words, “What indeed, etc.” Concerning the first he does two things: first he solves a doubt; then he makes the solution clear by a sign, where he says, “And because of this, sometimes, etc.”

He says, therefore, that it can be explained. how what has been said occurs and happens, namely, that someone perceives the present passion and remembers the absent thing. He presents the example of an animal painted on a tablet, which is both a depicted animal and an image of a real animal. Although both aspects belong to the same subject, nevertheless, these aspects differ in formality. Thus one is a consideration of it as a depicted animal, the other as it is the image of a real animal. In a similar manner the phantasm, which is in us, can be taken as it is something in itself, or as it is a phantasm of another thing. In itself it is to be regarded as a kind of object on which the intellect speculates, or the fantasy also, inasmuch as it pertains to the sensitive part , As it is a phantasm of another thing, which we sensed or understood previously, it is considered as an image leading to another and. the principle of remembering.

341. Therefore, since the soul remembers in the mode of a phantasm, if the soul turns to it in itself, it seems to be present to the soul, either as something intelligible which the intellect looks at in the phantasm, or simply as the phantasm which the imaginative faculty apprehends. If the soul turns to the phantasm insofar as it is the phantasm of another thing, and considers it as an image of what we previously sensed or understood, as was said concerning the picture (e.g., if someone does not see Coriscus but considers a phantasm of him as the image of Coriscus), there is now another passion to this consideration, and now this pertains to memory.

342. Moreover, just as it happens with the phantasm of some singular man, that sometimes it is considered in itself and sometimes as an image; e.g., the linage of Coriscus; so also it happens with intelligible objects. For sometimes the intellect looks at a phantasm as at a certain depicted animal, (and this occurs) if it looks at it in itself, and thus it is considered solely as a certain intelligible thing; if, however, the intellect looks at it as it is an image, it will thus be a principle of remembering, as it happens ‘herein’; i.e., concerning particular things.

343. Therefore, it is evident (from this), that when the soul turns itself to the phantasm, as it is a certain form reserved in the sensitive part, there is thus an act of the imagination or the fantasy, or even of the intellect considering this (in the) universal. If, however, the soul turns to it as an image of what we previously heard or understood, it pertains to the act of remembering.

Therefore, because being an image implies a certain signification about a form, Avicenna aptly says that memory regards the intention, imagination, the form apprehended by the senses.

344. Then when he says, “And because of this, sometimes, etc.” he makes clear what he said, by certain signs. He says that because we remember at the time when we attend to the phantasm, to the extent that it is the image of what we previously sensed and understood, therefore, men are situated. in relation to the act of memory in a threefold manner.

345. For sometimes there occurs in us movements of phantasms, which are formed from what we sensed and are left behind from the first change of a proper sense by the sensible thing; but we do not know whether these movements are in us because we previously sensed something. Thus we wonder whether we are remembering or not.

346. Then, it sometimes happens that a man understands and recollects something because the phantasm of what (he) has previously heard or seen then occurs to (him), which is properly remembering. This happens when a man, who is imagining a phantasm, is moved indeed by the present phantasm itself; but considers it insofar as it is the image of another which he previously sensed or understood.

347. Finally, the contrary of the first way sometimes happens, so that man believes that he remembers when he has not remembered, as happened to a certain man named Antipheron, who came from Oretanus; and it also happens to those suffering from mental derangement. For they think that phantasms occurring to them for the first time are, as it were, of some previous events, as if they remembered those things which they never saw or heard. This happens when one considers what is not the image of another prior event as if it were its image.

348. When when he says, “Exercises, however, etc.”, he shows by what things memory is preserved. He says that frequent meditations on those things which we sensed or understood preserve their memory so that one recollects well the things which he saw or understood. Meditation is nothing other than considering things many times as an image of things previously apprehended and not only in themselves, which mode of preserving pertains to the formality of memory. It is clear, too, that by the frequent act of remembering the habit of memorable objects is strengthened, as also any habit (is strengthened) through similar acts; and a multiplication of the cause fortifies the effect.

349. Then when he says, “What, therefore, etc.”, he summarizes similarly the aforesaid. He says that, it has been noted what memory is and what

remembering is: that memory is a habit; i.e., a certain habitual preservation of a phantasm, not, indeed in itself (for this pertains to the imaginative faculty), but insofar as the phantasm is an image of something previously sensed. We have also shown to what part of the soul (of the things which are in us) memory belongs; namely, that it pertains to the first sensitive element (common sense), insofar as we know time through it.

LESSON FOUR

350. After the Philosopher has come to a decision concerning memory and remembering, he now resolves the question of recollecting. First he says what, his intention is; then he continues what be proposed to do, where he says, “For recollection is not, etc.”

Therefore, he says first, that, after speaking about remembering, he must yet speak about recollecting in this order, so that whatever truths can be understood by argumentative reasonings are first supposed as actual truths, and thus he excuses himself from a prolonged argument, about those things which pertain to recollection.

351. Then when he says, “For recollection is not, etc.”, he continues what he proposed to do. Concerning this he does three things. First he shows that recollection is by a comparison to other apprehensions; then he resolves the mode of recollecting, where he says, “However, they have recollection, etc.” Finally he shows what kind of a passion recollection is, where he says, “But that is a certain bodily passion, etc.”

He does two things concerning the first. First he shows what recollection is not; then, what it is, at the words, “But as then (something) would reoccur, etc.” Concerning the first he does two things. First he proposes what he intends; then he manifests what he proposed to do, at the words, “For at the instant when one first learns, etc.” He says, therefore, first, that recollection is neither a reoccurrence of memory, in such a way that recollecting is nothing other than remembering again, nor, again, is recollection the first acquisition of some knowable object; e.g., what is a formed by the senses or the intellect.

352. Then when he says, “For at the instant when one first learns, etc.”, he makes clear what he said. He does two things concerning this: first he shows the difference between the two things which he noted, namely, the reoccurrence of memory and the acquisition (of knowledge); then he shows that recollection is neither the reoccurrence of memory nor the acquisition

(of knowledge), at the words, “Furthermore” it is clear, etc.” Concerning the first he does two things. First he shows that the acquisition (of some knowable object) is not memory” because the person acquiring does not remember; then he shows, on the other hand, that remembering is not the acquisition (of some knowable object), because the person remembering does net acquire something new, where he says, “Nor does he acquire, etc.”

Therefore, he says first, that when someone first learns or suffers a sensitive apprehension, there occurs no memory at that time, because nothing reoccurs unless it first existed; but no memory preceded. Therefore, to learn or sense for the first time is not to have a memory reoccur.

353. Then when he says, “Nor does he acquire, etc.”, he shows that remembering is not the first acquisition (of some knowable object). Concerning this he does two things. First he shows that remembering does not. consist in acquiring knowledge,; then he shows that it does not consist in acquiring (knowledge) in the first instant, at the words, “Further, at the very individual, etc.” Thus, he says first, that the person remembering does not acquire knowledge of the thing remembered from the first instant.

Since memory is of what is completed, as was noted above, there is memory only when knowledge through the mode of a habit or at least of a passion is already existing as completed. But, when the first passion is formed in the acquisition of knowledge, it is not yet completed; therefore, memory is not yet present in man.

354. Then when he says, “Further, at the very individual, etc.”, he shows that there is no memory either through the mode of a habit or through the mode of a passion in the first instant in which knowledge is just achieved, for knowledge is not yet converted into a habits. In this regard we should note what is proved in the sixth book of the Physics, that a thing is said to be completed only in the indivisible instant which is the term of time measuring the motion. He says, therefore, that when knowledge has been once achieved in the indivisible, which is the term of time of the generation of the knowledge, it can be said that, in that instant it is already in the patient; i.e., the passion and science (are already) in the one acquiring the knowledge. We are not speaking strictly here when we apply the name ‘science’, which properly signifies a habit, but we are taking this name as a common term for habit and passion. The reason for what he says is this: it is always true to say that the thing generated exists in the ultimate instant of

its generation; e.g., in the ultimate instant of the generation of fire, fire now is. Thus , when science exists, nothing prevents a remembering of those things which we already know, but this is by accident, For we do not remember those things inasmuch as we have science of them in the present, for essentially memory does not occur before time has elapsed, namely, before an intermediate time intervenes between the previously existing knowledge and the memory itself. A person now remembers what he previously heard, or saw, or suffered in any other way; he, however, does not now remember what he is suffering now. For it is clear that one is said to be suffering now, for the first time, in the last instant of the passion. Therefore, memory cannot be at that time.

355. Then when he says , “Furthermore, it is clear, etc.”, he shows further that recollection is neither the reoccurrence of a memory nor the acquisition of something new. He says that it has been made clear through the foregoing, that remembering does not happen to a person now recollecting; i.e., one does not remember what he is now recollecting, but what he sensed or in any other way suffered in the first instant. Thus, recollection is not the occurrence of memory; but it is referred to something which someone previously apprehended.

356. Then he says, “Further, it is clear, etc.”, he shows what recollection is. He says first, that recollection is the recovery of the first acquisition; then he shows that not every such recovery is recollection, at the words, “And so, not, etc.”

He says first, therefore, that recollection is not the reoccurrence of a memory, for we call it the habit of memory, when something reoccurs which one knew or sensed by the proper senses or the common sense. Now as remembering is referred to a knowledge previously achieved, so also recollecting. Recollecting, however, consists in this, that we recover a prior apprehension in some way, but not in such a way that recollection is one of those things which were mentioned; i.e. senses, memory, fantasy, or science; for remembering occurs through recollection, insofar as recollection is a kind of movement towards remembering. Thus memory follows recollection, as a term (follows) motion.

357. However according to another (way of) understanding, recollection follows memory, for just as the inquisition of reason is the way towards the knowledge of something, and yet proceeds from something known, so also

recollection is the way towards the memory of something, and yet proceeds from something remembered, as will be evident below.

358. Then when he says, “And so, not, etc.”, he shows that not just any reoccurrence (of the knowledge of) senses or science is recollection. He says that it is not universally true that recollection is achieved whenever the knowledge of science or senses, which was possessed previously, is renewed again, for in one way recollecting is the case in the one recovering (the knowledge of) senses or science, and in another way it is not. That this not universally true he shows by this: it happens that the same man after losing learns or discovers a second time the same thing which he possessed previously, yet this is not recollecting. Therefore, recollecting must differ from these, namely, from learning or discovering a second time. (He also says) that something more is involved in (recollection), which is its starting point, than is required for learning. However, what that something more is, is made evident by the following.

LESSON FIVE

359. After the Philosopher inquired how recollection is related to the other things pertaining to knowledge, he begins to Show here the mode of recollecting.

First he shows the mode of recollecting; then he shows the difference between memory and recollection, at the words, “Which, therefore, are not the same, etc.”

Concerning the first he does two things. First he shows the mode of recollecting with reference to things which we recollect; then with reference to time, for recollection concerns time as does memory, and this (he shows), at the words, “But it is necessary especially to know, etc.”

He does two things concerning the first. First he sets forth the cause of recollecting; then he shows the mode by which one proceeds in recollecting, at the words, “Whenever, therefore, we are recollecting, etc.”

The cause of recollecting, moreover, is the order of movements which are left in the soul from the first impression of what we apprehend.

360. Proposing this cause first, he says, therefore , that recollections occur because one movement naturally presents itself to us after another, and this happens in two ways. In one way, the second movement follows after the first movement from necessity; e.g., the apprehension of animal follows after the apprehension of man from necessity. It is thus evident that when the soul is moved by the first movement, it will be moved by the second also. But it happens in another way insofar as the second movement follows after the first not from necessity, but out of custom. Thus, for instance, someone is accustomed after this (the first movement) to think, or speak, or act, and then the second movement follows after the first, not always, but in the majority of instances; i.e., for the most part, just as natural effects follow from their causes for the most part, but not always.

361. However the custom spoken of is not established equally in all men. It happens that some by thinking a single time fix the custom more quickly

in themselves than others, even if the latter think of the sequence many times. This occurs either on account of greater attention and more profound knowledge, or because their nature is more receptive and retentive of an impression. For this reason also, it happens that certain things seen a single time are remembered better by us than ether things seen many times. The reason is that those things to which we vigorously apply the mind remain better in the memory. On the other hand those things which we see or consider superficially and lightly slip quickly from the memory.

362. Then when he says, “Whenever, therefore , we are recollecting, etc.”, he shows how recollection proceeds presupposing the aforesaid order of movements. Concerning this he does two things. First, he shows the mode of proceeding in recollecting; then he shows whence a person must proceed in recollecting, where he says, “But one must get hold of a starting point.”

He does two things concerning the first. First he shows the mode by which one proceeds in recollecting; then from this he shows how recollecting and learning differ, which he left undetermined above; and this (he shows) where he says, “Recollecting differs also in this, etc.”

Concerning the first he does three things. First he sets forth the mode of recollecting; then from this he solves a certain doubt, where he says, “However nothing is necessary etc.” Finally, he makes clear what he proposed by signs, at the words, Whence most swiftly.”

First, therefore, he concludes from the foregoing, that as one movement follows after another, either from necessity or custom, it is necessary, when we recollect, that we be moved by some one of these movements until we come to be moved to apprehend that movement which is wont to follow after the first. This is the movement which we intend to rediscover by recollecting, because recollecting is nothing other than the searching for something which slipped from the memory. Thus by recollecting we hunt; i.e., we seek what follows from something prior which we hold in the memory. For as one who inquires by demonstration proceeds from something prior which is known, from which he hunts something posterior, which is unknown; so also the person recollecting proceeds from something prior which is held in the memory to rediscover what slipped from the memory.

363. Moreover, this first thing from which the person recollecting begins his search is sometimes some known time, and sometimes some known thing with respect to time he sometimes begins from the ‘now’; i.e., proceeding from the present time into the past, which he seeks to remember. For instance, if he seeks to remember what he did four days ago, he thinks in this manner; today I did this, yesterday that, on the third day another thing; and thus following the succession of accustomed movements he arrives at working out what he did on the fourth day. Sometimes he begins from some other time; e. g., if someone retains in memory what he did eight days ago and has forgotten what he did four days ago, he will proceed by going forward to the seventh day, and so on until he comes to the fourth day, or he will go backward from the eighth day to the fifteenth day, or to some other past time.

364. In a like mode someone sometimes recollects beginning from some thing which he remembers, from which he proceeds to another by a threefold relationship. At times (he proceeds) by reason of likeness; e. g. , when someone remembers something about Socrates, and through this Plato, who is like him in wisdom, occurs to him. At other times (he proceeds) by reason of contrast; e.g., if someone should remember something about Hector, and through this, Achilles occurs to him. Finally, (he proceeds) at times by reason of any closeness whatever; e.g., when someone is mindful of ‘father’ and through this ‘son’ occurs to him. The same procedure holds good for any other close relationship, whether of society, or place, or time. For recollection is formed, inasmuch as movements of these kinds follow each other.

365. For the movements of some of the foregoing are the same, especially of the like things, while the movements of others are simultaneous, namely, of contrary things, because by a knowledge of one contrary the other is simultaneously known. Sometimes some movements have a portion of others, as happens in things closely related. For something is observed in each of the related things which pertains to the other, and thus that overlapping part, which is left out of an apprehension, although it is small, follows on the movement of the first thing; as a result, when the first thing is apprehended, the second occurs to apprehension as a consequent.

366. However it must be further noted that sometimes those who are seeking to find a consequent lost movement arrive at the posterior movement from some prior movement in the foregoing mode; and this properly is recollecting; namely, when someone intentionally seeks the memory of some things. It sometimes happens indeed that even those who are not seeking to remember arrive at the memory of some thing, for the reason that they are proceeding from a prior movement to a posterior movement, as has been described.

Since the movement of the forgotten thing is formed in the soul after the other (movement), and this happens ‘in most cases’; i.e., for the most part; then, given the other movements such as we have mentioned; i.e., by similars, contraries and closenesses, that second movement is excited, even when it was not intended. But this is loosely called recollection. It is , however, remembering in a casual way with a certain resemblance to recollection.

367. Then, when he says, “However. nothing is necessary, etc.”, he solves a certain doubt on the basis of the foregoing. For a doubt could arise (with reference to) why we frequently remember things that are far-off; e.g., things that happened many years before, and we do not remember things that are recent; e.g., things which occurred a few day’s before.

368. But he (Aristotle) says that, it is not necessary to apply the mind to this; i.e., to be disturbed by doubting, because it is clear that this occurs somehow in the same way, (as) was explained in the foregoing. He explains resuming what was said; namely, that it happens sometimes that the soul learns by apprehending a consequent which it had forgotten, without recollecting it by a prior inquiry or intention, for one movement follows another by custom. Hence upon the excitation of the first movement, the second follows, even if the man does not intend it. Now as this happens from custom apart from deliberate intention, so also one will do this when he wishes to recollect intentionally, for he seeks to elicit the first movement upon which the posterior movement follows; because it sometimes happens that the movements of things which are far-off are more established because of custom, therefore, we occasionally remember those things more, whether from inquisition or without inquisition.

369. Then when he says, “Whence, most swiftly, etc.”, he manifests the aforesaid mode (of proceeding) by two signs. The first of these he posits

saying that, because a consequent movement comes from a prior movement on account of custom, either by inquiring or not inquiring, therefore, recollections are formed most quickly and best when someone begins to meditate from the beginning of the entire affair, because the movements of things in the soul are formed in conformity with the order in which the things follow each other. So, for instance, when we seek some verse, we begin first at the beginning.

370. He gives the second sign, where he says, “Those things are easier to recollect, etc.” He says that those things are easier to recollect which are well ordered, such as mathematics and mathematical theorems, for the latter are concluded from the first, and so forth. Those things, however, which are badly ordered are recollected with difficulty.”

371. Therefore, to remember or recollect well, we can learn four useful lessons from the foregoing. First one must be careful to reduce to some order what one wishes to retain; then one must apply the mind profoundly and intently to those things; next one must frequently meditate (on them) in order; finally one must begin to recollect from the starting point.

LESSON SIX

372. After the Philosopher has shown the mode of recollecting, he explains two things here which were mentioned above. The first is how recollecting differs from relearning; the second is that it is necessary that the person recollecting begin from starting points, at the words, “Bu it is necessary to get hold of a starting point, etc.”

He does two things concerning the first. First he shows how recollection differs from relearning; then how recollection differs from rediscovery, at the words, “However many times, etc.”

Concerning the first it must be pointed out, that both he who recollects and he who relearns recovers knowledge which was lost; but he who recollects recovers it under the formality of memory, with reference; namely, to what was previously known. He, however, who relearns recovers it absolutely, and not as if it were of something previously known. Now, since we do not attain to a knowledge of the unknown except from some principles already known, it is necessary that the principles from which we proceed in order to know the unknown be of the same genus, as is evident from the first book of the Posterior Analytics. Therefore it is necessary that a person recollecting should proceed from things remembered as a starting point in order to recover knowledge under the formality of memory, which Ls not the case in relearning.

373. Therefore, he says that recollection differs from relearning in this: a person recollecting has in some way the capacity to be moved to something which is connected to a prior thing retained in memory. For instance, when someone recollecting that something was said to him, but has forgotten who said it, he will use what he has in his memory for the purpose of recollecting what he has forgotten. However, when he does not succeed in recovering the lost knowledge through the starting point retained in memory, but through something else which is proposed to him anew by a teacher, it is neither memory nor recollection, but learning anew.

374. Then, when he says, “However, many times, etc.”, he shows how recollecting differs from rediscovery. He says that frequently a man cannot now recollect what he has forgotten, because the movements by which he can arrive at what he seeks to remember do not remain in him. But if he should seek (knowledge) as if anew, he can proceed to a knowledge of that thing, and many times he finds what he is seeking as if he were acquiring knowledge anew. This happens when the soul is thinking of divers things and is moved by many movements, and if it happens that it hits on the movement with which the knowledge of the thing is connected, it, is said to discover (it).

375. Therefore, although he can discover, he cannot recollect, because recollection occurs insofar as a man retains interiorly a certain aptitude or capability of leading himself to the movements of the thing which he seeks. But this occurs when he can manage to be moved by the movement which he lost through forgetfulness; this (must happen) by himself) and not from someone teaching, as happens when he relearns; and from movements prepossessed, not from new movements) as when he rediscovers, as has been said. Then, when he says, “But it is necessary to get hold of a starting point, etc.”, he shows that it is necessary that a person recollecting begin from a starting point. Concerning this he does two things. First he shows what he proposed to do; then he assigns a cause of the defect, which we sometimes suffer in recollecting, at the words, “The cause of one’s sometimes recollecting, etc.: He does two things concerning the first (point). First he shows that it is necessary that a person recollecting begin from a starting point; then, from what kind of a starting point, where

He does three things concerning the first. First, he sets forth what he intends. He says that it is necessary that a person who wishes to recollect take a starting point from which he begins to be moved either by thinking, or speaking, or doing some other (operation).

377. Then, where he says, “Because of this, etc.”, he shows what he said through a sign. Now, because it is necessary that a person recollecting take some starting point from which he begins the process of recollection, (we find that) men sometimes seem to recollect from places in which things have been said, or done , or thought. They use the place as a certain starting point for recollecting, because access to the place is a certain starting point for all those things which are done in the place. Hence Cicero teaches in his

Rhetoric, that, to remember easily, it is necessary to imagine certain ordered places in which the phantasms of those things which we wish to remember are arranged in a certain order.

378. Then, when he says, “However, the cause is, etc.”, he Shows what he has proposed by a cause, saying, that the reason why it is necessary for a person recollecting to take a starting point is that men, by a certain roving of the mind, easily pass from one thing to another by reason of likeness , or contrariety, or closeness. For instance, if we think or speak of milk, we easily pass to white on account of the whiteness of milk; and from white to air on account of the clearness of the transparent medium of light which causes whiteness; and from air to the moist, because air is moist, and from moisture we arrive at a recollection of Autumn, which we come upon by reason of contrariety, because this season is cold and dry.

379. Then, when he says, “However, it seems, etc.” he shows what kind of a starting point the person recollecting ought to take. He says that what is universal seems to be the starting point and the means by which he can arrive at everything. However, the universal, which is spoken of here is not the one which is spoken of in Logic; namely, that which is predicated of many things; but (it is) that from which one is wont to be moved to divers thing. For instance, if someone, after (the apprehension of) milk, is moved to whiteness and to sweetness; and from whiteness to other things as has been mentioned; and then again from sweetness to digestive heat; and to fire; and consequently to other thoughts, milk is like a universal for all these movements. Now, it is necessary to have recourse to this (starting point) if one wishes to recollect the consequences of anything whatsoever, because if one does not previously recollect the consequences of something through other subsequent starting points, at least he could recollect when he comes on that first universal starting point. Or if he does not recollect then, he cannot recollect from any other source.

380. He gives the example of divers thoughts (expressed) by divers letters: A, B, G, D, E, Z, S, and T. He lists these letters according to the order of the Greek alphabet. Yet in recollecting the same order is not (followed); but it must be granted that someone thinking or speaking of B might pass to A; (thinking or speaking) of A, sometimes to E, sometimes to G D, or sometimes to D, or sometimes to E; (thinking or speaking) of G, sometimes to I, sometimes to A. Therefore, if someone does not recollect

what is under G, he can recollect what is under E, if he comes to E, and from it is moved to two letters; namely, to E and D. But perhaps he did not seek E nor D, but sought S or Z; then, he will recollect upon coming to G. But because we do not know whether what we are seeking is contained under E or under G; it is necessary to have recourse to A which is as a universal with respect to all the letters. It is always necessary to proceed in such a way; e.g., if B were yet more universal than A.

381. However the aforesaid arrangement can be understood In another way, so that he would come from A directly to G, but laterally (from) B to A, from G laterally to I, and from here, then, directly to T, from which (he could come) to D and E. Therefore, he (Aristotle) says that If someone remembers at E which is last, he comes upon T which is preceding. If perhaps he does not remember at T, because what he seeks is not contained under it, he would have recourse to G, under which certain other (letters) are contained; e.g., A and Z; and after that to A, as has been said, under which B is also contained. This can be observed in the line proposed.

382. Therefore, when he says, “The cause of a person’s sometimes recollecting, etc.” he assigns the cause of the defect which persons recollecting suffer. First (he considers) the case of not recollecting at all; and secondly, the case of a defective recollection, where he says, “And since, etc.” Therefore, he says first, that because it happens that from the same starting point from which someone is moved to divers thing, he is moved more frequently to one than. to another; therefore, even given the same starting point, men sometimes recollect and sometimes do not. For instance, if someone were moved from G to E and D, (he will be moved) more times to one than to the other. Whence given this (starting point), he recollects easily that towards which he is more frequently accustomed to be moved. But if he is not moved by the ‘old way’; i.e., by that through which he more accustomed to be moved, he is moved in a less accustomed way; and, therefore, he does not easily recollect because custom is, as it were, a kind of nature. For just an things which exist by nature are formed and repaired easily, for things quickly return to their own nature by the inclination of nature (as is evident from hot water which quickly returns to cold); so also we easily recollect things which we considered many times by the inclination of custom.

383. He shows that custom is like a nature by this: as in nature there is a certain order by which something comes to be after something else; so also when many activities succeed one another in an order, they produce a kind of nature. This occurs especially in the activities of animals, in whose principles (of action) one thing is impressing, and another is receiving the impression of the senses. Therefore, those things which we saw or heard frequently are more firmly fixed in the imagination after the mode of a kind of nature. So, for instance, the multiplication of the impression of a natural agent works toward the form which is the nature of the thing.

384. Then when he says, "Since in those things which are in the realm of nature, etc.", he shows the reason why we sometimes recollect defectively. He says that, as in those things which are according to nature, something may occur which is outside of nature, which happens by chance or fortune, as is seen in the parts of animals; so much more does something irregular and outside intention occur in those things which are according to custom, which although it imitates nature, is yet lacking its firmness. Therefore, even in this matter; i.e., in these things which we recollect through custom, recollecting works out differently on different occasions, and this happens on account of some impediment; e.g., when someone is distracted 'thence'; i.e., from the accustomed course to some other. This is evident in the case of those who say something from memory, for if their imagination is distracted to something else, they lose what they ought to say or say it defectively. On this account, when one needs to recollect some name or some word, he produces the word in a manner different from what he knows (conserves).

385. Finally, he summarizes the section (saying) that recollection occurs according to the aforesaid mode.

LESSON SEVEN

386. Now that the Philosopher has shown the mode of recollecting from the point of view of the things recollected, he determines here the mode of recollecting from the point of view of time.

First he sets forth what he intends; then he shows what he proposed to do, at the words, “There is something, etc.” He says, therefore, first, that in recollecting it is especially necessary to know time; namely, past time, which is the concern of memory, of which recollection is the search. However, past time is sometimes known by the person recollecting under a certain measure; e. g., when he knows that he sensed this thing at some time three days ago; and sometimes indefinitely; i.e., indeterminately; e.g., if he recalls that he sensed this at some time or other.

387. Then when he says, “There is something, etc.”, he shows what he proposed to do. First he shows how the soul knows the measure of time; then he shows the principal proposal; namely, that knowing time is necessary to the person recollecting, where he says, “When, therefore, (the movement) of a thing, etc.” Concerning the first, he does two things. First, he shows what he proposes to do; then he presents a certain question, at the words, “For how it differs, etc.”

He says, therefore, first, that there is something in the soul by which it judges the greater and lesser measure of time. (The fact) that there is (something in the soul) that judges about time is reasonable, for it judges about physical magnitudes, which the soul understands; the ‘large’; for instance, in relation to the quantity of visualized bodies, and the ‘far-off’ with respect to the extension of local distance. The amount of time, which is measured according to distance from the present instant (nunc), is proportioned to this.

388. However the soul knows magnitudes of this kind not by extending the understanding thereon, as if the soul knew magnitudes by touching them with the intellect. He seems to say this on account of Plato, as is evident in

the first book On the Soul. By this mode also, some people say that seeing is effected, because a ray passes the whole distance to the thing seen, as was mentioned in the second book On Sense and Sensation. But it is impossible that magnitudes are known by the soul by contact with the understanding, because in such a case the soul could not understand any but existing magnitudes; whereas in fact it understands magnitudes which are not existing. For nothing prevents the soul from understanding double the quantity of the heavens. Therefore, the soul does not know magnitude by stretching itself out upon the thing, but rather, because a certain movement from the sensible thing reflected in the soul, is proportional to the exterior magnitude. For there are in the sol certain forms and movements similar to things by which it knows the things.

389. Then, when he says, “For how it differs, etc.”, he settles a certain question concerning the aforesaid. Concerning this he does three things. First he sets forth the question; then he solves it, at the words, “Or because, etc.”

Finally he exemplifies the solution in letters, where he says, “As, therefore, etc.”

Since the soul knows magnitude by the image which it possesses of magnitude, he seeks first, therefore, how does that way differ from the way by which it knows the greater and lesser magnitude. For it does not, seem to have a different image because it does not differ in species.

390. Then, when he says, “Or because, etc.” he solves the question. He says that the soul by a similar figure or form understands lesser; i.e., a lesser quantity, just as by a similar form it knows a greater magnitude. For interior forms and movements correspond proportionately to exterior magnitudes, and perhaps the situation in respect to magnitudes or distances or places and times is the same as that of species of things; Hence, as there are divers images and movements in the knower responding proportionately to divers species of things; e.g., to a horse or a cow, also (there are divers images corresponding to divers quantities.

391. Then, when he says, “As, therefore, etc.”, he shows this diverse proportion by an example in letters. To clarify this, it must be noted, that, because he said above that in the understanding there are similar figures and movements proportioned to things, (the example he uses here) is that of the similarity of figures, as geometricians use (them). They call figures similar

(when) their sides are proportional and their angles are equal, as evident in the sixth book of Euclid:

392. Therefore, the triangle BAE is drawn, whose base is BE. Then, from a point marked G inside BA, a line, GD, is drawn Equidistant from the base to the other side; and. likewise a line equidistant from the base drawn in triangle GAD. Now it has been demonstrated in the first book of Euclid, that a straight line falling upon two equidistant (lines) has opposite angles equal. Angle AGB, therefore, is equal be AEB, and angle ADG is equal to angle AEB, but angle A is common. The three angles of triangle AGD, therefore are equal to the angles of triangle BAE; therefore, the lines which are subtended by the equal angles are proportional according to the fourth proportion in the sixth book of Euclid. Therefore, the proportion of AB to AG is the same as the proportion (of) BE to CD; therefore, alternately, the proportion (of) AB to BE is the same as the proportion (of) AG to GD; and thus the two aforesaid triangles are similar figures. Now, by the line AB and its parts, are understood the movements of the soul by which the soul knows, Then, by the lines BE, GD, and ZI, which are the bases of the triangle, are understood divers quantities, differing in greatness and smallness.

393. Therefore, he concludes by this example: if the soul is moved according to movement AB to know quantity BE, this movement will by itself make quantity GD to be known, because movement AG, which is contained in AB, and the magnitude GD, are related by the same proportion as the movement AB and the magnitude BE.

394. But then the question which was raised above, will recur, since more is required to know quantity GD, which is greater than for knowing quantity ZI, which is lesser.

395. That this might, be more explicitly seen, he takes distinct movements, one of which is not contained in the other. Therefore, let one line, KM, be divided at point T in such away, that there is the same proportion of KT to IM as of line AG (by which quantity GD is known) to line AB (by which BE is known). Thus, at the same time, (the soul) is moved according to these movements, because as quantity GD is known by movement AB, so also by movement KT. Now as quantity BE is known by movement AB, so also it is known by movement TM. If someone wishes to know quantity ZI by movement AZ, it is necessary the GZ be subtracted

from AG, as GB is added to it to know quantity BE. But if we wish to take distinct movements, it will be necessary to take TE, in place of the two movements Kt AND tm, SO THAT IT IS g AND m. The other two movements are drawn at the same point (as before); one is KL and the other LM, so that line KM is divided at point L, and in such a way that the proportion of KL to LM (is) the same as the proportion of AZ to AB. Whence, as he knows quantity BE by movement LM, so, by movement KL he knows ZI. It is thus demonstrated.

396. Then, when he says, “Since, therefore, etc.”, he shows the principal proposal. First he shows that it is necessary that the person recollecting know time; then he shows a twofold mode of knowing time, at the words, “Which, indeed, is of time, etc.”

Therefore, he says first that when a movement of an object to be remembered and of past time occurs in the soul at the same time, there is then an act of memory. But if someone should think himself so disposed, and is not put in the state of memory in this way, because either the movement of the thing or the movement of time is lacking, he has not remembered. For nothing prevents there being a misrepresentation in the memory; e.g., when it seems to someone that he remembers, and (yet) he does not remember, because the past time occurs to him, but no the thing which he saw, but another in its place. Sometimes one remembers and does not think that he remembers. It is hidden from him simply because the time does not occur to him, but (only) the thing, for as has been said above, remembering is to intend the phantasm of some thing as it is an image of some thing previously apprehended. Hence, if the movement of the thing is made without the movement of time, or conversely, he does not recollect.

397. Then, when he says, “Which, indeed, is etc.”, he shows the divers modes by which persons recollecting know time. For sometimes someone remembers time, but not under a definite measure; e.g., (not) that he did something the day before yesterday, but that he did it at some time. On the other hand, sometimes someone remembers under a measure of past time, although not under a definite measure. For men are accustomed to say that they remember something as past; but they do not know when it was, because they do not know the length of time; i.e., the measure. This happens because of a weak movement as is the case with those things which are seen from far-off, and are known indeterminately.

EXPLANATION OF THE LORD'S PRAYER

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EXPLANATION OF THE LORD'S PRAYER

FIVE QUALITIES OF PRAYER

"Our Father who art in heaven." Among all other prayers, the Lord's Prayer holds the chief place. It has five excellent qualities which are required in all prayer. A prayer must be confident, ordered, suitable, devout and humble.

It must be confident: "Let us, therefore, go with confidence to the throne of grace." It must not be wanting in faith, as it is said: "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." That this is a most trustworthy prayer is reasonable, since it was formed by Him who is our Advocate and the most wise Petitioner for us: "In whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;" and of whom it is said: "For we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just one." Hence, St. Cyprian says: "Since we have Christ as our Advocate with the Father for our sins, when we pray on account of our faults, we use the very words of our Advocate."

Furthermore, this prayer is even more worthy of confidence in that He who taught us how to pray, graciously hears our prayer together with the Father, as it is said in the Psalm: "He shall cry to Me, and I will hear him." Thus writes St. Cyprian: "It is a friendly, familiar, and devout prayer to ask of the Lord in His own words." And so no one goes away from this prayer without fruit. St. Augustine says that through it our venial sins are remitted.

Moreover, our prayer must be suitable, so that a person asks of God in prayer what is good for him. St. John Damascene says: "Prayer is the asking of what is right and fitting from God." Many times our prayer is not heard because we seek that which is not good for us: "You ask and you do not receive, because you ask amiss." To know, indeed, what one ought to pray for is most difficult; for it is not easy to know what one ought to desire. Those things which we rightly seek in prayer are rightly desired; hence the Apostle says: "For we know not what we should pray for as we ought." Christ Himself is our Teacher; it is He who teaches us what we ought to pray for, and it was to Him that the disciples said: "Lord, teach us to pray." Those things, therefore, which He has taught us to pray for, we most properly ask for. “Whatsoever words we use in prayer,” says St. Augustine, “we cannot but utter that which is contained in our Lord’s Prayer, if we pray in a suitable and worthy manner.”

Our prayer ought also to be ordered as our desires should be ordered, for prayer is but the expression of desire. Now, it is the correct order that we prefer spiritual to bodily things, and heavenly things to those merely earthly. This is according to what is written: “Seek ye first therefore the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.” Here Our Lord shows that heavenly things must be sought first, and then things material.

Our prayer must be devout, because a rich measure of piety makes the sacrifice of prayer acceptable to God: “In Thy name I will lift up my hands. Let my soul be filled with marrow and fatness.” Many times because of the length of our prayers our devotion grows cool; hence Our Lord taught us to avoid wordiness in our prayers: “When you are praying, speak not much.” And St. Augustine says: “Let much talking be absent from prayer; but as long as fervor continues, let prayer likewise go on.” For this reason the Lord made His Prayer short. Devotion in prayer rises from charity which is our love of God and neighbor, both of which are evident in this prayer. Our love for God is seen in that we call God “our Father;” and our love for our neighbor when we say: “Our Father . . . forgive us our trespasses,” and this leads us to love of neighbor.

Prayer ought to be humble: “He hath had regard for the prayer of the humble.” This is seen in the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican (Luke, xviii. 9-15), and also in the words of Judith: “The prayer of the humble and the meek hath always pleased Thee.” This same humility is observed in this prayer, for true humility is had when a person does not presume upon his own powers, but from the divine strength expects all that he asks for.

It must be noted that prayer brings about three good effects. First, prayer is an efficacious and useful remedy against evils. Thus, it delivers us from the sins we have committed: “Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin. For this shall every one that is holy pray to Thee in a seasonable time.” The thief on the Cross prayed and received forgiveness: “This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise.” Thus also prayed the Publican, and “went down to his home justified.” Prayer, also, frees one from the fear of future sin, and from trials and sadness of soul: “Is any one of you sad? Let him pray.” Again it delivers one from persecutors and enemies: “Instead of making me a return of love, they detracted me, but I gave myself to prayer.”

In the second place, prayer is efficacious and useful to obtain all that one desires: “All things whatsoever you ask when you pray, believe that you shall receive.” When our prayers are not heard, either we do not persevere in prayer, whereas “we ought always to pray, and not to faint,” or we do not ask for that which is more conducive to our salvation. “Our good Lord often does not give us what we wish,” says St. Augustine, “because it would really be what we do not wish for.” St. Paul gives us an example of this in that he thrice prayed that the sting of his flesh be removed from him, and his prayer was not heard. Thirdly, prayer is profitable because it makes us friends of God: “Let my prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight.”

THE OPENING WORDS OF THE LORD’S PRAYER

PREPARATION FOR THE PETITIONS

Our FATHER.—Note here two things, namely, that God is our Father, and what we owe to Him because He is our Father. God is our Father by reason of our special creation, in that He created us in His image and likeness, and did not so create all inferior creatures: “Is not He thy Father, that made thee, and created thee?” Likewise God is our Father in that He governs us, yet treats us as masters, and not servants, as is the case with all other things. “For Thy providence, Father, governeth all things;” and “with great favor disposest of us.” God is our Father also by reason of adoption. To other creatures He has given but a small gift, but to us an heredity—indeed, “if sons, heirs also.” “For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry, Abba (Father).”

We owe God, our Father, four things. First, honor: “If then I be a Father, where is My honor?” Now, honor consists in three qualities. (1) It consists in giving praise to God: “The sacrifice of praise shall glorify Me.” This ought not merely come from the lips, but also from the heart, for: “This people draw near Me with their mouth, and with their lips glorify Me, but their heart is far from Me.” (2) Honor, again, consists in purity of body towards oneself: “Glorify and bear God in your body.” (3) Honor also consists in just estimate of one’s neighbor, for: “The king’s honor loveth judgment.”

Secondly, since God is our Father, we ought to imitate Him: “Thou shalt call Me Father, and shalt not cease to walk after Me.” This imitation of our Father consists of three things. (1) It consists in love: “Be ye therefore followers of God, as most dear children; and walk in love.” This love of God must be from the heart. (2) It consists in mercy: “Be ye merciful.” This mercy must likewise come from the heart, and it must be in deed. (3) Finally, imitation of God consists in being perfect, since love and mercy should be perfect: “Be ye therefore perfect, as also your Heavenly Father is perfect.”

Thirdly, we owe God obedience: “Shall we not much more obey the Father of spirits?” We must obey God for three reasons. First, because He is our Lord: “All things that the Lord has spoken we will do, we will be obedient.” Secondly, because He has given us the example of obedience, for the true Son of God “became obedient to His Father even unto death.” Thirdly, because it is for our good: “I will play before the Lord who hath chosen me.” Fourthly, we owe God patience when we are chastised by Him: “Reject not the correction of the Lord; and do not faint when thou art chastised by Him. For whom the Lord loveth He chastises; and as a father in the son He pleaseth Himself.

OUR Father.—From this we see that we owe our neighbor both love and reverence. We must love our neighbor because we are all brothers, and all men are sons of God, our Father: “For he that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God whom he seeth not?” We owe reverence to our neighbor because he is also a child of God: “Have we not all one Father? Hath not one God created us? Why then does everyone of us despise his brother?” And again: “With honor preventing one another.” We do this because of the fruit we receive, for “He became to all that obey the cause of eternal salvation.”

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

THE PREEMINENCE OF GOD

Who Art in Heaven.—Among all that is necessary for one who prays, faith is above all important: “Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.” Hence, the Lord, teaching us to pray, first mentions that which causes faith to spring up, namely, the kindness of a father. So, He says “Our Father,” in the meaning which is had in the following: “If you then being evil know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask him!” Then, He says “Who art in heaven” because of the greatness of His power: “To Thee have I lifted up my eyes, who dwellest in heaven.”

The words, “who art in heaven,” signify three things. First, it serves as a preparation for him who utters the prayer, for, as it is said: “Before prayer prepare thy soul.” Thus, “in heaven” is understood for the glory of heaven: “For your reward is very great in heaven.” And this preparation ought to be in the form of an imitation of heavenly things, since the son ought to imitate his Father: “Therefore, as we have borne the image of the earthly, let us bear also the image of the heavenly.” So also this preparation ought to be through contemplation of heavenly things, because men are wont to direct their thoughts to where they have a Father and others whom they love, as it is written: “For where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.” The Apostle wrote: “Our conversation is in heaven.” Likewise, we prepare through attention to heavenly things, so that we may then seek only spiritual things from Him who is in heaven: “Seek things that are above, where Christ is.”

“Who art in heaven” can also pertain to Him who hears us, who is nearest to us; and then the “in heaven” is understood to mean “in devout persons” in whom God dwells, as it is written: “Thou, O Lord, art among us.” For holy persons are called “the heavens” in the Psalm: “The heavens show forth the glory of God,” since God dwells in the devout through faith. “That Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts.” God also dwells in us through love: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God and God in him.” And also through the keeping of the commandments: “If any one love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him.”

In the third place, “who art in heaven” can pertain to Him who is in heaven, He who cannot be included in the physical heavens, for “the heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain Thee.” And so it can mean that God is all-seeing in His survey of us, in that He sees us from above, that is, from heaven: “Because He hath looked forth from His high sanctuary; from heaven the Lord hath looked upon the earth.” It also signifies how sublime is God in His power: “The Lord hath prepared His throne in heaven”; and that He lives without change through eternity: “But Thou, O Lord, endurest forever.” And again: “Thy years shall not fail.” And so of Christ was it written: “His throne as the days of heaven.”

The Philosopher says that on account of the incorruptibility of the heavens all have considered them as the abode of spirits. And so “who art in heaven” tends to give us confidence in our prayer which arises from a threefold consideration: of God’s power, of our familiarity with Him, and of the fitness of our requests.

The power of Him to whom we pray is implied if we consider “heaven” as the corporeal heavens. God is not limited by any physical bounds: “Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord.” Nevertheless, He is said to be in the corporeal heavens to indicate two things: the extent of His power and the greatness of His nature. The former of these attributes is contrary to the view that all things happen out of necessity, by a fate regulated by the celestial bodies; and thus all prayer would be vain and useless. But such is absurd, since God dwells in the heavens as their Lord: “The Lord has prepared His throne in heaven.” The latter attribute, viz., His sublime nature, is against those who in praying propose or build up any corporeal images of God. Therefore, God is stated to be “in heaven” in that He exceeds all corporeal things, and even the desires and intellects of men; so that whatsoever man thinks or desires is far less than God. Thus, it is said: “Behold, God is great, exceeding our knowledge.” And again: “The Lord is high above all nations.” And finally: “To whom then have you likened God? Or what image will you make for Him?”

Familiar intercourse with God is shown through this “in heaven.” Some indeed have said that because of His great distance from us God does not care for men, and they cite these words: “He walketh about the poles of heaven, and He doth not consider our things.” Against this is the fact that God is nearer to us than we are to ourselves. This brings confidence to one who prays. First, because of the nearness of God: “The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon Him.” Hence, it is written: “But thou when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber,” that is, into thy heart. Second, because of the intercession of all the Saints among whom God dwells; for from this arises faith to ask through their merits for what we desire: “Turn to some of the Saints,” and, “Pray one for another, that you may be saved.”

This part of the prayer—that is, “in heaven”—is appropriate and fitting also, if “in heaven” is taken to mean that spiritual and eternal good in which true happiness consists. Because of it our desires are lifted up towards heavenly things; since our desires ought to tend towards where we have our Father, because there is our true home: “Seek the things that are above.” And again: “Unto an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that cannot fade, reserved in heaven for you.” Moreover, from it we are told that, if our life is to be in heaven, then we ought to be conformed to our Heavenly Father: “Such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly.” From all this the words “in heaven” are most appropriate in prayer in that they signify both a heavenly desire and heavenly life.

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

THE FIRST PETITION

“Hallowed Be Thy Name.”

This is the first petition, and in it we ask that God’s name be manifested and declared in us. The name of God, first of all, is wonderful because it works wonders in all creatures. Thus said Our Lord: “In My name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak new tongues. They shall take up serpents; and if they shall drink any deadly thing, it shall not hurt them.”

GOD’S NAME IS LOVABLE

This name is lovable: “There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.” We all should desire to be saved. We have an example in Blessed Ignatius, who had such great love for the name of Christ that, when Trajan ordered him to deny it, he affirmed that it could not be dragged from his mouth. Then, the emperor threatened to have him beheaded, and thus take the name of Christ out of the mouth of the Saint. But Ignatius replied: “Even though you take it from my mouth, you will never snatch it from my heart. I have this name written in my heart and there I never cease to invoke it.” Trajan heard this and wished to put it to the test. He had the servant of God beheaded and then commanded that his heart be taken out, and there upon the heart was found the name of Christ inscribed in letters of gold. This name had been engraved on the heart as a seal.

GOD’S NAME IS VENERABLE

The name of God is venerable: “In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.” “Those that are in heaven” refers to the Angels and the blessed; “those that are on earth” to people living in this world, who do so for love of heaven which they wish to gain; "those under the earth" to the damned, who do so out of fear.

GOD'S NAME IS INEFFABLE

This name is ineffable, for in the telling of it every tongue is wholly inadequate. Accordingly, it is sometimes compared to created things as, for instance, it is likened to a rock because of its firmness: "Upon this rock I will build My Church." It is likened to a fire because of its purifying power; for as fire purifies metal, so does God purify the hearts of sinners: "My God is a consuming fire." It is compared to light because of its power of enlightening; for as light illumines the darkness, so does the name of God overcome the darkness of the mind: "O my God, enlighten my darkness."

MEANING OF HALLOWED

We pray that this name may be manifested in us, that it be known and revered as holy. Now "holy" (or hallowed) may have a threefold meaning. First, it is the same as firm. Thus, those who are firmly established in eternal happiness are all the blessed in heaven, the Saints. In this sense, none is a "Saint" on earth because here all is continually changeable. As St. Augustine says: "I sank away from Thee, O Lord, and I wandered too much astray from Thee who art my firm support."

Secondly, "holy" may be understood as "unearthly." The holy ones who are in heaven have naught earthly about them: "I count (all things) . . . but as dung, that I may gain Christ." Earth may signify sinners. This would arise as reference to production. For if the earth is not cultivated, it will produce thorns and thistles. Similarly, if the soul of the sinner is not cultivated by grace, it will produce only thistles and thorns of sins: "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee." Again, earth may signify sinners as regards its darkness. The earth is dark and opaque; and so also is the sinner dark and obstructive to light: "Darkness was on the face of the deep." And, finally, earth is a dry element which will fall to pieces unless it is mixed with the moisture of water. So God placed earth just above water: "Who established the earth above the waters." So also the soul of the sinner is dry and without moisture as it is said: "My soul is as earth without water unto Thee."

“Holy” may, finally, be understood as “laved in blood,” since the Saints in heaven are called Saints because they have been washed in blood: “These are they who are come out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes, and have made them white in the blood of the Lamb.” And again: “He hath washed us from our sins in His blood.”

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

THE SECOND PETITION

“Thy Kingdom Come.”

The Holy Spirit makes us love, desire and pray rightly; and instills in us, first of all, a fear whereby we ask that the name of God be sanctified. He gives us another gift, that of piety. This is a devout and loving affection for our Father and for all men who are in trouble. Now, since God is our Father, we ought not only reverence and fear Him, but also have towards Him a sweet and pious affection. This love makes us pray that the kingdom of God may come: “We should live soberly and justly in this world, looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God.”

It may be asked of us: “Why, since the kingdom of God always was, do we then ask that it may come?” This, however, can be understood in three ways. First, a king sometimes has only the right to a kingdom or dominion, and yet his rule has not been declared because the men in his kingdom are not as yet subject to him. His rule or dominion will come only when the men of his kingdom are his subjects. Now, God is by His very essence and nature the Lord of all things; and Christ being God and Man is the Lord over all things: “And He gave Him power and glory and a kingdom.” It is, therefore, necessary that all things be subject to Him. This is not yet the case, but will be so at the end of the world: “For He must reign, until He hath put all His enemies under His feet.” Hence it is for this we pray when we say: “Thy kingdom come.”

WHY WE PRAY THUS

In so doing we pray for a threefold purpose: that the just may be strengthened, that sinners may be punished, and that death be destroyed. Now, the reason is that men are subject to Christ in two ways, either willingly or unwillingly. Again, the will of God is so efficacious that it must be fully complied with; and God does wish that all things be subject to Christ. Hence, two things are necessary: either man will do the will of God by subjecting himself to His commands, as do the just; or God shall exert His will and punish those who are sinners and His enemies; and this will take place at the end of the world: “Until I make Thy enemies Thy footstool.”

It is enjoined upon the faithful to pray that the kingdom of God may come, namely, that they subject themselves completely to Him. But it is a terrible thing for sinners, because for them to ask the coming of God’s kingdom is nothing else than to ask that they be subjected to punishment: “Woe to them that desire the day of the Lord!” By this prayer, too, we ask that death be destroyed. Since Christ is life, death cannot exist in His kingdom, because death is the opposite of life: “And the enemy, death, shall be destroyed last.” “He shall cast death down headlong forever.” And this shall take place at the last resurrection: “Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory.”

In a second sense, the kingdom of heaven signifies the glory of paradise. Nor is this to be wondered at, for a kingdom (“regnum”) is nothing other than a government (“regimen”). That will be the best government where nothing is found contrary to the will of the governor. Now, the will of God is the very salvation of men, for He “will have all men to be saved”; and this especially shall come to pass in paradise where there will be nothing contrary to man’s salvation. “They shall gather out of His kingdom all scandals.” In this world, however, there are many things contrary to the salvation of men. Hence, when we pray, “Thy kingdom come,” we pray that we might participate in the heavenly kingdom and in the glory of paradise.

WHY WE DESIRE THIS KINGDOM

This kingdom is greatly to be desired for three reasons. (1) It is to be greatly desired because of the perfect justice that obtains there: “Thy people shall be all just.” In this world the bad are mingled with the good, but in heaven there will be no wicked and no sinners. (2) The heavenly kingdom is to be desired because of its perfect liberty. Here below there is no liberty, although all men naturally desire it; but above there will be perfect liberty without any form of oppression: “Because the creature also shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption.” Not only will men then be free, but indeed they will all be kings: “And Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom.” This is because all shall be of one will with God, and God shall will what the Saints will, and the Saints shall will whatsoever God wills; hence, in the will of God shall their will be done All, therefore, shall reign, because the will of all shall be done, and the Lord shall be their crown: “In that day, the Lord of hosts shall be a crown of glory and a garland of joy to the residue of His people.” (3) The kingdom of God is to be desired because of the marvellous riches of heaven: “The eye hath not seen O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee.” And also: “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.”

Note that man will find everything that he seeks for in this world more excellently and more perfectly in God alone. Thus, if it is pleasure you seek, then in God you will find the highest pleasure: “You shall see and your heart shall rejoice.” “And everlasting joy shall be upon their heads.” If it is riches, there you will find it in abundance: “When the soul strays from Thee, she looks for things apart from Thee, but she finds all things impure and useless until she returns to Thee,” says St. Augustine.

Lastly, “Thy kingdom come” is understood in another sense because sometimes sin reigns in this world. This occurs when man is so disposed that he follows at once the enticement of sin. “Let not sin reign in your mortal body,” but let God reign in your heart; and this will be when thou art prepared to obey God and keep all His Commandments. Therefore, when we pray to God that His kingdom may come, we pray that God and not sin may reign in us.

May we through this petition arrive at that happiness of which the Lord speaks: “Blessed are the meek!” Now, according to what we have first explained above, viz., that man desires that God be the Lord of all things, then let him not avenge injuries that are done him, but let him leave that for the Lord. If you avenge yourself, you do not really desire that the kingdom of God may come. According to our second explanation (i.e., regarding the glory of paradise), if you await the coming of this kingdom which is the glory of paradise, you need not worry about losing earthly things. Likewise, if according to the third explanation, you pray that God may reign within you, then you must be humble, for He is Himself most humble: “Learn of Me because I am meek and humble of heart.”

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

THE THIRD PETITION

“Thy Will Be Done on Earth as It Is in Heaven.”

The third gift which the Holy Spirit works in us is called the gift of knowledge. The Holy Spirit not only gives us the gift of fear and the gift of piety (which is a sweet affection for God, as we have said); but He also makes man wise. It was this for which David prayed: “Teach me goodness and discipline and knowledge.” This knowledge which the Holy Spirit teaches us is that whereby man lives justly. Among all that goes to make up knowledge and wisdom in man, the principal wisdom is that man should not depend solely upon his own opinion: “Lean not upon thy own prudence.” Those who put all their trust in their own judgment so that they do not trust others, but only themselves, are always found to be stupid and are so adjudged by others: “Hast thou seen a man wise in his own conceit? There shall be more hope of a fool than of him.”

THE WILL OF GOD

Out of humility one does not trust one’s own knowledge: “Where humility is there is also wisdom.” The proud trust only themselves. Now, the Holy Spirit, through the gift of wisdom, teaches us that we do not our own will but the will of God. It is through this gift that we pray of God that His “will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” And in this is seen the gift of knowledge. Thus, one says to God “let Thy will be done,” in the same way as one who is sick desires something from the physician; and his will is not precisely his own, because it is the will of the physician. Otherwise, if his desire were purely from his own will, he would be indeed foolish. So we ought not to pray other than that in us God’s will may be done; that is, that

His will be accomplished in us. The heart of man is only right when it is in accord with the will of God. This did Christ: “Because I came down from heaven, not to do My own will but the will of Him that sent Me.” Christ, as God, has the same will with the Father; but as a Man He has a distinct will from the Father’s, and it was according to this that He says He does not do His will but the Father’s. Hence, He teaches us to pray and to ask: “Thy will be done.”

WHAT DOES GOD WILL?

But what is this that is asked? Does not the Psalm say: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased [has willed], He hath done?” Now, if He has done all that He has willed both in heaven and on earth, what then is the meaning of this: “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven”? To understand this we must know that God wills of us three things, and we pray that these be accomplished. The first thing that God wills is that we may have eternal life. Whoever makes something for a certain purpose, has a will regarding it which is in accord with the purpose for which he made it. In like manner, God made man, but it was not for no purpose, as it is written: “Remember what my substance is; for hast Thou made all the children of men in vain?”

Hence, God made men for a purpose; but this purpose was not for their mere pleasures, for also the brutes have these, but it was that they might have eternal life. The Lord, therefore, wills that men have eternal life. Now, when that for which a thing is made is accomplished, it is said to be saved; and when this is not accomplished, it is said to be lost. So when man gains eternal life, he is said to be saved, and it is this that the Lord wills: “Now, this is the will of My Father that sent Me, that every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him may have life everlasting.” This will of God is already fulfilled for the Angels and for the Saints in the Fatherland, for they see God and know and enjoy Him. We, however, desire that, as the will of God is done for the blessed who are in heaven, it likewise be done for us who are on earth. For this we pray when we say “Thy will be done” for us who are on earth, as it is for the Saints who are in heaven.

THE COMMANDMENTS: GOD’S WILL

In the second place, the will of God for us is that we keep His Commandments. When a person desires something, he not only wills that which he desires, but also everything which will bring that about. Thus, in order to bring about a healthy condition which he desires, a physician also wills to put into effect diet, medicine, and other needs. We arrive at eternal life through observance of the Commandments, and, accordingly, God wills that we observe them: “But if thou wilt enter into life, keep the Commandments.” “Your reasonable service . . . that you may prove what is the good and the acceptable and the perfect will of God.” That is, good because it is profitable: “I am the Lord thy God that teach thee profitable things.” And acceptable, that is, pleasing: “Light is risen to the just; and joy to the right heart.” And perfect, because noble: “Be you therefore perfect, as your Heavenly Father is perfect.” When we say “Thy will be done,” we pray that we may fulfill the Commandments of God. This will of God is done by the just, but it is not yet done by sinners. “In heaven” here signifies the just; while “on earth” refers to sinners. We, therefore, pray that the will of God may be done “on earth,” that is, by sinners, “as it is in heaven,” that is, by the just.

LET THY WILL BE DONE

It must be noted that the very words used in this petition teach us a lesson. It does not say “Do” or “Let us do,” but it says, “[Let] Thy will be done,” because two things are necessary for eternal life: the grace of God and the will of man. Although God has made man without man, He cannot save man without his cooperation. Thus, says St. Augustine: “Who created thee without thyself, cannot save thee without thyself,” because God wills that man cooperate with Him or at least put no obstacle in His way: “Turn ye to Me, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will turn to you.” “By the grace of God, I am what I am. And His grace in me hath not been void.” Do not, therefore, presume on your own strength, but trust in God’s grace; and be not negligent, but use the zeal you have. It does not say, therefore, “Let us do,” lest it would seem that the grace of God were left out; nor does it say, “Do,” lest it would appear that our will and our zeal do not matter. He does say “Let it be done” through the grace of God at the same time using our desire and our own efforts.

Thirdly, the will of God in our regard is that men be restored to that state and dignity in which the first man was created. This was a condition in which the spirit and soul felt no resistance from sensuality and the flesh. As long as the soul was subject to God, the flesh was in such subjection to the spirit that no corruption of death, or weakness, or any of the passions were felt. When, however, the spirit and the soul, which were between God and the flesh, rebelled against God by sin, then the body rebelled against the soul. From that time death and weaknesses began to be felt together with continual rebellion of sensuality against the spirit: “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.” “The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.”

Thus, there is an endless strife between the flesh and the spirit, and man is continually being brought lower by sin. The will of God, therefore, is that man be restored to his primal state so that no more would the flesh rebel against the spirit: “For this is the will of God, your sanctification.” Now, this will of God cannot be fulfilled in this life, but it will be fulfilled in the resurrection of the just, when glorified bodies shall arise incorrupt and most perfect: “It is sown a natural body; it shall rise a spiritual body.” In the just the will of God is fulfilled relative to the spirit, which abides in justice and knowledge and perfect life. Therefore, when we say “Thy will be done,” let us pray that His will also may be done regarding the flesh. Thus, the sense of “Thy will be done on earth” is that it may be done “for our flesh,” and “as it is in heaven” means in our spirit. Thus, we take “in heaven” for our spirit, and “on earth” as our flesh.

By means of this petition we arrive at the happiness of those who mourn, as it is written: “Blessed are they that mourn; for they shall be comforted.” This can be applied to each of the threefold explanations we have given above. According to the first we desire eternal life. And in this very desire we are brought to a mourning of soul: “Woe is me, that my sojourning is prolonged.” This desire in the Saints is so vehement that because of it they wish for death, which in itself is something naturally to be avoided: “But we are confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body and to be present with the Lord.” Likewise, according to our second explanation —viz., that we will to keep the Commandments —they who do so are in sorrow. For although such be sweet for the soul, it is bitter indeed for the flesh which is continually kept in discipline. “Going, they went and wept,” which refers to the flesh, “But coming, they shall come with joyfulness,” which pertains to the soul. Again, from our third explanation (that is, concerning the struggle which is ever going on between the flesh and the spirit), we see that this too causes sorrow. For it cannot but happen that the soul be wounded by the venial faults of the flesh; and so in expiating for these the soul is in mourning. “Every night,” that is, the darkness of sin, “I will wash my bed [that is, my conscience] with my tears.” Those who thus sorrow will arrive at the Fatherland, where may God bring us also!

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

THE FOURTH PETITION

“Give Us This Day Our Daily Bread.”

Sometimes it happens that one of great learning and wisdom becomes fearful and timid; and, therefore, it is necessary that he have fortitude of heart lest he lack necessities: “It is He that giveth strength to the weary, and increaseth force and might to them that are not.” The Holy Spirit gives this fortitude: “And the Spirit entered into me, . . . and He set me upon my feet.” This fortitude which is given by the Holy Ghost so strengthens the heart of man that he does not fear for the things that are necessary for him, but he trusts that God will provide for all his needs. The Holy Spirit who gives us this strength teaches us to pray to God: “Give us this day our daily bread.” And thus He is called the Spirit of fortitude.

It must be noted that in the first three petitions of this prayer only things spiritual are asked for—those which indeed begin to be in this world but are only brought to fruition in the life eternal. Thus, when we pray that the name of God be hallowed, we really ask that the name of God be known; when we pray that the kingdom of God may come, we ask that we may participate in God’s kingdom; and when we pray that the will of God be done, we ask that His will be accomplished in us. All these things, however, although they have their beginning here on earth, cannot be had in their fullness except in heaven. Hence, it is necessary to pray for certain necessaries which can be completely had in this life. The Holy Spirit, then, taught us to ask for the requirements of this present life which are here obtainable in their fullness, and at the same time He shows that our temporal wants are provided us by God. It is this that is meant when we say: “Give us this day our daily bread.”

In these very words the Holy Spirit teaches us to avoid five sins which are usually committed out of the desire for temporal things. The first sin is that man, because of an inordinate desire, seeks those things which go beyond his state and condition of life. He is not satisfied with what befits him. Thus, if he be a soldier and desires clothes, he will not have them suitable for a soldier, but rather for a knight; or if he be a cleric, clothes fit for a bishop. This vicious habit withdraws man from spiritual things, in that it makes his desires cleave to transitory things. The Lord taught us to avoid this vice by instructing us to ask for the temporal necessities of this present life as they are in accord with the position of each one of us. All this is understood under the name of "bread." And so He does not teach us to pray for that which is luxurious, nor for variety, nor for what is over-refined, but for bread which is common to all and without which man's life could not be sustained: "The chief thing for man's life is water and bread." And: "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content."

The second sin is that some in acquiring temporal goods burden others and defraud them. This vicious practice is dangerous, because goods thus taken away can be restored only with difficulty. For, as St. Augustine says: "The sin is not forgiven until that which is taken away is restored." "They eat the bread of wickedness." The Lord teaches us to avoid this sin, and to pray for our own bread, not that of another. Robbers do not eat their own bread, but the bread of their neighbor.

The third sin is unnecessary solicitude. There are some who are never content with what they have, but always want more. This is wholly immoderate, because one's desire must always be measured by his need: "Give me neither beggary nor riches, but give me only the necessaries of life." We are taught to avoid this sin in the words, "our daily bread," that is, bread of one day or for one time.

The fourth sin is inordinate voracity. There are those who in one day would consume what would be enough for many days. Such pray not for bread for one day, but for ten days. And because they spend too much, it happens what they spend all their substance. "They that give themselves to drinking and that club together shall be consumed." And: "A workman that is a drunkard shall not be rich."

The fifth sin is ingratitude. A person grows proud in his riches, and does not realize that what he has comes from God. This is a grave fault, for all things that we have, be they spiritual or temporal, are from God: "All things are Thine; and we have given Thee what we received of Thy hand."

Therefore, to take away this vice, the prayer has, “Give us” even “our daily bread,” that we may know that all things come from God.

From all this we draw one great lesson. Sometimes one who has great riches makes no use of them, but suffers spiritual and temporal harm; for some because of riches have perished. “There is also another evil which I have seen under the sun, and that frequent among men. A man to whom God hath given riches and substance and honor, and his soul wanteth nothing of all that he desireth; yet God doth not give him power to eat thereof, but a stranger shall eat it up.” And again: “Riches kept to the hurt of the owner.” We ought, therefore, pray that our riches will be of use to us; and it is this we seek for when we say, “Give us our bread,” that is, make our riches be of use to us. “His bread in his belly shall be turned into the gall of asps within him. The riches which he hath swallowed, he shall vomit up; and God shall draw them out of his belly.”

Another great vice is concerned with the things of this world, viz., excessive solicitude for them. For there are some who daily are anxious about temporal goods which are enough for them for an entire year; and they who are thus troubled will never have rest: “Be not solicitous therefore, saying: “What shall we eat, or What shall we drink, or Wherewith shall we be clothed?” The Lord, therefore, teaches us to pray that to-day our bread will be given us, that is, those things which will be needful for us for the present time.

One may also see in this bread another twofold meaning, viz., Sacramental Bread and the Bread of the Word of God. Thus, in the first meaning, we pray for our Sacramental Bread which is consecrated daily in the Church, so that we receive it in the Sacrament, and thus it profits us unto salvation: “I am the living bread which came down from heaven.” And: “He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.”

In the second meaning this bread is the Word of God: “Not in bread alone doth man live, but in every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God.” We pray, therefore, that He give us bread, that is, His Word. From this man derives that happiness which is a hunger for justice. For after spiritual things are considered, they are all the more desired; and this desire arouses a hunger, and from this hunger follows the fullness of life everlasting.

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

THE FIFTH PETITION

“And Forgive Us Our Trespasses As We Forgive Those Who Trespass Against Us.”

There are some men of great wisdom and fortitude who, because they trust too much in their own strength, do not wisely carry out what they attempt, and they do not bring to completion that which they have in mind. “Designs are strengthened by counsels.” It must be known that the Holy Ghost who gives fortitude also gives counsel. Every good counsel concerning the salvation of man is from the Holy Ghost. Thus, counsel is necessary for man when he is in difficulty, just as is the counsel of physicians when one is ill. When man falls into spiritual illness through sin, he must look for counsel in order to be healed. This necessity for counsel on the part of the sinner is shown in these words: “Wherefore, O king, let my counsel be acceptable to thee, and redeem thou thy sins with alms.” The best counsel, therefore, against sin is alms and mercy. Hence, the Holy Spirit teaches sinners to seek and to pray: “Forgive us our trespasses.”

We owe God that which we have taken away from His sole right; and this right of God is that we do His will in preference to our own will. Now, we take away from God’s right when we prefer our will to God’s will, and this is a sin. Sins, therefore, are our trespasses. And it is the counsel of the Holy Spirit that we ask God pardon for our sins, and so we say: “Forgive us our trespasses.”

We can consider these words in three ways: (1) Why do we make this petition? (2) How may it be fulfilled? (3) What is required on our part?

WHY DO WE MAKE THIS PETITION?

It must be known that from this petition we can draw two things that are necessary for us in this life. One is that we be ever in a state of salutary fear and humility. There have been some, indeed, so presumptuous as to say that man could live in this world and by his own unaided strength avoid sin. But this condition has been given to no one except Christ, who had the Spirit beyond all measure, and to the Blessed Virgin, who was full of grace and in whom there was no sin. “And concerning whom,” that is, the Virgin, “when it is a question of sin I wish to make no mention,” says St. Augustine. But for all the other Saints, it was never granted them that they should not incur at least venial sin: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us.” And, moreover, this very petition proves this; for it is evident that all Saints and all men say the “Our Father” in which is contained “Forgive us our trespasses.” Hence, all admit and confess that they are sinners or trespassers. If, therefore, you are a sinner, you ought to fear and humble yourself.

Another reason for this petition is that we should ever live in hope. Although we be sinners, nevertheless we must not give up hope, lest our despair drive us into greater and different kinds of sins. As the Apostle says: “Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness.” It is, therefore, of great help that we be ever hopeful; for in the measure that man is a sinner, he ought to hope that God will forgive him if he be perfectly sorry for sin and be converted. This hope is strengthened in us when we say: “Forgive us our trespasses.”

The Novatiani destroyed this hope, saying that one who has sinned but once after Baptism can never look for mercy. But this is not true, if Christ spoke truly when He said: “I forgave thee all the debt, because thou besoughtest Me.” In whatsoever day, therefore, you ask, you can receive mercy if with sorrow for sin you make your prayer. Both fear and hope arise from this petition. For all sinners who are contrite and confess their guilt, receive mercy. Hence, this petition is necessary.

THE FULFILLMENT OF THIS PETITION

Concerning the second consideration of this petition (viz., how it may be fulfilled), it must be known that there are two factors in sin: the fault by which God is offended, and the punishment which is due because of this fault. But the sin is taken away in contrition which goes with the purpose to confess and make satisfaction: “I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord. And Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin” One has no need to fear then, because for the remission of a fault contrition with a purpose to confess is sufficient.

But one might say: “If sin is thus taken away when a man is contrite, of what necessity is the priest?” To this it must be said that God does forgive the sin in contrition, and eternal punishment is changed to temporal, but nevertheless the debt of temporal punishment remains. If one should die without confession, not out of contempt for it but prevented from it, one would go to purgatory, where the punishment, as St. Augustine says, is very great. When you confess, the priest absolves you of this punishment in virtue of the keys to which you subject yourself in confession. When, therefore, one has confessed, something of this punishment is taken away; and similarly when he has again confessed, and it could be that after he has confessed many times, all would be remitted.

The successors of the Apostles found another mode of remission of this punishment, namely, the good use of indulgences, which have their force for one living in the state of grace, to the extent that is claimed for them and as indicated by the grantor. That the Pope can bring this about, is sufficiently evident. Many holy men have accomplished much good, and they have not greatly sinned, at least not mortally; and these good deeds were done for the common use of the Church. Likewise the merits of Christ and the Blessed Virgin are, as it were, in a treasury; and from it the Supreme Pontiff and they who are by him permitted can dispense these merits where it is necessary. Thus, therefore, sins are taken away not only as regards their guilt by contrition, but also as regards punishment for them in confession and through indulgences.

WHAT MUST WE DO?

Concerning the third consideration of this petition, it must be known that on our part we are required to forgive our neighbor the offenses which he commits against us. Thus, we say: “As we forgive those who trespass against us.” Otherwise God would not forgive us: “Man to man reserveth anger: and doth he seek remedy of God?” “Forgive and you shall be forgiven.” Therefore, only in this petition is there a condition when it says: “As we forgive those who trespass against us.” If you do not forgive, you shall not be forgiven.

But you may think, “I shall say what goes first in the petition, namely, ‘forgive us,’ but that ‘As we forgive those who trespass against us,’ I shall not say.” Would you seek to deceive Christ? You certainly do not deceive Him. For Christ who made this prayer remembers it well, and cannot be deceived. If therefore, you say it with the lips, let the heart fulfill it.

But one may ask whether he who does not intend to forgive his neighbor ought to say: “As we forgive those who trespass against us.” It seems not, for such is a lie. But actually it must be said that he does not lie, because he prays not in his own person, but in that of the Church which is not deceived, and, therefore the petition itself is in the plural number. And it must also be known that forgiveness is twofold. One applies to the perfect, where the one offended seeks out the offender: “Seek after peace.” The other is common to all, and to it all are equally bound, that one offended grant pardon to the one who seeks it: “Forgive thy neighbor if he hath hurt thee; and then shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou prayest.” And from this follows that other beatitude: “Blessed are the merciful.” For mercy causes us to have pity on our neighbor.

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

THE SIXTH PETITION

“And Lead Us Not Into Temptation.”

There are those who have sinned and desire forgiveness for their sins. They confess their sins and repent. Yet, they do not strive as much as they should in order that they may not fall into sin again. In this indeed they are not consistent. For, on the one hand, they deplore their sins by being sorry for them; and, on the other hand, they sin again and again and have them again to deplore. Thus it is written: “Wash yourselves, be clean. Take away the evil of your devices from my eyes. Cease to do perversely.”

We have seen in the petition above that Christ taught us to seek forgiveness for our sins. In this petition, He teaches us to pray that we might avoid sin—that is, that we may not be led into temptation, and thus fall into sin. “And lead us not into temptation.”

Three questions are now considered: (1) What is temptation? (2) In what ways is one tempted and by whom? (3) How is one freed from temptation?

WHAT IS TEMPTATION?

Regarding the first, it must be known that to tempt is nothing other than to test or to prove. To tempt a man is to test or try his virtue. This is done in two ways just as a man’s virtue requires two things. One requirement is to do good, the other is to avoid evil: “Turn away from evil and do good.” Sometimes a man’s virtue is tried in doing good, and sometimes it is tested in avoiding evil. Thus, regarding the first, a person is tried in his readiness to do good, for example, to fast and such like. Then is thy virtue great when thou art quick to do good. In this way does God sometimes try one’s virtue, not, however, because such virtue is hidden from Him, but in order that all might know it and it would be an example to all. God tempted Abraham in this way, and Job also. For this reason God frequently sends trials to the just, who in sustaining them with all patience make manifest their virtue and themselves increase in virtue: “The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love Him with all your heart and with all your soul, or not.” Thus does God tempt man by inciting him to good deeds.

As to the second, the virtue of man is tried by solicitation to evil. If he truly resists and does not give his consent, then his virtue is great. If, however, he falls before the temptation, he is devoid of virtue. God tempts no man in this way, for it is written: “God is not a tempter of evils, and He tempteth no man.”

HOW IS ONE TEMPTED?

The Temptations of the Flesh.—Man is tempted by his own flesh, by the devil and by the world. He is tempted by the flesh in two ways. First, the flesh incites one to evil. It always seeks its own pleasures, namely, carnal pleasures, in which often is sin. He who indulges in carnal pleasures neglects spiritual things: “Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence.”

Secondly, the flesh tempts man by enticing him away from good. For the spirit on its part would delight always in spiritual things, but the flesh asserting itself puts obstacles in the way of the spirit: “The corruptible body is a load upon the soul.” “For I am delighted with the law of God, according to the inward man. But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members.” This temptation which comes from the flesh is most severe, because our enemy, the flesh, is united to us; and as Boethius says: “There is no plague more dangerous than an enemy in the family circle.” We must, therefore, be ever on our guard against this enemy: “Watch and pray that ye enter not into temptation.”

The Temptations of the Devil.—The devil tempts us with extreme force. Even when the flesh is subdued, another tempter arises, namely, the devil against whom we have a heavy struggle. Of this the Apostle says: “Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in high places.” For this reason he is very aptly called the tempter: “Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you.”

The devil proceeds most cunningly in tempting us. He operates like a skillful general when about to attack a fortified city. He looks for the weak places in the object of his assault, and in that part where a man is most weak, he tempts him. He tempts man in those sins to which, after subduing his flesh, he is most inclined. Such, for instance, are anger, pride and the other spiritual sins. “Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.”

How the Devil Tempts Us.—The devil does two things when he tempts us. Thus, he does not at once suggest something that appears to us as evil, but something that has a semblance of good. Thereby he would, at least in the beginning, turn a man from his chief purpose, and then afterwards it will be easier to induce him to sin, once he has been turned away ever so little. “Satan himself transformeth himself into an angel of light.” Then when he has once led man into sin, he so enchains him as to prevent his rising up out of his sin. The devil, therefore, does two things: he deceives a man first, and then after betraying him, enthralls him in his sin.

Temptations of the World.—The world has two ways of tempting man. The first is excessive and intemperate desire for the goods of this life: “The desire of money is the root of all evil.” The second way is the fears engendered by persecutors and tyrants: “We are wrapped up in darkness.” “All that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution.” And again: “Fear not those that slay the body.”

How Is One Freed from Temptation?—Now we have seen what temptation is, and also in what way and by whom one is tempted. But how is one freed from temptation? In this we must notice that Christ teaches us to pray, not that we may not be tempted, but that we may not be led into temptation. For it is when one overcomes temptation that one deserves the reward. Thus it is said: “Count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations.” And again: “Son, when thou comest to the service of God, . . . prepare thy soul for temptation.” Again: “Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life.” Our Lord, therefore, teaches us to pray that we be not led into temptation, by giving our consent to it: “Let no temptation take hold on you, but such as is human.” The reason is that it is human to be tempted, but to give consent is devilish.

But does God lead one to evil, that he should pray: “Lead us not into temptation”? I reply that God is said to lead a person into evil by permitting him to the extent that, because of his many sins, He withdraws His grace from man, and as a result of this withdrawal man does fall into sin. Therefore, we sing in the Psalm: “When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me.” God, however, directs man by the fervor of charity that he be not led into temptation. For charity even in its smallest degree is able to resist any kind of sin: “Many waters cannot quench charity.” He also guides man by the light of his intellect in which he teaches him what he should do. For as the Philosopher says: “Every one who sins is ignorant.” “I will give thee understanding and I will instruct thee.” It was for this last that David prayed, saying: “Enlighten my eyes that I never sleep in death; lest at any time my enemy say: I have prevailed against him.” We have this through the gift of understanding. Therefore, when we refuse to consent to temptation, we keep our hearts pure: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God.” And it follows from this petition that we are led up to the sight of God, and to it may God lead us all!

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

SEVENTH PETITION

“But Deliver Us from Evil. Amen.”

The Lord has already taught us to pray for forgiveness of our sins, and how to avoid temptations. In this petition, He teaches us to pray to be preserved from evil, and indeed from all evil in general, such as sin, illness, affliction and all others, as St. Augustine explains it. But since we have already mentioned sin and temptation, we now must consider other evils, such as adversity and all afflictions of this world. From these God preserves us in a fourfold manner.

First, He preserves us from affliction itself; but this is very rare because it is the lot of the just in this world to suffer, for it is written: “All that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution.” Once in a while, however, God does prevent a man from being afflicted by some evil; this is when He knows such a one to be weak and unable to bear it. Just so a physician does not prescribe violent medicines to a weak patient. “Behold, I have given before thee a door opened, which no man can shut; because thou hast little strength.” In heaven this will be a general thing, for there no one shall be afflicted. “In six troubles,” those, namely, of this present life which is divided into six periods, “He shall deliver thee, and in the seventh evil shall not touch thee.” “They shall no more hunger nor thirst.”

Second, God delivers us from afflictions when He consoles us in them; for unless He console us, we could not long persevere: “We were pressed out of measure above our strength so that we were weary even of life.” “But God, who comforteth the humble, comforted us.” “According to the multitude of my sorrows in my heart, Thy comforts have given joy to my soul.”

Third, God bestows so many good things upon those who are afflicted that their evils are forgotten: “After the storm Thou makest a calm.” The afflictions and trials of this world, therefore, are not to be feared, both because consolations accompany them and because they are of short duration: "For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory."

Fourth, we are preserved from afflictions in this way that all temptations and trials are conducive to our own good. We do not pray, "Deliver us from tribulation," but "from evil." This is because tribulations bring a crown to the just, and for that reason the Saints rejoiced in their sufferings: "We glory also in tribulations, knowing that tribulation worketh patience." "In time of tribulation Thou forgivest sins."

THE VALUE OF PATIENCE

God, therefore, delivers man from evil and from affliction by converting them to his good. This is a sign of supreme wisdom to divert evil to good. And patience in bearing trials is a result of this. The other virtues operate by good things, but patience operates in evil things, and, indeed, it is very necessary in evil things, namely, in adversity: "The learning of a man is known by his patience."

The Holy Spirit through the gift of wisdom has us use this prayer, and by it we arrive at supreme happiness which is the reward of peace. For it is by patience we obtain peace, whether in time of prosperity or of adversity. For this reason the peace-makers are called the children of God, because they are like to God in this, that nothing can hurt God and nothing can hurt them, whether it be prosperity or adversity: "Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God."

"Amen." This is general ratification of all the petitions.

A SHORT EXPLANATION OF THE WHOLE PRAYER

By way of brief summary, it should be known that the Lord's Prayer contains all that we ought to desire and all that we ought to avoid. Now, of all desirable things, that must be most desired which is most loved, and that is God.

Therefore, you seek, first of all, the glory of God when you say: "Hallowed be Thy name." You should desire three things from God, and they concern yourself. The first is that you may arrive at eternal life. And you pray for this when you say: “Thy kingdom come.” The second is that you will do the will of God and His justice. You pray for this in the words: “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” The third is that you may have the necessaries of life. And thus you pray: “Give us this day our daily bread.” Concerning all these things the Lord says: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God,” which complies with the second, “and all these things shall be added unto you,” as in accord with the third.

We must avoid and flee from all things which are opposed to the good. For, as we have seen, good is above all things to be desired. This good is fourfold. First, there is the glory of God, and no evil is contrary to this: “If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? And if thou do justly, what shall thou give Him?” Whether it be the evil inasmuch as God punishes it, or whether it be the good in that God rewards it—all redound to His glory.

The second good is eternal life, to which sin is contrary: because eternal life is lost by sin. And so to remove this evil we pray: “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those who trespass against us.” The third good is justice and good works, and temptation is contrary to this, because temptation hinders us from doing good. We pray, therefore, to have this evil taken away in the words: “Lead us not into temptation.” The fourth good is all the necessaries of life, and opposed to this are troubles and adversities. And we seek to remove them when we pray: “But deliver us from evil. Amen.”

(For “Questions for Discussion” see Chapter 6.)

EXPLANATION OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

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ARTICLE 3

THE FIRST COMMANDMENT

“YOU SHALL NOT HAVE STRANGE GODS BEFORE ME.”

The entire law of Christ depends upon charity. And charity depends on two precepts, one of which concerns loving God and the other concerns loving our neighbor.

Now God, in delivering the law to Moses, gave him Ten Commandments written upon two tablets of stone. Three of these Commandments that were written on the first tablet referred to the love of God; and the seven Commandments written on the other tablet related to the love of our neighbor. The whole law, therefore, is founded on these two precepts.

ERRORS

The First Commandment which relates to the love of God is: “You shall not have strange gods.” For an understanding of this Commandment, one must know how of old it was violated. Some worshipped demons. “All the gods of the Gentiles are devils” [Ps 95:5]. This is the greatest and most detestable of all sins. Even now there are many who transgress this Commandment: all such as practise divinations and fortune-telling. Such things, according to St. Augustine, cannot be done without some kind of pact with the devil. “I would not that you should be made partakers with devils” [1 Cor 10:20].

Some worshipped the heavenly bodies, believing the stars to be gods: “They have imagined the sun and the moon to be the gods that rule the world” [Wis 13:2]. For this reason Moses forbade the Jews to raise their eyes, or adore the sun and moon and stars: “Keep therefore your souls carefully... lest perhaps lifting up your eyes to heaven, you see the sun and the moon, and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error you adore and serve them, which the Lord your God created for the service of all the nations” [Deut 4:15,19]. The astrologers sin against this Commandment in that they say that these bodies are the rulers of souls, when in truth they were made for the use of man whose sole ruler is God.

Others worshipped the lower elements: “They imagined the fire or the wind to be gods” [Wis 13:2]. Into this error also fall those who wrongly use the things of this earth and love them too much: “Or covetous person (who is a server of idols)” [Eph 5:5]

Some men have erred in worshipping their ancestors. This arose from three causes.

(1) From Their Carnal Nature.—”For a father being afflicted with a bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son who was quickly taken away; and him who then had died as a man, he began now to worship as a god, and appointed him rites and sacrifices among his servants” [Wis 14:15]

(2) Because of Flattery.—Thus being unable to worship certain men in their presence, they, bowing down, honored them in their absence by making statues of them and worshipping one for the other: “Whom they had a mind to honor... they made an image... that they might honor as present him that was absent” [Wis 14:17]. Of such also are those men who love and honor other men more than God: “He who loves his father and mother more than Me, is not worthy of Me” [10]. “Put your trust not in princes; in the children of man, in whom there is no salvation” [Ps 145:3]

(3) From Presumption.—Some because of their presumption made themselves be called gods; such, for example, was Nabuchodonosor (Judith, iii. 13). “Your heart is lifted up and you have said: I am God” [Ez 28:2]. Such are also those who believe more in their own pleasures than in the precepts of God. They worship themselves as gods, for by seeking the pleasures of the flesh, they worship their own bodies instead of God: “Their god is their belly” [Phil 3:19]. We must, therefore, avoid all these things.

WHY ADORE ONE GOD?

“You shall not have strange gods before Me.” As we have already said, the First Commandment forbids us to worship other than the one God. We shall now consider five reasons for this.

God’s Dignity.—The first reason is the dignity of God which, were it belittled in any way, would be an injury to God. We see something similar to this in the customs of men. Reverence is due to every degree of dignity. Thus, a traitor to the king is he who robs him of what he ought to maintain. Such, too, is the conduct of some towards God: “They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man” [Rom 1:23]. This is highly displeasing to God: “I will not give My glory to another, nor My praise to graven things” [Is 42:8]. For it must be known that the dignity of God consists in His omniscience, since the name of God, Deus, is from “seeing,” and this is one of the signs of divinity: “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods” [Is 41:23]. “All things are naked and open to His eyes” [Hb 4:13]. But this dignity of God is denied Him by practitioners of divination, and of them it is said: “Should not the people seek of their God, for the living and the dead?” [Is 8:19].

God’s Bounty.—We receive every good from God; and this also is of the dignity of God, that He is the maker and giver of all good things: “When You openest your hand, they shall all be filled with good” [Ps 103:28]. And this is implied in the name of God, namely, Deus, which is said to be distributor, that is, “dator” of all things, because He fills all things with His goodness. You are, indeed, ungrateful if you do not appreciate what you have received from Him, and, furthermore, you make for yourself another god; just as the sons of Israel made an idol after they had been brought out of Egypt: “I will go after my lovers” [Hosea 2:5]. One does this also when one puts too much trust in someone other than God, and this occurs when one seeks help from another: “Blessed is the man whose hope is in the name of the Lord” [1 Kg 18:21]. Thus, the Apostle says: “Now that you have known God... how turn you again to the weak and needy elements?... You observe days and months and times and years” [Gal 4:9,10]

The Strength of Our Promise.—The third reason is taken from our solemn promise. For we have renounced the devil, and we have promised fidelity to God alone. This is a promise which we cannot break: “A man who has violated the law of Moses dies without mercy on the word of two or three witnesses. How much worse punishment do you think will be deserved by one who treads under foot the Son of God, and esteems the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified, and outrages the Spirit of grace!” [Hb 10:28-29]. “While her husband lives, she shall be called an adulteress, if she be with another man” [Rom 7:3]. Woe, then, to the sinner who enters the land by two ways, and who “halts between two sides” [1 Kg 18:21]

Against Service of the Devil.—The fourth reason is because of the great burden imposed by service to the devil: “You shall serve strange gods day and night, who will give you no rest” [Jer 16:13]. The devil is not satisfied with leading to one sin, but tries to lead on to others: “Whoever sins shall be a slave of sin” [Jn 8:34]. It is, therefore, not easy for one to escape from the habit of sin. Thus, St. Gregory says: “The sin which is not remitted by penance soon draws man into another sin” [Super Ezech. 11]. The very opposite of all this is true of service to God; for His Commandments are not a heavy burden: “My yoke is sweet and My burden light” [Mt 11:30]. A person is considered to have done enough if he does for God as much as what he has done for the sake of sin: “For as you yielded your members to serve uncleanness and to greater and greater iniquity, so now yield your members to serve justice for sanctification” [Rm 6:19]. But on the contrary, it is written of those who serve the devil: “We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity and destruction, and have walked through hard ways” [Wis 5:7]. And again: “They have labored to commit iniquity” [Jer 9:5]

Greatness of the Reward.—The fifth reason is taken from the greatness of the reward or prize. In no law are such rewards promised as in the law of Christ. Rivers flowing with milk and honey are promised to the Muslims, to the Jews the land of promise, but to Christians the glory of the Angels: “They shall be as the Angels of God in heaven” [Mt 22:30]. It was with this in mind that St. Peter asked: “Lord, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life” [Jn 6:69]

ARTICLE 4

THE SECOND COMMANDMENT

“YOU SHALL NOT TAKE THE NAME OF THE LORD YOUR GOD IN VAIN.”

This is the Second Commandment of the law. Just as there is but one God whom we must worship, so there is only one God whom we should reverence in a special manner. This, first of all, has reference to the name of God. “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.”

THE MEANING OF “IN VAIN”

“In vain” has a threefold meaning. Sometimes it is said of that which is false: “They have spoken vain things every one to his neighbor” [Ps 11:3]. One, therefore, takes the name of God in vain when one uses it to confirm that which is not true: “Love not a false oath” [Zech 8:17]. “You shall not live because you have spoken a lie in the name of the Lord” [Zech 13:3]. Any one so doing does injury to God, to himself, and to all men.

It is an insult to God because, when you swear by God, it is nothing other than to call Him to witness; and when you swear falsely, you either believe God to be ignorant of the truth and thus place ignorance in God, whereas “all things are naked and open to His eyes,”[Hb 4:13]. or you think that God loves a lie, whereas He hates it: “You will destroy all who speak lies” [Ps 5:7]. Or, again, you detract from His power, as if He were not able to punish a lie.

Likewise, such a one does an injury to himself, for he binds himself to the judgment of God. It is the same thing to say, “By God this is so,” as to say, “May God punish me if it is not so!”

He, finally, does an injury to other men. For there can be no lasting society unless men believe one another. Matters that are doubtful may be confirmed by oaths: “An oath in confirmation puts an end to all controversy” [Hb 6:16]. Therefore, he who violates this precept does injury to God, is cruel to himself, and harmful to other men.

Sometimes “vain” signifies useless: “The Lord knows the thoughts of men, that they are vain” [Ps 93:11]. God’s name, therefore, is taken in vain when it is used to confirm vain things.

In the Old Law it was forbidden to swear falsely: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain” [Dt 5:11]. And Christ forbade the taking of oaths except in case of necessity: “You have heard that it was said to them of old: You shall not swear falsely... But I say to you not to swear at all” [Mt 5:33-34]. And the reason for this is that in no part of our body are we so weak as in the tongue, for “the tongue no man can tame” [Jm 3:8]. And thus even in light matter one can perjure himself. “Let your speech be: Yea, yea; No, no. But I say to you not to swear at all” [Mt 5:34,37].

Note well that an oath is like medicine, which is never taken continually but only in times of necessity. Hence, the Lord adds: “And what is over and above these is evil” [Mt 5:37]. “Let not the mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls. And let not the name of God be usual in your mouth, and meddle not with the names of saints. For you shall not escape free from them” [Sir 23:9].

Sometimes “in vain” means sin or injustice: “O sons of men, how long will you be dull of heart? Why do you love vanity?” [Ps 4:3]. Therefore, he who swears to commit a sin, takes the name of his God in vain. Justice consists in doing good and avoiding evil. Therefore, if you take an oath to steal or commit some crime of this sort, you sin against justice. And although you must not keep this oath, you are still guilty of perjury. Herod did this against John [Mk 6:17]. It is likewise against justice when one swears not to do some good act, as not to enter a church or a religious community. And although this oath, too, is not binding, yet, despite this, the person himself is a perjuror.

CONDITIONS OF A LAWFUL OATH

One cannot, therefore, swear to a falsehood, or without good reason, or in any way against justice: “And you shall swear: As the Lord lives, in truth, and in judgment and in justice” [Jer 4:2].

Sometimes “vain” also means foolish: “All men are vain, in whom there is not the knowledge of God” [Wis 13:1]. Accordingly, he who takes the name of God foolishly, by blasphemy, takes the name of God in vain: “And he who blasphemes against the name of the Lord, let him surely die” [Lev 24:16].

TAKING GOD’S NAME JUSTLY

“You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.” However, the name of God may be taken for six purposes. First, to confirm something that is said, as in an oath. In this we show God alone is the first Truth, and also we show due reverence to God. For this reason it was commanded in the Old Law that one must not swear except by God [Dt 6:13]. They who swore otherwise violated this order: “By the name of strange gods you shall not swear” [Ex 23:13]. Although at times one swears by creatures, nevertheless, it must be known that such is the same as swearing by God. When you swear by your soul or your head, it is as if you bind yourself to be punished by God. Thus: “But I call God to witness upon my soul” [2 Cor 1:23]. And when you swear by the Gospel, you swear by God who gave the Gospel. But they sin who swear either by God or by the Gospel for any trivial reason.

The second purpose is that of sanctification. Thus, Baptism sanctifies, for as St. Paul says: “But you are washed, but you are sanctified, but you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the Spirit of God” [1 Cor 6:11]. Baptism, however, does not have power except through the invocation of the Trinity: “But You, O Lord, are among us, and your name is called upon by us” [Jer 14:9].

The third purpose is the expulsion of our adversary; hence, before Baptism we renounce the devil: “Only let your name be called upon us; take away our reproach” [Is 4:1]. Therefore, if one return to his sins, the name of God has been taken in vain.

Fourthly, God’s name is taken in order to confess it: “How then shall they call on Him, in whom they have not believed?” [Rm 10:14]. And again: “Whoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved” [Rm 10:13]. First of all, we confess by word of mouth that we may show forth the glory of God: “And every one who calls on My name, I have created him for My glory" [Is 43:7]. Accordingly, if one says anything against the glory of God, he takes the name of God in vain. Secondly, we confess God's name by our works, when our very actions show forth God's glory: "That they may see your good works, and may glorify your Father who is in heaven" [Mt 5:16]. "Through you the name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles" [Rm 2:24].

Fifthly it is taken for our defense: "The name of the Lord is a strong tower; the just run to it and shall be exalted" [Prov 18:10]. "In My name they shall cast out devils" [Mk 16:17]. "There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved" [Acts 4:12].

Lastly, it is taken in order to make our works complete. Thus says the Apostle: "All that you do in word or work, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ" [Col 3:17]. The reason is because "our help is in the name of the Lord" [Ps 123:8]. Sometimes it happens that one begins a work imprudently by starting with a vow, for instance, and then not completing either the work or the vow. And this again is taking God's name in vain. "If you have vowed anything to God, do not defer paying it" [Eccles 5:3]. "Vow and pay to the Lord your God; all you round about Him bring presents" [Ps 75:12]. "For an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases Him" [Eccles 5:3].

ARTICLE 5

THE THIRD COMMANDMENT

“REMEMBER TO KEEP HOLY THE SABBATH DAY.”

This is the Third Commandment of the law, and very suitably is it so. For we are first commanded to adore God in our hearts, and the Commandment is to worship one God: “You shall not have strange gods before Me.” In the Second Commandment we are told to reverence God by word: “You shall not take the name of the Lord your God in vain.” The Third commands us to reverence God by act. It is: “Remember that you keep holy the Sabbath day”. God wished that a certain day be set aside on which men direct their minds to the service of the Lord.

REASONS FOR THIS COMMANDMENT

There are five reasons for this Commandment. The first reason was to put aside error, for the Holy Spirit saw that in the future some men would say that the world had always existed. “In the last days there shall come deceitful scoffers, walking after their own lusts, saying: Where is His promise or His coming? For since the time that the fathers slept, all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation. For this they are willfully ignorant of, that the heavens were before, and the earth out of water, and through water, created by the word of God” [2 Pet 3:3-5]. God, therefore, wished that one day should be set aside in memory of the fact that He created all things in six days, and that on the seventh day He rested from the creation of new creatures. This is why the Lord placed this Commandment in the law, saying: “Remember that you keep holy the Sabbath day.” The Jews kept holy the Sabbath in memory of the first creation; but Christ at His coming brought about a new creation. For by the first creation an earthly man was created, and by the second a heavenly man was formed: “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision is worth any thing, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature” [Gal 6:15]. This new creation is through grace, which came by the Resurrection: “That as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of His death, so shall we also be in the likeness of His resurrection” [Rm 6:4-5]. And thus, because the Resurrection took place on Sunday, we celebrate that day, even as the Jews observed the Sabbath on account of the first creation.

The second reason for this Commandment is to instruct us in our faith in the Redeemer. For the flesh of Christ was not corrupted in the sepulchre, and thus it is said: “Moreover My flesh also shall rest in hope” [Ps 15:9]. “Nor will You let your holy one see corruption” [Ps 15:10]. Wherefore, God wished that the Sabbath should be observed, and that just as the sacrifices of the Old Law signified the death of Christ, so should the quiet of the Sabbath signify the rest of His body in the sepulchre. But we do not now observe these sacrifices, because with the advent of the reality and the truth, figures of it must cease, just as the darkness is dispelled with the rising of the sun. Nevertheless, we keep the Saturdays in veneration of the Blessed Virgin, in whom remained a firm faith on that Saturday while Christ was dead.

The third reason is that this Commandment was given to strengthen and foreshadow the fulfillment of the promise of rest. For rest indeed was promised to us: “And on that day God shall give you rest from your labor, from your vexation, and from the hard bondage, to which you had been subjugated” [Is 14:3]. “My people shall dwell in a peaceful land, in secure accommodation, and in quiet places of rest” [Is 32:18].

We hope for rest from three things: from the labors of the present life, from the struggles of temptations, and from the servitude of the devil. Christ promised this rest to all those who will come to Him: “Come to Me, all ye that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you. Take up My yoke upon you, and learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart; and you shall find rest to your souls. For My yoke is sweet and My burden light” [Mt 11:28-30]

However, the Lord, as we know, worked for six days and on the seventh He rested, because it is necessary to do a perfect work: “Behold with your eyes how I have labored a little, and have found much rest to Myself" [Sir 51:35]. For the period of eternity exceeds the present time incomparably more than a thousand years exceeds one day.

Fourthly, this Commandment was given for the increase of our love: "For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul" [Wis 9:15]. And man always tends downwards towards earthly things unless he takes means to raise himself above them. It is indeed necessary to have a certain time for this; in fact, some do this continually: "I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall ever be in my mouth" [Ps 33:2]. And again: "Pray without ceasing" [1 Thes 5:17]. These shall enjoy the everlasting Sabbath. There are others who do this (i.e., excite love for God) during a certain portion of the day: "Seven times a day I have given praise to You" [Ps 118:164]. And some, in order to avoid being entirely apart from God, find it necessary to have a fixed day, lest they become too lukewarm in their love of God: "If you call the Sabbath delightful... then shall you delight in the Lord" [Is 58:13-14]. Again: "Then shall you abound in delights of the Almighty, and shall lift up your face to God" [Job 22:26]. And accordingly this day is not set aside for the sole exercise of games, but to praise and pray to the Lord God. Wherefore, St. Augustine says that it is a lesser evil to plough than to play on this day.

Lastly, we are given this Commandment in order to exercise works of kindliness to those who are subject to us. For some are so cruel to themselves and to others that they labor ceaselessly all on account of money. This is true especially of the Jews, who are most avaricious. "Observe the day of the Sabbath to sanctify it... that your man-servant and your maid-servant may rest, even as thyself" [19]. This Commandment, therefore, was given for all these reasons.

FROM WHAT WE SHOULD ABSTAIN ON THE SABBATH

"Remember that you keep holy (sanctify) the Sabbath day." We have already said that, as the Jews celebrated the Sabbath, so do we Christians observe the Sunday and all principal feasts. Let us now see in what way we should keep these days. We ought to know that God did not say to "keep" the Sabbath, but to remember to keep it holy. The word "holy" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes "holy" (sanctified) is the same as pure: "But you are washed, but you are sanctified” [1 Cor 6:11]. (that is, made holy). Then again at times “holy” is said of a thing consecrated to the worship of God, as, for instance, a place, a season, vestments, and the holy vessels. Therefore, in these two ways we ought to celebrate the feasts, that is, both purely and by giving ourselves over to divine service.

We shall consider two things regarding this Commandment. First, what should be avoided on a feast day, and secondly, what we should do. We ought to avoid three things. The first is servile work.

Avoidance of Servile Work.—”Neither do any work; sanctify the Sabbath day” [Jer 17:22]. And so also it is said in the Law: “You shall do no servile work therein” [Lev 23:25]. Now, servile work is bodily work; whereas “free work” (i.e., non-servile work) is done by the mind, for instance, the exercise of the intellect and such like. And one cannot be servilely bound to do this kind of work.

When Servile Work Is Lawful.—We ought to know, however, that servile work can be done on the Sabbath for four reasons. The first reason is necessity. Wherefore, the Lord excused the disciples plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath, as we read in St. Matthew (xii. 3-5). The second reason is when the work is done for the service of the Church; as we see in the same Gospel how the priests did all things necessary in the Temple on the Sabbath day. The third reason is for the good of our neighbor; for on the Sabbath the Saviour cured one having a withered hand, and He refuted the Jews who reprimanded Him, by citing the example of the sheep in a pit (“ibid.”). And the fourth reason is the authority of our superiors. Thus, God commanded the Jews to circumcise on the Sabbath [Jn 7:22-23].

Avoidance of Sin and Negligence on the Sabbath.—Another thing to be avoided on the Sabbath is sin: “Take heed to your souls, and carry no burdens on the Sabbath day” [Jer 18:21]. This weight and burden on the soul is sin: “My iniquities as a heavy burden are become heavy upon me” [Ps 37:5]. Now, sin is a servile work because “whoever commits sin is the servant of sin” [Jn 8:34]. Therefore, when it is said, “You shall do no servile work therein,”[Lev 3:25]. it can be understood of sin. Thus, one violates this commandment as often as one commits sin on the Sabbath; and so both by working and by sin God is offended. “The Sabbaths and other festivals I will not abide.” And why? “Because your assemblies are wicked. My soul hates your new moon and your solemnities; they are become troublesome to me” [Is 1:13]

Another thing to avoid on the Sabbath is idleness: “For idleness has taught much evil” [Sir 33:29]. St. Jerome says: “Always do some good work, and the devil will always find you occupied” [Ep. ad Rusticum]. Hence, it is not good for one to keep only the principal feasts, if on the others one would remain idle. “The King’s honor loves judgment” [Ps 98:4 Vulgate], that is to say, discretion. Wherefore, we read that certain of the Jews were in hiding, and their enemies fell upon them; but they, believing that they were not able to defend themselves on the Sabbath, were overcome and killed [1 Mac 2:31-38]. The same thing happens to many who are idle on the feast days: “The enemies have seen her, and have mocked at her Sabbaths” [Lam 1:7]. But all such should do as those Jews did, of whom it is said: “Whoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath day, we will fight against him” [1 Mac 2:41]

DO WHAT ON THE SABBATH?

“Remember to keep holy the Sabbath day.” We have already said that man must keep the feast days holy; and that “holy” is considered in two ways, namely, “pure” and “consecrated to God.” Moreover, we have indicated what things we should abstain from on these days. Now it must be shown with what we should occupy ourselves, and they are three in number.

The Offering of Sacrifice.—The first is the offering of sacrifices. In the Book of Numbers (18) it is written how God ordered that on each day there be offered one lamb in the morning and another in the evening, but on the Sabbath day the number should be doubled. And this showed that on the Sabbath we should offer sacrifice to God from all that we possess: “All things are Yours; and we have given You what we received from your hand” [1 Chron 29:14]. We should offer, first of all, our soul to God, being sorry for our sins: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit” [Ps 50:19]; and also pray for His blessings: “Let my prayer be directed as incense in your sight” [Ps 140:2]. Feast days were instituted for that spiritual joy which is the effect of prayer. Therefore, on such days our prayers should be multiplied.

Secondly, we should offer our body, by mortifying it with fasting: “I beseech you therefore, brethren, by the mercy of God, that you present your bodies a living sacrifice”[Rm 12:1], and also by praising God: “The sacrifice of praise shall honor Me” [Ps 49:23]. And thus on these days our hymns should be more numerous. Thirdly, we should sacrifice our possessions by giving alms: “And do not forget to do good, and to impart; for by such sacrifice God’s favor is obtained” [Hb 13:16]. And this alms ought to be more than on other days because the Sabbath is a day of common joys: “Send portions to those who have not prepared for themselves, because it is the holy day of the Lord” [Neh 8:10].

Hearing of God’s Word.—Our second duty on the Sabbath is to be eager to hear the word of God. This the Jews did daily: “The voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath” [Acts 13:27]. Therefore Christians, whose justice should be more perfect, ought to come together on the Sabbath to hear sermons and participate in the services of the Church! “He who is of God, hears the words of God” [Jn 8:47]. We likewise ought to speak with profit to others: “Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth; but what is good for sanctification” [Eph 4:29]. These two practices are good for the soul of the sinner, because they change his heart for the better: “Are not My words as a fire, says the Lord, and as a hammer that breaks the rock in pieces?” [Jer 23:29]. The opposite effect is had on those, even the perfect, who neither speak nor hear profitable things: “Evil communications corrupt good manners. Awake, you just, and do no sin” [1 Cor 15:33]. “Your words have I hidden in my heart” [Ps 118:11]. God’s word enlightens the ignorant: “Your word is a lamp to my feet” [Ps 118:105]. It inflames the lukewarm: “The word of the Lord inflamed him” [Ps 114:19]

The contemplation of divine things may be exercised on the Sabbath. However, this is for the more perfect. “O taste, and see that the Lord is sweet” [Ps 33:9], and this is because of the quiet of the soul. For just as the tired body desires rest, so also does the soul. But the soul’s proper rest is in God: “Be for me a God, a protector, and a house of refuge” [Ps 30:3]. “There remains therefore a day of rest for the people of God. For he who has entered into his rest has also rested from his works, as God did from His” [Hb 4:9-10]. When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her” (i.e., Wisdom) [Wis 8:16].

However, before the soul arrives at this rest, three other rests must precede. The first is the rest from the turmoil of sin: “But the wicked are like the raging sea which cannot rest” [Is 57:20]. The second rest is from the passions of the flesh, because “the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh” [Gal 5:17]. The third is rest from the occupations of the world: “Martha, Martha, you art careful and art troubled about many things” [Lk 10:41].

And then after all these things the soul rests peacefully in God: “If you call the Sabbath delightful... then shall you delight in the Lord” [Is 58:13-14]. The Saints gave up everything to possess this rest, “for it is a pearl of great price which a man having found, hid it, and for joy went off and sold all that he had and bought that field” [Mt 13:44-46]. This rest in truth is eternal life and heavenly joy: “This is my rest for ever and ever; here will I dwell, for I have chosen it” [Ps 131:14]. And to this rest may the Lord bring us all!

ARTICLE 6

THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT

“Honor your father and your mother, that you may be long-lived upon the land which the Lord your God will give you”

Perfection for man consists in the love of God and of neighbor. Now, the three Commandments which were written on the first tablet pertain to the love of God; for the love of neighbor there were the seven Commandments on the second tablet. But we must “love, not in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth” [1 Jn 3]. For a man to love thus, he must do two things, namely, avoid evil and do good. Certain of the Commandments prescribe good acts, while others forbid evil deeds. And we must also know that to avoid evil is in our power; but we are incapable of doing good to everyone. Thus, St. Augustine says that we should love all, but we are not bound to do good to all. But among those to whom we are bound to do good are those in some way united to us. Thus, “if any man does not take care of his own, especially of those of his house, he has denied the faith” [1 Tim 5:8]. Now, amongst all our relatives there are none closer than our father and mother. “We ought to love God first,” says St. Ambrose, “then our father and mother.” Hence, God has given us the Commandment: “Honor your father and your mother.”

The Philosopher also gives another reason for this honor to parents, in that we cannot make an equal return to our parents for the great benefits they have granted to us; and, therefore, an offended parent has the right to send his son away, but the son has no such right [Ethics V]. Parents, indeed, give their children three things. The first is that they brought them into being: “Honor your father, and forget not the groanings of your mother; remember that through them you were born” [Sir 7:29-30]. Secondly, they furnished nourishment and the support necessary for life. For a child comes naked into the world, as Job relates (1:24), but he is provided for by his parents. The third is instruction: “We have had fathers of our flesh for instructors” [Hb 12:9]. “Do you have children? Instruct them” [Sir 7:25].

Parents, therefore, should give instruction without delay to their children, because “a young man according to his way, even when he is old will not depart from it” [Prov 22:6]. And again: “It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth” [Lam 3:27]. Now, the instruction which Tobias gave his son (Tob 4) was this: to fear the Lord and to abstain from sin. This is indeed contrary to those parents who approve of the misdeeds of their children. Children, therefore, receive from their parents birth, nourishment, and instruction.

WHAT CHILDREN OWE PARENTS

Now, because we owe our birth to our parents, we ought to honor them more than any other superiors, because from such we receive only temporal things: “He who fears the Lord honors his parents, and will serve them as his masters that brought him into the world. Honor your father in work and word and all patience, that a blessing may come upon you from him” [Sir 3:10]. And in doing this you shall also honor thyself, because “the glory of a man is from honor of his father, and a father without honor is the disgrace of his son” [Sir 3:13].

Again, since we receive nourishment from our parents in our childhood, we must support them in their old age: “Son, support the old age of your father, and grieve him not in his life. And if his understanding fail, have patience with him; and do not despise him when you are in your strength... Of what an evil fame is he who forsakes his father! And he is cursed of God who angers his mother” [Sir 3:14,15]. For the humiliation of those who act contrary to this, Cassiodorus relates how young storks, when the parents have lost their feathers by approaching old age and are unable to find suitable food, make the parent storks comfortable with their own feathers, and bring back food for their worn-out bodies. Thus, by this affectionate exchange the young ones repay the parents for what they received when they were young” [Epist. II].

We must obey our parents, for they have instructed us. “Children, obey your parents in all things” [Col 3:20]. This excepts, of course, those things which are contrary to God. St. Jerome says that the only loyalty in such cases is to be cruel [Ad Heliod]: “If any man hate not his father and mother... he cannot be My disciple” [Lk 14:26]. This is to say that God is in the truest sense our Father: “Is not He your Father who possessed you, made you and created you?” [Deut 32:6].

REWARDS FOR KEEPING THIS COMMANDMENT

“Honor your father and your mother.” Among all the Commandments, this one only has the additional words: “that you may be long-lived upon the land.” The reason for this is lest it be thought that there is no reward for those who honor their parents, seeing that it is a natural obligation. Hence it must be known that five most desirable rewards are promised those who honor their parents.

Grace and Glory.—The first reward is grace for the present life, and glory in the life to come, which surely are greatly to be desired: “Honor your father... that a blessing may come upon you from God, and His blessing may remain in the latter end” [Sir 3:9-10]. The very opposite comes upon those who dishonor their parents; indeed, they are cursed in the law by God [Deut 27:16]. It is also written: “He who is unjust in that which is little, is unjust also in what is greater” [Lk 16:10]. But this our natural life is as nothing compared with the life of grace. And so, therefore, if you do not acknowledge the blessing of the natural life which you owe to your parents, then you are unworthy of the life of grace, which is greater, and all the more so for the life of glory, which is the greatest of all blessings.

A Long Life.—The second reward is a long life: “That you may be long-lived upon the land.” For “he who honors his father shall enjoy a long life” [Sir 3:7]. Now, that is a long life which is a full life, and it is not observed in time but in activity, as the Philosopher observes. Life, however, is full inasmuch as it is a life of virtue; so a man who is virtuous and holy enjoys a long life even if in body he dies young: “Being perfect in a short space, he fulfilled a long time; for his soul pleased God” [Wis 4:13]. Thus, for example, he is a good merchant who does as much business in one day as another would do in a year. And note well that it sometimes happens that a long life may lead up to a spiritual as well as a bodily death, as was the case with Judas. Therefore, the reward for keeping this Commandment is a long life for the body. But the very opposite, namely, death is the fate of those who dishonor their parents. We receive our life from them; and just as the soldiers owe fealty to the king, and lose their rights in case of any treachery, so also they who dishonor their parents deserve to forfeit their lives: "The eye that mocks his father and despises the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens pick it out, and the young eagles eat it" [Prov 30:17]. Here "the ravens" signify officials of kings and princes, who in turn are the "young eagles." But if it happens that such are not bodily punished, they nevertheless cannot escape death of the soul. It is not well, therefore, for a father to give too much power to his children: "Do not give to a son or wife, brother or friend, power over you while you live; and do not give your estate to another, lest you repent" [Sir 33:20].

The third reward is to have in turn grateful and pleasing children. For a father naturally treasures his children, but the contrary is not always the case: "He who honors his father shall have joy in his own children" [Sir 3:6]. Again: "With what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you again" [Mt 7:2]. The fourth reward is a praiseworthy reputation: "For the glory of a man is from the honor of his father" [Sir 3:13]. And again: "Of what an evil fame is he who forsakes his father?" [Sir 3:18]. A fifth reward is riches: "The father's blessing establishes the houses of his children, but the mother's curse roots up the foundation" [Sir 3:11].

MEANINGS OF "FATHER"

"Honor your father and your mother." A man is called father not only by reason of generation, but also for other reasons, and to each of these there is due a certain reverence. Thus, the Apostles and the Saints are called fathers because of their doctrine and their exemplification of faith: "For if you have ten thousands instructors in Christ, yet not many fathers. For in Christ Jesus, by the gospel, I have begotten you" [1 Cor 4:15]. And again: "Let us now praise men of renown and our fathers in their generation" [Sir 44:1]. However, let us praise them not in word only, but by imitating them; and we do this if nothing is found in us contrary to what we praise in them.

Our superiors in the Church are also called fathers; and they too are to be respected as the ministers of God: "Remember your prelates,... follow their faith, considering the end of their conversation" [Hb 13:7]. And again: "He who hears you, hears Me; and he who despises you, despises Me" [Lk 10:16]. We honor them by showing them obedience: "Obey your prelates, and be subject to them" [Hb 13:17]. And also by paying them tithes: "Honor the Lord with your substance, and give Him of the first of your fruits" [Prov 3:9].

Rulers and kings are called fathers: "Father, if the prophet had commanded you do some great thing, surely you would have done it" [2 Kg 5:13]. We call them fathers because their whole care is the good of their people. And we honor them by being subject to them: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers" [Rm 13:1]. We should be subject to them not merely through fear, but through love; and not merely because it is reasonable, but because of the dictates of our conscience. Because "there is no power but from God" [Rom 13:7]. And so to all such we must render what we owe them: "Tribute, to whom tribute is due; custom, to whom custom; fear, to whom fear; honor, to whom honor" [Rom 13:41]. And again: "My son, fear the Lord and the king" [Prov 24:21].

Our benefactors also are called fathers: "Be merciful to the fatherless as a father" [Sir 4:10]. He, too, is like a father [who gives his bond]. of whom it is said: "A good man will be surety for his neighbor, but a man who has lost his sense of shame will fail him" [Sir 29:14]. On the other hand, the thankless shall receive a punishment such as is written: "The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter's ice" [Wis 16:29]. Old men also are called fathers: "Ask your father, and he will declare to you; your elders and they will tell you" [Deut 32:7]. And again: "Rise up before the grey head, and honor the person of the aged man" [Lev 19:32]. "In the company of great men take not upon you to speak; and when the ancients are present, do not speak much" [Sir 32:13]. "Hear in silence, and for your reverence good grace shall come to you" [Sir 32:9]. Now, all these fathers must be honored, because they all resemble to some degree our Father who is in heaven; and of all of them it is said: "He who despises you, despises Me" [Lk 10:16].

ARTICLE 7

THE FIFTH COMMANDMENT

"YOU SHALL NOT KILL."

THE SIN OF KILLING

In the divine law which tells us we must love God and our neighbor, it is commanded that we not only do good but also avoid evil. The greatest evil that can be done to one's neighbor is to take his life. This is prohibited in the Commandment: "You shall not kill."

Killing of Animals Is Lawful.—In connection with this Commandment there are three errors. Some have said that it is not permitted to kill even brute animals. But this is false, because it is not a sin to use that which is subordinate to the power of man. It is in the natural order that plants be the nourishment of animals, certain animals nourish others, and all for the nourishment of man: "Even the green herbs have I delivered them all to you" [Gen 9:3]. The Philosopher says that hunting is like a just war [Politics I]. And St. Paul says: "Whatsoever is sold in the meat market, eat; asking no questions for conscience' sake" [1 Cor 10:25]. Therefore, the sense of the Commandment is: "You shall not kill men."

The Execution of Criminals.—Some have held that the killing of man is prohibited altogether. They believe that judges in the civil courts are murderers, who condemn men to death according to the laws. Against this St. Augustine says that God by this Commandment does not take away from Himself the right to kill. Thus, we read: "I will kill and I will make to live" [Deut 32:39]. It is, therefore, lawful for a judge to kill according to a mandate from God, since in this God operates, and every law is a command of God: "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things" [Prov 8:15].

And again: “For if you do what is evil, fear; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for he is God’s minister” [Rm 13:14]. To Moses also it was said: “Wizards you shall not allow to live” [Ex 22:18]. And thus that which is lawful to God is lawful for His ministers when they act by His mandate. It is evident that God who is the Author of laws, has every right to inflict death on account of sin. For “the wages of sin is death” [Rm 6:23]. Neither does His minister sin in inflicting that punishment. The sense, therefore, of “You shall not kill” is that one shall not kill by one’s own authority.

Suicide is Prohibited.—There are those who held that although this Commandment forbids one to kill another, yet it is lawful to kill oneself. Thus, there are the examples of Samson (Judges, xvi) and Cato and certain virgins who threw themselves into the flames, as St. Augustine relates in The City of God [I, 27]. But he also explains this in the words: “He who kills himself, certainly kills a man” [ibid. 13]. If it is not lawful to kill except by the authority of God, then it is not lawful to kill oneself except either upon the authority of God or instructed by the Holy Spirit, as was the case of Samson. Therefore, “you shall not kill.”

Other Meanings of “To Kill.”—It ought to be known that to kill a man may happen in several ways. Firstly, by one’s own hand: “Your hands are full of blood” [Is 1:15]. This is not only against charity, which tells us to love our neighbor as ourself: “No murderer has eternal life abiding in himself” [Jn 3:15]. But also it is against nature, for “every beast loves its like” [Sir 13:19]. And so it is said: “He who strikes a man with a will to kill him, shall be put to death” [Ex 21:12]. He who does this is more cruel than the wolf, of which Aristotle says that one wolf will not eat of the flesh of another wolf [De animal. IV].

Secondly, one kills another by word of mouth. This is done by giving counsel to anyone against another by provocation, accusation, or detraction: “The sons of men whose teeth are weapons and arrows, and their tongue a sharp sword” [Ps 56:5]. Thirdly, by lending aid, as it is written: “My son, do not go with them... for their feet run to evil, and they rush to shed blood” [Prov 1:15-16]. Fourthly, by consent: “They are worthy of death, not only they who do such things, but they also who consent to those who do them” [Rm 1:32]. Lastly, one kills another by giving a partial consent when the act could be completely prevented: “Deliver those who are led to death” [Prov 24:11]; or, if one can prevent it, yet does not do so through negligence or avarice. Thus, St. Ambrose says: “Give food to him that is dying of hunger; if you do not, you are his murderer.”

We have already considered the killing of the body, but some kill the soul also by drawing it away from the life of grace, namely, by inducing it to commit mortal sin: “He was a murderer from the beginning” [Jn 8:44], that is, in so far as he drew men into sin. Others, however, slay both body and soul. This is possible in two ways: first, by the murder of one with child, whereby the child is killed both in body and soul; and, secondly, by commiting suicide.

THE SIN OF ANGER

Why We Are Forbidden to Be Angry.—In the Gospel of St. Matthew (ch. 5) Christ taught that our justice should be greater than the justice of the Old Law. This means that Christians should observe the Commandments of the law more perfectly than the Jews observed them. The reason is that greater effort deserves a better reward: “He who sows sparingly, shall also reap sparingly” [2 Cor 9:6]. The Old Law promised a temporary and earthly reward: “If you are willing and will listen to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land” [Is 1:19]. But in the New Law heavenly and eternal things are promised. Therefore, justice, which is the observance of the Commandments, should be more generous because a greater reward is expected.

The Lord mentioned this Commandment in particular among the others when He said: “You have heard that it was said to them of old: You shall not kill.... But I say to you that anyone who is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment” [Mt 5:21-22]. By this is meant the penalty which the law prescribes: “If any man kills his neighbor on set purpose, and by lying in wait for him; you shall take him away from My altar, that he may die” [Ex 21:14].

Ways of Avoiding Anger—Now, there are five ways to avoid being angry. The first is that one be not quickly provoked to anger: “Let every man be swift to hear, but slow to speak and slow to anger” [James 1:19]. The reason is that anger is a sin, and is punished by God. But is all anger contrary to virtue? There are two opinions about this. The Stoics said that the wise man is free from all passions; even more, they maintained that true virtue consisted in perfect quiet of soul. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, held that the wise man is subject to anger, but in a moderate degree. This is the more accurate opinion. It is proved firstly by authority, in that the Gospel shows us that these passions were attributed to Christ, in whom was the full fountainhead of wisdom. Then, secondly, it is proved from reason. If all the passions were opposed to virtue, then there would be some powers of the soul which would be without good purpose; indeed, they would be positively harmful to man, since they would have no acts in keeping with them. Thus, the irascible and concupiscible powers would be given to man to no purpose. It must, therefore, be concluded that sometimes anger is virtuous, and sometimes it is not.

Three Considerations of Anger—We see this if we consider anger in three different ways. First, as it exists solely in the judgment of reason, without any perturbation of soul; and this is more properly not anger but judgment. Thus, the Lord punishing the wicked is said to be angry: “I will bear the wrath of the Lord because I have sinned against Him” [Micah 7:9]

Secondly, anger is considered as a passion. This is in the sensitive appetite, and is twofold. Sometimes it is ordered by reason or it is restrained within proper limits by reason, as when one is angry because it is justly fitting to be angry and within proper limits. This is an act of virtue and is called righteous anger. Thus, the Philosopher says that meekness is in no way opposed to anger. This kind of anger then is not a sin.

There is a third kind of anger which overthrows the judgment of reason and is always sinful, sometimes mortally and sometimes venially. And whether it is one or the other will depend on that object to which the anger incites, which is sometimes mortal, sometimes venial. This may be mortal in two ways: either in its genus or by reason of the circumstances. For example, murder would seem to be a mortal sin in its genus, because it is directly opposite to a divine Commandment. Thus, consent to murder is a mortal sin in its genus, because if the act is a mortal sin, then the consent to the act will be also a mortal sin. Sometimes, however, the act itself is mortal in its genus, but, nevertheless, the impulse is not mortal, because it is without consent. This is the same as if one is moved by the impulse of concupiscence to fornication, and yet does not consent; one does not commit a sin. The same holds true of anger. For anger is really the impulse to avenge an injury which one has suffered. Now, if this impulse of the passion is so great that reason is weakened, then it is a mortal sin; if, however, reason is not so perverted by the passion as to give its full consent, then it will be a venial sin. On the other hand, if up to the moment of consent, the reason is not perverted by the passion, and consent is given without this perversion of reason, then there is no mortal sin. “Whoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment,” must be understood of that impulse of passion tending to do injury to the extent that reason is perverted—and this impulse, inasmuch as it is consented to, is a mortal sin.

Why We Should Not Get Angry Easily—The second reason why we should not be easily provoked to anger is because every man loves liberty and hates restraint. But he who is filled with anger is not master of himself: “Who can bear the violence of one provoked?” [Prov 27:4]. And again: “A stone is heavy, and sand weighty, but the anger of a fool is heavier than both” [Prov 27:3]

One should also take care that one does not remain angry over long: “Be ye angry, and sin not” [Ps 4:5]. And: “Let not the sun go down upon your anger” [Eph 4:26]. The reason for this is given in the Gospel by Our Lord: “Be at agreement with your adversary betimes whilst you art in the way with him; lest perhaps the adversary deliver you to the judge, and the judge deliver you to the officer, and you be cast into prison. Amen, I say to you, you shall not go out from hence till you repay the last penny” [Mt 5:25-26].

We should beware lest our anger grow in intensity, having its beginning in the heart, and finally leading on to hatred. For there is this difference between anger and hatred, that anger is sudden, but hatred is long-lived and, thus, is a mortal sin: “Whoever hates his brother is a murderer” [1 Jn 3:15]. And the reason is because he kills both himself (by destroying charity) and another. Thus, St. Augustine in his “Rule” says: “Let there be no quarrels among you; or if they do arise, then let them end quickly, lest anger should grow into hatred, the mote becomes a beam, and the soul becomes a murderer.” Again: “A passionate man stirs up strife” [Prov 15:18]. “Cursed be their fury, because it was stubborn, and their wrath, because it was cruel” [Gen 49:7].

We must take care lest our wrath explode in angry words: “A fool immediately shows his anger” [Prov 12:16]. Now, angry words are twofold in effect; either they injure another, or they express one’s own pride in oneself. Our Lord has reference to the first when He said: “And whoever says to his brother: ‘You fool,’ shall be in danger of hell fire” [Mt 5:22]. And He has reference to the latter in the words: “And he who shall say: ‘Raca,’ shall be in danger of the council” [ibid.]. Moreover: “A mild answer breaks wrath, but a harsh word stirs up fury” [Prov 15:1].

Finally, we must beware lest anger provoke us to deeds. In all our dealings we should observe two things, namely, justice and mercy; but anger hinders us in both: “For the anger of a man does not work the justice of God” [James 1:20]. For such a one may indeed be willing but his anger prevents him. A certain philosopher once said to a man who had offended him: “I would punish you, were I not angry.” “Anger has no mercy, nor fury when it breaks forth” [Prov 27:4]. And: “In their fury they slew a man” [Gen 49:6].

It is for all this that Christ taught us not only to beware of murder but also of anger. The good physician removes the external symptoms of a malady; and, furthermore, he even removes the very root of the illness, so that there will be no relapse. So also the Lord wishes us to avoid the beginnings of sins; and anger is thus to be avoided because it is the beginning of murder.

ARTICLE 8

THE SIXTH COMMANDMENT

“YOU SHALL NOT COMMIT ADULTERY.”

After the prohibition of murder, adultery is forbidden. This is fitting, since husband and wife are as one body. “They shall be,” says the Lord, “two in one flesh” [Gen 2:24]. Therefore, after an injury inflicted upon a man in his own person, none is so grave as that which is inflicted upon a person with whom one is joined.

Adultery is forbidden both to the wife and the husband. We shall first consider the adultery of the wife, since in this seems to lie the greater sin, for a wife who commits adultery is guilty of three grave sins, which are implied in the following words: “So every woman who leaves her husband,... first, is unfaithful to the law of the Most High; and secondly, she has offended against her husband; thirdly, she has fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten her children of another man” [Sir 23:32-33].

First, therefore, she has sinned by lack of faith, since she is unfaithful to the law wherein God has forbidden adultery. Moreover, she has spurned the ordinance of God: “What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder” [Mt 19:6]. And also she has sinned against the institution or Sacrament. Because marriage is contracted before the eyes of the Church, and thereupon God is called, as it were, to witness a bond of fidelity which must be kept: “The Lord hath been witness between you and the wife of your youth whom you have despised” [Mal 2:14]. Therefore, she has sinned against the law of God, against a precept of the Church and against a Sacrament of God.

Secondly, she sins by infidelity because she has betrayed her husband: “The wife does not have power over her own body: but the husband” [1 Cor

7:4]. In fact, without the consent of the husband she cannot observe chastity. If adultery is committed, then, an act of treachery is perpetrated in that the wife gives herself to another, just as if a servant gave himself to another master: “She forsakes the guide of her youth, and has forgotten the covenant of her God” [Prov 2:17-18].

Thirdly, the adulteress commits the sin of theft in that she brings forth children from a man not her husband; and this is a most grave theft in that she expends her heredity upon children not her husband’s. Let it be noted that such a one should encourage her children to enter religion, or upon such a walk of life that they do not succeed in the property of her husband. Therefore, an adulteress is guilty of sacrilege, treachery and theft.

Husbands, however, do not sin any less than wives, although they sometimes may salve themselves to the contrary. This is clear for three reasons. First, because of the equality which holds between husband and wife, for “the husband also does not have power over his own body, but the wife” [1 Cor 7:4]. Therefore, as far as the rights of matrimony are concerned, one cannot act without the consent of the other. As an indication of this, God did not form woman from the foot or from the head, but from the rib of the man. Now, marriage was at no time a perfect state until the law of Christ came, because the Jew could have many wives, but a wife could not have many husbands; hence, equality did not exist.

The second reason is because strength is a special quality of the man, while the passion proper to the woman is concupiscence: “You husbands, likewise dwelling with them according to knowledge, giving honor to the female as to the weaker vessel” [1 Pt 3:7]. Therefore, if you ask from your wife what you do not keep yourself, then you are unfaithful. The third reason is from the authority of the husband. For the husband is head of the wife, and as it is said: “Women may not speak in the church,... if they would learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home” [10]. The husband is the teacher of his wife, and God, therefore, gave the Commandment to the husband. Now, as regards fulfillment of their duties, a priest who fails is more guilty than a layman, and a bishop more than a priest, because it is especially incumbent upon them to teach others. In like manner, the husband that commits adultery breaks faith by not obeying that which he ought.

Thus, God forbids adultery both to men and women. Now, it must be known that, although some believe that adultery is a sin, yet they do not believe that simple fornication is a mortal sin. Against them stand the words of St. Paul: “For fornicators and adulterers God will judge” [Hb 13:4]. And: “Do not err: neither fornicators... nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with men shall possess the kingdom of God” [1 Cor 6:9]. But one is not excluded from the kingdom of God except by mortal sin; therefore, fornication is a mortal sin.

But one might say that there is no reason why fornication should be a mortal sin, since the body of the wife is not given, as in adultery. I say, however, if the body of the wife is not given, nevertheless, there is given the body of Christ which was given to the husband when he was sanctified in Baptism. If, then, one must not betray his wife, with much more reason must he not be unfaithful to Christ: “Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them the members of a harlot? God forbid!”[13]. It is heretical to say that fornication is not a mortal sin.

Moreover, it must be known that the Commandment, “You shall not commit adultery,” not only forbids adultery but also every form of immodesty and impurity. There are some who say that intercourse between married persons is not devoid of sin. But this is heretical, for the Apostle says: “Let marriage be honorable in all and the bed undefiled” [Hb 13:4]. Not only is it devoid of sin, but for those in the state of grace it is meritorious for eternal life. Sometimes, however, it may be a venial sin, sometimes a mortal sin. When it is had with the intention of bringing forth offspring, it is an act of virtue. When it is had with the intent of rendering mutual comfort, it is an act of justice. When it is a cause of exciting lust, although within the limits of marriage, it is a venial sin; and when it goes beyond these limits, so as to intend intercourse with another if possible, it would be a mortal sin.

Adultery and fornication are forbidden for a number of reasons. First of all, because they destroy the soul: “He who is an adulterer has no sense, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul” [Prov 6:32]. It says: “for the folly of his heart,” which is whenever the flesh dominates the spirit.

Secondly, they deprive one of life; for one guilty of such should die according to the Law, as we read in Leviticus (20:10) and Deuteronomy (22:22). Sometimes the guilty one is not punished now bodily, which is to his disadvantage since punishment of the body may be borne with patience and is conducive to the remission of sins; but nevertheless he shall be punished in the future life. Thirdly, these sins consume his substance, just as happened to the prodigal son in that "he wasted his substance living riotiously" [Lk 15:13]. "Do not give your soul to harlots, lest you destroy your inheritance" [Sir 9:6]. Fourthly, they defile the offspring: "The children of adulterers shall not come to perfection, and the seed of the unlawful bed shall be rooted out. And if they live long they shall be nothing regarded, and their last old age shall be without honor" [Wis 3:16-17]. And again: "Otherwise your children should be unclean; but now they are holy" [1 Cor 7:14]. Thus, they are never honored in the Church, but if they are clerics their dishonor may go without shame. Fifthly, these sins take away one's honor, and this especially is applicable to women: "Every woman who is a harlot shall be trodden upon as dung in the way" [Sir 9:10]. And of the husband it is said: "He gathers to himself shame and dishonor, and his reproach shall not be blotted out" [Prov 6:33].

St. Gregory says that sins of the flesh are more shameful and less blameful than those of the spirit, and the reason is because they are common to the beasts: "Man when he was in honor did not understand; and became like senseless beasts that perish" [Ps 48:21].

ARTICLE 9

THE SEVENTH COMMANDMENT

“YOU SHALL NOT STEAL.”

The Lord specifically forbids injury to our neighbor in the Commandments. Thus, “You shall not kill” forbids us to injure our neighbor in his own person; “You shall not commit adultery” forbids injury to the person to whom one is bound in marriage; and now the Commandment, “You shall not steal,” forbids us to injure our neighbor in his goods. This Commandment forbids any worldly goods whatsoever to be taken away wrongfully.

Theft is committed in a number of ways. First, by taking stealthily: “If the goodman of the house knew at what hour the thief would come” [Mt 24:43]. This is an act wholly blameworthy because it is a form of treachery. “Confusion... is upon the thief” [Sir 5:17].

Secondly, by taking with violence, and this is an even greater injury: “They have violently robbed the fatherless” [Job 24:9]. Among such that do such things are wicked kings and rulers: “Her princes are in the midst of her as roaring lions; her judges are evening wolves, they left nothing for the morning” [Zeph 3:3]. They act contrary to God’s will who wishes a rule according to justice: “By Me kings reign and lawgivers decree just things” [Prov 8:15]. Sometimes they do such things stealthily and sometimes with violence: “Your princes are faithless companions of thieves, they all love bribes, they run after rewards” [Is 1:23]. At times they steal by enacting laws and enforcing them for profit only: “Woe to those who make wicked laws” [Is 10:1]. And St. Augustine says that every wrongful usurpation is theft when he asks: “What are thrones but forms of thievery?”[City of God IV, 4].

Thirdly, theft is committed by not paying wages that are due: “The wages of him whom you have hired shall not abide by you until the morning” [Lev 19:13]. This means that a man must pay every one his due, whether he be prince, prelate, or cleric, etc.: “Render therefore to all men their dues. Tribute, to whom tribute is due, custom, to whom custom” [Rm 13:7]. Hence, we are bound to give a return to rulers who guard our safety.

The fourth kind of theft is fraud in buying and selling: “You shall not have divers weights in your bag, a greater and a less” [Deut 25:13]. And again: “Do no unjust thing in judgment, in rule, in weight, or in measure” [Lev 19:35-36]. All this is directed against the keepers of wine-shops who mix water with the wine. Usury is also forbidden: “Who shall dwell in your tabernacle, or who shall rest in your holy hill?... He who has not put his money out to usury” [Ps 14:1,5]. This is also against money-changers who commit many frauds, and against the sellers of cloth and other goods.

Fifthly, theft is committed by those who buy promotions to positions of temporal or spiritual honor. “The riches which he swallowed, he shall vomit up, and God shall draw them out of his belly” [Job 20:15], has reference to temporal position. Thus, all tyrants who hold a kingdom or province or land by force are thieves, and are held to restitution. Concerning spiritual dignities: “Amen, amen, I say to you, he who does not enter by the door into the sheepfold but climbs up another way is a thief and a robber” [Jn 10:1]. Therefore, they who commit simony are thieves.

WHY STEALING MUST BE AVOIDED

“You shall not steal.” This Commandment, as has been said, forbids taking things wrongfully, and we can bring forth many reasons why it is given. The first is because of the gravity of this sin, which is likened to murder: “The bread of the needy is the life of the poor; he who defrauds them of it is a man of blood” [Sir 24:25]. And again: “He who sheds blood and he who defrauds the laborer of his hire are brothers” [Sir 24:27].

The second reason is the peculiar danger involved in theft, for no sin is so dangerous. After committing other sins a person may quickly repent, for instance, of murder when his anger cools, or of fornication when his passion subsides, and so on for others; but even if one repents of this sin, one does not easily make the necessary satisfaction for it. This is owing to the obligation of restitution and the duty to make up for what loss is incurred by the rightful owner. And all this is above and beyond the obligation to repent for the sin itself: “Woe to him who heaps together what is not his own; for how long will he load himself with thick clay?” [Hab 2:6 Vulgate; “clay” should be “debts”]. For thick clay is that from which one cannot easily extricate himself.

The third reason is the uselessness of stolen goods in that they are of no spiritual value: “Treasures of wickedness shall profit nothing” [Prov 10:2]. Wealth can indeed be useful for almsgiving and offering of sacrifices, for “the ransom of a man’s life are his riches” [Prov 13:8]. But it is said of stolen goods: “I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust” [Is 41:8]. And again: “He who offers sacrifice of the goods of the poor is as one who sacrifices the son in the presence of his father” [Sir 34:24].

The fourth reason is that the results of theft are peculiarly harmful to the thief in that they lead to his loss of other goods. It is not unlike the mixture of fire and straw: “Fire shall devour their tabernacles, who love to take bribes” [Job 15:34]. And it ought to be known that a thief may lose not only his own soul, but also the souls of his children, since they are bound to make restitution.

ARTICLE 10

THE EIGHTH COMMANDMENT

“YOU SHALL NOT BEAR FALSE WITNESS AGAINST YOUR NEIGHBOR.”

The Lord has forbidden anyone to injure his neighbor by deed; now he forbids us to injure him by word. “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.” This may occur in two ways, either in a court of justice or in ordinary conversation.

In the court of justice it may happen in three ways, according to the three persons who may violate this Commandment in court. The first person is the plaintiff who makes a false accusation: “You shall not be a detractor nor a whisperer among the people” [Lev 19:16]. And note well that it is not only wrong to speak falsely, but also to conceal the truth: “If your brother offends you, go and rebuke him” [Mt 18:15]. The second person is the witness who testifies by lying: “A false witness shall not be unpunished” [Prov 25:18]. For this Commandment includes all the preceding ones, inasmuch as the false witness may himself be the murderer or the thief, etc. And such should be punished according to the law. “When after most diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother, they shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother.... You shall not pity him, but shall require life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot” [Deut 19:18-21]. And again: “A man who bears false witness against his neighbor is like a dart and a sword and a sharp arrow” [Prov 25:18]. The third person is the judge who sins by giving an unjust sentence: “You shall not... judge unjustly. Respect not the person of the poor, nor honor the countenance of the mighty. But judge your neighbor according to justice” [Lev 19:15].

WAYS OF VIOLATING THIS COMMANDMENT

In ordinary conversation one may violate this Commandment in five ways. The first is by detraction: “Detractors, hateful to God” [Rm 1:30]. “Hateful to God” here indicates that nothing is so dear to a man as his good name: “A good name is better than great riches” [Prov 22:1]. But detractors take away this good name: “If a serpent bite in silence, he is no better that backbites secretly” [Eccles 10:11]. Therefore, if detractors do not restore this reputation, they cannot be saved.

Secondly, one may break this precept by listening to detractors willingly: “Hedge in your ears with thorns, do not listen to a wicked tongue, and make doors and bars for your mouth” [Sir 28:28]. One should not listen deliberately to such things, but ought to turn away, showing a sad and stern countenance: “The north wind drives away rain as does a sad countenance a backbiting tongue” [Prov 25:23].

Thirdly, gossipers break this precept when they repeat whatever they hear: “Six things there are which the Lord hates, and the seventh His soul detests... one who sows discord among brethren” [Prov 6:16,19]. Fourthly, those who speak honied words, the flatterers: “The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed” [Ps 9:24]. And again: “O My people, they who call you blessed deceive you” [Is 3:12].

SPECIAL EFFECTS OF TELLING LIES

The prohibition of this Commandment includes every form of falsehood: “Refuse to utter any lie; for the habit of lying serves no good” [Sir 7:14]. There are four reasons for this. The first is that lying likens one to the devil, because a liar is as the son of the devil. Now, we know that a man’s speech betrays from what region and country he comes from, thus: “Even your accent betrays you” [Mt 26:73]. Even so, some men are of the devil’s kind, and are called sons of the devil because they are liars, since the devil is “a liar and the father of lies” [Jn 8:44]. Thus, when the devil said, “No, certainly you shall not die,” [Gen 3:4], he lied. But, on the contrary, others are the children of God, who is Truth, and they are those who speak the truth.

The second reason is that lying induces the ruin of society. Men live together in society, and this is soon rendered impossible if they do not speak the truth to one another. “Therefore put away lying, speak the truth, every man with his neighbor; for we are members one of another” [Eph 4:25].

The third reason is that the liar loses his reputation for the truth. He who is accustomed to telling lies is not believed even when he speaks the truth: “What can be made clean by the unclean? And what truth can come from what is false?” [Sir 24:4].

The fourth reason is because a liar kills his soul, for “the mouth that lies kills the soul” [Wis 1:11]. And again: “You will destroy all who speak lies” [Ps 5:7]. Accordingly, it is clear that lying is a mortal sin; although it must be known that some lies may be venial.

It is a mortal sin, for instance, to lie in matters of faith. This concerns professors, prelates and preachers, and is the gravest of all other kinds of lies: “There shall be among you lying teachers, who shall bring in sects of perdition” [2 Pet 2:1]. Then there are those who lie to wrong their neighbor: “Do not lie to one another” [Col 3:9]. These two kinds of lies, therefore, are mortal sins.

There are some who lie for their own advantage, and this in a variety of ways. Sometimes it is out of humility. This may be the case in confession, about which St. Augustine says: “Just as one must avoid concealing what he has committed, so also he must not mention what he has not committed.” “Does God have any need of your lie?” [Job 13:7]. And again: “There is one who humbles himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit; and there is one who humbles himself exceedingly with a great lowness” [Sir 19:25 Vulgate].

There are others who tell lies out of shame, namely, when one tells a falsehood believing that he is telling the truth, and on becoming aware of it he is ashamed to retract: “In no wise speak against the truth, but be ashamed of the lie of your ignorance” [Sir 4:30]. Other some lie for desired results as when they wish to gain or avoid something: “We have placed our hope in lies, and by falsehood we are protected” [Is 28:15]. And again: “He who trusts in lies feeds the winds” [Prov 10:4]

Finally, there are some who lie to benefit another, that is, when they wish to free someone from death, or danger, or some other loss. This must be avoided, as St. Augustine tells us. “Accept no person against your own person, nor against your soul a lie” [Eccles 4:26]. But others lie only out of vanity, and this, too, must never be done, lest the habit of such lead us to mortal sin: “For the bewitching of vanity obscures good things” [Wis 4:12].

ARTICLE 11

THE NINTH (TENTH) COMMANDMENT

“YOU SHALL NOT COVET YOUR NEIGHBOR’S GOODS.”

[St. Thomas places the Tenth Commandment before the Ninth. The Tenth Commandment is wider in extension than the Ninth, which is specific.]

“You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods.” There is this difference between the divine and the human laws that human law judges only deeds and words, whereas the divine law judges also thoughts. The reason is because human laws are made by men who see things only exteriorly, but the divine law is from God, who sees both external things and the very interior of men. “You are the God of my heart” [Ps 72:26]. And again: “Man sees those things that appear, but the Lord sees the heart” [1 Sam 16:7]. Therefore, having considered those Commandments which concern words and deeds, we now treat of the Commandments about thoughts. For with God the intention is taken for the deed, and thus the words, “You shall not covet,” mean to include not only the taking by act, but also the intention to take. Therefore, it says: “You shall not even covet your neighbor’s goods.” There are a number of reasons for this.

The first reason for the Commandment is that man’s desire has no limits, because desire itself is boundless. But he who is wise will aim at some particular end, for no one should have aimless desires: “A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money” [Eccles 5:9]. But the desires of man are never satisfied, because the heart of man is made for God. Thus, says St. Augustine: “You hast made us for You, O Lord, and our heart is restless until it rests in You” [Conf. I]. Nothing, therefore, less than God can satisfy the human heart: “He satisfies your desire with good things” [Ps 102:5].

The second reason is that covetousness destroys peace of heart, which is indeed highly delightful. The covetous man is ever solicitous to acquire what he lacks, and to hold that which he has: “The fullness of the rich will not suffer him to sleep” [Eccles 5:11]. “For where your treasure is, there is your heart also” [Mt 6:21]. It was for this, says St. Gregory, that Christ compared riches to thorns [Lk 8:14].

Thirdly, covetousness in a man of wealth renders his riches useless both to himself and to others, because he desires only to hold on to them: “Riches are not fitting for a covetous man and a niggard” [Sir 14:3]. The fourth reason is that it destroys the equality of justice: “Neither shall you take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just” [Ex 23:8]. And again: “He who loves gold shall not be justified” [Sir 31:5]. The fifth reason is that it destroys the love of God and neighbor, for says St. Augustine: “The more one loves, the less one covets,” and also the more one covets, the less one loves. “Nor despise your dear brother for the sake of gold” [Sir 7:20]. And just as “No man can serve two masters,” so neither can he serve “God and mammon” [Mt 6:24].

Finally, covetousness produces all kinds of wickedness. It is “the root of all evil,” says St. Paul, and when this root is implanted in the heart it brings forth murder and theft and all kinds of evil. “They that will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil, and into many unprofitable and hurtful desires which drown men in destruction and perdition. For the desire of money is the root of all evil” [1 Tim 6:9-10]. And note, furthermore, that covetousness is a mortal sin when one covets one’s neighbor’s goods without reason; and even if there be a reason, it is a venial sin.

ARTICLE 12

THE TENTH (NINTH) COMMANDMENT

“YOU SHALL NOT COVET YOUR NEIGHBOR’S WIFE.”

St. John says in his first Epistle that “all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life” [1 Jn 2:16]. Now, all that is desirable is included in these three, two of which are forbidden by the precept: “You shall not covet your neighbor’s house.” Here “house,” signifying height, refers to avarice, for “glory and wealth shall be in his house” [Ps 111:3]. This means that he who desires the house, desires honors and riches. And thus after the precept forbidding desire for the house of one’s neighbor comes the Commandment prohibiting concupiscence of the flesh: “You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife.”

Because of the corruption which resulted from the Fall, none has been free from concupiscence except Christ and the glorious Virgin. And wherever there is concupiscence, there is either venial or mortal sin, provided that it is allowed to dominate the reason. Hence the precept is not, let sin not be; for it is written: “I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh” [Rm 7:18].

First of all, sin rules in the flesh when, by giving consent to it, concupiscence reigns in the heart. And, therefore, St. Paul adds “so as to obey the lusts thereof” to the words: “Do not let sin reign in your mortal body” [Rm 6:12]. Accordingly the Lord says: “Whoever looks on a woman to lust after her, has already committed adultery with her in his heart” [Mt 5:28]. For with God the intention is taken for the act.

Secondly, sin rules in the flesh when the concupiscence of our heart is expressed in words: “Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks” [Mt 12:34]. And again: “Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth” [Eph

4:29]. Therefore, one is not without sin who composes frivolous songs. Even the philosophers so thought, and poets who wrote amatory verses were sent into exile. Lastly, sin rules in the flesh when at the behest of desire the members are made to serve iniquity: “As you have yielded your members to serve uncleanness to greater and greater iniquity” [Rm 6:19]. These, therefore, are the progressive steps of concupiscence.

WAYS TO OVERCOME CONCUPISCENCE

We must realize that the avoidance of concupiscence demands much labor, for it is based on something within us. It is as hard as trying to capture an enemy in one’s own household. However, this desire can be overcome in four ways.

Firstly, by fleeing the external occasions such as, for instance, bad company; and in fact whatever may be an occasion for this sin: “Do not gaze not upon a maiden lest her beauty be a stumbling-block to you... Do not look around you in the ways of the city, nor wander up and down in its streets. Turn away your face from a woman dressed up, and do not gaze upon another’s beauty. For many have perished by the beauty of a woman, whereby lust is enkindled as a fire” [Sir 9:5-9]. And again: “Can a man hide fire in his bosom, and his garments not burn?” [Prov 6:27]. And thus Lot was commanded to flee, “neither stay you in all the country about” [Gen 19:17].

The second way is by not giving an opening to thoughts which of themselves are the occasion of lustful desires. And this must be done by mortification of the flesh: “I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection” [1 Cor 9:27].

The third way is perseverance in prayer: “Unless the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it” [Ps 126:1]. And also: “I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it” [Wis 8:21]. Again: “This kind is not cast out save by prayer and fasting” [Mt 17:20]. All this is not unlike to a fight between two persons, one of whom you desire to win, the other to lose. You must sustain the one and withdraw all support from the other. So also between the spirit and the flesh there is a continual combat. Now, if you wish the spirit to win, you must assist it by prayer, and likewise you must resist the flesh by such means as fasting; for by fasting the flesh is weakened.

The fourth way is to keep oneself busy with wholesome occupations: “Idleness hath taught much evil” [Sir 23:29]. Again: “This was the iniquity of Sodom your sister, pride, fullness of bread, and abundance, and the idleness of her” [Ez 16:49]. St. Jerome says: “Be always busy in doing something good, so that the devil may find you ever occupied.” Now, study of the Scriptures is the best of all occupations, as St. Jerome tells us: “Love to study the Scriptures and you will not love the vices of the flesh” [Ad Paulin.].

SUMMARY OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS

These are the ten precepts to which Our Lord referred when He said: “If you would enter into life, keep the commandments” (Mt 19:17). There are two main principles of all the Commandments, namely, love of God and love of neighbor. The man that loves God must necessarily do three things: (1) he must have no other God. And in support of this is the Commandment: “You shall not have strange gods”; (2) he must give God all honor. And so it is commanded: “You shall not take the name of God in vain”; (3) he must freely take his rest in God. Hence: “Remember that you keep holy the Sabbath day.”

But to love God worthily, one must first of all love one’s neighbor. And so: “Honor your father and mother.” Then, one must avoid doing harm to one’s neighbor in act. “You shall not kill” refers to our neighbor’s person; “You shall not commit adultery” refers to the person united in marriage to our neighbor; “You shall not steal” refers to our neighbor’s external goods. We must also avoid injury to our neighbor both by word, “You shall not bear false witness,” and by thought, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods” and “You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife.”

NATURE AND GRACE

SELECTIONS FROM THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF THOMAS AQUINAS

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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NATURE AND GRACE: SELECTIONS FROM THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF THOMAS AQUINAS

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

In this volume we have sought to present the view taken by Thomas Aquinas of the moral and spiritual world in which we live, and of the conditions of man’s self-realization which are consequent upon it. The final end of man lies in God, through whom alone he is and lives, and by whose help alone he can attain his end. The teaching of Aquinas concerning the moral and spiritual order stands in sharp contrast to all views, ancient or modern, which cannot do justice to the difference between the divine and the creaturely without appearing to regard them as essentially antagonistic as well as discontinuous. For Aquinas, no such opposition obtains between God and the world which he has made. Any evil which disrupts the continuity of the context of human endeavour after self-realization in God is due to corruption, not to nature, and such corruption is never absolute.

The attitude of Thomas is best understood in its historical contrast to that of Augustine. Although Aquinas sought at every turn to harmonize his teaching as far as possible with Augustine’s, to whose authority he refers more often than to any other, the difference between them was fundamental. His predecessor never seems to have freed himself entirely from the Manichaean conviction of cosmic evil. His mystical doctrine of the fall extended the effects of a cosmic evil will to nature itself, so that all nature is corrupt, not only human nature. Reason in man remains, but is helpless since it cannot operate apart from the will, which has lost its freedom through sin. There is consequently a sharp division between the realm of nature and the realm of grace, such as renders it impossible to explain how man can be regenerated through grace without apparently destroying the continuity of his own endeavour, and equally impossible to maintain that he can attain any knowledge of God or of divine things through knowledge of the created world. Since nature is corrupt, experience of created things, even if we could know them, could present nothing better than distorted images of what things ought to be. Anything learnt through sense would therefore be useless as a clue to the nature of the divine. The “inward way” is consequently the only way to true knowledge. The soul must develop within itself, and it can do so only through grace. True knowledge must be implanted in the mind by God, either gradually or all at once. Reliance on the ontological argument to divine existence automatically follows.

The teaching of Aquinas contrasts with that of Augustine on every point which we have mentioned, representing a kindlier view both of man and of nature. The will is free, and the natural desire for the good persists despite sin. Aquinas is more definite than Augustine that reason itself is impaired by sin. But he holds that it can be used, and that we must follow our reason as far as it will take us. Grace and revelation are aids which do not negate reason. Here as everywhere nature itself demands supernature for its completion, and the provision of divine grace meets the striving of human nature in its search for the ultimate good, this quest being itself due to the gracious moving of God. In so far as they are, created things are good, and in so far as they are and are good, they reflect the being of God who is their first cause. The natural knowledge of God is therefore possible through the knowledge of creatures. Not only so, but there is no human knowledge of God which does not depend on the knowledge of creatures. All knowledge begins from sense, even of things which transcend sense. For this reason alone Aquinas would have been bound to reject the ontological argument of Augustine, which depends on knowledge of ideal entities entirely unrelated to sense experience. The “five ways” of Pt. I, Q. 2, all involve the cosmological argument from the existence of created things as known through sense.

The task which Aquinas set himself to achieve was similar to that of Augustine. Augustine had sought to reconcile the principles of Christianity with the philosophy of Plato, without the pantheistic implications which had developed in the emanation theory of Plotinus. Aquinas sought to reconcile the philosophy of Aristotle with the principles of Christianity, avoiding the pantheism which it seemed to imply (cf. Pt. I, Q. 3, Art. 8). Many of Aristotle’s works had been introduced to the West during the eleventh and twelfth centuries from Arabian sources, particularly through Avicenna and

Averroes, whose extensive commentaries interpreted the thought of Aristotle in a strongly pantheistic vein. Averroes had also maintained that the common basis of a universal natural religion, underlying the differences of any particular religion, was the highest of all, the “scientific” religion, of which Aristotle was the founder. The several “positive” religions he regarded as necessary for the masses, poorer versions of the same truth, whose trappings were better removed. Revelation, like anything else peculiar to any one religion, was merely a poorer way of stating what Aristotle had stated in a much better way as the content of the moral law. The whole presentation apparently led to such extravagances that for a time the writings of Aristotle were proscribed. But such a thinker was too valuable to be cast aside, and it was mainly due to the efforts of the Dominicans, Albertus Magnus and his pupil Aquinas, that Aristotle’s philosophy came to be accepted by the Church as representing the highest to which unaided human reason could attain. Plato seems to be more in keeping with the Christian belief, since he regards the material universe as created, and the spiritual as above the natural. But the mystical elements of his thought encroached on the province of revelation, and had indeed been the source of heresies. The very limitations of Aristotle, on the other hand, served to emphasize that the truths of revelation were unknown to the Greeks because they were not discoverable by natural reason, but above reason.

Aquinas makes extensive use of Aristotle’s psychology, which he applies throughout in order to define problems relating to faith and the operation of grace. There was indeed no other psychology available with any pretentions to systematic completeness. He also makes use of the Aristoteleian metaphysics wherever relevant. The treatment of all problems proceeds according to the conceptual distinctions by means of which Aristotle did his thinking. This unfortunately gives the impression that Aquinas was a rational conceptualist. Aquinas was no more of a conceptualist than Aristotle, who was certainly nothing of the kind. If Aristotle had been a conceptualist, he could never have written the Prior Analytics, which reveal the attitude of the biological scientist who insisted that all generic conceptions must be justified through induction from experienced particulars. Although the syllogistic method, which Aquinas employs to the utmost, may put the original appeal to experience in the background, it should be realized that Aquinas uses conceptual thinking as a means to the knowledge of things, and declares that we formulate propositions only in order to know things by means of them, in faith no less than in science (22ae, Q. i, Art. 2), and also that truth consists in conformity of the intellect with the thing known (cf. Pt. I, Q. 21, Art. 2). The charge of “a priorism” is justifiable only in so far as it can be brought against any view which maintains that knowledge transcends what is immediately experienced—not on the ground of conceptualism. According to Aquinas, divine reality is itself simple. But things known are in the knower according to his manner of knowing, and we cannot understand truth otherwise than by thinking, which proceeds by means of the combination and separation of ideas (22ae, Q. I, Art. 2, ad 5; cf. Q. 27, Art. 4), this being the way proper to the human intellect, which is confused by the things which are most manifest to nature, just as the eye of the bat is dazzled by the light of the sun (Pt. I, Q. 1, Art. 5). If the terminology is found puzzling, it should be borne in mind that it is intended as the way out of complexity, not as the way into it. Further, although Aquinas frequently appears to “prove by definition,” what he really does is to answer a question by defining its elements as they must be defined according to the final view which he means to expound, clarifying the issue so that the question answers itself. It may be observed, also, that although objections dealt with sometimes contain plain logical fallacies, Aquinas never treats them as such, but invariably looks for a deeper reason behind them.

In Pt. I, Qq. 1–4 Aquinas defines sacred doctrine as the wisdom of all wisdoms. Its principal object is God, the first cause of all that is, in relation to whom alone are man and his place in the universe properly understood. Qq. 20–23 deal with God in relation to man, as determining the moral and spiritual world in which man must seek to attain the end which God ordains by means which God provides. In Prima Secundae, Qq. 82, 85 present Aquinas’ view of original sin and its effects, and Qq. 109–114 his treatise on divine grace. In Secunda Secundae, Qq. 1–7; 17–21; 23, 27 treat of the three theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, by means of which man may attain to blessedness, the final end to which all his activities must be subordinate. We may now proceed to comment on each of these five sections in turn.

PRIMA PARS

Questions 1–4

Sacred doctrine does not argue to prove its first principles, which are the articles of faith, since they cannot be proved to one who denies the revelation on which they are founded. Aquinas nevertheless maintains that human reason can demonstrate the existence, unity, and perfection of God. The “five ways” of arguing to divine existence could not be omitted from any representation of his thought, and call for some comment. The first article of Q. 2 rejects Anselm’s version of the ontological argument, particularly on the ground of its question-begging form. Most commentators, however, are agreed that the criticism offered is not valid against Anselm. Anselm did not contend, as did Descartes, that the proposition “God exists” is self-evident from the nature of the concepts as anyone is bound to understand them. Nor did he argue in a purely a priori fashion from an idea existing in the mind to a corresponding existence in nature. To argue in this way would have been contrary to the whole spirit of the Monologion, with which the Proslogion was intended to harmonize. It would have been to give the primacy to reason, which in Anselm’s view must never be given the primacy, since it depends on concepts built by imagination out of sense, which leads away from truth. Faith must precede reason, seeking to understand by means of reason what it already believes. There is indeed no “reason” why God should be, other than that he is (De Veritate, 10; cf. Monologion, 18). The “necessity” involved is not imposed by thought upon itself, but imposed upon articulate utterance by inward experience of what is real, through the “eye of the soul.” The line of Augustine’s thought which he appears to follow most particularly is that of the De Libero Arbitrio II, ch. 6, 14: “If we could find something which we could not only not doubt to be, but which is prior to our reason, would we not call it God? That only should we call God, than which nothing is better.” The distinction drawn in Proslogion IV between the two uses of the term “God,” namely, cum vox significans eam cogitatur, and cum res ipsa cogitatur, seem to make it plain that the argument is fundamentally a short restatement of the claim of the Monologion in terms which fit the Realist-Nominalist controversy. If a nominalist uses the term, it is a mere flatus vocis (De Fide Trinitatis II, 1274), and proves nothing. But if a realist uses it, it indicates, as for Anselm, his own inward experience of divine reality which compels the utterance “God is.” The self-evidence of the proposition is therefore derivative, since the reality is known. The very absence of any further explanation in Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo’s defence of the fool who said in his heart “there is no God,” in which he merely repeats that the phrase he used has a definite meaning, and is not a meaningless sound, also supports the view that this is the argument of the realist against the nominalist. If he adopted realism only as a useful means of serving a greater end, his adoption of it shows that, for Anselm, everything depends on inward experimental awareness.

Although Aquinas rejects the ontological argument, his argument from the existence of things to the reality of God as their first cause depends on its underlying import. For he maintain that although the first cause can be known to exist, its essence cannot be known; and as Aquinas himself quotes from Aristotle in 22ae, Q. 2, Art. 2, to know incomposites imperfectly is not to know them at all. The argument to a first cause cannot therefore be said to have proved anything, unless it is supplemented by the ontological argument, which depends on the mind’s direct awareness. This is apparent from the manner in which each of the five ways concludes with the observation “and this we call God.” But the five ways are not ultimately dependent on their outward form, any more than the argument of Anselm. If they were, they could readily be answered by anyone who has paid attention to Hume, since the mere fact that a thing exists does not imply that it requires a cause at all. No inference to a first cause is possible if a thing is initially apprehended merely as an existent. But things are not so apprehended according to Aquinas. The wording of Q. 2, Art. 3, suggests that his thought presupposes that of Aristotle’s Physics III, ch. 3, 202a. There Aristotle maintains that the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is identical with the actuality of that which can be moved. That is to say, when one thing is moved by another, this is a single, unified occurrence. The moving and the being moved are the same event, just as the interval between one and two is the same interval whichever way we read it, and just as a steep ascent and a steep descent are the same thing, from whichever end we choose to describe it. Thus for Aquinas, anything which exists, or which is moved, is seen as continuous with its creation, or with its being moved, by God who is the first cause. This is the reason why he can affirm, as he does in S. Contra Gentiles II, ch. i, that the divine act of creation is at once the act of God and a perfection of the thing made. Accordingly, when we contemplate any existing thing, the causal divine act of creation is actually present in the situation which we contemplate, and Aquinas would say that the fault is our own if we cannot perceive it. One may of course plead the inability to see. But one cannot refute the claim merely on the ground of its logical limitations, which are in fact parallel to those of Anselm’s argument in so far as one may certainly contend that the conclusion has found its way into the premises. This, however, is invariably the case with any argument which makes any genuine advance, since in all progressive arguments the distinction between datum and conclusion is artificial. The evidence with which we start, to which we assign the logical status of a datum, is bound to transcend its original boundaries by the time we have finished, and to acquire a deeper significance as it is understood in the conclusion. When it is claimed that the evidence is properly what the conclusion shows it to be, we cannot refute the claim merely by pointing out that this is different from the original conception of it. That is all we do if we reply that a mere existence does not imply God as its cause, which is no answer to one who seeks to open our eyes to see that it does.

The reader may find the reasoning of Q. 3 rather intricate, and there are some who would say that it deals with a meaningless problem. To say so, however, would be to miss the point of it. Like all great thinkers, Aquinas was thoroughly aware of the extent to which the mechanism of thinking gets in the way of truth. Thought is like a prism which breaks up the light which it receives, creating false distinctions and relations which have no counterpart in the reality which it seeks to understand. The distinctions between form and matter, essence and underlying subject, essence and existence, substance and attribute, genus and difference, belong to thought only, not to the nature of God. There is consequently no possibility of proving divine existence by arguing from them. But although Aquinas applies this consideration to the appreciation of the divine, he does not apparently maintain, as do some later thinkers, that it falsifies our knowledge of created things, which he regards as genuinely composite in their own nature. Indeed, it is because our knowledge of God to a degree depends on the experience of composites that it is bound to remain inadequate. This question should be compared directly with 22ae, Q. I, Art. 2.

As the first active principle and first efficient cause of all things, God is not only perfect in himself, but contains within himself the perfections of all things, in a more eminent way. It is this that makes possible the celebrated analogia entis, whereby the divine nature is known by analogy from existing things, and not only by analogy based on the memory, intellect, and will of man, as Augustine had maintained. It is a fundamental principle of Aquinas that every agent acts to the producing of its own likeness. Every creature must accordingly resemble God at least in the inadequate way in which an effect can resemble its cause. The analogy is especially an analogy of "being," which the mediaeval mind apparently conceived as in some way active, not merely passive. All created things resemble God in so far as they are, and are good. Goodness and beauty are really the same as "being," from which they differ only logically. Names which are derived from creatures may therefore be applied to God analogously, that is, proportionately, or we may say relatively, in the manner which the passages appended to Q. 3 should be sufficient to explain (cf. S. Contra Gentiles I, ch. 30). The application of them must, however, respect the principle of "negative knowledge," which is observed by most thinkers of the millennium following Plotinus when speaking of the transcendent. Plotinus had maintained that anything whatever could be truly denied of the divine being, and also that whatever we affirm, we must forthwith affirm the opposite (Enneads V). Aquinas maintains that we can know of God's essence only what it is not, not what it is, but that this is properly knowledge of God. Names may be applied in so far as they are intended to affirm what applies to him in a more eminent way than we can conceive, while they must at the same time be denied of him on account of their mode of signification. The principle is in keeping with the practice of the Old Testament, which repeatedly has recourse to negatives in reference to the divine.

Questions 20–23

In each of these four questions Aquinas begins by justifying the application to God of the terms employed, and then proceeds to show what we ought to mean by them. Love is the first movement of the divine will whereby God seeks the good of all things. He therefore loves all things that are. He loves better things the more in so far as he wills a greater good for them, and the universe would not be complete if it did not exhibit every grade of being. The justice and mercy of God are necessarily present in all God’s works, since his justice consists in rendering to every creature what is its due according to its own nature as created by himself, while his mercy consists in remedying defects, which God owes it to himself to make good in accordance with his wisdom and goodness. Divine providence is the reason, pre-existing in the mind of God, why things are ordained to their end, the order of providence comprising all that God provides in his governance of all things through secondary causes, which may be either necessary or contingent. The providential order is thus the permanent condition of human life and of all existence, controlling the ultimate issue of secondary causes in such a way that the divine purpose shall inevitably be attained. Predestination is a part of providence. Here we find a reluctance to pronounce upon certain questions which Aquinas obviously believed were not for man to investigate. The reason why God predestines some and not others, for example, lies in God himself, and is not to be looked for in human merits or in anything of the kind. Aquinas insists, however, that the divine intention cannot be altered by the prayers of the devout, although it may be furthered by them as secondary causes, which, as part of providence, predestination permits.

PRIMA SEGUNDAE

Questions 82, 85

The most serious aspect of sin is that it may deprive men of the effects of the providential order whereby they are directed to God as their final end. Original sin is the disordered disposition of nature which has resulted from the loss of original justice, and which in us has become almost second nature as a transmitted habit. Sin is thus regarded as unnatural, not as a natural opposition of man to God. Aquinas does justice to both sides of the effect of sin distinguished by Augustine as vitium, or moral damage, and reatus, or guilt, although he frequently prefers the milder term culpa in place of the latter. The distinctive contention of Aquinas is that the natural inclination to virtue is never entirely destroyed by sin. If it were, human nature would be destroyed at its very root. Man would then cease to be a rational being, since it is of the very nature of a rational being to seek the good, and would consequently be incapable even of sin. This does not mean, however, that sin cannot exclude from blessedness. Man cannot himself repair the damage of sin, nor remove the guilt of it, and mortal sin entails final rejection by God in accordance with his justice.

Questions 109–114

The treatise on grace raises several points worthy of special notice. Aquinas speaks of the “infusion of grace.” Such a phrase befits a view of grace as something magical, if not physical, but is not intended as implying any positive description of the inward nature of grace. It may be regarded as no less incongruous with his whole teaching than is the lingering legal terminology of Paul, or simply as being Aquinas’ way of acknowledging that grace is ultimately unanalysable and mystical, achieving its end outside the normal order of cause and effect—for Aquinas was certainly to some extent a mystic. It need not be understood as implying any self-circumscribed substitute for the regenerative and redemptive work of God himself, which is the damaging implication of any unspiritual view of grace. Any hypostatization of grace is ruled out by the very title of the first question, which makes it clear that grace is nothing less than the help of God, while the treatise itself expounds the manner in which divine grace is essential for every action of man, no less than for his redemption from sin and preparation for blessedness. It will be observed that sanctifying grace is distinguished from free grace, which denotes the divine gifts whereby one man may lead another to faith, but which do not sanctify; and also that justification is taken in its literal etymological sense as meaning “to make just,” not in the sense in which it is now normally understood to mean the acceptance of man by God despite the sin which God forbears to impute. As used by Aquinas, justification means the remission of sins ; but it is the creation of a just man that he has in mind, not the circumstance of a spiritual personal relationship. It is recognized that justification is by faith and not of works, and it is quite clear that Aquinas held no brief for the notion that salvation could be merited by good works. Merit itself is entirely the result of co-operative grace. When we say that a man merits anything, we ought to mean that what God has wrought in him merits further development and consummation, since God owes it to himself to perfect and complete the work which he has begun. The whole treatise causes one to wonder what would have happened at the time of the Reformation if Aquinas had been universally understood in the Catholic Church, and if all parties had used the same terms with the same meanings. The Reformation would still have been inevitable, but it might have taken a different course.

SECUNDA SECUNDAE

Questions 1–7; 17–21; 23, 27

The four cardinal virtues of Aristotle, wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, were sufficient to make man perfect in his intellect, feeling, will, and social relationships. The three theological virtues, Faith, Hope, and Charity, are essential for the attainment of his final end which lies in God. They are called “theological” virtues because they have God for their object. Through them eternal life is begun in us.

In most contexts, faith means belief. While he accepted certain points made by Abelard (1079–1142) in defence of the free use of reason, Aquinas nevertheless takes a thoroughly authoritarian view of the relation of faith to reason. Abelard had maintained, especially in opposition to Anselm, that reason was of God, the ground of the Imago Dei, and consequently fitted to investigate divine things, the truth of which it could to some extent understand without their presence. He had also insisted that some understanding of what was believed was essential for faith, mere acceptance on authority being lifeless and without moral or spiritual value, since we are no longer in the position of Abraham, to whom the Deus dixit was immediately present, and who could therefore follow the way of blind trust with profit (Introductio 1050 D-1051). This meant that the things of faith were not to be believed merely because they were revealed by God, but because their own truth convinced the believer. He maintained further that only reason could bring men to faith (Introd. 1048: Theologica Christiana IV, 1284). Aquinas agrees with Abelard that reason can never contradict faith (Pt. I, Q. 1, Art. 10), and that reason must be convinced of the truth which it accepts, since to believe is “to think with assent” (22ae, Q. 1, Art. 1). But he insists that the unseen things of faith are entirely beyond the reach of reason, and that faith is only of things unseen. He accordingly understands the conviction and assent of faith in a very different way. Reason must be convinced not by the matter of faith itself, but by the divine authority wherewith it is proposed to us for belief. The inward moving of God enables one to accept matters of faith on the strength of authority (22ae, Q. 6, Art. 1), and such acceptance is meritorious (22ae, Q. 2, Art. 9). Human reason can remove obstacles in the way of faith (22ae, Q. 2, Art. 10), but can never do more than provide a preamble to faith itself, though it may discover reasons for what is already believed through faith. Aquinas will go no further than to say that those whose office it is to teach others must have a fuller knowledge of what ought to be believed, and must believe it more explicitly, than those whom they instruct.

The principal object of faith is the “first truth” declared in sacred Scripture, according to the teaching of the Church, which understands it perfectly since the universal Church cannot err. The promise given to Peter in Luke 22:32 is interpreted as a guarantee of present infallibility, while John 16:13 is rendered “he will teach you all truth.” Thus although Aquinas maintains that an increase of grace is granted not immediately, but in its own time, i.e., when a man is sufficiently well disposed to receive it (12ae, Q. 114, Art. 8), he does not regard any such principle as applicable to the appreciation of scriptural revelation on the part of the Church. His explanation that the words of the Creed “I believe in the holy catholic Church” properly mean “in the Holy Spirit which sanctifies the Church” (22ae, Q. 1, Art. 9) consequently loses something of its value. The articles of faith are held to be permanent and infallible in substance, and Aquinas can conceive of no other reason for rejecting them than the defective opinion of one’s own will (22ae, Q. 5, Art. 3). The soteriological significance of belief lies in the circumstance that one must believe in the final end as possible of attainment, before one can either hope for it or strive for it. The absence of any further explanation of the saving dynamic of faith is inevitable in so far as belief is treated in abstraction by itself, without reference to the element of fiducia, or personal trust. It is merely observed that faith must be referred to the end of charity (22ae, Q. 3, Art. 2).

Hope is the virtue whereby man unites himself to God as his final end in a manner which is immediately practical. Despair is the deadliest of sins, a contention which provides an interesting contrast to later views which regard it as an essential preliminary to any spiritual attainment. Fear is the converse of hope, and in its essential substance is equally a gift of God which helps to keep us within the providential order which leads to blessedness. Charity is the supreme virtue which brings faith to its true form, uniting us directly to God, and directing all other virtues to this final end. Charity is, as it were, friendship with God, and herein Aquinas preserves the element which one may have missed in the treatise on faith. For charity is itself of the very essence of God. When present in us, it likens us to God, and likens us to him further in those works of mercy in which the whole Christian religion outwardly consists.

PART I. QUESTIONS 1–4; 20–23

QUESTION ONE

WHAT SACRED DOCTRINE IS, AND WHAT IT CONCERNS

In order to confine our purpose within definite limits, we must first inquire into sacred doctrine itself, what it is and what it concerns. Ten questions are asked.

1. Whether sacred doctrine is necessary.

2. Whether it is a science.

3. Whether it is one science, or several.

4. Whether it is speculative or practical.

5. How it is related to other sciences.

6. Whether it is wisdom.

7. What is its subject-matter.

8. Whether it proceeds by argument.

9. Whether it ought to make use of metaphors or figures of speech.

10. Whether the sacred Scriptures of this doctrine should be expounded in several ways.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Another Doctrine is Necessary, besides the Philosophical Sciences

1. It seems that there is no need for any other doctrine besides the philosophical sciences. Man should not strive to know what is above reason, since it is said in Ecclesiasticus 3:22: “seek not to know what is

higher than thyself.” Now what is within the reach of reason is adequately dealt with in the philosophical sciences. It seems superfluous, therefore, that there should be another doctrine besides the philosophical sciences.

2. Again, a doctrine can be concerned only with “what is,” since only what is true can be known, and whatever is true, is. Now all things which “are” are dealt with in the philosophical sciences, which treat even of God, wherefore one part of philosophy is called theology, or the science of divine things, as the philosopher
says in 6 Metaph. (Commentary II). There was therefore no need for another doctrine, besides the philosophical sciences.

On the other hand: it is said in II Tim. 3:16: “All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness. . . .” Now the divinely inspired Scriptures are quite distinct from the philosophical sciences, which are devised by human reason. It is therefore expedient that there should be another science which is divinely inspired, besides the philosophical sciences.

I answer: it was necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a doctrine founded on revelation, as well as the philosophical sciences discovered by human reason. It was necessary, in the first place, because man is ordained to God as his end, who surpasses the comprehension of reason, according to Isa. 64:4: “neither hath the eye seen, O God, besides thee, what he hath prepared for him that waiteth for him.” Men must have some foreknowledge of the end to which they ought to direct their intentions and actions. It was therefore necessary that some things which transcend human reason should be made known through divine revelation. It was necessary also that man should be instructed by divine revelation even in such things concerning God as human reason could discover. For such truth about God as could be discovered by reason would be known only by the few, and that after a long time, and mixed with many errors. Now the whole salvation of man, which lies in God, depends on the knowledge of this truth. It was therefore necessary that men should be instructed in divine things through divine revelation, in order that their salvation might come to pass the more fittingly and certainly. It was necessary, therefore, that there should be a sacred doctrine given through revelation, as well as the philosophical sciences discovered by reason.

On the first point: although things which are beyond human knowledge are not to be sought by man through reason, such things are revealed by God, and are to be accepted by faith. Hence Ecclesiasticus adds in the same passage: “many things beyond human understanding have been revealed unto thee” (3:25).

On the second point: sciences are distinguished by their different ways of knowing. The astronomer and the naturalist prove the same thing, for example, that the world is round. But the astronomer proves it by mathematics, without reference to matter, whereas the naturalist proves it by examining the physical. There is no reason, then, why the same things, which the philosophical sciences teach as they can be known by the light of natural reason, should not also be taught by another science as they are known through divine revelation. The theology which depends on sacred Scripture is thus generically different from the theology which is a part of philosophy.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Science

1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science depends on principles which are self-evident, whereas sacred doctrine depends on articles of faith which are not self-evident, since they are not conceded by everybody. As is said in II Thess. 3:2: “all men have not faith.” Hence sacred doctrine is not a science.

2. Again, there is no science of particulars. But sacred doctrine is concerned with particulars, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and others. It is not therefore a science.

On the other hand: Augustine says (14 De Trin. 1): “by this science only is faith begun, nourished, defended, and strengthened.” Now this is true of no science except sacred doctrine. Sacred doctrine is therefore a science.

I answer: sacred doctrine is a science. But we must realize that there are two kinds of sciences. Some of them, such as arithmetic, geometry, and the like, depend on principles known by the natural light of reason. Others depend on principles known through a higher science. Thus the science of perspective depends on principles known through geometry, and music on principles known through arithmetic. Sacred doctrine is a science of the latter kind, depending on principles known through a higher science, namely the science of God and the blessed. Just as music accepts the principles given to it by arithmetic, so does sacred doctrine accept the principles revealed to it by God.

On the first point: the principles of any science are either self-evident, or derived from what is known through a higher science. The principles of sacred doctrine are so derived, as we have said.

On the second point: sacred doctrine does not narrate particular things because it is principally concerned with them. It introduces them as examples to follow, as do the moral sciences; and also as proofs of the authority of those through whom the divine revelation, on which sacred Scripture and sacred doctrine are founded, reaches us.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Single Science

1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not a single science. As the philosopher says: “one science treats of one kind of subject only” (I Post. An., Text 43). Now sacred doctrine treats of the Creator and also of creatures, and these do not belong to one kind of subject. Hence it is not a single science.

2. Again, sacred doctrine treats of angels, of creatures with bodies, and of the customs of men. These belong to different philosophical sciences. Hence sacred doctrine is not a single science.

On the other hand: sacred Scripture speaks of these things as of a single science, for it is said in Wisdom 10:10: “She hath given him the science of holy things.”

I answer: sacred doctrine is a single science. The unity of a power or habit is indeed to be judged by its object, but by the formal nature of its object, not by the material nature of it. For example, man, ass, and stone agree in possessing the formal nature of "the coloured," which is the object of sight. Now since sacred doctrine treats of things as divinely revealed, as we said in the previous article, all things which are divinely revealed agree in the one formal nature which is the object of this science. They are therefore comprehended under sacred doctrine as a single science.

On the first point: sacred doctrine is not concerned with God and with creatures equally. It is concerned with God fundamentally, and with creatures in so far as they relate to God as their beginning or end. Thus the unity of the science is not destroyed.

On the second point: there is nothing to prevent lower powers or habits being differentiated in their relation to matters which yet go together for a higher power or habit, because a higher power or habit comprehends its object under a more universal aspect. Thus the object of the common sense is "the sensible," which includes both the "visible" and the "audible." Common sense is a single power which comprehends all objects of the five senses. Similarly, sacred doctrine remains a single science while it treats under one aspect, in so far as they are all revealed by God, matters which are dealt with by separate philosophical sciences. Sacred doctrine is thus like an imprint of God's knowledge, which is one and undivided, yet is knowledge of all things.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Sacred Doctrine is a Practical Science

1. It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science. For "the end of practical knowledge is action," according to the philosopher (2 Metaph., Text 3), and sacred doctrine is concerned with action, according to James 1:22: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only." Sacred doctrine is therefore a practical science.

2. Again, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law, and the Law has to do with the science of morals, which is practical. Sacred

doctrine is therefore a practical science.

On the other hand: every practical science is concerned with the works of men. Ethics is concerned with their actions, and architecture with their buildings. But sacred doctrine is concerned principally with God, whose works men are. Hence it is not a practical science. Rather is it speculative.

I answer: as was said in the preceding article, sacred doctrine embraces matters dealt with by separate philosophical sciences while it itself remains one, because the formal nature to which it attends in diverse things is their being made known by the divine light. Hence even though some matters in the philosophical sciences are speculative and some practical, sacred doctrine includes them all within itself, just as God knows both himself and his works by the same knowledge. But sacred doctrine is more speculative than practical, since it is concerned with divine things more fundamentally than with the actions of men, in which it is interested in so far as through them men are brought to the perfect knowledge of God in which their eternal happiness consists. The answer to the objections is then obvious.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether Sacred Doctrine is Nobler than other Sciences

1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences. For the dignity of a science is indicated by its certainty, and other sciences whose principles cannot be doubted appear to be more certain than sacred doctrine, whose principles, i.e., the articles of faith, are the subject of debate. Thus it seems that other sciences are nobler.

2. Again, a lower science depends on a higher, as music depends on arithmetic. Now sacred doctrine derives something from the philosophical sciences. Hieronymus, indeed, says that “the ancient teachers filled their books with so many philosophical doctrines and opinions that one does not know which to admire the more, their secular learning or their knowledge of the scriptures” (Epist. 84 to Magnus the Roman orator). Sacred doctrine is therefore lower than other sciences.

On the other hand: other sciences are said to be subsidiary to this doctrine in Prov. 9:3: “She hath sent forth her maidens: she crieth upon the highest places of the city.”

I answer: since sacred doctrine is speculative in some things and practical in others, it transcends all other sciences, whether speculative or practical. One speculative science is said to be nobler than another either because it is more certain, or because it treats of a nobler subject. Sacred doctrine surpasses other speculative sciences in both respects. It is more certain, since the certainty of other sciences depends on the natural light of human reason, which is liable to err, whereas its own certainty is founded on the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be deceived. Its subject is also nobler, since it is concerned principally with things above reason, whereas other sciences deal with things within the reach of reason. Finally, one practical science is nobler than another if it serves a more ultimate end. Politics is nobler than military science, because the good of an army is subsidiary to the good of the state. Now in so far as sacred doctrine is practical, its end is eternal happiness, and all other ends of the practical sciences are subsidiary to this as their ultimate end. It is plain, then, that it is nobler than the others in every way.

On the first point: there is nothing to prevent what is in itself the more certain from appearing to us to be the less certain, owing to the weakness of the intellect, “which is to the things most manifest to nature like the eyes of a bat to the light of the sun,” as is said in Metaph. 2. The doubt felt by some in respect of the articles of faith is not due to any uncertainty in the thing itself. It is due to the weakness of human understanding. Nevertheless, the least knowledge which one can have of higher things is worth more than the most certain knowledge of lesser things, as is said in the De Partibus Animalium (bk. 1, ch. 5).

On the second point: this science can make use of the philosophical sciences in order to make what it teaches more obvious, not because it stands in need of them. It does not take its principles from other sciences, but receives them directly from God through revelation. It thus derives nothing from other sciences as from superiors, but uses them as ancillary inferiors, as the master sciences use subsidiary sciences, or as politics uses military science. Its use of them is not due to any defect or inadequacy in itself. It is due to the limitation of our understanding. We are more easily led from what is known by natural reason, on which other sciences depend, to the things above reason which this science teaches us.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Sacred Doctrine is Wisdom

1. It seems that sacred doctrine is not wisdom. No doctrine which derives its principles from elsewhere is worthy of the name of wisdom. As it is said in Metaph. 1, cap. 2: “the wise man must order, and not be ordered.” Now the preceding article makes it plain that sacred doctrine derives its principles from outside itself. It follows that it is not wisdom.

2. Again, wisdom proves the principles of other sciences, and is accordingly called the head of the sciences in 6 Ethics 7. But sacred doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. It follows that it is not wisdom.

3. Again, sacred doctrine is acquired through study. But wisdom is infused, and is accordingly numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit in Isa. 11. It follows that sacred doctrine is not wisdom.

On the other hand: it is said at the beginning of the law, “this is your wisdom and your understanding in the sight of the nations” (Deut. 4:6).

I answer: this doctrine is the wisdom of all wisdoms, absolutely so, and not only in respect of one kind of wisdom. The wise man orders and judges, and we may say that a man is wise in respect of a certain genus of things when he takes account of the highest cause of that genus, since we judge inferior things by means of a higher cause. An architect who plans the form of a house is said to be wise in regard to buildings, and is called a master-builder in distinction from the subsidiaries who hew the wood and prepare the stones. Thus it is said in I Cor. 3:10: “as a wise master-builder, I have laid the foundation.” Again, a prudent man is said to be wise in what matters for the whole of human life, since he directs his human actions to their proper end. Thus it is said in Prov. 10:23: “a man of understanding hath wisdom.” Hence he who attends to the absolute and highest cause of the whole universe, which is God, is called wise above all. That is the reason why wisdom is also defined as the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine explains (12 De Trin. c. 14). Now it is the quintessence of sacred doctrine that it treats of God as the highest principle, as he is known only to himself, and to others by revelation, not merely as he is known through creatures in the philosophical way spoken of in Rom. 1:19: “Because that which may be known of God is manifest in them.” Hence sacred doctrine is especially said to be wisdom.

On the first point: sacred doctrine does not derive its principles from another human science, but from divine knowledge, whereby all our knowledge is ruled as by the highest wisdom.

On the second point: the principles of other sciences are either self-evident and indemonstrable, or proved by natural reason in some other science. But the special principles of this science are founded on revelation, not on natural reason. It is not therefore for sacred doctrine to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge them. It repudiates anything in the other sciences which is inconsistent with its truth, as wholly false. Thus it is said in II Cor. 10:5: “Casting down imaginations, and every high thing that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God.”

On the third point: since wisdom judges, and since there are two ways of judging, there are two kinds of wisdom. One may judge as the result of inclination, as does a man who has the habit of virtue, who judges rightly of the things which virtue requires him to do because he is inclined to do them. Thus it is said in 10 Ethics 5 and in 3 Ethics 4: “the virtuous man is the measure and rule of human actions.” One may also judge as the result of knowledge, as one who is versed in the science of morals can judge of virtuous actions even though he is not virtuous. The wisdom which is defined as a gift of the Holy Spirit judges of divine things in the first way, according to I Cor. 2:15: “he that is spiritual judges all things,” and as Dionysius relates (2 Div. Nom., lect. 4): “Hierotheus was taught not only by learning, but by the experience of divine things.” This doctrine, on the other hand, judges in the second way, since it is acquired through study, even though its principles are received through revelation.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether God is the Subject of This Science

1. It seems that God is not the subject of this science. The philosopher says that the subject of any science must be presupposed (1 Post. An.). But sacred doctrine does not presuppose what God is. Indeed, as the Damascene says, “it is impossible to say what is in God” (3 De Fid. Orth. 24). It follows that God is not the subject of this science.

2. Again, the conclusions of any science are all contained in its subject. But in sacred Scripture conclusions are reached about many things other than God, for example, about creatures, and the customs of men. It follows that God is not the subject of this science.

On the other hand: it is its main theme that is the subject of a science, and the main theme of this science is God. It is indeed called theology because its theme is God. It follows that God is the subject of this science.

I answer: God is the subject of this science. Its subject is related to a science as is its object to a power or habit. Now that under the aspect of which all things are referred to any power or habit is rightly named as the object of that power or habit. Thus a man and a stone are referred to sight because they are coloured, and hence colour is the proper object of sight. Likewise all things are viewed by sacred doctrine under the aspect of God, either because they are God himself, or because they have God for their beginning or end. It follows that God is truly the subject of this science. This is indeed obvious from its principles, the articles of faith, which are about God. The subject of the principles and the subject of the whole science are the same, since the whole science is virtually contained in its principles. Anyone who attends to the matters with which it deals without attending to the aspect under which it views them may indeed attribute a different subject to this science, such as things, signs, the work of salvation, or Christ in his fullness as both Head and members. Sacred doctrine deals with all of these things, but deals with them in their relation to God.

On the first point: although we cannot know what God is, in this doctrine we can use the effects of God, whether of nature or of grace, in place of a definition of the divine things of which the doctrine treats. We similarly use an effect in place of a definition of a cause in certain philosophical sciences, when we demonstrate something about a cause by means of its effect.

On the second point: all other things about which sacred Scripture reaches conclusions are comprehended in God, not indeed as parts or species or accidents, but as related to God in some way.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether Sacred Doctrine Proceeds by Argument

1. It seems that sacred doctrine does not proceed by argument. For Ambrose says: “where faith is sought, eschew arguments” (De Fid. Cath.), and it is especially faith that is sought in this doctrine. As it is said in John 20:31: “these are written, that ye might believe.” It follows that sacred doctrine does not proceed by argument.

2. Again, if sacred doctrine proceeded by argument, it would argue either on the ground of authority or on the ground of reason. But to argue from authority would be beneath its dignity, since “authority is the weakest kind of proof,” as Boethius says (Topica 6), and to argue by reason would be unworthy of its end, since “faith has no merit when human reason proves it by test,” as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. 26). It follows that sacred doctrine does not proceed by argument.

On the other hand: Titus 1:9 says of a bishop, “holding fast the faithful word as he hath been taught, that he may be able by sound doctrine both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers.”

I answer: just as other sciences do not argue to prove their own principles, but argue from their principles to prove other things which the sciences include, so neither does this doctrine argue to prove its principles, which are the articles of faith, but argues from these to prove other things. Thus in 1 Cor. 15 the apostle argues from the resurrection of Christ to prove the general resurrection. We must remember, however, that the inferior philosophical sciences do not prove their own principles, nor defend them against one who denies them. They leave this to a higher science. The highest of them, metaphysics, does argue in defence of its principles, provided that he who denies them concedes anything at all. But it cannot argue with him if he concedes nothing, although it can refute his reasoning. Now sacred doctrine, which has no superior, likewise argues at times with one who denies its principles, provided that its adversary concedes something of what is received through revelation. Thus we argue from the authority of sacred doctrine against heretics, and from the authority of one article of faith against those who deny another. But when an adversary believes nothing at all of what has been revealed, there is no way of proving the articles of faith by argument, except by disproving any grounds which he may bring against the faith. For since faith takes its stand on infallible truth, the contrary of which cannot possibly be demonstrated, it is obvious that proofs cited against the faith are not demonstrative, but answerable.

On the first point: although arguments of human reason cannot suffice to prove matters of faith, sacred doctrine argues from the articles of faith to other things, as said above.

On the second point: proof by authority is especially characteristic of this science, because its principles are obtained through revelation. The authority of those who received revelation has to be believed. But this does not detract from the dignity of the science. Appeal to an authority which depends on human reason is the weakest kind of proof. Appeal to an authority founded on divine revelation is the most telling. Yet sacred doctrine does make use of human reason, not indeed to prove the faith (which would take away its merit), but to clarify certain points of doctrine. Since grace does not supplant nature, but perfects it, reason ought to be the servant of faith in the same way as the natural inclination of the will is the servant of charity—“bringing into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ,” as the apostle says in II Cor. 10:5. Sacred doctrine uses even the authority of philosophers in this way, wherever they have been able to know the truth through natural reason. In Acts 17:28, for example, Paul quotes the words of Aratus: “as certain also of your poets have said, For we also are his offspring.” Sacred doctrine uses such authorities, however, as supporting and probable arguments. It uses the canonical Scriptures as the proper authority from which it is bound to argue, and uses other teachers of the Church as authorities from which one may indeed argue with propriety, yet only with probability.

ARTICLE NINE

Whether Sacred Doctrine should Use Metaphors

1. It seems that sacred doctrine should not use metaphors. What is fitting for lesser doctrines would appear to be inappropriate to this doctrine, which holds the supreme place among the sciences, as was said in the preceding article. Now to proceed by various similies and figures is fitting for poetry, the least of all doctrines. Hence this doctrine should not use metaphors.

2. Again, the purpose of this doctrine is, apparently, to explain the truth, since a reward is promised to those who explain it. “They who explain me shall have eternal life” (Ecclesiasticus 24:21). Now truth is obscured by metaphors. This doctrine should not, therefore, record divine things under the form of corporeal things.

3. Again, the more sublime are creatures, the greater their likeness to God. Hence if any of them are to be used in the manifestation of God, it ought to be the more sublime creatures especially—not the lowest, as is often the case in Scripture.

On the other hand: it is said in Hos. 12:10: “I have multiplied visions, and used similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets.” Now to declare something by a similitude is to use a metaphor. The use of metaphors therefore befits sacred doctrine.

I answer: it is fitting that sacred Scripture should declare divine and spiritual things by means of material similies. God provides for all things according to the capacity of their nature, and it is natural for man to reach intelligible things through sensible things, since all his knowledge begins from sense. Hence spiritual things are appropriately given to us by Scripture in material metaphors. This is what Dionysius is saying in 2 Coel. Hier.: “It is impossible for the divine ray to lighten us unless it is shaded by a variety of sacred veils.” It is also appropriate that the sacred Scriptures which are given for all alike (“I am debtor . . . both to the wise and to the unwise,” Rom. 1:14), should expound spiritual things by means of material similitudes, so that simple people who cannot understand intelligible things as they are should at least be able to understand them in this way.

On the first point: poetry uses metaphors to depict, since men naturally find pictures pleasing. But sacred doctrine uses them because they are necessary and useful.

On the second point: as Dionysius says, the ray of divine revelation is not destroyed by the sensible images which veil it (2 Coel Hier.). It remains in its truth, not allowing the minds of men to rest in the images, but raising them to know intelligible things. It instructs others also in intelligible things, through those to whom the revelation is made. Thus what is veiled by metaphor in one passage of Scripture is declared more explicitly in others. This veiling in metaphors is useful for stimulating the thoughtful, and useful also against unbelievers, of whom it is said in Matt. 7:6: “Give not that which is holy unto the dogs.”

On the third point: as Dionysius says, it is more fitting that Scripture should declare divine things in simple than in higher corporeal forms (2 Coel. Hier.). There are three reasons for this. First, the human mind is the more saved from error when it is abundantly plain that these forms are not a proper signification of divine things. This might be doubtful if divine things were described in terms of higher corporeal forms, especially with those who cannot think beyond higher corporeal things. Secondly, it is better suited to the knowledge of God which we have in this life. We know what God is not, better than we know what he is. Likenesses of things farther removed from him lead us to appreciate the more truly that God transcends whatever we say or think about him. Thirdly, divine things are the better hidden from the unworthy.

ARTICLE TEN

Whether One Passage of Sacred Scripture may have Several Interpretations

1. It seems that one passage of sacred Scripture cannot have several interpretations, such as the historical or literal, the allegorical, the tropological or moral, and the anagogical. For many meanings in one

passage make for confusion and deception, and destroy the cogency of argument. We cannot argue from ambiguous propositions, which are blamed for certain fallacies, whereas Scripture must be capable of showing the truth without any fallacy. There cannot, therefore, be several meanings intended by the same passage.

2. Again, Augustine says (De Utilitate Credendi): “The Scriptures which we call the Old Testament bear a fourfold record—the historical, the aetiological, the analogical, and the allegorical.” Now these appear to be quite different from the four interpretations mentioned. It seems wrong, therefore, that the same words of sacred Scripture should be expounded according to the latter.

3. Again, besides these four interpretations, there is the parabolical, which has been omitted.

On the other hand: Gregory says (20 Moral. 1): “The sacred Scriptures surpass all sciences by their manner of speaking. In one and the same word they record an event and proclaim a mystery.”

I answer: God is the author of sacred Scripture, and he is able not only to adapt words (which even a man can do), but also to adapt things to signify something. While words mean something in every science, it is characteristic of this science that the things which the words indicate themselves signify something. The signification by which words signify things belongs to the first interpretation of Scripture, namely the historical or literal. The interpretation wherein things signified by words stand for other things is called the spiritual interpretation, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. The spiritual interpretation is threefold. As the apostle says in Heb. 7, the Old Law is the figure of the New Law, and as Dionysius says (5 Eccles. Hier., cap. 1): “the New Law is itself the figure of future glory.” In the New Law, things done by the Head are signs of what we ourselves ought to do. Thus in so far as the contents of the Old Law indicate the contents of the New, the sense is allegorical. In so far as the deeds of Christ or the things which signify Christ are signs of what we ought to do, the sense is moral, and in so far as they signify what belongs to eternal glory, the sense is anagogical. Finally, since it is the literal sense which the author intends, and since the author is God, who comprehends all things in his mind together, “it is not unfitting that there should literally be several interpretations contained in one scriptural word” (12 Confessions 18–20; 24; 31).

On the first point: this manifold interpretation does not make for equivocation, or for any other kind of multiplicity. As we have said, its manifold nature does not mean that one word indicates different things, but that things indicated by words can be signs of different things. Thus no confusion results, since all interpretations are based on one, that is on the literal, from which alone we can argue. As Augustine says (Contra Vincent. Donatist. 48), we cannot argue from the allegorical meaning. Yet sacred Scripture loses nothing thereby, since nothing essential to the faith is contained in the spiritual sense of one passage which is not clearly expressed in the literal sense of another.

On the second point: the historical, the aetiological, and the anagogical are all three interpretations of the one literal interpretation. As Augustine explains in the same passage, it is history when something is merely narrated; aetiology when a reason is given for what is narrated, as when our Lord gave the reasons why Moses permitted the dismissal of wives, namely, for the hardness of their hearts (Matt. 19:8); analogy when the truth of one passage of Scripture is shown to be compatible with that of another. Of the four, allegory itself stands for the three spiritual interpretations. Thus Hugo St. Victor includes the anagogical under the allegorical, naming only the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological (Sentences 3. Prologue to 1 De Sacrament. 4).

On the third point: the parabolical meaning is contained in the literal, since the words indicate something directly, and also something figuratively. The literal sense is not the figure itself, but the thing which is figured. For when Scripture speaks of the arm of the Lord, the literal sense is not that God has such a bodily member, but that he has what such a bodily member indicates, namely active power. It is thus clear that the literal interpretation of Scripture cannot contain what is false.

QUESTION TWO

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Three questions are asked concerning the existence of God.

1. Whether it is self-evident that God exists.

2. Whether the existence of God can be demonstrated.

3. Whether God exists.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether it is Self-Evident that God Exists

1. It seems to be self-evident that God exists. Things are said to be self-evident when the knowledge of them is naturally in us, as is obviously the case with first principles. Now the Damascene says that "the knowledge that God exists is naturally inborn in all men" (1 De Fid. Orth. I, 3). It is therefore self-evident that God exists.

2. Again, as the philosopher says of the first principles of demonstration, whatever is known as soon as the terms are known is self-evident (1 Post. An., ch. 2). Thus we know that any whole is greater than its part as soon as we know what a whole is, and what a part is. Now when it is understood what the term "God" signifies, it is at once understood that God exists. For the term "God" means that than which nothing greater can be signified, and that which exists in reality is greater than that which exists only in the intellect. Hence since "God" exists in the intellect as soon as the term is understood, it follows that God exists also in reality. It is therefore self-evident that God exists.

3. Again, it is self-evident that truth exists. For truth exists if anything at all is true, and if anyone denies that truth exists, he concedes that it is true that it does not exist, since if truth does not exist it is then true that it does not exist. Now God is truth itself, according to John 14:6: "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." It is therefore self-evident that God exists.

On the other hand: no one can conceive the opposite of what is self-evident, as the philosopher explains in dealing with the first principles of demonstration (4 Metaph., text 9; 1 Post. An., texts 5 and ult.). Now the opposite of “God exists” can be conceived, according to Ps. 53:1: “The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.” It follows that it is not self-evident that God exists.

I answer: there are two ways in which a thing may be self-evident. It may be self-evident in itself, but not self-evident to us. It may also be self-evident both in itself and to us. A proposition is self-evident when its predicate is contained in the meaning of its subject. For example, the proposition “man is an animal” is self-evident, because “animal” is contained in the meaning of “man.” Hence if the predicate and the subject are known to everyone, the proposition will be self-evident to everyone. This is obviously the case with regard to the first principles of demonstration, whose terms are universals known to everyone, such as being and not-being, whole, part, and the like. But when there are some to whom the predicate and the subject are unknown, the proposition will not be self-evident to them, however self-evident it may be in itself. Thus Boethius says (Lib. de Hebd.—Whether all Existence is Good): “it happens that some universal concepts of mind are self-evident only to the wise, e.g., that the incorporeal is not in space.” I say, then, that this proposition “God exists” is self-evident in itself, since its predicate is the same with its subject. For God is his existence, as we shall show in Q. 3, Art. 4. But since we do not know what God is, it is not self-evident to us, but must be proved by means of what is better known to us though less well known to nature, i.e., by means of the effects of God.

On the first point: the knowledge that God exists is inborn in us in a general and somewhat confused manner. For God is the final beatitude of man, and a man desires beatitude naturally, and is also naturally aware of what he desires. But this is not absolute knowledge that God exists, any more than to know that someone is coming is to know that Peter is coming, even though it should actually be Peter who comes. Many indeed think that riches are man’s perfect good, and constitute his beatitude. Others think that pleasures are his perfect good, and others again something else.

On the second point: he who hears the term “God” may not understand it to mean that than which nothing greater can be conceived, since some have believed that God is a body. But given that one understands the term to mean this, it does not follow that he understands that that which the term signifies exists in the nature of things, but only that it exists in the intellect. Neither can it be argued that God exists in reality, unless it is granted that that than which nothing greater can be conceived exists in reality, which is not granted by those who suppose that God does not exist.

On the third point: it is self-evident that truth in general exists. But it is not self-evident to us that the first truth exists.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether God’s Existence can be Demonstrated

1. It seems that God’s existence cannot be demonstrated. God’s existence is an article of faith. But matters of faith cannot be demonstrated, since demonstration makes a thing to be known, whereas the apostle makes it clear that faith is of things not seen (Heb., ch. 11). It follows that God’s existence cannot be demonstrated.

2. Again, the medium of demonstration is the essence. But as the Damascene says (1 De. Fid. Orth. 4), we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not. It follows that we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

3. Again, God’s existence could be demonstrated only from his effects. But his effects are not proportionate to God himself, since God is infinite while they are finite, and the finite is not proportionate to the infinite. Now a cause cannot be demonstrated from an effect which is not proportionate to itself. It follows that God’s existence cannot be demonstrated.

On the other hand: the apostle says in Rom. 1:20: “the invisible things of him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” Now this is possible only if God’s existence can be demonstrated from the things that are made. For the first thing that is understood about anything is its existence.

I answer: there are two kinds of demonstration. There is demonstration through the cause, or, as we say, “from grounds,” which argues from what comes first in nature. There is also demonstration by means of effects, or “proof by means of appearances,” which argues from what comes first for ourselves. Now when an effect is more apparent to us than its cause, we reach a knowledge of the cause through its effect. Even though the effect should be better known to us, we can demonstrate from any effect that its cause exists, because effects always depend on some cause, and a cause must exist if its effect exists. We can demonstrate God’s existence in this way, from his effects which are known to us, even though we do not know his essence.

On the first point: the existence of God, and similar things which can be known by natural reason as Rom., ch. i, affirms, are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles. Faith presupposes natural knowledge as grace presupposes nature, and as perfection presupposes what can be perfected. There is no reason, however, why what is in itself demonstrable and knowable should not be accepted in faith by one who cannot understand the demonstration of it.

On the second point: when a cause is demonstrated by means of its effect, we are bound to use the effect in place of a definition of the cause in proving the existence of the cause. This is especially the case with regard to God. For in proving that something exists, we are bound to accept the meaning of the name as the medium of demonstration, instead of the essence, since the question of what a thing is must follow the question of its existence. Since the names applied to God are derived from his effects, as we shall show in Q. 13, Art. i, we may use the name “God” as the medium in demonstrating God’s existence from his effect.

On the third point: effects which are not proportionate to their cause do not give us perfect knowledge of their cause. Nevertheless, it can be clearly demonstrated from any effect whatever that its cause exists, as we have said. In this way we can prove God’s existence from his effects, even though we cannot know his essence perfectly by means of them.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether God Exists

1. It seems that God does not exist. If one of two contraries were to be infinite, the other would be wholly excluded. Now the name “God” means that he is infinite good. There would therefore be no evil if God were to exist. But there is evil in the world. It follows that God does not exist.

2. Again, what can be explained by comparatively few principles is not the consequence of a greater number of principles. Now if we suppose that God does not exist, it appears that we can still account for all that we see in the world by other principles, attributing all natural things to nature as their principle, and all that is purposive to human reason or will. There is therefore no need to suppose that God exists.

On the other hand: in Ex. 3:14 God says in person: “I AM THAT I AM.”

I answer: God’s existence can be proved in five ways. The first and clearest proof is the argument from motion. It is certain, and in accordance with sense experience, that some things in this world are moved. Now everything that is moved is moved by something else, since nothing is moved unless it is potentially that to which it is moved, whereas that which moves is actual. To move is nothing other than to bring something from potentiality to actuality, and a thing can be brought from potentiality to actuality only by something which is actual. Thus a fire, which is actually hot, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, so moving and altering it. Now it is impossible for the same thing to be both actual and potential in the same respect, although it may be so in different respects. What is actually hot cannot at the same time be potentially hot, although it is potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that, in the same respect and in the same way, anything should be both mover and moved, or that it should move itself. Whatever is moved must therefore be moved by something else. If, then, that by which it is moved is itself moved, this also must be moved by something else, and this in turn by something else again. But this cannot go on for ever, since there would then be no first mover, and consequently no other mover, because secondary movers cannot move unless moved by a first mover, as a staff cannot move unless it is moved by the hand. We are therefore bound to arrive at a first mover which is not moved by anything, and all men understand that this is God.

The second way is from the nature of an efficient cause. We find that there is a sequence of efficient causes in sensible things. But we do not find that anything is the efficient cause of itself. Nor is this possible, for the thing would then be prior to itself, which is impossible. But neither can the sequence of efficient causes be infinite, for in every sequence the first efficient cause is the cause of an intermediate cause, and an intermediate cause is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate causes be many, or only one. Now if a cause is removed, its effect is removed. Hence if there were no first efficient cause, there would be no ultimate cause, and no intermediate cause. But if the regress of efficient causes were infinite, there would be no first efficient cause. There would consequently be no ultimate effect, and no intermediate causes. But this is plainly false. We are therefore bound to suppose that there is a first efficient cause. And all men call this God.

The third way is from the nature of possibility and necessity. There are some things which may either exist or not exist, since some things come to be and pass away, and may therefore be or not be. Now it is impossible that all of these should exist at all times, because there is at least some time when that which may possibly not exist does not exist. Hence if all things were such that they might not exist, at some time or other there would be nothing. But if this were true there would be nothing existing now, since what does not exist cannot begin to exist, unless through something which does exist. If there had been nothing existing, it would have been impossible for anything to begin to exist, and there would now be nothing at all. But this is plainly false, and hence not all existence is merely possible. Something in things must be necessary. Now everything which is necessary either derives its necessity from elsewhere, or does not. But we cannot go on to infinity with necessary things which have a cause of their necessity, any more than with efficient causes, as we proved. We are therefore bound to suppose something necessary in itself, which does not owe its necessity to anything else, but which is the cause of the necessity of other things. And all men call this God.

The fourth way is from the degrees that occur in things, which are found to be more and less good, true, noble, and so on. Things are said to be more and less because they approximate in different degrees to that which is greatest. A thing is the more hot the more it approximates to that which is hottest. There is therefore something which is the truest, the best, and the noblest, and which is consequently the greatest in being, since that which has the greatest truth is also greatest in being, as is said in 2 Metaph., text 4. Now that which most thoroughly possesses the nature of any genus is the cause of all that the genus contains. Thus fire, which is most perfectly hot, is the cause of all hot things, as is said in the same passage. There is therefore something which is the cause of the being of all things that are, as well as of their goodness and their every perfection. This we call God.

The fifth way is from the governance of things. We see how some things, like natural bodies, work for an end even though they have no knowledge. The fact that they nearly always operate in the same way, and so as to achieve the maximum good, makes this obvious, and shows that they attain their end by design, not by chance. Now things which have no knowledge tend towards an end only through the agency of something which knows and also understands, as an arrow through an archer. There is therefore an intelligent being by whom all natural things are directed to their end. This we call God.

On the first point: as Augustine says (Enchirid. 11): “since God is supremely good, he would not allow any evil thing to exist in his works, were he not able by his omnipotence and goodness to bring good out of evil.” God’s infinite goodness is such that he permits evil things to exist, and brings good out of them.

On the second point: everything that can be attributed to nature must depend on God as its first cause, since nature works for a predetermined end through the direction of a higher agent. Similarly, whatever is due to purpose must depend on a cause higher than the reason or will of man, since these are subject to change and defect. Anything which is changeable and subject to defect must depend on some first principle which is immovable and necessary in itself, as we have shown.

QUESTION THREE

OF THE SIMPLE NATURE OF GOD

When we know that something exists, it still remains to inquire into the manner of its existence, in order to know what it is. But we cannot inquire into the manner in which God exists. We can inquire only into the manner in which he does not exist, since we cannot know of God what he is, but only what he is not. We must therefore consider how God does not exist, how we know him, and how we name him. The manner in which God does not exist can be shown by excluding what is incompatible with God, such as composition, movement, and the like. We shall therefore inquire into the simple nature of God which repels composition. We shall also inquire into the divine perfection, since the simple natures of corporeal things are imperfect, having parts.

Eight questions are asked concerning the simple nature of God.

1. Whether God is a body.

2. Whether there is composition of form and matter in God.

3. Whether there is composition of the quiddity, essence, or nature of God, and God as subject.

4. Whether there is composition of essence and existence in God. 5 . Or of genus and difference.

6. Or of substance and attribute.

7. Whether God is composite in any way, or altogether simple.

8. Whether God enters into composition with other things.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether God is a Body

1. It seems that God is a body. For what has three dimensions is a body, and sacred Scripture attributes three dimensions to God, as in Job 11:8–9: “It is as high as heaven; what canst thou do? deeper than hell; what canst thou

know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.” God is therefore a body.

2. Again, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a mode of quantity. Now it seems that God has figure, since it is said in Gen. 1:26: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness,” and image means figure, according to Heb. 1:3: “Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image
of his person. . . .” God is therefore a body.

3. Again, every thing that has bodily parts is a body, and Scripture attributes bodily parts to God, as in Job 40:9: “Hast thou an arm like God?” and in Ps. 34:15: “The eyes of the Lord are upon the righteous,” and in Ps. 118:16: “The right hand of the Lord doeth valiantly.” God is therefore a body.

4. Again, there cannot be position without a body, and scriptural sayings about God imply position. It is said in Isa. 6:1: “I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne,” and in Isa. 3:13: “The Lord standeth to judge the people.” God is therefore a body.

5. Again, only a body or something which has a body can be a local terminus a quo or ad quem, and Scripture speaks of God as a terminus ad quem in Ps. 34:5: “They looked unto him, and were lightened,” and as a terminus a quo in Jer. 17:13: “they that depart from me shall be written in the earth.” God is therefore a body.

On the other hand: it is said in John 4:24: “God is a spirit.”

I answer: God is certainly not a body. This can be proved in three ways. First, particular examples make it plain that no body moves unless it is moved. But it was shown in Q. 2, Art. 3, that God is the unmoved first mover. This proves that God is not a body. Secondly, the first being must be actual, and in no sense potential. Potentiality precedes actuality within any one thing which passes from potentiality to actuality, but actuality is prior to potentiality absolutely, since the potential can become actual only through something which is actual. Now it was shown in Ch 2, Art. 3, that God is the first being. It is therefore impossible that there should be anything potential in him. But every body is potential, since it is continuous, and consequently infinitely divisible. It is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, it is clear from Q. 2, Art. 3, that God is the noblest being. Now a body cannot possibly be the noblest being, since it can be either alive or lifeless. A live body is obviously nobler than a lifeless one. But a live body is not alive because it is a body, otherwise all bodies would be alive. It therefore owes its life to something else, as our own bodies owe their life to the soul, and that which gives life to the body is nobler than the body. It is therefore impossible that God should be a body.

On the first point: as was said in Q. 1, Art. 9, sacred Scripture records spiritual and divine things for us in the similitude of corporeal things. The ascription of three dimensions to God denotes the extent of his power, by the simile of physical quantity. His power to know hidden things is denoted by depth, the surpassing excellence of his power by height, his everlasting being by length, and the love which he bears to all things by breadth. Or as Dionysius says: “The depth of God means his incomprehensible essence, the length the power which permeates all things, the breadth the extension of God over all things, in the sense that all things are under his protection” (9 Div. Nom., lect. 3).

On the second point: it is not in respect of the body that man is said to be the image of God, but because he excels the other animals. Thus after saying: “let us make man in our image, after our likeness,” Gen. 1:26 adds: “and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea.” For man excels all animals in reason and understanding, and is made in the image of God in respect of them. But these are incorporeal.

On the third point: Scripture attributes bodily parts to God metaphorically, in respect of his actions. The function of the eye being to see, the mention of the eye of God denotes his power to see intellectually, not sensibly. Similarly with the other parts mentioned.

On the fourth point: anything attributed to God which implies position is purely metaphorical. Sitting denotes his un-changeableness and his authority. Standing denotes his power to overcome whatever opposes him.

On the fifth point: since God is everywhere, we do not approach him by physical steps, but by the feelings of the mind. We also depart from him in this way. Approach and departure denote spiritual feelings by the metaphor of movement in space.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether there is Composition of Form and Matter in God

1. It appears that there is composition of form and matter in God. Anything which has a soul is composed of matter and form, since soul is the form of body. Scripture attributes a soul to God, saying in the person of God: “Now the just shall live by faith: but if any man draw back, my soul shall have no pleasure in him” (Heb. 10:38). Hence God is composed of matter and form.

2. Again, according to 1 De Anima, texts 12, 14, 15, anger, joy, and the like are passions of the composite. Scripture ascribes such passions to God in Ps. 106:40: “Therefore was the wrath of God kindled against his people.” Hence God is composed of matter and form.

3. Again, matter is the principle of individuation. Now God must be an individual, since he is not predicated of many. Hence God is composed of matter and form.

On the other hand: anything composed of matter and form is a body, since the primary quality of matter is quantitative extention. But it was shown in the preceding article that God is not a body. It follows that God is not composed of matter and form.

I answer: there cannot possibly be matter in God. In the first place, matter is characterized by potentiality, and it has been shown that God is pure act, without any potentiality (Q. 2, Art. 3). It is therefore impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, anything composed of matter and form owes its goodness to its form. It must therefore be good through participation, its matter participating in its form. But the first and best good, which is God, is not good by participation, since good which belongs essentially is better than good which is participated. It is therefore impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, every agent acts by means of its form, and the manner in which a thing is an agent depends on how it is related to its form. Therefore that which is first, and an agent in its own right, must be a form primarily and by means of itself. Now God is the first agent, since he is the first efficient cause, as was shown in Q. 2, Art. 3. God is therefore his own form through his essence, and not a composition of form and matter.

On the first point: a soul is attributed to God metaphorically, in order to denote action, since it is by the soul that we will. What is pleasing to God's will is thus said to be pleasing to his soul.

On the second point: such things as anger are attributed to God metaphorically, in order to denote his effects, since an angry man punishes. Anger metaphorically signifies divine punishment.

On the third point: forms which can be received by matter are made individual by the matter of a primary underlying subject, which cannot be in another subject, although the form itself may be in many subjects unless some obstacle intervenes. But a form which cannot be received by matter, and which subsists by itself, is individual for the very reason that it cannot be received by anything else. God is such a form. It does not then follow that there is matter in God.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether God is the Same as his Essence, or Nature

1. It seems that God is not the same as his essence, or nature. Nothing can be in itself. But the essence or nature of God, which is his divinity, is said to be in God. God cannot then be the same as his essence or nature.

2. Again, an effect is similar to its cause, since every agent acts to produce its own likeness. Now with creatures, a subject is not the same as its essence. A man, for example, is not the same as his humanity. Neither then is God the same as his Divinity.

On the other hand: in John 14:6 it is clearly said that God is not merely living, but life: “I am the way, and the truth, and the life.” Thus Divinity is to God as is life to one who lives. God is therefore Divinity itself.

I answer: God is the same as his essence, or nature. In order to understand this, we must realize that the essence or nature is bound to be different from the underlying subject where things are composed of matter and form, because their essence or nature comprises only what is included in their definition. Thus humanity comprises what is included in the definition of man, or that by which a man is a man, and means that by which a man is a man. But the particular matter of the subject, and all the accidents which it possesses as an individual, are not included in the definition of the species. This flesh, these bones, whether the subject be white or black, and such things, are not included in the definition of man. Hence this flesh, these bones, and the accidents which distinguish this matter as individual are not included in the humanity, even though they are included in the man. The subject which is a man, therefore, included something which humanity does not include, so that a man is not precisely the same as his humanity. Humanity denotes the formal part of a man, since the defining principles are related to the individuating matter as its form. But where things are not composed of matter and form, and where individuation is not due to individual matter, that is, to this particular matter, but where forms individualize themselves, the forms are bound to be identical with the subsisting subjects, so that there is no difference between a subject and its nature. Now it was shown in the preceding article that God is not composed of matter and form. It follows that God must be his Divinity, and whatever else is predicated of him.

On the first point: we cannot speak of simple things except in terms of the composites by means of which we know anything. When we speak of God, therefore, we use concrete names to denote his substance, because only composite things subsist around us, and use abstract names to denote his simple nature. Hence when we say that Divinity, or life, or anything of this kind is in God, the compositeness belongs to the way in which our intellect understands, and not at all to that of which we speak.

On the second point: God’s effects do not resemble him perfectly, but only in so far as they are able. Their likeness to God is deficient in that they can reflect what is simple and single only by what is many. They have the compositeness which necessitates the difference between a subject and its nature.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Essence and Existence are the Same in God

1. It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. If they were the same, nothing would be added to God's existence. Now the existence to which nothing is added is the universal existence which is predicable of all things. Hence God would be the universal existence which is predicable of all things. But this is false, according to Wisdom 4:21: "they gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood." It follows that God's essence is not his existence.

2. Again, it was said in Q. 2, Arts. 2 and 3, that we can know that God exists. But we cannot know what God is. Hence God's existence is not the same as what he is, or his quiddity, or nature.

On the other hand: Hilary says: "Existence is not an accident in God, but subsisting truth" (De Trin. 7).

I answer: God not only is his essence, as was shown in Art. 3, but also is his existence. This can be shown in many ways. First, whatever a thing possesses in addition to its essence must either be caused by the principles of its essence, as is a property which is consequential to a species, such as laughing, which is consequential to "man" and caused by the essential principles of his species; or it must be caused by something external, as heat in water is caused by a fire. Hence when a thing's existence is different from its essence, its existence must either be caused by the principles of its essence, or be caused by something external. Now a thing's existence cannot possibly be caused by the principles of its own essence alone, since nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Hence anything whose existence is different from its essence must be caused by something other than itself. But we cannot say this of God, who is denned as the first efficient cause. It is therefore impossible that God's existence should be different from his essence.

Secondly, existence is the actuality of every form, or nature. That is, we do not say that goodness or humanity, for example, are actual, unless we mean that they exist. Hence where essence and existence are different, existence must be related to essence as the actual to the potential. But it was shown in Q.2, Art. 3, that there is nothing potential in God. It follows that essence and existence are not different in God. God's essence, therefore, is his existence.

Thirdly, anything which has existence without being existence exists through participation, just as anything which is alight but is not itself fire is alight through participation.

Now we proved in Art. 3 that God is his essence. It follows that, if God were not his own existence, he would exist not through his essence but through participation. But God would not then be the first being, which is an absurd thing to say. God is therefore his own existence, as well as his own essence.

On the first point: "that to which nothing is added" may mean two things. It may mean that a thing's nature precludes the addition of something. The nature of an irrational animal, for example, excludes reason. But it may also mean that a nature does not necessitate the addition of something. Thus the common nature of animal does not have reason added to it, because it does not necessitate the addition of reason, though neither does it exclude reason. It is in the first sense that nothing is added to God's existence, and in the second sense that nothing is added to universal existence.

On the second point: "is" may signify two things. It may signify the act of existing, or it may signify the synthesis by which the mind joins a subject to a predicate in a proposition. Now we cannot know the divine act of existing, any more than we can know the divine essence. But we do know that God "is" in the second sense, for we know that the proposition which we put together when we say "God exists" is true. We know this from his effects, as we said in Q. 2, Art. 2.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether God Belongs to a Genus

1. It seems that God does belong to a genus. For “substance” means self-subsistent being, and this is pre-eminently applicable to God. God therefore belongs to the genus “substance.”

2. Again, each thing is measured by what belongs to its own genus. Thus lengths are measured by length, and numbers by number. Now the commentator on 10 Metaph. says that God is the measure of all substances. God therefore belongs to the genus “substance.”

On the other hand: we think of a genus as prior to what it contains. But there is nothing prior to God, whether in reality or in the understanding. Therefore God does not belong to any genus.

I answer: a thing may belong to a genus in two ways. It may belong to it absolutely and properly, as does a species which the genus contains. Or it may be reducible to a genus, as are principles and privations. Point and unity, for example, are reducible to the genus “quantity” as principles of it, while blindness, and all privation, are reducible to the genus of their habits. But God does not belong to a genus in either of these ways.

There are three proofs that God cannot be a species of any genus. First, a species is made up of a genus and a difference. Now that from which the difference which constitutes a species is derived is always related to that from which the genus is derived as the actual to the potential. Thus “animal” is concretely derived from “sensitive nature,” a thing being called animal because it has a sensitive nature, while “the rational” is derived from “intellectual nature,” since the rational is that which has an intellectual nature. The intellectual is then related to the sensitive as the actual to the potential. This is likewise clear in other things. It is therefore impossible that God should belong to a genus as a species of it, since in God there is no adjunction of the potential with the actual.

Secondly, it was proved in the preceding article that God’s existence is his essence. Hence if God belonged to any genus, this genus would have to be “being,” since a genus indicates the essence of a thing, and is predicated because of what the thing is. But the philosopher proves that “being” cannot be the genus of anything (3 Metaph., text 10), since every genus includes differences which are external to its essence, and there are no differences external to being, since “not-being” cannot be a difference. It follows from this that God cannot belong to a genus.

Thirdly, all things which belong to one genus agree in their “what,” or the essence of their genus, which is predicated of them because of what they are. But they differ in point of existence, since the existence of a man is not the same as that of a horse, nor the existence of one man the same as that of another. Existence and essence are thus bound to be different in anything which belongs to a genus. But they are not different in God, as we proved in the preceding article. This makes it plain that God does not belong to a genus as a species.

It is clear from the foregoing that God has neither genus nor differences, and that there is no definition of God, nor any way of demonstrating him except through his effects. For definition is by means of genus and difference, and definitioa is the means of demonstration.

That God does not belong to a genus as a principle reducible to it is obvious from the fact that a principle which is reducible to a genus does not extend beyond that genus. The point, for example, is the principle of continuous quantity only, and the unit of discrete quantity only. But God is the ground of all existence, as we shall prove in Q. 44, Art. 1. Consequently, he is not contained in any genus as a principle.

On the first point: the term “substance” signifies more than self-subsistent being, for we have shown above that “being” cannot by itself be a genus. It signifies an essence which has the ability to exist, i.e., which can exist through itself, but whose existence is not identical with its essence. This makes it plain that God does not belong to the genus “substance.”

On the second point: this objection argues from the measure of proportion. God is not in this way the measure of anything. He is said to be the measure of all things because all things have existence in so far as they are like him.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether there is any Accident in God

1. It appears that there are some accidents in God. It is said in 1 Physics, texts 27, 30, that a substance can never be an accident. This means that what occurs as accident in one thing cannot be the substance of another, and is used to prove that heat is not the formal substance of fire, since heat occurs as an accident of other things. Now wisdom, virtue, and the like occur as accidents in ourselves, and are also ascribed to God. They must therefore be in God as accidents.

2. Again, in every genus there is something which is first, and there are many genera of accidents. Hence if the principles of these genera are not in God, there will be many things which are first, and which are not in God. But this is impossible.

On the other hand: every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, since “an absolute form cannot be a subject,” as Boethius says (De Trin.). There cannot then be any accident in God.

I answer: what we have already said makes it quite clear that there cannot be any accident in God. In the first place, a subject is related to its accident as the potential to the actual, and is actualized through its accident in a particular way. But potentiality is altogether alien to God, as we explained in Q. 2, Art. 3. In the second place, God is his existence. But as Boethius says {Lib. de Hebd.), existence itself cannot be augmented by the addition of anything else, although that which is something may have something else added to it. A thing which is hot may have something other than heat added to it, such as whiteness, but heat itself cannot contain anything other than heat. In the third place, what exists through itself is prior to what exists accidentally. But God is altogether primary being, and therefore nothing in him can exist accidentally. Nor can there be in God any inherent accident, such as the accident of laughing in man. Accidents of this kind are caused by the principles of the subject, whereas nothing in God is caused, since God is the first cause. There is therefore no accident in God.

On the first point: virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of ourselves univocally, as will be shown (Q. 13, Art. 5). It does not then follow that they are accidents in God as they are in us.

On the second point: principles of accidents are reducible to prior principles of substance because substances are prior to their accidents. God is not the primary content of the genus “substance.” He is nevertheless first in relation to all being, and outside every genus.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether God is Altogether Simple

1. It seems that God is not altogether simple. God’s creatures resemble him. Thus all things have being from God the first being, and all things are good since he is the first good. Now nothing that God creates is altogether simple. Therefore God is not altogether simple.

2. Again, whatever is better must be ascribed to God. Now in things around us, what is composite is better than what is simple. Composite bodies, for example, are better than their elements, and animals are better than their parts. Hence we should not say that God is altogether simple.

On the other hand, Augustine says: “God is absolutely and altogether simple” (4 De Trin. 6, 7).

I answer: it can be shown in many ways that God is altogether simple. In the first place, this can be proved from what we have already said. There is no combination of quantitative parts in God, since he is not a body. Neither is there in God any composition of form and matter. Neither is there any difference between God’s nature and God as subject, nor between his essence and his existence. Neither is there in God any composition of genus and difference. It is thus clear that God is in no way composite, but altogether simple. Secondly, everything that is composite is consequential to its elements, and dependent on them. But God is the first being, as we proved in Q. 2, Art. 3. Thirdly, everything that is composite has a cause, since elements which are naturally separate cannot be combined into one unless some cause unites them. But we proved in the same article that God has no cause, since he is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, everything that is composite must contain both potentiality and actuality. Either one part is the actuality of another, or at least all parts are as it were the potentiality of the whole. But this is not true of God. Fifthly, everything that is composite is more than any of its parts. This is obvious when the parts are dissimilar. No part of a man is a man, and no part of a foot is a foot. But even when the parts are similar, although something can be affirmed equally of the whole and of every part of it, since a part of air is air, and a part of water is water, we can still say something about the whole which cannot be said of any part. For if the whole water measures two cubits, no part of it does so. In this way, there is something other than itself in everything that is composite. We may also say that there is something other than itself in everything that has a form. A thing that is white, for example, may contain something that is not white. But a form itself cannot contain anything other than itself. Now God is pure form, or rather, pure being. He cannot then be composite in any way. Hilary argues in somewhat the same fashion when he says: “God, who is power, is not compounded from what is weak, nor is he who is light composed of things of darkness” (De Trin. 7).

On the first point: God’s creatures resemble him as effects resemble their first cause. But an effect is naturally composite in some way, since its existence is at least different from its essence, as we shall show in Q. 4, Art. 3.

On the second point: composite things around us are better than simple things because the perfection of creaturely good is to be found not in one simple thing, but in many. The perfection of divine goodness, on the other hand, is to be found in what is single and simple, as we shall prove in Q. 4, Art. 1, and in Q. 6, Art. 2.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether God Enters into the Composition of Other Things

1. It seems that God enters into the composition of other things. For Dionysius says (4 Coel. Hier.): “the being of all things, which transcends existence, is Divinity.” The being of all things enters into the composition of all things. Hence God enters into the composition of other things.

2. Again, God is a form. For Augustine says: “The word of God, which is God, is a form not formed” (De Verb. Dom., Sermo 33). Now a form is part of a composite. Therefore God is part of a composite.

3. Again, all things which exist, and which are in no wise different, are identical. Now God and primary matter exist, and are in no wise different. They are therefore fundamentally identical. But primary matter enters into the composition of things. Hence God also enters into their composition. The minor premise is proved as follows. Whatever things differ, differ by reason of certain differences, and must accordingly be composite. But God and primary matter are not composite in any way. Hence they do not differ in any way.

On the other hand: Dionysius says: “there is neither contact nor communion with God in the intermingling of parts” (2 Div. Nom., lect. 3). It is also said in the Book on Causes
(Interpretation of Aristotle, prop. 6): “the first cause rules all things without mingling with them.”

I answer: there have been three errors on this question. Augustine writes of some who said that God is a world-soul (7 De Civ. Dei. 6), and it is due to this that others have thought God to be the soul of the first heaven. Others again have thought that God is the formal principle of all things, as the Almaricians are said to have believed. The third error was that of David of Dinant, who very foolishly supposed that God was primary matter. But it is obvious that all these notions are false, and that God cannot possibly enter into the composition of other things in any way, either as their formal or as their material principle. In the first place, God is the first efficient cause, as we proved in Q. 2, Art. 3. Now an efficient cause is not numerically one with the thing made, but one with it in kind only. One man begets another man. The matter is neither numerically one with the efficient cause nor similar to it in kind, since it is potential, while the efficient cause is actual. Secondly, God is the first efficient cause, and therefore acts primarily and through himself. Now that which enters into the composition of something does not act primarily and through itself. Rather does the thing composed do so. Thus it is not the hand that acts, but the man who acts by means of it, and it is the fire that heats by means of heat. It follows that God cannot be a part of any composite thing. Thirdly, no part of any composite thing can be the first of all beings, not even its matter or its form, which are the fundamental parts of composite things. Matter is potential, and what is potential is subsequent to what is absolute and actual, as we explained in the first article. The form which is part of a composite thing is a participated form, and this is no less subsequent to what exists through its essence than is the thing which participates. Fire in that which is ignited, for example, is subsequent to what exists through its essence. Now we have proved in Q. 2, Art. 3 that God is the absolute first being.

On the first point: Divinity is said to be the being of all things as their efficient cause and example, not as their essence.

On the second point: the word of God is the exemplary form of a composite thing, not the form which is a part of it.

On the third point: simple things do not differ from each other by reason of differences, which is the way in which composite things differ. A man and a horse, for example, differ by reason of the difference between the rational and the irrational. But these differences do not themselves differ by reason of further differences. Properly speaking, we ought to say that differences are contrary, rather than different. As the philosopher says (10 Metaph., texts 24–25): “Contrariety is predicated absolutely, whereas things which differ differ in some way.” Properly speaking, then, God and primary matter do not differ. But they are contrary to each other. It does not then follow that they are identical.

QUESTION FOUR

THE PERFECTION OF GOD

After considering the simple nature of God, we must now consider the perfection of God, concerning which there are three questions.

1. Whether God is perfect.

2. Whether God is perfect universally, comprehending within himself the perfections of all things.

3. Whether creatures can be said to be like God.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether God is Perfect

1. It seems that perfection is not applicable to God. To be perfect means to be made complete, and we cannot say that God is made. Neither then can we say that God is perfect.

2. Again, God is the first beginning of things. Now the beginnings of things appear to be imperfect. The beginning of an animal, or of a plant, for example, is but a seed. It follows that God is imperfect.

3. Again, it was proved in Q. 3, Art. 4, that God's essence is the same as his existence. But God's existence appears to be very imperfect. It is entirely universal, and therefore receives all things as additional to itself. Hence God is imperfect.

On the other hand: it is said in Matt. 5:48: "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

I answer: Aristotle tells us that of the ancient philosophers, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus did not ascribe what is best and most perfect to their first principle (12 Metaph., text 40). This was because they believed the first principle to be purely material. A material first principle is very imperfect. Matter, as matter, is potential, and a material first principle is bound to be supremely potential, and therefore exceedingly imperfect. Now God is the first principle, but he is not material. He is defined as efficient cause, and must accordingly be supremely perfect. Just as matter as such is potential, so an agent as such is actual. The first active principle is therefore bound to be superlatively actual, and consequently superlatively perfect. For we say that a thing is perfect in so far as it is actual, and we call a thing perfect when it lacks nothing of its perfection.

On the first point: Gregory says (5 Moral. 26, 29): "Let us declare the glory of God by lisping as we can. We cannot rightly say that he is perfect, since he is not made." But since a thing which "becomes" is said to be perfect when it has passed from potentiality to actuality, we borrow the word "perfect" to signify anything which is not lacking in actuality, whether this is achieved through its being made perfect, or otherwise.

On the second point: the material beginning of things around us is imperfect. But it cannot be first absolutely, because it must be derived from something else which is perfect. Even though the seed be the beginning of the animal which develops from it, there is bound to be a previous animal, or plant, from which it came. Something actual must precede the potential, since only what is actual can enable the potential to become actual.

On the third point: existence itself is the most perfect of all things, since it is the actuality of all things. Nothing is actual save in so far as it exists. Existence itself is therefore the actuality of everything, even of forms. It is not a recipient which receives other things. Rather is it that which other things receive. When I speak of the existence of a man, or of a horse, or of anything else, I think of existence as something formal which is received, not as something which can receive existence.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether the Perfections of all Things are in God

1. It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For it was proved in Q. 3, Art. 7, that God is simple, whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. The perfections of all things cannot then be in God.

2. Again, contraries cannot occur in the same thing. Now the perfections of things are contrary to one another. Each thing is made perfect by the difference which belongs to its own species, and the differences which divide a genus and constitute its species are contrary to one another. But if contraries cannot be in the same thing, it seems that the perfections of all things cannot be in God.

3. Again, one who lives is more perfect than one who exists, and one who is wise is more perfect than one who lives. Thus to live is more perfect than to exist, and to be wise is more perfect than to live. Now God’s essence, is his existence. His essence cannot then contain within itself the perfection of life, or of wisdom, or any similar perfection.

On the other hand: Dionysius says: “God precontains all existence in one” (5 Div. Nom., lect. 3).

I answer: the perfections of all things are in God. God is said to be perfect in every way because he lacks no excellence discoverable in any genus, as the commentator on 5 Metaph., text 21, remarks. We may see this in two ways. First, any perfection which occurs in an effect must occur in its efficient cause, either in the same mode if the agent be univocal, as in the case of a man who begets a man, or in a more eminent way if the agent be equivocal, as in the case of the sun which contains the likenesses of the things generated by its power. For it is plain that an effect virtually pre-exists in its active cause. But whereas a thing pre-exists in a less perfect way in the potentiality of its material cause, since matter as such is imperfect, it pre-exists in its active cause in a more perfect way, not in a less perfect way, since an agent, as such, is perfect. Now God is the first efficient cause of all things. The perfections of all things must therefore pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius argues in similar fashion when he says: “God is not one thing without being another, but is all things, as their cause” (5 Div. Nom., lect. 2). Secondly, it was shown in Q. 3, Art. 4, that God is existence which subsists through itself. This proves that he must contain within himself the whole perfection of existence. For it is clear that if a thing which is hot does not possess the whole perfection of heat, this is because it does not participate in heat which is perfect in nature. If the heat were such as to subsist through itself, the thing which is hot would not lack any of the power of heat. Now God is existence which subsists through itself. He cannot then lack any perfection of existence. Dionysius argues in similar fashion when he says: “God exists not in a certain way, but absolutely, comprehensively precontaining the whole in unity within Himself” (5 Div. Nom., lect. 5), to which he adds: “He is the existence of things which subsist.”

On the first point: as Dionysius says (5 Div. Nom., lect. 2): “Just as the sun illumines things in a single way, and thereby contains in a single form within itself the substances of sensible things, and many different qualities, so and all the more must all things pre-exist as a natural unity in the cause of all things.” In this way, things which are in themselves diverse and contrary pre-exist as one in God, without destroying the unity of God. The reply to the second point is then obvious.

On the third point: as the same Dionysius says in the same passage, existence itself is more perfect than life, and life more perfect than wisdom, if we consider them as distinct ideas. But one who lives is nevertheless more perfect than one who merely exists, since one who lives also exists, while one who is wise both lives and exists. Accordingly, although to exist does not include to live and to be wise, since one who participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence, God's existence includes life and wisdom, since he who is self-subsistent existence itself cannot lack any perfection of existence.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether any Creature can be Like God

1. It seems that no creature can be like God. It is said in Ps. 86:8: “Among the gods there is none like unto thee, O Lord.” Now it is the most excellent of all the creatures that are said to be gods by participation. Still less, then, can other creatures be said to be like God.

2. Again, likeness implies that things can be compared. But there is no comparing things which belong to different genera, and consequently no likeness between them. We do not say, for example, that sweetness is like whiteness. Now no creature belongs to the same genus with God, since God does not belong to any genus, as was proved in Q. 3, Art. 5. It follows that no creature can be like God.

3. Again, we say that things are alike when they have the same form. But nothing has the same form as God, since nothing has an essence identical with its existence, save God alone. It follows that no creature can be like God.

4. Again, the likeness between similar things is reciprocal, since like is like to like. Hence if any creature were like God, God would also be like a creature. But this is contrary to the words of Isa. 40:18: “To whom then will ye liken God?”

On the other hand: it is said in Gen. 1:26: “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness,” and in I John 3:2: “when he shall appear, we shall be like him."

I answer: there are many kinds of likeness, since likeness depends on agreement or similarity of form, and there are many kinds of similarity of form. Some things are said to be like because they agree in possessing a form which is similar both in nature and in measure. They are then said to be not only like, but equal in their likeness. Thus two things which are equally white are said to be alike in whiteness. This is perfect likeness. Again, some things are said to be alike because they agree in possessing a form of the same nature, but not in the same measure, being more and less. Thus we say that one white thing is like another which is whiter. This is imperfect likeness. Thirdly, some things are said to be alike because they agree in possessing the same form, but not according to the same nature. This is apparent in the case of agents which are not univocal. Every agent, as such, acts to produce what is like itself. It makes each thing after its own form, and hence the likeness of its form is bound to be in its effect. Consequently, if the agent belongs to the same species as its effect, that which makes and that which is made will have the same specific nature. Thus it is when a man begets a man. But if the agent does not belong to the same species, there will be a likeness, but not a likeness of specific nature. For example, things generated by the power of the sun have a certain likeness to the sun, although it is the likeness of genus, not of specific form. Now if there be an agent which does not belong to any genus, its effect will reflect its likeness all the more remotely. It will not reflect the likeness of the form of the agent by possessing the same specific nature, nor by having the same genus, but by some kind of analogy, since existence itself is common to all things. The things which God has made are like him in this way. In so far as they are beings, they are like the first and universal principle of all being.

On the first point: according to Dionysius, sacred Scripture does not deny that there is likeness when it says that something is not like God. For "the same things are like God and unlike him. They are like him, since they imitate him who cannot be imitated perfectly, so far as he can be imitated; they are unlike him, since they fall short of their cause" (9 Div. Nom., lect. 3). They fall short not only qualitatively and quantitatively, as one white thing falls short of another which is whiter, but because they have no community either of specific nature or of genus.

On the second point: God is not related to creatures as things of different genera are related. He is related to them as that which is outside every genus, and the principle of every genus.

On the third point: when we say that a creature is like God, we do not mean that it has the same form according to genus and species. We speak by analogy, since God exists through his essence, whereas other things exist through participation.

On the fourth point: when we affirm that a creature is like God, we are not in any way compelled to say that God is like a creature. As Dionysius says (9 Div. Nom., lect. 3), and as we shall ourselves affirm in Q, 42, Art. 1, there may be mutual likeness between two things of the same order, but not between a cause and its effect. Hence we say that an effigy is like a man, but not that a man is like his effigy. Similarly, we can in a sense say that a creature is like God, but not that God is like a creature.

Appendix to Q. 4, Art. 3

Q. 12, Art. 12. (Whether, in this life, God can be known through natural reason.)

Our natural knowledge begins from sense. It can therefore extend so far as it can be led by sensible things. But our intellect cannot in this way attain insight into the divine essence. Sensible things are indeed effects of God, but they are not proportionate to the power of their cause, and for this reason the whole power of God cannot be known from them. Neither, consequently, can his essence be seen. But since effects depend on their cause, sensible things can lead us to know that God exists, and to know what is bound to be attributable to him as the first cause of all things, and as transcending all his effects. In this way we know that God is related to creatures as the cause of them all; that he differs from creatures, since he is none of the things caused by him; and that creatures are separated from God because God transcends them, not because of any defect in God. Q. 13, Art. 1. (Whether any name is applicable to God.)

According to the philosopher (I De Interpretatione, cap. i), words are the signs of concepts, and concepts are copies of things. It is thus plain that words refer to things through the medium of concepts. We can therefore name things in so far as we can understand them. Now it was proved in Q. 12, Art. 2, that in this life we cannot see God in his essence. But we do know God through creatures, as their principle, in terms of the excelling and the remote. We can accordingly apply to God names which are derived from creatures. Such a name, however, does not express what the divine essence is in itself, as “man” by its own meaning expresses the very essence of a man. The name “man” signifies the definition which explains the essence of a man, since it stands for the definition.

Q. 13, Art. 5. (Whether the things which are affirmed of God and also of creatures are affirmed of them univocally.)

It is impossible for anything to be predicated of God and of creatures univocally, because an effect which is not proportionate to the power of its active cause resembles its cause in an inadequate way. It does not have the same nature. What is separated and multiple in the effects is simple in the cause, in which it exists in a single mode. The sun, for example, produces many and various forms in inferior things, yet its power by which it does so is one. Similarly, the many perfections which exist separately in created things all pre-exist as a simple unity in God. Thus any name given to a perfection of a creature indicates a perfection which is distinct from its other perfections. When we call a man wise, for example, we name a perfection which is distinct from his essence as a man, and distinct from his power and from his existence. But when we apply this same name to God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from his essence, power, or existence. Accordingly, when the name “wise” is applied to a man, it circumscribes and comprehends what it signifies. But when it is applied to God, it leaves what it signifies uncomprehended, and beyond its power to denote. It is thus plain that the name “wise” is not applied to God and to a man with the same meaning. This is true of other names also. No name is applied univocally to God and to creatures.

Yet neither are such names ascribed merely equivocally, as some have said. If they were, nothing could be known or proved of God at all. We should always fall into the fallacy of equivocation. But this is contrary to what the philosopher says in 8 Physics and in 12 Metaph., where he demonstrates many things about God. It is contrary also to Rom. 1:20: “the invisible things of him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” We must therefore say that it is by way of analogy, that is, according to a relation of proportion, that such names are ascribed to God as well as to creatures. There are two ways of applying a name analogously. First, when many things are related to one thing. Thus “healthy” is applied both to medicine and to urine, because these both relate to the health of an animal, one being the sign of it and the other the cause of it. Secondly, when the one thing is related to the other. Thus “healthy” is applied both to medicine and to an animal, because medicine is the cause of health in an animal. Now it is in this second analogous way that some names are ascribed both to God and to creatures, and such names are neither purely equivocal nor purely univocal. As we said in Art. 1., it is only from what we know of creatures that we can ascribe names to God. But when we ascribe any one name to God as well as to creatures, we do so in accordance with the relation in which creatures stand to God as their principle and cause, in whom the perfection of all things pre-exist in an eminent way. This common ascription is midway between merely equivocal and purely univocal ascription. There is no one nature common to what is ascribed, as there is when things are ascribed univocally. Yet neither are the things ascribed entirely different, as they are when ascribed equivocally. A name ascribed in different senses by analogy signifies different relations to one and the same thing, as “healthy” signifies the sign of an animal’s health when ascribed to urine, and the cause of its health when ascribed to medicine.

QUESTION TWENTY

THE LOVE OF GOD

There are four questions concerning the love of God.

1. Whether there is love in God.

2. Whether God loves all things.

3. Whether he loves one thing more than another.

4. Whether God loves better things the more.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether there is Love in God

1. It seems that love is not in God. For there is no passion in God, and love is a passion. It follows that love is not in God.

2. Again, love, anger, sadness, and the like are condivided. But sadness and anger are not attributed to God otherwise than metaphorically. Neither, therefore, is love.

3. Again, Dionysius says (4 Div. Nom, lect. 12): "Love is a power which unites and binds." But there is no place for this in God, since God is simple. It follows that love is not in God.

On the other hand: it is said in I John 4:16: "God is love." I answer: we are bound to say that there is love in God, because the first movement of the will, and indeed of any appetitive power, is love. An act of will or of any appetitive power seeks both good and evil as its proper object, but good is the object of will or appetite more fundamentally and essentially. Evil is its object secondarily and derivatively, that is, in so far as it is opposed to good. Hence actions of will or appetite which refer to good are bound to be naturally prior to those which refer to evil, as joy is prior to sadness, and love prior to hate. Again, that which is more universal is naturally prior. Thus the intellect is related to universal truth before it is related to any particular truths. Now some actions of will and appetite refer to the good under some special circumstance. Joy and delight, for example, refer to good which is present and possessed, while desire and hope refer to good which is not yet possessed. Love, on the other hand, refers to the good universally, whether it be possessed or not possessed, and is therefore naturally the first action of the will and of the appetite. Hence all other appetitive movements presuppose love, as their first root. No one desires anything except as a good which is loved. Neither does anyone rejoice except in a good which is loved. Neither is there hatred, except of that which is opposed to what is loved. It is likewise obvious that sadness and other such feelings depend on love as their first principle. There must therefore be love in whomsoever there is will, or appetite, since if that which is first is removed, the rest is removed. Now it was proved in Q. 19, Art. 1, that there is will in God. We are therefore bound to say that there is love in God.

On the first point: the cognitive power moves only through the medium of the appetitive power. Thus the notion of the universal moves us through the notion of the particular, as is said in 3 De Anima, texts 57–58. So also the intellectual appetite, which we call the will, moves in us through the medium of the sensitive appetite, whose action is always accompanied by some sensible change, especially in the heart, which according to the philosopher is the first principle of movement in animals (De Part. Animalium 2, ch. 1; 3, ch. 4). It is indeed because they are accompanied by bodily change that actions of the sensitive appetite are called passions, and not actions of will. Accordingly, in so far as love, joy, and delight signify actions of the sensitive appetite, they are passions. But in so far as they signify actions of the intellectual appetite, they are not passions. Now they signify the latter when referred to God. That is why the philosopher says: “God rejoices by one, simple operation” (7 Ethics, text ult.). God also loves in the same manner, without passion.

On the second point: we must pay attention to the material element in the passions of the sensitive appetite, namely to the bodily change, and also to the formal aspect of an appetite. The material element in anger is the increase of blood around the heart, or something of the kind, while formally it is the desire for revenge. Further, the formal aspect of some passions involves a certain imperfection. Desire, for example, involves an unattained good. Sadness involves an evil which is endured, as does anger also, since it presupposes sadness. Other passions, however, such as love and joy, involve no imperfection. Now none of these can be attributed to God in respect of their material element, as we argued above. Nor can we attribute to God any passion which even formally involves imperfection, except in the metaphorical manner permissible in view of the likeness borne by an effect. (Q. 3, Art. 2; Q. ig, Art. 2.) But those which do not involve imperfection, such as love and joy, are rightly attributed to God, yet as without passion, as we have said.

On the third point: an act of love is always directed to two things. It is directed to the good which one wills for someone, and also to the person for whom one wills it. To love someone is in fact to will good for him. Hence when anyone loves himself he wills good for himself, and seeks to acquire it so far as he can. This is the reason why love is called a “uniting” power, even in God. Yet love is not composite in God, because the good which God wills for himself is not other than himself, since God is good by his own essence, as we proved in Q. 4, Arts. 1 and 3. Again, when anyone loves another and wills good for him, he substitutes this other for himself, and counts good for him as good for himself. For this reason love is called a “binding” power. It joins another to oneself, and relates oneself to him as if to oneself. In so far as God wills good to others, the love which is in God is an incomposite binding power.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether God Loves all Things

1. It seems that God does not love all things. Dionysius says: “love carries the lover outside himself, in a sense transferring him to the loved one” (4 Div. Nom., lect. 10). But we cannot possibly say that God is carried outside himself and transferred to other things. Neither, then, can we say that he loves what is other than himself.

2. Again, God’s love is eternal. Now other things are eternal only as they exist in God. It is consequently only as they exist in himself that God loves them. But what is in God is not other than God. Hence God does not love what is other than himself.

3. Again, there are two kinds of love, namely the love of desire and the love of friendship. But God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since he needs nothing besides himself. Neither does he love them with the love of friendship, since there cannot be friendship with irrational things, as the philosopher says in 8 Ethics 2. Hence God does not love all things.

4. Again, it is said in Ps. 5:5: “thou hatest all workers of iniquity.” But hate has nothing in common with love. Hence God does not love all things.

On the other hand: it is said in Wisdom 11:25: “Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing that thou hast made.”

I answer: God loves all things that exist. For all things that exist are good, in so far as they are. The very existence of anything whatsoever is a good, and so is any perfection of it. Now we proved in Q. 19, Art. 4, that God is the cause of all things. A thing must therefore be, and be good, to the extent which God wills. It follows that God wills some good to each thing that is. Now to love is just to will good for something. Clearly, then, God loves all things that are. But God does not love as we love. Our will is not the cause of the goodness in things, but is moved by their goodness as its object. Consequently, the love by which we will good for anyone is not the cause of his goodness. On the contrary, it is his goodness, whether real or imagined, that inspires the love whereby we will both the preservation of the good which he has and the provision of the good which he lacks, and whereby we also work to this end. God’s love, on the other hand, creates and infuses the goodness in things.

On the first point: the lover is carried beyond himself and transferred to the loved one in the sense that he wills good for him, and works to provide it as if for himself. Thus Dionysius says in the same passage: “in the interest of truth we must say that even God, who in his abundant loving-kindness causes all things, is carried beyond himself by his care for all that exists.”

On the second point: it is only in God that creatures have existed from eternity. Yet, since they have existed in himself from eternity, God has known their proper natures from eternity, and for the same reason has also loved them from eternity. Our own knowledge of things as they are in themselves is similar. We know them through their likenesses which exist in us.

On the third point: friendship is possible only with rational creatures who can return it, and who can share in the work of life, and fare well in fortune and happiness. Benevolence, also, is properly towards rational creatures. Irrational creatures can neither love God nor share his intellectual life of happiness. Properly speaking, therefore, God does not love them with the love of friendship. But he does love them with the love of desire. For he has ordained them for rational creatures, indeed for himself—not as if he needed them, but for the sake of his loving-kindness, in as much as they are useful to us. We can desire something for others no less than for ourselves.

On the fourth point: there is nothing to prevent the same thing being loved in one respect and hated in another respect. God loves sinners in so far as they are natures, because they are, and have their being from himself. But in so far as they are sinners they fail to be, and are not. This deficiency is not from God, and they are hateful to God in respect of it.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether God Loves All Things Equally

1. It seems that God loves all things equally. Wisdom 6:8 says: “He cares for all things equally.” Now God’s providential care for all things is due to his love for them. He therefore loves all things equally.

2. Again, God’s love is his essence. But his essence does not admit of more and less. Neither, consequently, does his love. He does not, therefore, love some things more than others.

3. Again, God’s knowledge and will extend to all things, in the same manner as his love. But we cannot say that God knows, or wills, some things more than others. Neither then does he love some things more than others.

On the other hand: Augustine says (Tract, 110 in Joan.): “God loves all that he has made. He loves rational creatures more; members of his only begotten still more; his only begotten much more.”

I answer: since to love is to will good for something, there are two ways in which one thing may be loved more or less than another. First, the act of the will may be more or less intense. God does not love some things more than others in this sense, because he loves all things by the same simple act of will, which is always of the same degree. Secondly, the good which is willed for something may be more or less. We are said to love one thing more than another when we will a greater good for it, even if the will is not more intense. Now we are bound to say that God loves some things more than others in this latter sense. For we said in the preceding article that his love is the cause of the goodness in things, and hence one thing would not be better than another, if God did not love one thing more than another.

On the first point: God is said to care for all things equally because he administers all things with equal care and wisdom, not because he provides an equal good for each thing.

On the second point: this reasoning argues from the intensity of the act of will which love involves. This does belong to the divine essence. But the good which God wills for a creature does not belong to the divine essence, and there is nothing to prevent it being more or less.

On the third point: knowledge and will signify the divine act only. Their meaning does not include any of the objects, whose diversity permits us to say that God knows and wills more and less, just as we said above concerning his love.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether God Always Loves Better Things the More

1. It seems that God does not always love better things the more. It is obvious that Christ is better than the entire human race. Yet according to Rom. 8:32 God loved the human race more than he loved Christ. “He that spared not his only Son, but delivered him up for us all . . .” Thus God does not always love better things the more.

2. Again, an angel is better than a man, according to Ps. 8:5: “Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels.” Yet God loved a man more than an angel, according to what is said in Heb. 2:16: “For verily he took not on him the nature of angels; but he took on him the seed of Abraham.” Thus God does not always love better things the more.

3. Again, Peter was better than John, since he had a greater love for Christ. Christ knew this when he asked of Peter, “Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me more than these?” Nevertheless, Christ loved John more than Peter. In his commentary on John 20:2, “ . . . the disciple whom Jesus loved,” Augustine says: “John is distinguished from the other disciples by this very

sign, not that Christ loved him alone, but that he loved him more than the rest.” Thus God’s love is not always greater towards the better.

4. Again, an innocent is better than a penitent. For in his commentary on Isa. 3:9, “they declare their sin as Sodom,” Hieronymus says that penitence is like a shipwreck. But God loves a penitent more than an innocent man, since he rejoices in him the more. For it is said in Luke 15:7: “I say unto you, that likewise joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentence.” Thus God does not always love more that which is better.

5. Again, a just man foreknown is better than a sinner who is predestined. Now God has a greater love for the sinner who is predestined, since he wills a greater good for him, namely, eternal life. Hence God does not always love more that which is better.

On the other hand: “everything loves what is like itself,” as is clear from Ecclesiasticus 13:19: “every beast loves what is like itself.” Now the better anything is, the more is it like God. God therefore loves better things the more.

I answer: what we have already said compels us to say that God loves better things the more. We said in Arts. 2 and 3 that for God to love something more just means that he wills a greater good for it, and also that God’s will is the cause of the goodness in things. It is therefore because God wills a greater good for them that some things are better. It follows that God has a greater love for things which are better.

On the first point: God loves Christ not only more than the entire human race, but more than the whole universe of creatures. For he willed a greater good for Christ, and gave him the name that is above every name, as true God. Nor did it in any way diminish his excellence, that God should deliver him up to die for the salvation of the human race. On the contrary, he thereby became a glorious conqueror, in keeping with Isa. 9:6: “the government shall be upon his shoulder.”

On the second point: It accords with what we have said on the first point, that God should love the human nature assumed by his Word in the person of Christ more than all the angels. For this nature is better than the angels, in consequence of this union. But if we are speaking of common human nature, and comparing it in grace and glory with that of an angel, we find that they are equal. For according to Rev. 21:17 the measure of a man and the measure of an angel are the same, although some angels may be better in respect of it than some men, and some men better than some angels. Yet the natural condition of an angel is better than that of a man. Hence it was not because he loved man more that God assumed the nature of a man, but because man needed him more. A good master of a house gives something costly to a sick servant which he does not give to a healthy son.

On the third point: this puzzle about Peter and John may be solved in several ways. Augustine, in his commentary, regards this passage as mystical, and explains that the active life signified by Peter is greater in love to God than the contemplative life signified by John, since it is more alive to the sufferings of this present life, and desires more fervently to be set free and to draw near to God; but that God loves the contemplative life the more, since he preserves it longer, for it does not end with the life of the body, as does the life of action. Others say that Peter had a greater love for Christ in his members, and that he was consequently the more loved of Christ, who for this reason commended the Church to his care; or that John had a greater love for Christ in himself, and that he was consequently the more loved of Christ, who for this reason commended his mother to his care. Others again say that it is doubtful which of them loved Christ the more with the love of charity, and doubtful which of them was destined by God’s love to the greater glory of eternal life. But it is said that Peter loved the more spontaneously and with the greater fervour, and that John was the more loved, on the evidence of the signs of familiarity which Christ accorded to him and not to others, on account of his youth and purity. Others again say that Christ loved Peter the more for his more excellent gift of charity, and John the more for his greater gift of intellect. If so, Peter was the better, and was the more loved, in an absolute sense, while John was the more loved conditionally. But it seems presumptuous to judge of this matter, since it is said in Prov. 16:2: “the Lord weigheth the spirits,” and none other than the Lord.

On the fourth point: penitents are related to innocents as the exceeding to the exceeded. For those who have the more grace are better, and are loved the more, whether they be innocents or penitents. But innocence is more worthy than penitence, other things being equal. The reason why God is said to rejoice in a penitent more than in an innocent man is that penitents often arise more cautious, more humble, and more fervent. Thus Gregory says, in his comments on this passage, “the leader in a battle rejoices more in one who turns from flight to press hard upon the enemy than in one who has neither fled nor fought bravely at any time.” We may also say that a gift of grace is greater when bestowed on a penitent who deserves punishment than when bestowed on an innocent man who does not. A hundred marks is a greater gift when given to a pauper than when given to a king.

On the fifth point: since God is the cause of the goodness in things, we must take into account the time at which God in his benevolence intends to bestow good on one whom he loves. At the time when God in his benevolence will bestow upon him the greater good of eternal life, the predestined penitent is better than the other. But at any other time he is worse. There is also a time when he is neither good nor bad.

QUESTION TWENTY-ONE

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD

After considering the Love of God, we must now consider his Justice and Mercy, concerning which there are four questions,

1. Whether there is justice in God.

2. Whether God’s justice is truth.

3. Whether God is merciful.

4. Whether God’s justice and mercy are present in all his works.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether There Is Justice in God

1. It seems that justice is not in God. Justice is condivided with temperance, and temperance is not in God. Neither, therefore, is justice in God.

2. Again, he who does whatsoever pleases his will does not act from justice. Now the apostle says that God “worketh all things after the counsel of his own will” (Eph. 1:11). Justice ought not then to be attributed to him also.

3. Again, a just act consists in giving to someone his due. But God owes nothing to any man. It follows that justice is not applicable to God.

4. Again, whatever is in God belongs to his essence. But justice cannot belong to his essence, since “good pertains to an essence, and justice to an act,” as Boethius says (Lib. de Hebd.). It follows that justice is not applicable to God.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 11:7: “the righteous Lord loveth righteousness.”

I answer: there are two kinds of justice. One kind has to do with giving and receiving in return, with buying and selling, for example, and other kinds of transaction and exchange. The philosopher calls this commutative justice, or the justice which regulates transactions and exchanges (5 Ethics 4). This justice does not apply to God, for “who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?” as the apostle says in Rom. 11:35. The other kind of justice has to do with distribution. It gives to each according to his worth, like a manager or steward, and is consequently called distributive justice. Now the just rule of a family, or of a nation, reveals that there is justice of this kind in its governor. So also the order of the universe, which appears in natural things as well as in matters of the will, reveals the justice which is in God. Thus Dionysius says: “we ought to see that God is truly just, in that he gives to each thing that exists whatever is due to its worth, and preserves it in its proper order and virtue” (8 Div. Nom., lect. 4).

On the first point: some moral virtues are concerned with the passions. Temperance is concerned with desire, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. We cannot attribute such virtues to God, since God has no passions, as we said in Q. 19, Art. 2, and Q. 20, Art. 1. Neither has he any sensitive appetite, which these virtues would require as their subject, according to what the philosopher says in 3 Ethics 2. There are, however, certain moral virtues concerned with actions like giving and spending, such as justice, liberality, and magnificence. These belong to the will, not to the sensitive part of the soul. There is therefore no reason why we should not attribute them to God. But we must attribute them as they apply to the actions of God, not as they apply to the actions of a citizen. It would indeed be ridiculous to praise God for the virtues of citizenship.

On the second point: since the object of the will is some good which the intellect appreciates, God can will only what accords with his wisdom. His wisdom is like a law of justice. It ensures that his will is right and just, and that he does justly whatever he does by his will, in the same way as we do legitimately whatever we do according to the law. But while we obey the law of one who is above us, God is a law unto himself.

On the third point: to each is due what is its own. But its own is that which is ordained for it. Thus a servant belongs to his master, and this relationship cannot be reversed, since the free is the cause of itself. The word “due,” therefore, denotes the relation of exigence or necessity which obtains between a thing and that for which it is ordained. Now there is a twofold order in things. There is the order whereby one created thing exists for the sake of another. Parts exist for the sake of a whole, accidents for the sake of substances, and each thing for the sake of its end. There is also the order whereby all things are ordained to God. We may accordingly discern two ways in which God acts with justice—in respect of what is due to himself, and in respect of what is due to a creature. In either way, God renders what is due. It is due to God that created things should fulfil whatever his wisdom and his will ordains, and that they should manifest his goodness. God’s justice upholds his right in this respect, rendering to himself what is due to himself. It is also due to each creature that it should have what is ordained for it. It is due to a man that he should have a hand, and that other animals should serve him. Herein also God acts with justice, giving to each thing what is due according to its nature and condition, although this is due only because each thing is entitled to what God’s wisdom has ordained for it in the first place. But although God renders to each thing what is its due in this way, he is not thereby a debtor, since he is not ordained to serve anything. Rather is everything ordained to serve God. God's justice, then, sometimes means the condescension of his goodness. At other times it means that he gives merit its due. Anselm speaks of it in both senses in Proslogion 10, "it is just when thou punishest the wicked, since they deserve it. It is just when thou sparest the wicked, for this is the condescension of thy goodness."

On the fourth point: justice can belong to God's essence even though it relates to an act, since what belongs to an essence may also be a principle of action. In any case, good does not always relate to an act. We say that a thing is good not only because of what it does, but also because it is perfect in its essence. For this reason, the passage quoted affirms that good is related to the just as the general to the special.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether God's Justice is Truth

1. It seems that God's justice is not truth. Justice is in the will. It is in fact uprightness of will, as Anselm says (De Verit. 13). But the philosopher says that truth is in the intellect (6 Metaph. 8; 6 Ethics 2, 6). Hence justice has no relation to truth.

2. Again, according to the philosopher, truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Hence truth is not included in the idea of justice.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 85:10: "Mercy and truth are met together," and truth here means justice.

I answer: truth consists in conformity between an intellect and a thing (Q. 16, Art. 1). But an intellect which causes a thing is the rule and the measure of it, whereas the thing itself is the rule and the measure of a mind which apprehends it. When things are the rule and measure of the intellect, truth consists in conformity of the intellect to the thing. So it is with ourselves. What we think and say is true or false according to what the thing is or is not. But when the intellect is the cause and rule of things, truth consists in conformity of the thing to the intellect. The work of an artist, for example, is said to be true when it conforms to his art. Now just works bear the same relation to the law which they obey as do works of art to the art itself. God’s justice is therefore rightly called truth, because it determines the order of things in conformity with his wisdom, which is its law. We ourselves speak of the truth of justice, in this same sense.

On the first point: the justice which obeys a regulative law is in the reason, or intellect. But the justice which obeys a command which regulates an action according to a law is in the will.

On the second point: the truth of which the philosopher is speaking is that virtue by which a man plainly shows what manner of man he is through his words or his deeds. This consists in the conformity of a sign to what it signifies. It does not consist in the conformity of an effect to its cause and rule, as we have said of the truth of justice.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether there is Mercy in God

1. It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of misery, as the Damascene says (2 De Fid. Orth. 14), and there is no misery in God. Neither, then, is there mercy in God.

2. Again, mercy is the mitigation of justice. But God cannot rescind what his justice requires, for it is said in II Tim. 2:13: “If we believe not, yet he abideth faithful: for he cannot deny himself,” and God would deny himself if he were to deny his own words, as the gloss says. We cannot therefore attribute mercy to him.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 111:4: “the Lord is gracious, and full of compassion.”

I answer: mercy is pre-eminently attributable to God, albeit as an effect, not as the affection of a passion. In evidence of this we may reflect that one is said to be merciful when one has misery in one’s heart, grieving for the misery of another as if it were one’s own, and consequently striving to dispel it as if it were one’s own. This is the effect of mercy. God does not grieve over the misery of another, but he pre-eminently does dispel the misery of another, whatever be the defect for which this word may stand. Now defects are remedied only by the perfection of some goodness, and the first origin of goodness is God, as we said in Q. 6, Art. 4. But we must bear in mind that God bestows perfections on things not only through his goodness, but in a different sense also through his justice, generosity, and mercy. Considered absolutely, it is through his goodness that God bestows a perfection (Art. 2). Yet in so far as God bestows perfections on things in accordance with their status, he bestows them through justice. In so far as he bestows them purely by his goodness, and not because things are useful to him, he bestows them through liberality. In so far as the perfections which God bestows dispel every defect, he bestows them in mercy.

On the first point: this objection argues from the manner in which mercy affects a passion.

On the second point: when God acts mercifully he does not do what is contrary to his justice, but does more than his justice requires, as it were like one who gives two hundred denarii to a person to whom he owes one hundred. Such a one acts with liberality or with mercy, without denying justice. So also does one who forgives an offence against himself. He who forgives something in a sense gives it. Thus the apostle calls forgiveness a gift in Eph. 4:32: “forgiving one another, even as God for Christ’s sake hath forgiven you.” It is plain from this that mercy does not destroy justice, but is a fulfilment of it. As James says: “mercy rejoiceth against judgment.”

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Justice and Mercy are Present in all God’s Works

1. Justice and mercy do not appear to be present in every work of God. For some of God’s works are attributed to his mercy, as for example the justification of the ungodly, while other works are attributed to his justice, as for example the condemnation of the ungodly. Thus it is said in James 2:13: “he shall have judgment without mercy that hath showed no mercy.” Hence justice and mercy are not present in every work of God.

2. Again, in Rom., ch. 15, the apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and to truth, but the conversion of the Gentiles he attributes to

mercy. Hence justice and mercy are not present in every work of God.

3. Again, many just men are afflicted in this life. But this is an injustice. Hence justice and mercy are not present in every work of God.

4. Again, justice is payment of a debt, and mercy is delivery from a misery. Thus justice, no less than mercy, presupposes something as the condition of its operation. But the work of creation does not presuppose anything. There is therefore neither justice nor mercy in the work of creation.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 25:10: “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth.”

I answer: mercy and truth are bound to be present in every work of God, if mercy means delivery from any defect whatsoever—though we cannot properly call every defect a misery, but only the defects of a rational nature which is capable of happiness, the opposite of misery. The reason why they are bound to be present is that divine justice renders either what is owed to God, or what is owed to a creature.

No work of God can lack justice in either of these senses. For God cannot do anything which is not in accordance with his wisdom and goodness, and this accordance is what we mean when we say that it is owed to God. Similarly, God cannot create anything in the realm of things which is not in accordance with order and proportion, which is what we mean by justice to creatures. Justice is therefore bound to be present in every work of God.

Further, a work of divine justice invariably presupposes a work of divine mercy as its foundation. For a creature has a right to something only on the ground of what it already possesses, or on the ground of what is already intended for it, and if this in turn is owed to the creature, it can be owed only on the ground of what is previous to it again. But this regress cannot be infinite. There must therefore be something which the creature possesses only by the goodness of God’s will, which is the final end. For example, we say that a man has the right to possess hands because he has a rational soul. But his right to a rational soul depends in turn on his being a man, and he is a man only by the goodness of God. Thus mercy is present from the very beginning of every work of God. Moreover, its power persists throughout all that follows, and is the more effective since a primary cause has a greater influence than a secondary cause. Thus it is that God in his abundant goodness bestows what is owing to a creature more liberally than its relative status deserves. The order of justice would indeed be maintained by less than is bestowed by the divine goodness, which exceeds the deserts of every creature.

On the first point: the reason why some works are attributed to justice and others to mercy is that justice is more thoroughly apparent in some of them, and mercy in others. Yet we can see that there is mercy even in the condemnation of sinners, reducing their punishment to less than they deserve, though not altogether remitting it. Justice is likewise present in the justification of the ungodly, since God remits their guilt for the sake of their love, even though he himself bestowed this love in mercy. Thus Luke 7:47 says of Magdelene: “Her sins, which are many, are forgiven; for she loved much.”

On the second point: the justice and mercy of God are apparent in both conversions. Yet in one respect justice is present in the conversion of the Jews and not in that of the Gentiles, since the Jews were saved for the sake of the promise given to their fathers.

On the third point: justice and mercy can be seen even in the punishment of the just in this world. Their afflictions purge them of trivial faults, and they are the more drawn to God through deliverance from worldly affections. As Gregory says in 26 Moral. 9: “The evils which oppress us in this world compel us to draw near to God.”

On the fourth point: even though the work of creation presupposes nothing in the nature of things, it does presuppose something in the divine knowledge. It maintains the character of justice in that it brings things into being in accordance with divine wisdom and goodness. It also in a sense maintains the character of mercy, in that it transforms things from not-being to being.

QUESTION TWENTY-TWO

OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE

Four questions are asked concerning divine providence.

1. Whether providence is appropriately ascribed to God.

2. Whether all things are under divine providence.

3. Whether divine providence affects all things directly.

4. Whether divine providence imposes a necessity on all that it provides.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Providence is Appropriately Ascribed to God

1. It seems that providence is not appropriately ascribed to God. For Tullius says that “providence is part of prudence” (2 De Invent.), and prudence cannot be ascribed to God. Prudence, according to the philosopher (6 Ethics 5, 8, 18), gives good counsel, whereas God is not subject to any doubt which could require good counsel. Hence providence is not appropriately ascribed to God.

2. Again, whatever is in God is eternal. But providence is not eternal, since it is concerned with existing things, which are not eternal, as the Damascene says (1 De Fid. Orth. 3). Hence providence is not in God.

3. Again, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be composite, since it involves both intellect and will. Hence providence is not in God.

On the other hand: it is said in Wisdom 14:3: “Thou, O Father, rulest all things by providence.”

I answer: we are bound to say that there is providence in God, since God has created every good that exists in things, as we said in Q. 6, Art. 4. Now there is good not only in the substance of things, but also in their ordination to an end, especially to the ultimate end, which is a divine good, as we said in Q. 21, Art. 4. God is therefore the source of the good which exists in the order which relates created things to their end. Further, since God is the cause of things through his intellect, the reason for every one of his effects must pre-exist in his intellect, as we explained in Q. 21, Art. 4, also. Hence the reason why things are ordained to their end must pre-exist in the mind of God. But the reason why things are ordained to their end is, properly speaking, providence, because it is the principal part of prudence. The other two parts of prudence, memory of the past and understanding of the present, are subordinate to it, helping us to decide how to provide for the future. As the philosopher says in 6 Ethics 12, prudence directs other capacities to an end, whether it be for one's own sake or for the sake of one's dependents in a family, state, or kingdom. Thus we say that a man is prudent when he directs his actions well in view of the end of life, and Matt. 24:45 speaks of "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath made ruler over his household." Prudence or providence of this kind is appropriately ascribed to God. There is indeed nothing in God which needs to be directed to its end, since God is himself the ultimate end. But what we mean by "providence" in God is the reason for the ordination of things to their end. Thus Boethius says (4 De Cons01.6): "Providence is the divine reason which resides in the highest principle of all things, and which disposes all things." We may add that this disposition is the reason for the ordination of things to their end, as well as for the ordering of parts in a whole.

On the first point: as the philosopher says in 6 Ethics 9 and 10, "prudence properly directs us in what good deliberation rightly advises, and in what sound judgment rightly judges." God does not indeed take counsel, for this means to inquire into what is doubtful. But he does decree the ordering of things to their end, since the true idea of things lies in him. As Ps. 148:6 says: "he hath made a decree which shall not pass." Prudence and providence in this sense are appropriately ascribed to God. The reason for doing things may be called "counsel" in God, not because it involves inquiry, but because of the certainty of the knowledge of it, to which those who take counsel can attain only by means of inquiry. Thus it is said in Eph. 1:11: " . . . who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will."

On the second point: there are two aspects of providential care. There is the reason for the order in things, which is called providence, and there is the disposition and execution of this order. The former is eternal, the latter temporal.

On the third point: providence does belong to the intellect, and also presupposes an end which is willed, since no one determines the means to an end unless he wills the end. Prudence likewise presupposes the moral virtues through which desires are related to the good, as is said in 6 Ethics 12. But even though providence should relate both to the will and to the intellect of God, this would not destroy the simple nature of God, since in God will and intellect are the same, as we said in Q. 19, Arts. 2 and 4.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether All Things are under Divine Providence

1. It seems that not all things are under divine providence. For nothing that is ordained happens contingently, and if all things were provided by God, nothing would happen contingently. There would then be no such thing as chance or fortune. But this is contrary to common opinion.

2. Again, every wise provider, so far as he is able, preserves those in his care from defect and from evil. But we see many evils in things. Hence either God cannot prevent evil, and is not omnipotent, or not all things are under his care.

3. Again, that which happens by necessity does not require providence, or prudence. As the philosopher says (6 Ethics 4, 9, 11): “prudence is right reason applied to contingencies, which demand deliberation and choice.” Now many things happen by necessity. Not all things, therefore, are ruled by providence.

4. Again, he who is left to himself is not under the providence of any governor. Now God leaves men to themselves, according to Ecclesiasticus 15:14: “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hands of his own counsel,” especially so the wicked, according to Ps. 81:12: “So I gave them up unto their own hearts’ lust.” Not all things, therefore, are under divine providence.

5. Again, the apostle says in 1 Cor. 9:9: “Doth God take care for oxen?”—or, we may say, for any irrational creature. Not all things, therefore, are under divine providence.

On the other hand: Wisdom 8:1 says of the wisdom of God: “It extends from end to end with power, and disposes all things sweetly.”

I answer: Democritus and the Epicureans, and others also, denied any such thing as providence, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others again have held that incorruptible things are under the care of providence, but that only the incorruptible species of corruptible things are so, not the corruptible individuals. The voice in Job 22:14 speaks their views: “Thick clouds are a covering to him, that he seeth not; and he walketh in the circuit of heaven.” Rabbi Moses, also, excluded men from the class of corruptible things on account of their surpassing intelligence, but followed the opinion of the others concerning things which pass away.

But we are bound to say that all things are under divine providence, individually as well as collectively. We prove this as follows. Every agent acts for the sake of an end. The effects of a first agent will therefore serve his end to the extent to which his causality extends. This means that the works of an agent may contain something which results from some cause other than his own intention, and which does not serve his end. But God’s causality extends to all being, since God is the first of all agents. It extends to the principles of individuals as well as of species, and to the principles of corruptibles as well as of in-corruptibles. Everything which has any kind of being is therefore bound to be ordained by God to some end. As the apostle says in Rom. 13:1: “the powers that be are ordained of God.” Now we said in the previous article that God’s providence is nothing other than the reason why things are ordained to an end. It follows that all things which have any kind of being must be under the rule of divine providence. We also said that God knows all things, whether universal or particular, and that his knowledge is related to things as the knowledge of an art to the things which it makes (Q. 14, Arts. 6, 11). It follows from this that all things are under the ordinance of God, just as the creations of an art are under the ordinance of the art.

On the first point: there is a difference between a universal cause and a particular cause. A thing may avoid being determined by a particular cause, but it cannot avoid being determined by a universal cause. It can avoid determination by one particular cause only through the intervention of another, as wood is prevented from burning by the action of water. It is therefore impossible for any effect to escape determination by the universal cause to which all particular causes are subordinate. Now in so far as an effect escapes determination by one particular cause, it is said to occur by chance, or to be contingent so far as that particular cause is concerned. But it is still said to be provided by the universal cause whose ordinance it cannot escape. For example, the meeting of two slaves may be due to chance so far as they are concerned, but it has nevertheless been arranged by the master who wittingly sent them to the same place, without either of them knowing about the other.

On the second point: there is a difference between a universal provider and one who cares for a particular thing. One who is entrusted with the care of a particular thing guards it from defect so far as he can. But a universal provider allows some defect to occur in some things, lest the good of the whole should be impaired. Corruptions and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to their particular natures, but to be nevertheless in harmony with universal nature, in as much as the defect of one issues in the good of another, even of the whole universe. The passing away of one individual is the generation of another, and the species is preserved by means of it. Now God is the universal provider of all that is. It is therefore fitting that his providence should permit certain defects in particular things, lest the perfect good of the universe should be impaired. The universe would lack many good things, if all evils were excluded. There would not be the life of a lion, if there were no slaying of animals. There would not be the endurance of martyrs, if there were no persecution by tyrants. Thus Augustine says: “God omnipotent would not allow any evil thing to exist in his works, were he not able by his omnipotence and goodness to bring good out of evil” (Enchirid. 2). Those who have believed that corruptible things subject to chance and to evil are outside the care of divine providence seem to have been influenced by these two objections which we have answered.

On the third point: man uses nature when he practises the arts and the virtues. But he did not make nature, and for this reason man’s providence does not extend to what nature determines by necessity. But God’s providence does so extend, since God is the author of nature. It was, apparently, this objection that induced Democritus and other ancient naturalists to think that the course of natural things was outside the scope of divine providence, and due to a material necessity.

On the fourth point: the saying that man is left to himself does not mean that he is altogether cut off from God’s providence. It means that the power which works determinately towards a single end is not extended to him as it is even to natural things, which act for an end only through the direction of something else, and do not direct themselves to it like rational creatures, who deliberate and choose by free will. The words “in the hands of his own counsel” are therefore significant. Yet the activity of man’s free will still derives from God as its cause, so that whatever he does by means of it is still under the rule of God’s providence. Even man’s own providence remains under God’s providence, as a particular cause under a universal cause. Nevertheless, God’s providence cares for the just in a more excellent way than it cares for the ungodly, since he allows nothing to happen to the just which might finally prevent their salvation. As Rom. 8:28 says: “all things work together for good to them that love God.” When it is said that God leaves the ungodly to themselves, this means that he does not restrain them from the evil of guilt, not that they are altogether excluded from his providence. They would indeed fall away into nothing, if his providence did not preserve them in being. When Tullius said that the matters concerning which men take counsel were outside the scope of divine providence, he seems to have been influenced by this objection.

On the fifth point: as we said in Q. 19, Art. 10, a rational creature is master of its own actions, since it possesses a freewill. But it is under divine providence in a special way as the recipient of blame or praise, and of punishment or reward. It is this aspect of God’s care which the apostle denies to oxen. He does not say that God’s providence has no regard for irrational creatures, as Rabbi Moses thought.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether God Provides for All Things Directly

1. It seems that God does not provide for all things directly. We must ascribe to God whatever dignity requires, and the dignity of a king requires that he provide for his subjects through the medium of ministers. Much more, then, does God provide for all things through some medium.

2. Again, providence ordains things to their end. Now the end of anything is its perfection and good, and every cause directs its effect to its good. Hence every active cause achieves the aim of providence. Secondary causes would therefore be done away, if God provided for all things directly.

3. Again, Augustine says [Enchirid. 17): “it is better not to know some things than to know them,” e.g., trivial things. The philosopher says this also in 12 Metaph., text 51. Now whatever is better must be attributed to God. Hence God does not have direct foresight of anything trivial or evil.

On the other hand: it is said in Job 34:13: “Who hath given him a charge over the earth? or who hath disposed the whole world?” And on this Gregory comments (24 Moral. 26): “God himself rules the world which he himself has made.”

I answer: providence includes two things, namely, the reason for the order in things ordained to an end, and the execution of this order, which is called government. Now God provides the first of these directly for all things, since the reason for all things, even for the most trivial, lies in the divine intellect. Moreover, to whatever causes God provides for any effects, he gives the power to produce them. The order of these effects must therefore have been in God’s mind beforehand. But divine providence uses certain media in carrying out this order, since it directs lower things by means of higher things. This is not due to any defect in God’s power. It is due to his abundant goodness, whereby he confers the dignity of causality even upon creatures. These considerations rule out the view of Plato, quoted by Gregory of Nyssa (8 De Providentia, 3), which supposed three kinds of providence. 1. The providence of the highest deity, which provides first and principally for spiritual things, and through them provides genera, species, and universal causes for the whole world. 2. The providence which provides for such individuals as come to be and pass away, which he attributes to the gods who encircle the heavens, i.e., to the separate substances which move the heavenly bodies in a circle. 3. The providence which watches over human affairs. This he attributes to demons, which the Platonists place betwixt ourselves and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei. 9, ch. 1–2; 8, ch. 14).

On the first point: the dignity of a king requires that his dispensations be carried out by ministers. But his ignorance of how they do it is a defect, since a practical science is the more perfect the more it takes account of the details of what it achieves.

On the second point: the directness with which God provides for all things does not do away with secondary causes, which are the means by which his ordinances are carried out, as we said in Q. 19, Arts. 5, 8.

On the third point: it is better for us not to know evil or trivial things, because they hinder us from contemplating better things. But it is not so with God. God sees all things in one intuition, and his will cannot be turned to evil.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Providence Imposes a Necessity on what it Provides

1. It seems that divine providence does impose a necessity on what it provides. An effect happens by necessity if it follows inevitably from a cause which exists or pre-exists through itself. The philosopher proves this in 6 Metaph., text 7. Now divine providence pre-exists, since it is eternal. Its effects also follow inevitably, since it cannot be frustrated. Divine providence therefore imposes a necessity on what it provides.

2. Again, every provider makes as certain as possible that his work shall not fail. Now God is all powerful. He therefore ensures what he provides by means of the certainty of necessity.

3. Again, Boethius says (4 De Consol. 6): “the destiny which is unalterably decreed by providence confines the actions and fortunes of men by the indissoluble connections of causes.” This implies that providence imposes a necessity on what it provides.

On the other hand: Dionysius says (4 Div. Nom., lect. 23): “the corruption of nature is not due to divine providence.” Some things, indeed, are contingent by nature. Divine providence does not therefore impose necessity on things to the exclusion of contingency.

I answer: divine providence imposes necessity on some things, but not, as some have believed, on all things. Providence ordains things for an end, and except for the divine goodness which is an end separated from them, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe. Now the universe would not be perfect if things did not exhibit every grade of being. Divine providence therefore produces every grade of being. It has accordingly prepared necessary causes for some effects, so that they may occur through necessity, and contingent causes for other effects, that they may occur contingently, each according to the condition of its proximate cause.

On the first point: the effect of divine providence is not merely that a thing should happen in some way. Its effect is either that it should happen contingently, or that it should happen through necessity. Whatever divine providence decrees shall happen inevitably and through necessity, happens inevitably and through necessity. Whatever it intends to happen contingently, happens contingently.

On the second point: the order of divine providence is immovable and certain in this, that everything that God provides happens in the manner in which God provides it, whether through necessity or contingently.

On the third point: the indissolubility and unalterability of which Boethius speaks refer to the certainty of providence itself, which fails neither to provide its effect nor to provide it in the manner which it decrees. They do not characterize the effects as occurring through necessity. We must bear in mind that necessity and contingency properly depend on the manner in which a thing exists. Its mode of contingency or necessity, therefore, really depends on the manner in which God provides it, since God is the universal provider of all that exists. It does not depend on the manner in which any particular provider provides it.

QUESTION TWENTY-THREE

OF PREDESTINATION

After divine providence, we must consider predestination. There are eight questions on predestination.

1. Whether God predestines.

2. What predestination is, and whether it implies anything in one who is predestined.

3. Whether God rejects some men.

4. How predestination relates to election, or, whether the predestined are chosen.

5. Whether merits are the ground or cause of predestination or reprobation, or of election.

6. Of the certainty of predestination, or, whether the predestined are bound to be saved.

7. Whether the number of the predestined is certain.

8. Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Men are Predestined by God

1. It seems that men are not predestined by God. For the Damascene says: “We ought to know that God foreknows all things, but does not predetermine all things. He has foreknowledge of all that is in us, but does not predetermine it” (2 De Fid. Orth. 30). Now human merits and demerits are in us, since free will makes us master of our actions. It follows that whatever has to do with merit or demerit is not predestined by God. But this makes the predestination of men impossible.

2. Again, it was said in Q. 22, Arts. 1 and 2 that all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence. Yet other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Neither, then, are men.

3. Again, angels are capable of blessedness no less than men. But predestination does not apply to angels, apparently because they have never known misery and because predestination is the decision to have mercy, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. 17). Neither, therefore, does it apply to men.

4. Again, the benefits which God bestows on men are revealed to the saints by the Holy Spirit, according to I Cor. 2:12: “Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God.” Hence if men were predestined by God, their predestination would be known to those who were predestined, since predestination is a benefit which God bestows. But this is obviously untrue.

On the other hand: it is said in Rom. 8:30: “whom he did predestinate, them he also called.”

I answer: it is rightly said that God predestines men. We have shown that all things are ruled by divine providence (Q. 22, Art. 4), and that providence ordains things to their end (Q. 22, Arts. 1 and 2). Now the end to which God ordains creatures is twofold. There is, first, the end which exceeds the proportion and the capacity of created nature. This is eternal life, which consists in the vision of the divine essence, which is beyond the nature of any creature, as we said in Q. 12, Art. 4. There is, secondly, the end which is proportionate to created nature, which a created thing may attain by means of its own natural power. Now when a thing cannot attain something by its own natural power, it must be directed to it by another, as an arrow is directed to its mark by an archer. Properly speaking, then, although a rational creature is capable of eternal life, he is brought to this life by God. The reason why he is brought to eternal life must therefore pre-exist in God, since the reason why anything is ordained to its end lies in God, and we have said that this is providence. The reason which exists in the mind of an agent is, as it were, a pre-existence in him of the the thing which he intends to do. We give the name of “predestination” to the reason why a rational creature is brought to eternal life, because to destine means to bring. It is plain, then, that predestination is a part of providence, if we consider it in relation to its objects.

On the first point: by predetermination the Damascene means the imposition of a necessity such as occurs in natural things predetermined to a single end. His next words make this clear—“God does not will malice, nor compel virtue.” This does not make predestination impossible.

On the second point: irrational creatures are not capable of the end which exceeds the capacity of human nature. Hence they are not properly said to be predestined, although we do speak loosely of predestination in relation to other ends.

On the third point: predestination applies to angels as well as to men, even though they have never known misery. A movement is defined by its terminus ad quem, not by its terminus a quo. To be made white means the same thing whether one who is made white was formerly black, pale, or red. Predestination also means the same thing whether or not one is predestined to eternal life from a state of misery.

On the fourth point: their predestination is revealed to some by special privilege. But to reveal it in every case would be improvident. Those who are not predestined would despair, and security would engender negligence in those who are.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Predestination Implies Anything in the Predestined

1. It seems that predestination does imply something in the predestined. Every action produces a passion in something external. Hence if predestination is an action in God, it is bound to be a passion in those who are predestined.

2. Again, commenting on the passage in Rom., ch. i, “He who was predestined . . . ,” Origen says: “Predestination is of one who is not yet, and destination of one who now is.” But Augustine asks: “What is predestination, if it is not the destination of one who exists?” {De Praed. Sanct.). Hence predestination is only of one who exists. It thus implies something about the predestined.

3. Again, preparation implies something in the thing prepared, and predestination is “the preparation of God’s benefits,” as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. 14). Predestination is therefore something in the predestined.

4. Again, nothing temporal is included in the definition of the eternal. Yet grace, which is temporal, is included in the definition of predestination, which is defined as preparation for present grace and future glory. It follows that predestination is not anything eternal. It cannot then be in God, since everything in God is eternal. It must therefore be in the predestined.

On the other hand: in the same passage Augustine says that predestination is “the foreknowledge of God’s benefits.” But foreknowledge is in one who foreknows, not in what is foreknown. Predestination is therefore in him who predestines, not in the predestined.

I answer: predestination is not anything in the predestined. It is solely in him who predestines. We have already said that predestination is a part of providence, and providence is an intention in the mind of the provider, as we said in Q. 22, Art. 1, not something in what is provided.

The carrying out of providence, however, which we call government, is passively in the governed while it is actively in him who governs. It is clear, then, that predestination is the reason which exists in the divine mind for the ordination of some to eternal life, and that the carrying out of this ordinance is passively in the predestined while it is actively in God. According to the apostle, predestination is put into effect as calling and glorification—“whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called . . . them he also glorified” (Rom. 8:30).

On the first point: actions which pass out to an external object do issue in some passion, as do heating and cutting, for example. But actions which remain within the agent, such as understanding and willing, do not. (Q. 14, Art. 4; Q. 18, Art. 3.) Predestination is an action of this latter kind, and therefore does not imply anything in the predestined. The carrying out of predestination, however, does pass out to its objects, and so implies something about them.

On the second point: destination sometimes means the actual directing of something to an end. It then refers only to the existent. But it also means the mental conception of so doing. For example, we are said to destine something if we firmly intend it in our minds. This is what it means in II Maccabees 6:20: “Eleazar determined to do nothing unlawful through love of life.” Destination may, then, refer to what does not exist. But whatever the destination of it may mean, predestination can refer to something which does not exist, because predestination contains the notion of antecedence.

On the third point: there are two kinds of preparation. There is the preparation of a passive agent to undergo passion. This is in the thing prepared. But there is also an agent’s preparation for action. This is in the active agent. Predestination is a preparation in this second sense, in which an agent is said to prepare himself mentally for action when he preconceives the idea of doing something. In this sense of the word, God has prepared himself from all eternity by predestination, preconceiving the idea of ordaining some to eternal life.

On the fourth point: grace is not included in the definition of predestination as part of its essence. It is included as the effect which predestination implies as a cause, and as the object of its action. It does not then follow that predestination is temporal.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether God Rejects Any Man

1. God, it seems, rejects no man. Nobody rejects one whom he loves, and God loves every man, according to Wisdom 11124: “Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing that thou hast made.” It follows that God rejects no man.

2. Again, if God does reject anyone, rejection must be related to the rejected as predestination is related to the predestined. Rejection must then be the cause of the perdition of the rejected, as predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. But this is not true, since it is said in Hos. 13:9: “O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help.” It follows that God does not reject anyone.

3. Again, no one can be held responsible for what he cannot avoid. But no one could avoid destruction if God were to reject him. As Ecclesiastes says (7:13): “Consider the work of God: for who can make that straight which he hath made crooked.” Men would not then be responsible for their own destruction. But this is false. It follows that God does not reject any man.

On the other hand: it is said in Mal. 1:2–3: “I loved Jacob. And I hated Esau.”

I answer: God does reject some men. We have said that predestination is a part of providence (Art. 1), and that providence permits a measure of defect in the things over which it rules (Q. 22, Art. 2). Now although providence ordains men to eternal life, it permits some of them to fail to attain this end. This is what is called rejection. Rejection is the part of providence which relates to those who fail to attain eternal life, just as predestination is the part of providence which relates to those who are ordained to it. Rejection therefore means more than foreknowledge, just as we agreed with Augustine (1 Ad Simplician 3) that providence means more than this (Q. 22, Art. 1). While predestination includes the will to bestow grace and glory, rejection includes the will to allow some to incur guilt, and to impose the penalty of damnation on account of guilt.

On the first point: God loves every man, and every creature also, in that he wills some good for every one of them. But he does not will every good for every one, and is said to hate some in so far as he does not will for them the good of eternal life.

On the second point: predestination is the cause of the glory which the predestined expect to receive in the life to come, and also of the grace which they receive in this present life. Rejection is the cause of desertion by God, but not of present guilt. It is the cause of eternal punishment to come, but guilt is due to the free will of him who is rejected and deserted by grace. What the prophet says is therefore true—“O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself.”

On the third point: rejection by God does not deprive the rejected one of any power. When it is said that a rejected man cannot receive grace, this does not mean that it is absolutely impossible for him to do so. It means that this is conditionally impossible. The salvation of a predestined man is ensured by a necessity which is likewise conditional, in that it permits freedom of choice. Thus even though one who is rejected by God cannot receive grace, it lies with his free will whether he falls into one sin or another, and his sin is deservedly imputed to him as guilt.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether the Predestined are Chosen by God

1. It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says: “just as the corporeal sun sheds its light upon all bodies without discrimination, so does God bestow his goodness’ (4 Div. Nom., lect. 1). Now it is especially God’s goodness that we receive when we share in grace and glory. It follows that God bestows grace and goodness without discrimination, and this belongs to predestination.

2. Again, election is of those who exist. But predestination is also of those who do not exist, since predestination is from eternity. There must therefore be some who are predestined without being elected.

3. Again, election implies discrimination. But it is said in 1 Tim. 2:4: “Who will have all men to be saved.” Thus predestination preordains all men to salvation. It is therefore without election.

On the other hand: it is said in Eph. 1:4: “according as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world.”

I answer: predestination presupposes election by its very nature, and election presupposes love. The reason for this is that predestination is part of providence, as we observed in Art. 1. We also said that providence, like prudence, is the reason preconceived in the mind for the ordination of things to an end (Q. 22, Art. 2). Now the ordination of something to an end cannot be preconceived unless the end is already willed. The predestination of some to eternal salvation therefore means that God has already willed their salvation. This involves both election and love. It involves love, because God wills the good of eternal salvation for them, to love being the same as to will good for someone (Q. 20, Arts. 2, 3). It involves election, because he wills this good for some in preference to others, some being rejected, as we said in Art. 3. But election and love are not the same in God as they are in ourselves. Our will is not the cause of the good in what we love. We are induced to love by good which exists already. We thus choose someone whom we shall love, and our choice precedes our love. With God, it is the reverse. When God wills some good to one whom he loves, his will is the cause of this good being in him, rather than in any other. It is plain, then, that the very meaning of election presupposes love, and that predestination presupposes election. All who are predestined are therefore elected, and loved also.

On the first point: we said in Q. 6, Art. 4, that there is nothing which does not share something of God's goodness. There is therefore no election in the universal bestowal of God's goodness, if this is what we have in mind. But if we are thinking of the bestowal of one particular good or another, this is not without election, since God gives certain good things to some which he does not give to others. Election is likewise involved in the bestowal of grace and glory.

On the second point: election is bound to be concerned with the existent when the will of the chooser is decided by a good which already exists in something. So it is with our own will. But it is otherwise with God, as we said in Q. 20, Art. 2. In Augustine's words, "they who do not exist are elect of God, and his choice does not err" (De Verb. Apost., Sermo 11).

On the third point: antecedently, God wills that all men should be saved (Q. 19, Art. 6). But this is to will conditionally, not absolutely. God does not will this consequentially, which would be to will it absolutely.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether the Foreknowledge of Merits is the Cause of Predestination

1. It seems that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the apostle says: "whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate" (Rom. 8:29), and the gloss of Ambrose on the words "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy" (Rom. 9:15) says: "I will have mercy on whom I

foreknow will return to me with his whole heart.” It thus appears that the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

2. Again, divine predestination includes the divine will. Now the divine will cannot be irrational, since Augustine says that predestination is “the decision to have mercy” (2 De Praed. Sanct. 17). But there is no rational ground for predestination except foreknowledge of merits. Foreknowledge of merits is therefore the cause, or rational ground, of predestination.

3. Again, it is said in Rom. 9:14: “Is there unrighteousness with God? God forbid.” Now it would be unrighteous to give unequal things to those who are equal, and all men are equal in nature, and also in original sin. It is in the merits and demerits of their actions that they differ. It is therefore only because he foreknows their unequal merits that God prepares for men such unequal things as predestination and rejection.

On the other hand: the apostle says (Titus 3:5): “Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us.” Now God predestines us to salvation in the same way as he saves us. It follows that the foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or ground of predestination.

I answer: we said in the preceding article that predestination involves will. We must therefore look for the reason for predestination in the same way as we looked for a reason for the divine will. Now we said in Q. 19, Art. 5, that we cannot assign any cause for the divine act of will, although it is possible to find a reason why things are willed, in so far as God wills one thing for the sake of another. No one has been so foolish as to say that merits are the cause of the divine act by which God predestines. The question is as to whether there is a reason for the effects of predestination, that is, whether God has preordained that he will give the effects of predestination to anyone on account of merits.

Some have said that the effect of predestination is ordained for us beforehand, on account of merits already earned in a previous life. This was the view of Origen. He thought that the souls of men were created first, and that according to their works they were assigned different states on becoming united with bodies in this world. But the apostle rules out such a view by what he says in Rom. 9:11–12: “For the children being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of him that calleth. It was said unto her, The elder shall serve the younger.”

Others have said that merits already earned in this life are the ground and cause of the effects of predestination. The Pelagians, for example, held that the beginning of well-doing lies with ourselves, although its consummation lies with God; and that this explains why the effect of predestination is given to one and not to another, since one has made a beginning by preparing himself, while another has not. But this is contrary to what the apostle says in II Cor. 3:5: “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves.” For we cannot point to any beginning which is previous to thinking, and consequently cannot say that there is anything within us which could be the reason for the effect of predestination.

Others again have said that the reason for predestination is to be found in the merits which result from the effects of it. By this they mean that God bestows grace on someone, and also preordains that he will bestow it, because he foreknows that such a one will make good use of it, just as a king gives a horse to a soldier because he knows that he will use it well. But they appear to have drawn a distinction between the results of grace and the results of free will, as if the same thing could not be the result of both. It is obvious, however, that anything which is due to grace is also the effect of predestination, and cannot be the reason for predestination, since it is included in it. And if anything else about ourselves is to be the reason for predestination, it must not be part of the effect of it. But again, anything which is due to free will is no more distinct from the effect of predestination than the result of a secondary cause is distinct from the result of a primary cause. Providence produces its effects through the operation of secondary causes, as we said in Q. 19, Art. 5, and even what is due to free will is the effect of predestination.

We must observe that the effect of predestination may be considered in two ways. If we are thinking of its particular effects, there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the ground and cause of another, nor any reason why a later effect should not be the final cause of an earlier effect. Nor is there any reason why an earlier effect of predestination should not be the cause of a later effect through its merit, which properly means its material disposition. We should then say that God has preordained that he will bestow glory on account of merits, and that he will give grace in order that glory may be merited. But if we are thinking of the effect of predestination as a whole, it is impossible that its entire, universal effect should have any cause which lies within ourselves, because anything within a man which ordains him to salvation is wholly included in the effect of predestination. Even his very preparation for grace is included in the effect of predestination, since even this is impossible without divine help, according to Lam. 5:21: "Turn thou us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned." The reason for the effect of predestination is therefore the divine goodness. The whole effect of predestination is ordained for the sake of the divine goodness as its end, and proceeds from the divine goodness as its prime mover.

On the first point: as we have said above, it is only as a final cause that foreknowledge of the use which will be made of grace is the ground of its bestowal.

On the second point: the rational ground for" the whole effect of predestination is the divine goodness itself. But one particular effect may still be the cause of another, as we have said.

On the third point: the reason why some are predestined and others rejected is to be found in the goodness of God. God is said to do all things for the sake of his goodness, in order that his goodness may be reflected in things. Now the divine goodness itself is single and simple. But created things cannot attain to the simple nature of the divine, and must therefore reflect the divine goodness by means of many forms. The universe thus requires diverse grades of things for the sake of its completeness, some things holding an exalted place in it and others a lowly place. In order to preserve this variety of grades, moreover, God permits some evils to arise, lest many good things should be prevented. We explained this in Q. 22, Art. 2, and Augustine agrees with it (1 Ad Simplician 11; 2 De Bono Persev.). Now we may consider the whole race of men in the same light as the whole universe of things. God has willed to show forth his goodness in men by mercifully sparing some of them, whom he predestines, and by justly punishing others, whom he rejects. This is the reason why he chooses some and rejects others, and it is the reason given by the apostle in Rom. 9:22: “What if God, willing to show his wrath [that is, to vindicate his justice], and to make his power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he hath afore prepared unto glory,” and also in II Tim. 2:20: “But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earth; and some to honour, and some to dishonour.” There is indeed no reason why some are elected to glory while others are rejected, except the will of God. Augustine says accordingly (Tract. 26 in Joan.): “If thou wouldst not err, seek not to judge why God draws one man and not another.” In the realm of nature, also, we can see a reason why one part of primary matter should be made originally in the form of fire, and another part of it in the form of earth. This was necessary for the diversity of species in natural things, since primary matter in itself is wholly uniform. But why one particular part of primary matter should be under one form, and another particular part of it under another form, depends entirely on the will of God; just as it depends entirely on the will of a builder whether one individual stone shall be in one part of a wall and another in another part of it, even though his art supplies the reason why some stones should be in the one part and some in the other. But there is no injustice in God’s preparation of unequal things for those who are not unequal. There would indeed be injustice if the effects of predestination were rendered as a debt which is due, and not given by grace. But when something is given gratuitously, one may give more or less of it to whomsoever it may please one’s will, without injustice, provided that one does not withhold what is due. This is what the master of the house is saying in Matt. 20:14–15: “Take that thine is, and go thy way. . . . Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?”

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Predestination is Certain

1. It seems that predestination is not certain. For on Rev. 3:11, “hold that fast which thou hast, that no man take thy crown,” Augustine says: “no other will take it if one does not lose it.” The crown to which one is

predestined may therefore be lost as well as won. Hence predestination is not certain.

2. Again, if something is possible, none of its consequences are impossible. Now it is possible for a predestined man, like Peter, to sin and to fall. But if he should, the effect of predestination would be frustrated in consequence. The frustration of the effect of predestination is therefore not impossible. Hence predestination is not certain.

3. Again, what God could have done, that he can do. But God could have omitted to predestine one whom he has predestined, and therefore may not predestine him now. Hence predestination is not certain.

On the other hand: in a gloss on Rom. 8:29, “whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate,” Augustine says: “predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of God’s blessings, by which
whosoever will be set free will most certainly be set free” (De Dono Persev. 14).

I answer: predestination achieves its effect most certainly and infallibly. But it does not impose necessity of such a kind that its effect is realized through necessity. We said in Art. 1 that predestination is part of providence. But the things over which providence rules do not all come about through necessity. Some of them are realized through contingency, in accordance with the condition of the immediate causes which providence has provided for them. The ordinance of providence is nevertheless infallible, in spite of this. Now the ordinance of predestination is infallible in the same way. It does not exclude the freedom of the will, but realizes its effects contingently by means of it. What we said concerning the knowledge and will of God (Q. 14, Art. 13; Q. 19, Art. 4) must be understood in this light. They do not preclude contingency in things, even though they are certain and infallible.

On the first point: when we say that a crown belongs to someone, we may mean either of two things. We may mean that he is predestined to it. If we mean this, no one loses his crown. But we may also mean that a crown is due on account of merit acquired through grace, since what we deserve in a sense belongs to us. If we mean this, then anyone may lose his crown through subsequent mortal sin. Another then receives the crown which he has lost, being substituted in his stead, since God does not allow any to fall without putting others in their place. As it is said in Job 34:24: “He shall break in pieces mighty men without number, and set others in their stead.” Men are thus set in the place of fallen angels, and Gentiles in the place of Jews. One who is substituted in the state of grace also receives the crown of the fallen in the sense that he rejoices in eternal life in the good which the other has done. For in eternal life everyone will rejoice in the good which has been done, whether by oneself or by another.

On the second point: considered in itself, that he should die in mortal sin is a possibility for one who is predestined. But if it is determined that he actually is predestined, this is not a possibility.

On the third point: as we said in Art. 4, predestination involves the divine will. Now the divine will is immutable. That God should will what he has created is therefore necessary, given that he has created it, though it is not necessary absolutely. We are bound to say the same of predestination. If all factors are taken into consideration, we must not say that God might not have predestined one whom he has predestined. We could say, speaking absolutely, that God either might or might not have predestined him. But this does not affect the certainty of predestination.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether the Number of the Predestined is Certain

1. The number of the predestined does not seem to be certain. For a number which may be increased is not certain, and it appears from Deut. 1:11 that the number of the predestined may be increased. “The Lord God of your fathers make you a thousand times so many as ye are.” The gloss says that the number is “definite with God, who knows them that are his.” Hence the number of the predestined is not certain.

2. Again, no reason can be given why God should preordain any one number to salvation rather than any other. Now God determines nothing without a reason. Hence the number of those preordained to salvation is not certain.

3. Again, the works of God are more perfect than those of nature. Now the works of nature reveal good in the many, and defect and evil in the few. It follows that if God were to determine the number of the saved, the saved would outnumber the damned. But Matt. 7:13 declares the very opposite: “Wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat: Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it.” The number of those who will be saved cannot then be determined by God.

On the other hand: Augustine says “the number of the predestined is certain, and cannot be increased or diminished” (De Corrept. et Grat. 13).

I answer: the number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that their number is formally certain, but not materially certain. This would mean that we could say with certainty that a hundred, for example, or a thousand, would be saved, but not that any particular persons would be saved. This view, however, destroys the certainty of predestination, of which we spoke in the preceding article. We must therefore affirm that the number of the predestined is known to God with material certainty, not only with formal certainty. We must declare that the number of the predestined is certain with God not only because he is aware of it, knowing how many will be saved—indeed he knows the number of the drops of rain and of the sands of the sea with equal certainty—but also because he chooses and determines each one.

To make this clear, we must understand that every agent intends to make something finite, as we explained when speaking of the infinite (Q. 7, Arts. 2, 3). When anyone intends a determinate measure in what he makes, he thinks out the number of its essential parts, which are necessary for the perfection of the whole. But he does not select any definite number for such elements as are required only for the sake of other elements, and not as principal parts. He accepts whatever number of them may be required for the sake of the others. Thus a builder thinks out the determinate measurement of a house, the determinate number of rooms which he wishes, and the determinate numerical measurements of its walls and roof. But he does not select any definite number of stones. He accepts whatever number of stones may be required to complete the measurements of its walls. Now we must think in this way when we think of God in relation to the whole universe which he has made. He has preordained the measure in which it ought to exist, and the appropriate number of its essential parts, whose order is in a manner perpetual. He has preordained the number of worlds, the number of the stars, of the elements, and of the species of things. But individuals which pass away are not ordained for the good of the universe as principals. They are ordained secondarily, in order to preserve the good of their species. Hence although God knows the number of all individuals, he has not preordained the number of oxen, midges, and the like. His providence produces whatever number of them may be required in order to preserve their species. Now rational creatures, to a greater extent than all other creatures, are ordained for the good of the universe as principals. For in so far as they are rational, they are incorruptible—especially those who seek to attain blessedness, since they are more immediately in touch with the final end. The number of the predestined is therefore known to God with certainty, not only because he knows it, but because he has predetermined their number as a principal.

It is not quite the same, however, with the number of the rejected. They seem to have been preordained by God for the sake of the elect, for whom "all things work together for good" (Rom. 8:28). As to what the total number of the predestined may be, some say that as many men will be saved as angels have fallen. Others say that as many will be saved as angels remain. Others again say that the number of the saved will be equal to the number of fallen angels added to the whole number of angels created. But it is better said that "the number of the elect for whom there is a place in supernal happiness is known only to God."

On the first point: this quotation from Deuteronomy refers to those whose righteousness in this life was foreknown of God. The number of these both increases and diminishes, but not the number of the predestined.

On the second point: the reason for the measure of any part is to be found in its proportion to the whole. The reason why God has made so many stars, or so many species of things, and the reason why he has predestined so many, is to be found in the proportion of its principal parts to the good of the universe.

On the third point: such good as is proportionate to the normal state of nature is found in the many, and is lacking in the few. But good which exceeds the normal state of nature is found in the few, and is lacking in the many. It is obvious, for example, that the majority of men have sufficient knowledge to regulate their lives, and that those who have not are few, and are called morons or idiots, while those who attain to a profound knowledge of intelligible things are very few. Now the eternal blessedness which consists in the vision of God exceeds the normal state of nature, especially since the normal state is bereft of grace through the corruption of original sin. It is therefore the few who will be saved. Yet the mercy of God is abundantly apparent, in that very many of those whom he chooses for salvation fall short of it according to the course and inclination of nature.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether Predestination can be Furthered by the Prayers of the Devout

1. It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the devout. Nothing that is eternal can be preceded by anything that is temporal. Consequently nothing that is temporal can help to bring about anything that is eternal. Now predestination is eternal. The prayers of the devout cannot then help anyone to be predestined, since they are temporal. Hence predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the devout.

2. Again, counsel is needed only if knowledge is lacking, and help is needed only if strength is lacking. But God predestines without either counsel or help. As it is said in Rom. 11:34: “For who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?” Hence predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the devout.

3. Again, anything which can be furthered can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anyone. Neither therefore can it be furthered by anyone.

On the other hand: it is said in Gen. 25:21: “And Isaac entreated the Lord for his wife, because she was barren: . . . Rebekah his wife conceived.” Thus was born Jacob, and he was predestined. But he would not have been predestined had he not been born. Thus predestination is furthered by the prayers of the devout.

I answer: there have been various errors concerning this question. Some, having in mind the certainty of predestination, have said that prayers are superfluous, and that anything else which we may do to ensure eternal salvation is equally so, because the predestined will attain eternal salvation and the rejected will not, whether such things are done or not. But all the warnings of sacred Scripture which exhort us to prayer and to other good works are against this opinion. Others have said that divine predestination is altered by prayers. Such is said to have been the belief of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine dispensation could be thwarted by means of prayers and sacrifices, and called it Fate. But the authority of sacred Scripture is against this also. It is said in I Sam. 15:29: “the Strength of Israel will not lie nor repent,” and in Rom. 11:29: “the gifts and calling of God are without repentance.”

In contrast, we must say that there are two things to be considered in predestination. We must distinguish the divine preordination from its effect. The divine preordination cannot in any wise be furthered by the prayers of the devout, since their prayers cannot cause anyone to be predestined. But the effect of predestination may be furthered by their prayers, and by other good works also. The reason for this is that predestination is part of providence. Providence does not suppress secondary causes, but achieves its effects through subordinating their operation to itself. God provides effects in nature by ordaining natural causes to produce them, without which they would not be produced. He predestines the salvation of a man in the same way, subordinating to the ordinance of predestination everything which can help him towards salvation, whether it be his own prayers, or the prayers of another, or good works of any other kind, while his salvation would not be attained without them. Those who are predestined must therefore be diligent in good works and in prayer, since the effect of predestination is thereby fulfilled with certainty. For this reason it is said in II Peter 1:10: “Give diligence to make your calling and election sure.”

On the first point: this reasoning proves only that the preordination of predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the devout.

On the second point: there are two ways in which one may be helped by another. One may receive strength from another, as do the weak when they are helped. God does not receive strength from anyone, this being the meaning of the words “who hath known the mind of the Lord?” But one is also said to be helped by another when one achieves one’s purpose by means of another, as does a master by means of his servant. God is helped in this way by ourselves, when we carry out what he has ordained. As it is said in I Cor. 3:9: “ye are God’s husbandry.” But this is not due to any lack of power in God. It is due to his use of secondary causes for the sake of preserving the beauty of the order of things, and for the sake of conferring the dignity of causality even upon creatures.

On the third point: as we said in Q. 19, Art. 6, secondary causes cannot evade the ordinance of the first and universal cause. They implement it. Predestination can therefore be furthered by creatures, but cannot be hindered by them.

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QUESTION EIGHTY-TWO

THE ESSENCE OF ORIGINAL SIN

WE MUST NOW CONSIDER THE ESSENCE OF ORIGINAL sin. There are four questions asked concerning it.

1. Whether original sin is a habit.
2. Whether original sin is one only, in any one man.
3. Whether original sin is desire.
4. Whether original sin is equally in all men.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Original Sin is a Habit

1. It seems that original sin is not a habit. As Anselm says (De Conceptu Virginali 2, 3, 26), original sin is the lack of original justice. It is therefore a kind of privation. But a privation is opposed to a habit. Hence original sin is not a habit.

2. Again, the character of guilt attaches to actual sin more than to original sin, since actual sin has more of the nature of the voluntary. But there is no guilt in the habit of actual sin. If there were, a man would sin guiltily while he slept. There cannot then be any guilt in a habit which is original.

3. Again, an act of sin always precedes the habit of it, because sinful habits are always acquired, never infused. But there is no act which precedes original sin. Hence original sin is not a habit.

On the other hand: Augustine says (De Baptismo Puer; De Peccat. Mer. et Remis. I, ch. 39; De Tempt., Sermo 45): “because of original sin infants have a tendency to desire, even though they do not actually desire.” Now we speak of a tendency where there is a habit. Original sin is therefore a habit.

I answer: as we said in Q. 50, Art. 1, there are two kinds of habit. There is the habit which inclines a power to act, of the kind which enables us to say that sciences and virtues are habits. Original sin is not a habit of this kind. But we also give the name of habit to the disposition by which a composite nature is well or ill disposed in a certain way, especially when such a disposition has become almost second nature, as in the case of sickness or of health. Original sin is such a habit. It is the disordered disposition which has resulted from the dissolution of the harmony which was once the essence of original justice, just as bodily sickness is the disordered disposition of a body which has lost the equilibrium which is the essence of health. Original sin is accordingly called the languor of nature.

On the first point: just as sickness of the body involves positive disorder in the disposition of the humours, as well as privation of the equilibrium of health, so original sin involves disorder in the disposition of the parts of the soul, as well as the privation of original justice. It is more than mere privation. It is a corrupt habit.

On the second point: actual sin is the disorder of an act. But original sin is the disordered disposition of nature itself, since it is the sin of nature. Now this disordered disposition has the character of guilt in so far as it is inherited from our first parent, as we said in Q. 81, Art. i. It also has the character of a habit, which the disordered disposition of an act has not. Original sin can therefore be a habit, though actual sin cannot be a habit.

On the third point: this objection argues about the kind of habit which inclines a power to act. Original sin is not a habit of this kind, although it does result in an inclination to disordered actions. It results in such inclination not directly but indirectly, through depriving us of the original justice which would have prevented disorderly actions, and once did prevent them. The inclination to disordered bodily functions results from sickness in this same indirect way. But we should not say that original sin is an infused habit, nor that it is acquired through action (unless the action of our first parent, but not that of any present person). It is inborn by reason of our corrupt origin.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether there are Many Original Sins in One Man

1. It seems that there are many original sins in one man. For it is said in Ps. 51:5: “Behold, I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me.” The sin in which one is conceived is original sin. There are therefore several original sins in one man.

2. Again, one and the same habit does not cause us to tend towards opposite things. For a habit inclines us through a modification of nature, which tends in one direction. But original sin, even in one man, inclines him to different and opposite sins. It is therefore not one habit, but several.

3. Again, original sin infects all parts of the soul. But the several parts of the soul are separate subjects of sin, as was explained in Q. 74, and the same sin cannot be in separate subjects. It seems, then, that original sin is not one, but many.

On the other hand: it is said in John 1:29: “Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world.” As the gloss explains, the singular is used because “the sin of the world,” which is original sin, is one.

I answer: there is only one original sin in any one man. We may see the reason for this in two ways. We may see it from the cause of original sin. It is only the first sin of our first parent that is transmitted to posterity, as we said in Q. 81, Art. 2. The original sin that is in any one man is therefore numerically one, while it is also proportionately one in all men, that is, one in respect of its first beginning. We may see the reason also if we consider the essence of original sin itself. Any disordered disposition is considered to be one if its cause is of one kind, and to be numerically one if it occurs in a single subject. This is obvious in the case of bodily sickness. There may indeed be many kinds of sickness arising from different causes, such as excessive heat or cold, or lesion of the lungs or of the liver. But a sickness of any one kind in one man is numerically one. Now there is only one cause of the corrupt disposition which we call original sin. Its cause is the privation of original justice, which took away from man the subjection of his mind to God. Original sin is therefore of one kind, and can only be numerically one in any one man. It is, however, numerically different in different men, though one in kind and in proportion.

On the first point: the plural “in sins” is here used in the customary manner of divine Scripture, which frequently uses the plural instead of the singular, as for example in Matt. 2:20: “they are dead which sought the young child’s life.” It is used either because all natural sins virtually pre-exist in original sin as their principle, so that original sin is virtually many; or because the sin transmitted to us through generation from our first parent includes many deformities, such as pride, disobedience, gluttony, and the like; or because many parts of the soul are infected by original sin.

On the second point: the same habit cannot incline us to opposite things directly and of itself, by means of its own form. But it can do so indirectly and accidentally, by taking away a preventative. The elements of a composite body tend in different directions when its harmony is destroyed. The several powers of the soul also tend in different directions when the harmony of original justice is taken away.

On the third point: original sin infects the different powers of the soul as parts of a single whole, just as original justice once held all parts of the soul together as a single whole. There is therefore only one original sin, just as there is only one fever in one man, though different parts of his body may be aggravated by it.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Original Sin is Desire

1. It seems that original sin is not desire. For every sin is contrary to nature, as the Damascene says (2 De Fid. Orth. 4, 30). But desire is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the power of concupiscence, which is a natural power. It follows that desire is not original sin.

2. Again, the apostle says that original sin is responsible for the “passions of sin” that are in us (Rom. 7:5). But there are many passions besides desire, as was said in Q. 23, Art. 4. Hence original sin is not desire rather than any other passion.

3. Again, it was said in Art. 2 that all parts of the soul are deranged by original sin. Now the chief part of the soul is the intellect, as the philosopher explains in 10 Ethics 7. Original sin is therefore ignorance, rather than desire.

On the other hand: Augustine says (1 Retract. 15): “Desire is the guilt of original sin.”

I answer: the species of each thing depends on its formal nature. Now we said in the preceding article that the species of original sin is determined by its cause. The formal nature of original sin is therefore determined by the cause of original sin. We must understand the cause of original sin, however, in contrast to the cause of the original justice which is its opposite, the causes of opposites being themselves opposites. The whole order of original justice consisted in the subjection of man’s will to God. Man was subject to God first and foremost through his will, which directs all other parts of his soul to their end, as we said in Q. 9, Art. 1. Disorder in any other part of his soul is therefore the consequence of his will turning away from God. Privation of original justice, by which the will of man was subject to God, is therefore the formal element in original sin. Every other disorder of the powers of the soul is related to original sin as the material which it affects. Now the disorder of these other powers consists especially in this, that they are wrongly directed to changeable good. Such disorder may be called by the common name of “desire.” Materially, then, original sin is desire. Formally, it is the lack of original justice.

On the first point: in man, the power of desire is naturally ruled by reason. Desire is therefore natural to man in so far as it is subject to reason. But desire which exceeds the bounds of reason exists in him as something contrary to nature. Such is the desire of original sin.

On the second point: we said in Q. 25, Art. 1, that the passions of anger are reducible to the passions of desire, which are more fundamental, and in Q.

25, Art. 2, that desire itself moves us more vehemently than any other of these latter passions, and is felt more. Original sin is accordingly ascribed to desire, since it is more fundamental than other passions, and virtually includes all of them.

On the third point: intellect and reason have the primacy where good in concerned. But, conversely, the lower part of the soul comes first where evil is concerned. For it darkens reason and drags it down, as we said in Q. 80, Art. 1. Original sin is therefore said to be desire rather than ignorance, although ignorance is one of its material defects.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Original Sin is in All Men Equally

1. It seems that original sin is not in all men equally. It was said in the preceding article that original sin is inordinate desire. But all men are not equally subject to desire. It follows that original sin is not in all men equally.

2. Again, original sin is the disordered disposition of the soul, as sickness is the disordered disposition of the body. Now sickness admits of more or less. Therefore original sin also admits of more and less.

3. Again, Augustine says: “lust transmits original sin to posterity.” (1 De Nup. et Concup. 23–24.) But the lust in generation may be greater in one than in another. Original sin may therefore be greater in one than in another.

On the other hand: it was said in the preceding article that original sin is the sin of nature. But nature is in all men equally. Original sin is therefore also in all men equally.

I answer: there are two things in original sin. One is the lack of original justice. The other is the relation of this lack to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is inherited through our corrupt origin. Now original sin cannot be greater or less in respect of the lack of original justice, since the whole gift of original justice has been taken away. Privations do not admit of more and less when they deprive us of something altogether, as we said of death and darkness in Q. 73, Art. 2. Nor can original sin be greater or less in respect of its relation to its origin. Everyone bears the same relation to the first beginning of the corrupt origin from which sin derives its guilt, and relations do not admit of greater and less. It is plain, then, that original sin cannot be greater in one man than in another.

On the first point: since man has lost the control of original justice which once kept all the powers of his soul in order, each power tends to follow its own natural movement, and to follow it more vehemently the stronger it is. Now some powers of the soul may be stronger in one man than in another, because bodily characteristics vary. That one man should be more subject to desire than another is not therefore the consequence of original sin, since all are equally deprived of the control of original justice, and the lower parts of the soul are equally left to themselves in all men. It is due to the different dispositions of their powers, as we have said.

On the second point: sickness of the body does not have an equal cause in all cases, even if it is of the same kind. For example, fever which results from putrefaction of the bile may be due to a greater or lesser putrefaction, or to one which is more or less removed from a vital principle. But the cause of original sin is equal in respect of everyone. There is therefore no comparison.

On the third point: it is not actual lust that transmits original sin to posterity, for one would still transmit original sin even if it were divinely granted that one should feel no lust in generation. We must understand it to be habitual lust, on account of which the sensitive appetite is not subject to reason, now that the control of original justice is lost. Lust of this kind is equally in all.

QUESTION EIGHTY-FIVE

THE EFFECTS OF SIN

We must now consider the effects of sin. We must consider the corruption of natural good, concerning which there are six questions.

1. Whether natural good is diminished by sin.

2. Whether it is entirely destroyed by sin.

3. Of the four wounds which Bede names as the wounds inflicted on human nature as the result of sin.

4. Whether privation of mode, species, and order is the effect of sin.

5. Whether death and other bodily defects are the effects of sin.

6. Whether these are in some way natural to man.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Sin Diminishes Natural Good

1. It seems that sin does not diminish natural good. For the sin of a man is no worse than the sin of a devil, and Dionysius says that what is naturally good in devils remains intact after they sin (4 Div. Nom., lect. 19). It follows that sin does not destroy the natural good in man.

2. Again, that which is prior is not changed by an alteration in that which is consequential to it. Thus a substance remains the same when its attributes are altered. Now nature is prior to voluntary action. It follows that nature is not changed, nor the good of nature thereby diminished, by any derangement of voluntary action which results from sin.

3. Again, sin is an action, and diminution a passion. Now an agent cannot possibly be affected by its own action, although it may act on one thing and be affected by another. It follows that one who sins cannot diminish the good of his own nature by his own sin.

4. Again, no accident acts upon the subject to which it belongs, since what is acted upon is potentially something, whereas the subject of an accident is already the actuality of which its accident is an accident. Now sin occurs in the good of nature as an accident in its subject. It follows that sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish anything is in a sense to act upon it.

On the other hand: according to a gloss by another, Bede expounds Luke 10:30 thus—“a certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho (that is, incurring the defect of sin) was stripped of his raiment and wounded in his natural powers.” It follows that sin diminishes the good of nature.

I answer: by natural good we may mean three things. We may mean the constitutive principles of nature itself, together with the properties consequential to them, such as the powers of the soul, and the like. Secondly, we may mean the inclination to virtue. This is a good of nature, since a man possesses it naturally, as we said in Q. 63, Art. 1. Thirdly, we may mean the gift of original justice, which was bestowed on the whole of human nature when it was bestowed on the first man. The constitution of human nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The gift of original justice was totally lost through the sin of our first parent. The natural inclination to virtue, finally, is diminished by sin. Actions generate an inclination to similar actions, as we said in Q^. 51, Art. 2, and the inclination to one of two contraries is bound to be diminished by an inclination to the other. Now sin is the contrary of virtue. The good of nature which consists in the inclination to virtue is therefore bound to be diminished by the very fact that a man sins.

On the first point: anyone who reads his words can see that Dionysius is speaking of the primary good of nature, which consists of being, living, and understanding.

On the second point: although it is prior to voluntary action, nature includes the inclination to voluntary action of some kind. Hence although nature itself is not changed by any alteration in its voluntary action, its inclination is changed in respect of its direction to an end.

On the third point: voluntary action is the outcome of diverse powers, of which some are active and others passive. Hence it may either cause something in him who acts voluntarily, or take something away from him, as we said when discussing the formation of a habit (Q. 51, Art. 2).

On the fourth point: an accident does not act upon its subject in the sense of producing an effect in it. But it does act on it formally, in the sense in which whiteness makes things white. There is therefore nothing to prevent sin diminishing the good of nature by being itself the diminution of it, as a derangement of action. It must be said, however, that the derangement of the soul is due to the circumstance that there is both activity and passivity in its actions. The sensitive appetite is moved by a sensible object, and also inclines the reason and the will, as we said in Q. 77, Art. 1, and Q. 80, Art. 2. Disorder arises through an object acting on one power which acts on another power and deranges it, not through an accident acting upon its own subject.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether the Whole Good of Human Nature can be Destroyed by Sin

1. It seems that the whole good of human nature can be taken away by sin. The good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. Now a finite thing is removed altogether if it is continually reduced, and the good of human nature may be continually reduced by sin. It seems that it may finally be taken away altogether.

2. Again, what is simple in nature is the same in its wholeness as it is in its parts. This is obvious in the case of air, water, flesh, or any body whose parts are similar. Now the good of nature is altogether uniform. Hence since part of it may be taken away by sin, it seems that the whole of it may be taken away by sin.

3. Again, the natural good which is diminished by sin is the capacity for virtue. Sin destroys this capacity altogether in some persons. It obviously does so in the damned, who can no more recover virtue than a blind man can recover his sight. Thus sin may entirely destroy natural good.

On the other hand: Augustine says (Enchirid. 13, 14): “evil exists only in what is good.” But the evil of guilt can be neither in the good of virtue nor in the good of grace, since these are contrary to it. It must therefore be in the good of nature. It cannot then totally destroy the good of nature.

I answer: we said in the preceding article that the natural good which sin diminishes is the natural inclination to virtue. Now the reason why man inclines to virtue is that he is rational. It is because he is rational that he acts in accordance with reason, and this is to act virtuously. But a man would not be able to sin without his rational nature. Sin cannot then deprive him of it altogether. It follows that his inclination to virtue cannot be entirely destroyed.

Since this natural good is found to be continually diminished by sin, some have sought to illustrate the diminution of it by the continuous reduction of a finite thing which is yet never entirely removed. As the philosopher says in 1 Physics, text 37, any finite magnitude will at length be exhausted if the same quantity is repeatedly taken from it—if I were to subtract a handbreadth from a finite quantity, for instance. But subtraction can go on indefinitely if the same proportion is subtracted instead of the same quantity. For example, if a quantity is divided in two, and the half taken from the half of it, subtraction can go on indefinitely, so long as each subsequent reduction is less than the preceding. This illustration, however, is irrelevant, because a subsequent sin diminishes the good of nature not less than a previous sin, but much more, if it be more serious.

We must say instead that the natural inclination to virtue is to be understood as a medium between two things. It depends on rational nature as its root, and inclines to the good of virtue as its term and end. The diminution of it may accordingly be understood either as referring to its root, or as referring to its term. Its root is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature itself, as we said in the preceding article. But it is diminished in respect of its term, in so far as an obstacle is put in the way of its attaining its end. If the natural inclination to virtue were diminished in respect of its root, it would be bound to be wholly destroyed in the end, along with the complete destruction of a man’s rational nature. But since it is diminished by way of an obstacle preventing the attainment of its end, it is manifest that it can be diminished indefinitely. Obstacles can be interposed indefinitely. A man can add sin to sin without end. But it cannot be entirely destroyed, since the root of inclination always remains. The same sort of thing is apparent in the case of a diaphanous body, which has the inclination to take in light because it is diaphanous, and whose inclination or capacity to do so is diminished by intervening clouds, yet always remains rooted in its nature.

On the first point: this objection argues from diminution by subtraction. But the good of nature is diminished by way of an obstacle which is interposed, and which neither destroys nor diminishes the root of inclination, as we have said.

On the second point: natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform. But it is related both to its principle and to its end, and is diminished in one way and not in another because of this diversity of relation.

On the third point: the natural inclination to virtue remains even in the damned, who would not otherwise feel the remorse of conscience. The reason why it does not issue in act is that grace is withheld in accordance with divine justice. The capacity to see similarly remains in a blind man, at the root of his nature, in so far as he is an animal naturally possessed of sight, but fails to become actual because the cause which would enable it to do so, by forming the organ which sight requires, is lacking.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Weakness, Ignorance, Malice, and Desire are Rightly Named as the Wounds of Nature Due to Sin

1. Weakness, ignorance, malice, and desire do not seem to be rightly named as the wounds of nature due to sin. For they are clearly named as causes of sin in Q. 76, Art. 1, Q. 77, Arts. 3, 5, and Q. 78, and the same thing is not both cause and effect of the same thing. They should not therefore be named as effects of sin.

2. Again, malice is called a sin. It should not therefore be named as one of the effects of sin.

3. Again, desire is natural, since it is the act of the power of concupiscence. But what is natural should not be named as a wound of nature. Therefore desire should not be named as a wound of nature.

4. Again, it was said in Q. 77 that to sin from weakness is the same thing as to sin from passion. Now desire is a passion. It should not then be distinguished from weakness.

5. Again, Augustine says that the sinner’s soul suffers two penalties, namely “ignorance” and “difficulty,” and that “error” and “vexation” arise out of them (De Nat. et Grat. 67; 1 Retract. 9). But these do not coincide with the four wounds named. Either the one list or the other is therefore inadequate.

On the other hand: this is said by Bede. (Reference unknown.)

I answer: there was a time when original justice enabled reason to have complete control over the powers of the soul, and when reason itself was subject to God and made perfect by him. But original justice was lost through the sin of our first parent, as we said in Q. 81, Art. 2. In consequence, all powers of the soul have been left to some extent destitute of their proper order, by which they are naturally inclined to virtue. It is this destitution that we call “a wound of nature.” Now there are four powers of the soul which can be the subject of virtue. There is reason, the virtue of which is prudence; will, the virtue of which is justice; the irascible power, the virtue of which is fortitude; and desire, the virtue of which is temperance. In so far as reason has lost the way to truth, there is the wound of ignorance. In so far as the will has lost its inclination to good, there is the wound of malice. In so far as the irascible power has lost its aggressiveness towards the difficult, there is the wound of weakness. Finally, in so far as desire is no longer directed to the delectable under the restraint of reason, there is the wound of desire.

These four, then, are the wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature by the sin of our first parent. But all four are also caused by other sins, since actual sin diminishes the inclination to virtue in every one of us, as we said in Arts. 1 and 2. Reason is darkened by sin, especially in practical matters. The will is hardened against the good. To act well becomes more difficult. Desire becomes more impulsive.

On the first point: there is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another. Indeed, the derangement caused by a previous sin inclines the soul to sin more readily.

On the second point: “malice” does not here mean the sin. It means that proneness of the will to evil which is mentioned in Gen. 8:21: “the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth.”

On the third point: as we said in Q. 82, Art. 3, desire is natural to man in so far as it is subject to reason, but is contrary to his nature if it exceeds the bounds of reason.

On the fourth point: every passion may be called a weakness in a general sense, since it saps the soul’s strength and hinders reason. Bede, however, means weakness in the strict sense in which it is opposed to fortitude, which is a character of the irascible power.

On the fifth point: the “difficulty” of which Augustine speaks includes the three wounds which affect the appetitive power, namely malice, weakness, and desire. One does not readily tend to good if these are present. Error and vexation are consequential wounds. A man grieves because he lacks the strength for what he desires.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Privation of Mode, Species, and Order is the Effect of Sin

1. It seems that privation of mode, species, and order is not the effect of sin. Augustine says (De Nat. Boni 3): “where these are great, good is great; where these are small, good is small; where these are absent, good is absent.” But sin does not take away natural good altogether. Therefore it does not deprive us of mode, species, and order.

2. Again, nothing is the cause of itself. But sin is the privation of mode, species, and order, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni 4, 36, 37). Such privation is not then the effect of sin.

3. Again, different sins have different effects. Now mode, species, and order are different. The privations of them are therefore different also. The privations of them are therefore the effects of different sins, not the effect of each sin.

On the other hand: sin is in the soul as sickness is in the body, according to Ps. 6:2: “Have mercy upon me, O Lord; for I am weak.” Now weakness deprives the soul of mode, species, and order. Therefore sin deprives the soul of mode, species, and order.

I answer: as we said in Pt. I, Q. 5, Art. 5, every created good possesses mode, species, and order because it is a created good, and because it exists. Every being and every good is conceived according to some form, and its form determines its species. Now the form of any thing of any kind, whether of a substance or of an accident, has a certain measure. For this reason it is said in 8 Metaph., text 10, that “the forms of things are like numbers.” Each thing has thus a certain mode, according to its measure. The form of each thing, finally, determines its order in relation to other things. Thus the degree of the mode, species, and order of things varies according to the degree of the good which is in them.

There is a certain good, with its mode, species, and order, which belongs to the very nature of man. This is neither taken away by sin, nor diminished by it. There is also good in the natural inclination to virtue, with its mode, species, and order. This is diminished by sin, but not entirely taken away. There is also the good of virtue and of grace, with its mode, species, and order. This is entirely taken away by mortal sin. There is, further, the good of orderly action, with its mode, species, and order. The privation of this last is essentially sin itself. The way in which sin is privation of mode, species, and order, and the way in which it deprives us of them or diminishes them, is thus made clear.

The answers to the first and second objections are obvious.

On the third point: what we have said above makes it clear that mode, species, and order follow one upon the other. They are therefore taken away, or diminished, together.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether Death and Other Defects of the Body are the Effects of Sin

1. It seems that death and other defects of the body are not the effects of sin. If a cause is equal, its effect will be equal. But these defects are not equal in everyone. They are greater in some than in others, whereas original sin, to which they seem principally due, is in all men equally, as was said in Q. 82, Art. 4. It follows that death and defects of this kind are not the effects of sin.

2. Again, when a cause is removed, its effect is removed. But when every sin is removed by baptism or by penitence, these defects are not removed. It follows that they are not the effects of sin.

3. Again, actual sin has more of the nature of guilt than original sin, and actual sin does not cause any defect in the body. Much less, then, does original sin. It follows that death and other defects of the body are not the effect of sin.

On the other hand: the apostle says in Rom. 5:12: “by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin.”

I answer: one thing may be the cause of another in either of two ways—either through itself, or accidentally. It is the cause of another through itself if it produces its effect by its own natural power, or by the power of its form. The effect is then essentially intended by the cause. It is obvious, then, that sin is not through itself the cause of death or of similar evils, because the sinner does not intend them. But one thing may also be the cause of another accidentally, by removing something which prevents it. It is said in 8 Physics, text 32, that one who dislodges a pillar is accidentally the mover of the stone which it supports. The sin of our first parent is, thus accidentally, the cause of death and of all similar defects of human nature. For it took away original justice, which not only kept the lower powers of the soul in subjection to reason, without any disorder, but also kept the whole body in subjection to the soul, without any defect (as was said in Pt. I, Q. 97, Art. 1). When original justice was taken away by this sin, human nature was so wounded by the derangement of the powers of the soul (as we said in Art. 4, and Q. 83, Art. 3), that it was rendered corruptible by the derangement of the body. Now the loss of original justice has the character of a punishment, comparable with the withholding of grace. Death and all attendant defects of the body are therefore the punishments of original sin. They are in accordance with the punitive justice of God, even though they are not intended by the sinner.

On the first point: an equal cause produces an equal effect, and an effect is increased or diminished along with its cause, provided that the cause produces its effect through itself. But equality of cause does not imply inequality of effect when the cause operates by removing a preventative. If someone applies equal force to two columns, it does not follow that the stones which rest on them will be disturbed equally. The heavier stone will fall the more quickly, because it is left to its own natural heaviness when the column which supports it is taken away. Now the nature of the human body was similarly left to itself when original justice was taken away. Some bodies are consequently subject to more defects and others to fewer defects, according to their different natural conditions, even though original sin is equal in all of them.

On the second point: according to what the apostle says in Rom. 8:11, the same power which takes away the guilt of original sin and of actual sin will take away these defects also: “ . . . he shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.” But all things are done in their due time, as God’s wisdom ordains. We must first be made to conform with Christ’s passion, before we attain to the immortal and undying glory which was begun in Christ and obtained by him for us. His passion must remain in our bodies for a time, before we share, like him, in undying glory.

On the third point: there are two things in actual sin which we may have in mind, namely, the act itself, and the guilt of it. The act of sin can cause a defect in the body. Some people take ill and die through over-eating. But the guilt of it deprives a man of grace for rectifying the actions of the soul, not of grace for preventing defects of the body. Original justice did prevent defects of the body. Hence actual sin is not the cause of such defects in the same way as original sin is the cause of them.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Death and Other Defects are Natural to Man

1. Death and similar defects seem to be natural to man. It is said in 10 Metaph., text 26, that corruptibles and incorruptibles belong to different genera. But man belongs to the same genus as other animals, and they are naturally corruptible. Hence man is naturally corruptible.

2. Again, anything composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, since it contains the cause of its corruption within itself. The human body is composed of contraries. It is therefore naturally corruptible.

3. Again, the natural action of heat is to dispel humidity. Now the life of man is maintained by heat and humidity together. Since it is by the natural

action of heat that his vital functions are sustained (as is said in 2 De Anima, text 50), it appears that death and similar defects are natural to man.

On the other hand: 1. God has made everything in man that is natural to him. But Wisdom 1:13 says that "God did not make death." It follows that death is not natural to man.

2. What is natural cannot be called a punishment or an evil, since what is natural is congenial. But we said in Art. 5 that death and similar defects are the punishments of original sin. They cannot then be natural to man.

3. Matter is adapted to its form, and each thing is adapted to its end. Now the end of man is eternal blessedness, as we said in Q. 3, Art. 8, and the form of his body is his rational soul, which is incorruptible, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 75, Art. 6. His body is therefore naturally incorruptible.

I answer: we can speak of any corruptible thing in two ways—according to its universal nature and according to its particular nature. The particular nature of each thing is an active and conserving power of its own, which intends both its existence and its conservation. According to this particular nature, therefore, every corruption and every defect is contrary to nature, as is said in 2 De Coelo, text 37.

The universal nature of a thing, on the other hand, is the active power of some universal principle of nature, such as one of the heavenly bodies, or some higher substance. This is the reason why God has been called Natura Naturans by some persons. Now a power of this kind intends the good and conservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things is indispensable. According to their universal nature, therefore, the corruptions and defects of things are natural. They are not natural according to the inclination of the form of a thing, since its form is the principle of its existence and perfection. But they are natural according to the inclination of the matter which the active universal agent proportionately distributes to a form of such a kind. Each form strives to be as permanent as it can be, but no form of any corruptible thing can secure permanence for itself, with the exception of the rational soul. The rational soul is not entirely dependent on corporeal matter, as are other forms. It at least has an activity of its own which is not material, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 75, Art. 2, and Q. 76, Art. 1.

Incorruption of form is therefore more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But his form is nevertheless a form whose matter is composed of contraries, and his being as a whole is consequently rendered corruptible by the inclination of its matter. According to what the nature of his material element is in itself, therefore, man is naturally corruptible. But according to the nature of his form, he is not naturally corruptible.

The first three contentions argue from the material element in man. The three which follow argue from his form. To answer them, we must observe two things. The first is that the form of man, which is his rational soul, is adapted in point of incorruptibility to his end, which is eternal blessedness. The second is that his naturally corruptible body is adapted to its form in one way, but not in another. This is because there are two kinds of condition which may be discerned in any material. There is a condition which an agent chooses, and a condition which he does not choose, but which is just the natural condition of the material itself. Thus a smith who wishes to make a knife chooses a hard and workable material, such as can be sharpened and made useful for cutting. Iron, in these respects, is a material adapted to a knife. But that it is breakable, and liable to rust, is the natural disposition of iron which the ironworker does not choose, but which he would exclude if he could. It is thus a condition adapted neither to the intention of the artisan nor to the purpose of his art. Now the human body is the material similarly chosen by nature for the sake of its moderately varied constitution, which makes it the most convenient organ of touch, and of the other sensitive and motive powers. But its corruptibility is due to the condition of matter, and nature did not choose it. Nature would rather have chosen an incorruptible material, if it could have done so. But God, to whom all nature is subject, made good this defect of nature when he created man. He bestowed a certain incorruptibility on the body by his gift of original justice, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 97, Art. 1. This is the reason why it is said that “God did not make death,” and that death is the punishment of sin. The answers to the objections are now obvious.

TREATISE ON GRACE. PRIMA SECUNDAE QUESTIONS 109—114

QUESTION ONE HUNDRED AND NINE

CONCERNING THE EXTERNAL PRINCIPLE OF HUMAN ACTIONS, THAT IS, THE GRACE OF GOD

WE MUST NOW CONSIDER THE EXTERNAL PRINCIPLE of human actions, that is, God, in so far as we are helped by him to act rightly through grace. We shall consider first the grace of God, secondly its cause, and thirdly its effects. The first of these inquiries will be threefold, since we shall inquire first into the necessity of grace, second into the essence of grace itself, and third into the divisions of it.

There are ten questions concerning the necessity of grace.

1. Whether without grace a man can know any truth.

2. Whether without grace a man can do or will any good.

3. Whether without grace a man can love God above all things.

4. Whether without grace a man can keep the commandments of the law, by his own natural powers.

5. Whether without grace he can merit eternal life.

6. Whether without grace a man can prepare himself for grace.

7. Whether without grace he can rise from sin.

8. Whether without grace he can avoid sin.

9. Whether, having received grace, a man can do good and avoid sin without further divine help. 10. Whether he can persevere in good by

himself.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether a Man can Know any Truth without Grace

1. It seems that a man cannot know any truth without grace. The gloss by Ambrose on I Cor. 12:3, “no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost,” says that “every truth, by whomsoever uttered, is by the Holy Ghost.” Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Hence we cannot know truth without grace.

2. Again, Augustine says (1 Soliloq. 6): “the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so that they may be seen. But it is God who gives the light. Reason is in our minds as sight is in our eyes, and the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul.” Now however pure it be, bodily sense cannot see any visible thing without the light of the sun. Hence however perfect be the human mind, it cannot by reasoning know any truth without the light of God, which belongs to the aid of grace.

3. Again, the human mind cannot understand truth except by thinking, as Augustine explains (14 De Trin. 7). Now in II Cor. 3:5 the apostle says: “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think anything as of ourselves.” Hence a man cannot know truth by himself, without the help of grace.

On the other hand: Augustine says (1 Retract. 4): “I do not now approve of having said in a prayer O God, who dost will that only the pure shall know truth.’ For it may be replied that many who are impure know many truths.” Now a man is made pure by grace, according to Ps. 51:10: “Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me.” It follows that a man can know truth by himself, without the help of grace.

I answer: to know truth is a use or action of the intellectual light, since the apostle says that “whatever doth make manifest is light” (Eph. 5:13), and every use involves movement, in the broad sense in which understanding and will are said to be movements, as the philosopher explains in 3 De Anima, text 28. In corporeal things, we see that any movement not only requires a formal principle of the movement or action itself, but also requires a motion of the first mover. Since the first mover in the order of material things is the heavenly body, fire could not cause change otherwise than through the motion of the heavenly body, even though it should possess perfect heat. It is plain, then, that just as every corporeal movement derives from the movement of the heavenly body as the first corporeal mover, so all movements, whether corporeal or spiritual, derive from the absolute prime mover, which is God. Hence no matter how perfect any corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot issue in its act unless it is moved by God, whose moving is according to the plan of his providence, not necessitated by nature like the moving of the heavenly body. Now not only is every motion derived from God as first mover, but every formal perfection is likewise derived from God, as from the first act. It follows that an action of the intellect, or of any created thing, depends on God in two ways: first, in that it has from him the perfection or the form by means of which it acts, and second, in that it is moved to its act by him. Every power bestowed by God upon created things has the power to achieve some definite action by means of its own properties. But it cannot achieve anything further, unless through a form which is added to it. Water, for example, cannot heat unless it is itself heated by fire. So also the human intellect possesses the form of intellectual light, which by itself is sufficient for the knowledge of such intelligible things as we can learn through sense. But it cannot know intelligible things of a higher order unless it is perfected by a stronger light, such as the light of faith or prophecy, which is called “the light of glory” since it is added to nature.

We must therefore say that, if a man is to know any truth whatsoever, he needs divine help in order that his intellect may be moved to its act by God. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light in order to know the truth in all things, but only in such things as transcend his natural knowledge. Yet God sometimes instructs men miraculously by grace in matters which can be known through natural reasons, just as he sometimes achieves by miracle things which nature can do.

On the first point: “every truth, by whomsoever uttered, is by the Holy Ghost”—but as bestowing the natural light and as moving us to understand and to speak the truth, not as dwelling in us through sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any permanent gift superadded to nature. This is the case only with certain truths which must be known and spoken—especially with truths of faith, of which the apostle is speaking.

On the second point: the corporeal sun illumines externally, God internally. The natural light bestowed on the mind is God's light, by which we are enlightened to know such things as belong to natural knowledge. Other light is not required for this, but only for such things as transcend natural knowledge.

On the third point: we always need divine help for any thinking, in so far as God moves the intellect to act. For to think is to understand something actively, as Augustine explains (14 De Trin. 7).

ARTICLE TWO

Whether a Man can Will or do Good without Grace

1. It seems that a man can will and do good without grace. For that of which he is master is within a man's power, and it was said previously that a man is master of his actions, especially of his willing. (Q. 1, Art. 1; Q. 13, Art. 6.) It follows that a man can will and do good by himself, without the help of grace.

2. Again, a man is master of what conforms with his nature more than of what is contrary to it. Now to sin is contrary to nature, as the Damascene says (2 De Fid. Orth. 30), whereas the practice of virtue conforms with nature, as was said in Q. 71, Art. 1. It seems, therefore, that since a man can sin by himself, he can much more will and do good by himself.

3. Again, "truth is the good of the intellect," as the philosopher says in 6 Ethics 2. Now the intellect can know truth by itself, just as any other thing can perform its natural action by itself. Much more, then, can a man will and do good by himself.

On the other hand: the apostle says in Rom. 9:16: "it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Augustine, also, says that "men do absolutely nothing good without grace, whether by thought, will, love, or deed" (De Corrept. et Grat. 2).

I answer: man’s nature may be considered in two ways, either in its purity, as it was in our first parent before sin, or as corrupt, as it is in ourselves after the sin of our first parent. In either state, human nature needs divine help in order to do or to will any good, since it needs a first mover, as we said in the preceding article. In regard to the sufficiency of his operative power, man in the state of pure nature could will and do, by his own natural power, the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue, though not surpassing good such as the good of infused virtue. In the state of corrupt nature he falls short of what nature makes possible, so that he cannot by his own power fulfil the whole good that pertains to his nature. Human nature is not so entirely corrupted by sin, however, as to be deprived of natural good altogether. Consequently, even in the state of corrupt nature a man can do some particular good by the power of his own nature, such as build houses, plant vineyards, and things of this kind. But he cannot achieve the whole good natural to him, as if he lacked nothing. One who is infirm, similarly, can make some movements by himself, but cannot move himself naturally like a man in health, unless cured by the help of medicine.

Thus in the state of pure nature man needs a power added to his natural power by grace, for one reason, namely, in order to do and to will supernatural good. But in the state of corrupt nature he needs this for two reasons, in order to be healed, and in order to achieve the meritorious good of supernatural virtue. In both states, moreover, he needs the divine help by which he is moved to act well.

On the first point: it is because of the deliberation of his reason, which can turn to one side or the other, that a man is master of his actions, and of willing and not willing. But although he is thus master, it is only through a previous deliberation that he either deliberates or does not deliberate. Since this regress cannot be infinite, we are finally driven to say that a man’s free will is moved by an external principle higher than the mind of man, that is, by God. The philosopher indeed proves this in his chapter on Good Fortune (7 Mor. Eudem. 18). Thus even the mind of a healthy man is not so thoroughly master of its actions that it does not need to be moved by God. Much more so the free will of a man weakened by sin and thereby hindered from good by the corruption of nature.

On the second point: to sin is nothing other than to fall short of the good which befits one according to one's nature. Now just as every created thing has its being from another, and considered in itself is nothing, so also it must be preserved by another in the good which befits its nature. It can nevertheless through itself fall short of this good, just as it can through itself cease to exist, if it is not providentially preserved.

On the third point: as we said in Art. 1, a man cannot even know truth without divine help. Now his nature is impaired by sin more in the desire for good than in the knowledge of truth.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether a Man can Love God above All Things by His Natural Powers alone, without Grace

1. It seems that a man cannot love God above all things by his natural powers alone, without grace. To love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity, and a man cannot have charity of himself, since "the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us" (Rom. 5:5). It follows that a man cannot love God above all things by his natural powers alone.

2. Again, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God more than oneself is to tend to what is above oneself. Hence no created nature can love God more than itself, without the help of grace.

3. Again, since God is the greatest good, we ought to give him the greatest love, which is to love him above all things. But without grace a man is not fit to give to God the greatest love, which we ought to give him, since it would be useless to add grace if he were so. It follows that a man cannot love God by his natural powers alone, without grace.

On the other hand: as some maintain, the first man was made with natural powers only, and it is obvious that in this state he loved God to some extent. But he loved God neither equally with himself nor less than himself, since he would have sinned in either case. He therefore loved God more than himself. It follows that man can love God more than himself and above all things by his natural powers alone.

I answer: as we said when we stated the various opinions about the natural love of angels (Pt. I, Q. 60, Art. 5), man in the state of pure nature could do such good as was natural to him by means of his natural power, without any superadded gift of grace, though not without the help of God moving him. To love God above all things is natural to man, and indeed to every creature, irrational as well as rational, and even to inanimate things, according to the manner of love of which each creature is capable. The reason for this is that it is natural for each thing to desire and to love something, according to what it is made fit to love, just as each thing acts as it is made fit to act, as is said in 2 Physics, text 78. Now it is clear that the good of the part is for the sake of the good of the whole. It follows that every particular thing, by its own natural desire or love, loves its own peculiar good for the sake of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. As Dionysius says, "God directs everything to love himself" (4 Div. Nom., lect. 11). In the state of pure nature, accordingly, man subordinated his love of himself, and of all other things also, to love of God as its end. Thus he loved God more than himself, and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature he falls short of this in the desire of his rational will, which through corruption seeks its own private good, unless it is healed by the grace of God.

We must say, accordingly, that in the state of pure nature man did not need a gift of grace added to his natural power, in order to love God above all things, although he did need the help of God moving him to do so. But in the state of corrupt nature he needs further help of grace, that his nature may be healed.

On the first point: charity loves God above all things more eminently than does nature. Nature loves God above all things because he is the beginning and the end of the good of nature. Charity loves God because he is the object of beatitude, and because man has spiritual fellowship with him. Moreover, charity adds an immediate willingness and joy to the natural love of God, just as the habit of virtue adds something to a good action which springs solely from the natural reason of a man who lacks the habit of virtue.

On the second point: when it is said that no nature can rise above itself, we must not understand that it cannot be drawn to what is above itself. For it is evident that the intellect can know, by natural knowledge, some things above itself, as it manifestly does in the natural knowledge of God. What we must understand is that a nature cannot be incited to an action which exceeds the proportion of its power. But to love God above all things is not such an action. This is natural to every created nature, as we have said.

On the third point: love is said to be greatest, not only on the ground of the degree of its affection, but also on the ground of the reason for it and the quality of it. On such grounds, the greatest love is the love with which charity loves God as him who leads us to beatitude, as we have said.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether a Man can fulfil the Commandments of the Law by His Natural Powers, without Grace

1. It seems that a man can fulfil the commandments of the law by his own natural powers, without grace. For the apostle says that “the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law” (Rom. 2:14). But what a man does by nature he can do by himself, without grace. He can therefore keep the commandments of the law without grace.

2. Again, Hieronymus (Pelagius) says that “they speak ill who affirm that God has commanded anything impossible for man” (Expositio Cath. Fidei, Epist. ad Damasc.). Now what a man cannot fulfil is impossible for him. It follows that he can fulfil all the commandments of the law by himself.

3. Again, it is plain from Matt. 22:37 that the greatest commandment of all is this: “thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart.” Now a man can fulfil this commandment by his natural powers alone, by loving God above all things, which the preceding article affirmed that he can do. He can therefore fulfil all the commandments of the law without grace.

On the other hand: Augustine says {De Haer. 88): “to believe that a man can fulfil all the divine commandments without grace is part of the Pelagian heresy.”

I answer: there are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the law. In the first place, one may actually do what the law commands, by performing acts of justice or fortitude, for example, or other acts of virtue. Man could fulfil all the commandments of the law in this way when he was in the state of pure nature, since he would not otherwise have been able to avoid sin, which is nothing other than transgression of the divine commandments. But a man in the state of corrupt nature cannot fulfil all the divine commandments without healing grace. In the second place, the law may be fulfilled not only in respect of what it commands, but also in respect of the manner of action. It is so fulfilled when actions are inspired by charity. A man cannot fulfil the law in this way without grace, whether in the state of pure nature or in the state of corrupt nature. For this reason, when Augustine said that men do absolutely nothing good without grace, he added: “not only do they know by grace what they ought to do, but they do it out of love by the aid of grace” (De Corrept. et. Grat.). In both states, moreover, men need the help of God moving them to fulfil his commandments, as we said in Art. 3.

On the first point: as Augustine says (De Spiritu et Littera, 27): “It should not disturb us that he said that these do by nature the things contained in the law. For this is wrought by the spirit of grace, to restore within us the image of God in which we were naturally made.”

On the second point: what we can do by means of divine help is not absolutely impossible for us. As the philosopher says: “what we can do through our friends we can in a sense do ourselves” (3 Ethics 3). Hieronymus (Pelagius) accordingly confesses, in the passage quoted, that “our will is free enough to allow us to say that we always need God’s help.”

On the third point: it is clear from what was said in Art. 3 that a man cannot, by his natural powers alone, fulfil the commandment about love to God in the same way as it is fulfilled through charity.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether a Man can Merit Eternal Life, without Grace

1. It seems that a man can merit eternal life without grace. Our Lord says (Matt. 19:17): “if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments”—whence it appears that whether a man enters into eternal life depends on his own will. Now we can do by ourselves what depends on our own will. It seems, therefore, that a man can merit eternal life by himself.

2. Again, God gives eternal life to men as a meed or reward, according to Matt. 5:12: “great is your reward in heaven,” and Ps. 62:12 says that a meed or reward is rendered by God according to a man’s works: “thou renderest to every man according to his work.” Hence the attainment of eternal life seems to depend on a man’s own power, since a man has control of his own works.

3. Again, eternal life is the ultimate end of human life. Now every natural thing can attain its end by its natural power. Much more then can man, who is of a higher nature, attain eternal life by his natural power, without any grace.

On the other hand: the apostle says: “the gift of God is eternal life” (Rom. 6:23), and the gloss by Augustine says: “this means that God leads us to eternal life for his mercy’s sake” (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. 9).

I answer: actions which lead to an end must be commensurate with the end. But no action transcends the limits of the principle by which a thing acts. Thus we see that no natural thing can produce, by its own action, an effect which is greater than its own active power, but only an effect commensurate with this power. Now eternal life is an end which exceeds what is commensurate with human nature, as is clear from what we said in Q. 5, Art. 5. It follows that a man cannot, by his natural powers, produce meritorious works commensurate with eternal life. A higher power is needed for this, namely, the power of grace. Hence a man cannot merit eternal life without grace, although he can perform works which lead to such good as is connatural to him, such as labour in the field, eat, drink, have friends, and so on, as is said by Augustine (or by another, in Contra Pelagianos 3; Hypognosticon 3, cap. 4).

On the first point: a man performs works deserving of eternal life by his own will. But as Augustine says in the same passage, his will must be prepared by God through grace.

On the second point: if one is to fulfil the commandments of the law in the adequate way which is meritorious, grace is indispensable. This agrees with what Augustine’s gloss says on Rom. 6:23, “the gift of God is eternal life,” namely that “it is certain that eternal life is the reward for good works, but works so rewarded are the result of God’s grace” (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. 8). It also agrees with what we said in the preceding article.

On the third point: this objection argues from the end which is connatural to man. But the very fact that human nature is nobler than natural things means that it can be raised, at least through the help of grace, to an end higher than this, to which inferior natures can nowise attain. A man who can recover his health through the help of medicine is, similarly, nearer to health than another who can in nowise do so, as the philosopher remarks in 2 De Coelo, texts 64, 65.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether without Grace a Man can Prepare Himself for Grace

1. It seems that a man can prepare himself for grace by himself, without the external help of grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as was said in Art. 4, and yet it is written in Zech. 1:3: “Turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you.” To prepare oneself for grace is nothing other than to turn unto God. It seems, therefore, that a man can prepare himself for grace by himself, without the help of grace.

2. Again, a man prepares himself for grace by doing what lies within him. For God will not refuse him grace if he does what lies within him, since Matt., ch. 7, says that “God gives his good spirit to them that ask him.” Now what is said to lie within us is within our power. Hence it seems that to prepare ourselves for grace is within our power.

3. Again, if a man needs grace to prepare himself for grace, for the same reason he will need grace to prepare himself for this latter grace, and so on to infinity, which is impossible. It seems to hold good in the first instance, therefore, that without grace a man can prepare himself for grace.

4. Again, Prov. 16:1 says: “The preparations of the heart in man.” Now that is said to be of man which he can do by himself. Hence it seems that a man can prepare himself for grace by himself.

On the other hand: it is said in John 6:44: “no man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him.” But a man would not need to be drawn by another if he could prepare himself for grace. Hence a man cannot prepare himself for grace without the help of grace.

I answer: the preparation of the human will for grace is twofold. In the first place, the will must be prepared for good works, and for the enjoyment of God. Such preparation is impossible without an enduring gift of grace, grace being the principle of meritorious works, as we said in the preceding article. But we may have in mind, in the second place, the preparation of the will so that this enduring gift may follow. We do not need to suppose another enduring gift already in the soul, by means of which a man is enabled to receive this enduring gift, since this would go on to infinity. But we are bound to suppose the gift of God’s help in moving the soul inwardly, and inspiring it to aim at good. For we need God’s help in these two ways, as we said in Arts. 2 and 3. It is plain that we need the help of God as mover. Every agent acts for some definite end, and every cause is therefore bound to direct its effects to its own end. Since the hierarchy of ends is parallel to the hierarchy of agents, it follows that man must be directed to his ultimate end by the moving of the first mover, and to his penultimate end by the moving of lesser movers, just as a soldier’s mind is set on victory by the influence of the army commander, and on following a standard by the influence of a captain. Now since God is the absolute first mover, it is by God’s moving that all things are directed to him, in accordance with the universal tendency to good by which each thing strives to resemble God after its own fashion. As Dionysius says: “God turns all things to himself” (4 Div. Nom., lect. 11). But God turns just men to himself as the special end which they seek, and to which they desire to cleave as to their true good, in accordance with Ps. 73:28: “It is good for me to draw near to God.” A man cannot therefore turn to God except through God turning him to himself. To turn to God is to prepare oneself for grace, just as one whose eyes are turned away from the light of the sun prepares himself to receive its light by turning his eyes towards the sun. It is clear, then, that a man cannot prepare himself for the light of grace without the gracious help of God, who moves him inwardly.

On the first point: a man turns to God of his own free will. Hence he is bidden to do so. But his free will can turn to God only through God turning it to himself, according to Jer. 31:18: “turn thou me, and I shall be turned; for thou art the Lord my God,” and also Lam. 5:21: “Turn thou us unto thee, O Lord, and we shall be turned.”

On the second point: a man can do nothing unless he is moved by God, as is said in John 15:5: “without me ye can do nothing.” When a man is said to do what lies within him, this is said to be within his power as moved by God.

On the third point: this objection argues from habitual grace, which needs preparation, since every form requires an amenable disposition. But no other previous moving is needed in order that a man may be moved by God, since God is the first mover. There is therefore no infinite regress.

On the fourth point: it is for man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his own free will. Yet he does not do so without God helping him as mover, and drawing him to himself, as we have said.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether a Man can rise from Sin without the Help of Grace

1. It seems that a man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what grace presupposes occurs without grace, and the light of grace presupposes that we rise from sin, according to Eph. 5:14: “arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light.” It follows that a man can rise from sin without grace.

2. Again, it was said in Q. 71, Art. 1, that sin is opposed to virtue as disease is opposed to health. Now a man may recover from illness by his natural strength, without the artificial aid of medicine, if there remains within him the principle of life on which the natural process depends. It seems then that

for a similar reason he may recover from a state of sin, and return to a state of justice, without the external help of grace.

3. Again, every natural thing can of itself recover the action which befits its nature. Thus water, when heated, returns to its natural coolness of its own accord, and a stone thrown upwards returns to its natural movement. Now sin is action contrary to nature, as the Damascene shows (2 De Fid. Orth. 30). It seems, then, that a man can of himself return from sin to a state of justice.

On the other hand: as the apostle says in Gal. 2:21: “If righteousness come by the law, then is Christ dead in vain,” that is, to no purpose. But by the same reasoning Christ is dead in vain, that is, to no purpose, if man possesses a nature through which he can become just. It follows that a man cannot become just through himself, that is, cannot return from a state of guilt to a state of justice.

I answer: a man can in no wise rise from sin by himself, without the help of grace. Sin endures as guilt, though it is transient as an action. (Q. 87, Art. 6.) To rise from sin, therefore, i? not the same as to cease from the action of sin, but involves the restoration of what a man has lost through sinning. We have already shown that a man incurs a threefold loss through sin, namely, the stain on the soul, the corruption of natural good, and the debt of punishment (Qq. 85, 86, 87, Arts. 1). He incurs a stain, since the deformity of sin deprives him of the comeliness of grace; natural good is corrupted, since his nature is deranged by the insubordination of his will to the will of God, which disruption of the order of things leaves his whole nature disordered; finally, by mortal sin he merits eternal damnation as the debt of punishment. Now it is obvious that none of these can be restored except by God. The comeliness of grace cannot be restored unless God sheds his light anew, since it is derived from the shining of the divine light, and therefore depends on an enduring gift of the light of grace. Neither can the natural order of things be restored, in which a man’s will is subordinated to the will of God, unless God draws his will to himself, as we said in the preceding article. Nor can the debt of punishment be forgiven save by God alone, against whom the offence is committed, and who is the judge of men. The help of grace is therefore indispensable if a man is to rise from sin. It is needed both as an enduring gift and as the inward moving of God.

On the first point: what a man is bidden to do pertains to the act of free will which his recovery from sin involves. When it is said “arise, and Christ shall give thee light,” we must understand not that the whole recovery from sin precedes the light of grace, but that when a man strives to rise from sin of his own free will as moved by God, he receives the light of justifying grace.

On the second point: natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health which is in a man through justifying grace. The principle of this is the grace which has been taken away on account of sin. A man cannot then restore himself, but needs the light of grace shed on him anew, like a soul re-entering a dead body to bring it back to life.

On the third point: when nature is unimpaired, it can restore itself to what befits it as commensurate with it, though it cannot without external help be restored to what exceeds this. But when human nature is impaired by sin, so that it is no longer pure, but corrupt, as we said in Q. 85, it cannot even restore itself to the good which is natural to it, much less to the supernatural good of justice.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether a Man can avoid Sin, without Grace

1. It seems that a man can avoid sin without grace. Augustine says that “no man sins in respect of what he cannot avoid” (De Duab. Animabus, 10, 11; 3 De Lib. Arb. 18). Hence it appears that if a man cannot avoid sin while he lives in mortal sin, he does not sin while he sins. But this is impossible.

2. Again, one is chastised in order that one may not sin. But if a man who lived in mortal sin were unable to avoid sin, it seems that it would be useless to chastise him. But this is impossible.

3. Again, it is said in Ecclesiasticus 15:17: “Before man are life and death, good and evil; whatsoever he shall choose shall be given him.” But when a

man sins, he does not cease to be a man. It is therefore still within his power to choose either good or evil. Hence one who lacks grace can avoid sin.

On the other hand: Augustine says (De Perf. Just. 21): “Whosoever denies that we ought to pray lead us not into temptation’ (and he denies this who argues that a man does not need the help of God’s grace in order not to sin) should assuredly be removed from every ear and anathematized by every mouth.”

I answer: we may speak of man in two ways; either as in the state of pure nature, or as in the state of corrupt nature. In the state of pure nature, man could avoid both mortal and venial sin, without grace. For to sin is nothing other than to fall short of what befits one’s nature, and a man in the state of pure nature could avoid this. Yet he could not avoid it without the help of God preserving him in good, without which help his nature itself would have ceased to exist. But in the state of corrupt nature a man needs grace to heal his nature continually, if he is to avoid sin entirely. In our present life this healing is accomplished first in the mind, the appetite of the flesh being not yet wholly cured. Hence the apostle, speaking as one who is restored, says in Rom. 7:25: “with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin.” A man in this state can avoid all mortal sin, which has to do with his reason, as we said in Q. 74, Art. 5. But he cannot avoid all venial sin, owing to the corrupt sensuality of his lower appetite. Reason can indeed suppress the urges of the lower appetite severally, wherefore they are sinful and voluntary. But it cannot suppress all of them. For while a man endeavours to suppress one of them, another may arise. Moreover, as we said in Q. 74, Art. 10, reason cannot always be vigilant enough to suppress such urges.

But before his reason is restored through justifying grace, a man can likewise avoid severally, for some time, the mortal sins which have to do with his reason, since he is not bound by necessity actually to sin at all times. But he cannot continue without mortal sin for long. As Gregory says, “a sin which is not instantly blotted out by repentance drags us down to another by its weight” {Hom. in Ezech. 11:25 Moral. 9). This is because reason ought to be subject to God, and ought to find in God the end which it desires, just as the lower appetite ought to be subject to reason. Every human action, indeed, ought to be regulated by this end, just as the urges of the lower appetite ought to be regulated by the judgment of reason. There are therefore bound to be many untoward actions of reason itself when reason is not entirely subject to God, just as there are bound to be uncontrolled movements of the sensitive appetite when the lower appetite is imperfectly subject to reason. When a man's heart is not so firmly fixed on God that he is unwilling to be separated from him for the sake of any good, or to avoid any evil, he forsakes God, and breaks his commandments in order to gain or to avoid many things. He thus sins mortally, especially since "he acts according to his preconceived end and previous habit whenever he is caught off his guard," as the philosopher says in 3 Ethics 8. Premeditation may perhaps enable him to do something better than his preconceived end requires, and better than that to which his habit inclines. But he cannot be always premeditating, and will not perchance continue for long before suiting his action to a will which is not controlled by God, unless he is quickly restored to right order by grace.

On the first point: as we have said, a man can avoid sinful actions taken singly, but he cannot avoid all of them, unless through grace. Yet his sin is not to be excused on the ground that he cannot avoid it without grace, because it is due to his own fault that he does not prepare himself for grace.

On the second point: as Augustine says (De Corrept. et Grat. 6): "chastisement is useful in order that the desire for regeneration may arise out of the pain of it. While the noise of chastisement resounds without, God may work within by an unseen inspiration, that one should so desire, if one be a son of promise." Chastisement is necessary because a man must desist from sin of his own will. But it is not enough without the help of God. Wherefore it is said in Eccl. 7:13: "Consider the work of God: for who can make that straight which he hath made crooked?"

On the third point: as Augustine says (or another, in Hypognosticon 3, cap. 1,2), this saying must be understood as referring to man in the state of pure nature, not yet the slave of sin, able both to sin and not to sin. Whatever a man then desires is given him. It is nevertheless by the help of grace that he desires what is good.

ARTICLE NINE

Whether, after receiving Grace, a Man can do Good and avoid Sin, without further help of Grace

1. It seems that one who has already received grace can do good and avoid sin by himself, without further help of grace. For if anything does not achieve that for which it is given, either it is given in vain, or it is imperfect. Now grace is given to enable us to do good and avoid sin. Hence if one who has received grace is unable to do this, either grace is given in vain, or it is imperfect.

2. Again, the Holy Spirit dwells in us by grace, according to I Cor. 3:16: “Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?” Now the Holy Spirit is omnipotent, and therefore sufficient to make us do good and to keep us from sin. It follows that a man who has received grace can do both of these things, without further help of grace.

3. Again, if a man who has received grace needs further help of grace in order to live rightly and avoid sin, by the same reasoning he will need yet further help of grace after receiving this further grace, and so on to infinity, which is impossible. One who is already in grace, therefore, does not need further help of grace in order to do good and avoid sin.

On the other hand: Augustine says {De Nat. et Grat. 26): “just as even the healthiest eye of the body cannot see unless aided by the radiance of light, so even the most perfectly-justified man cannot live rightly unless aided by the eternal light of heavenly righteousness.” Now justification is by grace, according to Rom. 3.24: “Being justified freely by his grace.” Hence even a man who has already received grace needs further help of grace in order to live rightly.

I answer: as we said in Art. 5, a man needs help from God in two ways, in order to live rightly. First, he needs a habitual gift by which his corrupt nature may be healed, and thereafter raised to perform works such as merit eternal life, which exceed what is commensurate with his nature. Secondly, he needs the help of grace by which God moves him to act. Now a man already in grace does not need further grace in the form of another infused habit. But there are two reasons why he needs the help of grace in the second way, if he is to act rightly. He needs it for the general reason that no creature can act at all except by the divine moving, as we said in the first article. He also needs it for the special reason that the natural condition of human nature remains corrupt and infected in the flesh, with which it serves the law of sin, according to Rom. 7:25, even though it be healed in the spirit through grace. There remains also a darkness of ignorance in the intellect, on account of which “we know not what we should pray for as we ought,” as it is said in Rom. 8:26. We cannot fully know what is for our good, because of the unpredictable course of events, and because we do not even know ourselves perfectly. As it is said in Wisdom 9:14: “the deliberations of mortals are hesitant, and our counsels uncertain.” We must therefore be guided and protected by God, who knows and can do all things. Hence even those who are reborn through grace as sons of God ought to pray “and lead us not into temptation,” and also “Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven,” and whatever else in the Lord’s prayer is relevant.

On the first point: a gift of habitual grace is not given so that we may dispense with any further divine help, since every creature must be preserved by God in the good which it receives from him. We cannot then conclude that grace is given in vain, or that it is imperfect, from the fact that a man in grace needs divine help in this way. A man will need divine help even in the state of glory, when grace will be perfect in every sense, whereas in this life grace is in one sense imperfect, in that it does not heal a man entirely, as we have said.

On the second point: the operation of the Holy Spirit, which inspires and perfects us, is not confined to the provision of the habitual gift which it causes in us. Together with the Father and the Son, it also inspires and protects us.

On the third point: this reasoning shows that a man needs no further habitual grace.

ARTICLE TEN

Whether a Man in Grace needs the help of Grace in order to Persevere

1. It seems that a man in grace does not need the help of grace in order to persevere. Perseverance, like continence, is something less than a virtue, as the philosopher explains in 7 Ethics 7 and 8. Now a man does not need any help of grace in order to possess the virtues on account of which he is justified by grace. Much less, then, does he need the help of grace in order to persevere.

2. Again, the virtues are all bestowed at the same time, and it is maintained that perseverance is a virtue. Hence it seems that perseverance is bestowed along with the other virtues infused by grace.

3. Again, as the apostle says in Rom., ch. 5, more was given back to man by the gift of Christ than he had lost through Adam's sin. But Adam received what enabled him to persevere. Much more, then, does the grace of Christ restore to us the ability to persevere. Hence a man does not stand in need of grace, in order to persevere.

On the other hand: Augustine says {De Persev. 2): "Why is perseverance asked of God, if it is not given by God? Is it not a supercillious request, to ask him for something which we know he does not give, but which is in our power without his giving it?" Moreover, perseverance is asked for even by those who are sanctified through grace. This is what we mean when we say "Hallowed be thy name," as Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian [De Corrept. et Grat. 12). Thus even a man in grace needs that perseverance be given him by God.

I answer: we speak of perseverance in three senses. In one sense, it means the habit of mind by which a man stands firm, and is not dissuaded from what virtue demands by sudden tribulations. Perseverance in this sense is related to tribulations as continence is related to desires and pleasures, as the philosopher says in 7 Ethics 7. In a second sense, it means the habit by which a man maintains his intention of persevering in good to the last. Perseverance in both senses is bestowed along with grace, as are also continence and the other virtues. In a third sense, it means the actual continuing in good to the end of life. A man does not need any other habitual grace in order to persevere in this sense. But he does need the help of God to direct him, and to guard him from the shocks of temptation, as is apparent from the preceding article. It is therefore necessary for him to ask God for this gift of perseverance even after he has been justified by grace, so that he may be delivered from evil until the end of life. For there are many to whom grace is given, to whom it is not given to persevere in grace.

On the first point: this objection argues from the first meaning of perseverance, just as the second objection argues from the second meaning. The answer to the second objection is then obvious.

On the third point: as Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. 43; De Corrept. et Grat. 12): “in his original state man received a gift whereby he might persevere, but not whereby he actually should persevere.” Now by the grace of Christ many receive a gift of grace whereby they may persevere, while it is also given them to do so. The gift of Christ is thus greater than Adam’s sin. But a man in the state of innocence, with no warring of the flesh against the spirit, could persevere by means of this gift of grace more easily than we can now, when regeneration by the grace of Christ, although begun in the mind, is not yet complete in regard to the flesh, as it shall be in heaven, when man shall be not only able to persevere, but unable to sin.

QUESTION ONE HUNDRED AND TEN

THE ESSENCE OF GOD’S GRACE

We must now consider the essence of God’s grace, concerning which there are four questions.

1. Whether grace denotes something in the soul.

2. Whether grace is a quality.

3. Whether grace differs from infused virtue.

4. Concerning the subject of grace.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Grace denotes Something in the Soul

1. It seems that grace does not denote anything in the soul. One is said to have the grace

of a man, just as one is said to have the grace of God. Thus it is said in Gen. 39:21: “the Lord gave Joseph favour in the sight of the keeper of the prison.” Now to say that one man has the favour of another is not to denote anything in him who has the favour, but to denote acceptance in him whose favour he enjoys. To say that a man has the grace of God, therefore, is not to denote anything in his soul, but merely to affirm that God accepts him.

2. Again, God enlivens the soul in the same way as the soul enlivens the body. Thus it is said Deut. 30:20: “He is thy life.” Now the soul enlivens the body immediately. Hence there is nothing which stands as a medium between God and the soul. It follows that grace does not denote anything created in the soul.

3. Again, the gloss on Rom. 1:7, “Grace to you and peace . . . ,” says: “grace, i.e., the remission of sins.” But the remission of sins does not denote anything in the soul. It signifies only that God does not impute sin, in accordance with Ps. 32:2: “Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.” Neither then does grace denote anything in the soul.

On the other hand: light denotes something in what is illumined, and grace is a light of the soul. Thus Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. 22): “The light of truth rightly deserts him who falsifies the law, and he who is thus deserted is left blind.” Hence grace denotes something in the soul.

I answer: there are three things commonly meant by grace, as the word is used in ordinary speech. First, it means someone’s love, as when we say that a certain soldier has the king’s favour, i.e., that the king holds him in favour. Secondly, it means a gift freely given, as when we say: “I do you this favour.” Thirdly, it means the response to a gift freely given, as when we are said to give thanks for benefits received. The second of these depends on the first, since it is out of love for another whom one holds in favour that one freely bestows a gift upon him. The third likewise depends on the second, since gratitude is due to gifts freely given.

Now if grace is understood according to either of the two latter meanings, it is obvious that it leaves something in the recipient of grace—the gift freely given, or the acknowledgment of it. But if grace means someone’s love, we must observe the difference between the grace of God and the favour of a man. For the good which is in a creature is due to the will of God, and therefore some of the good in a creature is due to the love of God, who wills the good of the creature. The will of a man, on the other hand, is moved by good which already exists in things, so that his approval does not wholly cause the good in a thing, but presupposes it, partially or wholly. It is plain, then, that God’s love invariably causes some good to be in the creature at some time, although such good is not co-eternal with his eternal love. God’s love to creatures has then two aspects, on account of this special kind of good. It is universal, in so far as God gives to created things their natural being. As it is said in Wisdom, ch. 11: “He loves all things that are.” It is also special, in so far as God raises a rational creature above its natural state, to share in divine good. It is in this special sense of love that God is said to love someone absolutely, since it is by this special love that he wills for a creature, absolutely, the eternal good which is himself. To say that a man has the grace of God, therefore, is to say that there is something supernatural in him, which God bestows.

Sometimes, however, the grace of God means God’s eternal love, as it does when we speak of the grace of predestination, which signifies that God predestines or elects some by grace, and not on account of merit, as according to Eph. 1:5–6: “Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children . . . to the praise of the glory of his grace.”

On the first point: even when a man is said to have the favour of another man, something is understood to be in him which pleases the other. So also when one is said to have the grace of God, but with this difference, that whereas a man’s approval presupposes that which pleases him in another, God’s love causes that which pleases him in a man, as we have said.

On the second point: God is the life of the soul as its efficient cause, whereas the soul is the life of the body as its formal cause. There is no medium between a form and its matter, because a form determines the formation of its matter, or subject, by means of itself. But an agent does not determine a subject by means of its own substance. It does so by means of the form which it causes to be in the matter.

On the third point: Augustine says (1 Retract. 5): “when I say that grace is for the remission of sins, and peace for reconciliation to God, I do not mean that peace and reconciliation are outside the scope of grace, but that the name of grace signifies the remission of sins especially.” There are thus many other gifts of God which pertain to grace, besides the remission of sins. Indeed there is no remission of sin without some effect divinely caused within us, as will be explained in Q. 113, Art. 2.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Grace is a Quality of the Soul

1. It seems that grace is not a quality of the soul. No quality acts on the subject to which it belongs. If it did, the subject would have to act on itself, since there is no action of a quality without the action of its subject. But grace acts on the soul, in justifying it. It follows that grace is not a quality.

2. Again, a substance is nobler than its quality. But grace is nobler than the soul’s nature, since we can do many things by grace which we cannot do by nature, as was said in Q. 109, Arts. 1, 2, and 3. It follows that grace is not a quality.

3. Again, no quality persists after it ceases to be in its subject. But grace persists, since it is not corrupted. If grace were corrupted it would be reduced to nothing, since it is created out of nothing—wherefore it is called a “new creature” in Galatians. It follows that grace is not a quality.

On the other hand: the gloss by Augustine on Ps. 104:15, “Oil to make his face to shine,” says that “grace is a beauty of the soul, which wins the divine love.” Beauty of soul is a quality, just as comeliness of body is a quality. It follows that grace is a quality.

I answer: as we maintained in the preceding article, to say that a man has the grace of God is to say that there is within him an effect of God’s gracious will. Now God’s gracious will helps a man in two ways, as we said in Q. 109, Art. 1. In the first place, a man’s mind is helped by God to know, to will, or to act. Such an effect of grace is not a quality, but a movement of the soul, since “in the moved, the act of the mover is a movement,” as is said in 3 Physics, text 18. Secondly, God infuses a habitual gift into the soul, for the reason that it would not be fitting that God should give less to those whom he loves in order that they may attain supernatural good, than he gives to creatures whom he loves in order that they may attain only natural good. Now God provides for natural creatures not only by moving them to their natural actions, but by endowing them with forms and powers which are the principles of actions, so that they may incline to such movements of their own accord. In this way the movements to which God moves them become natural to creatures, and easy for them, in accordance with Wisdom 8:1: " . . . and disposes all things sweetly." Much more, then, does God infuse certain forms or supernatural qualities into those whom he moves to seek after supernatural and eternal good, that they may be thus moved by him to seek it sweetly and readily. The gift of grace, therefore, is a certain quality.

On the first point: as a quality, grace is said to act on the soul not as an efficient cause, but as a formal cause, as whiteness makes things white, or as justice makes things just.

On the second point: any substance is either the nature of that of which it is the substance, or a part of its nature. In this sense, matter and form are both called "substance." But grace is higher than human nature. It cannot then be its substance, nor yet the form of its substance. Grace is a form accidental to the soul. What exists as substance in God occurs as accident in the soul which shares in divine good, as is obvious in the case of knowledge. But since the soul shares in divine good imperfectly, this participation itself, which is grace, exists in the soul in a less perfect mode than that in which the soul exists in itself. Such grace is nevertheless nobler than the soul's nature, in so far as it is an expression or sharing of the divine goodness, even though it is not nobler than the soul in respect of its mode of being.

On the third point: as Boethius says (Isagogue Porphyri): "the being of an accident is to inhere." Thus an accident is said to "be," not as if it existed by itself, but because some subject "is" through possessing it. It is thus affirmed of an existence, rather than affirmed to be an existence, as is said in 7 Metaph., text 2. Now since coming to be and passing away are affirmed of what exists, properly speaking no accident comes to be or passes away.

But an accident is said to come to be or to pass away when its subject begins or ceases to be actualized through possession of it. In this sense, grace is said to be created when it is men who are created in grace, i.e., when they are created anew out of nothing, and not on account of merit, according to Eph. 2:10: “created in Christ Jesus unto good works.”

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Grace is the same as Virtue

1. It seems that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine says “operative grace is faith that works by love” (De Spiritu et Littera 14, 32). But faith that works by love is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.

2. Again, whatever a definition fits, fits the thing defined. Now the definitions of virtue fit grace, whether they are given by saints or by philosophers—“it makes him who possesses it good, and his work good,” “it is a good quality of mind, whereby one lives rightly,” etc. Therefore grace is a virtue.

3. Again, grace is a quality of some kind. But it manifestly does not belong to the fourth species of quality, which comprises “the form or unchanging pattern of things.” Neither does it belong to the third species, since it is neither a “passion” nor a “passionate quality.” These belong to the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in 8 Physics, text 14, whereas grace is principally in the mind. Nor does it belong to the second species, which includes “natural power and impotence.” It must therefore belong to the first species, which is that of “habit” or “disposition.” But habits of mind are virtues, since even knowledge is in a sense a virtue. Hence grace is the same as virtue.

On the other hand: if grace is a virtue, it must certainly be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor hope, since these occur without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since “grace precedes charity,” as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. 16). Hence grace is not a virtue.

I answer: some have held that grace and virtue differ only as different aspects of one identical essence, which we call grace in so far as it is freely

given, or makes men pleasing to God, and which we call virtue in so far as it perfects us in well-doing. So indeed the Master
seems to have thought, in 2 Sent., Dist. 26. But this cannot be maintained if one pays due attention to the meaning of virtue. As the philosopher says in 7 Physics, text 17: “virtue is the disposition of the perfect, and I call that perfect which is disposed according to nature.” This makes it clear that the virtue of any particular thing is determined by a nature which is prior to it, and means the disposition of all its elements according to what is best for its nature. Now the virtues which a man acquires through practice, of which we spoke in Q. 55 fF., are obviously dispositions by which he is disposed in a manner which befits his nature as a man. But the infused virtues dispose men in a higher way to a higher end, and therefore according to a higher nature, indeed according to the divine nature in which he participates. We call this participation “the light of grace,” on account of what is said in II Peter 1:4: “Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises: that by these ye might be partakers of the divine nature.” It is in fact as receiving this nature that we are said to be born again as sons of God. Hence just as the natural light of reason is something over and above the acquired virtues, which are called virtues because they are ordered by this light, so the light of grace, which is a partaking of the divine nature, is something over and above the infused virtues, which are derived from it and ordered by it. Thus the apostle says in Eph. 5:8: “For ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord: walk as children of light.” Just as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk by the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues enable him to walk by the light of grace.

On the first point: Augustine gives the name of grace to “faith that works by love” because the act of faith which works by love is the first act in which sanctifying grace is manifest.

On the second point: the term “good,” as used in the definition of virtue, means conformity with a nature which is either prior, essential, or partaken. It is not applied in this sense to grace, but to the root of goodness in man, as we have said.

On the third point: grace belongs to the first species of quality. But it is not the same as virtue. It is the disposition which the infused virtues presuppose as their principle and root.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Grace is in the Soul’s Essence as its Subject, or in One of its Powers

1. It seems that grace is not in the soul’s essence as its subject, but in one of its powers. For Augustine says (or another, in Hypognosticon 3): “grace is to the will, or free will, as a rider to his horse,” and it was said in Q. 88, Art. 2, that the will, or the free will, is a power. It follows that grace is in a power of the soul as its subject.

2. Again, Augustine says (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. 4): “a man’s merits arise out of grace.” But merit consists in action, and action proceeds from a power. It seems, then, that grace is a power of the soul.

3. Again, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace, every soul which has an essence ought to be capable of receiving grace. But this is false, since it would follow that every soul was capable of receiving grace. Hence the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace.

4. Again, the soul’s essence is prior to its powers, and what is prior can be conceived apart from that which depends on it. If grace were in its essence, therefore, we could conceive of a soul which possessed grace without possessing any part or any power, whether will, intellect, or anything of the kind. But this is impossible.

On the other hand: it is through grace that we are regenerated as sons of God. Now generation reaches the essence before it reaches the powers. It follows that grace is in the soul’s essence before it is in its powers.

I answer: this question depends on the preceding question. If grace is the same as virtue, it must be in one of the soul’s powers as its subject, since the proper subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But we cannot say that a power of the soul is the subject of grace if grace is not the same as virtue, because every perfection of a power of the soul has the nature of virtue, as we said in Qq. 55, 56. Now grace is prior to virtue, and accordingly has a subject which is prior to the powers of the soul, such as the essence of the soul. Just as it is through the virtue of faith that a man partakes of the divine knowledge by means of the power of his intellect, and through the virtue of charity that he partakes of the divine love by means of the power of his will, so is it through regeneration or recreation of his soul's nature that he partakes of the divine nature by way of a certain likeness.

On the first point: just as the soul's essence is the source of the powers which are its principles of action, so is grace the source of the virtues which enter the powers of the soul, and move them to act. Hence grace is related to the will as a mover to a thing moved, which is the relation of a rider to his horse, not as an accident to its subject.

The answer to the second point is then clear. Grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of the virtues, just as the soul's essence is the principle of its vital operations through the medium of its powers.

On the third point: the soul is the subject of grace because it belongs to the species of the intellectual, or rational. But it is not on account of any of its powers that it belongs to this species. The powers of the soul are its natural properties, and are therefore consequential to its species. Because of its essence, the soul belongs to a different species from other souls, such as irrational animals and plants. That the human soul should be the subject of grace does not then imply that every soul should be so. A soul can be the subject of grace only if it is of a certain kind.

On the fourth point: since the powers of the soul are natural properties consequential to its species, a soul cannot exist without them. But supposing that it did exist without them, the soul would still be said to belong to the species of the intellectual, or rational, not as actually possessing such powers, but on the ground that its species was of the kind from which such powers are derived.

QUESTION ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN

THE DIVISIONS OF GRACE

We must now consider the division of grace, concerning which there are five questions.

1. Whether grace is appropriately divided into free grace and sanctifying grace.

2. Of the division of sanctifying grace into operative and co-operative grace.

3. Of the division of the same into prevenient and subsequent grace.

4. Of the division of free grace.

5. How sanctifying grace compares with free grace.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Grace is appropriately divided into Sanctifying Grace and Free Grace

1. It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into sanctifying grace and free grace. What was said in Q. no makes it clear that grace is a gift of God. Now a man is not pleasing to God because God has given him something. On the contrary, God freely gives him something because he is pleasing to God. There is therefore no grace which sanctifies.

2. Again, whatever is not given on account of previous merit, is freely given. Now the good of nature is given to man without any previous merit, since merit presupposes nature. Nature is therefore a free gift of God, and it belongs to a different genus from grace. Since the character of gratuitousness thus occurs outside the genus of grace, it is an error to regard it as a character which distinguishes grace from grace.

3. Again, every division ought to be between opposites. But even the sanctifying grace by which we are justified is freely extended to us by God, according to Rom. 3:24: “being justified freely by his grace.” Sanctifying grace should not then be contrasted with free grace.

On the other hand: the apostle attributes both things to grace, affirming that it sanctifies and also that it is freely given. In Eph. 1:6 he affirms that it sanctifies: “he hath made us accepted in the beloved,” and in Rom. 11:6 he affirms that it is freely given: “And if by grace, then it is no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace.” Grace may therefore be differentiated as either having one of these characters only, or having both characters.

I answer: as the apostle says in Rom. 13:1, “the powers that be are ordained of God.” Now the order of things is such that some things are led to God by means of others, as Dionysius says [Coel. Hier. 6, 7, 8). Hence grace, which is ordained to lead men to God, works in accordance with a certain order, in such a way that some men are led to God by means of other men. Grace is therefore twofold. There is grace through which a man is himself united to God, which is called sanctifying grace. There is also grace whereby one man co-operates with another to lead him to God. This latter gift is called “free grace,” since it is beyond the capacity of nature to give, and beyond the merit of him to whom it is given. But it is not called sanctifying grace, since it is not given in order that a man may himself be justified by it, but in order that he may co-operate towards the justification of another. It is of such grace that the apostle speaks in I Cor. 12:7: “But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal,” that is, for the benefit of others.

On the first point: grace is said to make one pleasing, not efficiently, but formally, since one is justified by it, and so made worthy to be called pleasing to God. As it is said in Col. 1:12: “which hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light.”

On the second point: since grace is freely given, it excludes the idea of debt. Now debt can be understood in two ways. In one sense it is the correlative of merit, applicable to a person upon whom it is incumbent to achieve works of merit, as in Rom. 4:4: “Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt.” In a second sense it refers to the condition which is natural to one, as when we say that a man “ought” to have reason, and other things pertaining to human nature. In neither sense, however, does debt imply that God owes anything to a creature. Rather does it mean that a creature ought to be subject to God, so that there may be realized within it the divine order according to which a given nature has certain conditions and properties, and attains certain ends by means of certain activities. It follows that the gifts of nature exclude debt in the first sense. But they do not exclude debt in the second sense. Supernatural gifts, on the other hand, exclude debt in both senses, and thus warrant the title of grace in a manner peculiar to themselves.

On the third point: sanctifying grace adds to the notion of free grace something integral to the meaning of grace itself, in that it makes a man pleasing to God. Free grace does not do this, but nevertheless retains the common name, as often happens. The two parts of the division thus stand in contrast, as grace which sanctifies and grace which does not sanctify.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Grace is appropriately divided into Operative and Co-operative Grace

1. It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into operative and co-operative grace. It was said in the preceding article that grace is an accident, and no accident can act on its subject. Hence no grace should be called operative.

2. Again, if grace works anything in us, it assuredly works justification. But grace does not work this by itself. For on John 14:12, “the works that I do shall he do also,” Augustine says: “He who created thee without thyself will not justify thee without thyself” (implicitly in Tract. 72 in Joan., explicitly in De Verb. Apost., Sermo 15, cap. 2). Hence no grace should be called operative simply.

3. Again, co-operation would seem to be appropriate to a subsidiary agent, but not to a principal agent. Now grace works in us more fundamentally than does free will, according to Rom. 9:16: “it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.” Grace should not then be called co-operative.

4. Again, a division should be between opposites. But operative and co-operative grace are not opposites, since the same agent can both operate and co-operate. Hence grace is not appropriately divided into operative and co-operative grace.

On the other hand: Augustine says (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. 17): “God perfects within us by co-operation what he initiates by operation. For he operates first to make us will, and co-operates with those who will to make them perfect.” Now the operations by which God moves us to good are operations of grace. Grace is therefore appropriately divided into operative and cooperative grace.

I answer: as we said in Q. 110, Art. 2, grace may be understood in two ways, as the divine help by which God moves us to do and to will what is good, and as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us. In either sense grace is appropriately divided into operative and co-operative grace. An operation which is part of an effect is attributed to the mover, not to the thing moved. The operation is therefore attributed to God when God is the sole mover, and when the mind is moved but not a mover. We then speak of "operative grace." But when the soul is not only moved but also a mover, the operation is attributed to the soul as well as to God. We then speak of "co-operative grace." In this case there is a twofold action within us. There is an inward action of the will, in which the will is moved and God is the mover, especially when a will which previously willed evil begins to will good. We therefore speak of "operative grace," since God moves the human mind to this action. But there is also an outward action, in which operation is attributed to the will, since an outward action is commanded by the will, as we explained in Q. 17, Art. 9. We speak of "co-operative grace" in reference to actions of this kind, because God helps us even in outward actions, outwardly providing the capacity to act as well as inwardly strengthening the will to issue in act. Augustine accordingly adds, to the words quoted, "he operates to make us will, and when we will, he co-operates with us that we may be made perfect." Hence if grace is understood to mean the gracious moving by which God moves us to meritorious good, it is appropriately divided into operative and co-operative grace.

If, on the other hand, grace is understood to mean a habitual gift, there is then a twofold effect of grace, as there is of any other form. There is an effect of "being" and an effect of "operation." The operation of heat is to make a thing hot, and also to cause it to emit heat. So likewise, grace is called "operative" in so far as it heals the soul, and in so far as it justifies the soul or makes it pleasing to God; and "co-operative" in so far as it is also the principle of meritorious action by the free will.

On the first point: as an accidental quality of the soul, grace acts on the soul not efficiently, but formally, in the way in which whiteness makes things white.

On the second point: God does not justify us without ourselves, since when we are justified we consent to his justice by a movement of our free will. This movement, however, is not the cause of grace, but the result of it. The whole operation is therefore due to grace.

On the third point: one is said to co-operate with another not only as an agent subsidiary to a principal agent, but also as contributing to an end which is preconceived. Now man is helped by God's operative grace to will what is good, and this end is already conceived. Hence grace co-operates with us.

On the fourth point: operative and co-operative grace are the same grace. They are nevertheless distinguished by their different effects, as is clear from what we have said.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Grace is Appropriately Divided into Prevenient and Subsequent Grace

1. It seems that grace is not appropriately divided into prevenient and subsequent grace. For grace is an effect of God's love, and God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to I John 4:10: "not that we loved God, but that he loved us." Grace should not therefore be described as prevenient and subsequent.

2. Again, sanctifying grace in man is one, since it is sufficient, according to II Cor. 12:9: "My grace is sufficient for thee." But the same thing cannot be both prior and posterior. Grace is therefore inappropriately divided into prevenient and subsequent grace.

3. Again, grace is known by its effects. Now the effects of grace are infinite in number, and one effect precedes another. It seems, therefore, that the species of grace will also be infinite in number, if grace is divided into prevenient and subsequent grace in respect of each of its effects. But what is

infinite in number is ignored by every art. The division of grace into prevenient and subsequent grace is therefore not appropriate.

On the other hand: God's grace is the outcome of his mercy. Now on the one hand we read in Ps. 59:10: "The God of my mercy shall prevent me," and on the other hand in Ps. 23:6: "mercy shall follow me." Grace is therefore appropriately divided into prevenient and subsequent grace.

I answer: just as grace is divided into operative and cooperative grace on account of its different effects, so is it divided into prevenient and subsequent grace on the same grounds. There are five effects of grace in us: first, that the soul is healed; second, that it wills what is good; third, that it carries out what it wills; fourth, that it perseveres in good; and fifth, that it attains to glory. Since grace causes the first effect in us, it is called prevenient in relation to the second effect. Since it causes the second effect in us, it is called subsequent in relation to the first effect. And since any particular effect follows one effect and precedes another, grace may be called both prevenient and subsequent in regard to the same effect as related to different effects. This is what Augustine is saying in De Nat. et Grat. 31, and 2 ad Bonif. 9, "Grace precedes, that we may be healed; it follows, that being healed we may be quickened; it precedes, that we may be called; it follows, that we may be glorified."

On the first point: since God's love means something eternal, it can never be called other than prevenient. Grace, however, signifies an effect in time, which can precede one effect and follow another. It may therefore be called both prevenient and subsequent.

On the second point: grace is not divided into prevenient and subsequent grace in respect of its essence, but solely in respect of its effects, as we said also in regard to operative and cooperative grace. Even as it pertains to the state of glory, subsequent grace is not numerically different from the prevenient grace by which we are now justified. The charity of the way is not annulled in heaven, but perfected, and we must say the same of the light of grace, since neither of them can mean anything imperfect.

On the third point: although the effects of grace may be as infinite in number as the deeds of men, they are all reducible to what is determinate in species. Moreover, they are all alike in that one precedes another.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Free Grace is Appropriately Divided by the Apostle

1. It seems that free grace is not appropriately distinguished by the apostle. For every gift which God freely gives us may be called a free grace, and the gifts which God freely give us, other than sanctifying gifts, are infinite in number. The free graces cannot then be comprehended under any precise division of grace.

2. Again, free grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace. Now faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are justified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: “being justified by faith.” It is therefore inappropriate to include faith among the free graces, especially when other virtues such as hope and charity are not included.

3. Again, the work of healing, and speaking with diverse kinds of tongues, are miracles. Further, the interpretation of tongues depends either on wisdom or on knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: “God gave them knowledge and skill in all learning and wisdom.” The gifts of healing and kinds of tongues are therefore inappropriately distinguished from the working of miracles, and likewise the interpretation of tongues from the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge.

4. Again, understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear are gifts of the Holy Spirit no less than wisdom and knowledge, as we said in Q. 68, Art. 4. All of these should therefore be included among the free graces.

On the other hand: the apostle says (I Cor. 12:8–10): “For to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another the word of knowledge by the same Spirit; to another faith by the same Spirit; to another the gifts of healing by the same Spirit; to another the working of miracles; to another prophecy; to another discerning of spirits; to another diverse kinds of tongues; to another the interpretation of tongues.”

I answer: as we said in the first article, free grace is given in order that one man may co-operate with another to lead him to God. Now a man cannot contribute to this end by moving another inwardly (only God can do this), but only by outwardly teaching or persuading him. Free grace accordingly contains all that a man requires in order to instruct another in divine things which transcend reason. Three things are required for this, i. He must have a full knowledge of divine things, so as to be able to teach others. 2. He must be able to verify or prove what he says, otherwise his teaching will be ineffective. 3. He must be able to convey his knowledge to others in a suitable manner.

1. We know from ordinary teaching that three things are essential for the first of these requirements. He who would instruct another in any science must first of all be firmly convinced of the principles of that science. Corresponding to this is faith, the certainty of the unseen things which are maintained as principles in catholic doctrine. Secondly, a teacher must have a correct knowledge of the principal conclusions of his science. Corresponding to this is the “word of wisdom,” which is the knowledge of divine things. Thirdly, he must have a wealth of examples, and must be thoroughly acquainted with the effects by means of which he will sometimes have to demonstrate causes. Corresponding to this is the “word of knowledge,” which is the knowledge of human things, since it is said in Rom. 1:20: “the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

2. Such matters as are within the scope of reason are proved by means of argument. But divine revelations which transcend reason are proved by means peculiar to the divine power, and this in two ways. In one way, they are proved by the teacher of sacred doctrine carrying out what only God can do, in such miraculous works as healing the body, for which is given the “gift of healing”; or again in such as are intended solely to manifest the divine power, for example, that the sun should stand still or darken, or the sea be divided, for which the “working of miracles” is given. In another way, they are proved by his declaring things which only God can know, such as contingent events of the future, for which “prophecy” is given; or the hidden things of the heart, for which is given the “discerning of spirits.”

3. The capacity to speak may be concerned either with the idioms which enable one to be understood by others, for which are “kinds of tongues,” or

with the sense of what is conveyed, for which is the “interpretation of tongues.”

On the first point: as we said in the first article, the blessings which are divinely bestowed upon us are not all called free graces, but only those which are beyond the power of nature, such as that a fisherman should be filled with the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge, and other things of the same kind. It is such that are here included under free grace.

On the second point: the faith which is here included among the free graces is not the virtue by which a man is himself justified, but the faith which possesses that supereminent certainty which makes him worthy to instruct others in matters pertaining to the faith. Hope and charity are concerned with the appetitive power by which it is ordained that a man shall seek God.

On the third point: the gift of healing is distinguished from the general working of miracles because it leads to faith in a special way. A man is more readily brought to faith if he acquires the blessing of bodily health through the power of faith. “Speaking with diverse tongues” and “interpretation of tongues” also lead to faith in special ways. They are accordingly regarded as free graces of a special kind.

On the fourth point: wisdom and knowledge are not included among the free graces on the ground that they are numbered with the gifts of the Holy Spirit, on the ground, that is, that men are readily brought by the Holy Spirit to matters of wisdom and knowledge. They are indeed gifts of the Holy Spirit, as we said in Q. 68, Arts, i and 4. But they are included among the free graces, because they provide a wealth of knowledge and wisdom which enables a man not only to discern divine things aright for himself, but also to instruct others and refute adversaries. The “word of wisdom” and the “word of knowledge” are therefore included with some point. As Augustine says, “It is one thing to know what a man must believe in order to attain to the life of the blessed. It is another thing to know how this helps the pious, and how it may be defended against the impious” (14 De Trin. 1).

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether Free Grace is Nobler than Sanctifying Grace

1. It seems that free grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. For the philosopher says that “the good of the race is better than the good of the individual” (1 Ethics 2), and sanctifying grace is ordained only for the good of the individual, whereas free grace is ordained for the common good of the whole Church, as was said in Arts. 1 and 4. Free grace is therefore nobler than sanctifying grace.

2. Again, a power which can act upon something else is greater than a power which is merely perfect in itself. Light which can illumine objects, for example, is greater than light which shines itself but cannot illumine objects. For this reason the philosopher says that “justice is the noblest of the virtues” (5 Ethics 1), since justice enables a man to behave rightly towards others. Now by sanctifying grace a man is made perfect in himself. But by free grace he contributes to the perfection of others. Free grace is therefore nobler than sanctifying grace.

3. Again, what is peculiar to those who are better is nobler than what is common to all. Thus reason, which is peculiar to man, is nobler than feeling, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all members of the Church, whereas free grace is a special gift to its worthier members. Free grace is therefore nobler than sanctifying grace.

On the other hand: after numbering the free graces, the apostle says (I Cor. 12:31): “and yet show I unto you a more excellent way”—and what follows clearly shows that he here speaks of charity, which belongs to sanctifying grace. Sanctifying grace is therefore more excellent than free grace.

I answer: a power is the more excellent the higher is the end for which it is ordained. For an end is always more important than the means to it. Now sanctifying grace is ordained to unite man directly with his final end, whereas the free graces are ordained to prepare him for his final end; prophecy, miracles, and the like being the means whereby he is put in touch with it. Sanctifying grace is therefore more excellent than free grace.

On the first point: as the philosopher says in 12 Metaph., text 52, the good of a multitude, such as an army, is twofold. There is the good which is in the multitude itself, such as the orderliness of an army. But there is also the good of its leader. This is separate from the multitude, and is the greater good, since the former is ordained for the sake of it. Now free grace is ordained for the common good of the Church, which consists in ecclesiastical order. But sanctifying grace is ordained for the common good which is separate, which is God himself. Sanctifying grace is therefore the nobler.

On the second point: if free grace could bring about in another what a man himself obtains through sanctifying grace, it would follow that free grace was the nobler, just as the light of the sun which illumines is greater than the light of the object which it illumines. But free grace does not enable a man to bring about in another the fellowship with God which he himself shares through sanctifying grace, although he creates certain dispositions towards it. Hence free grace is not bound to be the more excellent, any more than the heat in a fire, which reveals the specific nature by which it produces heat in other things, is nobler than its own substantial form.

On the third point: feeling is subservient to reason as its end. Hence reason is the nobler. But in this instance things are reversed. What is special is ordained to serve what is common. There is therefore no similarity.

QUESTION ONE HUNDRED AND TWELVE

THE CAUSE OF GRACE

We must now consider the cause of grace, concerning which there are five questions.

1. Whether God is the sole efficient cause of grace.

2. Whether any disposition for grace is required on the part of the recipient, by an act of free will.

3. Whether such a disposition can ensure grace.

4. Whether grace is equal in everyone.

5. Whether any man can know that he has grace.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether God is the Sole Cause of Grace

1. It seems that God is not the sole cause of grace. For it is said in John 1:17 that “grace and truth came by Jesus Christ,” and the name Jesus Christ means the creaturely nature assumed as well as the divine nature which assumed it. It follows that what is creaturely can be the cause of grace.

2. Again, the sacraments of the new law are said to differ from those of the old in this respect, namely that the sacraments of the new law are causes of the grace which those of the old law only signify. Now the sacraments of the new law are visible elements. It follows that God is not the sole cause of grace.

3. Again, according to Dionysius {Coel. Hier. 3, 4): “angels purge, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and men.” But rational creatures are purged, enlightened, and perfected through grace. It follows that God is not the sole cause of grace.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 84:11: “the Lord will give grace and glory.”

I answer: nothing can act upon what is above its own species, since a cause must always be greater than its effect. Now the gift of grace exceeds every capacity of nature, since it is none other than a participation of the divine nature, which exceeds every other nature. It is therefore impossible for any creature to be a cause of grace. Hence it is just as inevitable that God alone should deify, by communicating a sharing of the divine nature through a participation of likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire alone should ignite.

On the first point: the humanity of Christ is “an organ of his divinity,” as the Damascene says (3 De Fid. Orth. 15). Now an instrument carries out the action of a principal agent by the power of the principal agent, not by its own power. Thus the humanity of Christ does not cause grace by its own power, but by the power of the divinity conjoined with it, through which the actions of the humanity of Christ are redemptive.

On the second point: just as in the person of Christ humanity is the cause of our salvation through the divine power which operates as the principal agent, so it is with the sacraments of the new law. Grace is caused instrumentally by the sacraments themselves, yet principally by the power of the Holy Spirit operating in the sacraments.

On the third point: an angel purges, enlightens, and perfects an angel or a man by instruction, not by justification through grace. Wherefore Dionysius says {Coel. Hier. 7): “this kind of purging, enlightening, and perfecting is nothing other than the acquisition of divine knowledge.”

ARTICLE TWO

Whether a Preparation or Disposition for Grace is required on the part of man

1. It seems that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on the part of man. For the apostle says (Rom. 4:4): “Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt.” But a man could not of his own free will prepare himself for grace, unless by an operation. The meaning of grace would then be taken away.

2. Again, a man who walks in sin does not prepare himself for grace. Yet grace is given to some while they walk in sin. This is evident in the case of Paul, who received grace while “breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord” (Acts. 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on the part of man.

3. Again, an agent whose power is infinite does not need any disposition of matter, since he does not even need matter itself, as is obvious in creation. Now grace is likened to creation, being called a new creature in Gal., ch. 6, and it was said in the preceding article that God, whose power is infinite, is the sole cause of grace. It follows that no preparation for receiving grace is required on the part of man.

On the other hand: it is said in Amos 4:12: “prepare to meet thy God, O Israel,” and in I Sam. 7:3: “prepare your hearts unto the Lord.”

I answer: as we said in Q. 111, Art. 2, grace may be understood in two ways. Sometimes it means a habitual gift which God bestows. At other times it means the help of God, who moves the soul to good. Now some preparation is required for grace as a habitual gift, since a form can exist only in matter which is disposed to it. But no previous preparation is required on the part of man if we are speaking of grace as the help of God, by which he moves him to good. Rather is any preparation which can take place within him due to the help of God, who thus moves him. Even the good action of his free will, by which he is made ready to receive the gift of grace, is an action of his free will as moved by God. Hence a man is said to prepare himself. As it is said in Prov. 16:1: “the preparations of the heart in man.” But since his free will is moved by God as principal agent, his will is also said to be prepared by God, and his steps guided by the Lord.

On the first point: there is a preparation of oneself for grace which is simultaneous with the infusion of grace. This is indeed a meritorious work. But it merits the glory which a man does not yet possess, not the grace which he now has. There is also an incomplete preparation for grace which sometimes precedes sanctifying grace, though nevertheless due to God as mover. But this last is not sufficient for merit, since there is as yet no justification by grace. As we shall show in Q. 114, Art. 2, there is no merit except by grace.

On the second point: since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God first moves him to good, it is immaterial whether one is perfectly prepared all at once, or little by little. As it is said in Ecclesiasticus 11:21: “In the eyes of God, it is easy for a poor man suddenly to become rich.” Sometimes God moves a man to good, but not perfectly. This is a preparation which precedes grace. At other times he moves a man to good both instantaneously and perfectly, and such a one then receives grace suddenly, after the manner spoken of in John 6:45: “Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.” This is what happened to Paul, whose heart was suddenly moved by God to hear, to learn, and to come, even while he yet walked in sin. He thus received grace suddenly.

On the third point: an agent whose power is infinite needs neither matter nor a disposition of matter provided by the action of any other cause. Such an agent is nevertheless bound to cause both the matter in a thing and a disposition favourable to its form, according to the condition of the thing to be made. So likewise when God infuses grace into the soul, no preparation is required which God does not himself achieve.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Grace is Bound to be given to One Who Prepares Himself for Grace, or Who does what He can

1. It seems that grace is bound to be given to one who prepares himself for grace, or who does what he can. For a gloss on Rom. 3:21, “the righteousness of God . . . is manifested,” says: “God receives him who flies to him, since otherwise he would be unjust.” It is impossible that God should be unjust, and consequently impossible that he should not receive one who flies to him. Such a one is therefore bound to receive grace.

2. Again, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli 3): “the reason why God does not extend grace to the devil is that he was neither willing nor prepared to receive it.” But if a cause be removed, its effect is also removed. If anyone is willing to receive grace, therefore, he is bound to receive it.

3. Again, “good diffuses itself,” as Dionysius explains (4 Div. Nom., lect. 3), and the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Now a natural form is bound to be received by matter which is disposed to it. Much more, then, is grace bound to be given to one who prepares himself for it.

On the other hand: man is to God as clay to the potter, according to Jer. 18:6: “as the clay is in the potter’s hand, so are ye in mine hand.” But clay is not bound to receive a form from the potter, however much it may be prepared. Neither then is a man bound to receive grace from God, however much he may prepare himself.

I answer: preparation for grace may be considered under two aspects, since a man’s preparation for it is due to God as mover, and also to his own free will as moved by God, as we said in the preceding article. In so far as preparation for grace is due to a man’s own free will, there is no necessity why grace should follow it. The gift of grace exceeds any preparation by human power. But in so far as it is due to the moving of God, what God intends by such moving is bound to be achieved, since God’s purpose cannot fail. As Augustine says: “whosoever will be set free by the blessings of God will most certainly be set free {De Dono Persev. 14). Hence if a man whose heart is moved receives grace by the intention of God who moves him, he receives grace inevitably, in accordance with John 6:45: “Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.”

On the first point: this gloss refers to one who flies to God by a meritorious action of free will which has already been brought to its form by means of grace. If such a one did not receive grace, this would be contrary to the justice which God has himself ordained. Or, if it refers to an action of free will which precedes grace, it assumes that such flight to God is due to the moving of God, which moving ought not in justice to fail.

On the second point: the first cause of the absence of grace lies with ourselves, whereas the first cause of the bestowal of grace lies with God. Thus it is said in Hos. 13:9: “O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help.”

On the third point: a disposition of matter does not ensure the reception of a form, even in natural things, unless through the power of the agent which caused the disposition.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Grace is greater in One Man than in Another

1. It seems that grace is not greater in one man than in another. For it was said in Q. no, Art. 1, that grace is caused in us by God’s love, and according to Wisdom 6:7, “He made both the small and the great, and cares equally for all.” It follows that all receive grace equally.

2. Again, whatever is said to be the greatest possible does not admit of more and less. Now grace is said to be the greatest possible, since it unites us with our final end. It does not then admit of more and less. It follows that it is not greater in one man than in another.

3. Again, it was said in Q. 110, Arts. 1, 2, and 4, that grace is the life of the soul. But life does not admit of more and less. Neither then does grace.

On the other hand: it is said in Eph. 4:7: “But unto every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ.” Now what is given according to measure is not given equally to all. It follows that everyone does not have equal grace.

I answer: as we said in Q. 52, Arts. 1 and 2, a habit can have magnitude in two ways: in respect of its end or object, as when we say that one virtue is nobler than another because it is directed to a greater good; and in respect of its subject, as when we say that one who possesses a habit possesses it in greater or less degree. Now sanctifying grace cannot admit of more and less in respect of its end or object, since grace by its very nature unites a man with the greatest possible good, which is God. But grace does admit of more and less in respect of its subject, since one man may be more enlightened by the light of grace than another. Such diversity is partly due to him who prepares himself for grace, since he who prepares himself the more receives the greater fullness of grace. But we cannot accept this as the primary reason for it, because it is only in so far as his free will is itself prepared by God that a man prepares himself for grace. We must acknowledge that the primary reason for this diversity lies with God. For God distributes his gracious gifts diversely, to the end that the beauty and perfection of the Church may ensue from their diversity, even as he instituted the various degrees of things to the end that the universe might be perfect. Wherefore the apostle, having said: “unto every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ,” thereafter enumerates the various graces, adding the words “for the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ” (Eph. 4:12).

On the first point: the divine care may mean either of two things. It may mean the divine act itself, which is simple and uniform. If it means this, the divine care is equally towards all, since God bestows both the greater and the less by one, simple act. But if it means the gifts which creatures receive as the result of God’s care, there is then diversity, since God bestows greater gifts on some, and lesser gifts on others.

On the second point: natural life cannot admit of more and less, because it belongs to man’s essential being. But man participates in the life of grace accidentally, and may therefore do so in greater or in less degree.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether a Man can know that He has Grace

1. It seems that a man can know that he has grace. For grace is in the soul through its essence, and the most certain knowledge that the soul can have is of what is in itself through its own essence (as Augustine proves in 12 Gen. ad Litt. 31). Grace can therefore be known by him who has grace, with the greatest possible certainty.

2. Again, as knowledge is a gift from God, so also is grace. Now whosoever receives knowledge from God knows that he has knowledge, according to Wisdom 7:17: “the Lord hath given me true knowledge of the things that are.” For a like reason, therefore, whosoever receives grace from God knows that he has grace.

3. Again, light is more easily known than darkness, since “whatsoever doth make manifest is light,” as the apostle says (Eph. 5:13). But sin, which is spiritual darkness, can be known with certainty by him who has sin. Much more then can grace, which is spiritual light.

4. Again, the apostle says (I Cor. 2:12): “Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God; that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God.” Now grace is the first gift of God. A man who has received grace through the Holy Spirit therefore knows that grace is given to him.

5. Again, the Lord himself said to Abraham: “now I know that thou fearest God” (Gen. 22:12), that is, “I have made thee to know”—and this is the fear of reverence, for which grace is essential. A man can therefore know that he has grace.

On the other hand: it is said in Eccl. 9:1: “no man knoweth either love or hatred by all that is before them.” Now sanctifying grace makes a man worthy of the love of God. It follows that no man can know whether he has sanctifying grace.

I answer: there are three ways by which a thing may be known. One way is by revelation. A man may know by revelation that he has grace, since there are times when God reveals this to some as a special privilege, thus engendering within them the joy of security, even in this present life, in order that they may the more confidently and wholeheartedly carry out noble works, and withstand the evils of this present life. Thus was it said to Paul: “My grace is sufficient for thee” (II Cor. 12:9).

In another way, a man may know something by himself, and that with certainty. But no man can know, in this way, that he has grace. For we can be certain of something only if we apprehend it through its own proper principle. In knowledge of this kind, we are certain of conclusions which can be demonstrated from indemonstrable and universal principles. But no one can be sure that he knows any conclusion if he does not know its principle. Now the principle of grace is God himself, who is also its object, and God is unknown by us on account of his excellence. As Job says: “Behold, God is great, and we know him not” (36:26). Neither his presence in us nor his absence can be known with certainty. As Job says again: “Lo, he goeth by me, and I see him not: he passeth on also, but I perceive him not” (9:11). It follows that a man cannot judge with certainty whether he has grace. As it is said in I Cor. 4:3–4: “yea, I judge not mine own self . . . but he that judgeth me is the Lord.”

In a third way, we may know something conjecturally by means of signs. Anyone may know, after this manner, that he has grace, in as much as he perceives that he delights in God and loves not the world, and in as much as he is not aware of any mortal sin within him. We may understand in this wise what is said in Rev. 2:17: “To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, saving he that receiveth it.” But such knowledge is imperfect, wherefore it is said by the apostle in I Cor. 4:4: “I know nothing by myself; yet am I not hereby justified,” and also in Ps. 19:12–13: “Who can understand his errors? cleanse thou me from secret faults. Keep back thy servant also from presumptuous sins.”

On the first point: what is in the soul through its essence is known by way of experimental awareness, in so far as a man knows inward principles through actions. We know the will through willing, for example, and we know life through the functions of life.

On the second point: certainty of what we know is essential to science. Certainty of what we hold in faith is likewise essential to faith. The reason for this is that certainty is a perfection of the intellect, in which such gifts exist. Whosoever has either knowledge or faith, therefore, is certain that he has it. But it is otherwise with grace and charity, and the like, because these are perfections of the appetitive power.

On the third point: the principle and the object of sin both consist in changeable good, which we know. But the object and end of grace is unknown to us on account of the immensity of its light, of which 1 Tim. 6:16 says: “the light which no man can approach unto.”

On the fourth point: the apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, the hope of which is given unto us. We know such things assuredly through faith, although we do not know assuredly that we have grace whereby we may merit them.

On the fifth point: what was said to Abraham may have referred to his experimental awareness, which his actions revealed. Abraham could have known, experimentally through his actions, that he feared God. Or it may refer to a revelation.

QUESTION ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTEEN

THE EFFECTS OF GRACE

We must now inquire into the effects of grace. We shall inquire first into the justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operative grace, and second into merit, which is the effect of co-operative grace.

There are ten questions concerning the justification of the ungodly.

1. What is the justification of the ungodly.

2. Whether an infusion of grace is required for it.

3. Whether any movement of the free will is required for it.

4. Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.

5. Whether a movement of the free will against sin is required for it.

6. Whether the remission of sins is to be numbered with these requirements.

7. Whether the justification of the ungodly is gradual or instantaneous.

8. Concerning the natural order of things required for justification.

9. Whether the justification of the ungodly is the greatest work of God. 10. Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether the Justification of the Ungodly is the Remission of Sins

1. It seems that the justification of the ungodly is not the remission of sins. It is clear from what was said in Q. 71, Arts. 1 and 2, that sin is opposed not only to justice, but to all virtues. Now justification means a movement towards justice. Hence not every remission of sin is justification, since every movement is from one contrary to its opposite.

2. Again, it is said in 2 De Anima, text 49, that each thing should be denominated by what is most prominent in it. Now the remission of sins is brought about primarily by faith, according to Acts 15:9; “purifying their hearts by faith,” and also by charity, according to Prov. 10:12: “love covereth all sins.” It should therefore be denominated by faith, or by charity, rather than by justice.

3. Again, the remission of sins seems to be the same as calling, since one who is called is at a distance, and since we are separated from God by sin. Now according to Rom. 8:30: “whom he called, them he also justified,” calling comes before justification. It follows that justification is not the remission of sins.

On the other hand: a gloss on Rom. 8:30, “whom he called, them he also justified,” says: “that is, by the remission of sins.” It follows that the remission of sins is justification.

I answer: understood passively, justification means the movement towards justice, in the same way as to be heated means the movement towards heat.

But justice, considered in its own nature, means a certain right order, and may be understood in two senses. In one sense it means the right order of a man’s action. Such justice is reckoned as one of the virtues, either as particular justice, which regulates a man’s action in relation to another individual, or as legal justice, which regulates his action in relation to the good of the community, as explained in 5 Ethics 1. In a second sense it means the right order of a man’s inward disposition, signifying the subordination of his highest power to God, and the subordination of the lower powers of his soul to the highest, which is reason. The philosopher calls this “metaphorical justice,” in 5 Ethics 11.

Now justice of this latter kind may be brought about in two ways. It may be brought about by simple generation, which is from privation to form. Justification in this wise may happen even to one who is not in sin, through his receiving justice from God, as Adam is said to have received original justice. But it may also be brought about by movement from contrary to contrary. When it is brought about in this latter way, justification means the transmutation from a state of injustice to the state of justice which we have mentioned. It is this that we mean when we speak here of the justification of the ungodly, in agreement with the apostle’s words in Rom. 4:5: “But to him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.” And since a movement is denominated from its terminus ad quem rather than from its terminus a quo, the transmutation, wherein one is transmuted by remission of sin from a state of injustice to a state of justice, is called “the justification of the ungodly.”

On the first point: every sin involves the disorder of a man’s insubordination to God. Every sin may therefore be called an injustice, and consequently a contrary of justice. As it is said in I John 3:4: “Whosoever committeth sin transgresseth also the law: for sin is the transgression of the law.” Deliverance from any sin is therefore called justification.

On the second point: faith and charity subordinate man’s mind to God in specific ways, in respect of the intellect and in respect of the will. But justice means right order in general, and the transmutation referred to is therefore denominated by justice, rather than by faith or charity.

3. Again, “calling” refers to the help of God, who moves the mind from within and excites it to renounce sin. This moving of God is not itself remission of sin, but the cause of it.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether an Infusion of Grace is required for the Remission of Guilt, which is the Justification of the Ungodly

1. It seems that an infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly. For if there is a mean between two contraries, it is possible to be delivered from one of them without being brought to the other. Now there is a mean between the state of guilt and the state of grace, namely the state of innocence, in which one has neither grace nor guilt. One may therefore be forgiven one’s guilt without being brought to grace.

2. Again, remission of guilt consists in divine forbearance to impute it, according to Ps. 32:2: “Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity.” Infusion of grace, on the other hand, denotes something within us, as was maintained in Q. 110, Art. 1. It follows that an infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt.

3. Again, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now certain sins are contraries, like prodigality and parsimony. Whoever is subject to the sin of prodigality cannot then be subject to the sin of parsimony at the same time, although he may have bean subject to it previously. Hence he is set free from the sin of parsimony through sinning by the vice of prodigality. Thus a sin is remitted without grace.

On the other hand: it is said in Rom. 3:24: “Being justified freely by his grace.”

I answer: it is clear from what we said in Q. 71, Art. 5, that when a man sins, he offends God. Now an offence is not remitted unless the mind of the offended one is pacified towards the offender. Our sin is accordingly said to be remitted when God is pacified towards us. This peace is one with the love with which God loves us. But although the love of God is eternal and unchangeable as a divine action, the effect which it impresses upon us is intermittent, since we sometimes lose it and recover it again. Moreover, the effect of the divine love which we forfeit through sin is grace, and grace makes a man worthy of the eternal life from which mortal sin excludes him. The remission of sin would therefore be meaningless if there were no infusion of grace.

On the first point: to forgive an offender for an offence demands more than is required merely to feel no hatred towards one who does not offend. For it can happen with men that one man neither loves not hates another, and yet will not forgive an offence if the other should offend him, unless through exceptional good will. Now God’s good will to man is said to be renewed by a gift of grace. Hence although a man may have been without either grace or guilt before he sins, he cannot be without guilt after he sins, unless he has grace.

On the second point: just as God’s love not only consists in a divine act of will, but also implies some effect of grace, as we said in Q. no, Art. i, so also the divine forbearance to impute sin implies some effect in him to whom God does not impute it. For God’s forbearance to impute sin is an expression of his love.

On the third point: as Augustine says (1 De Nup. et Concup. 26): “If to be sinless were merely to desist from sin, it would be enough if the scriptural warning were this—‘My son, thou hast sinned. Do it not again.’ But this is not enough, wherefore there is added and pray that thy former sins may be forgiven thee.’” Now sins endures as guilt, though it is transient as an action, as we said in Q. 87, Art. 6. Hence although a man ceases from the action of his former sin when he passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he does not cease to bear the guilt of it. Indeed, he bears the guilt of both sins simultaneously. Moreover, sins are not contrary to each other in respect of turning away from God, which is the very reason why sin involves guilt.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether a Movement of the Free Will is required for the Justification of the Ungodly

1. It seems that a movement of the free will is not required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that infants are justified through the sacrament of Baptism without any movement of the free will, and sometimes adults also. Augustine indeed says that when one of his friends lay sick of a fever, “he lay for long unconscious in a deathly sweat, and when given up in despair, was baptized without his knowing it, and was regenerated” (4 Confessions, cap. 4). Now regeneration is by justifying grace. But God does not confine his power to the sacraments. He can therefore justify a man not only without any movement of the free will, but without the sacraments.

2. Again, a man does not have the use of his reason while asleep, and there cannot be a movement of the free will without the use of reason. Yet Solomon received the gift of wisdom from God while he slept (I Kings, ch. 3, and II Chron., ch. 1). It is just as reasonable that a man should sometimes receive the gift of justifying grace from God without a movement of the free will.

3. Again, grace is conserved and begun by the same cause. Hence Augustine says: “a man ought to turn to God, so that he may at all times be justified by him” (8 Gen. ad Litt. 10, 12). Now grace is conserved in a man without a movement of the free will. It can therefore be infused initially without a movement of the free will.

On the other hand: it is said in John 6:45: “Every man that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.” Now one cannot learn without a movement of the free will, since the learner gives his consent to the teacher. It follows that no man comes to God through justifying grace without a movement of the free will.

I answer: the justification of the ungodly is achieved through God moving a man to justice, as Rom., ch. 3 affirms. Now God moves each thing according to its own manner. We see in natural things that what is heavy is moved by God in one way, and what is light in another way, on account of the different nature of each. He likewise moves a man to justice in a manner which accords with the condition of his human nature, and it is proper to the nature of man that his will should be free. Consequently, when a man has the use of his free will, God never moves him to justice without the use of his free will. With all who are capable of being so moved, God infuses the gift of justifying grace in such wise that he also moves the free will to accept it.

On the first point: infants are incapable of a movement of free will. God therefore moves them to justice solely by moulding their souls. But this is possible only by means of a sacrament, because grace comes to them through spiritual regeneration by Christ; just as the original sin from which they are justified came to them through their carnal origin, not through their own will. It is the same with maniacs and morons, who have never had the use of their free will. But if anyone should lose the use of his free will either through infirmity or sleep, having formerly had the use of it, such a one does not receive justifying grace through the outward administration of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he previously intended to partake of it, which he could not do without the use of his free will. The friend of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated in this way because he assented to Baptism, both previously and subsequently.

On the second point: Solomon neither merited wisdom nor received it while he slept. But it was declared to him while he slept that God would infuse wisdom, because of his previous desire for it. Wisdom 7:7 accordingly puts these words in his mouth: “I desired, and understanding was given unto me.” Or it may be that his was not natural sleep, but the sleep of prophecy referred to in Num. 12:6: “If there be a prophet among you, I the Lord will make myself known unto him in a vision, and will speak unto him in a dream.” If so, his free will could have been used. But we must observe that the gifts of wisdom and of justifying grace are not alike. The gift of justifying grace directs a man especially to good, which is the object of the will, and therefore moves him to good by a movement of the will, which is a movement of his free will. Wisdom, on the other hand, perfects the intellect, which is more fundamental than the will, and can therefore be enlightened by the gift of wisdom without any complete movement of the free will. Some things are revealed in this way to men while they sleep, as we see from Job 33:15–16: “In a dream, in a vision of the night, when deep sleep falleth upon me, in slumberings upon the bed; Then he openeth the ears of men, and sealeth their instruction.”

On the third point: in the infusion of justifying grace there is a transmutation of the human soul. A movement proper to the human soul is therefore required, in order that the soul may be moved according to its own manner. But in the preservation of grace there is no transmutation. Consequently, no movement is required on the part of the soul, but only a continuation of divine inspiration.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether a Movement of Faith is reojuired for the Justification of the Ungodly

1. It seems that a movement of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly. For a man is justified by other things besides faith. He is justified by fear, for example, of which Ecclesiasticus says (1:21): “The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he who is without fear cannot be justified’”; and by charity, according to Luke 7:47: “Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much”; and by humility, according to James 4:6: “God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the humble”; and also by mercy, according to Prov. 16:6: “By mercy and truth iniquity is purged.” Hence a movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly than is a movement of the virtues named.

2. Again, justification requires an act of faith only in so far as a man knows God through faith. But a man can know God in other ways. He can know him through natural knowledge, for example, or by means of the gift of wisdom. It follows that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly.

3. Again, there are several articles of faith. Hence if an act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it seems that a man must contemplate all the articles of faith at the time when he is first justified. But this is impossible, because such contemplation would take a long time. It seems, therefore, that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly.

On the other hand: it is said in Rom. 5:1: “Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God. . . .”

I answer: as we said in the preceding article, the justification of the ungodly requires a movement of the free will, since God moves a man’s mind. Now God moves a man’s soul by turning it to himself, according to Ps. 85:7: “Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to life” (Septuagint). Hence justification requires the movement of the mind by which it turns to God. But the mind turns to God in the first instance by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: “he that cometh to God must believe that he is.” A movement of faith is therefore required for the justification of the ungodly.

On the first point: a movement of faith is not perfect unless it is formed by charity. There is, therefore, a movement of charity in the justification of the ungodly, simultaneous with the movement of faith. There is also an act of filial fear, and an act of humility. Provided that it can be directed to diverse ends, one and the same act of the free will can be the act of diverse virtues, one of which commands while the others obey. An act of mercy, however, either operates like a satisfaction for sin, in which case it follows justification, or serves as a preparation for justification, as it does when the merciful obtain mercy. It can therefore precede justification, contributing towards it simultaneously with the virtues mentioned, as it does when mercy is included in love to one’s neighbour.

On the second point: when a man knows God through natural knowledge, he is not turned to God as the object of blessedness and cause of justification. His knowledge is therefore insufficient for justification. The gift of wisdom presupposes faith, as we explained in Q. 68, Art. 4, ad 3.

On the third point: the apostle says (Rom. 4:5): “to him . . . that believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.” This makes it plain that an act of faith is required in the justification of the ungodly to this extent—that a man believe that God is the justifier of men through the mystery of Christ.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether a Movement of the Free Will against Sin is required for the justification of the ungodly

1. It seems that a movement of the free will against sin is not required for the justification of the ungodly. According to Prov. 10:12: “love covereth all sins,” charity alone is enough to blot out sin. But charity is not concerned with sin as its object. It follows that a movement of the free will against sin is not required for the justification of the ungodly.

2. Again, one who is pressing forward should not look behind him, according to Phil. 3:13–14: “forgetting those things which are behind, and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling. . . .” Now the previous sins of one who is on the way to righteousness are behind him. He should therefore forget them, and not turn back to them by a movement of the free will.

3. Again, in the justification of the ungodly, one sin is not forgiven without another. “It is impious to expect half a pardon from God” (Sunt Plures, Dist. 3 de Poenit.). A man would therefore have to reflect upon every one of his sins, if the justification of the ungodly required a movement of the free will against sin. But this seems impossible. For a man would need a long time for such reflection. Neither could he be forgiven for the sins which he had forgotten. It follows that a movement of the free will against sin is not required for the justification of the ungodly.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 32:5: “I said, I will confess my transgressions unto the Lord; and thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin.”

I answer: as we said in the first article, the justification of the ungodly is a movement, in which the human mind is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. It is therefore necessary that a man’s mind should relate itself to both states by a movement of the free will, just as a body which moves away from one point is related to both the points between which it moves. When a body moves in space, it obviously moves from a terminus a quo and approaches a terminus ad quem. When a human mind undergoes justification, it must both abandon sin and approach justice by a movement of the free will.

This movement of recoil and approach on the part of the free will means abhorrence and yearning. Hence in his exposition of John 10:13, “the hireling fleeth,” Augustine says: “our feelings are the movements of our souls; joy is the soul’s overflowing; fear is its flight; when you yearn, the soul advances; when you fear, it flees” (Tract. in Joan. 46). The justification of the ungodly thus requires a twofold movement of the free will. It must yearn for the justice which is of God. It must also abhor sin.

On the first point: it is by the same virtue that we strive towards one contrary and recoil from its opposite. It is thus by charity that we delight in God, and by charity also that we abhor the sins which separate us from God.

On the second point: when a man has put things behind him, he should not revert to them out of love for them. Rather should he forget them, lest he be drawn to them. But he ought to take note of them in thought as things to be abhorred, for thus does he forsake them.

On the third point: in the period before justification, a man must feel a loathing for the sins which he remembers having committed. From such preliminary meditation there ensues in the soul a movement of general loathing for all sins committed, including those which are buried in the past. For a man in this state would repent of the sins which he does not remember, if they were present to his memory. This movement contributes to his justification.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether the Remission of Sins should be Numbered with the things reequired for the Justification of the Ungodly

1. It seems that the remission of sins should not be numbered with the things required for the justification of the ungodly. For the substance of a thing is not numbered with the things required for it. A man, for example, should not be numbered together with his soul and his body. Now it was said in the first article that the justification of the ungodly itself is the remission of sins. The remission of sins should not therefore be numbered with the things required for it.

2. Again, infusion of grace and remission of sin are the same thing, just as illumination and the dispelling of darkness are the same thing. But what is

identical should not be numbered together with itself. Remission of guilt should not then be numbered together with infusion of grace.

3. Again, the remission of sins follows the movement of the free will toward God and against sin, as an effect follows its cause. For sins are forgiven as a result of faith and contrition. But an effect should not be numbered together with its cause, since things which are numbered as belonging to the same class are simultaneous by nature. The remission of guilt should not then be numbered with the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

On the other hand: since the end is paramount in all things, we should not omit to take account of the end in enumerating the things which are required for something. Now the remission of sins is the end in the justification of the ungodly, since it is said in Isa. 27:9: “and this is all the fruit to take away his sin.” The remission of sins should not therefore be omitted in the enumeration of things required for the justification of the ungodly.

I answer: four things are accounted necessary for the justification of the ungodly—an infusion of grace, a movement of the free will toward God in faith, a movement of the free will in recoil from sin, and the remission of guilt. The reason for this is that justification is a movement in which the soul is moved by God from a state of guilt to a state of justice. Three things are necessary for any movement in which one thing is moved by another: first, the motion of the mover itself; second, the movement of the thing moved; and third, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end. Now the infusion of grace is the motion of God, and the twofold movement by which the free will abandons a terminus a quo and approaches a terminus ad quem is the movement of the thing moved. But the consummation of the movement, or attainment of the end, lies in the remission of guilt. For therein is justification consummated.

On the first point: the justification of the ungodly is said to be itself the remission of sins because every movement takes its species from its end. But many other things are also required for the attainment of the end, as is clear from the preceding article.

On the second point: the infusion of grace and the remission of guilt may be considered in two ways. They are identical as referring to the substance of the act, since God bestows grace and forgives guilt by one and the same act. But they differ as referring to their objects, since the guilt removed and the grace infused are not the same; just as the generation and corruption of natural things differ, even though the generation of one may be identical with the corruption of another.

On the third point: this is not a classification according to genus and species, in which things classed together must be simultaneous. It is an enumeration of the different things required in order to complete something. It may therefore include one thing which precedes and another which follows, since one of the principles or parts of a composite thing may be prior to another.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether the Justification of the Ungodly is achieved Instantaneously or Gradually

1. It seems that the justification of the ungodly is not instantaneous, but gradual. For it was said in Art. 3 that justification requires a movement of the free will, and the action of the free will is that of choice, which presupposes thoughtful deliberation, as was said in Q. 13, Art. 1. Now deliberation implies a certain amount of reasoning, and reasoning involves a degree of succession. It seems, therefore, that the justification of the ungodly is gradual.

2. Again, there is no movement of the free will without actual consideration, and it was said in Q. 85, Art. 4 that we cannot actually understand many things at the same time. Now the justification of the ungodly requires a movement of the free will in different directions—in relation to God, and in relation to sin. It seems, therefore, that the justification of the ungodly cannot be instantaneous.

3. Again, a form which admits of more and less is received by its subject gradually, as is obvious in the case of whiteness or blackness. Now it was said in Q. 112, Art. 4, that grace admits of more and less. Hence grace is not

received suddenly. Since the justification of the ungodly requires an infusion of grace, it seems that it cannot be instantaneous.

4. Again, the movement of the free will which contributes to the justification of the ungodly is meritorious. It must therefore have its origin in grace, since there is no merit without grace (as will be shown later, Q. 114, Art. 2). Now a thing receives its form before it acts by means of it. Grace must therefore be first of all infused, and the movement of the free will in relation to God and sin must follow. Hence justification is not entirely instantaneous.

5. Again, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be a first instant in which it is present in the soul, and if guilt is remitted, there must likewise be a last instant in which one is under guilt. Now these instants cannot be the same, since opposites would be in the same thing at the same time if they were so. There must therefore be two successive instants, and these must have a period of time between them, as the philosopher explains in 6 Physics, text 2. It follows that justification is achieved not instantaneously, but gradually.

On the other hand: the justification of the ungodly is by the grace of the Holy Spirit, which justifies us. Now the Holy Spirit comes to the minds of men suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: “And suddenly there came a sound from heaven, as of a rushing mighty wind,” on which the gloss says: “the grace of the Holy Spirit knows no tardy travail” (and also a gloss by Ambrose on Luke 4:1: “he was led by the Spirit into the wilderness”). The justification of the ungodly is therefore instantaneous, not gradual.

I answer: the justification of the ungodly in its entirety has its origin in the infusion of grace. The free will is moved by grace, and guilt is removed by grace. Now the infusion of grace takes place in an instant, without any succession. For if any form is not imprinted on its subject suddenly, the reason is that its subject is not disposed to it, and that the agent needs time to make it so. Hence we see that a substantial form is received by matter at once, whenever matter becomes disposed to it through preliminary alteration. Hence also the atmosphere is at once illuminated by a body which is actually bright, since it is of its own accord disposed to receive light. Now we have already said that God needs no disposition, other than that which he himself creates, in order to infuse grace into the soul. As we said in Q. 112, Art. 2, he sometimes creates a disposition sufficient for the reception of grace all at once, sometimes by gradual degrees. A natural agent cannot adapt matter in an instant, because there is something in matter which resists his power. Matter is consequently adapted the more quickly the stronger is the power of the agent, as we may observe. The divine power can therefore adapt any created matter whatsoever instantly to its form, since the divine power is infinite. Much more can it so adapt the free will, the movement of which can be instantaneous by nature. The justification of the ungodly is therefore achieved by God in an instant.

On the first point: the movement of the free will which contributes to the justification of the ungodly is the consent to abhor sin and adhere to God. This consent is instantaneous. Deliberation may sometimes precede consent. But this is a way to justification, not the substance of it, just as local movement is a way to light, and change a way to generation.

On the second point: as we said in Pt. I, Q. 85, Art. 5, there is nothing to prevent us from understanding two things at the same time provided that they are in some way one. We understand a subject and a predicate simultaneously, since they are unified in a single affirmation. The free will can likewise be moved in two ways at the same time, provided that the one movement is subservient to the other. Now the movement of the free will in relation to sin is subservient to its movement in relation to God, since a man abhors sin because it is opposed to God, to whom he wills to adhere. Thus in the justification of the ungodly the free will abhors sin and turns to God simultaneously, just as a body simultaneously removes from one place and approaches another.

On the third point: there is no reason why a form which admits of more and less should not be received by matter instantaneously. If this were impossible, light could not be suddenly received by air, which can be illuminated in greater or in less degree. The explanation of this is to be found in the disposition of the matter or subject, as we have said.

On the fourth point: a thing begins to act by its form in the same instant in which the form is received. Fire moves upwards immediately it is kindled, and its upward movement would be completed at the same instant, if it were instantaneous. Now the movement of the free will, which is to will, is instantaneous, not gradual. The justification of the ungodly cannot therefore be gradual.

On the fifth point: the succession of two opposites in one subject which is in time must be considered differently from their succession in supra-temporal things. With things in time, there is no last instant in which a previous form inheres in its subject, although there is a last period of time in which it does so, and a first instant in which a succeeding form inheres in the matter, or subject. The reason for this is that there cannot be in time one instant which immediately precedes another, because instants are not continuous in time, any more than points are continuous in a line, as is proved in 6 Physics, text 1. A period of time, however, terminates at an instant, and hence a thing is under one opposite form during the whole period of time which precedes its movement to the other. But in the instant in which this period ends and the following period begins, it has the form which it attains by this movement.

But it is otherwise with supra-temporal things. For if there is any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (e.g., in angels), this succession is measured by time which is discrete, not continuous, as we explained in Q. 53, Arts. 2 and 3. In such succession there is a last instant in which the former was, and also a first instant in which that which follows is. But there cannot be any intervening period of time, because there is no continuous time which could require it.

Now the mind of man which is justified is in itself supra-temporal. But it is in time accidentally, in so far as it understands things under the aspect of continuous time, in terms of the phantasms by means of which it appreciates intelligible species, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 85, Arts. 1 and 2. It is according to this latter context, therefore, that we must judge of its change from one condition to another by movement in time. We must say, accordingly, that although there is a last period of time, there is no last instant in which guilt inheres; but that there is a first instant in which grace inheres, and that guilt inheres during the whole of the preceding period.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether the Infusion of Grace is the First of the Things required for the Justification of the Ungodly, According to the Order of Nature

1. It seems that the infusion of grace is not the first of the things required for the justification of the ungodly, according to the order of nature. For according to Ps. 34:14: “Depart from evil, and do good,” departure from evil comes before approach to good. Now remission of guilt pertains to departure from evil, and infusion of grace pertains to the pursuit of good. Hence remission of guilt is naturally prior to infusion of grace.

2. Again, a disposition naturally precedes the form to which it is disposed, and the movement of the free will is a disposition towards the reception of grace. It therefore precedes grace naturally.

3. Again, sin prevents the soul from freely inclining to God. Now what prevents a movement must be removed first, before the movement can follow. The remission of guilt, and the movement of the free will in recoil from sin, are therefore naturally prior to the movement of the free will toward God, and also to the infusion of grace.

On the other hand: a cause naturally precedes its effect. Now we said in the preceding article that the infusion of grace is the cause of all other things which are necessary for the justification of the ungodly. It is therefore naturally prior to them.

I answer: as we said in the preceding article, the justification of the ungodly is not gradual. It follows that the four things which we said were required for it (Art. 6) are simultaneous in time. But one of them is nevertheless prior to another in the order of nature. In the order of nature, the infusion of grace is first, the movement of the free will toward God is second, its recoil from sin is third, and the remission of guilt is last. The reason for this is that, according to the order of nature, the motion of the mover is first in any movement. The adaptation of the matter, or the movement of the thing moved, is naturally second, and the end or termination of the movement, in which the motion of the mover finds its completion, is last. Now the motion of God, who is the mover, is the infusion of grace, as we said in Art. 6, and the movement or adaptation of the thing moved is the twofold movement of the free will. We also made it clear that the termination or end of the movement is the remission of guilt. Hence in the justification of the ungodly, the infusion of grace is first in the order of nature, the movement of the free will toward God second, and its recoil from sin third. The movement of the free will toward God precedes its recoil from sin as its ground and cause, since he who is justified abhors sin on the ground that it is opposed to God. Fourth and last is the remission of guilt, which is the end for which this transmutation is ordained, as we said in Arts. 1 and 6.

On the first point: departure from one term and approach to another may be considered in two ways. If we consider them on the part of a subject which is moved, departure from one term naturally comes before approach to another, because the one contrary which a subject abandons is in it first, and the other contrary which it acquires as the result of movement is in it afterwards. But if we consider them on the part of an agent, this order is reversed. It is because a form is already in it that an agent acts to repel a contrary form. For example, it is because of its light that the sun acts to repel darkness. On the part of the sun itself, illumination is prior to the expelling of darkness. But on the part of the air which it illuminates, liberation from darkness is naturally prior to the reception of light. Yet these are simultaneous. Now if we are speaking of infusion of grace and remission of guilt as on the part of God who justifies, the infusion of grace is naturally prior to the remission of guilt. But if we are looking at them from the point of view of a man who is justified, this order is reversed. Liberation from guilt is then naturally prior to the reception of justifying grace. Or we may say that guilt is the terminus a quo of justifying grace, and justification its terminus ad quem, and that grace is the cause both of the remission of guilt and of the acquisition of justice.

On the second point: the disposition of a subject is naturally prior to its reception of a form. But it follows the action of the agent whereby the subject becomes thus disposed. In the order of nature, therefore, the movement of the free will precedes the reception of grace, but follows the infusion of grace.

On the third point: as it is said in 2 Physics, text 89, “the first movement of the soul is essentially that which relates to the principle of speculation, or to the end of action.” Outwardly, the removal of an obstacle precedes the pursuit of the end. But the movement of the free will is a movement of the soul. Its movement toward God as its end therefore precedes its movement in removing the obstacle of sin, according to the order of nature.

ARTICLE NINE

Whether the Justification of the Ungodly is the Greatest Work of God

1. It seems that the justification of the ungodly is not the greatest work of God. By the justification of the ungodly one obtains the grace of the wayfarer. But by glorification one obtains the grace of heaven, which is greater. The glorification of men and angels is therefore a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.

2. Again, the justification of the ungodly is ordained for the particular good of an individual man. But the good of the universe is greater than the good of an individual man, as is clear from 1 Ethics 2. The creation of heaven and earth is therefore a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.

3. Again, to make something out of nothing, when there is nothing which co-operates with the agent, is greater than to make something out of something else with the co-operation of the subject. Now in the work of creation something is made out of nothing, and there is consequently nothing which can cooperate with the agent. In the justification of the ungodly, on the other hand, something is made out of something else. That is, God makes a just man out of an ungodly man, who, moreover, co-operates by the movement of his free will, as was said in Art. 3. Hence the justification of the ungodly is not the greatest work of God.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 145:9: “his tender mercies are over all his works,” and the collect says: “O God, who declarest thy Almighty power especially by pardon and mercy.” Further, expounding John 14:12, “and greater works than these shall he do," Augustine says: "that a just man should be made out of an ungodly man is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth" (Tract. 72 in Joan.).

I answer: a work may be said to be great in two ways. It may be said to be great in respect of the manner of action. In this respect, the greatest work is the work of creation, in which something is made out of nothing. But a work may also be said to be great in respect of what it achieves. Now the justification of the ungodly terminates in the eternal good of participation in the divine nature. It is therefore greater in respect of what it achieves than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates in the good of changeable nature. Hence, when Augustine says: "that a just man should be made out of an ungodly man is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth," he adds: "for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the salvation and justification of the predestined shall remain."

But we must observe that there are two senses in which a thing is said to be great. The first sense is that of absolute quantity. In this sense, the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace which makes an ungodly man just, and the glorification of the just is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly. The second sense is that of relative quantity, in respect of which we may say that a mountain is small, and a millet great. In this sense, the gift of grace which makes the ungodly just is greater than the gift of glory which beatifies the just. For the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of an ungodly man, who is worthy of punishment, by more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of a just man, who is worthy of glory since he is justified. Hence Augustine says in the same passage: "Let him judge who can whether it is greater to create just angels than to justify the ungodly. If these are equal in respect of power, the latter is assuredly greater in mercy."

From this the answer to the first point is obvious.

On the second point: the good of the universe is greater than the good of an individual man, if we consider them as in the same genus. But the good of the grace given to one man is greater than the good of the whole natural universe.

On the third point: this reasoning argues about the manner of the agent's action. The creation is the greatest work of God in this respect.

ARTICLE TEN

Whether the Justification of the Ungodly is a Miracle

1. It seems that the justification of the ungodly is a miracle. For miracles are greater than works which are not miraculous, and the justification of the ungodly is a greater work than some others which are miraculous, as the passage from Augustine quoted in the preceding article makes clear. It follows that the justification of the ungodly is a miracle.

2. Again, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. Now when God causes something to happen in natural things contrary to their natural inclination, e.g., when he causes the blind to see, or raises the dead to life, it is a miracle. It seems then that the justification of the ungodly is a miracle. For the will of an ungodly man inclines to evil, and God moves him to good when he justifies him.

3. Again, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that any man should receive wisdom from God suddenly, without study. It is therefore miraculous also that any ungodly man should be justified by him.

On the other hand: miraculous works are beyond the power of nature. But the justification of the ungodly is not beyond the power of nature, since Augustine says: “the capacity to have faith is of the nature of man, as is also the capacity to have charity. But to have both faith and charity is of the grace of the faithful” {De Praed. Sanct. 5). It follows that the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.

I answer: three things are usually to be found in miracles. The first concerns the power of the agent. Miracles can be wrought only by the power of God, and are therefore absolutely mysterious, having a cause which is hidden, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 105, Art. 7. In this respect, the justification of the ungodly is just as miraculous as the creation of the world, or indeed any work whatever which can be wrought by God alone. Secondly, in some miracles there is a form induced which is beyond the natural capacity of the matter. When one who is dead is brought to life, for example, life is beyond the capacity of a body in that state. The justification of the ungodly is not miraculous in this respect, because the soul is naturally capable of receiving grace. As Augustine says, the soul is capable of God by the very fact that it is made in the image of God (loc. cit.). Thirdly, there is something in miracles over and above the normal and usual order of cause and effect. For example, one who is infirm suddenly acquires perfect health in a manner outside the normal order of recovery, whether by natural or artificial means. The justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous in this respect, and sometimes not. The normal and usual course of justification is that God moves the soul from within, turning a man to himself at first by an imperfect conversion, to the end that his conversion may thereafter become perfect. As Augustine says: “charity begun deserves to be increased, so that it may deserve to be perfected when it is increased” {Tract. 5 in Joan.). But there are times when God moves the soul with such force that it immediately attains the perfection of justice. This is what happened in the conversion of Paul, together with a miraculous outward prostration. The conversion of Paul is accordingly commemorated in the Church as a miracle.

On the first point: some miracles are inferior to the justification of the ungodly in respect of the good which they achieve. They are nevertheless outside the causal order through which such effects are normally produced, and consequently have more of the nature of miracle.

On the second point: it is not always miraculous that a natural thing should be moved in a way contrary to its natural inclination. If this were the case, it would be miraculous that water should be heated, or that a stone should be thrown upwards. Such an event is miraculous only when it is brought about by some cause other than that which is naturally its proper cause. Now there is no cause, other than God, which can justify the ungodly, just as there is no cause other than fire which can heat water. It follows that the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous in this respect.

On the third point: man is born to acquire wisdom and knowledge from God through his own diligence and study. It is therefore miraculous that he should become wise and learned in any other way. He is not born to acquire grace by his own work, but by the work of God. There is therefore no comparison.

QUESTION ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTEEN

CONCERNING MERIT, WHICH IS THE EFFECT OF CO-OPERATIVE GRACE

We must now consider merit, which is the effect of co-operative grace. There are ten questions concerning merit.

1. Whether a man can merit anything from God.

2. Whether without grace one can merit eternal life.

3. Whether through grace one can merit eternal life condignly.

4. Whether grace is the principle of merit, through charity as the principal medium.

5. Whether a man can merit the grace first given to himself.

6. Whether he can merit it on behalf of another.

7. Whether anyone can merit for himself restoration after a lapse.

8. Whether anyone can merit for himself an increase of grace, or of charity.

9. Whether anyone can merit for himself perseverance to the end. 10. Whether temporal goods can be merited.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether a Man can Merit Anything from God

1. It seems that a man cannot merit anything from God. No one merits a reward by repaying what he owes to another. But we cannot even fully repay what we owe to God, by all the good that we do. For we always owe him more than this, as the philosopher says in 8 Ethics 14. Hence it is said in Luke 17:10: “when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do.” It follows that a man cannot merit anything from God.

2. Again, it seems that a man merits nothing from God if he profits himself, but profits God nothing. Now by good work a man profits himself or another man, but not God. For it is said in Job 35:7: “If thou be righteous, what givest thou him? Or what receiveth he of thine hand?” It follows that a man cannot merit anything from God.

3. Again, whoever merits anything from another makes that other his debtor, since he who owes a reward ought to render it to him who merits it. But God is a debtor to no one, wherefore it is said in Rom. 11:35: “Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?” It follows that no one can merit anything from God.

On the other hand: it is said in Jer. 31:16: “thy work shall be rewarded.” Now a reward means something given for merit. Hence it seems that a man can merit something from God.

I answer: merit and reward mean the same thing. We call it a reward when it is given to someone in return for his work or labour, as a price for it. Now to give a reward for work or labour is an act of justice, just as to give a fair price for something received from another is an act of justice, and justice, as the philosopher says in 5 Ethics 4, is a kind of equality. Justice obtains absolutely between those between whom equality obtains absolutely. It does not obtain absolutely between those between whom equality does not obtain absolutely, but there may nevertheless be a kind of justice between them, since we speak of the “right” of a father, or of a master, as the philosopher says in ch. 6 of the same book. Merit and reward have accordingly an absolute meaning where justice obtains absolutely. But in so far as the meaning of justice remains where justice obtains relatively and not absolutely, the meaning of merit is relative though not absolute, such as is applicable to a son who deserves something from his father, or to a slave who deserves something from his master.

Now there is obviously a very great inequality between God and man. The gulf betwixt them is indeed infinite. Moreover, all the good that is in a man is due to God. The kind of justice which obtains where there is absolute equality cannot therefore obtain between man and God. There obtains only the justice which is relative to the proportion of what is wrought by each, according to their own mode. But since both the mode and the manner of man's virtue are due to God, it is only by a previous divine ordination that a man can merit anything from God. That is, a man can receive as a reward from God only what God has given him the power to work for by his own effort; just as natural things attain, by their own movements and activities, that to which they are divinely ordained. There is this difference, however. A rational creature moves itself to its action by its free will, and its action is therefore meritorious. This is not the case with other creatures.

On the first point: a man has merit in so far as he does what he ought by his own will. The act of justice whereby one repays a debt would not otherwise be meritorious.

On the second point: God does not seek to gain anything from our good works. He seeks to be glorified by them, i.e., that his goodness should be shown forth. He seeks this by his own works also. Neither does anything accrue to God from our worship of him, but to ourselves. Hence we merit something from God not because our works profit him, but because we work to his glory.

On the third point: our own action is meritorious only by reason of a previous divine ordination. It does not follow, therefore, that God becomes a debtor to ourselves simply. Rather does he become a debtor to himself, in so far as it is right that what he has ordained should be fulfilled.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether One can Merit Eternal Life without Grace

1. It seems that one can merit eternal life without grace. It was said in the preceding article that a man merits from God that to which he is divinely ordained. Now it is of the very nature of man that he is ordained to blessedness as his end, which is indeed the reason why he naturally seeks to be blessed. A man can therefore merit blessedness, which is eternal life, by his own natural powers and without grace.

2. Again, a work is the more meritorious the less it is incumbent upon one, and a good work is the less incumbent if it is done by him who has received

the fewer benefits. Now a man who has only his own natural good has received less from God than one who has received gifts of grace in addition. His work is therefore the more meritorious in God’s sight. Hence if one who has grace can in any wise merit eternal life, much more can one who is without grace.

3. Again, the mercy and liberality of God are infinitely greater than the mercy and liberality of man. Now one man can merit something from another, even though he has never had his grace. Much more, then, does it seem that a man without grace can merit eternal life from God.

On the other hand: the apostle says (Rom. 6:23): “the gift of God is eternal life.”

I answer: there are two states of man without grace, as we said in Q. 109, Art. 2. One is the state of pure nature, such as was in Adam before his sin. The other is the state of corrupt nature, such as is in ourselves before restoration through grace. If we are speaking of man in the first of these states, there is one reason why he cannot merit eternal life by his natural powers alone, and that is that his merit depends on a divine preordination. No action of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained to that which exceeds what is commensurate with the power which is its principle of action. It is indeed an ordinance of divine providence that nothing shall act beyond its own power. Now eternal life is a good which exceeds what is commensurate with created nature, since it transcends both natural knowledge and natural desire, according to I Cor. 2:9: “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man. . . .” No created nature, therefore, can suffice as the principle of an action which merits eternal life, unless there is added to it a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if we are speaking of man as he exists in sin, there is a second reason why this is so, namely, the impediment of sin. Sin is an offence against God which excludes us from eternal life, as we said in Q. 71, Art. 6, and Q. 113, Art. 2. Hence no one who lives in sin can merit eternal life unless he is first reconciled to God by the remission of sin. Now sin is remitted by grace, since the sinner merits not life but death, according to Rom. 6:23: “the wages of sin is death.”

On the first point: God has ordained that human nature shall attain the end of eternal life by the help of grace, not by its own power. Its own action can merit eternal life by the help of grace.

On the second point: a man without grace cannot have it in him to perform a work equal to that which proceeds from grace, since action is the more perfect the more perfect is its principle. This reasoning would be valid, however, if such works were equal in each case.

On the third point: the first reason to which we have referred relates to God and to man in dissimilar ways. For it is from God, and not from man, that a man has every power of welldoing which he possesses. He cannot therefore merit anything from God except by means of God's gift. The apostle expresses this pointedly when he says: "who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?" (Rom. 11:35). The second reason, on the other hand, which is concerned with the impediment of sin, relates to man and to God in a similar way, since one man cannot merit anything even from another man whom he has offended, unless he first makes retribution, and is reconciled to him.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether a Man in Grace can Merit Eternal Life Condignly

1. It seems that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life condignly. For the apostle says (Rom. 8:18): "the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us." Now the sufferings of the saints seem to be the worthiest of all meritorious works. Hence no works of men can merit eternal life condignly.

2. Again, a gloss by Augustine on Rom. 6:23: "the gift of God is eternal life," says: "He could have said with truth the wages of justice is eternal life.' But he preferred to say the gift of God is eternal life,' in order that we might understand that God leads us to eternal life for his mercy's sake, and not for the sake of our merits." Now what is merited condignly is received for the sake of merit, not for mercy's sake. It seems, therefore, that a man cannot merit eternal life condignly through grace.

3. Again, merit would seem to be condign if it is equal to the reward. But no action in this present life can be equal to eternal life. For eternal life transcends our knowledge and our desire, and even the charity and love of the wayfarer, just as it transcends nature. It follows that a man cannot merit eternal life condignly through grace.

On the other hand: that which is given in accordance with a righteous judgment would seem to be a condign reward. Now God gives eternal life in accordance with a righteous judgment, since it is said in II Tim. 4:8: “Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day.” It follows that a man merits eternal life condignly.

I answer: a man’s meritorious work may be considered in two ways; in so far as it proceeds from his own free will, and in so far as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. There cannot be condignity if a meritorious work is considered as it is in its own substance, and as the outcome of a man’s own free will, since there is then extreme inequality. There is, however, congruity, since there is a certain relative equality. For it seems congruous that if a man works according to his own, power, God should reward him according to the excellence of his power. But if we are speaking of a meritorious work as proceeding from the grace of the Holy Spirit, it merits eternal life condignly. For the degree of its merit then depends on the power of the Holy Spirit which moves us to eternal life, according to John 4:14: “ . . . shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life.” A man’s work is therefore rewarded according to the worth of the grace by which he is made a partaker of the divine nature, and adopted as a son of God to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: “ . . . and if children, then heirs.”

On the first point: the apostle is speaking of the sufferings of the saints according to what they are in their own substance.

On the second point: this gloss is to be understood as referring to the first cause of the attainment of eternal life, which is the mercy of God. Our merit is nevertheless the secondary-cause.

On the third point: the grace of the Holy Spirit which we have in this life is not equal to glory in actuality. But it is equal to it in power, like a seed which contains the power to become the whole tree. Thus does the Holy Spirit dwell in a man by grace as the efficient cause of eternal life, wherefore it is called the earnest of our inheritance in II Cor. 1:22.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Grace is the Principle of Merit through Charity more Principally than through Other Virtues

1. It seems that grace is not the principle of merit through charity more principally than through other virtues. Labour is worthy of its hire, according to Matt. 20:8: “call the labourers, and give them their hire.’’ But every virtue is the principle of some labour, since a virtue is a habit of action, as was said in Q. 55, Art. 2. Every virtue is therefore equally a principle of merit.

2. Again, the apostle says (I Cor. 3:8): “and every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labour.” But charity lightens labour rather than increases it, since “love makes every hard and heavy task easy, and almost as nothing,” as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Sermo 9; De Tempt., Sermo 49). Charity is not then the principle of merit more principally than other virtues.

3. Again, the virtue which is most principally the principle of merit would seem to be the virtue whose actions are the most meritorious. Now the most meritorious actions seem to be those of faith and patience, or fortitude. This is apparent from the martyrs, who for their faith remained stedfast unto death with patience and fortitude. Other virtues are therefore the principle of merit more principally than charity.

On the other hand: our Lord says: “he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him” (John 14:21). Now eternal life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, according to John 17:3: “this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God.” The meriting of eternal life therefore depends principally on charity.

I answer: there are two sources from which the meritorious character of a human action is derived, as may be understood from what we said in the first article. First and foremost, there is the divine ordination. This is the ground upon which an action is said to merit the good to which a man is divinely ordained. Secondly, there is the free will of man, which gives him the power to act voluntarily on his own part, more than any other creature. In regard to either source, the principle of merit depends especially on charity. For we must observe in the first place that eternal life consists in the enjoyment of God. The movement of man's mind towards the enjoyment of divine good is the proper action of charity, and it is the action of charity that directs all actions of the other virtues to this end, since charity commands the other virtues. The meriting of eternal life therefore depends primarily on charity, and secondarily on other virtues, in so far as their actions are directed by charity. It is apparent, also, that we do most willingly what we do out of love. Even in respect of the voluntary character essential to its nature, therefore, merit depends principally on charity.

On the first point: since charity has the ultimate end as its object, it moves the other virtues to act. A habit which relates to an end always commands the habits which relate to the means to it, as we explained in Q. 9, Art. 1.

On the second point: there are two ways in which a work may be laborious and difficult. It may be so because of its magnitude, which increases its merit. Charity does not lighten labour in this respect. On the contrary, it causes us to undertake the greatest works. As Gregory says, "charity is such that it does great works" {Hom. in Evang. 30). But a work may also be laborious and difficult because of a fault in him who labours. Anything can be hard and difficult if it is not done readily and with a will. Such labour lessens merit, and is removed by charity.

On the third point: an act of faith is not meritorious unless faith works by love, as is said in Gal. 5. Neither is an act of patience and fortitude meritorious unless performed through charity, according to I Cor. 13:3: "though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether a Man can Merit the First Grace for Himself

1. It seems that a man can merit the first grace for himself. For Augustine says that “faith merits justification” (Praef. Ps. 32), and a man is justified by the grace first given to him. It follows that a man can merit the first grace for himself.

2. Again, God gives grace only to those who are worthy. But we do not say that anyone is worthy of something good unless he has merited it condignly. It follows that one can merit the first grace condignly.

3. Again, with men, one can merit a gift which has already been received. One who has been given a horse by his master, for example, may deserve it through using it well in his master’s service. Now God is more generous than a man. Much more, then, can a man merit the first grace which he has already received from God, by reason of his subsequent works.

On the other hand: the very meaning of grace excludes the notion of reward for works, according to Rom. 4:4: “Now to him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt.” But what a man merits is credited to him as a reward for works. Hence he cannot merit the first grace.

I answer: we may think of a gift of grace in two ways. If we are thinking of the gratuitous character of the gift, it is obvious that all merit is opposed to grace, since the apostle says: “and if by grace, then it is no more of works” (Rom. 11:6). If, on the other hand, we are thinking of the nature of what is given, such a gift cannot be merited by one who does not have grace. For not only does grace exceed what is commensurate with nature, but a man in the state of sin before grace is prevented from meriting grace by the impediment of sin. Neither can grace already possessed be merited subsequently, since a reward is the outcome of work, and grace is the principle of all our good works, as we said in Q. 109. Finally, if one should merit another gratuitous gift by virtue of grace already received, this would not be the first grace. It is apparent, then, that no man can merit the first grace for himself.

On the first point: as Augustine says in 1 Retract. 23, he was at one time deceived in this matter, when he believed that the beginning of faith lay with ourselves, although its consummation was a gift of God. He retracts this belief, but it is apparently on this assumption that he declares that faith merits justification. But if we suppose that faith is begun in us by God, this being indeed a truth of faith, then even the act of faith follows the first grace. It cannot then merit the first grace. Hence a man is justified by faith not in the sense that he merits justification by believing, but in the sense that he believes while he is being justified. This movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, as we said in Q. 113, Art. 4.

On the second point: the reason why God gives grace only to the worthy is not that they were previously worthy, but that by grace God makes them worthy, who alone "can bring a clean thing out of an unclean" (Job. 14:4).

On the third point: every good work which a man does proceeds from the first grace as its principle. But it does not proceed from any gift of man. We cannot therefore argue in the same way about a gift of grace and a gift of man.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether a Man can Merit the First Grace for Another

1. It seems that a man can merit the first grace for another. For the gloss on Matt. 9:2, "and Jesus, seeing their faith," etc., says: "How much is our own faith worth in the sight of God, if he values the faith of one so highly that he heals another both inwardly and outwardly!" Now it is by the first grace that a man is healed inwardly. One man can therefore merit the first grace for another.

2. Again, the prayers of the righteous are not in vain, but effectual, according to James 5:16: "the effectual fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much." Now he has just said: "pray for one another, that ye may be healed," and a man can be healed only through grace. It seems, therefore, that one man can merit the first grace for another.

3. Again, it is said in Luke 16:9: “Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteousness; that, when ye fail, they may receive you into everlasting habitations.” But no one is received into everlasting habitations otherwise than through grace, through which alone one can merit eternal life, as was said in Art. 2, and also in Q. 109, Art. 5. It follows that one man can acquire the first grace for another by merit.

On the other hand: it is said in Jer. 15:1: “Though Moses and Samuel stood before me, yet my mind could not be toward this people.”

I answer: as we have explained already in Arts. 1, 2, and 4, there are two sources from which our works derive their meritorious character. In the first place, they have merit because God moves us. This merit is condign. In the second place, they have merit as proceeding from the free will, in so far as we do something willingly. This merit is congruous, since when a man makes good use of his own power, it is congruous that God should perform works that are more excellent, according to the surpassing excellence of his power. Now this makes it clear that none save Christ alone can merit the first grace for another condignly. For by the gift of grace each one of us is so moved by God that he may attain to eternal life, and eternal life cannot be merited condignly by anything other than God’s moving. But God moved the soul of Christ by grace not only that he might attain eternal life himself, but also that he might lead others to it, as the Head of the Church and the Captain of our salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: “bringing many sons unto glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings.”

But one man can merit the first grace for another by congruous merit. A man in grace fulfils the divine will, and it is congruous, according to the relation of friendship, that God should fulfil his desire by saving another. There may sometimes be an obstacle, however, on the part of him whose justification a sanctified man desires. The passage quoted from Jeremiah refers to such a case.

On the first point: the faith of some avails for the healing of others by congruous merit, not by condign merit.

On the second point: intercessory prayer depends on mercy, whereas merit depends on condign justice. Hence a man obtains many things through prayer, by the mercy of God, which are not justly merited. As it is said in Dan. 9:18: “For we do not present our supplications before thee for our righteousnesses, but for thy great mercies.”

On the third point: the poor who receive alms are said to receive others into everlasting habitations either because they intercede for their forgiveness by prayer, or because they merit it congruously by other good works. Or else this is a metaphorical way of saying that one deserves to be received into everlasting habitations for the sake of one’s deeds of pity towards the poor.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether a Man can Merit His Restoration after a Lapse

1. It seems that a man can merit his restoration after a lapse. For a man can merit what he can justly ask of God, and nothing can be more justly asked of God than to be restored after a lapse, as Augustine says in his commentary on Ps. 71:9: “forsake me not when my strength faileth.” A man can therefore merit his restoration after a lapse.

2. Again, a man’s own works profit himself more than another. But he can merit restoration after a lapse for another, in the same manner in which he can merit the first grace for him. Much more, therefore, can he merit restoration after a lapse for himself.

3. Again, it was explained in Art. 2, and also in Q. 109, Art, 5, that a man who has once been in grace has merited eternal life for himself by his good works. But he cannot attain eternal life unless he is restored through grace. It seems, therefore, that he has merited his restoration through grace.

On the other hand: it is said in Ezek. 18:24: “But when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity . . . All his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned.” His previous merits shall thus be of no avail for his restoration. Hence no man can merit restoration after a future lapse.

I answer: no man can merit his restoration after a future lapse, either by condign or by congruous merit. He cannot merit it condignly, because condign merit depends essentially on the gracious moving of God, and this is impeded by subsequent sin. Merit cannot then be the reason for any of the benefits which a man later receives from God for his restoration, since the previous gracious moving of God does not extend to them. On the other hand, congruous merit, by which one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from realizing its effect by an impediment of sin in him on whose behalf it is merited. Much more, then, is congruous merit made ineffective when the impediment is in him who merits, since the impediment then counts twice in the one person. Hence no man can in any wise merit his own restoration after a lapse.

On the first point: the desire by which one desires to be restored after a lapse is said to be just. So likewise a prayer for such restoration is called just, since it tends to justice. But it depends entirely on mercy, not on justice to merit.

On the second point: one can merit the first grace for another because there is no impediment, at least on the part of him who merits, such as there is in one who has lapsed from the state of justice after once possessing the merit of grace.

On the third point: some have said that no one merits eternal life absolutely, but only on condition that he perseveres, except when one merits it by an act of final grace. But this is unreasonable, since an act of final grace may sometimes be less meritorious than previous acts of grace, owing to the stricture of illness. We must therefore say that any act of charity merits eternal life absolutely. But subsequent sin puts an obstacle in the way, which prevents the effect of previous merit from being realized; just as natural causes fail to produce their effect because some obstacle intervenes.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether a Man can Merit an Increase of Grace or Charity

1. It seems that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity. For when one has received the reward which one has merited, one is not entitled

to any other reward. Thus it is said of some in Matt. 6:2: “They have their reward.” Hence if anyone were to merit an increase of grace or charity, it would follow that he could not expect any other reward, once this increase was granted. But this is impossible.

2. Again, nothing acts beyond its own species. Now it is clear from what was said in Arts. 2 and 4 that the principle of merit is either grace or charity. It follows that no man can merit grace or charity greater than that which he already possesses.

3. Again, everything that a man merits, he merits by each and every act which proceeds from grace or charity, since each and every such act merits eternal life. Hence if a man merits an increase of grace or charity, it seems that he merits it by any act of charity whatsoever: and if subsequent sin does not prevent it, everything that is merited is inevitably received from God, since it is said in II Tim. 1:12: “I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him.” It follows that grace or charity must be increased by each and every meritorious action. But this seems impossible, since meritorious actions are sometimes not very fervent, and insufficient for an increase of charity. Increase of charity cannot therefore be merited.

On the other hand: Augustine says (Tract. 5 in Joan.): “Charity deserves to be increased, so that when increased it may deserve to be perfected.” Increase of grace or charity is therefore merited.

I answer: as we said in Arts. 6 and 7, that to which the moving of grace extends is merited condignly. Now the moving of a mover extends not only to the final term of a movement, but also to the whole progress of the movement. The final term of the movement of grace is eternal life, and progress in this movement is by increase of charity or grace, according to Prov. 4:18: “the path of the just is as the shining light, that shineth more and more unto the perfect day.” It follows that increase of grace is merited condignly.

On the first point: reward is indeed the final term of merit. But there are two kinds of term in a movement. There is a final term, and also a mediate term which is both beginning and term at once. Now the reward of an increase of grace or charity is a mediate term. But a reward of man’s favour is a final term for those who set their heart on it. That is why they receive no other reward.

On the second point: an increase of grace is not beyond the power of grace already received, although it is quantitatively greater, just as a tree is not beyond the power of its seed, although greater in size.

On the third point: a man merits an increase of grace by each and every meritorious action, just as he thereby merits the consummation of grace, which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is granted not immediately, but in its own time, so is an increase of grace granted not immediately, but in its own time, that is, when a man is sufficiently well disposed to receive it.

ARTICLE NINE

Whether a Man can Merit Perseverance

1. It seems that a man can merit perseverance. For a man in grace can merit what he obtains through petition, and men obtain perseverance through petition, since otherwise perseverance would be asked of God in vain by the petition of the Lord’s prayer, as Augustine says (2 De Bono Persev.). It follows that perseverance can be merited by a man in grace.

2. Again, to be unable to sin is more than not to sin. Now to be unable to sin can be merited, since one merits eternal life, which is by its very nature impeccable. Much more, then, can one merit to live without sin, that is, to persevere.

3. Again, an increase of grace is more than perseverance in the grace which one already possesses. Now it was said in the preceding article that a man can merit an increase of grace. Much more, then, can he merit perseverance in the grace which he already possesses.

On the other hand: unless sin prevents it, a man receives from God everything that he merits. Now many who perform works of merit do not receive perseverance. But we cannot attribute this to sin, since God would not allow anyone who merited perseverance to fall into sin, for the very reason that sin is opposed to perseverance. It follows that perseverance cannot be merited.

I answer: since the free will with which he is naturally endowed can turn either to good or to evil, there are two ways in which a man may obtain from God perseverance in good. He may obtain it through the consummation of grace whereby his will is finally turned to good, as it shall be in heaven. He may also obtain it through a divine moving which inclines him to good till the end. Now as we explained in Arts. 6, 7, and 8, a man merits what is related to the movement of his free will as the final term to which God's moving directs it. But he does not merit what is related to the movement of his free will as its principle. This makes it clear that the perseverance which belongs to glory is merited, since it is the final term of the movement of man's free will. But the perseverance of the wayfarer is not merited, since it depends entirely on the moving of God, which is the principle of all merit. God nevertheless bestows the gift of perseverance freely, on whomsoever he bestows it.

On the first point: through petitionary prayer we receive many things which we do not merit. For God hears even the prayers of sinners who ask for the forgiveness which they do not deserve, as Augustine says {Tract. 44 in Joan.) on John 9:31: "we know that God heareth not sinners." Were it not so, the publican would have said in vain: "God be merciful to me a sinner." So also may one obtain the gift of perseverance through asking it of God, either for oneself or for another, even though it cannot be merited.

On the second point: the perseverance which belongs to glory is related to the meritorious actions of the free will as their final term. But the perseverance of the wayfarer is not so related to them, as we have said. The third point concerning the increase of grace is similarly answered, as will be clear from this and the preceding article.

ARTICLE TEN

Whether Temporal Goods can be Merited

1. It seems that temporal goods can be merited. For what is promised as a reward for righteousness is merited, and it appears from Deut., ch. 28, that

temporal goods were promised as a reward for righteousness under the old Law. Thus it seems that temporal goods can be merited.

2. Again, it seems that what God gives to a man in return for a service is merited. Now God sometimes rewards men for their services to him with temporal goods. For it is said in Ex. 1:21: “And it came to pass, because the mid wives feared God, that he made them houses,” and the gloss by Gregory says: “their good will might have earned the reward of eternal life, but the guilt of their deceit earned a reward that was temporal.” Further, it is said in Ezek. 29:18: “the king of Babylon caused his army to serve a great service against Tyrus: . . . yet he had no wages,” to which is added “and it shall be the wages for his army. I have given him the land of Egypt . . . because they wrought for me.” Thus temporal goods can be merited.

3. Again, evil is to demerit as good is to merit. Now some are punished by God for the demerit of sin by temporal punishments, as were the Sodomites (Gen., ch. 19). Temporal goods, accordingly, may be merited.

4. On the other hand: things which are merited do not come alike to all. But temporal good and evil come alike to the righteous and to the unrighteous, according to Eccl. 9:2: “All things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous, and to the wicked; to the good and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth and to him that sacrificeth not.” Thus temporal goods are not merited.

I answer: what is merited is a recompense or reward, and a recompense or reward has the nature of a good. Now the good of man is of two kinds, absolute and relative. The good of man which is absolute is his final end, according to Ps. 73:28: “it is good for me to draw near to God,” together with all that is ordained to lead him to it. This good is merited absolutely. The good of man which is relative, and not absolute, is what is good for him at the present time, or what is good for him in certain circumstances. Accordingly, if it is their usefulness for the virtuous works through which we are brought to eternal life that we have in mind, we must say that temporal goods are merited; just as increase of grace is merited, and indeed everything else that follows the grace first received and helps a man on his way to blessedness. For God gives to just men as much of temporal goods, and of temporal evils also, as will help them to attain to eternal life, and such temporal things are so far good absolutely. Hence it is said in Ps. 34:10: “they that seek the Lord shall not want any good thing,” and also in Ps. 37:25: “yet have I not seen the righteous forsaken.” Considered in themselves, however, such temporal goods are not the good of man absolutely, but only relatively. They are therefore merited not absolutely, but only relatively. That is, they are merited in so far as men are moved by God to do certain temporal things, wherein they achieve what God sets before them, and through God’s favour. We have already explained that eternal life is in an absolute sense the reward of works of justice, since it is related to the divine moving in a certain way (Arts. 6 and 8). So also may temporal goods, considered in themselves, derive the character of reward from their relation to the divine moving by which the wills of men are moved to seek them. But men do not always seek them with the right motive.

On the first point: as Augustine says: “these promised temporal things contained the symbols of spiritual things to be fulfilled in us in time to come. But this carnal people held fast to what was promised for this present life, and not only their speech but their very life was prophetic.” (4 Contra Faustum 2.)

On the second point: these retributions are said to have been divinely wrought because they were the result of the divine moving, not because of their connection with wilful deceit. This is especially the case with regard to the king of Babylon, who besieged Tyre with the intention of usurping the throne, rather than of serving God. Neither had the midwives any integrity of will, since they fabricated falsehoods, even though their will did happen to be good when they liberated the children.

On the third point: temporal evils are inflicted on the ungodly as punishments, in so far as they do not help them to attain to eternal life. But they are not punishments to the just, who are helped by them. Rather are they as medicines, as we said in Q. 87, Art. 8.

On the fourth point: all things come alike to the good and to the wicked as regards the substance of temporal goods and evils, but not as regards the end. For the good are guided to blessedness by them, whereas the wicked are not.

TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

I. ON FAITH. SECUNDA SECUNDAE, QUESTIONS 1–7

QUESTION ONE

THE OBJECT OF FAITH

THE FIRST OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES WHICH we must consider is faith. The second is hope, and the third is charity. Concerning faith, we shall consider first the object of faith, secondly the act of faith, and thirdly the habit of faith.

There are ten questions concerning the object of faith.

1. Whether the object of faith is the first truth.

2. Whether the object of faith is that which is simple or that which is complex, i.e., whether it is the reality itself or what can be said about it.

3. Whether what is false can be believed by faith.

4. Whether the object of faith can be something that is seen.

5. Whether it can be something known scientifically.

6. Whether matters of faith ought to be divided into certain articles.

7. Whether the same articles are articles of faith for all time.

8. Concerning the number of articles.

9. Concerning the manner of setting forth the articles in a symbol. 10. As to who is entitled to draw up a symbol of the faith.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether the Object of Faith is the First Truth

1. It seems that the object of faith is not the first truth. For whatever is proposed for our belief would seem to be the object of faith, and there are proposed for our belief not only things pertaining to the Godhead, which is the first truth, but also things pertaining to the humanity of Christ, to the sacraments of the Church, and to the condition of creatures. Hence not only the first truth is the object of faith.

2. Again, faith and unbelief have the same object, since they are opposites. Now there can be unbelief concerning everything in sacred Scripture, since a man is called an unbeliever if he disbelieves anything which is therein contained. It follows that faith is likewise concerned with everything in sacred Scripture, which contains many things relating to men, and to other creatures also. Hence the object of faith is not only the first truth, but also the truth about creatures.

3. Again, it was said in 12ae, Q. 62, Art. 3, that faith is condivided with charity. Now by charity we not only love God, who is the supreme good, but love our neighbour also. Hence the object of faith is not only the first truth.

On the other hand: Dionysius says (7 Div. Nom., lect. 5): “Faith is in the simple and eternal truth.” Now this is the first truth. The object of faith is therefore the first truth.

I answer: the object of any cognitive habit is twofold. It includes what is known materially as a material object, and also that through which it is known, this being the formal meaning of its object. In the science of geometry, for example, the conclusions are known materially, while the principles of demonstration whereby the conclusions are known are the formal meaning of the science. Now if we are thinking of the formal meaning of the object of faith, this is nothing other than the first truth. For the faith of which we are speaking does not assent to anything except on the ground that it is revealed by God. The ground upon which faith stands is therefore divine truth. But if we are thinking in a concrete way about the things to which faith gives its assent, these include not only God himself, but many other things. Such other things, however, are held in faith only because they relate to God in some way, that is to say, in so far as certain effects of the Godhead are an aid to man in his endeavour after the enjoyment of God. Thus the object of faith is still in a sense the first truth, since nothing is an object of faith unless it relates to God; just as the object of medicine is health, since nothing is considered to be medicine unless it relates to health.

On the first point: the things which pertain to the humanity of Christ, or to the sacraments of the Church, or to any creature whatsoever, are included in the object of faith in so far as we are directed by them to God, and in so far as we assent to them on account of the divine truth.

The second point, concerning all the matters related in sacred Scripture, is answered in the same way.

On the third point: by charity we love our neighbour for God's sake. Hence the object of charity is properly God, as we shall affirm later.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether the Object of Faith is Something Complex, in the Form of a Proposition

1. It seems that the object of faith is not something complex, in the form of a proposition. For the object of faith is the first truth, as was maintained in the first article, and the first truth is simple. Hence the object of faith is not something complex.

2. Again, the exposition of the faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not affirm the propositions, but the reality. For it does not say that God is almighty, but declares: "I believe in God . . . Almighty." Thus the object of faith is not the proposition, but the reality.

3. Again, faith is followed by vision, according to I Cor. 13:12: "For now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am known." Now the heavenly vision is of what is simple, since it is the vision of the divine essence itself. Hence the faith of the wayfarer is likewise in what is simple.

On the other hand: faith is a mean between knowledge and opinion. Now a mean and its extremes belong to the same genus, and since knowledge and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is also about propositions. But if faith is about propositions, the object of faith is something complex.

I answer: things known are in the knower according to the manner in which he knows them. Now the characteristic way in which the human intellect knows truth is by means of the combination and separation of ideas, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 85, Art. 5. It is therefore with a measure of complexity that the human intellect knows things which are in themselves simple; just as, conversely, the divine intellect knows without complexity things which are in themselves complex.

The object of faith may then be understood in two ways. If we are referring to the thing itself which is believed, the object of faith is something simple, namely, the thing itself in which we have faith. But from the point of view of the believer the object of faith is something complex, in the form of a proposition. Both opinions have been held true by the ancients, and both are true conditionally.

On the first point: this reasoning argues from the object of faith considered as the thing itself which is believed.

On the second point: it is clear from the very manner of speaking that the things in which faith believes are affirmed in the symbol, in so far as the act of the believer terminates in them. Now the act of the believer terminates in the reality, not in the proposition. For we formulate propositions only in order to know things by means of them, in faith no less than in science.

On the third point: the heavenly vision will be the vision of the first truth as it is in itself, according to I John 3:2: “but we know that, when he shall appear, we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is.” This vision will not then be by way of propositions, but by simple understanding. By faith, on the other hand, we do not apprehend the first truth as it is in itself. We cannot therefore argue about faith in the same way.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether what is False can be Held in Faith

1. It seems that what is false can be held in faith. Faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now what is false can be hoped for, since many hope for eternal life although they will not attain it. In regard to charity, similarly, many are loved as if they were good although they are not good. Hence what is false can similarly be held in faith.

2. Again, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to John 8:56: “Your father Abraham rejoiced to see my day; and he saw it, and was glad.” But after Abraham’s time it was possible that God should not become incarnate, since he was incarnate purely by reason of God’s will. What Abraham believed about Christ would then have been false. Hence it is possible that what is false should be held in faith.

3. Again, those of old believed that Christ would be born in the future, and many continued to believe this until the time when the Gospel was proclaimed. But after Christ had been born, and before the proclamation began, it was false that Christ would be born in the future. Hence what is false can be held in faith.

4. Again, it is one of the things pertaining to faith, that a man should believe that the true body of Christ is contained in the sacrament of the altar. Yet it might happen that the true body of Christ was not present, but only the bread, if it had not been properly consecrated. Hence what is false can be held in faith.

On the other hand: no virtue which perfects the intellect embraces what is false, since the false is the evil of the intellect, as the philosopher says (6 Ethics 2). Now faith is a virtue which perfects the intellect, as we shall show later (Q. 4, Arts. 2, 5). What is false cannot therefore he held in faith.

I answer: nothing can come under any power, habit, or act, except through the medium of that which its object formally signifies. Thus colour cannot be seen except through the medium of light, and a conclusion cannot be known except through the medium of demonstration. Now we said in Art. 1 that the object of faith formally signifies the first truth. Hence nothing can be held in faith except in so far as it stands under the first truth. But nothing which is false can stand under the first truth, any more than not-being can stand under being, or evil under goodness. It follows that what is false cannot be held in faith.

On the first point: the true is the good of the intellect, but not of any appetitive virtue. Hence all virtues which perfect the intellect entirely exclude the false, since it is the nature of a virtue to embrace only what is good. On the other hand, the virtues which perfect the appetitive part of the soul do not entirely exclude the false. One may act in accordance with justice and temperance even though one holds a false opinion about what one is doing. Now since faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part of the soul, we cannot argue about them in the same way. Yet neither is hope directed to what is false. For one does not hope to attain eternal life by means of one's own power (which would be presumption), but by means of the help of grace, and one will assuredly and infallibly attain it through grace, if one perseveres. Similarly, since charity loves God in whomsoever he may be, it makes no difference to charity whether God is or is not present in him who is loved for God's sake.

On the second point: considered in itself, "that God should not become incarnate" was possible even after the time of Abraham. But as we said in Pt. I, Q. 14, Arts. 13 and 15, the incarnation has a certain infallible necessity since it stands under the foreknowledge of God, and it is thus that it is held in faith. In so far as it is held in faith, therefore, it cannot be false.

On the third point: after Christ was born, the believer believed by faith that he would be born at some time. But it was due to human conjecture, not to faith, that there was error in the determination of the time. It is indeed possible for a believer to judge wrongly by human conjecture. But it is impossible to judge wrongly by reason of faith.

On the fourth point: by faith one does not believe that the bread is in the one state or the other, but that the true body of Christ is under the sensible appearance of the bread when it has been properly consecrated. Hence if it is not properly consecrated, nothing false is held by faith in consequence.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether the Object of Faith can be Something Seen

1. It seems that the object of faith is something which is seen. For our Lord said to Thomas: “Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed.” Thus the same thing is both seen and believed.

2. Again, the apostle says in I Cor. 13:12: “For now we see through a glass, darkly”—and he is speaking of the knowledge of faith. Hence what is believed is seen.

3. Again, faith is a kind of spiritual light. Now by light of any kind, something is seen. Hence faith is of things that are seen.

4. Again, as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Sermo. 33, cap. 5): “Every sense is called sight.” Now faith is of things that are heard, according to Rom. 10:17: “faith cometh by hearing.” Hence faith is of things that are seen.

On the other hand: the apostle says: “Faith is . . . the evidence of things not seen” (Heb. 11:1).

I answer: faith implies intellectual assent to that which is believed. But there are two ways in which the intellect gives its assent. In the first way, it is moved to give its assent by the object itself, which is either known in itself, as first principles are obviously known, since the intellect understands them, or known through something else that is known, as are conclusions which are known scientifically. In the second way, the intellect gives its assent not because it is convinced by the object itself, but by voluntarily preferring the one alternative to the other. If it chooses with hesitation, and with misgivings about the other alternative, there will be opinion. If it chooses with assurance, and without any such misgivings, there will be faith. Now those things are said to be seen which of themselves move our intellect or sense to know them. Hence it is clear that neither faith nor opinion can be of things that are seen, whether by sense or by the intellect.

On the first point: Thomas “saw one thing and believed another.” When he said: “my Lord and my God,” he saw a man. But by faith he confessed God.

On the second point: things which are held in faith may be considered under two aspects. If we consider them in their particularity, they cannot be both seen and believed at the same time, as we have said above. But if we consider them in their general aspect as things which can be believed, they are seen by him who believes them. For a man would not believe them if he did not see that they were to be believed, either on the evidence of signs, or on some other similar evidence.

On the third point: the light of faith enables us to see what we believe. Just as the habit of any other virtue enables a man to see what is becoming for him in respect of it, so does the habit of faith incline a man's mind to assent to such things as are becoming for true faith, but not to other things.

On the fourth point: it is the words signifying the things of faith that are heard, not the things of faith themselves. Hence it does not follow that these things are seen.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether the Things of Faith can be Known Scientifically

1. It seems that the things of faith can be known scientifically. We are ignorant of what we do not know scientifically, since ignorance is the opposite of science. But we are not ignorant of the things of faith, since ignorance is unbelief, according to I Tim. 1:13: "I did it ignorantly in unbelief." Hence the things of faith can be known scientifically.

2. Again, science is acquired through the giving of reasons. Now the sacred writers give reasons for the things of faith. Hence the things of faith can be known scientifically.

3. Again, whatever is proved by demonstration is known scientifically, since "demonstration is making known by syllogism." Now some of the things of faith are demonstratively proved by the philosophers, for example, that God exists, that he is one, and the like. Hence things of faith can be known scientifically.

4. Again, opinion is farther removed from science than is faith, since faith is said to be a mean between opinion and science. But it is said in 1 Post. An., text ult., that there can, in some way, be opinion and science about the same thing. Hence there can also be faith and science about the same thing.

On the other hand: Gregory says {Hom. in Evang. 21): "they do not have faith in things which are seen, but perceive them." Hence they do not perceive things which are of faith. But they do perceive what is known scientifically. There cannot then be faith in what is known scientifically.

I answer: every science depends upon principles which are known in themselves, and which are consequently seen. Everything which is known scientifically, therefore, is in a manner seen. Now we said in the preceding article that it is impossible for the same thing to be both seen and believed by the same person. It is nevertheless possible for the same thing to be seen by one person and believed by another. We hope that we shall some time see what we now believe about the Trinity, in accordance with I Cor. 13:12: "now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face." But the angels already have this vision. Hence what we believe, they see. It is also possible that what is seen or known scientifically by one man, even while he is a wayfarer, should be believed by another who has no demonstrative knowledge of it. But all men are without scientific knowledge of the things which are proposed for the belief of all alike. Such things are entirely matters of faith. Hence faith and scientific knowledge are not of the same thing.

On the first point: unbelievers are ignorant of the things of faith because they neither see or know them in themselves, nor are aware that they can be believed. Believers do not have demonstrative knowledge of them, yet they know them in so far as the light of faith enables them to see that they are to be believed, as we said in the preceding article.

On the second point: the reasons which are adduced by holy men in order to prove the things of faith are not demonstrative reasons. They are either persuasive, showing that what faith believes is not impossible, or else, as Dionysius says (2 Div. Nom. 1, lect. 1), they are grounded on principles of the faith itself, such as the authority of sacred Scripture. These principles are sufficient to prove something for believers, just as the principles of natural knowledge prove something for all men. In this way, theology is indeed a science, as we said at the beginning of this work (Pt. I, Q. i, Art. 2).

On the third point: things which can be proved by demonstration are included among the things to be believed in faith. This is not because all men believe them purely by faith, but because they are necessary presuppositions to what is believed by faith, and must initially be believed at least by way of faith by those who have no demonstrative knowledge of them.

On the fourth point: as the philosopher says in the same passage: “there can assuredly be scientific knowledge and opinion about the same thing, in different men.” This is what we have just said concerning scientific knowledge and faith. But one and the same man can have scientific knowledge and also faith about the same subject in different respects, although not in the same respect. For it is possible to know one thing scientifically, and to hold an opinion about something else, in relation to one and the same thing. Similarly, it is possible to know through demonstration that God is one, and at the same time to believe by faith that he is Triune. But one man cannot have scientific knowledge of the same thing in the same respect, and simultaneously either hold an opinion about it, or believe it by faith—for different reasons. There cannot be scientific knowledge simultaneously with opinion about the same thing, since it is essential to science that one should be convinced that what is known scientifically cannot possibly be otherwise; whereas it is essential to opinion that one should be aware that its object may be otherwise than it is thought to be. One is equally convinced that what is held in faith cannot possibly be otherwise, owing to the certainty of faith. But the reason why there cannot be scientific knowledge simultaneously with belief about the same thing in the same respect is this—that to know scientifically is to see, whereas to believe is not to see, as we have already said.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Matters of Faith ought to be Divided into Certain Articles

1. It seems that matters of faith ought not to be divided into certain articles. For we ought to have faith in all things contained in sacred Scripture, and these cannot be reduced to any definite number of articles, owing to their multitude. It seems superfluous, therefore, to distinguish articles of faith.

2. Again, art should ignore material distinctions, since they may be endless. Now it was said in the first article that the formal meaning of the object of faith is one and indivisible, since it is the first truth, from which it follows that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal meaning. The material distinction between them by means of articles should therefore be omitted as superfluous.

3. Again, it is said by some that "an article is an indivisible truth about God, which constrains us to believe." But belief is voluntary, since Augustine says "no man believes, unless he wills to believe" {Tract. 24 in Joan.). Hence it seems unfitting that matters of faith should be divided into articles.

On the other hand: Isodorus says: "an article is a perception of the divine truth, to which it tends." Now it is only through making distinctions that we can perceive the divine truth, since the truth which is one in God is many in our intellect. Matters of faith should therefore be divided into articles.

I answer: the term "article" appears to be derived from the Greek. Now the Greek arthron, which in Latin is articulus, signifies the putting together of several distinct parts. Thus the small parts of the body which fit neatly together are called the articles of the limbs. In Greek grammar, similarly, the parts of speech which combine with others to denote gender, number, and case are called articles. In rhetoric, also, certain ways of combining parts of speech are called articles. For Tullius says (4 Rhet. ad Heren.): "it is called an article when the single words which compose an utterance are separated by intervals, in this wise—'By your bitterness, by your voice, by your bearing, you have terrified your adversaries.'"

Hence the Christian belief also is said to be divided into articles, in so far as it is divided into parts which fit together. We said in Art. 4 that the object of faith is something unseen which relates to divine things. Now wherever something is unseen for a special reason, there is a special article. But separate articles are not to be distinguished where many things are known or unknown for the same reason. For example, there is one difficulty in seeing how God could suffer, and a different difficulty in seeing how he could rise from the dead. There are accordingly separate articles on the Passion and on the Resurrection. But that he suffered, was dead, and was buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one is accepted, there is no difficulty in accepting the others. These are accordingly all contained in the one article.

On the first point: some matters of belief belong to the faith by reason of what they are in themselves, while some matters belong to it not by reason of what they are in themselves, but only because they relate to other things; just as some propositions are put forward in science for the sake of their own meaning, and others merely as illustrations. Now faith is primarily concerned with what we hope to see in the hereafter, according to Heb. 11: 1: "faith is the substance of things hoped for." Hence those matters which directly order us to eternal life belong to faith by reason of what they are in themselves. Such are the three persons of God Almighty, the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, and the like, for each of which there is a separate article. Other things in sacred Scripture are proposed for belief not as if their meaning were fundamental, but in order to manifest the aforesaid—for example, that Adam had two sons; that a dead man was brought to life at a touch of the bones of Eliseus; and such things as are related in order to manifest the glory of God, or the incarnation of Christ. There is no need for separate articles corresponding to them.

On the second point: the formal meaning of the object of faith can be understood in two ways. If it refers to the reality itself in which we believe, the formal meaning of all matters of faith is one, since it is the first truth, and the articles of faith are not distinguished in respect of it. But the formal meaning of matters of faith can also be understood in relation to ourselves. So understood, the formal meaning of a matter of faith is that it is "not seen." It is in this latter regard that the articles of faith are distinguished, as has been shown.

On the third point: this definition of an article is the result of attending to the etymology of the word as if it were derived from the Latin, instead of attending to its true meaning as derived from the Greek. It has therefore no great weight. But it may be said that although no one is constrained to believe by any irresistible compulsion, since belief is voluntary, we are nevertheless constrained by a necessity which derives from the end. For as the apostle says: “he that cometh to God must believe that he is,” and “without faith it is impossible to please him” (Heb. 11:6).

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether the Articles of Faith have Increased with the Passing of Time

1. It seems that the articles of faith have not increased with the passing of time. The apostle says in Heb. 11:1, “faith is the substance of things hoped for.” Now the same things are to be hoped for at all times. It follows that the same things are to be believed at all times.

2. Again, as the philosopher explains in i Metaph., texts i and 2, the sciences which men have devised have grown because of the limited knowledge of those who invented them. But the doctrine of the faith was not invented by man, since it is a bequest from God. As it is said in Eph. 2:8, “it is the gift of God.” Knowledge of the things of faith must therefore have been perfect from the beginning, since there cannot be any limitation of knowledge in God.

3. Again, the operation of grace is not less orderly than the operation of nature. Now nature always begins from the perfect, as Boethius says (3 De Consol. 10). It seems, then, that the work of grace must have begun from the perfect. Hence those who first handed down the faith must have known it perfectly.

4. Again, just as the faith of Christ was delivered unto us by the apostles, so in the old Testament was knowledge of the faith handed down by the earlier fathers to those who came after them, according to Deut. 32:7: “ask thy father, and he will show thee.” Now the apostles were thoroughly instructed in the mysteries, since they received them “more fully than others, just as they received them earlier,” as the gloss says on Rom. 8:23: “but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit.” Hence it seems that knowledge of the faith has not increased with the passing of time.

On the other hand: Gregory says {Hom. in Ezech. 16), and also Hugo St. Victor (1 De Sacrament., Part 10, cap. 6): “the knowledge of the holy fathers increased with the fullness of time, . . . and the nearer they were to the coming of the Saviour, the more fully did they understand the sacraments of salvation.”

I answer: in the doctrine of the faith, the articles of faith have the same relative status as self-evident principles in the doctrines of natural reason. Now there is a certain order in these principles. Some of them are implicitly contained in others, and all of them depend on this as the first, namely, “it is impossible to affirm something and to deny it at the same time,” as the philosopher explains in 4 Metaph., text 9. In a similar way, all the articles are implicitly contained in certain fundamental matters of faith, such as that God is, and that he cares for the salvation of men. This is in accordance with Heb. 11:6: “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” The “being” of God includes all things which we believe to exist eternally in God, and in which our blessedness consists. Faith in providence embraces all that God provides in time for the salvation of men, and which leads to blessedness. The other articles are consequential to these, and some of them are contained in others. For example, faith in the incarnation of Christ, and in his passion, and all matters of this kind, is implicitly contained in faith in the redemption of man.

It must therefore be said that the articles of faith have not increased in substance with the passing of time. Everything that the later fathers have believed was contained, at least implicitly, in the faith of the earlier fathers. But the number of explicit articles has increased, since some things of which the earlier fathers had no explicit knowledge were known explicitly by the later fathers. Thus the Lord said to Moses: “I am the Lord: And I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, . . . but by my name Jehovah was I not known to them” (Ex. 6:2–3). Thus also David says in Ps. 119:100: “I understood more than the ancients,” and the apostle in Eph. 3:5: “Which in other ages was not made known [the mystery of Christ] . . . , as it is now revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit.”

On the first point: the same things are to be hoped for from Christ at all times. But since it is only through Christ that men have come to hope for them, the further they have been removed from Christ in time, the further have they been from receiving them. Thus the apostle says (Heb. 11:13):

“These all died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off.” Now the greater is the distance from which a thing is seen, the less clearly is it seen. The good things to be hoped for were therefore known more distinctly by those who lived near the time of Christ.

On the second point: there are two ways in which knowledge progresses. The knowledge of the teacher progresses as time goes on, be he one or many. That is the reason why sciences invented by human reason increase. But there is also the knowledge of the learner. A master who knows the whole art does not impart it to his pupil all at once, since he could not absorb it, but imparts it gradually, in accordance with his pupil’s capacity. Now it is as learners that men have progressed in knowledge of the faith with the passing of time. Hence the apostle likens the Old Testament to childhood, in Gal. 3:24.

On the third point: two causes are required for natural generation, namely, an active cause, and a material cause. According to the order of the active cause, the more perfect is naturally prior. Hence in respect of the active cause nature begins with what is perfect, since it is only through something perfect which already exists that the imperfect can be brought to perfection. According to the order of the material cause, on the other hand, the imperfect comes first, and nature advances from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of the faith, God is as the active cause, having perfect knowledge from eternity, while man is as the material cause, receiving the influence of God as the active cause. Hence in men, knowledge of the faith was bound to progress from the imperfect to the perfect. Yet some men have been like an active cause, as teachers of the faith. For the manifestation of the Spirit is given to some to profit withal, as it is said in I Cor. 12:7. Thus the fathers who formulated the faith were given such knowledge of it as could be profitably imparted to the people of their time, either openly or by way of metaphor.

On the fourth point: the final consummation of grace was achieved through Christ, whose time is consequently called “the fullness of time” in Gal. 4:4. Hence those who were nearer to Christ in time, whether earlier like John the Baptist, or later like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of the faith. We see the same thing with regard to a man’s condition, which is perfect in his youth, and more nearly perfect the nearer he is to his youth, whether before it or after it.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether the Articles of Faith are appropriately Enumerated

1. It seems that the articles of faith are not appropriately enumerated. For it was said in Art. 5 that things which can be known through demonstrative reasoning do not belong to faith as matters of belief for all. Now it can be shown by demonstration that God is one. The philosopher proves this in 12 Metaph. 52, and many other philosophers have added their proofs. “There is one God” should not therefore be an article of faith.

2. Again, it is just as necessary for faith that we should believe that God is omniscient, and that he cares for all, as that we should believe that he is almighty. Moreover, some have erred on both points. The wisdom and providence of God should therefore be mentioned in the articles of faith, as well as his omnipotence.

3. Again, according to John 14:9: “he that hath seen me hath seen the Father,” our knowledge of the Father is the same as our knowledge of the Son. There should therefore be only one article on the Father and the Son—and the Holy Spirit, for the same reason.

4. Again, the Person of the Father is not less than the Persons of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Now there are several articles on the Person of the Holy Spirit, and several on the Person of the Son. There should therefore be several articles on the Person of the Father.

5. Again, just as something is attributed to the Person of the Father and to the Person of the Holy Spirit in respect of their divinity, so also is something attributed to the Son in respect of his divinity. Now in the articles of faith there is a work attributed to the Father, namely the work of creation, and also a work attributed to the Holy Spirit, namely that “he spoke by the prophets.” The articles ought therefore to include a work attributed to the Son in respect of his divinity.

6. Again, the sacrament of the Eucharist has a special difficulty of its own, which is distinct from the difficulties of the many articles. There should therefore be a special article on the Eucharist. Hence it seems that there are not a sufficient number of articles.

On the other hand: the articles are enumerated as they are by authority of the Church.

I answer: as we said in Arts. 4 and 6, the things which belong to faith by reason of what they are in themselves are the things which we shall enjoy in eternal life, together with the means whereby we are brought to eternal life. Now we are told that we shall see two things, namely, the hidden Godhead, the vision of which is our blessedness, and the mystery of the humanity of Christ, through whom we have access into the glory of the sons of God, as it is said in Rom. 5:2. Hence it is said also in John 17:3: “And this is life eternal, that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.” The first distinction for faith, consequently, is between what pertains to the majesty of the Godhead and what pertains to the mystery of the manhood of Christ, which is called “the mystery of godliness” in I Tim. 3:16.

Three things are proposed for our belief concerning the majesty of the Godhead: first, the Unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; second, the Trinity of the Persons, on which there are three articles corresponding to the three Persons; third, the works proper to the Godhead. The first of these works is the “order” of nature, concerning which the article on the creation is proposed to us. The second is the “order” of grace, concerning which all that relates to the salvation of man is proposed to us in one article. The third is the “order” of glory, concerning which there is another article on the resurrection of the body and on eternal life. There are thus seven articles pertaining to the Godhead.

There are likewise seven articles concerning the humanity of Christ, of which the first refers to the incarnation, or the conception of Christ, the second to his virgin birth, the third to his passion, death, and burial, the fourth to his descent into hell, the fifth to his resurrection, the sixth to his ascension, and the seventh to his coming in judgment. There are thus fourteen articles in all.

Some, however, distinguish twelve articles of faith, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six pertaining to the humanity. They combine the three articles on the three Persons into one, on the ground that our knowledge of the three Persons is the same. They divide the article on the work of glorification into two, which refer respectively to the resurrection of the body and to the glory of the soul. They similarly combine into one the articles on the conception and on the nativity.

On the first point: by faith we hold many things concerning God which the philosophers have been unable to discover by natural reason, such as the providence and omnipotence of God, and that God alone is to be worshipped. These are all contained in the article on the unity of God.

On the second point: as we said in Pt. I, Q. 13, Art. 8, the very name “Godhead” implies providence of some kind. Further, in intellectual beings, power does not operate otherwise than in accordance with will and knowledge. Hence the omnipotence of God in a manner includes both knowledge and providence in relation to all things. For God could not do all that he wills among lower creatures, did he not both know them and care for them.

On the third point: in respect of the unity of their essence, we have but one knowledge of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, and the first article refers to it. With regard to the distinction of the persons, which is according to their relations of origin, knowledge of the Son is in a manner included in knowledge of the Father. For God would not be Father unless he had a Son, the Holy Spirit being the bond which unites them. Those who formulated one article on the three Persons were therefore well guided. Three articles can nevertheless be formulated on the three Persons, since there are points which must be observed concerning each of them, and about which error is possible. Arius indeed believed in the Father Almighty and Eternal, but he did not believe that the Son is coequal and consubstantial with the Father. It was therefore necessary to add an article on the Person of the Son, to settle this point. For the same reason, it was necessary to include a third article on the Person of the Holy Spirit, in view of Macedonius. Similarly, the conception and nativity of Christ may be comprehended in one article, and likewise the resurrection and eternal life, on the ground that they are ordained to the same end. But they may also be distinguished, on the ground that each has its own special difficulty.

On the fourth point: it pertains to the Son and to the Holy Spirit to be sent for the sanctification of creatures. Now there are several things to be believed about this. There are accordingly more articles on the Persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit than on the Person of the Father, who is never sent, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 43, Art. 4.

On the fifth point: the sanctification of a creature through grace, and its consummation in glory, are brought about by means of the gift of charity, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit; and also by means of the gift of wisdom, which is attributed to the Son. Hence either work pertains both to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, being attributable to each for a different reason.

On the sixth point: there are two points to consider about the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is that it is a sacrament. As such, it has the same nature as other effects of sanctifying grace. The other point is that the body of Christ is miraculously contained therein. This is included under omnipotence, just as all other miracles are attributed to omnipotence.

ARTICLE NINE

Whether the Articles of Faith are appropriately Set Forth in a Symbol

1. It seems that the articles of faith are not appropriately set forth in a symbol. For sacred Scripture is the rule of faith, and nothing should be added to it or taken from it. As it is said in Deut. 4:2, “Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish ought from it.” It was therefore unlawful to draw up any symbol as a rule of faith, once sacred Scripture had been written.

2. Again, in Eph. 4:5 the apostle says “one faith.” Now a symbol is a profession of the faith. It is therefore inappropriate that there should be

many symbols.

3. Again, the confession of faith contained in the symbol is for all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all capable of believing in God, but only those whose faith is formed. It is therefore inappropriate that the symbol of the faith should be expressed in such words as “I believe in one God.”

4. Again, it was said in the preceding article that the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith. But there is no mention of the descent into hell in the symbol of the Fathers, which therefore seems to be incomplete.

5. Again, in his exposition of John 14:1, “ye believe in God, believe also in me,” Augustine says: “we believe Peter or Paul, but we say that we believe in’ God only.” Now the catholic Church is merely something that is created. It seems inappropriate, therefore, to say “in one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church.”

6. Again, a symbol is drawn up as a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be set before everyone, publicly. Every symbol should accordingly be sung at mass, like the symbol of the Fathers. It seems inappropriate, therefore, to edit the articles of faith in the form of a symbol.

On the other hand: the universal Church cannot err, since it is governed by the Holy Spirit, which is the Spirit of truth. For this was the promise which our Lord gave to the disciples when he said: “when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth” (John 16:13). Now the symbol is published by the universal Church. It therefore contains nothing inappropriate.

I answer: as the apostle says in Heb. 11:6: “he that cometh to God must believe.” Now no one can believe, unless the truth which he may believe is proposed to him. It was therefore necessary that the truth of faith should be collected into one, that it might the more easily be proposed to all, lest any should default from the truth through ignorance of the faith. It is as such a collection of pronouncements of the faith that the “symbol” is so named.

On the first point: the truth of faith is contained in sacred Scripture diffusely and in various modes, in some of which it is obscure. To elicit the truth from sacred Scripture consequently requires prolonged study and training.

This is not possible for all of those who must know the truth of faith, many of whom are busy with other matters, and cannot find the time for study. It was therefore necessary to put together a clear summary of the pronouncements of sacred Scripture, and to propose this for the belief of all. This is not an addition to sacred Scripture, but rather an extract from it.

On the second point: it is the same truth of faith that is taught by every symbol. But it is necessary to explain the truth of faith more thoroughly whenever errors arise, lest the faith of the simple minded should be corrupted by heretics, and several symbols have had to be devised for this reason. But they differ only in that what is implicit in one is made more explicit in another, in order to counter the menace of heresies.

On the third point: the confession of faith is expressed in the symbol on behalf of the whole Church, which is united by the faith. Now the faith of the Church is formed faith, for such is the faith of all who belong to the Church worthily, and not as numbers. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in the symbol in a manner befitting faith which is formed, while it also enables those whose faith is unformed to study to conform to it.

On the fourth point: there was no need to make the descent into hell more explicit, since no error concerning it had arisen among heretics. Hence it is not reaffirmed in the symbol of the Fathers, but assumed as settled by the earlier symbol of the apostles. A later symbol does not however cancel an earlier one, but makes it explicit, as we said in reply to the second point.

On the fifth point: if we say “in the holy catholic Church,” it is to be understood that our faith refers to the Holy Spirit who sanctifies the Church, so that we mean “I believe in the Holy Spirit who sanctifies the Church.” It is better, however, and also customary, to omit the word “in,” and to say simply “the holy catholic Church,” as did Pope Leo (according to Rufinus in his exposition of the symbol, among the works of Cyprian).

On the sixth point: the symbol of the Fathers is sung publicly at mass because it is a declaration of the symbol of the apostles, and because it was formulated at a time when the faith had already been manifested, and when the Church had peace. The symbol of the apostles, on the other hand, is said secretly at Prime and Compline as if it were a protection against the shadows of past and future errors, because it was formulated in time of persecution, when the faith had not yet been made public.

ARTICLE TEN

Whether it is for the Chief Pontiff to Draw Up the Symbol of the Faith

1. It seems that it is not for the chief pontiff to draw up the symbol of the faith. For it is in order to make the articles of faith explicit that a new edition of the symbol is required, as was said in the preceding article. Now in the Old Testament, the articles of faith became more and more explicit as time went on, because the truth of faith became more apparent as the time of Christ drew near, as was said in Art. 7. But this reason ceased when the New Law came. There is consequently no need for the articles of faith to be made more and more explicit. It seems, therefore, that the chief pontiff has no authority to draw up a new edition of the symbol.

2. Again, no man is entitled to do what has been forbidden by the universal Church under penalty of anathema. Now a new edition of the symbol was forbidden by the universal Church under penalty of anathema. For it is stated in the acts of the first synod of Ephesus (p. 2, act. 6 in decreto de fide.): “After the Nicene Symbol had been read, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful for anyone to proffer, write, or compose any other faith than that denned by the holy Fathers who assembled in the Holy Spirit at Nicaea,” and this was forbidden under penalty of anathema. Moreover, the same is reaffirmed in the acts of the synod of Chalcedon (p. 2, act. 5). Hence it seems that the chief pontiff has no authority to draw up a new edition of the symbol.

3. Again, Athanasius was not a chief pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria. Yet he formulated a symbol, and it is sung in the Church. Thus it seems that the right to draw up a symbol does not belong to the chief pontiff any more than to others.

On the other hand: the edition of the symbol was formulated in a general synod. Now a general synod can be assembled only by authority of the chief pontiff, as stated in the Decretals, Dist. 17, chs. 4 and 5. The authority to draw up a symbol therefore lies with the chief pontiff.

I answer: as the first point affirms, a new edition of the symbol is necessary when incipient errors have to be avoided. The authority to draw up a new edition of the symbol therefore lies with him who has authority to determine matters of faith with finality, so that everyone may hold them in faith with confidence. Now authority to do this lies with the chief pontiff, to whom the major and more difficult problems of the Church are referred, as stated in the Decretals (extra. de Baptismo, cap. Majores). Thus the Lord said to Peter, whom he made chief pontiff, “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren” (Luke 22:32). The reason for this is that there ought to be only one faith of the whole Church, in accordance with I Cor. 1:10: “that ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you.” Now this is possible only if a question which arises concerning the faith is settled by him who rules over the whole Church, and his pronouncement firmly maintained in the whole Church. Hence the chief pontiff alone has authority to draw up a new edition of the symbol, just as he alone has authority in any other matter which affects the whole Church, such as the calling of a general synod, and the like.

On the first point: the truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since perverse men pervert the apostolic teaching, and also other doctrines and scriptures unto their own destruction, according to II Pet. 3:16, it has been necessary in later times to make the faith explicit, against incipient errors.

On the second point: this prohibition and pronouncement of the synod referred to private individuals, who have no authority to determine matters concerning the faith. But such a pronouncement by a general synod did not deny the right of a future synod to make a new edition of the symbol—not indeed containing a new faith, but expounding the same faith more fully. Indeed every synod has observed that a future synod would expound something more fully than a previous synod, should some heresy arise to make it necessary. This is consequently a matter for the chief pontiff, who has the authority to call a general synod, and also to confirm its pronouncements.

On the third point: it is clear from its very manner of expression that Athanasius did not compose his declaration of faith as a symbol, but rather as a doctrine. But because his doctrine contained the pure truth of faith in a concise form, it was accepted as a rule of faith by authority of the chief pontiff.

QUESTION TWO

THE ACT OF FAITH

We must now consider the act of faith, first the inward act, and second the outward act. There are ten questions concerning the inward act of faith.

1. In what belief consists, which is the inward act of faith.

2. In how many ways one may speak of belief.

3. Whether, for salvation, it is necessary to believe anything which is beyond natural reason.

4. Whether it is necessary to believe such things as are attainable by natural reason.

5. Whether, for salvation, it is necessary to believe anything explicitly.

6. Whether explicit belief is required of all men equally.

7. Whether, for salvation, it is always necessary to have explicit belief concerning Christ.

8. Whether explicit belief in the Trinity is necessary for salvation.

9. Whether the act of faith is meritorious. 10. Whether a human reason diminishes the merit of faith.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether to Believe is to Think with Assent

1. It seems that to believe is not to think with assent. For “to think” implies inquiry of some kind, the word being a contraction of “to consider together” (cogitare = coagitare = simul agitate). But the Damascene says that “faith is

assent without inquiry” (4 De Fid. Orth. 1). It follows that the act of faith does not involve thinking.

2. Again, it will be shown in Q. 4, Art. 2, that faith belongs to reason. But it was said in Pt. I, Q. 78, Art. 4, that thinking is an act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive part of the soul. It follows that faith does not involve thinking.

3. Again, belief is an act of the intellect, since the object of belief is the true. Now it was said in 12ae, Q. 15, Art. 1, ad. 3 that assent is not an act of the intellect, but an act of the will, just as consent is an act of the will. It follows that to believe is not to think with assent.

On the other hand: “to believe” is thus defined by Augustine. {De Praed. Sanct. 2.)

I answer: “to think” can mean three things. Firstly, it means any deliberative intellectual act in general. This is what Augustine has in mind in 14 De Trin. 7, when he says: “what I now call understanding is that whereby we understand when we think.” Secondly, and more precisely, it means the kind of intellectual deliberation which involves a degree of questioning, and which occurs before the intellect reaches perfection through the certainty of vision. This is what Augustine has in mind in 15 De Trin. 16, where he says: “The Son of God is not called the Thought of God, but the Word of God. When our thought has reached what we know and become formed by it, it becomes our word. The Word of God should therefore be conceived as without the thought of God, since it contains nothing which remains to be formed, and which could be unformed.” In this sense, thought properly means the movement of a soul which deliberates, and which is not yet perfected by a full vision of the truth. But since such movement may be either deliberation about universal meanings, which are the concern of the intellect, or deliberation about particular meanings, which are the concern of the sensitive part of the soul, the word “to think” is used in this second sense to mean the intellectual act of deliberation, and in yet a third sense to mean an act of the cogitative power.

Now if “to think” is understood in the first or general sense, “to think with assent” does not express the whole meaning of “to believe.” For a man thinks in this way even about what he knows and understands in science, and also gives his assent. But if it is understood in the second sense, then by means of this expression we understand the whole nature of the act of belief. There are some acts of the intellect, such as those whereby one contemplates what one knows and understands in science, in which assent is given with confidence, without any deliberation. There are also others in which thought is unformed, and in which there is no firm assent. One may incline to neither alternative, as one who doubts. Or one may incline to the one rather than to the other on the strength of slight evidence, as does one who suspects. Or, again, one may choose one alternative with misgivings about the other, as does one who holds an opinion. Now the act which is "to believe" holds firmly to the one alternative. In this respect, belief is similar to science and understanding. Yet its thought is not perfected by clear vision, and in this respect belief is similar to doubt, suspicion, and opinion. To think with assent is thus the property of one who believes, and distinguishes the act of "belief" from all other acts of the intellect which are concerned with truth or falsity.

On the first point: faith does not make use of inquiry by natural reason to demonstrate what it believes. But it does inquire into the evidence by which a man is induced to believe, for example, into the circumstance that such things are spoken by God and confirmed by miracles.

On the second point: as we have said above, the word "to think" is here understood as it applies to the intellect, not as meaning an act of the cogitative power.

On the third point: the intellect of the believer is determined by the will, not by reason. Hence assent is here understood to mean the act of the intellect as determined by the will.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether to Believe God, to Believe that there is a God, and to Believe in God are rightly Distinguished as Acts of Faith

1. It seems that to believe God, to believe that there is a God, and to believe in God are not rightly distinguished as acts of faith. For only one act springs

from a single habit, and faith is a single habit, since it is a single virtue. It is therefore wrong to attribute several acts to faith.

2. Again, what is common to all acts of faith should not be regarded as an act of faith of a particular kind. Now “to believe God” is common to all acts of faith, since faith takes its stand on the first truth. It seems wrong, therefore, to distinguish this from other acts of faith.

3. Again, we cannot regard anything as an act of faith, if it can be affirmed even of unbelievers. Now even unbelievers “believe that there is a God.” We should not, therefore, regard this as an act of faith.

4. Again, movement towards an end is an act of the will, the object of which is the good, or the end, whereas belief is an act of the intellect, not of the will. Now “to believe in God” implies movement towards an end. It should not then be regarded as one distinguishable kind of belief.

On the other hand: Augustine makes this distinction in De Verbis Domini (Sermo 61, cap. 2), and also in Tract. 29 in Joan.

I answer: the act of any power or habit is understood from the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith may be considered in three ways. As we said in reply to the third point in the preceding article, to believe is an act of the intellect as moved by the will to give its assent. The object of faith may therefore be understood either in relation to the intellect itself, or in relation to the will which moves the intellect, and there are two ways in which the object of faith is related to the intellect, as we said in Q. 1, Art. 1. In the first place, it is the material object of faith. The act of faith is then “to believe that there is a God,” since nothing is an object of faith unless it relates to God, as we said also. In the second place, the object of faith may be understood in its formal meaning, as the ground upon which the intellect assents to something as a matter to be believed. The act of faith is then “to believe God,” since the formal object of faith is the first truth, on which a man takes his stand when he assents to what he believes on the strength of it. Finally, the object of faith may be considered in relation to the intellect as moved by the will. The act of faith is then “to believe in God,” since the first truth is referred to the will, having the character of an end.

On the first point: these three do not denote different acts of faith, but one and the same act in different relations to the object of faith. The reply to the second point is then obvious.

On the third point: unbelievers do not "believe that there is a God" in the sense in which this can be regarded as an act of faith. They do not believe that God exists under the conditions which faith defines. Hence they do not really believe that there is a God. As the philosopher says (9 Metaph., text 22), "with incomposites, to know them imperfectly is not to know them at all."

On the fourth point: as we said in 12ae, Q. 9, Art. 1, the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end. In this regard the act of faith is said to be "to believe in God."

ARTICLE THREE

Whether, for Salvation, it is Necessary to Believe Anything which is Beyond Natural Reason

1. It seems that for salvation it is not necessary to believe anything which is beyond natural reason. For it seems that what naturally belongs to a thing is sufficient for its salvation and perfection. Now the things of faith are beyond natural reason, since they are unseen, as was said in Q. 1, Art. 4. To believe in them is therefore unnecessary for salvation.

2. Again, it is precarious for a man to give his assent when he cannot judge whether what is proposed to him is true or false. As it is said in Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear try words?" Now a man cannot so judge of the things of faith, because he cannot see how they are derived from their first principles, which is the way in which we judge of all things. To believe such things is therefore precarious, and consequently unnecessary for salvation.

3. Again, according to Ps. 37:39: "the salvation of the righteous is of the Lord," man's salvation consists in God. Now it is said in Rom. 1:20: "the invisible things of him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." But things which are clearly seen by the intellect are not believed. For salvation, therefore, it is unnecessary to believe anything.

On the other hand: it is said in Heb. 11:6: “without faith it is impossible to please him.”

I answer: throughout the natural order, two things concur towards the perfection of a lower nature. One of these is its own movement. The other is the movement of a higher nature. Thus water moves towards the centre by its own movement, but moves round the centre, ebbing and flowing, owing to the movement of the moon. The planets, similarly, move from west to east by their own movement, but move from east to west owing to the movement of the first heaven. Now it is only rational created nature that is immediately related to God. Other creatures do not attain to anything universal, but only to what is particular. They share in the divine goodness only in so far as they “are,” as in the case of inanimate things; or in so far as they “live, and know singulars,” as in the case of plants and animals. But a rational nature is related immediately to the universal principle of all being, in as much as it knows the universal meaning of “good” and of “being.” The perfection of a rational creature therefore consists not only in what belongs to it in consequence of its own nature, but also in what it derives from a certain participation in the divine goodness. The ultimate blessedness of man accordingly consists in a supernatural vision of God, as we said in 12ae, Q. 3, Art. 8. Now a man cannot attain to this vision unless he learns from God who teaches him, according to John 6:45: “Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father, cometh unto me.” But he does not become a partaker of this learning all at once. He attains it gradually, according to the mode of his nature. Anyone who learns in this way is bound to believe, if he is to attain to perfect knowledge. Thus even the philosopher observes that “it behoves the learner to believe” (1 Elenchi, ch. 2). Hence if a man is to attain to the perfect vision of blessedness, it is essential that he should first believe God, as a learner believes the master who teaches him.

On the first point: man’s nature depends on a higher nature. His natural knowledge is consequently insufficient for his perfection, for which something supernatural is required, as we have said.

On the second point: by the natural light of reason, a man assents to first principles. By the habit of a virtue, similarly, a virtuous man rightly judges what is becoming for that virtue. In this same way, by the divinely infused light of faith a man assents to the things of faith, but not to what is contrary to faith. There is therefore nothing precarious in such assent, and no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus.

On the third point: in many respects, faith perceives the invisible things of God in a way higher than that of natural reason as it reaches towards God from creatures. Hence it is said in Ecclesiasticus 3:23: “Many things beyond human understanding have been revealed unto thee.”

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether it is Necessary to Believe such Things as can be Proved by Natural Reason

1. It seems that it is not necessary to believe such things as can be proved by natural reason. There is nothing superfluous in the works of God—much less than in the works of nature. Now when a thing can already be done in one way, it is superfluous to add another. It would therefore be superfluous to accept by faith what can already be known by natural reason.

2. Again, things which are accepted by faith must necessarily be believed. Now it was said in Q. 1, Arts. 4 and 5 that there cannot be both faith and scientific knowledge of the same thing. But there is scientific knowledge of all things which can be known by natural reason. It seems, therefore, that there cannot be any obligation to believe such things as can be proved by natural reason.

3. Again, all things which can be known by natural reason would seem to be of one kind. Hence if some of them are proposed for belief, it seems that it is necessary to believe all of them. But this is false. It follows that it is not necessary to believe such things as can be proved by natural reason.

On the other hand: it is necessary to believe that God is one and incorporeal, and philosophers have proved this by natural reason.

I answer: it is necessary for man to accept by way of faith not only such things as are beyond reason, but also such things as reason can know, and this on three grounds. First, it is necessary in order that he may the more quickly attain to a knowledge of divine truth. For the demonstrative knowledge by which one can prove that God exists, and other things about God, comes last of all things which men may learn, presupposing many other sciences. Hence it is only after a long period of life that a man can attain to the knowledge of God in this way. Secondly, it is necessary in order that the knowledge of God may be the more widespread. For there are many who cannot become proficient in the sciences, either owing to natural limitation of mind, or on account of laziness in learning. All such would be deprived altogether of the knowledge of God, if divine things were not proposed to them by the way of faith. Thirdly, it is necessary for the sake of certainty. For human reason is very defective in divine things. A sign of this is that philosophers have gone wrong in many ways, and have contradicted each other, in their investigations by means of natural inquiry into human things. It was therefore necessary that divine things should be proposed to men by the way of faith, in order that they might have confident and certain knowledge of God. That is, it was necessary that such things should be proposed to them as spoken by God, who cannot speak false.

On the first point: inquiry by natural reason does not suffice to give mankind a knowledge of divine things, even of such things as can be proved by reason. Hence it is not superfluous that these other matters should be believed by the way of faith.

On the second point: the same man cannot have both scientific knowledge and faith concerning the same thing. But what is known scientifically by one can be believed by another, as we said (Q. 1, Art. 5).

On the third point: although things which can be known scientifically are alike in their scientific character, they are not alike in equally directing men to blessedness. Hence they are not all equally proposed for belief.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether a Man is required to Believe Anything Explicitly

1. It seems that a man is not required to believe anything explicitly. For no man is required to do what is not within his power, and it is not within a man’s power to believe anything explicitly, since it is said in Rom. 10:14–15: “how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how

shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach except they be sent?” Hence a man is not required to believe anything explicitly.

2. Again, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we directed to him by charity. Now a man is not required to fulfil the precepts of charity. It is enough that he should be mentally prepared to fulfil them. This is clear from our Lord’s commandment in Matt. 5:39: “whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also,” and from other similar passages, as Augustine observes (Sermo. Dom. in monte, 19). Neither then is a man required to believe anything explicitly. It is enough that he should be mentally prepared to believe such things as are proposed by God.

3. Again, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to Rom. 1:5: “for obedience to the faith among all nations.” But obedience to the faith does not require that a man should obey any particular precept. It is enough that he should be ready to obey, in accordance with Ps. 119:60: “I made haste, and delayed not to keep thy commandments.” Hence it seems to be enough for faith that a man should have a mind ready to believe whatever may be divinely proposed to him, without believing anything explicitly.

On the other hand: it is said in Heb. 11:6: “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.”

I answer: the precepts of the law, which a man is required to fulfil, are concerned with the acts of the virtues, which are a way of attaining salvation. Now as we said in 12ae, Q. 60, Art. 9, the act of a virtue depends on the relation of its habit to its object. But there are two things to be considered concerning the object of any virtue: first, that which in itself is properly the object of the virtue, and which is essential to its every act; second, whatever attaches accidentally or consequentially to what we mean by its proper object. To face the danger of death, and to attack the enemy in spite of danger for the common good, in itself belongs to the proper object of fortitude. But that a man should be armed, or that he should smite another with his sword in a just war, or do something of the kind, is related to the proper object of fortitude accidentally only.

Now a precept requires that a virtuous action should terminate in its essential and proper object, just as it requires the virtuous action itself. But it is only at given times, and in given circumstances, that a precept requires that a virtuous action should terminate in what belongs to its object accidentally or secondarily. We must therefore observe that, as we said in Q. i, Art. 8, what helps a man to attain blessedness belongs to the object of faith by reason of what it is in itself, whereas all things divinely revealed to us in sacred Scripture belong to its object accidentally or secondarily, such as that Adam had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and other things of this kind.

Accordingly, a man is required to believe explicitly such primary matters as are articles of faith, just as he is required to have faith. He is not however required to believe other matters explicitly, but only implicitly, or by preparedness of mind, that is, by being prepared to believe whatever sacred Scripture contains. He is required to believe such things explicitly only when he is aware that they are included in the doctrine of the faith.

On the first point: if a thing is said to be within a man's power when he can do it without the aid of grace, then there are many things required of him which are not within his power, unless he is healed by grace, such as to love God and his neighbour, and likewise to believe the articles of faith. But he can do these things through the aid of grace, of which Augustine says: "to whomsoever it is given, it is given in mercy; from whomsoever it is withheld, it is withheld in justice, in consequence of previous sins, or at least in consequence of original sin" (De Corrept. et Grat. 5 and 6).

On the second point: a man is required to love explicitly that which properly and in itself is the object of charity, namely, God and his neighbour. This objection argues from the precepts of charity which pertain to the object of charity consequentially.

On the third point: the virtue of obedience properly resides in the will. Readiness of will to obey one who commands is therefore sufficient for obedience, since this is properly and in itself the object of obedience. But one precept or another is accidental or consequential to its proper object.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether all Men Equally are required to have Explicit Faith

1. It seems that all men equally are required to have explicit faith. For it is clear from the precepts of charity that all men are required to believe such things as are necessary for salvation, and it was said in the preceding article that explicit belief in some matters is necessary for salvation. It follows that all men equally are required to have explicit faith.

2. Again, no one should be examined in what he is not required to believe explicitly. But simpletons are sometimes examined on the most meticulous points of faith. Everyone, therefore, is required to believe all things explicitly.

3. Again, if the more simple minded are not required to have explicit faith, but only implicit faith, they must have faith implicit in the faith of the wiser. But this is precarious, for the wiser may happen to be wrong. It seems, therefore, that even the more simple minded ought to have explicit faith. Hence all men equally are required to believe explicitly.

On the other hand: it is said in Job 1:14: “The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them.” According to Gregory, this means that in matters of faith the simpler minded, who are signified by the asses, ought to follow the wiser, who are signified by the oxen.

I answer: matters of faith are made explicit by revelation, since they are beyond reason. Now divine revelation reaches lower creatures through higher creatures, in a certain order. It is given to men through the angels, and to lower angels through higher angels, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier., caps. 4, 7). In the same way, it is through wiser men that the faith must be made explicit for the simpler. Hence just as higher angels have a fuller knowledge of divine things than the lower angels whom they enlighten, so also are wiser men, to whom it pertains to instruct others, required to have a fuller knowledge of what ought to be believed, and to believe it more explicitly.

On the first point: explicit understanding of what ought to be believed is not equally necessary for the salvation of all men. For wiser men, whose office is to instruct others, are required to believe more things explicitly than others.

On the second point: the simple minded are not examined in the subtleties of the faith unless there is a suspicion that they have been perverted by heretics, who have a habit of perverting the faith of the simple minded on subtle points. But if they do not hold tenaciously to a perverse doctrine, and if their error is due to their simplicity, they are not blamed for it.

On the third point: the simple minded have faith implicit in the faith of the wiser only to the extent to which the wiser adhere to the divine teaching. Hence the apostle says: “Wherefore I beseech you be ye followers of me” (I Cor. 4:16). Thus it is not human knowledge that is the rule of faith, but divine truth. If some of the wiser should err therein, this will not prejudice the faith of the simpler minded who believe that they have a true faith, unless they hold pertinaciously to their particular errors in opposition to the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err, since the Lord said: “I have prayed for thee [Peter], that thy faith fail not” (Luke 22:32).

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether Explicit Belief in the Mystery of the Incarnation of Christ is Necessary for the Salvation of Everybody

1. It seems that explicit belief in the mystery of the incarnation of Christ is not necessary for the salvation of everybody. A man is not required to have explicit belief in matters of which angels are ignorant, since the faith is made explicit by divine revelation, which reaches men through the medium of angels, as was said in the preceding article. Now even angels have been ignorant of the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, since they asked: “Who is this king of glory?” (Ps. 24:8), and “Who is this that cometh from Edom?” as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. 7). Hence men are not required to believe explicitly in the mystery of the incarnation of Christ.

2. Again, it is obvious that the blessed John the Baptist was one of the wise, and that he was very near to Christ. For the Lord said of him: “Among them that are born of women there hath not arisen a greater.” But even John the Baptist does not seem to have known the mystery of the incarnation of

Christ explicitly, since he inquired of Christ: “Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another?” (Matt. 11:3). Thus even the wise are not required to have explicit faith concerning Christ.

3. Again, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. 9, 4), many of the Gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of angels. Now it appears that the Gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith concerning Christ, since no revelation of the faith was given unto them. Thus it seems that explicit faith in the mystery of the incarnation of Christ has not been necessary for the salvation of everybody.

On the other hand: Augustine says (De Corrept. et Grat. 7, Epist. 190): “That faith is sound by which we believe that no man, whether old or young, is set free from the contagion of death or from the debt of sin, except by the one mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ.”

I answer: that through which we attain to blessedness, as we said in Art. 5, and in Q. 1, Art. 8, properly and in itself belongs to the object of faith. Now our way to blessedness is the mystery of the incarnation and passion of Christ. For it is said in Acts 4:12: “there is none other name under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved.” Hence some kind of belief in the mystery of the incarnation of Christ has been necessary for all men at all times, although the manner of belief required has been different for different persons at different times.

Before he was in the state of sin, man had explicit faith in the mystery of the incarnation of Christ as the means of his con-sumation in glory, but not as the means of liberation from sin through the passion and resurrection, since he was not aware of sin to come. It appears that he had foreknowledge of Christ’s incarnation, since according to Gen. 2:24 he said: “Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife,” on which passage the apostle says: “This is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ and the Church” (Eph. 5:32). We cannot then believe that the first man was ignorant of this mystery.

After sin, men believed explicitly in the mystery of the incarnation of Christ, including not only his incarnation, but also his passion and resurrection, through which the human race is set free from sin and death.

For they would not otherwise have foreshown the passion of Christ in certain sacrifices, both before the Law and under the Law. The wiser among them knew the meaning of these sacrifices explicitly. The simpler minded believed that under the veil of such sacrifices were contained divine preparations for the coming of Christ, of which they were dimly aware. Further, as we said in Q. 1, Art. 7, ad 1 and 4, the nearer men have been to Christ, the more distinctly have they known the things which pertain to the mysteries of Christ.

But now that grace has been revealed, wise and simple alike are required to have explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, especially in such things as are universally solemnized in the Church, and publicly proposed, such as the articles on the incarnation, of which we spoke in Q. 1, Art. 8. With regard to subtle points connected with the articles on the incarnation, however, some are required to believe them more or less explicitly, according to the status and office of each.

On the first point: the mystery of the kingdom of God was not altogether hidden from the angels, as Augustine says (5 Gen. ad Litt. 19), although their knowledge of it was in some respects more perfect after it had been revealed by Christ.

On the second point: John the Baptist did not inquire about the coming of Christ in the flesh as one who did not know of it, since he had openly confessed it, saying: “And I saw, and bare record that this is the Son of God” (John 1:34). Thus he did not say: “Art thou he that has come?” but “Art thou he that should come?” His question related to the future, not to the past. Nor are we to believe that he was ignorant of Christ’s coming passion, since he said: “Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world!” thus foretelling his approaching sacrifice. There have also been other prophets who were not ignorant of it, as is clear from Isa. ch. 53. We may therefore say with Gregory {Hom. in Evang. 6) that he asked this question because he did not know whether Christ would descend into hell in his own person. For he knew that the power of his passion would reach to those who were detained in hell, according to Zech. 9:11: “As for thee also, by the blood of thy covenant I have sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water.” But he was not required to believe explicitly, before it was fulfilled, that Christ would descend into hell himself. Or we may say with Ambrose (on Luke 7) that he asked this question out of piety, not out of doubt or ignorance. Or we may say with Chrysostom {Hom. in Matt. 37) that he asked this question not because he did not know, but in order that his disciples might be convinced by Christ himself, and that Christ directed his reply to John’s disciples, pointing to his works as signs.

On the third point: it is evident from their predictions that many of the Gentiles received a revelation concerning Christ. Thus it is said in Job 19:25: “I know that my Redeemer liveth.” The sibyl also predicted certain things of Christ, as Augustine says (13 Contra Faustum 15). Histories of the Romans also tell us that a tomb was discovered in the days of Con-stantine Augustus and his mother Irene, in which there lay a man on whose breast was a plate of gold, inscribed with the words “Christ will be born of a virgin, and I believe in him. O Sun, thou shalt see me again, in the time of Irene and Constantine.” (Vid. Baron. ad annum Christi 780). If, on the other hand, there have been some who have been saved without a revelation, these were not saved without faith in a Mediator. For although they did not have explicit faith, they believed that God was the deliverer of mankind in whatsoever ways might please him, accordingly as the Spirit should reveal the truth to such as should have knowledge of it. This was in accordance with Job. 35:11: “Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth . . . ?”

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether Explicit Belief in the Trinity is Necessary for Salvation

1. It seems that explicit belief in the Trinity has not been necessary for salvation. The apostle indeed says in Heb. 11:6: “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” But one can believe this without believing in the Trinity. Hence it has not been necessary to believe in the Trinity explicitly.

2. Again, in John 17:6 the Lord says: “I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me.” Expounding this, Augustine says: “Not thy name whereby thou art called God, but thy name whereby thou art called my Father,” and he adds later: “He is known among all nations as the God

who made the world; he is known in Judea as the God who is not to be worshipped together with false Gods; but he has not manifested unto men this name which was formerly hidden from them, by which he is called the Father of this Christ through whom he taketh away the sin of the world" (Tract 106 in Joan.). Thus it was not known, before the coming of Christ, that both Fatherhood and Sonship were in the Godhead. Hence the Trinity was not believed explicitly.

3. Again, what we are required to believe explicitly about God is that the object of blessedness is in God. Now the object of blessedness is the supreme good, and we can understand that this is in God without distinguishing between the Persons. Hence it has not been necessary to believe in the Trinity explicitly.

On the other hand: the Trinity of the Persons is expressed in many ways in the Old Testament. It is said at the very beginning of Genesis, for example, in order to express the Trinity, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness" (Gen. 1:26). Explicit belief in the Trinity has therefore been necessary for salvation from the very beginning.

I answer: it is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of the incarnation of Christ without faith in the Trinity. For the mystery of the incarnation of Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh, that he made the world new through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and that he was conceived by the Holy Ghost. Hence just as before the time of Christ the mystery of his incarnation was believed explicitly by the wise, and implicitly and as it were obscurely by the simple, so also was the mystery of the Trinity believed in the same manner. But now that grace has been revealed, it is necessary for everybody to believe in the Trinity explicitly. Moreover, all who are born again in Christ are reborn through invocation of the Trinity, in accordance with Matt. 28:19: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

On the first point: to believe these two things has been necessary for all men at all times. But it is not sufficient for all men at all times.

On the second point: before the coming of Christ, faith in the Trinity was hidden in the faith of the wise. But it was made manifest to the world through Christ, and also through the apostles.

On the third point: without the Trinity of the Persons, the supreme goodness of God can be understood as we now understand it through its effects. But without the Trinity of the Persons it cannot be understood as it is in itself, and as it will be seen by the blessed. Moreover, it is the sending of the divine Persons that brings us to blessedness.

ARTICLE NINE

Whether to Believe is Meritorious

1. It seems that to believe is not meritorious. It was said in 12ae, Q. 114, Art. 4, that the principle of merit is charity. Now faith is a preamble to charity, just as nature is a preamble. But a natural action is not meritorious, since we merit nothing by our natural powers. Neither then is the act of faith meritorious.

2. Again, belief is a mean between opinion and science, or the study of what is known scientifically. Now the study of science is not meritorious, and neither is opinion. Neither, then, is it meritorious to believe.

3. Again, he who assents to anything by faith either has a sufficient reason for believing, or does not. If he has a sufficient reason, his assent is no credit to him, since he is not then free to believe or not to believe. If he does not have a sufficient reason, he believes lightly, in the manner referred to in Ecclesiasticus 19:4: “he that believes in haste is light in heart”—which does not appear to be meritorious. Hence in no wise is it meritorious to believe.

On the other hand: it is said in Heb. 11:33: “Who through faith . . . obtained promises.” Now this would not have been, had they not merited by believing. To believe is therefore meritorious.

I answer: as we said in 12ae, Q. 114, Arts. 3 and 4, our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free will as moved by God through grace. It follows that any human action which depends on the free will can be meritorious, provided that it is related to God. Now “to believe” is the act of the intellect as it assents to divine truth at the command of the will as moved by God through grace. It is therefore an act commanded by the free will as ordered to God. The act of faith can therefore be meritorious.

On the first point: nature is related to charity, which is the principle by which we merit, as matter is related to its form. Faith, on the other hand, is related to charity as a disposition is related to the ultimate form which it precedes. Now it is obvious that a subject, or matter, cannot act except by the power of its form. Neither can a preceding disposition act before its form is received. Once the form has been received, however, a subject and a preceding disposition alike act by the power of the form, and the form is the main principle of action. The heat of a fire, for example, acts by the power of its substantial form. Thus without charity, neither nature nor faith can produce a meritorious action. But when charity supervenes, the act of faith becomes meritorious through charity, just as a natural action thereby becomes meritorious, including a natural action of the free will.

On the second point: two things may be considered in regard to science, namely, the assent of the knower to what he knows, and his study of it. The assent of one who knows scientifically does not depend on his free will, since the cogency of demonstration compels him to give it. Hence in science, assent is not meritorious. The actual study of a scientific matter, however, does depend on his free will, since it lies within his power whether to study or not to study. The study of science can therefore be meritorious if it is referred to the end of charity, that is, to the honour of God, or to the service of one’s neighbour. In faith, on the other hand, both assent and practice depend on the free will. The act of faith can therefore be meritorious in both respects. Opinion does not involve firm assent. It is indeed feeble and infirm, as the philosopher says in Post. An., text 44. Hence it does not appear to proceed from a complete volition, nor, therefore, to have much of the nature of merit in respect of its assent, although it may be meritorious in respect of actual study.

On the third point: he who believes has a sufficient reason for believing. He is induced to believe by the authority of divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and what is more, by the inward prompting of divine invitation.

Hence he does not believe lightly. But he does not have a reason such as would suffice for scientific knowledge. Thus the character of merit is not taken away.

ARTICLE TEN

Whether a Reason in Support of the Things of Faith Diminishes the Merit of Faith

1. It seems that a reason in support of the things of faith diminishes the merit of faith. For Gregory says: “Faith has no merit when human reason proves it by test” {Hom. in Evang. 26). Thus a human reason excludes the merit of faith altogether, if it provides an adequate proof. It seems, therefore, that any kind of human reason in support of the things of faith diminishes the merit of faith.

2. Again, as the philosopher says in 1 Ethics 9, “happiness is the reward of virtue.” Hence anything which diminishes the nature of a virtue diminishes the merit of it. Now a human reason seems to diminish the nature of the virtue of faith. For it is of the very nature of faith that its object is unseen, as was said in Q. 1, Arts. 4 and 5, and the more reasons are given in support of something, the less does it remain unseen. A human reason in support of the things of faith therefore diminishes the merit of faith.

3. Again, the causes of contraries are themselves contrary. Now anything which conduces to the contrary of faith, whether it be persecution in order to compel one to renounce it, or reasoning in order to persuade one to renounce it, increases the merit of faith. A reason which encourages faith therefore diminishes the merit of faith.

On the other hand: it is said in I Peter 3:15: “be ready always to give an answer to every man that asketh you a reason of the hope that is in you.” Now the apostle would not have given this advice if the merit of faith were to be diminished as a result of it. Hence a reason does not diminish the merit of faith.

I answer: as we said in the preceding article, the act of faith can be meritorious inasmuch as it depends on the will, in respect of assent and not only of practice. Now a human reason in support of the things of faith may relate to the will of the believer in two ways. In the first place, it may precede the will to believe, as it does when a man has no desire to believe, or has not a ready will to believe, unless he is induced to do so by some human reason. If it precedes in this way, a human reason diminishes the merit of faith. We have already said that a passion which precedes choice in moral virtues diminishes the worth of a virtuous action (12ae, Q. 24, Art. 4, ad 1; Q. 77, Art. 6, ad 6). Just as a man ought to perform acts of moral virtue on account of reasoned judgment, and not on account of passion, so ought he to believe the things of faith on account of divine authority, and not on account of human reason.

In the second place, a human reason may follow the will to believe. When a man has a ready will to believe, he rejoices in the truth which he believes, thinks about it, and turns it over in his mind to see whether he can find a reason for it. A human reason which thus follows the will to believe does not exclude merit. Rather is it a sign of greater merit, just as a passion which follows the will in moral virtues is a sign of greater readiness of will, as we said in 12ae, Q. 24, Art. 3, ad 1. This is the import of the words of the Samaritan to the woman, who signifies human reason (John 4:42): “Now we believe, not because of thy saying.”

On the first point: Gregory is speaking of such as have no desire to believe the things of faith otherwise than on the evidence of reason. But when a man is willing to believe them on the authority of God alone, the merit of faith is neither excluded nor diminished if he also has demonstrative proof of some of them, such as that God is one.

On the second point: the reasons which are given in support of the authority of faith are not demonstrative reasons, such as could lead the human intellect to intellectual vision. Hence the things of faith do not cease to be unseen. Such reasons remove hindrances to faith, showing that what is proposed in faith is not impossible. They consequently diminish neither the nature nor the merit of faith. But although demonstrative reasons brought in support of the preambles to faith (not in support of the articles) may diminish the nature of faith by causing what is proposed to be seen, they do not diminish the nature of charity, through which the will is ready to believe the things of faith even though they should remain unseen. Hence the nature of merit is not diminished.

On the third point: whatever is hostile to the faith, whethel it be the reasoning of a man or outward persecution, increases the merit of faith in so far as it shows that the will is readier and stronger in the faith. Martyrs had greater merit of faith, since they did not renounce the faith on account of persecutions. Men of wisdom also have greater merit, when they do not renounce it on account of reasons brought against it by philosophers or heretics. But things which encourage faith do not always diminish the readiness of the will to believe. Neither, therefore, do they always diminish the merit of faith.

QUESTION THREE

THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH

We must now consider the outward act of faith, that is, confession. Two questions are asked concerning confession.

1. Whether confession is an act of faith.

2. Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Confession is an Act of Faith

1. It seems that confession is not an act of faith. For the same act does not belong to different virtues, and confession belongs to penance, of which it is a part. It follows that confession is not an act of faith.

2. Again, sometimes a man is prevented from confessing the faith by fear, or by self-consciousness. Thus even the apostle asks others to pray that it may be given unto him “that I may open my mouth boldly, to make known the mystery of the gospel” (Eph. 6:19). Now it is through fortitude, which restrains both audacity and fear, that one does not shrink from what is good through either self-consciousness or fear. Hence it seems that confession is an act of fortitude, or of constancy, rather than an act of faith.

3. Again, the fervour of faith causes some to perform other outward good works, just as it causes them to confess the faith. Thus Gal. 5:6 speaks of “faith which worketh by love.” Yet these other outward works are not regarded as acts of faith. Hence neither is confession an act of faith.

On the other hand: a gloss on II Thess. 1:11, “and the work of faith with power,” says: “that is, confession, which is properly the work of faith.”

I answer: outward acts are properly the acts of that virtue to whose end they refer by reason of their specific nature. For example, fasting is an act of abstinence, since it refers by reason of its specific nature to the end of abstinence, which is to curb the flesh. Now the end to which confession of faith refers by reason of its specific nature is the end of faith, according to II Cor. 4:13: “having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe, and therefore speak.” For outward speaking is intended to convey what is conceived in the heart. Hence just as the inward conception of the things of faith is properly an act of faith, so likewise is the outward confession of them.

On the first point: the Scriptures commend three kinds of confession: first, confession of the things of faith, which is the proper act of faith, since it relates to the end of faith, as we have said; second, confession as an act of thanksgiving or praise, which is an act of glorification, since it is ordained for the outward honour of God, which is the end of glorification; third, the confession of sins, which is part of penance, since it is ordained for the blotting out of sin, which is the end of penance.

On the second point: that which removes an obstacle is not an essential cause, but only an accidental cause, as the philosopher explains in 8 Physics, text 32. Now fortitude removes an obstacle to confession of faith, whether it be fear or a feeling of shame. It is thus as it were only an accidental cause, not the proper and essential cause of confession of faith.

On the third point: inward faith works by love, through which it causes every outward act of virtue by means of the other virtues, which it commands but does not compel. But it produces confession as its own proper act, without any other virtue as a medium.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Confession of Faith is Necessary for Salvation

1. It seems that confession of faith is not necessary for salvation. For that whereby a man attains the end of a virtue would seem to be sufficient for salvation. Now the proper end of faith is that a man's mind should become one with the divine truth. But this can be attained without confession. Hence confession is not necessary for salvation.

2. Again, by outward confession a man declares his faith to another. But this is necessary only for those whose duty it is to instruct others. Hence it appears that the simple minded are not required to confess their faith.

3. Again, nothing is necessary for salvation if it is liable to be an offence to others, or liable to create a disturbance. For the apostle says in I Cor. 10:32: "Give none offence, neither to the Jews, nor to the Gentiles, nor to the church of God." Now a confession of faith sometimes raises a disturbance among unbelievers. It follows that confession of faith is not necessary for salvation.

On the other hand: the apostle says in Rom. 10:10: "For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation."

I answer: such things as are necessary for salvation are enjoined by the precepts of the divine law. But since confession of faith is something positive, it can be enjoined only by an affirmative precept. It is therefore necessary for salvation only to the extent to which it is enjoined by an affirmative precept of the divine law. Now we have already said that affirmative precepts are not binding for all times, although they are always binding
(12ae, Q. 71, Art. 5, ad 3; Q. 88, Art. 1, ad 2). They are binding only for particular times and places, in accordance with other circumstances to which a man's action must have due regard, if it is to be a virtuous action. Hence it is not necessary for salvation to confess one's faith at all times and places, but only at particular times and places—when God would be deprived of honour, or when the good of one's neighbour would be

imperilled, if one did not confess it. One is bound to confess one’s faith, for example, if one’s silence when asked about it would give the impression either that one had no faith, or that one did not believe the faith to be true; or if it would turn others away from the faith. In such circumstances, confession of faith is necessary for salvation.

On the first point: the end of faith, and of the other virtues also, ought to be referred to the end of charity, which is to love God and one’s neighbour. A man ought not therefore to be content to be one with divine truth through faith, but ought to confess his faith outwardly whenever the honour of God or the good of his neighbour demands it.

On the second point: everyone ought to confess their faith openly whenever some danger to the faith makes it necessary, whether it be to instruct other believers, or to strengthen them in the faith, or to set at naught the taunts of unbelievers. But it is not the duty of all to instruct others in the faith at other times.

On the third point: if an open confession of faith would cause a disturbance among unbelievers, without any good ensuing to the faith or to the faithful, public confession of faith is not to be commended. Thus our Lord says in Matt. 7:6: “Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.” But if any good is to be hoped for, or if there is any need, a man ought to ignore any such disturbance and openly confess his faith. Thus it is said in Matt. 15:12–14: “Then came his disciples, and said unto him, Knowest thou that the Pharisees were offended, after they heard this saying? But he answered . . . Let them alone [that is, do not disturb them]: they be blind leaders of the blind.”

QUESTION FOUR

THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH

We must now consider the virtue itself of faith. We shall consider first faith itself, secondly those who have faith, thirdly the cause of faith, and lastly the effects of faith. Eight questions are asked concerning faith itself.

1. What faith is.

2. In which power of the soul it inheres.

3. Whether its form is charity.

4. Whether formed and unformed faith are numerically the same.

5. Whether faith is a virtue.

6. Whether it is a single virtue.

7. How faith is related to the other virtues.

8. How the certainty of faith compares with the certainty of the intellectual virtues.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether this is a Satisfactory Definition of Faith: Faith is the Substance of Things Hoped for, the Evidence of Things not Seen

It seems that the apostle’s definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) is not satisfactory—“Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” For no quality is a substance, and it was said in 12ae, Q. 72, Art. 3, that faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue. It follows that faith is not a substance.

2. Again, different objects belong to different virtues. Now a thing hoped for is the object of hope. Hence it should not be included in the definition as if it were the object of faith.

3. Again, faith is made perfect by charity, rather than by hope. For charity is the form of faith, as will be shown in Art. 3. “Things loved” should therefore be included in the definition, rather than “things hoped for.”

4. Again, the same thing should not be included in different genera. Now “substance” and “evidence” are different genera, and neither is intended as a subalternative. It is therefore wrong to define faith as both “substance” and “evidence.” Hence faith is improperly described.

5. Again, evidence makes apparent the truth of that in evidence of which it is brought. Now when the truth about a thing is apparent, the thing is said to be seen. It is therefore contradictory to speak of “the evidence of things not seen,” since evidence causes something to be seen which was previously unseen. It is therefore wrongly said “of things not seen.” Hence faith is improperly described.

On the other hand: the authority of the apostle is sufficient.

I answer: there are some who say that these words of the apostle are not a definition of faith, on the ground that definition exhibits the “what,” or essence of a thing, as is maintained in 6 Metaph., text 19. But if anyone consider the matter aright, he will see that this description indicates everything by means of which faith could be defined, even though it is not expressed in the form of a definition. Philosophers indicate the principles of syllogism in a similar way, without making use of the syllogistic form.

To make this clear, we may observe that faith is bound to be defined in terms of its own proper act in relation to its own proper object. For faith is a habit, and habits are known through their acts, which are known through their objects. Now as we said in Q. 2, Arts. 2 and 3, the act of faith is to believe, and belief is an act of the intellect as directed to one object by the will. The act of faith is therefore related both to the object of the will, which is the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, which is the truth. Further, since faith is a theological virtue, as we said in 12ae, Q. 92, Art. 3, it has the same thing for its object as it has for its end. Consequently, the object of faith is bound to correspond, relatively, to the end of faith. Now we have already said that the object of faith is the unseen first truth, together with what is consequential to the first truth (Q. 1, Arts. 1 and 4). It must therefore be as something unseen that the first truth relates to the act of faith as its end. Such is the nature of things hoped for. As the apostle says: “we hope for that we see not” (Rom. 8:25). To see the truth is to possess it, whereas no one hopes for what he already possesses, since we hope for what we do not possess, as we observed in 12ae, Q. 67, Art. 4. The way in which the act of faith is related to the end of faith as the object of the will is accordingly indicated by the words: “faith is the substance of things hoped for.” We often apply the name “substance” to the origin from which something is derived, especially when all that derives therefrom is virtually contained therein, as in a first principle. For example, we might say that its primary indemonstrable principles are the substance of a science, since they are the first things that we understand about the science, and since the whole science is virtually contained in them. It is in this sense that faith is said to be "the substance of things hoped for." For the first beginning of things hoped for arises in us as a result of the assent of faith, which virtually contains everything that is hoped for. We hope for the blessedness in which we shall see, face to face, the truth to which we now unite ourselves by the way of faith, as we said when speaking of blessedness in 12ae, Q. 3, Art. 8; Q. 4, Art. 3.

The way in which the act of faith relates to the object of faith as the object of the intellect, on the other hand, is indicated by the words "the evidence of things not seen," "evidence" standing for the result of evidence. The firm adherence of the intellect to the unseen truth of faith is here called "evidence" because evidence leads the intellect to accept something in a final manner. Thus another version reads "conviction," as in Augustine's Tract. 79 in Joan., since the intellect is convinced by divine authority when it assents to what it does not see. Hence if anyone wishes to reduce these words to the form of a definition, he may say: "faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, and which causes the intellect to assent to things not seen."

Thus faith is distinguished from everything else that pertains to the intellect. By what is meant by "evidence," it is distinguished from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, whereby the intellect does not adhere firmly to anything. By what is meant by "things not seen," it is distinguished from science and understanding, through which a thing becomes seen. As "the substance of things hoped for," the virtue of faith is also distinguished from what is commonly called faith, but is not directed to the hope of blessedness.

All other definitions of faith are explanations of that given by the apostle. The definitions given by Augustine {Tract. 79 in Joan: 2 Quaest. Evang., Q. 39): "faith is the virtue by which we believe things not seen," by the Damascene (4 De Fid. Orth. 12): "faith is assent without inquiry," and by others: "faith is certainty of mind concerning things which are absent, more than opinion, but less than science,” affirm what the apostle means by “the evidence of things not seen.” The definition given by Dionysius (7 Div. Nom., lect. 5): “faith is the enduring foundation of believers, by which they are devoted to the truth, and the truth shown forth in them,” affirms what he means by “the substance of things hoped for.”

On the first point: “substance” does not here mean the highest genus as distinguished from other genera. It denotes that wherein every genus bears a likeness to a substance, in that what is primary therein virtually contains the rest, and is accordingly said to be the substance of the rest.

On the second point: since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, the end of faith must include the objects of the virtues by which the will is perfected. Now hope is one of these virtues, as we shall show in Q. 18, Art. 1, and its object is included in the definition for this reason.

On the third point: love can be of things seen as well as of things not seen, and of things present as well as of things absent. Things loved are therefore not so appropriate to faith as things hoped for, since hope is always for the absent and unseen.

On the fourth point: as they are used in the definition, “substance” and “evidence” do not mean different genera, nor even different acts. They indicate different relations of the same act to different objects, as is plain from what we have said.

On the first point: when evidence is drawn from the proper principles of something, it causes the thing itself to be seen. But the evidence of divine authority does not make the thing itself to be seen, and such is the evidence of which the definition speaks.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Faith is in the Intellect as its Subject

1. It seems that faith is not in the intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (implicitly in De Praed. Sanct. 5): “faith depends on the will of those who believe.” But the will is a power distinct from the intellect. It follows that faith is not in the intellect as its subject.

2. Again, assent to matters of faith is the outcome of a will obedient to God. Hence the praiseworthiness of faith seems to lie entirely in obedience. Now obedience is in the will. It follows that faith also is in the will, not in the intellect.

3. Again, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect. For faith “worketh by love” (Gal. 5:6), whereas the speculative intellect is not a principle of action, since it has nothing to say about what we ought to shun or avoid, as is said in 3 De Anima, texts 34, 35. Yet neither is it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some contingent truth about something which can be made or done, whereas the object of faith is eternal truth, as was explained in Q. 1, Art. 1. It follows that faith is not in the intellect as its subject.

On the other hand: faith is succeeded in heaven by vision, according to I Cor. 13:12: “Now we see through a glass, darkly; but then face to face.” Now vision is in the intellect. So also, therefore, is faith.

I answer: since faith is a virtue, the act of faith must be perfect. Now the perfection of an act which springs from two active principles requires the perfection of both these principles. For one cannot saw well unless one knows the art of sawing, and unless the saw is also well adapted for sawing. Further, when a disposition to act well exists in powers of the soul which tend to do the opposite, such a disposition is a habit, as we explained in 12ae, Q. 49, Art. 4, ad, 1, 2, and 3. An act which springs from two such powers can be perfect, therefore, only if such a habit already exists in both of them. Now to believe is an act of the intellect as moved to assent by the will, as we said in Q. 2, Arts. 1 and 2. Thus the act of belief springs both from the intellect and from the will, and each of these two powers is such that it is perfected by means of some habit, as we have explained. Hence if the act of faith is to be perfect, there must be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect; just as there must be a habit of prudence in the reason, and also a habit of temperance in the faculty of desire, if an act of desire is to be perfect. Nevertheless, the act of belief is immediately an act of the intellect, since the object of belief is “the true,” which properly pertains to the intellect. Faith must therefore be in the intellect as its subject, since it is the proper principle of the act of belief.

On the first point: by faith Augustine means the act of faith, which is said to depend on the will of believers in as much as the intellect assents to matters of faith by command of the will.

On the second point: not only must the will be ready to obey, but the intellect must also be disposed to follow the command of the will, just as desire must be well disposed to follow the direction of reason. There must therefore be a habit in the intellect which assents, as well as in the will which commands the intellect.

On the third point: it is quite clear from the object of faith that faith is in the intellect as its subject. Yet since the first truth, which is the object of faith, is the end of all our desires and actions (as Augustine explains in 1 De Trin. 8), faith works by love, just as "the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension," as it is said in 3 De Anima, text 49.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Charity is the Form of Faith

1. It seems that charity is not the form of faith. The species of each thing is derived from its own form. One thing cannot then be the form of another, if the two are distinguished as separate species of one genus. Now in I Cor., ch. 13, faith and charity are distinguished as separate species of virtue. Hence charity is not the form of faith.

2. Again, a form and that of which it is the form are in the same thing, since that which arises out of them is one absolutely. But faith is in the intellect, whereas charity is in the will. Hence charity is not the form of faith.

3. Again, the form of a thing is the principle of it. Now in so far as belief is due to the will, its principle would seem to be obedience rather than charity, according to Rom. 1:5: "for obedience to the faith among all nations." Obedience is therefore the form of faith, rather than charity.

On the other hand: everything works by means of its form. Now faith worketh by love. The love of charity is therefore the form of faith.

I answer: as we explained in 12ae, Q. 1, Art. 3, and Q. 17, Art. 6, voluntary acts take their species from the object to which the will is directed as an end. Now things derive their species from the manner in which a form exists in natural things. The form of any voluntary act is therefore in a sense the end to which it is directed, both because it takes its species from this end, and because its manner of action is bound to correspond to the end proportionately. It is also clear from what we said in the first article that the object of will which the act of faith seeks as an end is the good, and that this good is the divine good, which is the proper object of charity. Charity is accordingly said to be the form of faith, because it is through charity that the act of faith is made perfect, and brought to its form.

On the first point: charity is said to be the form of faith in the sense that it brings the act of faith to its form. There is nothing to prevent one act being brought to its form by different habits, and consequently classified under different species when human actions in general are being discussed, as we said in 12ae, Q. 18, Arts. 6, 7; Q. 61, Art. 2.

On the second point: this objection argues from the intrinsic form. Charity is not the intrinsic form of faith, but that which brings the act of faith to its form, as we have said.

On the third point: even obedience itself, like hope and any other virtue which can precede the act of faith, is brought to its true form by charity, as we shall explain in Q. 23, Art. 8. Charity is named as the form of faith for this reason.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Unformed Faith can become Formed, or Vice Versa

1. It seems that unformed faith cannot become formed, nor formed faith unformed. It is said in I Cor. 13:10: “when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.” Now in comparison with formed faith, unformed faith is imperfect. It will therefore be done away when formed faith is come. It follows that it cannot be numerically one habit with formed faith.

2. Again, the dead does not become the living. Unformed faith is dead, according to James 2:20: “faith without works is dead.” It follows that unformed faith cannot become formed.

3. Again, when God’s grace is bestowed on a believer, its effect is not less than when it is bestowed on an unbeliever. Now it causes a habit of faith in an unbeliever. It must therefore cause another habit of faith in a believer, who already has the habit of unformed faith.

4. Again, as Boethius says, “accidents cannot be altered.” Faith is an accident. It follows that the same faith cannot be formed at one time and unformed at another.

On the other hand: a gloss on James 2:20, “faith without works is dead,” says: “by works it is revived.” Thus faith which was once dead and unformed becomes formed and living.

I answer: opinion has varied on this matter. Some have said that the habit of formed faith is not the same habit as that of unformed faith; that unformed faith is done away when formed faith comes; and similarly that when a man whose faith is formed sins mortally, God infuses another habit of unformed faith. But it does not seem possible that a gift of grace should expel another gift of God, nor that any gift of God should be infused in consequence of mortal sin. Others have said that although the habits of formed and unformed faith are different habits, the habit of unformed faith is not done away, but remains together with the habit of formed faith in the same person. But it seems no less impossible that the habit of unformed faith should remain, inactive, in one who has faith that is formed.

We must therefore say, as against such views, that the habit of formed and of unformed faith is the same habit. The reason for this is that a habit is differentiated by what belongs to it essentially. What pertains to the intellect belongs to faith essentially, since faith is a perfection of the intellect. But what pertains to the will does not belong to faith essentially, and cannot therefore justify a distinction within it. Now the distinction between formed and unformed faith depends on charity, which pertains to the will, not on anything which pertains to the intellect. Hence formed and unformed faith are not different habits.

On the first point: the apostle means that when imperfection is essential to the nature of that which is imperfect, that which is imperfect shall be done away when that which is perfect is come. For example, when open vision is come, faith shall be done away, which is essentially “of things not seen.” But when imperfection is not essential to the nature of that which is imperfect, that which was imperfect and becomes perfect is numerically the same. For example, it is numerically the same person who was a boy and becomes a man, since boyhood is not essential to the nature of manhood. The unformed condition of faith is not essential to faith itself, but is accidental to it, as we have said. Hence it is the same faith which was unformed and becomes formed.

On the second point: what makes an animal alive belongs to its essence, since it is its essential form, namely, the soul. It is for this reason that the dead cannot become the living, and that the dead and the living differ in kind. But what brings faith to its form, or makes it alive, does not belong to the essence of faith. The two cannot then be compared.

On the third point: grace causes faith so long as faith endures, not only when it is newly begun in a man. For God works a man’s justification continually, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 104, Art. 1, and 12ae, Q. 109, Art. 9, just as the sun continually illumines the atmosphere. Hence grace does not do less for the believer than for the unbeliever, since it causes faith in both. It confirms and perfects faith in the one, and creates it anew in the other. Or we might say that it is accidental, as due to the nature of the subject, that grace does not cause faith to arise in one who already has faith; just as it is accidental, conversely, that a second mortal sin does not deprive a man of grace if he has already lost it through a previous mortal sin.

On the fourth point: when formed faith becomes unformed, it is not faith itself that is altered, but the subject of faith, that is, the soul, which at one time has faith with charity, at another faith without charity.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether Faith is a Virtue

1. It seems that faith is not a virtue. Virtue is “that which makes its subject good,” as the philosopher says in 2 Ethics 6, and is therefore directed to the good, whereas faith is directed to the true. It follows that faith is not a virtue.

2. Again, an infused virtue is more perfect than an acquired virtue. Now as the philosopher says in 6 Ethics 3, faith is not regarded as one of the acquired intellectual virtues, owing to its imperfection. Much less, then, can it be regarded as an infused virtue.

3. Again, it was said in the preceding article that formed and unformed faith are of the same species. But unformed faith is not a virtue, since it has no connection with other virtues. Hence neither is formed faith a virtue.

4. Again, the freely given graces are distinct from the virtues, and so is the fruit of the Spirit. Now in I Cor. 12:9 faith is included among the freely given graces, and in Gal. 5:22 it is included in the fruit of the Spirit. Hence faith is not a virtue.

On the other hand: a man is made just by means of the virtues. For “justice is the whole of virtue,” as it is said in 5 Ethics 1. But he is justified by faith, according to Rom. 5:1: “Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God. . . .” Hence faith is a virtue.

I answer: it is plain from what we said in 12ae, Q. 55, Arts. 3 and 4, that human virtue is that which makes human actions good. Any habit which is invariably the principle of a good action may therefore be called a human virtue. Now formed faith is such a habit. Two things are necessary, however, if the act of belief is to be perfect, since it is the act wherein the intellect finally gives its assent at the command of the will. The intellect must be infallibly directed to its object, which is the truth, and the will must be infallibly directed to the ultimate end, for the sake of which assent is finally given. Now both of these conditions are fulfilled in the act of formed faith. It is of the very nature of faith that the intellect should be in the way of truth at all times, since faith cannot believe what is false, as we said in Q. i, Art. 3. The will of the soul is likewise infallibly directed to the ultimate good by charity, which brings faith to its form. Formed faith is therefore a virtue.

Unformed faith, on the other hand, is not a virtue, since even though it should have the perfection which is necessary on the part of the intellect, it would still lack the perfection which is necessary on the part of the will; just as we said that temperance would not be a virtue if prudence were wanting in the reason, even though there should be temperance in the concupiscible element. (12ae, Q. 58, Art. 4; Q. 55, Art. 1.) An act of temperance requires an act of reason as well as an act of the concupiscible element. So likewise does the act of faith require an act of the will as well as an act of the intellect.

On the first point: “the true” is itself the good of the intellect, since it is the perfection of the intellect. Faith is consequently directed to the good in so far as the intellect is directed to truth by faith. Faith is further directed to the good in so far as it is brought to its form by charity, since the good is then the object of the will.

On the second point: the philosopher is speaking of the faith which trusts in human reason when it accepts a conclusion which does not necessarily follow, and which may be false. Faith of this kind is not a virtue. We are speaking of the faith which trusts in divine truth, which is infallible, and cannot be false. This faith can, therefore, be a virtue.

On the third point: formed and unformed faith do not differ in species as belonging to different species. They differ, however, as the perfect and the imperfect within the same species. Thus unformed faith lacks the perfect nature of a virtue because it is imperfect, virtue being a kind of perfection, as is said in 7 Physics, texts 17 and 18.

On the fourth point: some say that the faith included among the freely given graces is unformed faith. But this is not well said. For the graces mentioned are not common to all members of the Church, wherefore the apostle says: “there are diversities of gifts,” and again, “to one is given this, to another that.” Unformed faith, on the other hand, is common to all members of the Church. Lack of form is not a part of its substance, whereas a gift is gratuitous by its substance. We must therefore say that in this passage faith stands for some excellence of faith, such as constancy, as the gloss says, or the “word of faith.” Faith is also included in the fruit of the Spirit, because it rejoices in its own act, on account of its certainty. As numbered with the fruits in Gal., ch. 5, faith is accordingly explained as “certainty of things not seen.”

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Faith is a Single Virtue

1. It seems that faith is not a single virtue. For just as faith is a gift of God, according to Eph. 2:8, so also are wisdom and understanding clearly reckoned as gifts of God, according to Isa. 11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge are different, in that wisdom is of things eternal, whereas understanding is of things temporal. Hence since faith is of things eternal, and also of some things which are temporal, it seems that it is not single, but divided into parts.

2. Again, it was said in Q. 3, Art. 1 that confession is an act of faith. But confession is not the same for all. We confess as having happened in the past what the ancient fathers confessed as about to happen in the future, as is plain from Isa. 7:14: “Behold, a virgin shall conceive.” Hence faith is not single.

3. Again, faith is common to all who believe in Christ. But a single accident cannot be in different subjects. There cannot then be one faith for everybody.

On the other hand: the apostle says (Eph. 4:5): “One Lord, one faith.”

I answer: if we are speaking of the habit of faith, this may be considered either in respect of its object, or in respect of its subject. Faith is one in respect of its object, since its formal object is the first truth, in believing which we believe everything contained in the faith. But it is diverse in respect of its subject, since it occurs in different persons. Now it is obvious that faith, like any other habit, takes its species from what we mean by its formal object, while it is individualized by its subject. Consequently, if by faith we mean the habit whereby we believe, faith is one in species, even though it is numerically different in different persons. If, on the other hand, we mean that which is believed, then again, faith is one, since it is the same thing that is believed by all. For even though the matters of faith which all believe in common are diverse, they are all reducible to one.

On the first point: such temporal things as are proposed to faith are the object of faith only in so far as they relate to what is eternal, namely, to the first truth, as we said in Q. 1, Art. 1. Faith is therefore one, whether of things eternal or temporal. But it is otherwise with wisdom and understanding, which are concerned with the eternal and the temporal according to their different natures.

On the second point: the difference between past and future is not a difference within what is believed, but a difference in the relation of believers to the one thing which is believed, as we said in 12ae, Q. 103, Art. 4; Q. 107, Art. 1, ad 1.

On the third point: this objection argues from the numerical diversity of faith.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether Faith is the First of the Virtues

1. It seems that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a gloss by Ambrose on Luke 12:4, “I say unto you, my friends . . . ,” says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. A foundation is prior to what is founded upon it. Hence faith is not the first of the virtues.

2. Again, a gloss (Cassiod.) on the words “trust in the Lord,” in the psalm “Fret not” (Ps. 37) says: “hope leads to faith.” Now it is to be explained later that hope is a virtue (Q. 17, Art. 1). Hence faith is not the first of the virtues.

3. Again, it was said in Art. 2 that the intellect of the believer is inclined to assent to the things of faith by obedience to God. Now obedience is a virtue. Hence faith is not the first of the virtues.

4. Again, a gloss on I Cor. 3:11, “For other foundation can no man lay . . . ,” says that formed faith is the foundation, not unformed faith (Augustine, De Fide et Operibus 16). Now it was said in Art. 1 that faith is brought to its

form by charity. It is therefore through charity that faith is made the foundation, so that charity is the foundation rather than faith: and since the foundation is the first part of the building, it seems that charity is prior to faith.

5. Again, we understand the order of habits from the order of their acts. Now in the act of faith, the act of the will, which is made perfect by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is made perfect by faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. It follows that charity precedes faith. Hence faith is not the first of the virtues.

On the other hand: the apostle says (Heb. 11:1): “Faith is the substance of things hoped for.” Now a substance is first by nature. Faith is therefore the first of the virtues.

I answer: one thing may precede another in two ways, either essentially or accidentally. Essentially, faith is the first of all the virtues. The theological virtues are bound to be prior to the others, since their object is the final end, the end being the principle of action in all practical matters, as we said in 12ae, Q. 13, Art. 3; and Q. 34, Art. 4, ad. 1. Further, the final end itself must be in the intellect before it is in the will, since the will cannot intend anything which is not first apprehended by the intellect. Faith must then be the first of all the virtues. For the final end is in the intellect through faith, whereas it is in the will through hope and charity. Neither can natural knowledge attain to God as the object of blessedness, as he is sought by hope and charity.

Some other virtues, however, may precede faith accidentally. For an accidental cause is accidentally prior. As the philosopher explains in 8 Physics, text 32, the removal of a hindrance is accidentally part of the cause, and we may say that other virtues may be prior to faith in this way, in so far as they remove hindrances to belief. Fortitude, for example, removes irrational fear, which is a hindrance to faith, and humility removes pride, through which the intellect scorns to submit to the truth of faith. The same may also be said of certain other virtues, although they are not genuine virtues unless faith is presupposed, as Augustine says (4 Cont. Julian. 3).

The reply to the first point is thus obvious.

On the second point: hope does not always lead to faith. One cannot hope for eternal blessedness unless one believes it to be possible, since one cannot hope for what is impossible, as we said in 12ae, Q. 40, Art. 1. But hope may lead one to persevere in faith, or to remain steadfast in faith. It is in this sense that it is said to lead to faith.

On the third point: there are two senses in which we may speak of obedience. In the first place, we may mean the inclination of the will to obey the divine commandments. This is not in itself a special virtue. It is common to all virtues, since all virtues are commanded by the precepts of the divine law, as we said in 12ae, Q. 100, Art. 2. In this sense, obedience is necessary for faith. Secondly, we may mean the inclination of the will to obey the divine commandments as a duty. Understood in this sense, obedience is a special virtue, and part of justice, since it renders to a superior what is his due, by obeying him. Such obedience, however, is consequential to faith, since it is faith that enables a man to know that God is his superior who ought to be obeyed.

On the fourth point: the nature of a foundation requires not only that a thing should be first, but also that it should be a bond for the other parts of the building. For nothing is a foundation unless the other parts of the building hold together upon it. Now the spiritual edifice is bound together by charity, according to Col. 3:14: “above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness.” Thus it is true that faith cannot be the foundation without charity. But this does not mean that charity is prior to faith.

On the fifth point: faith does presuppose an act of will, but not an act of will which has been brought to its form by charity. Such an act presupposes faith, since the will cannot seek God with perfect love unless the intellect has a right belief about God.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether Faith is more Certain than Science and the Other Intellectual Virtues

1. It seems that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certainty, wherefore that is apparently the more certain which is the less open to doubt, just as that is

the whiter which is the less mixed with black. Now understanding and science, and even wisdom, have no doubts about their objects. But one who believes may be subject to intermittent doubt, and may have doubts concerning matters of faith. It follows that faith is not more certain than the intellectual virtues.

2. Again, vision is more certain than hearing. Now it is said in Rom. 10:17 that “faith cometh by hearing.” In understanding, science, and wisdom, on the other hand, there is a kind of intellectual vision. It follows that science, or understanding, is more perfect than faith.

3. Again, in matters pertaining to the intellect, things are more certain if they are more perfect. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since we advance to understanding through faith, according to Isa. 7:9: “Except ye believe, ye shall not understand” (Septuagint). Moreover, Augustine says that “faith is strengthened by science” (14 De Trin. 1). Hence it appears that science and understanding are more certain than faith.

On the other hand: the apostle says in I Thess. 2:13: “when ye received the word of God which ye heard of us,” that is, through faith, “ye received it not as the word of men, but, as it is in truth, the word of God.” Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Hence neither science nor anything else is more certain than faith.

I answer: as we said in 12ae, Q. 62, Art. 4, ad. 2, two of the intellectual virtues, namely prudence and art, are concerned with the contingent. Faith is more certain than either of these by reason of its very matter, since it is concerned with the eternal, which cannot be other than it is. There remain, then, the three intellectual virtues of wisdom, science, and understanding, which are concerned with the necessary, as we said in 12ae, Q. 57, Arts. 2 and 3. We must observe, however, that wisdom, science, and understanding may be understood in two ways. As understood by the philosopher in 6 Ethics 3, 6, and 7, they denote intellectual virtues. But they also denote gifts of the Holy Spirit.

There are two kinds of certainty which belong to them as intellectual virtues. In the first place, a thing is said to be more certain if the cause of certainty is itself more certain. Faith is in this sense more certain than the three virtues named, since it relies on divine truth, whereas they rely on human reason. Secondly, the assurance of the subject is more certain when the intellect grasps a thing more fully. In this sense, faith is less certain than these virtues, since the things of faith transcend the intellect of man, whereas the virtues named are concerned with what does not transcend it. Now a thing is judged absolutely by reference to its cause, and relatively by reference to the disposition of the subject. In the absolute sense, therefore, faith is the more certain, although these others are more certain relatively, that is, from the point of view of ourselves.

The case is similar if these three are understood to denote divine gifts given to us in this present life. Faith is more certain than such gifts, since they presuppose faith as their principle.

On the first point: this doubt does not pertain to the cause of faith. It pertains to ourselves, in so far as the intellect does not fully grasp the things of faith.

On the second point: other things being equal, vision is more certain than hearing. But if he from whom one hears greatly surpasses the vision of him who sees, hearing is more certain than vision. Indeed, anyone who has a little learning is more certain of what he hears from a scientist than of what he perceives by his own reason. Much more, then, is a man more certain of what he hears from God, which cannot be false, than of what he perceives by his own reason, which is liable to err.

On the third point: as divine gifts, perfect understanding and knowledge surpass the knowledge of faith in clarity, but not in certainty. For their certainty is the outcome of the certainty of faith, just as certainty of a conclusion is the outcome of certainty of the premises. As intellectual virtues, on the other hand, knowledge, wisdom, and understanding depend on the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certainty of the word of God, on which faith relies.

QUESTION FIVE

OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH

We must now inquire concerning those who have faith. Four questions are asked.

1. Whether angels and man had faith in their first state.

2. Whether devils have faith.

3. Whether heretics who err in one article of faith have faith in the other articles.

4. Whether, of those who have faith, one has greater faith than another.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Angels and Man had Faith in their First State

1. It seems that neither angels nor man had faith in their first state. For Hugo St. Victor says {Sentent. 1; 10 De Sacrament. 2): “it is because the eye of contemplation is not open that man cannot see God, or what is in God.” But the eye of contemplation was open in angels in their first state, before their confirmation or their lapse. As Augustine says, they “saw the realities in the word” (2 Gen. ad Litt. 8). It seems, also, that the eye of contemplation was open in the first man during his state of innocence, since Hugo St. Victor says in the same work (6, cap. 14): “in his first state, man knew his Creator not with the knowledge wherein the gate is open to hearing only, but with the knowledge which is of inward inspiration; not with the knowledge of those who by faith seek God while he is absent, but with clear vision of God as present to their contemplation.” Hence neither men nor the angels had faith in their first state.

2. Again, the knowledge of faith is dark and dim, according to I Cor. 13:12: “now we see through a glass, darkly.” But in their first state there was dimness neither in man nor in the angels, since darkness was the penalty of sin. Hence neither man nor the angels can have had faith in their first state.

3. Again, the apostle says in Rom. 10:17: “faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.” But there was no place for this in the first state of man or the angels, since they did not hear anything from another. Neither then was there faith in this state, whether of man or of angels.

On the other hand: the apostle says (Heb. 11:6): “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” Now in their first state, angels and man were coming to God. It follows that they had need of faith.

I answer: some say that the angels did not have faith before their confirmation or lapse, nor man before his sin, on account of their clear contemplation of divine things. But the only manifestation which excludes the character of faith is that wherein the principal object of faith is made apparent, or seen. For as the apostle says: “faith is the evidence of things not seen” (Heb. 11:1), and as Augustine says in Tract. 40 in Joan., and in 2 Quaest. Evang., Q. 39, “by faith we believe what we do not see.” Now the principal object of faith is the first truth, the vision of which makes us blessed, and supersedes faith. But neither the angels before confirmation nor man before sin were in the state of blessedness wherein God is seen in his essence. It is obvious, therefore, that they did not have the clear knowledge which would exclude the character of faith. Hence if they did not have faith, this could only be because they were entirely ignorant of the object of faith. If man and the angels had been created in the purely natural state, as some say they were, one might have maintained that neither angels before confirmation nor man before sin had faith. For the knowledge of faith is beyond the natural knowledge of God, with angels no less than with men. But as we said in Pt. I, Q. 62, Art. 3, and Q. . 91, Art. i, the gift of grace was given to man and to angels at the time when they were created.

We must therefore say that the hope of blessedness began in man and in the angels in consequence of the grace which they received, before this grace was consummated. Now as we said in Q. 4, Art. 7, this hope is begun in the intellect through faith, while it is begun in the will through hope and charity. Hence we are bound to say that the angels had faith before they were confirmed, and that man had faith before he sinned. But we must bear in mind that the object of faith has a formal aspect, as the first truth which transcends the natural knowledge of any creature, and also a material aspect, as that to which we assent when we acknowledge the first truth. In its formal aspect, faith is the same for all who know God by way of acknowledging the first truth, while future blessedness is as yet unattained.

Of the things which are materially proposed for belief, however, some are believed by one and clearly known by another, even in this present state, as we said in Q. i, Art. 5, and Ch 2, Art. 4, ad 2. We may accordingly say that angels before confirmation and man before sin had to some extent a clear knowledge of the divine mysteries, which we can know only by faith.

On the first point: although these words of Hugo St. Victor are the words of a master, and have the force of authority, it may be said that the contemplation which makes faith unnecessary is the contemplation of heaven, whereby supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did not have contemplation of this kind before confirmation. Neither did man before he sinned. Their contemplation was nevertheless of a higher order than our own. For it brought them nearer to God, and thereby gave them a clear knowledge of more things concerning the divine effects and mysteries than is possible for ourselves. Hence they did not have faith such as ours, which seeks God while he is absent, since God was more present to them by the light of wisdom than he is to us. But he was not present to them as he is present to the blessed by the light of glory.

On the second point: in their first state, man and the angels were not affected by any darkness of guilt or punishment. There was nevertheless in them a certain natural dimness of the intellect, since every creature is dim compared with the immensity of the divine light. Such dimness was sufficient to make faith necessary.

On the third point: although man in his first state did not hear anything outwardly, God inspired him inwardly. The prophets also heard in this way, according to Ps. 85:8: “I will hear what God the Lord will speak.”

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Devils Have Faith

1. It seems that devils do not have faith. For Augustine says that “faith depends on the will of those who believe” {De Praed. Sanct. 5). Now the will whereby one wills to believe in God is good. But there is no deliberate good will in devils. Hence it seems that devils do not have faith.

2. Again, faith is a gift of grace, according to Eph. 2:8: “For by grace ye are saved through faith . . . it is the gift of God.” Now the gloss on Hosea 3:1, “who look to other gods, and love flagons of wine,” says that the devils forfeited the gift of grace by their sin. It follows that faith did not remain in them after their sin.

3. Again, unbelief seems to be one of the more serious sins, according to what Augustine says {Tract. 9 in Joan.) on John 15:22: “If I had not come and spoken unto them, they had not had sin: but now they have no cloak for their sin.” Now some men are guilty of the sin of unbelief. Their sin would then be worse than that of devils, if devils had faith. But this is impossible. Therefore devils do not have faith.

On the other hand: it is said in James 2:19: “the devils also believe, and tremble.”

I answer: as we said in Q. 1, Art. 2, and Q. 2, Art. 1, the intellect of the believer assents to what he believes neither because he sees the thing as it is in itself, nor because he understands it through its first principles seen as they are in themselves, but because his will moves his intellect to give its assent. Now there are two ways in which the will may move the in-intellect to give its assent. In the first place, the will may be directed to the good, in which case belief is a praiseworthy act. Secondly, the intellect may be sufficiently convinced to judge that what is said ought to be believed, without being convinced by any evidence of the thing itself. Thus if a prophet should predict something as by the word of God, and if he should also give a sign by raising one who was dead, the intellect of one who saw would be convinced by the sign, and he would know assuredly that this was spoken by God who does not lie, even though what was predicted was not apparent. The character of faith would then remain.

Hence we must say that the faith of those who believe in Christ is praised as being of the first kind. Devils, on the other hand, do not have faith of this kind, but only of the second kind. For they see many unmistakable signs by which they know that the doctrine of the Church is given by God, although they do not see the things themselves which the Church teaches, for example, that God is Three and also One, and the like.

On the first point: the faith of devils is such as the evidence of signs compels. Their belief is therefore no credit to their will.

On the second point: even though it should be unformed, faith which is the gift of grace inclines a man to believe out of regard for what is good. The faith of devils is therefore not the gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe by what they perceive by their natural intellect.

On the third point: devils are displeased by the very obviousness of the signs which compel them to believe. Hence the evil in them is not diminished by their belief.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether One Who Disbelieves One Article of Faith can Have Unformed Faith in the Other Articles

1. It seems that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith can have unformed faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is no better than that of a catholic, and the intellect of a catholic needs the help of the gift of faith in order to believe in any of the articles. It seems, then, that neither can heretics believe in any articles of faith, unless through the gift of unformed faith.

2. Again, the faith contains many articles, just as a single science, such as geometry, contains many conclusions. Any man can have a scientific knowledge of geometry in respect of some geometrical conclusions, even though he is ignorant of others. Similarly, any man can have faith in some of the articles of faith, even though he does not believe the others.

3. Again, just as a man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he obey him in keeping the commandments of the law. He may be obedient in regard to some of the commandments, and not in regard to others. He may therefore have faith in regard to some of the articles, and not in regard to others.

On the other hand: as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain after a single mortal sin. Neither then does faith remain after disbelief in a single article.

I answer: neither formed faith nor unformed faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article. The reason for this is that the species of any habit depends on what we mean by its formal object, and cannot remain if this is taken away. Now the formal object of faith is the first truth, as manifested in the sacred Scriptures and the doctrine of the Church, which proceeds from the first truth. Hence anyone who does not adhere, as to an infallible and divine rule, to the doctrine of the Church, which proceeds from the first truth manifested in the sacred Scriptures, does not possess the habit of faith, even if he maintains the things of faith otherwise than by faith. It is similarly obvious that one who maintains a conclusion without knowing the premise by means of which it is demonstrated has no scientific knowledge of it, but only an opinion. It is plain, on the other hand, that one who adheres to the doctrine of the Church as an infallible rule assents to everything that the Church teaches. For if he were to maintain such doctrines of the Church as he might choose, and not such as he did not wish to maintain, he would not adhere to the doctrine of the Church as an infallible rule, but only in accordance with his own will. It is clear then, that a heretic who persists in disbelieving one article of faith is not prepared to follow the doctrine of the Church in all matters. If he did not so persist, he would not be a heretic, but merely one who erred. It is thus apparent that one who is a heretic in one article does not have faith in the other articles, but holds an opinion in accordance with his own will.

On the first point: a heretic does not maintain the other articles of faith, in which he does not err, as a faithful man maintains them, that is, through adherence to the first truth, to which a man is bound to adhere if the habit of faith is in him. He maintains the things of faith according to his own will and judgment.

On the second point: the different conclusions of a science are proved by means of different premises, one of which may be known apart from the others. A man may therefore have scientific knowledge of some conclusions of a science without knowing others. Faith, however, accepts all the articles of faith on the ground of a single premise, namely, the first truth proposed to us in the Scriptures, according to the doctrine of the

Church, which understands it properly. He who rejects this premise is therefore altogether without faith.

On the third point: the several commandments of the law may be considered in reference to their several proximate motives, in respect of which one of them may be kept and not another. But they may also be considered in reference to their single primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which anyone fails who transgresses any one commandment, according to James 2:10: “whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all.”

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Faith can be Greater in One Than in Another

1. It seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another, since the quantity of a habit is determined by reference to its object. Anyone who has faith has faith in all that the faith contains, since he who disbelieves in a single point is altogether without faith, as was said in the preceding article. Hence it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.

2. Again, that which depends on what is greatest does not admit of more and less. Now faith depends on what is greatest, since it demands that a man adhere to the first truth before all things. It follows that faith does not admit of more and less.

3. Again, it was said in -L-h 1, Art. 7, that the articles of faith are the first principles of the knowledge which is of grace. In the knowledge which is of grace, therefore, faith has the same relative status as has the understanding of principles in natural knowledge. Now the understanding of principles occurs equally in all men. Hence faith likewise occurs equally in all who believe.

On the other hand: wherever there is little and great, there is greater and less. Now there is little and great in faith. For the Lord said to Peter, “O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?” (Matt. 14:31), and to the woman, “O woman, great is thy faith” (Matt. 15:28). Thus faith can be greater in one than in another.

I answer: as we said in 12ae, Q. 52, Arts. 1 and 2, and Q. 112, Art. 4, the magnitude of a habit may be considered in two ways; in respect of its object, and in respect of the subject who possesses it. Faith may be considered in two ways in respect of its object, which includes what we mean by the formal object of faith, and also things materially proposed for belief. It cannot be different in different persons in respect of its formal object, since this is one and indivisible, as we said in Q. 1, Art. i. In this respect, faith is the same in all men, as we said in Q. 4, Art. 6. But the things which are materially proposed for belief are many, and can be accepted either more or less explicitly. Hence one man can believe explicitly more things than another. Faith may therefore be greater in one man than in another, in as much as it may be more explicit.

In respect of the person who possesses it, faith may again be considered in two ways, since the act of faith proceeds from the intellect and also from the will, as we said in Q. 2, Arts. 1 and 2, and in Q. 4, Art. 2. Faith may accordingly be said to be greater in one man than in another either when there is greater certainty and firmness on the part of the intellect, or when there is greater readiness, devotion, or confidence on the part of the will.

On the first point: he who persistently disbelieves any one of the things contained in the faith does not possess the habit of faith. But he who does not believe all things explicitly, yet is prepared to believe all of them, does possess the habit of faith. In respect of the object of faith, therefore, one man can have greater faith than another, in as much as he believes more things explicitly, as we have said.

On the second point: it belongs to the very nature of faith to put the first truth before all other things. Yet some of those who put it before all other things submit to it with greater assurance and devotion than others. In this way, faith is greater in one than in another.

On the third point: the understanding of principles is due to human nature itself, which occurs in all men equally. But faith is due to the gift of grace, which is not given to all men equally, as we said in 12ae, Q. 112, Art. 4. We cannot then argue about them in the same way. Moreover, one man may know the truth of principles better than another, if he has more intelligence.

QUESTION SIX

THE CAUSE OF FAITH

We must now consider the cause of faith, concerning which there are two questions.

1. Whether faith is infused into man by God.

2. Whether unformed faith is a gift of God.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Faith is Infused into Man by God

1. It seems that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (14 De Trin. 1): “by knowledge is faith begotten, nourished, defended, and strengthened in us.” Now what is begotten in us by knowledge would seem to be acquired, rather than infused. Thus it appears that faith is not in us by divine infusion.

2. Again, what a man attains through hearing and seeing would seem to be acquired. Now a man comes to believe both through seeing miracles and through hearing the doctrine of the faith. Thus it is said in John 4:53: “So the father knew that it was at the same hour in which Jesus said unto him, Thy son liveth: and himself believed, and his whole house,” and in Rom. 10:17: “faith cometh by hearing.” Hence faith can be acquired.

3. Again, a man can acquire what depends on his will, and Augustine says that “faith depends on the will of those who believe” (De Praed. Sanct. 5). It follows that a man can acquire faith.

On the other hand: it is said in Eph. 2:8–9: “by grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God: . . . lest any man should boast.”

I answer: for faith, two things are required. In the first place, the things which a man is to believe must be proposed to him. This is necessary if anything is to be believed explicitly. Secondly, the believer must give his assent to what is proposed. Now faith is bound to be from God as regards the first of these conditions. For the things of faith are beyond human reason, so that a man cannot know them unless God reveals them. They are revealed by God immediately to some, such as the apostles and the prophets, and mediately to others, through preachers of the faith who are sent by God according to Rom. 10:15: “And how shall they preach except they be sent?” The cause of the believer’s assent to the things of faith is twofold. There is in the first place an external cause which induces him to believe, such as the sight of a miracle, or the persuasion of another who leads him to the faith. But neither of these is a sufficient cause. For of those who see one and the same miracle, or who hear the same prophecy, some will believe and others will not believe. We must therefore recognize that there is also an inward cause, which moves a man from within to assent to the things of faith.

The Pelagians attributed this inward cause solely to a man’s own free will, and said accordingly that the beginning of faith lies with ourselves, since we prepare ourselves to assent to the things of faith, although the consummation of faith lies with God, who proposes to us such things as we ought to believe. But this is false. For when a man gives his assent to the things of faith, he is raised above his own nature, and this is possible only through a supernatural principle which moves him from within. This principle is God. The assent of faith, which is the principal act of faith, is therefore due to God, who moves us inwardly through grace.

On the first point: faith is begotten by knowledge, and is nourished by the external persuasion which knowledge provides. But the principal and proper cause of faith is that which inwardly moves us to give our assent.

On the second point: this reasoning argues from the cause whereby the things of faith are externally proposed, or whereby one is persuaded to believe them by means of word or deed.

On the third point: to believe does depend on the will of those who believe. But a man’s will must be prepared by God through grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above nature, as we have said, and as we said also in Q. 2, Art. 3.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Unformed Faith is a Gift of God

1. It seems that unformed faith is not a gift of God. For it is said in Deut. 32:4: “His work is perfect.” But unformed faith is imperfect. It is therefore not the work of God.

2. Again, just as an act is said to be deformed because it lacks the form which it ought to have, so is faith said to be unformed because it lacks the form which it ought to have. Now it was said in 12ae, Q. 79, Art. 2, that a deformed act of sin is not due to God. Neither then is unformed faith due to God.

3. Again, whomsoever God heals, he heals completely. For it is said in John 7:23: “If a man on the sabbath day receive circumcision, that the law of Moses should not be broken; are ye angry at me, because I have made a man every whit whole on the sabbath day?” Now by faith a man is healed of infidelity. Hence anyone who receives the gift of faith from God is healed of all his sins. But this is possible only by means of faith which is formed. Formed faith only, therefore, is a gift of God. It follows that unformed faith is not a gift of God.

On the other hand: the gloss by Augustine on I Cor., ch. 13, says that “the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God” (Sermo 5).

I answer: lack of form is a kind of privation. A privation sometimes belongs to the specific nature of a thing. At other times it does not, but is merely added to something which already conforms to its specific nature. For example, deficiency in the balance of the fluids of the body belongs to the specific nature of sickness, whereas darkness does not belong to the specific nature of the atmosphere, but is something added to it. Now when we assign a cause to anything, what we understand to be assigned as its cause is that which causes the thing to be of its own specific nature. Hence we cannot say that anything is the cause of a thing to whose specific nature a privation belongs, if it is not the cause of this privation itself. We cannot, for example, say that anything is the cause of bodily sickness, if it is not the cause of unbalance in the fluids of the body. On the other hand, we can say that something is the cause of the atmosphere, even if it is not the cause of its darkness.

Now in faith, lack of form is not a privation which belongs to the specific nature of faith itself. For faith is said to be unformed because it lacks a form which is added to it from without, as we said in Q.- 4, Art. 4. The cause of unformed faith is therefore that which is the cause of faith simply as faith, and this, as we said in the preceding article, is God. Unformed faith is therefore a gift of God.

On the first point: although unformed faith lacks the perfection which pertains to it as a virtue, it is nevertheless perfect in the perfection which suffices for the nature of faith.

On the second point: as we said in Pt. I, Q. 48, Art. 1, ad 2, and in 12ae, Q. 71, Art. 6, the deformity of an act belongs to its specific nature as a moral act. For an act is said to be deformed when it lacks the form which is intrinsically right for it, in view of the circumstances in which it is performed. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of an act which is deformed, because he is not the cause of its deformity. But he is nevertheless the cause of the act, considered as an act. Or we may say that deformity not only implies lack of the form which a thing ought to have, but also implies a contrary disposition so that deformity in an act is like falsehood in faith. Just as an act which is deformed is not due to God, neither is a faith which is false. But acts which are good in themselves are due to God even when they lack the form of charity, as often happens among sinners; just as unformed faith is due to God.

On the third point: one who receives faith from God without receiving charity is not entirely healed of infidelity, since the guilt of his former infidelity is not removed. He is healed partially only, so that he ceases from such sin. For it often happens that a man desists from one act of sin through God causing him to do so, but is prevented from desisting from another by the impulsion of his own iniquity. Thus God sometimes gives a man the gift of faith without the gift of charity, just as he gives to some men the gift of prophecy, or something similar, without charity.

QUESTION SEVEN

THE EFFECT OF FAITH

We must now consider the effects of faith, concerning which there are two questions,

1. Whether fear is an effect of faith.

2. Whether purification of the heart is an effect of faith.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Fear is an Effect of Faith

1. It seems that fear is not an effect of faith. For an effect does not precede its cause. But fear precedes faith, since it is said in Ecclesiasticus 2:8: “Ye that fear God, believe in him.” Hence fear is not an effect of faith.

2. Again, the same thing is not the cause of contrary effects. Now it was said in 12ae, Q. 23, Art. 2, that fear and hope are contraries, and the gloss on Matt. 1:2, “Abraham begat Isaac,” says that “faith begets hope.” It follows that faith is not the cause of fear.

3. Again, one contrary is not the cause of another. Now the object of faith is something good, namely, the first truth. But it was said in 12ae, Q. 18, Art. 2, that the object of fear is something evil, while it was also affirmed in the same passage that actions take their species from their objects. It follows that faith is not the cause of fear.

On the other hand: it is said in James 2:19: “the devils also believe, and tremble.”

I answer: fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as we said in 12ae, Q. 22, Art. 2, and Q. 42, Art. 1, and the principle of all appetitive movements is some good or evil which is apprehended. The principle of fear, as of all appetitive movements, must therefore be some apprehension. Now through faith we apprehend certain evils which follow divine judgment as punishments. In this way, faith is the cause of the servile fear whereby one fears the punishment of God. But it is also the cause of the filial fear whereby one fears to be separated from God, and whereby one does not presume to make oneself equal with God, but holds him in reverence. For by faith we know that God is great and good, that the worst evil is to be separated from him, and that it is evil to wish to be equal with God. Unformed faith is the cause of servile fear. Formed faith is the cause of filial fear, since it is through charity that faith causes a man to adhere to God, and to be subject to him.

On the first point: fear of God cannot always precede faith, since we would not fear God at all if we were entirely ignorant of the rewards and punishments which he disposes, and of which we learn through faith. But if there is already faith in some of the articles of faith, such as the divine excellence, the fear of reverence follows, through which in turn a man submits his intellect to God, thereby believing in all of the divine promises. Hence the passage quoted continues “and your reward will not become void.”

On the second point: the same thing can be the cause of contraries in relation to contraries, though not in relation to the same thing. Thus faith begets hope by causing us to appreciate the rewards which God bestows on the just, and begets fear by causing us to appreciate the punishments which he wills to inflict on sinners.

On the third point: the primary and formal object of faith is something good, namely, the first truth. But the material object of faith includes what is evil, for example, that it is evil not to be subject to God, or to be separated from him; and that sinners will endure the evils of divine punishment. In this way, faith can be the cause of fear.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Purification of the Heart is an Effect of Faith

1. It seems that purification of the heart is not an effect of faith. Purity of heart pertains mainly to the affections. But faith is in the intellect. Hence faith does not cause purification of the heart.

2. Again, that which causes purification of the heart cannot exist together with impurity. But faith exists together with the impurity of sin, as is obvious in those whose faith is unformed. Hence faith does not purify the heart.

3. Again, if faith were to purify the heart in any way, it would purify the intellect especially. But faith does not purify the intellect of dimness, since it knows things darkly. Hence faith does not purify the heart in any way.

On the other hand: it is said by Peter (Acts 15:9): “purifying their hearts by faith.”

I answer: the impurity of anything consists in its being mixed with meaner things. We do not say that silver is impure if it is mixed with gold, but only if it is mixed with lead, or with tin. Now it is obvious that a rational creature is of greater worth than all temporal and corporeal creatures. A rational creature therefore becomes impure if it subjects itself to temporal things through love of them. But when it turns to what is above itself, that is, to God, it is purified from this impurity by movement in the opposite direction. The first beginning of this movement is faith. As it is said in Heb. 11:6: “he that cometh to God must believe that he is.” The first beginning of purification of the heart is therefore faith, which purifies from the impurity of error. If faith is itself perfected by being brought to its form through charity, it purifies the heart completely.

On the first point: things which are in the intellect are the principles of things which are in the affections, since it is good understood that moves the affections.

On the second point: even unformed faith excludes such impurity as is opposed to itself, such as the impurity of error, which is due to die inordinate adherence of the human intellect to meaner things, and to the accompanying desire to measure divine things in terms of sensible things. But when faith is brought to its form by charity it tolerates no impurity, since “love covereth all sins,” as it is said in Prov. 10:12.

On the third point: the dimness of faith has nothing to do with the impurity of guilt, but is due to the natural limitation of the intellect of man in his present state.

II. ON HOPE. SECUNDA SECUNDAE, QUESTIONS 17—21

QUESTION SEVENTEEN

OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

AFTER CONSIDERING FAITH, WE MUST NOW CONSIDER hope. We shall first consider hope itself, concerning Lwhich there are eight questions.

1. Whether hope is a virtue.

2. Whether the object of hope is eternal blessedness.

3. Whether by the virtue of hope one man can hope for the blessedness of another.

4. Whether a man may legitimately hope in man.

5. Whether hope is a theological virtue.

6. Of the distinction of hope from the other theological virtues.

7. How hope is related to faith.

8. How it is related to charity.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Hope is a Virtue

1. It seems that hope is not a virtue. No one makes bad use of a virtue, as Augustine says (2 De Lib. Arb. 18). But one can make bad use of hope, since the passion of hope has extremes as well as a mean, just like other passions. It follows that hope is not a virtue.

2. Again, no virtue is the result of merits, since Augustine says that "God works virtue in us without ourselves" (on Ps. 119, Feci Iudicium; and De Grat. et Lib. Arb. 17). But the Master says that hope is the result of grace and of merits (3 Sent., Dist. 26). It follows that hope is not a virtue.

3. Again, it is said in 7 Physics, texts 17 and 18 that "virtue is the disposition of the perfect." But hope is the disposition of the imperfect, namely, of him who lacks what he hopes for. It follows that hope is not a virtue.

On the other hand: Gregory says (1 Moral. 12, olim 28) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues: faith, hope, and charity. Hope is therefore a virtue.

I answer: as the philosopher says in 2 Ethics 6, "the virtue of each thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good." Wherever a man's action is found to be good, therefore, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now with all things subject to rule and measure, a thing is called good because it attains its own proper rule. Thus we say that a garment is good when it neither exceeds nor falls short of its due measure. But there is a twofold measure of human actions, as we said in Q. 8, Art. 3. One is proximate and homogeneous, namely, reason. The other is supreme and transcendent, namely, God. Hence every human action which attains to reason, or to God himself, is good. The act of hope of which we are speaking attains to God. As we said when dealing with the passion of hope in 12ae, Q. 40, Art. 1, the object of hope is a future good which is difficult to obtain, yet possible. But there are two ways in which a thing may be possible for us. It may be possible through ourselves alone, or possible through others, as is said in 3 Ethics 3. When we hope for something which is possible for us through divine help, our hope attains to God, on whose help it relies. Hope is therefore clearly a virtue, since it makes a man's action good, and causes it to attain its due rule.

On the first point: in regard to the passions, the mean of virtue consists in attaining right reason. It is indeed in this that the essence of virtue consists. In regard to hope also, therefore, the good of virtue consists in a man's attaining his right rule, which is God, by way of hoping. Now no man can make bad use of the hope which attains God, any more than he can make bad use of a moral virtue which attains reason, since so to attain is itself a good use of virtue. But in any case the hope of which we are speaking is a habit of mind, not a passion, as we shall show in Q. 18, Art. 1.

On the second point: it is in respect of the thing hoped for that hope is said to be the result of merits, in the sense that one hopes to attain blessedness through grace and merits. Or this may be said of hope that is formed. But the habit of hope whereby one hopes for blessedness is not caused by merits. It is entirely the result of grace.

On the third point: he who hopes is indeed imperfect in respect of that which he hopes to obtain but does not yet possess. But he is perfect in that he already attains his proper rule, that is, God, on whose help he relies.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Eternal Blessedness is the Proper Object of Hope

1. It seems that eternal blessedness is not the proper object of hope. A man does not hope for that which is beyond every movement of his soul, since the action of hope is itself a movement of the soul. Now eternal blessedness is beyond every movement of the human soul, since the apostle says in I Cor. 2:9: “neither have entered into the heart of man . . .” It follows that blessedness is not the proper object of hope.

2. Again, petition is an expression of hope, since it is said in Ps. 37:5: “Commit thy way unto the Lord; trust also in him, and he shall bring it to pass.” But it is plain from the Lord’s Prayer that one may lawfully pray to God not only for eternal blessedness, but also for the good things of this present life, both spiritual and temporal, and for deliverance from evils which will have no place in eternal blessedness. It follows that eternal blessedness is not the proper object of hope.

3. Again, the object of hope is the arduous. But many other things are arduous for man, besides eternal blessedness. It follows that eternal blessedness is not the proper object of hope.

On the other hand: the apostle says in Heb. 6:19: “we have hope . . . which entereth,” that is, which causes us to enter, “into that within the veil,” that is, into heavenly blessedness, as the gloss says. The object of hope is therefore eternal blessedness.

I answer: as we said in the preceding article, the hope of which we are speaking attains to God, depending on his help in order to obtain the good for which it hopes. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. The good which we should properly and principally hope to receive from God is therefore the infinite good which is proportionate to the power of God who helps us, since it is proper to infinite power to lead to infinite good. This good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God. We ought indeed to hope for nothing less than himself from God, since the goodness by which he bestows good things on a creature is nothing less than his essence. The proper and principal object of hope is therefore eternal blessedness.

On the first point: eternal blessedness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, in such a way that the wayfarer may know what it is, or of what kind it is. But a man can apprehend it under the universal idea of perfect good, and in this way the movement of hope arises. It is therefore with point that the apostle says in Heb. 6:19: “we have hope . . . which entereth into that within the veil,” since what we hope for is yet veiled, as it were.

On the second point: we ought not to pray to God for any other good things unless they relate to eternal blessedness. Hope is therefore concerned principally with eternal blessedness, and secondarily with other things which are sought of Gtod for the sake of it, just as faith also is concerned principally with such things as relate to God, as we said in Q. 1, Art. 1.

On the third point: all other things seem small to one who sets his heart on something great. To one who hopes for eternal life, therefore, nothing else appears arduous in comparison with this hope. But some other things can yet be arduous in relation to the capacity of him who hopes. There can accordingly be hope in regard to them, as things subservient to the principal object of hope.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether One can Hope for the Eternal Blessedness of Another

1. It seems that one can hope for the eternal blessedness of another. For the apostle says in Phil. 1:6: “Being confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in you will perform
it until the day of Jesus Christ.” Now the perfection of that day will be eternal blessedness. One can therefore hope for the eternal blessedness of another.

2. Again, that for which we pray to God, we hope to obtain from him. We pray that God should bring others to eternal blessedness, in accordance with James 5:16: “pray for one another, that ye may be healed.” We can therefore hope for the eternal blessedness of others.

3. Again, hope and despair refer to the same thing. Now one can despair of the eternal blessedness of another, otherwise there would have been no point in Augustine’s saying that one should despair of no man while he lives (De Verb. Dom., Sermo 71, cap. 13). One can therefore hope for eternal life for another.

On the other hand: Augustine says {Enchirid. 8): “hope is only of such things as pertain to him who is said to hope for them.”

I answer: there are two ways in which one can hope for something. One can hope for something absolutely, such hope being always for an arduous good which pertains to oneself. But one can also hope for something if something else is presupposed, and in this way one can hope for what pertains to another. To make this clear, we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes a union of the lover with the loved one, whereas hope denotes a movement or projection of one’s desire towards an arduous good. Now a union is between things which are distinct. Love can therefore be directly towards another person whom one unites to oneself in love, and whom one looks upon as oneself. A movement, on the other hand, is always towards a term which is its own, and which is related to that which moves. For this reason, hope is directly concerned with a good which is one’s own, not with a good which pertains to another. But if it is presupposed that one is united to another in love, one can then hope and desire something for the other as if for oneself. In this way one can hope for eternal life for another, in so far as one is united to him in love. It is by the same virtue of hope that one hopes on behalf of oneself and on behalf of another, just as it is by the same virtue of charity that one loves God, oneself, and one's neighbour.

The answers to the objections are now obvious.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether One may Lawfully Hope in Man

1. It seems that one may lawfully hope in man. The object of hope is indeed eternal blessedness. But we are helped to attain eternal blessedness by the patronage of the saints, since Gregory says that "predestination is furthered by the prayers of the saints" (1 Dialog., cap. 8). One may therefore hope in man.

2. Again, if it is not lawful to hope in man, it should not be regarded as a vice in a man, that one cannot hope in him. But this seems to have been regarded as a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: "Take ye heed every one of his neighbour, and trust ye not in any brother." It is therefore lawful that one should hope in man.

3. Again, it was said in Art. 2 that petition is an expression of hope. Now a man may lawfully petition something of a man. It follows that he may lawfully hope in him.

On the other hand: it is said in Jer. 17:5: "Cursed be the man that trusteth in man."

I answer: as we said in 12ae, Q. 40, Art. 7, hope refers to two things, namely, to the good which one hopes to obtain, and to the help whereby one hopes to obtain it. The good which one hopes to obtain has the nature of a final cause. The help whereby one hopes to obtain it has the nature of an efficient cause. Now each of these types of cause contains what is principal and what is secondary. The principal end is the final end, while the secondary end is such good as leads to the final end. Similarly, the principal efficient causal agent is the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent.

Now hope refers to eternal blessedness as the final end, and refers to God’s help as the first cause which leads to it. Hence just as it is unlawful to hope for any good other than blessedness as a final end, but lawful to hope for it only as a means to final blessedness, so is it unlawful to hope in any man or any creature as if it were the first cause which brings us to blessedness. But one may lawfully hope in a man or in a creature as a secondary and instrumental agent, which helps one to obtain such good things as serve as a means to blessedness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and in this way that we petition things of men. This also explains why those are blamed who cannot be trusted to help.

The answers to the objections are now obvious.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether Hope is a Theological Virtue

1. It seems that hope is not a theological virtue. A theological virtue is a virtue which has God as its object. But hope has not only God as its object, but other things also, which we hope to obtain from him. It follows that hope is not a theological virtue.

2. Again, it was said in 12ae, Q. 64, Art. 4, that a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices. But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. It is therefore not a theological virtue.

3. Again, expectation pertains to longanimity, which is a species of fortitude. Now hope is a kind of expectation. It seems, therefore, that hope is a moral virtue, not a theological virtue.

4. Again, the object of hope is the arduous. To aim at the arduous is magnanimous, and magnanimity is a moral virtue. Hope is therefore a moral virtue, not a theological virtue.

On the other hand: in I Cor., ch. 13, hope is numbered together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.

I answer: a genus is divided according to the natures which differentiate its species. In order to determine the division of virtue to which hope belongs, therefore, we must attend to the source from which it derives its character as a virtue. We said in the first article that hope has the character of a virtue because it attains the supreme rule of human actions. Hope attains this rule as its first efficient cause, in so far as it relies on its help. It also attains this rule as its ultimate final cause, in so far as it looks for blessedness in the enjoyment of it. This makes it plain that in so far as hope is a virtue, its principal object is God. Now it is the very meaning of a theological virtue, that it has God as its object, as we said in 12ae, Q. 62, Art. 1. It is obvious, then, that hope is a theological virtue.

On the first point: whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for as subordinate to God as its final end, or to God as its first efficient cause, as we have said above.

On the second point: there is a mean in things which are ruled and measured, according to which they attain their proper rule and measure. Thus a thing is excessive if it exceeds its rule, and defective if it falls short of its rule. But there is neither a mean nor extremes in the rule or the measure itself. Now the proper object with which a moral virtue is concerned comprises things which are regulated by reason. It is therefore essentially the nature of a moral virtue to respect the mean in regard to its proper object. But the proper object with which a theological virtue is concerned is the first rule itself, which is not regulated by any other rule. It is consequently not essentially the nature of a theological virtue to respect a mean, although it may do so accidentally in regard to that which is subservient to its principal object. There can thus be neither a mean nor extremes in the trust of faith in the first truth, in which no man can trust too much, although there can be a mean and extremes in regard to the things which faith believes, since a truth is midway between two falsehoods. Similarly, there is neither a mean nor extremes in hope in regard to its principal object, since no man can trust too much in the help of God. There can be a mean and extremes, however, in regard to the things which one confidently expects to obtain, since one may either presume to obtain things which exceed what is proportionate to oneself, or despair of things which are proportionate to oneself.

On the third point: the expectation attributed to hope by definition does not imply deferment, as does the expectation of longanimity. It implies regard for divine help, whether what is hoped for be deferred or not.

On the fourth point: while magnanimity attempts what is arduous, it hopes to attain what is within one's own power. It is thus properly concerned in the doing of great things. But hope, as a theological virtue, looks upon the arduous as something to be attained through the help of another, as we said in the first article.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Hope is Distinct from the other Theological Virtues

1. It seems that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. It was said in 12ae, Q. 54, Art. 2, that a habit is distinguished by its object. But the object of hope is identical with that of the other theological virtues. It follows that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.

2. Again, in the symbol of the faith, by which we profess our faith, it is said: "And I look for the Resurrection of the dead, And the life of the world to come." Now it was said in the preceding article that to look for future blessedness pertains to hope. It follows that hope is not distinct from faith.

3. Again, by hope man tends to God. But this properly pertains to charity. It follows that hope is not distinct from charity.

On the other hand: where there is no distinction, there is no number. But hope is numbered with the other theological virtues. For Gregory says that there are three virtues: hope, faith, and charity (1 Moral. 16). Hope is therefore a virtue distinct from other theological virtues.

I answer: a virtue is said to be theological on the ground that it has God as the object to which it adheres. Now there are two ways in which one may adhere to something. One may adhere to it for its own sake. One may also adhere to it for the sake of something else which is thereby attained. Charity causes a man to adhere to God for his own sake, uniting his mind to God through the affection of love. Hope and faith, on the other hand, cause him to adhere to God as the principle whereby other things are vouchsafed to us. For it is through God that we have knowledge of the truth, and through God that we attain to the perfection of goodness. Faith causes a man to adhere to God as the principle whereby we know the truth, since we believe those things to be true which God tells us. Hope causes him to adhere to God as the principle whereby we attain to the perfection of goodness, since by hope we depend on God's help in order to obtain blessedness.

On the first point: as we have said, God is the object of these virtues under different aspects. A different aspect of its object suffices to distinguish a habit, as we maintained in 12ae, Q. 54, Art. 2.

On the second point: expectation is mentioned in the symbol not because it is the proper act of faith, but inasmuch as the act of hope presupposes faith, as we shall show in the next article. The act of faith is manifest in the act of hope.

On the third point: hope causes a man to tend to God as the final good to be obtained, and as a helper strong to aid; whereas charity properly causes him to tend to God by uniting his affection to God, so that he lives for God and not for himself.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether Hope precedes Faith

1. It seems that hope precedes faith. For the gloss on Ps. 37:3, “Trust in the Lord, and do good,” says that “hope is the entrance to faith, and the beginning of salvation.” But salvation is through faith, by which we are justified. Hence hope precedes faith.

2. Again, what is used in the definition of anything ought to be prior to it, and better known. Now hope is used in the definition of faith which is given in Heb. 11:1: “Faith is the substance of things hoped for.” It is therefore prior to faith.

3. Again, hope precedes a meritorious act. For the apostle says in I Cor. 9:10: “he that ploweth should plow in hope.” Now the act of faith is meritorious. Hence hope precedes faith.

On the other hand: it is said in Matt. 1:2: “Abraham begat Isaac,” that is, “faith begat hope,” as the gloss says.

I answer: in the absolute sense, faith precedes hope. The object of hope is a future good which is arduous yet possible to obtain. It is therefore necessary that the object of hope should be proposed to a man as something which is possible, in order that he may hope. Now as we said in the preceding article, the object of hope is in one way eternal blessedness, while in another way it is the divine help. These things are both proposed to us through faith, which enables us to know that it is possible to attain eternal life, and to know also that divine help has been prepared for us to this end, according to Heb. 11:6: “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.” This makes it clear that faith precedes hope.

On the first point: as the gloss says also, hope is said to be the “entrance to faith” in the sense that it is the entrance to the thing believed, since by hope we enter in to see what it is that we believe.

On the second point: the definition of faith makes use of “things hoped for” because the proper object of faith is not seen in itself. For this reason it was necessary to make use of a circumlocution, in terms of a consequence of faith.

On the third point: hope does not precede every meritorious act. It is enough if it accompanies such an act, or follows it.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether Charity is Prior to Hope

1. It seems that charity is prior to hope. For on Luke 17:6, “If ye had faith as a grain of mustard seed . . . ,” the gloss by Ambrose says: “From faith issues charity, and from charity issues hope.” But faith is prior to charity. Hence charity is prior to hope.

2. Again, Augustine says (14 De Civ. Dei. 9): “good movements and affections are derived from love, and from holy charity.” Now to hope, as an act of hope, is a good movement of the soul. It is therefore derived from charity.

3. Again, the Master says that hope proceeds from merits, which not only precede the thing hoped for, but precede hope itself; also that charity precedes hope in the order of nature (3 Sent., Dist. 26). Hence charity is prior to hope.

On the other hand: the apostle says (I Tim. 1:5): “Now the end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience,” that is, as the gloss says, “and of hope.” Hope is therefore prior to charity.

I answer: there are two kinds of order. There is the order of generation and of nature, according to which the imperfect is prior to the perfect. There is also the order of perfection and of form, according to which the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect. According to the first of these orders, hope is prior to charity. This is obvious, since hope and every appetitive movement is derived from love, as we said in 12ae, Q. 55, Arts. 1 and 2, when speaking of the passions.

But love may be either perfect or imperfect. Perfect love is that wherewith a thing is loved for its own sake, as for example when one wills good for someone for his own sake, as a man loves a friend. Imperfect love, on the other hand, is love wherewith one loves a thing not for its own sake, but in order that one may have the good of it for oneself, as a man loves a thing which he covets. Now perfect love pertains to charity, which adheres to God for his own sake. But imperfect love pertains to hope, since one who hopes intends to obtain something for himself.

Thus according to the order of generation, hope is prior to charity. For just as a man is led to love God through desisting from sin for fear of being punished by him (Tract. 9 in Joan.), so also does hope engender charity, since one who hopes to be rewarded by God may come to love God and to obey his commandments. But charity is naturally prior according to the order of perfection. For this reason, hope is made more perfect by the presence of charity. Thus we hope supremely when we hope on behalf of our friends. It is in this way that “hope issues from charity,” as Ambrose says.

The answer to the first point is thus obvious.

On the second point: hope and every appetitive movement of the soul is derived from love of some kind, since one loves the good for which one hopes. Not every hope, however, is derived from charity, but only the movement of hope that is formed, whereby one hopes for some good from God as a friend.

On the third point: the Master is speaking of hope that is formed, which is naturally preceded by charity, and also by the merits which result from charity.

QUESTION EIGHTEEN

THE SUBJECT OF HOPE

We must now consider the subject of hope, concerning which there are four questions.

1. Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject.

2. Whether there is hope in the blessed.

3. Whether there is hope in the damned.

4. Whether the hope of wayfarers is certain.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Hope is in the Will as its Subject

1. It seems that hope is not in the will as its subject. It was said in the first article of the preceding question, and also in 12ae, Q. 40, Art. 1, that the object of hope is an arduous good. Now the arduous is not the object of the will, but of the irascible element. Hope is therefore not in the will, but in the irascible element.

2. Again, where one thing is sufficient, it is superfluous to add another. Now charity, which is the most perfect of the virtues, is sufficient to make the power of the will perfect. It follows that hope is not in the will.

3. Again, the same power cannot perform two acts simultaneously. The intellect, for example, cannot understand many things simultaneously. Now an act of hope can be simultaneous with an act of charity, and since the act of charity clearly belongs to the will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to this same power. Thus hope is not in the will.

On the other hand: in 14 De Trin. 3 and 6, Augustine makes it clear that it is only in so far as it is composed of memory, understanding, and will that the soul can apprehend God. Now hope is a theological virtue, having God as its object. But it is neither in the memory nor in the understanding. It remains that hope is in the will as its subject.

I answer: habits are known through their acts, as is plain from what we said in Q. 4, Art. 1, and in Pt. I, Q. 87, Art. 2. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive part of the soul, since its object is the good. But there are two kinds of appetite in man. There is the sensitive appetite, which includes both the irascible and concupiscible elements, and there is also the intellectual appetite which we call the will, as we said in Q. 82, Art. 5. The movements which belong to the lower appetite are mixed with passion, while the movements of the higher appetite are free from passion, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 85, Art. 5 ad 1, and in 12ae, Q. 22, Art. 3 ad 3. The act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is its principal object is not a sensible good, but a divine good. The subject of hope is therefore the higher appetite which we call the will, not the lower appetite to which the irascible element pertains.

On the first point: the object of the irascible element is something which is sensible and arduous. The object of hope is something which is intelligible and arduous, or rather, something which transcends the intellect.

On the second point: charity is sufficient to perfect the will in respect of one action, which is to love. But another virtue is required to perfect it in respect of its other action, which is to hope.

On the third point: it is clear from what we said in Q. 17, Art. 8, that the movement of hope and the movement of charity relate to the same thing. There is therefore no reason why both movements should not belong to the same power simultaneously. The intellect can likewise understand many things simultaneously, provided that they relate to the same thing, as we said in Pt. I, Q. 85, Art. 4.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether there is Hope in the Blessed

1. It seems that there is hope in the blessed. Christ was the perfect comprehensor from the moment of his conception, and he had hope, since it is said in his person in Ps. 31:1: "In thee, O Lord, have I hoped," as the gloss expounds it. There can therefore be hope in the blessed.

2. Again, just as to obtain blessedness is an arduous good, so is to continue in blessedness. Men hope to obtain blessedness before they obtain it. They can therefore hope to continue in blessedness after they obtain it.

3. Again, it was said in Art. 3 of the preceding question that by the virtue of hope one can hope for blessedness for others as well as for oneself. Now in heaven the blessed hope for the blessedness of others, since otherwise they would not pray for them. There can therefore be hope in the blessed.

4. Again, the blessedness of the saints means glory of the body as well as of the soul. But it appears from Rev., ch. 6, and also from what Augustine says in 12 De Gen. ad Litt. 35, that the souls of the saints in heaven still await the glory of" the body. There can therefore be hope in the blessed.

On the other hand: the apostle says in Rom. 8:24: "for what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for?" The blessed enjoy the vision of God. There is therefore no place in them for hope.

I answer: if that which determines the species of a thing is taken away, its species is taken away, and it cannot continue to be of the same species, any more than a natural body whose form has been removed. Now hope, like the other virtues, derives its species from its principal object, as we said in Q. 17, Arts. 5 and 6, and in Pt. I, Q. 54, Art. 2, and its principal object is eternal blessedness as possible through divine help, as we said in Q. 17, Arts. 1 and 2. But a good which is arduous yet possible can be hoped for only when it belongs to the future. There cannot then be hope for blessedness when it is no longer future, but present. Hope, like faith, is therefore done away in heaven, and there can be neither hope nor faith in the blessed.

On the first point: although Christ was a comprehensor, and therefore blessed in the enjoyment of God, he was nevertheless a wayfarer in respect of the passibility of nature, while subject to nature. He could therefore hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality. But he would not do so by the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the body, but the enjoyment of God.

On the second point: the blessedness of the saints is called eternal life because the enjoyment of God makes them in a manner partakers of the divine eternity, which transcends all time. There is therefore no distinction of past, present, and future in the continuation of blessedness. Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of blessedness, but have blessedness itself, to which futurity is not applicable.

On the third point: so long as the virtue of hope endures, it is by the same hope that one hopes for blessedness for oneself and for others. But when the hope with which the blessed hoped for blessedness for themselves is done away, they hope for blessedness for others by the love of charity, rather than by the virtue of hope. In a similar way, although one who has charity loves both God and his neighbour with the same charity, one who does not have charity can love his neighbour with a different kind of love.

On the fourth point: hope is a theological virtue which has God as its principal object. The principal object of hope is therefore the glory of the soul which consists of the enjoyment of God, not the glory of the body. Moreover, although glory of the body is arduous in relation to human nature, it is not arduous to one who has glory of the soul; not only because glory of the body is comparatively less than glory of the soul, but because one who has glory of the soul already possesses the sufficient cause of glory of the body.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether there is Hope in the Damned

1. It seems that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is damned, and the prince of the damned, according to Matt. 25:41: “Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.” Yet the devil has hope, according to Job 41:9: “Behold, the hope of him is in vain.” It seems, therefore, that the damned have hope.

2. Again, just as faith can be formed and unformed, so can hope. Now there can be unformed faith in devils and in the damned, according to James 2:19: “the devils also believe, and tremble.” It seems, therefore, that there can be unformed hope in the damned.

3. Again, no man after death is credited either with a merit or with a demerit which he did not have in life, according to Eccl. 11:3: “and if the tree fall toward the south, or toward the north, in the place where the tree falleth, there it shall be.” But many of the damned had hope in this life, and never despaired. They will therefore have hope in the life to come.

On the other hand: hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12: “Rejoicing in hope.” Now the damned do not have joy, but rather sorrow and grief, according to Isa. 65:14: “Behold, my servants shall sing for joy of heart, but ye shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for vexation of spirit.” There is therefore no hope in the damned.

I answer: it is of the essence of blessedness that the will should find rest in it. It is likewise of the essence of punishment that the will should find what is inflicted as punishment repugnant. Now when a thing is not known, the will can neither find rest in it nor find it repugnant. Hence Augustine says that the angels could not be perfectly content in their first state, before their confirmation or their lapse, because they were not aware of what was to happen to them (n De Gen. ad Lit. 17, 19). For perfect and true blessedness, one must be certain of having it perpetually, since otherwise the will would not be at rest. Similarly, the eternity of damnation is part of the punishment of the damned, and it would not have the true nature of punishment unless it were repugnant to their will. Now the eternity of damnation would not be repugnant to their will unless the damned were aware that their punishment was everlasting. It is therefore a condition of their misery that they know that they can in no wise escape damnation and reach blessedness. As it is said in Job 15:22: “He believeth not that he shall return out of darkness.” It is clear, then, that the damned cannot look upon blessedness as a good which is possible, any more than the blessed can look upon it as a good which is future. Hence there is hope neither in the blessed nor in the damned. Wayfarers, however, can hope both in this life and in purgatory, since in either state they look upon blessedness as a future good which it is possible to obtain.

On the first point: Gregory says that this is said of the devil’s members, whose hope will be frustrated (33 Moral. 19). Or, if we take it as said of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope with which he hopes to vanquish the saints, in accordance with the preceding words: “he trusteth that he can draw up Jordan with his mouth” (Job 40:23). But this is not the hope of which we are speaking.

On the second point: as Augustine says: “faith is of things both bad and good, whether past, present, or future, whether pertaining to oneself or to another” (Enchirid. 8). But hope is only of good things of the future which pertain to oneself. It is therefore more possible that there should be unformed faith in the damned than that there should be unformed hope in them, since the good things of God are not possibilities for them, but things which they do not have.

On the third point: the absence of hope in the damned does not alter their demerit, any more than the cessation of hope in the blessed increases their merit. Such absence and cessation is due to the change of state in either case.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether the Hope of Wayfarers is Certain

1. It seems that the hope of wayfarers is not certain. For hope is in the will as its subject, and certainty does not pertain to the will, but to the intellect. It follows that hope cannot be certain.

2. Again, it was said in Q. 17, Art. 4, that hope is the result of grace and of merits. But it was also said in 12ae, Q. 112, Art. 5, that in this life we cannot know with certainty that we have grace. It follows that the hope of wayfarers is not certain.

3. Again, there cannot be certainty of that which can fail. Now many hopeful wayfarers fail to attain blessedness. It follows that the hope of wayfarers is not certain.

On the other hand: the Master says that "hope is the sure expectation of future blessedness" (3 Sent., Dist. 26). This may also be taken to be the meaning of II Tim. 1:12: "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him."

I answer: there are two ways in which certainty is found in something; essentially, and by participation. It is found in a cognitive power essentially, and by participation in everything that is moved infallibly to its end by a cognitive power. It is in this latter way that nature is said to be certain, since everything in nature is moved infallibly to its end by the divine intellect. It is in this way also that the moral virtues are said to be more certain in their operation than art, since they are moved to their actions by reason, after the manner of nature. In this way also, hope tends to its end with certainty, since it participates in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive power.

The answer to the first point is thus obvious.

On the second point: hope does not depend principally on the grace which one already possesses, but on the divine omnipotence and mercy, through which even those who do not have grace may receive it, and thereby attain eternal life. Whosoever has faith is certain of the divine omnipotence and mercy.

On the third point: the reason why some who have hope fail to attain blessedness is that the deficiency of their free will puts an obstacle of sin in the way. Their failure is not due to any defect of the divine power or mercy on which hope is founded, and does not prejudice the certainty of hope.

QUESTION NINETEEN

THE GIFT OF FEAR

We must now consider the gift of fear, concerning which there are twelve questions.

1. Whether God ought to be feared.

2. Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile, and worldly fear.

3. Whether worldly fear is always evil.

4. Whether servile fear is good.

5. Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear.

6. Whether servile fear is excluded by charity.

7. Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom.

8. Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear.

9. Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit. 10. Whether fear increases together with charity. 11. Whether fear remains in heaven. 12. Of what corresponds to it in the beatitudes and the fruits.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether God can be Feared

1. It seems that God cannot be feared. It was said in 12ae, Q. 41, Arts. 2 and 3, that the object of fear is a future evil. But God is free of all evil, since he is goodness itself. It follows that God cannot be feared.

2. Again, fear is opposed to hope. But we hope in God. We cannot therefore fear him at the same time.

3. Again, the philosopher says that “we fear the things from which evil comes to us” (2 Rhetoric 5). Now evil does not come to us from God, but from ourselves, according to Hos. 13:9: “O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thine help.” It follows that God ought not to be feared.

On the other hand: it is said in Jer. 10:7: “Who would not fear thee, O King of nations?” and in Mal. 1:6: “if I be a master, where is my fear?”

I answer: just as hope has a twofold object, namely the future good which one hopes to obtain, and the help of another through which one hopes to obtain it, so also can fear have a twofold object, namely the evil which a man fears, and the source from which it can come to him. God cannot be the evil which a man fears, since he is goodness itself. But he can be the object of fear, in so far as some evil thing may threaten us from him, or from a divine source. The evil of punishment comes to us from God. Yet this is not an evil absolutely, but only relatively Absolutely, it is a good. We say that a thing is good if it is ordered to an end, and evil implies privation of such order. Hence that is evil absolutely, which excludes the order which leads to the final end. This is the evil of guilt. The evil of punishment, on the other hand, is an evil only in so far as it deprives one of some particular good. It is a good absolutely, in so far as it belongs to the order which leads to the final end. Now the evil of guilt can come to us through our relationship to God, if we separate ourselves from him. In this way, God can and ought to be feared.

On the first point: this reasoning argues from the object of fear considered as the evil which a man fears.

On the second point: we must think both of the justice with which God punishes sinners and of the mercy with which he sets us free. The thought of God’s justice causes us to fear, and the thought of his mercy causes us to hope. God is thus the object both of fear and of hope, under different aspects.

On the third point: God is not the source of the evil of guilt, but we ourselves, in so far as we separate ourselves from him. But God is the source of the evil of punishment in so far as it has the nature of a good, as a just punishment justly inflicted upon us. Punishment occurs, however, only because our sin merits it in the first place. Hence it is said in Wisdom 1:13: “God did not make death . . . but the ungodly have summoned it by their hands and by their words.”

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Fear is appropriately Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile, and Worldly Fear

1. It seems that fear is not appropriately divided into filial, initial, servile, and worldly fear. For in 2 De Fid. Orth. 15 the Damascene names six kinds of fear, including laziness and shame, which were discussed in 12ae, Q. 41, Art. 4. But these are not mentioned in this division, which therefore seems inappropriate.

2. Again, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is a kind of fear, namely natural fear, which is neither good nor evil. For it is found in devils, according to James 2:19: “the devils believe, and tremble,” and also in Christ, who “began to be sore amazed, and very heavy,” according to Mark 14:33. The foregoing division of fear is therefore inadequate.

3. Again, the relation of a son to his father, of” a wife to her husband, and of a servant to his master, are severally different. Now filial fear, which is that of a son for his father, is distinguished from servile fear, which is that of a servant for his master. Chaste fear, which is seemingly that of a wife for her husband, ought then to be distinguished from all the fears mentioned.

4. Again, initial fear and worldly fear both fear punishment, as does servile fear. These should not therefore be distinguished from each other.

5. Again, fear is of evil things in the same way as desire is of good things. Now the “desire of the eyes,” by which one desires worldly goods, is different from the “desire of the flesh,” by which one desires one’s own pleasure. Hence the worldly fear by which one fears to lose external good things is different from the human fear by which one fears harm to one’s own person.

On the other hand: is the authority of the Master (3 Sent., Dist. 34).

I answer: we are here speaking of fear in so far as we turn to God in fear, or turn away from him in fear. Now the object of fear is something which is evil. Hence a man sometimes turns away from God because he fears evil things. This is called human fear, or worldly fear. Sometimes, on the other hand, a man turns to God and adheres to him because he fears evil things.

The evils which he then fears are of two kinds, namely, the evil of punishment, and the evil of guilt. If a man turns to God and adheres to him because he fears punishment, his fear is servile fear. If he does so because he fears guilt, his fear is filial fear, since what sons fear is to offend their fathers. Again, if a man turns to God for both of these reasons, his fear is initial fear, which is midway between these two. We have already discussed whether it is possible to fear the evil of guilt, in dealing with the passion of fear (12ae, Q. 42, Art. 3).

On the first point: the Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul. This division is concerned with fear in its relation to God, as we have said.

On the second point: moral good consists especially in turning to God, and moral evil in turning away from God. Hence each of the fears mentioned implies either moral evil or moral good. Natural fear is not included among these fears, because it is presupposed to moral good and evil.

On the third point: the relation of a servant to his master is founded on the power of a master over the servant who is subject to him. But the relation of a son to his father, or of a wife to her husband, is founded on the affection of the son who submits himself to his father, or on the affection of the wife who unites herself to her husband by the union of love. Filial fear and chaste fear therefore pertain to the same thing. For God is made our Father by reason of the love of charity, according to Rom. 8:15: “ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father,” and is also called our spouse by reason of this same charity, as in II Cor. 11:2: “I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ.” Servile fear, on the other hand, pertains to something different, since it does not include charity in its definition.

On the fourth point: these three fears all fear punishment, but in different ways. Worldly or human fear fears the punishment which turns one away from God, and which the enemies of God sometimes inflict or threaten. Servile and initial fear, on the other hand, fear the punishment by which men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear fears such punishment principally, initial fear secondarily.

On the fifth point: it is all the same whether a man turns away from God through fear of losing his worldly goods or through fear for the safety of his body, because external goods pertain to the body. These fears are consequently here regarded as the same, even though the evils feared are different, just as the good things desired are different. Owing to their difference, the sins to which they give rise are different in species. They are nevertheless all alike in that they lead men away from God.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Worldly Fear is always Evil

1. It seems that worldly fear is not always evil. For regard for men appears to belong to human fear, and some are blamed because they have no regard for men, as for example the unjust judge in Luke, ch. 18, who feared not God, neither regarded man. Hence it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

2. Again, worldly fear, it seems, fears the punishments imposed by worldly powers. But we are induced by such punishments to do good, according to Rom. 13:3: “Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same.” Hence worldly fear is not always evil.

3. Again, what is naturally in us does not seem to be evil, since what is natural is given us by God. Now it is natural that a man should fear harm to his own body, and natural also that he should fear loss of the worldly goods by which his present life is sustained. Hence it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

On the other hand: our Lord says: “fear not them which kill the body,” in Matt. 10:28, wherein worldly fear is forbidden. Now nothing is divinely forbidden unless it is evil. It follows that worldly fear is evil.

I answer: it is clear from what we said in 12ae, Q. 1, Art. 3; Q. 18, Art. 1; and Q. 54, Art. 2, that moral actions and moral habits take their name and their species from their objects. Now the proper object of an appetitive movement is the good which it seeks as an end, and each appetitive movement is accordingly named and specified by its proper end. It would therefore be a mistake for anyone to say that cupidity was love of work, on the ground that men work in order to serve their cupidity. For the covetous do not seek work as an end, but as the means to an end. They seek riches as an end, wherefore covetousness is rightly said to be the desire or love of riches, which is evil. Hence worldly love is correctly denned as the love whereby one trusts in the world as an end. It is consequently evil at all times. Now fear is born of love. For Augustine makes it clear that a man fears lest he should lose something which he loves (83 Quaest. Evang., Q. 33). Worldly fear is therefore the fear which results from worldly love, as from an evil root. For this reason, worldly fear is always evil.

On the first point: there are two ways in which one may have regard for men. One may have regard for them because there is something divine in them, such as the good of grace or of virtue, or at least the image of God. Those who do not have regard for men in this way are blamed. But one may also have regard for men in their opposition to God. Those who do not have regard for men in this way are praised, as Elijah or Elisha is praised in Ecclesiasticus 48:12: “In his days he feared not the prince.”

On the second point: when worldly powers impose punishments in order to restrain men from sin, they are ministers of God, according to Rom. 13:4: “for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” Fear of such worldly power is not worldly fear, but either servile or initial fear.

On the third point: it is natural that a man should fear harm to his own body, and the loss of temporal things. But to forsake justice on their account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the philosopher says in 3 Ethics 1 that there are certain things, such as deeds of sin, which a man ought not to contemplate on account of any fear, since to commit such sins is worse than to endure any penalties whatsoever.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Servile Fear is Good

1. It seems that servile fear is not good. If the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of servile fear is evil, since “he who does something out of fear does not do well, even though that which is done be good,” as the gloss says on Rom. ch. 8. It follows that servile fear is not good.

2. Again, that which has its origin in a root of sin is not good. Servile fear has its origin in a root of sin. For on Job 3:11, “Why died I not from the womb?” Gregory says: “when one fears the present punishment for one’s sin, and has no love for the countenance of God which one has lost, one’s fear is born of pride, not of humility.” Hence servile fear is evil.

3. Again, servile fear seems to be opposed to chaste fear, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity. Now mercenary love is always evil. Hence servile fear is likewise always evil.

On the other hand: nothing which is evil is of the Holy Spirit. But servile fear is of the Holy Spirit. For on Rom. 8:15, “For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear . . . ,” the gloss (ord. August. Tract. 9 in Joan.) says: “It is the same Spirit which inspires both fears,” that is, servile fear and chaste fear. Hence servile fear is not evil.

I answer: servile fear may be evil because of its servility. Since the free is “that which is the cause of itself,” as it is said in 1 Metaph., cap. 2, the slave is one who is not the cause of his own actions, but who is moved as by something external. Now whoever acts out of love acts as by himself, since he is moved to act by his own inclination. To act out of love is therefore opposed to the very nature of servility. Servile fear, in so far as it is servile, is therefore opposed to charity. Hence servile fear would be bound to be absolutely evil if servility belonged to its essential nature, just as adultery is absolutely evil because the element by which it is opposed to charity belongs to its specific nature. But the servility of which we are speaking does not belong to the specific nature of servile fear, any more than lack of form belongs to the specific nature of unformed faith. The species of a moral habit or action is determined by its object. But while its object is punishment, servile fear loves the good to which punishment is opposed, as the final end, and fears punishment consequentially, as the principal evil. So it is with one who does not have charity. Or again, servile fear may be directed to God as its end, in which case it does not fear punishment as a principal evil. Such fear is present in one who does have charity. For the species of a habit is not taken away by the circumstance that its object or end is subordinated to a more ultimate end. Servile fear is therefore substantially good, although its servility is evil.

On the first point: this saying of Augustine is to be understood as referring to one who does something out of servile fear because he is servile, that is, who has no love for justice, but merely fears punishment.

On the second point: servile fear is not born of pride in respect of its substance. But its servility is born of pride, in as much as a man is unwilling to subject his affection to the yoke of justice out of love.

On the third point: love is said to be mercenary when God is loved for the sake of temporal goods. This is in itself opposed to charity, and hence mercenary love is always evil. But fear which is substantially servile implies only fear of punishment, whether or not it be feared as the principal evil.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether Servile Fear is substantially the Same as Filial Fear

1. It seems that servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear. Filial fear seems to be related to servile fear as formed faith is related to unformed faith, since the one is accompanied by mortal sin, and the other is not. Now formed and unformed faith are substantially the same. Hence servile and filial fear are also substantially the same.

2. Again, habits are differentiated according to their objects. But servile and filial fear have the same object, since they both fear God. They are therefore substantially the same.

3. Again, just as a man hopes to enjoy God, and also to receive benefits from him, so does he fear to be separated from God, and also to be punished by him. Now the hope by which we hope to enjoy God is identical with the hope by which we hope to receive other benefits from him. The filial fear

by which we fear to be separated from God is therefore identical with the servile fear by which we fear to be punished by him.

On the other hand: Augustine says that there are two kinds of fear, the one servile, the other filial or chaste (Tract. 9 in Joan.).

I answer: the proper object of fear is evil. But fears are bound to differ in kind if the evils which they fear are different, since actions and habits are distinguished according to their objects, as we said in 12ae, Q. 54, Art. 2. Now it is clear from what we said in Art. 2 that the evil of punishment, which is feared by servile fear, differs in kind from the evil of guilt, which is feared by filial fear. This makes it obvious that servile and filial fear are not substantially the same, but differ in their specific natures.

On the first point: formed and unformed faith do not differ in respect of their object, since they both believe in God, and believe God. They differ solely in what is extrinsic to them, namely, in the presence or absence of charity. Hence they do not differ in their substance. Servile and filial fear, on the other hand, differ in respect of their objects. They are therefore not of the same nature.

On the second point: servile and filial fear do not have regard to God in the same way. Servile fear looks upon God as the principal source of punishments. Filial fear does not look upon God as the principal source of guilt, but rather as the term from which it fears to be separated by guilt. These two fears do not then have the same specific nature on account of their object, since even natural movements have different specific natures if they are related to a term in different ways. The movement away from whiteness, for example, is not specifically the same as the movement towards it.

On the third point: hope looks to God principally, whether in regard to the enjoyment of God or in regard to any other benefits. But it is not so with fear. We cannot therefore argue about them in the same way.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Servile Fear Remains when Charity is Present

1. It seems that servile fear does not remain when charity is present. For Augustine says: “when charity begins to dwell in us, it drives out the fear which has prepared a place for it” (Tract 9 in Joan.).

2. Again, “the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, which is given unto us” (Rom. 5:5). Now it is also said that “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (II Cor. 3:17), and since liberty excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is expelled by the advent, of charity.

3. Again, servile fear is caused by love of oneself, in as much as punishment diminishes the good of oneself. Now love to God expels love of oneself. It even causes one to despise oneself, according to Augustine, who says: “love of God to the contempt of self builds the city of God” (14 De Civ. Dei. 28; in Ps. 65). It seems, therefore, that servile fear is expelled by the advent of charity.

On the other hand: servile fear is a gift of the Holy Spirit, as was said in Art. 4. Now the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not taken away by the advent of charity, by which the Holy Spirit dwells in us. Hence servile fear is not taken away by the advent of charity.

I answer: servile fear is caused by love of oneself, since it is fear of the punishment which is detrimental to the good of oneself. Fear of punishment is therefore as compatible with charity as is love of oneself. For it amounts to the same thing whether a man desires his own good, or fears to be deprived of it.

There are three ways in which love of oneself may be related to charity. It may be opposed to charity, as it is when one makes love of oneself one’s end. It may, on the other hand, be included within charity, as it is when a man loves himself for God’s sake, and in God. It may, again, be distinct from charity and yet not opposed to charity, as for example when one loves oneself as one’s own proper good, but without making one’s own proper good one’s end. One may similarly have a special love for one’s neighbour, other than the love of charity which is founded upon God, and yet compatible with charity, loving him by reason of commodity, consanguinity, or some other human circumstance.

Thus fear of punishment, likewise, may be included within charity. For to be separated from God is a kind of punishment, which charity naturally shuns. This pertains to chaste fear. It may also be opposed to charity, as it is when one fears punishment because it is contrary to one’s own natural good, as the principal evil opposed to the good which one loves as an end. This fear of punishment is not compatible with charity. Again, fear of punishment may be substantially different from chaste fear. A man may fear punishment not because it means separation from God, but because it is harmful to his own good, yet without either making this good his end or consequently fearing the evil of punishment as the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is compatible with charity, but it is not called servile unless punishment is looked upon as the principal evil, as we explained in Arts. 2 and 3. Hence in so far as fear is servile, it cannot remain when charity is present. Yet the substance of fear can remain when charity is present, just as love of oneself can remain when charity is present.

On the first point: Augustine is here speaking of fear in so far as it is servile. The other two arguments speak of it in the same way.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether Fear is the Beginning of Wisdom

1. It seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom. The beginning of a thing is a part of it. But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear is in the appetitive power, whereas wisdom is in the intellectual power. Hence it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

2. Again, nothing is the beginning of itself. But it is said in Job 28:28: “Behold, the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom.” Hence it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

3. Again, there is nothing prior to a beginning. But there is something prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Hence it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 111:10: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.”

I answer: there are two ways in which we may say that something is the beginning of wisdom. We may mean that it is the beginning of wisdom in regard to its essence, or that it is the beginning of it in regard to its effect. We may similarly say that the principles upon which an art proceeds are the beginning of an art in regard to its essence, or again, that the foundation is the beginning of the art of building, since a builder begins his work with the foundation.

Now although wisdom is the knowledge of divine things, as we shall affirm later, we think of the knowledge of God in a different way from the philosophers. For us, life is ordained to the enjoyment of God, and ordered thereto by means of a certain participation in the divine nature through grace. Hence we do not think of wisdom merely as the knowledge of God, as do the philosophers. We think of it as directive of human life, which is ordered not only by human reasons, but by divine reasons also, as Augustine explains in 12 De Trin. 14.

It is therefore the first principles of wisdom that are the beginning of it in regard to its essence, and these are the articles of faith. In this way, accordingly, faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But in regard to its effect, the beginning of wisdom is that wherein wisdom begins to operate. In this way, fear is the beginning of wisdom, although servile fear is the beginning of it in a different way from filial fear. Servile fear is like an external principle which disposes one to wisdom, in as much as one is prepared for the effect of wisdom by refraining from sin through fear of punishment. As it is said in Ecclesiasticus 1:21: “The fear of the Lord driveth out sin.” Chaste or filial fear, on the other hand, is the beginning of wisdom as the first effect of it. It pertains to wisdom to regulate human life according to divine reasons. Wisdom must therefore begin in this, that a man reverence God and submit himself to God. He will then be ruled by God in all things.

On the first point: this argument shows that fear is not the beginning of wisdom in regard to its essence.

On the second point: the fear of God is related to the whole of a human life which is ruled by God’s wisdom, as is its root to a tree. Hence it is said in

Ecclesiasticus 1:20: “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord; for the branches thereof are longlived.”

On the third point: as we have said above, faith is the beginning of wisdom in one way, and fear in another. Hence it is said in Ecclesiasticus 25:12: “The fear of God is the beginning of love; but the beginning of faith must be joined fast to it.”

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether Initial Fear Differs Substantially from Filial Fear

1. It seems that initial fear differs substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love, whereas initial fear is the beginning of love, according to Ecclesiasticus 25:12: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of love.” Initial fear is therefore other than filial fear.

2. Again, initial fear fears punishment, which is the object of servile fear. Thus it seems that initial fear is the same as servile fear. But servile fear is other than filial fear. Hence initial fear is substantially other than filial fear.

3. Again, a mean differs equally from both extremes. Now initial fear is a mean between servile fear and filial fear. It therefore differs from both of them.

On the other hand: the perfect and the imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing. Now as Augustine explains (Tract. 9 in Joan.), initial and filial fear differ in respect of the perfection and the imperfection of charity. Hence initial fear does not differ substantially from filial fear.

I answer: fear is said to be initial because it is a beginning. Both servile fear and filial fear may in a manner be called initial, since each of them is in a manner the beginning of wisdom. Initial fear is not so called because it is distinct from servile and from filial fear. It is so called because it applies to the state of beginners, in whom filial fear is begun through the beginning of charity, but is not in them perfectly since they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity. Initial fear thus bears the same relation to filial fear as imperfect charity bears to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity do not differ in their substance, but only in their state. We must therefore say that initial fear, as we here understand it, does not differ substantially from filial fear.

On the first point: as Augustine says (Tract. 9 in Joan.), the fear which is the beginning of love is servile fear, which introduces charity, as the bristle introduces the thread. If this refers to initial fear, it means that fear is the beginning of love not absolutely, but in so far as it is the beginning of the state of perfect charity.

On the second point: initial fear does not fear punishment as its proper object. It fears punishment because something of servile fear is conjoined with it. When its servility has been removed, the substance of servile fear remains, together with charity. The act of servile fear remains, together with imperfect charity, in one who is moved to do well not only by love of justice, but also by fear of punishment. But this act ceases in one who has perfect charity, since “perfect love casteth out fear” (1 John 4:18).

On the third point: initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear as the imperfect is a mean between perfect being and not-being, as it is said in 2 Metaph., text 7, not as a mean between two things of the same genus. Imperfect being is the same in substance with perfect being, but differs altogether from not-being.

ARTICLE NINE

Whether Fear is a Gift of the Holy Spirit

1. It seems that fear is not a gift of the Holy Spirit. No gift of the Holy Spirit is opposed to a virtue, which is also from the Holy Spirit, since otherwise the Holy Spirit would be opposed to itself. But fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. It follows that fear is not a gift of the Holy Spirit.

2. Again, it is the property of a theological virtue that it has God as its object. Now fear has God as its object, in so far as it is God that is feared. Fear is therefore a theological virtue, not a gift.

3. Again, fear is the result of love. Now love is reckoned as a theological virtue. Fear is therefore a theological virtue also, since it pertains to the same thing.

4. Again, Gregory says that “fear is given as a protection from pride” (2 Moral. 26). Now the virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Hence fear is comprehended under a virtue.

5. Again, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since they are given in order to support the virtues, as Gregory says (2 Moral., ibid.). Now hope is a virtue, and it is more perfect than fear, since hope looks to what is good while fear looks to what is evil. Hence it should not be said that fear is a gift.

On the other hand: the fear of the Lord is numbered with the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit in Isa., ch. 11.

I answer: there are many kinds of fear, as we said in Art. 2. But as Augustine says, “human fear is not a gift of God” (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. 18). For this is the fear which caused Peter to deny Christ, whereas the fear which is a gift of God is that of which it is said in Matt. 10:28: “but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.” Neither is servile fear to be numbered with the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, even though it may be due to the Holy Spirit. For servile fear can be combined with the will to sin, as Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. 57), whereas gifts of the Holy Spirit cannot be combined with the will to sin, since they are not without charity, as we said in 12ae, Q. 68, Art. 5. It remains, therefore, that the fear of God which is numbered with the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit is filial fear, or chaste fear.

In 12ae, Q. 68, Arts. 1 and 3, we said that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are habitual perfections of the powers of the soul, in consequence of which these powers can be readily moved by the Holy Spirit, just as its appetitive powers can be readily moved by reason in consequence of the moral virtues. Now the first thing that is necessary if anything is to be readily moved by any mover is that it should be subject to the mover, and not repelled by it, since antipathy towards the mover on the part of the thing moved impedes the movement. This is achieved by filial or chaste fear, by which we reverence God and fear to be separated from him. Filial fear thus holds the first place in the ascending order of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and the last place in their descending order, as Augustine says in 1 Sermo Domini in monte, cap. 4.

On the first point: filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope. For by filial fear we do not fear lest we should fail in that which we hope to obtain through divine help, but fear lest we should separate ourselves from this help. Filial fear and hope thus hold to one another, and perfect one another.

On the second point: the proper and principal object of fear is the evil which one fears. God cannot be the object of fear in this way, as we said in the first article. In this way he is the object of hope, and of the other theological virtues also. For by the virtue of hope we depend on God's help not only to obtain all other good things, but to obtain God himself as the principal good. The same is true of the other theological virtues.

On the third point: although love is the principle from which fear arises, it does not follow that fear of God is not a habit distinct from charity, which is love of God. Love is the principle of all affections, but we are nevertheless perfected in different affections by different habits. Love has more of the nature of a virtue than has fear. For it is plain from what we said in Pt. I, Q. 60, Arts. 3 and 4, that love looks to the good, to which virtue is principally ordained by its own nature. Hope is reckoned as a virtue for this same reason. Fear, on the other hand, looks principally to what is evil, and implies flight from it. It is therefore something less than a theological virtue.

On the fourth point: as it is said in Ecclesiasticus 10:12: "the beginning of man's pride is to stand apart from God," that is, to refuse to submit to God. This is opposed to filial fear, which reverences God, and is given as a protection from pride because it excludes the beginning of pride. Yet it does not follow that fear is the same as the virtue of humility, but rather that it is the beginning of this virtue. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are indeed the beginnings of the intellectual and moral virtues, as we said in 12ae, Q. 68, Arts. 5 and 8. But the theological virtues are the beginnings of the gifts, as we said in 12ae, Q. 69, Art. 4, ad 3.

From this the answer to the fifth point is clear.

ARTICLE TEN

Whether Fear Diminishes as Charity Increases

1. It seems that fear diminishes as charity increases. For Augustine says: “the more charity increases, the more fear decreases” {Tract. 9 in Joan.).

2. Again, fear diminishes as hope increases. Now it was said in Q^. 17, Art. 8, that hope increases as charity increases. It follows that fear diminishes as charity increases.

3. Again, love implies union, and fear implies separation. Now separation diminishes as union increases. It follows that fear diminishes as the love of charity increases.

On the other hand: Augustine says: “the fear of God is not only the beginning of the wisdom whereby one loves God above all things and one’s neighbour as oneself, but perfects it” (83 Quaest. Evang. Q. 36).

I answer: as we said in Arts. 2 and 4, there are two kinds of fear of God. There is the filial fear by which one fears to offend a father, or to be separated from him. There is also the servile fear by which one fears punishment. Filial fear is bound to increase as charity increases, as an effect increases along with its cause. For the more one loves someone, the more does one fear lest one should offend him, or be separated from him. The servility of servile fear is entirely removed by the advent of charity. Yet the substance of the fear of punishment remains, as we said in Art. 6. This last is diminished as charity increases, most of all in regard to its act. For the more one loves God, the less does one fear punishment: in the first place because one is the less concerned about one’s own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly because one is the more confident of one’s reward the more firmly one adheres to God, and consequently has less fear of punishment.

On the first point: Augustine is speaking of the fear of punishment.

On the second point: it is the fear of punishment that decreases as hope increases. Filial fear increases as hope increases, since the more certainly one expects to obtain some good thing through the help of another, the more does one fear lest one should offend the other, or be separated from him.

On the third point: filial fear does not imply separation from God. Rather does it imply submission to God, and fears separation from submission to him. It implies separation in the sense that it does not presume to be equal with God, but submits to him. Separation in this sense is also found in charity, since charity loves God more than itself and above all things. Hence the reverence of fear does not diminish as the love of charity increases, but increases together with it.

ARTICLE ELEVEN

Whether Fear Remains in Heaven

1. It seems that fear does not remain in heaven. For it is said in Prov. 1:33: " . . . shall dwell safely, and shall be quiet from fear of evil," and this is to be understood as referring to those who already enjoy wisdom in eternal blessedness. Now all fear is fear of evil, since evil is the object of fear, as was said in Arts. 2 and 5, and in 12ae, Q. 42, Art. 1. There will therefore be no fear in heaven.

2. Again, in heaven men will be like God, since it is said in I John 3:2: "when he shall appear, we shall be like him." But God fears nothing. In heaven, therefore, men will have no fear.

3. Again, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope looks to what is good, while fear looks to what is evil. But there will be no hope in heaven. Neither then will there be fear in heaven.

On the other hand: it is said in Ps. 19:9: "The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring for ever." I answer: there will in no wise be servile fear in heaven, nor fear of punishment. Such fear is excluded by the security which belongs to blessedness by its very nature, as we said in 12ae, Q. 5, Art. 4. But filial fear will be made perfect when charity is made perfect, just as it increases when charity increases—wherefore its act will not be quite the same in heaven as it is now.

To make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible good. The movement of fear being similar to flight, fear implies flight from a possible and troublous evil, since small evils do not inspire fear. Now the good of each thing consists in remaining in its order, while its evil consists in abandoning its order, and the order of a rational creature consists in being subject to God, yet above other creatures. It is therefore an evil for a rational creature that it should presumptuously assume equality with God, or despise him, just as it is an evil for it that it should subject itself to a lower creature through love. Such evil is possible for a rational creature considered in its own nature, on account of the natural flexibility of its free will. But it is not possible for the blessed, owing to the perfection of glory. Flight from the evil of insubordination to God, which is possible for nature, will consequently be impossible for the blessedness of heaven. Hence in expounding Job 26:11, "The pillars of heaven tremble and are astonished at his reproof," Gregory says (17 Moral. in fin): "The heavenly powers which unceasingly behold him tremble while they contemplate. Yet their trembling is not of fear, lest it should be a punishment to them, but of wonder"—for they wonder at the incomprehensibility of God, whose being transcends them. Augustine likewise supposes that there is fear in heaven, although he leaves the matter open to doubt, in 14 De Civ. Dei. 9: "If this chaste fear which endures for ever is to endure in the life to come, it will not be the fear which fears an evil which may happen, but the fear which holds to a good which cannot be lost. For when love is unchangeable towards a good which has been obtained, fear is assuredly certain of avoiding evil, if we may so speak. By the name of chaste fear is signified a will whereby we shall of necessity be unwilling to sin, and whereby we shall be free of the anxiety of weakness lest perchance we should sin, avoiding sin with the tranquillity of charity. Or if no kind of fear is there present, it may be that fear is said to endure for ever because that to which fear leads us is everlasting."

On the first point: the fear which this passage excludes from the blessed is the anxious fear which takes precautions against evil, not the fear of security, of which Augustine speaks.

On the second point: as Dionysius says (9 Div. Nom., lect. 3): “The same things are like God and unlike him. They are like him by reason of imitation of the inimitable”—that is, they imitate God in so far as they can, although he cannot be imitated perfectly; “they are unlike him, since they infinitely and immeasurably fall short of their cause, with which they cannot be compared.”

On the third point: hope implies a defect, namely the futurity of blessedness, which will cease when blessedness is present. But fear implies a defect which is natural to a creature, since a creature is infinitely distant from God. This defect will remain in heaven. Hence fear will not be done away entirely.

ARTICLE TWELVE

Whether Poverty of Spirit is the Beatitude which Corresponds to the Gift of Fear

1. It seems that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude which corresponds to the gift of fear. For it was explained in Art. 7 that fear is the beginning of the spiritual life, whereas poverty of spirit pertains to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Matt. 19:21: “If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor.” Hence poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift of fear.

2. Again, it is said in Ps. 119:120: “My flesh trembleth for fear of thee,” from which it appears that fear mortifies the flesh. Now the beatitude of mourning seems to correspond to the mortification of the flesh. Hence the beatitude of mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than poverty of spirit.

3. Again, it was said in Art. 9 that fear corresponds to the virtue of hope. Now hope seems to correspond especially to the last beatitude, which is: “Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God,” since it is said in Rom. 5:2: “we . . . rejoice in hope of the glory of God.” Hence this beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than poverty of spirit.

4. Again, it was said in 12ae, Q. 70, Art. 2, that the fruits of the Spirit correspond to the beatitudes. But there is nothing in the fruits which corresponds to the gift of fear. Neither then is there anything in the beatitudes which corresponds to it.

On the other hand: Augustine says (1 Sermo Domini in monte, cap. 4): “The fear of God befits the humble, of whom it is said ‘Blessed are the poor in spirit.’”

I answer: poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Reverence for God and submission to God belong to filial fear. What results from this submission therefore belongs to the gift of fear. When a man submits himself to God, he no longer seeks to glory in himself, nor in any other save God, since this would be incompatible with perfect submission to God. Thus it is said in Ps. 20:7: “Some trust in chariots, and some in horses; but we will remember the name of the Lord our God.” Hence if any man fears God perfectly, he will not seek to glory in himself through pride, nor yet in external goods such as honours and riches. Now in either regard, such restraint pertains to poverty of spirit. For poverty of spirit can be understood to mean either the humiliation of a puffed up and haughty spirit, as Augustine interprets it (loc. cit.); or the renunciation of worldly things, which is of the spirit, that is, of our own will at the instigation of the Holy Spirit, as Ambrose says on Luke 6:20: “Blessed be ye poor,” and as Hieronymus says also, in interpretation of Matt. 5:3.

On the first point: a beatitude is the actuality of a perfect virtue. Hence all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. But contempt of worldly goods would seem to be the beginning of this perfection, since it permits one to tend towards perfect participation in spiritual goods, just as fear comes first among the gifts of the Spirit. Renunciation of worldly goods is the way to perfection, even though perfection does not consist in the renunciation of them. Yet filial fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is present in the perfection of wisdom, as we said in Arts. 7 and 10.

On the second point: undue glorification in oneself or in other things is more directly opposed to submission to God, which results from filial fear, than is love of external things. Love of external things is opposed to this fear consequentially, since one who reverences God and submits to him does not delight in things other than God. But such love does not pertain to the arduous, with which fear and glorification are concerned. Hence the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear directly, while the beatitude of mourning corresponds to it consequentially.

On the third point: hope implies a movement towards the term to which it relates, whereas fear implies rather a movement away from the term to which it relates. Hence the last beatitude, which is the term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope in point of its ultimate object, while the first beatitude, which involves recoil from worldly things which hinder submission to God, fittingly corresponds to fear.

On the fourth point: those gifts of the Holy Spirit which relate to the moderate use of worldly things, or to abstention from them, such as modesty, continence, or chastity, do appear to correspond to the gift of fear.

QUESTION TWENTY

OF DESPAIR

We must now consider the vices opposed to the virtue of hope. The first of these is despair. The second is presumption. Four questions are asked concerning despair.

1. Whether despair is a sin.

2. Whether there can be despair without unbelief.

3. Whether despair is the greatest of sins.

4. Whether it is born of listlessness.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Despair is a Sin

1. It seems that despair is not a sin. Augustine makes it clear that every sin turns to changeable good when it turns away from unchangeable good (De

Lib. Arb., 1, cap. ult; 2, cap. 19). But despair does not turn to changeable good. Hence it is not a sin.

2. Again, that which springs from a good root would not seem to be a sin, since “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit” (Matt. 7:18). Now despair appears to spring from a good root, namely, from the fear of God, or from horror at the magnitude of one’s own sins. Hence it is not a sin.

3. Again, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin for the damned to despair. Now their despair is not imputed to them as guilt, but rather as their damnation. Neither, then, is despair imputed to the wayfarer as guilt. Hence it is not a sin.

On the other hand: that by which men are led into sin would seem to be not only a sin, but a principle of sins. Such is despair, since the apostle says: “Who being past feeling have given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness” (Eph. 4:19). Despair is therefore not only a sin, but a principle of sins.

I answer: as the philosopher says in 6 Ethics 2, affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to pursuit and avoidance in the appetite, while truth and falsity in the intellect correspond to what is good and to what is bad in the appetite. Hence every appetitive movement which corresponds to what is true in the intellect is good in itself, while every appetitive movement which corresponds to what is false in the intellect is bad in itself, and a sin. Now the true intellectual appreciation of God is of God as the source of man’s salvation, and as the forgiver of sins, according to Ezek. 18:23: “Have I any pleasure at all that the wicked should die? saith the Lord God; and not that he should return from his ways, and live?” That God denies pardon to a penitent sinner, or that he does not turn sinners to himself by means of justifying grace, is a false opinion. Accordingly, just as the movement of hope, which corresponds to the true appreciation of God, is laudable and virtuous, so the opposite movement of despair, which corresponds to the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.

On the first point: every mortal sin turns away from unchangeable good in some way, and turns to changeable good in one way or another. Since the theological virtues have God as their object, the sins opposed to them consist principally in turning away from unchangeable good, and consequentially in turning to changeable good. Other sins consist principally in turning to changeable good, and consequentially in turning away from unchangeable good. One who commits fornication does not intend to separate himself from God, but seeks delight in carnal pleasure, of which separation from God is the consequence.

On the second point: there are two ways in which a thing may spring from a root of virtue. It may spring directly from the virtue itself, as an action springs from its habit. No sin can spring from a virtuous root in this way. It is indeed in this sense that Augustine says: “no man can make bad use of a virtue” (2 De Lib. Arb. 18, 19). But a thing may also spring from a virtue indirectly, or be occasioned by a virtue, and there is nothing to prevent a sin arising out of a virtue in this way. For example, men sometimes pride themselves on their virtues. As Augustine says: “Pride lies in wait for good works, so that they perish” (Epist. 211 olim 109). In this way, despair can arise out of the fear of God, or out of horror at one’s own sins, if a man makes bad use of these good things by turning them into an occasion for despair.

On the third point: the damned are not in a state which permits of hope, since it is impossible for them to return to blessedness. That they do not hope is consequently not imputed to them as guilt, but is part of their damnation. Neither is it imputed to a wayfarer as a sin, that he despairs of something which he is not born to attain, or of something which he is not under obligation to attain. It is not a sin, for example, if a doctor despairs of curing a sick man, or if one despairs of ever becoming rich.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether there can be Despair without Unbelief

1. It seems that there cannot be despair without unbelief. For the certainty of hope is founded on faith, and the effect cannot be removed so long as the cause remains. One cannot lose the certainty of hope through despair, therefore, unless one loses one’s faith.

2. Again, to put one’s own guilt before the goodness and mercy of God is to deny the infinite goodness or mercy of God, and this is unbelief. Now one who despairs puts his guilt before the mercy or goodness of God, in accordance with Gen. 4:13: “My punishment is greater than I can bear.” Anyone who despairs is therefore an unbeliever.

3. Again, anyone who falls into a condemned heresy is an unbeliever. Now one who despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy, namely that of the Novatians, who say that sins cannot be forgiven after baptism. It seems, therefore, that anyone who despairs is an unbeliever.

On the other hand: the removal of a consequent does not imply the removal of what is prior to it. Now hope is a consequence of faith, as was said in Q. 17, Art. 7. Hence faith can remain when hope is removed. It does not then follow that whosoever despairs is an unbeliever.

I answer: unbelief belongs to the intellect, whereas despair belongs to the appetitive power. Further, the intellect is concerned with universals, whereas the appetitive power is moved in relation to particulars, since appetitive movement is of the soul towards things which are in themselves particular. Now one who rightly appreciates something in its universal aspect may yet be wrong in his appetitive movement, owing to a faulty estimation of a particular instance of it. For one must pass from appreciation of the universal to desire for the particular through the medium of one’s estimate of the particular, as is said in 3 De Anima, text 58; just as one can infer a particular conclusion from a universal proposition only through an assumption about the particular. It is due to this circumstance that one who rightly believes something in universal terms may yet be wrong in his appetitive movement towards a particular thing, if his estimate of the particular has been corrupted by habit, or by passion. Thus the fornicator, who chooses fornication as something good for himself, has at the time a false estimate of the particular, even though he may retain an appreciation of the universal which is true as a belief, namely, that fornication is a mortal sin. Similarly, one who continues to believe truly, in universal terms, that the Church can remit sins, may still undergo the movement of despair through having a false estimate of the particular, namely, that he is in such a state that he cannot hope for pardon. In this way there can be despair without unbelief, just as there can be other mortal sins without unbelief.

On the first point: an effect is removed not only if the first cause is removed, but also if a secondary cause is removed. Hence the movement of hope can be taken away not only by the removal of the universal estimate of faith, which is as it were the first cause of the certainty of faith, but also by the removal of the particular estimate, which is as it were a secondary cause.

On the second point: it would be unbelief to think, in universal terms, that the mercy of God was not infinite. But he who despairs does not think thus. He supposes that there is no hope of divine mercy for himself, owing to some particular disposition.

The answer to the third point is similar. The Novatians deny in universal terms that there is remission of sins in the Church.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Despair is the Greatest of Sins

1. It seems that despair is not the greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbelief, as was said in the preceding article. Unbelief is the greatest of sins, since it corrupts the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Hence despair is not the greatest of sins.

2. Again, as the philosopher explains, the greatest good is opposed to the greatest evil (8 Ethics 10). Now it is said in I Cor., ch. 13, that charity is greater than hope. It follows that hatred of God is a greater sin than despair.

3. Again, the sin of despair involves nothing more than inordinately turning away from God. But other sins involve inordinately turning to other things, as well as inordinately turning away from God. Hence despair is not graver than other sins, but less grave.

On the other hand: the sin which is incurable would seem to be the gravest, according to Jer. 30:12: “Thy bruise is incurable, and thy wound is grievous.” Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer. 15:18: “ . . .

my wound incurable, which refuseth to be healed.” It follows that despair is the gravest of sins.

I answer: the sins which are opposed to the theological virtues are graver than other sins, owing to their kind. For the theological virtues have God as their object, and the sins opposed to them consequently involve turning away from God, directly and principally. The principal evil and the gravity of every mortal sin consists in turning away from God, since it would not be a mortal sin to turn to changeable good, even inordinately, if this were possible without turning away from God. The gravest of mortal sins is therefore that which primarily and essentially turns away from God.

Unbelief, despair, and hatred of God are all opposed to theological virtues. If we compare them, we find that in themselves, that is, in their own specific nature, hatred and unbelief are graver than despair. Unbelief is due to a man’s not believing the very truth of God. Hatred of God is due to his will being opposed to the very goodness of God. Despair, on the other hand, is due to a man’s failure to hope that he will share in the goodness of God. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are opposed to God as he is in himself, whereas despair is opposed to him by way of being opposed to our participation in his good. In the absolute sense, therefore, to disbelieve the truth of God, or to harbour hatred of God, is a graver sin than not to hope to receive glory from him.

But if we compare despair with the other two sins from our own point of view, it is more dangerous. For by hope we are called back from evils and induced to strive for what is good, and if hope is lost, men fall headlong into vices, and are taken away from good works. Hence the gloss on Prov. 24:10, “If thou faint in the day of adversity, thy strength is small,” says: “Nothing is more execrable than despair. For he who despairs loses his constancy in the daily labours of this life, and what is worse, loses his constancy in the endeavour of faith.” Further, as Isodorus says in 2 De Summo Bono 14: “To commit a crime is death to the soul; but to despair is to descend into hell.”

From this the answers to the objections are obvious.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Despair Arises from Listlessness

1. It seems that despair does not arise from listlessness. For the same thing does not result from different causes, and Gregory says that despair of the future life results from lust (31 Moral. 17). It does not then result from listlessness.

2. Again, as despair is opposed to hope, so is listlessness opposed to spiritual joy. Now spiritual joy is the result of hope, according to Rom. 12:12: “Rejoicing in hope.” Hence listlessness is the result of despair, not vice versa.

3. Again, the causes of contraries are themselves contrary. Now hope is the contrary of despair, and hope seems to be caused by contemplation of the divine blessings, especially the incarnation. As Augustine says: “Nothing was so necessary in order to raise our hope, as that we should be shown how much God loves us. What could more plainly declare this to us than that the Son of God should deign to take our nature upon himself?” (13 De Trin. 10). Despair therefore results from neglect to think of these blessings, rather than from listlessness.

On the other hand: Gregory numbers despair among the results of listlessness (31 Moral. 17).

I answer: as we said in Q. 17, Art. 1, and in 12ae, Q. 40, Art. 1, the object of hope is a good which is arduous, and also possible to obtain. There are accordingly two ways in which one may fail in the hope of obtaining blessedness. One may fail to look upon it as an arduous good, and one may fail to look upon it as a good which it is possible to obtain, whether by oneself or through the help of another. It is especially through corruption of our affection by love of bodily pleasures, particularly those of sexuality, that we are brought to the point where spiritual goods do not savour of good, or do not seem to be very good. For it is due to love of such things that a man loses his taste for spiritual goods, and does not hope for them as arduous goods. In this way, despair arises from lust. But it is owing to excessive dejection that one fails to look upon an arduous good as possible to obtain, whether by oneself or through the help of another. For when dejection dominates a man’s affection, it seems to him that he can never rise to anything good. In this way, despair arises from listlessness, since listlessness is the kind of sadness which casts down the spirit.

Now the proper object of hope is this—that a thing is possible to obtain. For to be good, or to be arduous, pertains to the object of other passions also. It is therefore from listlessness that despair arises the more especially, although it can also arise from lust, for the reason which we have stated.

From this the reply to the first point is plain.

On the second point: as the philosopher says in 1 Rhetoric 11, just as hope creates joy, so do men have greater hope when they live joyously. So likewise do they fall the more readily into despair when they live in sadness, according to II Cor. 2:7: “lest perhaps such a one should be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” The object of hope is a good to which the appetite tends naturally, and from which it will not turn aside naturally, but only if some obstacle intervenes. Hence joy is more directly the result of hope, and despair more directly the result of sadness.

On the third point: neglect to think of the divine blessings is itself the result of listlessness. For a man who is affected by a passion thinks especially of the things which pertain to it. Hence it is not easy for a man who lives in sadness to contemplate any great and joyful things. He thinks only of things that are sad, unless he turns away from them by a great effort.

QUESTION TWENTY-ONE

OF PRESUMPTION

We must now consider presumption, concerning which there are four questions.

1. What is the object of presumption, on which it relies.

2. Whether presumption is a sin.

3. To what it is opposed.

4. From that it arises.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Presumption Relies on God, or on One’s Own Power

1. It seems that presumption, which is a sin against the Holy Spirit, does not rely on God, but on one’s own power. Sin is the greater, the lesser is the power in which one puts too much trust, and the power of man is less than the power of God. Hence one who presumes on the power of man is guilty of a greater sin than one who presumes on the power of God. Now sin against the Holy Spirit is the gravest of all sins. It follows that presumption, which is said to be a kind of sin against the Holy Spirit, relies on the power of man rather than on the power of God.

2. Again, other sins arise out of sin against the Holy Spirit. For sin against the Holy Spirit is called malice, and through malice a man sins. Now it seems that other sins arise out of the presumption with which a man presumes on himself, rather than out of the presumption with which he presumes on God. For Augustine makes it clear that love of oneself is the beginning of sins (14 De Civ. Dei. 28). It appears, therefore, that the presumption which is a sin against the Holy Spirit relies especially on the power of man.

3. Again, sin is due to turning inordinately to changeable good. Now presumption is a sin. It is therefore due to turning to the power of a man, which is a changeable good, rather than to turning to the power of God, which is an unchangeable good.

On the other hand: by presumption one despises the divine justice which punishes sinners, just as by despair one despises the divine mercy on which hope relies. Now justice is in God, just as mercy is in God. Presumption therefore consists in turning to God in an inordinate manner, just as despair consists in turning away from him.

I answer: presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. The object of hope is a good which is arduous and yet possible, but there are two ways in which a thing may be possible for a man. It may be possible for him through his own power, and it may be possible only through the power of God. Now in either case there can be presumption through immoderate hope. The hope whereby one relies on one's own power is presumptuous, if one aims at a good beyond one's capacity as if it were possible for one to attain it, after the manner referred to in Judith 6:15 (Vulgate): "Thou humblest those that presume of themselves." Such presumption is opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which holds to the mean in hope of this kind. But hope whereby one relies on the power of God can also be presumptuous through immoderation, if one looks for some good thing as if it were possible through the divine power and mercy, when it is not possible. It would be presumptuous, for example, for a man to hope to obtain pardon without penitence, or glory without merit. Such presumption is indeed a kind of sin against the Holy Spirit, since one who so presumes takes away or despises the aid whereby the Holy Spirit calls him back from sin.

On the first point: as we said in Q. 20, Art. 3, and in 12ae, Q. 73, Art. 3, a sin against God is more serious than other sins, owing to its kind. The presumption with which one relies on God in an inordinate manner is therefore a more serious sin than the presumption with which one relies on one's own power. To rely on the divine power for the purpose of obtaining what it is unbecoming for God to give is to deprecate the divine power, and it is obvious that one who deprecates the power of God sins more seriously than one who exalts his own power more than he ought.

On the second point: the presumption with which one presumes on God in an inordinate manner includes the love of oneself whereby one inordinately desires one's own good. For when we desire something excessively, we readily think that it is possible through others, when it is not so.

On the third point: presumption on the mercy of God includes turning to changeable good, in so far as it is the outcome of inordinate desire for one's own good. It also includes turning away from unchangeable good, in so far as it attributes to the divine power what is unbecoming to it. This means that a man turns away from the divine power.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Presumption is a Sin

1. It seems that presumption is not a sin. No sin is a reason why a man should be heard by God. Yet some are heard by God on account of presumption, since it is said in Judith 9:17 (Vulgate): “Hear me, a miserable supplicant who presumes upon thy mercy.” Hence presumption on the divine mercy is not a sin.

2. Again, presumption implies excessive hope. But the hope whereby we hope in God cannot be excessive, since his power and his mercy are infinite. Hence it seems that presumption is not a sin.

3. Again, a sin does not excuse sin. But presumption excuses sin, since the Master says (2 Sent., Dist. 22): “Adam sinned the less, because he sinned in the hope of pardon,” which would seem to be presumptuous. Hence presumption is not a sin.

On the other hand: presumption is said to be a kind of sin against the Holy Spirit.

I answer: as we said in the first article of the preceding question, every appetitive movement which corresponds to a falsity in the intellect is bad in itself, and a sin. Now presumption is an appetitive movement, since it involves inordinate hope. It also corresponds to a falsity in the intellect, as does despair. For just as it is false that God does not pardon the penitent, or that he does not turn sinners to penitence, so also is it false that he extends pardon to those who persevere in their sins, or that he gives glory to those who cease from good works. The movement of presumption corresponds to this opinion. Hence presumption is a sin. But it is a lesser sin than despair, since to have mercy and to spare is more becoming to God than to punish, on account of his infinite goodness. To have mercy and to spare is in itself becoming to God, whereas to punish becomes him by reason of our sins.

On the first point: presumption is sometimes used to denote hope, since even the hope in God which is justifiable seems presumptuous if measured by reference to the condition of man, although it is not presumptuous if we bear in mind the immensity of the divine goodness.

On the second point: the hope which presumption implies is not excessive in the sense that it expects too much from God, but in the sense that it expects something from God which is unbecoming to him. This is to expect too little from God, since it is a way of deprecating his power, as we said in the first article.

On the third point: to sin with the intention of persevering in sin, and in the hope of pardon, is presumptuous. Sin is thereby increased, not diminished. But to sin with the intention of refraining from sin, and in the hope that one will sometime be pardoned, is not presumptuous. This diminishes sin, since it seems to show that the will is less confirmed in sin.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Presumption is Opposed to Fear rather than to Hope

1. It seems that presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope. For inordinate fear is opposed to fear, and presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, since it is said in Wisdom 17:11: “a troubled conscience always presumes harsh things,” and in the same passage “fear is the aid to presumption.” Hence presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.

2. Again, those things are contrary which are farthest removed from each other. Now presumption is farther removed from fear than from hope. For presumption implies a movement towards something, as does hope also, whereas fear implies a movement away from something. Hence presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

3. Again, presumption excludes fear entirely. It does not exclude hope entirely, but only the Tightness of hope. Now things are opposed when they mutually exclude each other. Hence it seems that presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.

On the other hand: two contrary vices are opposed to the same virtue. Timidity and audacity, for example, are opposed to fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is the contrary of the sin of despair, and despair is directly opposed to hope. Hence it appears that presumption is also opposed to hope, more directly than to fear.

I answer: as Augustine says (4 Cont. Julian. 3): “with all virtues, there are not only vices which are clearly opposed to them, as temerity is clearly opposed to prudence. There are also vices which are akin to them, not truly, but with a false kind of similarity, such as astuteness bears to prudence.” This is what the philosopher means when he says that a virtue seems to have more in common with one contrary vice than with another, as temperance seems to have the greater kinship with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.

Presumption seems obviously opposed to fear, especially to servile fear, since servile fear is afraid of the punishment which comes from God’s justice, while presumption hopes that this will be remitted. It is nevertheless more opposed to hope, by reason of the false similarity which it bears as a kind of inordinate hope in God. Things which belong to the same genus are more opposed than things which belong to different genera (since contraries belong to the same genus), and for this reason presumption is more opposed to hope than it is to fear. For presumption and hope look to the same object, in which they both trust. Hope trusts ordinately, and presumption inordinately.

On the first point: just as we speak of hope loosely in reference to what is evil, although rightly only in reference to what is good, so is it with presumption. It is in this loose way that inordinate fear is called presumption.

On the second point: things are contrary when they are farthest removed within the same genus. Now presumption and hope imply movements which belong to the same genus, and which may be either ordinate or inordinate. Presumption is therefore more directly contrary to hope than to fear. For it is contrary to hope by reason of its specific difference, as the inordinate is contrary to the ordinate, while it is contrary to fear by reason of the difference which distinguishes its genus (namely, by the anxiety which is of hope).

On the third point: presumption is opposed to fear by reason of the difference which distinguishes its genus. But it is opposed to hope by reason of its own specific difference. Hence it is owing to the genus to which it belongs that presumption excludes fear entirely, while it excludes hope only to the extent to which its own specific difference excludes the ordinateness of hope.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Presumption is Caused by Vainglory

1. It seems that presumption is not caused by vainglory. For presumption appears to trust especially in the divine mercy, and mercy relates to misery, which is the opposite of glory. Hence presumption is not the result of vainglory.

2. Again, presumption is the opposite of despair, and despair is caused by sadness, as was said in Q. 20, Art. 4, ad 2. Now the causes of opposites are themselves opposite. Hence it appears that presumption is due to pleasure, and therefore to carnal vices, which are more voluptuous than others.

3. Again, the vice of presumption consists in aiming at an impossible good as if it were possible. But it is due to ignorance that one thinks a thing to be possible when it is impossible. Hence presumption is the result of ignorance, rather than of vainglory.

On the other hand: Gregory says (31 Moral. 17): “the presumption of novelties is the child of vainglory.”

I answer: as we said in the first article, there are two kinds of presumption. There is the presumption which trusts in one’s own power, and which attempts what transcends one’s power as if it were possible for oneself to attain it. Such presumption is obviously due to vainglory. For it is because a man has a great desire for glory that he attempts things beyond his power, especially novelties, which command more admiration. Hence Gregory says with point that the presumption of novelties is the child of vainglory. There is also the presumption which trusts inordinately in the divine mercy, or in the divine power, and by which one hopes to obtain glory without merit, or pardon without penitence. Presumption of this kind seems to arise directly out of pride. It is as if a man esteemed himself so highly as to think that

God would neither punish him nor exclude him from glory, even though he should sin.

The answers to the objections are now obvious.

III. ON CHARITY. SECUNDA SECUNDAE. QUESTIONS 23, 27

QUESTION TWENTY-THREE

OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF

THERE ARE EIGHT QUESTIONS CONCERNING CHARITY itself.

1. Whether charity is friendship.
2. Whether it is something created in the soul.
3. Whether it is a virtue.
4. Whether it is a particular kind of virtue.
5. Whether it is a single virtue.
6. Whether it is the greatest of the virtues.
7. Whether there can be any true virtue without charity.
8. Whether charity is the form of the virtues.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether Charity is Friendship

1. It seems that charity is not friendship. As the philosopher says in 8 Ethics 5, nothing is so characteristic of friendship as to live with a friend. But charity in man is toward God and the angels, “whose dwelling is not with flesh” according to Dan. 2:11. It follows that charity is not friendship.

2. Again, it is said in 8 Ethics 2 that there is no friendship where there is no return of affection. Now charity is extended even to enemies, according to Matt. 5:44: “Love your enemies.” It follows that charity is not friendship.

3. Again, the philosopher says that there are three kinds of friendship, founded on the pleasant, on the useful, and on the good (8 Ethics 3). Now charity is not a friendship founded on the useful, or on the pleasant. As Hieronymus says in his letter to Paulinus, “it is a true friendship, sealed by the bond of Christ, in which men are united not by any commonplace usefulness, nor merely by bodily presence, nor yet by any subtle and soothing flattery, but by the fear of God and the study of the sacred Scriptures.” But neither is it a friendship founded on goodness, since friendship of this kind obtains only between the virtuous, as the philosopher says in 8 Ethics 4, whereas by charity we love even sinners. It follows that charity is not friendship.

On the other hand: it is said in John 15:15: “Henceforth I call you not servants . . . but I have called you friends.” Now this was said to them by reason of charity, and not otherwise. Charity is therefore friendship.

I answer: as the philosopher says in 8 Ethics 2 and 3, it is not every love that has the character of friendship, but only the love which includes benevolence, by which we love someone so as to will some good for him. When we do not will good for the things we love, but seek their good for ourselves, as we do when we love wine, or a horse, or something of the kind, this is not the love of friendship, but a kind of concupiscence. It would indeed be ridiculous to say that one had friendship with wine, or with a horse. But benevolence is not enough for friendship. Friendship requires mutual love, because a friend is the friend of a friend, and such mutual goodwill is founded on communion. Now man has communion with God, since God communicates his beatitude to us, and this communion is bound to be the foundation of a certain friendship. Of this communion I Cor. 1:9 says: “God is faithful, by whom ye were called unto the fellowship of his Son.” The love which is founded on this communion is charity. It is apparent, then, that charity is a friendship of man with God.

On the first point: the life of man is twofold. We have no communication or conversation with God or the angels through the outward life, which we live according to our sensible and corporeal nature. But we converse both with God and with the angels through the spiritual life of the mind, even in our present imperfect state. Thus Phil. 3:20 says that “our conversation is in heaven,” and Rev. 22:3–4 says tnat this conversation will be made perfect in heaven, when “his servants shall serve him: and they shall see his face.” Charity is imperfect in this life, but will be made perfect in heaven.

On the second point: there are two ways in which friendship is extended to another. To one’s friend only, it is extended to another for his own sake. But it is also extended to another for the sake of a different person. For his friend’s sake a man may love all who belong to his friend, whether they be sons or slaves, or connected with him in any way. Love for a friend may indeed be so great that we love those who belong to him even though they should offend us or hate us. It is in this way that the friendship of charity extends even to enemies. The friendship of charity is first of all towards God, and we love them out of charity towards God.

On the third point: only one who is virtuous can be the principal friend to whom friendship based on goodness is extended. But those who belong to him are looked upon with love, even when they are not virtuous. Charity extends in this way to sinners, although it is especially a friendship founded on goodness. Through charity we love sinners for God’s sake.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether Charity is Something Created in the Soul

1. It seems that charity is not something created in the soul. Augustine says (8 De Trin. 8): “he who loves his neighbour loves love itself in consequence.” Now God is love. It is therefore God whom such a one principally loves in consequence. He says also (15 De Trin. 17): “we say God is love’ in the same way as we say God is a Spirit.’ It follows that charity is God himself, not anything created in the soul.”

2. Again, according to Deut. 30:20: “He is thy life,” God is spiritually the life of the soul, just as the soul is the life of the body. Now the soul enlivens the body through itself. Therefore God enlivens the soul through himself. But he enlivens the soul through charity, according to I John 3:14: “We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren.” Hence God is charity itself.

3. Again, nothing created has infinite power. Rather is every created thing vanity. Now charity is not vanity, but repels vanity. Charity, also, has infinite power, since it leads a man's soul to infinite good. Hence it is not anything created in the soul.

On the other hand: Augustine says (3 De Doctr. Christ. 10): "What I call charity is the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for his own sake." This movement is something created in the soul. Charity is therefore something created in the soul.

I answer: the Master examines this question thoroughly in 1 Sent., Dist. 17, and decides that charity is not something created in the soul, but the Holy Spirit dwelling in the mind. He does not mean that the movement of love by which we love God is itself the Holy Spirit. He means to say that the Holy Spirit causes this movement of love without any habit serving as a medium, as do the habits of faith and of hope, for example, or the habit of some other virtue, when it moves us to other virtuous actions. He said this because of the excellence of charity.

If we consider the matter aright, however, this is detrimental to charity rather than the reverse. For the movement of charity does not arise from the mind being moved by the Holy Spirit merely as a body is moved by an external mover, without being in any way the principle of its movement. This would be contrary to the nature of voluntary action, which must have its beginning within oneself, as we said in 12ae, Q. 6, Art. 1. It would mean that love is not voluntary, which is a contradiction, since the very nature of love implies that it is an action of the will. Nor can we say that the Holy Spirit moves the will to the act of love as one moves an instrument. An instrument may be a principle of action, but it does not decide to act or not to act. This, again, would take away the nature of voluntary action. It would also exclude merit, and we have already said that it is especially by the love of charity that merit is acquired (12ae, Q. 114, Art. 4). If the will is moved to love by the Holy Spirit, it must itself perform the act of love.

Now no action is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it is made connatural to that power by means of some form which is the principle of action. For this reason God, who moves all things to their proper end, has provided individual things with forms which incline them to the ends which he has assigned to them. In this way he “disposes all things sweetly,” as Wisdom 8:1 says. Now it is obvious that charity, as an action, exceeds the nature of the power of the will. Hence unless the will were inclined to charity by some form added to our natural power, this action would be more imperfect than its natural actions, and more imperfect than the actions of the other powers of the soul. Nor would it be performed easily and joyfully. But this is false, since no power inclines so readily to its proper action, nor performs it so joyfully, as charity. It is especially necessary for charity, therefore, that there should be in us some habitual form superadded to our natural power, inclining it to act with charity, and causing it to do so readily and joyfully.

On the first point: the divine essence itself is charity, just as it is also wisdom and goodness. The charity by which formally we love our neighbours is then a certain participation in the divine charity, in the same sense in which we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, or wise with the wisdom which is God (the goodness by which formally we are good being a kind of participation in divine goodness, and the wisdom by which formally we are wise being a kind of participation in divine wisdom). This manner of speaking is common among the Platonists with whose teaching Augustine was imbued, and his words have been a source of error to those who did not know this.

On the second point: God is the efficient cause both of life in the soul through charity and of life in the body through the soul. But charity is formally the life of the soul, just as the soul is formally the life of the body. We may therefore conclude that charity is directly united with the soul, just as the soul is directly united with the body.

On the third point: formally, charity is efficacious. But the efficacy of a form reflects the power of the agent who provides it. It is obvious that charity is not vanity. What it reveals, by its infinite effect of justifying the soul and thereby uniting it with God, is the infinite divine power which is its source.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether Charity is a Virtue

1. It seems that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship, and it is plain from 8 Ethics 1 that the philosophers do not regard friendship as a virtue, since they include it neither in the moral virtues nor in the intellectual virtues. Hence charity is not a virtue.

2. Again, it is said in 1 De Coelo et Mundi 116 that a virtue is what is ultimate in respect of a power. But charity does not come last. Rather do joy and peace come last. Hence it seems that charity is not a virtue, but that joy and peace are virtues, rather than charity.

3. Again, every virtue is possessed as a habit which is an accident. But charity is not possessed as an accident, since it is nobler than the soul, whereas no accident is nobler than its subject. Hence charity is not a virtue.

On the other hand: Augustine says {De Mor. Eccles. 11): “Charity is the virtue by which we love God, and which unites us to God when our attitude is faultless.”

I answer: human actions are good in so far as they are regulated by their proper rule and measure. Human virtue therefore consists in the attainment of the rule of human actions, since it is the principle of all good human actions. Now we said in Q. 17, Art. 1, that the rule of human action is twofold, namely, human reason, and God himself. Accordingly, while “that which accords with right reason” serves as a definition of moral virtue (6 Ethics 2), the attainment of God constitutes the nature of this virtue of charity, just as we said that it constitutes the nature of faith and of hope (Q. 4, Art. 5; Q. 17, Art. I). Charity is therefore a virtue, since it attains God through uniting us to God, as the quotation from Augustine affirms.

On the first point: in 8 Ethics 1 the philosopher does not deny that friendship is a virtue. He affirms that it either is a virtue or implies virtue. It may indeed be described as a virtue concerned with action toward another, although it is not the same as justice. Justice is concerned with what is legally due in action toward another. Friendship is concerned with what is morally due as between friends, or better, with what free beneficence requires, as the philosopher explains in 8 Ethics 13. But we may say that friendship is not in itself a virtue distinct from other virtues. Its praiseworthy and honourable character depends on its object, that is, on the goodness of the virtues upon which it is founded. This is clear from the fact that every friendship is not praiseworthy and honourable. Friendship founded on the pleasant or the useful is obviously not so. Virtuous friendship is therefore the consequence of virtue, rather than itself a virtue. With charity, however, it is otherwise. For charity is founded on the goodness of God, not on human virtue.

On the second point: it is the same virtue which loves something and also rejoices in it. As we said when dealing with the passions in 12ae, Q. 25, Art. 2, joy follows love, wherefore love is accounted a virtue rather than joy, which is the effect of love. That a virtue is ultimate in respect of a power implies not that it comes last in the order of effects, but rather that it comes last in a certain order of excess, as a hundred pounds exceeds forty.

On the third point: every attribute is inferior to its substance in respect of existence, since a substance exists in its own right, while an accident exists only in something else. In respect of its specific nature, however, although an accident which is caused by principles which lie within its subject is less noble than its subject, an accident which is caused by participation in a higher nature is more noble than its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of this higher nature. Light, for example, is nobler than a diaphanous body. In this way charity is nobler than the soul, since it is a certain participation in the Holy Spirit.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether Charity is a Specific Virtue

1. It seems that charity is not a specific virtue. For Hieronymus says (reference unknown, but Augustine says the same thing in Epist. 167): “I summarize all definitions of virtue thus—virtue is charity, by which we love God and our neighbour.” Augustine also implies in De Mor. Eccles. 15, and says expressly in 15 De Civ. Dei. 22, that “virtue is the rule of

love.” But the definition of virtue in general makes no mention of any specific virtue. Hence charity is not a specific virtue.

2. Again, what extends to the operations of all virtues cannot itself be a specific virtue. Now charity extends to the operations of all virtues, according to I Cor. 13:4: “Charity suffereth long, and is kind,” etc. It extends even to a man’s every deed, according to I Cor. 16:14: “Let all your things be done with charity.” Hence charity is not a specific virtue.

3. Again, the precepts of the law correspond to the acts of the virtues. Now Augustine says {De Perf. Just. 5): “The general commandment is Thou shalt love,’ and the general prohibition is Thou shalt not covet.’” Charity is thus a general virtue.

On the other hand: the general is never numbered together with the specific. But charity is numbered together with the specific virtues of hope and faith, as in I Cor. 13:13: “And now abideth faith, hope, and charity, these three.” Charity is therefore a specific virtue.

I answer: we have already explained (12ae, Q. 18, Art. 2, and Q. 54, Art. 2) that an act and a habit both derive their species from their object, and that the proper object of love is the good (12ae, Q. 17, Art. 1). There is therefore a specific kind of love where there is a specific kind of good. Now in its aspect as the object of happiness, divine good is a specific kind of good. The love of charity is consequently a specific kind of love, since it is the love of this specific good. Charity is therefore a specific virtue.

On the first point: charity is mentioned in the definition of virtue in general not because its nature is that which is common to every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it, as we shall show in Arts. 7 and 8. Prudence is mentioned in the definition of the moral virtues for a similar reason in 2 Ethics 6 and 6 Ethics 13, because they depend on prudence.

On the second point: a virtue or an art which is concerned with an ultimate end has authority over such virtues as are concerned only with other subordinate ends. Thus the art of the soldier commands the art of horsemanship, as is said in 1 Ethics 1. Now the object of charity is the final end of human life, which is eternal blessedness. Hence charity extends to the whole activity of human life by way of authority, not by directly determining every virtuous action.

On the third point: the precept of love is said to be the general commandment because all other precepts are subordinate to it as their end, according to I Tim. 1:5: “the end of the commandment is charity.”

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether Charity is a Single Virtue

1. It seems that charity is not a single virtue. For habits are different if their objects are different, and charity has two objects which are infinitely apart, namely, God and one’s neighbour. It follows that charity is not a single virtue.

2. Again, it was shown in Q. 17, Art. 6, and in 12ae, Q. 54, Art. 2, that a habit is diverse if its object has several aspects, even though its object is fundamentally one. Now there are many aspects of love to God, since we ought to love God in return for each benefit received. It follows that charity is not a single virtue.

3. Again, charity includes friendship towards one’s neighbour, and there are several kinds of friendship named by the philosopher in 8 Ethics 11 and 12. It follows that charity is not a single virtue, but a virtue of several different kinds.

On the other hand: as God is the object of faith, so is he the object of charity. Now according to Eph. 4:5: “One faith,” faith is a single virtue because of the unity of divine truth. Charity is therefore a single virtue because of the unity of divine goodness.

I answer: charity is friendship of man with God. Now we may distinguish between friendships according to their different ends, and say that there are three kinds of friendship, founded on the useful, on the pleasant, and on the good. We may also distinguish between them as does the philosopher in 8 Ethics 11 and 12, according to the different types of communion on which they are founded, and say there are friendships between relatives, between fellow-citizens, and between travellers, founded on natural relationship, on civil community, and on the companionship of the road. But we cannot divide charity in either of these ways. For the end of charity is one, since it is the divine goodness, and the communion of eternal beatitude on which its friendship is based is likewise one. It remains that charity is simply a single virtue, and not a virtue of several kinds.

On the first point: this reasoning would be valid if God and one's neighbour were objects of charity equally. But they are not so. God is the principal object of charity, whereas one's neighbour is loved for God's sake.

On the second point: by charity we love God for his own sake. The love of charity is therefore of one single kind. According to Ps. 106:1 it is love for God's goodness, which is his substance: "O give thanks unto the Lord; for he is good." Other reasons for which we love God, or ought to love him, are secondary and consequential.

On the third point: the philosopher is speaking of human friendship, in which there are diverse ends and diverse kinds of communion. But there is no such diversity in charity, as we have said, so that the two are not the same.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Charity is the Most Excellent of the Virtues

1. It seems that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. For the virtue of a higher power is the higher, just as its operation is the higher, and the intellect is a higher power than the will. It follows that faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity, which is in the will.

2. Again, that by means of which another thing works would seem to be inferior to it. A servant through whom his master acts, for example, is inferior to his master. Now Gal. 5:6 says that "faith worketh by love." It follows that faith is more excellent than charity.

3. Again, what is additional to something would seem to be more perfect. Now hope seems to be additional to charity, since the object of charity is the good, while the object of hope is arduous good. It follows that hope is more excellent than charity.

On the other hand: I Cor. 13:13 says: “the greatest of these is charity.”

I answer: human actions are good in so far as they are regulated by their proper rule. Human virtue therefore consists in the attainment of the rule of human actions, since it is the principle of good actions. We have already said in Art. 3 that the rule of human actions is twofold—human reason and God. But God is the first rule of human actions, and human reason must be ruled by him. The theological virtues consist in the attainment of the first rule, since their object is God. It follows that they are more excellent than the moral and intellectual virtues, which consist in the attainment of human reason. The most excellent of the theological virtues, further, must be that which attains God the most perfectly.

Now what exists through itself is always greater than what exists only through something else. Faith and hope attain God through learning the truth from him, and through receiving some good from him. But charity attains God so as to rest in God, not through receiving something from him. Charity is therefore more excellent than faith and hope, and consequently more excellent also than all other virtues. Prudence is similarly more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it attains reason through itself, whereas the others attain reason only through reason itself determining the mean in actions and passions.

On the first point: the operation of the intellect is completed when the thing understood is in him who understands. The excellence of its operation is therefore measured by the intellect itself. But the operation of the will, and also of any appetitive power, is completed when the subject is inclined to something as an end. The excellence of its operation is therefore measured by the object sought. Now as the Book on Causes maintains (props. 12, 20), when one thing exists in another thing, it does so according to the mode of the thing in which it exists. Hence anything which is lower than the soul must exist in the soul in a mode higher than that in which it exists by itself. But anything which is higher than the soul must exist by itself in a mode higher than that in which it exists in the soul. It follows that knowledge of things beneath us is more excellent than love of them. This is the reason why the philosopher places the intellectual virtues above the moral virtues in 6 Ethics 7 and 12. But love of things higher than ourselves is more excellent than knowledge of them. This is especially true of love to God. Charity is therefore more excellent than faith.

On the second point: faith does not use charity as an instrument, which is the way in which a master uses his servant, but as its own form. The reasoning is therefore false.

On the third point: it is the same good which is the object of charity and of hope. But charity implies union with its object, whereas hope implies distance from it. This is the reason why charity does not look upon the good as arduous, as does hope. The good is not arduous for charity, since charity is already one with it. It is thus clear that charity is more excellent than hope.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether there can be any True Virtue without Charity

1. It seems that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is a property of virtue to produce a good action, and those who lack charity nevertheless perform some good actions. They sometimes clothe the naked, feed the hungry, and do other similar things. There can therefore be true virtue without charity.

2. Again, there cannot be charity where there is no faith, since charity proceeds “out of faith unfeigned” (I Tim. 1:5). But those who lack faith can still have true chastity while they inhibit their desires, and true justice while they judge aright. There can therefore be true virtue without charity.

3. Again, it is evident from 6 Ethics 3 and 4 that science and art are virtues. But these are found in sinners who have no charity. There can therefore be true virtue without charity.

On the other hand: the apostle says in I Cor. 13:3: “And though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” But virtue is very profitable. According to Wisdom 8:7: “It teaches temperance, justice, prudence, and virtue, than which there is nothing in life more profitable to men.” There is therefore no true virtue without charity.

I answer: virtue is directed to the good, as we said in 12ae, Q. 55, Art. 3, and the good is fundamentally the end, since means to an end are said to be good only because they relate to an end. Now there are two kinds of end, one ultimate and the other proximate. There are therefore two kinds of good also, one ultimate and universal, the other proximate and particular. According to Ps. 73:28: “It is good for me to draw near to God,” the ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God. Man is directed to this by charity. The secondary and as it were particular good of man may be of two kinds. One of these is genuinely good, capable in itself of leading to the principal good which is his ultimate end. The other is only apparently good, not genuinely good, since it leads him away from his ultimate end. It is plain, then, that absolutely true virtue is virtue which directs a man to his principal good. As the philosopher says in 7 Physics, text 17, “virtue is the disposition of the perfect towards the best.”

It follows that there cannot be any true virtue without charity. If, however, we are to call that a virtue which directs one only to some particular end, then any virtue may be said to be true without charity, in so far as it directs one to some particular good. If this particular good is not a genuine good, but only an apparent good, the virtue which directs one to it will not be a true virtue, but only the false imitation of a virtue. As Augustine says (4 Cont. Julian. 3), “the prudence with which misers devise diverse means of gain is not true virtue; neither is the justice by which they leave another’s goods alone for fear of dire penalties; nor the temperance by which they curb their appetite for costly luxuries; nor the courage by which ‘they flee from poverty across sea, rock, and fire,’ as Horatius has it (1 Epistol. 1).” But if this particular good is a genuine good, such as the preservation of the state, or something of the kind, the virtue which directs one to it will be a true virtue. It will nevertheless be imperfect, if it is not brought into relation to the ultimate and perfect good. Absolutely true virtue, therefore, is impossible without charity.

On the first point: when a man lacks charity, his action may be of two kinds. When it is the expression of the very thing on account of which he lacks charity, it is always evil. What an unfaithful man does because he is unfaithful is always a sin, as Augustine says, even though he should clothe

the naked for the sake of his infidelity, or do something similar (4 Cont. Julian. 3). His action, however, may not be the expression of his lack of charity, but the expression of some different gift which he has received from God, such as faith, or hope, or even of the natural good which sin does not entirely destroy, as we said in Q. 10, Art. 4, and in 12ae, Q. 85, Arts. 1 and 2. Any such action may be good in its own way, without charity. But it cannot be perfectly good, since it is not directed to the ultimate end as it should be.

On the second point: an end has the same significance in practical matters as a first principle in speculative matters. Now there cannot be genuinely true science if an indemonstrable first principle is not properly understood. Neither can there be absolutely true justice or chastity without their due relation to the end, which relation depends on charity, however correct one may be in other respects.

On the third point: science and art, by their very nature, imply a relation to some particular good. But they do not relate to the ultimate end of human life as do the moral virtues, which make one good in an absolute sense, as we said in 12ae, Q. 56, Art. 3.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether Charity is the Form of the Virtues

1. It seems that charity is not the form of the virtues. The form of a thing is either its exemplary form or its essential form. But charity is not the exemplary form of the other virtues. If it were so, the other virtues would necessarily belong to the same species as charity. Neither is it their essential form. If it were so, it could not be distinguished from them. Hence charity is in no wise the form of the virtues.

2. Again, in Eph. 3:17 charity is compared to the root and the ground of the other virtues, “being rooted and grounded in love.” Now a root or a ground has the nature of a material element, rather than of a form, since it is the first part to be made. Hence charity is not the form of the virtues.

3. Again, 2 Physics, text 70, makes it plain that form, end, and efficient cause are not numerically identical. Now charity is said to be the mother of the virtues. We should not then say that it is their form.

On the other hand: Ambrose implies that charity is the form of the virtues (Commentary on Corinthians).

I answer: in moral matters, the form of an action depends principally on the end. The reason for this is that the principle of moral actions is the will, whose object, and as it were whose form, is the end. But the form of an action always depends on the form of the agent. In moral matters, therefore, what gives an action its form is the agency which directs it to its end. Now the preceding article made it clear that charity directs the actions of all other virtues to the ultimate end. It is therefore charity that gives their form to the actions of all other virtues. In this same sense it is said to "be the form of the virtues" since we speak of the virtues in relation to their actions as formed.

On the first point: charity is said to be the form of the other virtues neither as their exemplary form nor as their essential form, but rather as their efficient cause, in as much as it gives a form to each of them, as we have explained.

On the second point: charity is compared to a ground and a root because all other virtues are sustained and nourished by it, not because a ground and a root have the nature of a material cause.

On the third point: charity is said to be the end of the other virtues because all other virtues serve the end of charity. It is said to be the mother of the other virtues because it conceives the actions which it commands in them out of desire for the ultimate end, as a mother conceives in herself by another.

QUESTION TWENTY-SEVEN

OF THE PRINCIPAL ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE

There are eight questions concerning the principal act of charity.

1. Whether it is more proper to charity to love, or to be loved.
2. Whether the love of charity is the same as benevolence.
3. Whether God is to be loved for his own sake.
4. Whether God can be loved immediately in this life.
5. Whether God can be loved wholly.
6. Whether love to God has a mode.
7. Whether love to a friend or love to an enemy is the better.
8. Whether love to God or love to one’s neighbour is the better.

ARTICLE ONE

Whether to be Loved is More Proper to Charity than to Love

1. It seems that to be loved is more proper to charity than to love. For better persons have better charity, and they ought also to be loved more. To be loved is therefore more proper to charity.

2. Again, what is found in the greater number would seem to be the more in accordance with nature, and consequently the better. Now as the philosopher says in 8 Ethics 8, “there are many who wish to be loved rather than to love, and those who love flattery are always many.” To be loved is therefore better than to love, and consequently more in accordance with charity.

3. Again, the philosopher says (1 Post. An., text 5): “that on account of which anything is of a certain kind is itself more so.” Now men love on account of being loved, since “nothing evokes love so much as loving another first,” as Augustine says (De Catech. Rud., cap. 4). Charity therefore consists in being loved, more properly than in loving.

On the other hand: the philosopher says (8 Ethics 8): “friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved.” Now charity is a kind of friendship. It therefore consists in loving rather than in being loved.

I answer: to love belongs to charity as charity. For charity is a virtue, and therefore inclines to its proper act by its very essence. But to be loved is not the act of the charity of the loved one. The act of his charity is to love. He happens to be loved because another is moved by charity to seek his good, as one instance of the universal nature of good. This makes it clear that to love belongs to charity more properly than to be loved. For what belongs to a thing essentially and substantially belongs to it more properly than what belongs to it on account of something else. There are two signs of this. One is that friends are praised because they love, rather than because they are loved. If they are loved and do not love, they are indeed blamed. The other is that mothers, who love supremely, seek to love rather than to be loved. Some of them, as the philosopher says in 8 Ethics 8, "give their sons to a nurse, and love them without expecting any affection in return, if this is impossible."

On the first point: better persons are more lovable because they are better. But it is their own love that is greater because their charity is more perfect —although their love is proportionate to what they love. A better man does not love what is beneath him less than it deserves, whereas one who is not so good does not love a better man as he deserves to be loved.

On the second point: the philosopher says in the same passage that "men wish to be loved in so far as they wish to be honoured." For just as honour is shown to a man as a testimony of the good that is in him, so the fact that he is loved shows that there is some good in him, since only what is good can be loved. Thus men wish to be honoured for the sake of something else. But those who have charity wish to love for the sake of love itself, since love itself is the good of charity, just as the act of any virtue is the good of that virtue. The wish to love therefore belongs to charity more properly than the wish to be loved.

On the third point: some men do love on account of being loved. But this does not mean that they love for the sake of being loved. It means that love is one way of inducing a man to love.

ARTICLE TWO

Whether the Love which is an Act of Charity is the Same as Benevolence

1. It seems that the love which is an act of charity is nothing other than benevolence. For the philosopher says that "to love is to will good for someone," and this is benevolence. The act of charity is therefore nothing other than benevolence.

2. Again, an act belongs to the same power as its habit, and it was said in Q. 24, Art. 1, that the habit of charity belongs to the will. It follows that charity is an act of the will. But it is not an act of charity unless it intends good, and this is benevolence. The act of charity is therefore nothing other than benevolence.

3. Again, in 9 Ethics 4 the philosopher mentions five characteristics of friendship—that a man should will good for his friend, that he should wish him to be and to live, that he should enjoy his company, that he should choose the same things, and that he should grieve and rejoice together with him. Now the first two of these apply to benevolence. Hence the first act of charity is benevolence.

On the other hand: the philosopher says that "benevolence is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship" (9 Ethics 5). Now we said in Q. 23, Art. 1, that charity is friendship. It follows that benevolence is not the same as the love which is an act of charity.

I answer: benevolence is correctly said to be an act of the will whereby we will good for someone. But it differs from love, whether love be actualized in the sensitive appetite or in the intellectual appetite, which is the will. In the sensitive appetite, love is a kind of passion. Now every passion inclines to its object by impulse. Yet the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but results from unremitting contemplation of its object. The philosopher accordingly explains the difference between benevolence and passionate love by saying that benevolence "has neither emotion nor appetition," meaning that it does not incline to its object by impulse, but wills good to another solely by the judgment of reason. Moreover, passionate love is the result of continual acquaintance, whereas benevolence sometimes arises suddenly, as it does when we want one of two pugilists to win. In the intellectual appetite also, love differs from benevolence. For love implies a union of affection between the lover and the loved. One who loves looks upon the loved one as in a manner one with himself, or as belonging to himself, and is thus united with him. Benevolence, on the other hand, is a simple act of the will whereby one wills good for someone, without the presupposition of any such union of affection. The love which is an act of charity includes benevolence. But as love, or dilection, it adds this union of affection. This is the reason why the philosopher says that "benevolence is the beginning of friendship."

On the first point: the philosopher is giving a definition of love, indicating the character by which the act of love is most clearly revealed. He is not describing the whole nature of love.

On the second point: love is an act of the will which intends good. But it includes a union of affection with the loved one, which is not implied in benevolence.

On the third point: as the philosopher says in the same passage, these are characteristic of friendship because they spring from the love with which a man loves himself. That is to say, a man does all these things for his friend as if for himself, by reason of the union of affection of which we have spoken.

ARTICLE THREE

Whether by Charity God is to be Loved on Account of Himself

1. It seems that by charity God is to be loved not on account of himself, but on account of what is other than himself. For Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang. 11): "the soul learns to love the unknown from the things which it knows." Now by the unknown he means intelligible and divine things, and by the known he means the things of sense. Hence God is to be loved on account of things other than himself.

2. Again, according to Rom. 1:20: "the invisible things of him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," love to God is

consequential. Hence God is loved on account of what is other than himself, not on account of himself.

3. Again, the gloss (on Matt. 1:2: “Abraham begat Isaac”) says that “hope begets charity,” and Augustine (Tract. 9 in Joan.) says that “fear begets charity.” Now hope expects to receive something from God, and fear shrinks from something that God might inflict. It seems, then, that God is to be loved either on account of some good for which we hope, or on account of some evil which we fear. It follows that God is not to be loved on account of himself.

On the other hand: Augustine says (1 De Doctr. Christ. 4) that “to enjoy someone is to cling to him on account of himself,” and he also says that “God is to be enjoyed.” It follows that God is to be loved on account of himself.

I answer: “on account of” denotes a causal relation. But there are four kinds of cause—final cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and material cause. A material disposition is reducible to a material cause, since it is a cause conditionally only, not absolutely. We can thus affirm that one thing is to be loved “on account of” another according to each of these four kinds of cause. We love medicine, for example, on account of health as a final cause. We love a man on account of virtue as a formal cause, since by reason of virtue he is formally good, and consequently lovable. We love some persons on account of their being the sons of a certain father, which circumstance is the efficient cause of our love. We are also said to love a person on account of something which disposes us to love him, such as benefits received from him, this being a material disposition reducible to a material cause. Once we have begun to love a friend, however, we love him not on account of such benefits, but on account of virtue.

Now in each of the first three of these senses we love God on account of himself, not on account of what is other than himself. For God does not serve anything other than himself as a final end, but is himself the final end of all things. Neither is God formally good by reason of anything other than himself. For his own substance is his goodness, and his goodness is the exemplary form by which all things are good. Nor, again, is goodness in

God through another, but in all things through God. In the fourth sense, however, God can be loved on account of what is other than himself. For we are disposed to love God the more on account of other things, such as benefits received, or rewards for which we hope, or even the punishments which we hope to avoid through him.

On the first point: this quotation, “the soul learns to love the unknown from the things which it knows,” does not mean that the known is the formal, final, or efficient cause of love for the unknown. It means that one is disposed by what one knows to love the unknown.

On the second point: knowledge of God is acquired through other things. But once God is known, he is known not through other things, but through himself, in accordance with John 4:42: “Now we believe, not because of thy saying; for we have heard him ourselves, and know that this is indeed . . . the Saviour of the world.”

On the third point: hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain disposition.

ARTICLE FOUR

Whether God can be Loved Immediately in this Life

1. It seems that God cannot be loved immediately in this life. Augustine says (10 De Trin. 1, 2): “what is unknown cannot be loved.” In this life we do not know God immediately, since “now we see through a glass, darkly” (I Cor. 13:12). Neither then do we love him immediately.

2. Again, if we cannot do what is less, we cannot do what is more. Now to love God is more than to know him, since I Cor. 6:17 says: “he who is joined unto the Lord [that is, by love] is one spirit” with him. But we cannot know God immediately. Much less, then, can we love God immediately.

3. Again, according to Isa. 59:2: “your iniquities have separated between you and your God,” we are separated from God through sin. But sin is greater in the will than in the intellect. We are therefore less able to love God immediately than we are to know him immediately.

On the other hand: our knowledge of God is said to be dark because it is mediate, and it is evident from I Cor. 13 that it will vanish away in heaven. But the same passage says that the charity of the way does not fail. Hence the charity of the way adheres immediately to God.

I answer: we said in Pt. I, Q. 82, Art. 2, and Q. 84, Art. 7 that the act of the cognitive power is complete when the thing known is in him who knows, and that the act of an appetitive power is complete when the appetite is inclined to the thing itself. The movement by which an appetitive power inclines to things is therefore in accordance with the order of things themselves, whereas the action of the cognitive power is in accordance with the manner of the knower. The order of things themselves is such that God can be both known and loved in and through himself. For God is essentially existent truth and goodness, by which other things are known and loved. But since our knowledge begins from sense, things which are nearer to sense are known first, and the term of knowledge is in that which is furthest removed from sense.

Now love is the act of an appetitive power. We must therefore say that even in this life it tends first of all to God, and is thence turned towards other things. Hence charity loves God immediately, and loves other things through God as medium. With knowledge, however, this order is reversed. For we know God through other things, as we know a cause through its effect, whether we know him by the way of eminence or by the way of negation, as Dionysius says (4 Div. Nom., lects. 2, 3).

On the first point: the unknown cannot be loved. But the order of knowing and the order of love need not be the same. Love is the terminus of knowledge, and may therefore begin at the very point where knowledge comes to an end, that is, in the thing itself which is known through other things.

On the second point: love of God is more than knowledge of him, especially in this life, and therefore presupposes knowledge of him. But while knowledge seeks higher things through the medium of created things in which it cannot rest, love begins with higher things, and turns from them to other things by a kind of rotation. Knowledge begins with creatures and tends towards God. Love begins with God as its final end, and turns towards creatures.

On the third point: turning away from God is cured by charity, not by knowledge alone, and charity joins the soul to God immediately in a bond of spiritual union.

ARTICLE FIVE

Whether God can be Loved Wholly

1. It seems that God cannot be loved wholly. Love follows knowledge, and God cannot be known wholly by us, since this would be to comprehend him. He cannot then be loved wholly by us.

2. Again, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius explains (4 Div. Nom., lect. 9). But the heart of man cannot be united wholly with God, since “God is greater than our heart” (I John 3:20). God cannot then be loved wholly.

3. Again, God loves himself wholly. Hence if he were loved wholly by any other, another would love God as much as God loves himself. But this is impossible. It follows that God cannot be loved wholly by any creature.

On the other hand: it is said in Deut. 6:5: “thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart.”

I answer: when love is understood as a medium between the lover and the loved, the question whether God can be loved wholly may be understood in three ways. If the character of wholeness refers to what is loved, God ought to be loved wholly, since one ought to love everything that pertains to God. If it refers to him who loves, again God ought to be loved wholly, since a man ought to love God with all his might, and to devote his all to the love of God in accordance with Deut. 6:5: “thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart.” But the character of wholeness may be understood as referring to the comparison between the lover and what is loved, and as meaning that the manner of his love should be adequate to what is loved. This is impossible. God is infinitely lovable, since each thing is lovable in proportion as it is good, and since God’s goodness is infinite. But no creature can love God infinitely, since every power that any creature possesses is finite, whether it be natural or infused.

The reply to the objections is then obvious. The three objections argue from this third meaning of the question. The contrary assumes the second meaning.

ARTICLE SIX

Whether Love to God ought to have a Mode

1. It seems that love to God ought to have a mode. For Augustine makes it clear that the very nature of good consists in mode, species, and order (De Nat. Boni 3, 4), and love to God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: “above all things put on charity.” Love to God ought therefore to have a mode.

2. Again, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccles. 8): “Tell me, I pray, the mode of love. For I fear lest I be kindled with desire and love toward God more than I ought.” Now he would be asking in vain, if there were no mode of love to God. There must therefore be some mode of love to God.

3. Again, Augustine says (4 Gen. ad Litt. 3): “a mode is what its proper measure prescribes for each thing.” Now reason is the measure of man’s will as well as of his outward actions. Inward love to God ought therefore to have a mode which reason prescribes, just as the outward act of charity has a mode which reason prescribes, in accordance with Rom. 12:1: “your reasonable service.”

On the other hand: Bernard says {De Diligendo Deum 1): “The cause of love to God is God. Its mode is to love him without mode.”

I answer: the passage from Augustine quoted in the third point makes it clear that mode means a determination of measure. Now this determination is found both in a measure and in a thing which is measured, but in different ways. It belongs to a measure essentially, since a measure is itself determinative of other things, and gives them their form; whereas its presence in things measured is due to something other than themselves, that is, to their conformity with a measure. Hence a measure can contain nothing that is without mode. But a thing measured has no mode if it does not conform to its measure, but either falls short of it or exceeds it.

As the philosopher explains in 2 Physics, text 89, the proper reason for what we desire or do must be sought in the end. The end is thus the measure of anything that we may desire or do, and consequently has a mode on its own account. Things done for the sake of an end, on the other hand, have a mode because they are related to an end. Hence the philosopher says also, in 1 Politics 6, that “in every art, the desire for the end has neither end nor limit.” But what is done for the sake of an end does have a limit. A doctor does not prescribe any limit for health, which he makes as perfect as he can. But he does prescribe a limit for medicine. He does not give as much medicine as possible, but as much as health requires, and medicine would be without mode if it exceeded or fell short of this amount.

Now love to God is the end of every human action and affection, wherein especially we attain our ultimate end, as we said in Q. 23, Art. 6. Love to God cannot then have a mode such as applies to things which are measured, and which may be either too much or too little. But it does have a mode such as applies to a measure, of which there is no excess, but the greater the conformity to rule the better. Hence love to God is the better, the more God is loved.

On the first point: to have a quality essentially is more significant than to have it on account of something else. Thus a measure, which has a mode essentially, is better than a thing measured, which has a mode on account of something other than itself. Hence also charity, which has a mode as a measure, is more eminent than the other virtues, which have a mode as things which are measured.

On the second point: as Augustine adds in the same passage, “the mode of love to God is to love him with all our heart,” which means that God ought to be loved as much as he can be loved. So it is with any mode which applies to a measure.

On the third point: an affection is to be measured by reason if its object is subject to the judgment of reason. But the object of love to God is God, who transcends the judgment of reason. Hence love to God also transcends the judgment of reason, and is not to be measured by reason. Neither can we compare the inward act of charity with its outward acts. The inward act of charity has the nature of an end, since man's ultimate good consists in the adherence of his soul to God, in accordance with Ps. 73:28: “It is good for me to draw near to God.” Its outward acts, on the other hand, are the means to this end.

ARTICLE SEVEN

Whether it is more Meritorious to Love an Enemy than to Love a Friend

1. It seems that it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend. For it is said in Matt. 5:46: “if ye love them which love you, what reward have ye?” Thus love to a friend does not merit a reward. But love to an enemy does merit a reward, as the same passage shows. It is therefore more meritorious to love enemies than to love friends.

2. Again, an action is the more meritorious the greater is the charity from which it springs. Now Augustine says that it is the perfect sons of God who love their enemies (Enchirid. 73), whereas even those whose charity is imperfect love their friends. It is therefore more meritorious to love enemies than to love friends.

3. Again, there would seem to be greater merit where there is greater effort for good, since it is said in I Cor. 3:8: “every man shall receive his own reward, according to his labour.” Now it takes a greater effort to love an enemy than to love a friend, since it is more difficult. It seems, then, that it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend.

4. On the other hand: the better love is the more meritorious. Now to love a friend is the better, since it is better to love the better person, and a friend who loves one is better than an enemy who hates one. Hence it is more meritorious to love a friend than to love an enemy.

I answer: as we said in Q. 25, Art. 1, God is the reason why we love our neighbour in charity. Hence when it is asked whether it is better or more meritorious to love a friend or to love an enemy, we may compare the two either in respect of the neighbour who is loved, or in respect of the reason why he is loved. In respect of the neighbour who is loved, love to a friend is more eminent than love to an enemy. A friend is better than an enemy, and more closely united with oneself. He is thus the more fitting material for love, and the act of love which passes out to such material is consequently the better. The contrary act is also worse for the same reason. It is worse to hate a friend than to hate an enemy.

But love to an enemy is the more eminent in respect of the reason for it, on two grounds. First, we may love a friend for some reason other than God, whereas God is the sole reason for love to an enemy. Secondly, supposing that each of them is loved for God's sake, a man's love to God is shown to be the stronger if it extends his soul to what is farther removed from himself, that is, to the love of enemies; just as the power of a fire is shown to be greater if it extends its heat to objects more remote. For our love to God is shown to be so much the greater when we achieve harder things for the sake of it, just as the power of a fire is shown to be so much the stronger when it is able to consume less combustible material.

But charity nevertheless loves acquaintances more fervently than those who are distant, just as the same fire acts more strongly on nearer objects than on those which are more remote. Considered in itself, love to friends is in this respect more fervent, and better, than love to enemies.

On the first point: the word of our Lord must be understood through itself. Love to friends does not merit a reward in God's sight when they are loved only because they are friends, as would seem to be the case when we love them in a way in which we do not love our enemies. But love to friends is meritorious when they are loved for God's sake, and not merely because they are friends.

The replies to the other points are plain from what we have said. The second and third argue from the reason for love. The fourth argues from the person who is loved.

ARTICLE EIGHT

Whether it is more Meritorious to Love One's Neighbour than to Love God

1. It seems that it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbour than to love God. For the apostle presumably prefers the more meritorious, and according to Rom. 9:3: he would choose to love his neighbour rather than to love God: “For I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for my brethren.” It is therefore more meritorious to love one’s neighbour than to love God.

2. Again, it was said in the preceding article that to love a friend is in one sense less meritorious. Now God is very much a friend, since “he first loved us,” as I John 4:19 says. Hence it seems that to love God is less meritorious.

3. Again, what is more difficult would seem to be more virtuous and more meritorious, since “virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good” (2 Ethics 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one’s neighbour. All things love God naturally. Moreover, there is nothing unlovable in God, which is not the case with one’s neighbour. Love to one’s neighbour is therefore more meritorious than love to God.

On the other hand: “that on account of which anything is of a certain kind is itself more so.” Now love to one’s neighbour is meritorious only on account of love to God, for whose sake he is loved. Hence love to God is more meritorious than love to one’s neighbour.

I answer: this comparison may be understood in two ways. If, in the first place, each love is considered in isolation, love to God is undoubtedly the more meritorious. For love to God merits a reward on its own account, since its ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to whom its own movement tends. A reward is therefore promised to such as love God, in John 14:21: “he that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I . . . will manifest myself to him.” But the comparison may also be understood to be between love to God alone and love to one’s neighbour for God’s sake. If so, love to one’s neighbour includes love to God, whereas love to God does not include love to one’s neighbour. The comparison is then between perfect love to God which extends to one’s neighbour, and love to God which is insufficient and imperfect. For it is written in I John 4:21: “And this commandment have we from him, That he who loveth God love his brother also.” In this latter sense, love to one’s neighbour is the better.

On the first point: according to the exposition of one gloss (Lyrani), the apostle did not wish to be separated from Christ when in the state of grace, but had so desired when in the state of unbelief, and consequently is not to be imitated in this regard. Or we may say with Chrysostom (1 De Compunct. 8; Hom. 16 in Epist. ad Rom.) that this does not prove that the apostle loved his neighbour more than he loved God, but that he loved God more than he loved himself. For he was willing to be deprived for a time of the enjoyment of God, which he would have sought out of love for himself, to the end that God should be honoured among his neighbours, which he desired out of love to God.

On the second point: love to a friend is sometimes the less meritorious because the friend is loved for his own sake. Such love lacks the true ground of the friendship of charity, which is God. That God should be loved for his own sake does not therefore diminish merit, but constitutes the whole ground of merit.

On the third point: It is the good rather than the difficult that provides the ground of merit and of virtue. Hence all that is more difficult is not bound to be more meritorious, but only what is more difficult and also better.

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NINETY-NINE HOMILIES OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

UPON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS FOR FORTY-NINE SUNDAYS OF THE CHRISTIAN YEAR

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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NINETY-NINE HOMILIES OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS: UPON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS FOR FORTY-NINE SUNDAYS OF THE CHRISTIAN YEAR

PREFACE

FOR the large circulation which has fallen to the lot of the several portions of these Homilies, now collected into one volume, for the favourable criticism accorded to them by the press, and for the number of private expressions of approval which the Editor has received from fellow Priests, he feels deeply grateful; yet his gratitude is not so much on his own account, or on that of his little book, as that this portion, at least, of the writings of S. Thomas Aquinas is allowed to be capable of supplying one of the wants of the present day—a really sound help to sermon-making. It is a most cheering and encouraging fact, that the men of the present day are willing in any degree to acknowledge, that they can learn something of value from the great Schoolman. Despite all the undeserved contempt and obloquy heaped upon the Schoolmen, both at the time of the so-called revival of letters and ever since; despite the vast advances which have been made during the last half century in every department of theological learning and criticism; and, lastly, despite the growth of that spirit of infidelity, a combined product of the nominalism which accompanied the religious convulsions three hundred years ago, and of the Protestant dogma of right of private judgment—the sermons of the "Angelical Doctor" are being not only read, but preached, in substance, if not in form, in many churches, both at home and in the Colonies. The Translator's work has been indeed a labour of love, sweetened by the thought and strengthened by the belief that this little book must contribute, in some small degree, to a revival amongst us of the Scholastic Theology. There are many reasons which render such a revival desirable, and at the present time especially so; but there is one reason above all others which claims to be stated here.

In so far as things divine have an intellectual basis, and can be shadowed forth by any operation of the mind, they must be represented to us by conceptions which far surpass any possible earthly manifestation of them. The "hypostasis of things hoped for" can only spring from the abiding conviction, that we are now to rest upon certain ideas which hereafter shall be exchanged for their realities. Now, we can form but an idea of what the absolutely good, and true, and beautiful may be like; by-and-by we expect to see these ideas realized, in God, and in our glorified selves. Yet perfect goodness, and truthfulness, and beauty, and holiness are not mere ideas; they are realities, finding their true archetype in the mind and being of God—realities of which, by our union with Him through our Blessed Lord, we may hope to be partakers. The teaching of the four great Schoolmen, of Abert the Great, as well as of the Seraphic, Angelical, and Subtle Doctors, was, in common with that of Plato and the New Testament, essentially and entirely realistic. However the Scotists differed from the Thomists on some questions of Theology, they were quite agreed upon this point. However Luther may have differed from Zwingle, and Zwingle from Calvin, in their "views" of Sacramental grace, they were "consented together" in support of that nominalism which would reduce the deep mysteries of the Kingdom of Grace to mere names, and would limit our conceptions of them, and endeavours after them, to what it seems now possible to attain. It is not too much to say, that the Sadduceeism which is now sapping all the vitality of our faith and morals, is but the legitimate product of that nominalism which has lain at the root of all religious belief ever since the religious movement of the sixteenth century. Because the Scholastic Theology is realistic in its teaching, it is the only antidote which will be powerful enough to counteract the effects of that pernicious influence which the Teutonic Upas-tree has cast over so large a portion of Christendom. In these skeleton sermons, the realistic teaching is, with one single exception (Epiph. Hom. I., § iii.), indirect, giving to them an anti-monastic tone and temper, at the same time not leading to the sacrifice of any portion of their practical bearing. Short and unpretending as they are, they admit of a threefold use.

Firstly, they can be taken as profitable guides in directing private or devotional reading; for they are full of vigorous and condensed thoughts—they bring things new and old together in a striking relationship. We notice a few such thoughts. In the Advent Homilies (I.) the sevenfold benefit of our Blessed Lord's second coming; and the moral aphorism, that "a man is in the judgment by thinking upon the judgment;" that goodness has its precepts, counsels, and promises (Hom. IV.); the threefold cry of Christ (Hom. IX.) In the Lenten Homilies, the fast in Paradise, and our Lord's fasting as joined with His Baptism (Hom. I.); the seven things that our Lord did upon the Mountain (Hom. VIII.); and the threefold nature of the Word of God (Hom. X.) The Easter Homilies explain the three kinds of flowers in our Lord, and the three typical Maries (Hom. II.); what it is for a man to be at peace with himself (Hom. V.); the three gifts of Christ—His Body, His Blood, His Soul (Hom. VI.); three reasons why the Adorable Son came forth from the Father (Hom. XII.) In the Trinity Homilies, we read of the Heavenly Feast, its makers, ministers, and guests (Hom. IV.); how the Holy Angels stand before God in contemplation, love, and praise (Hom. VI.); why the Holy Angels desire the creature's future glory (Hom. VII.); the seven loaves with which she feeds the faithful (Hom. XIV.); three witnesses against the sinner in the Judgment—God, conscience, creation; it is a momentary thing which delights, an eternal thing which crucifies (Hom. XX.); unity of the intellect, of the affections, of the life (Hom. XXXIII.); the security, the pleasantness, and abundance of the City of God (Hom. XXXVII.); the translation of the Saints (Hom. XLVII.) Such as these are the lines of reflection which S. Thomas offers to the contemplation of the thoughtful and devout reader, presenting the subject in germ, leaving its development to the effort of individual minds. As neither moral nor spiritual truth affects any two persons in precisely the same way, such a method of presenting truth as this is, leaves for the initiated mind nothing to be desired; whilst the uninitiated soul would scarcely be capable of receiving the generalizations of S. Thomas in any form.

Secondly, these Homilies are valuable as giving the scholastic interpretation of many texts of Holy Scripture; valuable as shewing how the Schoolmen saw our Blessed Lord as shadowed forth in type and prophecy in God's servants of old. Amongst a vast number of explained texts, we select the following, as worthy of special notice:—

In the Advent Homilies, Joel 3:18, a prophecy of the Incarnation (Hom. I.); Hos. 13:14, the spoliation of Hades; Eph. 1:18, the reparation of Heaven; Isa. 61:1 fully commented on; 2 Sam. 22:36 applied to our Blessed Lord (Hom. II.); Ps. 148:6, universal service of God by creation (Hom. III.); Ps. 39:3, the fire that burned, that of contrition.

In the Lenten Homilies, Heb. 9:10, the "reformation," as of the Jew; Prov. 1:8, the "mother" is Holy Church (Hom. I.); Rev. 16:13, the frogs are spirits of detraction (Hom. IV.); Job 16:22, the walk of death (Hom. V.); Ezek.

28:16, interpreted of a devil (Hom. VI.); Ps. 31:21, the “shining city” is the City of God; Isa. 31:9, fire and furnace symbols of charity (Hom. VII.); S. John 14:30, our Blessed Lord walking dryshod over the sea of this world; Exod. 35:30 gives the twelve breads with which our Lord feeds the faithful (Hom. VIII.); Zech. 9:11, the deliverance of the Saints from Hades (Hom. IX.); Job 4:12, the mental word (Hom. X.); Coloss. 1:3, recruiting of the Heavenly Ones (Hom. XII.)

In the Easter Homilies is noted Ex. 12:21, Numb. 9:3–5, Jos. 5:10, the three mystical Passovers (Hom. I.); Cant. 2:12, flowers are the splendour of the Lord’s glorified Body; S. Matt. 28:2, the earthquake a leaping of the earth for joy (Hom. II.); Ezek. 36:25, clean water of Holy Baptism (Hom. III.); Jer. 11:19, our Blessed Lord the Lamb brought to the slaughter (Hom. V.); Ezek. 4:14, the Lord feeding His flock (Hom. VI.); Judges 2:1 proves sadness of this present world; Nah. 1:13 applied to eternal happiness (Hom. VIII.); Lam. 3:26, the elevation of the mind to God.

The Trinity Homilies are very rich in deep and thoughtful readings of Holy Scripture. Isa. 25:5, the feast of the new Creation (Hom. IV.); Isa. 6:5, seraphims of purification (Hom. VI.); Ps. 105:6, the reparation of the Heavenly City (Hom. VII.); Isa. 26, the lost gift of glory (Hom. IX.); Isa. 3:14 explains the “council” of S. Matt. 5:22 (Hom. XII.); Ps. 132:15, the Eternal Bread (Hom. XIV.); Job 20:27 referred to final Judgment (Hom. XVIII.); Isa. 30:1–3, shews the nature of the trust of the wicked (Hom. XXIII.); S. Mark 7:33, mystical fingers put into ears (Hom. XXIV.); Ps. 57:3, healing power of Holy Baptism (Hom. XXVI.); Ps. 76:2, Salem, the Tabernacle of Peace (Hom. XXVII.); Isa. 33:20, a description of the City of God (Hom. XXXVIII.); Isa. 3:14, army of Saints final ministers of punishment (Hom. XL.); Prov. 18:4, “deep waters” represent the Old Testament, the “flowing brooks” the New Testament (Hom. L.) These Homilies are, to a limited extent, a commentary upon many difficult passages of the Inspired Canon.

Thirdly, the great use of these Homilies is for sermon-making. They bring a text of Holy Scripture to bear upon each statement; they adopt a natural division of the subject; they take up minute details which signify much, but which at first sight seem to be wholly unworthy of notice; they contrast in the strongest possible way nature with grace. These four statements can be proved with the utmost ease by a careful reading of only a few of the Homilies.

There are two methods by which these outlines can be expanded into a sermon of the required length for the present day: by enlarging upon the divisions of each and every head, lengthening the whole sermon equally. But by far the most telling result is obtained, in the majority of cases at least, by confining the expansion to only one head. Take, for example, Homily X., for Lent: "The Word of God and its Hearers." Omitting the first head, the three ways in which the Saints are of God; the third and fourth heads, the foolishness and misery of those who hear not; we treat alone of the second head, the Threefold Word of God which the Saints hear.

"1. Eternal: S. John 1:1, 'In the beginning was the Word.' " This naturally leads to the mention of all the utterances of God the Son, whether as the Word creative or prophetical, before the Incarnation; of what our Lord did in that infinite abyss of past time, in that eternal to-day of God when the Son went out to create the worlds. The pre-Incarnate naturally links itself on to the Incarnate Word, to our Lord's eternal words which He spake in time; eternal in import, containing an eternal consequence either for life or for death. These eternal words He is speaking in His Body the Church now; as He spake, so speaks the Church, proclaiming those words of truth and life, which became as wells of water in the souls of the faithful, springing up into everlasting life. So for ever to His Elect will the Saviour speak words of encouragement, and hope, and love; at the end of all things of love only, when charity alone remains. The Eternal Word, "I am Alpha and Omega." Abel heard His voice; all the Patriarchs and Prophets of the Elder Church—all the Saints, Virgins, Martyrs, Confessors of the New Covenant; the Voice of the Beloved, eternal as His own nature is, eternal in power and action upon ourselves. The Saints "hear by faith." He it is Who is speaking in His Holy Sacraments, by the mouths of His Priests. Meet it is that the Eternal High Priest should speak in the Eternal Mysteries of His Church and Kingdom. We need faith in these Mysteries, in order that we may hear His "Eternal Word."

2. Mental: Job 4:12, "A thing [word, Vulg.] was secretly brought to me." Not that secret word which, as S. Gregory says, the heretics pretend to hear, who represent the Woman of Solomon saying (Prov. 9:17; Vulg. 7), "Stolen waters are sweeter, and bread eaten in secret is more pleasant." Not that

secret word which would lift some above others, and which can only be obtained by secret means, but that communication of inward inspiration when the secret word is delivered to the minds of the Elect, of whom S. John says (1 S. John 2:27), “His anointing teacheth you all things.” This is that mental word which is received in the heart by the utterance of the Holy Ghost; secret, to be felt, not expressed in the noise of speech; it sounds secretly in the ear of the soul. Seek we to have our souls silent before God, freed from pleadings of all emotion, to catch the accents of the mental word. This mental word is the fruit of contemplation; and, by the chinks of such contemplation, God speaks to us, not in voice, but through mind; not fully developing Himself, yet revealing something of Himself to the mind of man. As we bore through the strata of earth to find that water which is silently circulating through its crust, so we, by contemplation, boring through the strata of the letter, find the ever-flowing grace which reveals itself as a mental word: the Saints hear this “by inspiration (Ps. 85:8), ‘I will hear what God the Lord will speak’ ” (p. 18).

3. Vocal: S. Matt. 4:4, “Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth,” &c. Vocal words: God’s commands, His promises, the dogmatic teaching of the Catholic faith—this the Saints learn and hear “by preaching (S. Luke 8:8), ‘He that hath ears to hear, let him hear’ ” (p. 19). Take heed how ye hear. Office of preaching in the Church. Duty of hearers and of preachers. Sum up these words: Incarnate Word, to be believed on; Inspired Word, to be felt; Preached Word, to be lived upon.

After all, it must be left to the preacher’s own peculiar habit of thought to determine which of the heads shall be expanded; and the manner in which this is to be done. The Homily upon which the attempt has been made is not as favourable as some others for the experiment; it seemed fairer to take a more unlikely one to illustrate in the process, as far as the translator had the power to do so. Almost a course of Sermons could be founded upon Homily XLV., for the Twenty-third Sunday after Trinity.

In regard to the Author of these Homilies, he was born A.D. 1224, in the castle of Aquin, in the territory of Labore, in Italy, being descended from the Kings of Sicily and Aragon. Educated firstly in the Monastery of Mount Cassino, afterwards at Naples. In 1244, studied at Cologne under Albertus Magnus. Doctor of Paris, 1255. Returned into Italy, 1263. Professor of

Scholastic Theology at Naples. Died 1274, in the Monastery of Fossanova, near Terracina. An old distich prefixed to his portrait runs thus:—

Nobilibus Thomas generatus utroque parente
Terrarum scriptis claret ubique suis.

And he will shine as long as profound Scriptural Theology shall continue to hold its own in the world. May this little book be but a first fruit of the revival amongst us of the study of the writings of S. Thomas Aquinas.

S. Peter Mancroft, Norwich,
Feast of S. Matthew, 1867.

LAUS DEO.

THE ADVENT HOMILIES OF S. THOMAS AQUINAS

TRANSLATED BY

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MDCCCLXVII.

NOTICE

The Homilies of the great “Angelical Doctor” are but outlines, the filling in of which are left to the preacher’s own judgment and taste. It is because these outline Homilies are so very full of suggestive hints, and display such a very wonderful knowledge of Holy Scripture, that the experiment is made of presenting the Advent series to the reader in an English dress. The skeleton character of the original is preserved in the translation. If the present publication should meet with a fair amount of success, the remaining Homilies for the entire Christian year will be published in the same form.

HOMILY I

THE FOUR-FOLD DAY

FIRST SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“The day is at hand.”—Rom. 13:12.

THIS word Day is to be taken in a four-fold sense—“The Day is at hand;” the day of mercy, the day of grace, the day of justice, and the day of glory. That Sun makes this a four-fold day, whose advent holy Church now celebrates. The day of mercy is the birth-day of the Lord, in which the Sun of Righteousness arises upon us; or more truly, He Who made that day so glorious. The day of grace is the time of grace; the day of justice is the day of judgment; the day of glory is the day of eternity. Joel speaks of the first—(3:18)—“In that day the mountains shall drop down new wine, and the hills shall flow with milk.” Concerning the second, 2 Cor. 6:2, “Behold, now is the day of salvation.” Of the third, Wis. 1, “The day of wrath, that day the day of tribulation.” Concerning the fourth, Zach. 14:7, “But it shall be one day which shall be known to the Lord—not day, nor night; but it shall come to pass that at evening time it shall be light.” Psalm 135:10, “One day in Thy Courts is better than a thousand.” The birth-day of the Lord draws near, that devoutly the day of mercy may be celebrated and honoured; the day of grace that it may be received; the day of judgment that it may be feared; the day of glory that it may be attained. The Church celebrates the first, Phil. 4:5, “For the Lord is at hand.” Isa. 56:1, “For My salvation is near to come, and My righteousness is near to be revealed.” On account of the second, 2 Cor. 6:2, “Behold, now is the accepted time; behold, now is the day of salvation.” On account of the third, James 5:9, “Behold the Judge standeth before the door.” On account of the fourth, Rev.

22:12, “Behold I come quickly, and My reward is with Me to give to every man according as his work shall be.”

We ought to celebrate the birth-day of the Lord, the day of mercy, with mercy and truth. Christ came to us in these two ways, and so we ought to go to Him. Ps. 25:10, “All the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth.” To celebrate the day of grace with purity and humility, for these two graces make acceptable grace. Of the first, Prov. 22:11, “He that loveth pureness of heart, for the grace of his lips, the King shall be his friend.” Of the second, James 4:6, “God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace to the humble.” The Church celebrates the day of judgment with meditation and fear. As S. Jerome says, “Whether I eat or drink, that voice seems ever to resound in my ears, ‘Rise up, ye dead, and come to judgment.’ ” On the contrary, it is said of the wicked, Prov. 28:5, “Evil men understand not judgment.” We ought to hasten to run to meet the day of glory with righteousness. Heb. 4:11, “Let us labour, therefore, to enter into that rest.” To four Christian virtues the Apostle exhorts us in this epistle. To mercy and truth in the words, “Let us put on the armour of light.” For the arms of light are mercy and truth; for mercy is the shield by which we are defended from the enemy, and truth is the power by which we overcome all things. Of the first, Eccl. 29:12, 13, “Shut up alms in thy store-houses, and it shall deliver thee from all affliction. It shall fight for thee against thine enemies better than a mighty shield and a strong spear.” Of courage, Eccles. 3:4, “Truth is great, and will prevail; it is great, and stronger than all things; the whole earth invokes truth, and it blesses heaven itself; it moves all work, and they tremble because of it, and there is no iniquity in it. A wicked banquet, a wicked king, wicked women, all wicked sons of men, and all their wicked works, and truth is not in them, and they shall perish in their iniquity, and truth shall remain.” The epistle further exhorts us to purity and humility, “Not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying” (13:13). Chambering and wantonness are acts of riot which make impurity. Strife and envying proceed from pride. In prohibiting immodesty it exhorts to purity; in prohibiting pride it exhorts to humility. In the words, “Let us walk honestly, as in the day,” it awakens us to reflection upon and to fear of the judgment; that is, that we should so live as it is meet to live in the day of judgment. A man is in the judgment by thinking upon the judgment; he lives honestly by fearing the judgment. It exhorts us to justice and despatch

—“Now it is high time to awaken out of sleep;” and, therefore, by hastening from the sleep of sin, to arise to the fulfilling of justice; and the reason is given why a man should do this: “For now is our salvation nearer than when we believed;” to which salvation may we be led by Jesus Christ Our Lord.

HOMILY II

THE COMING OF THE KING

FIRST SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Behold, thy King cometh unto thee, meek,” &c.—S. Matt. 21:5.

THIS is a prophecy of the Advent of Our Lord Jesus Christ, about which there are three signs. First, the dignity of Him Who is coming; secondly, the utility of His Advent; thirdly, the manner in which He came. Of the first sign we read in the Gospel, “Thy King cometh;” a merciful King; a just King; a wise King; a terrible King; an omnipotent King; an eternal King. A merciful King in sparing; a just in judging; a good in rewarding; a wise in governing; an omnipotent King in defending the good; a terrible King in punishing the evil; an eternal King in ruling eternally, and in bestowing immortality. Of the first, Isa. 16:5, “And in mercy shall the throne be established.” Of the second, Isa. 34, “And behold, a King shall reign in justice;” Isa. 16:5, “And He shall sit upon it in truth in the tabernacle of David.” Of the third, Ps. 73:1, “Truly God, is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart.” Of the fourth, Jer. 23:5, “I will raise unto David a righteous branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth.” Of the fifth, Esth. 3:9, “O Lord, Lord, the King Almighty, for the whole world is in Thy power.” Of the sixth, Wis. 11:10, “As a severe King, Thou didst condemn and punish.” Of the seventh, Jer. 10:10, “But the Lord is the true God, He is the living God and an everlasting King;” S. Luke 1:33, “And of His Kingdom there shall be no end.” Of the seven, collectively, 2 Macc. 1:24, “O Lord, Lord, God, Creator of all things, Who art fearful, and strong, and righteous, and merciful, and the only gracious King.” Wisdom in the Creator, mercy in the pitiful, goodness in the good, justice in the just, severity in the terrible, power in the powerful, eternity in the eternal. This is the King Who Cometh to thee for thy profit. Here the use of the Advent is noted, for it was seven-fold as applied to the present time:—First, for the illumination of the world; second, for the spoliation of Hades; third, for the reparation of Heaven; fourth, for the destruction of sin; fifth, for the vanquishment of the devil; sixth, for the reconciliation of man with God; seventh, for the beatification of man. Of the first, S. John 8:12, "I am the light of the world: he that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life;" S. John 1:9, "That was the true light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world." Of the second, Hos. 13:14, "O death, I will be thy plague; O grave, I will be thy destruction;" Zech. 9:11, "As for thee also, by the blood of thy covenant, I have sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water." Of the third, Eph. 1:10, "That in the dispensations of the fulness of times might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth, even in Him." Of the fourth, Heb. 2:14, 15, "That He might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage." Of the fifth, Rom. 6:6, "Knowing this, that our old man is crucified with Him, that the body of sin might be destroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin." Of the sixth, Rom. 5:10, "For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life." Of the seventh, S. John 3:16, "For God so loved the world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." It was because the holy Fathers saw the good things which were about to happen at His Advent that they were calling with so great desire, "O that Thou wouldst rend the heavens and come down." Concerning these seven things the Prophet spake, Isa. 61:1, "The Spirit of the Lord God is upon Me, because the Lord hath anointed Me to preach good tidings unto the meek; He hath sent Me to bind up the broken-hearted; to proclaim liberty to the captives, and the opening of the prison to them that are bound; to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord," &c. He hath "anointed Me to preach good tidings." Behold, the illumination of the world, for by preaching He hath enlightened the world for us; "to bind up the broken-hearted," in destroying sin; and sin being destroyed, makes the broken heart to be healed. "To proclaim liberty to the captives:" behold the spoliation of Hades, for by spoiling Hades He led captivity captive. “The opening of the prison:” behold the restoration of Heaven, which is the opening of Heaven. “To proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord:” behold the reconciliation of man with God. “The day of vengeance of our God” is the day of the destruction of the devil: for so He visited with vengeance for all the injuries which the devil had done to the saints. “To comfort all that mourn:” behold the beatification of men. In this verse is noted the manner of His coming. “Meek:” in meekness Our Lord Jesus Christ wished to come; and He wished to come meekly for four reasons. In the first place, that He might the more easily correct the wicked: Psalm 89:10 (Vulgate reading), “For mildness is come upon us; and we shall be corrected.” In the second place, that He might show to all His lowliness: Eccles. 3:19, “My Son, do Thy work in meekness, and Thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men.” In the third place, that He might draw the sheep to Himself, and that He might multiply to Himself a people: 2 Sam. 22:36, “And Thy gentleness hath made me great.” S. Bernard says, “We wholly run after Thee, O good Jesus, on account of Thy meekness.” In the fourth place, that He might teach meekness: S. Matt. 11:29, “Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart.” There are four things which ought especially to commend meekness to us: the first, because it delivers us from evil; the second, because it perfects grace; the third, because it preserves the soul; and the fourth, because it deserves the land of the living. Of the first: It delivers from evil, because judicious meekness belongs to him who feels with no bitterness of mind. Of the second, Prov. 3:34, “He giveth grace unto the lowly.” Of the third, Ecclesus. 10:31, “Keep Thy soul in meekness.” Of the fourth, S. Matt. 5:5, “Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.” Let us, therefore, ask that this Lord and King may come to us.

HOMILY III

THE TEACHING OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.—No. I

SECOND SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “For whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning.”—Rom. 15:4.

THE Apostle has taught us on the preceding Sunday to arise from the dead; on this day he teaches us towards what we ought to arise, for the Scripture, which our heavenly Master has given for us, is to be studied and read. And the Lord as a good Master was the more solicitous to provide us with the best writings, that He might make us perfectly instructed. “Whatever things,” He said, “were written, were written for our learning.” But these writings are comprised in two books—that is to say, in the Book of Creation, and in the Book of Scripture. The first book has so many creations: it has just so many most perfect writings, which teach the truth without a lie; hence, when Aristotle was asked whence he had learnt so many and so great things, answered, “From the things themselves, which know not how to deceive.” But they teach two things to be learned; and of the things which may be known four things are to be taught. First, that there is a God; secondly, that this God is one; thirdly, that this God is triune; and, fourthly, that He is the highest good. For the world teaches by itself that it is His work. Wis. 13:5, “For by the greatness of the beauty, and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, to be known thereby.” Because they are one, and are preserved, in the same manner, they teach the unity of God; for, if there were many Gods, the world would have already been destroyed, since division is the cause of destruction.” S. Matt. 12:25, “Every kingdom divided against itself is brought to desolation; and every city or house divided against itself shall not stand.” For all things exist by number, weight, and measure; or, according to S. Augustine, “On the Trinity by mode, by species, and by order; so that they teach a three-fold Godhead.” Wis. 11:21, “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, number, and weight.” Because all things are good, they teach that He is the highest goodness through Whom so many good things proceed. According to S. Augustine it is a great token of goodness that every creature conceives itself to be good; therefore, because God is good, so are we. About the actions to be done, in like manner, we are taught a four-fold lesson. God is to be obeyed, loved, feared, and praised. Of the first, we ought to obey God, for all things serve Him. Ps. 148:6, “He hath made a decree which shall not pass.” Nothing among God’s creatures does the Creator find to be disobedient, save the sinner and the devil. God teaches us to love Him by His benefits and gifts, which He shows to us daily. S. Augustine says that heaven and earth, and all things which are in them, on every side, say to me that I should love Thee; neither do they cease to say this by all things, that I may be inexcusable if I love Thee not. By pains and punishments they teach us to fear God. We see that all things are prepared to punish those that rebel against their Creator. Wis. 16:24, “For the creature serving Thee, the Creator, is made fierce against the unjust for their punishment: and abateth its strength for the benefit of them that trust in Thee.” They teach us to praise God; for all things praise Him and invite us to His praising. S. Augustine says that it is wonderful that man does not always praise God, since every creature invites to the praising of Him; and this so plainly that all His creatures become as so many Scriptures of God, teaching us that there are four things to be known, as well as four commands to be performed.

HOMILY IV

THE TEACHING OF HOLY SCRIPTURE. —No. II

SECOND SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“Whatsoever things were written aforetime were written for our learning.”—Rom. 15:4.

AS we have treated of above, there are two books which are written for our learning, the book of the Creation, which formed the subject of the former homily; and the book of Scripture, of which we have now to speak. This book teaches us two things—things good and things evil: the good, that we should perform them; the evil, that we should avoid them. There are three attributes which are taught us about the Good, precepts, counsels, and promises; for the Good is threefold, and it is both honest, and pleasant, and profitable. The precepts teach us honest good, because they teach the worship of the One God, and fairness of manners and of virtues which make the honest man. In counsels there is the useful good. S. Matt. 19:21, “If thou wilt be perfect go and sell that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven.” The delightful or joyous good flows from promises. S. John 16:22, “I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice.” Deut. 4:1, “Hearken, O Israel, unto the statutes and the judgments which I teach you that ye may live, and go in and possess the land which the Lord God of your fathers giveth you.” Likewise, concerning the evil things there are three points to be noticed—prohibitions, dissuasions, and comminations, and they agree with the threefold nature of evil. There is the evil of deadly sin, of venial sin, and of the sin of eternal punishment. The prohibitions refer to the evil of deadly sin, “Neither shalt thou commit fornication,” &c., and so with regard to the other prohibitions. The dissuasions refer to venial sins, Eccles. 19:1, “He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little. Thou hast avoided grand things, be careful lest thou art overwhelmed in the sand.” Comminations have respect to the evil of eternal punishment—Isa. 66:24, “For their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched.” Rightly, therefore, does the Apostle say that whatever things were written in the book of Scripture were written for our instruction.

HOMILY V

THE ADVENT OF JUSTICE

SECOND SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“And there shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars.”—S. Luke 15:25.

WE spoke in the Gospel of the preceding Sunday of the mercy of Our Lord’s second coming; we will now treat of the justness of His Advent. It appertains to justice to punish the evil, and to reward the good; and therefore both these acts are treated of in this Gospel. The former in the words of the text, “And there shall be signs;” and the latter in the second part of this Gospel, “Look up, and lift up your heads, for your redemption draweth nigh.” About the punishment of the wicked, the Gospel shows that the Creator and the creature unite for their punishment. This creature, which meets together for the punishment of the wicked, is three-fold—spiritual, corporeal, and composite. The spiritual creature is an angel; the composite creature is a man; the corporeal creature is two-fold, superior and inferior—the former being the heavenly bodies, the latter being the elements. Therefore the Lord points out in this Gospel that the wicked receive punishment from Him, by angels, by heavenly bodies, and from themselves. Firstly, they shall see the Son of Man; secondly, the powers of heaven shall be shaken; thirdly, there will be signs in the sun, moon, and stars; fourthly, the sea and waves roaring; fifthly, men’s hearts failing them for fear. Of the first, it is known that in a three-fold manner God will afflict the wicked: firstly, in awarding; secondly, in convicting; thirdly, in condemning. Of the first, “I have been naked;” of the second, “Since ye have not done it unto Me,” &c.; of the least of these, &c.; of the third, “Depart from Me, ye wicked.” As in a three-fold manner the Son of Man afflicts the wicked, so do the angels also. In the first place by drawing the wicked to judgment; in the second place by separating them from the good; in the third place by consigning them to eternal fire. S. Matt. (13:41, 42) speaks of this three-fold office of the angels, “The Son of Man shall send forth His angels,” &c. “They shall gather out of His kingdom,” and so draw the wicked to judgment, since with their heavy bodies they cannot move so quickly as the angels. “All things that offend and them which do iniquity, and so they will separate the evil from the midst of the just.” “And shall cast them into a furnace of fire.” So fulfilling the third office. The celestial body shall in the same way—in a three-fold manner—afflict the wicked. In the first place, by frightening them with signs; in the second place, by afflicting them with darkness; in the third place, by discovering their wickedness. Of the first, there shall be signs in the sun, moon, and stars, Joel 2:30, 31, “And I will show wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke;” of the second, S. Matt. 24:29, “The sun shall be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light;” of the third, Job 20:27, “The heavens shall reveal his iniquity.”

HOMILY VI

THE TRUE MINISTRY OF CHRIST

THIRD SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Let a man so account of us as the ministers of Christ.”—1 Cor. 4:1.

IN the preceding Epistle the Apostle has taught us that Christ was a Minister for us. “But I say that Christ was the Minister of the Circumcision,” so, therefore, in this Epistle he teaches us that we ought to be the ministers of Christ, and six matters are treated of concerning this ministry. First, that we ought to make ministers of Christ; second, that we ought to avoid a thoughtless choice; third, to despise human discernment; fourth, not to trust to individual conscience; fifth, to submit all choice to Christ as the Judge; sixth, to seek praises from God alone. Of the first, “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ;” of the second, “to judge nothing before the time;” of the third, that “it is a very small thing to me that I should be judged of you;” of the fourth, “I know nothing by myself;” of the fifth, “until the Lord come;” of the sixth, “then shall every man have praise of God.” It ought to be known about the first point that there are three chief reasons why we ought to be ministers of Christ and to serve Him—(1) Because whatever we are able to do He gave us the power to do when He created us; (2) because He served us by redeeming us; (3) because He will further preserve us to glory. Of the first, S. Bernard, “Who ought we more rightly to serve than Him Who need not have created us unless He willed.” “It is He that hath made us” (Ps. 95:7). Of the second, S. Luke 22:27, “I am among you as He that serveth,” for He temporally served them by washing their feet, in cleansing by His own blood the wounds of sinners, and in ministering to His own flesh—(1) S. John 13:5, “And began to wash the disciples’ feet.” (2) Rev. 1:5, “Him that loved us and washed us from our sins in His own blood.” Isa. 43:24, “Thou hast made me to serve with thy sins.” (3) S. Matt. 26:26, “Jesus took bread and brake and gave it to His disciples.” S. Bernard, “The good Minister Who gave His Flesh for food, His Blood for drink, and His Soul for a ransom, He will likewise serve in glory.” S. Mark 12:37, “That He will gird Himself and make them to sit down to meat, and will come forth to serve them.” Rightly, therefore, we are said to be His ministers. But there are these things which He chiefly hates in His ministers—want of compassion, disobedience, and uselessness. Of the first, S. Matt. 18:32, 33, “O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me: shouldest not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow-servant, even as I had pity on thee?” S. Matt. 24:48, 49, “But and if that evil servant shall say in his heart, My lord delayeth his coming; and shall begin to smite his fellow-servants, and to eat and drink with the drunken, the lord of that servant shall come in a day when he looketh not for him, and in an hour that he is not aware of, and shall cut him asunder, and appoint him his portion with the hypocrites: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.” Of the second, S. Luke 12:47, “And that servant which knew his lord’s will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes.” Of the third, S. Matt. 25:30, “And cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.” There are three things which the Lord requires in His servants—the first, that they should be cleansed from every defilement of sin; the second, that they should be ornamented with every virtue; the third, that they should be decorated with honesty of maners. Of the first, Ps. 101:6, “He that walketh in a perfect way he shall serve Me.” 1 Tim. 3:10 (Vulg.), “Let them minister having no crime.” Of the second, 2 Cor. 6:4, “In all things approving ourselves as the ministers of God.” Of the third, 1 Peter 2:12, “Having your conversation honest among the Gentiles.” Of these three things, Exo. 40:12, 13, “And thou shalt bring Aaron and his sons unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation and wash them with water;” (40:15), “and thou shalt anoint them as thou didst anoint their father,” &c. 2 Cor. 2:15, “We are unto God a sweet savour of Christ.” But the Lord requires that we should serve Him in three ways—first, by imitating Him; second, by delighting in His service; thirdly, by fearing Him. Of the first, S. John 12:26, “If any man serve Me, let him follow Me.” Of the second, Ps. 100:2, “Serve the Lord with gladness.” Of the third, Ps. 2:11, “Serve the Lord with fear.” The first makes the service acceptable to the Lord; the second makes us ready in serving; the third preserves us in His service. But the Lord promises three rewards to His servants, viz., happiness, dignity, and eternity. Of the first reward, 1 Tim. 3:13, “For they that have used the office of a deacon well purchase to themselves a good degree.” Of the second reward, S. Matt. 25:23, “Well done, good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful over a few things,” &c. Of the third reward, Rev. 7:15, “And serve Him day and night in His Temple;” and afterwards He “shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters.” Eternity is a fountain of life. As Dionysius says, “Eternity is endless, and at the same time the whole and perfect possession of life.” Of these three attributes, S. John 7:26, “Where I am, there also shall My servant be.” Where Christ is, there is joyful exultation and eternal delightfulness, to which for His sake may the Lord God bring us.

HOMILY VII

THE ADVENT OF GRACE

THIRD SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“Now, when John had heard in the prison the works of Christ,” &c.—S. Matt. 11:2–4.

IN the preceding Gospel the Advent of Justice was treated of: in this Gospel the Advent of Grace is considered. Mention is here made of S. John Baptist, whose name is interpreted the grace of God; or, as he in whom the grace of God was. Four things are here spoken about S. John—(1) his imprisonment; (2) the question about the Advent of Christ by the disciples whom He sent; (3) the answer of the Lord; (4) the manifold commendation of John. He was praised chiefly on four accounts—(1) for the strength of his constancy; (2) for the rigour of his clothing; (3) for the dignity of his office; (4) for the holiness of his life. Firstly, when John had heard; secondly, “Who art thou;” thirdly, “Go and shew John again,” &c.; fourthly, “He began to say unto the multitudes concerning John.” And, again (1) of the commendation, “What went ye out into the wilderness to see? A reed shaken with the wind?” (2) “A man clothed in soft raiment.” (3) “Yea I say unto you, and more than a prophet.” (4) “This is he of whom it is written, Behold, I send My messenger before thy face,” &c. But afterwards it ought to be known concerning the bonds that three kinds of people are said to be in bonds. The godly are placed in the bonds of precepts; the impious, in the bonds of sinners; the condemned, in the bonds of the tormentors. Of the first, Ezekiel 4:8, “Behold, I will lay bands upon thee.” Hos. 11:4, “I drew them with the cords of a man; with bands of love.” Of the second, Prov. 5:22, “He shall be holden with the cords of his sins.” Isa. 10:4 (Vulgate), “That you be not bound down under the bond.” Of the third, Wisdom 17:2, “Fettered with the bonds of darkness.” S. Matt. 22:13, “Bind him hand and foot, and take him away and cast him into outer darkness.” The first bonds are to be sought for; the second bonds to be dissolved; and the third to be avoided. For three reasons the bonds of the teachers are to be embraced—(1) because by them safety is obtained against all evil; (2) because he who is bound by them is protected by the wisdom of God; (3) because from them he goes forth to government. Of the first reason, Eccles. 6:30, “Then shall her fetters be a strong defence.” Of the second reason, Wisdom 10:14, “And left him not in bonds.” Of the third reason, Eccles. 4:14, “Because out of prison and chains sometimes a man cometh forth to a kingdom.” There are not only the bonds of preceptors to be embraced, but the bonds of sinners to be dissolved. For the sinner is bound with the chains of pride, of avarice, of luxury, and of an evil tongue. Of the first chain, Job 39:5, “Who hath sent out the wild ass free? Or who hath loosed the bands of the wild ass?” By the wild ass pride is understood. Job 11:12, “For vain man would be wise, though man be born like a wild ass’s colt;” whence the bands of the wild ass are the bands of pride. Of the second chain, Isa. 5:18, “Woe unto them that draw iniquity with cords of vanity.” Riches are vanity. Of the third chain, Prov. 8:22, “Immediately he followeth her as an ox led to be a victim, and not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to bonds,” (Vul.), for the hands of a woman are the bonds that draw. Ecc. 7:27, “And I find more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands.” These are the bonds that are to be dissolved.

These bonds are loosened in four ways—(1) by the grace of justification; (2) by the grace of contrition; (3) by the modesty of confession; (4) by the penance of satisfaction. Of the first way, Ps. 116:16, “Thou hast loosed my bonds,” that is to say, the Lord has done this by infusing grace. Of the second way, Dan. 3:25, “Lo, I see four men loose;” where it is said the fire consumed the chains of the children. By the fire contrition is understood. Psalm 39:3, “While I was musing the fire burned.” Of the third way, Hos. 5:13 (Vulg.), “And Ephraim saw his sickness, and Judah his band.” Judah is interpreted as confessing. So that he saw his band when being penitent; he saw himself bound by the band of sinners; he declares himself in confession, that he may be loosed. Of the fourth way, Nah. 1:12, 13, “I have afflicted thee. And will burst thy bonds in sunder.” So are loosed the bands of sinners; but the bands of the tormentors are to be avoided for three reasons—(1) because they are dark; (2) because they are cruel; (3) because they are eternal. Of the first reason, Wisdom 17, “Fettered with bonds of darkness.” Of the second reason, Eccles. 13:15, “He will not spare to do thee hurt, and to cast thee into prison.” Of these bands, Isa. 28:22, “Lest by chance he should be bound with our fetters.” Of the third reason, S. Jude 6, “He hath reserved in everlasting chains under darkness.” He speaks of demons. From these chains may God deliver us, to Whom, &c.

HOMILY VIII

THE TRUE JOY

FOURTH SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Rejoice in the Lord alway: and again I say, Rejoice. Let your moderation be known unto all men.”—Philip. 4:4, 5.

THE Apostle exhorted us in the end of the preceding Epistle that we should reserve all things to Christ, the true Judge; but, lest we should be overcome by the long delay, he said that He was about to come in a very little while. “The Lord,” he said, “is at hand.” But the Apostle in the words of the text teaches three things—(1) he exhorts to inward holiness; (2) to honest conversation; (3) he subjoins the reason. I. Inward holiness consists in two things—firstly, that evil affections should be renovated; and, secondly, that good affections should be obtained. S. Bernard said that holy affection makes the saint, whilst evil affection is to rejoice in the world. II. But there is an evil joy of the world, as in evil things, in vanities, in base pleasures. The joy in evil things is to rejoice in wickedness; the joy of vanities is to rejoice in riches, which are vain; and the joy in base pleasures is to rejoice in wantonness. Of the first, Prov. 2:14, “Who rejoice to do evil, and delight in the frowardness of the wicked.” Of the second, Ps. 49:6, “They that trust in their wealth, and boast themselves in the multitude of their riches.” Of the third, Job 21:12, “And rejoice at the sound of the organ.” S. James 5:5, “Ye have lived in pleasure on the earth, and been wanton.” S. Augustine says of these three kinds of joy—“What is the joy of the world? Wantonness is the impurity of the wickeness of the world; to toy with the games, to be luxurious, to be allured, to be swallowed up, and to offend by baseness. To rejoice in the Lord is that joy which tends to salvation; for the loving-kindness of the Lord leads to justification, for He is most bountiful by way of remuneration. For a very small servitude He gives eternal life and the heavenly kingdom, and such a Lord is without doubt to be rejoiced in; Who saves His servants by redeeming them; Who dismisses all their debts by justifying them; and Who will crown them with an eternal kingdom by preserving them.”

Of the first, Isa. 33:22, “The Lord is our King; He will save us.” S. Matt. 1:21, “He shall save His people from their sins.” Of the second, Rom. 5:1, “Therefore, being justified by faith, we have peace with God.” Of the third, Apoc. 2:10, “Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life.” Of these three, Isa. 61:10, “I will greatly rejoice in the Lord. My soul shall be joyful in my God, for He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation. He hath covered me with the robe of righteousness as a bridegroom decketh himself with ornaments, and as a bride adorneth herself with her jewels.” To which joy may we be led through Jesus Christ our Lord.

HOMILY IX

THE CRY TO GOD

FOURTH SUNDAY IN ADVENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness.”—S. John 1:23.

IN the former Gospel it was seen how Christ manifoldly praised John; in the present Gospel it is noted how John humbled himself. Morally, this world is understood by the text, Deut. 8:15, “Who led thee through that great and terrible wilderness, wherein were fiery serpents, and scorpions, and drought.” The scorpion represents luxury, and the drought is avarice. In this desert the creature proclaims Christ, the Just One and the Preacher. The creature cries three things—firstly, that we should know God; secondly, that we should love Him; thirdly, that we should give Him the praise that is due to Him. Of the first, S. Augustine said, “All things cry, God made me.” Of the second, he says again, “Heaven and earth, and all things which are in them on all sides, tell me that I ought to love Thee; neither do they cease to say this to all things, that they may be inexcusable if they love Thee not.” Of the third, he says, “It is wonderful that man rests from the praise of God when all creation invites us to praise Him.” In like manner Christ cries threefoldly—firstly, in doing miracles; secondly, by preaching things useful and profitable; thirdly, in dying for us. Of the first, S. John 11:43, “He cried with a loud voice, Lazarus, come forth.” Of the second, S. John 7:37, “Jesus stood and cried, saying, If any man thirst, let him come unto Me and drink.” Of the third, S. Matt. 26:5, 6, “Jesus, when He had cried again with a loud voice, yielded up the ghost.” In the first cry His power appeared; in the second, His wisdom; in the third, His ineffable goodness and love. These three cries were necessary for our redemption—that He might be able to redeem; that He might know how to redeem; and that He might be willing to redeem us. Of these three reasons, 1 Cor. 1:30, "Christ Jesus, Who of God is made unto us wisdom and righteousness and sanctification;" also verse 24, "Christ, the power of God, and the wisdom of God." Christ is the anointed One, and therefore He is good; He is Power, and therefore He is powerful; He is Wisdom, and therefore He is wise. In like manner the just cry manifoldly—firstly, in praying; secondly, in confessing; thirdly, in praising. Of the first way, Ps. 76:1, "I cried unto God with my voice; even unto God with my voice, and He gave ear unto me." Of the second way, Ps. 32:5, "I said, I will confess my transgressions unto the Lord, and Thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin." Of the third way, Ps. 57:2, "I will cry unto God most high, unto God that performeth all things for me," for we ought to give Him thanks for His mercy. The Preacher likewise ought to cry three things—firstly, the wickedness of men; secondly, the misery of human weakness; thirdly, that the way of the Lord should be prepared. Of the first, Isa. 58:1, "Cry aloud, spare not; lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and shew My people their trangression." Of the second, Isa. 40:6, "The voice said, Cry. And he said, What shall I cry? All flesh is grass." Of the third, Isa. 40:3, "The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord," &c. Purity, humility, and justice prepare the way of the Lord. Of the first and second, Isa. 62:10, "Prepare ye the way;" and he adds the mode of preparing it—"Cast up the high way," by removing the loftiness of pride, that the way may be made by humility; "Gather out the stones," by the removing of the other sins, which preparation is the office of purity. Of the third, S. John 1:23, "Make straight the way of the Lord," and by purity make the rough ways plain. Humility orders us in relation to God; Justice regulates us in regard to our neighbours; and Purity with regard to ourselves. May we so govern ourselves that we may be worthy to obtain salvation through Jesus Christ Our Lord. Amen.

THE EPIPHANY AND ANTE-LENTEN HOMILIES OF S. THOMAS AQUINAS

TRANSLATED FROM THE LATIN

BY

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MDCCCLXVII.

NOTICE

THE same deep insight into the things of God which is seen in the other Homilies of S. Thomas can be abundantly recognized in the present series. In Homily I., "The Elements of Human Perfection," the creative archetype is pertinently asserted. "Erant enim in idea in mente divina, creata sunt in proprio esse." This sentence is perhaps the only direct expression of realism to be found throughout the Homilies, although in an indirect way it pervaded every thought of the great Schoolman. In Homily II., "The Seekers and the Sought," we find contrasted the contemplative with the active life, under the names of Mary and Joseph. Sometimes it occurs in Mary and Martha; at others in Rachel and Leah, which is so finely handled by Dante:—

"Sappia qualunque 'l mio nome dimanda
Ch' io mi son Lia, e vo movendo 'ntoono
Le belle mani a farmi una ghirlanda.
Ma mia suora Rachel mai non si smaga
Dal suo ammiraglio e siede tutto giorno."
—Purg., c. xxvii.

In Homilies VII. and VIII., "The Mystical Ship," are traces of an early school of mystical interpretation very common in the Eastern Church; and in Homily X., "The Tares and the Wheat," we notice a remarkable interpretation of Ps. 29:7, as well as a mystical application of corn, and wine, and oil to symbolize the Three Persons of the Ever Blessed Trinity.

And now a consideration of "The Heavenly Stadium" sounds the first note of Lenten preparation. The Homily on the Septuagesima Gospel indicates strikingly our Blessed Lord's fourfold going out. "Labour and Toil" is treated of as being most intimately connected with sin, and various forms of sin are identified with several kinds of toil. "The Birds and the Seed" (Hom. XIV.) points out the evil work of the spirit of darkness. Quinquagesima brings its usual teaching upon "Charity," which S. Thomas identifies with the Highest Good; and its Gospel is illustrated by a minute comparison between the infirmities of the bodily sight, which symbolize the still greater infirmities of mental vision. How the Schoolmen loved and revered the Holy Scriptures S. Thomas shows by quoting Is. 29:18 as to the life-giving power of “The Words of the Book.”

S. Peter, Mancroft, Norwich.
Feast of S. Matthew, 1867.

HOMILY I

THE ELEMENTS OF HUMAN PERFECTION

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God.”—Rom. 12:2.

THE Apostle in these words exhorts us to three things, in which consists the entire perfection of man. Firstly, that the form of this world be relinquished—“Be not conformed to this world.” Secondly, that the form of the new life be assumed—“but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind.” Thirdly, that the will of God may be known—“that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the form.[The form of life and existence (Greek, μορφή; Latin, forma) is far, more intensive than the more habit (Greek, σχῆμα; Latin, modus).—Trans.] or manner of existence, of this world is threefold. (1) In the lust of concupiscence. (2) In the desire of earthly goods. (3) In the pride of life. Of these three, 1 S. John 2:16, “The lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world.” It is to be remembered that this threefold form has likewise a threefold manifestation—the “lust of the flesh” has a sensual form; the “lust of the eyes,” an earthly form; the “pride of life,” a devilish form. Lust makes a man sensual; avarice makes him earthly; pride makes him like the devil. Of these three, S. James 3:15, “This wisdom descendeth, not from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish.” By the first, we are “conformed to this world” through gluttony and revelling; by the second, through avarice; by the third, through pride; so that they themselves will perish with the perishing world. As S. Greg. Mag. says, “He who leans upon that which is failing must of necessity come to ruin when it perishes." 1 S. John 2:15, 17, "Love not the world." Why not? "The world passeth away and the lust thereof."

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the form of the new life is also threefold. It consists (1) in holiness of will; (2) in truth of speech; (3) in justness of deed. The first informs the heart; the second, the mouth; the third, the hands. Of the first, Eph. 6:6, 7, "Doing the will of God from the heart, with good will." Of the second, Eph. 4:25, "Putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour." Of the third, Gal. 6:10, "As we have therefore opportunity, let us do good unto all men." Of these three, Eph. 5:9, "For the fruit of the Spirit is in all goodness, and righteousness, and truth"—in "goodness" of heart, in "righteousness" of deed, in "truth" of speech. The form of goodness makes us angelical, since by goodness man became like unto the angels. The form of righteousness makes us celestial; by righteousness we are likened unto the saints. The form of truth makes us divine; by truth we are made like unto God. Of these three, Rom. 12:1, "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God." Living by faith, Heb. 10:38, "The just shall live by faith." "Holy," which is cleansed. "Acceptable to God," through the truth, for God is truth.

III. On the third head it is to be noted that the "will of God" is threefold. Firstly, "good;" secondly, "acceptable;" thirdly, "perfect." This is to be understood in many ways, but chiefly in three. I. In a moral sense, the will of God was "good" in creating; "acceptable" in recreating; "perfect" in glorifying. "Good" in giving the gifts of nature; "acceptable" in giving the gifts of grace; "perfect" in the bestowal of glory. Of the first, Rev. 4:11, "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power; for Thou hast created all things, and for Thy pleasure they are and were created." For they were in idea in the Divine mind, they were created to have an existence of their own. Of the second, Ps. 30:7, "Lord, by Thy favour [tuâ voluntate, Vulg.] Thou hast made my mountain to stand strong;" since, in recreating, the Lord renewed the Divine beauty in us, and strengthened it by the favour of the Holy Ghost. Of the third, S. John 17:24, "Father, I will that they also whom Thou hast given Me be with Me where I am; that they may behold My glory." Ps. 73:24, "Thou shalt guide me with Thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory." II. In another sense, the will of God is "good" in us by cleansing us from all impurity; "acceptable" through the showing forth of pity; “perfect” from the fervour of charity. Of the first, 1 Thess. 4:3, “This is the will of God, even your sanctification,” i.e., cleansing. Of the second, S. Matt. 9:13, “I will have mercy, and not sacrifice.” Of the third, S. Luke 12:49, “I am come to send fire on the earth, and what will I if it be already kindled?” By fire charity is understood. III. In a third sense, the “will of God” can be viewed as “good” in those who are married; “acceptable” in the continent; “perfect” in prelates who are preserved for perfection. In the married, as exciting them to works of mercy; in the continent, to do good to others like them; in prelates, to lay down their lives for the brethren. Of the first will can be understood Ps. 143:10, “Teach me to do Thy will.” Of the second, 1 Thess. 4:4, “That every one of you should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour, not in the lust of concupiscence.” Of the third, Ps. 103:21, “Ministers of His that do His pleasure.” The reward of His will is eternal life—Ps. 30:5, “In His favour [voluntas, Vulg.] is life.”

HOMILY II

THE SEEKERS OF THE LORD

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Behold! Thy father and I have sought Thee sorrowing.”—S. Luke 2:48.

MANY things are taught in this Gospel according to the letter, as is manifest, but in this word we are taught to seek God, to which we are frequently exhorted in Holy Scripture. Three things are noted in these words—Firstly, the seekers, “Behold! Thy father and I.” Secondly, the manner of seeking, “have sought Thee sorrowing.” Thirdly, the person sought for, “sought Thee.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted that the seekers were Mary and Joseph, in whom two kinds of men are represented by which the Lord is sought—(1) He is sought by the contemplative in contemplation; (2) by the active in action. Mary signifies the illuminated, and typifies the contemplative who in contemplation receive the Divine illuminations. Joseph is interpreted “increase,” and he signifies the active, who ought to have increase from works of mercy. The Lord is sought by both these, and to both can be applied. Ps. 105:3, 4, “Let the heart of them rejoice that seek the Lord. Seek the Lord and His strength.” The first portion of this refers to the contemplative, who are in continual joy and jubilation; the second portion to the active, who now and then need to be strengthened. Again, by Mary, Star of the Sea, faith is signified; and by Joseph, the increase of charity. Faith seeks for God, inasmuch as He is our Father; charity, inasmuch as He is the chief good. Of these two, Cant. 5:6, “My soul failed when He spake. I sought Him, but I did not find Him.” Inasmuch as He speaks, insomuch did I seek, for faith cometh by hearing. “As far as he is beloved he seeks charity, which is the life binding the lover with the beloved,” as S. Austin says. So plainly, if He be sought by charity, afterwards He shall be found.

II. On the second head it is to be noted that He ought to be sought for in seven differen ways—(1) With purity of mind, that we may be held to be free from every defilement of sin—1 Esd. 6:21, “All that had separated themselves from the filthiness of the nations of the earth to seek the Lord the God of Israel.” (2) With simplicity of intention—Wisd. 1:1, “Seek Him in simplicity of heart.” (3) From the whole heart, that we may think only upon Him; (4) from our whole will, that we may only desire Him—of these two, 2 Chron. 15:15, “They had sworn with all their heart, and sought Him with their whole desire; and He was found of them.” (5) Quickly, ere the time in which He can be found pass away—Isaiah 55:6, “Seek ye the Lord while He may be found, call ye upon Him while He is near.” (6) Perseveringly, without cessation—Ps. 105:4, “Seek His face evermore.” (7) With sorrow for sin—Micah 4:10, “Be in pain and labour to bring forth the daughter of Zion … the Lord shall redeem thee from the hand of thine enemies.” “I and My Father,” &c.

III. On the third head it is to be noted that we ought to seek God, “have sought Thee;” and to do this for four reasons—because (1) He is just, (2) merciful, (3) good, (4) Life. God is just, since no one who seeks as he ought to do shall fail to find Him; merciful, since He so graciously receives those seeking Him—of these two, Zeph. 2:3, “Seek ye the Lord … seek righteousness, seek meekness.” He is good, that He may magnify and reward those seeking Him—Lam. 3:25, “The Lord is good unto them that wait for Him, to the soul that seeketh Him.” He is Life, since He gives eternal life to those who are seeking Him—Ps. 69:32, “Your heart shall live that seek God.” To which life may we be brought, &c.

HOMILY III

THE LAW OF HOSPITALITY

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“Given to hospitality.”—Rom. 12:13.

IN this Epistle, which is altogether full of moral precepts, we are exhorted to great hospitality, to which four motives ought chiefly to move us. Firstly, the command of the Lord. Secondly, the example of the saints. Thirdly, the loss which is sustained by not exercising hospitality. Fourthly, the manifold advantage in its exercise.

I. On the first head it is to he noted that the Lord enjoined hospitality by a threefold law—the law of nature, the old and the new law. (1) He commanded, by the law of nature, that as we desire to receive hospitality from others, so we should shew it to others—S. Matt. 7:12, “All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them.” (2) By the old law—Isa. 58:7, “Is it not to deal My bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house?” Deut. 26:12, “The stranger, the fatherless, the widow, that they may eat within thy gates and be filled.” (3) By the new law—Heb. 13:2, “Be not forgetful to entertain strangers.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the example of the saints teach us three things about hospitality—(1) That we should constrain strangers to “come in unto us.” S. Luke 24:29, “They constrained them, saying, Abide with us; for it is toward evening, and the day is far spent.” (2) That we should protect our guests from harm—Gen. 19:7, 8, “I pray you, brethren, do not so wickedly …; with these men do nothing, for therefore came they under the shadow of my roof;” whence we may learn that it was a patriarchal custom to protect guests from violence (3) That with joy and gladness we should minister abundantly to their necessities—Gen. 18:3, 6, 7, “Pass not away, I pray thee, from thy servant.… And Abraham said, Make ready quickly these measures of fine meal; and Abraham ran unto the herd:” this history teaches us how with joy and gladness we ought abundantly to minister unto strangers.

III. On the third head it is to be noted that three evils are incurred by those who are unwilling to exercise hospitality. (1) They are here punished by the Lord—Wisd. 19:13–16, “Others, indeed, received not strangers unknown to them, but these brought their guests into bondage that had deserved well of them. And not only so, but in another respect also they were wise; for the others against their will received strangers, but these grievously afflicted them whom they had received with joy. But they were struck with blindness.” (2) They shall be confounded in the judgment—S. Matt. 25:43, “I was a stranger, and ye took me not in.” (3) They shall be shut up in an evil habitation—S. Matt. 25:4, “Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels.”

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted that for three reasons we ought to be given to hospitality. (1) By doing this we gain grace, as the woman of Samaria who talked with Christ. (2) By doing this we frequently entertain saints and angels—Heb. 13:1, “Be not forgetful to entertain strangers, for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.” (3) By doing this, we shall be received into an eternal, heavenly, and glorious habitation—S. Matt. 25:33, 34, “I was a stranger, and ye took me in.… Come, ye blessed children of My Father, inherit the Kingdom,” &c.

HOMILY IV

THE DUTIES OF MARRIAGE

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “And the third day there was a marriage in Cana of Galilee; and the Mother of Jesus was there.”—S. John 2:1.

FOUR marriages are spoken of in Holy Scripture—the first, historical; the second, allegorical; the third, tropological; the fourth, anagogical. (1) The literal marriage is the carnal union between the man and the woman; (2) the allegorical is between Christ and His Church; (3) the tropological between God and the soul; (4) the anagogical between God and the Church Triumphant. Of the first, Esth. 2:18, “The King made a great feast with all his princes and servants” on the occasion of his marriage with Esther. Of the second, S. Matt. 22:2, “The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto a certain King which made a marriage for his son.” Of the third, Hosea 2:19, “I will betroth thee unto me in righteousness.” Of the fourth, S. Matt. 25:10, “They that were ready went in with Him to the marriage.” We now treat of the literal marriage, which, firstly, God sanctioned in three ways; which, secondly, implies three conditions.

I. On the first head it is to be noted that the literal marriage (1) God ordained in Paradise—Gen. 1:28, “God blessed them and said, Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth.” (2) He confirmed it by His Word—S. Matt. 19:6, “What therefore God hath joined together, let no man put asunder.” (3) He honoured it by His presence—“Both Jesus was called,” &c. (4) He magnified it by a miracle—“The ruler of the feast had tasted the water that was made wine.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that in literal marriages there should be present three good qualities. (1) Faith, that the marriage bed be not violated—1 Cor. 7:4, “The husband hath not power of his own body, but the wife.” (2) Offspring, that children may be generated for the Lord—1 S. Tim. 2:15, “She shall be saved in childbearing if they continue in faith.” (3) An oath, that neither can be separated the one from the other—Eph. 5:32, “This is a great mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church.” The first good despoils the adulterers, of whom Heb. 13:4 —“Whoremongers and adulterers God will judge;” the second, those who either procure barrenness, or bring up their children not to worship and serve God; the third, those who commit adultery, or marry two wives at the same time—Rom. 7:3, “If while her husband liveth she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress.” So we learn what are the hindrances to unlawful marriage.

HOMILY V

PRIDE AND COVETOUSNESS

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“Be not wise in your own conceits.”—Rom. 12:16.

IN these words, according to a twofold exposition, two sins are prohibited—the sins of pride and avarice. The text is then explained thus: “Be not wise in your own conceits;” that is, deeming yourselves to be wise and prudent, which would be an effect of pride—Isaiah 5:21, “Woe unto them that are wise in their own eyes.” Another explanation is—“Be not wise,” &c.: hold not your wisdom for yourself alone, but also communicate it to others; hence the Gloss., exercise your wisdom not for yourself only, but rather for the benefit of your neighbour.

Three things ought chiefly to dissuade us from the sin of pride—firstly, it disorders a man towards God; secondly, towards his neighbour; thirdly, towards himself.

I. On the first head it is to be noted that by pride a man is disaffected toward God in three ways. (1) By falling away from Him—Ecclus. 10:14, “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God.” (2) By fighting against Him—Ps. 73:23 (Vulg.), “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually.” (3) By exalting himself against Him—Job 15:26 (Vulg.), “He hath run against Him with his neck raised up.” Therefore is the Lord ever armed that He may resist the proud—S. James 4:6, “God resisteth the proud.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that by pride a man is disaffected towards his neighbour in three ways. (1) By disturbing him with injuries—Prov. 13:10, “By pride cometh contention.” (2) By vexing him with malice—Isaiah 14:5, “The Lord hath broken the staff of the wicked.” (3) By condemning and despising him—Job. 12:4, “I am as one mocked of his neighbour, who calleth upon God, and He answereth him.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted that by pride a man is disaffected towards himself in three ways. (1) By deceiving himself—Jer. 49:16, “Thy terribleness hath deceived thee, and the pride of thine heart.” (2) By rendering himself foolish—Prov. 21:24 (Vulg.), “The proud and the arrogant is called ignorant.” (3) By confounding himself—Prov. 11:2, “When pride cometh, then cometh shame.”

Of Covetousness.—Against the sin of avarice the Creator, the creature, and Nature alike warn us. (1) The Creator by prohibiting it—S. Luke 12:15, “Take heed and beware of covetousness.” (2) The creature, in giving itself and its possessions. S. Austin says, “It is a great sign of Divine goodness that every creature thinks to give somewhat of its own nature.” (3) Nature, by restraining it—Tobit 4:16, “See thou never do to another what thou would hate to have done thee by another.” Of the two sick that are healed in the Gospel for the day, the leprous is a proud and the paralytic is an avaricious man. They are cured for two reasons, which the Apostle unfolds in this Epistle. (1) “Live peaceably with all men,” which prohibits pride, the great destroyer of peace. (2) “Provide things honest,” which prohibits avarice.

HOMILY VI

THE LEPROSY OF SIN

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Behold, there came a leper and worshipped Him, saying, Lord, if Thou wilt, Thou canst make me clean.”—S. Matt. 8:2.

MORALLY, by this leper the sinner is understood, and this for four qualities of leprosy. Firstly, it is a corruption of humours. Secondly, it is a corruption of the members. Thirdly, it is infectious to others. Fourthly, it causes a separation from others. Sin is, therefore (1), a corruption of natural powers; (2) a failing of the gifts of grace; (3) an infection of one’s neighbours; (4) a separation from the joys of saints and angels. S. Austin calls sin a corruption of manner, form, and order. It takes away grace, since grace cannot exist with mortal sin—Wisd. 1:4, “Nor dwell in a body subject to sins.” It infects neighbours and the unreasoning creatures—Ps. 105:38, 39 (Vulg.), “And the land … was defiled with their works;” Jer. 3:2, “Thou hast polluted the land with thy whoredoms.” It separates man from fellowship of God and the angels—Wisd. 1:3, “Perverse thoughts separate from God.” Of these four—Ps. 14:1, “They are corrupt,” behold the corruption of natural things; “they have done abominable works,” behold the separation came not for effect; abomination is a cause of separation; “those that doeth good,” behold the loss of grace: when grace is lost no one can do good works; “they are altogether become filthy,” behold the infection. The leprous man chiefly infects by his breath. These four particulars of leprosy are described in Leviticus 13:45. The leper in whom the plague is, (1) his clothes shall be rent, (2) and his head bare; (3) he shall put a covering upon his upper lip; (4) he shall dwell alone without the camp. Of (1), because he is rent and poured out in his natural powers; of

(2), the naked head is a mind devoid of grace; of (3), the lip-covering is to prevent infection: “guard the door of my lips;” of (4), without the camp of God, separated from the habitation of angels and saints.

HOMILY VII

THE MYSTICAL SHIP.—No. I

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“And when He was entered into a ship His disciples followed Him.”—S. Matt. 8:23.

FOUR things are to be considered in this Gospel. Firstly, the entering of Christ and His disciples into a ship. Secondly, the “great tempest in the sea.” Thirdly, the prayer of His disciples—“Lord save us, we perish.” Fourthly, the obedience of the storm to the command of Christ—“There was a great calm.”

Morally, we are taught also four things. Firstly, to enter into holiness of life. Secondly, that temptations rage after we have entered. Thirdly, in our temptation to cry unto the Lord. Fourthly, to look for a calm according to His will.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, (1) That he enters into a ship who follows a holy life—S. Matt. 9:1, “He entered into a ship … and came into His own city,” just as by holiness of life man passes over and comes to his heavenly city. In the following Homily it will be explained why a holy life is likened unto a ship. (2) The disturbance of the sea by the tempest represents the temptations which rise up against holiness—Ecclus. 2:1, “Son, when thou comest to the Service of God stand in justice and in fear, and prepare thy soul for temptation.” (3) The cry of the disciples in the tempest is the prayer of the saints in tribulations and temptations—Ps. 120:1, “In my distress I cried unto the Lord, and He heard me.” (4) The calm of the tempest is the cessation of temptation—Tob. 3:2, “After a storm Thou makest a calm.” Of these four—Ps. 69:23–29, “I am come into deep waters” in the ship of holiness, behold the first; “The floods overflow me,” behold the second; “I am weary of my crying,” behold the third; “Thy salvation, O God, set me up on high” above my temptations, behold the fourth.

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the tempest in the sea arose from the winds. Holy Scripture speaks of four winds when temptation arises, and trouble to the saints. Firstly, from the infestation of demons: this is a cold wind—Ecclus. 43:22, “The cold north wind bloweth, and the water congealeth into crystal.” Secondly, from the perverseness of heretics: this is a blasting wind—Gen. 41:6, 7, “Seven thin ears and blasted with the east wind sprung up after them,” and “devoured the seven rank and full ears.” Thirdly, from the cruelty of tyrants: this is a vehement wind—Job. 1:19, “Behold there came a great wind from the wilderness.” Fourthly, from the malignity of false Christians: this is a burning wind—Ecclus. 11:4, “He that observeth the wind shall not sow.” Of these four, Dan. 7:2—“The four winds of heaven strove upon the great sea.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted that in the prayer of the Apostles there were three things which moved the Lord to help them. Firstly, because they besought Him instantly, “they awoke Him.” Secondly, they asked humbly, “Lord.” Thirdly, because they prayed for a useful thing, “Save us.” Of (1), Rom. 12:12. “Continuing instant in prayer;” of (2), S. Luke 18:13, 14, “The prayer of the humble publican penetrated Heaven itself;” of (3), S. John 16:24, “Ask and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full.” Of these three, S. Matt. 7:7—“Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you.” “Ask” humbly, and ye shall receive; “seek” what is profitable, and “ye shall find;” “knock” continually, and the Kingdom of Heaven shall be opened unto you. Unto which Kingdom may we be brought.

NOTE.—S. Thomas Aquinas has no Homily upon the Epistle for this Sunday. The first of two on the Holy Gospel has supplied the omission. These two Homilies, as will be seen, illustrate each other.

HOMILY VIII

THE MYSTICAL SHIP.—NO. II

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“And when He was entered into a ship His disciples followed Him.”—S. Matt. 8:23.

MORALLY, by a ship holiness of life is signified—by reason of (1) the material; (2) the form; (3) the use. A ship is made of wood, iron, oakum, and pitch.

I. On the first head, the material of the ship, it is to be noted that—(1) By wood is represented righteousness, which is the righteousness of Christ—Wisd. 14:7, “Blessed is the wood by which justice cometh.” (2) By iron, on account of its solidity, fortitude is expressed—Jer. 1:18, “Behold I have made thee this day … an inner pillar.” (3) By oakum or tow, by which wounds are bound up, is implied temperance, by which is healed the wound of fleshly lust. Of those whose wounds have not been bound up it is said, Isa. 1:6, “Wounds, and bruises, and putrifying sores: they have not been closed, neither bound up.” Jud. 16:13, of Samson, when deceived by Delilah, and bound with new ropes, “he broke them from off his arms like a thread.” (4) By pitch is symbolized charity, which is the bond of souls—Gen. 6:14, “Pitch it within and without with pitch.” A holy man is formed by charity—1 Cor. 16:14, “Let all your things be done with charity.

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the form of the ship consists in five particulars. Firstly, the smallness of the beginning. Secondly, breadth of the middle. Thirdly, the height of the end. Fourthly, the narrowness of the bottom. Fifthly, the wideness of the top. Of (1), the smallness of its beginning, is the grief for past sins—Jer. 6:26, “Make thee mourning as for an only son, most bitter lamentation.” Of (2), the breadth of the middle is hope of the eternal joys—Rom. 12:12, “Rejoicing in hope.” Of (3), the height of the end is the fear of eternal punishments. The holy man grieves over the sins he commits, and he fears the punishments which he merits, but he fails not through desperation in fear and grief—S. Matt. 3:8, “Bring forth, therefore, fruits meet for repentance.” Of (4), the narrowness of the bottom is the humility which arises from highest goodness—Ps. 81:10, “Open thy mouth wide and I will fill it.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted that the use of a ship in four ways stands for holiness of life. 1. The first use is to carry men across the sea. We ought by holiness to pass over the sea of this world to the heavenly country, to God—Wisd. 14:5, “Men also trust their lives even to a little wood, and passing over the sea by ships are saved.” 2. The second is to carry merchandise, or fruits, which are the odour of good works, to be diffused from us on all sides—Job. 9:25, 26, “My days are swifter than a post … they are passed away as the swift ships.” Phil. 4:18, “An odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well-pleasing to God.” 3. The third use is to make war in them. We ought by holiness to war against the demons—1 Macc. 15:3, “I have chosen a great army, and have built ships of war.” Eph. 6:12, “We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers.” 4. The fourth use is to catch fishes, to convert men to God—S. Matt. 4:19, “I will make you fishers of men.”

HOMILY IX

THE HOLY NAME

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY

> “Whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the Name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by Him.”—Coloss. 3:17.

THE Name of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ is here noted of in three ways—Firstly, it is to be ever thought of. Secondly, it is to be ever used. Thirdly, it has manifold power.

I. On the first head it is to be noted that the Name of God is to be used on five occasions—(1) In walking—Ps. 20:7, “We will remember the Name of the Lord our God.” (2) In praying—S. John 16:23, “Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in My Name, He will give it you.” (3) In speaking; (4) in working—of these two, the text. (5) In hoping—Ps. 39:5 (Vulg.), “Blessed is the man whose trust is in the Name of the Lord.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the Name of God is to be used in five ways. (1) It is to be retained in the heart, and so become a cause of joy—Is. 26:8, “The desire of our soul is to Thy Name.” (2) It is to be heard by the ear, and so cause delight—Job 29:11, “When the ear heard me, then it blessed me.” (3) It is to be carried in the hand, and so be a lever of strength—Prov. 18:10, “The Name of the Lord is a strong tower.” (4) It is to be written on the forehead, as a mark of honour; it will make a man (Isa. 58:13) “holy of the Lord, honourable.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted that the manifold virtue of this Name is expressed in eight particulars in the text—(1) In It were all things created. (2) By It are the demons put to flight. (3) By It were all infirmities healed. (4) Through It were sinners justified. (5) By It are the sad made joyful. (6) By It are the tempted helped. (7) Through It are the just increased in grace. (8) All who call upon It are saved. Note, that this Name enlightens the reason; soothes anger; delights the desire. The inhabitants of the world unseen, fear It; of the earth, adore It; of Heaven, praise It. It spoils Hades; It liberates the earthly; It exalts the heavenly.

HOMILY X

THE TARES AND THE WHEAT

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER THE EPIPHANY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them; but gather the wheat into my barn.”—S. Matt. 13:30.

IN these words five things are noted—Firstly, the sin of the wicked, “tares.” Secondly, their punishment, “bind them in bundles to burn them.” Thirdly, the goodness of the righteous, “the wheat.” Fourthly, their glory, “gather into My barn.” Fifthly, the abundance of God’s “barn.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted that the tares are of three kinds, corresponding to three sins—(1) They are darnel, which signifies luxury. Darnel perverts the state of the reason just as luxury does—Ezek. 23:9, “Upon whom she doted;” Hos. 4:11, “Whoredom and wine and new wine take away the heart;” 1 Kings 11:3, “His wives turned away his heart.” (2) They are vetch, which is bitter, which signifies avarice, and which afflicts the covetous in a wonderful way—Eccles. 5:13, 14, “Riches kept by the owners thereof to their hurt. But those riches perish by evil travail.” There is a “sore evil” in collecting them; a worse in hoarding them; the worst of all in losing or leaving them. (3) They are wild oats, which on account of their uselessness signify pride—Job 11:12 (Vulg.), “A vain man is lifted up into pride.” Truly tares are indeed evil.

II. On the second head is to be noted their punishment, “bind them in bundles,” &c., of which three points are to be considered—(1) They will be bound with eternal chains, “bind them;” (2) they will be bound together “in bundles”—of these two, Wisd. 17:17, “They were all bound together with the chain of darkness.” (3) They will be burnt, “to burn them”—Isa. 66:24, “Neither shall their fire be quenched.” From five particulars can be learned the greatness of this punishment by fire: (1) It burns, yet is not consumed—Wisd. 19:20, “The flames wasted not the flesh of corruptible animals.” (2) With the heat, cold is also mingled—S. Matt. 13:42, “Into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing” (from excessive heat) “and gnashing of teeth” (from intense cold). So the Gloss. (3) It will most cruelly afflict—S. Austin says, “So much hotter will it be than our fire; as our fire is than mere painted fire.” (4) It will be eternal—S. Matt. 25:41, “Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire.” (5) It will be heat without splendour—Ps. 29:7, “The voice of the Lord divideth the flames of fire.” In a flame is both light and heat; the Lord will divide it so that the heat alone remains.

III. On the third head is to be noted the goodness of the holy (the wheat), three forms of which will be here mentioned—(1) It is white on account of purity; (2) it is red on account of charity—of these two, Cant. 5:10, “My Beloved is white and ruddy.” (3) It is heavy by gravity of manners—Ps. 35:18, “I will praise Thee among much people.”

IV. On the fourth head is to be noted the glory of the Saints, “gather the wheat into My barn”—which is (1) spacious, for the sake of pleasantness; (2) refreshing, for the sake of joy; (3) enduring, on account of eternity. Of the first, Ps. 26:8, “Lord, I have loved the habitation of Thy house, and the place where Thine honour dwelleth.” Of the second, Ps. 112:3, “Wealth and riches shall be in His house.” Of the third, 2 Cor. 5:1, “An house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens.”

V. On the fifth head is to be noted the abundance of the “barn”—it is full of corn and wine and oil. (1) Corn is the joy of the vision of the Son—Ps. 81:16, “He should have fed them also with the finest of the wheat;” S. John 12:24, “Except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die.” (2) Wine is the joy of the vision of the Father—Ps. 104:15, “Wine that maketh glad the heart of man.” (3) Oil, the joy of the vision of the Holy Spirit—Ps. 45:7, “Thy God hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows.” The “oil of gladness” is God the Holy Ghost. Of these three, 2 Chron. 11:11, “Store of victual and of oil and wine.” Gen. 27:28, “God give thee of the dew of heaven, and the fatness of the earth, and plenty of corn and wine.”

HOMILY XI

THE HEAVENLY STADIUM

SEPTUAGESIMA.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “So run, that ye may obtain.”—1 Cor. 9:24.

THE Apostle sets before us two things in this Epistle. Firstly, he exhorts us to run—“run.” Secondly, he points out the end of running—“that ye may obtain.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted that the course to be run is threefold. (1) The first is the course of nature—Job 9:25, “My days are swifter than a post;” Jer. 23:10, “Their course is evil;” 1 Cor. 9:26, “I therefore run not as uncertainly.” The course of nature is threefold, for naturally the creature runs in a threefold way. Firstly, they run in serving men—3 Esd. 4:34, “Swift is the sun in his course,” for it travels in order that it may serve man. Secondly, in punishing the wicked—Wisd. 5:23, “The water of the sea shall rage against them, and the rivers shall run together in a terrible manner: a mighty wind shall stand up against them, and as a whirlwind shall divide them.” Creatures were naturally created to punish those who rebelled against their Creator”—Wisd. 16:24, “For the creature serving Thee, the Creator, is made fierce against the unjust for their punishment.” Thirdly, they hasten in having aimed at nothing, when the creatures, who are naturally from nothing by themselves, strain after nothing. S. Austin asks, “What is the present life save a kind of passage to death?” (2) The course of sin is likewise threefold. Firstly, the course of pride—Job 15:26 (Vulg.), “He hath run against Him with his neck raised up, and is armed with a fat neck.” Secondly, of avarice—Prov. 1:16, “Their feet run to evil.” It is said of the covetous, Ps. 50:18, “When thou sawest a thief, thou consentedest with him.” Thirdly, of luxury—Eccles. 7:26, “I find more bitter than death the woman whose heart is snares and nets, and her hands as bands.” As sheep are led to the slaughter, so are men by luxury. (3) The course of grace is likewise threefold. Firstly, a course of doctrine—Gal. 2:2, “I went up by revelation, and communicated unto them that Gospel which I preach among the Gentiles, but privately to them which were of reputation, lest by any means I should run, or had run, in vain.” Secondly, of mercy—Gen. 18:7, 8, “Abraham ran unto the herd, and fetcht a calf tender and good … and set it before them.” Thirdly, of perseverance—2 S. Tim. 4:7, “I have finished my course, I have kept the faith: henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the end of running so as to gain the reward implies three conditions. (1) We must run cautiously, lest we fall or tumble down into the pitfall of sin—Eph. 5:15, “See then that ye walk circumspectly.” (2) We must run quickly, lest another overtake us, or lest we should become torpid through sloth—Heb. 4:11, “Let us labour to enter into this rest.” (3) We must run perseveringly, so that we forsake not the course, nor fail of well-doing—S. Matt. 24:13, “He that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved.” Patience is chiefly needed to enable us to persevere, and to bear all the troubles which come upon us in this world—Heb. 12:1, “Let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus.”

HOMILY XII

THE LORD’S WORK AND OURS

SEPTUAGESIMA.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “And he went out about the third hour, and saw others standing idle in the market-place, and said unto them; Go ye also into the vineyard, and whatsoever is right I will give you.”—S. Matt. 20:3, 4.

FOUR things are noted in these words. Firstly, the goodness of the Lord: “He went out” for the salvation of His people. For the going out of Christ to lead men into His vineyard was an act of infinite goodness—Habak. 3:13, “Thou wentest forth for the salvation of Thy people.” Secondly, the foolishness of man: “Saw others standing idle in the market-place.” Nothing is more foolish than for man, who ought in this present life so to work that he may live eternally, to live idly—Ecclus. 22:2, “The sluggard is pelted with the dung of oxen, and everyone that toucheth him will shake his hands.” Thirdly, the necessity of working in the Lord’s vineyard—“Go ye also into the vineyard;” 2 Thess. 3:10, “If any would not work, neither should he eat.” Fourthly, the profit of the labour—“Whatsoever is right I will give you;” Rev. 22:12, “Behold, I come quickly; and My reward is with Me, to give to every man according as his work shall be.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted that Christ is said to have had five goings out—(1) In the beginning of the world, as a Sower, sowing His creatures—S. Luke 8:5, “A Sower went out to sow His seed.” (2) In His Nativity, enlightening the world—Isa. 62:1, “Until the righteousness thereof go forth as brightness, and the salvation thereof as a lamp that burneth;” S. John 16:28, “I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world.” (3) In His Passion, saving His own from the power of the Devil, and from all evil—Isa. 51:5, “My righteousness is near, My salvation is gone forth.” (4) In providing, as a householder, for His family and affairs—“The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto a man that is an householder, which went out early in the morning to hire labourers into his vineyard.” (5) He will go out in judgment, in a threefold way. Firstly, as a Visitor, making a severe inquisition upon the wicked—Isa. 26:21, “Behold, the Lord cometh out of His place to punish the inhabitants of the earth for their iniquity.” Secondly, as a strong fighter, subduing all His rebellious ones—Isa. 42:13, “The Lord shall go forth as a mighty man; He shall stir up jealousy as a man of war.” Thirdly, as a Judge, punishing the wicked after their deservings—Mic. 1:3, “Behold, the Lord cometh forth out of His place, and He will come down and tread upon the high places of the earth.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that for five reasons it is most foolish to live in idleness in this present life. (1) Man was born to labour—Job. 5:7 (Vulg.), “Man is born to labour.” (2) From idleness evil is learned, as from a bad master—Ecclus. 33:29, “Idleness hath taught much evil.” (3) Idleness frequently commits dreadful sin—Ezek. 16:49, “Behold, this was the iniquity of thy sister Sodom, pride, fulness of heart, and abundance of idleness.” (4) Idleness incurs the loss of eternal good—Prov. 6:10, 11, “A little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to sleep: so shall thy poverty come as one that travelleth.” (5) Because eternal toil is acquired from a short rest—Ps. 73:5, “They are not in trouble [Vulg., labour] as other men, neither are they plagued like other men;” but like demons, Ps. 48:9, 10 (Vulg.), “shall labour for ever, and shall live unto the end.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted that this vineyard in which men are sent to labour is righteousness, in which, as S. Chrysostom observes, there are as many plants as there are virtues, and in which we perform five works. (1) Planting it with good works and graces—Ps. 107:37, “Plant vineyards which may yield fruits of increase;” Prov. 31:16, “With the fruit of her hands she planted the vineyard.” (2) Clearing it from thorns, which are vices, which the idle do not do—Prov. 24:30, 31, “I went by the field of the slothful and by the vineyard of the man void of understanding, and, lo! it was all grown over with thorns, and nettles had covered the face thereof.” (3) Pruning the superfluous shoots—Cant. 2:12 (Vulg.), “The time for pruning is come;” S. John 15:2, “Every branch that beareth fruit He purgeth it that it may bring forth more fruit.” (4) Restraining the little foxes, the demons—Cant. 2:15, “Take us the foxes, the little foxes that spoil the vines.

(5) Protecting them from robbers—i.e., from the praises and the blames of men—Cant. 1:6, “They made me the keeper of the vineyards.”

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted that the reward of the labourers is a penny of the Gospel, which is equal to a thousand silver pieces—Cant. 8:11, “Thou, O Solomon, must have a thousand,” for the thousand pieces of silver are the thousand joys of eternity. To which may we be brought.

HOMILY XIII

LABOUR AND TOIL

SEXAGESIMA.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“In labours more abundant.”—2 Cor. 11:23.

HOLY SCRIPTURE treats of four kinds of labour or travail. Firstly, material labour, by which man supplies the deficencies of nature—Job. 5:7, “Man is born unto trouble” (Vulg., labour). Secondly, the labour of sin, in which a man toils at committing sin—Jer. 9:5, “Weary themselves to commit iniquity.” Thirdly, the labour of Gehenna, after which there follows no rest—Ps. 48:9, 10 (Vulg.), “Shall labour for ever, and shall still live unto the end.” Fourthly, the labour of grace, which the just undergo in order to do good works—Prov. 10:16, “The labour of the righteous tendeth to life.” Three of these kinds of labour are to be noticed.

I. On the first head it is to be noted that in natural labour five points are to be considered. (1) It was inflicted on man on account of sin, whence it is manifest that man should hate sin as the cause of his toil—Gen. 3:17–19. “Cursed is the ground for thy sake: in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread.” (2) That if endured in love eternal blessedness is the fruit of labour—Ps. 128:2. “Thou shalt eat the labour of thine hands, happy shalt thou be.” (3) It is demanded because the fruit of the land is frequently consumed by wild beasts, by insects, and by enemies; all of which are the effects of sin, therefore man ought to hate sin—Deut. 28:33, “The fruit of thy land, and all thy labours, shall a nation which thou knowest not eat up.” On the other hand, it is said of the just—Isaiah 62:8, “Surely I will no more give thy corn to be meat for thine enemies; and the sons of the stranger shall not drink thy wine.” (4) All are called to labour: the idle are denied bread—2 Thess. 3:10, “If any would not work, neither should he eat.” (5) He that refuseth to labour is punished with eternal punishment—Ps. 72:5 (Vulg.), “They are not in the labour of men, neither shall they be scourged like other men;” but with the demons.

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the labour of toil of sin is of five kinds. (1) Of covetousness—Eccles. 4:8, “Yet is there no end of all his labour; neither is his eye satisfied with riches;” Prov. 23:4, “Labour not to be rich.” (2) Of pride—“What profit hath he that hath laboured for the wind?” The wind is pride. (3) Of luxury—Eccles. 9:9, “Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest all the days of the life of thy vanity … That is thy portion in this life, and in thy labour which thou takest under the sun. (4) Of sorceries—Isaiah 47:12, “Stand now with thine enchantments, and with the multitude of thy sorceries, wherein thou hast laboured from thy youth.” (5) Of gluttony—Eccles. 6:7, “All the labour of man is for his mouth, and yet the appetite is not filled.” What he may eat, and drink, and enjoy of his labour; so does the glutton speak.

III. On the third head it is be noted of the labour of Gehenna, that three particulars are to be noted. (1) Its immensity—Lam. 3:5, “He hath compassed me with gall and travail.” (2) Its bitterness—Eccles. 10:15, “The labour of the foolish wearieth every one of them.” (3) Its duration—Ps. 48:9, 10, “Shall labour for ever, and shall live unto the end.” From which labour may the Lord deliver us.

HOMILY XIV

THE BIRDS AND THE SEED

SEXAGESIMA.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“The fowls of the air devoured it.”—S. Luke 8:5.

BY the fowls of the air, are understood evil spirits; by the sea, righteousness; whence three points arise from the mystical expositions. Firstly, the quickness of the evil spirit to do evil—“birds;” secondly, their natural dignity—“of the air,” or of heaven; thirdly, the iniquity of their sin—“devoured it.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted that evil spirits are compared to birds for three reasons. (1) Their high flight; the evil spirits fly on high—Numb. 24:21, “Thou puttest thy nest in a rock.” (2) For their quickness of flight—Lam. 4:19, “Our persecutors are mightier than the eagles of the heaven.” (3) In their rapacity they live by devouring the souls that they have seized—Ezek. 17:3, “A great eagle with great wings, long-winged, full of feathers, took the branch of the cedar. He cropped off the top of his young twigs.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the birds of the air are called evil spirits from their natural dignity, which consists of three things. (1) Of origin; for they were created in the high heavens. (2) Of lightness or subtlety. Of these two—Isa. 14:12–14, “How art thou fallen, O Lucifer, Son of the Morning … I will be like the Most High.” His origin is pointed out, in that he is said to have fallen from Heaven, for he was created in Heaven. The name Lucifer signifies lightness and beauty of nature. (3) Of habitation on high—Eph. 6:12, “Spiritual wickedness in high places.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted that the iniquity of the evil spirits consists in their devouring three kinds of seeds. (1) Seed of the Word of God—“The seed is the Word of God;” S. Luke 8:12, “Then cometh the

Devil and taketh away the Word out of their hearts.” (2) Seed of righteousness—2 Cor. 9:6, “He who soweth sparingly shall reap also sparingly,” &c. (3) Seed of any good work—Ps. 126:6, “He that goeth forth and weepeth, bearing precious seed, shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bearing his sheaves with him.” We sow this seed whenever we do good. Of (1), The evil spirits take away the seed of the Word of God by sowing error in the mind of man—2 Cor. 4:4, “In whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them that believe not, lest the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ, Who is the Image of God, should shine unto them.” Of (2), They take away the seed of righteousness by enticing men into unrighteousness—S. John 8:44, “Ye are of your father the Devil, the lust of your father ye will do.” Of (3), The Devil takes away the seed of good works, at the same time that he makes men to glory in them—S. Matt. 6:1, 2, “Take heed that ye do not your alms before men to be seen of them. When thou dost thine alms, do not sound a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do … that they may have glory of men … They have their reward.” Whence it is manifest that the seed must be guarded from the “birds of the air,” from the evil spirits, that it may bring forth fruit an hundredfold, which fruit is the joy of eternity. To which may we be brought.

HOMILY XV

CHARITY: ITS GAIN AND LOSS

QUINQUAGESIMA.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity,” &c.—1 Cor. 13:1.

IN this Epistle we are invited to the exercise of charity, and it is manifoldly commended to us chiefly for five reasons. Firstly, for its preciousness—“Charity, which name signifies what is dear and precious.” Secondly, the loss in its absence—“I am become as sounding brass,” &c. Thirdly, its value in this present life—“Charity suffereth long, and is kind.” Fourthly, its eternity—“Charity never faileth.” Fifthly, its dignity—“The greatest of these is charity.” Now mention the first two points.

I. On the first head it is to be noted that charity is precious on four accounts. (1) It can only come from One, and it must be given by the highest good—Rom. 5:5, “The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost.” (2) It belongs only to the good. S. Austin says, “Charity is a peculiar fountain; a stranger does not communicate with it.” (3) Possessing it, all good things are possessed. S. Austin says, “Mark, how great a good is charity, which being absent renders all other good things vain, but he to whom it is present has all things. (4) The possessor of charity is most dear to God, for it is of that nature that they who possess it are called dear, whence the Lord calls those living in charity the most beloved—Cant. 5:1, “Eat, O friends; drink, yea, drink abundantly, O beloved.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the absence of charity entails a threefold loss, as the Apostle here points out. (1) The best part of our nature is wasted—“I am become as sounding brass.” In time the brass is worn away by giving out the sound, just as the rational creature without charity is consumed by vices. S. Austin says in the “City of God,” “If we were not of a good nature we should not be harmed by vices; for what harm can they do us save to deprive us of integrity, beauty, salvation, and peace?" (2) The soul without charity, being separated from God, dies—"I am nothing"—that is, I am dead, I am separated from the truth, without which man is dead; 1 S. John 3:14, "He that loveth not his brother abideth in death." (3) Every work without charity is rendered useless—"Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, though I give my body to be burned." S. Ambrose declares that he who has not charity lacks all good. From which state may we be preserved.

HOMILY XVI

BLINDNESS AND SIGHT

QUINQUAGESIMA.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“A certain blind man sat by the way-side.”—S. Luke 18:35.

MORALLY, by the blind man the sinner is understood—Zeph. 1:17, “They shall walk like blind men, because they have sinned against the Lord.” As the blind does not see bodily, so the sinner does not see spiritually. Firstly, there are seven causes which hinder the bodily sight, which represent the seven mortal sins which produce spiritual blindness. Secondly, there are seven things which produce mental illumination.

I. On the first head it is to be noted that the seven causes of blindness and the seven sins are—(1) A swelling of the face, and this is pride; S. Austin says, “My face is swollen so greatly that it does not suffer me to see.” (2) A darkness in the air: this is envy, whence the envious are spoken of as being blind—Wisd. 2:21, “Their own malice blinded them.” It is also said of the envy of the Jews—1 Sam. 18:9, “Saul eyed David from that day forward.” (3) A derangement of the eyes: this is anger—Ps. 31:9, “Mine eye is consumed with grief, yea, my soul and my belly.” (4) Dust or anything that falls into the eye: this is avarice. Dust is of those temporal things which darken—S. Austin says, “I wandered after temporal things, and I was blinded.” (5) A closing of the eyes, for no one can see who closes his eyes, or does not wish to open them: and this is a weakening, for the weakened from slothfulness alone is not able to open his intellectual eyes to behold spiritual good. Betius says that the wicked accustom their eyes to darkness, they turn them away from the light of truth; they are like those birds who see at night, but who are blind by day. (6) The gathering round the eyes of blood and humour: this is gluttony—Prov. 23:29, “Who hath redness of eyes? They that tarry long at the wine;” even according to the letter, the spiritual and bodily eyes are both darkened by an excess of wine. (7) The shadow of little spots, for occasionally a small spot or nubercula is formed in the eye and produces blindness: this is luxury. S. Austin said, “Small cloudy spots were coming up from the wine of carnal concupiscence, and they darkened my heart that the sincerity of love could not be distinguished from the darkness of lust.

II. On the second head it is to be noted that the spiritual sight consists also of seven graces. (1) Of faith—S. Luke 18:42, “Receive thy sight: thy faith hath saved thee.” S. Austin, “Faith is the illumination of the mind, the means by which it is enlightened from the First Light to behold spiritual blessings.” (2) Of humility—S. John 9:39, “For judgment I am come into this world, that they which see not might see:” these are humble who think that they see not. (3) Of present trial and bitterness—Tobit 6:9, “The gall is good for anointing the eyes in which there is a little white speck.” (4) Of love of one’s neighbour—Rev. 10:1, “Eye-salve, that thou mayest see.” (5) Abundance of tears: this is illustrated by he who, being born blind, went and washed in the pool of Siloam—S. John 9:7, “He went his way therefore and washed, and came seeing.” (6) Of fervent prayer—S. Matt. 20:31, “Cried out, saying, Have mercy on us, O Lord, thou Son of David.… So Jesus had compassion on them, and touched their eyes, and immediately their eyes received sight.” (7) Of the reverential hearing of Holy Scripture—Isa. 29:18, “In that day shall the deaf hear the words of the book, and the eyes of the blind shall see out of obscurity and out of darkness.”

THE HOMILIES OF S. THOMAS AQUINAS, FOR THE SUNDAYS FROM LENT TO THE ASCENSION

CONTAINING TWENTY-FOUR HOMILIES UPON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS FOR THE SUNDAYS IN LENT, EASTER DAY, AND THE SUNDAYS AFTER EASTER

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NOTICE

The present instalment of the Homilies of S. Thomas is perhaps richer than the former portions of the same work in unfolding the Humanity, Divinity, and Work of the Word made Flesh. Lent, Passiontide, and Easter necessarily closely connect themselves with the humility, the sorrow, and the glory of our one Adorable Sacrifice and High Priest; and S. Thomas ever traces out the power of the "endless life" that underlies all this outward change. Yet each of these short sketches has a merit of its own, and one so seemingly incomplete and unworthy of S. Thomas as "The Government of the Tongue" (XI., Easter) presents us with a pregnant and thoughtful reading of Lam. 3:28. Some may miss in the present outlines the copious spiritual readings of the Old Testament which formed so marked a feature in the former Homilies; but we gain in exchange a deeper insight into the New Testament. The worlds spiritual and moral are brought very near the one to the other: the sea and mountain play their parts in Our Blessed Lord's "Works and Ways" (Hom. VIII., Lent); the powers of heaven, earth, and hell enter into the triumph of this all-glorious Passion (Hom. II., Easter); the invisible powers of darkness which take up their abode in "the Sinful Soul" (Hom. IV., Lent), when cast out by the grace of God, prepare that soul for the contemplation of the "City of God" (Hom. VII., Lent), in which glorious City the "Eternal Passover" (Hom. I., Easter) shall be for ever celebrated. The "Risen Saviour" (Hom. II., Easter), with His "Three Witnesses" (Hom. III., id.), when He leaves behind Him His "Blessing of Peace" (Hom. III., id.), teaches us both by word and example how these high mysteries of His Church and Grace may be realized by us even now in part—an earnest of that more abundant entrance which we hope will one day be ministered unto us "into the Everlasting Kingdom of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ."

It is a matter of deep thankfulness with the Editor that this unpretending little publication should have called forth so many expressions of sympathy and interest; and, in some cases, in quarters where it might have been least expected.

THE LENTEN HOMILIES OF S. THOMAS AQUINAS

HOMILY I

THE GRACE AND DUTIES OF LENT

THE FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Behold now is the accepted time: behold now is the day of salvation.”—2 Cor. 6:2.

TWO subjects for consideration are indicated in these words—firstly, a commendation of the present time, “Behold now is the accepted time;” secondly, the cause of this commendation is added, “Behold now is the day of salvation.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the present time is called an “acceptable time,” for eight reasons—(1) Because it is the time for seeking the Lord: Hos. 10:12, “It is time to seek the Lord, till He come and rain righteousness upon you.” (2) Because it is a time for reconciling the Lord: Ps. 69:13, “My prayer is unto Thee, O Lord, in an acceptable time.” (3) Because it is a time for correcting our ways: Heb. 9:10, “Until the time of reformation”—i.e., of the injustice of the Jews. (4) Because it is a time for restraining superfluities and vices: Cant. 2:12 (Vulg.), “The time of pruning is come.” (5) Because it is the time of receiving the Divine compassion: Ps. 102:13, “For the time to favour her, yea the set time, is come.” (6) Because it is the time for suffering tribulation: Jer. 30:7, “It is even the time of Jacob’s trouble; but he shall be saved out of it.” (7) Because it is the time of acquiring salvation; Ecclus. 4:28, “Refrain not to speak in the time of salvation.” (8) Because it is a time for doing good: Ps. 119:126, “It is time for Thee, Lord, to work.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that this “day of salvation” exhorts and invites us by eight ways to holiness—(1) The Holy Scriptures, which are read at this time. The Gospels and Epistles which are read invite us to prayer, to fasting, to almsgiving, to just dealing, to repentance, and to other things of this sort, so that he must be indeed insensible who does not now do good. (2) The Creator invites us, Who is believed at this time to have made the world; so that he would be greatly neglectful who did not perform some good act for God, when He has made so many good things for us. (3) The creature invites us to this, which in the time of winter ceased from work, and now begins to be active again, as is seen in herbs, plants, and animals: Jer. 8:7, “The stork in the heaven knoweth her appointed times”—i.e., for building, &c. (4) The example of Christ invites us to well-doing, Who at this time wrought many good things for us: S. Bernard, “Who made me altogether and at once by a word, in regenerating me; Who said many things, and did many miracles, and endured hardships.” (5) The ordination of the Church invites us all to confession, and fasting, and frequenting of the church; whence he who does not do these things breaks the precepts of Mother Church: Prov. 1:8, “Forsake not the law of thy Mother.” (6) The incitement and habits of many, for now many begin to perform good works, so that a man ought to be ashamed to remain alone with the few: Heb. 12:1, “Seeing we also are compassed about with so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us.” (7) The abundant forming, out of Divine grace; for it is to be believed that God, Who bestowed so many good things upon us, in these days pours out more abundantly His grace upon us: whence it is read in the Epistle, “that ye receive not the grace of God in vain.” (8) The expectation of the great Easter ought to exhort us to good, for he who expects a great festival ought to make a great vigil, wherefore the Church now sings, “It is not for nought that we rise in the morning before the light, because the Lord promised the Crown to the watchers;” and again, “We expect to receive the Body of Christ, which none ought to receive unless purged: 1 Cor. 11:28, ‘Let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that Bread and drink of that Cup.’ Whence so by worthily celebrating the Lenten fast at the present time we shall come to Horeb, the Mount of God—to the heavenly Supper of the Gospel—to which,” &c.

HOMILY II

CHRIST AN EXAMPLE IN FASTING

THE FIRST SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “When He had fasted forty days and forty nights, He was afterward an hungered.”—Matt. 4:2.

S. AUGUSTINE says that it is the highest religion to imitate what we worship, so that, when Our Lord fasted, we ought to imitate Him in fasting. There are four reasons which ought to move us to fasting—firstly, the command of God; secondly, the example of Christ; thirdly, the manifold harm which befals those who do not fast; fourthly, the manifold benefits which come to them from fasting.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the Lord commanded us to fast in a fourfold manner—(1) By Himself, to Adam and Eve in Paradise, when He commanded that they should fast—i.e., abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and eat it not. (2) He commanded it by the Law of Moses: Lev. 16:31, “It shall be a Sabbath of rest unto you, and ye shall afflict your souls by a statute for ever.” (3) God commanded it by the Prophets: Joel 2:15, “Sanctify a fast.” (4) God commanded it by the Apostles: 2 Cor. 11:27, “In hunger and thirst, in fastings often”—whence he is a manifest transgressor of the precepts of grace who is unwilling to fast.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that Our Lord taught us that there were four things necessary in fasting—(1) That we should be cleansed from all sin. (2) That we should conceal our fasting from the applause of men. (3) That we should fast with long-suffering and perseverance. (4) That we should overcome the temptations of the Devil. The first He taught in this, that He fasted when He was baptized; so also he who wishes to fast well ought first to be cleansed by penitence and confession: S. Matt. 6:17, “But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thine head and wash thy face.” The second

He taught because He sought the desert when about to fast; whence He showed to us that when we fast and do good works we must hide ourselves from the praises of men: S. Matt. 6:16, “When ye fast, be not, as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance … that thou appear not unto men to fast.” The third He taught in this, that He fasted forty days and forty nights: S. Austin, “Subdue your flesh with abstinence from meat and drink as far as your health will permit.” The fourth He taught in this, that He did not give way to the temptation of the Devil: “Man shall not live by bread alone … Get thee hence, Satan;” Ecclus. 2:1, “Son, when thou comest to the service of God … prepare thy soul for temptation.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that four evils come upon those who are unwilling to fast when they ought—(1) The evil of iniquity: Ezek. 16:49, “Behold, this was the iniquity of thy sister Sodom, pride, fulness of bread.” (2) The evil of loss, for he who is not willing to fast will have to fast for ever from the fruit of eternal life; and this is indicated in Gen. 3:17, where it is recorded that Adam would not abstain from the forbidden fruit; wherefore the Lord said, “Now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life … the Lord God sent him forth from the Garden of Eden.” (3) The evil of present punishment: Ecclus. 34:7, “By surfeiting many have perished.” (4) The evil of the punishment of perpetual hunger and thirst in the lower world: Isa. 65:13, “Behold, My servants shall eat, but ye shall be hungry: behold, My servants shall drink, but ye shall be thirsty”—which relates to the “heavenly feast,” from which they who do not fast now, but “fare sumptuously every day, shall not have a drop of water even” (see S. Luke 16:19–24).

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that a fourfold profit flows from fasting—(1) The mortification of vices. (2) An elevation of the mind towards God. (3) The acquisition of virtue. (4) The reward of eternal blessedness. Of these four S. Gregory says: “If thou represseth vices by bodily fasting,” behold the first; “thou elevatest the mind,” behold the second; “thou increaseth virtue,” behold the third; “thou grantest rewards,” behold the fourth.

HOMILY III

THE CHRISTIAN’S LIFE

THE SECOND SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “We beseech you, brethren, and exhort you by the Lord Jesus, that as ye have received from us how ye ought to walk and to please God,” &c.—1 Thess. 4:1.

THE Apostle exhorts in this Epistle to five things. Firstly, that we should study to walk according to God: “How ye ought to walk.” Secondly, that we may be pleasing to God: “To please God.” Thirdly, as holy: “Your sanctification.” Fourthly, that we should do no injury to our neighbour: “That no man go beyond and defraud.” Fifthly, that we should avoid sins of sensuality: “Ye should abstain from fornication.”

I. On the first head it is be noted, that the Apostle taught us twelve ways of walking; five of them will be mentioned here, and the rest in Homily V. for the Third Sunday in Lent—(1) In humility, lest inflated with pride we are not able to pass up the narrow way. (2) In patience, that we may bear cheerful the toils and the misfortunes of the way. (3) In meekness, that we may have companions on our way, and may not perturb them in the journey. (4) In charity, that we may communicate good words to our companions. (5) In compassion, that we may help the infirmities of the saints. Of these five, Eph. 4:1, 2, “That ye walk worthy of the vocation, with all lowliness,” behold the first; “Long suffering,” behold the second; “Meekness,” behold the third; “Forbearing one another,” behold the fourth; “In love,” behold the fifth.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that five things are needful for us to please God. (1) That we should fear Him above all as omnipotent and just. (2) That we should hope in Him above all, as if in a liberator. Of these two, Ps. 147:11, “The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him,” behold the first; “In those that hope in His mercy,” behold the second. (3) That we should love Him above all, as our highest good: Prov. 8:17, “I love them that love Me.” (4) That we shall sustain tribulations willingly for His sake: Judith 8:23, “All that pleased God passed through many tribulations, remaining faithful.” (5) That for His sake we should despise fleshly delights, and live after the Spirit: Rom. 8:8, 9, “They that are in the flesh cannot please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit,” &c.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that we ought to seek to be holy for five reasons—i.e., be made clean. (1) That we may become like God: 1 S. Pet. 1:16, “Be ye holy, for I am holy.” (2) Lest we should do injury to Christ, Who cleansed us with such great toil and cost: Apoc. 1:5, “Loved us, and washed us from our sins in His Own Blood.” (3) Lest we should be prevented from entering the Heavenly City: Apoc. 21:27, “There shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth.” (4) That we may be made capable of receiving wisdom: Wisd. 7:27, “Conveyeth herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” (5) That we may be worthy to see God: S. Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God,” which vision Christ has procured for us.

[Note, S. Thomas has not treated of the fourth head, and for the fifth he refers to Homily V. for the Third Sunday in Lent.]

HOMILY IV

THE SINFUL SOUL

THE SECOND SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “My daughter is grievously vexed with a devil.”—S. Matt. 15:22.

MORALLY by this demoniac is understood a sinful soul, and here are noted two evils which a man acquires through deadly sin. The first is, that he is possessed by a devil; the second is, that he is grievously vexed.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that a sinful soul possesses seven devils. (1) An immoderate desire of knowledge, this a noon-day devil: Ps. 91:6 (Vulg.), “The noon day devil.” (2) An immoderate avarice for possession; this is the dumb devil: S. Luke 11:14, “He was casting out a devil, and it was dumb.” (3) The ambition of ruling; this devil is Asmodeus by name: Tobit 3:8, “A devil named Asmodeus had killed them.” Asmodeus is interpreted of him about to make judgment; and it signifies ambition, which desires to possess the power of judging men who are to be judged by God. (4) The delight of carnal pleasures; this is the blind devil: S. Matt. 12:22, “Then was brought unto Him one possessed with a devil, blind and dumb.” This is carnal concupiscence, which blinds the eyes of the mind: S. Austin, “Clouds were ascending from the slimy concupiscence of the flesh, and they overclouded and darkened my soul; so that the sincerity of love could not be distinguished from the blackness of lust.” (5) The cruelty of doing harm; this is the fierce devil: S. Matt. 8:22, “There met Him two possessed with devils coming out of the tombs, exceeding fierce.” (6) The malignity of detracting; of this, Apoc. 16:13, “I saw three unclean spirits like frogs come out of the mouth of the dragon.” By the frog is understood the loquacity of detraction, for there are three ways of detraction. The first is the undervaluing blessings; the second is exaggerating evils; the third is imputing false crimes. (7) Desperation, which is the seventh devil, from which flows all evils; this devil is called “legion,” because in a state of desperation many devils enter into the mind: S. Matt. 5:9, “What is thy name? And he answered, saying, My name is Legion, for we are many.” Of these seven devils: S. Luke 8:2, “Mary called Magdalene, out of whom went seven devils.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that these devils vex the man whom they possess in seven ways. (1) By blinding him. (2) Depriving him of speech; of these two: S. Matt. 12:22, “One possessed with a devil, blind and dumb.” (3) They vex by kindling the flame of desire. (4) By drowning in the water of luxury. (5) By altering the revolution of changing things; of these three: S. Matt. 17:15, “Lord, have mercy on my son, for he is lunatic and sore vexed; for ofttimes he falleth into the fire, and oft into the water.” The sinner is called a lunatic, since like the moon (luna) he increases and decreases at certain seasons, and often falls into the fire of lust and into the water of luxury. (6) He afflicts with the cold of his spiritual ones by wearing the clothing of virtues: S. Luke 8:27, “There met Him a certain man which had devils a long time, and ware no clothes.” (7) He vexes with the griefs and anguishes which sinners often suffer by inflicting upon themselves: S. Matt. 5:2, 5, “There met Him out of the tombs a man with an unclean spirit … cutting himself with stones.” Jer. 2:19, “See, that it is an evil and bitter thing that thou hast forsaken the Lord thy God,” &c.

Five things are noted of this woman of Canaan which availed for the liberation of this demoniac. (1) Humility: “Yet the dogs eat.” (2) Her patience, since she patiently endured the seeming reproaches of Our Lord. (3) Her prayer, “Have mercy on me, O Lord.” (4) Her perseverance: she did not cease asking till she obtained what she desired. (5) Her faith: “O woman, great is thy faith.” If we had had these five qualities we should be delivered from every devil, that is, from all sin; which may Christ grant us to be. Amen.

HOMILY V

THE WALK OF THE RIGHTEOUS AND OF THE WICKED

THIRD SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Walk as children of the light“—Eph. 5:8.

THE Apostle, in these words, lays down three points for consideration. Firstly, he exhorts to walking: “walk.” Secondly, the manner of walking: “as children.” Thirdly, He assigns a cause “of the light,” for light is the means of walking: S. John 12:35, “Walk while ye have the light.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that man has a fourfold walk. (1) Of nature, by walking according to which a man hastens towards death: Job. 16:22, “I shall go the way whence I shall not return.” (2) Of sin, by walking according to which a man passes on from sin to sin: Ps. 12:8, “The wicked walk on every side.” (3) Of grace, by walking according to which a man goes on from good to better: Gen. 17:1, “Walk before Me, and be thou perfect.” (4) Of glory, according to which the holy walk who are following Christ: Apoc. 3:4, “They shall walk with Me in white, for they are worthy.” The first is to be endured, the second to be avoided, the third to be acted upon, the fourth to be desired. The Apostle exhorts to the third: Eph. 4:7, “I beseech you that ye walk worthy.”

II. On the second head is to be noted the manner of walking, of which the Apostle mentions twelve ways; five of which were explained in Homily III., for the second Sunday in Lent, and seven remain to be considered here. It is known that we ought to walk “in newness of life”—(1) Casting away our former sin: Rom. 6:4, “We also should walk in newness of life.” (2) Subjecting the flesh to the Spirit, and living according to the Spirit: Gal.

5:16, “Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh.” (3) In love, loving God and one’s neighbours: Eph. 5:2, “Walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us.” (4) Honestly, having a good conversation amongst men: 1 Thess. 4:12, “Walk honestly toward them that are without.” (5) In wisdom, edifying others by sweet and profitable words: Coloss. 4:5, “Walk in wisdom toward them that are without.” (6) In Christ, by following and imitating Him: Coloss. 2:6, “As ye have, therefore, received Christ Jesus the Lord, so walk in Him.” (7) We ought to walk in the light, as doing nothing worthy of reproof: S. John 11:9, “If any man walk in the day he stumbleth not.” The holy walk in these seven paths, but the wicked in seven other ways—(1) According to the flesh, in fulfilling its desires: 2 S. Peter 2:10, “Them that walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness.” (2) According to the course of this world: Eph. 2:2, “Wherein in time past ye walked according to the course of this world.” (3) In vanity, by loving the things which are vain: Eph. 4:17, “As other Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind.” (4) In living inordinately, and dishonestly, and dissolutely: 2 Thess. 3:6, “Withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the tradition which he received of us.” (5) In fulfilling whatsoever desires they list. (6) By living luxuriantly in lasciviousness. (7) In gluttonies, revellings, and the like. Of these three: 1 S. Pet. 4:3, “So have wrought the will of the Gentiles when we walked in lasciviousness, lusts, excess of wine, revellings, banquetings, and abominable idolatries.” Those who so walk, perish: Job. 6:18, “The paths of their way are turned aside; they go to nothing, and perish;” whilst they who walk after the former ways come to the joy of eternal life, which may Christ give us. Amen.

HOMILY VI

THE CAST-OUT DEVIL

THIRD SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“He was casting out a devil, and it was dumb.”—S. Luke 11:14.

IN these words, concerning the casting out of this devil, is signified the casting out of the devil from the heart, and they teach three things. Firstly, the frequency of the casting out: “And He was casting out,” whence it is implied that He did frequently cast them out. Secondly, the wickedness of him who was cast out: “and he was dumb.” Thirdly, the profitableness of this casting out: “When the devil was gone out the dumb spake.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the Lord frequently cast out a devil—(1) In casting him out from Heaven: Ezek. 28:16, “I will cast thee as profane out of the mountain of God.” Apoc. 12:9, “The great dragon was cast out.” (2) He cast him out of Paradise when cursing him: Gen. 3:14, “Because thou hast done this thou art cursed above all cattle, and above every beast of the earth.” (3) He cast him from a mount when He repelled him: S. Matt. 4:10, “Get thee hence, Satan.” (4) Casting him out from the souls in driving him from them: Acts 10:38, “Who went about doing good, and healing all that were oppressed of the devil.” (5) He cast him out from the bodies of the sick when He healed them: S. Luke 4:41, “Devils also came out of many.” (6) He cast him out from the world, delivering it from his power: S. John 12:31, “Now shall the prince of this world be cast out.” (7) He cast him into hell, consigning him to eternal fires: Isa. 14:15, “Thou shalt be brought down to hell, to the sides of the pit.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that a threefold evil came upon the sick man from the devil, signifying the threefold evil which comes from sin. The first was, because the devil possessed him; the second, because he made him blind; the third, because he deprived him of the power of speech. That man had these three miseries, because he was a demoniac, was blind, and was dumb; they signify three evils which flow from sin—(1) He was possessed by the devil: 2 S. Tim. 2:26, “That they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil, who are taken captive by him at his will.” (2) He was made blind: Zeph. 1:17, “They shall walk like blind men because they have sinned against the Lord.” (3) He was made dumb, so that he could neither praise God nor confess his sins: Isa. 56:10, “They are all dumb dogs; they cannot bark.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that three blessings follow the casting out of the devil—first, the liberation from his possession; second, the restitution of sight; third, the restoration of speech; and these signify the three good things which happen to a soul in justification—(1) That the soul is delivered from the power of the devil: Coloss. 1:13, “Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness.” (2) That the light of grace is restored to it: Ps. 146:8, “The Lord openeth the eyes of the blind.” (3) That speech is given, by which sin may be confessed and God may be praised: Ps. 51, “Deliver me from blood-guiltiness, O God”—i.e., from sins—“and my tongue shall sing aloud of Thy righteousness.”

HOMILY VII

THE CITY OF GOD

FOURTH SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “But Jerusalem which is above is free.”—Gal. 4:26.

IN these words, the City of God, which rules in Heaven, is commended on three accounts. Firstly, for situation: “which is above.” Secondly, for its name: “Jerusalem.” Thirdly, for its liberty: “is free.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that for four reasons it is commended as being “above”—(1) For purity: uncleannesses are not “above,” but reach down into the vallies. In this celestial city there is nothing unclean: Apoc. 21:27, “There shall in no wise enter into it anything that defileth.” (2) For health: for that which is placed “above” is healthy; so is this celestial city, where there is neither pain nor death: Apoc. 21:4, “There shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain.” (3) For safety, for the city placed “above” is the more secure: Ps. 31:21, “He hath showed me His marvellous kindness in a strong city.” (4) For spaciousness; for the earth which is below is, as it were, a point in the sphere, but the heavens are the circumference: S. Austin, “But do you marvel that the breadth of the heavens are not limited by narrow boundaries? From the extreme boundary of Spain to the streets of this city, the space which intervenes is compassed in a very few days, if the wind carries the ship; whilst that celestial region takes the swiftest star a journey of thirty years to reach it.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that inasmuch as the city is named Jerusalem, it is to be commended for many reasons; for many things are spoken of Jerusalem in Scripture which must be understood of the heavenly Jerusalem. Ten qualities are here noticed—(1) Its wonderful beauty and fairness: Cant. 6:3, “Thou art beautiful, O my love, as Tirzah, comely as Jerusalem.” (2) Its inexpressible love and charity: Isa. 31:9, “The Lord, Whose fire is in Zion and His furnace in Jerusalem.” (3) The delightful splendour of its brightness: Tobit 13:13, “Jerusalem, City of God, … Thou shalt shine with a glorious light, and all the ends of the earth shall worship thee.” (4) The splendour of its walls, streets, and gates: Tobit 13:17, “The gates of Jerusalem shall be built of sapphire and emerald, and all the walls thereof round about of precious stones. All its streets shall be paved with white and clean stones.” (5) Its abundance of all things: Isa. 33:20, Vulg., “Their eyes shall see Jerusalem a rich habitation.” (6) The affluence of all delights: Isa. 66:10, 11, “Rejoice ye with Jerusalem, and be glad with her, all ye that love her: rejoice with joy for her, … be delighted with the abundance of her glory.” (7) Its perpetual and continual joy: Isa. 65:18, “I create Jerusalem a rejoicing.” (8) Its eternal honour and glory: Isa. 60:1, Vulg., “Arise, be enlightened, O Jerusalem; for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee.” (9) The happiness of eternal peace: Isa. 66:12, “Behold I will extend peace to her like a river.” (10) The eternal happiness of blessed light: Tobit 13:16, “Alleluia shall be sung in its streets.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that there will be deliverance there from five evils—(1) From the vexation of dæmons: Isa. 14:3, “And it shall come to pass in that day that the Lord shall give thee rest from thy sorrow, and from thy fear, and from the hard bondage.” (2) From the affliction of all evil: Tobit 13:9, “The Lord our God hath delivered Jerusalem His city from all her troubles.” (3) From the corruption of the creature: Rom. 8:21, “The creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption.” (4) From the death of the body: Rom. 7:24, 25, “Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord.” (5) Liberty from the servitude of sin: S. John 8:36, “If the Son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.” Blessed, therefore, is that city where there is no evil, where all is good. To which good may we be brought, &c.

HOMILY VIII

THE WAYS AND WORKS OF CHRIST

FOURTH SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“Jesus went over the sea of Galilee.”—S. John 6:1.

THERE are three things especially in this Gospel which Jesus is said to have done. Firstly, He “went over the sea.” Secondly, He ascended into a mountain: “went up into a mountain.” Thirdly, He fed multitudes: “Jesus took bread,” &c.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that Jesus did three things in connection with the sea—(1) He calmed it. (2) He walked upon it with dry feet. (3) He went over it. These three things Christ did in the world: Ps. 104:25, “This great and wide sea.” (1) Christ calmed the world in reconciling it with God the Father. (2) Walking over the world with dry feet, by loving nothing earthly. (3) He went over the world, ascending into heaven. Of the first: 2 Cor. 5:19, “God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself.” Of the second: S. John 14:30, “The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in Me.” Of the third: S. John 16:28, “I leave the world and go to the Father.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that in the Gospels it is recorded that Christ did seven things on the mountain—(1) On it He overcame the Devil. (2) On it He preached to His disciples. (3) He was transfigured on the mount. (4) On it He prayed frequently. (5) On it He appeared to His disciples. (6) On it He fed the multitude. (7) From it He ascended into heaven. Of the first: S. Matt. 4:8, “The Devil taketh Him up into an exceeding high mountain.” Of the second: S. Matt. 5:1, “Seeing the multitudes, He went up into a mountain, and when He was set His disciples came unto Him.” Of the third: S. Matt. 17:1, 2, “Jesus taketh Peter, James, and John his brother, and bringeth them up into an high mountain apart, and was transfigured before them.” Of the fourth: S. Matt. 14:23, “He went up into a mountain apart to pray.” Of the fifth: S. Matt. 28:16, “The eleven disciples went away into Galilee, into a mountain where Jesus had appointed them.” Of the sixth: S. John 6:3, 11, “Jesus went up into a mountain … Jesus took the loaves.” And of the seventh: S. Luke 24:50, “He led them forth as far as Bethany, and He lifted up His hands.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that in two villages the Lord fed the multitudes with twelve loaves, and these twelve signify the breads with which He feeds those who follow Him in the way—(1) of charity, (2) joy, (3) peace, (4) long-suffering, (5) gentleness, (6) goodness, (7) faith, (8) meekness, (9) temperance, (10) modesty, (11) continence, (12) chastity. These are the twelve breads of propitiation of which it is spoken: Exod. 25:30, “Thou shalt set upon a table shew-bread before Me alway.” Of all these: Gal. 5:22, 23, “But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace,” &c.

HOMILY IX

THE ATONEMENT

PASSION SUNDAY, OR FIFTH SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“How much more shall the Blood of Christ, Who through the Eternal Spirit,” &c.—Heb. 9:14.

THE Apostle points out especially four things in this Epistle. Firstly, he shows Christ to have been an High Priest: “Christ being come, an High Priest;” secondly, He commends His High Priesthood: “of good things to come;” thirdly, He shews what He offered: “offered Himself without spot to God;” fourthly, He points out the profit or effect of His oblation: “purge your conscience,” &c.

On this last head it is to be noted, that the Blood of Christ purchased seven benefits for us. (1) Cleansing from our sins and defilement: Apoc. 1:5, “Unto Him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in His Own Blood.” Heb. 13:12, “Jesus also, that He might sanctify the people with His Own Blood.” (2) Our redemption: Apoc. 5:9, “And hast redeemed us to God by Thy Blood.” 1 S. Peter 1:18, 19, “Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, &c.; but with the precious Blood of Christ.” (3) Our peacemaking with God and the angels: Coloss. 1:20, “Having made peace through the Blood of His Cross.” (4) Confirmation of the testament of the eternal inheritance: 1 Cor. 11:25, “This Cup is the New Testament in My Blood.” (5) A drinking and inebriation to the consumers: S. Matt. 26:27, 28, “Drink ye all of it; for this is My Blood of the New Testament,” &c. Deut. 32:14, “Thou didst drink the pure blood of the grape.” (6) The opening of the door of Heaven: Heb. 10:19, “Having … boldness to enter into the holiest by the Blood of Jesus”—i.e., His continual prayer to God for us; for His Blood cries daily for us to the Father. Heb. 12:24, “The Blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things than that of Abel.” The blood of Abel calls for vengeance; the Blood of Christ demands pardon. (7) The deliverance of the saints from Hades: Zech. 9:11, “By the blood of thy covenant I have sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water.” From which, &c.

HOMILY X

THE WORD OF GOD AND ITS HEARERS

PASSION SUNDAY, OR FIFTH SUNDAY IN LENT.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “He that is of God heareth God’s words.”—S. John 8:47.

IN these words four things are noted. Firstly, the great glory of the saints: “He that is of God.” For what can be more glorious than to be of God? S. John 1:12, “He gave power to become the sons of God.” Secondly, their great wisdom: “Heareth God’s words.” Psalm 19:7, “The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.” Thirdly, the foolishness of the reprobate: “therefore ye hear them not, because ye are not of God.” For fools despise the wisdom of right dogma, and the doctrine of pure conversation, as the Pharisees did the words and works of Christ. Fourthly, their great misery: “are not of God.” What can be more unhappy than not to be of God? Hosea 7:13, “Woe unto them! for they have fled from Me.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that in three ways the saints are to be of God. (1) By creation, as an effect from a cause: Rom. 11:36, “For of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things.” (2) By justification, as the splendour from light: Ephes. 5:8, “Ye were sometimes darkness, but now light in the Lord.” 1 S. John 3:9, “Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin.” (3) By imitation or assimilation, as a copy from a pattern: 1 S. John 2:5, “Whoso keepeth His Word, in him verily is the love of God perfected: surely know we that we are in Him. He that saith he abideth in Him, ought himself also to walk even as He walked.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the Word of God which the saints willingly hear is threefold. (1) Eternal: S. John 1:1, “In the beginning was the Word.” (2) Mental: Job 4:12, “A thing [word, Vulg.] was secretly brought to me.” (3) Vocal: S. Matt. 4:4, “Man shall not live by bread, &c.,

but by every word that proceedeth,” &c. The first they hear by faith: S. John 11:25, “He that believeth in Me, though he were dead, yet shall he live.” The second by inspiration: Psalm 85:8, “I will hear what God the Lord will speak.” The third, by preaching: S. Luke 8:8, “He that hath ears to hear, let him hear.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that they are foolish who do not hear the Word of God, chiefly for two reasons—(1) Because from the hearing of the Word of God all evil is avoided. (2) All good is gained. Of these two: Prov. 1:33, “But whoso hearkeneth unto Me shall dwell safely”—i.e., because in this life they shall be terrified with no adversaries, and at death will be made joyful by the entering into eternal life; “and shall be quiet from fear of evil.” In the present, abundance of blessed works, all fear of those who can kill the body being removed; in the future, abundance of joys, fear being taken away of any defect or adversity.

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that the great miseries which flow from the not “being of God” arise from two causes—(1) They who are without God have all evil: S. Augustine, “Whence I know, that it is evil to me without Thee; not alone without, but also within myself; and all abundance which is not God, is need. (2) He who is of God has everything which is best: S Augustine, “He who enters into the joy of his Lord, and is secure, will also find himself to have the best of the best.”

HOMILY XI

HUMILITY AND GLORY

PALM SUNDAY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“Who, being in the form of God,” &c.—Philipp. 2:6.

THE Apostle in this Epistle treats of three things—firstly, of the Majesty of Christ, “Who being in the form of God;” secondly, of His humility, “made Himself of no reputation;” thirdly, of the advantage of His humility, “Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the Majesty of Christ is revealed in three attributes—(1) In His Divinity, “Who being in the form of God;” for if He was Deity in the form of God, He was therefore God: Acts 10:36, “Preaching peace by Jesus Christ; He is Lord of all.” (2) In shewing the power of His Divinity, “Thought it not robbery,” &c.—i.e., He was God in truth and not by rapine, as the Devil wished to be: Rom. 9:5, “Of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came, Who is over all, God blessed for ever;” true God. (3) In revealing His eternity, “To be equal with God:” S. John 1:1, “In the beginning was the “Word,” &c.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that His humility appears in three ways—(1) In the reception of the form of a servant: “He made Himself of no reputation, and took upon Him the form of a servant,” &c. (2) In the exhibition of perfect obedience, “became obedient:” S. John 6:38, “I came down from heaven not to do Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me,” &c. (3) In the endurance of a most degraded death, “Unto death:” Wisd. 2:20, “Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that His exaltation was the gain of His humility. After His death He appeared exalted above all creatures: “Wherefore God also hath highly exalted Him.” The Apostle makes a threefold exaltation—(1) In comparison with the angels, “that at the Name of Jesus every knee should bow of things in heaven,” &c.: Heb. 1:6, “Let all the angels of God worship Him.” (2) In comparison or in the deeds of men, “things in earth:” Rom. 8:29, “That He might be the first-born among many brethren.” (3) In comparison of the demons: Heb. 2:14, “That through death He might destroy him that had the power of death, that is the Devil.” S. Augustine, “The hand nerveless and affixed to the Cross overcame the powers of the air.” Christ by His death subjected to Himself devils, men, and angels: Heb. 2:8, “Thou hast put all things in subjection under His feet … He left nothing that is not put under Him.” He who wishes to be saved must so learn at first to be humbled: S. Luke 14:11, “He that humbleth himself shall be exalted.” Job 22:29, Vulg., “He that hath been humbled shall be in glory.” To which may we be brought, &c.

HOMILY XII

THE LORD’S WORK AND OURS

PALM SUNDAY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“And they crucified Him.”—S. Matthew 27:35.

WE ought to consider three things concerning the Passion of the Lord—firstly, its nature; secondly, its power; thirdly, its benefit.

I. On the first head it is to he noted, that the Passion of Christ was very bitter for three reasons—(1) On account of the goodness of Him suffering. (2) On account of the indignity of His Passion. (3) On account of the cruelty of those carrying out the sentence. The goodness of Him suffering is manifest from three circumstances—Firstly, because He harmed no one: 1 S. Peter 2:22, “Who did no sin.” Secondly, because He most patiently sustained the injuries laid upon Him: 1 S. Peter 2:23, “Who, when He was reviled, reviled not again;” Jer. 11:19, “I was like a lamb or an ox that is brought to the slaughter.” Thirdly, He was doing good to all: Acts 10:38, “Who went about doing good;” S. John 10:32, “Many good works have I shewed you from My Father.” The indignity of His Death is manifest from three things—Firstly, he was judged, which was the most wicked of all: S. Luke 23:21, “But they cried, saying, Crucify Him, crucify Him.” Secondly, because of the many indignities which He suffered: S. Matt. 27:27–30, “Gathered unto Him the whole band of soldiers. And they stripped Him, and put on Him a scarlet robe. And when they had platted a crown of thorns, they put it upon His head, and a reed in His right hand … And they spit upon Him.” Thirdly, because He was condemned to a most shameful death: Wisd. 2:20, “Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death.” The cruelty of those who crucified Him is seen from three things—Firstly, very cruelly flagellated Him before death: S. Matt. 27:26, “When he had scourged Jesus, he delivered Him to be crucified.” Secondly, in giving Him at the point of death vinegar and hyssop to drink: S. John 19:29, “They filled a spunge with vinegar, and put it upon hyssop, and put it to His mouth;” Ps. 69, “In My thirst they gave Me vinegar to drink.” Thirdly, in wounding Him even after death: S. John 19:34, “One of the soldiers with a spear pierced His side.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the power of His Passion appeared in three things—(1) In heaven; it took away the light from it, S. Luke 23:44, 45, “There was a darkness over all the earth until the ninth hour. And the sun was darkened.” (2) In earth, for it trembled, S. Matt. 27:51, “The earth did quake and the rocks rent.” (3) In Hades, who delivered up its dead, S. Matt. 27:52, “Many bodies of the Saints which slept arose.” The heavens declare the power of the Passion of Christ; the earth proclaims it; Hades announced it. Phil. 2:8, 9, “Obedient unto death … That at the Name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the benefit of the Passion extended to inhabitants of heaven, earth, and hell. By the Passion of Christ the heavenly ones were recruited; earthly men were liberated from the hand of the Devil; and the holy fathers who were in Hades, were delivered from that place. Of the first, Coloss. 1:20, “To reconcile all things unto Himself by Him, whether things in earth or things in heaven.” Of the second, S. John 12:31, “Now is the judgment of this world; now shall the princes of this world be cast out;” Coloss. 2:15, “Having spoiled principalities and powers.” Of the third, Zech. 9:11, “I have sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water.”

THE EASTER HOMILIES OF S. THOMAS AQUINAS

HOMILY I

THE ETERNAL PASSOVER

EASTER DAY.—(FROM THE ANTHEM)

> “Christ Our Passover is sacrified for us: therefore let us keep the feast.”—1 Cor. 5:7.

OUR Lord Jesus Christ in a threefold manner showed Himself to us in eating. Firstly, sacramentally: S. Matt. 26:26, 27, “Take, eat; this is My Body,” &c. Secondly, spiritually: “For what hast thou designed teeth and stomach? Believe, and thou hast eaten” (S. Austin). Thirdly, eternally: “There Thou wilt satiate me of thee with a wonderful satiety” (S. Austin). According to this, He made to us a threefold Paschal Feast—(1) bodily; (2) spiritual; (3) eternal. These three mystical Passovers were those which the children of Israel celebrated—the first in the Exodus from Egypt (Ex. 12:21 et seq.); the second in the desert (Numb. 9:3–5); the third in the land of promise (Jos. 5:10). For the celebrating of the first Passover, in which we eat a Lamb without blemish, sacrified for all, the Apostle in this epistle shows five things to be necessary—(1) That we should be cleansed from carnal concupiscence: “Purge out, therefore, the old leaven.” The “old leaven” is carnal concupiscence, which from our first parent begun to corrupt the lump of human nature: 1 Cor. 5:6, “A little leaven leaveneth the whole lump.” (2) That we may be cleansed from pride: “Neither with the leaven of malice.” Malice is another term to express pride, which is the beginning of all malice: Ecclus. 10:15, “Pride is the beginning of every sin.” (3) That we may be cleansed from an evil covetousness, “And wickedness.” Covetousness is called wickedness because it desires that which is not; for all love the riches of the world, which they can never obtain: Ecclus. 10:10, “Nothing is more wicked than to love money.” (4) A cleansing of the heart is necessary, “But with the unleavened bread of sincerity.” For he who wishes to celebrate this solemn Passover ought himself to be most cleansed: Numb. 18:11, “Everyone that is clean in thy house shall eat of it.” (5) Truth of life is necessary: Ephes. 4:15, “And of truth,” “speaking the truth in love.” He who wishes, therefore, to celebrate this ineffable Passover must be purged from the sin of carnal concupiscence, and of avarice, and of pride; and must be delighted in purity of mind, in truth of life, and will come to that Passover which does not follow the Lenten fast, but will be there a perpetual and eternal solemnity. To which may Jesus Our God bring us. Amen.

HOMILY II

A RISEN SAVIOUR

EASTER DAY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“He must rise again from the dead.”—S. John 20:9.

IN these words five things are to be noted. Firstly, the infinite goodness of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Secondly, His delightful beauty. Thirdly, His wonderful love. Fourthly, the joyful solemnity of God. Fifthly, the fervent charity of the women.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, the goodness of Jesus; for Jesus is interpreted Saviour, since He wished to die that He might save by His death, and show His infinite goodness. Truly today for three reasons the Saviour appeared—(1) Because He saved us today from those demons whom He despoiled today: Coloss. 2:15, “Having spoiled principalities and powers, He made a show of them openly.” (2) Because today He saved us from death, which He vanquished today: “Hath overcome death,” &c. (Collect). 1 Cor. 15:54, “Death is swallowed up in victory.” For today Christ victoriously rose, having conquered death. (3) Because He saved us from hell, which he unchained today: Ps. 107:16, “He hath broken the gates of brass, and cut the bars of iron in sunder.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, the beauty of Him Who rose, which is expressed by the word Nazarene as applied to Christ, which signifies a flower among flowers whose beauty remains: Cant. 2:1, “I am the Rose of Sharon and the Lily of the valley.” But there were in Christ three kinds of flowers—(1) red flowers, (2) black, (3) white. The red flowers are drops of blood; the black, the stripes of the wounds; the white, the splendours of the glorified Body. Of the third and first, Cant. 5:10, “My Beloved is white and ruddy.” Of the second, 1 S. Pet. 2:24, “By Whose stripes ye were healed.” Jesus was altogether blooming, because girt with roses—that is, with drops of blood; adorned with violets—that is, with the stripes of wounds; entrenched with lilies—that is, with the splendours of the glorified Body: Cant. 2:12, “The flowers appear on the earth.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, the charity of Him rising again “from the dead:” S. Matt. 28:5, “Jesus Who was crucified.” The death of Christ was such an inestimable love of charity as no mere man was able to conceive of: Eph. 3:18, “The Love of Christ which passeth knowledge.” S. John 15:13, “Greater love hath no man than this.” For three reasons especially He wished to die the death of the Cross—(1) That He might show manifestly to all that He both truly died, and from this death truly rose again. For it was patent to all that He was really dead when the Cross raised on high showed Him, on it, dead: Acts 10:39, “And we are witnesses of all things which He did.… Whom they slew and hanged on a tree.” (2) That as the Tree had produced the fruit of death, so the Tree having produced the fruit of this life might quicken all: “Who by the wood of the Cross wrought salvation for the human race” (S. Greg. Mag.) (3) That as the Devil had overcome man by the Tree, so He might similarly, by the Tree, triumph.

IV. On the fourth head is to be noted, the festivity of this present day: S. Matt. 28:6, “He must rise again,” “He is risen.” The Resurrection of the Lord has made for us this day of solemnity and joy: Ps. 118:24, “This is the day which the Lord hath made; we will rejoice and be glad in it.” Three events have made this day to be solemn—(1) The sending of an Angel from Heaven: S. Matt. 28:2, “The Angel of the Lord by descending from Heaven.” (2) The earth, by leaping for joy: S. Matt. 28:2, “There was a great earthquake.” (3) Hell, by restoring the Saints: S. Matt. 27:52, 53, “Many bodies of the Saints which slept arose and came out of the graves.” So that the heavens, the earth, and Hades all finished their testimony to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.

V. On the fifth head is to be noted, the devoted love of the women: S. Matt. 28:5, “Cometh Mary Magdalene;” “Ye seek Jesus.” These holy women teach us to seek Jesus according to His own promise, if we wish to find Him. Jesus is to be sought for in a threefold manner—firstly, in faith; secondly, in hope; thirdly, in charity. (1) Reasonably he seeks Him by faith, who seeks the light of His truth. (2) Earnestly he seeks Him in hope, who looks for the glory of His Majesty. (3) Fervently they seek Him in charity, who long for the sweetness of His goodness. These are the three Marys who came to the sepulchre. O Lord Jesus! make us to seek Thee and to find Thee. Amen.

HOMILY III

THE THREE WITNESSES OF CHRIST

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “There are three that bear witness in earth, the spirit, the water, and the blood.”—1 S. John 5:8.

IT is necessary that we should believe Christ to be the true God and true Man, and He therefore wished to furnish us with many testimonies that He was God and Man. We have both—i.e., the testimony of His Divinity, as above, “There are three that bear record in Heaven.” Of the testimony of His humanity He says here, “There are three that bear witness on earth.” The heavenly witnesses which Christ had to His Divinity are twelve—(1) The Father, (2) the Son, (3) the Holy Ghost, (4) the working of miracles, (5) the saints, (6) the angels, (7) the heavens, (8) the air, (9) the water, (10) the earth, (11) Hades, (12) the fire. The earthly witnesses which S. John gives here to His humanity, in which chiefly His love to us appears, are three—first, the effusion of blood; secondly, the emanation of water; thirdly, the emission of the spirit. Of the first two: S. John 19:34, “Forthwith came there out blood and water.” Of the third: S. Matt. 27:50, “Jesus, when He had cried again with a loud voice, yielded up the ghost.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the Lord Jesus gave to us a threefold water—(1) The water of Baptism for the cleansing of sins: Ezek. 36:25, “Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean.” (2) The water of wisdom for the extinction of spiritual thirst: Ecclus. 15:3, “And give him the water of wholesome wisdom to drink.” S. John 4:14, “Whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst.” S. Austin says, that “if anyone has drank of the water of Paradise—of which one drop is larger than the ocean—it results that the thirst of earthly desire would be extinguished in him.” (3) The refreshing water of the Holy Spirit:

S. John 7:37–39, “If any man thirst, let him come unto Me and drink. But this spake He of the Spirit.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that by the shedding of blood seven benefits were wrought for us (see Lenten Homily IX. for Passion Sunday, p. 17).

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that He breathed forth His Spirit for three ends—(1) That He might quicken us: S. John 10:15, “I lay down My life for the sheep.” (2) That He might deliver the saints from hell. The soul of Christ, with His Divinity, descended into hell, and delivered the saints who were there at that time: Zech. 9:11, “I have sent forth thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water.” (3) That He might give us an example of laying down our lives. For whosoever desires to follow Christ, ought entirely to surrender his life: S. Luke 9:23, “If any man will come after Me.” 2 Cor. 5:15, “He died for all, that they who live should not henceforth live unto themselves, but unto Him Who died for them.” He who so dies will come to that life in which no one dies; to which life may Christ, Who is our life, bring us.

HOMILY IV

THE BLESSING OF PEACE

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“Peace be unto you.”—S. John 20:19.

IN this Gospel is mentioned that threefold peace which the Lord brought to His Disciples for the purpose of showing that for three reasons it is necessary for us. Firstly, peace with God: S. John 16:33, “In Me ye might have peace, in the world ye shall have tribulation.” Secondly, peace in ourselves: Job. 5:24, “Thou shalt know that thy tabernacle shall be in peace.” S. Bernard, “Peace to you is peace by you; and whatever seems to threaten without, you shall not fear, because it will not harm.” Thirdly, peace with our neighbours is necessary: Rom. 12:18, “As much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that peace with God implies three conditions—(1) That God must be feared: Ecclus. 1:22, “The fear of the Lord is a crown of wisdom, filling up peace and the fruit of salvation.” Again, Ecclus. 1:27, “The fear of the Lord driveth out sin.” (2) That God must be hoped in: Isai. 26:3, “Thou wilt keep him in perfect peace whose mind is stayed on Thee.” (3) That the commands of God must be obeyed: Isai. 48:18, “O that thou hadst hearkened to My commandments! then had thy peace been as a river.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that three things are needful if a man would have peace with himself—(1) That he should submit himself wholly to God: Job. 22:21, 22, “Acquaint now thyself with Him and be at peace; … lay up His words in thine heart.” (2) That he should ever guard his good-will: S. Luke 2:14, “On earth peace, good-will towards men.” (3) That he should regulate every motion of the mind and body according to wisdom: Rom. 8:6, Vulg., “The wisdom of the spirit is life and peace.” S. Matt. 5:9, “Blessed are the peacemakers.” Gloss., “The peacemakers are all who order the motions of the mind and subject them to reason, and who do not disagree in these things.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that three things are necessary to the man who desires to be in peace with his neighbour—(1) That he should do those things which are pleasing to God: Prov. 16:7, “When a man’s ways please the Lord, He maketh even his enemies to be at peace with him.” (2) That he should do no injury to anyone: 2 Cor. 6:3, “Giving no offence;” and Ps. 119:165, “Great peace have they who love Thy law.” It is the law of God that the things which we are unwilling should be done to us, we should not do to others; but that which we should wish to be done to us, that we should do to others. (3) That we should show kindness to all: Rom. 2:10, “Glory, honour, and peace to every man that worketh good.

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that there are three things which chiefly destroy peace—(1) Pride: Job 9:4, Vulg., “Who hath resisted Him and hath had peace?” (2) Anger: Ecclus. 28:11, “A passionate man kindleth strife, and a sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring a debate in the midst of them that are at peace.” (3) Any kind of iniquity: Isai. 48:22, “There is no peace, saith the Lord, unto the wicked.” He who desires in this present life to have peace with God, with himself, with his neighbour, and the peace of eternity for the future, must avoid these three stumbling-blocks; to which peace may we be led, &c. Amen.

HOMILY V

CHRIST OUR EXAMPLE

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should follow His steps.”—1 S. Peter 2:21.

FIVE things are noted in this Epistle—firstly, the innocence of Our Lord, “Who did no sin;” secondly, His great patience, “When He suffered, threatened not;” thirdly, His inexpressible charity, “Who His own self bear our sins in His own Body”; fourthly, the manifold benefits flowing from these three, “By Whose stripes ye were healed;” fifthly, the steps in which we should follow Christ.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that His innocence is shown in three ways—(1) Because he did no sin: Heb. 7:26, “Holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners.” (2) Because He never deceived: “Neither was guile found in His mouth.” 2 Cor. 1:19, 20, “The Son of God, Jesus Christ … was not yea and nay, but in Him was yea. For all the promises of God in Him are yea, and in Him Amen.” (3) Because He never did any injury to anyone: “Who, when He was reviled, reviled not again.” Isa. 53:7, “As a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so He openeth not His mouth.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that His patience in His Passion is shewn in three ways—(1) In that He voluntarily offered Himself: “Committed Himself to Him that judgeth righteously.” Isa. 53:7 (Vulg.), “He was offered because it was His own will.” (2) Because, unjustly judged, He endured it with the greatest patience. It requires the greatest patience to sustain an unjust sentence: S. John 10:32, “Many good works have I shewed you … for which of those works do ye stone Me?” 1 S. Pet. 2:19, “This is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully.” (3) Because He did not utter threats against His crucifiers: “When He suffered He threatened not.” Jer. 11:19, “But I was like a lamb … that is brought to the slaughter.” He prayed for them: Isa. 53:12, “Made intercession for the transgressors,” that they should not perish.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the inexpressible charity of Christ is shown in three ways—(1) Because He Himself bore our sins: S. John 1:29, “Behold the Lamb of God, Who taketh away the sins of the world.” (2) In the manner of His Oblation: “In his own Body.” Isa. 53:5, “He was wounded for our iniquities,” &c. (3) Because He sustained so cruel a death for the taking away of our sins: “On the Tree”—i.e., the Cross. Phil. 2:8, “Obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross.”

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that the death of Christ procured for us a threefold benefit—(1) It freed us from the guilt of sin: “We being dead to sins.” S. Peter 2:14, “Who gave Himself for us that He might redeem us from all iniquity,” &c. (2) He restored to us the gift of grace: “Should live unto righteousness.” Rom. 5:19, “By the obedience of the One shall many be made righteous.” S. John 1:15, “Of His fulness have all we received, and grace for grace.” (3) It delivered us from corruption: “By Whose stripes ye were healed.” Isa. 53:4, “Surely He hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows.”

V. On the fifth head it is to be noted, that the steps in which we should follow Him are three—(1) In the purity of innocence: Lev. 11:44, “Ye shall be holy, for I am holy.” S. Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the pure in heart.” 1 S. Peter 1:15, “Be ye holy in all manner of conversation.” (2) In the firmness of patience: S. Luke 4:19, “In your patience possess ye your souls.” Heb. 12:3, “Consider Him that endured such contradiction of sinners against Himself, lest ye be wearied and faint in your minds.” (3) In charity: 1 S. John 3:11, “This is the commandment that ye heard from the beginning, that we should love one another.” Job 23:11, “My foot hath held His steps: His way have I kept.” He who so follows Him in these steps shall come to the joy of eternal blessedness: S. John 8:12, “He that followeth Me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life;” to which may Christ Himself, the Light and the Life, bring us. Amen.

HOMILY VI

THE GOOD SHEPHERD

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“The Good Shepherd giveth His life for the sheep.”—S. John 10:11.

IN these words three things are to be noted—firstly, the great goodness of Our Lord Jesus Christ, “I am the Good Shepherd;” secondly, His great love, “I lay down my life;” thirdly, the holiness and goodness of His elect, “for the sheep.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that there are three reasons why Christ is called the “Good Shepherd,” since His office is threefold—(1) to defend the sheep; (2) to lead and feed them in good pastures; (3) to restore those who are wandering. So Our Lord Jesus Christ, firstly, defends His sheep (1) from lions, i.e., devils; (2) from wolves, i.e., tyrants; (3) from bears, i.e., heretics: Ezek. 34:8, 10, “Surely because My flock became a prey, and My flock became meat to every beast of the field … I will deliver My flock from their mouth;” S. John 10:28, “They shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of My hand.” Secondly, Christ feeds all His sheep in the meadow of scriptural grace and glory: Ezek. 34:14, “I will feed them in a good pasture, and upon the high mountains of Israel shall their fold be … In a fat pasture they shall feed upon the mountains of Israel.” Thirdly, He will restore those who are wandering: S. Luke 15:4, “What man of you having an hundred sheep.” Ezek. 34:16, “I will seek that which was lost, and bring again that which was driven away.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that Christ gave three things for us, in which His great love for us is seen (1) Food for the body: S. Matt. 26:26, “Take, eat, this My Body.” (2) His Blood to drink: S. Matt. 26:27, 28, “Drink ye all of it; for this is My Blood.” (3) His soul as the price of our redemption: 1 S. John 3:16, “Hereby perceive we the love of God, because He laid down His life for us.” S. John 10:15, “I lay down My life for the sheep.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that there are three effects of goodness. (1) To harm no one: 2 Cor. 6:3, “Giving no offence in anything.” (2) To bear injuries patiently: Rom. 12:17, “Recompense to no man evil for evil.” (3) To give self or substance willingly for others: 1 S. John 3:16, “We ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” It is for these three reasons that the sheep are called holy—as injuring no one, as suffering evil cheerfully, and as giving up themselves and their possessions for the use of men; and they who are so the sheep shall doubtless come to the fold of Christ, which is the Kingdom of Heaven: S. Matt. 25:33, 34, “He shall set the sheep on His right hand … Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom,” &c. To which kingdom may we be brought. Amen.

HOMILY VII

THE CONQUERED FLESH

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “I beseech you as strangers and pilgrims, abstain from fleshly lusts.”—1 S. Peter 2:11.

FOUR things are noted in these words. Firstly, abstinence from fleshly lusts is pointed out, “abstain from fleshly lusts.” Secondly, the necessity for such abstinence, “which war against the soul.” Thirdly, honest conversation is enjoined, “having your conversation honest.” Fourthly, the benefit of a good conversation is added, “that whereas they speak against you as evildoers, they may by your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God in the day of visitation.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that there are three kinds of lusts from which the Scripture commands us to abstain. (1) Worldly lusts. (2) Hurtful and unprofitable lusts. (3) Carnal lusts. Firstly, the lusts of the world are the desires of worldly honours: Titus 2:11, 12, “The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men, teaching us that, denying ungodliness and worldly lusts,” &c. Secondly, hurtful lusts are the desires of riches: 1 S. Tim. 6:9, “But they that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts,” &c. Thirdly, the lusts of the flesh are when fleshly delights are longed for: Rom. 13:14, “Make not provision for the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that fleshly lusts in three ways “war against the soul,” and therefore it is needful for us to abstain from them. (1) They war against by ever fighting against it: Job 7:1, Vulg., “The life of man upon earth is a warfare;” the whole life of man is like a certain conflict. (2) Mortally, in wounding it: Prov. 21:25, “The desire of the slothful killeth him, for his hands refuse to labour.” (3) By inflicting eternal perdition and destruction: 1 Tim. 6:9, “Hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition;” for fleshly desires kill by sin here, and in the future, kill with eternal death.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that a good conversation consists in three things. (1) In purity of mind: 2 Cor. 1:12, “For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity … we had our conversation in the world.” (2) In honesty or holiness of manners: 2 Pet. 3:11, “Seeing then that all these things shall be dissolved, what manner of persons ought ye to be in all holy conversation and godliness.” (3) In perpetual avidity of the joys of heaven: Philipp. 3:2, “Our conversation is in heaven.”

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that a threefold benefit follows a good conversation. (1) The refutation or silencing of detractors, “That whereas they speak against you:” 1 S. Pet. 2:15, “So is the will of God, that with well doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men.” (2) The being had in honour, “By your good works, which they shall behold, glorify God in the day of visitation:” S. Matt. 5:16, “Let your light so shine before men,” &c. (3) The great reward promised to their conversation, “in the day of visitation,” i.e., in the time of retribution; and God alone knows how great the glory then to be given to us. To which glory may we be led by Jesus Christ. Amen.

HOMILY VIII

EVERLASTING JOY

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “The world shall rejoice, and ye shall be sorrowful, but your sorrow shall be turned into joy.”—S. John 16:20.

THREE things are noted in these words. Firstly, the foolishness of the worldly, “The world will rejoice:” Eccles. 2:2, “I said of laughter, It is mad: and of mirth, What doeth it?” Secondly, the wisdom of the saints: “Ye shall be sorrowful:” Eccles. 7:4, “The heart of the wise is in the house of mourning: but the heart of fools is in the house of mirth.” Thirdly, the future song of the saints, “Your sorrow shall be turned into joy:” S. Luke 6:21, “Blessed are ye that weep now, for ye shall laugh.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that three things shew the joy of the worldly to be foolish—(1) The time, for the present is not the time of rejoicing but of weeping: Eccles. 3:4, “A time to weep and a time to laugh.” The time of weeping is put first, to indicate that the present is this time, a time to laugh is added afterwards to signify that the future will be the time of joy; for now, indeed, is the time of weeping and of mourning over sins. (2) That this world is a place of sadness, and not of joy: Ps. 83:6, 7, Vulg., “In his heart he hath disposed to ascend by steps in a vale of tears, in the place which he hath set.” Judg. 2:1, “An angel of the Lord came up from Gilgal to Bochim,” i.e., the “place of weepers.” (3) They joy in evil: Prov. 2:14, “Who rejoice to do evil.” The foolishness of the joy of the worldly is sufficiently manifest, since they rejoice in a time of sadness, in a place of misery, in the doing evil. S. Austin, “What is the joy of this world? say briefly, unchasteness, worthlessness, consideringly to cheat, to do that which is base, to be gorged with feasting.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the wise are sad for three reasons—(1) By sadness the evil of man is corrected: Eccles. 7:3, "By the sadness of the countenance the heart is made better." (2) By momentary sadness man escapes eternal torment. S. Greg. Mag., "The Saints regard this present life as a gain, because by this they know that they will not escape eternal life;" Nahum 1:13, "I have afflicted thee, I will afflict thee no more." (3) By a mean measure of justice they acquire eternal joys: 2 Cor. 4:17, 18, "For our light affliction which is but for a moment worketh for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen."

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the future joys of the saints are said to consist of three things—(1) In the consolation of the Divine Presence: "I will see you again." S. Augustine, "Lastly, there will be God Himself, Who will be all in all, Who will be to us salvation, honour, and glory, and joy, and every good:" Gen. 15:1, "I am … thy exceeding great reward." (2) In the highest exultation of heart, "Your heart shall rejoice:" Isa. 35:10, "They shall obtain joy and gladness." (3) In the attaining of eternity: Isa. 35:10, "The ransomed of the Lord shall return, and come to Zion with songs and everlasting joy upon their heads;" to which joy, &c.

HOMILY IX

LITTLE SPEECH

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak.”—S. James 1:19.

IN these words the Apostle S. James bids us be more slow in speaking than in hearing, and these considerations ought to move us to this—Firstly, the testimony of nature. Secondly, the harm of much speaking. Thirdly, the benefit of little speaking.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that nature teaches us in a threefold way that we should rather hear, than speak. (1) Nature gave to man a double instrument of hearing, and only a single instrument of speaking, and this in itself shows, that in a twofold degree man ought rather to hear than to speak. (2) Nature gave to very many animals the faculty of hearing, but not the faculty of speech save to the rational animal, man; so that speech ought to be rational: Coloss. 4:6, “Let your speech be alway with grace, seasoned with salt.” (3) Nature gave the instruments of hearing ever open, but the instruments of speech she closed by two barriers or protections: for man has his ears ever open, but his tongue closed in by his lips and teeth. The tongue is like an evil monarch, and therefore God enclosed it with many barriers: Mich. 7:5, “Keep the doors of thy mouth.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that a threefold evil comes through much speaking—(1) The evil of sin: Prov. 10:19, “In the multitude of words there wanteth not sin.” (2) The evil of punishment: Ecclus. 20:8, “He that useth many words shall hurt his own soul.” (3) The evil of infamy. Prov. 18:13, “He that answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him.” Of these three: S. James 3:6, “The tongue is a world of iniquity;” behold the first. “The tongue is an unruly evil, full of deadly poison;” behold the second. “The tongue among our members defileth the whole body;” behold the third.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that a threefold advantage flows to him who hears much and speaks little—(1) The good thing of grace: Ecclus. 32:9, “Hear in silence, and for thy reverence good grace shall come unto thee.” (2) The good thing of wisdom: Ecclus. 6:34, “If thou wilt incline thine ear thou shalt receive instruction, and if thou love to hear thou shalt be wise.” (3) Happiness and tranquillity of mind: Prov. 21:21, “Whoso keepeth his mouth and his tongue keepeth his soul from troubles,” &c.

HOMILY X

THE CONVICTION OF THE WORLD

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “And when He is come He will reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment.”—S. John 16:8.

IN these words three things are laid down, concerning which the Holy Spirit will reprove the world. Firstly, He will reprove of sin, because men ought not to commit it. Secondly, of righteousness, because men ought to perform it. Thirdly, of judgment, because men ought to fear it.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that sin is to be avoided for many reasons, but chiefly for three great evils which it brings to man—(1) Because it places man here in many miseries: Prov. 14:34, “Sin is a reproach to any people.” (2) Because it deprives man of eternal glory: Isa. 26:10, “In the land of uprightness will he deal unjustly, and will not behold the majesty of the Lord.” (3) Because it leads man to eternal punishment: S. Matt. 25:46, “These shall go away into everlasting punishment.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that righteousness is chiefly to be followed for three reasons—(1) Because it places man in many joys: Ps. 19:8, “The statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart.” (2) Because it liberates man from perpetual death: Prov. 11:4, “But righteousness,” i.e., the works of righteousness, “delivereth from death,” i.e., eternal. Prov. 21:25, “He that followeth after righteousness and mercy findeth life.” (3) Because it leads man to eternal joys: S. Matt. 25:46, “The righteous into life eternal.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the future judgment is to be feared for three reasons—(1) On account of the equity of the Judge: Ps. 7:12, Vulg., “God is a just Judge, strong and patient: is He angry every day?” (2) Because of the severity of the Judge: Judith 16:20, 21, “In the

Day of Judgment He will visit them, for He will give fire and worms into their flesh.” (3) Because of the irrevocability of the sentence: S. Matt. 25:41, “Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the Devil and his angels.” It is called “everlasting fire” because it has no end; from which may we be delivered, &c.

HOMILY XI

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TONGUE

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> "If any man among you seem to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain."—S. Jas. 1:26.

S. JAMES in these words exhorts us to the bridling; of the tongue, and there are three reasons which move us so to do. Firstly, because he who does not bridle his tongue, falls into many sins. Secondly, because he incurs many bad punishments. Thirdly, because he who bridles his tongue, acquires many good things. Of the first: Prov. 10:19, "In the multitude of words there wanteth not sin." Of the second: Ecclus. 20:8, "He that useth many words shall hurt his own soul." Of the third: Prov. 18:13, "He that answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him."

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that Scripture treats of many tongues, by which are signified those different sins which are committed by the tongue; and such tongues are to be bridled—(1) The deceitful tongue, which is in double dealings and betrayals: Ps. 120:2, "Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips and from a deceitful tongue." Jer. 9:8, "Their tongue is as an arrow shot out, it speaketh deceit: one speaketh peaceably to his neighbour with his mouth, but in heart he layeth his wait." (2) The boastful tongue, which is proud and arrogant: Ps. 12:3, "The Lord shall cut off all flattering lips and the tongue that speaketh proud things." (3) The serpent-like and poisonous tongue, which utters envies and detractions: Ps. 140:3, "They have sharpened their tongues like a serpent, adders' poison is under their lips." (4) A lying tongue, that utters perjuries, falsehoods, and false witnesses: Prov. 6:16, "Six things does the Lord hate, a proud look, a lying tongue," &c. (5) The bland tongue, which utters deceits: Prov. 6:24, "Keep thee from the evil woman, from the flattery of the tongue of a strange woman.” (6) The tongue of a third person, which utters seducements and allurements: Ecclus. 28:19, “The tongue of a third person hath cast out valiant women, and deprived them of their labour.” The first tongue is in the deed of sensuality of the man loving the woman; the second, that of the woman loved; the third that of the herald or messenger who conveys the words of the lover to the beloved, and vice versa. (7) The wicked tongue, which utters flatteries: Prov. 17:4, “A wicked doer giveth heed to false lips.” They are false lips which do evil by inciting flatterers. (8) The tongue which is sword-like, which consists of things angry and furious, and which slays many by railings and reproaches: Ps. 57:4, “The sons of men whose teeth are spears and arrows, and their tongue a sharp sword.” (9) The deceitful tongue, which abides in false merchants and deceivers; they deceive the simple by recommending their wares, and defrauding by false weights, numbers, and measures: Prov. 26:28, Vulg, “A deceitful tongue loveth not truth,” i.e., Christ; “and a slippery mouth worketh ruin,” i.e., of body and soul: Prov. 21:6, “The getting of treasures by a lying tongue,” i.e. in operation, “is a vanity, and tossed to and fro,” without soul and discretion, “of them that seek death,” i.e., willingly or unwillingly. (10) Tongue of blasphemy, which is in those who blaspheme God and the saints. (11) Tongue without grace, which utters mockeries and derisions with those who willingly speak idle words: Ecclus. 20:21, “A man without grace is as a vain fable.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the man who does not bridle his tongue incurs many penalties—(1) Ruin: Prov. 12:13, Vulg., “For the sins of the lips ruin draweth nigh to the evil man.” Eccles. 10:12, “The lips of a fool will swallow up himself.” (2) He can have nothing prosperous in this life: Ps. 140:11, “Let not an evil speaker be established in the earth.” (3) Labour. (4) Sorrow: Ps. 9:7, Vulg., “Under his tongue are labour and sorrow.” (5) Perverse destruction of him who speaks. (6) Expulsion from eternal life: Ps. 52:4, 5, “Thou lovest all devouring words, O thou deceitful tongue. God shall likewise destroy thee for ever.” (7) The burning up of the deceitful tongue itself: Ps. 40:8, Vulg., “Their tongue hath been dry with thirst.” (8) The torture of the evil tongue by infernal fire: S. Luke 16:24, “Send Lazarus, that he may dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue.” (9) The gnawing of the tongue itself: Rev. 16:10, “And they gnawed their tongues for pain.” (10) Eternal death: Prov. 18:21, “Death and life are in the power of the tongue”—i.e., in its operation or works. He who bridleth his tongue will have eternal life; he who does not do this, will come into eternal death. (11) He will suffer every evil: Prov. 17:20, “He that hath a perverse tongue falleth into mischief”—that is, into the evil of Gehenna. Prov. 13:3, “He that keepeth his mouth keepeth his life; but he that openeth wide his lips shall have destruction”—i.e., eternal.

III. On the third it is to be noted, that three benefits arise from the bridling of the tongue—(1) Perfection of life: S. James 3:2, “If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man. (2) Elevation of the mind to God: Lam. 3:28, “He sitteth alone and keepeth silence.” (3) The gaining of eternal life: Ps. 34:12, 13, “What man is he that desireth life and loveth many days that he may see good? Keep thy tongue from evil, and thy lips from speaking guile.”

HOMILY XII

THE COMING AND GOING OF OUR BLESSED LORD

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER EASTER.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “I came forth from the Father, and am come into the world: again I leave the world, and go to the Father.”—S. John 16:28.

FOUR considerations are suggested by these words. Firstly, His going from the Father: “I came forth from the Father.” His going forth from the Father was to make Himself visible. Secondly, His advent in the world: “Am come into the world.” Thirdly, His departure from the world: “Again I leave the world.” Fourthly, His ascension to the Father: “and go to the Father.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that Christ came forth from the Father for three reasons—(1) That He might manifest the Father in the world: S. John 1:18, “No man hath seen God at any time; the Only Begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Hm.” (2) To declare His Father’s will to us: S. John 15:15, “All things that I have heard of My Father I have made known unto you.” (3) That He might show the Father’s love towards us: S. John 3:16, “God so loved the world that He gave His Only Begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him,” &c.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that Christ came into the world for three reasons—(1) To enlighten it: S. John 8:12, “I am the Light of the world.” (2) That He might reconcile it to God the Father: 2 Cor. 5:19, “God was in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.” (3) To deliver it from the power of the Devil: S. John 12:31, “Now is the judgment of this world: now shall the prince of this world be cast out.” S. John 3:17, “God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through Him might be saved.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that Christ left the world for three reasons—(1) On account of its wickedness: 1 S. John 5:19, “The whole world lieth in wickedness.” (2) On account of the perversity of its ingratitude: S. John 15:18, “If the world hate you, ye know that it hated Me before it hated you.” What could be greater ingratitude than for the world to hate Him Who came to save it? (3) That by leaving the world He should give us an example: 1 S. John 2:15, “Love not the world, neither the things that are in the world.” S. John 15:19, “Ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world.”

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that Christ ascended to the Father for three reasons—That he might intercede with Him for us: S. John 14:16, “I will pray the Father.” (2) That He might give to us the Holy Spirit: S. John 16:7, “If I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send Him unto you.” (3) That He might prepare for us a place with the Father: S. John 14:2, “I go to prepare a place for you.” To which place may He lead us. Amen.

THE HOMILIES OF S. THOMAS AQUINAS, FOR THE SUNDAYS FROM TRINITY TO ADVENT

PART I

CONTAINING TWENTY-FOUR HOMILIES UPON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS FOR THE FIRST TWELVE SUNDAYS AFTER TRINITY

TRANSLATED BY

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NOTICE

The very kind way in which the “Advent Homilies” of the great Schoolman have been received, has induced the Translator to issue another portion of that, which he one day hopes may be formed into a complete work. It has been the wish of some that the outlines of S. Thomas might be expanded for them, and so be made ready for their use. To do this would be not only to tamper with what ought to be preserved entire with all care, but it would destroy the great merit and value of these suggestive skeletons, which, opening so many different trains of thought, leave it to the preacher’s own judgment to enlarge upon them, according to his learning, ability, and peculiar cast of mind. It will very often be found that a third portion of one Homily will afford quite sufficient material for the formation of such a sermon as is suitable to our times. The thorough investigation of the three divisions of one section, often leads to more telling and satisfactory results than can be obtained from the partial development of each of the leading heads. Where the theological wealth is so great, it seems almost invidious to draw comparisons; but for their power and fulness we recommend specially to the reader’s attention Homilies IV., XIV., XVIII., and XXI.

HOMILY I

TWO-FOLD LOVE

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE.)

> “We love Him because He first loved us. If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar.”—1 S. John 4:19, 20.

THE Apostle S. John asserts three propositions in these words. Firstly, he exhorts us to love—“We love Him.” Secondly, he assigns the cause of our love—“Because He first loved us.” Thirdly, he exhorts us to the love of our neighbour—“If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother,” &c.

I. On the first head it is to be noted that we ought to love God in three ways. Firstly, that our whole heart may be filled with His love—Deut. 6:5, “And thou shall love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul.” Secondly, that we should love nothing except for His sake—S. August “He loves Thee less, who with Thee loves anything else, which he loves not for Thy sake.” Thirdly, that no enemy should turn us away from His love—Rom. 8:35, “Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution,” &c.

II. On the second head is to be noted that there are three reasons why we ought chiefly to love God. (1) On account of His goodness—S. Bern., “Good is the cause of our loving God. For so great is the goodness of God, that if He never had done or never will do any good to man, nevertheless he ought ever to love Him.” (2) On account of His love—as in text, “We love God because He first loved us. S. August., “I, wretched, as much as possible, ought to love my God, Who made me what I was not; Who redeemed me when I was about to perish; Who when I was sold on account of my sins, gave Himself for me, and Who loved me so much that He gave the price of His blood for me.” (3) We ought to love God on account of our profit, for He has prepared good things which are not able to be spoken of for those who love Him—1 Cor. 2:9, “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted that we ought to love our neighbour for three reasons. (1) On account of the command (S. John 13:34), “A new commandment I give unto you.” (2) On account of the example of nature, for we see that all things naturally love similar things—Eccl. 13:15, 16, “Every beast loveth its like, so also every man him that is nearest to himself: all flesh shall consort with the like to itself.” (3) On account of the evil which follows him who does not love his neighbour, because he incurs the death of sin and hell—1 S. John 3:14, “He that loveth not his brother abideth in death;” from which death may He deliver us, &c.

HOMILY II

DIVES AND LAZARUS

FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Son, remember that thou in thy lifetime receivedst the good things, and likewise Lazarus the evil things: but now he is comforted, and thou art tormented.”—S. Luke 16:25.

FOUR considerations are to be noted in these words. Firstly, the prosperity of the wicked in the present life: “thou in thy lifetime receivedst the good things.” Secondly, the short adversity of the just in this world: “Lazarus evil things.” Thirdly, the eternal happiness of the just: “now he is comforted.” Fourthly, the perpetual calamity of the wicked: “thou art tormented.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that temporal prosperity consists in three things, which this rich man had. (1) In temporal riches—“There was a certain rich man.” Psa. 49:6, “They that trust in their wealth, and boast themselves of the multitude of their riches.” (2) In worldly honours—he “was clothed in purple and fine linen,” &c. S. James 4:16, “Ye rejoice in your boastings.” (3) In carnal pleasures—“And fared sumptuously every day.” Job 21:13, “They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment go down to the grave.” Amos 6:4, “Eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the midst of the stall.”

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the adversity of the saints in this present life consists in the three things which belonged to Lazarus. (1) In poverty of possessions—“There was a certain beggar.” Tobit 4:21, “We lead indeed a poor life, but we shall have many good things if we fear God and depart from all sin, and do that which is good.” (2) In the gain of contempt—“Was laid at his gate.” 1 Cor. 4:3, “We are made as the filth of the world, and are the offscouring of all things unto this day.” (3) In the bitterness of tribulations and afflictions—“Full of sores.” Judith 8:23, Vulg., “All that have pleased God passed through many tribulations.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, in what things the happiness of the saints consists in another state of being. (1) In glory and honour—“Was carried by the angels.” S. August., “A crowd of slaves proclaims the illustrious funeral rites of this rich man in purple; but how much more illustrious in the sight of God was the ministry of angels which was furnished to that poor man full of sores, who did not bear him to a marble tomb, but to the bosom of Abraham.” Psa. 21:5. “His glory is great in Thy salvation.” (2) In the possession of the heavenly kingdom—“Into Abraham’s bosom,” by which is understood the rest of Paradise. S. Matt. 5:3, “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of God.” (3) In the fruition of eternal delights and consolations—Psa. 16:10, “At Thy right hand, there are pleasures for evermore.” Psa. 31:19, “Oh, how great is Thy goodness which Thou hast laid up for them that fear Thee,” &c.

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that three things are mentioned here in which the future calamity of the wicked consists. (1) The complete absence of all good things; and this is noted by the fact that Dives was not able to have a drop of water. Job 27:20, Vulg., “Poverty like water shall take hold on him.” (2) The bitterness and multiplicity of the punishments—“I am tormented in this flame.” Psa. 11:6, “Upon the wicked He shall rain snares, fire and brimstone, and an horrible tempest: this shall be the portion of their cup.” (3) The mighty confusion and ignominy—“Was buried; and in hell.” What can be more ignominious than to be buried with such a burial? Jer. 22:19, “He shall be buried with the burial of an ass.” Jer. 20:11, Vulg., “They shall be greatly confounded, because they have not understood the everlasting reproach which never shall be effaced.” Therefore present prosperity is to be condemned; present adversity to be joyfully sustained; the calamity of the lost to be fled from; and the happiness of the saints to be sought for with all desire; to which may we be led, &c.

HOMILY III

ALMSGIVING—A THREEFOLD BLESSING

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “But whoso hath this world’s good, and seeth his brother have need,” &c.—1 S. John 3:17.

S. JOHN the Apostle in these words exhorts us to the practice of almsgiving for three reasons, for he who does almsgiving obtains three good gifts—(1) temporal good; (2) spiritual good; (3) eternal good.

I. About the first good. It is noted that man acquires a threefold temporal good by almsgiving. (1) Increase of riches—Prov. 3:9, 10, “Honour the Lord,” i.e., seek ye His praise, not thine own, not of the world. “Of thy substance,” i.e., which you rightly possess—not from rapine, not from the stranger; and of the first-fruits of your own fruit give to the poor, and “so shall thy barns be filled with plenty,” i.e., in a future satiety. They shall not hunger any more, neither shall they thirst any more; and “thy presses shall burst out with new wine.” Gloss.: They who lay up treasure in heaven shall find their own delights, the granary of whom will be filled by plenty, because they shall be satiated, when His glory will be manifested; and the wine-presses will overflow with wine. He kindles the hearts of the faithful towards the praises of the Creator, and he who bestows earthly subsidies upon the poor will be rendered richer by the giving in heavenly remuneration. (2) Defence from his enemies—Ecclus. 17:22, “The alms of man is as a signet with him, and shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye.” Ecclus. 29:13, “He shall fight for thee against thine enemies better than a mighty shield and strong spear. Gloss.: Alms will rather prevail against the enemies than earthly weapons. (3) The prolongation of the present life—1 Tim. 4:8, “Godliness is profitable unto all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come.”

II. About the second good it is to be noted, that man by almsgiving acquires a threefold spiritual good. (1) Remission of sins—Dan. 4:27, “Break off thine iniquities by shewing mercy to the poor.” Prov. 16:6, “By mercy and truth iniquity is purged.” Gloss.: All sin. “By mercy” the iniquity of sinners is remitted when it gives to and forgives others. “By truth” is understood justice accusing itself for its iniquity, and repenting. (2) The hearing of prayers—Ecclus. 29:12, Vulg., “Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it shall obtain help for thee against all evil;” that is to say, in removing evil. Gloss.: Alms shut up in the heart, are useful for advising and consulting. (3) The preservation of grace—Ecclus. 17:22, “The alms of man is as a signet with him, and shall preserve the grace of a man,” &c.

III. Of the third good, it is to be similarly noted, that by almsgiving men acquire a threefold eternal good. (1) Liberation from eternal death—Tobit 4:11, Vulg., “For alms deliver from all sin and from death,” &c. (2) The possession of eternal life—1 S. Tim. 4:8, “Godliness is profitable, &c., having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.” (3) The increase of eternal reward—2 Cor. 9:6, “He which soweth sparingly shall also reap sparingly, and he which soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully, and shall obtain eternal life;” to which may we be brought, &c.

HOMILY IV

THE HEAVENLY FEAST

SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“A certain man made a great supper, and bade many.”—S. Luke 14:16.

THE heavenly blessedness, as the saints teach, is understood by this supper. But it is called a “great supper” for three reasons. Firstly, on account of the multitude of those who celebrate this supper; secondly, on account of the dishes of meat which are given there in abundance; thirdly, on account of the eternity of the supper itself.

I. On the first head it is called great for a threefold reason. (1) By reason of those who make it. The makers are the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Spirit incomprehensible; and therefore They make an immense or incomprehensible supper. Isai. 25:6, “And in this mountain shall the Lord of Hosts make unto all people a feast of fat things, a feast of wine on the lees of fat things, full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined.” Esth. 1:3, of Ahasuerus: “In the third year of his reign he made a feast unto all his princes and his servants,” &c. (2) By reason of those ministering, who are thousands of thousands—Dan. 7:10, “Thousand thousands ministered unto him.” (3) By reason of the guests, who were ten thousand times ten thousand—Dan. 7:10, “Ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him.”

II. On the second head this is called a great supper because there will be there a thousand thousand of dishes. The dishes are the joys in life eternal; and because there are in heaven a thousand thousand of joys, there were at the “great supper” a thousand thousand dishes. But we are here able to fix upon three great dishes. (1) There will be a dish of joy by the absence of all evil. (2) A dish of joy by the presence of all good—Deut. 8:9, “Where thou shalt eat bread without scarceness: thou shalt not lack anything in it.” Isai. 35:10, “They shall obtain joy and gladness, and sorrow and sighing shall flee away. (3) There will be a dish of joy by Divine praise—Psa. 84:5, “Blessed are they that dwell in Thy house, they will be still praising Thee.” Of these three S. August., in his book “On the City of God,” O how great will be that happiness where there will be no evil; where no good will be hidden; it will be intent upon eternal praises, and God will be all in all.

III. On the third head it is noted, that this great supper is called eternal for three reasons. (1) S. John 16:22, “Your joy no man taketh from you.” For to sit down to supper is to rejoice. (2) Because no one will ever cease from supping—Apoc. 4:8, “And they rest not day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, Which was, and is, and is to come.” For to praise is the same as to sup. (3) It is called eternal because it is eaten entire at once—Boetius, “Eternity is called the possession of the Blessed Life, entire at once.” Rev. 19:9, “Blessed are they which are called unto the marriage supper of the Lamb;” to which supper may Jesus Christ lead us, &c.

HOMILY V

THE BLESSINGS OF HUMILITY

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Humble yourselves therefore under the mighty hand of God, that He may exalt you in due time” (S. Peter 5:6); or, “in the time of Visitation” (Vulgate).

IN these words S. Peter asserts three things. In the First place, he exhorts to humility, “humble yourselves;” in the Second place, he shows the necessity of the humbling “under the mighty hand of God,” Who is able to humble the unwilling; in the Third place, he places the usefulness of humility, that “He may exalt you in due time.”

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that humility is threefold. (1) Of guilt, Ecclus. 19:23, “There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit.” (2) Of punishment, Psalm 106:42, “Their enemies also oppressed them, and they were brought into subjection under their hand.” (3) Of grace, S. Matt. 11:29, “Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart.” The first kind of humility is to be fled from; the second to be endured; the third to be sought for.

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that God shows His power over the proud in three ways. (1) In resisting them; (2) in casting them down; (3) in punishing them eternally. Of the first, S. James 4:6, “God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the humble.” Of the second, Psalm 72:18, Vulg., “When they were lifted up Thou hast cast them down.” Of the third, Joel 2:20, “And his stink shall come up, and his ill-savour shall come up, because he hath done great things.” Baruck 5:7, “For God hath appointed to bring down every high mountain.” (S. Thos. reads “mind.”)

III. On the third head, it is to be noted, that man acquires a threefold profit from humility. (1) The gift of grace; (2) the gift of knowledge; (3) the gift of glory. Of the first, S. James 4:6, God “giveth grace unto the humble.” Of the second, S. Matt. 11:25, “Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes.” Of the third, Job. 22:29, Vulg., “For he that hath been humbled shall be in glory.”

HOMILY VI

ANGELIC MINISTRATION

THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “There is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that repenteth.”—S. Luke 15:10.

TWO things are noted in these words. First, the dignity of the angels—“the angels of God.” Second, their benignity, “joy over one sinner that repenteth.” Great is the dignity of the angels, because they are the messengers of God; and great is their benignity, because they rejoice in the conversion of the sinner.

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that the angels are called “angels of God,” as they are spoken of here; and our angels, as they are called in S. Matt. 18:10, “Their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven.” And by this threefold calling a twofold virtue is to be noted in them, for they have the double virtue of standing by and ministering; for they stand by God, and they minister to us. They stand by God in a threefold manner. (1) In contemplation, S. Matt. 18:10, “Do always behold the face of My Father.” (2) In loving, 1 S. Peter 1:12, “Which things the angels desire to look into;” S. August., “So great is the fulness of the Divine countenance that no one is able to behold it without love.” (3) In praising, S. Peter Dam., “It is the work of the angels to praise God in hymns.” The angels also minister to us in a threefold manner. First, in purging us; second, in enlightening us; third, in helping us forward. S. Dioni. Are., For by liberating us they purge us. Isaiah 6:6, “Then flew one of the seraphims unto me, having a live coal in his hand,” &c. They illuminate by teaching. Dan. 10:13, “Michael, one of the chief princes, came to help me, and I remained there with the kings of Persia. Now I am come to make thee understand what shall befal thy people in the latter days.” They help by providing good things. 1 Kings 19:5, “An angel touched him, and said unto him, Arise and eat.”

II. On the second head, it is noted, that for three reasons the angels rejoice over the conversion of sinners. (1) On account of the fulfilment of their ministry; for they are ministers that exhort us to repentance. Heb. 1:14, “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister to them who shall be heirs of salvation?” (2) On account of the confusion of the demons; for the demons are confounded when any one is converted to repentance, which is the joy of angels. Rev. 12:9–12, “And the great dragon was cast out, that old serpent called the Devil, and Satan.… and his angels were cast out with him.” Afterwards, “I heard a loud voice saying in heaven, Now is come salvation, and strength, … therefore rejoice, ye heavens.” (3) On account of the honour of God; for the sinner when he is converted honours God, which is the joy of angels. Jos. 7:19, “My son, give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Israel, and make confession unto Him.”

HOMILY VII

THE CREATURE'S FUTURE GLORY

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> "For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God."—Rom. 8:19.

THE Apostle in this Epistle designs to show that all His creatures desired the Advent of the Glory of the Saints. There are four creatures which desire especially the glory of the saints. First, angelic creatures; second, heavenly creatures; third, earthly creatures; fourth, human creatures; and, therefore, perhaps, he names four creatures in this Epistle.

I. On the first head, it is noted, that the angels desire it for three reasons. (1) On account of the full completion of the victory over their enemies. Rev. 12:9, "And the great serpent was cast out; that old serpent called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world: he was cast out into the earth, and his angels were cast out with him;" and afterwards "Rejoice, ye heavens, and ye that dwell in them." (2) On account of the completion of their ministry. 1 Cor. 15:24, "When He shall have put down all rule, and all authority, and power, for He must reign till He hath put all enemies under His feet." (3) On account of the perfect reparation of His city. Psalm 105:6, "He shall judge among the heathen, He shall fill the places with the dead bodies." Ephes. 1:10, Vulg., "To re-establish all things in Christ that are in heaven and on earth."

II. On the second head, it is to be noted that the heavenly creature was desiring this for three reasons. (1) On account of the taking away the unworthiness of its servitude. S. Isid., "The sun and the moon will not descend to setting after the judgment, nor to the wicked placed under the earth, will light serve them." (2) On account of the recovery of lost beauty.

Isai. 30:26, “Moreover, the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold.” (3) On account of his rest from motion, Habak. 3:11, “The sun and moon stood still in their habitation.” The sun in rising, the moon in setting, as they were ordained at the creation for these three good things, the heavenly bodies obtain.

III. It is noted, in the third place, that the earthly creature desires it for three reasons. (1) On account of its cleansing from the sins of the wicked, for now the wicked defile the earth with their iniquities. Psalm 105:39, Vulg., the land “was defiled with their works;” but hereafter it shall, be purged with fire. 2 Peter 3:10, “The elements shall melt with fervent heat; the earth, also, and the works that are therein, shall be burnt up.” (2) On account of its liberation from corruption; for there is now birth because there is destruction, but when destruction shall cease then there will be no necessity for birth. Rom. 8:21, “The creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God.” (3) On account of its renovation. Isaiah 65:17, “Behold, I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former shall not be remembered nor come into mind; but be ye glad and rejoice for ever in that which I create.”

IV. Man desires it likewise for three reasons. (1) On account of his liberation from evil; (2) on account of his repletion in every good; (3) on account of his conservation for eternity. These three things follow man in the day of judgment who so lives here, that he may be found worthy at that day. Of these three S. Augustine, in his book of the “City of God,” “There will be one free will of that City in all things, and inseparable and individual; having been freed from all evil, filled with all good, for good does not fail in eternity, perfecting indefectibly by the happiness of eternal joys;” which may Christ grant us. Amen.

HOMILY VIII

ON SHEWING MERCY

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father also is merciful.”—S. Luke 6:36.

THE Lord sets before us two things in these words. Firstly, He induces us to mercy, “Be ye therefore merciful.” Secondly, it gives the rule for shewing mercy, “as your Father also is merciful.”

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that three reasons chiefly move us in shewing mercy. (1) Necessity; (2) utility; (3) congruity. It is a necessity, because he who does not shew mercy will not find mercy. James 2:13, “For he shall have judgment without mercy that hath shewed no mercy.” It is useful, because he who shews mercy shall find mercy. S. Matt. 5:7, “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.” It is congruous, because when we obtain mercy from all creatures, it is only suitable that we should shew mercy to others. For we are full of misery, and unless other creatures should have compassion on us in giving themselves and their kind offices for us, we should not be able to exist. For if the sun or fire should give up its light and heat, and the earth its fruit, what could miserable man do? Therefore it is sufficiently congruous, since man meets mercy, that he should shew mercy to others. Prov. 19:22, Vulg., “The needy man is merciful;” and he who needs mercy ought to shew mercy to others—ought to be sorry for others; whence, in a certain way, creatures accuse the unmerciful.

II. On the second head, it is to be noted that the mercy of God chiefly appeared in three ways. (1) In the gift of His Son: it was a great gift, and a great mercy, of which S. Luke 1:72, “To perform the mercy promised to our fathers.” (2) In the glorification of the just, Psalm 109:21, “Because Thy mercy is good.” Psalm 36:5, “Thy mercy, O Lord, is in the heavens.” (3) In the justification of sinners, Psalm 86:13, “For great is Thy mercy toward me.” On account of the first mercy we ought to praise Him and love Him. On account of the second mercy we ought to be confident, for however great sinners they may be they may fly to God. Isa. 55:7. “Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and He will have mercy upon him: and to our God, for He will abundantly pardon.” On account of the third mercy we ought, with quickness, to run to God. Heb. 4:11, “Let us labour, therefore, to enter into that rest” (Vulgate, hasten). To which rest may we, &c.

HOMILY IX

THE EVIL AND THE GOOD

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Let him eschew evil and do good; let him seek peace and ensue it.”—1 Peter 3:11.

THERE are two parts of righteousness to which the blessed Peter invites us in these words. The first is the avoiding of evil, “Let him eschew evil.” The second is, the delighting in good, “and do good.”

I. On the first head, it is to be noted that evil is chiefly to be avoided for three things. (1) On account of the great bitterness which it induces. (2) On account of the loss which it entails. (3) On account of the punishment to which it leads. Of the first, Jer. 2:19, “See that it is an evil thing and bitter that thou hast forsaken the Lord thy God,” &c. Sin induces much bitterness on account of three reasons. (1) Because the Lord is opposed to sin. Deut. 25:16, “For all that do unrighteously are an abomination unto the Lord thy God.” Deut. 31:17, “Many evils and troubles shall befall them, so that they will say in that day, Are not these evils come upon us because our God is not among us?” (2) Because man by sin is greatly disordered in himself. S. August., Thou hast commanded, O Lord, and it is truly so, that every disordered mind is the punishment to itself. Job. 7:20, “Why hast Thou set me as a mark against Thee, so that I am a burden to myself?” (3) Because every sinner impugns the just judgment of God to every creature. Wis. 16:24, “The creature serving Thee, the Creator, is made fierce against the unjust for their punishment.”

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that the sinner incurs a threefold loss, which is sin. (1) Because by sin itself manifold good is taken away. S. Augustine, in the “City of God,” says, If we were not of a good disposition the vices of it would not harm us; but now what they do by these things in harming, is that they take away from themselves, integrity, beauty, and salvation. (2) Because of sin the gift of grace is taken away. Wis. 1:4, “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.” (3) On account of sin the gift of glory is taken away. Isaiah 26:10, “Will he deal unjustly, and will not behold the majesty of the Lord.”

III. On the third head, it is to be noted that sin leads men to many punishments; but here three are stated. There will be (1) Continual sorrow in mind. Isa. 13:8, “Pangs and sorrows shall take hold of them; they shall be in pain, as a woman that travaileth.” Job. 20:22, “In the fulness of his sufficiency he shall be in straits; every hand of the wicked shall come upon him.” (2) Continual hunger in heart. S. Matt. 13:30, “Bind them in bundles to burn them.” (3) There will be eternity in both states. S. Matt. 25:41, “Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire.” Concerning these three, Isaiah 66:24, “Their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched.” The worm denotes grief in mind; he calls the fire torment in the heart. The fire being inextinguishable, marks the eternity in both; from which fire may Christ deliver us.

HOMILY X

THINGS FORSAKEN AND FOLLOWED

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“They forsook all, and followed Him.”—S. Luke 5:11.

TWO things are necessary for us for the following of Him. Firstly, that we should turn away from a changing good by despising it; secondly, that we should turn towards an unchanging good in loving and imitating it. Both these things are noted in the Gospel—the first, “they forsook all;” the second, “and followed Him.”

I. On the first head, it is noticed that we ought to forsake four things if we wish to follow Christ—(1) in forsaking earthly things by despising them, S. Luke 14:33, “Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be My disciple;” (2) in leaving kinsfolk and parents for the sake of God, S. Matt. 10:37, “He that loveth father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me,” &c.; (3) in abandoning his own body by mortifying it; (4) in denying his own will. Of these two, S. Luke 9:23, “If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow Me.”

II. On the second head, it is noted that we ought to imitate Christ in four ways—(1) in humility, S. Matt. 11:29, “Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart;” (2) in piety, S. Luke 6:36, “Be ye therefore merciful, as your Father is also merciful;” (3) in charity, S. John 15:17, “These things I command you, that ye love one another;” (4) in the bitterness of tribulations, 1 S. Peter 2:21, “Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example that ye should follow His steps.” There are two right wayst hrough which man walks to the kingdom of heaven, Wisd. 10:10, “She conducted the just through the right way, and shewed him the kingdom of God.” To which kingdom may we, &c.

HOMILY XI

MAN’S TWOFOLD STATE

SIXTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “For if we have been planted together in the likeness of His death, we shall be also in the likeness of His resurrection.”—Romans 6:5.

THE Apostle makes mention of two things in these words. Firstly, he expresses the excellence that we ought to have, “We have been planted together in the likeness of His death.” This is our merit that we may have in ourselves the likeness of His, that is of Christ’s, death. Secondly, he expresses what we ought to receive on account of this excellence, “We shall be also in the likeness of His resurrection.” This is our reward, that we may have the likeness of the resurrection of Christ.

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that there were five things in the death of Christ in which we ought to follow Him—(1) humility; (2) obedience. Of these two, Philip. 2:8, “He humbled Himself and became obedient unto death.” To the first the Lord invites us, S. Matt. 11:29, “Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart;” to the second, S. John 14:15, “If ye love Me, keep My commandments.” (3) Ineffable charity was in the death of Christ, S. John 15:13, “Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends;” and in this we ought to be like Him ourselves, S. John 15:12, “This is My commandment, that ye love one another.” (4) Patience, 1 S. Peter 2:23, “When He suffered He threatened not;” and in this we ought to be made like unto Him, Heb. 12:1, 2, “Let us run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus, the Author and Finisher of our faith, Who for the joy that was set before Him endured the Cross.” (5) Perseverance, because he who in all things perseveres unto death will be saved, Philip. 2:8, “Obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross;” but we ought to have the likeness of His death in our perseverance, S. Matt. 10:27, “But he that endureth unto the end shall be saved.

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that the glory of our body, when it is conformed to the body of the glory of Christ, consists of seven things. (1) It will be lovely by the suitableness of all the members, S. August. (“City of God,” lib. xxii. c. 19), “Thenceforth there will be no deformity, which now makes unsuitableness of parts, where also the things which are deformed may be corrected; and what is less than it ought to be, since the Creator knew, thence it will be supplied, and what is more than it ought to be will be taken away, the integrity of the material being preserved.” (2) There will be a wonderful sweetness of the outward appearance in the whole body, S. August., “How great will be the sweetness of complexion when the Just shall shine as the Sun in the kingdom of His Father!” The beauty of all the outward appearance consists in these two things, S. August., “All beauty of the body is from the suitableness of its parts, as by a certain sweetness of complexion;” but there will be then all beauty in our bodies, Philip. 3:21, “Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body.” (3) There will be velocity of motion, S. August., “Where the spirit shall be willing there will be the body instantly.” (4) It will have a perfect liberation from all want. (5) There will be full and high happiness. Of these two, S. August., “All the members and bowels of the incorruptible body, which now we see distributed various ways by the use of necessity, will not then be so; but this necessity is itself full and certain security and eternal happiness, and it will advance in the praises of God.” (6) It will be impassible, and immortal, and eternal, S. August., “Whatever has perished from the living bodies, or from the corpses after death, shall be restored, or it shall remain in the sepulchre, in the newness of the spiritual body changed out of the oldness of the animal body, and it will rise again, clothed in incorruption and immortality. (7) There will be full peace and concord between the body and the spirit, S. August., “A spiritual flesh will be supplied to the flesh, but it will yet be flesh, not spirit.” How happy, therefore, will they be who shall be held to be worthy of that resurrection! Yet they must be those, who here have died with Christ, Colos. 3:3, 4, “Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in

God. When Christ, Who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with Him in glory.” To which glory may we, &c.

HOMILY XII

IMPERFECT OBEDIENCE

SIXTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven.”—S. Matt. 5:20.

IN this Gospel the Lord treats of four things. I. He shews what we ought to do, “Except your righteousness shall exceed,” &c.; which proves that we ought to have abundant righteousness.

II. He shews what we seek, “the kingdom of heaven.” For this reason we ought to do righteousness, that by it we may come to the kingdom. Of both, S. Matt. 6:33, “Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His righteousness.” There He shews what we should avoid, “Thou shalt not kill.”

III. But He shews that we ought to flee from a threefold sin. (1) The sin of deed, “Thou shalt not kill:” by this is prohibited every act by which our neighbour is injured. Isai. 1:16, “Cease to do evil.” Levit. 19:16, “Neither shalt thou stand against the blood of thy neighbour.” (2) He prohibits all sin of the heart, “Whosoever is angry with his brother.” Eccles. 11:10, “Remove anger from thy heart, and put away evil from thy flesh.” (3) Sin of the mouth, S. Matt. 5:22, “But whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca.” Ephes. 4:29, “Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth.”

IV. He shews what we ought to fear, i.e., the coming judgment, “Shall be in danger of the judgment.” But He here places three things that we ought to fear—(1) The judgment in which all the wicked shall be condemned, “shall be in danger of the judgment.” Judith 16:20, “The Lord Almighty will take revenge on them; in the day of judgment He will visit them.” (2) The Council of Angels and Saints, in which all the wicked will be examined, but “who shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the Council.” Isai.

3:14, “The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of His people and the princes thereof.” Mal. 4:6, “Lest I come to smite the earth with a curse.” (3) The infernal fire, in which all the wicked will be eternally punished, “shall be in danger of hell fire.” Judith 16:21, “For He will give fire and worms into their flesh that they may burn and may feel for ever.” From which fire may Christ deliver us, &c.

HOMILY XIII

THE EVIL AND THE GOOD WAY

SEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “As ye have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and to iniquity unto iniquity, even so now yield your members servants to righteousness unto holiness.”—Romans 6:19.

IN this Epistle the Apostle exhorts us to two things—firstly, to the avoidance of evil, “As ye have yielded your members,” &c.; secondly, to the love of good, “even so now yield your members,” &c.

I. On the first head, the Apostle assigns in this Epistle four reasons through which sin should be avoided. (1) Because sin pollutes the mind “to uncleanness.” Hosea 9:10, “Their abominations were according as they loved.” (2) Because by sin man ignominiously subjects himself to servitude, “When ye were the servants of sin.” S. John 8:34, “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.” (3) Because great confusion flows from sin, “What fruit had ye then in those things whereof ye are now ashamed?” Jeremiah 17:13, “O Lord, all that forsake Thee shall be ashamed.” (4) Because by sin man is led to eternal death, “The wages of sin is death.” Psalm 33:22, Vulg., “The death of the wicked is very evil.”

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that likewise four reasons are given why good should be chosen. For men acquire four great things from the choice of that which is good. (1) Purity of the mind or sanctification, which is cleansing, S. Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.” (2) Justice of the will “to righteousness.” For righteousness is a right will, S. Ansel., “Justice is rectitude of the will preserved on its own account.” (3) Liberty of the spirit, “Ye were free from righteousness.” 2 Cor. 3:17, “Where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty.” S. John 8:36, “If the Son, therefore, shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.” (4)

Man by doing good obtains eternal life, “The gift of God is eternal life.” S. John 5:29, “And shall come forth they that have done good unto the resurrection of life.” S. Matt. 25:46, “Those shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal.”

HOMILY XIV

THE FEAST OF HEAVEN AND EARTH

SEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “And He took the seven loaves and gave thanks, and brake and gave to His disciples to set before them.”—S. Mark 8:6, 7.

THE Lord feeds His holy ones in a threefold manner. First, with corporeal bread, Psal. 104:14, “That He may bring forth food out of the earth.” Secondly, with spiritual bread, Prov. 20:13, “Open thine eyes,” i.e., the eyes of the heart to holy vigils, “and thou shalt be satisfied with bread,” i.e., with holy doctrine or with heavenly joys. Thirdly, with eternal bread, Psal. 132:15, “I will satisfy her poor with bread.”

By these seven loaves are understood the seven breads with which the Lord feeds His faithful ones, that they may not fail in the way of righteousness; but in their strength they may come to the table of heavenly glory. The first is the most sweet effusion of tears from the desire of glory, Psal. 42:3, “My tears have been my meat day and night.” S. August., “Tears were flowing to me, and it was well for me in regard to them.” The second, the ineffable consolation in the words of God, S. Matt. 4:4, “Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.” Jer. 15:16, “Thy words were found, and I did eat them, and Thy word was unto me the joy and rejoicing of mine heart, for I am called by Thy name, O Lord God of Hosts.” The third, the ineffable delight in the partaking of the Eucharist, S. John 6:51, “The bread that I will give is My flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.” Wisdom 16:20, “And gavest them bread from heaven, prepared without labour, having in it all that is delicious and the sweetness of every taste.” The fourth, the admirable sweetness from the presence of Christ, S. John 6:51, “I am the living bread which came down from heaven.” For it is evident that the just ever have Christ to dwell in their hearts; how great is the happiness of him who ever has Christ dwelling in his heart. Ephes. 3:16, 17, “That He would grant you according to the riches of His glory to be strengthened with might by His Spirit in the inner man, that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith.” The fifth, the foretaste of eternal blessedness, Psal. 78:25, “Man did eat angels’ food.” S. August., “Brought in within I know not to what sweetness, which if it is perfected in me, I know not what eternal life is, unless it be that.” The sixth, in the possession of joy by every virtue, because it is joy to have so many gifts of the Holy Spirit, and those twelve fruits which the Apostle enumerated—Gal. 5:22, 23, “But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance”—which are therefore called fruits, because they more refresh the mind than can be expressed by words. Prov. 9:5, “Come, eat of My bread.” The seventh, the exultation by the testimony of conscience, Prov. 15:15, Vulg., “A secure mind is like a continual feast.” 2 Cor. 1:12, “For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience.”

Of the just man it is said, Isai. 33:16, “Bread shall be given him.” The small fishes are the joys in the presence of the saints, who are even now taken away from the most bitter sea of this world, who frequently come and console the just “who are in the way.” There are, indeed, some martyrs who are wasted, as Laurence and others, who, being afflicted with fires and differents torments, were smiling brightly, and so by their mirth proclaimed that they had infinite delights within, by which they could despise external torments. 2 Cor. 11:27, 30, “If I must needs glory, I will glory of the things which concern my infirmities.” 2 Cor. 12:9, 10, “Most gladly therefore will I rather glory in my infirmities. I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ’s sake.” Concerning this banquet of the just it is said, S. Matt. 22:4, “Behold, I have prepared my dinner; my oxen and my fatlings are killed.” At such banquets, which the wicked know not of, the just are enjoying all the day long. Psal. 68:4, Vulg., “Let the just feast and rejoice before God.” If the righteous so feast in the present time, what will it be in the time to come? Blessed is he who shall eat bread in the kingdom of heaven. To which kingdom may Jesus Christ lead us.

HOMILY XV

THE EARTHLY AND THE HEAVENLY LIFE

EIGHTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “For if ye live after the flesh ye shall die; but if ye through the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live.”—Romans 8:13.

THE Apostle does three things in these words—Firstly, he commands us that we should mortify the pleasure of the flesh, “through the Spirit do ye mortify the deeds of the body.” Secondly, he places the necessity of mortifying it, “if ye live after the flesh ye shall die.” Thirdly, he places the profit of the mortification, “ye shall live.”

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that in a threefold manner we ought to mortify the flesh. (1) By destroying its carnal desires and sin, Colos. 3:5–10, “Mortify therefore your members which are upon the earth—fornication, uncleanness, inordinate affection, evil concupiscence, and covetousness, which is idolatry, for which things’ sake the wrath of God cometh on the children of disobedience; in the which ye also walked some time, when ye lived in them. But now ye also put off all these: anger, wrath, malice, blasphemy, filthy communication out of your mouth. Lie not one to another, seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him that created him.” (2) By macerating it by fasting and afflictions to the likeness of the passion of Jesus Christ, 2 Cor. 4:10, “Always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life also of Jesus might be made manifest in our body.” (3) In afflicting it by spiritual meditations, Eccles. 12:12, “Much study is a weariness of the flesh.” Ecclus. 31:1, “Watching for riches consumeth the flesh.” That is carnal pleasures; the thought of it takes away sleep, i.e., the weariness of sluggishness. In the same chapter, 5:2, “The thinking beforehand taketh away the understanding,” i.e., he who sees beforehand the rewards of gifts turns away sense—i.e., from all evil concupiscence; and heavy infirmity—i.e., of the body—makes the mind free from sin.

II. On the second head, it is to be noted that it is necessary we should mortify the flesh, since if we live after the flesh we shall die; for it follows that there is a threefold death from the pleasure of the flesh—(1) the death of sin; (2) the death of nature, Ecclus. 34:7, “By surfeiting many have perished;” (3) the death of Gehena, Gal. 6:8, “He that soweth to his flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption;” Psal. 33:22, Vulg., “The death of the wicked is very evil.”

III. On the third head, it is to be noted that a threefold life is acquired by the mortification of the flesh—(1) prolongation of natural life, Ecclus. 37:31, “He that is temperate shall prolong life;” (2) the life of grace, Rom. 8:6, “To be spiritually minded is life and peace;” (3) the prolongation of the life of glory, 2 Cor. 4:11, “Always bearing about in the body the dying of the Lord Jesus, that the life of Jesus might be made manifest in our body.”

HOMILY XVI

THE THREE TREES

EIGHTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit.”—S. Matt. 7:17.

THE Lord in this Gospel signifies the three kinds of trees which are in the island of this world. Firstly, He signifies the tree bringing forth good fruits, “Every good tree.” Secondly, that bringing forth evil fruits, “A corrupt tree,” &c. Thirdly, the tree bringing forth no fruits, “Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit,” &c.

I. The Lord commends the first tree to us for three reasons. First, from the multiplicity of fruits—“fruit.” He speaks plurally, that the just who is here called a good tree ought to produce much fruit: for it ought to produce twelve fruits—(1) charity; (2) joy; (3) peace; (4) patience; (5) long suffering; (6) goodness; (7) gentleness; (8) mildness; (9) faith; (10) modesty; (11) continency; (12) chastity. Gal. 5:22, “But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace,” &c. Secondly, He commends it for the preciousness of the fruits, “good;” but the goodness of these fruits is manifest, because by such fruits the kingdom of God is gained; and the trees of Paradise give such fruit. Rom. 14:17, “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.” Thirdly, He commends it by its constancy of fruit bearing, “brings forth.” It is of the present time in which it is shewn that it is ever in the act of bearing fruit, Jer. 17:7, 8, “Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is; for he shall be as a tree planted by the water … and shall not be careful in the year of drought, neither shall cease from yielding fruit.” Ezek. 47:12, “And by the river upon the bank thereof, this side and on that side, shall grow all trees for meat; whose leaf shall not fade, neither shall the fruit thereof be consumed.” Of these three, Rev. 22:2, “On either side of the river was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations.” Behold the preciousness of the fruits, for the just eat them and they live for ever. “Twelve manner of fruits”—their multiplicity. “Every month”—behold their continuity of bearing.

II. Three evils are attributed to the second tree—(1) mortification of the fruits of the wicked—“fruit,” for in this word, which is spoken in the plural, Our Lord remarks that the wicked man, who is here called “a corrupt tree,” bears many evil fruits, which are evil deeds. But the Apostle enumerates seventeen fruits of the evil tree, Gal. 5:19, 20, 21, which are the “works of the flesh,” and “they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.” (2) The perversity of the fruits, “evil,” S. Matt. 12:35, “An evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things.” (3) The assiduity of working evil, “brings forth,” Hos. 4:10, Vulg., “They have committed fornication, and have not ceased.”

III. About the third tree, it is to be noted, that there are three kinds of trees which bring forth no fruit—(1) Which makes leaves without flowers: these are they which have words without works, S. Matt. 21:19, “He saw a fig-tree and found nothing thereon but leaves only.” Our Lord cursed it, “How soon is the fig-tree withered away.” (2) Which has flowers without fruits: these are they which bring forth works in appearance but not in truth, 2 Tim. 3:5, “Having a form of godliness, but denying the power thereof.” Job 8:12, 13, “Whilst it is yet in his greenness, and not cut down, it withereth before any other herb. So are the paths of all that forget God, and the hypocrite’s hope shall perish.” (3) That which brings forth fruit, but it is wholly useless, Wisd. 4:5, “Their fruit shall be unprofitable, and sour to eat, and fit for nothing.” Jude 12, “Trees whose fruit withereth, without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots.” But, alas, to such trees, for they are cut down with the axe of the Divine judgment, and they will be sent into the eternal fire of hell. S. Matt. 3:10, “And now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees, therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire.” From which fire may the Lord deliver us.

HOMILY XVII

IDOLATRY

NINTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“Neither be ye idolaters, as were some of them.”—1 Cor. 10:7.

THE Apostle here sets forth two things. Firstly, he admonishes that we should flee from spiritual idolatry, “Neither be ye idolaters.” For he was speaking to the faithful who now had no idols; whence it is manifest that he was advising them to avoid that idolatry which consists in vices. Secondly, he compares the spiritual idolatry with bodily idolatry, “As were some of them,” who adored a calf and other idols.

I. Of the bodily idolatry, it is known that it was threefold—(1) in the stars; (2) in the elements. Of these two, Wisdom 13:2, “Either the fire or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon,” &c. In the former of these is seen the idolatry of the elements; in the latter, that of the stars. (3) Idolatry in animals, Rom. 1:23, “And change the glory of the incorruptible God into an image,” &c. The idolatry in the stars signifies pride, whence the first proud one said, Isa. 14:13, “I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above the stars of God … I will be like the Most High.” S. Augustine, “And they thought that they would exalt themselves with stars and lightning, and behold they have fallen upon earth.”

II. The idolatry of the elements signifies the idolatry of the covetous, Colos. 3:5, “Covetousness, which is idolatry.” The idolatry of animals is that of carnal concupiscence, which exists in the pleasures of the flesh, S. Jude 10, “But what they know naturally as brute beasts in those things they corrupt themselves.” Of these three, S. James 3:15, “This wisdom descendeth not from above, but is earthly,” through avarice; “sensual,” by luxury; “devilish,” through pride.

HOMILY XVIII

THE GREAT ACCOUNT

NINTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“Give an account of thy stewardship.”—S. Luke 16:2.

THIS word is spoken to every one at death or in the judgment, since it behoves us all to come before the heavenly tribunal of Christ the Judge, 2 Cor. 5:10, “For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad;” and therefore every man ought to think how he will then be able to give account. But we ought to consider three things about this account. (1) The difficulty of rendering the account; (2) of the witnesses, who will accuse those rendering a false account, themselves giving the true one; (3) the severity of the sentence which will be given against those who have rendered a false account.

I. On the first head, it is to be noted that (1) it will be difficult to render account of all the thoughts, Ps. 75:11, Vulg., “For the thought of man shall give praise to Thee.” Wisd. 1:9, “For inquisition shall be made into the thoughts of the ungodly.” (2) Of the sayings, S. Matt. 12:36, “But I say unto you that every idle word that men shall speak they shall give account thereof in the day of judgment; for by thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned.” Eccles. 12:14, “For God shall bring every work into judgment, with every secret thing, whether it be good or whether it be evil.”

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that three most true witnesses will accuse the ungodly in the judgment. The first witness will be God, Mal. 3:5, “And I will come near to you to judgment; and I will be a swift witness against the sorcerers, and against the adulterers, and against false swearers

… For I am the Lord: I change not.” The second will be conscience, Rom. 2:15, “Their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts in the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ.” The third will be every creature, Job 20:27, “The heavens shall reveal his iniquity, and the earth shall rise up against him;” whence a certain holy father said: we are about to render an account in the presence of heaven and earth; and do you mock?

III. On the third head, it is to be noted, that the severity to the sentence on the wicked will be felt in three ways. (1) They will be deprived of all good things, S. Augus. (in his book of the “City of God”), “In the last punishment it will be just, that the wicked and the ungodly should weep for the loss of natural good things in their torments, feeling their depriver to be the most just God, when they have despised the most bountiful Benefactor.” Job 20:15, “He hath swallowed down riches, and he shall vomit them up again: God shall cast them out of his belly.” (2) Because they shall be tormented by the burning of the most fierce fire, Isa. 66:24, “Neither shall their fire be quenched.” (3) Because they shall not be liberated for ever, S. Matt. 25:41, “Depart from me,” without Whom there is no good: behold the first. “Into fire:” behold the second. “Everlasting:” behold the third. From which may Jesus Christ deliver us.

HOMILY XIX

TRUE AND FALSE GLORY

TENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY

> [This Homily is substituted for the one which occurs in the series, and which treats of the false gods of the heathen.]

“He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord.”—1 Cor. 1:1.

EVERY rational creature longs for glory, because such an one was created for glory; and therefore the Apostle in these words points out where true glory can be found; and he points out here two kinds of glory—an unreal and a live glory.

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that there is (1) a false glory in temporal riches—“And boast themselves in the multitude of their riches,” Psa. 49:6. (2) A vain glory—“Wicked boasteth of his heart’s desire,” Psa. 10:3; that is, he glories in earthly dignities. “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might,” Jer. 9:23. (3) There is also a foolish glory in pleasures; for it is foolish to glory in mortal meats—“She that liveth in pleasure is dead,” 1 S. Tim. 5:6. (4) An evil glory in wickedness—“Why boasteth thou thyself in mischief?” Psa. 52:1. The first glory tendeth to poverty—“The rich man shall lie down, but he shall not be gathered; he openeth his eyes, and he is not” (Job 27:19). The second ends in ignominy—“Their glory shall fly away like a bird,” Hosea 9:11. The third is changed into the anguish of grief—“How much she hath glorified herself and lived deliciously, so much torment and sorrow gave her,” Rev. 18:7. The fourth into eternal torment—“Upon the wicked He shall rain snares, fire and brimstone,” &c., Psa. 11:6. “For their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched,” Isa. 66:24.

II. On the second head, it is to be noted that true glory consists (1) in our knowledge of the Lord—“Let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me that I am the Lord,” Jer. 9:24. (2) In consideration of His wonders—“He gave them to glory in His marvellous acts,” Ecclus. 17:9. (3) In His love—“Let them that love Thy name be joyful in Thee,” Psa. 5:11. (4) In His praise—“That my glory may sing praise to Thee,” Psa. 30:12. (5) In the fruition of God—“I shall be satisfied when I awake with Thy likeness,” Psa. 17:15.

HOMILY XX

THE MISFORTUNES AND PUNISHMENTS OF THE WICKED

TENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Thine enemies shall cast a trench about thee, and compass thee round, and keep thee in on every side.”—S. Luke 19:43.

THE Lord in these words predicts the adversity which was about to destroy the vain prosperity of this world, about which three things are to be noted. (1) The universality of the adversity itsèlf—“Compass thee round.” (2) The multiplicity of the punishment which there will be in it—“And keep thee in on every side.” The multitude is the cause of the keeping in. (3) The eternity of the same adversity—“Shall lay thee even with the ground;” that is, will destroy wholly, so that no one will be able to be liberated.

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that misfortunes come to the wicked from eight quarters. (1) From the earth—Psa. 106:17, “The earth opened and swallowed up,” &c. Job. 20:27, “The earth shall rise up against him.” (2) From water, which shall suffocate them—Wisd. 5:23, “The water of the sea shall rage against them, and the rivers shall run together in a terrible manner.” (3) From the air which will lighten against them—Wisd. 5:22, “Then shafts of lightning shall go directly from the clouds as from a bow well bent; they shall be shot out, and shall fly to the mark.” (4) From fire, which shall consume them—Psa. 97:3, “A fire goeth before him and burneth his enemies round about.” (5) From the sun, moon, and stars, which shall hide themselves from him—Joel 3:15, “The sun and the moon shall be darkened, and the stars shall withdraw their shining.” S. Matt. 24:29, “Shall the sun be darkened, and the moon shall not give her light, and the stars shall fall from heaven.” (6) From the saints, who will condemn them—S.

Matt. 19:28, “Ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.” (7) From the Lord Jesus Christ, Who will judge them—S. Matt. 25:34, 41, “Then shall the King say unto them on the left hand, Depart from me, ye cursed,” &c. (8) From the angels, who will carry them into hell—S. Matt. 13:41, 42, “The Son of Man shall send forth His angels … and shall cast them into a furnace of fire.”

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that there are eight punishments of the wicked, which will greatly distress them. (1) There will be a rational blindness of the highest ignorance, for the torment—S. Greg., “In the ordained torments it will be permitted to know nothing beyond the torments themselves. (2) There will be a continued trouble of hatred and anger to the irritation of the tormented—Psa. 112:10, “The wicked shall see it and be grieved.” (3) There will be the lack of all sweetness for the punishment of the lustful—S. Greg., “For what can be a greater misery than ever to desire what never can be, and ever to hate what always is. For the ungodly will never have what he desires. Ps. 112:10, “The desire of the wicked shall perish.” (4) There will be a continual sound of weeping and wailing for the punishment of the hearer—Job. 15:21, “A dreadful sound is in his ears.” S. Jas. 5:1, “Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl.” (5) There will be a continual effusion of tears for the punishment of the eyes of the bodies of those who were burned—S. Luke 6:25, “Woe unto you that laugh now, for ye shall mourn and weep.” Job 20:18, “He shall be punished for all that he did, and yet not be consumed.” In the lives of the Fathers we read, “Let us pray, children, before we come to that place where tears shall consume our bodies.” (6) There will be an intolerable odour as the smell of the suppliants—Isai. 3:24, “Instead of a sweet smell there shall be a stink.” (7) There will be the taste for punishment, food and drink the most bitter—Jer. 9:15, “I will feed them, even this people, with wormwood, and give them the water of gall to drink.” (8) There will be a most glowing fire and perpetual burning—Isai. 66:24, “For their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched.” “Are they not therefore foolish who, for momentary delights, bind themselves to so many perpetual evils?” (S. Greg.)

III. On the third head—the eternity of the adversity—it is a momentary thing which delights: it is an eternal thing which crucifies.

HOMILY XXI

THE THREEFOLD POWER OF GRACE

ELEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“By the grace of God I am what I am.”—1 Cor. 15:10.

THREE things are to be noted in these words. Firstly, the great bountifulness of God—“By the grace of God,” &c. Secondly, the utility of the grace—“His grace which was bestowed upon me was not in vain.” Thirdly, the weakness of the free-will—“Yet not I.”

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that in three ways appears the great goodness of God to sinners, which appeared in S. Paul. (1) In the calling of so great sinners—“Because I persecuted the Church of God.” 1 S. Tim. 1:15, “Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, of which I am chief.” (2) In the bestowing of abundant grace—Rom. 5:20, “Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound.” This is expressed in the words, “By the grace of God I am what I am;” as a great Apostle, such an one, and so great. (3) In the exhibition of spiritual friendship—Job 22:23, “If thou return to the Almighty thou shalt be built up, thou shalt put away iniquity far from thy tabernacles;” 22:26, “For then shalt thou have thy delight in the Almighty, and shalt lift up thy face unto God.”

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that there is here a manifold utility of grace. (1) Because it cleanses from the defilement of all sin—Rom. 3:24, “Being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation,” &c. (2) Because it liberates us from all misery—Rom. 7:24, “O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord.” (3) Because it confirms in good—Heb. 13:9, “It is a good thing that the heart be established with grace.” (4) It illuminates the mind—Job 25:3, “Upon whom doth not His light arise?” (5) It delights the mind, whence grace is defined to be the soul’s delight. (6) It makes joyful its possessor—Psa. 104:15, “Oil to make his face to shine;” whence the Gloss., “Grace is a certain glistening of the mind to the commending holy love.” (7) It leads men to the glory of eternal life—Rom. 6:23, “The gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.”

III. On the third head, it is to be noted, that the weakness of the free-will appears in three ways. (1) Because it is ever prone to doing evil—Gen. 8:21, “For the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth.” (2) Because it is not able by itself to arise again when it has fallen into deadly sin—Psalm 78:39, “Man is as a wind that passeth away and cometh not again.” (3) Because it is not able to do any good thing—2 Cor. 3:5, “Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to do anything as of ourselves.” The Helper of grace is ever to be fled to, Who willingly offered Himself for all, and through Whom we can do all things; which may the Lord give us, &c. Amen.

HOMILY XXII

PRIDE AND HUMILITY

ELEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“Two men went up in the temple to pray.”—S. Luke 18:10.

THREE things are to be noted in this Gospel. Firstly, the great pride of the Pharisee, “The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself.” Secondly, the true humility of the publican, “The publican standing afar off.” Thirdly, the great justice of God in His house, “This man went down to his house justified,” &c.

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that the pride of the Pharisee was seen in three ways. (1) Because candidly he was thinking himself just, “I am not as other men are;” as if he alone was just. (2) Because he despised others, “I thank Thee that I am not as other men are;” despising all, he alone thought he possessed what he did not. (3) Because he arrogantly boasted of his own good deeds, “I fast twice in the week.” Gloss., “He who went up to pray does not pray, but praises himself.” There are three acts of pride, as the Gloss. says, which thus begins, “There are four kinds of fear,” &c.

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that the humility of the publican appears in three things. (1) He was standing a long way off, as if unworthy to enter the temple of God: “Standing afar off.” (2) That he judged himself unworthy even to see the temple: “Would not so much as lift up his eyes to heaven,” &c. (3) Because he judged himself to be a sinner, and was asserting this: “Smote upon his breast, saying, God be merciful to me a sinner.” These are three acts of humility, Gloss., “He did not dare to draw near that God should draw near unto him”—the first; “He does not regard that he should be regarded”—the second; “He knows that God does not know him”—the third.

III. On the third head, it is to be noted, that the justice of Christ appears in three ways in this Gospel—(1) in the justification of the humble publican; (2) in the condemnation of the proud Pharisee; (3) in the exaltation of the humble over the proud. Of the first, “This man went down to his house justified.” Of the second, “Rather than the other.” Gloss., “That is, before him in comparison with him; or more than he.” Gloss., “The heart is exalted before a fall, which applies to the Pharisee; and it is humbled before grace, which applies to the publican.” Of the third, “He that humbleth himself shall be exalted.” Gloss., “The controversy is placed between the publican and Pharisee: afterwards the sentence of the Judge is recorded, that we should avoid pride; that we should hold to humility, which exalts a man to eternal glory.” Job 22:29, Vulg., “He that hath been humbled shall be in glory.” To which glory may we, &c.

HOMILY XXIII

TRUE AND FALSE CONFIDENCE

TWELFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Such trust have we through Christ to God-ward.”—2 Cor. 3:4.

THE Apostle treats of three things in these words. Firstly, he treats of the faith of the Saints, “Such trust have we.” Secondly, he shews on whose account there is this trust, “Through Christ.” Thirdly, he shews in whom the Saints have trust, “To God-ward.” Remark that this trust is twofold—good and evil.

I. The good trust is of the Saints or of the good men; but the evil trust is the confidence of bad men or of sinners. But the trust of the good, as gathered from the text, consists in seven things. (1) In the fear of God, Prov. 14:26, “In the fear of the Lord is strong confidence.” (2) In prayer, 1 Chron. 17:25, Vulg., “Thy servant hath found confidence to pray before thee.” 1 S. John 3:21, “Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God; and whatsoever we ask we receive of Him, because we keep His commandments, and do those things that are pleasing in His sight.” (3) In consecration of himself to God, Job 11:14–18, “If iniquity be in thy hand, put it far away, and let not wickedness dwell in thy tabernacles, for then shalt thou lift up thy face without spot, yea, thou shalt be stedfast and shall not fear; because thou shalt forget thy misery, and remember it as waters that pass away, and thine age shall be clearer than the noon-day; thou shalt shine forth, thou shalt be as the morning. And thou shalt be secure, because there is hope; yea, thou shalt dig about thee, and thou shalt take thy rest in safety: also thou shalt lie down and none shall make thee afraid; yea, many shall make suit unto thee.” (4) In bountiful almsgiving, Tobit 4:12, “Alms shall be a great confidence before the Most High God.” (5) In the keeping of the Divine law, Prov. 22:17–19, “Bow down thine ear and hear the words of the wise, and apply thine heart unto my knowledge; for it is a pleasant thing if thou keep them within thee: they shall withal be fitted in thy lips that thy trust may be in the Lord”—i.e., not in the world, not in anything else. (6) In the blood of Christ, Heb. 10:19, “Having therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way.” (7) In the day of judgment, 1 S. John 4:17, “Herein is our love made perfect, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment; because as He is, so are we in this world.”

II. In like manner the trust of the wicked consists in seven things, which are to be gathered from the text. (1) In riches, Jer. 49:4, “Wherefore gloriest thou in the valleys, thy flowing valleys, O backsliding daughter? that trusted in her treasures.” (2) In stupidity and maliciousness, Isa. 47:10, “For thou trusted in thy wickedness: thou hast said, None seeth me. Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted thee; and thou hast said in thine heart, I am, and none else besides me.” (3) In the false array of the powerful, “Isa. 30:1, 2, 3, “Wo to the rebellious children … To strengthen themselves in the strength of Pharaoh, and having trust in the shadow of Egypt; therefore shall the strength of Pharaoh be your shame, and the trust in the shadow of Egypt your confusion.” “Pharaoh” is the prince of this world, “the shadow of Egypt” the power of this world. He is rightly called “confusion,” because often when help is looked for destruction follows; as also the shadow of the power of this world ends in ignominy. According as Isaiah says, 42:17, “They shall be turned back, they shall be greatly ashamed that trust in graven images”—i.e., in the appearance of power and in the powerful. (4) In the vain beauty of the flesh, Ezek. 16:15, “But thou didst trust in thine own beauty, and playedst the harlot because of thy renown, and pouredst out thy fornication upon every one that passed by.” (5) In the fortification of towers and walls, Deut. 28:52, “And he shall besiege thee in all thy gates until thy high and fenced walls come down wherein thou trustedst in all thy land.” (6) In the invocation of demons, Deut. 32:37, “Where are their gods, their rock in whom they trusted?” (7) In intercourse with that which is outward and unreal, Job 8:13, “The hypocrite’s hope shall perish; whose hope shall be cut off, and whose trust shall be a spider’s web.” From which trust may Christ deliver us.

HOMILY XXIV

THE SINNER HEALED

TWELFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “They bring unto Him one that was deaf and had an impediment in his speech, and they besought Him to put His hands upon him.”—S. Mark 7:32.

IN this Gospel three points are characteristically noted. Firstly, that the infirmity of every sinner is great and manifold, “Deaf and had an impediment in his speech.” Secondly, the means which are necessary for the healing, “And they besought Him,” &c. Thirdly, the varied benefit that results from his being healed, “His ears were opened and the string of his tongue loosed.”

I. On the first head, it is to be noted, that every sinner falls under three severe infirmities when he lapses into deadly sin. (1) Blindness, through the darkening of the mind, “Their own wickedness hath blinded them,” Wisd. 2:21. “Having the understanding darkened through the blindness of their heart … to work all uncleanness with greediness,” Ephes. 4:18, 19. (2) Deafness, through the rebellion of disobedience, “Who is blind but my servant? Or deaf as my messenger,” Isa. 42:19. “They are like the deaf adder that stoppeth her ears,” Psalm 58:4. (3) Dumbness, through the concealing of their sins, “They are all dumb dogs, they cannot bark,” Isa. 56:10. “Though wickedness be sweet in his mouth, though he hide it under his tongue,” Job 20:12. Upon these three infirmities the Gloss. upon the Gospel remarks, “The human race, as if it were one man, being corrupted by different plagues, is blinded in a protoplast: whilst it sees it is blind; whilst it hears it is deaf; whilst it speaks it is made dumb.”

II. On the second head, it is to be noted, that two circumstances united for the healing of this infirm one, and that they point out the three things which are necessary for the curing of the sinner. (1) The prayer of the Saints and of the Church, “And they benefit him.” “If any man see his brother sin.…; he shall ask,” S. John 5:16. (2) The reception of the gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit, “Put His fingers into his ears.” Gloss. upon Holy Gospel, “He puts the fingers into the ears, when, through the Holy Spirit, He opens the ears of the heart for understanding and receiving of the words of salvation.” “Being purified freely by His grace through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus,” Rom. 3:24. (3) The operation of repentance, which consists of three parts. Firstly, of grief of heart, “Looking up to heaven He sighed.” So He taught us to groan for ourselves or for our offences, “I am weary with my groaning … I water my couch with my tears,” Ps. 6:6. Secondly, of confession by the mouth, “The string of his tongue was loosed.” The string of the tongue of the sinner was loosed when he confessed his sin, “Confess your faults one to another,” S. James 5:16. Thirdly, in fulfilling the commands of God and the priest, “His ears were opened,” &c. The ears of the sinner were opened when he obeyed the precepts of God and the priest by fulfilling them, making satisfaction for them, “Obey them that have the will over you, and submit yourselves; for they watch for souls, as they that must give account,” Heb. 13:17.

III. On the third head, it is to be noted, that a threefold benefit follows upon the conversion of the sinner. (1) That he is liberated from all spiritual infirmity, “The string of his tongue was loosed and he spoke plain.” “Return ye backsliding children, and I will heal your backslidings,” Jer. 3:22. (2) Because God is praised on this account, “By so much the more, a great deal they published it.” “Deliver me from bloodguiltiness, O God … my tongue shall sing aloud of Thy righteousness,” Ps. 51:14. (3) Because the power and goodness of God is declared, “He hath done all things well: He maketh both the deaf to hear and the dumb to speak.”

THE HOMILIES OF S. THOMAS AQUINAS, FOR THE SUNDAYS FROM TRINITY TO ADVENT

PART II

CONTAINING TWENTY-SIX HOMILIES UPON THE EPISTLES AND GOSPELS FOR THE LAST THIRTEEN SUNDAYS AFTER TRINITY

TRANSLATED BY

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MDCCCLXVI.

NOTICE

THE very kind way in which the “Advent Homilies” of the great Schoolman have been received, has induced the Translator to issue another portion of that, which he one day hopes may be formed into a complete work. It has been the wish of some that the outlines of S. Thomas might be expanded for them, and so be made ready for their use. To do this would be not only to tamper with what ought to be preserved entire with all care, but it would destroy the great merit and value of these suggestive skeletons, which, opening so many different trains of thought, leave it to the preacher’s own judgment to enlarge upon them, according to his learning, ability, and peculiar cast of mind. It will be very often found that a third portion of one Homily will afford quite sufficient material for the formation of such a sermon as is suitable to our times. The thorough investigation of the three divisions of one section, often leads to more telling and satisfactory results than can be obtained from the partial development of each of the leading heads.

HOMILY XXV

ABRAHAM A PATTERN FOR SINNERS

THIRTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“To Abraham and his seed were the promises made.”—Gal. 3:16.

IN these words it is shown that heavenly promises are made to those who seek with all their powers to be like Abraham.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that seven things are pointed out of Abraham, in which every Christian ought to imitate him. (1) In constancy of faith, Rom. 4:3, “Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness.” Heb. 11:6, “But without faith it is impossible to please Him, for he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him.” (2) In perfect obedience, Gen. 22:17, “And thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies, and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.” Deut. 10:12, “And now, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee but to fear the Lord thy God, to walk in all His ways, and to love Him, and to serve the Lord thy God with all thy heart and with all thy soul?” (3) In disregard of country. (4) In contempt of pedigree. Of these two, Gen. 12:1, 2, “The Lord said unto Abram, Get thee out of thy country, and from thy kindred, and from thy father’s house, and to the land that I will shew thee,” &c. (5) In hospitality and compassion. Gen. 18:3–5, “My Lord, if now I have found favour in thy sight, pass not away, I pray thee, from thy servant: let a little water, I pray you, be fetched, and wash your feet, and rest yourselves under the tree; and I will fetch a morsel of bread, and comfort ye your hearts; after that ye shall pass on.” Heb. 13:2, “Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels unawares.” (6) In humility, Gen. 18:27, “I have taken upon me to speak unto the Lord, which am but dust and ashes;” which are the words of Abraham to the Lord. Matt. 11:29, “Learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart.” (7) In fear of God, Gen. 22:12, “Lay not thy hand upon the lad, neither do thou anything unto him: for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from Me.” Deut. 10:12, “And now, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee?” &c. In these words we are exhorted to imitate Abraham, “If ye were Abraham’s children, ye would do the works of Abraham,” S. John 13:3–9.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that to those who in these things imitate Abraham, the Lord makes seven great promises which he made to Abraham. (1) He promised to him that He would give him His blessing. (2) That He would exalt him. (3) That He would humble his enemies. (4) That He would honour him among all nations. Of these four, Gen. 12:2, 3. “I will bless thee;” mark the first. “And make thy name great;” mark the second. “I will curse him that curseth thee;” mark the third. “And in thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed;” mark the fourth. (5) That God would protect him in all things. (6) That He Himself would be to him as a reward. Of these two, Gen. 15:1, “The word of the Lord came unto Abram in a vision, saying, Fear not, Abram: I am thy shield;” mark the first. “And thy exceeding great reward;” mark the second. (7) That God would give to him a land flowing with milk and honey, Gen. 13:15–17, “The Lord said unto Abram, Lift up now thine eyes, and look from the place where thou art northward, and southward, and eastward, and westward. For all the land which thou seest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed for ever.”

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the Lord gives seven good things to those who imitate Abraham. (1) He blesses them, Ephes. 1:3, “Who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ.” (2) He glorifies them, Rom. 8:30, “Whom He justified them also He glorified.” (3) He humbles their enemies, Psalm 132:14, “Turned my hand against their adversaries.” (4) He protects them, Psalm 91:14, “Because He hath set his love upon Me, therefore will I deliver him: I will set him on high because he hath known My name.” (5) He honours them, Psalm 139:17, “How precious are thy thoughts unto me, O God” [friends, Vulg.] (6) God Himself gives Himself to them for a reward, He who will be all in all, He who will be salvation, life, honour, glory, peace, joy, and all good things. (7) He gives to them the land flowing with milk and honey, that is the kingdom of heaven, the joy of the humanity and divinity making joyful. S. Matt. 25:34, “Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you.” To which kingdom may we be brought, &c.

HOMILY XXVI

THE SINNER SUCCOURED

THIRTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead.”—S. Luke 10:30.

IN this parable there are three points to be noted. Firstly, the manifold misery of sinners: “A certain man went down from Jerusalem.” Secondly, is shown the manifold pity of Christ to the sinner: “A certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was; and when he saw him he had compassion on him, and went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two-pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again I will repay thee.” Thirdly, the rule which is given to us for imitation: “Go, and do thou likewise.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that men incur a fourfold misery when they sin. (1) They are deprived of heavenly glory: “went down from Jerusalem,” &c., Gloss. That man by the falling away of trifling, to miseries, and to the infirmity of this sad and changeable life, descends from the heavenly Jerusalem. The wicked shall hide themselves, “for fear of the Lord, and for the glory of His Majesty,” Isai. 2:19. (2) The wicked are subjected under wicked spirits: “and fell among thieves,” Gloss. In the power of the evil spirits: “and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil who are taken captive by him at his will,” 2 S. Tim. 2:26 (3) They are despoiled of their good possessions: “which stripped him of his raiment,” Gloss. It refers to the garments of spiritual grace: “into a malicious soul wisdom shall not enter; nor dwell in the body that is subject unto sin," Wisdom 1:4. (4) They are wounded in their natural good things: "and wounded him;" bring wounds upon him, that is, sins, by which the integrity of human nature is violated. "If there were not natural good things vices could not harm them; but now what they do is to take away integrity, beauty, virtue, and salvation" (S. Augustine).

II. On the second head it is to be noted, four kinds of compassion are expressed which Christ manifested towards sinners. (1) Was the taking of human nature: "A certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was; and when He saw him he had compassion on him," Gloss. The Samaritan is Christ, who was made man for our sakes, that He might deliver us from this present life. (2) Was the institution of the Sacraments for the salvation of sinners: "and bound up his wounds," Gloss. In baptism: "He healeth the broken in heart, and bindeth up their wounds," Psalm 147:3. (3) Was the infusion of the grace of the Holy Spirit: "pouring in oil," Gloss. The charisma of the Holy Spirit: "but the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in My name, He shall teach you all things.… whatsoever I have said unto you," S. John 14:26. "And of His fulness have all we received, and grace for grace. For the law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ," S. John 1:16, 17. (4) In enduring the bitterness of His passion for sinners: "and set Him on His own beast." Gloss. The beast is His flesh, in which He places the wounded, because He "bare our sins in His own Body on the tree," 1 S. Peter 2:24.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that we ought to show a four-fold compassion to the penitent. (1) In succouring him: "Bear ye one another's burdens," &c. Gal. 6:2. (2) In praying for him: "If any man see his brother sin a sin which is not unto death, he shall ask, and he shall give him life for them that sin not unto death. There is a sin unto death: I do not say that he shall pray for it," 1 S. John 5:16. "Pray one for another, that ye may be healed," S. James 5:16. (3) In instructing him: "If a man be overtaken in a fault, ye which are spiritual restore such an one in the spirit of meekness," Gal. 6:1. "Brethren, if any of you do err from the truth, and one convert him, let him know," &c., S. James 5:19, 20. "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone," S. Matt. 18:15. (4) In the gift of pardon: "Then came Peter to Him and said, Lord, how oft shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? Till seven times?…. Until seventy times seven,” S. Matt. 18:21, 22. “Reproach not a man that turneth from sin,” i.e., turning from sin to repentance; “But remember that we are all worthy of punishment,” Ecclus. 8:5.

HOMILY XXVII

FOUR FRUITS OF THE SPIRIT

FOURTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, gentleness, goodness, faith.”—Gal. 5:22.

IT is certain that man ought to possess these fruits chiefly for three reasons. Firstly, on account of necessity, “Every tree which bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down and cast into the fire,” S. Matt. 3:10. Secondly, on account of their sweetness, because they refresh the mind with ineffable delight, “I sat down under His shadow with great delight, and His fruit was sweet to my taste,” Cant. 2:3. Thirdly, on account of profit, because they confer many benefits.

I. The first fruit, LOVE, has three wonderful virtues. (1) Because the man who eats this fruit is made unconquerable: “Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution … in all these things we are more than conquerors through Him that loved us,” Rom. 8:35–38. (2) Because every good and evil profits him who is refreshed by this fruit: “We know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them that are called according to His purpose,” Rom. 8:28. “All things;” Gloss., things good and evil. (3) Because he who eats such fruit shall not die eternally: “Charity never faileth,” 1 Cor. 13:8.

II. The second fruit, JOY, has likewise three great virtues. (1) Because the eating of this fruit makes men strong to conquer every evil spirit: “Spiritual joy is one means of conquering the enemy,” S. Anthony. (2) Because it makes men live for ever: “No joy above the joy of the heart,” Ecclus. 30:16. (3) Because it leads those who eat it to the glory of the heavenly kingdom:

“For the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost,” Rom. 14:17.

III. The third fruit, PEACE, likewise has three great virtues. (1) Because it protects man from all evil: “The peace of God which passeth all understanding shall keep your hearts and minds through Christ Jesus,” Philipp. 4:7. (2) Because it causes men to become sons of God: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God,” S. Matt. 5:9. (3) Because in the place where the fruit is found God willingly dwells and rests, “In Salem [i.e., peace] also is His tabernacle,” Psal. 76:2.

IV. The fourth fruit, LONG-SUFFERING, or PATIENCE, has also three great virtues. (1) Because the eating of it gives man wisdom: “He that is slow to wrath is of great understanding,” Prov. 14:29. (2) Because it preserves the soul of man: “In patience possess ye your souls,” S. Luke 21:19. (3) Because it makes even bitter things sweet, so great is its sweetness: “My brethren, count it all joy when ye fall into divers temptations; knowing this, that the trying of your faith worketh patience. But let patience have her perfect work, that ye may be perfect and entire, wanting nothing,” S. James 1:2–4.

HOMILY XXVIII

THE TEN LEPERS

FOURTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “There met Him ten men that were lepers, which stood afar off.”—S. Luke 17:12.

THREE points are characteristically noticed in this Gospel. Firstly, the number of the sinners, “ten men.” Secondly, the remedy for their healing, “there met Him.” Thirdly, the remedies which are necessary to those who are cured of sin, “one of them when he saw that he was healed.”

To consider, now, the difference and number of the sinners it is to be noted that the ten lepers may signify ten kinds of sins. (1) The first leper is an infidel and a heretic who is separated from the society of the faithful and the holy: “The Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Command the children of Israel, that they put out of the camp every leper.… and the children of Israel did so, and put them without the camp,” &c., Num. 5:24. (2) The second leper is a blasphemer and detractor: “And Miriam and Aaron spake against Moses because of the Ethiopean woman whom he had married.… and they said, Hath the Lord spoken only by Moses? Hath He not also spoken by us? And the Lord heard it.… Wherefore, then, were ye not afraid to speak against My servant Moses?.… And Aaron looked upon Miriam, and behold she was leprous,” Num. 12:1, 2, 8, 10. (3) The third leper is gluttonous, who taints the air with fœtid exhalations, proceeding from excessive repletion: “He is a leprous man, he is unclean.… He shall put a covering upon his upper lip, and shall cry, Unclean, unclean,” Levit. 13:44, 45. (4) The fourth leper is the avaricious man, who is ever infected with an immoderate desire of possessing: this was the leprosy of Gehazi: “Is it a time to receive money, and to receive garments, and oliveyards … the leprosy therefore of Naaman shall cleave unto thee, and unto thy seed for ever,” 2 Kings 5:26, 27. (5)

The fifth leper is the proud man, who with a swelling mind exalts himself against the Lord and Christ. Such was Naaman, King of Syria, and being very rich, and “also a mighty man in valour, but he was a leper,” 2 Kings 5:1. (6) The sixth leper is the ambitious man, who desired honours and dignities: such an one as Uzziah, who took upon himself the honour of High Priest: “He transgressed against the Lord his God, and went into the temple of the Lord to burn incense.… and while he was wroth with the priests the leprosy rose up in his forehead before the priests,” 2 Chron. 26:16–20. (7) The seventh leper is the hypocrite or vainglorious, who foolishly prides himself on his good things: such was the leprosy of Simon the Pharisee: “When Jesus was in Bethany in the house of Simon the leper,” S. Matt. 26:6. (8) The eighth leper is the sensual man, who contaminates creatures with the issue of his uncleannesses: “What man soever of the seed of Aaron is a leper, or hath a running issue, he shall not eat of the holy things until he be clean,” Levit. 22:3. (9) The ninth leper is a homicide: such as was Joab, upon whom the wrath of God came because he slew Abner: “Let there not fail from the house of Joab one that hath an issue, or that is a leper,” 2 Sam. 3:29. (10) The tenth leper is he who is obstinate and desperate, and who finally sins: “When the plague of leprosy is in a man.… if the rising be white in the skin, and it have turned the hair white.… it is an old leprosy,” Levit. 13:9–11. S. Jerome observes, that he who despairs of pardon for sin is more bound by his desperation than by the sin which he has committed. Desperation increases despair, and is a greater tyrant than any sin. He who wishes to be cured from sin’s leprosy runs to the fountain of precious blood, which the ineffable charity of our Lord Jesus Christ opened for us: Who washed us in it, and will cleanse all those who fly unto Him from the leprosy of all sin. “Unto Him that loved us and washed us from our sins in His own blood.… to Him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen.” Rev. 1:5, 6.

HOMILY XXIX

GOOD WORKS

THIS HOMILY IS FOUNDED UPON AN EPISTLE WHICH IS NOT IN THE ANGLICAN PRAYER BOOK

“And let us not be weary in well doing.”—Gal. 6:9.

IN these words the Apostle lays down three propositions. Firstly, he exhorts that we should do good, “In well doing.” Secondly, that we should not fail of good works, “Let us not be weary.” Thirdly, he places before us the reward, “In due season we shall reap.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that we ought to do good for three reasons. (1) Because all things naturally teach us to do good, and they teach this in a three-fold manner. Firstly, because all things are good, “And God saw everything that He had made, and behold it was very good,” Gen. 1:31. Sinners can never sufficiently blush when placed in so great a multitude of creatures which are all good, whilst they themselves are evil. Secondly, because all things naturally do good, for whatever the creature gives to itself is an indication of the goodness of themselves and of the Creator. S. Dionysius says that God is the effusion of good to Himself; S. Augustine, that it is a great indication of the Divine goodness that which every creature thinks to give to itself. Thirdly, because all things naturally desire good, and tend to good; so Philo says, that good is that which is desired by all.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that there are three things which chiefly enable man to persevere in good. (1) Constant and devoted prayer, by which man implores the help of God lest he should give way under temptations, “Watch and pray lest ye enter into temptation,” S. Matt. 26:41. (2) Continuous fear; for immediately a man ceases to fear he fails to perform good works, “Unless a man hold himself diligently in the fear of the Lord, his house shall be soon overthrown," Ecclus. 27:3. Interpret, "the fear of the Lord," the custody of life; "soon," i.e., unforeseenly; "his house shall be overthrown," i.e., his earthly dwelling, or the hope of earthly things. (3) The avoiding of small sins which are the occasion of deadly sins, and frequently overthrow the edifice of good works. "Thou hast avoided great things," says S. Augustine, "take heed that thou be not overwhelmed in the sand;" i.e., by small things. "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little," Ecclus. 19:1.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the Apostle states three things. (1) He places the reward as suitable to him who receives it, "in due time," Gloss. In that time in which it is most meet and convenient; the congruous time will be the day of judgment, in which each will receive according to what he hath done, "When I shall receive the congregation [Vulg. time] I will judge uprightly." (2) He notes the plenteousness of the reward, "We shall reap." In reaping abundance is noted, "Shall doubtless come again with rejoicing, bringing his sheaves with him," Psal. 126:6. "He which soweth bountifully shall reap also bountifully," 2 Cor. 9:6. "Great is your reward in heaven," S. Matt. 5:12. (3) He places the eternity of the reward, "We faint not," "And your joy no one taketh from you," S. John 15:22. "And these shall go into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal," S. Matt. 25:46.

HOMILY XXX

GOD OUR ONLY MASTER

FIFTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “No man can serve two masters.”—S. Matt. 6:24.

THE Lord Jesus Christ shews in these words that God alone is to be served, and that no one is to be obeyed in opposition to God, and that no one is to be hindered from serving God, “Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve,” S. Matt. 4:10. There are five reasons on account of which we ought to serve God.

I. Firstly, we ought to serve God on the ground of congruity; for all things serve Him, whence it is sufficiently congruous that man also should serve Him, “They continue this day according to Thine ordinances, for all are Thy servants,” Psa. 119:91. But all things serve God in a three-fold manner. (1) By precepts given to them from the Creator Himself for their fulfilling, “He hath also established them for ever and ever; He hath made a decree which shall not pass,” Psa. 148:6. (2) In punishing those that rebel against the Creator. (3) In shewing kindnesses to His friends. Of these two, Wisdom 16:24, “For the creature that serveth Thee, Who art the Maker, increaseth his strength against the unrighteous for their punishment, and abateth his strength for the benefit of such as put their trust in Thee.”

II. Secondly, we ought to serve God because He alone has in us the right of possession, as being the true Lord. “I am Thy servant, and the son of Thine handmaid,” Psa. 116:16. But the Lord possesses in us a three-fold right. (1) The right of creation, “For He is our God, and we are the people of His pasture,” Psa. 45:9. (2) By the right of purchase, “Ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold.… but with the precious Blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish,” 1 S. Peter 1:18, 19; “Ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are God’s,” 1 Cor. 6:20. (3) By right of the support of life, “Who giveth food to all flesh,” Psa. 136:25.

III. Thirdly, we ought to serve God on account of the dignity of serving Him, for He confers a three-fold profit in serving Him. (1) A warlike triumph, “Thou therefore endure hardness, as a good soldier of Jesus Christ,” 2 S. Tim. 2:3; “Is there any number of His armies?” Job 25:3. (2) The priestly dignity. (3) Regal majesty. Of these two, “And hast made us unto our God kings and priests: and we shall reign on the earth,” Rev. 5:10; “But ye are a chosen generation, a royal priesthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people,” 1 S. Peter 2:9. For to serve God is to reign.

IV. Fourthly, we ought to serve Him on account of the necessity of so doing; and a three-fold necessity is laid upon us to serve God. (1) Because he who is unwilling to serve God subjects himself to the servitude of his enemies. (2) Because he suffers the loss of every good thing. (3) Because he is altogether weighed down under manifold miseries. Of these three, “Because thou servedst not the Lord thy God with joyfulness, and with gladness of heart, for the abundance of all things; therefore shalt thou serve enemies which the Lord shall send against thee, in hunger, and in thirst, and in nakedness, and in want of all things; and He shall put a yoke of iron upon thy neck until He have destroyed thee,” Deut. 28:47, 48.

V. Fifthly, we ought to serve God for the sake of our advantage; for many profitable things flow to man from the service of God. But here three are noticed. (1) Liberation from all enemies, “But the Lord your God ye shall fear; and He shall deliver you out of the hands of all your enemies,” 2 Kings 17:39. (2) Ineffable exultation of heart, “Serve the Lord with gladness, come before His presence with singing,” Psa. 100:2. (3) The eternal fruition of all joys, “Behold, My servants shall eat, but ye shall be hungry; behold, My servants shall drink, but ye shall be thirsty; behold, My servants shall rejoice, but ye shall be ashamed; behold, My servants shall sing for joy of heart,” Isai. 65:13, 14. “Where I am there also shall My servant be,” S. John 12:26. For Jesus was at the right hand of the Father, that is in the highest good things of the Father, and there will “He place those who serve Him.” “Blessed is that servant whom the Lord, when He cometh, shall find so doing. Verily I say unto you, that He shall make him ruler over all His goods,” S. Matt. 24:46, 47. “Well done, good and faithful servant.… enter thou into the joy of thy Lord,” S. Matt. 25:23. To which joy may we be brought, &c.

HOMILY XXXI

FOUR CONDITIONS OF SALVATION

SIXTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “May be able to comprehend with all saints what is the breadth, and length, and depth, and height.”—Ephes. 3:18.

IN these words four things are noted, which are necessary to us for salvation. Firstly, charity, by which we love our friends and enemies: “What is the breadth,” Gloss. Which signifies the expansive nature of charity, which extends even to our enemies. Secondly, perseverance, that we finally continue in charity; “and length;” Gloss. That which is the length of charity is the length of perseverance. Thirdly, right intention, that we may set before ourselves God only as the reward of our actions.” “And height.” This is that which lifts the soul on high, that God may be expected for a reward. Fourthly, that we may not fail in all these things through pride. “The depth:” it is humility which places man in the lowest state in regard to man, but in the highest state in relation to God. “He that humbleth himself shall be exalted,” S. Luke 18:14.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that for three reasons we ought chiefly to love our enemies. (1) On account of the precept, “But I say unto you, love your enemies; bless them that curse you, &c.… That ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven,” S. Matt 5:44, 45. (2) On account of the example of God: “God commendeth His love towards us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us.… For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life,” Rom. 5:8–10. (3) On account of our profit; for charity towards our enemies causes us to become sons of the Most High God: “Pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you,” &c., S. Matt. 5:44.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that for three reasons we ought to persevere in good. (1) That we may avoid blame, since he is greatly blamed who begins and does not persevere: “For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down first, and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish it? Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him, saying, This man began to build, and was not able to finish,” S. Luke 14:28–30. (2) That punishment may be avoided; for he deserves a greater punishment who, having tasted how sweet it is to perform good works, has not persevered in them. “For it had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them. But it is happened unto them, according to the true proverb, the dog is turned to his own vomit again; and the sow that was washed to her wallowing in the mire,” 2 S. Peter 21, 22. (3) On account of the reward to be acquired, for the reward is earned by perseverance alone: “He that endureth to the end shall be saved,” S. Matt. 10:22.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that for two reasons we ought to expect God alone to be our reward. (1) Because He alone is the true reward: “I am thy shield and thy exceeding great reward,” Gen. 15:1. S. Augustine says, that God will be the reward of all in all, because He will be to us life and salvation, strength and plenty, honour and glory, peace and joy, and all good things. (2) Because He will be an eternal reward: “This is life eternal, that they might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent,” S. John 17:3.

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that humility, in three ways, preserves man in good. (1) By defending him from his enemies: “The Lord preserveth the simple: I was brought low, and He helped me,” Psalm 116:6. (2) By promising increase of grace: “God resisteth the proud, but giveth grace unto the humble,” S. James 4:6. (3) By leading man to eternal glory: “Honour shall uphold the humble in spirit,” Prov. 29:23. To which honour may we, &c.

HOMILY XXXII

THREE-FOLD BENEFITS

THE HOMILY UPON THE GOSPEL BEING OMITTED IN THE SERIES, ANOTHER HOMILY OF THE SAME AUTHOR IS GIVEN TO SUPPLY ITS PLACE

> “And when He had given thanks, He distributed to the disciples, and the disciples to them that were set down.”—S. John 6:11.

THE Gloss. says that Christ, having given thanks, teaches us to give thanks for three benefits. Firstly, for corporeal benefits. Secondly, for spiritual benefits. Thirdly, for eternal benefits.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that we ought to give thanks for corporeal benefits, for three reasons. (1) Because He ordained that they should be in the gift of nature: “Giving thanks always for all things unto God and the Father, in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ,” Ephes. 5:20. (2) Because He preserves them to nature by removing the evil from them: “And they that before had been wronged, gave thanks, because they were not hurt now; and asked this gift, that there might be a difference. Therefore they received a burning pillar of fire for a guide of the way which they knew not,” Wis. 18:2, 3. (3) Because He nourishes it by refreshing it with bodily food: “Now the Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, &c. … and commanding to abstain from meats, which God created to be received with thanksgiving.… For every creature of God is good, and nothing to be refused.… For it is sanctified by the word of God and prayer,” 1 S. Tim. 4:1–6.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that we ought in like manner, for three reasons, to give thanks to God for spiritual benefits. (1) Because He sanctifies us by conferring grace: “Giving thanks unto the Father, which hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light: Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness, and hath translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son, in Whom we have redemption through His blood,” Colos. 1:12–15. (2) Because He instructs us, teaching by His word: “For this cause also we thank God without ceasing, because, when ye received the word of God, which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe,” 1 Thess. 2:13. (3) Because He refreshes the soul in granting to it the food of the Eucharist: “And He took bread and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is My Body, which is given for you,” S. Luke 22:19. Inasmuch as Christ gave us His Body, with thanksgiving we ought to receive that ineffable food.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that we ought likewise to give thanks, in a three-fold manner, for eternal benefits. (1) For the liberation of the just from eternal death: “Giving thanks unto the Father, &c., Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness,” Colos. 1:13. (2) For the just condemnation of the profane; for the high glorification and dignity of the saints. Of these two: “The four-and-twenty elders, which sat before God on their seats, fell upon their faces, and worshipped God, saying, We give Thee thanks, O Lord God Almighty, which art, and wast, and art to come; because Thou hast taken to Thee Thy great power, and hast reigned. And the nations were angry, and Thy wrath is come, and the time of the dead, that they should be judged, and that Thou shouldest give reward unto Thy servants the prophets, and to the saints, and them that fear Thy Name,” Rev. 11:17, 18.

HOMILY XXXIII

THE COMMUNION OF SAINTS

SEVENTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.”—Ephes. 4:3.

NOTE that the Apostle raises three points upon these words. Firstly, he exhorts us that we should preserve unity: “Endeavouring to keep,” &c., Secondly, he places before us the manner of this keeping: “in the bond of peace.” Thirdly, he exhorts us to earnest desire towards both: “Endeavouring.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that a three-fold unity is necessary for us. (1) Intellectual unity, by means of a common faith. (2) Unity of the affections, through a right desire of concord. Of these two: “Let us walk by the same rule,” in relation to the first. “Let us mind the same thing,” in relation to the second, Philip. 3:16. (3) Unity of conversation, through a uniform uprightness of conduct: “God setteth the solitary in families,” Ps. 68:6. “And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own,” &c., Acts 4:32. All things were common with them, because they were of like conversation.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the holy ought to be tied together by a three-fold bond. (1) By the bond of wisdom: “Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her, and be not grieved with her bonds,” Ecclus. 6:25. Her, i.e., wisdom; “be not grieved,” &c., not bearing her wearily and irksomely. (2) With the bond of love: “Above all these things put on charity, which is the bond of perfectness,” Colos. 3:14. (3) In the bond of peace: “Let the peace of God rule in your hearts,” Id. 15.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that they who wish to preserve unity must have the five virtues of which the Apostle makes mention in this Epistle. (1) Humility, that no one should exalt himself over another, for this often makes a cause of discord: “He that is of a proud heart stirreth up strife,” Prov. 28:25. (2) Meekness, lest any should do injury to others, which is likewise a cause of dissension: “Shewing all meekness unto all men,” S. Tit. 3:2. (3) Patience, that imposed injuries may be patiently sustained, and by patience a brother may be won back again to concord: “Be patient toward all men. See that none render evil for evil unto any man: but ever follow that which is good, both among yourselves and to all men,” 1 Thess. 5:14, 15. (4) Forbearance, that the infirmities of companions may be supported and tolerated: “Bear ye one another’s burdens,” Gal. 6:2. (5) Charity, “in love;” for mutual services are nourished of and by charity. “By love serve one another. For all the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. But if ye bite and devour one another, take heed that ye be not consumed one of another,” Gal. 5:13–15.

HOMILY XXXIV

THE EXALTATION OF THE HUMBLE

SEVENTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> "For whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted."—S. Luke 14:11.

THE Lord in these words offers four points for our consideration. Firstly, He exhorts that we should flee from the sin of pride: "Whosoever exalteth himself." Secondly, He adds the punishment of the proud: "Shall be abased." Thirdly, He admonishes us to the grace of humility: "He that humbleth himself." Fourthly, He shows the reward of humility: "Shall be exalted."

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the proud perversely exalt themselves in three ways. (1) By foolishly lifting themselves up against God: "He runneth upon Him[God], even on His neck, upon the thick bosses of His bucklers: because he covereth his face with his fatness, and maketh collops of fat on his flanks," Job. 15:26, 27. And again: "If thou turnest thy spirit against God, and lettest such words go out of thy mouth," Id. 13. "The tumult of those that rise up against Thee increaseth continually," Ps. 74:23. (2) By foolishly pleasing themselves: "God therefore being forsaken, man seeks to exist for himself, that is to please himself. He does not now become absolutely nothing, but he approaches to nothingness; whence the proud, according to the Holy Scriptures, are called by another name, the 'self-pleasers' (Authades)," S. August., City of God, 14:13. (3) By arrogantly preferring themselves before others: "The wicked in his pride doth persecute the poor," Ps. 10:2. S. Augustine asks, What is pride, except it be the desire of a false exaltation? Of these three: "Why doth thine heart carry thee away?" By lifting thee up: behold the first. "And what do thine eyes wink at?” By pleasing thyself, “that thou turned thy spirit against God:” behold the third. Job 15:12, 13.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the proud are punished in a three-fold manner. (1) Because they are cast down from their pride: “The tumult of those that rise up against Thee increaseth continually,” Ps. 74:23. (2) Because they are confounded in the sight of all men: “Therefore will I change their glory into shame,” Hos. 4:7. “All that forsake Thee shall be ashamed,” Jer. 17:13. Again: “They shall be greatly ashamed.… their everlasting confusion shall never be forgotten,” Jer. 20:11. “Ephraim shall receive shame, and Israel shall be ashamed of his own counsel,” Hos. 10:6. (3) They will be punished eternally: “How much she hath glorified herself and lived deliriously, so much torment and sorrow give her: for she saith in her heart, I sit a queen, and am no widow, and shall see no sorrow. Therefore shall her plagues come in one day, death and mourning, and famine; and she shall be utterly burned with fire,” Rev. 18:7, 8. “Cast abroad the rage of thy wrath: and behold every one that is proud, and abase him. Look on every one that is proud, and bring him low,” Job. 40:11, 12. Again: “Hide them in the dust together, and bind their faces in secret,” Id. 13.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that we ought to be humbled in a three-fold manner. (1) In ourselves, by the knowledge that we are nothing. S. Gregory says, that humility is the emptying from ourselves of our own understanding. (2) By contempt, if any humble person can be made much of; if any lowly person can be brought into repute. It is easy, indeed, to place a veil before the eyes, and to wear poor clothing, and to walk with the head bowed down; but patient endurance of wrong proves who is truly humble. (3) We ought to humble ourselves by submitting ourselves to all: “Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man, for the Lord’s sake: whether it be to the king, as supreme, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by Him for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well,” 1 Pet. 2:13, 14.

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that the Lord will, in a three-fold way, exalt him who humbles himself. (1) By conferring on him the power of judgment: “Then answered Peter, and said unto Him, Behold, we have forsaken all and followed Thee; what shall we have therefore? And Jesus said unto them, Verily I say unto you, That ye which have followed Me, in the regeneration when the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of His glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel,” S. Matt. 19:27, 28. (2) In conferring royal dignity: “He raiseth up the poor out of the dust, and lifteth up the beggar from the dunghill, to set them among princes, and to make them inherit the throne of glory,” 1 Sam. 2:8. “He withdraweth not His eyes from the righteous: but with kings are they on the throne; yea, He doth establish them for ever, and they are exalted,” Job. 36:7. (3) By giving eternal glory: “Honour shall uphold the humble in spirit,” Prov. 29:23. “To set up on high those that be low; that those which mourn may be exalted to safety,” Job. 5:11.

HOMILY XXXV

TRUE AND FALSE RICHES

EIGHTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “I thank my God always on your behalf, for the grace of God which is given you by Jesus Christ; that in everything ye are enriched by Him.”—1 Cor. 1:4, 5.

IN that the Apostle gives thanks that they were enriched “by Him,” he indicates that there are certain riches which are to be desired; and in that Christ truly threatened the rich, he shews that there are certain riches which are to be avoided. Whence we learn that there are temporal riches, spiritual riches, and eternal riches. Of temporal riches: “If riches increase, set not your heart upon them,” Ps. 62:10. Of spiritual riches: “Blessed is the man that feareth the Lord, and.… Wealth and riches shall be in his house,” Ps. 112:1–3. Of eternal riches: “Riches and honour are with me; yea, durable riches and righteousness,” Prov. 8:18. “Riches are with me,” i.e., the better things; “And glory,” i.e., ineffable; “durable riches,” i.e., such as are exalted; and righteousness, i.e., such as are according to merit.

I. In the first place it is to be noted, that temporal riches are to be despised chiefly for four reasons. (1) On account of their uselessness: “He that loveth abundance shall not be satisfied with increase,” Eccles. 5:10. “Increase,” fruit, i.e., of eternal life. “Riches profit not in the day of wrath,” Prov. 11:4. That is, temporal riches do hot avail for the salvation of man in the day of judgment; “But righteousness delivereth from death;” i.e., the good works of righteousness deliver from eternal death. “Set not thy heart upon goods; and say not, I have enough for my life.… For they shall not profit thee in the day of calamity,” Ecclus. 5:1–8. “We brought nothing into the world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out,” 1 S. Tim. 6:7. (2) On account of the necessity of leaving them: “They have slept their sleep; and none of the men of might have found their hands," Ps. 76:5. "He hath swallowed down riches, and he shall vomit them up again: God shall cast them out of his belly," Job 20:15. (3) Because they lead those wrongly possessing them to perpetual poverty: "The rich man shall lie down, but he shall not be gathered: he openeth his eyes, and he is not," Job 27:19. (4) Because the contempt of them leads to eternal life: "And everyone that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for My Name's sake, shall receive an hundred-fold, and shall inherit everlasting life," S. Matt. 19:29.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that by riches man sins in four ways. (1) By acquiring them unjustly: "He that by usury and unjust gain increaseth his substance, he shall gather it for him that will pity the poor," Prov. 28:8. "He that oppresseth the poor to increase his riches, and he that giveth to the rich, shall surely come to want," Prov. 22:16. (2) By possessing them covetously: "Riches kept for the owners thereof to their," i.e., to the hurt of their Lord, "perish by evil travail," Eccles. 5:13, 14. (3) By being badly spent: "Give not thy substance to women," Vulg., Prov. 31:3; "to women," to the corruptions of sin; "thy substance," i.e., thy body and the riches of temporal things. Mystically it signifies thy heap of virtues, lest you be contaminated with the corruptions of vices. "The younger son gathered all together, and took his journey into a far country, and there wasted his substance in riotous living," S. Luke 15:13. (4) By trusting in them, and becoming proud of them: "He that trusteth in his riches shall fall," i.e., from eternal life, Prov. 11:28; Gloss. Delighting himself in present good things, he does not think about or attend to future things, so that in the end he will lack eternal riches: "Charge them that are rich in this world that they be not highminded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God.… laying up in store for themselves a good foundation against the time to come, that they may lay hold on eternal life," 1 S. Tim, 6:17–19.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that spiritual riches are knowledge and virtue; riches of salvation, wisdom, and knowledge: "The fear of the Lord is his treasure," Isa. 33:6, Vulg.; "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin," Ecclus. 1:27; "They that fear the Lord will prepare their hearts, and in His sight will sanctify their souls," Ecclus 3:20; "The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord … For he that is without fear cannot be justified," Ecclus. 25:15–18. Discretion and honest conversation comes to us by knowledge, for it is by knowledge that man knows what is due to God, to his neighbour, and to himself. God teaches us this knowledge, having weaned us from milk, and drawn us from the breasts of pleasures and desires. Isaiah asks by the Holy Spirit, the Lord, saying, "Whom shall he teach knowledge? And whom shall he make to understand doctrine?" And then He answers, "Them that are weaned from the milk, and drawn from the breasts," Isa. 28:9. It is wonderful when man finds bitterness and tormenting pain in these breasts that he does not separate from them. As S. Augustine says, "Oh, Lord, Thou hast mingled my delights with bitterness that I might seek to live without bitterness. You, O man, if you wish to be taught by the Lord, separate yourself from these breasts, because it is said, 'Wisdom shall not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins,' Wis. 1:4." And by wisdom the love of God enters into the soul; whence S. Bernard says, "Since a man can learn what he wishes, he cannot learn wisdom while he neither fears nor loves God."

IV. On the fourth head it is to be noted, that these spiritual riches are to be sought for three reasons. (1) On account of their immensity: "For she is an infinite treasure to men! which they that use become the friends of God." "For God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom," Wis. 7:14, 28. "She is more precious than rubies, and all the things thou canst desire are not to be compared unto her," Prov. 3:15. Gloss.: It is preferred not only before earthly, but also before celestial, riches; and charity, lastly, is preferred in the very sight itself of the angels, so that none need be fearful of poverty who have acquired the riches of wisdom. (2) On account of their profit: "The ransom of a man's life are his riches; but the poor heareth not rebuke," Prov. 13:8. "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire," S. Matt. 25:41. Or he does not sustain, Gloss. He who wishes to redeem his soul from future wrath gathers together the riches of good works; for if he lacks these, he will not be able to sustain rebuke at the day of judgment. The poor shall not be rebuked, but they shall partake of the blessing of the inheritance. (3) On account of dignity: "The crown," i.e., eternal, "is their riches," Prov. 14:24. Their true riches are not earthly emoluments nor the froward blindness of the foolish, Gloss. The wise, if they have any earthly emolument for riches, nevertheless partake of the crown as if for virtues which are to them in the future. "But the foolishness of fools is folly;" that is, that they rejoice in present gains through envy of that which is eternal. For foolishness is often called improvidence.

V. On the fifth head it is to be noted, that eternal riches are to be sought for three reasons. (1) On account of their truth, for they are true riches: "If, brethren, you wish to be truly rich, love true riches," S. Bernard. (2) On account of their joyousness: "Let the saints be joyful in glory, let them sing aloud upon their beds," Ps. 149:5. "Thine eyes shall see the King in His beauty," Isa. 33:17. (3) On account of eternity: "But the just shall live for evermore," Wis. 5:16. "And of His kingdom there shall be no end," S. Luke 1:33. "Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, &c., but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven," &c., S. Matt. 6:19, 20. The Lord shewed by these three (rust, moth, and thieves) that there is nothing safe in the possession of riches; for there are certain things, such as silver and gold and metals, which rust devours; there are others which the moth but not the rust corrupts and eats, such as silken and precious garments; there are other things which neither rust nor moth eat, but which thieves steal and dig up, such as gems and precious stones; whence it is manifest how uncertain is every possession of our life, and all other things. The Lord persuades us to have our treasures in heaven, but how can any one lay up treasures in heaven unless by making riches in time? We are able to understand spiritual wickedness by rust, moth, and thieves. By rust pride is signified, for it having invaded souls, turns them from the right way, ever shewing itself openly, and expanding itself for human praise. By the moth envy is signified, corrupts where it invades, and deprives of all integrity. By thieves evil spirits are understood, who watch that they may dig up and steal the treasures of the mind. In heaven there is no rust; there is no place there for pride, since the devil and his followers were cast out from thence. In heaven there is no moth, no envy, because none there will envy the happiness of another. In heaven there are no thieves or demons, because they have joined their head. S. Chrysostom points out vain-glory as being the one thief who steals the treasure which is laid up in heaven.

HOMILY XXXVI

GOD’S DEALINGS WITH THE WICKED

EIGHTEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “The Lord said unto my Lord, Sit Thou on My right hand, till I make Thine enemies Thy footstool.”—S. Matt. 22:44.

THREE things are noted in these words. Firstly, the Divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ: “The Lord said unto my Lord,” which is God saying that He had begotten a coequal Son, Who was born not after the order of David, but so that He was ever of the Father. Secondly, His great dignity according to His human nature: “Sit thou on My right hand,” i.e., reign Thou over the best of My good things. Thirdly, the power and justice of God: “Till I make Thine enemies Thy footstool;” for it pertains to the justice and power of God that He should punish all the enemies of Christ. But mark that there are six ways in which the Lord will punish His enemies; whence they are foolish who wish to be His enemies, and are such, and are not reconciled to Him. (1) He will fight against them with the whole world: “Until I make thine enemies Thy footstool,” Ps. 110:1. Gloss., Until I subdue them, willing or unwilling. (2) He will shew them His fury: “The Lord will take vengeance on His adversaries, and He reserveth wrath for His enemies,” Nahum 1:2. (3) He will judge them most severely: “If I whet My glittering sword, and Mine hand take hold on judgment, I will render vengeance to Mine enemies, and will reward them that hate Me,” Deut. 32:41. (4) He will blind them with the uttermost darkness: “Darkness shall pursue His enemies,” Nahum 1:8. (5) He will render to them eternal punishment: “He smote His enemies in the hinder parts; He put them to a perpetual reproach,” Ps. 78:66. (6) He will condemn them to an eternal death: “And now tell you even weeping.… the enemies of the Cross of Christ: whose end is destruction,” Philip. 3:18, 19. “But those mine enemies, which would not that I should reign over them, bring them hither and slay them before me,” S. Luke 19:27. S. Augustine says that they are the enemies of God not by nature, but by committing sins which are opposed to His commands; for all the enemies of Christ who are unwilling to obey Him, they avail nothing to hurt Him; but they are enemies to themselves by their resistance of His will, and not by their power of doing Him harm. Although anyone is an enemy, He is able to become his friend if he flies to the Blood of Christ: “For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by His life,” Rom. 5:10. To which life may we be brought.

HOMILY XXXVII

RESISTING THE DEVIL

NINETEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Neither give place to the devil. Let him that stole steal no more: but rather let him labour, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have to give to him that needeth.”—Ephes. 4:27, 28.

THE Apostle lays down three propositions in this Epistle. Firstly, he exhorts the faithful lest they should give place to the devil in their heart: “Neither give place to the devil.” Secondly, he bids them avoid those things which prepare a place for him: “Let him that stole steal no more.” Thirdly, he admonishes them that they ought to do that which may put the devil to flight: “But rather let him labour,” &c.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that for seven reasons we ought not to give place to the devil. (1) Because the serpent desires to poison the soul which receives him with a most deadly poison: “The great dragon was cast out, that old serpent called the devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world,” Rev. 12:9. (2) Because he is a lion seeking to devour souls: “Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about seeking whom he may devour,” 1 Pet. 5:8. (3) Because he is envious, bringing envy into his dwelling-place: “Nevertheless through envy of the devil came death into the world, and they that do hold of his side do find it,” Wis. 2:24. (4) Because he is an accuser, ever accusing those who receive him: “The accuser of our brethren is cast down, which accuseth them before our God day and night,” Rev. 12:10. (5) Because he is a thief stealing the gifts of grace from those in whom he dwells: “Then cometh the devil and taketh the word out of their heart lest they should believe and be saved,” S. Luke 8:12. (6) Because he is a homicide, entangling those who receive him in perpetual death: “Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him," S. John 8:44. (7) Because he who gives place to the devil, will share a place with him in hell: "Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels," S. Matt. 25:44. It is manifest, therefore, that in many ways they are very foolish who give place to the devil in their souls, for they receive a serpent, a lion, a thief, and a murderer.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the Apostle bids us abstain chiefly from seven sins which make a place for the devil in the heart of man. (1) From theft: "Let him that stole steal no more." (2) From every evil word: "Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth." (3) From sadness and bitterness: "Let all bitterness be put away from you." (4) From wrath: "And wrath." (5) From anger: "And anger." (6) From clamour: "And clamour." (7) From blasphemy or evil speaking: "And evil speaking." S. Augustine says that blasphemy consists in those things which are falsely spoken of God, and therefore blasphemy is worse than to sin by swearing falsely, because that in swearing falsely witnesses are brought forward, but in blasphemy false things are spoken of God Himself. For this reason evil speaking or blasphemy is joined "with all malice."

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the Apostle likewise exhorts us in this Epistle to seven virtues, by which the devil is driven from the soul. (1) To renovation of mind: "And be renewed in the spirit of your mind." We ought to be renewed in five ways. Firstly, as an eagle, laying down the beak of an evil tongue: "Wherefore, putting away lying, speak every man truth." "My youth is renewed like the eagle's," Ps. 103:5. Secondly, as a stag casting away the horns of pride: "As the hart panteth after the water-brooks," Psalm 42:1,[S. Augustine writes on this Psalm: "Quid aliud est in cervo? Serpentes necat, et post serpentium interemptionem majoii siti in-ardescit: peremptis serpentibus ad fontes acrius currit." See also Alian's "Hist. Animalium," lib. II., 100:9, where the same phenomenon is referred to.—Trans.] Gloss. The hart is burdened with beautiful hair and horns: it attracts or draws up the serpent by its nostrils; which being swallowed, the poison inflames it, whence it most ardently desires the water, on drinking which it sheds its horns and hair: "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters," Isa. 55:1. Thirdly, as a hawk accepting the plumage of virtue through the grace of the Holy Spirit: "Does the hawk fly by thy wisdom and stretch her wings to the south,” Job 39:26. Fourthly, as a serpent casting off the skin of the old conversation: “Seeing that ye have put off the old man with his deeds; and have put on the new man,” &c., Colos. 3:9, 10. Fifthly, by taking away the lust of evil.love: “But he knoweth the way that I take: when He hath tried me, I shall come forth as gold,” Job 23:10. (2) He exhorts us to honest labour: “But rather let him labour.” (3) To the enlargement of charity: “That he may have to give,” &c. (4) He bids those things be spoken which tend to the edification of faith: “That it may minister grace unto the hearers.” (5) To the showing of kindness: “And be ye kind one to another.” (6) To tender-heartedness: “Tender-hearted.” (7) To the mutual forgiveness of injuries: “Forgiving one another, even as God for Christ’s sake hath forgiven you.”

HOMILY XXXVIII

THE HEAVENLY CITY

NINETEENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> "And He entered into a ship, and passed over, and came into His own city. And, behold, they brought to Him a man sick of the palsy, lying on a bed: and Jesus seeing their faith said unto the sick of the palsy; Son, be of good cheer; thy sins be forgiven thee."—S. Matt. 9:1, 2.

ALLEGORICALLY this city, "His own city," is a heavenly city. "Glorious things are spoken of thee, O City of God," Ps. 87:3. To this city he comes who "enters into a ship," i.e., a holy life; and Jesus, passing beyond the sea of this life, "entered into a ship, and passed over." Morally, this ship signifies holiness of life for three reasons. Firstly, because of its material. Secondly, because of its form. Thirdly, by reason of its end. Everybody ought to hasten to this city for three reasons. Firstly, because of its security. Secondly, because of its pleasantness. Thirdly, because of its abundance.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the security of the heavenly city flows from three causes. (1) Because it is the most solid city, being strengthened by the firmest columns: "Blessed be the Lord; for He hath shewed me His marvellous kindness in a strong city," Ps. 31:21. (2) Because there is no wicked there who disturbs its security and peace: "Oh, Lord, when Thou awakest Thou shalt despise their image," Ps. 83:1. (3) Because it is established for eternity: "As we have heard, so have we seen in the City of the Lord of Hosts, in the City of our God; God will establish it for ever," Ps. 48:8. "For he looked for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God," Heb. 11:10.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the pleasantness of the city arises from three causes. (1) Because it is decorated with the fairest walls: "She hath sent forth her maidens," Prov. 9:2.; i.e., the elected, infirm, and despised preachers, that they might call by their word and example faithful people to her citadel, and might gather together to the walls of charity, to the heavenly high places of the celestial country. (2) Because it is illumined by perpetual light: “There shall be no night there; and they need no candle, neither light of the sun, for the Lord God giveth them light,” Rev. 22:5. (3) Because there will be a wonderful climate without heat and without cold, which will ever be sustained: “Neither shall the sun light on them nor any heat, for the Lamb which is in the midst of the Throne shall feed them and shall lead them unto living fountains of water, and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes,” Rev. 7:16, 17. “We went through fire and through water; but Thou broughtest us out into a wealthy place,” Ps. 66:12.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that there will be an abundance of all good things in this city, that is of all joys: “Thine eyes shall see Jerusalem, a quiet [rich, Vulg.] habitation,” Isa. 33:20. The joys shall flow together from three sources. (1) From the fairness of the Divine vision: “Thine eyes shall see the King in His beauty,” Isa. 33:17. (2) From the fairness and goodness of the angelic society, for angels are its citizens: “Ye are come unto Mount Zion, unto the City of the Living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels,” &c., Heb. 12:22, 23. (3) From the continuation of eternal solemnity: “Look upon Zion, the city of our solemnities,” Isa. 33:20. They who are in that city celebrate a perpetual feast; they do nought but rest, see, love, praise, sing, which harmonize with the festival. S. Augustine, in his book on the City of God, says, “If it is asked, What is the occupation of this city? we say, that there we shall take rest, and shall see, and shall love, and shall praise, and shall sing. For what else shall be our end unless we come to that kingdom, of which there will be no end.” To which kingdom may Almighty God bring us, &c.

HOMILY XXXIX

THE CHRISTIAN’S WALK

TWENTIETH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“See that ye walk circumspectly.”—Ephes. 5:15,

THE Apostle in this Epistle admonishes us to circumspection of walking, and he places circumspection itself in three qualities. Firstly, that we should walk discreetly: “Not as fools, but as wise.” Secondly, with quickness: “Be not drunk with wine.” Thirdly, humbly: “Giving thanks always for all things unto God and the Father, in the Name of our Lord Jesus Christ.”

I. On the first head, the manner of our walking, it is to be noted, that discretion in walking is seen in three ways. (1) In the election of the things which are to be done: “But as wise.” (2) In the comparison of the things which are selected: “Redeeming the time.” (3) In inclining towards the proper end: “Understanding what the will of the Lord is.”

II. In the second place, that despatch in walking consists in two things. (1) In the fear of hindrances: “Be not drunk with wine.” (2) In the indwelling of that which is better: “But be ye filled with the Spirit.”

III. In the third place, that the humility of spiritual walking consists in two things. (1) In relation to God: “Giving thanks … unto God,” &c. (2) In relation to one’s neighbour: “Subjecting yourselves one to another in the fear of God. You see by this how we ought to walk circumspectly.” The Apostle exhorts us in these words that we should walk cautiously in this way of injustice for three reasons. (1) Because we walk in the midst of snares: “Thou art going in the midst of snares, and walking upon the arms of them that are grieved,” Ecclus. 9:18. (2) Because we walk in the midst of robbers: “As troops of robbers wait for a man, so the company of priests murder in the way by consent,” Hosea 6:9. “His troops come together, and raise up their way against me,” Job 19:12. (3) Because we walk in the midst of pits: “And the vale of Siddim was full of slime pits,” Gen. 14:10. “Fear, and the pit, and the snare are upon thee, oh inhabitant of the earth. And it shall come to pass, that he who fleeth from the noise of the fear shall fall into the pit,” Isa. 24:17, 18.

11. On the second head, the conditions of our walking, it is to be noted—

(1.) In the first place, that we walk in the midst of three snares. (1) The iniquity of the proud: “The proud have hid a snare for me … they have set gins for me,” Ps. 145. (2) The lust of the avaricious: “But they that will be rich fall into temptation and a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition,” 1 Tim. 6:9. (3) The perversity of false accusers: “And hast preserved my body from destruction, from the snare of an unjust tongue, and from the lips of them that forge lies,” Ecclus. 1:3.

(2.) In the second place, that similarly we walk in the midst of three kind of robbers. (1) The Devil: “The thief cometh not but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy,” St. John 10:10. (2) The flatterer: “The thief cometh in, and the troop of robbers spoileth without,” Hos. 7:1. (3) Vainglory: S. Gregory says that as a certain robber it joins itself to the human traveller in the way; that it seeks those who are incautious, and spoils them, especially seeking to despoil those who bear treasure publicly in the way. And, again, that the appetite for human praise is a certain robber which gladly unites to those who are walking in the right way, that their eyes being led away they may be slain by the sword which hangs from their path. S. Chrysostom observes that vain-glory is the one thief, which robs us of our treasure laid up in heaven. The Devil steal souls; the flatterers, purity of conscience; vain-glory, the reward of eternal glory.

(3.) In the third place, that we similarly walk in the midst of three pits. (1) Woman, or luxury: “The mouth of a strange woman is a deep pit: he that is abhorred of the Lord shall fall therein,” Prov. 22:14. Gloss., the “abhorred of the Lord” is the son of wrath. He who embraces the words or kisses of a strange woman knocks as at the door of an abyss, and unless he draws back his feet, restraining his members, he will fall into that penal pit into which none except the son of wrath falls down. (2) Gluttony and drunkenness: “Who falls into pits,” Prov. 23:29, Vulg. “Who hath redness of eyes? They that tarry long at the wine, they that go to seek mixed wine,” Prov. 23. (3)

The grief of the hypocrites and evil-doers: “There shall the great owl make her nest” [Vulg. “hole”], Isa. 34:15, Gloss. The owl signifies the double dealers, who hide intentions under the thorns of duplicity. “The foxes have holes,” &c., S. Matt. 8:20. On account of the danger of snares, we ought ever to walk cautiously before the Lord, that He Himself may draw our feet out of the trap. S. Augustine says, “I resist the seducers that my feet may not be entangled by which I walk in Thy way, and I will lift up to Thee the invisible eyes that Thou mayest draw my feet out of the snare. Whence dost Thou draw them, for if they seek Thee Thou ceasest not to lift them up. But I, therefore, run where the snares are scattered abroad.” On account of the danger of robbers we ought to walk cautiously, armed for walking with all spiritual arms. “Put on the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to stand in the evil day, and having done all to stand,” Ephes. 6:13. On account of the dangers of pitfalls, we ought to walk cautiously, ever walking with gravity and by the light of grace: “Let us walk honestly as in the day,” Rom. 13:13.

HOMILY XL

THE LORD’S ARMIES AND THEIR WORK

TWENTIETH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “He sent forth His armies and destroyed those murderers.”—S. Matt. 22:7.

IN these words the Lord speaks in a parable of the perdition of the ungodly which is about to be in the judgment, and marks here three things. Firstly, the great power of God: “He sent forth His armies.” Secondly, His severe justice: “He destroyed His murderers.” Thirdly, the perverse wickedness of the reprobate: “those murderers.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that God sends great armies in the day of judgment for the punishment of the wicked. (1) The army of angels: “The angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among the just, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire,” S. Matt. 13:49, 50. (2) The army of saints: “The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of His people and the princes thereof,” Isa. 3:14. (3) The army of all created things: “He will arm the creature for the revenge of His enemies.… And the whole world shall fight with Him against the unwise,” Wisd. 5:18–21.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that God will destroy the wicked in a three-fold way. (1) Quickly, because there will be swift destruction to them: “The Lord shall send against thee in hunger, and in thirst, and in nakedness, and in want of all things,” Deut. 28:48. “When they shall say peace and safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them,” 1 Thess. 5:3. (2) Universally, because no evil one will be able to escape: “Thou hast destroyed all them that go a whoring from Thee,” Ps. 73:27. “They were given in marriage until the day that Noe entered into the ark, and the flood came and destroyed them all. Likewise also, as it was in the days of Lot, they did eat, they drank, they bought, they sold, they planted, they builded; but the same day that Lot went out of Sodom it rained down fire and brimstone from heaven, and destroyed them all," S. Luke 17:27–29. (3) Eternally: "Fear Him which is able to destroy both body and soul in hell," S. Matt. 10:28.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that God will destroy the reprobate for their perverse wickedness: "He will miserably destroy those wicked men," S. Matt. 21:41. "Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing," Ps. 5:6. "And destroyed those murderers." Three sins are noted here—sin of the heart in maliciousness; sin of the mouth in lying; sin of the deed in murder. For all who sin, whether in heart, or word, or deed, unless they repent, will be punished by God in eternity, and will be led to the day of wrath. From which may the Lord Almighty deliver us. Amen.

HOMILY XLI

THE ARMOUR OF GOD

TWENTY-FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God.… and having done all, to stand.”—Ephes. 6:13.

THE Apostle in these words lays down three propositions. Firstly, he exhorts that we arm ourselves with spiritual arms: “Take unto you the whole armour of God.” Secondly, he shews our need of it: “That ye may be able to withstand.” Thirdly, he gives the reason for it: “Having done all, to stand.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that according to this Epistle we ought to take five kinds of arms. (1) We ought to take the girdle of knowledge: “Stand, therefore, having your loins girt about with truth.” “Gird up thy loins like a man,” Job 40:7. (2) We ought to put on the breast-plate of righteousness: “Breast-plate of righteousness.” “He put on righteousness as a breast-plate,” Isai. 59:17. (3) We ought to take the shield of faith: “His truth shall be thy shield and buckler. Thou shalt not be afraid for the terror by night,” Ps. 91:4, 5. “Your adversary the devil as a roaring lion walketh about,” &c., 1 S. Pet. 5:8. (4) With the helmet of salvation: “And take the helmet of salvation.” “An helmet of salvation upon His head,” Isa. 59:17. “Putting on the breast-plate of faith and love, and for an helmet the hope of salvation; for God hath not appointed us to wrath,” &c., 1 Thess. 5:8, 9. (5) The sword of the Word of God: “The sword of the Spirit, which is the Word of God.” “For the Word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword,” Heb. 4:12.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that there are five days of evil from which these arms defend us. (1) The first day is iniquity: “In the day of good things”—i.e., of the present time, in which you are able to obtain eternal life—“be not unmindful of evils; and in the day of evils be not unmindful of good things,” Ecclus. 11:27. (2) The day of temporal prosperity: “I am not troubled, following Thee for my pastor; and I have not desired the day of man, as Thou knowest. That which went out of my lips hath been right in Thy sight,” Jer. 17:16, Vulg. “The Lord will deliver him in the time of trouble,” Ps. 41:1. (3) The day of temporal adversity: “Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof,” S. Matt. 6:34. (4) The day of temptation of the devil: “Wherefore should I fear in the days of evil?” i.e., in the days of temptation, Ps. 49:6. (5) The day of judgment: “Ye that put far away the evil day, and cause the seat of violence to come near,” Amos 6:3. It is called the evil day because “That is a day of wrath, a day of trouble and distress, a day of wasteness and desolation, a day of darkness and gloominess, a day of clouds and thick darkness, a day of trumpet and alarm against the fenced cities, and against the high towers. And I will bring distress upon men, and they shall walk with blind men, because they have sinned against the Lord: and their blood shall be poured out as dust, and their flesh as the dung,” Zeph. 1:15–18.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that in three ways we ought to stand perfect. (1) In purity of heart and body: “Having therefore these promises, dearly beloved, let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God,” 2 Cor. 7:1. (2) In the keeping of the commandments of God: “If ye fulfil the royal law according to the Scripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, ye do well; but if ye have respect to persons ye commit sin, and are convinced of the law as transgressors. For whosoever shall keep the whole law, &c. … thou art become a transgressor of the law,” S. James 2:8–12. (3) In the reformation of the tongue: “If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man, and also able to bridle the whole body,” S. James 3:2. (4) In love towards God and one’s neighbour: “Perfect love casteth out fear,” 1 S. John 4:18. “But I say unto you, Love your enemies. Bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them that despitefully use you and persecute you, that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven.… Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect,” S. Matt. 5:44, 45, 48. (5) In the praise of God and in the giving of thanks: “Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings Thou hast perfected praise,” Ps. 8:2. To which praise may He lead us Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.

HOMILY XLII

THE FEVER OF SIN, AND ITS CURE

TWENTY-FIRST SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Yesterday, at the seventh hour, the fever left him.”—S. John 4:52.

MORALLY, two things are to be noted in these words. Firstly, the infirmity of the sinner: “The fever.” Secondly, those things which were necessary for the cure: “At the seventh hour the fever left him.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that sinners labour under seven kind of fevers. (1) That which is continuous, which is sensuality: “They have committed fornication, and have not ceased,” Hosea 4:10, Vulg. (2) That which is daily, which is gluttony, by which men daily sin: “They are greedy dogs, which can never have enough.… We will fill ourselves with strong drink; and to-morrow shall be as this day, and much more abundant,” Isai. 56:11, 12. (3) That which recurs on the third day, and is called the Tertian fever; which signifies anger, from the accession of heat: “For as the wood of the forest is, so the fire burneth: and as a man’s strength is, so shall his anger be,” Ecclus. 28:12. (4) That which recurs on the fourth day, which is quartan, and which signifies that acidity which provokes melancholy: “As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart,” Prov. 25:20, Vulg. “The Lord shall smite thee with a consumption, and with a fever, and with an inflammation, and with an extreme burning, and with a sword, and with a blasting, and with a mildew,” Deut. 28:22. (5) That which is common to the nations, which is avarice, which is difficult or never to be cured. S. Jerome observes, that when other vices grow old in man, avarice alone grows young. (6) That which is intermittent, which is pride, which quickly fails: “When they were lifted up, Thou hast cast them down,” Ps. 72:18, Vulg. “They are exalted for a little while, but are gone and brought low; they are taken out of the way as all other, and cut off as the tops of the ears of corn,” Job. 24:24. (7) That which is putrid: “A sound heart is the life of the flesh, but envy the rottenness of the bones,” Prov. 14:30.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that there are seven medicines which heal men of these fevers. (1) A devoted hearing of God: “He sent His Word, and healed them, and delivered them from their destructions,” Ps. 107:20. “For it was neither herb nor mollifying plaster that healed them, but Thy Word, O Lord, which healeth all things,” Wisd. 16:12. (2) In contrition for sin: “For I acknowledge my transgressions, and my sin is ever before me,” Ps. 51:3. (3) A devoted calling upon God: “O Lord, my God, I cried unto Thee, and Thou hast healed me,” Ps. 30:2. (4) The infusion of faith: “And He said to the woman, Thy faith hath saved thee; go in peace,” S. Luke 7:50. (5) The showing of compassion: “When thou seest the naked, that thou cover him: and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh. Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thine health shall spring forth speedily,” Isai. 58:7, 8. (6) The desertion of sin: “In returning and rest shall ye be saved,” Isai. 30:15. (7) Perfect contrition of heart: “Return, ye backsliding children, and I will heal your backslidings.… truly in the Lord our God is the salvation of Israel,” Jer. 3:22, 23. This is the “seventh hour,” in which the fever leaves the sinner altogether. But all these means avail nothing, unless they take their efficacy from that sacred medicine which heals all our diseases—i.e., the Passion of Christ our God, “Who His own Self bare our sins in His own Body on the tree, by Whose stripes ye were healed,” 1 S. Pet. 2:24.

HOMILY XLIII

THE INNOCENT

TWENTY-SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “That ye may be sincere and without offence, till the day of Christ.”—Philip. 1:10.

THE Apostle in this Epistle exhorts us to three things. Firstly, to the avoiding of sin: “That ye may be sincere.” Secondly, to all love: “Filled with the fruits of righteousness.” Thirdly, to the possession of a right intention: “With the glory and praise of God.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that three commands are given. (1) That we should seek after purity of mind: “That ye may be sincere.” “Blessed are the pure in heart; for they shall see God,” S. Matt. 5:3. (2) That we should avoid doing injury to our neighbours: “Without offence: giving no offence in anything,” 2 Cor. 6:3. (3) That we should persevere in both courses: “Till the day of Christ,” i.e., till after death; when the day of man is ended the day of Christ begins. “He that endureth to the end shall be saved,” St. Matt. 10:22. The Gloss. treats of this under the word “sincere;” without the works of corruption, either towards ourselves or our neighbours, and to persevere in this course till the day of Christ.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the Apostle likewise gives three commandments. (1) He exhorts to rectitude of mind: “The fruits of righteousness.” S. Anselm defines justice to be that rectitude of will which is preserved for its own sake. (2) To the having a delight in that which is good: “Being filled with the fruits of righteousness; which are love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance,” Gal. 5:22, 23. (3) To the having perfection in good, “being filled:” “Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect,” S. Matt. 5:48.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that three rewards flow from a right intention, for our every action ought to have its eye of intention guarded in respect to God. (1) That we may believe that every good thing, as if from the fount of all good, comes from Him through Jesus Christ: “Of His fulness have all we received, and grace for grace; for the Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ,” S. John 1:16, 17. “Without Me ye can do nothing,” S. John 15:5. (2) That we should make God to be praised and honoured in all our actions: “Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father, which is in heaven,” S. Matt. 5:16. (3) That the reward of eternal glory may be given to us for our desire to work: “Unto the glory and praise of God.” “Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, &c.… Where thieves do not break through and steal,” S. Matt. 6:19, 20.

HOMILY XLIV

THE SPIRITUAL DEBTOR

TWENTY-SECOND SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “And his lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors till he should pay all that was due unto him.”—S. Matt. 18:34.

MORALLY, by the servant is understood any sinner against whom God will be angry in the judgment, and whom He will deliver over to eternal torments. Whence three things are to be noted in these words. Firstly, the just indignation of God against the reprobates: “His lord was wroth.” Secondly, the severe condemnation of sinners: “Delivered him to the tormentors.” Thirdly, the duration of this same damnation: “Till he should pay all that was due unto him.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that there are four classes of men with whom God will be angry in the judgment. (1) Against those who despise the law of God: “Because they have cast away the law of the Lord of Hosts, and despised the Word of the Holy One of Israel, therefore is the anger of the Lord kindled against His people, and He hath stretched forth His hand against them and hath smitten them; and the hills did tremble, and their carcases were torn in the midst of the streets,” Isa. 5:24, 25. (2) He will be wroth against those who remain, or persist, in their sins unto the end: “Behold, Thou art wroth; for we have sinned: in those is continuance, and we shall be saved,” Isa. 64:5. (3) Against those who abuse temporal riches: “I am very sore displeased with the heathen that are at ease,” Zach. 1:15. (4) Against those who have no compassion on their neighbours: “For he shall have judgment without mercy that hath showed no mercy; and mercy rejoiceth against judgment,” S. James 2:13. This can be applied to that servant who was unwilling to have compassion on his fellow-servant.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the sinner will be tormented by four different tormentors. (1) By God: “And when He was come to the other side into the country of the Gergesenes there met Him two possessed with devils.… And when they were come out they went into the herd of swine: and behold, the whole herd of swine ran violently down a steep place to the sea and perished in the waters,” S. Matt. 8:28–33. (2) By conscience: S. Augustine says, “Thou hast commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every inordinate mind should be a punishment to itself.” (3) By eternal death; whilst it is said of the saints, that their souls “are in the hand of God, and there shall no torment touch them,” Wisd. 3:1. “I pray thee, therefore, father, that thou wouldst send him to my father’s house, for I have five brethren, that he may testify unto them, lest they also come to this place of torment,” S. Luke 16:27, 28. (4) From every creature: “For the creature that serveth Thee, Who art the Maker, increaseth his strength against the unrighteous for their punishment, and abateth his strength for the benefit of such as put their trust in Thee,” Wisd. 16:24.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that we ought to repay Him according to the four-fold debt which we owe to Him. Firstly, He gave to us the world with its creatures: “Thou hast put all things under his feet,” Ps. 8:6. Secondly, the body with its senses. Thirdly, the mind with its powers. Of these two: “And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul,” Gen. 2:7. Fourthly, grace with its operations: “Wherefore we, receiving a kingdom that cannot be moved, let us have grace whereby we may serve God acceptably, with reverence and godly fear,” Heb. 12:28. (1) Of the world, we ought to repay Him by giving alms to the poor: “Let it not grieve thee to bow down thine ear to the poor, and give him a friendly answer with meekness.” “My son, defraud not the poor of his living.… Turn not thine eye away from the needy, and give him none occasion to curse thee,” Ecclus. 4:1, 5. “Get thyself the love of the congregation, and bow thy head to a great man,” Id. 5:7, Gloss. Meekness and humility are commended in these words, for the meek spurns no one; humility subjects itself to all, the Christian is bound to make himself affable and humble to equals and inferiors: “Lord, my heart is not haughty, nor mine eyes lofty,” Ps. 131:1. (2) Of the body, we ought to repay Him by restoring it to Him free from defilement. (3) Of the mind, repay Him by following the examples of wisdom recorded in Wisdom, chap. 10. (4) Of the grace, we ought to repay Him by seeking to use it to His honour: “We beseech you that ye receive not the grace of God in vain,” 2 Cor. 6:1. He who does not repay these debts in time will never be able to repay them in eternity, and therefore he will have to suffer torments in the place of the tormentors for ever and ever. From which may we be delivered.

HOMILY XLV

THE HEAVENLY CONVERSATION

TWENTY-THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

“For our conversation is in heaven.”—Philip. 3:20.

THE Apostle in these words teaches that the conversation of the just is in heaven; so that if we wish to be like them we must not have our conversation about the miseries of this present life, but “in heaven.” The Apostle here lays down three things in regard to the conversation in heaven. Firstly, the reason why we should have our conversation there. Secondly, the nature of that conversation. Thirdly, the similitude between the conversation of the saints and of the angels.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the saints have their conversation in heaven for three reasons. (1) For security, for he who has his conversation in heaven is secure from the dangers of this troublesome life: “Lay me down now, and put me in a surety with Thee; who is he that will strike hands with me?” Job 17:3. S. Augustine says that he who enters into the joy of his Lord is secure, and will experience the best condition in the best place. (2) On account of delight; for he who has his conversation in heaven will have a continuous joy and delight: “For her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness,” Wisd. 8:16. Seneca compares the mind of the wise to a world above the moon, which is ever calm. (3) On account of the necessity that there is for all earthly things to pass away. The saints know that all the earthly things here quickly are about to pass away: “But the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall meet with fervent heat … Nevertheless we, according to His promise, look for a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness,” 2 Pet. 3:10, 14.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the saints have in heaven a three-fold conversation. (1) In ever thinking over the good things of heaven. (2) In desiring to be ever in heaven. Of these two it is said, such an holy one is held worthily in the memory of man; he has passed ever to the joy of angels, since in the body only he is placed in the present conversation, his true conversation being in that heavenly country. (3) The conversation of the saints in heaven consists in their living after the manner of heaven. The Gloss. on the text being, that our conversation is in heaven while we live on earth; because we have our hope there, and because we are like to the angels both in living and knowing.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the conversation of the saints is like that of the angels in three ways. (1) In purity. (2) In simplicity without guile. (3) In charity. These three are chiefly seen in the angels: simplicity in essence, purity in nature, charity in grace. The conversation of the saints is also in these three: “For our rejoicing is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity and godly sincerity, not with fleshly wisdom, but by the grace of God, we have had our conversation in the world,” 2 Cor. 1:12.

HOMILY XLVI

THE MASTER AND HIS TEACHING

TWENTY-THIRD SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

“Master, we know that Thou art true, and teachest the way of God in truth.”—S. Matt. 22:16.

OUR Lord Jesus Christ in these words is commended in three ways. Firstly, from the dignity of His mastership: “Master.” Secondly, from the utility of His doctrine: “The way of God.” Thirdly, from the equality of His teaching: “Thou regardest not the persons of men.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that the dignity of “Master” belongs to Him for four reasons. (1) Because only with Him does truth ever exist: “Ye call me Master and Lord: and ye say well, for so I am,” S. John 13:13. (2) On account of the power of teaching: “When Jesus had ended these sayings the people were astonished at His doctrine: for He taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes,” S. Matt. 7:28, 29. (3) Because He alone was able to teach concerning all things: “Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things,” 1 S. John 2:20. There is no master able to teach all things save Our Lord Jesus Christ: “All wisdom is from the Lord God, and hath been always with Him, and is before all time,” Ecclus. 1:1. (4) Because He alone is able to teach the hidden man: “Neither be ye called masters; for one is your Master, even Christ,” S. Matt. 23:10, Gloss. Because He alone gives understanding.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that Our Lord Jesus Christ taught us four ways which are greatly profitable. (1) The way of penitence: “Enter ye in at the strait gate … because strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it,” S. Matt. 7:13, 14. “Jesus began to preach and to say, Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand,” S. Matt. 4:17. (2) The way of wisdom: “I have taught thee in the way of wisdom, I have led thee in right paths. When thou goest thy steps shall not be straitened, and when thou runnest thou shalt not stumble. Take fast hold of instruction; let her not go," Prov. 4:11–14, Gloss. The actions of equity when they begin seem to be confined, but when they advance they seem already from habit to be spacious, and because in base action they labour earnestly they find a stumbling-block in the middle of the course; because suddenly, when they do not foresee, they are seized for punishment. (3) The way of obedience: "Make me to understand the way of Thy precepts," Ps. 119:27. "A new commandment give I unto you, That ye love one another. By this shall all men know that ye are My disciples, if ye have love one to another," S. John 13:34, 35. "Yet I shew unto you a more excellent way. Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal," 1 Cor. 12:31, 13:1. "He will teach us of His ways, and we will walk in His paths," Isa. 2:3.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that Christ is no respecter of persons in four particulars. (1) In justifying: "Then Peter opened his mouth and said, Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: but in every nation he that feareth Him and worketh righteousness is accepted with Him," Acts 10:34, 35. (2) In teaching: "And teachest the way of God in truth." (3) In punishing: "There is no respect of persons with God. For as many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law … the doers of the law shall be justified," Rom. 2:11–14. (4) In rewarding: "Knowing that whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free … Knowing that your Master also is in heaven: neither is there respect of persons with Him," Eph. 6:8, 9.

HOMILY XLVII

THE PORTION OF THE SAINTS

TWENTY-FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Giving thanks unto the Father, which hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light.”—Coloss. 1:12.

THE Apostle teaches us in these words that we should give thanks to God the Father for three great benefits which He has granted to us through Jesus Christ. The first benefit was our justification: “Partakers of the inheritance.” The second benefit is our liberation from the power of the Devil: “Who hath delivered us from the power of darkness.” The third benefit is translation into the eternal kingdom: “And hath translated us into the kingdom of His dear Son.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that it is a three-fold inheritance which God distributes to His saints. (1) Eternal predestination: “In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of Him Who worketh all things after the council of His own will; that we should be to the praise of His glory, who first trusted in Christ,” Eph. 1:11, 12. (2) Justification: “Unto him shall be given the chosen gift of faith, and an inheritance in the temple of the Lord,” Wisd. 3:14. (3) Eternal glorification: “Now is he numbered among the children of God, and his lot is among the saints,” Wisd. 5:5.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that God in a three-fold manner delivers us from the power of the Devil. (1) By liberating us from the service of the Devil: “That through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is the Devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage,” Heb. 2:14. The Devil is the prince of darkness: “We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world,” Eph. 6:12. (2) By illuminating the darkness of our ignorance by the light of His doctrine: “The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light,” Isa. 9:12. “Who hath called you out of darkness into His marvellous light: which in time past were not the people, but are now the people of God: which had not obtained mercy, but now have obtained mercy,” 1 S. Pet. 2:9, 10. (3) By putting to flight the darkness of our sins by the light of His powers: “Ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord: walk as children of light,” Eph. 5:8.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that the Lord makes a three-fold translation of the holy ones. (1) He translates them from the darkness of exile to the light of the vision of His glory: “Enoch pleased the Lord, and was translated,” Ecclus. 44:6. Into paradise, which is the place furnishing the vision of God which is the blessedness of saints and angels. “And this is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom thou hast sent.” (2) He translates them from death to eternal life: “We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren,” 1 S. John 3:14. (3) He translates them from this wretched state to the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom: “Unto the kingdom of His dear Son,” &c.

HOMILY XLVIII

TRUE REPENTANCE

TWENTY-FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “And, behold, a woman which was diseased with an issue of blood twelve years, came behind Him, and touched the hem of His garment,” &c.—S. Matt. 9:20.

MORALLY, three things are to observed of this miracle. Firstly, a wretchedness of the sinning mind: “Behold, a woman which was diseased.” Secondly, the humility of the sinning one: “Came behind Him and touched the hem of His garment.” Thirdly, the profit of repentance: “Daughter, be of good comfort.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that in three ways the sinner suffers from “an issue of blood.” (1) Through an excessive love of kindred: “Hear this, I pray you, ye heads of the house of Jacob, and princes of the house of Israel, that abhor judgment, and pervert all equity. The heads thereof judge for reward, and the priests thereof teach for hire, and the prophets thereof divine for money.… Jerusalem shall become heaps, and the mountain of the house as the high places of the forest,” Micah 3:9, 11, 12. (2) Through an issue, the flowing of carnal delights: “Deliver me from blood-guiltiness [bloods], O God, thou God of my salvation,” Ps. 51:14. (3) Through the workings of any sin, no matter what: “Hear the word of the Lord, ye children of Israel: for the Lord hath a controversy with the inhabitants of the land, because there is no truth, nor mercy, nor knowledge of God in the land. By swearing, and lying, and killing, and stealing, and committing adultery, they break out, and blood toucheth blood. Therefore shall the land mourn,” Hos. 4:1–3.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that penitence consists in three conditions, which are the effects of contrition. (1) In faith: “Thy faith hath made thee whole." "Purifying their hearts by faith," Acts 15:9. "A broken and contrite heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise," Ps. 51:17. (2) In humility, which is the preparer for confession: "Came behind." S. Bernard says, that for a man to make a proper confession of his sins is the ninth stage in humility: "Confess your faults one to another, and pray one for another, that ye may be healed," S. James 5:16. (3) In the toil of satisfaction: "Touched the hem of His garment." "Bring forth therefore fruits meet for repentance," S. Matt. 3:8. S. Gregory the Great observes, that anyone who returns to God with the heart, acquires by repentance a gain by so much the greater, as he had suffered loss from his sin.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that a threefold reward is here indicated as flowing from repentance. (1) That God turns towards the sinner, against whom He was both angry and opposed: "Thus saith the Lord of Hosts: Turn ye unto Me, saith the Lord of Hosts, and I will turn unto you, saith the Lord of Hosts. Be not as your fathers, unto whom the former prophets have cried, saying, Thus saith the Lord of Hosts: turn ye now from your evil ways, and from your evil doings: but they did not hear, nor hearken unto me, saith the Lord. Your fathers, where are they? and the prophets, do they live for ever?" Zech. 1:3–6. (2) That the grace of God is infused into the soul: whence Jesus looked upon Peter (and he wept bitterly), whom He had delivered from the sin of denying Him, and did not permit him to fall from the elevation of the Apostolate: "And Peter remembered the word of Jesus, Who said unto Him, Before the cock crow, thou shalt deny Me thrice. And he went out and wept bitterly," S. Matt. 26:75. For the Lord is as the sun, which shining makes the crops to live and to be fruitful. "Turn thee unto me, and have mercy upon me," Ps. 25:16. (3) That salvation comes from repentance: "And the woman was made whole." "Look unto Me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth," Isa. 45:22.

HOMILY XLIX

THE PREPARATION FOR THE COMING

TWENTY-FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE EPISTLE)

> “Behold, the day is come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth.”—Jer. 23:5.

THE Advent of Our Lord Jesus Christ is predicted in these words, about which three things are to be noted. Firstly, the congruity of Him coming: “Behold, the day is come;” for it was congruous that many days should precede the Advent of the Lord, during which men might prepare themselves for His reception. Secondly, the dignity of Him coming: “I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and a King,” &c. Thirdly, the utility of His Advent: “And shall execute justice and judgment in the earth.”

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that five spiritual days preceded the Advent of Christ. (1) Was the day of the eternal preordination of the Father: “Whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting,” Micah 5:2. (2) Was the day of the promise made to the Fathers: “The oath which He sware to our Father Abraham, that He would grant unto us,” S. Luke 1:73, 74. (3) Was the day in which this day was prefigured in the Law: “Search the Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life: and they are they which testify of Me.… Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed Me; for he wrote of Me,” S. John 5:39–46. (4) Was the day of the preaching of Him by the prophets: “He hath visited and redeemed His people, … as He spake by the mouth of His holy prophets,” S. Luke 1:68, 70. (5) Was the day of the Incarnation of Christ: “In that day the mountains shall drop down new wine, and the hills shall flow with milk; … and a fountain shall come forth of the House of the Lord,” Joel 3:18. Of these five can be interpreted the words of Judith: “Let us yet endure five days, in the which space the Lord Our God may turn His mercy toward us,” Judith 7:30.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the Prophet treats of five things which relate to the dignity of Christ. (1) He commends Him from His fairness. (2) From the power of His strength. These two qualities are included in the name of David, which signifies that which is desirable to the sight, and which is strong of arm. Now, Christ was desirable to the sight, on account of His exceeding beauty: “Thou art fairer than the children of men,” Ps. 45:2. “Which things the angels desire to look into,” 1 Peter 1:12. Christ was also strong of arm, on account of His admirable fortitude. S. Augustine speaks of Him as being bound in hand, and fixed to the Cross, and yet having made war against the power of the air. “If I speak of strength, lo, He is strong,” Job. 9:19. (3) He commends Him on account of His innate holiness: “A righteous Branch,” i.e., in conception, because He is alone without sin. “Therefore, also, that Holy Thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God,” S. Luke 1:35. (4) From His regal dignity: “A King shall reign.” “For He is Lord of Lords, and King of Kings,” Rev. 17:14. (5) From the brightness of His wisdom: “And shall be wise,” Vulg. “In Whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge,” Colos. 2:3.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that Christ came into the world that He might judge and reward us, or, as it is here expressed, to “execute justice and judgment in the earth.” (1) Judgment in condemning the unbelieving: “He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the Name of the Only Begotten Son of God,” S. John 3:18. (2) In justifying and loving those who believe: “God so loved the world, that He gave His Only Begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life. For God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through Him might be saved,” S. John 3:16, 17. We ought to believe in Him by faith, which guides us, and operates in us for our salvation. We ought to fly from sin, lest we be condemned: “He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned,” S. Mark 16:16. From which condemnation may He deliver us, &c.

HOMILY L

THE COMING ONE

TWENTY-FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.—(FROM THE GOSPEL)

> “Then those men, when they had seen the miracle that Jesus did, said, This is of a truth that Prophet that should come into the world.”—S. John 6:14.

THREE things are recorded in these words. Firstly, the power of Christ: “When they had seen the miracle that Jesus did.” For that miracle that He had wrought was an act of infinite power. S. Dionysius says, that a miracle is a manifest act of the power of God directed to the highest aim. Secondly, the great wisdom of Christ: “This is of a truth that Prophet,” &c., Prophesying is an act of infinite wisdom: “The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a Prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto Me; unto Him ye shall hearken,” Deut. 18:15. Thirdly, the great justice of Christ: “That should come into the world;” for Christ is to come into the world to judge it in justice. “And He shall judge the world in righteousness. He shall minister judgment to the people in righteousness,” Psalm 9:8.

I. On the first head it is to be noted, that there were four signs of Christ. (1) The first was His Incarnation, which was a sign of infinite goodness: “Therefore the Lord Himself shall give you a sign: Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son,” &c, Isa. 7:12. (2) The operation of miracles, which was a sign of infinite power: “And many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of His disciples, which are not written in this book: but these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye might have life through His Name,” S. John 20:30, 31. (3) His Passion: “Then certain of the Scribes and of the Pharisees answered, saying, Master, we would see a sign from Thee. But He answered and said unto them, An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign;

and there shall no sign be given to it, but the sign of the Prophet Jonas: for as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale’s belly, so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth,” St. Matt. 12:38–42. (4) His coming to judgment: “All ye inhabitants of the world and dwellers on the earth, see ye, when He lifteth up an ensign on the mountains, and when He bloweth a trumpet, hear ye,” Isa. 18:3.

II. On the second head it is to be noted, that the great wisdom of Christ is seen in four particulars. (1) In His doctrine—i.e., in truth: “Master, we know that Thou art true, and teachest the way of God in truth,” S. Matt. 22:16. (2) In its depth: “The words of a man’s mouth are as deep waters”—i.e., words from the mouth of Christ are spiritual doctrine; “and the well-spring of wisdom as a flowing brook,” Prov. 18:4: for so great is the abundance of word of doctrine, of this present life, the fountain of wisdom. Mystically, the “deep waters” refer to the Old Testament; and the “flowing brooks” to the New Testament; and Christ and His Apostles unlock the mysteries of both Testaments. Again, words of wisdom wash and bedew the mind, lest it remains defiled with the spot of sin, or fails through the lack of moisture; and because certain things mystically be hid, and certain are open, they are rightly called here “a deep water,” and a “flowing brook.” (3) In its unity: “The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life,” S. John 6:63. (4) In its eternity: “Heaven and earth shall pass away; but My words shall not pass away,” S. Luke 21:33.

III. On the third head it is to be noted, that Christ is about to come in the world for four purposes. (1) To condemn the wicked: “Behold, the Lord cometh, with ten thousands of His saints, to execute judgment upon all, and to convince all that are ungodly among them of all their ungodly deeds, which they have ungodly committed,” S. Jude 15. (2) To reward the good: “Behold, I come quickly; and My reward is with Me, to give to every man according as his work shall be,” Rev. 22:12. (3) To burn up the earth with fire, and to renovate it: “Our God shall come, and shall not keep silence; a fire shall devour before Him,” Ps. 50:3. (4) To reign by Himself for ever. Every other kingdom shall cease; the kingdom of Christ will remain for ever: “I saw in the night visions, and, behold, one like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of Days, and they brought Him near before Him. And there was given Him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve

Him: His dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and His kingdom that which shall not be destroyed,” Dan. 7:13, 14.

OF GOD AND HIS CREATURES

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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OF GOD AND HIS CREATURES

PREFACE

SOME years ago, a priest of singularly long and varied experience urged me to write “a book about God.” He said that wrong and imperfect notions of God lay at the root of all our religious difficulties. Professor Lewis Campbell says the same thing in his own way in his work, Religion in Greek Literature, where he declares that the age needs “a new definition of God.” Thinking the need over, I turned to the Summa contra Gentiles. I was led to it by the Encyclical of Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, urging the study of St Thomas. A further motive, quite unexpected, was supplied by the University of Oxford in 1902 placing the Summa Contra Gentiles on the list of subjects which a candidate may at his option offer in the Final Honour School of Literae Humaniores,—a very unlikely book to be offered so long as it remains simply as St Thomas wrote it. Lastly I remembered that I had in 1892 published under the name of Aquinas Ethicus a translation of the principal portions of the second part of St Thomas’s Summa Theologica: thus I might be reckoned some thing of an expert in the difficult art of finding English equivalents for scholastic Latin.

There are two ways of behaving towards St Thomas’s writings, analogous to two several treatments of a church still standing, in which the saint might have worshipped. One way is to hand the edifice over to some Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments: they will keep it locked to the vulgar, while admitting some occasional connoisseur: they will do their utmost to preserve every stone identically the same that the mediaeval builder laid. And the Opera Omnia of St Thomas, handsomely bound, may fill a library shelf, whence a volume is occasionally taken down for the sole purpose of knowing what St Thomas said and no more. Another thirteenth-century church may stand, a parish church still, in daily use; an ancient monument, and something besides; a present-day house of prayer, meeting the needs of a twentieth-century congregation; and for that purpose refitted, repainted, restored, repaired and modernised; having had that done to it which its mediaeval architects would have done, had they lived in our time. Nothing is more remarkable in our old English churches than the sturdy self-confidence, and the good taste also lasting for some centuries, with which each successive age has superimposed its own style upon the architecture of its predecessors. If St Thomas's works are to serve modern uses, they must pass from their old Latinity into modern speech: their conclusions must be tested by all the subtlety of present-day science, physical, psychological, historical; maintained, wherever maintainable, but altered, where tenable no longer. Thus only can St Thomas keep his place as a living teacher of mankind.

For the history of the Contra Gentiles I refer the reader to the folio edition printed at the Propaganda Press in 1878 cura et studio Petri Antonii Uccellii, pp. xiii-xxxlx. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) came to the University of Paris in 1245, and there for three years heard the lectures of Albertus Magnus, taking his Bachelor's degree in 1248. He returned to the University in 1253, took his Master's degree in 1257, and thereupon lectured in theology for two or three years, leaving the University in 1259 or 1260. He wrote the Summa contra Gentiles in Italy, under the pontificate of Urban IV (1261-1264), at the request of St Raymund of Pennafort. He went for the third time to the University of Paris in 1269, finally returning to Italy in 1271. Though the Summa contra Gentiles was written in Italy, there is reason to believe that the substance of it was got together during the Saint's second residence at Paris, and formed the staple of his lectures in the University. The more celebrated Summa Theologica was a later work.

The Summa contra Gentiles is in the unique position of a classic whereof the author's manuscript is still in great part extant. It is now in the Vatican Library. The manuscript consists of strips of parchment, of various shades of colour, contained in an old parchment cover to which they were originally stitched. The writing is in double columns, minute and difficult to decipher, abounding in abbreviations, often passing into a kind of shorthand. Through many passages a line is drawn in sign of erasure: but these remain not less legible than the rest, and are printed as foot notes in the Propaganda edition: they do not appear in the present translation. To my mind, these erasures furnish the best proof of the authenticity of the autograph, which is questioned by S. E. Frette, editor of Divi Thomae Opera Omnia (Vives, Paris, 1874), vol. XII, preface iv-vi. An inscription on the cover states that the manuscript is the autograph of St Thomas, and that it was brought from Naples to the Dominican convent at Bergamo in 1354: whence its name of the Bergamo autograph.’ Many leaves were lost in the sack of the convent by the armies of the first French Revolution; and the whole of Book IV is missing.

The frequent erasures of the Saint himself lend some countenance to the omissions of his translator. Re-reading his manuscript in the twentieth century, St Thomas would have been not less ready than he showed himself in the thirteenth century to fulfil the Horatian precept, saepe stylum vertas.

J. R.

BOOK I

CHAPTER I

THE FUNCTION OF THE WISE MAN

My mouth shall discuss truth, and my lips shall detest the ungodly (Prov. vii, 7).

ACCORDING to established popular usage, which the Philosopher considers should be our guide in the naming of things, they are called wise' who put things in their right order and control them well. Now, in all things that are to be controlled and put in order to an end, the measure of control and order must be taken from the end in view; and the proper end of everything is something good. Hence we see in the arts that art A governs and, as it were, lords it over art B, when the proper end of art B belongs to A. Thus the art of medicine lords it over the art of the apothecary, because health, the object of medicine, is the end of all drugs that the apothecary's art compounds. These arts that lord it over others are called master-building,' or masterful arts'; and the master-builders' who practise them arrogate to themselves the name of wise men.' But because these persons deal with the ends in view of certain particular things, without attaining to the general end of all things, they are called wise in this or that particular thing,' as it is said, As a wise architect I have laid the foundation' (1 Cor. iii, 10); while the name of wise' without qualification is reserved for him alone who deals with the last end of the universe, which is also the first beginning of the order of the universe. Hence, according to the Philosopher, it is proper to the wise man to consider the highest causes.

Now the last end of everything is that which is intended by the prime author or mover thereof. The prime author and mover of the universe is intelligence, as will be shown later (B. II, Chap.XXIII,XXIV). Therefore the last end of the universe must be the good of the intelligence, and that is truth. Truth then must be the final end of the whole universe; and about the consideration of that end wisdom must primarily be concerned. And therefore the Divine Wisdom, clothed in flesh, testifies that He came into the world for the manifestation of truth: For this was I born, and unto this I came into the World, to give testimony to the truth (John xvii, 37). The Philosopher also rules that the first philosophy is the science of truth, not of any and every truth, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, and appertains to the first principle of the being of all things; hence its truth is the principle of all truth, for things are in truth as they are in being.

It is one and the same function to embrace either of two contraries and to repel the other. Hence, as it is the function of the wise man to discuss truth, particularly of the first beginning, so it is his also to impugn the contrary error. Suitably therefore is the double function of the wise man displayed in the words above quoted from the Sapiential Book, namely, to study, and upon study to speak out the truth of God, which of all other is most properly called truth, and this is referred to in the words, My mouth shall discuss truth, and to impugn error contrary to truth, as referred to in the words, And my lips shall detest the ungodly.

CHAPTER II

OF THE AUTHOR’S PURPOSE

OF all human pursuits, the pursuit of wisdom is the more perfect, the more sublime, the more useful, and the more agreeable. The more perfect, because in so far as a man gives himself up to the pursuit of wisdom, to that extent he enjoys already some portion of true happiness. Blessed is the man that shall dwell in wisdom (Ecclus xiv, 22). The more sublime, because thereby man comes closest to the likeness of God, who hath made all things in wisdom (Ps. ciii, 24). The more useful, because by this same wisdom we arrive at the realm of immortality. The desire of wisdom shall lead to an everlasting kingdom (Wisd. vi, 21). The more agreeable, because her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any weariness, but gladness and joy (Wisd. viii, 16).

But on two accounts it is difficult to proceed against each particular error: first, because the sacrilegious utterances of our various erring opponents are not so well known to us as to enable us to find reasons, drawn from their own words, for the confutation of their errors: for such was the method of the ancient doctors in confuting the errors of the Gentiles, whose tenets they were readily able to know, having either been Gentiles themselves, or at least having lived among Gentiles and been instructed in their doctrines. Secondly, because some of them, as Mohammedans and Pagans, do not agree with us in recognising the authority of any scripture, available for their conviction, as we can argue against the Jews from the Old Testament, and against heretics from the New. But these receive neither: hence it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, which all are obliged to assent to. But in the things of God natural reason is often at a loss.

CHAPTER III

THAT THE TRUTHS WHICH WE CONFESS CONCERNING GOD FALL UNDER TWO MODES OR CATEGORIES

BECAUSE not every truth admits of the same mode of manifestation, and "a well-educated man will expect exactness in every class of subject, according as the nature of the thing admits," as is very well remarked by the Philosopher (Eth. Nicom. I, 1094b), we must first show what mode of proof is possible for the truth that we have now before us. The truths that we confess concerning God fall under two modes. Some things true of God are beyond all the competence of human reason, as that God is Three and One. Other things there are to which even human reason can attain, as the existence and unity of God, which philosophers have proved to a demonstration under the guidance of the light of natural reason. That there are points of absolute intelligibility in God altogether beyond the compass of human reason, most manifestly appears. For since the leading principle of all knowledge of any given subject-matter is an understanding of the thing's innermost being, or substance—according to the doctrine of the Philosopher, that the essence is the principle of demonstration—it follows that the mode of our knowledge of the substance must be the mode of knowledge of whatever we know about the substance. Hence if the human understanding comprehends the substance of anything, as of a stone or triangle, none of the points of intelligibility about that thing will exceed the capacity of human reason. But this is not our case with regard to God. The human understanding cannot go so far of its natural power as to grasp His substance, since under the conditions of the present life the knowledge of our understanding commences with sense; and therefore objects beyond sense cannot be grasped by human understanding except so far as knowledge is gathered of them through the senses. But things of sense cannot lead our understanding to read in them the essence of the Divine Substance, inasmuch as they are effects inadequate to the power that caused them. Nevertheless our understanding is thereby led to some knowledge of God, namely, of His existence and of other attributes that must necessarily be attributed to the First Cause. There are, therefore, some points of intelligibility in God, accessible to human reason, and other points that altogether transcend the power of human reason.

The same thing may be understood from consideration of degrees of intelligibility. Of two minds, one of which has a keener insight into truth than the other, the higher mind understands much that the other cannot grasp at all, as is clear in the plain man' (in rustico), who can in no way grasp the subtle theories of philosophy. Now the intellect of an angel excels that of a man more than the intellect of the ablest philosopher excels that of the plainest of plain men (rudissimi idiotae). The angel has a higher standpoint in creation than man as a basis of his knowledge of God, inasmuch as the substance of the angel, whereby he is led to know God by a process of natural knowledge, is nobler and more excellent than the things of sense, and even than the soul itself, whereby the human mind rises to the knowledge of God. But the Divine Mind exceeds the angelic much more than the angelic the human. For the Divine Mind of its own comprehensiveness covers the whole extent of its substance, and therefore perfectly understands its own essence, and knows all that is knowable about itself; but an angel of his natural knowledge does not know the essence of God, because the angel's own substance, whereby it is led to a knowledge of God, is an effect inadequate to the power of the cause that created it. Hence not all things that God understands in Himself can be grasped by the natural knowledge of an angel; nor is human reason competent to take in all that an angel understands of his own natural ability. As therefore it would be the height of madness in a plain man' to declare a philosopher's propositions false, because he could not understand them, so and much more would a man show exceeding folly if he suspected of falsehood a divine revelation given by the ministry of angels, on the mere ground that it was beyond the investigation of reason.

The same thing manifestly appears from the incapacity which we daily experience in the observation of nature. We are ignorant of very many properties of the things of sense; and of the properties that our senses do apprehend, in most cases we cannot perfectly discover the reason. Much more is it beyond the competence of human reason to investigate all the points of intelligibility in that supreme excellent and transcendent substance of God. Consonant with this is the saying of the Philosopher, that “as the eyes of bats are to the light of the sun, so is the intelligence of our soul to the things most manifest by nature” (Aristotle, Metaphysics I, min. l).

To this truth Holy Scripture also bears testimony. For it is said: Perchance thou wilt seize upon the traces of God, and fully discover the Almighty (Job xi, 7). And, Lo, God is great, and surpassing our knowledge (Job xxxvi, 26). And, We know in part (I Cor. xiii, 9). Not everything, therefore, that is said of God, even though it be beyond the power of reason to investigate, is at once to be rejected as false.

CHAPTER IV

THAT IT IS AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE TRUTHS OF GOD, KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON, TO BE PROPOSED TO MEN TO BE BELIEVED ON FAITH

IF a truth of this nature were left to the sole enquiry of reason, three disadvantages would follow. One is that the knowledge of God would be confined to few. The discovery of truth is the fruit of studious enquiry. From this very many are hindered. Some are hindered by a constitutional unfitness, their natures being ill-disposed to the acquisition of knowledge. They could never arrive by study to the highest grade of human knowledge, which consists in the knowledge of God. Others are hindered by the needs of business and the ties of the management of property. There must be in human society some men devoted to temporal affairs. These could not possibly spend time enough in the learned lessons of speculative enquiry to arrive at the highest point of human enquiry, the knowledge of God. Some again are hindered by sloth. The knowledge of the truths that reason can investigate concerning God presupposes much previous knowledge. Indeed almost the entire study of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God. Hence, of all parts of philosophy, that part stands over to be learnt last, which consists of metaphysics dealing with points of Divinity. Thus, only with great labour of study is it possible to arrive at the searching out of the aforesaid truth; and this labour few are willing to undergo for sheer love of knowledge.

Another disadvantage is that such as did arrive at the knowledge or discovery of the aforesaid truth would take a long time over it, on account of the profundity of such truth, and the many prerequisites to the study, and also because in youth and early manhood, the soul, tossed to and fro on the waves of passion, is not fit for the study of such high truth: only in settled age does the soul become prudent and scientific, as the Philosopher says. Thus, if the only way open to the knowledge of God were the way of reason, the human race would dwell long in thick darkness of ignorance: as the knowledge of God, the best instrument for making men perfect and good, would accrue only to a few, and to those few after a considerable lapse of time.

A third disadvantage is that, owing to the infirmity of our judgement and the perturbing force of imagination, there is some admixture of error in most of the investigations of human reason. This would be a reason to many for continuing to doubt even of the most accurate demonstrations, not perceiving the force of the demonstration, and seeing the divers judgements of divers persons who have the name of being wise men. Besides, in the midst of much demonstrated truth there is sometimes an element of error, not demonstrated but asserted on the strength of some plausible and sophistic reasoning that is taken for a demonstration. And therefore it was necessary for the real truth concerning divine things to be presented to men with fixed certainty by way of faith. Wholesome therefore is the arrangement of divine clemency, whereby things even that reason can investigate are commanded to be held on faith, so that all might easily be partakers of the knowledge of God, and that without doubt and error.

Hence it is said: Now ye walk not as the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their own notions, having the understanding darkened (Eph. iv, 17, 18); and, I will make all thy sons taught of the Lord (Isa. liv, 1, 5).

CHAPTER V

THAT IT IS AN ADVANTAGE FOR THINGS THAT CANNOT HE SEARCHED OUT BY REASON TO BE PROPOSED AS TENETS OF FAITH

SOME may possibly think that points which reason is unable to investigate ought not to be proposed to man to believe, since Divine Wisdom provides for every being according to the measure of its nature; and therefore we must show the necessity of things even that transcend reason being proposed by God to man for his belief.

1. One proof is this. No one strives with any earnestness of desire after anything, unless it be known to him beforehand. Since, then, as will be traced out in the following pages (B. III, Chap.CXLVIII), Divine Providence directs men to a higher good than human frailty can experience in the present life, the mental faculties ought to be evoked and led onward to something higher than our reason can attain at present, learning thereby to desire something and earnestly to tend to something that transcends the entire state of the present life. And such is the special function of the Christian religion, which stands alone in its promise of spiritual and eternal goods, whereas the Old Law, carrying temporal promises, proposed few tenets that transcended the enquiry of human reason.

2. Also another advantage is thence derived, to wit, the repression of presumption, which is the mother of error. For there are some so presumptuous of their own genius as to think that they can measure with their understanding the whole nature of the Godhead, thinking all that to be true which seems true to them, and that to be false which does not seem true

to them. In order then that the human mind might be delivered from this presumption, and attain to a modest style of enquiry after truth, it was necessary for certain things to be proposed to man from God that altogether exceeded his understanding.

3. There is also another evident advantage in this, that any knowledge, however imperfect, of the noblest objects confers a very high perfection on the soul. And therefore, though human reason cannot fully grasp truths above reason, nevertheless it is much perfected by holding such truths after some fashion at least by faith. And therefore it is said: Many things beyond the understanding of man are shown to thee (Ecclus iii, 23). And, The things that are of God, none knoweth but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them through his Spirit (1 Cor. ii, 10, 11).

CHAPTER VI

THAT THERE IS NO LIGHTMINDEDNESS IN ASSENTING TO TRUTHS OF FAITH, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ABOVE REASON

THE Divine Wisdom, that knows all things most fully, has deigned to reveal these her secrets to men, and in proof of them has displayed works beyond the competence of all natural powers, in the wonderful cure of diseases, in the raising of the dead, and what is more wonderful still, in such inspiration of human minds as that simple and ignorant persons, filled with the gift of the Holy Ghost, have gained in an instant the height of wisdom and eloquence. By force of the aforesaid proof, without violence of arms, without promise of pleasures, and, most wonderful thing of all, in the midst of the violence of persecutors, a countless multitude, not only of the uneducated but of the wisest men, flocked to the Christian faith, wherein doctrines are preached that transcend all human understanding, pleasures of sense are restrained, and a contempt is taught of all worldly possessions. That mortal minds should assent to such teaching is the greatest of miracles, and a manifest work of divine inspiration leading men to despise the visible and desire only invisible goods. Nor did this happen suddenly nor by chance, but by a divine disposition, as is manifest from the fact that God foretold by many oracles of His prophets that He intended to do this. The books of those prophets are still venerated amongst us, as bearing testimony to our faith. This argument is touched upon in the text: Which (salvation) having begun to be uttered by the Lord, was confirmed by them that heard him even unto us, God joining in the testimony by signs and portents and various distributions of the Holy Spirit (Heb. ii, 3, 4). This so wonderful conversion of the world to the Christian faith is so certain a sign of past miracles, that they need no further reiteration, since they appear evidently in their effects. It would be more wonderful than all other miracles, if without miraculous signs the world had been induced by simple and low-born men to believe truths so arduous, to do works so difficult, to hope for reward so high. And yet even in our times God ceases not through His saints to work miracles for the confirmation of the faith.

CHAPTER VII

THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT CONTRARY TO THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIAN FAITH

THE natural dictates of reason must certainly be quite true: it is impossible to think of their being otherwise. Nor a gain is it permissible to believe that the tenets of faith are false, being so evidently confirmed by God. Since therefore falsehood alone is contrary to truth, it is impossible for the truth of faith to be contrary to principles known by natural reason.

2. Whatever is put into the disciple's mind by the teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless the teacher is teaching dishonestly, which would be a wicked thing to say of God. But the knowledge of principles naturally known is put into us by God, seeing that God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore these principles also are contained in the Divine Wisdom. Whatever therefore is contrary to these principles is contrary to Divine Wisdom, and cannot be of God.

3. Contrary reasons fetter our intellect fast, so that it cannot proceed to the knowledge of the truth. If therefore contrary informations were sent us by God, our intellect would be thereby hindered from knowledge of the truth: but such hindrance cannot be of God.

4. What is natural cannot be changed while nature remains. But contrary opinions cannot be in the same mind at the same time: therefore no opinion or belief is sent to man from God contrary to natural knowledge.

And therefore the Apostle says: The word is near in thy heart and in thy mouth, that is, the word of faith which we preach (Rom. x, 8). But because it surpasses reason it is counted by some as contrary to reason, which cannot be. To the same effect is the authority of Augustine (Gen. ad litt. ii, 18): “ What truth reveals can nowise be contrary to the holy books either of the Old or of the New Testament.” Hence the conclusion is evident, that any arguments alleged against the teachings of faith do not proceed logically from first principles of nature, principles of themselves known, and so do not amount to a demonstration; but are either probable reasons or sophistical; hence room is left for refuting them.

CHAPTER VIII

OF THE RELATION OF HUMAN REASON TO THE FIRST TRUTH OF FAITH

THE things of sense, from whence human reason takes its beginning of knowledge, retain in themselves some trace of imitation of God, inasmuch as they are, and are good; yet so imperfect is this trace that it proves wholly insufficient to declare the substance of God Himself. Since every agent acts to the producing of its own likeness, effects in their several ways bear some likeness to their causes: nevertheless the effect does not always attain to the perfect likeness of the agent that produces it. In regard then to knowledge of the truth of faith, which can only be thoroughly known to those who behold the substance of God, human reason stands so conditioned as to be able to argue some true likenesses to it: which likenesses however are not sufficient for any sort of demonstrative or intuitive comprehension of the aforesaid truth. Still it is useful for the human mind to exercise itself in such reasonings, however feeble, provided there be no presumptuous hope of perfect comprehension or demonstration. With this view the authority of Hilary agrees, who says (De Trinitate, ii, 10), speaking of such truth: “In this belief start, run, persist; and though I know that you will not reach the goal, still I shall congratulate you as I see you making progress. But intrude not into that sanctuary, and plunge not into the mystery of infinite truth; entertain no presumptuous hope of comprehending the height of intelligence, but understand that it is incomprehensible.”

CHAPTER IX

THE ORDER AND MODE OF PROCEDURE IN THIS WORK

THERE is then a twofold sort of truth in things divine for the wise man to study: one that can be attained by rational enquiry, another that transcends all the industry of reason. This truth of things divine I do not call twofold on the part of God, who is one simple Truth, but on the part of our knowledge, as our cognitive faculty has different aptitudes for the knowledge of divine things. To the declaration therefore of the first sort of truth we must proceed by demonstrative reasons that may serve to convince the adversary. But because such reasons are not forthcoming for truth of the second sort, our aim ought not to be to convince the adversary by reasons, but to refute his reasonings against the truth, which we may hope to do, since natural reason cannot be contrary to the truth of faith. The special mode of refutation to be employed against an opponent of this second sort of truth is by alleging the authority of Scripture confirmed from heaven by miracles. There are however some probable reasons available for the declaration of this truth, to the exercise and consolation of the faithful, but not to the convincing of opponents, because the mere insufficiency of such reasoning would rather confirm them in their error, they thinking that we assented to the truth of faith for reasons so weak.

According then to the manner indicated we will bend our endeavour, first, to the manifestation of that truth which faith professes and reason searches out, alleging reasons demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the books of philosophers and saints, for the establishment of the truth and the confutation of the opponent. Then, to proceed from what is more to what is less manifest in our regard, we will pass to the manifestation of that truth which transcends reason, solving the arguments of opponents, and by probable reasons and authorities, so far as God shall enable us, declaring the truth of faith.

Taking therefore the way of reason to the pursuit of truths that human reason can search out regarding God, the first consideration that meets us is of the attributes of God in Himself; secondly of the coming forth of creatures from God; thirdly of the order of creatures to God as to their last end.

CHAPTER X

OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT HE PROVED, BEING A SELF-EVIDENT TRUTH

THIS opinion rests on the following grounds:

1. Those truths are self-evident which are recognised at once, as soon as the terms in which they are expressed are known. Such a truth is the assertion that God exists: for by the name God' we understand something greater than which nothing can be thought. This notion is formed in the understanding by whoever hears and understands the name God,' so that God must already exist at least in the mind. Now He cannot exist in the mind only: for what is in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only; but nothing is greater than God, as the very meaning of the name shows: it follows that the existence of God is a self evident truth, being evidenced by the mere meaning of the name.

2. The existence of a being is conceivable, that could not be conceived not to exist; such a being is evidently greater than another that could be conceived not to exist. Thus then something greater than God is conceivable if He could be conceived not to exist; but anything greater than God' is against the meaning of the name God.' It remains then that the existence of God is a self-evident truth.

3. Those propositions are most self-evident which are either identities, as Man is man,' or in which the predicates are included in the definitions of the subjects, as Man is an animal.' But in God of all beings this is found true, that His existence is His essence, as will be shown later ([4]Chap.

XXII); and thus there is one and the same answer to the question What is He?’ and Whether He is.’ Thus then, when it is said God is,’ the predicate is either the same with the subject or at least is included in the definition of the subject; and thus the existence of God will be a self-evident truth.

4. Things naturally known are self-evident: for the knowledge of them is not attained by enquiry and study. But the existence of God is naturally known, since the desire of man tends naturally to God as to his last end, as will be shown further on (B. III, Chap.XXV).

5. That must be self-evident whereby all other things are known; but such is God; for as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual cognition.

CHAPTER XI

REJECTION OF THE AFORESAID OPINION, AND SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID REASONS

THE above opinion arises partly from custom, men being accustomed from the beginning to hear and invoke the name of God. Custom, especially that which is from the beginning, takes the place of nature; hence notions wherewith the mind is imbued from childhood are held as firmly as if they were naturally known and self-evident. Partly also it owes its origin to the neglect of a distinction between what is self-evident of itself absolutely and what is self-evident relatively to us. Absolutely indeed the existence of God is self-evident, since God’s essence is His existence. But since we cannot mentally conceive God’s essence, his existence is not self-evident relatively to us.

1. Nor is the existence of God necessarily self-evident as soon as the meaning of the name God’ is known. First, because it is not evident, even to all who admit the existence of God, that God is something greater than which nothing can be conceived, since many of the ancients said that this world was God. Then granting that universal usage understands by the name God’ something greater than which nothing can be conceived, it will not follow that there exists in rerum natura something greater than which nothing can be conceived. For thing’ and “notion implied in the name of the thing” must answer to one another. From the conception in the mind of what is declared by this name God’ it does not follow that God exists otherwise than in the mind. Hence there will be no necessity either of that something, greater than which nothing can be conceived, existing otherwise

than in the mind; and from this it does not follow that there is anything in rerum natura greater than which nothing can be conceived. And so the supposition of the nonexistence of God goes untouched. For the possibility of our thought outrunning the greatness of any given object, whether of the actual or of the ideal order, has nothing in it to vex the soul of any one except of him alone who already grants the existence in rerum natura of something than which nothing can be conceived greater.

2. Nor is it necessary for something greater than God to be conceivable, if His non-existence is conceivable. For the possibility of conceiving Him not to exist does not arise from the imperfection or uncertainty of His Being, since His Being is of itself most manifest, but from the infirmity of our understanding, which cannot discern Him as He is of Himself, but only by the effects which He produces; and so it is brought by reasoning to the knowledge of Him.

3. As it is self-evident to us that the whole is greater than its part, so the existence of God is most self-evident to them that see the divine essence, inasmuch as His essence is His existence. But because we cannot see His essence, we are brought to the knowledge of His existence, not by what He is in Himself but by the effects which He works.

4. Man knows God naturally as he desires Him naturally. Now man desires Him naturally inasmuch as he naturally desires happiness, which is a certain likeness to the divine goodness. Thus it is not necessary that God, considered in Himself, should be naturally known to man, but a certain likeness of God. Hence man must be led to a knowledge of God through the likenesses of Him that are found in the effects which He works.

5. God is that wherein all things are known, not as though other things could not be known without His being known first, as happens in the case of self-evident principles, but because through His influence all knowledge is caused in us.

CHAPTER XII

OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IS A TENET OF FAITH ALONE AND CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED

THE falseness of this opinion is shown to us as well by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to argue causes from effects, as also by the order of the sciences, for if there be no knowable substance above sensible substances, there will be no science above physical science; as also by the efforts of philosophers, directed to the proof of the existence of God; as also by apostolic truth asserting: The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. i, 20).

The axiom that in God essence and existence are the same is to be understood of the existence whereby God subsists in Himself, the manner of which is unknown to us, as also is His essence; not of the existence which signifies an affirmative judgement of the understanding. For in the form of such affirmative judgement the fact that there is a God falls under demonstration; as our mind is led by demonstrative reasons to form such a proposition declaratory of the existence of God. In the reasonings whereby the existence of God is demonstrated it is not necessary to assume for a premise the essence or quiddity of God: but instead of the quiddity the effect is taken for a premise, as is done in demonstrations a posteriori from effect to cause. All the names of God are imposed either on the principle of denying of God Himself certain effects of His power, or from some habitude of God towards those effects. Although God transcends sense and the objects of sense, nevertheless sensible effects are the basis of our demonstration of the existence of God. Thus the origin of our own knowledge is in sense, even of things that transcend sense.

CHAPTER XIII

REASONS IN PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

WE will put first the reasons by which Aristotle proceeds to prove the existence of God from the consideration of motion as follows.

Everything that is in motion is put and kept in motion by some other thing. It is evident to sense that there are beings in motion. A thing is in motion because something else puts and keeps it in motion. That mover therefore either is itself in motion or not. If it is not in motion, our point is gained which we proposed to prove, namely, that we must posit something which moves other things without being itself in motion, and this we call God. But if the mover is itself in motion, then it is moved by some other mover. Either then we have to go on to infinity, or we must come to some mover which is motionless; but it is impossible to go on to infinity, therefore we must posit some motionless prime mover. In this argument there are two propositions to be proved: that everything which is in motion is put and kept in motion by something else; and that in the series of movers and things moved it is impossible to go on to infinity.

The Philosopher also goes about in another way to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in the series of efficient causes, but we must come to one first cause, and this we call God. The way is more or less as follows. In every series of efficient causes, the first term is cause of the intermediate, and the intermediate is cause of the last. But if in efficient causes there is a process to infinity, none of the causes will be the first: therefore all the others will be taken away which are intermediate. But that is manifestly not the case; therefore we must posit the existence of some first efficient cause, which is God.

Another argument is brought by St John Damascene (De Fid. Orthod. I, 3), thus: It is impossible for things contrary and discordant to fall into one harmonious order always or for the most part, except under some one guidance, assigning to each and all a tendency to a fixed end. But in the world we see things of different natures falling into harmonious order, not rarely and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore there must be some Power by whose providence the world is governed; and that we call God.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT IN ORDER TO A KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WE MUST USE THE METHOD OF NEGATIVE DIFFERENTIATION

AFTER showing that there is a First Being, whom we call God, we must enquire into the conditions of His existence. We must use the method of negative differentiation, particularly in the consideration of the divine substance. For the divine substance, by its immensity, transcends every form that our intellect can realise; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is, but we have some sort of knowledge of it by knowing what it is not. The more we can negatively differentiate it, or the more attributes we can strike off from it in our mind, the more we approach to a knowledge of it: for we know each thing more perfectly, the fuller view we have of its differences as compared with other things; for each thing has in itself a proper being, distinct from all others. Hence in dealing with things that we can define, we first place them in some genus, by which we know in general what the thing is; and afterwards we add the differentias whereby the thing is distinguished from other things; and thus is achieved a complete knowledge of the substance of the thing. But because in the study of the divine substance we cannot fix upon anything for a genus (Chap.XXV), nor can we mark that substance off from other things by affirmative differentias, we must determine it by negative differentias. In affirmative differentias one limits the extension of another, and brings us nearer to a complete designation of the thing under enquiry, inasmuch as it makes that thing differ from more and more things. And the same holds good also of negative differentias. For example, we may say that God is not an accident, in that He is distinguished from all accidents; then if we add that He is not a body, we shall further distinguish Him from some substances; and so in order by such negations He will be further distinguished from everything besides Himself; and then there will be a proper notion of His substance, when He shall be known as distinct from all. Still it will not be a perfect knowledge, because He will not be known for what He is in Himself.

To proceed therefore in the knowledge of God by way of negative differentiation, let us take as a principle what has been shown in a previous chapter, that God is altogether immovable, which is confirmed also by the authority of Holy Scripture. For it is said: I am the Lord and change not (Mal. iii, 6); With whom there is no change (James i, 17); God is not as man, that he should change (Num. xxiii, 19).

CHAPTER XV

THAT GOD IS ETERNAL

THE beginning of anything and its ceasing to be is brought about by motion or change. But it has been shown that God is altogether unchangeable: He is therefore eternal, without beginning or end.

2. Those things alone are measured by time which are in motion, inasmuch as time is an enumeration of motion. But God is altogether without motion, and therefore is not measured by time. Therefore in Him it is impossible to fix any before or after: He has no being after not being, nor can He have any not being after being, nor can any succession be found in His being, because all this is unintelligible without time. He is therefore without beginning and without end, having all His being at once, wherein consists the essence of eternity.

3. If at some time God was not, and afterwards was, He was brought forth by some cause from not being to being. But not by Himself, because what is not cannot do anything. But if by another, that other is prior to Him. But it has been shown that God is the First Cause; therefore He did not begin to be: hence neither will He cease to be; because what always has been has the force of being always.

4. We see in the world some things which are possible to be and not to be. But everything that is possible to be has a cause: for seeing that of itself it is open to two alternatives, being and not being; if being is to be assigned to it, that must be from some cause. But we cannot proceed to infinity in a series of causes: therefore we must posit something that necessarily is. Now everything necessary either has the cause of its necessity from elsewhere, or not from elsewhere, but is of itself necessary. But we cannot proceed to infinity in the enumeration of things necessary that have the cause of their necessity from elsewhere: therefore we must come to some first thing

necessary, that is of itself necessary; and that is God. Therefore God is eternal, since everything that is of itself necessary is eternal.

Hence the Psalmist: But thou, O Lord, abidest for ever: thou art the self-same, and thy years shall not fail (Ps. ci, 13-28).

CHAPTER XVI

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO PASSIVE POTENTIALITY

EVERYTHING that has in its substance an admixture of potentiality, to the extent that it has potentiality is liable not to be: because what can be, can also not be. But God in Himself cannot not be, seeing that He is everlasting; therefore there is in God no potentiality.

2. Although in order of time that which is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in actuality, is in potentiality before it is in actuality, yet, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality, because potentiality does not bring itself into actuality, but is brought into actuality by something which is already in actuality. Everything therefore that is any way in potentiality has something else prior to it. But God is the First Being and the First Cause, and therefore has not in Himself any admixture of potentiality.

4. Everything acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. Whatever then is not all actuality, does not act by its whole self, but by something of itself. But what does not act by its whole self, is not a prime agent; for it acts by participation in something else, not by its own essence. The prime agent then, which is God, has no admixture of potentiality, but is pure actuality.

6. We see that there is that in the world which passes from potentiality to actuality. But it does not educe itself from potentiality to actuality, because what is in potentiality is not as yet, and therefore cannot act. Therefore there must be some other prior thing, whereby this thing may be brought out from potentiality to actuality. And again, if this further thing is going out from potentiality to actuality, there must be posited before it yet some other thing, whereby it may be reduced to actuality. But this process cannot go on

for ever: therefore we must come to something that is only in actuality, and nowise in potentiality; and that we call God.

CHAPTER XVIII

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO COMPOSITION

IN every compound there must be actuality and potentiality. For a plurality of things cannot become one thing, unless there be actuality and potentiality. For things that are not one absolutely, are not actually united except by being in a manner tied up together or driven together: in which case the parts thus got together are in potentiality in respect of union; for they combine actually, after having been potentially combinable. But in God there is no potentiality: therefore there is not in Him any composition.

3. Every compound is potentially soluble in respect of its being compound, although in some cases there may be some other fact that stands in the way of dissolution. But what is soluble is in potentiality not to be, which cannot be said of God, seeing that He is of Himself a necessary Being.

CHAPTER XX

THAT GOD IS INCORPOREAL

EVERY corporeal thing, being extended, is compound and has parts. But God is not compound: therefore He is not anything corporeal.

5. According to the order of objects is the order and distinction of powers: therefore above all sensible objects there is some intelligible object, existing in the nature of things. But every corporeal thing existing in nature is sensible: therefore there is determinable above all corporeal things something nobler than they. If therefore God is corporeal, He is not the first and greatest Being.

With this demonstrated truth divine authority also agrees. For it is said: God is a spirit (John iv, 24): To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, only God (1 Tim. i, 17): The invisible things of God are understood and discerned by the things that are made (Rom. i, 29). For the things that are discerned, not by sight but by understanding, are incorporeal.

Hereby is destroyed the error of the first natural philosophers, who posited none but material causes. The Gentiles also are refuted, who set up the elements of the world, and the powers therein existing, for gods; also the follies of the Anthropomorphite heretics, who figured God under bodily lineaments; also of the Manicheans, who thought God was an infinite substance of light diffused through infinite space. The occasion of all these errors was that, in thinking of divine things, men came under the influence of the imagination, which can be cognisant only of bodily likeness. And therefore we must transcend imagination in the study of things incorporeal.

CHAPTER XXI

THAT GOD IS HIS OWN ESSENCE

IN everything that is not its own essence, quiddity, or nature, there must be some composition. For since in everything its own essence is contained,—if in anything there were contained nothing but its essence, the whole of that thing would be its essence, and so itself would be its own essence. If then anything is not its own essence, there must be something in that thing besides its essence, and so there must be in it composition. Hence also the essence in compound things is spoken of as a part, as humanity in man. But it has been shown that in God there is no composition. God therefore is His own essence.

2. That alone is reckoned to be beyond the essence of a thing, which does not enter into its definition: for the definition declares what the thing essentially is. But the accidents of a thing are the only points about it which fall not within the definition: therefore the accidents are the only points about a thing besides its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as will be shown (Chap.XXIII): therefore there is nothing in Him besides His essence.

3. The forms that are not predicable of subsistent things, whether in the universal or in the singular, are forms that do not of themselves subsist singly, individualised in themselves. It is not said that Socrates or man or animal is whiteness; because whiteness is not anything subsisting singly in itself, but is individualised by the substance in which it exists. Also the essences or quiddities of genera or species are individualised according to the definite matter of this or that individual, although the generic or specific quiddity includes form and matter in general: hence it is not said that Socrates or man is humanity. But the Divine Essence is something existing singly by itself, and individualised in itself, as will be shown ([11]Chap.

XLII). The Divine Essence therefore is predicated of God in such a way that it can be said: God is His own essence.’

CHAPTER XXII

THAT IN GOD EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE IS THE SAME

IT has been shown above (Chap.XV, n. 4) that there is an Existence which of itself necessarily is; and that is God. If this existence, which necessarily is, is contained in some essence not identical with it, then either it is dissonant and at variance with that essence, as subsistent existence is at variance with the essence of whiteness; or it is consonant with and akin to that essence, as existence in something other than itself is consonant with whiteness. In the former case, the existence which of itself necessarily is will not attach to that essence, any more than subsistent existence will attach to whiteness. In the latter case, either such existence must depend on the essence, or both existence and essence depend on another cause, or the essence must depend on the existence. The former two suppositions are against the idea of a being which of itself necessarily is; because, if it depends on another thing, it no longer is necessarily. From the third supposition it follows that that essence is accidental and adventitious to the thing which of itself necessarily is; because all that follows upon the being of a thing is accidental to it; and thus the supposed essence will not be the essence at all. God therefore has no essence that is not His existence.

2. Everything is by its own existence. Whatever then is not its own existence does not of itself necessarily exist. But God does of Himself necessarily exist: therefore God is His own existence.

4. Existence’ denotes a certain actuality: for a thing is not said to be’ for what it is potentially, but for what it is actually. But everything to which there attaches an actuality, existing as something different from it, stands to the same as potentiality to actuality. If then the divine essence is something

else than its own existence, it follows that essence and existence in God stand to one another as potentiality and actuality. But it has been shown that in God there is nothing of potentiality (Chap.XVI), but that He is pure actuality. Therefore God's essence is not anything else but His existence.

5. Everything that cannot be except by the concurrence of several things is compound. But nothing in which essence is one thing, and existence another, can be except by the concurrence of several things, to wit, essence and existence. Therefore everything in which essence is one thing, and existence another, is compound. But God is not compound, as has been shown (Chap.XVIII). Therefore the very existence of God is His essence.

This sublime truth was taught by the Lord to Moses (Exod. iii, 13, 14) If they say to me, What is his name? what shall I say to them? Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is hath sent me to you: showing this to be His proper name, He who is. But every name is given to show the nature or essence of some thing. Hence it remains that the very existence or being of God is His essence or nature.

CHAPTER XXIII

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO ACCIDENT

EVERYTHING that is in a thing accidentally has a cause for its being therein, seeing that it is beside the essence of the thing wherein it is. If then there is anything in God accidentally, this must be by some cause. Either therefore the cause of the accident is the Divinity itself, or something else. If something else, that something must act upon the divine substance: for nothing induces any form, whether substantial or accidental, in any recipient, except by acting in some way upon it, because acting is nothing else than making something actually be, which is by a form. Thus God will be acted upon and moved by some agent, which is against the conclusions of ChapterXIII. But if the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident supposed to be in it, then,—inasmuch as it cannot possibly be the cause of it in so far as it is the recipient of it, because at that rate the same thing in the same respect would actualise itself,—then this accident, supposed to be in God, needs must be received by Him in one respect and caused by Him in another, even as things corporeal receive their proper accidents by the virtue of their matter, and cause them by their form. Thus then God will be compound, the contrary of which has been above proved. &gt;

4. In whatever thing anything is accidentally, that thing is in some way changeable in its nature: for accident as such may be and may not be in the thing in which it is. If then God has anything attaching to Him accidentally, it follows that He is changeable, the contrary of which has above been proved (Chap.XIII,XV).

5. A thing into which an accident enters, is not all and everything that is contained in itself: because accident is not of the essence of the subject. But God is whatever He has in Himself. Therefore in God there is no accident.—The premises are proved thus. Everything is found more excellently in

cause than in effect. But God is cause of all: therefore whatever is in Him is found there in the most excellent way possible. But what most perfectly attaches to a thing is the very thing itself. This unity of identity is more perfect than the substantial union of one element with another, e.g., of form with matter; and that union again is more perfect than the union that comes of one thing being accidentally in another. It remains therefore that God is whatever He has.

Hence Augustine (De Trinitate, v, c. 4, n. 5): “There is nothing accidental in God, because there is nothing changeable or perishable.” The showing forth of this truth is the confutation of sundry Saracen jurists, who suppose certain “ideas” superadded to the Divine Essence.

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT HE CHARACTERISED BY THE ADDITION OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENTIA

IT is impossible for anything actually to be, unless all things exist whereby its substantial being is characterised. An animal cannot actually be without being either a rational or an irrational animal. Hence the Platonists, in positing Ideas, did not posit self-existent Ideas of genera, seeing that genera are characterised and brought to specific being by addition of essential differentias; but they posited self-existent Ideas of species alone, seeing that for the (further) characterising of species (in the individuals belonging to it) there is no need of essential differentias. If then the existence of God is characterised and receives an essential characteristic by the addition of something else, that existence will not of itself actually be except by having that other thing superadded to it. But the existence of God is His own very substance, as has been shown. It would follow that the substance of God could not actually be except by something supervening upon it; and thence the further conclusion would ensue that the substance of God is not of itself necessarily existent, the contrary of which has been shown above (Chap.XV, n. 4)

2. Everything that needs something superadded to enable it to be, is in potentiality in respect of that addition. Now the divine substance is not in any way in potentiality, as has been shown (Chap.XVI), but God’s own substance is God’s own being. Therefore His existence cannot be characterised by any superadded substantial characteristic.

CHAPTER XXV

THAT GOD IS NOT IN ANY GENUS

EVERYTHING that is in any genus has something in it whereby the nature of the genus is characterised and reduced to species: for there is nothing in the genus that is not in some species of it. But this is impossible in God, as has been shown in the previous chapter.

2. If God is in any genus, He is either in the genus of accident or the genus of substance. He is not in the genus of accident, for an accident cannot be the first being and the first cause. Again, He cannot be in the genus of substance: for the substance that is a genus is not mere existence : otherwise every substance would be its own existence, since the idea of the genus is maintained in all that is contained under the genus: at that rate no substance would be caused by another, which is impossible (Chap.XIII,XV). But God is mere existence: therefore He is not in any genus.

3. Whatever is in a genus differs in point of existence from other things that are in the same genus: otherwise genus would not be predicated of several things. But all things that are in the same genus must agree in the quiddity, or essence, of the genus: because of them all genus is predicated so as to answer the question what (quid) each thing is. Therefore the existence of each thing that exists in a genus is something over and above the quiddity of the genus. But that is impossible in God.

4. Everything is placed in a genus by reason of its quiddity. But the quiddity of God is His own mere (full) existence . Now a thing is not ranked in a genus on the score of mere (bare) existence: otherwise being,’ in the sense of mere (bare) existence, would be a genus. But that being’ cannot be a genus is proved in this way. If being’ were a genus, some differentia would have to be found to reduce it to species. But no differentia

participates in its genus: I mean, genus is never comprehended in the idea of the differentia: because at that rate genus would be put twice over in the definition of the species. Differentia then must be something over and above what is understood in the idea of genus. Now nothing can be over and above what is understood by the idea of being'; since being' enters into the conceivability of all things whereof it is predicated, and thus can be limited by no differentia.

Hence it is also apparent that God cannot be defined, because every definition is by genus and differentias. It is apparent also that there can be no demonstration of God except through some effect of His production: because the principle of demonstration is a definition of the thing defined.

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL OR ABSTRACT BEING OF ALL THINGS

THINGS are not distinguished from one another in so far as they all have being, because in this they all agree. If therefore things do differ from one another, either being’ itself must be specified by certain added differentias, so that different things have a different specific being; or things must differ in this that being’ itself attaches to specifically different natures. The first alternative is impossible, because no addition can be made to being,’ in the way that differentia is added to genus, as has been said (Chap.XXV, n. 4). It remains therefore that things differ in that they have different natures, to which being’ accrues differently. But the divine being is not something accessory to any nature, but is the very nature or essence of God (Chap.XXII). If therefore the divine being were the formal and abstract being of all things, all things would have to be absolutely one.

4. What is common to many is not anything over and above the many except in thought alone. For example, animal’ is not anything over and above Socrates and Plato and other animals, except in the mind that apprehends the form of animal’ despoiled of all individualising and specifying marks: for what is really animal is man: otherwise it would follow that in Plato there were several animals, to wit, animal in general, and man in general, and Plato himself. Much less then is bare being in general anything over and above all existing things, except in the mind alone. If then God be being in general, God will be nothing more than a logical entity, something that exists in the mind alone.

This error is set aside by the teaching of Holy Scripture, which confesses God lofty and high (Isa. vi, 1), and that He is above all (Rom. ix, 5). For if

He is the being of all, then He is something of all, not above all. The supporters of this error are also cast out by the same sentence which casts out idolaters, who gave the incommunicable name of God to stocks and stones (Wisd. xiv, 8, 21). For if God were the being of all, it would not be more truly said, A stone is a being,’ than A stone is God.’

What has led men into this error is a piece of faulty reasoning. For, seeing that what is common to many is specialised and individualised by addition, they reckoned that the divine being, to which no addition is made, was not any individual being, but was the general being of all things: failing to observe that what is common or universal cannot really exist without addition, but merely is viewed by the mind without addition. Animal’ cannot be without rational’ or irrational’ as a differentia, although it may be thought of without these differentias. Moreover, though the universal be thought of without addition, yet not without susceptibility of addition. Animal’ would not be a genus if no differentia could be added to it; and so of other generic names. But the divine being is without addition, not only in thought, but also in rerum natura; and not only without addition, but without even susceptibility of addition. Hence from this very fact, that He neither receives nor can receive addition, we may rather conclude that God is not being in general, but individual being: for by this very fact His being is distinguished from all other beings, that nothing can be added to it. (Chap.XXIV).

CHAPTER XXVIII

THAT GOD IS UNIVERSAL PERFECTION

AS all perfection and nobility is in a thing inasmuch as the thing is, so every defect is in a thing inasmuch as the thing in some manner is not. As then God has being in its totality, so not-being is totally removed from Him, because the measure in which a thing has being is the measure of its removal from not-being. Therefore all defect is absent from God: He is therefore universal perfection.

2. Everything imperfect must proceed from something perfect: therefore the First Being must be most perfect.

3. Everything is perfect inasmuch as it is in actuality; imperfect, inasmuch as it is in potentiality, with privation of actuality. That then which is nowise in potentiality, but is pure actuality, must be most perfect; and such is God.

4. Nothing acts except inasmuch as it is in actuality: action therefore follows the measure of actuality in the agent. It is impossible therefore for any effect that is brought into being by action to be of a nobler actuality than is the actuality of the agent. It is possible though for the actuality of the effect to be less perfect than the actuality of the acting cause, inasmuch as action may be weakened on the part of the object to which it is terminated, or upon which it is spent. Now in the category of efficient causation everything is reducible ultimately to one cause, which is God, of whom are all things. Everything therefore that actually is in any other thing must be found in God much more eminently than in the thing itself; God then is most perfect.

Hence the answer given to Moses by the Lord, when he sought to see the divine face or glory: I will show thee all good (Exod. xxxiii, 19).

CHAPTER XXIX

HOW LIKENESS TO GOD MAY BE FOUND IN CREATURES

EFFECTS disproportionate to their causes do not agree with them in name and essence. And yet some likeness must be found between such effects and their causes: for it is of the nature of an agent to do something like itself. Thus also God gives to creatures all their perfections; and thereby He has with all creatures a likeness, and an unlikeness at the same time. For this point of likeness, however, it is more proper to say that the creature is like God than that God is like the creature. For that is said to be like a thing, which possesses its quality or form. Since then that which is found to perfection in God is found in other beings by some manner of imperfect participation, the said point of likeness belongs to God absolutely, but not so to the creature. And thus the creature has what belongs to God, and is rightly said to be like to God: but it cannot be said that God has what belongs to the creature, nor is it fitting to say that God is like the creature; as we do not say that a man is like his picture, and yet his picture is rightly pronounced to be like him.

CHAPTER XXX

WHAT NAMES CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD

WE may further consider what may be said or not said of God, or what may be said of Him only, what again may be said of God and at the same time also of other beings. Inasmuch as every perfection of the creature may be found in God, although in another and a more excellent way, it follows that whatever names absolutely denote perfection without defect, are predicated of God and of other beings, as for instance, goodness,’ wisdom,’ being,’ and the like. But whatever names denote such perfection with the addition of a mode proper to creatures, cannot be predicated of God except by way of similitude and metaphor, whereby the attributes of one thing are wont to be adapted to another, as when a man is called a block’ for the denseness of his understanding. Of this sort are all names imposed to denote the species of a created thing, as man,’ and ‘stone’: for to every species is due its own proper mode of perfection and being. In like manner also whatever names denote properties that are caused in things by their proper specific principles, cannot be predicated of God otherwise than metaphorically. But the names that express such perfections with that mode of supereminent excellence in which they appertain to God, are predicated of God alone, as for instance, Sovereign Good,’ First Being,’ and the like. I say that some of the aforesaid names imply perfection without defect, if we consider that which the name was imposed to signify. But if we consider the mode of signification, every name is attended with defect: for by a name we express things as we conceive them in our understanding: but our understanding, taking its beginning of knowledge from sensible objects, does not transcend that mode which it finds in such sensible objects. In them the form is one thing, and that which has the form another. The form, to be sure, is simple, but imperfect, as not subsisting by itself: while that which has the form subsists, but is not simple—nay, is concrete and composite. Hence whatever our understanding marks as subsisting, it marks in the concrete: what it marks as simple, it marks, not as something that is, but as that whereby something is. And thus in every name that we utter, if we consider the mode of signification, there is found an imperfection that does not attach to God, although the thing signified may attach to God in some eminent way, as appears in the name goodness' and good.' Goodness' denotes something as not subsisting by itself: good,' something as concrete and composite. In this respect, then, no name befits God suitably except in respect of that which the name is imposed to signify. Such names therefore may be both affirmed and denied of God, affirmed on account of the meaning of the name, denied on account of the mode of signification. But the mode of supereminence, whereby the said perfections are found in God, cannot be signified by the names imposed by us, except either by negation, as when we call God eternal' or infinite,' or by reference or comparison of Him to other things, as when He is called the First Cause' or the Sovereign Good.' For we cannot take in (capere) of God what He is, but what He is not, and how other beings stand related to Him.

CHAPTER XXXI

THAT THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE BEING PREDICATED OF GOD AND OF OTHER BEINGS

THE perfections proper to other things in respect of their several forms must be attributed to God in respect of His productivity alone, which productivity is no other than His essence. Thus then God is called wise,’ not only in respect of His producing wisdom, but because, in so far as we are wise, we imitate in some measure His productivity, which makes us wise. But He is not called ‘stone,’ though He has made stones, because in the name of ‘stone’ is understood a determinate mode of being wherein a stone is distinguished from God. Still a stone is an imitation of God its cause, in being, in goodness, and other such respects. Something of the sort may be found in the cognitive and active powers of man. The intellect by its one power knows all that the sentient part knows by several powers, and. much more besides. Also, the higher the intellect, the more it can know by one effort, to which knowledge an inferior intellect does not attain without many efforts. Again, the royal power extends to all those particulars to which the divers powers under it are directed. Thus also God by His one simple being possesses all manner of perfection, all that other beings compass by divers faculties—yea, much more. Hereby the need is clear of many names predicated of God: for as we cannot know Him naturally otherwise than by arriving at Him from the effects which He produces, the names whereby we denote His perfections must be several and diverse, answering to the diverse perfections that are found in things. But if we could understand His essence as it is in itself, and adapt to it a name proper to it, we should express it by one name only, as is promised to those who shall behold Him in essence: In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name shall be one (Zach. xiv, 9).

CHAPTER XXXII

THAT NOTHING IS PREDICATED OF GOD AND OTHER BEINGS SYNONYMOUSLY

AN effect that does not receive a form specifically like the form whereby the agent acts, is incapable of receiving in synonymous predication the name taken from that form. But, of the things whereof God is cause, the forms do not attain to the species of the divine efficacy, since they receive piecemeal and in particular what is found in God simply and universally.

3. Everything that is predicated of several things synonymously, is either genus species, differentia, accidens, or proprium. But nothing is predicated of God as genus, as has been shown (Chap.XXV); and in like manner neither as differentia; nor again as species, which is made up of genus and differentia; nor can any accident attach to Him, as has been shown (Chap.XXIII); and thus nothing is predicated of God either as accident or as proprium, for proprium is of the class of accidents. The result is that nothing is predicated synonymously of God and other beings.

6. Whatever is predicated of things so as to imply that one thing precedes and the other is consequent and dependent on the former, is certainly not predicated synonymously. Now nothing is predicated of God and of other beings as though they stood in the same rank, but it is implied that one precedes, and the other is consequent and dependent. Of God all predicates are predicated essentially. He is called being' to denote that He is essence itself; and good,' to denote that He is goodness itself. But of other beings predications are made to denote participation. Thus Socrates is called a man,' not that he is humanity itself, but one having humanity. It is

impossible therefore for any predicate to be applied synonymously and in the same sense to God and other beings.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THAT IT IS NOT AT ALL TRUE THAT THE APPLICATION OF COMMON PREDICATES TO GOD AND TO CREATURES INVOLVES NOTHING BEYOND A MERE IDENTITY OF NAME

WHERE there is a mere accidental identity of name, there is no order or respect implied of one thing to another, but quite by accident one name is applied to several different things. But this is not the case with the names applied to God and to creatures: for in such a community of names we have regard to the order of cause and effect (Chap.XXIX,XXXII).

2. Moreover, there is some manner of likeness of creatures to God (Chap.XXIX).

3. When there is no more than a mere identity of name between several things, we cannot be led from one of them to the knowledge of another; but from the attributes found in creatures we are led to a knowledge of the attributes of God (Chap.XXX,XXXI).

5. There is no use predicating any name of any thing unless by the name we come to understand something about the thing. But if names are predicated of God and creatures by a mere coincidence of sound, we understand by those names nothing whatever about God, seeing that the significations of those names are known to us only inasmuch as they apply to creatures: there would at that rate be no use in saying or proving of God that God is a good being, or anything else of the sort.

If it is said that by such names we only know of God what He is not—in that, e.g., He is called living’ as not being of the genus of inanimate things—at least it must be allowed that the predicate living,’ applied to God and to creatures, agrees in the negation of the inanimate, and thus will be something more than a bare coincidence of name.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THAT THE THINGS THAT ARE SAID GOD AND CREATURES ARE SAID ANALOGOUSLY

THUS then from the foregoing arguments the conclusion remains that things said alike of God and of other beings are not said either in quite the same sense, or in a totally different sense, but in an analogous sense, that is, in point of order or regard to some one object. And this happens in two ways: in one way inasmuch as many things have regard to one particular, as in regard to the one point of health an animal is called healthy' as being the subject of health medicine is called healthful' as being productive of health; food is healthy,' being preservative of health; urine, as being a sign of health: in another way, inasmuch as we consider the order or regard of two things, not to any third thing, but to one of the two, as being' is predicated of substance and accident inasmuch as accident is referred to substance, not that substance and accident are referred to any third thing. Such names then as are predicated of God and of other beings are not predicated analogously in the former way of analogy—for then we should have to posit something before God—but in the latter way.

In this matter of analogous predication we find sometimes the same order in point of name and in point of thing named, sometimes not the same. The order of naming follows the order of knowing, because the name is a sign of an intelligible concept. When then that which is prior in point of fact happens to be also prior in point of knowledge, there is one and the same priority alike in point of the concept answering to the name and of the nature of the thing named. Thus substance is prior to accident by nature, inasmuch as substance is the cause of accident; and prior also in knowledge, inasmuch as substance is put in the definition of accident; and therefore being’ is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, alike in point of the nature of the thing and in point of the concept attaching to the name. But when what is prior in nature is posterior in knowledge, in such cases of analogy there is not the same order alike in point of the thing named and in point of the concept attaching to the name. Thus the power of healing, that is in healing remedies, is prior by nature to the health that is in the animal, as the cause is prior to the effect: but because this power is known from its effect, it is also named from its effect: hence, though healthful’ or health- producing,’ is prior in order of fast, yet the application of the predicate healthy’ to the animal is prior in point of the concept attaching to the name. Thus then, because we arrive at the knowledge of God from the knowledge of other realities, the thing signified by the names that we apply in common to God and to those other realities—the thing signified, I say, is by priority in God, in the mode proper to God: but the concept attaching to the name is posterior in its application to Him: hence He is said to be named from the effects which He causes.

CHAPTER XXXV

THAT THE SEVERAL NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS

THOUGH the names predicated of God signify the same thing, still they are not synonymous, because they do not signify the same point of view. For just as divers realities are by divers forms assimilated to the one simple reality, which is God, so our understanding by divers concepts is in some sort assimilated to Him, inasmuch as, by several different points of view, taken from the perfections of creatures, it is brought to the knowledge of Him. And therefore our understanding is not at fault in forming many concepts of one thing; because that simple divine being is such that things can be assimilated to it in many divers forms. According to these divers conceptions the understanding invents divers names, an assigns them to God—names which, though they denote one and the same thing, yet clearly are not synonymous, since they are not assigned from the same point of view. The same meaning does not attach to the name in all these cases, seeing that the name signifies the concept of the understanding before it signifies the thing understood.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THAT THE PROPOSITIONS WHICH OUR UNDERSTANDING FORMS OF GOD ARE NOT VOID OF MEANING

FOR all the absolute simplicity of God, not in vain does our understanding form propositions concerning Him, putting together and putting asunder. For though our understanding arrives by way of divers concepts to the knowledge of God, still it understands the absolute oneness of the object answering to all those concepts. Our mind does not attribute the manner of its understanding to the object is understood: thus it does not attribute immateriality to a stone, though it knows the stone immaterially. And therefore it asserts unity of the object by an affirmative proposition, which is a sign of identity, when it says, God is good': in which case any diversity that the composition shows is referable to the understanding, but unity to the thing understood. And on the same principle sometimes our mind forms a statement about God with some mark of diversity by inserting a preposition, as when it is said, Goodness is in God.' Herein is marked a diversity, proper to the understanding; and a unity, proper to the thing.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THAT GOD IS HIS OWN GOODNESS

EVERY good thing, that is not its own goodness, is called good by participation. But what is called good by participation presupposes something else before itself, whence it has received the character of goodness. This process cannot go to infinity, as there is no processus in infinitum in a series of final causes: for the infinite is inconsistent with any end, while good bears the character of an end. We must therefore arrive at some first good thing, which is not good by participation in reference to anything else, but is good by its own essence; and that is God.

4. What is, may partake of something; but sheer being can partake of nothing. For that which partakes, is potentiality: but being is actuality. But God is sheer being, as has been proved (Chap.XXII): He is not then good by participation, but essentially so.

5. Every simple being has its existence and what it is, in one: if the two were different, simplicity would be gone. But God is absolute simplicity, as has been shown (Chap.XVIII): therefore the very goodness that is in Him is no other than His own very self.

The same reasoning shows that no other good thing is its own goodness: wherefore it is said: None is good but God alone (Mark x, 18; Luke xviii, 19).

CHAPTER XXXIX

THAT IN GOD THERE CAN BE NO EVIL

ESSENTIAL being, and essential goodness, and all other things that bear the name of essential,' contain no admixture of any foreign element; although a thing that is good may contain something else besides being and goodness, for there is nothing to prevent the subject of one perfection being the subject also of another. Everything is contained within the bounds of its essential idea in such sort as to render it incapable of containing within itself any foreign element. But God is goodness, not merely good. There cannot therefore be in Him anything that is not goodness, and so evil cannot be in Him at all.

3. As God is His own being, nothing can be said of God that signifies participation. If therefore evil could be predicated of Him, the predication would not signify participation, but essence. Now evil cannot be predicated of any being so as to be the essence of any: for to an essentially evil thing there would be wanting being, since being is good. There cannot be any extraneous admixture in evil, as such, any more than in goodness. Evil therefore cannot be predicated of God.

5. A thing is perfect in so far as it is in actuality: therefore it will be imperfect inasmuch as it is failing in actuality. Evil therefore is either a privation, or includes a privation, or is nothing. But the subject of privation is potentiality; and that cannot be in God: therefore neither can evil.

This truth also Holy Scripture confirms, saying: God is light, and there is no darkness in Him, (1 John i, 5) Far from God impiety, and iniquity from the Almighty (Job xxxiv, 10).

CHAPTER XL

THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF ALL GOOD

GOD in His goodness includes all goodnesses, and thus is the good of all good.

2. God is good by essence: all other beings by participation: therefore nothing can be called good except inasmuch as it bears some likeness to the divine goodness. He is therefore the good of all good.

Hence it is said of the Divine Wisdom: There came to me all good things along with it (Wisd. vii, 11).

From this it is further shown that God is the sovereign good (Chap.XLI.

CHAPTER XLII

THAT GOD IS ONE

THERE cannot possibly be two sovereign goods. But God is the sovereign good. Therefore there is but one God.

2. God is all-perfect, wanting in no perfection. If then there are several gods, there must be several thus perfect beings. But that is impossible: for if to none of them is wanting any perfection, nor is there any admixture of imperfection in any, there will be nothing to distinguish them one from another.

7. If there are two beings, each necessarily existent, they must agree in point of necessary existence. Therefore they must be distinguished by some addition made to one only or to both of them; and thus either one or both must be composite. But no composite being exists necessarily of itself, as has been shown above (Chap.XVIII). Therefore there cannot be several necessary beings, nor several gods.

9. If there are two gods, this name God' is predicated of each either in the same sense or in different senses. If in different senses, that does not touch the present question: for there is nothing to prevent anything from being called by any name in a sense different from that in which the name is ordinarily borne, if common parlance so allows. But if the predication is in the same sense, there must be in both a common nature, logically considered. Either then this nature has one existence in both, or it has two different existences. If it has one existence, they will be not two but one being: for there is not one existence of two beings that are substantially distinct. But if the nature has a different existence in each possessor, neither of the possessors will be his own essence, or his own existence, as is proper to God (Chap.XXII): therefore neither of them is that which we understand by the name of God.

12. If there are many gods, the nature of godhead cannot be numerically one in each. There must be therefore something to distinguish the divine nature in this and that god: but that is impossible, since the divine nature does not admit of addition or difference, whether in the way of points essential or of points accidental (Chap.XXIII,XXIV).

13. Abstract being is one only: thus whiteness, if there were any whiteness in the abstract, would be one only. But God is abstract being itself, seeing that He is His own being (Chap.XXII). Therefore there can be only one God.

This declaration of the divine unity we can also gather from Holy Writ. For it is said: Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one Lord (Deut. vi, 4) And, One Lord, one faith (Eph. iv, 5).

By this truth the Gentiles are set aside in their assertion of a multitude of gods. Yet it must be allowed that many of them proclaimed the existence of one supreme God, by whom all the other beings to whom they gave the name of gods had been created. They awarded the name of godhead to all everlasting substances, chiefly on the score of their wisdom and felicity and their government of the world. And this fashion of speech is found even in Holy Scripture, where the holy angels, or even men bearing the office of judges, are called gods: There is none like thee among gods, O Lord (Ps. lxxxv, 8.); and, I have said, Ye are gods (Ps. lxxxi, 6). Hence the Manicheans seem to be in greater opposition to this truth in their maintenance of two first principles, the one not the cause of the other.

CHAPTER XLIII

THAT GOD IS INFINITE

INFINITY cannot be attributed to God on the score of multitude, seeing there is but one God. Nor on the score of quantitative extension, seeing He is incorporeal. It remains to consider whether infinity belongs to Him in point of spiritual greatness. Spiritual greatness may be either in power or in goodness (or completeness) of nature. Of these two greatnesses the one follows upon the other: for by the fact of a thing being in actuality it is capable of action. According then to the completeness of its actuality is the measure of the greatness of its power. Thus it follows that spiritual beings are called great according to the measure of their completeness, as Augustine says: “In things in which greatness goes not by bulk, being greater means being better” (De Trinit. vi, 9). But in God infinity can be understood negatively only, inasmuch as there is no term or limit to His perfection. And so infinity ought to be attributed to God.

2. Every actuality inhering in another takes limitation from that wherein it is: for what is in another is therein according to the measure of the recipient. An actuality therefore that is in none, is bounded by none: thus, if whiteness were self-existent, the perfection of whiteness in it would have no bounds till it attained all the perfection of whiteness that is attainable. But God is an actuality in no way existent in another: He is not a form inherent in matter; nor does His being inhere in any form or nature; since He is His own being, His own existence (Chap.XXI). The conclusion is that He is infinite.

4. Actuality is more perfect, the less admixture it has of potentiality. Every actuality, wherewith potentiality is blended, has bounds set to its perfection: while that which is without any blend of potentiality is without

bounds to its perfection. But God is pure actuality without potentiality (Chap.XVI), and therefore infinite.

6. There cannot be conceived any mode in which any perfection can be had more perfectly than by him, who is perfect by his essence, and whose being is his own goodness. But such is God: therefore anything better or more perfect than God is inconceivable. He is therefore infinite in goodness.

7. Our intellect, in understanding anything, reaches out to infinity; a sign whereof is this, that, given any finite quantity, our intellect can think of something greater. But this direction of our intellect to the infinite would be in vain, if there were not something intelligible that is infinite. There must therefore be some infinite intelligible reality, which is necessarily the greatest of realities; and this we call God.

8. An effect cannot reach beyond its cause: now our understanding cannot come but of God, who is the First Cause. If then our understanding can conceive something greater than any finite being, the conclusion remains that God is not finite.

9. Every agent shows greater power in action, the further from actuality is the potentiality which it reduces to actuality, as there is need of greater power to warm water than to warm air. But that which is not at all, is infinitely distant from actuality, and is not in any way in potentiality: therefore if the world was made a fact from being previously no fact at all, the power of the Maker must be infinite.

This argument avails to prove the infinity of the divine power even to the mind of those who assume the eternity of the world. For they acknowledge God to be the cause of the substantial being of the world, although they think that substance to have been from eternity, saying that the eternal God is the cause of an ever-existing world in the same way that a foot would be the cause of an everlasting foot-print, if it had been from eternity stamped on the dust. Still, even accepting the position thus defined, it follows that the power of God is infinite. For whether He produced things in time, according to us, or from eternity, according to them, there can be nothing in the world of reality that He has not produced, seeing that He is the universal principle of being; and thus He has brought things to be, without presupposition of any matter or potentiality. Now the measure of active power must be taken according to the measure of potentiality or passivity;

for the greater the pre-existing or preconceived passivity, the greater the active power required to reduce it to complete actuality. The conclusion remains that, as finite power in producing an effect is conditioned on the potentiality of matter, the power of God, not being conditioned on any potentiality, is not finite, but infinite, and so is His essence infinite.

To this truth Holy Scripture bears witness: Great is the Lord and exceedingly to he praised, and of his greatness there is no end (Ps. cxliv, 3).

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT GOD HAS UNDERSTANDING

IN no order of causes is it found that an intelligent cause is the instrument of an unintelligent one. But all causes in the world stand to the prime mover, which is God, as instruments to the principal agent. Since then in the world there are found many intelligent causes, the prime mover cannot possibly cause unintelligently.

5. No perfection is wanting in God that is found in any kind of beings (Chap.XXVIII): nor does any manner of composition result in Him for all that (Chap.XVIII). But among the perfections of creatures the highest is the possession of understanding: for by understanding a thing is in a manner all things, having in itself the perfections of all things.

6. Everything that tends definitely to an end, either fixes its own end, or has its end fixed for it by another: otherwise it would not tend rather to this end than to that. But the operations of nature tend to definite ends: the gains of nature are not made by chance: for if they were, they would not be the rule, but the exception, for chance is of exceptional cases. Since then physical agents do not fix their own end, because they have no idea of an end, they must have an end fixed for them by another, who is the author of nature. But He could not fix an end for nature, had He not Himself understanding.

7. Everything imperfect is derived from something perfect: for perfection is naturally prior to imperfection, as actuality to potentiality. But the forms that exist in particular things are imperfect, for the very reason that they do exist in particular, and not in the universality of their idea, or the fulness of their ideal being. They must therefore be derived from some perfect forms, which are not under particular limitations. Such forms cannot be other than objects of understanding, seeing that no form is found in its universality or

ideal fulness, except in the understanding. Consequently such forms must be endowed with understanding, if they are to subsist by themselves: for only by that endowment can they be operative. God therefore, who is the first actuality existing by itself, whence all others are derived, must be endowed with understanding.

This truth also is in the confession of Catholic faith: for it is said: He is wise of heart and mighty of power (Job ix, 4): With him is strength and wisdom (Ibid. xii, 16): Thy wisdom is made wonderful to me (Ps. cxxxviii, 6): O depth of riches, of wisdom and of knowledge of God (Rom. vi, 33).

CHAPTER XLV

THAT IN GOD THE UNDERSTANDING IS HIS VERY ESSENCE

TO understand is an act of an intelligent being, existing in that being, not passing out to anything external, as the act of warming passes out to the object warmed: for an intelligible object suffers nothing from being understood, but the intelligence that understands it is perfected thereby. But whatever is in God is the divine essence. Therefore the act of understanding in God is the divine essence.

5. Every substance is for the sake of its activity. If therefore the activity of God is anything else than the divine substance, His end will be something different from Himself; and thus God will not be His own goodness, seeing that the good of every being is its end.

From the act of understanding in God being identical with His being, it follows necessarily that the act of His understanding is absolutely eternal and invariable, exists in actuality only, and has all the other attributes that have been proved of the divine being. God then is not potentially intelligent, nor does He begin anew to understand anything, nor does He undergo any change or composition in the process of understanding.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS BY NOTHING ELSE THAN BY HIS OWN ESSENCE

UNDERSTANDING is brought actually to understand by an impression made on the understanding, just as sense comes actually to feel by an impression made on sense. The impression made on the understanding then is to the understanding as actuality to potentiality. If therefore the divine understanding came to understand by any impression made on the understanding other than the understanding itself, the understanding would be in potentiality towards that impression, which, it has been shown, cannot be (Chap.XVI,XVII).

3. Any impression on the understanding that is in the understanding over and above its essence, has an accidental being: by reason of which fact our knowledge reckons as an accident. But there can be no accident in God. Therefore there is not in His understanding any impression besides the divine essence itself.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT GOD PERFECTLY UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF

WHEN by an impression on the understanding that power is brought to bear on its object, the perfection of the intellectual act depends on two things: one is the perfect conformity of the impression with the thing understood: the other is the perfect fixing of the impression on the understanding: which perfection is the greater, the greater the power of the understanding to understand. Now the mere divine essence, which is the intelligible representation whereby the divine understanding understands, is absolutely one and the same with God Himself and with the understanding of God. God therefore knows Himself most perfectly.

6. The perfections of all creatures are found at their best in God. But of perfections found in creatures the greatest is to understand God: seeing that the intellectual nature is pre-eminent above other natures, and the perfection of intellect is the act of understanding, and the noblest object of understanding is God. God therefore understands Himself perfectly.

This also is confirmed by divine authority, for the Apostle says: The spirit of God searcheth into even the deep things of God (1 Cor. ii, 10).

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT GOD PRIMARILY AND ESSENTIALLY KNOWS HIMSELF ALONE

THE Understanding is in potentiality in regard of its object, in so far as it is a different thing from that object. If therefore the primary and essential object of divine understanding be something different from God, it will follow that God is in potentiality in respect of some other thing, which is impossible (Chap.XVI).

5. A thing understood is the perfection of him who understands it: for an understanding is perfected by actually understanding, which means being made one with the object understood. If therefore anything else than God is the first object of His understanding, something else will be His perfection, and will be nobler than He, which is impossible.

CHAPTER XLIX

THAT GOD KNOWS OTHER THINGS BESIDES HIMSELF

WE are said to know a thing when we know its cause. But God Himself by His essence is the cause of being to others. Since therefore He knows His own essence most fully, we must suppose that He knows also other beings.

3. Whoever knows anything perfectly, knows all that can be truly said of that thing, and all its natural attributes. But a natural attribute of God is to be cause of other things. Since then He perfectly knows Himself, He knows that He is a cause: which could not be unless He knew something also of what He has caused, which is something different from Himself, for nothing is its own cause.

Gathering together these two conclusions, it appears that God knows Himself as the primary and essential object of His knowledge, and other things as seen in His essence.

CHAPTER L

THAT GOD HAS A PARTICULAR KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS

EVERY agent that acts by understanding has a knowledge of what it does, reaching to the particular nature of the thing produced; because the knowledge of the maker determines the form of the thing made. But God is cause of things by His understanding, seeing that in Him to be and to understand are one. But everything acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. God therefore knows in particular, as distinct from other things, whatever He causes to be.

3. The collocation of things, distinct and separate, cannot be by chance, for it is in regular order. This collocation of things, then, distinct and separate from one another, must be due to the intention of some cause. It cannot be due to the intention of any cause that acts by physical necessity, because physical nature is determined to one line of acton. Thus of no agent, that acts by physical necessity, can the intention reach to many distinct effects, inasmuch as they are distinct. The distinct arrangement and collocation of things must proceed from the intention of some knowing cause. Indeed it seems the proper function of intellect to remark the distinction of things. It belongs therefore to the First Cause, which of itself is distinct from all others, to intend the distinct and separate collocation of all the materials of the Universe.

4. Whatever God knows, He knows most perfectly: for there is in Him all perfection (Chap.XXVIII). Now what is known only in general is not known perfectly: the main points of the thing are not known, the finishing touches of its perfection, whereby its proper being is completely realised and brought out. Such mere general knowledge is rather a perfectible than a

perfect knowledge of a thing. If therefore God in knowing His essence knows all things in their universality, He must also have a particular knowledge of things.

8. Whoever knows any nature, knows whether that nature be communicable: for he would not know perfectly the nature of animal,’ who did not know that it was communicable to many. But the divine nature is communicable by likeness. God therefore knows in how many ways anything may exist like unto His essence. Hence arises the diversity of types, inasmuch as they imitate in divers ways the divine essence. God therefore has a knowledge of things according to their several particular types.

This also we are taught by the authority of canonical Scripture. God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31). Nor is there any creature invisible in his sight, but all things are naked and open to his eyes (Heb. iv, 13).

CHAPTER LI

SOME DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION HOW THERE IS IN THE DIVINE UNDERSTANDING A MULTITUDE OF OBJECTS

THIS multitude cannot be taken to mean that many objects of understanding have a distinct being in God. For these objects of understanding would be either the same with the divine essence, and at that rate multitude would be posited in the essence of God, a doctrine above rejected on many grounds (Chap.XXXI); or they would be additions made to the divine essence, and at that rate there would be in God some accident, which we have above shown to be an impossibility (Chap.XXXIII). Nor again can there be posited any separate existence of these intelligible forms, which seems to have been the position of Plato, who, by way of avoiding the above inconveniences, introduced the doctrine of Ideas. For the forms of physical things cannot exist without matter, as neither can they be understood without matter. And even supposing them so to exist, even this would not suffice to explain God understanding a multitude of objects. For, assuming the aforesaid forms to exist outside the essence of God, and that God could not understand the multitude of things without them, such understanding being requisite to the perfection of His intellect, it would follow that God's perfection in understanding depended on another being than Himself, and consequently His perfection in being, seeing that His being is His understanding: the contrary of all which has been shown (Chap.XL). Moreover, assuming what shall be proved hereafter (Bk II, Chap.XV), that whatever is beyond the essence of God is caused by God, the above forms, if they are outside of God, must necessarily be caused by Him. But He is cause of things by His understanding, as shall be shown (Bk II, Chap.XXIII,XXIV). Therefore God's understanding of these intelligible forms is a natural prerequisite for the existence of such forms. God's understanding then of the multitude of creatures is not to be explained by the existence of many intelligible abstract forms outside of God.

CHAPTER LII

REASONS TO SHOW HOW THE MULTITUDE OF INTELLIGIBLE IDEAL FORMS HAS NO EXISTENCE EXCEPT IN THE DIVINE UNDERSTANDING

IT is not to be supposed that the multitude of intelligible ideal forms is in any other understanding save the divine, say, the understanding of an angel. For in that case the divine understanding would depend, at least for some portion of its activity, upon some secondary intellect, which is impossible: for as substances are of God, so also all that is in substances: hence for the being of any of these forms in any secondary intellect there is prerequired an act of the divine intelligence, whereby God is cause.

2. It is impossible for one intellect to perform an intellectual operation by virtue of another intellect being disposed to that operation: that intellect itself must operate, which is disposed so to do. The fact then of many intelligible forms being in some secondary intellect cannot account for the prime intellect knowing the multitude of such forms.

CHAPTER LIII

HOW THERE IS IN GOD A MULTITUDE OF OBJECTS OF UNDERSTANDING

AN external object, coming to be an object of our understanding, does not thereby exist in our understanding in its own proper nature: but the impression (species) of it must be in our understanding, and by that impression our understanding is actualised, or comes actually to understand. The understanding, actualised and informed’ by such an impression, understands the thing in itself.’ The act of understanding is immanent in the mind, and at the same time in relation with the thing understood, inasmuch as the aforesaid impression,’ which is the starting-point of the intellectual activity, is a likeness of the thing understood. Thus informed by the impression (species) of the thing, the understanding in act goes on to form in itself what we may call an intellectual expression’ (intentio) of the thing. This expression is the idea (ratio, logos) of the thing, and so is denoted by the definition. So it must be, for the understanding understands alike the thing absent and the thing present; in which respect imagination and understanding agree. But the understanding has this advantage over the imagination, that it understands the thing apart from the individualising conditions without which the thing exists not in rerum natura. This could not be except for the understanding forming to itself the aforesaid expression.’ This expression’ (intentio) in the understanding, being, we may say, the term of the intellectual activity, is different from the intellectual impression’ (species intelligibilis), which actualises the understanding and which must be considered the starting-point of intellectual activity; and yet both the one and the other, both the impression’ (species) and the expression’ (intentio), are likenesses of the thing in itself,’ which is the object of the understanding. From the fact of the intellectual impression, which is the form of the intellect and the starting-point of intellectual knowledge, being a likeness of the external thing, it follows that the expression, or idea, formed by the understanding, is also like the thing: for as an agent is, so are its activities. And again, from the fact of the expression, or idea, in the understanding being like to its object, it follows that the understanding in the act of forming such an idea understands the said object.

But the divine mind understands by virtue of no impression other than its own essence (Chap.XLVI). At the same time the divine essence is the likeness of all things. It follows therefore that the concept of the divine understanding itself, which is the Divine Word, is at once a likeness of God Himself understood, and also a likeness of all things whereof the divine essence is a likeness. Thus then by one intelligible impression (species intelligibilis), which the divine essence, and by one intellectual recognition (intentio intellecta), which is the Divine Word, many several objects may be understood by God.

CHAPTER LIV

THAT THE DIVINE ESSENCE, BEING ONE, IS THE PROPER LIKENESS AND TYPE OF ALL THINGS INTELLIGIBLE

BUT again it may seem to some difficult or impossible that one and the same simple being, as the divine essence, should be the proper type (propria ratio) and likeness of different things. For as different things are distinguished by means of their proper forms, it needs must be that what is like one thing according to its proper form should be found unlike to another.

True indeed, different things may have one point of likeness in so far as they have one common feature, as man and ass, inasmuch as they are animals. If it were by mere discernment of common features that God knew things, it would follow that He had not a particular but only a general knowledge of things (contrary to Chap.L). To return then to a proper and particular knowledge, of which there is here question.

The act of knowledge is according to the mode in which the likeness of the known object is in the knowing mind: for the likeness of the known object in the knowing mind is as the form by which that mind is set to act. If therefore God has a proper and particular knowledge of many different things, He must be the proper and particular type of each. We have to enquire how that can be.

As the Philosopher says, the forms of things, and the definitions which mark such forms, are like numbers, in which the addition or subtraction of unity varies the species of the number. So in definitions: one differentia subtracted or added varies the species: thus sentient substance’ varies in species by the addition of irrational’ or rational.’ But in instances of the many in one’ the condition of the understanding is not as the condition of concrete nature. The nature of a concrete being does not admit of the severance of elements, the union of which is requisite to the existence of that being: thus animal nature will not endure if the soul be removed from the body. But the understanding can sometimes take separately elements that in actual being are united, when one of them does not enter into the concept of the other; thus in three’ it may consider two’ only, and in rational animal’ the ‘sentient’ element alone. Hence the understanding may take what is inclusive of many elements for a proper specimen of many, by apprehending some of them without others. It may take ten’ as a proper specimen of nine by subtraction of one unit, and absolutely as a proper specimen of all the numbers included in ten.’ So also in man’ it might recognise a proper type of irrational animal’ as such, and of all the species of irrational animal,’ unless these species involved some positive differentias. Therefore a certain philosopher, named Clement, said that in the scale of beings the nobler are types and patterns of the less noble. Now the divine essence contains in itself the noble qualities of all beings, not by way of a compound but by way of a perfect being (Chap.XXXI). Every form, as well particular as general, is a perfection in so far as it posits something; and involves imperfection only in so far as it falls short of true being. The divine understanding then can comprehend whatever is proper to each in its essence, by understanding wherein each thing imitates the divine essence, and wherein it falls short of the perfection proper to that essence. Thus, by understanding its own essence as imitable in the way of life without consciousness, it gathers the proper form of a plant, by understanding the same essence as imitable in the way of consciousness without intellect, the proper form of an animal; and so of the rest. Evidently then the divine essence, inasmuch as it is absolutely perfect, may be taken as the proper type of each entity; and hence by it God may have a particular knowledge of all. But because the proper type of one is distinct from the proper type of another—and distinction is the principle of plurality—there must be observable in the divine intellect a distinction and plurality of recognised types, in so far as the content of the divine mind is the proper type of different things. And as it is in this way that God is cognisant of the special relation of likeness that each creature bears to Him, it follows that the types (rationes) of things on the divine mind are not several or distinct, except in so far as God knows things to be in several divers ways capable of assimilation to Himself.

And from this point of view Augustine says that God has made man in one plan and horse on another; and that the plans or types of things exist severally in the divine mind (De div. quaest., LXXXIII, 46). And herein also is defensible in some sort the opinion of Plato, who supposes Ideas, according to which all beings in the material world are formed.

CHAPTER LV

THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS AT ONCE AND TOGETHER

THE reason why our understanding cannot understand many things together in one act is because in the act of understanding the mind becomes one with the object understood; whence it follows that, were the mind to understand many things together in one act, it would be many things together, all of one genus, which is impossible. Intellectual impressions are all of one genus: they are of one type of being in the existence which they have in the mind, although the things of which they are impressions do not agree in one type of being: hence the contrariety of things outside the mind does not render the impressions of those things in the mind contrary to one another. And hence it is that when many things are taken together, being anyhow united, they are understood together. Thus a continuous whole is understood at once, not part by part; and a proposition is understood at once, not first the subject and then the predicate: because all the parts are known by one mental impression of the whole. Hence we gather that whatever several objects are known by one mental presentation, can be understood together: but God knows all things by that one presentation of them, which is His essence; therefore He can understand all together and at once.

2. The faculty of knowledge does not know anything actually without some attention and advertence. Hence the phantasms, stored in the sensorium, are at times not actually in the imagination, because no attention is given to them. We do not discern together a multitude of things to which we do not attend together: but things that necessarily fall under one and the same advertence and attention, are necessarily understood together. Thus

whoever institutes a comparison of two things, directs his attention to both and discerns both together. But all things that are in the divine knowledge must necessarily fall under one advertence; for God is attentive to behold His essence perfectly, which is to see it to the whole reach of its virtual content, which includes all things. God therefore, in beholding His essence, discerns at once all things that are.

6. Every mind that understands one thing after another, is sometimes potentially intelligent, sometimes actually so; for while it understands the first thing actually, it understands the second potentially. But the divine mind is never potentially intelligent, but always actually: it does not, then, understand things in succession, but all at once.

Holy Scripture witnesses to this truth, saying that with God there is no change nor shadow of vicissitude (James i, 17).

CHAPTER LVI

THAT THERE IS NO HABITUAL KNOWLEDGE IN GOD

IN whatever minds there is habitual knowledge, not all things are known together: but some things are known actually, others habitually. But in God all things are known actually (Chap.LV).

2. He who has a habit of knowledge, and is not adverting to what he knows, is in a manner in potentiality, although otherwise than as he was before he understood at all: but the divine mind is nowise in potentiality.

3. In every mind that knows anything habitually, the mind's essence is different from its intellectual activity, which is the act of attentive thought. To such a mind, in habitual knowledge, activity is lacking, though the essence of the mind itself cannot be lacking. But in God His essence is His activity (Chap.XLV).

4. A mind that knows habitually only, is not in its ultimate perfection: hence that best of goods, happiness, is not taken to be in habit but in act. If then God is habitually knowing, He will not be all-perfect (contrary to Chap.XXVIII).

5. As shown in chapterXLVI, God has understanding by His essence, not by any intelligible forms superadded to His essence. But every mind in habitual knowledge understands by some such forms: for a habit is either a predisposition of the mind to receive mental impressions, or forms, whereby it comes actually to understand; or it is an orderly aggregation of such forms, existing in the mind, not in complete actuality, but in some manner intermediate between potentiality and actuality.

6. A habit is a quality: but in God there can be neither quality nor any other accident (Chap.XXIII): habitual knowledge therefore is not proper to

God.

Because the mental state of thinking, or willing, or acting habitually only, is like the state of a sleeper, David says, by way of removing all habitual states from God: Lo, he shall not slumber or sleep who keepeth Israel (Ps. cxx, 4). And again it is said: The eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun (Ecclus xxiii, 28), for the sun is always in the act of shining.

CHAPTER LVII

THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IS NOT A REASONED KNOWLEDGE

OUR thought is then reasoned, when we pass from one object of thought to another, as in making syllogisms from principles to conclusions. Reasoning or arguing does not consist in seeing how a conclusion follows from premises by inspection of both together. That is not argument, but judging of argument. Now God does not think of one thing after another in any sort of succession, but of all things at once (Chap.LV). His knowledge therefore is not reasoned or argumentative, although He knows the argument and reason of all things.

2. Every reasoner intues principles with one thought, and the conclusion with another. There would be no need to proceed to a conclusion from the consideration of premises, if the mere consideration of the premises at once laid the conclusion bare. But God knows all things by one act which is His essence (Chap.LV). His knowledge therefore is not argumentative.

3. All argumentative knowledge has something of actuality and something of potentiality, for conclusions are potentially in premises. But in the divine mind potentiality has no place.

5. Things that are known naturally are known without reasoning, as appears in the case of first principles. But in God there can be no knowledge that is not natural, nay, essential: for His knowledge is His essence.

7. Only in its highest advance does the inferior touch upon the superior. But the highest advance of our knowledge is not reasoning, but intuition (intellectus), which is the starting-point of reasoning. God’s knowledge then is not rational,’ in the sense of argumentative,’ but intuitive only.

8. Reasoning means a lack of intuition: the divine knowledge therefore is not reasoned.

If any should take it amiss that God cannot make a syllogism, let them mark that He has the knowledge how to make syllogisms as one judging of them, not as one arguing syllogistically.

To this there is witness of Holy Scripture in the text: All things are naked and open to his eyes (Heb. iv, 13): whereas things that we know by reasoning are not of themselves naked and open to us, but are opened out and laid bare by reason.

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT GOD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND BY COMBINATION AND SEPARATION OF IDEAS

THINGS mentally combinable and separable are naturally considered by the mind apart from one another: for there would be no need of their combination and separation, if by the mere apprehension of a thing as being it were at once understood what was in it or not in it. If therefore God understood by a mental process of combination and separation, it would follow that He did not take in all things at one glance, but each thing apart, contrary to what has been shown above (Chap.LV).

3. A mind that combines and separates, forms different judgements by different combinations. For a mental combination does not go beyond the terms of the combination. Hence, in the combination, or affirmative judgement (compositione), whereby the mind judges that man is an animal, it does not judge that a triangle is a figure. Now combination or separation is an operation of the mind. If God therefore views things by mentally combining and separating them, His mental act will not be one only but manifold; and so His essence will not be one only.

Not for this however must we say that He is ignorant of tenable propositions: for His one and simple essence is the pattern of all things manifold and compound; and so by it God knows the whole multitude and complexity as well of actual nature as of the ideal world (tam naturae quam rationis).

This is in consonance with the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said, For my thoughts are not your thoughts (Isa. lv, 8); and yet, The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men (Ps. xciii, 11), which certainly proceed by combination and separation of ideas.

CHAPTER LIX

THAT THE TRUTH TO BE FOUND IN PROPOSITIONS IS NOT EXCLUDED FROM GOD

THOUGH the knowledge of the divine mind is not after the manner of combination and separation of ideas in affirmative and negative propositions, nevertheless there is not excluded from it that truth which, according to the Philosopher, obtains only in such combinations and separations. For since the truth of the intellect is an equation of the intellect and the thing, inasmuch as the intellect says that to be which is, or that not to be which is not, truth belongs to that in the intellect which the intellect says, not to the act whereby it says it; for it is not requisite to the truth of the intellect that the mere act of understanding be equated to the thing, but what the mind says and knows by understanding must be equated to the thing, so that the case of the thing shall be as the mind says it is. But God by his simple understanding, in which there is no combination and separation of ideas, knows not only the essence of things, but also the propositions that are tenable concerning them (Chap.LVII,LVIII). Thus what the divine mind says by understanding is affirmation and negation. Therefore the simplicity of the divine mind does not import the shutting out from it of truth.

CHAPTER LX

THAT GOD IS TRUTH

TRUTH is a perfection of the understanding and of its act. But the understanding of God is His substance; and the very act of understanding, as it is the being of God, is perfect as the being of God is perfect, not by any superadded perfection, but by itself. It remains therefore that the divine substance is truth itself.

4. Though truth is properly not in things but in the mind, nevertheless a thing is sometimes called true, inasmuch as it properly attains the actuality of its proper nature. Hence Avicenna says that the truth of a thing is a property of the fixed and appointed being of each thing, inasmuch as such a thing is naturally apt to create a true impression of itself, and inasmuch as it expresses the proper idea of itself in the divine mind. But God is His own essence: therefore, whether we speak of truth of the intellect or truth of the object, God is His own truth.

This is also confirmed by the authority of our Lord saying of Himself: I am the way and the truth and the life (John xiv, 6).

CHAPTER LXI

THAT GOD IS PURE TRUTH

THE understanding is not liable to error in its knowledge of abstract being, as neither is sense in dealing with the proper object of each sense. But all the knowledge of the divine mind is after the manner of a mind knowing abstract being (Chap.LVIII): it is impossible therefore for error or deception or falsehood to creep into the cognitive act of God.

3. The intellect does not err over first principles, but over reasoned conclusions from first principles. But the divine intellect is not reasoning or argumentative (Chap.LVII), and is therefore not liable to deception.

4. The higher any cognitive faculty is, the more universal and far-reaching is its proper object: hence what sight is cognisant of accidentally, general sensibility or imagination seizes upon as a content of its proper object. But the power of the divine mind is the acme of cognitive power: therefore all things knowable stand to it as proper and ordinary objects of knowledge, not as accidental objects. But over proper and ordinary objects of knowledge a cognitive faculty never makes a mistake.

5. An intellectual virtue is a perfection of the understanding in knowing. It never happens that the understanding utters anything false, but its utterance is always true, when prompted by any intellectual virtue; for it is the part of virtue to render an act good, and to utter truth is the good act of the understanding. But the divine mind, being the acme of perfection, is more perfect by its nature than the human mind by any habit of virtue.

6. The knowledge of the human mind is in a manner caused by things: hence it comes to be that things knowable are the measure of human knowledge: for the judgement of the mind is true, because the thing is so. But the divine mind by its knowledge is the cause of things. Hence God's knowledge must be the measure of things, as art is the measure of products

of art, whereof the perfection of each varies according to its agreement with art. Thus the divine mind stands to things as things stand to the human mind. But any error that arises out of any inequality between the human mind and the thing is not in things, but in the mind. If therefore there were not an absolutely perfect correspondence of the divine mind with things, the error would be in the things, not in the divine mind. There is however no error in the things that be: because each has so much of truth as it has of being. There is then no failure of correspondence between the divine mind and the things that be.

Hence it is said: God is truthful (Rom. iii, 4): God is not like man, that he should lie (Num. xxiii, 19): God is light, and there is no darkness in him (1 John i, 5).

CHAPTER LXII

THAT THE TRUTH OF GOD IS THE FIRST AND SOVEREIGN TRUTH

THE standard in every genus is the most perfect instance of the genus. But the divine truth is the standard of all truth. The truth of our mind is measured by the object outside the mind: our understanding is called true, inasmuch as it is in accordance with that object. And again the truth of the object is measured by its accordance with the divine mind, which is the cause of all things (B. II, Chap.XXIV), as the truth of artificial objects is measured by the art of the artificer. Since then God is the first understanding and the first object of understanding, the truth of every understanding must be measured by His truth, as everything is measured by the first and best of its kind.

CHAPTER LXIII

THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM GOD THE KNOWLEDGE OF INDIVIDUAL THINGS

THE first argument is drawn from the very condition of individuality. For as matter (materia signata) is the principle of individuality, it seems that individuals cannot be known by any immaterial faculty, inasmuch as all knowledge is a certain assimilation, and hence even in us those powers alone apprehend individual objects, that make use of material organs, as do the imagination and senses, but our understanding, which is immaterial, does not recognise individuals as such: much less then is the divine understanding apt to take cognisance of individuals, being, as it is, the furthest removed from matter.

2. The second argument is that individual things do not always exist. Either then they will always be known by God, or they will sometimes be known and sometimes not known. The former alternative is impossible, because there can be no knowledge of that which is not: for knowledge is only of things true, and things that are not cannot be true. The second alternative is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine mind is absolutely invariable (Chap.XLV).

3. The third argument is from the consideration that not all individual things come of necessity, but some are by contingency: hence there can be no certain knowledge of them except when they exist. For that knowledge is certain, which is infallible: but all knowledge of contingent being is fallible while the thing is still in the future; for the opposite may happen of that which is held in cognition: for if the opposite could not happen, the thing

would be a necessity: hence there can be no science in us of future contingencies, only a conjectural reckoning. On the other hand we must suppose that all God’s knowledge is most certain and infallible (Chap.LXI). It is also impossible for God to begin to know anything, by reason of His immutability. From this it seems to follow that He does not know individual contingencies.

4. The fourth argument is from this, that some individual effects have their cause in will. Now an effect, before it is produced, can be known only in its cause: for so only can it have being before it begins to have being in itself. But the motions of the will can be known with certainty by none other than the willing agent, in whose power they are. It is impossible therefore that God should have certain knowledge of such individual effects as derive their causation from a created will.

5. The fifth argument is from the infinite multitude of individual things. The infinite as such is unknown: for all that is known is measured in a manner by the comprehension of the knower, measurement being nothing else than a marking out and ascertaining of the thing measured: hence every art repudiates infinities. But individual existences are infinite, at least potentially.

6. The sixth argument is from the vileness of individual things. As the nobility of knowledge is weighed according to the nobility of the thing known, so the vileness also of the thing known seems to redound to the vileness of the knowledge. Therefore the excellent nobility of the divine mind does not permit of God knowing sundry most vile things that have individual existence.

7. The seventh argument is from the evil that is found in sundry individual things. Since the object known is in some manner in the knowing mind, and evil is impossible in God, it seems to follow that God can have no knowledge at all of evil and privation: only the mind that is in potentiality can know that, as privation can be only in potentiality.

CHAPTER LXIV

A LIST OF THINGS TO BE SAID CONCERNING THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

TO the exclusion of the above error we will show first that the divine mind does know individual things; secondly, that it knows things which actually are not; thirdly, that it knows future contingencies with infallible knowledge; fourthly, that it knows the motions of the will; fifthly, that it knows infinite things; sixthly, that it knows the vilest and least of things that be; seventhly, that it knows evils and all manner of privations or defects.

CHAPTER LXV

THAT GOD KNOWS INDIVIDUAL THINGS

GOD knows things in so far as He is the cause of them. But the substantial effects of divine causation are individual things, universals not being substantial things, but having being only in individuals.

2. Since God’s cognitive act is His essence, He must know all that is in any way in His essence; and as this essence is the first and universal principle of being and the prime origin of all, it virtually contains in itself all things that in any way whatsoever have being.

5. In the gradation of faculties it is commonly found that the higher faculty extends to more terms, and yet is one; while the range of the lower faculty extends to fewer terms, and even over them it is multiplied, as we see in the case of imagination and sense, for the single power of the imagination extends to all that the five senses take cognisance of, and to more. But the cognitive faculty in God is higher than in man: whatever therefore man knows by the various faculties of understanding, imagination and sense, God is cognisant of by His one simple intuition. God therefore is apt to know the individual things that we grasp by sense and imagination.

6. The divine mind, unlike ours, does not gather its knowledge from things, but rather by its knowledge is the cause of things; and thus its knowledge of things is a practical knowledge. But practical knowledge is not perfect unless it descends to individual cases: for the end of practical knowledge is work, which is done on individuals.

9. As the Philosopher argues against Empedocles, God would be very wanting in wisdom, if He did not know individual instances, which even men know.

This truth is established also by the authority of Holy Scripture, for it is said: There is no creature invisible in his sight: also the contrary error is excluded by the text: Say not, I shall be hidden from God; and from the height of heaven who shall mind me? (Ecclus xvi, 16).

From what has been said it is evident how the objection to the contrary (Chap.LXIII, 1) is inconclusive: for though the mental presentation whereby divine understanding understands is immaterial, it is still a type both of matter and form, as being the prime productive principle of both.

CHAPTER LXVI

THAT GOD KNOWS THINGS WHICH ARE NOT

THE knowledge of the divine mind stands to things as the knowledge of the artificer to the products of his art. But the artificer by the knowledge of his art knows even those products of it which are not yet produced.

3. God knows other things besides Himself by His essence, inasmuch as His essence is the type of other things that come forth from Him (Chap.LIV). But since the essence of God is infinitely perfect (Chap.XLIII), while of every other thing the being and perfection is limited, it is impossible for the whole sum of other things to equal the perfection of the divine essence. Therefore the representative power of that essence extends to many more things than the things that are. As then God knows entirely the power and perfection of His essence, His knowledge reaches not only to things that are, but also to things that are not.

6. The understanding of God has no succession, as neither has His being: it is all together, ever abiding, which is the essential notion of eternity, whereas the duration of time extends by succession of before and after. The proportion of eternity to the whole duration of time is as the proportion of an indivisible point to a continuous surface,—not of that indivisible point which is a term of the surface, and is not in every part of its continuous extent: for to such a point an instant of time bears resemblance; but of that indivisible point which lies outside of the surface, and yet co-exists with every part or point of its continuous extent: for since time does not run beyond motion, eternity, which is altogether beyond motion, is no function of time. Again, since the being of the eternal never fails, eternity is present to every time or instant of time. Some sort of example of this may be seen

in a circle: for a point taken on the circumference does not coincide with every other point; but the centre, lying away from the circumference, is directly opposite to every point on the circumference. Whatever therefore is in any portion of time, co-exists with the eternal, as present to it, although in respect to another portion of time it be past or future. But nothing can co-exist in presence with the eternal otherwise than with the whole of it, because it has no successive duration. Whatever therefore is done in the whole course of time, the divine mind beholds it as present throughout the whole of its eternity; and yet it cannot be said that what is done in a definite portion of time has always been an existing fact. The conclusion is that God has knowledge of things that in the course of time as yet are not.

By these reasons it appears that God has knowledge of nonentities. But all nonentities do not stand in the same regard to His knowledge. Things that neither are, nor shall be, nor have been, are known by God as possible to His power: hence He does not know them as being anywise in themselves, but only as being within the compass of divine power. These sort of things are said by some to be known by God with the knowledge of simple understanding’ (notitia simplicis intelligentiae). But as for those things that are present, past, or future to us, God knows them as they are within the compass of His power; and as they are within the compass of their own several created causes; and as they are in themselves; and the knowledge of such things is called the knowledge of vision’ (notitia visionis). For of the things that are not yet with us, God sees not only the being that they have in their causes, but also the being that they have in themselves, inasmuch as His eternity is indivisibly present to all time. We must remember that God knows the being of everything through His own essence: for His essence is representable by many things that are not, nor ever shall be, nor ever have been. That same essence is the type of the power of every cause, in virtue of which power effects pre-exist in their causes. Again the being of everything, that it has in itself, is modelled upon the being of the divine essence. Thus then God knows nonentities inasmuch as in some way they have being, either in the power of God, or in their (creature) causes, or in themselves.

To this the authority of Holy Scripture also gives testimony: All things are known to the Lord our God before their creation; as also, after they are fully made, he regardeth all (Ecclus xxiii, 29): and, Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee (Jer. i, 5).

CHAPTER LXVII

THAT GOD KNOWS INDIVIDUAL CONTINGENT EVENTS

HENCE we may gather some inkling of how God has had an infallible knowledge of all contingent events from eternity, and yet they cease not to be contingent. For contingency is not inconsistent with certain and assured knowledge except so far as the contingent event lies in the future, not as it is present. While the event is in the future, it may not be; and thus the view of him who reckons that it still be may be mistaken: but once it is present, for that time it cannot but be. Any view therefore formed upon a contingent event inasmuch as it is present may be a certitude. But the intuition of the divine mind rests from eternity upon each and every [one] of the events that happen in the course of time, viewing each as a thing present. There is nothing therefore to hinder God from having from eternity an infallible knowledge of contingent events.

2. A contingent event differs from a necessary event in point of the way in which each is contained in its cause. A contingent event is so contained in its cause as that it either may not or may ensue therefrom: whereas a necessary event cannot but ensue from its cause. But as each of these events is in itself, the two do not differ in point of reality; and upon reality truth is founded. In a contingent event, considered as it is in itself, there is no question of being or not being, but only of being: although, looking to the future, a contingent event possibly may not come off. But the divine mind knows things from eternity, not only in the being which they have in their causes, but also in the being which they have in themselves.

3. As from a necessary cause the effect follows with certainty, with like certainty does it follow from a contingent cause, when the cause is

complete, provided no hindrance be placed. But as God knows all things (Chap.L). He knows not only the causes of contingent events, but like-wise the means whereby they may be hindered from coming off. He knows therefore with certitude whether they are going to come off or not.

6. The knowledge of God would not be true and perfect, if things did not happen in the way that God apprehends them to happen. But God, cognisant as He is of all being of which He is the principle, knows every event, not only in itself, but also in its dependence on any proximate causes on which it happens to depend: but the dependence of contingent events upon their proximate causes involves their ensuing upon them contingently. God therefore knows sundry events to happen, and to happen contingently: thus the certitude and truth of divine knowledge does not remove the contingency of events.

7. When it is said, God knows, or knew, this coming event,’ an intervening medium is supposed between the divine knowledge and the thing known, to wit, the time to which the utterance points, in respect to which that which is said to be known by God is in the future. But really it is not in the future in respect of the divine knowledge, which existing in the instant of eternity is present to all things. In respect of such knowledge, if we set aside the time of speaking, it is impossible to say that so-and-so is known as non-existent; and the question never arises as to whether the thing possibly may never occur. As thus known, it should be said to be seen by God as already present in its existence. Under this aspect, the question of the possibility of the thing never coming to be can no longer be raised: what already is, in respect of that present instant cannot but be. The fallacy then arises from this, that the time at which we speak, when we say God knows,’ co-exists with eternity; or again the last time that is marked when we say God knew’; and thus a relation of time, past or present, to future is attributed to eternity, which attribution does not hold; and thus we have fallacia accidentis.

8. Since everything is known by God as seen by Him in the present, the necessity of that being true which God knows is like the necessity of Socrates’s sitting from the fact of his being seen seated. This is not necessary absolutely, by necessity of the consequent,’ as the phrase is, but conditionally, or by necessity of the consequence.’ For this conditional proposition is necessary: He is sitting, if he is seen seated.’ Change the

conditional proposition into a categorical of this form: What is seen sitting, is necessarily seated': it is clear that the proposition is true as a phrase, where its elements are taken together (compositam), but false as a fact, when its elements are separated (divisam). All these objections against the divine knowledge of contingent facts are fallacia compositionis et divisionis.

That God knows future contingencies is shown also by the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said of Divine Wisdom, It knows signs and portents beforehand, and the issues of times and ages (Wisd. viii, 8): and, There is nothing hidden from his eyes: from age to age he regardeth (Ecclus xxxix, 24, 25).

CHAPTER LXVIII

THAT GOD KNOWS THE MOTIONS OF THE WILL

GOD knows the thoughts of minds and the volitions of hearts in virtue of their cause, as He is Himself the universal principle of being. All that in any way is, is known by God in His knowledge of His own essence (Chap.XLIX). Now there is a certain reality in the soul, and again a certain reality in things outside the soul. The reality in the soul is that which is in the will or thought. God knows all these varieties of reality.

3. As God by knowing His own being knows the being of everything, so by knowing His own act of understanding and will He knows every thought and volition.

5. God knows intelligent substances not less well than He knows or we know sensible substances, seeing that intelligent substances are more knowable, as being better actualised.

This is confirmed by the testimony of Holy Scripture:—God searcher of hearts and reins (Ps. vii, 10): Hell and perdition are before the Lord: how much more the hearts of the sons of men? (Prov. xi, 11): He needed not that any one should bear testimony of what was in man: for he himself knew what was in man (John ii, 25).

The dominion of the will over its own acts, whereby it has it in its power to will and not to will, is inconsistent with will-force being determined to one fixed mode of action: it is inconsistent also with the violent interference of any external agency; but it is not inconsistent with the influence of that Higher Cause, from whence it is given to the will both to be and to act. And thus in the First Cause, that is, in God, there remains a causal influence over the motions of the will, such that, in knowing Himself, God is able to know these motions.

CHAPTER LXIX

THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS

BY knowing Himself as the cause of things, He knows things other than Himself (Chap.XLIX). But He is the cause of infinite things, if beings are infinite, for He is the cause of all things that are.

2. God knows His own power perfectly (Chap.XLIX). But power cannot be perfectly known, unless all the objects to which it extends are known, since according to that extent the amount of the power may be said to be determined. But His power being infinite (Chap.XLIII) extends to things infinite, and therefore also His knowledge.

3. If the knowledge of God extends to all things that in any sort of way are, He must not only know actual being, but also potential being. But in the physical world there is potential infinity, though not actual infinity, as the Philosopher proves. God therefore knows infinite things, in the way that unity, which is the principle of number, would know infinite species of number if it knew whatever is in its potentiality: for unity is in promise and potency every number.

4. God in His essence, as in a sort of exemplar medium, knows other things. But as He is a being of infinite perfection, there can be modelled upon Him infinite copies with finite perfections, because no one of these copies, nor any number of them put together, can come up to the perfection of their exemplar; and thus there always remains some new way for any copy taken to imitate Him.

10. The infinite defies knowledge in so far as it defies counting. To count the parts of the infinite is an intrinsic impossibility, as involving a contradiction. To know a thing by enumeration of its parts is characteristic of a mind that knows part after part successively, not of a mind that comprehends the several parts together. Since then the divine mind knows

all things together without succession, it has no more difficulty in knowing things infinite than in knowing things finite.

11. All quantity consists in a certain multiplication of parts; and therefore number is the first of quantities. Where then plurality makes no difference, no difference can be made there by anything that follows upon quantity. But in God's knowledge many things are known in one, not by many different presentations, but by that one species, or presentation, which is the essence of God. Hence a multitude of things is known by God all at once; and thus plurality makes no difference in God's knowledge: neither then does infinity, which follows upon quantity.

In accordance with this is what is said in Psalm cxlvi: And of his wisdom there is no telling.

From what has been said it is clear why our mind does not know the infinite as the divine mind does. Our mind differs from the divine mind in four respects; and they make all the difference. The first is that our mind is simply finite, the divine mind infinite. The second is that as our mind knows different things by different impressions, it cannot extend to an infinity of things, as the divine mind can. The third results in this way, that as our mind is cognisant of different things by different impressions, it cannot be actually cognisant of a multitude of things at the same time; and thus it could not know an infinity of things except by counting them in succession, which is not the case with the divine mind, which discerns many things at once as seen by one presentation. The fourth thing is that the divine mind is cognisant of things that are and of things that are not (Chap.LXVI).

It is also clear how the saying of the Philosopher, that the infinite, as infinite, is unknowable, is in no opposition with the opinion now put forth: because the notion of infinity attaches to quantity; consequently, for infinite to be known as infinite, it would have to be known by the measurement of its parts, for that is the proper way of knowing quantity: but God does not know the infinite in that way. Hence, so to say, God does not know the infinite inasmuch as it is infinite, but inasmuch as, to His knowledge, it is as though it were finite.

It is to be observed however that God does not know an infinity of things with the knowledge of vision,' because infinite things neither actually are, nor have been, nor shall be, since, according to the Catholic faith, there are not infinite generations either in point of time past or in point of time to come. But He does know an infinity of things with the knowledge of simple understanding’: for He knows infinite things that neither are, nor have been, nor shall be, and yet are in the power of the creature; and He also knows infinite things that are in His own power, which neither are, nor shall be, nor have been. Hence to the question of the knowledge of particular things it may be replied by denial of the major: for particular things are not infinite: if however they were, God would none the less know them.

CHAPTER LXX

THAT GOD KNOWS BASE AND MEAN THINGS

THE stronger an active power is, to the more remote objects does it extend its action. But the power of the divine mind in knowing things is likened to active power: since the divine mind knows, not by receiving aught from things, but rather by pouring its influence upon things. Since then God’s mind is of infinite power in understanding (Chap.XLIII), its knowledge must extend to the remotest objects. But the degree of nobility or baseness in all things is determined by nearness to or distance from God, who is the fulness of nobility. Therefore the very vilest things in being are known to God on account of the exceeding great power of His understanding.

2. Everything that is, in so far as it has place in the category of substance or quality, is in actuality: it is some sort of likeness of the prime actuality, and is ennobled thereby. Even potential being, from its reference to actuality shares in nobility, and so comes to have the name of being.’ It follows that every being, considered in itself, is noble; and is only mean and vile in comparison with some other being, nobler still. But the noblest creatures are removed from God at a distance not less than that which separates the highest in the scale of creation from the lowest. If then the one distance were to bar God’s knowledge, much more would the other; and the consequence would be that God would know nothing beyond Himself.

3. The good of the order of the universe is nobler than any part of the universe. If then God knows any other noble nature, most of all must He know the order of the universe. But this cannot be known without taking cognisance at once of things nobler and things baser: for in the mutual distances and relations of these things the order of the universe consists.

4. The vileness of the objects of knowledge does not of itself redound on to the knower; for it is of the essence of knowledge that the knower should contain within himself impressions of the object known according to his own mode and manner. Accidentally however the vileness of the objects known may redound upon the knower, either because in knowing base and mean things he is withdrawn from the thought of nobler things, or because from the consideration of such vile objects he is inclined to some undue affections: which cannot be the case with God.

5. A power is not judged to be small, which extends to small things, but only that which is limited to small things. A knowledge therefore that ranges alike over things noble and things mean, is not to be judged mean; but that knowledge is mean, which ranges only over mean things, as is the case with us: for we make different studies of divine and of human things, and there is a different science of each. But with God it is not so; for with the same knowledge and the same glance He views Himself and all other beings.

With this agrees what is said of the Divine Wisdom: It findeth place everywhere on account of its purity, and nothing defiled stealeth in to corrupt it (Wisdom vii, 24, 25).

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS

WHEN good is known, the opposite evil is known. But God knows all particular good things, to which evil things are opposed: therefore God knows evil things.

2. The ideas of contraries, as ideas in the mind, are not contrary to one another: otherwise they could not be together in the mind, or be known together: the idea therefore whereby evil is known is not inconsistent with good, but rather belongs to the idea of good (ratio qua cognoscitur malum ad rationem boni pertinet). If then in God, on account of His absolute perfection, there are found all ideas of goodness (rationes bonitatis, as has been proved (Chap.XL), It follows that there is in Him the idea (ratio) whereby evil is known.

3. Truth is the good of the understanding: for an understanding is called good inasmuch as it knows the truth. But truth is not only to the effect that good is good, but also that evil is evil: for as it is true that what is, is, so it is true that what is not, is not. The good of the understanding therefore consists even in the knowledge of evil. But since the divine understanding is perfect in goodness, there cannot be wanting to it any of the perfections of understanding; and therefore there is present to it the knowledge of things evil.

4. God knows the distinction of things (Chap.L). But in the notion of distinction there is negation: for those things are distinct, of which one is not another: hence the first things that are of themselves distinct, mutually involve the exclusion of one another, by reason of which fast negative propositions are immediately verified of them, e.g., No quantity is a substance.’ God then knows negation. But privation is a sort of negation:

He therefore knows privation, and consequently evil, which is nothing else than a privation of due perfection.

8. In us the knowledge of evil things is never blameworthy in mere point of knowledge, that is in the judgement that is passed about evil things, but accidentally, inasmuch as by the observation of evil things one is sometimes inclined to evil. But that cannot be in God; and therefore there is nothing to prevent His knowing evil.

With this agrees what is said, that Evil surpasseth not [God's] wisdom (Wisd. vii, 30) and, Hell and perdition are before the Lord (Prov. xv, 11) and, My offences are not hidden from thee (Ps. lxviii, 6); and, He knoweth the vanity of men, and seeing doth he not consider iniquity? (Job xi, 11.)

It is to be observed however that if God's knowledge were so limited as that His knowledge of Himself did not involve His knowing other beings of finite and partial goodness, at that rate He would nowise know privation or evil: because to the good which is God Himself there is no privation opposed, since privation and its opposite are naturally about the same object; and so to that which is pure actuality no privation is opposed, and consequently no evil either. Hence on the supposition that God knows Himself alone, by knowing the excellences of His own being, He will not know evil. But because in knowing Himself He knows beings in which privations naturally occur, He must know the opposite privations, and the evils opposite to particular goods.

It must be further observed that as God, without any argumentative process, knows other beings by knowing Himself, so there is no need of His knowledge being argumentative in coming to the knowledge of evil things through good things: for good is as it were the ground of the knowledge of evil, evil being nothing else than privation of good: hence what is evil is known through what is good as things are known through their definitions, not as conclusions through their premises.

CHAPTER LXXII

THAT GOD HAS A WILL

FROM the fact that God has understanding, it follows that He has a will. Since good apprehended in understanding is the proper object of the will, understood good, as such, must be willed good. But anything understood involves an understanding mind. A mind then that understands good, must, as such, be a mind that wills good.

3. What is consequent upon all being, is a property of being, as such. Such a property must be found in its perfection in the first and greatest of beings. Now it is a property of all being to seek its own perfection and the preservation of its own existence. Every being does this in its own way: intelligent beings, by their will: animals, by their sensitive appetite: unconscious nature, by a certain physical nisus. It makes a difference however whether the thing craved for is possessed or not. Where it is not possessed, the nisus of desire proper to each several kind goes out to seek what is wanting: where the thing is possessed, it is rested in and clung to. This characteristic of all being cannot be wanting in the first of beings, which is God. Since then God has understanding, He has also a will, whereby He takes complacency in His own being and His own goodness.

4. The more perfect the act of understanding is, the more delightful to the understanding mind. But God has understanding and a most perfect act thereof (Chap.XLIV): therefore that act yields Him the utmost delight. But as sensible delight is through the concupiscible appetite, so is intellectual delight through the will. God then has a will.

This will of God the testimonies of Holy Scripture confess: All things whatsoever he hath willed, the Lord hath done (Ps. cxxxiv, 6): Who resisteth his will? (Rom. ix, 19).

CHAPTER LXXIII

THAT THE WILL OF GOD IS HIS ESSENCE

GOD has will inasmuch as He has understanding. But He has understanding by His essence (Chap.XLIV,XLV), and therefore will in like manner.

2. The act of will is the perfection of the agent willing. But the divine being is of itself most perfect, and admits of no superadded perfection (Chap.XXIII): therefore in God the act of His willing is the act of His being.

3. As every agent acts inasmuch as it is in actuality, God, being pure actuality, must act by His essence. But to will is an act of God: therefore God must will by His essence.

4. If will were anything superadded to the divine substance, that substance being complete in being, it would follow that will was something adventitious to it as an accident to a subject; also that the divine substance stood to the divine will as potentiality to actuality; and that there was composition in God: all of which positions have been rejected (Chap.XVI,XVIII,XXIII).

CHAPTER LXXIV

THAT THE OBJECT OF THE WILL OF GOD IN THE FIRST PLACE IS GOD HIMSELF

GOOD understood is the object of the will. But what is understood by God in the first place is the divine essence: therefore the divine essence is the first object of the divine will.

3. The object in the first place willed is the cause of willing to every willing agent. For when we say, I wish to walk for the benefit of my health,' we consider that we are assigning a cause; and if we are further asked, Why do you wish to benefit your health?' we shall go on assigning causes until we come to the final end, which is the object willed in the first place, and is in itself the cause of all our willing. If then God wills anything else than Himself in the first place, it will follow that that 'something else' is to Him a cause of willing. But His willing is His being (Chap.LXXIII), Therefore something else will be the cause of His being, which is contrary to the notion of the First Being.

CHAPTER LXXV

THAT GOD IN WILLING HIMSELF WILLS ALSO OTHER THINGS BESIDES HIMSELF

EVERY one desires the perfection of that which for its own sake he wills and loves: for the things which we love for their own sakes we wish to be excellent, and ever better and better, and to be multiplied as much as possible. But God wills and loves His essence for its own sake. Now that essence is not augmentable and multipliable in itself (Chap.XLII), but can be multiplied only in its likeness, which is shared by many. God therefore wills the multitude of things, inasmuch as He wills and loves His own perfection.

3. Whoever loves anything in itself and for itself, wills consequently all things in which that thing is found: as he who loves sweetness in itself must love all sweet things. But God wills and loves His own being in itself and for itself; and all other being is a sort of participation by likeness of His being.

6. The will follows the understanding. But God with His understanding understands Himself in the first place, and in Himself understands all other things: therefore in like manner He wills Himself in the first place, and in willing Himself wills all other things.

This is confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture: Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing of the things that thou hast made (Wisd. xi, 2)

CHAPTER LXXVI

THAT WITH ONE AND THE SAME ACT OF THE WILL GOD WILLS HIMSELF AND ALL OTHER BEINGS

EVERY power tends by one and the same activity to its object and to that which makes the said object an object to such a power, as with the same vision we see light and the colour which is made actually visible by light. But when we wish a thing for an end, and for that alone, that which is desired for the end receives from the end its character of an object of volition. Since then God wills all things for Himself (Chap.LXXIV), with one act of will He wills Himself and other things.

2. What is perfectly known and desired, is known and desired to the whole extent of its motive power. But a final end is a motive not only inasmuch as it is desired in itself, but also inasmuch as other things are rendered desirable for its sake. He therefore who perfectly desires an end, desires it in both these ways. But it is impossible to suppose any volitional act of God, by which He should will Himself, and not will Himself perfectly: since there is nothing imperfect in God. By every act therefore by which He wills Himself, He wills Himself and other things for His own sake absolutely; and other things besides Himself He does not will except inasmuch as He wills Himself.

3. As promises are to conclusions in things speculative, so is the end to the means in things practical and desirable: for as we know conclusions by premises, so from the end in view proceeds both the desire and the carrying out of the means. If then one were to wish the end apart, and the means apart, by two separate acts, there would be a process from step to step in his

volition (Chap.LVII). But this is impossible in God, who is beyond all movement.

7. To will belongs to God inasmuch as He has understanding. As then by one act He understands Himself and other beings, inasmuch as His essence is the pattern of them all, so by one act He wills Himself and all other beings, inasmuch as His goodness is the type of all goodness.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT THE MULTITUDE OF THE OBJECTS OF GOD’S WILL IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE SIMPLICITY OF HIS SUBSTANCE

GOD wills other things inasmuch as He wills His own goodness (Chap.LXXV). Things then come under the will of God according as they are included in His goodness. But in His goodness all things are one: for they are in Him according to the mode that befits Him; material things, immaterially; and things many, in union (Chap.LV,LVIII). Thus the multitude of the objects of the divine will does not multiply the divine substance.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THAT THE DIVINE WILL REACHES TO THE GOOD OF INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCES

THE excellence of order in the universe appears in two ways, first, inasmuch as the whole universe is referred to something beyond the universe, as an army to its leader: secondly, inasmuch as the parts of the universe are referred to one another, like the parts of an army; and the second order is for the sake of the first. But God, in willing Himself as an end, wills other things in their reference to Him as an end. He wills therefore the excellence of order in the universe in reference to Himself, and the excellence of order in the universe in mutual reference of its parts to one another. But the excellence of order is made up of the good of individual existences.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture: God saw the light, that it was good (Gen. i, 4); and similarly of His other works; and lastly of them altogether: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31).

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT GOD WILLS THINGS EVEN THAT AS YET ARE NOT

SOME one might perhaps think that God wills only the things that are: for correlatives go together; and if one perishes, the other perishes; if then willing supposes a relation of the willing subject to the object willed, none can will any but things that are. Besides, the will and its objects are to one another as Creator and creature: now God cannot be called Creator, or Lord, or Father, except of things that are: neither then can He be said to will any but things that are. And it may be further argued, that if the divine will is invariable, as is the divine being, and wills only actual existences, it wills nothing but what always is.

Let us say then in answer to these objections, that as good apprehended by the intellect moves the will, the act of the will must follow the condition of the mental apprehension. Now the mind apprehends the thing, not only as it is in the mind, but also as it is in its own nature: for we not only know that the thing is understood by us (for that is the meaning of its being in the mind'), but also that the thing exists, or has existed, or is to exist in its own nature. Though then at the time the thing has no being other than in the mind, still the mind stands related to it, not as it is in the mind, but as it is in its own nature, which the mind apprehends. Therefore the relation of the divine will to a non-existent thing is to the thing according as it is in its own nature, attached to some certain time, and not merely to the thing as it is in the knowledge of God. For God wills the thing, that is not now, to be in some certain time: He does not merely will it inasmuch as He Himself understands it.

Nor is the relation of the will to its object similar to the relation of Creator to creature, of Maker to made, of Lord to subject. For will, being an immanent act, does not involve the actual external existence of the thing willed: whereas making and creating and governing do signify an action terminated to an external effect, such that without its existence such action is unintelligible.

CHAPTER LXXX

THAT GOD OF NECESSITY WILLS HIS OWN BEING AND HIS OWN GOODNESS

GOD wills His own being and His own goodness as His first object and reason for willing all other things (Chap.LXXIV), and this He wills in everything that He does will. Nor is it possible for Him to will it merely potentially: He must will it actually, as His willing is His being.

4. All things, in so far as they have existence, are likened to God, who is the first and greatest being. But all things, in so far as they have existence, cherish their own being naturally in such manner as they can. Much more therefore does God cherish His own being naturally.

CHAPTER LXXXI

THAT GOD DOES NOT OF NECESSITY LOVE OTHER THINGS THAN HIMSELF

A WILL does not of necessity tend to the means to an end, if the end can be had without those means. Since then the divine Goodness can be without other beings,—nay, other beings make no addition to it,—God is under no necessity of willing other things from the fact of His willing His own goodness.

2. Since good, understood to be such, is the proper object of the will, the will may fasten on any object conceived by the intellect in which the notion of good is fulfilled. Hence though the being of anything, as such, is good, and its not-being, as such, is evil; still the very not- being of a thing may become an object to the will, though not of necessity, by reason of some notion of good fulfilled: for it is good for a thing to be, even though some other thing is not. The only good then which the will by the terms of its constitution cannot wish not to be, is the good whose non-existence would destroy the notion of good altogether. Such a good is no other than God. The will then by its constitution can will the non-existence of anything else except of God. But in God there is will according to the fulness of the power of willing. God then can will the non-existence of any other being besides Himself.

3. God in willing His own goodness wills also other things than Himself as sharing His goodness. But since the divine goodness is infinite, and partakable in infinite ways, if by the willing of His own goodness He of necessity willed the beings that partake of it, the absurdity would follow that He must will the existence of infinite creatures sharing His goodness in

infinite ways: because, if He willed them, those creatures would exist, since His will is the principle of being to creatures.

We must consider therefore why God of necessity knows other beings than Himself, and yet does not of necessity will them to exist, notwithstanding that His understanding and willing of Himself involves His understanding and willing other beings. The reason of it is this: an intelligent agent's understanding anything arises from a certain condition of the understanding,—for by a thing being actually understood its likeness is in the mind: but a volitional agent's willing anything arises from a certain condition of the object willed,—for we will a thing either because it is an end, or because it is a means to an end. Now the divine perfection necessarily requires that all things should so be in God as to be understood in Him. But the divine goodness does not of necessity require that other things should exist to be referred to Him as means to an end; and therefore it is necessary that God should know other things, but not that He should will other things. Hence neither does He will all things that are referable to His goodness: but He knows all things which are in any way referable to His essence, whereby He understands.

CHAPTER LXXXII

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE AFORESAID DOCTRINE AND SOLUTIONS OF THE SAME

THESE awkward consequences seem to follow, if any things that God wills He does not will of necessity.

1. If the will of God in respect of certain objects of will is not determined by any of them, it seems to be indifferent. But every faculty that indifferent is in a manner in potentiality.

2. Since potential being, as such, is naturally changeable,—for what can be can also not be,—it follows that the divine will is variable.

4. Since what hangs loose, indifferent between two alternatives, does not tend to one rather than to the other, unless it be determined by one or other, either God wills none of the things to which He is indifferent, or He is determined by one or other of them, in which case there must be something antecedent to God to determine Him.

But none of the above objections can stand.

1. The indifference, or indeterminateness, of a faculty may be attributable either to the faculty itself or to its object. To the faculty itself, when its indeterminateness comes from its not having yet attained to its perfection. This argues imperfection in the faculty, and an unfulfilled potentiality, as we see in the mind of a doubter, who has not yet attained to premises sufficient to determine him to take either of two sides. To the object of the faculty, when the perfect working of the faculty does not depend on its adoption of either alternative, and yet either alternative may be adopted, as when art may employ different instruments to do the same work equally

well. This argues no imperfection in the faculty, but rather its pre-eminent excellence, inasmuch as it rises superior to both opposing alternatives, and therefore is indifferent to both and determined by neither. Such is the position of the divine will with respect to things other than itself. Its perfection depends on none of them; being as it is intimately conjoined with its own last end and final perfection.

2. In the divine will there is no potentiality. Unnecessitated, it prefers one alternative to another respecting the creatures which it causes to be. It is not to be looked upon as being in a potential attitude to both alternatives, so as first to be potentially willing both, and then to be actually willing one. It is for ever actually willing whatever it wills, as well its own self as the creatures which are the objects of its causation. But whatever creature God wills to exist, that creature stands in no necessary relation to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will.

4. We cannot admit that either the divine will wills none of the effects of its causation, or that its volition is determined by some exterior object. The proper object of the will is good apprehended as such by the understanding. Now the divine understanding apprehends, not only the divine being, or divine goodness, but other good things likewise (Chap.XLIX); and it apprehends them as likenesses of the divine goodness and essence, not as constituent elements of the same. Thus the divine will tends to them as things becoming its goodness, not as things necessary to its goodness. So it happens also in our will: which, when it inclines to a thing as absolutely necessary to its end, tends to it with a certain necessity; but when it tends to a thing solely on account of its comeliness and appropriateness, does not tend to it necessarily.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

THAT GOD WILLS ANYTHING ELSE THAN HIMSELF WITH AN HYPOTHETICAL NECESSITY

IN every unchangeable being, whatever once is, cannot afterwards cease to be. Since then God's will is unchangeable, supposing Him to will anything, He cannot on that supposition not will it.

2. Everything eternal is necessary. But God's will for the causation of any effect is eternal: for, as His being, so His willing is measured by eternity. That will therefore is necessary, yet not absolutely so, since the will of God has no necessary connexion with this objection willed. It is therefore necessary hypothetically, on a supposition.

3. Whatever God once could do, He can still. His power does not grow less, as neither does His essence. But He cannot now not-will what He is already supposed to have willed, because His will cannot change: therefore He never could not-will whatever He once willed (nunquam potuit non velle quidquid voluit). It is therefore hypothetically necessary for Him to have willed whatever He has willed, as it is for Him to will whatever He does will: but in neither case is the necessity absolute.

4. Whoever wills anything, necessarily wills all that is necessarily requisite to that purpose, unless there be some defect on his part, either by ignorance, or because his will sometimes is drawn away by some passion from a right choice of means to the end: nothing of which can be said of God. If God then in willing Himself wills anything else besides Himself, He needs must will all that is necessarily required to the effecting of the thing

willed, as it is necessary that God should will the being of a rational soul, if He wills the being of a man.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

THAT THE WILL OF GOD IS NOT OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES IMPOSSIBLE

THOSE things are in themselves impossible, which involve an inconsistency, as that man should be an ass, which involves the rational being irrational. But what is inconsistent with a thing, excludes some one of the conditions requisite to it, as being an ass excludes a man's reason. If therefore God necessarily wills the things requisite to that which by supposition He does will, it is impossible for Him to will what is inconsistent therewith.

2. God, in willing His own being, wills all other things, that He does will, in so far as they have some likeness to it. But in so far as anything is inconsistent with the notion of being as such, there cannot stand therein any likeness to the first or divine being, which is the fountain of being. God therefore cannot will anything that is inconsistent with the notion of being as such, as that anything should be at once being and not being, that affirmation and negation should be true together, or any other such essential impossibility, inconsistency, and implied contradiction.

3. What is no object of the intellect, can be no object of the will. But essential impossibilities, involving notions mutually inconsistent, are no objects of intellect, except perchance through the error of a mind that does not understand the proprieties of things, which cannot be said of God.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE DIVINE WILL DOES NOT TAKE AWAY CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS

HYPOTHETICAL necessity in the cause cannot lead to absolute necessity in the effect. But God's will about a creature is not absolutely necessary, but hypothetically so (Chap.LXXXIII). Therefore the divine will is no argument of absolute necessity in creatures. But only this absolute necessity excludes contingency: for even a contingent fact may be extended either way into an hypothetical necessity: thus it is necessary that Socrates moves, if he runs. It does not therefore follow that a thing happens of necessity, if God wills it: all that holds is the necessary truth of this conditional: If God wills anything, the thing will be': but the consequent' (as distinguished from the consequence') need not be a necessary truth.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THAT REASON CAN BE ASSIGNED FOR THE DIVINE WILL

THE end is a reason for willing the means. But God wills His own goodness as an end, and all things else as means thereto: His goodness therefore is a reason why He wills other things different from Himself.

2. The good of a part is ordained to the end of the good of the whole, as the imperfect to the perfect. But things become objects of the divine will according as they stand in the order of goodness. It follows that the good of the universe is the reason why God wills every good of any part of the universe.

3. Supposing that God wills anything, it follows of necessity that He wills the means requisite thereto. But what lays on others a necessity for doing a thing, is a reason for doing it. Therefore the accomplishment of a purpose, to which such and such means are requisite, is a reason to God for willing those means.

We may therefore proceed as follows. God wishes man to have reason, to the end that he may be man: He wishes man to be, to the end of the completion of the universe: He wishes the good of the universe to be, because it befits His own goodness. The same proportion however is not observable in all three stages of this ratiocination. The divine goodness does not depend on the perfection of the universe, and receives no accession thereby. The perfection of the universe, though depending necessarily on the good of some particular components, which are essential parts of the universe, has no necessary dependence on others, although even from them some goodness or beauty accrues to the universe, such things serving solely for the fortification (munimentum) or embellishment of the rest. But any particular good depends absolutely on the elements that are requisite to it: and still even such goods have adjuncts that go merely to better their condition. Sometimes therefore the reason of the divine will involves mere becomingness, sometimes utility, sometimes also hypothetical necessity, but never absolute necessity, except when the object of God’s volition is God Himself.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THAT NOTHING CAN BE A CAUSE TO THE DIVINE WILL

THOUGH some reason may be assigned for the divine will, yet it does not follow that there is any cause of that will's volition. For the cause of volition is the end in view: now the end in view of the divine will is its own goodness: that then is God's cause of willing, which is also His own act of willing. But of other objects willed by God none is to God a cause of willing, but one of them is cause to another of its being referred to the divine goodness, and thus God is understood to will one for the sake of another. But clearly we must suppose no passing from point to point of God's will, where there is only one act, as shown above of the divine intellect (Chap.LVII). For God by one act wills His own goodness and all other things, as His action is His essence.

By this and the previous chapter the error is excluded of some who say that all things proceed from God by sheer will, so that no reason is to be rendered of anything that He does beyond the fact that God so wills. Which position is even contrary to divine Scripture, which tells us that God has done all things according to the order of His wisdom: Thou hast done all things in wisdom (Ps. ciii, 24); and God has shed wisdom over all his works (Ecclus i, 10).

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

THAT THERE IS A FREE WILL IN GOD

GOD does not necessarily will things outside Himself (Chap.LXXXI).

3. Will is of the end: choice of the means. Since then God wills Himself as end, and other things as means, it follows that in respect of Himself He has will only, but in respect of other things choice. But choice is always an act of free will.

4. Man by free will is said to be master of his own acts. But this mastery belongs most of all to the Prime Agent, whose act depends on no other.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THAT THERE ARE NO PASSIONS IN GOD

PASSION is not in the intellectual appetite, but only in the sensitive. But in God there is no sensitive appetite, as there is no sensible knowedge.

2. Every passion involves some bodily alteration, a thing impossible in the incorporeal Deity.

3. In every passion the subject is more or less drawn out of his essential condition or connatural disposition: which is not possible in the unchangeable God.

4. Every passion fixes determinedly on some one object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. Passion, like physical nature, rushes blindly at some one thing: that is why passion needs repressing and regulating by reason. But the divine will is not determined of itself to any one object in creation: but proceeds according to the order of its wisdom (Chap.LXXXII).

5. Every passion is the passion of a subject that is in potentiality. But God is altogether free from potentiality, being pure actuality.

Thus every passion, generically as such, is removed from God. But certain passions are removed from God, not only generically, but also specifically. For every passion takes its species from its object: if then an object is altogether unbefitting for God, the passion specified by that object is removed from God also on specific grounds. Such a passion is Sadness and Grief, the object of which is evil already attaching to the sufferer. Hope, again, though it has good for its object, is not of good obtained, but to be obtained, a relation to good which is unbefitting for God by reason of His so great perfection, to which addition is impossible. Much more does that perfection exclude any potentiality in the way of evil. But Fear regards an evil that may be imminent. In two ways then Fear, specifically as such, is removed from God, both because it supposes a subject that is in potentiality, and because it has for its object some evil that may come to be in the subject. Regret again, or Repentance, is repugnant to God, as well because it is a species of sadness, as also because it involves a change of will.

Moreover, without an error of the intellectual faculty, it is impossible for good to be mistaken for evil. And only in respect of private advantages is it possible for the loss of one being to be the gain of another. But to the general good nothing is lost by the good of any private member; but every private good goes to fill in the public good. But God is the universal good, by partaking in whose likeness all other things are called good. No other being’s evil then can possibly be good for God. Nor again, seeing that God’s knowledge makes no mistakes, can He apprehend as evil that which is simply good, and no evil to Him. Envy therefore is impossible to God, specifically as Envy, not only because it is a species of sadness, but also because it is sadness at the good of another, and thus takes the good of another as evil to itself.

It is part of the same procedure to be sad at good and to desire evil. Such sadness arises from good being accounted evil: such desire, from evil being accounted good. Now Anger is desire of the evil of another for vengeance’ sake. Anger then is far from God by reason of its species, not only because it is a species of sadness, but also because it is a desire of vengeance, conceived for sadness at an injury done one.

CHAPTER XC

THAT THERE IS IN GOD DELIGHT AND JOY

THERE are some passions which, though they do not befit God as passions, nevertheless, so far as their specific nature is considered, do not involve anything inconsistent with divine perfection. Of the number of these is Delight and Joy. Joy is of present good. Neither by reason of its object, which is good, nor by reason of the relation in which the object, good actually possessed, stands to the subject, does joy specifically contain anything inconsistent with divine perfection. Hence it is manifest that joy or Delight has being properly in God. For as good and evil apprehended is the object of the sensitive appetite, so also is it of the intellectual appetite, or will. It is the ordinary function of both appetites to pursue good and to shun evil, either real or apparent, except that the object of the intellectual appetite is wider than that of the sensitive, inasmuch as the intellectual appetite regards good and evil simply, while the sensitive appetite regards good and evil felt by sense; as also the object of intellect is wider than the object of sense. But the activities of appetite are specified by their objects. There exist therefore in the intellectual appetite, or will, activities specifically similar to the activities of the sensitive appetite, and differing only in this, that in the sensitive appetite they are passions on account of the implication of a bodily organ, but in the intellectual appetite they are simple activities. For as by the passion of fear, coming over the sensitive appetite, one shuns evil looming in the future, so the intellectual appetite works to the same effect without passion. Since then joy and Delight are not repugnant to God specifically, but only inasmuch as they are passions, it follows that they are not wanting even in the divine will.

2. Joy and Delight are a sort of rest of the will in its object. But God singularly rests in Himself as in the first object of His own will, inasmuch as He has all sufficiency in Himself.

3. Delight is the perfection of activity, perfecting activity as bloom does youth. But the activity of the divine understanding is most perfect. If therefore our act of understanding, coming to its perfection, yields delight, most delightful must be the act whereby God understands.

4. Everything naturally feels joy over what is like itself, except accidentally, inasmuch as the likeness hinders one's own gain, and two of a trade' quarrel. But every good thing is some likeness of the divine goodness, and nothing is lost to God by the good of His creature. Therefore God rejoices in good everywhere.

Joy and Delight differ in our consideration: for Delight arises out of good really conjoined with the subject; while Joy does not require this real conjunction, but the mere resting of the will on an agreeable object is sufficient for it. Hence, strictly speaking, Delight is at good conjoined with the subject: Joy over good external to the subject. Thus, in strict parlance, God takes delight in Himself: but has Joy both over Himself and over other things.

CHAPTER XCI

THAT THERE IS LOVE IN GOD

IT is of the essential idea of love, that whoever loves wishes the good of the object loved. But God wishes His own good and the good of other beings (Chap.LXXV); and in this respect He loves Himself and other beings.

2. It is a requisite of true love to love the good of another inasmuch as it is his good. But God loves the good of every being as it is the good of that being, though He does also subordinate one being to the profit of another.

3. The essential idea of love seems to be this, that the affection of one tends to another as to a being who is in some way one with himself. The greater the bond of union, the more intense is the love. And again the more intimately bound up with the lover the bond of union is, the stronger the love. But that bond whereby all things are united with God, namely, His goodness, of which all things are imitations, is to God the greatest and most intimate of bonds, seeing that He is Himself His own goodness. There is therefore in God a love, not only true, but most perfect and strong.

But some might be of opinion that God does not love one object more than another; for a higher and a lower degree of intensity of affection is characteristic of a changeable nature, and cannot be attributed to God, from whom all change is utterly removed. Besides, wherever else there is mention of any divine activity, there is no question of more and less: thus one thing is not known by God more than another. In answer to this difficulty we must observe that whereas other activities of the soul are concerned with one object only, love alone seems to tend to two. For love wishes something to somebody: hence the things that we desire, we are properly said to desire,’ not to love,’ but in them we rather love ourselves for whom we desire them. Every divine act then is of one and the same intensity; but love may be said to admit of greater and less’ in two ways, either in point of the good that we will to another, in which way we are said to love him more to whom we wish greater good; or again in point of the intensity of the act, in which way we are said to love him more to whom we wish, not indeed a greater good, but an equal good more fervently and effectually. In the former way then there is nothing to object to in the saying that God loves one more than another, inasmuch as He wishes him a greater good: but, understood of the second way, the saying is not tenable.

Hence it appears that of our affections there is none that can properly be in God except joy and love, though even these are in Him not by way of passion, as they are in us. That there is in God joy or delight is confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture. I was delighted day by day playing before him, says the Divine Wisdom, which is God (Prov. viii, 30). The Philosopher also says that God ever rejoices with one simple delight. The Scripture also speaks of love in God: With everlasting love I have loved thee (Jer. xxxi, 3); For the Father himself loveth you (John xvi, 27).

But even other affections (affectiones), which are specifically inconsistent with divine perfection, are predicated in Holy Writ of God, not properly but metaphorically, on account of likeness of effects. Thus sometimes the will in following out the order of wisdom tends to the same effect to which one might be inclined by a passion, which would argue a certain imperfection: for the judge punishes from a sense of justice, as an angry man under the promptings of anger. So sometimes God is said to be angry,' inasmuch as in the order of His wisdom He means to punish some one: When his anger shall blaze out suddenly (Ps. ii, 13). He is said to be compassionate,' inasmuch as in His benevolence He takes away the miseries of men, as we do the same from a sentiment of pity: The Lord is merciful and compassionate, patient and abounding in mercy (Ps. cli, 8). Sometimes also He is said to be repentant,' inasmuch as in the eternal and immutable order of His providence, He builds up what He had previously destroyed, or destroys what He had previously made, as we do when moved by repentance: It repenteth me that I have made man (Gen. vi, 6, 7). God is also said to be ‘sad,’ inasmuch as things happen contrary to what He loves and approves, as sadness is in us at what happens against our will: And the Lord saw, and it seemed evil in his eyes, because judgement is not: God saw that there is no man, and he was displeased, because there was none to meet him (Isa. lix, 15, 16).

CHAPTER XCII

IN WHAT SENSE VIRTUES CAN BE POSITED IN GOD

AS the divine goodness comprehends within itself in a certain way all goodnesses, and virtue is a sort of goodness, the divine goodness must contain all virtues after a manner proper to itself. But no virtue is predicated as an attribute of God after the manner of a habit, as virtues are in us. For it does not befit God to be good by anything superadded to Him, but only by His essence, since He is absolutely simple. Nor again does He act by anything superadded to His essence, as His essence is His being (Chap.XLV). Virtue therefore in God is not any habit, but His own essence.

2. A habit is an imperfect actuality, half-way between potentiality and actuality: hence the subjects of habits are compared to persons asleep. But in God actuality is most perfect. Virtue therefore in Him is not like a habit or a science, but is as a present act of consciousness, which is the extremest perfection of actuality.

Since human virtues are for the guidance of human life, and human life is twofold, contemplative and active, the virtues of the active life, inasmuch as they perfect this present life, cannot be attributed to God: for the active life of man consists in the use of material goods, which are not assignable to God. Again, these virtues perfect human conduct in political society: hence they do not seem much to concern those who keep aloof from political society: much less can they befit God, whose conversation and life is far removed from the manner and custom of human life. Some again of the virtues of the active life direct us how to govern the passions: but in God there are no passions.

CHAPTER XCIII

THAT IN GOD THERE ARE THE VIRTUES WHICH REGULATE ACTION

THERE are virtues directing the active life of man, which are not concerned with passions, but with actions, as truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, art. Since virtue is specified by its object, and the actions which are the objects of these virtues are not inconsistent with the divine perfection, neither is there in such virtues, specifically considered, anything to exclude them from the perfection of God.

3. Of things that come to have being from God, the proper plan of them all is in the divine understanding (Chap.LXVI). But the plan of a thing to be made in the mind of the maker is Art: hence the Philosopher says that Art is “the right notion of things to be made.” There is therefore properly Art in God, and therefore it is said: Wisdom, artificer of all, taught me (Wisd. vii, 21).

4. Again, the divine will, in things outside God, is determined by His knowledge (Chap.LXXXII). But knowledge directing the will to act is Prudence: because, according to the Philosopher, Prudence is “the right notion of things to be done.” There is therefore Prudence in God; and hence it is said: With him is prudence (Job xii, 13).

5. From the fact of God wishing anything, He wishes the requisites of that thing. But the points requisite to the perfection of each several thing are due to that thing: there is therefore in God Justice, the function of which is to distribute to each his own. Hence it is said: The Lord is just, and hath loved justice (Ps. x, 8).

6. As shown above (Chapp.LXXIV,LXXV), the last end, for the sake of which God wills all things, in no way depends on the means to that end,

neither in point of being nor in point of well-being. Hence God does not wish to communicate His goodness for any gain that may accrue to Himself thereby, but simply because the mere communication befits Him as the fountain of goodness. But to give, not from any advantage expected from the gift, but out of sheer goodness and the fitness of giving, is an act of Liberality. God therefore is in the highest degree liberal; and, as Avicenna says, He alone can properly be called liberal: for every other agent but Him is in the way of gaining something by his action and intends so to gain. This His liberality the Scripture declares, saying: As thou openest thy hand, all things shall be filled with goodness (Ps. ciii, 28) ; and, Who giveth to all abundantly, and reproacheth not (James i, 5).

7. All things that receive being from God, necessarily bear His likeness, in so far as they are, and are good, and have their proper archetypes in the divine understanding (Chap.LIV). But this belongs to the virtue of Truth, that every one should manifest himself in his deeds and words for such as he really is. There is therefore in God the virtue of Truth. Hence, God is true (Rom. iii, 4); and, All thy ways are truth (Ps. cxviii, 151).

In point of exchange, the proper act of commutative justice, justice does not befit God, since He receives no advantage from any one; hence, Who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? (Rom. xi, 35;) and, Who bath given to me beforehand, that I may repay him? (Job xli, 2.) Still, in a metaphorical sense, we are said to give things to God, inasmuch as He takes kindly what we have to offer Him. Commutative justice therefore does not befit God, but only distributive justice.

To judge of things to be done, or to give a thing, or make a distribution, is not proper to man alone, but belongs to any and every intellectual being. Inasmuch therefore as the aforesaid actions are considered in their generality, they have their apt place even in divinity: for as man is the distributer of human goods, as of money or honour, so is God of all the goods of the universe. The aforesaid virtues therefore are of wider extension in God than in man: for as the justice of man is to a city or family, so is the justice of God to the entire universe: hence the divine virtues are said to be archetypes of ours. But other virtues, which do not properly become God, have no archetype in the divine nature, but only, as is the case with corporeal things generally, in the divine wisdom, which contains the proper notions of all things.

CHAPTER XCIV

THAT THE CONTEMPLATIVE (INTELLECTUAL) VIRTUES ARE IN GOD

IF Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the highest causes; and God chiefly knows Himself, and knows nothing except by knowing Himself, as the first cause of all (Chap.XLVI), it is evident that Wisdom ought to be attributed to God in the first place. Hence it is said: He is wise of heart (Job ix, 4.); and, All wisdom is of the Lord God, and hath been with him alway (Ecclus i, 1). The Philosopher also says at the beginning of his Metaphysics that Wisdom is a divine possession, not a human.

2. If Knowledge (Science) is an acquaintance with a thing through its proper cause, and God knows the order of all causes and effects, and thereby the several proper causes of individual things (Chapp.LXV,LXVII), it is manifest that Knowledge (Science) is properly in God; hence God is the Lord of sciences (1 Kings ii, 3)

3. If the immaterial cognition of things, attained without discussion, is Understanding (Intuition), God has such a cognition of all things (Chap.L); and therefore there is in Him Understanding. Hence, He hath counsel and understanding (Job xii, 13).

CHAPTER XCV

THAT GOD CANNOT WILL EVIL

EVERY act of God is an act of virtue, since Ills virtue is His essence (Chap.XCII).

2. The will cannot will evil except by some error coming to be in the reason, at least in the matter of the particular choice there and then made. For as the object of the will is good, apprehended as such, the will cannot tend to evil unless evil be somehow proposed to it as good; and that cannot be without error. But in the divine cognition there can be no error (Chap.LXI).

3. God is the sovereign good, admitting no intermixture of evil (Chap.LXI).

4. Evil cannot befall the will except by its being turned away from its end. But the divine will cannot be turned away from its end, being unable to will except by willing itself (Chap.LXXV). It cannot therefore will evil; and thus free will in it is naturally established in good. This is the meaning of the texts: God is faithful and without iniquity (Deut. xxxii, 4); Thine eyes are clean, O Lord, and thou canst not look upon iniquity (Hab. i, 13).

CHAPTER XCVI

THAT GOD HATES NOTHING

AS love is to good, so is hatred to evil; we wish good to them whom we love, and evil to them whom we hate. If then the will of God cannot be inclined to evil, as has been shown (Chap.XCV), it is impossible for Him to hate anything.

2. The will of God tends to things other than Himself inasmuch as, by willing and loving His own being and goodness, He wishes it to be diffused as far as is possible by communication of His likeness. This then is what God wills in beings other than Himself, that there be in them the likeness of His goodness. Therefore God wills the good of everything, and hates nothing.

4. What is found naturally in all active causes, must be found especially in the Prime Agent. But all agents in their own way love the effects which they themselves produce, as parents their children, poets their own poems, craftsmen their works. Much more therefore is God removed from hating anything, seeing that He is cause of all.

Hence it is said: Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest nothing of the things that Thou hast made (Wisd. xi, 25).

Some things however God is said, to hate figuratively (similitudinarie), and that in two ways. The first way is this, that God, in loving things and willing their good to be, wills their evil not to be: hence He is said to have hatred of evils, for the things we wish not to be we are said to hate. So it is said: Think no evil in your hearts every one of you against his friend, and love no lying oath: for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord (Zach. viii, 17). But none of these things are effects of creation: they are not as subsistent things, to which hatred or love properly attaches. The other way is by God's wishing some greater good, which cannot be without the privation of a lesser good; and thus He is said to hate, whereas it is more properly love. Thus inasmuch as He wills the good of justice, or of the order of the universe, which cannot be without the punishment or perishing of some, He is said to hate those beings whose punishment or perishing He wills, according to the text, Esau I have hated (Malach. i, 3); and, Thou hatest all who work Iniquity, thou wilt destroy all who utter falsehood: the man of blood and deceit the Lord shall abominate (Ps. v, 7).

CHAPTER XCVII

THAT GOD IS LIVING

IT has been shown that God is intelligent and willing: but to understand and will are functions of a living being only.

2. Life is attributed to beings inasmuch as they appear to move of themselves, and not to be moved by another. Therefore things that seem to move of themselves, the moving powers of which the vulgar do not perceive, are figuratively said to live, as we speak of the living' (running) water of a flowing stream, but not so of a cistern or stagnant pool; and we call quicksilver' that which seems to have a motion of its own. This is mere popular speech, for properly those things alone move of themselves, which do so by virtue of their composition of a moving force and matter moved, as things with souls; hence these alone are properly said to live: all other things are moved by some external force, a generating force, or a force removing an obstacle, or a force of impact. And because sensible activities are attended with movement, by a further step everything that determines itself to its own modes of activity, even though unattended with movement, is said to live; hence to understand and desire and feel are vital actions. But God, of all beings, is determined to activity by none other than Himself, as He is prime agent and first cause; to Him therefore, of all beings, does it belong to live.

3. The divine being contains the perfection of all being (Chap.XXVIII). But living is perfect being; hence animate things in the scale of being take precedence of inanimate. With God then to be is to live.

This too is confirmed by authority of divine Scripture: I will raise to heaven my hand, and swear by my right hand, and say: I live for ever (Deut. xxxii, 40): My heart and my flesh) have rejoiced in the living God (Ps. lxxiii, 3).

CHAPTER XCVIII

THAT GOD IS HIS OWN LIFE

IN living things, to live is to be: for a living thing is said to be alive inasmuch as it has a soul; and by that soul, as by its own proper form, it has being: living in fact is nothing else than living being, arising out of a living form. But, in God, Himself is His own being (Chap.XXII): Himself therefore is His own life.

2. To understand is to live: but God is His own act of understanding (Chap.XLV).

3. If God is living, there must be life in Him. If then He is not His own life, there will be something in Him that is not Himself, and thus He will be compound,—a rejected conclusion (Chap.XVIII).

And this is the text: I am life (John xiv, 6).

CHAPTER XCIX

THAT THE LIFE OF GOD IS EVERLASTING

IT is impossible for God to cease to live, since Himself He is His own life (Chap.XCVIII).

2. Everything that at one time is and at another time is not, has existence through some cause. But the divine life has no cause, as neither has the divine being. God is therefore not at one time living and at another not living, but always lives.

3. In every activity the agent remains, although sometimes the activity passes in succession: hence in motion the moving body remains the same in subject throughout the whole course of the motion, although not the same in our consideration. Where then the action is the agent himself, nothing there can pass in succession, but all must be together at once. But God’s act of understanding and living is God Himself (Chapp.XLV,XCVIII): therefore His life has no succession, but is all together at once, and everlasting.

Hence it is said: This is the true God and life everlasting (1 John v, 20).

CHAPTER C

THAT GOD IS HAPPY

HAPPINESS is the proper good of every intellectual nature. Since then God is an intellectual being, happiness will be His proper good. But God in regard of His proper good is not as a being that is still tending to a proper good not yet possessed: that is the way with a nature changeable and in potentiality; but God is in the position of a being that already possesses its proper good. Therefore He not only desires happiness, as we do, but is in the enjoyment of happiness.

2. The thing above all others desired or willed by an intellectual nature is the most perfect thing in that nature, and that is its happiness. But the most perfect thing in each is its most perfect activity: for power and habit are perfected by activity: hence the Philosopher says that happiness is a perfect activity. Now the perfection of activity depends on four conditions. First, on its kind, that it be immanent in the agent. I call an activity immanent in the agent,’ when nothing else comes of it besides the act itself: such are the acts of seeing and hearing: such acts are perfections of the agents whose acts they are, and may have a finality of their own in so far as they are not directed to the production of anything else as an end. On the other hand, any activity from which there results something done besides itself, is a perfection of the thing done, not of the doer: it stands in the relation of a means to an end, and therefore cannot be the happiness of an intellectual nature. Secondly, on the principle of activity, that it be an activity of the highest power: hence our happiness lies not in any activity of sense, but in an activity of intellect, perfected by habit. Thirdly, on the object of activity; and therefore our happiness consists in understanding the highest object of understanding. Fourthly, on the form of activity, that the action be perfect, easy, and agreeable. But the activity of God fulfils all these conditions:

since it is (1) activity in the order of understanding; and (2) His understanding is the highest of faculties, not needing any habit to perfect it; and (3) His understanding is bent upon Himself, the highest of intelligible objects; and (4) He understands perfectly, without any difficulty, and with all delight. He is therefore happy.

3. Boethius says that happiness is a state made perfect by a gathering of all good things. But such is the divine perfection, which includes all perfection in one single view (Chapp.XXVIII,LIV).

4. He is happy, who is sufficient for himself and wants nothing. But God has no need of other things, seeing that His perfection depends on nothing external to Himself; and when He wills other things for Himself as for an end, it is not that He needs them, but only that this reference befits His goodness.

5. It is impossible for God to wish for anything impossible (Chap.LXXXIV). Again it is impossible for anything to come in to Him which as yet He has not, seeing that He is nowise in potentiality (Chap.XVI). Therefore He cannot wish to have what He has not: therefore He has whatever He wishes; and He wishes nothing evil (Chap.XCV). Therefore He is happy, according to the definition given by some, that “he is happy who has what he wishes and wishes nothing evil.”

His happiness the Holy Scriptures declare: Whom he will show in his own time, the blessed and powerful one (1 Tim. vi, 15).

CHAPTER CI

THAT GOD IS HIS OWN HAPPINESS

GOD’S happiness is the act of His understanding (Chap.C). But that very act of God’s understanding is His substance (Chap.XLV). He therefore is His own happiness.

CHAPTER CII

THAT THE HAPPINESS OF GOD IS MOST PERFECT, AND EXCEEDS ALL OTHER HAPPINESS

WHERE there is greater love, there is greater delight in the attainment of the object loved. But every being, other things being equal, loves itself more than it loves anything else: a sign of which is that, the nearer anything is to oneself, the more it is naturally loved. God therefore takes greater delight in His happiness, which is Himself, than other blessed ones in their happiness, which is not what they are.

3. What is by essence, ranks above what is by participation. But God is happy by His essence, a prerogative that can belong to no other: for nothing else but God can be the sovereign good; and thus whatever else is happy must be happy by participation from Him. The divine happiness therefore exceeds all other happiness.

4. Perfect happiness consists in an act of the understanding. But no other act of understanding can compare with God's act: as is clear, not only from this that it is a subsistent act, but also because by this one act God perfectly understands Himself as He is, and all things that are and are not, good and evil; whereas in all other intellectual beings the act of understanding is not itself subsistent, but is the act of a subsistent subject. Nor can any one understand God, the supreme object of understanding, so perfectly as He is perfect, because the being of none is so perfect as the divine being, nor can any act ever be more perfect than the substance of which it is the act. Nor is there any other understanding that knows even all that God can do: for if it did, it would comprehend the divine power. Lastly, even what another

understanding does know, it does not know all with one and the same act. God therefore is incomparably happy above all other beings.

5. The more a thing is brought to unity, the more perfect is its power and excellence. But an activity that works in succession, is divided by different divisions of time: in no way then can its perfection be compared to the perfection of an activity that is without succession, all present together, especially if it does not pass in an instant but abides to eternity. Now the divine act of understanding is without succession, existing all together for eternity: whereas our act of understanding is in succession by the accidental attachment to it of continuity and time. Therefore the divine happiness infinitely exceeds human happiness, as the duration of eternity exceeds the now in flux' of time (nunc temporis fluens).

6. The fatigue and various occupations whereby our contemplation in this life is necessarily interrupted,—in which contemplation whatever happiness there is for man in this life chiefly consists,—and the errors and doubts and various mishaps to which the present life is subject, show that human happiness, in this life particularly, can in no way compare with the happiness of God.

7. The perfection of the divine happiness may be gathered from this, that it embraces all happinesses according to the most perfect mode of each. By way of contemplative happiness, it has a perfect and perpetual view of God Himself and of other beings. By way of active life, it has the government, not of one man, or of one house, or of one city, or of one kingdom, but of the whole universe. Truly, the false happiness of earth is but a shadow of that perfect happiness. For it consists, according to Boethius, in five things, in pleasure, riches, power, dignity and fame. God then has a most excellent delight of Himself, and a universal joy of all good things, without admixture of contrary element. For riches, He has absolute self-sufficiency of all good. For power, He has infinite might. For dignity, He has primacy and rule over all beings. For fame, He has the admiration of every understanding that in any sort knows Him.

To Him then, who is singularly blessed, be honour and glory for ever and ever, Amen.

BOOK II

GOD THE ORIGIN OF CREATURES

CHAPTER I

CONNEXION OF WHAT FOLLOWS WITH WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE

THERE can be no perfect knowledge of anything unless its activity be known: for from the mode of activity proper to a thing, and the species to which it belongs, the measure and quality of its power is estimated; and the power shows the nature of the thing, for each thing is naturally active according to the nature with which it is actually endowed. But there is a twofold activity: one immanent in the agent, and a perfection of his, as feeling, understanding and willing; the other passing out to an exterior thing, and a perfection of the thing made and constituted thereby, as warming, cutting and building. Both of these acts are proper to God: the first, inasmuch as he understands, wills, rejoices and loves; the second inasmuch as He produces and brings things into being, conserves and governs them. Of the first act of God we have spoken in the previous book, treating of the divine knowledge and will. It remains now to treat of the second action, whereby things are produced and governed by God.

CHAPTER IV

THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN VIEW CREATURES FROM DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS

HUMAN philosophy considers creatures as they are in themselves: hence we find different divisions of philosophy according to the different classes of things. But Christian faith considers them, not in themselves, but inasmuch as they represent the majesty of God, and in one way or another are directed to God, as it is said: Of the glory of the Lord his work is full: hath not the Lord made his saints to tell of his wonders? (Ecclus xlii, 16, 17.) Therefore the philosopher and the faithful Christian (fidelis) consider different points about creatures: the philosopher considers what attaches to them in their proper nature: the faithful Christian considers about creatures only what attaches to them in their relation to God, as that they are created by God, subject to God, and the like. Hence it is not to be put down as an imperfection in the doctrine of faith, if it passes unnoticed many properties of things, as the configuration of the heavens, or the laws of motion. And again such points as are considered by philosopher and faithful Christian alike, are treated on different principles: for the philosopher takes his stand on the proper and immediate causes of things; but the faithful Christian argues from the First Cause, showing that so the matter is divinely revealed, or that this makes for the glory of God, or that God's power is infinite. Hence this speculation of the faithful Christian ought to be called the highest wisdom, as always regarding the highest cause, according to the text: This is your wisdom and understanding before the nations (Deut. iv, 6). And therefore human philosophy is subordinate to this higher wisdom;

and in sign of this subordination divine wisdom sometimes draws conclusions from premises of human philosophy. Further, the two systems do not observe the same order of procedure. In the system of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and from them leads on to the knowledge of God, the first study is of creatures and the last of God; but in the system of faith, which studies creatures only in their relation to God, the study is first of God and afterwards of creatures; and this is a more perfect view, and more like to the knowledge of God, who, knowing Himself, thence discerns other beings. Following this latter order, after what has been said in the first book about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the beings that come from God.

CHAPTER V

ORDER OF MATTERS TO BE TREATED

THE order of our treatise will be to deal first with the production and bringing of things into being (Chapp VI-XXXVIII); secondly with the distinction of things (Chapp. XXXIX-XLV); thirdly, with the nature of things thus produced and distinct so far as it appertains to the truth of faith (Chapp. XLVI-CI).

CHAPTER VI

THAT IT BELONGS TO GOD TO BE TO OTHER BEINGS THE PRINCIPLE OF EXISTENCE

IN inferior agents it is a sign of attained perfection, when they can produce their own likeness. But God is sovereignly perfect (B.I. Chap.XXVIII). Therefore it belongs to Him to make some being like Himself in actual existence.

6. The more perfect any principle of activity is, the wider its sphere of action. But that pure actuality, which is God, is more perfect than actuality mingled with potentiality, such as is in us. Now actuality is the principle of action. Since then by the actuality which is in us, we are not only capable of immanent acts, such as understanding and willing, but also of acts tending to exterior things and productive of effects, much more can God, by virtue of His actuality, not only understand and will, but also produce an effect.

Hence it is said: Who maketh great and wonderful and inscrutable works without number (Job v. 9).

CHAPTER VII

THAT THERE IS IN GOD ACTIVE POWER

AS passive power, or passivity, follows upon being in potentiality, so active power follows upon being in actuality; for everything acts by being in actuality, and is acted upon by being in potentiality. But it belongs to God to be in actuality; and therefore there is suitably ascribed to Him active power, but not passive power.

Hence it is said: Thou art powerful, O Lord (Ps. lxxxviii, 9); and Thy power and thy justice, O God, are even to the highest heaven, in the wonders that thou hast made (Ps. lxx, 18, 19).

CHAPTER VIII

THAT GOD’S POWER IS HIS SUBSTANCE

ACTIVE power belongs to the perfection of a thing. But every divine perfection is contained in God’s own being (B. I, Chap.XXVIII). God’s power therefore is not different from his being. But God is His own being (B. I, Chap.XXII); He is therefore His own power.

4. In things the powers of which are not their substance, the said powers are accidents. But there can be no accident in God (B. I, Chap.XXIII), who is therefore his own power.

CHAPTER IX

THAT GOD’S POWER IS HIS ACTION

GOD’S power is His substance, as has been shown in the previous chapter: also His action is His substance, as has been shown of His intellectual activity (B. I, Chap.XLV), and the same argument holds of His other activities. Therefore in God power and action are not two different things.

2. The action of any being is a complement of its power; for it stands to power as the second actuality to the first. But the divine power, being God’s very essence, has no other complement than itself. And therefore in God action and power are not distinct.

4. Any action that is not the agent’s very substance is in the agent as an accident in its subject. But in God there can be nothing accidental. Therefore in God His action is none other than His substance and His power.

CHAPTER X

IN WHAT MANNER POWER IS SAID TO BE IN GOD

SINCE the divine action is nothing else than the divine power, it is manifest that power is not said to be in God as a principle of His action (for nothing is the principle of itself), but as a principle of the thing made or done: also that when power is said to be in God in respect of the things made or done by Him, this is a predication of objective fact: but when it is said to be in Him in respect of His own action, such predication regards only our way of viewing things, inasmuch as our understanding views under two different concepts God’s power and God’s action. Hence if there be any actions proper to God, that do not pass into anything made or done, but are immanent in the agent, in respect of these actions there is not said to be power in God except in our way of viewing things, not in objective fact. There are such actions, namely, understanding and willing. Properly speaking, the power of God does not regard these actions, but only effects produced in the world external to Him. Intellect and will, then, are in God, not as faculties,’ or powers,’ but only as actions. It is also clear from the aforesaid that the multitude of actions which are attributed to God, as understanding, willing, producing creatures, and the like, are not different things, since each one of these actions in God is His own being, which is one and the same.

CHAPTER XI

THAT SOMETHING IS PREDICATED OF GOD IN RELATION TO CREATURES

SINCE power is proper to God in respect of the effects of His production, and power ranks as a principle, and a principle is so called in relation to its derivative; it is clear that something may be predicated of God in relation to the effects of His production.

2. It is unintelligible how one thing can be made a subject of predication in relation to another thing, unless contrariwise the other thing be made a subject of predication in relation to it. But other beings are made subjects of predication in relation to God, as when it is said that they have their being from God and depend on Him. God therefore must be made a subject of predication in relation to creatures.

3. Likeness is a relation. But God, as other agents, acts to the production of His own likeness.

4. Knowledge is predicated in relation to the thing known. But God has knowledge of other beings.

5. Whatever is first and sovereign, is so in relation to others, But God is the first being and the sovereign good.

CHAPTER XII

THAT THE RELATIONS, PREDICATED OF GOD IN REGARD TO CREATURES, ARE NOT REALLY IN GOD

THESE relations cannot be in God as accidents in a subject, seeing that in God there is no accident (B. I, ChapXXIII). Nor again can they be in the very substance of God: for then the substance of God in its very essence would be referred to another; but what is referred to another for its very essence, in a manner depends on that other, as it can neither be nor be understood without it; but this would make the substance of God dependent on another being, foreign to itself.

2. God is the first measure of all beings (B. I, Chap.XXVIII). He is to them as the object is to our knowledge, that is to say, its measure. But though the object is spoken of in relation to the knowledge of it, nevertheless the relation really is not in the object known, but only in the knowledge of it. The object is said to be in relation, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it.

3. The aforesaid relations are predicated of God, not only in respect of things that actually are, but also in respect of things that potentially are, because of them also He has knowledge, and in respect of them He is called both first being and sovereign good. But what actually is bears no real relation to what is not actually but potentially. Now God is not otherwise related to things that actually are than to things that potentially are, because he is not changed by producing anything.

4. To whatsoever is added anything fresh, the thing receiving that addition must be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now sundry

fresh relations are predicated of God, as that He is lord or ruler of this thing newly come into being. If then any relation were predicated as really existing in God, it would follow that something fresh was added to God, and therefore that He had suffered some change, either essential or accidental, contrary to what was shown above (B. I, Chapp.XXIII,XXIV)

CHAPTER XIII

HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD

IT cannot be said that the aforesaid relations are things existing outside of God. For since God is first of beings and highest of excellencies, we should have to consider other relations of God to those relations, supposing them to be things; and if the second relations again were things, we should have to invent again a third set of relations, and so on to infinity. Again, there are two ways in which a denomination may be predicated. A thing is denominated from what is outside it, as from place a man is said to be somewhere,’ and from time once’; and again a thing is denominated from what is within it, as white’ from whiteness. But from relation nothing is found to bear a denomination as from something outside itself, but only as from something within itself: thus a man is not called father’ except from the paternity that is in him. It is impossible therefore for the relations, whereby God has relation to the creature, to be anything outside God. Since then it has been shown that they are not in Him really and yet are predicated of Him, the only possible conclusion is that they are attributed to Him merely by our mode of thought, inasmuch as other beings are in relation to Him: for when our understanding conceives that A is related to B, it further conceives that B is related to A, even though sometimes B is not really so related.

Hence it is also clear that the aforesaid relations are not predicated of God in the same way that other things are predicated of God: for all other things, as wisdom or will, are predicated of His essence, while the aforesaid relations are by no means so predicated, but only according to our mode of thought. And yet our thought is not at fault: for, by the very fact of our mind knowing that the relations of effects of divine power have God himself for their term it predicates some things of Him relatively.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT THE PREDICATION OF MANY RELATIONS OF GOD IS NO PREJUDICE TO THE SIMPLICITY AND SINGLENESS OF HIS BEING

IT is no prejudice to the simplicity of God’s being that many relations are predicated of Him, not as denoting anything affecting His essence, but according to our mode of thought. For our mind, understanding many things, may very well be related in manifold ways to a being that is in itself simple; and so it comes to view that simple being under manifold relations. Indeed the more simple anything is, the greater is its power, and the more numerous the effects whereof it is the principle; and thus it is viewed as coming into relation in more manifold ways. The fact then that many things are predicated of God relatively is an attestation of the supreme simplicity and singleness of His being.

CHAPTER XV

THAT GOD IS TO ALL THINGS THE CAUSE OF THEIR BEING

HAVING shown (ChapVI) that God is to some things the cause of their being, we must further show that nothing out of God has being except of Him. Every attribute that attaches to anything otherwise than as constituting its essence, attaches to it through some cause, as whiteness to man. To be in a thing independently of causation is to be there primarily and immediately, as something ordinary (per se) and essential. It is impossible for any one attribute, attaching to two things, to attach to each as constituting its essence. What is predicated as constituent of a thing’s essence, has no extension beyond that thing: as the having three angles together equal to two right angles has no extension beyond triangle,’ of which it is predicated, but is convertible with triangle.’ Whatever then attaches to two things, cannot attach to them both as constituting the essence of each. It is impossible therefore for any one attribute to be predicated of two subjects without its being predicated of one or the other as something come there by the operation of some cause: either one must be the cause of the other, or some third thing must be cause of both. Now being’ is predicated of everything that is. It is impossible therefore for there to be two things, each having being independently of any cause; but either these things must both of them have being by the operation of a cause, or one must be to the other the cause of its being. Therefore everything which in any way is, must have being from that which is uncaused; that is, from God (B. I, Chap.XV).

2. What belongs to a thing by its nature, and is not dependent on any causation from without, cannot suffer diminution or defect. For if anything essential is withdrawn from or added to nature, that nature, so increased or

diminished, will give place to another. If on the other hand the nature is left entire, and something else is found to have suffered diminution, it is clear that what has been so diminished does not absolutely depend on that nature, but on some other cause, by removal of which it is diminished. Whatever property therefore attaches to a thing less in one instance than in others, does not attach to that thing in mere virtue of its nature, but from the concurrence of some other cause. The cause of all effects in a particular kind will be that whereof the kind is predicated to the utmost. Thus we see that the hottest body is the cause of heat in all hot bodies, and the brightest body the cause of brightness in all bright bodies. But God is in the highest degree being' (B. I, Chap.XIII). He then is the cause of all things whereof being' is predicated.

3. The order of causes must answer to the order of effects, since effects are proportionate to their causes. Hence, as special effects are traced to special causes, so any common feature of those special effects must be traced to some common cause. Thus, over and above the particular causes of this or that generation, the sun is the universal cause of all generation; and the king is the universal cause of government in his kingdom, over the officials of the kingdom, and also over the officials of individual cities. But being is common to all things. There must then be over all causes some Cause to whom it belongs to give being.

4. What is by essence, is the cause of all that is by participation, as fire is the cause of all things fiery, as such. But God is being by His essence because He is pure being; while every other being is being by participation, because there can only be one being that is its own existence (B. I, Chapp.XXII,XLII). God therefore is cause of being to all other beings.

5. Everything that is possible to be and not to be, has some cause: because, looked at by itself, it is indifferent either way; and thus there must be something else that determines it one way. Hence, as a process to infinity is impossible, there must be some necessary being that is cause of all things which are possible to be and not to be.

6. God in His actuality and perfection includes the perfections of all things (B. I, Chap.XXVIII); and thus He is virtually all. He is therefore the apt producing cause of all.

This conclusion is confirmed by divine authority: for it is said: Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are therein (Ps. cxlv, 6).

And, All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing (John i, 3). And From whom are all things, by whom are all things, in (unto) whom are all things (Rom. xi, 16).

CHAPTER XVI

THAT GOD HAS BROUGHT THINGS INTO BEING OUT OF NOTHING

TO every effect produced by God there is either something pre-existent or not. If not, the thesis stands, that God produces some effect out of nothing pre-existent. If anything pre-exists, we either have a process to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to something primitive, which does not presuppose anything else previous to it. Now this primitive something cannot be God Himself, for God is not the material out of which anything is made (B. I, Chap.XVI): nor can it be any other being, distinct from God and uncaused by God (Chap.XV).

3. The more universal the effect, the higher the cause: for the higher the cause, the wider its range of efficiency. Now being is more universal than motion. Therefore above any cause that acts only by moving and transmitting must be that cause which is the first principle of being; and that we have shown to be God (B. I, Chap.XIII). God therefore does not act merely by moving and transmuting: whereas every cause that can only bring things into being out of pre-existing material acts merely in that way, for a thing is made out of material by movement or some change.

4. It is not proper to the universal cause of being, as such, to act only by movement and change: for not by movement and change is being, as such, made out of not-being, as such, but being this' is made out of not being this.' But God is the universal principle of being (Chap.XV). Therefore it is not proper to Him to act only by movement or change, or to need pre-existent material to make anything.

5. Every agent has a term of action like itself, for its acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. Given then an agent in actuality by some form inherent in it,

and not to the whole extent of its substance, it will be proper to such an agent to produce its effect by causing a form in some way inherent in matter. But God is in actuality, not by anything inhering in Him, but to the whole extent of His substance (B. I, Chap.XVIII). Therefore the proper mode of divine action is to produce the whole subsistent thing, and not a mere inherent thing, as is form in matter.

10. Between actuality and potentiality such an order obtains, that, though in one and the same being, which is sometimes in potentiality sometimes in actuality, potentiality is prior in time to actuality (although actuality is prior in nature), yet, absolutely speaking, actuality must be prior to potentiality, as is clear from this, that potentiality is not reduced to actuality except by some actual being. But matter is being in potentiality. Therefore God, first and pure actuality, must be absolutely prior to matter, and consequently cause thereof.

This truth divine Scripture confirms, saying: In the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen. i, 1). For to create is nothing else than to bring a thing into being without any pre-existent material.

Hereby is confuted the error of the ancient philosophers, who supposed no cause at all for matter, since in the actions of particular agents they always saw some matter pre-existent to every action. Hence they took up the common opinion, that nothing is made out of nothing, which indeed is true of the actions of particular agents. But they had not yet arrived at a knowledge of the universal agent, the active cause of all being, whose causative action does not necessarily suppose any pre-existent material.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT CREATION IS NOT A MOVEMENT NOR A CHANGE

EVERY movement or change is the actualisation of something that was in potentiality, as such: but in this action of creation there is nothing pre-existent in potentiality to become the object of the action.

2. The extremes of movement or change fall under the same order, being either of the same kind, as contraries are, or sharing one common potentiality of matter. But nothing of this can be in creation, to which no previous condition of things is supposed.

3. In every change or movement there must be something coming to be otherwise than as it was before. But where the whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there cannot be any permanent residuum, now in this condition, now in that: because such a residuum would not be produced, but presupposed to production.

CHAPTER XVIII

SOLUTION OF ARGUMENTS AGAINST CREATION

HENCE appears the futility of arguments against creation drawn from the nature of movement or change,—as that creation must be in some subject, or that non-being must be transmuted into being: for creation is not a change, but is the mere dependence of created being on the principle by which it is set up, and so comes under the category of relation: hence the subject of creation may very well be said to be the thing created. Nevertheless creation is spoken of as a change’ according to our mode of conceiving it, inasmuch as our understanding takes one and the same thing to be now non-existent and afterwards existing. If Creation (creaturedom) is a relation, it is evidently some sort of reality; and this reality is neither uncreated, nor created by a further act of creation. For since the created effect really depends on the Creator, this relation must be a certain reality. Now every reality is brought into being by God; and therefore also this reality is brought into being by God, and yet was not created by any other creation than that of the first creature, because accidents and forms do not exist by themselves, and therefore neither are they terms of separate creation, since creation is the production of substantial being; but as they are in another,’ so are they created in the creation of other things.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT CREATION IS NOT SUCCESSIVE

SUCCESSION is proper to movement. But creation is not movement. Therefore there is in it no succession.

2. In every successive movement there is some medium between the extremes. But between being and not-being, which are the extremes in creation, there can be no medium, and therefore no succession.

3. In every making, in which there is succession, the process of being made is before the state of achieved completion. But this cannot happen in creation, because, for the process of being made to precede the achieved completion of the creature, there would be required some subject in which the process might take place. Such a subject cannot be the creature itself, of whose creation we are speaking, because that creature is not till the state of its achieved completion is realised. Nor can it be the Maker, because to be in movement is an actuality, not of mover, but of moved. And as for the process of being made having for its subject any pre-existing material, that is against the very idea of creation. Thus succession is impossible in the act of creation.

5. Successive stages in the making of things become necessary, owing to defect of the matter, which is not sufficiently disposed from the first for the reception of the form. Hence, when the matter is already perfectly disposed for the form, it receives it in an instant. Thus because a transparent medium is always in final disposition for light, it lights up at once in the presence of any actually shining thing. Now in creation nothing is prerequisite on the part of the matter, nor is anything wanting to the agent for action. It follows that creation takes place in an instant: a thing is at once in the act of being created and is created, as light is at once being shed and is shining.

CHAPTER XXI

THAT IT BELONGS TO GOD ALONE TO CREATE

SINCE the order of actions is according to the order of agents, and the action is nobler of the nobler agent, the first and highest action must be proper to the first and highest agent. But creation is the first and highest action, presupposing no other, and in all others presupposed. Therefore creation is the proper action of God alone, who is the highest agent.

2. Nothing else is the universal cause of being but God (Chap.XV).

3. Effects answer proportionally to their causes. Thus actual effects we attribute to actual causes, potential effects to potential causes, particular effects to particular causes, and universal effects to universal causes. Now the first thing caused is being,’ as we see by its presence in all things. Therefore the proper cause of being,’ simply as such, is the first and universal agent, which is God. Other agents are not causes of being,’ simply as such, but causes of being this,’ as man’ or white’: but being,’ simply as such, is caused by creation, which presupposes nothing, because nothing can be outside of the extension of being,’ simply as such. Other productions result in being this,’ or being of this quality’: for out of pre-existent being is made being this,’ or being of this quality.’

6. Every agent that acts as an instrument completes the action of the principal agent by some action proper and connatural to itself, as a saw operates to the making of a stool by cutting. If then there be any nature that operates to creation as an instrument of the prime creator, this being must operate through some action due and proper to its own nature. Now the effect answering to the proper action of an instrument is prior in the way of production to the effect answering to the principal agent; hence it is that the

final end answers to the principal agent: for the cutting of the wood is prior to the form of the stool. There must then be some effect due to the proper operation of the instrument used for creation; and this effect must be prior in the way of production to being’: for being’ is the effect answering to the action of the prime creator. But that is impossible: for the more general is prior in the way of generation to the more particular.

Hereby is destroyed the error of certain philosophers, who said that God created the first spirit, and by it was created the second, and so in order to the last.

CHAPTER XXII

THAT GOD IS ALMIGHTY

AS creation is the work of God alone, so whatever beings are producible only by creation must be immediately produced by Him. Such are all spirits, the existence of which for the present let us suppose, and likewise all bodily matter. These several existences are immediate effects of creative power. Now power is not determined and limited to one effect, when it is productive of several effects immediately, and that not out of any pre-existent material. I say immediately,’ because if the production were through intermediate agents, the diversity of effects might be ascribed to those intermediate causes. I say again not out of any pre-existent material,’ because the same agent by the same action causes different effects according to the difference of material. God’s power then is not determined and limited to one effect.

2. Every perfect active power is co-extensive with and covers all cases of its own proper effect: thus perfect building power would extend to everything that could be called a house. But the divine power is of itself the cause of being, and being is its proper effect. Therefore that power extends to all things that are not inconsistent with the idea of being: for if the divine power were available only for one particular effect, it would not be the ordinary cause of being, as such, but cause of this being.’ Now what is inconsistent with the idea of being’ is the opposite of being,’ which is not-being.’ God then can do all things that do not include in themselves the element of not-being, that is to say, that do not involve a contradiction.

3. Every agent acts inasmuch as it is in actuality. According then to the mode of actuality of each agent in the mode of its active power. Now God is perfect actuality, having in Himself the perfections of all beings (B. I,

Chap.XXVIII): therefore His active power extends to all things that are not inconsistent with actual being.

5. There are three ways in which an effect may not be in the power of an agent. In one way, because it has no affinity or likeness to the agent, for every agent acts to the production of its own likeness somehow: hence man cannot be the parent of brute or plant, though he can be parent of man, who is more than they. In another way, on account of the excellence of the effect, transcending the compass of the active power: thus the active power of matter cannot produce spirit. In a third way, on account of the material being determined to some effect, and the agent having no power over it: thus a carpenter cannot make a saw, because his art gives him no power over iron. But in none of these ways can an effect be withdrawn from the divine power: not for the unlikeness of the effect, since every being, in so much as it has being, is like God (Chap.XV): nor again for the excellence of the effect, since God is above all in goodness and perfection (B. I, Chapp.XXVIII,XLI): nor lastly for the defect of the material, since God in His action needs no material (Chap.XVI).

This also is taught by divine Scripture as a tenet of faith. I am God Almighty, walk before me and be perfect (Gen. xvii, 1): I know that thou canst do all things (Job xlii, 2): No word shall be impossible with God (Luke i, 37).

Hereby is excluded the error of sundry philosophers, who have laid it down that God can do nothing except according to the course of nature. On such it is said: As though the Almighty had no power, they reckoned of him (Job xxii, 17).

CHAPTER XXIII

THAT GOD’S ACTION IN CREATION IS NOT OF PHYSICAL NECESSITY, BUT OF FREE CHOICE OF WILL

THE power of every necessary agent is determined and limited to one effect. That is the reason why all physical effects always come out in the same way, unless there be some interference: but acts of the will not so. But the divine power is not directed to one effect only (Chap.XXII). God then does not act by physical necessity, but by will.

2. Whatever does not involve a contradiction, is within the range of the divine power. But many things that do not exist in creation would still involve no contradiction if they did exist. This is most evidently the case in regard of the number and size and distances of the stars and other bodies. They would present no contradiction, no intrinsic absurdity, if they were arranged on another plan. Many things therefore lie within the range of divine power, that are not found in nature. But whoever does some and leaves out others of the things that he can do, acts by choice of will and not by physical necessity.

4. Since God’s action is His substance (B. I, Chap.LXXIII), the divine action cannot come under the category of those acts that are transient’ and not in the agent, but must be an act immanent’ in the agent, such as are acts of knowing and desiring, and none other. God therefore acts and operates by knowing and willing.

6. A self-determined agent is prior to an agent determined from without: for all that is determined from without is reducible to what is self-determined, or we should have process to infinity. But he who is not master

of his own action is not self-determined: for he acts as led by another, not as his own leader. The prime agent then must act in such a way as to remain master of his own action. But no one is master of his own action except he be a voluntary agent.

7. Will-action is naturally prior to physical action: for that is naturally prior which is more perfect, albeit in the individual it be posterior in time. But will-action is the more perfect, as within our experience voluntary agents are more perfect than physical. Therefore will-action must be assigned to God, the prime agent.

8. Where will-action and physical action go together, will-action represents the higher power and uses the other as an instrument. But the divine power is supreme, and therefore must act by will-action, not under physical necessity.

This truth also divine Scripture teaches us. All things, whatsoever he hath willed, the Lord hath done (Ps. cxxxiv, 6): Who worketh all things according to the counsel of his will (Eph. i, 11).

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT GOD ACTS BY HIS WISDOM

THE will is moved by some apprehension. But God acts by willing. Since then in God there is intellectual apprehension only, and He understands nothing otherwise than by understanding Himself, whom to understand is to be wise (B. I, Chap.LIV), it follows that God works out all things according to His wisdom.

2. Every agent acts in so far as it has within it something corresponding to the effect to be produced. But in every voluntary agent, as such, what corresponds to the effect to be produced is some intellectual presentation of the same. Were there no more than a mere physical disposition to produce the effect, the agent could act only to one effect, because for one physical cause there is only one physical mode of operation (ratio naturalis unius est una tantum). Every voluntary agent therefore produces its effect according to the mode of intellectual operation proper to itself. But God acts by willing, and therefore it is by the wisdom of His intellect that he brings things into being.

3. The function of wisdom is to set things in order. Now the setting of things in order can be effected only through a knowledge of the relation and proportion of the said things to one another, and to some higher thing which is the end and purpose of them all: for the mutual order of things to one another is founded upon their order to the end which they are to serve. But it is proper to intelligence alone to know the mutual relations and proportions of things. Again, it is proper to wisdom to judge of things as they stand to their highest cause. Thus every setting of things in order by wisdom must be the work of some intelligence. But the things produced by God bear an orderly relation to one another, which cannot be attributed to chance, since it (sit not sint) obtains always or for the most part. Thus it is

evident that God, in bringing things into being, intended them in a certain order. Therefore His production of them was a work of wisdom.

All this is confirmed by divine authority, for it is said: Thou has made all things in wisdom (Ps. ciii, 24); and the Lord in wisdom founded the earth (Prov. iii, 19).

Hereby is excluded the error of some who said that all things depend on the absolute will of God, independent of any reason.

CHAPTER XXV

IN WHAT SENSE SOME THINGS ARE SAID TO BE IMPOSSIBLE TO THE ALMIGHTY

IN God there is active power, but no potentiality. Now possibility is spoken of both as involving active power and as involving potentiality. Those things then are impossible to God, the possibility of which would mean in Him potentiality. Examples: God cannot be any material thing: He cannot suffer change, nor defect, nor fatigue, nor forgetfulness, nor defeat, nor violence, nor repentance, anger, or sadness.

Again, since the object and effect of active power is some produced reality, it must be said to be impossible for God to make or produce anything inconsistent with the notion of reality,' or being,' as such, or inconsistent with the notion of a reality that is made,' or produced,' inasmuch as it is made,' or produced.' Examples: God cannot make one and the same thing together to be and not to be. He cannot make opposite attributes to be in the same subject in the same respect. He cannot make a thing wanting in any of its essential constituents, while the thing itself remains: for instance, a man without a soul. Since the principles of some sciences, as logic, geometry, and arithmetic, rest on the formal, or abstract, constituents on which the essence of a thing depends, it follows that God cannot effect anything contrary to these principles, as that genus should not be predicable of species, or that lines drawn from the centre of a circle to the circumference should not be equal. God cannot make the past not to have been. Some things also God cannot make, because they would be inconsistent with the notion of a creature, as such: thus He cannot create a

God, or make anything equal to Himself, or anything that shall maintain itself in being, independently of Him. He cannot do what He cannot will: He cannot make Himself cease to be, or cease to be good or happy; nor can He will anything evil, or sin. Nor can His will be changeable: He cannot therefore cause what He has once willed not to be fulfilled. There is however this difference between this last impossibility on God’s part and all others that have been enumerated. The others are absolute impossibilities for God either to will or do: but the things now spoken of God might will and do if His will or power be considered absolutely, but not if it be considered under the presupposition of His will to the contrary. And therefore all such phrases as, God cannot act contrary to what He has arranged to do,’ are to be understood in sensu composito; but, understood in sensu diviso, they are false, for in that sense they regard the power and will of God considered absolutely.

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT THE DIVINE UNDERSTANDING IS NOT LIMITED TO CERTAIN FIXED EFFECTS

NOW that it has been shown (Chap.XXIII) that the divine power does not act of physical necessity, but by understanding and will, lest any one should think that God's understanding or knowledge extend only to certain fixed effects, and that thus God acts under stress of ignorance, though not under stress of physical constraint, it remains to show that His knowledge or understanding is bounded by no limits in its view of effects.

2. We have shown above (B. I, Chap.XLIII) the infinity of the divine essence. Now the plane of the infinite can never be reached by any piling up of finite quantities, because the infinite infinitely transcends any finite quantities however many, even though they were infinite in number. But no other being than God is infinite in essence: all others are essentially included under limited genera and species. Howsoever then and to whatsoever extent the effects of divine production are comprehended, it is ever within the compass of the divine essence to reach beyond them and to be the foundation of more. The divine understanding then, in perfectly knowing the divine essence (B. I, Chap.XLVII), transcends any infinity of actual effects of divine power and therefore is not necessarily limited to these or those effects.

4. If the causality of the divine understanding were limited, as a necessary agent, to any effects, it would be to those effects which God actually brings into being. But it has been shown above (B. I, Chap.LXVI)

that God understands even things that neither are nor shall be nor have been.

5. The divine knowledge stands to the things produced by God as the knowledge of an artist to the knowledge of his art. But every art extends to all that can possibly be contained under the kind of things subject to that art, as the art of building to all houses. But the kind of thing subject to the divine art is being' (genus subjectum divinae artis est ens), since God by His understanding is the universal principal of being (Chapp.XXI,XXIV). Therefore the divine understanding extends its causality to all things that are not inconsistent with the notion of being,' and is not limited to certain fixed effects.

Hence it is said: Great is our Lord, and great his power, and of his wisdom; there is no reckoning by number (Ps. cxlvi, 5).

Hereby is excluded the position of some philosophers who said that from God's understanding of Himself there emanates a certain arrangement of things in the universe, as though He did not deal with creatures at His discretion fixing the limits of each creature and arranging the whole universe, as the Catholic faith professes. It is to be observed however that, though the divine understanding is not limited to certain effects, God nevertheless has determined to Himself fixed effects to be produced in due order by His wisdom, as it is said: Thou hast disposed all things in measure, number and weight (Wisd. xi, 21).

CHAPTER XXVIII

THAT GOD HAS NOT BROUGHT THINGS INTO BEING IN DISCHARGE OF ANY DEBT OF JUSTICE

JUSTICE is to another, rendering him his due. But, antecedently to the universal production of all things, nothing can be presupposed to which anything is due.

2. An act of justice must be preceded by some act, whereby something is made another's own; and that act, whereby first something is made another's own, cannot be an act of justice. But by creation a created thing first begins to have anything of its own. Creation then cannot proceed from any debt of justice.

3. No man owes anything to another, except inasmuch as he in some way depends on him, receiving something from him. Thus every man is in his neighbour's debt on God's account; from whom we have received all things. But God depends on none, and needs nothing of any.

5. Though nothing created precedes the universal production of all things, something uncreated does precede it: for the divine goodness precedes as the end and prime motive of creation, according to Augustine, who says: "Because God is good, we exist" (De Verb. Apost. Serm. 13). But the divine goodness needs nothing external for its perfection. Nor is it necessary, for all that God wills His own goodness, that He should will the production of things other than Himself. God wills His own goodness necessarily, but He does not necessarily will other things. Therefore the production of creatures is not a debt of necessity to the divine goodness. But, taking justice in the wider sense of the term, there may be said to be

justice in the creation of the world, inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness.

7. But if we consider the divine plan, according as God has planned it in His understanding and will to bring things into being, from that point of view the production of things does proceed from the necessity of the divine plan (B. I, Chap.LXXXIII): for it is impossible for God to have planned the doing of anything, and afterwards not to do it. Thus fulfilment is necessarily due to His every plan. But this debt is not sufficient to constitute a claim of justice, properly so called, in the action of God creating the world: for justice, properly so called, is not of self to self.

Hence it is said: Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? (Rom. xi, 35.) Who hath first given to me, that I may repay him? (Job xli, 2.)

Hereby is shut out the error of some who have tried to prove that God can do no otherwise than as He does, because He can do no otherwise than as He owes, or ought.

CHAPTER XXIX

HOW IN THE PRODUCTION OF A CREATURE THERE MAY BE FOUND A DEBT OF JUSTICE IN RESPECT OF THE NECESSARY SEQUENCE OF SOMETHING POSTERIOR UPON SOMETHING PRIOR

I SPEAK here of what is prior, not in order of time merely, but by nature. The debt is not absolute, but conditional, of the form: If this is to be, this must go before.' According to this necessity a triple debt is found in the production of creatures. First, when the conditional proceeds from the whole universe of things to some particular part requisite for the perfection of the universe. Thus, if God willed the universe to be such as it is, it was due that He should make the sun and water and the like, without which the universe cannot be. Second, when the conditional proceeds from one creature to another. Thus, if God willed man to be, He was obliged to make plants and animals and such like, which man needs to his perfect being: though God has made both the one and the other out of His mere will. Third, when the conditional proceeds from the existence of the individual creature to its parts and properties and accidents, on which the creature depends for its being or perfection. Thus, supposing that God wished to make man, it was due, on this supposition, that He should unite in him soul and body, senses, and other appurtenances, intrinsic and extrinsic. In all these matters, rightly considered, God is not said to be a debtor to the creature, but a debtor to the fulfilment of His own plan.

On these explanations of the meaning of the term debt’ and due,’ natural justice is found in the universe both in respect of the creation of things and in respect of their propagation; and therefore God is said to have established and to govern all things justly and reasonably. Thus then is shut out a two-fold error: on the one hand of those who would limit the divine power, saying that God can do only as He does, because so He is bound to do; on the other, of those who say that all things follow on His sheer will, and that no other reason is to be sought or assigned in creation than that God wills it so.

CHAPTER XXX

HOW ABSOLUTE NECESSITY MAY HAVE PLACE IN CREATION

ALTHOUGH all things depend on the will of God as their first cause, and this first cause is not necessitated in its operation except on the supposition of its own purpose, not for that however is absolute necessity excluded from creation, need we aver that all things are contingent.

1. There are things in creation which simply and absolutely must be. Those things simply and absolutely must be, in which there is no possibility of their not being. Some things are so brought into being by God that there is in their nature a potentiality of not being: which happens from this, that the matter in them is in potentiality to receive another form. Those things then in which either there is no matter, or, if there is any, it is not open to receive another form, have no potentiality of not being: such things then simply and absolutely must be. If it be said that things which are of nothing, of themselves tend to nothingness, and thus there is in all creatures a potentiality of not being,—it is manifest that such a conclusion does not follow. For things created by God are said to tend to nothingness only in the way in which they are from nothing; and that is only in respect of the power of the agent who has created them. Thus then creatures have no potentiality of not being: but there is in the Creator a power of giving them being or of stopping the influx of being to them.

4. The further a thing is distant from the self-existent, that is, from God, the nigher it is to not being; and the nigher it is to God, the further it is withdrawn from not being. Those things therefore which are nighest to God, and therefore furthest removed from not being,—in order that the hierarchy of being (ordo rerum) may be complete,—must be such as to have in

themselves no potentiality of not being, or in other words, their being must be absolutely necessary.

We observe therefore that, considering the universe of creatures as they depend on the first principles of all things, we find that they depend on the will (of God),—not as necessarily arising therefrom, except by an hypothetical, or consequent necessity, as has been explained (Chap.XXVIII). But, compared with proximate and created principles, we find some things having an absolute necessity. There is no absurdity in causes being originally brought into being without any necessity, and yet, once they are posited in being, having such and such an effect necessarily following from them. That such natures were produced by God, was voluntary on His part: but that, once established, a certain effect proceeds from them, is a matter of absolute necessity. What belongs to a thing by reason of its essential principles, must obtain by absolute necessity in all things.

CHAPTER XXXI

THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR CREATURES TO HAVE EXISTED FROM ETERNITY

IF either the entire universe or any single creature necessarily exists, this necessity must arise either from the being itself or from some other being. From the being itself it cannot arise: for every being must be from the first being; and what has not being of itself, cannot necessarily exist of itself. But if this supposed necessity arises from another being, that is, from some extrinsic cause, then, we observe, an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. Now an effect necessarily arising from an efficient cause means that the agent acts of necessity: when the agent does not act of necessity, neither is it absolutely necessary for the effect to arise. But God does not act under any necessity in the production of creatures (Chap.XXIII). So far therefore as the efficient cause is concerned, there is not any absolute necessity for any creature to be. Neither is there any such necessity in connexion with the final cause. For means to an end receive necessity from their end only in so far as without them the end either cannot be at all, or cannot well be. Now the end proposed to the divine will in the production of things can be no other than God's own goodness, as has been shown (B. I, Chap.LXXV): which goodness depends on creatures neither for its being nor for its well-being (B. I, Chapp.XIII,XXVIII). There is then no absolute necessity for the being of any creature: nor is it necessary to suppose creation always to have existed.

3. It is not necessary for God to will creation to be at all (B. I, Chap.LXXXI): therefore it is not necessary for God to will creation always

to have been.

CHAPTER XXXII, XXXV

REASONS ALLEGED FOR THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD ON THE PART OF GOD, WITH ANSWERS TO THE SAME

ARG. 1. Every agent that is not always in action, suffers some change when it comes to act. But God suffers no change, but is ever in act in the same way; and from His action created things come to be: therefore they always have been.

Reply (Chap.XXXV). There is no need of God suffering any change for fresh effects of His power coming to be. Novelty of effect can only indicate change in the agent in so far as it shows novelty of action. Any new action in the agent implies some change in the same, at least a change from rest to activity. But a fresh effect of God's power does not indicate any new action in God, since His action is His essence (B. I, Chap.XLV).

Arg. 2. The action of God is eternal: therefore the things created by God have been from eternity.

Reply. That does not follow. For, as shown above (Chap.XXIII), though God acts voluntarily in creation, yet it does not follow that there need be any action on His part intermediate between the act of His will and the effect of the same, as in us the action of our motor activities is so intermediate. With God to understand and will is to produce; and the effect produced follows upon the understanding and will according to the determination of the understanding and the command of the will. But as by the understanding there is determined the production of the thing, and its every other condition, so there is also prescribed for it the time at which it is to be; just as any art determines not only that a thing be of this or that character, but also that it be at this or that time, as the physician fixes the time for giving the medicine. Thus, assuming God's will to be of itself effectual for the production of an effect, the effect would follow fresh from the ancient will, without any fresh action coming to be put forth on the part of God.

Arg. 3. Given a sufficient cause, the effect will ensue: otherwise it would be possible, when the cause was posited, for the effect either to be or not to be. At that rate, the sequence of effect upon cause would be possible and no more. But what is possible requires something to reduce it to act: we should have therefore to suppose a cause whereby the effect was reduced to act, and thus the first cause would not be sufficient. But God is the sufficient cause of the production of creatures: otherwise He must be in potentiality, and become a cause by some addition, which is clearly absurd.

Reply. Though God is the sufficient cause of the production and bringing forth of creatures into being, yet the effect of His production need not be taken to be eternal. For, given a sufficient cause, there follows its effect, but not an effect alien from the cause. Now the proper effect of the will is that that should be which the will wants. If it were anything else than what the will wanted, not the proper effect of the cause would be secured, but a foreign effect. Now as the will wishes that this should be of this or that nature, so it also wishes that it should be at this or that time. Hence, for will to be a sufficient cause, it is requisite that the effect should be when the will wishes it to be. The case is otherwise with physical agencies: they cannot wait: physical action takes place according as nature is ready for it: there the effect must follow at once upon the complete being of the cause. But the will does not act according to the mode of its being, but according to the mode of its purpose; and therefore, as the effect of a physical agent follows the being of the agent, if it is sufficient, so the effect of a voluntary agent follows the mode of purpose.

Arg. 4. A voluntary agent does not delay the execution of his purpose except in expectation of some future condition not yet realised. And this unfulfilled futurity is sometimes in the agent himself, as when maturity of active power or the removal of some hindrance is the condition expected: sometimes it is without the agent, as when there is expected the presence of some one before whom the action is to take place, or the arrival of some opportune time that is not yet come. A complete volition is at once carried into effect by the executive power, except for some defect in that power. Thus at the command of the will a limb is at once moved, unless there be some break-down in the motor apparatus. Therefore, when any one wishes to do a thing and it is not at once done, that must be either for some defect of power, the removal of which has to be waited for, or because of the incompleteness of the volition to do the thing. I call it completeness of volition,’ when there is a will absolutely to do the thing, anyhow. The volition I say is incomplete,’ when there is no will absolutely to do the thing, but the will is conditioned on the existence of some circumstance not yet present, or the withdrawal of some present impediment. But certainly, whatever God now wills to be, He has from eternity willed to be. No new motion of the will can come upon Him: no defect or impediment can have clogged His power: there can have been nothing outside Himself for Him to wait for in the production of the universe, since there is nothing else uncreated save Him alone (Chapp.VI,XV). It seems therefore necessary that God must have brought the creature into being from all eternity.

Reply. The object of the divine will is not the mere being of the creature, but its being at a certain time. What is thus willed, namely, the being of the creature at that time, is not delayed: because the creature began to exist then exactly when God from eternity arranged that it should begin to exist.

Arg. 5. An intellectual agent does not prefer one alternative to another except for some superiority of the one over the other. But where there is no difference, there can be no superiority. But between one non-existence and another non-existence there can be no difference, nor is one non-existence preferable to another. But, looking beyond the entire universe, we find nothing but the eternity of God. Now in nothing there can be assigned no difference of instants, that a thing should be done in one instant rather than in another. In like manner neither in eternity, which is all uniform and simple (B. I, Chap.XV), can there be any difference of instants. It follows that the will of God holds itself in one unvarying attitude to the production of creatures throughout the whole of eternity. Either therefore His will is that creation never be realised at all under His eternity, or that it always be realised.

Reply. It is impossible to mark any difference of parts of any duration antecedent to the beginning of all creation, as the fifth objection supposed that we could do. For nothingness has neither measure nor duration, and the eternity of God has no parts, no before and no after. We cannot therefore refer the beginning of all creation to any severally marked points in any pre-existing measure. There are no such points for the beginning of creation to be referred to according to any relation of agreement or divergence. Hence it is impossible to demand any reason in the mind of the agent why he should have brought the creature into being in this particular marked instant of duration rather than in that other instant preceding or following. God brought into being creation and time simultaneously. There is no account to be taken therefore why He produced the creature now, and not before, but only why the creature has not always been. There is an analogy in the case of place: for particular bodies are produced in a particular time and also in a particular place; and, because they have about them a time and a place within which they are contained, there must be a reason assignable why they are produced in this place and this time rather than in any other: but in regard of the whole stellar universe (coelum), beyond which there is no place, and along with which the universal place of all things is produced, no account is to be taken why it is situated here and not there. In like manner in the production of the whole creation, beyond which there is no time, and simultaneously with which time is produced, no question is to be raised why it is now and not before, but only why it has not always been, or why it has come to be after not being, or why it had any beginning.

Arg. 6. Means to the end have their necessity from the end, especially in voluntary actions. So long then as the end is uniform, the means to the end must be uniform or uniformly produced, unless they come to stand in some new relation to the end. Now the end of creatures proceeding from the divine will is the divine goodness, which alone can be the end in view of the divine will. Since then the divine goodness is uniform for all eternity, alike in itself and in comparison with the divine will, it seems that creatures must be uniformly brought into being by the divine will for all eternity. It cannot be said that any new relation to the end supervenes upon them, so long as the position is clung to that they had no being at all before a certain fixed time, at which they are supposed to have begun to be.

Reply. Though the end of the divine will can be none other than the divine goodness, still the divine will has not to work to bring this goodness into being, in the way that the artist works to set up the product of his art, since the divine goodness is eternal and unchangeable and incapable of addition. Nor does God work for His goodness as for an end to be won for Himself, as a king works to win a city: for God is His own goodness. He works for this end, only inasmuch as He produces an effect which is to share in the end. In such a production of things for an end, the uniform attitude of end to agent is not to be considered reason enough for an everlasting work. Rather we should consider the bearing of the end on the effect produced to serve it. The one evinced necessity is that of the production of the effect in the manner better calculated to serve the end for which it is produced.

Arg. 7. Since all things, so far as they have being, share in the goodness of God; the longer they exist, the more they share of that goodness: hence also the perpetual being of the species is said to be divine. But the divine goodness is infinite. Therefore it is proper to it to communicate itself infinitely, and not for a fixed time only.

Reply. It was proper for the creature, in such likeness as became it, to represent the divine goodness. Such representation cannot be by way of equality: it can only be in such way as the higher and greater is represented by the lower and less. Now the excess of the divine goodness above the creature is best expressed by this, that creatures have not always been in existence: for thereby it appears that all other beings but God Himself have God for the author of their being; and that His power is not tied to producing effects of one particular character, as physical nature produces physical effects, but that He is a voluntary and intelligent agent.

CHAPTERS XXXIII, XXXVI

REASONS ALLEGED FOR THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD ON THE PART CREATURES, WITH ANSWERS TO THE SAME

ARG. 1. There are creatures in which there is no potentiality of not being (see Chap.XXX): it is impossible for them not to be, and therefore they always must be.

Reply (Chap.XXXVI). The necessity of such creatures being is only a relative necessity, as shown above (Chap.XXX): it does not involve the creature’s always having been: it does not follow upon its substance: but when the creature is already established in being, this necessity involves the impossibility of its not-being.

Arg. 3. Every change must either go on everlastingly, or have some other change preceding it. But change always has been: therefore also changeable things: therefore creatures.

Reply. It has already been shown (Chapp.XII,XVII) that without any change in God, the agent, He may act to the production of a new thing, that has not always been. But if a new thing may be produced by Him, He may also originate a process of change.

Arg. 5. If time is perpetual, motion must be perpetual, time being the record of motion.’ But time must be perpetual: for time is inconceivable without a present instant, as a line is inconceivable without a point: now a present instant is always inconceivable without the ending of a past and the beginning of a future instant; and thus every given present instant has before it a time preceding and after it a time succeeding, and so there can be no first or last time. It follows that created substances in motion have been from eternity.

Reply. This argument rather supposes than proves the eternity of motion. The reason why the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the past is because any given phase of motion is the beginning and end of different phases. There is no showing that every instant must be of this character, unless it be assumed that every given phase of time comes between motion going before and motion following after, which is tantamount to assuming the perpetuity of motion. Assuming on the contrary that motion is not perpetual, one may say that the first instant of time is the beginning of the future, and not the end of any past instant. Even in any particular case of motion we may mark a phase which is the beginning only of movement and not the end of any: otherwise every particular case of motion would be perpetual, which is impossible.

Arg. 6. If time has not always been, we may mark a non-existence of time prior to its being. In like manner, if it is not always to be, we may mark a non-existence of it subsequent to its being. But priority and subsequence in point of duration cannot be unless time is; and at that rate time must have been before it was, and shall be after it has ceased, which is absurd. Time then must be eternal. But time is an accident, and cannot be without a subject. But the subject of it is not God, who is above time and beyond motion (B. I, Chapp.XIII,XV). The only alternative left is that some created substance must be eternal.

Reply. There is nothing in this argument to evince that the very supposition of time not being supposes that time is (read, Si ponitur tempus non esse, ponatur esse). For when we speak of something prior to the being of time, we do not thereby assert any real part of time, but only an imaginary part. When we say, Time has being after not being’, we mean that there was no instant of time before this present marked instant: as when we say that there is nothing above the stellar universe, we do not mean that there is any place beyond the stellar universe, which may be spoken of as above’ it, but that above it there is no place’ at all.

CHAPTER XXXIV, XXXVII

REASONS ALLEGED FOR THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD ON THE PART OF THE CREATIVE PROCESS ITSELF, WITH ANSWERS TO THE SAME

ARG. 1. It is the common opinion of all philosophers, and therefore it must be true, that nothing is made of nothing (Aristotle, Physics, B. I, Chapp.VII,VIII). Whatever is made, then, must be made of something; and that again, if it is made at all, must be made of something else. But this process cannot go on to infinity; and therefore we must come to something that was not made. But every being that has not always been must have been made. Therefore that out of which all things are first made must be something everlasting. That cannot be God, because He cannot be the material of anything. Therefore there must be something eternal outside God, namely, primordial matter.

Reply (Chap.XXXVII). The common position of philosophers, that nothing is made of nothing, is true of the sort of making that they considered. For all our knowledge begins in sense, which is of singular objects; and human investigation has advanced from particular to general considerations. Hence, in studying the beginning of things, men gave their attention to the making of particular things in detail. The making of one sort of being out of another sort is the making of some particular being, inasmuch as it is this being,’ not as it is being’ generally: for some prior being there was that now is changed into this being.’ But entering more deeply into the origin of things, philosophers came finally to consider the issuing of all created being from one first cause (Chapp.XV,XVI). In this origin of all created being from God, it is impossible to allow any making out of pre-existent material: for such making out of pre-existent material would not be a making of the whole being of the creature. This first making of the universe was not attained to in the thought of the early physicists, whose common opinion it was that nothing was made of nothing: or if any did attain to it, they considered that such a term as making' did not properly apply to it, since the name making' implies movement or change, whereas in this origin of all being from one first being there can be no question of the transmutation of one being into another (Chap.XVII). Therefore it is not the concern of physical science to study this first origin of all things: that study belongs to the metaphysician, who deals with being in general and realities apart from motion. We may however by a figure of speech apply the name of making' to creation, and speak of things as made,' whatsoever they are, the essence or nature whereof has its origin from other being.

Arg. 2. Everything that takes a new being is now otherwise than as it was before: that must come about by some movement or change: but all movement or change is in some subject: therefore before anything is made there must be some subject of motion.

Reply. The notion of motion or change is foisted in here to no purpose: for what nowise is, is not anywise, and affords no hold for the conclusion that, when it begins to be, it is otherwise than as it was before.

These then are the reasons which some hold to as demonstrative, and necessarily evincing that creatures have always existed, wherein they contradict the Catholic faith, which teaches that nothing but God has always existed, and that all else has had a beginning of being except the one eternal God. Thus then it evidently appears that there is nothing to traverse our assertion, that the world has not always existed. And this the Catholic faith teaches: In the beginning God created heaven and earth (Gen. i, 1): and, Before he made anything, from the beginning (Prov. viii, 22).

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ARGUMENTS WHEREWITH SOME TRY TO SHOW THAT THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL, AND SOLUTIONS OF THE SAME

ARG. 1. God is the cause of all things (Chap.XV). But a cause must be prior in duration to the effects of its action.

Reply. That is true of things that act by motion, for the effect is not till the termination of the motion: but with causes that act instantaneously there is no such necessity.

Arg. 2. Since the whole of being is created by God, it cannot be said to be made out of any being: whence the conclusion follows that it is made out of nothing, and consequently that it has existence after not existing.

Reply. To the notion of being made out of something, if that is not admitted one must supply the contradictory notion: which contradictory notion is not being made out of anything. Observe, it is not being made out of nothing, except in the former sense of not being made out of anything.

Arg. 3. It is not possible to pass through infinity. But if the world always had been, infinity would have been passed through by this time, there being infinite days, or daily rounds of the sun, if the world always has been.

Reply. An infinite quantity, though not existing in simultaneous actual realisation, may nevertheless be in succession, because every infinite, so taken, is really finite. Any given round of the sun could be passed, because so far the number of them was finite: but when they are all viewed together, on the supposition that the world had always existed, it would be impossible to fix upon any first day, and so to make any transition from that to the present day, since transition always requires two extreme points.

Arg 4. It would follow that addition is made to the infinite, because to past days, or sun-rounds, a new round is daily added.

Reply. There is nothing to hinder addition to the infinite on that side on which it is finite. Supposing time eternal, it must be infinite as preceding, but finite as succeeding, for the present is the limit of the past.

Arg. 5. It would follow in a world always existing that we should have an infinite series of efficient causes, father being cause of child, and grandfather to father, and so to infinity.

Reply. The impossibility of an infinite series of efficient causes, according to philosophers (Aristotle, Metaph. ii, 2), holds for causes acting together: because then the effect has to depend on an infinity of co-existent actions; and the infinity of causes there is essential, the whole infinite multitude of them being requisite for the production of the effect. But in the case of causes not acting together no such impossibility holds, in the opinion of those who suppose an endless series of generations. The infinity in this case is accidental to the causes: for to Socrates's father, as such, it is quite an accident whether he be the son of another man or no: whereas to a stick, inasmuch as it moves a stone, it is not an accident whether it be moved by an hand: for it only moves inasmuch as it is moved.

Arg. 6. It would follow that an infinite multitude exists, to wit, the immortal souls of infinite men who have been in the past.

Reply. This objection is more difficult: nevertheless the argument is not of much use, because it supposes many things.

Since these reasons, alleged by some to prove that the world has not always existed, are not necessarily conclusive, though they have a certain probability, it is sufficient to touch on them slightly, without insisting too much, that the Catholic faith may not seem to rest on empty reasonings, and not rather on the solid basis of the teaching of God.

CHAPTER XLI

THAT THE VARIETY OF CREATURES DOES NOT ARISE FROM ANY CONTRARIETY OF PRIME AGENTS

IF the diversity of things proceeds from diversity or contrariety of diverse agents, this would seem to hold especially of the contrariety of good and evil, so that all good things should proceed from a good principle, and evils from an evil principle. Now there is good and evil in all genera. But there cannot be one first principle of all evils: for the very essence of such a principle would be evil, and that is impossible. Everything that is, inasmuch as it is a being, must necessarily be good: for it loves and strives to preserve its own being, a sign whereof is this fact, that everything fights against its own destruction: now what all things seek is good. It is impossible therefore for the diversity of things to arise from two principles, one good and one evil.

9. What in no manner of way is, is neither good nor evil: while every thing that is, in so far as it is, is good. A thing can be evil therefore only inasmuch as it is not-being, that is, privative being; and the evil is precisely the privation. Now privation never comes of the ordinary action of any cause: because every cause acts inasmuch as it is endowed with form'; and thus the ordinary effect of its action must also be endowed with form,' since every agent acts to the production of its own likeness, unless it be accidentally hindered. It follows that evil does not come of the ordinary action of any cause, but is accidentally incident among the effects of ordinary causation. There is therefore no one primary and essential

principle of all evil: but the first principle of all is one primary good, among the effects of which there ensues evil incidentally.

Hence it is said: I am the Lord, and there is none other, forming light and creating darkness, making peace and creating evil: I am the Lord doing all these things (Isa. xlv, 6, 7). And, Good things and evil things, life and death, poverty and rank are from God (Ecclus xi, 14). And, Against evil is good, and against life death; so against the just man is the sinner. And so behold all the works of the Most High, two and two, and one against one (Ecclus xxxiii, 15).

God is said to make and create evil things, inasmuch as He creates things that are good in themselves and yet hurtful to others: thus the wolf, though a good thing naturally in his kind, is evil to the sheep. Hence it is said: Shall there be evil in the city that the Lord hath not done? (Amos iii, 6.)

Hereby is excluded the error of those who suppose two primitive contrary principles, good and evil. This error of the early philosophers some evil-minded men have presumed to introduce into Christian teaching, the first of whom was Marcion, and afterwards the Manicheans, who have done most to spread this error.

What all things seek, even a principle of evil would seek.

But all things seek their own self-preservation.

Therefore even a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation. Again,

What all things seek, is good.

But self-preservation is what all things seek.

Therefore self-preservation is good.

But a principle of evil would seek its own self-preservation.

Therefore a principle of evil would seek some good.

But a principle of evil ought to be averse to all good.

Therefore a principle of evil is absurd. One wonders whether this is the argument that St Thomas thought of at the table of St Louis, when he suddenly started up and cried, Ergo conclusum est contra Manichaeos. But it is difficult to kill a heresy with a syllogism. One might perhaps distinguish between absolute and relative good; and upon that distinction urge that the self-preservation, which the evil principle sought, was good relatively to it only, but evil absolutely for the world. The deepest flaw in the Manichean notion of an Evil Principle is that which is pointed out in the next argument ([213]n. 9). Moreover every argument which establishes the unity and infinite perfection of God, is destructive of Manicheism. (Cf. Isaias xlv, 6, 7, quoted below.) Matter is not evil, as Plato supposed, but its essential capacities for good are greatly limited; and, where good stops short, evil readily enters in. God does not override essentialities.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT THE VARIETY OF CREATURES HAS NOT ARISEN FROM VARIETY OF MERITS AND DEMERITS

ORIGEN in his book peri archon says that God out of mere bounty in His first production of creatures made them all equal, all spiritual and rational, and they by free will behaved in various ways, some adhering to God more or less, and others receding from Him more or less; and thus by order of divine justice various grades ensued among spiritual substances, some appearing as angels of various orders, some as human souls also of various states and conditions, some again as demons in various states. He also said that it was through this variety of rational creatures that God instituted a variety also of material creatures, so that the nobler spiritual substances should be united to the nobler bodies, and that in divers other ways the material creation might serve to express the variety of spiritual substances. According to Origen, man, sun, and stars are composed of rational substances united with corresponding bodies. Now all this opinion can be shown to be manifestly false.

1. The better a thing is, the higher place does it hold in the intention of the agent who produces it. But the best thing in creation is the perfection of the universe, which consists in the orderly variety of things: for in all things the perfection of the whole is preferable to the perfection of parts and details. Therefore the diversity of creatures does not arise from diversity of merits, but was primarily intended by the prime agent.

2. If all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, we should have to allow that they do not depend for their activity one on

another. What arises by the concurrence of divers causes working independently of one another is matter of chance; and thus the diversity and order of creation comes by chance, which is impossible.

12. Since a spiritual creature, or angel, does not deserve to be degraded except for sin,—and it is degraded from its high, invisible estate, by being united with a visible body,—it seems that visible bodies have been added to these spiritual creatures because of sin; which comes near to the error of the Manicheans, who laid it down that the visible creation proceeded from an evil principle.

Origen seems not to have given sufficient weight to the consideration that, when we give, not in discharge of any debt, but out of liberality, it is not contrary to justice if we give in unequal measure: but God brought things into being under no debt, but of sheer liberality (Chap.XXVIII): therefore the variety of creatures does not presuppose variety of merits.

CHAPTER XLV

THE REAL PRIME CAUSE OF THE VARIETY OF CREATURES

SINCE every agent intends to induce its own likeness in the effect, so far as the effect can receive it, an agent will do this more perfectly the more perfect itself is. But God is the most perfect of agents: therefore it will belong to Him to induce His likeness in creation most perfectly, so far as befits created nature. But creatures cannot attain to any perfect likeness of God so long as they are confined to one species of creature; because, since the cause exceeds the effect, what is in the cause simply and as one thing is found in the effect in a composite and manifold way, unless the effect be of the same species as the cause; which is impossible in the case before us, for no creature can be equal to God. Multiplicity therefore and variety was needful in creation, to the end that the perfect likeness of God might be found in creatures according to their measure.

2. As the things that are made of any material are contained in the potentiality of the material, so the things done by any agent must be in the active power of the agent. But the potentiality of the material would not be perfectly reduced to actuality, if out of the material were made only one of those things to which the material is in potentiality. Therefore if any agent whose power extends to various effects were to produce only one of those effects, his power would not be so completely reduced to actuality as by making many. But by the reduction of active power to actuality the effect attains to the likeness of the agent. Therefore the likeness of God would not be perfect in the universe, if there was only one grade of all beings.

3. A creature approaches more perfectly to the likeness of God by being not only good itself, but able to act for the good of others. But no creature

could do anything for the good of another creature, unless there were plurality and inequality among creatures, because the agent must be other than the patient and in a position of advantage (honorabilius) over it.

5. The goodness of the species transcends the goodness of the individual. Therefore the multiplication of species is a greater addition to the good of the universe than the multiplication of individuals of one species.

7. To a work contrived by sovereign goodness there ought not to be lacking the height of perfection proper to it. But the good of order in variety is better than the isolated good of any one of the things that enter into the order: therefore the good of order ought not to be wanting to the work of God; which good could not be, if there were no diversity and inequality of creatures. There is then diversity and inequality between creatures, not by chance, not from diversity of elements, not by the intervention of any (inferior) cause, or consideration of merit, but by the special intention of God, wishing to give the creature such perfection as it was capable of having.

Hence it is said, God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31); and this after He had said of them singly, that they were good; because while things are good singly in their several natures, all taken together they are very good, because of the order of the universe, which is the final and noblest perfection of creation.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME INTELLECTUAL NATURES

THIS then being the cause of the diversity among creatures, it remains now to treat of the several distinct creatures themselves as we proposed to do in the third part of this book (Chap.V). And we will show first that by the disposition of Divine Providence assigning perfection to creatures in the way best befitting them, it was consonant with reason that some intellectual creatures should be placed at the head of creation.

5. Nothing else moves God to the production of creatures but His own goodness, which He has wished to communicate to other beings according to the manner of their assimilation to Himself (B. I, Chap.LXXXVII). Now the likeness of one thing may be found in another in two ways: in one way in point of natural being, as the likeness of heat is found in the body heated; in another way in point of knowledge, as the likeness of fire (perceived) is in sight or touch. In order then that the likeness of God might be in creatures in such modes as were possible, it was necessary that the divine goodness should be communicated to creatures, not only by likeness in being, but also by likeness in knowing. But mind alone can know the divine goodness. Therefore there needed to be intelligent creatures.

6. In all comely arrangements of things, the attitude of the secondary to the last imitates the attitude of the first to all, as well secondary as last, though the imitation is not always perfect. Now God comprehends in Himself all creatures (B. I, Chapp.XXV,LI,LIV); and this is represented in

material creatures, although in another way: for the higher body comprehends and contains the lower, according to quantitative extension; whereas God contains all creatures in simple mode, and not by quantitative extension. In order then that an imitation of God might not be wanting to creatures even in this mode of containing, there were made intellectual creatures to contain material creatures, not by any extension of quantity, but simply by mode of intelligence: for what is understood is in the mind that understands it, and is comprehended in its intellectual activity.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCES ARE VOLUNTARY AGENTS

GOOD is what all things yearn after, and in all beings there is a craving (appetitus) for good. In beings unendowed with any sort of cognition, this craving is called physical appetite’ (appetitus naturalis). In beings that have sensitive cognition it is called animal appetite,’ and is divided into concupiscible’ and irascible.’ In intelligent beings it is called the intellectual’ or rational appetite,’ otherwise the will.’

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCES HAVE FREE WILL

THEY must be free, if they have dominion over their own acts.

2. A free agent is an agent that is cause of its own action (sui causa, sibi causa agendi). Agents that are determined (moventur) and act only inasmuch as they are determined by others, are not causes of their own acts. Only self-determining agents (moventia seipsa) have liberty of action; and these alone are guided in their action by judgement. A self-determining agent is made up of two elements, one determining and another determined. The element determined is the appetite; and that is determined either by intellect, or by phantasy, or by sense: for to these powers it belongs to judge. Of such self-determining agents, those alone judge freely which determine their own judgement. But no faculty of judging determines its own judgement unless it reflects upon its own act. If then it is to determine itself to judge, it must know its own judgement; and that knowledge belongs to intellect alone. Irrational animals then have a sort of free determination, or action, but not a free judgement (sunt quodammodo liberi quidem motus, sive actionis, non autem liberi judicii): while inanimate things, being dependent for their every determination on things other than themselves, have not so much as free action, or determination. On the contrary, intelligent beings have not only free action, but also free judgement, which is having free will.

3. An apprehension becomes a motive according as the thing apprehended takes the form of something good or suitable. In agents that determine their own movements, the outward action goes upon some judgement pronouncing a thing good or suitable according as it is

apprehended. If the agent pronouncing the judgement is to determine himself to judge, he must be guided to that judgement by some higher form or idea in his apprehension. This idea can be no other than the universal idea (ipsa ratio) of goodness or fitness, by aid whereof a judgement is formed of any given definite good, fit, or suitable thing. Therefore those agents alone determine themselves to judge, which have this general concept of goodness or fitness,—that is to say, only intelligent agents. Therefore intelligent agents alone determine themselves, not only to act, but also to judge. They therefore alone are free in judging, which is having free will.

4. No movement or action follows from a general concept except by the medium of some particular apprehension, as all movement and action deals with particulars. Now the understanding naturally apprehends the universal. In order then that movement or any manner of action may follow upon the intellectual apprehension, the universal concept of the understanding must be applied to particular objects. But the universal contains in potentiality many particular objects. Therefore the application of the intellectual concept may be made to many divers objects; and consequently the judgement of the understanding about things to be done is not determined to one thing only.

5. Some agents are without liberty of judgement, either because they have no judgement at all, as is the case with things that have no knowledge, as stones and plants, or because they have a judgement naturally determined to one effect, as irrational animals. For by natural reckoning the sheep judges that the wolf is hurtful to it, and on this judgement flies from the wolf. But whatever agents have their judgement of things to be done not determined by nature to one effect, they must have free will. Such are all intelligent agents; for the understanding apprehends, not only this or that good, but good itself in general. Hence, since it is through the idea in apprehension that the understanding moves the will; and in all things the motive, or moving power, and the object moved must be proportioned to one another; it follows that the will of an intelligent subsistent being is not determined by nature except to good in general. Whatever therefore is presented to the will under the specific notion of good (sub ratione boni), the will may incline to it, without let or hindrance from any natural determination to the contrary. Therefore all intelligent agents have free will, arising out of the judgement

of the understanding; and free will is defined a free judgement on the matter of a specific notion, or general concept.’

CHAPTER XLIX

THAT SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE IS NOT CORPOREAL

IF the understanding were a corporeal substance, intelligible ideas of things would be received in it only as representing individual things. At that rate, the understanding would have no conception of the universal, but only of the particular, which is manifestly false.

4. If the understanding were a corporeal substance, its action would not transcend the order of corporeal things, and therefore it would understand nothing but corporeal things, which is manifestly false, for we do understand many things that are not corporeal.

5. There can be no infinite power in any finite body: but the power of the understanding is in a manner infinite in the exercise of intelligence: for it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite in its logical extension.

7 and 8. Of no bodily substance is the action turned back upon the agent. But the understanding in its action does reflect and turn round upon itself: for as it understands an object, so also it understands that it does understand, and so endlessly.

Hence Holy Scripture calls intelligent subsistent beings by the name of spirits,' using of them the style which it is wont to use for the incorporeal Deity, according to the text, God is a Spirit (John iv, 24).

Hereby is excluded the error of the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no substance but corporeal substance: which opinion some have endeavoured to foist into the Christian faith, saying that the soul is an effigy of the body, a sort of outline contour of the human body.

CHAPTER LII

THAT IN CREATED SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCES THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE

THOUGH subsistent intelligences are not corporeal, nor compounded of matter and form, nor existent as material forms in matter, still it must not be thought that they come up to the simplicity of the being of God: for there is found in them a certain composition, inasmuch as existence (esse) and essence (quod est) is not in them the same.

4. Whatsoever reality subsists of and by itself, nothing attaches to that reality except what is proper to being as being. For what is said of any reality not as such, does not belong to that reality otherwise than accidentally by reason of the subject: hence, considered apart from the subject in a particular case, the attribute does not belong to that reality at all. Now to be caused by another' does not belong to being, as being: otherwise every being would be caused by another, which is impossible (B. I, Chap.XIII) Therefore that existence which is being of itself and by itself, must be uncaused. No caused being therefore is its own existence.

5. The substance of every reality is a being of itself and not through another. Hence actual illumination is not of the substance of air, because it accrues to it through another. But to every created reality existence accrues through another, otherwise it would not be a creature. Therefore of no created substance is it true to say that its existence is its substance.

Hence in Exodus iii, 14, existence is assigned as the proper name of God, He who is: because it is proper to God alone that His substance is none other than His existence.

CHAPTER LIII

THAT IN CREATED SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCES THERE IS ACTUALITY AND POTENTIALITY

IN whatever being there are found two elements, the one complementary to the other, the proportion of the one element to the other is as the proportion of potential to actual: for nothing is completed except by its own actuality. But in a created intelligent subsistent being there are two elements, the substance itself and the existence thereof which is not the same thing as the substance. Now that existence is the complement of the existing substance: for everything actually exists by having existence. It follows that in every one of the aforesaid substances there is a composition of actuality and potentiality.

2. What is in any being, and comes of the agent that produced it, must be the actuality of that being: for it is an agent's function to make a thing be in actuality. But, as shown above (Chap.XV), all other substances have their existence of the prime agent: indeed their being created substances consists precisely in this, that they have their existence of another. Existence itself therefore is in these created substances as a sort of actualisation of the same. But that in which actuality is received is potentiality: for actuality is such in relation to potentiality. In every created subsistent being therefore there is potentiality and actuality.

CHAPTER LV

THAT SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCES ARE IMPERISHABLE

WHAT ordinarily and of itself attaches to a thing, inheres in it necessarily and invariably and inseparably, as roundness ordinarily and of itself inheres in a circle, but in a bit of brass metal only incidentally. It is possible for a bit of brass metal to be other than round: it is impossible for a circle to be other than round. Now existence ordinarily follows upon the form: for we call that ordinary,’ which the thing is inasmuch as it is itself; and everything has existence inasmuch as it has form. Substances therefore that are not pure forms may be deprived of existence inasmuch as they lose their form, as brass is deprived of roundness inasmuch as it ceases to be circular. But substances that are pure forms are never deprived of existence: thus if the ideal circle had substantial existence, that substance could never be made other than round. But subsistent intelligences are pure subsistent forms: therefore it is impossible for them ever to cease to exist.

8. Everything that perishes, perishes by suffering something. Destruction is a sort of suffering. But no subsistent intelligence can suffer any impression such as to lead to its destruction. For to suffer is to receive something; and whatever is received in a subsistent intelligence must be received according to the manner of the same: that is to say, it must be received as an intelligible impression. But whatever is so received in a subsistent intelligence, goes to perfect that intelligence, not to destroy it: for the intelligible is the perfection of the intelligent. A subsistent intelligence therefore is indestructible.

10. The intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect: hence the understanding in the act of understanding, and its term, or object in the act

of being understood, are one. What therefore belongs to the object as intelligible, must belong also to the mind as cognisant of that object; because perfection and perfectible are of the same genus. Now the intelligible object, as such, is necessary and imperishable: for things necessary, or things that must be, are perfectly cognisable to the understanding; while things contingent, that are but might not be, as such, are cognisable only imperfectly: they are not matter of science, but of opinion. Hence the understanding attains to science of perishable things, only in so far as they are imperishable,—that is to say, in so far as they become to the mind universals. Intellect therefore, as such, must be indestructible.

13. It is impossible for a natural desire to be void of object, for nature does nothing in vain. But every intelligence naturally desires perpetuity of being, not only perpetuity of being in the species, but in the individual: which is thus shown. The natural desire which some creatures have arises from conscious apprehension: thus the wolf naturally desires the killing of the animals on which he feeds, and man naturally desires happiness. Other creatures, without any conscious apprehension, are led by the inclination of primitive physical tendencies, which is called in some physical appetite.' The natural desire of being is contained under both modes: the proof of which is that creatures devoid of any sort of cognitive faculty resist destructive agencies to the full strength of their natural constitution, while creatures possessed of any manner of cognitive faculty resist the same according to the mode of their cognition. Those creatures therefore, devoid of cognition, who have in their natural constitution strength enough to preserve perpetual being, so as to remain always the same numerically, have a natural appetite for perpetuity of being even in respect of sameness of number: while those whose natural constitution has not strength for this, but only for preservation of perpetuity of being in respect of sameness of species, also have a natural appetite for perpetuity. This difference then must be noted in those creatures whose desire of being is attended with cognition, that they who do not know being except in the present time, desire it for the present time, but not for ever, because they have no apprehension of everlasting existence: still they desire the perpetual being of their species, a desire unattended with cognition, because the generative power, which serves that end, is preliminary to and does not come under

cognition. Those then that do know and apprehend perpetual being as such, desire the same with a natural desire. But this is the case with all subsistent intelligences. All such subsistent intelligences therefore have a natural desire of everlasting being. Therefore they cannot possibly cease to be.

13. All things that begin to be, and afterwards cease to be, have both their beginning and their ceasing from the same power: for the same is the power to make to be and to make not to be. But subsistent intelligences could not begin to be except through the power of the prime agent. Therefore neither is there any power to make them cease to be except in the prime agent, inasmuch as that agent may cease to pour being into them. But in respect of this power alone nothing can be called perishable; as well because things are called necessary or contingent in respect of the power that is in them, not in respect of the power of God (Chap.XXX), as also because God, the author of nature, does not withdraw from things that which is proper to their nature; and it has been shown that it is proper to intellectual natures to be perpetual.

CHAPTER LVI, LXIX

HOW A SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE MAY BE UNITED WITH A BODY, WITH A SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS ALLEGED TO PROVE THAT A SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE UNITED WITH A BODY AS ITS FORM

A SUBSISTENT intelligence cannot be united with a body by any manner of combination: for combined elements, when the combination is complete, do not remain actually, but virtually only: for if they remained actually, it would not be a combination, but a mere mechanical mixture. But this combination and consequent cessation of actual existence cannot befall subsistent intelligences; for they are imperishable.

It is likewise evident that a subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a body by any manner of contact, properly so called. For contact is only of bodies: those things are in contact, the extremities of which are together, as points, or lines, or circumferences, which are the extremities of bodies.

Still there is one mode of contact whereby a subsistent intelligence may be mingled with a body. For natural bodies in touching one another involve a change, and thus are united together, not only in their quantitative extremities, but also by likeness of one same quality or form, the one in pressing its form on the other. And though, if we regard only quantitative extremities, the contact must be mutual in all cases, yet, if we consider action and passion, there will be found some cases of touching without being touched, and some cases of being touched without touching. Any cases that may be found of contact without contact in quantitative extremities must still be called instances of contact, inasmuch as they are instances of action: thus we say that he who saddens another touches’ him. According to this mode of touch it is possible for a subsistent intelligence to be united to a body by contact: for subsistent intelligences act upon bodies and move them, being more highly actualised than bodies are.

This contact is not quantitative but virtual, and differs from bodily contact in three respects. First, because in this contact the indivisible can touch the divisible, which cannot happen in bodily contact: for only that which is indivisible can be touched by a point, whereas a subsistent intelligence, indivisible though it be, can touch a divisible quantity by acting upon it. The point and the subsistent intelligence are not indivisible in the same way. The point is indivisible as a term of quantity, and has a definite situation in a continuous surface, beyond which it cannot be thrown: whereas a subsistent intelligence is indivisible by being outside of the category of quantity altogether: hence no indivisible element of quantity is marked out for contact with it. Secondly, because quantitative contact is only with extremities, but virtual contact is with the whole subject touched: for the subject is touched inasmuch as it is acted upon and moved; but that is inasmuch as it is in potentiality; and potentiality extends to the whole, not merely to the extremities of the whole: hence the whole is touched. From this appears a third difference: because in quantitative touch, which is of extremities, the touching body must be outside of the touched, and cannot pervade it, but is stopped by it; whereas the virtual contact, which is proper to subsistent intelligences, reaching to the inmost recesses of things, makes the touching substance be within the touched and pervade it without let or hindrance. Thus then a subsistent intelligence may be united with a body by virtual contact.

Elements united by such contact are not absolutely one: they are one in action and in being acted upon, which does not involve absolute oneness of being. Such absolute oneness may be in three ways: in the way of indivisibility, in the way of continuity, and in the way of natural unity. Now out of a subsistent intelligence and a body there cannot be made an indivisible unity: it must be a compound of two things. Nor again a continuous unity, because the parts of a continuum are quantitative. It remains to be enquired whether out of a subsistent intelligence and a body there can result such a unity as means oneness of nature. But out of two permanent elements there results no being one by nature except that which results of the union of substantial form with matter: for out of substance and accident there results no being one by nature, for the nature or essence of man' and whiteness' is not the same. This question then remains to be studied, whether a subsistent intelligence can be the substantial form of any body. Looking at the matter argumentatively, it might seem that the thing is impossible.

Arg. 1. Of two actually existent substances no one being can be made: for the actuality of every being is that whereby it is distinguished from another being. But a subsistent intelligence is an actually existing substance: so likewise is a body. Apparently therefore no one being can be made of a subsistent intelligence and a body.

Arg. 2. Form and matter are contained under the same genus: for every genus is divided into actual and potential. But a subsistent intelligence and a body are of different genera.

Arg. 3. All that is in matter must be material. But if subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, the being of such intelligence must be in matter: for there is no being of the form beyond the being of the matter. It follows that a subsistent intelligence could not be immaterial, as supposed.

Arg. 4. It is impossible for anything having its being in a body to be apart from the body. But intelligence is shown to be apart from the body, as it is neither the body itself nor a bodily faculty.

Arg. 5. Whatever has being in common with the body, must also have activity in common with the body: for the active power of a thing cannot be more exalted than its essence. But if a subsistent intelligence is the form of a body, one being must be common to it and the body: for out of form and matter there results absolute unity, which is unity in being. At that rate the activity of a subsistent intelligence, united as a form to the body, will be exerted in common with the body, and its faculty will be a bodily (or organic) faculty: positions which we regard as impossible.

(Chap.LXIX). It is not difficult to solve the objections alleged against the aforesaid union.

Reply 1. The first objection contains a false supposition: for body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but out of the two of them is made one substance actually existing: for a man’s body is not the same in actuality when the soul is present as when it is absent: it is the soul that gives actual being.

Reply 2. As for the second objection, that form and matter are contained under the same genus, it is not true in the sense that both are species of one genus, but inasmuch as both are elements of the same species. Thus then a subsistent intelligence and a body, which as separate existences would be species of different genera, in their union belong to one genus as elements of the same.

Reply 3. Nor need a subsistent intelligence be a material form, notwithstanding that its existence is in matter: for though in matter, it is not immersed in matter, or wholly comprised in matter.

Reply 4. Nor yet does the union of a subsistent intelligence with a body by its being that body’s form stand in the way of intelligence being separable from body. In a soul we have to observe as well its essence as also its power. In point of essence it gives being to such and such a body, while in point of power it executes its own proper acts. In any activity of the soul therefore which is completed by a bodily organ, the power of the soul which is the principle of that activity must bring to act that part of the body whereby its activity is completed, as sight brings the eye to act. But in any activity of the soul that we may suppose not to be completed by any bodily organ, the corresponding power will not bring anything in the body to act; and this is the sense in which the intellect is said to be separate,’—not but that the substance of the soul, whereof intellect is a power, or the intellectual soul, brings the body to act, inasmuch as it is the form which gives being to such body.

Reply 5. Nor is it necessary, as was argued in the fifth place, that if the soul in its substance is the form of the body, its every operation should be through the body, and thus its every faculty should be the actuation of some part of the body: for the human soul is not one of those forms which are entirely immersed in matter, but of all forms it is the most exalted above matter: hence it is capable of a certain activity without the body, being not dependent on the body in its action, as neither in its being is it dependent on the body.

CHAPTER LVII

PLATO’S THEORY OF THE UNION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL WITH THE BODY

MOVED by these and the like objections, some have said that no subsistent intelligence can possibly be the form of a body. But because the nature of man of itself seemed to give the lie to this statement, inasmuch as man is seen to be composed of an intellectual soul and a body, they have thought out various ways to save the nature of man and adjust their theory to fact. Plato therefore and his followers laid it down that the intellectual soul is not united with the body as form with matter, but only as the mover is with the moved, saying that the soul is in the body as a sailor in his boat: thus the union of soul and body would be virtual contact only, of which above (Chap.LVI). But as such contact does not produce absolute oneness, this statement leads to the awkward consequence that man is not absolutely one, nor absolutely a being at all, but is a being only accidentally. To escape this conclusion, Plato laid it down that man is not a compound of soul and body, but that the soul using the body is man. This position is shown to be impossible: for things different in being cannot have one and the same activity. I call an activity one and the same, not in respect to the effect to which the activity is terminated, but as it comes forth from the agent. It is true that many men towing a boat make one action in respect of the thing done, which is one; but still on the part of the men towing there are many actions, as there are many different strains and exertions to haul the boat along: for as action is consequent upon form and power, it follows that where there are different forms and powers there must also be different actions. Now though the soul has a certain proper motion of its own, which it performs independently of the body, namely, the act of understanding, there are however other activities common to soul and body, namely, those of fear, anger, sensation, and the like; for these only come about by some change wrought in some definite part of the body; hence evidently they are conjoint activities of soul and body. Therefore out of soul and body there must result one being, and the two cannot be distinct in being.

But this reasoning may be met by the following reply on behalf of Plato's view.—There is no difficulty, it will be said, in mover and moved having the same act, notwithstanding their difference in being: for motion is at once the act of the moving force, from which it is, and the act of the thing moved, in which it is. Thus then, on Plato's theory, the aforesaid activities may be common to soul and body, belonging to the soul as the moving force, and to the body as the thing moved. But this explanation cannot hold for the following reasons.

1. As the Philosopher proves (De Anima, II), sensation results by the sentient subject being moved or impressed by external sensible things: hence a man cannot have a sensation without some external sensible thing, as nothing can be moved without a mover. The sensory organ therefore is moved and impressed in sensation, but that is by the external sensible object. What receives the impression is the sense, as is evident from this, that senseless things do not receive any such manner of impression from sensible objects. The sense therefore is the passive power of the sensory organ. The sentient soul therefore in sensation does not play the part of mover and agent, but is that principle in the subject impressed, in virtue of which the said subject lies open to the impression. But such a principle cannot be different in being from the subject impressed. Therefore the sentient soul is not different in being from the animated body.

2. Though motion is the common act of moving force and object moved, still it is one activity to impart motion and another to receive motion: hence the two several categories of action and passion. If then in sensation the sentient soul stands for the agent, and the body for the patient, there will be one activity of the soul and another of the body. The sentient soul therefore will have an activity and proper motion of its own: it will have therefore its own subsistence: therefore, when the body perishes, it will not cease to be. Thus sentient souls, even of irrational animals, will be immortal; which

seems improbable, although it is not out of keeping with Plato’s opinion. But this will be matter of enquiry further on (Chap.LXXXII).

3. A body moved does not take its species according to the power that moves it. If therefore the soul is only united to the body as mover to moved, the body and its parts do not take their species from the soul: therefore, when the soul departs, the body and the parts thereof will remain of the same species. But this is manifestly false: for flesh and bone and hands and such parts, after the departure of the soul, do not retain their own names except by a fac,on de parler; since none of these parts retains its proper activity, and activity follows species. Therefore the union of soul and body is not that of mover with moved, or of a man with his dress.

6. If the soul is united with the body only as mover with moved, it will be in the power of the soul to go out of the body when it wishes, and, when it wishes, to reunite itself with the body.

That the soul is united with the body as the proper form of the same, is thus proved. That whereby a thing emerges from potential to actual being, is its form and actuality. But by the soul the body emerges from potentiality to actuality: for the being of a living thing is its life: moreover the seed before animation is only potentially alive, and by the soul it is made actually alive: the soul therefore is the form of the animated body.

Again: as part is to part, so is the whole sentient soul to the whole body. But sight is the form and actuality of the eye: therefore the soul is the form and actuality of the body.

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT VEGETATIVE, SENTIENT, AND INTELLIGENT ARE NOT IN MAN THREE SOULS

PLATO lays it down that not one and the same soul is in us at once intelligent, sentient, and vegetative. In this view, granted that the sentient soul is the form of the body, it does not follow that any subsistent intelligence can be the form of a body. The untenableness of this position is thus to be shown.

1. Attributes of the same subject representing different forms are predicated of one another accidentally: thus white’ is said to be musical’ accidentally, inasmuch as whiteness and music happen both to be in Socrates. If then the intelligent, sentient, and vegetative soul are different powers or forms in us, then the attributes that we have according to these forms will be predicated of one another accidentally. But according to the intelligent soul we are called men,’ according to the sentient animals,’ according to the vegetative living.’ This then will be an accidental predication, man is an animal,’ or an animal is a living creature.’ But on the contrary these are cases of essential predication: for man, as man, is an animal; and an animal, as an animal, is a living creature. Therefore it is from the same principle that one is man, animal, and alive.

2. A thing has unity from the same principle whence it has being, for unity is consequent upon being. Since then everything has being from its form, it will have unity also from its form. If therefore there are posited in man several souls, as so many forms, man will not be one being but several. Nor will the order of the forms to one another, one ensuing upon the other,

suffice for the unity of man: for unity in point of orderly succession is not absolute unity: such unity of order in fact is the loosest of unities.

4. If man, as Plato held, is not a compound of soul and body, but is a soul using a body; either this is understood of the intelligent soul, or of the three souls, if there are three, or of two of them. If of three, or two, it follows that man is not one, but two, or three: for he is three souls, or at least two. But if this is understood of the intelligent soul alone, so that the sentient soul is to be taken for the form of the body, and the intelligent soul, using the animate and sentient body, is to be man, there will still ensue awkward consequences, to wit, that man is not an animal, but uses an animal; and that man does not feel, but uses a thing that does feel.

5. Of two or three there cannot be made one without anything to unite them, unless one of them stands to the other as actuality to potentiality: for so of matter and form there is made one without any external bond to bind them together. But if in man there are several souls, they do not stand to one another as matter and form, but they are all supposed to be actualities and principles of action. If then they are to be united to make one man, or one animal, there must be something to unite them. This cannot be the body, since rather the body is made one by the soul: the proof of which fact is that, when the soul departs, the body breaks up. It must be some more formal principle that makes of those several entities one; and this will be rather the soul than those several entities which are united by it. If this again has several parts, and is not one in itself, there must further be something to unite those parts. As we cannot proceed to infinity, we must come to something which is in itself one; and this of all things is the soul. There must therefore in one man, or one animal, be one only soul.

CHAPTER LIX

THAT THE POTENTIAL INTELLECT OF MAN IS NOT A SPIRIT SUBSISTING APART FROM MATTER

THERE were others who used another invention in maintaining the point, that a subsistent intelligence cannot be united with a body as its form. They say that the intellect which Aristotle calls potential,’ is a spiritual being, subsisting apart by itself, and not united with us as a form. And this they endeavour to prove from the words of Aristotle, who says, speaking of this intellect, that it is “separate, unmixed with body, simple and impassible,” terms which could not be applied to it, they say, if it were the form of a body. Also from the argument by which Aristotle proves that because the potential intellect receives all impressions of sensible things, and is in potentiality to them all, it must be devoid of all to begin with, as the pupil of the eye, which receives all impressions of colours, is devoid of all colour; because if it had of itself any colour, that colour would prevent other colours from being seen; nay, nothing would be seen except under that colour; and the like would be the case of the potential intellect, if it had of itself any form or nature of sensible things, as it would have were it the form of any body; because, since form and matter make one, the form must participate to some extent in the nature of that whereof it is the form.

These passages moved Averroes to suppose the potential intellect, whereby the soul understands, to be separate in being from the body, and not to be the form of the body. But because this intellect would have no connexion with us, nor should we be able to understand by it unless it were somehow united with us, Averroes fixes upon a mode in which it is united with us, as he thinks, sufficiently. He says that an impression actually made in the understanding is a form’ of the potential intellect, in the same way that an actually visible appearance, as such, is a form’ of the visual faculty; hence out of the potential intellect, and this form or impression actually made in the same, there results one being. With whatever being therefore this form’ of the understanding is conjoined, the potential intellect is also conjoined with that being. But this form is conjoined with us by means of the phantasm,’ or image in the phantasy, which image is a Sort of subject receiving in itself that form’ of understanding.

1. It is easy to see how frivolous and impossible all this construction is. For what has understanding is intelligent; and that of which an intelligible impression is united with the understanding, is understood. The fact that an intelligible impression, united with a (foreign) understanding, comes somehow to be in man, will not render man intelligent; it will merely make him understood by that separately subsisting intelligence.

2. Besides, the impression actually in understanding is the form of the potential intellect, in the same way that the actual visible appearance is the form of the visual power, or eye. But the impression actually in understanding is to the phantasms as the actual visible appearance is to the coloured surface, which is outside the soul. This similitude is used by Averroes, as also by Aristotle. Therefore the supposed union of the potential intellect (by means of the intelligible form) with the phantasm that is in us will resemble the union of the visual power with the colour that is in the stone. But this union does not make the stone see, but be seen. Therefore the aforesaid union does not make us understand, but be understood. But, plainly, it is properly and truly said that man understands: for we should not be investigating the nature of understanding were it not for the fact that we have understanding. The above mode of union then is insufficient.

5. The intellect in the act of understanding and the object as represented in understanding are one, as also the sense in the act of sensation and the object as represented in sense. But the understanding as apt to understand and its object as open to representation in understanding are not one, as neither is sense, so far as it is apt to have sensation, one with its object, so far as that is open to be represented in sensation. The impression made by the object, so far as it lies in images of the phantasy, is not any representation in the understanding. Only by undergoing a process of

abstraction from such images does the impression became one with the intellect in the act of understanding. In like manner the impression of colour is actually felt in sense, not as it is in the stone, but as it is in the eye. Now, on the theory of Averroes, the intelligible form, or impression in the understanding, only comes to be conjoined with us by finding place in the images of our phantasy. Therefore it is not conjoined with us inasmuch as it is one with the potential intellect, being its form. Therefore it cannot be the medium whereby the potential intellect is conjoined with us: because, in so far as it is conjoined with the potential intellect, it is not conjoined with us; and in so far as it is conjoined with us, it is not conjoined with the potential intellect.

CHAPTER LX

THAT MAN IS NOT A MEMBER THE HUMAN SPECIES BY POSSESSION OF PASSIVE INTELLECT, BUT BY POSSESSION OF POTENTIAL INTELLECT

AVERROES endeavours to meet these arguments and to maintain the position aforesaid. He says accordingly that man differs from dumb animals by what Aristotle calls the passive intellect,’ which is that cogitative power’ (vis cogitativa) proper to man, in place whereof other animals have a certain estimative power’ (aestimativa). The function of this cogitative power’ is to distinguish individual ideas and compare them with one another, as the intellect, which is separate and unmixed, compares and distinguishes between universal ideas. And because by this cogitative power, along with imagination and memory, phantasms, or impressions of phantasy, are prepared to receive the action of the active intellect,’ whereby they are made actual terms of understanding, therefore the aforesaid cogitative power is called by the names of intellect’ and reason.’ Doctors say that it has its seat in the middle cell of the brain. According to the disposition of this power one man differs from another in genius, and in other points of intelligence; and by the use and exercise of this power man acquires the habit of knowledge. Hence the passive intellect is the subject of the various habits of knowledge. And this passive intellect is in a child from the beginning; and by virtue of it he is a member of the human species before he actually understands anything. So far Averroes. The falsity and perverseness of his statements evidently appears.

1. Vital activities stand to the soul as second actualities to the first. Now the first actuality is prior in time to the second in the same subject, as knowledge is prior in time to learned speculation. In whatever being therefore there is found any vital activity, there must be some portion of soul standing to that activity as the first actuality to the second. But man has one activity proper to him above all other animals, namely that of understanding and reasoning. Therefore we must posit in man some proper specific principle, which shall be to the act of understanding as the first actuality to the second. This principle cannot be the aforesaid passive intellect': for the principle of the aforesaid activity must be "impassible and nowise implicated with the body," as the Philosopher proves, whereas evidently quite the contrary is the case with the passive intellect. Therefore that cognitive faculty called the passive intellect' cannot possibly be the speciality that differentiates the human species from other animals.

2. An incident of the sensitive part cannot constitute a being in a higher kind of life than that of the sensitive part, as an incident of the vegetative soul does not place a being in a higher kind of life than the vegetative life. But it is certain that phantasy and the faculties consequent thereon, as memory and the like, are incidents of the sensitive part. Therefore by the aforesaid faculties, or by any one of them, an animal cannot be placed in any higher rank of life than that which goes with the sentient soul. But man is in a higher rank of life than that. Therefore the man does not live the life that is proper to him by virtue of the aforesaid cogitative faculty,' or passive intellect.'

4. The potential intellect' is proved not to be the actualisation of any corporeal organ from this consideration, that the said intellect takes cognisance of all sensible forms under a universal aspect. Therefore no faculty, the activity of which can reach to the universal aspects of all corporeal forms, can be the actualisation of any corporeal organ. But such a faculty is the will: for of all of the things that we understand we can have a will, at least of knowing them. And we also find acts of the will in the general: thus, as Aristotle says (Rhet. II, 4), we hate in general the whole race of robbers. The will then cannot be the actualisation of any bodily organ. But every portion of the soul is the actualisation of some bodily

organ, except only the intellect properly so called. The will therefore belongs to the intellectual part, as Aristotle says. Now the will of man is not extrinsic to man, planted as it were in some separately subsisting intelligence, but is in the man himself: otherwise he would not be master of his own acts, but would be worked by the will of a spirit other than himself: those appetitive, or conative, faculties alone would remain in him, the activity whereof is conjoined with passion, to wit the irascible and concupiscible in the sentient part of his being, as in other animals, which are rather acted upon than act. But this is impossible: it would be the undoing of all moral philosophy and all social and political science. Therefore there must be in us a potential intellect to differentiate us from dumb animals: the passive intellect is not enough.

6. A habit and the act proper to that habit both reside in the same faculty. But to view a thing intellectually, which is the act proper to the habit of knowledge, cannot be an exercise of the faculty called passive intellect,’ but must properly belong to the potential intellect: for the condition of any faculty exercising intelligence is that it should not be an actualisation of any corporeal organ. Therefore the habit of knowledge is not in the passive intellect, but in the potential intellect.

8. Habitual understanding, as our opponent acknowledges, is an effect of the active intellect.’ But the effects of the active intellect are actual representations in understanding, the proper recipient of which is the potential intellect, to which the active intellect stands related, as Aristotle says, “as art to material.” Therefore the habitual understanding, which is the habit of knowledge, must be in the potential intellect, not in the passive.

CHAPTER LXI

THAT THE AFORESAID TENET IS CONTRARY TO THE MIND OF ARISTOTLE

ARISTOTLE defines soul, “the first actuality of a natural, organic body, potentially alive”; and adds, “this definition applies universally to every soul.” Nor does he, as the aforesaid Averroes pretends, put forth this latter remark in a tentative way, as may be seen from the Greek copies and the translation of Boethius. Afterwards in the same chapter he adds that there are “certain parts of the soul separable,” and these are none other than the intellectual parts. The conclusion remains that the said parts are actualisations of the body.

2. Nor is this explanation inconsistent with Aristotle’s words subjoined: “About the intellect and the speculative faculty the case is not yet clear: but it seems to be another kind of soul.” He does not hereby mean to separate the intellect from the common definition of soul,’ but from the peculiar natures of the other parts of soul: as one who says that fowls are a different sort of animal from land animals, does not take away from the fowl the common definition of animal.’ Hence, to show in what respect he called it “another kind,” he adds: “And of this alone is there possibility of separation, as of the everlasting from the perishable.” Nor is it the intention of Aristotle, as the Commentator aforesaid pretends, to say that it is not yet clear whether intellect be soul at all, as it is clear of other and lower vital principles. For the old text has not, “Nothing has been declared,” or “Nothing has been said,” but “Nothing is clear,” which is to be understood as referring to the peculiar properties of intellect, not to the general

definition (of soul). But if, as the Commentator says, the word soul’ is used not in the same sense of intellect and other varieties, Aristotle would have first distinguished the ambiguity and then made his definition, as his manner is: otherwise his argument would rest on an ambiguity, an intolerable procedure in demonstrative sciences.

3. Aristotle reckons intellect’ among the faculties’ of the soul. Also, in the passage last quoted, he names the speculative faculty.’ Intellect therefore is not outside the human soul, but is a faculty thereof.

4. Also, when beginning to speak of the potential intellect, he calls it a part of the soul, saying: “Concerning the part of the soul whereby the soul has knowledge and intellectual consciousness.”

5. And still more clearly by what follows, declaring the nature of the potential intellect: “I call intellect that whereby the soul thinks and under stands”: in which it is manifestly shown that the intellect is something belonging to the human soul.

The above tenet (of Averroes) therefore is contrary to the mind of Aristotle and contrary to the truth: hence it should be rejected as chimerical.

CHAPTER LXII

AGAINST THE OPINION OF ALEXANDER CONCERNING THE POTENTIAL INTELLECT

UPON consideration of these words of Aristotle, Alexander determined the potential intellect to be some power in us, that so the general definition of soul assigned by Aristotle might apply to it. But because he could not understand how any subsistent intelligence could be the form of a body, he supposed the aforesaid faculty of potential intellect not to be planted in any subsistent intelligence, but to be the result of some combination of elements in the human body. Thus a definite mode of combination of the components of the human body puts a man in potentiality to receive the influence of the active intellect, which is ever in act, and according to him, is a spiritual being subsisting apart, under which influence man becomes actually intelligent. But that in man whereby he is potentially intelligent is the potential intellect: hence it seemed to Alexander to follow that the potential intellect in us arises from a definite combination of elements. But this statement appears on first inspection to be contrary to the words and argument of Aristotle. For Aristotle shows (De anima, III, iv, 2-4) that the potential intellect is unmingled with the body: but that could not be said of a faculty that was the result of a combination of bodily elements. To meet this difficulty Alexander says that the potential intellect is precisely the predisposition’ (praeparatio, epitedeotes) which exists in human nature to receive the influence of the active intellect; and that this predisposition’ is not any definite sensible nature, nor is it mingled with the body, for it is a relation and order between one thing and another. But this is in manifest disagreement with the mind of Aristotle, as the following reasons show:

3. Aristotle assigns these characteristics to the potential intellect: to be impressed by the intelligible presentation, to receive intelligible impressions, to be in potentiality towards them (De anima, III, iv, 11, 12): all which things cannot be said of any disposition,' but only of the subject predisposed. It is therefore contrary to the mind of Aristotle, that the mere predisposition' should be the potential intellect.

4. An effect cannot stand higher above the material order than its cause. But every cognitive faculty, as such, belongs to the immaterial order. Therefore it is impossible for any cognitive faculty to be caused by a combination of elements. But the potential intellect is the supreme cognitive faculty in us: therefore it is not caused by a combination of elements.

6. No bodily organ can possibly have a share in the act of understanding. But that act is attributed to the soul, or to the man: for we say that the soul understands, or the man through the soul. Therefore there must be in man some principle independent of the body, to be the principle of such an act. But any predisposition, which is the result of a combination of elements, manifestly depends on the body. Therefore no such predisposition can be a principle like the potential intellect, whereby the soul judges and understands.

But if it is said that the principle of the aforesaid operation in us is the intellectual impression actually made by the active intellect, this does not seem to suffice: because when man comes to have actual intellectual cognition from having had such cognition potentially, he needs to understand not merely by some intelligible impression actualising his understanding, but likewise by some intellectual faculty as the principle of such activity. Besides, an impression is not in actual understanding except so far as it is purified from particular and material being. But this cannot happen so long as it remains in any material faculty, that is to say, in any faculty either caused by material principles or actualising a material organ. Therefore there must be posited in us some immaterial intellectual faculty, and that is the potential intellect.

CHAPTER LXIV

THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY

THE maintainers of this view did not mean that the soul is a harmony of sounds, but a harmony of contrary elements, whereof they saw living bodies to be composed. The view is rejected for the following reasons:

1. You may find such a harmony in any body, even a mere chemical compound (corpus mixtum). A harmony cannot move the body, or govern it, or resist the passions, as neither can a temperament. Also a harmony, and a temperament also, admits of degrees. All which considerations go to show that the soul is neither harmony nor temperament.

2. The notion of harmony rather befits qualities of the body than the soul: thus health is a harmony of humours; strength, of muscles and bones; beauty, of limb and colour. But it is impossible to assign any components, the harmony of which would make sense, or intellect, or other appurtenances of the soul.

3. Harmony may mean either the composition itself or the principle of composition. Now the soul is not a composition, because then every part of the soul would be composed of certain parts of the body, an arrangement which cannot be made out. In like manner the soul is not the principle of composition, because to different parts of the body there are different principles of composition, or proportions of elements, which would require the several parts of the body to have so many several souls,—one soul for bone, one for flesh, one for sinew; which is evidently not the case.

CHAPTER LXV

THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A BODY

LIVING beings are composed of matter and form,—of a body, and of a soul which makes them actually alive. One of these components must be the form, and the other the matter. But a body cannot be a form, because a body is not in another as in its matter and subject. Therefore the soul must be the form: therefore it is not a body.

5. The act of understanding cannot be the act of anything corporeal. But it is an act of the soul. Therefore the intellectual soul at least is not a body.

It is easy to solve the arguments whereby some have endeavoured to prove that the soul is a body. They point such facts as these,—that the son resembles the father even in the accidents of his soul, being generated from the father by severance of bodily substance; and that the soul suffers with the body; and is separated from the body, separation supposing previous bodily contact. Against these instances we observe that bodily temperament is a sort of predisposing cause of affections of the soul: that the soul suffers with the body only accidentally, as being the form of the body: also that the soul is separated from the body, not as touching from touched, but as form from matter; although there is a certain contact possible between an incorporeal being and the body, as has been shown above (Chap.LVI).

Many have been moved to this position by their belief that what is not a material body has no existence, being unable to transcend the imagination, which deals only with material bodies. Hence this opinion is proposed in the person of the unwise: The breath of our nostrils is smoke, and reason a spark in the beating of the heart (Wisdom ii, 2).

CHAPTER LXVI

AGAINST THOSE WHO SUPPOSE INTELLECT AND SENSE TO BE THE SAME

SENSE is found in all animals, but animals other than man have no intellect: which is proved by this, that they do not work, like intellectual agents, in diverse and opposite ways, but just as nature moves them fixed and uniform specific activities, as every swallow builds its nest in the same way.

2. Sense is cognisant only of singulars, but intellect is cognisant of universals.

3. Sensory knowledge extends only to bodily things, but intellect takes cognisance of things incorporeal, as wisdom, truth, and the relations between objects.

4. No sense has reflex knowledge of itself and its own activity: the sight does not see itself, nor see that it sees. But intellect is cognisant of itself, and knows that it understands.

CHAPTER LXVII

AGAINST THOSE WHO MAINTAIN THAT THE POTENTIAL INTELLECT IS THE PHANTASY

PHANTASY is found in other animals besides man, the proof of which is that, as objects of sense recede from sense, these animals still shun or pursue them. But intellect is not in them, as no work of intelligence appears in their conduct.

2. Phantasy is only of things corporeal and singular; but intellect, of things universal and incorporeal.

4. Intelligence is not the actualisation of any bodily organ. But phantasy has a fixed bodily organ.

Hence it is said: Who teacheth us above the beasts of the earth, and above the fowls of the air instructeth us (Job xxxv, 11): whereby we are given to understand that there is in man a certain cognitive power, above the sense and fancy that are in other animals.

CHAPTER LXVIII

HOW A SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE MAY BE THE FORM OF A BODY

If a subsistent intelligence is not united with a body merely as its mover, as Plato thought ([238]Chap. LVII); nor is the intellect, whereby man understands, a predisposition in human nature, as Alexander said (Chap.LXII; nor a temperament, as Galen (Chap.LXIII); nor a harmony, as Empedocles (Chap.LXIV); nor a body, nor a sense, nor a phantasy (Chapp.LXV,LXVI,LXVII); it remains that the human soul is a subsistent intelligence, united with the body as its form: which may be thus made manifest.

There are two requisites for one thing to be the substantial form of another. One requisite is that the form be the principle of substantial being to that whereof it is the form: I do not mean the effective, but the formal principle, whereby a thing is and is denominated being.' The second requisite is that the form and matter should unite in one being'; namely, in that being wherein the substance so composed subsists. There is no such union of the effective principle with that to which it gives being. A subsistent intelligence, as shown in Chap.LVI, is not hindered by the fact that it is subsistent from communicating its being to matter, and becoming the formal principle of the said matter. There is no difficulty in the identification of the being, in virtue of which the compound subsists, with the form itself of the said compound, since the compound is only through the form, and neither subsist apart.

It may be objected that a subsistent intelligence cannot communicate its being to a material body in such a way that there shall be one being of the subsistent intelligence and the material body: for things of different kinds have different modes of being, and nobler is the being of the nobler substance. This objection would be in point, if that being were said to belong to that material thing in the same way in which it belongs to that subsistent intelligence. But it is not so: for that being belongs to that material body as to a recipient subject raised to a higher state; while it belongs to that subsistent intelligence as to its principle and by congruence of its own nature.

In this way a wonderful chain of beings is revealed to our study. The lowest member of the higher genus is always found to border close upon the highest member of the lower genus. Thus some of the lowest members of the genus of animals attain to little beyond the life of plants, certain shellfish for instance, which are motionless, have only the sense of touch, and are attached to the ground like plants. Hence Dionysius says: “Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the higher to the beginnings of the lower.” Thus in the genus of bodies we find the human body, composed of elements equally tempered, attaining to the lowest member of the class above it, that is, to the human soul, which holds the lowest rank in the class of subsistent intelligences. Hence the human soul is said to be on the horizon and boundry line between things corporeal and incorporeal, inasmuch as it is an incorporeal substance and at the same time the form of a body.

Above other forms there is found a form, likened to the supramundane substances in point of understanding, and competent to an activity which is accomplished without any bodily organ at all; and this is the intellectual soul: for the act of understanding is not done through any bodily organ. Hence the intellectual soul cannot be totally encompassed by matter, or immersed in it, as other material forms are: this is shown by its intellectual activity, wherein bodily matter has no share. The fact however that the very act of understanding in the human soul needs certain powers that work through bodily organs, namely, phantasy and sense, is a clear proof that the said soul is naturally united to the body to make up the human species.

CHAPTER LXIX

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS ALLEGED TO SHOW THAT A SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE UNITED WITH A BODY AS THE FORM OF THAT BODY

The arguments wherewith Averroes endeavours to establish his opinion do not prove that the subsistent intelligence is not united with the body as the form of the same.

1. The words of Aristotle about the potential intellect, that it is “impassible, unmixed, and separate,” do not necessitate the admission that the intellectual substance is not united with the body as its form, giving it being. They are sufficiently verified by saying that the intellectual faculty, which Aristotle calls the speculative faculty,’ is not the actualisation of any organ, as exercising its activity through that organ.

2. Supposing the substance of the soul to be united in being with the body as the form of the body, while still the intellect is not the actualisation of any organ, it does not follow that intellect falls under the law of physical determination, as do sensible and material things: for we do not suppose intellect to be a harmony, or function (ratio, golos) of any organ, as Aristotle says that sense is.

3. That Aristotle is saying that the intellect is unmingled,’ or separate,’ does not intend to exclude it from being a part, or faculty, of the soul, which soul is the form of the whole body, is evident from this passage, where he is arguing against those who said that there were different parts of the soul in

different parts of the body:—”If the whole soul keeps together the body as a whole, it is fitting that each part of the soul should keep together some part of the body: but this looks like an impossibility: for it is difficult even to imagine what part of the body the intellect shall keep together, or how.”

CHAPTER LXXIII

THAT THE POTENTIAL INTELLECT IS NOT ONE AND THE SAME IN ALL MEN

HENCE it is plainly shown that there is not one and the same potential intellect, belonging to all men who are and who shall be and who have been, as Averroes pretends.

A. 1. It has been shown that the substance of the intellect is united with the human body and is its form (Chap.LVII). But it is impossible for there to be one form otherwise than of one matter. Therefore there is not one intellect for all men.

A. 2 and 3. It is not possible for a dog’s soul to enter a wolf’s body, or a man’s soul any other body than the body of a man. But the same proportion that holds between a man’s soul and a man’s body, holds between the soul of this man and the body of this man. It is impossible therefore for the soul of this man to enter any other body than the body of this man. But it is by the soul of this man that this man understands. Therefore there is not one and the same intellect of this man and of that.

A. 4. A thing has being from that source from whence it has unity: for one and being are inseparable. But everything has being by its own form. Therefore the unity of the thing follows the unity of the form. It is impossible therefore for there to be one form of different individual men. But the form of any individual man is his intellectual soul. It is impossible therefore for there to be one intellect of all men.

But if it is said that the sentient soul of this man is other than the sentient soul of that, and so far forth the two are not one man, though there be one intellect of both, such explanation cannot stand. For the proper activity of every being follows upon and is indicative of its species. But as the proper activity of an animal is to feel, so the proper activity of a man is to understand. As any given individual is an animal in that he has feeling, so is he a man by virtue of the faculty whereby he understands. But the faculty whereby the soul understands, or the man through the soul, is the potential intellect. This individual then is a man by the potential intellect. If then this man has another sentient soul than another man, but not another potential intellect, but one and the same, it follows that they are two animals, but not two men.

B. To these arguments the Commentator replies by saying that the potential intellect is conjoined with us through its own form, namely, through an intelligible impression, one subject of which [is the said potential intellect, and one subject again] is the phantasm existing in us, which differs in different men; and thus the potential intellect is multiplied in different men, not by reason of its substance, but by reason of its form.

The nullity of this reply appears by what has been shown above (Chap.LIX), that it would be impossible for any man to have understanding, if this were the only way in which the potential intellect were conjoined with us. But suppose that the aforesaid conjunction (continuatio) were sufficient to render man intelligent, still the said answer does not solve the arguments already alleged.

B. 1. According to the above exposition, nothing belonging to intellect will remain multiplied as men are multiplied except only the phantasm, or impression in phantasy; and this very phantasm will not be multiplied as it is actually understood, because, as so understood, it is in the potential intellect, and has undergone abstraction of material conditions under the operation of the active intellect; whereas the phantasm, as a potential term of intelligence, does not transcend the grade of the sentient soul.

B. 2. Still the objection holds, that this man will not be differentiated from that except by the sentient soul; and the awkward consequence follows that this man and that together do not make a plurality of men.

B. 3. Nothing attains its species by what it is potentially, but by what it is actually. But the impression in phantasy, as multiplied in this man and that, has only a potentially intelligible being. Therefore that impression, as so multiplied, does not put any given individual in the species of intelligent animal,’ which is the definition of man.’ Thus it remains true that the specific ratio of man’ is not multiplied in individual men.

B. 4. It is the first and not the second perfection that gives the species to every living thing. But the impression in phantasy is a second perfection; and therefore not from that multiplied impression has man his species.

B. 6. That which puts a man in the species of man must be something abiding in the same individual as long as he remains: otherwise the individual would not be always of one and the same species, but now of one species and now of another. But the impressions of phantasy do not remain always the same in the same man; but new impressions come, and previous impressions perish. Therefore the individual man does not attain his species by any such impression: nor is it anything in the phantasy that conjoins him with the formal principle of his species, which is the potential intellect.

C. But if it is said that the individual does not receive his species by the phantasms themselves, but by the faculties in which the phantasms are, namely, the phantasy, the memory, and the vis cogitativa which is proper to man, and which in the De anima, III, v, Aristotle calls the passive intellect,' the same awkward consequences still follow.

C. 1. Since the vis cogitativa operates only upon particulars, the impressions of which it puts apart and puts together; and further, since it has a bodily organ through which it acts, it does not transcend the rank of the sentient soul. But in virtue of his sentient soul, as such, man is not a man, but an animal. It still therefore remains true that the element, supposed to be multiplied in us, belongs to man only in his animal capacity.

C. 2. The cogitative faculty, since it acts through an organ, is not the faculty whereby we understand. But the principle whereby we understand is the principle whereby man is man. Therefore no individual is man by virtue of the cogitative faculty: nor does man by that faculty essentially differ from dumb animals, as the Commentator pretends.

C. 3. The cogitative faculty is united to the potential intellect, the principle of human intelligence, only by its action of preparing phantasms for the active intellect to render them actual terms of intelligence and perfections of the potential intellect. But this preliminary activity of the cogitative faculty does not always remain the same in us. Therefore it cannot be the means whereby man is conjoined with the specific principle of the human species, or made a member of that species.

C. 4. If the potential intellect of this and that man were numerically one and the same, the act of understanding would be one and the same in both which is an impossibility.

D. But if it is said that the act of understanding is multiplied according to the diversity of impressions in phantasy, that supposition cannot stand.

D. 3. For the potential intellect understands a man, not as this individual man, but as man simply, according to the specific essence of the race. But this specific essence remains one, however much impressions in phantasy are multiplied, whether in the same man or in different men. Therefore no multiplication of phantasms can be the cause of multiplication of the act of understanding in the potential intellect, considering the same species; and thus we shall still have numerically one action in different men.

D. 4. The proper subject in which the habit of knowledge resides is the potential intellect. But an accident, so long as it remains specifically one, is multiplied only by coming to reside in different subjects. If then the potential intellect is one in all men, any habit of knowledge specifically the same, say, the habit of grammar, must be numerically the same in all men, which is unthinkable.

E. But to this they say that the subject of the habit of knowledge is not the potential intellect, but the passive intellect and the cogitative faculty (Chap.LX): which it cannot be.

E. 1. For, as Aristotle shows in the Ethics (II, i), like acts engender like habits; and like habits reproduce like acts. Now by the acts of the potential intellect there comes to be the habit of knowledge in us; and we are competent for the same acts by possession of the habit of knowledge. Therefore the habit of knowledge is in the potential intellect, not in the passive.

E. 2. Scientific knowledge is of demonstrated conclusions; and demonstrated conclusions, like their premises, are universal truths. Science therefore is in that faculty which takes cognisance of universals. But the passive intellect is not cognisant of universals, but of particular notions.

F. The error of placing the habit of scientific knowledge in the passive intellect seems to have arisen from the observation that men are found more or less apt for the study of science according to the several dispositions of the cogitative faculty and the phantasy.

F. 1. But this aptitude depends on those faculties only as remote conditions: so it also depends on the complexion of the body, as Aristotle says that men of delicate touch and soft flesh are clever. But the proximate principle of the act of speculative understanding is the habit of scientific knowledge: for this habit must perfect the power of understanding to act readily at will, as other habits perfect the powers in which they are.

F. 2. The dispositions of the cogitative faculty and the phantasy regard the object: they regard the phantasm, which is prepared by the efficiency of these faculties readily to become a term of actual understanding under the action of the active intellect. But habits do not condition objects: they condition faculties. Thus conditions that take the edge off terrors are not the habit of fortitude: fortitude is a disposition of the conative part of the soul to meet terrors. Hence it appears that the habit of knowledge is not in the passive but in the potential intellect.

F. 3. If the potential intellect of all men is one, we must suppose that the potential intellect has always existed, if men have always existed, as Averroists suppose; and much more the active intellect, because agent is more honourable than patient, as Aristotle says (De anima, III, v). But if the agent is eternal, and the recipient eternal, the contents received must be eternal also. Therefore the intellectual impressions have been from eternity in the potential intellect: therefore it will be impossible for it to receive afresh any new intellectual impressions. But the only use of sense and phantasy in the process of understanding is that intellectual impressions may be gathered from them. At this rate then neither sense nor phantasy will be needed for understanding; and we come back to the opinion of Plato, that we do not acquire knowledge by the senses, but are merely roused by them to remember what we knew before.

G. But to this the Commentator replies that intellectual presentations reside in a twofold subject: in one subject, from which they have everlasting being, namely, the potential intellect; in another subject, from which they have a recurring new existence, namely, the phantasm, or impression in phantasy. He illustrates this by the comparison of a sight-presentation, which has also a twofold subject, the one subject being the thing outside the soul, the other the visual faculty. But this answer cannot stand.

G. 1. For it is impossible that the action and perfection of the eternal should depend on anything temporal. But phantasms are temporal things, continually springing up afresh in us from the experience of the senses. Therefore the intellectual impressions, whereby the potential intellect is actuated and brought to activity, cannot possibly depend on phantasms in the way that visual impressions depend on things outside the soul.

G. 2. Nothing receives what it has already got. But before any sensory experience of mine or yours there were intellectual impressions in the potential intellect: for the generations before us could not have understood had not the potential intellect been reduced to act by intellectual impressions. Nor can it be said that those impressions, formerly received in the potential intellect, have ceased to be: because the potential intellect not only receives, but keeps what it receives: hence it is called the "place of ideas." Therefore, on this showing, no impressions from our phantasms are received in the potential intellect.

G. 6 and 7. If the potential intellect receives no intellectual impressions from the phantasms that are in us, because it has already received them from the phantasms of those who were before us, then for the like reason we must say that it receives impressions from the phantasms of no generation of men, whom another generation has preceded. But every generation has been preceded by some previous generation, if the world and human society is eternal, as Averroists suppose. Therefore the potential intellect never receives any impressions from phantasms; and from this it seems to follow that the potential intellect has no need of phantasms to understand. But we (nos) understand by the potential intellect. Therefore neither shall we need sense and phantasm for our understanding: which is manifestly false and contrary to the opinion of Aristotle.

For the potential intellect, like every other substance, operates according to the mode of its nature. Now according to its nature it is the form of the body. Hence it understands immaterial things, but views them in some material medium; as is shown by the fact that in teaching universal truths particular examples are alleged, in which what is said may be seen. Therefore the need which the potential intellect has of the phantasm before receiving the intellectual impression is different from that which it has after the impression has been received. Before reception, it needs the phantasm to gather from it the intellectual impression, so that the phantasm then stands to the potential intellect as an object which moves it. But after receiving the impression, of which the phantasm is the vehicle, it needs the phantasm as an instrument or basis of the impression received. Thus by command of the intellect there is formed in the phantasy a phantasm answering to such and such an intellectual impression; and in this phantasm the intellectual impression shines forth as an exemplar in the thing exemplified, or as in an image.

G. 8. If the potential intellect is one for all men and eternal, by this time there must have been received in it the intellectual impressions of all things that have been known by any men whatsoever. Then, as every one of us understands by the potential intellect,—nay, as the act of understanding in each is the act of that potential intellect understanding,—every one of us must understand all that has been understood by any other men whatsoever.

H. To this the Commentator replies that we do not understand by the potential intellect except in so far as it is conjoined with us through the impressions in our phantasy, and that these phantasms are not the same nor similar amongst all men. And this answer seems to be in accordance with the doctrine that has gone before: for, apart from any affirmation of the unity of the potential intellect, it is true that we do not understand those things, the impressions whereof are in the potential intellect, unless the appropriate phantasms are at hand. But that this answer does not altogether escape the difficulty, may be thus shown.

When the potential intellect has been actualised by the reception of an intellectual impression, it is competent to act of itself: hence we see that, once we have got the knowledge of a thing, it is in our power to consider it again when we wish: nor are we at a loss for lack of phantasms, because it is in our power to form phantasms suitable to the consideration which we wish, unless there happens to be some impediment on the part of the organ, as in persons out of their mind or in a comatose state. But if in the potential intellect there are intellectual impressions of all branches of knowledge,—as we must say, if that intellect is one and eternal,—then the necessity of phantasms for the potential intellect will be the same as in his case who already has knowledge, and wishes to study and consider some point of that knowledge, for that also he could not do without phantasms. Since then every man understands by the potential intellect so far as it is reduced to act by intellectual impressions, so every man should be able on this theory to regard, whenever he would, all the known points of all sciences: which is manifestly false, for at that rate no one would need a teacher. Therefore the potential intellect is not one and eternal.

CHAPTER LXXIV

OF THE OPINION OF AVICENNA, WHO SUPPOSED INTELLECTUAL FORMS NOT TO BE PRESERVED IN THE POTENTIAL INTELLECT

THE above arguments (against Averroes) seem to be obviated by the theory of Avicenna. He says that intellectual impressions do not remain in the potential intellect except just so long as they are being actually understood. And this he endeavours to prove from the fact that forms are actually apprehended so long as they remain in the faculty that apprehends them: thus in the act of perception both sense and intellect become identified with their objects: hence it seems that whenever sense or intellect is united with its object, as having taken its form, actual apprehension, sensible or intellectual, occurs. But the faculties which preserve forms which not actually apprehended, he says, are not the faculties that apprehend those forms, but storehouses (thesauros) attached to the said apprehensive faculties. Thus phantasy is the storehouse of forms apprehended by sense; and memory, according to him, is the storehouse of notions apprehended independently of sensation, as when the sheep apprehends the hostility of the wolf. The capacity of these faculties for storing up forms not actually apprehended comes from their having certain bodily organs in which the forms are received, such reception following close upon the (first) apprehension; and thereby the apprehensive faculty, turning to these storehouses, apprehends in act. But it is acknowledged that the potential intellect is an apprehensive faculty, and has no bodily organ: hence Avicenna concludes that it is impossible for intellectual impressions to be preserved in the potential intellect except so long as it is actually understanding. Therefore, one of three things: either (1) these intellectual impressions must be preserved in some bodily organ, or faculty having a bodily organ: or (2) they must be self-existent intelligible forms, to which our potential intellect stands in the relation of a mirror to the objects mirrored: or (3) whenever the potential intellect understands, these intellectual impressions must flow into it afresh from some separate agent. The first of these three suppositions is impossible: because forms existing in faculties that use bodily organs are only potentially intelligible. The second supposition is the opinion of Plato, which Aristotle rejects. Hence Avicenna concludes that, whenever we actually understand, there flow into our potential intellect intellectual impressions from the active intellect, which he assumes to be an intelligence subsisting apart. If any one objects against him that then there is no difference between a man when he first learns, and when he wishes to review and study again something which he has learnt before, he replies that to learn and con over again what we know is nothing else than to acquire a perfect habit of uniting ourselves with the (extrinsic) active intelligence, so as to receive therefrom the intellectual form; and therefore, before we come to reflect on and use our knowledge, there is in man a bare potentiality of such reception, but reflection on our knowledge is like potentiality reduced to act. And this view seems consonant with what Aristotle teaches, that memory is not in the intellectual but in the sensitive part of the soul. So it seems that the preservation of intellectual impressions does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. But on careful consideration this theory will be found ultimately to differ little or nothing from the theory of Plato. Plato supposed forms of intellect to be separately existing substances, whence knowledge flowed in upon our souls: Avicenna supposes one separate substance, the active intellect, to be the source when knowledge flows in upon our souls. Now it makes no matter for the acquirement of knowledge whether our knowledge is caused by one separate substance or by several. Either way it will follow that our knowledge is not caused by sensible things: the contrary of which conclusion appears from the fact that any one wanting in any one sense is wanting in acquaintance with the sensible objects of which that sense takes cognisance.

1. It is a novelty to say that the potential intellect, viewing the impressions made by singular things in the phantasy, is lit up by the light of the active intellect to know the universal; and that the action of the lower faculties, phantasy, memory, and cogitative faculty, fit and prepare the soul to receive the emanation of the active intellect. This, I say, is novel and strange doctrine: for we see that our soul is better disposed to receive impressions from intelligences subsisting apart, the further it is removed from bodily and sensible things: the higher is attained by receding from the lower. It is not therefore likely that any regarding of bodily phantasms should dispose our soul to receive the influence of an intelligence subsisting apart. Plato made a better study of the basis of his position: for he supposed that sensible appearances do not dispose the soul to receive the influence of separately subsisting forms, but merely rouse the intellect to consider knowledge that has been already caused in it by an external principle: for he supposed that from the beginning knowledge of all things intellectually knowable was caused in our souls by separately existing forms, or ideas: hence learning, he said, was nothing else than recollecting.

3. Intellectual knowledge is more perfect than sensory. If therefore in sensory knowledge there is some power of preserving apprehensions, much more will this be the case in intellectual knowledge.

6. This opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who says that the potential intellect is “the place of ideas”: which is tantamount to saying that it is a “storehouse” of intellectual impressions, to use Avicenna’s own phrase.

The arguments to the contrary are easily solved. For the potential intellect is perfectly actuated about intellectual impressions when it is actually considering them: when it is not actually considering them, it is not perfectly actuated about them, but is in a condition intermediate between potentiality and actuality. As for memory, that is located in the sentient part of the soul, because the objects of memory fall under a definite time for there is no memory but of the past; and therefore, since there is no abstraction of its object from individualising conditions, memory does not belong to the intellectual side of our nature, which deals with universals This however does not bar the potential intellect’s preservation of intellectual impressions, which are abstracted from all particular conditions.

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting:

The soul that rises with us, our life’s star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting
And cometh from afar:
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home. (Wordsworth’s Ode, Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood.)

CHAPTER LXXV

CONFUTATION OF THE ARGUMENTS WHICH SEEM TO PROVE THE UNITY OF THE POTENTIAL INTELLECT

ARG. 1. Apparently, every form that is specifically one and numerically multiplied, is individualised by its matter: for things specifically one and numerically many agree in form, and are distinguished according to matter. If then the potential intellect is multiplied according to number in different men, while it remains one in species, it must be multiplied in this and that man by matter,—by the matter which is that man's body the form of which it is supposed to be. But every form, individualised by matter which it actuates, is a material form: for the being of everything must depend on that on which its individuation depends: for as general constituents are of the essence of the species, so individualising constituents are of the essence of this individual. It follows therefore that the potential intellect is a material form, and consequently that it does not receive any thing, nor do anything, except through a bodily organ: which is contrary to the nature of the potential intellect.

Reply. We confess that the potential intellect is specifically one in different men, and many according to number,—waiving the point that the constituents of man are not put into genus and species for what they are in themselves, but for what they are as constituents of the whole. Still it does not follow that the potential intellect is a material form, dependent for its being on the body. For as it is specifically proper to the human soul to be united to a certain species of body, so any individual soul differs from any other individual soul, in number only, inasmuch as it is referable to numerically another body. Thus then human souls,—and consequently the potential intellect, which is a faculty of the human soul,—are individualised according to bodies, not that the individuation is caused by the bodies.

Arg. 2. If the potential intellect were different in this man and that, the impression understood would have to be numerically different in this man, while remaining one in species: for since the proper subject of impressions actually understood is the potential intellect, when that intellect is multiplied there must be a corresponding multiplication of intellectual impressions according to the number of different individuals. But the only impressions or forms which are the same in species and different in number, are individual forms, which cannot be intellectual forms, because objects of intellect are universal, not particular. It is impossible therefore for the potential intellect to be multiplied in different individual men.

Reply. This second argument fails from neglecting to distinguish between that whereby (quo) we understand, and that which (quod) we understand. The impression received in the potential intellect is not to be taken for that which is understood. For as all arts and sciences have for their object-matter things which are understood, it would follow that the subject-matter of all sciences was impressions on the potential intellect: which is manifestly false, for no science has anything to say to such mental impressions except psychology and metaphysics: though it is true that through those mental impressions there is known the whole content of all the sciences. Therefore, in the process of understanding, the intellectual impression received in the potential intellect is that whereby we understand, as the impression of colour in the eye is not that which is seen, but that whereby we see. On the other hand, that which is understood is the nature (ratio) of things existing outside the soul, as also it is things existing outside the soul that are seen with the bodily sight: for to this end were arts and sciences invented, that things might be known in their natures (naturis).

Still it does not follow that, if sciences are of universal truths, universals should subsist by themselves outside the soul, as Plato supposed. For though for the truth of knowledge it is necessary that the knowledge should answer to the thing, still it is not necessary that the mode of the knowledge and the mode of the thing should be the same: for properties that are united in the thing are sometimes known separately. Thus one and the same thing is white and sweet: still sight takes cognisance only of the whiteness, and taste only of the sweetness. Thus again intellect understands a line drawn in sensible matter apart from that sensible matter, though it might understand it also along with the sensible matter. This difference arises according to the diversity of intellectual impressions received in the intellect, which some times are the likeness of quantity only, sometimes of a sensible quantitative substance. In like manner also, though the nature of genus and species never exists except in concrete individuals, still the intellect understands the nature of genus and species without understanding the individualising elements; and this is the meaning of understanding universals. And so these two positions are reconciled, that universals have no subsistence outside the soul; and yet that the intellect, understanding universals, understands things which are outside the soul.

The fact of the intellect understanding the nature of genus and species stripped of its individualising elements, arises from the condition of the intellectual impression received in understanding, which impression is rendered immaterial by the active intellect, inasmuch as it is abstracted from matter and materialising conditions whereby a thing is individualised. And therefore the sentient faculties can take no cognisance of universals, since they cannot receive an immaterial form, seeing that they receive always in a bodily organ.

It is not therefore necessary that the intellectual impression of this and that intelligence should be numerically one: for it would follow thereupon that the act of understanding in them both was also numerically one, since activity follows form, which is the principle of species: but it is necessary, to the end that one object should be understood by both minds, that there should be a like impression of one and the same object in them both. And this is possible enough, although the intellectual impressions differ in number: for there is no difficulty in having different images of one thing; hence the contingency of one than being seen by several persons. There is nothing inconsistent then with the universalising knowledge of the understanding in their being different intellectual impressions in different minds. Nor need it ensue, because these intellectual impressions are many in number and the same in species, that they are not actual but only potential terms of understanding, as is the case with other individual things. Mere individuality is not inconsistent with intelligibility: for we must admit the potential and active intellects themselves, if we may suppose the two to subsist apart, united to no body, but subsistent by themselves, to be individual beings and still intelligible. What is inconsistent with intelligibility is materiality: as is shown by this consideration, that for the forms of material things to become actually intelligible, abstraction has to be made from the particular matter in which they are lodged; and therefore in cases in which individuation is due to particular matter involving particular dimensions, the things so individualised are not actually intelligible. But where individuation is not due to matter, such individual things may without difficulty be actually intelligible. Now intellectual impressions, like all other forms, are individualised by their subject, which is the potential intellect; and since the potential intellect is not material, it does not stand in the way of the actual intelligibility of the impressions individualised by it.

But though we have said that the intellectual impression, received in the potential intellect, is not that which is understood, but that whereby we understand, still it remains true that by reflection the intellect understands itself and its own intellectual act and the impression whereby it understands. Its own intellectual act it understands in two ways,—in one way, in particular, for it understands that it is now understanding; in another way, in general, inasmuch as it reasons about the said act. And likewise it understands intellect and the impression in intellect in two ways,—by remarking that itself is and has an intellectual impression, which is particular knowledge; and by studying its own nature and the nature of the intellectual impression, which is knowledge of the universal. According to this latter way we treat of intellect and of the intelligible in science.

Arg. 3. The master transfuses the knowledge which he has into the scholar. Either then the knowledge transfused is the same in number, or different in number, though the same in species. The latter alternative seems impossible: because it supposes the master to cause his own knowledge in the scholar in the same way that an agent causes its own form in another being, by generating a nature specifically like its own; which seems proper to material agents. It must be then that numerically the same knowledge is caused in the scholar that was in the master; which would be impossible, were there not one potential intellect of them both.

Reply. The saying that the knowledge in master and scholar is numerically one, is partly true and partly not: it is numerically one in point of the thing known, but not in point of the intellectual impressions whereby the thing is known, nor in point of the habit of knowledge itself. It is to be observed however that, as Aristotle (Metaph. VII, ix) teaches, there are arts in whose subject matter there is not any principle active in producing the effect of the art, as is clear in the building art: for in wood and stones there is no active power moving to the erection of a house, but only a passive aptitude. But there is an art in whose subject matter there is an active principle moving in the direction of the effect of the art, as is clear in the healing art: for in the sick subject there is an active principle tending to health. And therefore the effect of the former kind of art is never produced by nature, but always by art, as every house is a work of art: but the effect of the latter kind is produced as well by art as by nature without art: for many are healed by the operation of nature without the art of medicine. In these things that can be done both by art and nature, art imitates nature: thus if one is sick of a chill, nature heals him by warming him: hence the physician also, if he is to cure him, heals him by warming. Similar is the case with the art of teaching: for in the pupil there is an active principle making for knowledge, namely, the understanding, and those primary axioms which are naturally understood; and therefore knowledge is acquired in two ways,—without teaching, by a man's own finding out, and again by teaching. The teacher therefore begins to teach in the same way that the discoverer begins to find out, by offering for the consideration of the scholar elements of knowledge already possessed by him: because all education and all knowledge starts from pre-existing knowledge, drawing conclusions from elements already in the mind, and proposing sensible examples whereby there may be formed in the scholar's soul those impressions of phantasy which are necessary or intelligence. And because the working of the teacher from without would effect nothing, unless borne out by an internal principle of knowledge, which is within us by the gift of God, so it is said among theologians that man teaches by rendering the service of ministry, but God by working within: so too the physician is called nature's minister in healing.

A final remark. Since the Commentator makes the passive intellect the residence of habits of knowledge (Chap.LX), the unity of the potential intellect helps not at all to the numerical unity of knowledge in master and scholar: for certainly the passive intellect is not the same in different men, since it is an organic faculty. Hence, on his own showing, this argument does not serve his purpose.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THAT THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATELY SUBSISTING INTELLIGENCE, BUT A FACULTY OF THE SOUL

WE may further conclude that neither is the active intellect one in all men, as Alexander and Avicenna suppose, though they do not suppose the potential intellect to be one in all men.

4. Plato supposed knowledge in us to be caused by Ideas, which he took to subsist apart by themselves. But clearly the first principle on which our knowledge depends is the active intellect. If therefore the active intellect is something subsisting apart by itself, the difference will be none, or but slight, between this opinion and that of Plato, which the Philosopher rejects.

5. If the active intellect is an intelligence subsisting apart, its action upon us will either be continual and uninterrupted, or at least we must say that it is not continued or broken off at our pleasure. Now its action is to make the impressions on our phantasy actual terms of intelligence. Either therefore it will do this always or not always. If not always, still it will not do it at our discretion. Either therefore we must be always in the act of understanding, or it will not be in our power actually to understand when we wish.

But it may be said that the active intellect, so far as with it lies, is always in action, but that the impressions in our phantasy are not always becoming actual terms of intelligence, but only when they are disposed thereto; and they are disposed thereto by the act of the cogitative faculty, the use of which is in our power; and therefore actually to understand is in our power; and this is why not all men understand the things whereof they have the impressions in their phantasy, because not all have at command a suitable act of the cogitative faculty, but only those who are accustomed and trained thereto. But this answer does not appear to be altogether sufficient. That the impressions in phantasy are marshalled by the cogitative faculty to the end that they may become actual terms of understanding and move the potential intellect, does not seem a sufficient account, if it be coupled with the supposition of the potential intellect being a separately subsistent intelligence. This seems to go with the theory of those who say that inferior agents supply only predispositions to final perfection, but that final perfection is the work of an extrinsic agency: which is contrary to the mind of Aristotle: for the human soul does not appear to be worse off for understanding than inferior natures are for their own severally proper activities.

9. In the nature of every cause there is contained a principle sufficient for the natural operation of that cause. If the operation consists in action, there is at hand an active principle, as we see in the powers of the vegetative soul in plants. If the operation consists in receiving impressions, there is at hand a passive principle, as we see in the sentient powers of animals. But man is the most perfect of all inferior causes; and his proper and natural operation is to understand, an operation which is not accomplished without a certain receiving of impressions, inasmuch as every understanding is determined by its object; nor again without action, inasmuch as the intellect makes potential into actual terms of understanding. There must therefore be in the nature of man a proper principle of both operations, to wit, both an active and a potential intellect, and neither of them must be separate in being (or physically distinct), from the soul of man.

10. If the active intellect is an intelligence subsisting apart, it is clearly above the nature of man. But any activity which a man exercises by mere virtue of a supernatural cause is a supernatural activity, as the working of miracles, prophecy, and the like effects, which are wrought by men in virtue of a divine endowment. Since then man cannot understand except by means of the active intellect, it follows, supposing that intellect a separately subsistent being, that to understand is not an operation proper and natural to man; and thus man cannot be defined as intellectual or rational.

11. No agent works except by some power which is formally in the agent as a constituent of its being. But the working both of potential and of active

intellect is proper to man: for man produces ideas by abstraction from phantasms, and receives in his mind those ideas; operations which it would never occur to us to think of, did we not experience them in ourselves. The principles therefore to which these operations are attributable, namely, the potential and the active intellect, must be faculties formally existing in us.

12. A being that cannot proceed to its own proper business without being moved thereto by an external principle, is rather driven to act than acts of itself. This is the case with irrational creatures. Sense, moved by an exterior sensible object, makes an impression on the phantasy; and so in order the impression proceeds through all the faculties till it reaches those which move the rest. Now the proper business of man is to understand; and the prime mover in understanding is the active intellect, which makes intellectual impressions whereby the potential intellect is impressed; which potential intellect, when actualised, moves the will. If then the active intellect has a separate subsistence outside man, the whole of man’s activity depends on an extrinsic principle. Man then will not be his own leader, but will be led by another; and thus will not be master of his own acts, nor deserve praise nor blame; and the whole of moral science and political society will perish: an awkward conclusion. Therefore the active intellect has no subsistence apart from man.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE POTENTIAL AND THE ACTIVE INTELLECT TO BE UNITED IN THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL

SOME one perhaps may think it impossible for one and the same substance, that of our soul, to be in potentiality to receive all intellectual impressions (which is the function of the potential intellect), and to actualise those impressions (which is the function of the active intellect); since nothing acts as it is in potentiality to receive, but only as it is in actual readiness to act. But, looking at the matter rightly, no inconvenience or difficulty will be found in this view of the union of the active and potential intellect in the one substance of the soul. For a thing may well be in potentiality in one respect and in actuality in another; and this we find to be the condition of the intellectual soul in its relation to phantasms, or impressions in phantasy. For the intellectual soul has something in actuality, to which the phantasm is in potentiality; and on the other hand the intellectual soul potentiality that which is actually found in the phantasms. For the substance of the human soul has the attribute of immateriality: but it is not thereby assimilated to this or that definite thing; and yet such assimilation is requisite for our soul to know this or that thing definitely, since all cognition takes place by some likeness of the object known being stamped on the knowing mind. Thus then the intellectual soul remains in potentiality, open to the reception of definite impressions in the likeness of things that come within our observation and knowledge, which are the natures of sensible things. These definite natures of sensible things are represented to us by phantasms, which however have not yet reached the stage of being objects of intellect, seeing that they are likenesses of sensible things under material conditions, which are individualising properties,—and besides they are in bodily organs. They are therefore not actual objects of understanding; and yet since in the case of this man [or other sensible object], whose likeness is represented by phantasms, it is possible to fix upon a universal nature stripped of all individualising conditions, these phantasms are potentially intelligible. Thus then they have a potentially intelligible being, but an actually definite likeness to things, whereas in the intellectual soul, as we saw, the situation was the other way about. There is then in the intellectual soul a power exercising its activity upon phantasms, making them actual objects of understanding; and this power of the soul is called the active intellect. There is also in the soul a power that is potentially open to definite impressions of sensible things; and this power is the potential intellect.

But the intellectual soul does not lie open to receive impressions of the likenesses of things that are in phantasms in the way that the likeness exists in the phantasm, but according as those likenesses are raised to a higher stage, by being abstracted from individualising material conditions and rendered actual objects, or terms, of understanding. And therefore the action of the active intellect upon the phantasms precedes their being received into the potential intellect; and thus the prime agency is not attributable to the phantasms, but to the active intellect.

There are some animals that see better by night than by day, because they have weak eyes, which are stimulated by a little light, but dazzled by much. And the case is similar with our understanding, which is “to the clearest truths as the bat’s eye to the sun” (Aristotle, Metaph. I, Appendix): hence the little intellectual light that is connatural to us is sufficient for us to understand with. But that the intellectual light connatural to our soul is sufficient to produce the action of the active intellect, will be clear to any one who considers the necessity for positing such an intellect. Our soul is found to be in potentiality to intelligible objects as sense to sensible objects: for as we are not always having sensations, so we are not always understanding. These intelligible objects Plato assumed to exist by themselves, calling them Ideas’: hence it was not necessary for him to posit any active intellect’ rendering objects intelligible. But if this Platonic position were true, the absolutely better objects of intelligence should be better also relatively to us, and be better understood by us, which is manifestly not the case: for things are more intelligible to us which are nigher to sense, though in themselves they are less excellent objects of understanding. Hence Aristotle was moved to lay down the doctrine, that the things which are intelligible to us are not any self-existent objects of understanding, but are gathered from objects of sense. Hence he had to posit some faculty to do this work of making terms of understanding: that faculty is the active intellect. The active intellect therefore is posited to make terms of understanding proportionate to our capacity. Such work does not transcend the measure of intellectual light connatural to us. Hence there is no difficulty in attributing the action of the active intellect to the native light of our soul, especially as Aristotle compares the active intellect to light (De anima, III, v, 2).

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THAT IT WAS NOT THE OPINION OF ARISTOTLE THAT THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS A SEPARATELY SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE, BUT RATHER THAT IT IS A PART OF THE SOUL

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT THE HUMAN SOUL DOES NOT PERISH WITH THE BODY

EVERY intelligent subsisting being is imperishable (Chap.LV): but the human soul is an intelligent subsisting being.

2. Nothing is destroyed by that which makes its perfection. But the perfection of the human soul consists in a certain withdrawal from the body: for the soul is perfected by knowledge and virtue: now in knowledge there is greater perfection, the more the view is fixed on high generalisations, or immaterial things; while the perfection of virtue consists in a man's not following his bodily passions, but tempering and restraining them by reason.—Nor is it of any avail to reply that the perfection of the soul consists in its separation from the body in point of activity, but to be separated from the body in point of being is its destruction. For the activity of a thing shows its substance and being, and follows upon its nature: thus the activity of a thing can only be perfected inasmuch as its substance is perfected. If then the soul is perfected in activity by relinquishing the body and bodily things, its substance cannot fail in being by separation from the body.

4. A natural craving cannot be in vain. But man naturally craves after permanent continuance: as is shown by this, that while existence is desired by all, man by his understanding apprehends existence, not in the present moment only, as dumb animals do, but existence absolutely. Therefore man attains to permanence on the part of his soul, whereby he apprehends existence absolute and for all time.

6. Intelligible being is more permanent than sensible being. But the substratum of material bodies (materia prima) is indestructible, much more

the potential intellect, the recipient of intelligible forms. Therefore the human soul, of which the potential intellect is a part, is indestructible.

8. No form is destroyed except either by the action of the contrary, or by the destruction of the subject wherein it resides, or by the failure of its cause. Thus heat is destroyed by the action of cold: by the destruction of the eye the power of sight is destroyed; and the light of the atmosphere fails by the failure of the sun's presence, which was its cause. But the human soul cannot be destroyed by the action of its contrary, for it has no contrary, since by the potential intellect the soul is cognitive and receptive of all contraries. Nor again by the destruction of the subject in which it resides, for it has been shown above that the human soul is a form not dependent on the body for its being. Nor lastly by the failure of its cause, for it can have no cause but one which is eternal, as will be shown (Chap.LXXXVII). In no way therefore can the human soul be destroyed.

9. If the human soul is destroyed by the destruction of the body, it must be weakened by the weakening of the body. But the fact is that if any faculty of the soul is weakened by the body being weakened, that is only incidentally, inasmuch as that faculty of the soul stands in need of a bodily organ, as the sight is weakened by the weakening of the organ of sight, but only incidentally, as may be shown by this consideration: if any weakness fell essentially upon the faculty, the faculty would not be restored by the restoration of the organ; but now we see that however much the faculty of sight seems weakened, it is restored, if only the organ is restored. Since then the soul's faculty of understanding needs no bodily organ, the understanding itself is not weakened, neither essentially nor incidentally, either by old age or by any other weakness of body. But if in the working of the understanding there happens fatigue or hindrance through bodily weakness, this is not due to weakness of the understanding itself, but to weakness of other faculties that the understanding has need of, to wit, the phantasy, the memory, and the cogitative faculty.

10. The same is evidenced by the very words of Aristotle: "Moving causes pre-exist, but formal causes are along with the things whereof they are causes: for when a man is well, then there is health. But whether anything remains afterwards, is a point to consider: in some cases there may well be something remaining: the soul is an instance, not the whole soul, but the intelligence: as for the whole soul remaining, that is perhaps an

impossibility.” Clearly then, in speaking of forms, he wishes to speak of the intellect, which is the form of man, as remaining after its matter, that is, after the body. It is clear also that though Aristotle makes the soul a form, yet he does not represent it as non- subsistent and consequently perishable, as Gregory of Nyssa imputes to him: for he excludes the intellectual soul from the general category of other forms, saying that it remains after the body and is a subsistent being (substantiam quandam).

Hereby is banished the error of the impious in whose person it is said: We were born out of nothingness, and hereafter we shall be as though we had never been (Wisd. ii, 2); in whose person again Solomon says: One is the perishing of man and beast, and even is the lot of both: as man dies, so do beasts die: all breathe alike, and man hath no advantage over beasts (Eccles iii, 19): that he does not say this in his own person, but in the person of the ungodly, is clear from what he says at the end, as it were drawing a conclusion: Till the dust return to the earth, from whence it came; and the spirit go back to the God who gave it (Eccles xii, 7).

CHAPTER LXXX, LXXXI

ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO PROVE THAT THE HUMAN SOUL PERISHES WITH THE BODY, WITH REPLIES TO THE SAME

ARG. 1. If human souls are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, as shown above (Chap.LXXV), then when the bodies perish, the souls cannot remain in their multitude. Hence one of two conclusions must follow: either the human soul must wholly cease to be; or there must remain one soul only, which seems to suit the view of those who make that alone incorruptible which is one in all men, whether that be the active intellect alone, as Alexander says, or with the active also the potential intellect, as Averroes says.

Reply. Whatever things are necessarily in conjunction and proportion with one another, are made many or one together, each by its own cause. If the being of the one depends on the other, its unity or multiplication also will depend on the same: otherwise it will depend on some extrinsic cause. Form then and matter must always be in proportion with one another, and conjoined by a certain natural tie. Hence matter and form must vary together in point of multiplicity and unity. If then the form depends on the matter for its being, the multiplication of the form will depend on the matter, and so will its unity. But if the form is in no such dependence on the matter, then,—though it will still be necessary for the form to be multiplied with the multiplication of the matter,—the unity or multiplicity of the form will not depend on the matter. But it has been shown (Chap.LXVIII, andnote, p. 154, that the human soul is a form not dependent on matter for its being. Hence it follows that, though souls are multiplied as the bodies which they inform are multiplied, still the fact of bodies being many cannot be the cause of souls being many. And therefore there is no need for the plurality of souls to cease with the destruction of their bodies.

Arg. 2. The formal nature (ratio formalis, pp.111,116) of things is the cause of their differing in species. But if souls remain many after the perishing of their bodies, they must differ in species, since in souls so remaining the only diversity possible is one of formal nature. But souls do not change their species by the destruction of the body, otherwise they would be destroyed too, for all that changes from species to species is destroyed in the transition. Then they must have been different in species even before they parted from their bodies. But compounds take their species according to their form. So then individual men must differ in species, an awkward conclusion consequent upon the position that souls remain a multitude after their bodies are gone.

Reply. It is not any and every diversity of form that makes a difference of species. The fact of souls separated from their bodies making a multitude follows from their forms being different in substance, inasmuch as the substance of this soul is different from the substance of that. But this diversity does not arise from the souls differing in their several essential constitutions, but from their being differently commensurate with different bodies: for one soul is commensurate with one body and not with another. These commensurations remain in souls even when their bodies perish, as the substances of the souls also remain, not being dependent on their bodies for their being. For it is by their substances that souls are forms of bodies: otherwise they would be united with their bodies only accidentally, and soul and body would not make up an essential but only an accidental unity. But inasmuch as they are forms, they must be commensurate with their bodies. Hence it is clear that their several different commensuratenesses remain in the departed souls, and consequently plurality.

Arg. 3. It seems quite impossible, on the theory of those who suppose the eternity of the world, for human souls to remain in their multitude after the death of the body. For if the world is from eternity, infinite men have died before our time. If then the souls of the dead remain after death in their multitude, we must say that there is now an actual infinity of souls of men previously dead. But actual infinity is impossible in nature.

Reply. Of supporters of the eternity of the world, some have simply allowed the impossibility, saying that human souls perish altogether with their bodies. Others have said that of all souls there remains one spiritual existence which is common to all,—the active intellect according to some, or with the active also the potential intellect according to others. Others have supposed souls to remain in their multitude after their bodies; but, not to be obliged to suppose an infinity of souls, they have said that the same souls are united to different bodies after a fixed period; and this was the opinion of the Platonists, of which hereafter (Chap.LXXXIII). Others, avoiding all the aforesaid answers, have maintained that there was no difficulty in the existence of an actual infinity of departed souls: for an actual infinity of things, not related to one another, was only an accidental infinity, in which they saw no difficulty; and this is the position of Avicenna and Algazel. Which of these was the opinion of Aristotle is not expressly set down in his writings, although he does expressly hold the eternity of the world. But the last mentioned opinion is not inconsistent with his principles: for in the Physics, III, v, his argument against an actual infinity is confined to natural bodies, and is not extended to immaterial substances. Clearly however the professors of the Catholic faith can feel no difficulty on this point, as they do not allow the eternity of the world.

Arg. 5. It is impossible for any substance to exist destitute of all activity. But all activity of the soul ends with the body, as may be shown by simple enumeration. For the faculties of the vegetative soul work through bodily qualities and a bodily instrument; and the term of their activity is the body itself, which is perfected by the soul, is thereby nourished and developed, and comes to furnish the generative products. Also all the activities of the faculties of the sensitive soul are accomplished through bodily organs; and some of them are accompanied by (sensible) bodily change, as in the case of the passions. As for the act of understanding, although it is not an activity exercised through any bodily organ, nevertheless its objects are phantasms, which stand to it as colours to sight: hence as sight cannot see without colours, so the intellectual soul cannot understand without phantasms. The soul also needs, for purposes of understanding, the faculties which prepare the phantasms to become actual terms of intellect, namely, the cogitative faculty and the memory, of which it is certain that they cannot endure without the body, seeing that they work through organs of the body.

Hence Aristotle says that “the soul by no means understands without a phantasm,” and that “nothing understands without the passive intellect,” by which name he designates the cogitative faculty, “which is perishable”; and that “we remember nothing” after death of the things that we knew in life. Thus then it is clear that no activity of the soul can continue after death, and therefore neither can its substance continue.

Reply. The assertion that no activity can remain in the soul after its separation from the body, we say, is incorrect: for those activities remain which are not exercised through organs, and such are understanding and will. As for activities exercised through bodily organs, as are the activities of the vegetative and sentient soul, they do not remain. But we must observe that the soul separated from the body does not understand in the same way as when united with the body: for everything acts according as it is. Now though the being of the human soul, while united with the body, is perfect (absolutum), not depending on the body, still the body is a sort of housing (stramentum) to it and subject receptive of it. Hence the proper activity of the soul, which is understanding, while independent of the body in this that it is not exercised through any bodily organ, nevertheless finds in the body its object, which is the phantasm. Hence, so long as the soul is in the body, it cannot understand without a phantasm, nor remember except by the cogitative and reminiscent faculty whereby phantasms are shaped and made available (Chap.LXXIII); and therefore this method of understanding and remembering has to be laid aside when the body is laid aside. But the being of the departed soul belongs to it alone without the body: hence its intellectual activity will not be accomplished by regard to such objects as phantasms existing in bodily organs, but it will understand by itself after the manner of those intelligences that subsist totally apart from bodies (Chapp. XCI-CI), from which superior beings it will be able to receive more abundant influence in order to more perfect understanding.

We may see some indication of this even in living men. When the soul is hampered by preoccupations about its body, it is less disposed to understand higher things. Hence the virtue of temperance, withdrawing the soul from bodily delights, helps especially to make men apt to understand. In sleep again, when men are not using their bodily senses, they have some perception of things to come, impressed upon them by superior beings, and attain to facts that transcend the measure of human reasonings. This is much more the case in states of syncope and ecstasy, as the withdrawal from the bodily senses is there greater. And that is what one might expect, because, as has been pointed out above (Chap.LXVIII), the human soul being on the boundary line between corporeal and incorporeal substances, and dwelling as it were on the horizon of eternity and time, it approaches the highest by receding from the lowest. Therefore, when it shall be totally severed from the body, it will be perfectly assimilated to the intelligences that subsist apart, and will receive their influence in more copious streams. Thus then, though the mode of our understanding according to the conditions of the present life is wrecked with the wreck of the body, it will be replaced by another and higher mode of understanding.

But memory, being an act exercised through a bodily organ, as Aristotle shows, cannot remain in the soul after the body is gone; unless memory be taken in another sense for the intellectual hold upon things known before: this intellectual memory of things known in life must remain in the departed soul, since the intellectual impressions are indelibly received in the potential intellect (Chap.LXXIV). As regards other activities of the soul, such as love, joy, and the like, we must beware of a double meaning of the terms: sometimes they mean passions, or emotions, which are activities of the sensitive appetite, concupiscible or irascible, and as such they cannot remain in the soul after death, as Aristotle shows: sometimes they mean a simple act of will without passion, as Aristotle says that “The joy of God is one, everlasting, and absolute,” and that “In the contemplation of wisdom there is admirable delight”; and again he distinguishes the love of friendship from the love of passion. But as the will is a power that uses no bodily organ, as neither does the understanding, it is evident that such acts, inasmuch as they are acts of will, may remain in the departed soul.

CHAPTER LXXXII

THAT THE SOULS OF DUMB ANIMALS ARE NOT IMMORTAL

NO activity of the sentient part can have place without a body. But in the souls of dumb animals we find no activity higher than the activities of the sentient part. That animals neither understand nor reason is apparent from this, that all animals of the same species behave alike, as being moved by nature, and not acting on any principle of art: for every swallow makes its nest alike, and every spider its web alike. Therefore there is no activity in the soul of dumb animals that can possibly go on without a body.

2. Every form separated from matter is actually understood. Thus the active intellect makes impressions actually understood, inasmuch as it abstracts them. But if the soul of a dumb animal remains after the body is gone, it will be a form separated from matter. Therefore it will be form actually understood. But "in things separated from matter understanding and understood are the same" (De Anima, III, iv, 13). Therefore the soul of a dumb animal will have understanding, which is impossible.

3. In everything that is apt to arrive at any perfection, there is found a natural craving after that perfection: for good is what all crave after, everything its own good. But in dumb animals there is no craving after perpetuity of being except in the form of perpetuity of the species, inasmuch as they have an instinct of generation, whereby the species is perpetuated,—and the same is found in plants. But they have not that craving consequent upon apprehension: for since the sentient soul apprehends only what is here and now, it cannot possibly apprehend perpetuity of being, and therefore has no physical craving after such

perpetuity. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal is incapable of perpetuity of being.

CHAPTER LXXXIII, LXXXIV

APPARENT ARGUMENTS TO SHOW THAT THE HUMAN SOUL DOES NOT BEGIN WITH THE BODY, BUT HAS BEEN FROM ETERNITY, WITH REPLIES TO THE SAME

ARG. 1. (A.) What will never cease to be, has a power of being always. But of that which has a power of being always it is never true to say that it is not: for a thing continues in being so far as its power of being extends. What therefore will never cease to be, will never either begin to be.

Reply. The power of a thing does not extend to the past, but to the present or future: hence with regard to past events possibility has no place. Therefore from the fact of the soul having a power of being always it does not follow that the soul always has been, but that it always will be.—Besides, that to which power extends does not follow until the power is presupposed. It cannot therefore be concluded that the soul is always except for the time that comes after it has received the power.

Arg. 2. Truth of the intellectual order is imperishable, eternal, necessary. Now from the imperishableness of intellectual truth the being of the soul is shown to be imperishable. In like manner from the eternity of that truth there may be proved the eternity of the soul.

Reply. The eternity of understood truth may be regarded in two ways,—in point of the object which is understood, and in point of the mind whereby it is understood. From the eternity of understood truth in point of the object, there will follow the eternity of the thing, but not the eternity of the thinker.

From the eternity of understood truth in point of the understanding mind, the eternity of that thinking soul will follow. But understood truth is eternal, not in the latter but in the former way. As we have seen, the intellectual impressions, whereby our soul understands truth, come to us fresh from the phantasms through the medium of the active intellect. Hence the conclusion is, not that our soul is eternal, but that those understood truths are founded upon something which is eternal. In fact they are founded upon the First Truth, the universal Cause comprehensive of all truth. To this truth our soul stands related, not as the recipient subject to the form which it receives, but as a thing to its proper end: for truth is the good of the understanding and the end thereof. Now we can gather an argument of the duration of a thing from its end, as we can argue the beginning of a thing from its efficient cause: for what is ordained to an everlasting end must be capable of perpetual duration. Hence the immortality of the soul may be argued from the eternity of intellectual truth, but not the eternity of the soul.

Arg. 3. That is not perfect, to which many of its principal parts are wanting. If therefore there daily begin to be as many human souls as there are men born, it is clear that many of its principal parts are daily being added to the universe, and consequently that very many are still wanting to it. It follows that the universe is imperfect, which is impossible.

Reply. The perfection of the universe goes by species, not by individuals; and human souls do not differ in species, but only in number (Chap.LXXV).

(B.) Some professing the Catholic faith, but imbued with Platonic doctrines, have taken a middle course [between Platonists, who held that individual souls were from eternity, now united with bodies, now released by turns; and Alexander, Averroes,—and possibly Aristotle himself,—deniers of personal immortality]. These men, seeing that according to the Catholic faith nothing is eternal but God, have supposed human souls not to be eternal, but to have been created with the world, or rather before the visible world, and to be united with bodies recurrently as required. Origen was the first professor of the Christian faith to take up this position, and he has since had many followers. The position seems assailable on these grounds.

1. The soul is united with the body as the form and actualising principle thereof. Now though actuality is naturally prior to potentiality, yet, in the

same subject, it is posterior to it in time: for a thing moves from potentiality to actuality. Therefore the seed, which is potentially alive, was before the soul, which is the actuality of life.

2. It is natural to every form to be united to its own proper matter: otherwise the compound of matter and form would be something unnatural. Now that which belongs to a thing according to its nature is assigned to it before that which belongs to it against its nature: for what belongs to a thing against its nature attaches to it incidentally, but what belongs to it according to its nature attaches to it ordinarily; and the incidental is always posterior to the ordinary. It belongs to the soul therefore to be united to the body before being apart from the body.

3. Every part, separated from its whole, is imperfect. But the soul, being the form (Chap.XLVII), is a part of the human species. Therefore, existing by itself, apart from the body, it is imperfect. But the perfect is before the imperfect in the order of natural things.

(C.) If souls were created without bodies, the question arises how they came to be united with bodies. It must have been either violently or naturally. If violently, the union of the soul with the body is unnatural, and man is an unnatural compound of soul and body, which cannot be true. But if souls are naturally united with bodies, then they were created with a physical tendency (appetitus naturalis) to such union. Now a physical tendency works itself out at once, unless something comes in the way. Souls then should have been united with bodies from the instant of their creation except for some intervening obstacle. But any obstacle intervening to arrest a physical tendency, or natural craving, does violence to the same. Therefore it would have been by violence that souls were for a period separated from their bodies, which is an awkward conclusion.

(D.) But if it be said that both states alike are natural to the soul, as well the state of union with the body as the state of separation, according to difference of times, this appears to be impossible,—because points of natural variation are accidents to the subject in which they occur, as age and youth: if then union with body and separation from a body are natural variations to the soul, the union of the soul with the body will be an accident; and man, the result of that union, will not be an ordinary, regular entity (ens per se), but a casual, incidental being (ens per accidens).

(E.) But if it is said that souls are united with bodies neither violently nor naturally, but of their own spontaneous will, that cannot be. For none is willing to come to a worse state except under deception. But the soul is in a higher state away from the body, especially according to the Platonists, who say that by union with the body the soul suffers forgetfulness of what it knew before, and is hindered from the contemplation of pure truth. At that rate it has no willingness to be united with a body except for some deceit practised upon it. Threfore, supposing it to have pre-existed before the body, it would not be united therewith of its own accord.

(F.) But if as an alternative it is said that the soul is united with the body neither by nature, nor by its own will, but by a divine ordinance, this again does not appear a suitable arrangement, on the supposition that souls were created before bodies. For God has established everything according to the proper mode of its nature: hence it is said: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31). If then He created souls apart from bodies, we must say that this mode of being is better suited to their nature. But it is not proper for an ordinance of divine goodness to reduce things to a lower state, but rather to rise them to a higher. At that rate the union of soul with body could not be the result of a divine ordinance.

(G.) This consideration moved Origen to suppose that when souls, created from the beginning of time, came by divine ordinance to be united with bodies, it was for their punishment. He supposed that they had sinned before they came into bodies, and that according to the amount of their guilt they were united with bodies of various degrees of nobility, shut up in them as in prisons. But this supposition cannot stand for reasons alleged above (Chap.XLIV).

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE SOUL IS NOT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF GOD

The divine substance is eternal, and nothing appertaining to it begins anew to be (B. I, Chap.XV). But the souls of men were not before their bodies (Chap.LXXXIII).

3. Everything out of which anything is made is in potentiality to that which is made out of it. But the substance of God, being pure actuality, is not in potentiality to anything (B. I, Chap.XVI).

4 and 5. That out of which anything is made is in some way changed. Moveover the soul of man is manifestly variable in point of knowledge, virtue, and their opposites. But God is absolutely unchangeable (B. I, Chap.XII): therefore nothing can be made out of Him, nor can the soul be of His substance.

7. Since the divine substance is absolutely indivisible, the soul cannot be of that substance unless it be the whole substance. But the divine substance cannot but be one (B. I, Chap.XLII). It would follow that all men have but one intellectual soul, a conclusion already rejected (Chap.LXXV).

This opinion seems to have had three sources. Some assumed that there was no incorporeal being, and made the chiefest of corporeal substances God. Hence sprang the theory of the Manichean, that God is a sort of corporeal light, pervading all the infinities of space, and that the human soul is a small glimmer of this light. Others have posited the intellect of all men to be one, either active intellect alone, or active and potential combined. And because the ancients called every self-subsistent intelligence a deity, it followed that our soul, or the intellect whereby we understand, had a divine nature. Hence sundry professors of the Christian faith in our time, who assert the separate existence of the active intellect, have said expressly that the active intellect is God. This opinion might also have arisen from the likeness of our soul to God: for intelligence, which is taken to be the chief characteristic of Deity, is found to belong to no substance in the sublunary world except to man alone, on account of his soul.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT TRANSMITTED BY GENERATION

Where the activities of active principles suppose the concurrence of a body, the origination also of such principles supposed bodily concurrence: for a thing has existence according as it has activity: everything is active according to its being. But when active principles have their activities independent of bodily concurrence, the reverse is the case: the genesis of such principles is not by any bodily generation. Now the activity of the vegitative and sentient soul cannot be without bodily concurrence (Chapp.LVII,LXVIII): but the activity of the intellectual soul has place through no bodily organ (Chap.LXIX). Therefore the vegitative and sentient souls are generated by the generation of the body, and date their existence from the transmission of the male semen, but not the intellectual soul.

2. If the human soul owed its origin to the transmission of the male semen, that could be only in one of two ways. Either we must suppose that the soul is actually in the male semen, being as it were accidentally separated from the soul of the generator as the semen is separated from the body:—we see something of this sort in Annelid animals, that live when cut in pieces: these creatures have one soul actually and many potentially; and when the body is divided, a soul comes to be actually in every living part:—or in another way it may be supposed that there is in the male semen a power productive of an intellectual soul, so that the intellectual soul may be taken to be in the said semen virtually, not actually. The first of these suppositions is impossible for two reasons. First, because the intelligent soul being the most perfect of souls and the most potent, the proper subject for it to perfect is a body having a great diversity of organs apt to respond to

its manifold activities: hence the intellectual soul cannot be in the male semen cut off from the body (in semine deciso), because neither are the souls of the lower animals of the more perfect sort multiplied by cutting them in pieces (per decisionem), as is the case with Annelid animals. Secondly, because the proper and principal faculty of the intelligent soul, the intellect, not being the actualisation of any part of the body, cannot be accidentally divided with the division of the body: therefore neither can the intelligent soul. The second supposition (that the intelligent soul is virtually contained in the male semen) is also impossible. For the active power in the semen is effectual to the generation of an animal by effecting a bodily transmutation: there is no other way for a material power to take effect. But every form, which owes its being to a transmutation of matter, has being in dependence on matter: for (n. 3) every form, educed into existence by a transmutation of matter, is a form educed out of the potentiality of matter: for this is the meaning of a transmutation of matter, that something is educed into actuality out of potentiality. But an intelligent soul cannot be educed out of the potentiality of matter: for it has been shown above (Chap.LXVIII) that the intelligent soul transcends the whole power of matter, as it has an immaterial activity (Chap.LXIX). Therefore the intelligent soul is not induced into being by any transmutation of matter, and therefore not by the action of any power that is in the male semen.

5. It is ridiculous to say that any subsistent intelligence is either divided by division of the body or produced by any corporeal power. But the soul is a subsistent intelligence (Chap.LXVIII). Therefore it can neither be divided by the separation of the semen from the body, nor produced by any active power in the same.

6. If the generation of this is the cause of that coming to be, the destruction of this will be the cause of that ceasing to be. But the destruction of the body is not the cause of the human soul ceasing to be (Chap.LXXIX). Neither then is the generation of the body the cause of the soul commencing to be.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS BROUGHT INTO BEING BY A CREATIVE ACT OF GOD

Everything that is brought into being is either generated or created. But the human soul is not generated, either by way of composition of parts or by the generation of the body (Chap.LXXXVI); and yet it comes new into existence, being neither eternal nor pre-existent (Chapp.LXXXIII,LXXXIV): therefore it comes into being by creation. Now, as has been shown above, God alone can create (Chap.XXI).

2. Whatever has existence as subsistent being, is also made in the way that a subsistent being is made: while whatever has no existence as a subsistent being, but is attached to something else, is not made separately, but only under condition of that having been made to which it is attached. But the soul has this peculiarity to distinguish it from other forms, that it is a subsistent being; and the existence which is proper to it communicates to the body. The soul then is made as a subsistent being is made: it is the subject of a making-process all its own, unlike other forms, which are made incidentally in the making of the compounds to which hey belong. But as the soul has no material part, it cannot be made out of any subject-matter: consequently it must be made out of nothing, and so created.

5. The end of a thing answers to its beginning. Now the end of the human soul and its final perfection is, by knowledge and love to transcend the whole order of created things, and attain to its first principle and beginning, which is God. Therefore from God it has properly its first origin.

Holy Scripture seems to insinuate this conclusion: for whereas, speaking of the origin of other animals, it scribes their souls to other causes, as when it says: Let the waters produce the creeping thing of living soul (Gen. i, 20): coming to man, it shows that his soul is created by God, saying: God formed man from the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life (Gen. ii, 7).

CHAPTER LXXXVIII, LXXXIX

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TRUTH OF THE CONCLUSION LAST DRAWN, WITH THEIR SOLUTION

For the better understanding of the solutions given, we must prefix some exposition of the order and process of human generation, and of animal generation generally. First then we must know that that is a false opinion of certain persons who say that the vital acts which appear in the embryo before its final development (ante ultimum complementum), come not from any soul or power of soul existing in it, but from the soul of the mother. If that were true, we could no longer call the embryo an animal, as every animal consists of soul and body. The activities of life do not proceed from an active principle from without, but from a power within; a fact which seems to mark the distinction between inanimate and living things, it being proper to the latter to move themselves. Whatever is nourished, assimilates nourishment to itself: hence there must be in the creature that is nourished an active power of nutrition, since an agent acts to the likeness of itself. This is still more manifest in the operations of sense: for sight and hearing are attributable to a power existing in the sentient subject, not in another. Hence, as the embryo is evidently nourished before its final development, and even feels, this cannot be attributed to the soul of another.

It has been alleged that the soul in its complete essence is in the male semen from the first, its activities not appearing merely for want of organs. But that cannot be. For since the soul is united with the body as a form, it is only united with that body of which it is properly the actualisation. Now the soul is the actualisation of an organised body. Therefore before the organisation of the body the soul is in the male semen, not actually, but virtually. Hence Aristotle says that seed and fruit have life potentially in such a way that they “cast away,” i.e. are destitute of soul; whereas that (body) whereof the soul is the actualisation has life potentially, and does not “cast away” soul.

It would follow, if the soul were in the male semen from the first, that the generation of an animal was only by fissure (per decisionem), as is the case with Annelid animals, that are made two out of one. For if the male semen has a soul the instant it was cut off from the body, it would then have a substantial form. But every substantial generation precedes and does not follow the substantial form. Any transmutations that follow the substantial form are not directed to the being of the thing generated, but to its well-being. At that rate the generation of the animal would be complete in the mere cutting off of the male semen from the body of the parent; and all subsequent transmutations would be irrelevant to generation. The supposition is still more ridiculous when applied to the rational soul, as well because it is impossible for that to be divided according to the division of the body, so as even to be in the semen cut off therefrom; as also because it would follow that in all cases of the semen being wasted, without conception ensuing, souls were still multiplied.

Nor again can it be said, as some say, that though there is not in the male semen at its first cutting off any soul actually, but only virtually, for want of organs, nevertheless, as the said semen is a bodily substance, organisable although not organised, so the active power of that semen is itself a soul, potential but not actual, proportional to the condition of the semen. The theory goes on to say that, as the life of a plant requires fewer organs than the life of an animal, the aforesaid active power turns into a vegetative soul as soon as the semen is sufficiently organised for the life of a plant; and further that, when the organs are more perfected and multiplied, the same power is advanced to be a sentient soul; and further still that, when the form of the organs is perfect, the same becomes a rational soul, not indeed by the action of the power of the semen itself, but only by the influence of some exterior agent: and this the advocates of this theory take to be the reason why Aristotle said (De gen. animal., II, iii) that the intellect is from without.

Upon this view it would follow that numerically the same active power was now a vegetative soul only, and afterwards a sentient soul; and so the substantial form itself was continually more and more perfected: it would further follow that a substantial form was educed from potentiality to actuality, not instantaneously, but successively; and further than generation was a continuous change, as is alteration,—all so many physical impossibilities. There would ensue even a still more awkward consequence, that the rational soul was mortal. For no formal constituent added to a perishable thing makes it naturally imperishable: otherwise the perishable would be changed into the imperishable, which is impossible, as the two differ in kind. But the substance of the sentient soul, which is supposed to be incidentally generated when the body is generated in the process above described, is necessarily perishable with the perishing of the body. If therefore this soul becomes rational by the bringing in of some manner of light from without to be a formal constituent of the soul, it necessarily follows that the rational soul perishes when the body perishes, contrary to which has been shown (Chap.LXXIX) and to the teaching of Catholic faith.

Therefore the active power which is cut off, or emitted, with the male semen from the body, and is called formative,’ is not itself the soul, nor ever becomes the soul in the process of generation. But the frothy substance of the male semen contains gas (spiritus), and this gas is the subject on which the formative power rests, and in which it is inherent. So the formative power works out the formation of the body, acting in virtue of the soul of the father, the prime author of generation, not in virtue of the soul of the offspring, even after the offspring comes to have a soul: for the offspring does not generate itself, but is generated by the father. This is clear by enumeration of the several powers of the soul. The formation is not attributable to the soul of the embryo itself on the score of that soul’s generative power: for that power puts forth no activity till the work of nutrition and growth is complete; and besides, its work is not directed to the perfection of the individual, but to the preservation of the species. Nor can it be assigned to the embryo’s nutritive power, the work of which is to assimilate nourishment to the body nourished; for in this case there is no room for such a work; since nourishment taken while the body is in formation is not applied to assume the likeness of a pre-existent body, but goes to the production of a more perfect form and a nearer approach to the likeness of the father. Nor is the development of the embro attributable to its own power of growth: for to power of growth there does not belong change of form, but only change in bulk. And as for the sensitive and intellectual powers, it is clear that theirs is no office bearing on such a development. It follows that the formation of the body, particularly of its earliest and principal parts, does not proceed from the engendered soul, nor from any formative power acting in virtue thereof, but from a formative power acting in virtue of the generative soul of the father, the work of which is to make another like in species to the progenitor. This formative power therefore remains the same in the subject aforesaid from the beginning of the formation even to the end. But the appearance of the being under formation does not remain the same: for first it has the appearance of semen, afterwards of blood, and so on until it arrives at its final completeness.

Nor need we be uneasy in admitting the generation of an intermediate product, the existence of which is presently after broken off, because such transitional links are not complete in their species, but are on the way to a perfect species; and therefore they are not engendered to endure, but as stages of being, leading up to finality in the order of generation. The higher a form is in the scale of being, and the further it is removed from a mere material form, the more intermediate forms and intermediate generation must be passed through before the finally perfect form is reached. Therefore in the generation of animal and man,—these having the most perfect form,—there occur many intermediate forms and generations, and consequently destructions, because the generation of one being is the destruction of another. The vegetative soul therefore, which is first in the embryo, while it lives the life of a plant, is destroyed, and there succeeds a more perfect soul, which is at one nutrient and sentient, and for that time the embryo lives the life of an animal: upon the destruction of this, there succeeds the rational soul, infused from without, whereas the preceding two owed their existence to the virtue of the male semen.

With these principles recognised, it is easy to answer the objections.

Arg. 1. Man being an animal by the possession of a sentient soul, and the notion of animal’ befitting man in the same sense as it befits other animals, it appears that the sentient soul of man is of the same kind as the souls of other animals. But things of the same kind have the same manner of coming to be. Therefore the sentient soul of man, as of other animals, comes to be by the active power that is in the male semen. But the sentient and the intelligent soul in man is one in substance (Chap.LVIII). It appears then that even the intelligent soul is produced by the active power of the semen.

Reply. Though sensitive soul in man and brute agree generically, yet they differ specifically. As the animal, man, differs specifically from other animals by being rational, so the sentient soul of a man differs specifically from the sentient soul of a brute by being also intelligent. The soul therefore of a brute has sentient attributes only, and consequently neither its being nor its activity rises above the order of the body: hence it must be generated with the generation of the body, and perish with its destruction. But the sentient soul in man, over and above its sentient nature, has intellectual power: hence the very substance of this soul must be raised above the bodily order both in being and in activity; and therefore it is neither generated by the generation of the body, nor perishes by its destruction.

Arg. 2. As Aristotle teaches, in point of time the foetus is an animal before it is a man. But while it is an animal and not yet a man, it has a sentient and not an intelligent soul, which sentient soul beyond doubt is produced by the active power of the male semen. Now that self-same sentient soul is potentially intelligent, even as that animal is potentially a rational animal: unless one chooses to say that the intelligent soul which supervenes is another substance altogether, a conclusion rejected above (Chap.LVIII). It appears then that the substance of the intelligent soul comes of the active power that is in the semen.

Reply. The sentient soul, whereby the human foetus was an animal, does not last, but its place is taken by a soul that is at once sentient and intelligent.

Arg. 3. The soul, as it is the form of the body, is one being with the body. But unity of thing produced, unity of productive action, and unity of producing agent, all go together. Therefore the one being of soul and body must be the result of one productive action of one productive agent. But confessedly the body is produced by the productive action of the power that is in the male semen. Therefore the soul also, as it is the form of the body, is produced by the same productive action, and not by any separate agency.

Reply. The principle of corresponding unity of produced, production, and producer, holds good to the exclusion of a plurality of productive agents not acting in co-ordination with one another. Where they are co-ordinate, several agents have but one effect. Thus the prime efficient cause acts to the production of the effect of the secondary efficient cause even more vigorously than the secondary cause itself; and we see that the effect produced by a principal agent through the agency of an instrument is more properly attributed to the principal agent than to the instrument. Sometimes too the action of the principal agent reaches to some part of the thing done, to which the action of the instrument does not reach. Since then the whole active power of nature stands to God as an instrument to the prime and principal agent, we find no difficulty in the productive action of nature being terminated to a part only of that one term of generation, man, and not to the whole of what is produced by the action of God. The body then of man is formed at once by the power of God, the principal and prime agent, and by the power of the semen, the secondary agent. But the action of God produces the human soul, which the power of the male semen cannot produce, but only dispose thereto.

Arg. 4. Man generates his own specific likeness by the power that is in the detached semen, which generation means causing the specific form of the generated. The human soul therefore, the specific form of man, is caused by the power in the semen.

Reply. Man generates his specific likeness, inasmuch as the power of his semen operates to prepare for the coming of the final form which gives the species to man.

Arg. 5. If souls are created by God, He puts the last hand to the engendering of children born sometimes of adultery.

Reply. There is no difficulty in that. Not the nature of adulterers is evil, but their will: now the effect which their semen produces is natural, not voluntary: hence there is no difficulty in God’s co-operating to that effect and giving it completeness.

In a book ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa there are found further arguments, as follows:

Arg. 6. Soul and body make one whole, that is, one man. If then the soul is made before the body, or the body before the soul, the same thing will be prior and posterior to itself. Therefore body and soul are made together. But the body begins in the cutting off, or emission, of the semen. Therefore the soul also is brought into being by the same.

Reply. Allowing that the human body is formed before the soul is created, or conversely, still it does not follow that the same man is prior to himself: for man is not his body or his soul. It only follows that one part of him is prior to another part; and in that there is no difficulty: for matter is prior in time to form,—matter, I mean, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to form, not inasmuch as it is actually perfected by form, for so it is together with form. The human body then, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to soul, as not yet having the soul, is prior in time to the soul: but, for that time, it is not actually human, only potentially so: but when it is actually human, as being perfected by a human soul, it is neither prior nor posterior to the soul, but together with it.

Arg. 7. An agent's activity seems to be imperfect, when he does not produce and bring the whole thing into being, but only half makes it. If then God brought the soul into being, while the body was formed by the power of the male semen, body and soul being the two parts of man, the activities of God and of the seminal power would be both imperfect. Therefore the body and soul of man are both produced by the same cause. But certainly the body of man is produced by the power of the semen: therefore also the soul.

Reply. Body and soul are both produced by the power of God, though the formation of the body is of God through the intermediate instrumentality of the power of the natural semen, while the soul He produces immediately. Neither does it follow that the action of the power of the semen is imperfect, since it fulfils the purpose of its existence.

Arg. 8. In all things that are engendered of seed, the parts of the thing engendered are all contained together in the seed, though they do not actually appear: as we see that in wheat or in any other send the green blade and stalk and knots and grains and ears are virtually contained in the original seed; and afterwards the seed gathers bulk and expansion by a process of natural consequence leading to its perfection, without taking up any new feature from without. But the soul is part of man. Therefore in the male semen of man the human soul is virtually contained, and it does not take its origin from any exterior cause.

Reply. In seed are virtually contained all things that do not transcend corporeal power, as grass, stalk, knots, and the like: from which there is no concluding that the special element in man which transcends the whole range of corporeal power is virtually contained in the seed.

Arg. 9. Things that have the same development and the same consummation must have the same first origin. But in the generation of man we find the same development and the same consummation: for as the configuration and growth of the limbs advances, the activities of the soul show themselves more and more: for first appears the activity of the sentient soul, and last of all, when the body is complete, the activity of the intelligent soul. Therefore body and soul have the same origin. But the first origin of the body is in the emission of the male semen: such therefore also is the origin of the soul.

Reply. All that this shows is that a certain arrangement of the parts of the body is necessary for the activity of the soul.

Arg. 10. What is conformed to a thing, is set up according to the plan of that to which it is conformed, as wax takes the impress of a seal. But the body of man and of every animal is conformed to its own soul, having such disposition of organs as suits the activities of the power to be exercised through those organs. The body then is formed by the action of the soul: hence also Aristotle says that the soul is the efficient cause of the body. This could not be, if the soul were not in the male semen: for the body is formed by the power that is in that semen: therefore the soul has its origin in that emission of it.

Reply. That the body is conformed and fashioned according to the soul, and that therefore the soul prepares a body like unto itself, is a statement partly true and partly false. Understood of the soul of the generator, it is true: understood of the soul of the generated, it is false. The formation of the body in its prime and principal parts is not due to the soul of the generated, but to the soul of the generator, as has been shown.

Arg. 11. Nothing lives except by a soul. But the male semen is alive, of which fact there are three indications. In the first place, the semen is cut off and detached from a living being: secondly, there appears in it vital heat and activity: thirdly, the seeds of plants, committed to earth, could never warm to life from the lifeless earth, had they not life in themselves.

Reply. The semen is not alive actually, but potentially, and has a soul, not actually, but virtually. In the process of generation the embryo comes to have a vegetative and a sentient soul by the virtue of the semen, which souls do not endure, but pass away and are succeeded by a rational soul.

Arg. 12. If the soul is not before the body (Chap.LXXXIII), nor begins with the liberation of the semen, it follows that the body is first formed, and afterwards there is infused into it a soul newly created. But if this is true, it follows further that the soul is for the body: for what is for another appears after it, as clothes are for men and are made after them. But that is false: rather the body is for he soul, as the end is ever the more noble. We must say then that the origin of the soul is simultaneous with the emission of the semen.

Reply. There are two ways of one thing being for another.’ A thing may be to serve the activity, or secure the preservation, or otherwise promote the good of another, presupposing its being; and such things are posterior to that for which they are, as clothes for the person, or tools for the mechanic. Or a thing may be for another’ in view of that other’s being: what is thus for another’ is prior to it in time and posterior to it in nature. In this latter way the body is for the soul, as all matter is for its form. The case would be otherwise, if soul and body did not make one being, as they say who take the soul not to be the form of the body.

CHAPTER XCI

THAT THERE ARE SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCES NOT UNITED WITH BODIES

WHEN human bodies perish in death, the substance of the intelligence remains in perpetuity (Chap.LXXIX). Now if the substance of the intelligence that remains is one for all, as some say, it follows necessarily that it has being apart from body; and thus our thesis is proved, that some subsistent intelligence exists apart from a body. But if a multitude of intelligent souls remain after the destruction of their bodies, then some subsistent intelligences will have the property of subsisting without bodies, all the more inasmuch as it has been shown that souls do not pass from one body to another (ChapLXXXIII). But the property of subsisting apart from bodies is an incidental property in souls, since naturally they are the forms of bodies. But what is ordinary must be prior to what is incidental. There must then be some subsistent intelligences naturally prior to souls; and to these intelligences the ordinary property must attach of subsisting without bodies.

3. The higher nature in its lowest manifestation touches the next lower nature in its highest. But intelligent nature is higher than corporeal, and at the same time touches it in some part, which is the intelligent soul. As then the body perfected by the intelligent soul is highest in the genus of bodies, so the intelligent soul united to the body must be lowest in the genus of subsistent intelligences. There are then subsistent intelligences not united with bodies, superior in the order of nature to the soul.

7. The substance of a thing must be proportionate to its activity, because activity is the actualisation and perfection of an active substance. But understanding is the proper activity of an intelligent substance. Therefore an intelligent substance must be competent for such activity. But understanding is an activity not exercised through any bodily organ, and not needing the body except in so far as objects of understanding are borrowed from objects of sense. But that is an imperfect mode of understanding: the perfect mode of understanding is the understanding of those objects which are in themselves intelligible: whereas it is an imperfect mode of understanding when those things only are understood, which are not of themselves intelligible, but are rendered intelligible by intellect. If then before everything imperfect there must be something perfect in that kind, there must be antecedently to human souls, which understand what they gather from phantasms, sundry subsistent intelligences which understand things in themselves intelligible, not gathering their knowledge from sensible objects, and therefore in their nature separate from anything corporeal.

CHAPTER XCIII

THAT INTELLIGENCES SUBSISTING APART ARE NOT MORE THAN ONE IN THE SAME SPECIES

INTELLIGENCES subsisting apart are subsistent essences. Now the definition of a thing being the mark of its essence, is the mark of its species. Subsistent essences therefore are subsistent species.

2. Difference in point of form begets difference of species, while difference in point of matter begets difference in number. But intelligences subsisting apart have nothing whatever of matter about them. Therefore it is impossible for them to be several in one species.

4. The multiplication of species adds more nobility and perfection to the universe than the multiplication of individuals in the same species. But the perfection of the universe consists principally in intelligences subsisting apart. Therefore it makes more for the perfection of the universe that there should be many intelligences different in species than many different in number in the same species.

CHAPTER XCIV

THAT AN INTELLIGENCE SUBSISTING APART AND A SOUL ARE NOT OF ONE SPECIES

A DIFFERENT type of being makes a different species. But the being of the human soul and of an intelligence subsisting apart is not of one type: the body can have no share in the being of a separately subsisting intelligence, as it can have in the being of the human soul, united with the body as form with matter.

3. What makes a species by itself cannot be of the same species with that which does not make a species by itself, but is part of a species. Now a separately subsisting intelligence makes a species by itself, but a soul not, it is part of the human species.

4. The species of a thing may be gathered from the activity proper to it: for activity shows power, and that is an indication of essence. Now the proper activity of a separately subsisting intelligence and of an intelligent soul is understanding. But the mode of understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence is quite different from that of the soul. The soul understands by taking from phantasms: not so the separately subsisting intelligence, that has no bodily organs in which phantasms should be.

CHAPTER XCVI

THAT INTELLIGENCES SUBSISTING APART DO NOT GATHER THEIR KNOWLEDGE FROM OBJECTS OF SENSE

A HIGHER power must have a higher object. But the intellectual power of a separately subsisting intelligence is higher than the intellectual power of the human soul, the latter being lowest in the order of intelligences (Chap.LXXVII). Now the object of the intelligence of the human soul is a phantasm (Chap.LX), which is higher in the order of objects than the sensible thing existing outside and apart from the soul. The object therefore of a separately subsisting intelligence cannot be an objective reality (res) existing outside the soul, as though it could get knowledge immediately from that; nor can it be a phantasm: it must then be something higher than a phantasm. But nothing is higher than a phantasm in the order of knowable objects except that which is an actual term of intelligence. Intelligences subsisting apart therefore do not gather their intellectual knowledge from objects of sense, but understand objects which are of themselves terms of intelligence.

3. According to the order of intelligences is the order of terms of intelligence. But objects that are of themselves terms of intelligence are higher in order than objects that are terms of intelligence only because we make them so. Of this latter sort are all terms of intelligence borrowed from sensible things: for sensible things are not of themselves intelligible: yet these sensible things are the sort of intelligible things that our intellect understands. A separately subsisting intelligence therefore, being superior

to our intelligence, does not understand the intellectual aspects of things by gathering them from objects of sense: it seizes upon those aspects as they are in themselves.

4. The manner of activity proper to a thing corresponds to the manner and nature of its substance. But an intelligence subsisting apart is by itself, away from any body. Therefore its intellectual activity will be conversant with objects not based upon anything corporeal.

From these considerations it appears that in intelligences subsisting apart there is no such thing as active and potential intellect, except perchance by an improper use of those terms. The reason why potential and active intellect are found in our intelligent soul is because it has to gather intellectual knowledge from sensible things: for the active intellect it is that turns the impressions, gathered from sensible things, into terms of intellect: while the potential intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of all forms of sensible things. Since then separately subsisting intellects do not gather their knowledge from sensible things, there is in them no active and potential intellect.

Nor again can distance in place hinder the knowledge of a disembodied soul (animae separatae). Distance in place ordinarily affects sense, not intellect, except incidentally, where intellect has to gather its data from sense. For while there is a definite law of distance according to which sensible objects affect sense, terms of intellect, as they impress the intellect, are not in place, but are separate from bodily matter. Since then separately subsistent intelligences do not gather their intellectual knowledge from sensible things, distance in place has no effect upon their knowledge.

Plainly too neither is time mingled with the intellectual activity of such beings. Terms of intellect are as independent of time as they are of place. Time follows upon local motion, and measures such things only as are in some manner placed in space; and therefore the understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence is above time. On the other hand, time is a condition of our intellectual activity, since we receive knowledge from phantasms that regard a fixed time. Hence to its judgements affirmative and negative our intelligence always appends a fixed time, except when it understands the essence of a thing. It understands essence by abstracting terms of understanding from the conditions of sensible things: hence in that operation it understands irrespectively of time and other conditions of sensible things. But it judges affirmatively and negatively by applying forms of understanding, the results of previous abstraction, to things, and in this application time is necessarily understood as entering into the combination.

CHAPTER XCVII

THAT THE MIND OF AN INTELLIGENCE SUBSISTING APART IS EVER IN THE ACT OF UNDERSTANDING

What is sometimes in actuality, sometimes in potentiality, is measured by time. But the mind of an intelligence subsisting apart is above time (Chap.XCVI). Therefore it is not at times in the act of understanding and at times not.

2. Every living substance has by its nature some actual vital activity always going on in it, although other activities are potential: thus animals are always repairing waste by assimilation of nourishment, though they do not always feel. But separately subsisting intelligences are living substances, and have no other vital activity but that of understanding. Therefore by their nature they must be always actually understanding.

CHAPTER XCVIII

HOW ONE SEPARATELY SUBSISTING INTELLIGENCE KNOWS ANOTHER

AS separately subsisting intelligences understand proper terms of intellect; and the said intelligences are themselves such terms,—for it is independence of matter that makes a thing be a proper term of intellect; it follows that separately subsisting intelligences understand other such intelligences, finding in them their proper objects. Every such intelligence therefore will know both itself and its fellows. It will know itself, but in a different way from that in which the human potential intellect knows itself. For the potential intellect is only potentially intelligible, and becomes actually such by being impressed with an intellectual impression. Only by such an impression does it become cognisant of itself. But separately subsisting intelligences by their nature are actually intelligible : hence every one of them knows himself by his own essence, not by any impression representative of another thing.

A difficulty: Since all knowledge, as it is the knowing mind, is a likeness of the thing known, and one separately subsistent intelligence is like another generically, but differs from it in species (Chap.XCIII), it appears that one does not know another in species, but only so far as the two meet in one common ratio, that of the genus.

Reply. With subsistent beings of a higher order than we are, the knowledge contained in higher generalities is not incomplete, as it is with us. The likeness in the mind of animal,' whereby we know a thing generically only, yields us a less complete knowledge than the likeness of man,' whereby we know an entire species. To know a thing by its genus is to know it imperfectly and, as it were, potentially; to know it by its species is to know it perfectly and actually. Holding as it does the lowest rank among subsistent intelligences, our intellect stands in such pressing need of particular detailed likenesses, that for every distinct object of its knowledge it requires a distinct likeness in itself: hence the likeness of animal’ does not enable it to know rational,’ consequently not man’ either, except imperfectly. But the intellectual presentation in an intelligence subsisting apart is of a higher power, apt to represent more, and leads to a knowledge, not less perfect, but more perfect. By one presentation such an intelligence knows both animal’ and the several specific differentias which make the several species of animals: this knowledge is more or less comprehensive according to the hierarchical rank of the intelligence. We may illustrate this truth by contrasting the two extremes, the divine and human intellect. God knows all things by the one medium of His essence; man requires so many several likenesses, images or presentations in the mind, to know so many several things. Yet even in man the higher understanding gathers more from fewer presentations: slow minds on the other hand need many particular examples to lead them to knowledge. Since a separately subsistent intelligence, considered in its nature, is potentially open to the presentations whereby being’ in its entirety (totum ens) is known, we cannot suppose that such an intelligence is denuded of all such presentations, as is the case with the potential intellect in use ere it comes to understand. Nor again can we suppose that this separately subsistent intelligence has some of these presentations actually, and others, potentially only. For separate intelligences do not change (Chap.XCVII); but every potentiality in them must be actualised. Thus then the intellect of the separately subsistent intelligence is perfected to the full extent of its capacity by intelligible forms, so far as natural knowledge goes.

CHAPTER XCIX

THAT INTELLIGENCES SUBSISTING APART KNOW MATERIAL THINGS, THAT IS TO SAY, THE SPECIES OF THINGS CORPOREAL

SINCE the mind of these intelligences is perfect with all natural endowments, as being wholly actualised, it must comprehend its object, which is intelligible being, under all its aspects. Now under intelligible being are included the species also of things corporeal.

2. Since the species of things are distinguished like the species of numbers, whatever is in the lower species must be contained somehow in the higher, as the larger number contains the smaller. Since then separately subsistent intelligences rank higher than corporeal substances, all properties that in a material way are in corporeal substances must be in these separately subsistent intelligences in an intelligible and spiritual way: for what is in a thing is in it according to the mode of the thing in which it is.

CHAPTER C

THAT INTELLIGENCES SUBSISTING APART KNOW INDIVIDUAL THINGS

INASMUCH as the likenesses representative of things in the mind of a separately subsistent intelligence are more universal than in our mind, and more effectual means of knowledge, such intelligences are instructed by such likenesses of material things not only to the knowledge of material things generically or specifically, as would be the case with our mind, but also to the knowledge of individual existences.

1. The likeness or presentation of a thing in the mind of a separately subsistent intelligence is of far-reaching and universal power, so that, one as that presentation is and immaterial, it can lead to the knowledge of specific principles, and further to the knowledge of individualising or material principles. Thereby the intelligence can become cognisant, not only of the matter of genus and species, but also of that of the individual.

2. What a lower power can do, a higher power can do, but in a more excellent way. Hence where the lower power operates through many agencies, the higher power operates through one only: for the higher a power is, the more it is gathered together and unified, whereas the lower is scattered and multiplied. But the human soul, being of lower rank than the separately subsistent intelligence, takes cognisance of the universal and of the singular by two principles, sense and intellect. The higher and self-subsistent intelligence therefore is cognisant of both in a higher way by one principle, the intellect.

3. Intelligible impressions of things come to our understanding in the opposite order to that in which they come to the understanding of the separately subsisting intelligence. To our understanding they come by way

of analysis (resolutio), that is, by abstraction from material and individualising conditions: hence we cannot know individual things by aid of such intelligible or universal presentations. But to the understanding of the separately subsisting intelligence intelligible impressions arrive by way of synthesis (compositio). Such an intelligence has its intelligible impressions by virtue of its assimilation to the original intelligible presentation of the divine understanding, which is not abstracted from things but productive of things,—productive not only of the form, but also of the matter, which is the principle of individuation. Therefore the impressions in the understanding of a separately subsisting intelligence regard the whole object, not only the specific but also the individualising principles. The knowledge of singular and individual things therefore is not to be withheld from separately subsistent intelligences, for all that our intellect cannot take cognisance of the singular and individual.

CHAPTER CI

WHETHER TO SEPARATELY SUBSISTING INTELLIGENCES ALL POINTS OF THEIR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE ARE SIMULTANEOUSLY PRESENT

Not everything is actually understood, of which there is an intellectual impression actually in the understanding. For since a subsistent intelligence has also a will, and is thereby master of his own acts, it is in his power, when he has got an intellectual impression, to use it by actually understanding it; or, if he has several, to use one of them. Hence also we do not actually consider all things whereof we have knowledge. A subsistent intelligence therefore, knowing by a plurality of impressions, uses the one impression which he wishes, and thereby actually knows at once all things which by one impression he does know. For all things make one intelligible object inasmuch as they are known by one presentation,—as also our understanding knows many things together, when thy are as one by composition or relation with one another. But things that an intelligence knows by different impressions, it does not take cognisance of together. Thus, for one understanding, there is one thing at a time actually understood. There is therefore in the mind of a separately subsisting intelligence a certain succession of acts of understanding; not however movement, properly so called: since it is not a case of actuality succeeding potentiality, but of actuality following upon actuality. But the Divine Mind, knowing all things by the one medium of its essence, and having its act for its essence, understands all things simultaneously: hence in its understanding there is incident no succession, but its act of understanding is entire, simultaneous, perfect, abiding, world without end. Amen.

BOOK III

GOD THE END OF CREATURES

CHAPTER I

PREFACE TO THE BOOK THAT FOLLOWS

The Lord is a great God, and a great king above all gods. For the Lord will not reject his people, because in his hands are all the ends of the earth, and the heights of the mountains he beholdeth. For the sea is his, and he made it, and his hands have formed the dry land. (Ps. xciv).

IT has been shown above (B. I, Chap.XIII) that there is one first of beings, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God. Out of the abundance of His perfection He bestows being on all things that exist; and thus He proves to be not only the first of beings, but also the first principle of all. He bestows being on other things, not out of any necessity of his nature, but by the free choice of His will, as has been shown (B. II, Chap.XXIII). Consequently He is master of the things that He has made: for we have dominion over the things that are subject to our will. This His dominion over the things that He has brought into being is a perfect dominion, since in producing them He needs the aid of no exterior agent, nor any subject matter to work upon, seeing that He is the universal efficient cause of all being. Of the things produced by the will of an agent every one is directed by that agent to some end: for some good and some end is the proper object of the will: hence the things that proceed from will must be directed to some end. Everything attains its last end by its own action, which is directed by Him who has given to things the principles whereby they act. It needs must be then that God, who is by nature perfect in Himself and by His power bestows being on all things that are, should be the ruler of all beings, Himself ruled by none: nor is there anything exempt from His government, as there is nothing that does not derive being from

Him. He is then perfect in government, as He is perfect in being and causation.

The effect of this government appears variously in various natures according to the difference between them. Some creatures are brought into being by God to possess understanding, to bear his likeness and present His image. They not only are directed, but also direct themselves by proper actions of their own to their due end. If in the direction of themselves they remain subject to the divine guidance, they are admitted in course of that guidance to the attainment of their last end. Other beings, devoid of understanding, do not direct themselves to their own end, but are directed by another. Some of those are imperishable; and as they can suffer no defect in their natural being, so in their proper actions they never deflect one whit from the path that leads to the end prefixed to them, but are indefectibly subject to the rule of the prime ruler. Other creatures are perishable, and liable to the failure of their natural being, which however is compensated by the gain of another: for the perishing of one is the engendering of another. In like manner in their proper actions they swerve from the natural order from which swerving however there accrues some compensatory good. Hence it appears that even apparent irregularities and departures from the order of the first rule escape not the power of the first ruler. These perishable bodies, created as they are by God, are perfectly subject to His power.

The Psalmist, filled with God’s spirit, considering this truth , and wishing to point out to us the divine government of things, first describes to us the perfection of the first ruler,—of His nature, when he says God; of His power, when he says, is a great Lord, needing no co-operation to work the effect of His power; of His authority, when he says a great king above all gods, because, though there be many rulers, all are subject to His rule. Secondly he describes to us the manner of government,—as well in respect of intelligent beings, which follow His rule and gain from Him their last end, which is Himself, and therefore he says, for the Lord will not reject his people,—as also in respect of perishable beings, which, however they sometimes depart from their proper modes of action, still are never let go beyond the control of the prime ruler: hence it is said, in his hands are all the ends of the earth,—likewise in respect of the heavenly bodies, which exceed all the height of the earth and of perishable bodies, and always observe the right order of divine rule: hence he says, and the heights of the mountains he beholdeth. Thirdly he assigns the reason of this universal control, which is, because things created by God needs must be ruled by Him: hence he says, For the sea is his, etc.

Since then in the first Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and in the second of the perfection of God's power, it remains for us in this third Book to treat of His perfect authority, or dignity, in as much as He is the last end and ruler of all things. This therefore will be our order of procedure, to treat first of God, as the final end of all things; secondly of His universal control, whereby He governs every creature; thirdly of the special control which He exercises in the government of creatures endowed with understanding.

CHAPTER II

THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS TO SOME END

IN the case of agents that manifestly act to some end, we call that the end to which the effort of the agent tends. Gaining that, he is said to gain his end; and missing that, he is said to miss his intended end. Nor on this point does it make any difference whether the end be tended to with knowledge or not: for as the target is the end of the archer, so is it also the end of the path of the arrow. The effort of every agent tends to some certain end. Not any and every action can proceed from any and every power. Action is sometimes terminated to some product, sometimes not. When action is terminated to some product, the effort of the agent tends to the same. When action is not terminated to any product, the effort of the agent tends to the action itself. Every agent therefore must intend some end in his action, sometimes the action itself, sometimes something produced by the action.

3. It is impossible for the chain of actions to extend to infinity: there must then be something, in the getting of which the effort of the agent comes to rest. Therefore every agent acts to some end.

6. Actions are open to criticism only so far as they are taken to be done as means to some end. It is not imputed as a fault to any one, if he fails in effecting that for which his work is not intended. A physician is found fault with if he fails in healing, but not a builder or a grammarian. We find fault in points of art, as when a grammarian does not speak correctly; and also in points of nature, as in monstrous births. Therefore both the natural agent, and the agent who acts according to art and with a conscious purpose, acts for an end.

7. To an agent that did not tend to any definite effect, all effects would be indifferent. But what is indifferent to many things, does not do one of them rather than another: hence from an agent open to both sides of an alternative (a contingente ad utrumque) there does not follow any effect, unless by some means it comes to be determined to one above the rest: otherwise it could not act at all. Every agent therefore tends to some definite effect, and that is called its end.

Still there are actions that do not seem to be for any end, as things done for sport, and acts of contemplation, and things done without advertence, as the stroking of the beard and the like: from which instances one may suppose that there is such a thing as an agent acting not for any end. But we must observe that though acts of contempation are not for any other end, they are an end in themselves: as for things done in sport, sometimes they are their own end, as when one plays solely for the amusement that he finds in play; sometimes they are for an end, as when we play that afterwards we may resume work more vigorously: while things done without advertence may proceed not from the understanding, but from some phantasy or physical principle; yet even these acts tend to certain ends, though beyond the scope of the intellect of the agent.

Hereby is banished the error of certain ancient natural philosophers (Empedocles and Democritus, mentioned in Aristotle, Physics II, ii, 6) who supposed all things to happen by necessity of matter, and eliminated final causes from the universe.

CHAPTER III

THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS TO SOME GOOD

THAT to which an agent definitely tends must be suited to it: for it would not tend to the thing except for some suitability to itself. But what is suitable to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts to some good.

6. An intellectual agent acts for an end by determining its own end. A physical agent, though acting for an end, does not determine its own end, having no idea of an end, but moves in the direction of an end determined for it by another. Now an intellectual agent does not fix for itself an end except under some aspect of good: for a term of intellect is a motive only under an aspect of good, which is the object of will. Therefore a physical agent also does not move or act to any end except inasmuch as it is good. Such an agent has its end determined by some natural appetite or tendency.

7. It is part of the same plan of action to shun evil and to seek good. But all things are found to shun evil. Intellectual agents shun a thing for this reason, that they apprehend its evil: while all physical agents, to the full extent of the power that is in them, resist destruction, because that is the evil of everything. All things therefore act to some good.

CHAPTER IV

THAT EVIL IN THINGS IS BESIDE THE INTENTION OF THE AGENT

WHAT follows from an action different from what was intended by the agent, manifestly happens beside his intention. But evil is different from good, which every agent intends. Therefore evil happens beside the intention.

2. Failure in effect and action follows upon some defect in the principles of action, as a halting gait follows upon crookedness of legs. Now an agent acts by whatever of active power he has, not by what defect of active power he suffers; and according as he acts, so does he intend his end. He intends therefore an end answering to his power. Anything therefore that ensues answering to defect of power will be beside the intention of the agent. But such is evil.

4. In agents that act by intellect, or by any sort of judgement, intention follows apprehension: for intention tends to that which is apprehended as an end. If then experience lights upon something not of the species apprehended, the event will be beside the intention: thus if one intends to eat honey, and eats gall, taking it for honey, that will be beside the intention. But every intellectual agent intends a thing according as he takes it for something good: if then it turns out not to be good but evil, that will be beside the intention.

CHAPTERS V, VI

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TRUTH OF THE CONCLUSION LAST DRAWN, WITH SOLUTIONS OF THE SAME

Chapter VI

FOR the clearer solution of the arguments alleged we must observe that evil may be considered either in a substance or in some action of a substance. Evil in a substance consists in its lack of something which it is naturally apt to have and ought to have. It is no evil to a man not to have wings, because he is not by nature apt to have them; nor not to have yellow hair, because, though his nature is apt to have such hair, still that colour of hair is not due to his nature. But it is an evil to him not to have hands, because he is apt by nature to have them, and ought to have them, if he is to be perfect; and yet the same is no evil to a bird. Every privation, properly and strictly speaking, is of something which one is naturally apt to have and ought to have. The essence of evil consists in privation, thus understood. Primordial matter, being in potentiality to all forms, is naturally in actuality without any one particular form that you like to mention. But some particular form is due to each of the things that are constituted out of such matter. The privation therefore of such a form, in regard of primordial matter, is no evil to the nature of primordial matter; but in regard of the compound whereof it is the form, it is an evil to that compound thing: thus it is evil to incandescent gas (ignis) to be deprived of the form of incandescent gas. And since privations are not said to be' except so far as they are in a subject, a privation will be 'simply evil,' when it is evil in regard of the subject in which it is:

otherwise, it will be evil relatively to something' (malum alicujus), but not 'simply evil.'

Arg. 1 (Chap. V). What happens beside the intention of the agent is said to be matter of luck and chance and rare occurrence.' But evil is not said to be matter of luck and chance, or rare occurrence, but to happen continually, or for the most part: thus in the physical order the unmaking of one thing is always attached to the making of another; and in the moral order sin is of usual occurrence. This does not look like evil arising contrary to intention.

Reply (Chap. VI). Not everything that is beside the intention of the doer need be the result of luck or chance. For if what is beside the intention follows upon what is intended either always or frequently, it cannot be said to happen by luck or chance. Thus in him who intends to enjoy the pleasantness of wine, if from his drinking wind drunkenness follows always or frequently, it will be no matter of bad luck or chance: but it would be by chance, if it were quite the exception. Although then the evil of one thing perishing in course of nature follows beside the intention of him who brings the other thing into being, such evil nevertheless follows invariably: for invariably to the positing of one form there is annexed the privation of another: hence this perishing does not happen by chance, nor as the exception, though the privation is sometimes not evil simply, but only a relative evil, as has been said. But if it be such a privation as to deprive the new being produced of what is due to it, it will be matter of chance and simply evil, as is the case of monstrous births: for such a mishap does not follow of necessity upon what is intended, but is contrary to it, since the agent intends the perfection of the being that he engenders.—Evil affecting action happens in physical agents for want of active power: hence, if the agent's power is defective, this evil happens contrary to intention, yet not by chance, because it necessarily follows upon such an agent, when such agent suffers this failure of power either always or frequently: but it will be by chance, if the failure rarely accompanies such an agent.—Coming to voluntary agents, intention in them must be of some particular good, if action is to follow: for universal considerations of themselves do not move the will, unless there be added the consideration of the particular circumstances under which the action is to take place. If then the good that is intended has conjoined with it the privation of rational good either always or frequently, there follows moral evil, and that not by chance, as is clear in his case who wishes to cohabit with a woman for pleasure, while the inordination of adultery is annexed to that pleasure: in that case the evil of adultery does not ensue by chance: but it would be an evil happening by chance, if upon the thing intended there followed some exceptional misadventure, as when one aiming at a bird kills a man. That goods of this sort, upon which privations of rational good follow, are so generally intended, arises from the practice of most men living according to sense, which they do because sensible things are more manifest to us, and make more effectual motives in the particular circumstances in which our action is cast; and many such goods are attended with privation of rational good.

Arg. 2. Aristotle (Eth. Nic., III, vii) expressly says that wickedness is voluntary, and proves it from the fact that men do unjust acts voluntarily: but, he adds, it is irrational to pretend that a man voluntarily acting unjustly does not wish to be unjust, or voluntarily committing rape does not wish to be incontinent; and that is why legislators punish wicked men as voluntary evil-doers. It seems then that evil is not irrespective of will or intention.

Reply. Though evil be beside the intention, it is still voluntary, not as it is in itself, but incidentally. The object of intention is the final end, willed for its own sake: but the object of volition is also that which is willed for the sake of something else, though absolutely it would not be willed,—as one throws cargo into the sea to save the ship, not intending the casting away of the cargo, but the safety of the vessel; and yet willing the casting away of the cargo, not simply and absolutely, but for the sake of safety. In like manner, for the gaining of some sensible good, one wills to do an inordinate action, not intending the inordinateness, nor willing it simply, but for that purpose. And therefore in this way wickedness and sin are said to be voluntary, like the casting away of cargo at sea.

Arg. 3. Every process of nature serves as an end intended by nature. But destruction is as much a natural change as production: therefore its end, which is a privation and counts as evil, is intended by nature as much as form and goodness, which are the end of production.

Reply. From what has been said it appears that what is simply evil is altogether contrary to intention in the works of nature, as are monstrous births: but what is not simply evil, but only evil in a particular relation, is not intended by nature in itself, but incidentally.

CHAPTER VII

THAT EVIL IS NOT A NATURE OR ESSENCE

EVIL is nothing else than a privation of that which a thing is naturally apt to have and ought to have. But a privation is not an essence, but a negation in a substance.

5. Every essence is natural to some thing. If the essence ranks as a substance, it is the very nature of the thing. If it ranks as an accident, it must be caused by the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance, though perhaps not natural to some other substance. But what is in itself evil cannot be natural to anything: for the essence of evil is privation of that which is naturally apt to be in a thing and is due to it. Evil then, being a privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to anything. Hence whatever is naturally in a thing is good, and the want of it an evil. No essence then is in itself evil.

6. Whatever has any essence is either itself a form or has a form, for by form everything is assorted in some genus or species. But form, as such, has a character of goodness, being the principle of action and the end which every maker intends, and the actuality whereby every subject of form is perfected. Whatever therefore has any essence, as such, is good.

7. Being is divided into actuality and potentiality. Actuality, as such, is good, because everything is perfected by that whereby it actually is. Potentiality too is something good: for potentiality tends to actuality, and is proportionate to actuality, not contrary to it; and is of the same genus with actuality; and privation does not attach to it except accidentally. Everything therefore that is, in whatsoever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is good.

8. All being, howsoever it be, is from God (B. II, Chap.VI). But God is perfect goodness (B. I, Chap.XLI). Since then evil cannot be the effect of goodness, it is impossible for any being, as being, to be evil.

Hence it is said: God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31): He made all things good in his own time (Eccles. iii, 11): Every creature of God is good (1 Tim. iv, 4).

CHAPTERS VIII, IX

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE AFORSESAID CONCLUSION, WITH ANSWERS TO THE SAME

ARG. 1. Evil is a specific difference in certain kinds of things, namely, in moral habits and acts: for as every virtue in its species is a good habit, so the contrary vice in its species is an evil habit; and similarly of acts. Evil therefore is something that gives species to certain things: it is therefore an essence, and natural to some things.

Reply. The reason why good and evil are reckoned specific differences in moral matters, is because moral matters depend on the will: for a thing enters into the sphere of morality inasmuch as it is voluntary. But the object of the will is the end in view and good: hence moral actions are specified by the end for which they are done, as physical actions are from the form of their active principle. Since then good and evil are designated according to due bearing on the end, or the lack of such due bearing, good and evil must be the first differentias marking species in moral matters. But the measure of morality is reason. Therefore things must be called morally good or evil according as they bear on the end which reason determines. Whatever therefore in moral matters derives its species from an end, which is according to reason, is said to be good in its species: while what derives its species from an end contrary to reason, is said to be evil in its species. But that end, though inconsistent with the end which reason assigns, is nevertheless some sort of good, as being pleasurable according to sense, or the like: hence such ends are good in some animals, and even in man when they are moderated by reason; and what is evil for one may very well be good for another. And therefore evil, inasmuch as it is a specific differentia in the genus of moral matters, does not involve anything that is essentially evil, but something that is in itself good, but evil to man inasmuch as it sets aside the order of reason, which is man’s good.

Arg. 4. All that acts is something. But evil acts inasmuch as it is evil: for it understands good and spoils it. Evil therefore, inasmuch as it is evil, is some thing.

Reply. A privation, as such, is no principle of action. Hence it is well said that evil does not fight against good except in the power of good: but in itself it is impotent and weak and originative of no action. Evil is said however to spoil good also formally in itself, as blindness is said to spoil sight, or whiteness to colour a wall.

Arg. 5. Where there is found more and less, there must be an order of things, for negations and privations are not susceptible of more and less. But we find among evils one worse than another. Therefore evil must be some thing.

Reply. Conditions that imply privation are intensified or relaxed as are inequality and unlikeness: for a thing is more unequal according as it is further removed from inequality, and more unlike according as it is more removed from likeness: hence a thing is more evil according as it is a greater privation of good, or at a greater distance from good.

Arg. 6. Thing and being are convertible terms. But evil is in the world. Therefore it is some thing and nature.

Reply. Evil is said to be’ in the world, not as having any essence, or existing as a thing, but in the way in which a thing is’ evil precisely by evil, as blindness, an in the way in which any privation is said to be,’ inasmuch as an animal is’ blind by blindness. For there are two senses of being’: in one sense it means the essence of a thing, and is divided into the ten predicaments; and in this sense no privation can be called a being: in another sense, it signifies the truth of an affirmative proposition (veritatem compositionis); and thus evil and privation is said to be a being, inasmuch as a thing is said to be’ thereby under a privation.

CHAPTER X

THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS GOOD

WHAT is not, is cause of nothing: every cause must be some being. But evil is not any being (Chapp.VII,IX): therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. If then evil is caused by anything, what causes it must be good.

4. Every cause is either material, formal, efficient, or final. But evil can be neither matter nor form: for it has been shown (Chapp.VII,IX) that both actual being and potential being is good. In like manner evil cannot be an efficient cause, since everything acts according as it is actually and has a form. Nor can it be a final cause, since it is beside the intention (Chap.IV). Evil therefore cannot be the cause of anything; and therefore, if there be any cause of evil, it must be caused by good.

But since good and evil are opposites, and one opposite cannot be cause of another except accidentally, it follows that good cannot be the active cause of evil except accidentally. In physics, this accident may happen either on the part of the agent or on the part of the effect. On the part of the agent, when the agent suffers from a lack of power, whence it follows that the action is defective and the effect deficient. But to an agent, as such, it is quite an accident to suffer from a lack of power: for an agent does not act inasmuch as power is lacking to him, but according as he has anything of power. Thus then evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent, inasmuch as the agent runs short of power: therefore it is said that evil has not got an efficient cause, but a deficient cause, because evil does not follow from an efficient cause except in so far as it is deficient in power, and in this respect is is not efficient. It comes to the same thing if the defect of the action and effect arises from some defect of the instrument, or of any other thing requisite for the agent’s action, as when motive power produces halting through crookedness of the shin-bone: for the agent acts by both the power and the instrument. On the part of the effect evil is caused accidentally as well in respect of the matter of the effect as also in respect of its form. For if the matter is indisposed to receive the impression of the agent, some defect must follow in the effect. Nor is it imputable to any defect of the agent, that it does not transmute an indisposed matter to a perfect act: for the power of every natural agent is determined according to the limit of its nature; and its failure to transcend that cannot be brought in against it as a defect in power: such defect can then only be argued when it falls short of the measure of power due to it by nature. On the part of the form of the effect evil is accidentally incident, inasmuch as one form necessarily involves the privation of another form, and with the production of one thing there must needs ensue the destruction of another. But this evil does not belong to the effect intended by the agent, but attaches to something else. In the processes of nature therefore evil is caused by good only accidentally. The same is the case also in the processes of art: for art in its operation imitates nature, and is at fault in the same way as nature.

But in moral matters the case seems to be different. For a flaw in morals does not follow from any lack of power, seeing that weakness either entirely removes, or at least diminishes, moral reprehensibleness: for weakness does not deserve the punishment which is due to fault, but rather compassion and indulgence: to be blameworthy, a point of conduct must be a voluntary act, not an inevitable necessity. On careful consideration we find that the case of morals is in some respects like, in some respects unlike the case of physics. The unlikeness consists in this, that a moral fault is viewed as consisting in the action alone, not in any effect produced: for moral virtues are not effective, but active, while arts are effective; and therefore it has been said that art is at fault in the same way as nature. Moral evil therefore is not estimated according to the matter and form of the effect, but follows simply from the agent. Now in moral actions there are found in orderly enumeration four active principles. One principle is the executive power, namely, the motor power which moves the limbs to execute the command of the will. This power is moved by the will, and so the will is another principle. The will is moved by the judgement of the apprehensive faculty, which judges the particular thing proposed to be good or bad.—good and bad being the (formal) objects of the will, the one object of seeking, the other of avoidance. Lastly, the apprehensive faculty is moved by the thing apprehended. The first active principle then in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive faculty; the third is the will; the fourth is motor power which executes the command of reason. But the act of the executive power already presupposes moral good or evil; for these exterior acts bear a moral character only in so far as they are voluntary. Hence if the act of the will is good, the exterior act will also be called good; and evil, if the volition is evil. It would be no point of moral badness for the exterior act to fail by some defect unconnected with the will: thus lameness is not a moral but a natural blemish. Such a lack of executive power diminishes, if it does not totally excuse from, moral blemish. Again, the act whereby the object moves the apprehensive faculty is exempt from moral blemish: for it is according to the order of nature that what is visible affects the sight, and every object affects the corresponding passive potentiality. Even the act of the apprehensive faculty, considered in itself, is nowise morally blameworthy, as we see that any defect in it excuses from or diminishes moral blame, like the lack of executive power: for infirmity and ignorance alike excuse from sin, or diminish it. It remains then that moral blameworthiness is found first and foremost in the act of the will alone; and reasonably so, since an act is called moral’ from being voluntary. In the act of the will then is to be sought the root and origin of what in the moral order is sin.

But this investigation leads us into an apparent difficulty. On the understanding that defect in an act arises from some defect in the principle of action, some defect in the will must be presupposed before there can be any moral fault. If this defect is natural, it is ever inherent in the will; and the consequence is that the will must always do wrong in action, a consequence proved false by the fact of there being such things as acts of virtue. On the other hand, if the defect is voluntary, that is already a moral fault, the cause of which must stand over for further enquiry; and so we shall have a running account to infinity. We must therefore say that the defect pre-existing in the will is no natural necessity, otherwise it would follow that the will sinned in every act: nor again is a thing of chance and ill luck, for at that rate there could be in us no moral fault, since events of chance are unpremeditated and beyond the control of reason. The defect therefore is voluntary, but not a moral fault: so we must suppose to save the account running to infinity.

Now we must consider how that can be. In every active principle the perfection of its power depends on some superior active principle: for a secondary agent acts by virtue of the power of the prime agent. So long then as the secondary agent remains under the power of the prime agent, it will act unfailingly: but it will fail in its action whenever it happens to swerve from the order of the prime agent, as appears in an instrument when it ceases to respond to the movement of the agent who uses it. Now it has been said above that in the order of moral actions principles go before volition, the apprehensive faculty and the object apprehended, which is the end in view. But since to everything movable there corresponds a proper motive power, not any and every apprehensive faculty is the due motive power of any and every appetite, but one apprehension is the proper motive of one appetite, another of another. As then the sensible apprehensive faculty is the proper motive power of the sensible appetite, so the proper motive power of the will is reason itself. Further, as reason can apprehend many sorts of good things and many ends of action; as moreover every power has its own proper end; the will also must have some object and end of action and prime motive, and that must be not any and every sort of good, but some definite good. Whenever then the will tends to act under the motive of an apprehension of reason representing to it its own proper good, a due action ensues. But when the will bursts out into action upon the apprehension of the sensible apprehensive faculty, or even upon the apprehension of reason itself, representing some other good than the proper good of the will, there ensues in the action of the will a moral fault. Therefore any faulty action in the will is preceded by a lack of due regard to reason and to the proper end of willing. I say a lack of due regard to reason,’ in such cases as when, upon some sudden aprehension of sense, the will tends to some good that is pleasant according to sense. I say a lack of due regard to the proper end of willing,’ in cases when the reason arrives by reasoning at some good, which is not either now or in this way good, and still the will tends to it as though it were its proper good. Now this lack of due regard is voluntary: for it is in the power of the will to will and not to will: it is likewise in its power to direct reason actually to consider or to cease from considering, or to consider this or that. Still this failure of due consideration is not a moral evil: for, consideration or no consideration, or whatever the consideration be on reason’s part, there is not sin until the will comes to tend to some undue end, which then is an act of will.—Thus it remains true that in moral as well as in physical actions, evil is not caused by good except accidentally.

CHAPTER XI

THAT EVIL IS FOUNDED IN SOME GOOD

EVIL cannot exist by itself, having no essence (Chap.VII): it must therefore be in some subject: but every subject, being a substance, is some good.

3. A thing is called evil because it does harm: that can only be because it does harm to good: for to do harm to evil is a good thing, since the undoing of evil is good. But it would not do harm to good, formally speaking, unless it were in good: thus blindness does harm to a man inasmuch as it is within him.

But since good and evil are opposites, and one opposite cannot be the subject of another, but expels it, it seems at first sight strange if good is said to be the subject of evil. But if the truth is sought out, we shall find nothing strange or awkward in this conclusion. Good is commonly predicated as being is predicated, since every being, as such, is good. It is not strange that not-being should be in being as its subject: for every privation is some not-being, and still its subject is a substance, which is a being. Still not-being has not for its subject the being that is its opposite: thus sight is not the subject in which blindness is, but the animal. So the subject in which evil is, is not the good opposed to it, for that is taken away by the evil, but some other good. Thus the subject of moral evil is natural good: while natural evil, which is a privation of form, is in matter, and matter is good, as also is potential being.

CHAPTER XII

THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY SWALLOW UP GOOD

THE subject of evil must always remain, if evil is to remain. But the subject of evil is good: therefore good always remains.

But on the contingency of evil being infinitely intensified, and good being continually diminished by that intensification of evil, it appears that good may be diminished by evil even to infinity. And the good so diminished must be finite, for infinite good is not capable of evil. It seems then that in time good may be entirely taken away by evil.

This then is the reply. Evil, as we have seen, entirely takes away the good to which it is opposed, as blindness takes away sight: but there must remain that good which is the subject of evil, which subject, as such, bears a character of goodness, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the actuality of good, whereof it is deprived by evil. The less then it is in potentiality to that good, the less good it will be. But a subject comes to be less in potentiality, or openness to a form, not only by the subtraction of some part of its potentiality, which is tantamount to subtraction of part of the subject itself, but also by the said potentiality being impeded by some contrary act from issuing in the actuality of the form. Good therefore is diminished by evil rather by the planting of evil, its contrary, than by the taking off of any portion of good. And this agrees with what has been already said about evil: for we said that evil happens beside the intention of the doer, who always intends some good, and upon the good intended there follows the exclusion of some other good opposite to that good. The greater then the multiplication of that good, upon which, contrary to the intention of the agent, evil follows, the greater the diminution of potentiality in respect of the opposite good; and so all the more may good be said to be diminished by evil. This diminution however of good by evil in the physical world cannot go on indefinitely: for all the physical forms and powers are limited, and come to some term beyond which they cannot go. But in moral matters this diminution of good by evil may proceed to infinity: for the understanding and the will have no limits to their acts: thus he who wills to commit a theft may will it again and commit another, and so to infinity. The further then the will tends towards undue ends, the more difficult it becomes for it to return to its proper and due end, as may be seen in persons in whom the habit of vice has been induced by a custom of sinning. Thus then by moral evil the good of natural aptitude may be diminished without limit: yet it can never be totally taken away, but always waits on nature while that remains.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE

RUNNING through all the species of causes, we find that evil is a cause accidentally. In the species of efficient cause, since through the deficiency of power in the active cause there follows defect in the effect and action. In the species of material cause, since through the indisposition of the matter there follows a defect in the product. In the species of formal cause, since to one form there is always annexed the privation of another form. In the species of final cause, since the evil annexed to an undue end means the hindering of the end that is due.

CHAPTER XV

THAT THERE IS NOT ANY SOVEREIGN EVIL, ACTING AS THE PRINCIPLE OF ALL EVILS

A SOVEREIGN evil should be without participation in any good, as that is the sovereign good which is wholly removed from evil. But there cannot be any evil wholly removed from good, since evil is founded on good (Chap.XI).

2. If anything is sovereignly evil, it must be evil by its very essence, as that is sovereignly good which is good by its essence. But evil has no essence (Chap.VII).

3. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. But all evil is caused by good (Chap.X). There is therefore no evil first principle.

5. The incidental must be posterior to the ordinary. But evil happens only incidentally and beside the intention (Chap.IV). Therefore it is impossible for evil to be a first principle.

Hereby is excluded the error of the Manicheans.

CHAPTER XVI

THAT THE END IN VIEW OF EVERYTHING IS SOME GOOD

THAT to which a thing tends when in absence from it, and in which it rests when in possession of it, is the scope and aim and end in view. But everything, so long as it lacks the perfection proper to it, moves towards gaining that perfection, so far as it depends upon itself so to do; and when it has gained that perfection, therein it rests. The end then of everything is its perfection. But the perfection of everything is its own good. Everything therefore is ordained to good as to its end.

4. Things that are aware of an end and things that are unaware of an end are alike ordained to an end, with this difference, that things that are aware of an end tend to an end of themselves, while things that are unaware of an end tend to an end under the direction of another, as appears in the case of archer and arrow. But things that are aware of an end are always ordained to good for their end: for the will, which is the appetite of a fore-known end, never tends to anything except under the aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore things also which are unaware of an end are ordained to good for their end, and so good is the end of all things.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT ALL THINGS ARE ORDAINED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD

THE sovereign good, which is God, is the cause of goodness in all good things. He is therefore also the cause of every end being an end, since whatever is an end is such inasmuch as it is good. But that whereby another thing has an attribute, has more of that attribute itself. Therefore God above all things is the end of all.

4. In every series of ends the last end must be the end of all the ends preceding. But we find all things arranged in various grades of goodness under our sovereign good, which is the cause of all goodness; and thereby, since good bears the character of an end, all things are ordered under God as ends preceding under their last end.

5. Private good is subordinated to the end of the common good: for the being of a part is for the sake of the being of the whole: hence the good of the race is more godlike than the good of the individual man. But the sovereign good, which is God, is the common good, since the good of the whole community depends on Him: while the goodness which marks any given thing is its own private good, and also the good of other things which depend upon it. All things therefore are subordinate to the end of one good, which is God.

7. The last end of every producer, in so far as he is a producer, is himself: for the things produced by us we use for ourselves; and if ever a man makes anything for another man, that is referred to his own good,—his utility, his pleasure, or his honour. But God is the productive cause of all things, either immediately or mediately. And therefore He is the end of all.

Hence it is said: God hath wrought all things for himself (Prov. xvi, 4): and, I am alpha and omega, the first and the last (Apoc. xxii, 13).

CHAPTER XVIII

HOW GOD IS THE END OF ALL THINGS

GOD is at once the last end of all things, and is nevertheless before all things in being. There is an end which, while holding the first place in causation according as it is in intention, is nevertheless posterior in being; and this is the case with every end that an agent establishes by his action, as the physician establishes health by his action in the sick man, which health nevertheless is his end. There is again an end which is prior in causation, and also is prior in being: such an end one aims at winning by one's actions or movement, as a king hopes to win a city by fighting. God then is the end of things, as being something which everything has to gain in its own way.

2. God is the last end of things and the prime agent of all (Chap.XVII). But an end established by the action of an agent cannot be the prime agent: rather it is the effect produced by the agent. God therefore cannot be the end of things as though He were anything established in being thereby, but only as some pre-existent object for them to attain.

4. An effect tends to an end in the same way that the producer of the effect acts for that end. But God, the first producer of all things, does not act in view of acquiring anything by His action, but in view of bestowing something by His action: for He is not in potentiality to acquire anything, but only in perfect actuality, whereby He can give and bestow. Things then are not directed to God as though God were an end unto which any accretion or acquisition were to be made: they are directed to Him so that in their own way they may gain from God God Himself, since He Himself is their end.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT ALL THINGS AIM AT LIKENESS TO GOD

ALL things evidently have a natural appetite for being, and resist destructive agencies wherever they are threatened with them. But all things have being inasmuch as they are likened to God, who is the essential subsistent Being, all other things having being only by participation. All things therefore have an appetite for likeness to God, making that their last end.

4. All created things are some sort of image of the prime agent, God: for every agent acts to the production of its own likeness: now the perfection of an image consists in representing its original by likeness thereto: the image in fact is made on purpose. All things then exist for the attainment of the divine likeness; and that is their last end.

CHAPTER XX

HOW THINGS COPY THE DIVINE GOODNESS

NOT all creatures are established in one and the same degree of goodness. The substance of some is form and actuality,—that is to say, something which, in point of essence, has the attribute of actual being and goodness. The substance of other beings is composed of matter and form: this substance has the attribute of actual being and goodness, but only in respect of part of itself, namely, the form. While then the divine substance is its own goodness, a simple substance (or pure spirit) partakes of this goodness to the extent of its essence, but a composite substance to the extent of some part of its essence. In this third grade of substance again there is found a difference in being. For, composed as they are of matter and form, the form of some of them fills the whole potentiality of the matter, so that there remains not in the matter any potentiality to any other form, and consequently not in any other matter any potentiality to this form: such are the heavenly bodies, into the essential constitution of which their whole matter enters. In other bodies the form does not fill the whole potentiality of the matter: hence there still remains in the matter a potentiality to another form, and in some portion of matter there remains a potentiality to this form, as appears in the (four) elements and bodies composed thereof. Now because a privation is a negation in a substance of that which may well be in the substance, it is clear that with this form, which does not fill the whole potentiality of the matter, there is compatible the privation of some form due to that substance. No such privation can attach to a substance, the form of which fills the whole potentiality of its matter; nor to a substance which is essentially a form; still less to that Substance, whose very being is His essence. Further it is clear that, since evil is the privation of good, there is in this lowest order of substances changeable good with admixture of evil, a changeableness to which the higher orders are not liable. The substance therefore that ranks lowest in being is lowest also in rank of goodness.

We likewise find an order of goodness among the parts of a substance composed of matter and form. For since matter, considered in itself, is potential being, while form is the actualisation of that being, and the substance composed of the two is actually existent through the form, the form will be good in itself; the composed substance will be good as it actually has the form; and the matter will be good inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the form. But though everything is good in so far as it is being, it need not be supposed that matter, as it is only potential being, is only potentially good. For being’ is an absolute term, while there is goodness even in relation: for not only is a thing called good’ because it is an end, or is in possession of an end, but also, though it has not yet arrived at any end, provided only it be ordained to some end, a thing is called good’ even on that account. Though then matter cannot absolutely be called being’ on the title of its potentiality involving some relation to being, yet it may absolutely be called good’ on account of this very relation. Herein it appears that good’ is a term of wider extension than being.’

Yet in another way does the goodness of the creature fall short of the divine goodness. As has been said, God possesses the highest perfection of goodness in his mere being: but a created thing does not possess its perfection in point of one attribute only, but in point of many: for what is united in the highest is multiple and manifold in the lowest. Hence God is said to be fraught with virtue and wisdom and activity in one and the same respect, but a creature in different respects. The greater the distance at which a creature stands removed from the first and highest goodness, the greater the multiplication of points requisite for it to be perfectly good. But if it cannot attain to perfect goodness, it will hold on to an imperfect goodness in a few points. Hence it is that, though the first and highest goodness is absolutely simple, and the substances nearest to it approach it alike in goodness and in simplicity, still the lowest substances are found to be more simple than other substances higher than they are, as the elements are more simple than animals and men, because they cannot attain to the perfection of knowledge and understanding to which animals and men attain. It appears therefore from what has been said that, though God has His goodness perfect and entire in the simplicity of His being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness by their mere being, but only by many details of being. Hence, though every one of these creatures is good in so far as it has being, still it cannot absolutely be called good if it is destitute of other qualities requisite for its goodness; as a man devoid of virtues and subject to vices is good in a certain way, inasmuch as he is a being and inasmuch as he is a man, but on the whole he is not good, but rather evil. For no creature then is it the same thing to be and to be good, absolutely speaking, although every creature is good in so far as it has being: but for God it is quite the same thing to be and to be good, absolutely speaking. Now, as it has been shown, everything tends finally to some likeness of the divine goodness; and a thing is likened to the divine goodness in respect of all the points which appertain to its own proper goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not only in its being but in all other qualities requisite for its perfection: from which considerations the consequence is clear, that a thing is finally ordained to God, not only in its substantial being, but likewise in those accidental qualities that appertain to its perfection, and also in respect of its proper activity, which likewise belongs to the perfection of a thing.

CHAPTER XXI

THAT THINGS AIM AT LIKENESS TO GOD IN BEING CAUSES OF OTHER THINGS

A THING must be first perfect in itself before it can cause another thing. The last perfection to supervene upon a thing is its becoming the cause of other things. While then a creature tends by many ways to the likeness of God, the last way left open to it is to seek the divine likeness by being the cause of other things, according to what the Apostle says, We are God’s coadjutors (1 Cor. iii, 9).

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT ALL THINGS SEEK GOOD, EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF CONSCIOUSNESS

AS the heavenly sphere is moved by a subsistent intelligence (Chap. XXIII), and the movement of the heavenly sphere is directed to generation in sublunary creatures, the generations and and movements of these sublunary creatures must originate in the thought of that subsistent intelligence. Now the intention of the prime agent and of the instrument is bent upon the same end. The heavenly spheres then (coelum) are the cause of sublunary motions by virtue of their own motion, which is impressed upon them by a spirit. It follows that the heavenly spheres are the instrument of spirit. Spirit then is the prime agent, causing and intending the forms and motions of sublunary bodies; while the heavenly spheres are the instruments of the same. But the intellectual outlines of all that is caused and intended by an intelligent agent must pre-exist in his mind, as the forms of works of art pre-exist in the mind of the artificer, and from that mind (et ex eo) those forms must pass into the things made. All the forms then that are in sublunary creatures, and all their motions, are determined by the forms that are in the mind of some subsistent intelligence, or intelligences. Therefore Boethius says that the forms which are in matter have come from forms apart from matter. In this respect the saying of Plato is verified, that forms existing apart are the originating principles of the forms that are in matter: only, Plato supposed these forms to subsist by themselves, and to be immediate causes of the forms of sensible things; we suppose them to exist in a mind, and to cause sublunary forms through the instrumentality of the motion of the heavenly spheres.

Thus it is not difficult to see how natural bodies, devoid of intelligence, move and act for an end. For they tend to their end, being directed thereto by a subsistent intelligence, in the way that an arrow tends to its end, directed by the archer: as the arrow from the impulse of the archer, so do natural bodies receive their inclination to their natural ends from natural moving causes, whence they derive their forms and virtues and motions. Hence it is plain that every work of nature is the work of a subsistent intelligence. The credit of an effect rests by preference with the prime mover, who guides instruments to their purpose, rather than with the instruments which he guides. Thus we find the operations of nature proceeding in due course and order to an end, like the the operations of a wise man. It is evident therefore that even agents devoid of consciousness can work for an end, and strive after good with a natural appetite, and seek the divine likeness and their own perfection. It is further evident that, the more perfect the power and the more eminent the degree of goodness, the more general is the appetite for good, and the more distant from self are the objects for which good is sought and unto which good is done. For imperfect beings tend solely to the good of the individual; perfect beings to the good of the species; more perfect beings to the good of the genus; and God, who is the most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being. Hence some say, not without reason, that goodness as such is diffusive of itself.

CHAPTER XXV

THAT THE END OF EVERY SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE IS TO UNDERSTAND GOD

THE proper act of everything is its end, as being its second perfection: hence what is well disposed to its own proper act is said to be virtuous and good. But to understand is the proper act of a subsistent intelligence: that then is its end. And the most perfect instance of this act is its final end and perfection: this is particularly true of acts which are not directed to production, acts such as understanding and feeling. But since such acts take their species from their objects, and are known through their objects, any given one of these acts will be the more perfect, the more perfect its object is. Consequently, to understand the most perfect intelligible object, which is God, will be the most perfect instance of the activity of understanding. To know God then by understanding is the final end of every subsistent intelligence.

But one may say: It is true that the last end of a subsistent intelligence consists in understanding the best intelligible object, still the best intelligible object, absolutely speaking, is not the best object for this or that subsistent intelligence; but the higher any subsistent intelligence is, the higher is its best intelligible object; and therefore the highest subsistent intelligence created has for its best intelligible object that which is best absolutely; hence its happiness will be in understanding God; but the happiness of a lower subsistent intelligence will be to understand some lower intelligible object, which is at the same time the highest of the objects that can be understood by it. And particularly it seems to be the lot of the human understanding, on account of its weakness, not to understand the absolutely best intelligible object: for in respect of the knowledge of that truth of which there is most to be known the human intellect is as the bat's eye to the sun.

Nevertheless it may be manifestly shown that the end of every subsistent intelligence, even the lowest, is to understand God. For (a) the final end of all beings, to which they tend, is God (Chap.XVIII. But the human understanding, however it be lowest in the order of subsistent intelligences, is nevertheless superior to all beings devoid of understanding. Since then the nobler substance has not the ignobler end, God Himself will be the end also of the human understanding. But every intelligent being gains its last end by understanding it. Therefore it is by understanding that the human intellect attains God as its end.

(c). Everything most of all desires its own last end. But the human mind is moved to more desire and love and delight over the knowledge of divine things, little as it can discern about them, than over the perfect knowledge that it has of the lowest things.

(e). All sciences and arts and practical faculties are attractive only for the sake of something else: for in them the end is not knowledge but production of a work. But speculative sciences are attractive for their own sake, for their end is sheer knowledge. Nor is there found any action in human life, with the exception of speculative study, which is not directed to some other and further end. Even actions done in sport, which seem to be done in view of no end, have a due end, which is refreshment of mind, to enable us thereby to return stronger to serious occupations: otherwise we should play always, if play was sought for its own sake, which would be unbefitting. Therefore the practical arts are ordained to the speculative, and all human activity has intellectual speculation for its end. In all due ordination of sciences and arts, the character of final end attaches to that science or art which issues precepts as master-builder to the rest: thus the art of navigation, to which belongs the management of a ship, lays down precepts for ship-building. In this relation Metaphysics (philosophia prima) stand to all speculative sciences. On metaphysics they all depend, and from that science they receive their principles and directions how to proceed against deniers of principles. This first philosophy is wholly directed to the final end of the knowledge of God: hence it is called a divine science. The knowledge of God therefore is the final end of all human study and activity.

(f). In all series of agents and causes of change the end of the prime agent and mover must be the ultimate end of all, as the end of a general is the end of all the soldiers who serve under him. But among all the component parts of man we find the intellect to be the superior moving power: for the intellect moves the appetite, putting its object before it; and the intellectual appetite, or will, moves the sensible appetites, the irascible and concupiscible: hence we do not obey concupiscence except under the command of the will. The sensitive appetite, crowned by the consent of the will, proceeds to move the body. The end therefore of the intellect is the end of all human actions. But the end and good of the intellect is truth; and consequently its last end is the first truth. The last end then of the whole man and of all his activities and desires is to know the first truth, which is God.

(g). There is a natural desire in all men of knowing the causes of the things that they see. It was through wonder at seeing things, the causes of which were unseen, that men first began to philosophise. Nor does enquiry cease until we arrive at the first cause: then we consider our knowledge perfect, when we know the first cause. Man then naturally desires so to know the first cause as his last end. But the first cause is God; and the last end of man and of every subsistent intelligence, is called blessedness or happiness. To know God then is the blessedness and happiness of every subsistent intelligence.

Hence it is said: This is eternal life, that they know thee, the only true God (John xvii, 3).

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ANY ACT OF THE WILL

SINCE a subsistent intelligence in its activity arrives at God, not by understanding alone, but also by an act of the will desiring and loving Him and taking delight in Him, some one may think that the last end and final felicity of man is not in knowing God, but rather in loving Him, or exercising some other act of the will upon Him; especially seeing that the object of the will is good, which bears the character of an end, whereas truth, which is the object of the intellect, does not bear the character of an end except in so far as it (ipsum) too is good. Hence it seems that man does not attain his last end by an act of intellect, but rather by an act of will. But this position is manifestly proved to be untenable.

1. Happiness, being the peculiar good of an intelligent nature, must attach to the intelligent nature on the side of something that is peculiar to it. But appetite is not peculiar to intelligent nature, but is found in all things, though diversely in diverse beings: which diversity however arises from the different ways in which they stand to consciousness. Things wholly devoid of consciousness have only natural appetite, or physical tendency. Things that have sensitive consciousness have sensible appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible are included. Things that have intellectual consciousness have an appetite proportionate to that consciousness, namely, the will. The will therefore, as being an appetite, is not a peculiar appurtenance of an intelligent nature, except so far as it is dependent on the intelligence: but intelligence in itself is peculiar to an intelligent nature. Happiness therefore consists in an act of the intellect substantially and principally rather than in an act of the will.

2. In all powers that are moved by their objects the objects are naturally prior to the acts of those powers. But such a power is the will, for the desirable object moves desire. The object therefore of the will is naturally prior to the act. The prime object of will then precedes every act of will. No act of will therefore can be the prime object of volition. But the prime object of will is the last end, which is happiness. Happiness therefore cannot possibly be itself an act of will.

3. In all powers that can reflect on their own acts, the act of that power must first fix on some object, and then fix on its own act. For if the intellect understands that it understands, we must suppose that it first understands some thing, and afterwards understands its own understanding of that thing: for the act of understanding, which the intellect understands, means the understanding of some object. Hence we must either proceed to infinity; or, coming to some first object of understanding, this object, we must say, will not be a sheer act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. Similarly the first object of will cannot be any sheer act of willing, but some other good. But the first object of will to an intelligent nature is happiness: for it is for the sake of happiness that we will whatever we do will. Happiness therefore cannot possibly consist essentially in any act of will.

4. Everything has the truth of its nature by having the constituents of its substance: for a real man differs from a painted one by the constituents of the substance of man. But true happiness does not differ from false happiness in respect of the act of will: for the will is in the same attitude of desire, or love, or delight, whatever the object proposed to it for its sovereign good, true or false: but whether the object so proposed be the true sovereign good or a counterfeit, that difference is decided by intellect. Happiness therefore consists essentially in intellect rather than in any act of will.

5. If any act of will were happiness itself, that act would be either desire or love or delight. Now it is impossible for desire to be the last end: for desire obtains inasmuch as the will tends to something which it has not yet got: but such straining after the absent is inconsistent with the idea of an achieved last end. Love again cannot be the last end: for good is loved not only in its presence but also in its absence: for it is from love that good not possessed is sought for by desire. And though the love of good already attained is more perfect, that access of perfection is to be ascribed to the

attainment and established possession of the good loved. The attainment of good then, which is the end, is a different thing from the love of good, which love is imperfect before attainment, and perfect after attainment. In like manner neither is delight the last end: for the very possession of good is the cause of delight, while we either feel the good now possessed, or remember the good possessed before, or hope for the good to be possessed in future: delight therefore is not the last end. No act of will therefore can be the substance of happiness.

6. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable of itself. But that is false: for it makes a difference what delight is desired, considering the object from which delight ensues: for the delight which follows upon good and desirable activities is good and desirable: but that which follows upon evil activities is evil and to be shunned. Delight therefore has its goodness and desirability from something beyond itself. Therefore it is not itself the final end, happiness.

7. The right order of things coincides with the order of nature, for natural things are ordained to their end without mistakes. But in natural things delight is for activity, and not the other way about: for we see that nature has attached delight to those activities of animals which are manifestly ordained to necessary ends, as in the use of food, which is ordained to the preservation of the individual, and in the intercourse of the sexes, which is ordained to the preservation of the species: for if delight were not in attendance, animals would abstain from the aforesaid necessary acts. It is impossible therefore for delight to be the final end.

8. Delight seems to be nothing else than a rest of the will in some befitting good, as desire is an inclination of the will to the gaining of some good. Now it is ridiculous to say that the end of movement is not the coming to be in one’s proper place, but the satisfaction of the inclination whereby one tended to go there. If the principle aim of nature were the satisfaction of the inclination, it would never give the inclination. It gives the inclination, that thereby one may tend to one’s proper place: when that end is gained, there follows the satisfaction of the inclination: thus the satisfaction of the inclination is not the end, but a concomitant of the end.

9. If any exterior thing is to be any one’s end, we must assign the title of last end to that activity whereby the thing is first gained: thus to people who make money their end, the getting of the money is the end, not the love or

desire of it. But the last end of a subsistent intelligence is God. That activity then in man makes the substance of his happiness, whereby he first attains to God. But that is the activity of understanding: for we cannot will what we do not understand. The final happiness of man then substantially consists in knowing God by the understanding, and not in any act of the will.

From what has been said we may solve the objections to the contrary. The fact of the sovereign good being the object of the will does not necessitate sovereign good being substantially the act of the will itself, as was the tenor of the argument first proposed: nay, from the fact of its being the first object, it follows that it is not the act.

Arg. 2. The last perfection of activity is delight, which perfects activity as beauty does youth. If then any perfect activity is the last end, it seems that the last end is rather in the activity of the will than of the intellect.

Reply. There are two ways of being a perfection to a thing. In one way there is a perfection to a thing already complete in its species: in another way there is a perfection going to make up the species. Thus the perfection of a house, considered as complete in its species, is that use for which the house is intended, namely, being inhabited: hence this should be put in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be adequate. A perfection going to make up the species of a house may be one of the constituents and substantial principles of the species: or it may be something that goes to the preservation of the species, as the buttresses made to prop the house up: lastly, under this head we must count whatever makes the house more comely for use, as its beauty. That therefore which is the perfection of a thing, considered as already complete in its species, is the end of a thing, as being inhabited is the end of a house. And in like manner the proper activity of each thing, which is a sort of use of it, is the end of the thing. But the perfections which go to make up the species are not the end of the thing: rather the thing is their end. Thus matter and form are for the species. In like manner the perfections that preserve a thing in its species, as health and nutrition, though they perfect the animal, are not the end of its existence, but rather the other way about. Those perfections also whereby a thing is fitted to discharge the proper activities of its species and gain its due end more becomingly, are not the end of the thing, but rather the other way about, e.g., a man’s beauty and bodily strength, and other accomplishments, of which the philosopher says that they minister to happiness instrumentally. Now when we say that delight is the perfection of activity, we do not mean that activity specifically considered is directed to the purpose of delight,—the fact is, it is ordained to other ends, as eating is ordained to the preservation of the individual,—we mean that delight ranks among the perfections which go to make up the species of a thing: for through the delight that we take in any action we apply ourselves to it more attentively and becomingly.

Arg. 3. Delight seems to be so desired for its own sake as never to be desired for the sake of anything else: for it is foolish to ask of any one why [he] wishes to be delighted. But this is the condition of the last end, to be desired for its own sake. Therefore the last end is rather in an act of the will than of the understanding, so it seems.

Reply. Delight, though it is not the last end, is still a concomitant of the last end, since from the attainment of the last end delight supervenes.

Arg. 4. In the desire of the last end there is the greatest agreement amongst all men, because it is natural. But more seek delight than knowledge. Therefore it seems that delight is the end rather than knowledge.

Reply. There are not more seekers of the delight that there is in knowing than there are seekers of knowledge: but there are more seekers after sensible delights than there are seekers of intellectual knowledge and the delight thence ensuing; and the reason is because external things are more known to the majority of men, as human knowledge starts from objects of sense.

Arg. 5. The will seems to be a higher power than the understanding: for the will moves the understanding to its end: for when there is the will so to do, then it is that the understanding actually considers the knowledge which it habitually possesses. The action therefore of the will seems to be nobler than the action of the understanding; and therefore the final end of happiness seems in the act of will rather than in the act of understanding.

Reply. It is manifestly false to say that the will is higher than the understanding as moving it; for primarily and ordinarily the understanding moves the will. The will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the good apprehended: but the will moves the understanding, we may say, incidentally, inasmuch as the act of understanding itself is apprehended as good and so is desired by the will. Hence it follows that the understanding actually understands, and in this has the start of the will; for never would the will desire to understand, unless first the understanding apprehended the act of understanding itself as good. And again the will moves the understanding to actual activity in the way in which an efficient cause is said to move: but the understanding moves the will in the way in which a final cause moves, for good understood is the end of the will. Now the efficient cause is posterior in motion to the final cause, for the efficient cause moves only for the sake of the final cause. Hence it appears that, absolutely speaking, the understanding is higher than the will, but the will is higher than the understanding accidentally and in a qualified sense.

CHAPTER XXVII

THAT THE HAPPINESS OF MAN DOES NOT CONSIST IN BODILY PLEASURES

ACCORDING to the order of nature, pleasure is for the sake of activity, and not the other way about. If therefore certain activities are not the final end, the pleasures ensuing upon these activities are neither the final end nor accessories of the final end. But certainly the activities on which bodily pleasures follow are not the final end: for they are directed to other obvious ends, the preservation of the body and the begetting of offspring. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the final end, nor accessories of the final end, and happiness is not to be placed in them.

3. Happiness is a good proper to man: dumb animals cannot be called happy except by an abuse of language. But bodily pleasures are common to man and brute: happiness therefore cannot consist in them.

4. The final end of a thing is noblest and best of all that appertains to the thing. But bodily delights do not appertain to a man in respect of what is noblest in him.

5. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being conjoined with things lower than himself, but in his conjunction with something above him.

7. In all things that are said to be ordinarily’ (per se), more’ follows upon more,’ if absolutely’ goes with absolutely.’ If then bodily pleasures were good in themselves, to take them to the utmost would be the best way of taking them. But this is manifestly false: for excessive use of such things is accounted a vice, injures the body, and bars further enjoyments of the same sort.

8. If human happiness consisted in bodily pleasures, it would be a more praiseworthy act of virtue to take such pleasures than to abstain from them. But this is manifestly false, for it is the special praise of the act of temperance to abstain from such pleasures.

9. The last end of everything is God (Chap.XVIII). That then must be laid down to be the last end of man, whereby he most closely approaches to God. But bodily pleasures injure a man from any close approach to God: for God is approached by contemplation, and the aforesaid pleasures are a hindrance to contemplation.

Hereby is excluded the error of the Epicureans, who placed the happiness of man in these pleasures: in whose person Solomon says: This seemed to me good, that man should eat and drink and make merry on the fruit of his toil (Eccles. V, 17). Everywhere let us leave behind us signs of mirth, for this is our portion and this our lot (Wisd. ii, 9). Also the error of the followers of Cerinthus is excluded, who spread the fable of a thousand years of the pleasures of the belly as an element in the kingdom of Christ after the resurrection, hence they are called Chiliasts, or Millennarians. Also the fables of the Saracens, who place the rewards of the just in the aforesaid pleasures.

CHAPTER XXVIII, XXIX

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONOURS NOR IN HUMAN GLORY

THE last end and happiness of man is his most perfect activity (Chap.XXVI). But the honour paid to a man does not consist in any act of his own, but in the act of another towards him.

2. That is not the last end, which is good and desirable on account of something else. But such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured except for some other good thing existing in him.

4. Even bad men may be honoured. It is better then to become worthy of honour than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not the highest good of man.

Hence it appears that neither does man's chief good consist in glory, or celebrity of fame. For glory, according to Cicero, is "a frequent mention of a man with praise"; or according to St Augustine, "brilliant notoriety with praise" (clara notitia cum laude). So then men wish for notoriety, attended with praise and a certain brilliance, that they may be honoured by those to whom they become known. Glory then is sought for the sake of honour. If then honour is not the highest good, much less is glory.

CHAPTER XXX

THAT MAN’S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN RICHES

RICHES are not desired except for the sake of something else: for of themselves they do no good, but only as we use them. But the highest good is desired for its own sake, and not for the sake of something else.

2. The possession or preservation of those things cannot be the highest good, which benefit man most in being parted with. But such is the use of riches, to spend.

3. The act of liberality and munificence, the virtues that deal with money, is more praiseworthy, in that money is parted with, than that money is got. Man’s happiness therefore does not consist in the possession of riches.

4. That in the gaining of which man’s chief good lies must be some thing better than man. But man is better than his riches, which are things ordained to his use.

5. The highest good of man is not subject to fortune: for fortuitous events happen without effort of reason, whereas man must gain his proper end by reason. But fortune has great place in the gaining of riches.

CHAPTER XXXI

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WORLDLY POWER

A MAN is called good inasmuch as he attains to the sovereign good. But inasmuch as he has power he is not called either good or evil: for he is not good who can do good things, nor is a man evil of being able to do evil things. Therefore the highest good does not consist in being powerful.

3. All power is over another (ad alterum). But the highest good is not over another.

CHAPTER XXXII

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE GOODS OF THE BODY

THE soul is better than the body. Therefore the good of the soul, as understanding and the like, is better than the good of the body. The good of the body therefore is not the highest good of man.

3. These goods are common to man and other animals: but happiness is the proper good of man alone.

4. For goods of the body, many animals are better off than man: some are swifter, some are stronger, and so of the rest. If in these things the highest good consisted, man would not be the most excellent of animals.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THAT THE FINAL HAPPINESS MAN DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF THE MORAL VIRTUES

HUMAN happiness, if it is final, is not referable to any further end. But all moral acts are referable to something further: thus acts of fortitude in war are directed to securing victory and peace: acts of justice to the preservation of peace amongst men by every one remaining in quiet possession of his own.

2. Moral virtues aim at the observance of the golden mean in passions and in the disposal of external things. But the moderation of the passions or of external things cannot possibly be the final end of human life, since these very passions and external things are referable to something else.

3. Man is man by the possession of reason; and therefore happiness, his proper good, must regard what is proper to reason. But that is more proper to reason which reason has in itself than what it does in another. Since then the good of moral virtue is something which reason establishes in things other than itself, moral virtue cannot be the best thing in man, which is happiness.

Virtue alone is happiness below, he cannot reasonably mean that moral virtue is formally and precisely happiness, but only that it is indispensable to happiness, and presupposed, as the base of a tower is presupposed to the spire. Moral virtue is more indispensable, but happiness is better. But the privation of happiness is a less evil than the privation of moral virtue. So it is less evil to have the spire blown down than to have the tower on which it rests blown up, although the spire is higher and nobler than the substructure. The doctrine of this chapter is in Aristotle, Nic. Eth. X, viii.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THAT THE FINAL HAPPINESS OF MAN CONSISTS IN THE CONTEMPLATION OF GOD

IF then the final happiness of man does not consist in those exterior advantages which are called goods of fortune, nor in goods of the body, nor in goods of the soul in its sentient part, nor in the intellectual part in respect of the moral virtues, nor in the virtues of the practical intellect, called art and prudence, it remains that the final happiness of man consists in the contemplation of truth. This act alone in man is proper to him, and is in no way shared by any other being in this world. This is sought for its own sake, and is directed to no other end beyond itself. By this act man is united in likeness with pure spirits, and even comes to know them in a certain way. For this act also man is more self-sufficient, having less need of external things. Likewise to this act all other human activities seem to be directed as to their end. For to the perfection of contemplation there is requisite health of body; and all artificial necessaries of life are means to health. Another requisite is rest from the disturbing forces of passion: that is attained by means of the moral virtues and prudence. Likewise rest from exterior troubles, which is the whole aim of civil life and government. Thus, if we look at things rightly, we may see that all human occupations seem to be ministerial to the service of the contemplators of truth.

Now it is impossible for human happiness to consist in that contemplation which is by intuition of first principles,—a very imperfect study of things, as being the most general, and not amounting to more than a potential knowledge: it is in fact not the end but the beginning of human study: it is supplied to us by nature, and not by any close investigation of truth. Nor can happiness consist in the sciences, the object-matter of which is the meanest things, whereas happiness should be an activity of intellect dealing with the noblest objects of intelligence. Therefore the conclusion remains that the final happiness of man consists in contemplation guided by wisdom to the study of the things of God. Thus we have reached by way of induction the same conclusion that was formerly established by deductive reasoning, that the final happiness of man does not consist in anything short of the contemplation of God.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN SUCH KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS IS COMMON TO THE MAJORITY OF MANKIND

THERE is a certain general and vague knowledge of God in the minds of practically, all men, whether it be by the fact of God's existence being a self-evident truth, as some think (B. I, Chap.X); or, as seems more likely, because natural reasoning leads a man promptly to some sort of knowledge of God: for men seeing that natural things follow a certain course and order, and further considering that order cannot be without an ordainer, they perceive generally that there is some ordainer of the things which we see. But who or what manner of being the ordainer of nature is, and whether He be one or many, cannot be gathered off-hand from this slight study. Thus, seeing a man move and do other acts, we perceive that there is in him a cause of these activities, which is not in other things; and this cause we call the soul; and still we do not yet know what the soul is, whether it is anything corporeal or not, or how it performs the aforesaid acts. Now such knowledge as this cannot possibly suffice for happiness.

1. For happiness must be an activity without defect. But this knowledge is susceptible of admixture of many errors: thus some have believed that the ordainer of mundane events is no other than the heavenly bodies: hence they have affirmed the heavenly bodies to be gods. Others have said the same of the elements, thinking that their natural movements and activities come not from any controlling power outside them, but that they control other things. Others, believing that human acts are not subject to any other

than human control, have called those men who control other men gods. Such knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.

3. No one is blameworthy for not possessing happiness: nay, men who have it not, and go on tending to it, are praised. But lack of the aforesaid knowledge of God renders a man particularly blameworthy. It is a great indication of dulness of perception in a man, when he perceives not such manifest signs of God; just as any one would be counted lacking in perception, who, seeing a man, did not understand that he had a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalms (xiii and lii): The fool said in his heart: There is no God.

4. Knowledge of a thing in general, not descending into any details, is a very imperfect knowledge, as would be the knowledge of man merely as something that moves. By such knowledge a thing is known potentially only, for details are potentially contained in generalities. But happiness, being a perfect activity and the supreme good of man, must turn upon what is actual and not merely potential.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH IS TO BE HAD BY DEMONSTRATION

AGAIN there is another knowledge of God, higher than the last mentioned: this knowledge is acquired by demonstration, by means of which we come nearer to a proper knowledge of Him, since demonstration removes from Him many attributes, by removal of which the mind discerns God standing apart from other beings. Thus demonstration shows God to be unchangeable, eternal, incorporeal, absolutely simple, one. A proper knowledge of an object is arrived at, not only by affirmations, but also by negations. Thus as it is proper to man to be a rational animal, so it is proper to him also not to be inanimate or irrational. But between these two modes of proper knowledge there is this difference, that when a proper knowledge of a thing is got by affirmations, we know both what the thing is and how it is distinct from others: but when a proper knowledge of a thing is got by negations, we know that the thing is distinct from other things, but what it is remains unknown. Such is the proper knowledge of God that we have by demonstrations. But that is not sufficient for the final happiness of man.

1. The individuals of a species arrive at the end and perfection of that species for the most part; and natural developments have place always or for the most part, though they fail in a minority of instances through something coming in to mar them. But happiness is the end and perfection of the human species, since all men naturally desire it. Happiness then is a common good, possible to accrue to all men, except in cases where an obstacle arises to deprive some of it. But few they are who arrive at this

knowledge of God by way of demonstration, on account of the difficulties mentioned above (B. I, Chap.IV). Such scientific knowledge then is not the essence of human happiness.

3. Happiness excludes all misery. But deception and error is a great part of misery. Now in the knowledge of God by demonstration manifold error may be mingled, as is clear in the case of many who have found out some truths about God in that way, and further following their own ideas, in the failure of demonstration, have fallen into many sorts of error. And if any have found truth in the things of God so perfectly by the way of demonstration as that no error has entered their minds, such men certainly have been very few: a rarity of attainment which does not befit happiness, happiness being the common end of all.

4. Happiness consists in perfect activity. Now for the perfection of the activity of knowledge certainty is required: but the aforesaid knowledge has much of uncertainty.

CHAPTER XL

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH

HAPPINESS is the perfect activity of the human intellect (Chap.XXVI). But in the knowledge that is of faith, though there is high perfection on the part of the object so apprehended, there is great imperfection on the side of intellect, for intellect does not understand that to which it assents in believing.

2. Final happiness does not consist principally in any act of will (Chap.XXVI). But in the knowledge of faith the will has a leading part: for the understanding assents by faith to the things proposed to it, because it wills to do so, without being necessarily drawn by the direct evidence of truth.

3. He who believes, yields assent to things proposed to him by another, which himself he does not see: hence the knowledge of faith is more like hearing than seeing. Since then happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith.

4. Happiness being the last end, all natural desire is thereby appeased. But the knowledge of faith, far from appeasing desire, rather excites it, since every one desires to see that which he believes.

CHAPTERS XLI-XLV

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT THE SOUL IN THIS LIFE DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF

AN apparent difficulty may be alleged against what has been said from some words of Augustine, which require careful treatment. He says (De Trinitate, IX, iii): “As the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things by the senses of the body, so of incorporeal things by itself: therefore it knows itself by itself, because itself is incorporeal.” By these words it appears that our mind understands itself by itself, and, understanding itself, understands separately subsistent intelligences, or pure spirits, which would militate against what has been shown above. But it is clear that such is not the mind of Augustine. For he says (De Trinitate, X, ix, 12) of the soul seeking knowledge of itself: “Let it not then seek to find (cernere) itself as though it were absent, but let its care be to discern (discernere) itself as it is present: let it not observe itself as though it did not know itself but let it distinguish itself from that other thing which it has mistaken for itself.” Whence he gives us to understand that the soul of itself knows itself as present, but not as distinct from other things; and therefore he says (De Trin. X, x) that some have erred in not distinguishing the soul from things that are different from it. But by the knowledge of a thing in its essence the thing is known as distinct from other things: hence definition, which marks the essence of a thing, distinguishes the thing defined from all other things. Augustine then did not mean that the soul of itself knows its own essence. So then, according to the thought of Augustine, our mind of itself knows itself, inasmuch as it knows concerning itself that it exists: for by the very perceiving of itself to act it perceives itself to be. But it acts of itself. Therefore of itself it knows concerning itself that it exists.

1. But it cannot be said that the soul of itself knows concerning itself what it essentially is. For a cognitive faculty comes to be actually cognisant by there being in it the object which is known. If the object is in it potentially, it knows potentially: if the object is in it actually, it is actually cognisant: if in an intermediate way, it is habitually cognisant. But the soul is always present to itself actually, and never potentially or habitually only. If then the soul of itself knows itself by its essence, it must ever have an intellectual view of itself, what it essentially is, which clearly is not the case.

2 and 3. If the soul of itself knows itself in its essence, every man, having a soul, knows the essence of the soul: which clearly is not the case, for many men have thought the soul to be this or that body, and some have taken it for a number or harmony.

So then, by knowing itself, the soul is led to know concerning separately subsistent intelligences the fact of their existence, but not what they are essentially, which would mean understanding their substances. For whereas we know, either by demonstration or by faith, concerning these pure spirits that they are intelligent subsistent beings, in neither way could we gather this knowledge but for the fact that our soul knows from itself the meaning of intelligent being. Hence we must use our knowledge of the intelligence of our own soul as a starting-point for all that we can know of separately subsistent intelligences. But even granting that by speculative sciences we could arrive at a knowledge of the essence of our own soul, it does not follow that we could thereby arrive at a knowledge of all that is knowable about pure spirits; for our intelligence falls far short of the intelligence of a pure spirit. A knowledge of the essence of our own soul might lead to a knowledge of some remote higher genus of pure spirits: but that would not be an understanding of their substances.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT WE CANNOT IN THIS LIFE SEE GOD AS HE ESSENTIALLY IS

If the connatural dependence of our understanding on phantasms prevents us in this life from understanding other pure spirits, much less can we in this life see the divine essence, which transcends all angels. Of this fact the following may also be taken as an indication: the higher our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more it is abstracted from sensible things: but the final terminus to which contemplation can possibly arrive is the divine substance: therefore the mind that sees the divine substance must be totally divorced from bodily senses, either by death or by some rapture. Hence it is said in the person of God: No man shall see me and live (Exod. xxxiii, 20). Whereas in Holy Scripture some are said to have seen God, that must be understood to have been inasmuch as by some vision of the phantasy or corporeal appearance the presence of divine power was shown.

Certain words of Augustine raise a difficulty in this matter. Thus he says (De Trinitate, IX, vii) : “In the eternal truth, whence all corporeal creatures are, we see with our mind’s eye the form according to which we are, and according to which we execute anything truly and rightly either in ourselves or in corporeal things.” Also he says (Confess. I, xxv): “If both of us see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true, where, I pray, do we see it? Neither I in you, nor you in me, but both of us in that unchangeable truth which is above our minds.” And to the like effect (De Trin. XII, ii): “It belongs to the higher reason to judge of these bodily things according to aspects (rationes) eternal and everlasting, which certainly would not be unchangeable, were they not above the human mind.” But aspects unchangeable and everlasting cannot be elsewhere than in God, since, according to Catholic faith, God alone is eternal. It seems to follow that we can see God in this life, and that by seeing Him, and aspects of things in Him, we judge of the rest of things.

On the other hand it is incredible that in the above words Augustine should mean to assert that in this life we can understand God as He essentially is, seeing that in his book De videndo Deum he says the contrary. It remains to enquire how in this life we can see that unchangeable truth or those everlasting aspects. That truth is in the soul, Augustine himself confesses: hence he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. But truth is not in the soul alone as God is said to be essentially’ (per essentiam) in all things; nor as He is by His likeness in all things, inasmuch as everything is called true’ so far as it approaches to the likeness of God: for from those points of view the soul stands in no better position than other beings: truth then is in the soul in a special manner, inasmuch as the soul knows truth. As then the soul and other beings are called true’ in their natures, as bearing some likeness to the supreme nature of God,—which is truth itself, as being its own fulness of actual understanding (suum intellectum esse),—so what is known by the soul is manifestly known, inasmuch as there exists in the soul a likeness of that divine truth which God knows. Hence on the text (Ps. xi, 2) truths are diminished from the sons of men, the Gloss [Augustine, Enarrationes in h.l.] says: “The truth is one, whereby holy souls are illumined: but since there are many souls, there may be said to be in them many truths, as from one face many images appear in as many mirrors.” Though different things are known and believed to be true by different minds, yet there are some truths in which all men agree, for instance, the primary intuitions of intellect as well speculative as practical, because, so far as these go, an image of divine truth comes out universally in the minds of all. As then whatever any mind knows for certain, it knows it by virtue of these intuitions, which are the canons of all judgements, and into which all judgements may be resolved, the mind is said to see all things in the divine truth, or in everlasting aspects, and to judge of all things according to those aspects. This explanation is confirmed by the words of Augustine (Soliloq. I, viii, 15): “Even the truths taught in the schools, which every one, who understands them, unhesitatingly allows to be true, we must believe, could not possibly be understood, were they not lit up by the light of another, what I may call a sun proper to them (nisi ab alio quasi sole suo illustrantur).” He says then that the theories of science are seen in the divine truth as visible objects are seen in the light of the sun: but certainly such objects are not seen in the very body of the sun, but by the light which is a likeness of the solar brightness, remaining in the air and similar bodies. From these words then of Augustine it cannot be gathered that God is seen in His substance in this life, but only as in a mirror, which the Apostle also confesses of the knowledge of this life, saying (1 Cor. xiii, 12): We see now as in a glass darkly.

Though the human mind represents the likeness of God more closely than lower creatures, still such knowledge of God as can be gathered from the human mind does not transcend that kind of knowledge which is borrowed from sensible objects, since the soul knows her own essential nature by understanding the nature of things of sense (Chap.XLVI). Hence neither by this method can God be known in any higher way than as the cause is known by the effect.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT THE FINAL HAPPINESS OF MAN IS NOT IN THIS LIFE

IF then human happiness does not consist in the knowledge of God whereby He is commonly known by all or most men according to some vague estimate, nor again in the knowledge of God whereby He is known demonstratively in speculative science, nor in the knowledge of God whereby He is known by faith, as has been shown above (Chapp. XXXVIII-XL); if again it is impossible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God so as to know Him in His essence, or to understand other pure spirits, and thereby attain to a nearer knowledge of God (Chapp. XLI-XLVI); and still final happiness must be placed in some knowledge of God (Ch.XXXVII); it follows that it is impossible for the final happiness of man to be in this life.

2. The last end of man bounds his natural desire, so that, when that is reached, nothing further is sought: for if there is still a tendency to something else, the end of rest is not yet gained. But that cannot be in this life: for the more one understands, the more is the desire of understanding. natural to all men, increased.

3. When one gains happiness, he gains also stability and rest. All have this idea of happiness, that it involves stability as a necessary condition: hence the philosopher says that we do not take man for a chameleon. But in this life there is no stability: for however happy a man be called, sicknesses and misfortunes may always happen to debar him from that activity, whatever it is, wherein happiness consists.

4. It seems unfitting and irrational that the period of development should be great and the period of duration small: for it would follow that nature for

the greater part of its time went without its final perfection. Hence we see that animals that live for a short time take a short time in arriving at maturity. But if human happiness consists in perfect activity according to perfect virtue, whether intellectual or moral, such happiness cannot accrue to man till after a long lapse of time; and this is especially apparent in speculative activity, in which the happiness of man is ultimately placed. For scarcely in extreme age can a man arrive [at] a perfect view of scientific truth; and then for the most part there is little of human life left.

5. That is the perfect good of happiness, which is absolutely free from admixture of evil, as that is perfect whiteness, which is absolutely unmingled with black. But it is impossible for man in the state of this life to be altogether free from evils,—not to say bodily evils, as hunger, thirst, cold and heat, but even from evils of the soul. There is no man living who is not at times disturbed by inordinate passions, who does not at times overstep the mean in which virtue consists, or fall short of it, who is not in some things deceived, or ignorant of what he wishes to know, or driven to weak surmises on points where he would like absolute certainty.

6. Man naturally shrinks from death, and is sad at the thought of it. Yet man must die, and therefore cannot be perfectly happy while here he lives.

7. Happiness consists, not in habit, but in activity: for habits are for the sake of acts. But it is impossible in this life to do any act continually.

8. The more a thing is desired and loved, the greater grief and sadness does its loss bring. But if final happiness be in this world, it will certainly be lost, at least by death; and it is uncertain whether it will last till death, since to any man there may possibly happen in this life diseases totally debarring him from any virtuous activity, such as insanity. Such happiness therefore must always have a natural pendent of sadness.

But it may be replied that whereas happiness is the good of an intelligent nature, true and perfect happiness belongs to those in whom intelligent nature is found in its perfection, that is, in pure spirits; but in man it is found imperfectly by way of a limited participation. And this seems to have been the mind of Aristotle: hence, enquiring whether misfortunes take away happiness, after showing that happiness lies in virtuous activities, which are the most permanent things in this life, he concludes that they who enjoy such perfection in this life are “happy for men,” meaning that they do not absolutely attain happiness, but only in a human way.

Now it is demonstrable that the aforesaid answer is not to the undoing of the arguments above alleged. For (a) though man is inferior in the order of nature to pure spirits, yet he is superior to irrational creatures; and therefore he must gain his final end in a more perfect way than they. But they gain their final end so perfectly as to seek nothing further. Thus the natural desire of dumb animals is at rest in the enjoyment of sensual delights. Much more must the natural desire of man be put to rest by his arrival at his last end. But that is impossible in this life: therefore it must be attained after this life.

(b) It is impossible for a natural desire to be empty and vain: for nature does nothing in vain. But the desire of nature (for happiness) would be empty and vain, if it never possibly could be fulfilled. Therefore this natural desire of man is fulfillable. But not in this life. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life.

Alexander and Averroes laid it down that the final happiness of man is not in such knowledge as is possible to man through the speculative sciences, but in a knowledge gained by conjunction with a separately subsistent intelligence, which conjunction they conceived to be possible to man in this life. But because Aristotle saw that there was no other knowledge for man in this life than that which is through the speculative sciences, he supposed man not to gain perfect happiness, but a limited measure of happiness suited to his state. In all which investigation it sufficiently appears how hard pressed on this side and on that these fine geniuses (praeclara ingenia) were. From this stress of difficulty we shall find escape in positing, according to the proofs already given, that man can arrive at true happiness after this life, the soul of man being immortal. In this disembodied state the soul will understand in the way in which pure spirits understand (B. II, Chapp.XCVI, sq.) The final happiness of man then will be in the knowledge of God, which the human soul has after this life according to the manner in which pure spirits know Him.

Therefore the Lord promises us reward in heaven (Matt. v, 12), and says that the saints shall be as the angels (Matt. xxii, 30), who see the face of God in heaven (Matt. xviii, 10).

CHAPTER XLIX

THAT THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH PURE SPIRITS HAVE OF GOD THROUGH KNOWING THEIR OWN ESSENCE DOES NOT CARRY WITH IT A VISION OF THE ESSENCE OF GOD

WE must further enquire whether this very knowledge, whereby separately subsistent intelligences and souls after death know God through knowing their own essences, suffices for their own happiness. For the investigation of this truth we must first show that the divine essence is not known by any such mode of knowledge. In no way can the essence of a cause be known in its effect, unless the effect be the adequate expression of the whole power of the cause. But pure spirits know God through their own substances, as a cause is known through its effect inasmuch as each sees God as mirrored in another, and each sees God as expressed in himself. But none of these pure spirits is an effect adequate to the power of God (B. II, Chapp.XXVI,XXVII). It is impossible therefore for them to see the divine essence by this method of knowledge.

2. An intelligible likeness, whereby a thing is understood in its substance must be of the same species as that thing, or rather it must be its species,—thus the form of a house in the architect’s mind is the same species as the form of the house which is in matter, or rather it is its species,—for by the species of man you do not understand the essence of ass or horse. But the nature of an angel is not the same as the divine nature in species, nay not even in genus (B. I,Chap. XXV).

3. Everything created is bounded within the limits of some genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself every perfection of entire being (B. I, Chapp.XXVIII,XLIII). It is impossible therefore for the divine substance to be seen through any created medium.

Nevertheless a pure spirit by knowing its own substance knows the existence of God, and that God is the cause of all, and eminent above all, and removed (remotus) from all, not only from all things that are, but from all that the created mind can conceive. To this knowledge of God we also may attain in some sort: for from the effects of His creation we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause (sustaining principle) of other beings, super-eminent above other beings, and removed from all. And this is the highest perfection of our knowledge in this life: hence Dionysius says (De mystica theologia c. 2) that “we are united with God as with the unknown”; which comes about in this way, that we know of God what He is not, but what He is remains absolutely unknown. And to show the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge it is said of Moses that he drew nigh to the darkness in which God was (Exod. xx, 21).

But because an inferior nature at its height attains only to the lowest grade of the nature superior to it, this knowledge must be more excellent in pure spirits than in us. For (a) the nearer and more express the effect, the more evidently apparent the existence of the cause. But pure spirits, that know God through themselves, are nearer and more express likenesses of God than the effects through which we know God.

(c) High dignity better appears, when we know to what other high dignities it stands preferred. Thus a clown, knowing the king to be the chief man in the kingdom, but for the rest knowing only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has to do, does not know the king’s pre-eminence so well as another, who knows the dignity of all the princes of the realm. But we men know only some of the lowest of things that are. Though then we know that God is high above all beings, still we do not know the height of the Divine Majesty as the angels know it, who know the highest order of beings and God’s elevation above them all.

CHAPTER L

THAT THE DESIRE OF PURE INTELLIGENCES DOES NOT REST SATISFIED IN THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE WHICH THEY HAVE OF GOD

EVERYTHING that is imperfect in any species desires to gain the perfection of that species. He who has an opinion about a thing, opinion being an imperfect knowledge of the thing, is thereby egged on to desire a scientific knowledge of the thing. But the aforesaid knowledge, which pure spirits have of God without knowing His substance fully, is an imperfect kind of knowledge. The main point in the knowledge of anything is to know precisely what it essentially is. Therefore this knowledge which pure spirits have of God does not set their natural desire to rest, but rather urges it on to see the divine substance.

2. The knowledge of effects kindles the desire of knowing the cause: this search after causes set men upon philosophising. Therefore the desire of knowing, naturally implanted in all intelligent beings, does not rest unless, after finding out the substances of things made, they come also [etiam, not etiamsi] to know the cause on which those substances depend. By the fact then of pure spirits knowing that God is the cause of all the substances which they see, the natural desire in them does not rest unless they come also to see the substance of God Himself.

4. Nothing finite can set to rest the desire of intelligence. Given any finite thing, intelligence always sets to work to apprehend something beyond it.

But the height and power of every created substance is finite. Therefore the intelligence of a created spirit rests not in the knowledge of any created substances, however excellent, but tends still further in a natural desire to understand that substance which is of infinite height and excellence, namely, the divine substance (Chap.XLIII).

6. The nearer a thing is to the goal, the greater is its desire. But the intelligences of pure spirits are nearer to the knowledge of God than is our intelligence: therefore they desire that knowledge more intensely than we do. But even we, however much we know that God exists and has the attributes above mentioned, have not our desire assuaged, but still further desire to know God in His essence: much more then do pure spirits. The conclusion is, that the final happiness of pure spirits is not in that knowledge of God whereby they know Him through knowing their own substances, but their desire leads them further to the substance of God.

Hereby it sufficiently appears that final happiness is to be sought in no other source than in activity of intellect, since no desire carries so high as the desire of understanding truth. All our other desires, be they of pleasure or of anything else desirable by man, may rest in other objects; but the aforesaid desire rests not until it arrives at God, on whom all creation hinges and who made it all. Hence Wisdom aptly says: I dwell in the heights of heaven, and my throne is in the pillar of a cloud (Ecclus xxiv, 7); and it is said, Wisdom calls her handmaids to the citadel (Prov. ix, 3). Let them blush therefore who seek in basest things the happiness of man so highly placed.

CHAPTER LI

HOW GOD IS SEEN AS HE ESSENTIALLY IS

AS shown above (Chap.XLIX), the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect in any created presentation. Hence, if God’s essence is to be seen, the intelligence must see it in the divine essence itself, so that in such vision the divine essence shall be at once the object which is seen and that whereby it is seen.

This is the immediate vision of God that is promised us in Scripture: We see now in a glass darkly, but then face to face (i Cor. xiii, 2): a text absurd to take in a corporeal sense, as though we could imagine a bodily face in Deity itself, whereas it has been shown that God is incorporeal (B. I, Chap.XX). Nor again is it possible for us with our bodily face to see God, since the bodily sense of sight, implanted in our face, can be only of bodily things. Thus then shalt we see God face to face, in that we shall have an immediate vision of Him, as of a man whom we see face to face. By this vision we are singularly assimilated to God, and are partakers in His happiness: for this is His happiness, that He essentially understands His own substance. Hence it is said: When He shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is (1 John iii, 2). And the Lord said: I prepare for you as my Father hath prepared for me a kingdom, that ye may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom (Luke xxii, 29). This cannot be understood of bodily meat and drink, but of that food which is taken at the table of Wisdom, whereof it is said by Wisdom: Eat ye my bread and drink the wine that I have mingled for you (Prov. ix, 5). They therefore eat and drink at the table of God, who enjoy the same happiness wherewith God is happy, seeing Him in the way which He sees Himself.

CHAPTER LII

THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN OF ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE TO SEE GOD AS HE ESSENTIALLY IS

THE property of a higher nature cannot be attained by a lower nature except by the action of that higher nature to which it properly belongs. But to see God by the divine essence is the property of the divine nature: for it is proper to every agent to act by its own proper form. Therefore no subsistent intelligence can see God by the divine essence except through the action of God bringing it about.

5. To see the substance of God transcends the limits of every created nature: for it is proper to every intelligent created nature to understand according to the mode of its substance: but the divine substance is not intelligible according to the mode of any created substance (Chap.XLIX).

Hence it is said: The grace of God is life everlasting (Rom. vi, 23). For we have shown that the happiness of man consists in the vision of God, which is called life everlasting, whereunto we are led solely by the grace of God, because such vision exceeds the faculty of every creature, and it is impossible to attain it except by an endowment from God. And the Lord says: I will manifest myself to him (John xiv, 21).

CHAPTER LIII

THAT A CREATED INTELLIGENCE NEEDS SOME INFLUX OF DIVINE LIGHT TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

IT is impossible for that which is the proper form of one thing to become the form of another thing, unless that latter thing comes to partake of some likeness to the former. But the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intelligence, and is proportioned to it: for in God these three are one, that which understands, that whereby it understands, and that which is understood. It is impossible therefore for the very essence of God to become an intelligible form to any created intellect otherwise than by the said intellect coming to be partaker in some likeness to God.

3. If two things, not previously united, come afterwards to be united, this must be either by a change in both or by a change in one of them. If therefore any created intellect begins anew to see the essence of God, the divine essence must be conjoined anew with that intellect by way of intelligible presentation. But it is impossible for the divine essence to change; and therefore such union must begin by some change in the created intellect, that is to say, by its making some new acquisition.

But because we arrive at the knowledge of things intelligible through things sensible, we also transfer the names of sensible cognition to intelligible cognition, and particularly the properties of sight, which among senses is the nobler and more spiritual and more akin to intellect: hence intellectual knowledge itself is called sight, or vision. And because bodily vision is not accomplished except through light, the means whereby intellectual vision is fulfilled borrow the name of light. That disposition therefore whereby a created intelligence is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance is called the light of glory.’

This is the light of which it is said: In thy light we shall see light (Ps. xxxv, 10), to wit, of the divine substance; and, The city needeth not sun nor moon, for the brightness of God illuminateth it (Apoc. xxi, 23); and, No more shall there be sun to shine on thee by day, nor brightness of moon to enlighten thee, but the Lord shall be to thee an everlasting light, and thy God shall be thy glory Isaias lx, 19). And because in God being and understanding are the same and He is to all the cause of understanding, He is on that account called light’: He was the true light, that enlighteneth every man coming into this world John i, 8) : God is light (1 John i, 5): Clad in light as in a garment (Ps. ciii, 2). And therefore also as well God as the angels in Holy Scripture are described in figures of fire, because of the brightness of fire.

CHAPTER LIV

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE AFORESAID STATEMENTS, AND THEIR SOLUTIONS

ARG. 1. No access of light to the eye can elevate the sight to see things that transcend the natural faculty of bodily vision. But the divine substance transcends the entire capacity of created intelligence, even more than intellect transcends the capacity of sense. Therefore no light can supervene upon any created intelligence, to elevate it to the capacity of seeing the divine substance.

Reply. The divine substance is not beyond the capacity of created intelligence as though it were something altogether alien from it, as sound is alien from sight, or an immaterial substance from sense,—for the divine substance is the prime object of intelligence, and the beginning of all intellectual knowledge,—but it is beyond the capacity of created intelligence as exceeding its power, as the more excellent sensible objects are beyond the capacity of sense.

Arg. 2. That light which is received in the created intelligence is itself created, and therefore falling infinitely short of God. Therefore no such light can raise the creature to the vision of the divine substance.

Reply. This light raises the creature to the vision of God, not that there is no interval between it and the divine substance, but it does so in virtue of the power which it receives from God to such effect, although in its own being it falls infinitely short of God. For this created light does not conjoin the intelligence with God in point of being, but only in point of understanding.

Arg. 4. What is created, may very well be connatural with some created thing. If then that light is created, there may be some created intelligence, which by its own connatural light will see the divine substance, contrary to what has been shown (Chap.XLII).

Reply. The vision of the divine substance exceeds all natural faculty: hence the light whereby a created intelligence is perfected to the vision of the divine substance must be supernatural.

Arg. 6. There must be proportion between the intelligence and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between a created intelligence, perfected in the aforesaid light, and the divine substance, since the distance between them still remains infinite.

Reply. So there is a proportion between a created intelligence and God as an object of understanding, not a proportion implying any commensurateness of being, but a proportion implying a reference of one to the other, as matter is referred to form, or cause to effect. Thus there may well be a proportion between the creature and God, as the understanding is referred to the understood, or the effect to the cause.

Some have been moved by these and the like arguments to lay down the statement that God is never to be seen by any created intelligence. But this position, besides taking away the true happiness of the rational creature, which cannot be except in the vision of the divine substance, as has been shown (Chap.LI), is also in contradiction with the authority of Holy Scripture, and is to be rejected as false and heretical.

CHAPTER LV

THAT THE CREATED INTELLIGENCE DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE

THE aforesaid light is a principle of divine knowledge, since by it the created intelligence is elevated to see the divine substance. Therefore the mode of divine vision must be commensurate with the intensity of the aforesaid light. But the aforesaid light falls far short in intensity of the brightness of the divine understanding. It is impossible therefore for the divine substance to be seen by such light so perfectly as the divine understanding sees it. The divine understanding sees that substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible: for the truth of the divine substance and the clearness of the divine understanding are equal, nay are one. It is impossible therefore for created intelligence through the aforesaid light to see the divine substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. But everything that is comprehended by any knowing mind is known by it as perfectly as it is knowable. Thus he who knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, taking it as a matter of opinion on probable grounds because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend that truth: he alone comprehends it, who knows it as matter of science, through the medium of a demonstration showing cause. It is impossible therefore for any created intelligence to comprehend the divine substance.

2. Finite power cannot compass in its activity an infinite object. But the divine substance is infinite in comparison with every created intellect, since every created intellect is bounded within the limits of a certain species.

When it is said that the divine substance is seen but not comprehended by created intelligence, the meaning is not that something of it is seen and something not seen, since the divine substance is absolutely simple: what is meant is that it is not seen perfectly so far as it is visible. In the same way he who holds a demonstrable conclusion as a matter of opinion, is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is, scientifically, though there is no part of it that he does not know.

CHAPTER LVI

THAT NO CREATED INTELLIGENCE IN SEEING GOD SEES ALL THINGS THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM

THEN only does the knowledge of a principle necessitate the knowledge of all its effects, when the principle is thoroughly comprehended by the understanding: for so a principle is known to the whole extent of its power, all its effects being known as caused by it. But through the divine essence other things are known as effects from their cause. Since then created intelligence cannot know the divine substance so as to comprehend it, there is no necessity for it in seeing the divine substance to see all things that can be known thereby.

3. The extent of any power is measured by the objects to which it reaches. To know then all the objects to which any power reaches is to comprehend the power itself. But the divine power, being infinite, can be comprehended by no created intelligence, as neither can the divine essence (Chap.LV). Neither then can any created intelligence know all the objects to which the divine power extends.

5. No cognitive faculty knows anything except under the aspect of its proper object: thus by sight we know things only as coloured. Now the proper object of intelligence is whatever is in the substance of a thing. Therefore whatever the intelligence knows of a thing, it knows by a knowledge of the substance of the thing. If ever we know the substance of a thing by its accidents, that happens accidentally, inasmuch as our intellectual knowledge arises from sense, and thus we need to arrive at an intellectual view of substance through a knowledge of accidents: wherefore

this does not take place in mathematics, but in the natural sciences only. Whatever therefore in a thing cannot be known by a knowledge of its substance, must remain unknown to the knowing mind. But what a voluntary agent wishes cannot be known by a knowledge of his substance: for the will does not tend to its objects altogether by natural necessity: hence will’ and nature’ are counted two distinct active principles. What therefore a voluntary agent wills is not knowable except haply through certain effects, as, when we see one acting voluntarily, we know what he has willed: or it may be known in its cause, as God knows our wills, as He knows other effects of His production, by the fact of His being to us the cause of willing (B. I, Chap.LXVIII ad fin.): or it may be known by one intimating his will to another, as when one expresses his desire by speech. Since then many things depend on the absolute will of God, as has been partly shown already, and will hereafter appear, a created intelligence, even though seeing the substance of God, does not for all that see all that God sees by his substance.

It may be objected that God’s substance is something greater than all that He can make, or understand, or will beyond Himself; and that therefore, if a created intelligence can see the substance of God, much more can it know all that God through Himself either understands or wills or can do. But on careful study we see that it is not one and the same thing for an object to be known in itself and known in its cause. There are things easy enough to know in themselves, but not easily known in their causes. Though it is true that it is a grander thing to have understanding of the divine substance than to understand anything else, knowable in itself, away from that substance, still it is more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance, and in it to see its effects, than to know the divine substance without seeing its effects. Now the seeing of the divine substance may be without comprehension of it: but to have all things rendered intelligible through that substance and actually known, that cannot come about without comprehension.

CHAPTER LVII

THAT EVERY INTELLIGENCE OF EVERY GRADE CAN BE PARTAKER OF THE VISION OF GOD

SINCE it is by supernatural light that a created intelligence is raised to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intelligence so low in its nature as to be incapable of being raised to this vision. For that light cannot be connatural to any creature (Chap.LIV), but transcends the faculty of every created nature. But what is done by supernatural power is not hindered by diversity of nature, since divine power is infinite. Hence in the miraculous healing of the sick it makes no difference whether one be very ill or slightly indisposed. Therefore diversity of grade in intelligent nature is no hindrance to the lowest subject of such a nature being raised by that light to that vision.

2. The distance from God of the intelligence highest in order of nature is infinite in respect of perfection and goodness: whereas the distance of that intelligence from the very lowest intelligence is finite, for between finite and finite there cannot be infinite distance. The distance therefore between the lowest created intelligence and the highest is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the highest created intelligence and God. But what is as nothing can make no sensible variation, as the distance between the centre of the earth and our point of vision is as nothing in comparison with the distance between our point of vision and the eighth sphere, compared with which the whole earth counts as a point; and therefore no sensible error follows from our astronomers in their calculations taking their point of observation for the centre of the earth. Whatever intellect then

is raised to the vision of God by the above mentioned light,—be it highest, or lowest, or middlemost,—it makes no difference.

3. Every intelligence naturally desires the vision of the divine substance (Chapp.XXV,L). But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Any and every created intelligence then can arrive at the vision of the divine substance; and inferiority of nature is no impediment.

Hence the Lord promises to man the glory of the angels: They shall be as the angels of God in Heaven (Matt. xxii, 30); and in the Apocalypse the same measure is said to be of man and angel: the measure of a man, that is, of an angel (Apoc. xxi, 17). Therefore often in Holy Scripture the angels are described in the form of men, either entirely so, as with the angels who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii), or partially, as with the living creatures of whom it is said that the hand of a man was under their wings (Ezech. i, 8).

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT ONE MAY SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER

THE light of glory raises to the vision of God in this, that it is a certain likeness to the divine understanding (Chap.LIII). But a thing may be likened to God with more or less of closeness. Therefore one may see the divine substance with more or less of perfection.

4. The end must correspond to the means taken to gain it. But not all subsistent intelligences are equally prepared for their end, which is the vision of the divine substance: for some are of greater virtue, some of less, virtue being the way to happiness. Therefore there must be a diversity in their vision of God.

Hence it is said: in my Father’s House there are many mansions (John xiv, 2). In the mode of vision then there appear diverse grades of glory among the Blessed, but in respect of the object of vision their glory is the same. Hence to all the labourers in the vineyard, though they have not laboured equally, the Lord tells us that the same reward, or penny, is to be given, because the same object is given to all to see and enjoy, namely, God.

CHAPTER LIX

HOW THEY WHO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS

SINCE the vision of the divine substance is the final end of every subsistent intelligence, and the natural desire of every being is at rest when it has attained to its final end, the natural desire of every intelligence that sees the divine substance must be perfectly set at rest. But it is the mind's natural desire to know the genera and species and capabilities of all things and the whole order of the universe, as is shown by the zeal of mankind in trying to find out all these things. Every one therefore of those who see the divine substance will know all the above-mentioned objects.

2. In this is the difference between sense and intellect, as shown in De anima, III, iv, that sense is spoilt or impaired by brilliant or intense sensible objects, so that afterwards it is unable to appreciate similar objects of lower degree: but intellect, not being spoilt or checked by its object, but simply perfected, after understanding an object in which there is more to understand, is not less but better able to understand other objects which afford less scope for understanding. But the highest in the category of intelligible beings is the divine substance. When then an understanding is raised by divine light to see the substance of God, much more is it perfected by the same light to understand all other objects in nature.

4. Though of those who see God one sees Him more perfectly than an other, every one nevertheless sees Him with such perfection as to fill all his natural capacity, nay, the vision transcends all natural capacity (Chap.LII). Every one therefore, seeing the divine substance, must know in that substance all things to which his natural capacity extends. But the natural capacity of every intelligence extends to the knowledge of all genera and

species and the order of creation. These things therefore every one of those who see God will know in the divine substance.

Hence to Moses asking for a sight of the divine substance the Lord replied: I will show thee all good (Exod. xxxiii, 19); and Gregory says (Dialogues iv, 33): “What is it that they do not know, who know Him who knows all things?”

But on careful reflection upon what has been said it appears that they who see the divine substance in one way know all things, and in one way they do not. If by all things’ is meant whatever belongs to the perfection of the universe, the arguments alleged prove that they do see all things. To the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, with their properties and powers: for the intention of nature fixes on specific natures: as for individuals, they are for the species. It belongs then to the perfection of a subsistent intelligence, that it should know the natures and capabilities and proper accidents of all species. And by the knowledge of natural species individuals also existing under these species are known by the intelligence that sees God.

But if by all things’ is meant all things that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intelligence sees all things in the substance of God, as has been shown above (Chap.LVI). This may be verified in various respects. First, as regards things that God can do, but neither does nor ever means to do. All such things cannot be known without a thorough comprehension of His power, which is not possible to any created intelligence (Chap.LV). Hence it is said: Perchance thou wilt seize upon the footprints of God and perfectly discover the Almighty. He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and whence shalt thou know? Longer than the earth is his measure, and broader than the sea (Job xi, 7-9). Secondly, as regards the plans of things made, no intelligence can know them all without comprehending the divine goodness. For the plan of every thing made is taken from the end which the maker intends; and the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness: the plan therefore of things made is the diffusion of the divine goodness in creation. To know then all the plans of things made, one would have to know all the good things that can come about in creation according to the order of the divine wisdom: which would mean comprehending the divine goodness and wisdom, a thing that no created intelligence can do. Hence it is said: I understood that of all the works of God man cannot find out the plan (Eccles. viii, 17). Thirdly, as regards things that depend on the mere will of God, as predestination, election, justification, and the like, which belong to the sanctification of the creature, it is said: The things that are in man none knoweth but the spirit of man that is in him: in like manner the things that are of God none knoweth but the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii, 11).

CHAPTER LX

THAT THEY WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL THINGS IN HIM AT ONCE

SINCE it has been shown that a created intelligence in seeing the divine substance understands therein all the species of things; since moreover all things that are seen by one presentation must be seen together by one vision; it necessarily follows that the intelligence which sees the divine substance views all things, not successively, but simultaneously. Hence Augustine says (De Trinitate XV, xvi): “Our thoughts will not then be unstable, coming and going from one thing to another, but we shall see all our knowledge together at one glance.”

CHAPTER LXI

THAT BY THE SIGHT OF GOD ONE IS PARTAKER OF LIFE EVERLASTING

ETERNITY differs from time in this, that time has being in succession, but the being of eternity is all present together. But in the sight of God there is no succession: all things that are seen in that vision are seen at one glance. That vision therefore is accomplished in a certain participation of eternity. That vision also is a certain life: for activity of intellect is a life. Therefore by that sight the created intelligence is partaker of life everlasting.

4. The intellectual soul is created on the confines of eternity and time: because it is last in order of intelligences, and yet its substance is raised above corporeal matter, being independent of the same. But its action, inasmuch as it touches inferior things that are in time, is temporal. Therefore, inasmuch as it touches superior things that are above time, its action partakes of eternity. Such is especially the vision whereby it sees the divine substance. Therefore by such vision it enters into participation of eternity, and sees God in the same way as any other created intelligence.

Hence the Lord says: This is life everlasting, to know thee the only true God (John xvii, 3).

CHAPTER LXII

THAT THEY WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOR EVER

WHATEVER now is, and now is not, is measured by time. But the vision that makes the happiness of intellectual creatures is not in time, but in eternity (Chap.LXI). It is impossible therefore that from the moment one becomes partaker of it he should ever lose it.

2. An intelligent creature does not arrive at its last end except when its natural desire is set at rest. But as it naturally desires happiness, so it naturally desires perpetuity of happiness: for, being perpetual in its substance, whatever thing it desires for the thing's own sake, and not for the sake of something else, it desires as a thing to be had for ever. Happiness therefore would not be the last end, if it did not endure perpetually.

3. Everything that is loved in the having of it brings sadness, if we know that at some time we must part with it. But the beatific vision, being of all things most delightful and most desired, is of all things most loved by them who have it. They could not therefore be otherwise than saddened, if they knew that at some time they were to lose it. But if it were not meant to last for ever, they would be aware of the fact: for in seeing the divine substance, they also see other things that naturally are (Chap.LIX).

6. It is impossible for one to wish to resign a good thing that he enjoys, except for some evil that he discerns in the enjoyment of that good, or because he reckons it a hindrance to greater good. But in the enjoyment of the beatific vision there can be no evil, since it is the best thing to which an intelligent creature can attain: nor can he who enjoys that vision possibly think that there is any evil in it, or anything better than it, since the vision of that sovereign truth excludes all false judgement.

5. Nothing that is viewed with wonder can grow tedious: as long as it is an object of wonder, the desire of seeing it remains. But the divine substance is always viewed with wonder by any created intelligence, since no created intelligence can comprehend it. Therefore such intelligence can never find that vision tedious.

9. The nearer a thing comes to God, who is wholly unchangeable, the less changeable it is and the more enduring. But no creature can draw nearer to God than that which beholds His substance. The intelligent creature then gains in the vision of God a certain immutability, and cannot fall from that vision.

Hence it is said: Blessed are they who dwell in thy house, O Lord: they shall praise thee for ever and ever (Ps. lxxxiii, 5): He shall never be moved from his place, that dwelleth in Jerusalem (Ps. cxxiv, 1): Whoever shall overcome, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall not go out any more (Apoc. iii, 12).

CHAPTER LXIII

HOW IN THAT FINAL HAPPINESS EVERY DESIRE OF MAN IS FULFILLED

FROM what has been said it evidently appears that in that final happiness which comes of the vision of God every human desire is fulfilled, according to the text: Who filleth thy desire with good things (Ps. cii, 5). And every human endeavour there finds its final good: as may be seen by discussing the several heads.—I. As man is an intelligent being, there is in him a desire of investigating truth, which desire men follow out in the pursuit of a contemplative life. And this will manifestly be fulfilled in that vision, since by the sight of the first and highest truth all things that man naturally desires to know will become known to him (Chap.L).

2. There is also a desire which a man has in keeping with his rational faculty of managing and disposing of inferior things: which desire men prosecute in the pursuit of an active and civil life. And the chief scope and purpose of this desire is the laying out of man's whole life according to reason, which means living virtuously. This desire will then be altogether fulfilled when reason shall be in the height of its vigour, being enlightened by divine light that it may not fall away from what is right.

3. Upon civil life there follow certain goods which a man needs for his social and political activities. Thus there is honour and high estate, the inordinate desire of which makes men intriguing and ambitious. But that vision elevates men to the supreme height of honour, uniting them with God; and therefore, as God is the king of ages (1 Tim. i, 17), so the Blessed united with Him are said to reign: They shall reign with Christ (Apoc. xx, 6).

4. Another object of desire following upon civil life is celebrity of fame, by inordinate desire of which men are said to be covetous of vain glory. By that divine vision the blessed become celebrated, not before men, who may deceive and be deceived, but in the most true knowledge of God and of all their companions in bliss. And therefore that happiness is very frequently termed glory' in Holy Scripture, as in Ps. cxliv, 5: The saints shall exult in glory.

5. There is also another thing desirable in civil society, namely, riches, by inordinate craving and love for which men become illiberal and unjust. But in that blissful state there is sufficiency of all good things, inasmuch as the Blessed enjoy Him who comprises the perfection of them: wherefore it is said: All good things came to me with her (Wisdom vii, 11); and, Glory and wealth is in this house (Ps. cxi, 3).

6. There is also a third desire in man, common to him with other animals, the desire of pleasurable enjoyments, which men pursue in the life of pleasure, and thereby become intemperate and incontinent. But in the happiness of the sight of God there is perfect delight, all the more perfect than the pleasure of sense, which brute animals also can enjoy, as intellect is higher than sense; all the more perfect as (quanto) the good in which we shall take delight is greater than any sensible good, and comes more home to us, and is more continually delightful; all the more perfect again as the delight is more pure and free from all admixture of sadness or harassing solicitude; and of this it is said: They shall be inebriated by the plenty of thy house, and thou wilt make them drink of the torrent of thy pleasure (Ps. xxxv, 9).

7. There is also a natural desire common to all things, in that they all desire self-preservation, so far as possible; by the immoderation of which desire men are rendered timid and spare themselves too much from labours. This desire also shall be perfectly fulfilled when the Blessed attain to perfect everlasting duration, secure from all hurt, according to the text: They shall not hunger nor thirst any more, neither shall the sun fall upon them, nor any heat (Isa. xlix, 10; Apoc. vii, 16).

Thus it appears that by the vision of God subsistent intelligences gain true happiness, in which every desire is wholly laid to rest, and in which there is abundant sufficiency of all good things, which Aristotle considers a requisite of happiness. Nothing in this life is so like this final and perfect happiness as the life of them who contemplate truth so far as possible. For the contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come, whereas the life of action and the political life do not transcend the bounds of this present.

CHAPTER LXIV

THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE

THE foregoing conclusions sufficiently show that God is the end of all things. Hence it may be further gathered that by His providence He governs and rules all things. For whatever things are referred to an end, are all subject to His management to whom principally that end belongs, as appears in an army: for all the components of the army and all their works are referred to one last end, the good of the general, which is victory, and therefore it belongs to the general to govern the whole army. In like manner the art which is concerned with the end gives commands and laws to the art which is concerned with the means, as politics to the art of war, the art of war to the management of cavalry, navigation to shipbuilding. Since therefore all things are referred to an end, which is the divine goodness (Chapp.XVII,XVIII), God, to whom that goodness principally belongs,—as being His own substance, possessed, understood, and loved,—must have the chief control of all things.

5. Things that are distinct in their natures do not combine into one system, unless they be bound up in one by one directing control (ab uno ordinante). But in the universe there are things, having distinct and contrary natures, which nevertheless all combine in one system, some things taking up the activities of other things, some things being aided or even wrought by others. There must then be one ordainer and governor of the universe.

8. Every agent that intends an end cares more for that which is nearer to the last end. But the last end of the divine will is the divine goodness, and the nearest thing to that in creation is the goodness of the order of the entire universe, that being the end to which every particular good of this or that

thing is referred, as the less perfect is referred to the more perfect, and every part is for its whole. What therefore God most cares for in creation is the order of the universe: He is therefore its controller.

Hence Holy Scripture ascribes the course of events to the divine command: Who giveth command to the sun, and it riseth not, and encloseth the stars as under a seal (Job ix, 7): He hath given a command, and it shall not pass away (Ps. cxlviii, 6).

CHAPTER LXV

THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN BEING

FROM God’s governing all things by His providence it follows that He preserves them in being. For everything whereby things gain their end is part of the governing of them. But to the last end which God intends, namely, the divine goodness, things are directed not only by their activities, but also by the fact of their existence, because by that mere fact they bear some likeness to the divine goodness. Therefore it is proper to divine providence to keep things in being.

5. As a work of art presupposes a work of nature, so a work of nature presupposes a work of God creating: for the material of artificial things is from nature, and the material of natural things is through creation of God. But artificial things are preserved in being by virtue of natural things, as a house by the solidity of its stones. Therefore natural things are not preserved in being otherwise than through the power of God.

6. The impression made by an agent does not remain in the effect when the action of the agent ceases, unless that impression turns into and becomes part of the nature of the effect. Thus the forms and properties of things generated remain in them to the end, after the generation is done, because they are made natural to the things: in like manner habits are difficult to change, because they turn into nature. But dispositions, bodily impressions, and emotions, though they remain for some little while after the action of the agent, do not remain permanently: they find place in the subject as being on the way to become part of its nature. But what belongs to the nature of a superior genus in no way remains after the action of the agent is over, as light does not remain in a transparent medium after the

source of light is taken away. But being is not the nature or essence of anything created, but of God alone (B. I, Chapp.XXI,XXII). Nothing then can remain in being when the divine activity ceases.

7. Concerning the origin of things there are two theories, one of faith, that things had a first commencement, and were then brought into being by God; the other the theory of sundry philosophers, that things have emanated (fluxerint) from God from all eternity. On either theory we must say that things are preserved in being by God. For if things are brought into being by God after not being, the being of things must be consequent upon the divine will; and similarly their not being, because He has permitted things not to be when He willed and made things to be when He willed. Things therefore are, so long as He wills them to be. His will then is the upholder of creation. On the other hand, if things have emanated from God from all eternity, it is impossible to assign any time or instant in which first they emanated from God. Either then they were never produced by God at all, or their being is continually coming forth from God so long as they exist.

Hence it is said: Bearing up all things by the word of his power (Heb. i, 3). And Augustine says (De Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “The power of the Creator, and the might of the Almighty and All-containing, is the cause of the permanence of every creature. If this power ever ceased from governing creation, all the brave show of creatures would at once cease, and all nature would fall to nothing. It is not like the case of one who has built a house, and goes away, and still the structure remains, when his work has ceased and his presence is withdrawn. The world could not endure for the twinkling of an eye, if God retired from the government of it.”

Hereby is excluded the theory of some Doctors of the Law of the Moors, who, by way of sustaining the position that the world needs the preserving hand of God, have supposed all forms to be accidents, and that no accident lasts for two successive instants, the consequence being that the formation of things is always in the making,—as though a thing needed no efficient cause except while it is in the making. Some of them are further said to hold that the indivisible atoms, out of which they say that all substances are composed,—which atoms, according to them, alone are indestructible,—could last for some short time, even though God were to withdraw His guidance from the world. Some of them further say that things would not cease to be but for God causing in them an accident of ceasing.’ All which positions are manifestly absurd.

CHAPTER LXVI

THAT NOTHING GIVES BEING EXCEPT IN AS MUCH AS IT ACTS IN THE POWER OF GOD

NOTHING gives being except in so much as it is an actual being. But God preserves things in actuality.

5. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. But among all effects the first is being: all other things, as they proceed from their cause, are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the prime agent, and all other things act inasmuch as they act in the power of the prime agent. Secondary agents, which are in a manner particular determinants of the action of the prime agent, have for the proper effects of their action other perfections determinant of being.

6. What is essentially of a certain nature, is properly the cause of that which comes to have that nature only by participation. But God alone is being by essence, all others are beings by participation. Therefore the being of everything that exists is an effect properly due to God; so that anything that brings anything else into being does so insomuch as it acts in the power of God.

Hence it is said: God created all things to be (Wisd. i, 14).

CHAPTER LXVII

THAT GOD IS THE CAUSE OF ACTIVITY IN ALL ACTIVE AGENTS

AS God not only gave being to things when they first began to be, but also causes being in them so long as they exist (Chap.LXV); so He did not once for all furnish them with active powers, but continually causes those powers in them, so that, if the divine influx were to cease, all activity would cease.

Hence it is said: Thou hast wrought all our works in us, O Lord (Isa. xxvi, 12). And for this reason frequently in the Scriptures the effects of nature are put down to the working of God, because He it is that works in every agent, physical or voluntary: e.g., Hast thou not drawn me out like milk, and curdled me like cheese? with skin and flesh thou hast clothed me, with bones and sinews thou hast put me together (Job x, 10, 11).

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE AND IN ALL THINGS

AN incorporeal thing is said to be in a thing by contact of power. Therefore if there be anything incorporeal fraught with infinite power, that must be everywhere. But it has been shown (B. I Chap.XLIII) that God has infinite power. He is therefore everywhere.

4. Since God is the universal cause of all being, in whatever region being can be found there must be the divine presence.

6. An efficient cause must be together with its proximate and immediate effect. But in everything there is some effect which must be set down for the proximate and immediate effect of God's power: for God alone can create (B. II, Chap.XXI); and in everything there is something caused by creation,—in corporeal things, primordial matter; in incorporeal beings, their simple essences (B. II, Chapp.XV, sq). God then must be in all things, especially since the things which He has once produced from not-being to being He continually and always preserves in being (Chap.LXV).

Hence it is said: I fill heaven and earth (Jer. xxiii, 24): If I ascend into heaven, thou art there: if I descend into hell, thou art there (Ps. cxxxviii, 8).

God is indivisible, and wholly out of the category of the continuous: hence He is not determined to one place, great or small, by the necessity of His essence, seeing that He is from eternity before all place: but by the immensity of His power He reaches all things that are in place, since He is the universal cause of being. Thus then He is whole everywhere, reaching all things by His undivided power.

CHAPTER LVIX

OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS

SOME have taken an occasion of going wrong by thinking that no creature has any action in the production of natural effects,—thus that fire does not warm, but God causes heat where fire is present. So Avicebron in his book, The Fountain of Life, lays it down that no body is active, but the power of a subsistent spirit permeating bodies does the actions which seem to be done by bodies. But on such theories many awkward consequences follow.

1. If no inferior cause, and especially no corporeal cause, does any work, but God works alone in all agencies, and God does not change by working in different agencies; no difference of effect will follow from the difference of agencies in which God works: but that is false by the testimony of sense.

2. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom for anything to be to no purpose in the works of the wise. But if created things in no way work to the production of effects, but God alone works all effects immediately, to no purpose are other things employed by Him.

3. To grant the main thing is to grant the accessories. But actually to do follows upon actually to be: thus God is at once pure actuality and the first cause. If then God has communicated to other beings His likeness in respect of being, it follows that He has communicated to them His likeness in respect of action.

4. To detract from the perfection of creatures is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. But if no creature has any action in the production of any effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the

creature: for it marks abundance of perfection to be able to communicate to another the perfection which one has oneself.

5. God is the sovereign good (B. I, Chap.XLI). Therefore it belongs to Him to do the best. But it is better for good conferred on one to be common to many than for it to be confined to that one: for common good always proves to be more godlike than the good of the individual. But the good of one comes to be common to many when it is derived from one to many, which cannot be except in so far as the agent diffuses it to others by a proper action of its own. God then has communicated His goodness in such a way that one creature can transmit to others the good which it has received.

6. To take away order from creation is to take away the best thing that there is in creation: for while individual things in themselves are good, the conjunction of them all is best by reason of the order in the universe: for the whole is ever better than the parts and is the end of the parts. But if actions are denied to things, the order of things to one another is taken away: for things differing in their natures are not tied up in the unity of one system otherwise than by this, that some act and some are acted upon.

7. If effects are not produced by the action of creatures, but only by the action of God, it is impossible for the power of any creature to be manifested by its effect: for an effect shows the power of the cause only by reason of the action, which proceeds from the power and is terminated to the effect. But the nature of a cause is not known through its effect except in so far as through its effect its power is known which follows upon its nature. If then created things have no actions of their own productive of effects, it follows that the nature of a created thing can never be known by its effect; and thus there is withdrawn from us all investigation of natural science, in which demonstrations are given principally through the effect.

Some Doctors of the Moorish Law are said to bring an argument to show that accidents are not traceable to the action of bodies, the ground of the argument being this, that an accident does not pass from subject to subject: hence they count it an impossibility for heat to pass from a hot body to another body heated by it, but they say that all such accidents are created by God. Now this is a ridiculous proof to assign of a body not acting, to point to the fact that no accident passes from subject to subject. When it is said that one hot body heats another, it is not meant that numerically the same heat, which is in the heating body, passes to the body heated; but that by virtue of the heat, which is in the heating body, numerically another heat comes to be in the heated body actually, which was in it before potentially. For a natural agent does not transfer its own form to another subject, but reduces the subject upon which it acts from potentiality to actuality.

CHAPTER LXX

HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM A NATURAL AGENT

SOME find it difficult to understand how natural effects are attributable At once to God and to a natural agent. For (Arg. 1) one action, it seems, cannot proceed from two agents. If then the action, by which a natural effect is produced, proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God.

Arg. 2. When an action can be sufficiently done by one, it is superfluous to have it done by more: we see that nature does not do through two instruments what she can do through one. Since then the divine power is sufficient to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ also natural powers for the production of those same effects. Or if the natural power sufficiently produces its own effect, it is superfluous for the divine power to act to the same effect.

Arg. 3. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce.

Upon consideration, these arguments are not difficult. Reply 1. The power of the inferior agent depends upon the power of the superior agent, inasmuch as the superior agent gives to the inferior the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or applies it to action; as a workman applies a tool to its proper effect, frequently however without giving the tool the form whereby it acts, nor preserving it, but merely giving it motion. The action therefore of the inferior agent must proceed from that agent not merely through its own power, but through the power of all superior agents, for it acts in virtue of them all. And as the ultimate and lowest agent acts immediately, so is the power of the prime agent immediate in the production of the effect. For the power of the lowest agent is not competent to produce the effect of itself, but in power of the agent next above it; and the power of that agent is competent in virtue of the agent above it; and thus the power of the highest agent proves to be of itself productive of the effect, as the immediate cause, as we see in the principles of mathematical demonstrations, of which the first principle is inimediate. As then it is not absurd for the same action to be produced by an agent and the power of that agent, so neither is it absurd for the same effect to be produced by an inferior agent and by God, by both immediately, although in different manners.

Reply 2. Though a natural thing produces its own effect, it is not superfluous for God to produce it, because the natural thing does not produce it except in the power of God. Nor is it superfluous, while God can of Himself produce all natural effects, for them to be produced by other causes: this is not from the insufficiency of God's power, but from the immensity of His goodness, whereby He has wished to communicate His likeness to creatures, not only in point of their being, but likewise in point of their being causes of other things (Chap.XXI). Reply 3. When the same effect is attributed to a natural cause and to the divine power, it is not as though the effect were produced partly by God and partly by the natural agent: but the whole effect is produced by both, though in different ways, as the same effect is attributed wholly to the instrument, and wholly also to the principal agent.

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT THE DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS NOT WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRESENCE OF EVIL IN CREATION

PERFECT goodness could not be in creation if there were not found an order of goodness among creatures, some being better than others: or else all possible grades of goodness would not be filled up; nor would any creature be like God in having pre-eminence over another. Thus a great beauty would be lost to creation in the removal of the order of distinct and dissimilar beings, one better than the other. A dead level of goodness would be a manifest derogation to the perfection of creation. A higher grade of goodness consists in there being something which cannot fall away from goodness; a lower grade, in there being that which can fall away. The perfection of the universe requires both grades of goodness. But it is the care of a ruler to uphold perfection in the subjects of his government, not to make it less. Therefore it is no part of divine providence wholly to exclude from creation the capability of falling away from good. But upon this capability evil ensues: for what is capable of falling away, sometimes does fall away; and the mere lack of good is evil (Chap.VII).

3. The best rule in any government is to provide for everything under government according to the mode of its nature: just administration consists in this. As then it would be contrary to any rational plan of human administration for the civil government to debar its subjects from acting according to their offices and conditions of life, except perhaps in an occasional hour of emergency, so it would be contrary to the plan of divine government not to allow creatures to act according to the mode of their

several natures. But by the very fact of creatures so acting there follows destruction and evil in the world, since by reason of mutual contrariety and inconsistency one thing is destructive of another.

5. There are many good things in creation which would find no place there, unless evils were there also. Thus there would be no patience of the just, if there were not the malice of persecutors: no room for vindictive justice, if there were no offences: and in the physical order one thing cannot come to be unless something else is destroyed. If then evil were wholly excluded from the universe by divine providence, the number of good things would be proportionally diminished: which ought not to be, because good is more vigorous in goodness than evil in badness (virtuosius est bonum in bonitate quam in malitia malum), as above shown (Chap.XII).

6. The good of the whole takes precedence of the good of the part. It belongs then to a prudent ruler to neglect some defect of goodness in the part for the increase of goodness in the whole, as an architect buries the foundation under the earth for the strengthening of the whole house. But if evil were removed from certain portions of the universe, much perfection would be lost to the universe, the beauty of which consists in the orderly blending of things good and evil (pulcritudo ex ordinata bonorum et malorum adunatione consurgit), while evil things have their origin in the breaking down of good things, and still from them good things again take their rise by the providence of the ruler, as an interval of silence makes music sweet.

7. Other things, and particularly inferior things, are ordained to the end of the good of man. But if there were no evils in the world, much good would be lost to man, as well in respect of knowledge, as also in respect of desire and love of good: for good is better known in contrast with evil; and while evil results come about, we more ardently deire good results: as sick men best know what a blessing health is.

Therefore it is said: Making peace and creating evil (Isai. xlv, 7): Shall there be evil in the city that the Lord has not done? (Amos iii, 6.)

Boethius (De consolatione, Lib. I, prosa 4) introduces a philosopher asking the question: If there is a God, how comes evil?’. The argument should be turned the other way: If there is evil, there is a God.’ For there would be no evil, if the order of goodness were taken away, the privation of which is evil; and this order would not be, if God were not.

Hereby is taken away the occasion of the error of the Manicheans, who supposed two primary agents, good and evil, as though evil could not have place under the providence of a good God.

We have also the solution of a doubt raised by some, whether evil actions are of God. Since it has been shown (Chap.LXVI) that every agent produces its action inasmuch as it acts by divine power, and that thereby God is the cause of all effects and of all actions (Chap.LXVII); and since it has been further shown (Chap.X) that in things subject to divine providence evil and deficiency happens from some condition of secondary causes, in which there may be defect; it is clear that evil actions, inasmuch as they are defective, are not of God, but of defective proximate causes; but so far as the action and entity contained in them goes, they must be of God,—as lameness is of motive power, so far as it has anything of motion, but so far as it has anything of defect, it comes of curvature of the leg.

CHAPTER LXXII

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH AN ELEMENT OF CONTINGENCY IN CREATION

AS divine providence does not exclude all evil from creation, neither does it exclude contingency, or impose necessity upon all things. The operation of providence does not exclude secondary causes, but is fulfilled by them, inasmuch as they act in the power of God. Now effects are called necessary’ or contingent’ according to their proximate causes, not according to their remote causes. Since then among proximate causes there are many that may fail, not all effects subject to providence will be necessary, but many will be contingent.

6. On the part of divine providence no hindrance will be put to the failure of the power of created things, or to an obstacle arising through the resistance of something coming in the way. But from such failure and such resistance the contingency occurs of a natural cause not always acting in the same way, but sometimes failing to do what it is naturally competent to do; and so natural effects do not come about of necessity.

CHAPTER LXXIII

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH FREEDOM OF THE WILL

THE government of every prudent governor is ordained to the perfection of the things governed, to the gaining, or increasing, of maintenance of that perfection. An element of perfection then is more worthy of being preserved by providence than an element of imperfection and defect. But in inanimate things the contingency of causes comes of imperfection and defect: for by their nature they are determined to one effect, which they always gain, unless there be some let or hindrance arising either from limitation of power, or the interference of some external agent, or indisposition of subject-matter; and on this account natural causes in their action are not indifferent to either side of an alternative, but for the most part produce their effects uniformly, while they fail in a minority of instances. But that the will is a contingent cause comes of its very perfection, because its power is not tied to one effect, but it rests with it to produce this effect or that, wherefore it is contingent either way. Therefore providence is more concerned to preserve the liberty of the will than to preserve contingency in natural causes.

2. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their several modes. But a thing's mode of action depends upon its form, which is the principle of action. But the form whereby a voluntary agent acts is not determinate: for the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect; and the intellect has not one determined form of effect under its

consideration, but essentially embraces a multitude of forms; and therefore the will can produce multiform effects.

3. The last end of every creature is to attain to a likeness to God (Chap.XVII): therefore it would be contrary to providence to withdraw from a creature that whereby it attains the divine likeness. But a voluntary agent attains the divine likeness by acting freely, as it has been shown that there is free will in God (B. I, Chap.LXXXVIII).

4. Providence tends to multiply good things in the subjects of its government. But if free will were taken away, many good things would be withdrawn. The praise of human virtue would be taken away, which is nullified where good is not done freely: the justice of rewards and punishments would be taken away, if man did not do good and evil freely: wariness and circumspection in counsel would be taken away, as there would be no need of taking counsel about things done under necessity. It would be therefore contrary to the plan of providence to withdraw the liberty of the will.

Hence it is said: God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel: before man is life and death, whatever he shall please shall be given him (Ecclus xv, 14-17).

Hereby is excluded the error of the Stoics, who said that all things arose of necessity, according to an indefeasible order, which the Greeks called ymarmene (heimarmene).

CHAPTER LXXIV

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH FORTUNE AND CHANCE

THE multitude and diversity of causes proceeds from the order of divine providence and arrangement. Supposing an arrangement of many causes, one must sometimes combine with another, so as either to hinder or help it in producing its effect. A chance event arises from a coincidence of two or more causes, in that an end not intended is gained by the coming in of some collateral cause, as the finding of a debtor by him who went to market to make a purchase, when his debtor also came to market.

Hence it is said: I saw that the race was not to the swift . . . . but that occasion and chance are in all things (Eccles ix, 11) to wit, in all sublunary things (in inferioribus).

CHAPTER LXXV

THAT THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD IS EXERCISED OVER INDIVIDUAL AND CONTINGENT THINGS

IF God has no care of these individual things, that is either because He does not know them, or because He has no power over them, or because He has no will to take care of them. But it has been shown above (B. I, Chap.LXV) that God has knowledge of individual things. Nor can it be said that He has no power to take care of them, seeing that His power is infinite (B. II, Chap.XXII). Nor again that God has no wilt to govern them, seeing that the object of His will is universally all good (B. I, Chap.LXXVIII).

3. This common attribute is found in productive causes, that they have a care of the things that they produce, as animals naturally nourish their young. God thereof has care of the things of which He is the cause. But He is the cause even of these particular things (B. II, Chap.XV), and therefore He has care of them.

5. It would be a foolish providence not to take care of those things without which the objects of one’s care could not exist. But certainly, if all particulars were to fail, universals could not remain. If then God has care of the universal only, and neglects the individual altogether, His providence must be foolish and imperfect. But if it is said that God has care of individuals so far as to see that they are maintained in being, but no further, that answer cannot stand. For all that befalls individuals has some bearing on their preservation or destruction. If therefore God has care of individuals so far as to see to their preservation, He must have care of all that befalls them.

7. This is the difference between speculative and practical knowledge, that speculative knowledge and all that concerns such knowledge is wrought out in generalities, whereas the sphere of practical knowledge is the particular. For the end of practical knowledge is truth, which consists primarily and ordinarily in the immaterial and universal, while the end of practical knowledge is action, which deals with particular facts. Hence the physician does not attend man in general, but this man; and to the care of the individual man the whole science of medicine is directed. But providence, being directive of things to their end, must be a department of practical knowledge. Thus the providence of God would be very imperfect, if it stopped short at the universal, and did not reach individual cases.

8. The perfection of speculative knowledge lies in the universal rather than in the particular: universals are better known than particulars; and therefore the knowledge of the most general principles is common to all. Still, even in speculative science, he is more perfect who has not a mere general but a concrete (propriam) knowledge of things. For he who knows in the general only, knows a thing only potentially. Thus the scholar is reduced from a general knowledge of principles to a concrete knowledge of conclusions by his master, who has both knowledges,—as a being is reduced from potentiality to actuality by another being, already in actuality. Much more in practical science is he more perfect, who disposes things for actuality not merely in the universal but in the particular. God’s most perfect providence therefore extends even to individuals.

9. Since God is the cause of being, as such (B. II, Chap.XV), He must also be the provider of being, as such. Whatever then in any way is, falls under His providence. But singular things are beings, and indeed more so than universals, because universals do not subsist by themselves, but are only in singulars. Divine providence therefore has care also of singulars.

Hence it is said: Two sparrows are sold for a farthing; and not one of them falls to the ground without your Father (Matt. x, 29); and, [Wisdom] reaches from end to end strongly (Wisd. viii, 1), that is, from the highest creatures to the lowest. Also their opinion is condemned who said: The Lord hath abandoned the earth, the Lord doth not see (Ezech. ix, 9): He walketh about the poles of heaven, and doth not consider our things (Job xxii, 14).

CHAPTER LXXVI

THAT THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD WATCHES IMMEDIATELY OVER ALL INDIVIDUAL THINGS

IN matters of human administration, the higher administrator confines his care to the arrangement of general main issues, and leaves details to his subordinates, and that on account of his personal limitations, because, as for the state and condition of lesser things, he is either ignorant of them, or he cannot afford the labour and length of time that would be necessary to arrange for them. But such limitations are far from God: it is no labour for Him to understand, and it takes Him no time, since in understanding Himself He understands all things else (B. I, Chap.XLIX).

4. In human administrations, the industry and care of the lower officials arranges matters left to their charge by their chief. Their chief does not bestow upon them their faculty of industry and care, but merely allows it free play. If the industry and care came from their superior, the arrangement would be the superior’s arrangement; and they would not be authors of the arrangement, but carriers of it into execution. But we have seen (B. I, Chap.LI: B. III, Chap.LXVII) that all wisdom and intelligence comes from God above; nor can any intellect understand anything except in the power of God, nor any agent do anything except in the same power. God Himself therefore by His providence immediately disposes all things; and whoever are called providers under Him, are executors of His providence.

7. If God does not by Himself take immediate care of lower individualities, that must be either because He despises them, or because He fears to sully His dignity, as some say. But that is irrational, for there is

greater dignity in devising an arrangement than in working one out. If then God works in all things, as has been shown (Chap.LXVII), and that is not derogatory to His dignity, nay rather befits His universal and sovereign power, an immediate providence over individual things is no contemptible occupation for Him either, and throws no slur upon His dignity.

Hence it is said: Thou hast done the things of old and hast devised one thing after another (Judith ix, 4).

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE ARE CARRIED INTO EXECUTION BY MEANS OF SECONDARY CAUSES

IT belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and diversity of servants to carry his command into execution, the height and greatness of his lordship appearing by the multitude of persons of various ranks who are subject to him: but no dignity of any ruler is comparable with the dignity of the divine government: it is suitable therefore that the arrangements of divine providence be carried into execution by divers grades of agents.

6. As the cause is superior to the effect, the order of causes is nobler than that of effects: in that order therefore the perfection of divine providence is better shown. But if there were not intermediate causes carrying divine providence into execution, there would be in creation no order of causes, but only of effects. The perfection therefore of divine providence requires that there should be intermediate causes carrying it into execution.

Hence it is said: Bless the Lord, all his powers, ye ministers that do his word (Ps. cii, 21): Fire, hail, snow, stormy winds that do his word (Ps. cxlviii, 8).

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THAT INTELLIGENT CREATURES ARE THE MEDIUM THROUGH WHICH OTHER CREATURES ARE GOVERNED BY GOD

SINCE the preservation of order in creation is a concern of divine providence, and it is a congruous order to descend by steps of due proportion from highest to lowest, divine providence must reach by a certain rule of proportion to the lowest things. The rule of proportion in this, that as the highest creatures are under God and are governed by Him, so lower creatures should be under the higher and be governed by them. But of all creatures intelligent creatures are the highest (Chap.XLIX). Therefore the plan of divine providence requires that other creatures should be governed by rational creatures.

CHAPTER LXXXI

OF THE SUBORDINATION OF MEN ONE TO ANOTHER

SINCE man is endowed with understanding and sense and bodily power, these faculties are arranged in order in him by the disposition of divine providence according to the plan of the order that obtains in the universe, bodily power being put under that of sense and intellect as carrying out their command, and the sentient faculty itself under the faculty of intellect. And similar is the order between man and man. Men pre-eminent in understanding naturally take the command; while men poor in understanding, but of great bodily strength, seem by nature designate for servants, as Aristotle says in his Politics, with whom Solomon is of one mind, saying: The fool shall serve the wise (Prov. xi, 29). But as in the works of one man disorder is born of intellect following sense, so in the commonwealth the like disorder ensues where the ruler holds his place, not by pre-eminence of understanding, but by usurpation of bodily strength, or is brought into power by some burst of passion. Nor is Solomon silent upon this disorder: There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, a fool set in high estate (Eccles x, 5, 6). But even such an anomaly does not carry with it the entire perversion of the natural order: for the dominion of fools is weak, unless strengthened by the counsel of the wise. Hence it is said: A wise man is strong, and a knowing man stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels (Prov. xxiv, 5, 6). And because he who gives counsel rules him who takes it, and becomes in a manner his master, it is said: A wise servant shall be master over foolish sons (Prov. xvii, 2).

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

THAT OTHER SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCES CANNOT BE DIRECT CAUSES OF OUR ELECTIONS AND VOLITIONS

NOR is it to be thought that the souls of the heavens, if any such souls there be, or any other separately subsisting created intelligences, can directly thrust a volition in upon us, or be the cause of our choice. For the actions of all creatures are contained in the order of divine providence, and cannot act contrary to the conditions of action which providence has laid down. Now it is a law of providence that everything be immediately induced to action by its own proximate cause. But the proximate cause of volition is good apprehended by the understanding: that is the proper object of the will, and the will is moved by it as sight by colour. No subsistent creature therefore can move the will except through the medium of good grasped by the understanding. That is done by showing it that something is good to do, which is called persuasion. No subsistent creature therefore can act upon our will, or be the cause of our choice, otherwise than by means of persuasion.

4. “The violent is that the origin whereof is from without, without the subject of violence in any way contributing thereto.” Were then the will to be moved by any exterior principle, that motion would be violent. I call that an exterior principle of motion, which moves as an efficient cause, and not as a final cause. But violence is inconsistent with voluntariness. It is impossible therefore for the will to be moved to voluntary action by an exterior principle acting as an efficient cause, but every motion of the will

must proceed from within. Now no subsistent creature is in touch with the interior of an intelligent soul: God alone is in such close connexion with the soul, as He alone is cause of its being and maintains it in existence. Therefore by God alone can a motion of the will be efficiently caused.

Hence it is said: The king’s heart is in the hand of the Lord: he shall turn it whithersoever he will (Prov. xxi, 1); and, God it is worketh in us both to will and to accomplish according to his good pleasure (Phil. ii, 13).

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THAT THE MOTION OF THE WILL IS CAUSED BY GOD, AND NOT MERELY BY THE POWER OF THE WILL

SOME, not understanding how God can cause the movement of the will in us without prejudice to the freedom of the will, have endeavoured to pervert the meaning of these texts, saying that God causes in us to will and to accomplish, inasmuch as He gives us the power of willing, but not as making us will this or that. Hence some have said that providence is not concerned with the subject-matter of free will, that is, with choices, but with extrinsic issues: for he who makes choice of something to gain or something to accomplish, for instance, building or the amassing of wealth, will not always be able to attain his end, and thus the issues of our actions are not subject to free will, but are disposed by providence.

1. But this theory runs manifestly counter to texts of Holy Scripture. For it is said: All our works thou hast wrought in us, O Lord (Isai. xxvi, 12): hence we have of God not merely the power of willing, but also the act. And the above quoted saying of Solomon, he shall turn it whithersoever he will, shows that the divine causality extends at once to will-power and to actual volition.

2. Nothing can act in its own strength unless it act also in the power of God (Chap.LXVI): therefore man cannot use the will-power given to him except in so far as he acts in the power of God.

4. God is the cause of all action, and works in every agent (Chap.LXX): therefore He is cause of the motives of the will.

CHAPTER XC

THAT HUMAN CHOICES AND VOLITIONS ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE

THE government of providence proceeds from the divine love where with God loves His creatures. Love consists chiefly in the lover wishing good to the loved one. The more God loves things, then, the more they fall under His providence. This Holy Writ teaches, saying: God guards all that love him (Ps. cxliv, 20); and the Philosopher also teaches that God has especial care of those who love understanding, and considers them His friends. Hence He loves especially subsistent intelligences, and their volitions and choices fall under His providence.

6. The inward good endowments of man, which depend on his will and choice, are more proper to man than external endowments, as the gaining of riches: hence it is according to the former that man is said to be good, not according to the latter. If then human choices and motions of the will do not fall under divine providence, but only external advantages, it will be more true to say that human affairs are beyond providence than that they are under providence.

CHAPTER XCI

HOW HUMAN THINGS ARE REDUCED TO HIGHER CAUSES

FROM what has been shown above we are able to gather how human things are reducible to higher causes, and do not proceed by chance. For choices and motives of wills are arranged immediately by God: human intellectual knowledge is directed by God through the intermediate agency of angels: corporeal events, whether interior (to the human body) or exterior, that serve the need of man, are adjusted by God through the intermediate agency of angels and of the heavenly bodies.

All this arrangement proceeds upon one general axiom, which is this: Everything manifold and mutable and liable to fail may be reduced to some principle uniform and immutable and unfailing.' But everything about our selves proves to be manifold, variable, and defectible. Our choices are evidently manifold, since different things are chosen by different persons in different circumstances. They are likewise mutable, as well on account of the fickleness of our mind, which is not confirmed in its last end, as also on account of changes of circumstance and environment. That they are defectible, the sins of men clearly witness. On the other hand, the will of God is uniform, because in willing one thing He wills all other things: it is also immutable and indefectible (B. I, Chapp.XXIII,LXXV). Therefore all motions of volition and choice must be reduced to the divine will, and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our volitions and elections.

In like manner our intelligence is liable to multiplicity, inasmuch as we gather intelligible truth from many sensible objects. It is also mutable, inasmuch as it proceeds by reasoning from one point to another, passing from known to unknown. It is also defectible from the admixture of phantasy and sense, as the errors of mankind show. But the cognitions of the angels are uniform, as they receive the knowledge of truth from the one fountain of truth, God (B. II, Chapp.XCVIII,C, with notes). It is also immutable, because not by any argument from effects to causes, nor from causes to effects, but by simple intuition do they gaze upon the pure truth of things. It is also indefectible, since they discern the very natures of things, or their quiddities in themselves, about which quiddities intelligence cannot err, as neither can sense err about the primary objects of the several senses. But we learn the quiddities (essences) of things from their accidents and effects. Our intellectual knowledge then must be regulated by the knowledge of the angels.

Again, about human bodies and the exterior things which men use, it is manifest that there is in them the multiplicity of mixture and contrariety; and that they do not always move in the same way, because their motions cannot be continuous; and that they are defectible by alteration and corruption. But the heavenly bodies are uniform, as being simple and made up without any contrariety of elements. Their motions also are uniform, continuous, and always executed in the same way: nor can there be in them corruption or alteration. Hence our bodies, and other things that come under our use, must necessarily be regulated by the motion of the heavenly bodies.

CHAPTER XCII

IN WHAT SENSE ONE IS SAID TO BE FORTUNATE, AND HOW MAN IS AIDED BY HIGHER CAUSES

GOOD fortune is said to befall a man, when something good happens to him beyond his intention, as when one digging a field finds a treasure that he was not looking for. Now an agent may do something beyond his own intention, and yet not beyond the intention of some agent whom he is under: as if a master were to bid a servant to go to some place, to which he had sent another servant without the first servant knowing of it, the meeting with his fellow-servant would be beyond the intention of the servant sent, and yet not beyond the intention of the master sending: in reference to the servant it will be luck and chance, but not in reference to the master,—to him it is an arrangement. Since then man is subordinate in body to the forces of physical nature (corporibus coelestibus), subordinate in intellect to the angels, and subordinate in will to God, a thing may happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order of physical nature (corporum coelestium), or according to the arrangement of angels, or again of God. But though God alone works directly upon man's choice, yet the action of an angel does something for that choice by way of persuasion, while the action of the heavenly body (of the forces of physical nature) does something by way of predisposition, inasmuch as the bodily impressions of the heavenly bodies (physical forces) upon our bodies predispose us to certain choices. When then under the impression of the physical forces of nature (coelestium corporum) one is swayed to certain choices that prove useful to him, though his own reason does not discern their utility; and simultaneously under the light shed on him by separately subsistent intelligences, his understanding is enlightened to do those acts, and his will is swayed by a divine act to choose that useful course, the utility whereof goes unperceived by him,—then he is said to be a fortunate man.’

But here a difference is to be noted. For the action of the angel and of the physical force (corporis coelestis) merely predisposes the man to choose, but the action of God accomplishes the choice. And since the predisposition that comes of the bodily affection, or of the persuasion of the understanding, does not induce necessity of choice, man does not always choose that which his guardian angel intends, nor that to which physical nature (corpus coeleste) inclines, but man always chooses that which God works in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels sometimes comes to nought, according to the text: We have tended Babylon, but she is not healed (Jerem. li, 9). And much more may physical inclination (inclinatio coelestium corporum) come to nought: but divine providence always holds firm.

It is further to be observed that good or ill fortune may befall a man as a matter of luck, so far as his intention goes, and so far as the working of the prime forces of nature (corpora coelestia) goes, and so far as the mind of the angels goes, but not in regard of God: for in reference to God nothing is by chance, nothing unforeseen, either in human life or anywhere else in creation.

CHAPTER XCIII

OF FATE, WHETHER THERE BE SUCH A THING, AND IF SO, WHAT IT IS

SOME when they say that all things are done by fate, mean by fate the destiny that is in things by disposition of divine providence. Hence Boethius says: “Fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things, whereby providence assigns them each to their several orders.” In this description of fate disposition’ is put for destiny.’ It is said to be inherent in things,’ to distinguish fate from providence: for destiny as it is in the divine mind, not yet impressed on creation, is providence; but inasmuch as it is already unfolded in creatures, it is called fate.’ He says in changeable things’ to show that the order of providence does not take away from things their contingency and changeableness. In this understanding, to deny fate is to deny divine providence. But because with unbelievers we ought not even to have names in common, lest from agreement in terminology there be taken an occasion of error, the faithful should not use the name of fate,’ not to appear to fall in with those who construe fate wrongly, subjecting all things to the necessity imposed by the stars. Hence Augustine says: “If any man calls by the name of fate the might or power of God, let him keep his opinion, but mend his speech” (De civit. Dei, V, 1). And Gregory: “Far be it from the minds of the faithful to say that there is such a thing as fate” (Hom. 10 in Epiphan.)

CHAPTER XCIV

OF THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE

IT will be necessary now to repeat some of the things that have been said before, to make it evident that (a) nothing escapes divine providence, and the order of divine providence can nowise be changed; and yet (b) it does not follow that the events which happen under divine providence all happen of necessity.

(a) Our first point of study is this, that as God is the cause of all existing things, conferring being on them all, the order of His providence must embrace all things: for He must grant preservation to those to whom He has granted existence, and bestow on them perfection in the attainment of their last end. In the case of every one who has to provide for others there are two things to observe, the pre-arranging of the order intended and the setting of the pre-arranged order on foot. The former is an exercise of intellectual ability, the latter of practical. The difference between the two is this, that in the pre-arrangement of order the providence is more perfect, the further the arrangement can be extended even to the least details: there would be not many parts of prudence in him who was competent only to arrange generalities: but in the carrying of the order out into effect the providence of the ruler is marked by greater dignity and completeness the more general it is, and the more numerous the subordinate functionaries through whom he fulfils his design, for the very marshalling of those functionaries makes a great part of the foreseen arrangement. Divine providence, therefore, being absolutely perfect (B. I, Chap.XXVIII), arranges all things by the eternal forethought of its wisdom, down to the smallest details, no matter how trifling they appear. And all agents that do any work act as instruments in His hands, and minister in obedience to Him, to the unfolding of that order of providence in creation which He has from eternity devised. But if all things that act must necessarily minister to Him in their action, it is impossible for any agent to hinder the execution of divine providence by acting contrary to it. Nor is it possible for divine providence to be hindered by the defect of any agent or patient, since all active or passive power in creation is caused according to the divine arrangement. Again it is impossible for the execution of divine providence to be hindered by any change of providence, since God is wholly unchangeable (B. I, Chap.XV). The conclusion remains, that the divine provision cannot be annulled.

(b) Now to our second point of study. Every agent intends good, and better so far as it can (Chap.III). But good and better do not have place in the same way in a whole and in its parts. In the whole the good is the entire effect arising out of the order and composition of the parts: hence it is better for the whole that there should be inequality among the parts, without which inequality the order and perfection of the whole cannot be, than that all the parts should be equal, every one of them attaining to the rank of the noblest part. And yet, considered by itself, every part of lower rank would be better if it were in the rank of some superior part. Thus in the human body the foot would be a more dignified part of man if it had the beauty and power of the eye; but the whole body would be worse off for lacking the office of the foot. The scope and aim therefore of the particular agent is not the same as that of the universal agent. The particular agent tends to the good of the part absolutely, and makes the best of it that it can; but the universal agent tends to the good of the whole: hence a defect may be beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. It is the intention of the particular agent that its effect should be perfect to the utmost possible in its kind: but it is the intention of the universal agent that this effect be carried to a certain degree of perfection and no further. Now between the parts of the universe the first apparent difference is that of contingent and necessary. Beings of a higher order are necessary and indestructible and unchangeable: from which condition beings fall away, the lower the rank in which they are placed; so that the lowest beings suffer destruction in their being and change in their constitution, and produce their effects, not necessarily, but contingently.

Every agent therefore that is part of the universe endeavours, so far as it can, to abide in its being and natural constitution, and to establish its effect: but God, the governor of the universe, intends that of the effects which take place in it one be established as of necessity, another as of contingency; and with this view He applies different causes to them, necessary causes to these effects, contingent causes to those. It falls under divine providence therefore, not only that this effect be, but also that this effect be necessarily, that other contingently. Thus, of things subject to divine providence, some are necessary, and others contingent, not all necessary.

Hence it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: If God has foreseen this thing in the future, it will be.’ But it will be as God has provided that it shall be; and supposing that He has provided that it shall be contingently, it follows infallibly that it will be contingently, and not necessarily.

Cicero (De divinatione ii, 8) has this argument: If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain; but if so, all things happen by fate, nothing is left in our power, and there is no such thing as free will.’ A frivolous argument, for since not only effects are subject to divine providence, but also causes, and modes of being, it follows that though all things happen by divine providence, some things are so foreseen by God as that they are done freely by us.

Nor can the defectibility of secondary causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, take away the certainty of divine providence: for since God works in all things, it belongs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to keep them from failing.

The Philosopher shows that if every effect has a proper cause (causam per se), every future event may be reduced to some present or past cause. Thus if the question is put concerning any one, whether he is to be slain by robbers, that effect proceeds from a cause, his meeting with robbers; and that effect again is preceded by another cause, his going out of his house; and that again by another, his wanting to find water; the preceding cause to which is thirst, and this is caused by eating salt meat, which he either is doing or has done. If then, positing the cause, the effect must be posited of necessity, he must necessarily be thirsty, if he eats salt meat; and he must necessarily will to seek water, if he is thirsty; and be must necessarily go out of the house, if he wills to seek water; and the robbers must necessarily come across him, if he goes out of the house; and if they come across him, he must be killed. Therefore from first to last it is necessary for this man eating salt meat to be killed by robbers. The philosopher concludes that it is not true that, positing the cause, the effect must be posited, because there are some causes that may fail. Nor again is it true that every effect has a proper cause: for any accidental effect, e.g., of this man wishing to look for water and falling in with robbers, has no cause.

CHAPTERS XCV, XCVI

THAT THE IMMUTABILITY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT BAR THE UTILITY OF PRAYER

AS the immutability of divine providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it bar the utility of prayer. For prayer is not poured out to God that the eternal arrangement of providence may be changed,—that is impossible,—but that man may gain what he desires of God. It is fitting for God to assent to the pious desires of His rational creatures, not that our desires move the immutability of God, but it is an outcome of His goodness suitably to carry out what we desire.

4. It is proper for friends to will the same thing. Now God loves His creature (B. I, Chap.XCI) and every creature all the more that the said creature has a share in His goodness, which is the prime and principal object of God's love. But, of all creatures, the rational creature most perfectly partakes in the divine goodness. God therefore wills the fulfilment of the desires of the rational creature. And His will is effective of things.

5. The goodness of the creature is derived in point of likeness from the goodness of God. But it is a point of special commendation in men, not to deny assent to just requests: thereupon they are called liberal,' clement,' merciful and kind.' This therefore is a very great function of divine goodness, to hear pious prayers.

Hence it is said: He will do the will of them that fear him, and hear their prayers and save them (Ps. cxliv, 9): Every one that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and the door shall be opened to him that knocketh (Matt. vii, 8).

Thus a twofold error concerning prayer is excluded. Some have said that there is no fruit of prayer. This was said as well on the part of those who denied divine providence, as the Epicureans did; as also on the part of those who withdrew human affairs from divine providence, as some of the Peripatetics did; as also on the part of those who thought that all things happen of necessity, as the Stoics did. From all these tenets it would follow that prayer is fruitless, and consequently all divine worship in vain: which error is referred to in Malachy iii, 14: Ye have said: he laboureth in vain who serveth God, and what profit is it that we have kept his ordinances, and that we have walked sad before the Lord of Hosts?

There were others on the contrary who said that the divine arrangement was reversible by prayer. And the prima facie rendering of certain texts of scripture seems to favour this view. Thus, after Isaias by divine command had said to King Ezechias: Put thine house in order, for thou shalt die and not live; yet upon Ezechias's prayer the word of the Lord came to Isaias, saying: Go and tell Ezechias: I have heard thy prayer, lo I will add to thy days fifteen years (Isa. xxxviii, 1-5). Again it is said in the person of the Lord: I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and pull down and destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them (Jer. xviii, 7, 8); Turn to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful: who knoweth but he will turn and forgive? (Joel ii, 13, 14.) But against construing these texts to mean that the will of God is changeable, or that anything happens to God in time, or that temporal events in creation are the cause of anything coming to exist in God, there are other authorities of Holy Writ, containing infallible and express truth. Thus it is said: God is not as man, that he should die, nor as the son of man, that he should change. Has he said then and shall not do? Has he spoken and shall not fulfil? (Num. xxiii, 19): The victorious one in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for he is not a man that he should repent (1 Kings xv, 29): I am the Lord and change not (Malach. iii, 6).

On careful consideration it will appear that all mistakes in this matter arise from failing to note the difference between the system of the universe and any particular system (universalem ordinem et particularem). There is nothing to hinder any particular system being changed, whether by prayer or by any other means; for there is that existing beyond the bounds of the system which is capable of changing it. But beyond the system that embraces all things nothing can be posited whereby such system could possibly be changed, depending as it does on the universal cause. Therefore the Stoics laid it down that the system established by God could nowise be changed. But they failed in a right appreciation of this general system in supposing that prayers were useless, which was taking for granted that the wills of men, and their desires whence their prayers proceed, are not comprehended in that general system. For when they say that the same effect follows whether prayers are put up or not,—follows, that is, as part of the univeral system of things,—they manifestly reserve and except prayers as not entering into that general system. Supposing prayers included in the system, then effects will follow from them by divine appointment as from other causes. One might as well exclude the effects of other every-day causes as exclude the effect of prayer. And if the immutability of the divine plan does not withdraw the effects of other causes, neither does it take away the efficacy of prayer.

Prayers then avail, not as changing a system arranged from eternity, but as being themselves part of that system. And there is no difficulty in the efficacy of prayer changing the particular system of some inferior cause, by the doing of God, who overpasses all causes, and who consequently is not bound by the necessity of any system depending on any cause; but on the contrary every necessity of system dependent on any inferior cause is checked by Him, as having been instituted by Him. Inasmuch then as pious prayers avail to alter some points of the system of inferior causes that was established by God, God is said to turn,' or repent.' Hence Gregory says that God does not change His counsel, though He sometimes changes His sentence, not the sentence which declares His eternal arrangements, but the sentence which declares the order of inferior causes, according to which Ezechias was to die, or some nation to be punished for its sins. Such change of sentence is called in metaphorical language repentance,' inasmuch as God behaves like one repentant, to whom it belongs to change what He has done. In the same way God is said metaphorically to be angry,' inasmuch as by punishing He produces the effect of anger. (B. I, Chap.XCI ad fin.)

CHAPTER XCVI

THAT GOD DOES NOT HEAR ALL PRAYERS

THERE is no anomaly in the prayers of petitioners being sometimes not granted by God. For God fulfils the desires of His rational creature inasmuch as that creature desires good: but sometimes it happens that what is asked is not true but seeming good, which is simply evil: such a prayer is not within the hearing of God. Hence it is said: Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss (James iv, 3).

2. It is suitable that God should fulfil our desires in so far as He moves us to desire. If therefore the movement of desire on our part is not kept up by earnestness in prayer, there is nothing to be surprised at if the prayer does not gain its due effect. Hence the Lord [St Luke] says: We ought always to pray and not to faint (Luke xviii, 1); and the Apostle, Pray without ceasing (1 Thess. v, 17).

3. It befits God to hear the prayer of the rational creature inasmuch as that creature draws nigh to Him. But one draws nigh to God by contemplation and devout affection and humble and firm intention. That prayer therefore which does not so draw nigh to God is not within God’s hearing. Hence it is said: He hath regarded the prayer of the humble (Ps. ci, 18); and, Let him ask in faith, debating not within himself (James i, 6).

4. God hears the prayers of the pious on the ground of friendship. He then who turns away from the friendship of God is not worthy to have his prayer heard. Hence it is said: Whosoever turns away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be abominable (Prov. xxviii, 9): Though ye multiply prayers, I will not hear: for your hands are full of blood (Isai. i, 15). This is why sometimes a friend of God is not heard, when he prays for those who

are not God’s friends, as it was said: Do not thou pray for this people, nor take unto thee praise and supplication for them, and do not withstand me: for I will not hear thee (Jerem. vii, 16).

It happens sometimes that for very friendship one denies his friend’s petition, knowing it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him, as a physician refuses what his patient asks for. No wonder then if God, who fulfils the desires put before Him by His rational creature for the love that He bears to that creature, fails sometimes to fulfil the petition of those whom He singularly loves, that He may fulfil it otherwise with something more helpful to the salvation of the petitioner, as we read in 2 Cor. xii, 7-9; and the Lord says to some: Ye know not what ye ask (Matt. xx, 22). Therefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Paulin. et Theras.): “The Lord is good in often not giving what we will, to give instead what we should prefer.”

CHAPTER XCVII

HOW THE ARRANGEMENTS OF PROVIDENCE FOLLOW A PLAN

GOD by His providence directs all things to the end of the divine goodness, not that anything accrues as an addition to His goodness by the things that He makes, but His aim is the impression of the likeness of His goodness so far as possible on creation. But inasmuch as every created substance must fall short of the perfection of the divine goodness, it was needful to have diversity in things for the more perfect communication of the divine goodness, that what cannot perfectly be represented by one created exemplar, might be represented by divers such exemplars in divers ways in a more perfect manner. Thus man multiplies his words to express by divers expressions the conception of his mind, which cannot all be put in one word. And herein we may consider the excellence of the divine perfection shown in this, that the perfect goodness which is in God united and simple, cannot be in creatures except according to diversity of modes and in many subjects. Things are different by having different forms, whence they take their species. Thus then the end of creation furnishes a reason for the diversity of forms in things.

From the diversity of forms follows a difference of activities, and further a diversity of agents and patients, properties and accidents.

Evidently then it is not without reason that divine providence distributes to creatures different accidents and actions and impressions and allocations. Hence it is said: The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth, hath established the heavens in prudence. By his wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew (Prov. iii, 19, 20).

As it is necessary for one wishing to build a house to look out for timber, but his looking out for pitch-pine (ligna abietina) depends on his mere will, not on his plan of building a house; so it is necessary for God to love His own goodness, but it does not thence necessarily follow that He should wish to have that goodness represented by creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without that. Hence the bringing of creatures into being depends on the mere will of God, although it is done in consideration of the divine goodness. Supposing however that God wishes to communicate His goodness by way of similitude as far as possible, it logically follows thence that there should be creatures of different sorts: but it does not follow of necessity that creatures should be of this or that grade of perfection, or exist in this or that number. But supposing that it is in the divine will to wish this number in creation, and this grade of perfection in each creature, it thence follows logically that creation be in such and such form, and such and such matter; and so of further consequences. Manifestly then providence disposes of things according to a certain plan, and yet this plan presupposes the divine will.

What has been said shuts out two errors, the error of those who believe that all things follow mere will without reason, which is the error of sundry Doctors of the Mohammedan law, as Rabbi Moses says; according to whose teaching, the only difference between fire warming and fire freezing is God's so willing the former alternative; and again the error is shut out of those who say that the order of causes springs from divine providence by way of necessity.

There are certain words of Holy Scripture which appear to put down all things to the mere will of God. Their meaning is not to take away all rational character from the dispensations of Providence, but to show that the will of God is the first principle of all things. Such texts are: All things, whatsoever he hath willed, the Lord hath done (Ps. cxxxiv, 6:) Who can say to him, Why doth thou so? (Job ix, 12:) Who resisteth his will? (Rom. ix, 19.) And Augustine (De Trin. III:) "Nothing but the will of God is the prime cause of health and sickness, of rewards and punishments, of graces and recompenses."

Thus in answer to the question, Why? asked of any natural effect, we can render a reason from some proximate cause, yet so that we reduce all things to the prime cause. Thus if it is asked why wood gets hot in presence of fire, it is answered [etc., etc., in terms of Aristotelian physics], and so on till we come to the will of God [who willed to create matter and energy, such as we know them, from the beginning]. Hence whoever answers the question, why the wood got hot, Because God has willed it so, answers appropriately, if he intends to carry back the question to the prime cause; but inappropriately, if he intends to exclude all other causes.

CHAPTER XCIX

GOD CAN WORK BEYOND THE ORDER LAID DOWN FOR CREATURES, AND PRODUCE EFFECTS WITHOUT PROXIMATE CAUSES

SINCE accidents follow upon the substantial principles of the thing, he who immediately produces the substance of a thing must be able immediately to work in the thing whatever effects follow upon substantial existence. But God by creation has brought all things immediately into being. He can therefore immediately move anything to any effect without intermediate causes.

But if any one says that, once God has fixed an orderly course of events, He cannot change it without changing Himself; and that He would change Himself, if ever He worked in the world to the production of effects apart from their own proper causes, such a saying may be refuted by a study of nature. For the orderly course of events fixed by God, if we look at it as it obtains in creation, will be found to hold for the most part, but not everywhere or always: for sometimes, although in a minority of cases, the thing turns out otherwise, either for lack of power in the agent, or for indisposition of the matter, or from some vis major supervening. Yet not on that account does the law of providence fail or suffer change: for it comes under providence that the natural course of things, instituted to hold usually, should sometimes fail. If therefore by the action of some created power the natural course of events may be altered from the usual to the unusual, and that without any alteration of divine providence, much more may the divine power sometimes do a thing, without prejudice to its own providence, beyond the course assigned to natural events by God. This God does at times to manifest His power: for there is no better way of manifesting the subjection of all nature to the divine will than by something being done at times beyond the course of nature: for thereby it appears that the course of events proceeds from Him, and is not of necessity of nature, but through free will. Nor should this be accounted a frivolous reason to allege, that God works some effects in nature to the end of manifesting Himself to human minds, since it has been shown that all the material creation is subordinated to serve the end of intellectual nature, while the end of intellectual nature itself is the knowledge of God. No wonder then if some change is wrought in corporeal substance to afford intelligent nature a knowledge of God.

CHAPTER C

THAT THE THINGS WHICH GOD DOES BEYOND THE ORDER OF NATURE ARE NOT CONTRARY TO NATURE

SINCE God is prime agent, all things inferior to Him are as His instruments. But instruments are made to serve the end of the prime agent, according as they are moved by Him: therefore it is not contrary to, but very much in accordance with, the nature of the instrument, for it to be moved by the prime agent. Neither is it contrary to nature for created things to be moved in any way whatsoever (qualitercunque) by God: for they were made to serve Him.

4. The first measure of every being and of every nature is God, seeing that He is the first being and canse of being to all. And since everything must be judged by its measure, that must be called natural’ to a thing whereby it is conformed to its measure, or standard. That then will be natural to a thing, which has been put into it by God. Therefore, though something further be impressed upon a thing, making it otherwise than as it was before, that is not against nature.

5. All creatures stand to God as the products of art to the artist (B. II, Chap.XXIV). Hence all nature may be called an artistic product of divine workmanship (artificiatum divinae artis). But it is not contrary to the notion of workmanship for the artist to work something to a different effect in his work, even after he has given it the first form. Neither then is it contrary to nature if God works something in natural things to a different effect from that which the ordinary course of nature involves.

Hence Augustine says: “God, the Creator and Founder of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature, because to every creature that is natural which He makes so, of whom is all measure, number and order of nature.

I can do all that doth become a God:

Who can do more, is none. That alone doth become a God,’ which is consonant with the eide, or fixed intelligible natures of things, which are the expression of His nature as imitable beyond Himself God is “the first measure of every being and of every nature” by virtue of what He is in Himself in His own being and His own nature, not by mere virtue of His will.

CHAPTER CI

OF MIRACLES

CHAPTER 101—THINGS that are done occasionally by divine power outside of the usual established order of events are commonly called miracles (wonders). We wonder when we see an effect and do not know the cause. And because one and the same cause is sometimes known to some and unknown to others, it happens that of the witnesses of the effect some wonder and some do not wonder: thus an astronomer does not wonder at seeing an eclipse of the sun, at which a person that is ignorant of astronomy cannot help wondering. An event is wonderful relatively to one man and not to another. The absolutely wonderful is that which has a cause absolutely hidden. This then is the meaning of the word miracle,' an event of itself full of wonder, not to this man or that man only. Now the cause absolutely hidden to every man is God, inasmuch as no man in this life can mentally grasp the essence of God (Chap.XLVII). Those events then are properly to be styled miracles, which happen by divine power beyond the order commonly observed in nature.

Of these miracles there are several ranks and orders. Miracles of the highest rank are those in which something is done by God that nature can never do. Miracles of the second rank are those in which God does something that nature can do, but not in that sequence and connexion. Thus it is a work of nature that an animal should live, see and walk: but that it should live after death, see after blindness, walk after lameness, these things nature is powerless to effect, but God sometimes brings them about miraculously. A miracle of the third rank is something done by God, which is usually done by the operation of nature, but is done in this case without the working of natural principles, as when one is cured by divine power of a fever, in itself naturally curable, or when it rains without any working of the elements.

CHAPTER CII

THAT GOD ALONE WORKS MIRACLES

WHAT is entirely subject to established order cannot work beyond that order. But every creature is subject to the order which God has established in nature. No creature therefore can work beyond this order, which working beyond the order of nature is the meaning of working miracles.

2. When any finite power works the proper effect to which it is determined, that is no miracle, though it may surprise one who does not understand the operation. But the power of every creature is limited to some definite effect, or effects. Whatever therefore is done by the power of any creature cannot properly be called a miracle. But what is done by the power of God, infinite and incomprehensible, is properly a miracle.

3. Every creature in its action requires some subject to act upon: for it belongs to God alone to make a thing out of nothing (B. II, Chap.XXI). But nothing that requires a subject for its action can act except to the production of those effects to which that subject is in potentiality: for the work of action upon a subject is to educe that subject from potentiality to actuality. As then a creature can never create, so it can never act upon a thing except to the production of that which is in the potentiality of that thing. But in many miracles done by divine power a thing is done, which is not in the potentiality of that upon which it is done, as in the raising of the dead.

Hence it is said of God: Who doth great wonderful works alone (Ps. cxxxv, 4).

CHAPTER CIII

HOW SEPARATELY SUBSISTING SPIRITS WORK CERTAIN WONDERS, WHICH YET ARE NOT TRUE MIRACLES

IT was the theory of Avicenna that matter is far more obedient to spiritual agencies than to the action of contraries in nature. Hence he goes on to say that upon the suggestion of these spiritual agents there sometimes follows an effect in the lower world, such as rain, or the cure of some sick person, without the coming in of any intermediate corporeal agency. He instances the change wrought in the body by the mere suggestion of a strong impression of phantasy, as when one walking upon a plank set aloft easily falls, because his fear pictures a fall to him, whereas he would not fall if the same plank were laid on the ground, giving him no occasion to fear. Again it is notorious that upon the mere suggestion of the soul the body grows hot, as in desire or anger, or is chilled, as in fear. Sometimes too a strong suggestion brings on an illness, a fever, or even leprosy. Thereupon Avicenna says that if the soul is pure, not subject to bodily passions, and strong in its suggestive power, not only its own body will obey its suggestion, but even foreign bodies, even to the healing of the sick upon suggestion made by it. And this he thought to be the cause of the evil eye (fascinationis), that any soul having a strong affection of malevolence is capable of making a noxious impression on another, particularly on a child, who for the tenderness of his constitution is readily susceptible of such impressions. Hence he concludes that much more does an effect in this lower world follow upon the suggestion of pure spirits, without the action of any bodily agent. And this position tallies well enough with his other theories: for he supposes that all substantial forms in this lower world are effluxes from a pure spirit, and that bodily agents do no more than prepare the matter to receive the impression of the separately subsisting spiritual agent. But this is not true according to the doctrine of Aristotle, who proves that such forms as are in matter arise from other forms which are also in matter, for thus is maintained the likeness between maker and made.

The fact is, a created spirit has no power of its own to induce any form upon corporeal matter otherwise than by setting some body into local motion. This much is in the power of a created spirit, to make a body obey it to the extent of moving locally. So by moving a body locally an angel can employ natural agents to the production of certain effects. But such action is not miraculous, properly speaking. Hence it remains true that created spirits do not work miracles of their own power. But there is nothing against their working miracles inasmuch as they work in the power of God, as appears from the fact that one choir of angels is especially told off, as Gregory says, to work miracles. Gregory further says that some saints sometimes work miracles by an act of power, and not merely by intercession.

CHAPTER CIV

THAT THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS ARE NOT DUE SOLELY TO THE INFLUENCE OF THE HEAVENLY SPHERES

CHAPTER CV

WHENCE THE PERFORMANCES OF MAGICIANS DERIVE THEIR EFFICACY

MAGICIANS in their performances use certain words with a meaning to the production of definite effects. Now a word, as meaning something, has no power except from some understanding, the understanding either of him who utters the word or of him to whom it is uttered: from the understanding of the utterer, in the case where a word is of such power that by the idea which it contains it is apt to produce real effects, the idea being applied to the production of those effects by the ministry of the voice: from the understanding of the person addressed, in the case when the hearer is induced to do something by the reception into his understanding of the idea conveyed by the word. Now it cannot be said that those words, uttered by magicians with a meaning, have their efficacy from the understanding of him who utters them. For, since power follows upon essence, difference of power argues a difference of essential principle. But we find the condition of the understanding of men generally to be such that it is more true to say that its cognition is caused by things than that any idea which it conceives can be the cause of things. If then there are any men who by words expressive of the concept of their understanding can change things one into another, and do that by power of their own (res possint transmutare propria virtute), they must be beings of another species from ordinary mortals, and cannot be called men in the sense in which others are men (dicentur aequivoce homines). The alternative is to suppose that such effects are accomplished by the understanding of some person, to whom the speech of him who utters such words is addressed. This supposition has its confirmation in the fact that the expressions which magicians use consist of invocations, entreaties, adjurations, or even commands, as of one person talking with another.

Besides, in the ceremonies of this art they employ certain characters and geometrical figures. But a figure is no principle of action, imparted or received: or else mathematical drawings would be active and passive. Matter therefore cannot be disposed by geometrical figures to the reception of any natural effect. It follows that these figures are not used as disposing causes, but as signs. Now we use signs only to address other intelligent beings. Magical arts therefore owe their efficacy to some intelligence, to whom the speech of the magician is addressed,—as is also shown by the sacrifices, prostrations, and other rites employed, which can be nothing else but signs of reverence paid to some intelligent nature.

CHAPTER CVI

THAT THE SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE, WHICH LENDS EFFICACY TO MAGICAL PERFORMANCES, IS NOT GOOD IN BOTH CATEGORIES OF BEING

IT remains to be further investigated, what that intelligent nature is, by whose power these operations are carried into effect. To begin with, it is apparent that it is no good and praiseworthy nature. For it is not the behaviour of an intelligence well disposed to lend countenance to acts contrary to virtue. But that is what is done by magical arts: they usually serve to bring about adulteries, thefts, killing, and the like evil practices. Hence they who use such arts are called evil practitioners' (malefici).

3. The working of a benignant intelligence is to bring men to the proper good things of men, which are the good things of reason: but to draw men away from those good things, and allure them to trifles, is the conduct of an intelligence of a perverse bent. Now by these magical arts men make no profit in the good things of reason, which are sciences and virtues, but only in such trifles as the finding of things stolen, the catching of robbers, and the like.

4. There seems to be a certain grimace and character of unreasonableness attaching to the proceedings of the aforesaid arts. Thus they require an agent who abstains from sexual intercourse, and yet they are frequently employed for the procurement of sexual intercourse in its illicit forms.

6. As it belongs to the good to lead on to goodness, one might expect any right-minded intelligence to lead on to truth, truth being the proper good of the understanding. But the proceedings of magicians are generally of a character to mock men and deceive them.

8. It is not the way of a rightly ordered intelligence, supposing it to be a superior being, to take orders from an inferior; or, supposing it to be an inferior, to suffer itself to be entreated as though it were a superior being. But magicians invoke those whose assistance they use, with supplication, as though they were superior beings; and then, when they have come, they command them as though they were inferiors.

CHAPTER CVII

THAT THE SUBSISTENT INTELLIGENCE, WHOSE AID IS EMPLOYED IN MAGIC, IS NOT EVIL BY NATURE

WHATEVER is in things must be either cause or caused: otherwise it would not be in relation with other things. The subsistent beings in question then are either causes only or they are also caused. If they are causes only, evil cannot be cause of anything except incidentally (Chap.XIV); and everything incidental must be reducible to that which is ordinary: therefore there must be something in them prior to the evil that is there, something whereby they are causes. But that which is prior in everything is its nature and essence. Therefore these subsistent beings are not evil in their nature. The same conclusion follows if they are things caused. For no agent acts except with some intention of good: evil therefore cannot be the effect of any cause except incidentally. But what is caused incidentally only cannot be by nature, since every nature has a regular and definite mode of coming into being.

4. Nothing can exist unless it has existence from the first being, and the first being is the sovereign good (B. II, Chap.XV). But since every being, as such, acts to the production of its own likeness, all things that come of the first being must be good.

7. Since the will tends to good grasped by the understanding, and finds therein its natural and proper object and end, it is impossible for any subsistent intelligence to have by nature a bad will, unless the understanding in it naturally is mistaken in its judgement of what is good.

But no understanding can be so mistaken: for false judgements in acts of the understanding are like monsters in the physical universe, which are not according to nature, but out of the way of nature: for the good of the understanding and its natural end is the knowledge of truth.

This is also confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture: for it is said, Every creature is good (1 Tim. iv, 4): God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good (Gen. i, 31).

Hereby is excluded the error of the Manicheans, who suppose that these subsistent intelligences, commonly called demons or devils, are naturally evil.

Porphyry tells in his Letter to Anebo that there is a certain kind of spirits who make it their business to listen to magicians, a kind naturally deceitful, assuming every form, personating gods [angels] and men and souls of the departed; and that this kind of being it is which makes all these appearances for better or for worse: for the rest, that this kind of spirit renders no assistance towards anything that is really good, but on the contrary is the author of evil counsel, and accuses and hampers and envies the earnest votaries of virtue, and is full of hastiness and pride, rejoices in the smell of burnt meats, and is captivated by flatteries. The only thing to quarrel with in this account is his saying that such malice is in these spirits “naturally.”

CHAPTER CIX

THAT IN SPIRITS THERE MAY BE SIN, AND HOW

AS there is an order in active causes, so also in final causes, requiring that the secondary end should be subordinate to the primary, as the secondary agent depends on the primary. Now every will naturally wishes that which is the proper good of the person willing, namely, his own perfect well-being; and the will cannot possibly will aught to the contrary of this. If we can find a voluntary agent, whose good is a final end, such as not to be contained under the order leading to any other end, but rather all other ends being contained in the order leading up to it,—in such a voluntary agent there can be no fault of the will. Such a voluntary agent is God, whose being is sovereign goodness, which is the final end. In God then there can be no fault of the will. But in any other voluntary agent, whose proper good must necessarily be contained in the order leading to some other good, a sin of the will may occur,—considering the agent as he is in his own nature. In every voluntary agent there is a natural inclination to will and love his own perfect well-being, and that to such an extent that he cannot will the contrary. But a created agent has no natural endowment of so subordinating his own well-being to another end than himself as to be incapable of swerving from that end: for the higher end does not belong to the creature's own nature, but to a superior nature. It is left therefore to the decision of his own will to subordinate his proper well-being to a higher end. Sin therefore might have found place in the will of a pure spirit in this way,—that he did not refer his own good and well-being to the final end, but made that good his end and adhered to it accordingly. And because rules of conduct necessarily are taken from the end in view, it followed as a matter of course that the said spirit arranged his other elections according to that same object (ex re ipsa) in which he had placed his last end. Hence his will was not regulated by any higher will, a position of independence proper to God alone. In this sense we must understand the saying that he aimed at equality with God [cf. Isai. xiv, 13], not that he ever expected his goodness to equal the divine goodness: such a thought could never have occurred to his mind. But to wish to rule others, and not to have one's own will ruled by any superior, is to wish to be in power and cease to be a subject; and that is the sin of pride. Hence it is aptly said that the first sin that a spirit committed was pride. But because once error has been committed in regard to a first principle, a varied and manifold course of error is bound to ensue, so from the spirit's first inordination of will there followed manifold other sin in his will, such as hatred of God for withstanding his pride and justly chastising his offence, envy against man, and the like.

Further we may note that when any one's proper good is subordinate to several higher powers, it is open to a voluntary agent to withdraw himself from his subordination to one superior, and not relinquish his subordination to another, be that other the superior or the inferior of the first. Thus a soldier, being subordinate at once to the king and to the general of the army, may direct his will to the good of the general and not to the good of the king, or the other way about. If the general withdraws from his allegiance to the king, the will of the soldier, withdrawing from the will of the general and directing his affection to the king, will be good; and the will of the soldier, following the general's will against the will of the king, will be evil. Now not only are pure spirits subordinate to God, but also one of them is subordinate to another from first to last (B. II, Chap.XCV). And because in any voluntary agent, short of God, there may be sin in his will, if we consider him as left to his own nature, possibly one of the higher angels, or even the very highest of all, committed a sin in his will. And this is probable enough, that the sinner was highest of them all: for he would not have made his own good estate the final end of his acquiescence, had not his goodness been very perfect. Some of the lower angels then of their own will may have subordinated their good to [thrown in their lot with] that leader, and so have withdrawn their allegiance from God, and sinned as he did: while others, observing due regard to God in the motion of their will, rightly withdrew from their subordination to the sinner, although he was higher than they in the order of nature.

This is the difference between man and a pure spirit, that in the one being of man there are several appetitive faculties, one subordinate to another: this is not the case in pure spirits, although one of them is under another. But in man, however the inferior appetite may swerve from due subordination, any sin that occurs occurs in his will. As then it would be a sin in pure spirits for any inferior amongst them to swerve from due subordination to a superior, while that superior remained in subordination to God; so in the one person of man sin may occur in two ways: in one way by the human will not subordinating its own good to God, and that sin man has in common with the pure spirit; in another way by the good of the lower appetite not being regulated according to the higher, as when the pleasures of the flesh, to which the concupiscible appetite tends, are willed not in accordance with reason; and this sin does not occur in pure spirits.

CHAPTERS CVIII, CX

ARGUMENTS SEEMING TO PROVE THAT SIN IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SPIRITS, WITH SOLUTIONS OF THE SAME

ARG. 1. Every other cognitive faculty but the understanding makes use of living bodily organs. In pure spirits therefore it is impossible for there to be any cognitive faculty but the understanding; and whatever they take cognisance of, they have understanding of. But in so far as one has understanding, one does not err: for all error springs from lack of understanding. Therefore there can be no error in the apprehension of these spirits. But without such error there can be no sin in the will: because the will always tends to good as apprehended: hence unless there he a mistake in the apprehension of good, there can be no sin in the will.

Arg. 2. In us there occurs sin of the will in respect of matters about which we have true knowledge of their general bearings, but on a particular point our judgement is hampered by some passion fettering the reason. But these passions cannot be in spiritual beings, because such passions belong to the sensitive part, and that has no action without a bodily organ. Having therefore a right knowledge in general, the will of a pure spirit cannot tend to evil by any defect of knowledge in particular.

Arg. 3. No cognitive faculty is deceived about its own proper object, but only about some object foreign to it: thus sight is not deceived in judging of colours, but when a man undertakes by sight to judge of tastes, then deception occurs. Now the proper object of understanding is the essence of a thing. No deception then is incident to the apprehension of understanding, so long as it fixes upon the pure quiddities of things: but all intellectual deception, we may think, arises from the forms of things apprehended coming to be mixed up with phantasms, as in our experience. But such a mode of cognition does not obtain in pure spirits, since phantasms cannot be without a body. To pure spirits therefore no error in cognition can possibly be incident, and consequently no sin in the will.

Reply to Arguments 1, 2, 3. We are not obliged to say that there was any error in the understanding of a pure spirit, in the shape of a false judgement, judging that to be good which is not good: the mistake, such as it was, lay in not attending to the higher good, to which the spirit's private good ought to have been referred: the reason of which inattention [read inconsiderationis ratio] may have been the inward turning of the will upon the spirit's private good: for it is open to the will to turn more or less of its affection upon this object or upon that.

Arg. 5. Since appetite or desire tends to nothing but its own proper good, it seems impossible for desire to go astray in the case when the person desiring has one only definite good to desire. The reason why sin is incident to our desire is the composition of our nature, a compound of the spiritual and the corporeal, occasioning a multiplicity of things to be good for us, one thing being good for us in mind and another in body. Of this variety of good things the less important has to be subordinated to the more important. Hence sin of the will arises in us when we neglect that order, and go after what is good for us under a certain qualification, discarding what is good for us absolutely. But in pure spirits there is no such composition, no diversity of things good for them; nay, all their good is intellectual. Hence it seems they are incapable of sin in the will.

Reply. The angel who sinned did not go after any other good than the one good that was proper to him: but his sin lay in this, that he dropped the higher good to which he should have subordinated himself As we sin by pursuing the lower goods of the body away from the order of reason, so the devil sinned by not referring his own excellence to the excellence of God.

Arg. 6. In us, sin of the will arises out of excess or defect, while virtue lies in the mean between them. But pure spirits can pursue only intellectual good things, in which things no excess is possible, for of themselves they are in the mean between excess and defect, as truth is in the mean between two errors.

Reply. The devil passed the mean of virtue inasmuch as he did not submit himself to a superior order; and thus he gave himself more than his due, and to God less than His due.

CHAPTER CXII

THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE GOVERNED BY PROVIDENCE FOR THEIR OWN SAKES, AND OTHER CREATURES IN REFERENCE TO THEM

THE very condition of intellectual nature, whereby it is mistress of its own acts, requires the care of Providence, providing for it for its own sake: while the condition of other creatures, that have no dominion over their own act, indicates that care is taken of them not for themselves, but for their subordination to other beings. For what is worked by another is in the rank of an instrument: while what works by itself is in the rank of a prime agent. Now an instrument is not sought for its own sake, but for the use of the prime agent: hence all diligence of workmanship applied to instruments must have its end and final point of reference in the prime agent. On the other hand all care taken about a prime agent, as such, is for its own sake.

2. What has dominion over its own act, is free in acting. For he is free, who is a cause to himself of what he does: whereas a power driven by another under necessity to work is subject to slavery. Thus the intellectual nature alone is free, while every other creature is naturally subject to slavery. But under every government the freemen are provided for for their own sakes, while of slaves this care is taken that they have being for the use of the free.

3. In a system making for an end, any parts of the system that cannot gain the end of themselves must be subordinate to other parts that do gain the end and stand in immediate relation to it. Thus the end of an army is victory, which the soldiers gain by their proper act of fighting: the soldiers

alone are in request in the army for their own sakes; all others in other employments in the army, such as grooms or armourers, are in request for the sake of the soldiers. But the final end of the universe being God, the intellectual nature alone attains Him in Himself by knowing Him and loving Him (Chap.XXV). Intelligent nature therefore alone in the universe is in request for its own sake, while all other creatures are in request for the sake of it.

6. Everything is naturally made to behave as it actually does behave in the course of nature. Now we find in the actual course of nature that an intelligent subsistent being converts all other things to his own use, either to the perfection of his intellect, by contemplating truth in them, or to the execution of works of his power and development of his science, as an artist develops the conception of his art in bodily material; or again to the sustenance of his body, united as that is to an intellectual soul.

Nor is it contrary to the conclusion of the aforesaid reasons, that all the parts of the universe are subordinate to the perfection of the whole. For that subordination means that one serves another: thus there is no inconsistency in saying that unintelligent natures serve the intelligent, and at the same time serve the perfection of the universe: for if those things were wanting which subsistent intelligence requires for its perfection, the universe would not be complete.

By saying that subsistent intelligences are guided by divine providence for their own sakes, we do not mean to deny that they are further referable to God and to the perfection of the universe. They are cared for for their own sakes, and other things for their sake, in this sense, that the good things which are given them by divine providence are not given them for the profit of any other creature: while the gifts given to other creatures by divine ordinance make for the use of intellectual creatures.

Hence it is said: Look not on sun and moon and stars besides, to be led astray with delusion and to worship what the Lord thy God hath created for the service of all nations under heaven (Deut. iv, 19): Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, sheep and all oxen and the beasts of the field (Ps. viii, 8).

Hereby is excluded the error of those who lay it down that it is a sin for man to kill dumb animals: for by the natural order of divine providence they are referred to the use of man: hence without injustice man uses them either by killing them or in any other way: wherefore God said to Noe: As green herbs have I given you all flesh (Gen. ix, 3). Wherever in Holy Scripture there are found prohibitions of cruelty to dumb animals, as in the prohibition of killing the mother-bird with the young (Deut. xxii, 6, 7), the object of such prohibition is either to turn man’s mind away from practising cruelty on his fellow-men, lest from practising cruelties on dumb animals one should go on further to do the like to men, or because harm done to animals turns to the temporal loss of man, either of the author of the harm or of some other; or for some ulterior meaning, as the Apostle (1 Cor. ix, 9) expounds the precept of not muzzling the treading ox.

CHAPTER CXIII

THAT THE ACTS OF THE RATIONAL CREATURE ARE GUIDED BY GOD, NOT MERELY TO THE REALISATION OF THE SPECIFIC TYPE, BUT ALSO TO THE REALISATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL

EVERYTHING is reckoned to exist for the sake of its activity, activity being the final perfection of a thing. Thus then everything, so far as it comes under divine providence, is guided by God to its proper act. But a rational creature subject to providence is governed and provided for as an individual for its own sake, not merely for the sake of the species, as is the case with other perishable creatures (Chap.CXII). Thus then rational creatures alone are guided by God to their acts, not merely specific but individual.

2. Whatever things are guided in their acts only in what appertains to the species, such things have not the choice of doing or not doing: for what is consequent upon the species is common and natural to all individuals contained under the species; and what is natural is not in our power. If then man were guided in his acts only to the extent of fitting him for his species, he would have no choice of doing or not doing, but would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as happens in all irrational creatures.

3. In whatsoever beings there are found actions over and above such as fall in with the common inclination of the species, such beings must be regulated by divine providence in their actions with some guidance beyond

that which is extended to the species. But in the rational creature many actions appear, which the inclination of the species is not sufficient to account for, as is shown by their being not alike in all, but various in various individuals.

4. The rational creature alone is capable of being guided to its acts not merely specifically but individually: for by the gift of understanding and reason it is able to discern the diversity of good and evil according as is befitting to diverse individuals, times and places.

5. The rational creature is not only governed by divine providence, but is also capable to some extent of grasping the notion of providence, whereas other creatures share in providence merely by being subject to providence. Thus the rational creature is partaker in providence, not merely by being governed, but by governing: for it governs itself by its own acts, and also other beings. But every lower providence is subject to the supreme providence of God. Therefore the government of the acts of the rational creature, in so far as they are personal acts, belongs to divine providence.

6. The personal acts of the rational creature are properly the acts that come from a rational soul. Now the rational soul is capable of perpetuity, not only in the species, as other creatures are, but also in the individual. The acts therefore of the rational creature are guided by divine providence, not only as they belong to the species, but also as they are personal acts.

CHAPTER CXIV

THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR A LAW TO BE GIVEN TO MAN BY GOD

THE acts of irrational creatures, as they belong to the species, are guided by God according to a natural inclination, consequent upon the nature of the species. Therefore, over and above that, there must be given to men something to guide them in their personal acts, and that we call law.’

3 and 4. To them is a law fittingly given, who know what they are about, and have the alternative of doing a thing or leaving it undone. But that is proper to the rational creature only. Therefore the rational creature alone is conceptible of law.

Hence it is said: I will give my law in their hearts (Jer. xxx, 33): I will write for him my manifold laws (Osee viii, 12).

CHAPTER CXV

THAT THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THE DIVINE LAW IS TO SUBORDINATE MAN TO GOD

THE end which God intends is Himself.

2. The end of every human creature is to adhere to God, for in that his happiness consists.

4. That should be the main purpose of a law, from which the law derives its efficacy. But the law given by God has efficacy among men from the fact that man is suited to God. This therefore ought to be the chief precept in the divine law, that the human mind should adhere to God.

Hence it is said: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God ask of thee but that thou fear the Lord thy God and walk in his ways, and love him and serve the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and thy whole soul? (Deut. x, 12.)

CHAPTER CXVI

THAT THE END OF THE DIVINE LAW IS THE LOVE OF GOD

THE main intention of the divine law is that man should adhere to God; and man adheres to God chiefly by love. There are two powers whereby man may cleave to God, his understanding and his will. By the lower faculties of his soul man cannot cleave to God, but adheres to lower things. Now the adhesion that is of the understanding is completed by that which is of the will: for by the will man comes to rest in what the understanding apprehends. The will cleaves to a thing either through love or through fear, but in different ways. When it adheres to a thing through fear, it adheres for the sake of something else, namely, to avoid an evil threatening it, if it does not adhere: but when it adheres to a thing through love, it adheres for the thing's own sake. But what is for its own sake carries the day over what is only for the sake of something else. Therefore the adhesion of love to God is the chief way of adhering to Him, and is the point principally intended in the divine law.

2. The end of every law, and particularly of the divine law, is to make men good. Now a man is called good from having a good will: for the will it is which reduces to act whatever good there is in the man: but the will is good by willing good, and particularly the chief good, which is the end: the more then the will wills this good, the better the man is. Therefore the will of the sovereign good, which is God, is what most of all makes men good, and is principally intended in the divine law.

3. The law aims at making men virtuous: but it is a condition of virtue that the virtuous person should act firmly and with pleasure; and love it is that best makes us do a thing firmly and with delight.

Therefore it is said: The end of the commandment is charity (1 Tim. i, 5): The greatest and first commandment is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God (Matt. xxii, 37, 38).

CHAPTER CXVII

THAT BY THE DIVINE LAW WE ARE DIRECTED TO THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR

THERE should be a union of affection among those who have one common end: but men share in the one common last end of happiness, to which they are ordained of God; and therefore they should be united in mutual love.

2. Whoever loves another, must in consequence also love those whom that other loves and who are united with him. But men are loved by God, seeing that for them He has prepared the enjoyment of Himself as their last end. Therefore as one is a lover of God, so must he also be a lover of his neighbour.

3. Since man is naturally a social animal, he needs to be helped by other men to gain his proper end; and this is most aptly done by mutual love prevailing amongst men.

4. To attend to divine things, a man needs tranquillity and peace. Now the things that might trouble peace are most effectually taken away by mutual love. Since then the law of God orders men to attend to divine things, mutual love amongst men must necessarily be a provision of the divine law.

5. The divine law is given to man to bear out the natural law. But it is natural to all men to love one another: a sign of this is the fact that by a sort of natural instinct man helps any man, even a stranger, in necessity, as by calling him back from a wrong turn that he may have taken on his way, lifting him up from a fall, and the like, as though every man were kinsman and friend of every other man.

Hence it is said: This is my commandment, that ye love one another (John xv, 12): This commandment we have of God, that he who loveth God do love also his brother (1 John iv, 21): The second commandment is, thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself (Matt. xxii, 39).

CHAPTER CXVIII

THAT BY DIVINE LAW MEN ARE OBLIGED TO A RIGHT FAITH

AS sight by the bodily eye is the principle of the bodily passion of love, so the beginning of spiritual love must be the intellectual vision of some object of the same. But the vision of that spiritual object of understanding, which is God, cannot be had at present by us except through faith, because God exceeds our natural reason, especially if we consider Him in that regard under which our happiness consists in enjoying Him.

2. The divine law directs man to be entirely subject to God. But as man will is subjected to God by loving Him, so his understanding is subjected to Him by believing Him,—but not by believing anything false, because no falsehood can be proposed to man by God, who is the truth: hence he who believes anything false does not believe God.

3. Whoever holds an erroneous view about a thing, touching the essence of the thing, does not know the thing. Thus if any one were to fix on the notion of irrational animal, and take that to be man, he would not know man. The case would be otherwise, if he was mistaken only about some of the accidents of man. But in the case of compound beings, though he who errs about any of the essentials of a thing does not know the thing, absolutely speaking, still he knows it in a sort of a way: thus he who thinks man to be an irrational animal knows him generically: but in the case of simple beings this cannot be,—any error shuts out entirely all knowledge of the thing. But God is to the utmost degree simple. Therefore whoever errs about God does not know God. Thus he who believes God to be corporeal has no sort of knowledge of God, but apprehends something else instead of God. Now as a thing is known, so is it loved and desired. He then who errs

concerning God, can neither love Him nor desire Him as his last end. Since then the divine law aims at bringing men to love and desire God, that same law must bind men to have a right faith concerning God.

Hence it is said: Without faith it is impossible to please God (Heb. xi, 6); and at the head of all other precepts of the law there is prescribed a right faith in God: Hear, O Israel: the Lord thy God is one Lord (Deut. vi, 4).

CHAPTER CXIX

THAT BY CERTAIN SENSIBLE RITES OUR MIND IS DIRECTED TO GOD

BECAUSE it is connatural to man to gather his knowledge through the senses, and most difficult for him to transcend sensible things God has provided for man that even in sensible things there should be made for him a commemoration of things divine. To this end sensible sacrifices have been instituted, which man offers to God, not as though God needed them, but to bring home to man the lesson that he ought to offer himself and all he has to God, his end, Creator, Ruler, and Lord of all. There are also exercised upon man certain hallowings through certain sensible things, whereby man is washed, or anointed, or given to eat and drink, along with the utterance (prolatione) of audible words, to represent to man by these sensible signs the augmentation of spiritual gifts wrought in him from without, namely, by God, whose name is expressed in audible words. Also certain sensible rites are performed by men, not to rouse God to action, but to prompt themselves to divine service. Of this nature are prostrations, genuflections, vocal cries and chants: which things are not done as though God had need of them, who knows all, even the affection of the mind,—whose will is unchangeable (Chap.XCV), and who moreover does not accept the movement of the body for its own sake: but we do these things on our own behalf, that by these sensible rites our intention may be directed to God and our affection inflamed. At the same time also we hereby make profession of God being author of our soul and body, in that we pay Him acts of homage spiritual and bodily.

Hence it is not surprising that the [Manichean] heretics, who say that God is not the author of our body, blame these bodily observances being paid to

God. In which censure they evidently fail to remember that they themselves are men, not seeing that sensible representations are necessary to us for inward knowledge and affection. For it is experimentally shown that our soul is excited by bodily acts to think and feel: hence we properly use such acts to raise our mind to God.

In the payment of these bodily observances the cult, or worship, of God is said to consist. For we are said to cultivate those objects to which we pay attention by our works. Now we busy ourselves in paying attention to the things of God, not as though we were of service to Him, as is the case when we are said to tend, or cultivate, other things by our attentions, but because such actions are of service to ourselves, enabling us to come nearer to God. And because by inward acts we go straight to God, therefore it is by inward acts properly that we worship God: nevertheless outward acts also belong to the cult, or worship, of God, inasmuch as by such acts our mind is raised to God, as has been said.

Hence the worship of God is also called religion, because by such acts a man in some sort binds (ligat) himself, that his thought may not wander astray from God; and also because by a sort of natural instinct he feels himself bound (obligatum) to God, that in such manner as he can he should pay reverence to Him from whom is the origin of his being and of all his good.

Hence also religion has received the name of piety, for piety is that whereby we pay due honour to parents: hence aptly the honour paid to God, parent of all, is taken to be a part of piety, and they who oppose the worship of God are called impious.

But because not only is God cause and origin of our being, but our whole being is in His power, and all that is in us is His due, and thereby He is truly our Lord and Master, therefore what we perform in honour of God is called service. Now God is our master not by accident, as one man is another's master, but by nature; and therefore the service that we owe to God is quite different from that whereby we are accidentally subject to a man, the dominion of man over man being partial, and derivative from God. Hence the service specially due to God is called among the Greeks latria.

CHAPTER CXX

THAT THE WORSHIP OF LATRIA IS TO BE PAID TO GOD ALONE

THERE have been some who have thought that this worship should be paid not only to the first principle of all things, but also to all creatures that are above men. Hence, while considering God to be the one prime and universal principle of all things, they have still thought it right to pay latria, first after God, to the subsistent intelligences in the heavens, which they also called gods, whether they existed entirely apart from bodies or were the souls of spheres or stars. Secondly, also to certain subsistent intelligences which they believed to be united to bodies of air, and called them genii (daimones): because they believed them to be above men, as a body of air is above a body of earth, they insisted that these intelligences also were to be worshipped by men with divine worship, and in comparison with men they said that they were gods, as being intermediate between men and gods. And because they believed that the souls of good men, by the fact of their separation from bodies, passed to a higher state than the state of the present life, they considered that divine worship should be paid also to the souls of the dead, whom they called heroes, or manes. Some again, taking God to be the soul of the universe, have believed that the worship proper to Godhead is to be paid to the whole universe and to all its parts, not however for the sake of the material part, but for the sake of the soul, which they said was God, as honour is paid to a wise man, not for his body but for his mind. Some again used to say that even things naturally below man still should be worshipped by man with divine honours, inasmuch as some portion of the power of a higher nature is communicated to them. Hence, believing that certain images made by man were receptive of supernatural power, either from the influence of the heavenly bodies or from the presence of Spirits within them, they said that such images should receive divine worship, and they called those images gods: on which account themselves were called idolaters,' because they paid the worship of latria to idols and images.

1. But it is irrational in men who posit one only separate first principle, to pay divine worship to another. For we pay worship to God, not as though He needed it, but to strengthen in ourselves by sensible signs a true opinion about God. Now the opinion that God is one, exalted above all, cannot be strengthened in us by sensible signs except by our paying him some separate and peculiar tribute, which we call divine worship. Evidently then true opinion about the one principle is weakened, if divine worship is paid to several.

2. This exterior worship is necessary for man, to the end that man's soul may conceive a spiritual reverence for God. But custom goes a long way in moving the mind of man: for we are more easily moved to that to which we are accustomed. Now the custom among men is that the honour that is paid to him who holds the highest place in the commonwealth, as to the king or emperor, is paid to none other. Therefore there should be a worship that is paid to none other than the one principle of the universe; and that we call the worship of latria.

3. If the worship of latria is due to another merely because he is superior, and not because he is supreme, it would follow that one man should pay latria to another man, and one angel to another angel, seeing that among men, and also among angels, one is superior to another. And since among men he who is superior on one point is inferior on another, it would follow that men should interchange latria in their mutual dealings, which is absurd.

4. Man ought to pay God something special in recognition of the special benefit of his creation; and that is the worship of latria.

5. Latria means service, and service is due to the master. Now he is properly and truly called master, who lays down to others precepts of conduct, and himself takes a precept of conduct from none: for he who executes the arrangement of a superior is rather minister than master. But God's providence disposes all things to their due actions: hence in Holy Writ the angels and the heavenly bodies are said to minister both to God, whose ordinance they execute, and to us, to whose benefit their actions

tend. Therefore the worship of latria, due to the sovereign master, is to be paid only to the sovereign principle of the universe.

6. Among all acts of latria, a unique rank belongs to sacrifice: for genuflections, prostrations and other such marks of honour may be paid even to man, although with another intention than they are paid to God: but no one ever thought to offer sacrifice except to him whom he regarded as God, or affected so to regard. The outward rite of sacrifice represents the inward true sacrifice, whereby the human mind offers itself to God, as to the principle of its creation, the author of its activity, the term of its happiness. Therefore to God alone should man offer sacrifice and the worship of latria, and not to any created spirits whatsoever.

Hence it is said: He shall be slain who offers sacrifice to any gods but to the Lord alone (Exod. xxii, 20): The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and him only shalt thou serve (Deut. vi, 13). And because it is an undue thing for the worship of latria to be paid to any other than the first principle of all things, and only an evil-minded rational creature will incite others to undue acts; evidently men have been set on to the aforesaid undue worships by the instigation of devils, who have presented themselves to men to be adored in place of God, seeking divine honour. Hence it is said: All the gods of the heathen are devils (Ps. xcv, 5): The things which the heathen sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God (1 Cor. x, 20).

CHAPTER CXXI

THAT THE DIVINE LAW DIRECTS MAN TO A RATIONAL USE OF CORPOREAL AND SENSIBLE THINGS

AS man’s mind may be raised to God by corporeal and sensible things, provided that they are duly used to show reverence to God, so also the undue use of them either totally withdraws the mind from God, fixing the final intention of the will upon inferior things, or clogs the mind’s aspiration after God, making it take unnecessary interest in such things. Now the divine law is given for this end chiefly, to lead man to cling to God. It is a function therefore of divine law to direct man in his affection for and use of corporeal and sensible things.

2. As man’s mind is subordinate to God, so his body is subordinate to his soul, and his lower powers to his reason. It belongs therefore to divine providence, the plan of which, as proposed by God to man, is the divine law, to see that all things keep their order. Therefore that divine law must so direct man as that his lower powers shall be subject to his reason, and his body to his soul, and exterior things shall serve his necessity.

4. Every lawgiver must comprise in his legislation those enactments without which the law could not be observed. Now law being set over reason, man could not follow the law unless all other things belonging to man were subjected to reason.

Hence it is said: Your reasonable service (Rom. xii, i); and, This is the will of God, your sanctification (1 Thess. iv, 9).

Hereby is excluded the error of such as say that those acts alone are sinful, whereby our neighbour is either hurt or shocked.

CHAPTER CXXII

OF THE REASON FOR WHICH SIMPLE FORNICATION IS A SIN BY DIVINE LAW, AND OF THE NATURAL INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE

HENCE appears the folly of those who say that simple fornication is not a sin. For they say: Given a woman free from a husband, and under no control of father or any other person, if any one approaches her with her consent, he does her no wrong, because she is pleased so to act, and has the disposal of her own person: nor does he do any wrong to another, for she is under no one's control: therefore there appears no sin. Nor does it seem to be a sufficient answer to say that she wrongs God, for God is not offended by us except by what we do against our own good (Chap.CXXI): but it does not appear that this conduct is against man's good: hence no wrong seems to be done to God thereby. In like manner also it does not appear a sufficient answer, that wrong is thereby done to one's neighbour, who is scandalised: for sometimes a neighbour is scandalised by what of itself is not a sin, in which case the sin is only incidental: but the question is not whether fornication is a sin incidentally, but whether it is a sin ordinarily and in itself.

We must seek a solution from what has been said before: for it has been said (Chapp.XVI,LXIV) that God has care of everything according to that which is good for it. Now it is good for everything to gain its end, and evil for it to be diverted from its due end. But as in the whole so also in the parts, our study should be that every part of man and every act of his may attain its due end. Now though the semen is superfluous for the preservation of the individual, yet it is necessary to him for the propagation of the species: while other excretions, such as excrement, urine, sweat, and the like, are needful for no further purpose: hence the only good that comes to man of them is by their removal from the body. But that is not the object in the emission of the semen, but rather the profit of generation, to which the union of the sexes is directed. But in vain would be the generation of man unless due nurture followed, without which the offspring generated could not endure. The emission of the semen then ought to be so directed as that both the proper generation may ensue and the education of the offspring be secured.

Hence it is clear that every emission of the semen is contrary to the good of man, which takes place in a way whereby generation is impossible; and if this is done on purpose, it must be a sin. I mean a way in which generation is impossible in itself as is the case in every emission of the semen without the natural union of male and female: wherefore such sins are called 'sins against nature.' But if it is by accident that generation cannot follow from the emission of the semen, the act is not against nature on that account, nor is it sinful; the case of the woman being barren would be a case in point.

Likewise it must be against the good of man for the semen to be emitted under conditions which, allowing generation to ensue, nevertheless bar the due education of the offspring. We observe that in those animals, dogs for instance, in which the female by herself suffices for the rearing of the offspring, the male and female stay no time together after the performance of the sexual act. But with all animals in which the female by herself does not suffice for the rearing of the offspring, male and female dwell together after the sexual act so long as is necessary for the rearing and training of the offspring. This appears in birds, whose young are incapable of finding their own food immediately they are hatched: for since the bird does not suckle her young with milk, according to the provision made by nature in quadrupeds, but has to seek food abroad for her young, and therefore keep them warm in the period of feeding, the female could not do this duty all alone by herself: hence divine providence has put in the male a natural instinct or standing by the female for the rearing of the brood. Now in the human species the female is clearly insufficient of herself for the rearing of the offspring, since the need of human life makes many demands, which cannot be met by one parent alone. Hence the fitness of human life requires man to stand by woman after the sexual act is done, and not to go off at once and form connexions with any one he meets, as is the way with fornicators. Nor is this reasoning traversed by the fact of some particular woman having wealth and power enough to nourish her offspring all by herself: for in human acts the line of natural rectitude is not drawn to suit the accidental variety of the individual, but the properties common to the whole species.

A further consideration is, that in the human species the young need not only bodily nutrition, as animals do, but also the training of the soul. Other animals have their natural instincts (suas prudentias) to provide for themselves: but man lives by reason, which [read quam] takes the experience of a long time to arrive at discretion. Hence children need instruction by the confirmed experience of their parents: nor are they capable of such instruction as soon as they are born, but after a long time, the time in fact taken to arrive at the years of discretion. For this instruction again a long time is needed; and then moreover, because of the assaults of passion, whereby the judgement of prudence is thwarted, there is need not of instruction only, but also of repression. For this purpose the woman by herself is not competent, but at this point especially there is requisite the concurrence of the man, in whom there is at once reason more perfect to instruct, and force more potent to chastise. Therefore in the human race the advancement of the young in good must last, not for a short time, as in birds, but for a long period of life. Hence, whereas it is necessary in all animals for the male to stand by the female for such time as the father’s concurrence is requisite for bringing up of the progeny, it is natural for man to be tied to the society of one fixed woman for a long period, not a short one. This social tie we call marriage. Marriage then is natural to man, and an irregular connexion outside of marriage is contrary to the good of man; and therefore fornication must be sinful.

Nor yet should it be counted a slight sin for one to procure the emission of the semen irrespective of the due purpose of generation and rearing of issue, on the pretence that it is a slight sin, or no sin at all, to apply any part of one’s body to another use than that to which it is naturally ordained, as if, for example, one were to walk on his hands, or do with his feet something that ought to be done with his hands. The answer is that by such inordinate applications as those mentioned the good of man is not greatly injured: but the inordinate emission of the semen is repugnant to the good of nature, which is the conservation of the species. Hence, after the sin of murder, whereby a human nature already in actual existence is destroyed, this sort of sin seem to hold the second place, whereby the generation of human nature is precluded.

The above assertions are confirmed by divine authority. The unlawfulness of any emission of semen, upon which offspring cannot be consequent, is evident from such texts as these: Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind: Thou shalt not lie with any beast (Levit. xviii, 22, 23): Nor the effeminate, nor sodomites, shall possess the kingdom of God (1 Cor. vi, 10). The unlawfulness of fornication and of all connexion with any other woman than one's own wife is clear from Deut. xxiii, 17: There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel: Keep thyself from all fornication, and beyond thine own wife suffer not the charge of knowing another (Job. iv, 13): Fly fornication (1 Cor. vi, 18).

Hereby is refuted the error of those who say that there is no more sin in the emission of the semen than in the ejection of other superfluous products from the body.

CHAPTER CXXIII

THAT MARRIAGE OUGHT TO BE INDISSOLUBLE

LOOKING at the matter rightly, one must see that the aforesaid reasons not only argue a long duration for that natural human partnership of male and female, which we call marriage, but further imply that the partnership ought to be lifelong.

1. Property is a means to the preservation of human life. And because natural life cannot be preserved in one and the same person of the father living on for all time, nature arranges for its preservation by the son succeeding his father in likeness of species: wherefore it is appropriate that the son should succeed his father in his property. It is natural therefore that the father's interest in his son should continue to the end of his life, and that father and mother should dwell together to the end.

2. Woman is taken into partnership with man for the need of childbearing: therefore when the fertility and beauty of woman ceases, there is a bar against her being taken up by another man. If then a man, taking a woman to wife in the time of her youth, when beauty and fertility wait upon her, could send her away when she was advanced in years, he would do the woman harm, contrary to natural equity.

3. It is manifestly absurd for the woman to be able to send away the man, seeing that woman is naturally subject to the rule of man, and it is not in the power of a subject to run away from control. It being then against the order of nature for the woman to be allowed to desert the man, if the man were allowed to desert the woman, the partnership of man and woman would not be on fair terms, but would be a sort of slavery on the woman's side.

4. Men show a natural anxiety to be sure of their own offspring; and whatever stands in the way of that assurance runs counter to the natural instinct of the race. But if the man could send away the woman, or the woman the man, and form a connexion with another, certainty as to parentage would be difficult, when a woman had intercourse first with one man and then with another.

5. The greater the love, the more need for it to be firm and lasting. But the love of man and woman is counted strongest of all; seeing that they are united, not only in the union of the sexes, which even among beasts makes a sweet partnership, but also for the sharing in common of all domestic life, as a sign whereof a man leaves even father and mother for the sake of his wife (Gen. ii, 24). It is fitting therefore for marriage to be quite indissoluble.

6. Of natural acts, generation alone is directed to the good of (the specific) nature: for eating and the separation from the body of other excretions concern the individual, but generation has to do with the preservation of the species. Hence, as law is instituted for the common good, the function of procreation ought to be regulated by laws divine and human. Now the laws laid down ought to proceed on the basis of the dictate of nature (ex naturali instinctu), if they are human laws, as in the exact sciences every human discovery takes its origin from principles naturally known: but if they are divine laws, they not only develop the dictate of nature, but also make up the deficiency of what nature dictates, as dogmas divinely revealed surpass the capacity of natural reason. Since then there is in the human species a natural exigency for the union of male and female to be one and indivisible, such unity and indissolubility must needs be ordained by human law. To that ordinance the divine law adds a supernatural reason, derived from the significancy of marriage as a type of the inseparable union of Christ with His Church, which is one as He is one. Thus then irregularities in the act of generation are not only contrary to the dictate of nature, but are also transgressions of laws divine and human: hence on this account any irregular behaviour in this matter is even a greater sin than in the matter of taking food or the like. But since all other factors in human life should be subordinate to that which is the best thing in man, it follows that the union of male and female must be regulated by law, not from the mere point of view of procreation, as in other animals, but also with an eye to good manners, or manners conformable to right reason, as

well for man as an individual, as also for man as a member of a household or family, or again as a member of civil society. Thus understood, good manners involve the indissolubility of the union of male and female: for they will love one another with greater fidelity, when they know that they are indissolubly united: each partner will take greater care of the things of the house, reflecting that they are to remain permanently in possession of the same things: occasions of quarrels are removed, that might otherwise arise between the husband and the wife's relations, if the husband were to divorce his wife; and thus affinity becomes a firmer bond of amity: also occasions of adultery are cut off, occasions which would readily offer themselves, if husband could divorce his wife, or wife her husband.

Hence it is said: But I say to you that whoever putteth away his wife, except for fornication, and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and he that marrieth her that is put away, committeth adultery (Matt. xix, 9): But to them that are united in marriage, it is not I that give commandment, but the Lord, that the wife depart not from her husband (1 Cor. vii, 10).

Divorce was reckoned an impropriety also among the ancient Romans, of whom Valerius Maximus (De memor. dictis, II, 1) relates that they believed that the marriage tie ought not to be broken off even for barrenness.

Hereby the custom is banned of putting away wives, which however in the Old Law was permitted to the Jews for their hardness of heart, because they were prone to the killing of their wives: so the less evil was permitted to keep out the greater.

CHAPTER CXXIV

THAT MARRIAGE OUGHT TO BE BETWEEN ONE MAN AND ONE WOMAN

ONE general reason holds for all animals, which is this, that every animal desires free enjoyment of the pleasure of sexual union as of eating: which freedom is impeded by there being either several males to one female, or the other way about: and therefore animals fight alike for food and for sexual jealousy. But in men there is a special reason, inasmuch as man naturally desires to be sure of his own offspring. But here a difference comes in. Both of the above mentioned reasons hold for the case of the cohabitation of one female with several males: but the second reason does not hold against the cohabitation of one male with several females,—I mean certainty in point of parentage is not in that case prevented. But the first reason makes against it: for as the free enjoyment of the female is taken from the male, if the female has another partner, so the same free enjoyment is taken from the female, if the male has more than one partner.

2. In every species of animal in which the sire takes any interest in the offspring, one male keeps company with one female only, as in all birds that rear their young in common: for one male could not avail for several females as a helper in the rearing of their progeny: whereas in animals in which the males take no interest in the offspring, one male consorts with several females promiscuously, and the female with several males, as appears in dogs, poultry, and the like. But the male's interest in the offspring is greater in the human species than in any other.

3 and 4. The reason why a wife is not allowed more than one husband at a time is because otherwise paternity would be uncertain. If then while the wife has one husband only, the husband has more than one wife, there will not be a friendship of equality on both sides, friendship consisting in a certain equality. There will not be the friendship of a free man with a free woman, but a sort of friendship of a slave with her master. The husband might well be allowed a plurality of wives, if the understanding were allowable, that the friendship of each with him was not to be that of a free woman with a free man but of a slave with her master. And this is borne out by experience: for among men that keep many wives the wives are counted as menials.

5. From one man having several wives there arises discord at the domestic hearth, as experience shows.

Hence it is said: They shall be two in one flesh (Gen. ii, 24).

CHAPTER CXXV

THAT MARRIAGE OUGHT NOT TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN KINDRED

SINCE in marriage there is a union of different persons, those persons who ought to reckon themselves as one because of their being of one stock, are properly excluded from intermarrying, that they may love one another more ardently on the mere ground of their common origin.

2. Since the intercourse of man and wife carries with it a certain natural shame, those persons should be prevented from such intercourse who owe one another a mutual reverence on account of the tie of blood. And this is the reason touched on in Leviticus xviii.

3. Excessive indulgence in sexual pleasures makes for the corruption of good manners: for such pleasures of all others most absorb the mind and hinder the right exercise of reason. But such excessive indulgence would ensue, if the intercourse of the sexes were allowed among persons who must necessarily dwell under the same roof, where the occasion of such intercourse could not be withdrawn.

5. In human society the widening of friendships is of the first importance. That is done by the marriage tie being formed with strangers.

It is to be observed that as that inclination is natural,’ which works upon objects as they usually occur, so law too is framed for what usually happens. Thus it is no derogation from the reasons above alleged, that in some particular case the venture may turn out otherwise: for the good of the individual ought to be overlooked in view of the good of the many, since the good of the multitude is ever more divine than the good of the individual. Lest however any particular complaint might remain wholly without remedy, there rests with legislators and others on like footing authority to dispense in a general enactment so far as is necessary in a particular case. If the law is human, a dispensation may be given by men possessed of power like to that which made the law. If the law is a divine enactment, a dispensation may be given by divine authority, as in the Old Law a dispensatory indulgence seems to have been granted for plurality of wives, and for concubines, and divorce.

CHAPTER CXXVI

THAT NOT ALL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS SIN

THE members of the body being the instruments of the soul, the end of every member is the use of it, as in the case of any other instrument. But there are members of the body the use of which is for the intercourse of the sexes: that therefore is their end. But that which is the end of any natural thing cannot be in itself evil, because the things of nature are ordinances of divine providence. Therefore the intercourse of the sexes cannot be in itself evil.

3. Natural inclinations are put into things by God, who is the prime mover of all. Therefore it is impossible for the natural inclination of any species to be directed to an object in itself evil. But in all full-grown animals there is a natural inclination to sexual union, which union therefore cannot be in itself evil.

4. That without which something good and excellent cannot be, is not in itself evil. But the perpetuity of the species in animals is not preserved except through generation, which is of sexual intercourse.

Hence it is said: She sinneth not, if she marry (1 Cor. vii, 36).

Hereby is excluded the error of those who totally condemn marriage, which some do because they believe that temporal things proceed not from a good but from an evil principle.

CHAPTER CXXVII

THAT OF NO FOOD IS THE USE SINFUL IN ITSELF

EVERYTHING is done rationally, when it is directed according to its due bearing upon a due end. But the due end of the taking of food is the preservation of the health by nourishment. Therefore whatever food can serve that end, may be taken without sin.

2. Of no thing is the use evil in itself unless the thing itself be evil in itself. But no food is in its nature evil; because everything is in its nature good (Chap.VII); albeit some particular food may be evil to some particular person, inasmuch as it makes against his bodily health. Therefore of no food, considered as such and such a thing, is the partaking a sin in itself: but it may be a sin, if a person uses it irrationally and not to his health.

3. To apply things to the purpose for which they exist is not in itself evil. But plants exist for the sake of animals, some animals for the sake of others, and all for the sake of man (Chap.LXXXI). Therefore to use either plants, or the flesh of animals, either for eating, or for any other purpose for which they are useful to man (vel ad quidquid aliud sunt homini utilia), is not in itself a sin.

4. The defect which makes sin redounds from soul to body, but not backwards from body to soul: for by sin we mean a disorder of the will. But articles of food concern the body immediately, not the soul. Therefore the taking of various foods cannot be in itself a sin, except in so far as it is inconsistent with rectitude of will. And that may come to be in several ways: in one way by some inconsistency with the proper end of food, as when for the pleasure of eating one uses food that disagrees with health either in kind or in quantity. Another way would be when the food becomes

not the condition of him who eats it, or of the society in which he lives, as when one is more nice in his food than his means will allow, or violates the social conventions of those with whom he sits at table. A third way would be in the case of certain foods prohibited by some special law: thus in the Old Law sundry meats were forbidden for what they signified; and in Egypt of old the eating of beef was prohibited, lest agriculture should suffer; and again there is the case of rules prohibiting the use of certain foods in order to check the lower appetites.

Hence the Lord says: Not what entereth in at the mouth defiles a man (Matt. xv, 11). Since eating and the intercourse of the sexes are not things in themselves unlawful, and exterior possessions are necessary for getting food, for rearing and supporting a family, and other bodily wants, it follows that neither is the possession of wealth in itself unlawful, provided the order of reason be observed,—I mean, provided the man possesses justly the things that he has, and does not fix the final end of his will in them, and uses them duly for his own and others' profit.

Hereby is excluded the error of some, who, as Augustine says, "most arrogantly called themselves Apostolics, because they did not receive into their communion married men and proprietors, such as are many monks and clerks whom the Catholic Church now contains: these people are heretics, because, separating themselves from the Church, they think that there is no hope for other persons who make use of what they do without" (De haeresibus, c. 40).

CHAPTER CXXVIII

HOW THE LAW OF GOD RELATES A MAN TO HIS NEIGHBOUR

OF all things that man makes use of, the chief are other men. Man is naturally a social animal, needing many things that the individual cannot procure by himself. The divine law therefore must needs instruct man to live according to the order of reason in his relations with other men.

2. The end of the divine law is to bring man to cleave to God. Now man is aided thereto by his fellow-man, as well in point of knowledge as in point of affection: for men help one another in the knowledge of the truth, and one incites another to good and restrains him from evil. Hence it is said: Iron is sharpened by iron, and man sharpens the face of his friend (Prov. xxvii, 17): Better two together than one, etc. (Eccles iv, 9-12).

There is then orderly concord amongst men, when to each there is rendered his own, which is the act of justice; and therefore it is said: The work of justice is peace (Isa. xxxii, 17). To the observance of this justice man is inclined both by an interior and an exterior principle. By an interior principle, in so far as a man has a will to observe the precepts of the divine law, which is done by his bearing love to God and to his neighbour: for whoever loves another renders him his due spontaneously and with pleasure, and even acts more by liberality: hence the whole fulfilment of the law hinges upon love (Rom. xiii, 10: Matt. xxii, 40). But because some are not so inwardly disposed as to do of their own accord what the law commands, they have to be dragged by an exterior force to the fulfilment of the justice of the law; and so they fulfil the law under fear of penalties, not as freemen but as slaves. Hence it is said: When thou shalt do thy judgements upon the earth by punishing the wicked, the inhabitants of earth shall learn justice (Isa. xxvi, 9). Others are so disposed as to do of their own accord what the law bids them. They are a law to themselves, having charity, which bends their wills in place of a law to generous conduct. There was no need of an exterior law being enacted for them: hence it is said: The law was not made for the just, but for the unjust: which is not to be taken to mean that the just are not bound to fulfil the law, as some have misunderstood the text, but that the just are inclined of themselves to do justice even without a law.

CHAPTER CXXIX

THAT THE THINGS COMMANDED BY THE DIVINE LAW ARE RIGHT, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE LAW ENACTS THEM, BUT ALSO ACCORDING TO NATURE

BY the precepts of the divine law the human mind is subordinated to God, and all the rest of man is subordinated to reason. But this is just what natural order requires, that the inferior be subject to the superior. Therefore the things commanded by the divine law are in themselves naturally right.

2. Divine providence has endowed men with a natural tribunal of reason (naturale judicatorium rationis), to be the ruling principle of their proper activities. But natural principles are ordained to natural purposes. There are certain activities naturally suited to man, and these activities are in themselves right, and not merely by positive law.

3. Where there is a definite nature, there must be definite activities proper to that nature: for the proper activity of every nature is consequent upon the nature. Now it is certain that men's nature is definite. There must therefore be certain activities that in themselves befit man.

4. Wherever a thing is natural to any one, any other thing also is natural, without which the first thing cannot be had, for nature fails not in necessities. But it is natural to man to be a social animal. Those things therefore naturally befit man, without which the maintenance of human society would be impossible. Such things are the securing to every man of

his own, and abstinence from wrongdoing. Some points therefore of human conduct are naturally right.

5. The use of lower creatures to meet the need of human life is a natural property of man. Now there is a certain measure in which the use of the aforesaid creatures is helpful to human life. If this measure is transgressed, as in the disorderly taking of food, it results in harm to man. There are therefore certain human acts naturally appropriate, and others naturally inappropriate.

6. In the natural order man's body is for his soul, and the lower powers of the soul for reason. It is therefore naturally right for man so to manage his body and the lower faculties of his soul as that the act and good of reason may least of all be hindered, but rather helped. Mismanagement in this regard must naturally be sinful. We count therefore as things naturally evil carousings and revellings and the disorderly indulgence of the sexual instinct, whereby the act of reason is impeded and subjected to the passions, which do not leave the judgement of the reason free.

7. To every man those things are naturally befitting, whereby he tends to his natural end; and the contraries are naturally unbefitting. But God is the end to which man is ordained by nature (Chap.CXV). Those things therefore are naturally right, whereby man is led to the knowledge and love of God; and the contraries are naturally evil for man.

Hence it is said: The judgements of the Lord are righteous, having their justification in themselves (Ps. xviii, 10).

Hereby is excluded the tenet of those who say that things just and right are the creation of positive law.

CHAPTER CXXX

THAT THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT OF MEN IS AFTER THE MANNER OF PATERNAL GOVERNMENT

THE father has care of the child, not only in his relations with other men, as the king has care of him, but also in his individual concerns, as has been shown above of God (Chap.XCIII). And this with good reason, for a parent is like God in giving natural origin to a human being. Hence divine and paternal government extend to the individual, not merely as a member of society, but as a person subsisting in his own nature by himself. The two governments differ however in this, that paternal government can extend only to the things that appear in man externally, but divine government reaches also to interior acts and dispositions. For no man can take cognisance of things hidden from him: the secrets of hearts are hidden from men, though open to God (B. I, Chap.LIX). God therefore takes account of man not only as to his exterior behaviour, but also as to his inward affections, what he means to do, and what he intends to gain by doing it. Of such points man takes no cognisance, except so far as by outward acts the inward disposition is shown.

Every one has care of things according as they belong to him: for solicitude about things that are no affair of yours is blamed as meddlesomeness. But one man belongs to another's charge otherwise than as he belongs to God. One man belongs to another either by natural origin and bodily descent, or by some combination in external works. But man belongs to God inasmuch as he has his origin from Him, which origin means a certain likeness to God: for every being acts to the production of its own likeness. Now man has more of the likeness of God in his soul than in his body, and most of all in his mind. Clearly therefore, in the origin of man as coming from God, the main thing intended is the mind, and for the mind's sake the other (sentient) parts of the soul are produced by God; and for the soul the body is produced: so God's principal care is for the mind of man,—first, for the mind; then for the other parts of the soul, and after them for the body. Hence it is by the mind that man attains his last end, which is human happiness (Chap.XXXVII). Other things in man serve as instruments for the securing of happiness. Hence we may observe that human government takes cognisance of interior acts so far as they are directed to external conduct and are thereby unfolded to view: but God contrariwise takes cognisance of external conduct so far as it points to interior dispositions, particularly in regard of the mind, whereby man is capable of happiness,—human happiness consisting, as has been said, in the fruition of God. The whole care therefore that God has of man is in view of preparing his mind for the fruition of God, whereunto the mind is prepared by faith, hope and charity: for by faith man's mind is disposed to recognise God as a Being above himself: by hope it is strengthened to reach out to Him and see in Him man's true good: by charity it fixes upon Him so as immovably to adhere to Him. All things that God requires of man in this life are referable to these three virtues.

Hence it is said: And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God ask of thee, except that thou fear the Lord thy God and walk in his ways? (Deut. x, 12.) Now there remain faith, hope and charity, these three (1 Cor. xiii, 13).

But because the human mind is naturally more imperfect than other intellectual natures; and the more perfect a thing is, the more energy it shows in tending to its end; it appears that the human mind is naturally weaker in tending to God, the end of all, than are the higher minds of the angels. This weakness shows itself on two points. First, in the deficiency of intellectual power in the human soul, as compared with higher intelligences, so that it cannot go straight to intellectual truth as it is in itself (Chapp.XLI,CXIX). Secondly, in the obstacles that keep it back from throwing itself with all its force upon God; obstacles on the part of the body, which claims care for sustenance and repose; and again obstacles on the part of the lower powers of the soul, inasmuch as the excitements of phantasy and the perturbations of passion trouble that interior peace, which is so necessary for the mind freely to throw itself upon God. These obstacles cannot be wholly removed by man from his path, so long as he lives in this mortal body: for he has to attend to the things necessary for this mortal life, and is thereby hindered from always actually tending to God. But the aforesaid hindrances should be so far got under that there should be in man's mind an intention at least, directed to God without interruption; and the more the mind can be even actually fixed on God, the more perfect will man's life be, as keeping nearer to its last end. And this actual fixing of the mind upon God will go to strengthen the intention directed towards Him, which intention must needs come to naught unless at times the mind be fixed upon Him actually. All the precepts and counsels therefore of the divine law go to furnish man with aids for fixing his mind on God and removing obstacles to such attention.

For both these purposes man needs to live at peace and concord with his fellow-men. For man needs to be aided by man, as well to the preservation of life and limb, as also to the end that one man may inflame and incite and instruct another to yearn after God. In the absence of peace and concord, man's mind must be disquieted by contentions and fighting, and hindered from aspiring to God. And therefore the divine law has made provision for the preservation of peace and concord amongst men by the practice of justice. It commands that to every man be rendered his due, as honour to parents: that none be harmed or hindered in the enjoyment of the good that belongs to him, whether by word,—hence the prohibition of false witness,—or by deed touching his own person,—hence the prohibition of murder,—or by deed touching a person allied to him,—hence the prohibition of adultery, or by deed touching his property,—hence the prohibition of theft. And because God takes cognisance not only of the public but also of the domestic behaviour of men, the divine law has forbidden neglect of wife, servants, etc., which is no concern of human law.

But it is not enough for peace and concord to be preserved among men by precepts of justice, unless there be a further consolidation of mutual love. Justice provides for men to the extent that one shall not get in the way of another, but not to the extent of one helping another in his need. One may happen to need another's aid in cases in which none is bound to him by any debt of justice, or where the person so bound does not render any aid. Thus there came to be need of an additional precept of mutual love amongst men, so that one should aid another even beyond his obligations in justice.

Hence it is said: His commandment we have received, that whoever loveth God should also love his brother (1 John iv, 21): This is my commandment, that ye love one another as I have loved you (John xv, 12).

It is evident that love suffices for the fulfilment of the works of justice. Hence it is said: Love is the fulfilment of the law (Rom. xiii, 10): to commend which fulfilment there are given us precepts and counsels of God concerning works of mercy, love and succour of enemies, and the like deeds of kindness, which overflow and run over the measures of justice.

But because the aforesaid precepts of justice require their completion in the love of one’s neighbour, and that depends on the love of God; and when love is gone, and faith and charity are also gone, the human mind cannot duly tend to God; it follows that the observance of the precepts of the aforesaid virtues is necessarily required of man, and by the neglect of them man is entirely thrown out of his subordination to God. Now human life takes its denomination from the end to which it is directed. They who constitute their last end in pleasures are said to lead a life of pleasure. They who constitute their last end in the contemplation of truth are said to lead a contemplative life: hence whosoever constitute their last end in the enjoyment of God, their life is an adherence to God, which is absolutely the life of man, for to that end man is naturally ordained (Chap.XXXVII). On other ends man’s life is dependent only in a qualified sense, inasmuch as such ends are not imposed on man by nature, but by his own choice. Death then being the opposite of life, it is a sort of death to a man to drop out of the order which has its last term in God. Hence the sins whereby a man breaks away from such order are called mortal,’ or deadly’ sins; and those instructions of the law whereby men are held to their engagements of justice, charity, hope, and faith, are called commandments,’ or prohibitions,’ because they are to be of necessity observed.

As one necessary condition for the flight of the mind to God is peace with neighbours, with whom man has to live in society and be aided by them, so another necessary condition is peace and good order of the elements within man himself. We observe that there are two ways in which the free flight of the mind to God may be hindered. One way is by the intensification of the acts of the lower powers. When one power comes vigorously into action, it draws to itself the interest of man, which cannot be scattered over many objects simultaneously: hence another power must be either stopped from acting or have its activity diminished. By the lower powers I mean the sentient powers, as well apprehensive, namely, the external and internal senses, the phantasy and other attendant powers, as also appetitive, as the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Hence when there is strong delight in sense, or much excitement of phantasy, or an inclination of the concupiscible or of the irascible faculty to their several objects, the mind must necessarily be impeded in its act of ascent to God.

In another way the movement of the mind to God may be hindered on the part of the mind itself, by its occupation with other things: for one power cannot be in perfect activity over several objects simultaneously.

But since the mind at times uses the inferior powers as obedient instruments, and can occupy itself with several objects, when they all bear upon one and all help to apprehend that one, we must understand that the mind is then only hindered from its flight to God by the lower powers, or by its own occupation with other objects, when those powers or those objects bear not at all on the mind’s movement to God: otherwise, far from being hindrances, they may be positive helps to the free flight of man’s mind to his Creator.

Indeed man cannot altogether avoid occupying his mind about other things, by the fact that he must be solicitous about the necessaries of his bodily life. There are however among men various degrees of this solicitude. The first degree of solicitude extends just so far as the common measure of human life requires. It involves the providing of necessaries for self, wife, children, and other persons belonging to oneself according to one’s state. This degree of solicitude is lawful, and may be said to be connatural to man.

The second degree is reached when a man is more solicitous about the aforesaid things of the body than the common measure of human life requires according to his state, without however this solicitude going so far as to withdraw him from his subordination to God, or making him transgress the commandments of justice and charity. There is evidently sin in this, since the man exceeds his proper measure; yet not mortal sin, since he undertakes nothing contrary to the precepts of justice and charity. His sin is called venial,’ as being readily pardonable,’—as well because, for one who keeps his face set towards his last end, any error that he may make is easily put straight,—thus in speculative sciences any one who has a true conception of principles may thereby easily correct such errors as he may fall into in drawing conclusions; and the end in view in the things of action is like the first principle in things of speculation,—as also because to one steady in friendship any delinquency is readily forgiven,—as also because it is no easy matter absolutely to observe due measure and exceed in nothing. Hence whoever does not cast away from his heart the rule of reason, which is laid down by the end in view, even though he does not altogether observe rectitude in the things which have to be regulated by that rule, is not overmuch to be blamed, but deserves pardon.

The third degree is when the solicitude for temporals grows so great as to withdraw the soul from subordination to God, and bring it to transgress the commandments of justice and charity, faith and hope, without which man’s mind cannot remain in due relation with God; and this is manifest mortal sin.

The fourth degree is when contrariwise man’s solicitude for worldly things stops short of the common measure of human life. If this is owing to remissness and flabbiness of mind, or to any undue eagerness, it is to be held for a base proceeding: for the transgression of the golden mean in either direction is blameworthy. But if lower things are neglected that better things may be attended to, to wit, that the mind may take a free flight to the things of God, this is a virtue more perfect than human. To teach man such perfection, there have not been given him commandments, but rather counsels to draw him forth and incite him.

CHAPTER CXXXI

OF THE COUNSELS THAT ARE GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW

BECAUSE the best part for man is to fix his mind on God and divine things, and it is impossible for man to busy himself with intense ardour in a number of different directions, there are given in the divine law counsels for enabling the human mind to take a more free flight to God. These counsels withdraw men from the occupations of the present life, so far as is possible for men still living on earth. Such withdrawal is not so necessary to justice as that justice cannot be without it: for virtue and justice is not done away with by man's making use of corporeal and earthly things according to the order of reason: therefore these admonitions of the divine law are called counsels, and not commandments, inasmuch as they advise a man to drop things less good for things that are better.

Human solicitude busies itself about the common measure of human life in three chief particulars. First, about one's own person, what one is to do or where to live; secondly, about persons related to oneself, especially wife and children; thirdly, about the procurement of exterior things, needful for the support of life. For cutting off solicitude about exterior things there is given in the divine law the counsel of poverty, which prompts to the casting away of the things of this world. Hence the Lord says: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast and give to the poor, and come, follow me (Matt. xix, 21). For cutting off solicitude about wife and children there is given man the counsel of virginity, or continence. Hence it is said: About virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give a counsel; and, adding the reason of this counsel, he continues: He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things of the Lord, how he may please God; but he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife, and is divided (1 Cor. vii, 25-33). For cutting off man’s solicitude even about himself there is given the counsel of obedience, whereby a man commits the disposal of his acts to his superior. Therefore it is said: Obey your superiors and be subject to them, for they watch as having to render an account of your souls (Heb. xiii, 17).

Because the highest perfection of human life consists in the mind of man being detached from other things and fixed on God, and the three counsels aforesaid seem singularly to dispose the mind to this detachment, we may see in them proper adjuncts of a state of perfection, not that they themselves constitute perfection, but inasmuch as they are dispositions to perfection, which consists in the union of the detached soul with God. This is expressly shown in the words of our Lord counselling poverty: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow me,—where He places the perfection of life in the following of Him.

They may also be called effects and signs of perfection. For when the mind is strongly possessed with love and desire of anything, it thereupon counts other things as quite secondary: so from man’s mind being carried with fervent love and desire to divine things, wherein its perfection consists, the consequence is a casting off of all that might retard its movement to God,—care of property, affection for wife and children, and even love of one’s own self. This is signified by the words of Scripture: If a man shall give the whole substance of his house in exchange for love, he will account it nothing (Cant. viii, 7): Having found one precious pearl, he went and sold all that he had, and acquired it (Matt. xiii, 46): the advantages that I had I considered as dirt, that I might gain Christ (Philip. iii, 8).

Since then the three counsels aforesaid are dispositions to perfection, and effects of perfection, and signs of the same, they who make the three corresponding vows to God are properly said to be in a state of perfection. The perfection to which they dispose the mind consists in the free converse of the soul with God. Hence they who make profession of the aforesaid vows are called religious,’ as dedicating themselves and all that is theirs to God by a manner of sacrifice, extending to property by poverty, to the body by continence, and to the will by obedience: for religion consists in the worship of God (Chap.CXIX).

CHAPTERS CXXXII, CXXXV

ARGUMENTS AGAINST VOLUNTARY POVERTY, WITH REPLIES

THERE have been found persons to condemn voluntary poverty, thereby going against the teaching of the gospel, Of these Vigilantius was the first. He has had imitators, men making themselves out to be doctors of the law, not understanding either what they say or about what they affirm (1 Tim. i, 7). They have been led by these and the like reasons.

Arg. 1. Animals that cannot find the necessaries of life at any time of the year, have a natural instinct for gathering such necessaries at a time when they can be found, and laying them up, as we see in bees and ants. But men need many things for the preservation of their life, which cannot be found any time. Therefore man has a natural tendency to gather together and lay up such things, and it is against the law of nature to scatter them again.

Reply. Still it is not necessary for every one to be busy with this task of gathering: as even among bees not all have the same duty, some gather honey, others make cells out of wax,—to say nothing of the queen-bees being exempt from all such occupations. And so it must be with men: for many things being necessary to human life, for which one man by himself cannot suffice, different functions have to be undertaken by different men,—some have to labour in the fields, some to tend cattle, and some to build. And because human life needs not only corporal but also spiritual aids, some have to devote themselves to spiritual things for the benefit of the rest; and these persons should be set free from the care of temporals.

Arg. 2. As every one is bound by natural law to preserve his life, so also his exterior substance, as being the means whereby life is preserved.

Reply. For them who relinquish temporal things there still remains every likelihood and hope of finding the sustenance necessary for life, either through their own labour, or the benefactions of others, whether in the shape of possessions held in common or of food daily given: for what we can do through our friends, in a manner we can do of ourselves, as the Philosopher says (Eth. Nic. VIII, xi).

Arg. 3. Man is by nature a social animal. But society cannot be maintained among men except on a system of mutual aid. To take their part in this system of aid they render themselves incapable, who fling away their exterior substance.

Reply. It is a greater thing to aid another in spirituals than in temporals, spiritual things being the more necessary to the end of final happiness. Hence he who by voluntary poverty strips himself of the ability to aid others in temporals, in order to the acquirement of spiritual good, whereby he may aid others to better advantage, does nothing against the good of human society.

Arg. 4. If it is an evil thing to have worldly substance, a good thing to rid neighbours of evil, and an evil thing to lead them into evil, it follows that to give any of the substance of this world to a needy person is evil, and to take away such substance from him who has it is good: which is absurd. It is therefore a good thing to have worldly substance, and to fling it entirely away by voluntary poverty is evil.

Reply. Wealth is a good thing for man, so far as it is directed to rational good, but not in itself: hence poverty may very well be better than wealth, if by poverty man finds his way to a more perfect good.

Arg. 5. Occasions of evil are to be shunned. But poverty is an occasion of evil, leading men on to thefts, flatteries, perjuries, and the like.

Reply. Neither riches, nor poverty, nor any other exterior condition is of itself the good of man. Such things are good only as tending to the good of reason. Hence vice may arise out of any of them, when they are not turned to man’s use according to the rule of reason. Still not for that are they to be accounted simply evil, but only the abuse of them is evil.

Arg. 6. Virtue, lying in the mean, is spoilt by either extreme. There is a virtue called liberality, which consists in giving where one should give, and holding one’s hand where one should hold it. On the side of defect is the vice of stinginess, which holds its hand in all cases indiscriminately. On the side of excess is the vice of lavish giving away of everything, as is done by those who embrace voluntary poverty, a vice akin to prodigality.

Reply. The golden mean is not determined according to quantity of exterior goods, but according to the rule of reason. Hence sometimes it happens that what is extreme in quantity of some exterior commodity is the mean according to the rule of reason. There is none who tends to great things more than the magnanimous man, or who in expenditure surpasses the munificent, or princely man. The rule of reason does not measure the mere quantity of commodity employed, but the condition of the person and his intention, fitness of place, time, and the like, also many conditions of virtue. Therefore one does not run counter to virtue by voluntary poverty, even though one abandon all things. Nor is this an act of prodigality, seeing that it is done with a due end and other due conditions. To expose oneself to death, under due conditions, is an act of fortitude and a virtue: yet that is going far beyond the abandonment of one’s possessions.

CHAPTERS CXXXIII, CXXXVI

OF VARIOUS MODES OF LIVING ADOPTED BY THE VOTARIES OF VOLUNTARY POVERTY

FIRST MODE. The first mode is for the possessions of all to be sold, and all to live in common on [the capital fund accumulated by] the price, as was done under the Apostles at Jerusalem: As many as had possessions in lands or houses sold them, and laid the price at the feet of the Apostles, and division was made to each according to the need of each (Acts iv, 34, 35).

Criticism. It is not easy to induce many men with great possessions to take up this mode of life; and if the amount realised out of the possessions of a few rich is divided among many recipients, it will not last long.

Reply. This mode will do, but not for a long time. And therefore we do not read of the Apostles instituting this mode of living when they passed to the nations among whom the Church was to take root and endure.

Second Mode. To have possessions in common, sufficient to provide for all members of the community out of what the property brings in, as is done in most monasteries.

Criticism. Earthly possessions breed solicitude, as well for the gathering in of the returns as also for the defence of them against acts of fraud and violence; and this solicitude is all the greater as greater possessions are required for the support of many. In this way then the end of voluntary poverty is defeated, at least in the case of many, who have the procuratorship of these possessions. Besides, common possession is wont to be a source of discord.

Reply. The administration of these common possessions may be left to the care of one or a few persons, and the rest remain without solicitude for temporals, free to attend to spiritual things. Nor do they who undertake this solicitude for others lose any of the perfection of their life: for what they seem to lose by defect of quiet they recover in the service of charity, in which perfection consists. Nor is there any loss of concord by occasion of this mode of common possessions. For they who adopt voluntary poverty ought to be persons who despise temporal things; and such persons are not the men to quarrel over temporals.

Third mode. To live by the labour of one's hands, as St Paul did and advised others to do. We have not eaten bread of any one for nothing, but in labour and fatigue, night and day working, not to be a burden to any of you: not that we had not authority to act otherwise, but to present ourselves to you as a model for you to imitate: for when we were with you, we laid down to you the rule, if any man not work, neither let him eat (2 Thess. iii, 8-10).

Criticism. It seems folly for one to abandon what is necessary, and afterwards try to get it back again by labour. Moreover, whereas the end of the counsel of voluntary poverty is the readier following of Christ in freedom from worldly solicitudes, earning one's livelihood by one's own labour is a matter of more anxiety than living on the possessions which one had before, especially if they were a modest competency. And the Lord seems to forbid manual labour to His disciples in the text: Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap: consider the lilies of the field how they grow, they labour not, neither do they spin (Matt. vi, 26, 28). Moreover this mode of living is inadequate. Many desire a perfect life, who have not the capacity for earning their livelihood by labour, not having been brought up thereto: also there is the possibility of sickness. And no little time must be spent in labour to suffice for earning a livelihood: many spend their whole time in labour, and yet can scarcely live. Thus the votaries of voluntary poverty will be hindered from study and spiritual exercises; and their poverty will be more of a hindrance than a help to the perfection of their life.

Reply. In the case of rich men, their possessions involve solicitude in getting them or keeping them; and the heart of the owner is drawn to them; inconveniences which do not happen to one whose sole object is to gain his daily bread by the labour of his hands. Little time is sufficient, and little solicitude is necessary, for gaining by the labour of one's hands enough to support nature: but for gathering riches and superfluities, as craftsmen in the world propose, much time has to be spent and much solicitude shown. Our Lord in the Gospel has not forbidden labour of the hands, but anxiety of mind about the necessaries of life. He did not say, Do not labour, but, Be not solicitous. And this precept He enforces by an argument from less to greater. For if divine providence sustains birds and lilies, which are of inferior condition, and cannot labour at those works whereby men get their livelihood, much more will it provide for men, who are of worthier condition, and to whom it has given ability to win their livelihood by their own labours. It is the exception for a man not to be able to win enough to live upon by the labour of his hands; and an institution is not to be rejected for exceptional cases. The remedy is, for him whose labour is not enough to keep him, to be helped out either by others of the same society, who can make more by their labour than is necessary for them, or by others who are well off. Nor need those who are content with little spend much time in seeking a livelihood by the labour of their hands: so they are not much hindered from spiritual works, especially as in working with their hands they can think of God and praise Him.

Fourth mode. To live on the alms contributed by others, who retain their wealth. This seems to have been the method observed by our Lord: for it is said that sundry women followed Christ, and ministered to him out of their means (Luke viii, 2, 3).

Criticism. It seems irrational for one to abandon his own and live on another's property,—or for one to receive of another and pay him back nothing in return. There is no impropriety in ministers of the altar and preachers, to whom the people are indebted for doctrine and other divine gifts, receiving support at their hands: for the labourer is worthy of his hire, as the Lord says (Matt. x, 10); and the Apostle, the Lord hath ordained that they who preach the gospel should live by the gospel (1 Cor. ix, 14). But it is an apparent absurdity for these persons who minister to the people in no office to receive the necessaries of life from the people. Others moreover, who through sickness and poverty cannot help themselves, must lose their alms through these professors of voluntary poverty, since men neither can nor will succour a great multitude of poor. Moreover independence of spirit is particularly requisite for perfect virtue: otherwise men easily become partakers in other people’s sins, either by expressly consenting to them, or by palliating or dissembling them. But this method of life is a great drawback to such independence, for a man cannot but shrink from offending one by whose patronage he lives. Moreover the necessity of exposing one’s necessities to others, and begging relief, renders mendicants objects of contempt and dislike, whereas persons who take up a perfect life ought to be reverenced and loved. But if any one will praise the practice of begging as conducive to humility, he seems to talk altogether unreasonably. For the praise of humility consists in despising earthly exaltation, such as comes of riches, honours, fame, but not in despising loftiness of virtue, for in that respect we ought to be magnanimous. That then would be a blameworthy humility, for the sake of which any one should do anything derogatory to loftiness of virtue. But the practice of begging is so derogatory, as well because it is more virtuous to give than to receive, as also because there is a look of filthy lucre about it.

Reply. There is no impropriety in him being supported by the alms of others, who has abandoned his own possessions for the sake of something that turns to the profit of others. Were this not so, human society could not go on. If every one busied himself only about his own affairs, there would be no one to minister to the general advantage. The best thing then for human society (hominum societati) is that they who neglect the care of their own interests to serve the general advantage, should be supported by those whose advantage they serve. Therefore do soldiers live on pay provided by others, and civil rulers are provided for out of the common fund. But they who embrace voluntary poverty to follow Christ, certainly abandon what they have to serve the common advantage, enlightening the people by wisdom, learning and example, or sustaining them by their prayer and intercession. Hence there is nothing base in their living on what they get from others, seeing that they make a greater return, receiving temporals and helping others in spirituals. Hence the Apostle says: Let your abundance in temporals supply their want, that their abundance in spirituals also may supply your want (2 Cor. viii, 14: cf. Rom. xv, 27). For he who abets another becomes a partner in his work, whether for good or evil. By their example other men become less attached to riches, seeing them abandon riches altogether for the sake of perfection. And the less one loves riches, the more ready will he be to make distribution of his riches in other's need: hence they who embrace voluntary poverty are useful to other poor people, provoking the rich to works of mercy by word and example. Nor do they lose their liberty of spirit for the little they receive from others for their sustenance. A man does not lose his independence except for things that become predominant in his affections: for things that a man despises, if they are given to him, he does not lose his liberty. Nor is there any unseemliness in their exposing their necessities, and asking what they need either for themselves or others. The Apostles are read to have done so (2 Cor. viii, ix). Such begging does not render men contemptible, if it is done moderately, for necessaries, not for superfluities, without importunity, and with due regard to the conditions of the persons asked, and place and time. There is no shadow of disgrace about such begging, though there would be, if it were done with importunity or without discretion.

There is, no doubt, a certain humiliation in begging, as having a thing done to you is less honourable than doing it, and receiving than giving, and obeying royal power than governing and reigning. The spontaneous embracing of humiliations is a practice of humility, not in any and every case, but when it is done for a needful purpose: for humility, being a virtue, does nothing indiscreetly. It is then not humility but folly to embrace any and every humiliation: but where virtue calls for a thing to be done, it belongs to humility not to shrink from doing it for the humiliation that goes with it, for instance, not to refuse some mean service where charity calls upon you so to help your neighbour. Thus then where begging is requisite for the perfection of a life of poverty, it is a point of humility to bear this humiliation. Sometimes too, even where our own duty does not require us to embrace humiliations, it is an act of virtue to take them up in order to encourage others by our example more easily to bear what is incumbent on them: for a general sometimes will do the office of a common soldier to encourage the rest. Sometimes again we may make a virtuous use of humiliations as a medicine. Thus if any one's mind is prone to undue self-exaltation, he may with advantage make a moderate use of humiliations, either self-imposed or imposed by others, so to check the elation of his spirit by putting himself on a level with the lowest class of the community in the doing of mean offices.

Fifth mode. There have also been some who said that the votaries of a perfect life should take no thought either for begging or labouring or laying up anything for themselves, but should exped their sustenance from God alone, according to the texts, Be not solicitous, and, Take no thought for the morrow (Matt. vi, 25, 34).

Criticism. This seems quite an irrational proceeding. For it is foolish to wish an end and omit the means ordained to that end. Now to the end of eating there is ordained some human care of providing oneself with food. They then who cannot live without eating ought to have some solicitude about seeking their food. There follows also a strange absurdity: for by parity of reasoning one might say that he will not walk, or open his mouth to eat, or avoid a stone falling, or a sword striking him, but expect God to do all, which is tantamount to tempting God.

Reply. It is quite an irrational error to suppose that all solicitude about making a livelihood is forbidden by the Lord. Every action requires care: if then a man ought to have no solicitude about temporal things, it follows that he should do nothing temporal, which is neither a possible nor a reasonable course. For God has prescribed to every being actions according to the peculiarity of its nature. Man, being made up of a nature at once spiritual and corporeal, must by divine ordinance exercise bodily actions; and at the same time have spiritual aims; and he is the more perfect, the more spiritual his aims are. But it is not a mode of perfection proper to man to omit bodily action: bodily actions serve necessary purposes in the preservation of life; and whoever omits them neglects his life, which he is bound to preserve. To look for aid from God in matters in which one can help oneself by one’s own action, and so to leave that action out, is a piece of folly and a tempting of God: for it is proper to the divine goodness to provide for things, not immediately by doing everything itself, but by moving other things to their own proper action (Chap.LXXVII). We must not then omit the means of helping ourselves, and expect God to help us in defect of all action of our own: that is inconsistent with the divine ordinance and with His goodness.

But because, though it rests with us to act, still that our actions shall attain their due end does not rest with us, owing to obstacles that may arise, the success that each one shall have in his action comes under divine arrangement. The Lord then lays it down that we ought not to be solicitous for what does not belong to us, that is, for the success of our actions: but He has not forbidden us to be solicitous about what does belong to us, that is, for the work which we ourselves do. It is not then to act against the precept of the Lord, to feel solicitude for the things which have to be done; but he goes against the precept, who is solicitous for what may turn out even when (etiam si) he does all that is in his power to do, and takes due precautions beforehand (praemittat) to meet the contingency of such untoward events.

When that is done, we ought to hope in God’s providence, by whom even the birds and herbs are sustained. To feel solicitude on such points seems to appertain to the error of the Gentiles who deny divine providence. Therefore the Lord concludes that we should take no thought for the morrow (Matt. vi, 34), by which He has not forbidden us to lay up betimes things needful for the morrow; but He forbids that solicitude about future events which goes with a sort of despair of the divine assistance, as also the allowing of the solicitude that will have to be entertained to-morrow to come in before its time perversely to-day: for every day brings its own solicitude; hence it is added, Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.

CHAPTER CXXXIV

IN WHAT THE GOOD OF POVERTY CONSISTS

LET us observe in riches what is to be thought of poverty. Exterior riches are necessary to the good of virtue inasmuch as by them we support the body and succour other people. Means to an end must derive their goodness from the end. Exterior riches therefore must be some sort of a good to man, still not a principal but a secondary good: for the principal good is the end,—other things are good as subordinate to the end. Therefore it has been held that the virtues are the greatest of good things to man, and exterior riches the least. Now the means to any end must be checked by the requirements of that end. Riches therefore are so far forth good as they make for the exercise of virtue. But if that measure is exceeded, and the exercise of virtue impeded by them, they are no longer to be counted among good but among evil things. Hence it comes about that the possession of riches is a good thing for some men, who turn them to a virtuous use; and an evil thing for other men, who thereby are withdrawn from virtue, either by excessive solicitude or excessive affection for their wealth, or by elation of mind thence arising.

But there are virtues of the active life and virtues of the contemplative life; and these two orders of virtues make use of riches in different ways. The contemplative virtues need riches solely for the sustenance of nature: the active virtues as well for this purpose as also for the further purpose of helping a neighbour. Hence the contemplative life is more perfect in this, that it requires fewer earthly aids, its attention being wholly given to divine things. Hence the Apostle says: Having food, and wherewith to be clothed, with these let us be content (1 Tim. vi, 8).

Poverty then is praiseworthy, inasmuch as it delivers a man from the vices in which some men are entangled by riches. Again, inasmuch as it removes the solicitude that goes with wealth, it is useful to some persons, namely, to those who have the gift of occupying themselves with better things; but hurtful to others, who, set free from this solicitude, busy themselves about worse things. But in so far as poverty takes away the good that comes of riches, namely, the helping of other people, and hinders self support, it is simply an evil, except in so far as the loss of the power of helping neighbours in temporals may be compensated by the advantage of a free attention to divine and spiritual things. But the good of one's own subsistence is so necessary, that the lack of it can be compensated by no other good: for on the offer of no other good should a man deprive himself of the means of supporting his own life. Poverty therefore is praiseworthy, when it delivers a man from earthly cares, and he thereby arrives to give his mind more freely to divine and spiritual things, yet so that he retains the means of lawful self-support, whereunto not much provision is requisite. And the less solicitude any method of poverty involves, the more praiseworthy is that poverty. But poverty is not more praiseworthy, the greater it is: for poverty is not good in itself, but only inasmuch as it removes from a man's path the obstacles of his freely applying himself to spiritual things: hence the measure of such removal of obstacles is the measure of the goodness of poverty. And this is a general principle with respect to all creatures: they are good only in so far as they lead to virtue, not in themselves.

CHAPTER CXXXVII

ARGUMENTS AGAINST PERPETUAL CONTINENCE, WITH REPLIES

ARG. 1. The good of the species is more godlike than the good of the individual. He then who abstains altogether from the act whereby the species is perpetuated, sins more than he would by abstaining from the act whereby the individual is preserved, namely, eating and drinking.

Reply. Things that belong to the necessity of the individual stand on a different footing from things that belong to the necessity of the community. In the necessities of the individual, individual provision must be made: everyone must make use of meat and drink. But in the necessities of the community it is neither needful nor possible for the office of meeting such needs to be assigned to every individual. Many things are necessary to a multitude of men, which no one individual can attend to: therefore there must be different offices for different persons, as in the body the several members have their several functions. Since then procreation is not a necessity of the individual, but a necessity of the species, there is no need for all men to be procreants; but some men may abstain, and devote themselves to other offices, as to the life of a soldier or a contemplative.

Arg. 2. By divine ordinance there are given to man members apt for procreation, and a force of appetite inciting him thereto: whoever then altogether abstains from procreation seems to resist the ordinance of God.

Reply. Divine providence gives to man endowments necessary for the species as a whole: still there is no call upon every individual man to make use of every one of these endowments. Thus man has a building capacity and a fighting capacity: yet all men need not be builders or soldiers; neither need every one apply himself to procreation.

Arg. 3. If it is good for one man to lead a life of continence, it is better for many so to do, and the best thing of all would be for all to do it: so the human race would become extinct.

Reply. From things necessary to the community, though it be better for individuals to abstain, when one is given to better things, still it is not good for all to abstain. This is apparent in the order of the universe. Though a pure spirit is better than a bodily substance, still that would not be a better but a more imperfect universe, in which there were pure spirits alone. Though the eye is better than the foot, it would not be a perfect animal that had not both eye and foot. So neither would the state of the commonwealth of man kind be perfect, unless there were some applied to acts of procreation, and others abstaining from such acts and given to contemplation.

Arg. 4. Chastity, like other virtues, lies in the mean. Therefore he acts against virtue, who altogether abstains from the gratification of his appetites.

Reply. This objection has been already solved in treating of poverty (Chapp.CXXXII, CXXXV, Arg. 6). Irrational abstinence from all [lawful] sexual pleasures is called the vice of insensibility: but a rational abstinence [from all even lawful forms of such gratification] is a virtue exceeding the common measure of man, for it puts man in some sort of participation of the likeness of God. Hence virginity is said to be allied to angels.

But though we say in general that it is better for one individual to observe continence than to use marriage, it may very well be that for some other individual the second course is the better. Hence the Lord says: Not all men take this word: whoever can take, let him take (Matt. xix, 11, 12).

CHAPTER CXXXIX

AGAINST THOSE WHO FIND FAULT WITH VOWS

SOME have taken it for a folly to bind oneself by vow to obey another, or to observe any practice: for there is more of virtue in a good act as there is more of freedom: hence the praiseworthiness of virtuous acts seems to be diminished by their being done under necessity of obedience or vow.

But these cavillers seem to be ignorant of the nature of necessity. For there is a twofold necessity: a necessity of constraint, and this diminishes the praiseworthiness of virtuous acts, as telling against their voluntariness: for that is done under constraint, which is contrary to the will. There is again a necessity springing out of interior inclination; and this, far from diminishing, increases the credit of a virtuous act: for it makes the will tend to the act of virtue all the more earnestly. For evidently, the more perfect the habit of virtue is, with all the more force does it urge the will to the act of virtue and leaves it less chance of swerving. Nay, if it attains to the highest pitch of perfection, it induces a sort of necessity of well-doing, as will appear in the case of the Blessed, who cannot sin (B. IV, Chap.XCII); nor yet is there anything thereby lost either to the freedom of the wilt or to the goodness of the act. There is another necessity derived from the bearing of the means on the end in view, as when it is said to be necessary for one to find a ship in order to cross the sea. But neither does this necessity diminish the freedom of the will or the goodness of the acts: nay rather, for one to act as doing something necessary to an end is in itself praiseworthy, and all the more praiseworthy the better the end. But it will be seen that the necessity of observing what one has vowed to observe, or obeying the superior under whom one has placed oneself, is not a necessity of constraint: nor again is it a necessity arising out of interior inclination, but out of the bearing of means on the end: for it is necessary for the votary to do this or that, if the vow is to be fulfilled, or the obedience kept. Since then these are praiseworthy ends, inasmuch as they are acts whereby a man submits himself to God, the aforesaid necessity takes off nothing from the praise of virtue.

From yet another point of view the fulfilment of a vow, or of a superior's commands, for God's sake, is worthy of greater praise or reward. For as one act may be an act of two vices, in that the act of one vice is directed to the end of another vice, e.g., when one steals to commit fornication, in which case the act is specifically one of avarice, but intentionally one of lust,—so in the same way the act of one virtue may be directed to the act of another virtue, as when one gives for charity, in which case the act is specifically one of liberality, but finally one of charity: such an act is more praiseworthy for the greater virtue of charity than for liberality: hence, though the liberality come to fall short, the act will be more praiseworthy, inasmuch as it is referred to charity, and worthy of greater reward, than if it were done with greater liberality, but not in view of charity. Let us suppose then a man doing some act of virtue, say, fasting, or restraining his sexual passion: if he does this without a vow, it will be an act of chastity, or abstinence: but if he does it under a vow, it is further referable to another virtue, that virtue to which it belongs to vow and pay one's vows to God, which is called the virtue of religion, a higher virtue than chastity, or abstinence, as putting us in a right relation with God. The act of abstinence therefore, or continence, will be more praiseworthy inasmuch as it is done under vow, even though the doer of it does not take so much delight in his abstinence, or continence: that deficiency is made up by his taking delight in a higher virtue, which is religion.

If any one does anything for God, he offers the act to God, such as it is: but if he does it under a vow, he offers to God not only the act but also the power: thus he clearly has the intention of rendering to God some greater service. Therefore his act will be the more virtuous by reason of the greater good intended, even though another shows himself more fervent in the execution.

Moreover, the will that goes before a deed, virtually endures throughout the whole course of the doing of it; and renders it praiseworthy, even when the agent in the execution of his work is not thinking of the purpose for which he began: for it is not necessary for him who has undertaken a journey for God’s sake, to be actually thinking of God at every step of the journey. But clearly he who has vowed to do a thing has willed it more intensely than another who simply has a purpose of doing it; because he has not only willed to do it, but also has willed to fortify himself against failing to do it. This original earnestness of will renders the fulfilment of the vow, with more or less of earnestness, praiseworthy, even when the will is not actually fixed on the work, or is fixed on it but languidly. Thus what is done under vow is more praiseworthy than what is done without vow, other conditions however being equal.

CHAPTER CXL

THAT NEITHER ALL GOOD WORKS NOR ALL SINS ARE EQUAL

COUNSELS are not given except of the better good. But in the divine law there are given counsels of poverty and continency: these then are better than the use of matrimony and the possession of temporal estate, which things however are quite consistent with virtuous action.

2. Acts are specified by their objects. The better therefore the object, the more virtuous will be the act according to its species. But the end is better than the means thereto; and in the category of means the better is that which comes nearer to the end. Therefore among human acts that is the best, which tends straight to God, the last end; and after that, an act is better in its species according as its object is nearer to God.

3. Good is in human acts according as they are regulated by reason. But some acts come nearer to reason than others: acts which are acts of reason itself have more of the good of reason in them than the acts of the lower powers commanded by reason.

4. The commandments of the law are best fulfilled by love (Chap.CXXVIII). But one man may do his duty out of greater love than another.

6. The better act is the act of the better virtue. But one virtue is better than another: thus munificence is better than liberality, and high-souled conduct in a high position (magnanimitas) than decency in a lowly state (moderantia, i.e., metriotes).

Hence it is said: He who joineth his virgin in marriage doth well: but he who joineth her not doth better (1 Cor. vii, 38).

By the same reasons it appears that not all sins are equal: for one sin goes wider of the last end than another sin, is a greater perversion of the order of reason, and does greater harm to one's neighbour. Hence it is said: Thou hast done more wicked things than they in all thy ways (Ezech. xvi, 47).

But there may seem to be some reason in the position that all virtuous acts are equal, if we consider that every virtuous act is directed to a final good: hence, if there is the same final good for all virtuous acts, they must all be equally good.—It is to be replied that, though there is one final end of goodness, nevertheless there is a difference of degree in the good things that are referred to that end, some of them being better than others and nigher to the last end. Hence there will be degrees of goodness in the will and its acts according to the diversity of good objects to which the will and its acts are terminated, though the ultimate end be the same.

Or again it may be argued that all sins are equal, because sin in human acts comes solely of overpassing the rule of reason: but he overpasses the rule of reason who swerves from it in a small matter, equally with him who swerves from it in a great one; just as, if a line be drawn, not to be overstepped, it comes to the same thing in court whether the trespasser has overstepped it little or much; or as a boxer is cast, once he has gone outside the limits of the ring, little or much: so then, once a man has overstepped the bounds of reason, the amount of his transgression makes no difference. On careful consideration, however, it appears that in all cases where perfection and goodness consists in a certain conformity to measure, the evil will be the greater, the greater the departure from that due conformity. Thus health consists in a due blending of humours, and beauty in a due proportion of features and limbs, and truth in a conformity of thought or speech to fact. The greater the unevenness of humours, the greater the sickness: the greater the incongruity of features or limbs, the greater the ugliness; and the greater the departure from truth, the greater the falsehood: thus the reckoning is not so false that brings in 5 for 3 as that which brings in 100 for 3. But the good of virtue consists in a certain conformity to measure: for virtue is a mean, according to due limitation under the circumstances, between contrary vices. Wickedness then is greater, the further it is out of this harmony. Nor is transgressing the limits of virtue like transgressing bounds fixed by a court. For virtue being of itself good, the transgression of it is of itself evil; and therefore the greater the departure from virtue, the greater the evil. But the transgression of a limit fixed by a court is not of itself evil, but only accidentally so, inasmuch as it is forbidden. But in these accidental connexions, though the being of one thing at all follows upon another's being at all, it does not follow that the being of the one thing in a higher degree follows upon the other's coming to be in a higher degree. Thus if a white body is musical, it does not follow that the whiter the body, the more musical: but it does follow that if whiteness is distinctive of vision, a stronger whiteness wilt be more distinctive.

A noteworthy difference between sins is that between mortal and venial sin. A mortal sin is one that deprives the soul of spiritual life. The essence of spiritual life consists in two things, according to the likeness of natural life. Just as the body lives naturally by its union with the soul, which is the principle of life; and again, quickened by the soul, the body moves of itself, while a dead body either remains immovable, or is moved only by an exterior power: so is man's will alive, when conjoined by a right intention with its last end, which is its object and, as it were, its form; and in thus cleaving by love to God and to its neighbour, it is moved by an interior principle of action. But when a right intention of the last end and love is gone, the soul is, as it were, dead, and no longer moves of itself to do any right actions, but either wholly gives over doing them, or is led to do them only by an exterior principle, to wit, the fear of punishment. Whatever sins therefore stand not with a right intention of the last end and love, are mortal sins: but, so long as these finalities are attended to, any deficiency in point of right order of reason will not be a mortal sin, but venial.

CHAPTER CXLI

THAT A MAN’S ACTS ARE PUNISHED OR REWARDED BY GOD

TO him it belongs to punish or reward, to whom it belongs to lay down the law. But it belongs to divine providence to lay down the law for men (Chap.CXIV): therefore also to punish or reward.

2. Whenever there is due order to an end, that order must lead to the end, and departure from that order must shut out the end: for things that are according to an end derive their necessity from the end, in such way that they must be, if the end is to follow, and while they are without impediment, the end ensues. But God has imposed upon men’s acts an order in respect of their final good. If then that order is duly laid down, it must be that they who walk according to it shall gain their final good, that is, be rewarded, and they who depart from that order by sin shall be shut out from their final good, that is, punished.

3. As physical things are subject to the order of divine providence, so also human acts. In regard to both the one and the other the due order may be observed, or it may be transgressed. But there is this difference, that the observation or transgression of the due order lies in the power of the human will, but not in the power of physical things. As then in physical things, when due order is observed in them, there follows of natural necessity their preservation and good, but their destruction and evil when the due and natural order is departed from; so in human things it needs must be that when a man voluntarily observes the order of law by Heaven imposed upon him, he gains good, not of necessity, but by the dispensation of the ruler,—that is to say, he gains reward; and conversely, when the order of law is neglected, he comes to evil, that is to say, is punished.

4. It is part of the perfection of God’s goodness to have no part of nature in disorder. Hence we see in the physical world that every evil is part of an orderly arrangement to some good, as the killing of the sheep is the feeding of the wolf. Since then human acts are subject to the order of divine providence as well as physical events, the evil that happens in human acts must lead up in an orderly way to good. But this is most aptly brought about by the punishment of sins: for thus excesses beyond the due amount are embraced under the order of justice, which restores equality. Man exceeds the due degree and proper amount by preference of his own will to that of God, satisfying himself against the ordinance of God: this inequality is removed by his being compelled to suffer something against his will according to the same ordinance.

6. Divine providence has arranged things so that one shall profit another. But it is most fitting for man to be advanced to his final good as well by the good as by the evil of his fellow-man, being excited to do well by seeing well-doers rewarded, and withheld from evil-doing by seeing evil-doers punished.

Hence it is said: I am the Lord thy God . . . . visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children . . . . and doing mercy a thousandfold upon them that love me and keep my commandments (Exod. xx, 5, 6): Thou wilt render to every one according to his works (Ps. lxi, 13): To them who, according to patience in good work, seek glory and honour and incorruption, life everlasting: but to them who . . . . obey not the truth, but give credit to iniquity, wrath and indignation (Rom. ii, 7, 8).

CHAPTER CXLII

OF THE DIFFERENCE AND ORDER OF PUNISHMENTS

EVIL is the privation of good: hence the order and difference of punishments must be according to the difference and order of good things. The chief good and final end of man is happiness: the higher good for him then is that which comes nearer to this end. Coming nearest to it of all is virtue, and whatever else advances man to good acts leading to happiness: next is a due disposition of reason and of the powers subject to it: after that, soundness of bodily health, which is necessary to unfettered action: lastly, exterior goods, as accessory aids to virtue. The greatest punishment therefore for man will be exclusion from happiness: after that, the privation of virtue, and of any perfection of supernatural (supernaturalium) powers in his soul for doing well: then the disorder of the natural powers of his soul: after that, the harm of his body; and finally the taking away of exterior goods.

But because it belongs to the idea of pain not only that it should be a privation of good, but also that it should be contrary to the will, and not every man’s will esteems goods as they really are, but sometimes the privation of the greater good is less contrary to the will, and therefore seems less of a punishment, it so comes about that the majority of men, esteeming sensible and corporeal things more and knowing them better than the good things of the intellect and the spirit, dread corporeal penalties more than spiritual ones: thus in their estimation the order of punishments is the very reverse of that aforesaid. With them, injuries to the body and losses of exterior things make the greatest punishment: but as for disorder of the soul and loss of virtue and forfeiture of the enjoyment of God, in which the final happiness of man consists, all this they count little or nothing. Hence it is that they do not consider the sins of men to be punished by God, because they see usually sinners enjoying good health and the blessings of exterior fortune, of which sometimes virtuous men are deprived. This ought not to appear surprising to persons who look straight at the facts. For since all exterior things are referable to things interior, and the body to the soul, exterior and corporeal good things are really good for man in so far as they turn to the good of reason within him; and turn to his evil so far as they hinder that good of reason. Now God, the disposer of all things, knows the measure of human virtue: hence He sometimes supplies a virtuous man with corporeal and exterior good things to aid his virtue, and does him a favour in so doing: sometimes again He withdraws the aforesaid things, considering them to be an obstacle to man's virtue and enjoyment of God. Where they are such an obstacle, exterior good things turn to a man's prejudice, and the loss of them to his gain. If then punishment in every case means the infliction of some evil, and it is not an evil for a man to be deprived of exterior and corporeal good things so far as is conducive to his advancement in virtue, such deprivation will not be a punishment to a virtuous man: on the other hand a real punishment to the wicked will be the concession to them of exterior goods, whereby they are incited to evil. Hence it is said: The creatures of God are turned to hate, and to a temptation to the souls of men, and a trap for the feet of the unwise (Wisd. xiv, 11). But because it is of the notion of punishment not only to be an infliction of evil, but further an evil contrary to the will, the loss of corporeal and exterior goods, even when it makes for advancement in virtue and not for evil, is called punishment by a stretch of language, inasmuch as it is contrary to the will.

CHAPTER CXLIII

THAT NOT ALL PUNISHMENTS NOR ALL REWARDS ARE EQUAL

AS there are degrees in virtuous actions and in sins (Chap.CXL), so there must be degrees of rewards and punishments: for so the equality of distributive justice requires, that unequal returns be made for unequal services.

Hence it is said: According to the measure of the sin shall also be the measure of the stripes (Deut. xxv, 2).

CHAPTER CXLIV

OF THE PUNISHMENT DUE TO MORTAL AND VENIAL SINS RESPECTIVELY IN REGARD TO THE LAST END

MAN may sin in either of two ways, either so that the intention of his mind be quite turned away from subordination to God, the final good, and that is a mortal sin: or otherwise so that, while the mind’s intention remains fixed on the final end, some obstacle is put in the way to retard its free movement to the end, and that is a venial sin. As then the difference of punishments must be according to the difference of sins, it follows that whoever sins mortally must have for his punishment to be cast out from the attainment of his end; but he who sins venially is punished, not by being cast out, but by being retarded or experiencing difficulty in gaining his end; for so the equality of justice is preserved, in that as man, by sinning [venially], voluntarily turns aside from his end, so in suffering punishment, against his will, he should be impeded in the gaining of that end.

3. When any one attains a good thing that he was not intending, that is by luck and chance. If then he whose intention is turned away from the last end were to gain that last end, it would be by luck and chance,—which is an absurd thing to suppose, seeing that the last end is a good of intelligence, and luck and chance are inconsistent with intelligent action, because chance events come about without the direction of intelligence: it is absurd then to suppose intelligence gaining its end by an unintelligent method. He then will not gain his end, who by sinning mortally has his intention turned away from his last end.

5. In an orderly course of means leading up to an end such a relation obtains that, if the end is or is to be, the means thereto must be: if the means to the end are not forthcoming, neither will the end be forthcoming: for if the end could be secured without the means to the end being taken, it would be labour lost to seek the end by the taking of such means. But it is by arts of virtue, the chief element in which is an intention of the due end, that man attains to his last end and happiness (Chap.CXLI). Whoever then acts against virtue, and turns his back on his last end, it is proper for him to suffer deprivation of that end.

Hence it is said: Depart from me, all ye workers of iniquity (Matt. vii, 23).

CHAPTER CXLV

THAT THE PUNISHMENT WHEREBY ONE IS DEPRIVED OF HIS LAST END IS INTERMINABLE

THERE is no privation except of that which naturally belongs to the subject: a puppy at birth cannot be said to lie under any privation of sight. But man is not apt to attain his last end in this life (Chap.XLVIII). Therefore any privation of such end must come as a punishment after this life. But after this life there remains to man no ability of gaining his last end, since it is through the body that he gains perfection alike in knowledge and in virtue. And once the soul is separated from the body, it returns not again to this state of receiving perfection from the body, as we have argued above (B. II, Chap.LXXXIII) against the advocates of the transmigration of souls (transcorporationem ponentes). Whoever then incurs this punishment must be deprived of his last end, and remain eternally deprived of it.

3. Natural equity seems to require every one to be deprived of the good against which he takes action, as thereby he renders himself unworthy of that good. Hence by process of civil justice whoever offends against the commonwealth is deprived of the society of the commonwealth altogether, either by death or by perpetual banishment. Nor is the time taken by his offence considered, but the power against which he has offended. He then who sins against his last end and against charity, which is the foundation of the society of the Blessed and of wayfarers on the road to Blessedness, ought to be punished eternally, though his sin took only a short space of time.

4. In the divine judgement the will is taken for the deed: because as men see what is done outwardly, so does God view the hearts of men. But whoever for the sake of some temporal good has turned himself away from the final end, which is possessed for ever, has preferred the temporal enjoyment of that good to the eternal enjoyment of the last end: much more then, it clearly appears, would he have willed the enjoyment of that temporal good for all eternity. Therefore according to the divine judgement he ought to be punished as though he had gone on sinning for eternity. And beyond question, for eternal sin eternal punishment is due.

Hence it is said: These shall go into everlasting punishment, but the just into life everlasting (Matt. xxv, 46).

Hereby is excluded the error of them who say that the punishment of the wicked will at some time come to an end. This position seems to have had its foundation in the position of certain philosophers who said that all punishments were purgatorial, and consequently at some time terminable. And this position seems plausible, as well by the custom of mankind, for human laws inflict penalties as means and in a manner medicines for the amendment of vices; as also by reason, for if punishment were inflicted, not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake, it would follow that the authority punishing took delight in punishments for their own sake, which is inconsistent with the goodness of God: it needs must be then that punishment is inflicted for the sake of something else, and no more suitable end appears than the amendment of vices. There seems therefore reason for saying that all punishments are purgatorial, and consequently terminable, since whatever is matter of purgation is accidental in regard of the creature, and can be removed without consumption of its substance.

In reply it must be allowed that punishments are inflicted by God, not for their own sake, as though God took delight in them, but for the sake of something else, namely, in view of the order which He wishes to impose on creatures, in which order the good of the universe consists (B. II, Chap.XLV). The order of the universe requires all things to be dispensed by God in due proportion, in weight, number, and measure (Wisd. xi, 21). But as rewards answer proportionably to virtuous actions, so punishments to sins; and to some sins everlasting punishments are proportionable. God then inflicts eternal punishments on some sins, that the due order may be observed in things, which order proves His wisdom.

But even though one were to allow that all punishments are applied to the amendment of vices, and to no other purpose, not on that account are we obliged to suppose that all punishments are purgatorial and terminable. For even by human laws some men are punished by death, not for their amendment, but for the amendment of others: hence it is said: For the scourging of the pestilent man, the fool shall be wiser (Prov. xix, 25). Sometimes also human laws drive men out of the State into perpetual banishment, that the State may be purer by being rid of them: hence it is said: Cast out the scorner, and the quarrel will go out with him, and suits and brow- beatings will cease (Prov. xxii, 10). Even then though punishments be employed only for the reformation of manners, it may very well be that by the judgement of God some men ought to be for ever separated from the society of the good and eternally punished, that by the fear of everlasting punishment men may cease to sin, and the society of the good may be the purer for their separation, as it is said: There shall not enter therein anything unclean, or making abomination or lying (Apoc. xxi, 27).

CHAPTER CXLVI

THAT SINS ARE PUNISHED ALSO BY THE EXPERIENCE OF SOMETHING PAINFUL

PUNISHMENT ought to be proportionate to the fault. But in a fault not only is there an aversion of the mind from the last end, but also an undue conversion of it to other objects as ends. Not only then should the sinner be punished by exclusion from the end, but also by other things turning to his pain.

2. No one is afraid to lose what he does not desire to gain. They then who have their will turned away from their last end, have no fear of being shut out from it. Consequently that mere exclusion would not be enough to call them off from sinning. Some other punishment then must be employed, which sinners may fear.

3. One who puts to undue use the means to a certain end, not only is deprived of the end, but incurs some other hurt besides. Thus inordinate taking of food not only does not bring health, but further induces sickness. But whoever sets up his rest in creatures does not use them as he ought: he does not refer them to their last end. Not only then ought he to be punished by going without happiness, but also by experiencing some pain from creatures.

Hence divine Scripture not only threatens sinners with exclusion from glory, but also with affliction in other ways. Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire (Matt. xxv, 41). He shall rain nets on sinners: fire and brimstone and the breath of stormy winds shall be the portion of their cup (Ps. x, 7).

CHAPTER CXLVII

THAT IT IS LAWFUL FOR JUDGES TO INFLICT PUNISHMENTS

MEN who on earth are set over others are ministers of divine providence. But it is the order of providence that the wicked be punished.

4. Good stands in no need of evil, but the other way about (Chap. XI). Whatever then is of necessity for the preservation of good, cannot be of itself evil. But for the preservation of concord among men it is necessary for penalties to be inflicted on the wicked.

5. The common good is better than the good of the individual. There fore some particular good must be withdrawn for the preservation of the common good. But the life of certain pestilent fellows is a hindrance to the common good, that is, to the concord of human society. Such persons therefore are to be withdrawn by death from the society of men.

Hence the Apostle says: He beareth not the sword in vain (Rom. xiii, 4: cf. 1 Pet. ii, 14).

Hereby is excluded the error of those who say that corporal punishments are unlawful, and quote in support of their error such texts as, Thou shalt not kill (Exod. xx, 13): Let both grow until the harvest (Matt. xiii, 30). But these are frivolous allegations. For the same law which says, Thou shalt not kill, adds afterwards: Thou shalt not suffer poisoners (maleficos, pharmakous) to live (Exod. xxii, 18). And as for both growing until the harvest, how that is to be understood appears from what follows: lest perchance in gathering the tares ye root out along with them the wheat also: in this passage then the killing of the wicked is forbidden where it cannot be done without danger to the good, as happens when the wicked are not yet clearly marked off from the good by manifest sins, or when there is ground for apprehension that the wicked may involve many good men in their ruin.

The fate of the wicked being open to conversion so long as they live does not preclude their being open also to the just punishment of death. Indeed the danger threatening the community from their life is greater and more certain than the good expected by their conversion. Besides, in the hour of death, they have every facility for turning to God by repentance. And if they are so obstinate that even in the hour of death their heart will not go back upon its wickedness, a fairly probable reckoning may be made that they never would have returned to a better mind.

CHAPTER CXLVIII

THAT MAN STANDS IN NEED OF DIVINE GRACE FOR THE GAINING OF HAPPINESS

IT has already been shown (Chapp.CXI-[442]CXIII) that divine providence disposes of rational creatures otherwise than of other things, inasmuch as their nature stands on a different footing from that of others. It remains to be shown that also in view of the dignity of their end divine providence employs a higher method of government in their regard. Their nature clearly fits them for a higher end. As being intelligent, they can attain to intelligible truth, which other creatures cannot. So far as they attain this truth by their own natural activity, God provides for them otherwise than for other creatures, giving them understanding and reason, and further the gift of speech, whereby they can aid one another in the knowledge of truth. But beyond this, the last end of man is fixed in a certain knowledge of truth which exceeds his natural faculties, so that it is given to him to see the First Truth in itself. To creatures lower than man it is not given to arrive at an end exceeding the capacities of their natures. In view of this end, a method of government must be found for man, different from that which suffices for the lower creation. For the means must be proportionate to the end: if then man is ordained to an end transcending his natural capacities, he must be furnished with some supernatural assistance from heaven, enabling him to tend to that end.

2. A thing of inferior nature cannot be brought to that which is proper to a superior nature except by the virtue and action of the said superior nature. Thus the moon, which has no light of its own, is made luminous by the

virtue and action of the sun. But to behold the First Truth as it is in itself so transcends the capacity of human nature as to be proper to God alone (Chap.LII). Therefore man needs help of God to arrive at such an end.

5. There are many impediments in the way of man’s arriving at his end. He is impeded by the weakness of his reason, which is easily dragged into error, and so erring he is thrown off the right way of arriving at his end. He is impeded by the passions of the sensitive portion of his nature, and by the tastes which drag him to sensible and inferior things. The more he clings to such things, the further he is separated from his last end: for these things are below man, whereas his end is high above him. He is impeded also very frequently by infirmity of body from the performance of the acts of virtue which carry him on to his end. Man therefore needs the divine assistance, lest with such impediments in his way, he fail altogether in the gaining of his last end.

Hence it is said: No man can come to me, unless the Father, who hath sent me, draw him (John vi, 44): As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself unless it abide in the vine, so neither can ye unless ye abide in me (John xv, 4).

Hereby is excluded the error of the Pelagians, who said that man could merit the glory of God by sheer free will of his own.

CHAPTER CXLIV

THAT THE DIVINE ASSISTANCE DOES NOT COMPEL A MAN TO VIRTUE

DIVINE providence provides for all things according to their mode of existence (Chap. LXXIII,n. 2). But it is proper to man and to every rational creature to act voluntarily and to be master of his own acts; and compulsion is contrary to voluntariness.

3. It is by will that man is directed to a final end: for the good and the final end is the object of will. And the divine assistance is vouchsafed us for this special purpose, that we may attain to our final end. That aid therefore does not exclude the act of our will: on the contrary, it is precisely the act of our will that the divine assistance produces in us: hence the Apostle says: It is God who worketh in us both to will and to act according to the good will (Phil. ii, 13). But compulsion defeats in us the act of the will: for we do that under compulsion of which we will the contrary.

4. Man arrives at his last end by acts of virtue. But acts done under compulsion are not acts of virtue, for in virtue the chief thing is choice.

Hence it is said: Consider that to-day the Lord hath put forth in thy sight life and good, and on the other hand death and evil, that thou mayest love the Lord thy God and walk in his ways. But f thy heart is turned away, and thou wilt not hear, etc. (Deut. xxx, 15-18): Before man is life and death, good and evil: what pleases him shall be given to him (Ecclus xv, 18).

CHAPTER CL

THAT MAN CANNOT MERIT BEFOREHAND THE SAID ASSISTANCE

EVERYTHING stands as matter to that which is above itself. Now matter does not move itself to its own perfection, but must be moved by another. Man then does not move himself to the gaining of the divine assistance, which is above him, but rather he is moved by God to the gaining of it. But the motion of the mover precedes the motion of the thing moved, alike in the order of thought and in the order of causation. The divine assistance therefore is not given to us because we are advanced to receive it by our good works; but rather we are proficient in good works because we are forestalled by the divine assistance.

Hence it is said: Not by the works of justice that we have done, but according to his own mercy he hath saved us (Tit. iii, 5): It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy (Rom. ix, 16): because man needs must be forestalled by the divine assistance for purposes both of willing well and doing well. As the victory is attributed to the general, which is won by the labour of the soldiers, so such expressions as the above are not to be taken as exclusive of the free choice of the will, according to the misconstruction which some have put upon them, as though man were not master of his own acts, interior and exterior, but they show that man is under God. Again it is said: Turn us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be turned (Lament. v, 21): which shows that our turning, or conversion, is anticipated by the aid of God converting us. Still we read, as spoken in the person of God: Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you (Zach. i, 3); not that the work of God in us does not go before our conversion; but the meaning is that the conversion, whereby we turn to God, is aided also by His subsequent aid, strengthening it to arrive to effect, and securing it that it may reach its due term.

Hereby is excluded the error of the Pelagians, who said that the divine assistance is given us in consideration of our deservings; and that, while the beginning of our justification is of ourselves, the consummation of it is of God.

CHAPTER CLI

THAT THE AFORESAID ASSISTANCE IS CALLED GRACE,’ AND WHAT IS THE MEANING OF GRACE CONSTITUTING A STATE OF GRACE’

BECAUSE what is given to another without any previous deserts of his is said to be given gratis, and because the divine aid given to man anticipates all human deserving, it follows that this aid is given to man gratis, and therefore is aptly called by the name of grace.’ Hence the Apostle says: If by grace, it is not now of works, otherwise grace is no more grace (Rom. xi, 6).

There is also another reason why the aforesaid assistance of God has received the name of grace.’ One person is said to be in the good graces’ of another, because he is well loved by him. Now it is of the essence of love that he who loves should wish good and do good to him whom he loves. God indeed wishes and does good to all His creatures, for the very being of the creature and its every perfection is of God willing and working it (B. I, Chapp.XXIX,XXX: B. II, Chap.XV): hence it is said: Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things that thou hast made (Wisd. xi, 25). But a special tie of divine love is observable in connexion with those to whom He renders assistance, enabling them to attain the good which transcends the order of their nature, namely, the perfect fruition, not of any created good, but of God’s own self. This assistance then is aptly called grace,’ not only because it is given gratis,’ but also because by this assistance a man comes to be, by a special prerogative, in the good graces’ of God.

This grace, in the man in the state of grace, must be a form and perfection of him who has it.

1. That whereby a man is directed to an end must be in continual relation with him: for the mover works change continually until the body moved attains the term of its motion. Since then man is directed to his last end by the assistance of divine grace, he must continually enjoy this assistance until he arrives at the end. But that would not be if the assistance were afforded him only as a sort of motion or passion, and not as a form abiding and, as it were, resting in him: for the movement and passion would not be in the man, except when his attention was being actually turned to the end, as is not the case continually, which is evident most of all in men asleep. Therefore the grace that puts a man in the state of grace is a form and perfection abiding in man, even when he is not actively engaged.

2. The love of God is causative of the good that is in us, as the love of man is called forth and caused by some good that is in the object of his love. But man is excited to special love by some special good pre-existent in the object. Therefore where there is posited a special love of God for man, there must consequently be posited some special good conferred by God on man. Since then the grace that constitutes the State of grace denotes a special love of God for man, there must be likewise denoted some special goodness and perfection thereby existing in man.

3. Everything is ordained to an end suited to it according to the character of its form: for of different species there are different ends. But the end to which man is directed by the assistance of divine grace is something above human nature. Therefore there must be superadded to man some supernatural form and perfection, whereby he may be aptly ordained to the aforesaid end.

4. Man ought to arrive at his last end by dint of activities of his own. Now everything is active in virtue of some form of its own. In order then that man may be brought to his last end by activities of his own, there must be superadded to him some form, to validate his activities for the gaining of his last end.

5. Divine providence provides for all according to the mode of their nature. But it is a mode proper to man to require for the perfection of his actions, over and above his natural powers, certain perfections in the shape of habits, whereby he may do good, and do it well, connaturally, readily,

and pleasantly. Therefore the aid of grace, given man by God for arriving at his last end, implies some form and perfection intrinsic to man.

Hence in Scripture the grace of God is spoken of as light: Ye were once darkness, but now light in the Lord (Eph. v, 8). The perfection whereby man is led on to his final end in the vision of God is appropriately termed light, light being the principle of vision.

Hereby is set aside the opinion of some who say that the grace of God is no positive quality in man (nihil in homine ponit), as no positive quality is ascribed to the courtier who is said to be in the good graces of the King, but rather to the King who has an affection for him. We see how this mistake arose, from failing to observe the difference between divine love and human love: for divine love is causative of the good that it loves in another, but not so human love.

CHAPTER CLII

THAT THE GRACE WHICH CONSTITUTES THE STATE OF GRACE CAUSES IN US THE LOVE OF GOD

THE grace which constitutes the state of grace is an effect of God’s love. But the proper effect of God’s love in man is to make man love God: for the chief effort of the lover is laid out in drawing the beloved to the love of him; and unless that succeeds, the love must be broken off.

2. There must be some union between those who have one end in view, as citizens in one State, and soldiers ranked together on the battlefield. But the final end to which man is led by the assistance of divine grace is the vision of God as He essentially is, which is proper to God Himself; and so God shares this final good with man. Man then cannot be led on to this end unless he is united with God by conformity of will, the proper effect of love: for it belongs to friends to like and dislike together, and to rejoice and grieve together. The grace then that constitutes the state of grace renders man a lover of God, as he is thereby guided to an end shared with him by God.

3. The grace that constitutes the state of grace must principally perfect the heart. But the principal perfection of the heart is love. The proof of that is, that every motion of the heart starts from love: for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, except for some good that he loves; nor loathes, nor fears, nor is sad, or angry, except about something contrary to the good that he loves.

4. The form whereby a thing is referred to any end assimilates that thing in a manner to the end: thus a body by the form of heaviness acquires a likeness and conformity to the place to which it naturally moves. But the

grace that constitutes the state of grace is a form referring man to his last end, God. By grace then man attains to a likeness of God. And likeness is a cause of love.

5. A requisite of perfect work is that the work be done steadily and regularly. That is just the effect of love, which makes even hard and grievous tasks seem light. Since then the grace that constitutes the state of grace goes to perfect our works, the said grace must establish the love of God within us.

Hence the Apostle says: The charity of God is spread abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us (Rom. v, 5).

CHAPTER CLIII

THAT DIVINE GRACE CAUSES IN US FAITH

THE movement of grace, guiding us to our last end, is voluntary, not violent (Chap.CXLIX). But there can be no voluntary movement towards an object unless the object be known. Therefore grace must afford us a knowledge of our last end. But such knowledge cannot be by open vision in our present state (Chap.XLVIII): therefore it must be by faith.

2. In every knowing mind, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of nature: hence an angel, a man, and a dumb animal have different modes of knowledge according to their differences of natures. But, for the gaining of his last end, man has a perfection superadded to him, over and above his nature, namely, grace. Therefore there must also be superadded to him a knowledge, over and above his natural knowledge, and that is the knowledge of faith, which is of things not discerned by natural reason.

3. As when wood is first warmed by fire, the fire does not take kindly to the wood; but finally, when the wood is all ablaze, the fire becomes as it were connatural to the wood and a part of its very being: or as when a pupil is taught by a master, he must, to start with, take in the ideas of the master, not as understanding them of himself, but in the spirit of one ready to accept on another’s word things beyond his capacity; and so in the end, when his education is advanced, he will be able to understand those things: in like manner, before we arrive at our final end, which is the clear vision of the First Truth as it is in itself, the intellect of man must submit to God in readiness to take His word; and that submission and readiness to believe is the work of divine grace.

4. See further, B. I, Chapp.IV,V.

Hence the Apostle says: By grace ye are saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God (Eph. ii, 8).

Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that the beginning of faith in us was not of God, but of ourselves.

CHAPTER CLIV

THAT DIVINE GRACE CAUSES IN US A HOPE OF FUTURE BLESSEDNESS

IN every lover there is caused a desire of union with his loved one, so far as may be: hence it is most delightful to live in the society of those whom one loves. As then by grace man is made a lover of God, there must be caused in him a desire of union with God, so far as may be. But faith, which is caused of grace, declares the possibility of a union of man with God in perfect fruition, wherein blessedness consists. Consequently the desire of this fruition follows upon the love of God. But desire is a troublesome thing, without hope of attainment. It was proper therefore that in men, in whom the love of God and faith in Him was caused by grace, there should be caused also the hope of attaining to future blessedness.

3. Virtue, the way to blessedness, is paved with difficulties: hence the need of hope.

4. No one stirs to reach an end, which he reckons it impossible to compass.

Hence it is said: He hath regenerated us unto a living hope (1 Pet. i, 3): In hope we are saved (Rom. viii, 24).

CHAPTER CLV

OF GRACES GIVEN GRATUITOUSLY

SINCE the things done by God are done in order (Chapp.LXXVII-[453]LXXX), a certain order had to be followed in the manifestation of the truths of faith, so that some should receive those truths immediately from God, others receive of them, and so in order even to the last. The invisible good things, the vision of which makes the happiness of the blessed, and which are the objects of faith, are first revealed by God to the blessed angels by open vision: then by the ministry of angels they are manifested by God to certain men, not by open vision, but by a certitude arising from divine revelation. This revelation is made by an inner light of the mind, elevating the mind to see such things as the natural light of the understanding cannot attain to. As the natural light of the understanding renders a man certain of what he observes by that light, so does this supernatural light convey certainty of the objects which it reveals: for we cannot securely publish to others what we are not certain of ourselves. This light, which inwardly enlightens the mind, is sometimes borne out by other aids to knowledge, as well exterior as interior. There may be formed by divine power some utterance, or locution, heard by the external senses. Or it may be an inner locution, caused by God, and perceived by phantasy. Or there may be bodily appearances, external and visible, formed by God. Or such corporeal appearance may be inwardly depicted in phantasy. By these means, aided by the light inwardly impressed on his mind, man receives a knowledge of divine things. Hence, without the inner light, these aids are insufficient for the knowledge of divine things; whereas the inner light is sufficient of itself without them.

Now because those who receive a revelation from God ought in the order of divine enactment to instruct others, there needed to be further communicated to them the grace of speech. Hence it is said: The Lord hath given me a learned tongue (Isai. l, 4): I will give you speech and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to withstand and gainsay (Luke xxi, 15). Hence also the gift of tongues (Acts ii, 4).

But because any announcement put forth requires confirmation before it can be received,—unless indeed it is self-evident, and the truths of faith are not evident to human reason,—there was need of something to confirm the announcements of the preachers of the faith. But, inasmuch as they transcend reason, they could not be confirmed by any demonstrative process of reasoning from first principles. The means therefore to show that the announcements of these preachers came from God was the evidence of works done by them such as none other than God could do, healing the sick, and other miracles. Hence the Lord, sending his disciples to preach, said: Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out devils (Matt. x, 8); and, They going forth preached everywhere, the Lord working withal, and confirming their words by the signs that followed.

In the aforesaid effects of grace we observe a certain difference. Though the name of grace’ applies to them all, inasmuch as they are given gratuitously’ without any preceding merit, nevertheless the working of love alone has a further claim to the name of grace,’ as constituting the subject in the state of grace,’ or in the good graces of God’ (gratum Deo facit): for it is said: I love them that love me (Prov. viii, 17). Hence faith and hope and other means to the last end may be in sinners, who are not in the grace of God: love alone is the proper gift of the just, because he who abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him (1 John iv, 16).

There is another difference to be observed in these workings of grace, and it is this, that some of them are necessary for a whole lifetime, as believing, hoping, loving, and obeying the commandments of God, without which things salvation is impossible; and for these effects there must be in man certain habitual perfections, that he may be able to act according to them as occasion requires. Other effects of grace are necessary, not for a whole lifetime, but at certain times and places, as working of miracles, or foretelling of future events. To these effects habitual perfections are not given, but certain impressions are made by God, which cease when the act ceases, and have to be repeated when the act is repeated. Thus prophets in every revelation are illumined with a new light; and in every working of miracles there must be a fresh putting into operation of divine power.

CHAPTER CLVI

THAT MAN NEEDS THE ASSISTANCE OF DIVINE GRACE TO PERSEVERE IN GOOD

THE power of free will regards matters of election: but a matter of election is some particular thing to be done; and a particular thing to be done is what is here and now: but perseverance is not a matter of present and immediate conduct, but a continuance of activity for all time: perseverance therefore is an effect above the power of free will, and therefore needing the assistance of divine grace.

3. Though man is master of his act, he is not master of his natural powers; and therefore, though he is free to will or not will a thing, still his willing cannot make his will in the act of willing adhere immovably to the thing willed or chosen. But the immovable adherence of the will to good is requisite for perseverance: perseverance therefore is not in the power of free will.

Hence it is said: He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus (Philip. i, 6): The God of all grace, who hath called us to his eternal glory in Christ Jesus, himself will perfect us through some little suffering, confirm and establish us (1 Pet. v, 10). There are also found in Holy Scripture many prayers for perseverance: e.g., Perfect my steps in thy ways, that my footsteps may not slip (Ps. xvi, 5); and especially that petition of the Lord’s Prayer, Thy kingdom come: for the kingdom will not come for us unless we persevere in good.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that free will is sufficient for man for his perseverance in good, and that there is no need of the assistance of grace for the purpose.

As free will is not sufficient for perseverance in good without the help of God given from without, so neither is any infused habit. For in the state of our present life the habits infused into us of God do not totally take away from our free will its fickleness and liability to evil, although they do to some extent establish the free will in good. And therefore, when we say that man needs the aid of grace for final perseverance, we do not mean that, over and above the habitual grace first infused into him for the doing of good acts, there is infused into him another habitual grace enabling him to persevere; but we mean that, when he has got all the gratuitous habits that he ever is to have, man still needs some aid of divine providence governing him from without.

CHAPTER CLVII

THAT HE WHO FALLS FROM GRACE BY SIN MAY BE RECOVERED AGAIN BY GRACE

IT belongs to the same power to continue and to repair after interruption, as is the case with the powers of nature in regard of bodily health. But man perseveres in good by the aid of divine grace: therefore, if he has fallen by sin, he may be recovered by help of the same grace.

2. An agent that requires no predisposition of its subject, can imprint its effect on its subject, howsoever disposed. But God, requiring no predisposition of the subject of His action, when the subject is corporeal,—as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead to life,—does not require any previous merit either in the will for the conferring of His grace, which is given without merits (Chap.CXLIX). Therefore even after a man has fallen from grace by sin, God can confer on him the grace that puts the recipient in the state of grace, whereby sins are taken away.

5. In the works of God there is nothing in vain, as neither in the works of nature, for nature has this prerogative of God. Now it would be in vain for anything to move with no chance of arriving at its term. Whatever naturally moves to a certain end, must be somehow competent to get there. But after a man has fallen into sin, so long as the state of this life lasts, there remains in him an aptitude of being moved to good, shown by such signs as desire of good and grief at evil. Therefore there is some possibility of his return to good.

6. There exists in nature no potentiality, which cannot be reduced to act by some natural active power. Much less is there in the human soul any

potentiality, which is not reducible to act by the active power of God. But even after sin there still remains in the human soul a potentiality of good, because the natural powers, whereby the soul is related to its proper good, are not taken away by sin.

Therefore it is said: Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as Snow (Isai. i, 18): Charity covereth all sins (Prov. x, 12). Nor do we ask of the Lord in vain, Forgive us our trespasses.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Novatians, who said that man cannot obtain pardon for sins committed after baptism.

CHAPTER CLVIII

THAT MAN CANNOT BE DELIVERED FROM SIN EXCEPT BY GRACE

BY mortal sin man is turned away from his last end. And to that last end he is set on his way only by grace.

2. Offence is removed only by love. But by mortal sin man quarrels with God: for it is said that God hates' sinners, inasmuch as He is minded to deprive them of the last end, which He has in preparation for them who love Him. Man then cannot rise from sin except by grace, whereby friendship is established between God and man.

Hence it is said: It is I who blot out thine iniquities for my own sake (Isai. xliii, 25).

Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians, who said that man can rise from sin by free will.

CHAPTER CLIX

HOW MAN IS DELIVERED FROM SIN

BECAUSE man cannot return to one opposite without retiring from the other, to return to the state of righteousness he must withdraw from sin, whereby he had declined from righteousness. And because it is chiefly by the will that man is set on the way to his last end, or turned away therefrom, he must not only withdraw from sin in exterior act by ceasing to sin, but he must further withdraw in will, that so he may rise again by grace. Now withdrawal of the will from sin means at once repentance for the past and a resolution to avoid sin in future. For if a man did not purpose to cease from sin, sin as it is in itself (or sin in general) would not be contrary to his will. If he were minded to cease from sin, but had no sorrow for sin past, that same particular sin of which he was guilty would not be against his will. Now the will must withdraw from sin by taking the course contrary to that which led it into sin. But it was led into sin by appetite and delight in inferior things. Therefore it must withdraw from sin by certain penal inflictions. As delight drew it to consent to sin, so these inflictions strengthen it in abomination of sin.

When then man by grace has obtained pardon for his sin and has been restored to the state of grace, he still remains bound by God’s justice to some punishment for his sin. If of his own will he exacts this punishment of himself, he is thereby said to make satisfaction’ to God, inasmuch as by punishing himself for his sin he fulfils with labour and pain the order instituted of heaven, which order he had transgressed by sinning and following his own will. But if he does not exact this punishment of himself it will be inflicted by God, since the domain of divine providence cannot be suffered to lie in disorder. The punishment in that case will not be called ‘satisfactory,’ since it will not be of the choice of the sufferer, but it will be called purificatory,’ or purgatorial,’ because he will be purified and purged by another punishing him; and so whatever was inordinate in him will be brought back to due order. Hence the Apostle says: If we were to judge ourselves, we should not be judged: but while we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord, that we may not be condemned with this world (1 Cor. xi, 31).

Nevertheless, in the process of conversion, the disgust for sin and the fixing of the affections on God may be so intense as that there shall remain no outstanding liability to punishment. For the punishment which one suffers after the forgiveness of sin is necessary to bring the mind to cleave more firmly to good,—punishments being medicines,—as also for the observance of the order of justice in the punishment of the sinner. But love of God, especially when it is vehement and strong, is sufficient to establish man’s mind in good; and intense disgust for a past fault carries with it great sorrow for the same. Hence by the vehemence of the love of God and hatred for sin there is excluded any further need of satisfactory or purgatorial punishment. And though the vehemence be not so great as totally to bar the punishment, nevertheless, the greater the vehemence, so much less of punishment will suffice.

But what we do through our friends we are reckoned to do of ourselves, inasmuch as friendship makes two one in heart, and this is especially true of the love of charity: therefore, as a man may make satisfaction to God of himself, so also may he do it through another, especially in case of necessity: for the punishment which his friend suffers on his account he reckons as his own punishment; and thus punishment is not wanting to him in that he has compassion for the sufferings of his friend, and that all the more for his being the cause of his friend’s suffering. And again the affection of charity in him who suffers for his friend makes his satisfaction more acceptable to God than it would be if he were suffering for his own doings: for the one is an effort of spontaneous charity, the other an acquiescence in necessity. Hence we learn that one man may make satisfaction for another, provided both of them be in charity. Hence the saying of the Apostle: Bear ye one another’s burdens, and so ye shall fulfil the law of Christ (Gal. vi, 2).

CHAPTER CLX

THAT IT IS REASONABLY RECKONED A MAN’S OWN FAULT IF HE BE NOT CONVERTED TO GOD, ALTHOUGH HE CANNOT BE CONVERTED WITHOUT GRACE

SINCE no one can be set on the way to his last end without the aid of divine grace, or without it have the necessary means of reaching that end, as are faith, hope, love and perseverance, some might think that man is not to blame for being destitute of these gifts, especially seeing that he cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: for none is responsible for that which depends on another. But allow this, and many absurdities follow. It follows that the man who has neither faith nor hope nor love of God, nor perseverance in good, still does not deserve punishment: whereas it is expressly said: He that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him (John iii, 36). And since none reaches the end of happiness without the aforesaid endowments, it would follow further that there are some who neither attain to happiness nor yet suffer punishment of God: the contrary whereof is shown from what will be said to all present at the judgement of God: Come . . . . possess ye the kingdom prepared for you, or, Depart . . . . into everlasting fire (Matt. xxv, 34-41).

To solve this doubt, we must observe that though one can neither merit divine grace beforehand, nor acquire it by movement of his free will, still he can hinder himself from receiving it: for it is said of some: They have said unto God, Depart from us, we will not have the knowledge of thy ways’ (Job xxi, 14). And since it is in the power of free will to hinder the reception of divine grace or not to hinder it, not undeservedly may it be reckoned a man’s own fault, if he puts an obstacle in the way of the reception of grace. For God on His part is ready to give grace to all men: He wills all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. ii, 4). But they alone are deprived of grace, who in themselves raise an obstacle to grace. So when the sun lights up the world, any evil that comes to a man who shuts his eyes is counted his own fault, although he could not see unless the sunlight first came in upon him.

CHAPTER CLXI

THAT A MAN ALREADY IN MORTAL SIN CANNOT AVOID MORE MORTAL SIN WITHOUT GRACE

WHEN it is said that it is in the power of free will to avoid putting obstacles to grace, that saying is to be understood of those in whom the natural faculty is unimpaired by sin. But if the will has fallen into evil courses by some previous inordinate act, it will not be altogether in its power to avoid putting obstacles in the way of grace. For though for some momentary occasion it may abstain from some particular act of sin by its own power, nevertheless, if left long to itself, it will fall into sin; and by sin an obstacle is put to grace. For when the mind of man turns aside from the state of righteousness, it clearly puts itself out of relation with its due end. Thus what ought to be the prime object of its affections, as being its last end, comes to be less loved than that other object to which it has inordinately turned, making of it another last end. Whatever in such a posture of the mind occurs to fit in with the inordinate end, however inconsistent with the due end, will be chosen, unless the will be brought back to due order, so as to prefer the due end to all others, and that is an effect of grace. But the choice of anything inconsistent with the last end puts an obstacle in the way of grace, as grace goes to turn one in the direction of the end. Hence after sin a man cannot abstain from all further sin before by grace he is brought back to due order.

Moreover, when the mind is inclined to a thing, it is no longer impartial between two alternatives. And that to which the mind is more inclined it chooses, unless by a rational discussion, not unattended with trouble, it is withdrawn from taking that side: hence sudden emergencies afford the best sign of the inward bent of the mind. But it is impossible for the mind of man to be so continually watchful as rationally to discuss whatever it ought to do or not to do. Consequently the mind will at times choose that to which it is inclined by the present inclination: so, if the inclination be to sin, it will not stand long clear of sin, thereby putting an obstacle in the way of grace, unless it be brought back to the state of righteousness.

Further we must consider the assaults of passion, the allurements of sense, the endless occasions of evil-doing, the ready incitements of sin, sure to prevail, unless the will be withheld from them by a firm adherence to the last end, which is the work of grace.

Hence appears the folly of the Pelagian view, that a man in sin can go on avoiding further sins without grace. On the contrary the Lord bids us pray: Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.

But though persons in sin cannot of their own power help putting obstacles in the way of grace, unless they be forestalled by some aid of grace, still this lack of power is imputable to them for a fault, because it is left behind in them by a fault going before; as a drunken man is not excused from murder, committed in drunkenness, when he gets drunk by fault of his own. Besides, though this person in sin has it not in his unaided power altogether to avoid sin, still he has power here and now to avoid this or that sin: hence whatever he commits, he voluntarily commits, and the fault is imputed to him not undeservedly.

CHAPTER CLXII

THAT SOME MEN GOD DELIVERS FROM SIN, AND SOME HE LEAVES IN SIN

THOUGH the sinner raises an obstacle to grace, and by the exigence of the order of things ought not to receive grace, nevertheless, inasmuch as God can work setting aside the connatural order of things, as when He gives sight to the blind, or raises the dead, He sometimes out of the abundance of His goodness forestalls by the assistance of His grace even those who raise an obstacle to it, turning them away from evil and converting them to good. And as He does not give sight to all the blind, nor heal all the sick, that in those whom He heals the work of His power may appear, and in the others the order of nature may be observed, so He does not forestall by His aid all who hinder grace, to their turning away from evil and conversion to good, but some He so forestalls, wishing in them His mercy to appear, while in others He would have the order of justice made manifest. Hence the Apostle says: God, though willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show forth the riches of his glory upon the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared unto glory (Rom. ix, 22, 23).

But when, of men who are enthralled in the same sins, God forestalls and converts some, and endures, or permits, others to go their way according to the order of things, we should not enquire the reason why He converts these and not those: for that depends on His sheer will, just as from His sheer will it proceeded that, when all things were made out of nothing, some things were made in a position of greater advantage than others (digniora). Hence again the apostle says: Hath not the potter power over the clay, to make of the same lump one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour? (Rom. ix, 21.)

Hereby is refuted the error of Origen, who said that the reason why some were converted to God, and not others, was to be sought in divers works that their souls had done before they were united with their bodies, a theory already set aside (B. II, Chapp.XLIV,LXXXIII).

CHAPTER CLXIII

THAT GOD IS CAUSE OF SIN TO NO MAN

THOUGH there are some sinners whom God does not convert to Himself, but leaves them in their sins according to their deserts, still He does not induce them to sin.

1. Men sin by deviating from God their last end. But as every agent acts to its own proper and befitting end, it is impossible for God's action to avert any from their ultimate end in God.

2. Good cannot be the cause of evil, nor God the cause of sin.

3. All the wisdom and goodness of man is derived from the wisdom and goodness of God, being a likeness thereof. But it is repugnant to the wisdom and goodness of man to make any one to sin: therefore much more to divine wisdom and goodness.

4. A fault always arises from some defect of the proximate agent, not from any defect of the prime agent. Thus the fault of limping comes from some defect of the shin-bone, not from the locomotor power, from which power however is whatever perfection of movement appears in the limping. But the proximate agent of human sin is the will. The sinful defect then is from the will of man, not from God, who is the prime agent, of whom however is whatever point of perfect action appears in the act of sin.

Hence it is said: Say not, He himself hath led me astray: for he hath no use for sinful men: He hath commanded none to do impiously, and he hath not given to any man license to sin (Ecclus xv, 12, 21): Let none, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God tempteth no man to evil (James i, 13).

Still there are passages of Scripture, from which it might seem that God is to some men the cause of sin. Thus it is said: I have hardened the heart of Pharaoh and his servants (Exod. x, 1): Blind the heart of this people, and make its ears dull, and close its eyes, lest perchance it see with its eyes, and be converted, and I heal it: Thou hast made us wander from thy ways: Thou hast hardened our heart, that we should not fear thee (Isai. vi, 10: lxiii, 17): God delivered them over to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not seemly (Rom. i, 28). All these passages are to be understood as meaning that God does not bestow on some the help for avoiding sin which He bestows on others. This help is not merely the infusion of grace, but also an exterior guardianship, whereby the occasions of sin are providentially removed from a man's path. God also aids man against sin by the natural light of reason, and other natural goods that He bestows on man. When then He withdraws these aids from some, as their conduct deserves that he should, according to the exigency of His justice, He is said to harden them, or to blind them.

CHAPTER CLXIV

OF PREDESTINATION, REPROBATION, AND DIVINE ELECTION

SINCE it has been shown that by the action of God some are guided to their last end with the aid of grace, while others, bereft of that same aid of grace, fall away from their last end; and at the same time all things that are done by God are from eternity foreseen and ordained by His wisdom, as has also been shown, it needs must be that the aforesaid distinction of men has been from eternity ordained of God. Inasmuch therefore as He has from eternity pre-ordained some to be guided to the last end, He is said to have predestined' them. Hence the Apostle says: Who hath predestined us to the adoption of sons, according to the purpose of his will (Eph. i, 5). But those to whom from eternity He has arranged not to give grace, He is said to have reprobated,' or hated,' according to the text: I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau (Malach. i, 2). In point of this distinction, inasmuch as some He has reprobated and some He has predestined, we speak of the divine election,' of which it is said: He hath elected us in him before the constitution of the world (Eph. i, 4). Thus it appears that predestination and election and reprobation is a part of divine providence, according as by the said providence men are guided to their last end. And it may be shown that predestination and election do not induce necessity, by the same arguments whereby it was shown that divine providence does not take away contingency from creation (Chap.LXXII).

But that predestination and election have no cause in any human merits may be shown, not only by the fact that the grace of God, an effect of predestination, is not preceded by any merits, but precedes all merit, but also by this further fact, that the divine will and providence is the first cause of all things that are made. Nothing can be cause of the will and providence of God; although of the effects of providence, and of the effects of predestination, one effect may be cause of another. For who hath first given to him, and recompense shall be made him? For if him and by him and in him are all things: to him be glory forever, Amen (Rom. xi, 35, 36).

BOOK IV

OF GOD IN HIS REVELATION

CHAPTER I

PREFACE

LO, these things that have been said are but a part of his ways; and whereas we have heard scarce one little drop of his speech, who shall be able to look upon the thunder of his greatness? (Job xxvi, 14.) It is the nature of the human mind to gather its knowledge from sensible things; nor can it of itself arrive at the direct vision of the divine substance, as that substance is in itself raised above all sensible things and all other beings to boot, and beyond all proportion with them. But because the perfect good of man consists in his knowing God in such way as he can, there is given man a way of ascending to the knowledge of God, to the end that so noble a creature should not seem to exist altogether in vain, unable to attain the proper end of his existence. The way is this, that as all the perfections of creatures descend in order from God, who is the height of perfection, man should begin from the lower creatures, and ascend by degrees, and so advance to the knowledge of God. Of this descent of perfections from God there are two processes. One is on the part of the first origin of things: for the divine wisdom, to make things perfect, produced them in order, that the universe might consist of a complete round of creatures from highest to lowest. The other process belongs to the things themselves: for, as causes are nobler than effects, the first and highest products of causation, while falling short of the First Cause, which is God, nevertheless are superior to the effects which they themselves produce; and so on in order, until we come to the lowest of creatures. And because in that roof and crown of all things' (summo rerum vertice), God, we find the most perfect unity; and everything is stronger and more excellent, the more thoroughly it is one; it follows that diversity and variety increase in things, the further they are removed from Him who is the first principle of all. Therefore the process of derivation of creatures from their first principle may be represented by a sort of pyramid, with unity at the apex, and the widest multiplicity at the base. And thus in the diversity of things there is apparent a diversity of ways, beginning from one principle and terminating in different terms. By these ways then our understanding can ascend to God.

But the weakness of our understanding prevents us from knowing these ways perfectly. Our knowledge begins with sense; and sense is concerned with exterior accidents (phenomena), which are of themselves sensible, as colour, smell, and the like. With difficulty can our mind penetrate through such exterior phenomena to an inner knowledge of things, even where it perfectly grasps by sense their accidents. Much less will it be able to attain to a comprehension of the natures of those objects of which we perceive only a few phenomena by sense; and still less of those natures no accidents of which lie open to sense, but certain effects which they produce, inadequate to their power, enable us to recognise them. But even though the very natures of things were known to us, still we should have but slight knowledge of their order, of their mutual relations, and direction by divine providence to their final end, since we cannot penetrate the plan of Providence. The ways themselves then being so imperfectly known to us, how shall we travel by them to any perfect knowledge of the First Beginning of all things, which transcends all created ways and is out of all proportion with them? Even though we knew the said ways perfectly, we should still fall short of perfect knowledge of their origin and starting-point.

Feeble and inadequate then being any knowledge to which man could arrive by these ways, God has revealed to men facts about Himself which surpass human understanding; in which revelation there is observed an order of gradual transition from imperfect to perfect. In man’s present state, in which his understanding is tied to sense, his mind cannot possibly be elevated to any clear discernment of truths that surpass all proportions of sense: in that state the revelation is given him, not to be understood, but to be heard and believed. Only when he is delivered from the thraldom of sensible things, will he be elevated to an intuition of revealed truth. Thus there is a threefold knowledge that man may have of divine things. The first is an ascent through creatures to the knowledge of God by the natural light of reason. The second is a descent of divine truth by revelation to us; truth exceeding human understanding; truth accepted, not as demonstrated to sight, but as orally delivered for belief. The third is an elevation of the human mind to a perfect insight into things revealed.

This triple knowledge is suggested by the text above quoted from Job. These things that have been said are but a part of his ways, applies to that knowledge whereby our understanding ascends by way of creatures to a knowledge of God. And because we know these ways but imperfectly, that is rightly put in, but a part, for we know in part (1 Cor. xiii, 9). The next clause, and whereas we have heard scarce one little drop of his speech, refers to the second knowledge, whereby divine truths are revealed for our belief by means of oral declaration: for faith is hearing, and hearing by the word of Christ (Rom. x, 17). And because this imperfect knowledge is an effluent from that perfect knowledge whereby divine truth is seen in itself,—a revelation from God by the ministry of angels, who see the face of the Father (Matt. xviii, 10), he rightly terms it a drop, as it is written: In that day the mountains shall drop sweetness (Joel iii, 18). But because revelation does not take in all the mysteries which the angels and the rest of the blessed behold in the First Truth, there is a meaning in the qualification, one little drop: for it is said: Who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning? many things are hidden greater than these, for we see but a few of his works (Ecclus xliii, 35): I have many things to say to you, but ye cannot hear them now (John xvi, 2). These few points that are revealed to us are set forth under similitudes and obscurities of expression, so as to be accessible only to the studious, hence the expressive addition, scarce, marking the difficulty of the enquiry. The third clause, who shall be able to look upon the thunder of his greatness? points to the third knowledge, whereby the First Truth shall be known, not as believed, but as seen: for we shall see him as he is (1 John iii, 2). No little fragment of the divine mysteries will be perceived, but the Divine Majesty itself, and all the perfect array of good things: hence the Lord said to Moses: I will show thee all good (Exod. xxxiii, 19). Rightly therefore we have in the text the words look upon his greatness. And this truth shall not be proposed to man under the covering of any veils, but quite plain: hence the Lord says to His disciples: The hour cometh, when I will no longer speak to you in proverbs, but will tell you openly of my Father (John xvi, 25): hence [the] word thunder in the text, indicative of this plain showing.

The words of the above text are adapted to our purpose: for whereas in the previous books we have spoken of divine things according as natural reason can arrive through creatures to the knowledge of them,—but that imperfectly, according to the limitations of the author's capacity, so that we can say with Job: Lo, these things that have been said are but a part of his ways; it remains now to treat of truths divinely revealed for our belief, truths transcending human understanding. And the words of the text are a guide to our procedure in this matter. As we have scarce heard the truth in the statements of Holy Scripture, those being as it were one little drop coming down to us, and no man in this life can look upon the thunder of his greatness, our method will be as follows. Taking as first principles the statements of Holy Scripture, we will endeavour to penetrate their hidden meaning to the best of our ability, without presuming to claim perfect knowledge of the matter. Our proofs will rest on the authority of Holy Scripture, not on natural reason: still it will be our duty to show that our assertions are not contrary to natural reason, and thereby defend them against the assaults of unbelievers. And since natural reason ascends by creatures to the knowledge of God, while the knowledge of faith descends by divine revelation from God to us, and it is the same way up and down, we must proceed in these matters of supra-rational belief by the same way in which we proceeded in our rational enquiries concerning God. Thus we shall treat first of the supra-rational truths that are proposed for our belief concerning God Himself, as the confession of the Trinity [Chapp. I - XXVI: cf. I, Chap.IX: this answers to Book I]. Secondly, of the supra-rational works done by God, as the work of the Incarnation and its consequences [Chapp. XXVII - LXXVIII: answering to Book II]. Thirdly, of the supra-rational events expected at the end of human history, as the resurrection and glorification of bodies, the everlasting bliss of souls, and events therewith connected [Chapp. LXXIX - XCVII: answering to Book III].

CHAPTER II

OF GENERATION, PATERNITY, AND SONSHIP IN GOD

WE find in the New Testament frequent attestations that Jesus Christ is the Son of God: Matt. xi, 27: Mark i, 1: John iii, 35: v, 21: Rom. i, 1: Heb. i, 1. And the same, though more rarely, in the Old Testament: Prov. xxx, 4: Ps. ii, 7: Ps. lxxxviii, 27. On the two last passages we must understand that as some expressions in the context may suit David, others not at all, these words are spoken of David and Solomon, according to the custom of Scripture, as prefiguring some one else, in whom all that is said is fulfilled.

And because the names of Father’ and Son’ are consequent upon some generative process, Scripture has not omitted to speak of divine generation, Ps. ii, 7: Prov. viii, 24, 25: John i, 14, 18: Heb. i, 6.

CHAPTER III

THAT THE SON OF GOD IS GOD

WE must not however fail to observe that divine Scripture uses the above names also to denote the creation of things: thus it is said: Who is the father of rain? or who hath begotten the drops of dew? From whose womb hath ice gone forth, and who hath begotten the frost from heaven? (Job xxxviii, 28.) Lest then by these names of paternity, sonship, and generation, nothing further should be understood than an act of creative energy, Scripture has further not failed to call Him God also, whom it has named Son and Begotten,—John i, 1, 14: Titus iii, 11: Ps. xliv, 7, 8 [Heb. i, 8, 9]: Isa. ix, 6. And that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, Peter confessed, Matt. xvi, 16.

CHAPTERS IV, IX

THE OPINION OF PHOTINUS TOUCHING THE SON OF GOD, AND ITS REJECTION

IT is customary in Scripture for those who are justified by divine grace to be called sons of God,—John i, 12: Rom. viii, 1: 1 John iii, 1: and begotten of God, James i, 1: 1 John iii, 9; and, what is more wonderful, even the name of Godhead is ascribed to them, Exod. vii, 1: Ps. lxxxi, 6: John x, 35. Going upon this usage, some wrong-headed men took up the opinion that Jesus Christ was a mere man, that His existence began with His birth of the Virgin Mary, that He gained divine honours above the rest of men through the merit of His blessed life, that like other men He was the Son of God by the Spirit of adoption, and by grace was born of God, and by a certain assimilation to God is called in the Scriptures God, not by nature, but by some participation in the divine goodness, as is also said of the saints, 2 Pet. i, 4. And this position they endeavoured to confirm by authority of Holy Scripture: All power is given to me in heaven and on earth (Matt. xxviii, 18): but, say they, if He were God before all time, He would not have received power in time. Also it is said of the Son that He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh, and predestinated the Son of God in power (Rom. i, 3, 4): but what is made and predestinated is not eternal. Again the text, He was made obedient unto death, even the death of the cross: wherefore hath God exalted him, and given him the name that is above every name (Phil. ii, 8, 9), seems to show that by merit of His obedience and suffering He was granted divine honours and raised above all. Peter too says: Let all the House of Israel most certainly know that this

Jesus, whom ye have crucified, God hath made Lord and Christ (Acts ii, 36). He seems then to have become God in time, not to have been born so before all ages. They also allege in support of their opinion those texts of Scripture which seem to point to defect in Christ, as that He was carried in woman’s womb (Luke i, 42: ii, 5), that He grew in age (Luke ii, 52), that He suffered hunger (Luke iv, 2) and fatigue (John iv, 6), and was subject to death, that he continually advanced (Luke ii, 40, 52), that He confessed He did not know the day of judgement (Mark xiii, 32), that He was stricken with fear of death (Luke xxii, 42, 44), and other weaknesses inadmissible in one who was God by nature.

But careful study of the words of Holy Scripture shows that there is not that meaning in them which these Photinians have supposed. For when Solomon says: The abysses as yet were not, and I (Wisdom) was already conceived (Prov. viii, 24), he sufficiently shows that this generation took place before all corporeal things. And though an endeavour has been to wrest away these and other testimonies by saying that they are to be understood of predestination, in the sense that before the creation of the world it was arranged that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary, not that her Son existed before the world; nevertheless the words which follow show that He was before Mary not only in predestination, but really. For it follows: When he weighed the foundations of the earth, I was with him arranging all things: but if He had existed in predestination only, He could have done nothing. This conclusion may be drawn also from the Evangelist John: for, that none might take as referring to predestination the words, In the beginning was the Word, he adds: All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing: which could not be true, had He not real existence before the world was. Likewise from the texts John iii, 13: vi, 38, it appears that He had real existence ere He descended from heaven. Besides, whereas according to the above-mentioned position, a man by the merit of His life was advanced to be God, the Apostle contrariwise declares that, being God, He was made man: Being in the form of God, he thought it no robbery, etc. (Phil. ii, 6.)

Again, among the rest who had the grace of God, Moses had it abundantly, of whom it is said: The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend (Exod. xxxiii, 11). If then Jesus Christ were only called Son of God’ by reason of the grace of adoption, as is the, case with other Saints, Moses might be called Son of God’ on the same title as Christ, allowing all the while that Christ was endowed with more abundant grace: for among the rest of the saints one is filled with greater grace than another, and still they are all called Sons of God.’ But Moses is not called Son’ on the same title as Christ: for the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as the son from the servant: Moses indeed was faithful in his house as a servant: but Christ as the Son in his own house (Heb. iii, 5).

The like argument may be gathered from many other places of Scripture, where Christ is styled Son of God’ in a singular manner above others, as at His baptism, This is my beloved Son (Matt. iii, 17); or where He is called the Only-begotten,’—The Only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared (John i, 18): for were He Son in a general way, as others are, He could not be called Only-begotten’: sometimes too He is designated as First-born,’ to show that there is a derivation of sonship from Him to others: To be made conformable to the image of his Son, that he may be the first-born among many brethren (Rom. viii, 29): God hath sent his Son, that we might receive the adoption of sons (Gal. iv, 4: which texts show that He, by the likeness of whose Sonship others are called sons, is Son Himself after another way than they.

Furthermore, in the Holy Scriptures some works are set down as so peculiarly proper to God as to be never attributable to any one else, e.g., the sanctification of souls and the forgiveness of sins: for it is said, I am the Lord who sanctify you (Levit. xx, 8): I am he who blot out thy sins for mine own sake (Isai. xliii, 25). Yet both these works Scripture attributes to Christ, Heb. ii, 11: xiii, 12. He declared of Himself that He had the power of forgiving sins, and proved His assertion by a miracle (Matt. ix, 1-8); and the angel foretold of Him that He should save his people from their sins (Matt. i, 21). Christ therefore as sanctifier and forgiver of sins is not called God’ in the same sense as others are called gods,’ who are sanctified and whose sins are forgiven, but as one having the power and nature Godhead.

As for those testimonies of Scripture whereby the Photinians endeavoured to show that Christ is not God by nature, they do not serve their purpose: for we confess in Christ the Son of God after the Incarnation two natures, a human and a divine: hence there are predicated of Him at once attributes proper to God, by reason of His divine nature, and attributes seeming to involve some defect, or shortcoming, by reason of His human nature. Thus His saying, All power is given to me, does not mean that He then received the power as a new thing to Him, but that the power, which, the Son of God had enjoyed from all eternity, had now begun to appear in the same Son made man, by the victory which He had gained over death by rising again. Hereby it is also clear that Peter's saying (Acts ii, 36) of God having made him [Jesus] Lord and Christ, is to be referred to the Son in His human nature, in which He began to have in time what in His nature He had from eternity.

Nor does the Apostle (Rom. i, 3) say absolutely that the Son was made,' but that He was made of the seed of David according to the flesh by the assumption of human nature. Hence the following words, predestinated Son of God, apply to the Son in His human nature: for that union of human nature with the Son of God, which made it possible man to be called Son of God, was not due to any human merits, but to the grace of God predestinating.

CHAPTER V

REJECTION OF THE OPINION OF SABELLIUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD

BECAUSE it is a fixed idea in the mind of all who think rightly of God, that there can be but one God by nature, some, conceiving from the Scriptures the belief that Christ is truly and by nature God and the Son of God, have confessed that Christ, the Son of God, and God the Father are one God; and yet have not allowed that there was any God the Son,’ so called according to His nature from eternity, but have held that God received the denomination of Sonship from the time that He was born of the Virgin Mary. Thus all things that Christ suffered in the flesh they attributed to God the Father. This was the opinion of the Sabellans, who were also called Patripassians,’ because they asserted that the Father had suffered, and that the Father Himself was Christ. The peculiarity of this doctrine was the tenet that the term Son of God’ does not denote any existing Person, but a property supervening upon a pre-existing Person.

The falsity of this position is manifest from Scripture authority. For Christ in the Scriptures is not only called the Son of the Virgin, but also the Son of God. But it cannot be that the same person should be son of himself, or that the same should give existence and receive it. We observe also that after the Incarnation the Father gives testimony of the Son: This is my beloved Son (Matt. iii, 17): thereby pointing to His person. Christ therefore is in person other than His Father.

CHAPTER VI

OF THE OPINION OF ARIUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD

WHEREAS it is not in accordance with sacred doctrine to say, with Photinus, that the Son of God took His beginning from Mary; or, with Sabellius, that the eternal God and Father began to be the Son by taking flesh; there were others who took the view, which Scripture teaches, that the Son of God was before the Incarnation and even before the creation of the world; but because the Son is other than the Father, they accounted Him to be not of the same nature with the Father: for they could not understand, nor would they believe, that any two beings, distinct in person, had the same essence and nature. And because, according to the doctrine of faith, alone of natures the nature of God the Father is believed to be eternal, they believed that the nature of the Son was not from eternity, although the Son was before other creatures. And because all that is not eternal is made out of nothing and created by God, they declared that the Son of God was made out of nothing and is a creature. But because they were driven by the authority of Scripture to call the Son also God, they said that He was one with God the Father, not by nature, but by a union of wills, and by participation in the likeness of God beyond other creatures. Hence, as the highest creatures, the angels are called in Scripture gods’ and ‘sons of God,’—e.g., Where werst thou, when the morning stars praised me, and all the sons of God shouted for joy? (Job xxxviii, 4-7): God stood in the assembly of gods (Ps. lxxxi, 1):—they considered that He should be called Son of God’ and God’ pre-eminently above others, inasmuch as through Him the Father created every other creature. .

CHAPTER VII

REJECTION OF ARIUS’S POSITION

HOLY Scripture calls Christ Son of God’ and the angels ‘sons of God,’ yet not in the same sense. To which of the angels did he ever say: Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee? (Heb. i, 5).

2. If Christ were called Son’ in the same sense as all the angels and saints, He would not be Only-begotten, however much, for the excellence of His nature above the rest, He might be called first-born (Ps. lxxxviii, 27). But the Scripture declares Him to be the Only-begotten (John i, 14).

5. Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever (Rom. ix, 5): Expecting the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ (Tit. ii. 13): I will raise up to David a just branch, and this is what they shall call him, the Lord our just one (Jerem. xxiii, 5, 6), where in the Hebrew we find the tetragrammaton, the name of God alone.

7. No creature receives the whole fulness of the divine goodness: but in Christ there dwells all the fulness of the Godhead (Col. ii, 9).

8. An angel’s mind falls far short of the divine mind: but the mind of Christ in point of knowledge does not fall short of the divine mind: for in Him are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. ii, 3).

9. All things whatsoever that the Father hath are mine; All mine are thine, and thine are mine (John xvi, 15: xvii, 10). [Cf. Luke xv, 31.] Therefore there is the same essence and nature of the Father and the Son.

10. In Phil. ii, 7, 8, by the form of God is understood no other than the nature of God, as by the form of a servant is understood no other than human nature.

11. The Jews sought to kill him because he said that God was his Father, making himself equal to God (John v, 18). This is the narrative of the

evangelist, whose testimony is true (John xix, 35): nor is it doubtful to any Christian but that what Christ said of Himself is true.

13. No created substance represents God in His substance: for whatever appears of the perfection of any creature is less than what God is: hence through no creature can the essence of God be known. But the Son represents the Father; for the Apostle says of Him that He is the image of the invisible God (Col. i, 15). And lest He should be accounted an image falling short of and failing to represent the essence of God; or an image whence the essence of God could not be known, even as man is said to be the image of God (1 Cor xi, 7), He is declared to be a perfect image, representing the very substance of God, the splendour of his glory, and figure of his substance (Heb. i, 3).

19. Our final happiness is in God alone; and to Him alone the honour of latria is to be paid (B. III, Chap.CXX). But our happiness is in God the Son: This is life everlasting, that they know thee, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ (John xvii, 3). And it is said: That all may honour the Son, as they honour the Father (John v, 23); and again, Adore him, all ye angels (Ps. xcvi, 8), which the Apostle (Heb. i, 6) quotes as applying to the Son.

Taught by these and similar evidences of Holy Scripture, the Catholic Church confesses Christ to be the true and natural Son of God, co-eternal and equal with the Father; true God, of the same essence and nature with the Father; begotten, not created, nor made. Hence it appears that the faith of the Catholic Church alone truly confesses generation in God, referring the generation of the Son to the fact of His receiving the divine nature of the Father. Other teachers heretically refer this generation to a nature extraneous to Godhead,—Photinus and Sabellius to a human nature; Arius not to a human indeed, but still to a created nature, more honorable than other creatures. Arius further differs from Sabellius and Photinus in asserting that this generation was before the creation of the world, while they say that it was not before the Virgin birth. Sabellius however differs from Photinus in this, that Sabellius confesses Christ to be true God by nature, which neither Photinus nor Arius confesses; but Photinus says that He was a mere man, Arius that He was a sort of compound super-excellent creature, at once divine and human. Photinus and Arius confess that the person of the Father and of the Son is different, which Sabellius denies. The Catholic faith therefore, taking the middle course (media via incedens) confesses, with Arius and Photinus against Sabellius, that the person of the Father and of the Son is different, the Son being begotten, the Father absolutely unbegotten; but with Sabellius against Photinus and Arius, that Christ is true God by nature, and of the same nature with the Father,—albeit not of the same person. Hence we gather some inkling of the truth of the Catholic position: for to the truth, as the Philosopher says, even false opinions testify; whereas false opinions are at variance, not only with the truth, but with one another.

CHAPTER VIII

EXPLANATION OF THE TEXTS WHICH ARIUS USED TO ALLEGE FOR HIMSELF

THAT they may know thee, the only true God (John xvii, 3) is not to be taken to mean that the Father alone is true God, as though the Son were not true God, but that the one sole true Godhead belongs to the Father, without however the Son being excluded from it. Hence John, interpreting these words of the Lord, attributes to the true Son both these titles which here our Lord ascribes to His Father: That we may know the true God, and be in his true Son Jesus Christ: this is the true God and life everlasting (1 John v, 20). But even though the Son had confessed that the Father alone is true God, He should not for that be understood Himself as Son to be excluded from Godhead; for since the Father and the Son are one God, whatever is said of the Father by reason of His Divinity is as though it were said of the Son, and conversely. Thus the Lord's saying: No one knoweth the Son but the Father, nor does any one know the Father but the Son (Matt. xi, 27), is not to be understood as excluding the Father from knowledge of Himself, or the Son either.

2. In the text, Whom in his own time he will show forth, who is blessed and alone powerful, King of Kings and Lord of Lords (1 Tim.. vi, 15), it is not the Father that is named, but that which is common to the Father and the Son. For that the Son also is King of Kings and Lord of Lords, is manifestly shown in the text: He was clad in a garment sprinkled with blood, and his name was called, the Word of God: and he hath on his garment and on his thigh written, King of Kings and Lord of Lords (Apoc. xix, 13, 16).

3. The sense of the text, the Father is greater than I (John xiv, 28), is taught us by the Apostle (Phil. ii, 6). For since greater' is relative to less,'

this must be understood of the Son according as He is made less; and He was made less in His taking the form of a servant, yet withal being equal to God the Father in the form of God. And no wonder if on this account the Father is said to be greater than Him, since the Apostle says that He was even made less than the angels: That Jesus, who was made a little less than the angels, we have seen crowned with glory and honour for his suffering of death (Heb. ii, 9.: cf. Ps. viii, 4-6).

4. Then the Son also himself shall be subject to him who subjected to him all things. The context here shows that this is to be understood of Christ as man: for as man He died, and as man He rose again: but in His divinity, doing all things that the Father does (John v, 19), He too has subjected to Himself all things: for we look for a Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ, who will reform the body of our lowliness, made conformable to the body of his glory, by the act of his power of subjecting all things to himself (Phil. iii, 20).

5. By the Father being said to give to the Son (John iii, 35: Matt. xi, 27), nothing else is understood than the generation of the Son, whereby the Father has given the Son His own nature And this may be gathered from the consideration of that which is given: for the Lord says: That which my Father hath given me is greater than all (John x, 29): where that which is greater than all is the divine nature, wherein the Son is equal to the Father.

6. Hence it appears how the Son is said to be taught (John v, 20: xv, 15), although He is not ignorant. It has been shown above that, in God, understanding and being are the same (B. I, Chap.XLV): hence the communication of the divine nature is also a communication of intelligence. But a communication of intelligence may be called a ‘showing,’ or ‘speaking,’ or teaching.’ By the fact, then, of the Son having received the divine nature of His Father at His birth, He is said to have heard’ from His Father, or the Father to have ‘shown’ Him: not that the Son was in ignorance before, and afterwards the Father taught Him: for the Apostle confesses Christ the power of God and wisdom of God (1 Cor. i, 24); and wisdom cannot be ignorant, or power weak.

7. The text, The Son cannot do anything of himself (John v, 19), argues no weakness in the Son; but since with God to act is no other thing than to be, it is here said that the Son cannot act of Himself, but has His action of the Father, as He cannot be of Himself, but only of the Father. Were He to

be of Himself,’ He could not be the Son. But because the Son receives the same nature that the Father has, and consequently the same power, therefore though He neither is of Himself’ (a se) nor acts of Himself, still He is by Himself’ (per se) and acts by Himself, since He at once is by His own nature, which He has received from the Father, and acts by His own nature received from the Father. Hence, to show that though the Son does not act of Himself,’ nevertheless He acts by Himself,’ the verse goes on: Whatsoever things he (the Father) doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner.

8. All the texts about the Father giving commandment to the Son, and the Son obeying the Father, or praying to the Father, are to be understood of the Son as He is subject to His Father, which is only in point of the humanity which He has assumed (John xiv, 31: xv, 10: Phil. ii, 8), as the Apostle shows (Heb. v, 7: Gal. iv, 4).

10. His saying, To sit on my right or left hand is not mine to give you, but to them for whom it is prepared (Matt. xx, 23), does not show that the Son has no power of distributing the seats in heaven, or the participation of life everlasting, which He expressly says does belong to Him to bestow: I give them life everlasting (John x, 27); and again it is said: The Father hath given all judgement to the Son (John v, 22): He will set the sheep on his right hand and the goats on his left (Matt. xxv, 33): it belongs then to the power of the Son to set any one on His right or on His left, whether both designations mark different degrees of glory; or the one refers to glory, the other to punishment. We must look to the context, whereby it appears that the mother of the sons of Zebedee rested on some confidence of kindred with the man Christ. The Lord then by His answer did not mean that it was not in His power to give what was asked, but that it was not in His power to give to them for whom it was asked: for it did not belong to Him to give inasmuch as He was the Son of the Virgin, but inasmuch as He was the Son of God; and therefore it was not His to give to any for their connexion with Him according to fleshly kindred, as He was the Son of the Virgin, but it belonged to Him as Son of God to give to those for whom it was prepared by His Father according to eternal predestination.

11. Nor from the text: Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no, not the angels of heaven, nor the Son, but my Father alone (Mark xiii, 32): can it be understood that the Son did not know the hour of His coming, seeing that in

Him are hidden all treasures of wisdom and knowledge (Col. ii, 3), and seeing that He perfectly knows that which is greater still, namely, the Father (Matt. xi, 27 but the meaning is that the Son, as a man in His place amongst men, behaved Himself after the manner of one ignorant in not revealing that day to His disciples. For it is a usual mode of speaking in Scripture for God to be said to know a thing, if He makes it known: thus, Now I know that thou fearest the Lord (Gen. xxii, 12), means I have made it known.’ And contrariwise the Son is said not to know that which He does not make known to us.

CHAPTER 12

HOW THE SON OF GOD IS CALLED THE WISDOM OF GOD

WISDOM in man is a habit whereby our mind is perfected in the knowledge of the highest truths: such are divine truths. Wisdom in God is His knowledge of Himself. But because He does not know Himself by any presentation of Himself other than His essence, and His act of understanding is His essence, the wisdom of God cannot be a habit, but is the very essence of God. But the Son of God is the Word and Concept of God understanding Himself. The Word of God, thus conceived, is properly called begotten Wisdom':—hence the Apostle names Christ the wisdom of God (1 Cor. i, 24). This Word of wisdom, conceived in the mind, is a manifestation of the wisdom of the mind which thereby understands: as in us acts are a manifestation of habits. Also the divine wisdom is called light,' as consisting in a pure act of knowledge; and the manifestation of light is the brightness thence proceeding: the Word of divine wisdom therefore is fittingly called the brightness of light,' according to the text: being the brightness of his glory (Heb. i, 3). But though the Son, or Word of God, is properly called conceived wisdom,' nevertheless the name of Wisdom, when used absolutely, must be common to the Father and the Son; since the wisdom that is resplendent through the Word is the essence of the Father, and the essence of the Father is common to Him with the Son.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS TRUE GOD

A TEMPLE is consecrated to none but God: hence it is said: The Lord in his holy temple (Ps. x, 5). But there is a temple appointed to the Holy Ghost, as it is said: Know ye not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost? (i Cor. vi, 19.) The Holy Ghost then is God, particularly since our members, which the text says are the temple of the Holy Ghost, are the members of Christ: for the writer had said before: Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ? (v. 15.) Seeing that Christ is true God, it would be inappropriate for the members of Christ to be the temple of the Holy Ghost, unless the Holy Ghost were God.

2. The service of latria (B. III, Chap.CXX) is paid by holy men to God alone (Deut. vi, 13). But holy men pay that service to the Holy Ghost: for it is said: We who serve the Spirit as God (qui spiritui Deo servimus.—Phil. iii, 3). And though some manuscripts have, We who serve in the spirit of the Lord (qui spiritu Domini servimus [showing the reading theou]), yet the Greek manuscripts and the more ancient Latin ones have, We who serve the Spirit as God (qui spiritui Deo servimus); and from the Greek itself [latreuontes] it appears that this is to be understood of the service of latria, which is due to God alone.

3. To sanctify men is a work proper to God: I am the Lord who sanctify you (Levit. xxii, 9). But it is the Holy Ghost who sanctifies, according to the words of the Apostle: Ye are washed and sanctified and justified, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ and in the Spirit of our God (1 Cor. vi, 11).

4. As the life of the body is by the soul, so the soul's life of justice is by God: hence the Lord says: As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father, so whosoever eateth me, the same shall also live by me (John vi, 58). But such life is by the Holy Ghost; hence it is added: It is the Spirit that

giveth life (John vi, 63): and the Apostle says: If with the spirit ye mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live (Rom. viii, 18).

7. The Spirit searcheth all things, even the profound things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii, 10, 11). But to comprehend all the profound things of God is not given to any creature: for no one knoweth the Son but the Father, nor doth any one know the Father but the Son (Matt. xi, 27); and in the person of God it is said, My secret to me (Isai. xxiv, 16). Therefore, the Holy Ghost is, not a creature.

8. According to the above comparison, the Holy Ghost is to God as a man's spirit to man. But a man's spirit is intrinsic to man, not of a foreign nature, but part of him. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not of a nature extrinsic to Deity.

11. Evidently from Holy Scripture it was God who spoke by the prophets, as it is said: I will hear what the Lord God speaketh in me (Ps. lxxxiv, 9). But it is equally evident that the Holy Ghost spoke in the prophets: The Scripture must be fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost foretold by the mouth of David (Acts i, 16). The holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost (2 Pet. i, 21). Clearly then the Holy Ghost is God.

17. The Holy Ghost is expressly called God in the text: Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart to lie to the Holy Ghost? . . . . Thou hast not lied to men, but to God (Acts. v, 3, 4).

23. Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministries, but the same Lord. And there are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all. . . . But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will (1 Cor. xii, 4, 5, 6, 11). This text clearly declares the Holy Ghost to be God, as well by saying that the Holy Ghost works what it has previously said that God works, as also by the declaration of His working according to the arbitrement of His own will.

CHAPTER XVIII

THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS A SUBSISTENT PERSON

BUT inasmuch as some have maintained that the Holy Ghost is not a subsistent Person, but is either the divinity of the Father and the Son (cf. St Aug. de haeresibus, n. 52), or some accidental perfection of the mind given us by God, as wisdom, or charity, or other such created accidents, we must evince the contrary.

1. Accidental forms do not properly work, but the subject that has them works according to the arbitrement of his own will: thus a wise man uses wisdom when he wills. But the Holy Ghost works according to the arbitrement of His own will (1 Cor. xii, 11).

2. The Holy Ghost is not to be accounted an accidental perfection of the human mind, seeing that He is the cause of such perfections: for the charity of God is spread abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us (Rom. v, 5): To one is given by the Spirit the utterance of wisdom, to another the utterance of knowledge according to the same Spirit (1 Cor. xii, 8).

3. The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and receives from the Son (John xv, 26: xvi, 14): which cannot be understood of the divine essence.

4. Scripture speaks of the Holy Ghost as of a subsistent Person: The Holy Ghost said to them: Set aside for me Barnabas and Saul for the work unto which I have taken them: . . . . and they, sent by the Holy Ghost, went (Acts xiii, 2, 4): It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and us (Acts xv, 28).

5. The Father and the Son being subsistent Persons and of divine nature, the Holy Ghost would not be numbered with them (Matt. xxviii, 19: 2 Cor. xiii, 13: 1 John v, 7) were He not a Person subsistent in the divine nature.

CHAPTER XX

OF THE EFFECTS WHICH THE SCRIPTURES ATTRIBUTE TO THE HOLY GHOST IN RESPECT OF THE WHOLE CREATION

THE love wherewith God loves His own goodness is the cause of the creation of things (B. I, Chap.LXXXVI); and it is laid down that the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love wherewith God loves Himself. Therefore the Holy Ghost is the principle of the creation of things; and this is signified in Ps. ciii, 30: Send forth thy spirit and they shall be created. Again, as the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, and love is an impulsive and motor power, the motion that is from God in things is appropriately attributed to the Holy Ghost. But the first motion, or change, coming from God in things is the production of the diversity of species from matter created formless (ex materia creata informi species diversas produxit). This work the Scripture attributes to the Holy Ghost: The Spirit of God moved over the waters (Gen. i, 2) By the the waters Augustine wishes to be understood primordial matter. The Spirit of the Lord is said to move over them, not as being in motion on Himself, but as the principle of motion. The government of creation also is fitly assigned to the Holy Ghost, as government is the moving and directing of things to their proper ends. And because the governing of subjects is an act proper to a lord, lordship too is aptly attributed to the Holy Ghost: the Spirit is Lord (1 Cor. iii, 17).

Life also particularly appears in movement. As then impulse and movement by reason of love are proper to the Holy Spirit, so too is life fitly attributed to Him, as it is said: It is the Spirit that quickeneth (John vi, 64: 2 Cor. iii, 6).

CHAPTER XXI

OF THE EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE HOLY GHOST IN SCRIPTURE IN THE WAY OF GIFTS BESTOWED ON THE RATIONAL CREATURE

SINCE the Father, Son and Holy Ghost have the same power, as they have the same essence, everything that God works in us must be by the efficient causation of Father, Son and Holy Ghost together. But the word of wisdom, sent us by God, whereby we know God, is properly representative of the Son; and the love, wherewith we love God, is properly representative of the Holy Ghost. Thus the charity that is in us, though it is the effect of Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is in a certain special aspect said to be in us through the Holy Ghost. But since divine effects not only begin by divine operation, but are also sustained in being by the same, and nothing operates where it is not , it needs must follow that wherever there is any effect wrought by God, there is God Himself who works it. Hence, since the charity wherewith we love God is in us through the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost Himself must be in us, so long as charity is in us. Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and the Holy Ghost dwelleth in you? (1 Cor. iii, 16.) And through the Holy Ghost the Father and Son also dwell in us. Hence the Lord says: We will come to him, and take up our abode with him (John xiv, 23). Cf. 1 John iv, 13, 16.

It is a point of friendship to reveal one’s secrets to one’s friend: for as friendship unites affections, and makes of two as it were one heart, a man may well seem not to have uttered beyond his own heart what he has revealed to his friend. Hence the Lord says to His disciples: I will not call you servants, but friends, because all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known to you (John xv, 15). Since then by the Holy Ghost we are constituted friends of God, the revelation of divine mysteries to men is fittingly said to take place through the Holy Ghost: To us God has revealed them through the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. ii, 10). Besides the revealing of one’s secrets to one’s friend, which is part of the union of affections that goes with friendship, there is a further requisite of the same union, to share one’s possessions with one’s friend, according to 1 John iii, 17. And therefore all the gifts of God are said to be given us by the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. xii, 7-11). And by such gifts of the Spirit we are conformed to God, and by Him rendered apt to the performance of good works, and our way is thereby paved to happiness: which three effects the Apostle declares: God hath anointed us, and sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts (2 Cor. i, 21, 22: cf. Eph. i, 13, 14). The sealing may be taken to imply the likeness of conformity to God: the anointing, the fitting of man to do perfect acts: the pledge, the hope whereby we are set on the way to the heavenly inheritance of life everlasting.

And because good will towards a person leads at times to the adoption of him as a son, that so the inheritance may belong to him, the adoption of the sons of God is properly attributed to the Holy Ghost: Ye have received the spirit of adoption of sons, wherein we cry, Abba, Father (Rom. viii, 15).

Again, by admission to friendship all offence is removed. Since then we are rendered sons of God through the Holy Ghost, through Him also our sins are forgiven us by God; and therefore the Lord says: Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins ye shall forgive, they are forgiven them (John xx, 22). And therefore forgiveness is denied to them who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost (Matt. xii, 31), as to persons who have not that whereby man attains the forgiveness of his sins.

CHAPTER XXII

OF THE EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE HOLY GHOST IN THE ATTRACTION OF THE RATIONAL CREATURE TO GOD

IT is a mark of friendship to take delight in the company of one's friend, to rejoice at what he says and does, and to find in him comfort and consolation against all troubles: hence it is in our griefs especially that we fly to our friends for comfort. Since then the Holy Ghost renders us friends of God, making Him to dwell in us and we in Him, we have through the same Holy Spirit joy in God and comfort under all the adversities and assaults of the world: hence it is said: Give me back the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with thy guiding Spirit (Ps. l, 14): The kingdom of God is justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost (Rom. xiv, 17): The Church had peace, and was edified, walking in the fear of the Lord, and filled with the consolation of the Holy Ghost (Acts ix, 31).

Another mark of friendship is to fall in with a friend's wishes. Now God's wishes are unfolded to us by His commandments, the keeping of which therefore is part of our love of God : If ye love me, keep my commandments (John xiv, 15). As then we are rendered lovers of God by the Holy Ghost, by Him we are also led to fulfil God's commandments: Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, the same are the sons of God (Rom. viii, 14). But it is a noteworthy point that the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost, not as bondsmen, but as free. He is free, who is a cause unto himself; and we do that freely which we do of ourselves, that is, of our own willing; but what we do against our will, we do, not freely, but after the manner of bondsmen. The Holy Ghost then, rendering us lovers of God, inclines us to act of our own will, freely, out of love, not as bondsmen prompted by fear. Ye have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but ye have received the spirit of adoption as sons (Rom. viii, 15). True good being the object of the will, whenever a man turns away from true good under the influence of passion or ill habit, and so is swayed by a power foreign to his proper self, he in that respect behaves like a bondsman. On the other hand, if we consider his act as a genuine act of his will, inclined to what is good for him in his own eyes, although not really good, he acts freely in thus following passion or corrupt habit. But again he acts like a bondsman, if, while the volition of fancied good just mentioned remains, he nevertheless abstains from what he wills for fear of the law enacted to the contrary. Since then the Holy Ghost inclines the will by love to true good, its natural object, He takes away alike the servitude whereby, a slave to passion and sin, man acts against the due order of his will, and that other servitude whereby man acts according to the law, but against the motion of his will, like a slave of the law and no friend to it. Hence the Apostle says: Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty (2 Cor. iii, 17): If ye are led by the Spirit, ye are not under the law (Gal. v, 18)

CHAPTER XXIII

REPLIES TO ARGUMENTS ALLEGED AGAINST THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY GHOST

CHAP. XVI. It was the position of Arius that the Son and Holy Ghost were creatures, the Son however being greater than the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost being His minister, even as he said the Son was to the Father. After Arius came Macedonius, who was orthodox on the point of the Father and Son being of one and the same substance, but refused to believe the same of the Holy Ghost, and said that He was a creature.

Chap. XXIII. 2. He shall not speak of himself but whatsoever things he shall hear, he shall speak (John xvi, 13). Since all the knowledge and power and action of God is the essence of God, all the knowledge and power and action of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is from another; but that of the Son is from the Father only, that of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son. To hear then, on the part of the Holy Ghost, signifies His taking knowledge, as He takes essence, from the Father and the Son.

3. The Son of God is said to have been sent in this sense, that He appeared to man in visible flesh; and, thus came to be in the world in a new way, in which He had not been before, namely, visibly, although He had always been there invisibly as God. And the Son's doing this came to Him of His Father: hence in this respect He is said to be 'sent' by the Father. In like manner the Holy Ghost too appeared visibly both in the appearance of a dove over Christ in His baptism, and in fiery tongues over the Apostles; and though He did not become a dove or fire, still He appeared under such visible appearances as signs of Himself. And thus He too came to be in a

new way in the world, visibly; and this He had of the Father and of the Son, hence He is said to be ‘sent’ by the Father and the Son, which does not imply inferiority in Him, but procession. There is yet another way in which the Holy Ghost is said to be sent, and that invisibly. The Son proceeds from the Father as the knowledge wherewith God knows Himself; and the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son as the love wherewith God loves Himself. Hence when through the Holy Ghost one is made a lover of God, the Holy Ghost is an indweller in him; and thus He comes to be in a new way in man, in point of the new special effect of His indwelling in man. Now that the Holy Ghost works this effect in man, comes to Him of the Father and the Son; and therefore He is said to be invisibly sent by Father and Son.

4. Nor is the Holy Ghost excluded from the Divinity by the occasional mention of the Father and the Son without the Holy Ghost (Matt. xi, 27: John xvii, 3: Rom. i, 7: 1 Cor. viii, 6): for hereby the Scripture silently intimates that whatever attribute of divinity is predicated of one of the three, must be understood of them, all, seeing that they are one God. God the Father can never be taken to be without the Word and without Love; and the Word and Love cannot be taken to be without the Father. Hence it is said of the Son: No one knoweth the Father but the Son (Matt. xi, 27): so it is also said of the Holy Ghost: The things that are of God, none knoweth but the Spirit of God (1 Cor. ii, 11): though it is certain that neither the Father nor the Son is excluded from this knowledge of divine things.

7. Habitually in Holy Scripture the language of human passion is applied to God (B. I, Chapp.LXXXIX-[464]LXCI). Thus it is said: The Lord was angered in fury against his people (Ps. cv, 40): for He punishes, as men in anger do: hence it is added: And gave them over into the hands of the Gentiles. So in the text, Sadden not the Holy Spirit of God (Eph. iv, 30), the Holy Ghost is said to be saddened, because He abandons sinners; as men, when they are saddened and annoyed, forsake the company of them that annoy them.

8. Another customary phraseology of Holy Scripture is the attributing of that to God, which He produces in man. So it is said: The Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings (Rom. viii, 26): because He makes us ask, for He produces in our hearts the love of God, whereby we desire to enjoy Him and ask according to our desire.

9. Since the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love wherewith God loves Himself; and since God loves with the same love Himself and other beings for the sake of His own goodness (B. I Chapp.LXXV,LXXVI); it is clear that the love wherewith God loves us belongs to the Holy Ghost. In like manner also the love wherewith we love God. In respect of both these loves the Holy Ghost is well said to be given. In respect of the love wherewith God loves us, He may be said to be given, in the sense in which one is said to give his love to another, when he begins to love him. Only, be it observed, there is no beginning in time for God’s love of any one, if we regard the act of divine will loving us; but the effect of His love is caused in time in the creature whom He draws to Himself. Again, in respect of the love wherewith we love God, the Holy Ghost may be said to be given us, because this love is produced in us by the Holy Ghost, who by reason of this love dwells in us, and so we possess Him and enjoy His support. And since the Holy Ghost has it of the Father and the Son that He is in us and is possessed by us, therefore He is aptly said to be given us by the Father and the Son. Your Father from heaven will give the good Spirit to them that ask him (Luke xi, 13; cf. Acts v, 32: John xv, 26). Nor does this argue Him to be less than the Father and the Son, but only to have His origin from them.

11. It is reasonable that in the case of the divine nature alone nature should be communicated in more modes than the one mode of generation. In God alone act and being are identical: hence since there is in God, as in every intelligent nature, both intelligence and will, alike that which proceeds in Him as intelligence, to wit, the Word, and that proceeds in Him as love and will, to wit, Love, must have divine being and be God; thus as well the Son as the Holy Ghost is true God.

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE SON

IF any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not of him (Rom. viii, 9). These words of the Apostle show that the same Spirit is of the Father and of the Son: for the text alleged follows upon these words immediately preceding: If so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now it cannot be said that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit merely of the man Christ (Luke iv, 3): for from Gal. iv, 6, Since ye are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, it appears that the Holy Ghost makes sons of God inasmuch as He is the Spirit of the Son of God,—sons of God, that is to say, by adoption, which means assimilation to Him who is Son of God by nature. For so the text has it: He hath predestined (them) to become conformable to the image of his Son, that he may be the first-born among many brethren (Rom. viii, 29). But the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of the Son of God except as taking His origin from Him: for this distinction of origin is the only one admissible in the Godhead.

2. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son: When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father (John xv, 26). Now the sender has some authority (auctoritatem) over the sent. We must say then that the Son has some authority in respect of the Holy Ghost. Now that cannot be an authority of dominion, superiority, or seniority: it can only be an authority in point of origin. So then the Holy Ghost is from the Son. But if any one will have it that the Son also is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to the text (Luke iv, 18) where the Lord said that the saying of Isaias (lxi, 1) was fulfilled in Him: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: to preach glad tidings to the poor he hath sent me: we must observe that it is in respect of the nature

which He has assumed that the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Ghost [cf. Acts x, 38]: but the Holy Ghost has assumed no such nature, that the Son in point thereof should send Him or have authority regarding Him.

3. The Son says of the Holy Ghost: He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine (John xvi, 14). Now it cannot be maintained that He shall receive that which belongs to the Son, namely, the divine essence, but not receive it of the Son, but only of the Father: for it follows, All things whatsoever that the Father hath are mine: therefore did I say to you that he shall receive of mine: for if all things that the Father has belong to the Son, the authority of the Father, whereby He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, must belong likewise to the Son.

7. The Son is from the Father, and so too is the Holy Ghost. The Father then must be related to the Son and to the Holy Ghost as a principle to that which is of the principle. Now He is related to the Son in the way of paternity, but not so to the Holy Ghost, otherwise the Holy Ghost would be the Son. There must then be in the Father another relation, which relates Him to the Holy Ghost; and that relation is called 'spiration.' In like manner, as there is in the Son a relation which relates Him to the Father, and is called filiation,' there must be in the Holy Ghost too a relation which relates Him to the Father, and is called procession.' And thus in point of the origin of the Son from the Father there are two relations, one in the originator, the other in the originated, namely, paternity and filiation; and other two in point of the origin of the Holy Ghost, namely spiration and procession. Now paternity and spiration do not constitute two persons, but belong to the one person of the Father, because they are not opposed one to the other. Neither then would filiation and procession constitute two persons, but would belong to one person, but for the fact of their being opposed one to the other. But it is impossible to assign any other opposition than that which is in point of origin. There must then be an opposition in point of origin between the Son and the Holy Ghost, so that one is from the other.

10. If the rejoinder is made that the processions of Son and Holy Ghost differ in principle, inasmuch as the Father produces the Son by mode of understanding, as the Word, and produces the Holy Ghost by mode of will, as Love, the opponent must go on to say that according to the difference of understanding and will in God the Father there are two distinct processions

and two distinct beings so proceeding. But will and understanding in God the Father are not distinguished with a real but only with a mental distinction (B. I, Chapp.XLV,LXXIII). Consequently the two processions and the two beings so proceeding must differ only by a mental distinction. But things that differ only by a mental distinction are predicable of one another: thus it is true to say that God’s will is His understanding, and His understanding is His will. It will be true then to say that the Holy Ghost is the Son, and the Son the Holy Ghost, which is the impious position of Sabellius. Therefore, to maintain the distinction between Holy Ghost and Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by mode of understanding and the Holy Ghost by mode of will, unless we further go on to say that the Holy Ghost is of the Son.

13. The Father and the Son, being one in essence, differ only in this, that He is the Father, and He the Son. Everything else is common to Father and Son. But being the origin of the Holy Ghost lies outside of the relationship of paternity and filiation: for the relation whereby the Father is Father differs from the relation whereby the Father is the origin of the Holy Ghost. Being the origin then of the Holy Ghost is something common to Father and Son.

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT THERE ARE ONLY THREE PERSONS IN THE GODHEAD, FATHER AND SON AND HOLY GHOST

FROM all that has been said we gather that in the divine nature there subsist three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that these three are one God, being distinct from one another by relations alone. The Father is distinguished by the relation of paternity and by being born of none: the Son is distinguished from the Father by the relationship of filiation: the Father and Son from the Holy Ghost by spiration; and the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son by the procession of love whereby He proceeds from both. Besides these three Persons it is impossible to assign in the divine nature any fourth Person.

1. The three divine Persons, agreeing in essence, can be distinguished only by the relation of origin. These relations of origin cannot obtain in respect of any process tending to things without, as whatever proceeded without would not be co-essential with its origin; but the process must all stay within. Now such a process, abiding within its origin, is found only in the act of understanding and will. Hence the divine persons cannot be multiplied except in accordance with the requirements of the process of understanding and will in God. But in God there can be but one process of understanding, seeing that His act of understanding is one, simple, and perfect, whereby, understanding Himself, He understands all other things; and so there can be in God only one procession of the Word. In like manner the process of love must be one and simple, because the divine will also is one and simple, whereby in loving Himself God loves all other things.

There can therefore be in God but two Persons proceeding: one by way of understanding, as the Word, or Son; the other by way of love, as the Holy Ghost: there is also one Person not proceeding, namely, the Father. There can only therefore be three Persons in the Trinity.

2. The divine Persons must be distinguished according to their mode of procession. Now the mode of personal procession can be but threefold. There may be a mode of not proceeding at all, which is proper to the Father; or of proceeding from one who does not proceed, which is proper to the Son; or of proceeding from one who does proceed, which is proper to the Holy Ghost. It is impossible therefore to assign more than three Persons.

3. If any objicient says that, the Son being perfect God, there is in Him perfect intellectual power, whereby He can produce a Word; and in like manner the Holy Ghost, being infinite goodness, which is a principle of communication, must be able to communicate the divine nature to another divine person, he should take note that the Son is God as begotten, not as begetting; hence the power of understanding is in Him as in one proceeding as a Word, not as in one producing a Word. In like manner the Holy Ghost being God as proceeding, there is in Him infinite goodness as in a person receiving, not as in one communicating infinite goodness to another. The whole fulness of Godhead then is in the Son, numerically the same as in the Father, but with a relation of birth, as it is in the Father with a relation of active generation. If the relation of the Father were attributed to the Son, all distinction would be taken away: for the divine Persons are distinguished one from another solely by their mutual relations. And the like argument holds of the Holy Ghost.

A likeness of the divine Trinity is observable in the human mind. That mind, by actually understanding itself, conceives its word’ in itself, which word’ is nothing else than what is called the intellectual expression (intentio intellecta, cf. B. I, Chap.LIII) existing in the mind; which mind, going on to love itself, produces itself in the will as an object loved. Further it does not proceed, but is confined and complete in a circle, returning by love to its own substance, whence the process originally began by formation of the intellectual expression’ of that substance. There is however a process going out to exterior effects, as the mind for love of itself proceeds to some action beyond itself. Thus we remark in the mind three things: the mind itself, whence the process starts within its own nature; the mind conceived in the understanding; and the mind loved in the will. And so we have seen that there is in the divine nature a God unbegotten, the Father, the origin of the entire procession of Deity; and a God begotten after the manner of a word’ conceived in the understanding, namely, the Son; and a God proceeding by mode of love, who is the Holy Ghost: beyond Him there is no further procession within the divine nature, but only a proceeding to exterior effects. But the representation of the divine Trinity in us falls short, in regard of Father, Son and Holy Ghost being one nature, and each of them a perfect Person. Hence there is said to be in the mind of man the image’ of God: Let us make man to our image and likeness (Gen. i, 26). But as for the irrational creation, on account of the remoteness and obscurity of the representation as found in them, there is said to be the foot-print’ of the Trinity, but not the image’ (vestigium, non imago).

CHAPTER XXVII

OF THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD ACCORDING TO THE TRADITION OF HOLY SCRIPTURE

OF all the works of God, the mystery of the Incarnation most transcends reason. Nothing more astonishing could be imagined as done by God than that the true God and Son of God should become true man. To this chief of wonders all other wonders are subordinate. We confess this wonderful Incarnation under the teaching of divine authority, John i, 14: Phil. ii, 6-11. The words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself also declare it, in that sometimes He says of Himself humble and human things, e.g., The Father is greater than I (John xiv, 28): My soul is sorrowful even unto death (Matt. xxvi, 38): which belonged to Him in the humanity which He had assumed: at other times lofty and divine things, e.g., I and the Father are one (John x, 30): All things that the Father hath are mine (John xvi, 15): which attach to Him in His divine nature. And the actions that are recorded of Him show the same duality of nature. His being stricken with fear, sadness, hunger, death, belongs to His human nature: His healing the sick by His own power, His raising the dead and effectually commanding the elements, His casting out of devils, forgiving of sins, His rising from the dead when He willed, and finally ascending into heaven, show the power of God that was in Him.

CHAPTER XXVIII

OF THE ERROR OF PHOTINUS CONCERNING THE INCARNATION

PHOTINUS and others pretend that the divinity was in Christ, not by nature, but by a high degree of participation in divine glory, which He had merited by His works. But on this theory it would not be true that God had taken flesh so as to become man, but rather that a fleshly man had become God. It would not be true that the Word was made flesh (John i, 14), but that flesh had been made the Word. Kenosis and coming down would not be predicable of the Son of God, but rather glorification and being lifted up would be predicated of man. It would not be true that, being in the form of God, he emptied [ekenosen] himself, taking the form of a servant (Phil. ii, 6), but only the exaltation of man to divine glory would be true, of which presently we read, wherefore hath God exalted him. It would not be true, I descended from heaven (John vi, 38), but only, I ascend to my Father (John xx, 17): notwithstanding that Holy Scripture joins both assertions together: None ascendeth into heaven but he who descendeth from heaven, the Son of man, who is in heaven (John iii, 13): He who descended, the same also ascendeth above all the heavens (Eph. iv, 10). Nor would it be true to say of the Son that He was sent by the Father, or that He went out from the Father to come into the world, but only that He went to the Father, although He Himself makes the two declarations together: I go to him who sent me: I went out from the Father, and came into the world; and again I leave the world and go unto the Father (John xvi, 5, 28).

CHAPTER XXIX

OF THE ERROR OF THE MANICHEANS CONCERNING THE INCARNATION

THE Manicheans said that the Son of God took not a real but an apparent body; and that the things which He did as man,—being born, eating, drinking, walking, suffering, and being buried,—were not done in reality, but in show. To begin with, this theory robs Scripture of all authority. For since a show of flesh is not flesh, nor a show of walking walking, the Scripture lies when it says, The Word was made flesh, if the flesh was only apparent: it lies when it says that Jesus Christ walked, ate, was dead and buried, if these things happened only in fantastic appearance. But if even in a small matter the authority of Holy Scripture is derogated from, no point of our faith can any longer remain fixed, as our faith rests on the Holy Scripture, according to the text, These things are written that ye may believe (John xx, 31).

Some one may say that the veracity of Holy Scripture in relating appearance for reality is saved by this consideration, that the appearances of things are called figuratively and in a sense by the names of the things themselves, as a painted man is called in a sense a man. But though this is true, yet it is not the way of Holy Scripture to give the whole history of one transaction in this ambiguous way, without there being other passages of Holy Scripture from whence the truth may be manifestly gathered. Otherwise there would follow, not the instruction but the deception of men: whereas the Apostle says that whatsoever things are written, are written for our instruction (Rom. xv, 4); and that all Scripture, divinely inspired, is useful for teaching and instructing (2 Tim. iii, 16). Besides, the whole gospel narrative would be poetical and fabulous, if it narrated appearances of things for realities, whereas it is said: We have not been led by sophisticated fables in making known to you the power of our Lord Jesus Christ (2 Peter i, 16). Wherever Scripture has to tell of appearances, it gives us to understand this by the very style of the narrative, e.g., the apparition of the three men to Abraham, who in them adored God and confessed the Deity (Gen. xviii). As for the visions of the imagination (imaginarie visa) seen by Isaias, Ezechiel, and other prophets, they originate no error, because they are not narrated as history, but as prophetic pictures: still there is always something put in to show that it is but an apparition (Isai. vi, 1: Ezech. i, 4: viii, 3).

When divine truths are conveyed in Scripture under figurative language, no error can thence arise, as well from the homely character of the similitudes used, which shows that they are but similitudes; as also because what in some places is hidden under similitudes, in others is revealed by plain speaking. But there is no Scripture authority to derogate from the literal truth of all that we read about the humanity of Christ. When the Apostle says: God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom. viii, 3): he does not say, in the likeness flesh, but adds sinful, since Christ had true flesh, but not sinful flesh, there being no sin in Him; but His flesh was like sinful flesh, inasmuch as He had flesh liable to suffering, as man’s flesh was rendered liable by sin. So the expression, made in the likeness of men (Phil. ii, 7), conveys no idea of illusion: that is shown by what follows, taking the form of a servant, where form’ is clearly put for nature,’ as the adjoining clause shows, being in the form of God: for it is not supposed that Christ was God only in resemblance.

Moreover there are passages in which Holy Scripture expressly bars the suspicion of Christ being a mere appearance, Matt. xiv, 26, 27: Luke xxiv, 37-39: Acts x, 40, 41: and St John’s words, What was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the word of life (1 John i, 1). In fact, if Christ had not a real body, He did not really die; neither therefore did he really rise again: And if Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain, yea and we are found false witnesses of God, because we have given testimony of God that he hath raised up Christ, whom he hath not raised up [if He never really died] (1 Cor. xv, 14, 15).

CHAPTERS XXXII, XXXIII

OF THE ERROR OF ARIUS AND APOLLINARIS CONCERNING THE SOUL OF CHRIST

ARIUS held that Christ had no soul, but assumed flesh alone, to which the Divinity stood in the place of a soul. In this he was followed by Apollinaris. Apollinaris however was brought to confess that Christ had a sensitive soul; but he averred that the Divinity stood to that sensitive soul in place of mind and intellect (S. Aug. de haeresibus, 55).

1. It is impossible for the Word of God to be the form of a body.

2. Take away what is of the essence of man, and a true man cannot remain. But manifestly the soul is the chief constituent of the essence of man, being his form. If Christ then had not a soul, He was not true man, though the Apostle calls Him such: One mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. ii, 5).

4. What is generated of any living being cannot be called its offspring, unless it come forth in the same species. But if Christ had no soul, He would not be of the same species with other men: for things that differ in form’ cannot be of the same species. At that rate Christ could not be called the Son of Mary, or she His mother: which however is asserted in Scripture (Luke i, 43: ii, 33: John xix, 25).

5. Express mention is made of the soul of Christ, Matt. xxvi, 8: John x, 18: xii, 27.

9. The body stands to the soul as matter to form, and as the instrument to the prime agent. But matter must be proportionate to form, and the instrument to the prime agent. Therefore according to the diversity of souls

there must also be a diversity of bodies. And this is apparent even to sense: for in different animals we find different arrangements of limbs, adapted to different dispositions of souls. If then in Christ there were not a soul such as our soul, neither would He have had limbs like the limbs of man.

CHAPTER XXXIV

OF THE ERROR OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE WORD WITH MAN

BY the foregoing chapters it appears that neither was the divine nature wanting to Christ, as Photinus said; nor a true human body, according to the error of the Manicheans; nor again a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris supposed. These three substances then meet in Christ, the Divinity, a human soul, and a true human body. It remains to enquire, according to the evidence of Scripture, what is to be thought of the union of the three. Theodore of Mopsuestia, then, and Nestorius, his follower, brought out the following theory of this union.

They said that a human soul and a human body were naturally united in Christ to constitute one man of the same species and nature with other men; and that in this man God dwelt as in His temple by grace, as He does in other holy men. Hence He said Himself: Dissolve this temple, and in three days I will raise it up: which the Evangelist explains: He spoke of the temple of his body (John ii, 19). Hereupon there followed a union of affections between the Man Christ and God, the Man adhering with hearty good will to God, and God willingly accepting Him, as He says Himself: He that sent me is with me; and he hath not left me alone, because I do always the things that are pleasing to him (John viii, 29): giving us to understand that the union of that Man with God is as the union of which the Apostle speaks: He that adhereth to God, is one spirit (1 Cor. vi, 17). And as by this union the names that properly apply to God are transferred to men, so that they are called gods, and sons of God, and lords, and holy ones, and christs, as appears by divers passages of Scripture (e.g., Pss. lxxxi, civ); so are divine names duly applied to the Man Christ, and by reason of the indwelling of God and the union of affections with Him He is called God, and Son of God, and Lord, and Holy One, and Christ. Moreover, because in that Man there was greater fulness of grace than in other holy men, He was above others the temple of God, and more closely united with God in affection, and shared the divine names by a peculiar privilege of His own; and for this excellence of grace He was put in participation of divine honour and dignity, and has come to be adored along with God. And thus one is the person of the Word of God, and another the person of that Man who is adored along with God. Or if there is said to be one person of them both, that will be by reason of the aforesaid union of affections, on the strength of which that Man and the Word of God will be one person, in the same way in which it is said of husband and wife that they are no more two, but one flesh (Matt. xix, 6). And because such a union does not authorise us to predicate of the one whatever can be predicated of the other—for not whatever is true of the husband is true of the wife, or vice versa,—therefore in the case of the union of the Word with that Man this Nestorian doctrine has it we should not fail to notice how the properties of that Man, belonging to His human nature, cannot fitly be predicated of the Word of God, or God. Thus it is proper to that Man to have been born of a Virgin, to have suffered, died, and been buried: all of which things, Nestorians say, are impossible to predicate of God, or of the Word of God. But because there are some names which, while applying to God in the first place, are communicated to man in a sense, as Christ, Lord, Holy One, or even Son of God, they see no difficulty in terms expressive of the above incidents of humanity being united as predicates with these names. So they think it proper to say that Christ,' the Lord of glory,' the Saint of saints,' or even the Son of God,' was born of a virgin,' 'suffered,' died,' and was buried.' Therefore they say that the Blessed Virgin should not be called mother of God,' or of the Word of God,' but mother of Christ.'

1. Any thoughtful person may see that this theory cannot stand with the truth of the Incarnation. The theory holds that the Word of God was united with the Man Christ only by the indwelling of grace and consequent union of wills. But the indwelling of the Word of God in man does not mean the Word of God being Incarnate: for the Word of God and God Himself dwelt

in all the saints from the beginning of the world, according to the text: Ye are the temple of the living God, as God says: I will dwell in them (2 Cor vi, 16: Levit. xxvi, 12). But this indwelling cannot be called an incarnation: otherwise God must have become incarnate frequently from the beginning of the world. Nor is it enough to constitute an incarnation, if the Word of God and God dwelt in the Man Christ with more abundant grace: for greater and less do not make a difference of species in point of union.

3. Everything that is made anything is that which it is made, as what is made man is man, and what is made white is white. But the Word of God has been made man (John i, 14). Therefore the Word of God is man. But, of two things differing in person, or suppositum, the one cannot possibly be predicated of the other. When it is said Man is an animal,’ that self-same being which is an animal is man. When it is said, Man is white,’ some particular man himself is pointed at as being white, although whiteness is beyond the essential notion of humanity. But in no way can it be said that Socrates is Plato, or any other of the individuals either of the same or of a different species. If then the Word has been made flesh, that is, man, it is impossible for there to be two persons, one of the Word, the other of the Man.

4. No one would say, I am running,’ when some one else was running, except perhaps figuratively, meaning that another was running in his place. But that man who is called Jesus (John ix, 11) says of Himself, Before Abraham was, I am (John viii, 58); I and the Father are one (John x, 30); and sundry other phrases, manifestly proper to the divinity of the Word. Therefore the person of that Man speaking is the person of the Son of God.

6. To ascend into heaven is clearly an attribute of Christ as man, who in their sight was taken up (Acts i, 9). And to descend from heaven is an attribute of the Word of God. But he who descended, the same is he that hath ascended (Eph. iv, 10).

11. Though a man be called Lord’ by participation in the divine dominion, still no man, nor any creature whatever, can be called the Lord of glory’: because the glory of happiness to come is something which God alone by nature possesses, others only by the gift of grace: hence it is said: The Lord of mighty deeds, he is the king of glory (Ps. xxiii, 10). But, had they known, never could they have crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor. ii, 8). It is true then to say that God was crucified.

12. Scripture attributes suffering and death to the only-begotten Son of God: He spared not his own Son, but gave him up for us all (Rom. viii, 32): God so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son (John iii, 16: cf. verse 1 and Rom. v, 8).

17. The word was made flesh (John i, 14). But the Word was not flesh except of a woman. The Word then was made of a woman (Gal. iv, 4),—of a Virgin Mother, for a Virgin is the Mother of the Word of God.

19. Phil. ii, 5-11. If with Nestorius we divide Christ into two—into the Man, who is the Son of God by adoption, and the Son of God by nature, who is the Word of God,—this passage cannot be understood of the Man. That Man, if he be mere man, was not, to begin with, in the form of God so as afterwards to come to be in the likeness of men, but rather the other way about, being man, He became partaker of the Deity, in which participation He was not emptied, but exalted. It must then be understood of the Word of God, that He was, to begin with, from eternity in the form of God, that is, in the nature of God, and afterwards emptied himself by being made in the likeness of men. That emptying cannot be understood to mean the mere in dwelling of the Word of God in the man Christ Jesus. For from the beginning of the world the Word of God has dwelt by grace in all holy men, yet not for that is it said to be emptied: for God's communication of His goodness to creatures is no derogation from Himself but rather an exaltation, inasmuch as His pre-eminence appears by the goodness of creatures, and all the more the better the creatures are. Hence if the Word of God dwelt more fully in the Man Christ than in other saints, there was less emptying of the Word in His case than in the case of others. Evidently then the union of the Word with human nature is not to be understood to mean the mere indwelling of the Word of God in that Man, but the Word of God truly being made man. Thus only can that emptying be said to take place; the Word of God being said to be emptied, that is made small, not by any loss of His own greatness, but by the assumption of human littleness.

24. The man Christ, speaking of Himself, says many divine and supernatural things, as, I will raise him up at the last day (John vi, 40): I give them life everlasting (John x, 28). Such language would be the height of pride, if the speaker were not Himself God, but only had God dwelling in him. And still Christ says of Himself: Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart (Matt. xi, 29).

26. In him all things were made (Col. i, 16) is said of the Word of God; and first-born of the dead (ib. 18) is said of Christ; in such context as to show that the Word of God and Christ are one and the same person.

27. The same conclusion appears in 1 Cor. viii, 6: And one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things.

The opinion of Nestorius on the mystery of the Incarnation differs little from the opinion of Photinus. Both asserted that the man Christ was God only through the indwelling of grace. Photinus said that Christ merited the name and glory of Godhead by His passion and good works. Nestorius avowed that He had this name and glory from the first instant of His conception on account of the full and ample indwelling of God in Him. But concerning the eternal generation of the Word they differ considerably; Nestorius confessing it, Photinus denying it entirely.

CHAPTER XXXV

AGAINST THE ERROR OF EUTYCHES

EUTYCHES, to save the unity of person in Christ against Nestorius, said that in Christ there was only one nature. He went on to explain how before the union there were two distinct natures, one divine and one human; but in the union they both met so as to form one. He said then that the person of Christ was of two natures, but did not subsist in two natures. The falsity of this statement is apparent on many counts.

1. In Christ Jesus there was a Body, and a natural Soul, and the Divinity. The Body of Christ, even after the union, was not the Divinity of the Word: for the Body of Christ, even after the union, was passible, visible to bodily eyes, and distinct in lineaments and limbs, all of which attributes are alien to the Divinity of the Word. In like manner the Soul of Christ after union was distinct from the Divinity of the Word, because the Soul of Christ, even after the union, was affected by the passions of sadness and grief and anger (Mark iii, 5: xiv, 34), which again can in no way be adapted to the Divinity of the Word. But soul and body make up human nature. Thus then, even after union, there was a human nature in Christ, other than the Divinity of the Word, which is the divine nature.

2. Being in the form of God, he took the form of a servant (Phil. ii, 6, 7). It cannot be said that the form of God and the form of a servant are the same, for nothing takes that which it already has. In Eutyches's view, Christ having already the form of God, could not have taken the form of a servant, the two being the same. Nor can it be said that the form of God in Christ was changed by the union, for so Christ after the union would not be God. Nor again can it be said that the form of the servant was mingled with the form of God, for mingled elements do not remain entire, but both are partially changed: hence it should not be said that He had taken the form of

a servant, but something of that form. Thus the Apostle’s words must mean that in Christ, even after union, there were two forms, therefore two natures.

3. If we suppose a blending of both natures, divine and human, neither would remain, but some third thing; and thus Christ would be neither God nor man. Eutyches then cannot be understood to mean that one nature was made out of the two. He can only mean that after union only one of the natures remained. Either then in Christ only the divine nature remained, and what seemed in Him human was merely phenomenal, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into a human nature, as Apollinaris said: against both of whom we have argued above (Chapp.XXIX,XXXI).

5. When one nature is constituted of two permanent components, these components are either bodily parts, like the limbs of an animal, a case not in point here, or they are matter and form, like body and soul: but God is not matter, nor can He stand to any matter in the relation of form. Therefore in Christ, true God and true Man, there cannot be one nature only.

7. Where there is no agreement in nature, there is no specific likeness. If then the nature of Christ is a compound of divine and human, there will be no specific likeness between Him and us, contrary to the saying of the Apostle: He ought in all things to be made like to his brethren (Heb. ii, 17).

9. Even this saying of Eutyches seems inconsistent with the faith, that there were two natures in Christ before the union: for as human nature is made up of body and soul, it would follow that either the soul, or the body of Christ, or both, existed before the Incarnation, which is evidently false.

CHAPTER XXXVI

OF THE ERROR OF MACARIUS OF ANTIOCH, WHO POSITED ONE OPERATION ONLY AND ONE WILL ONLY IN CHRIST

TO every nature there is a proper activity: for the form is the principle of activity, and different natures have different forms and different acts. If then in Christ there is only one operation, there must be in Him only one nature: but to hold that is the Eutychian heresy.

2. There is in Christ a perfect divine nature, whereby He is consubstantial with the Father; and a perfect human nature, whereby He is of one species with us. But it is part of the perfection of the divine nature to have a will (B. I, Chap.LXXII); and part of the perfection of human nature to have a will, whereby a man is capable of free choice. There must therefore be two wills in Christ.

3. If in Christ there is no other will than the will of the Word, by parity of reasoning there can be in Him no understanding but the understanding of the Word: thus we are brought back to the position of Apollinaris (Chap.XXXII).

4. If there was only one will in Christ, that must have been the divine will: for the Word could not have lost the divine will, which he had from eternity. But it does not belong to the divine will to merit. Thus then Christ would have merited neither for Himself nor for us by His passion, contrary to the teaching of the Apostle: He was made obedient unto death, therefore hath God exalted him (Phil. ii, 8, 9).

6. In one ordinary man, though he be one in person, there are nevertheless several appetites and operations according to different natural principles. In his rational part there is in him will: in his sensible part there is in him an irascible [thumos] and a concupiscible appetite [epithumetikon]: and again there is physical tendency following upon physical powers. In like manner he sees with the eye, hears with the ear, walks with the foot, speaks with the tongue, and understands with the mind, all so many different activities. And the reason is, because activities are not only multiplied according to difference of active subjects, but also according to the difference of the principles whereby one and the same subject works, from which principles also the activities derive their species. But the divine activity differs much more from the human than the natural principles of human nature from one another. There is therefore a difference of will and a difference of operation between the divine and the human nature in Christ, although Christ Himself is one in both natures.

7. The authority of Scripture shows plainly two wills in Christ: Not to do my will, but the will of Him that sent me (John vi, 38): Not my will but thine be done (Luke xxii, 42). These texts show that Christ had a will of His own, besides the will of His Father. On the other hand there was a will common to Him with the Father: for Father and Son have one will, as they have one nature. There are then in Christ two wills.

8. And in like manner of operations, or activities,—there was in Christ one operation common to Him with the Father, of which He says: Whatsoever things the Father doeth, the same the Son doeth also (John v, 19); and there was in Him another operation which attached not to the Father, as sleeping, hungering, eating, and the like things that Christ did or suffered in His humanity, as the Evangelists record (Mark iv, 38; xi, 12; ii, 16).

Monothelism appears to have sprung from the inability of its authors to distinguish between what is absolutely one and what is one in subordination to another. They saw that the human will in Christ was altogether subordinate to the divine will, so that Christ willed nothing with His human will otherwise than as the divine will predisposed Him to will. In like manner Christ wrought nothing in His human nature either in doing or in suffering, except what the divine will arranged, according to the text, I do ever the things that are pleasing to him (John viii, 29). The human operation of Christ gained a divine efficacy by His union with the Divinity, in consequence of which everything that He did or suffered made for salvation: wherefore Dionysius calls the human activity of Christ theandric.’ Seeing then that the human will and operation of Christ was subordinate to the divine, with a subordination that never failed, they [the Monothelites] judged that there was only one will and operation in Christ; although it is not the same thing to be one by subordination and one absolutely.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE DOCTRINE OF CATHOLIC FAITH CONCERNING THE INCARNATION

ACCORDING to the tradition of Catholic faith we must say that in Christ there is one perfect divine nature, and a perfect human nature, made up of a rational soul and human flesh; and that these two natures are united in Christ, not by mere indwelling of the one in the other, or in any accidental way, as a man is united with his garment, but in unity of one person. For since Holy Scripture without any distinction assigns the things of God to the Man Christ, and the things of the Man Christ to God, He must be one and the same person, of whom both varieties of attributes are predicable. But because opposite attributes are not predicable of one and the same subject in the same respect, and there is an opposition between the divine and human attributes that are predicated of Christ,—as that He is passible and impassible, dead and immortal, and the like,—these divine and human attributes must be predicated of Christ in different respects. If we consider that of which these opposite attributes are predicated, we shall find no distinction to draw, but unity appears there. But considering that according to which these several predications are made, there we shall see the need of drawing a distinction. Since that according to which divine attributes are predicated of Christ is different from that according to which human attributes are predicated of Him, we must say that there are in Him two natures, unamalgamated and unalloyed. And since that of which these human and divine attributes are predicated is one and indivisible, we must say that Christ is one person, and one suppositum, supporting a divine and a human nature. Thus alone will divine attributes duly and properly be predicated of the Man Christ, and human attributes of the Word of God.

Thus also it appears how, though the Son is incarnate, it does not follow that the Father or the Holy Ghost is incarnate: for the incarnation does not have place in respect of that unity of nature wherein in the three Persons agree, but in respect of person and suppositum, wherein the three Persons are distinct. Thus as in the Trinity there is a plurality of persons subsisting in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there is one person subsisting in a plurality of natures.

CHAPTER XLI

SOME FURTHER ELUCIDATION OF THE INCARNATION

EUTYCHES made the union of God and man a union of nature: Nestorius, a union neither of nature nor of person: the Catholic faith makes it a union of person, not of nature. To forestall objections, we need to form clear notions of what it is to be united in nature,' and what it is to be united in person.'

Those things then are united in nature,' which combine to constitute the integrity of some specific type, as soul and body are united to constitute the specific type of animal.' Once a specific type is set up in its integrity, no foreign element can be united with it in unity of nature without the breaking up of that specific type. But what is not of the integrity of the specific type is readily found in some individual contained under the species, as whiteness and clothedness in Socrates or Plato. All such non-specific attributes are said to be united in unity of suppositum,' or in the case of rational beings, in unity of person,' with the individual.

Now some have reckoned the union of God and man in Christ to be after the manner of things united in unity of nature.' Thus Arius and Apollinaris and Eutyches. But that is quite an impossibility. For the nature of the Word is a sovereignly perfect whole from all eternity, incapable of alteration or change: nothing foreign to the divine nature,—no human nature, nor any element of human nature,—can possibly come to thrust itself into that unity. Others saw the impossibility of this position, and turned aside in the contrary direction. Whatever is added to any nature without belonging to the integrity of the same, may be reckoned to be either an accident, as whiteness and music, or to stand in an accidental relation to the subject, as a ring, a dress, a house. Considering then that human nature is added to the Word of God without belonging to the integrity of His nature, these [Nestorians] thought that the union of this supperadded human nature with the Word was merely accidental. Manifestly, it could not be in the Word as an accident, for God is not susceptible of accidents; and besides human nature itself stands in the category of substance, and cannot be an accident of anything. The alternative which they embraced was to conclude that the human nature stood in an accidental relation with the Word. Nestorius then laid it down that the human nature stood to the word in the relation of a temple to the Deity whose temple it was; and that union with human nature meant a mere indwelling of the Word in that nature. And because a temple has its individuality apart from him that dwells in it, and the individuality proper to human nature is personality, it followed that the personality of the human nature was one, and the personality of the Word another; and thus the Word and the Man were two persons: all which conclusion has been set aside by our previous arguments.

We must therefore lay it down that the union of the Word with the Man was such, that neither was one nature compounded out of two; nor was the union of the Word with human nature like the union of a substance with something exterior to it and standing in an accidental relation to it, like the relation of a man to his garment and his house: but the Word must be considered to subsist in human nature as in a nature made properly its own, so that that Body is truly the Body of the Word of God, and that Soul the Soul of the Word of God, and the Word of God truly is man. And though such union cannot be perfectly explained by mortal man, still we will endeavour, according to our capacity and ability, to say something towards the building up of faith and the defence of this mystery of faith against unbelievers.

In all creation there is nothing so like this union as the union of soul and body. So the Athanasian Creed has it: “As the rational soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.” But whereas the rational soul is united with the body, (a) as form with matter, (b) as chief agent with instrument (B. II, Chapp.LVI,LVII); this comparison cannot hold in respect of the former mode of union, for so we should be brought round to the [Eutychian] conclusion, that of God and man there was made one nature. We must take the point of the comparison then to be the union of soul with body as of agent with instrument. And with this the sayings of some ancient Doctors agree, who have laid it down that the human nature in Christ is an instrument of His divinity, as the body is an instrument of the soul. The body and its parts, as instruments of the soul, come in a different category from exterior instruments. This axe is not my own proper instrument as is this hand. With this axe many men may work: but this hand is set aside for the proper activity of this soul. Therefore the hand is a tool conjoined with and proper to him that works with it: but the axe is an instrument extrinsic to the workman and common to many hands. Thus then we may take it to be with the union of God and man. All men stand to God as instruments wherewith He works: For he it is that worketh in us to will and accomplish on behalf of the good will (Phil. ii, 13). But other men stand to God as extrinsic and separate instruments. God moves them, not merely to activities proper to Himself, but to activities common to all rational nature, such as understanding truth, loving goodness, and working justice. But human nature has been taken up in Christ to work as an instrument proper to God alone, such works as cleansing of sins, illumination of the mind by grace, and introduction to everlasting life. The human nature therefore of Christ stands to God as an instrument proper and conjoined, as the hand to the soul.

The aforesaid examples however are not alleged as though a perfect likeness were to be looked for in them. We must understand how easy it was for the Word of God to unite Himself with human nature in a union far more sublime and intimate than that of the soul with any proper instrument.’

CHAPTER XL, XLIX

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE FAITH OF THE INCARNATION, WITH REPLIES

ARG. 1. If God has taken flesh, He must be either changed into a body, or be some power resident in a body.

Reply 1. The Incarnation does not mean either the conversion of the Word into flesh, or the union of the Word with a human body as the form of the same.

Arg. 2. If the person of the Word of God acquires a new subsistence in a human nature, it must undergo a substantial change, as everything is changed that acquires a new nature.

Reply 2. The change is not in the Word of God, but in the human nature assumed by the Word.

Arg. 3. If the personality of the Word of God has become the personality of a human nature, it follows that since the Incarnation the Word of God has not been everywhere, as that human nature is not everywhere.

Reply 3. Personality does not extend beyond the bounds of that nature from which it has its subsistence. But the Word of God has not its subsistence from its human nature, but rather draws that human nature to its own subsistence or personality: for it does not subsist through it, but in it.

Arg. 4. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, substance, or nature. It seems impossible therefore for one person to subsist in two natures.

Reply 4. The assertion is true, if you speak of the nature whereby a thing has being, absolutely speaking; and so, absolutely speaking, the Word of God has being by the divine nature alone, not by the human nature. But by the human nature it has being as Man.

Arg. 8. Soul and body in Christ are of not less potency than they are in other men. But their union in other men constitutes a person: therefore also in Christ.

Reply 8. The human soul and body in Christ being drawn into the personality of the Word, and not constituting another person besides the person of the Word, does not mark a diminution of potency, but a greater excellence. Everything is better for being united to what is more excellent than itself, better than it was, or would be, if it stood by itself.

Arg. 10. This man, who is Christ, considered merely as made up of soul and body, is a substance: but not a universal, therefore a particular substance: therefore a person.

Reply 10. Yes, He is a person, but no other person than the person of the Word: because the human nature has been so assumed by the person of the Word that the Word subsists as well in the human as in the divine nature: but what subsists in human nature is this man': therefore the Word Himself is spoken of when we say this Man.'

Arg. 11. If the personality of the divine and human nature in Christ is the same, divine personality must be part of the notion of the Man who is Christ. But it is not part of the notion of other men. Therefore the application of the common term man' to Christ and to other men is an instance of the use of the same term not in the same sense; and thus He will not be of the same species with us.

Reply 11. Variation of the sense of a term comes from diversity of form connoted, not from diversity of person denoted. The term man' does not vary in sense by denoting sometimes Plato, sometimes Socrates. The term man' then, whether used of Christ or of other men, always connotes the same form, that is, human nature, and is predicated of them all in the same sense. But the denotation varies in this that, as taken for Christ, the term denotes an uncreated person; but as taken for other men, a created person.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT THE HUMAN NATURE, ASSUMED BY THE WORD, WAS PERFECT IN SOUL AND BODY IN THE INSTANT OF CONCEPTION

THE Word of God took a body through the medium of a rational soul: for the body of man is not more assumable by God than other bodies except for the rational soul. The Word of God then did not assume a body without a rational soul. Since then the Word of God assumed a body from the first instant of conception, in that very instant the rational soul must have been united with the body.

4. The body which the Word assumed was formed from the first instant of conception, because it would have been against the fitness of things for the Word of God to have assumed anything that was formless. Moreover the soul, like any other natural form, requires its proper matter. Now the proper matter of the soul is an organised body: for "the soul is the actualisation of an organic, natural body, that is in potentiality to life." If then the soul was united with the body from the first instant of conception, the body must needs have been organised and formed from the first instant of conception. Moreover in the order of the stages of generation the organisation of the body precedes the introduction of the rational soul: hence, positing the latter, we must posit the former stage also. But increase in quantity up to the due measure may very well be subsequent to the animation of the body. Thus then, concerning the conception of the Man assumed, we must think that in the very instant of conception His body was organised and formed, but had not as yet its due quantity.

Tis mystery, I but conjecture make.
Divinity with flesh unmeet to blend:
But thinking Soul, as twere a frontier power,
Image of God, in body domiciled,
Is apt to mediate between the twain.
The Godhead then conjoined itself with Soul,
And so assumed dimensions of a man.

CHAPTER XLV

THAT CHRIST WAS BORN OF A VIRGIN WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO HIS TRUE AND NATURAL HUMANITY

GOD’S power being infinite, and all other causes deriving their efficacy from that, any effect produced by any cause may be produced by God without aid of that cause, and yet be of the same species and nature as though it had been produced in the ordinary way. As then the natural power of the human semen produces a true man, having the species and nature of a man, so the divine power, which has given that power to the semen, may produce the effect of that power, without calling the cause into activity, and so constitute a true man, having the species and nature of a man. Nor is anything lost to the dignity of the Mother of Christ by the virgin conception and birth: there is nothing in that to prevent her being called the Mother of the Son of God: for by the working of divine power she supplied the matter physically requisite for the generation of the body of Christ: which is all that a mother need do.

CHAPTERS XLVI, XLVII

THAT CHRIST WAS CONCEIVED BY THE HOLY GHOST

THOUGH every divine activity, whereby anything is done in creatures, is common to the entire Trinity, nevertheless the formation of the body of Christ is appropriately attributed to the Holy Ghost: for in Scripture every grace is wont to be attributed to the Holy Ghost, since what is given gratuitously is reckoned to be bestowed out of the love of the giver; and there is no greater grace bestowed on man than his coming to be united with God in union of person. Still the Holy Ghost cannot be called the father of Christ in His human generation; because the Holy Ghost did not produce the human nature of Christ out of His own substance, but merely by an exertion of His power.

CHAPTER LIV

OF THE INCARNATION AS PART OF THE FITNESS OF THINGS

BY the fact of God having willed to unite human nature to Himself in unity of person, it is plainly shown to men that man can be intellectually united with God and see Him with an immediate vision. It was therefore very fitting for God to assume human nature, thereby to lift up man's hope to happiness. Hence since the Incarnation men have begun to aspire more after happiness, as Christ Himself says: I have come that they may have life and have it more abundantly (John x, 10).

2. Although in certain respects man is inferior to some other creatures, and in some respects is likened to the very lowest, yet in respect of the end for which he is created nothing is higher than man but God alone: for in God alone does the perfect happiness of man consist. This dignity of man, requiring to find happiness in the immediate vision of God, is most aptly shown by God's immediate assumption of human nature. The Incarnation has borne this fruit, visible to all eyes, that a considerable portion of mankind has abandoned the worship of creatures, trampled under foot the pleasures of the flesh, and devoted itself to the worship of God alone, in whom alone it expects the perfect making of its happiness, according to the admonition of the Apostle: Seek the things that are above (Col. iii, 1).

3. Since the perfect happiness of man lies in a knowledge of God beyond the natural capacity of any created intelligence (B. III, Chap.LII), there was wanted for man in this life a sort of foretaste of this knowledge to guide him to the fulness of it; and that foretaste is by faith (B. III, Chapp.XL,CLIII). But this knowledge of faith, whereby a man is guided to his last end, ought to be of the highest certitude: to which perfect certitude man needed to be

instructed by God Himself made man. So it is said: No man hath seen God ever: the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath told us (John i, 18): For this I was born, and for this I came into the world to give testimony to the truth (John xviii, 37). Thus we see that since the Incarnation of Christ men have been instructed more evidently and surely in the knowledge of God, according to the text: The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord (Isai. xi, 9).

4. Since the perfect happiness of man consists in the enjoyment of God, it was requisite for man's heart to be disposed to desire this enjoyment. But the desire of enjoying anything springs from the love of it. Therefore it was requisite for man, making his way to perfect happiness, to be induced to love God. Now nothing induces us to love any one so much as the experience of his love for us. Nor could God's love for man have been more effectually demonstrated to man than by God's willing to be united with man in unity of person: for this is just the property of love, to unite the lover with the loved.

5. Friendship resting on a certain equality, persons very unequal cannot be conjoined in friendship. To promote familiar friendship then between man and God, it was expedient that God should become man, "that while we know God in visible form, we may thereby be borne on to the love of His invisible perfections " (Mass of Christmas Day).

6. For the strengthening of man in virtue it was requisite that he should receive doctrine and examples of virtue from God made man, since of mere men even the holiest are found at fault sometimes. I have given you an example, that as I have done so ye also do (John xiii, 15).

8. The tradition of the Church teaches us that the whole human race has been infected by sin. And it is part of the order of divine justice that sin should not be forgiven without satisfaction. But no mere man was able to satisfy for the sin of all mankind, since every mere man is something less than the whole multitude of mankind. For the deliverance then of mankind from their common sin, it was requisite for one to make satisfaction, who was at once man, so that satisfaction should be expected of him, and something above man, so that his merit should be sufficient to satisfy for the sin of the whole human race. Now in the order of happiness there is nothing greater than man but God alone: for though the angels are higher in condition of nature, they are not higher in respect to their final end, because

they are made happy with the same happiness as man. It was needful therefore for man’s attainment of happiness that God should become man, to take away the sin of the world (John i, 29: Rom. iv, 25: v, 18: Heb. ix, 28).

CHAPTER LV

POINTS OF REPLY TO DIFFICULTIES TOUCHING THE ECONOMY OF THE INCARNATION

WE must bear in mind that, so immovable is the divine goodness in its perfection, that nothing is lost to God, however near any creature is raised to Him: the gain is to the creature.

3. Man being a compound of a spiritual and a corporeal nature, and thereby, we may say, occupying the borderland of two natures, all creation seems to be interested in whatever is done for man’s salvation. Lower corporeal creatures make for his use, and are in some sort of subjection to him: while the higher spiritual creation, the angelic, has in common with man its attainment of the last end. This argues a certain appropriateness in the universal Cause of all creatures taking to Himself in unity of person that creature whereby He is more readily in touch with all the rest of creation.

4. Sin in man admits of expiation, because man’s choice is not immovably fixed on its object, but may be perverted from good to evil, and from evil brought back to good; and the like is the case of man’s reason, which, gathering the truth from sensible appearances and signs, can find its way to either side of a conclusion. But an angel has a fixed discernment of things through simple intuition; and as he is fixed in his apprehension, so is he fixed also in his choice. Hence he either does not take to evil at all; or if he does take to evil, he takes to it irrevocably, and his sin admits of no expiation. Since then the expiation of sin was the chief cause of the Incarnation, it was more fitting for human nature than for angelic nature to be assumed by God.

7. Though all created good is a small thing, compared with the divine goodness, still there can be nothing greater in creation than the salvation of the rational creature, which consists in the enjoyment of that divine goodness. And since the salvation of man has followed from the Incarnation of God, it cannot be said that that Incarnation has brought only slight profit to the world. Nor need all men be saved by the Incarnation, but they only who by faith and the sacraments of faith adhere to the Incarnation.

8. The Incarnation was manifested to man by sufficient evidences. There is no more fitting way of manifesting Godhead than by the performance of acts proper to God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the course of nature (naturae leges), by doing something above that nature of which Himself is the author. Works overriding the ordinary course of nature (opera quae supra leges naturae fiunt) are the aptest evidences of divine being. Such works Christ did; and by these works He argued His Divinity. When asked, Art thou he that is to come? He replied, The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead rise again (Luke vii, 22). And if it be said that the same miracles have been wrought by others, we must observe that Christ worked them in a very different and more divine way. Others are said to have wrought miracles by prayer, but Christ wrought them by command, as of His own power. And He not only wrought them Himself, but He gave to others the power of working the same and even greater miracles; and they worked them at the mere invocation of the name of Christ. And not only corporal miracles, but spiritual miracles, were wrought through Christ and at the invocation of His name: the Holy Ghost was given, hearts were set on fire with divine love, minds were suddenly instructed in the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of the simple were rendered eloquent to propose the divine truth to men (Heb. ii, 3, 4).

9. Human nature is so conditioned as not to be apt to be led to perfection at once; but it must be led by the hand through stages of imperfection, so to arrive at perfection at last, as we see in the training of children. If great and unheard-of truths were proposed to a multitude, they would not grasp them immediately: their only chance is to become accustomed to such truths by mastering lesser truths first. Thus it was fitting for the human race to receive their first instruction in the things of salvation by light and rudimentary lessons (levia et minora documenta), delivered by the patriarchs, the law and the prophets; and that finally in the consummation of

ages the perfect doctrine of Christ should be set forth on earth. When the fulness of time was come, God sent his Son (Gal. iv, 4). The law was our paedagogue unto Christ, but now we are no longer under a paedagogue (Gal. iii, 24, 25).

12. It was not expedient for the Incarnate God in this world to live in wealth and high honour: first, because the object of His coming was to withdraw the minds of men from their attachment to earthly things, and to raise them to things heavenly, for which purpose He found it necessary to draw men by His example to a contempt of riches: secondly, because if He had abounded in riches, and had been set in some high position, His divine doings would have been ascribed rather to secular power than to the virtue of the Divinity. This indeed forms the most efficacious argument of His Divinity, that without aid of secular power He has changed the whole world for the better.

13. God's commandment to men is of works of virtue; and the more perfectly any one performs an act of virtue, the more he obeys God. Now of all virtues charity is the chief: all others are referred to it. Christ's obedience to God consisted most of all in His perfect fulfilment of the act of charity: for greater charity than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends (John xv, 13).

15. Though God has no wish for the death of men, yet He has a wish for virtue; and by virtue man meets death bravely, and exposes himself to danger of death for charity. Thus God had a wish for the death of Christ, inasmuch as Christ took upon Himself that death out of charity, and bravely endured it.

17. It is well said that Christ wished to suffer the death of the cross in order to give an example of humility. The virtue of humility consists in keeping oneself within one's own bounds, not reaching out to things above one, but submitting to one's superior. Thus humility cannot befit God, who has no superior, but is above all. Whenever any one subjects himself out of humility to an equal or any inferior, that is because he takes that equal or inferior to be his superior in some respect. Though then the virtue of humility cannot attach to Christ in His divine nature, yet it may attach to Him in his human nature. And His divinity renders His humility all the more praiseworthy: for the dignity of the person adds to the merit of humility; and there can be no greater dignity to a man than his being God.

Hence the highest praise attaches to the humility of the Man God, who, to wean men's hearts from worldly glory to the love of divine glory, chose to endure a death of no ordinary sort, but a death of the deepest ignominy.

19. It was necessary for Christ to suffer (Luke xxiv, 46), not only to afford an example of braving death for the love of truth, but also for the expiation of the sins of other men; which expiation He made by His own sinless Self choosing to suffer the death due to sin, and so satisfying for others by taking on Himself the penalty due to others. And though the sole grace of God is sufficient for the forgiveness of sins, nevertheless in the process of that forgiveness something is required on his part to whom the sin is forgiven, namely, to offer satisfaction to him whom he has offended. And because men could not do this for themselves, Christ did it for all, suffering a voluntary death for charity.

20. Although when it is a question of punishing sins, he must be punished who has sinned, nevertheless, when it is a question of making satisfaction, one may bear another's penalty. When punishment is inflicted for sin, his iniquity is put into the scale who has sinned: but when satisfaction is made by the offender's voluntary taking upon himself a penalty to appease him whom he has offended, account is taken in that case of the affection and good will of him who makes the satisfaction. And this appears best in the case of one taking upon himself a penalty instead of another, and God accepting the satisfaction of one for another (B. III, Chap.CLIX ad fin.)

25. Though the death of Christ is sufficient satisfaction for original sin, there is nothing incongruous in the miseries consequent upon original sin remaining in all men, even in those who are made partakers of the redemption of Christ. It was a fit and advantageous arrangement for the punishment to remain after the guilt was taken away:—first, for the conformity of the faithful with Christ, as of members with their head, that as Christ endured many sufferings, so His faithful should be subject to sufferings, and so arrive at immortality, as the Apostle says: If we suffer with him, so that we be glorified with him (Rom. viii, 17):—secondly, because if men coming to Christ gained immediate exemption from death and suffering, many men would come rather for these corporal benefits than for spiritual goods, contrary to the intention of Christ, who came into the world to draw men from the love of corporal things to spiritual things:—thirdly, because this sudden impassibility and immortality would in a

manner compel men to receive the faith of Christ, and so the merit of faith would be lost.

26. Each individual must seek the remedies that make for his own salvation. The death of Christ is a universal cause of salvation, as the sin of the first man was a universal cause of damnation. But there is need of a special application to each individual for the individual to share in the effect of a universal cause. The effect of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through his carnal origin. The effect of the death of Christ reaches each individual by his spiritual regeneration, whereby he is conjoined and in a manner incorporated with Christ.

CHAPTER L

THAT ORIGINAL SIN IS TRANSMITTED FROM OUR FIRST PARENT TO HIS POSTERITY

THIS expressly appears from the words of the Apostle: As by one man sin came into the world, and by sin death, so death passed on to all men, seeing that all have sinned (Rom. v, 12) . It cannot be said that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, because in that interpretation sin would have reached only to those who imitate the first man in sinning; and since by sin death came into the world, death would reach only those who sin in the likeness of the first man that sinned. But to exclude this interpretation the Apostle adds: Death reigned from Adam to Moses even over those who did not sin in the likeness of the transgression of Adam. The Apostle’s meaning therefore was not that by one man sin entered into the world in the way of imitation, but in the way of origin.

Moreover, the common custom of the Church is to administer baptism to new-born children. But there would be no purpose in such administration, unless there were sin in them. If it is said that the purpose of infant baptism is not the cleansing of sin, but the arriving at the kingdom of God, the saying is nonsensical. They who say so, appeal to our Lord’s words: Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God (John iii, 5). The fact is, no one is excluded from the kingdom of God except for some fault. For the end of every rational creature is to arrive at happiness; which happiness can be only in the kingdom of God; which kingdom again is nothing else than the organised society of those who enjoy the vision of God, in which true happiness consists (B. III, Chap.LXIII). But nothing fails to gain its end except through some fault or flaw. If then unbaptised children cannot arrive at the kingdom of God, we must say that there is some fault, flaw, or sin in them.

CHAPTERS LI, LII

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORIGINAL SIN, WITH REPLIES

CHAP. LII—Before dealing with objections, we must premise that there are apparent in mankind certain probable signs of original sin, as we can argue fault from penalty. Now the human race generally suffers various penalties, corporal and spiritual. Among corporal penalties the chief is death, to which all the others lead up, as hunger, thirst, and the like. Among spiritual penalties the chief is the weak hold that reason takes of man, so that man with difficulty arrives at the knowledge of truth, easily falls into error, and cannot altogether surmount his bestial appetites, but often has his mind clouded by them. Some one may say that these defects, corporal and spiritual, are not penal, but natural. But looking at the thing rightly, and supposing divine providence, which to all varieties of perfection has adapted subjects apt to take up each variety, we may form a fairly probable conjecture that God, in uniting the higher nature of the soul to the lower nature of the body, had the intention that the former should control the latter; and further intended to remove, by His special and supernatural providence, any impediment to such control arising out of any defect of nature. Thus, as the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, it might be supposed that such would be the terms of the union of the soul with the body, that nothing could possibly be in the body contrary to the soul whereby the body lives; and in like manner, as reason in man is associated with sensitive appetite and other sensitive powers, it might be expected that reason would not be hampered by those sensitive powers, but rather would rule them. In accordance with these natural anticipations, we lay it down, according to the doctrine of faith, that the original constitution of man was such that, so long as his reason was subject to God, his lower faculties served him without demur, and no bodily impediment could stand in the way of his body obeying him, God and His grace supplying whatever was wanting in nature to the achievement of this result. But when his reason turned away from God, his lower powers revolted from reason; and his body became subject to passions contrary to the [rational] life that is by the soul. Thus then, though it may be admitted that these defects are natural, if we look at human nature on its lower side; nevertheless, if we consider divine providence and the dignity of the higher portion of human nature, we have a fairly probable ground for arguing that these defects are penal. Thus we may gather the inference [a priori] that the human race must have been infected with some sin from its first origin. Now we may answer the arguments to the contrary.

Arg. 1. The son shall not bear the iniquity of his father (Ezech. xviii, 20).

Reply 1. There is a difference between what affects one individual and what affects the nature of a whole species: for by partaking in the species many men are as one man, as Porphyry says. The sin then that belongs to one individual is not imputable to another individual, unless he sins too, because the one is personally distinct from the other. But any sin touching the specific nature itself may without difficulty be propagated from one to another, as the specific nature is imparted by one to others [by generation]. Since sin is an evil of rational nature, and evil is a privation of good, we must consider of what good the privation is, in order to decide whether the sin in question belongs to our common nature, or is the particular sin of a private individual. The actual sins then, that are commonly committed by men, take away some good from the person of the sinner, such as grace and the due order of the parts of his soul: hence they are personal, and not imputable to a second party beyond the one person of the sinner. But the first sin of the first man not only robbed the sinner of his private and personal good, namely, grace and the due order of his soul, but also took away a good that belonged to the common nature of mankind. According to the original constitution of this nature, the lower powers were perfectly subject to reason, reason to God, and the body to the soul, God supplying by grace what was wanting to this perfection by nature. This benefit, which by some is called original justice,’ was conferred on the first man in such sort that it should be propagated by him to posterity along with human nature. But when by the sin of the first man reason withdrew from its subjection to God, the consequence was a loss of the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason, and of the body to the soul,—and that not only in the first sinner, but the same common defect has come down to posterity, to whom original justice would otherwise have descended. Thus then the sin of the first man, from whom, according to the doctrine of faith, all other men are descended, was at once a personal sin, inasmuch as it deprived that first man of his own private good, and also a sin of nature (peccatum naturale), inasmuch as it took away from that man, and consequently from his posterity, a benefit conferred upon the whole of human nature. This defect, entailed upon other men by their first parent, has in those other men the character of a fault, inasmuch as all men are counted one man hy participation in a common nature. This sin is voluntary by the will of our first parent, as the action of the hand has the character of a fault from the will of the prime mover, reason. In a sin of nature different men are counted parts of a common nature, like the different parts of one man in a personal sin.

Arg. 5. What is natural is no sin, as it is not the mole’s fault for being blind.

Reply 5. The defects above mentioned are transmitted by natural origin, inasmuch as nature is destitute of the aid of grace, which had been conferred upon nature in our first parent, and was meant to pass from him to posterity along with nature; and, inasmuch as this destitution has arisen from a voluntary sin, the defect so consequent comes to bear the character of a fault. Thus these defects are at once culpable, as referred to their first principle, which is the sin of Adam; and natural, as referred to a nature now destitute [of original justice].

Arg. 6. A defect in a work of nature happens only through defect of some natural principle.

Reply 6. There is a defect of principle, namely, of the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its first creation; which gift was in a manner natural,’ not that it was caused by the principles of nature, but because it was given to man to be propagated along with his nature.

Arg. 9. The good of nature is not taken away by sin: hence even in devils their natural excellences remain. Therefore the origin of human generation, which is an act of nature, cannot have been vitiated by sin.

Reply 9. By sin there is not taken away from man the good of nature which belongs to his natural species, but a good of nature which was superadded by grace.

10. The gift, not belonging to the essence of the species, was nevertheless bestowed by God gratuitously on the first man, that from him it might pass to the entire species: in like manner the sin, which is the privation of that gift, passes to the entire species.

11. Though by the sacraments of grace one is so cleansed from original sin that it is not imputed to him as a fault,—and this is what is meant by saying that he is personally delivered from that sin,—yet he is not altogether healed; and therefore by the act of nature [i.e., of generation] original sin is transmitted to his posterity. Thus then in the human procreant, considered as a person, there is no original sin; and there may very well be no actual sin in the act of procreation: still, inasmuch as the procreant is a natural principle of procreation, the infection of original sin, as regards the nature, remains in him and in his procreative act.

CHAPTER LVI

OF THE NEED OF SACRAMENTS

THE death of Christ is the universal cause of man's salvation: but a universal cause has to be applied to particular effects. Thus it was found necessary for certain remedies to be administered to men by way of bringing Christ's death into proximate connexion with them. Such remedies are the Sacraments of the Church. And these remedies had to be administered with certain visible signs:—first, because God provides for man, as for other beings, according to his condition; and it is the condition of man's nature to be led through sensible things to things spiritual and intelligible: secondly, because instruments must be proportioned to the prime cause; and the prime and universal cause of man's salvation is the Word Incarnate: it was convenient therefore that the remedies, through which that universal cause reaches men, should resemble the cause in this, that divine power works invisibly through visible signs.

Hereby is excluded the error of certain heretics, who wish all visible sacramental signs swept away; and no wonder, for they take all visible things to be of their own nature evil, and the work of an evil author (B. III, Chap.XV).

These visible sacramental signs are the instruments of a God Incarnate and Crucified (instrumenta Dei incarnati et passi).

CHAPTER LVII

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD AND OF THE NEW LAW

THESE Sacraments, having their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, which they represent, must fall in and correspond with the salvation wrought by Christ. Before the Incarnation and Passion of Christ this salvation was promised, but not accomplished: it was wrought by the Incarnation and Passion of the Word. Therefore the Sacraments that preceded the Incarnation of Christ must have been such as to signify and promise salvation: while the Sacraments that follow the Passion of Christ must be such as to render salvation to men, and not merely show it forth by signs.

This avoids the error of the Jews, who believe that the sacred rites of the Law must be observed for ever, because they were instituted by God, who repents not and changes not. There is no change or repentance about an arrangement, which arranges for different things to be done according to the fitness of different times; as the father of a family gives different commands to his son in his nonage and when he is come of age. Still more irrational was the error of those who said that the rites of the Law were to be observed along with the Gospel; an error indeed which is self-contradictory: for the observance of the Gospel rites is a profession that the Incarnation and the other mysteries of Christ are now accomplished; while the observance of the rites of the Law is a profession that they are still to be fulfilled.

CHAPTER LVIII

OF THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW

THE remedies that provide for spiritual life are marked off, one from another, according to the pattern of corporal life. Now in respect of corporal life we find two classes of subjects. There are some who propagate and regulate corporal life in others, and some in whom corporal life is propagated and regulated. To this corporal and natural life three things are ordinarily necessary, and a fourth thing incidentally so. First, a living thing must receive life by generation or birth. Secondly, it must attain by augmentation to due quantity and strength. The third necessity is of nourishment. These three, generation, growth, and nutrition, are ordinary necessities, since bodily life cannot go on without them. But because bodily life may receive a check by sickness, there comes to be incidentally a fourth necessity, the healing of a living thing when it is sick. So in spiritual life the first thing is spiritual generation by Baptism: the second is spiritual growth leading to perfect strength by the Sacrament of Confirmation: the third is spiritual nourishment by the Sacrament of the Eucharist: there remains a fourth, which is spiritual healing, either of the soul alone by the Sacrament of Penance, or of the soul first, and thence derivatively, when it is expedient, of the body also, by Extreme Unction. These Sacraments then concern those subjects in whom spiritual life is propagated and preserved. Again, the propagators and regulators of bodily life are assorted according to a twofold division, namely, according to natural origin, which belongs to parents, and according to civil government, whereby the peace of human life is preserved, and that belongs to kings and princes. So then it is in spiritual life: there are some propagators and conservators of spiritual life by means of spiritual ministration only, and to that ministration belongs the Sacrament of Order: there are others who propagate and preserve at once corporal and spiritual life together, and that is done by the Sacrament of Matrimony, whereby man and woman come together to raise up issue and educate their children to the worship of God.

CHAPTER LIX

OF BAPTISM

THE generation of a living thing is a change from not living to life. Now a man is deprived of spiritual life by original sin; and whatever sins are added thereto go still further to withdraw him from life. Baptism therefore, or spiritual generation, was needed to serve the purpose of taking away original sin and all actual sins. And because the sensible sign of a Sacrament must be suited to represent the spiritual effect of the Sacrament, and the washing away of filth is done by water, therefore Baptism is fittingly conferred in water sanctified by the word of God. And because what is brought into being by generation loses its previous form and the properties consequent upon that form, therefore Baptism, as being a spiritual generation, not only takes away sins, but also all the liabilities contracted by sins,—all guilt and all debt of punishment: therefore no satisfaction for sins is enjoined on the baptised.

With the acquisition of a new form there goes also the acquisition of the activity consequent upon that form; and therefore the baptised become immediately capable of spiritual actions, such as the reception of the other Sacraments. Also there is due to them a position suited to the spiritual life: that position is everlasting happiness: and therefore the baptised, if they die fresh from baptism, are immediately caught up into bliss: hence it is said that baptism opens the gate of heaven.

One and the same thing can be generated only once: therefore, as Baptism is a spiritual generation, one man is to be baptised only once. The infection that came through Adam defiles a man only once: hence Baptism, which is directed mainly against that infection, ought not to be repeated. Also, once a thing is consecrated, so long as it lasts, it ought not to be consecrated again, lest the consecration should appear to be of no avail:

hence Baptism, as it is a consecration of the person baptised, ought not to be repeated.

CHAPTER LX

OF CONFIRMATION

THE perfection of spiritual strength consists in a man’s daring to confess the faith of Christ before any persons whatsoever, undeterred by any shame or intimidation. This Sacrament then, whereby spiritual strength is conferred on the regenerate man, constitutes him a champion of the faith of Christ. And because those who fight under a Prince wear his badge, persons confirmed are signed with the sign of Christ, whereby He fought and conquered. They receive this sign on their foreheads, to signify that they do not blush publicly to confess the faith of Christ. The signing is done with a composition of oil and balsam, called chrism,’ not unreasonably. By the oil is denoted the power of the Holy Ghost, whereby Christ is termed anointed’ [Acts ii, 36: x, 38] and from Christ [christos, anointed] Christians’ have their name, as soldiers serving under Him. In the balsam, for its fragrance, the good name is shown, which they who live among worldly people should have, to enable them publicly to confess the name of Christ, to which end they are brought forth from the remote confines of the Church to the field of battle. Appropriately too is this Sacrament conferred by bishops only, who are the generals of the Christian army: for in secular warfare it belongs to the general to enroll soldiers: thus the recipients of this Sacrament are enrolled in a spiritual warfare, and the bishop’s hand is imposed over them to denote the derivation of power from Christ.

CHAPTER LXI

OF THE EUCHARIST

BECAUSE spiritual effects are produced on the pattern of visible effects, it was fitting that our spiritual nourishment should be given us under the appearances of those things that men commonly use for their bodily nourishment, namely bread and wine. And for the further correspondence of spiritual signs with bodily effects, in the spiritual regeneration of Baptism the mystery of the Word Incarnate is united with us otherwise than as it is united in this Sacrament of the Eucharist, which is our spiritual nourishment. In Baptism the Word Incarnate is only virtually contained, but in the Sacrament of the Eucharist we confess Him to be contained substantially, as nourishment must be substantially united with the nourished.

And because the completion of our salvation was wrought by Christ’s passion and death, whereby His Blood was separated from His Body, therefore the Sacrament of His Body is given us separately under the species of bread, and His Blood under the species of wine.

CHAPTER LXIII

OF THE CONVERSION OF BREAD INTO THE BODY OF CHRIST

IT is impossible for the true Body of Christ to begin to be in this Sacrament by local motion, because then it would cease to be in heaven, upon every consecration of this Sacrament; as also because this Sacrament could not then be consecrated except in one place, since one local motion can only have one terminus; also because local motion cannot be instantaneous, but takes time. Therefore its presence must be due to the conversion of the substance of bread into the substance of His Body, and of the substance of wine into the substance of His Blood. This shows the falseness of the opinion of those who say that the substance of bread co-exists with the substance of the Body of Christ in this Sacrament; also of those who say that the substance of bread is annihilated. If the substance of bread co-exists with the Body of Christ, Christ should rather have said, Here is my Body, than, This is my Body. The word here points to the substance which is seen, and that is the substance of bread, if the bread remain in the Sacrament along with the Body of Christ. On the other hand it does not seem possible for the substance of bread to be absolutely annihilated, for then much of the corporeal matter of the original creation would have been annihilated by this time by the frequent use of this mystery: nor is it becoming for anything to be annihilated in the Sacrament of salvation.

We must observe that the conversion of bread into the Body of Christ falls under a different category from all natural conversions. In every natural conversion the subject remains, and in that subject different forms succeed one another: hence these are called formal conversions.’ But in this conversion subject passes into subject, while the accidents remain: hence this conversion is termed ‘substantial.’ Now we have to consider how subject is changed into subject, a change which nature cannot effect. Every operation of nature presupposes matter, whereby subjects are individuated; hence nature cannot make this subject become that, as for instance, this finger that finger. But matter lies wholly under the power of God, since by that power it is brought into being: hence it may be brought about by divine power that one individual substance shall be converted into another pre-existing substance. By the power of a natural agent, the operation of which extends only to the producing of a change of form and presupposes the existence of the subject of change, this whole is converted into that whole with variation of species and form. So by the divine power, which does not presuppose matter, but produces it, this matter is converted into that matter, and consequently this individual into that: for matter is the principle of individuation, as form is the principle of species. Hence it is plain that in the change of the bread into the Body of Christ there is no common subject abiding after the change, since the change takes place in the primary subject [i.e., in the matter], which is the principle of individuation. Yet something must remain to verify the words, This is my body, which are the words significant and effective of this conversion. But the substance does not remain: we must say therefore that what remains is something beside the substance, that is, the accident of bread. The accidents of bread then remain even after the conversion.

This then is one reason for the accident of bread remaining, that something may be found permanent under the conversion. Another reason is this. If the substance of bread was converted into the Body of Christ, and the accidents of bread also passed away, there would not ensue upon such conversion the being of the Body of Christ in substance where the bread was before: for nothing would be left to refer the Body of Christ to that place. But since the dimensions of bread (quantitas dimensiva panis), whereby the bread held this particular place, remain after conversion, while the substance of bread is changed into the Body of Christ, the Body of Christ comes to be under the dimensions of bread, and in a manner to occupy the place of the bread by means of the said dimensions.

CHAPTER LXIV

AN ANSWER TO DIFFICULTIES RAISED IN RESPECT OF PLACE

IN this Sacrament something is present by force of conversion, and something by natural concomitance. By force of conversion there is present that which is the immediate term into which conversion is made. Such under the species of bread is the Body of Christ, into which the substance of bread is converted by the words, This is my body. Such again under the species of wine is the Blood of Christ, when it is said, This is the chalice of my blood. By natural concomitance all other things are there, which, though conversion is not made into them, nevertheless are really united with the term into which conversion is made. Clearly, the term into which conversion of the bread is made is not the Divinity of Christ, nor His Soul: nevertheless the Soul and the Divinity of Christ are under the species of bread, because of the real union of them both with the Body of Christ. If during the three days that Christ lay dead this Sacrament had been celebrated, the Soul of Christ would not have been under the species of bread, because it was not really united with His Body: nor would His Blood have been under the species of bread, nor His Body under the species of wine, because of the separation of the two in death. But now, because the Body of Christ in its nature is not without His Blood, the Body and Blood are contained under both species; the Body under the species of bread by force of conversion, and the Blood by natural concomitance; and conversely under the species of wine.

Hereby we have an answer to the difficulty of the incommensurateness of the Body of Christ with the space taken up by the bread. The substance of the bread is converted directly into the substance of the Body of Christ: but the dimensions of the Body of Christ are in the Sacrament by natural concomitance, not by force of conversion, since the dimensions of the bread remain. Thus then the Body of Christ is not referred to this particular place by means of its own dimensions, as though commensurate room had to be found for them, but by means of the dimensions of the bread, which remain, and for which commensurate room is found.

And so of the plurality of places. By its own proper dimensions the Body of Christ is in one place only; but by means of the dimensions of the bread that passes into it, the Body of Christ is in as many places as there are places in which the mystery of this conversion is celebrated,—not divided into parts, but whole in each: for every consecrated bread is converted into the whole Body of Christ.

CHAPTER LXV

THE DIFFICULTY OF THE ACCIDENTS REMAINING

IT cannot be denied that the accidents of bread and wine do remain, as the infallible testimony of the senses assures us. Nor is the Body and Blood of Christ affected by them, since that could not be without change in Him, and He is not susceptible of such accidents. It follows that they remain without subject. Nor is their so remaining an impossibility to the divine power. The same rule applies to the production of things and to their conservation in being. The power of God can produce the effects of any secondary causes whatsoever without the causes themselves, because that power is infinite, and supplies to all secondary causes the power in which they act: hence it can preserve in being the effects of secondary causes without the causes. Thus in this Sacrament it preserves the accident in being, after removing the substance that preserves it.

CHAPTER LXVI

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE SACRAMENTAL SPECIES PASS AWAY

FOR the removal of this doubt there has been invented a famous theory (famosa positio), which is held by many. They say that when this Sacrament comes to be changed in the ordinary process of digestion or to be burnt, or otherwise destroyed, the accidents are not converted into substance, but there returns by miracle the substance of bread that had been before, and out of that are generated the products into which this Sacrament is found to turn. But this theory cannot stand at all. It seems better to say that in the consecration there is miraculously conferred upon the accidents the power of subsistence, which is proper to substance: hence they can do all things, and have all things done to them, that the substance itself could do, or have done to it, if it were there: hence without any new miracle they can nourish, or be reduced to ashes, in the same mode and order as if the substance of bread and wine were there.

CHAPTER LXVII

ANSWER TO THE DIFFICULTY RAISED IN RESPECT OF THE BREAKING OF THE HOST

IT has been said above (Chap.LXIV) that the substance of the Body of Christ is in this Sacrament by virtue of the Sacrament [Sacramental words]: but the dimensions of the Body of Christ are there by the natural concomitance which they have with the substance. This is quite the opposite way to that in which a body naturally is in place. A body is in place by means of its dimensions, by which it is made commensurate with its place.

But substantial being and quantitative being do not stand in the same way related to that in which they are. Quantitative being is in a whole, but is not whole in each part: it is part in part, and whole in the whole. But substantial being is whole in the whole, and whole in every part of the same, as the whole nature and species of water is in every drop of water, and the whole soul in every part of the body. Since then the Body of Christ is in the Sacrament by reason of its substance, into which the substance of bread is changed, while the dimensions of bread remain,—it follows that as the whole species of bread was under every part of its (visible) dimensions, so the whole Body of Christ is under every part of the same. The breaking then (of the Host) does not reach to the Body of Christ, as though the Body of Christ were subjected to that breaking: its subject is the dimensions of bread, which remain.

CHAPTER LXVIII

THE EXPLANATION OF A TEXT

NOR is there anything contrary to the tradition of the Church in the word of the Lord saying to the disciples, who seemed scandalised: The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life (John vi, 63). He did not thereby give them to understand that His true flesh was not delivered to be eaten by the faithful in this Sacrament, but that it was not delivered to be eaten in the way of ordinary flesh, taken and torn with the teeth in its own proper appearance, as food usually is; that it is received in a spiritual way, not in the usual way of fleshly food.

CHAPTER LXIX

OF THE KIND OF BREAD AND WINE THAT OUGHT TO BE USED FOR THE CONSECRATION OF THIS SACRAMENT

THOSE conditions must be observed which are essential for bread and wine to be. That alone is called wine, which is liquor pressed out of grapes: nor is that properly called bread, which is not made of grains of wheat. Substitutes for wheaten bread have come into use, and shave got the name of bread; and similarly other liquors have come into use as wine: but of no such bread other than bread properly so called, or wine other than what is properly called wine, could this Sacrament possibly be consecrated: nor again if the bread and wine were so adulterated with foreign matter as that the species should disappear. A valid Sacrament may be consecrated irrespectively of varieties of bread and wine, when the varieties are accidental, not essential. The alternative of leavened or unleavened bread is an instance of such accidental variety; and therefore different churches have different uses in this respect; and either use may be accommodated to the signification of the Sacrament. Thus as Gregory says in the Register of his Letters : “The Roman Church offers unleavened bread, because the Lord took flesh without intercourse of the sexes: but other Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father, clothed in flesh, is at once true God and true man.” Still the use of unleavened bread is the more congruous, as better representing the purity of Christ’s mystical Body, the Church, which is figured in a secondary way (configuratur) in this Sacrament, as the text has it: Christ our passover is sacrificed: therefore let us feast in the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth (1 Cor. v, 7, 8).

This shuts out the error of some heretics who say that this Sacrament cannot be celebrated in unleavened bread: a position plainly upset by the authority of the gospel, where we read (Matt. xxvi, 17: Mark xiv, 12: cf. Luke xxii, 7) that the Lord ate the passover with His disciples, and instituted this Sacrament, on the first day of the azymes, at which time it was unlawful for leavened bread to be found in the houses of the Jews (Exod. xii, 15); and the Lord, so long as He was in the world, observed the law. It is foolish then to blame in the use of the Latin Church an observance which the Lord Himself adhered to in the very institution of this Sacrament.

CHAPTER LXX

THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A MAN TO SIN AFTER RECEIVING SACRAMENTAL GRACE

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT A MAN WHO SINS AFTER THE GRACE OF THE SACRAMENTS MAY BE CONVERTED TO GRACE

HEREBY is excluded the error of the Novatians, who denied pardon to sinners after baptism. They took occasion of their error from the text: It is impossible for those who have been once enlightened [photisthentas, baptised], and have tasted the heavenly gift, and have been made partakers of the Holy Ghost . . . . and have fallen, to be again renewed [anakainizein, renovari, Vulg.] unto penance (Heb. vi, 4, 6). But the sense is plain from the immediate context: crucifying to themselves again the Son of God, and making him a mockery. There is denied to them then that renewal unto penance, whereby a man is crucified along with Christ, which is by baptism: for as many of us as have been baptised in Christ Jesus, have been baptised in his death (Rom. vi, 3, 6: Gal. ii, 19, 20: v, 24). As then Christ is not to be crucified again, so he who sins after baptism is not to be baptised again. Hence the Apostle does not say that it is impossible for such persons to be reclaimed, or converted, to penance, but that it is impossible for them to be renewed [anakainizein], renovation being the effect usually ascribed to baptism, which is called the laver of regeneration and renewal [anakainoseos] (Titus iii, 5).

CHAPTER LXXII

OF THE NEED OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, AND OF THE PARTS THEREOF

THE Sacrament of Penance is a spiritual cure. As sick men are healed, not by being born again, but by some reaction (alteratio) set up in their system; so, of sins committed after baptism, men are healed by the spiritual reaction of Penance, not by repetition of the spiritual regeneration of Baptism. Now a bodily cure is sometimes worked entirely from within by the mere effort of nature; sometimes from within and from without at the same time, when nature is aided by the benefit of medicine. But the cure is never wrought entirely from without: there still remain in the patient certain elements of life, which go to cause health in him. A spiritual cure cannot possibly be altogether from within, for man cannot be set free from guilt but by the aid of grace (B. III, Chap.CLVII). Nor can such a cure be altogether from without, for the restoration of mental health involves the setting up of orderly motions in the will. Therefore the spiritual restoration, effected in the Sacrament of Penance, must be wrought both from within and from without. And that happens in this way.

The first loss that man sustains by sin is a wrong bent given to his mind, whereby it is turned away from the unchangeable good, which is God, and turned to sin. The second is the incurred liability to punishment (B. III, Chapp.[490]CXLI-[491]CXLVI). The third is a weakening of natural goodness, rendering the soul more prone to sin and more reluctant to do good. The first requisite then of the Sacrament of Penance is a right ordering, or orientation of mind, turning it to God and away from sin, making it grieve for sin committed, and purposing not to commit it in future. All these things are of the essence of Contrition. This re-ordering of the mind cannot take place without charity, and charity cannot be had without grace (B. III, Chap.CLI). Thus then Contrition takes away the offence of God, and delivers from the liability of eternal punishment, as that liability cannot stand with grace and charity: for eternal punishment is in separation from God, with whom man is united by grace and charity.

This re-ordering of the mind, which consists in Contrition, comes from within, from free will aided by divine grace. But because the merit of Christ, suffering for mankind, is the operative principle in the expiation of all sins (Chap.LV), a man who would be delivered from sin must not only adhere in mind to God, but also to the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus (1 Tim. ii, 5), in whom is given remission of all sins. For spiritual health consists in the turning of the mind and heart to God; which health we cannot gain otherwise than through the physician of our souls Jesus Christ, who saves his people from their sins (Matt. i, 21); whose merit is sufficient for the entire taking away of all sins, since He it is that taketh away the sins of the world (John i, 29). Not all penitents however perfectly gain the effect of remission; but each one gains it in so much as he is united with Christ suffering for sins. Our union with Christ in baptism comes not of any activity of our own, as from within, because nothing begets itself into being; it is all of Christ, who hath regenerated us unto living hope (1 Peter i, 3): consequently the remission of sins in baptism is by the power of Christ, uniting us to Himself perfectly and entirely; the result being that not only is the impurity of sin taken away, but also all liability to sin is entirely cancelled,—always excepting the accidental case of those who gain not the effect of the Sacrament, because they are not sincere in approaching it. But in this spiritual cure (the Sacrament of Penance), it is our own act, informed with divine grace, that unites us with Christ. Hence the effect of remission is not always gained totally by this union, nor do all gain it equally. The turning of mind and heart to God and to detestation of sin may be so vehement as to gain for the penitent a perfect remission of sin, including at once purification from guilt and a discharge of the entire debt of punishment. But this does not always occur. Sometimes, though the guilt is taken away and the debt of eternal punishment cancelled, there still remains some obligation of temporal punishment, to save the justice of God, which redresses fault by punishment.

But since the infliction of punishment for fault requires a trial, the penitent who has committed himself to Christ for his cure must await the judgement of Christ in the assessment of his punishment. This judgement Christ exercises through His ministers, as in the other Sacraments. No one can give judgement upon faults that he is ignorant of. Therefore a second part of this Sacrament is the practice of Confession, the object of which is to make the penitent's fault known to Christ's minister. The minister then, to whom Confession is made, must have judicial power as viceregent of Christ, who is appointed judge of the living and of the dead (Acts x, 42). There are two requisites of judicial power, authority to investigate the offence, and power to acquit (potestas absolvendi) or condemn. This science of discerning and this power of binding or loosing are the two keys of the Church, which the Lord committed to Peter (Matt. xvi, 19). He is not to be understood to have committed them to Peter for Peter to hold them alone, but that through him they might be transmitted to others; or else the salvation of the faithful would not be sufficiently provided for. These keys have their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, whereby Christ has opened to us the gate of the heavenly kingdom. As then without Baptism, in which the Passion of Christ works, there can be no salvation for men,—whether the Baptism be actually received, or purposed in desire, when necessity, not contempt, sets the Sacrament aside; so for sinners after Baptism there can be no salvation unless they submit themselves to the keys of the Church either by actual Confession and undergoing of the judgement of the ministers of the Church, or at least by purposing so to do with a purpose to be fulfilled in seasonable time: because there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we are to be saved (Acts iv, 12).

Hereby is excluded the error of certain persons, who said that a man could obtain pardon of his sins without confession and purpose of confession; or that the prelates of the Church could dispense a sinner from the obligation of confession. The prelates of the Church have no power to frustrate the keys of the Church, in which their whole power is contained; nor to enable a man to obtain forgiveness of his sins without the Sacrament which has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ: only Christ, the institutor and author of the Sacraments, can do that. The prelates of the Church can no more dispense a man from confession and absolution in order to remission of sin than they can dispense him from baptism in order to salvation.

But this is a point to observe. Baptism may be efficacious to the remission of sin before it is actually received, while one purposes to receive it: though afterwards it takes fuller effect in the gaining of grace and the remission of guilt, when it actually is received. And sometimes the very instant of baptism is the instant of the bestowal of grace and the remission of guilt where it was not remitted before. So the keys of the Church work their effect in some cases before the penitent actually places himself under them, provided he have the purpose of placing himself under them. But he gains a fuller grace and a fuller remission, when he actually submits himself to the keys by confessing and receiving absolution. And the case is quite possible (nihil prohibet) of a person at confession receiving grace and the forgiveness of the guilt of sin by the power of the keys in the very instant of absolution [i.e., not before then]. Since then in the very act of confession and absolution a fuller effect of grace and forgiveness is conferred on him who by his good purpose had obtained grace and remission already, we clearly see that by the power of the keys the minister of the Church in absolving remits something of the temporal punishment which the penitent still continued to owe after his act of contrition. He binds the penitent by his injunction to pay the rest. The fulfilment of this injunction is called Satisfaction, which is the third part of Penance, whereby a man is totally discharged from the debt of punishment, provided he pays the full penalty due. Further than this, his weakness in spiritual good is cured by his abstaining from evil things and accustoming himself to good deeds, subduing the flesh by fasting, and improving his relations with his neighbour by the bestowal of alms upon those neighbours from whom he had been culpably estranged.

Thus it is clear that the minister of the Church in the use of the keys exercises judicial functions. But to none is judgement committed except over persons subject to his court. Hence it is not any and every priest that can absolve any and every subject from sin: priest can absolve that subject only over whom he is given authority.

CHAPTER LXXIII

OF THE SACRAMENT OF EXTREME UNCTION

BY dispensation of divine justice, the sickness of the soul, which is sin, sometimes passes to the body. Such bodily sickness is sometimes conducive to the health of the soul, where it is borne humbly and patiently and as a penance whereby one may make satisfaction for sin. Sometimes again sickness injures spiritual well-being by hindering the exercise of virtues. It was fitting therefore to have a spiritual remedy, applicable to sin precisely in this connexion of bodily sickness being a consequence of sin. By this spiritual remedy bodily sickness is sometimes cured, when it is expedient for salvation. This is the purpose of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, of which St James speaks (James v, 14, 15). Nor is the Sacrament useless, even though bodily health does not ensue upon its reception: for it is directed against other consequences of sin, as proneness to evil and difficulty in doing good, infirmities of soul which have a closer connexion with sin than bodily infirmity. Negligence, the various occupations of life, and the shortness of time, prevent a man from perfectly remedying the above defects by penance. Thus this Sacrament is a wholesome provision for completing the sinner’s cure, delivering him from his debt of temporal punishment, and leaving nothing in him at the departure of his soul from his body to hinder his reception into glory.

This Sacrament is not to be given to all sick persons, but only to such as seem to be near to death from sickness. If they recover, this Sacrament may be administered to them again, if they are again reduced to the like state. For the unction of this Sacrament is not an unction of consecration, like the unction of Confirmation, the ablution of Baptism, and certain other unctions, which are never repeated, because the consecration always remains so long as the thing consecrated lasts: but the anointing in this Sacramentis for healing, and a healing medicine ought to be given again and again as often as the sickness recurs.

Though some are in a state near to death without sickness, as are persons condemned to death, and they would need the spiritual effects of this Sacrament, still this Sacrament is not to be given to them, but only to the sick, since it is given under the form of bodily medicine, and bodily medicine is not proper except for one bodily sick. For in the administration of Sacraments their signification must be observed.

Oil is the special matter of this Sacrament, because it is of efficacy for bodily healing by mitigation of pains, as water, which washes bodies, is the matter of the Sacrament in which spiritual cleansing is performed. And as bodily healing must go to the root of the malady, so this unction is applied to those parts of the body from which the malady of sin proceeds, as are the organs of sense.

And because through this Sacrament sins are forgiven, and sin is not forgiven except through grace, clearly grace is conferred in this Sacrament. Nor is a bishop necessary to give this Sacrament, since the Sacrament does not bestow any excellence of state, as do those Sacraments in which a bishop is the minister. Since however a great abundance of grace, proper to effect a perfect cure, is required in this Sacrament, it is right that many priests should take part in the rite, and that the prayer of the whole Church should help out the effect of this Sacrament: hence James says: Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and the prayer of faith shall save the sick man. If however only one priest be present, he is understood to confer the Sacrament in the power of the whole Church, whose minister he is, and whose person he bears. As in other Sacraments, the effect of this Sacrament may be hindered by the insincerity (fictionem) of the recipient.

CHAPTER LXXIV

OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER

SINCE Christ intended to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, He needed to institute other men as ministers to Himself, who should dispense the Sacraments to the faithful. Hence He committed to His disciples the consecration of His Body and Blood, saying: Do this in memory of me (Luke xxii, 19). He gave them the power of forgiving sins, according to the text: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them (John xx, 23). He enjoined on them the function of baptising: Go, teach all nations, baptising them (Matt. xxviii, 19). Now a minister stands to his master as an instrument to a prime agent. An instrument must be proportionate to the agent: therefore the ministers of Christ must be conformable to Him. But Christ, our Lord and Master, by His own power and might worked out our salvation, inasmuch as He was both God and man. As man, He suffered for our redemption: as He was God, His suffering brought salvation to us. The ministers of Christ then must be men, and at the same time have some share in the Divinity (aliquid divinitatis participare) in point of spiritual power: for an instrument too has some share in the power of the prime agent.

Nor can it be said that this power was given to the disciples of Christ not to be transmitted to others. It was given unto edification (2 Cor. xiii, 10), to the building up of the Church, and must be perpetuated so long as the Church needs building up, that is, to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii, 20). And since spiritual effects are transmitted to us from Christ under sensible signs, this power had to be delivered to men under some such signs,—certain forms of words, definite acts, as imposition of hands, anointing, the delivery of a book or chalice, and the like. Whenever anything spiritual is delivered under a corporeal sign, that is called a Sacrament. Thus in the conferring of spiritual power a Sacrament is wrought, which is called the Sacrament of Order. Now it is a point of divine liberality that the bestowal of power should be accompanied with the means of duly exercising that power. But the spiritual power of administering the Sacraments requires divine grace for its convenient exercise: therefore in this Sacrament, as in other Sacraments, grace is bestowed.

Among Sacraments the noblest, and that which sets the crown on the rest, is the Sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore the power of Order must be considered chiefly in relation to this Sacrament: for everything is ruled by the end for which it is made. Now the power that gives perfection, also prepares the matter to receive it. Since then the power of Order extends to the consecration of the Body of Christ and the administration of the same to the faithful, it must further extend to the rendering of the faithful fit and worthy for the reception of that Sacrament. But the believer is rendered fit and worthy by being free from sin: otherwise he cannot be united with Christ spiritually, with whom he is sacramentally united in the reception of this Sacrament. The power of Order therefore must extend to the remission of sins by the administration of those Sacraments which are directed to that purpose, Baptism and Penance.

CHAPTER LXXV

OF THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS

SINCE the power of Order is principally directed to the consecration of the Body of Christ, and its administration to the faithful, and the cleansing of the faithful from sin, there must be some chief Order, the power of which extends chiefly to these objects; and that is the Order of Priesthood. There must be other Orders to serve the chief Order by one way or another preparing its matter; and these are the Orders of Ministers. The power of Priesthood extending to two objects, the consecration of the Body of Christ, and the rendering the faithful by absolution from sin fit to receive the Eucharist, the lower Orders must serve the Priesthood either in both or in one of these respects. The lower Orders serve the Priesthood only in preparing the people [for the Eucharist]. This the Doorkeepers do by shutting out unbelievers from the company of the faithful: the Lectors by instructing the catechumens in the rudiments of the faith,—hence the Scripture of the Old Testament is committed to their reading: the Exorcists by cleansing those who are already instructed, if in any way they are hindered by the devil from the reception of the Sacraments. The higher Orders serve the priestly Order both in the preparation of the people and in the consummation of the Sacrament. Thus the Acolytes have a ministry to exercise over the vessels, other than sacred, in which the matter of the Sacrament is prepared: hence the altar-cruets are delivered to them at their ordination. The Subdeacons have a ministry to exercise over the sacred vessels, and over the arrangement of the matter not yet consecrated. The Deacons have a further ministry over the matter already consecrated, as the deacon administers the Blood of Christ to the faithful. These three Orders of Priests, Deacons and Subdeacons, are called Sacred Orders, because they receive a ministry over sacred things. The higher Orders also serve for the preparation of the people: for to Deacons is committed the publishing of the doctrine of the Gospel to the people: to Subdeacons that of the Apostles: while Acolytes render to both the attendance which conduces to solemnity of teaching, by carrying candles and otherwise serving.

CHAPTER LXXVI

OF THE EPISCOPAL DIGNITY, AND THAT THEREIN ONE BISHOP IS SUPREME

THERE must be some power of higher ministry in the Church to administer the Sacrament of Order; and this is the episcopal power, which, though not exceeding the power of the simple priest in the consecration of the Body of Christ, exceeds it in its dealings with the faithful. The presbyter's power is derived from the episcopal; and whenever any action, rising above what is common and usual, has to be done upon the faithful people, that is reserved to bishops; and it is by episcopal authority that presbyters do what is committed to them; and in their ministry they make use of things consecrated by bishops, as in the Eucharist the chalice, altar-stone and palls.

1. Though populations are different in different dioceses and cities, still, as there is one Church, there must be one Christian people. As then in the spiritual people of one Church there is required one Bishop, who is Head of all that people; so in the whole Christian people it is requisite that there be one Head of the whole Church.

2. One requisite of the unity of the Church is the agreement of all the faithful in faith. When questions of faith arise, the Church would be rent by diversity of judgements, were it not preserved in unity by the judgement of one. But in things necessary Christ is not wanting to His Church, which He has loved, and has shed His blood for it: since even of the Synagogue the Lord says: What is there that I ought further to have done for my vineyard and have not done it.? (Isai. v, 4.) We cannot doubt then that by the ordinance of Christ one man presides over the whole Church.

3. None can doubt that the government of the Church is excellently well arranged, arranged as it is by Him through whom kings reign and lawgivers enact just things (Prov. viii, 15). But the best form of government for a multitude is to be governed by one: for the end of government is the peace and unity of its subjects: and one man is a more apt source of unity than many together.

But if any will have it that the one Head and one Shepherd is Christ, as being the one Spouse of the one Church, his view is inadequate to the facts. For though clearly Christ Himself gives effect to the Sacraments of the Church,—He it is who baptises, He forgives sins, He is the true Priest who has offered Himself on the altar of the cross, and by His power His Body is daily consecrated at our altars,—nevertheless, because He was not to be present in bodily shape with all His faithful, He chose ministers and would dispense His gifts to His faithful people through their hands. And by reason of the same future absence it was needful for Him to issue His commission to some one to take care of this universal Church in His stead. Hence He said to Peter before His Ascension, Feed my sheep (John xxi, 1) and before His Passion, Thou in thy turn confirm thy brethren (Luke xxii, 32); and to him alone He made the promise, To thee I will give the keys of the kingdom of heaven (Matt. xvi, 19). Nor can it be said that although He gave this dignity to Peter, it does not pass from Peter to others. For Christ instituted His Church to last to the end of the world, according to the text: He shall sit upon the throne of David and in his kingdom, to confirm and strengthen it in justice and judgement from henceforth, now, and for ever (Isai. ix, 7). Therefore, in constituting His ministers for the time, He intended their power to pass to posterity for the benefit of His Church to the end of the world, as He Himself says: Lo, I am with you to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii, 20).

Hereby is cast out the presumptuous error of some, who endeavour to withdraw themselves from obedience and subjection to Peter, not recognising his successor, the Roman Pontiff, for the pastor of the Universal Church.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT SACRAMENTS CAN BE ADMINISTERED EVEN BY WICKED MINISTERS

NO agent can do anything in what is beyond his competence, unless he gets power from elsewhere: thus the mayor cannot put restraint upon the citizens except in virtue of the power that he receives from the king. But what is done in the Sacraments exceeds human competence. Therefore no one can administer the Sacraments, however good he may be, unless he receives power so to do. But the opposite of goodness is wickedness and sin. Therefore neither by sin is he hindered from the administration of the Sacraments, who has received power to do so.

5. One man cannot judge of the goodness or wickedness of another man: that is proper to God alone, who searches the secrets of hearts. If then the wickedness of the minister could hinder the effect of the Sacrament, it would be impossible for a man to have a sure confidence of his salvation: his conscience would not remain free from the sense of sin. But it is irrational for any one to have to rest the hope of his salvation on the goodness of a mere man: for it said, Cursed is the man who puts his trust in man (Jer. xvii, 5). In order then that we may rest the hope of our salvation on Christ, who is God and man, we must allow that the Sacraments work salvation in the power of Christ, whether they be administered by good or evil ministers.

Hence the Lord says: The Scribes and Pharisees have come to sit in the chair of Moses: whatever things therefore they say to you, observe and do: but according to their works do ye not (Matt. xxiii, 2).

Hereby is cast out the error of those who say that all good men can administer the Sacraments, and no bad men.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY

THOUGH by the Sacraments men are restored to grace, they are not immediately restored to immortality. Since then the faithful people needs to be perpetuated to the end of the world, this has to be done by generation. Now generation works to many ends: to the perpetuity of the species, to the perpetuity of the political commonwealth, and to the perpetuity of the Church. Hence it comes to be ruled and guided by different powers. As it works to the good of nature in the perpetuity of the species, it is guided to that end by nature so inclining; and in that respect it is called a function of nature.' As it works to social and political good, it is subject to the ordinance of the civil law. As it works to the good of the Church, it must be subject to Church government. But the things that are administered to the people by the ministers of the Church, are called Sacraments. Matrimony then, as consisting in the union of male and female, intending to beget and educate offspring to the worship of God, is a Sacrament of the Church. Hence a blessing is pronounced upon it by the ministers of the Church. And as in other Sacraments something spiritual is prefigured by external acts, so in this Sacrament, by the union of male and female, there is figuratively represented the union of Christ with His Church, according to the text of the Apostle (Eph. v, 32). And because the Sacraments effect what they represent (sacramenta efficiunt quod figurant), we must believe that grace is bestowed by this Sacrament on persons marrying, to enable them to have their part in the union of Christ with His Church; and this aid is very necessary for them, that in their application to fleshly and carnal things they may not be sepa rated from Christ and the Church.

Now the figure must correspond to the reality which it signifies. But the union of Christ with His Church is of one Bridegroom with one Bride to be kept for ever. For of the Church it is said: One is my beloved, my perfect one (Cant. vi, 8): nor ever shall Christ be parted from His Church: for so He says Himself, Lo, I am with you even to the end of the world (Matt. xxviii, 20); and so the Apostle, We shall be for ever with the Lord (1 Thess. iv, 16). Matrimony therefore, as a Sacrament of the Church, must be of one husband with one wife, to continue without separation: this is meant by the faith (or troth), whereby husband and wife are bound to one another. So then there are three goods of matrimony, as it is a Sacrament of the Church: offspring, to be reared and educated to the worship of God: faith, whereby one husband is tied to one wife: and sacramental signification by the indivisible union of the matrimonial connexion, making it a sacred sign of the union of Christ with His Church.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT THROUGH CHRIST THE RESURRECTION OF OUR BODIES WILL TAKE PLACE

AS we have been delivered by Christ from the penalties incurred by the death of the first man; and as by the sin of the first man there has been bequeathed to us not only sin, but also death, which is the punishment of sin; we must by Christ be delivered from both these consequences, both from guilt and from sin (Rom. iv, 12, 17). To show to us both effects in Himself, He chose both to die and to rise again; to die, to deliver us from sin (Heb. ix, 28); to rise again, to deliver us from death (1 Cor. xv, 20) [cf. Rom. iv, 25]. We gather the effect of Christ's death in the Sacraments so far as remission of guilt goes: at the end of the world we shall gain the effect of Christ's resurrection in our deliverance from death.

But some do not believe in the resurrection of the body; and what is said in Scripture on that subject they perversely understand of a spiritual resurrection from the death of sin to grace: which error is reproved by the Apostle in Hymenaeus and Philetus (2 Tim. ii, 16). Moreover the Lord promises both resurrections, when He says: The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the the Son of God, and they that hear shall live: which refers to the resurrection of souls, then beginning by men beginning to adhere to Christ by faith. But presently He makes explicit promise of a bodily resurrection: The hour cometh in which all who are in the tombs shall hear the voice of the Son of God: for manifestly not souls are in the tombs, but bodies. Cf. Job xix, 25.

Reason too gives evident support to the resurrection of the flesh.—1. The souls of men are immortal (B. II, Chap.LXXIX). But the soul is naturally united with the body, being essentially the form of the body (B. II, Chap.LVII). Therefore it is against the nature of the soul to be without the body. But nothing that is against nature can be lasting. Therefore the soul will not be for ever without the body. Thus the immortality of the soul seems to require the resurrection of the body.

2. The natural desire of man tends to happiness, or final perfection (B. III, Chap.XXIV). Whoever is wanting in any point proper to his perfect well-being, has not yet attained to perfect happiness: his desire is not yet perfectly laid to rest. Now the soul separate from the body is in a sense imperfect, as is every part away from its whole, for the soul is part of human nature.

3. Reward and punishment are due to men both in soul and in body. But in this life they cannot attain to the reward of final happiness (B. III, Chap.XLVIII); and sins often go unpunished in this life: nay, here the wicked live and are comforted and set up with riches (Job xxi, 7). There must then be a second union of soul with body, that man may be rewarded and punished in body and in soul.

CHAPTER LXXXI

SOME POINTS OF REPLY TO DIFFICULTIES ON THE RESURRECTION

IN the first creation of human nature God endowed the human body with an attribute over and above what was due to it by the natural principles of its constitution, namely, with a certain imperishability, to adapt it to its form, that as the life of the soul is perpetual, so the body might perpetually live by the soul. Granting that this imperishability was not natural in regard of the active principle, still it may be called natural in regard of the end, taking the end of matter to be proportioned to its natural form. When then, contrary to the order of its nature, the soul turned away from God, there was withdrawn from the body that God-given constitution which made it proportionate to the soul; and death ensued. Considering then how human nature actually was constituted to begin with, we may say that death is something which has accidentally supervened upon man through sin. This accident has been removed by Christ, who by the merit of His passion and death has destroyed death. Consequently that same divine power, which originally endowed the body with incorruption, will restore the body again from death to life.

None of the essential elements in man is altogether annihilated in death. The rational soul, the form’ of man, remains after death. The matter also remains, which was subject to that form. So by the union of numerically the same soul with numerically the same matter, numerically the same man will be restored.

What does not bar numerical unity in a man while he lives on uninterruptedly, clearly can be no bar to the identity of the risen man with the man that was. In a man’s body while he lives, there are not always the same parts in respect of matter, but only in respect of species. In respect of matter there is a flux and reflux of parts: still that fact does not bar the man’s numerical unity from the beginning to the end of his life. We have an example in a fire, which, while it goes on burning, is called numerically one, because its species remains, though the wood is burnt out and fresh wood supplied. So it is in the human body: for the form and species (kind) of the several parts continues unbroken throughout life, but the matter of the parts is dissolved by the natural heat, and new matter accrues by nourishment. But the man is not numerically different by the difference of his component parts at different ages, although it is true that the material composition of the man at one stage of his life is not his material composition at another. So then, for numerically the same man to rise again, it is not requisite for all the material that ever entered into his composition throughout the whole course of his life to be gathered together and resumed, but just so much of it as suffices to make up his proper bulk and stature. We may expect that to be resumed by preference, which was more perfect in the species and form of humanity. If anything was wanting to his due stature, either through untimely death or mutilation, divine power will supply that from elsewhere. Nor will this supplementary matter mar the personal identity of the risen body: for even in the workmanship of nature addition is made from without to the stature of a boy without prejudice to his identity: for the boy and the adult is numerically the same man.

The resurrection is natural in respect of its end and term, inasmuch as it is natural to the soul to be united to the body: but its efficient cause is not any agency of nature, but the divine power alone.

All men will rise again, though not all have adhered by faith to Christ, or have received His Sacraments. For the Son of God assumed human nature, in order to restore it: the defect of nature then shall be made good in all, inasmuch as all shall return from death to life: but the defect shall not be perfectly made good except in such as have adhered to Christ, either by their own act believing in Him, or at least by the Sacrament of faith.

CHAPTER LXXXII

THAT MEN SHALL RISE AGAIN IMMORTAL

THAT cannot be said to have been destroyed, which is to go on for ever. If then men were to rise again always with the prospect of another death, in no way could death be said to have been destroyed by the death of Christ. But it has been destroyed,—for the present, causally, as was foretold: I will be thy death, O death (Osee xiii, 14): and in the end it shall be destroyed actually: the last enemy to be destroyed is death (1 Cor. xv, 26).

3. The effect is like its cause. But the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection; and Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more (Rom. vi, 9).

Hence it is said: The Lord shall cast out death for ever (Isa. xxv, 8): Death shall be no more (Apoc. xxi, 24).

Hereby entrance is denied to the error of certain Gentiles of old, who believed that times and temporal events recurred in cycles. For example, in that age one Plato, a philosopher in the city of Athens, and in the school that is called Academic, taught his scholars thus, that in the course of countless revolving ages, recurring at long but fixed intervals, the same Plato, and the same city, and the same school, and the same scholars would recur, and so would be repeated again and again in the course of countless ages. As for the text: What is that has been? That same that shall be. There is nothing new under the sun: nor can any one say, Lo, this is fresh: for it hath already gone before in the ages that have preceded us (Eccles i, 9): it is to be understood of events like in kind, but not in number.

Alter erit tum Tiphys, et altera quae vehat Argo
Delectos heroas: erunt etiam altera bella,

Atque iterum ad Trojam magnus mittetur Achilles.—Virgil, Eclogue, iv, 34-36. The fancy, we cannot call it the doctrine, appears in the mythus of Plato, Politicus, 270 sq. The distant way in which St Thomas speaks of Plato is in strong contrast with his familiar mention of the Philosopher.’ See B. II, Chap. LVII,note, p. 118.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

THAT IN THE RESURRECTION THERE WILL BE NO USE OF FOOD OR INTERCOURSE OF THE SEXES

WHEN our perishable life is over, those things which serve the needs of a perishable existence must also come to an end. One such thing is food, which serves to supply the waste of the body.

The use of the intercourse of the sexes is for generation. If then such intercourse is to continue after the resurrection, unless it is to continue to no purpose, many men will come to exist after the resurrection, who did not exist before.

But if any one says that in the risen Saints there will be use of food and sexual intercourse, not for the preservation of the individual and of the species, but solely for the pleasure that goes with such acts, to the end that no pleasure may be lacking in man's final reward,—such a saying is fraught with many absurdities. In the first place, the life of the risen Saints will be better ordered than our present life. But in this present life it is a disorderly and vicious thing to make use of food and procreation solely for pleasure, and not for the need of sustaining the body or rearing children. For the pleasures that attend such actions are not the ends of those actions, but rather the action is the end and purpose of the pleasure, nature having arranged for pleasure as a concomitant of such actions, lest for the labour that goes with them animals should desist from these actions necessary to nature, as they certainly would desist, were they not enticed by pleasure. It is therefore a perversion of order and an indecency for actions to be done solely for the pleasure that goes with them (B. III, Chap.XXVII). This then shall nowise be the case with the risen Saints, whose life we must assume to be a life of perfect order and propriety. Moreover the notion is ridiculous of seeking bodily pleasures, common to us with brute animals, where there are in view the highest delights, shared with the angels, in the vision of God (B. III, Chap.LI). Hence the Lord says: In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be given in marriage, but shall be as the angels of God (Matt. xxii, 30).

As for the alleged example of Adam, the perfection of Adam was personal, but human nature was not yet entirely perfect, as the race of mankind was not yet multiplied. Adam then was constituted in the perfection proper to the origin of the human race, for the multiplication of which he needed to beget children, and consequently to make use of food. But the maturity of the risen state is when human nature shall have come to its full perfection, and the number of the elect shall be complete. Then shall generation no more have place, nor the use of food. Therefore the immortality and incorruption of the risen Saints shall be different from that which was in Adam. The immortality and incorruption of the risen Saints will consist in their being incapable of death, or of the dissolution of any part of their bodily frame. The immortality of Adam consisted in his being capable of immortality, provided he did not sin, and capable of death, if he did sin; and this was secured, not by the prevention of all bodily waste in him, but by the aid of food to counteract an entire dissolution.

The Scripture texts that seem to promise the use of food after the resurrection, are to be understood in a spiritual sense. What is said in the Apocalypse, xx, 4, of the thousand years, is to be understood of the resurrection of souls rising from sin,—cf. Eph. v, 14, Rise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee; and the thousand years means the whole period of Church history, during which the martyrs reign with Christ, and the other saints, as well in that kingdom of God which is the Church on earth, as in the heavenly country of departed souls.

Hence we may finally conclude that all the activities of the active life shall cease, as they all bear upon the use of food, and the getting of children, and other necessities of a perishable existence. Alone left in the risen Saints shall be the occupation of the contemplative life: wherefore it is said of the contemplative Mary: Mary hath chosen the better part, which shall not be taken from her (Luke x, 42).

CHAPTER LXXXIV

THAT RISEN BODIES SHALL BE OF THE SAME NATURE AS BEFORE

SOME have supposed that in the resurrection our bodies are transformed into spirit, because the Apostle says: There is sown an animal body, there shall rise a spiritual body (1 Cor. xv, 40). And the text, Flesh and blood shall not possess the kingdom of God (1 Cor. xv, 50), has prompted the conjecture that risen bodies shall not have flesh and blood. But this is a manifest error.

1. Our resurrection shall be on the model of the resurrection of Christ, who will reform the body of our humiliation, so that it shall become conformable to the body of his glory (Phil. iii, 21). But Christ after His resurrection had a body that could be felt and handled, as He says: Feel and see, because a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me to have (Luke xxiv, 39): in like manner therefore also other risen men.

5. For numerically the same man to rise again, his essential parts must be numerically the same. If then the body of the risen man shall not consist of these muscles and these bones of which it is now composed, the risen man will not be numerically the same.

6. The supposition of the body passing into a spirit is altogether impossible: for those things only pass into one another which have some matter in common [cf. Chap.LXIII].

7. If the body passes into a spiritual substance, it must either pass into that spiritual substance which is the soul, or into some other. If into that which is the soul, then in the resurrection there will be nothing in man but soul, and he will be exactly as he was before the resurrection. But if into another spiritual substance, then two spiritual substances will be one in

nature, which is impossible, since every spiritual substance subsists by itself.

9. He who rises again must be an animal, if he is to be a man.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE BODIES OF THE RISEN SHALL BE OTHERWISE ORGANISED THAN BEFORE

THOUGH the bodies of the risen are to be of the same species with our present bodies, still they will be otherwise organised (aliam dispositionem habebunt); and chiefly in this, that all the bodies of the risen, of good men and evil men alike, will be incorruptible. For that, three reasons may be assigned. First, in respect of the end of the resurrection, which is reward or punishment for the things done in the body; and both the one and the other is to be everlasting (B. III, Chapp.LXII,CXLV). Secondly, in respect of the formal cause of the resurrection, which is the soul. Since the recovery of the body is a provision for the perfection of the soul, it is fitting that the body be organised in such fashion as shall suit the soul (Chap.LXXIX. But the soul is incorruptible, therefore the body shall be restored to it incorruptible. A third reason may be found in the efficient cause of the resurrection. God will restore to life bodies already corrupted and fallen to decay: much more will He be able, once He has restored life to them, to ensure that life abiding in them everlastingly.

This body, now corruptible, will be rendered incorruptible in such sort that the soul shall have perfect control over it, giving it life. Nor shall any foreign power be able to hinder this communication of life. Risen man then shall be immortal, not by taking up another body, that shall be incorruptible, but by his present corruptible body being made incorruptible. This corruptible mast put on incorruption (1 Cor. xv, 53). So then that saying, Flesh and blood shall not possess the kingdom of God (1 Cor. xv, 50), means that in the risen state the corruption of flesh and blood shall be taken away, while the substance of flesh and blood remains.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

OF THE QUALITIES OF GLORIFIED BODIES

BRIGHTNESS. Though by the merit of Christ the defect of nature [i.e., death] is taken away from all, good and bad alike, at the resurrection, there will still remain a difference between the good and bad in their personal attributes. It is of the essence of nature that the human soul be the form of the body, quickening it and preserving it in being; while by personal acts the soul deserves to be raised to the glory of the vision of God, or to be shut out from the order of this glory through its own fault. The bodies of all men alike will be organised as befits the soul, so that the soul shall be an imperishable form giving imperishable being to the body, because to this effect the power of God will entirely subject the matter of the human body to the human soul. But from the brightness and excellence of the soul that is raised to the vision of God, the body, united to such a soul, shall gain a further advantage. It will be entirely subject to the soul, God's power so disposing, not in being only, but in all its actions, experiences, motions and bodily qualities. As then the soul in the enjoyment of the vision of God will be replenished with a spiritual brightness, so by an overflow from soul to body, the body itself, in its way, will be clad in a halo and glory of brightness. Hence the Apostle says: It is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory (1 Cor. xv, 43): because our body, which now has no light of its own, shall then be bright and shining, according to the promise: The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father (Matt. xiii, 43).

II. Agility. The soul that shall enjoy the vision of God, being conjoined to its last end, will find its desire fulfilled in all things. And because the body moves at the desire of the soul, the body in this case will absolutely obey the beck of the spirit in its every command to move: hence the bodies of the risen will be agile; and this is what the Apostle means, when he says: It is sown in weakness: it shall rise in power (ib.) We experience weakness in the body, in that it proves incapable of satisfying the soul in the movements and actions which the soul commands. This weakness shall then be entirely removed by virtue overflowing into the body from the soul united to God. Hence it is said of the just that they shall run hither and thither like sparks in a dry bed of reeds (Wisd. iii, 7).

III. Impassibility. As the soul that enjoys God will have its desire fulfilled in respect of the gaining of all good, so also in respect of the removal of all evil. The body therefore, being made perfect in proportion to the soul, shall be free from all evil, actual and potential. As for actuality, there will be in the risen no corruption, no deformity, no defect. In point of potentiality, the risen Saints will be beyond the possibility of suffering aught that could give them pain: they will thus be impassible. Still this does not bar in them that sensibility which is proper to sentient beings: for they will use the senses to their delight in things that are not inconsistent with their state of incorruption. This impassibility is declared by the Apostle: It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.

IV. Subtlety. As the soul enjoying God shall perfectly adhere to Him, and share in His goodness to the full height of its capacity; so the body shall be perfectly subject to the soul, and share in its attributes so far as possible, in clearness of sense, in seemliness of bodily appetite, and in general perfection of the entire organism: for a natural object is more perfect, the more perfectly its matter is subject to its form. Therefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. xv, 44): There is sown an animal body, there shall rise a spiritual body. The risen body will be spiritual, not as being a spirit, but as being wholly subject to the spirit; as the present body is called animal, not because it is an animal, but because it is subject to animal appetites and needs food.

It appears by what has been said that the risen body shall be bright and shining, incapable of suffering, moving without difficulty and labour, and most perfectly actuated by its form.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

OF SEX AND AGE IN THE RESURRECTION

STILL we must not suppose, what some have thought, that female sex has no place in the bodies of the risen Saints. For since resurrection means the reparation of the defects of nature, nothing of what makes for the perfection of nature will be withdrawn from the bodies of the risen. Now among other organs that belong to the integrity of the human body are those which minister to generation as well in male as in female. These organs therefore will rise again in both. Nor is this conclusion impaired by the fact that there will be no longer any use of these organs (Chap.LXXXIII). If that were any ground for their absence from the risen body, all the organs bearing on digestion and nutrition should be absent, for there will not be any use for them either: thus great part of the organs proper to man would be wanting in the risen body. We conclude that all such organs will be there, even organs of which the function has ceased: these will not be there without a purpose, since they will serve to make up the restored integrity of the natural body.

Neither is the weakness of the female sex inconsistent with the perfection of the resurrection. Such weakness is no departure from nature, but is intended by nature. This natural differentiation will argue the thoroughgoing perfection of nature, and commend the divine wisdom that arranges creation in diversity of ranks and orders. Nor is there anything to the contrary in the expression of the Apostle: Till we all meet and attain to the unity of faith and recognition of the Son of God, even to a perfect man, to the measure of the full stature of Christ (Eph. iv, 13). This does not mean that in that meeting in which the risen shall go forth to meet Christ in the air every one shall be of the male sex, but it indicates the perfection and strength of the Church, for the whole Church shalt be like a perfect, full-grown man, going out to meet Christ.

Again, all must rise at the age of Christ, which is the age of perfect manhood, for the sake of the perfection of nature, which is at its best in this age above others.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

OF THE QUALITY OF RISEN BODIES IN THE LOST

THE bodies of those who are to be lost must be proportionate to their souls. Now the souls of the wicked have a nature which is good, as created by God: but the will in them will be disorderly, falling short of its proper end. Their bodies therefore, so far as nature goes, will be restored to entirety: thus they will rise at a perfect age without any diminution of organs or limbs, and without any defect or detriment, which any malformation or sickness may have brought on. Hence the Apostle says: The dead shall rise incorrupt (1 Cor. xv, 52): and that this is to be understood of all men, good and bad alike, is clear from the context. But inasmuch as their soul will have its will turned away from God and deprived of its proper end, their bodies will not be spiritual (1 Cor. xv, 44, in the sense of being wholly subject to the spirit, but rather their soul will be in effect carnal. Nor will their bodies be agile, obeying the soul without difficulty, but rather ponderous and heavy and insupportable to the soul, even as their souls are by disobedience turned away from God. Their bodies will remain liable to suffering, even as now, or more so: they will suffer affliction from sensible things, but not corruption; as their souls will be tormented by the natural desire of happiness made frustrate. Their bodies too will be opaque and darksome, as their souls will be void of the light of divine knowledge. This is the meaning of what the Apostle says, that we shall all rise again, but we shall not all be changed (1 Cor. xv, 51): for the good alone shall be changed to glory, and the bodies of the wicked shall rise without glory.

Some may think it impossible for the bodies of the wicked to be liable to suffering, and yet not liable to disintegration, since every impression suffered, when it goes beyond the common, takes off from the substance: so we see that if a body is long kept in the fire, it will be entirely consumed; and when pain becomes unusually intense, the soul is separated from the body. But all this happens on the supposition of the transmutability of matter from form to form. Now the human body, after the resurrection, will not be transmutable from form to form, either in the good or in the wicked; because in both it will be entirely perfected by the soul in respect of its natural being.

CHAPTER XC

HOW INCORPOREAL SUBSISTENT SPIRITS SUFFER FROM CORPOREAL FIRE, AND ARE BEFITTINGLY PUNISHED WITH CORPOREAL PUNISHMENTS

WE must not suppose that incorporeal subsistent spirits,—as the devil, and the souls of the lost before the resurrection,—can suffer from fire any disintegration of their physical being, or other change, such as our perishable bodies suffer from fire. For incorporeal substances have not a corporeal nature, to be changed by corporeal things. Nor are they susceptible of sensible forms except intellectually; and such intellectual impression is not penal, but rather perfective and pleasurable. Nor can it be said that they suffer affliction from corporeal fire by reason of a certain contrariety, as their bodies shall suffer after the resurrection: for incorporeal subsistent spirits have no organs of sense nor the use of sensory powers. Such spirits shall suffer then from corporeal fire by a sort of constriction (alligatio). For spirits can be tied to bodies, either as their form, as the soul is tied to the human body to give it life; or without being the body's form, as magicians by diabolic power tie spirits to images. Much more by divine power may spirits under damnation be tied to corporeal fire; and this is an affliction to them to know that they are tied to the meanest creatures for punishment.

1. Every sin of the rational creature comes of its not submitting in obedience to God. Now punishment ought to correspond and be in

proportion to offence, so that the will may be penally afflicted by enduring something the very reverse of what it sinfully loved. Therefore it is a proper punishment for a sinful rational nature to find itself subject by a sort of constriction' to bodily things inferior to itself.

2. The pain of sense answers to the offence in respect of its being an inordinate turning to some changeable good, as the pain of loss answers to the offence in respect of its being a turning away from the Unchangeable Good (B. III, Chap.CXLVI). But the rational creature, and particularly the human soul, sins by inordinate turning to bodily things. Therefore it is a befitting punishment for it to be afflicted by bodily things.

Though the promises in Scripture of corporal rewards, like meat and drink (Isai. xxv, 6: lxv, 13: Luke xxii, 29: Apoc. xxii, 2), for the Blessed, are to be taken in a spiritual sense, nevertheless some corporal punishments, with which the wicked are threatened in Scripture, are to be understood as corporal punishments in the proper sense of the terms used. For though it is not becoming for a higher nature to be rewarded by the use of something inferior to itself: rather its reward should consist in union with something higher than itself: nevertheless the punishment of a superior nature may fittingly consist in its being rated with things inferior to it. Some, however, of the corporeal imagery that we find in Scripture, speaking of the pains of the lost, may very well be interpreted in a spiritual and figurative sense. Thus in the saying, Their worm dieth not (Isai. lxvi, 24: Mark ix, 44), by the worm may be understood the remorse of conscience with which the wicked will be tormented: for it is impossible for a material worm to gnaw a spiritual substance, or so much as the bodies of the damned, which will be imperishable. Weeping and gnashing of teeth too (Matt. xiii, 42) can only be understood metaphorically of subsistent spirits; although in the bodies of the lost after the resurrection the phrase may be taken to have its bodily fulfilment,—not that there can be any flow of tears, for there can be no secretion from such bodies, but the weeping will mean pain of heart, trouble of eyes and head, and such usual accompaniments of weeping.

CHAPTER XCI

THAT SOULS ENTER UPON PUNISHMENT OR REWARD IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEIR SEPARATION FROM THEIR BODIES

THERE can be no reason for deferring reward or punishment beyond the time at which the soul is first capable of receiving either the one or the other, that is, as soon as it leaves the body.

2. In this life is the state of merit and demerit: hence the present life is compared to a warfare and to the days of a hired labourer: Man’s life is a warfare upon the earth, and his days as those of a day-labourer (Job vii, 1). But when the state of warfare is over, or the labour of a man hired for the day, then reward or punishment is due at once, according as men have acquitted themselves well or ill in the effort: hence it is said: The reward of thy hired labourer shall not rest with thee till morning (Levit. xix, 13).

3. The order of punishment and reward follows that of offence and merit. Now it is only through the soul that merit and demerit appertain to the body: for nothing is meritorious or demeritorious except for being voluntary. Therefore reward and punishment properly pass from the soul to the body, not to the soul for the body’s sake. There is no reason therefore why the resumption of bodies should be waited for in the punishing or rewarding of souls: nay, it seems fitting rather that souls, in which fault or merit had a prior place, should have a priority likewise of punishment or reward.

Hereby is refuted the error of sundry Greeks, who say that before the resurrection of their bodies souls neither mount up to heaven nor are plunged into hell.

But we must observe that there may be some impediment on the part of the good in the way of their souls receiving their final reward in the vision of God immediately upon their departure from the body. To that vision, transcending as it does all natural created capacity, the creature cannot be raised before it is entirely purified: hence it is said that nothing defiled can enter into it (Wisd. vii, 25), and that the polluted shall not pass through it (Isai. xxxv, 8). Now the pollution of the soul is by sin, which is an inordinate union with lower things: from which pollution it is purified in this life by Penance and other Sacraments. Now it happens sometimes that this process of purification is not entirely accomplished in this life; and the offender remains still a debtor with a debt of punishment upon him, owing to some negligence, or distraction, or to death overtaking him before his debt is paid. Not for this does he deserve to be entirely shut out from reward: because all this may happen without mortal sin; and it is only mortal sin that occasions the loss of charity, to which the reward of life everlasting is due. Such persons then must be cleansed in the next life, before entering upon their eternal reward. This cleansing is done by penal inflictions, as even in this life it might have been completed by penal works of satisfaction: otherwise the negligent would be better off than the careful, if the penalty that men do not pay here for their sins is not to be undergone by them in the life to come. The souls then of the good, who have upon them in this world something that needs cleansing, are kept back from their reward, while they endure cleansing purgatorial pains. And this is the reason why we posit a purgatory, or place of cleansing.

CHAPTER XCII

THAT THE SOULS OF THE SAINTS AFTER DEATH HAVE THEIR WILL IMMUTABLY FIXED ON GOOD

SO long as a soul can change from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in a state of combat and warfare: it has to be careful in resisting evil, not to be overcome by it, or in endeavouring to set itself free from it. But so soon as the soul is separated from the body, it will be no longer in the state of warfare or combat, but of receiving reward or punishment, according as it has lawfully fought or unlawfully.

3. Naturally the rational creature desires to be happy: hence it cannot will not to be happy: still its will may turn aside from that in which true happiness consists, or, in other words, it may have a perverse will: this comes of the object of true happiness not being apprehended as such, but some other object in its stead, and to this the will inordinately turns, and makes a last end of it: thus he who makes bodily pleasures the end of his existence, counts them best of good things, which is the idea of happiness. But they who are already blessed in heaven apprehend the object of true happiness as making their happiness and last end: otherwise their desire would not be set at rest in that object, and they would not be blessed and happy. The will of the blessed therefore cannot swerve from the object of true happiness.

4. Whoever has enough in what he has, seeks nothing else beyond. But whoever is finally blessed has enough in the object of true happiness, and therefore seeks nothing that is not in keeping with that object. Now the only

way in which the will can be perverse is by willing something inconsistent with the object of true happiness.

5. Sin never befalls the will without some ignorance in the understanding [cf. B. III, Chap.X]: hence it is said, They are mistaken who do evil (Prov. xiv, 22); and the Philosopher says that every evil man is ignorant. But the soul that is truly blessed can in no way be ignorant, since in God it sees all things that appertain to its perfect well-being. In no way then can it have an evil will, especially since that vision of God is always actual.

6. Our soul can err about conclusions before it is brought back to first principles. When the knowledge of conclusions is carried back to first principles, we have scientific knowledge which cannot be false. Now as the principle of demonstration is in abstract sciences, so is the scope, end and aim, in matters of desire. So long then as our will does not attain its final end, it may be perverted, but not after it has arrived at the enjoyment of its final end, which is desirable for its own sake, as the principles of demonstration are self-evident. .

CHAPTER XCIII

THAT THE SOULS OF THE WICKED AFTER DEATH HAVE THEIR WILL IMMUTABLY FIXED ON EVIL

THE very disorder of the will is a punishment and a very great affliction, because insomuch as a person has a disordered will, everything that is done rightly displeases him: thus it will displease the damned to see the will of God fulfilled in all things, that will which they have sinfully resisted.

3. The will is changed from sin to goodness only by the grace of God (B. III, Chapp.CLVII,CLVIII). But as the souls of the good are admitted to a perfect participation in the divine goodness, so the souls of the damned are totally excluded from grace.

4. As the good, living in the flesh, make God the ultimate end of all their doings and desires, so the wicked set up their rest in some undue end which turns them away from God. But the disembodied spirits of the good will immovably cling to the end which they have set before themselves in this life, namely, God. Therefore the souls of the wicked will immovably cling to the end which they too have chosen for themselves. As then the will of the good cannot become evil, so the will of the evil cannot become good.

CHAPTER XCIV

OF THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE WILL OF SOULS DETAINED IN PURGATORY

BUT because there are souls which in the instant of their parting do not arrive at happiness, and yet are not damned, we must show that even these souls cannot change their purpose after parting from their bodies; and the proof is this:—the souls of the blessed and of the lost have their will immutably fixed according to the end to which they have adhered. But the souls that carry with them into the next world some matter for purgatory are not ultimately in a different case from the blessed, for they die in charity, whereby we adhere to God as to our last end. Therefore they too will have their will immutably fixed.

CHAPTER XCV

OF THE GENERAL CAUSE OF IMMUTABILITY IN ALL SOULS AFTER THEIR SEPARATION FROM THE BODY

THE end is in matters of desire like the first principles of demonstration in the abstract sciences. These principles are naturally known, and any error concerning them could come only from a perversion of nature [verging on idiotcy]: hence a man could not be moved from a true understanding of such principles to a false one, or from a false to a true, except through some change in his nature. It is impossible for those who go wrong over first principles to be brought right by other and more certain principles; or for any one to be beguiled from a true understanding of such principles by other principles more plausible. So it is in regard of the last end. Every one has a natural desire of the last end; and the possession of a rational nature, generically as such, carries with it a craving for happiness: but the desire of happiness and the last end in this or that shape and aspect comes from a special disposition of nature: hence the Philosopher says that as the individual is himself, so does the end appear to him. If then the frame of mind under which one desires a thing as his last end is fixed and immovable, the will of such a person is unchangeably fixed in the desire of that end. But these frames of mind, prompting such desires, can be removed from us so long as the soul is united with the body. Sometimes it is an impulse of passion that prompts us to desire a thing as our last end: but the impulse of passion quickly passes away, and with it is removed the desire of that end. In other cases the frame of mind, provocative of such desire, amounts to a habit; and that frame of mind is not so easily got rid of, and the desire of an end thence ensuing is consequently stronger and more lasting: yet even a habit is removable in this life. We have seen then that so long as the frame of mind lasts, which prompts us to desire a thing as our last end, the desire of that particular end is irremovable, because the last end, or whatever be taken for such, is desired above all things else; and no other object of greater desire can ever call us away from the desire of that which we take for our last end. Now the soul is in a changeable state so long as it is united with the body, but not after it is parted from the body. Separated therefore from the body, the soul will be no longer apt to advance to any new end, but must rest for ever in the end already attained. The will then will be immovable in its desire of what it has taken for its last end. But on the last end depends all the goodness or wickedness of the will. Whatever good things one wills in view of a good end, he does well to will them, as he does ill to will anything in view of an evil end. Thus the will of the departed soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from one object of volition to another, its attitude to the last end remaining constant.

Nor is such fixedness of will inconsistent with free will. The act of free will is to choose, and choice is of means to the end, not of the last end. As then there is nothing inconsistent with free choice in our will being immovably fixed in the desire of happiness and general abhorrence of misery, so neither will our faculty of free choice be set aside by our will being resistlessly carried to one definite object as its last end. As at present our common nature is immovably fixed in the desire of happiness in general, so hereafter by one special frame of mind we shall be fixed in the desire of this or that particular object as constituting our last end.

Nor is it to be thought that when souls resume their bodies at the resurrection, they lose the unchangeableness of their will, for in the resurrection bodies will be organised to suit the requirements of the soul (Chapp.LXXXVI,LXXXIX): souls then will not be changed by re-entering their bodies, but will remain permanently what they were.

CHAPTER CXVI

OF THE LAST JUDGEMENT

THERE is a twofold retribution for the things that a man has done in life, one for his soul immediately upon its separation from the body, another at the resurrection of the body. The first retribution is to individuals severally, as individuals severally die: the second is to all men together, as all men shall rise together. Therefore there must be a twofold judgement: one of individuals, regarding the soul; another a general judgement, rendering to all men their due in soul and body. And because Christ in His Humanity, wherein He suffered and rose again, has merited for us resurrection and life everlasting, it belongs to Him to exercise that judgement whereby risen men are rewarded or punished, for so it is said of Him: He hath given him authority to exercise judgement, because he is the Son of Man (John v, 27). And further, since in the last judgement there will be question of the reward or punishment of persons present in visible bodily shape, it is fitting for that judgement to be a visible process. Hence Christ will take His seat as judge in human shape, so that all can see Him, good and bad. But the vision of His Godhead, which makes men blessed, will be visible only to the good. As for the judgement of souls, that is an invisible process, dealing with invisible beings.

CHAPTER XCVII

OF THE STATE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGEMENT

IT needs must be that the motion of the heavens shall cease; and therefore it is said that time shall be no more (Apoc. x, 6).

A WORD in conclusion from the translator, or restorer. There has been present in my mind throughout my task the figure which I employed in the preface, of the restoration of a thirteenth-century church. I find myself surrounded with debris which I have found it necessary to remove from the structure of the Contra Gentiles:—Ptolemaic astronomy pervading the work even to the last chapter; a theory of divine providence adapted to this obsolete astronomy (B. III, Chapp. XXII, XXIII, LXXXII, XCI, XCII); an incorrect view of motion (B. I, Chap. XIII); archaic embryology (B. II, Chapp. LXXXVI, LXXXIX); total ignorance of chemistry, and even of the existence of molecular physics: deficient scholarship, leading at times to incorrect exegesis (B. IV, Chap. VII, S: 5: Chap. XVII, S: 2: Chap. XXXIV in Heb. ii, 10): even a theology of grace and the Sacraments that might here and there have expressed itself otherwise had the writer lived subsequently to the Council of Trent and the Baian and Jansenist controversies (B. III, Chap. L): finally, an over-cultivation of genera and species, that is, of logical classification, issuing in a tendency to deductive argument from essences downwards to effects, as though whatever is most valuable in human knowledge could be had by the Aristotelian method of demonstration,’ with comparatively slight regard to observation and experiment, to critical, historical, and a posteriori methods generally.

It may be asked: Seeing that St Thomas is so often at fault in matter where his doctrines have come under the test of modern experimental science and criticism, what confidence can be reposed in him on other points, where his conclusions lie beyond the reach of experience? To a Catholic the answer is simple enough; and it shall be given in St Thomas's own words: "Our faith reposes on the revelation made to the Apostles and Prophets who have written the Canonical Books, not on any revelation that may have been made to other Doctors" (Sum. Theol. I, q. 8 ad 2,—the context is worth reading). Our confidence is limited in conclusions of mere reason, by whomsoever drawn: our confidence is unlimited in matters of faith, as taught by the Church (B. I, Chapp.III-[518]VI). The practical value of the Summa contra Gentiles lies in its exposition of the origin, nature, duty, and destiny of man, according to the scheme of Catholic Christianity. That scheme stands whole and entire in the twentieth century as it stood in the thirteenth: in that, there is nothing to alter in the Contra Gentiles: it is as practical a book as ever it was. The debris are the debris of now worn-out human learning, which St Thomas used as the best procurable in his day, to encase and protect the structure of faith. Or, to express myself in terms of the philosophy of our day, dogma has not changed, but our apperception' of it, or the mental system' into which we receive it. So the Summa contra Gentiles stands, like the contemporary edifices of Ely and Lincoln: it stands, and it will stand, because it was built by a Saint and a man of genius on the rock of faith.

The Summa contra Gentiles is an historical monument of the first importance for the history of philosophy. In the variety of its contents, it is a perfect encyclopaedia of the learning of the day. By it we can fix the high water mark of thirteenth-century thought:—for it contains the lectures of a Doctor second to none in the greatest school of thought then flourishing, the University of Paris. It is by the study of such books that one enters into the mental life of the period at which they were written; not by the hasty perusal of Histories of Philosophy. No student of the Contra Gentiles is likely to acquiesce in the statement, that the Middle Ages were a time when mankind seemed to have lost the power of thinking for themselves. Mediaeval people thought for themselves, thoughts curiously different from ours, and profitable for us to study.

Lastly, the Summa contra Gentiles is mega tekmerion—considering the ravages of six and a half centuries of time upon what was once the most harmonious blending of faith with the science of the day,—it is a fact of solemn admonition to all Doctors and Professors of Philosophy and Theology within the Church of Christ, that they should be at least as solicitous as an English Dean and Chapter now are, for the keeping in yearly repair of the great edifice given over to their custody; that they should regard with watchful and intelligent eyes the advance of history, anthropology, criticism and physical science; and that in their own special sciences they should welcome, and make every sane endeavour to promote, what since 1845 has been known as the Development of Doctrine.

ON KINGSHIP

TO THE KING OF CYPRUS

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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ON KINGSHIP: TO THE KING OF CYPRUS

TO THE KING OF CYPRUS

[1] As I was turning over in my mind what I might present to Your Majesty as a gift at once worthy of Your Royal Highness and befitting my profession and office, it seemed to me a highly appropriate offering that, for a king, I should write a book on kingship, in which, so far as my ability permits, I should carefully expound, according to the authority of Holy Writ and the teachings of the philosophers as well as the practice of worthy princes, both the origin of kingly government and the things which pertain to the office of a king, relying for the beginning, progress and accomplishment of this work, on the help of Him, Who is King of Kings, Lord of Lords, through Whom kings rule, God the Mighty Lord, King great above all gods.

BOOK ONE

CHAPTER 1

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE WORD ‘KING’

[2] The first step in our undertaking must be to set forth what is to be understood by the term king.

[3] In all things which are ordered towards an end, wherein this or that course may be adopted, some directive principle is needed through which the due end may be reached by the most direct route. A ship, for example, which moves in different directions. according to the impulse of the changing winds, would never reach its destination were it not brought to port by the skill of the pilot. Now, man has an end to which his whole life and all his actions are ordered; for man is an intelligent agent, and it is clearly the part of an intelligent agent to act in view of an end. Men also adopt different methods in proceeding towards their proposed end, as the diversity of men’s pursuits and actions clearly indicates. Consequently man needs some directive principle to guide him towards his end.

[4] To be sure, the light of reason is placed by nature in every man, to guide him in his acts towards his end. Wherefore, if man were intended to live alone, as many animals do, he would require no other guide to his end. Each man would be a king unto himself, under God, the highest King, inasmuch as he would direct himself in his acts by the light of reason given him from on high. Yet it is natural for man, more than for any other animal, to be a social and political animal, Footnote to live in a group.

[5] This is clearly a necessity of man’s nature. Footnote For all other animals, nature has prepared food, hair as a covering, teeth, horns, claws as means of defence or at least speed in flight, while man alone was made without any natural provisions for these things. Instead of all these, man

was endowed with reason, by the use of which he could procure all these things for himself by the work of his hands. Now, one man alone is not able to procure them all for himself, for one man could not sufficiently provide for life, unassisted. It is therefore natural that man should live in the society of many.

[6] Moreover, all other animals are able to, discern, by inborn skill, what is useful and what is injurious, even as the sheep naturally regards the wolf as his enemy. Some animals also recognize by natural skill certain medicinal herbs and other things necessary for their life. Man, on the contrary, has a natural knowledge of the things which are essential for his. life only in a general fashion, inasmuch as he is able to attain knowledge of the particular things necessary for human life by reasoning from natural principles. But it is not possible for one man to arrive at a knowledge of all these things by his own individual reason. It is therefore necessary for man to live in a multitude so that each one may assist his fellows, and different men may be occupied in seeking, by their reason, to make different discoveries—one, for example, in medicine, one in this and another in that.

[7] This point is further and most plainly evidenced by the fact that the. use of speech is a prerogative proper to man. By this means, one man is able fully to express his conceptions to others. Other animals, it is true, express their feelings to one another in a general way, as a dog may express anger by barking and other animals give vent to other feelings in various fashions. But man communicates with his kind more completely than any other animal known to be gregarious, such as the crane, the ant or the bee. —With this in mind, Solomon says: “It is better that there be two than one; for they have the advantage of their company.”‘

[8] If, then, it is natural for man to live in the society of many, it is necessary that there exist among men some means by which the group may be governed. For where there are many men together and each one is looking after his own interest, the multitude would be broken up and scattered unless there were also an agency to take care of what appertains to the commonweal. In like manner, the body of a man or any other animal would disintegrate unless there were a general ruling force within the body which watches over the common good of all members. With this in mind, Solomon says [Eccl. 4:9]: “Where there is no governor, the people shall fall.”

[9] Indeed it is reasonable that this should happen, for what is proper and what is common are not identical. Things differ by what is proper to each: they are united by what they have in common. But diversity of effects is due to diversity of causes. Consequently, there must exist something which impels towards the common good of the many, over and above that which impels towards the particular good of each individual. Wherefore also in all things that are ordained towards one end, one thing is found to rule the rest. Thus in the corporeal universe, by the first body, i.e. the celestial body, the other bodies are regulated according to the order of Divine Providence; and all bodies are ruled by a rational creature. So, too in the individual man, the soul rules the body; and among the parts of the soul, the irascible and the concupiscible parts are ruled by reason. Likewise, among the members of a body, one, such as the heart or the head, is the principal and moves all the others. Therefore in every multitude there must be some governing power.

CHAPTER 2

DIFFERENT KINDS OF RULE

[10] Now it happens in certain things which are, ordained towards an end that one may proceed in a right way and also in a wrong way. So, too, in the government of a multitude there is a distinction between right and wrong. A thing is rightly directed when it is led towards a befitting end; wrongly when it is led towards an unbefitting end. Now the end which befits a multitude of free men is different from that which befits a multitude of slaves, for the free man is one who exists for his own sake, while the slave, as such, exists for the sake of another. If, therefore, a multitude of free men is ordered by the ruler towards the common good of the multitude, that rulership will be right and just, as is suitable to free men. If, on the other hand, a rulership aims, not at the common good of the multitude, but at the private good of the ruler, it will be an unjust and perverted rulership. The Lord, therefore, threatens such rulers, saying by the mouth of Ezekiel: “Woe to the shepherds that feed themselves (seeking, that is, their own interest) : should not the flocks be fed by the shepherd?” Shepherds indeed should seek the good of their flocks, and every ruler, the good of the multitude subject to him.

[11] If an unjust government is carried on by one man alone, Footnote who seeks his own benefit from his rule and not the good of the multitude subject to him, such a ruler is called a tyrant—a word derived from strength—because he oppresses by might instead of ruling by justice. Thus among the ancients all powerful men were called tyrants. If an. unjust government is carried on, not by one but by several, and if they be few, it is called an oligarchy, that is, the rule of a few. This occurs when a few, who differ from the tyrant only by the fact that they are more than one, oppress the people by means of their wealth. If, finally, the bad government is carried on by the

multitude, it is called a democracy, i.e. control by the populace, which comes about when the plebeian people by force of numbers oppress the rich. In this way the whole people will be as one tyrant.

[12] In like manner we must divide just governments. If the government is administered by many, it is given the name common to all forms of government, viz. polity, as for instance when a group of warriors exercise dominion over a city or province. If it is administered by a few men of virtue, this kind of government is called an aristocracy, i.e. noble governance, or governance by noble men, who for this reason are called the Optimates. And if a just government is in the hands of one man alone, he is properly called a king. Wherefore the Lord says by the mouth of Ezekiel:” “My servant, David, shall be king over them and all of them shall have one shepherd.”

[13] From this it is clearly shown that the idea of king implies that he be one man who is chief and that he be a shepherd, seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own.

[14] Now since man must live in a group, because he is not sufficient unto himself to procure the necessities of life were he to remain solitary, it follows that a society will be the more perfect the more it is sufficient unto itself to procure the necessities of life. Footnote There is, to some extent, sufficiency for life in one family of one household, namely, insofar as pertains to the natural acts of nourishment and the begetting of offspring and other things of this kind. Self-sufficiency exists, furthermore, in one street Footnote with regard to those things which belong to the trade of one guild. In a city, which is the perfect community, it exists with regard to all the necessities of life. Still more self-sufficiency is found in a province Footnote because of the need of fighting together and of mutual help against enemies. Hence the man ruling a perfect community, i.e. a city or a province, is antonomastically called the king. The ruler of a household is called father, not king, although he bears a certain resemblance to the king, for which reason kings are sometimes called the fathers of their peoples.

[15] It is plain, therefore, from what has been said, that a king is one who rules the people of one city or province, and rules them for the common good. Wherefore Solomon says [Eccl. 5:8]: “The king rules over all the land subject to him.”

CHAPTER 3

WHETHER IT IS MORE EXPEDIENT FOR A CITY OR PROVINCE TO BE RULED BY ONE MAN OR BY MANY

[16] Having set forth these preliminary points we must now inquire what is better for a province or a city: whether to be ruled by one man or by many.

[17] This question may be considered first from the viewpoint of the purpose of government. The aim of any ruler should be directed towards securing the welfare of that which he undertakes to rule. The duty of the pilot, for instance, is to preserve his ship amidst the perils of the sea. and to bring it unharmed to the port of safety. Now the welfare and safety of a multitude formed into a society lies in the preservation of its unity, which is called peace. If this is removed, the benefit of social life is lost and, moreover, the multitude in its disagreement becomes a burden to itself. The chief concern of the ruler of a multitude, therefore, is to procure the unity of peace. It is not even legitimate for him to deliberate whether he shall establish peace in the multitude subject to him, just as a physician does not deliberate whether he shall heal the sick man encharged to him, Footnote for no one should deliberate about an end which he is obliged to seek, but only about the means to attain that end. Wherefore the Apostle, having commended the unity of the faithful people, says: “Be ye careful to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace.” Thus, the more efficacious a. government is in keeping the unity of peace, the more useful it will be. For we call that more useful which leads more directly to the end. Now it is manifest that what is itself one can more efficaciously bring about unity than several—just as the most efficacious cause of heat is that which is by

its nature hot. Therefore the rule of one man is more useful than the rule of many.

[18] Furthermore, it is evident that several persons could by no means preserve the stability of the community if they totally disagreed. For union is necessary among them if they are to rule at all: several men, for instance, could not pull a ship in one direction unless joined together in some fashion. Now several are said to be united according as they come closer to being one. So one man rules better than several who come near being one.

[19] Again, whatever is in accord with nature is best, for in all things nature does what is best. Now, every natural governance is governance by one. In the multitude of bodily members there is one which is the principal mover, namely, the heart; and among the powers of the soul one power presides as chief, namely, the reason. Among bees there is one king bee' and in the whole universe there is One God, Maker and Ruler of all things. And there is a reason for this. Every multitude is derived from unity. Wherefore, if artificial things are an imitation of natural things' and a work of art is better according as it attains a closer likeness to what is in nature, it follows that it is best for a human multitude to be ruled by one person.

[20] This is also evident from experience. For provinces or cities which are not ruled by one person are torn with dissensions and tossed about without peace, so that the complaint seems to be fulfilled which the Lord uttered through the Prophet [Jer 12:10]: “Many pastors have destroyed my vineyard.” On the other hand, provinces and cities which are ruled under one king enjoy peace, flourish in justice, and delight in prosperity. Hence, the Lord by His prophets promises to His people as a great reward that He will give them one head and that “one Prince will be in the midst of them” [Ez 34:24, Jer 30:21].

CHAPTER 4

THAT THE DOMINION OF A TYRANT IS THE WORST

[21] Just as the government of a king is the best, so the government of a tyrant is the worst.

[22] For democracy stands in contrary opposition to polity, since both are governments carried on by many persons, as is clear from what has already been said; while oligarchy is the opposite of aristocracy, since both are governments carried on by a few persons; and kingship is the opposite of tyranny since both are carried on by one person. Now, as has been shown above, monarchy is the best government. If, therefore, "it is the contrary of the best that is worst." it follows that tyranny is the worst kind of government.

[23] Further, a united force is more efficacious in producing its effect than a force which is scattered or divided. Many persons together can pull a load which could not be pulled by each one taking his part separately and acting individually. Therefore, just as it is more useful for a force operating for a good to be more united, in order that it may work good more effectively, so a force operating for evil is more harmful when it is one than when it is divided. Now, the power of one who rules unjustly works to the detriment of the multitude, in that he diverts the common good of the multitude to his own benefit. Therefore, for the same reason that, in a just government, the government is better in proportion as the ruling power is one-thus monarchy is better than aristocracy, and aristocracy better than polity—so the contrary will be true of an unjust government, namely, that the ruling power will be more harmful in proportion as it is more unitary.

Consequently, tyranny is more harmful than oligarchy; and oligarchy more harmful than democracy.

[24] Moreover, a government becomes unjust by the fact that the ruler, paying no heed to the common good, seeks his own private good. Wherefore the further he departs from the common good the more unjust will his government be. But there is a greater departure from the common good in an oligarchy, in which the advantage of a few is sought, than in a democracy, in which the advantage of many is sought; and there is a still greater departure from the common good in a tyranny, where the advantage of only one man is sought. For a large number is closer to the totality than a small number, and a small number than only one. Thus, the government of a tyrant is the most unjust.

[25] The same conclusion is made clear to those who consider the order of Divine Providence, which disposes everything in the best way. In all things, good ensues from one perfect cause, i.e. from the totality of the conditions favourable to the production of the effect, while evil results from any one partial defect. There is beauty in a body when all its members are fittingly disposed; ugliness, on the other hand, arises when any one member is not fittingly disposed. Thus ugliness results in different ways from many causes; beauty in one way from one perfect cause. It is thus with all good and evil things, as if God so provided that good, arising from one cause, be stronger, and evil, arising from many causes, be weaker. It is expedient therefore that a just government be that of one man only in order that it may be stronger; however, if the government should turn away from justice, it is more expedient that it be a government by many, so that it may be weaker and the many may mutually hinder one another. Among unjust governments, therefore, democracy is the most tolerable, but the worst is tyranny.

[26] This same conclusion is also apparent if one considers the evils which come from tyrants. Since a tyrant, despising the common good, seeks his private interest, it follows that he will oppress his subjects in different ways according as he is dominated by different passions to acquire certain goods. The one who is enthralled by the passion of cupidity seizes the goods of his subjects; whence Solomon says [Prov 29:4]: “A just king sets up the land; a covetous man shall destroy it.” If he is dominated by the passion of anger, he sheds blood for nothing; whence it is said by Ezekiel: ‘

“Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood.” Therefore this kind of government is to be avoided as the Wise man admonishes [Sirach 9:13]: “Keep far from the man who has the power to kill,” because he kills not for justice’ sake but by his power, for the lust of his will. Thus there can be no safety. Everything is uncertain when there is a departure from justice. Nobody will be able firmly to state: This thing is such and such, when it depends upon the will of another, not to say upon his caprice. Nor does the tyrant merely oppress his subjects in corporal things but he also hinders their spiritual good. Those who seek more to use, than to be of use to, their subjects prevent all progress, suspecting all excellence in their subjects to be prejudicial to their own evil domination. For tyrants hold the good in greater suspicion than the wicked, and to them the valour of others is always fraught with danger.

[27] So the above-mentioned tyrants strive to prevent those of their subjects who have become virtuous from acquiring valour and high spirit in order that they may not want to cast off their iniquitous domination. They also see to it that there be no friendly relations among these so that they may not enjoy the benefits resulting from being on good terms with one another, for as long as one has no confidence in the other, no plot will be set up against the tyrant’s domination. Wherefore they sow discords among the people, foster any that have arisen, and forbid anything which furthers society and co-operation among men, such as marriage, company at table and anything of like character, through which familiarity and confidence are engendered among men. They moreover strive to prevent their subjects from becoming powerful and rich since, suspecting these to be as wicked as themselves, they fear their power and wealth; for the subjects might become harmful to them even as they are accustomed to use power and wealth to harm others. Footnote Whence in the Book of Job it is said of the tyrant [15:21]: “The sound of dread is always in his ears and when there is peace (that is, when there is no one to harm him), he always suspects treason.”

[28] It thus results that when rulers, who ought to induce their subjects to virtue,” are wickedly jealous of the virtue of their subjects and hinder it as much as they can, few virtuous men are found under the rule of tyrants. For, according to Aristotle’s sentence [Eth. III, 11: 1116a 20], brave men are found where brave men are honoured. And as Tullius says [Tuscul. Disp. I, 2, 4]: “Those who are despised by everybody are disheartened and flourish

but little.” It is also natural that men, brought up in fear, should become mean of spirit and discouraged in the face of any strenuous and manly task. This is shown by experience in provinces that have long been under tyrants. Hence the Apostle says to the Colossians: “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged.”

[29] So, considering these evil effects of tyranny King Solomon says [Prov 28:12]: “When the wicked reign, men are ruined” because, forsooth, through the wickedness of tyrants, subjects fall away from the perfection of virtue. And again he says [Prov 29:2]: “When the wicked rule the people shall mourn, as though led into slavery.” And again [Prov 28:28]: “When the wicked rise up men shall hide themselves”, that they may escape the cruelty of the tyrant. It is no wonder, for a man governing without reason, according to the lust of his soul, in no way differs from the beast. Whence Solomon says [Prov 28:15]: “As a roaring lion and a hungry bear, so is a wicked prince over the poor people.” Therefore men hide from tyrants as from cruel beasts and it seems that to be subject to a tyrant is the same thing as to lie prostrate beneath a raging beast.

CHAPTER 5

WHY THE ROYAL DIGNITY IS RENDERED HATEFUL TO THE SUBJECTS

[30] Because both the best and the worst government are latent in monarchy, i.e. in the rule of one man, the royal dignity is rendered hateful to many people on account of the wickedness of tyrants. Some men, indeed, whilst they desire to be ruled by a king, fall under the cruelty of tyrants, and not a few rulers exercise tyranny under the cloak of royal dignity.

[31] A clear example of this is found in the Roman Republic. When the kings had been driven out by the Roman people, because they could not bear the royal, or rather tyrannical, arrogance, they instituted consuls and other magistrates by whom they began to be ruled and guided. They changed the kingdom into an aristocracy, and, as Sallust relates [Bellum Catilinae VI, 7]: “The Roman city, once liberty was won, waxed incredibly strong and great in a remarkably short time.” For it frequently happens that men living under a king strive more sluggishly for the common good, inasmuch as they consider that what they devote to the common good, they do not confer upon themselves but upon another, under whose power they see the common goods to be. But when they see that the common good is not under the power of one man, they do not attend to it as if it belonged to another, but each one attends to it as if it were his own.

[32] Experience thus teaches that one city administered by rulers, changing annually, is sometimes able to do more than some kings having, perchance, two or three cities; and small services exacted by kings weigh more heavily than great burdens imposed by the community of citizens.

This held good in the history of the Roman Republic. The plebs were enrolled in the army and were paid wages for military service. Then when the common treasury was failing, private riches came forth for public uses, to such an extent that not even the senators retained any gold for themselves save one ring and the one bulla (the insignia of their dignity).

[33] On the other hand, when the Romans were worn out by continual dissensions taking on the proportion of civil wars, and when by these wars the freedom for which they had greatly striven was snatched from their hands, they began to find themselves under the power of emperors who, from the beginning, were unwilling to be called kings, for the royal name was hateful to the Romans. Some emperors, it is true, faithfully cared for the common good in a kingly manner, and by their zeal the commonwealth was increased and preserved. But most of them became tyrants towards their subjects while indolent and vacillating before their enemies, and brought the Roman commonwealth to naught.

[34] A similar process took place, also, among the Hebrew people. At first, while they were ruled by judges, they were ravished by their enemies on every hand, for each one "did what was good in his sight" (1 Sam 3:18). Yet when, at their own pressing, God gave them kings, they departed from the worship of the one God and were finally led into bondage, on account of the wickedness of their kings.

[351 Danger thus lurks on either side. Either men are held by the fear of a tyrant and they miss the opportunity of having that very best government which is kingship; or, they want a king and the kingly power turns into tyrannical wickedness.

CHAPTER 6

THAT IT IS A LESSER EVIL WHEN A MONARCHY TURNS INTO TYRANNY THAN WHEN AN ARISTOCRACY BECOMES CORRUPT

[36] When a choice is to be made between two things, from both of which danger impends, surely that one should be chosen from which the lesser evil follows. Now, lesser evil follows from the corruption of a monarchy (which is tyranny) than from the corruption of an aristocracy.

[37] Group government [polyarchy] most frequently breeds dissension. This dissension runs counter to the good of peace which is the principal social good. A tyrant, on the other hand, does not destroy this good, rather he obstructs one or the other individual interest of his subjects—unless, of course, there be an excess of tyranny and the tyrant rages against the whole community. Monarchy is therefore to be preferred to polyarchy, although either form of government might become dangerous.

[38] Further, that from which great dangers may follow more frequently is, it would seem, the more to be avoided. Now, considerable dangers to the multitude follow more frequently from polyarchy than from monarchy. There is a greater chance that, where there are many rulers, one of them will abandon the intention of the common good than that it will be abandoned when there is but one ruler. When any one among several rulers turns aside from the pursuit of the common good, danger of internal strife threatens the group because, when the chiefs quarrel, dissension will follow in the people. When, on the other hand, one man is in command, he more often keeps to governing for the sake of the common good. Should he not do so,

it does not immediately follow that he also proceeds to the total oppression of his subjects. This, of course, would be the excess of tyranny and the worst wickedness in government, as has been shown above. The dangers, then, arising from a polyarchy are more to be guarded against than those arising from a monarchy.

[39] Moreover, in point of fact, a polyarchy deviates into tyranny not less but perhaps more frequently than a monarchy. When, on account of there being many rulers, dissensions arise in such a government, it often happens that the power of one preponderates and he then usurps the government of the multitude for himself. This indeed may be clearly seen from history. There has hardly ever been a polyarchy that did not end in tyranny. The best illustration of this fact is the history of the Roman Republic. It was for a long time administered by the magistrates but then animosities, dissensions and civil wars arose and it fell into the power of the most cruel tyrants. In general, if one carefully considers what has happened in the past and what is happening in the present, he will discover that more men have held tyrannical sway in lands previously ruled by many rulers than in those ruled by one.

[40] The strongest objection why monarchy, although it is “the best form of government”, is not agreeable to the people is that, in fact, it may deviate into tyranny. Yet tyranny is wont to occur not less but more frequently on the basis of a polyarchy than on the basis of a monarchy. It follows that it is, in any case, more expedient to live under one king than under the rule of several men.

CHAPTER 7

HOW PROVISION MIGHT BE MADE THAT THE KING MAY NOT FALL INTO TYRANNY

[41] Therefore, since the rule of one man, which is the best, is to be preferred, and since it may happen that it be changed into a tyranny, which is the worst (all this is clear from what has been said), a scheme should be carefully worked out which would prevent the multitude ruled by a king from falling into the hands of a tyrant.

[42] First, it is necessary that the man who is raised up to be king by those whom it concerns should be of such condition that it is improbable that he should become a tyrant. Wherefore Daniel, commending the providence of God with respect to the institution of the king says [1 Sam 13:14]: “The Lord sought a man according to his own heart, and the Lord appointed him to be prince over his people.” Then, once the king is established, the government of the kingdom must be so arranged that opportunity to tyrannize is removed. At the same time his power should be so tempered that he cannot easily fall into tyranny. Footnote How these things may be done we must consider in what follows.

[43] Finally, provision must be made for facing the situation should the king stray into tyranny. Footnote

[44] Indeed, if there be not an excess of tyranny it is more expedient to tolerate the milder tyranny for a while than, by acting against the tyrant, to become involved in many perils more grievous than the tyranny itself. For it may happen that those who act against the tyrant are unable to prevail and the tyrant then will rage the more. But should one be able to prevail against

the tyrant, from this fact itself very grave dissensions among the people frequently ensue: the multitude may be broken up into factions either during their revolt against the tyrant, or in process of the organization of the government, after the tyrant has been overthrown. Moreover, it sometimes happens that while the multitude is driving out the tyrant by the help of some man, the latter, having received the power, thereupon seizes the tyranny. Then, fearing to suffer from another what he did to his predecessor, he oppresses his subjects with an even more grievous slavery. This is wont to happen in tyranny, namely, that the second becomes more grievous than the one preceding, inasmuch as, without abandoning the previous oppressions, he himself thinks up fresh ones from the malice of his heart. Whence in Syracuse, at a time when everyone desired the death of Dionysius, a certain old woman kept constantly praying that he might be unharmed and that he might survive her. When the tyrant learned this he asked why she did it. Then she said: “When I was a girl we had a harsh tyrant and I wished for his death; when he was killed, there succeeded him one who was a little harsher. I was very eager to see the end of his dominion also, and we began to have a third ruler still more harsh—that was you. So if you should be taken away, a worse would succeed in your place.” Footnote

[45] If the excess of tyranny is unbearable, some have been of the opinion that it would be an act of virtue for strong men to slay the tyrant and to expose themselves to the danger of death in order to set the multitude free. An example of this occurs even in the Old Testament, for a certain Aioth slew Eglon, King of Moab, who was oppressing the people of God under harsh slavery, thrusting a dagger into his thigh; and he was made a judge of the people [Judges 3:14 ff].

[46] But this opinion is not in accord with apostolic teaching. For Peter admonishes us to be reverently subject to our masters, not only to the good and gentle but also the froward [1 Pet 2:18-19]: “For if one who suffers unjustly bear his trouble for conscience’ sake, this is grace.” Wherefore, when many emperors of the Romans tyrannically persecuted the faith of Christ, a great number both of the nobility and the common people were converted to the faith and were praised for patiently bearing death for Christ. They did not resist although they were armed, and this is plainly manifested in the case of the holy Theban legion.” Aioth, then, must be

considered rather as having slain a foe than assassinated a ruler, however tyrannical, of the people. Hence in the Old Testament we also read that they who killed Joas, the king of Juda, who had fallen away from the worship of God, were slain and their children spared according to the precept of the law" (2 Sam 14:5-6).

[47] Should private persons attempt on their own private presumption to kill the rulers, even though tyrants, this would be dangerous for the multitude as well as for their rulers. This is because the wicked usually expose themselves to dangers of this kind more than the good, for the rule of a king, no less than that of a tyrant, is burdensome to them since, according to the words of Solomon [Prov 20:26]: "A wise king scatters the wicked." Consequently, by presumption of this kind, danger to the people from the loss of a good king would be more probable than relief through the removal of a tyrant.

[48] Furthermore, it seems that to proceed against the cruelty of tyrants is an action to be undertaken, not through the private presumption of a few, but rather by public authority.

[49] If to provide itself with a king belongs to the right of a given multitude, it is not unjust that the king be deposed or have his power restricted by that same multitude if, becoming a tyrant, he abuses the royal power. It must not be thought that such a multitude is acting unfaithfully in deposing the tyrant, even though it had previously subjected itself to him in perpetuity, because he himself has deserved that the covenant with his subjects should not be kept, since, in ruling the multitude, he did not act faithfully as the office of a king demands. Thus did the Romans, who had accepted Tarquin the Proud as their king, cast him out from the kingship on account of his tyranny and the tyranny of his sons; and they set up in their place a lesser power, namely, the consular power. Similarly Domitian, who had succeeded those most moderate emperors, Vespasian, his father, and Titus, his brother, was slain by the Roman senate when he exercised tyranny, and all his wicked deeds were justly, and profitably declared null and void by a decree of the senate. Thus it came about that Blessed John the Evangelist, the beloved disciple of God, who had been exiled to the island of Patmos by that very Domitian, was sent back to Ephesus by a decree of the senate. Footnote

[50] If, on the other hand, it pertains to the right of a higher authority to provide a king for a certain multitude, a remedy against the wickedness of a tyrant is to be looked for from him. Thus when Archelaus, who had already begun to reign in Judaea in the place of Herod his father, was imitating his father's wickedness, a complaint against him having been laid before Caesar Augustus by the Jews, his power was at first diminished by depriving him of his title of king and by dividing one-half of his kingdom between his two brothers. Later, since he was not restrained from tyranny even by this means, Tiberius Caesar sent him into exile to Lugdunum, a city in Gaul. Footnote

[51] Should no human aid whatsoever against a tyrant be forthcoming, recourse must be had to God, the King of all, Who is a helper in due time in tribulation. For it lies in his power to turn the cruel heart of the tyrant to mildness. According to Solomon [Prov 21:1]: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, withersoever He will He shall turn it." He it was who turned into mildness the cruelty of King Assuerus, who was preparing death for the Jews. He it was who so filled the cruel king Nabuchodonosor with piety that he became a proclaimer of the divine power. "Therefore," he said, "I, Nabuchodonosor do now praise and magnify and glorify the King of Heaven; because all His works are true and His ways judgments, and they that walk in pride He is able to abase" (Dan 4:34). Those tyrants, however, whom he deems unworthy of conversion, he is able to put out of the way or to degrade, according to the words of the Wise Man [Sirach 10:17]: "God has overturned the thrones of proud princes and has set up the meek in their stead." He it was who, seeing the affliction of his people in Egypt and hearing their cry, hurled Pharaoh, a tyrant over God's people, with all his army into the sea. He it was who not only banished from his kingly throne the above-mentioned Nabuchodonosor because of his former pride, but also cast him from the fellowship of men and changed him into the likeness of a beast. Indeed, his hand is not shortened that He cannot free His people from tyrants. For by Isaiah (14:3) He promised to give his people rest from their labours and lashings and harsh slavery in which they had formerly served; and by Ezekiel (34:10) He says: "I will deliver my flock from their mouth," i.e. from the mouth of shepherds who feed themselves.

[52] But to deserve to secure this benefit from God, the people must desist from sin, for it is by divine permission that wicked men receive

power to rule as a punishment for sin, as the Lord says by the Prophet Hosea [13:11]: “I will give you a king in my wrath” and it is said in Job (34:30) that he “makes a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people.” Sin must therefore be done away with in order that the scourge of tyrants may cease.

CHAPTER 8

THAT MUNDANE HONOUR AND GLORY ARE NOT AN ADEQUATE REWARD FOR A KING

[53] Since, according to what has been said thus far, it is the king’s duty to seek the good of the multitude, the task of a king may seem too burdensome unless some advantage to himself should result from it. It is fitting therefore to consider wherein a suitable reward for a good king is to be found.

[541 By some men this reward was considered to be nothing other than honour and glory. Whence Tullius says in the book On the Republic [De Republica V, 7, 9]: “The prince of the city should be nourished by glory,” and Aristotle seems to assign the reason for this in his Book on Ethics [V, 10: 1134b 7]: “because the prince for whom honour and glory is not sufficient consequently turns into tyrant.” For it is in the hearts of all men to seek their proper good. Therefore, if the prince is not content with glory and honour, he will seek pleasures an riches and so will resort to plundering and injuring his subjects.

[55] However, if we accept this opinion a great many incongruous results follow. In the first place, it would be costly to kings if so many labours and anxieties were to be endured for a reward so perishable, fo nothing, it seems, is more perishable among human things than the glory and honour of men’s favour since it depends upon the report of men and their opinions, than which nothing in human life is more fickle. And this is why the Prophet Isaiah calls such glory “the flower of grass.”

[56] Moreover, the desire for human glory takes away greatness of soul. For he who seeks the favour of men must serve their will in all he says and

does, and thus, while striving to please all, he becomes a slave to each one. Wherefore the same Tullius says in his book On Duties [De officiis, I, 20, 68] that “the inordinate desire for glory is to be guarded against; it takes away freedom of soul, for the sake of which high-minded men should put forth all their efforts.” Indeed there is nothing more becoming to a prince who has been set up for the doing of good works than greatness of soul. Thus, the reward of human glory is not enough for the services of a king.

[57] At the same time it also hurts the multitude if such a reward be set up for princes, for it is the duty of a good man to take no account of glory, just as he should take no account of other temporal goods. It is the mark of a virtuous and brave soul to despise glory as he despises life, for justice’ sake: whence the strange thing results that glory ensues from virtuous acts, and out of virtue glory itself is despised: and therefore, through his very contempt for glory, a man is made glorious—according to the sentence of Fabius: Footnote “He who scorns glory shall have true glory,” and as Sallust [Bellum Catilinae 54, 6] says of Cato: “The less he sought glory the more he achieved it.” Even the disciples of Christ “exhibited themselves as the ministers of God in honour and dishonour, in evil report and good report” (2 Cor 6:8). Glory is, therefore, not a fitting reward for a good man; good men spurn it. And, if it alone be set up as the reward for princes, it will follow that good men will not take upon themselves the chief office of the city, or if they take it, they will go unrewarded.

[58] Furthermore, dangerous evils come from the desire for glory. Many have been led unrestrainedly to seek glory in warfare, and have sent their armies and themselves to destruction, while the freedom of their country was turned into servitude under an enemy. Consider Torquatus, the Roman chief. In order to impress upon the people how imperative it is to avoid such danger, “he slew his own son who, being challenged by an enemy, had, through youthful impetuosity, fought and vanquished him. Yet he had done so contrary to orders given him by his father. Torquatus acted thus, lest more harm should accrue from the example of his son’s presumption than advantage from the glory of slaying the enemy.” [Cf. Augustine, De civ. Dei, V, 18.]

[59] Moreover, the desire for glory has another vice akin to it, namely, hypocrisy. Since it is difficult to acquire true virtues, to which alone honour and glory are due, and it is therefore the lot of but a few to attain them,

many who desire glory become simulators of virtue. On this account, as Sallust says [Bellum Catilinae 10, 5]: “Ambition drives many mortals to become false. They keep one thing shut up in their heart, another ready on the tongue, and they have more countenance than character.” But our Saviour also calls those persons hypocrites, or simulators, who do good works that they may be seen by men. Therefore, just as there is danger for the multitude, if the prince seek pleasures and riches as his reward, that he become a plunderer and abusive, so there is danger, if glory be assigned to him as reward, that he become presumptuous and a hypocrite.

[60] Looking at what the above-mentioned wise men intended to say, they do not seem to have decided upon honour and glory as the reward of a prince because they judged that the king’s intention should be principally directed to that object, but because it is more tolerable for him to seek glory than to desire money or pursue pleasure. For this vice is akin to virtue inasmuch as the glory which men desire, as Augustine says [De civ. Dei V, 12], is nothing else than the judgment of men who think well of men. So the desire for glory has some trace of virtue in it, at least so long as it seeks the approval of good men and is reluctant to displease them. Therefore, since few men reach true virtue, it seems more tolerable if one be set up to rule who, fearing the judgment of men, is restrained from manifest evils. For the man” who desires glory either endeavours to win the approval of men in the true way, by deeds of virtue, or at least strives for this by fraud and deceit. But if the one who desires to domineer lacks the desire for glory, he will have no fear of offending men of good judgment and will commonly strive to obtain what he chooses by the most open crimes. Thus he will surpass the beasts in the vices of cruelty and lust, as is evidenced in the case of the Emperor Nero, who was so effete, as Augustine says [loc. cit.], “that he despised everything virile, and yet so cruel that nobody would have thought him to be effeminate.” Indeed all this is quite clearly contained in what Aristotle says in his Ethics [IV, 7:1124a 16] regarding the magnanimous man: True, he does seek honour and glory, but not as something great which could be a sufficient reward of virtue. And beyond this he demands nothing more of men, for among all earthly goods the chief good, it seems, is this, that men bear testimony to the virtue of a man.

CHAPTER 9

THAT THE KING SHOULD LOOK TO GOD FOR ADEQUATE REWARD

[61] Therefore, since worldly honour and human glory are not a sufficient reward for royal cares, it remains to inquire what sort of reward is sufficient.

[62] It is proper that a king look to God for his reward, for a servant looks to his master for the reward of his service. The king is indeed the minister of God in governing the people, as the Apostle says: “All power is from the Lord God” (Rom 13:1) and God’s minister is “an avenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil” (Rom 13:4). And in the Book of Wisdom (6:5), kings are described as being ministers of God. Consequently, kings ought to look to God for the reward of their ruling. Now God sometimes rewards kings for their service by temporal goods, but such rewards are common to both the good and the wicked. Wherefore the Lord says to Ezechiel (29:18): “Nabuchodonosor, king of Babylon, has made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre, and there has been no reward given him nor his army for Tyre, for the service he rendered Me against it,” for that service namely, by which, according to the Apostle, power is “the minister of God and the avenger to execute wrath upon him who does evil.” Afterwards He adds, regarding the reward: “Therefore, thus says the Lord God, ‘I will set Nabuchodonosor the king of Babylon in the land of Egypt, and he shall rifle the spoils thereof, and it shall be wages for his army.’” Therefore, if God recompenses wicked kings who fight against the enemies of God, though not with the intention of serving Him but to execute their own hatred and cupidity, by giving them such great rewards as to yield them victory over their foes, subject kingdoms to their sway and grant them spoils to rifle,

what will He do for kings who rule the people of God and assail His enemies from a holy motive? He promises them not an earthly reward indeed but an everlasting one and in none other than in Himself. As Peter says to the shepherds of the people (1 Pet 5:2,4): “Feed the flock of God that is among you and when the prince of pastors shall appear (i.e. the King of kings, Christ) you shall receive a never-fading crown of glory,” concerning which Isaiah says (28:5): “The Lord shall be a crown of glory and a garland of joy to His people.”

[63] This is also clearly shown by reason. It is implanted in the minds of all who have the use of reason that the reward of virtue is happiness. The virtue of anything whatsoever is explained to be that which makes its possessor good and renders his deed good. Moreover, everyone strives by working well to attain that which is most deeply implanted in desire, namely, to be happy. This, no one is able not to wish. It is therefore fitting to expect as a reward for virtue that which makes man happy. Now, if to work well is a virtuous deed, and the king’s work is to rule his people well, then that which makes him happy will be the king’s reward. What this is has now to be considered.” Happiness, we say, is the ultimate end of our desires. Now the movement of desire does not go on to infinity else natural desire would be vain, for infinity cannot be traversed. Since, then, the desire of an intellectual nature is for universal good, that good alone can make it truly happy which, when attained, leaves no further good to be desired. Whence happiness is called the perfect good inasmuch as it comprises in itself all things desirable. But no earthly good is such a good. They who have riches desire to have more, they who enjoy pleasure desire to enjoy more, and the like is clear for the rest: and if they do not seek more, they at least desire that those they have should abide or that others should follow in their stead. For nothing permanent is found in earthly things. Consequently there is nothing earthly which can calm desire. Thus, nothing earthly can make man happy, so that it may be a fitting reward for a king.

[64] Again, the last perfection and perfect good of anything one chooses depends upon something higher, for even bodily things are made better by the addition of better things and worse by being mixed with baser things. If gold is mingled with silver, the silver is made better, while by an admixture of lead it is rendered impure. Now it is manifest that all earthly things are beneath the human mind. But happiness is the last perfection and the perfect

good of man, which all men desire to reach. Therefore there is no earthly thing which could make man happy, nor is any earthly thing a sufficient reward for a king. For, as Augustine" says, "we do not call Christian princes happy merely because they have reigned a long time, or because after a peaceful death they have left their sons to rule, or because they subdued the enemies of the state, or because they were able to guard against or to suppress citizens who rose up against them. Rather do we call them happy if they rule justly, if they prefer to rule their passions rather than nations, and if they do all things not for the love of vainglory but for the love of eternal happiness. Such Christian emperors we say are happy, now in hope, afterwards in very fact when that which we await shall come to pass. But neither is there any other created thing which would make a man happy and which could be set up as the reward for a king. For the desire of each thing tends towards its source, whence is the cause of its being. But the cause of the human soul is none other than God Who made it to His own image. Therefore it is God alone Who can still the desires of man and make him happy and be the fitting reward for a king.

[65] Furthermore, the human mind knows the universal good through the intellect, and desires it through the will: but the universal good is not found except in God. Therefore there is nothing which could make man happy, fulfilling his every desire, but God, of Whom it is said in the Psalm (102:5): "Who satisfies your desire with good things." In this, therefore, should the king place his reward. Wherefore, King David," with this in mind, said (Ps 72:25,28): "What have I in heaven? And besides You what do I desire upon earth?" and he afterwards adds in answer to this question: "It is good for me to adhere to my God and to put my hope in the Lord God." For it is He Who gives salvation to kings, not merely temporal salvation by which He saves both men and beasts together, but also that salvation of which He says by the mouth of Isaiah (51:6): "But my salvation shall be for ever," that salvation by which He saves man and makes them equal to the angels.

[66] It can thus also be verified that the reward of the king is honour and glory. What worldly and frail honour can indeed be likened to this honour that a man be made a "citizen with the Saints and a kinsman of God" (Eph 2:19), numbered among the sons of God, and that he obtain the inheritance of the heavenly kingdom with Christ? This is the honour of which King David, in desire and wonder, says (Ps 138:17): "Your friends, O God, are

made exceedingly honourable.” And further, what glory of human praise can be compared to this, not uttered by the false tongue of flatterers nor the fallacious opinion of men, but issuing from the witness of our inmost conscience and confirmed by the testimony of God, Who promises to those who confess Him that He will confess them before the Angels of God in the glory of the Father? They who seek this glory will find it and they will win the glory of men which they do not seek: witness Solomon, who not only received from the Lord wisdom which he sought, but was made glorious above other kings.

CHAPTER 10

WHAT DEGREE OF HEAVENLY BEATITUDE THE KING MAY OBTAIN

[67] Now it remains further to consider that they who discharge the kingly office worthily and laudably will obtain an elevated and outstanding degree of heavenly happiness.

[68] For if happiness is the reward of virtue, it follows that a higher degree of happiness is due to greater virtue. Now, that indeed is signal virtue by which a man can guide not only himself but others, and the more persons he rules the greater his virtue. Similarly, in regard to bodily strength, a man is reputed to be more powerful the more adversaries he can beat or the more weights he can lift. Thus, greater virtue is required to rule a household than to rule one's self, and much greater to rule a city and a kingdom. To discharge well the office of a king is therefore a work of extraordinary virtue. To it, therefore, is due an extraordinary reward of happiness.

[69] Again, those who rule others well are more worthy of praise than those who act well under others' direction. This applies to the field of all arts and sciences. In the speculative sciences, for instance, it is nobler to impart truth to others by teaching than to be able to grasp what is taught by others. So, too, in matters of the crafts, an architect who plans a building is more highly esteemed and paid a higher wage than is the builder who does the manual labour under his direction; also, in warfare the strategy of the general wins greater glory from victory than the bravery of the soldier. Now the ruler of a multitude stands in the same relation to the virtuous deeds performed by each individual as the teacher to the matters taught the architect to the buildings, and the general to the wars. Consequently, the

king is worthy of a greater reward if he governs his subjects well than any of his subjects who act well under him.

[70] Further, if it is the part of virtue to render a man's work good, it is, it seems, from greater virtue that one does greater good. But the good of the multitude is greater and more divine than the good of one man. Wherefore the evil of one man is sometimes endured if it redounds to the good of the multitude, as when a robber is killed to bring peace to the multitude. God Himself would not allow evils to be in the world were it not for the fact that He brings good out of them for the advantage and beauty of the universe. Now it belongs to the office of the king to have zealous concern for the good of the multitude. Therefore a greater reward is due to the king for good ruling than to the subject for acting according to rule.

[71] This will become clearer if considered in greater detail. For a private person is praised by men, and his deed reckoned for reward by God, if he helps the needy, brings peace to those in discord, rescues one oppressed by a mightier; in a word, if in any way he gives to another assistance or advice for his welfare How much the more, then, is he to be praised by men and rewarded by God who makes a whole province rejoice in peace, who restrains violence, preserves justice and arranges by his laws and precepts what is to be done by men?

[72] The greatness of kingly virtue also appears in this, that he bears a special likeness to God, since he does in his kingdom what God does in the world; wherefore in Exodus (22:9) the judges of the people are called gods, and also among the Romans the emperors received the appellative Divus. Now the more a thing approaches to the likeness of God the more acceptable it is to Him. Hence, also, the Apostle urges (Eph 5:1): "Be therefore imitators of God as most dear children." But if according to the saying of the Wise Man (Sirach 13:9), every beast loves its like inasmuch as causes bear some likeness to the caused, it follows that good kings are most pleasing to God and are to be most highly rewarded by Him.

[73] Likewise, if I may use the words of Gregory [Regula Pastoralis I, 9]: "What else is it (for a king) to be at the pinnacle of power if not to find himself in a mental storm? When the sea is calm even an inexperienced man can steer a ship straight; when the sea is troubled by stormy waves, even an experienced sailor is bewildered. Whence it frequently happens that in the business of government the practice of good works is lost which in

tranquil times was maintained.” For, as Augustine says [De civ. Dei V, 24], it is very difficult for rulers “not to be puffed up amid flattering and honouring tongues and the obsequiousness of those who bow too humbly, but to remember that they are men.” It is said also in Sirach (31:8,10): “Blessed is the rich man who has not gone after gold nor put his trust in money nor in treasures, who could have transgressed with impunity and did not transgress, who could do evil and did not do it.” Wherefore, having been tried in the work of virtue, he is found faithful and so, according to the proverb of Bias [Aristotle, Eth. Nic. V, 3: 1130a 1]: “Authority shows the man.” For many who seemed virtuous while they were in lowly state fall from virtue when they reach the pinnacle of power. The very difficulty, then, of acting well, which besets kings, makes them more worthy of greater reward; and if through weakness they sometimes do amiss, they are rendered more excusable before men and more easily obtain forgiveness from God provided, as Augustine says (De civ. Dei, V, 24), they do not neglect to offer up to their true God the sacrifice of humility, mercy, and prayer for their sins. As an example of this, the Lord said to Elias concerning Achab, king of Israel, who had sinned a great deal: “Because he has humbled himself for My sake, I will not bring the evil in his days.”

[74] That a very high reward is due to kings is not only demonstrated by reason but is also confirmed by divine authority. It is said in the prophecy of Zachariah (12:8) that, in that day of blessedness wherein God will be the protector of the inhabitants of Jerusalem (i.e. in the vision of eternal peace), the houses of others will be as the house of David, because all will then be kings and reign with Christ as the members with their head. But the house of David will be as the house of God, because just as he carried out the work of God among the people by ruling faithfully, so in his reward he will adhere more closely to God. Likewise, among the Gentiles this was dimly realized, as in a dream, for they thought to transform into gods the rulers and preservers of their cities.

CHAPTER 11

WHAT ADVANTAGES WHICH ARE RENDERED TO KINGS ARE LOST BY THE TYRANT

[75] Since such a magnificent reward in heavenly blessedness is in store for kings who have acted well in ruling, they ought to keep careful watch over themselves in order not to turn to tyranny. Nothing, indeed, can be more acceptable to them than to be transferred from the royal honour, to which they are raised on earth, into the glory of the heavenly kingdom. Tyrants, on the contrary, who desert justice for a few earthly advantages, are deprived of such a great reward which they could have obtained by ruling justly. How foolish it is to sacrifice the greatest and eternal goods for trifling, temporal goods is clear to everyone but a fool or an infidel.

[76] It is to be added further, however, that the very temporal advantages for which tyrants abandon justice work to the greater profit of kings when they observe justice.

[77] First of all, among all worldly things there is nothing which seems worthy to be preferred to friendship. Friendship unites good men and preserves and promotes virtue. Friendship is needed by all men in whatsoever occupations they engage. In prosperity it does not thrust itself unwanted upon us, nor does it desert us in adversity. It is what brings with it the greatest delight, to such an extent that all that pleases is changed to weariness when friends are absent, and all difficult things are made easy and as nothing by love. There is no tyrant so cruel that friendship does not bring him pleasure. When Dionysius, sometime tyrant of Syracuse, wanted to kill one of two friends, Damon and Pythias, the one who was to be killed

asked leave to go home and set his affairs in order, and the other friend surrendered himself to the tyrant as security for his return. When the appointed day was approaching and he had not yet returned, everyone said that his hostage was a fool, but he declared he had no fear whatever regarding his friend’s loyalty. The very hour when he was to be put to death, his friend returned. Admiring the courage of both, the tyrant remitted the sentence on account of the loyalty of their friendship, and asked in addition that they should receive him as a third member in their bond of friendship. [Cf. Valerius Maximus IV, 7, Ext. 1; Vincent of Beauvais, Specul. Doctrinale V, 84.]

[78] Yet, although tyrants desire this very benefit of friendship, they cannot obtain it, for when they seek their own good instead of the common good there is little or no communion between them and their subjects. Now all friendship is concluded upon the basis of something common among those who are to be friends, for we see that those are united in friendship who have in common either their natural origin, or some similarity in habits of life, or any kind of social interests. Consequently there can be little or no friendship between tyrants and their subjects. When the latter are oppressed by tyrannical injustice and feel they are not loved but despised, they certainly do not conceive any love, for it is too great a virtue for the common man to love his enemies and to do good to his persecutors. Nor have tyrants any reason to complain of their subjects if they are not loved by them, since they do not act towards them in such a way that they ought to be loved by them. Good kings, on the contrary, are loved by many when they show that they love their subjects and are studiously intent on the common welfare, and when their subjects can see that they derive many benefits from this zealous care. For to hate their friends and return evil for good to their benefactors—this, surely, would be too great a malice to ascribe fittingly to the generality of men.

[79] The consequence of this love is that the government of good kings is stable, because their subjects do not refuse to expose themselves to any danger whatsoever on behalf of such kings. An example of this is to be seen in Julius Caesar who, as Suetonius relates [Divus Iulius 67], loved his soldiers to such an extent that when he heard that some of them were slaughtered, “he refused to cut either hair or beard until he had taken vengeance.” In this way, he made his soldiers most loyal to himself as well

as most valiant, so that many, on being taken prisoner, refused to accept their lives when offered them on the condition that they serve against Caesar. Octavianus Augustus, also, who was most moderate in his use of power, was so loved by his subjects that some of them “on their deathbeds provided in their wills a thank-offering to be paid by the immolation of animals, so grateful were they that the emperor’s life outlasted their own” [Suetonius, Divus Augustus 59]. Therefore it is no easy task to shake the government of a prince whom the people so unanimously love. This is why Solomon says (Prov 29:14): “The king that judgeth the poor in justice, his throne shall be established forever.”

[80] The government of tyrants, on the other hand, cannot last long because it is hateful to the multitude, and what is against the wishes of the multitude cannot be long preserved. For a man can hardly pass through this present life without suffering some adversities, and in the time of his adversity occasion cannot be lacking to rise against the tyrant; and when there is an opportunity there will not be lacking at least one of the multitude to use it. Then the people will fervently favour the insurgent, and what is attempted with the sympathy of the multitude will not easily fail of its effects. It can thus scarcely come to pass that the government of a tyrant will endure for a long time.

[81] This is very clear, too, if we consider the means by which a tyrannical government is upheld. It is not upheld by love, since there is little or no bond of friendship between the subject multitude and the tyrant, as is evident from what we have said. On the other Aand, tyrants cannot rely on the loyalty of their subjects, for such a degree of virtue is not found among the generality of men, that they should be restrained by the virtue of fidelity from throwing off the yoke of unmerited servitude, if they are able to do so. Nor would it perhaps be a violation of fidelity at all, according to the opinion of many,’ to frustrate the wickedness of tyrants by any means whatsoever. It remains, then, that the government of a tyrant is maintained by fear alone and consequently they strive with all their might to be feared by their subjects. Fear, however, is a weak support. Those who are kept down by fear will rise against their rulers if the opportunity ever occurs when they can hope to do it with impunity, and they will rebel against their rulers all the more furiously the more they have been kept in subjection against their will by fear alone, just as water confined under pressure flows

with greater impetus when. it finds an outlet. That very fear itself is not without danger, because many become desperate from excessive fear, and despair of safety impels a man boldly to dare anything. Therefore the government of a tyrant cannot be of long duration.

[82] This appears clearly from examples no less than from reason. If we scan the history of antiquity and the events of modern times, we shall scarcely find one government of a tyrant which lasted a long time. So Aristotle, in his Politics [V, 12: 1315b 11-39], after enumerating many tyrants, shows that all their governments were of short duration; although some of them reigned a fairly long time because they were not very tyrannical but in many things imitated the moderation of kings.

[83] All this becomes still more evident if we consider the divine judgment, for, as we read in Job (24:30), "He makes a man who is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people." No one, indeed, can be more truly called a hypocrite than the man who assumes the office of king and acts like a tyrant, for a hypocrite is one who mimics the person of another, as is done on the stage. Hence God permits tyrants to get into power to punish the sins of the subjects. In Holy Scripture it is customary to call such punishment the anger of God. Thus in Hosea (13:11) the Lord says: "I will give you a king in my wrath." Unhappy is a king who is given to the people in God's wrath, for his power cannot be stable, because "God does not forgets to show mercy nor does He shut up His mercies in His anger" (Ps 76:10). On the contrary, as we read in Joel (2:13): "He is patientand rich in mercy and ready to repent of the evil." So God does not permit tyrants to reign a long time, but after the storm brought on the people through these tyrants, He restores transquillity by casting them down. Therefore the Wise Man" says (Sirach 10:17): "God has overturned the thrones of proud princes and hath set up the meek in their stead."

[84] Experience further shows that kings acquire more wealth through justice than tyrants do through rapine. Because the government of tyrants is displeasing to the multitude subject to it, tyrants must have a great many satellites to safeguard themselves against their subjects. On these it is necessary to spend more than they can rob from their subjects. On the contrary, the government of kings, since it is pleasing to their subjects, has for its protection, instead of hirelings, all the subjects. And they demand no pay but, in time of need, freely give to their kings more than the tyrants can

take. Thus the words of Solomon are fulfilled (Prov 11:24): “Some (namely, the kings) distribute their own goods (doing good to their subjects) and grow richer; others (namely, the tyrants) take away what is not their own and are always in want.” In the same way it comes to pass, by the just judgment of God, that those who unjustly heap up riches, uselessly scatter them or are justly deprived of them. For, as Solomon says (Eccles. 5:9): “A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money and he who loves riches shall reap no fruit from them.” Rather, we read in Proverbs (15:27): “He who is greedy of gain troubles his own house.” But to kings who seek justice, God gives wealth, as He did to Solomon who, when he sought wisdom to do justice, received a promise of an abundance of wealth.”

[85] It seems superfluous to speak about fame, for who can doubt that good kings live in a sense in the praises of men, not only in this life, but still more, after their death, and that men yearn for them? But the name of wicked kings straightway vanishes or, if they have been excessive in their wickedness, they are remembered with execration. Thus Solomon says (Prov 10:7): “The memory of the just is with praises, and the name of the wicked shall rot,” either because it vanishes or it remains with stench.

CHAPTER 12

WHAT PUNISHMENTS ARE IN STORE FOR A TYRANT

[86] From the above arguments it is evident that stability of power, wealth, honour and fame come to fulfil the desires of kings rather than tyrants, and it is in seeking to acquire these things unduly that princes turn to tyranny. For no one falls away from justice except through a desire for some temporal advantage.

[87] The tyrant, moreover, loses the surpassing beatitude which is due as a reward to kings and, which is still more serious, brings upon himself great suffering as a punishment. For if the man who despoils a single man, or casts him into slavery, or kills him, deserves the greatest punishment (death in the judgment of men, and in the judgment of God eternal damnation), how much worse tortures must we consider a tyrant deserves, who on all sides robs everybody, works against the common liberty of all, and kills whom he will at his merest whim?

[88] Again, such men rarely repent; but puffed up by the wind of pride, deservedly abandoned by God for their sins, and besmirched by the flattery of men, they can rarely make worthy satisfaction. When will they ever restore all those things which they have received beyond their just due? Yet no one doubts that they are bound to restore those ill-gotten goods. When will they make amends to those whom they have oppressed and unjustly injured in their many ways?

[89] The malice of their impenitence is increased by the fact that they consider everything licit which they can do unresisted and with impunity. Hence they not only make no effort to repair the evil they have done but, taking their customary way of acting as their authority, they hand on their

boldness in sinning to posterity. Consequently they are held guilty before God, not only for their own sins, but also for the crimes of those to whom they gave the occasion of sin.

[90] Their sin is made greater also from the dignity of the office they have assumed. Just as an earthly king inflicts a heavier punishment upon his ministers if he finds them traitors to him, so God will punish more severely those whom He made the executors and ministers of His government if they act wickedly, turning God’s judgment into bitterness. Hence, in the Book of Wisdom (6:5-7), the following words are addressed to wicked kings: “Because being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly nor kept the law of justice nor walked according to the will of God, horribly and speedily will He appear to you, for a most severe judgment shall be for them that bear rule; for to him that is little, mercy is granted, but the mighty shall be mightily tormented.” And to Nabuchodonosor it is said by Isaiah (14:15-16): “But you shall yet be brought down to hell, into the depth of the pit. They who see you shall turn toward you and gaze on you” as one more deeply buried in punishments.

[91] So, then, if to kings an abundance of temporal goods is given and an eminent degree of beatitude prepared for them by God, while tyrants are often prevented from obtaining even the temporal goods which they covet, subjected also to many dangers and, worse still, deprived of eternal happiness and destined for most grievous punishment, surely those who undertake the office of ruling must earnestly strive to act as kings towards their subjects, and not as tyrants.

[92] What has been said hitherto should suffice in order to show what a king is, and that it is good for the multitude to have a king, and also that it is expedient for a ruler to conduct himself towards the multitude of his subjects as a king, not as a tyrant.

CHAPTER 13

ON THE DUTIES OF A KING

[93] The next point to be Considered is what the kingly office is and what qualities the king should have. Since things which are in accordance with art are an imitation of the things which are in accordance with nature (from which we accept the rules to act according to reason), it seems best that we learn about the kingly office from the pattern of the regime of nature. Footnote

[94] In things of nature there is both a universal and a particular government. The former is God's government Whose rule embraces all things and Whose providence governs them all. The latter is found in man and it is much like the divine government. Hence man is called a microcosm. Footnote Indeed there is a similitude between both governments in regard to their form; for just as the universe of corporeal creatures and all spiritual powers come under the divine government, in like manner the members of the human body and all the powers of the soul are governed by reason. Thus, in a proportionate manner, reason is to man what God is to the world. Since, however, man is by nature a social animal living in a multitude, as we have pointed out above,' the analogy with the divine government is found in him not only in this way that one man governs himself by reason, but also in that the multitude of men is governed by the reason of one man. This is what first of all constitutes the office of a king. True, among certain animals that live socially there is a likeness to the king's rulership; so we say that there are kings among bees. Yet animals exercise rulership not through reason but through their natural instinct which is implanted in them by the Great Ruler the Author of nature.

[95] Therefore let the king recognize that such is the office which he undertakes, namely, that he is to be in the kingdom what the soul is in the

body, and what God is in the world.’ If he reflect seriously upon this, a zeal for justice will be enkindled in him when he contemplates that he has been appointed to this position in place of God, to exercise judgment in his kingdom; further, he will acquire the gentleness of clemency and mildness when he considers as his own members those individuals who are subject to his rule.

CHAPTER 14

WHAT IT IS INCUMBENT UPON A KING TO DO AND HOW HE SHOULD GO ABOUT DOING IT

[96] Let us then examine what God does in the world, for in this way we shall be able to see what it is incumbent upon a king to do.

[97] Looking at the world as a whole, there are two works of God to be considered: the first is creation; the second, God’s government of the things created. These two works are, in like manner, performed by the soul in the body since, first, by the virtue of the soul the body is formed, and then the latter is governed and moved by the soul.

[98] Of these works, the second more properly pertains to the office of kingship. Therefore government belongs to all kings (the very name rex is derived from the fact that they direct the government), while the first work does not fall to all kings, for not all kings establish the kingdom or city in which they rule but bestow their regal care upon a kingdom or city already established. We must remember, however, that if there were no one to establish the city or kingdom,’ there would be no question of governing the kingdom. The very notion of kingly office, then, comprises the establishment of a city and kingdom, and some kings have indeed established cities in which to rule; for example, Ninus founded Ninevah, and Romulus, Rome. It pertains also to the governing office to preserve the things governed, and to use them for the purpose for which they were established. If, therefore, one does not know how a kingdom is established, one cannot fully understand the task of its government.

[99] Now, from the example of the creation of the world one may learn how a kingdom is established. In creation we may consider, first, the production of things; secondly, the orderly distinction of the parts of the world. Further, we observe that different species of things are distributed in different parts of the world: stars in the heavens, fowls in the air, fishes in the water, and animals on land. We notice further that, for each species, the things it needs are abundantly provided by the Divine Power. Moses has minutely and carefully set forth this plan of how the world was made. First of all, he sets forth the production of things in these words: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Gen 1:1). Next, he declares that all things were distinguished from one another by God according to a suitable order: day from night, higher things from lower, the sea from the dry land. He next relates that the sky was adorned with luminaries, the air with birds, the sea with fishes, the earth with animals; finally, dominion over earth and animals was given to men. He further states that, by Divine Providence, plants were made for the use of men and the other animals.

[100] Of course the founder of a city and kingdom cannot produce anew men, places in which to dwell, and the other necessities of life. He has to make use of those which already exist in nature, just as the other arts derive the material for their work from nature; as, for example, the smith takes iron, the builder wood and stone, to use in their respective arts. Therefore the founder of a city and kingdom must first choose a suitable place which will preserve the inhabitants by its healthfulness, provide the necessities of life by its fruitfulness, please them with its beauty, and render them safe from their enemies by its natural protection. If any of these advantages be lacking, the place will be more or less convenient in proportion as it offers more or less of the said advantages, or the more essential of them. Next, the founder of a city and kingdom must mark out the chosen place according to the exigencies of things necessary for the perfection of the city and kingdom. For example, when a kingdom is to be founded, he will have to determine which place is suitable for establishing cities, and which is best for villages and hamlets, where to locate the places of learning, the military training camps, the markets—and so on with other things which the perfection of the kingdom requires. And if it is a question of founding a city, he will have to determine what site is to be assigned to the churches,

the law courts, and the various trades! Furthermore, he will have to gather together the men, who must be apportioned suitable locations according to their respective occupations. Finally, he must provide for each one what is necessary for his particular condition and state in life; otherwise, the kingdom or city could never endure.

[101] These are, briefly, the duties that pertain to the office of king in founding a city and kingdom, as derived from a comparison with the creation of the world.

CHAPTER 15

THAT THE OFFICE OF GOVERNING THE KINGDOM SHOULD BE LEARNED FROM THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT

[102] Just as the founding of a city or kingdom may suitably be learned from the way in which the world was created, so too the way to govern may be learned from the divine government of the world.

[103] Before going into that, however, we should consider that to govern is to lead the thmig governed in a suitable way towards its proper end. Thus a ship is said to be governed when, through the skill of the pilot, it is brought unharmed and by a direct route to harbour. Consequently, if a thing be directed to an end outside itself (as a ship to the harbour), it is the governor's duty, not only to preserve the thing unharmed, but further to guide it towards this end. If, on the contrary, there be a thing whose end is not outside itself, then the governor's endeavours will merely tend to preserve the thing undamaged in its proper perfection.

[104] Nothing of this kind is to be found in reality, except God Himself, Who is the end of all. However, as concerns the thing which is directed to an end outside itself, care is exercised by different providers in different ways. One might have the task of preserving a thing in its being, another of bringing it to a further perfection. Such is clearly the case in the example of the ship; (the first meaning of the word gubernator [governor] is pilot.) It is the carpenter's business to repair anything which might be broken, while the pilot bears the responsibility of bringing the ship to port. It is the same with man. The doctor sees to it that a man's life is preserved; the tradesman

supplies the, necessities of life; the teacher takes care that man may learn the truth; and the tutor sees that he lives according to reason.

[105] Now if man were not ordained to another end outside himself, the above-mentioned cares would be sufficient for him. But as long as man's mortal life endures there is an extrinsic good for him, namely, final beatitude which is looked for after death in the enjoyment of God, for as the Apostle' says (2 Cor 5:6): "As long as we are in the body we are far from the Lord." Consequently the Christian man, for whom that beatitude has been purchased by the blood of Christ, and who, in order to attain it, has received the earnest of the Holy Spirit, needs another and spiritual care to direct him to the harbour of eternal salvation, and this care is provided for the faithful by the ministers of the church of Christ.

[106] Now the same judgment is to be formed about the end of society as a whole as about the end of one man. If, therefore, the ultimate end of man were some good that existed in himself, then the ultimate end of the multitude to be governed would likewise be for the multitude to acquire such good, and persevere in its possession. If such an ultimate end either of an individual man or a multitude were a corporeal one, namely, life and health of body, to govern would then be a physician's charge. If that ultimate end were an abundance of wealth, then knowledge of economics would have the last word in the community's government. If the good of the knowledge of truth were of such a kind that the multitude might attain to it, the king would have to be a teacher. It is, however, clear that the end of a multitude gathered together is to live virtuously. For men form a group for the purpose of living well Footnote together, a thing which the individual man living alone could not attain, and good life is virtuous life. Therefore, virtuous life is the end for which men gather together. The evidence for this lies in the fact that only those who render mutual assistance to one another in living well form a genuine part of an assembled multitude. If men assembled merely to live, then animals and slaves would form a part of the civil community. Or, if men assembled only to accrue wealth, then all those who traded together would belong to one city. Yet we see that only such are regarded as forming one multitude as are directed by the same laws and the same government to live well.

[107] Yet through virtuous living man is further ordained to a higher end, which consists in the enjoyment of God, as we have said above.

Consequently, since society must have the same end as the individual man, it is not the ultimate end of an assembled multitude to live virtuously, but through virtuous living to attain to the possession of God.

[108] If this end could be attained by the power of human nature, then the duty of a king would have to include the direction of men to it. We are supposing, of course, that he is called king to whom the supreme power of governing in human affairs is entrusted. Now the higher the end to which a government is ordained, the loftier that government is. Indeed, we always find that the one to whom it pertains to achieve the final end commands those who execute the things that are ordained to that end. For example, the captain, whose business it is to regulate navigation, tells the shipbuilder what kind of ship he must construct to be suitable for navigation; and the ruler of a city, who makes use of arms, tells the blacksmith what kind of arms to make. But because a man does not attain his end, which is the possession of God, by human power but by divine according to the words of the Apostle (Rom 6:23): “By the grace of God life everlasting”—therefore the task of leading him to that last end does not pertain to human but to divine government.

[109] Consequently, government of this kind pertains to that king who is not only a man, but also God, namely, our Lord Jesus Christ, Who by making men sons of God brought them to the glory of Heaven. This then is the government which has been delivered to Him and which “shall not be destroyed” (Dan 7:14), on account of which He is called, in Holy Writ, not Priest only, but King. As Jeremiah says (23:5): “The king shall reign and he shall be wise.” Hence a royal priesthood is derived from Him, and what is more, all those who believe in Christ, in so far as they are His members, are called kings and priests.

[110] Thus, in order that spiritual things might be distinguished from earthly things, the ministry of this kingdom has been entrusted not to earthly kings but to priests, and most of all to the chief priest, the successor of St. Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Roman Pontiff. To him all the kings of the Christian People Footnote are to be subject as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. Footnote For those to whom pertains the care of intermediate ends should be subject to him to whom pertains the care of the ultimate end, and be directed by his rule.

[111] Because the priesthood of the gentiles and the whole worship of their gods existed merely for the acquisition of temporal goods (which were all ordained to the common good of the multitude, whose care devolved upon the king), the priests of the gentiles were very properly subject to the kings. Similarly, since in the old law earthly goods were promised to the religious people (not indeed by demons but by the true God), the priests of the old law, we read, were also subject to the kings. But in the new law there is a higher priesthood by which men are guided to heavenly goods. Consequently, in the law of Christ, kings must be subject to priests.

[112] It was therefore also a marvellous disposition of Divine Providence that, in the city of Rome, which God had foreseen would be the principal seat of the Christian priesthood, the custom was gradually established that the rulers of the city should be subject to the priests, for as Valerius Maximus relates [De Bello Gallico VI, 13, 5]: “Our city has always considered that everything should yield precedence to religion, even those things in which it aimed to display the splendour of supreme majesty. We therefore unhesitatingly made the imperial dignity minister to religion, considering that the empire would thus hold control of human affairs if faithfully and constantly it were submissive to the divine power.

[113] And because it was to come to pass that the religion of the Christian priesthood should especially thrive in France, God provided that among the Gauls too their tribal priests, called Druids, should lay down the law of all Gaul, as Julius Caesar relates in the book which he wrote about the Gallic war.

CHAPTER 16

THAT REGAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE ORDAINED PRINCIPALLY TO ETERNAL BEATITUDE

[114] As the life by which men live well here on earth is ordained, as to its end, to that blessed life which we hope for in heaven, so too whatever particular goods are procured by man’s agency—whether wealth, profits, health, eloquence, or learning—are ordained to the good life of the multitude. If, then, as we have said, the person who is charged with the care of our ultimate end ought to be over those who have charge of things ordained to that end, and to direct them by his rule, it clearly follows that, just as the king ought to be subject to the divine government administered by the office of priesthood, so he ought to preside over all human offices, and regulate them by the rule of his government.

[115] Now anyone on whom it devolves to do something which is ordained to another thing as to its end is bound to see that his work is suitable to that end; thus, for example, the armourer so fashions the sword that it is suitable for fighting, and the builder should so lay out the house that it is suitable for habitation. Therefore, since the beatitude of heaven is the end of that virtuous life which we live at present, it pertains to the king’s office to promote the good life of the multitude in such a way as to make it suitable for the attainment of heavenly happiness, that is to say, he should command those things which lead to the happiness of Heaven and, as far as possible, forbid the contrary.

[116] What conduces to true beatitude and what hinders it are learned from the law of God, the teaching of which belongs to the office of the

priest, according to the words of Malachi (2:7): “The lips of the priest shall guard knowledge and they shall seek the law from his mouth.” Wherefore the Lord prescribes in the Book of Deuteronomy (17:18-19) that “after he is raised to the throne of his kingdom, the king shall copy out to himself the Deutoronomy of this law, in a volume, taking the copy of the priests of the Levitical tribe, he shall have it with him and shall read it all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, and keep his words and ceremonies which are commanded in the law.” Thus the king, taught the law of God, should have for his principal concern the means by which the multitude subject to him may live well.

[117] This concern is threefold:, first of all, to establish a virtuous life in the multitude subject to him; second, to preserve it once established; and third, having preserved it, to promote its greater perfection.

[118] For an individual man to lead a good life two things are required. The first and most important is to act in a virtuous manner (for virtue is that by which one lives well); the second, which is secondary and instrumental, is a sufficiency of those bodily goods who se use is necessary for virtuous life. Yet the unity of man is brought about by nature, while the unity of multitude, which we call peace, must be procured through the efforts of the ruler. Therefore, to establish virtuous living in a multitude three things are necessary. First of all, that the multitude be established in the unity of peace. Second, that the multitude thus united in the bond of peace, be directed to acting well. For just as a man can do nothing well unless unity within his members be presupposed, so a multitude of men lacking the unity of peace will be hindered from virtuous action by the fact that it is fighting against itself. In the third place, it is necessary that there be at hand a sufficient supply of the things required for proper living, procured by the ruler’s efforts.

[119] When virtuous living is set up in the multitude by the efforts of the king, it then remains for him to look to its conservation. Now there are three things which prevent the permanence of the public good. One of these arises from nature. The good of the multitude should not be established for one time only; it should be in a sense perpetual. Men, on the other hand, cannot abide forever, because they are mortal. Even while they are alive they do not always preserve the same vigour, for the life of man is subject to many changes, and thus a man is not equally suited to the performance of

the same duties throughout the whole span of his life. A second impediment to the preservation of the public good, which comes from within, consists in the perversity of the wills of men, inasmuch as they are either too lazy to perform what the commonweal demands, or, still further, they are harmful to the peace of the multitude because, by transgressing justice, they disturb the peace of others. The third hindrance to the preservation of the commonweal comes from without, namely, when peace is destroyed through the attacks of enemies and, as it sometimes happens, the kingdom or city is completely blotted out.

[120] In regard to these three dangers, a triple charge is laid upon the king. First of all, he must take care of the appointment of men to succeed or replace others in charge of the various offices. Just as in regard to corruptible things (which cannot remain the same forever) the government of God made provision that through generation one would take the place of another in order that, in this way, the integrity of the universe might be maintained, so too the good of the multitude subject to the king will be preserved through his care when he sets himself to attend to the appointment of new men to fill the place of those who drop out. In the second place, by his laws and orders, punishments and rewards, he should restrain the men subject to him from wickedness and induce them to virtuous deeds, following the example of God, Who gave His law to man and requites those who observe it with rewards, and those who transgress it with punishments. The king's third charge is to keep the multitude entrusted to him safe from the enemy, for it would be useless to prevent internal dangers if the multitude could not be defended against external dangers.

[121] Finally, for the proper direction of the multitude there remains the third duty of the kingly office, namely, that he be solicitous for its improvement. He performs this duty when, in each of the things we have mentioned, he corrects what is out of order and supplies what is lacking, and if any of them can be done better he tries to do so. This is why the Apostle exhorts the faithful to be "zealous for the better gifts" (1 Cor 12:31).

[122] These then are the duties of the kingly office, each of which must now be treated in greater detail.

PART II

CHAPTER 1

THAT IT BELONGS TO THE OFFICE OF A KING TO FOUND THE CITY

[123] We must begin by explaining the duties of a king with regard to the founding of a city or kingdom. For, as Vegetius [De Re Militari IV, prol.] declares, “the mightiest nations and most commended kings thought it their greatest glory either to found new cities or have their names made part of, and in some way added to, the names of cities already founded by others.” This, indeed, is in accord with Holy Scripture, for the Wise Man says in Sirach (40:19): “The building of a city shall establish a name.” The name of Romulus, for instance, would be unknown today had he not founded the city of Rome.

[124] Now in founding a city or kingdom, the first step is the choice, if any be given, of its location. A temperate region should be chosen, for the inhabitants derive many advantages from a temperate climate. In the first place, it ensures them health of body and length of life; for, since good health consists in the right temperature of the vital fluids, Footnote it follows that health will be best preserved in a temperate clime, because like is preserved by like. Should, however, heat or cold be excessive, it needs must be that the condition of the body will be affected by the condition of the atmosphere; whence some animals instinctively migrate in cold weather to warmer regions, and in warm weather return to the colder places, in order to obtain, through the contrary dispositions of both locality and weather, the due temperature of their humours.

[125] Again, since it is warmth and moisture that preserve animal life, if the heat is intense the natural moisture of the body is dried up and life fails, just as a lantern is extinguished if the liquid poured into it be quickly

consumed by too great a flame. Whence it is said that in certain very torrid parts of Ethiopia a man cannot live longer than thirty years. Footnote On the other hand, in extremely cold regions the natural moisture is easily frozen and the natural heat soon lost.

[126] Then, too, a temperate climate is most conducive to fitness for war, by which human society is kept in security. As Vegetius tells us [De Re Militari 1, 2], "all peoples that live near the sun and are dried up by the excessive heat have keener wits but less blood, so that they possess no constancy or self-reliance in hand-to-hand fighting; for, knowing they have but little blood, they have great fear of wounds. On the other hand, Northern tribes, far removed from the burning rays of the sun are more dull-witted indeed, but because they have an ample flow of blood, they are ever ready for war Those who dwell in temperate climes have, on the one hand, an abundance-of blood and thus make light of wounds or death, and, on the other hand, no lack of prudence, which puts a proper restraint on them in camp and is of great advantage in war and peace as well.

[127] Finally, a temperate climate is of no little value for political life. As Aristotle says in his Politics [VII, 7: 1327b 23-32]: "Peoples that dwell in cold countries are full of spirit but have little intelligence and little skill. Consequently they maintain their liberty better but have no political life and (through lack of prudence) show no capacity for governing others. Those who live in hot regions are keen-witted and skilful in the things of the mind but possess little spirit, and so are in continuous subjection and servitude. But those who live between these extremes of climate are both spirited and intelligent; hence they are continuously free, their political life is very much developed, and they are capable of ruling others." Therefore, a temperate region should be chosen for the foundation of a city or a kingdom.

CHAPTER 2

THAT THE CITY SHOULD HAVE WHOLESOME AIR

[128] After deciding on the locality of the kingdom, the king must select a site suitable for building a city.

[129] Now the first requisite would seem to be wholesome air, for civil life presupposes natural life, whose health in turn depends on the wholesomeness of the air. According to Vitruvius [De Architectura I, 4], the most healthful spot is “a high place, troubled neither by mists nor frosts and facing neither the sultry nor the chilly parts of the sky. Also, it should not lie near marsh country.” The altitude of the place contributes to the wholesomeness of the atmosphere because highlands are opento all the breezes which purify the air; besides, the vapours, which the strength of the sun’s rays causes to rise from the earth and waters, are more dense in valleys and in low-lying places than in highlands, whence it is that the air on mountains is rarer. Now this rarified air, which is the best for easy and natural breathing, is vitiated by mists and frosts which are frequent in very damp places; as a consequence, such places are found to be inimical to health. Since marshy districts have an excess of humidity, the place chosen for the building of a city must be far from any marshes. “For when the morning breezes come at sunrise to such a place, and the mists that rise from the swamps join them, they will scatter through the town the breath of the poisonous beasts of the marshes mingled with the mist, and will render the site pestilential.” “Should, however, the walls be built in marshes that lie along the coast and face the north (or thereabouts) and if these marshes be higher than the seashore, they would seem to be quite reasonably built, since, by digging ditches, a way will be opened to drain the water of the

marshes into the sea, and when storms swell the sea it will flow back into the marshes and thus prevent the propagation of the animals there. And if any animals come down from higher places, the unwonted saltiness of the water will destroy them.”

[130] Further provision for the proper proportion of heat and cold must be made when laying out the city by having it face the correct part of the sky. “If the walls, particularly of a town built on the coast, face the south, it will not be healthy,” since such a locality will be cold in the morning, for the rays of the sun do not reach it, but at noon will be baked in the full glare of the sun. As to places that face the west, at sunrise they are cool or even cold, at noon quite warm, and in the evening unpleasantly hot, both on account of the long-continued heat and the, exposure to the sun. On the other hand, if it has an eastern exposure, in the morning, with the sun directly opposite, it will be moderately warm, at noon it will not, be much warmer since the sun does not reach it, directly, but in the evening it will be cold as the rays of the sun will be entirely on the other side. And there will be the same or a similar proportion of heat and cold if the town faces the north. By experience we may learn that the change from cold to heat is unhealthy. “Animals which are transferred from cold to warm regions cannot endure but are dissolved,” “since the heat sucks up their moisture and weakens their natural strength;” whence even in salubrious districts “all bodies become weak from the heat.”

[131] Again, since suitable food is very helpful for preserving health, we must further judge of the salubrity of a place which has been chosen as a town-site by the condition of the food which grows upon its soil. The ancients were wont to explore this condition by examining the animals raised on the spot. For man, like other animals, finds nourishment in the products of the earth. Hence, if in a given place we kill some animals and find their entrails to be sound, the conclusion will be justified that man also will get good food in the same place. If, however, the members of these animals should be found diseased, we may reasonably infer that that country is no healthy place for men either.

[132] Just as a temperate climate must be sought, so good water must be made the object of investigation. For the body depends for its health on those things which men more frequently put to their use. With regard to the air it is clear that, breathing it continuously, we draw it down into our very

vitals; as a result, purity of air is what conduces most to the preservation of men. But of all things put to use as nourishment, water is used most frequently both as drink and food. Nothing therefore, except good air, so much helps to make a district healthy as does pure water.

[133] There is still another means of judging the healthfulness of a place, i.e., by the ruddy complexion of the inhabitants, their sturdy, well-shaped limbs, the presence of many and vivacious children, and of many old people. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the deadliness of a climate where people are misshapen and weak, their limbs either withering or swollen beyond proportion, where children are few and sickly, and old people rather scarce.

CHAPTER 3

THAT THE CITY SHOULD HAVE AN ABUNDANT SUPPLY OF FOOD

[134] It is not enough, however, that the place chosen for the site of a city be such as to preserve the health of the inhabitants; it must also be sufficiently fertile to provide food. A multitude of men cannot live where there is not a sufficient supply of food. Thus Vitruvius [I, 5] narrates that when Dinocrates, a brilliant architect, was explaining to Alexander of Macedon that a beautifully laid out city could be built upon a certain mountain, Alexander asked whether there were fields that could supply the city with sufficient grain. Finding out that there were not, he said that an architect who would build a city on such a site would be blameworthy. For "just as a newborn infant cannot be fed nor made to grow as it should, except on the nurse's milk, so a city cannot have a large population without a large supply of foodstuffs."

[135] Now there are two ways in which an abundance of foodstuffs can be supplied to a city. The first we have already mentioned, where the soil is so fertile that it amply provides for all the necessities of human life. The second is by trade, through which the necessaries of life are brought to the town in sufficient quantity from different places.

[136] It is quite clear that the first means is better. The more dignified a thing is, the more self-sufficient it is, since whatever needs another's help is by that fact proven to be deficient. Now the city which is supplied by the surrounding country with all its vital needs is more self-sufficient than another which must obtain those supplies by trade. A city therefore which has an abundance of food from its own territory is more dignified than one which is provisioned through trade.

[137] It seems that self-sufficiency is also safer, for the import of supplies and the access of merchants can easily be prevented whether owing to wars or to the many hazards of the sea, and thus the city may be overcome through lack of food.

[138] Moreover, this first method of supply is more conducive to the preservation of civic life. A city which must engage in much trade in order to supply its needs also has to put up with the continuous presence of foreigners. But intercourse with foreigners, according to Aristotle's Politics [V, 3: 1303a 27; VII, 6: 1327a 13-15], is particularly harmful to civic customs. For it is inevitable that strangers, brought up under other laws and customs, will in many cases act as the citizens are not wont to act and thus, since the citizens are drawn by their example to act likewise, their own civic life is upset.

[139] Again, if the citizens themselves devote their life to matters of trade, the way will be opened to many vices. Since the foremost tendency of tradesmen is to make money, greed is awakened in the hearts of the citizens through the pursuit of trade. The result is that everything in the city will become venal; good faith will be destroyed and the way opened to all kinds of trickery; each one will work only for his own profit, despising the public good; the cultivation of virtue will fail since honour, virtue's reward, will be bestowed upon the rich. Thus, in such a city, civic life will necessarily be corrupted.

[140] The pursuit of trade is also very unfavourable to military activity.' Tradesmen, not being used to the open air and not doing any hard work but enjoying all pleasures, grow soft in spirit and their bodies are weakened and rendered unsuited to military labours. In accordance with this view, Civil Law" forbids soldiers to engage in business.

[141] Finally, that city enjoys a greater measure of peace whose people are more sparsely assembled together and dwell in smaller proportion within the walls of the town, for when men are crowded together it is an occasion for quarrels and all the elements for seditious plots are provided. Hence, according to Aristotle's doctrine, Footnote it is more profitable to have the people engaged outside the cities than for them to dwell constantly within the walls. But if a city is dependent on trade, it is of prime importance that the citizens stay within the town and there engage in trade.

It is better, therefore, that the supplies of food be furnished to the city from its own fields than that it be wholly dependent on trade.

[142] Still, trade must not be entirely kept out of a city, since one cannot easily find any place so overflowing with the necessaries of life as not to need some commodities from other parts. Also, when there is an over-abundance of some commodities in one place, these goods would serve no purpose if they could not be carried elsewhere by professional traders. Consequently, the perfect city will make a moderate use of merchants.

CHAPTER 4

THAT THE CITY SHOULD HAVE A PLEASANT SITE

[143] A further requisite when choosing a site for the founding of a city is this, that it must charm the inhabitants by its beauty. A spot where life is pleasant will not easily be abandoned nor will men commonly be ready to flock to unpleasant places, since the life of man cannot endure without enjoyment. It belongs to the beauty of a place that it have a broad expanse of meadows, an abundant forest growth, mountains to be seen close at hand, pleasant groves and a copiousness of water.

[144] However, if a country is too beautiful, it will draw men to indulge in pleasures,’ and this is most harmful to a city. In the first place, when men give themselves up to pleasure their senses are dulled, since this sweetness immerses the soul in the senses so that man cannot pass free judgment on the things which cause delight. Whence, according to Aristotle’s sentence [Eth. Nic. VI, 5: 1140b 11-21], the judgment of prudence is corrupted by pleasure.

[145] Again, indulgence in superfluous pleasure leads from the path of virtue, for nothing conduces more easily to immoderate increase which upsets the mean of virtue, than pleasure. Pleasure is, by its very nature, greedy, and thus on a slight occasion one is precipitated into the seductions of shameful pleasures just as a little spark is sufficient to kindle dry wood; moreover, indulgence does not satisfy the appetite for the first sip only makes the thirst all the keener. Consequently, it is part of virtue’s task to lead men to refrain from pleasures. By thus avoiding any excess, the mean of virtue will be more easily attained.

[146] Also, they who give themselves up to pleasures grow soft in spirit and become weak-minded when it is a question of tackling some difficult enterprise, enduring toll, and facing dangers. Whence, too, indulgence in pleasures is detrimental to warfare, as Vegetius puts it in his On the Art of Knighthood (De re militari I, 3) “He fears death less who knows that he has had little pleasure in life.”

[147] Finally, men who have become dissolute through pleasures usually grow lazy and, neglecting necessary matters and all the pursuits that duty lays upon them, devote themselves wholly to the quest of pleasure, on which they squander all that others had so carefully amassed. Thus, reduced to poverty and yet unable to deprive themselves of their wonted pleasures, they do not shrink from stealing and robbing in order to have the wherewithal to indulge their craving for pleasure.

[148] It is therefore harmful to a city to superabound in delightful things, whether it be on account of its situation or from whatever other cause. However, in human intercourse it is best to have a moderate share of pleasure as a spice of life, so to speak, wherein man’s mind may find some recreation.

APPENDIX

SELECTED PARALLEL TEXTS

1. CONTRA IMPUGNANTES DEI CULTUM ET RELIGIONEM, CH. 5

Avicenna says: Nature did not give covering to man (as she gave hair to other animals), nor means of defence (as the oxen received horns and the lions claws); nor did nature prepare man's food (except the mother's milk). Instead of all this man was endowed with reason to provide for these things, and with hands to execute the providence of reason, as the Philosopher says.

AVICENNA De Anima (Sextus Naturalium) V, 1: fol. 22rb: Man's actions possess certain properties which proceed from his soul and are not found in other animals. The first of these is that man's being in which he is created, could not last if he did not live in society. Man is not like other animals, each of which is self-sufficient for living with what it has by its nature. One man, on the contrary, if he were alone and left to rely on nothing but what he has by nature, would soon die, or at least his life would be miserable and certainly worse than it was meant to be. This is because of the nobility of man's nature and the ignobility of the nature of other beings... It is necessary for man to add certain things to what nature gives him: he must needs prepare his food and also his clothing; for raw food, not treated by art, is unbecoming to him: he would not be able to live well with it. Likewise does he have to treat certain materials and make them into garments, while other animals have their covering by nature. First of all, then, man needs the art of agriculture, and, in the second place, many other arts. Now, one man would be unable to acquire all these necessaries of life, if he were alone... He can do so, however, in society where one bakes the other's bread and the latter in turn weaves the former's clothes, and one man imports wares from far-away lands for which he receives remuneration from the produce of another man's country. These are the most evident among many other reasons why it is necessary for man to possess the natural ability to express to his fellowmen what is in his mind.... Thefirst and the easier means of doing this is through the voice... [the other, a more laborious one, being through gesture ...] Nature bestowed upon man's soul the faculty to compose out of sounds a sign which is capable of being understood by others. Other animals also utter sounds by which they are able to indicate their wants. Yet these sounds have but a natural and confused signification indicating only in a general way what is wanted or not wanted. Human sounds, on the contrary, may distinctly signify an infinite range of wants. Hence they in their turn are infinite in number.—Cf. Plato, Republic II, 11 ff. (369B ff); Aristotle, Politics III, 9: 1280a 25 ff.

2. IN LIBROS ETHICORUM ARISTOTELIS EXPOSITIO, LIB. I, LECT. 1

Man is by nature a social animal, since he stands in need of many vital things which he cannot come by through his own unaided effort (Avicenna). Hence he is naturally part of a group by which assistance is given him that he may live well. He needs this assistance with a view to life as well as to the good life. First, with a view to life, i.e., to having all those things which are necessary for life and without which this earthly lifecannot be lived. In this regard, assistance is given to man by the group called the household of which he is part. For everyone has from. his parents birth, nourishment and education. Also all the members of the household or family help one another in regard to the necessities of life. Assistance of another kind comes to man by another group of which he is part, assistance, that is, in view of the perfect fullness of life, in other words, that man may not only live but also live well, being equipped with all the things that make for the perfection of living. For this purpose, assistance comes to man from the civil group of which he is part. This assistance concerns not only man's corporal needs inasmuch as there are in a city many crafts which one household could not develop, but also his moral needs. Public power, indeed, by making itself feared, puts restraint upon those insolent youths who could not be corrected by paternal admonitions. [See Summa I-II, 95, 4.]

3. IN LIBROS POLITICORUM ARISTOTELIS EXPOSITIO, LIB. I, LECT. 1. [POL. I, 2; 1252B 12: THE DEFINITION OF THE HOUSEHOLD.]

The Philosopher shows here for what purpose the community of the household is instituted. It is to be borne in mind that every human communication is built upon certain doings of men. Thereare some things which need to be done every clay, such as eating, seeking protection from the cold, and such like. Other things do not have to be done daily, such as trading, fighting the enemy, and such like. Now it is natural for men to communicate and to help one another in both these kinds of work. Therefore, Aristotle says, the household is a community naturally instituted for the life of every day, i.e., for those works which have to be done daily.

[Ibid. 1252b 15: The definition of the clan-village, called vicus in the mediaeval Latin translation.]

Here the Philosopher speaks about the [next] community, viz., the vicus. He calls vicus the first communication arising out of several households. It is the first communication after the household, since there is to follow another one, viz., the city. The vicus is not instituted for the life of every day, as was the household, but with a view to needs not recurring daily. The members of this community do not come together to communicate concerning those things which are to be done daily, such as eating, and sitting by the fire, and such like, but concerning external works transcending the daily round of necessities.

[Ibid. 1252b 16: The vicus appears to be most natural.]

The Philosopher says that the neighbourhood or vicinity of houses (which is the vicus) appears to be a most natural form of community; for nothing is more natural in the realm of live beings than the propagation of many from one: and this constitutes the cluster of homes (vicinia domorum.)

[Ibid. 1252b 27: The definition of the city.]

The Philosopher shows that in the nature of a city there are three essential characteristics. His first point is to determine what are the material elements of the city. Just as the vicus is composed of several households, so is the city composed of several vici. The second affirmation [concerns the formal characteristic of a city.] The city is the perfect community. This, Aristotle explains thus: Since every communication, whenever it is found among men, is ordained to something necessary for life, that community will be the perfect community which is ordained to the end that man may have the fullness of human life: and this is the city. For it is in the city that man finds the satisfaction of whatever needs human life may have in the circumstances in which it is lived (sicut contingit esse). Thus the city is composed of several vici in one of which the Smith’s craft is exercised, in another the weaver’s craft, and so on. It is clear then that the city is the perfect community. In the third place, the Philosopher shows to what end or purpose the city is instituted. Its origin, indeed, may be ascribed to the purpose of simply living, inasmuch as men find in it the things which make their life livable at all. But once it exists, it will provide men with the means not only to live but also to live well, inasmuch as, by the laws of the city, life is made to be virtuous life.

[Ibid. 1253a 7: The reason why man is a political animal.]

The Philosopher demonstrates from a consideration of man~s proper operation that man.is a civic animal (animal civile), even more so than bees or other gregarious animals. This is the reason: We say that nature makes nothing in vain, because she always works for a definite purpose. When, therefore, nature endows a being with something which, of itself, is ordained to an end, it is evident that this end is proposed to that being by nature. Now, we see that certain animals possess the faculty of making sounds, while man alone, above all other animals, has the faculty of language. Even when certain animals may utter the language of man, they do not speak in a proper sense, since they do not understand what they say but are merely trained to utter these sounds. Yet there is a difference between language and simple sound. A sound is the sign of grief and pleasure, and consequently of other passions, such as anger and fear which, as is said in the second book of the Ethics [3: 1104b 14] are all ordained to pleasure and grief. Therefore the faculty of sound is given to other animals, whose nature attains to the point at which they have the perceptions of pleasure and grief; and this is what they signify to one another by certain natural sounds, the lion by roaring and the dog by barking, instead of which we have our interjections. Human language, on the other hand, signifies what is advantageous and what is harmful. From this it follows that it signifies what is just and what is unjust. For justice and injustice consist in this, that several persons are adjusted, or not adjusted, to one another in respect of things advantageous or harmful. So language is proper to men, since it is a peculiarity of theirs in comparison with the rest of the animal world that they possess the knowledge of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, and of other similar relations.... In these things men communicate one with another naturally. Since, therefore, this communication constitutes the household and the city, man is naturally a domestic and a civic animal.

4. IN LIBROS ETHICORUM ARISTOTELIS EXPOSITIO, LIB. VIII, LECT. 10

[Eth. Nic. VIII, 10; 1160a 31-35: The classification of the constitutions.]

There are three species of constitutions and an equal number of corruptions or deviation-forms. The right constitutions are, first, kingship, i.e., the rule of one man; second, aristocracy, i.e., the rule of the best (this kind of civic order is indeed ruled by the virtuous men); thirdly, timocracy. Such a third species will have to be assumed, although not all agree to do so, as is said in the fifth (?) book of the Politics [IV, 3: 1290a 22]. Timocracy is fittingly called so from the [Greek] word timae which means remuneration (pretium); for under this constitution the poor are remunerated for attending, and the rich fined for not attending, the civic assemblies, as is said in the fourth book of the Politics. Footnote Others call this constitution by the generic name polity, since it is that of the rich and the poor alike; compare the fourth book of the Politics.

[Ibid. 35-36: Their respective value.]

Comparing these constitutions the Philosopher says that the best is kingship, since under this form of government one man, and the best of all, holds power. The least good is timocracy which is the ruling of the mediocre. Between these extremes lies aristocracy in which a few of the best are ruling but with less power of action than is invested in one man acting well and possessing the plenitude of power.

[Ibid. 1160a 36-b 12: On kingship and tyranny.]

...Tyranny is the deviation-form or corruption of kingship. [Thus these forms stand to each other in the opposition of contrariety.] In regard to this point, Aristotle shows, first, that both forms are of the same genus, for both are monarchies, i.e., one-man governments. Second, he brings out their differences, saying that they differ most widely, from which it appears that they are contraries. For contraries, being of the same genus, are most widely distant one from the other. What the difference is between tyranny and kingship, the Philosopher declares by saying that, in this regime, the tyrant looks to his own advantage, while the king has his eye on that of his subjects. This is further evidenced in what follows: The true king, Aristotle says, is sufficient for governing by his own resources and, therefore, should possess all good things: the goods of the soul, -those of the body, and external goods; and he should possess them in such abundance that he be worthy and, at the same time potent, to hold power. If he is such, he needs nothing further and so will not be tempted to care for his own advantage as do those who still are in need. The king will be the benefactor of his subjects, which is the attribute of those who have an overflowing abundance of good things. If a king is not such a man, he is rather a clerotos, as Aristotle says, which means he is king [not naturally but] by the decision of the lots. On the other hand, the tyrant, since he pursues his own interest, is the very contrary of the king. Hence it is clear that tyranny is the worst deviation-form. For it is the contrary of the best that is worst and a man passes over from kingship, i.e., the best form, to tyranny which is a de-o pravity of monarchy, i.e., one-nign rule; in other words, it is the bad king who becomes a tyrant. Tyranny, then, the Philosopher concludes, is the worst form of government.

[Ibid. 1260b 12-16: The corruption of aristocracy.]

Aristocracy, in its turn, passes over into oligarchy, i.e., the dominion of a few. This happens on account of the badness of the rulers who do not distribute according to worthiness the goods which belong to the city but snatch away either all or a great deal of them, for their own use and in order to enrich themselves and their friends. Thus it comes about that instead of the most worthy (who are the rulers in an aristocracy) there are now a few and bad man at the head of the city.

[Ibid. 16-22: The corruption of timocracy.]

Timocracy, according to the Philosopher, is corrupted into democracy, i.e., the power of the people. These forms are coterminous, i.e., close to each other. They are alike in two regards. First, timocracy (meaning the constitution characterized by a certain system of remunerations) as well as democracy are forms of government in which the many have power; second, in either constitution the criterion of estimating who are “the best people” is the same (omnes qui sunt in honoribus constituti sunt aequales). The difference between them consists in that timocracy keeps in view the common good of both the rich and the poor, while democracy knows only of the good of the poor. Hence democracy is the least bad of the deviation-forms. Its distance from timocracy which is a right constitution is very small indeed.

5. IN LIBROS POLITICORUM ARISTOTELIS EXPOSITIO, LIB. III, LECT. 5-6

[Pol. III, 6; 1279a 17-21: The distinction between right and wrong constitutions.]

The Philosopher propounds the distinction between right and unjust constitutions. Since don-Anion over free men is ordained to the interest of the subjects, it is clear that, when a constitution makes the holders of power aim at the common interest, it is a right constitution, judging by the standards of absolute justice. When, on the contrary, a constitution looks only to the interest of those who possess political power, it is a wrong constitution and a perversion of the right form. For there is, in this case, no absolute justice, i.e., justice for all, but only relative justice, namely, for those who are atthe top. They therefore exercise dominion over the city by using the citizens as slaves to the rulers' own advantage; and that is against justice, since the city is a community of freemen, the slaves not being citizens at all.

[Ibid. 7; 1279a 25-32: The classification of the constitutions.]

Here the Philosopher classifies the constitutions... A constitution, he says, is the ordering, in a city, of those who have power and those who are subjected (ordo dominantium in civitate). Therefore, the criterion for classifying the constitutions will be found in the diversity of those who possess the power. They are either One, or Few, or Many. Further, in each case, there are two different possibilities. Power is held either for the common advantage, and in this case the constitution will be right; or for the advantage of the holders themselves, and in this case the constitution will be a perversion, no matter whether power is vested in one, or a few, or many. For this is the alternative: either the subjects are not citizens: [then they have no part in the common utility]; or they [are citizens and] have their share in the common good.

[Ibid. 1279a 32- b 4: The names of the right constitutions.]

Now the Philosopher proceeds to declarethe names of these constitutions. . . . If there is dominion of one man directed towards the common interest, the constitution is called monarchy, in the general use of language. If a few are holding the power and using it for the common good, this is an aristocracy, so-called because political power is held by the best, i.e., the virtuous men, or again because it is used for the best interest of the city and of all citizens. Finally, if many have power and exercise it with a view to the common interest, the constitution is commonly called polity which is the generic name of all constitutions. There is a good reason for this usage which gives to this form the generic name. It is easy to find in a city one man or a few who are of outstanding virtue. But it is very difficult indeed for there to be many who attain to the perfection of virtue. Most likely, however, one virtue will be common to a greater number of men, viz., military bravery. This is the reason why under this constitution warriors and those who carry arms are at the top.

[Ibid. 6-10: The names of the perverted constitutions.]

...They are as follows: The perversion of kingship is called tyranny; the perversion of aristocracy, oligarchy (which means: power of the few); finally democracy (meaning; power of the people, or rather the vulgar mass) is the perversion of that polity in which the many dominate but on the basis of at least one virtue, viz., military bravery. Hence, Aristotle concludes, tyranny is the dominion of one man aiming at his own interest; oligarchy is the dominion of a few aiming at the interest of the rich; democracy is the dominion of many aiming at the interest of the poor. None of these constitutions takes thought for the common good.

[Ibid. 8; 1279b 34-1280a 6: The criterion of number is not adequate.]

[After closer examination of these definitions] it appears that, in the case of democracy the large number of the holders of power is an accidental circumstance; and likewise, in the case of oligarchy the small number is merely accidental. For it is nothing but a fact that everywhere there are more poor than rich people. The above mentioned names, therefore, owe their origin [not to a universally valid reason but] simply to a fact which happens to be true in most of the cases. Since, however, a specific differentiation cannot be obtained on the basis of what is merely accidental, it follows that, per se, the distinction between oligarchies and democracies cannot be made in virtue of the larger or smaller number of the rulers.

Rather their specific difference results from the difference between poverty and riches. If a regime is ordained to the increase of the possessions of the rich, its very species is determined by this end and it is for this reason that it differs specifically from a regime whose end is liberty, which regime is democracy. Hence, wherever the rich hold political power, no matter whether they are many or few, there will be oligarchy; and wherever the poor hold this power, there will be democracy; and that the latter are many and the former few is nothing but an accidental circumstance. For only a few have riches yet all partake of liberty. This is why both classes fight each other. The few want to dominate for the sake of their possessions and the many want to prevail upon the few since they believe that, by the criterion of liberty, they have just as good a right to political power as the rich.

6. SCRIPTUM SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM II, DIST. 44, Q. II, A. 2

[The problem is whether Christians are bound to obey secular powers, especially tyrants.]

The procedure in discussing this problem is this: It seems that they are not bound to this obedience... The fourth argument [in favour of this position) runs as follows: It is legitimate for anyone, who can do so, to re-take what has been taken away from him unjustly. Now many secular princes unjustly usurped the dominion of Christian lands. Since, therefore, in such cases rebellion is legitimate, Christians have no obligation to obey these princes. —The fifth argument: If it is a legitimate and even a praiseworthy deed to kill a person, then no obligation of obedience exists toward that person. Now in the Book on Duties [De Officiis I, 8, 26] Cicero justifies Julius Caesar’s assassins. Although Caesar was a close friend of his, yet by usurping the empire he proved himself to be a tyrant. Therefore toward such powers there is no obligation of obedience.

On the other hand, however, there are the following arguments proving the contrary position: First, it is said: Servants, be in subjection to your masters (1 Pet. 2:18.) Second, it is also said: He who resists the power, withstands the ordinance of God (Rom. xiii, 2.) Now it is not legitimate to withstand the ordinance of God. Hence it is not legitimate either to withstand secular power.

Solution and determination. Obedience, by keeping a commandment, has for its [formal] object the obligation, involved in the commandment, that it be kept. Now this obligation originates in that the commanding authority has the power to impose an obligation binding not only to external but also to internal and spiritual obedience—”for conscience sake”, as the Apostle says (Rom. xiii, 5.) For power (authority) comes from God, as the Apostle implies in the same place. Hence, Christians are bound to obey the authorities inasmuch as they are from God; and they are not bound to obey inasmuch as the authority is not from God.

Now, this not being from God may be the case, first, as to the mode in which authority is acquired, and, second, as to the use which is made of authority.

Concerning the first case we must again distinguish two defects: There may be a defect of the person acquiring authority inasmuch as this person is unworthy of it. There may also be a defect in the mode of acquiring authority, namely, if it is obtained by violence, or simony, or other illegitimate means.

As to the first of these defects, we say that it does not constitute an obstacle against acquiring lawful authority. Since, then, as such, authority is always from God (and this is what causes the obligation of obedience), the subjects are bound to render obedience to these authorities, unworthy as they may be.

As to the second of those defects, we say that in such a case there is no lawful authority at all. He who seizes power by violence does not become a true holder of power. Hence, when it is possible to do so, anybody may repel this domination, unless, of course, the usurper should later on have become a true ruler by the consent of the subjects or by a recognition being extended to him by a higher authority.

The abuse of power might take on two forms. First, a commandment emanating from the authority might be contrary to the very end in view of which authority is instituted, i.e., to be an educator to, and a preserver of, virtue. Should therefore the authority command an act of sin contrary to virtue, we not only are not obliged to obey but we are also obliged not to obey, according to the example of the holy martyrs who preferred death to obeying those ungodly tyrants.

The second form of abusing power is for the authority to go beyond the bounds of its legal rights, for instance, when a master exacts duties which the servant is not bound to pay, or the like. In this case the subject is not obliged to obey, but neither is he obliged not to obey.

Consequently... to the fourth argument the answer is this: An authority acquired by violence is not a true authority, and there is no obligation of obedience, as we said above.

To the fifth argument the answer is that Cicero speaks of domination obtained by violence and ruse, the subjects being unwilling or even forced to accept it and there being no recourse open to a superior who might pronounce judgment upon the usurper. In this case he that kills the tyrant for the liberation of the country, is praised and rewarded. Footnote

7. CONTRA GENTILES IV, 76

...It is evident that, although there are many different peoples in different dioceses and cities, yet there is one Christendom (Populus Christianus), just as there is one Church. Therefore, just as there is one bishop appointed to one particular people in order to be the head of them all, so in the whole of Christendom one must be the head of the whole Church....

JOHN OF PARIS thought ftt to correct this text in the following way: It is evident that, although there are many different peoples in different dioceses and cities, in which the bishops hold authority in matters spiritual, yet there is one Church of all the Faithful and one Christendom. Therefore, just as there is one bishop in every diocese appointed to be the head of the particular church of that people, so in the whole Church and in the whole of Christendom, there is one supreme bishop, viz., the Pope. —De Potestate Regia et Papali (A.D. 1302), ch. III.

8. SCRIPTUM, SUPER LIBROS SENTENTIARUM II, DIST. 44, EXPOSITIO TEXTUS

[The problem is whether we should obey a superior authority more than an inferior one.]

If the position be taken that such is indeed our duty, this seems not to be true.... For [fourth argument] spiritual power is higher than secular power. If, then, it were true that we must obey more the superior power, the spiritual power would have the right always to release a man from his allegiance to a secular power, which is evidently not true.

Solution and determination. Two cases are to be considered in which we find the superior and the inferior authorities standing in different relations one to the other. First, the inferior authority originates totally from the superior authority. In this case, absolutely speaking and in all events, greater obedience is due to the superior power. An illustration of this is the order of natural causes: the first cause has a stronger impact upon the thing caused by a second cause than has this very second cause, as is said in the Liber De Causis [1]. In this position we find God's power in regard to every created power, or likewise the Emperor's power in regard to that of the Proconsul, or again the Pope's power in regard to every spiritual power in the Church, since by the Pope all degrees of different dignities in the Church are distributed and ordered. Whence papal authority is one of the foundations of the Church, as is evident from Matthew 16:18. So in all things, without any distinction, the Pope ought to be obeyed more than Bishops and Archbishops; (more also by the monk than is the abbot).—The second case to be considered is, that both the superior and the inferior powers originate from one supreme power. Their subordination, thus, depends on the latter who subordinates one to the other as he pleases. As to this case we say that here one power is superior to the other only in regard to those matters in view of which they have been so suborclinated one to the other by that supreme power. Hence in these matters alone greater obedience is due to the superior than to the inferior. An example of this is our relation to the authorities of a Bishop and an Archbishop, both of which descend from the papal authority.

The answer then... to the fourth argument is this. Spiritual as well as secular power comes from the divine power. Hence secular power is subjected to spiritual power in those matters concerning which the subjection has been specified and ordained by God, i.e., in matters belonging to the salvation of the soul. Hence in these we are to obey spiritual authority more than secular authority. On the other hand, more obedience is due to secular than to spiritual power in the things that belong to the civic good (bonum civile). For it is said Matthew 22:21: Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's. A special case occurs, however, when spiritual and secular power are so joined in one person as they are in the

Pope, who holds the apex of both spiritual and secular powers. This has been so arranged by Him who is both Priest and King, Priest Eternal after the order of Melchisedech, King of Kings and Lord of Lords, Whose dominion shall not pass away, and his kingdom shall not be destroyed for ever and ever. Amen. [Conclusion of the second book of the Scriptum; this explains the doxological ending.]

ON THE POWER OF GOD

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ON THE POWER OF GOD

QUESTION I

THE POWER OF GOD

THERE are seven points of inquiry: (1) Is there power in God? (2) Is God's power infinite? (3) Can God do what nature cannot do? (4) Is a thing to be judged possible or impossible in reference to lower or to higher causes? (5) Can God do what he does not, or leave undone what he does? (6) Can God do whatever others do, for instance, can he sin, walk, etc.? (7) Is God all-powerful?

Q. I: ARTICLE I

IS THERE POWER IN GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXV, A. 1: C.G. I, 16; II, 7]

THE question before us concerns God's power: the first point of inquiry is whether there is power in God. And it would seem that the reply should be in the negative.

1. Power is a principle of operation. Now God's, operation, which is his essence, has no principle, since neither is it begotten nor does it proceed. Therefore power is not in God.

2. Whatever is most perfect should be ascribed to God, according to Anselm, (Monolog. xiv). Hence that which implies a relation to something more perfect should not be ascribed to God. But all power bears a relation to something more perfect, namely a passive form and an active operation. Therefore we should not ascribe power to God.

3. Power according to the Philosopher (Metaph. V, 12), denotes a principle of transmutation terminating in. another thing as such. Now a principle indicates relationship: and power is the relation of God to his

creatures, significative of his ability to create or move them. But no such relation is really in God, but only in our way of thinking. Therefore power is not really in God.

4. Habit is more perfect than power, since it is closer to operation. But there are no habits in God. Neither, therefore, is there power in him.

5. No expression should be employed that is derogatory to God's primacy or simplicity. Now God by virtue of his simplicity, and considered as first agent, acts by his essence. Therefore we should not speak of him as acting by his power, which at least in its manner of signifying connotes something added to his essence.

6. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 4), in everlasting things there is no difference between actual being and possible being: and much more must this be the case in God. Now where two things are identical, they should have one name taken from the more dignified. But essence is more dignified than power, because power is an addition to essence. Therefore we should speak only of God's essence and not of his power.

7. As primary matter is pure potentiality (potentia), so is God pure act. Now primary matter considered in its essence is entirely void of act. Therefore God considered in his essence is void of all power (potentia).

8. Any power apart from its act is imperfect, so that as no imperfection may be ascribed to God, such a power cannot be in him. If then there is power in God, it must needs be always united to its act, and consequently the power to create will always be united to the act of creation : so that it will follow that God created things from eternity: which is heretical.

9. When one thing suffices for a certain action, it is superfluous to add another. But God's essence suffices for God to act through it. Therefore it is superfluous to say that he has power whereby to act.

10. To this you may reply that God's power differs from his essence, not really but only in our way of thinking.—On the contrary, a concept to which there is no corresponding reality is void and senseless.

11. Substance is the most excellent of the predicaments; and yet, as Augustine asserts, it is not ascribed to God (De Trin. vii, 6). Much less, therefore, is the predicament of quality. Now power is assigned to the second species of quality. Therefore it should not be ascribed to God.

12. You will say, perhaps, that power as attributed to God is not a quality, but the very essence of God, differing therefrom but logically.—On the

contrary, either there is something real corresponding to this logical distinction, or there is nothing. If nothing, the objection fails. If something, then it follows that in God power is in addition to his essence, even as the notion of power is distinct from the notion of essence.

13. According to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 5) all power or energy is for the sake of some eligible end. But nothing of this kind can be said of God, since he is not for the sake of something else. Therefore power is unbecoming to God.

14. According to Dionysius (De Coel. Hier. xi) energy is a medium between substance and work. But God does not work through a medium. Therefore he does not work by energy, nor consequently by power: and thus it follows that power is not in God.

15. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12 ; ix, i) active power, which alone can be ascribed to God, is a principle of transmutation terminating in another ihing as such. But God acts without transmutation : for instance, in the creation. Therefore active power cannot be attributed to God.

16. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that active and passive power are in the same subject. But passive power is unbecoming to God. Therefore active power is also.

17. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that a contrary privation attaches to an active power. Now it is in the nature of contraries to have the same subject. Since then there can nowise be privation in God, neither can power be in him.

18. The Master says (II D. i.) that action is not properly speaking attributable to God. But where action is not, there can be no power, active or passive. Therefore no kind of power is in God.

On the contrary, it is written (Ps. lxxxviii, 9) : Thou art mighty, O Lord, and thy truth is round about thee.

Again it is written (Matt. iii, 9) : God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham.

Moreover, all operation proceeds from power. Now operation is supremely attributable to God. Therefore power is most becoming to God.

I answer that to make the point at issue clear we must observe that we speak of power in relation to act. Now act is twofold; the first act which is a form, and the second act which is operation. Seemingly the word ‘act’ was first universally employed in the sense of operation, and then, secondly, transferred to indicate the form, inasmuch as the form is the principle and end of operation. Wherefore in like manner power is twofold: active power corresponding to that act which is operation—and seemingly it was in this sense that the word ‘power’ was first employed:— and passive power, corresponding to the first act or the form,—to which seemingly the name of power was subsequently given.

Now, just as nothing suffers save by reason of a passive power, so nothing acts except by reason of the first act, namely the form. For it has been stated that this first act is so called from action. Now God is act both pure and primary, wherefore it is most befitting to him to act and communicate his likeness to other things: and consequently active power is most becoming to him: since power is called active forasmuch as it is a principle of action. We must also observe that our mind strives to describe God as a most perfect being. And seeing that it is unable to get at him save by likening him to his effects, while it fails to find any creature so supremely perfect as to be wholly devoid of imperfection, consequently it endeavours to describe him as possessing the various perfections it discovers in creatures, although each of those perfections is in some way at fault, yet so as to remove, from God whatever imperfection is connected with them. For instance, being denotes something complete and simple, yet non-subsistent; substance denotes something subsistent, yet the subject of something. Accordingly we ascribe being and substance to God; but substance by reason of subsistence not of substanding; and being by reason of simplicity and completeness, not of inherence whereby it inheres to something. In like manner we ascribe to God operation by reason of its being the ultimate perfection, not by reason of that into which operation passes. And we attribute power to God by reason of that which is permanent and is the principle of power, and not by reason of that which is made complete by operation.

Reply to the First Objection. Power is a principle not only of the operation but also of the effect. Hence it does not follow if power be in God as the principle of his effect, that it is a principle of God’s essence which is his operation. Another and a better reply is that there is a twofold relation in God. One is real, that namely, by which the persons are mutually distinct, for instance, paternity and filiation ; otherwise the divine persons would be distinct not really but logically, as Sabellius maintained. The other kind of relation is logical, and is indicated when we say that the divine operation comes from the divine essence, or that God works by his essence : for prepositions indicate some kind of relationship. This is because when we attribute to God operation considered as requiring a principle, we attribute to him also the relationship of that which derives its existence from a principle, wherefore such relation is only logical. Now operation involves a principle, whereas essence does not: hence, although the divine essence has no principle, neither really nor logically, yet the divine operation has a principle in our way of thinking.

Reply to the Second Objection. Although all that is most perfect should be attributed to God, it does not follow that whatsoever is attributed to him is most perfect, but that it is suitable to designate that which is most perfect. The reason is that to a most perfect thing something may be attributed, so far as it is itself perfect, which however admits of something else more perfect still, though lacking the perfection which the other has.

Reply to the Third Objection. Power is said to be a principle, not as though it were the very relation signified by the name principle, but because it is identical with the principle.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Habit is never in an active power, but only in a passive power, and is more perfect than it : such a power, however, is not attributed to God.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. It is absurd to say that though God works by his essence there is no power in God. Because that which is a principle of action is a power: wherefore the mere fact that God works by his essence implies that there is power in God. Hence the notion of power in God does not derogate from his simplicity or his primacy, since it does not indicate something in addition to his essence.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The statement that in everlasting things there is no difference between actual being and possible being, refers to passive power: consequently it has no bearing on the point at issue, because no such power is in God. Nevertheless, since it is true that active power in God is identical with his essence, we must reply that although the divine essence and power are the same in reality, yet seeing that power by its manner of signification indicates something in addition, it requires a special name : for names correspond to ideas, as the Philosopher says (Periherm. i).

Reply to the Seventh Objection. This argument proves that there is no passive power in God: and this we grant.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. God’s power is always united to act, i.e. to operation (for operation is the divine essence) : but the effects follow according as his will commands and his wisdom ordains. Consequently it does not follow that his power is always united to its effect, or that creatures have existed from eternity.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. God’s essence suffices for him to act thereby: and yet his power is not superfluous: because it is understood not as a thing in addition to his essence, but as connoting in our way of thinking the sole relation of a principle : for from the mere fact that the essence is the principle of action it follows that it has the formality of power.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The reality corresponds to the concept in two ways. First, immediately, that is to say, when the intellect conceives the idea of a thing existing outside the mind, for instance, a man or a stone. Secondly, mediately, when, namely, something follows the act of the intellect, and the intellect considers it by reflecting on itself. So that the reality corresponds to that consideration of the intellect mediately, that is to say, through the medium of the intellect’s concept of the thing. For instance, the intellect understands animal nature in a man, a horse, and many other species: and consequently it understands that nature as a genus : to this act, however, whereby the intellect understands a genus, there does not correspond immediately outside the mind a thing that is a genus ; and yet there is something that corresponds to the thought that is the foundation of this mental process. It is the same with the relation of principle that power adds to essence : since something corresponds to it in reality, not however immediately, but mediately. For our mind conceives the creature as bearing a relation to and dependent on its Creator: and for this very reason, being unable to conceive one thing related to another, without on the other hand conceiving that relation to be reciprocal, it conceives in God a certain relation of principle, consequent to its mode of understanding, which relation is referred to the thing mediately.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The power that is assigned to the second species of quality is not ascribed to God : it belongs to creatures who do not act immediately through their essential forms, but through the medium of accidental forms, whereas God acts immediately by his essence.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Something does indeed correspond in the divine reality to our various concepts of the divine attributes, but that something is one and the same. Because our mind is compelled to represent by means of various forms, that most simple being which is God, by reason of his incomprehensibility: so that these various forms which our mind conceives about God, are indeed in God as the cause of truth, in so far as the thing which is God can be represented by all these forms: nevertheless they are in our mind as their subject.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The saying of the Philosopher applies to active and effective powers and the like, as applied to the productions of art and human activity: since not even in the physicalorder is it always true that an active power is for the sake of its effects. Thus it were absurd to say that the power of the sun is for the sake of the worms produced by its power : and much less is the divine power for the sake of its effects.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. God’s power is not a medium in reality, since it differs not from his essence except logically : which suffices for our speaking of it as though it were a medium. But God does not work through a medium that is really distinct from himself : wherefore the argument fails.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Action is twofold. One is accompanied by transmutation of matter; the other presupposes no matter, for instance, creation : and God can act either way, as we shall see further on. Hence active power may rightly be ascribed to God, although he does not always act by causing a change in something.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Philosopher’s statement is not general but particular, and applies to a thing which, like an animal, causes its own movement. When, however, one thing is moved by another, passive and active power do not coincide.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The privation that is contrary to power is impotence. But we must not speak of contraries in connection with God, because nothing in God has a contrary, since he is not in a genus.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. We do not remove action as such from God, but that kind of action which belongs to nature, where things are at the same time active and passive.

Q. I: ARTICLE II

IS GOD’S POWER INFINITE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXV, A. 2: C.G. I, 43]

THE second point of inquiry is whether God’s power is infinite: and it would seem that it is not.

1. It is stated in Metaph. ix, 1, that in nature any active power that has no corresponding passive power is fruitless. But no passive power in nature corresponds to an infinite power in God. Therefore an infinite power in God would be fruitless.

2. The Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that a thing of finite magnitude has not infinite power: since if it had it would act in no time. Because the greater power acts in less time: wherefore the greater the power the less the time. But there is no proportion between an infinite and a finite power. Neither, therefore, is there proportion between the time taken by the action of an infinite power, and that taken by the action of a finite power. Yet between an time and any other time there is proportion. Therefore since a finite power takes time to move, an infinite power will move in no time. For the same reason, if God’s power is infinite, it will always act without time: but this is false.

3. To this you may reply that God’s will determines in how much time he will bring his effects to completion. —On the contrary, God’s will cannot change his omnipotence. But it is natural to an infinite power to act without time. Therefore this cannot be changed by God’s will.

4. A power is made known by its effect. But God cannot produce an infinite effect. Therefore his power is not infinite.

5. Power is proportionate to operation. But God’s operation is simple. Therefore his power is simple also. But the simple and the infinite are mutually incompatible. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

6. Infinity is an attribute of quantity according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, i). But in God there is neither quantity nor magnitude. Therefore his power cannot be infinite.

7. Whatever is distinct is finite. But God’s power is distinct from other things. Therefore it is finite.

8. The infinite denotes something endless. Now end is threefold: the end of a magnitude, as a point; the end of perfection, as a form; and the end of intention, as a final cause. But the last two since they belong to, perfection must not be removed from God. Therefore the divine power is not infinite.

9. If God’s power be infinite, this can only be because it is concerned with infinite effects. But there are many other things which have effects potentially infinite; thus the intellect can understand an infinite number of things potentially, and the sun can produce an infinite number of things. If, then, God’s power be infinite, for the same reason many other powers will be infinite: which is impossible.

10. Finish is something excellent: and all that is excellent should be ascribed to God. Therefore God’s power should be described as finite.

ii. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6) infinity implies parts and matter: which imply imperfection and are unbecoming to God. Therefore there is no infinity in God’s power.

12. According to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 6) a term is neither finite nor infinite. But God’s power is the term of all things. Therefore it is not infinite.

13. God works with his whole power. If then his power be infinite, his effect will be always infinite: and this is impossible.

On the contrary, Damascene says that the infinite is that which neither time nor place nor mind can grasp. Now this is becoming to the divine power. Therefore God’s power is infinite.

Further, Hilary says (De Trin. viii) that God’s power is immeasurable; he is the living mighty One, ever Present, never failing. Now that which is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore God’s power is infinite.

I answer that a thing is said to be infinite in two ways: First, by way of privation; thus a thing is said to be infinite, when it is in its nature to have an end, and yet it has none: but such infinity is found only in quantities. Secondly, by way of negation, when it has no end. Infinity cannot be ascribed to God in the former sense, both because in him there is not quantity, and because all privation denotes imperfection, which is far removed from God. On the other hand infinity in the second sense is ascribed to God and to all that is in him, because he himself, his essence, his wisdom, his power, his goodness are all without limit, wherefore in him all is infinite.

With special regard to the infinity of his power it must be observed that whereas active power answers to act, the quantity of a power depends on the quantity of the act: since the more actual a thing is the more it abounds in active power. Now God is infinite act: for act can be finite in two ways only. First, on the part of the agent: thus an architect by his will sets definite bounds to the beauty of a house. Secondly, on the part of the recipient: thus the heat of a furnace is limited by and its intensity depends upon the disposition of the fuel. Now God's action is not limited by any agent, because it proceeds from no other but himself: nor is it limited by any recipient, because since there is no passive potency in him, he is pure self-subsistent act. Wherefore it is clear that God is infinite: and this can be made evident as follows: The being of man is limited to the species of man, because it is received into the nature of the human species: the same applies to the being of a horse, or of any other creature. But the being of God, since it is not received into anything, but is pure being, is not limited to any particular mode of a perfection of being, but contains all being within itself: and thus as being taken in its widest sense can extend to an infinity of things, so the divine being is infinite: and hence it is clear that his might or active power is infinite. But we must note that, although his power is infinite by reason of his essence, nevertheless from the very fact that we refer it to the things whereof it is the source, it has a certain mode of infinity which the essence has not.

For in the objects of power there is a certain multitude, in action also there is a certain intensity according to its efficiency, so that a certain infinity may be ascribed to active power after the manner of the infinity of quantity, whether continuous or discrete. Of discrete quantity, forasmuch as the quantity of a power is measured by many or few objects,—and this is called extensive quantity: of continuous quantity, forasmuch as the quantity of a power is measured by the intensity or slackness of its action, —and this is called intensive quantity. The former quantity is ascribed to power in respect of its objects, the latter in respect of its action: and active power is the principle of both. In both ways the divine power is infinite: since never does it produce so many effects that it cannot produce more; nor does it ever act with such intensity, that it cannot act more intensely. But in the divine operation intensity is not measured according as operation is in the operator, for then it is always infinite, since God's operation is his essence, but according as it attains its effect, for thus some things are moved by God more efficaciously, some less.

Reply to the First Objection. Nothing in God can be called fruitless: for a fruitless thing is one that is directed to an end which it cannot attain: whereas God and all that is in him, are not directed to an end, but are the end. Or we may reply that the Philosopher is speaking of, a natural active power. For there is co-ordination in the things of nature, and in all created things: whereas God is outside that order, since to him as an extrinsic good is the whole of it directed, as the army to the commander-in-chief, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 10). — Consequently there is no need in creatures for a power corresponding to God's power.

Reply to the Second Objection. According to the Commentator (Phys. viii, com. 79) this argument drawn from the proportion between time and the mover's power means that a magnitude's infinite power is proportionate to an infinity of time, since they both belong to one definite genus, i.e. continuous quantity; but it does not hold with regard to an infinity apart from magnitude, that is not .proportionate to an infinity of time, since it is of another kind. It may also be replied, as hinted in the objection, that since God acts by his will, he adapts the movement of whatever he moves, according as he wills.

Reply to the Third Objection. Although God's will cannot change his power, it can limit its effect: because the will is the motive force of power.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The very notion of being made or created is incompatible with the infinite. The very fact that it is made out of nothing, argues its imperfection and potentiality, and shows that it is not pure act: and consequently it cannot be equalled to the infinite, as though it also were infinite.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Privative infinity is an attribute of quantity and is repugnant to simplicity; whereas negative infinity is not.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument applies to infinity taken as a privation.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. A thing may be distinct in two ways. First, by some kind of adjunct; thus man is distinct from an ass by the difference of reason: and a distinct thing of this kind must needs be finite, because the adjunct defines it as a particular thing. Secondly, by itself — and thus God is distinct from other things: and this for the simple reason that it is impossible to add anything to him: hence it does not follow that he is finite, either in himself or as regards anything that is attributed to him.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Since end implies perfection, it is ascribed to God in the highest possible way; namely, that he is essentially the end, and not denominatively finite.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. As in quantities we may consider infinity in regard to one dimension, and not in regard to another, or again in regard to all dimensions; even so may we consider infinity in effects. Thus it is possible for a creature considered in itself to be able to produce an infinity of effects in some particular respect, for instance, as regards number in one species; and then the nature of all those effects is finite, being confined to one particular species—for instance, an infinite number of men or asses. But it is impossible for a creature to be able to produce an infinity of effects in every way, in point of number, species and genera: this belongs to God alone, wherefore his power alone is simply infinite.

The reply to the Tenth Objection is the same as to the Eighth.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This argument takes infinity as a privation: and the same answer applies to the Twelfth Objection.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. God always works with the whole of his power. But his effect is limited according to the determination of his will and the order of reason.

Q. I: ARTICLE III

ARE THOSE THINGS POSSIBLE TO GOD WHICH ARE IMPOSSIBLE TO NATURE?

THE third point of inquiry is whether God can do what nature cannot: and the reply seemingly should be in the negative.

1. The (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24 says that since God is the author of nature he cannot do what is contrary to nature. Now things that nature cannot do are contrary to nature. Therefore God cannot do them.

2. As all that is necessary in nature can be demonstrated, so whatsoever is impossible in nature can be disproved by demonstration. Now every conclusion of a demonstration involves the principles of that demonstration: and all principles of demonstration imply the principle that yes and no cannot be both true at the same time. Therefore this principle is involved whenever a thing is impossible to nature. But according to the respondent

God cannot make yes or no to be both true at the same time. Therefore he cannot do what is naturally impossible.

3. There are two principles under God, reason and nature. Now God cannot do what is impossible to reason, for instance, that a genus be not predicated of its species. Neither therefore can he do what is impossible to nature.

4. As false and true are in relation to knowledge, so are possible and impossible to operation. Now God cannot know what is false in nature; therefore he cannot do what is impossible in nature.

5. SO far as there is uniformity among a number of things, what is proved of one is taken to be proved of all: thus if it be proved of one triangle that the three angles equal two right angles, we take this to be proved of all triangles. Now all impossible things apparently agree in the point of their being possible or impossible to God: both in relation to the doer, since God's power is infinite, and in relation to the thing done, since everything has an obediential potentiality to God. Therefore, if there be anything naturally impossible that God cannot do, seemingly he cannot do anything that is impossible.

6. It is written (2 Tim. ii, 13) that God is faithful, he cannot deny himself. But he would deny himself, says the (interlinear) gloss, if he fulfilled not his promise. Now, as God's promise comes from God, so is all truth from God: because (according to a gloss of Ambrose [=Ambrosiaster] on 1 Corinthians xii, 3, No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Spirit) all truth, by whomsoever uttered, is from the Holy Spirit. Therefore God cannot act counter to the truth. He would, however, were he to do what is impossible. Therefore he cannot do what is naturally impossible.

7. Anselm says (Cur Deus homo, i, 24) that God cannot do what is in the least way unbecoming. Now it would be unbecoming for yes and no to be true at the same time, because the mind would be in a fix. Therefore God cannot do this; and consequently he cannot do whatever is impossible to nature.

8. No artist can Work counter to his art, since this is the very principle of his work. But God would be working against his art, were he to do what is impossible in nature, because the order of nature, in relation to which that thing is impossible, is a reflection of the divine art. Therefore God cannot do what is naturally impossible.

9. That which is impossible in itself is more impossiblee than what is impossible accidentally. Now God cannot do what is accidentally impossible, for instance, that what has been should not have been; thus Jerome says (Ep. 22, Ad Eustoch., de cust. virg.) that God, whereas he can do other things, cannot make a virgin of one who is not a virgin. See also Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 5) and the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2). Therefore God cannot do what is in itself naturally impossible.

i. On the contrary, it is written (Luke i, 37): No word shall be impossible with God.

2. Any power that can do one thing, but not another, is limited. If, then, God can do what is possible to nature, but not that which is impossible, or some that are impossible and not others, it would seem that his is a limited power, which is contrary to what we have proved above. Therefore, etc.

3. That which is uncircumscribed by anything in existence, cannot be hindered by anything in existence. Now God is uncircumscribed by anything in existence. Therefore nothing in existence can be a hindrance to him: so that the truth of the principle of contradiction cannot be a hindrance to God's action. The same applies to all other principles.

4. Privation is not susceptive of degrees. Now the impossible connotes privation of power. Therefore if God can do one impossible thing, for instance restore sight to the blind, it would seem that he can do all.

5. All resistance is by reason of opposition. But nothing can oppose God's power, as shown above. Therefore nothing can resist it: and so he can do all things impossible.

6. As blindness is opposed to sight, so is virginity opposed to birth-giving. Now God made a virgin to give birth and yet remain a virgin. Therefore he can equally make a blind man to see while remaining blind, and he can make yes and no to be true at the same time, and consequently all impossible things.

7. It is more difficult to unite diverse substantial forms, than diverse accidental forms. Now God united together the most diverse substantial forms, namely the divine and human natures, which differ as uncreated and created. Much more, therefore, can he unite two accidental forms, so that the same thing be black and white: and thus the same conclusion follows.

8. If we deny of the thing defined part of its definition, it will follow that contrary statements are true at the same time; for instance, if we were to say

that a man is not a rational being. Now it is part of the definition of a straight line that its extremities are points. Therefore if anyone were to deny this of a straight line, it would follow that two contrary statements are simultaneously true. Now God did this when he came in to his disciples, the doors being closed: since two bodies were then in the same place, so that two lines would have terminated in two points only, and each of them also in two points. Consequently God can make yes and no to be true at the same time, and therefore he can do all things impossible.

I answer that according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a thing is said to be possible or impossible in three ways. First, in respect of a power active or passive: thus it is possible for a man to walk in respect of his ability to walk, whereas it is impossible for him to fly. Secondly, not in respect of a power but in itself: thus we say that a thing is possible if it be not impossible, and that a thing is impossible which of necessity is not. Thirdly, a thing is said to be possible in respect of mathematical power, as we say in geometry; thus a certain line is potentially measurable, because its square is measurable. Omitting this last kind of possibility, let us consider the other two. It must be noted that a thing is said to be impossible, not in respect of any power, but in itself, by reason of the mutual exclusion of terms. Now all such mutual exclusion corresponds to some opposition: and every opposition connotes affirmation and negation, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4, so that all impossibilities of this kind imply the mutual exclusion of an affirmation and a negation. That this cannot be ascribed to any active power is proved as follows. All active power is consequent upon the actuality and entity of the thing to which it belongs. Now every agent has a natural tendency to produce its like: wherefore every act of an active power terminates in being. For although at times non-being is the result of an action, such as, for instance, corruption, this is simply because the being of one thing is incompatible with the being of another; thus the being of a hot thing is incompatible with the being of a cold thing: wherefore the chief purpose of heat is to generate heat, but that it destroys cold is by way of consequence. Now, for yes and no to be true at the same time cannot have the nature of being, nor even of non-being, since being removes non-being, and nonbeing removes being: and consequently it can be neither the principal nor the secondary term of action of an active power.

On the other hand a thing is said to be impossible in respect of a power in two ways. First, on account of an inherent defect in the power, in that the effect is beyond its reach, as when a natural agent cannot transform a certain matter. Secondly, when the impossibility arises from without, as in the case of a power that is hindered or tied. Accordingly there are three ways in which it is said to be impossible for a thing to be done. First, by reason of a defect in the active power, whether in transforming matter, or in any other way. Secondly, by reason of a resistant or an obstacle. Thirdly, because that which is said to be impossible cannot be the term of an action. Those things, then, which are impossible to nature in the first or second way are possible to God: because, since his power is infinite, it is subject to no defect, nor is there any matter that he cannot transform at will, since his power is irresistible. On the other hand those things which involve the third kind of impossibility God cannot do, since he is supreme act and sovereign being: wherefore his action cannot terminate otherwise than principally in being, and secondarily in nonbeing. Consequently he cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, nor any of those things which involve such an impossibility. Nor is he said to be unable to do these things through lack of power, but through lack of possibility, such things being intrinsically impossible: and this is what is meant by those who say that ‘God can do it, but it cannot be done.’

Reply to the First Objection. Augustine’s words quoted in the gloss mean, not that God is unable to do otherwise than nature does, since his works are often contrary to the wonted course of nature; but that whatever he does in things is not contrary to nature, but is nature in them, forasmuch as he is the author and controller of nature. Thus in the physical order we observe that when an inferior body is moved by a higher, the movement is natural to it, although it may not seem in keeping with the movement which it has by reason of its own nature: thus the tidal movement of the sea is caused by the moon; and this movement is natural to it as the Commentator observes (De coelo et mundo, iii, comm. 20), although water of itself has naturally a downward movement. Thus in all creatures, what God does in them is quasi-natural to them. Wherefore we distinguish in them a twofold potentiality: a natural potentiality in respect of their proper operations and movements, and another, which we call obediential, in respect of what is done in them by God.

Reply to the Second Objection. Every impossibility involves the incompatibility of affirmation and negation as such. Those things, however, that are impossible by reason of a lack of the natural power, such as that a blind man can be made to see, and the like, since they are not intrinsically impossible, do not involve such an impossibility in themselves, but only in relation to the natural power to which they are impossible. Thus were we to say that nature can make a blind man to see, the statement would involve an impossibility of this kind, because nature's power is confined to definite effects, beyond which is the effect we would ascribe to it.

Reply to the Third Objection. Philosophical reasoning regards impossibilities not in relation to a power, but in themselves: because it does not consider things in their application to matter or to any natural power.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. That which is naturally false is false simply; hence there is no comparison.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Impossibilities are not all in the same ratio: since some things are impossible in themselves, and some with respect to a power, as above stated. Nor does the fact that they bear different relations to the divine power militate against the infinity of that power, or the obedience of the creature thereto.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. God does not destroy what is already true: because he does not make that which was true not to have been: but he does make that which otherwise had been true, not to be true. Thus when he raises the dead to life, he makes it to be untrue that he is dead, which would have been true otherwise.—Or we may reply, that there is no comparison, since were God not to keep his promise, it would follow that he is untruthful: whereas this does not follow if he undoes what he has done: because he has not decreed that whatever he does should always remain so, as he has ordained to keep his promise.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, not because it is unbecoming, but for the reason stated above.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. God's art extends not only to the things made but to many others also. Hence when he changes the course of nature in anything, he does not therefore act against his art.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is accidentally impossible for Socrates not to have run, if he did run: since that Socrates runs or runs not, considered in itself, is a contingency: yet since it would imply that what has been has not been, it becomes impossible in itself. Hence it is said to be impossible accidentally, that is through some adventitious circumstance: which circumstance is impossible in itself, and clearly involves a contradiction: since to say that a thing has been, and that it has not been are contradictory statements: which would be the case if the past were made not to have been.

Reply to, the First Objection on the other side. A word is not only uttered by the lips but is also conceived in the mind. Now the mind cannot conceive yes and no as being true at the same time (Metaph. iv, 3), and therefore it cannot conceive anything in which this is involved. For otherwise since, according to the Philosopher, contrary opinions involve contrary statements, it would follow that the same person would have contrary opinions at the same time. Wherefore it is not contrary to the angel’s statement to say that God cannot do the above-mentioned kind of impossibility.

Reply to the Second Objection. God cannot do this kind of impossibility because it is outside the range of possibility: wherefore God’s power is not said to be limited, although he cannot do it.

Reply to the Third Objection. God is said to be unable to do this, not as though he were prevented by the free-will, as stated above, but because this cannot be the term of action of an active power.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Privation as such is not susceptive of degrees, but it can be in respect of its cause: thus a man who has lost an eye is more blind than one who is prevented from seeing by some disease of the eye. In like manner that which is impossible in itself may be said to be more impossible than a thing which is impossible simply.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated above, God is said to be unable to do this, not because something prevents him, but for the reasons given.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Virginity is not opposed to child-bearing as blindness to sight: it is opposed to copulation without which nature cannot cause a child to be born, whereas God can.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The created and uncreated, though disparate, were not in Christ in the same respect, but in respect of the different natures: hence it does not follow that God can make opposite things to be in the same subject and in the same respect.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. When Christ entered, the doors being closed, and two bodies were in the same place, nothing occurred contrary to the principles of geometry. For then not one but two lines terminated in two points of different bodies on the one side. Although two mathematical lines are not distinguishable except by, their position, so that one cannot conceive two such lines to be in the same Place: nevertheless two natural lines are distinguishable by their subjects, so that, granted that two bodies occupy the same place, it follows that two lines coincide, as well as two points, and two surfaces.

Q. I: ARTICLE IV

SHOULD WE JUDGE A THING TO BE POSSIBLE OR IMPOSSIBLE WITH REFERENCE TO LOWER OR TO HIGHER CAUSES?

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether we ought to judge of a thing’s possibility or impossibility in reference to its lower or its higher causes. And it would seem that we should consider its higher causes.

1. The (interlinear) gloss on 1 Corinthians i says that the folly of the wise men of the world consisted in their judging of possibility and impossibility by observing nature. Therefore we should judge a thing to be possible or impossible by considering not its lower but its higher causes.

2. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, i), that which is first in any genus is the measure of whatsoever is included in that genus. Now God’s power is the first power. Th fore a thing should be deemed possible or impossible in reference to it.

3. The more a cause penetrates its effect, the better it serves as a guide to our judgement of the effect. Now the First Cause reaches further into the effect than do secondary causes. Therefore we should rather judge of an effect by referring to the First Cause: and consequently we should deem a thing possible or impossible in relation to the higher causes.

4. To give sight to a blind man is impossible with respect to the lower causes: and yet it is possible, since sometimes it is done. Therefore we should judge of a thing’s impossibility not according to the lower but according to the higher causes.

5. Before the world existed it was possible that it would exist. But this possibility did not rest on lower causes. Therefore the same conclusion

follows.

1. On the contrary an effect should be adjudged possible in reference to the cause on which its possibility is based. Now an effect derives its possibility, contingency or even necessity from its proximate and not from its remote cause: thus merit is a contingent effect by reason of the free-will, its proximate cause, and not a necessary effect by reason of its remote cause which is divine predestination. Therefore one should judge of a thing’s possibility or impossibility by referring to its lower or proximate causes.

2. What is possible in regard to lower causes is also possible in regard to higher causes, and therefore in every way possible. Now that which is possible in every way is possible simply. Therefore in order to judge whether a thing be simply possible, we must refer to the lower causes.

3. The higher causes are necessary. If, then, we are to consider effects in the light of higher causes, all effects win, be necessary: and this is impossible.

4. All things are possible to God. Therefore if we must judge of a thing’s possibility or impossibility in reference to him, nothing will be impossible: and this is absurd.

5. In the employment of terms we should follow the common use. Now we are wont in referring to power, to speak of power, disposition, necessity and action as being related to one another. But these are to be found in the lower and not the higher causes. Therefore we should judge of the possibility or impossibility of a thing in reference to the lower and not the higher causes.

I reply that judgement as to the possibility or impossibility of a thing may be considered in two ways; with reference to the one who judges, and with reference to the thing in question.

As regards the first it must be observed that if there are two sciences, one of which considers the higher causes, and the, other the less high, judgement in each must not be formed in the same way, but in reference to those causes which both sciences consider. Take, for instance, the physician and the astrologer, of whom the latter considers the highest causes and the former the proximate causes: the physician will form his judgement about a man’s illness or death according to the proximate causes, namely the forces of nature and the gravity of the disease: whereas the astrologer will judge according to the remote causes, namely the position of the stars. It is thus with the point at issue. For wisdom is twofold: mundane wisdom called philosophy, which considers the lower causes, causes namely that are themselves caused, and bases its judgements on them: and divine wisdom or theology, which considers the higher, that is the divine, causes and judges according to them. Now the higher causes are the divine attributes, such as the wisdom, goodness, will of God, and the like. It must be noted, however, that there is no point in referring this question to those effects which belong exclusively to the higher causes, and which God alone can produce; since it were senseless to say that they are possible or impossible in relation to lower causes. The point in question is about effects produced by lower causes: since such effects may be produced by both lower and higher causes, and it is about them that a doubt may occur. Again the question at issue does not concern things that are possible or impossible not with respect to a power, but in themselves. Accordingly these effects of second causes with which this question is concerned are judged by the theologian to be possible or impossible with regard to the higher causes, and by the philosopher, with regard to the lower causes. If, however, this judgement be formed with respect to the nature of the thing in question, it is clear that the effects must be judged to be possible or impossible with respect to their proximate causes, since the action of their remote causes is determined according to their proximate causes, to which those effects are especially likened: and with respect to which, therefore, any judgement about the effects should be formed. This may be made evident by comparison with passive power. For properly speaking matter is not said to be potentially this or that when the matter is remote, as earth with respect to becoming a goblet: but when the matter is proximate and potentially receptive of actuality by one agent, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix, 1, 7): thus gold is potentially a goblet, since it receives that form by art alone. In like manner an effect, so far as its nature is concerned, is said to be possible or impossible in respect of its proximate causes alone.

Reply to the First Objection. The wise men of the world are said to be foolish because they judged things that are impossible with regard to lower causes, to be absolutely and simply impossible even to God.

Reply to the Second Objection. The possible is compared to power not as the thing measured is compared to its measure, but as object to power. And yet the divine power is the measure of all powers.

Reply to the Third Objection. Although the first cause has the greatest influence on the effect, its influence, nevertheless, is determined and specified by the proximate cause, whose likeness therefore the effect bears.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although to make the blind see is possible to God, it cannot be said to be possible in every way.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. That the world would exist was possible with respect to the higher causes; hence this does not concern the question at issue. Wherefore the statement that the world will exist, was possible not only as regards the divine power, but also in itself, because the terms do not contradict each other.

Reply to the First Objection on the other side. This argument considers the nature of the effect that is in question.

Reply to the Second Objection. Although what is possible with respect to inferior causes is also possible with respect to higher causes, this does not apply to the impossible, rather is it the other way about. Consequently we must not form a universal decision on the matter, or judge that a thing is possible or impossible in every case with respect to lower causes.

Reply to the Third Objection. We do not judge a thing to be possible or impossible to this or that cause through some likeness in point of possibility or impossibility between that cause and some other cause, but because it is possible or impossible to that cause.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The theologian would say that whatever is not impossible in itself is possible to God; according to Mark ix, 22, All things are possible to him that believeth, and Luke i, 37, No word shall be impossible with God.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Though all these things are not to be found in the higher causes, they are subject to them: hence this argument considers passive and not active power of which we are speaking now.

Q. I: ARTICLE V

CAN GOD DO WHAT HE DOES NOT?

[SUM. TH. 1, Q. XXV, A. 5; XIV, A. 8: Q. XV; C.G. II, 23-30]

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether God can do what he does not, and leave undone what he does? It would seem that the reply should be in the negative.

1. God cannot do otherwise than what he foresees that he will do. Now he does not foresee that he will do otherwise than what he does. Therefore God cannot do otherwise than he does.

2. But, say you, that argument considers power in its relation to prescience, and not absolutely.—On the contrary, the things of God are more unchangeable than the things of man. Now with us it is impossible for what has been not to have been. Much less then is it possible that God did not foresee what he foresaw: and so long as his foreknowledge stands, he cannot act otherwise. Therefore absolutely speaking God cannot do otherwise than he does.

3. God's wisdom is unchangeable even as his nature. Now those who said that God acts by natural necessity, said that he cannot do otherwise than he does. Therefore we too must say so, who say that God acts according to the order of his wisdom.

4. But it may be said that the foregoing argument considers power as controlled by wisdom and not absolutely. —On the contrary, that which is impossible in the order of wisdom is said without qualification to be impossible to the man Christ: although it was possible to him absolutely. Thus it is said (Jo. viii, 55): If I shall say that I know him not, I shall be like to you, a liar. For Christ could say those words, but since it was against the order of wisdom, it is said without any qualification that he could not lie. Much more therefore must we say absolutely that God cannot do what is contrary to the order of wisdom.

5. Two things that are in mutual contradiction cannot be in God. Now the absolute and the conditional are in mutual contradiction, since the absolute is that which is considered in itself, while the conditional depends on something else. Therefore we should not place in God an absolute and a conditional power.

6. God's power and wisdom are equal: wherefore one does not extend beyond the other. Therefore his power cannot be separated from his wisdom, and consequently is always regulated by it.

7. What God has done is just. But he cannot act but justly. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he has done or will do.

8. It becomes God's goodness not only to communicate itself, but to do so in most orderly fashion; hence what God does is done in an orderly way.

Now God cannot act without order. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he has done.

9. God cannot do but what he wills to do: because in voluntary agents the power follows the will as commanded by it. Now he wills not save what he does. Therefore he cannot do save what he does.

10. Since God is a most wise operator, he does nothing without an idea. Now the ideas' on which God acts are, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), productive of the things that exist: and the things that exist are the things that are: wherefore God has no other things in hiss mmindd save those that are. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he does.

11. According to the philosophers, the things of nature are in the first mover, that is God, as in the craftsman are the things that he makes: wherefore God works like a craftsman. Now a craftsman does not work without having the form or idea of his work: for according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, i) the material house comes from the house that is in the builder's mind. But God has ideas of those things only that he has done, or does, or will do. Therefore God cannot do anything else.

12. Augustine (De Symbolo i) says: God is unable to do that alone which he does not wish to do. Now he does not wish to do save what he does. Therefore he cannot do but what he does.

13. God cannot change. Therefore he cannot be indifferent to either of two contraries: so that his power is fixed on one thing. Therefore he cannot do otherwise than he does.

14. Whatever God does or omits to do, he does or omits for the best reason. Now God cannot do or omit to do save for the best reason. Therefore he cannot do or omit except what he does or omits to do.

15. According to Plato the best produces the best: and so God who is supremely good, does whatever is best. Now the best, being superlative, is only one. Therefore God cannot do otherwise or other things than he has done.

1. On the contrary Christ, God and man, said (Matt. xxvi, 53): Cannot I ask my Father? Therefore Christ could do what he did not.

2. It is said (Ephes. iii, 20): To him who is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand. But he does not do all things. Therefore he can do things that he? does not.

3. God’s power is infinite. But it would not be were it confined to the things that he does. Therefore he can do other things besides.

4. Hugh of St. Victor says that God’s works are not equal to his power. Therefore his power surpasses his work: and consequently he can do more than he does.

5. God’s power is an endless act, since nothing can put an end to it. Now this would not be the case if it were limited to what it does. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

I reply that the error of those who say that God cannot do otherwise than he does is connected with two schools of thought. Certain philosophers maintained that God acts from natural necessity: in which case since nature is confined to one effect, the divine power could not extend to other things besides what it actually does. Then there have been certain theologians who maintained that God cannot act beside the order of divine justice and wisdom according to which he works, and thus they came to say that God cannot do otherwise than he does. This error is ascribed to Peter Almalar.

Let us now inquire into the truth or falsity of these opinions. To begin with the first, it is evident that God does not act from natural necessity. Every agent acts for an end, since all things seek the good. Now for the agent’s action to be suited to the end, it must be adapted and proportionate to it, and this cannot be done save by an intellect that is cognisant both of the end and of its nature as end, and again of the proportion between the end and the means: otherwise the suitability of the action to the end would be fortuitous. But this intellect ordering the means to the end is sometimes united to the agent or mover; such is man in his actions: sometimes it is separate, as in the case of the arrow whose flight in a definite direction is effected by an intellect united not to it but to the archer. Now that which acts of natural necessity cannot determine its end: because in the latter case the agent acts of itself, and when a thing acts or is in motion of itself, there is in it to act or not to act, to be in motion or not to be in motion, which cannot apply to that which is moved of necessity, since it is confined to one effect. Hence everything that acts of natural necessity must have its end determined by an intelligent agent. For this reason philosophers say that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence. Therefore whenever a natural body is united to an intellect, as in man, as regards those actions whereby that intellect determines the end, nature obeys the will, as when a man walks:, whereas as regards those actions by which the intellect does not fix the end, nature does not obey, as in the process of nourishment and growth. Accordingly we conclude that a thing which acts from natural necessity cannot be a principle of action, since its end is determined by another. Hence it is impossible that God act from natural necessity, and so the foundation of the first opinion is false.

It remains for us to examine the second opinion. Observe then that there are two senses in which one is said to be unable to do a thing. First, absolutely: when, namely, one of the principles necessary for an action does not extend to that action; thus it his foot be fractured a man cannot walk. Secondly, by supposition, for if we suppose the opposite of an action, that action cannot be done, thus so long as I sit I cannot walk. Now since God is an intellectual and voluntary agent, as we have proved, we must consider in him three principles of action: first, the intellect, secondly, the will, thirdly, the power of nature.

Accordingly the intellect directs the will, and the will commands the executive power. The intellect, however, does not move except by proposing to the will its appetible object, so that the entire movement of the intellect is in the will. Now God is said in two ways to be unable to do a thing. In one way when his power does not extend to it; thus we say that God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, as we have shown above. In this way it cannot be said that God cannot do but what he does, for it is evident, that his power can extend to many other things. In another way, when God’s will cannot extend to it. For every will must needs have an end which it wills naturally, the contrary of which it cannot will: thus man naturally desires to be happy and cannot wish to be unhappy. Moreover the will, besides having of necessity a desire for its natural end, desires also of necessity those things without which it cannot obtain that end, if they be known: such things are those that are proportionate to the end: thus if I wish to live I wish for food: whereas it does not of necessity desire these things without which the end can be obtained. Now the natural end of the divine will is the divine goodness, which it is unable not to will. Creatures, however, are not proportionate to this end, as though without them the divine goodness could not be made manifest, which manifestation was God’s intention in creating. For even as the divine goodness is made manifest through these things that are and through this order of things, so could it be made manifest through other creatures and another order: wherefore God’s will without prejudice to his goodness, justice and wisdom, can extend to other things besides those which he has made. And this is where they erred: for they thought that the created order was commensurate and necessary to the divine goodness. It is clear then that God absolutely can do otherwise than he has done. Since, however, he cannot make contradictories to be true at the same time, it can be said ex hypothesi that God cannot make other things besides those he has, made: for if we suppose that he does not wish to do otherwise, or that he foresaw that he would not do otherwise, as long as the supposition stands, he cannot do otherwise, though apart from that supposition he can.

Reply to the First Objection. When you say that God is not able to do except what he has foreseen that he would do, the statement admits of a twofold construction: because the negative may refer either to the power signified in the word able, or to the act signified in the word do. In the former case the statement is false: since God is able to do other things besides those that he foresees he will do, and it is in this sense that the objection runs. In the latter case the statement is true, the sense being that it is impossible for God to do anything that was not foreknown by him. In this sense the statement is not to the point.

Reply to the Second Objection. In God nothing is past or future: in him everything is in the eternal present. And when we speak of him in a past or future tense, it is not he but we who are past or future: wherefore the objection by referring to the necessity of the past misses the mark. We must also observe that the objection is not to the point, since God’s foreknowledge of What he will do is not commensurate with his power to do (which is the object of our present inquiry) but only with what he actually does, as already stated.

Reply to the Third Objection. Those who maintained that God acts from natural necessity, held the opinion we are discussing, not only on account of the unchangeableness of nature, but also because nature is confined to one process of action. But divine wisdom is not confined to one manner of action, and its knowledge extends to many things. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Christ could not wish to say those words absolutely, without prejudice to his goodness, since they would be untrue.

This does not apply to the question at issue, as we have already indicated; hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The absolute and the conditional are ascribed to the divine power solely from. our point of view. To this power considered in itself and which we describe as God’s absolute power, we ascribe something that we do not ascribe to it when we compare it with his ordered wisdom.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Wherever God’s power works his wisdom is present; nevertheless we consider power without reference to his wisdom.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. God has done whatever is actually just not whatever is just potentially: since he is able to do that which at present is not just through not being in existence; yet if it were, what he does would be just.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The divine goodness is able to communicate itself in orderly fashion, not only in the way in which things are actually set in order, but in many other ways.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Though God does not wish to do save what he does, he can nevertheless wish to do other things: wherefore absolutely speaking he can do other things.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. When Dionysius speaks of the divine ideas as being productive of things, he is speaking absolutely without implying that those things actually exist at present.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The question is whether there is in God an idea of those things that neither exist, nor will exist, nor have existed, and that nevertheless God is able to make. Seemingly the reply should be, if we take an idea in, its complete signification, namely as signifying the art-form, not only as conceived by the intellect, but also as directed to execution by the will, then of such things God has no idea. On the other hand if we take an idea in its incomplete state, as the mere mental conception of the worker, then God has an idea of those things. For it is clear that the created craftsman conceives works that he has no intention of executing. Now whatever God knows is in him as something thought out, since in him actual and habitual knowledge do not differ: for he knows his whole power and whatsoever he is able to do: hence in him are, thought out as it were, the ideas of whatsoever things he is able to make.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. This means that God is unable to do what he does not wish to be able to do; hence it is not to the point.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Though God is unchangeable, his will is not confined to one issue as regards things to be done: hence he has free-will.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The best reason for which God does everything, is his goodness and wisdom, which would remain even though he made other things or acted otherwise.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. What God does is the best in reference to his goodness: hence whatsoever else can be referred to his goodness, according to the order of his wisdom, is still the best.

Q. I: ARTICLE VI

CAN GOD DO WHAT OTHERS CAN DO?

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether God can do things that are possible to others, for instance, can he sin, walk and so forth? And seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.

i. Augustine says (Enchir. cv) that it is a better nature that can sin than that which cannot. Now whatsoever is best should be ascribed to God. Therefore God can sin.

2. We should not withhold from God anything that is praiseworthy. Now it is said in praise of a man (Ecclus. xxxi, 10) that he could have transgressed and hath not transgressed. Therefore the power to sin and not to sin should be ascribed to God.

3. The Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 5) that evil deeds are possible to a god or a wise man. Therefore God can sin.

4. To consent to a mortal sin is to sin mortally: and he who commands the commission of a mortal sin, is a consenting party, in fact sometimes he is the principal. Since then God commanded Abraham to commit a mortal sin, namely to slay his innocent son, and Osee to take a wife of fornication, and have of her children of fornication, and Semei to curse David (2 Kings xvi), although he sinned by so doing since we find that he was punished for the deed (3 Kings ii); it would seem that he sinned mortally.

5. It is a mortal sin to co-operate with one who sins mortally. Now God co-operates with him who commits a mortal sin: since he operates in every

deed, and consequently in every man who commits a mortal sin. Therefore God sins.

6. Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xxi, cf. Gloss on Rom. i) says that God operates in the hearts of men, by inclining their will whithersoever he will, be it to good or to evil. Now it is a sin to incline a man's will to evil. Therefore God sins.

7. Man was made to God's image (Gen. i). Now whatsoever is in the image must needs be in the original: and man's will is indifferent to this or that. Therefore God's will is also: and consequently he can sin and not sin.

8. Whatsoever a lower power can do, a higher power can do also. Now man whose power is inferior to God's power is able to walk, to sin and so forth. Therefore God also can do these things.

9. To omit is not to do the good one is able to do. But God is able to do many good things that he does not. Therefore he omits them and consequently sins.

10. Apparently he sins who can prevent the commission of sin, and prevents it not. Now God can prevent all sins being committed. Since then he does not do so it would seem that he sins.

11. It is written (Amos iii, 6): Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done? But this cannot refer to penal evil, since it is written (Wis. i, 13): God made not death. Therefore it must refer to the evil of sin: so that God is the author of the evil of sin.

On the contrary it is said (1 Jo. i, 5): God is light, and in him there is no darkness. Now sin is spiritual darkness. Therefore in God there can be no sin.

Moreover, a sovereign is not bound by his own laws. And every sin is contrary to the divine law as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). Therefore God cannot be subject to sin.

I answer that, as already stated (A. 5) there are two ways in which God may be said to be unable to do a thing, in respect of his will and in respect of his power. On the part of his will God cannot do what he cannot will. And since no will can consent to the contrary of what it naturally desires,—thus a man's will cannot desire unhappiness,—it is clear that God's will cannot will what is contrary to his goodness, since he wills this naturally. Now sin is a lapse from divine goodness: wherefore God cannot will to sin. Therefore we must grant absolutely that God cannot sin. On the part of his power God is said in two ways to be unable to do a thing, in respect of his power and in respect of the thing. His power considered in itself, since it is infinite, lacks nothing that appertains to power. There are certain things, however, which in name denote power whereas in reality they are wanting in power. Such are many negations that are expressed affirmatively: as when we say that so and so can fail, the terms would seem to imply some sort of power, whereas it is rather a lack of power that is signified. For this reason, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a power is said to be perfect when it is unable to do such things: because while such affirmations are in reality negations, the corresponding negations have an affirmative force. Hence we say that God cannot fail, and consequently that he cannot be moved (since movement and failing imply imperfection), and therefore that he cannot walk nor perform any other bodily actions, since these are inseparable from movement. On the part of the thing, God is said to be unable to do a thing when it implies a contradiction, as stated above (A. 5): and in this way we say that God cannot make another God equal to himself: since a contradiction is implied in that what is made must needs be somewhat in potentiality, seeing that it receives its being from another, and consequently cannot be pure act which is proper to God.

Reply to the First Objection. This comparison must not be taken universally, but only as between man and dumb animals.

Reply to the Second Objection. That which is said in praise of man is not always becoming to the praise of God; it might even be a blasphemy, as if I were to say that God repents and the like. Because, as Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv) what is praised in a lower nature is blamed in a higher.

Reply to the Third Objection. The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as conditional to the will. This conditional statement is true: God can do wicked things if he will, although both antecedent and consequence are impossible; thus it is clear that if a man flies he has wings.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nothing prevents an act that is in itself a mortal sin from becoming virtuous through the addition of a circumstance. Thus absolutely speaking it is a mortal sin to kill a man: yet it is not a mortal sin but an act of justice for the judge’s minister to put a man to death for justice’ sake in pursuance of the judge’s sentence. Now, even as the civil authority has the disposal of men in matters of life and death, and all that touches the .end of its government, namely justice, so God has all things at his disposal to direct them to the end of his government, which end is his goodness. Wherefore though it may be in itself a mortal sin to slay an innocent son, yet if this be done at God's command for an end foreseen and preordained by God, though unknown to the slayer, it is not a sin but a meritorious act. The same applies to the fornication of Osee, for it is clear that God orders all human procreation. Some, however, assert that this did not happen in reality, but only in a prophetic vision. As to the command given to Semei we must give a different reply. God is said in two ways to command. In one way by speaking either interiorly or outwardly through a created substance: and thus he commanded Abraham and the Prophets. In another way by inclination: thus it is related that he commanded a worm to consume the ivy (Jonas iv, 7). In this way he commanded Semei to curse David, by inclining his heart, and this in the manner we shall explain in the Reply to the Sixth Objection.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The sinful act, forasmuch as it has entity and actuality, is to be referred to God as its cause; but in so far as it has the deformity of sin, it must be referred to the free-will and not to God: thus all that there is of movement in limping comes from the power to walk, whereas the defect is owing to a misshapen leg.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. God is said to incline man's will to evil, not as though he infused malice into it, or urged it to wickedness, but by permitting and directing the evil, for instance he directs the exercise of cruelty to the punishment of those whom he deems deserving of it.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although man is made in God's image, it does not follow that whatever is in man is also in God. Nevertheless, as to the point raised, God's will is indifferent to this or that, since it is not fixed to one object. For he is able either to do a thing or not to do it, to do this or to do that: yet it does not follow that in either case he can do ill, which is to sin.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument applies to those things which refer to the perfection of power but not to those which refer to the lack of power.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Though God is able to do many good things which he does not, he does not omit them, since he is not bound to do them, which is a necessary condition of an omission.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The same answer applies here, since a man is not guilty of a sin through failing to prevent it, unless he be bound to do so.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The words of Amos refer to penal evil. And the words of the Book of Wisdom, God hath not made death, refer to the cause of death, as the wages of sin; or to the original formation of human nature when man was made by nature immortal.

Q. I: ARTICLE VII

IS GOD ALMIGHTY?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXV, A. 3: III, Q. XIII, A. I: C.G. II, 22, 25]

THE seventh point of inquiry is: Why is God called almighty?

1. It would seem that the reason is because he can simply do all things. For he is called almighty in the same way as he is called omniscient. Now he is called omniscient because he simply knows all things. Therefore he is called almighty because he can simply do all things.

2. If the reason for calling him almighty is not because he can simply do all things, then the implication that he can do all things is not absolutely true but only in an accommodated sense: in which case the predication would not be universal but particular, and consequently the divine power would be confined to certain effects and therefore finite.

On the contrary, as stated above (AA. 3, 5) God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time: neither can he sin or die. Yet these things would be included in the above predication were it to be taken absolutely. Therefore it must not be taken absolutely: and consequently the reason why God is called almighty is not because he can absolutely do all things.

3. It would seem that he is called almighty because he can do whatsoever he wills. For Augustine says (Enchir. xcvi): He is called almighty for no other reason but that he can do whatsoever lie wills.—On the contrary. The blessed can do whatsoever they will, otherwise their will would not be perfect. And yet they are not called almighty. Therefore the fact that God can do whatsoever he wills is not sufficient reason for calling him almighty. Further, a wise man does not will the impossible, wherefore no wise man

desires to do except what he is able to do. And yet not all the wise are almighty. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

4. It would seem that he is called almighty because he can do whatsoever is possible. For he is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Therefore there is equal reason for calling him almighty because he can do all things possible.—On the contrary, if he be called almighty because he can do all things possible,, this is either because he can do all things possible to him, or because he can do all things possible to nature. In the latter case his power would not surpass that of nature, which is absurd: in the former case, everyone would be called almighty, since everyone can do what is possible to himself. Moreover such an explanation is by way of circumlocution, which is inept.

5. If God is called almighty and all-knowing, why is he not also called all-willing?

I answer that in an attempt to assign a reason for God's omnipotence some have sought it in things that are not the reason but rather the cause of omnipotence, or which appertain to the perfection of his omnipotence, or to the nature of his power, or to the way in which he has power. Thus some have said that God is almighty because his power is infinite: these assigned not the reason but the cause of omnipotence: for instance, a rational soul is the cause not the definition of a man. Some said that God is almighty because he is impassible and indefectible, and nothing can act on him, and so on, all of which appertain to the perfection of his power. And some said that he is called almighty because he can do whatsoever he wills, and this by nature and essentially; but this regards the way in which he has power. Now all these reasons are insufficient in that they fail to account for the relation between operation and its object, which relation is implied in omnipotence. Wherefore we reply that we must take one of the explanations indicated in the objections which take into account this relationship to objects.—Accordingly, as stated above (A. 5) God's power, considered in itself, extends to all such objects as do not imply a contradiction. Nor does the objection stand that refers to things which imply a defect or bodily movement, since the very possibility of such things involves their impossibility to God. And as regards things that imply a contradiction, they are impossible to God as being impossible in themselves. Consequently God's power extends to things that are possible in themselves: and such are the things that do not involve a contradiction. Therefore it is evident that God is called almighty because he can do all things that are possible in themselves.

Reply to the First Objection. God is called omniscient because he knows all things knowable. Now the false are not knowable and therefore he knows them not: and things impossible in themselves are compared to power as the false are compared to knowledge.

Reply to the Second Objection. This argument would stand if the universality were confined within the genus of things possible so as not to extend to all things possible.

To the second reason suggested for calling God almighty we have to say that to be able to do whatsoever he wills is not a sufficient reason, though it is a sufficient sign: it is ‘in this sense that we must take the works of Augustine. To the argument advanced for the third reason, we reply that God is called almighty because he is able to do all things that are absolutely possible: hence it is not to the point where the objection distinguishes between things possible to God and those which are possible, to nature.

To the last question we reply that in voluntary actions, power and knowledge (as stated in Metaph. ix, 2, 5) are brought into action by the will: wherefore in God power and knowledge are described in universal terms as being without limit, as when we say that God is all-knowing and almighty: whereas the will, seeing that it is the determining force, cannot cover all things, but only those to which it determines power and knowledge: hence God cannot be called all-willing.

QUESTION II

OF GOD’S GENERATING POWER

THERE are six points of inquiry: (1) Is there a generating power in God? (2) Whether the power to generate is applied to God essentially or notionally? (3) Whether the power to generate is brought into act by a command of the will? (4) Whether there can be more than one Son in God? (5) Whether the generating power is included in omnipotence? (6) Whether the generating power is the same as the creative power?

Q. II: ARTICLE I

IS THERE A GENERATIVE POWER IN GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XII, A. 4]

WE are inquiring about God’s generative power, and the first point of inquiry is whether in God there is the power to beget. The reply seemingly should be in the negative.

1. All power is either active or passive. Now there can be no passive power in God: nor in him can a generative power be active, because then the Son would be the result, of an action and would be made, which is against the faith. Therefore there is no generative power in God.

2. According to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), action belongs to that which has power. Now in God there,. is no begetting: and consequently there is no generative power. The middle proposition is proved thus. Wherever there is a begetting there is communication and reception of nature. But since reception involves matter and passive power, which are not in God, reception is inadmissible in God: and therefore there can be no begetting in God.

3. The begetter must needs be distinct from the begotten. Not, however, in that which the begetter communicates to the begotten, since rather are they the same in that regard. Consequently in the begotten there must needs be something besides that which he receives by generation from the begetter: so that seemingly whatsoever is begotten must be composite. But in God there is no composition. Therefore there cannot be a begotten God, and consequently there can be no begetting in God, and the same conclusion follows.

4. No imperfection should be ascribed to God. Now every power, active or passive, in comparison with its act is imperfect. Therefore we should not attribute a generative power to God.

5. But, you will say, this applies to a power that is not united to its act.—On the contrary, whatsoever is perfected by another is less perfect than that by which it is perfected. Now the power that is united to its act is perfected by that act. Therefore that act is more perfect than the power: so that even a power that is united to its act is imperfect in comparison with its act.

6. The divine nature is more effective in acting than created nature. Now there is among creatures a nature that works not through the medium of a power, but by itself: thus the sun enlightens the air, and the soul quickens the body. Consequently there is much stronger reason why the divine nature should be by itself the generative principle and not through a power. Therefore there is no generative power in God.

7. Generative power is a sign either of perfection or of imperfection. It is not, however, a sign of perfection because if it were it would be found in the higher ranks of creatures rather than in the lower, in the angels and heavenly bodies more or rather than in animals and plants. Therefore it is a sign of imperfection, and consequently should not be ascribed to God.

8. A twofold generative power is to be found in things here below. It is complete in those things where generation is effected by sexual intercourse: it is incomplete when generation takes place without mingling of sexes; in plants, for instance. Since then we cannot ascribe the complete power to God in whom there cannot be an intercourse of sexes, it would seem that generative power cannot in any sense be ascribed to God.

9. The object of power can only be something possible: since power (potentia) is so called from its relationship to the possible (possibilis). Now the existence of generation in God is not a possible or a contingent thing,

since it is eternal. Therefore we ‘cannot ascribe to God a power in respect of generation, and consequently the power to generate is not in him.

10. The power of God, being infinite, is not terminated either by its act or by its object. Now if in God there be a generative power, its act will be generation, and its effect will be a Son. Therefore the Father’s power will not be confined to the begetting of one Son but will extend to many; which is absurd.

11. According to Avicenna, when a thing has a certain quality entirely from without, to that thing considered in itself we attribute the opposite quality: thus the air which has no light except from without, is dark considered in itself. In this way since all creatures derive being, truth, and necessity from without, considered in themselves they are non-existent, untrue, and impossible. But nothing of the kind is possible in God. Consequently in God there cannot be one who has being entirely from another, nor can there be one that is begotten, nor generation and generative power.

12. In the Godhead the Son has nothing but what he receives from the Father, else it would follow that there is composition in him. Now he receives his essence from thee Father: and consequently there is nothing in him but the essence. Hence if there be generation in God, or if the Son be begotten, it will follow that the essence is begotten: and this is false, since then there would be a distinction in the divine essence.

13. If, in God, the Father begets, this must belong to him in respect of his nature. But the nature is the same in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. For the same reason, then, both Son and Holy Spirit will beget; which is contrary to the teaching of faith.

14. A nature that exists perpetually and perfectly in one supposite, is not communicated to another supposite. Now the divine nature exists perfectly in the Father, and again perpetually since it is incorruptible. Therefore it is not communicated to another supposite: and consequently there is no generation there.

15. Generation is a kind of change. But there is no change in God. Neither therefore is there generative power.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher a thing is perfect when it is able to produce its like. Now God the Father is perfect. Therefore he can produce his like, and beget a Son.

Moreover Augustine says (Cont. Maxim. iii, 7) that if the Father could not beget, it follows that he lacked the power. But there is no lack of power in God. Therefore he was able to beget, and in him is the generative power.

I answer that it is in the nature of every act to communicate itself as, far as possible. Wherefore every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: while to act is nothing else than to communicate as far as possible that whereby the agent is in act. Now the divine nature is supreme and most pure act: wherefore it communicates itself as far as possible. It communicates itself to creatures by likeness only: this is clear to anyone, since every creature is a being according to its likeness to it. The Catholic Faith, moreover, asserts another mode of communication of the divine nature, in that it is communicated by a quasi-natural communication: so that as one to whom the human nature is communicated is a man, so one to whom the Godhead is communicated is not merely like God, but is truly God. But here we must observe that there is a twofold difference between the divine nature and material forms. In the first place material forms are not subsistent, so that the human nature in a man is not the same thing as the man who subsists: whereas the Godhead is the same thing as God, so that the divine nature itself is subsistent. Secondly, no created form or nature is its own being: whereas God's very being is his nature and quiddity; so that the name proper to him is: He who is (Exod. iii, 14), because thereby he is named as if from his proper form. Consequently since forms here below are not self-subsistent, there must needs be in the subject to which a form is communicated, besides the form, something whereby the form or nature receives subsistence: this is matter, which underlies material forms and natures. And seeing that a material form or nature is not its own being, it receives being through its reception into something else: wherefore according as it is received into a diversity of subjects it has a diversity of being: thus human nature in respect of being is not one in Socrates and Plato, although the essential notion of humanity is the same in both. On the other hand since the divine nature is self-subsistent, in the communication thereof there is no need of anything material for subsistence: and consequently it is not received into a subject by way of matter, so that he who is begotten be composed of matter and form. And because again the divine essence is its own being, it does not receive being from the supposite in which it is: so that by virtue of one and the same being it is in both the communicator and the one to whom it is communicated, thus remaining identically the same in both.

We have an example of this communication, and that most becomingly, in the intellect: for the divine nature is spiritual, wherefore it is manifested better by means of spiritual examples. Thus when our intellect conceives the quiddity of a thing that is self-subsistent and outside the mind, there is a kind of communication of this self-subsistent thing, inasmuch as our intellect receives in a way from the exterior thing the form of the latter: and this intelligible form having its existence in our intellect proceeds in a way from that exterior thing. Since, however, the exterior thing differs in nature from the understanding intellect, the form understood by the intellect and the form of the self-subsistent object differ in their respective beings. But when our intellect understands its own quiddity, both conditions stand, since in its process of formation the form understood proceeds after a fashion from the intellect understanding it into the intellect receiving it, and besides a certain unity is maintained between the conceived form which proceeds and the thing whence it proceeds, since both have intelligible being, seeing that one is the intellect, while the other is the intelligible form which is called the word of the intellect. Since, however, our intellect is not by its essence established in the perfect act of intellectuality, nor is the human intellect identical with human nature, it follows that although the aforesaid word is in the intellect and somewhat conformed to it, yet it is not identified with the essence of the intellect, but it expresses its likeness. Again, in the conception of this intelligible form the human nature is not communicated, wherefore it cannot properly be called a begetting which implies a communication of nature.

Now even as when our intellect understands itself there is in it a word proceeding and bearing a likeness to that from which it proceeds, so, too, in God there is a word bearing the likeness of him from whom it proceeds. The procession of this word transcends in two ways the procession of our word. First, because our word differs from the essence of the intellect, as already stated, whereas the divine intellect being by its very essence in the perfect act of intellectuality, cannot be the recipient of an intelligible form that is not its essence: consequently its word is essentially one with it. Secondly, the divine nature itself is its intellectuality, wherefore a communication that takes place in an intellectual manner, is also a communication by way of nature, so that it can be called a begetting, and thus again the divine word surpasses the procession of our word, and Augustine (De Trin. i) assigns this mode of generation. Since, however, we are treating of divine things according to our mode whereby our intellect proceeds from its knowledge of things here below, therefore as in these latter wherever we find action we find an active principle which we call power, so do we also in matters concerning God, although in him power and action are not distinct as in creatures. For this reason, given that in God there is generation, a term that is significative of action, it follows that we must grant him the power to beget, or a generative power.

Reply to the First Objection. The power which we attribute to God is neither active properly speaking nor passive, seeing that the predicaments of action and passion are not in him, and his action is his very substance: but the power which is in him is designated by us after the manner of an active power. Nor does it follow that the Son is the result of action or making, even as neither does it follow that in God there is properly speaking action or passion.

Reply to the Second Objection. While the term and end of receiving is having, there are two ways of receiving and two ways of having. In one way matter has its form, and a subject an accident, or in fact anything that is possessed besides the essence: in another way the supposite has a nature, for instance, a man has human nature: for the nature is not beside the essence of the haver, indeed it is his essence: thus Socrates is truly that which is a man. Accordingly the begotten one even in mankind receives the form of his begetter, not as matter receives form, or subject accident, but as a supposite or hypostasis has the specific nature: and it is thus in God. Hence in God begotten there is no need of matter or of a subject of the divine nature: but it follows that he is the subsistent Son having the nature of God.

Reply to the Third Objection. God begotten is not, distinct from the begetting God by an added essence, since, as stated above, there is no need for matter as a, recipient of the Godhead: they are distinct, however, by the relation implied in receiving one’s nature from another: so that in the Son the relation of sonship, takes the place of all the individualising principles in things created (for which reason it is called a personal property), while the divine nature takes the place of the specific nature. Yet since this same relation is not really distinct from the divine nature, it does not involve any composition therein, whereas with us a certain composition results from the specific and individualising principles.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. This argument avails when power and act, whether united or not, are distinct from each other: but this is not the case in God.

Wherefore the Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear.

I Reply to the Sixth Objection. Anything that is a principle whereby an action is done is of the nature of a power, whether it be an essence, or an accidental medium such as a quality standing between essence and action.. In corporeal creatures, however, seldom or never do we find a subsistent nature in action without an intervening accident; thus the sun illumines by means of the light in it. But that the soul quickens the body, is by means of the soul's essence: yet though the word quickening expresses action, it is not in the genus of action, since it is first act rather than second.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. In creatures generation is impossible without a distinction of essence or nature in point of existence, since their nature is not their existence. Consequently generation among creatures suggests imperfection: wherefore it is unbecoming to the higher creatures. But in God generation is possible without this or any other imperfection: and so nothing forbids us to ascribe it to God.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument considers generation in the material world, and therefore it is not to the point.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is true that the object of an active or passive power must be possible and contingent, when the action or passion in question is accompanied by movement (since all movable things are possible and contingent). Such, however, is not the generative power in God, as stated above, wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The Son of God is not the effect of the generative power, for we confess our belief that he is begotten, not made. If, however, he were the effect ‘ the power of the Begetter would not terminate in him, although he cannot beget another Son, because the Begetter is infinite. The reason why there cannot be another Son in God is because Sonship is a personal property and thereby the Son is, so to say, individualised. And the principles of individuality of each individual thing belong to that thing alone: otherwise it would follow that a person or an individual thing would be logically communicable.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The saying of Avicenna is true when that which is received is not identically the same in recipient and giver, as is the case in creatures in relation to God. Hence whatsoever is received by a creature is as vanity in comparison with the being of God, since a creature cannot receive being in that perfection with which it is in God. On the other hand in God the Son receives the same identical nature as that which the Father has: hence the argument fails.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The Son has nothing that is really distinct from the essence which he receives from the Father: but from the very fact that he receives from the Father it follows that in him is a relation by which he is referred to and distinct from the Father. And yet this relation is not distinct from his essence.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Though the same nature is in Father and Son, it is in each by a different mode of existence, that is to say with a different relation. Consequently that which belongs to the Father in respect of his nature does not of necessity belong to the Son.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Creatures become like God by participating in their specific nature; hence the fact that a particular created supposite subsists in a created nature, is directed to something else as its end. Consequently if the end be sufficiently attained by one individual by a perfect and proper participation in the specific nature, there is no need for another individual participating in that nature. On the other hand God's nature is the end and is not for, the sake of an end: and it is meet that the end should be communicated in every possible way. Hence though in God it is found perfectly and properly in one supposite, nothing, forbids its being in another.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Generation is a kind of change in so far as by means of generation the common nature is received in some matter which is the subject of change. This is not the case in the divine generation, so the conclusion does not follow.

Q. II: ARTICLE II

IS GENERATION ATTRIBUTED TO GOD ESSENTIALLY OR NOTIONALLY?

[SUM. THEOL. I, XXXII, A. 2.]

THE second point of inquiry is whether generation is attributed to God essentially or notionally. And it would seem that it is only attributed notionally.

1. Power is a kind of principle, as appears from the definition in Metaph. v, 12. Now when we use the term principle in reference to a divine person the term is used notionally. Since then the generative power implies a principle in this sense, it would seem that it is attributed to God notionally.

2. Should it be said that it denotes both the essence and a notion,—on the contrary, according to Boethius (De Trin.) there are two predicaments in God, substance to which the essence belongs, and relation to which the notional acts belong. But a thing cannot be in two predicaments, since a white man is not one thing save accidentally (Metaph. v, 7). Therefore the generative power cannot include both, substance namely and notional act.

3. In God the principle is distinct from that which proceeds therefrom. But there should be no distinction in his essence. Consequently the idea of principle is incompatible with the essence: so that power which involves the idea of a principle does not denote the essence in God.

4. In God property is relative and notional: while that which is common is essential and absolute. Now the generative power is not common to Father and Son, but is proper to the Father. Therefore it is attributed as a notion or relation, and not essentially nor absolutely.

5. The principle of a thing’s proper action is its proper form and not the common form: thus man understands by his intellect, because this action is proper to him in relation to other animals, even as the form of rationality or intellectuality. Now generation is the proper operation of the Father as Father. Therefore its principle is Paternity which is the Father’s proper form, and not the Godhead which is the common form. But Paternity is a relative term. Therefore the generative power not only viewed as a principle, but also as to the thing which is a principle, denotes a relation.

6. As the generative power does not really differ from the essence, so neither does paternity. But this does not prevent paternity from being a purely relative term. Therefore neither does it oblige us to say that the generative power denotes the essence together with a relation.

7. In God three things have the nature of a principle, power, knowledge and will, and these are ascribed to God essentially. Now knowledge and will in God do not each signify at the same time some relation or notion. For equal reason, therefore, neither does power: and so it cannot be said that the generative power signifies at the same time the essence on the part of the power, and a notion on the part of generation: but seemingly it signifies nothing. but the notion for reasons already given.

On the contrary the Master says (I.D.vii) that the generative power in the Father is the very essence of God.

Further, Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father begets by virtue of the Godhead. Therefore the Godhead is the principle of generation, and is in the nature of a power.

Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) that generation is the work of nature; and thus the same conclusion follows.

Further, there is but one power in God. Now the creative power is attributed to the essence. Therefore the generative power should be also.

I answer that there are several opinions on this point. Some maintained that the generative power is not ascribed to God otherwise than relatively: and they were moved by the following argument. Power is essentially a principle of a kind: and a principle signifies a relation and a property if attributed to the divine power and not to creatures. Bit in arguing thus they were at fault in two ways. First, although power is rightly described as a kind of principle which comes under the generic head of relation, nevertheless the thing which is a principle of action or passion is not a relation but an absolute form, namely the essence of the power. Wherefore the Philosopher places science in the genus, not of relation but of quality, although a relation is incidental to both. Secondly, when speaking of God, terms that signify a principle in respect of operation are not employed relatively as denoting properties but only those that signify a principle in respect of the term of operations. Because when we speak of a principle as a property in God we refer to the subsistent person: whereas the term operation does not involve subsistence: and consequently it does not follow that terms which denote a principle of operation are employed to signify a property, otherwise will, knowledge, intellect and all like terms would be employed as indicating properties. Power, however, although it is a principle sometimes both of action and of the product of action, yet the latter is incidental to it while the former is essential to it: because active power by its action does not always produce something that is the term of that action, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 1; Metaph. ix, 6), there are many operations that have no product: whereas power is always a principle of action or operation. Consequently it does not follow that because power implies the relation of a principle, it is therefore predicated of God relatively.

Moreover this opinion appears to be in conflict with the truth. If the thing that is a power is the same as the principle of action, it follows that the divine nature is the thing that is a principle in God: for since every agent as such produces its like, that thing in the begetter is the principle of his begetting, in respect of which the begotten is likened to the begetter: thus a man by virtue of his human nature begets a son who is like him in that nature. Now God begotten is like God the Father in the divine nature: hence the divine nature is the generating principle whereby the Father begets, as Hilary says (l.c.).

For this reason others said that the generative power signifies the essence alone. But this opinion again appears to be at fault. An action done by virtue of the common nature, by an individual included in that nature, takes on a certain mode from its proper principles: thus an action due to a man’s animal nature is produced in him in accordance with the principles of the human species, wherefore a man on account of his rational nature enjoys a more perfect act of the imagination than other animals. Again actions peculiar to man are performed by this or that individual in accordance with the individualising principles of this or that man; the result being that one man understands better than another. Consequently if the common nature be the principle of an operation that belongs to the Father alone, it follows that it is the principle in accordance with the personal property of the Father. And for this reason the idea of power includes, after a fashion, paternity even in respect of that which is the principle of generation.

For these reasons we must say with others that the generative power denotes at the same time the essence and the property.

Reply to the First Objection. Power conveys the idea of a principle in relation to operation which, as already stated, is not ascribed to God as a notional act.

Reply to the Second Objection. Among creatures one predicament is accidental to another, wherefore one thing cannot result from two, except what is one accidentally; whereas in God relation is in reality the very essence; and thus there is no comparison.

Reply to the Third Objection. Among creatures the principle of generation is twofold, namely the generator and that whereby he generates. The generator, however, is distinct from the thing generated by virtue of the generation, since nothing generates itself: whereas that whereby the generation takes place is not distinct but is common to both, as stated above. Consequently it does not follow that there is a distinction in the divine nature, as the generative power, since power is the principle whereby the effect is produced.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. By reason of the implied relation the generative power is not common but proper.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In every generation, the generating principle in chief is not an individual form but the form proper to the specific nature. Again there is no need for the thing generated to be like the generator in regard to individual conditions, but in regard to the specific nature. Now fatherhood is not in the Father as the form of a species, as human nature is in man, for then the divine nature is in him; but it is in him, so to speak, as the principle of his individuality, since it is a personal property. Consequently it does not follow that in him it is the generating principle in chief, but that it is understood along with it, so to speak, as we have already explained: otherwise it would follow that the Father by begetting would communicate not only his Godhead but also his Fatherhood which is inadmissible.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generative power is really identical with the divine nature, so that the nature is essentially included in it: it is not the same with the Paternity, wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Knowledge or will are not the principle of generation, since generation belongs to the nature which as a principle of action may be considered as a power. Hence it is that in God power is cosignified with relation, which does not apply to knowledge or will.

The replies to the arguments on the other side may be easily gathered from what has been said.

Q. II: ARTICLE III

IN THE ACT OF GENERATION DOES THE GENERATIVE POWER COME INTO ACTION AT THE COMMAND OF THE WILL?

[SUM. TH. 1, Q. XLI, A. 2]

THE third point of inquiry is whether in the act of generation the generative power comes into action at the command of the will. It would seem that the reply should be in the affirmative.

1. Hilary (De Synod.) says that not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son. Now if he did not beget of his will he begot of natural necessity, since an agent is either voluntary or natural. Therefore the Father begot the Son by his will: and thus the generative power proceeded to generate through the command of the Will.

2. But, you will say, the Father begot the Son by an act of his will, neither preceding nor following but accompanying the act of generation.—On the contrary this argument is seemingly inadequate. For since everything in God is eternal, nothing in him can precede in point of time anything that is in him: and yet we find in him one thing having to another the relation of a principle, for instance, his will in relation to his election of the just, from the mere fact that it proceeds from his intellect. Therefore though the will to beget did not precede the begetting of the Son, nevertheless it would seem that we may consider it to be the principle of the Son's generation, for the reason that it proceeds from the intellect.

3. The Son proceeds through an act of the intellect since he proceeds as the Word: because there is no intellectual word except when thinking of a thing we understand it, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4). Now the will is the principle of the intellectual operation: for it commands the act of the intellect, even as those of the other powers, as Anselm says (De Simil. ii): thus I understand because I wish to do so, just as I walk because I wish to walk. Therefore the will is the principle of the Son's generation.

4. But, say you, it is true of man that the will commands the act of the intelligence, but not of God.—On the contrary, predestination is, in a way, an act of the intelligence: for we say that God predestined Peter because he willed, according to Romans ix, 18: He hath mercy on whom he eill, and

whom he will he hardeneth. Therefore not only in man but also in God does the will command the act of the intelligence.

5. According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 5) that which causes its own movement can be either in motion or not: and for the same reason that which is cause of its own act, can act or not act. But nature cannot act or not act, since it is determined to one action. Therefore it is not the cause of its own action, but acts as moved by another. Now this cannot be the case in God. Therefore in God no action is from nature, and consequently neither is generation. Therefore generation is from his will, since all agents are reduced to nature or will as stated in Phys. ii, 4.

6. If the action of nature precede that of the will, this leads to an absurdity, for the will would be rendered void. Because since nature is determined to one course of action, if it moved the will, it would move it to one thing alone, and this is contrary to the essence of the will which, as such, is free. On the other hand if the will move nature, neither nature nor will is abrogated, since that which is indifferent to many things is not debarred from moving towards one. Therefore the action of the will reasonably precedes the action of nature, rather than vice versa. Now the generation of the Son is pure action or operation. Therefore it comes from the will.

7. It is written (Ps. cxlviii, 5): He spake and they were made, which words Augustine expounds as follows (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6, 7): He begat the Word in whom they were that they might be made. Accordingly the procession of the Word from the Father is the reason of the creature’s production. Wherefore if the Son proceeds not from the Father by the command of the Father’s will, it would seem that all creatures proceed from the Father naturally and not only by his will which is erroneous.

8. Hilary says (De Synod.): If anyone say that the Son was born of the Father without the concurrence of the Father’s will, let him be anathema. Therefore the Father did not beget the Son involuntarily; and so the same conclusion follows.

9. It is written (Jo. iii, 35): The Father loveth the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand, which words a gloss expounds of the giving of the eternal generation. Therefore the love of the Father for the Son is the reason rather than the sign of the eternal generation. Now love is from the will. Therefore the will is the principle of the Son’s generation.

10. Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv) says that God’s love does not allow him to be without offspring. Hence again it would seem to follow that love is the reason of generation.

11. Any opinion about God that does not involve absurdity or error can be maintained. Now if we suppose that the Father begat the Son voluntarily, no absurdity follows, since neither does it follow apparently that the Son is not eternal, nor that he is not consubstantial with or equal to the Father, since the Holy Spirit who proceeds as an act of the will, is co-eternal, co-equal and consubstantial with the Father and Son. Therefore seemingly it is not erroneous to assert that the Father begat the Son by his will.

12. No will can fail to will its last end. Now the end of God’s will is to communicate his goodness, and this is especially effected by generation. Therefore the Father’s will cannot but will the generation of the Son. Therefore by his will he begat the Son.

13. Human generation is drawn from the divine according to Ephesians iii, 15: Of whom all paternity is named in heaven and on earth. Now human generation is subject to the command of the will, else there could be no sin in the act of generation. Therefore the divine generation is also, and so the same conclusion follows.

14. Every action proceeding from an unchangeable nature is necessary. Now the divine nature is utterly unchangeable., Wherefore if the (divine) generation be the operation of the nature and not of the will, it follows that it is necessary, so that the Father begat the Son of necessity: and this is contrary to the teaching of Augustine (Ad Oros. iii).

15. Augustine (De Trin. xv, xx) says that the Son is Counsel of counsel, and will of will. Now the preposition of indicates a principle. Therefore the will is the principle of Son’s generation, and so the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary Augustine (Ad Oros. iii) says The Father begot the Son neither by his will nor of necessity.

Again, the supreme effusion of the will is through the channel of love. But the Son proceeds not by way of love, rather is it the Holy Spirit who proceeds thus. Therefore the will is not the principle of the Son’s generation.

Further, the Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light according to Hebrews i, 3: Who being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance. Now brightness does not proceed from light by the will. Neither therefore does the Son proceed thus from the Father.

I answer that the generation of the Father may be referred to the will as the object of the will: since the Father both willed the Son and the generation of the Son from eternity: but by no means can the will be the principle of the divine generation. This is made evident as follows. The will as such being free is indifferent to either of the alternatives: for it can act or not act, do thus or do otherwise, will and not will. And if this does not apply to the will with regard to a certain thing, this will be true of the will not as will, but on account of the natural inclination it has for a certain thing, as for the last end which it is unable not to will: thus the human will is unable not to will happiness, and cannot will unhappiness. Wherefore it is clear that whenever a thing has the will for its principle, it is possible for it to be or not to be, to be such or otherwise, to be now or then. Now everything of this description is a creature; since in an uncreated being there is no possibility of being or not being, but the essential necessity of being, as Avicenna proves (Metaph. viii, 4). Wherefore if we suppose the Son to be begotten by the will, it must needs follow that he is a creature. For this reason the Arians who held the Son to be a creature, said that he was begotten by the will: whereas Catholics say that he was begotten not by will but by the nature. For nature is determined to one effect: and accordingly since the, Son is begotten of the Father by nature, it follows that it is impossible for him not to be begotten, or to be otherwise than he is, or not consubstantial with the Father: since that which proceeds naturally, proceeds in likeness to that from which it proceeds. This is the teaching of Hilary (De. Syn.): God’s will gave every creature its nature, whereas a perfect nativity gave the Son his nature. Hence everything is such as God willed it to be, while the Son is such as God is. Now, as already stated, although the will is indifferent to some things, it has a natural inclination in regard to the last end: and in like manner the intellect has a certain natural movement in respect of its knowledge of first principles. Moreover, the principle of the divine knowledge is God himself, who is the end of his will; wherefore that which proceeds in God by his act of self-knowledge, proceeds naturally, and likewise that which proceeds by his act of self-love. And for this reason, since the Son proceeds as the Word by an act of the divine intellect inasmuch as the Father knows himself, and the Holy Spirit by an act of the will inasmuch as the Father loves the Son: it follows that both Son and Holy Spirit proceed naturally, and further, that they are consubstantial, coequal and coeternal with the Father and with each other.

Reply to the First Objection. Hilary is speaking of the necessity that denotes violence: this is evident from the words that follow: Not led by natural necessity, since he willed to beget the Son.

Reply to the Second Objection. There is not an antecedent will in God in respect of anything whatsoever; because everything that God ever wills, he has willed from eternity. But his will is concomitant with every good that is in him and creatures: for he wills himself to be and the creature to be. It is, however, precedent or antecedent in point of time with reference to creatures alone who have not existed from eternity. His intellect is precedent as regards those eternal acts which are denominated as terminating in creatures, such as government, predestination and the like. But the generation of the Son is neither a, creature nor does it signify an act terminating in a creature. Therefore with regard to it God's will is not antecedent, either in time or in our way of thinking, but only concomitant.

Reply to the Third Objection. just as the act of the intellect seems to follow the act of the will, in so far as it is commanded by the will, so on the other hand the act of the will seems to follow the act of the intellect, in so far as the will's object, namely the good understood, is offered to it by the intellect. Hence we should go on indefinitely unless we come to a stop either in the act of the intellect or in the act of the will. But we cannot come to a stop in an act of the will whose object is presupposed to its act. Therefore we must come to a stop in an act of the intellect, and an act which proceeds from the intellect naturally, so as not to be commanded by the will. It is in this way that the Son of God proceeds as the Word, by an act of the divine intellect, as we have already stated.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The act of the divine intellect is natural, in so far as it terminates in God himself who is the principle of his intellect: but in so far as it is described as terminating in creatures, its relation to whom is somewhat like the relation of our intellect to its conclusions, it proceeds not naturally but voluntarily. Consequently some of the acts of the divine intellect are designated as being commanded by the divine will.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. With regard to those things to which it can extend by virtue of its essential principles, nature does not need to be determined by another, but only with regard to those things for which its own principles do not suffice. Consequently philosophers in saying that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence, were not led by observing the effects of heat and cold considered in themselves, since even those who said that natural effects were necessitated by matter referred all the works of nature to the agency of heat and cold. But they were led by observing those effects which were beyond the power of these qualities of heat and cold: such as the arrangement of members in the body of an animal in suchwise that nature is safeguarded. Since this generation is the work of the divine nature considered in itself, there is no need for it to be determined to such an action by the will.—It may also be replied that nature is determined by something for some particular end. But a nature which is itself the end and not directed to an end does not require determination from without.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The action of the will precedes the action of nature if we take them in separate subjects. Wherefore the action of the entire inferior nature is dependent on the will of its Governor. But in the same subject the action of nature must needs precede the act of the will. For nature is logically prior to will, since nature in the logical order comes the first in a thing's subsistence, while the will comes last as directing that thing to its end. Yet it does not follow that the will is rendered void. For although the will follows the natural inclination in being determined to that one thing which is the last end to which nature inclines, it nevertheless remains undetermined with regard to other things. Take man, for instance, who desires happiness naturally and of necessity, but not other things. Accordingly in God the action of nature precedes the act of the will both naturally and logically: for the generation of the Son is the prototype of all the productions that proceed from the divine will, that is to say of all creatures.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Though all creatures were made'by the Word of God begotten of the Father, it does not follow that if the Word proceeded naturally, creatures also proceed naturally: thus although our intellect knows first principles naturally, it does not follow that it knows naturally the conclusions deduced from them. For the will makes use of our natural gifts for this or that purpose.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The Father begot voluntarily, but this indicates nothing else than his concomitant will.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. If these words are made to refer to the eternal generation, the Father’s love for the Son is not to be taken as the reason but as the sign of that giving whereby the Father from all eternity gave all things to the Son. For likeness is the reason of love.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Dionysius is speaking of the formation of creatures, not of the generation of the Son.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The Holy Spirit is said to proceed by way of the will, because he proceeds by an act which is naturally an act of the will, namely the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For the Holy Spirit is love even as the Son is the Father’s Word expressive of himself.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Again this argument proves only that the Father wills the generation of the Son: and this denotes a concomitant will that regards the generation as its object, not as something whereof it is the principle.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Human generation is effected by a natural force, namely the generative power, through the medium of the motive power which is subject to the command of the will, whereas the generative power is not. This does not apply to God, and so the comparison fails.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine does not mean to deny the necessity attaching to immutability as the argument suggests, but the necessity induced by force.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. When it is said that the Son is ‘will of will’ the sense is ‘will of the Father’ who is will. Hence this preposition ‘of’ denotes the generative principle that is the begetter, and not the principle whereby generation is effected, which is the point of our inquiry.

Q. II: ARTICLE IV

CAN THERE BE SEVERAL SONS IN GOD?

THE fourth point of inquiry is, whether there can be several Sons in God. It would seem that the reply should be in the affirmative.

1. A natural operation that is becoming to one individual is becoming to every individual of the Same nature. Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) generation is an operation of nature, and it is becoming to the Father. Therefore it is becoming also to the Son and Holy Spirit who are

supposites of the same nature. But the Son does not beget himself since, according to Augustine, nothing can generate itself. Therefore he begets another Son, so that in God there can be several Sons.

2. The Father communicated all his might to the Son. Now the generative power belongs to the Father's might. Therefore the Son has this power from the Father; and the same conclusion follows.

3. The Son is the perfect image of the Father, and this demands perfect likeness. But this would not be the case if the Son did not imitate the Father in all respects. Therefore as the Father begets a Son, so also does the Son; and the same conclusion follows.

4. According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii) likeness to God is more perfect in respect of conformity in action than in respect of conformity in some form: thus that which both shines and illuminates is more like the sun than that which shines only. Now the Son is most perfectly like the Father. Therefore he is conformed to him not only in the power but also in the act of generation. Thus we have the same conclusion as before.

5. The reason why God after making one creature is able to make another is because his power is neither exhausted nor diminished in creating. Now in like manner the Father's power is neither exhausted nor diminished through begetting the Son. Therefore by begetting the Son he is not disabled from begetting another: and so there can be several Sons in God.

6. But, say you, the reason why he does not beget another Son is that the result would be unbecoming, as Augustine points out, namely that there would be an infinite number of divine generations, if the Father were to beget many sons, or the Son to beget grandsons to the Father, and so on.—On the contrary nothing in God is potential but what is also actual, else he were imperfect. Therefore if it is potential that the Father beget several sons, and nothing arise to prevent it, there will be several Sons in God.

7. It belongs to the nature of that which is generated to proceed in likeness to the generator. Now as the Son is like the Father, so also is the Holy Spirit so that the Holy Spirit is likewise a Son: and thus there are several Sons in God.

8. According to Anselm (Monolog. xxxii) for the Father to beget the Son is nothing else but for the Father to speak himself. Now, as the Father can speak himself," so also can the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore Father, Son and Holy Spirit can beget Sons, and the same conclusion follows.

9. The Father is said to beget the Son, because he conceives intellectually his own likeness. But the Son and Holy Spirit can do the same: and thus we come to the same conclusion.

10. Power comes between essence and operation. Now the essence of the Father and the Son is one, and theirs is one power. Therefore it becomes the Son to beget: and we conclude as before.

11. Goodness is the principle of diffusion. Now even as there is infinite goodness in the Father and the Son so is there in the Holy Spirit. Therefore even as the Father by begetting the Son bestows on him his nature by an infinite communication, so likewise does the Holy Spirit by producing a divine person, since the divine goodness is not bestowed in an infinite degree on a creature. Wherefore it would seem that there can be several Sons in God.

12. No good can be possessed happily unless it be shared with another. Now Sonship is a good possessed by the Son. Therefore seemingly his perfect happiness demands that he should beget a Son.

13. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from light, according to Hebrews i, 3: Who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance. Now one splendour can produce another, and this one a third, and this one yet another. And thus it would seem to be in the procession of the divine persons, so that the Son can beget another Son; and hence the same conclusion follows.

14. Paternity belongs to the Father’s dignity. But the same dignity is both Father’s and Son’s. Therefore paternity is becoming to the Son: and consequently the Son begets.

15. Where the power is there is the act. But the Son has the power to beget. Therefore he begets.

On the contrary those creatures are most perfect which contain their entire matter, each one by itself alone forming a single species. Now as material creatures are individualised by their matter, so the person of the Son is constituted by Sonship. Therefore, as the Son of God is a perfect Son, in God seemingly Sonship is in him alone.

Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 7, 18, 23) that if the Father being able to beget did not beget he would be envious. But the Son is not envious. Therefore seeing that he does not beget, he cannot do so. Consequently there cannot be several Sons in God. Again, what has been said perfectly should not be said over again. Now the Son is the perfect Word lacking nothing (Augustine, De Trin. vi, io; vii, 2). Therefore there ought not to be several Words in God, nor several Sons.

I answer that there cannot be several Sons in God: this is proved as follows. The divine persons in all things absolute are identical, and essentially coincident with one another: and between them there can be no other distinction but that founded on the relations, and on no other relationship but that of origin. The reason of this is that of other relations, some presuppose distinction, such as equality and likeness, while some imply inequality, such as master and servant, and so on. On the other hand relations of origin by their very nature denote conformity: because that which takes its origin from another, as such bears the likeness thereof. In God, therefore, there is nothing whereby the Son can be distinguished from the other persons, except the relation of Sonship, which is his personal property, and by virtue of which he is not only the Son but also this supposite or this person. Now it is impossible for that whereby this particular supposite is individualised to be found in anything else: otherwise the supposite itself would be communicable, which is incompatible with the very nature of an individual, supposite or person. Consequently it is utterly impossible that in God there be more Sons than one. For it cannot be said that one Sonship makes one Son, and another Sonship another Son: because as sonships do not differ logically, it would follow that if they differed in matter or supposite, there would be matter in God, or some principle of distinction other than relation.

Besides the above, another special reason may be given why the Father can beget but one Son. Nature is determined to one effect: and therefore, since the Father begets the Son by nature, there can be but one Son begotten of the Father. Nor can it be said that there are several in tlie one species, as is the case with us; since in. God there is no matter which is the principle of numerical distinction within the one species.

Reply to the First Objection. Although in the Father generation is an operation of the divine nature, nevertheless it belongs thereto with reference at the same time to the personal property of the Father, as stated above (A. 2): wherefore it does not follow that it belongs to the Son, who has the divine nature without that property.

Reply to the Second Objection. The Father communicates to the Son all that divine might which goes with the divine nature absolutely. But the generative power goes with the divine nature in conjunction with the personal property of the Father, as stated.

Reply to the Third Objection. An image is like the original in point of species, not of relation. For though the image is produced by someone it does not follow that the original is also produced by someone: because neither is likeness properly considered with regard to relation but with regard to form.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Even as the Son is like the Father in the divine nature and not in a personal property, so too is he like him in an action that goes with the nature provided it does not go with a personal property. Such, however, is not generation: wherefore the argument fails.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although the Father's generative power is not exhausted nor diminished by his begetting the Son: yet the Son equals the infinity of that power, for he is infinite intelligence, and not a finite creature. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In a reductio ad absurdum, the avoiding of the absurdity is not necessarily the only reason for denying the statement from which the absurdity follows, but there are also the reasons for which the absurdity is made manifest. Hence it is not only because an infinity of generations in God would be the result, that there are not more than one Son in God.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds after the manner of love. Now love does not denote something that is stamped and specified with the likeness of the lover or of the beloved, whereas the word expresses the idea of the speaker and the thing to which that idea corresponds. Consequently, as the Son proceeds as Word, by the very nature of his procession it belongs to him to proceed in likeness to his Begetter, and therefore he is his Son, and his procession is called a generation. On the other hand this belongs to the Holy Spirit not by reason of his procession, but rather from a property of the divine nature; because in God there can be nothing that is not God: so that the divine love itself is God, precisely because it is divine, not because it is love.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. To speak may be taken in two senses, strictly and broadly. To speak, in a strict sense, is to utter a word, and then it denotes a notional act and is proper to the Father. Augustine employs the term in this sense when he says (Trin. vii, i) that the Father alone speaks himself. Secondly, to speak may be taken broadly in so far as a person may be said to speak when he understands, and then it is an essential act. In this sense Anselm writes (Monolog. lx) when he says that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit speak themselves.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Even as to beget in God belongs to the Father alone, so also does to conceive: wherefore the Father alone conceives his own likeness intellectually', although the Son and the Holy Spirit understand it: because no relation is indicated in the word understand, except perhaps only in our way of thinking: whereas begetting and conceiving imply real origin.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. This argument holds in regard to an action that proceeds from the nature absolutely without any relation to a property. Such, however is not generation, wherefore the argument fails.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there can be no other than spiritual procession, and this is only by way of intellect and will. Consequently another divine person cannot proceed from the Holy Spirit, because he proceeds by way of the will as love, and the Son by way of the intellect as Word.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. A personal property must needs be incommunicable, as stated above: wherefore happiness does not demand that it should be shared with another.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. This comparison does not necessarily apply in every respect.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Even as paternity in the Father and filiation in the Son are one essence, so too their dignity and goodness are one.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. When we speak of the polestas generandi the gerund generandi may be taken in three ways. First, as the gerund of the active voice, and thus the potestas generandi (power of generating) is in him who has the power to generate. Secondly, as the gerundive of the passive voice, and thus the polestas generandi (power to be generated) belongs to one who has the power to be generated. Thirdly, as the gerund of an impersonal verb, and then the potestas generandi belongs to one who has the power whereby he is actually generated by another." In the first sense the Potentia generandi is not in the Son, but it is in the second and third sense: wherefore the argument does not prove.

Q. II: ARTICLE V

IS THE GENERATIVE POWER INCLUDED IN OMNIPOTENCE?

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the generative power is included in omnipotence. And seemingly the reply should be in the negative.

1. Omnipotence is becoming to the Son according to the words of the Creed: The Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty. But the generative power is not becoming to him. Therefore it is not included in omnipotence.

2. Augustine (Enchir. xcvi) says that God is almighty because he is able to do whatsoever he wills: so that it would seem to follow that omnipotence includes any power that is at the command of the will. Now such is not the generative power: since the Father did not beget the Son by his will, as we have shown above (A. 3). Therefore the generative power does not belong to omnipotence.

3. Omnipotence is attributed to God in the sense that it extends to all those things that are in themselves possible. But the generation of the Son or the Son himself comes within the range not of things possible, but of things necessary. Therefore the generative power is not included in omnipotence.

4. That which belongs to several things in common belongs to them in respect of something that is common to all of them. Thus in every triangle the three angles are together equal to two right angles, and this applies to all triangles inasmuch as they are triangular figures. Consequently that which belongs to one thing alone, belongs to it in respect of that which is proper to it. Now omnipotence is not proper to the Father. Since then the generative power in God belongs to the Father alone, it does not belong to him as omnipotent, and consequently is not included in omnipotence.

5. Even as there is one essence of Father and Son, so is there one omnipotence. Now it does not pertain to the Son’s omnipotence that he be able to beget. Neither, then, does it belong to the omnipotence of the Father: and consequently by no means does the generative power belong to omnipotence.

6. Things differing in kind do not come under the same heading: thus when I say ‘all dogs’ I do not include both the dog that barks and the constellation. Now the generation of the Son and the formation of the other things that are the subject-matter of omnipotence are not of the same kind. Therefore when I say: ‘God is almighty’ I do not include his power of generating.

7. The subject-matter of omnipotence is anything to which omnipotence extends. Now in God there is no subject-matter according to Jerome. Therefore neither the Son’s generation nor the Son himself is the subject-matter of omnipotence: and the same conclusion follows as before.

8. According to the Philosopher (Phys. v, i) a relation cannot be the direct term of a movement, nor consequently of an action: and therefore it cannot be the object of a power, since power connotes direction to an action. Now generation and Son imply relation in God. Therefore God’s power does not extend to them: and consequently omnipotence does not include the power to beget.

On the contrary Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 7, 18, 23): If the Father is unable to beget a Son equal to him, where is his omnipotence? Therefore omnipotence includes begetting.

Further, omnipotence is attributed to God in respect not only of external acts, such as creation, government and the like, which are expressed as terminating extrinsically in their effects, but also of interior acts, such as intelligence and will. For if anyone were to say that God cannot understand, he would take away from his omnipotence. Now the Son proceeds as Word by an act of intelligence. Therefore God’s omnipotence is understood to include the begetting of the Son.

Again, it is a greater thing to beget the Son than to create heaven and earth. But the power to create heaven and earth belongs to omnipotence. Much more, then, does the power to beget the Son.

Moreover, in every genus there is a principle to which all that belong to that genus are reduced. Now in the genus of powers the principle is omnipotence. Therefore all power is reduced to omnipotence; and consequently the generative power is either included in omnipotence, or there will be two principles in the genus of power, which is impossible.

I answer that the power to beget belongs to the omnipotence of the Father, but not to omnipotence simply. This may be proved as follows.

Since power is considered as being rooted in the essence and is the principle of action, we must judge of the power and action as of the essence. Now in the divine essence we must note that, by reason of its supreme simplicity, whatever is in God is his essence: wherefore the very relations by which the persons are distinct one from another, are in reality the divine essence. And though one and the same essence is common to the three persons, nevertheless the relation of one person is not common to the three, on account of the opposition in which these relations stand to one another. Thus paternity is the divine essence, yet paternity is not in the Son, because paternity is opposed to sonship. Hence we may say that paternity is the divine essence forasmuch as this is in the Father, not as in the Son; because the divine essence is not in the same way in the Father as in the Son: it is in the Son as received from another: but not in the Father. And although the Father has paternity which the Son has not, it does not follow that the Father has something that the Son has not: because the relation, by reason of its generic nature as such, is a thing (aliquid), but is purely relative (ad aliquid). That it is something real is due to the fact that it is in a subject, which is either identical with it as in God, or is its cause, as in creatures. Wherefore since that which is absolute is common to Father and Son they are distinct not by something absolute but by something relative: and therefore we must not say that the Father has something that the Son has not, but that something belongs to the Father in one respect, to the Son in another. The same then applies to action and power. Generation denotes action with a certain respect, and the generative power denotes power with a certain respect: so that generation is God’s action, but only as it is in the Father: likewise the generative power is the divine omnipotence, but only as this is in the Father. Yet it does not follow that the Father is able to do what the Son cannot do: but whatsoever the Father can do, the Son can do likewise, although he cannot beget, because to beget implies a relation.

Reply to the First Objection. Omnipotence includes the power to beget, but not as it is in the Son, as stated above.

Reply to the Second Objection. In these words Augustine does not intend to explain the whole meaning of omnipotence, but to indicate a sign of omnipotence. Nor is he speaking of omnipotence except in reference to creatures.

Reply to the Third Objection. The possible things to which omnipotence extends must not be confined to those that are contingent, since even necessary things were brought into being by the divine power. Hence there is no reason why the begetting of the Son should not be included among the things possible to the divine power.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Though omnipotence absolutely considered is not proper to the Father, nevertheless as considered together with its Particular mode of existence, or definite relation, it becomes proper to the Father. In the same way the expression God the Father is proper to the Father, although God is common to the three persons.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. just as the three persons have one and the same essence, it is not in each under the same relation, or with the same mode of existence: and the same applies to omnipotence.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generation, of the Son and the formation of creatures are of the same kind not univocally indeed, but only by analogy. Thus Basil (Hom. de Fide xv) says that the Son receives in common with all creatures. In this sense he is called the Firstborn of every creature (Colos. i, 15), and for the same reason his generation may be placed under one common head with the production of creatures.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The generation of the Son is the subject-matter of omnipotence; not, however, so as to imply that being subject denotes inferiority, but so as subject-matter indicates the object of power.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The generation of the Son signifies the relation by way of action, and the Son signifies the relation as a subsistent hypostasis: and thus there is no reason why we should not refer omnipotence to these things.

The arguments on the other side merely prove that the omnipotence of the Father includes the power to beget.

Q. II: ARTICLE VI

ARE THE GENERATIVE AND CREATIVE POWERS THE SAME?

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether the power to beget is the same as the power to create: and the answer, seemingly should be in the negative.

1. According to Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 27) generation is the operation or work of nature: whereas according to Hilary (De Synod.)

creation is a work of the will. Now will and nature are not one and the same principle, but are opposite members of a division, as stated in Phys. ii, 4, 5. Therefore the generative and creative powers are not the same.

2. Powers are distinguished by their acts (De Anima ii, 4). Now generation and creation are very different acts. Therefore the generative and creative powers are also distinct.

3. There is less unity among things that admit of a same common predication, than among those that have the same being. Now in no respect do the generative and creative powers admit of a same common predication, as neither do the acts of generating and creating, nor the Son and a creature. Therefore the generative and creative powers are not the same in being.

4. There is no order among things that are identical. Now the creative power logically precedes the generative power, even as the essential precedes the notional. Therefore these powers are not the same.

On the contrary in God power and essence are not distinct. But there is only one divine essence. Therefore there is only one divine power. Therefore the powers in question are not distinct.

Again, God does not do by several means what he is able to do by one. Now God is able both to generate and to create by one power, and all the more seeing that the generation of the Son is the prototype of the production of creatures, as Augustine expounds the words, He spake, and they were made (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6, 7): That is to say He begot the Word in whom they existed as things to be made. Therefore the generative and creative powers are but one power.

I answer that, as stated above (A. 5), in speaking of the divine power we must take as our guide those things that apply to the divine essence. Now in God though one relation is really distinct from another on account of the mutual opposition between the relations which are real in God, nevertheless the relation and the divine essence are distinct not really, but only logically, since there is no opposition between them. Consequently we cannot grant that there are several absolute things in God, as some have asserted who maintained that there is a twofold being in God, an essential being and a personal being. The reason is that all being in God is essential, and the very, persons are constituted by virtue of that essential being. Now when we consider the divine power we find besides the power a certain relation to what is subject to that power. Accordingly if we take power in its relation to an essential act, such as intelligence or creation, and power in its relation to a notional act such as generation, and compare them together as power, we find that they are one and the same power, even as nature and person have but one being. And. yet we understand at the same time that each power has its peculiar relationship to its respective act to which it is directed. Therefore the generative and creative powers are one and the same power, if we consider them as powers, but they differ in their respective relationships to different acts.

Reply to the First Objection. Although in creatures nature and will are distinct, in God they are one and the same.—Or we may reply that the creative power does not denote the purpose or will, but the power as directed by the will: whereas the generative power acts as inclined by nature. But this does not necessitate a distinction of powers, since there is nothing to prevent the same power from being directed to one act by the will and inclined to another by nature. Thus our intellect is urged by the will to believe, and is led by nature to understand first principles.

Reply to the Second Objection. The higher the power the wider its scope: so that a diversity of objects does not require that it should be divided: thus the imagination is one power covering all objects of sense, for the perception of which distinct senses are appropriated. Now the divine power is raised above all others: wherefore a difference of acts requires no distinction therein, if we consider it as power; but God by his, one power is able to do all things.

Reply to the Third Objection. The generative and creative powers, considered as to their substance, so to speak, do not merely admit of a same common predication, but they are one and the same thing: the analogy comes in through this relationship to their respective acts.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. There is no order of first and second between these powers, except in respect of their being distinct: so that such an order is only in reference to their acts. Hence it is clear that the generative power precedes the creative power, as generation preceded creation. But in relation to the essence they are identical and there is no order between them.

QUESTION III

CREATION

THERE are nineteen points of inquiry: (1) Can God create? (2) Is creation a kind of change? (3) Is creation something real in the creature? (4) Can the creative power be communicated to a creature? (5) Is it possible for anything to be that is not created by God? (6) Is there but one principle of creation? (7) Does God operate in every operation of nature? (8) Does creation take part in the works of nature? (9) Is the soul created? (10) Is the soul created in the body, or outside the body? (11) Do the sensitive and vegetative souls come into being by creation? (12) Are those souls in the seed at the time of impregnation? (13) Can that which derives its being from another be eternal? (14) Can anything that is essentially distinct from God be eternal? (15) Did things proceed from God by natural necessity? (16) Is it possible for many things to proceed from one? (17) Has the world always existed? (18) Were the angels created before the material world? (19) Could angels have existed before the material world?

Q. III: ARTICLE I

CAN GOD CREATE A THING FROM NOTHING?

[SUM. TH. 1. Q. XIV, A. 2]

WE now inquire about the creation, which is the first effect of the divine power; and the first point of inquiry is whether God can create anything out of nothing. Seemingly the reply should be in the negative.

1. God cannot act counter to first principles; for instance, he cannot make a whole not greater than its part. Now according to Aristotle (Phys. i, 8)

philosophers declare it is a commonly received axiom that out of nothing nothing comes. Therefore God cannot make a thing out of nothing.

2. Whatever is made was possible before it was made for if it could not be, it could not be made, since the impossible cannot be the term of a change. Now the potentiality by virtue of which a thing is possible, cannot be otherwise than in a subject, unless it be itself a subject: because an accident cannot exist but in a subject. Therefore whatever is made, is produced from matter or a subject. Therefore nothing can be made out of nothing.

3. Infinite distance cannot be crossed. Now there is an infinite distance between absolute non-being and being: because the less a potentiality is disposed to actuality the further is it removed from act, so that if there be no potentiality at all, the distance will be infinite. Therefore it is impossible for a thing to come into being from absolute non-being.

4. The Philosopher says (De Gen. i, 7) that things utterly dissimilar do not act on one another: because there must be common genus and matter in agent and patient. Now absolute non-entity and God are utterly dissimilar. Therefore God cannot act on absolute non-entity: and consequently he cannot make a thing out of nothing.

5. Should it be said that the foregoing argument applies to an agent whose action is distinct from its substance, and presupposes a subject into which it is received? —On the contrary, Avicenna says (Metaph. ix, 2) that if heat were separated from matter it would act of itself without its matter: and yet its action would not be its substance. Therefore the fact that God’s action is his substance is no reason for his not needing matter.

6. From no premises we can draw no conclusion, which is a process, of reason. Now logical being is consequent to natural being. Therefore neither can anything in nature be made from nothing.

7. If a thing is made from nothing, this preposition from connotes either cause or order. And apparently if it connotes a cause it will be either the efficient or the material cause. But nothing cannot be the efficient cause of being, nor can it be the material cause, so that as regards the point at issue ‘from’ does not denote a cause. Nor can it denote order, because as Boethius says there is no order between non-being and being. Therefore in no sense can a thing be made from nothing.

8. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) active power is the cause whereby one thing is changed into another, as such. Now there is no power in God save that which is active. Therefore it requires a thing which is the subject of change and consequently cannot make a thing out of nothing.

9. Things differ from one another in that one is more perfect than another. Now the cause of this difference is not on the part of God, since he is one and simple. Therefore we must assign matter as the cause thereof: and consequently we must hold that things were made from matter and not from nothing.

10. That which is made from nothing has being after nonbeing. Consequently it is possible to conceive an instant which is the last of its non-being, and when it ceases not to be; and another instant which is the first of its being and from which it begins to be. Now these instants are either one and the same, or distinct. If they coincide it follows that two contradictory statements are true at the same instant: if they are distinct, then since there is an intervening time between the two instants, it follows that there is a mean between affirmation and negation: for it cannot be said that it is not after the last instant of its non-existence, nor that it is before the first instant of its existence. But both these things are impossible, namely that contradictory statements be true simultaneously, and that they have a mean. Therefore a thing cannot be made from nothing.

11. That which is made of necessity at some time was becoming: and what is created was at some time being created. Hence that which is created was becoming and was made either simultaneously or not simultaneously. Now it cannot be mid that it was not simultaneously, since the creature, before it is made, is not: and if its becoming precedes its having been made, there must have been a subject of the making, and this is contrary to the definition of creation. On the other hand if its becoming and its having been made are simultaneous, it follows that at the same time it is being made and not being made, since in things that are not purely transient, that which has been made is: whereas that which is being made, is not. But this is impossible. Therefore it is impossible for a thing to be made from nothing or to be created.

12. Every agent produces its like: and every agent acts forasmuch as it is actual. Therefore nothing is made but what is actual. Now primal matter is not actual. Therefore it cannot be made, especially by God who is pure act.

Hence whatsoever things are made, are made from pre-existing matter, and not from nothing.

13. Whatsoever God makes he fashions according to his idea, even as an artist produces art-works according to art-forms. Now there is no idea of primal matter in God, because an idea is a form and the likeness of that which it represents: whereas primal matter, since it is conceived to be essentially formless, cannot be represented by a form. Therefore primal matter cannot be made by God; and thus the same conclusion follows.

14. The same thing cannot be a principle both of perfection and of imperfection. Now things are said to be imperfect when they are inferior to others, and this can only be the case when their inferiority is due to their being imperfect. Since then God is the principle of perfection, we must needs ascribe imperfection to some other principle: and this can only be matter. Therefore things must needs have been made from matter of some kind, and not from nothing.

15. If a thing. is made from nothing, it is made therefrom either as from a subject, as a statue made of bronze; or as from its opposite, as a shape from something shapeless: or as from these two combined, as a statue from shapeless bronze. Now a thing cannot be made from nothing as subject, since non-being cannot be the matter of being. Nor as a composite, since then non-being would be transformed into being, as shapeless bronze is transformed into shapely bronze; so that there would have to be something common to being and non-being; which is impossible. Nor again as from its opposite, since absolute non-being differs more from being than two beings, of the same genus, and yet one of the latter cannot be changed into another; for instance, shape is not changed into colour, except perhaps accidentally. Therefore by no means can a thing be made from nothing.

16. Whatsoever accidentally is originates in that which is essential. From that which is opposite a thing is made accidentally, and from a subject a thing is made essentially: thus a statue is made accidentally from that which is shapeless, but from bronze essentially, since shapelessness is accidental to the bronze. If, then, a thing is made from nothing, this will be accidentally: and thus it follows that it will need to be made from a subject, and therefore not from nothing.

17. The maker gives being to that which is made. If then God makes a thing out of nothing, he gives being to that thing. Hence either there is

something that receives being, or there is nothing. If nothing, then nothing receives being by that action of God's, and thus nothing is made thereby. And if there is something that receives being, this something will be distinct from that which is from God, since recipient is distinct from that which is received. Therefore God makes a thing from something already existing, and not from nothing.

On the contrary, on Genesis i, 1, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, a gloss taken from Bede says that to create is to make a thing from nothing. Therefore God can make a thing from nothing.

Again, Avicenna (Metaph. vii, 2) says that an agent who acts by virtue of an accident requires matter to act upon. But God does not act by virtue of an accident, indeed his action is his very substance. Therefore he requires no matter to act upon, and consequently can make a thing from nothing.

Again, God's power is greater than that of nature. Now the power of nature makes things from that in which previously they were in potentiality. Therefore God's power does something more, and makes things out of nothing.

I answer that we must hold firmly that God can and does make things from nothing.

In order to make this evident we must observe that every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: wherefore action must needs be attributed to an agent according to the measure of its actuality. Now a particular thing is actual in a particular manner, and this in two ways. First by comparison with itself, because its substance is not wholly act, since such things are composed of matter and form: for which reason a natural thing acts not in respect of its totality, but in respect of its form whereby it is in act. Secondly, in comparison with things that are in act: because no natural thing comprises the acts and perfections of all the things that are in act: but each one has an act confined to one genus and one species, so that none has an activity extending to being as such, but only to this or that being as such, and confined to this or that species: for an agent produces its like. Wherefore a natural agent produces a being not simply, but determines a pre-existent being to this or that species, of fire, for example, or of whiteness and so forth. Wherefore the natural agent acts by moving something, and consequently requires matter as a subject of change or movement, and thus it cannot make a thing out of nothing.

On the other hand God is all act,—both in comparison with himself, since he is pure act without any admixture of potentiality,—and in comparison with the things that are in act, because in him is the source of all things, wherefore by his action he produces the whole subsistent being, without anything having existed before (since he is the source of all being), and in respect of his totality. For this reason he can make a thing from nothing, and this action of his is called creation. Wherefore it is stated in De Causis (prop. xviii) that being is by creation, whereas life and the like are by information: for all causation of absolute being is, traced to the first universal cause, while the causation of all that is in addition to being, or specific of being, belongs to second causes which act by information, on the presupposition as it were of the effect of the first cause. Hence no thing gives being except in so far as it partakes of the divine power. For this reason it is said again in De Causis (prop. iii) that the soul, by giving us being, has a divine operation.

Reply to the First Objection. The Philosopher says that it is a common axiom or opinion of the physicists that from nothing nothing is made, because the natural agent, which was the object of their researches, does not act except by movement. Consequently there must needs be a subject of movement or change which, as we have stated, is not required for a supernatural agent.

Reply to the Second Objection. Before the world was, it was possible for the world to be: but it does not follow that there was need of matter as the base of that possibility. For it is stated in Metaph. v, 12, that sometimes a thing is said to be possible, not in respect of some potentiality, but because it involves no contradiction of terms, in which sense the possible is opposed to the impossible. Accordingly it is said that before the world was it was possible for the world to be made, because the statement involved no contradiction between subject and predicate. We may also reply that it was possible by reason of the active power of the agent, but not on account of any passive power of matter. The Philosopher uses this argument (Metaph. vii, 13) in treating of natural generation against the Platonists who maintained that separate forms are the principles of natural generation.

Reply to the Third Objection. Between being and absolute non-being there is an infinite distance in a certain sense, and that always, but not in the same way. Sometimes it is infinite on both sides, as when we compare non-being with the divine being which is infinite: thus we might compare infinite whiteness with infinite blackness. Sometimes it is finite on one side only, as when we compare absolute non-being with created being which is finite: thus we might compare infinite blackness with finite whiteness. Accordingly then from non-being it is impossible to pass to the being that is infinite: but it is possible to pass to the being that is finite, inasmuch as the distance from non-being to that kind of being is determinate on the one side, although there is no passage properly speaking: for thus it is in continuous movements through which one part passes after another. But there is no such passage for that which is infinite.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. When a thing is made from nothing, non-being or nothing does not hold the position of patient, save accidentally, but rather that of the opposite to the thing made by the action. Nor again is the opposite in the position of patient in the action of nature, except accidentally; but the subject is this.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. If heat were separated from matter, it would act indeed without matter as a requisite for the agent, but not without that matter that is required on the part of the patient.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In the acts of the reason to come to a conclusion is like being moved in the processes of nature, because in reaching a conclusion the reason discourses from one thing to another: wherefore as all natural movement is from a starting-point, so also is every conclusion of the reason. And as the understanding of first principles, which is the starting-point whence the conclusion is derived, does not proceed as a conclusion from something else, even so creation which is the principle of all movement, is not from something else.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. When a thing is said to be made from nothing, the sense is twofold, as Anselm says (Monolog. v, viii). The negative implied in the word nothing may bear directly on the preposition from, or it may be included in that preposition. If it bears directly on the preposition, again a twofold sense is possible. It may bear on the whole so that the negative extends not only to the preposition but also to the verb; in this sense we might say that a thing is made from nothing because it is not made: thus it could be said of a silent man that he speaks of nothing. In this sense we may say of God that he is made from nothing, because he is utterly not made: but this manner of speaking is not customary. In another sense the verb remains affirmed, and the negative bears on the preposition only: and then we say that a thing is made from nothing, because it is made indeed, but there is no preexisting thing from which it is made: thus we say that so-and-so grieves for nothing, because he has no cause for grieving: it is in this sense that a thing is said to be made from nothing by creation. If, however, the preposition includes the negation, then again the sense is twofold, one true, one false. It is false if the preposition connotes causality (since in no way can non-being be the cause of being): it is true if it implies mere order, so that to make a thing from nothing, is to make a thing whereas before there was nothing, and this is true of creation. The statement of Boethius that there is no order between non-being and being, refers to the order of definite proportion, or of real relation; such order, says Avicenna (Metaph. iii) cannot be between being and non-being.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This definition applies to a natural active power.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. God produces things not of natural necessity but according to the order of his wisdom. Hence it does not follow that diversity among things arises from their matter but from the ordering of divine wisdom, which established diverse natures for the adornment of the universe.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. When a thing is made from nothing, its being begins in an instant, and its non-being is not in that instant, nor is it in any real but only in an imaginary instant. For as outside the universe there is no real but only in an imaginary dimension, in respect of which we may say that God is able to make a thing outside the universe at this or that distance from the universe; even so before the beginning of the world there was no real but an imaginary time, wherein it is possible to conceive an instant which was the last instant of non-being. Nor does it follow that there must have been a time between those two instants, since real time is not a continuation of imaginary time.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. That which is made from nothing becomes and is already made simultaneously: and the same applies to all instantaneous changes; thus the air is being illuminated and is actually illuminated at the same time. For in such things to become and to be already made are synonymous, in so far as a thing already is in the first instant of its making.

It may also be replied that a thing which is made from nothing is said to be in course of making when it is already made, not in respect of movement, which is from one term to another, but in respect of the outflow of the agent into the thing made. For these two are to be found in natural generation, namely transition from one term to another, and outflow of agent into the thing made, but the latter alone has a place in creation.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Properly speaking neither matter, nor form, nor accident are said to be made: but that which is made is the thing that subsists. For since to be made terminates in being, it belongs properly to that to which it belongs per se to be, namely to a subsistent thing: wherefore neither matter, nor form, nor accident are said properly speaking to be created, but to be concreated: whereas a subsistent thing, whatsoever it may be, is properly said to be created. Without, however, laying stress on this, we may reply that primal matter has a likeness to God in so far as it has a share of being. For even as a stone, as a being, is like God, although it has no intelligence as God has, so primal matter in so far as it has being and yet not actual being, is like God. Because being is, so to say, common to potentiality and act.

The reply to the Thirteenth Objection follows from this: because properly speaking there is no idea of matter but of the composite, since the idea is the form whereby something is made. Yet we may say that there is an idea of matter in so far as matter in a sense reflects the divine essence.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. If one of two creatures be inferior to the other, it does not follow that it is imperfect, because imperfection denotes the lack of something which is natural or due to a thing. Hence in heaven though one saint is above another, none will be imperfect. And if there be imperfection in creatures, it need not be ascribed to God or to matter, but to the fact that the creature is made from nothing.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing is said to be made from nothing as from an opposite, in the sense explained above. Yet it does not thereby follow that a being of one kind can be made from one of another kind, for instance, shape from colour: because being and non-being cannot possibly co-exist, whereas colour and shape can. On the other hand that wherefrom a thing is made must needs be in contact with the thing made, yet they are not simultaneous.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. If from connotes causality, a thing is not made from its opposite except accidentally, that is by reason of the subject. If however it connotes order, a thing is made from its opposite even per se: hence privation is said to be the principle of a thing's becoming but not of its being. It is in this sense, as stated above, that a thing is said to be made from nothing.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. God at the same time gives being and produces that which receives being, so that it does not follow that his action requires something already in existence.

Q. III: ARTICLE II

IS CREATION A CHANGE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIV, A. 2, AD 2]

THE second point of inquiry is whether creation is a change: and seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.

1. Change denotes the succession of one being after another, as stated in Phys. v, i: and this is true of creation, which is the production of being after non-being. Therefore creation is a change.

2. Whatever is made, in a sense is made from non-being: since what is, is not being made. Consequently as generation (whereby a thing is made as to a part of its substance) is to the privation of the form (which privation is non-being in a certain respect), so is creation (whereby a thing is made as to its entire substance) to absolute non-being. Now properly speaking, privation is the term from which generation begins. Therefore properly speaking absolute nonbeing is the term from which creation begins; so that creation properly speaking is a change.

3. The greater the distance between the terms, the greater the change. Thus a change from white to black is greater than a change from white to pale. Now absolute non-being is more distant from being than one contrary from another, or than relative non-being from being. Therefore since transition from contrary to contrary, or from relative non-being to being is a change, much more is creation, a change, since it is the transition of absolute non-being into being.

4. That which is in a condition now otherwise than before is changed or moved. Now the creature is conditioned now otherwise than before: since formerly it was absolute nonbeing, and afterwards became a being. Therefore that which is created is changed or moved.

5. That which passes from potency to act is changed. Now the creature passes from potency to act: since before it was created it was only in the potency of the maker, and now it actually is. Hence that which is created is moved or changed, and consequently creation is a change.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher (Categ. 14) in his work on the Categories, there are six kinds of movement or change: but none of them is creation, as one may see by taking them one by one. Therefore creation is not a change.

I answer that in every change there needs to be something common to either term thereof: because if the opposite terms of a change had nothing in common, it could not be defined as a transition from one thing to another. For change and transition signify that one same thing is otherwise now than before. Moreover the very terms of a change are not incompatible except in so far as they are referred to one same thing: because two contraries if referred to different subjects can exist simultaneously. Accordingly there is sometimes one actually existent common subject of both terms of a change, and then we have movement properly so called, an example of which we have in alteration, increase and decrease, and local movement. In all such movements the one subject while actually remaining the same is changed from one contrary to another. Sometimes again we find the one subject common to either term, yet it is not an actual but only a potential being, as is the case in simple generation and corruption. For the subject of the substantial form and of the privation thereof is primal matter which is not an actual being: wherefore neither generation nor corruption are movements properly so called, but a kind of change. And sometimes there is no common subject actually or potentially existent: but there is the one continuous time, in the first part of which we find the one contrary, and in the second part the other: as when we say that this thing is made from that, namely after that, for instance, from the morning comes noon. This, however, is a change not properly but metaphorically speaking, forasmuch as we imagine time as being the subject of those things that take place in time. Now in creation there is nothing common in the ways above mentioned: for there is no common subject actually or potentially existent. Again there is no continuous time, if we refer to the creation of the universe, since there was no time when there was no world. And yet we may find a common but purely imaginary subject, in so far as we imagine one common time when there was no world and afterwards when the world had been brought into being. For even as outside the universe there is no real magnitude, we can nevertheless picture one to ourselves: so before the beginning of the world there was no time and yet we can imagine one. Accordingly creation is not in truth a change, but only in imagination, and not properly speaking but metaphorically.

Reply to the First Objection. As stated above, the word change denotes the existence of one thing after another in connection with one same subject: but this is not the case in creation.

Reply to the Second Objection. In generation whereby a thing is made in respect of part of its substance, there is a common subject of privation and form, that is not actually existent: wherefore, just as in generation we find a term properly speaking, so also properly speaking do we find transition: but it is not so with creation, as stated above.

Reply to the Third Objection. It is true that the greater the distance the greater the change, provided that the subject is identical.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. That which is otherwise now than it was before is changed, provided the subject remains: else absolute non-being would be changed, because it is neither the same as nor otherwise than it was before. And in order that there be a change, one same thing must be otherwise than it was before.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Passive and not active power is the subject of change: hence that which proceeds from passive power into act is changed, but not that which proceeds from an active power: and so the objection proves nothing.

Q. III: ARTICLE III

IS CREATION SOMETHING REAL IN THE CREATURE, AND IF SO, WHAT IS IT?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIV, A. 3]

THE third point of inquiry is whether creation be anything real in the creature, and if so what is it? Seemingly it is not anything real in the creature.

1. As stated in De Causis (prop. x) whatever is received into a thing is therein according to the mode of the recipient. Now the creative action of God is received in absolute nonbeing, since in creating God makes a thing from nothing. Therefore creation places nothing real in the creature.

2. All that is real is either God or a creature. Now creation is not the Creator, else it would be eternal: nor is it a creature, since then it would need to be created by another creative act: and this creature again would need to be created by yet another creative act, and so on indefinitely. Therefore creation is not a real thing.

3. Whatever is is either substance or accident. But creation is not a substance, for it is neither matter nor form nor composite, as can easily be proved. Nor is it an accident, for an accident is subsequent to its subject, whereas creation is naturally prior to its subject, since it presupposes no subject. Therefore creation is nothing real in things.

4. As generation is to the thing generated, so is creation to the thing created. But the subject of generation is not the thing generated, but its term; its subject is primal matter (De Generat. et Corrupt. x, i). Neither therefore is the thing created the subject of creation. Nor can it be said that its subject is some matter, since the creature is not created from any matter. Therefore creation has no subject, and hence it is not an accident: and it is clear that it is not a substance. Therefore it is nothing real in things.

5. If creation be something real in a thing, since it is not a change, as proved above, it would seem most likely that it is a relation. But it is not a relation, since it cannot belong to any of the species of relation: because absolute being is neither subject nor equal to absolute non-being whence such relation would proceed. Therefore creation is nothing real in a thing.

6. If creation implies a relation of the creature to God from whom it has its being: since such relation remains ever in the creature, not only when the latter begins to be, but as long as it exists, something would be continually created; which would seem absurd. Hence creation is not a relation, and the same conclusion follows as before.

7. Every relation that exists really in things derives from something distinct from that relation, for instance, equality results from quantity, and

likeness from quality. If then creation be a relation really existing in the creature, it must needs be distinct from the source whence it flows. Yet this is that which is received through creation. But it would follow that creation is not received by the creative act, and consequently that it, is something uncreated: which is impossible.

8. Every change is reduced to the genus which is its term, for instance, alteration is referred to quality, increase to quantity: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. III, I, that there are as many kinds of movement as there are of being. Now creation terminates in substance, and yet cannot be said, to belong to the genus of substance, as was proved above (Obj. 3). Therefore seemingly it is nothing real.

On the contrary, if creation is nothing real, nothing is really created. Now this is clearly false. Therefore creation is something real.

Again, God is Lord of the creature because he brought it into being by creating it. Now dominion implies a real relation in the creature. Much more therefore does creation.

I answer that some have said that creation is something real between the Creator and the creature. And since the mean is neither of the extremes, it would follow that creation is neither the Creator nor the creature. But the Masters judged this to savour of error, since everything that in any way exists has its existence not otherwise than from God, and consequently is a creature.

Wherefore others said. that creation itself does not posit anything real on the part of the creature. But this would also seem unreasonable. Because in all those things that are referred the one to the other, the one depending on the other but not conversely, there is a real relation in the one that is dependent, and in the other there is a logical relation, as in the case of knowledge and the thing known, according to the teaching of the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 15). Now the creature by its very name is referred to the Creator: and depends on the Creator who does not depend on it. Wherefore the relation whereby the creature is referred to the Creator must be a real relation, while in God it is only a logical relation. The Master says this expressly (I., D. 30).

We must accordingly say that creation may be taken actively or passively. Taken actively it denotes the act of God, which is his essence, together with a relation to the creature: and this is not a real but only a logical relation.

But taken passively, since, as we have already said, it is not properly speaking a change, it must be said to belong, not to the genus of passion, but to that of relation. This is proved as follows. In every real change and movement there is a twofold process. One is from one term of movement to the other, for instance from whiteness to blackness: the other is from the agent to the patient, for instance from the maker to the thing made. These processes however differ from each other while the movement is in progress, and when the term has been reached. While the movement is in progress, the thing moved is receding from one term and approaching the other: which does not apply when the term has been reached: as may be seen in that which is moved from whiteness to blackness, for at the term of the movement it no longer approaches to blackness, but begins to be black. Likewise while it is in movement the patient or the thing made is being changed by the agent: but when it is at the term of the movement, it is no longer being changed by the agent: but acquires a certain relation to the agent, inasmuch as it has its being therefrom, and is in some way like unto it: thus at the term of human generation the offspring acquires sonship. Now creation, as stated above (A. 2), cannot be taken for a movement of the creature previous to its reaching the term of movement, but denotes the accomplished fact. Wherefore creation does not denote an approach to being, nor a change effected by the Creator, but merely a beginning of existence, and a relation to the Creator from whom the creature receives its being. Consequently creation is really nothing but a relation of the creature to the Creator together with a beginning of existence.

Reply to the First Objection. In creation the recipient of the divine action is not non-being but that which is created, as stated above.

Reply to the Second Objection. Creation taken actively denotes the divine action to which the mind attaches a certain relation, and thus it is uncreated: but taken passively as stated above, it is a real relation signified after the manner of a change on account of the newness or beginning that it implies. Now this relation is a kind of creature, taking creature in a broad sense for anything that comes from God. Nor is it necessary to proceed to infinity, since the relation of creation is not referred to God by another real relation but by itself: because no relation is related by another relation, as Avicenna says (Metaph. iii, 10). If, however, we take creature in a stricter sense for that only which subsists (which properly speaking is made and created, even as properly speaking it has being), then the aforesaid relation is not a created thing, but is concreated; even as properly speaking it is not a being, but something inherent. The same applies to all accidents.

Reply to the Third Objection. This relation is an accident, and considered in its being, inasmuch as it adheres to a subject, is subsequent to the thing created: even so an accident both logically and naturally is subsequent to its subject: although it is not an accident such as is caused by the principles of its subject. If, however, we consider it from the point of view of its arising from the action of the agent, then the aforesaid relation is after a fashion prior to its subject, because like the divine act itself it is the proximate cause thereof.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. In generation there is both change and a relation whereby the thing generated is referred to the generator. Considered from the point of view of change its subject is not the thing generated but the matter thereof: but considered as implying a relation its subject is the thing generated. On the other hand in creation there is a relation, but there is not a change properly speaking, as already stated: hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. This relation is not to be taken as existing between being and non-being, for such a relation cannot be real, as Avicenna says (Metaph. iii.), but as between a being and its Creator: wherefore it is clear that it is a relation of subjection.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Creation denotes this relation together with inception of existence: hence it does not follow that a thing, whenever it may be, is being created, although its relation to God ever remains. Yet even as the air as long as it is light is illuminated by the sun, so may we say with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that the creature, as long as it is in being, is made by God. But this is only a distinction of words, inasmuch as creation may be understood with newness of existence or without.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. That from which the creative relation derives chiefly is the subsistent being, from which that relation, itself a creature, differs, not principally but secondarily as it were, as something concreated.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Movement is reduced to the genus of its term, in so far as there is a process from potency to act; since during the movement the term thereof is potential, and potency and act belong to the same genus. But in creation there is no process from potency to act; wherefore the comparison fails.

Q. III: ARTICLE IV

IS THE CREATIVE POWER OR ACT COMMUNICABLE TO A CREATURE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XI. A. 5]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether the creative power or act be communicable to a creature. And seemingly it is.

1. The same manner and order in which things flow from their first principle is observed in their direction to their last end, since their first principle is the same as their last end. Now the lower creatures are directed to God as their end by means of the higher creatures, because as Dionysius s says (Coel. Hier. v. i) it is a rule of the Godhead to draw to himself the last things through the first. Therefore the lower creatures also flow from their first principle through creation by means of the higher creatures, so that the creative act is communicated to the creature.

2. Whatsoever can be communicated to a creature without taking it outside the bounds of a creature is communicable to a creature by the power of the Creator, who is able to create even new kinds of creatures. Now the power to create if communicated to a creature would not place the creature outside its bounds. Therefore the creative power is communicable to a creature. The minor is proved as follows. To place a creature outside its bounds is to attribute something that is incompatible with the notion of being created. Now it is not incompatible with the notion of being created that a creature be able to create, unless because it would seem to need an infinite power in order to create. But it would not need such a power, as it seems: since a thing is as distant from one of two opposites as it shares in the nature of the other: thus the further a thing is from being black the more white it is. Now the creature has a finite share in the nature of being: wherefore its distance from absolute non-being is also finite. And the bringing of a thing into being from a finite distance is not a proof of infinite power; wherefore the creative act can proceed from a finite power, and consequently the creative power is not incompatible with the notion of being created, nor does it place the creature beyond its bounds.

3. Regarding the statement just made that a thing is as distant from one opposite as it shares in the nature of the other, it might be remarked that this is true when both opposites are natures, such as contraries are, but not when one is a nature and the other not, as privation and habit, affirmation and negation.—On the contrary, the opposition in question is between contraries in the point of their being distant from each other, and this belongs to them inasmuch as they are opposites. Now the cause and root of opposition in contraries is the opposition of affirmation and negation (Metaph. iv, 6). Therefore the above statement is especially true of the opposition of affirmation and negation.

4. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) things are said to be made in three ways: in the Word, in the angelic intelligence, in their own nature. Wherefore it is said (Gen. i): He said: Be made, and it was made. Now the manner in which things were made in the angelic intelligence comes between the other two ways. Therefore seemingly creatures come into being in their own nature from the Word of the Creator through the medium of the angelic knowledge: so that they could be created by means of the angels.

5. Nothing and something are more distant than something and being, since nothing and something have nought in common, whereas something is a part of being. Now God by creating makes that which was nothing to become something, and consequently that there be power where before there was no power. Much more then can he make a limited power such as that of a creature to have omnipotence whereby things are created. Therefore he can communicate to a creature the act of creation.

6. Spiritual light is more excellent and more powerful than material light. Now material light multiplies itself. Therefore an angel who is spiritual light according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22) is able to multiply himself. But he cannot do this except by creating. Therefore an angel can create.

7. Substantial forms are not generated, since the composite alone is generated as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 8, 9), wherefore they cannot be brought into being except by creation. Now created nature disposes matter for its form. Therefore it co-operates in creation ministerially; and consequently a creature can receive the power to help in the work of creation.

8. The work of justification ranks higher than the work of creation, forasmuch as grace surpasses nature. Hence Augustine says (Tract. lxxii, 3,

in Joan.) that the justification of a sinner is a greater work than the creation of heaven and earth. Now the creature renders service in the justification of a sinner: since the priest is said to justify or forgive sins ministerially. Much more therefore can a creature administer in the act of creation.

9. Every made thing must be like the agent, as is proved in Metaph. vii, 8. Now the corporeal creature-is not like God either specifically or generically. Therefore it cannot come from God by creation except by means of a creature like unto it at least in genus: and consequently it would seem that corporeal creatures are created by God by means of the higher creatures.

10. It is stated in De Causis (prop. xix) that the second intelligence does not receive of the higher goods which come from the first cause, save through the medium of the higher intelligence. Now being is one of the higher goods. Therefore the second intelligence does not receive its being from God except through the first intelligence: so that seemingly God communicates the creative act to a creature.

11. In the same work (prop. viii) it is stated that an intelligence knows what is beneath it after the manner of its substance inasmuch as it is its cause. Now one intelligence understands another that is beneath it: therefore it is its cause. But an intelligence, since it is not composite, is not caused otherwise than by creation. Therefore an intelligence can create.

12. Augustine says (De immortal. anim. xvi) that the spiritual creature gives species and being to the corporeal creature: and so it would seem that corporeal creatures are created by means of the spiritual.

13. Knowledge is twofold, that from which things derive (ad rem) and that which is derived from things (a rebus). Now an angel’s knowledge of corporeal things is not derived from things, since he has no sensitive faculties which are the channels through which the intellect derives its knowledge of sensible objects. Hence he knows things by knowledge from which things derive, which is like God’s. Therefore as God is the cause of things by his knowledge, so seemingly the angelic knowledge is the cause of things.

14. Things come into being in two ways; first through issuing from absolute non-being into being by creation; secondly through issuing from potency into act. Now the material forces of nature can produce things in the second way, namely by drawing them out of potency into act. Therefore an immaterial force which is more powerful, such as that of an angel, can

bring a thing into being in the first way which belongs to the greater power, namely by producing it from absolute non-being, which is to create: and so it would seem that an angel can create.

15. Nothing surpasses the infinite. Now it requires an infinite power to produce a thing out, of nothing, otherwise there would be no reason why creatures should not create. Wherefore no other power can surpass it: so that to produce a creature out of nothing and give it the power to create is no more than to create. Now God can do the latter: wherefore he can also do the former.

16. The greater the resistance offered by the patient to the agent, the greater the difficulty encountered by the agent. Now a contrary offers more resistance than a nonbeing: since a non-being cannot act as a contrary can. Since then a creature is able to make a thing from its contrary, much more seemingly should it be able to make something out of nothing, which is to create. Therefore a creature can create.

On the contrary being and non-being are infinitely apart. Now an infinite power is required to operate at an infinite distance. Therefore an infinite power is required to create: so that the creative power cannot be communicated to a creature.

Again, according to Dionysius (Coelest. Hier. xi) the higher creatures such as the angels are divided into essence, power and operation: whence we may conclude that no creature's power is its essence: so that no creature acts of its whole self, since that by which a thing acts is its power. Now the production of the effect corresponds to the act of the agent. Therefore no creature is able to produce an effect in its entirety, and consequently it cannot create, but always presupposes matter for its action.

Moreover, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that angels cannot create anything, be they good or bad. Now of all creatures the angels rank highest: much less then can any other creature create.

Again, it belongs to the same power to create and to preserve creatures in being. Now creatures cannot be preserved in being save by the divine power, since if it withdrew from things they would at once cease to be, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore things cannot be created except by the divine power.

Again, that which belongs strictly to one thing cannot be appropriate to another. Now it is generally agreed that to create belongs to God, Therefore to create cannot be appropriate to a creature.

I answer that, certain philosophers held that God created the lower creatures through the instrumentality of the higher (De Causis, prop. x; Avicenna, Metaph. ix, 4; Algazel). They were led t this conclusion through supposing that from one simple being only one being can be produced, and that through the instrumentality of the latter a multitude of things were produced by the first being. They spoke thus as though God acted from natural necessity; for thus from one simple thing only one can. proceed. We, on the other hand, hold that things proceed from Goa by way of knowledge and intelligence, in which way there is nothing to prevent a multitude of things from proceeding immediately from the one first and simple being God, inasmuch as his wisdom contains all things. Hence according to the Catholic Faith we hold that God immediately created all spiritual substances and corporeal matter, and deem it heresy to say that anything was created by an angel or by any creature. Wherefore Damascene (De Orth. Fid. ii, 2) declares: Whosoever shall say that an angel created anything, let him be anathema. Certain Catholic writers, however, have maintained that, although no creature can create, it could be granted to a creature that God should create a thing through its instrumentality. The Master favours this opinion (IV., D. 5). Some on the other hand hold that the creative act cannot in any sense be communicated to a creature: and this is the more common opinion.

In order to make this point clear, we must observe that creation denotes an active power whereby things are brought into being, wherefore it requires no pre-existing matter or previous agency: for these are the only causes that ate pre-requisite for action. The reason of this is that the form of the thing generated is the term of the generator’s action, and is likewise the end of generation which as to its being does not precede. but follows the action. Now it is clear from its definition, that creation does not presuppose matter: since to create is to make a thing from nothing. That it does not presuppose a previous active cause is clear from the teaching of Augustine who (De Trin. iii, 8) proves that the angels cannot create, because they work by means of nature’s implanted seeds, namely the active forces of nature. Accordingly if we take creation thus strictly, it is evident that the first agent alone is competent to create, since a second cause does not act save through the influx of the first: so that every action of a second cause is dependent on a pre-existing active cause. Nor did the philosophers maintain that angels or intelligences create, except through a divine power communicated to them: in the sense that the second cause could have a twofold action, one proceeding from its own nature, the other from the power of a preexisting cause. For it is not possible that a second cause by its own power be the principle of being as such: this belongs to the first cause, since the order of effects follows the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being, which is presupposed to all other effects, and does not presuppose any other effect: wherefore to give being as such must be the effect of the first cause alone by its own power: and whatever other cause gives being does this in so far as it is the recipient of the divine power and operation, and not by its own power. Thus an instrument performs an instrumental operation not by the power of its own nature, but by the power of the person who handles it: and thus the natural heat engenders living flesh by the power of the soul, while by the power of its nature it merely causes heat and dissolution. In this sense then certain philosophers held the first intelligences to create the second in giving them being by the power of the first cause communicated to them. For being is by creation, while goodness, life and so forth are by information as stated in De Causis. This was the foundation of idolatry, in that divine worship was accorded to created substances as though they were the creators of others.

The Master, however (l.c.), holds that it is possible for a, creature to receive the power to create not as by its own power, or authority as it were, but ministerially as an instrument. But if we look into the question carefully, it will be clear that this is impossible. The action of any thing, even though it be performed instrumentally, must proceed from that thing’s power. And since the power of every creature is finite, no creature can possibly act, even as an instrument, to the effect of creating something: since creation demands infinite energy in the power whence it proceeds. This is made clear by the five following arguments.

The first is based on the fact that the power of a maker is proportionate to the distance between the thing made and the opposite thing from which it is made: thus the colder a thing is, and therefore the further removed it is from being hot, the greater will be the heat-power required to make that cold thing hot. Now absolute non-being is infinitely distant from being: because non-being is further removed from any particular being than any other particular being however distant these may be: and consequently none but an infinite power can produce being from non-being.

The second reason is that in the making of a thing the manner of the making depends on the action of the maker. Now the agent acts forasmuch as it is in act: wherefore that alone acts by its whole self, which is wholly in act, and this belongs to. none but the infinite act who is the first act: and consequently none but an infinite power can make a thing as to its whole substance.

The third reason is that since an accident must needs be in a subject, and the subject of an action is the recipient of that action, that agent alone whose action is not an accident but its very substance requires no recipient matter when it makes a thing; and such an agent is none but God, who therefore alone can create.

The fourth reason is that as all second causes derive their action from the first cause, as is proved in De Causis, prop. xix, xx, it follows that all second agents receive their mode and order from the first agent, who receives neither mode nor order from any other. Now, since the mode of an action depends on the matter that is the recipient of the agent's action, the first agent alone will be competent to act without presupposing matter from another agent, and to provide matter for all second agents.

The fifth argument is a reduction to absurdity. In so far as they reduce a thing from potentiality to act powers are proportionate to one another according to the distance of the potentiality from the act, since the further the potentiality is removed from the act, the greater is the power required. Hence if there be a finite power productive of something without any presupposed potentiality, there must be some proportion between it and a power that educes a thing from potentiality to act: so that there will be proportion between no potentiality and some potentiality: which is impossible: for there is no proportion between non-being and being. We conclude then that no power of a creature can create, neither by its own virtue, nor as the instrument of another.

Reply to the First Objection. In the bringing of things to their end, the means to that end are already in existence: wherefore it is not impossible for a creature to co-operate, with God in the direction of things to their last end: whereas in the general bringing of things into being nothing existed as yet: hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Second Objection. Nothing prevents our imagining a distance on the one part infinite and on the other finite. We imagine a distance infinite on either part, when either opposite extreme is infinite, for instance, infinite heat and infinite cold: but the imagined distance will be finite on the one hand, when one of the opposite extremes is finite; for instance, infinite heat and finite cold. Accordingly infinite being is infinitely removed on both hands from absolute non-being: whereas finite being from absolute non-being is removed infinitely on the one hand only; yet it requires an infinite active power.

The Third Objection we grant, since it makes no difference to the point at issue whether both opposite extremes be a nature, or one only.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Things are said made in our intelligence in respect of knowledge only, and by reason of an operative power: wherefore things are brought into being not with the co-operation of the angels, but with their knowledge.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. A thing is said to be impossible to someone not only on account of the distance between the extremes, but also because it is altogether impossible to be done: for instance, we might say that God cannot be made from a body, because it is altogether impossible for God to be made. Accordingly we reply that omnipotence cannot be made from a power, not only on account of the distance between them, but also because omnipotence is utterly unmakable. For whatever is made cannot be pure act, since from the very fact that it has its being from another, it is proved to have potentiality, and consequently cannot have infinite power.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Material light multiplies itself not by creating a new light, but by shedding itself over matter. This cannot be said of the angels since they are self-subsistent substances.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. A form may be considered in two ways. First, in so far as it is in potentiality: and thus God concreates it with matter, without any concurrent action of nature for the disposition of the matter. Secondly, in so far as it is in act, and thus it is not created, but is educed by natural agency from the potentiality of matter: wherefore there is no need of dispositive action on the part of nature in order that a thing be created. Seeing, however, that there is a natural form, namely the rational soul, which is brought into being by creation, and whose matter is disposed by nature, we must observe that since the creative act is independent of matter, there are two senses in which a thing is said to be created. Some things are created without any presupposed matter, and produced neither from matter nor in matter, for instance, the angels and the heavenly bodies: and for the creation of such nature can do nothing dispositively. On the other hand some things are created, without any matter presupposed from which they be made, but on the presupposition of matter in which they may be: such are human souls. So far then as they have matter in which to be, nature can act dispositively yet not so that the action of nature extend to the substance of that which is created.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. In the work of justification man does something, but only as a minister by employing the sacraments: so that as the sacraments are said to justify instrumentally and dispositively, the solution comes to the same as the preceding one.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although between God and the creature there cannot be a generic or specific likeness, there can nevertheless be a certain likeness of analogy, as between potentiality and act, substance and accident. This is true in one way forasmuch as creatures reproduce, in ‘their own way, the idea of the divine mind, as the work of a craftsman is a reproduction of the form in his mind. In another way it is true in that creatures are somewhat likened to the very nature of God, forasmuch as they derive their being from the first being, their goodness from the sovereign good, and so on. However this objection is not to the point: for even granted that creatures proceed from God through the instrumentality of some created power, the same difficulty remains, namely how this first nature can be created by God and yet not be like God.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. This error is contained explicitly in De Causis (prop. x) whose author holds that the lower creatures were created by God by means of the higher: wherefore in this matter the authority of this book is not to be accepted.

The same is to be said of the Eleventh Objection.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Augustine is speaking, there of the soul which gives being and species to a corporeal thing not as creating but as informing it.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although an angel’s knowledge of things is not derived from them, it does not follow that his knowledge of them is their cause. His knowledge is a mean between the two kinds of knowledge e mentioned. For he knows things by a natural knowledge by means of ideas implanted in his mind from the divine intellect: so that his knowledge is not directed to things as their cause, but is a likeness of the divine intellect which is their cause.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. In the eduction of things from potentiality to act many degrees may be observed, inasmuch as a thing may be educed from more or less remote potentiality to act, and again more or less easily. Hence although the angel’s power surpasses that of material nature it does not follow that he is able to make a thing from absolute non-being because nature is able to educe a thing from potentiality to act: but that he can do this much more easily than nature. Thus Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons are able to apply the forces of nature more secretly and efficaciously than we are aware.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. No power is greater than the power to create: nor does this prove that the creative power must include the bestowal on a creature of the power to create, since it is utterly incommunicable to a creature. That a thing be impossible may be due not only to one’s inability to do it, but also sometimes to the fact that the thing itself cannot be done: thus God cannot make God, not through a defect of power, but because God cannot be made by anyone. In like manner the creative power cannot be finite, nor can it be communicated to a creature, because it is infinite.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. A thing is difficult to do in two ways. First, because the patient resists the agent. This does not apply in every case, but only when there is action and reaction, and the agent is subject to the reaction of the patient: thus the heavenly bodies, whose action meets with no opposition on the part of another agent, suffer no difficulty in their action through the patient’s counteraction: and much less does God. Secondly, and this applies to all cases, because the patient is far removed from the action: since the further the potentiality is removed from act, the greater is the difficulty encountered by the action of the agent. Wherefore, since absolute non-being is further removed from act than matter subject to any contrary whatsoever, however intense the other contrary may be: it is evident that it requires a greater power to produce a thing from nothing, than one contrary from another.

Q. III: ARTICLE V

CAN THERE BE ANYTHING THAT IS NOT CREATED BY GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIIV, A. I]

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether there can be anything that is not created by God. Seemingly this is possible.

1. Since the cause is more powerful than its effect, that which is possible to our intellect which takes its knowledge from things would seem yet more possible to nature. Now our intellect can understand a thing apart from understanding that it is from God, because its efficient cause is not part of a thing’s nature, so that the thing can be understood without it. Much more therefore can there be a real thing that is not from God.

2. All things made by God are called his creatures. Now creation terminates at being: for the first of created things is being (De Causis, prop. iv). Since then the quiddity of a thing is in addition to its being, it would seem that the quiddity of a thing is not from God.

3. Every action terminates in an act, even as it proceeds from an act: because every agent acts in so far as it is in act, and every agent produces its like in nature. But primal matter is pure potentiality. Therefore the creative act cannot terminate therein: so that not all things are created by God.

On the contrary it is said (Rom. xi, 36): From him and by him and in him are all things.

I answer that the ancients in their investigations of nature proceeded in accordance with the order of human knowledge. Wherefore as human knowledge reaches the intellect by beginning with the senses, the early philosophers were intent on the domain of the senses, and thence by degrees reached the realm of the intellect. And seeing that accidental forms are in themselves objects of sense, whereas substantial forms are not, the early philosophers said that all forms are accidental, and that matter alone is a substance. And because substance suffices to cause accidents that result from the substantial elements, the early philosophers held that there is no other cause besides matter, and that matter is the cause of whatever we observe in the sensible world: and consequently they were forced to state that matter itself has no cause, and to deny absolutely the existence of an efficient cause. The later philosophers, however, began to take some notice of substantial forms: yet they did not attain to the knowledge of universals, and they were wholly intent on the observation of special forms; and so they posited indeed certain active causes, not such as give being to things in their universality, but which transmute matter to this or that form: these causes they called intelligence, attraction and repulsion, which they held responsible for adhesion and separation. Wherefore according to them qot all beings came from an efficient cause, and matter was in existence before any efficient cause came into action. Subsequent to these the philosophers as Plato, Aristotle and their disciples, attained to the study of universal being: and hence they alone posited a universal cause of things, from which all others came into being, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 4). This is in agreement with the Catholic Faith; and may be proved by the three arguments that follow.

First, if in a number of things we find something that is common to all, we must conclude that this something was the effect of some one cause: for it is not possible that to each one by reason of itself this common something belong, since each one by itself is different from the others: and diversity of causes produces a diversity of effects. Seeing then that being is found to be common to all things, which are by themselves distinct from one another, it follows of necessity that they must come into being not by themselves, but by the action of some cause. Seemingly this is Plato’s argument, since he required every multitude to be preceded by unity not only as regards number but also in reality. The second argument is that whenever something is found to be in several things by participation in various degrees, it must be derived by those in which it exists imperfectly from that one in which it exists most perfectly: because where there are positive degrees of a thing so that we ascribe it to this one more and to that one less, this is in reference to one thing to which they approach, one nearer than another: for if each one were of itself competent to have it, there would be no reason why one should have it more than another. Thus fire, which is the extreme of heat, is the cause of heat in all things hot. Now there is one being most perfect and most true: which follows from the fact that there is a mover altogether immovable and absolutely perfect, as philosophers have proved. Consequently all other less perfect beings must needs derive being therefrom. This is the argument of the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, I).

The third argument is based on the principle that whatsoever is through another is to be reduced to that which is of itself. Wherefore if there were a per se heat, it would be the cause of all hot things, that have heat by way of participation. Now there is a being that is its own being: and this follows from the fact that there must needs be a being that is pure act and wherein there is no composition. Hence from that one being all other beings that are not their own being, but have being by participation, must needs proceed. This is the argument of Avicenna (in Metaph. viii, 6; ix, 8). Thus reason proves and faith holds that all things are created by God,

Reply to the First Objection. Although the first cause that is God does not enter into the essence of creatures, yet being which is in creatures cannot be understood except as derived from the divine being: even as a proper effect cannot be understood save as produced by its proper cause.

Reply to the Second Objection. From the very fact that being is ascribed to a quiddity, not only is the quiddity said to be but also to be created: since before it had being it was nothing, except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creating essence.

Reply to the Third Objection. This argument roves that primal matter is not created per se: but it does not follow that it is not created under a form: for it is thus that it has actual being.

Q. III: ARTICLE VI

IS THERE BUT ONE PRINCIPLE OF CREATION?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIIX]

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether there be but one principle of creation: and seemingly the reply should be in the negative.

1. Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv): The cause of evil is not a good. Now there is evil in the world. Either, then, it is produced by a cause which is not a good, or it is not caused at all, but is a first cause: and in either case we must posit more than one principle of creation: since it is clear that the first cause of good things must be a good.

2. But someone may say that a good is the cause of evil, not per se but accidentally.—On the contrary every effect that flows from a cause accidentally, flows from some other cause per se: since everything

accidental can be traced to something per se. Hence if evil be the effect of good accidentally, it will be the per se effect of something else, so that the same conclusion follows as before.

3. An effect that is produced accidentally happens beside the intention of the cause and is not a thing made. If, then, a good be the accidental cause of evil, it follows that evil is not something made. Now nothing is uncreated save the principle of creation, as we have shown above (A. 1). Therefore evil is a principle of creation.

4. No vice occurs in the effect beside the intention of the cause, except either by reason of ignorance on the part of the cause through lack of foresight, or by reason of impotence that could not be avoided. But in God the Creator of all good there is neither impotence nor ignorance. Therefore evil, which is vicious, cannot occur in God’s effects beside his intention; for Augustine says (Enchir. ii) that the reason why a thing is evil is because it is vicious.

5. That which occurs accidentally happens in the minority of cases (Phys. ii, 5). But evil occurs in the majority of cases (Top. ii, 6). Therefore evil is not due to an accidental cause.

6. According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 7) the cause of evil is not effective but defective. But an accidental cause is effective. Therefore a good is not the accidental cause of evil.

7. That which is not has no cause: since what is not is neither cause nor caused. Now evil, according to Augustine (Tract. i, 13, in Joann), is not a thing. Consequently evil has no cause, neither Per se nor accidental. Therefore there is no truth in the statement that a good is the accidental cause of evil.

8. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, i) that in which a thing is first is the cause of whatsoever contains that thing subsequently: thus fire causes heat in whatsoever is hot. Now malice was first in the devil. Therefore he is the cause of malice in all the wicked: and consequently there is one principle of all the wicked as there is of all the good.

9. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) good is in one way, but evil in many ways. Consequently evil is nearer to being than good is. Therefore if good is a nature needing a creator, evil also will need a creator: and so the same conclusion follows.

10. That which is not can be neither genus nor species. Now evil is taken to be a genus. For it is stated (Categ., 10) that good and evil are not in a genus but are themselves genera. Evil, therefore, is a being and consequently needs a creator. Therefore since it is not created by a good, we must, apparently admit that there is an evil principle of creation.

11. Both of two contraries is a positive nature, since contraries are in the same genus. Now what is not cannot be in a genus. But good and evil are contrary to each other. Therefore evil is a nature: and we come to the same conclusion.

12. The difference that makes a species signifies a nature wherefore nature, in one way, is that which gives a thing its specific difference, according to Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Now evil is a difference constituting a species: for good and evil differentiate habits. Therefore evil is a nature: and thus the same conclusion follows.

13. Good is set against evil, and life against death: so also is the sinner against a just man (Ecclus. xxxiii, 15). If, therefore, good is one principle of creation, there must be set against it an evil principle.

14. Intensity and remission connote relation to some term. Now one thing is worse than another. Hence there must be something supremely bad that is the term of all evil: and this must be the principle of all evil things, even as the supreme good is the principle of all good things.

15. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit (Mat. vii, 18). Now evil exists in the world. Therefore it cannot be a fruit, otherwise an effect, of a good cause which is denoted by a good tree: and consequently some first evil must be the cause of all evils.

16. We are told (Gen. i, 2) that when things were first created darkness was on the face of the earth. But the good by its very nature is enlightening and therefore cannot be the creation of darkness. Consequently the creation described there originates not from a good but from an evil principle.

17. The effect bears witness to its cause as being similar thereto. But evil nowis6 bears witness to God, nor is it in any way like him. Therefore it cannot come from him but must be from another principle.

18. Every effect exists potentially in its cause. But evil is not in God, either actually or potentially. Therefore it comes not from God; and the some conclusion follows.

19. just as generation is a natural movement so also is corruption. Now the end of corruption is privation, just as the end of generation is the form. Hence just as the intention of nature is the induction of the form, so also does nature intend privation: and consequently evil being a privation must be produced, even as the form, by a per se active cause.

20. Every agent acts on the presupposition of the first agent. Now the free-will, in sinning, does not act on the presupposition of the divine action: for there are sins like fornication and adultery which are inseparable from their deformity which cannot come from God. Therefore the free-will must either be a first agent or be reducible to a first agent other than God.

21. It will be said perhaps that the substance, and not the deformity of the act, comes from God.—On the contrary the Commentator (in Metaph. vii, 8) says: It is impossible for the matter to result from the action of one agent while the form results from the action of another. Now deformity is the form as it were of the sinful act. Wherefore the deformity of sin cannot be ascribed to one cause, and its substance to another.

22. From one simple cause only a simple effect can proceed. Now God is utterly simple. Therefore suchlike composite things are not from him but from some other cause.

23. The stain of sin is something in the soul: for were it nothing besides the privation of grace, a man by committing one mortal sin would be guilty of all. Now the stain of sin is not from God, for God is not the author of that which he punishes, as Fulgentius says (Ad Monim. i): and since it is not from eternity it must have a cause. Therefore it must be ascribed to some cause other than God.

24. It is written (Ecclus. iii, 14): I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever. Now corruptible things do not continue for ever. Therefore they are not the work of God, and they must be referred to another principle.

25. Every agent produces its like. But corruptible bodies are not like God, for God is a spirit (Jo. iv, 24). Therefore corruptible bodies are not from God: and the same conclusion follows.

26. Nature always does what is best, according to the Philosopher (De Caelo ii, 5): and this is due to the goodness of nature. But God's goodness surpasses nature's. Consequently God makes things as good as he can. Now spiritual things are better than things corporeal. Therefore the latter are not

from God, since had he made them he would have given them spiritual goodness. It follows then that we must admit several principles of creation.

On the contrary it is written (Isa. xlv, 6, 7): I am the Lord, and there is none else. I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil; I the Lord do all these things.

Again, evil has no other root but the nature of good, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But this would not be true if the creative principle of evil were distinct from that of good: else the principle of evil things would be more powerful than that of good things since it would produce its own effect even in good things. Therefore evil is not from a creative principle other than that of good.

Again, the Philosopher, shows (Phys. viii, 6) that there is but one principle of movement. But this would not be true, if there were divers first creative principles: because one principle would not govern or move the creatures of another contrary principle. Therefore there is but one principle of creation.

I answer that, as we have already stated, the ancient philosophers, through taking note only of the material principles of nature, when they considered material things fell into the error of holding that all natural things are not created. Hence from holding matter and contrariety to be the principles of nature they came to conceive of two first principles of things: and this was owing to a threefold fault in their consideration of contraries. The first was that they considered contraries only in the point of their specific diversity, and disregarded their generic unity and the fact that contraries are in the same genus. Consequently they ascribed to them a cause not in respect of what they have in common but in respect of that wherein they differ.

Hence, as stated (Phys. i, 4), they referred all contraries to two first contraries as two first principles. Among them Empedocles, made the first contraries to be the first active principles, to wit attraction and repulsion: and it is stated (Metaph. i, 4) that he was the first to uphold two principles, good and evil. The second fault was that they judged both contraries equally, whereas one of them must always imply privation of the other, and consequently be perfect while the latter is imperfect, the former good and the latter less good (Phys. i, 2). In consequence they held both good and evil to be distinct natures, because they seemed to them the most generic contraries. For this reason Pythagoras said that things were divided into two genera, good and evil; in the genus of good things he placed all perfect things, such as light, males, rest and the like, while in the genus of evil things he placed darkness, females and the like. The third fault was that they considered things in reference to the things themselves, or in the mutual relationships between one individual thing and another, but not as bearing upon the order of the universe. Hence when they found one thing harmful to another, or imperfect in comparison with perfect things, they pronounced it to be simply evil in its nature and not to owe its origin to the cause of good. Wherefore Pythagoras placed women, as being imperfect, in the genus of evil. This again was at the root of the Manichean statement that corruptible things being imperfect in comparison with things incorruptible are the work not of the good God but of a contrary principle, and likewise the visible in comparison with the invisible, and the Old Testament in comparison with the New; an opinion that was confirmed by their observing that certain good creatures, man for instance, suffer harm from certain visible and corruptible creatures. Now this error is utterly impossible: since all things must be traced to one first principle which is good. For the present this may be proved by three arguments.

First argument. Whenever different things have one thing in common, they must be referred to one cause in respect of that common thing: since either one is the cause of the other, or they both proceed from a common cause: seeing that it is impossible for that which they have in common to be derived from the properties in which they differ; as we proved before (A. 5). Now all contraries and things differing from one another, that exist in the world, have some one thing in common, either the specific or the generic nature, or at least the common ratio of being: and consequently they must all have one principle which is the cause of being in all of them. Now being, as such, is a good which is evidenced by the fact that everything desires to be and the good is defined as that which is desirable. Hence above all various causes we must place one first cause, even as above these contrary agents in nature the natural philosophers placed one primal agent, namely the heaven, as the cause of all movement here below. Since, however, in this heaven there is variety of position, to which variety is to be traced the contrariety of inferior bodies, it is necessary to have recourse to a first mover that is not moved either per se or accidentally.

Second argument. Every agent acts forasmuch as it is in act, and consequently forasmuch as it is in some way perfect. Now forasmuch as a thing is evil it is not in act, since a thing is said to be evil through being in a state of potentiality, and deprived of its proper and due act. But forasmuch as a thing is in act, it is good; because in this respect it has perfection and entity, and it is in this that the good essentially consists. Therefore nothing acts forasmuch as it is evil, but everything acts inasmuch as it is good. Consequently there cannot be an active principle of things other than a good. And since every agent produces its like, nothing is produced except forasmuch as it is in act, and for this reason, forasmuch as it is good. On both sides therefore the position is shown to be untenable which holds evil to be the creative principle of evils. This argument agrees with the words of Dionysius (Divin. Nom. iv) who states that evil acts not save by virtue of a good, and that evil is outside the scope of intention and generation.

Third argument. If diverse beings were to be exclusively to contrary principles without these being traced to one supreme principle, they could not possibly come together into one order except accidentally: because co-ordination of many things cannot result but from one co-ordinator, except by chance. Now we observe corruptible and incorruptible things, spiritual and corporal, perfect and imperfect coming together into one order. Thus the spiritual move the corporal: which is evident at least in man. Again things corruptible are controlled by incorruptible: as may be observed in the alterations of elements by heavenly bodies. Nor may it be said that such occurrences are fortuitous: for they would not happen always or for the most part, but only in the minority of cases. Consequently all these various things must be traced to one first principle whereby they are co-ordinated: and for this reason the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 10) that there is one ruler over all.

Reply to the First Objection. As we have shown above, Avil is not a being but a lack of being, and consequently cannot be a per se effect. In this sense Dionysius says that good is not the cause of evil, and not as though evil were to be made a first cause.

Reply to the Second Objection. This argument. is true of an effect that can have a cause per se. Such is not evil: which therefore cannot properly speaking be described as an effect.

Reply to the Third Objection. Evil is incidental to an effect, but it is not an effect properly speaking: this follows from the fact that it is not intended. And yet it does not follow that it is a first principle, unless it be added that evil is a nature. For just as evil, since it is not a being but a privation of being, lacks the essential condition of an effect, so and much more indeed does it lack the necessary condition of a cause, as we have shown.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. According to Augustine (Enchir. xcvi): God is so good that never would he allow evil to exist, unless he were so powerful as to be able to draw good from evil. Hence it is due to neither impotence nor ignorance on God’s part that evils occur in the world, but it is owing to the order of his wisdom and to the greatness of his goodness, whence come the many and divers grades of goodness in things, many of which would be lacking were he to allow no evil to exist. Thus there would be no good of patience without the evil of persecution, nor the good of the preservation of its life in a lion, without the evil of the destruction of the animals on which it lives.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Evil occurs in the minority of cases if we compare effects with their proper causes. This is clear in the process of nature: because there is no fault or evil in the action of nature, except when the active cause is affected by some impediment: and this is only in the minority of cases, as when nature produces monsters and the like. On the other hand in the domain of the will evil would seem to be of more frequent occurrence in things done than in things made, forasmuch as art through imitating nature fails only in the minority of cases. Whereas in actions which are affected by vice and virtue there is a twofold appetite moving man to action, to wit the rational and the sensual: and that which is good in relation to the one appetite is evil in relation to the other: thus the pursuit of pleasure is good with reference to the sensual appetite, which we call sensuality, whereas it is evil with reference to the appetite of reason. And seeing that the majority follow their senses rather than their reason, consequently bad men are more numerous than good. On the other hand he who follows his rational appetite behaves well more often than ill.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The accidental, cause is twofold. The one does something towards the effect, but is said to cause it accidentally, because the effect that ensues is not intended by it: such is the man who finds a treasure while digging a grave. The other does nothing towards the effect, but is called accidental because it is accidental to the active cause: thus white may be said to be the cause of the house, because it is an accident of the builder. Likewise the accidental effect is twofold. The one could be the term of the cause's action, but occurs beside the cause's intention, as, for instance, the finding of the treasure: such an effect, though accidental with regard to that cause, can be the per se effect of another cause. In this sense evil has no accidental cause, because as already stated it cannot be the term of an action. The other kind of accidental effect is one which is not the term of an agent's action, but it is called an accidental effect because it is accidental to an effect: thus white that is accidental to a house may be said to be an accidental effect of the builder. In this sense nothing prevents evil from having an accidental cause.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Evil, though it is not as nature, is not a pure negation but a privation: and this according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, 2) is a negation adhering to a subject, for privation is negation in a subject, so that inasmuch as it is accidental to something, it can have an accidental cause in the sense already explained.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Evil was in the devil before others in point of time; but not in point of nature, as though wickedness were his essence or an accident deriving from the principles of his nature. Nor does it matter that he ,be worse than others, since this is not on account of any connaturality of wickedness to him, but is accidental through his having sinned more grievously. Now a thing is said to be a principle in relation to other things with regard to that which is said of it per se and not accidentally.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is owing to its perfection that good happens in but one way: because a thing cannot be perfect unless all those conditions are fulfilled which combine together to make it perfect. If any of these be lacking the thing is imperfect and therefore evil: and consequently the imperfection of evil is the reason why evil is so manifold: and thus evil is less a being than good is.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The statement of the Philosopher refers to the opinion of Pythagoras who maintained that good and evil are genera, as we have said above. This opinion, however, has some truth in it. For since, as we have observed, good indicates something positive whereas evil indicates a privation; just as every form is a good, so is every privation an evil, wherefore good and evil are in a sense convertible with being and privation of being. Now, it is shown in Metaph. x, 4, that in all contraries there is an implication of privation and habit, so that always the contrary that is the more perfect is reducible to a good, while the other which is less perfect is reducible to an evil.

Hence the Philosopher (Phys. i, 9) says that one of two contraries is harmful: and in this sense good and evil may be described as contrary generically.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The evil that is contrary to a good indicates not only a privation of that good, but a habit to which that privation is annexed: which habit is evil not by reason of its entity, but because it has annexed to it the privation of a due perfection.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Evil differentiates the vicious habit, not merely as a privation, but with the addition of the intention of an undue end, which intention does not include the notion of evil except in so far as the end in question is inconsistent with a due end: thus the end of carnal pleasure is inconsistent with the good dictated by reason. The reason why good and evil are assigned as specifying the habits of the soul is that moral acts, and consequently habits, are specified by the end, which is so to say the form of the will, the proper principle of evil deeds and good and evil denote relation to the end.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The meaning is not that good is set against evil as one first principle against another first principle, but that they both derive from one first principle, the one per se, the other accidentally: this is clear from what follows: And so look upon all the works of the Most High, etc.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Evil is not intensified by approach to a term, but by recession from a term: for as a thing is said to be good as participating of goodness, so is it said to be evil as lacking in goodness.

Reply to the, Fifteenth Objection. By the good tree our Lord means a cause of good, not the first cause but the second cause in relation to some particular effect: the same applies to the evil tree. Hence by the evil tree he indicates heretics who are known by their works, as a tree by its fruit. This is clear if we consider the comparison: for the first cause of the fruit is not the tree but the root. If, however, we take the tree to signify any cause, as

Dionysius apparently does, then we reply as in the answer to the First Objection, that good is not the per se cause of evil.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The darkness mentioned as existing at the beginning of the creation was not a creature, but simply the absence of light in the atmosphere. It was not however an evil, since absence of good is an evil only when that good can and ought to be present. Thus it is not an evil in a stone that it cannot sense, nor is it an evil in a newly born child that it cannot walk. Nor was it owing to imperfection in the active cause that the air was created without light, but through its wisdom that so orders things that they are brought from imperfection to perfection.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. This argument supposes that evil has a cause per se: and we have shown this to be false.

The Eighteenth Objection is met with the same reply.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Nature stands in relation to generation otherwise than to corruption. The form that is the term of generation is directly intended by nature both universal and particular, whereas privation of a form is beside the intention of a particular nature, although it is intended by universal nature, not indeed directly but as necessary for the introduction of another form. Hence generation is natural in every way, whereas corruption is sometimes against nature, if we refer it to a nature in particular.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Whatever there is of entity or action in a sinful act is referred to God as first cause: while the element of deformity is referred to the free will as cause. Thus when a man limps his walking is due, to the motive power as first cause, but that he walks awry is due to a deformity in his leg.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. This argument applies to two agents entirely unrelated, but not when one of them operates in the other: for then one effect can proceed from both. Now God operates in every nature and in every will: hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. This argument refers to an agent that acts of natural necessity: and one such agent is confined to one effect. Nor does it follow that an effect must be simple because its cause is simple: because an effect need not equal its cause either in universality or in simplicity. But God does not act of natural necessity, but of his own will:

wherefore he is able to make both simple things and composite things, things mutable and things immutable.

Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. The stain of sin does not impose a nature on the soul, but only the privation of grace: which privation is referred to the preceding sinful act, that caused or might have caused it. Consequently it does not follow that one who has not committed the act of a particular sin, has the stain of that sin.

Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. God's works continue for ever not in number but in species or genus; in their substance, but not in their mode of being, for the fashion of this world passeth away (1 Cor. vii, 31).

Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. Although God is a spirit his wisdom contains the ideas of bodies; and bodies are made like them in the same way as a craftsman's work is like him in respect of his art. However, bodies are like God in respect of his nature, in so far as they have being, goodness and a certain unity.

Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. Nature always does what is best, not with regard to the part but with regard to the whole: otherwise it would make a man's body all eye or all heart: for it would be better for the part but not for the whole. In like manner, although it would be better for this or that thing to be placed in a higher order, it would not be better for the universe, which would remain imperfect if all creatures were of one order.

Q. III: ARTICLE VII

DOES GOD WORK IN OPERATIONS OF NATURE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. CV, A. 5: C.G. III. LXVII; I-II, Q. X, ART. 4]

THE seventh point of inquiry is whether God works in the operations of nature: and apparently the answer should be in the negative.

1. Nature neither fails in necessary things nor abounds in the superfluous. Now the action of nature requires nothing more than an active force in the agent, and passivity in the recipient. Therefore there is no need for the divine power to operate in things.

2. It may be replied that the active force of nature depends in its operation on the operation of God.—On the contrary as the operation of created nature depends on the divine operation, so the operation of an elemental

body depends on the operation of a heavenly body: because the heavenly body stands in relation to the elemental body, as a first to a second cause. Now no one maintains that the heavenly body operates in every action of an elemental body. Therefore we must not say that God operates in every operation of nature.

3. If God operates in every operation of nature God's operation and nature's are either one and the same operation or they are distinct. They are not one and the same: since unity of operation proves unity of nature: wherefore as in Christ there are two natures, so also are there two operations: and it is clear that God's nature and man's are not the same. Nor can they be two distinct operations: because distinct operations cannot seemingly terminate in one and the same product, since movements and operations are diversified by their terms. Therefore it is altogether impossible that God operate in nature.

4. It will be replied that two operations can have the same term, if one is subordinate to the other.—On the contrary, when several things are immediately related to some one thing, one is not subordinate to the other. Now both God and nature produce the natural effect immediately. Therefore of God's operation and nature's one is not subordinate to the other.

5. Whenever God fashions a nature, by that very fact he gives it all that belongs essentially to that nature: thus by the very fact that he makes a man he gives him a rational soul. Now strength is essentially a principle of action, since it is the perfection of power, and power is a principle of acting on another which is distinct (Metaph. v,12). Therefore by implanting natural forces in things, he enabled them to perform their natural operations. Hence there is no need for him also to operate in nature.

6. It might be replied that natural forces like other beings cannot last unless they be upheld by the divine power.—On the contrary, to operate on a thing is not the same as to operate in it. Now the operation whereby God either produces or preserves the forces of nature, has its effect on those forces by producing or preserving them. Therefore this does not prove that God works in the operations of nature.

7. If God works in the operations of nature, it follows that by so doing be imparts something to the natural agent: since every agent by acting makes something to be actual. Either then this something suffices for nature to be able to operate by itself, or it does not suffice. If it suffices, then since God

also gave nature its natural forces, for the same reason we may say that the natural forces were sufficient for nature to act: and there will be no further need for God to do anything towards nature’s operation besides giving nature the natural forces. If on the other hand it does not suffice, he will need to do something more, and if this is not sufficient, more still and so on indefinitely, which is impossible: because one effect cannot depend on an infinite number of actions, for, since it is not possible to pass through an infinite number of things, it would never materialise. Therefore we must accept the alternative, namely that the forces of nature suffice for the action of nature without God operating therein.

8. Further, given a cause that acts of natural necessity, its action follows unless it be hindered accidentally, because nature is confined to one effect. If, then, the heat of fire acts of natural necessity, given heat, the action of heating follows, and there is no need of a higher power to work in the heat.

9. Things that are altogether disparate can be separate from each other. Now God’s action and nature’s are altogether disparate, since God acts by his will and nature by necessity. Therefore God’s action can be separated from the action of nature, and consequently he need not operate in the action of nature.

10. A creature, considered as such, is like God inasmuch as it actually exists and acts: and in this respect it participates of the divine goodness. But this would not be so if its own forces were not sufficient for it to act. Therefore a creature is sufficiently equipped for action without God’s operation therein.

11. Two angels cannot be in the same place, according to some, lest confusion of action should result: because an angel is where he operates. Now God is more distant from nature than one angel from another. Therefore God cannot operate in the same action with nature.

12. Moreover, it is written (Ecclus. xv, 14) that God made man and left him in the hand of his own counsel. But he would not have so left him, if he always operated in man’s will. Therefore he does not operate in the operation of the will.

13. The will is master of its own action. But this would not be the case, if it were unable to act without God operating in it, for our will is not master of the divine operation. Therefore God does not operate in the operation of the win.

14. To be free is to be the cause of one’s own action (Metaph. i, 2). Consequently that which cannot act without receiving the action of another cause is not free to act: now man’s will is free to act. Therefore it can act without any other cause operating in it: and the same conclusion follows.

15. A first cause enters more into the effect than does a second cause. If, then, God operates in will and nature as a first in a second cause, it follows that the defects that occur in voluntary and natural actions are to be ascribed to God rather than to nature or will: and this is absurd.

16. Given a cause whose action suffices, it is superfluous., to require the action of another cause. Now it is clear, that if God operates in nature and will, his action is sufficient, since God’s works are Perfect (Deut. xxii, 4). Therefore all action of nature and will would be superfluous. But nothing in nature is superfluous, and consequently neither nature nor will would do anything, and God alone would act. This, however, is absurd: therefore it is also absurd to state that God operates in nature and will.

On the contrary it is written (Isa. xxvi, 12): Lord, thou hast wrought all our works in us.

Moreover, even as art presupposes nature, so does nature presuppose God. Now nature operates in the operations of art: since art does not work without the concurrence of nature: thus fire softens the iron so as to render it malleable under the stroke of the smith. Therefore God also operates in the operation of nature.

Again, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 2) man and the sun generate man. Now just as the generative act in man depends on the action of the sun, so and much more does the action of nature depend on the action of God. Therefore in every action of nature God operates also.

Further, nothing can act except what exists. Now nature cannot exist except through God’s action, for it would fall into nothingness were it not preserved in being by the action of the divine power, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit.). Therefore nature cannot act unless God act also.

Again, God’s power is in every natural thing, since he is in all things by his essence, his presence and his power. Now it cannot be admitted that God’s power forasmuch as it is in things is not operative: and consequently it operates as being in nature. And it cannot be said to operate something besides what nature operates, since evidently there is but one operation. Therefore God works in every operation of nature.

I answer that we must admit without any qualification that God operates in the operations of nature and will. Some, however, through failing to understand this aright fell into error, and ascribed to God every operation of nature in the sense that nature does nothing at all by its own power. They were led to hold this opinion by various arguments. Thus according to Rabbi Moses some of the sages in the Moorish books of law asserted that all these natural forms are accidents, and since an accident cannot pass from one subject to another, they deemed it impossible for a natural agent by its form to produce in any way a similar form in another subject, and consequently they said that fire does not heat but God creates heat in that which is made hot. And if it were objected to them, that a thing becomes hot whenever it is placed near the fire, unless some obstacle be in the way, which shows that fire is the per se cause of heat; they replied that God established the order to be observed according to which he would never cause heat except at the presence of fire: and that the fire itself would have no part in the action of heating. This opinion, is manifestly opposed to the nature of sensation: for since the senses do not perceive unless they are acted upon by the sensible object—which is clearly true in regard to touch and the other senses except sight, since some maintain that this is effected by the visual organ projecting itself on to the object—it would follow that a man does not feel the fire’s heat, if the action of the fire does not produce in the sensorial organ a likeness of the heat that is in the fire. In fact if this heat-species be produced in the organ by another agent, although the touch would sense the heat, it would not sense the heat of the fire, nor would it perceive that the fire is hot, and yet the sense judges this to be the case, and the senses do not err about their proper object.

It is also opposed to reason which convinces us that nothing in nature is void of purpose. Now unless natural things had an action of their own the forms and forces with which they are endowed would be to no purpose; thus if a knife does not cut, its sharpness is useless. It would also be useless to set fire to the coal, if God ignites the coal without fire.

It is also opposed to God’s goodness which is self-communicative: the result being that things were made like God not only in being but also in acting.

The argument which they put forward is altogether frivolous. When we say that an accident does not pass from one subject to another, this refers to the same identical accident, and we do not deny that an accident subjected in a natural thing can produce an accident of like species in another subject: indeed this happens of necessity in every natural action. Moreover, they suppose that all forms are accidents, and this is not true: because then in natural things there would be no substantial being, the principle of which cannot be an accidental but only a substantial form. Moreover, this would make an end of generation and corruption: and many other absurdities would follow.

Avicebron (Fons Vitae) says that no corporeal substance acts, but that a spiritual energy penetrating all bodies acts in them, and that the measure of a body’s activity is according to the measure of its purity and subtlety, whereby it is rendered amenable to the influence of a spiritual force. He supports his statement by three arguments. His first argument is that every agent after God requires subject-matter on which to act: and no corporeal agent has matter subject to it, wherefore seemingly it cannot act. His second argument is that quantity hinders action and movement: in proof of which he points out that a bulky body is slow of movement and heavy: wherefore a corporeal substance being inseparable from quantity cannot act. His third argument is that the corporeal substance is furthest removed from the first agent, which is purely active and nowise passive, while the intermediate substances are both active and passive: and therefore corporeal substances which come last, must needs be passive only and not active.

Now all this is manifestly fallacious in that he takes all corporeal substances as one single substance; and as though they differed from one another only in accidental and not in their substantial being. If the various corporeal substances be taken as substantially distinct, every one will not occupy the last place and the furthest removed from the first agent, but one will be higher than another and nearer to the first agent, so that one will be able to act on another. Again in the foregoing arguments the corporeal substance is considered only in respect of its matter and not in respect of its form, whereas it is composed of both. It is true that the corporeal substance belongs to the lowest grade of beings, and has no subject beneath it, but this is by reason of its matter, not of its form: because in respect of its form a corporeal substance has an inferior subject in any other substance whose matter has potentially that form which the corporeal substance in question has actually. Hence it follows that there is mutual action in corporeal substances, since in the matter of one there is potentially the form of another, and vice versa. And if this form does not suffice to act, for the same reason neither does the energy of a spiritual substance, which the corporeal substance must needs receive according to its mode.—Nor does quantity hinder movement and action, since nothing is moved but that which has quantity (Phys. vi, 10). Nor is it true that quantity causes weight. This is disproved in De Coelo iv, 2. In fact, quantity increases the speed of natural movement, thus a weighty body, the greater it is, the greater the velocity of its downward movement, and in like manner that of a light body in its movement upwards. And although quantity in itself is not a principle of action, no reason can be given why it should hinder action, seeing that rather is it the instrument of an active quality; except in so far as active forms in quantitative matter receive a certain limited being that is confined to that particular matter, so that their action does not extend to an extraneous matter. But though they receive individual being in matter, they retain their specific nature, by reason whereof they can produce their like in species, and yet are unable themselves to be in another subject. Hence we are to understand that God works in every natural thing not as though the natural thing were altogether inert, but because God works in both nature and will when they work. How this may be we must now explain.

It must be observed that one thing may be the cause of another’s action in several ways. First, by giving it the power to act: thus it is said that the generator moves heavy and light bodies, inasmuch as it gives them the power from which that movement results. In this way God causes all the actions of nature, because he gave natural things the forces whereby they are able to act, not only as the generator gives power to heavy and light bodies yet does not preserve it, but also as upholding its very being, forasmuch as he is the cause of the power bestowed, not only like the generator in its becoming, but also in its being; and thus God may be said to be the cause of an action by both causing and upholding the natural power in its being. For secondly, the preserver of a power is said to cause the action; thus a remedy that preserves the sight is said to make a man see. But since nothing moves or acts of itself unless it be an unmoved mover; thirdly, a thing is said to cause another’s action by moving it to act: whereby we do not mean that it causes or preserves the active power, but that it applies the power to action, even as a man causes the knife’s cutting by the very fact that he applies the sharpness of the knife t6 cutting by moving it to cut. And since the lower nature in acting does not act except through being moved, because these lower bodies are both subject to and cause alteration: whereas the heavenly body causes alteration without being subject to it, and yet it does not cause movement unless it be itself moved, so that we must eventually trace its movement to God, it follows of necessity that God causes the action of every natural thing by moving and applying its power to action. Furthermore we find that the order of effects follows the order of causes, and this must needs be so on account of the likeness of the effect to its cause. Nor can the second cause by its own power have any influence on the effect of the first cause, although it is the instrument of the first cause in regard to that effect: because an instrument is in a manner the cause of the principal cause’s effect, not by its own form or power, but in so far as it participates somewhat in the power of the principal cause through being moved thereby: thus the axe is the cause of the craftsman’s handiwork not by its own form or power, but by the power of the craftsman who moves it so that it participates in his power. Hence, fourthly, one thing causes the action of another, as a principal agent causes the action of its instrument: and in this way again we must say that God causes every action of natural things. For the higher the cause the greater its scope and efficacity: and the more efficacious the cause, the more deeply does it penetrate into its effect, and the more remote the potentiality from which it brings that effect into act. Now in every natural thing we find that it is a being, a natural thing, and of this or that nature. The first is common to all beings, the second to all natural things, the third to all the members of a species, while a fourth, if we take accidents, into account, is proper to this or that individual. Accordingly this or that individual thing cannot by its action produce another individual of the same species except as the instrument of that cause which includes in its scope the whole species and, besides, the whole being of’ the inferior creature. Wherefore no action in these lower bodies attains to the production of a species except through the power of the heavenly body, nor does anything produce being except by the power of God. For being is the most common first effect and more intimate than all other effects: wherefore it is an effect which it belongs to God alone to produce by his own power: and for this reason (De Causis, prop. ix) an intelligence does not give being, except the divine power be therein.

Therefore God is the cause of every action, inasmuch as every agent is an instrument of the divine power operating.

If, then, we consider the subsistent agent, every particular agent is immediate to its effect: but if we consider the power whereby the action is done, then the power of the higher cause is more immediate to the effect than the power of the lower cause; since the power of the lower cause is not coupled with its effect save by the power of the higher cause: wherefore it is said in De Causis (prop. i) that the power of the first cause takes the first place in the production of the effect and enters more deeply therein. Accordingly the divine power must needs be present to every acting thing, even as the power of the heavenly body must needs be present to every acting elemental body. Yet there is a difference in that wherever the power of God is there is his essence, whereas the essence of the heavenly body is not wherever its power is: and again God is his own power, whereas the heavenly body is not its own power. Consequently we may say that God works in everything forasmuch as everything needs his power in order that it may act: whereas it cannot properly be said that the heaven always works in an elemental body, although the latter acts by its power. Therefore God is the cause of everything’s action inasmuch as he gives everything the power to act, and preserves it in being and applies it to action, and inasmuch as by his power every other power acts. And if we add to this that God is his own power, and that he is in all things not as part of their essence but as upholding them in their being, we shall conclude that he acts in every agent immediately, without prejudice to the action of the will and of nature.

Reply to the First Objection. The active and passive powers. of a natural thing suffice for action in their own order: yet the divine power is required for the reason given above.

Reply to the Second Objection. Although the action of the forces of nature may be said to depend on God in the same way as that of an elemental body depends on the heavenly body, the comparison does not apply in every respect.

Reply to the Third Objection. In that operation whereby God operates by moving nature, nature itself does not operate: and even the operation of nature is also the operation of the divine power, just as the operation of an instrument is effected by the power of the principal agent. Nor does this prevent nature and God from operating to the same effect, on account of the order between God and nature.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Both God and nature operate immediately, although as already stated there is order between them of priority and posteriority.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. It belongs to the lower power to be a principle of operation in a certain way and in its own order, namely as instrument of a higher power: wherefore, apart from the latter it has no operation.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. God is the cause of nature's operation not only as upholding the forces of nature in their being, but in other ways also, as stated above.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The natural forces implanted in natural things at their formation are in them by way of fixed and constant forms in nature. But that which God does in a natural thing to make it operate actually, is a mere intention, incomplete in being, as colours in the air and the power of the craftsman in his instrument. Hence even as art can give the axe its sharpness as a permanent form, but not the power of the art as a permanent form, unless it were endowed with intelligence, so it is possible for a natural thing to be given its own proper power as a permanent form within it, but not the power to act so as to cause being as the instrument of the first cause, unless it were given to be the universal principle of being. Nor could it be given to a natural power to cause its own movement, or to preserve its own being. Consequently just as it clearly cannot be given to the craftsman's instrument to work unless it be moved by him, so neither can it be given to a natural thing to operate without the divine operation.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The natural necessity whereby heat acts is the result of the order of all the preceding causes: wherefore the power of the first cause is not excluded.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although nature and will are disparate in themselves, there is a certain order between them as regards their respective actions. For just as the action of nature precedes the act of our will, so that operations of art which proceed from the will presuppose the operation of nature: even so the will of God which is the origin of all natural movement precedes the operation of nature, so that its operation is presupposed in every operation of nature.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The creature has a certain likeness to God by sharing in his goodness, in so far as it exists and acts, but not so that it can become equal to him through that likeness being perfected: wherefore as the imperfect needs the perfect, so the forces of nature in acting need the action of God.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. One angel is less distant from another in the degree of nature than God from created nature; and yet in the order of cause and effect God and the creature come together, whereas two angels do not: wherefore God operates in nature, but one angel does not operate in another.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. God is said to have left man in the hand of his counsel not as though he did not operate in the will: but because he gave man's will dominion over its act, so that it is not bound to this or that alternative: which dominion he did not bestow on nature since by its form it is confined to one determinate effect.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The will is said to have dominion over its own act not to the exclusion of the first cause, but inasmuch as the first cause does not act in the will so as to determine it of necessity to one thing as it determines nature; wherefore the determination of the act remains in the power of the reason and will.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Not every cause excludes liberty, but only that which compels: and it is not thus that God causes our operations.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Forasmuch as the first cause has more influence in the effect than the second cause, whatever there is of perfection in the effect is to be referred chiefly to the first cause: while all defects must be referred to the second cause which does not act as efficaciously as the first cause.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. God acts perfectly as first cause: but the operation of nature as second cause is also necessary. Nevertheless God can produce the natural effect even without nature: but he wishes to act by means of nature in order to preserve order in things.

Q. III: ARTICLE VIII

DOES GOD WORK IN NATURE BY CREATING?

[SUM. THEOL. I, Q. XIV, A. 8.]

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether God works in nature by creating; and this is to ask whether creation is mingled in the works of nature: and seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.

1. Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): “The apostle Paul considering the secret works of God in the creation and formation of things, and the outward works of creatures, takes a comparison from agriculture when he says I have planted, Apollo watered, but God gave the increase.”

2. To this it may be answered that creation here stands for any kind of making.—On the contrary Augustine (ibid.) intends there to draw from the Apostle’s words the distinction between the creature’s operation and that of God. Now this distinction is not based upon creation taken in a general sense for any kind of making, because thus even nature creates, since it does make something as we have shown above, but not by creation in the strict sense. Therefore the words quoted must be taken as referring to creation properly so called.

3. Augustine adds (ibid.): just as in our life none but God can inform the soul with righteousness, whereas even men can outwardly preach the Gospel, so God inwardly creates the visible world, while he applies to nature in which he creates all things the various external operations of good or bad angels or men or any animals whatsoever; thus to the soil he applies husbandry. Now he informs the soul with righteousness by creating in the strict sense of the word: since grace is effected by creation. Therefore he creates the forms of things in the strict sense of the term.

4. You may say, however, that natural forms have a cause in their subject, whereas grace has not: and this is why grace is created in the proper sense of the word, while natural forms are not.—On the contrary according to a gloss on Genesis i, i, “to create is to make a thing out of (ex) nothing.” Now this preposition ex sometimes connotes efficient causality as in 1 Corinthians viii, 6, “Of (ex) whom are all things,... by whom are all things”: and sometimes it connotes material causality, as in Tobit xiii, 21, “all the walls thereof round about of (ex) precious stones.” Hence when a thing is said to be made out of nothing, it is not the relation of an efficient cause that is denied (since then God would not be the efficient cause of creatures), but that of a material cause. But natural forms have efficient causes in their

subjects, and in this they differ from grace: they also have matter in which they are, and this is also competent to grace. Consequently grace is not more capable of being created than natural forms are, since it also has a cause in its subject.

5. Art-forms have no cause in their subject but are entirely effected from without. If, then, grace is said to be created because it has no cause in its subject, for the same reason accidental art-forms must be the result of creation.

6. That which has no matter as a constituent part cannot be made of matter. Now forms have no matter as a constituent part: because form is contradistinguished both from matter and from composite things (De Anima ii, i). Since, then, forms are made since they. have a beginning of existence, it would seem that they are not made out of matter; and consequently are made out of nothing and therefore are created.

7. But it might be said that although natural forms have no matter as a constituent part, they have matter as a subject, and as such are not created.—On the contrary the rational soul is a form in matter like other natural forms. But it is admitted that the rational soul is created. Therefore we must say the same of other natural forms.

8. If you say that the rational soul is not as other natural forms educed from matter.—On the contrary nothing is educed from that in which it is not. Now before generation is complete the form which is the term of generation is not in the matter; otherwise contrary forms would be in matter at the same time. Therefore natural forms are not educed from matter.

9. The form which is the term of generation does not make its appearance before generation is complete. If then it was there it was latent: and the result would be that all kinds of forms are latent in all kinds of matter, an opinion upheld by Anaxagoras and disproved by Aristotle (Phys. i, 4).

10. You will say perhaps, that the natural form does not exist completely as Anaxagoras maintained before generation is complete, but incompletely.—On the contrary if the form is in any way at all in matter before generation’ is complete, it is there as to some part of itself: and if it be not there completely as to some part of itself, it does not pre-exist at all. Hence the form will have several parts, and consequently is not simple: which is contrary to what is laid down at the beginning of the Six Principles [by Gilbert de la Porrée].

11. If the form does not pre-exist completely in matter and is made complete subsequently, this complement must be the result of generation. Now this complement does not pre-exist in matter, because in that case the form would be already complete. Therefore this complement at least would be created.

12. It will be said perhaps that this complement preexisted in matter incompletely, not in respect of a part, but because it existed at first in one way and afterwards in another way: since at first it was potential and afterwards actual.—On the contrary, when a thing is in one way at first and afterwards in another way it is altered and not generated. Hence if the work of nature consists in nothing more than that a form which was previously in potentiality becomes afterwards actual, it follows that nature’s operation does not produce generation but only alteration.

13. In the lower nature there is no active principle that is not an accident: thus fire acts by heat which is an accident, and so on. Now an accident cannot be the active cause of a substantial form, since nothing acts beyond its own species: and an effect cannot transcend its cause, whereas a substantial form transcends an accident. Therefore a substantial form is not produced by the action of a lower nature, and consequently it is the result of creation.

14. The imperfect cannot be the cause of the perfect. Now the soul’s power is not in the semen of the dumb animal except imperfectly. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal is not produced by the natural action of the seminal force: and thus it must needs be produced by creation, and likewise all other natural forms.

15. That which is neither animate nor living cannot be the cause of an animate and living being. Now animals engendered from putrid matter are living animated beings and there are not to be found in nature any living beings from which they receive life. Therefore their souls must be produced by creation by the first living being, and for like reason so also must other natural forms.

16. Again, nature does not produce other than its like. But. we find certain natural things of which there is no previous likeness in their generator: thus a mule is not like in species either a horse or an ass. Therefore the form of the mule is not the result of nature’s action but of creation: and thus the same conclusion follows.

17. Again, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. iii; De Lib. Arb. ii, 17) that natural things would not be informed by their forms, unless there were some first being whereby they are informed. But this is God. Therefore all forms are created by God.

18. Again, Boethius says (De Trin.) that forms which exist in matter are produced by forms which exist without matter. Now a form that exists without matter, so far as the present question is concerned, can only be an idea of a thing, which idea exists in the divine mind: because the angels who may be described as forms existing without matter are not the causes of material forms, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). Therefore natural forms are not produced by the action of nature but are bestowed by creation.

ig. Being is caused by creation (De Causis, prop. xviii). Now this would not be true unless forms were created, since the form is the principle of being. Therefore forms are made by creation, and God produces something in nature by creation, namely forms.

20. That which is self-subsistent is the cause of that which is not self-subsistent. Now the forms of natural things are not self-subsistent but subsist in matter. Therefore their cause is a self-subsistent form: and consequently must be created by an extrinsic agent. Hence it would seem that God works in nature by creating forms.— On the contrary the work of creation is distinct from the work of government and that of propagation. Now that which is done by the action of nature belongs to the works of government and propagation. Therefore creation is not mingled with the work of nature.

Moreover, God alone can create. Hence if forms are created, they will be the work of God alone, so that all nature’s work, the purpose of which is the form, will be useless.

Moreover, just as matter is not a part of the substantial form so neither is it a part of the accidental form. Hence if the reason why substantial forms must be produced by creation is because they have no matter, the same argument will apply to accidental forms. Now as the thing generated is perfected by the substantial form, so does it receive a certain disposition from the accidental form: and consequently nature would take no part in generating, neither as perfecting nor as disposing, and all natural action would be useless.

Further, nature produces like from like. Now the thing generated is like its generator in species and form. Therefore the form is produced by the action of the generator and not by creation.

Further, the actions of diverse agents do not terminate in one same effect. But matter and form combine to produce that which is one simply. Therefore there cannot be one agent to dispose the matter and another to induce the form. Now it is the natural agent that disposes the matter: therefore it also induces the form. Consequently forms are not produced by creation, and creation is not mingled with the works of nature.

I answer that there have been different opinions on this point, and they all arose seemingly from this one principle that nature cannot make a thing out of nothing. Whence some concluded that nothing is made except in the sense that it is drawn out of another wherein it was latent.

The Philosopher (Phys. i, 4) imputes this opinion to Anaxagoras who apparently was deceived through failing to distinguish potentiality from act: for he thought that whatever is generated must already have been in actual existence: whereas it must have pre-existed potentially and not actually. For if it pre-existed potentially it would become out of nothing: while if it pre-existed actually it would not become at all, since what is does not become.

Since, however, the thing generated is in potentiality through its matter, and in act through its form, others maintained that a thing becomes as regards its form while its matter was already in existence. And seeing that nature cannot operate on nothing, and therefore presupposes something to act on, according to them nature’s operation is confined to disposing matter for its form. While the form which must needs become and cannot be presupposed, must be produced by an agent who does not presuppose anything and can make something out of nothing: and such is the supernatural agent which Plato held to be the giver of forms. Avicenna held this to be the lowest intelligence among separate substances: while more recent followers of this opinion say that it is God.

Now seemingly this is unreasonable. Since everything has a natural tendency to produce its like (because a thing acts forasmuch as it is actual, namely by making actual that which previously was potential) there would be no need of likeness in the substantial form in the natural agent, unless the substantial form of the thing generated were produced by the action of the agent. For which reason that which is to be acquired in the thing generated is found to be actually in the natural generator, and each one acts inasmuch as it is in act: wherefore seemingly there is no reason to seek another generator and pass over this one.

It must be observed, then, that these opinions arose from ignorance of the nature of form, just as the first-mentioned opinions arose from ignorance of the nature of matter. For being is not predicated univocally of the form and the thing generated. A generated natural thing is said to be per se and properly, as having being and subsisting in that being: whereas the form is not thus said to be, for it does not subsist, nor has it being per se; and it is said to exist or be, because something is by it: thus accidents are described as beings, because by them a substance is qualified or quantified, but not as though by them it is simply, as it is by its substantial form. Hence it is more correct to say that an accident is of something rather than that it is something (Metaph. vii, 2). Now that which is made is said to become according to the way in which it is: because its being is the term of its making: so that properly speaking it is the composite that is made per se. Whereas the form properly speaking is not made but is that whereby a thing is made, that is to say it is by acquiring the form that a thing is said to be made.

Accordingly the fact that nature makes nothing out of nothing does not prevent our asserting that substantial forms acquire being through the action of nature: since that which is made is not the form but the composite, which is made from matter and not out of nothing. And it is made from matter, in so far as matter is potentially the composite through having the form potentially.

Consequently it is not correct to say that the form is made in matter, rather should we say that it is educed from the potentiality of matter. And from this principle that the composite and not the form is made the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 8) proves that forms result from natural agents. Because since the thing made must needs be like its maker, and that which is made is the composite, it follows that the maker must be composite and not a self-subsistent form, as Plato, maintained: so that as the thing made is composite, and that by which it is made is a form in matter made actual, so the generator is composite and not a mere form, while the form is that whereby it generates, a form to, wit existing in that particular matter such as that flesh, those bones and so forth.

Reply to the First Objection. In these words Augustine ascribes creation to God in the works of nature by reason of nature's forces which at the beginning God implanted in matter by the work of creation, not as though something were created in every work of nature.

Reply to the Second Objection. In these words of, Augustine creation is to be taken in its proper sense, but it is not to be referred to natural effects but to the forces by which nature works; which forces were planted in nature by the work of creation.

Reply to the Third Objection. Since grace is not a subsistent form it cannot properly be said to be or to be made, and consequently properly speaking it is not created in the same way as self-subsistent substances are. Nevertheless the infusion of grace approaches somewhat to the nature of creation in so far as grace has not a cause in its subject—neither an efficient cause nor a material cause wherein it pre-exists potentially in such a way that it can like other natural forms be educed into act by a natural agent.

Hence the reply to the Fourth Objection is clear because when we say that a thing is made out of nothing we deny that it has a material cause: and it somewhat savours of absence of matter that a form cannot be educed from the natural potentiality of matter.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although nature contains no effective principle with regard to art-forms, such forms do not surpass the order of nature, as grace does: in fact they are beneath that order, because nature is above art.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. That a form has no matter as part thereof would prove that it is competent to be created, if like a self-subsistent thing it could be, made properly speaking.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although the rational soul has matter for its subject, it is not educed from the potentiality of matter, since its nature is raised above the entire material order, as is evidenced by its intellectual operation. Moreover, this form is a self-subsistent thing that remains when the body dies.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The form which is the term of generation was in matter before generation was complete, not actually but potentially: and there is nothing to prevent two contraries being together in the same subject, one actually and the other potentially.

The reply to the Ninth Objection is thus made clear: since Anaxagoras held that forms pre-exist in matter not actually but in a latent state.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The form pre-exists in matter imperfectly, not as though a part of it were actually there and another part not, but because it is wholly there in potentiality, and is afterwards educed wholly into actuality.

Whence we may gather the reply to the Eleventh Objection, since the form is not perfected by adding to the matter something extraneous that was not already in the matter potentially.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Actuality and potentiality are not different accidental modes of being, such as go to make alteration: they are substantial modes of being. For even substance is divided by potentiality and act, like any other genus.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. An accidental form acts by virtue of the substantial form whose instrument it is: thus heat is said to be the instrument of the nutritive power (De Anima ii, 4): wherefore it is not unreasonable if the action of an accidental form terminate in a substantial form.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Again the heat in the semen acts as the instrument of the soul’s power which is in the semen: and though this power has an imperfect being it results from the action of a perfect soul, because the semen derives it from the soul of the generator. Moreover, it acts by virtue of a heavenly body whose instrument it is after a fashion. Hence we do not say that the semen begets, but the soul and the sun.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Animals engendered from putrid matter are less perfect than other animals: hence in engendering them the power of the heavenly body by acting on inferior matter has the same effect as it has in conjunction with the power of the semen in engendering the bodies of more perfect animals.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although a mule is unlike a horse or ass in species, it is like them in the proximate genus: by reason of which likeness one species, a mean species as it were, is engendered from different species.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. just as the divine power, the first agent to wit, does not exclude the action of the natural forces, so neither does the prototypal form which is God exclude the derivation of forms from other lower forms whose action terminates in like forms.

Hence we gather the reply to the Eighteenth Objection; for Boethius means to say that forms which are in matter derive from forms which are without matter not as from proximate causes but as from the prototypes.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Being is said to be the result of creation in so far as every second cause when it gives being does so forasmuch as it acts by the power of the first creating cause: since being is the first effect and presupposes nothing else.

Reply to. the Twentieth Objection. A natural form that is in matter cannot be produced by a self-subsistent form of the same species because matter is essential to a natural form: yet it is produced by a self-subsistent form, as we have stated.

Q. III: ARTICLE IX

IS THE RATIONAL SOUL BROUGHT INTO BEING BY CREATION OR IS IT TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE SEMEN?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. CXVIII]

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether the soul be brought into being by creation or by transmission through the semen: and it would seem that it is transmitted through the semen.

1. It is written (Gen. xlvi, 26): All the souls that went with Jacob into Egypt and that came out of his thigh, besides his sons'wives, sixty-six. Now nothing comes from a father's thigh but what is transmitted through the semen. Therefore the rational soul is transmitted with the semen.

2. It may be replied that the part is taken for the whole, namely the soul for the man.—On the contrary, a man is composed of soul and body, and therefore if the whole man comes out of his father's thigh, it follows as above that not the body only but also the soul is transmitted with the semen.

3. An accident cannot be transmitted unless its subject be transmitted, since an accident does not pass from one .subject to another. Now the rational soul is the subject of original sin. Therefore seeing that original sin is transmitted from parent to child it would seem that the child's rational soul is transmitted from its parent.

4. It may be said that although original sin is in the soul as its subject, it is in the flesh as its cause: and consequently is transmitted by the transmission of the flesh.—On the contrary it is written (Rom. v, 12): By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned. The words in quo are expounded by a gloss of Augustine (De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 10) as meaning in which sinner or in which sin. Now all would not have sinned in that sin, unless that same sin had been transmitted to all. Therefore the same sin that was in Adam is transmitted to all men; and consequently the soul that was the subject of that sin.

5. Every agent produces its like. Also every agent acts by virtue of its form. Therefore that which it produces is a form. Now the begetter is an agent. Therefore the form of the begetter is produced by the action of the begetter. Since then a man begets a man, and the rational soul is the form of a man, it would seem that the rational soul is produced by generation and not by creation.

6. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 7) the efficient cause produces its own species in its effect. Now man takes his species from his rational soul. Therefore seemingly the rational soul is caused by the begetter in the begotten.

7. Children are like their parents because they are begotten by their parents. And they are like their parents not only in dispositions of the body but also in those of the soul. Therefore as bodies derive from bodies, so do souls derive from souls.

8. Moses says (Levit. xvii, 14): The soul of all flesh is in the blood. Now blood is transmitted with the semen, especially as the seed of the male is merely blood depurated by heat. Therefore the soul is transmitted with the semen.

9. Moreover the embryo before it is perfected with the rational soul, has certain animate actions, namely growth, nourishment and sensation: and where there is animate action there is life: consequently it lives. Now the soul is the principle of life in a body: consequently it has a soul. But it cannot be said that it receives yet another soul: because then there would be two souls in one body. Therefore the soul which was from the beginning transmitted in the semen is the rational soul.

10. Souls differing in species constitute animals of different species. If, then, before the rational soul there was in the semen a soul that was not rational, there was an animal of a different species from man: which consequently could not become a man since animals do not pass from one species to another.

11. You will say that these actions belong to the embryo not through the soul, but by some power of the soul known as the formative power.—On the contrary, power is rooted in substance; hence it occupies a place between substance and operation according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi). Consequently if the soul’s power is there, its substance is there also.

12. The Philosopher says (De Gener. Anim. ii, 3) that the embryo is a living being before it is an animal, and an animal before it is a human being. Now every animal has a soul. Therefore it has a soul before it has a rational soul whereby it is a human being.

13. According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, i) a soul is “the act of a living body as such.” Now if the embryo is a living being and has vital

functions by means of this formative power, this very power will be its act in so far as it is a living thing. Therefore it will be a soul.

14. According to De Anima i, 2, life comes into all living things by the vegetal soul. Now it is clear that the embryo lives before the infusion of the rational soul, since it gives signs of exercising vital functions. Therefore the vegetal soul is in it before the rational soul.

15. The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) disproves the assertion that growth is not the effect of fire as principal agent, but of the vegetal soul. Now the embryo grows before the advent of the rational soul. Therefore it has a vegetal soul.

16. If before the advent of the rational soul there is not a vegetal soul but a formative power, at the advent of the soul this power will be inoperative, since the function it exercised in the embryo will subsequently be sufficiently fulfilled in the animal by the soul. Consequently it would remain superfluous: and this would seem to be unreasonable since nothing is superfluous in. nature.

17. You will say perhaps that this power ceases at the advent of the rational soul.—On the contrary, dispositions do not cease at the advent of the form, but remain, and after a fashion maintain the form in matter. Now this power was a kind of disposition to the soul. Therefore at the advent of the latter, it does not cease.

18. By its action this power conduces to the infusion of the soul. If, then, at the soul’s advent this power is destroyed, seemingly the soul has something to do with its destruction: and this is impossible.

19. A man is a human being by his rational soul. Therefore if the soul is not brought into being by generation, it win not be true that a man is generated: which is clearly false.

20. Further, the human body comes into being by the action of its begetter. If, then, the soul is not brought into being by the begetter, there will be a twofold being in man; corporeal being derived from the begetter, and animate being derived from another source: and consequently soul and body will not form one being simply, since each has its own being.

21. Moreover, it is impossible that the matter be the term of action of one agent, and the form the term of action of another agent: otherwise form and matter would not together make one thing simply, for one thing is made by

one action. Now the action of nature in generating terminates in the body. Therefore it, terminates in the soul also, which is the form of the body.

22. Moreover, according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Anim. ii, 3) principles whose actions are not performed independently of the body are produced together with the body. Now the action of the rational soul is not performed independently of the body: since most of all would understanding be independent of the body, and this is clearly not the case, because we cannot understand without images (De Anima iii, 8): and there cannot be images without a body. Therefore the rational soul is transmitted with the body.

23. To this it may be replied that the rational soul when it understands requires images for the acquisition of intelligible species but not after it has acquired them.—On the contrary, after a man has acquired knowledge, his act of intelligence is hindered if the organ of imagination be injured. And this would not be the case if the intellect after acquiring knowledge were no longer in need of images. Consequently it needs them not only in acquiring knowledge but also in applying the knowledge it has acquired.

24. And if it be replied that the impediment to the act of intelligence arising from an injury to the organ of imagination arises not from the fact that the intellect needs images in using the knowledge it has acquired, but from the imagination and intellect being both seated in the one essence of the soul, so that the intellect is hindered accidentally through the imagination being hindered.—On the contrary the conjunction of powers in the one essence of the soul is the reason why if the act of one power be intense the act of the other is remiss: thus a person who is intent on seeing is less intent on hearing. It is also the reason why one power acts with greater strength when another is deprived of its act: thus the blind are often sharp of hearing. Therefore this conjunction of powers is not a reason for the action of the intellect being hindered through an impediment to the imagination, in fact it should rather be strengthened.

25. He who gives the work its final complement is the worker's chief co-operator. Now if all human souls are created by God and by him infused into bodies, he gives the final complement to a generation that comes of adultery. Therefore he co-operates in adultery: and this is absurd.

26. According to the Philosopher (Meteor. iv, 12; De Anima ii, 4) a perfect thing is one that can make its like: land consequently the more

perfect a thing is, the more is it able to make its like. Now the rational soul is more perfect than the material forms of the elements which produce other forms like themselves. Therefore the rational soul has the power by way of generation to produce another rational soul.

27. The rational soul is situated between God and corporeal things: wherefore (De Causis, prop. ii) it is asserted that it is created on the horizon between eternity and time. Now in God there is generation and also in corporeal things. Therefore the soul which is situated between them is produced by generation.

28. The Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 3) says that the spirit that comes forth with the seed of the male, is a force emanating from the soul, and is a divine thing. Now such a thing is the intellect. Therefore the intellect seemingly is transmitted with the seed.

29. The Philosopher (ibid. 4) says that in generation the female provides the body, and that the soul proceeds from the male: so that seemingly the soul is procreated and not created.

On the contrary it is written (Isa. lvii, 16): Every breathing I have made, and by breathing we are to understand the soul. Therefore seemingly the soul is created by God.

Again, it is written (Ps. xxxii, 15): He maketh the heart of each one of them. Therefore one soul is not engendered by another, but all are created separately by God.

I answer that in times past this question has been answered in various ways by different people. Some said that the soul of the child is procreated from the soul of the parent, even as its body is from the body of the parent. Others said that all souls were created apart from bodies: but they held that they were all created together without bodies, and afterwards each one was united to a body when this was begotten, either by an act of its will according to some, or by God’s command and operation according to others. Others held that souls are created and at the same time infused into bodies. Although formerly these opinions were held and it was doubtful which of them came nearest to the truth, as may be gathered from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. x, 21, 22; De Anima et ejus orig.), afterwards, however, the first two were condemned by the Church and the third approved [Pope Vigilius, Can. i, contra Originem; Council of Braga, Anathem. vi, Contra haeret.; Pope Anastasius II, Epist. ad episc. Galliae].

Hence we read in De Eccles. Dogm. (xiv): “We do not believe in the fiction of Origen that human souls were created at the beginning with other intellectual natures, nor that they are Procreated together with their bodies by coition, as the Luciferians with Cyril, and certain Latin writers have Presumed to maintain. But we affirm that the body alone is begotten by sexual Procreation, and that after the formation of the body the soul is created and infused.”

A careful examination will make it clear that the opinion now under consideration was rightly condemned which held the rational soul to be transmitted with the semen. Three arguments will make this sufficiently evident for the present.

First argument. The rational soul differs from other forms, in that the latter have a being not wherein they subsist but whereby the things informed by them subsist: whereas the rational soul has being in suchwise as to subsist therein: and this is made clear by their respective modes of action. For seeing that only that which exists can act, a thing is referred to operation or action as it is referred to being: so that since the body must of necessity take part in the action of other forms, but not in the action of the rational soul, which is to understand and will: it follows of necessity that being must be ascribed to the rational soul as subsisting, but not to other forms. For this reason the rational soul is the only form that can exist separate from the body. Hence it is clear that the rational soul is brought into being not as other forms are, which properly speaking are not made but are said to be made in the making of this or that thing. That which is made is made properly speaking and per se. And that which is made, is made either of matter or out of nothing. Now that which is made from matter, must needs be made from matter subject to contrariety: since generation is from contraries according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Anim. i, 18). Wherefore since a soul has either no matter at all or at least none that is subject to contrariety it cannot be made out of something. Hence it follows that it comes into being by creation as being made out of nothing. Now to maintain that the soul is made by the generation of the body, is to say that it is not subsistent and consequently that it ceases with the body.

Second argument. It is impossible for the action of a material force to rise to the production of a force that is wholly spiritual and immaterial: because nothing acts beyond its species, in fact the agent must needs be more perfect than the patient as Augustine asserts (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Now the begetting of a man is effected by the generative power which is exercised through organs of the body: moreover, the seminal force acts only by means of, heat (De Gen. Anim. ii, 3): wherefore since the rational soul is a wholly spiritual form, neither dependent on the body nor exercising its action in common with the body, it can by no means be produced through the procreation of the body, nor be brought into being by an energy residing in the seed.

Third argument. Every form that comes into being by generation or the forces of nature is educed from the potentiality of matter (Metaph. vii, 7). Now the rational soul cannot be educed from the potentiality of matter: because a form whose operation is independent of matter cannot be produced from corporeal matter. It follows, then, that the rational soul is not evolved by the generative power. This argument is given by Aristotle (De Gen. Animal. ii, 3).

Reply to the First Objection. In the passage quoted the part stands for the whole, namely the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche: and this because the soul is the chief part of man, and a whole is considered as though it were identified with its most important part: so that the soul or intellect is considered as constituting to whole man (Ethic. ix, 4).

Reply to the Second Objection. The whole man comes from the thigh of the begetter,—in so far as the force in the semen coming from the thigh conduces to the union of soul and body, by giving the matter its ultimate disposition which calls for the introduction of the form: by reason of which union man is a man:—but not as though each part of man were caused by that seminal force.

Reply to the Third Objection. Original sin is said to be the sin of the entire nature just as actual sin is said to be the sin of the individual: wherefore the comparison between actual sin and the one individual person is the same as that between original sin and the entire human nature transmitted by our first parent in whom was the beginning of sin and by whose voluntary act original sin is imputed as voluntary to all men. Hence original sin is in the soul in so far as it is the sin of human nature. Now human nature is transmitted from parent to child by procreation of the flesh into which subsequently the soul is infused: and the soul contracts the infection because together with the transmitted flesh it forms one nature: for were it not united thereto so as to form one nature it would not contract the infection, as neither does an angel by assuming a human body.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. As in Adam's nature the nature of us all originated, so original sin which is in us originated in that original sin: because nature, as already stated, is the direct recipient of original sin, while the soul is its consequent recipient.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. A man begets his like in species by virtue of his form, namely his rational soul: not that this is the immediate active principle in human generation, but because the generative force and the active principles of the semen do not dispose the matter so as to make it a body fit to be perfected by a rational soul, except in so far as they act as instruments of a rational soul. Nevertheless this action does not go so far as to produce a rational soul, for the reasons already given.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The generator begets his like in species in so far as the begotten is produced by the action of the generator in order that it may share in his species: and this comes to pass by the begotten receiving a form like that of the generator. If, then, that, form be non-subsistent, and its being consist merely in that it is united to its subject, it will be necessary for the generator to be cause of that form; as is the case with all material forms. If on the other hand it be a subsistent form, so that its being is not entirely dependent on its union with matter, as in the case of the rational soul, then it suffices that the generator be the cause of the union of such a form with matter by merely disposing the matter for the form: nor need it be the cause of the form.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The disposition of the rational soul is in keeping with the disposition of the body: both because it receives something from the body, and because forms are diversified according to the diversity of their matter. Hence it is that children are like their parents even in things pertaining to the soul, and not because one soul is evolved from another.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Because properly speaking a soul is the act of a living body, and life is conditional upon heat and humidity which are preserved in an animal by means of its blood: therefore it is stated that the soul is in the blood, thus indicating the proper disposition of the body as matter perfected by the soul.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. There are several opinions about the life of the embryo. According to some in human generation the soul, like the human body, is subject to stages of progression, so that as the human body is virtually in the semen, yet has not actually the perfection of a human body by having distinct members, but gradually reaches this perfection through the force of the semen, so at the beginning of the generation the soul is there having virtually all the perfection which subsequently is to be seen in the perfect human being, yet it has not this perfection actually, since there is no sign of the soul's activity, but attains thereto by degrees: so that at first there are indications of the action of the vegetal soul, then of the sensitive soul, and lastly of the rational soul. Gregory of Nyssa mentions this opinion (De Homine): but it cannot be admitted. It means either that the soul in its species is in the semen from the very . outset, deprived however of its perfect activity through lack of organs, or that from the beginning there is in the semen some energy or form not having as yet the species of a soul (just as the semen has not as yet the appearance of a human body) but by the action of nature gradually transformed into a soul at first vegetal, then sensitive and lastly rational. The former alternative is rebutted first by the authority of the Philosopher. He says, in fact (De Anima ii, i), that when we say that the soul is the act of a physico-organic body which has life potentially we do not exclude the soul, as we exclude it from the semen and the fruit. Hence we gather that the semen is animated potentially in that the soul is not therein. Secondly, because as the semen has no definite likeness to the members of the human body (else its resolution would be a kind of corruption) but is the residue of the final digestion (De Gener. Anim. i, 19), it was not yet while in the body of the begetter perfected by the soul, so that in the first instant of its separation it could not have a soul. Thirdly, granted that it was animated when it was separated, this cannot refer to the rational soul: because since it is not the act of a particular part of the body, it cannot be sundered when the body is sundered.

The second alternative is also clearly false. For seeing that a substantial form is brought into act not continuously or by degrees but instantaneously (else movement would needs be in the genus of substance just as it is in that of quality) the force which from the outset is in the semen cannot by degrees advance to the various degrees of soul. Thus the form of fire is not produced in the air so as gradually to advance from imperfection to perfection, since no substantial form is subject to increase and decrease, but it is the matter alone that is changed by the previous alteration so as to be more or less disposed to receive the form: and the form does not begin to be in the matter until the last instant of this alteration.

Others say that in the semen there is at first the vegetal soul and that afterwards while this remains the sensitive soul is introduced by the power of the generator, and that lastly the rational soul is introduced by creation. So that they posit in man three essentially different souls. Against this, however, is the authority of the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus (xv): "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated and which is mingled with the blood, the other spiritual, which obeys the reason." Moreover, it is impossible for one and the same thing to have several substantial forms ! because, since the substantial form makes a thing to be, not in this or that way, but simply, and establishes this or that thing in the genus of substance; if the first form, does this, the second form at its advent will find the subject already established with substantial being and consequently win accrue to it accidentally: and thus it would follow that the sensitive and rational souls in man would be united accidentally to the body, Nor can it be said that the vegetal soul which is the substantial form in a plant is not the substantial form in a man, but a mere disposition to the form, since that which is in the genus of substance cannot be an accident of anything.

Hence others say that the vegetative soul is potentially sensitive and that the sensitive soul is its act: so that the vegetative soul which at first is in the semen is raised to the perfection of the sensitive soul by the action of nature; and further that the rational soul is the act and perfection of the sensitive soul, so that the sensitive soul is brought to its perfection consisting in the rational soul, not by the action of the generator but by that of the Creator. Hence they hold that the rational soul is in man partly from within, namely as regards its intellectual nature, and partly from without as regards its vegetative and sensitive nature. Now this is altogether impossible, because either it means that the intellectual nature is distinct from the vegetal and sensitive souls, and thus we return to the second opinion, or it means that these three natures constitute the substance of the soul wherein the intellectual nature will be the form as it were, and the sensitive and vegetative natures, matter. From, this it would follow, as the sensitive and vegetative natures are corruptible through being educed from matter, that the substance of the rational soul would not be immortal. Moreover, this opinion is involved in the same impossibility as we have shown to be implicated in the first opinion, namely that a substantial form be brought into act by degrees.

Others say that there is no soul in the embryo until it is perfected by the rational soul, and that the vital functions to be observed therein proceed from the soul of the mother. But this also is impossible: because living and non-living things differ in that living things are self-moving in respect of vital functions, whereas non-living things are not. Wherefore nutrition and growth which are the functions proper to a living being cannot result in the embryo from an extrinsic principle such as the mother’s soul. Moreover, the mother’s nutritive power would assimilate food to the mother’s body and not to the body of the embryo: ‘since nutrition serves the individual just as generation serves the species. Further, sensation cannot be caused in the embryo by the mother’s soul. Wherefore others say that there is no soul in the embryo before the infusion of the rational soul, but that there is a formative force that exercises these vital f~nctions in the embryo. This again is impossible, because before the embryo attains to its ultimate complement it shows signs of various vital functions; and these cannot be exercised by one power: so that there must needs be a soul there having various powers.

We must therefore say differently that from the moment of its severance the semen contains not a soul but a soul power: and this power is based on the spirit contained in the semen which by nature is spumy and consequently contains corporeal spirit. Now this spirit acts by disposing matter and forming it for the reception of the soul. And we must observe a difference between the process of generation in men and animals and in air or water. The generation of air is simple, since therein only two substantial forms appear, one that is voided and one that is induced, and all this takes place together in one instant, so that the form of water remains during the whole period preceding the induction of the form of air; without any previous dispositions to the form of air. On the other hand in the generation of an animal various substantial forms appear: first the semen, then blood and so on until we find the form of an animal or of a man. Consequently this kind of generation is not simple, but consists of a series of generations and corruptions: for it is not possible, as we have proved above, that one and the same substantial form be educed into act by degrees. Thus, then, by the formative force that is in the semen from the beginning, the form of the semen is set aside and another form induced, and when this has been set aside yet another comes on the scene, and thus the vegetal form makes its first appearance: and this being set aside, a soul both vegetal and sensitive is induced; and this being set aside a soul at once vegetal, sensitive and rational is induced, not by the aforesaid force but by the Creator. According to this opinion the embryo before having a rational soul is a living being having a soul, which being set aside, a rational soul is induced: so that it does not follow that two souls are together in the same body, nor that the rational soul is transmitted together with the body.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the embryo is not a perfect being but is on the way to perfection: and therefore it is not in a genus or species save by reduction, just as the incomplete is reduced to the genus or species of the complete.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the soul is not in the semen from the beginning, the soul-force is there, as stated above, which force is based on the spirit contained in the semen; and is called a soul-force because it comes from the soul of the generator.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Before the advent of the rational soul the semen is a living and animate being, as stated above; wherefore we grant this argument.

The same answer applies to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Objections.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The formative force that is from the outset in the semen remains even after the advent of the rational soul; just as the animal spirits remain into which nearly the whole substance of the semen is changed. This force, which at first served to form the body, afterwards regulates the body. Thus heat which at first disposes matter to the form of fire remains after the advent of the form of fire as an instrument of the latter’s activity.

This answer applies to the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Objections.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Although the rational soul is not evolved from the generator, its union with the body is in a manner from the generator, as stated above. Consequently we say that a man is begotten.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. There is not a twofold being in man for the simple reason that when it is said that man's body is from his begetter and his soul from his Creator we are not to understand that the being acquired by the body from its begetter is distinct from that which the soul acquires from its Creator, but that the Creator gives being to the soul in the body, while Ae begetter disposes the body to participate in this being through the soul united to it.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Two agents that are altogether disparate cannot combine so that the one's action terminate in the matter and the other's in the form, but this is possible in the case of two co-ordinate agents one of which is the instrument of the other: because the action of the principal agent sometimes extends to something that is beyond the range of the instrument. Now nature is a kind of instrument of the, divine power as we have shown above (A. 8, rep. 14; A. 7). Hence it is not impossible that the divine power alone produce the rational soul, while the action of nature extends no further than to giving the body the requisite disposition.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. An intelligence existing in a body, in order to understand, needs nothing corporeal as a co-principle of intellectual action, in the same way as the sight in order to see: for the principle of vision is not the sense of sight only, but the eye consisting of pupil and the faculty of seeing. But it needs a body objectively, as the sight needs the wall on which is the colour: because images are compared to the intellect as colours to sight (De Anima iii, 5). This is why the intellect is prevented from, understanding when the organ of the imagination is injured: since so long as it is in the body it needs images, not only as receiving from the images when it is acquiring knowledge; but also as referring the intelligible species to the images when it applies knowledge already acquired. For this reason science makes use of examples.

From this we gather how to reply to the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Objections.

Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. This was the argument of Apollinaris according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Homine vi). He was deceived, however, in failing to distinguish the action of nature which is the procreation of the child, to which action God gives the complement, from the deliberate act of adultery wherein the sin consists.

Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. The soul being more perfect than material forms would be able to produce its like if a rational soul could be produced otherwise than by creation, which is impossible. And this is owing to its perfection as may be gathered from what has been said.

Reply to the Twenty-seventh Objection. In God alone can there be one nature in several supposites, wherefore in him alone can there be generation without the imperfection of change and division. Hence the higher creatures which are indivisible and unchangeable in substance such as the rational soul and the angels are not generated: whereas the lower creatures are, being divisible and corruptible.

Reply to the Twenty-eighth Objection. The force that is in the semen is called intellect by the Philosopher according to the Commentator (in Metaph. vii, 9) on account of a certain likeness: inasmuch as like the intellect its action, is exercised without an organ.

Reply to the Twenty-ninth Objection. This saying of the Philosopher refers to the sensitive but not the rational soul.

Q. III: ARTICLE X

IS THE RATIONAL SOUL CREATED IN THE BODY?

[SUM. TH. 1, Q. XC, A. 4.]

THE tenth point of inquiry is whether the rational soul be created in or apart from the body. Seemingly it is created apart from the body.

1. Things belonging to the same species come into being in the same way. Now our souls belong to the same species as Adam’s: and Adam’s soul was created apart from his body and at the same time as the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 25,27). Therefore other human souls are also created apart from their bodies.

2. A whole is imperfect if it lacks one of the parts required for its perfection. Now rational souls belong to the perfection of the universe more than corporeal substances, since an intellectual substance excels a corporeal substance. If, then, rational souls were not all created from the beginning, but created day by day when their bodies are begotten, it follows that the

universe is imperfect through lacking its most excellent parts: and this seemingly is unreasonable. Therefore rational souls were created from the beginning apart from their bodies.

3. It savours of a theatrical display that the universe should be destroyed when it attains to its ultimate perfection. Now the world will come to an end when the begetting of men ceases, and then the universe will have reached the utmost height of its perfection, if souls are created at the same time as their bodies are begotten: wherefore in that case the divine government will be like a play: which is surely absurd.

4. You will say perhaps that there is no reason why the perfection of the universe should not lack something in point of numbers, seeing that it is complete in respect of all its species.—On the contrary, as the species of things, considered in themselves enjoy a certain perpetuity, they belong to the essential perfection of the universe, in that they are per se intended by the Author of the universe. Individuals, however, which have not perpetuity belong to a certain accidental perfection of the universe, in that they are intended not per se but for the conservation of the species. Now rational souls not only in their species but also in each individual enjoy perpetuity. Therefore if rational souls were all lacking at the beginning, the universe was imperfect even as it would have been had some of the species of the universe been wanting.

5. Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i) assigned two gates to heaven, one for the gods, and one for souls, in Cancer namely and in Capricorn, through one of which souls came down to earth. But it would not be so unless souls were created in heaven apart from their bodies. Therefore souls were created independently of bodies.

6. An efficient cause precedes its effect in point of time. Now the soul is the efficient cause of the body (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore it exists before the body and is not created in the body.

7. It is stated in De Spiritu et Anima (xiii) that before its union with the body the soul has the irascible and concupiscible appetite. But these cannot be in the soul before it exists. Therefore the soul exists before its union with the body, and consequently is not created in the body.

8. The substance of the rational soul is not measured by time, since it is above time (De Causis ii): nor is it measured by eternity, because this belongs to God alone. Again it is stated (De Causis, l.c.) that the soul is

beneath eternity, therefore like the angels it is measured by eviternity, so that the duration of angels and souls has the same unit of measurement. Consequently as the angels were created at the beginning of the world, seemingly souls were created then also and not in their respective bodies.

9. In eviternity there is no before and after, else it would not differ from time, as some think. Now if angels were created before souls, or one soul before another, there would be before and after in eviternity, since this is the measurement of the soul's duration, as stated above. Therefore souls must all have been created together with the angels.

10. Unity of place indicates unity of nature: wherefore different places are assigned to bodies differing in nature. But angels and souls agree in nature, since they are spiritual and intellectual substances. Therefore souls like the angels were created in the empyrean and not in bodies.

11. The more subtle a substance is the higher place it requires: thus the place of fire is higher than that of air or water. Now the soul is a much more subtle substance than a body. Therefore seemingly it was created above all bodies. and not in the body.

12. A thing reaches its ultimate perfection forasmuch as it occupies its proper place, for it cannot be outside its proper place except through violence. Now the ultimate perfection of the soul is'a heavenly home. Therefore this is the place befitting its nature, and so it would seem that it was created there.

13. It is written (Gen. ii, 2): God rested on the seventh day from all the work which he had done: whereby we are given to understand that God ceased then from creating anything new. Therefore souls are not created in their respective bodies, but were created independently at the beginning.

14. The work of creation preceded the work of increase. But this would not be, if souls be created as bodies increase in number. Therefore they were created before bodies.

15. God does all things according to justice. Now justice requires that diverse and unequal awards should not be made save to those who are found to be unequal in merit. Now we find that men from their birth are subject to many inequalities of soul: in some cases the body to which a soul is united is well adapted to the soul's actions, in others the body is ill-adapted to them: some are born of unbelievers, others are born of believers and are saved through receiving the sacraments. Therefore it would seem

that there preceded in souls an inequality of merits, and consequently that souls were created before bodies.

16. Things that are united in their beginning would seem to depend on each other as to their being. But the soul is independent of the body as to its being: which is shown by the fact that it remains when the body has ceased to be. Therefore it does not begin to exist together with the body.

17. Things that hinder each other are not naturally united. Now the soul is hindered in its action by the body, for the corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wis. ix, 15). Therefore the soul is not naturally united to the body, and thus it would seem that before its union with the body it existed apart therefrom.

On the contrary it is stated (Eccles. Dogm. xiv) that souls were not created together with other intellectual creatures.

Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Creat. Hom. xxix) that it is reprehensible “to hold either opinion, whether of those who foolishly assert a previous existence of souls in a certain state and order becoming to them, or of those who maintain that our souls are created after our bodies.”

Further, Jerome says (Symb. Fid. ii): “We condemn the error of those who hold that souls sinned or lived in heaven before being united to bodies.”

Further, the proper act is evolved in its proper matter. Now the soul is the proper act of the body. Therefore it is created in the body.

I answer that as we have stated (A. 9) some held the opinion that our souls were all created together apart from our bodies: and that this is false we shall now proceed to show by four arguments.

First argument. Things when created by God were in a state of natural perfection: for the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 2): and Boethius says (De Consol. x, pros. 10) that nature originates in perfect things. Now the soul apart from the body has not the perfection of its nature, because by itself it is not the complete species of a nature, but a part of human nature: otherwise soul and body would not together form one thing save accidentally. Hence the human soul was not created before its body. Now all those who held that souls exist outside bodies before being united to them, supposed them to be perfect natures, and that the natural perfection of the soul is not that it be united to its body, and that it is united to it accidentally as a man to his clothes: thus

Plato said that a man is not made of soul and body, but is a soul making use of a body. Wherefore all those who held souls to be created apart from bodies, believed in the transmigration of souls, namely that a soul after casting off one body is united to another body, even as a man changes from one suit of clothes to another.

The second argument is given by Avicenna. Seeing that the soul is not composed of matter and form—for it is distinct both from matter and from the composite (De Anima ii, i)—there could be no distinction between one soul and another except that which arises from a difference of forms, supposing that souls differ from one another by themselves. Now difference of form implies difference of species. And numerical distinction within the same species arises from distinction of matter: and this cannot apply to the soul as regards the matter of which a thing is made but only as regards the matter in which the soul comes into being. Consequently there cannot be many human souls of the same species and distinct individually unless from their very beginning they be united to bodies, so that their mutual distinction arises from their union to bodies, as from a material principle in a manner of speaking, although that distinction comes from God as their efficient cause. Now if souls were created apart from their bodies, as there would have been no material principle to distinguish them they would have differed in species like all separate substances which according to the philosophers differ specifically.

Third argument. We have already shown that man’s rational soul is not in substance distinct from the sensible and vegetal soul: moreover the vegetal and sensible soul ,cannot originate except from the body since they are acts of certain parts of the body. Wherefore neither can the rational soul, so far as is becoming to its nature, be created apart from the body; without prejudice, however, to the divine power.

Fourth argument. If the rational soul were created apart from the body, and in that state were possessed of the perfection of its natural being, no reasonable cause can be assigned for its union with the body. It cannot be said that it united itself to a body of its own accord, for clearly it is not in the soul’s power to abandon the body, which it could do were it united to the body by its own choice. Moreover, if souls were created wholly apart from bodies, it cannot be explained why the soul thus separated desired to be united to a body. Nor can it be said that after an interval of years the soul acquired a natural desire for union with a body, and that nature brought about this union: because things that happen at certain intervals of time, are referred to the celestial movement as their cause, since that movement is the measure of the spaces of time: and souls separate from bodies cannot be subject to the movements of heavenly bodies. Again it cannot be said that they were united to bodies by God, if they were previously created by him without bodies. For if it be alleged that he did so to perfect them, why did he create them at first without bodies? On the other hand if he did this to punish them for their sins so that the soul was thrust into a body as into a prison, as Origen asserted, it would follow that the format;.on, of natures composed of spiritual and corporal substances was accidental and not according to God’s original intention: and this is contrary to the statement of Genesis i, 31: God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good, whence we gather that it was through God’s goodness and not on account of the wickedness of any creature whatsoever that those good works were done.

Reply to the First Objection. Augustine in De Genesi ad literam and especially in his work De Origine Animae speaks as inquiring rather than asserting, as he himself declares.

Reply to the Second Objection. The universe in its beginning was perfect as regards the species of things, but not as regards all individuals: or as regards nature’s causes from which afterwards other things could be propagated, but not as regards all their effects. And though rational souls are not evolved by natural causes, the bodies into which as being connatural to them they are infused by God are produced by the action of nature.

Reply to the Third Objection. The object of the play is the play itself. But in the movement whereby God moves corporeal creatures the object in view is something beside the movement, namely the complete number of the elect, and when that is reached the movement, but not the substance, of the world will cease.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The multitude of souls belongs to the ultimate, not the initial essential perfection of the universe, since the entire transformation of mundane bodies is ordered somewhat to the multiplication of souls, which requires a multiplication of bodies as we have proved above.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The Platonists maintained that the soul’s nature is complete in itself, and that the soul is united to the body accidentally, wherefore they affirmed the transmigration of souls from one body to another. Especially were they led to hold this opinion because they held that souls are immortal and that generation never fails. Hence in order to avoid an infinite number of souls they imagined a kind of circle so that a soul after leaving a body was subsequently reunited to it. Macrobius expresses himself in accordance with this opinion which is false: and consequently on this point his authority cannot be admitted.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The Philosopher (De Anima ii, l.c.) does not state that the soul is the efficient cause of the body, but as he explains (ibid.) the cause whence the body’s movements originate, in so far as it is the principle of locomotion, growth and other like movements in the body.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The meaning of the authority quoted is that the irascible and concupiscible appetite is in the soul before its union with the body by a priority of nature, not of time: because the soul does not derive it from the body, but rather the body from the soul.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The soul is measured by time. in so far as it has being in union with the body: although considered as a spiritual substance it is measured by eviternity. But it does not follow that it began together with the angels to be measured by eviternity.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although there is no before and after in eviternity as regards the things it measures, nothing forbids one thing from having before another a part in eviternity.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the angel and Jhe soul agree in intellectual nature, they differ in that the angel is a nature complete in itself, so that he could be created in himself: whereas the soul through having the perfection of its nature by union with the body, required to be created, not in heaven but in that body whose perfection it is.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the soul is in itself more simple than any body, it is nevertheless the form and perfection of a body composed of elements, and to which a middle place is due: and together with this body it must needs be created here below.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The initial perfection of the soul regards its natural being, and consists in the soul’s union with the body: wherefore in its beginning it required to be created in the place occupied by the body.

But its ultimate perfection regards that which it has in common with other Intellectual substances, and this it will receive in heaven.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Souls that are created now are new creatures indeed in point of number, but are old in point of species: since they already existed in the works of the six days, in those who were like them in species, namely in the souls of our first parents.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It behoved the work of creation whereby the principles of nature were established to precede the work of propagation: but the creation of souls is not a work of that kind.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It belongs to justice to render what is due; wherefore it is contrary to justice to treat equal persons unequally if they are being paid what is due to them, but not if they are receiving gratis, as when souls are created. We may also reply that this diversity does not arise from a diversity of merit in souls, but from a diversity of dispositions in bodies: wherefore Plato said (Dial. de Legibus) that forms are infused according to the deserts of matter.

I Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although the soul depends on the body for its beginning, in order to begin its existence in the perfection of its nature, nevertheless it does not, depend on the body for its end, because it exists in the body as a subsistent being, so that when the body ceases to exist the soul remains in its own being, though not in the perfection of its nature that it receives from its union with the body.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. It is not the nature of the body but its corruption that is a load upon the soul, as the text itself declares.

Q. III: ARTICLE XI

IS THE SENSIBLE AND VEGETAL SOUL CREATED OR IS IT TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE SEMEN?

[SUM. TH. 1, Q. CXVIII, A. I.]

THE eleventh point of inquiry is whether the sensible soul be created or transmitted through the semen: and it would seem that it is created.

1. Things of the same kind come into being in the same manner. Now the sensible and vegetal soul in man is of the same species or kind as in dumb animals and plants: and in man it is created since it is substantially one with

the rational soul, which is created, as proved above (A. 9). Therefore the sensitive and vegetal souls in animals and plants are created.

2. It might be said that the sensible and vegetal souls in animals and plants are perfections, whereas in man they are dispositions.—On the contrary the more excellent a thing is the more excellent is the manner of its coming into being. Now it is more excellent to be a form and perfection than to be a disposition: and consequently if the sensible and vegetal souls in man, in whom they are mere dispositions, come into being by creation which is the most excellent way of coming into being, since the highest creatures originate in this manner, seemingly a fortiori are they created in plants and animals.

3. The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 3): “That which really exists, substance to wit, is not accidental to anything”. If, then, the sensible and vegetal souls are substantial forms in animals and plants, they cannot be accidental dispositions in man.

4. In living things the generative power is effective through the force residing in the semen. Now the sensible and vegetal souls are not actually in the semen. Since then nothing acts except inasmuch as it is in act, seemingly the sensible and vegetal souls cannot be produced by the force in the semen, and thus they are produced not by generation but by creation.

5. You will say perhaps that though the force in the semen is not actually the sensitive soul, yet it acts by virtue of the sensitive soul of the father from whom it issues.—On the contrary, that which acts by virtue of another acts as its instrument. Now an instrument moves not unless it be moved: while mover and moved must be together (Phys. vii, 2). Since then the force that is in the semen is not in contact with the sensible soul of the generator, seemingly it cannot act as its instrument or by virtue thereof.

6. An instrument is compared to the principal agent as a moved and commanded power to a moving and commanding power which is an appetitive and moving force. Now a power that is commanded and moved does not move anything if it be severed from the power that moves and commands it, as may be seen in the severed limbs of an animal. Neither then can the force in the separated semen act by virtue of the generator.

7. When an effect falls short of the perfection of its cause it cannot compass the action proper to that cause: since diversity of action argues diversity of nature. Now the force in the semen although an effect of the

sensible soul of the generator falls short of its perfection. Therefore, it cannot accomplish the action that belongs properly to the sensible soul, namely the production of another soul like to it in species.

8. Corruption of their subject leads to corruption of form and power. Now in the process of generation the semen, according to Avicenna, is corrupted and receives another form. Therefore the power that was in the semen is also corrupted, and consequently a sensible soul cannot be produced by it.

9. Lower natures function only by means of heat and other active and passive qualities. Now heat cannot give being to the sensible soul, because nothing acts outside its own species: nor can the effect surpass its cause. Therefore the sensible or vegetal soul cannot be brought into being by a natural agent, and consequently it is created.

10. A natural agent acts not by informing but by transmuting matter. Now transmutation of matter can only lead to an accidental form. Therefore a natural agent cannot produce a sensible and vegetal soul which is a substantial form.

11. Sensible and vegetal souls have a certain quiddity, and this quiddity is brought into being by something else: moreover it did not exist before being evolved except in so far as it was possible for matter to have it. Hence it must needs be produced by an agent that produces something out of no matter: and this is no other but God creating.

12. Animals produced from seed rank higher than those engendered from corrupt matter, for they are more perfect and reproduce their like. Now the souls of animals engendered from corrupt matter are created, since no agent of like species can be assigned by which they can be produced. Therefore it would seem that there is much more reason for the souls of animals produced from seed to be created.

13. But you will say that the souls of animals engendered from corrupt matter are produced by the power of a heavenly body, just as they are produced in other animals by the formative force in the semen —On the contrary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. lv), a living substance surpasses all inanimate substances. Now a heavenly body is not a living substance, for it is inanimate. Therefore a sensible soul being a principle of life cannot be produced by its power.

14. But you will say that a heavenly body can be the cause of a sensible soul, inasmuch as it acts by virtue of ,an intellectual substance that moves

it.—On the contrary that which is received into another, is received according to the mode of the recipient, and not according to its own mode. Wherefore if the power of an intellectual substance is received by an inanimate heavenly body, it will not be there as a vital force that can be a principle of life.

15. An intellectual substance is not only a living but also an intelligent being. If, then, by its power a heavenly body can be so moved by it as to give life it will be able likewise to give intelligence, so that the rational soul will be produced by the begetter: which is false.

16. If the sensible soul is produced by a natural agent and not by creation, it must be produced either by the body or by the soul. It is not produced by the body, because then a body would act beyond its species. Nor is it produced by the soul, because then either the whole soul of the father would be transmitted to his child, and thus the father would remain without a soul; or part of it would be transmitted, and thus the whole soul would not remain in the father: and either alternative is false. Therefore the sensible soul is not produced by the begetter but by the Creator.

17. The Commentator (De Anima iii) says that no cognitive power is evolved by the action of mixed elements. Now the sensible soul is a cognitive power. Therefore it is not evolved by the elements, and consequently not by the action of nature, inasmuch as here below no action of nature is independent of the action of the elements.

18. No form except it be subsistent can cause movement wherefore according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4) movement is not caused by the forms of elements but only by the generator and that which removes an obstacle. But the sensible soul is a cause of movement, since every animal is moved by its soul. Therefore the sensible soul is not a mere form but a self-subsistent substance. It is also clear that it is not composed of matter and form. Now all such substances are brought into being by creation and not otherwise. Therefore the sensible soul comes into being by creation.

19. You will say, perhaps, that the sensible soul does not by itself move the body, but that the animated body moves itself.—On the contrary the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that in everything which puts itself in motion there must be one part that is mover only, and another that is moved. Now the body cannot be mover only, because no body moves except it be moved. Wherefore the soul is mover only, so that the sensible soul will have

a function in which the body has no share, and consequently will be a subsistent substance.

20. But you will say that the sensible soul moves according to the command of the appetitive power, whose act is shared by both soul and body.—On the contrary in an animal there is not only a power commanding but also a power executing movement: and the function of this latter power cannot for the reasons already given be shared by both soul and body: and consequently the sensible soul must operate by itself, and therefore is a self-subsistent substance, and is brought into being by creation and not by natural generation.

On the contrary it is written (Gen. i, 20): Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having a living soul; so that seemingly the sensible souls of reptiles and of other animals are produced by the action of corporal elements.

Further, as the father's body is in relation to his soul, so is the son's body in relation to his soul. Therefore reciprocally as the son's body is to his father's, so is the son's soul to his father's. Now the son's body is evolved from his father's. Therefore the son's soul is evolved from his father's.

I answer that philosophers are divided in their opinions about the production of substantial forms. Some maintain that the natural agent only disposes the matter and that the form which is the ultimate perfection is produced by supernatural agency. This opinion is shown to be false chiefly on two counts. First, because seeing that the being of natural and corporal forms consists solely in their union with matter, it would seem that it belongs to the same agent to produce them and to transmute matter. Secondly, inasmuch as these forms do not surpass the power, order and faculty of the active principles of nature, there would seem to be no need to refer their origin to higher principles: wherefore the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 8) says that flesh and bone are engendered by the form that is in this or that flesh and bone: and in his opinion the natural agent not only disposes the matter, but educes the form into act, which is contrary to the above opinion.

Nevertheless we must exclude the rational soul from this generality of forms: because it is a subsistent substance, wherefore its being does not consist solely in its union with the body. Otherwise it could not exist apart from the body: the possibility of which is shown by its operation, which belongs to the soul in entire independence of the body. And the mode of its operation indicates the mode of its coming into existence: since that which is not per se does not operate per se. Again the intellectual nature transcends the entire order and faculty of material and corporal principles, since by its act of intelligence the intellect is able to rise above all corporal nature, which would not be the case if its nature were confined within the limits of corporal nature.

Now neither of these things can be said of the sensible and vegetal souls. That the being of these souls cannot consist otherwise than in union with the body is shown by their functions, which cannot be exercised without a bodily organ, wherefore absolutely speaking they have no being independently of the body. For this reason they cannot exist apart from the body, nor be brought into being except in so far as the body is brought into being. Consequently these souls, like the body, are produced by the natural agency of the generator. To maintain that they are created separately would appear to be in agreement with the opinion of those who held that these souls survived their bodies, whereas both these opinions are condemned in De Eccl. Dogmat. Again these souls do not transcend the order of natural causes. This will be made evident if we consider their operations. The order of actions follows the order of natures. Now we find some forms whose scope of action does not go further than what can be done by material principles: thus the forms of elements and of mixed bodies do not go beyond the action of heat and cold: wherefore they are wholly immersed in matter. On the other hand although the vegetal soul does not function except by means of the qualities aforesaid, its action attains to something that is beyond the scope of these qualities, to the production, namely, of flesh and bone, to the fixation of the term of growth and the like, so that it remains within the order of material principles; though not so much as the forms in question. But the sensible soul does not of necessity function by means of heat and cold, as evidenced by the functions of the sight, imagination and so forth: yet for the exercise of these functions, the organs require to be equipped with a certain degree of heat and cold, without which the aforesaid actions cannot be performed. Hence the sensible soul does not wholly transcend the order of material principles, although it is not lowered to their level as much as the above-mentioned forms. The rational soul, however, also exercises a function that surpasses that of heat and cold, nor does it exercise it by means of heat and cold, nor by means of a bodily organ: wherefore it alone transcends the order of natural principles, whereas the sensible soul in dumb animals and the vegetal soul in plants do not.

Reply to the First Objection. Although the sensible soul in man and dumb animals is of the same genus it does not belong to the same species: thus a man and a dumb animal are not of the same species: consequently the functions of the sensible soul are far more excellent in man than in dumb animals, as evidenced by the touch and the interior powers of apprehension. Nor is it true that things generically but not specifically the same must needs come into being in the same manner, as evidenced in the case of animals engendered from seed and from corrupt matter: since these agree I in genus but not in species.

Reply to the Second Objection. In man the sensible soul is said to be a disposition, not as though it differed in substance from the rational soul, and were a disposition thereto, but because the sensitive faculty in man is not distinct from the rational, save as one power from another. On the other hand in dumb animals the sensible soul differs from the rational soul in man as one substantial form from another. Nevertheless as the sensitive and vegetal powers in man flow from the essence of the soul, so do they in dumb animals and plants: but with this difference that in plants there flow only vegetal forces from the essence of the soul, in dumb animals not only vegetal but also sensitive powers whence their soul is denominated, while in man besides the above the intellectual powers flow whence he is denominated.

Reply to the Third Objection. The substance whence the sensitive faculty flows both in dumb animals and in man is the substantial form: while in both cases the power is an accident.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The sensible soul is not actually in the semen as to its own species but as in an active force: thus a house is actually in the mind of the builder as in an active force; and thus are bodily forms in the heavenly powers.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent so long as it retains the power communicated to it by the principal agent; thus the arrow is moved by the archer as long as it retains the force wherewith it was shot by him. Thus in heavy and light things that which is generated is moved by the generator as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby: so that the semen also is understood to be moved by the soul of the begetter, as long as it retains the force communicated by that soul, although it is in body separated from it. And the mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in the case of projectiles.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The soul's appetitive power has no command except on the body united to it, wherefore the separated part does not obey the behest of the soul's appetitive faculty. Nor is the semen moved by the begetter's soul through being commanded but through the transfusion of a kind of energy which remains in the semen even after its separation.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The sensible and vegetal souls are evolved from the potentiality of matter like other material forms for the production of which a power is needed that transforms matter. Now the force that is in the semen has this power although it falls short of the other functions of the soul. For just as by the function of the nutritive force the soul transforms matter so as to change it into the whole body, so by the aforesaid force in the semen matter is transformed so as to result in conception. Consequently nothing hinders this. same force from accomplishing the action of the sensitive soul and by virtue thereof.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This same force has its root in the animal spirit enclosed within the semen as its subject. Now according to Avicenna nearly all the semen is changed into animal spirit. Hence although the corpulent matter whence the embryo is formed undergoes many changes in the process of generation, the subject of that force is not destroyed.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. As heat acts as the instrument of the substantial form of fire, so there is nothing to prevent it from acting as the instrument of the sensible soul in bringing a sensible soul into being, though it does not do so by its own power.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Matter is transmuted hot only by an accidental but also by a substantial change: for both forms pre-exist in the potentiality of matter. Hence a natural agent which transmutes matter is the cause not only of the accidental but also of the substantial form.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The sensible soul since it is not subsistent is not a quiddity, as neither are other material forms, but is part of a quiddity; and its being consists in its forming one substance together with matter: wherefore to say that the sensible soul is produced means nothing more than that the matter is transmuted from potentiality to act.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The more imperfect a thing is the fewer the requisites for its making. Wherefore since animals engendered from corrupt matter are more imperfect than those engendered from seed, in the former the sole power of a heavenly body is sufficient, which power is operative also in the semen, although it does not suffice without the power of the soul for the production of animals from seed. For the power of a heavenly body remains in the lower bodies in so far as they are transmuted by it as by the first cause of alteration. For this reason the Philosopher says (De Animal.) that all these lower bodies are full of a soul's energy. But the heaven, though not alike in species to the animals engendered from corrupt matter, is like them in so far as an effect virtually persists in its efficient cause.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although the heavenly body is not a living thing, it acts by virtue of a living substance by whom it is moved, whether this be an angel or God. In the opinion of the Philosopher, however, heavenly bodies are animate and living.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The power of the heavenly body which causes movement remains in the heavenly body and its movement, not as a form having complete natural being, but after the manner of an intention, as power is in the craftsman's tool.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. As stated above, the rational soul surpasses the entire order of corporal principles, wherefore no body can act even instrumentally in its production.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The sensible soul is produced in the embryo neither by the action of the body, nor by a transmission of the soul, but by the action of the formative energy that is in the semen from the soul of the begetter, as stated above.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. It is denied that a cognitive faculty can be produced by the action of the elements forasmuch as the forces contained in the elements are unable to produce such a power in the same way as they suffice to cause hardness or softness. But it is not denied that they may be competent to co-operate in some way instrumentally.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The sensible soul causes movement by its appetite. Now the function of the sensitive appetite is seated not in the soul alone but in the composite; hence this power has a fixed organ. Therefore we cannot conclude that the sensible soul has an operation independent of the body.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. A body can cause a movement without being itself moved with the same kind of movement as that which it causes: thus the heavenly body which is moved locally causes alteration without itself being altered: and in like manner the organ of the appetitive power causes local movement, whereas itself is not moved but only altered somewhat locally. For the sensitive appetite does not function without alteration in the body, as evidenced in cases of anger and like passions.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The motive force that executes a movement does not of itself cause movement, but is rather a disposition of the thing movable whereby it has a natural aptness to be moved by this or that mover.

Q. III: ARTICLE XII

IS THE SENSIBLE OR VEGETAL SOUL IN THE SEMEN FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE LATTER'S SEPARATION?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. CXIX]

THE twelfth point of inquiry is whether the sensible or vegetal soul be in the semen as soon as this is separated

and seemingly the reply should be in the affirmative.

1. Gregory of Nyssa (De Creat. Hom. xxvi) says that “it is reprehensible to hold either opinion, whether of those who foolishly assert a previous existence of souls in a certain state and order becoming to them, or of those who maintain that our souls are created after our bodies.” Now if the soul was not in the semen from the beginning it must be created after the body. Therefore it was in the semen from the beginning.

2. If the sensitive like the rational soul was not in the semen from the beginning, the same rule will apply to the one as to the other. Now the rational soul comes by creation. Therefore the sensible soul is also created: whereas we have proved the contrary to be the case.

3. The Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4) that the force residing in the semen is like the son going forth from his father's house. Now the

son is of the same species as his father. Therefore the force in the semen is of the same species as the sensible soul whence it derives.

4. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that this same force is like art which, were it in matter, would perfect the work of the craftsman. Now the species of the work done is in the art. Therefore the species of the sensible soul produced through the semen is in the seminal force.

5. The sundering of the semen is natural, whereas the sundering of an annulose animal is unnatural. Now according to the Philosopher the soul is in the sundered part of an annulose animal. Much more then is it in the sundered semen.

6. The Philosopher says (ibid.) that in the generation of an animal the male provides the soul. Now nothing issues from the father except the semen. Therefore the soul is in the semen.

7. An accident is not transmitted unless its subject be transmitted. Now certain diseases are transmitted from parents to their children, such as leprosy, gout and so on. Consequently the subject of these diseases is transmitted: which subject cannot be soulless. Therefore the soul is in the semen from the beginning.

8. Hippocrates says that generation is prevented by the excision of a vein in the neighbourhood of the ear. Now this would not be, unless the semen as already actually existing were taken fro& the whole body. Since then the soul is in whatever is actually part of an animal, it would seem that the soul is in the semen from the beginning.

9. He also says that a certain horse on account of too frequent coition was found to have no brains. But this would not be unless the semen were taken from that which is an actual part of the body. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

10. The superfluous is not part of the substance of a thing. Accordingly if the semen is superfluous it will not belong to the substance of the generator: and thus the child that results from the semen will not be of his father’s substance: which is unreasonable. Therefore the semen is part of the generator’s substance, and consequently the soul is therein actually.

11. That which has no soul is inanimate. If, then, the semen has no soul it will be inanimate. Consequently an inanimate body will be transformed and become animate: and this would seem absurd. Therefore the soul is in the semen from the beginning.

On the contrary the Philosopher says (De Anim. ii, 2) that the semen and the fruit are potentially animate but actually inanimate.

Again, it would seem impossible for the semen to be animate from the first except in two ways, either by the transmission of the generator's entire soul into the semen, or by the transmission of part thereof. Now, apparently either of these alternatives is impossible, since from the former it would follow that the soul does not remain in the father, and from the latter, that not the entire soul remains. Therefore the soul is not in the semen from the beginning.

I answer that some held the opinion that the soul is in the semen from the moment of its separation, so that they would have the soul procreated by the soul at the same time as the body (of the semen) is cut off from the body, and the part severed from the body would at once become animate. But this opinion is apparently false: because as the Philosopher proves (De Gener. Anim. i, 18, 19) the semen is not severed from what was an actual part, but from the surplus remaining after the final digestion, and not definitely assimilated. Now no part of the body is actually perfected by the soul, unless it be finally assimilated; wherefore the semen before being separated was not perfected by the soul so as to be informed by it: but there was in the semen a certain energy in respect of which by the action of the soul it was altered and brought to the final disposition required for definite assimilation: so that after separation it was not animate but contained a certain energy derived from the soul. For this reason the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) says that in the semen there is a power that emanates from the soul. Moreover if the soul were in the semen from the beginning, it would be either there in its species as a soul actually; or not, but as a kind of energy to be transformed afterwards into a soul. The former is impossible, because since the soul is the act of an organic body, the body cannot receive the soul before it is in any way whatever provided with organs. Moreover it would follow that all that the soul does in the semen, is to dispose the matter, so that consequently there would be no generation, since generation does not follow but precedes the substantial form: —unless one were to say that besides the soul there is another substantial form in the body, the result being that the soul would not be substantially united to the body, seeing that it would be added to the body after the latter had already become an individual thing by reason of this other form. It would follow moreover that the generation of a living being would not be generation but a kind of separation, just as timber cut off from timber is actually timber.

The second alternative is also impossible, since in that case it would follow that the substantial form is not at once but by degrees acquired by matter, so that there would be movement in substance as there is in quantity and quality, which is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (Phys. v, 2). It would also follow that substantial forms are subject to increase and decrease, which is impossible. It follows then that there is not a soul in the semen, but a certain energy derived from the soul, which prepares the way for the soul's advent.

Reply to the First Objection. Before the advent of the soul and the force that prepares the way for the soul, the body of a living being, e.g. a lion or an olive, is not animate but is merely the seed of a body: for the seed is related to this force as the body is to the soul.

Reply to the Second Objection. There is this difference between the rational and other souls, that the rational soul is not evolved from the energy in the seed as the other souls are; although no soul is in the seed from the beginning.

Reply to the Third Objection. This force is likened to a son going forth from his father's house not in the point of specific completion, but with regard to the acquisition of some particular complement that is lacking. For a first perfection often takes on the likeness of a second perfection.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The likeness between this force'and art consists in this that as the thing made by the craftsman pre-exists in his art as in an active force, so before it is generated a living being pre-exists in the formative energy.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The reason why the dissection of an annulose animal is violent and unnatural is that the severed part was actually a part of the animal and perfected by its soul: so that by the dissection of the matter the soul remains in either part, which soul was actually one in the whole body, and potentially several. This is because in animals of this kind the whole body is composed of almost homogeneous parts, and their souls being of a lower degree of perfection than others, require but little diversity of organs.

Hence it is that when a part is severed it can be a subject of the soul, as having sufficient organs for the purpose: as happens in the case of other like bodies such as wood, stone, water and air. The Philosopher proves (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that the semen was not actually a part before its separation, for the reason that its separation would not have been natural, but a kind of corruption: wherefore it. does not follow that the soul remains in the semen after its separation.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The male is said to provide the soul inasmuch as the seed of the male contains a force that prepares the way for the soul.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The diseases mentioned in the objection are not transmitted together with the semen as though they were actually in the semen, but because their germs are in the semen, thus causing a certain indisposition therein.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Seeing that the semen is a surplus, it has certain outlets like other superfluities: and if these outlets be cut off, generation is prevented, and not because something of what was an actual part of the body has been destroyed.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. It is the same with the immoderate emission of the semen as with the immoderate discharge of other superfluities which destroys that which has already been converted into bodily tissue, a destruction that is violent and unnatural. But things that happen contrary to nature, must not be ascribed to the action of nature.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The semen is a surplus in the sense that although it is not actually a part of the father’s substance, it is potentially the whole thereof; and for this reason the child is said to be of his father’s substance.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the semen is not actually animate it is so virtually, whereupon it is not simply inanimate.

Q. III: ARTICLE XIII

CAN THAT WHICH PROCEEDS FROM ANOTHER BE ETERNAL?

THE thirteenth point of inquiry is whether that which is from another can be eternal: and seemingly it cannot.

1. Nothing that always is needs something that it may be Therefore nothing that is from another is always.

2. Nothing receives what it has already. Now that which always is always has being; and hence that which is always does not receive being. But that which is from another receives its beirg from that whence it is. Therefore nothing that is from another is always.

3. That which is already is not generated or made or in a way brought into being. Because whatsoever is in a state of becoming is not yet. Consequently whatsoever is generated, made or brought into being must at one time not have been. Now such is whatsoever is from another. Therefore whatsoever is from another at some time is not. But that which at some time is not, is not always. Therefore nothing that is from another, is eternal.

4. That which has not being save from another, considered in itself is not: and such a thing must needs not be at some time or other. Therefore whatsoever is from another must needs at some time have not been: and thus it is not eternal.

5. Every effect is posterior to its cause. Now that which is from another is the effect of that from which it is. Therefore it is posterior to that from which it is, and thus it cannot be eternal.

On the contrary according to Hilary (De Trin. xii) that which was born of the eternal Father has eternal being from his birth. Now the Son of God was born of the eternal Father. Therefore he has eternal being from his birth and consequently he is eternal.

I answer that since we affirm that the Son of God proceeds from the Father naturally, it follows that he must proceed from the Father in suchwise as to be co-eternal with him. This may be made clear as follows.

There is this difference between will and nature, that nature is determined to one thing both as regards what is produced by the power of nature and as regards producing or not producing: whereas the will is not determined in either respect. Thus a man is enabled by his will to do this or that, for instance a carpenter can make a bench or a box; and again make, and cease from making them: whereas fire cannot but heat if the subject-matter of its action be present nor can it produce in matter any effect other than its like. Consequently although it may be said of creatures which. proceed from God by his will, that he could make a creature of this or that fashion, and at this or that time, this cannot be said of the Son who proceeds naturally. For the Son proceeding naturally could not be of a fashion different from the nature of the Father. Nor could the Son be sooner or later in relation to the

Father’s nature. For it cannot be said that the divine nature was ever lacking in natural perfection, on the advent of which by virtue of the nature God’s Son was begotten: since the divine nature is simple and unchangeable. Nor can it be said that this begetting was delayed through lack or indisposition of matter, seeing that it is altogether void of change. It follows then that since the Father’s nature is eternal, that the Son was begotten of the Father from eternity and that he is coeternal with the Father.

The Arians through holding that the Son does not proceed naturally from the Father, said that like other things that proceed from God according to the decree of his will he was neither co-equal nor co-eternal with the Father. The difficulty of regarding the begetting of the Son as co-eternal with the Father arose from the fact that in our human observation of nature’s works one thing proceeds from another by movement: and a thing brought into being by movement begins to be at the beginning sooner than at the end of the movement. And since the beginning of a movement must needs in point of time precede the end on account of movement implying succession, and again since movement cannot have a beginning without a moving cause to produce it: it follows that the moving cause in the production of anything must precede in point of duration that which it produces. Consequently that which proceeds from another without movement is in point of duration co-existent with that whence it proceeds: such is the flash of the fire or the sun, because the flash of light proceeds from the body of light suddenly and not gradually, for illumination is not a movement but the term of a movement. It follows then that in God in whom there is absolutely no movement, the proceeding one is co-existent with him from whom he proceeds: and thus since the Father is eternal, the Son and the Holy Spirit who proceed from him are co-eternal with him.

Reply to the First Objection. If need denotes a defect or lack of what is needed, then that which is always, needs not another in order that it may exist. But if it denotes nothing more than the order of origin in reference to that whence a thing is, nothing hinders a thing that always is from needing another in order that it may exist, in so far as it has being not from itself but from another.

Reply to the Second Objection. Before receiving it the recipient has not what he receives, but he has it when he has received it: consequently if he received it from eternity he had it from eternity.

Reply to the Third Objection. This argument applies to generation in which there is movement, since that which is being moved to existence does not exist yet: which is true in the sense that what is being generated is not, whereas what has been generated, is. Consequently where there is no distinction between being generated and having been generated, it does not follow that what is generated is from another.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. It is true that what has its being from another is nothing considered in itself, if it be distinct from the being that it receives from another: but if it be the very same being that it receives from another, then considered in itself it cannot be nothing: for it is not possible to consider non-being in being itself, although it is possible to consider something besides being in that which is. Because that which is may have a mixed being: but being itself cannot, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). The first part of this distinction applies to creatures, the second to the Son of God.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The Son of God cannot be called an effect, because he is not made but begotten: since that is said to be made whose being is distinct from its maker. Wherefore neither can the Father be called the cause of the Son properly speaking, but his principle. Nor is it necessary for every cause to precede its effect in point of duration, but only by priority of nature, as in the case of the sun and its shining.

Q. III: ARTICLE XIV

IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THAT WHICH DIFFERS FROM GOD ESSENTIALLY TO HAVE ALWAYS EXISTED?

THE fourteenth point of inquiry is whether it is possible for that which differs essentially from God to have existed always: and it would seem possible.

1. The cause that produces the whole substance of a thing has not less power over its effect than the cause which produces the form alone. Now if the cause which produces the form alone be eternal it can produce it from eternity: thus the light produced and diffused by fire is co-existent with it and would be co-eternal if the fire were eternal, according to Augustine (De Trin.). Much more reason then is there why God who produces the whole substance of a thing, should be able to produce a co-eternal effect.

2. It will be said perhaps that this is impossible because it leads to the false position of equalling a creature to God in point of duration.—On the contrary, a duration that is not wholly simultaneous but successive cannot be equalled to one that is ‘wholly simultaneous. Now if the world had always been, its duration would not have been wholly simultaneous, since it would have been measured by time according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore a creature would not be equalled to God in point of duration.

3. As a divine person proceeds from God without movement, so does a creature. Now a divine person can be co-eternal with God from whom he proceeds. Therefore a creature can be likewise.

4. That which is unchangeable in its being can always do the same thing. Now God is unchangeable from eternity. Therefore from eternity he can do the same thing: and consequently if he produced a creature at any time he could do so from eternity.

5. You will say perhaps that the above argument applies to a natural but not to a voluntary agent.—On the contrary, God’s power is not nullified by his will. Now if he did not work by his will it would follow that he produced the creature from eternity, Therefore even given that he works by his will, it does not remove the possibility of his having created from eternity.

6. If God produced a creature at a certain time or instant, and if his power does not increase, he could have produced the creature at a previous time or instant, and for the same reason, before that, and so on indefinitely. Therefore he could have produced it from eternity.

7. God can do more than the human intellect can understand, wherefore it is said (Luke i, 37): No word shall be impossible with God. Now the Platonists understood God to have made something that had always existed. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 31): “Plato writing about the world and of the gods made by God in the world, asserts most explicitly that they came into existence and had a beginning; yet they will not have an end, and he states that through the all-powerful will of their maker they will live for ever. In explaining, however, what he meant by beginning, the Platonists affirm that he meant the beginning not of time but of their formation. For, say they, even as, if a foot had pressed on the dust from eternity, there would always have been the footprint underneath, which no one would doubt to have been made by the walker, so the world always existed and he

who made it always existed, and yet it was made.” Therefore God could make something that always was.

8. God can do in the creature whatever is not inconsistent with the notion of a created thing: else he were not omnipotent. Now it is not inconsistent with the notion of a created thing, considered as made, that it should always have existed, otherwise to say that creatures always existed would be the same as to say that they were not made, which is clearly false. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xi, 4; x, 31) distinguishes two opinions, one asserting that the world always existed in suchwise that it was not made by God; the other stating that the world always was and that nevertheless God made it. Therefore God can do this so that something made by him should always have been.

9. just as nature can produce its effect in an instant, so also can a voluntary agent if unhindered. Now God is a voluntary agent that cannot be hindered. Therefore the creatures brought into being by his will, could be produced from eternity, even as the Son who proceeds from the Father naturally.

1. On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 23): “Seeing that the nature of the Trinity is altogether uncommunicable, it is so exclusively eternal that nothing can be co-eternal with it.”

2. Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i): That which is brought into being from nothingness by its very nature is incapable of being co-eternal with one who has no beginning and is eternal. Now the creature is brought from nothingness into being. Therefore it cannot have been always.

3. Whatsoever is eternal is unchangeable. But a creature cannot be unchangeable, because were it left to itself it would fall back into nothingness. Therefore it cannot be eternal.

4. Nothing that depends on another is necessary, nor consequently eternal: since all that is eternal is necessary. Now that which is made depends on another. Therefore nothing made can be eternal.

5. If God could make a creature from eternity, he did; because according to the Philosopher, (Phys. iii, 4) in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is. Now it is against faith to say that creatures were made from eternity. Therefore it is also against faith to say that they could be.

6. A wise man’s will does not delay to do what he intends except for some reason. But no reason can be given why God made the world then and not before or from eternity, if it could be made from eternity. Therefore seemingly it could not.

7. If creatures were made, they were made either from nothing or from something. They were not made from something: since this would either be part of the divine essence, which is impossible, or it would be something else, and if this were not made, there would be something besides God not made by him, and this has been proved to be false: and if it were made from something else, we should either go on indefinitely, which is impossible, or we should come to something made from nothing. Now it is impossible for that which is made from nothing to have always been. Therefore it is impossible for a creature to ‘have been always.

8. It is essential to the eternal not to have a beginning, whereas it is essential to the notion of a creature to have a beginning. Therefore no creature can be eternal.

9. A creature is measured either by time or by eviternity. But time and eviternity differ from eternity. Therefore a creature cannot be eternal.

10. If a thing be created it must be possible to assign an instant wherein it was created. Now before that instant it did not exist. Therefore we must conclude that creatures, were not always.

I answer that according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a thing is said to be possible, sometimes in reference to a power, sometimes in reference to no power. If in reference to a power, this power may be active or passive. In reference to an active power, as when we say that to a builder it is possible to build; in reference to a passive power, as when we say that it is possible for the wood to burn. Sometimes, however, a thing is said to be possible, not in reference to a power, but either figuratively, as in geometry a line is said to be potentially rational—this we may pass over for the present; or absolutely, that is when the terms of a proposition are in no way mutually contradictory: whereas we have the impossible when they exclude each other. Thus it is said to be impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the same time, not in reference to an agent or patient, but because it is impossible in itself, as being self-contradictory. If, then, we consider the statement that something substantially distinct from God has always existed, it cannot be described as impossible in itself as though it contained a contradiction in the terms: because to be from another is not inconsistent with being from eternity, as we have proved above; except when the one proceeds from the other by movement, of which there can be no question in the procession of things from God. And when we add substantially distinct, this again involves no contradiction absolutely speaking with the fact of having always been.

If we refer the possibility to an active power, then God does not lack the power to produce from eternity an essence distinct from himself.

On the other hand if we refer the possibility to a passive power, then given the truth of the Catholic faith, it cannot be said that something substantially distinct from God can proceed from him and yet have always existed. For the Catholic faith supposes that all things other than God at some time existed not. Now as it is impossible for a thing never to have existed, if it be granted that at some time it has been, so is it impossible for a thing to have been always, if it be granted that at some time it did not exist. Wherefore some say that this is possible on the part of God creating, but not on the part of an essence proceeding from God because our faith teaches the contrary.

Reply to the First Objection. This argument considers the question from the point of view of the power of the maker, but not of the thing made, which is supposed not to have existed at some time.

Reply to the Second Objection. Even if creatures had always existed they would not be equalled to God simply but in so far as they imitate him. There is nothing unreasonable in this, and so the objection has but little force.

Reply to the Third Objection. In the divine person there is nothing that is supposed not to have existed at some time, as there is in every essence other than God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. This argument considers the power of the maker, which indeed is not diminished by his will, except in so far as it was by the decree of the divine will that creatures did not always exist.

This suffices for the reply to the Fifth Objection.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. If it be stated that creatures existed before any given time, the position of faith is safeguarded because it is stated that nothing except God existed always: but it is not safeguarded if we say that creatures have always existed: hence the comparison fails. It must also be noted that the argument is lacking in form. For God is able to make any creature better, yet he cannot make a creature of infinite goodness: because infinite goodness is incompatible with the notion of being created, whereas determinate goodness is not, however great it be.

It must also be observed that when we say that God could have made the world sooner than he did, if this priority be referred to the power of the maker, the statement is undoubtedly true, because he had from eternity the power to do this; and eternity precedes the time of the creation. if, however, it be referred to the being of the thing made, as though before the instant wherein the world was created there were a real time wherein the world could have been made, it is evident, that then the statement is false, since before the world there was no movement and consequently no time. Yet it is possible to imagine a time anterior to the world, just as we can imagine altitudes and dimensions outside the heavens: and forasmuch we can say that God could make the heavens higher, and that he could have created them sooner, since he could have made time longer and altitude higher.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is true that the Platonists understood this: but they were not guided by faith, since it was unknown to them.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument proves nothing more than that to be made and to be always are not. incompatible considered in themselves: so that it considers that which is possible absolutely.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers possibility in reference to an active power.

Whereas the arguments on the contrary side would seem to conclude that it is impossible from every point of view, we must now proceed to answer them.

Solution of the First Argument. According to Boethius (De Consol. v), even if the world had always existed it would not be co-eternal with God, because its duration would not be wholly simultaneous, which is essential to eternity. For eternity is the “perfect possession of endless life without succession” (ibid.). Now the succession of time results from movement according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, ii). Hence whatsoever is subject to change, even if it be always, cannot be eternal: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 23) that no creature can be co-eternal with the unchangeable nature of the Trinity.

Solution of the Second Argument. Damascene speaks on the supposition of the Catholic faith: this is clear from his saying: “That which is brought into being from nothingness, etc.”

Solution of the Third Argument. Changeableness by its very nature excludes eternity but not indefinite duration.

Solution of the Fourth Argument. It is true that what depends on another can never exist unless it be upheld by that whence it proceeds: yet if the latter always existed the former also existed always.

Solution of the Fifth Argument. From the fact that God was able to do a thing it does not follow that he did it, because he acts by his will and not by natural necessity. And where it is said that in eternal things there is no difference between what can be and what is, this refers to passive and not to active power: because a passive power that is not perfected by its act is a principle of corruption and therefore repugnant to eternity: whereas it casts no reflection on an active power that its effect be not actually in existence, especially if the active power be a voluntary cause: because the effect is not the perfection of an active power in the same way as the form is of a passive power.

Solution of the Sixth Argument. Our intelligence is unable to fathom the production of the first creatures, because it cannot grasp that Art which is the sole reason why the creatures in question were such as they were. Hence just as no man can explain why the heavens are so great and not greater, so neither can we tell why the world was not made sooner, although both came within the scope of the divine power.

Solution of the Seventh Argument. The first creatures were produced not from something but from nothing. Not, however, from the mode of their production but from the teaching of faith do we gather that they were non-existent before they were brought into being. For the statement that a creatikre is made from nothing may mean according to Anselm (Monolog. viii) that it is not made from something, so that the negation includes the preposition and is not included by it, and thus denies the order implied by the preposition; while the preposition itself does not imply order to nothing. I If on the other hand order to nothing is affirmed, and the preposition includes the negation, it still does not follow that at some time the creature was non-existent. For one might say with Avicenna that nonexistence preceded the existence of a thing not by duration but by nature: since, to wit, were it left to itself it would have no existence, and it has existence solely from another: because that which a thing is competent to have of itself is naturally prior to that which it is not adapted to have save from another.

Solution of the Eighth Argument. It belongs to the notion of eternity to have no beginning of duration: while it belongs to the notion of a created thing to have a beginning of its origin but not of duration: unless we take creation according to the teaching of faith.

Solution of the Ninth Argument. Eviternity and time differ from eternity, not only in the point of a principle of duration but also in the point of succession. Time in itself implies succession; while succession is annexed to eviternity, inasmuch as eviternal substances are in a way changeable, though they are unchangeable as measured by eviternity. On the other hand eternity has no succession nor is succession annexed to it.

Solution of the Tenth Argument. God's work whereby he brings things into being must not be taken as the work of a craftsman who makes a box and then leaves it: because God continues to give being, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12; viii, 12). Hence it does not follow that we must assign an instant wherein things were brought into being, before which they existed not, except on account of the teaching of faith.

Q. III: ARTICLE XV

DID THINGS PROCEED FROM GOD OF NATURAL NECESSITY OR BY THE DECREE OF HIS WILL?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIX, A. 4]

THE fifteenth point of inquiry is whether things proceeded from God of natural necessity or by a decree of his will: and it would seem that they proceeded of natural necessity.

1. Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv) says: "As our sun neither "by reason nor by Pre-election, but by its very being enlightens all things that can participate its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of its goodness upon all things according to their capacity." Seeing then that the sun enlightens without reason or pre-election, it does so of natural

necessity. Therefore God also produces creatures by communicating his goodness to them of natural necessity.

2. Every perfection of a lower nature derives from the perfection of the divine nature. Now it belongs to the perfection of a lower nature by its own power to produce its like in some effect. A fortiori therefore God naturally and not voluntarily communicates the likeness of his goodness to creatures.

3. Every agent produces its like; wherefore the effect proceeds from its active cause in so far as it bears a likeness thereto. Now the creature bears a likeness to God as regards those things which belong to God by nature, namely being, goodness, unity and so forth; and not as regards things willed or understood, as the product of his art bears a likeness to the craftsman as regards the art-given form and not as regards his nature, for which reason he produces it voluntarily and not naturally. Therefore things proceed from God by virtue of his nature and not by his will.

4. It may be replied that the divine will communicates the likeness of the natural attributes.—On the contrary, a likeness of nature cannot be communicated otherwise than by the power of nature. Now the power of nature is nowhere subject to the will: wherefore in God, since the Father begets the Son naturally he does not beget him by his will: and in man the forces of the vegetal soul which are called natural forces are not subject to his will. Therefore it is no’tpossible for a likeness of the divine attributes to be communicated to creatures by the divine will.

5. Augustine says (De Doct. Christ. i, 32) that “we exist because God is good,” so that seemingly God’s goodness is the cause of the production of creatures. Now goodness is natural to God. Therefore the emanation of things from God is natural.

6. In God nature and will are the same: and consequently if he produces things willingly it would seem that he produces them naturally.

7. Natural necessity results from the fact that nature invariably acts in the same way, unless prevented. Now God is more unchangeable than the lower nature. Therefore God produces his effects more of necessity than the lower nature.

8. God’s operation is his essence: and his essence is natural to him. Therefore whatever he does he does naturally.

9. Again, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 2) the end is what is willed, the means are what we choose. But God has no end since he is

infinite. Therefore he acts not willingly but rather of natural necessity.

10. God operates inasmuch as he is good, according to Augustine (De Doct. Christ. i, 32). Now he is the necessary good. Therefore he works of necessity.

11. Whatsoever exists is either contingent or necessary. Now a thing is necessary in three ways, by coercion, by supposition and absolutely. It cannot be said that in God anything is potential or contingent: since this argues mutability according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xi, 5), because what is contingent may happen not to be. Again, nothing. in God is necessary by coercion because in him nothing is violent or contrary to nature (Metaph. v, 5). Nor is ~there anything necessary by suppositeion, because this depends on certain things being presupposed, and God is not dependent on anything. It remains then that all in God is absolutely necessary, and it would seem consequently that he produced things necessarily.

12. It is written (2 Tim. ii, 13) that God continueth faithful, he cannot deny himself. Now seeing that he is his own goodness he would deny himself were he to deny his own goodness. But he would deny his own goodness were he not to pour it out by communicating it to others, for this is proper to goodness. Consequently God cannot but produce creatures by communicating his own goodness to them: and therefore he produces them of necessity: because that which cannot but be is convertible with that which is necessary (Perihermen. ii, 3).

13. According to Augustine the Father in begetting the Son expressed himself by his word. Now Anselm says (Monolog. lii) that by the same word the Father expresses himself and the creature. Seeing then that the Father begot the Son naturally and not by the command of his will, it would seem that thus also did he produce creatures, since in God to speak and to make do not differ according to the words of Scripture (Ps. xxxi, 1, 9): He spake and they were made.

14. Every voluntary agent wills of necessity his ultimate end; thus man of necessity wills to be happy. Now the ultimate end of the divine will is the communication of his goodness: since to this end did he make creatures that he might communicate his goodness to them. Therefore God wills this of necessity, and thus of necessity does he produce them.

15. just as God is good by his essence so is he necessary by his essence. Now because God is good by his essence there is nothing in God but what is good. Therefore in like manner there is nothing in him but what is necessary: and consequently he produces things necessarily.

16. God's will is determined to one thing, namely the good. Now nature through being determined to one works necessarily. Therefore God's will produces creatures necessarily.

17. The Father by virtue of his nature is the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit, as Hilary says (De Synod.). Now the same nature that is in the Father and Son is also in the Holy Spirit. Therefore likewise the Holy Spirit is a principle by his nature. But he is not a principle except of creatures. Therefore creatures proceed from God naturally.

18. The effect proceeds from its cause in action: wherefore a cause is not related to its effect except as related to its action or operation. Now the relation of God's action or operation to himself is natural, since God's action is his essence. Therefore the relation of God to his effect is also natural so that he produces it naturally.

19. By that which is essentially good nothing is made but what is good and well made. Therefore by that which is essentially necessary, nothing is made but what is necessary and necessarily. made. Now such is God. Therefore all things proceed from him of necessity.

20. Since what exists of itself is prior to that which exists by another, it follows that the first agent acts by his essence. Now his essence and his nature are the same. Therefore he acts by his nature: and thus creatures proceed from him naturally.

On the contrary Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of God gave all things their substance: and (ibid.): Such are creatures as God willed them to be." Therefore God produced creatures by his will and not by natural necessity.

Moreover Augustine addressing God says (Confess. xii, 7): "Lord, thou didst make two things, one nigh to thyself," the angel, to wit, "the other nigh to nothing," namely matter. "Yet neither is of thy nature, since neither is what thou art." Now the Son proceeds from the Father naturally inasmuch as he has the same nature as the Father, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Therefore the creature does not proceed naturally from God.

I answer that without any doubt we must hold that God by the decree of his will and by no natural necessity brought creatures into being. This may for the present be made clear by four arguments.

First argument. The universe must needs be directed to an end, otherwise all things in the universe would befall by chance. Unless one were to say that the first creatures were not directed to an end but produced by natural necessity; and that subsequent creatures are directed to an end. This was the opinion of Democritus who maintained that the heavenly bodies were produced by chance, but lower bodies by determinate causes; and is refuted (Phys. ii, 4) for the reason that more exalted beings cannot be less ordinate than those of lower dignity. We must therefore hold that in producing creatures God had some end in view. Now both will and nature act for an end, but not in the same way. Nature has no knowledge of the purpose for which it acts, nor does it view it in the fight of an end, nor is it aware of the connection between the means and the end; so that it cannot propose an end to itself, nor move order or direct itself towards the end, whereas this is within the competency of a voluntary agent that can understand the end and all those other things. Wherefore the voluntary agent acts for the end in suchwise that he proposes the end to himself, and to a certain extent moves himself towards the end by directing his actions thereto. On the other hand nature tends to its end as a thing that is moved and directed by an intelligent and voluntary agent, even as an arrow flies towards a certain mark through the aim of the archer: and in this sense philosophers say that the work of nature is the work of an intelligence. Now that which is by another is always preceded by that which is of itself. Consequently the first director to an end must direct by his will: and thus God brought creatures into being by his will and not naturally. Nor may it be objected that the Son was naturally begotten by the Father, and yet his birth preceded creation: because the Son proceeds not as one ordained to an end, but as the end of all.

Second argument. Nature is determined to one thing: and since every agent produces its like, it follows that nature must tend to produce a likeness that is determinately in one subject. Now seeing that equality is caused by unity, whereas inequality is caused by multitude which is manifold (wherefore equality exists between things in only one way, but inequalit~ in many various degrees), nature always produces its equal unless it be hindered by a defect either in the active force or in the recipient or patient. But God is not hindered by a defect in the patient, since he needs not matter: nor is his power defective, but infinite. Wherefore nothing proceeds from him naturally but what is his equal, namely the Son. On the other hand creatures, being unequal, are produced not naturally but voluntarily, for there are many degrees of inequality. Nor may it be said that the divine power is determined to one only, seeing that it is infinite. Wherefore since the power of God extends to the production of various degrees of inequality among creatures, it was by the decree of his. will and not of natural necessity that he fashioned this or that creature in this or that particular degree.

Third argument. Since every agent in some way produces its like, the effect must in some way pre-exist in its cause. Now whatsoever is contained in another is therein according to the mode of the container: wherefore as God himself is intelligence it follows that creatures pre-exist in him intelligibly, in which sense it is written (Jo. i, 3): That which was made was life in him. But that which is in an intelligence does not proceed therefrom except by means of the will for the will is the executor of the intellect, and the intelligible moves the will. Consequently creatures must have proceeded from God by his will.

Fourth argument. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text 16) action is twofold: one that remains in the agent, of which it is the perfection and act; such as to understand, to will and the like: the other issues from the agent into an extrinsic patient which it perfects and actuates, such as to heat, to move and the like. Now God’s action cannot be taken as belonging to this latter kind of action, because his action is his very essence, and consequently does not issue outside him. Hence it must be taken as belonging to the former kind of action which is only to be found in one possessed of intelligence and will, or also of the faculty of sense, which latter again does not apply to God, because sensation, though it does not issue into an external object, is caused by the action of an external object. Therefore whatsoever God does outside himself he does it as understanding and willing it. Nor does this argument belie the naturalness of the Son’s begetting, the term of which was not something outside the divine essence. We must therefore hold that all creatures proceeded from God by his will and not of natural necessity.

Reply to the First Objection. The comparison of Dionysius must be understood to refer to the universality of diffusion: as the sun sheds its rays on all bodies without differentiating one from another, so likewise is it with God’s goodness: but it does not apply to the absence of will.

Reply to the Second Objection. It is owing to the perfection of the divine nature that by virtue thereof its likeness is communicated to creatures: yet this communication was made not of natural necessity but voluntarily.

This suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nature is not subject to will from within: but in externals nothing prevents nature from being subject to the will. Thus in the local movements of animals nature in their muscles and sinews is subject to the command of their appetite. Consequently it is not unreasonable if by virtue of the divine nature creatures be brought into existence according to the behest of the divine will.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The good is the proper object of the will: hence the goodness of God as willed and loved by him is the cause of things through his will.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although will, and nature are identically the same in God, they differ logically, in so far as they express respect to creatures in different ways: thus nature denotes a respect to some one thing determinately, whereas will does not.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is owing not merely to the unchangeableness of nature that it produces a particular effect of necessity, but to its being determined to one: this does not apply to the divine will although it is supremely unchangeable.

Reply to the Eighth, Objection. Although God’s operation belongs to him naturally seeing that it is his very nature or essence, the created effect follows the operation of his nature which, in our way of understanding, is considered as the principle of his will, even as the effect that is heating follows according to the mode of the heat.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although God is infinite he is the end of all things. He is not infinite as though he were deprived of finiteness in the same way as there may be an infinite in quantity, although quantity by nature is finite, for in this way an end is neither finite nor infinite. But he is infinite in a negative sense, because be is altogether without an end.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. It is true that God operates inasmuch as he is good, and that goodness is in him of necessity, but it does not follow that he works of necessity. Because his goodness works through his will in so far as it is the object or end of his will. Now the will is not inclined of necessity to the means, although it is necessitated in respect of the last end.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. As regards the things which are in God himself, nothing can be described as potential: all is naturally and absolutely necessary. But in respect of creatures we can call certain things potential not in regard to passive potentiality, but in regard to an active power which is not limited to one effect.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Were God to deny his own goodness by doing something contrary thereto or wherein his goodness were not expressed, we should arrive at the impossible conclusion that he denied himself. But this would not follow if he were not to communicate his goodness to anything since it would suffer nothing by not being communicated.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although the Word of God. proceeds from the Father naturally, it does not follow that creatures proceed from God naturally. The Father by his words speaks his creatures according as they ate in him: and in him they are as producible not necessarily but voluntarily.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The last end is not the communication of the divine goodness, but that goodness itself for love of which God wills to communicate it. He works for his goodness' sake not as desiring to have what he has not, but as wishing to communicate what he has: for he acts not from desire, but from love, of the end.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. As in God there is naught but good, so is there naught but what is necessary. But it does not follow that whatsoever proceeds from him does so of necessity.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. As stated above God's will inclines naturally to his goodness: so that he cannot will but what is becoming to him, namely the good. Yet he is not determined to this or that good: wherefore it does not follow that the goods which exist proceed from him necessarily.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Though the same nature is in the Father, Son and Holy Spirit it has not the same mode of existence in each one of the three, and when I say mode of existence I mean in respect of the relations. In the Father nature is considered as not received from another: in the Son, as received from another. Consequently we must not infer that whatsoever belongs to the Father by virtue of his nature, belongs also to the Son or the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The effect follows from the action according to the mode of the principle of the action: wherefore since the divine will which has no necessary connection with creatures is considered, in our way of thinking, to be the principle of the divine action in regard to creatures, it does not follow that the creature proceeds from God by natural necessity, although the action itself is God's, essence or nature.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The creature is like God as regards general conditions, but not as to the mode of participation: thus being is in God otherwise than in creatures, and so too is goodness. Hence although from the first good all goods derive, and all beings from the first being, yet all do not derive supreme goodness from the sovereign good, nor from the necessary being do all things proceed of necessity.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. God's will is his essence: wherefore his working by his will does not prevent his working by his essence. God's will is not an intention in addition to his essence, but is his very essence.

Q. III: ARTICLE XVI

CAN A MULTITUDE OF THINGS PROCEED FROM ONE FIRST THING?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XLVII, A. I; C.G. II, XXXIX-XLV: III, XCVII]

THE Sixteenth point of inquiry is whether many things can proceed from one: and seemingly the answer should be in the negative.

1. As God is essentially good and consequently the sovereign good, so is he essentially and supremely one. Now inasmuch as he is good nothing can proceed from him but what is good. Therefore inasmuch as he is one, only one thing can proceed from him.

2. As good is convertible with being, so also is one. Now the creature is like God in that it has being, as stated above. Therefore as it is like God in goodness, so must it be like him in unity, and thus from the one God one creature should proceed.

3. As good and evil taken in general are mutually opposed by way of privation, although they are contraries considered as differentiating habits; so one and many are opposed to each other by way of privation (Metaph. x, 3). Now by no means do we say that wickedness proceeds from God, but from a defect in second causes. Neither therefore should we say that God is the cause of multitude.

4. Cause and effect should be proportionate to each ,other, forasmuch as single things cause single things and universal things cause universal, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 3). Now God is the most universal of all causes. Therefore his proper effect is the most universal of all, namely being. Now it is not because things have being that there is not multitude, since diversity and distinction are the cause of multitude, and all things agree in point of being. Therefore multitude is not from God, but from second causes whence each thing derives its particular condition of being, whereby it is differentiated from others.

5. Every effect has its proper cause. But one cannot be proper to many. Therefore one cannot be the cause of many.

6. You will say perhaps that this is true of natural but not of voluntary causes.—On the contrary the craftsman is the cause of his work by his will. But that work comes from the craftsman in accordance with the proper form thereof existing in the mind of the craftsman. Therefore even in voluntary effects each one requires its proper cause.

7. There ought to be conformity between cause and effect. God is altogether one and simple. Therefore there should be neither multitude nor composition in the creature which is his effect.

8. One effect cannot proceed immediately from a diversity of agents. Now as the cause is appropriate to the effect, so is the effect to its cause. Therefore from one same cause there cannot proceed many immediate effects: and thus the same conclusion follows.

9. In God it is the same power that begets, spirates and creates. Now the power to beget terminates in one only, and likewise the power to spirate: because in the Trinity there can be but one Son and one Holy Spirit. Therefore the creative power also terminates in one only.

10. But you will ‘say that the universe of creatures is somewhat one with regard to order.—On the contrary the effect should be like its cause. But the unity of God is not a unity of order, since in God there is no before and after

nor higher and lower. Consequently unity of order does not suffice to make it possible that many things be made by one God.

11. One simple thing has but one action. Now one action has but one effect. Therefore one simple thing can produce but one effect.

12. The creature proceeds from God not only as the effect from its effective cause, but also as the exemplate from its exemplar. Now one exemplar has but one proper exemplate. Therefore only one creature can proceed from God.

13. God is cause of things by his intellect. Now an agent by intellect acts by the form in his intellect. Wherefore since there is but one form in the divine intellect, it would seem that only one creature can proceed from it.

14. But you will say that although the form in the divine intellect is one in substance since it is the divine essence, we may nevertheless consider therein a certain plurality by reason of various respects to various creatures, so that there is a logical plurality.—On the contrary these several respects are either in the divine intellect or solely in our mind. In the first case it will follow that there is plurality and not supreme simplicity in the divine intellect. In the second case, it will follow that God does not produce a variety of creatures except by means of our reason’ and consequently that he produces a variety of creatures through various respects to creatures, which respects exist only in our reason. This is what we are endeavouring to show, namely that multitude does not proceed from God immediately.

15. God brings things into being through his intellect apprehending them. Now in him there is but one apprehension: since his act of intelligence is his essence which is one. Therefore he produces but one creature.

16. That which has no being save in the mind is not a creature of God, for such things would seem to be vanity, a’s chimeras and the like. Now multitude is only in the reason, because it signifies an abstraction that does not exist in reality. Therefore God is not the cause of multitude.

17. According to Plato (Tim.) the best produces the best. Now the best can only be one. Since then God is best of all things, only one thing can be produced by him.

18. Every agent that acts for an end produces an effect as, near to the end as possible. Now God in producing the creature ordains it to an end. Therefore he makes it as near to the end as possible. But this can be done only in one way. Therefore he produces only one creature.

19. It is unjust to deal unequally to various recipients, unless these be already unequal either in merit or in some other diversity of condition. Now no diversity precedes God’s work, otherwise he would not be the first cause of all. Therefore when he first created things he did not bestow unequal gifts on his creatures. But diversity and multitude of creatures are in respect of their receiving more or less of the divine gifts (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore when God first created things he did not produce a multitude.

20. God communicates his goodness to creatures according to, their capacity. Now the nature of higher creatures was capable of such perfection and dignity as to be the causes of lower creatures: because the more perfect things can act on those which are less perfect and communicate their perfection to them. Therefore seemingly God produced the lower creatures by means of the higher, and thus he did not produce immediately more than one creature, whatever it be, higher than the others.

21. The more immaterial a form the more active it is, as being more remote from potentiality: since a thing acts forasmuch as it is in act and not as in potentiality. Now in an angel’s mind there are forms of things and these forms are more immaterial than the forms that are in natural things. Now seeing that natural forms are causes of like forms, it would seem that a fortiori the forms in an angel’s mind produce like forms of natural things. But diversity and consequently multitude of things result from the form. Therefore seemingly multitude did not proceed from God except by means of the higher creatures.

22. Whatsoever God makes is one thing. Therefore only one thing proceeds from him: and thus he is not the cause of multitude.

23. God understands but one thing, because he understands nothing outside himself (Metaph. xii, 9). Now he is cause of things by his intellect. Therefore he causes but one thing.

24. Anselm says (Monolog. viii) that in God the creature is the creative essence. Now the creative essence is but one. Consequently in God the creature is one only. But the creature is produced by God according to the same way as it pre-existed in God. Therefore only one creature proceeds from God and consequently multitude is not from him.

On the contrary it is written (Wis. xi, 21): Lord, thou hast disposed all things in number, weight and measure. But there is no number without multitude. Therefore multitude is from God.

Again, God’s power surpasses that of any other thing. Now one point can be the beginning of many lines. Thus then can God, though he is one, be the beginning of many creatures.

Again, that which is proper to unity as such is most appropriate to that which is supremely one. Now it is proper to unity to be the principle of multitude. Therefore it is most appropriate to God who is supremely one to be the cause of multitude.

Again, Boethius says (Arith.) that God brought things into being according to a numerical exemplar. Now the exemplate is like the exemplar. Therefore he produced things in multitude and number.

Again it is written (PS. ciii, 24): Thou hast done all things in wisdom. Now seeing that it belongs to a wise man to set things in order, it follows that there must be order and consequently multitude in all the things done by wisdom. Therefore the multitude of things is from God.

I answer that the impossibility of many things proceeding from one immediate and proper principle would seem to arise from the cause being determined to its effect, so that it would seem due and necessary that from such and such a cause such and such an effect should proceed. Now there are four causes two of which, the material and the effective cause to wit, precede the effect as to intrinsic being; while the end precedes it if not in being yet in intention; and the form precedes it in neither way considered as form, since the effect has its being by the form and consequently its being is simultaneous with that of the effect. But in so far as the form is the end it precedes the effect in the intention of the agent. And although the form is the end of the operation, being the end that terminates the operation of the agent, nevertheless every end is not a form. For there is in the intention an end that is not the end of the operation, as in the case of a house. The form of the house is the end terminating the operation of the builder: but his intention does not terminate there but in a further end, namely a dwelling-place, so that the end of the operation is the form of a house, that of the intention, a dwelling-place. Accordingly the necessity of such and such effects coming into being cannot arise from the form as such, since thus it is simultaneous with the effect, but it must arise either from the power of the effective cause, or from the matter, or from the end whether of the intention or of the operation. Now it cannot be said that the effect of God’s action is necessitated by matter: because seeing that he is the author. of all being, nothing in any way whatsoever having being is presupposed to his action, so that one be bound to say that owing to the disposition of matter his action must produce this or that effect. Likewise neither can it arise from the effective power: because seeing that his active power is infinite, it is not determined to one effect save to that which were equal to him, and this cannot be competent to any effect. Wherefore if it be necessary that he produce an effect beneath himself, his power considered in itself is not determined to any particular distant degree, so that it be necessary for such and such an effect to be produced by his active power. Likewise neither can it arise from the end of the intention. For this end is the divine goodness, which gains nothing from the production of the effects.

Again it cannot be wholly represented by those effects nor be wholly communicated to them, so that one be able to say that it were necessary for an effect of God to be such and such in order wholly to’participate of God’s goodness, since it is possible for an effect to participate thereof in many ways, so that no effect is rendered necessary by the end. Necessity arises from the end when the intention of the end cannot be fulfilled, either not at all or not conveniently, without this or that thing. It remains therefore that necessity in God’s works cannot arise except from the form which is the end of operation. For seeing that the form is not infinite it has determined principles without which it cannot exiAt, and a determined mode of existence; thus we might say, for instance, supposing that God intends to make a man, that it is necessary and due that he give him a rational soul and an organic body, without which there is no such thing as a man. It is the same with the universe. That God wished to make the universe such as it,is, was not made necessary or due, either by the end or by the power of the effective cause, or by the potentiality of matter, as we have proved. But given that he wished to make the universe such as it is, it was necesssary that he should produce such and such creatures whence such and such a form of universe would arise. And seeing that the perfection of the universe requires both diversity and multitude in things, inasmuch as it cannot be found in one thing on account of the latter’s remoteness from the perfection of the first good, it was necessary on the supposition of that intended form that God should produce many and diverse creatures; some simple, some compound, some corruptible, some incorruptible.

Through failing to note this some philosophers wandered from the truth. Because they did not understand that God is the author of the universe, some of them maintained that matter was self-existent and that matter itself necessitated diversity among the things evolved therefrom. Some of them would make things to differ according to the rarity or density of matter, like the early physicists who could not see further than the material cause.—Others traced this diversity to the action of some effective cause, whereby different effects were produced according to a difference of matter. Thus Anaxagoras held that a divine intelligence produced a diversity of things by freeing them from the commixture of matter. Thus also Empedocles explained by attraction and repulsion the various differences and affinities arising from diversity of matter. That these were in error is shown for two reasons. First, because they did not hold that all being flows from the first and supreme being, as we proved above (A. 5). Secondly, because according to them it would follow that the order and distinction of the parts of the universe arose from chance, since they were necessitated by the requirements of matter.—Others, like Avicenna and his school (Metaph. ix, 4), ascribed the plurality and diversity of things to a necessity arising from the effective cause. He said that the first being by understanding himself produced one effect only, namely the first intelligence which of necessity fell short of the simplicity of the first being, since potentiality began to be united to act, and that which receives being from another is not its own being, but a potentiality as it were in respect thereof. And so from this first intelligence, in as far as it understands the first being, another and lower intelligence proceeds, and inasmuch as it understands its own potentiality it produced the heavenly body which it moves, and inasmuch as it understands its act it produces the soul of the first heaven. Thus through a number of intermediate causes there arose in consequence diversity among things. This opinion also cannot stand. First, because it would have the divine power limited to one effect which is the first intelligence. Secondly, because it makes other substances besides God to be the creators of other creatures, and we have shown this to be impossible (A. 4). Moreover this opinion like those already mentioned would imply that the beauty arising from the order of the universe is the result of chance, since it ascribes the diversity of things not to the intention of an end, but to the determination of active causes in respect of their effects.

Others, like Plato and his followers, erred regarding the necessity imposed by the final cause. For he said that the universe as to its actual conformation was the necessary outcome of the divine goodness as understood and loved by God, so that the sovereign good produced the very good. This indeed may be true if we look only at what is and not at what might be. This universe consisting of the things that actually exist is very good, and it is due to the sovereign goodness of God that it is very good. Nevertheless God's goodness is not so tied to this universe that it could not have produced a better or one that is less good.

Others again erred through failing to note the necessity resulting from the formal cause, but only that which is due to the divine goodness. Thus the Manicheans considering that God is suptemely good, thought that only those creatures proceed from God that are the best of creatures, those, namely, which are spiritual and incorruptible: and they ascribed corporeal and corruptible beings to another principle. The error of Origen although contrary to this comes from the same source (Peri Archon i, 7, 8). He considered God as supremely good and just, and for this reason he believed that at first he created only the best, i.e. rational creatures all equal to one another: and that these by their free-will acted in various ways well or ill, and he maintained that from this resulted the various degrees of things in the universe. He held that those rational creatures which turned to God were promoted to the ranks of the angels, and to the various orders according to the degree of their merits: while on the other hand the remaining rational creatures who by their free-will sinned, were in his opinion cast into the ranks of the lower world and bound to bodies: some which sinned less grievously were bound to the sun, moon and stars, some to human bodies, some transformed into demons. Both of these errors apparently disregard the order of the universe and confine their observation to its individual parts. For the very order of the universe is sufficient proof that from: one principle, without any previous difference of merits, originated various degrees among creatures for the perfection of the universe, which by its multiplicity and variety of creatures reproduces that which in the divine goodness pre-existed without composition or distinction. Even so the perfection of a house or of the human body requires diversity of parts, since neither would be complete if all its parts were of the same condition, for instance, if every part of the human body were an eye, since the functions of the other parts would be wanting: or if every part of the house were the roof, the house would be imperfect and fail of its purpose which is to shelter from rain and disaster. Accordingly we must conclude that the multitude and diversity of creatures proceeded from one principle, not on account of a necessity imposed by matter, not on account of a limitation in power, not on account of goodness or a necessity imposed by goodness, but from the order of wisdom, in order that the perfection of the universe might be realised in the diversity of creatures.

Reply to the First Objection. Inasmuch as God is one, that which he produced is one, not only because each thing is one in itself, but because all things taken together are in a sense one perfect thing, and this kind of unity requires diversity of parts, as we have already shown.

Reply to the Second Objection. The creature is like God in unity, inasmuch as each creature is one in itself, and all together are one by unity of order, as stated above.

Reply to the Third Objection. Wickedness consists entirely in privation of being, whereas multitude results from being. Even the difference between one being and another is a being. Wherefore since God is not the cause of a thing tending to non-being, but is the author of all being, he is not the principle of evil, but he is the cause of multitude. It must be observed, however, that unity is twofold. There is a unity that is convertible with being: it adds nothing to being save that it excludes division, and it excludes multitude—in so far as multitude results from division—not extrinsic multitude that is composed of unities as parts, but intrinsic multitude that is opposed to unity: since when we say that a thing is one we do not deny the existence of others extrinsic thereto with which it constitutes a multitude, but we deny its division into many. The other kind of unity is the principle of number, and to the idea of being it adds that of measure: it is this kind of unity that multitude excludes, since number results from the division of continuity. Yet multitude does not entirely exclude unity, since when a whole is divided the parts still remain undivided: but it does exclude unity of the Whole: whereas evil considered in itself excludes the good, since in no way does it constitute a good nor is it constituted thereby.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The relation of being to the things comprised under the head of being is not the same as that of animal or any other genus to its species. The species adds to the genus: as man adds to animal a difference that is not included in the essence of the genus: thus animal denotes merely the sensitive nature which does not contain rationality; whereas the things comprised under being add nothing extraneous to the notion of being. Wherefore it does not follow that the cause of an animal as such, is the cause of the rational nature as such. But it follows that the cause of being as such must be the cause of all the various kinds of being, and consequently of the entire multitude of beings.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Appropriateness of cause to effect regards the likeness of the effect to its cause. Now the likeness of the creature to God consists in its being a faithful reproduction of what previously existed in God's intellect and will: even as the products of the craftsman's art are like him in so far as they express his artistic ideas and witness to his intention of producing them. For just as the natural agent acts by its form, so does the craftsman act by his intellect and will. Accordingly God is the proper cause of each creature, inasmuch as he understands each creature and wills it to be. The statement that the same thing cannot be proper to many is true of appropriateness of equality and does not apply to the case in point.

The Reply to the Sixth Objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although there is a certain likeness between the creature and God, it is not one of equality. Hence it does not follow that because unity in God is altogether free of multitude and composition therefore the same unity is to be found in the creature.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Although an effect cannot surpass its cause, a cause can surpass its effect: and consequently several effects can proceed from one cause although one effect cannot proceed immediately from several causes.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although in God the generative and the creative power is really the same, they do not connote the same respect: the generative power connotes relationship to that which proceeds by nature, and which therefore can be but one: whereas the creative power implies relationship to something that proceeds by the will, and which consequently need not be one.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. As we have already indicated, although the creature imitates the unity of God, it does not follow that its unity is of the same kind as God's.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although God’s action is one and simple, for it is his essence: we must not infer that it has only one effect, but that it has many: because from God’s action effects proceed according to the order of his wisdom and the decree o f his will.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. When the exemplate is a perfect copy of the exemplar, there can be but one copy of one exemplar, except accidentally through the copies differing in matter. Creatures, however, are not perfect representations of their exemplar: wherefore they can imitate it in various ways so that there can be many exemplates. There is but one perfect mode of imitation, for which reason there can be but one Son who is the perfect image of the Father.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although the form in the divine intellect is but one really, it is many logically by reason of its manifold respect to creatures, inasmuch as creatures are perceived to represent that form in many ways.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. These various respects to creatures are not only in our intellect but also in God’s. And yet there are not in the divine intellect different ideas by which God understands; for he understands by one only which is his essence, but they are many as understood by him. Even as we understand that the creature can imitate God in many ways, so also does God understand this: and consequently he understands the various respects of creatures to him.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Even as God understands all things by one, so does he understand them all by one act of apprehension: because the act of the intelligence must needs be one or many according to the unity or plurality of the principle of understanding.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although multitude apart from many things is only in the mind, multitude in many things is an objective reality: even so animal in general is only in the mind, but the animal nature is in individuals. A Consequently both multitude and animalnature must be traced to God as their cause.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The universe as created by God is the best possible in respect of the things that actually exist; but not in respect of the things that God is able to create.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. This argument would hold if that which is done in order to obtain an end can gain the end wholly and perfectly by way of equality: and this is not the case in the question at issue.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. This argument which is used by Origen (Peri Archon, 7, 8) is not very convincing. There is no injustice in dealing unequally with equal persons except when one is giving them their due: and this cannot be said of the first creation of things. That which is given out of pure liberality may be given more or less liberally as the giver wills and as his wisdom dictates.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Although other creatures are beneath the angels, their production requires infinite power in their maker, inasmuch as they are brought into being by creation, since they are not made from preexistent matter. Consequently we must hold that all creatures as not being made from pre-existent matter are created by God immediately.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Since being is the term and proper effect of creation, it is impossible that the things created by God receive their forms from the angels, because all being derives from a form.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. Whatsoever God makes is indeed one in itself, yet this unity, as stated above, does not exclude all manner of multitude, since that multitude whereof unity is a part remains.

Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. When the Philosopher says that God understands nothing outside himself he does not mean that God does not understand things that are outside him, but that even those things that are outside God are seen by him not outside but in him, because he knows all things in his essence.

Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. The creature is said to be in God in two ways. First as in its governing cause and preserver of its being: and in this sense the creature is understood as already existing apart from the Creator, so that we may say that the creature derives its being from the Creator. For the creature is not understood to be preserved in being except as already having being in its proper nature, in respect of which being the creature is distinguished from God. Wherefore in this sense the creature as existing in God is not the creative essence. Secondly the creature is said to be in God inasmuch as it exists virtually in its effective cause or as the thing known in the knower. In this sense the creature, as existing in God, is the very essence of God according to Jo. i, 3: That which was made, in him was life. Nevertheless although the creature as existing in God thus, is the divine essence, there is not, in this sense, only one creature in God but many:

because the divine essence is an adequate medium for knowing different creatures, and a sufficient power to produce them.

Q. III: ARTICLE XVII

HAS THE WORLD ALWAYS EXISTED?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIIX, A. I: C.G. II, XXXIV, XXXVII]

THE seventeenth point of inquiry is whether the world has always existed: and it would seem that it has.

1. A thing never fails in that which is proper to it. Now according to Dionysius (De Coel. Hier. iv) it is proper to the divine goodness to communicate itself to the things that exist; and this was done by the creation. Since then the divine goodness always was it would seem that it has always brought creatures into being, and that consequently the world has always existed.

2. God does not refuse a creature that which it is capable of having according to its nature. Now there are creatures the nature of which is capable of having been always, for instance, the heavens. Therefore seemingly it was granted to the heavens to have been always. But given that the heavens existed we must allow that other creatures existed as the Philosopher proves (De Coelo ii, 3). Therefore it would appear that the world has always existed. The minor premiss is proved as follows. That which is incorruptible is capable of having always been, since were it capable of being only for a certain fixed time, it would not exist for ever, and therefore would not be incorruptible. Now the heavens are incorruptible: and consequently are capable of being always.

3. It will be replied that the heavens are not absolutely incorruptible, since they would fall away into nothingness if God did not preserve them in being.—On the contrary we must not conclude that a statement is possibly or contingently true from the fact that it would be false if the consequence were false: thus it is necessarily true that man is an animal, and yet it would be false if the consequence were false, namely that man is a substance. Consequently we must not conclude that the heavens are corruptible from the fact that they would cease to exist on the supposition that God withdrew his sustaining power from creatures.

4. As Avicenna proves (Metaph. ix, 4) every effect in comparison with its cause is necessary, since if given the cause the effect does not follow of necessity, even when the cause is present it will be possible for the effect to follow or not. Now that which is possible does not become actual except through something actual: so that besides the aforesaid cause we shall need another cause to make the effect emerge from the potentiality whereby it was possible for it to be or not, to be on the presupposition of its cause. Whence it follows that given a sufficient cause the effect follows of necessity. Now God is the sufficient cause of the world. Therefore as God always was, so also was the world.

5. Whatsoever preceded time has always been: for eviternity did not precede time but began with time. Now the world was before time, since it was created in the first instant of time, which clearly was before time: for it is written (Gen. i, i): In the beginning God created heaven and earth, where a gloss notes, “that is in the beginning of time.” Therefore the world existed from eternity.

6. That which remains unchanged always produces the same effect, unless it be hindered. Now God is always the same according to Psalm ci, 28: Thou art always the selfsame. Since then God cannot be hindered in his action on account of the infinity of his power, it would seem that he always produces the same effect: so that as he produced the world at some time, it would seem that he always produced it from eternity.

7. As man necessarily wills his own happiness so God necessarily wills his own goodness and whatsoever pertains to it. Now it belongs to God’s goodness to bring creatures into being. Therefore God wills this of necessity, and seemingly willed to do so from eternity, even as from eternity he willed his own goodness.

8. It may be said that it belongs to God’s goodness to bring creatures into being, but not to do so from eternity.—On the contrary it is more bountiful to give quickly than tardily: and the bounty of God’s goodness is infinite. Therefore seemingly he gave being to creatures from eternity.

9. Augustine says (Confess. vii, 4): “In thee to be able is to will, and to will is to do.” Now God from eternity willed to create the, world: otherwise he would have changed, if the will to create came to him anew. Since then there is no inability in God, it would seem that he created the world from eternity.

10. If the world was not always, before it existed it was either possible for it to exist or it was impossible. If it was not possible, it was impossible and consequently it was necessary for it not to be: and thus it would never have been brought into being. And if it was possible for it to be, there was some potentiality in respect thereof, and consequently a subject or matter, since potentiality demands a subject. But if there was matter there was also form, since matter cannot be entirely devoid of form. Therefore there was a body composed of matter and form, and consequently the entire universe.

11. Whatsoever becomes actual after being potential, is brought from potentiality to actuality. Hence if before the world actually existed it was possible for it to exist, we must infer that the world was brought from potentiality to actuality, and consequently that matter preceded and was eternal; so that we come to the same conclusion as before..

12. An agent that begins to act anew is moved from potentiality to actuality; and this cannot be said of God who is utterly immovable. Therefore it would seem that he does not begin anew to act, but that he created the world from eternity.

13. If a voluntary agent begins to do what he already willed but has not done yet, we must suppose that something has occurred to induce him to do it now, which did not induce him before, but stirs him to action as it were. But it cannot be said that before the world existed there was something besides God to offer him a fresh inducement to act. Since then he purposed from eternity to create the world (otherwise something new would have occurred to his will) it would seem that he made the world from eternity.

14. Further, nothing besides God’s goodness moves the divine will to act. Now the divine goodness is always the same. Therefore God’s will also is always bent on the production of creatures, and thus he produced them from eternity.

15. That which is always in its beginning and always in its end, never begins and never ceases, because a thing is after it has begun and before it has ceased. Now time is always in its beginning and end, because time is nothing but an instant which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future.—Hence time never begins nor ends but is always: and consequently movement also and things that are subject to movement, in fact, the whole world: since there is no time without movement, nor movement without movables, nor movable things apart from the world.

16. It will be said perhaps that the first instant of time is not the end of the past nor the last beginning of the future.—On the contrary the now of time is always considered as flowing, wherein it differs from the now of eternity: and that which flows passes from one thing to another. Consequently every now passes from a previous to a following now, and there cannot be a first or last now.

17. Movement follows that which can be moved, and time follows movement. Now the first movable being circular has neither beginning nor end, for it is not possible to indicate the actual beginning or end of a circle. Therefore neither time nor movement has a beginning, and the same conclusion follows as above.

18. It will be said that although a circular body has no beginning of its magnitude, it has a beginning of its duration.—On the contrary duration of movement follows the measure of magnitude, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, ii), magnitude, motion and time are mutually proportionate. Hence if there be no beginning of the magnitude of a circular body neither will there be a beginning of the magnitude of movement or of time, and consequently there will be no beginning of their duration, since their duration, especially that of time, is their magnitude.

19. God is the cause of things by his knowledge: and knowledge connotes relation to the thing knowable. Since then relatives are by nature simultaneous, and God’s knowledge is eternal, it would seem that things were produced by him from eternity.

20. God precedes the world either in the order of nature only, or by duration. If only in the order of nature, as a cause precedes its synchronous effect, it would seem that creatures must have existed, like God, from eternity. And if he precede the world in duration, there must have been a duration prior to that of the world, so as to constitute a before and after in duration; and this implies time. Therefore the world was preceded by time and consequently by movement and movable things: and we come to the same conclusion as before.

21. Augustine (De Trin. v, 16) says: “I dare not assert that God was not Lord from eternity.” Now so long as he was Lord he had creatures for his subjects. Therefore we must not assert that creatures are not from eternity.

22. God was able to create the world before he created it, else he were impotent. Likewise he knew that he could, else he were ignorant. And

apparently he willed, else he were envious. Therefore it would seem that he did not wait to begin creating creatures.

23. Whatsoever is finite ‘can be communicated to a creature. Now eternity is something finite: else nothing could extend beyond it, and yet it is written (Exod. xv, 18): The Lord shall reign for eternity and beyond. Therefore one would infer that a creature is capable of being eternal, and that it was becoming to the divine goodness to produce creatures from eternity.

24. Whatsoever has a beginning has a measure of its duration. Now time cannot have a measure of its duration: for it cannot be measured by eternity, since then it would have been always: nor by eviternity, since then it would last for ever: nor by time, since nothing is its own measure. Therefore time had no beginning, and consequently neither had movable things, nor the world.

25. If time had a beginning, this was either in time or in an instant. It did not begin in an instant, for in an instant there is not yet time: nor did it begin in time, for in that case no time would precede the term of time, since before a thing begins to exist it is nothing. Consequently time had no beginning and the same conclusion follows as before.

26. God from eternity was the cause of things: otherwise we should have to say that he was at first their potential and afterwards their actual cause; so that there would be something already in existence to reduce him from potentiality to act: and this is impossible. Now nothing is a cause unless it has an effect. Therefore the world was created by God from eternity.

27. Truth and being are convertible: and many truths are eternal, such as that man is not an ass, and that the world was to be, and many similar truths. Therefore it would seem that many beings are from eternity, and not God alone.

28. But it may be said that all these are true by the first truth which is God.—On the contrary, the truth of this proposition, The world will exist, differs from the truth of this proposition, Man is not an ass, because granted, though it is impossible, that the one is false, the other remains true. But the first truth cannot alter. Therefore these propositions are not true by the first truth.

29. According to the Philosopher (Categor. 5.) a statement is true or false according as the thing is so or not. if, then, many propositions are true from

eternity, it would seem that the things signified by them have existed from eternity.

30. With God to speak and to make are the same according to Psalm xxxii, 9, He spake and they were made. Now God spoke from eternity, otherwise the Son who is the Father's Word would not be co-eternal with the Father. Therefore God's work is eternal and the world was made from eternity.

On the contrary it is said (Prov. viii, 24 seqq.) in the words of divine Wisdom: The depths were not as yet and I was already conceived, neither had the fountains of waters as yet sprung out. The mountains with their huge bulk had not as yet been established: before the hills was I brought forth. He had not yet made the earth, nor the rivers, nor the poles of the world. Therefore the poles of the world, the rivers and the earth were not always.

Again according to Priscian, the younger in point of time are keener in point of intelligence. But keenness of intelligence is not infinite: therefore the time during which it increases is not infinite and consequently neither is the world.

Again it is written (Job xxiv, 19): With inundation the ground by little and little is washed away. Now the earth is not infinite: so that if time were infinite the earth would by now have been wholly washed away: and this is clearly false.

Again it is evident that God naturally preceded the world as a cause precedes its effect. But in God duration and nature are the same, therefore God preceded the world by duration, and thus the world was not always.

I answer that we must not hesitate to hold that, as the Catholic faith teaches, the world has not always existed. This cannot be disproved by any physical demonstration.

In order to make this clear we must observe that as we have shown in a previous question in God's works we cannot assign a necessity on the part of the material cause, nor on the part of the active power of the agent, nor on the part of the ultimate end, but only on the part of the form which is the end of the work, since if the form be presupposed it is requisite that things be such as to be fit for such and such a form. Hence we must speak of the production of this or that particular creature otherwise than of the production of the whole universe by God. When we speak of the production of a particular creature, it is possible to gather the reason why it is such and such, from some other creature, or at least from the order of the universe to which every creature is ordained, as a part to the form of the whole. But when we speak of the production of the whole universe, we cannot point to any other creature as being the reason why the universe is such and such. Wherefore since neither on the part of the divine power which is infinite, nor of the divine goodness which stands not in need of creatures, can a reason be assigned for the particular disposition of the universe this reason must be found in the mere will of the Creator: so that if it be asked why the heavens are of such and such a size, no other reason can be given except that their maker willed it so. For this reason too, as Rabbi Moses says, Holy Writ exhorts us to consider the heavenly bodies, since we gather from their disposition how all things are subject to the will and providence of a Creator. For no reason can be given for the distance of this star from that one, or for any other dispositions that we observe in the heavens, save the ordinance of divine wisdom: wherefore it is written (Isa. xl, 26): Lift up your eyes on high and see who hath created these things. Nor does it matter if someone say that the distance in question results from the nature of the heavens or heavenly bodies, even as a certain quantity is appointed to every natural thing, because just as the divine power is not confined to this rather than to that quantity, so is it not confined to a nature that requires one particular quantity rather than to a nature that requires another quantity. Consequently it makes no difference whether it be a question of quantity or of nature: although we grant that the nature of the heavens is not indifferent to any quantity in particular, and that there is no inherent possibility of the heavens having any other quantity than that which they actually have. But this cannot be said of time or the duration of time. For time like place is extraneous to things: wherefore although there is no possibility in the heavens with respect to another quantity or inherent accident, yet is there a possibility with regard to place and position, since the heavens have a local movement; and with regard to time, since time ever succeeds time, even as there is succession in movement and ubiety: wherefore it cannot be said that neither time nor ubiety result from the heavens’ nature, as was the case with quantity. It is clear then that the appointment of a fixed quantity of duration for the universe depends on the mere will of God, even as the appointment of a fixed quantity of dimension. Consequently we cannot come to a necessary conclusion about the duration of the universe, so as to prove demonstratively that the world has always existed.

Some, however, through failing to observe that the universe was made by God, were unable to avoid erring in this question about the beginning of the world. Thus the earliest physicists recognised no effective cause and maintained that uncreated matter was the cause of all things, and thus they were compelled to hold that matter had always existed. For seeing that nothing brings itself from non-existence into being, that which begins to exist must be caused by something else. These asserted—either that the world was always in continual existence, because they recognised none but natural agents which being confined to one mode of action, of necessity always produced the same effects; —or that the world had an interrupted existence; thus Democritus held the world, or rather worlds, to be in a continual state of formation and destruction on account of the chance movements of atoms.

Since, however, it seemed unreasonable that all the congruities and utilities to be found in nature should be due to chance, whereas they obtain either always or in the majority of cases: and seeing that nevertheless this would follow if there were no other cause but matter, and especially that there are some effects which cannot be sufficiently explained by the causality of matter, others like Anaxagoras posited an intellect as active cause, or like Empedocles, attraction and repulsion. Yet they did not hold these to be the active causes of the universe, but likened them to other particular agents whose activity consists in the transformation of matter from one thing into another. Consequently they were compelled to assert that matter is eternal, through not having a cause of its existence: but that the world had a beginning, because every effect of a cause which acts by, movement follows its cause in duration, since such effect does not exist before the end of the movement, which end is preceded by the initial movement, co-existent with which is the agent that initiates the movement.

Aristotle (Phys. viii, i), observing that if it be said that the efficient cause of the world acted by movement, it would follow that one would have to proceed to infinity, since every movement must be preceded by another movement, maintained that the world has always existed. He argued not from the position that the world was made by God, but from the position that an agent which begins to act must be moved: thus considering the particular and not the universal cause. Wherefore in order to prove the eternity of the world he based his arguments on movement and the immobility of the prime mover: and hence if we consider them carefully, his arguments seem to be those of one who is arguing against a position, so that at the commencement of Phys. viii, having introduced the question of the eternity of movement, he begins by citing the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, his object being to argue against them. Those who came after Aristotle, however, considering that the whole universe was produced by God through his will and not by movement, endeavoured to prove the eternity of the world from the fact that the will does not wait to do what it intends, except on account of some new occurrence or change, even though we be compelled to imagine it in the succession of time, in that one wills to do this or that now and not sooner. Yet these fell into the same error as those mentioned before. For they considered the first agent as being like an agent which exercises its activity in time and yet acts through its will. Such an agent is not the cause of time but presupposes it: whereas God is cause even of time, since time is included in the universality of the things made by God: and therefore seeing that we are considering the production of all being by God, the fact that he made it then and not sooner does not enter the question. For this considers time as though it preceded the making instead of being conditional on the making. But if we consider the making of the universality of creatures among which time itself is included, we must consider why such and such a measure was affixed to time, and not why the making was at such and such a time. The fixing of the measure to time depends on the mere will of God, who willed that the world should not have always been, but should have a beginning, even as he willed the heavens to be neither greater nor smaller than they are.

Reply to the First Objection. It is proper to (divine) goodness to bring things into being through the will of which it is the object. Consequently it does not follow that because the divine goodness always existed therefore thin brought into being always existed, produced according to the disposition but that they were of the divine will.

Reply to the Second Objection. The heavenly body being incorruptible is capable of always being: but no capability whether of being or of operating regards the past, but only the present or the future: since no man exercises a power over his past actions, for he cannot cause to have been done that which he has not done: but he has the power to do it now or in the future. Consequently the capability in the heavens of being always regards not the past but the future.

Reply to the Third Objection. The fact that the heavens would return into nothingness if God ceased to uphold them does not make them corruptible simply. Seeing, however, that the preservation of the creature by God depends on God's unchangeableness, not on natural necessity (in which case it would be absolutely necessary), and is necessary solely on the supposition that God wills and has unchangeably decreed that preservation, it may be granted that the heavens are corruptible in a restricted sense, in so far as their incorruptibility is dependent on God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Every effect carries a necessary relationship to its effective cause whether natural or voluntary. But we have already proved (A. 15) that God is the cause of the world not by a necessity of his nature, but by his will: wherefore it was necessary for the divine ‘ effect to follow not whenever the divine nature existed, but when the divine will decreed that it should follow, and in the very manner that he willed.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. A thing may precede time in two ways. First, before the whole of time, and before anything belonging to time. In this way the world did not precede time, because the instant wherein the world began, though not time, is something belonging to time, not indeed a part but the starting-point of time. In another way a. thing is said to precede time because it is before the completion of time: and time is not complete before the instant that is preceded by another instant: in this sense the world preceded time. It does not follow from this that the world is eternal, since the instant of time that precedes time is not eternal.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Since every agent produces its like, an effect must follow from an effectively operating cause, so as to bear a likeness to its cause. Now as that which proceeds from a cause that acts by its nature bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like the form of its cause, so that which proceeds from a voluntary agent bears a likeness thereto in that it has a form like its cause, for asmuchas the effect is the reproduction of something in accordance with the will, as instanced in the work produced by the craftsman. But the will appoints not only the form of the effect but also the place, time and all other conditions thereof: so that the effect of the will follows when the will decides and not as soon as the will is. For the likeness of the effect to the will is not in the point of being but in the point of disposal by the will. Consequently, though the will remain ever the same, it does not follow that its effect should flow from it from eternity.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. God necessarily wills his own goodness and whatsoever is necessarily connected with his goodness. Such is not the production of creatures, and consequently the objection fails.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Since God made creatures in order to manifest himself, it was more fitting and more to the purpose that they should be made in suchwise as to manifest him in a more becoming manner and more clearly. Now he is more clearly manifested by creatures if they be not from eternity, because this brings into greater evidence the fact that he brought them into being and that he does not need them, and that they are entirely dependent on his will.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. God's will to create the world was eternal; not that the world should exist from eternity, but that it should be made when he actually did make it.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Before the world was it was possible for the world to be made, not by a pdssive potentiality, but by the active power of the agent.—Or we may reply that it was possible not by reason of some power, but because the terms of the proposition, The world exists are not in contradiction to each other. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 12) a thing may be said to be possible in this way without reference to a potentiality.

This suffices for the reply to the Eleventh Objection.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. This argument stands in the case of an agent that begins a new action, whereas God's action is eternal, since it is his substance. He is said, however, to begin to act in reference to a new effect that results from his eternal action according to the disposition of his will which is considered as the principle of his action in relation to the effect. For the effect follows from the action according to the condition of the form that is the principle of that action: even so a thing is heated by the action of the fire according to the degree of heat in the fire.

Reply to the Thirteenth, Objection. This argument considers the agent that produces its effect in time without being the cause of time: this does not apply to God as stated above (A. 5).

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. If movement be taken strictly God's will is not moved but it is said to be moved, metaphorically speaking, by its object: and thus God's goodness alone moves his will, according to the saying of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22) that God moves himself independently of place and time. Nor does it follow that creatures were produced whenever God's goodness existed, because creatures proceed from God not as though they were due or necessary to his goodness, since it does not need them, nor does he gain anything by them, but by his mere will.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Since the first succession of time was caused by movement (Phys. iv, 12) it is true that every instant is a beginning and an end of time, even as it is true that every moved thing is in a beginning and in an end of movement: so that if we suppose that movement neither always existed nor will always exist, there will be no need to say that every instant is a beginning and an end of time; for there will be an instant which will be only a beginning, and an instant which will be only an end. Hence this objection argues in a circle and consequently does not prove: but it serves the purpose of Aristotle who employs it to attack a position as we have said above. In fact, many arguments serve to rebut an opinion on account of the statements advanced by its holders, and yet in themselves .are not absolute demonstrations.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. An instant is indeed always considered as flowing, yet not always as flowing from one thing to another, but sometimes as only flowing from something, for example, the last instant of time, sometimes as flowing only towards something, as the first instant.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. This argument does not prove that movement has always existed, but that circular movement can be always, because from mathematical principles we cannot with certainty draw conclusions about movement: hence Aristotle (Phys. viii, 8) does not infer the eternity of a movement from its being circular, but from the fact that a movement is eternal he shows that it must be circular, because no other movement can be eternal.

This suffices for the reply to the Eighteenth Objection.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Things, knowable are related to our knowledge as God's knowledge is to creatures: because God's knowledge is the cause of creatures and things knowable are the cause of our knowledge.

Wherefore even as things are knowable even without our knowing them (De Categor. 7), so is it possible for God to have knowledge without the knowable thing having existence.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. God does indeed precede the world by duration, not of time but of eternity, since God's existence is not measured by time. Nor was there real time before the world, but only imaginary; thus now we can imagine an infinite space of time running with eternity and preceding the beginning of time.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. If the relation of lordship be regarded as consequent to the action whereby God actually governs creatures, then God was not Lord from eternity. But if it be regarded as consequent to the power of governing, then it belongs to God from eternity. Nor does it follow that creatures must have existed from eternity except potentially.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. This is Augustine's argument (Contra Maxim. ii, 7, 8, 23) to prove that the Son is co-eternal and co-equal with the Father. But this argument is not applicable to the world, because as the Son's nature is the same as the Father's it requires to be co-eternal and co-equal with the Father's, otherwise were this denied him it would savour of envy. The nature of the creature, however, does not require this: and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. The Greek text reads: The Lord shall reign for age upon age and beyond: and Origen, as quoted by a gloss, says that by age we are to understand the space of one generation the limits of which are known to us: by age upon age we are to understand an immense space of time which has an end, yet unknown to us: and that God's reign will extend even beyond this. Hence 'eternity' here means the duration of time. Anselm, however (Proslog. xix, xx), takes eternity to mean eviternity, which has no end: and yet God is said to reign beyond it, because in the first place eviternal things can be thought of as non-existent; secondly, because they would not be if God ceased to uphold them, so that of themselves they do not exist: thirdly, because they have not their whole existence at once, but are subject to successive change.

Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. That which has a beginning must have a measure of its duration in so far as it begins through movement. But time does not begin thus by creation, wherefore the argument does not prove. However, it may be said that every measure is measured by itself within its own genus: thus a line is measured by a line, and time by time.

Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. Time is not like permanent things which have their whole substance at once: so that there is no need for the whole of time to exist as soon as it begins. Consequently it is not untrue that time begins in an instant.

Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. God's action is eternal, but its effect is not, as we have stated above: hence though God was not always cause, inasmuch as his effect was not always, it does not follow that he was not cause potentially, since his action was always, unless we refer the potentiality to the effect.

Reply to the Twenty-seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 4) truth is in the mind, not in things, for it is the equation of thought and thing. Wherefore whatsoever has been from, eternity has been true by the truth of the divine mind, which truth is eternal.

Reply to the Twenty-eighth Objection. Whatsoever things are said to be true from eternity do not vary in their truth, but are true by the one same truth of the divine mind, with reference nevertheless to various things as future in their own being: so that we are able to indicate a certain distinction in that truth resulting from their various relations.

Reply to the Twenty-ninth Objection. The saying of the Philosopher refers to our mental or oral statements, since the truth of our thought or words is caused by things already evident: whereas the truth of the divine mind is the cause of things.

Reply to the Thirtieth Objection. On the part of God there is no difference between to make and to speak, for God's action is not an accident but his substance: nevertheless to make connotes the effect actually existing in its own nature, whereas to speak does not.

The arguments on the contrary side, although they prove what is true, are not demonstrative except the first which is based on authority. The argument taken from the growth of intelligence in the course of time, does not prove that time must have had a beginning: since possibly the study of the sciences may have been frequently interrupted, and subsequently taken up anew after a long interval, as the Philosopher observes. Again the soil is not so much eaten away by erosion on one part of the earth's surface without a corresponding increase taking place elsewhere through the combination of the elements. And the duration of God, although it be identified with the divine nature in reality, differs therefrom logically: so that it does not follow that God preceded the world in duration from the fact that he preceded it naturally.

Q. III: ARTICLE XVIII

WERE THE ANGELS CREATED BEFORE THE VISIBLE WORLD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. LXI]

THE eighteenth point of inquiry is whether the angels were created before the visible world: and it would seem that they were.

1. Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 3) quotes Gregory Nazianzen as saying that “at first God devised the angelic and heavenly Powers, and the devising was the making thereof.” Therefore he created the angels before making the visible world.

2. Should it be said that first here denotes order of nature not of duration; on the contrary, Damascene (l.c.) cites two opinions on this point: one of which states that the angels were created first, while the other holds the contrary. Now no one ever denied that the angels were in the order of nature created before visible creatures. Therefore we must take it to refer to the order of duration.

3. Basil says (Hexam. hom. i): “Prior to this world there existed a nature that is intelligible to our understanding: and subsequently he states that this is the angelic nature.” Therefore it would seem that the angels were created before this world.

4. The Scriptures enumerate those things that were created together with the visible world without any mention of the angels. Therefore it would seem that the angels were not created together with the visible world but before.

5. That which is directed to the perfection of another as its end is subsequent thereto. Now the visible world is directed to the perfection of the intellectual creature since, according to Ambrose (In Hexaem. i, 5), God who by nature is invisible produced a visible work in order to make himself known thereby. But he could only be made known to a rational creature. Therefore the rational creature was made before the visible world.

6. Whatsoever precedes time precedes the visible world, since time began together with the visible world. Now angels were created before time, since they were created before the day, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9). Therefore the angels were created before the visible world.

7. Jerome says (Super Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): “Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed, before which for how many ages, for how long think you the angels served God and to his command owed their existence?” Now the visible world began with our time. Therefore the angels were in existence before the visible world.

8. A wise man produces his effects in due order. Now the angels precede visible creatures in point of excellence. Therefore they should have been brought into being first by God who is the supremely wise Master-Craftsman.

9. God inasmuch as he is good makes others share in his goodness. Now angels were capable of being dignified by preceding the visible creature in point of duration. Therefore seemingly this was vouchsafed them by God’s sovereign goodness.

10: Man is described as being a lesser world by reason of his likeness to the greater world. Now man’s more noble part, his heart to wit, is formed before the other parts, according to the Philosopher (De Gen. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore seemingly the angels, who are the more noble part of the greater world, were created before visible creatures.

11. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 7, 8), Scripture in the work of the second and following days divided the formation of things into three stages: for first it states that God said: Let there be a firmament made: then: And it was so done, and, thirdly: God made the firmament. The first of these refers to the existence of things in the Word; the second to the existence in the angelic mind, of creatures to be made; the third to the creature’s existence in its own nature. Now when creatures were yet to be made they did not exist. Therefore angels existed and had knowledge of the visible things of nature before the latter existed.

12. It might be said, however, that it is a question of the making of creatures as to their formation and not as to their first creation.—On the contrary, in the opinion of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, xv), the creation of visible nature did not precede its formation in point of time. Hence if angels

existed before the formation of visible creatures, they also existed before its creation.

13. God’s “speaking was the cause of creatures being made. Now seemingly this cannot refer to the birth of the Word, since this was from eternity and not repeated in course of time: and yet Scripture tells of God speaking from day to day. Nor can it refer to audible speech, both because there was as yet no man to hear the voice of God speaking, and because before the formation of light it would have, been necessary for some other body to be formed, since an audible voice is not produced except by means of a body. It would seem then that it refers to the spiritual speech whereby God spake to the angels: and consequently that the angels’ knowledge is presupposed as a cause for the production of visible creatures.

14. As observed above, Holy Writ employs three expressions in relating the creation; whereof the first refers to the existence of things in the Word, the second to their existence in the angelic knowledge, the third to their existence in their own nature. Now the first of these precedes the second in point both of duration and of causality. Therefore likewise the second, namely the angelic knowledge, precedes the third, namely the existence of the visible creature, both in duration and causality.

15. Order is required in the issue of things from their source no less than in their advancement to their end. Now according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v).it is God’s ruling that the lowest things should be brought to their end by the intermediate. Therefore in like manner corporeal creatures being the lowest proceed from God by the angelic creatures who hold the middle position: wherefore the angels precede corporeal creatures as a cause precedes its effect.

16. It is unbecoming that things utterly disparate should be associated together. Now angels and visible creatures are altogether disparate. Therefore they were not associated together in the creation by being formed at the same time. And it would be a perversion of order if they were created after visible creatures. Therefore they were created before them.

17. It is written (Ecclus. i, 4): Wisdom hath been created before all things: and this cannot refer to the Son of God who is the Wisdom of the Father: since he was not created but begotten. Therefore the angelic wisdom which is a creature was formed before all things.

18. Hilary says (De Trin. xii): No wonder that we believe that our Lord Jesus Christ was before all ages seeing that even the angels were created by God before the world. Now the Son of God preceded all ages not only in order of dignity but also in duration. Therefore the angels also preceded the visible world.

19. The angelic nature stands between the divine and the corporeal natures: and eviternity, which measures the angels’ existence, stands between eternity and time. Now by his eternity God preceded the angels and the visible creature. Therefore by their eviternity the angels preceded the visible world.

20. Augustine (De Civ. Dei xi, 9) says that the angels were always in existence. But it cannot be said that corporeal creatures were always in existence. Therefore the angels preceded the corporeal creature.

21. The movements of corporeal creatures are directed by the ministrations of spiritual creatures, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, i) and Gregory (Dial. iv). Now the mover precedes that which he moves. Therefore angels, preceded visible creatures.

22. Dionysius likens God’s action on things to the action of fire on the things which it burns. Now fire acts on the nearer bodies before those that are distant. Therefore God’s goodness produced angelic creatures which are nearest to him before corporeal creatures which are distant from him and thus the angels existed before the world. On the contrary, it is written at the commencement of Genesis: In the beginning God created heavens and earth, where Augustine explains the heavens to mean the angelic nature and the earth the corporeal nature. Therefore the angels were created together with corporeal things.

Again, the gloss of Strabo on the same text states that the heavens refer to the empyrean which was inhabited by the holy angels as soon as it was created. Therefore the angels were created at the same time as the empyrean which is a visible creature.

Again, man is described as the lesser world on account of his likeness to the greater world. Now man’s soul is made at the same time as his body. Therefore in the greater world the angelic and the corporeal creature were made at the same time.

I answer that all the Catholic Doctors are agreed that the angels have not always existed inasmuch as they were made from nothing. Some, however, held that the angels were not made at the same time as the visible world but before: a conclusion to which they were led by various reasons. Some held that it was not God’s original intention to form corporeal creatures, and that his production of the latter was occasioned by the merits or demerits of spiritual creatures. Thus Origen maintained that in the first instance

God made all the immaterial and rational creatures. These, he said, were all equal, for the divine justice required them to be so: since without injustice there could apparently be no reason for inequality in endowments, except diversity of merit and demerit. Consequently he maintained that the diversity which we observe among creatures was preceded by a diversity of merit and demerit, so that those spiritual creatures which were more faithful to God were promoted to the higher orders among the angels, and those who sinned more grievously were chained to the baser and viler bodies: so that this very diversity of merits required that various degrees of bodies should be produced by God.

Augustine refutes this opinion (De Civ. Dei xi, 23). For it is clear that God’s goodness is the sole reason for his producing creatures both spiritual and corporeal, inasmuch as his creatures which out of his goodness he has fashioned reproduce his uncreated goodness according to their mode. Wherefore Scripture says of each of God’s works and afterwards of all of them together: God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good; as though to say that God had formed creatures in order that they might have goodness. On the other hand in the aforesaid opinion corporeal creatures were formed not because it was good for them to be, but that the wickedness of the spiritual creature might be punished. Moreover it would follow that the order’ we perceive to exist in the universe is the result of chance, forasmuch as various rational creatures happened to sin variously: for had all sinned equally, there would be no difference of nature in bodies, according to this opinion.

Hence others rejecting this opinion held that spiritual substances were created before corporeal substances because they perceived that the nature of the former surpasses the entire range of corporeal nature: and they maintained that thp created spiritual nature, even as it ranks between God and the corporeal creature in the order of nature, so is it placed between them in point of duration. Seeing that this opinion was held by such great doctors as Basil, Gregory Nazianzen and others we must not condemn it as being erroneous: but if we consider carefully yet another opinion held by Augustine and other doctors and now more generally accepted, we shall find that the latter is the more reasonable of the two. For we must consider the angels not only absolutely, but also as a part of the universe: and there is all the more reason for doing so inasmuch as the good of the universe is of greater weight than the good of any individual creature, even as the good of the whole is of greater import than that of a part. Now it became the angels, considered as part of the universe, to be created together with corporeal creatures. Because of one whole there should seemingly be one making. And if the angels were created apart, they would seem utterly alienated from the order of corporeal creatures, and to constitute as it were another universe by themselves. Hence we must conclude that the angels were created together with corporeal creatures, yet without prejudice to the other opinion.

This suffices for the replies to the first three Objections which follow the lines of the second opinion.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. According to Basil (Hexaem. homil. i) the lawgiver Moses at the commencement of Genesis began by relating the origin of visible creatures, omitting spiritual creatures who had been created before: the reason for this omission being that he was addressing himself to an unlettered people incapable of grasping spiritual things. Augustine on the other hand held that by the heavens Moses denoted the spiritual creature and by the earth the corporeal, when he wrote: In the beginning God created heaven and, earth. And the reason why he expressed the creation of the angels under the metaphor of the heavens and not clearly may be the same as that given above, namely because the people were uncultured. Also in order to avoid idolatry to which they were inclined, and of which they would be afforded an occasion if they were told of other spiritual substances besides one God, and ranking above the heavens; and all the more seeing that these very substances were called gods by the gentiles. According to Strabo, and others before him, the heavens in the text quoted signify the empyrean which is the, abode of the holy angels, by the figure of metonymy, the container being put for the content.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) the angels’ knowledge of God is not derived from visible creatures: wherefore the visible creature was made that it might manifest God not to the angels, but to the rational creature which is man: so that this proves to be the end of creatures. Now the end though it is first in intention is the last in execution, wherefore man was made last.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. According to Augustine (Super Gen. i, 5) the creation of heaven and earth did not precede in duration the formation or production of light, wherefore he does not mean to say that the spiritual nature was created before the first day by a priority of duration, but by a kind of natural order: because the spiritual substance and formless matter considered in their respective essences are not subject to the changes of time. Consequently we cannot infer that the spiritual creature was formed before the corporeal, since even before the formation of light mention is made of the creation of the corporeal creature denoted by the earth. According to others the creation of heaven and earth belongs to the first day, because together with them time was created: although the division of time into day and night began with light: hence time is stated to be one of the four things first created, namely the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless matter and time.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Jerome is expressing himself in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument would avail were each creature brought into being as existing absolutely by itself: for then it would be fitting for each one to be created separately according to the degree of its goodness. Seeing, however, that all creatures are produced as parts of one universe, it was fitting that all should be produced together so as to form one universe.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although it would conduce to a certain dignity of the spiritual creature were it created before the visible creature, it would not conduce to the, dignity and unity of the universe.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the heart is formed before the other members, there is but one continual generation of the animal’s body, the heart is not formed by a separate generation, and the other members afterwards by a succession of generations at various intervals. This does not apply to the creation of the angels and corporeal creatures, as though they were produced by one formative act, the spiritual creature first and the whole universe by a continuous production: because successive production applies to things produced from matter, in which one part is nearer than another to the final completion. Consequently there was no place for succession in the first creation of things, although it may obtain in the formation of things from created matter. Wherefore the doctors who held that the angels were created before the world, maintained that the creation of the former was entirely distinct from the creation of bodies, and that there was a long interval between. Moreover there is need for the heart in an animal to be formed first, because its activity conduces to the formation of the other members: whereas no spiritual creature co-operates in the creation of corporeal creatures since God alone can create. Hence the Commentator (Metaph. xi, com. 44) finds fault with Plato for asserting that God after treating the angels committed to them the creation of corporeal creatures.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Augustine is referring to the making of corporeal creatures as regards not their first creation but their formation.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. If it be maintained that all things were created together in their form and matter, the spiritual creature is said to have known the corporeal creature that was to be made, not that this formation was future in point of time, but because it was known as future forasmuch as it was perceived in its cause wherein it existed potentially: even so one who considers a box in the principles from which it is made may be said to know it as something to be made.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. God’s speaking refers to the eternal generation of the divine Word in whom from eternity was the type of all things to be made. Nor does the frequent repetition in each work of the phrase God said imply that God spoke in time: for although the Word is one in himself he contains the proper type of every single creature. Accordingly God’s word prefaces each work as the proper type of the work to be produced, lest the work being complete, it be necessary to ask why that particular work was done, whereas it had already been stated before the production of the work, that God spoke: even so when we wish to indicate the cause of a thing we begin with knowledge of the cause.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The existence of things in the Word is the cause of their existence in themselves: whereas the existence of things in the angelic mind is not the cause of their existence in themselves: wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing is directed to its end by means of its operation: whereas it is not brought into being by its operation, but only by the operation of its effective cause. Hence it is more fitting that the higher creatures should co-operate with God in bringing things to their end than in their production.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Although corporeal and spiritual creatures are disparate in regard to their own proper natures, they are connected in regard to the order of the universe. Hence the necessity for them to be created together.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection.’ According to Augustine (Conf. xii, 15) these words of Ecclesiasticus refer to created wisdom abiding in the angelic nature, and he holds that it was created first by priority not of duration but of dignity. According to Hilary (De Synod.) they refer to the uncreated wisdom, namely the Son of God: and it is said to be both created and begotten, as may be gathered from Proverbs viii, and various other passages of Scripture, in order to exclude any imperfection from the birth of God’s Son. Thus creation implies imperfection on the part of the creature in so far as it is made from nothing, but it implies perfection on the part of the Creator, who produces creatures without himself being changed. On the other hand birth implies perfection in the son in so far as he receives the nature of the begetter, while it implies imperfection in the begetter after the manner of generation here below, inasmuch as begetting is accompanied by change or division of substance in the begetter. Hence the Son of God is said to be both created and begotten, in order that creation may exclude change in the begetter, and birth exclude imperfection in the begotten, the two combining to ,give us one perfect idea.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Hilary’s statement is in accordance with the opinion of the early doctors.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. God is the cause of the angelic nature, but the latter is not the cause of the corporeal nature: and thus there is no comparison.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The angels are said to have been always in existence, not that they were from ,eternity but from all time, because whenever time was the angels were. In this sense corporeal creatures were always.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The mover does not of necessity precede in point of time the thing moved, but in dignity, as for instance, the soul precedes the body.

Reply to ths Twenty-second Objection. In the action of fire on bodies a twofold order is to be observed, of position and of time. There is order of position in its every action, because all its actions are affected by position, and its activity bears more on the bodies nearest to it: wherefore by spreading it becomes less effective so that at last it is entirely spent. On the other hand order of time does not affect all the actions of fire, but only those that are accompanied by movement. Hence as fire illumines and heats bodies, in heating there is order of position and time; but in illumination which is not movement but the term of a movement there is only order of position. Since then God's action in creating is without movement the comparison is true, not as regards order of time but as regards order of position. Because in spiritual action the various degrees of nature correspond to diversity of position in corporeal action. Accordingly the comparison of Dionysius is verified in this that as fire is more effective on the bodies nearest to it, so God bestows his goodness more plentifully on those that are nearest to him in the degree of worthiness.

Q. III: ARTICLE XIX

WAS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE ANGELS TO EXIST BEFORE THE VISIBLE WORLD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. LXI, A. 3]

THE nineteenth point of inquiry is whether it were possible for the angels to exist before the visible world: and seemingly it was impossible.

1. Two distinct things that cannot be in the same place require a difference of place. Now it is universally agreed that two angels cannot be in the same place. Hence it is inconceivable that there be two distinct angels unless there be two distinct places. Now there was no place before the visible creature, for place according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 4) is a space occupied by a body. Therefore the angels could not exist before the visible world.

2. The production of the corporeal creature nowise deprived the angels of their natural power. Hence if it was possible for the angels to exist outside a place before the visible world was made, it would be possible even now that the visible world has been created: and this apparently is not true, because if

they were not in a place they would be nowhere and thus they would seem not to exist at all.

3. Boethius says that every created spirit needs a body. Now an angel is a created spirit. Therefore he needs a body and consequently could not exist before the corporeal creature.

4. To this it may be replied that an angel needs a body not for his existence but for his ministrations.—On the contrary, the angelic ministrations are exercised where we are, namely in this world. Now the angels have a corporeal place besides our abode, namely the empyrean heaven. Therefore it is not only in order to minister to us that they need a body in a corporeal place.

5. It is impossible to imagine before and after without time. Now if the angels had existed before the world, the beginning of the angels' existence would have preceded the beginning of the visible world. Consequently time would have begun before the visible world, and that is impossible, since time follows movement, and movement is consequent to the thing moved. Therefore it was impossible for the angels to exist before the world.

On the contrary whatsoever does not involve a contradiction God can do in his creatures. Now no contradiction is involved if the angels exist while the visible creature exists not. Therefore it was not impossible for God to create the angels before the world.

I answer that, as Boethius says (De Trin.) in speaking of God, we must not be led astray by our imagination, nor indeed should we in speaking of any corporeal things whatsoever: because seeing that the imagination is founded upon our senses, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 3), it cannot rise above quantity which is the subject of sensible qualities. Through failing to note this, and to transcend their imagination, some have been unable to understand that anything cat exist without being situated somewhere. For this reason some of the philosophers of old said that what is not in a place is not at all (Phys. iv, 3): and through the same error some of the moderns have maintained that angels cannot exist without a corporeal creature, through thinking angels to be like things which they imagine to occupy different places. This is in contradiction with the opinion of those of old who held the angels to have existed before the world. It is also prejudicial to the dignity of the angelic nature which being naturally superior to the corporeal creature is nowise dependent thereon. Therefore absolutely speaking it was possible for the angels to exist before the world.

Reply to the First Objection. Two angels cannot be in the same place, not because they are distinct from each other, but because this would confuse their operations; hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to the Second Objection. Even now nothing prevents angels from not being in a place if they so will: although they are always in a place on account of the order by virtue of which the spiritual creature presides over the corporeal, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii).

Reply to the Third Objection. As Boethius himself explains, angels need bodies only for their ministrations and not for the perfection of their nature.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The angels are in the empyrean heaven as being a place befitting contemplation, not as though contemplation were impossible elsewhere.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. This before and after do not prove that there was real time before the world but only imaginary time, as we have stated above when discussing the eternity or creation of the world.

QUESTION IV

OF THE CREATION OF FORMLESS MATTER

THERE are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether the creation of formless matter preceded in duration that of things? (2) Whether matter was informed all at once or by little and little?

Q. IV: ARTICLE I

DID THE CREATION OF FORMLESS MATTER PRECEDE IN DURATION THE CREATION OF THINGS?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. LXVI, A. I; QQ LXVII, LXIX]

THE first point of inquiry is whether the creation of formless matter preceded in duration the creation of things: and it Would seem that it did not.

1. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xv) that formless preceded informed matter as the voice precedes the song. Now the voice precedes the song not in duration but only in nature. Therefore formless matter precedes informed things not in duration but only in nature.

2. It might be said that Augustine is speaking of matter with regard to the formation that results from the elemental forms which were in matter from the very beginning.—On the contrary, as water and earth are elements, so also are fire and air. Now Scripture in referring to the formless state of matter mentions earth and water. Consequently if matter from the beginning had the forms of the elemental forms which were in matte from the very beginning.—On the contrary, as water and earth are elements, so also are

fire and air. Now Scripture in referring to the formless state of matter mentions earth and water. Consequently if matter from the beginning had the forms of the elements, Scripture would also have mentioned fire and air.

3. The substantial form together with matter aree thee cause of the accidental qualities according to the Philosopher (Phys. i). Now the active and passive qualities are the accidental properties of the elements. Hence, if substantial forms were in matter from the beginning, it follows that the active and passive qualities were there also, so that there was no formlessness there apparently.

4. But it will be said that there was formlessness or confusion as regards the position of the elements.—On the contrary according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo, iv, text. 25) every element has a place corresponding to its form: for the elements occupy their respective places by virtue of their respective forms. Hence if from the beginning matter had substantial forms, it follows that each element was in iis proper place, so that there was no confusion of elements in respect of which matter could be called formless.

5. If matter be called formless for no other reason but that the elements had not yet their proper and natural place, it would seem to follow that matter is said to be informed by the fact that the elements were allotted their natural positions. But this is not verified in the work of distinction, where certain waters are placed above the heavens, whereas water’s natural place is beneath the air and immediately above the earth (De Coelo et Mundo iv). Therefore the formless state of matter was not owing to the aforesaid confusion of place.

6. It will be said perhaps that the waters are stated to be above the heavens in so far as they are raised above them by evaporation.—On the contrary as philosophers prove, the vaporised waters cannot be raised above the entire atmosphere, in fact they do not rise more than half way: and consequently much less can they rise above fire and yet further above the heavens.

7. The, formless state of matter is expressed in the words (Gen. i, 2), The earth was void and empty. Now matter is said to be void in respect of the power of production, and to be empty in respect of adornment, according to the explanation of holy men, so that the text refers to the things that move on the face of the earth. Consequently the formless condition of matter does not refer to place, nor did it precede in duration the formation of matter.

8. He who can give all at once is less liberal if he give by degrees, wherefore it is written (Prov. iii, 28): Say not to thy friend: Go and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee. Now God was able to give perfect being to things at once. Hence since he is supremely liberal he did not make matter formless before giving it a form.

9. Movement from centre to centre results from the elements occupying their natural position. Now the formless state of matter gives evidence that there was movement from centre to centre, because the vaporised waters as we are told arose above the earth. Therefore the elements had already their natural positions.

10. Rarity and density are the causes of things being heavy and light (Phys. iv). Now rarity and density were already in the elements, for we are told that the waters were more rarefied than now. Therefore things were heavy or light, and the elements had their respective positions which belong to them according as they are heavy or light.

11. In this formless condition of things it is clear that the earth had its position, and we are given to understand that it was covered with the waters when we read (Gen. i, 9): Let the waters that are under the heaven be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear. Therefore the other elements likewise had their respective positions so that there was no formlessness in matter.

12. From a perfect agent issues a perfect effect, since every agent produces its like. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore from the very first he produced perfect matter, which consequently was formed since the form is the perfection of matter.

13. If formless matter preceded the formation of things in duration, matter existing in that condition either was entirely devoid of form, or it had some kind of form. If it was altogether without form it was only potential and not actual, and consequently it was not yet created, since existence is the term of creation. If, on the other hand, it had some kind of form, this was either an elemental form, or the form of a mixed body. If it was an elemental form, it had either one form or several. If several, there was already diversity on account of the divers elemental forms. If one only, it follows that one particular elemental form naturally precedes the others in matter, and thus one element would be the origin of the others. This was the theory of the early physicists who held that there is only one element, and

this is refuted by the Philosopher (De Gener. et Corrup. ii). And if it had the form of a mixed body, it follows that the form of a compound naturally precedes the elemental forms in matter: and this is clearly false, because a compound is made by something that sets the elements in motion so as to produce the form of the compound. Therefore it is impossible that matter was at first formless and afterwards formed.

14. It will be said perhaps that matter had the elemental forms but not in the same way as now, since the waters were more rarefied, and in the form of vapour, mixed with the air.—On the contrary, each elemental form requires a particular measure of rarity or density that is essential to it. Now the rarity which enables a thing to rise into the air surpasses the condition of water which is naturally heavier than air. Consequently if the waters were so rarefied that in the shape of vapour they rose into the air, they no longer retained the nature of water: and thus the elemental forms were not in matter, whereas we have stated the contrary to be the case.

15. The various kinds of things were formed from formless matter during the works of the six days. Now among the works of the six days the firmament was formed on the second day. Hence, if formless matter was subject to the elemental forms it would follow that the heavens were made from the four elements, and this is refuted by the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo i).

16. The natural body is compared to its shape as matter to its form. Now a natural body cannot be without a shape. Therefore matter cannot be without a form.

17. If matter was without a form when it was first created, the gathering of the waters which took place on the third day would never have been. But this would seem impossible: because if the waters covered the earth on all sides, there was no place into which they could be gathered together. Hence seemingly formless matter did not precede the formation of things,. That the waters covered the earth on all sides is apparent from the fact that the elements were separate (De Coelo et Mundo iii, text. 56).

18. It will be said perhaps that there were hollow places under the surface of the earth into which the waters subsided, so that the earth provided a place for the waters to congregate.—On the contrary such hollows or caverns in the earth are caused by rocks upholding the surface and preventing it from subsiding: and this could not apply to the case in point

since rocks are compounded of the elements, and it would follow that mixed bodies existed before the formation of the elements. Therefore such cavernous places were impossible.

19. If there were such hollow places in the earth they could not be empty: and so they would be full of air or water: and this would seem to be impossible since it is contrary to the nature of either to be underneath the earth.

20. The water that covered the earth on all sides was either in its natural place or not. If it was, it could not be removed thence except by violence, since otherwise than by force a body is not moved from where it rests naturally. But this is not in keeping with the original institution of things whereby nature was established, since nature is incompatible with violence. On the other hand. if this position of the water was violent, the water could by its nature return to the disposition which it lacked, since a thing returns naturally from a place in which it is situated by force. Consequently the gathering together of the waters into one place should not be ascribed to the work of formation.

21. Things were created in accordance with their natural order. Now distinction is naturally prior to confusion, thus a simple thing is naturally prior to a compound. Hence it was not fitting to the institution of things that they should be at first in a state of confusion and afterwards be made distinct.

22. A process from actuality to potentiality is more suitable to the corruption of things than to their institution: because things are made by becoming actual from being potential. Now to proceed from compound things to the elements, is to proceed from the actual to the potential, since the elements are as matter in relation to the form of the compound. Therefore it was not suitable to the institution of things that they should first of all be in a state of confusion and composition, and afterwards be made distinct.

23. This would seem to savour of the errors of the ancient philosophers: namely of Empedocles who held that the parts of the world were divided from one another by repulsion whereas previously they had been united by attraction: and of Anaxagoras who held that at first all things formed one mass, and that afterwards the mind began to make distinctions by analysing this confused and composite mass. These opinions have been sufficiently

refuted by later philosophers.—Therefore we must not hold that by a priority of duration matter was in a formless and confused state before its information.

1. On the contrary Gregory (Moral. xxxii) commenting on Ecclus. xviii, 1: He that liveth for ever created all things together, says that all things were created together in their substantial matter but not in their specific form: and this would not be unless the substantial matter existed before receiving specific forms. Therefore formless matter preceded the formation of things in point of duration.

2. Again, that which is not cannot exercise an operation. Now formless matter exercises an operation, since it is appetent of a form (Phys. iii). Therefore matter can be without a form, and thus it is not unreasonable to suppose that formless matter preceded the formation of things in point of duration.

3. Again, God can do more than nature. Now nature makes a potential thing to be actual. Therefore God can make that which is a being simply to be potential: and thus he could make matter without a form.

4. Again, we must not deny the existence of what Scripture declares to have been: for as Augustine says (De Trin. v), no Christian contradicts the statements of Holy Writ. Now the divine Scriptures assert that at one, time the earth was void and empty. Therefore we must not deny this. And in whatever sense the words be explained they imply that matter was formless. Therefore at some time the substance of matter was in existence before its formation, otherwise it would never have been formless.

5. Again, we have shown (A. 18) that spiritual and corporeal creatures were made at the same time. Now the formless state in the spiritual creature preceded its formation in point of duration. Therefore the same is to be said of the corporeal creature. The minor premise is proved as follows. The formation of the spiritual creature denotes its conversion to the Word whereby it was enlightened. And as soon as light was made light was divided from darkness, which in the spiritual creature denotes sin. But there could be no sin in the angels in the first instant of their creation, because in that case the demons would never have been good angels. Therefore the spiritual creature was not formed in the first instant of its creation.

6. Again, the material of which a thing is made precedes even in time that which is made from it. Now God created the earth from invisible matter

(Gen. i, 21) which according to Augustine (Super Gen. i, 15) was formless matter. Therefore formless matter preceded the formation of the earth. The major premise is proved thus. According to the Philosopher (Phys. i) things are said to be made in two ways. First thus: if I say: “This is made so and so per se” which belongs to a subject, for example, “a man is made white”; or, “This is made so and so accidentally” namely from a privation or contrary, for example “A not-white or a black thing is made white.” Secondly, as when I say “This is made from so and so”: this does not refer to the subject except by reason of a privation. For we do not say that a white man is made from a man, but that a white thing is made from a not-white or a black thing, or from a black or not-white man. Accordingly that from which a thing is made is either a privation or contrary, or it is matter subject to privation or contrary. And in either case that from which a thing is made must precede in point of time, since contraries cannot be in the same subject together, nor can matter be subject at the same time to privation and form. Therefore that from which a thing is made precedes in time that which is made from it.

7. Further, the action of nature as far as possible imitates the action of God even as the action of a second cause imitates that of the first cause. Now the process of nature’s action is from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore God also at first in order of time produced something imperfect and afterwards perfected it, and thus formless matter preceded its formation.

8. Again, Augustine says that when Scripture mentions earth and water in the words of Genesis (i, 2), The earth was void and empty, and the spirit of God moved over the waters, the sense is not that they were already earth and water, but that they could be. Hence primary matter at one time had not as yet the nature of earth and water, but was able to have it: and consequently matter without a form preceded its formation. I answer that as Augustine says (Conf. xii) this question admits of a twofold discussion, one regards the true answer to the question itself, the other regards the sense of the text in which Moses inspired by God tells the story of the world’s beginning.

As to the first discussion two things are to be avoided one is the making of false statements especially such as are contrary to revealed truth, the other is the assertion that what we think to be true is an article of faith, for as Augustine says (Confess. x), when a man thinks his false opinions to be the teaching of godliness, and dares obstinately to dogmatise about matters of which he is ignorant, he becomes a stumbling block to others. The reason why he says that such an one is a stumbling block is because the faith is made ridiculous to the unbeliever when a simple-minded believer asserts as an article of faith that which is demonstrably false, as again Augustine says in his commentary (Gen. ad lit. i). As regards the other discussion two things also are to be avoided. One is to give to the words of Scripture an interpretation manifestly false: since falsehood cannot underlie the divine Scriptures which we have received from the Holy Spirit, as neither can there be error in the faith that is taught by the Scriptures. The other is not to force such an interpretation on Scripture as to exclude any other interpretations that are actually or possibly true: since it, is part of the dignity of Holy Writ that under the one literal sense many others are contained. It is thus that the sacred text not only adapts itself to man's various intelligence, so that each one marvels to find his thoughts expressed in the words of Holy Writ; but also is all the more easily defended against unbelievers in that when one finds his own interpretation of Scripture to be false he can fall back upon some other. Hence it is not inconceivable that Moses and the other authors of the Holy Books were given to know the various truths that men would discover in the text, and that they expressed them under one literary style, so that each truth is the sense intended by the author. And then even if commentators adapt certain truths to the sacred text that were not understood by the author, without doubt the Holy Spirit understood them, since he is the principal author of Holy Scripture. Consequently every truth that can be adapted to the sacred text without prejudice to the literal sense, is the sense of Holy Scripture.

Having laid down these principles we must observe that commentators have given to the opening chapter of Genesis various explanations, none of which is contrary to revealed truth: and as far as concerns the question in point they may be divided into two groups in respect of their twofold interpretation of the formless state of matter indicated at the beginning of Genesis by the words, The earth was void and empty. Some understood these words to mean that matter was formless in the sense that it actually had no form but that all forms were in it potentially. Now matter of this kind cannot exist in nature unless it receive formation from some form:

since whatever exists in nature exists actually, and actual existence comes to a thing from its form which is its act, so that nature does not contain a thing without a form. Moreover, since nothing can be included in a genus that is not contained specifically in some division of the genus, matter cannot be a being unless it be determined to some specific mode of being, and this cannot be without a form. Consequently if formless matter be understood in this sense it could not possibly precede its formation in point of duration, but only by priority of nature, inasmuch as that from which something is made naturally precedes that which is made from it, even as night was created first. This was the view taken by Augustine. Others took the view that the formless state of matter does not denote absence of all form in matter, but the absence of natural finish and comeliness: in which sense it is quite possible that matter was in a formless state before it was formed. This would seem in keeping with the wise ordering of its Maker who in producing things out of nothing did not at once bring them from nothingness to the ultimate perfection of their nature, but at first gave them a kind of imperfect being, and afterwards perfected them: thus showing not only that they received their being from God so as to refute those who assert that matter is uncreated; but also that they derive their perfection from him, so as to refute those who ascribe the formation of this lower world to other causes. Such was the view of Basil the Great, Gregory and others who followed them. Since, however, neither opinion is in conflict with revealed truth, and since both are compatible with the context, while admitting that neither may be held, we must now deal with the arguments advanced on both sides.

Reply to the First Objection. Augustine is speaking of formless matter as devoid of all form, in which case we must needs say that its formless state preceded its formation by priority of nature alone. In the next Article we shall state his view on the order of the formation.

Reply to the Second Objection. There are several opinions on this point. Philo is said to have understood that the Book of Genesis in mentioning the number and order of the elements speaks of earth and water in the strict sense. The waters are indicated as being above the earth, since it is written (i, 9): Let the waters be gathered together into their own place, and let the dry land appear. Above these two he places the air as being mentioned in the words: The Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters, where he takes spirit to denote the air: and takes the heaven to mean fire; because it is located above all the others. Seeing however that Aristotle proved (De Coelo i) that the heavens cannot be made of fire, as indicated by their circular movement, Rabbi Moses agrees with Aristotle, and while adopting Philo's view as to the three first elements, contended that fire is denoted by the darkness, because in its own sphere fire does not give light: and he holds that the situation of fire is indicated in the words: Upon the face of the deep. He holds also that by the heavens we are to understand the Fifth Essence.

As Basil, however (Hom. ii, in Hexam.), observes that Scripture is not wont to signify the air by the Spirit of the Lord, and that by mentioning the extremes it implies the intermediate elements: and with reason inasmuch as it is evident to the senses that 'water and earth are bodies, whereas air and fire are not so intelligible to unlettered minds such as those for whose instructions the Scriptures were given.

According to Augustine (Dial. lxv, qu. 21) the earth and water mentioned before the formation of fight, do not denote the completely formed elements, but formless matter void of all species. Moreover the formless state of matter is signified by these two elements rather than the others, because they are more akin to a formless state as having more matter and less form, and again because they are better known to us and indicate to us more clearly the matter of the other elements. Also formless matter is signified by two rather than by one element only, lest if one only were mentioned we might be led to think that this one alone was formless matter.

Reply to the Third Objection. In the opinion of Basil and other holy men the formless state of things in the beginning did not imply that the elements lacked their natural qualities: since each had its respective forms both substantial and accidental.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The situation of the elements may be considered in two ways. First as regards their respective natures: and in this way fire naturally contains air, air water, and water earth. Secondly, as regards the necessity of generation which belongs to the middle place: and thus it is necessary that the surface of the earth be partly covered by water, so as to favour the generation and preservation of mixed bodies, especially of perfect animals which require air for breathing. We must reply, then, that this primordial formless state did not affect the situation natural to the elements considered in themselves (for all the elements had it) but the situation that was competent to them in respect of the generation of mixed bodies. This situation was not perfect as yet, seeing that mixed bodies had not yet been produced.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. With regard to the waters that are above the heavens there have been various opinions. Origen is credited with the view that they denote spiritual natures. But this cannot be reconciled with the text, since it is not competent to the nature of a spiritual being to occupy a situation, as though the firmament intervened between them and the lower corporeal waters, according to the text (i, 6). Hence others hold that the firmament signifies the neighbouring airy sky above which the waters are raised by evaporation and become rain-clouds: and then the airy heaven stands between the higher vaporised waters that float in the space of the mid-air, and the aqueous body which is seen to be situated on the earth. Rabbi Moses, agrees with this explanation, which nevertheless would seem to be incompatible with the context: since the text goes on to say (verses 16, 17) that God made two great lights and the stars, and that he set them in the firmament of the heaven. Consequently others maintain that the firmament signifies the starry heaven, and that the waters situated above the heavens are of the same nature as the elemental waters, but that they are set there by divine providence in order to temper the power of the fire of which they held the entire heaven to consist, according to Basil. In support of this view some according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4, 5) advanced two arguments. One was that since water by means of evaporation can rise into mid-air where the rains are produced, if it be yet more rarefied and divided into yet smaller particles (for it is indefinitely divisible like all continuous bodies) it will be able by reason of its rarefaction to rise above the starry heaven, and remain there in a position becoming to its nature. The other argument is that in the star Saturn, whose heat must be extreme on account of the rapidity of its movement by reason of the length of its orbit, the effects of cold are observed, and they pretend that this is occasioned by the neighbourhood of the water which has a cooling effect on this star.

But this explanation we consider to be defective in that it ascribes to the Scriptures statements that are proved evidently to be false.—First, as regards position, for it would seem to upset the natural situation of bodies. Because since a body should occupy a higher position according as it is more formal, it would seem inconsistent with the nature of things that water, which is the most material of all bodies with the exception of earth, should be set even above the starry heaven. Moreover it would seem out of keeping that things of the same species should be allotted different natural places, which would be the case if the element of water were partly immediately above the earth and p~rtly above the heavens. Nor is it enough to reply that God by his omnipotence upholds those waters against their nature, above the heavens, since we are discussing the nature that God gave to things, and not the miracles that he may have been pleased to work in them; as Augustine says (ibid. ii, i). —Secondly, the argument about rarefaction and divisibility of the waters is altogether futile. For though mathematical bodies are indefinitely divisitle, natural bodies have a fixed term to their divisibility, since every form demands a certain quantity even as other accidents in accordance with its nature. Hence neither can rarefaction of water continue indefinitely, but it reaches a, fixed term which is the rarity of fire. Moreover, water might continue to be rarefied until it was no longer water, but air or fire, if the bounds of water's rarity were exceeded. Nor would it be possible for water naturally to rise above the positions of air and fire, unless it lost the nature of water so as to surpass their rarity. Nor again would it be possible for an elemental body which is corruptible to become more formal than the heavens which are incorruptible, and thus be set above them naturally. Thirdly, the second argument is utterly trivial. Heavenly bodies as philosophers show are not susceptible to impressions from foreign bodies. And it was impossible for Saturn to be cooled by those waters, without the stars of the eighth sphere being affected by them in the same way: whereas many of these stars are observed to have a heating influence.

Wherefore one would prefer to offer an explanation which would leave the text of Scripture unassailable, by suggesting that those waters are not of the same nature as our elemental water, but are of the, nature of the Fifth Essence, being transparent like the waters here below, even as the empyrean shines like our fire. Some call them crystalline, not that they are frozen into the form of crystals, since according to Basil (Hom. iii in Hexam.) only a silly child or an imbecile

could imagine such things about the heavens: but on account of their solidity, even as it is written about all the heavens (Job xxxvii, 18) that they are strong as though they were made of molten brass. This heaven according to astronomers is the ninth sphere. Hence Augustine does not adopt any of these explanations but dismisses them as doubtful; thus he says (ibid. 5): Howsoever these waters may be there and of what kind they may be, one thing is certain, they are there. Surely the written Word has greater authority than the combined genius of men.

The Sixth Objection we grant.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. If according to the exposition of Basil (Hom. iv in HexTm.) and his followers we take the earth to signify the element of earth, we may consider it first as the principle from which certain things originate, plants for instance, of which it is the mother so to speak (De Veget.) so that in their respect it was void before it produced them, since we say that a thing is void or vain if it fail to attain its proper effect or end. Secondly, we may consider it as the abode and place of animals, in respect of which it is described as empty.—Or, according to the text of the Septuagint which reads invisible and incomposite part of the earth was invisible through being covered with water, as also because light was not yet produced so as to render it visible; while it was incomposite because there were as yet no plants and animals to adorn it, nor was it as yet a fit place for their generation and conservation. If, however, the earth signifies primary matter, as Augustine maintains (Dial. lxv, qu. 21), then it is said to be void in comparison with the composite body in which it subsists, because a void is opposite to firmness and solidity; while it is described as being empty in comparison with the forms which were lacking to its potentiality. Hence Plato (Tim.) compares the receptivity of matter to place, inasmuch as place received that which is located therein: and empty and full are terms which are properly applied to a place. Again matter considered in its formless condition is described as invisible, inasmuch as it lacks form which is the principle of all knowledge; and incomposite since it only subsists in a, composite state.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. It pertains to the liberality of a giver not only that he give quickly, but also that he give ordinately and each gift at a suitable time. Hence when the text continues, When thou canst give at present, we must understand the possibility not only of giving absolutely, but also of giving most suitably. Wherefore, in order to observe a suitable order God gave his creatures at first an imperfect state, so that by degrees they might proceed from nothingness to perfection.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. As we have already stated the situation connatural to the elements was in the elements: hence the objection does not avail against this opinion.

The same answer applies to the Tenth and Eleventh Objections.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. A perfect agent produces a perfect effect: but this effect need not be simply perfect from the very beginning as regards its nature, and it will suffice if it be perfect in keeping with that stage of its existence: even so a child may be described as perfect immediately after its birth.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. According to the view that we are defending for the nonce matter is not said to be formless as though it were devoid of all form; or as though it had but one form—either with a potentiality to, all forms, as the ancient physicists maintained who asserted that there was only one primary element;—or virtually containing many other forms, as happens in mixed bodies. The various elemental forms were in various parts of matter, which nevertheless was said to be formless, because it had not as yet received the forms of mixed. bodies, to which forms the forms of the, elements were in potentiality: and because the elements were not as yet suitably placed for the production of such bodies, as we have already stated.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Nothing, not even the authority of the book of Genesis or any argument of reason, binds us to say that at the beginning the elemental forms were not in matter in the same way as they are now: although possibly vapours arose from the waters, as happens now, and then perhaps in greater volume seeing that the earth was wholly covered by the waters.

Reply to the Fifteenth, Objection. There are several opinions about the firmament which was created on the second day.

Some hold that this firmament, is not distinct from the heaven which is stated to have been made on the first day: and they contend that Scripture at first announces the works collectively, and afterwards explains how they were done in the course of the six days. This is the view expressed by Basil in his Hexaemeron.

Others maintain that the firmament created on the second day is distinct from the heaven stated to have been made on the first, and this view admits of a threefold explanation.—Some asserted that the heaven created on the first day signifies the spiritual creature whether formed or still unformed, and that the firmament fashioned on the second day is the corporeal heaven that we see. This is the opinion of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 9: Confess. xii).—Others contend that the heaven created on the first day is the empyrean, and that the firmament created on the second day is the starry heaven visible to us. This is the view of Strabo (Gloss. Ord. in Gen. i).—Others maintain that the heaven made on the first day is the starry heaven, and that the firmament made on the second day signifies the region of the air in the neighbourhood of the earth, and separating waters from waters, as stated above. Augustine alludes to this opinion (Gen. ad lit. ii, i) which is that of Rabbi Moses. If this last explanation be adopted it is easy to solve the difficulty: because the firmament made on the second day has not the nature of the fifth essence, so that, as regards the firmament, there is no reason why in its production there should not have been a process from formlessness to formation, whether in respect of rarefaction through the rising vapours being diminished by the gathering, together of the waters, or in respect of its position through the air taking the place of the receding waters. On the other hand in the case of the first three opinions which hold the firmament to denote the starry heaven, there is no need to ascribe to the heaven a process from formlessness to formation, as though it acquired a new form, since Scripture does not bind us to ascribe such a process to the lower elements. But we must understand that the firmament was endowed with a power in respect of the generation of mixed bodies and that its formation consisted in this: even as we have already said about the formation of the lower elements in relation to the generation of mixed bodies (ad 4, ad 13): since as the lower elements are the matter from which mixed bodies are formed, so the firmament is the active cause of mixed bodies. Hence we may take the division of the lower from the higher waters to be like that of two extremes which are distinguished from each other by a mean that has some affinity with both. Thus the lower waters are subject to change inasmuch as through the movement of the firmament they become the matter of mixture, whereas the higher waters are not. According to the opinion of Augustine (Super Gen. ii, li) if we suppose formless matter to have preceded its formation in point of time, there is no great difficulty, since we must ascribe some kind of matter to a heavenly body, seeing that the latter also has movement. Hence there is nothing to prevent such matter preceding its formation by priority of nature, although no kind of formation accrued to it from time. Nor are we therefore bound to say that the heavenly body and the lower elements have one nature in common, although they have a common name, earth or water for instance, in the opinion of Augustine: because this unity is not one of substance but of proportion in so far as any matter is considered from the viewpoint of its potentiality to its form.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. This is clear from what has already been said, since the formless condition of matter does not imply that it is devoid of all form but is to be taken as already explained.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The opinion of Augustine (Dial. iv, qu. 21) who held that the earth and water previously mentioned signify not the elements but primary matter is not incompatible with the gathering together of the waters. Thus he says himself (Gen. ad lit. ii, 7, 8) that as the words Let a firmament be made indicate the formation of the heavenly bodies on the second day, so the words Let the waters be gathered together signify the formation of the lower elements on the third day. Hence as the words Let the waters be gathered together mean that the water received its form, so the words Let the dry land appear denote the same with regard to the earth. The reason for these words being used in the formation of these elements instead of words significant of making, e.g. “Let water” or “earth be made”—as when the heaven was mentioned, e.g.—Let a firmament be made, was in order to indicate the imperfection of their forms and their affinity to formless matter. The expression gathered together is used in connection with water to denote its mobility; and the word appear in connection with the earth to signify its stability. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, ii): “Of the waters it is said ‘Let them be gathered together, and of the earth ‘Let it appear,’ because water glides and flows away, whereas the earth abides.”

If, however, we adopt the view of Basil and other holy men who said that in both cases the same earth is signified, and likewise the same water but differently disposed before and after, several replies are suggested. Some said that part of the earth was not under water, and that the waters which covered the inhabitable parts were by God’s command gathered together thither. This is disproved from the text itself by Augustine (Super Genes. 1, 12) who says: “If part of the earth was bare whither the waters could be gathered together, then the dry land appeared already and this is contrary to the context.” Hence others said that the waters were rarefied and nebulous and afterwards condensed and gathered into a smaller place. But this involves no less a difficulty, both because they were not real waters if they had the form of vapour, and because they would have occupied a place in the air, and the difficulty remains to find a place for the air. Consequently others say that there were hollow places in the earth which by God’s operation could receive the multitude of waters. But against this would seem to be the fact that it is accidental if one part of the earth be further than another from the centre: whereas in this formation of things they received their natural shape, as Augustine says (Super. Genes, vi, 6). Wherefore it would seem better to hold with Basil (Hom. iv, in Hexaem.) that the waters were distributed over various parts of the earth and afterwards gathered together, an, explanation which would seem to be warranted by the text making use of this expression: for even if the waters covered the whole earth, they would not need to be everywhere as deep as they are now in’ some parts.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Seeing that mineral bodies do not show any evident superiority of excellence over the elements as living bodies do, they are not described as having been formed apart from the elements, and we understand them to have been produced at the same time as the elements. Hence nothing prevents the existence of hollow places before the waters were gathered together, so that the earth could afterwards provide room for the waters to be gathered together in the depressions of its surface. However, the words used by Augustine in his allusion to this view (Gen. ad lit. i, 12) seem to mean that these hollow places did not already exist beneath the surface, but that they were formed on the surface of the earth when the waters were gathered together. These in fact are his words: “By subsiding in all directions the earth was able to provide these hollow places into which the waters flowing and rushing together were received, and the dry land appeared in those parts that the waters had abandoned.” The same view is expressed by Basil (Hom. iv, in Hexaem.): “When the waters were commanded to gather together, a place for their gathering was at once formed, so that by God’s command sufficient place was provided to receive the confluence of the many waters.” It may be that sufficient place was made by the depressions in the earth’s surface, even as certain parts are accidentally higher as hills and mountains.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. If the hollow places did not already exist in accordance with what we have said in the last reply, this objection is to no purpose. If, however, they were already in existence we reply that altogether it is unnatural for water or air to be situated beneath the earth if this be left to itself, it is not so if the earth be hindered somewhat in its movement. Thus in caverns beneath the earth we find that the earth is supported by pillars which arise through the air from the floor, since nature abhors a vacuum. But if it be contended that the shallow waters spread over the whole surface of the earth were subsequently gathered together into greater depths, as stated above, these objections will fall to the ground.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. If we consider the situation natural to the elements and befitting their nature absolutely, then it is natural for water to cover the whole earth on all sides just as it is natural for the air to cover the waters. But if we consider the elements in relation to the generation of mixed bodies, in which the heavenly bodies also take an active part, then their natural situation is that which was given to them afterwards. Hence as soon as the dry land appeared in some part of the earth we are told at once that the, plants were produced. That the heavenly bodies should exercise an active influence on the elements is not contrary to nature, as the Commentator says (De Coel. et Mund. iii): thus the ebb and flow of the sea, although it is .not the natural movement of water as a heavy body, since it is not towards the centre, nevertheless is natural to water as moved by a heavenly body instrumentally. Much more truly may this be said of the divine action on the elements whose whole nature subsists thereby. As regards the point at issue both these actions would seem to concur in the gathering together of the waters, the divine action principally, and that of the heavenly body in a subordinate degree. Hence immediately after the formation of the firmament the text refers to the gathering of the waters together. Moreover the very nature of water furnishes us with a likely explanation. In the elements the container is more formal than the content, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii); hence water fails to be a perfect container of the earth in so far as it is not so perfectly formal, as fire and air, being more akin to the density of the earth than to the rarity of fire.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The state of confusion ascribed to the world in its beginning, did not consist in a mingling of the elements, but was by way of contrast with the present state of things, the various parts of the world being distinct from one another and favourable to the generation and preservation of living beings.

This suffices for the Replies to the Twenty-second and Twenty-third Objections.

We must now deal with the arguments on the other side which support Augustine's view.

1. Gregory's words express the view that we have already upheld. They do not mean, however, that when things were first created the matter of all things was made devoid of all specific forms, but without certain forms, namely those of living things, and without ‘ the order requisite for their generation, as we have explained above (ad 4, ad 13).

2. Appetence of form is not an act of matter but a certain relationship in matter in respect of a form, in so far as matter has the form potentially, as the Commentator states (Phys. i, 81).

3. Were God to make a mere potential being he would do less than nature which makes actual beings. The perfection of all actions depends on the term to which it tends rather than that from which it originates. Moreover the very argument involves a contradiction, namely that anything be made that is pure potentiality: since what has been made must needs be so long as it is (Phys. vi): and what is purely potential, is not simply.

4. If, as Augustine holds, the words of Scripture, The earth was void and empty signify matter utterly devoid of form we are not to suppose that it was ever actually so, but that its nature was such if we consider it apart from inherent forms.

5. The formation of a spiritual creature may be understood in two ways: first by the infusion of grace, secondly by the consummation glory. The first, according to Augustine's opinion, was bestowed on the spiritual creature from the first moment of its creation: and in that case the darkness from which the light was divided does not signify the sin of the wicked angels, but the formless state of the nature, which was not formed as yet but remained to be formed by subsequent works (Gen. ad lit. i). —Or, as he

says elsewhere (ibid. iv) the day signifies God’s knowledge, and the night the creature’s knowledge which is indeed darkness in comparison with God’s (ibid.). Or, if the darkness signifies the sinful angels, then this distinction refers to their sin not as actually committed but as foreseen by God: wherefore he says in his work addressed to Orosius (Dial. lxv, QQ. qu. 24): “Foreseeing that some of the angels would fall through pride, by the ordinance of his unfailing prescience he divided the good from the bad, calling the bad darkness and the good light.”

The second formation does not belong to the creation of things at the beginning, but rather to their continuation and government by divine providence. For this last, according to Augustine, is true of all those things in which the operation of nature is required, namely that they come at length to this formation: because by the movement of their free-will some turned to God and remained standing, others turned from him and fell.

6. The world is said to have been made of invisible matter, not that formless matter preceded the world in point of time, but by priority of nature. Likewise privation was not at any time in matter before the advent of a form, but matter taken as formless is taken as having a privation.

7. It is owing to the imperfection of nature that operates by movement that it proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect: because movement is the act of that which is imperfect. God, however, by reason of the perfection of his power was able at once to give being to perfect things; hence the comparison fails.

8. The words of Augustine do not mean that matter was in such potentiality to the elemental forms that it had none of them: but that considered in its essence it includes no form actually, but is in potentiality to them all.

Q. IV: ARTICLE II

WAS MATTER FORMED ALL AT ONCE OR BY DEGREES?

[SUM. TH. I Q. LXVII-LXXII]

THE second point of inquiry is whether matter was formed all at once or by degrees: and seemingly it was formed by degrees.

1. It is written (Judith ix, 4) Thou hast done the things of old and hast devised one thing after another. Now, with God to devise is to act according to Damascene (De Fide Orthod. ii, 3) hence the text quoted continues: And what thou hast designed hath been done. Therefore things were made in a certain order and not all at once.

2. Several parts of time cannot be together at once, because the whole of time is successive. Now according to Genesis i, things were formed at various times. Therefore seemingly things were formed by degrees and not all at once.

3. It will be said, perhaps, that according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ii, 7, 9) those six days are not the days or divisions of time to which we are accustomed, but a six-fold manifestation of things to the angelic mind corresponding to the six classes of things.—On the contrary day is caused by the presence of light, whereupon it is written (Gen. 1, 5) that God called the light day. And light properly speaking is not found in spiritual creatures but only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore neither can the angels' knowledge be, called day properly speaking. Consequently it would seem not to be a literal exposition of the text to take day as signifying the angelic knowledge. The minor premise is proved thus: Nothing that is a direct object of the senses properly is applicable to the spiritual world: for such things as are common to sense and spirit are not sensible except indirectly, for instance substance, power, virtue and the like. Now light is the direct object of the sense of sight. Hence it cannot be applied properly speaking to spiritual things.

4. An angel has two ways of knowing things, in the Word and in their own nature: consequently 'day' must refer to the one, or the other. It cannot signify his knowledge of things in the Word since this is only one in relation to all those things: because an angel, whatsoever things he knows, knows them simultaneously and by one knowledge, seeing that he knows them in the Word. Thus there would be but one day. On the other band if it refer to his knowledge of things in their respective natures, it would follow that there were many more than six days, inasmuch as there are many genera and species of creatures. Hence it would seem that the six days cannot refer to the angelic knowledge.

5. It is written (Exod. xx, 9, 10): Six days shalt thou labour but on the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God thou shalt do no work on it:

and afterwards the reason is given (verse ii): For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth and the sea and all things that are in them, and rested on the seventh day. Now in permitting work on six days and forbidding it on the seventh the Law speaks of days in the literal and material sense. Therefore the days ascribed to God's works are to be taken in the material sense.

6. If day signifies the angels' knowledge it follows that to make a thing in a day is nothing else but to produce it in the knowledge of the angels. But it does not follow that if a thing is produced in the angels' knowledge it therefore exists in its own nature, but only that it is known by the angels. Consequently we should not be informed about the creation of things in their respective natures, which is contrary to Scripture.

7. The knowledge of any single angel differs from that of any other. If then day signifies an angel's knowledge, there should be as many days as there are angels, and not only six as Scripture tells us.

8. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 7, 8) says that by the words, God said: Let... be made we are to understand that the thing to be made pre-existed in the Word: that by the words, It was so we understand that knowledge of the thing was produced in the intellectual creature: and by the words, God made we understand that the thing was made in itself. If then day signifies the angels' knowledge, then having said of this or that work, And it was so in reference to the angelic knowledge, it was superfluous to add, The evening and morning were the first—or the second day.

9. But it will be said that these words are added to indicate the spiritual creature's twofold manner of knowing things. One is his knowledge of things in the Word and this is called morning, or morning knowledge: the other is his knowledge of things in their respective nature, and this is called evening, or evening knowledge.—On the contrary, though an angel can at the same time consider several things in the Word, he cannot at the same time consider several things in his own nature, since he understands different things in their respective natures by means of different species. If then each of the six days has both morning and evening, there must needs have been some kind of succession in the six days, and consequently the formation of things did not take place all at once.

io Several actions cannot proceed from one power at the same time, any more than one straight line can terminate at one end in more than one point:

since power terminates in action. Now the consideration of things in the Word and in their respective natures is not one but several actions. Therefore morning and evening knowledge are not simultaneous, and thus again it follows that there was succession in those six days.

11. As stated above (A. i) Augustine explains the division of light from darkness as that of the formed creature from the informed matter which had yet to be formed: so that after one creature had been formed on the part of its matter there still remained another creature to be formed, and consequently matter was not formed all at once.

12. According to Augustine the angels’ morning knowledge signifies their knowledge of the Word in whom they knew the creatures yet to be made. But this would not be the case if the creatures whose formation is assigned to the following days were formed at the same time as the angels. Therefore all things were not created at the same time.

13. In spiritual matters a day is spoken of by way of comparison with the material day. Now in the material day morning precedes evening. Therefore in these days evening should not have been mentioned before the morning: Evening and morning were the first day.

14. Between evening and morning is night, and between morning and evening is midday. Hence as Scripture mentions evening and morning, it should have mentioned midday also.

15. Every material day has both evening and morning. But this is not the case with these seven days: for the first has no morning, and the seventh has no evening. Therefore it is unreasonable to compare these days with ours.

16. It might be said that the first day has no morning because morning signified that knowledge of the creature yet to be made which the angel received from the Word: and, before being made, the spiritual creature could not receive from the Word any knowledge of its own future making.—On the contrary from this it follows that the angel at one time existed whereas other creatures were not yet made, but were still to be made. Therefore all things were not made at the same time.

17. The spiritual creature does not acquire knowledge of things beneath it from those things themselves: and thus he does not need their presence in order to know them. Consequently before those things were made he could know them as things to be made in their respective nature and not only in the Word: so that knowledge of a thing to be made would seem to belong to

the evening as well as the morning knowledge: and thus according to the foregoing exposition, the second day should have had neither morning nor evening.

18. Those things which are first simply are first in an angel's knowledge: since the fact that things which are last are first known to us is due to our acquiring knowledge through our senses. Now the types of things in the Word are simply prior to the things in themselves. Therefore the angels' knowledge of things in the Word precedes his knowledge of things in their respective natures and consequently the morning should have been mentioned before the evening and this is contrary to the text of Scripture.

19. Things that differ specifically cannot combine to form one. Now knowledge of things in the Word and in their respective natures differ specifically, since the medium of knowledge is entirely different in either case: and, consequently, according to the foregoing exposition, morning and evening could not make one day.

20. The Apostle (1 Cor. xiii, 8, 10) says that knowledge will be destroyed in heaven: and this only refers to the knowledge of 'things in their respective natures, which is the evening knowledge. Now in heaven we shall, be as the angels (Mat. xxii, 30). Therefore evening knowledge is not in the angels.

21. Knowledge of things in the Word surpasses knowledge of them in their respective natures more than the sun's brightness surpasses candle-light. But sunlight renders useless the light of a candle: and therefore much more does the morning knowledge of the angels render their evening knowledge useless.

22. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24, 25) queries whether Adam's soul were made apart from his body at the same time as the angels or at the same time as his body. But there would be no purpose in discussing this question if all things were made at the same time, because then the human body was made at the same time as the angels. It would seem then that in Augustine's opinion all things were not made at the same time.

23. The portion of earth from which man's body was made had the form of slime according to Genesis ii, 7: and it had not yet the form of a human body. Therefore forms were not all at the same time produced in matter.

24. An angel's knowledge of a thing in its own nature can be no other but his knowledge through the species bestowed on him by nature: for it cannot

be said that he acquires species from the things perceived, since he lacks sensorial organs. Now these species bestowed on the angels are independent of corporeal things: and thus even before things existed angels could know them in their respective natures. Consequently from the fact that angels knew a thing in its own nature we cannot argue that it was brought into being: wherefore the explanation given above would seem unreasonable.

25. The morning knowledge whereby the angels knew things in the Word must needs have been through some species, since all knowledge is such. Now it could not be through a species issuing from the Word, because such a species would be a creature, so that the knowledge produced by it would be evening rather than morning knowledge, since evening knowledge is that which is produced by means of a creature. Nor may it be said that the aforesaid knowledge was acquired by means of a species that is the Word himself, since in that case the angel would see the Word; which he did not do before he was beatified, because the beatific vision consists in seeing the Word. But the angels were not beatified in the first instant of their creation, as neither did the demons sin in that first instant. Therefore if morning signifies the knowledge which angels have in the Word, we must infer that all things were not created at the same time.

26. It will be said, perhaps, that in that instant the angels saw the Word as the type of things to be created, but not as the end of the Blessed.—On the contrary there is only a relative difference between the Word considered as end and considered as type. Now the knowledge of God’s relation to creatures is not beatific, seeing that this relation in reality is in the creature rather than in God: and it is only the vision of the divine essence that is beatific. Consequently, as regards the bliss of those who see the Word, it matters not whether they see him as the end of beatitude or as a type.

27. Prophets also are said to have seen the future in the mirror of eternity, inasmuch as they saw the divine mirror as reflecting future events: and then there would be no difference between the angel’s morning knowledge and the knowledge of a prophet.

28. It is written (Gen. ii, 5) that God made every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew. Now the herbs were brought forth on the third day. Hence some things were made before the third day, and all were not made at the same time.

29. It is written (Ps. ciii, 24) that God made all things in wisdom. Now a wise man does things in an orderly way (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore, seemingly, God did not make all things together, but in order of time and by degrees.

30. It might be said that though order of time was not observed in the creation, the order of nature was.—On the contrary in the order of nature the sun, moon and stars precede the plants, for it is clear that they are causes of plants: and yet we are told that the heavenly, lights were made after the plants. Therefore the order of nature was not observed.

31. The heavenly firmament naturally precedes earth and water, and yet Scripture mentions these before the firmament which we are told was made on the second day.

32. The subject naturally precedes its accident. Now light is an accident and its first subject is the firmament. Therefore the creation of light would not precede that of the firmament.

33. Animals that walk are more perfect than those which swim or fly, principally by reason of their likeness to man: and yet the creation of fishes and birds is related before that of terrestrial animals. Therefore the right order of nature was not observed.

34. Fishes and birds seemingly do not in their respective natures differ from each other more than from terrestrial animals: and yet we are told that fishes and birds were created on the same day. Therefore the days do not correspond to various kinds of things, but rather to various successive times and then all things were not created at the same time.

1. On the contrary it is written (Gen. ii, 4, 5): These are the generations of the heaven and the earth when they were created in the day that the Lord made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field. Now we are told that the plants of the field were created on the third day: while heaven and earth were made on the first day, or even before all days. Hence the things made on the third day were created on the same day as those which were made on the first day or before all days: and thus in like manner all things were made at the same time.

2. Again it is written (Job xl, 10): Behold Behemoth whom I made with thee. Now according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii, 9) Behemoth signifies the devil, who was made on the first day or before all days: while man, to whom the Lord’s words are addressed, was made on the sixth day. Hence

things made on the sixth day were created together with those that were made on the first day: and so we arrive at the same conclusion as before.

3. Again, parts of the universe depend on one another, especially the lower on the higher parts. Therefore it was impossible for some parts to be made before others, especially the lower before the higher.

4. Again there is a greater difference between corporeal and spiritual creatures than between one corporeal creature and another. Now, as we have already shown, the spiritual and corporeal creatures were made at the same time. Therefore, a fortiori, all spiritual creatures were made at the same time.

5. Again by reason of the immensity of his power God works in an instant: and thus the work of each day was accomplished suddenly and instantaneously. Therefore there is no sense in saying that he waited until the next day to do his next work, and remained idle for a whole day.

6. Further if the days mentioned in the story of the creation were ordinary days, it is difficult to understand how the night could be wholly distinct from the day, and light from darkness. For if the light which we are told was made on the first day enveloped the whole earth, nowhere was there darkness, which is the earth’s shadow cast on the side opposite to the light that causes day. And if that light by its movement revolved around the earth so as to cause day and night, then there was always day on one side, and night on the other, and consequently night was not wholly divided from the day, and this is contrary to Scripture.

7. Again the division between day and night is caused by the sun and other heavenly luminaries, wherefore it is written in the story of the fourth day (verse 14): Let there be lights made in the firmament of the heaven and the text continues and let them be for signs and for seasons and for days and years. Seeing then that the effect does not precede its cause, it cannot be that the first three days were of the same kind as the days which are regulated by the sun: and consequently the mention of those days is no proof that things were made one after the other.

8. Moreover if then there was some other light which by its movement caused day and night, there must have been some vehicle with a circular movement to carry this other light and cause a succession of day and night. Now this vehicle would be the firmament which we are told was made on

the second day. Therefore at least the first day could not be the same kind of day as those we have now, nor likewise as the other days of the text.

9. Again if that light was made that it might produce day and night, it would also do so now: for it is unreasonable to say that it was made solely to serve this purpose for the three days that preceded the creation of the sun, and that afterwards it ceased to exist. But there is no other light now besides the sun that causes day and night. Therefore neither during those three days was there any other corporeal light to cause the distinction between day and night.

10. Someone might say that this light was afterwards resolved into the solar body.—On the contrary whenever a thing is made out of pre-existent matter, it is composed of a matter susceptive of a succession of forms. But such is not the matter of which the sun or any other heavenly body is composed, because in them there is no contrariety (De coel. et mund. i). Therefore it is impossible that the sun was afterwards formed out of that light.

I answer that in the supposition that formless matter did not precede its formation in point of time but only in point of origin (and it could not be otherwise if formless matter signify matter entirely devoid of form) it follows of necessity that the formation of things was simultaneous, since it is not possible for any part of matter to be even for an instant entirely formless. Besides, as regards that particular part, matter would precede its formation in point of time. Wherefore if we adopt the opinion of Augustine as discussed in the preceding article, there is no reason to propose the question at the head of this article, and we must state at once that all things were formed at the same time, except in so far as it remains for us to explain in what sense we are to take the six days mentioned by Scripture. For if we are to take them to be like the days we have now, this would be in contradiction with the aforesaid opinion, since then we should have to hold that the formation of things took place during a series of days.

Augustine explains these days in two ways. First in his opinion (Gen. ad lit. i, 17) the distinction of light from darkness signifies the distinction of formed from formless matter which awaited its form, the difference being one not of time but of the order of nature. He holds that the order between formlessness and formation according as all things are ordered by God is implied by day and night, for day and night are an ordering of light and darkness. He says that evening denotes the termination of the work done: and morning the future beginning of the work, future not in the order of time but in the order of nature: for the first work contains already a kind of indication of the future work to be done. According to this view we must take the days as being distinct from one another inasmuch as there were various formations and consequently a lack of various forms.

Since however it would follow from this that the seventh day also was distinct from the first six, if these also were distinct from one another (whence it would seem to follow either that God did not make the seventh day, or that he made something after the seven days wherein he completed his work) he (Augustine) maintained in consequence, that all these seven days were but one, namely the angelic knowledge, and that the number refers to the distinction between the things they knew rather than to a distinction of days: in other words that the six days signify the angel’s knowledge in reference to the six classes of things created by God, while one day signifies the angel’s knowledge in reference to the Maker’s rest, in that he rested in himself from the things be had made: so that evening signifies knowledge of a thing in its own nature, and morning, knowledge in the Word.

According to other holy men these days denote order of time and succession in the production of things. In their opinion there was order not only of nature but also of time and duration in the works of the six days: for they contend that as matter was in a formless condition before its formation, so also one formation preceded another in the order of time. Because (as stated in the preceding article) by the formless condition of matter they did not understand the lack and exclusion of all form (since heaven, water and earth by which they understood the heavenly bodies, were already in existence, besides spiritual substances, and the four elements under their respective forms) but the mere absence and exclusion of the due distinction and perfect comeliness of each thing, in that it was lacking in that finish and beauty now to be seen in the corporeal creature. Thus we can gather from the text of Genesis, that the corporeal nature was lacking in a threefold beauty, for which reason it is described as being formless.—The heavens and the entire diaphanous body lacked the comeliness and beauty of light: and this is denoted by the darkness. The element of water lacked due order and distinction from the element of earth: and this lack of form is designated by the word deep, which signifies a certain inordinate immensity of the waters according to Augustine (Cont. Faust. xxii, ii).—The earth lacked a twofold beauty: one which it acquired by the withdrawal of the waters, and this is signified by the words: And the earth was void and empty—or invisible, because it could not be seen by reason of the waters covering it on all sides: the other which it acquires through being adorned with plants, and this is indicated when it is said that it was empty or incomposite, i.e. unadorned. Thus then before the work of distinction Scripture mentions a manifold distinction as already existing in the elements of the world from the beginning of its creation. First it mentions the distinction between heaven and earth in so far as the heaven signifies the entire transparent body which includes fire and air on account of their transparency which they have in common with the heaven. Secondly it mentions the distinction of the elements as regards their substantial forms, by naming water and earth which are more perceptible to sense, and thus implying the others which are less apparent. Thirdly it mentions positional distinction: for the earth was beneath the waters which concealed it, while the air which is the subject of darkness is indicated as being above the waters in the words, Darkness was over the face of the deep. Accordingly the formation of the first body, namely the heaven, took place on the first day by the production of light whose illuminating property was communicated to the sun and heavenly bodies which already existed in respect of their substantial forms, and thus their formlessness of darkness was removed. From this formation resulted the distinction of movement and time, namely of night and day, since time is consequent to the movement of the higher heaven. Hence the text mentions the distinction of light and darkness: since the cause of light was in the substance of the sun, and the cause of darkness was in the opaqueness of the earth: so that while there was light in one hemisphere, there was darkness in the other, and again in the one hemisphere light at one time and darkness at another. This is expressed in the words, He called the light day, and the darkness might.—On the second day took place the formation and distinction of the middle body, namely water, by the formation of the firmament in that it was given parts and order. Thus under the name of water are comprised all transparent bodies: so that the firmament or starry heaven produced on the second day, not in substance, but as to a certain accidental perfection, divided the waters that are above the firmament (from those that are beneath it). By the firmament is meant the whole trans~ parent heaven without the stars, known also as the I aqueous’ or crystalline heaven. Philosophers say that it is the ninth sphere and the first moving body, which causes the whole heaven to revolve as a daily movement, and producing by that movement a continuity of generation. In like manner the starry heaven by its zodiacal movement causes diversity in generation and corruption, by approaching to or receding from us and by the varying power of the stars. The waters beneath the firmament are the other corruptible transparent bodies. Consequently these lower transparent bodies signified under the name of waters received from the firmament a certain order and were divided into fitting parts.—On the third day was formed the lowest body, namely the earth, in so far as it was freed of its watery covering, and the lowest division was made of the sea from the dry land. It was thus not unfitting that the text having expressed the formless condition of the earth in the words, The earth. was invisible or empty, should signify its formation in the words And let the dry land appear, and the waters being gathered together into one place apart from the dry land, and God called the dry land Earth, and the gathering together of the waters he called Seas: and whereas the earth was hitherto void and empty he adorned it with plants and herbs.—On the fourth day took place the adornment of the first part of the corporeal creature, which had been divided on the first day, the adornment to wit of the heavens by the creation of the luminaries. These as to their substance were created from the beginning, but whereas then their substance was formless now on the fourth day it is formed, not indeed with a substantial form, but by receiving a certain fixed power, inasmuch as these luminaries were endowed with certain powers for certain effects, as evinced by the different effects produced by solar, lunar or stellar rays. Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) refers to this distinction of powers when he says that the light of the sun was formed on the fourth day, whereas hitherto it had been formless. If Scripture makes no mention of these luminaries from the outset but only on the fourth day, it was according to Chrysostom. in order to keep the people from idolatry, by showing that the luminaries were not gods, seeing that they did not exist from the beginning.—Qn the fifth day, the second part of corporeal nature which had been divided on the second, day was adorned by the creation of birds and fishes. Wherefore on this fifth day Scripture mentions the waters and the heavenly firmament, so as to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second, where mention was made of the waters and firmament. On this day then by God’s word the birds and fishes in their respective, natures were brought into actual being from the already created elemental matter in order to adorn the air and the water which are a fitting medium for their animal movements.—On the sixth day the third part of corporeal nature and the lowest body, namely the earth, was adorned by the creation of terrestrial animals to which it is connatural to move on the earth. Hence just as in the work of creation the text indicates a threefold division of corporeal creatures, the first signified under the name of heaven, the middle signified under the name of water, and the lowest signified under the name of earth; while the first part, i.e. the heaven was distinguished on the first day and adorned on the fourth, the middle part, i.e. the waters, distinguished on the second day and adorned on the fourth, as we have stated; so was it fitting that the lowest part, i.e. the earth which was distinguished on the third day, should, be adorned on this the sixth day by the terrestrial animals being brought into actual existence and divided into various species.

From all this it is clear that Augustine differs from other holy men in his explanation of the works of the six days. First, by the earth and water first created he understands primal matter utterly devoid of form, and by the creation of the firmament, the gathering together of the waters and by the uncovering of the dry land he understands the introduction of substantial forms into corporeal matter. Whereas the other saints take the earth and water first created to signify the elements of the world existing each under its own form, and the subsequent works to indicate some kind of division of the already existing bodies through their receiving certain powers and accidental properties, as stated above.—Secondly they differ in respect of the production of plants and animals: since the other saints say that these were actually produced in their respective natures during the work of the six days, whereas Augustine holds that they were produced only potentially.—Thirdly in holding (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34) that all the works of the six days took place at the same time Augustine apparently does not differ from the others as to the manner in which things were produced.—First, because both views agree in saying that in the first production of things matter was the subject of the substantial forms of the elements, so that primal matter did not precede the substantial forms of the elements of the world by a priority of duration.—Secondly because both opinions are agreed that in the first production of things by the work of creation plants and animals were not brought into actual but only potential existence, inasmuch as they could be educed from the elements by the power of God's word.

There is however a fourth point in which they differ. According to the other saints after the first production of the creature when the elements of the world and the heavenly bodies as to their substantial forms were produced, there was a time when there was no light: also when the firmament was not yet formed, or the transparent body adorned and made distinct: also when the earth was still covered with the waters, and as yet the luminaries were not formed. This is the fourth point wherein they differ from the view of Augustine who (l.c.) held that all these things were formed together in the same instant of time.

That the works of the six days according to the other saints were produced not simultaneously but by degrees, was not owing to lack of power in the Creator who could have produced all things at once, but was directed to the manifestation of God's wisdom in the production of things, in that when he made things out of nothing he did not at once bring them from nothingness to their ultimate natural perfection, but conferred on them at first an imperfect being, and afterwards perfected them, so that the world was brought gradually from nothingness to its ultimate perfection. Thus different days corresponded to the various degrees of perfection, and it was shown that things derived their being from God, against those who contended that matter was uncreated, and that moreover he is the author of their perfection, against those who ascribed, the formation of the lower world to other causes.

The first explanation of these things namely that held by Augustine is the more subtle, and is a better defence of Scripture against the ridicule of unbelievers: but the second which is maintained by the other saints is easier to grasp, and more in keeping with the surface meaning of the text. Seeing however that neither is in contradiction with the truth of faith, and that the context admits of either interpretation, in order that neither may be unduly favoured we now proceed to deal with the arguments on either side.

Reply to the First Objection. In the divine works order of nature and origin and not of duration was observed. Formless spiritual and corporeal natures were formed first by priority of nature and origin. And though both natures were formed at the same time; inasmuch as the spiritual nature naturally transcends the corporeal, its formation preceded that of the corporeal nature in the order of nature. Again since an incorruptible corporeal nature transcends a corruptible nature, it behoved the former to be formed first in the order of nature. Wherefore on the first day the formation of the spiritual nature is signified by the creation of light, whereby the mind of the spiritual creature was illumined through its conversion to the Word. On the second day the formation of the corporeal nature heavenly and incorruptible, is signified by the creation of the firmament, which we understand to include the production of all the heavenly bodies and their distinction in respect of their various forms. —On the third day the formation of the corporeal nature of the four elements is signified by the gathering together of, the waters and the appearance of the dry land.—On the fourth day the adornment of the heaven is signified by the creation of the luminaries, and this in the order of nature should precede the adornment of the waters and the earth which took place on the following days. Thus God’s works were wrought in order indeed, not of duration but of nature.

Reply to the Second Objection. Things were not formed by degrees nor at various times: all these days which the text assigns to God’s works are but one day described as present to each of the six classes of things and numbered accordingly: even so God’s Word by whom all things were made is one, namely the Son of God, and yet we read repeatedly God said... And just as those works persevere in his subsequent works which are propagated from them by the agency of nature, so do, those six days continue throughout the succeeding time. This may be made clear as follows. The angelic nature is intellectual and is properly described as light, and thus the enlightening of the angel should be called day. Now the angelic nature when things were first created was given the knowledge of these things, so that in a manner of speaking the light of the angel’s intellect was made present to the things created, in so far as they were made known to the light of his mind. Hence this knowledge of things, implying that the light of the angelic intellect is made present to the things known, is called day: and various days are distinguished and ordered according to the various classes and order of the things known. Thus the first day is the knowledge of God’s first work in forming the spiritual creature and converting it to the Word.—

The second day is the knowledge of the second work whereby the higher corporeal creature was formed by the creation of the firmament.—The third day is the knowledge of the third work of the formation of the corporeal creature in respect of the lower part, namely the earth, water and neighbouring air.—The fourth day is the knowledge of the fourth work or the adornment of the higher part of the corporeal creature, that is of the firmament by the creation of luminaries.—The fifth day is the knowledge of the fifth divine work whereby the air and water were adorned by the creation of birds and fishes.—The sixth day is the knowledge of God's sixth work, namely of the adornment of the earth by the, creation of terrestrial animals.—The seventh day is the angelic knowledge as referred to the Maker's rest in that he rested in himself from the production of new works.

Now since God is all light, and there is no darkness in him, God's knowledge in itself is pure light: whereas the creature through being made from nothing contains within itself the darkness of potentiality and imperfection, and consequently the knowledge of which a creature is the object must needs be mingled with darkness. Now a creature may be known in two ways: either in the Word, as the outcome of the divine scheme, and thus the knowledge of it is called morning knowledge, because as the morning is the end of darkness and the beginning of light, so the creature, whereas before it was not in existence, receives a beginning of light from the light of the Word. Secondly a creature is known as existing in its own nature: and this is called evening knowledge, because as the evening is the end of light and verges into night, so the creature as subsistent in itself terminates the operation of the light of the divine Word, in that it is made thereby, and of itself would fall into the darkness of its deficiencies were it not upheld by the Word. And so this knowledge being divided into morning and evening is called day: for just as in comparison with the Word's knowledge it is darksome, so in comparison with that ignorance which is darksome, it is light. In this way we may observe a certain circular movement of day and night, inasmuch as the angel knowing himself in his own nature referred this knowledge to the praise of the Word as his end, and in the Word as principle received the knowledge of the next work. And as this morning is the end of the preceding day so is it the beginning of the next day: for day is a part of time and the effect of light. And the distinction of those first days is not a distinction of different times, but refers to the spiritual light according as divers and distinct classes of things were made known to the angelic mind.

Reply to the Third Objection. The statement that light properly speaking is not in spiritual things, is untrue. For Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24) says that in spiritual things light is better and more certain; also that light is said of Christ otherwise than stone; for he is light properly speaking, and stone metaphorically. The reason is that all that is made manifest is light (Eph. iv, 13): and manifestation belongs more properly to spiritual than to corporeal things. Hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) numbers light among the intelligible names of God, and intelligible names belong properly to the spiritual world. In proof of the opposite statement it is said that the name light was first employed to signify the cause of manifestation to sight: and in this. way light is a quality directly perceptible to sense, and is not properly applied to spiritual things. It is however extended by common use so as to signify anything that causes a manifestation in any kind of knowledge; so that it bears this signification in ordinary language and in this way light belongs more properly to spiritual things.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. As we have stated above, these days are differentiated not in respect of succession in knowledge, but according to the natural order of the things known. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) holds that these seven days are one day represented by things in seven ways. Consequently the order of the days should be referred to the natural order of the works, which are assigned to days, each day corresponding to certain things which by the angelic intellect are known simultaneously in the Word.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The six days wherein God is said to have created the heaven, the earth, the sea and an that are in them, do not signify a succession of time, but the angelic knowledge as referred to six classes of things created by God, while the seventh day is the angel’s knowledge as referred to the rest of the Maker. For in Augustine’s opinion (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15) God is said to have rested on the seventh day inasmuch as he revealed to the angelic mind the rest whereby he rested in himself from the things created, whereby he is happy in himself and needs not creatures, being all-sufficient to himself: and this knowledge Augustine calls day.—God is said to have rested from work on the seventh day, because afterwards he did nothing new that in some way did not already exist either materially or causally or in respect of some specific or generic likeness in the works of the six days.—And whereas after the completion of all his works God rested in himself on the seventh day, Scripture and the Law commanded the seventh day to be kept holy. For then especially is a thing holy when it rests in God; thus things dedicated to God (e.g. the tabernacle, the vessels, the ministers) are called holy things. Now the seventh day was dedicated to the worship of God and for this reason it is said to be kept holy. Accordingly as God after producing six classes of creatures and making them known to the angelic mind, rested not indeed in the things he had created as though they were his end, but in himself and from the things he had created: inasmuch as he himself is his own beatitude (since he is not made happy by making things, but through being all-sufficient to himself and heeding not the things he made),—even so are we to learn to rest not in God's works nor in ours, but from work and in God in whom our happiness consists. In fact for this very reason was man commanded' to labour in his own works for six days, and to rest on the seventh applying himself to the worship of God and resting in the meditation of divine things, wherein his sanctification chiefly consists.

Again the newness of the world proves in a striking manner the existence of God and that he needs not creatures: wherefore man was commanded in the Law to rest and hold festival on the seventh day which saw the completion of the world, in order that the novelty of the world produced all at once and the six different classes of things might keep man in continual remembrance of God, and lead him to give thanks to him for the great and fruitful boon of the creation, so as to rest his thoughts in him as his end, in this life by grace, in the future life by glory.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Every new work of God as referred to the angelic knowledge is called a day: and as there were but six classes of things created in the beginning by God and made known to the angelic intellect, as stated above, so are there but six days: to which the seventh is added, namely the same angelic knowledge as referred to God's rest in himself. For God produced nothing in nature without first, in the order of nature, making it known to the angel's mind.

The Reply to the Seventh Objection is clear from what has been said: because these days are not differentiated in relation to a difference in the angelic knowledge, but by the different primordial works as referred to that knowledge: so that those first days are distinct in reference to different works and not in reference to different knowledges. Hence these six days are distinct according as the light of the angelic mind is shed on the six classes of things made known to it.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. According to Augustine these three denote the threefold being of things. First, their being in the Word: for things have being in the divine art which is his Word, before they have being in themselves: and this is signified by the words, God said: Let... be made, i.e. He begot the Word in whom things were before they were made.—Secondly, things have being in the angelic mind, because God created nothing in nature, without having previously revealed its nature to the angelic mind: and this is signified in the words, it was so done, namely by the outpouring of the Word into the angel’s intellect.—Thirdly, things have being in their own nature: and this is signified when it is said, He made. For even as the art to which the creature is fashioned is in the Word before it is produced in the creature so in the order of nature was knowledge of that same art in the angelic mind before the creature was produced. Thus the angel has a threefold knowledge of things, namely as they are in the Word, as they are in his mind, and as they are in their respective natures. The first is called morning’ knowledge, while the other two are included in evening’ knowledge: and in order to indicate this twofold mode of a spiritual creature’s knowledge of things, it is said: Evening and morning were one day. Accordingly by these six days wherein we read that God made all things, Augustine understands (De Civ. Dei xi, 9) not these ordinary days that are measured by the course of the sun, since we are told that the sun was created on the fourth day, but one day, that is the angelic knowledge made present to the six classes of things. Thus even as the presence of a corporeal luminary by its shining on this lower world makes a temporal day, so the presence of the spiritual light of the angelic mind by its shining on creatures makes a spiritual day: so that in his opinion these six days are differentiated according as the light of the angel’s intellect shines on the six classes of things made known to it: and the first day is his knowledge of God’s first work, the second day, his knowledge of the second work, and so on. Consequently these six days differ not in the order of time or of the succession of things, but in the natural order of the things known, in so far as one thing was known before another in the order of nature. And just as in a natural or material day the morning is the beginning and the evening the end and term, even ‘so the angel’s knowledge of each work in its original being, namely as having its being in the Word, is called morning knowledge: while the knowledge thereof in respect of its ultimate being, and as existing in its own nature, is called evening knowledge. For the origin of everything’s being lies in the cause whence it issues: while its term lies in its recipient which terminates the action of its cause. Wherefore the first knowledge of a thing is the consideration thereof in the cause whence it comes: while the ultimate knowledge of a thing is the consideration of that thing in itself. Since then the being of things issues from the eternal Word as from their original principle, and this issue terminates in the being that things have in their respective natures, it follows that knowledge of things in the Word which has for its object their first and original being, should be called morning knowledge, by way of comparison with the morning which is the beginning of day: whereas knowledge of a thing in its own nature, which has for its object its ultimate and terminated being, should be called evening knowledge since the evening ends day. Hence as the six classes of things in relation to the angelic knowledge differentiate the days, even so the unity of the thing known which is knowable by various modes of cognition constitutes the unity of the day, which itself is divided into evening and morning.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. An angel is unable directly and principally to understand in their own natures several things, but he is well able to understand several things indirectly as related to one intelligible object. And whereas all things that were produced in their respective natures, were in the order of nature first impressed in the shape of images on the angelic mind, the angel by knowing himself, at the same time, so to say, knows those six classes of things in their natural mutual co-ordination, since by knowing himself, he knows whatsoever has being in himself.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. One power can exercise two operations at the same time, if one of these is referred and ordered to the other; ‘thus it is evident that the will at the same time wills the end and the means, and the intellect at the same time understands the premises and the conclusions through the premises, provided that it knows the conclusions. Now the angels’ evening knowledge is ordered to their morning knowledge, according to Augustine (Dial. lxv QQ. qu. 26: Super Genes. ii, 3, 8), just as natural knowledge and love are ordered to heavenly knowledge and love. Wherefore nothing hinders an angel from having at the same time morning and evening knowledge, just as natural and heavenly knowledge are together. For one power cannot exercise at the same time two operations that proceed from two species of the same kind, if the one be not ordered to the other (and such are all created non-subsistent intelligible species), so that an angel cannot at the same time produce several intellectual acts by means of several concreated species. But if those two operations proceed from forms generically different and disparate one of which is ordered to the other (and such are a subsistent uncreated form, and a non-subsistent created form), then they can be produced simultaneously. Wherefore since the angel's knowledge of things in their respective natures, which is called evening knowledge is exercised by means of a created non-subsistent intelligible species, while his knowledge of things in the Word, which is called morning knowledge is exercised through the subsistent essence of the Word; and since these two are generically distinct and disparate, yet one is ordered to the other, it follows that both knowledges can be exercised at the same time. The reason is that a concreated species inhering in the intellect is not incompatible with the union of the intellect to the essence of the Word, which actuates the intellect not in respect of being but only in respect of understanding, inasmuch as it is disparate and of a higher order, and this same inherent species and whatsoever of perfection there is in the created intellect are by way of a material disposition to that union and blessed vision whereby things are seen in the Word. Hence just as disposition to a form and the form itself can coexist in that which is actually complete, so the inhering intelligible species coexists with the intellect's union to the essence of the Word, in the intellect's perfect operation. Wherefore a twofold operation issues simultaneously from the intellect of the blessed angel; one by reason of its union to the essence of the Word and whereby it sees things in the Word, and this is called morning knowledge; the other by reason of the species inhering to it, whereby it sees things in their own nature, and this is called evening knowledge. Neither of these actions is weakened or lessened by attention to the other, on the contrary it is strengthened, seeing that the one leads to the other, even as the imagination of what one has seen is more vivid when the thing is actually present to the eye. For the action whereby the blessed see the Word and things in the

Word is the reason of their every action. And when of two actions one is the reason of the other or is ordered to the other, both of them can be exercised at once by the same power. In that case the one power terminates in different actions in respect of different species mutually ordered the one to the other, not in the same respect but in different respects. For species that differ in genus and order, or that are disparate, can be united together in respect of a perfect act, for instance colour, smell and taste in fruit. Now the divine essence, whereby the angel's intellect sees things in the Word is uncreated and self-subsistent: the essence of an angel whereby he sees always himself and things as having being in himself is created and self-subsistent by reason of the being he had received and by which his intellect subsists; and the infused or concreated intelligible species, whereby he sees things in their own nature is non-subsistent: wherefore these three are different in order and genus, and disparate, so that the first is as it were the reason of the others, and the second the reason of the third: consequently the angelic intellect will be able to have a threefold operation in respect of those three forms. Even so the soul of Christ at the same time understands things by the species of the Word, as by infused, and by acquired species.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. just as in the opinion of Augustine (Ad Oros. qu. xxi) the informity of matter preceded its formation by priority not of time but of order (as sound and voice precede the song), so the formation of the spiritual nature signified in the creation of light, since this is more noble than the corporeal nature, preceded the formation of the latter in the order of nature and origin but not of time. Now the formation of the spiritual nature consists in its being enlightened so as to adhere to the Word, not indeed by perfect glory, with which it was not created, but by perfect grace with which it was created. Accordingly by this light the distinction was made from darkness, to wit from the formless condition of the corporeal creature as yet unformed, yet in the order of nature to be formed afterwards. Because the formation of the spiritual creature may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting the infusion of grace, second, as denoting the conservation of glory. The former according to Augustine was vouchsafed the spiritual creature from the very first instant of its creation, in which case the darkness from which the light was divided does not denote the sin of the wicked angels, but the formless condition of nature which was not yet formed, but in the order of nature was to be formed in the subsequent works

(Gen. ad lit. i, 5, 6, 7).—Or again (Super Gen. iv, 22, 23) day signifies God’s knowledge, night the creature’s, which latter is darkness in comparison with God’s (ibid.).—Or again if darkness be taken to signify the wicked angels, then this distinction refers to their sin not as present but as future to God’s foreknowledge. Hence (Ad Oros. qu. xxiv) he says: “God foreseeing that some of his angels would fall through pride, by the unchangeable order of his foreknowledge, divided the good from the wicked, and called the wicked darkness, the good, light.”

The second formation of the spiritual nature does not belong to the beginning of things, but rather to their course in which they are governed by divine providence. Hence the distinction of light from darkness, if by darkness we understand the sins of the demons, must be taken in reference to God’s foreknowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 19) that he alone could divide light from darkn,ess who before the angels fell could foresee that they would fall. But if by darkness we understand the formless condition of matter yet to be formed, the order is signified not of time but of nature between the formations of both natures.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. If we suppose that all things were created at the same time as to both matter and form, then the angel is said to have been cognisant of the future creation of the corporeal creature, not as though the corporeal creature were future in point of time, but because it was known as future inasmuch as it was seen in its cause in which it existed already as something that could issue therefrom. Thus he who knows a chest in the materials of which it is made, may be said to know the chest as a future thing. For the knowledge of a thing in the Word is called 9 morning’ knowledge, whether the thing is already made or has to be made, and refers indifferently to present or future things, since it is conformed to the divine knowledge whereby God knows all things simply before they are made as well as after they have been made. Nevertheless all knowledge of a thing in the Word refers to that thing as yet to be made, whether it be already made or not, in so far as ‘yet to be made ‘ indicates not time but the issue of the creature from its Creator. Even so the artificer has in his art the knowledge of the work he produces, but that knowledge refers to the work as something he intends to make even when it has already been made. Wherefore for this reason, although the corporeal creature was made at the same time as the spiritual nature, the angel is nevertheless said to have known the corporeal creature in the Word as something yet to be made, for the reason already given.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Even as morning precedes evening, so the morning precedes the evening knowledge in the order of nature, not in respect of one and the same work but in respect of different works. Nevertheless evening knowledge of a prior work is understood to precede morning knowledge of a later work. For the work of the first day was the creation of light, whereby we understand the formation of the angelic nature by the enlightenment of grace; while the knowledge whereby the spiritual creature knows himself is consequent to its being in his own nature. Hence in the order of nature the spiritual creature knew himself in his own nature by ‘evening’ knowledge whereby he knew himself as already created, before he knew himself in the Word in whom he knew God’s work as something yet to be done. Accordingly in this knowledge whereby the good angels knew themselves they did not rest, as making themselves the object of their fruition and their own end, because then they would become night as the wicked angels who sinned, but they referred their knowledge to the praise of God. Thus by his knowledge of himself the good angel was converted to the contemplation of the Word, and this was the beginning of the following day, because in the Word he received knowledge of the following work, namely the firmament. Now just as in continuous time the same ‘now’ belongs to two periods of tirae, inasmuch as it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, even so the ‘ morning ‘ knowledge of the second day terminates the first day and begins the second day, and so on to the seventh day. Consequently on the first day evening alone is mentioned, since the angel first had ‘evening’ knowledge of himself, and that evening knowledge went forward to ‘morning’ knowledge, in so far as from contemplation of himself he advanced to the contemplation of the Word, and to the morning, of the next day by receiving in the Word the morning knowledge of the next work. Thus then morning knowledge of one and the same work after the first work naturally precedes the ‘evening’ knowledge of the same work: but evening knowledge of a previous work naturally precedes morning knowledge of a later work: wherefore as the first day had only an evening, so the seventh day through signifying contemplation of God, which being faultless never wanes has only a morning.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine gives the name of morning knowledge to that which is in full light, so that it includes mid-day knowledge: in fact he calls it sometimes day sometimes morning knowledge.—Or else it may be said that all knowledge of the angelic intellect has a mixture of darkness on the part of the knower, so that no knowledge of an angelic intellect can be called mid-day knowledge, but only that knowledge whereby God knows all things in himself.—Again, since God is all light and no darkness is in him, the knowledge, of God, being all light, ,may in itself and absolutely be called mid-day knowledge: whereas a creature being made from nothing has the darkness of potentiality and imperfection, and consequently the knowledge of a creature is mixed with darkness. This mixture is signified by morning and evening, for as much as a creature can be known in two ways.—First in the Word, according as the creature issues from the divine art,—and thus the knowledge thereof is called morning knowledge. because as morning is the end of darkness and the beginning of light, so the creature after darkness, namely after nonexistence, receives a beginning of light from the Word. Secondly the creature is knowable in its own nature by means of a created species, and such knowledge is called evening knowledge, since just as evening is the end of light and verges into night, even so the creature as subsistent in itself is the end of the operation of the Word who is light, in that it is made by him, and so far as it is concerned tends to the darkness of non-existence unless it were upheld by the Word. And yet this knowledge is called day, because as in comparison with the knowledge of the Word it is darksome, so in comparison with ignorance which is altogether darksome, it is called light; even so the life of the just man is said to be darksome as compared with the life of glory, and yet is called light in comparison with the life of the wicked.Again seeing that morning and evening are parts of a day, and that day in the angels is knowledge illumined by the light of grace, it follows that morning and evening knowledge extend only to the gratuitously bestowed knowledge of the good angels, so that the enlightened angel’s knowledge of God’s works is called day, and the days are distinguished in reference to the various kinds of divine works as known, and are arranged according to their order. Now each of those works is known by the enlightened angel in two ways. First in the Word or by the species of the Word, and this is called morning knowledge. Secondly, in its own nature, or by a created species. In this knowledge the good angels do not rest as making it their end, because they would become night like the wicked angels: but they refer that knowledge to the praise of the Word and the light of God in whom they know all things as in their source. Wherefore this knowledge of the creature being referred to God is not called night: which it would be were they to rest therein, since they would become night through making a creature the object of their fruition. Accordingly, morning and evening knowledge are divisions of the day, i.e. the knowledge which the good enlightened angels have of the works of creation. Now the good angels' knowledge of a creature, whether through a created or an uncreated medium, has always an element of obscurity; and so it is not called mid-day knowledge as the knowledge of God in himself is; nor is it called night, as that knowledge of a creature which is not referred to the divine light, but it is called morning and evening knowledge, for this reason that evening as such terminates in the morning. Hence not all knowledge of a thing in its nature can be called evening knowledge, but only that which is referred to the glory of the Creator. Thus the knowledge which the demons have of things cannot, strictly speaking, be called either morning or evening knowledge: because morning and evening in reference to the angelic knowledge are not to be likened to it on all points but only in the point of beginning and end.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Although created in grace, the angel was not beatified from the very beginning of his creation, nor did he see God's Word in his essence: wherefore neither had he morning knowledge of himself, which signifies knowledge of a thing through the species of the Word. But at first he had evening knowledge of himself inasmuch as he knew himself in himself naturally, for this reason that in everyone natural knowledge precedes supernatural knowledge, as being the latter's foundation, and an angel's knowledge naturally follows his being in his own nature: so that when he was first created he had not morning but evening knowledge of himself. This knowledge he referred to the praise of the Word and by so doing he merited morning knowledge. It is significant then that the first day is stated to have had only an evening and not a morning, which evening passed into morning: because the spiritual creature which, we are told, was made on the first day, knew itself as soon as it was made. This was evening knowledge, and by referring it to the praise of the

Word, it merited the morning knowledge of the next work. For not every knowledge of a thing in its nature can be called evening knowledge but only that which is referred to the praise of the Creator: since evening recedes and ends with the morning. Hence the knowledge which the demons acquire by themselves about things is neither morning nor evening knowledge: but this can only be said of the knowledge gratuitously bestowed on the good angels. Accordingly the knowledge of things in their respective natures, if it be referred to the praise of the Word, is always evening knowledge: nor does the fact that it is so referred make it morning knowledge, but it makes it terminate therein, and by so doing the angel merits to receive morning knowledge. And just as the first day which signifies the formation and knowledge of the spiritual creature in its own nature, has only an evening, so too the seventh day has only a morning in that it signifies the contemplation of God which being faultless never wanes, and which corresponds to the angels’ knowledge in reference to God’s rest in himself, while to rest in God is the enlightenment and sanctification of everything. For in that God ceased to fashion new creatures he is said to have completed his work and to have rested in himself from his works. And just as God rests in himself alone, and is happy in the enjoyment of himself, even so we are made happy by enjoying him alone, and thus he makes us to rest in him both from his works and from our own. Accordingly the first day which corresponds to the knowledge which the spiritual creature enlightened by the light of grace had concerning itself, has only an evening: whereas the seventh day which corresponds to the angelic knowledge in reference to God’s rest and fruition in himself has only a morning, because in God there is no darkness. For God is stated to have rested on the seventh day inasmuch as he revealed to the angels his own rest whereby he rested in himself from the things he had made. It is the knowledge of this rest that Augustine (Dial. lxv, qu. 26) calls day. And since the creature’s rest whereby it stands firm in God, has no end, in like manner God’s rest whereby he rests in himself from the things he has made, in that he needs them not, has no end, for he will never need them: hence it is that the seventh day which corresponds to that rest has not an evening but a morning; whereas the other days which correspond to the angelic knowledge in reference to things, have both morning and evening, as already stated.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. As we have already explained, it is possible to know a thing already made as something yet to be made, if it be considered in the causes whence it issues: and thus the angels received knowledge in the Word of things to be made, for the Word is the supreme art of things. Because all knowledge of a thing in the Word, otherwise morning knowledge, is said to have for its object the thing as yet to be made, whether or not it be already made; since yet to be made indicates not time but the issue of the creature from the Creator, as stated above (ad 14). Wherefore though the corporeal creature was made at the same time as the spiritual nature, the angel is said by morning knowledge to know in the Word the thing as something yet to be made. Why the first day had no morning but only evening has been explained in the previous Reply.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The spiritual creature does not derive his knowledge from things: he understands them naturally by means of innate or concreated species. Now the species in an angel's mind do not equally refer to the present and the future. Present things have actually a likeness to the forms in the angelic mind, so that by those forms the present can be known: whereas future things are not yet actually like those forms, so that by those forms the future cannot be known, since knowledge is effected by an actual assimilation of the known to the knower. Wherefore, as an angel does not know the future as such, he needs the presence of things in order that by the forms impressed on him he may know things in their respective natures: because before these latter are made, they are not assimilated to those forms. Moreover evening and morning knowledge are differentiated on the part not of the thing known but of the medium of knowledge. Morning knowledge results from an uncreated medium that transcends the nature both of the knower and of the thing known: and for this reason knowledge of things through the species of the Word is called morning whether the things be already made or remain yet to be made: whereas evening knowledge is effected by means of a created medium that is proportionate both to the knower and to the thing known, whether the latter be already made or remain yet to be made.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Although the angel has being in the Word before he has being in his own nature, nevertheless seeing that knowledge presupposes the existence .of the knower, he could not know himself before he existed. Now his knowledge of himself in his own nature is natural to him, whereas his knowledge of the Word is supernatural. Hence it behoved. him to know himself first in his own nature, before knowing himself in the Word: because in everyone natural knowledge precedes supernatural as its foundation. Other things, however, by his morning knowledge he knew in the Word by a priority of the natural order before knowing them in their respective natures by his evening knowledge: so that in respect of the subsequent works morning preceded evening, as already stated.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. As one complete science includes various particular sciences, whereby various conclusions are known, so also the one angelic knowledge which is a kind of whole comprises morning and evening knowledge as its parts, even as morning and evening are parts of the day, albeit disparate. Because things that are mutually disparate if ordered to each other can constitute one whole: thus matter and form which are disparate, constitute one composite; and again flesh, bones and sinews are parts of one composite body. Now the divine essence whereby things are known in the Word by morning knowledge is the prototype of all the concreated forms in the angelic mind, seeing that these derive from it as from their exemplar, and through them things are known in their own nature by evening knowledge: even as the angel's essence is the type whereby he understands the being which he knows; yet it is not a. perfect type, for which reason he needs other superadded forms. Consequently when an angel sees God in his essence, as also himself and other things by means of concreated species, in a way of speaking he understands one thing: thus because light is the reason for seeing colour, therefore when the eye sees both light and colour it sees in a manner of speaking one visible thing. And although these operations are distinct in reality, seeing that the operation whereby he sees God is everlasting and is measured by participated eternity, and the operation whereby he understands himself is everlasting and is measured by eviternity, while the operations whereby he understands other things by innate species is not everlasting but one succeeds the other, nevertheless since one is ordered to the other, and one is the formal reason as it were of the other, they are so to speak one thing: because where one thing is on account of another there is but one (Top. iii, 2), so that when several operations are mutually ordered the one to the other, they can be simultaneous and constitute one whole.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Whereas the intellect is the abode of intelligible species, it follows that the science of setting in order the intelligible species, in other words the intellect's skill and ability in using those species must remain after death, even as the intellect itself which is the abode of those species. On the other hand the manner in which it actually uses them in the present state of life, namely by turning to phantasms which dwell in the sensible powers, will not remain after death: because seeing that the sensible powers will be destroyed, the soul will be unable either by the species acquired in this life, or by the species acquired by it in its state of separation, to understand by turning t o phantasms; but it will be able to do so in a manner befitting the mode of being that it will have in likeness to the angels. Hence knowledge will be destroyed not as to the habit, nor as to the substance of the cognitive act that takes its species from the species of the object, but as to the manner of knowing, which will not be by conversion to the phantasms; and this is the meaning intended by the Apostle.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The light caused in the air by the sun and that produced by a candle are of the same kind, and seeing that two forms of the same kind cannot coexist in a perfect state in the same subject, it follows that sun and candle together produce one light in the air. Now the divine essence whereby things are known in the Word differs in kind from the species whereby an angel knows a thing in its nature: wherefore the comparison fails. For when perfection is come the opposite imperfection is made void: thus on the advent of the vision of God, faith which is of things unseen is made void. But the imperfection of evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of morning knowledge, since knowledge of a thing in itself is not, opposed to knowledge of it in its cause: nor again does it involve a contradiction that a thing be known through two mediums one of which is more perfect than the other: even so we may hold the same conclusion by a demonstration and a probable medium. In like manner the same thing may be known by an angel in the uncreated Word and through an innate species; since the one is not opposed, in fact rather is it a material disposition, to the other. Now perfection by its advent removes the opposite imperfection. But the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of heavenly bliss, in fact it underlies it, just as the imperfection of potentiality underlies the perfection of form: and the form removes not potentiality but the privation to which it is opposed. In like manner the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the beatific knowledge but underlies it as a material disposition. Hence the angel can know things by a created medium in their own nature; and this is ‘evening’ and natural knowledge; and at the same time by the essence of the Word, which is beatific and’ morning ‘ knowledge.” And these two knowledges do not hinder each other, since the one is ordered to the other, and is by way of a material disposition to the other.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. Augustine (Super Gen. v, 12, 14) holds that at the very beginning of creation certain things specifically distinct were produced in their respective, natures, such as the four elements produced from nothing, as well as the heavenly bodies and spiritual substances: for this kind of production requires no matter either out of which or in which a thing is made. Also that other things are stated to have been created in their seed-forms, for example animals, plants and men, and that these were all subsequently produced in their respective natures in that work by which God after the six days attends to nature previously established, of which work it is said (Jo. v, 17): My Father worketh until now. Moreover he holds that in the production and distinction of things we should see an order not of time but of nature: inasmuch as all the works of the six days were wrought in the one instant of time either actually, or potentially in their seed-forms, in that afterwards they could be made from pre-existent matter either by the Word, or by the active forces with which the creature was endowed in its creation. Wherefore in regard to the first man’s soul which, he suggests without asserting it, was created actually at the same time as the angels, he does not hold that it was created before the sixth day, although he holds that on the sixth day it was actually made, and the first man’s body as to its seed-forms: for God endowed the earth with a passive potentiality so that by the active power of the Creator man’s body could be formed therefrom. Accordingly the soul was actually made at the same time as the body was made in its passive potentiality to God’s active power.—Or again, seeing that in truth according to Aristotle (De Anima ii), the soul is not a complete species in itself but is united to the body as the latter’s form, and is naturally a part of human nature, we must infer that the first man’s soul was not brought into actual existence before the formation of the body, but was created and infused into the body at the same time as the body was formed, even as Augustine holds (Super Gen. x, 17) with regard to other souls. For God produced the first things in their perfect natural state, according as the species of each one required. Now the rational soul being a part of human nature has not its natural perfection except as united to the body. Hence it naturally has its being in the body, and existence outside the body is non-natural to it: so that it was unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.

If then we adopt the opinion of Augustine on the works of the six days, it may be said that as in those six days the body of the first man was not actually formed and produced, but only potentially in its seed-forms: even so his soul was not produced then actually and in itself, but in its generic likeness; and thus preceded the body during those six days not actually and in itself, but in respect of a certain generic likeness, inasmuch as it has an intellectual nature in common with the angels. Afterwards however, in the work whereby God attends to the creature already produced, the soul was actually created at the same time as the body was formed.

The Reply to the Twenty-third Objection is clear from what has been said. The human body was not brought into actual existence in those six days, as neither were the bodies of other animals, but only in the shape of seed-forms, since God in creating the elements, planted in them certain forces or seeds, so that either by the power of God, or by the influence of the stars or by seminal propagation animals might be produced. Accordingly those things that were actually produced in those six days were created not by degrees but at the same time, while the others were brought into existence as seed-forms in their like.

Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. As we have already said in the Reply to the Sixteenth Objection, knowledge of things by innate species that are proportionate to things is called ‘evening’ knowledge and is of things as subsisting in their respective nature, whether already made or yet to be made. And although those species are related equally to the present or future, the things themselves that are present or future are not equally related to the species because present things are actually assimilated to the species and thus can be actually known thereby; whereas future things are not actually assimilated to them. Therefore it does not follow that they can be known by them. And evening knowledge which is of things in their respective natures is not so called because the angels take from things the species whereby they understand them, but because by the species received at their creation they understand things as subsisting in their respective nature.

Reply to the Twenty-fifth Objection. In Augustine’s opinion (Super Gen. ii, 8) the angels from the very beginning saw the things to be made by the Word. The things which, we are told, were made in the works of the six days were all made at the same time: wherefore those six days were all from the very outset of the creation, and consequently the good angels must have known the Word and creatures in the Word from the very beginning. Creatures have a threefold being as already stated. First in the divine art which is the Word: this is signified when it is said: God said ? Let... be made, i.e. He begot the Word in whom such and such a work was before it could be made. Secondly, they have being in the angelic intelligence, and this is signified in the words, It was so done, to wit by the outpouring of the Word. Thirdly they have being in themselves and in their respective natures. In like manner the angel has a threefold knowledge of things: of things as existing in the Word, as existing in his own mind, and as existing in their respective natures. Again the angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word: a natural know ledge whereby he knows the Word by his likeness shining forth in his (the angel’s) nature, wherein consists his natural beatitude, and which he can obtain by his natural powers: and a supernatural and beatific knowledge whereby he knows the Word in his (the Word’s) essence, and in this his supernatural beatitude consists, which surpasses his natural powers.

By either of these the good angel knows things or creatures in the Word: by his natural knowledge, however, he knows things in the Word imperfectly: whereas by his beatific knowledge he knows things in the Word with greater fullness and perfection.

The first knowledge of things in the Word was received by the angel at the instant of his creation, wherefore it is stated in De Eccl. Dogmat. that “the angels who persevered in the happy state wherein they were created, possess the good they have, not by nature but by grace.” Again Augustine (De Fide ad Pet. iii) says: “The angelic spirits received from above the gift of eternity and beatitude when they were created in their spiritual nature.” Yet they were not thereby beatified simply, seeing that they were capable of greater perfection, but in a restricted sense, i.e. in relation to the time being. Thus the Philosopher (I Ethic. x) says that some are happy in this life, not simply, but as men. The second or beatific knowledge was bestowed on the angels not from the beginning of their creation, since they were not created in a state of perfect beatitude, but from the moment they were beatified by perfect conversion to the good. Accordingly all these six classes of things were created at the same time together with the angels, and in the same instant the angel by natural knowledge knew in the Word whatsoever afterwards he knew in the Word more fully by supernatural knowledge, which the angels received immediately on their referring their natural self-knowledge to the praise of the Word: and this same natural knowledge being measured by eviternity, is always coexistent with their supernatural knowledge of the Word, and with their knowledge through innate species, of creatures in their respective natures. Hence these three cognitions are co-existent, nor does one properly speaking follow the other: although, the knowledge of things in the Word, be they already made or yet to be made, is called morning knowledge: while the knowledge of things through a created medium in their own nature, be they present or future, is called evening knowledge.

Reply to the Twenty-sixth Objection. It is not possible that an angel see the Word or divine essence as the type of things to be made, without seeing it as the end of the Blessed and the object of beatitude c since the divine essence in itself is the object of beatitude and the end of the Blessed. For it is not possible to see the divine essence as the type of things to be made without seeing it in itself; wherefore the whole argument is granted.

Reply to the Twenty-seventh Objection. Some with the object of distinguishing between prophetic and beatific knowledge; contended that the prophets see the divine essence itself which they call the mirror of eternity, not however in the way in which it is the object of the Blessed and the end of beatitude, but as the type of things to be done, inasmuch as it contains the types of future events, as stated in the argument. But this is impossible, since God in his very essence is the object of beatitude and the end of the Blessed, according to the saying of Augustine (Conf. v, 4): Happy whoso knoweth thee, though he know not these, i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible, to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God without seeing it also, both because the divine essence is the type of all things that are made (the ideal type of the thing to be made adding nothing to the divine essence save only a relationship to the creature); and because knowledge of a thing in itself (and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly bliss) precedes the knowledge of that thing as related to something else (and such is the knowledge of God as containing the types of things). Wherefore it is impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types of creatures yet not as the object of heavenly bliss. And since they do not see the divine essence as the object of heavenly bliss (both because vision does away with prophecy (1 Cor. xiii, 9, 10) and because the beatific vision denotes knowledge of God not as distant but as near, since he is seen face to face), it follows that prophets do not see the essence of God as the type of future events, nor do they see things in the Word as the angels did by morning knowledge. For the prophetic vision is not the vision of the very essence of God, nor do they see in the divine essence Itself the things that they do see, as the angels did: but they see them in certain images according as they are enlightened by the divine light as Dionysius says (Cad. Hier. iv). These images illumined by the divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the divine essence, inasmuch as in a mirror are formed images from other things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet’s mind thus enlightened may be called a mirror in so far as a likeness of the truth of the divine foreknowledge is reflected therein, and for this reason it is called the mirror of eternity as reflecting by means of those images the fore-knowledge of God who in his eternity sees all things as present before him. Hence the prophet’s knowledge bears a greater resemblance to the angel’s evening than to his morning knowledge: since the morning knowledge is effected through an uncreated medium, and the prophet’s through a created medium, that is by species impressed on him or illumined by the divine light, as stated above.

Reply to the Twenty-eighth Objection. In Augustine’s opinion the words, Let the earth bring forth the green herb do not signify that plants were actually produced then in their own nature, but that the earth then received certain forces of production to be brought into action in the work of propagation: so that we may understand that the earth did then bring forth the green herb and the fruit-tree yielding fruit in the sense that then it was made capable of bringing them forth. This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture (Gen. ii, 4, 5) where we read: These are the generations of the heaven and the earth when they were created in the day that the Lord God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew. Whence two conclusions are to be inferred. First, that all the works of the six days were created on the day when God made heaven and earth and every plant of the field, so that the plants, which are stated to have been made on the third day were produced at the same time as heaven and earth were created by God. Secondly, that the plants were brought forth then, not into actual existence, but only in certain seed-forms, inasmuch as the earth was enabled to produce them. This is signified when it is stated that God brought forth every plant of the field before it actually sprung up in the earth by the work of administration, and every herb of the ground before it grew. Accordingly before they actually grew above the earth they were produced causally in the earth.

It is also confirmed by the following argument. In those first days God produced the creature in its cause, in its origin, or mi actual existence, by a work from which he rested subsequently, and yet afterwards in the administration of things which he had made, he continues to work even until now in the work of propagation. Now the production of plants from the earth into actual existence belongs to the work of propagation, since the powers of the heavenly body as father, and of the earth as mother suffice for their production. Hence the plants were not actually produced on the third day but only in their causes: and after the six days they were brought into actual existence in their respective species and natures by the work of government. Consequently before the plants were produced causally, nothing was produced, but they were produced together with the heaven and the earth. In like manner the fishes, birds and animals were produced in those six days causally and not actually.

Reply to the Twenty-ninth Objection. It belongs to the wisdom of an artificer whose works, like God’s, are all perfect, to make neither the whole separate from its chief part, nor the parts separate from the whole: since neither the whole separate from the chief part, or the parts separate from the whole have perfect being. Since then the angels in their various species, together with the heavenly bodies and the four elements are the chief parts constituting the one universe, inasmuch as they are mutually ordered to one another and of service the one to the other; it follows that it belongs to God’s wisdom to produce the whole universe, together with all its parts at the same time and not by degrees. The reason whereof is that of one whole together with all its parts there should be but one production, and that to produce the one before the other is a mark of weakness in the agent. Now God has infinite power without any weakness, and the universe is his principal effect. Wherefore he created by one single productive act the whole universe together with all its principal parts. And although in the production of the universe no order of time was observed, the order of nature and origin was observed. For according to Augustine the work of creation preceded the work of distinction in the order of nature but not of time; likewise the work of distinction preceded the work of adornment in the order of nature. The work of creation consisted in the making of heaven and earth: and by the heaven we are to understand the production of the spiritual nature in a formless condition: and by the earth, —the formless matter of corporeal beings. These two, as Augustine says (Conf. xii, 8), being outside time, considered in their essence are not subject to the alternations of time: wherefore the creation of both is described as taking place before all days. Not that this formless condition preceded formation by a priority of time, but only in the order of nature and origin, as sound precedes song. Again in his opinion, one formation does not precede another in point of duration, but only in the order of nature. According to this order we must needs give the first place to the formation of the highest spiritual nature, signified in the making of light on the first day, inasmuch as the spiritual nature surpasses the corporeal in dignity and eminence, wherefore it behoved it to be formed first: and it is formed by being enlightened, so as to adhere to the Word of God. Now just as in the natural order spiritual and divine light surpasses the corporeal nature in dignity and eminence, so also do the higher bodies surpass the lower. Hence on the second day mention is made of the formation of the higher bodies, when it is said, Let a firmament be made, whereby it is signified that a heavenly form was bestowed on formless matter which existed already not in point of time but in the order of origin only. The third place is given to the impression of the elemental forms on formless matter, existing already by a priority not of time but of origin and nature. Hence by the words, Let the waters be gathered together and let the dry land appear, we are to understand that corporeal matter received the substantial form of water so that it was enabled to carry out that movement, as also the substantial form of earth so that it became visible as dry land: because water glides and flows away, whereas the earth abides (Gen. ad lit. ii, ii). Moreover under the name of wker, according to Augustine, we are to understand that the other higher elements also were formed.

In the following three days corporeal nature is stated to have been adorned. It behoved the parts of the world to be first in the order of nature formed and distinguished and afterwards each part to be adorned by being filled with their respective occupants. On the first day, as stated, the spiritual nature was formed and distinguished,; on the second the heavenly bodies were formed and distinguished, and on the fourth adorned; on the third day the lower bodies’, namely, air, water and earth were formed and distinguished: of which the air and water as being of greater dignity were adorned on the fifth day; and the earth, being the lowest body, was adorned on the sixth day. Thus the perfection of the divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six which is the sum and product of its aliquot parts, one, two and three: in that one day was deputed to the formation and distinction of the spiritual creature: two days to the formation and distinction of the corporeal nature, and three to its adornment (thus 1+2+3=6: 6x1=6: 2x3=6 and 3x2=6). Since then six is the first perfect number, it fittingly denotes the perfection of things and of the divine works. Accordingly there is nothing to show that the order of the divine works was one of time and not of nature.

Reply to the Thirtieth Objection. The luminaries were produced in actual and not virtual existence like the plants: thus the firmament has no power productive of luminaries, as the earth has enabling it to bring forth plants. Hence Scripture does not say: Let the firmament produce lights, as it says: Let the earth bring forth the green herb, i.e. let it have the power to produce them. Wherefore the luminaries actually existed before the plants did, although the latter were produced virtually and in their causes before the luminaries were brought into actual existence. Moreover it has been stated that the order of production preceded in the order of nature the work of adornment; and the luminaries belong to the adornment of the heavens, while the plants, especially as regards their virtual existence, do not belong to the adornment of the earth, but rather to its perfection. For seemingly only such things belong to the perfection of the heavens and the earth as are intrinsic to the heavens and earth; while adornment is one of those things that are distinct from them: even so a man is perfected by his proper parts and forms, but is adorned by his clothes or something of the kind. Now things become mutually distinct especially by local movement whereby they are separated the one from the other. . Hence the work of adornment comprises in a special way the production of those things that are endowed with movement whether in the heavens or on the earth. According to Ptolemy the luminaries are not fixed in the heavens but have a movement independent of that of the spheres, while in the opinion of Aristotle, the stars are fixed to the spheres; and really do not move except with the movement of the spheres: nevertheless the movements of the luminaries and stars is perceptible to the senses whereas that of the spheres is not. Moses coming down to the level of an unlettered people, described things as they appear, by saying that the luminaries are an adornment of the heavens.—Plants are not part of the earth's adornment, only the animals are: because a thing belongs to the adornment of the place wherein it has real or apparent movement, and not where it remains motionless; and the plants cling to the earth by their roots, so that they are not part of its adornment but form part of its perfection. As to the stars although they have no movement of themselves, they have an accidental and apparent movement; while the plants have no movement at all. Consequently in the order of nature it. behoved the plants which belong to the intrinsic perfection of part of the universe to be produced before the luminaries which belong to the adornment of the heavens.

Reply to the Thirty-first Objection. According to Augustine (Super Gen. contra Manich. i, 5, 7) the earth and water mentioned at the beginning before the creation of the firmament do not signify the elements of earth and water, but primal matter devoid of all forms and species. Moses, seeing that he was addressing an unlettered people could not mention primal matter, except under the guise of things known to them and most akin to a formless condition through having more matter and less form. For this reason, he expresses it by combining a twofold comparison, and instead of calling it earth only or water only, he calls it earth and water, lest if he mentioned only one of these, it might be thought that primal matter was really that and nothing else. ‘ Yet it bears a certain likeness to earth, inasmuch as it supports and underlies forms as the earth supports plants and other things. Again earth of all the elements has the least specification, being more solid and allied to matter, and less formal than the others. It bears also this likeness to water, that it has a natural aptitude for receiving various forms: because humidity which is becoming to water renders things impressionable and easy to fix. Accordingly the earth is said to be void and empty or invisible and incomposite, because matter is known by its form: so that considered in itself, it is said to be invisible, i.e. unknowable, and void inasmuch as the form is the end for which matter craves (because a thing is said to be void when it fails to obtain its end): or it is called void in comparison with the composite wherein it subsists, because a void is opposed to firmness and solidity. It is said to be incomposite, because it cannot subsist outside a composite, and lacks the beauty of actual existence. It is said to be empty because its potentiality is filled by the form: hence Plato (Tim.) identified matter with place, inasmuch as the receptivity of matter is somewhat like to the receptivity of place, in that while the same matter remains, divers forms succeed one another, just as divers bodies succeed one another in one place. Hence terms that are predicated of place are by comparison predicated of matter, so that matter is said to be empty because it lacks the form which fills the capacity and potentiality of matter. Thus, then, formless primal matter in the order of nature and origin preceded the formation of the firmament, and the latter in the order of nature preceded the earth and water mentioned on the third day, as stated above.

Reply to the Thirty-second Objection. Augustine (De Civ. Dei xi, 33) holds that it was not fitting for Moses to omit the production of the spiritual creature: and so he contends that in the words, In the beginning God created, heaven and earth, heaven signifies the spiritual creature as yet unformed, and earth, formless corporeal matter. And seeing that the spiritual nature is more worthy than the corporeal, it behoved it to receive its formation first. Accordingly the formation of the spiritual nature is signified in the creation of light which denotes spiritual light; because the formation of a spiritual nature consists in its being enlightened so as to adhere to the Word of God, not indeed by perfect glory in which it was not created, but by that which is conferred with the light of grace in which it was created: and this spiritual light preceded the firmament in the order of nature.

But in the opinion of other holy men the light created on the first day was corporeal, and was produced in the heaven created on the first day together with the substance of the sun as regards the common nature of light, while on the fourth day it received definite powers for the production of definite effects.

Reply to the Thirty-third Objection. The order of the production of these animals, since they belong to the adornment of the parts of the universe, depends on the order of the parts they adorn rather than on their own excellence. Now air and water which are adorned by fishes and birds as being more worthy in the order of nature precede the earth which is adorned by the animals that walk on its surface: wherefore it behoved the production of flying creatures and of fishes or swimming creatures to precede that of the creatures that walk.—It might also be said that in the process of generation perfection follows imperfection, and is ordered in such wise that the more imperfect things are produced first in the order of nature: because this process requires that the more perfect a thing is and the greater its likeness to the active cause, the later its production in point of time, although in the order of nature and dignity it takes precedence. For this reason since man is the most perfect of all animals, it behoved him to be made after all the others and not immediately after the heavenly bodies, which are not reckoned in relation to the lower bodies in the order of generation, since they have no matter in common with them, but one that is altogether disparate.

Reply to the Thirty-fourth Objection. Birds and fishes as regards the matter from which they are produced have more in common with each other than with terrestrial animals. Fishes and birds are said to be produced from the waters: the former from the more solid parts, the latter from the more subtle portion that was resolved into vapour so as to be a mean between air and water: hence the birds arose into the air, while the fishes sank into the deep. Now animals are assigned to various days or to one day according as their bodies are produced from different matters or from the same matter. Since then fishes and birds are said to be produced from the waters inasmuch as, considering their respective temperaments in comparison with the temperament peculiar to the common genus, they have more water in their composition than other animals have, whereas other animals are said to have been produced from the earth, hence it is that one day is assigned to the production of fishes and birds, and another day to the production of the terrestrial animals. Moreover the production of animals is related solely with respect to their being intended for the adornment of parts of the world: wherefore the days on which the animals were produced are distinguished solely with respect to their likeness or difference in the point of adorning some part of the world. As to fire and air seeing that the common people do not regard them as parts of the world, Moses does not mention them expressly but comprises them with the intermediate element namely water, especially as regards the lower parts of the air. Consequently one day is assigned to the birds and fishes which adorn the water and the air as to its lower part which is akin to water: while one other day is assigned to all the terrestrial animals.

If, however, preference be given to the opinion of Gregory and others, the arguments against this view must now be dealt with. These authors hold that between the days in question there was a succession of time, and that things were produced by degrees, so that when heaven and earth were created, there was as yet no light, nor was the firmament formed, nor were the waters removed from the face of the earth, nor the heavenly lights produced.

1. On the day when God created heaven and earth, namely the heavenly bodies and the four elements with their substantial forms, he also created every plant of the field, not actually or before it sprang up from the earth, but potentially so that afterwards on the third day it was produced into actual existence.

2. According to Gregory (Moral. xxxii, 9) when God created the angel, he created man also, not actually or in himself, but potentially or in his likeness, in so far as he is like the angels in regard to his intellect. Afterwards on the sixth day man was produced actually in himself.

3. The disposition of a thing that is already complete is not the, same as its disposition while yet in the making: wherefore although the nature of a perfect and complete world requires that all the essential parts of the universe exist together, it could be otherwise when the world was as yet in its beginning: thus in a complete man there cannot be a heart without his other parts, yet in the formation of the embryo the heart is fashioned before any other part. It may also be replied that in this beginning of things the heavenly bodies and all the elements with their substantial forms were produced together with the angels, all of which are the principal parts of the universe; and that on the following days, something was done in the nature

already created, and pertaining to the perfection and adornment of the parts already produced.

4. Although the Greek doctors maintained that the spiritual creature was created before the corporeal, the Latin doctors held that the angels were created at the same time as the corporeal nature, so as to ensure the simultaneous production of the universe in respect of its principle parts. For seeing that corporeal creatures are one in created matter, and that the matter of corporeal creatures was created at the same time as the angels, it may be said that all things were in a sense created at the same time either actually or potentially. Now angels have not matter in common with the corporeal creature: wherefore when the angels were created, corporeal nature would nowise have been created, and consequently neither the universe: and so it is reasonable that they should be created together with the corporeal nature. Accordingly all corporeal things were created at the same time, not actually but in respect of matter in some way formless; and afterwards by degrees they were brought into actual existence by the distinction and adornment of the already existing creature.

5. Even as a creature has not being of itself so neither has it perfection otherwise than from God: so in order to indicate that the creature has being from God and not of itself, it was his will that it should come into existence after non-existence: and in order to indicate that the creature has not perfection of itself, it was God’s will that it should be at first imperfect, and afterwards by degrees be perfected by the work of distinction and adornment. It may also be replied that it behoved the creation of things to show forth not only the might of God’s power but also the order of his wisdom, so that things having precedence in nature have priority of production: wherefore it was not due to inability on the part of God as though he needed time for his works, that all things were not produced, distinguished and adorned at the same time, the reason of all this being that the order of wisdom might be observed in the production of things. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world. After the work of creation the following work in every case added a new state of perfection to the world: wherefore in order to indicate this perfection and newness of state, it was God’s will that one day should correspond to each distinction and adornment, and not because he was weak or tired.

6. The light which, we are told, was made on the first day was the light of the sun, according to Gregory and Dionysius, which, together with the substance of the luminaries, which is the subject of that light, was produced on the first day as regards the common nature of light. On the fourth day, the luminaries were endowed with a definite power for the production of definite effects: thu’s we observe that the rays of the sun have a different effect from those of the moon, and so forth. For this reason Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that this light was the light of the sun, but as yet formless as regards that which was the sun’s substance, and was endowed with an illuminating power in a general way: and that afterwards it was formed on the fourth day, not indeed with a substantial form, since it has that on the first day, but as regards certain accidental additions by receiving definite powers for the production of definite effects. Accordingly when this light was produced, the light was divided from the darkness in a triple respect. First in respect of its cause, since the cause of light was the sun’s substance, while the cause of darkness was the opaqueness of the earth. Secondly in respect of place, since there was light in one hemisphere and darkness in the other. Thirdly, in respect of time, since in the one hemisphere there was light at one time, and darkness at another. This is indicated in the words of Genesis i, 5, He called the light day and the darkness night. Hence that light neither covered the earth on all sides, since in one hemisphere there was light, and darkness in the other: nor was there always light on one side and darkness on the other, but in the same hemisphere there was day at one time and darkness at another.

7. The heaven has a twofold movement. One is the diurnal movement which is common to the whole heaven and causes day and night. This movement would seem to have been produced on the first day, when the formless substance of the sun and other luminaries was produced. The other is its own peculiar movement, which differs in the various heavenly bodies, whose movements bring about the differences of days, months and years. On the first day was produced the common division of time into day and night by the diurnal movement which is common to the whole heaven, and may be said to have begun on the first day. Wherefore on the first day mention is made only of the distinction of day and night produced by the diurnal movement common to all the heavens. On the fourth day was made the distinction as regards the difference of days and seasons, in that one day

is warmer than another, one season warmer than another, and one year warmer than another: all of which result from the special and proper movements of the stars, which movements may be understood to have commenced on the fourth day. Hence it is that on the fourth day mention is made (ibid. 14) of the difference between days, seasons and years: And let them be for seasons and for days and for years: and this difference results from their respective movements. Accordingly those first three days that preceded the formation of the luminaries were of the same kind as the days that are now regulated by the sun as regards the common division of time into day and night resulting from the diurnal movement common to the whole heaven, but not as regards the special differences of days resulting from those proper movements.

8. Some say that the light stated to be created on the first day was a luminous cloud, which subsequently when the sun was made, was resolved into the surrounding matter. But this is not likely, seeing that in the beginning of Genesis Scripture relates the establishment of nature in that condition wherein it was to remain, so that it should not be said that anything was made which after a little while ceased to exist. Hence others say that this luminous cloud still exists but united to the sun in such a manner that it cannot be distinguished from it. But in this case this cloud would be superfluous, whereas nothing in God’s works is void of purpose or superfluous. Wherefore yet others say that the body of the sun was formed from this cloud. But this again is inadmissible, if we suppose the solar body not to be composed of the four elements but actually incorruptible: since in that case its matter is not susceptive of different forms. Consequently we have to say with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) that this light was the light of the sun, of a formless sun however, in respect of what was already the substance of the sun: and that it had an illuminating power in a general way, and that on the fourth day it received a special definite power for the production of its peculiar and particular effects. And thus day and night resulted ‘from the circular movement whereby this light approached and receded. Nor is it unlikely that the substances of the spheres which by their common diurnal movement caused this light to revolve, existed from the very beginning, and that subsequently they received certain powers in the works of distinction and adornment.

9. The production of light signifies that the property of ,luminosity and transparency which is reducible to the genus of light was then bestowed on all luminous and diaphanous bodies. And since the sun is the principle and source of light, by illuminating both higher and lower bodies, therefore Dionysius by the light in question understands the formless light of the sun, which by the common diurnal movement divided the day from the night, even as it does now.

10. And thus the tenth argument is solved, since that light was not a cloud in its very substance that afterwards ceased to be. It might however be called a cloud as resembling one in respect of a property, in that as a luminous cloud receives from the sun a light that is less bright than its source, even so in those first three days the substance of the sun had an imperfect and as it were formless light which was afterwards perfected on the fourth day: wherefore the substance of the sun was then luminous, since from the moment in which it was created it had its substantial form: yet the sun is stated to have been formed from it on the fourth day, not in substance, but by the addition of a new power, just as a man from being ignorant of music becomes musical not in substance but in capacity.

QUESTION V

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THINGS BY GOD

THERE are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether things are preserved in their being by God, or do they of themselves continue to exist independently of all divine action. (2) Whether God can enable a creature to continue in existence of itself alone. (3) Whether God can annihilate a creature. (4) Whether any creature is or will be annihilated. (5) Whether the heavenly movement will cease at any time. (6) Whether it is possible for a man to know when the heavenly movement will cease. (7) Whether the elements will remain when the heavenly movement ceases. (8) Whether action and passion will remain in the elements when the heavenly movement ceases. (9) Whether plants, dumb animals and minerals will remain after the end of the world. (10) Whether human bodies will remain when the heavens cease to be in motion.

Q. V: ARTICLE I

ARE THINGS PRESERVED IN THEIR BEING BY GOD?

[III CONTRA GENT. LXV, LXVII, XLIV. SUM. TH. I, Q. CIV. A. I]

THE question at issue is about the preservation of things in their being by God: and the first point of inquiry is whether they continue to exist independently of all divine action: and seemingly they do.

1. It is written (Deut. xxxii, 4): God’s works are Perfect. Accordingly it is argued thus. A perfect thing is that which lacks nothing, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii).

Now a thing lacks something in its very being if it cannot exist without the assistance of an external agent. Such a thing therefore is not perfect, and consequently the works of God are not such.

2. It may be said that God’s works are not simply perfect but only in regard to their nature.—On the contrary a thing is perfect as to its nature if it has all that its nature is capable of having. Now whatsoever has all that its nature is capable of having, is able to continue in existence, even if God cease to preserve it from without. If then some creatures are perfect in their nature they can continue to exist without God keeping them in existence. The minor premise is proved thus. The preservation of things is a work of God: hence is is said Jo. v. 17): My Father worketh even till now, and I work (cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. x): and when an agent works, the effect receives something. Wherefore as long as God preserves things the things preserved receive something from God, and thus whatsoever needs to be preserved has not all that it is capable of having.

3. A thing is not perfect unless it fulfils its purpose. Now the principles of a thing are intended for the purpose of preserving the being thereof. If then the created principles of things are unable to keep things in existence, it follows that they are imperfect, and are not God’s works: which is absurd.

4. God is the efficient cause of things. Now the effect remains when the action of the efficient cause ceases: thus the builder ceases to act yet the house remains; the flame that caused the fire may cease to bum yet the fire caused by it continues. Therefore even if God’s actions cease altogether, creatures can continue to exist.

5. But someone will say that lower agents are the causes of things becoming but not of their existence: so that the existence of an effect remains when the causes of its becoming have been removed: whereas God is the cause of things not only in their becoming but also in their being. Wherefore things cannot continue to exist if the divine action ceases. On the contrary every thing generated has being by its form. If then the lower generating causes do not cause existence, they will not be causes of forms: and consequently forms that are in matter are not produced by forms in matter, which is contrary to the opinion of the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 8) who asserts that a form which is in this or that flesh and bones is produced by a form that is in this or that flesh and bones: and it will follow that forms

in matter are produced by forms outside matter, which was Plato’s view, or by the giver of forms, as Avicenna contended (Metaph. ix, 4, 5).

6. Things whose being is as yet in the state of becoming cannot continue after the agent has ceased to act, as instanced in movement, fire and the like, whereas those in actual existence can continue even after the agent has been removed. Hence Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) says: By the presence of light the air is not made (permanently) lightsome, but is being made lightsome, for if it had been made (permanently) lightsome, it would not continue to be made lightsome, and if the light were removed it would remain, lightsome.” Now there are many creatures whose being is not in a state of becoming but of actual existence, such as the angels and all bodies. Therefore creatures can remain in existence after God has ceased to act.

7. Lower generating causes, as proved above, cause the existence of the things they generate; not, however, as principle and first, but as second causes. Now the first cause of existence which is God, does not give the things he produces the beginning of existence except through the second causes mentioned above. Wherefore neither does he give them continuance of existence, since one and the same thing derives both being and continuance of being from the same cause. Wherefore things generated are kept in existence by their essential principles, when second active causes have ceased: and consequently even when the first cause, namely God, withdraws his activity.

8. If a thing cease to exist this is either by reason of its matter or because it is produced from nothing. But matter is not a cause of corruption except through being subject to contrariety; and there is not in all creatures matter subject to contrariety. Hence those things in which there is no matter subject to contrariety, such as the heavenly bodies and angels, cannot cease to exist by reason of matter. Nor can they cease to exist through being produced from nothing since from nothing nothing comes, and nothing has no action, and consequently does not cause a thing to be corrupted. Therefore if all divine action were to cease, such things would not cease to exist.

9. The form begins to be in matter in the last instant of a thing’s becoming when it is no longer in the state of becoming but of actual existence. Now in Avicenna’s opinion (Metaph. ix, 4, 5) the forms of generated things are inserted in matter by an active intelligence which is the giver of forms. Wherefore that intelligence is the cause of being and not

only of becoming so that by its action things can be kept in existence apart from God’s action.

10. The substantial form also is a cause of existence so that if the cause of a thing’s existence also keeps it in existence, it follows that the form of a thing suffices to keep it in existence.

11. A thing is kept in existence by its matter inasmuch as this upholds the form. Now according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 82: De Coelo et Mundo, i, 20) matter is ungenerated and incorruptible., so that it is not produced by a cause, and, therefore remains even when all action of an efficient cause ceases. Wherefore it will be possible for things to remain in existence after the action of the, first efficient cause, namely God, has ceased.

12. It is written (Ecclus. xxxiii, 15): Look upon all the works of the most High. Two and two, and one against another. Now some of God’s works need his action to keep them in existence. Therefore as against these there must be some of God’s works which do not need to be kept in existence by him.

13. The natural appetite cannot be null and void. Now everything has a natural appetence for the preservation of Its existence. Wherefore a thing is able of itself to remain in existence, else its natural appetite would be frustrated.

14. Augustine says (Enchir. x) that God makes each thing good, and all things together very good; for which reason it is written (Gen. i, 31): God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good. Accordingly the universe of creatures is very good and the best of all since best produces best according to Plato (Tim.). Now it. is better not to need another thing for one’s preservation in existence, than to need another for that purpose. Therefore the universe of creatures needs no other to keep it in existence.

15. Heavenly bliss is something created in the nature of the blessed. Now heavenly bliss is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 2): and this must needs include continuance in existence, which is one of the greatest goods. Therefore there is a creature that can of itself remain in existence.

16. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei vii, 30) that God so governs things by his providence that he allows them to exercise their own movements. Now the proper movement of nature since it proceeds from nothing is to return to

nothing. Therefore God allows the nature that comes from nothing to return to nothing: and consequently he does not keep things in existence.

17. A recipient that is contrary to what it has received does not preserve it but destroys it. Thus we observe that when a natural agency produces in a subject an effect by violence, this effect remains for a time in the subject opposed to it, after the natural agent has ceased to act: thus after the fire has ceased to act, heat remains in the water heated, but only for a time. Now God's effects are received not in a contrary but in nothing, since he is the author of the whole substance of a thing. Much more then will the divine effects remain, be it only for a time, after God's action has ceased.

Form is the principle of knowledge, operation and existence. Now a form without assistance from without can be a principle of operation and knowledge. Therefore It can also be a principle of existence, so that after all divine action has ceased, things can be kept in existence by their forms.

On the contrary it is written (Heb. i, 8): Upholding all things by , the word of his power: and the gloss remarks "Even as all things were created by him, so by him are they preserved unchangeable."

Again, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): "The might of the Creator and the Power of the Almighty is the cause of existence in every creature; and if the ruling power of God were withdrawn from his creatures, their form would at once cease and all nature would collapse;" and further on: "The world would not stand for one instant, if God withdrew his support." Again, Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 37) that all things would fall into nothingness were they not upheld by the hand of the Almighty.

Again, in the book De Causis (prop. ix) it is said: "Every intelligence derives its immobility" i.e. stability and essence, "from that goodness which is the first cause." A fortiori therefore, other creatures are not stabilised in existence save by God.

I answer that without any doubt whatever it must be admitted that things are preserved in existence by God, and that they would instantly be reduced to nothing were God to abandon them. The proof of this may be expressed as follows. An effect must needs depend on its cause. This is part of the very nature of cause and effect; and is evidenced in formal and material causes, seeing that on the removal of any of its material or formal principles, a thing at once ceases to exist, because such principles enter into its essence., The statement applies to efficient causes even as to formal and material causes: since the efficient cause produces a thing by inducing the form or disposing the matter. Hence a thing depends equally on its efficient cause, its matter and its form since through the one it depends on the other. As to final causes the same is to be said of them as of efficient causes: because the end is a cause only for as much as it moves the efficient cause to act, since it comes first not in existence but in the intention. Consequently there is no action where there is no final cause (Metaph. iii, 2). Accordingly the existence of a thing made depends on its efficient cause inasmuch as it depends on the form of the thing made. Now there can be an efficient cause on which the form of the thing made does not depend directly and considered as a form, but only indirectly: thus the form of a generated fire does not depend on the generating fire directly and by reason of its species, seeing that it occupies the same degree in the order of things, and the form of fire is in the same way in both the generated and in the generating fire, and is distinguished therefrom only by a material distinction, through being seated in another matter. Hence since the generated fire has its form from some cause, this same form must depend on some higher principle, that is the cause of that form directly and in respect of its very species. Now seeing that properly speaking the existence of a form in matter implies no movement or change except accidentally, and since no bodies act unless moved, as the Philosopher shows, it follows of necessity that the principle on which the form depends directly must be something incorporeal, for the effect depends on its active cause through the action of a principle. And if a corporeal principle be in some way the cause of a form, this is due to its acting by virtue of an incorporeal principle and as its instrument. In fact this is necessary in order that the form begin to exist, inasmuch as it does not begin to exist otherwise than in matter: because matter cannot be subject of a form unless it have a particular disposition, since the proper act should be in its proper matter. When, therefore, matter is in a disposition unsuitable to a particular form, it cannot directly receive that form from an incorporeal principle on which the form directly depends, so that there is need for something to .transmute the matter: and this will be a corporeal agent whose action consists in moving something. This corporeal agent acts by virtue of the incorporeal principal, and its action terminates in this or that form, inasmuch as this or that form is in the corporeal agent either actually (as in universal agents) or virtually (as in equivocal agents). Accordingly these lower corporeal agents are not the cause of the forms in things made, except to the extent of their causality in trans-muting matter, since they do not act except by transmuting, as stated above (Q. iii, AA. 7, 8): and this is by transmuting matter and educing the form from the potentiality of matter. Hence the form of the thing generated depends naturally on the generator in so far as it is educed from the potentiality of matter, but not as to its absolute existence. And, therefore, when the act of the generator ceases, the eduction of the form from potentiality into actual being, that is the becoming of the thing generated, ceases, whereas the form itself whereby the thing generated has its existence, does not cease. Hence it is that the existence of the thing generated, but not its becoming, remains after the action of the generator has ceased. On the other hand, forms that do not exist in matter, such as intellectual substances, or that exist in matter nowise indisposed to the form, such as the heavenly bodies wherein there are no contrary dispositions, must proceed from a principle that is an incorporeal agent that acts not by movement, nor do they depend on something for their. becoming without depending on it also for their being. Wherefore just as when the action of their efficient cause which acts by movement ceases, at that very instant the becoming of the thing generated ceases, even so when the action of an incorporeal agent ceases, the very existence of things created by it ceases. Now this incorporeal agent by whom all things, both corporeal and incorporeal are created, is God, as we have proved above (Q. iii, AA. 5, 6, 8), from whom things derive not only their form but also their matter. And as to the question at issue it makes no difference whether they were all made by him immediately, or in a certain order as certain philosophers have maintained. We conclude then that with the cessation of the divine operation, at the same instant all things would fall into nothingness, as we have proved by the authorities quoted in the arguments On the contrary.

Reply to the First Objection. God’s creatures are perfect in their nature and order: and their perfection requires among other things that they be kept in existence by God.

Reply to the Second Objection. God does not create things by one action and preserve them by another. The existence of permanent things is not divisible except accidentally In so far as it is subject to some kind of movement: and in itself is in an instant. Hence God’s action which is the direct cause of a thing’s existence is not distinct as the principle of its being and as the principle of its continuance in being.

Reply to the Third Objection. As long as the essential principles of a thing remain, so long does that thing continue to exist: but those very principles would cease to be, were the divine action to cease.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. These lower agents cause a thing as to its becoming, but not as to its existence properly speaking: whereas God is the direct cause of existence: wherefore the comparison fails. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “When a man is building a house and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and gone: whereas the world would not stand for a single instant if God withdrew his support.”

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Inasmuch as corporeal agents do not act except by transmuting, and as nothing is transmuted except by reason of matter, the causality of corporeal agents cannot extend beyond things that in some way are in matter. The Platonists together with Avicenna through denying the eduction of forms from matter were obliged to hold that natural agents merely dispose matter, and that the form is induced by a principle that is separate from matter. On the other hand if with Aristotle we hold substantial forms to be educed from the potentiality of matter, natural agents will dispose not only matter but also the substantial form, only, however, in regard to its eduction from the potentiality of matter into actual existence, as stated above (Q. iii, AA. 9, 11): so that they will be principles of existence as considered in its inchoation but not as considered absolutely.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Some of the forms that begin to exist in matter through the action of a corporeal agent are when produced perfect both in their specific nature and in their being in matter, like the form of their generator: the reason being that the matter does not retain contrary principles: and such forms remain after the action of their generator, until the time of their corruption. Other forms however when produced are perfect in their specific nature, but have not perfect being in matter: thus heat in hot water has the perfect species of heat, but not perfect being which depends on the hold that the form has on the matter, inasmuch as the matter retains the form that is contrary to the quality of heat. Forms of this description can remain for a short time after the action of the agent, but are prevented from remaining for long by the contrary principle that is in the matter. Again other forms when produced in matter are imperfect both in species and in being: as for instance light which is produced in the air by a luminous body: for light in the air is not a perfect natural form as light in the luminous body, but rather after the manner of an intention. Hence just as a man's likeness does not remain in a mirror save as long as the mirror is in front of him, even so neither does light remain in the air when the luminous body is no longer present. For these intentional beings depend on the natural forms of bodies directly and not only accidentally, so that they no longer remain in existence after the action of the agent has ceased. Wherefore suchlike things are said to be in a state of becoming on account of the imperfection of their being, whereas perfect creatures are not said to be in a state of becoming although they have an imperfect being, and God Who made them never ceases to uphold them.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The action of a corporeal agent does not extend beyond movement, so that it is the instrument of the first agent in the eduction of forms from potentiality to actuality which education is by movement: but not in their preservation, except in so far as through some kind of movement matter is made to retain the disposition which renders it appropriate to the form: it is thus in fact that the lower bodies are kept in existence through the movement of the heavenly bodies.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. If the divine action were to cease, the creature also would cease to exist, not through the presence of a contrary in its matter, since that would cease to exist~ at the same time as the matter, but because the creature is made from nothing: and yet not in the sense that nothingness conduces actually to the corruption of the creatures, but that it does not act for its preservation.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Even the giver of forms, if we suppose with Avicenna that it is something apart from God, must cease to exist if God who is its cause cease to act.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The form also would cease to exist if the aforesaid action were to cease, so that it could no longer be a principle of existence.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Matter is said to be ungenerated because it is not produced by generation: but this does not exclude its being produced by God, seeing that every imperfect thing must needs originate from a perfect one.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In God’s works the presence of one contradictory does not argue the presence of its opposite (for then it would follow that since some of his works are created, there must be some that are not created) although this is true if we apply it to other kinds of opposition. But the things to which the objection refers are in contradictory opposition to each other; wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. It is true that everything has a natural desire to be kept in existence, not however by its own action but by its cause.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The universe of creatures is the best, not simply, but in the genus of created things so that nothing prevents something from being better.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The goods, the accumulation of which makes the state of beatitude perfect, have their source in the creature’s union with its cause: since the beatitude of the rational creature consists in enjoying God.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Properly speaking tendency to nothingness is not a movement of nature, which always has a tendency to the good; but it is a defect of nature that it tends to nothingness, so that the argument is based on a false supposition.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. A violent agent that produces a violent impression is the cause of that impression as to its becoming and not simply as to its being, as explained above (ad 6). Wherefore as soon as the agent ceases to act the impression may last for a time but not for long on account of its imperfection.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. just as a form cannot be a principle of existence, unless we presuppose some previous principle, even so neither can it be a principle of operation since God works in everything as we have shown above (Q. iii, A. 6): nor again of knowledge, since all knowledge derives from the uncreated fight.

Q. V: ARTICLE II

CAN GOD ENABLE A CREATURE TO KEEP ITSELF IN EXISTENCE BY ITSELF AND WITHOUT GOD’S ASSISTANCE?

THE second point of inquiry is whether God can make a creature able of itself to keep itself in existence independently of God , and seemingly he can do so.

1. To create is more than to keep oneself in existence. Now a creature could have received the power to create according to the Master (Sent. v, 4). Therefore it could have received the power to keep itself in existence.

2. The power of God over things surpasses the power of our intellect. Now our intellect can understand a creature apart from God. Much more therefore can God make a creature able of itself to keep itself in existence.

3. There is a creature made to God's image (Gen. i, 26). Now according to Hilary (De Synod.) an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another: so that an image can be adequate to the thing of which it is the image. Seeing then that God needs no other to keep him in existence, it would seem that he could communicate this to a creature.

4. The more perfect the agent the more perfect an effect can it produce. Now natural agents can produce effects which are able to remain in existence without their causes. Therefore a fortiori God can do this.

On the contrary God can do nothing that is prejudicial to his own authority: and it would be prejudicial to his dominion if anything could exist without his upholding it. Therefore God cannot do this.

I answer that God's omnipotence does not imply that he can make two contradictories true at the same time. Now the statement that God can produce a thing which does not need to be upheld by him involves a contradiction. For we have already proved that every effect depends on its cause in so far as it is its cause. Accordingly the statement that a thing needs not God to uphold its existence implies that it is not created by God: while the statement that such a thing is produced by God implies that it is created by him. Wherefore just as it would involve a contradiction to say that God produced a thing that was not created by him, even so it would involve a contradiction were one to say that God made a thing that did not need to be kept in existence by him. Wherefore God is equally unable to do either.

Reply to the First Objection. Since to create is to be the cause of something, and only that which has no cause needs not to be kept in existence by another, it is clear that not to need to be kept in existence by another is more than to create: even as to have no cause is more than to be a cause. Moreover it is not altogether true that the power of creating is communicable to a creature, seeing that it is the act of the first agent as we have shown above (Q. iii, A. 4).

Reply to the Second Objection. Although the intellect is able to understand a creature without understanding God, it cannot understand a creature not being kept in existence by God, since this involves a contradiction, as if one were to say that a creature is not created by God, as stated above (Q. iii, A. 5).

Reply to the Third Objection. Equality is essential to an image, not absolutely speaking but of a perfect image: such an image of God is not a creature but the Son of God; wherefore the argument proves nothing.

The Reply to the Fourth Objection may be gathered from what has been already said in the preceding answer.

Q. V: ARTICLE III

CAN GOD ANNIHILATE A CREATURE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. CIV, A. 3]

THE third point of inquiry is whether God can annihilate a creature: and seemingly he cannot.

1. Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 2) that God does not cause things to tend to non-existence. But this would be the case were he to annihilate a creature. Therefore God cannot annihilate a creature.

2. Corruptible creatures whose existence is more unstable than that of others, do not cease to exist save through the action of some active cause: thus fire is extinguished by some counteracting agency. Much less therefore can other creatures cease to exist otherwise than through some agency. If then God were to annihilate a creature, this would not be except through some kind of action. But this cannot be done through an action: since every action, proceeding as it does from an actual being, must terminate in an actual being, because every maker produces its like. Now an action whereby an actual being is produced in no way annihilates. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.

3. Whatsoever happens accidentally must be traced to something that is intended directly. Now no active cause produces imperfection and corruption save accidentally, since nothing acts without intending a good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv): thus the purpose of fire in destroying water is not to deprive the water of its form, but to introduce its own form into the matter. Wherefore imperfection cannot be caused by an agent, without some perfection being caused at the same time. Now where a perfection is produced there is not annihilation. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.

4. Nothing acts except for an end: since the end moves the effective cause. Now the end of God's action is his own goodness: and this is indeed obtained by his producing things, so that they are made in likeness to their producer, but not by his annihilating them, since thereby they would be utterly deprived of that likeness. Therefore God cannot annihilate a thing.

5. So long as the cause remains its effect must needs remain also: because if this were not necessary, it would be possible, given a cause, for its effect to be or not to be and then it would need something else to determine its being and thus the cause would not suffice for the existence of its effect. But God is the sufficient cause of things. Therefore as long as God exists things must needs remain in existence. Now God cannot prevent his own remaining in existence. Therefore he cannot reduce creatures to non-existence.

6. It will be said that God would not be the actual cause if things were to be annihilated.—On the contrary, God's action is his being, wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32) that God's existence is the reason of our existence. Now his existence was never new to him. Therefore lie never ceases to act, and will always be an actual cause.

7. God cannot act against common sense, e.g. he cannot make the whole larger than its part. Now all wise men are agreed that the rational soul is immortal. Therefore God cannot cause it to be annihilated.

8. The Commentator says (Metaph. xi, com. 41) that if a thing in itself can either be or not be, nothing else can make it be of necessity. Wherefore whatsoever creatures have being of necessity do not admit of the intrinsic possibility of being or of not being. Now such are all incorruptible things, e.g. incorporeal substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore in none of these is there the possibility of not being: so that if they be left to themselves

through God withdrawing his action from them, they will not cease to exist and thus seemingly God cannot annihilate them.

9. The thing received does not remove the potentiality of the recipient; but it may perfect it. If then there exist a thing which potentially does not exist, it cannot receive anything that will remove this potentiality: and consequently a thing that in itself contains the possibility of not existing, cannot receive from anything else the necessity of existing.

10. Whatever causes a generic difference belongs to the essence of things, for the genus is part of a thing's definition. Now certain things differ generically in the point of being corruptible or incorruptible (Metaph. x, 10). Therefore everlastingness or incorruptibility is part of such things' essence. Now God cannot deprive a thing of what is essential to it, thus he cannot make a man not to be an animal and yet remain a man. Therefore he cannot cause incorruptible things not to last for ever, and thus e cannot reduce them to nothing.

11. A corruptible thing can never be changed so as to become naturally incorruptible (for the incorruptibility of bodies rising from the dead is a gift not of nature but of glory) and the reason for this is that corruptible and incorruptible differ generically, as stated above. Now if a thing which has an intrinsic possibility not to exist, could be made by something else to exist of necessity, a corruptible thing might be changed into an incorruptible one. Therefore a thing which has an intrinsic possibility not to exist cannot possibly acquire necessity of existing from another: and so we come to the same conclusion as above.

12. If creatures have no necessity of existing except in so far as they depend on God, and if they depend on God in so far as he is their cause, their necessity of existing must correspond to the mode of causality whereby God is their cause. Now God is the cause of things not of necessity but by his will, as we have proved above (Q. iii, A. 15). Therefore necessity in things will be such as it is in things that are produced by the will. Now things effected by the will are not necessary simply and absolutely: their necessity is only conditional, inasmuch as the will is not determined by necessity, to one particular effect. It follows then that in things nothing is absolutely necessary, but only conditionally —even as it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs; or walk if he wishes to walk and is not prevented

from so doing. Whence it would seem to follow that no creature is simply incorruptible, and that all are corruptible: which cannot be admitted.

13. Just as God is the sovereign good so is he the most perfect being. Now inasmuch as he is the sovereign good, it is unbecoming to him to be the cause of the evil of sin. Therefore inasmuch as he is the most perfect being it is unbecoming to him to cause things to be annihilated.

14. Augustine says (Enchir. xi) that God is so good that he would never allow evil to be done, were he not so powerful that he can produce a good from any evil whatsoever. But no good would result if creatures were to be annihilated. Therefore God cannot allow creatures to return to nothingness.

15. The distance from nothing to being is no less than from being to nothing. Now it belongs to an infinite power to produce a being from nothing on account of the infinite distance. Therefore only an infinite power can reduce a being to nothing. But no creature has infinite power. Hence if we take away the action of the Creator, a creature cannot be reduced to nothing: and yet only on the supposition that God's action be removed was it said that he can annihilate things. Therefore nowise can God reduce creatures to nothing.

On the contrary Origen says (Peri Archon): That which was given can be taken away and lost. Now creatures were given existence by God. Therefore it can be taken from them: so that God can reduce them to nothing.

Again, that which depends on God's simple will, can also cease if it be God's will. Now the creature's whole being depends on God's simple will, since he is the cause of things by his will and not by natural necessity. Therefore if it be his will creatures can be annihilated.

Again, God is not more indebted to creatures after they begin to exist than he was before they began to exist. Now, before they came into existence, he could, without prejudice to his goodness, abstain from bringing them into being, since his goodness nowise depends on creatures. Therefore without prejudice to his goodness God can withdraw his action from creatures, with the result as proved above (A. 2) that they would cease to exist. Therefore God can annihilate creatures.

Again, as we have proved (A. 1) God, by the same action, produces and upholds things. Now God was able not to produce creatures. Therefore he can likewise abstain from upholding them: ,and thus he can annihilate them.
I answer that things made by God may be said to be possible to, him in two

ways. First with regard to the power of the agent alone: thus before the world was made, it was possible for the world to exist, not by a possibility inherent to the creature, which did not exist, but only by the power of God, who was able to bring the world into being. Secondly in respect of a possibility inherent to the thing made: thus it is possible for a composite body to be corrupted. Accordingly if we consider the possibility of non-existence in reference to things made, there have been two opinions on this point. Avicenna (Metaph. viii, 6) held that all things except God have in themselves a possibility of being and of non-being. Because seeing that being is something besides the essence of a created thing, the very nature of a creature considered in itself has a possibility of being, while it only has necessity of being from another whose nature is its being, and which therefore by its nature exists of necessity; and this is God. On the other hand the Commentator (Metaph. xi, text. 41: and De Subst. Orb.) holds a contrary opinion, to wit that certain things were created in whose nature there is no possibility of non-being inasmuch as a thing that has in its nature a possibility of non-being, cannot acquire everlastingness from without, so as to become by its very nature everlasting. The latter opinion would seem more reasonable. Because possibility of being and non-being does not belong to a thing save by reason of its matter which is pure potentiality. And matter since it cannot exist without a form cannot have a potentialityin respect of non-being, save as, while existing under some form it retains the possibility of receiving another form. Accordingly it may happen in two ways, that a thing’s nature does not include the possibility of non-being. First, because that thing is a pure form subsistent in its own being, such as incorporeal substances which are entirely immaterial. For if a form through being in matter is the principle of existence in material things, and a material thing cannot cease to exist save by losing its form, it follows that when a form subsists by itself it can nowise cease to exist, even as neither can existence be separated from itself. Secondly, because the matter has no potentiality in respect of another form, and the whole of its potentiality is determined by one form: such are the heavenly bodies in which there is no contrariety of forms. Accordingly a possibility of non-being is in the nature of those things alone whose matter is subject to contrariety of forms: whereas it belongs to other things by their nature to exist of necessity, all possibility of nonexistence being removed from their nature. And yet this does not imply that their necessity of existence is not from God: since one necessity may cause another (Metaph. v). For the created nature to which everlastingness belongs is produced by God. Moreover in those things which contain a possibility of non-being the matter remains, while the forms change: thus, when things are generated, they are educed from potentiality into actuality by generation even as, when they are corrupted, they are reduced from actuality so as to return to a state of potentiality. It follows then that in all created natures there is no such potentiality whereby a thing is made to have the possibility of tending to nonexistence.

If on the other hand we consider the power of God the Maker of things, we must observe that a thing is said to be impossible to God in two ways. First, because it is impossible in itself, in that by its very nature it is outside the scope of any power whatsoever: such are things that involve a contradiction. Secondly, because the opposite of that thing is necessary: and this occurs in two ways with respect to an agent. First on the part of a natural active power that is confined to one effect: thus the power of a hot thing is confined to heating:, in this way God the Father begot the Son necessarily and cannot but beget him. Secondly, on the part of the ultimate end to which everything tends of necessity: thus man necessarily desires happiness and cannot possibly desire to be unhappy: and likewise God necessarily wills his goodness, and cannot possibly will things that are incompatible with it: for example we say that God cannot lie or wish to he. Now the simple non-existence of creatures is not in itself impossible as involving a contradiction (else they had existed from eternity: and the reason of this is that they are not their own being): thus in the statement, The creature does not exist at all, the predicate is not in conflict with the definition of the subject, whereas it is in the sentence, Man is not a rational animal: for sentences of the latter kind imply a contradiction and are impossible in themselves. Likewise God did not produce creatures by natural necessity, as though his power were determined to the existence of creatures, as we have proved above (A. 3). Likewise God’s goodness does not depend on creatures, as though it could not be without them: seeing that it gains nothing by them. It remains then that it is not impossible for God to reduce things to nothing: since he is not under the necessity of giving them being, except on the presupposition of his decree and fore-knowledge, in that he decreed and foresaw that he would keep things in existence for ever.

Reply to the First Objection. If God were to reduce creatures to nothing, he would not be the cause of their tendency to non-existence: because it would result not from his causing non-existence in them, but from his ceasing ‘to give them existence.

Reply to the Second Objection. Corruptible things cease to exist, in so far as their matter receives another form, with which its previous form was incompatible: wherefore their corruption requires the action of a certain agent, whereby the new form is educed from its potential state into actual existence. Whereas if God were to annihilate a thing, there would be no need for any action, and it would suffice if God were to Withdraw the action whereby he gives things existence: thus the absence of the sun’s action in enlightening the air causes the absence of light in the air.

Reply to the Third Objection. This argument would avail, if God could by some action annihilate things: but this is not so, rather would it be by ceasing from action.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Where there is no action we need not require an end. But seeing that even cessation from action cannot be in God save by his will, and that the will’s object is the end, it might be possible to ascribe an end even in the annihilation of things: so that as in the production of things, the end was the manifestation of God’s abundant goodness, so in the annihilation of things the end could be the sufficiency of his goodness, seeing that it is so self-sufficing as to need nothing from without.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The effect both follows its cause and derives its mode from the cause; wherefore effects consequent upon an act of the will, proceed from the will at the time appointed by the will; and not necessarily as soon as the will has decreed their existence. And thus since creatures proceed from God by his will, they come into being when it is God’s will that they should be, not of necessity or simultaneously with God’s will, otherwise they would have existed from eternity.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The action whereby God made things may be considered from a twofold point of view: it may be considered in its substance and in its relation to its effect. The substance of that action since it is the divine essence is eternal and cannot but be; whereas the relation to its effect depends on the divine will: because every action of a maker produces its effect according to the exigency of the principle of that action: thus fire imparts heat according to the measure of its own heat. Hence seeing that God’s will is the principle of the things made by him, his action bears a relation to his effects according as his will determines. Hence though God’s action cannot cease in its substance, its relation to his effects might cease, if he so willed.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. A principle of common sense is one whose opposite involves a contradiction, for instance, A whole is greater than its part, because it is contrary to the definition of a whole that it be not greater than its part. Now it is not contrary to common sense that a rational soul cease to exist, as we have already made clear: but it is in common sense that the nature of the rational soul be incorruptible. Wherefore if God were to reduce a human soul to nothing this would not be through the soul’s having some inherent possibility of non-existence, as stated above.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. A thing whose nature contains the possibility of non-existence does not acquire from an external source the necessity of being so that this necessity be contained in its nature, since this would involve a contradiction, to wit the possibility of a nature’s nonexistence together with the necessity of its existence; but there is nothing to prevent its acquiring incorruptibility by grace or glory. Thus by virtue of the union of the soul with its principle Adam’s body was in a way incorruptible through the grace attached to the state of innocence, and the bodies of the risen dead will be incorruptible by the grace belonging to the state of glory. On the other hand a nature which does not include the possibility of non-existence is not prevented from acquiring from another source the necessity of existence, since whatsoever perfection it has, it has received it from another: wherefore if its cause withdraw its action, it would cease to exist, not on account of its inherent potentiality to non-existence, but on account of God’s power to cease giving existence.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. It has been sufficiently shown that things which are incorruptible by nature are not to be supposed, as the objection supposes, to have at first a potentiality to non-existence which potentiality is removed by something received from God: whereas in things which are incorruptible by grace, there underlies in their nature a possibility of non-existence, which however is entirely voided by grace through the power of God.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. If by ceasing to uphold them God were to reduce incorruptible creatures to nothing, he would not by so doing deprive their nature of its everlastingness, so that it would remain without being everlasting: but their whole nature would cease to exist through their cause ceasing to exercise its influence over them.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. That which is by nature corruptible cannot be changed so as to become naturally incorruptible, and vice versa: although that which is corruptible by nature can be made to last for ever by the superaddition of glory. Yet it does not follow that certain corruptible things become naturally incorruptible, since were their cause to withdraw they would cease to exist.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although incorruptible creatures depend on God’s will, which can either give or not give them existence, nevertheless by that same will they are gifted with the absolute necessity of existence, in so far as they are created in a nature wherein there is no potentiality to non-existence: because every creature is such as God willed it to be, as Hilary says (De Synod).

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although God is able to reduce creatures to nothing, he cannot as long as they continue to exist, cease to be the cause of their existence. Now he is their cause both efficient and final. Accordingly just as he cannot cause an existing creature not to owe its existence to him, even so he cannot cause that creature not to be ordered to his goodness. Wherefore since the evil of sin removes the order of which he is the end, inasmuch as sin is aversion from the highest good; it follows that God cannot be the cause of the evil of sin, although he can be the cause of annihilation, by ceasing altogether to uphold a creature.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine is speaking of the evil of sin: and even if he were referring to penal evil, the annihilation of things would be no evil, because every evil since it is a privation is based upon good, as Augustine says (Enchir. xi). Hence just as there was no evil before things were created, so neither would there be any evil were God to annihilate all things.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. No creature has the power either of making something from nothing or of reducing a thing to nothing. The fact that if God ceased to uphold creatures they would return to nothing is not due to a creature’s action but to its defect, as stated above.

Q. V: ARTICLE IV

IS THERE A CREATURE THAT OUGHT TO BE OR ACTUALLY IS ANNIHILATED?

THE third point of inquiry is whether any creature is to be annihilated, or is actually annihilated: and seemingly the answer should be in the affirmative.

1. just as a finite power cannot move in an infinite time, even so by no finite power can a thing exist for an infinite time. Now all corporeal power is finite (Phys. viii). Therefore no body has the power to exist for an infinite time. But there are bodies that cannot be corrupted, because nothing is contrary to them, like the heavenly bodies. Therefore at some time they must of necessity be annihilated.

2. That which is directed to the attainment of an end is no longer needed where the end has been reached: thus a ship is necessary that we may cross the sea, but we no longer need it after crossing the ocean. Now corporeal creatures were made for the sake of the spiritual creature, in order to help it to reach its end. When therefore the spiritual creatures arrive at their ultimate end they no longer need corporeal creatures: and since there is nothing superfluous in God’s works it would seem that at the last end of all things every corporeal creature will cease to exist.

3. Nothing accidental is infinite. Now existence is accidental to the creature according to Avicenna (Metaph. viii, 4); wherefore Hilary (De Trin. vii) distinguishes God from his creatures by stating that there is no accident in God. Therefore no creature will last for ever, and all creatures will at some time be reduced to nothing.

4. The end should correspond to the beginning. Now creatures had their beginning after nothing had existed but God. Therefore creatures will return to an end wherein there will be absolutely nothing in existence.

5. That which has no power to exist always, cannot endure for ever. And that which has not always been has no power to exist always. Therefore that which was not always cannot endure for ever. But creatures were not always. Therefore they cannot last for ever, and thus they will at length be annihilated.

6. Justice requires, if a man is ungrateful for a benefit bestowed or acquired, that he should be deprived of it. Now by committing mortal sin man proved himself ungrateful. Therefore justice demands that he be deprived of all the benefits he has received from God, among which is his

very existence: also God’s judgement on sinners will be just according to the Apostle (Rom. ii, 2). Therefore they win be annihilated.

7. The words of Jeremias are to the point (x, 24): Correct me O Lord, and yet with judgement and not in thy fury, lest thou bring me to nothing.

8. It will be said perhaps that God’s punishments are even less severe than what is deserved, on account of his mercy which in his judgements is always mingled with justice: so that God does not exclude sinners entirely from a share in his benefits.—On the contrary, mercy is not shown to man by granting him what it were better for him not to have: and it were better for the damned not to be at all than to be thus, as evidenced by the words about Judas (Matt. xxvi, 24): It were better for him had that man not been born, Therefore it is no part of God’s mercy that the damned be kept in existence.

9. Things that have no matter in their composition are altogether, i.e. utterly destroyed when they disappear (Metaph. iii): for instance accidents. Now accidents frequently disappear. Therefore some things are reduced to nothing.

10. The Philosopher (Phys. vi) argues that if a continuous quantity is composed of indivisible parts, it must be resolved into indivisible parts. Whence we may infer that everything is resolved into the elements from which it is produced. Now all creatures are produced from nothing. Therefore all at some time will be resolved into nothing.

11. It is written (2 Pet. iii, 10): The heavens shall pass away with great violence. But they cannot pass away by corruption so as to be changed into some other body, since they have no contrary. Therefore they will pass away into nothing.

12. Again to the point are the words of Psalm ci, 26, 27: The heavens are the works of thy hands: they shall perish, and of Luke xxi, 63: Heaven and earth shall Pass away. On the contrary it is written (Eccles. i, 4): The earth standeth for ever: and again (ibid. iii, 14): I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever. Therefore creatures will not be annihilated.

I answer that the created universe will never be annihilated. And notwithstanding that corporeal creatures have not always existed they will last nevertheless for ever as to their substance: although it has been maintained by some that at the final consummation all corruptible creatures will be reduced to nothing, an opinion that has been ascribed to Origen, who however apparently does not assert it as his own but rather as a view held by others.

In support of this solution to the question we may argue from a twofold source. First from the divine will, on which the existence of creatures depends. Although considered in itself God’s will about creatures is indifferent to opposite things, since it is not more bound to one alternative than to another, yet it is necessitated in a way of speaking through the granting of a supposition. For even as in creatures that which is indifferent to opposite things is necessitated through a supposition being made (thus it is possible for Socrates to sit or not to sit, but while he sits, it is necessary that he sit), so too the divine will which, considered in itself, can will either a certain thing or its opposite—for instance, to save or not to save Peter cannot will not to save Peter so long as he wills to save him. And whereas God’s will is unchangeable, if it be supposed that he wills a certain thing at some time, on that supposition it is necessary that he will it always, although it is not necessarily if he will a thing to last for a time, that he also will it to last for ever. Now he who wills a thing for its own sake, wills it to last for ever, for the very reason that he wills it for itself: because if he wills a thing to exist for a time, and afterwards not to exist, he wills that thing to exist for the perfection of something else, and when this latter is perfected, he no longer wills the thing that lie only willed that this other thing might be made perfect. Now God wills the created universe for its own sake, although he wills its existence for his own sake: fbr these two are not incompatible with each other. Because God wills creatures to exist for his goodness’ sake, namely that they may imitate and reflect it; which they do inasmuch as from it they derive their being, and subsist in their respective natures. Consequently it amounts to the same whether we say that God made all things for himself according to the text of Proverbs xvi, 4, The Lord hath made all things for himself, or that he made creatures that they might exist, according to Wisdom, i, 14, He created all things that they might be. Wherefore from the very fact that God made creatures it is to be inferred that he willed them to last for ever, and seeing that his will is unchangeable the opposite will never happen.

Secondly, from the very nature of things. God fashioned each nature in such a way as not to deprive it of its property. Hence on the words of

Romans xi, 24, Contrary to nature thou wert grafted, a gloss says that God who is the author of nature does not act contrary to nature, although at times in support of the faith he performs in creatures works that surpass nature. Now it is a natural property of those immaterial things which have no contrary that they last for ever, since in them there is no potentiality to non-existence, as we have shown above. Thus even as he does not deprive fire of its natural inclination to rise, so neither does he deprive the aforesaid things of their everlastingness by reducing them to nothing.

Reply to the First Objection. According to the Commentator (Metaph. xi, comm. 41) although all potentiality residing in a body is finite it does not follow that every body has a finite potentiality to exist: seeing that bodies that are actually corruptible have no potentiality, finite or infinite, to exist but only to be moved. This solution however apparently does not solve the difficulty. Potentiality to exist may be taken not only in the sense of a passive potentiality that is on the side of matter, but also in the sense of an active power which is on the part of the form which cannot be lacking to incorruptible things: because power of existence is proportionate to the degree in which a form is in a thing: wherefore the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo, i) holds that certain things have the virtue and power to last for ever. Accordingly we reply otherwise as follows. From the fact that a thing lasts for an infinite time we cannot infer that it has an infinite potentiality to exist, unless it be itself measured by time either directly, as movement, or indirectly, as the existence of things that are subject to movement, and are for a certain period of time, beyond which they cannot last. Now the existence of a heavenly body is not affected by time or movement, since it is utterly unchangeable. Wherefore from the fact that the heaven lasts for an infinite time, it does not acquire infinity of existence, seeing that it is altogether outside the continuance of time: for which reason theologians say that it is measured by eviternity. Therefore the heaven does not require an infinite power in order to last for ever.

Reply to the Second Objection. just as one part of an army is related both to another part and to the commander-in-chief, so too the corporeal creature is directed both to assist in the perfecting of the spiritual, and to reflect the divine goodness. The latter it will do for ever, though it cease to do the former.

Reply to the Third Objection. If we speak of substantial existence, then existence is not described as an accident as though it were in the genus of accident (for it is the act of an essence) but by a kind of similitude, inasmuch as like an accident it is not part of the essence. And yet even if it were in the genus of accident nothing prevents it from lasting for ever, seeing that proper accidents are of necessity in their respective substances, so that nothing hinders them from being in them for ever. On the other hand accidents that adhere to their subjects accidentally are nowise everlasting by nature: but the substantial existence of a thing cannot be an accident of this kind, because it is the act of its essence.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Before things existed, there was no nature having everlastingness as a property, as there was when things had been created. Moreover it would conduce to a certain perfection of the spiritual creature that things did not always exist, since this is a distinct proof that God is the cause of things: whereas no good would result if all things were annihilated. Hence the comparison fails between the beginning and the end.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Those things that will last for ever have the power to last for ever; but they did not always have this power, wherefore they did not always exist.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although in justice God could deprive of existence and annihilate a creature that sins against him, yet it is a more becoming justice that he keep it in existence to punish it: and this for two reasons. First, because in the former case justice would have no admixture of mercy, since nothing would remain to which he might show mercy: and yet it is written (Ps. xxiv, 10) that all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth. Secondly, because in the second case justice is more in proportion with sin, and this in two respects. In the first place, when a sin is committed the will rebels against God, whereas nature does not, but observes the order assigned to it by God: so that the punishment should be such as to afflict the will by hurting the nature which the will had abused: whereas if the creature were utterly annihilated, nature would be hurt indeed, but the will would not be afflicted. In the second place, seeing that sin contains two things, aversion from the incommutable good, and conversion to transient good, aversion results from conversion, since no sinner intends to turn away from God, but seeks the enjoyment of a temporal good which is incompatible with the enjoyment of evil. Wherefore as the pain of loss corresponds to the aversion of sin, while the pain of sense corresponding to the conversion is inflicted for the actual sin, it is fitting that the pain of loss should not be without the pain of sense: whereas if the creature were annihilated there would be eternal pain of loss, but the pain of sense would cease.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The judgement mentioned by the prophet signifies the infliction of a congruous punishment in proportion to sin, as explained above: and the fury from which he prays to be delivered is that which excludes the moderation of mercy.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. A thing is said to be better either because it includes a greater good, and thus it is better for the damned to exist than not to exist: or because it excludes an evil, since even absence of evil is reckoned a good by the Philosopher (Ethic. v., 8). The words of our Lord quoted are to be taken in the latter sense.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Although forms and accidents have no matter in their composition, they have matter in which they exist and from the potentiality of which they are educed: wherefore when they cease to be, they are not utterly annihilated, but remain in the potentiality of matter as before.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Even as creatures are made from nothing, so are they reducible to nothing, if so it pleased God.

Reply to the Eleventh and Twelfth Objections. The sense of the passages quoted is not that the substance of the world will perish, but that its outward appearance will vanish according to the Apostle (1 Cor. vii, 31).

Q. V: ARTICLE V

WILL THE HEAVENLY MOVEMENT CEASE AT ANY TIME?

[SUM. TH. SUPPL., Q. XCI, A. 2]

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the movement of the heavens will cease at any time: and seemingly it will not.

1. It is written (Gen. viii, 22): All the days of the earth, seed time and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day, shall not cease. Now all these result from the movement of the heavens. Therefore as long as the earth remains the movement of the heavens will continue. But the

earth will stand for ever (Eccles. i, 4). Therefore the movement of the heavens will also last for ever.

2. It might be said that the passage quoted refers to the earth as serving man in his present state of life, wherein by sowing and reaping he gathers a harvest for the support of his animal life; but not as serving him in the state of glory, when it will last for ever for the greater enjoyment of the good.—On the contrary it is written (Jer. xxxi, 35, 36): Thus saith the Lord who giveth the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon and of the stars for the light of the night, who stirreth up the sea and the waves thereof roar, the Lord of hosts is his name. If these ordinances shall fail before me: then also the seed of Israel shall fail so as not to be a nation before me for ever. Now this does not refer to Israel in the flesh, seeing that by reason of their dispersion they can no longer be called a nation. Wherefore it must refer to the spiritual Israel, who will be in the truest sense a nation before the Lord, when they shall see God in his essence. Therefore in the state of beatitude the laws aforesaid which are consequent upon the movement of the heavens, will not cease, and consequently neither will the movement of the heavens.

3. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii) anything that is rendered necessary by something that is already necessary, is itself absolutely necessary; thus an animal’s death is necessary being necessitated by matter. Now the operations of incorruptible things, among which we must reckon the heavenly movement, are for the sake of the substances of those things whose operations they are, so that apparently they are rendered necessary by something that is already necessary; while the contrary obtains in corruptible things, whose substance is for the sake of their operations, so that their necessity depends on something subsequent to them, as the Commentator remarks (ibid.) therefore the heavenly movement is necessary absolutely and so it will never cease.

4. The end of the heavenly movement is that the heavens by their movement may be likened to God, inasmuch as they pass from potentiality to actuality by coming into new positions, which they actually acquire successively: inasmuch as a thing is so far like God, who is pure act, as it is itself actual. Now this end would cease if movement were to cease: so that, since movement does not cease unless the end which is its purpose is obtained, the movement of the heavens will never cease.

5. It might be said that the heavenly movement is not for this end, but for the completion of the number of the elect, and that when this is complete the heavens will cease to be moved.—On the contrary nothing is for the sake of that which is of less account, because the end is of more account than the means, for it is the cause of goodness in the means. Now the heavens, inasmuch as they are incorruptible, are of more account than things subject to generation and corruption. Wherefore it is not to be said that the movement of the heavens is for the sake of some generation in this lower world, whereby nevertheless the number of the elect might be made complete.

6. Yet it might be said that the movement of the heavens is not for the generation of the elect as its principal end, but as its secondary end.—On the contrary that which is put in motion in order to secure the end of the movement continues in motion even when a secondary end has been obtained. If then generation whereby the number of the elect is made complete is a secondary end of the celestial movement, this movement does not cease when that number is reached.

7. All that is in potentiality is imperfect until it is made actual. Now in the consummation of the world, God will not leave anything imperfect. Since then the heaven's potentiality to ubiety is not actualised otherwise than by movement, it would seem that the heavenly movement will not cease even at the consummation of the world.

8. If the causes of a certain effect be incorruptible and invariable the effect will be everlasting. Now all the causes of the celestial movement are incorruptible and invariable, whether we refer to the moving cause or to the thing itself that is moved. Therefore the movement of heaven will last for ever.

9. That which is receptive of everlastingness will never be deprived of its everlastingness by God, as instanced in angels, the rational soul and the substance of heaven. Now the heavenly movement is susceptive of everlastingness, since circular movement alone can last for ever according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii). Therefore the movement of heaven will last for ever, like other things that have a natural aptitude to be everlasting.

10. If heaven cease to be moved this cessation will either be in an instant or in time. If in an instant, it will follow that a thing is at rest and in motion at the same time: because seeing that it was in motion during the whole of

the preceding time, we must agree that it was in motion at any given instant of that time. Now in this given instant in which it was stated that heaven was at rest, it was natural to the heaven to be in motion, since rest and motion apply to the same subject: and this instant belongs to the preceding time inasmuch as it is its term. Therefore heaven would be moved in that instant. Yet it was agreed that it was at rest therein. Therefore in the same instant it would be at rest and in motion, which is impossible. On the other hand if this cessation be in time, it follows that there will be time after the celestial movement. But there is no time without movement of heaven: wherefore the heavenly movement will continue after it has ceased, and this again is impossible.

11. If the heavenly movement is ever to cease, it follows that time which is its measure will cease also (Phys. iv). But time cannot cease: therefore the celestial movement cannot cease. Proof of the minor premise:—Anything that is always in its beginning and its end, never began and will never cease, because everything is subsequent to its beginning and previous to its end. Now the only thing we can seize on in time is an instant, and this is the beginning of the future and the end of the past: so that time is ever in’its beginning and end. Therefore time will never cease.

12. The celestial movement is natural to heaven, as their respective movements are to heavy and light bodies (De Coelo i). There is this difference, however, that elemental bodies exercise their natural movement only when they are outside their proper place, whereas the heaven is moved even while it is in its proper place. Whence we may infer that the relation of an elemental body to its natural movement when it is outside its proper place is like the relation of the heaven to its natural movement when it is in its proper place. Now an elemental body when outside its proper place does not rest unless it be forced. Therefore the heavenly body cannot rest unless it be forced. But this is inadmissible. For since nothing violent can endure for ever, it would follow that this heavenly rest does not last for ever,’and that at length the heavens would begin again to be moved, which is ridiculous. Therefore we must not say that the heavenly movement will cease at some time.

13. Things that succeed one another should have some kind of order and mutual proportion. But there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite. Therefore it is unreasonable to assert that heaven is moved for a

finite time, and afterwards is at rest for an infinite period: and yet this must be said if the heavenly movement began and will end and will never begin again.

14. The more excellent likeness to God is that which is in respect of a more excellent act: thus man’s likeness to God by reason of his rational soul is more excellent than that of a dumb animal, which is by reason of its sensitive soul. Now the second act is more excellent than the first; thus consideration is better than knowledge. Therefore the heaven’s likeness to God in respect of its second act which is to cause things in this lower world is more excellent than its likeness in respect of brightness which is its first act. If then in the consummation of the world the chief parts of the world will be bettered, it would seem that the heaven will not cease to be moved when it is filled with a greater brightness.

I l5. Magnitude, movement and time are in sequence to one another in respect of division and finitude or infinitude (Phys. vi, text. 18, 37, 38, 39). Now there is neither beginning nor end in a circular magnitude. Therefore neither is there any end in a circular movement: so that the heavenly movement being circular it would seem that it will never have an end.

16. It might be replied to the last objection that although a circular movement may have no end considered in its nature, it will have an end by the will of God.—On the contrary Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): In discussing the origin of the world, we do not ask what God can do, but what the nature of things allows of being done. Now the consummation of the world corresponds to its origin, as the end corresponds to the beginning. Therefore in discussing the end of the world we must not have recourse to the divine will, but to the nature of things.

17. The sun by its presence causes light and day in this lower world, and by its absence it produces darkness and night. Now the sun cannot be present in both hemispheres except by movement. Therefore if the heavenly movement cease, the sun by its presence will make it to be always day in one part of the world, and in the other part by being always absent it will cause a continual night: so that the latter part will not be bettered but will be worse off in the consummation of the world.

18. That which is indifferent to two things will either cling to both or to neither. Now the sun so far as its nature is concerned is indifferent to any particular position in the heavens. Therefore it will either occupy everyone

or none. But it cannot occupy none, since every sensible body is somewhere. Therefore it must occupy them all: and this is impossible except by successive movement. Therefore it will always be in movement.

19. At the end of the world none of the things that will remain will lose their perfection, inasmuch as they will not be worse off in that state but will be bettered. Now movement is a perfection of the heavens: because movement is the perfection of the thing moved as such (Phys. ii. text. 16) and because by movement the heavens acquire perfect goodness (De cxl. ii, text. 66). Therefore at the end of the world the heavens will not cease to be moved.

20. No body ever attains to the degree of a spiritual nature. Now it belongs to a spiritual nature to have perfect goodness without movement (De Coel. et Mund. ii, text. 62 seqq.). Wherefore the heaven will never attain to perfect goodness if its movement ceases: and this is contrary to the nature of the world’s consummation.

21. Nothing is removed except by its contrary. Now there , is nothing contrary to the heavenly movement (De Coel. et Mund. i, text 10, 15). Therefore the heavenly movement will never cease.

On the contrary it is written (Apoc. x, 5, 6): The angel whom I saw standing upon the sea and upon the earth lifted up his hand to heaven, and he swore by him that he liveth for ever and ever.... that time shall be no longer. Now time will endure as long as the heavens are moved. Therefore at some time the heavens will cease to be moved.

Again it is written (Job xiv. 12): Man when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken; he shall not awake nor rise up out of his sleep. Now we must not understand that the heavens will be broken in their substance, because this will always remain, as proved above. Therefore when the dead shall rise again, the heavens will be broken in the sense that their movement will cease.

Again, commenting on Rom. viii, 22, Every creature groaneth and travaileth even until now, a gloss of Ambrose says: All the elements labour to fulfil their various duties; thus the sun and moon, not without toil, run their appointed courses. This they do for our benefit: so that when we are removed hence, they will rest. Therefore at the resurrection of the saints the movements of the heavenly bodies will cease.

Again, Isidore (De Ord. Creatur.) writes: After the judgement the sun will receive the reward of his labour, thenceforward neither sun nor moon shall set: which is impossible as long as the heavens are in motion. Therefore the heavens win then cease to be moved.

I answer that following the teaching of holy men we hold that at some time the celestial movement will cease, although this be a matter of faith rather than of demonstration by reason. In order to make clear wherein this question offers difficulty, it must be observed that the heavenly movement, is not natural to the heavenly body in the same way as the elemental body's movement is natural to the elemental body. The latter movement has in the thing movable its principle not only material and receptive but also formal and active: because the form of the elemental body follows that movement, even as other natural properties result from essential principles: wherefore in these things the generator is said to be the mover inasmuch as it gives the form that results from the movement. But this does not apply to a heavenly body. Because as nature ever tends to one definite effect through not being indifferent to many, it is impossible that any nature tend to movement as such, since, in every movement there is a certain absence of uniformity, inasmuch as the thing moved passes from one mode of being to another, and uniformity in the thing moved is contrary to the definition of movement. In consequence nature never inclines to movement for the sake of movement, but for the sake of some definite result to be obtained by movement: thus a heavy body is inclined by nature to rest in the centre, wherefore it, tends to a downward motion, for the reason that by such a movement it will reach that place. On the other hand the heaven by its movement does not reach a 'whereabouts' to which it is inclined by nature, because every 'whereabouts' is the beginning and end of a movement: so that its natural movement cannot result, so to say, from a tendency of a natural inherent power, in the same way as the natural movement of fire has an upward tendency. Now circular movement is said to be natural to the heaven, in so far as it has a natural aptitude for that kind of movement, so that it contains in itself the passive principle of that movement, while the active principle of this movement is some separate substance, such as God, or an intelligence, or a soul according to some; as to which of these it may be it matters not to the question at issue. Accordingly no argument for the permanence of this movement can be taken from the nature of a heavenly body wherein there is only aptitude for movement: and we seek one from a separate active principle. And seeing that every agent acts for an end, we must consider what is the end of the heaven's movement: because if this end be such as to require that this movement should cease at some time, then the heavens will at length cease to be moved; while if rest is inconsistent with that end, then its movement will last for ever: for it cannot be said that it will cease through a change in its moving cause, since God's will like his nature is unchangeable, and through it whatever intermediate causes produce the heavenly movement may have become unchangeable likewise.

Now in making this observation three things must be avoided. In the first place we must not say that the heaven is moved for the sake of being moved: as we have said that it exists for the sake of existing, wherein it is like God. The reason is that movement by its very nature cannot be regarded in the light of an end, since it is a tendency to something else: so that it answers to the definition of means rather than of an end. This is confirmed by the fact that movement is the act of that which is imperfect (De Anima iii, 7; Phys. iii): while the end is the ultimate perfection.—Secondly, we must not say that the heavenly movement is for the sake of something less excellent than the heavens: because since the end specifies the means it ought to be more worthy than the means. Now the action of a more noble agent may happen to terminate in a less noble effect, but not as the end intended by that action: thus the safety of a peasant is an end secured by the king's government, yet the king's government does not seek that peasant's safety as its end, for it seeks something better, namely the common good. Consequently it cannot be admitted that the generation of beings in this lower world is the end of the heavenly movement, although it is its effect and term: since both heaven itself is more excellent than this lower world, and its movement than the movements and changes that take place here below.—Thirdly, we must not suppose the end of the heaven's movement to be something indefinite, since to take the indefinite as a final cause is to destroy the end and the very nature of good (Metaph. ii). Because it is impossible to reach the indefinite; and nothing is moved to that which it cannot obtain (De Coelo et Mundo, i). Wherefore it cannot be said that the end of the celestial movement is to attain to that for which it has no potentiality: although Avicenna would seem to say so. But this it cannot possibly obtain: since while it is actually in one position it is in its previous position potentially.

Wherefore we must assign as the end of the heavenly movement something that the heaven can obtain by its movement, that is distinct from its movement and more excellent.

This admits of a twofold solution. The first is that we assign as the end of the heavenly movement something in the heavens themselves and coexistent with movement. With this in view some philosophers held that the end of the heavenly movement is its likeness to God in causing, which takes place during the movement. In this view it is not becoming for this movement to cease, since were it to cease the end resulting from the movement would cease also. The second solution is that we assign as the end of the heavenly movement something outside heaven that is obtained by that movement, and which can remain when that movement ceases: and this is the view that we adopt. We hold then that the movement of the heavens is for the completion of the number of the elect. For the rational soul is more excellent than any body whatsoever, even than the heavens: wherefore there is nothing unreasonable in supposing that the end of the heavenly movement is the multiplication of rational souls; not indeed indefinitely, since this could not result from the movement of the heavens; and it could in that case be moved to something that it could not obtain. Therefore it is a definite number of souls that is the end of the heavenly movement: and when this is reached the movement will cease.

Now though either of these views can be upheld, the second, which is of faith, seems the more probable, and this for three reasons. First because it differs not whether we say that a certain thing's end is its likeness to God in some particular respect, or the thing itself with this likeness: just as we have said above that the end of things may be said to be either their being made like to God's goodness, or their nature as likened to God. Wherefore to say that the end of things is to be like God in causing is the same as to say that their end is to cause. Now to cause cannot be an end since it is an operation which implies an effect and tends to something else. Moreover in operations of this kind the effect is better than the operation (Ethic. i, i), so that suchlike operations cannot be the end of the operator, for they do not perfect the maker but the thing made: and thus the thing made is more correctly the end (Metaph. ix: Ethic. i, i). Now the things that are produced by the heavenly movement cannot be the end of that movement since they are less excellent than the heavens, as stated above. Wherefore it is unreasonable to hold that the end of the heavenly movement is likeness to God in causing. Secondly, since the heavenly movement is produced by an external active principle, while the heavens themselves have merely the natural aptitude for that movement, as stated above, it follows that the heavens are moved and act as an instrument: for such is the disposition of an instrument, as may be seen in the productions of art: thus the axe has nothing more than the aptitude for its particular movement, while the principle of this movement is in the craftsman. Hence as philosophers say, that which moves through being itself moved, moves as an instrument. Now in the instrumental action there cannot be an end in the instrument save accidentally in so far as the instrument is considered as a thing made and not as an instrument. Consequently it is not probable that the end of the heavenly movement is a perfection of the heavens: rather is it something outside the heavens.—Thirdly, if likeness to God in causing is the end of the heavenly movement, this likeness will be found chiefly in the production of that which is produced by God immediately, to wit the rational soul: to the production of which the heavenly movement conduces by disposing the matter. So that it is more probable that the end of the heavenly movement is the number of the elect than a likeness to God in causing generation and corruption as the philosophers say. For this reason we grant that the heavens will cease to be in motion when the number of the elect is complete.

Reply to the First Objection. The text refers to the duration of the earth as subject to change: for it is thus that it receives the seed and gives the harvest. So long as the earth is in that state the heavens will not cease to be in motion.

Reply to the Second Objection. The text quoted refers not to the carnal but to the spiritual Israel: not indeed as in God’s presence by seeing him face to face in his heavenly home, but as a wayfarer in the presence of God by faith. Hence the words of the text resemble those of our Lord to his disciples (Matt. xxviii, 20): Behold I am with you ... until the consummation of the world.

Reply to the Third Objection. The preposition propter (for the sake of) indicates a cause: sometimes it indicates a final cause which comes into being afterwards, and sometimes it indicates a material or efficient cause, which precedes. Now when it is stated that in incorruptible things acts are for the sake of the agents, ‘for the sake of’ indicates not the final but the efficient cause on account of which, and not of the end, there is necessity in those actions. Accordingly the celestial movement, if we refer it to that which is in motion, is not necessitated thereby as by its efficient cause, as we have proved, but it is necessitated by its mover: which being a voluntary mover necessitates the movement according as it is determined by the order of divine wisdom, and not so that it last for ever.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The end of the heaven’s movement cannot consist in its becoming like God by actually reaching to various successive positions which previously it occupied potentially: both because this is indefinite, as we have shown, and because while on the one hand it becomes like God by reaching positions actually which it occupied before potentially, on the other hand it becomes less like God by the fact that positions previously actual become potential.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although things subject to. generation and corruption are inferior to the heavens, the rational soul is superior to the heavenly body: and yet the former is produced by God into being in matter dispersed by the heavenly movement.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. According to the teaching of faith the completion of the number of the elect is not the secondary but the principal end of the heaven’s movement. It is not, however, its ultimate end because the ultimate end of everything is the divine goodness, inasmuch as creatures in some way attain thereto either by likeness or by rendering the service they owe God.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. It is not true that a thing is to be described as imperfect by reason of any potentiality therein that has not been given actuality: this is true only when actuality makes the thing complete. A man is not imperfect because being potentially in India he is not actually there: but he will be imperfect if he lack knowledge or virtue which are his natural perfections. Now heaven is not perfected by its position as these lower bodies which are preserved by occupying their proper positions. Wherefore although its potentiality to be in this or that position be never given actuality, it does not follow that it is imperfect. In fact if we consider heaven in itself it does not acquire greater perfection by being in one position than by being in another: it is indifferent to all positions, since it is moved naturally to any one. Now this indifference conduces to rest rather than to perpetual movement, unless we take into account the will of Him who moves it and intends its end. Thus certain philosophers explained the earth’s rest in the centre by assigning as its cause the equidistance of the centre to each part of the heaven’s circumference.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Though all the causes of the celestial movement are everlasting, nevertheless the mover on whom its necessity depends, moves by his will: nor is it necessary that he move it for ever, but only according to the exigency of the end.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The heaven’s capacity of perpetual movement is not to be confused with its capacity of existing for ever. Its existence depends on its natural principles, from which it acquires the necessity of existing, in that they exclude the possibility of non-existence, as we have shown above: whereas its nature does not include perpetual movement but only an aptitude thereto, and the necessity of that movement being perpetual depends on its mover. Hence also according to the Commentator (Metaph. ii: De Subst. Orb.) the, heaven has everlasting movement which it receives from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore even those who hold that this movement will never cease, say that the cause of its duration and everlastingness is God’s will. And yet the unchangeableness of God’s will does not, as they contend, necessarily prove the everlastingness of the celestial movement: because his win is not shown to be changeable if he wish different things to succeed one another according to the exigency of the end which he wills unchangeably. We must, therefore, Seek the reason for an everlasting movement in the end rather than in the unchangeableness of the mover.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The heavenly movement will end in an instant: and in that instant there will be neither movement nor rest, but the end of movement and the beginning of rest. The subsequent rest will not be in time, because rest is measured by time not directly, but indirectly (Phys. iv): so that the rest of a body not subject to any kind of movement is in no way measured by time. Yet, nbt to draw the line too fine, one might say that after movement there will be not rest but a certain immobility in the heavens.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Even as the celestial movement will cease, so also will time be no more, as appears from the text quoted from the Apocalypse. The last instant of all time will indeed be the end of the past, but not the beginning of the future: because that an instant be at once both the end of the past and the beginning of the future obtains in a continuous circular movement in which every point is both beginning and end in respect of different parts. Hence if the celestial movement cease, just as there will be an ultimate indivisible point of movement, so will there be of time.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. We have already said that it is not on account of an active inclination of its formal principle to such a movement that the heaven's movement is natural, as in the case of the elements: so that it does not follow, if the heavens cease to be in motion, that their rest is therefore violent.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. If the celestial movement were not for the sake of something else, we should expect to find some kind of proportion between that movement, and the subsequent rest, in the supposition that the movement is not everlasting. But whereas it is ordinated to another end, this proportion must be referred to the end and not to the subsequent rest. Accordingly we are to understand that God in bringing all creatures into being out of nothing, himself instituted the first perfection of the universe, consisting in the principal parts thereof, and the various species of things: and that in order to give it its final perfection, consisting in the completion of the ranks of the blessed, he ordained the various movements and operations of creatures, some of which are natural, for instance, the movement of the heavens and the activities of the elements, whereby matter is prepared to receive rational souls, while others are voluntary such as the ministrations of the angels who are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation. Wherefore when this consummation has been attained to remain for ever without change, those things that were ordained thereto will cease for ever.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. This argument takes into consideration the second act that is an operation abiding in the operator and is the end of the operator and therefore excels the form of the operator. But the second act which is an action tending to something made is not the end of the agent, nor does it excel the agent's form, unless the thing made excel that which makes it, as things produced by act excel the instruments as being the ends of the latter.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It is true that there is no actual beginning or end in a circular magnitude, yet it is possible to indicate a beginning or end therein in respect of an inception or termination of some kind of movement.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. At the beginning of the world nature was being established; wherefore in discussing its beginning we must not omit what is proper to nature. On the other hand at the end of the world the operation of nature will attain the end appointed by God: wherefore in discussing it we must have recourse to God's will which determined that end.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. When the heavens cease to be in motion, although the sun will always remain to the one side of the earth, there will not be utter darkness and gloom on the other side, because God will give brightness to the elements. Hence it is written (Apoc. xii, 23): The city hath no need of the sun nor of the moon... for the glory of God hath enlightened it. And no inconsistency will follow if the part which was inhabited by the Saints receive a greater light.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Though the heaven is indifferent to any position that is possible to it, its movement is not for the purpose of obtaining a position but for something else: wherefore in whatever position it remains, it matters not so long as its movement has achieved its purpose.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Although movement is the act of that which is moved it is the act of that which is imperfect. Hence if a thing is deprived of movement we must not infer that it is deprived of a perfection simply, especially if it acquires nothing by its movement. When the Philosopher says that by movement heaven acquires perfect goodness, he is expressing himself according to the first of the above-mentioned opinions about the end of the celestial movement, which end is consistent with the movement being everlasting.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The perfection of a spiritual nature is that it can be the cause of other things without being moved itself, a perfection to which the heavens can never attain. Nevertheless the heavens will not for this reason be worse off than before, inasmuch as their end does not consist in causing other things, as stated above.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The heavens will cease to be in motion not on account of anything contrary to their movement, but solely on account of the will of their mover.

Q. V: ARTICLE VI

CAN ANY MAN KNOW WHEN THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVENS WILL CEASE?

[SUM. TH. SUPPL, Q. LXXXVIII, A. 3]

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether man can know when the movement of the heavens will cease: and it would seem that this is impossible.

1. According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei) the sixth age is from the coming of Christ to the end of the world. Now it is known how long the previous ages lasted. Therefore it is possible to know how long this age is to last, by comparing it with the others, and thus we can tell when the movement of the heavens will cease.

2. The end of everything corresponds to its beginning. Now the beginning of the world has been known by revelation ever since Moses wrote: In the beginning God created heaven and earth. Therefore it is possible to know about the end of the world by revelation delivered to us in the Scriptures.

3. It is said that the reason for our uncertainty about the end of the world is that, man may ever be solicitous for the state of his soul. But the uncertainty about his death is enough to ensure that solicitude on his part. Therefore there was no need for uncertainty about the end of the world, except perhaps for the sake of those in whose lifetime the end of the world will come.

4. It is related of some that they received a revelation of their approaching death, the Blessed Martin for instance. And Augustine says (Ep. ad Oros.) that each one will appear at the judgement as he was in death: so that there is the same reason fox concealing the day of one’s death as for hiding the day of judgement. Consequently the day of judgement which concerns all should have been revealed in the Scriptures whereby all are taught.

5. A sign is intended for the purpose of making something known. Now certain signs of the Lord’s coming at the end of the world are given in the Gospels (Matt. xxiv, Luke xxi) and by the Apostle (1 Tim. iv, 2 Tim. iii, 2

Thess. ii). Therefore seemingly it is possible to know the time of the Lord’s coming and of the end of the world.

6. No man is reproved or punished here below for what does not he in his power. Now in Scripture some are reproved and punished for ignorance of the times. Thus our Lord spoke to the Pharisees (Matt. xvi, 3): You know how to discern the face of the sky: and can you not know the signs of the times? and (Luke xix, 44) he says: They shall not leave in thee a stone upon a stone, because thou hast not known the time of thy visitation. Again (Jerem. viii, 7): The kite in the air hath known her time: the turtle, the swallow and the stork have observed the time of their coming, but my People have not known the judgement of the Lord. Therefore the day of judgement or the time of the end of the world can be known.

7. At his second coming Christ will appear more manifestly than at his first: since then every eye shall see him, and they also who pierced him (Apoc. i, 7). Now his first coming was foretold in Scripture even as to the exact time of its happening (Dan. ix). Therefore one would think that his second coming also should have been foretold as to its precise date.

8. Man is said to be a little world because he bears a likeness to the greater world. Now the end of a human life can be definitely foreseen. Therefore the end of the world can be foreknown.

9. Great and small, long and short are relative terms whereby one thing is compared to another. Now the time from Christ’s coming until the end of the world is described as being short, according to 1 Corinthians, vii, 29, Time is short, and again (ibid. x, ii), Upon whom the ends of the world are come, and (1 Jo. ii, 18), It is the last hour. Therefore this is said in comparison with the preceding time: and consequently at least it can be known that the time between Christ’s coming and the end of the world is much shorter than from the beginning of the world to the coming of Christ.

10. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, xx, 16) that fire which will consume the surface of the earth at the end of the world will be caused by a conflagration of all the fires of the world. Now by observing the movement of the heavens it is possible to know how long it will take the heavenly bodies, which are the natural generators of heat in this lower world, to be in the most favourable position to bring about this result, so that this universal conflagration be effected by the concurrent action of the heavenly bodies

and the, fires of the lower world. Therefore it is possible to know when the end of the world will be.

On the contrary it is said (Matt. xxiv, 36): Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven.

Again, if this were to be revealed to anyone, especially should it have been revealed to the Apostles, who were appointed to teach the whole world. Yet when they asked about the final coming of the Lord they received the following answer (Act. i, 7): It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in his own power. Much less then was it revealed to others.

Again, We are not forbidden to believe the revelation which we have received in the Scriptures. Now the Apostle (2 Thess. ii, 2) forbids us to believe any sort of announcement as if the day of the Lord were at hand. Therefore we must beware of the impostors who endeavour to foretell the time of the day of the Lord: hence he goes on to say: Let no man deceive you by any means.

Again, Augustine says (Ad Hesych. ep. cxcix): “Can we, I ask you, define the time of his coming, in such a way that at least we can say that he will come within, for instance, the next hundred years, or within any number of years greater or less?” But we are entirely ignorant about this. Therefore we cannot know whether the end of the world will be within any given number of years, whether ten thousand or twenty thousand, or two or three.

I answer that the exact time of the end of the world is utterly unknown, except to God and to Christ as man, The reason of this is that there are two ways in which we can know the future, by natural knowledge and by revelation. By natural knowledge we foresee certain future events in their causes which we see present, and from which we look forward to their effects—either with the certainty of science if the causes be such as to produce their effects of necessity, or by conjecture, if the causes be such as to produce their effects in the majority of cases, as an astronomer foresees a future eclipse, and a physician future death. In this way it is impossible to foreknow the exact time of the end of the world, because the cause of the heaven’s movement and its cessation is no other but the will of God, as we have shown; and we cannot by our natural powers know that cause. Other results of the heaven’s movement or of any other sensible cause can be foreknown by natural knowledge, such as the destruction of some particular part of the earth, which was hitherto inhabitable and afterwards becomes uninhabitable. By revelation however, though it be possible for it to be known if such were God's will, it is not becoming that it should be revealed except to Christ as man: and this for three reasons. First, because the world will not come to an end until the number of the elect is complete, which completion is as it were the fulfilment of the whole of divine predestination; wherefore it is not fitting that the end of the world should be revealed except to him who has received the revelation of the whole of divine predestination, that is to Christ as man, through whom the whole predestination of the human race is in a manner fulfilled. Wherefore it is said (Jo. v, 20): The Father loveth the Son and showeth him all things which himself doth.—Secondly, because through our not knowing how long the present state of the world will last, whether for a short or for a long time, we look upon the things of this world as though they were soon to pass away: wherefore it is said (1 Cor. vii, 3 1) They that use this world (let them be) as if they used it not, for the fashion of this world passeth away.—Thirdly that men may ever be prompt to look forward to God's judgement, through being in utter ignorance of its exact time, wherefore it is written (Mt. xxiv, 42): Watch ... because you know not what hour your Lord will come. Hence, as Augustine says (Ad Hesych. ep. cxcix) he who says that he knows not when the Lord will come whether after a short or after a long time is in agreement with the words of the Gospel. And of two who say that they know, his is the more dangerous statement who sa s that Christ will come soon or that the end of the world is at hand, since this might occasion men to disbelieve in the end of the world if it fails to happen when it was foretold.

Reply to the First Objection. As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 57)) the last age of the world corresponds to the last stage in a man's life, which does not last for a fixed number of years as the other stages do, but lasts sometimes as long as all the others together, and even longer. Wherefore the last age of the world cannot be assigned a fixed number of years or generations.

Reply to the Second Objection. The revelation of the world's beginning was useful in showing that God is the cause of all things. But harm rather than good would result from knowledge of the end of the world: so that the comparison fails.

Reply to the Third Objection. Man is naturally solicitous not only for himself but also for the good estate of the community whereof he is a part, for instance, of the household, or city or even of the whole world. Consequently in order that man might be on his guard there was need for both things to be hidden from him, the end of his own life and the end of the world.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The revelation of the end of one’s own life is a particular revelation, while the revelation of the end of the whole world is connected with the revelation of the whole of divine predestination: so that the comparison fails.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. These signs were given in order to declare the future end of the world at some time, but not the exact date of its end. Thus among those signs there are some that have been seen almost from the begin ning of the world, for instance, that nation shall rise against nation and that there will be earthquakes in places, although these things will happen more frequently towards the end of the world; but in what measure, we cannot know.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. This reproof of our Lord refers to those who knew not the time of his first coming, but not to those who are in ignorance of the time of his second coming.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Christ’s first coming opened to us the way to merit by faith and the other virtues: hence on our part it was necessary for us to have knowledge of his first coming, so that by believing in him who was come we might obtain merit through his grace. But in his second coming rewards will be given according to merit, so that on our part it will be a question not of action or of knowledge but of receiving: wherefore there is no need for us to know the exact time of that coming. However, this day is said to be manifest, not as though it were clearly foreknown, but because it will be manifest when it comes.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The fife of man’s body depends on certain things already existing and of the material order, whence it is possible to have some fore-knowledge of his coming end. It is not thus with the whole world: wherefore in this particular there is no comparison, although there are certain points in which man the lesser world is like the greater world.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. These words of Scripture that would seem to indicate shortness of time or nearness of the end, are not so much to be referred to the amount of time as to a certain disposition of the present state of the world. For no other state will succeed that of the Law of the Gospel which has brought things to perfection, and succeeded the Old Law as the Old Law succeeded the Law of Nature.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. This conflagration of the world-fires is not supposed to be the outcome of some natural cause, so that it be possible by observing the movement of the heavens to foresee when it will happen: but it will take place at the bidding of God’s will.

Q. V: ARTICLE VII

WILL THE ELEMENTS REMAIN WHEN THE HEAVENS CEASE TO BE IN MOTION?

[SUM. TH. SUPPL., Q. LXXIV, A. 5, Q. XCI, A. 4]

THE seventh point of inquiry is whether the elements will remain when the heavens cease to be in motion, and seemingly they will not.

1. It is written (2 Pet. iii, 10, 12) that at the end of the world the elements shall melt with heal. Now when a thing is melted it remains no more. Therefore the elements will not remain.

2. But, it will be. said, they will remain in substance, though not as to their active and passive qualities.—On the contrary, if the cause remains the effect remains. Now essential principles cause the proper accidents. Since then the active and passive qualities are the proper accidents of the elements, it would seem, as long as the essential principles remain, without which the substance cannot exist, that the active qualities must also remain.

3. An inseparable accident is never actually separated from its subject. Now heat is an accident inseparable from fire. Therefore fire cannot remain without retaining heat and the same applies to the other elements.

4. But, it will be said, this will be done by the power of God, so that the elements will remain without their active and passive qualities, though is impossible naturally.—On the contrary, as nature was established at the beginning of the world, so will it be consummated at the end of the world. Now, in speaking of the beginning of the world, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii) we must consider not what God can do but what nature

requires. Therefore this is also to be considered in discussing the end of the world.

5. Active and passive qualities are in all the elements. And a gloss of Bede on the text of Peter quoted above says that the fire which will be kindled at the end of the world will entirely engulf two of the elements, and will restore the others to a better fashion. Therefore the destruction of the elements cannot refer to their active and passive qualities, since in that case it would not be said that only two elements would be consumed.

6. But, it will be said, the active qualities, to wit heat and cold, are most prominent in two elements, fire and water, and for this reason these two are stated to be absorbed. On the contrary at the end of the world the elements will be bettered, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Now the agent is more noble than the patient. Therefore those elements should remain in which active qualities are prominent, rather than those which betray passive qualities.

7. Augustine (Super Gen. iii, 10) says that water and earth are passive, while fire and air are active. Therefore if certain elements are to be absorbed on account of their active power, it would seem that these should be fire and air rather than earth and water.

8. Heavy and light are natural qualities of the elements just as hot and cold, wet and dry. If then the latter qualities do not remain in the elements, neither do the former. Now it is by reason of the nature of heaviness and lightness that the elements have their natural places: so that if the elemental qualities do not remain after the end of the world, they will have no special place, so that the earth be below and fire up above.

9. The elements were made for the use of man on his road to beatitude. Now the means cease when the end has been obtained. Therefore the elements will cease to exist when, at the end of the world, man will have obtained his final reward in heaven.

10. Matter is for the sake of the form that it acquires by generation. Now the elements are as matter in relation to all mixed bodies. Since then there will be no further generation of mixed bodies after the end of the world, it would seem that the elements will not remain.

11. On Luke xxi, 33, Heaven and earth shall pass away, the (interlinear) gloss adds, “having cast aside their previous form.” Since then the form

gives being, it would seem that the elements will no longer exist after the end of the world.

12. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) corruptible and incorruptible are not included in the same genus, and similarly therefore neither are mutable and immutable. If then a thing be transformed from mutability to immutability, it would seem that it no longer remains in its natural genus. Now the elements will be changed from mutability to immutability because the (interlinear) gloss on Matthew v, 18, Till heaven and earth pass, says: “Till they pass from mutability to immutability.” Therefore the elements will not retain their present nature.

13. The present disposition of the elements is natural: hence if this disposition be removed so as to give place to another, this will be unnatural to them. Now that which is unnatural and violent cannot last for ever, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo el Mundo, ii: iii). Consequently this latter disposition cannot remain for ever in the elements, and they would return to the former, which would seem inadmissible. Therefore the elements in their substance will cease to exist, and not only their disposition, their substance remaining.

14. That alone can be incorruptible and ingenerable whose entire matter underlies the form for which it has a potentiality: as instanced in the heavenly bodies. Now this cannot apply to the elements: because the matter that underlies the form of one element has a potentiality for the form of another. Therefore the elements cannot be incorruptible, and consequently cannot last for ever.

15. That which has no power to exist for ever cannot be everlasting. Now the elements have no power to exist for ever, because they are corruptible. Therefore they cannot last for ever when the heavens cease to be in motion.

16. But, it will be said, the elements are incorruptible as a whole, though they be corruptible in their parts.—On the contrary it is on account of the movement of the heavens that one part of an element is destroyed and another generated: for it is thus that the element is preserved as a whole. Hence when the heavenly movement ceases there will be no longer an assignable cause for the preservation of the whole element.

17. The Philosopher says (Phys. viii) that the movement of the heavens is the source of life to all things in nature; and Rabbi Moses says that the heavenly movement is to the universe what the beating of the heart is to the

animal, in that the fife of the whole animal depends thereon. Now when the heart ceases to beat, all the parts of the animal cease to live. Therefore when the heavens cease to move, all the parts of the universe will perish, and thus the elements will not remain.

18. Everything has its being from its form. Now the heavenly movement is the cause of forms in this lower world: and this is proved from the statement of philosophers who assert that nothing here below acts for the production of a species except by virtue of the heaven's movement. Therefore when this ceases, the elements will cease to exist, since their forms will be destroyed.

19. At the presence of the sun the higher elements always overcome the lower, as happens in summer on account of the strength of the heat: whereas at the absence of the sun the opposite happens. Now when the heavens cease to be in motion, the sun will always be on one side of the earth, and absent from the other. Therefore on the one side the cold elements will be entirely destroyed, and the hot on the other side: so that the elements will not remain when the heavenly movement ceases.

On the contrary a gloss of Ambrose on Romans viii, 20, The creature was made subject to vanity, says: "All the elements labour to fulfil their offices... wherefore they will rest when we are taken up to heaven." Now only that which exists can be said to rest. Therefore the elements will remain at the end of the world.

Again, the elements were made for the manifestation of the divine goodness: and then most of all will there be need to manifest the divine goodness when all things will receive their final consummation. Therefore the elements will remain at the end of the world.

I answer that all are agreed in holding that the elements in some way will remain, and in some fashion pass away: but opinions differ as to the manner of remaining and passing away.

Some have maintained that all the elements will remain as regards their matter, but that some will receive a higher form, namely water and fire, which will receive the form of the heavens. Thus it will be possible to give the name of heaven to three of the elements, namely to air (which by reason of its nature is sometimes called the heaven in Scripture) and to water and fire which will assume the form of the heavens. Hereby would be verified the words of Apocalypse xxi, i, I saw a new heaven and a new earth, because heaven would include the three elements, fire, air and water. However this view is impossible: because the elements are not in potentiality to receive the form of the heaven, inasmuch as the latter has no contrary, and all the matter that has a potentiality for the heavens’ form underlies that form. Moreover it would follow that the heavens could be generated and corrupted: which the Philosopher proves to be false (De Coelo et Mundo, i). Again the argument in support of this view is frivolous: because as Basil says (Hom. in Hexaem.) “Scripture in mentioning the extremes includes those that come between.” Thus when we read (Gen. i, i) that In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the creation of heaven and earth includes the intermediate elements. Moreover sometimes all the lower things are comprised in the word earth. Thus in Psalm cxlvii, 7, the words Praise the Lord from the earth are succeeded by these, Fire, hail, etc. Hence there is no reason why we should not say that by the renewal of heaven and earth Scripture intended also the renewal of the intermediate elements, or that earth includes all the elements.

Wherefore others hold that all the elements will remain as to their substance, not only in respect of their matter but also as regards their substantial forms. For just as, in the opinion of Avicenna, the elemental forms remain in a mixed body, while their active and passive qualities remain not in full force but reduced to a mean; so will it be possible in the last state of the world for these elements to remain without these qualities. This would seem in agreement with what Augustine says (De Civit. Dei xvi): In this world-conflagration the qualities of the corruptible elements that were suitable to our bodies will be entirely destroyed by fire, and the elemental substance wig have those qualities which by a wondrous change will be suitable to immortal bodies. But this does not seem a reasonable view. First because, since the active and passive qualities are proper accidents of the elements, they must needs be caused by the essential principles of the latter, so that as long as the essential principles remain, it is impossible for these qualities to cease, save by violence, in which case they would not cease for long. Wherefore neither does the opinion of Avicenna seem probable, when he asserts that the elements retain their forms actually in a mixed body although they do retain them but only virtually as the Philosopher says: since it would follow that the various elemental forms remain in the various parts of matter. Now this would not happen unless they were also distinct as to position, so that the mixture would not be real but only apparent. Moreover in a mixed body the qualities of one element counteract the qualities of another: and this cannot apply to the final consummation of the world, when all violence win cease.—Secondly because, since the active and passive qualities belong to the integrity of the elements' nature, it would follow that the elements will remain in a state of imperfection. Hence Augustine in the passage quoted refers not to the active and passive qualities, but to the dispositions of things subject to generation, corruption and alteration.

Seemingly then the question is best solved by saying that the elements will remain in their substance with their natural qualities, but that generation, corruption and alteration. resulting from their action on one another will cease, because it is by means of these that the elements are ordinated to the completion of the number of the elect, even as the heaven by means of its movement. The substance, however, of the elements will remain even as the substance of heaven. The reason is that since the universe win remain for ever, as we have proved already, it follows that whatsoever belongs to the perfection of the universe must remain as to its substance. Now this applies to the elements inasmuch as they are essential parts of the universe, as the Philosopher proves (De Coelo et Mundo, ii). For if the universe is a circular body it must have a centre, and this is the earth: and given the earth which is heavy absolutely as occupying the centre, there must be its contrary namely fire which is light absolutely: because if one contrary exists in nature, the other must exist also. Now given the extremes, we must posit the middle: wherefore we must posit air and water, which are heavy in comparison with, fire, and light in comparison with earth: one of which is nearer to the earth than the other. Hence from the very conformation of the universe it is evident that the elements are essential parts thereof.—This is also made clear if we consider the order of causes to their effects. Thus even as heaven it the universal active cause of things that are generated, so the elements are their universal matter. Hence the perfection of the universe requires that the elements remain in their substance. Moreover by their very nature they have an aptitude to remain thus. The reason is that corruption occurs in mixed bodies otherwise than in the elements. Mixed bodies contain within themselves the active Principle of corruption, through being composed of contraries: whereas the elements have an outside contrary but are not composed of contraries, wherefore they do not contain an active principle of corruption, but only a passive principle, inasmuch as their matter has an aptitude to receive another form than that which they actually have. It is due to this principle that generation and corruption in the elements are natural movements or changes, and not to any active principle as the Commentator says (Phys. ii). Accordingly even as it is possible for the movement of a heavenly body to cease without suffering violence, while the body itself remains, because the active principle of its movement is external to it, as stated above; so too is it possible that the elements cease to be corrupted and remain in their substance, when the external cause of their corruption ceases, which cause must be reduced to the heavenly movement which is the first principle of generation and corruption.

Reply to the First Objection. This melting of the elements does not mean that their substance will be destroyed but that they will be refined by the fire which will go before the face of the judge. After being thus refined the elements will remain in their substance and natural qualities, as we have stated.

The Second and Third Objections are granted.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. At the beginning of the world the nature of bodies was established in accordance with its being ordained to generation and corruption, whereby the number of the elect is made complete. But at the end of the world the. substance. of the elements will remain as being ordained to the perfection of the universe. Consequently there will be no need in that final state for the elements to retain all that they needed at the beginning of the world.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Bede’s gloss does not mean that two elements will be thus destroyed in their substance, but that they will be changed in their state. This is especially evident in the case of two elements, namely air and water to which according to some the gloss refers: although others take it to refer to fire and water in which the active qualities are most prominent.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Action depends on the agent rather than on the patient for the simple reason that the agent ranks above the patient. Hence when the elements will no longer be subject to change and mutual reaction, it is more fitting to describe this as a withdrawal of active forces rather than of passive qualities.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. If we consider action and passion in the elements with respect to the essential principles it is true, as Augustine says, that water and earth are passive, while fire and air are active, because fire and air have more of form which is the principle of action, and earth and water have more of matter which is the principle of passivity. But if we consider them with respect to active and passive qualities which are the immediate principles of action, then fire and water are more active, while earth and air are more passive.

The Eighth Objection is granted.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The elements considered in their mutability were made for man on his way to heaven; but in the point of their substance, they were made both for the perfection of the universe, and for the substance of man which is composed of them.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. At the end of the world not all mixed bodies will cease to exist since human bodies will remain. It is therefore fitting, if some of the elements remain in the body of man who is the lesser world, that they should all remain in the greater world.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The form to be cast aside by the elements is their mutability, and not that form which is their principle of existence.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The elements will lose their changeable disposition, because they will cease to be changed; but they will not lose their changeable nature.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The elements disposition to generation, corruption and change is natural to them as long as the heavens continue to be in motion, but it will not be so after this movement has ceased.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. This argument proves that in the elements there is a material, but not an active, principle of corruption: hence they undergo no change, when the heavenly movement ceases which is the cause of their being changed.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. just as an element has no power to last for ever, inasmuch as it can be destroyed by an extrinsic agent, even so it has none but a material principle of corruption, as stated above.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. As long as the heavens continue to be in motion the elements as a whole are incorruptible, while here and there they are generated or destroyed. When, however, the heavens cease to be in motion there will be another cause of their incorruptibility, namely that whereas they cannot be destroyed save by an extrinsic cause, when the heavenly movement ceases, that extrinsic cause will cease also.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The heaven's movement gives life to all nature in its state of mutability which will cease at the end of the world.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Although the eduction of forms from matter depends on the celestial movement, their preservation depends on higher causes as already explained.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The sun causes heat by movement according to the Philosopher (De Colo et Mundo, ii), wherefore when movement ceases there win no longer be a cause of corruption in the elements, which results from excess of heat.

Q. V: ARTICLE VIII

WILL ACTION AND PASSION REMAIN IN THE ELEMENTS AFTER THE HEAVENS HAVE CEASED TO BE IN MOTION?

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether action and passion will remain in the elements after the heavens have ceased to be in motion: and seemingly they will.

1. Natural forces are confined to one effect: thus the power of fire, being a natural force, is adapted for heating, and not for not heating. Now, as we have said before (A. 7), at the end of the world fire and other elements will retain their powers. Therefore it will be impossible for fire and the other elements not to be active.

2. As the Philosopher says (De Gener. Anim. i) mutual action and passion require the agent and patient to be alike in matter and unlike in form. Now when the heavens cease to be moved, this will be the case, since their substance will remain, and their essential principles will be unchanged. Therefore after the cessation of the heavenly movement there will be action and passion in the elements.

3. The cause of action and passion in the elements is that in the elemental matter there is ever an appetence for another form, although by the one

form it is perfected. Now matter will retain this appetence even after the heavens have ceased to be moved; inasmuch as the whole potentiality of matter will not be fulfilled by one form. Therefore action and passion will remain in the elements at the end of the world.

4. That which belongs to the perfection of an element will not be taken from it. Now it belongs to the perfection of everything to produce its like, because diffusion of being derives from the sovereign good to all beings. Therefore seemingly after the end of the world the elements will produce their like: and thus action and passion will be in them.

5. just as it is proper to fire to be hot, so is it proper to fire to heat: because as heat results from the essential principles of fire, so heating results from heat. If then at the end of the world fire and its heat remain, it would seem that it will continue to heat.

6. All bodies in contact with one another, in some way alter one another (De Gener. Anim. i). Now in that state of the world the elements will be in contact with one another. Therefore they will alter one another: and thus there will be action and passion.

7. At the end of the world the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold (Isa. xxx, 26). But the sun and moon by their light illumine the lower bodies now: wherefore a fortiori will they then illumine them: so that there will remain some kind of action and passion in this lower world, since light will be reflected from the nearest bodies to the furthest.

8. The saints with their eyes will see the things of this world. Now things cannot be seen unless there be action and passion, because the organ of sight is passive to the visible object. Therefore there will be action and passion even after the cessation of the heavenly movement.

On the contrary if the cause be removed the effect is removed also. Now the heavenly movement is the cause of action and passion in these corporeal things according to the Philosopher’s teaching (Metaph. i: De Coelo ii). Therefore after the cessation of the heaven’s movement, there will be no more action and passion in this lower world.

Again, there can be no action and passion in bodies without movement. But if the first movement which is that of heaven (Phys. viii) cease, all subsequent movements will cease also. Therefore with the cessation of the celestial movement, action and passion will cease in this lower world.

I answer that according to the book De Causis when the first cause withdraws its action from the effect, the second cause must needs withdraw its action therefrom, inasmuch as the second cause acts only by reason of the action of the first cause by virtue of which it acts. And since every agent acts for as much as it is actual, the order of active causes will be according to the order of their actuality. Now the lower bodies are less actual than the heavenly bodies, because their potentiality is not made wholly complete by act, inasmuch as their matter underlying one form retains a potentiality to another form. This does not obtain in the heavenly bodies, since their matter has no potentiality to another form, so that their potentiality is wholly terminated by the form that they have. Again, the separate substances have yet more perfect actuality than even the heavenly bodies, because they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, falling short however of God’s actuality who is his own being, which does not apply to other separate substances. Thus it is to be observed that as the elements also surpass one another in their degrees of actuality, water being more specific than earth, air more than water, and fire more than air, even so is it in the heavenly bodies and in separate substances. Accordingly the elements act by virtue of the heavenly bodies, and the heavenly bodies by virtue of separate substances: so that when the separate substances cease to act, the action of the heavenly body must cease also, and when this ceases the action of the elemental body must also cease.

It must be observed however that a body has a twofold action: one according to a property of a body, inasmuch as it acts by movement (for it is proper to a body that it be moved so as to move and act), the other by attaining to the order of separate substances and receiving a share in their mode of operation: thus lower natures are wont to share in a property of a higher nature, for instance certain animals share in a certain likeness to prudence which is proper to man. This latter action of a body does not aim at the transformation of matter, but at communicating a certain likeness to its form to the ‘medium,’ which may be compared to the spiritual ‘intention’ which things impress on the senses or intelligence: thus the air receives the light of the sun, and the ‘medium’ receives a reflection of coloured images. Now both these actions are caused here below by the heavenly bodies. Thus fire by its heat transforms matter by virtue of a heavenly body; and visible bodies reflect their images in the medium by the power of light, the source whereof is in a heavenly body. Hence if both these actions on the part of a heavenly body were to cease, no action would remain in this lower world. But if the heavens were to cease to be in motion, the first action would cease, but not the second: and consequently when the heavenly movement ceases, in this lower world the action whereby the ‘medium’ is illumined and affected by sensible things will continue, but not the action whereby matter is transformed and which results in generation and corruption.

Reply to the First Objection. The power of fire is indeed confined to heating, but on the presupposition of those prior causes that are required for fire to act.

Reply to the Second Objection. Likeness in matter and contrariety of form are not sufficient for action and passion in this lower world, unless the heavenly movement be presupposed by virtue of which all the lower active powers act.

Reply to the Third Objection. Matter is not sufficient for action without an active principle. Wherefore the appetence of matter is not a sufficient proof of action in the elements, without the heavenly movement which is the first principle of action.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Things of lower degree never attain to the perfection of their superiors. Now it is the exclusive perfection of the Supreme Agent that he is so perfect that he can act without the aid of any other agent: and consequently this can never be the case with inferior agents.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Provided that fire acts then it is true that its proper action is to heat; yet its action is dependent on something else, as already stated. The same solution applies to the Sixth Objection: inasmuch as for the elements to act, contact is not enough unless we presuppose the movement of the heavens.

We grant the two remaining arguments, since they do not apply to actions whereby matter is transformed, but to actions whereby species are multiplied by a kind of spiritual intention.

Q. V: ARTICLE IX

WILL PLANTS, ANIMALS AND MINERALS REMAIN AFTER THE END OF THE WORLD?

[SUM, TH. SUPPL., Q. XCI, A. 5]

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether plants, animals and minerals will remain after the last judgement: and seemingly they will.

1. It is written (Eccles. iii, 14): I have learnt that all the works which God hath made continue for ever. Now minerals, plants and dumb animals are the works of God. Therefore they will remain for ever.

2. It might be said that these words refer to those of God's works which in some way are ordained to incorruption: for instance the elements, though corruptible in part are incorruptible as a whole.—On the contrary, as the elements are incorruptible as a whole, while corruptible in part, so the things mentioned are incorruptible in the species, although the individuals are corruptible. Therefore it would seem that those things also remain for ever.

3. The intention of nature cannot be frustrated, because nature's intention consists in its being guided to its end by God. Now by generation and corruption nature intends to assure the perpetuity of the species. Therefore, unless these things be preserved in their species, nature's intention will be abortive: and this is impossible, as stated.

4. The beauty of the universe will belong to the glory of the blessed, for which reason holy men say that for the greater glory of the blessed the elements of the world will be raised to a better state. Now plants, minerals and dumb animals belong to the beauty of the universe. Therefore they will not be utterly destroyed in the state of perfect bliss.

5. It is written (Rom. i, 20): The invisible things of God... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: and among these things may be reckoned plants and animals. Now in that state of perfect bliss it willbe necessary for man to see the invisible things of God. Therefore it is unfitting that those works of God be destroyed.

6. it is written (Apoc. xxii, 2): On both sides of the river was the tree... bearing twelve fruits. Since then the text refers to the consummate bliss of the saints in heaven, it would seem that in that state the plants will remain.

7. From the divine being all beings derive the desire to exist for ever, in so far as they are likened to the first being which is everlasting. Now that which things derive through their likeness to the divine being will not be

taken from them in the final consummation. Therefore plants and animals will remain for ever, at least in their species.

8. In that final state of universal consummation things will not be deprived of that which pertains to their perfection. Now the work of adornment was a kind of consummation of the work of creation. Wherefore since animals belong to the work of adornment, it would seem that they will not cease to exist in that final state of the world.

9. Animals and plants no less than the elements are of use to man in his state as wayfarer. Now the elements will remain'. Therefore animals and plants will also, and consequently they will not cease to exist.

10. The more a thing shares in a property of the first everlasting being namely God, the more seemingly is it also everlasting. Now plants and animals have a greater share than the elements in the divine properties: inasmuch as the elements have only existence, whereas plants have life, and animals in addition to this have knowledge. Therefore animals and plants should last for ever rather than the elements.

11. As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) it is an effect of divine wisdom that the lower nature at its highest point is in conjunction with the lowest point of the higher nature. Now this will not be true if animals and plants cease to exist, because in no point do the elements attain to human perfection, whereas certain animals do in a measure: and plants come near to animals, and minerals which are immediately above the elements approach to the plants. Therefore at the end of the world, seeing that nothing should be destroyed belonging to the order of divine wisdom, it would seem that animals and plants should not cease to exist.

12. If when the world was created animals and plants had not been produced, the world would not have been perfect. But the world will be more perfect in the end than at the beginning. Therefore seemingly all animals and plants will remain.

13.Certain minerals and dumb animals are appointed for the punishment of the damned: for instance (Ps. X, 7): Fire, brimstone and storms of wind shall be the portion of their cup, and (Isa. lxvi, 24): Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched. Now the punishment of the damned will be everlasting. Therefore seemingly animals and minerals will remain for ever.

14. The elements contain the germs of mixed bodies, animals and plants according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9). Now these germs would be to no purpose if these things were not produced from them. Since then at the end of the world the elements will remain and consequently the germs they contain, and seeing that none of God’s works are frustrated, it would seem that animals and plants will remain when the world is renewed.

15. The final cleansing of the world will be by the action of fire. But some minerals are of such strong composition that they are not consumed by fire, gold for instance. Therefore one would think that these at least will remain after that fire.

16. The universal is everlasting: yet it does not exist save in individuals. Therefore it would seem that the individuals of every universal will last for ever: and consequently dumb animals, plants and minerals will always exist.

On the contrary Origen says (Peri Archon): We must not think that animals whether tame or wild, or trees or rocks will reach that final state.

Again, animals and plants are ordained for man’s animal life: hence it is written (Gen. ix, 31): Even as the green herbs have I delivered all things for your meat. But man’s animal life will come to an end. Therefore animals and plants will also cease to exist.

I answer that in that renewal of the world no mixed body will remain except the human body. In support of this view we shall proceed in the order prescribed by the Philosopher (Phys. ii) namely by considering first the final cause, then the material and formal principles and lastly the moving causes. The end of minerals, plants and animals is twofold. One is the completion of the universe, to which end all the parts of the universe are ordained: yet the aforesaid things are not ordained to this end as though by their very nature and essentially they were required for the universe’s perfection, since they contain nothing that is not to be found in the principal parts of the world (namely the heavenly bodies and the elements) as their active and material principles. Consequently the things in question are particular effects of those universal causes which are essential parts of the universe, so that they belong to the perfection of the universe only in the point of their production by their causes, and this is by movement. Hence they belong to the perfection of the universe not absolutely speaking but only as long as the latter is in motion. Wherefore as soon as movement in the universe ceases these things must cease to exist.—The other end is man, because as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) things that are imperfect in nature are ordained to those that are perfect, as their end, with the result that as he says (ibid.) since an animal's life is imperfect as compared with a man's which is perfect simply, and a plant's life as compared with an animal's: it follows that plants are for animals being prepared by nature to be the latter's food; and animals are for man, to whom they are necessary as food and for other purposes. Now this necessity lasts as long as man's animal life endures. But this life will cease in that final renewal of the universe, because the body will rise not natural but spiritual (1 Cor. xv, 44): hence animals and plants will also cease to exist then.

Again this is consistent with the matter and form of these things: for since they are composed of contrary elements, they contain within themselves an active principle of corruption. Wherefore if they were prevented from corrupting by an external, principle only, this would be in a manner violent and inconsistent with perpetuity, since that which is violent cannot last for ever according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo, i). Nor have they an internal principle to preserve them from corruption, because their forms are in themselves corruptible through not being self-subsistent but depending on matter for their being. Consequently they cannot remain for ever identically the same; nor specifically the same when generation and corruption cease.

The same conclusion follows from the consideration of the moving cause. In plants and animals to be is to live, and in corporeal things this cannot be without movement. Hence animals die when the heart ceases to beat, and plants when they lack nourishment. Now these things have no moving principle that is not dependent on the first movable: since the very souls of animals and plants are wholly subject to the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore when the heavenly movement ceases it will be impossible for them to retain movement or life. It is evident then that at the renewal of the world the aforesaid things will be unable to remain.

Reply to the First Objection. All God's works continue for ever either in themselves or in their causes: in this way animals and plants will remain because the heavenly bodies and the elements will remain.

Reply to the Second Objection. Perpetuity of species and not of the individual is secured by generation which will cease when the heavens cease to be in motion.

Reply to the Third Objection. Nature’s intention is to perpetuate the species as long as the heavenly movement continues whereby that perpetuity is assured.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The things fn question conduce to the beauty of the universe as regards the changeable state of the world, and man’s animal life, and not otherwise, as stated above.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In heaven the saints will not need to see the invisible things of God in creatures as they do in the present life to which the Apostle refers: but they will see the invisible things of God in themselves.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The tree of life in the words quoted signifies Christ or Wisdom of whom it is written (Prov. iii, 18) . She is a tree of life to them that lay hold Upon her.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The desire to exist for ever is in creatures by reason of their likeness to God, in each one however, according to its mode.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. As stated above, the work of creation whereby the earth was adorned with animals and plants was accomplished in reference to the first consummation of the world, wherein the world was given a state of changeableness directed to the completion of the number of the elect, but not simply in reference to the final consummation of the world.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The elements are said to be rewarded not in themselves, because in themselves they had no merit; but because men will be rewarded in them, inasmuch as their brightness will conduce to the glory of the elect. As to plants and animals they will be of no use to man like the elements which will be as it were the place of their glory: hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although plants and animals are better than the elements in respect of life and knowledge: nevertheless in respect of simplicity which conduces to incorruptibility, the elements are more like God.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In man himself there is a conjunction of natures, inasmuch as in him the nature of a mixed body is united to the nature of plants and animals.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The perfection of the world at the creation was not the same as the perfection of the world at its consummation, as already stated: wherefore that which belonged to its first perfection need not belong to its second perfection.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The worm that is mentioned as part of the punishment of the wicked is not to be taken literally but metaphorically, and according to Augustine (De Civit. Dei, xx) signifies the remorse of their conscience. Other like expressions, if there be any, should be interpreted in the same way.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The germs contained in the elements do not suffice to produce an effect without the aid of the heavenly movement: wherefore when the heavens cease to be in motion it does not follow that there will still be animals and plants; nor does it follow that these germs are useless, since they belong to the perfection of the elements.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Although there are certain things that are not consumed by fire for the nonce, yet as Galen says there is nothing that fire will not consume in time, if it remain long enough in the fire: and yet the fire of that world-conflagration will be much more fierce than the fire to which we are used. Besides, the action of the fire will not be the sole cause of the destruction of mixed bodies, since there will also be the cessation of the heavenly movement.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. There are three ways of looking at the universal; and in each way it is true that the universal is after a manner everlasting. We may consider the universal in one way as apart from any kind of being: and thus it is true that the universal lasts for ever, rather by abstraction of the cause determining it to a definite duration than by assigning the cause of its perpetuity: for it does not belong to the nature of a universal to exist at one time more than at another. In this way also primal matter is said to be one. Secondly, we may consider the universal in respect of the being it has in individuals: and thus again it is true that it exists always, since whenever the individual exists its universal exists. In the same way it is said to be everywhere, because it is wherever its individual exists, even though there are many places where its individual is not: so that neither is the universal there. Thirdly, the universal may be considered in respect of the being it has in the mind: and thus again it is true that the universal is everlasting, especially in the mind of God.

Q. V: ARTICLE X

WILL HUMAN BODIES REMAIN AFTER THE HEAVENLY MOVEMENT HAS CEASED?

[SUM. TH. 1, Q. LXXVII, A. 8]

THE tenth point of inquiry is whether human bodies will remain after the cessation of the heavenly movement: and seemingly they will not.

1. It is written (1 Cor. xv, 50) Flesh and blood cannot possess the Kingdom of God. Now the human body is composed of flesh and blood. Therefore at the end of the world human bodies will not remain.

2. All mixtures of the elements are caused by the movement of the heavens, because alteration is required in a mixture. Now the human body is a mixture of the elements. Therefore when the heavens cease to be in motion it cannot remain.

3. Necessity arising from matter is absolute (Phys. ii). Now in a body composed of contrary elements there is necessity for corruption arising from the very matter. Therefore it is necessary for such bodies to be corrupted: and it is impossible for them to remain after the state of generation and corruption. Since then human bodies answer to this description, it follows that at the end of the world they cannot possibly remain.

4. Man in common with dumb animals has a sensible body. Now the sensible bodies of dumb animals will not remain at the end of the world. Neither therefore will human bodies remain.

5. The end of man is a perfect assimilation to God. Now seeing that God has no body, the soul without the body is more like God than when united to the body. Therefore in the state of final beatitude the soul will be without the body.

6. Man’s perfect beatitude requires the perfect operation of his intelligence. Now the intellectual soul’s operation is more perfect when the soul is separated from the body than when it is united to it: because a united force is stronger than a divided one (De Causis). Now a separate form is self-united, while forms united to matter are as it were scattered in many directions. Therefore in the state of perfect bliss the soul will not be united to the body.

7. The elements that form a mixed body have a natural inclination to be in their proper places. Now a natural inclination cannot be in vain: for which reason that which is against nature cannot be everlasting. Consequently the elements in a mixed body must of necessity tend to their proper places at some time or other, so that the mixed body will be corrupted. Therefore after the state of corruption human bodies will not remain, since they are a mixture of the elements.

8. Every natural movement of any body whatsoever depends on the movement of the heavens. Now the movement of the heart without which there can be no life in a man’s body, is a natural movement. Therefore it cannot continue when the heavens cease to be in motion, and thus man’s body will not continue to live.

9. The members of a man’s body for the most part are directed to purposes befitting his animal life, as instanced in the veins, stomach and the like which are for the purpose of nourishment. Now animal life will not remain in man in the state of bliss. Therefore neither will the members of his body remain (otherwise they would be useless) and consequently not the body itself.

On the contrary it is written (1 Cor, xv. 53): This corruptible must put on incorruption. Now this corruptible signifies the body. Therefore the body will remain, clothed in incorruption.

Again it is written (Phil. iii, 22): Who will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of his glory. But Christ never did and never will put aside the body which once for all he reassumed in his resurrection; according to Romans vi, 9: Christ having risen again from the dead dieth no more. Therefore the saints also will live for ever with the bodies in which they rose again: and thus human bodies will remain after the end of the world,

I answer that as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) Porphyry held that the human soul in order to be perfectly happy must avoid all bodies, so that in his opinion the soul cannot be united to the body in the state of perfect bliss. Origen (Peri Archon) refers to this opinion when he says that some maintained that the saints would eventually lay aside the bodies resumed at the resurrection, so that being made like God they might live in perfect happiness. This opinion, besides being contrary to faith (as may be gathered both from the authorities quoted and from many others), is also contrary to reason. For there can be no perfect happiness where nature itself is not perfect. And since the union of soul and body is natural, besides being substantial and not accidental, the soul's nature cannot be perfect unless it be united to the body: wherefore the soul separated from the body cannot have the ultimate perfection of beatitude. For this reason Augustine (De Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) says that the souls of the blessed do not as perfectly enjoy the sight of God before the resurrection as after: wherefore the human body will need to be united to the soul in the final state of beatitude. The above-mentioned opinion is a sequel to the position of those who hold that the soul is united to the body accidentally, as a sailor to his ship or a man to his clothes. For this reason Plato, as Gregory of Nyssa relates (De Anima x), said that man is a soul clothed with a body. But this cannot stand: for man would not be a per se being but an accidental being: nor would he be in the genus of substance but in that of accident, as being something clothed or shod.

Moreover it is evident that the arguments given above which refer to mixed bodies, cannot apply to man: because man is ordained to the perfection of the universe as an essential part thereof, since there is in him something that is not even virtually contained either in the elements or in the heavenly bodies, namely the rational soul. Again man's body is ordained to him, not only in his animal life but for the perfection of his nature. And although his body is composed of contrary elements it will contain an incorruptible principle, that Will be able to preserve it without violence, inasmuch as it is intrinsic to him. And it will suffice as a principle of movement when the heavenly movement ceases, since it does not depend on the latter.

Reply to the First Objection. Flesh and blood signify the corruption of these things, wherefore the text continues: Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.

Reply to the Second Objection. Movement causes mixture in the making: but its preservation comes from the substantial form, and besides, from principles yet higher than the heavens. This has been explained in previous articles.

Reply to the Third Objection. By its perfect union with God the soul will have complete sway over the body: so that although matter, if left to itself, is corruptible, it win acquire incorruption by the power of the soul.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. In man the sensitive faculty derives from an incorruptible principle, namely the rational soul: whereas in dumb animals it derives from a corruptible principle. Wherefore man’s sensitive body can last for ever while that of the dumb animal cannot.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The soul is more like God when united to the body than when separated from it, because its nature is then more perfect. For a thing is like God forasmuch as it is perfect, although God’s perfection is not of the same kind as a creature’s.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The human soul is not capable of being multiplied in the same way as material forms which can be divided if their subject be divided: but remains in itself in its simplicity and unity. Hence its operation will not be hindered by its union with the body when the body will be wholly subject to it. Now indeed it is hindered by its union with the body, because its power over the body is not perfect.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The elements’ natural inclination towards their proper places will be retained in the body through the power of the soul, lest the elements be destroyed: because the elements will have a more perfect place in the human body than in their own places.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The movement of the heart will result in man from the nature of the rational soul which is independent of the celestial movement: wherefore it will not cease when that of the heavens ceases.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. All the body’s members will remain, not indeed for the purposes of the animal life, but from the perfection of human nature.

QUESTION VI

ON MIRACLES

THERE are ten points of inquiry. (1) Can God do anything in creatures, that is beyond natural causes, or against nature, or contrary to the course of nature? (2) Whether anything that God does against nature or against the course of nature can be called a miracle? (3) Can spiritual creatures work miracles by their own natural power? (4) Can good angels and men work miracles by a gift of grace? (5) Do the demons co-operate in the working of miracles? (6) Have angels or demons bodies naturally united to them? (7) Can angels or demons assume bodies? (8) Can an angel or demon by means of an assumed body exercise the operations of a living body? (9) Should the working of a miracle be ascribed to faith? (10) Are demons compelled by sensible and corporeal objects, deeds or words to work the miracles which appear to be done by the arts of magic?

Q. VI: ARTICLE I

CAN GOD DO ANYTHING IN CREATURES THAT IS BEYOND NATURE, AGAINST NATURE, OR CONTRARY TO THE COURSE OF NATURE?

[CON. GEN. III, 98, 99, 100]

THE first point of inquiry is whether God can do anything in creatures that is beyond or against nature, or contrary to the course of nature: and seemingly he cannot.

1. The (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24, Contrary to nature thou wert grafted, says: “God the author of all natures does nothing against nature.”

2. Another gloss on the same passage observes: “God can no more act against the law of nature than he can act against himself.” Now he can

nowise act against himself because he cannot deny himself (2 Tim. ii, 13). Therefore he cannot act against the order of nature.

3. Just as the order of human justice derives from divine justice, so does the order of nature derive from divine wisdom since it is this that ordereth all things sweetly (Wis. viii, x). Now God cannot act against the order of human justice: further, he would be the cause of sin which alone is contrary to the order of justice. Since then God's wisdom is no less than his justice, it would seem that neither can he act against the order of nature.

4. Whenever God works in creatures through the innate laws of nature, he does not act against the course of nature. Now God cannot fittingly work in a creature independently of the innate laws of nature. Therefore he cannot fittingly work against the course of nature. The minor proposition is proved as follows. Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 11, 12) that visible apparitions were shown to the patriarchs by means of the angelic ministrations, inasmuch as God governs bodies through spirits. In like manner he governs the lower bodies through the higher (ibid. 4): and it may also be said that he directs all effects through their causes. Since then the laws of nature are implanted in natural causes, it would seem that God cannot fittingly work in natural effects, except by means of the natural laws: and thus he will do nothing contrary to the course of nature.

5. God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time: because since this is incompatible with the very nature of being as such, it is also incompatible with a creature: and the first of things created was being (De Causis, p. 54). Now the aforesaid principle, being the first principle of all, to which all others are reduced (Metaph. iv), must be implied in every necessary proposition, and its opposite in every impossible proposition. Since then things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible in nature, for instance that a blind man be made to see, or a dead man to live, they imply the opposite of the aforesaid proposition. Therefore God cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature.

6. A gloss on Ephesians iii says that God does not change his will so as to act against the causes which he had established by his will. Now God established natural causes by his will. Therefore he neither does nor can do anything contrary to them, inasmuch as he cannot change: for to do anything contrary to that which one has deliberately decided would seem to point to a change in one's will.

7. The good of the universe is a good of order, and to this the course of nature belongs. But God cannot act against the good of the universe, since it is due to his sovereign goodness that all things are good in relation to the order of the universe. Therefore God cannot do anything contrary to the order of nature.

8. God cannot be the cause of evil. Now according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iv) evil is the privation of measure, form and order. Therefore God cannot do anything contrary to the course of nature which belongs to the order of the universe.

9. It is written (Gen. ii, 2) that on the seventh day God rested from all the work which he had done, and this because as the (ordinary) gloss observes, he ceased to produce new works. Now in the works of the six days he did nothing contrary to the course of nature: wherefore Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. ii) says that in discussing the works of the six days we do not ask what God might have done miraculously, but what was compatible with nature which he established then. Therefore neither did God afterwards do anything contrary to the course of nature.

10. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) nature causes order in all things. Now God cannot do anything that is not in order, since according to Romans xiii, i: Those that are of God are well ordered. Therefore he cannot do anything contrary to nature.

11. Nature no less than human reason is from God. But God cannot act against the principles of reason, for instance that the genus be not predicated of its species, or that the side of a square be not proportionate to the diameter. Neither therefore can he act against the principles of nature.

12. The entire course of nature derives from divine wisdom even as the products of art proceed from art, according to Augustine in his commentary on Jo. i, 3, 4: That which was made, was life in him. Now a craftsman does nothing against the principles of his art except by mistake: and this cannot happen to God. Therefore God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

13. The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text 78) that the manner in which a thing is done follows its natural aptitude to be done in that way. Now what has a natural aptitude to be done as it is done, is not done against nature. Therefore nothing is done contrary to nature.

14. Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo xx) that God cannot do what is in the least way unbecoming. Now it is unbecoming for the course of nature to be changed, while it is becoming for it to be observed. Therefore it is impossible that God act against the course of nature.

15. Knowledge is to falsehood, as power to the impossible. Now God cannot know what is naturally false. Therefore he cannot do what is contrary to the course of nature, since this is naturally impossible.

16. That which is impossible of itself is more impossible than that which is accidentally impossible, since that which is of itself so and so is more than other things so and so. Now it is accidentally impossible for that which has been not to have been: and yet God cannot do this according to Jerome I and the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2). Therefore neither can God do things that are contrary to the course of nature and impossible in themselves, for instance that a blind man see.

17. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, i) an action is compulsory when its principle is external, and the person compelled contributes nothing to it. Now nature cannot contribute to things that are done against the course of nature: and thus if they are done by God they will be compulsory and will not last. But this cannot be admitted, since the blind retain their sight after having it restored by God.

18. Every genus is divided into potentiality and act (Phys. iii): and passive potentiality comes under potentiality, while active potentiality comes under act: wherefore nature has no passive potentiality without a corresponding active potentiality, since they come under the same genus, as again the Commentator states (Metaph. ix, text. 11, 17). Now there is no natural active potentiality directed to things contrary to the course of nature: and consequently neither is there a natural passive potentiality. But when a creature has no passive potentiality in respect of a thing, this is said to. be impossible, although by virtue of his omnipotence God can do all things. Therefore things that are contrary to the course of nature are impossible through something lacking to creatures, although not by reason of a defect in God's powers.

19. Whatsoever God has done once it would not be unbecoming if he did it always. Yet it would be unbecoming were he to produce all natural effects independently of their natural causes, because in that case natural things would be deprived of their operations. Therefore it is unbecoming for him

to produce at times an effect in this lower world without the agency of natural causes: and if he acts by their means he does nothing against the course of nature. Therefore God does nothing contrary to the course of nature.

20. A natural cause is ordained to its effect essentially, and vice versa. Now God cannot deprive a thing of that which is essential to it, so long as the thing remains: for instance, that a man be not an animal. Therefore he cannot produce an effect without the natural cause that is essentially ordained to that effect: for instance he cannot give sight without the natural causes whence sight is produced.

21. It is unfitting for a greater good to be neglected for a lesser good. Now the good of the universe is greater than any particular good of any thing whatsoever: wherefore Augustine says (Enchir. x) that God made every single thing good, and all things together very good, for the order of the universe. Therefore it is unfitting that God for the spiritual good of an individual man or of a nation, change the course of nature which belongs to the order of the universe, wherein its good consists. Therefore God never does anything contrary to the course of nature.

On the contrary, nature cannot restore a habit to one who is deprived of it: yet this can be done by God: thus it is written (Mt. xi, 5): The blind see, the deaf hear, etc. Therefore God does something contrary to the order of nature. Again, the power of a higher being is not dependent on or limited by the power of a lower being. Now God is above nature. Therefore his power is not limited by that of nature: so that nothing prevents him from acting against the order of nature.

I answer that, without any doubt God can work in creatures independently of created causes, just as he works in all created causes, as shown elsewhere: and by working independently of created causes he can produce the same effects and in the same order as he produces them by their means: or even other effects and in a different order: so that he is able to do something contrary to the common and customary course of nature. We shall realise how true this, is if we consider the views that have been held in opposition to this truth. These are three in number.

The first is that of some early philosophers who contended that these corporeal things do not derive their existence from any higher cause; thu’s some of them, as Anaxagoras, said that an intelligence was the cause of some kind of movement in them, for instance, a movement of segregation. According to this opinion natural forms which are the principles of natural actions cannot be influenced, nor their actions hindered, by any supernatural cause: so that nothing can happen contrary to the course of nature, which is unchangeably regulated by these corporeal causes. Now this opinion is false: because the supreme being must needs be the cause of being in all things (Metaph. ii, text. 4), just as that which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in all other things. We have treated this point more fully elsewhere (Sum. Theol., I, Q. xliv, A. i) when we proved that nothing can exist unless it be made by God.

A second opinion in opposition to this truth was held by other philosophers who asserted that God is the cause of all by his intellect. They maintained however that God has a universal knowledge of things inasmuch as he knows himself, and that he himself is the source of all being, but that he has no proper knowledge of each individual being. But, said they, from common and universal knowledge individual effects do not follow except by means of particular knowledge. Thus, if I know that all fornication is to be avoided, I shall not avoid this particular action unless I know that it is fornication. Accordingly they said that particular effects do not proceed from God except in a certain order by means of other causes, of which the higher are more universal, and the lower more particular: and according to this view God is unable to do anything contrary to the order of nature. But this opinion is false: for since God knows himself perfectly, he must needs know all that is in him in any way whatsoever. Now in him is the likeness of every one of his effects, inasmuch as there can be nothing that does not imitate him: and thus it follows that he has proper knowledge of all things, as we have proved elsewhere (Sum. Theol., I, Q. xiv).

The third opinion opposed to the aforesaid truth is that of some philosophers who said that God produces things by natural necessity: so that his works are confined to the course of things appointed by nature, and thus he is unable to act against it. But this again is evidently false: since above all those things that act of natural necessity there must be something that determines nature to one mode of action, as elsewhere (Sum. Th., I, Q. xix, A. 4) we have proved. It is impossible then that God the first agent act of natural necessity: and this again has been proved in several ways in another question (ibid. A. 3 and above Q. iii, A. 15).

These three points being established, namely that God is the author of being in all things of nature; that he has proper knowledge and providence in respect of each individual; and that he does not act of natural necessity, it follows that he can act independently of the course of nature in the production of particular effects—either as regards being by producing in natural things a new form which nature is unable to produce, for instance, the form of glory; or by producing a form in a particular matter, as sight in a blind man: or as regards operation, by restraining the action of nature from doing what it would naturally do, for instance, by hindering fire from burning (Dan. iii, 49, 50), or water from flowing, as happened in the Jordan (Jos. iii, 13).

Reply to the First Objection. Both God and nature act against individual nature: for instance, it is against the nature of this or that particular fire that it be extinguished: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo et Mundo, ii) that corruption, decrepitude, and in general all defects are contrary to nature: whereas nothing in nature acts against universal nature. For particular nature denotes the relation of a particular cause to a particular effect, while universal nature denotes the relation of the first agent in nature, which is the heavens, to all agents in the lower world. And seeing that none of the lower bodies acts save by virtue of the heavenly body, it is impossible for any natural body to act against universal nature: while the very fact that anything acts against a particular nature, is in accord with universal nature. Now just as the heaven is the universal cause in respect of lower bodies, so God is the universal cause in respect of all beings, and in comparison with him even the heaven is a particular cause. For nothing prevents one and the same cause from being universal in relation to things below it, and particular in relation to those above it: thus if we take the predicables, animal is universal in relation to man, and particular in relation to substance. Accordingly just as by the power of the heavens something can happen that is contrary to this or that particular nature, and yet not contrary to nature simply, since it is in accord with universal nature: even so by the power of God something can occur that is contrary to universal nature which is dependent on the power of the heavens; without being contrary to nature simply, since it will be in accord with the supremely universal nature, dependent on God in relation to all creatures. It is in this sense that Augustine in the gloss quoted says that God does nothing contrary to nature: wherefore he goes on to say, because “the nature of each thing is what God does in it.”

The Reply to the Second Objection is evident from what has just been said: because in that gloss Augustine refers to the supreme law of nature which is God’s ordinance with regard to all creatures.

Reply to the Third Objection. As we have already explained although God can do something contrary to the relation between. one creature and another, he cannot do anything contrary to a creature’s relation to himself. Now the justice of a man consists chiefly in his being duly referred to God: so that God cannot do anything contrary to the order of justice. On the other hand the course of nature is dependent on the relation of one creature to another, wherefore God can act against the course of nature.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. just as God can produce effects in nature without employing natural causes, so also can he without the ministry of the angels: but the reason for his doing so is not the same in both cases. He acts independently of natural causes in order that being unable to ascribe the effect to visible causes we may be compelled to attribute it to some higher cause, and that thus a visible miracle may be a manifestation of the divine power. But the activities of the angels are not visible; wherefore their ministrations do not hinder us from ascribing something to the divine power. For this reason Augustine does not say that God is unable to work without the ministry of the angels, but that he does not do so.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. just as God cannot make yes and no to be true at the same time, so neither can he do what is impossible in nature in so far as it includes the former impossibility. Thus for a dead man to return to life clearly involves a contradiction if we suppose that his return to life is the natural effect of an intrinsic principle, since a dead man is essentially one who lacks the principle of life. Wherefore God does not do this but he makes a dead man to regain life from an extrinsic principle: and this involves no contradiction. The same applies to other things that are impossible to nature, and which God is able to do.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. God does not change his will when he does anything. contrary to natural causes: because from eternity he foresaw and decreed that he would do what he does in time. Wherefore he so ordered the course of nature, that by his eternal decree he preordained whatsoever he would at some time do independently of that course.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. When God does anything outside the course of nature he does not put aside the entire order of the universe wherein its good consists, but the order of some particular cause to its effect.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Penal evil is contrary to the order between one part of the universe and another part;

and in like manner every evil that is a defect of nature. But sinful evil is contrary to the order between the whole universe and its last end, inasmuch as the will in which sinful evil resides, is deprived by sin of its order in relation to the last end of the universe. Wherefore God cannot be the cause of this evil: Since he cannot act against the latter order, although he can act against the former.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. God does not work miracles except in creatures that already exist, and in some way existed already in the works of the six days. Hence miraculous works, in a manner of speaking, existed already materially in the works of the six days, although it was not befitting that anything should be done miraculously contrary to the course of nature, when nature itself was being established.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Nature is the cause of order in all natural things, but not in all things absolutely speaking. Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The logician and the mathematician consider things in their abstract principles, so that in logic and mathematics nothing is impossible except what is contrary to the abstract notion of a thing. These things involve a contradiction and consequently are of themselves impossible. Such impossibilities God cannot do. On the other hand the physicist studies individual matter, wherefore he reckons as an impossibility, even that which is impossible to an individual. But nothing prevents God from being able to do what is impossible to lower agents.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. The divine art is not fully extended in producing creatures: so that God can by his art do something otherwise than the course of nature requires. Hence although he can do something contrary to the course of nature it does not follow that he can act against his art: since even a human craftsman can by his art produce another work in a different way to that in which he produced a previous work.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The Philosopher refers to things that are done in nature: for such things are so done ,as they have a natural aptitude to be done.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is fitting that the course of nature be observed forasmuch as it is ordained by divine providence: wherefore if it be in the order of divine providence that something be done otherwise, there is no reason why it should not be.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. A thing cannot be said to be false simply or false relatively in the same way as a thing is impossible simply or impossible relatively: if a thing is false at all, it is false simply. Hence God cannot know falsehood, even as he cannot do what is simply impossible. And yet just as he can do what is relatively impossible, so is he able to do what is relatively unknown.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. All accidental things are to be reduced to something per se; wherefore nothing prevents that which is accidentally impossible from being ,more impossible when reduced to that which is impossible in itself: thus snow by its whiteness dazzles the eyes more than the whiteness of the wall does, because the whiteness of the snow is greater than that of the wall. In like manner that Socrates did not run is an impossibility because it is reduced to a per se impossibility, namely that the past has not been; which involves a contradiction. Consequently nothing prevents this from being more impossible than that which is impossible relatively, although accidentally it is not impossible.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In every natural thing there is natural order and relationship to all higher causes: and therefore things that happen to lower bodies through the influence of the heavenly bodies, are not compulsory, although they may seem contrary to the natural movements of these lower bodies, as evidenced in the ebb and flow of the sea consequent upon the movement of the moon. And much less compulsory is what God does in this lower world.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. A higher active force can produce a higher effect with the same material: thus nature can produce gold out of earth and a mixture of other elements, which art cannot do. Hence it is that the same thing has a potentiality for various effects, according to its relation to various agents. Wherefore nothing prevents created nature from being in potentiality to certain effects that can be produced by the power of God, and which cannot be produced by a lower power: this potentiality of nature is called obediential forasmuch as every creature obeys its Creator.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Every created thing is ordered to its own operation by God: and thus it is not unfitting if by divine providence a certain effect is produced without the co-operation of nature.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Although God produces an effect without the action of its natural cause, he does not destroy the relation between cause and effect. Thus the fiery furnace retained its relation to burning, although it burned not the three children in the furnace.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. When God does anything contrary to the course of nature, the whole order of the universe is not subverted, but the course resulting from the relation between one particular thing and another. Hence it is not unfitting if at times something is done contrary to the course of nature for man's spiritual welfare which consists in his being ordered to the last end of the universe.

Q. VI: ARTICLE II

CAN EVERYTHING THAT GOD DOES WITHOUT NATURAL CAUSES OR CONTRARY TO THE COURSE OF NATURE BE CALLED A MIRACLE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. CV, A. 7]

THE second point of inquiry is whether everything can be called a miracle that God does without natural causes or against the order of nature: and seemingly the answer should be in the negative.

1. We may gather from Augustine (Super Joan. Tract. viii: De Trin. iii, 5) that a miracle "is something difficult which seldom occurs, exceeding the faculty of nature and so far surpassing our hopes as to compel our astonishment." Now God sometimes acts against the course of nature even in very little things, for instance when he made wine from water (Jo. ii), and yet he did this without natural causes. Therefore not everything that God does independently of natural causes should be called a miracle.

2. That which often happens should not be described as occurring seldom. Yet at the time of the apostles God often wrought works without natural causes; thus it is related (Acts v. 15) that they brought forth the sick into the streets, etc. Hence such things were not of rare occurrence, and consequently were not miracles.

3. What nature can do is not above the faculty of nature. Now sometimes without natural causes God does things that could be done by nature: as when our Lord healed Peter’s mother-in-law of the fever with which she was stricken. This then was not beyond the faculty of nature and was not miraculous.

4. A dead man cannot live again through the action of a natural cause. Now the saints look forward to the resurrection of the dead when God will raise all the dead to life at the end of the world: wherefore we say in the creed: I look for the resurrection of the dead. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of natural causes, surpasses human hope; wherefore such a thing is not a miracle.

5. The creation of heaven and earth, or the creation of a rational soul is a work of God surpassing other active causes: for God alone can create, as we have proved above (Q. iii, AA. 1, 4: Sum. Th., I., Q. xlv, A. 5). Yet these cannot be called miracles, since they are not done for the manifestation of grace, for which purpose alone miracles are wrought according to Augustine, but for the establishment of nature. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of nature is a miracle.

6. The conversion of a sinner is a work of God beyond the faculty of nature: and yet it is not a miracle, but rather the end of a miracle, since miracles are wrought in order that men be, converted to God. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of nature is a miracle.

7. It is more astonishing if a thing be done by one who is less powerful than if it be done by one who is more powerful. Now God is more powerful than nature: yet nature’s works are not called miracles, for instance, the healing of a sick man, or the like. Much less then should it be called a miracle when it is wrought by God.

8. Monsters are contrary to nature, and yet they are not described as miraculous. Therefore not everything that is contrary to nature is miraculous.

9. Miracles are wrought in confirmation of the faith. Now the Incarnation of the Word was not intended as an argument in confirmation, but to be an object, of faith. Therefore it was not a miracle: and yet it was the work of God alone without the action of any other cause. Therefore not everything that God does beyond the faculty of nature is a miracle.

On the contrary, Augustine says that things follow a threefold course: they may be either natural or voluntary or marvellous. Now those things which God does beyond the faculty of natural causes belong neither to the course of nature, nor to the course of voluntary things, since neither nature nor created will has any effective part in them. Therefore they belong to the order of wonders: and thus they are miracles.

Again, Richard of St. Victor says that a miracle is a work of the Creator manifestive of divine power. Now this applies to those of God’s works which surpass natural causes. Therefore they are miracles.

I answer that the word miracle is derived from mirari (to be astonished). Now two things concur in making us astonished, as we may gather from the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2). One is that the thing which astonishes us has a hidden cause: the second is that in that which astonishes us we perceive something that would seem to be in contradiction with the cause of our wonder: thus someone might be astonished if he saw iron rising towards a magnet, through not knowing the magnet’s power, since apparently the iron ought by its natural movement to tend downwards. This happens in two ways: for a thing may be wonderful in itself, or it may be wonderful to us. A thing is wonderful to us, when the cause of that which astonishes us is hidden, not simply, but to this or that individual, and when the thing at which we marvel has in reality no disposition inconsistent with the marvellous effect, but only. in the opinion of the person who marvels. The result is that what is wonderful or astonishing to one person, is not wonderful or astonishing to another,: thus one who knows of the magnet’s power through having been taught or had experience of it, is not astonished at the aforesaid effect: whereas an ignorant person is astonished.—A thing is wonderful or marvellous in itself when its cause is simply hidden, and when the thing has a contrary disposition to the visible effect. Such things may be called not only actually or potentially wonderful, but also miracles, as having in themselves a cause for admiration. Now the most hidden cause and the furthest removal from our senses is God who works most secretly in all things: wherefore those effects are properly called miracles, which are produced by God’s power alone on things which have a natural tendency to the opposite effect or to a contrary mode of operation: whereas effects produced by nature, the cause of which is unknown to us or to some of us, as also those effects, produced by God, that are of a nature to be produced by none but God, cannot be called miraculous but only marvellous or wonderful. For this reason a miracle in its definition is described as being above the order of nature in the words exceeding the faculty of nature, to which on the part of the thing done corresponds the word difficult. Again it is described as transcending our knowledge, in the words so far surpassing our hopes as to compel admiration, to which on the part of the thing done correspond the words which seldom occurs: since when we are accustomed to an occurrence it becomes more familiar to our knowledge.

Reply to the First Objection. The difficulty mentioned In the definition of a miracle refers to the greatness of the thing not in itself, but in comparison with the faculty of nature: wherefore every effect is reckoned to be difficult that God works in any little thing, if that effect surpasses the faculty of nature.

Reply to the Second Objection. A miracle is described as seldom occurring because it is contrary to the usual course of nature, even were it to be repeated day after day. Thus the transubstantiation of bread into Christ’s body occurs every day, yet it ceases not to be miraculous: because the things that happen generally in the whole order of the universe are to be described as usual occurrences rather than what happens in one individual thing alone.

Reply to the Third Objection. It is customary to divide the miraculous works of God into those which are done above, those which are done against, and those which are done without nature.—A miracle is above nature when God produces an effect which nature is wholly incapable of producing. This happens in two ways. First, when God induces into matter a form which nature is utterly unable to induce, for instance, the form of glory which God will induce into the bodies of the elect; and again the Incarnation of the Word. Secondly when nature, although able to induce a particular form into some matter, is unable to induce it into this particular matter: thus nature is able to produce life, but not to produce it in this corpse. A miracle is contrary to nature, when nature retains a disposition contrary to the effect produced by God: for instance when he prevented the three children in the furnace from being hurt, while the fire retained the power to bum; and when the waters of the Jordan stood (Jos. iii, 16) while retaining the force of gravity; and again when a virgin gave birth to a son.—A miracle is done by God without nature, when he produces an effect that nature can produce, but in a manner of which nature is incapable. This may be either through lack of the instruments which nature is wont to employ, as when Christ changed water into wine (Jo. ii): for nature can do this in a certain way, the water absorbed by the vine for the purpose of nourishment being converted in due time into the juice of the grape by the process of assimilation: or, because the effect is produced by God more copiously than when produced by nature, for instance, the frogs that were brought forth in Egypt (Exod. viii, 6): or because it is produced in less time than nature can produce it, as when a person is instantly cured through the prayer of a saint, for nature could have done this, yet not at once but by degrees, not now but at another time: for instance, the miracle already quoted wrought on Peter’s mother-in-law. Evidently then all such works, if we take into account both the substance and the manner of the thing done, surpass the faculty of nature.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The coming resurrection of the dead is beyond the hope of nature, but not beyond the hope of grace. This twofold hope is mentioned (Rom. iv, 18): Who against hope believed in hope.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Heaven, earth and rational souls in the natural order cannot be created by any cause other than God: wherefore the creation of these is not a miracle.

The same answer applies to the Sixth Objection as regards the conversion of a sinner.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Nature’s works are also God’s works, but, the miracles wrought by God are not wrought by nature: and thus the argument does not conclude. Moreover, the action of nature is manifest to us, whereas God is a hidden cause: for which reason God’s works are more wonderful to us than the works of nature.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Monsters are a result that is contrary to a particular nature, but not to universal nature.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. In the words of the saints the Incarnation is the miracle of miracles, because it is greater than all other miracles, and because all other miracles are ordered to ft. For this reason not only does it lead us to believe in other articles of faith, but other miracles lead us to believe in it: since nothing prevents one miracle from leading to faith in another, as, for instance, the raising of Lazarus leads us to believe in a future resurrection.

Q. VI: ARTICLE III

CAN SPIRITUAL CREATURES WORK MIRACLES BY THEIR NATURAL POWER?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. CX, AA. 1 SEQQ.: CON. GEN. III, 103]

THE third point of inquiry is whether spiritual creatures can work miracles by their natural power: and seemingly they can.

1. That which can be done by a lower power, can a fortiori be done by a higher power. Now the power of a spiritual creature surpasses that of a corporeal creature: wherefore it is written (Job xli, 24): There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him. Therefore a spiritual creature can produce the same effects as nature. But when a natural effect is produced, not by a natural but by a hidden cause, it is a miracle. Therefore the spiritual creature can work miracles.

2. The more actual a thing is the more is it active, inasmuch as activity is in proportion to actuality. Now the forms that are in rational creatures are more actual than the forms which are in corporeal creatures, because they are more immaterial: and consequently they are more active. But the forms that are in a corporeal nature produce their like in nature. Much more therefore are the forms in the mind of a spiritual creature capable of doing this: so that a rational creature can produce natural effects without natural causes: and this is a miracle.

3. An angel’s intelligence is more akin to the divine intelligence than a man’s is. Now in the human intelligence there are active forms residing in the practical intellect, such as the forms of art. Much more then are these active forms in an angel’s intelligence: inasmuch as it is evident that the ideas in the divine intellect are supremely active.

4. It might be said that the active forms in the angelic mind are employed in the production of effects by means of a corporeal agent in the same way as forms in the human mind.—On the contrary any power that cannot come into action except by means of a corporeal instrument, is uselessly bestowed on one who has no bodily organs: thus the power of locomotion would be useless to an animal unless it had the means to move. But an angel has not a body naturally united to him. Therefore his power needs no corporeal agent in order to do its work.

5. Any power whose field of action exceeds that of its organ can perform some actions without that organ: thus since the eye's field of action is not equal to the whole power of the soul, the latter performs many actions without the eye. Now a body cannot be in proportion to the whole power of an angel. Therefore an angel can produce certain effects without employing corporeal agents: and thus seemingly he can work miracles by his natural power.

6. An angel's power surpasses all corporeal power more than the body of the heavens surpasses the elements. Now certain effects are produced in this lower world by the power of a heavenly body independently of the action the active and passive qualities that are the forces proper to the elements. Much more then can certain effects be produced in nature by the power of an angel, without the aid of the powers of natural bodies.

7. According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) all bodies are governed by God through the rational spirit of life; and Gregory says the same (Dial. iv.: so that seemingly the movements of the heavens and of all nature are controlled by the angels even as the movements of the human body are controlled by the soul. Now the soul produces forms in the body independently of the natural active forces of the body: thus a mere fancy makes a man grow hot or cold, or become feverish or even leprous according to physicians. A fortiori then it is possible that by the mere concept of the angel who moves the heavens certain effects be produced in this lower world without the action of natural causes: and thus an angel can work a miracle.

8. It will be said perhaps that this is due to the fact that the soul is the form of the body, whereas an angel is not the form of a corporeal creature. —On the contrary, whatsoever effects result from the soul's operation, are produced by the soul as moving, and not as informing the body: since by its operation it is not the body's form but its mover. Now the aforesaid effects of the soul on the body are consequent upon impressions of the soul in imagining something. Therefore they are produced by the soul as mover but not as form.

9. The reason why God can work wonders is because his power is infinite. Now in De Causis (prop. xvi) it is stated that the power of an intelligence is infinite especially over the lower world. This can be proved from the fact that an intelligence causes the heavenly movement, as proved

above, which h~s a natural aptitude to be everlasting: and only an infinite power can cause an everlasting movement (Phys. viii). Therefore it would seem that angels can work miracles even by their natural power.

10. It is also stated in De Causis (Prop. xvii) that a united force is stronger than one that is divided: and the Commentator says that the power of an intelligence the more it is concentrated and united, the greater and stronger it is, and the more capable of working wonders. Now the Commentator is speaking there of an intelligence’s natural power, since he knew not of the power of grace. Therefore by his natural power an angel can work miracles.

11. But to this it might be replied that an angel can work wonders not by his own power, but by employing the forces implanted in nature by God, in order to produce the desired result.—On the contrary, these natural germs which contain the active forces of nature cannot be employed so as to produce a certain effect otherwise than by local movement. Now seemingly it amounts to the same that bodies obey or do not obey a spiritual substance whether as to local movement or as to other kinds of movement: since all natural movement, has its distinctive and definite mover. Hence if angels have at their command the use of these germs in the production of an effect in nature by means of local movement, they will also be able by the movements of alteration or of generation to induce a form into matter by their mere command: and this is to work wonders.

12. The power to induce a form into matter, and the power to prevent its induction are in the same genus: thus the form of fire is induced into matter by the power of a body, and it is also the power of a body that prevents the induction of that form. Now a natural agent is prevented by the power of a spiritual creature from-inducing a form into matter. Thus it is related that by virtue of some particular writing a man was not burnt after being cast into a furnace: and clearly this was not the work of God who protects his saints from torture on account of their merits and not for the sake of any writing: so that this must have been a work of the devil’s power. It would seem therefore, with equal reason, that a spiritual creature can at will induce a form into matter without any corporeal agency. And yet one would reckon it a miracle that a man be not burnt when cast into the fire, as in the case of the three children.

13. A form that is in the imagination or in the senses is superior to a form in corporeal matter forasmuch as it is more immaterial. Now a spiritual creature can produce a form in the imagination or senses, so that a thing appe&rs otherwise than it is. Thus Augustine says (De Civit. Dei xviii, 18): Verily the demons do not create substantial beings, they only change the outward appearance of things created by the true God: and afterwards he adds that they do, this by acting on the imagination. Much more therefore can an angel produce a form in corporeal matter: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

14. To this it might be replied that the demon’s action on the imagination does not consist in the production of new forms but in the composition and division of forms already existing.—On the contrary the soul is a more noble being than a corporeal nature. If then a demon can by his power produce what is the proper operation of the sensitive soul, namely composition and division of images, one would think that a fortiori he is able by his power to produce the operations of a corporeal nature: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

15. As power is to power so is operation to operation. Now an angel’s power does not depend on the power of a corporeal creature. Neither then does his operation depend on that of a corporeal creature: and therefore he can work miracles independently of natural causes.

16. Just as to make a thing out of nothing argues infinite power by reason of the infinite distance between being and nothing; even so is it possible to a finite power to reduce a thing from potentiality to act. Now the angels’ power surpasses all other finite powers. Therefore by his power an angel can bring into actuality all the forms that are in the potentiality of matter, without the action of any natural cause: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

17. An agent that is hindered acts not but is passive. Now the angel that acts on corporeal things is in no way passive to them. Therefore he is not prevented in his action from working miracles by acting independently of natural causes.

On the contrary God works miracles inasmuch as nature is subject to him. But it is not subject to the angels: since he hath not subjected unto angels the world (to come) (Heb. ii, 5). Therefore angels cannot work miracles by their natural power.

Again, Augustine (De Trin. ii, 10) after carefully discussing this question, concludes: “It is good for me to be mindful of my limitations, and I would have my brethren remember theirs, lest human weakness should go further than is safe. How angels do these things, or rather how God does them through his angels, my sight is not keen enough to see, my reason too diffident to unravel, my mind too slow to grasp; nor can I answer with assurance all the queries that could be made on this matter, as though I were an angel myself, or a prophet, or an apostle.” Wherefore employing the same moderation, without dogmatizing and without prejudice to a better opinion, we shall discuss the question so far as reason and authority will avail to elucidate it.

It must be observed then that in regard to the point at issue philosophers have disagreed. Avicenna held that the spiritual substance which moves the heavens produces effects in the lower bodies not only by means of the celestial movement but even independently of any bodily action: for he contended that corporeal matter is much more obedient to the concept and command of the aforesaid spiritlial substance than to any counter agents in nature or to any corporeal agent. It was owing to this cause, he maintained, that sometimes unwonted disturbances take place in the air, and extraordinary cures of diseased persons; which we call miracles. He gives as an instance the movement of the body by the soul inasmuch as when the latter is affected by a mere imagination, the body without any corporeal agency, is affected by heat or cold, by fever or even by leprosy. This view is quite in keeping with the principles laid down by him. For he holds that natural agents do no more than dispose matter: and that substantial forms are bestowed by a spiritual substance which he calls the giver of forms: the result being that matter in the natural course obeys the spiritual substance as regards the reception of the form therefrom. No wonder then if a spiritual substance produce certain forms in matter outside the ordinary course of corporeal agents and by the sole command of its will. For if matter obeys a separate substance in receiving a substantial form, it is only reasonable that it obey also in receiving the dispositions to a form: for this clearly requires less power. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, and of those who follow him, the above view cannot stand. Aristotle in fact advances two arguments to prove that forms are not stamped on matter by a separate substance, but are brought into act from the potentiality of matter by the action of a form existing in matter. The first of these arguments is given in Metaph. vii, 8, and is based on the principle which he there proves, that what is made is properly speaking the composite, and not form or matter: since it is the composite which properly speaking has being. Now every agent produces its like: wherefore that which gives existence to natural things by generation, must needs be something composite and not a form without matter, in other words it cannot be a separate substance. The other argument, to be found in Phys. viii, is that whereas the same thing has a natural aptitude to produce always the same effect, and since that which is generated or corrupted or altered, increased or diminished is not always in the same condition, it follows that whatsoever generates or moves with the aforesaid kinds of movement is not always in the same condition, but passes from one state to another. But this cannot be a separate substance, because all such substances are unchangeable, and anything that is changed is a body (Phys. vi). Consequently the immediate cause of the reduction of a form into act by generation or alteration, is a body passing from one mode of being to another through accession and recession by local motion. Hence it is that a separate substance is by its command the immediate cause of local, movement in a body, by means of which it causes other movements whereby the thing moved acquires a new form. Now this is reasonable. For local movement is the first and most perfect movement, in that it does not change a thing inwardly but only in point of its place which is external to it: wherefore a corporeal nature receives its first movement, which is local, from a spiritual nature,. Accordingly the corporeal nature obeys the bidding of the spiritual in the point of its natural relation to local movement, but not as regards the reception of a form. This of course is to be understood in reference to the created spiritual nature whose power and essence are confined to a definite genus, and not to the uncreated spiritual substance whose power is infinite, and not confined to a particular genus and the laws governing that genus. In this point faith is in agreement with this opinion: thus Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that corporeal matter does not obey the mere will of the angels. However, the teaching of faith differs somewhat from the position of the philosophers. The philosophers mentioned held that separate substances by their bidding move the heavenly bodies with local movement: and that in this lower world local movement is not caused immediately by a separate substance, but by other causes, natural, voluntary or violent. Thus the commentator Alexander ascribes to the activity of the heavenly bodies all the effects which we ascribe to angels or demons in this lower world. But this seems insufficient: because these effects do not follow a definite course, like those which are produced by the natural action of the higher or lower bodies. Besides there are certain effects that altogether surpass the powers of a heavenly body, for instance, the sudden changing of rods into snakes, and many similar ones. But faith asserts that not only heavenly bodies cause local movement by their bidding, but that other bodies also do so, at God’s behest or with his permission. Accordingly by their command they cause local movement in those bodies that have a natural active power to produce a particular effect which however Augustine (Super Gen. ix, 17) calls the seeds of nature. It follows that their operations will not be miraculous but should rather be described as an art, For miraculous effects are produced by a supernatural cause without recourse to the action of nature: whereas it belongs to art to employ the action of natural principles, in producing an effect which either nature cannot produce, or at least not so efficiently. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that “art both copies mature, and makes things which nature cannot make, and sometimes assists nature”: thus the physician helps nature to heal by employing those things which have a natural healing power in the process of alteration and digestion. Now in the production of like effects the good or bad angel’s art is more efficacious and leads to better results than the art of man: and this for two reasons. First, because seeing that corporeal effects in this lower world depend chiefly on the heavenly bodies, then is an art most effective when the heavenly body’s power acts in cooperation with it. Thus in farming and medicine it is useful to notice the movements and position of the sun, moon and stars, whose powers are much better known to the angels by their natural knowledge than to men. Hence they are better fitted to choose the hour at which the power of a heavenly body is more likely to co-operate in producing the desired result. This apparently is the reason why necromancers observe the position of the stars when they invoke the demons.—The second reason is that angels are better acquainted than men with the active and passive powers of the lower bodies, and are therefore able to employ them effectively with greater ease and expedition seeing that bodies move locally at their command. Hence again physicians produce more wonderful results in healing, because they are better acquainted with the powers of natural things.—We may add as a third reason that an instrument acts not only by its own power but also by the power of its mover. Thus a heavenly body produces a certain effect by virtue of the spiritual substance which moves it, for instance, it causes life in animals engendered from corrupt matter; and natural heat as the instrument of the vegetal soul conduces to the formation of flesh. Therefore it is not unreasonable to suppose that natural bodies themselves, forasmuch as they are moved by a spiritual substance, produce a greater effect. We may gather this from the words of Gen. vi, 4 where we read: Giants were upon the earth in those days. For after the sons of God went into the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men, men of renown: and the (ordinary) gloss commenting on this text observes that it is not incredible that men of this kind were born of women who consorted with demons. It is therefore evident that angels whether good or wicked are unable to work miracles by their natural power: but they can produce certain wonderful effects in which their action is after the manner of an art.

Reply to the First Objection. It is true that the natural power of an angel or demon is greater than the natural power of a body; but it does not extend so far as to induce form into matter immediately, but only by means of a body. Hence it does this more excellently than a body since the first mover excels the second in action.

Reply to the Second Objection. The forms of natural things in the angelic mind are more actual than forms existing in matter: wherefore they are the immediate principle of a more perfect operation namely of understanding. But they are not the immediate principle of that operation which is the transmutation of matter; but they operate through the medium of the will, and the will through the (motive) power, which power is the immediate cause of local movement, by means of which they are the cause of other movements, and a kind of cause of the induction of form into matter.

Reply to the Third Objection. The forms in the human mind do not produce artifacts save through the will, the motive power, the natural organs and the craftsman’s tools.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. A power that can employ an organ which serves it in all its operations must have that organ united to it; thus the eye is united to the faculty of sight. But no body could serve an angel so far as to equal his power: hence an angel has not a body actually united to him. For this reason those philosophers who held that separate substances produce no effects here below except by means of the heavens, said that a spiritual substance is united to the heavens as ‘its instrument, and this they called the heavens’ soul: and that besides this there is another spiritual substance, not united to the heavens, by which the heavens’ soul is moved as a man is moved by the object of his desire, and this spiritual substance they called intelligence.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although an angel causes the movement of the heavens, he can by his act of intelligence bring his action to bear on things here below, independently of the heavens’ movement, and of any body whatsoever, by moving other bodies: and yet he is unable to induce a form into matter without employing a corporeal agent.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The heaven being a corporeal agent can be the immediate cause of alteration and information: but it is not so with the angels.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. In the natural order the soul by its bidding moves the body locally: because its appetitive power commands the movement, and the body obeys its bidding, and this is effected by the motive powers affixed to the organs and derived by the body from the soul which informs the body. Other alterations such as heat, cold and the like derive from the soul by means of local movement. It is also evident that imagination gives rise to a passion whereby in some way the movements of the heart and spirits are affected: and that when the latter are drawn towards the heart or diffused throughout the members the body is likewise affected: and this may lead to disease especially if the matter be so disposed.

This suffices for the Reply to the Eighth Objection.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. An angel’s power is said to be infinite over the lower world, inasmuch as his power is not enclosed in matter, and consequently is not confined by an inferior recipient. But it is not infinite in respect of things above it, as already stated: because the angel receives a finite nature from God, so that his substance is confined to a particular genus, and consequently his power is confined to a particular mode of action: and this cannot be said of God.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although an angel does wonderful things as the result of art, they are not miracles, as we have stated above.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the local movements of the lower bodies as well as other movements are brought about by certain fixed natural causes: the corporeal creature in the natural order obeys the spiritual as regards local movement, but not as regards other movements, for the reason already given: and especially if the power of the spiritual creature is not confined to a particular body, as the soul’s power is to the body united to it.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. just as a created spiritual substance cannot by its command give form to matter, even so it cannot by its command prevent a form from being given to matter by a natural agent: and if it does this sometimes, it is by putting a natural obstacle in the way, even though this may not be perceptible to human senses: especially since it can move the flame of a fire locally, so as not to approach the combustible.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. A separate spiritual substance can by its natural power influence the imagination; not indeed by introducing forms into the organ of imagination at his bidding, but by raising a kind of commotion of the spirits and humours. For it is evident that if these be disturbed, phantoms appear, as instanced in those who are insane or asleep. Besides it is said that certain natural things are effective in producing this disturbance in the imagination, and that magicians make use of them in order to produce illusory visions.

This suffices for the Reply to the Fourteenth Objection.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Even as an angel surpasses a heavenly body in respect of power, so also does he in respect of operation, as stated above: yet not to the extent of inducing form into matter immediately and by his mere bidding.

Rep~y to the Sixteenth Objection. A finite power can educe something from potentiality to act; but not any finite power, nor in any way: because every finite power has a fixed mode of action.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Even though an agent be not hindered it cannot do what is beyond its power; thus fire cannot make a thing cold although there is nothing to prevent it. Hence from the fact that an angel cannot induce a form into matter by his bidding we may infer, not that he is prevented from doing this by some extrinsic agent, but that his natural power does not extend to this.

Q. VI: ARTICLE IV

CAN GOOD ANGELS AND MEN WORK MIRACLES BY SOME GIFT OF GRACE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. CX, A. 4]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether good angels and men can work miracles by some gift of grace: and it would seem that they can.

1. The angelic orders were established for no other purpose than their operations. Now an order of angels was appointed for the working of miracles: thus Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xxxiv) that signs and miracles are usually wrought by the Virtues. Therefore angels can work miracles by a gift of grace.

2. It is written (Acts vi. 8): Stephen full of grace and fortitude did great signs and wonders among the people. Now grace would not be mentioned first unless the subsequent acts were a consequence thereof. Therefore even men can work miracles by the power of grace.

3. A gift of grace is not given except for the sake of what the recipient may do thereby. Now some received the gratuitous gift to work miracles: thus it is said . (1 Cor. xii, 9, 10): To another is given the grace of healing in one Spirit; to another the working of miracles. Therefore by a gift of grace the saints can work miracles.

4. To this it may be replied that saints are said to work a miracle not by doing it themselves but by impetrating God for the miracle to be done.—On the contrary prayer becomes impetration through those things that make it acceptable to God, namely faith, charity and other virtues pertaining to sanctifying grace. Therefore saints need no gratuitous gift in order to work miracles.

5. Gregory (Dial. ii, 30) says that “those who are devoutly united to God, if the necessity should arise, not unfrequently perform signs in both these ways, working wonders sometimes b their prayers, sometimes by their power.” Now when any one does a thing by his power, he does it by his own act and not merely by impetration. Therefore angels and holy men work miracles by their own action.

6. According to Anselm (De Pecc. Orig. xi) there is a threefold course in things, the natural, the voluntary and the wonderful. Now in the natural course of things angels act as standing between God and natural bodies:

thus Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says: “All bodies are governed by God through the rational spirit of life;” and Gregory says (Dial. iv. 5): “In this visible world all dispositions are executed through invisible creatures.” The same applies to the voluntary course of things: for the angels stand between us and God and are the bearers of the light that they receive from him. Therefore also in the course of wonderful things the angels are intermediaries, inasmuch as miracles are worked through their agency.

7. To this it will be replied that angels are intermediaries as acting not by their own power but by the power of God.—On the contrary, whoever acts by the power of another, is in some way the cause of the effect produced by that power. If then the angels act by the divine power in working miracles, they also are in some way the cause thereof.

8. The Old Law was given by God miraculously, wherefore it is related (Exod. xix, 16) that thunders began to be heard and lightning to flash, and a very thick cloud to cover the mount. Now the Law was given by the angels (Gal. iii, 19). Therefore miracles are wrought by the angels.

9. Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): “Whosoever possesses a thing and gives it not although he would suffer no loss by giving it, does not possess it as it ought to be possessed.” Now God has the power to work miracles, and he would lose nothing by imparting it to others. Therefore if he has not bestowed it on others, it would seem that he has not that power as it ought to be possessed. Hence one would infer that God has given to angels and men the power to work miracles.

On the contrary it is written (Ps. lxxi, 18): Who alone worketh great wonders.

Again, according to Bernard (De Disp. et Pracept.) none save the maker of a law can change that law or dispense therefrom: thus in human affairs the emperor alone can change the law, since it was he who made it, Now God alone framed the law of nature’s course. Therefore he alone can work miracles by acting independently of the natural course.

I answer that angels inasmuch as they are ministers of the divine power can by a gift of grace do things that surpass their natural power of action: in fact it may be said that angels take an active part in working miracles in three ways.—First, by impetration; and this way may be common to both men and angels.—Secondly, inasmuch as by their natural power they dispose matter for the working of a miracle: thus it is said that they will collect the dust of the dead who by God’s power will return to life. This way, however, is peculiar to the angels: since human spirits, through being united to bodies, cannot act on external objects save by means of the body to which in a sense they are chained.—Thirdly, by co-operation. This way, however, Augustine leaves without coming to a decision. Thus (De Civ. Dei, xxii, 9) he says: “Whether God himself does all these things by himself in his unsearchable way, or by his ministers, or by the souls of the martyrs, or by men as yet in the body, or by the angels to whom he issues his invisible commands (the martyr’s part consisting in prayer and impetration but not operation) or by some other way incomprehensible to mortals, in any case these miracles are witnesses of that which proclaims that flesh will rise again to eternity.” Gregory, however (Dial. ii, 34 appears to give a decisive answer to the question. He says that holy men even in this life work miracles not merely by prayer and impetration but also authoritatively, and therefore by co-operation: and he proves this both by reason and by examples. His reason is that if men were given the power to become the sons of God, it is not strange that by that power they can work miracles. The examples he offers are that of Peter, who without any previous prayer, pronounced sentence of death on the lying Ananias and Sapphira by mere denunciation (Acts v, 4, 9): and of the Blessed Benedict who “looked on the bonds of a poor countryman and thus loosened them more speedily than it were possible to human hands.” Wherefore he concludes that the saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by power. We must now discuss how this may be possible.

It is evident that God alone works miracles by his sole command. Now we find that the divine commands reach the lower rational spirits, namely the souls of men, by means of the higher spirits, namely the angels, as in the promulgation of the Old Law. In the same way the divine command can, through the angelic and human spirits, reach corporeal creatures through whom in a manner of speaking the divine decrees are intimated to nature. Accordingly, human and angelic spirits act somewhat as instruments of the divine power for the accomplishment of a miracle. This does not mean that they are possessed of a permanent habitual power, since then they would be able to work miracles whenever they chose to do so. In fact Gregory declares this to be impossible (l.c.) and proves his assertion by quoting the example of Paul, who prayed that the sting might depart from him (2 Cor.

xii, 9) yet his prayer was not granted; and of Benedict, who against his will was detained by the storm that was granted through his sister’s prayer. The saints’ power to co-operate with God in the working of miracles may be taken to be something after the manner of imperfect forms I called ‘intentions,’ which are not permanent and are only evoked at the presence of the principal agent, even as ‘light in the air, and movement in an instrument. Accordingly the gratuitous gift that is the grace of miracles or of healing can denote a power of this kind: so that this grace which is given that a man may work supernaturally, is like the grace of prophecy which is given that a man may know supernaturally, and by virtue of which the prophet cannot prophesy when he lists, but only when the spirit of prophecy moves him, as Gregory proves (Hom. in Ezech. i). Nor is it strange if in this way God uses the spiritual creature as an instrument in order to produce wondrous effects in corporeal nature, seeing that he also uses corporeal creatures instrumentally in the sanctification of spiritual creatures, for instance in the sacraments.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since it is true that God alone works miracles by his authority: and it is also true that he communicates to creatures the power to work miracles, according to the creatures’ capacity and the order of divine wisdom: to the effect that a creature may work a miracle ministerially by grace.

Q. VI: ARTICLE V

DO THE DEMONS ALSO CO-OPERATE IN THE WORKING OF MIRACLES?

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the demons also cooperate in the working of miracles: and it would seem that they do.

1. It is said (Mt. xxiv, 24): There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders. Now such things they will not do save by the power of the demons. Therefore demons co-operate in the working of miracles.

2. The sudden healing of a sick man is a miracle: thus Christ worked a miracle when he healed Peter’s mother-in-law (Lk. iv). But the demons also can do this: since a sick man may be quickly cured by using medicine: and the demons, being by nature rapid in their movements, and well acquainted

with the healing properties of medicines, can apply these so efficaciously, that the sick man is cured at once. Therefore they can work miracles.

3. It is a miracle to make the dumb speak. But it is a yet greater miracle to make a dog speak or sing: and Simon Magus is stated to have done this by a demon’s power. Therefore a demon can work miracles.

4. Valerius Maximus relates (Fact. et Dict. Mem. i, 8) that the statue of Fortune situated at Rome on the Latin Way, spoke not once but twice thus: “It is well that you have looked on me oh matrons; rightly have you hallowed me.” Now it is a greater miracle for stones than for the dumb to speak: and yet the latter is miraculous. Therefore seemingly demons can work miracles.

5. History tells us as related by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x 26) that a certain Vestal Virgin in proof of undefiled chastity carried water from the Tiber in a leaky jug, and yet the water was not spilt. Now this could not happen unless the water by some non-natural power were prevented from falling: which was certainly a miracle when the Jordan was divided and the waters stood still. Therefore demons can work miracles.

6. It is much more difficult to change a man into a dumb animal than water into wine. Now the change of water into wine (Jo. ii) was miraculous. Therefore a fortiori is it a miracle to change a man into a dumb animal. Yet men are changed into dumb animals by the demon’s power; thus Varro relates, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xviii, 16 seqq.), that when the companions of Diomedes were returning from Troy they were changed into birds, which for a long time afterwards flew around the temple of Diomedes: also that the famous sorceress Circe changed the companions of Ulysses into beasts, and that some Arcadians after crossing a swamp were changed into wolves. Therefore demons can work miracles.

7. Job’s trials were evidently brought about through the agency of the devil, since the Lord gave the latter power over all that job had (job i, 12). Now these trials were not effected without a miracle, as evinced by the fire coming down from heaven, and the wind that destroyed his house, resulting in the death of his children. Therefore demons can work miracles.

8. It was a miracle that Moses changed his rod into a serpent (Exod. vii, 10). Therefore it would seem that demons can work miracles.

9. The working of miracles is further removed from man’s than from the angels’ power. Now miracles are sometimes wrought by wicked men: thus

the wicked are made to say (Mt. vii, 22): Have not we prophesied in thy name... and done many miracles? Therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons also.

On the contrary, at the time of Antichrist the devil will be able to do works of very great power: for he must be loosed a little time (Apoc. xx, 3), which refers to the time of Antichrist. But he will not then work real miracles, since it is clearly stated (2 Thess. ii, 9) that the time of Antichrist will be in all power and signs and lying wonders. Therefore the demons cannot work miracles.

I answer that just as the good angels by grace can do something surpassing the power of nature, so the wicked angels being restrained by divine power are unable to do as much as they might by their natural powers. The reason of this is that as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 9) some things the angels would be able to do if they were permitted to do them, which however they cannot do because, they are not permitted to do, them. (Hence the angels are said to be ‘bound’ in that they are prevented from doing things to which their natural powers could extend; and to be ‘loosed’ when by the divine decree they are permitted to do what their nature enables them to do.) While as he says (ibid.) some things they cannot do even if permitted to do them, because the kind of nature bestowed on them by God does not permit of their doing such things. Accordingly God does not give them the power to do things that surpass the faculty of their nature, because seeing that a miraculous work is a divine witness to God’s power and truth, if the demons whose whole will is diverted to evil, were to receive the power to work miracles, God would vouch for their falsehood, which is repugnant to his goodness. Hence at times they perform by God’s permission only such works as seem miraculous to men, and which are within the limits of their natural power. Even so, as explained above (A. 4) by their natural power they can produce as art produces things, those effects only that result from the natural forces contained in bodies, which obey them in respect of local movement; and thus they can employ them in producing an effect in a very short time. Now by means of these powers it is possible for bodies to undergo real transformation: inasmuch as in the natural course one thing is generated from another. Besides this they can by working some kind of change in a body, for instance by disturbing the organ of the imagination,’ in respect of the various spirits and humours, make things that do not really exist to appear to the imagination: an effect that may be produced by means of certain external bodies, by the application of which things appear different to what they really are, as in cases of delirium or insanity.

Accordingly demons can work wonders in us in two ways first by means of real bodily transformation: secondly by disturbing the imagination so as to delude the senses. But neither of these works is miraculous but is like the work of a craftsman, as explained above (A. 4): wherefore it must be said simply that demons cannot work real miracles.

Reply to the First Objection. Signs and wonders denote things that can be done by natural power, yet to men are marvellous; or again that are done by deceiving the senses as explained above.

Reply to the Second Objection. Nothing prevents a man from being cured more quickly by the devil’s art than by nature left to itself: since we find that the same is true of human art. It does not seem however that the demons can cure a man all at once (although certain other effects they can produce almost suddenly) because the medicines that are applied to a man’s body effect his cure instrumentally, nature being the principal agent. Wherefore the medicines applied should be such as can be made to act by nature: and if too many were applied they would be not conducive but prejudicial to health. Hence it is that diseases which are by nature incurable, are also incurable by demons. It is different with effects that depend on an external agent as their principal cause. It must be observed, however, that if demons were to effect a sudden cure it would not be a miracle, since to be successful they would have to employ natural forces.

Reply to the Third Objection. Speaking dogs and like works of Simon the magician were quite possibly done by trickery and not in very truth. If, however, they were genuine, it matters not: since the demon did not give a dog the power of speech miraculously as when it is given to the dumb; but by some kind of local movement he made sounds to be heard like words composed of letters and syllables. It is thus that we may understand Balaam’s ass to have spoken, although in this case it was by the action of a good angel.

The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection about the statue: for this was done by a devil producing sounds like human speech by means of a movement in the air.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. It is not unlikely that in commendation of chastity the true God through his good angels worked this miracle of the jug holding the water, because whatever good was in the heathens was from God. If, however, it was the work of the demons, this is not inconsistent with what has been said. Local rest and movement are from principles of the same genus, since the same nature that makes a thing move locally makes it rest locally. Wherefore just as demons can move bodies locally so can they prevent them being moved. Nor is it a miracle, as it is when it is done by God, because it results from the demon's natural power in respect of this particular effect.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. These transformations of which Varro speaks were not real but apparent: they were effected by the demon working on a man's imagination by introducing therein a bodily image, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18).

Reply to the Seventh Objection. By God's permission the devils can by a movement of the air cause disaster, even as this may be the natural result of the wind's movements. It was in this way that Job's trials were brought about by the work of the demons.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The (ordinary) gloss mentions two opinions about the works of Pharaoh's magicians. According to one view the rods were not really changed into serpents, but only in appearance by a kind of conjuring trick. But Augustine, quoted in the same gloss says that the change was real. And he proves this with a certain amount of likelihood from the fact that Scripture uses the same word in speaking of the rods of the magicians and the rod of Moses, which of course was changed into a real serpent. Yet the demons' work in changing the rods into serpents was no miracle, since they did it by means of seed collected together, with which they were able to corrupt the rods and change them into serpents. But what Moses did was a miracle, since this was done by the power of God without the cooperation of any power of nature.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Men of evil life are sometimes the heralds of truth, wherefore God works miracles to vouch for the truth of their message: but this cannot be said of the demons,

Reply to the Tenth argument advanced in a contrary sense. It is stated that the devil's power will be let loose at the time of Antichrist, inasmuch as he will be permitted to do many things that he is not allowed to do now: hence he will do many things with the result that those will be seduced who deserved to be seduced for not assenting to the truth. And he will do some things by trickery, wherein there will be neither a true nor a miraculous result. He will also by a real transformation of bodies do some things wherein although the results be real they will not be miraculous, since they will be effected through natural causes. These are called lies on account of the intention with which he will do them, namely to induce men, by his wonderful works, to believe in his lies.

Q. VI: ARTICLE VI

HAVE ANGELS AND DEMONS BODIES NATURALLY UNITED TO THEM?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. LI, A. 1]

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them: and it would seem that they have.

1. Every animal is composed of a body naturally united to a soul. Now angels and demons are animals; for Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Ev.) that “as the Jews were rational beings it was fitting that the message should be brought to them by a rational animal, an angel to wit:” and of the demons Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10): “The demons are animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies.” Therefore angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them.

2. Origen says (Peri Archon i, 6) that of all spiritual creatures God alone has no body. Since then angels and demons are spiritual creatures, it would seem that they have bodies naturally united to them.

3. The imagination, and the irascible and concupiscible faculties are powers employing organs. Now these powers are in demons and likewise in angels: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the wickedness of the devil is anger in the irascible, lust in the concupiscible and licence in the imagination. Therefore they have bodies naturally united to them.

4. Angels are either composed of matter and form or they are not. If they are, they must have bodies: because seeing that matter considered in itself is one. (since it is not differentiated save by a form) it follows that in all divers things composed of matter there must be divers forms received into divers

parts of matter: for the same matter cannot receive divers forms. Now diversity of parts in matter is inconceivable without division of matter; likewise division without dimension, since without these substance is indivisible (Phys. i). Consequently all things composed of matter must be dimensioned and therefore bodies.—On the other hand if angels are not composed of matter and form, they are either self-subsistent forms or forms united to bodies. If they are self-subsistent forms, it follows that they do not derive their being from another: because since the form as such is the principle of being, that which is a pure form has not its being from a cause, but is only a cause of being in other things. And if they are forms united to bodies, these bodies must be united to them naturally: because union of form with matter is natural. It remains then that we must needs admit one of these three, namely that angels are bodies, or are uncreated substances, or have bodies naturally united to them. But the first two are impossible. Therefore we must admit the third.

5. A form as such is that whereby something is informed. Wherefore a pure form informs without being in any way informed: and this belongs to God alone, who is the supreme beauty whence all things are beautiful, as Augustine says De Civ. Dei viii (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 23). Therefore angels are not pure forms, and consequently are forms united to bodies.

6. just as the soul is unable to produce an effect in external bodies, except by means of corporeal instruments, so neither can an angel without corporeal powers, which he uses as instruments. Now the soul for the purpose of its activities has a body naturally united to it. Therefore angels have also.

7. The first movement in bodies is that whereby a body is moved by an incorporeal substance. Now the first movement is of that which moves itself (Phys. viii) because that which is (so and so) of itself precedes that which is (so and so) through another. Therefore that which is moved immediately by an incorporeal substance is moved as being moved of itself. But this is impossible unless the incorporeal substance that causes movement be united to the body naturally. Since then angels and demons move bodies immediately (A. 2) it would seem that they have bodies naturally united to them.

8. It is better to live and give life than to live only, just as light is more perfectly in that which shines and enlightens than in that which shines only.

Now the human soul lives and quickens the body naturally united to it. Therefore the angel lives not less perfectly than the soul.

9. The movement of a body that has various movements is the movement of a thing that moves itself: because that which has only one movement seemingly does not move itself (Phys. viii). Now the celestial body is moved with various movements. Thus the planets according to astronomers are said at times to move forwards, at other times backwards and sometimes io be stationary. Therefore the movement of the higher bodies is of things which move themselves, so that they are composed of corporeal and of spiritual substance. But this spiritual substance is not a human soul, nor is it God. Therefore it is an angel: and consequently an angel has a body naturally united to him.

10. Nothing acts beyond its species. Now the heavenly bodies cause life in the world below, as instanced in animals engendered of putrid matter by the power of the celestial bodies. Since then a living substance excels one that is not living, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29, 55) ~ it would seem that the heavenly bodies have life and thus have spiritual substances naturally united to them so that we come to the same conclusion as before.

11. The first movable thing is the heavenly body. Now the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii) that all moved things are reduced to the first movable that is moved of itself. Therefore the heaven is moved of itself: and thus it is composed of a body that is moved and an immovable mover which is a spiritual substance and so the same conclusion follows as before.

12. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) divine wisdom has so ordained that the highest point of the lower nature is in contact with the lowest point of the higher nature. Now the highest point in corporeal nature is the heavenly body, since it transcends all other bodies. Therefore it is in contact with the spiritual nature and is united to it; and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

13. The body of the heavens is more excellent than the human body, even as the everlasting surpasses the corruptible. Now the human body is naturally united to a spiritual substance. Therefore a fortiori the heavenly body is, seeing that the more noble body has the more noble form: and thus we come to the same conclusion as before.

14. Certain animals are formed from the earth, for instance men and beasts; some from water, as fish and birds, according to Genesis i.

Therefore there must b~ some formed from air, some from fire and some from celestial matter. Now the latter cannot be other than angels and demons, for seeing that these are the more noble bodies they must have the more noble souls. Therefore angels and demons are animals and have bodies naturally united to them

15. Plato also seems to favour this view: thus in the Timaeus he says that there are animals solid as the earth, others akin to liquid, others subtle as the air, others akin to the gods: and these must be the angels. Consequently the angel is an animal, and the same conclusion follows as before.

16. Nothing is moved except a body (Phys. vi). Now an angel is moved. Therefore he is either a body or naturally united to a body.

17. The Word of God is above the angels: and he is united to a body. Therefore it is not beneath the dignity of an angel to be united to a body naturally.

18. Porphyry says (Pradic., De Differentia) that the word mortal in the definition of a man distinguishes us from the gods, whereby only the angels can be meant. Therefore the angels are animals, and thus have bodies naturally united to them.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fid. Orth. ii, 3) says that an angel is an intellectual substance, ever movable, free and incorporeal.

Again, it is stated in De Causis (prop. 7) that an intelligence is a simple substance: and the Commentator says (ibid.) that it is neither a magnitude nor spread over a magnitude. Now an angel is an intelligence, as is clearly indicated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) who calls the angels divine minds and intelligences. Therefore an angel is neither a body nor united to a body.

Again, angels and souls differ in the point of incapability and capability of union to a body: so that if an angel were united to a body, he would nowise differ from a soul; which cannot be admitted.

Again, there is a spiritual substance that is dependent on a body as regards its beginning and its end, for instance the vegetal and sensible soul: there is also a spiritual substance dependent on a body as regards its beginning and not as regards its end, to wit, the human soul. Therefore there will be a spiritual substance that needs not a body, either as to its beginning or as to its end: and this can be no other but an angel or a demon. That there be one which needs a body as to its end and not as to its beginning, is impossible.

Again, there is a form, e.g. of a stone, that is neither a soul nor a spirit: and there is a form that is a soul but not a spirit, e.g. of a dumb animal: and there is a form that is both soul and spirit, e.g. the form of a man. Therefore there will be a form that is a spirit but not a soul: and such is an angel. Hence an angel is riot united to a body naturally, since this enters into the definition of a soul.

I answer that the ancients were divided in opinion concerning incorporeal substances.

Some of the philosophers of old contended that there was no such thing as an incorporeal substance and that all substances are bodies: and Augustine (Confess.) confesses that at one time he fell into this error. This opinion, however, was refuted by the philosophers. Aristotle rejected it (Phys. viii) for this reason that there must be some infinite moving power, since otherwise it would not produce a perpetual movement. Again he proves that every power of a magnitude must be finite whence it follows that there must be a power that is wholly incorporeal, in order to produce a continual movement. Again he proves the same conclusion in another way (Metaph. xii). Act precedes potentiality both by nature and in time, absolutely speaking: although in this or that individual that passes from potentiality to act, potentiality precedes act in point of time. But seeing that it must be brought into actuality by something that is already actual, it follows that absolutely speaking act precedes potentiality even in time. Wherefore since every body is in potentiality, as its mutability shows, there must needs be an everlasting unchangeable substance that precedes all bodies. A third argument in support of the same conclusion may be taken from the principles of the Platonists. Finite and, individual being must needs be preceded by a being that is infinite: thus if we find fire having a finite and so to speak participated nature in iron, we must expect to find the nature of fire in something that is fire essentially. Hence seeing that being and all other perfections and forms are found to have a finite nature in that they are received into matter, we infer that there must pre-exist an incorporeal substance wherein there is the perfection of being not in a finite mariner but with a certain universal fullness. The reason why they were led into the error of maintaining that all substance is corporeal was that their intelligence being unable to rise above their ‘imagination whose object is wholly corporeal they were unable to reach the knowledge of incorporeal substances which the intelligence alone can grasp.

Others admitted the existence of incorporeal substances but they supposed them to be united to bodies, and they denied that any incorporeal substance could be found that is not the form of a body. Hence they contended that God himself is the world-soul: thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei iv, A states that Varro held God to be a soul that governs the world by movement and reason. Hence he said that the whole world is God on account of its soul and not by reason of its body, just as a man is said to be wise in respect of his soul, not of his body. For this reason heathens worshipped the whole world and its parts. This opinion also was refuted by the philosophers for several reasons. First because a power united to and informing a body has a restricted action through being united to a particular kind of body: wherefore since there must needs be a universal agent exercising its influence on all bodies, inasmuch as the first mover cannot be a body, as we have proved, it follows that there must be some incorporeal being that is not united to a body. Hence Anaxagoras posited a subsistent intellect, that it might be able to command (Phys. viii), because to command belongs to one who is above those who are commanded, and is neither subject nor bound to them in any way.—Secondly, because if every incorporeal substance be united to a body as the form thereof, it would follow that the first thing to be in motion moves itself like an animal, as being composed of a corporeal and a spiritual substance. Now that which moves itself does so by its will inasmuch as it is appetent of something: for the appetite is a moved mover, while the appetible object is a non-moved mover. Consequently above the incorporeal substance united to a body there must be something higher to move it as the appetible object moves the appetite: and this must be an intelligible good: since this is appetible as being good simply, whereas the appetible object of sense is sought, as being this particular good and at this particular moment.

Now an intelligible good must be incorporeal, since were it not devoid of matter it could not be an object of intelligence: wherefore it must needs be intelligent, seeing that a substance is intelligent through being free of matter. Therefore above the substance that is united to a body, there must be another higher substance that is incorporeal or intellectual and not united to a body. This is the proof given by Aristotle (Metaph. xi); for it cannot be said that a thing which sets itself in motion seeks nothing outside itself: since it would never be in motion, inasmuch as the purpose of motion is to obtain something. that is extrinsic in some way or other.—Thirdly, because that which sets itself in motion may be moved or not moved (Phys. viii), wherefore if something that is moved by itself be continually in motion, the continuance of its motion must needs be due to something outside that is wholly immovable. Now we observe that the heaven whose soul they held to be God is in continual motion: wherefore above the substance that animates the world—if there be such a substance—there must be a yet higher substance, that is not united to a body, and is self-subsistent. Those who contended that every substance is united to a body were apparently led astray through thinking that matter is the cause of susbistence and individuality in all beings, as it is in corporeal beings: wherefore they thought that incorporeal substances cannot subsist outside a body: as suggested by way of objection in the Commentary on De Causis.

Accordingly Plato and Aristotle rejected these opinions and held that certain substances are incorporeal, some united to bodies, some not united to any body. Plato according to Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i) posited two separate substances, namely God the father of the whole universe and occupying the highest place: and beneath him the mind of God which he called the paternal intelligence containing the types or ideas of all things. He also held that many incorporeal substances are united to bodies: some united to heavenly bodies, and these the Platonists called gods; some united to air—like bodies, whom they called demons. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16) quotes the following definition of the demons as given by Apuleius,: Demons are animals with a rational mind, a passive and immortal soul. Moreover, the heathens who adopted the ideas of Plato held that divine worship was to be given to an these incorporeal substances on account of their immortality. Further, they believed that incorporeal substances are united to the grosser terrestrial bodies, those namely that are akin to earth and water, to wit the souls of men and of other animals. Aristotle agrees with Plato on two points, and differs from him in two. He agrees with him in that he believes in a supreme substance neither corporeal nor united to a body, and in holding the heavenly bodies to be animate: but he differs from him by maintaining the existence of several incorporeal substances not united to a body, corresponding to the various heavenly movements: and again in denying the existence of air-like animals, and he did so with reason. First, because a mixed body is superior to an elemental body, especially as regards the form: since the elements are the matter of mixed bodies. Wherefore incorporeal substances which are the highest of all forms ought to be united to mixed bodies and not to the elements. Now there can be no mixed body in which there is not a preponderance of earth and water in point of the quantity of matter, since even the higher elements are more active through being more formal: and if these latter were to preponderate, the proportion due to a mixture would not be observed, seeing that the higher elements would altogether subdue the lower. Consequently it is not possible that incorporeal substances be united as forms to aerial bodies, but to mixed bodies in which the earthy and watery matter preponderates.—Secondly, because a homogeneous and uniform body must needs have the same form in the whole and in its parts. Now the body of the air is all of one nature: so that if any spiritual substances be united to any parts of the air, they must also be united to the whole: and thus the whole air will be animated, which seemingly is an absurd thing to say, although some of the ancients were of this opinion (De Anima i), holding that the air is full of gods. —Thirdly, because if a spiritual substance has no other powers besides intellect and will, it were useless for it to be united to a body, since these operations are performed independently of the body: inasmuch as every form of a body executes some of its actions in dependence on the body. If however a spiritual substance has other powers (as apparently the Platonists held to be the case with the demons, for they said that these had a passive soul, and passions are only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Phys. viii), it needs to be united to an organic body, so as to be able to perform the actions of such powers by means of determinate organs. But an aerial body cannot satisfy this condition, since it is shapeless. It follows then that spiritual substances cannot be naturally united to aerial bodies. As to whether incorporeal substances be united as forms of heavenly bodies Augustine leaves the question unsolved (Gen. ad lit. ii), while Jerome would seem to assert it as a fact in his commentary on Ecclesiastes i, 6, The Spirit goeth forward surveying all places round about, as also Origen (Peri Archon, i, 7). Several modern writers consider this to be disproved by the fact that since according to Scripture the number of the blessed is composed exclusively of men and angels, these spiritual substances would not be reckoned either among human souls or among the angels who are incorporeal. However Augustine (Enchir. lviii) considers this also doubtful: “It is by no means certain whether the sun, moon and stars belong to the same company, namely of the angels: although some are of opinion that they are bodies of light without sense or intelligence. Yet without any doubt whatever the teaching of both Plato and Aristotle differs from the doctrine of faith inasmuch as we hold that there are many substances not united to bodies, many more indeed than any of these admit.” And this would seem the more probable view, for three reasons. First, because as the bodies above are of higher rank than those below, even so incorporeal substances rank higher than bodies: and the bodies above excel those below, inasmuch as the earth compared to the heavens is as a point in comparison with a sphere, as proved by astronomers. Hence incorporeal substances according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiv.) surpass the entire multitude of material species; and this is indicated (Dan. vii, 10): Thousands of thousands ministered to him and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before him. Moreover it is in keeping with the outpouring of the divine goodness that it should bring into existence in greater profusion those things that are the noblest in nature. And seeing that the higher things do not depend on the lower, nor are their powers confined to the things here below, we must not limit their activities to the phenomena of the lower world.—Secondly, because in the order of natural things, we find many degrees Intervening between natures that are distant from each other: thus between animals and plants, there are imperfect animals which are like plants, in being fixtures, and are like animals in having sensation. Since then the supreme substance which is God is farthest removed from corporeal nature, it seems reasonable that there should be many intervening degrees of nature, and not only those substances which are principles of movement.—Thirdly, because since God exercises not only a universal providence over corporeal beings, but also a particular providence over individuals, in which as stated above (A. i) at times he works independently of the order of universal causes: we must posit the existence not only of incorporeal substances who serve God in administering the universal causes of nature, namely the movements of heavenly bodies, but also of others who administer to God’s particular works in individuals, especially as regards man whose mind is not subject to the heavenly movements. Accordingly following the truth of faith we assert that angels and demons have not bodies naturally united to them, but are wholly incorporeal as Dionysius says.

Reply to the First Objection. In several passages of his works Augustine makes use of the Platonic view about angels and demons having bodies, without actually agreeing with it. Hence (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) treating of the punishment of the demons he follows up both the opinion of those who said that demons have aerial bodies, and the view of those who say that they are wholly incorporeal. Gregory describes an angel as being an animal, in the ‘broad sense of the term, namely as indicating any animate being.

Reply to the Second Objection. On many points Origen adopts the views of the Platonists: thus he seems to have been of the opinion that all created incorporeal substances are united to bodies: and yet he does not state this positively, but suggests it as by no means certain, and at the same time mentions the other view.

Reply to the Third Objection. Without doubt Dionysius maintained that angels and demons are incorporeal. He employs the terms anger and concupiscence metaphorically for an inordinate will, and imagination as signifying the erring choice of their intelligence, inasmuch as “every wrongdoer is ignorant” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, i) and they err who work evil (Prov. xiv).

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Even if angels be composed of matter and form, this argument does not prove that they are bodies; unless we suppose that angels and bodies have the same matter. It might be said indeed that the matter of bodies is distinct not by dimensional division but by relation to forms of different kinds, since potentiality is proportionate to act. But we would rather believe that angels are not composed of matter and form, but are pure self-subsistent forms. Nor does it follow from this that they were not created, because a form is a principle of existence, as that whereby a particular thing is, although the existence both of form and of matter in the composite proceeds from the one agent. Hence if there be a created substance that is a pure form it can have an efficient but not a formal principle.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii) there is an order of precedence even in formal causes: so that nothing prevents a form resulting from the participation of another form: and thus

God who is pure being, is in a fashion the species of all subsistent forms that participate of being but are not their own being.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In the natural order an angel’s power is higher and therefore more universal than the power of a human soul: wherefore it could not have a corporeal organ that would adequately correspond to the action which it exercises on eternal bodies: and consequently it was not fitting for it to be bound to certain corporeal organs, as the soul is by union with the body.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The first thing moved is that which moves itself by reason of the immovable mover: hence if the immovable mover moves either a body naturally united to it, or one that is not so united, the relation of priority remains the same.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The soul united to the body quickens the body not only effectively but also formally: and absolutely speaking to quicken the body thus is less than to be self-quickening only. Because the soul is able to quicken the body inasmuch as it has the lowest degree of being which can be common to the soul and body when united together: whereas the being of an angel is higher in degree, and therefore cannot be thus communicated to a body: wherefore it lives only and does not quicken formally.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. That the planets seem to have a backward and forward movement and sometimes to be stationary is not due to a variable movement of one and the same movable, but to the various movements of different movables, whether we put it down to eccentrics and epicycles according to Ptolemy, or to a difference of movements in the poles, as others maintain. And yet even if the heavenly bodies vary in their movements this does not prove that their movement is caused by a voluntary mover that is united rather than separated from them.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Even if the heavenly bodies be inanimate, they are moved by a living separate substance by whose power they act, even as an instrument by the power of the principal agent, and thus they cause life in things below them.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The Philosopher brings his arguments to two alternative conclusions, namely that all things moved must be reduced either directly to an immovable mover, or to a self-mover, part of which is an immovable mover: although he seems to prefer the latter alternative. If, however, anyone give preference to the former, nothing unreasonable is implicated in (the Philosopher’s) arguments.,

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. That which is highest in bodies reaches the lowest degree of the spiritual nature by participating of its properties, for instance by being incorruptible, but not by being united to it.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The human body is inferior to the heavenly body as regards matter: yet it has a more noble form, if heavenly bodies are inanimate:—more noble, that is, in itself, but not as informing the body because the form of heaven perfects its matter in a more excellent way, by making it incorruptible, than the rational soul perfects the body. The reason is because the spiritual substance that moves heaven is of too high a dignity to be united to a body.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Bodies cannot be aerial for reasons already given. And this suffices for the Reply to the Fifteenth Objection which proceeds on the lines of Plato’s opinion.,

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. An angel’s movements are not by commensuration of the angel with space, like the movements of a body: and the term is used equivocally when we speak of the movements of angels and of bodies.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The Word of God is not united to a body as informing it: for in that case the Word and the flesh would become one nature: and this is heretical.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Porphyry follows the opinion of Plato when he gives the name of gods to the demons whom he held to be animals as well as the heavenly bodies.

Q. VI: ARTICLE VII

CAN ANGELS OR DEMONS ASSUME BODIES?

THE seventh point of inquiry is whether angels or demons can assume bodies: and it would seem that they cannot.

1. A body cannot be united to an incorporeal substance except either in being or in movement. Now angels cannot have bodies united to them in being, because they would then be naturally united to them, which is contrary to what has been said (A. 6). Hence it follows that they cannot be united to bodies except as moving them. But this does not amount to

assumption: since then angels and demons would assume every body that they move, which is clearly false: for an angel moved the tongue of Balaam’s ass, and yet we do not say that he assumed it. Therefore we cannot say that angels or demons assume bodies.

2. If angels or demons assume bodies, this is not because they need to, but either for our instruction (as regards the good angels) or for our deception (as regards the wicked angels). But in either case an imaginary vision would be enough. Therefore seemingly they do not assume bodies.

3. God appeared to the Patriarchs in the Old Testament, even as angels are stated to have done, as Augustine proves (De Trin. iii, 11, 12). Now we must not say that God assumed a body, except in the mystery of the Incarnation. Therefore neither do angels assume bodies when they appear.

4. just as it naturally becomes the soul to be united to a body, so is it naturally becoming to an angel not to be united to a body. Now the soul cannot leave the body at will. Therefore neither can an angel assume a body.

5. No finite substance can perform several operations at the same time. Now an angel is a finite substance. Therefore he cannot at the same time administer to us and assume a body.

6. There should be proportion between assumed and assumer. But there is no proportion between an angel and a body, since they belong to wholly different genera and are therefore incompatible with each other. Therefore an angel cannot assume a body.

7. If an angel assume a body, this will either be a heavenly body or one with the nature of the four elements. But it cannot be a heavenly body, since the body of the heavens cannot be divided, or forced out of its place. Nor can it be an igneous body, for then he would consume the other bodies with which he came into contract: nor an aerial body, since air is shapeless: nor an aqueous body, for water does not retain shape: nor an earthly body, since they disappear suddenly, like the angel who appeared to Tobias. Therefore they do not assume any kind of body.

8. Every assumption terminates in some kind of union. But none of the three kinds of unity mentioned by the Philosopher (Phys. i) can result from an angel and a body: thus they cannot be one by continuity, nor by indivisibility, nor logically. Therefore an angel cannot assume a body.

9. If angels assume bodies, the bodies assumed by them either really are or are not as they appear to be. If they really are, since sometimes they appear as men, the body assumed by them will be a real human body: which is impossible, unless we say that an angel assumed a man, which would seem to be improbable. And if they are not, this again is seemingly unfitting, since pretense is unbecoming to the angels of truth. Therefore in no way does an angel assume a body.

10. As stated above (AA. 3, 4, 5) angels and demons cannot produce effects in the bodies of the lower world except by means of natural forces. Now the forces of nature are not implanted in bodies for the purpose of forming the human body otherwise than by the special process of generation, and from a special seed: and it is plain that angels do not assume a body in this way. And the same argument applies to the other bodily shapes in which angels appear at times. Therefore this cannot result from their assuming bodies.

11. In order to put a body in motion the mover must influence the body moved. But it cannot do this without some kind of contact: and seeing that an angel cannot be in contact with a body, it would seem that he cannot move a body, nor consequently assume one.

12. Someone will reply to this that angels by their command move bodies with local movement.—On the contrary "Mover and moved must be together" (Phys. viii). But from the fact that an angel commands something by his will it does not follow that he is together with the body that is said to be moved by him. Therefore he cannot command it by his mere will.

13. As stated above (AA. 3, 4, 5) a body's movement does not obey the mere will of an angel as regards its information. Now shape is a kind of form. Therefore by his mere command an angel cannot shape a body so that it have the appearance of a man, or of something of the kind wherein he may appear.

14. The (interlinear) gloss on Ps. x, 5), the Lord is in his holy temple, says that although the demons. exercise an external power over idols they cannot reside in them, nor consequently in other bodies. But if they assume bodies they must be in the bodies assumed. Therefore we must not say that they assume bodies.

15. If they assume bodies, they are united either to the whole body or to part of it. If they are united to a part only, they will be unable to move the

whole body, unless they move one part by means of another: and this would seem to be impossible, unless the assumed body has organs appointed for movement, and this is peculiar to animate bodies. And if he be united immediately to the whole body, the angel must needs be in each part of the body assumed, and of course, wholly in each part, since he is indivisible. Hence he will be in several places at the same time, which belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel cannot assume a body.

On the contrary it is related (Gen. xviii, 2) that the angels who appeared to Abraham came to him in assumed bodies: and the same is said of the angel who appeared to Tobias.

I answer that, some of those who believe the statements of Scripture about angelic apparitions, say that an angel never assumes a body: thus Rabbi Moses who holds this view, says that all the apparitions of angels related in the Scriptures, are prophetic, i.e. imaginary visions, the seer being either awake or asleep. But this does not safeguard the truth of Scripture: because the very expressions used by Scripture indicate what things are genuine facts and what are prophetic visions. Thus when we are to understand an apparition to be a mere vision, it employs words denoting a vision; for example (Ezech. viii, 3): The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven and brought me in the vision of God in Jerusalem. Wherefore it is clear that when a thing is simply stated as a fact, we are to take it as such: and this applies to many apparitions in the Old Testament. We must admit then without any qualification that the angels do sometimes assume a body, by fashioning a sensible body, and offering it to external or corporeal vision: even as at other times by producing forms in the imagination they cause themselves to appear in imaginary visions. This is fitting for three reasons. First and chiefly, because all the apparitions of the Old Testament were ordered to that apparition whereby the Son of God appeared visibly on the earth, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 11, 12). Wherefore since the Son of God took to himself a real body, and not an imaginary one as the Manicheans pretended, it was fitting that the angels also should appear to men by assuming real bodies.—A second reason may be gathered from the words of Dionysius in his letter to Titus. Thus he says there that among other reasons why in the divine Scriptures divine things are made known to us under sensible signs, there is this—that the whole man may be perfected by participating as far as possible in divine things, by grasping the intelligible truth not only by his intellect, but also by perceiving it in sensible nature by means of sensible forms which are images as it were of divine things. Hence in like manner seeing that angels appear to man in order to perfect him, it is fitting that they not only enlighten his intelligence by intellectual vision, but also that they profit his imagination and exterior senses by imaginary visions, namely of the bodies they assume. Wherefore this threefold vision is mentioned by Augustine (Gen. ad lit, xi, 7, 24).—A third reason may be that although the angels are by nature above us, it is possible for us by grace to attain to equality and fellowship with them—They will be as the angels in heaven (Mt. xxii, 30). Hence in order to give proof of their companionability and kinship in our regard, they conform to us, in so far as it becomes them, by assuming a body: and thus by assuming what is ours, they enable our minds to rise to what is peculiar to them: even so the Son of God by descending to us, raised us to things divine.—As to the demons, when they transform themselves into angels of light, they endeavour to deceive us by, doing what the good angels do for our profit.

Reply to the First Objection. An angel does not assume every body that he moves. To assume is to take to oneself (ad se sumere). Accordingly an angel assumes a body, not that he may unite it to his nature as a man takes food: nor to unite it to his person, as the Son of God took human nature; but in order to represent himself, in the same way as intelligible things can be represented by sensible objects. Thus an angel is said to assume a body when he fashions himself a body in such a way that it is adapted to represent him, as Dionysius explains by saying that the bodily shapes signify the angelic properties (Coel. Hier. v).

Reply to the Second Objection. As already stated not only imaginary but also corporeal vision is useful for our instruction.

Reply to the Third Objection. As Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 11, 12) all the apparitions of God related in the Old Testament were effected by the ministry of the angels, who fashion certain forms imaginary or corporeal, whereby they lead the seer’s mind to God; even as it is possible to lead man to God by sensible signs. Accordingly in these apparitions the. angels assumed the bodies that appeared: yet God is said to have appeared in them, because he was the end whereto the angels intended to raise man’s mind by means of these representations. Hence in these apparitions Scripture sometimes states that God appeared and sometimes an angel.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Nothing has a power that surpasses its being, since everything's power rises from its essence or presupposes it. And since the soul is united by its being to the body as the form thereof, it is not in its power to release itself from union with the body: and in like manner it is not in the angel's power to unite himself in his being to a body as its form: but he can assume a body in the manner indicated above, to which body he is united as its mover, and as a figure to its shape.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. These two operations, the assumption of a body and ministering to us are ordered the one to the other: so that there is nothing to prevent both being done at the same time.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Between an angel and a body there cannot be proportion of commensuration, since their respective magnitudes are not in the same genus and are altogether disparate. But nothing prevents an angel from having a certain relationship to a body such as that of a mover to the thing moved, or of a figure to its shape; and this may be called proportion.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. An angel can assume a body from any element, as well as from several elements mixed together. It is, however, more fitting that he assume a body from the air, which condenses easily so as to take and retain shape and reflect various colours from other bodies, as may be seen in the clouds: so that as far as the present question is concerned there is no difference between pure air and steam or smoke which tend to the nature of air.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The division referred to is that of simple unity: the union of an angel with a body does not produce unity of this kind but a relative unity, such as that of the mover and thing moved, or figure and shape, as stated above.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The appearances of the body assumed by an angel are real as regards what is perceptible to the senses, as this is the per se sensible, for example colour and shape, but not as regards the specific nature which is accidentally sensible. Not does this implicate any pretence on the part of the angel, since he does not present himself to human eyes under the guise of a man in order to be taken for a man, but that angelic virtues may be indicated by means of human characteristics: thus neither are metaphors false whereby certain things, are signified by their likeness to others.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the natural forces of bodies do not suffice to produce the real species of a human body except by the way of generation, they suffice to produce a resemblance to a human body as regards colour, shape and like external accidents. This would seem to apply particularly to certain of these accidents which can be produced by the local movement of certain bodies, whereby vapours are condensed or rarefied, and clouds given various shapes.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. An. angel in moving a body induces the movement therein, and touches it not by corporeal but by spiritual or virtual contact.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. A (body's) power must needs execute the angel's behest, so that he must be in virtual contact with the body that he moves.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Shape is a form that can be produced in matter by cutting, condensing, vaporising or fashioning, or some like kind of movement: wherefore the same does not apply to this kind of forms as to others.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. We may understand something as being in a body in two ways. First as contained within the dimensions of the body: and in this way nothing prevents a demon from being in a body. Secondly as present in the essence of a thing by giving it being and operating therein: this belongs to God alone, although he is not an essential part of anything. Moreover the sense of the gloss is that the demons were not in idols as idolaters imagined them to be, namely so that the idol and the indwelling spirit were one being.

I Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. An angel in the same way as the soul is wholly in each part of the assumed body: for though he is not, as the soul is, the form of that body he is its mover: and mover and moved must be together. Yet it does not follow that he is in several places at the same time, because the whole assumed body in relation to the angel is as one place.

Q. VI: ARTICLE VIII

CAN AN ANGEL OR DEMON BY MEANS OF AN ASSUMED BODY EXERCISE THE FUNCTIONS OF A LIVING BODY?

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether an angel or demon by means of an assumed body can exercise the functions of a living body: and seemingly he cannot.

1. Whoever is competent to have the power to exercise a certain function, is competent to have anything that is required for the exercise of that function, else the power would be useless to him. Now the functions of living bodies cannot be exercised without bodily organs. Since then an angel has no bodily organs naturally united to him, it would seem that he cannot exercise these functions.

2. The soul excels nature. But an angel cannot make nature act except by means of natural forces. Much less therefore can he produce the functions of the soul in an inanimate body.

3. Of all the operations of the soul that are exercised through organs, those of the senses are more akin to intellectual operation which is proper to an angel. But an angel cannot feel or imagine through an assumed body. Much less then can he exercise the other functions of the soul.

4. Without a voice there can be no speech: and voice is sound emitted from an animal’s mouth. Since then the angel who uses an assumed body is not an animal, seemingly he cannot use it to speak; much less for other actions, seeing that speech being a sip of intelligence is apparently most akin to him.

5. In one and the same individual the ultimate operation of the vegetal soul is generation: for an animal feeds and grows before generating. Now it cannot be said that an angel, or a body assumed by him, feeds or grows. Therefore an assumed body cannot generate.

6. Someone will reply that an angel or demon can generate through an assumed body, not by means of seed from that body, but by conveying seed from a man to a woman: even as he produces certain real natural effects by employing appropriate seeds.—On the contrary, animal seed is effective chiefly by natural heat: and if a demon were to transport seed from a distance, it would seem impossible to prevent the natural heat from evaporating. Therefore a man cannot be generated in this way.

7. If this were possible, from such seed a man would be generated in proportion to the power of human seed. Hence those who are stated to have been begotten by demons would not be of higher stature and greater strength than others who are generated in the usual way from human seed. Whereas it is stated (Gen. vi, 4): After the Sons of God went into the daughters of men, and they brought forth children (giants were born) these are the mighty men of old, men of renown.

8. Food is taken by eating: so that if angels do not feed in their assumed bodies, seemingly neither do they eat.

9. To show the reality of his risen human body, Christ after his resurrection willed to eat. Now this would have been no proof of his resurrection if angels or demons in their assumed bodies were able to eat: and it certainly was a proof. Therefore angels or demons cannot eat through their assumed bodies.

1. On the contrary it is said of the angels who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii, 9): When they had eaten, they said to him: Where is Sara th wife? Therefore angels both eat and speak in their assumed bodies.

2. Commenting on Gen. vi, 2, The sons of God etc. Jerome says: “The Hebrew word אלהים, has either a singular or a plural signification: for it means both God and gods. Hence Aquila dared to say that the sons of gods are gods, thereby meaning saints or angels.” Therefore apparently the angels generate.

3. Just as nothing is without purpose in human art, so neither is there in the art of the angels. Now there would be no purpose in their assuming bodies disposed as organic bodies, unless they used the organs. Therefore seemingly in their assumed bodies they exercise functions corresponding to the various organs: for instance, they see with the eyes, hear with the ears and so forth.

I answer that an action takes its species from two sources, the agent, and its term: thus heating differs from cooling in that the former proceeds from heat and terminates in heat, while the latter proceeds from cold and terminates in cold. Properly speaking action like movement takes its species from its term; whereas it takes its naturality from its source. For movement and action are said to be natural when they proceed from an intrinsic source. We must note then that some of the functions of the soul not only proceed from the soul as their source, but also terminate in the soul and the animate body. Such like actions cannot be ascribed to angels in their assumed bodies; for they are neither of the same species (as when performed by us) nor are they natural to the angel: for instance, sensation, growth, nourishment and the like. For sensation follows a movement from things to the soul; likewise nourishment and growth consist in generating something that is added to the living body. On the other hand some actions of the soul have the soul as their source, but terminate in an external effect: and if this effect can be produced by mere bodily division or local movement, it may be said that the angel in his assumed body performs such an action, as regards a specific likeness in the effect: but the action will not be truly natural, but like a natural action: thus speech is produced by movement of the organs and air, and eating, by division of food and its transmission throughout the body. Hence speech when ascribed to angels in assumed bodies is not really natural speech but an imitation thereof by producing a like effect: and the same applies to eating. Wherefore it is written (Tob. xii, 18, 19): When I was with you... I seemed indeed to eat and to drink with you; but I use an invisible meat and drink. If, however, the effect requires to be the result of a transformation, it cannot be produced by an angel: except perhaps by means of a natural action, as in the case of generation.

Reply to the First Objection. An angel does not perform these actions naturally, wherefore he needs not to have the corresponding organs naturally united to him.

Reply to the Second Objection. As stated above, an angel does not perform real operations of the soul but imitations of them.

Reply to the Third Objection. We have said (in the body of the Article) why sensation cannot be ascribed to angels in assumed bodies.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. As stated above, an angel’s speech in an assumed body is not real but an imitation of speech.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Generation is never ascribed to good angels: concerning the demons, however, there are two opinions. Some say that even the demons are unable to generate in their assumed bodies, and this for the reasons given in the objections. Others, however, are of opinion that they can, not indeed by seed from the body assumed, or by virtue of their own nature, but by employing the seed of a man for the purpose of generation, one and the same demon being succubus to a man and transferring the seed thus received by acting as incubus to a woman. This may be reasonably held, since demons cause also other natural things by using appropriate seeds, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8, 9).

Reply to the Sixth Objection. A demon is able to remedy the evaporation of the semen, both by rapidity of movement, or by employing such means as will retain the natural heat in the semen.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Without doubt a generation that is effected in the way mentioned is the result of the force in the human seed. Wherefore a man begotten in this way is the child not of the demon but of the mart whose seed was employed. And yet it is possible that stronger and bigger men be begotten in this way; because the demons who seek to be admired for their feats, can observe the position of the stars, and the respective temperaments of the man and woman so as to produce such an effect: and especially if the seed through being used by them as instrument receive thereby an increase of power.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Eating is ascribed to angels in assumed bodies, not for the purpose of growth, but as the mere act of eating: likewise it is ascribed to Christ after whose resurrection no addition could be made to his body. There is this difference however, that in Christ’s case eating was real, since he had a vegetal soul, and so there could be an increase in the truth of his nature. But in neither case was the food changed into flesh and blood, but was resolved into prejacent matter.

This suffices for the Reply to the Ninth Objection.

Solution of the first argument in the contrary sense. We have explained in the body of the Article in what sense eating and speaking are to be ascribed to an angel.

Solution of the second argument. The sons of God denote the sons of Seth, who were sons of God by grace, and of the angels by imitation. The sons of men are the sons of Cain, who abandoned God and lived according to the flesh.

Solution of the third argument. The angels assume the organs of sense, not to use them, but as signs: hence although they do not sense by them, they do not assume them to no purpose.

Q. VI: ARTICLE IX

SHOULD THE WORKING OF A MIRACLE BE ATTRIBUTED TO FAITH?

[SUM. TH. II-II, Q. CLXXVIII, AA. 1, 2.]

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether the working of a miracle should be ascribed to faith: and seemingly it should not.

1. The gratuitous graces differ from the virtues, in that the virtues are common to all holy persons, whereas the gratuitous graces are divided among various persons, according to 1 Corinthians xii, 4: There are diversities of graces. Now the working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace, wherefore it is said (ibid. 10.): To another the working of miracles. Therefore the working of miracles is not, to be get down to faith.

2. It will be replied that it is ascribed to faith as the meritorious cause, and to the gratuitous grace as the executive cause.—On the contrary a gloss says: “Sometimes Prophecy, the working of miracles, the casting out of devils is not due to the merit of the worker but to the invocation of Christ’s name.” Therefore seemingly it is not to be ascribed to faith.

3. Charity is the source and root of merit, and without it formless faith cannot merit. Hence if the working of miracles be put down to faith by reason of merit, it should be ascribed still more to charity.

4. Since holy men work miracles by praying, the working of miracles should be ascribed chiefly to that virtue which causes prayers to be heard: and this is charity. Thus it is said, (Mt. xviii, 19): If two of you shall consent upon earth concerning anything whatsoever they shall ask it shall be done to them by my Father who is in heaven: and (Ps. xxxvi, 4): Delight in the Lord and he will give thee the requests of thy heart. For it is charity that makes man delight in the Lord through love of God, and consent with his fellow men through love of his neighbour. Therefore the working of miracles should be set down to charity.

5. It is said (Jo. ix, 31): We know that God doth not hear sinners. Now charity alone removes sins, for as it is written (Prov. x, 12) charity covereth all sins. Therefore the working of miracles should be attributed to charity and not to faith.

6. Holy men work miracles not only by impetration but also authoritatively, as Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30): and this is due to man’s union

with God, so that the divine power comes to his aid. Now charity causes this union, for he who is joined to the Lord, i.e. by charity, is one spirit (1 Cor. vi, 17). Therefore the working of miracles is to be ascribed to charity.

7. Envy is especially opposed to charity, since charity rejoices in the good things for which envy grieves. Now according to a gloss on Gal. iii, i, envy by bewitching men produces an evil effect in them. Therefore the working of miracles is to be put down to charity.

8. The intellect is not a principle of action except through the medium of the will. Now faith is in the intellect, and charity is in the will. Therefore neither does faith work save through charity: Faith that worketh by charity (Gal. v. 6). Therefore just as virtuous deeds are ascribed to charity rather than to faith, so also is the working of miracles.

9. At other miracles are directed to the Incarnation of Christ which is the miracle of miracles. Now the Incarnation is ascribed to charity (Jo. iii, 16): God so loved the world, as to give his only begotten Son. Therefore other miracles are to be ascribed not to faith but to charity.

10. It was a miracle that Sara old and barren bore a son to an old man: and this is ascribed to hope (Rom. iv, 18): Who against hope believed in hope. Therefore the working ,of miracles is to be ascribed to hope and not to faith.

11. A miracle is something difficult and unusual as Augustine says (Tract. viii in Joan: De Trin. iii, 5). Now difficult things are the object of hope. Therefore the working of miracles should be attributed to hope.

12. A miracle is a sign of the divine power. Now just as charity corresponds to goodness which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and as faith corresponds to truth which is appropriated to the Son: even so hope corresponds to power which is appropriated to the Father. Therefore the working of miracles should be ascribed to hope.

13. Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu, 79) that wicked men sometimes work miracles by outward signs of righteousness. Therefore the working of miracles is to be set down to righteousness, and not to faith.

14. It is stated (Acts vi, 8) that Stephen full of grace and fortitude did great wonders and signs among the people. Therefore seemingly it should be ascribed to fortitude.

15. Our Lord said to his disciples (Mt. xvii, 20) when they were unable to cast out devils: This kind is not cast out but by Prayer and fasting. Now the

casting out of devils is reckoned among miracles: and fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence. Therefore the working of miracles belongs to abstinence.

16. Bernard says that to be constantly with women without falling is more than to raise the dead. Now that belongs to chastity. Therefore it belongs to chastity to work miracles, and not to faith.

17. That which is derogatory to faith should not be ascribed to faith. Now miracles are derogatory to faith since unbelievers ascribe them to the magic acts. Therefore miracles should riot be set down to faith.

18. The faith of Peter and Andrew is commended by Gregory (Hom. v. in Evang.) for that they believed without seeing miracles. Therefore miracles are derogatory to faith and the same conclusion follows as before.

19. Given the cause the effect follows. If then faith be the cause of miracles being wrought, all who believe would work miracles: and this is clearly false. Therefore it does not belong to faith to work miracles.

On the contrary it is said (Mk. xvi, 17): These signs shall follow them that believe. In my name they shall cast out devils, etc.

Again our Lord said (Mt. xvii, 19): If you have faith as a grain of mustard-seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove: and nothing shall be impossible to you.

Again, if A which is the opposite of B causes C which is the opposite of D, then B is the cause of D. Now unbelief is a cause which hinders the working of miracles: thus it is said (Mk. vi, 5, 6) of Christ: He could not do any miracles there (i.e. in his own city) only that he cured a few that were sick, laying his hands upon them, and he wondered because of their unbelief, and (Mt. xvii, 18) it is related that when the disciples asked our Lord: Why could not we cast him out? Because of your unbelief, said he. Therefore faith is the cause of the working of miracles. I answer that holy men work miracles in two ways, according to Gregory (Dial. ii, 30) namely by impetration and authoritatively. Now in both ways faith renders a man fit to work miracles. For faith makes a man deserve that a miracle be wrought in answer to his prayer: and this is clear for the following reason. It is to be observed that whereas in natural things all particular causes derive the effectiveness of their action from the universal cause, a particular and proper effect is ascribed to a particular cause. We have an example of this in the active forces of the lower bodies in relation to the power of the heavenly body; and in the lower spheres which while following the movement of the first sphere, have each one their proper movements: and it is the same with the virtues whereby we merit. For they all derive their efficacy in meriting from charity, which unites us to God from whom we merit, and perfects our will whereby we merit, and yet each virtue merits a certain particular reward proportionately corresponding to it: thus humility merits exaltation, and poverty merits the kingdom. Hence sometimes when a man has lost charity, although he merits nothing condignly by acts of other virtues, yet through the divine liberality he may be repaid for these acts by certain congruous benefits, at any rate in this life. Wherefore it is said that a man may sometimes congruously merit an increase of worldly goods by deeds generically good which he has done while deprived of charity. In this way then faith merits the working of miracles, although the root of the merit is charity.

Three reasons may be given for this. First, because miracles are arguments of faith, inasmuch as when something is done above the faculty of nature, it provides a proof of that which surpasses the natural faculty of reason: hence it is said (Mk. xvi, 20): They going forth preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.

The second reason is because faith is based chiefly on the divine power, which it conceives as being the motive or medium of assent to things which appear to be above reason: wherefore the divine power in miraculous works comes especially to the assistance of faith.

The third reason is because miracles are wrought independently of natural causes: and faith takes its arguments not from reasons pertaining to nature and the senses but from things pertaining to God.

Hence just as poverty in worldly goods merits spiritual riches, and humility merits heavenly exaltation, even so faith through despising as it were things done naturally, merits after a. fashion the working of miracles which are wrought above the faculty of nature.

In like manner faith makes a man suitable to work a miracle authoritatively. Three reasons will make this clear. First, because as already stated (A. 4) holy men are said to work miracles authoritatively, not as though they were the chief authors of miracles, but because as divine instruments they announce, as it were, to natural things the divine command which nature obeys when miracles are wrought. Now it is by faith that God's words dwell in us, because faith is a kind of participation in God's truth: wherefore faith disposes a man to the working of miracles.

Secondly, because holy men who work miracles authoritatively, act by the power of God working in nature. For God's action is compared to the whole of nature, as the soul's action to the body: and the body is transmuted by the soul above the orderof natural principles, especiallybya persistent imagination whereby the body is heated whether through desire or through anger, or is even constitutionally changed so as to become feverish or leprous. Accordingly a man will be disposed to the working of miracles by that which gives persistence and stability to his apprehension. And a firm faith does this: and therefore firmness of faith conduces in no small measure to the working of miracles. This is made evident (Mt. xxi, 21) where it is said: If you shall have faith and stagger not, not only this of the fig-tree shall you do, but also if you shall say to this mountain, Take up and cast thyself into the sea, it shall be done: and (Jas. i, 6), Let him ask in faith nothing wavering.

Thirdly, because miracles wrought authoritatively are done by way of command, and therefore a man is especially fitted to work miracles authoritatively by that which fits him to command: and this is a certain aloofness and withdrawal from those whom he has to command. Thus Anaxagoras says that the intellect is not mixed with the body, so that it may govern it. Now faith withdraws the mind from the domain of nature and sense, and sets it on the foundation of things intelligible. Consequently faith renders a man fit to work miracles authoritatively. For this reason those virtues are most conducive to the working of miracles, which withdraw a man's mind from those things which are most material: such as continence and abstinence which withdraw man from the preference of those things which engage his mind in sensible things. But other virtues which direct man in the administration of temporal things, do not so dispose him to the working of miracles.

Reply to the First Objection. The working of miracles is ascribed to the gratuitous grace as its proximate principle, and to faith as a disposition to the gratuitous grace.

Reply to the Second Objection. Though sometimes a sinner works a miracle, this is not due to his merit—that is, not to his condign merit—but to a certain congruity, inasmuch as he holds constantly to the faith in witness whereof God works the miracle.

Reply to the Third Objection. Charity through being a greater virtue than faith makes faith meritorious: yet faith more congruously merits in a special way the working of miracles. For faith is a perfection of the intellect, whose act consists in the thing understood being, after a fashion, in the intellect: whereas charity is a perfection of the will, whose act consists in its tending to the thing in itself. Wherefore by charity man abides in God and becomes one with him: whereas by faith divine things abide in us: for which reason it is said (Heb. xi, i) that faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.—Moreover miracles are wrought in confirmation of faith, and not of charity.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. As stated, charity merits the granting of prayers, as the universal source of merit: but faith merits in a special way the working of miracles, as we have said above (Reply Obj. 3).

Reply to the Fifth Objection. According to a gloss on this passage, these are the words of the blind man, who had not yet fully received the sight of wisdom: wherefore they contain an untruth. God does at times hear sinners; but this is owing to his liberality and not to their merits: so that their prayer is impetratory but not meritorious; even as sometimes the prayer of a just man is meritorious but not impetratory: for impetration regards the object of the petition and is wholly gratuitous, whereas merit regards the merited reward and is a matter of justice.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. As we have already said (Reply Obj. 3) charity unites man to God as drawing man to God: but faith draws divine things to us.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Envy could not have an evil effect by bewitching men, unless a fixed imagination conduced to that effect.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument proves that faith merits through charity, and this has been granted (Reply Obj. 3). Moreover the objection holds in those actions which a man does by his own power, and wherein the intellect directs the will that commands the executive power. But in those actions where the divine power is executive, faith alone which is based on the divine power suffices for action.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers the miracle as wrought by God whose every action in creatures is motived by love. Thus God’s love did not permit him to be barren as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.

iv). But we are considering the miracle as done by man: wherefore the objection is not to the point.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The working of miracles is not properly ascribed to hope: because the object of hope is a thing to be obtained, wherefore it is only about eternal things. But faith is of things both eternal and temporal: and thus it can extend to things that have to be done. For this reason in the words quoted the chief place is given to hope rather than to faith: He believed in hope.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. The object of hope is something difficult to obtain, not difficult to do.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. God's power corresponds to hope, inasmuch as he is above all in majesty; and the possession of this is the object of hope. But the power itself as effective of miracles is the base on which faith is founded chiefly.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Outward signs of righteousness come from that faith whereby the whole Church is justified, according to Rom. iii, 22, The justice of God through faith in Christ Jesus.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The martyrs showed fortitude in suffering and constancy in confessing on account the firmness of their faith.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Abstinence also conduces to the working of miracles, but not in the same degree as faith.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Though it be difficult to be constantly with women and not to fall, it is not a miracle properly speaking, since it depends on a created power, namely the free-will.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The abuse of miracles by those who spoke ill of them does not detract from their efficacy in confirming the faith of those who were well disposed.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The faith of Peter and Andrew is commended on account of their readiness to believe: and this was all the more enhanced as they needed fewer reasons for believing; and miracles by their very nature are to be reckoned among these reasons.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. Faith is not a sufficient cause of working miracles, but a disposition thereto. And miracles are wrought according to the ordering of divine providence, which gives men suitable remedies for various causes and in many ways.

Q. VI: ARTICLE X

ARE DEMONS FORCED TO WORK MIRACLES BY SENSIBLE AND CORPOREAL OBJECTS, DEEDS OR WORDS?

THE tenth point of inquiry is whether demons by sensible and corporeal objects, deeds, or words, be forced to work the miracles that seem to be wrought by magic: and seemingly they can.

1. Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9) quotes Porphyry as saying that a certain man in Chaldea was seized with envy and by adjuring the spiritual powers, bound them with his imprecations not to grant the prayers of any other. And (ibid. 21) he says: Unless the demons first gave the information, it was not possible to know what any one of them desired or disliked, by what name he was to be invoked or compelled. Therefore demons are compelled to produce magical effects.

2. Whosoever does a thing against his will is in some way compelled. Now demons sometimes do a thing against their will when they are adjured by magicians. Thus it is always the devil's will to lead men into sin: and yet a man may be incited to base love by magic, and by the same art may be freed from the violence of the incitement. Therefore demons are compelled by magicians.

3. It is related of Solomon that he performed certain exercises and thereby compelled the demons to quit bodies that were obsessed by them. Therefore demons can be compelled by adjuration.

4. If demons come when evoked by a magician this is because they are either enticed or compelled. But they are not always evoked by being enticed: since sometimes they are adjured through things they hate, for instance through the virginity of the imprecator, whereas they themselves are ever inciting men to concubinage. Therefore seemingly they are sometimes compelled.

5. It is the devil's constant aim to turn man away from God. Nevertheless they obey the summons when they are adjured through things that imply that they revere God, for instance by invoking God's majesty. Therefore they do this not willingly but under compulsion.

6. If so be that they are enticed by sensible objects it is not as animals are enticed by food, but as spirits are drawn by such signs as give pleasure, for instance different kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, chants, rites, as

Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6). Yet apparently they are not drawn by signs; for only those are drawn by signs who make use of signs, and these are only those who are possessed of senses: inasmuch as a sign is that which besides the impression it makes on the senses brings something else to our knowledge. Therefore demons are in no way enticed but are only compelled.

7. A certain man said to Jesus (Mt. xvii, 14) Lord have Pity on my son, for he is a lunatic and suffereth much: and (Mk. ix, 16) it is said: I have brought my son to thee, having a dumb spirit. Now the (ordinary) gloss observes on the words quoted from Matthew: "Him Mark calls deaf and dumb whom Matthew describes as a lunatic, —not that the moon obeys the demons, but that the demon by observing the moon's course has an evil influence on man." It would seem, then, that by observing the heavenly bodies and other material things the demons may be compelled to do this or that.

8. Seeing that demons sinned by pride it is hardly likely that they are enticed by things that are derogatory to their superior nature. Yet they are adjured by invocations of their power and by the most incredible falsehoods, all of which is derogatory to their knowledge. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, ii) quotes Porphyry as saying: "Why should a weak man threaten, or seek by falsehood to extract the truth? for he will threaten to make the heavens fall and do other like things impossible to man, that the gods like silly children overawed by false and absurd threats may obey his behest." Therefore the demons are evoked not by being enticed but by being compelled.

9. The demons endeavour is to bring men to idolatry: and they compass this chiefly by their presence in images. Now if they came of their own accord, they would always come to such things. But they come only at certain times, and when invoked by certain chants and rites, and then only to certain consecrated or rather execrated images. Demons therefore are invoked not by being enticed but by compulsion.

10. Sometimes demons are invoked by magic art in order that they may turn men to base love. But demons endeavour to do this of their own accord: wherefore there would be no use in enticing them to do this if they did so whenever they were invoked. Now they do not so always. Therefore

when they do they are invoked, not as being enticed but as, being compelled.

On the contrary, it is written (Job xii, 24): There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him, namely the devil. Now a greater power is not compelled by a lesser. Therefore nothing on earth can compel the demons.

Again, to be invoked and to be compelled apply to different subjects: we invoke those who are above, and we compel those who are beneath, according to Porphyry. Now demons come when called: therefore they are not compelled.

Should anyone say that they are compelled by the power of God: I reply, on the contrary, that to compel the demons by (calling upon) the power of God is the effect of the gift of grace whereby the order of heavenly powers is fulfilled. Now this gift is not in unbelievers and wicked men like sorcerers. Therefore neither can the demons be compelled by invoking the divine power. Again, it is no sin to do what is done chiefly by the divine power, for instance to work miracles. If then magicians were to compel the demons by the power of God, they would not sin in employing the magic arts; which is plainly false. Therefore the demons cannot in any way be compelled by magic.

I answer that there have been many opinions about the things done by the magic arts. Some, like Alexander, have said that the effects produced by magic are the result of powers and energies engendered in the lower world by the forces in these lower bodies combined with an observation of the heavenly movements. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, i) states that Porphyry believed that it is possible for men to employ herbs, stones, animals, certain sounds and voices, figures and various forms of trickery as well as by observing the movement of the stars in the revolution of the heavens, to conjure up forces conducive to the various effects of the stars. This opinion seems to be inadequate: since, although the natural forces of higher and lower bodies may suffice to produce some of the results ascribed to witchcraft, such as certain transmutations of bodies, nevertheless there are certain results of magic that are altogether beyond the scope of material forces. For it is plain that speech can only come from an intelligence: and magicians cause spoken answers to be heard; wherefore this must proceed from an intelligence, especially seeing that these answers sometimes convey information about hidden matters. Nor can it be said that this is done by influencing the imagination alone by some kind of trickery: because in that case these voices would not be heard by all the bystanders, nor could they be heard by those who are awake and have the use of their senses. It follows then that these answers proceed either from the mind of the magician or from some outside intellectual agency.

The former is impossible for two reasons. First, because a man's mind cannot by its own power come to the knowledge of hidden matters except through matters known to him: so that by its will it is unable to effect the revelation of hidden matters, which is produced by the magic arts, since the principles of reason are insufficient to lead to the knowledge of those hidden matters. Secondly, because if the magician's mind produced these results by its own power, it would not need to resort to invocations or other like external means.

It is clear, therefore, that these results of magic are produced by some external spirits: not however by righteous and good spirits; and this is clear for two reasons, First, because good spirits would not associate themselves with wicked men, such as are the majority of magicians; secondly, because they would not co-operate with man in wrong-doing, which is often the result of magic. It remains then for us to conclude that they are produced by evil spirits whom we call demons.

These demons may be said to be compelled in two ways first by a higher power that forces them to act of necessity secondly, by way of enticement, even as a man is said to be compelled to do something when he is drawn by his desire. In neither way, however, properly speaking, can demons be compelled by material things: unless we suppose them to have aerial bodies naturally united to them and consequently sensible affections like other animated beings: thus Apuleius believed that demons are animals with aerial bodies and passive souls. For in that case they could be compelled in either way by a corporeal power; either of the heavenly bodies (by whose action they might be led to certain passions) or of these lower bodies which might be to them an object of pleasure: thus Apuleius says that "they delight in the smoke of sacrifices and such like things." This opinion, however, has been shown to be false in the previous Articles.

We conclude then that the demons which give success to the magic art may be both compelled and enticed. They are compelled by a higher being:

sometimes by God himself, —sometimes through the divine power by holy angels and men. Thus the demons are said to be curbed by the angelic brder of Powers. Holy men, even as they participate in the gift of the Virtues inasmuch as they work miracles, so do they share in the gift of the Powers inasmuch as they cast out devils. Sometimes too they are compelled by superior demons; and this compulsion alone can be effected by means of, magic. They may also be compelled, being as it were enticed, by the magic arts, not indeed by means of corporeal things for their own sake, but for the sake of something else. First because they are aware that the result for which they are invoked can be more easily produced by such corporeal things: and they want their power to be an object of admiration: and for this reason they are more ready to obey the summons when they are invoked under certain constellations. Secondly, in so far as these corporeal things are sips of certain spiritual things that please them. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6) says that demons are enticed by these things not as animals are by food, but as spirits by signs. For seeing that men in token of their subjection to God offer sacrifice and prostrate themselves, the demons delight in having such tokens of reverence offered to them. Moreover different demons are enticed by different signs as corresponding better to their various vices. Thirdly, they are enticed by those corporeal things which lead men into sin: for this reason they are enticed by lies or anything that deceives men or leads them into sin.

Reply to the First Objection. Demons are said to be compelled by magic art in the ways given above.

Reply to the Second Objection. The demon is quite content if by preventing an evil and promoting a good he makes it easier for him to draw men into familiar converse, with him, and to become an object of admiration to them: thus they even transform themselves into angels of light (2 Cor. xi, 14).

Reply to the Third Objection. If Solomon performed these exorcisms when he was in a state of grace, they could derive the power to compel the demons from the power of God. But if it was after he had turned to the worship of idols, so that we have to understand that he performed them by magic arts, these exorcisms had no power to compel the demons, except in the manner explained above.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The demons come when invoked by virgins, in order to lead men to think that they are divine, as though they loved purity.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Again, by coming when adjured by the invocation of the divine majesty, they wish men to think that they are not utterly banished by the justice of God. For they do not desire to be as gods, as altogether equal to God, but rejoice in receiving from men divine worship under him.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Demons are not said to be enticed by signs as though they used signs, but seeing that men are wont to employ signs, they take pleasure in the signs employed by men on account of what they signify.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. As the ordinary gloss observes (ibid.) demons afflict men more at certain phases of the moon, in order to bring God’s creatures into evil repute, by the fact that men believe them to serve the demons and thus deceive men.

Reply to the Eighth, Objection. Although such lies would seem derogatory to the demons’ power: yet it pleases them that men believe in these lies: because the devil is a liar and the father of lies.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The demons become present to images when invoked at certain hours and by certain signs, for reasons already given.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the demons ever desire to draw men into sin: they endeavour. to do so all the more when they have a greater incentive, and when there is a likelihood of a greater number being drawn into sin.

QUESTION VII

THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE

THERE are eleven points of inquiry: (1) Whether God is simple. (2) Whether God’s substance or essence are the same as his being. (3) Is God in any genus? (4) Whether ‘good,’ ‘just,’ ‘wise’ and the like predicate an accident in God. (5) Whether the aforesaid terms signify the divine substance. (6) Whether these terms are synonymous. (7) Whether these terms are said of God and creatures univocally or equivocally. (8) Is there any relation between God and the creature? (9) Whether the relations between God and creatures are really in creatures. (10) Whether God is really related to the creature, so that the relation be something in God. (11) Whether temporal relations are in God only logically.

Q. VII: ARTICLE I

IS GOD SIMPLE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. III]

THE first point of inquiry is whether God is simple: and seemingly he is not.

1. From one simple thing only one thing can naturally proceed: for the same always produces the same according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii). But many things come from God. Therefore he is not simple.

2. If a simple thing is reached the whole of it is reached. Now God is reached by the blessed: for as Augustine says (De videndo Deum), “to reach God with the mind is great happiness.” If, then, God is simple he is wholly

reached by the blessed. Now that which is wholly reached is comprehended. Therefore God is comprehended by, the blessed: which is impossible. Therefore God is not simple.

3. The same thing cannot be several kinds of cause. Now God is several kinds of cause (Metaph. xi). Therefore there must be various things in him: and consequently he is composite.

4. Whatsoever contains one thing in addition to another is composite. Now in God there is one thing besides another, namely property and essence. Therefore there is composition in God.

5. It will be replied that the property is the same thing as the essence. On the contrary, affirmation and negation are not true of the same. Now the divine essence is common to the three Persons, whereas the properties are incommunicable. Therefore property and essence are not the same.

6. A thing is composite if different predicaments are predicated of it. Now substance and relation are predicated of God, according to Boethius (De Trin.). Therefore God is composite.

7. In everything there is substance, power and operation, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi): wherefore seemingly operation follows power and substance. Now there are several divine operations. Therefore there is plurality and composition in the divine substance.

8. Wherever there is plurality of forms there must be composition. Now in God there is plurality of forms, for as the Commentator says (Metaph. xi, com. 18), all forms exist actually in the first mover, even as they are potentially in primal matter. Therefore composition is in God.

9. Whatsoever is added to a thing that has complete being is accidental to it. Now certain things are said of God since the beginning of time, such as that he is the Creator and the Lord. Therefore these things are in him accidentally. But an accident with its subject forms a kind of composition. Therefore composition is in God.

10. Where there are several things there is composition. Now in God there are three persons, and there are three things according to Augustine (De Doct. Christ. i, 5). Therefore composition is in God.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trim. viii): God is not composed of several things as man is, as though what he has were distinct from him who has it. Again Boethius says (De Trin.): He is truly one since there is no number in him. Now where there is composition there is number. Therefore God is incomposite and utterly simple.

I answer that we must hold that God is altogether simple and for the nonce this may be proved by three arguments. The first is as follows. We have proved (Q. iii, A. 5) in a former discussion, that all beings proceed from a first being which we call God. Now although in one and the same thing that is at one time in act, at another time in potentiality, potentiality precedes act in time but follows it in nature: yet absolutely speaking act precedes potentiality not only in nature, but also in time, since everything that is in potentiality is made actual by some being that is in act. Accordingly the being that made all things actual, and itself proceeds from no other being, must be the first actual being without any admixture of potentiality. For were it in any way in potentiality, there would be need of another previous being to make it actual. Now in every composite of whatsoever kind of composition there must needs be a mixture of act and potentiality: because of the things whereof it is composed, either one is in potentiality to the other, as matter to form, subject to accident, genus to difference, or all the parts together are in potentiality to the whole, since parts are reducible to matter, and the whole is reducible to form (Phys. ii) so that no composite is first act. But the first being which is God must needs be pure act, as we have proved (Q. i, A. i). Therefore it is impossible that God be composite: and thus it follows that he is utterly simple. The second reason is because seeing that composition requires difference in the. component parts, these different parts require an agent to unite them together: since different things as such are not united. Now every composite has being through the union of its component parts. Therefore every composite depends on a pre-existing agent: and consequently the first being which is God, from whom all things proceed, cannot be composite. The third reason is because the first being, which is God, must needs be most perfect and consequently supremely good: since the principles of things are not imperfect, as Pythagoras and Leucippus contended. Now the supremely good is that in which there is nothing lacking in goodness, even as the supremely white is that in which there is no admixture of blackness. But this is impossible in any composite thing because the good that results from the composition of its parts, and whereby the, whole is good, is not in any single part. Wherefore the parts are not good with the goodness proper to the whole. Consequently that which is supremely good must be supremely simple and void of all composition. This argument is given by the Philosopher (Metaph. xi) and by Hilary (De Trin. vii), where he says that “God who is light is not composed of things that are dim, nor is he who is strength composed of things that are weak.”

Reply to the First Objection. Aristotle does not mean that a multitude cannot proceed from one. For since an agent produces its like, and since an effect falls short of reproducing its cause, it follows that where we find unity in the cause we shall find multiplicity in the effects: thus in the sun’s power all the forms of generable bodies are, in a fashion, one, and yet they are diversified in its effects. Hence it is that by its one power a thing is able to produce various effects: thus fire by its heat liquefies and solidifies, softens and hardens, flames and blackens: and man by. the power of his reason acquires various sciences and produces various works of art. Wherefore a fortiori God by his one simple power is able to create many things. The Philosopher means then that a thing so long as it remains the same does not produce different effects at different times, if it act by natural necessity: except perhaps accidentally, through diversity of matter, or the intervention of another agent, but this is not to the point.

Reply to the Second Objection. God is attained by the mind of the blessed, whole but not wholly, because the mode of God’s knowableness infinitely surpasses the mode of a created intellect: and thus the created intellect cannot understand God as perfectly as he is understandable, and consequently he cannot comprehend him.

Reply to the Third Objection. By reason of one and the same thing God is considered by us as having different kinds of causality: because in that he is the first act, he is an active cause, he is the exemplar of all forms, and he is supreme goodness and consequently the final cause of all things.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Property and essence in God differ not in reality but only logically: for paternity itself is the divine essence, as we shall show further on (Q. viii, A. i).

Reply to the Fifth Objection. As the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 3), nothing prevents contradictory statements being verified about one same thing from different points of view: thus the same identical point from different aspects is the beginning and end (of a line): and considered as the beginning it is not the end and vice versa. Wherefore since essence and property are the same in reality but differ logically, nothing prevents the one being common and the other incommunicable.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In God the absolute and the relative do not differ really, but only logically as stated above: wherefore we cannot infer that there is composition in him.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. God's operation may be considered from the point of view either of the operator or of the work done. If we consider it on the part of the operator, then in God there is but one operation and this is in his essence: for he produces his effects not by an action that is between him and the thing done, but by his intelligence and will which are his very being. If, however, we consider God's operation on the part of the work done, then there are various operations, and various effects of the divine operation: but this does not argue composition in him.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The form of the effect has a different mode of being in the natural agent and the agent by art. The form of the effect is in the natural agent inasmuch as the agent produces an effect of like nature, since every agent produces its like. Now this happens in two ways. When the effect bears a perfect likeness to the agent, as proportionate to the agent's power, then the form of the effect is in the agent in the same degree: thus it is in univocal agents, for instance fire generates fire. When, however, the effect is not perfectly likened to the agent, as being improportionate to the agent's power, then the form of the effect is not in the same degree in the agent but in a higher degree: this is the case in equivocal agents, for instance the sun generates fire. On the other hand in agents by art, the form of the effect pre-exists in the same degree ,but not in the same mode of being: because in the effect the form has material being, whereas in the mind of the craftsman it has intelligible being. Now whereas a thing may be in the intellect as the thing which we understand, and as the species whereby we understand, art-forms are in the intellect as that whereby we understand: because it is through conceiving the form of his art-work that the craftsman produces that work in matter. Accordingly the forms of things are in God in both ways. Because while his action in reference to things is from his intellect, it is not without the action of nature. But whereas here below the craftsman's art acts by virtue of an extraneous nature which it employs as an instrument, as a brickmaker uses fire to bake his bricks: on the other hand God's art employs no extraneous nature in its action, but produces its effect by virtue of his own nature. Hence the forms of things are in the divine nature as in the power that produces them, but not according to the same degree, since no effect is equal to that power. Consequently all forms that are manifold in his effects are in his power as one thing, so that their multiplicity argues no composition in him. Likewise in his intellect there are many things understood through one thing which is his essence. Now it is no proof of composition in one who understands that he understand many things by one: wherefore neither from this point of view does it follow that there is composition in God.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Relations that are ascribed to God in time, are in him not really but only logically: because real relation is where one thing really depends on another either simply or in a certain respect. Hence knowledge bears a real relation to what is knowable, whereas the relation of the thing knowable to knowledge is only logical according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 20). Since then God depends on no other being, but on the contrary all things depend on him, other things bear a real relation to God, while his relation to them is only logical, for the reason that our intelligence is unable to understand that A is related to B without conceiving a corresponding relation of B to A.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Plurality of Persons does not argue composition in God. The Persons may be considered in two ways. First, in reference to the Essence with which they are identical: so that there is no composition here. Secondly, in reference to one another, and thus they are regarded as mutually distinct not as united together: wherefore from this point of view again there is no composition: since every composition implies union.

Q. VII: ARTICLE II

IS GOD’S ESSENCE OR SUBSTANCE THE SAME AS HIS EXISTENCE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. III, AA. 3, 4]

THE second point of inquiry is whether God’s essence or substance is the same as his existence: and seemingly it is not.

1. Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 1, 3): “That God is, is evident to us; but what he is in substance and nature is utterly incomprehensible and

unknown.” Now the same thing cannot be both known and unknown. Therefore God’s existence is not the same as his substance or essence.

2. But it will be replied that God’s existence is unknown to us even as his substance, as regards what it is.

On the contrary, these two questions are different , Is he? and What is he? and we know the answer to the former, but not the answer to the latter, as evinced from the authority quoted. Therefore that which in God corresponds to the question Is he? is not the same as that which corresponds to the question What is he? and existence corresponds to the former question and substance or nature corresponds to the latter.

3. Again it will be replied that God’s existence is known not in itself but through its likeness in creatures.

On the contrary, in the creature there is existence and substance or nature, and since it has both from God it is likened to God in both, because an agent produces its like. If then God’s existence is known through the likeness of created existence, it follows that his substance is known through the likeness of created substance: and thus we would know not only that God is but also what he is.

4. A thing is said to differ from another by reason of its substance: nor can one thing differ from another by reason of that which is common to all things: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 3) that being should not be placed in a definition, since it would not differentiate the thing defined from another. Consequently the substance of a thing that is distinct from other things cannot be its being, since being is common to all things. Now God is something distinct from all other things. Therefore his being is not his substance.

5. Things are not distinct if they have not a distinct being. Now the being of A is not distinct from B’s being considered as being but considered as in this or that nature. Hence a being that is in a nature that is not distinct from its being will not be distinct from any other being: and thus it will follow, if God’s substance is his being, that he is the common being of all things.

6. Being to which no addition can be made is being common to all things. Now if God is his own being no additions can be made to his being; and then his being will be common to all. Consequently he can be predicated of everything, and will enter into the composition of everything: which is heretical and contrary to the statement of the Philosopher who says (De

Causis, prop. xx) that the first cause rules all things without being mingled with them.

7. Nothing that implies concretion should be said of a thing that is utterly simple. Now such is existence: for it would seem that existence is to essence as whiteness is to the white thing. Therefore we should not say that God's substance is his existence.

8. Boethius says (De Hebdom.): Whatsoever has being participates of that which is being, and thus has being; and participates of something else, and thus it is this or that thing. Now God has being. Therefore, besides his being, there is something else in him whereby he is a particular thing.

9. That which is most imperfect should not be ascribed to God who is most perfect. Now existence is most imperfect like primal matter: for just as primal matter may be determined by any form, so being, inasmuch as it is most imperfect, may be determinated by all the proper predicaments. Therefore as primal matter is not in God, so neither should existence be an attribute of the divine substance.

10. That which signifies something as an effect should not be ascribed to the first substance which has no beginning. Now such is existence, for every being has existence through its essential principles. Therefore it is unfitting to say that God's substance is its own existence.

11. A proposition is self-evident wherein a thing is predicated of itself. But if God's substance is its own existence, the subject and predicate will be identical in the proposition, God exists. Wherefore it will be a self-evident proposition; yet this is not true seemingly, since it can be demonstrated. Therefore God's existence is not his substance.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. vii): In God existence is not an accident but subsisting truth. Now that which is subsisting is the substance of a thing. Therefore God's existence is his substance.

Again, Rabbi Moses says that "God is a being but not in an essence, is living but not with life, is powerful but not with power, wise but not with wisdom." Therefore in God essence is not distinct from existence.

Again, a thing is properly denominated from what it is since the name of a thing denotes its essence and quiddity (Metaph. iv). Now of all God's names He who is (Exod. iv) is the most appropriate to him. Hence as this name, is given to him in respect of his existence, it would seem that God's very existence is his essence.

I answer that in God there is no distinction between existence and essence. In order to make this clear we must observe that when several causes producing various effects produce one effect in common in addition to their various effects, they must needs produce this common effect by virtue of some higher cause to which this effect properly belongs. The reason for this is that since a proper effect is produced by a particular cause in respect of its, proper nature or form, different causes having different natures and forms must needs have their respective different proper effects: so that if they have one effect in common, this is not the proper effect of any one of them, but of some higher cause by whose virtue they act: thus pepper, ginger and the like which differ in characteristics have the common effect of producing heat; yet each one has its peculiar effect differing from the effects of the others. Hence we must trace their common effect to a higher cause, namely fire to whom that effect properly belongs. Likewise in the heavenly movements each planet has its peculiar movement, and besides this they have all a common movement which must be the proper movement of some higher sphere that causes them all to revolve with the daily movement. Now all created causes have one common effect which is being, although each one has its peculiar effect whereby they are differentiated: thus heat makes a thing to be hot, and a builder gives being to a house. Accordingly they have this in common that they cause being, but they differ in that fire causes fire, and a builder causes a house. There must therefore be some cause higher than all other by virtue of which they all cause being and whose proper cause is being: and this cause is God, Now the proper effect of any cause proceeds therefrom in likeness to its nature. Therefore being must be the essence or nature of God. For this reason it is stated in De Causis (prop. ix) that none but a divine intelligence gives being, and that being is the first of all effects, and that nothing was created before it.

Reply to the First Objection. ‘Being’ and ‘is’ maybe taken in two ways (Metaph. x, 13, 14). Sometimes they signify the essence of a thing and the act of being, and sometimes they denote the truth of a proposition even in things that have no being: thus we say that blindness is because it is true that a man is blind. Accordingly when Damascene says that God’s existence is evident to us, the existence of God is taken in the second sense and not the first. For in the first sense God’s existence is the same as his essence, and as his essence is unknown so also is his existence. In the second sense we know that God is, because we conceive this proposition in our mind from his effects.

This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. God’s being which is his essence is not universal being, but being distinct from all other being: so that by his very being God is distinct from every other being.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated in De Causis (prop. iv) God’s being is individualised and distinct from every other being by the very fact that it is self-subsistent being, and is not something additional to a nature that is distinct from its being. Now every other being that is not subsistent must be individualised by the nature and essence that subsists in that being: and of such beings it is true that the being of A is distinct from the being of B by the fact that it is the being of another nature: even so if there were one heat existing of itself without matter or subject, by that very fact it would be distinct from every other heat, just as heats existing in a subject are not differentiated otherwise than by their subjects.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Being to which no addition is made is universal being, though the possibility of addition thereto is not incompatible with the notion of universal being: whereas the divine being is being to which no addition can be made and this enters into the very notion of the divine being: wherefore the divine being is not universal being. Thus by adding the difference rational to animal in general we do not add anything to the notion of animal in general: and yet it is not incompatible with the idea of animal in general that an addition to it be possible: for this enters into the notion of irrational animal which is a species of animal.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The mode of signification of the names we give things is consequent upon our mode of understanding: for names signify the concepts of our intellect (Peri Herm. i). Now our intellect understands ,being according to the mode in which it finds it in things here below from which it gathers its knowledge, and wherein being is not subsistent but inherent. Now our reason tells us that there is a self-subsistent being: wherefore although the term being has a signification by way of concretion, yet our intellect in ascribing being to God soars above the mode of its signification, and ascribes to God the thing signified, but not the mode of signification.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The saying of Boethius refers to things that have being by participation and not by their essence: since that which has being by its essence, if we stress the terms' should be described as being itself rather than as that which has being.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Being, as we understand it here, signifies the highest perfection of all: and the proof is that act is always more perfect than potentiality. Now no signate form is understood to be in act unless it be supposed to have being. Thus we may take human nature or fiery nature as existing potentially in matter, or as existing in the power of an agent, or even as in the mind: but when it has being it becomes actually existent. Wherefore it is clear that being as we understand it here is the actuality of all acts, and therefore the perfection of all perfections. Nor may we think that being, in this sense, can have anything added to it that is more formal and determines it as act determines potentiality: because being in this latter sense is essentially distinct from that to which it is added and whereby it is determined. But nothing that is outside the range of being can be added to being: for nothing is outside its range except non-being, which can be neither form nor matter. Hence being is not determined by something else as potentiality by act but rather as act by potentiality: since in defining a form we include its proper matter instead of the difference: thus we define a soul as the act of an organic physical body. Accordingly this being is distinct from that being inasmuch as it is the being of this or that nature. For this reason Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that though things having life excel those that merely have being, yet being excels life, since living things have not only life but also being.

Reply to the Tenth Objection'. The order of agents follows the order of ends, in that the last end corresponds to the first agent and in due proportion other ends to other agents in their order. Take, for example, the ruler of a state, the commander of the army and a private soldier: the ruler is clearly the first in the order of agents; at whose orders the commander goes forth to the war; and under him is the private soldier who engages in hand-to-hand combat at the orders of his commander. Now the end of the, private soldier is to overthrow his opponent, and this is directed yet further to the victory of the army, which is the end of the commander-in-chief; and this again is directed to the welfare of the state or kingdom, which is the end of the ruler or king. Accordingly being which is the proper effect and end of the operation of the first agent must occupy the position of last end. Now although the end is first in the intention, it is last in execution, and is the effect of other causes. Therefore created being, which is the proper effect corresponding to the first agent, is caused from other principles, and yet the first cause of being is the first principle of all.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. A proposition may be self-evident in itself and yet not self-evident to this or that individual; when, to wit, the predicate belongs to the definition of the subject, which definition is unknown to him: thus if he knew not what is a whole, he would not know this proposition, A whole is greater than its part. The reason is that such propositions become known when their terms are known (Poster. Anal. i). Now this proposition, God is, is in itself self-evident, since the same idea is expressed in both subject and predicate: but with regard to us it is not self-evident, because we know not what God is: so that for us it needs to be proved, though not for those who see God in his essence.

Q. VII: ARTICLE III

IS GOD CONTAINED IN A GENUS?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. III, A. 5]

THE third point of inquiry is whether God is contained in a genus: and seemingly he is.

1. Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): Substance inn God denotes the common species of the three Persons like in species: hypostasis signifies an individual, for instance the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, Peter or Paul. Thus God is compared to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as a species to individuals. Now wherever there is a species with individuals, there is a genus: since the species is composed of genus and difference. Therefore seemingly God is contained in a genus.

2. Things which are in no way different are identical. But God is not identical with other things: therefore in some way he is different from them. Now that which is different from something else differs therefrom by some difference. Therefore there is a difference in God, whereby he differs from other things. But it is not an accidental difference, since nothing in God is accidental, as Boethius says (De Trin.). And every substantial difference

makes a division of a genus. Therefore God is contained in a genus. Things may be the same either in genus, or in species, or in individual (Topic. i, 6). Therefore things may also differ in these ways, since if one of two opposites admits of multiplicity, the other does so too. Therefore God is distinct from a creature either in individual only, or in number and species, in which case he will be in the same genus as the creature, and consequently will be contained in a genus: or he will differ from the creature in genus, and then he will be in another genus from the creature: because diversity results from numbers, so that difference of genus implies a number of genera. Therefore in any case God must be contained in a genus.

4. Anything to which the generic difference of substance applies belongs to the genus (of substance). Now the generic difference of substance is self-subsistence, which is most applicable to God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

5. Anything that can be defined must be in a genus. Now God can be defined, for he is said to be pure act. Therefore God is contained in a genus.

6. Whatsoever is predicated of another essentially and of other things besides, is compared to that thing either as its species or as its genus. Now all things predicated of God are predicated of him essentially, since all the predicaments when applied to God refer to his essence, as Boethius says (De Trin.). And it is clear that they are applicable not only to God but to other things besides. Therefore they are compared to God either as the species to the individual, or as the genus to its species, and in either case God must be contained in a genus.

7. A thing is measured by a measure of its own genus (Metaph. x). Now according to the Commentator (ibid.) God is the measure of all substances. Therefore God is in the same genus as other substances.

On the contrary whatsoever is contained in a genus contains something in addition to the genus, and therefore is composite. But God is utterly simple. Therefore he is not contained in a genus.

Moreover, whatsover is contained in a genus can be defined, or else comprised under something that is defined. But this cannot apply to God since he is infinite. Therefore he is not in a genus.

I answer that God is not contained in a genus, and for the nonce this may be proved by three arguments. The first argument is that nothing is assigned to a genus by reason of its being but by reason of its quiddity; and this is clear from the fact that the being of a thing is proper to that thing and distinct from the being of anything else: whereas the essence may be common. Hence the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, 3) says that being is not a genus. Now God is Being itself: wherefore he cannot be in a genus.

The second reason is that although matter is not a genus nor form a difference, nevertheless the notion of the genus is taken from the matter, and the notion of the difference from the form: for instance, in man the sensible nature whence he derives his animality is material in relation to his reason whence derives the difference of rationality. For an animal is that which has a sensitive nature, and a rational being is one that has reason. Hence in everything that is contained in a genus there must be composition of matter and form, or of act and potentiality: and this cannot be in God who is pure act as we have shown (A. 1). Therefore he cannot be in a genus. The third reason is that as God is simply perfect he contains the perfections of all genera: for this is what is meant by being simply perfect (Metaph. v). Now that which is contained in a genus is confined within the limits of that genus. Wherefore God cannot be in a genus: for in that case his essence would not be infinite nor absolutely perfect, but his essence and perfection would be confined within the limits of a definite genus.

Hence it is also evident that God is neither a species nor an individual, nor is there difference in him. Nor can he be defined, since every definition is taken from the genus and species. Wherefore neither can we demonstrate anything about him save from his effects, since the middle proposition of an a priori demonstration is a definition.

Reply to the First Objection. Damascene uses the word species metaphorically and not in the strict sense. God’s name (i.e. God) is like a species in that it is predicated essentially of several distinct individuals: but it cannot be called a species strictly speaking, since a species is not identically the same in each individual but only logically: whereas the same identical divine essence is common to the three Persons: wherefore Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God, but Peter, Paul and Mark are not one man.

Reply to the Second Objection. A distinction is to be noted between difference and diversity according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x). Diversity is absolute and is applied to things which are not the same: whereas difference is relative, since that which is different differs in a certain respect. Accordingly if we take the term different strictly, it is not true that things which are in no way different are the same: but if we take the term different in a broad sense it is true: and in this sense we grant that God differs from other things. It does not follow, however, that he differs by reason of a difference, but that he differs from other things by reason of his essence: for this must needs be the case in first principles and simple things. Thus man differs from a donkey by the difference of rationality: but rationality is not distinguished from a donkey by a still further difference (since thus there would be no end to the process), for it differs therefrom by itself.

Reply to the Third Objection. God is said to be diverse in genus from the creature, not as though he were contained mi another genus, but because he is altogether outside a genus.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. According to Avicenna (Metaph. iii, 8) substance is not rightly defined as a self-subsistent being: for being cannot be the genus of a thing according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii, 3), because nothing can be added to being that has not a share of being, and a difference should not be a part of the genus. If, however, substance can be defined notwithstanding that it is the most universal of genera, its definition will be a thing whose quiddity is competent to have being not in a subject. Hence the definition of substance cannot be applied to God, whose quiddity is not distinct from his being. Wherefore God is not contained in the genus of substance but is above all substance.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. God cannot be defined: because whatsoever is defined is comprehended by the intellect of him that defines it; and God is incomprehensible to the intellect. Hence it is not a definition of God when we say that he is pure act.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. It is essential to a genus that it be predicated univocally. Now nothing can be predicated univocally of God and the creature, as we shall prove further on (A. 7). Hence although things predicated of God are predicated of him substantially they are not predicated of him generically.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Although God does not belong to the genus of substance as contained in a genus, as a species or an individual is contained in a genus: yet we may say that he is in the genus of substance by reduction as its principle, even as a point is in the genus of continuous quantity, and unity in the genus of number. In this way he is the measure of all substances, as unity is the measure of all numbers.

Q. VII: ARTICLE IV

DO ‘GOOD,’ WISE,’ ‘JUST’ AND THE LIKE PREDICATE AN ACCIDENT IN GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. III, A. 6: XIII, 6]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether good, wise, just and the like predicate an accident in God: and it would appear that they do.

1. A predicate that signifies not the substance but something consequent upon the nature of a thing is an accidental predicate. Now Damascene (De Fide Orthod.) says that good, just and holy when said of God, are consequent to his nature and do not signify his essence. Therefore they predicate an accident in God.

2. But it was replied that Damascene is referring to the .mode of signification of these terms.

On the contrary, a mode of signification that results from the generic nature must have a real foundation: since when the predicate of a proposition is a genus it denotes the substance of the subject, for it is an essential predication. Now the mode of signification of the terms in question is consequent upon the nature in respect of the genus: for they are in the genus of quality, which by its very nature bears a relation to the subject: for a quality is whereby we are disposed in this or that way (quales). Therefore this mode of signification must be based on a reality; in other words the things signified by these words are consequent upon the nature of the thing of which they are predicated and therefore accidents.

3. But it will be said that these terms are not predicated of God in reference to their genus, which is quality; because the expressions we apply to God are not to be taken in their strict sense.

On the contrary, the species is falsely predicated of that which is not included in the genus: thus if a thing is not an animal it is untrue to say that it is a man. If then the genus of the aforesaid, which is quality, is not predicated of God, these terms will be not only improperly but also falsely predicated of God: and consequently it will be untrue to say that God is just or holy: and this cannot be admitted. Therefore we must conclude that these terms are predicated of God accidentally.

4. According to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 2) that which really has being, namely substance, is never an accident: wherefore in like manner a per se accident is always. an accident. Now justice, wisdom and the like are per se accidents. Therefore in God also they are accidents.

1 5. Whatsoever we find in created things is copied from God who is the exemplary form of all things. Now wisdom, justice and so on are accidents in creatures. Therefore they are accidents in God.

6. Wherever there is quantity and quality there is accident. Now in God, seemingly, there is quantity and quality: because in him there is likeness and equality: thus we say that the Son is like and equal to the Father: and likeness is oneness in quality, and equality is oneness in quantity. Therefore there are accidents in God.

7. A thing is measured by the first of its genus. Now God is the measure not only of substances but also of all accidents, since he is the creator of both substance and accident. Therefore in God there is not only substance but also accidents.

8. If A can be understood apart from B, B is accidental to A. Thus Porphyry (Praedic. cap. de accidente) proves that things which are separable are accidents, since we can conceive a white crow, and a white Ethiopian. Now it is possible to conceive God apart from goodness, according to Boethius; (De Hebd.). Therefore goodness denotes an accident in God, and for the same reason the others.

9. Two things should be considered in the meaning of a name, namely that from which it is taken and the thing to which it is given: and in both respects this term ‘wisdom’ would appear to denote an accident. For it is taken from the fact that it makes a man wise, which seemingly is the act of wisdom; while the thing to which it is given is a quality. Therefore in every respect this and similar terms signify an accident in the subject of which they are predicated: and therefore it is an accident in God.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that God, inasmuch as he is a simple form, cannot be a subject. Now every accident is in a subject. Therefore there can be no accident in God.

Moreover every accident is dependent on something else. But no such thing can be in God, since that which is dependent must have a cause: and

God is the first cause and has no cause whatsoever. Therefore no accidents can be in God.

Again, Rabbi Moses says that in God suchlike terms do not signify tendencies in addition to his substance. Now every accident denotes a tendency in addition to the substance of its subject. Therefore these terms do not denote accidents in God.

Again, an accident is something that can be present or absent without the destruction of its subject. But this is impossible in God, since he is unchangeable, as proved by the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 5). Therefore accidents cannot be in God.

I answer that without any doubt whatever we must hold that there are no accidents in God. For our present purpose it will suffice to prove this by three arguments.

The first argument is that no nature, essence or form can receive the addition of something extraneous: although that which has a nature, form or essence can receive something extraneous thereto, thus humanity contains nothing but what belongs intrinsically to humanity. This is clear from the fact that if anything be added to or subtracted from definitions which indicate the essence of a thing, the species is changed, as is the case with numbers, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. viii). Man, however, who has humanity, can have something else which is not contained in the notion of humanity, such as whiteness and the like which are not humanity but in the man. Now in every creature there is a distinction between the one who has a thing and the thing which he has. In composite creatures there is a twofold difference; since the supposite or individual has the nature of its species —thus a man has humanity—and also has being: for a man is neither humanity nor is he his own being. Wherefore a man can have an accident, but his humanity or his being cannot. In simple substances there is only one difference, that namely between essence and existence. Thus in the angels every supposite is his own nature, since the quiddity of a simple being is the simple being itself according to Avicenna (Metaph. v), but it is not its own being, so that the quiddity subsists in its own being. In these substances therefore there can be an intelligible but not a material accident. On the other hand in God there is no distinction between haver and the thing had, or between participator. and the thing participated: indeed he is both his own nature and his own being, wherefore nothing in him can be adventitious or accidental. This argument is apparently indicated by Boethius (De Hebd.) when he says: “That which has being can have something in addition to its being: but that which is being, has nothing besides itself.”

The second reason is that since an accident is extraneous to the essence of its subject, and things that are diverse are not united together save by some cause, it follows, if any accident accrue to God, that this is due to some cause. It cannot, however, be due to some extrinsic cause, since it would follow that this extrinsic cause acts on God, and is previous to him, even as the mover precedes that Which is moved and the maker that which is made: for an accident is produced in a subject by an extrinsic cause acting on the subject in which the accident is produced. Again it cannot be due to an intrinsic cause as happens with per se accidents whose cause is in their subject. For a subject cannot both cause and receive an accident on the same count, since no power moves itself into action: wherefore it must receive the accident on one count, and cause it on another, and thus it will be composite: thus certain things receive an accident on account of their matter, and cause it on account of the nature of their form. Now we have shown (A. i) that God is not composite. Therefore no accident can possibly be in him.

The third argument is that accident is compared to subject as act to potentiality, since it is a kind of form thereof. Wherefore since God is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, he cannot be the subject of an accident.

Accordingly from the foregoing we conclude that in God there is not composition of matter and form or of any essential parts, nor of genus and difference, nor of subject and accidents: and that the aforesaid terms do not predicate an accident in God.

Reply to the First Objection. Damascene is speaking of these names not as to what they predicate of God, but as to the reason why we predicate them of him. For we take these terms on account of their signification from certain accidental forms that we observe in creatures. In fact from this it is his intention to show that the expressions employed by us in speaking of God do not signify his essence.

Reply to the Second Objection. Although quality is the genus of human goodness, wisdom and justice, it is not their genus if we take them as predicated of God, because quality as such is a being forasmuch as it qualifies the subject in which it is. But wisdom and justice are denominated not from this but rather from a certain perfection or act: wherefore such things are predicated of God by reason of their difference and not of their genus. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. v, i): As far as we can, let us conceive goodness that is not a quality, and greatness that is not a quantity. —Wherefore we cannot conclude that such things are consequent to God's nature.

Refily to the Third Objection. If good and just were predicated of God univocally, it would indeed follow that their predication is false if we do not predicate their genus of him: but as we shall show further on (A. 7) nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The wisdom that is an accident is not in God: his is another wisdom not univocally so called: hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The exemplate is not always a perfect reproduction of the exemplar; so that sometimes the exemplate reproduces defectively and imperfectly that which is in the exemplar: especially is this the case in exemplates that are taken from God who is an exemplar surpassing all proportion of the creature.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Likeness and equality are ascribed to God not as though there were quality and quantity in him, but because we ascribe to him certain things which imply quality and quantity in us: for instance, when we say that God is great, wise, and so forth.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Accidents are not beings save in relation to substance as the first being: wherefore we infer that accidents are measured by some first thing that is not an accident, but a substance.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. If we understand a thing in its essence then it is true that anything which does not enter into that consideration is accidental: since given that we understand it in its essence, we must needs understand whatsoever pertains to its essence; thus if we understand what a man is, we must needs understand what is an animal. Here, however, we do not see God in his essence, but consider him in his effects. Wherefore nothing prevents us from considering him in his effect that is being, without considering him in his effect that is goodness; and this is what Boethius intends to say. Yet it must be observed that although we may understand

God somewhat without understanding his goodness; we cannot understand God and understand that he is not good—thus we cannot understand man and understand that he is not an animal—for this would be to deny God's essence which is goodness. On the other hand the saints in heaven who see God in his essence, by seeing God see his goodness.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The term wisdom in its application to God is true as regards that from which it is taken. It is not taken, however, from the fact that it makes a man wise, but from its being a habit perfecting the intellect. For knowledge as such is referred to the thing known, whereas as an accident it is referred to the knower: and the possession of wisdom is accidental to man but not to God.

Q. VII: ARTICLE V

DO THESE TERMS SIGNIFY THE DIVINE ESSENCE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIII, A. 12]

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether these terms signify the divine essence: and seemingly they do not.

1. Damascene says (De Fide Orthod. i, 4): We must not think that the terms we employ in speaking of God denote what he is in his substance: rather do they indicate what he is not, or some kind of relationship, or something to be excluded from him, or else such things as are consequent to his nature or action. Now the being that is predicated of a thing substantially denotes what that thing's substance is. Therefore these terms are not predicated of God substantially as indicating his essence.

2. No term that signifies the essence of a thing can truly be denied of that thing. For Dionysius says (Col. Hier. ii) that "negations about God are true, but affirmations are vague." Therefore these terms do not signify God's essence.

3. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) these expressions signify the outpouring of divine goodness into things. But God does not pour out his substance on things. Therefore such expressions do not signify the divine essence.

4. Origen says that God is called wise because he fills us with wisdom, Now this denotes not the divine essence but a divine effect. Therefore these

terms do not signify the divine essence.

5. The first cause is denominated only from its first effect (De Causis, prop. xvi) which is the intelligence. Now when a cause is denominated from its effect, the predication connotes not the essence but the cause. Therefore expressions that are ascribed to God do not predicate his essence but his causality.

6. Words signify the concepts of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). Now we are unable to understand the divine essence; since as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) we know not what he is but that he is. Therefore we cannot give him a name nor employ words to express his essence.

7. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) all things participate of the divine goodness. But all do not participate of the divine essence which is only in the three Persons. Therefore God’s goodness does not denote his essence.

8. We cannot know God except from his likeness in creatures: thus the Apostle says (Rom. i, 20) that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made. Now we name him according as we know him. Therefore we do not name him except from his likeness in creatures. But when we name a thing from its likeness to another, such a name is predicated of it not essentially but metaphorically: inasmuch, as it is said secondly of God and first of the thing whence the simile is taken: whereas that which signifies the essence of a thing is said of that thing first.

9. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii) that which signifies the essence, denotes that and nothing else. Wherefore if this word good signifies the divine essence, there win be nothing in the divine essence that is not signified thereby: even so there is nothing in the essence of man that is not signified by this word man. But this word good does not signify wisdom: so that wisdom will not be the divine essence, and for the same reason neither will the other terms. Therefore all these words cannot possibly signify the divine essence.

10. As quantity is the cause of equality, and quality the cause of likeness, so is essence the cause of identity. If then all these expressions signify God’s essence, they would no longer indicate equality or likeness but rather identity between God and us: so that a creature might be identified with

God from the fact that it imitates his wisdom, goodness and so forth: and this is absurd.

li. Nothing can be contrary to nature in God who is the source of all nature: nor does he anything contrary to nature according to the (ordinary) gloss on Romans xi, 24: Contrary to nature thou wert grafted. Now it is contrary to nature that an accident be substance. Since then wisdom, justice and the like are per se accidents, they cannot be substance in God.

12. When we say that God is good, good is a complex term. But there would be no complexity if God's goodness were his very substance. Therefore seemingly good does not denote God's substance; and the same reason applies to all similar expressions.

13. Augustine says that God eludes every conception of our intelligence, so that it cannot grasp him. But this would not be so if these terms signified the divine essence, since God would correspond to a conception of our intellect. Therefore they do nobt signify the divine essence.

14. Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that man is best united to God by realising that in knowing God he knows nothing about him. But this would not be so if these ideas and expressions of man's reflected God's very essence. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 7): In God to be is to be mighty, or wise; such is his simplicity that whatsoever you may say of him is his essence.

Again, Boethius says (De Trin.) that under whatsoever predicament, except relation, we predicate things of God they all refer to his essence: thus although just apparently indicates a quality, it signifies his essence: the same applies to great and so forth.

Again all things that are ascribed to another by way of participation presuppose one to whom they are ascribed per se and essentially. Now these expressions are applied to creatures by way of participation. Since then they are reduced to God as their first cause, it follows that they are said of God essentially, and thus it follows that they signify his essence.

I answer that some have maintained, and Rabbi Moses most emphatically, that these terms when predicated of God do not signify the divine essence. He says in effect that these expressions are to be taken in reference to God in two ways. First, as indicating a likeness of effect: and that God is said to be wise, not that wisdom is something in him, but because in his effects he acts like a wise man, namely by directing each one to its due end; again that he is said to be a living God inasmuch as he acts like a living being, in that he acts of himself. Secondly, by way of negation: so that when we say God lives we do not mean that life is something in him, but that God has not that mode of existence which is in things inanimate. Likewise when we say that God is an intelligent being, we do not mean that intelligence is really in him, but that he has not that mode of existence whereby dumb animals exist: and so on. In either case, however, this explanation is apparently insufficient and objectionable. The first, for two reasons. First, because according to this explanation there, would be no difference in saying God is wise, or God is angry or God is a fire: since he is said to be angry because he acts like an angry man by punishing; for angry men are wont to act thus. Also he is said to be a fire, because he acts like fire when he cleanses, and fire does this in his own way. Now this is contrary to the view taken by the saints and prophets in speaking of God: since certain things they affirm of him and deny others: for they assert that he is living, wise and the like, and deny that he is a body or subject to passions. But in the opinion we are discussing anything may be said or denied of God with equal reason. The second reason is that since, as our faith teaches and as he also grants, creatures have not’ always existed, it follows that we could not say that God was wise or good before the existence of creatures. For it is evident that before creatures existed he did nothing as regards his effects, neither as good nor as wise. Now this is altogether contrary to sound faith: unless perhaps he meant to say that before the existence of creatures God would be called wise, not that he worked as being wise, but because he could do so: and then it would follow that wisdom denotes something in God and consequently is his essence, since whatsoever is in. God is his essence. The second explanation appears likewise to be unsatisfactory: because there is not a specific term that does not exclude from God some mode of being that is unbecoming to him. For every specific term includes the difference whereby the opposite species is excluded: thus the term lion includes the difference quadruped which differentiates a lion from a bird. Accordingly if predicates about God were employed merely for the purpose of exclusion, just as we say that God is living because, according to him (Rabbi Moses), God has not being in the same way as inanimate creatures: even so might we say that God is a lion because he has not the mode of being of a bird. Moreover the idea of negation is always based on an affirmation: as evinced by the fact that every negative proposition is proved by an affirmative: wherefore unless the human mind knew something positively about God, it would be unable to deny anything about him. And it would know nothing if nothing that it affirmed about God were positively verified about him. Hence following Dionysius (Div. Nom. xiii) we must hold that these terms signify the divine essence, albeit defectively and imperfectly: the proof of which is as follows.

Since every agent acts inasmuch as it is actual and consequently produces its like, the form of the thing produced must in some manner be in the agent: in different ways, however. When the effect is proportionate to the power of the agent, this form must be of the same kind in the maker and the thing made: for then maker and thing made are of the same species, and this is the case in all univocal causes: thus man begets a man, and fire generates fire. When, however, the effect is improportionate to the power of the cause, the form is not of the same kind in both maker and thing made, but is in the agent in a more eminent way. Because according as the form is in the agent, the latter has the power to produce the effect: so that if the whole power of the agent is not reflected in the thing made, it follows that the form is in the maker in a more eminent way than in the thing made. This is the case in all equivocal agents, for instance when the sun generates fire. Now it is plain that no effect equals the power of the first agent which is God, else only one effect would proceed from his one power. But seeing that from his one power many and various effects proceed, it is evident that every effect of his falls short of the power of its cause. Consequently no form of a divine effect is in the effect in the same degree as in God: and yet they must needs be in him in a more eminent way. Wherefore all forms which in the various effects are distinct and different from one another are united in him as in one common power: even so all the forms produced by the power of the sun in this lower world are in the sun in respect of its one power, to which all things generated by the sun’s action are assimilated as regards their forms. In like manner the perfections of creatures are assimilated to God in respect of his one simple essence. Since then our intellect takes its knowledge from creatures, it is informed with the likenesses of perfections observed in creatures, namely of wisdom, power, goodness and so forth. Wherefore just as creatures by their perfections are somewhat, albeit deficiently, like God, even so our intellect is informed with the species of these perfections. Now whenever an intellect is by its intelligible form assimilated to a thing, that which it conceives and affirms in accordance with that intelligible species is true of that thing to which it is assimilated by its species: inasmuch as knowledge is assimilation of the mind to the thing known. Hence it follows that whatsoever the intellect informed with the species of these perfections conceives or asserts about God, truly exists in God who corresponds to each one of these species inasmuch as they are all like him. Now if such an intelligible species of our intellect were equal to God in its likeness to him, our intellect would comprehend him, and the intellect's conception would be a perfect definition of God, just as a walking animal biped is a perfect definition of a man. However, this species does not perfectly reflect the divine essence, as stated above, and therefore although these terms which our intellect attributes to God from such conceptions signify the divine essence, they do not signify it perfectly as it exists in itself, but as it is conceived by us.

Accordingly we conclude that each of these terms signifies the divine essence, not comprehensively but imperfectly. Wherefore this name He Who Is is most becoming to God, since it does not ascribe any particular form to God, but signifies being without any limitation. This is the meaning of Damascene (De Fide Orthod. i, 12) when he says that the name He Who Is denotes “a boundless sea of substance.” This solution of the question is confirmed by the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. i): Since all things are comprised in the Godhead simply and without limit, it is fitting that he should be praised and named on account of them all. Simply because the perfections which are in creatures by reason of various forms are ascribed to God in reference to his simple essence: without limit, because no perfection found in creatures is equal to the divine essence, so as to enable the mind under the head of that perfection to define God as he is in himself. A further confirmation may be found in Metaph. v, where it is stated that the simply perfect is that which contains the perfections of all genera: which words the Commentator expounds as referring to God.

Reply to the First Objection. Damascene means to say that these expressions do not signify what God is by defining and including his essence as it were: wherefore he goes on to say that this name He Who Is which denotes God’s essence indefinitely is most becomingly ascribed to God.

Reply to the Second Objection. Although Dionysius says that there is truth in denying these expressions of God he does not say that there is untruth in affirming them, but that their signification is vague: because as regards the thing signified they are truly ascribed to God, since in a way it is in him, as we have shown. But as regards their mode of signification they can be denied of God, since each of these terms denotes a definite form, and in this way they are not ascribed to God as we have already stated. Wherefore absolutely speaking they can be denied of God, because they are not becoming to him in the way signified: since this mode is according to the way in which they are in our intellect, as already stated, whereas they are becoming to God in a more eminent way. For this reason the affirmation of them is described as vague as being not altogether fitting on account of the difference of mode. Hence, according to the teaching of Dionysius (Myst. Theol. i; Coel. Hier. ii; Div. Nom. ii, iii), these terms are applied to God in three ways. First, affirmatively: for instance, God is wise: since we must needs say this of God because in him there is a likeness to the wisdom that derives from him.—Nevertheless seeing that wisdom in God is not such as that which we understand and name, it can be truly denied, so that we may say: God is not wise.—Again, since wisdom is not denied of God as though he were lacking in wisdom, but because in him it transcends the wisdom e indicate and name, we ought to say that God is super-wise. Accordingly Dionysius explains perfectly by these three ways of ascribing wisdom to God, how these expressions are to be applied to God.

Reply to the Third Objection. These expressions are said to denote the divine outpourings, because they are first employed to signify these outpourings as existing in creatures, while from the likeness thereof to God the human mind is led to ascribe the same expressions to God in a higher degree.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The saying of Origen does not mean that when we say God is wise, the sense is that God is the cause of wisdom; but that as we have explained from the wisdom which he causes our intellect is led to ascribe supereminent wisdom to God.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. When we say that God is intelligence, we name him after his effect. But a name that signifies the essence of his effect cannot be applied to him definitively in the same way as it signifies that essence. Wherefore this name, although it is applicable to him in a way, is not applicable as his name: since that which a name signifies is the definition. On the other hand it is applicable to the effect as its name.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument proves that we cannot give God a name that defines or includes or equals his essence since we do not know to that extent what God is.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. just as all things participate in God's goodness not in identity but in likeness thereto so also do they participate in a likeness of God's being. But there is a difference: for goodness implies the relationship of cause, since good is self-diffusive: whereas being connotes mere existence and quiescence.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. An effect includes something whereby it is like its cause, and something whereby it differs therefrom: and this by reason of its matter or something of the kind. Take for example a brick hardened by fire: the clay is heated by the fire and thus becomes like the fire: then it is condensed and hardened, and this is due to the nature of the material. Accordingly if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick is likened to it, it will be ascribed to it properly in a more eminent degree and with priority: because fire is hotter than the brick: and it is hot in a more eminent way, since the brick is hot by being made hot, while the fire is hot by nature. On the other hand if we ascribe to the fire that wherein the brick differs from the fire, it will be untrue, and any term that signifies this condition of dissimilarity cannot be said of fire unless metaphorically. Thus it is false to say that fire, the most subtle of bodies, is dense. It can, however, be described as hard on account of the violence of its action, and the difficulty to quench it. Accordingly in creatures there are certain perfections whereby they are likened to God, and which as regards the thing signified do not denote any imperfection, such as being, life, understanding and so forth: and these are ascribed to God properly, in fact they are ascribed to him first and in a more eminent way than to creatures. And there are in creatures certain perfections wherein they differ from God, and which the creature owes to its being made from nothing, such as potentiality, privation, movement and the like. These are falsely ascribed to God: and whatsoever terms imply suchlike conditions cannot be ascribed to God otherwise than metaphorically, for instance lion, stone and so on, inasmuch as matter is included in their definition. They are, however, ascribed to him metaphorically by reason of a likeness in their effects.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. This argument considers that which signifies substance definitively and comprehensively: but none of these expressions denote the divine essence thus, as stated above.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although these perfections; in God are his very substance, they are not the very substance of the creature, wherefore in their respect the creature is not said to be the same as God but like him.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. It would be contrary to nature if wisdom in God were of the same kind as that which is an accident: but this is not the case as we have already stated. Nor is the authority quoted to the point: for God makes nothing against nature in himself, because he makes nothing in himself.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. When we say God is good, this term good is complex not as reflecting any composition in God, but on account of the composition in our intellect.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. God eludes the conception of our intellect because he transcends all that our mind conceives of him; but not so that our intellect is in no intelligible way likened to him.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is because human intelligence is not equal to the divine essence that this same divine essence surpasses our intelligence and is unknown to us: wherefore man reaches the highest point of his knowledge about God when he knows that he knows him not, inasmuch as he knows that that which is God transcends whatsoever he conceives of him.

Q. VII: ARTICLE VI

ARE THESE TERMS SYNONYMOUS?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIII, A. 4: C.G. I, 35]

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether these terms are synonymous: and apparently they are.

1. Synonyms are terms that have exactly the same meaning. Now all these terms when applied to God signify the same thing: for they denote the

divine essence, which is altogether simple and one, as we have proved. Therefore, these terms are all synonymous.

2. Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i. ii) that in God A things are one except ingenerability, generation and procession. Now terms that signify the same are synonymous. Therefore all the terms applied to God, except those that signify personal properties are synonyms.

3. Things that are identical with one and the same thing are identical with one another. Now in God wisdom is identical with his substance, and so also are his will and his power. Wherefore in God wisdom, power and will are absolutely the same thing: and thus these terms are synonymous.

4. It will be replied that these terms signify one thing indeed, but from different points of view, and therefore are not synonyms.—On the contrary a point of view that has no objective reality is untrue and futile: so that if there are many such points of view, while the thing itself is only one, it would seem that these points of view are futile and false.

5. But someone will reply that these points of view are not futile, since something in God corresponds to them.—On the contrary creatures are likened to God inasmuch as they were made by him in likeness to his idea. Now plurality of ideas or points of view does not connote a plurality of relations in God to the creature: since by his essence he is the idea of all things. Neither then does anything in the divine essence correspond to the points of view from which we describe God from his likeness to his creatures.

6. That which is supremely one cannot be the root and foundation of multitude. Now the divine essence is supremely one. Therefore it cannot be the root and foundation of the different points of view of these expressions.

7. Difference of relations that are really in God, causes a distinction of Persons. If then something in God corresponds to the mutual relations of the attributes there would be a number of persons corresponding to the number of attributes: and thus there would be more than three persons in God which is heretical. Wherefore seemingly these expressions are altogether synonymous.

On the contrary it is futile to put words together that are synonymous, for instance, clothes and garments. If then these words are synonymous it will be futile to say God is good, God is wise: but this is not so.

Again, to deny one synonym about anything is to deny the others. Yet some have denied God’s power without denying his knowledge or goodness. Therefore these words are not synonymous.

Again, this is proved from the Commentator who says (Metaph. xi) that these expressions when applied to God are not synonymous.

I answer that all those who have considered the question are agreed in saying that these terms are not synonymous. This view offers no difficulty to those who held that these expressions signify not God’s essence, but certain notions added to his essence, or modes of the divine action in its effects, or the denial of what they signify in creatures. But given that they signify the divine essence, as we have proved (A. 5), the question would seem to present considerable difficulty: since then we have all these terms with one simple signification, namely the divine essence. But it must be observed that the signification of a term does not refer to the thing immediately but through the medium of the mind: because words are the tokens of the soul’s impressions, and the conceptions of the mind. are images of things, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i).

Now terms may be hindered from being synonymous either by reason of the things signified, or on the part of the notion conveyed by the term and to signify which the term is employed. Wherefore the terms which are applied to God cannot be hindered from being synonymous by reason of their signifying different things, according to what has been said above, but only by the various aspects consequent to the conception of the mind. Hence the Commentator (Metaph. xi) says that multiplicity in God is, only according to differences in the intellect and not in being, and we express the same when we say that he is one in reality and many things logically. Now these various aspects which are in our mind cannot be such that nothing corresponds to them on the part of the thing:~ since the things which these aspects regard are ascribed to God by the mind. Wherefore if there were nothing in God, either in himself or in his effect, corresponding to these points of view, the intellect would be in error in attributing them to him, and all propositions expressive of such attributions would be false; which is inadmissible. Now there are certain aspects to which nothing corresponds in the thing understood: but the things thus conceived the mind does not attribute to things as they are in themselves, but only as they are understood: for example, the aspect of genus or species and other intellectual ‘intentions’; since in the things themselves that are outside the mind there is nothing that is a likeness of the notion of genus or species. And yet the intellect is not in error: for the things reflected by these notions, namely genus and species, are not attributed by the intellect to things as existing outside the mind but only as existing therein. Because just as the intellect understands things existing outside the mind, so does it, by reflecting on itself, understand that it understands them: wherefore just as the intellect has a conception or notion to which the thing as existing outside the mind corresponds, so has it a conception or notion to which the thing corresponds as,understood: for instance, to the notion or conception of a man there corresponds the thing outside the mind, while nothing but the thing as understood corresponds to the notion or conception of the genus or species. But it is impossible that such be the meaning of these expressions that are applied to God: for in that case the intellect would not attribute them to him as he is in himself but as he is understood: and this is plainly false; for when we say God is good, the sense would be that we think him to be so, but that he is not so in reality.

Accordingly some hold that the meanings of these terms connote various corresponding divine effects: for they maintain that when we say God is good, we indicate God’s essence together with a connoted effect, the sense being God is and causes goodness, so that the difference in these attributions arises from the difference in his effects. But this does not seem right: because seeing that an effect proceeds in likeness to its cause, we must needs understand a cause to be such before its effects are such. Wherefore God is not called wise because he is the cause of wisdom: but because he is wise, therefore does he cause wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Doct. Christ. ii, 32) that because God is good, therefore we exist, and inasmuch as we exist we are good. Moreover according to this view it would follow that these expressions are attributed to the creature before the Creator: just as health is attributed first to a healthy man and afterwards to that which gives health, since the latter is called healthy through being a cause of health.—Again if when we say God is good we mean nothing more than God is and is the cause of goodness, it would follow that we could equally predicate of him the names of all the divine effects, for instance, that God is heaven since he is the cause of heaven. —Again this is clearly false if it refer to actual causality: because then we could not say that God was good, wise or the like from eternity, for he did not cause things actually from eternity. If on the other hand it refer to virtual causality, so that God be called good because he is and has the power to infuse goodness; then we shall have to say that the term good signifies that power. Now that power is a supereminent likeness of its effect even as the power of any equivocal agent. Thus it would follow that the intellect in conceiving goodness is like that which is in God and is God: so that something that is in God and that is God corresponds to the notion or conception of goodness.

We must say then that all these many and diverse notions correspond to something in God of which they are likenesses. For it is plain that one form can have but one specific likeness proportionate to it: while there can be many imperfect likenesses, each one of which falls short of a perfect representation of the form. Since then, as we have proved above, the ideas we conceive of the perfections; we observe in creatures are imperfect and improportionate likenesses of the divine essence, nothing prevents the same one essence from corresponding to all these ideas, as being imperfectly represented thereby. So that all these conceptions are in the mind as their subject, but in God, as the foundation of their truth. For the idea that the intellect has of a thing is not true unless that thing corresponds to the idea by its likeness to it. Accordingly the cause of difference or multiplicity in these expressions is on the part of the intellect, which is unable to compass the vision of that divine essence in itself, but sees it through many faulty likenesses thereof which are reflected by creatures as by a mirror. Whereof if it saw that very essence, it would not need to use many terms, nor would it need many conceptions.

‘For this reason God’s Word, which is his perfect concept, is but one: wherefore it is written (Zach. xiv, 9): In that day there shall be one Lord, and his name will be one—when God’s very essence will be seen, and knowledge of God will not be gathered from creatures.

Reply to the First Objection. These terms signify one thing indeed, but under different aspects, as stated above: hence they are not synonyms

Reply to the Second Objection. Damascene means that in God all things are one in reality except the personal properties which constitute a real distinction of Persons: but he does not deny a logical difference in the terms that are attributed to God.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has just been said: because as wisdom and goodness are in reality the same as the divine essence, so are they identical with each other: and yet they differ logically, as stated.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. It has already been explained that though God is absolutely one, yet these many concepts or notions are not false, because to all of them one and the same thing corresponds albeit imperfectly represented by them: but they would be false if nothing corresponded to them.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Since in God there is absolute unity, and multiplicity in creatures, just as God understands many creatures by one intelligible species which is his essence, while there is a manifold relationship of God to creatures: even so in our intellect which mounts up to God from the multiplicity of creatures, there must be many species having relations to one God.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. These different aspects are founded on the divine essence not as their subject but as on the source of truth, or as on that which is represented by all of them: and this is not in conflict with God's simplicity.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Paternity and Sonship are mutually opposed: so that they require a real distinction of supposites: whereas goodness and wisdom are not opposite to each other.

Q. VII: ARTICLE VII

ARE THESE TERMS ASCRIBED UNIVOCALLY OR EQUIVOCALLY TO GOD AND THE CREATURE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIII, A. 5: C.G. I, XXXII SEQQ.]

THE seventh point of inquiry is whether these terms are attributed to God and creatures univocally or equivocally.

1. Measure and the thing measured must be in the same genus. Now God's goodness is the measure of all created goodness, and the same applies to his wisdom. Therefore they are said of creatures univocally.

2. Things are like which have a common form. Now the creature can be likened to God, according to Genesis i, 26, Let us make man to our own

image and likeness. Therefore there is a community of form between God and the creature. Now something can be predicated univocally of things that have a common form. Therefore something can be predicated univocally of God and the creature.

3. More or less makes no difference in the species. Now whereas God is called good and the creature also is called good, the difference seems to be that God is better than the creature. Therefore goodness in God and the creature is of the same species and consequently is predicated univocally of both.

4. There is no comparison possible between things of different genera, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii), thus we cannot compare the speed of alteration with the speed of local movement. But we compare God to the creature: thus we say that God is supremely good, and that the creature is good. Therefore God, and the creature are in the same genus and consequently something can be predicated of them univocally.

5. Nothing can be known except through a homogeneous species: thus whiteness in a wall would not be known by its image in the eye unless the two were homogeneous. Now.God by his goodness knows all beings, and so forth. Therefore God's goodness and the creature's are homogeneous: and consequently good is predicated univocally of God and the creature.

6. The house that the builder has in his mind and the material house are homogeneous. Now all creatures came from God as a work proceeds from the craftsman. Therefore goodness that is in God is homogeneous with the goodness that is in the creature: wherefore we come to the same conclusion as before.

7. Every equivocal agent is reduced to something univocal. Therefore the first agent which is God must be univocal. Now something is predicated univocally of a univocal agent and its proper effect. Therefore something is predicated univocally of God and the creature.

1. On the contrary the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 7) that nothing except in name is common to the eternal and the temporal. Now God is eternal and creatures temporal. Therefore nothing but a name can be common to God and creatures: and consequently these terms are predicated equivocally of God and the creature.

2. Since the genus is the first part of a definition, a difference of genus causes equivocation: so that if a term be employed to signify something in

different genera it will be equivocal. Now wisdom as attributed to a creature is in the genus of quality: wherefore seeing that it is not a quality in God, as we have shown, it would seem that this word wisdom is predicated equivocally of God and his creatures.

3. Nothing can be predicated except equivocally of things that are in no way alike. Now there is no likeness between creatures and God: for it is written (Isa. xl, 18): To whom then have you likened God? Therefore seemingly nothing can be predicated univocally of God and creatures.

4. But it will be replied that although God cannot be said to be like a creature, a creature can be said to be like God.

On the contrary, it is written (Ps. lxxxii, 2): O God, who shall be like to thee? as if to say: None.

5. A thing cannot be like a substance in respect of an accident. Now wisdom in a creature is an accident, and in God is the substance. Therefore man cannot be like God by his wisdom.

6. Since in a creature being is distinct from form or nature, nothing can be like being itself by its form or nature. Now these terms when predicated of a creature signify a form or nature: while God is his own very being. Therefore a creature cannot be like God by these things that are predicated of a creature: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

7. God differs more from a creature than number from whiteness. But it is absurd to liken a number to whiteness or vice versa. Therefore still more absurd is it to liken a creature to God: and again the same conclusion follows.

8. Things that are like have some one thing in common: and things that have one thing in common have a common predicate. But nothing whatever can be predicated in common with God. Therefore there can be no likeness between God and the creature.

I answer that it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and a creature: this is made plain as follows. Every effect of an univocal agent is adequate to the agent’s power: and no creature, being finite, can be adequate to the power of the first agent which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a creature to receive a likeness to God univocally. Again it is clear that although the form in the agent and the form in the effect have a common ratio, the fact that they have different modes of existence precludes their univocal predication: thus though the material house is of the same type as the house in the mind of the builder, since the one is the type of the other; nevertheless house cannot be univocally predicated of both, because the form of the material house has its being in matter, whereas in the builder’s mind it has immaterial being. Hence granted the impossibility that goodness in God and in the creature be of the same kind, nevertheless good would not be predicated of God univocally: since that which in God is immaterial and simple, is in the creature material and manifold. Moreover being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose being is to be in something else. Wherefore it is evident that a different relation to being precludes an univocal predication of being. Now God’s relation to being is different from that of any creature’s: for he is his own being, which cannot be said of any creature. Hence in no way can it be predicated univocally of God and a creature, and consequently neither can any of the other predicables among which is included even the first, being: for if there be diversity in the first, there must be diversity in the others: wherefore nothing is predicated univocally of substance and accident.

Others, however, took a different view, and held that nothing is predicated of God and a creature by analogy but by pure equivocation. This is the opinion of Rabbi Moses, as appears from his writings. This opinion, however, is false, because in all purely equivocal terms which the Philosopher calls equivocal by chance, a term is predicated of a thing without any respect to something else: whereas all things predicated of God and creatures are predicated of God with a certain respect to creatures or vice versa, and this is clearly admitted in all the aforesaid explanations of the divine names. Wherefore they cannot be pure equivocations. Again, since all our knowledge of God is taken from creatures, if the agreement were purely nominal, we should know nothing about God except empty expressions to which nothing corresponds in reality. Moreover, it would follow that all the proofs advanced about God by philosophers are sophisms: for instance, if one were to argue that whatsoever is in potentiality is reduced to actuality by something actual and that therefore God is actual being, since all things are brought into being by him, there will be a fallacy of equivocation; and similarly in all other arguments. And again the effect must in some way be like its cause, wherefore nothing is predicated equivocally of cause and effect; for instance, health of medicine and an animal.

We must accordingly take a different view and hold that nothing is predicated univocally of God and the creature: but that those things which are attributed to them in common are predicated not equivocally but analogically. Now this kind of predication is twofold. The first is when one thing is predicated of two with respect to a third: thus being is predicated of quantity and quality with respect to substance. The other is when a thing is predicated of two by reason of a relationship between these two: thus being is predicated of substance and quantity. In the first kind of predication the two things must be preceded by something to which each of them bears some relation: thus substance has a respect to quantity and quality: whereas in the second kind of predication this is not necessary, but one of the two must precede the other. Wherefore since nothing precedes God, but he precedes the creature, the second kind of analogical predication is applicable to him but not the first.

Reply to the First Objection. This argument avails in the case of a measure to which the thing measured can be equal or commensurate: but God is not a measure of this kind 3ince he infinitely surpasses all that is measured by him.

Reply to the Second Objection. The likeness of the creature to God falls short of univocal. likeness in two respects. First it does not arise from the participation of one form, as two hot things are like by participation of one heat: because what is affirmed, of God and creatures is predicated of him essentially, but of creatures, by participation: so that a creature’s likeness to God is as that of a hot thing to heat, not of a hot thing to one that is hotter. Secondly, because this very form of which the creature participates falls short of the nature of the thing which is God just as the heat of fire falls short of the nature of the sun’s power whereby it produces heat.

Reply to the Third Objection. More and less may be considered from three points of view, and predicated accordingly. First when it is only a question of the quantity of the thing participated: thus snow is said to be whiter than the wall, because whiteness is more perfect in the snow than in the wall, and yet it is of the same nature: and consequently such a difference of more or less does not cause a difference of species. Secondly when the one is predicated participatively and the other essentially: thus we might say that goodness is better than a good thing. Thirdly when the one same term is ascribed to one thing in a more eminent degree than to another, for instance, heat to the sun than to fire. These last two modes of more and less are incompatible with unity of species and univocal predication: and it is thus that a thing is predicated more and less of God and creatures, as already explained.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. When we say that God is better or that he is the sovereign good we compare him to creatures not as though he participated of the same generic, nature as creatures, like the species of a genus; but as the principle of a genus.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Inasmuch as an intelligible species has a higher mode of existence, the knowledge arising therefrom is the more perfect: for instance, the knowledge arising from the image of a stone in the mind is more perfect than that which results from the species in the senses. Hence God is able to know things most perfectly in his essence, inasmuch as in his essence is the supereminent but not homogeneous likeness of things.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. There is a twofold likeness between God and creatures. One is the likeness of the creature to the divine mind, and thus the form understood by God and the thing itself are homogeneous, although they have not the same mode of being, since the form understood is only in the mind, while the form of the creature is in the thing. There is another likeness inasmuch as the divine essence itself is the supereminent but not homogeneous likeness of all things. It is by reason of this latter likeness that good and the like are predicated in common of God and creatures: but not by reason of the former, because when we say God is good we do not mean to define him from the fact that he understands the creature’s goodness, since it has already been observed that not even the house in the mind of the builder is called a house in the same sense as the house in being.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The equivocal agent must precede the univocal: because the latter’s causality does not extend to the whole species (else it were its own cause) but only to an individual member of the species. But the equivocal agent’s causality extends to the entire species: and consequently the first agent must be an equivocal agent.

1. Reply to the First Argument on the contrary side. The Philosopher refers to things that are common physically, not logically. Now things that have a different mode of existence have nothing in common in respect of that being which is considered by the physicist, but they may have some common ‘intention’ that the logician may consider. Moreover, even from the physicist’s point of view the elemental and the heavenly body are not in the same genus: but in the view of the logician they are. However, the Philosopher does not mean to exclude analogical but only univocal community: since he wishes to prove that the corruptible and the incorruptible have not a common genus.

2. Difference of genus excludes univocation but not analogy. In proof of this, healthy is applied to urine in the genus of sign, but to medicine in the genus of cause.

3. In no sense is God said to be like the creature, but contrariwise: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. x), “likeness is not reciprocated between cause and effect, but only in coordinates”: thus a man is not said to be like his statue, but vice versa, the reason being that the form wherein the likeness consists is in the man before it is in the statue. Hence we do not say that God is like his creatures but vice versa.

4. According to Dionysius (ibid.) when it is said that no creature is like God this is to be understood as referring to effects which are imperfect and beyond all comparison fall short of their cause: nor does this refer to the quantity of the thing participated but to the other two modes, as explained above (Reply to Third Objection).

5. A thing cannot be like substance in respect of an accident, so that the likeness regard a form of the same kind: but there may be the likeness that is between cause and effect: since the first substance must needs be the cause of all accidents.

6. The Sixth Argument is answered in like manner.

7. Whiteness is not in the genus of number, nor is it the principle of a genus: wherefore they do not admit of comparison. Whereas God is the principle of every genus, and consequently all things are somewhat likened to him.

8. This argument refers to things that have a common genus or matter: which does not apply to God and the creature.

Q. VII: ARTICLE VIII

IS THERE ANY RELATION BETWEEN GOD AND THE CREATURE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIII, A. 7: Q. XXVIII, A. 4: Q. XXXII, A. 2]

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether there be any relation between God and the creature: and it would seem that there is none.

1. According to the Philosopher (De Praedic. v) relatives are simultaneous. But creatures cannot be simultaneous with God: since in every way he precedes creatures Therefore there cannot be any relation between God and a creature.

2. Things that are related can be compared in some way. But there is no comparison between God and a creature: since things that differ in genus are not comparable with one another, for instance, a number and a line. Therefore there is no relation between God and a creature.

3. Relative and co-relative. belong to the same genus. But God is not in the game genus as the creature. Therefore we cannot predicate a relation between them.

4. A creature cannot be in opposition to the Creator: because one opposite is not the cause of the other. Now relatives are in opposition to each other. Therefore there cannot be a relation between a creature and God.

5. Anything of which something new can be predicated, may be said in a sense to become. Consequently if something be said of God in relation to the creature, it follows that in a sense God becomes: which is impossible, seeing that he is unchangeable.

6. Whatsoever is predicated of a thing is predicated either essentially or accidentally. Now expressions that denote relation to creatures are not predicated of God essentially, since essential predicates are predicated necessarily and always: nor are they predicated accidentally. Therefore such relations can nowise be predicated of God.

On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. v, .13) that the Creator is related to the creature as the master to his servant.

I answer that relation differs from quantity and quality in that quantity and quality are accidents residing in the subject, whereas relation, as Boethius says (De Trin.), signifies something not as adhering to a subject but as passing from it to something else: wherefore de la Porrée said that relations are not adherent but assistant, which is true in a sense as we shall show further on. Now when a thing is attributed to someone as proceeding from him to another this does not argue composition between them, as neither does action imply composition with the agent. And for this reason the Philosopher proves (Phys. v) that there can be no movement in relation: since without any change in the thing that is related to another, the relation can cease for the sole reason that this other is changed. Thus it is clear with regard to action that there is no movement in respect of action except metaphorically and improperly speaking, just as we say that one who passes from inaction into action is changed: and this, would not be the case if relation or action signified something abiding in the subject. Hence it is evident that it is not incompatible with a thing's simplicity to have many relations towards other things: indeed the more simple a thing is the greater the number of its concomitant relations: since its power is so much the less limited and consequently its causality so much the more extended. Wherefore it is stated in De Causis (prop. xvii) that a united force is less confined than a distributed force. Now we must needs admit a relation between a principle and the things which proceed from it; and not only a relation of origin inasmuch as a result springs from its source, but also a relation of distinction, seeing that an effect must needs be distinct from its cause, for nothing is its own cause. Accordingly from God's supreme simplicity there results an infinite number of respects or relations between creatures and him, inasmuch as he produced creatures distinct from himself and yet somewhat likened to him.

Reply to the First Objection. Those relatives are naturally simultaneous which have the same reason for their mutual relationship, for instance, father and son, master and servant, double and half. But when there is not the same reason on either side for referring one thing to another, then relatives are not naturally simultaneous, but one naturally precedes the other: as the Philosopher states with regard to sense and the sensible object, knowledge and the thing knowable (De Praed. v). Wherefore it clearly does not follow that God and the creature are naturally simultaneous, since there is not the same reason on either side for one being referred to the other. It is not necessary, however, even in relatives that are naturally simultaneous that the subjects be naturally simultaneous, but only the relations.

Reply to the Second Objection. Not all the things that are related can be compared to each other,. but only those that are related in respect of one quantity or quality, so that one may be described as greater, better, whiter and so on than the other. But different relations can be compared to each other even if they belong to different genera: since things that differ generically differ from one another. And yet although God is not in the same genus as the creature as a thing contained in a genus, he is nevertheless in every genus as the principle of the genus: and for this reason there can be relation between the creature and God as between effect and principle.

Reply to the Third Objection. The subjects of things mutually related need not be in the same genus, but only the things themselves that are thus related: thus quantity is said to be distinct from quiddity. And yet as we have already said it is not the same with God and creatures as with things differing generically and nowise co-ordinated to one another.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Relative opposition differs in two ways from other kinds of opposition. First in the latter one thing is said to be opposite to another inasmuch as it excludes it,—as negation excludes affirmation,—and in this respect is opposed to it: and opposition of privation and habit, and of contrariety includes opposition of contradiction (Metaph. iv). But it is not thus with things that are opposed relatively. For son is not opposed to father by excluding him, but on account of the nature of his relationship to him. Hence follows the second difference: because in other kinds of opposition one of the opposites is always imperfect by reason of the negation attaching to privation and one of the contraries. But this is not necessarily so in relative opposition, indeed it is possible to consider both relatives as perfect, as is especially evident in equiparent relatives and in relatives of origin, for instance, things that are equal to or like one another, father and son. Wherefore relation is more attributable to God than other kinds of opposition. By reason of the first difference relative opposition may be observed between the creature and God, but not any other kind: seeing that it is owing to God that creatures are affirmed rather than excluded; and yet creatures have a certain relationship to God. By reason of the second difference, in the divine Persons (in whom there can be no imperfection) there can be relative opposition and no other, as we shall show further on (Q. viii).

Reply to the Fifth Objection. To become is to be changed properly speaking: wherefore just as a thing is not changed in respect of a relation except accidentally, to wit through a change in the thing to which the relation is consequent, so neither is a thing said to become in respect of a relation, except accidentally. Thus a body through a change in its quantity becomes equal (to another), yet the change is not essentially connected with equality but is related thereto accidentally. And yet a thing does not need to be changed in order that a relation begin to be predicated of it but it suffices that a change occur in one of the extremes since the cause of relationship between two is something inherent in both. Consequently from whichever extreme a change is wrought in that which caused the relationship, the relationship between them ceases. Accordingly from the fact that a change is wrought in the creature, a relation begins ‘to be attributed to God. Hence he cannot be said to become except metaphorically; inasmuch as he is like a thing that becomes, through something new that is said about him: thus we say (Ps. lxxxix, i): Lord, thou art become our refuge.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. When these relations begin to be ascribed to God on account of some change wrought in creatures, it is evident that the cause of their being attributed to him is on the part of the creature, and that they are predicated of God accidentally. But as Augustine says this does not imply an accident in God, but refers to something outside him and compared to him accidentally: for God’s existence does not depend on creatures as neither does the builder’s existence depend on the house: wherefore just as it is accidental to the builder that the house exists, so is it accidental to God that the creature exists. For we say that anything without which a thing can exist is accidental to it.

Q. VII: ARTICLE IX

ARE THESE RELATIONS BETWEEN A CREATURE AND GOD REALLY IN CREATURES THEMSELVES?

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether these relations between creatures and God are in creatures themselves: and it would seem that they are not.

1. There are certain relations which posit nothing real on either side; as Avicenna says (Metaph. iv, 10) of the relation between entity and non-

entity. Now no relatives are further apart than God and the creature. Therefore this relation posits nothing real on our side.

2. We must not assert anything that leads to an indefinite process. Now if relation to God is something real in a creature, we shall have to go on indefinitely: since that relation will be a creature, if it be something real, and therefore will likewise bear a relation to God, and so on indefinitely. Therefore we must not assert that relation to God is something real in a creature.

3. Nothing has a relation except to one definite thing (Metaph. iv): thus double is not related to anything but half; and father is not related except to son, and so on. Therefore there must be correspondence between the things that are related and those to which they are related. Now God is simply one being. Therefore there can be no real relation in creatures to him.

4. The creature is related to God inasmuch as it proceeds from him. Now the creature proceeds from God as to its very substance. Therefore it is related to God by its substance and not by an additional relation.

5. A relation is a kind of mean between the related extremes. But there can be no real mean between God and the creature which is created by him immediately. Therefore relation to God is nothing real in the creature.

6. The Philosopher (Metaph. iv) says that if the reality of things depended on our opinion and perception, whatsoever we perceive would be real. Now it is clear that all creatures are dependent on the perception or knowledge of their Creator. Therefore all creatures are referred to God by their substance and not by an inherent relation.

7. It would seem that the more things are distant from one another the less are they related. Now there is a greater distance between the creature and God than between one creature and another. But seemingly the relation between one creature and another is nothing real: for since it is not a substance, it must he an accident and consequently must be in a subject, and therefore cannot be removed therefrom without the subject being changed: and yet we have asserted the contrary to be the case with relations. Therefore the creature’s relation to God is nothing real.

8. just as a created being is infinitely distant from nonbeing, so also is it infinitely distant from God. But there is no relation between created being and absolute non-being, according to Avicenna (Metaph. iv, 10). Neither therefore is there a relation between created being and uncreated being.

On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16): It is evident that whatever begins to be Predicated of God whereas it was not Predicated of him before is said of him relatively: relatively, that is, not to an accident in God (as if something had accrued to him), but, without doubt, to an accident in the thing in relation to which God begins to be predicated. Now an accident is something real in its subject. Therefore relation to God is something in the creature.

Again, whatsoever is related to a thing through being changed is really related thereto. Now the creature is related to God through being changed. Therefore it is really related to God.

I answer that relation to God is something real in the creature. To make this clear we must observe that as the Commentator says (Metaph. xi, text. 19), seeing that of all the predicaments relation has the least stability, some have thought that it should be reckoned among the predicables because the predicaments (prima intellecta) have an objective reality and are the first things to be understood by the intellect: whereas the predicables (secunda intellecta) are certain ‘intentions’ consequent to our mode of understanding: inasmuch as by a second act the intellect reflects on itself, and knows both the fact that it understands and the manner of its understanding. According then to this view it would follow that relation has no objective reality, but exists only in the mind, even as the notion of genus or species and of second substances. But this is impossible: because nothing is assigned to a predicament unless it has objective reality: since logical being is divided against the being that is divided by the ten predicaments (Metaph. v). Now if relation had no objective reality, it would not be placed among the predicaments. Moreover the perfection and goodness that are in things outside the mind are ascribed not only to something absolute and inherent to things but also to the order between one thing and another: thus the good of an army consists in the mutual ordering of its parts, to which good the Philosopher (Metaph. x) compares the good of the universe. Consequently there must be order in things themselves, and this order is a kind of relation. Wherefore there must be relations in things themselves, whereby one is ordered to another. Now one thing is ordered to another either as to quantity or as to active or passive power: for on these two counts alone can we find in a thin something whereby we compare it with another.

For a thing is measured not only by its intrinsic quantity but also in reference to an extrinsic quantity. And again by its active power one thing acts on another, and by its passive power is acted on by another: while by its substance and quality a thing is ordered to itself alone and not to another, except accidentally: namely inasmuch as a quality, substantial form or matter is a kind of active or passive power, and forasmuch as one may ascribe to them a certain kind of quantity: thus one thing produces the same in substance; and one thing produces its like in quality; and number or multitude causes dissimilarity and diversity in the same things; and dissimilarity in that one thing is considered as being more or less so and so than another, thus one thing is said to be whiter than another. Hence the Philosopher (Metaph. v) in giving the species of relations, says that some are based on quantity and some on action and passion. Accordingly things that are ordered to something must be really related to it, and this relation must be some real thing in them. Now all creatures are ordered to God both as to their beginning and as to their end: since the order of the parts of the universe to one another results from the order of the whole universe to God: even as the mutual order of the parts of an army is on account of the order of the whole army to its commander (Metaph. xii). Therefore creatures are really related to God, and this relation is something real in the creature.

Reply to the First Objection. That between one creature and another there is a relation which posits nothing in either extreme is not due to the distance between them, but to the fact that certain relations are based not on any order in things, but on an order which is only in our intellect: but this does not apply to the order of creatures to God.

Reply to the Second Objection. The relations themselves are not related to something else by any further relation but by themselves because their very essence is relative. It is not the same with things whose essence is absolute, so that this does not lead to an indefinite process.

Reply to the Third Objection. The Philosopher concludes (ibid.) that if all things are related to the supreme good, the supreme good must be infinite by nature: and accordingly an infinite number of things can be related to that which is infinite by nature. Such is God, since the perfection of his essence is not confined to any genus, as we have stated above. For this reason an infinite number of creatures can be related to God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The creature is related to God by its essence as cause of that relation, and by that same relation, formally: thus a thing is said to be like in quality, causally; and by its likeness, formally: and for this reason the creature is said to be like God.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. When it is said that the creature proceeds from God immediately, we exclude an intermediate creative cause, but not the intermediate real relationship which arises naturally from the creature’s production, even as equality results immediately from quantity: thus a real relation follows naturally the production of created substance.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Creatures depend on God’s knowledge as an effect depends on its cause, and not as though their very existence consisted in that knowledge, so that for a creature to exist would mean nothing else but that it is known by God. This was the view of those who contended that whatsoever is perceived is real, and that the reality of things depends on’ our thoughts and perception, so that to exist would be nothing but to be an object of perception or thought.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The very relation that is nothing but the order between one creature and another may be considered as an accident, or as a relation. Considered as an accident it is something adhering to a subject; but not considered as a relation or order, for then it is mere towardness, something passing as it were from one thing to another and assisting that which is related. Accordingly a relation is something inherent, but not because it is a relation: thus action as action is considered as issuing from the agent; but, as an accident, is considered as inherent to the active subject. Wherefore nothing prevents such an accident from ceasing to exist without ‘any change in its subject, because it is not essentially complete through its existence in its subject but through transition into something else: and if this be removed the essence of this accident is removed as regards the action, but remains as regards its cause: even so, if the matter be removed, the heating is removed, although the cause of heating remain.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. There is no order between created being and non-being, but there is between created and uncreated being, hence the comparison fails.

Q. VII: ARTICLE X

IS GOD REALLY RELATED TO THE CREATURE SO THAT THIS RELATION BE SOMETHING IN GOD?

THE tenth point of inquiry is whether God be really related to the creature so that this relation be something in God and seemingly the answer should be in the affirmative.

1. There is a real relation in the mover to that which it moves: wherefore the Philosopher (Metaph. v) reckons the relation between mover and moved to be a species of the predicament relation. Now God is compared to the creature as mover to that which is moved. Therefore he is really related to the creature.

2. It will be replied that he moves creatures without any change in himself; wherefore he is not really related to the thing moved. On the contrary, the presence of one of two relative opposites in a thing is not a reason for attributing the other to the. same thing: thus a thing is not double because it is a half, nor is God Father because he is Son. Accordingly if mover and moved are mutually related, it does not follow that where there is the relation of mover there must be the relation of moved. Hence that God is not moved does not hinder him from having the relation of mover to moved.

3. As the father gives being to the son so does the Creator give being to the creature’ But the father is really related to the son. Therefore the Creator is also really related to the creature.

4. Terms that are predicated of God properly and not metaphorically indicate the thing signified as being in God; and among terms of this kind Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) reckons Lord. Wherefore the thing signified by this word Lord is really in God. But it is a relation to the creature. Therefore, etc.

5. Knowledge relates to the thing knowable (Metaph. v). Now God is compared to creatures as known to the thing known. Therefore in God there is a relation to creatures.

6. The thing moved always bears a relation to its mover. Now the will is compared to the thing willed as the thing moved to its mover: because the appetible object is a mover that is not moved,(Metaph. xii). Since then it is

God’s will that things exist, for he hath dome all things whatsoever he would (Ps. cxiii, ii), it would seem that he is really related to the creature.

7. If God is not related to creatures, the only reason would seem to be that he is not dependent on them and is far above them. But the heavenly bodies likewise are independent of elemental bodies and surpass them almost out of all proportion. Wherefore it would follow that there is no real relation in the higher bodies to the lower world.

8. All names are taken from forms: and forms are something inherent to the things whereto they belong. Since then God is named from his relation io creatures, it would seem that these relations are something in God.

9. Proportion—for instance that of double to half—is a real relation. Now seemingly there is a proportion in God to the creature: since there must be proportion between mover and the thing moved. Therefore it would seem that God is really related to creatures.

10. Whereas understanding is an image of the thing (understood), and words are signs of things, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), these two are ordered differently in disciple and teacher. The teacher begins with the things whence he has gathered the knowledge in his intellect, and expresses that knowledge in words, while the disciple begins with the words through which he arrives at the ideas in the intellect of the teacher, and thence at the knowledge of things. Now whatsoever is said about these relations must first of all come to the knowledge of a teacher. Consequently with him these relative terms correspond to the ideas in.his intellect and these ideas correspond to an objective reality: wherefore seemingly these relations are real.

11. These relative terms which are predicated of God in time signify relations that are either predicamental (secundum esse) or transcendental (secundum dici). If their relativity is transcendental they posit nothing real in either extreme. But according to what has been said this is false, since they really exist in the’creature as related to God. Therefore they signify predicamental relation, and consequently they posit something real in both extremes.

12. It is in the nature of relatives that given one the other follows, and if one be removed the other is also removed. If then there is a real relation in the creature, there must be in God a real relation to the creature.

On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16): “It is clear that whatsoever is said of God relatively is an accident in the thing to which God begins to be referred.” Hence it would seem that these relations are attributed to God not by reason of something in him but on account of something outside him: so that they posit nothing real in him.

Again, as the knowable thing is the measure of knowledge, so is God the measure of all things, as the Commentator says (Metaph. x). Now the knowable thing is not referred to knowledge by a real relation existing in it, but rather by the relation of knowledge to it, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v). Therefore seemingly neither is God related to the creature by a real relation in him.

Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “Likeness is not reciprocal between cause and effect, for an effect is said to be like its cause and not vice versa.” Now the same would seem to apply to other relations as to that of likeness. Therefore ,seemingly neither is there reciprocity in the relations between God and the creature, and we cannot argue that because the creature is really related to God, therefore is God really related to the creature.

I answer that the relations whereby we refer God to creatures are not really in God. To make this clear we must observe that since a real relation consists in the order of one thing to another, as already stated, a real relation is mutual in those things alone wherein on either side there is the same reason for mutual order: and this apples to all relations consequent to quantity. For since the notion of quantity is independent of all objects of sense, it is the same in all corporeal natures. And for the same reason that a quantitative thing A is really related to the quantitative thing B, B is really related to A. Now between one quantity, considered absolutely, and another there is the order deriving from measure and thing measured, under the name of whole and part and other such things that result from quantity.

On the other hand in relations arising from action and passion or active and passive power there is not always order of movement on both sides. Because that which has the nature of being patient, moved or caused must always have an order to the agent or mover, seeing that the effect is always perfected by its cause and dependent thereon: so that it is ordered to it as the cause of its perfection. Now agents, whether movers or causes, sometimes have an order to their respective patients, whether moved or caused, inasmuch, to wit, as the good or perfection of the mover or agent is to be found in the effect, patient or thing moved.

This is especially evident in univocal agents which by their action produce their like in species, and consequently perpetuate their species as far as this is possible. This is also evident in all other things which move, act or cause through themselves being moved; because by their very movement they are ordered to produce effects; and again in all those things where any good accrues to the cause from its effect. And there are some things to which others are ordered but not vice versa, because they are wholly foreign to that genus of actions or power from which that order arises: thus knowledge has a relation to the thing known, because the knower by an intelligible act has an order to the thing known which is outside the soul. Whereas the thing itself that is outside the soul is not touched by that act, inasmuch as the act of the intellect does not pass into exterior matter by changing it; so that the thing which is outside the soul is wholly outside the genus of intelligible things.

For this reason the relation which arises from the act of the mind cannot be in that thing. The same applies to sense and the sensible object: for although the sensible object by its own action affects the organ of sense, and consequently bears a relation to it, just as other natural agents have a relation to the things on which they act, nevertheless it is not the alteration of the organ that perfects the act of perception, but the act of the sensitive power; to which act the sensible object outside the soul is altogether foreign. In like manner a man who stands to the right of a pillar bears a corresponding relation to the pillar by reason of his motive power whereby he is competent to be to the right or to the left, before or behind, above or below. Wherefore such-like relations in man or animal are real, but not in the thing which lacks that power. In like manner again money is external to the action whereby prices are fixed, which action is a convention between certain persons: and man is outside the genus of those actions whereby the artist produces his image. Hence there is not a real relation either in a man to his image, or in money to the price, but vice versa. Now God does not work by an intermediary action to be regarded as issuing from God and terminating in the creature: but his action is his substance and is wholly outside the genus of created being whereby the creature is related to him. Nor again does any good accrue to the creator from the production of the creature: wherefore his action is supremely liberal as Avicenna says (Metaph. viii, 7). It is also evident that he is not moved to act, and that without any change in himself he makes all changeable things. It follows then that there is no real relation in him to creatures, although creatures are really related to him, as effects to their cause.

In this matter Rabbi Moses erred in many ways, for he wished to prove that there is no relation between God and the creature, because seeing that God is not a body he has no relation to time or place. Thus he considered only the relation which results from quantity and not that which arises from action and passion.

Reply to the First Objection. The natural mover or agent moves and acts by an intermediary movement or action that is between the mover and the thing moved: between the agent and the patient: wherefore in this intermediary, at least agent and patient, mover and thing moved must come together. Wherefore the agent as such is not outside the genus of the patient as such: and consequently each has a real relation to the other, especially seeing that this intermediary action is a perfection proper to the agent so that the term of that action is a perfection of the agent. This does not apply to God, as stated above: and thus the comparison fails.

Reply to the Second Objection. The fact that the mover is moved is not the cause of its relation of mover being a real relation, but a sign thereof. For the fact that it moves through being moved shows that from one point of view it beongs to the same genus as the thing moved; and again from the fact that by its movement it is moved to a certain end it follows that this end is its good.

Reply to the Third Objection. The father, being an univocal agent gives the nature of his own genus to his son: but God does not thus give being to the creature: hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The denomination lord comprises three things in its signification: namely, first, power to compel subjects; secondly, arising from that power, relation to those subjects; thirdly, a relation in those subjects to their lord, since one relative implies the other. Accordingly the term lord retains its meaning in God as regards the first and third, but not the second. Hence Ambrose (De Fide i, i) says that this name lord is a name of power, and Boethius says that dominion is the power of compelling slaves.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. God’s knowledge has not the same relation to things as ours has: since it is related to them as their cause and measure, inasmuch as things are true so far as by his knowledge God ordained them. On the other hand things are the cause and measure of our knowledge. Wherefore just as our knowledge bears a real relation to things and not vice versa, so are things really related to God’s knowledge and not vice versa. Or we may reply that God understands other things by understanding himself, wherefore his knowledge is related directly not to things but to the divine essence.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The appetible object that moves the appetite is the end, and the means do not move the appetite save on account of the end. Now the end of the divine will is nothing else than the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that other things bear the same relation to the divine will as the mover does to that which it moves.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The heavenly bodies are related to the lower bodies by real relations arising from quantity, inasmuch as on either side there is quantity of the same kind; and again by real relations arising from action and passion, because the action whereby being themselves moved they move other things is intermediary and is not their very substance, since by being a cause of lower things they obtain a certain good.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. That from which a thing is denominated need not always be its natural form, and it suffices for it to be expressed, grammatically speaking, by way of a form: thus a man is denominated from an action, his apparel and the like which are not really forms.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. If by proportion is meant a definite excess, then there is no proportion in God to the creature. But if proportion stands for relation alone, then there is relation between the Creator and the creature: in the latter really, but not in the former.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the teacher begins with things, the ideas of things are received by the teacher’s mind otherwise than in nature, because that which is received into another follows the mode of the recipient: and it is plain that ideas are in the teacher’s mind immaterially, but materially in nature.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This distinction between predicamental and transcendental relatives does not prove the relations in question to be real. Certain predicamental relative terms do not signify a real relation, for instance, right and left as ascribed to a pillar: and some transcendental relative terms signify real relations, for instance, knowledge and sensation. Because relatives are said to be predicamental when terms are employed to signify the relations themselves, while they are said to be transcendental when thee terms are employed to signify qualities or something of the kind primarily, from which relations arise. Nor as regards the question at issue does it matter whether they be real or logical relations.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although given one relative the other follows, this does not imply that both are posited in the same way: and it suffices that one be real and the other logical.

Q. VII: ARTICLE XI

ARE THESE TEMPORAL RELATIONS IN GOD AS LOGICAL I RELATIONS?

THE eleventh point of inquiry is whether these temporal relations are in God as logical relations: and it would seem that they are not.

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIII, A. 7, AD I.]

1. An idea to which nothing real corresponds is idle and vain, according to Boethius (Super Proem. Poyphyr. in Praedicab.). Now these relations are not really in God, as proved above. Therefore it is vain and idle for the reason to attribute them to him.

2. That which has only a logical existence is not ascribed to things except according as they are in the mind, for instance genus, species and order. Now these temporal relations are not ascribed to God according as he is only in our mind, since if they were, then, to say that God is Lord because we understand him to reign over creatures would have no objective reality, which is clearly false. Therefore these relations are not in God as logical relations.

3. This name Lord signifies a relation since it is a predicamental relative. But Lordship is not merely a logical relation in God. Therefore neither are these relations in God only logical.

4. If there were no created intelligence God would still be Lord and Creator. But there would be no logical relations if there were no created

intelligence. Therefore God and Lord and the like do not denote merely logical relations.

5. That which has existence in our mind only has not existed from eternity. Now some of God's relations to the creature have been from eternity, such as the relations implied in the terms knowledge and predestination. Therefore such are not merely logical relations in God.

On the contrary, names signify ideas or concepts (Peri Herm. i). Now it is plain that these names are relative terms. Therefore these relations must be logical.

I answer that just as a real relation consists in order between thing and thing, so a logical relation is the order of thought to thought; and this may occur in two ways.

First, when the order is discovered by the mind and attributed to that which is expressed in a relative term. Such are the relations attributed by the mind to the things understood as such, for instance, the relations of genus and species: for the mind discovers these relations by observing the order between that which is in the mind and that which is outside the mind, or again the order between one idea and another.

Secondly, when these relations arise from the mode of understanding, namely when the mind understands one thing in its relation to another, although that relation is not discovered by the intellect but follows by a kind of necessity its mode of understanding. Such relations are attributed by the intellect not to that which is in the intellect but to that which has objective reality. This happens forasmuch as certain things not mutually related are understood in relation to one~another, although the mind does not understand them to be related, for in that case it would be in error. Now in order that two things be related they must each have existence, be distinct from each other (for nothing bears a relation to itself), and be referable to the other. Now the mind sometimes conceives two things as having ,existence, whereas one or neither of them is a being: as when it considers two futures, or one present and one future, and considers one in relation to the other by placing one before the other; wherefore such relations are purely logical since they arise from the mode of understanding. And sometimes the mind considers one thing as though it were two, and considers them in the light of a certain relationship: as when a thing is said to be identical with itself, and such a relation is purely logical. Sometimes the mind considers two things as referable to each other, whereas there is no relation between them, in fact one of them is itself essentially a relation: as when a relation is said to be accidental to its subject, wherefore such a logical relation has merely a logical relationship to anything else. Again the mind sometimes considers something in relation to another inasmuch as it is the term of the relationship of another thing to it, and yet itself is not related to the other: as when it considers something knowable as terminating the relationship of knowledge to it; and thus it imputes to the thing knowable a certain relation to knowledge, and such a relation is purely logical. In like manner our mind attributes to God certain relative terms, inasmuch as it considers God as the term of the creature's relation to him: wherefore such relations are purely logical.

Reply to the First Objection. In these relations there is something objective corresponding to them, namely the relation of the creature to God. For just as a thing is said to be knowable relatively, not in reference to knowledge but because knowledge refers to it (Metaph. v), even so God is spoken of relatively because creatures are related to him.

Reply to the Second Objection. This argument considers those relations that are discovered by reason and attributed to things that are in the mind. The relations in question, however, are not of this kind but arise from the mode of understanding.

Reply to the Third Objection. just as a man is identical with himself really and not only logically (although such a relation is merely logical) inasmuch as the cause of the relation is real, namely substantial identity, which the mind considers in the light of a relation: even so the power to compel subjects is in God really, and our mind considers it in relation to the subjects on account of the subjects' relation to God: and thus he is called Lord really, although in him the relation is merely logical. For the same reason it is evident that he would be Lord even if there were no created mind in existence.

Hence the Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. As stated above God's knowledge is related essentially not to the creature but to the essence of the Creator whereby God knows all things.

QUESTION VIII

THOSE THINGS THAT ARE PREDICATED OF GOD RELATIVELY FROM ETERNITY

THERE are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether relations predicated of God from eternity and signified by the names Father and Son are real or logical relations. (2) In God is relation his substance? (3) Do the relations constitute and distinguish the persons and hypostases? (4) If the relations be mentally abstracted do the hypostases remain in God?

Q. VIII: ARTICLE I

ARE THE RELATIONS PREDICATED OF GOD FROM ETERNITY REAL OR ONLY LOGICAL RELATIONS?

[C.G. IV, XIV: SUM. TH. I, Q. XXVIII, A. X]

WE have now to inquire into the relations attributed to God from eternity: and the first point of inquiry is whether the relations attributed to God from eternity and signified by the names Father and Son be real or only logical relations. It would seem that they are not real.

1. According to Damascene (De Fid. Orth. i, ii) in the subsistent Trinity there is something common and identical, and if there be any distinction or diversity this is in our knowledge and understanding. Now the Persons are distinct by their relations. Therefore in God the relations are merely logical.

2. Boethius says (De Trin. iv): Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Spirit is like the relation of the same to the

same. Now the relation of identity is purely logical. Therefore such are the relations of paternity and filiation.

3. In God there is no, real relation to the creature, because he produced creatures without any change in himself, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 16). Now much more true is it that the Father produced the Son, and the Son proceeded from the Father without any change taking place. Therefore in God there is no real relation in the Father to the Son or vice versa.

4. Things that are not perfect, such as privation, matter and movement, are not attributed to God. Now of all things relation has the most unstable being, so much so that some have reckoned it among the predicables; according to the Commentator (Metaph. xi). Therefore there can be no relation in God.

5. In creatures there is always composition of the relation and its subject: for one thing cannot inhere to another without composition., Now there can be no composition in God. Therefore there cannot be real relation in him.

6. Things that are absolutely simple differ from one another by themselves. Now the divine Persons are absolutely simple. Therefore they differ by themselves an&not by any relations: and consequently there is no need of putting relations in God, since the only reason for doing so is to distinguish the Persons.

7. just as the relations are properties of the divine Persons so are the absolute attributes properties of the essence. Now the absolute attributes have only a logical being in God. Therefore the relations in God are merely logical.

8. A perfect thing lacks nothing (Phys. iii). Now the divine substance is most perfect, and consequently lacks nothing that pertains to its perfection. Therefore there is no need to place relations in God.

9. Seeing that God is the first beginning and last end of things, anything that is reducible to something previous cannot. be in God, but only those things to which others are reduced: thus the movable is reducible to the immovable, and the accidental to the essential; wherefore God is not moved, and nothing in him is accidental. Now everything that denotes ‘to-another’ being is reducible to absolute or ‘ to-itself ‘ being. Therefore in God nothing is relative to another but all is absolute.

10. By his very nature God exists of necessity. Now everything that by its very nature exists of necessity is absolute: for the relative cannot exist

without its correlative. But that which by its very nature exists of necessity, does not cease to exist when something else is removed. Therefore no real relations are in God.

11. As stated in the preceding question (A. 9) every real relation arises from some kind of quantity or from action or passion. But there is no quantity in God: for in the words of Augustine (De Trin. v, i) “God is great without quantity.” Nor is there number in him, as Boethius says (De Trin.), whence relations could arise, although there is number resulting from relations. Hence if there be real relations in God they must be attributed to him in respect of some action of his. Not, however, in respect of the action whereby he brings creatures into being, since in the preceding question (A. 10) it was proved that there is no real relation in God to creatures. Nor again in respect of the personal action ascribed to God, such as generation: for seeing that in God to beget belongs to a distinct hypostasis, and distinction arises only from relation, it will be necessary for the relation to precede such an action, so that it cannot result from it. Accordingly we must conclude that, if any real relation in God arises from his action, it must be consequent upon his eternal or essential action of intelligence or volition. But even this is impossible, since such an action results in the relation between the one who understands and the thing understood, and such a relation in God cannot be real: else in God be who understands and that which he understands would be really distinct, which is clearly false, since each is predicated of each Person: for not only does the Father understand, but also the Son and the Holy Spirit: and likewise each of them is understood. Wherefore seemingly no real relation is in God.

12. Man’s natural reason can attain to the knowledge of the divine mind: for it has been demonstrated by philosophers that God is intelligence. If then real relations which in God are said to distinguish the Persons arise from the action of the intellect, it would seem possible for human reason to discover the Trinity of Persons, and this would no longer be an article of faith. For faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not (Heb. xi, i).

13. Relative opposition is divided against other kinds of opposition: and the latter cannot be ascribed to God. Neither therefore can relative opposition.

On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that “relation alone multiplies the Trinity.” Now this multiplication is not merely logical but is real, for as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three things. Therefore the relations in God are not merely logical but real.

Again, that which is real is constituted by something real. Now the relations in God are properties which constitute the Persons; and person signifies something real. Therefore the divine relations also must be real.

Again, generation is more perfect in God than in creatures. Now in creatures generation produces a real relationship, namely that of father and son. Therefore a fortiori relations in God are real.

I answer that those who follow the teaching of the catholic faith must hold that the relations in God are real. The catholic faith teaches that there are in God three Persons of one Essence. Now number results from some kind of distinction — wherefore in God there must be some distinction not only in respect of creatures who differ from him in nature, but also in respect of someone subsisting in the divine nature. But this distinction cannot regard anything absolute, since whatsoever is predicated of God absolutely denotes the divine essence, so that it would follow that the divine Persons differ essentially, which is the heresy of Arius. It follows then that the divine Persons are distinct only by their relations. Now this distinction cannot be merely logical, because things that are only logically distinct can be predicated of one another: thus we say that the beginning is the end, because one point in reality is both beginning and end (of a line) although there is a logical distinction. Hence it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father: because seeing that names are given in order to distinguish things, it would follow that the divine Persons differ only in name, which is the heresy of Sabellius. It remains thus to be said that the relations in God are something real: how this may be we must endeavour to discover by following the statements of holy men, although reason is unable to do so fully.

We must observe then that since a real relation cannot be conceived unless it arise from quantity or from action or passion, it follows that we must posit relation in God according to one of these modes. Now in God there cannot be quantity either continuous or discrete, nor anything bearing a likeness to quantity, except number arising from and presupposing relation; and unity, which regards the essence, the consequent relation of which is not real but merely logical, as, for instance, the relation implied in the word same, as we have stated in the preceding question (A. ii). It follows then that we ascribe to God the relation that arises from action: not indeed the action that passes into something passive, since nothing is passive in God in whom there is no matter, and there is no relation in God to what is outside him, as we have proved (Q. vii, A. 10). Consequently real relation in God must follow the action that remains in the agent, and in God these are intelligence and volition, since sensation through being effected by means of a corporeal organ cannot be attributed to God who is wholly incorporeal. For this reason Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi) says that in God Fatherhood is perfect, i.e. not corporeally or materially but intelligibly. Now the one who understands may have a relation to four things in understanding: namely to the thing understood, to the intelligible species whereby his intelligence is made actual, to his act of understanding, and to his intellectual concept. This concept differs from the three others.

It differs from the thing understood, for the latter is sometimes outside the intellect, whereas the intellectual concept is only in the intellect. Moreover the intellectual concept is ordered to the thing understood as its end, inasmuch as the intellect forms its concept thereof that it may know the thing understood.

It differs from the intelligible species, because the latter which makes the intellect actual is considered as the principle of the intellect's act, since every agent acts forasmuch as it is actual: and it is made actual by a form, which is necessary as a principle of action.

And it differs from the act of the intellect, because it is considered as the term of the action, and as something effected thereby. For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the thing, or even an affirmative or negative proposition.

This intellectual concept in us is called properly a word, because it is this that is signified by the word of mouth. For the external utterance does not signify the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but the concept of the intellect by means of which it relates to the thing. Accordingly this concept or word by which our intellect understands a thing distinct from itself originates from another and represents another. It originates from the intellect through an act of the intellect: and it is the likeness of the thing understood. Now when the intellect understands itself this same word or concept is its progeny and likeness, that is of the intellect understanding itself. And this happens because the effect is like its cause in respect of its form, and the form of the intellect is the thing understood. Wherefore the word that originates from the intellect is the likeness of the thing understood, whether this be the intellect itself or something else. And this word of our intellect is extrinsic to the essence of the intellect (for it is not the essence but a kind of passion thereof), yet it is not extrinsic to the intellect's act of intelligence, since this act cannot be complete without it. If then there be an intellect whose act of intelligence is its very essence, it follows that this word is not extrinsic to the essence of that intellect even as it is not extrinsic to its act of intelligence. Such is the divine intellect: since in God to be and ta understand are the same. Wherefore his word is not outside his essence, but co-essential with it. Accordingly in God we find the origin of one from another, namely a word proceeding, and one from whom the word proceeds without prejudice to the unity of the essence. For whenever one thing originates from another there must be a real relation—either only on the part of that which originates, when it receives not the same nature as its principle, as in the creature's origination from God—or on the part of both, when to wit that which originates attains to the nature of its principle, as when a man is begotten, and a real relation results between father and son. Now in God the Word is co-essential with its principle, as we have proved. It follows then that in God there is a real relation both on the part of the Word and on the part of the Speaker.

Reply to the First Objection. In the divine Persons there is essential unity, but there is a logical distinction by reason of the relation which does not differ from the Essence really but only logically, as we shall state further on.

Reply to the Second Objection. Relation in the divine Persons bears a certain likeness to the relation of identity if we consider the unity of Essence: whereas if we consider the origin of one (Person) from another in the same nature we must conclude that these relations are real.

Reply to the Third Objection. just as God undergoes no change in producing his creature, so is he not changed in the production of his Word. Yet the creature does not attain to the divine essence and nature, wherefore the divine essence is not communicated to the creature. For this reason the relation of God to the creature does not result from anything in God but only with respect to something done on the part of the creature. On the other hand the Word is produced as co-essential with God himself; wherefore God is related to his Word in respect of something in God and not only with respect to something on the part of the Word. For then is there a real relation on one side and not on the other, when the cause of the relation is on one side and not on the other: for instance, the relation between the knowable object and knowledge results from the act of the knower and not from anything that he may know.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Relation has a most unstable existence, if this belongs to it alone: but it is not so in God, for in him relation has no other existence than that of the substance, as we shall show further on in the next Article. Hence the argument fails.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. This argument considers the real relation whose being is distinct from the substance in which it is. But this is not so in the case in point, as we shall show further on.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Since the divine Persons differ by their relations only, they do not differ otherwise than by themselves, for the relations are the very Persons who subsist, as we shall prove (A. 4).

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The essential attributes which are properties of the essence are in God really and not logically. For God’s goodness is something. real, and so is his wisdom and so forth, although they are not distinct from his essence otherwise than logically: and the same applies to the relations, as we shall prove further on.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. God’s substance would be imperfect were there anything in it distinct therefrom. But in God relation is his substance, as we shall prove further on: wherefore the objection fails.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The movable and the accidental are reducible to something previous as the imperfect to the perfect. For an accident is imperfect: and movement is the act of what is imperfect. But relation sometimes follows from the perfection of a thing, as in the case of the intellect, since it follows the operation which is its perfection. Hence the divine perfection does not hinder us from ascribing relations to God, as it forbids us to ascribe movement and accident to him.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. That which necessarily exists of itself is not related to anything extraneous, but nothing prevents it from being related to something within it. Wherefore as it is not said to be necessary through another, it is said to be necessary of itself.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Real relation in God follows the action of his intellect, not as though this real relation were that of the one who understands to what he understands, but to his word: for the word and not the thing understood proceeds from him who understands.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although natural reason is able to succeed in proving that God is intelligence, it is not able to discover adequately his mode of understanding. just as we are able to know that God. is but not what he is: even so we are able to know that God understands, but not how he understands. Now to understand by conceiving a word belongs to the mode of understanding: wherefore reason cannot prove this adequately, but it can form a kind of conjecture by comparison with what takes place in us.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. In other kinds of opposition one of the extremes is always by way of being imperfect or non-existent, or with an admixture of non-entity: since negation excludes being and privation is a negation, and of two contraries one always includes a privation. Hence other kinds of opposition cannot be in God, whereas relative opposition can because on neither side does it imply imperfection.

Q. VIII: ARTICLE II

IS RELATION IN GOD THE SAME AS HIS SUBSTANCE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXVIII, A. 2: C.G. IV, XIV]

THE second point of inquiry is whether in God relation is his substance: and seemingly it is not.

1. That no substance is a relation is a self-evident proposition like no substance is a quantity. Neither then is God’s substance a relation.

2. It will be replied that God’s substance is a real and not merely a logical relation.

On the contrary an idea to which nothing real corresponds is idle and vain. But nothing is vain in God. Therefore it is not possible that relation in God differ logically from his substance.

3. The divine Persons are distinct by their relations: for “relation alone multiplies the Trinity,” according to Boethius (De Trin.). If then the divine Persons are not distinct in substance, seeing that the relations add nothing real to the substance but only a logical consideration, it will follow that the distinction between the divine Persons is only logical; which is the heresy of Sabellius.

4. The divine Persons are not distinct by anything absolute . because it would follow that they are distinct in essence, since what is said of God absolutely signifies his essence; for instance, goodness, wisdom and so forth. If then the relations are the same thing as the divine essence it will follow either that the divine Persons are not distinct by the relations, or that they are distinct in essence.

5. If relation is the same thing as God’s very substance, it will follow that just as God and his greatness belong to the predicament of substance, since God is his own greatness, so likewise Paternity will belong to the predicament of substance: so that whatsoever is said of God will be said in reference to his substance, which is contrary to the statement of Augustine (De Trin. v, 4, 5) that not all the things said of God refer to his substance: for relalions are ascribed to God such as that of Father and Son.

6. Whatsoever is said of the predicate may be said of the subject. But if relation is God’s very essence, it will be true to say: The divine essence is Paternity, and with equal reason: Filiation is the divine essence: and thus it would follow that Filiation is Paternity.

7. Things that are the same admit of the same predicates thus the Philosopher says (Top. i): “The slightest difference that we may assign will show that the things are not the same.” Now we predicate of the divine essence that it is wise, that it created the world and so on: while such things, apparently, are not predicated of Paternity and Filiation. Therefore in God relation is not the divine essence.

8. That which distinguishes the divine Persons is not the same thing as that which neither distinguishes them nor is itself distinguished. Now in God relation distinguishes while essence neither distinguishes nor is distinguished. Therefore they are not the same thing.

9. One and the same thing cannot by its essence be the cause of contraries except accidentally. Now distinction which in God results from relation is

contrary to unity, the principle of which is the essence. Therefore relation and essence are not the same thing.

10. If two things are the same with each other, where one is there is the other. If then the divine essence is the same thing with Paternity, wheresoever is the divine essence there will be Paternity. But it is in the Son. Therefore Paternity is also: which is clearly false.

11. In God relation and essence differ at least in our conception of them. Now where the concept or definition differs, there is a different being; since a definition states the quiddity of a thing's being. Hence in God the being of the relation will differ from the being of the substance. Consequently relation and substance differ in being, and therefore really.

12. According to the Philosopher (Praedic.) the being of relation is to be 'to-another.' Therefore the being of relation and not the being of substance consists in respect to another. Therefore relation and substance are not the same in being; and we come to the same conclusion as before.

13. Augustine says (De Trin. V, 4, 5) that something is said of God not substantively but relatively. Now that which signifies the divine substance is predicated substantively. Therefore in God relation does not signify the essence: and the same conclusion follows.

14. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that God is not God in the same way as he is Father. Now he is God by the divine essence, but Father by Paternity. Therefore the essence is not Paternity: wherefore in God the relations are not the divine substance.

On the contrary, whatsoever is in God is God, as Augustine says (De Trin. V, 5). Now relation is in God, as Paternity in the Father. Therefore relation is God himself and the divine substance.

Again every supposite containing things that are different is composite. Now in the person of the Father there is Paternity and the essence: wherefore if Paternity and the divine essence are two things it will follow that the person of the Father is composite; and this is clearly false. It follows therefore that in God relation is the very substance.

I answer that given that there are relations in God we are bound to say that they are the divine essence: else we would have to say that there is composition in God and that the divine relations are accidents, since whatsoever adheres to a thing besides its substance is an accident. It would also follow that something that is not the divine substance is eternal; and all these things are heretical.

Accordingly to make the matter clear we must observe that some of the nine kinds of accident are defined with regard to the nature of an accident, for the nature of an accident is to inhere; wherefore I describe those as defined. with regard to the nature of an accident which are defined as inhering to a subject, such as quantity and quality. On the other hand relation is not defined with regard to its nature as an accident, for it is described not as being in a subject but as having a respect to something extraneous. For this reason the Philosopher (Metaph. v) says that knowledge as a relation is not in the knower but in the thing known. Hence through taking note of the manner of signification in relative terms some said that they are not adherents but as it were assistants to substance, because they denote a kind of medium between the related substance and that to which it is related. From this it was necessary to infer that in creatures relations are not accidents, since the being of an accident is to be in (a subject). Hence certain theologians of the school of Gilbert de la Porrée extended this opinion to the divine relations, and contended that the relations are not in the divine Persons but are assistants to them as it were. And seeing that the divine essence is in the Persons it followed that the relations are not the divine essence: and since every accident adheres (to a subject) it followed that they are not accidents: and in this sense they took the saying of Augustine quoted above, namely that relations are not predicated of God either substantively or accidentally. But from this opinion it follows that relation is not an objective reality but only a subjective idea: since every real thing is either a substance or an accident. For this reason some of the ancient reckoned relation among the predicables, as the Commentator remarks (Metaph. xi, com. 19): wherefore the followers of de la Porrée are compelled to hold that the divine relations are merely logical. Thus it would follow that th distinction between the Persons is not real: which is heretical.

Accordingly we must reply that a thing may be adherent and yet not be defined as adherent: even as action is not defined as being in but from the agent, and yet it is clear that it is in the agent. In like manner although relation is not defined as adhering yet it needs must be adherent that is to say when it is a real relation, for if it be a logical relation it is not adherent.

And just as in creatures it mus be an accident, so in God it must be the substance, since whatsoever is in God is his substance. Therefore real relations, must be the divine substance, yet they have not the mode of substance, but receive another mode of predication differing from those things that are predicated of God substantively.

Reply to the First Objection. No substance that is in a genus can be a relation, because it is confined to one genus and is therefore excluded from another. The divine essence however! is not in the genus of substance, but is above every genus, and comprises the perfection of all genera Wherefore nothing prevents its including that which pertains to relation.

Reply to the Second Objection. Substance and relation differ logically and in that thing which is God something corresponds to both: yet not a different thing to each but one and the same. Moreover it is most appropriate that one thing should correspond to two points of view, when its nature comprises that thing perfectly: and thus it is in the case in point.

Reply to the Third Objection. Although relation does not add a thing to the essence, but only a point of view, yet it is itself a thing, even as goodness is a thing in God, and yet it does not differ from the essence otherwise than logically; and the same applies to wisdom. Wherefore just as things which pertain to goodness or wisdom, such as intelligence and so on, are really in God, even so that which is proper to a real relation, namely opposition and distinction, is really in God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The essential attributes not only signify that which is the divine essence, but they also signify it in a certain way, since they signify something as existing in God: and for this reason a difference in respect of anything absolute would reflect on the divine essence. On the other hand the divine relations, though they signify that which is the divine essence, they do not signify it by way of essence, since they do not convey the idea of existence in something, but of reference towards something else. Hence the distinction arising from the divine relations does not point to a distinction in the essence but only to respect to another by way of origin, as explained above.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Although the relation is the divine substance, it does not convey the idea of substance, as already explained: wherefore it is not predicated substantively, because to be predicated thus belongs to the mode of signification.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. This argument applies to the per se predicables. Now a thing is predicated per se of something when the predication regards the proper nature of that thing; whereas if the predication arises not from the proper nature but from identity, it is not even per se predication. Hence when it is said, The divine essence is Paternity, Paternity is predicated of the divine essence on account not of a logical but of a real identity: and the same applies if essence be predicated of Paternity, as already stated; because essence and relation differ logically. Wherefore this argument falls into the fallacy of accident: because although there is no accident in God, there is a certain likeness to an accident, inasmuch as things which are predicated of one another in respect of an accident while differing logically have but one subject.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3) it is not things which are iii any way the same that receive the same predicates but only those that have the same definition. Now the divine essence and Paternity, although the same in reality, have not the same definition: wherefore it does not follow that whatsoever is predicated of the one is predicated of the other. It must be observed, however, that certain things follow the definitions of essence and relation: wherefore one of these removes the other; thus neither does essence distinguish nor is relation common. On the other hand certain things imply a certain difference from the definition of essence or relation, not in their principle signification but in their mode of signifying: and these are predicated of essence or relation, although not properly: such are adjectives and verbal substantives, e.g. good, wise, to understand, to will: because suchlike terms as to the thing signified,. signify the essence; ,yet they signify it as though it were a supposite and not in the abstract. For this reason good, wise, creating and the like are most appropriately predicated of the Persons and of the concrete essential names such as God, Father; yet they may be predicated, albeit improperly, of the essence in the abstract and not taken as a supposite. Still less properly are they predicated of the relations: because they are applicable to the supposite in respect of the essence and not of the relation: thus God is good or creative through having his essence—not through having a relation.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. That which causes a distinction and that which neither distinguishes nor is distinguished can be the same in reality but not logically.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The unity of the essence is not opposed to the distinction of the relations: wherefore it does not follow that relation and essence are causes of contraries.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. If two things be the same both really and logically, wherever the one is there must the other be. But this does not necessarily apply when they are the same really but not logically: thus the same instant is the beginning of the future and the end of the past: yet not the beginning of the future but that which is the beginning of the future is said to be in the past. In like manner we do not say that Paternity is in the Son, but that which is Paternity, the essence.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there is no being save that of the essence, even as there is no (act of) understanding but the intellect—and therefore as in God there is but one act of understanding, so is there but one being Wherefore it can nowise be granted that in God the being of the. relations is distinct from the being of the essence. Now the definition of a thing does not signify its being but its being this or that, namely what that thing is. Wherefore two definitions of one thing do not prove that it has a twofold being, but that it can be said in two ways of that thing that it is: thus we may say of a point what it is as a beginning, and what it is as an end,. on account of the, different definitions of beginning and end.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Since in creatures relation is an accident its being is to be in something, and. not to have a respect to some other thing: but considered as a relation its being is to have respect to something else.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Relatives are said not to be predicated of God substantially, because they are not predicated as something existing in a substance, but as having a respect to something else, yet not as though that which they signify were not the substance.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. God is said not to be God in the same way as Father on account of the different ways of signifying godhead and paternity, as explained above.

Q. VIII: ARTICLE III

DO THE RELATIONS CONSTITUTE AND DISTINGUISH THE PERSONS OR HYPOSTASES?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXX, A. I: Q. XI. A. 2]

THE third point of inquiry is whether the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons or Hypostases: and seemingly they do not.

1. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i): Every relative expression signifies something besides the relation expressed: thus a master is a man, a slave is a man. Now the Persons in God are expressed relatively. Therefore they are something besides the relative term: and consequently they are not constituted by the relations: for if you remove that which constitutes a thing it is no longer a thing.

2. It will be replied that in God that which is besides Paternity is the Father.

On the contrary it is evident that Father is also a relative term. If then through Paternity being relative the Person must contain something besides Paternity, for the same reason beside being Father the Person must contain something that is not relative.

3. Augustine says (ibid.) that in no sense can the Father be referred to himself, but whatsoever is said of him is in relation to the Son. Thus the same conclusion follows as before.

4. One may reply that what the Father is besides the relation is the essence.

On the contrary whatsoever is in a relative besides the relation is referred to the other thing by that relation, as may be seen from the examples which he gives: thus man is related to servant by the relationship of dominion. Now the essence in God is not related, since it neither begets nor is begotten. Therefore this cannot be said of the essence but of the subject of the relation, which subject begets or is begotten.

5. A thing is considered in itself before we refer it to another. Now nothing is constituted by that which comes after it in our consideration of it. Therefore the hypostasis of the Father is not constituted by its relation to something else.

6. In God hypostases are more perfect than in us. But in us properties neither constitute nor distinguish hypostases, but are signs of distinction in hypostases already constituted. Therefore neither in God do the relations which are properties constitute or distinguish the hypostases.

7. Logically the generating hypostasis precedes generation, since the generator is understood to be the principle of generation: and logically generation precedes Paternity, since relations follow actions or passions (Metaph. v). Therefore logically the hypostasis of the Father precedes Paternity, and consequently is not constituted by it, as neither is the hypostasis of the Son by Filiation.

8. No form is constituted or distinctive outside its own genus; thus whiteness constitutes and distinguishes a white from a black thing in point of quality: likewise length constitutes and differentiates a thing in point of quantity. Therefore neither is relation constitutive or distinctive outside the genus of relation. But a hypostasis belongs to the genus of substance. Therefore relation neither constitutes nor distinguishes the hypostasis.

9. In God relation is the divine essence: wherefore if it constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis, this is either qua the divine substance or qua relation. Not, however, qua divine essence, because since this is common to the three Persons it cannot be the principle of their distinction: nor again qua relation, because relation does not signify anything self-subsistent I which is the meaning of the word hypostasis, but merely reference to another. Therefore relation nowise distinguishes or constitutes the hypostasis.

10. In God nothing constitutes or distinguishes itself. Now the relations are themselves the hypostases: for just as Godhead and God do not differ, so neither do Paternity and Father. Therefore the relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases.

11. One should not ask how two things are distinct unless they have something in common which is distinguished by something added in each of them: thus animal is common to man and horse, and is distinguished as rational and irrational by the addition of differences: wherefore we may ask how man and horse differ. Whereas things which have nothing in common so as to be distinguished in the foregoing manner are distinct by themselves and not by any distinguishing principle. Now two divine hypostases have nothing common but the essence, and this is not in any way distinguished by relations. Therefore it should be said not that the hypostases are distinguished by the relations, but that they are distinct by themselves.

12. Nothing causes what it presupposes. But relation presupposes distinction, since thereby one thing is referred to another, and otherness

implies distinction. Therefore relation cannot be a principle of distinction.

13. Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 15) says that in the angels the hypostases are distinguished by quality alone, and in God by origin alone. Now origin differs logically from relation, as generation from Paternity. Therefore the hypostases are distinguished not by relation but by origin.

14. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6, 7) the divine hypostases are distinguished by their properties. Now it is the property of the Father that he begot the Son, according to Augustine, and of the Son that he is born of the Father. Therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by generation and birth. But these denote origin, therefore the Father and the Son are distinguished by origin and not by relation.

15. There are some relations in God which neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, such as equality and likeness. Therefore neither do the other relations, such as Paternity and Filiation, constitute and distinguish the hypostases.

On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God relation alone multiplies the Trinity. Now multitude in the Trinity: arises from constituted and distinct hypostases. Therefore relation alone constitutes the Persons and hypostases.

Moreover things are distinguished only by what is not predicated of them in common. Now the relations alone are predicated of the divine Persons severally and not in common according to Augustine (De Trin. v, 8). Therefore the Persons and hypostases in God are distinguished by the relations alone.

I answer that there are two opinions on this question. The first is that in God relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, but show that they are constituted and distinct. In order to elucidate the point it must be observed that this word hypostasis denotes an individual substance, one to wit that cannot be predicated of several. Hence genera and species in the predicament of substance, such as man or animal, cannot be called hypostases, since they are predicated of several: whereas Socrates and Plato are called hypostases because they are predicated of one only. Accordingly if, as Jews and pagans assert, there is no Trinity in God, there is no need to ask what constitutes or distinguishes the hypostasis since this is nothing but the divine essence: because by his very essence God is something undivided in itself, and distinct from all things that are not God. Seeing, however, that the Catholic Faith teaches that there is one essence in three Persons, it is inconceivable that the divine essence distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in God: because we understand the Godhead as constituting God, and as common to the three Persons and therefore as predicated of several subjects and not as an incommunicable hypostasis. In like manner nothing that is said of God absolutely can be understood as distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the Persons, since what is predicated of God absolutely conveys the notion of something essential. Wherefore that which constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis in the divine Persons must be that which before anything else is not predicated of several but exclusively of one. Now there are two things that fulfil this condition, relation ~,nd origin, and generation and Paternity (or birth and Filiation), which although they are really but one thing in God, differ nevertheless logically and in their mode of signification. Logically the first of these is origin, for relation seemingly follows origin. Wherefore this opinion holds that the divine hypostases are constituted and distinguished by their origin, and this is indicated when we say A is from B, and from B is A: and that the relations of Paternity and Filiation logically follow the constitution and distinction of the Persons, and indicate the constitution and distinction of the hypostases. Thug, the fact that one is called Father shows that another originates from him: and the fact that one is called Son shows that he originates from another. Nor does it follow from this opinion that the divine hypostases, if not distinguished by their relations, are distinguished by something absolute, since the origins themselves imply relation: seeing that as father denotes relationship to a son, so does begetter. to one begotten.

Nevertheless this opinion seemingly is void of foundation. For a thing may be understood to distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in two ways. It may be taken for the principle whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted and distinguished; as man is constituted by humanity, and Socrates by ‘socrateity’: or it may be taken for the way as it were to distinction and constitution: thus we might say that Socrates is a man by his generation which is the way to the form whereby he is constituted formally. It is clear then that a thing’s origin cannot be understood as constituting and distinguishing except in reference to that which constitutes and distinguishes formally: since if humanity were not produced by generation, never would a man be constituted by generation. Consequently it cannot be said that the hypostasis of the Son is constituted by its nativity, except in so far as we take its nativity as terminating in something whereby the hypostasis is formally constituted. Now the relation in which nativity terminates is filiation. Therefore the hypostasis of the Son must be formally constituted and distinguished by Filiation and not by its origin: nor by the relation implied in the origin, since the relation implied in the origin like the origin itself denotes something not as yet subsistent in the nature but as tending thereto. And since all hypostases of the same nature have the same constitutive and distinguishing principle, it follows that in like manner on the part of the Father we must understand that the hypostasis of the Father is constituted and distinguished by Paternity, and not by active generation nor by the relation implied thereby.

This is the second opinion, namely that the relations constitute and distinguish the Persons and hypostases: and it may be explained as follows. As already proved, Paternity is the same as the divine essence: and likewise the Father is the same as God: wherefore Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes God. And just as Paternity, although it is the divine essence, is not common as the essence is: even so although the Father is the very same thing as God, he is not common as God is, but proper. Accordingly God the Father as God is something common as having the divine nature, and as Father is something proper and distinct from the other Persons. Hence he is a hypostasis, which signifies that which subsists in a nature and is distinct from others: so that Paternity by constituting the Father constitutes the hypostasis.

Reply to the First Objection. The divine Persons are something besides a relation: this is the essence which is not spoken of relatively. This is what Augustine means to say as may be seen by studying his words carefully.

Hence we grant the Second and Third Objections.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although relation is not attributed to the essence as though it were a form, it is attributed to it as identical with it. For even if we do not say that the essence begets or is related, we do say that it is a generation and relation. However, relative terms are predicated of the essential names in the concrete even by way of information: thus we say that God begets God, and that God is related to God, inasmuch as relation and essence are understood as having a common supposite, as we have shown: although the essential names themselves are not distinct. Wherefore apart from the relative terms the essential names are understood in the concrete, since through the relations they have a relative signification.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In each divine hypostasis we speak of something that is absolute: this belongs to the essence, and in our way of thinking precedes the divine relations. Yet that which we conceive as absolute, since it is common, does not regard the distinction of the hypostases: so that it does not follow that we must conceive the hypostasis as distinct before we understand its relation.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In lower things hypostases are distinct in essence, so that the properties which result from the essence cannot be the principle of distinction, but are signs thereof. But the divine hypostases are nowise distinct in essence wherefore the properties must be the principle of this distinction.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Two things are requisite to constitute a hypostasis. First it must be self-subsistent and undivided in itself: secondly it must be distinct from other hypostases of the same nature. If, however, there be no other hypostases of the same nature it will still be a hypostasis, even as Adam when there were not as yet other hypostases in human nature. Hence the generating hypostasis must always be presupposed to generation, insofar as it is self-subsistent and undivided in itself, but not as distinct from other hypostases of the same nature, if other hypostases of the same nature originate solely by this kind of generation: thus Adam was not distinct from other hypostases of the same nature before the formation of the woman from his rib, and the birth of his children. But in God the hypostases are not multiplied except by the procession of the other Persons from one. Wherefore we understand the Person of the Father as subsistent before we understand him as begetting, and not as distinct from the other hypostases of the same nature which do not proceed unless we presuppose this generation. And although the divine relations constitute the hypostases and thus make them subsistent, they do this inasmuch as they are the divine essence: because a relation as such neither has nor can give subsistence, for this belongs to a substance alone. On the other hand the relations as such distinguish, for it is as such that they are mutually opposed. It follows then that the relation of Paternity, inasmuch as it constitutes the hypostasis of the Father (which it does as identical with the divine substance) is presupposed to generation, but inasmuch as it distinguishes, generation is presupposed to

Paternity. As regards the Son there is no further difficulty: because birth logically precedes the hypostasis of the one born, for we conceive it as the way to it: since generation is the way to substance.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. As we have already stated in God relation is something besides relation; for it is God's very substance in reality: wherefore it can constitute something subsistent and not merely relative.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. As already stated relation as such distinguishes the hypostasis: while as identical with the divine essence it constitutes the hypostasis, and does both inasmuch as it is both relation and divine essence.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. In God the abstract and the concrete do not differ in reality, since in God there is neither accident nor matter: they differ only in their manner of signification, inasmuch as we understand the Godhead as constituting God and God as having Godhead: the same applies to Paternity and the Father, for though they are really the same thing, they differ in their mode of signification.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although in God nothing is really common save the one essence, there is a logical community in the divine Persons in the fact that each is a supposite of the essence. This community is indicated in all concrete essential names, that signify the supposite in general: for instance, God is one who has the Godhead. Accordingly it is logically common to the three Persons to be a supposite of the divine nature, although the three Persons are not one supposite, but three: even as Socrates and Plato are two men although it is logically common to them to be a man. Now a difference is sought not only in things that have something real in common, but even in those that have something in common logically.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Relation presupposes the distinction of the other genera such as substance and quantity; and sometimes also of action and passion: whereas it does not presuppose but causes the distinction arising from towardness: thus the relation of double presupposes the relation of great and small, whereas it does not presuppose but causes the relation of 2 to 1. In God, however, there is no other than relative distinction.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Richard says that the Persons are distinct by their origin, inasmuch as they are distinguished by relations of origin.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Augustine uses the words begot the Son and is the Father as having the same meaning: wherefore he sometimes speaks of origin instead of relation.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The relations of equality and likeness cannot cause a distinction of Persons in God, rather do they presuppose it. Likeness is sameness of quality in things that differ, and equality is sameness of quantity in things that are distinct. Thus it is clear that distinction of supposites is presupposed to both likeness and equality.

Q. VIII: ARTICLE IV

IF MENTAL ABSTRACTION BE MADE OF THE RELATIONS, DO THE DIVINE HYPOSTASES REMAIN?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XL, A. 3]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether if we make mental abstraction of the relations the divine hypostases remain, and it would seem that they do remain.

1. In the created world everything is made to a likeness of what is in God. Now if we make abstraction of the relations and properties of the human hypostasis there still remains the hypostasis. Therefore the same applies to God.

2. It is not owing to the same reason that the Father is someone and that he is the Father: for the Son also is someone and yet he is not the Father. Hence if we remove Paternity from the Father he is still someone. Now he is someone inasmuch as he is a hypostasis. Therefore if we remove Paternity by mental abstraction, the hypostasis of the Father still remains.

3. Seeing that we understand a thing through its definition, we can understand anything even if abstraction be made of what is not included in its definition. Now relation is not included in the definition of a hypostasis. Therefore we can make abstraction of the relation and still understand the hypostasis.

4. Jews and heathens understand that there is a hypostasis in God, for they conceive him to be a self-subsistent being: yet they do not understand

Paternity, Filiation and like relations in him. Therefore if we make abstraction of such relations the hypostases still remain in God.

5. That to which anything is added remains when the addition is removed: thus man adds rational to animal (since man is a rational animal): wherefore if we remove rational, animal remains. Now Person adds a property to hypostasis: for person signifies a “hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity.” Therefore if by abstraction we remove property from the Person, the hypostasis remains.

6. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 2) that the Word is begotten Wisdom. Now wisdom presupposes the hypostasis and begotten presupposes the property. Therefore if we remove from the Word that he is begotten, his hypostasis still remains: and the same applies to the other Persons.

7. If we make abstraction, of Paternity and Filiation there still remain in God the One (proceeding) from another and One from whom another (proceeds). But these denote the hypostases. Therefore abstraction being made of the relations the hypostases remain in God.

8. Though the constituent difference be removed the genus remains. Now the personal properties by constituting the Persons are in God as constituent differences. Therefore if these properties be removed, the genus person or hypostasis remains.

9. Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6) that if we remove the fact that (this Person) is the Father, it still remains that he is unbegotten. Now unbegotten is a property that can have no other subject but a hypostasis. Therefore if we make abstraction of Paternity, the hypostasis of the Father still remains.

10. As the relations are properties of the hypostases, so are the attributes properties of the essence. Now if we make abstraction of an essential attribute we still conceive the divine substance: thus Boethius says (De Hebd.) that if by abstraction we remove goodness from God, it still remains that he is God. Therefore in like manner if we remove the relations, the hypostases; still remain in God.

11. According to Boethius (Super Proem. Porphyr. in Praed.) it is proper to the intellect to separate things that are naturally united. Now property and hypostasis are really united in God. Therefore the intellect can separate them.

12. It is possible to conceive a thing after removing what it contains: thus we can conceive a subject after an accident has been removed from it. Now

the divine relations are said to be in the hypostases. Therefore after the relations have been removed by abstraction the hypostases remain.

On the contrary, in God no distinction is possible except by the relations. Now the hypostasis denotes something distinct. Therefore the hypostases do not remain if the relations be removed. For seeing that in God there are only two modes of predication, namely substantive and relative, if the relations be removed nothing remains to be predicated except substantively: and such are things that regard the essence, so that the hypostases will no longer be distinct.

I answer that as stated above (A. 3) some have contended that in God the hypostases are not constituted or distinguished by the relations but only by their origin. And ,they held relation to be consequent to the origin of the Person as terminating and completing it, so as to indicate a certain dignity. Wherefore since person is thought to denote dignity, they said that the hypostasis with the added relation is conceived to constitute the Person; and thus they held the relations to constitute the Person and not the hypostasis. In this sense it is customary with some to call these relations Personalities: and consequently just as with us if we remove from a man that which pertains to dignity and makes him a person, his hypostasis remains, even so in God if we mentally abstract these personal relations from the Persons they say that the hypostases but not the Persons will remain. Seeing, however, that as we have proved above (A. 3) these relations both constitute and distinguish the hypostases, we must hold the contrary opinion that abstraction being made of these relations neither the Persons nor the hypostases remain: because if the constituents of a thing be removed the thing itself cannot remain.

Reply to the First Objection. Neither relations nor properties constitute the human hypostasis, whereas we have proved that they constitute the divine hypostasis: wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to the Second Objection. From the same cause the Father is someone and is the Father: the same that is, really and not only logically, yet with a logical distinction, either as that of generic and specific, or of common and proper. Thus it is plain that from the same form man is an animal and, is a man (since one thing has not several actually distinct substantial forms): yet from his soul inasmuch as it is a sensible soul, he is only an animal, and from his soul as both sensible and rational, he is a man.

Hence a horse is an animal but is not a man; because its sensible soul is not the same sensible soul as that of a man, and for that reason it is not the same individual animal as a man. The same applies to the question in point. The Father is someone and is the Father on account of the relation: but he is someone on account of the relation considered in general: while that he is a particular someone is due to this particular relation which is Paternity. For this reason again the Son, in whom is a relation, but not the relation of Paternity, is someone, but he is not that particular someone that is the Father.

Reply to the Third Objection. The definition of a thing may include something in two ways: explicitly, i.e. actually, or implicitly, i.e. potentially. The definition of an animal does not include the rational soul explicitly and actually, for then every animal would have a rational soul: but it includes it implicitly and potentially, because an animal is a sensible animate substance. Now just as soul includes rational soul potentially, so does animated being contain rational being potentially: so that where the definition of animal is actually applied to man, rational must be included in the definition of animal explicitly, for as much as animal is the same as man. It is thus in the case in point: for hypostasis considered in general is a distinct substance, wherefore since there can be no distinction in God except by reason of relation, when I say ‘divine hypostasis’ it must of necessity be conceived as distinct by reason of a relation. Hence although relation is not included in the definition of the hypostasis that is a man, it is included in the definition of a divine hypostasis.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Jews and heathens do not conceive the essence as distinct except from things of another nature, and such distinction arises from the divine essence itself. We, however, conceive the hypostasis as distinct from that which is of the same nature, and from which it cannot be distinguished otherwise than by relation alone. Hence the objection proves nothing.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The manner of definition differs in accidents and substances. Substances are not defined by something outside their essence: wherefore the first thing included in the definition of a substance is the genus, which is predicated essentially of the thing defined. Whereas an accident is defined by something outside its essence, namely by its subject, on which it depends for its being. Hence in its definition the subject takes the place of the genus: for instance, simous means "flat-nosed." Accordingly just as if we remove the difference from the definition ,of a substance the genus remains, even so if we remove the accident (which takes the place of the. difference) from the definition of an accident the subject remains. There is, however, a difference. When the difference is removed the genus remains, but not identically the same: thus if we remove rational, the same identical animal which is rational animal does not remain; whereas when from the definition of an accident we remove that which takes the place of the difference the same identical subject remains, thus the same nose remains when we remove the curved or 'pug' shape. This is because an accident does not complete the essence of its subject as the difference completes the essence of the genus. When therefore we say, I a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity, hypostasis is included in the definition of person not as subject but as genus. Wherefore if we remove the property pertaining to dignity the hypostasis does not remain the same identically or specifically but only generically, and as applied to nonrational substances.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. When we say, The Word is Begotten Wisdom, 'Wisdom' stands for the hypostasis, although it does not signify it. Hence it does not include the property in its signification, and so it is necessary to add it: thus I might say that God is the Begotten Son.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. He that proceeds from another and he from whom another proceeds do not differ from Filiation and Paternity save as common from proper: since Son denotes him who is from another by generation, and Father signifies him from whom another is by generation: unless we contend that he who is from another and he from whom another is denote the origin, while Father and Son denote the consequent relations. But we have already made it plain that the hypostases are constituted not by their origins but by their relations.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. After abstraction of the constituent difference, the genus remains in common but not in any species or individual.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Augustine does not mean to say that God the Father remains unbegotten if we abstract his Paternity, except perhaps in so far as unbegotten would then denote a condition of nature and not a property of the Person. His intention was to show that if we abstract the

Paternity, unbegotten may still remain in general: since. it is not necessary that whatsoever is unbegotten be the Father.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The notion of goodness does not constitute the notion of the essence, in fact good is conceived as informing being. On the other hand the property constitutes the hypostasis: wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although the mind is able to separate certain things that are united, it cannot do so in every case: for it cannot separate things one of which enters into the definition of the other; thus it cannot separate animal from man. Now property enters into the definition of the hypostasis: wherefore the objection does not prove.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. If one removes that which is in another as subject or place, that in which it was remains: but it is not so if we remove that which is part of a thing’s essence: thus man no longer remains if we remove rational: and in like manner if we remove the property, the hypostasis does not remain.

QUESTION IX

THE DIVINE PERSONS

THERE are nine points of inquiry. (1) Of the Person as compared with the essence, subsistence and hypostasis. (9.) What is a person? (3) Can there be a Person in God? (4) In God does this word Person mean something relative or something absolute? (5) Are there a number of Persons in God? (6) Is it right to predicate Person plurally in God? (7) How are numeral terms predicated of God, positively or in a removing sense? (8) Is there diversity in God? (9) Are there only three Persons in God, or more or less than three?

Q. IX: ARTICLE I

THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE ESSENCE, SUBSISTENCE AND HYPOSTASIS

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXIX, A. 2]

WE are inquiring about the divine Persons, and the first point of inquiry is about the Persons in comparison with the essence, subsistence and hypostasis: and it would seem that they are absolutely the same.

1. Augustine (De Trin. vii, 3) says that the Greeks mean the same when they acknowledge three hypostases in God, as the Latins when they acknowledge three Persons. Wherefore hypostasis and Person signify the same.

2. But it will be replied that the person differs from the hypostasis in that the latter signifies an individual of any nature in the genus of substance, whereas a person denotes an individual of none but a rational nature.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that the Greeks employ the term hypostasis to denote only an individual of rational nature. If, then, person signifies an individual of rational nature, hypostasis and person are absolutely the same.

3. Names are taken from our idea of the things they signify. Now individuality conveys the same idea in things of a rational nature as in other substances. Therefore an individual of rational nature should not have a special name rather than other individuals in the genus of substance, as though there were a difference between hypostasis and person.

4. Subsistence is taken from subsisting. Now nothing subsists besides individuals in the genus of substance, in which are accidents and second substances, namely genus and species (Praedic.). Therefore only individuals in the genus of substance are subsistences. But an individual in the genus of substance is a hypostasis or person. Therefore subsistence is the same as hypostasis and person.

5. It will be replied that genera and species in the genus of substance subsist, since to subsist belongs to them according to Boethius (loc. cit.).

On the contrary, to subsist is to exist by oneself. Hence what exists only in another does not subsist. Now genera and species are only in something else: for they are only in ‘first substances,’ and if these latter be removed, nothing of the former can possibly remain (Praedic. Substantia). Hence to subsist does not belong to genera and species, but only to individuals in the genus of substance: so that we must still conclude that subsistence is the same as hypostasis.

6. Boethius, (Comment. Praedic.) says that ουσια, i.e. essence, signifies that which is composed of matter and form. Now this must be an individual, since matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore the essence signifies the individual, and thus person, hypostasis, essence and subsistence are the same.

7. The essence is signified by the definition, since a definition tells us what a thing is. Now the definition of a natural thing that is composed of matter and form, includes not only the form but also the matter, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi). Therefore the essence is something composed of matter and form.

8. It will be replied that the essence denotes the common nature, while the other three, namely subsistence, hypostasis and person, signify an individual in the genus of substance. On the contrary, universal and particular are to be found in every genus. Now in other genera there are not

different names for the particular and the universal; thus quality and quantity are denominated in the same way whether ‘in general or in particular. Neither therefore in the genus of substance should there be different names to denote a universal and a particular substance: wherefore one would think that these terms have the same signification.

On the contrary, Boethius says (Comment. Praed.) that ουσια, i.e. essence, signifies that which is composed of matter and form; that ουσιωσις, i.e. subsistence, signifies the form, and hypostasis the matter. Therefore they differ.

Moreover the same conclusion would seem to follow from the fact that the same author (De Duab. Nat.) explains the difference between these terms.

I answer that the Philosopher (Metaph. v) says that substance may be taken in two ways. In one sense it is the ultimate subject which is not predicated of another: and this is the individual in the genus of substance: while in another sense it is the form or nature of a subject. The reason for this distinction is that several subjects may have a common nature; thus several men have in common the nature of man. Hence the need of distinguishing that which is one from that which is multiple: for the common nature is signified by the definition which indicates what a thing is: so that this common nature is called the essence or quiddity. Wherefore whatsoever a thing contains pertaining to the common nature is included in the signification of the essence, whereas this cannot be said of all that is contained in the individual substance. For if whatsoever is in the individual substance were to belong to the common nature, there would be no possible distinction between individual substances of the same nature. Now that which is in the individual substance besides the common nature is individual matter (which is the principle of individuation) and consequently individual accidents which determine this same matter. Accordingly the essence is compared to the individual substance as a formal part thereof, for instance, human nature in Socrates. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence is not quite the same as the subject, and consequently it is not predicated of the subject: for we do not say that Socrates is his human nature. On the other hand in simple substances there is no difference between essence and subject, seeing that in them there is no individual matter to individualise the common nature, but their very essence is a subsistence. This is clear from what the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii), and from Avicenna, who says (Metaph.) that a simple thing is its own quiddity. Now two things are proper to the substance which is a subject. The first is that it needs no external support but is supported by itself: wherefore it is said to subsist, as existing not in another but in itself. The second is that it is the foundation to accidents by sustaining them, and for this reason it is said to substand. Accordingly substance which is a subject, inasmuch as it subsists, is called ουσιωσις or subsistence, but inasmuch as it substands it is called hypostasis by the Greeks, and ‘first substance’ by the Latins. It is clear then that hypostasis and substance differ logically but are one in reality. Essence, however, in material substances is not the same as they really, nor yet is it altogether diverse since it is by way of a formal part: but in immaterial substances it is altogether the same in reality while differing logically. Person adds a definite nature to the hypostasis, since it is nothing more than a hypostasis of rational nature.

Reply to the First Objection. Inasmuch as person adds nothing but the rational nature to the hypostasis, it follows that hypostasis and person are absolutely the same in rational nature; thus seeing that man adds rational to animal, it follows that a rational animal is a man. Hence Augustine’s statement is true when he says (De Trin. vii, 4) that Greeks mean the same when they acknowledge three hypostases in God, as the Latins when they acknowledge three Persons.

Reply to the. Second Objection. The word hypostasis in Greek in its proper signification denotes an individual substance of any nature, but through use it has come to, mean only an individual of rational nature.

Reply to the Third Objection. just as it is proper to an individual substance to exist by itself, so is it proper to it to act by itself. For nothing acts but an actual being: for which reason as heat exists not by itself so neither does it act by itself, but the hot thing heats by its heat. Now to act by themselves is becoming in a higher degree to substances of a rational nature than to others: since rational substances alone have dominion over their actions, so that it is in them to act or not to act, while other substances are acted on rather than act themselves. Hence it was fitting that the individual substance of rational nature should have a special name.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Although nothing subsists but the individual substance which is called a hypostasis, it is not said to subsist for the same reason as it is said to substand: it is said to subsist as not existing in another, and to substand inasmuch as other things are in it. Hence if there were a substance that exists by itself without being the subject of an accident, it could be called a subsistence but not a substance.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Boethius expresses himself according to the opinion of Plato, who held genera and species to be separate subsistent forms devoid of accidents; and in this view they could be called subsistences but not hypostases. Or we may reply that genera and species are said to subsist, not because they themselves subsist, but because in their natures individuals subsist, apart from all accidents.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. In material substances essence denotes something composed of matter and form; not indeed of individual but of common matter: thus the definition of man which signifies his essence, includes flesh and bones but not this flesh and these bones. On the other hand individual matter is included in the meaning of hypostasis and subsistence in material things.

This suffices for the Reply to the Seventh Objection.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Accidents are not individualised save by their subjects. Substance alone is individualised by itself and its proper principles; hence it is fitting that only in the genus of substance should the particular have a special name.

The arguments advanced in a contrary sense may be granted. But it must be noted that Boethius in his commentary on the Categories takes these terms in a different sense from that in which they are usually employed and as he uses them in his work De Duabus Naturis. Thus he applies% the term hypostasis to matter as the first substanding principle, whereby the ‘ first substance ‘ is enabled to underlie accidents: since a simple form cannot be a subject, as he also says (De Trin.). Again he applies the term ουσιωσις to the form as the principle of being: because by it is a thing actual: while he employs ουσια or essence as indicating the composite. Whence he shows that in material substances both form and matter are essential principles.

Q. IX: ARTICLE II

WHAT IS MEANT BY A PERSON?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXIX, AA. 1, 3]

THE second point of inquiry is the meaning of the word person. Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) defines it as “an individual substance o rational nature”: and it would seem that this definition is incorrect.

1. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) no singular thing can be defined. Now a person is an individual in the genus of substance as already stated. Therefore it cannot be defined.

2. To this it will be replied that although that which is a person is singular, the idea of a person is something common, and this suffices to make it possible to define it.

On the contrary, that which is common to all individual substances of rational nature, is the ‘intention’ of singularity, which is not in the genus of substance. Therefore in the definition of person we should not give substance the place of the genus.

3. But it will be replied that this word person does not denote a mere intention, but an intention together with its subject.

On the contrary, the Philosopher (Metaph. vii) proves that a compound of subject and accident cannot be defined: because such a definition would be nugatory. For seeing that the definition of an accident includes the subject, e.g. nose in the definition of simous, it will be necessary in defining a compound of subject and accident to express the subject twice; once for itself and once for the accident. If, then, person signifies the intention together with the subject it will be futile to define it.

4. The subject of this common intention is an individual. If then person denotes the intention together with its subject, it will still follow that in defining person the individual will be defined, which cannot be done.

5. An intention is not included in the definition of a thing, nor accident in the definition of a substance. Now person denominates a thing and a substance. Therefore it is unfitting to include individual in the definition of person, since it denotes both an intention and an accident.

6. A thing in whose definition substance is expressed as the genus must be itself a species of substance. Now person is not a species of substance, for then it would be condivided with other species of substance. Therefore it is unfitting in defining person to express substance as the genus.

7. Substance is divided into first and second. Now second substance cannot have a place in the definition of person: since a contradiction of terms would be involved in saying individual substance, inasmuch as ‘second substance’ is a universal substance. Likewise it cannot denote a ‘first substance,’ for a ‘first substance’ is an individual substance, so that it would be futile to add individual to substance in defining person. Therefore it is unfitting to include substance In the definition of person.

8. The term subsistence is seemingly more akin than su& stance to person: thus we say that there are three subsistences in God, as likewise three Persons: whereas we do not say there are three substances, but one. Therefore it were better to define person as a subsistence than as a substance.

9. If you multiply the thing defined you multiply the genus included in the definition: thus many men are many animals. Now there are three persons and not three substances in God. Therefore substance should not be expressed as the genus in the definition of person.

10. Rational is a difference of animal. Now person is to be found in things that are not animals, viz. in the angels and in God. Therefore rational should not be expressed as the difference in defining person.

11. Nature is only in movable things, since it is the principle of movement (Phys. ii, 1). Now essence is in things both movable and immovable. Therefore it were better in defining person to include essence rather than nature, seeing that person is found to be both in movable and immovable things, since there are persons in men, angels and God.

12. The definition should be convertible with the thing defined. Now not every individual substance of rational nature is a person. For the divine essence qua essence is not a person, else in God there would be one Person even as there is one essence. Therefore the aforesaid definition of person is unsuitable.

13. Human nature in Christ is an individual substance of rational nature: for it is neither an accident nor a universal substance, nor is it of irrational nature: and yet in Christ it is not a person, since it would follow that the divine Person in assuming human nature assumed a human person. Thus there would be two persons in Christ, the divine Person assuming and the human person assumed, which is the heresy of Nestorius. Therefore not every individual substance of rational nature is a person.

14. The soul separated by death from the body is not said to be a person; yet it is an individual substance of rational nature. Therefore this is not a suitable definition of person.

I answer that as explained above it is reasonable that the individual in the genus of substance should have a special name: because a substance is individualized by its proper principles, and not by something extraneous as an accident is by its subject. Again it is reasonable that among individual substances the individual of rational nature should have a special name, because as stated above it belongs to it properly and truly to act by itself. Wherefore just as the word hypostasis according to the Greeks, or ‘first substance’ according to the Latins is the special name of an individual in the genus of substance, even so the word person is the special name of an individual of rational nature: so that person is a special name under both these heads. Hence to indicate that it is in a special manner an individual in the genus of substance, it is stated that it is an individual substance; and to indicate that it is in a special manner (an individual) of rational nature it is added of rational nature. Accordingly by describing it as a substance we exclude accidents from the notion of person, for no accident can be a person, and by adding individual we exclude genera and species in the genus of substance, since they cannot be called persons: and by adding of rational nature we exclude inanimate bodies, plants and dumb animals which are not persons.

Reply to the First Objection. Three points are to be noted in an individual substance: first, the generic and specific nature existing in the individual: second, such a nature’s mode of existence, inasmuch as the generic and specific nature in the individual substance exists as proper to that individual and not as common to many: third, the principle whence arises this mode of existence. Now just as a nature considered in itself is common, so also is that nature’s mode of existence: for we do not find human nature existing in things except as individualized in this or that man: since there is not a man that is not a particular man, except in the opinion of Plato who posited separate universals. But the principle of that mode of existence, namely the principle of individuation, is not common, but differs in each individual: for this particular thing is individualized by this matter, and that one by that matter. Accordingly just as the term denoting the nature is common and definable, e.g. man or animal, so too is the term denoting the nature together with such a mode of existence, e.g. hypostasis or person. On the other hand the term that includes in its signification a determinate principle of individuality, is neither common nor definable, e.g. Socrates or Plato.

Reply to the Second Objection. Not only is the intention of singularity common to all individual substances, but also the generic nature together with that particular mode of existence. In this way the term hypostasis denotes a nature of the genus substance as individualized; while the term Person denotes only a rational nature with that particular mode of existence. For this reason neither hypostasis nor person is a term of intention, like singular and individual, but denotes a thing only, and not a thing together with an intention.

This suffices for the Replies to the Third and Fourth Objections.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Whereas the essential differences of things are often unknown and unnamed, we are sometimes under the necessity of employing accidental differences to denote substantial distinctions, as the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. viii). Thus it is that individual is included in the definition of person, in order to indicate an individual mode of existence.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The division of substance into ‘first’ and ‘second’ is not a division into genus and species, since ‘second’ substance covers nothing that is not covered by ‘first’ substance: but it is a division of a genus according to different modes of existence. Thus ‘second’ substance denotes the generic nature in itself absolutely, while ‘first’ substance signifies that nature as individually subsistent: wherefore the division is analogous rather than specific. Accordingly person is contained in the genus substance, although not as a species, but as defining a specific mode of existence.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Some hold that substance is included in the definition of person, inasmuch as it signifies a hypostasis; but since the definition of hypostasis includes individual as opposed to community of universality and to part (for no universal or part of a thing, e.g. a hand or a foot, can be called a hypostasis) they say that individual is added in the definition of person, inasmuch as individual excludes the community of assumability: for they hold that human nature in Christ is a hypostasis but not a person. Wherefore, say they, to exclude assumability, individual is added in the definition of person. This, however, would seem contrary to the intention of Boethius who (De Duab. Nat.) by the term individual excludes universals from the definition of Person. Hence it is better to say that in the definition of person substance does not stand for hypostasis but for that which is common to ‘first’ substance, i.e. hypostasis and ‘second’ substance, and is divided into both: so that this common (substance) by the addition of individual is narrowed down to the hypostasis, and thus to say: An individual substance of rational nature, is the same as to say a hypostasis of rational nature.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. In view of what we have just said, this argument does not prove. Substance does not stand for hypostasis, but for that which is common to all substance in whatever sense it be taken. If, however, substance were to stand for hypostasis the objection would, remain inconclusive: because the substance that is a hypostasis, is more akin to person than is subsistence, since person conveys the idea of subject like a ‘first’ substance, and not merely the idea of subsistence, as subsistence does. But seeing that the term substance is employed even by the Latins to denote the essence, therefore in order to avoid error we do not speak of three substances, as we do of three subsistences. The Greeks, however, who have the word hypostasis as distinct from ουσια do not hesitate to acknowledge three hypostases in God.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. just as we speak of three Persons in God so may we speak of three individual substances: but of only one substance that is the essence.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Rational is the difference of animal, inasmuch as reason whence it is taken denotes discursive knowledge, such as is in angels but not in man nor in God. But Boethius takes rational in a broad sense for intellectual, and this is common to man, angels and God.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In the definition of person nature is not to be taken according as it is the principle of movement, in which sense it is defined by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, i) but as defined by Boethivs (De Duab. Nat.) according as it is the specific difference giving each thing its form. And since the difference completes the definition and confines the thing defined to its species, it follows that the term nature is more suitable in the definition of person which is special to certain substances, than the term essence which is most common.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In the definition of person individual signifies that which is not predicated of several; and in this sense the divine essence is not an individual substance by predication, inasmuch as it is predicated of several persons, although it is individual in itself. However, Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 18, 23) amends the definition of Boethius as applied to the divine Persons; and says that a person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature, so as to indicate by the term incommunicable that the divine essence is not a Person.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Seeing that an individual substance is something complete existing by itself, human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it was assumed into the divine Person, cannot be called an individual substance such as is a hypostasis, any more than a hand, a foot or anything that does not subsist by itself apart from anything else: and for this reason it does not follow that it is a person.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The separated soul is a part of rational nature and not a whole rational human nature: wherefore it is not a person.

Q. IX: ARTICLE III

CAN THERE BE A PERSON IN GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXIX, A. 3]

THE third point of inquiry is whether there can be a person in God: and seemingly the reply should be in the negative.

1. According to Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) the word person is taken from personating, for masked men were called persons, because they personated something in comedies and tragedies. But it is unbecoming for God to be masked except perhaps metaphorically speaking. Therefore the term person should not be applied to God except perhaps metaphorically.

2. As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1, 2, 4), it is impossible for us to know what any of the things are which we ascribe to God, as regards the sense in which they apply to him. Yet what a person is we know by the above-given definition (A. 2). Therefore person is not applicable to God, at least in the sense of the aforesaid definition.

3. God is not in a genus: because since he is infinite he cannot be confined within the limits of any genus. Now person signifies something in

the genus of substance. Therefore person is not to be applied to God.

1 4. There is no composition in God. But person signifies something composite: for an individual of human nature, which is a person, is extremely composite: besides, the parts of the definition of person show that person is a composite thing. Therefore there is no person in God.

5. There is no matter in God. But matter is the principle of individuation. Since then a person is an individual substance, the term cannot be applied to God.

6. Every person is a subsistence. But God cannot be called a subsistence, for he is not subject to anything. Therefore he is not a person.

7. Person is comprised under hypostasis. Now there cannot be a hypostasis in God, since there are no accidents in him, and hypostasis denotes the subject of an accident as stated above (A. i). Therefore there is no person in God.

The contrary is plain from the authority of Athanasius in the Creed, Quicumque vult, etc., and of Augustine (De Trin. vii, 6), and from the general usage of the Church who being taught of the Holy Spirit cannot err.

I answer that, as stated above, person denotes a certain nature with a certain mode of existence. Now the nature which person includes in its definition is of all natures the most exalted, to wit that nature which is intellectual in regard to its genus. Likewise the mode of existence signified by the word person is most exalted, namely that a thing exists by itself. Since then whatsoever is most excellent in creatures should be attributed to God, it is becoming that the word person should be attributed to God, even as other terms which are said of God properly.

Reply to the First Objection. Two things must be considered in a name: that which it is intended to signify, and that from which it is taken for the purpose of signification. For a name is often given to signify a certain thing, but is taken from an accident or an action or an effect of that thing, and yet these are not the chief signification of the name which denotes rather the very substance or nature of the thing. Thus the word lapis (stone) is taken from laesio pedis (hurting the foot), yet it does not signify this, but rather a body wherein such an accident is frequently found: so that laesio pedis belongs to the etymology of the word lapis rather than to its meaning. Accordingly when it is not the intended signification of a term that is appropriate to God, but some property by way of likeness, then such a term is applied to God metaphorically. Thus God is called a lion, not that the lion's nature is to be attributed to God, but on account of the lion's strength. When, however, that which the term signifies is appropriate to God, it is applied to God in its proper sense, for instance, good, wise and the like, although sometimes the source from which such terms are taken is not applicable to God. Thus although to personate as a masked man, whence comes the term person, is not to be attributed to God, yet that which the word signifies, namely that which subsists in an intellectual nature is appropriate to God: and for this reason the term person is ascribed to God in its proper sense.

Reply to the Second Objection. Both the word person and the definition of person given above are applicable to God: not however, so as to be a definition of God, since there is more in God than is signified by the term. Hence the definition of the term does not define what God is.

Reply to the Third Objection. Although God is not in the genus of substance as a species, he belongs to the genus of substance as the principle of the genus.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. It is accidental to person as such that it is composite, because the complement or perfection required for personality is not to be found at once in one simple thing, but requires a combination of several, as is to be observed in men. But in God together with supreme simplicity there is supreme perfection: wherefore in him there is person without composition. As to the parts which combine to make. the definition of person they do not argue composition in person except in material substances: and individual, being a negation, does not imply composition through being added to substance. Hence the only composition that remains is that of individual substance, i.e. hypostasis with the nature: which two in immaterial substances are absolutely one and the same thing.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In material things whose forms are not self-subsistent but adherent to matter the principle of individuation must needs come from matter: whereas immaterial forms, being self-subsistent, are individualized by themselves, because from the very fact that a thing is self-subsistent, it cannot be predicated of several. Consequently there is no reason why there should not be an individual substance and a person in immaterial things.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Although there is no composition in God by reason whereof we might be able to understand subjection of one thing to another in him, nevertheless by an act of the mind we consider his being apart from his substance as subject to his being, and from this point of view call it subsistence.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Though there are no accidents in God, there are personal properties of which the hypostases are the subjects.

Q. IX: ARTICLE IV

IN GOD DOES THE TERM ‘PERSON’ SIGNIFY SOMETHING RELATIVE OR SOMETHING ABSOLUTE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXIX, A. 4]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether this term person signifies something relative or something absolute in God: and seemingly it signifies something absolute.

1. Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that “when John states that there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit, if it be asked, Three what? the answer is, Three Persons.” Now the query What? refers to the essence. Therefore in God person signifies the essence.

2. Augustine (ibid. 6) says that in God to be and to be a person are the same. Now in God to be denotes the essence and not a relation. Therefore person does so also.

3. Augustine (loc. cit.) says: “Person is predicated (of the Father) absolutely not with respect to the Son or the Holy Spirit: just as he is called God, great, good or just absolutely.” Now all these denote the essence and not a relation. Therefore person does so also.

4. Augustine (ibid. 4) says that although “the term essence is common to them,” namely the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, so that each one is called the essence, yet the term person is common to them. But relation in God is not common but distinctive. Therefore person does not signify relation in God.

5. It will be replied that in God Person is common logically and not really. On the contrary, there are no universals in God: hence Augustine (ibid. 6) rejects the opinion of those who said that the essence in God is like a genus or species, and Person like a species or individual. Now that which

is common logically and not really is common after the manner of a universal. Hence in God Person is common not merely logically but really, so that it cannot denote a relation.

6. A term does not denote things of different genera except equivocally: thus acute is applied equivocally to the sense of taste and to a mathematical figure. Now it is evident that person does not signify a relation in angels and man, but something absolute. Therefore if it signifies a relation in God, it will be employed equivocally.

7. That which is accidental to the thing signified by a term is beside the term's signification; thus white which is accidental to man is beside the signification of man. Now the thing signified by the word person is an individual substance of rational nature, since according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv) the description of what a word means is its definition: and it is accidental to such a substance that it be related to something else. Therefore relation is beside the signification of the word person.

8. It is inconceivable that any term be predicated of a thing to which the meaning of that term is seen to be inappropriate: thus if we understand that a certain thing is not a rational animal it is inconceivable that such a thing be a man. Now Jews and pagans acknowledge God to be a person; yet they do not acknowledge relations in him, whereas we ascribe them to him according to faith. Therefore person does not signify these relations in God.

9. But to this it will be replied that Jews and pagans err in their views about God: and thus we cannot argue from their opinion.—On the contrary neither an erroneous opinion nor truth itself can change the meaning of a word: so that if the word person does not signify relation in the opinion of those who err about God, neither will it do so with those who think aright about him.

10. According to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) words are signs of ideas. Now the idea conceived of the word person is the idea of a 'first' substance. Therefore this word person signifies a 'first' substance, than which nothing is more absolute, since it is self-existent. Therefore the word person does not signify a relation, but something absolute.

11. But to this it may be replied that the word person signifies a relation after the manner of a substance.—On the contrary, this is a self-evident proposition: No relation is a substance, just as this: No quantity is a substance, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i). If then the word person

signifies the substance as we have already proved, it cannot possibly signify a relation.

12. Opposite terms cannot be true of the same thing. Now self-existence and existence by another are opposite terms. If then person signifies substance which is a self-existent being, it cannot signify a relation.

13. A term that signifies a relation, is referred to some. thing that it co-signifies, for instance, master and servant. Now it is clear that person has no reference to something else. Therefore it does not signify a relation, but something absolute.

14. Person is as it were one by itself (per se una). Now unity in God regards the essence. Therefore person signifies essence and not relation.

15. To this it will be replied that this word signifies one distinct thing, and since distinction in God arises from relation, person must signify relation.

On the contrary, the Son and Holy Spirit are said to be distinguished by the mode of their origin; because the Son proceeds by way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Spirit by way of the will, as Love. Therefore distinction in God is not through the relations alone: and consequently it does not follow that person signifies relation.

16. If relation causes distinction in God, while person is something distinct without causing distinction, relation cannot be signified by the word person.

17. The relations in God are called properties: whereas the person is something underlying the properties. Therefore it does not signify relation.

18. There are four relations in God, paternity, filiation, procession, common spiration: for innascibility which is the fifth notion is not a relation. But the word person signifies none of these: because if it signified paternity, it would not be said of the Son; if it signified filiation, it would not be said of the Father; if it signified the procession of the Holy Spirit, it would be said neither of the Father nor of the Son; and if it signified the common spiration, it would not be said of the Holy Spirit. Therefore the word person does not signify relation.

On the contrary Boethius says (De Trin.) that “every term that refers to the Persons signifies relation.” Now no term refers to the persons more than person itself. Therefore the word person signifies relation.

Again, in God under Person are included the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. But these names signify relation. Therefore person does also.

Again, nothing absolute is divided in God. But person is divided. Therefore it is not absolute but relative.

I answer that the term person in common with the absolute names of God is predicated of each Person, and does not in itself refer to anything else, and in common with the names signifying relation it is divided and predicated of several: wherefore it would seem that person admits of both significations absolute and relative. How the name person can a it of both significations has been explained in various ways.

Some say that person signifies both, but equivocally. They assert that in itself it expresses the essence absolutely both in the singular and in the plural, like the name God, or good or great: but that owing to the insufficiency of names employed in speaking of God, the holy fathers in the Council of Nicea accommodated the term person so that it could be employed sometimes in a relative sense, especially in the plural, as when we say that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three Persons, or with the addition of a disjunctive term, as when we say: “One is the Person of the Father, another of the Son,” or: “The Son is distinct from the Father in person.” And that when it is predicated in the singular absolutely, it may equally signify the essence or the relation, as when we say: “The Father is a person,” or: “The Son is a person.” Apparently this is the opinion of the Master (I., D. xxv): but this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation. For it was not without reason taken from the very signification of the word, that the holy fathers inspired by God chose this term to express a profession of the true faith; and all the more seeing that they would have provided an occasion for error in affirming three Persons, if the word person signified the essence absolutely.

Wherefore others said that it expresses at the same time essence and relation but not equally; the one directly and the other indirectly. Some of them maintained that it expresses the essence directly and the relation indirectly: while others took the contrary view. Yet neither opinion solves the difficulty: for if it signifies the essence directly it should not be predicated in the plural, and if it signifies the relation directly, it should not be predicated absolutely or of each Person. Hence others said that it signifies both directly: and some of them said that it, expresses equally both essence and relation, and neither more than the other.

But this is unintelligible: since that which does not signify one thing signifies nothing: wherefore according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv) every term signifies one thing in one sense. Hence others said that it signifies relation as affecting the essence: but it is difficult to see how this is possible inasmuch as relations do not determine the essence in God. And so others said that the relation does not express the absolute, i.e. the substance which is essence, but the substance which is hypostasis, since this is determined by a relation. This is indeed true, but does not make us any wiser, seeing that the meaning of hypostasis or subsistence is less clear than that of person.

Accordingly to elucidate the matter it must be noted that, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the proper definition of a term is its signification. Now when a term is predicated of a thing which is directly included in the signification of that term as the determinate in the indeterminate, that thing is said to be classed under that term: but if it is not directly included in the term’s signification it is said to be coupled with it. Thus animal signifies a sensible animate substance, and white signifies a colour that dilates the sight: while man is included directly in the idea of animal as the determinate in the indeterminate; for man is a sensible animate substance, having a rational soul: and is included under white, not directly, however, since white is outside his essence. Hence man is classed under the term animal, but is coupled with the term white. And since that which comes under a common denomination is related to the common name as the determinate to the indeterminate, that which was included becomes the thing signified by the addition of a determining word to the common term: thus a rational animal is a man. But we must observe that a thing is signified in two ways, formally and materially. Formally a term signifies that which it was chiefly intended to signify and this is the definition of the term: thus man signifies something composed of a body and a rational soul. Materially a term signifies that which is requisite for that definition: thus man signifies something that has a heart, brain and such parts as are required in order that the body be animated with a rational soul.

Accordingly we reply that the term person signifies nothing else but an individual substance of rational nature. And since under an individual substance of rational nature is contained the substance, individual, i.e. incommunicable and distinct from others, whether of God, of man or of angels, it follows that a divine Person must signify something subsistent and distinct in the divine nature, just as a human person signifies something subsistent and distinct in human nature: and this is the formal signification of a person whether divine or human. Since, however, that which is distinct and subsistent in human ‘nature is nothing else than something individualized and differentiated from others by individual matter, it follows that this is the material signification when we speak of a human person. But the only thing that is distinct and incommunicable in the divine nature is relation, since all that is absolute is common and undivided. Now in God relation is really the same as the essence. And as in God essence is identical with the one who has the essence (e.g. the Godhead is identical with God), so also is relation the same as the one who is related. Consequently relation is the same as that which is distinct and subsists in the divine nature. It is evident then that person commonly speaking signifies an individual substance of rational nature; while a divine person in its formal signification denotes a distinct being subsistent in the divine nature. And seeing that this can be nothing else but a relation or a relative being, it follows that in its material signification it denotes a relation or a relative being. Hence it may be said that it signifies a relation by way of substance not qua essence but qua hypostasis, even as it signifies a relation not qua relation but qua relative: e.g. as signifying Father not as signifying paternity. For in this way the signified relation is included indirectly in the signification of the divine Person, which is nothing but something distinct by a relation and subsistent in the divine essence.

Reply to the First Objection. What? queries not only the essence but also sometimes the supposite, for instance: What swims in the sea? Fish. And so the answer to what? is the person.

Reply to the Second Objection. It is on account of the mode of signification of this word person, that Augustine says: “In God to be and to be a person are the same.” For it does not signify by way of relation as Father and Son do.

Reply to the Third Objection. It is due to the formal signification of person that it is predicated absolutely without reference to another.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. In God essence is common in reality, but person only logically, like the word relation.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In God there are no differences of being since there is but one being in him. Now this is incompatible with the idea of universal, wherefore there is no universal in him, although there is in him one thing logically and not really.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The fact that person designates one thing in God and another in man must be referred to a difference in suppositality rather than in the signification of the word person: and equivocation arises from a difference in signification but not in suppositality.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although relation is accidental to the common signification of Person, it is not accidental to the divine Person, as we have proved above.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. This argument considers the formal and not the material signification of the term: and the same answer applies to the Ninth Objection.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. A ‘first’ substance is said to be absolute as being independent of another. In God, however, the relative term does not exclude the absolute that depends on another, but the absolute that is not related to another.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This proposition, No relation is a substance is self-evident if it refer to relation and substance that are in a genus. God, however, is not confined within the limits of a genus, but contains in himself the perfections of all genera. Wherefore relation and substance are not really distinct in him.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Self-existent is opposed to non-self-existent and not to that which is related to another.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The word person does not itself refer to a relation, but by its mode of signification.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. In God one is common to essence and relation: thus we say that the essence is one, and that the Father is one.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. It may be that this different mode of procession whereby the Son is said to proceed by way of intellect, and the Holy Spirit by way of will, does not suffice for a personal distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, since in God will and intellect are not really distinct. If, however, it be granted that this suffices to make a distinction between them, it is clear that each is distinct from the Father by a relation, in that one of them proceeds from the Father by generation, the other by spiration, and these relations constitute their Persons.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. just as relation signifies as causing distinction in God, so is that which is related signified as being distinct. Now in God relation and the thing related are not distinct, as neither are essence and that which is: hence in God that which distinguishes and that which is distinct are one and the same.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In God property is not an accident, but is really the same as the thing whose property it is: although it differs therefrom logically. Accordingly person does not signify relation as a property, but as the essence underlying the property.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Although there cannot be a universal without singulars, it can be understood apart from them and consequently signified. Hence it follows that if there axe no singulars there is no universal: but it does not follow that unless some one singular be misunderstood or signified amiss, the universal is not understood or signified. Thus the word man does not signify any one individual man but only man in general: and in like manner the word person, although it does not signify paternity or filiation or common spiration or procession, it nevertheless signifies relation in general in the way already explained, even as the word relation does in its own particular way.

Q. IX: ARTICLE V

ARE THERE SEVERAL PERSONS IN GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXX, A. I]

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether there are several persons in God: and seemingly there are not.

1. Boethius says (De Trin.): That is truly one in which there is no number. But God is most truly one. Therefore number is not in him.

2. It will be replied that in God there is not number simply but a number of persons.

On the contrary, from a qualified statement we may always infer a simple statement provided the qualification has not the effect of diminishing: thus from the proposition, There is a white man, it follows that there is a man, but from the proposition, There is a dead man, it does not follow that there is a man. Now when we say a number of persons the qualification does not diminish since person is something most complete. Therefore if in God there is a number of persons, it follows that there is number simply.

3. Unity is opposed to number according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 20). But opposite things are not in the same subject. Since then in God there is supreme unity there cannot be number or plurality in him.

4. Wherever there is number there is plurality of units and where there are several units there is manifold being, because the being of one unit is distinct from the being of another unit. If then there be number in God there must be manifold being and manifold essence; which is clearly false.

5. just as unity is undivided so is there division in number. But there cannot be division in God since there is no composition in him. Therefore there cannot be number in God.

6. Every number has parts, for it is composed of units. But there are no parts in God, since there is no composition in him. Therefore number is not in God.

7. We should not attribute to God anything wherein the creature differs from him. Now the creature differs from God in that it is produced in, a certain number, according to Wisdom xi, 21: Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight. Therefore we should not ascribe number to God.

8. Number is a species of quantity. But there is no quantity in God, inasmuch as if any quantitative expression were predicated of God he would be substantially changed, as says Boethius (De Trin.). Therefore either there is no number in God, or it belongs to his substance; which is contrary to the faith.

9. Wheresoever is number there are those things to which number is liable, such as addition, subtraction, multiplication and division, and the like which result from number. But these cannot be in God. Therefore number cannot be in God.

10. Every number is finite. Therefore the infinite cannot be numbered. Since then God is infinite there cannot be number in him.

11. To this it might be replied that God though infinite to us is finite to himself.

On the contrary, that which belongs to God in himself is truer than that which belongs to him as compared to us. If then God is finite to himself and infinite to us he is more truly finite than infinite: and this is clearly false.

12. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) number is multitude measured by unity. But God is a measure, himself unmeasured. Therefore no number is in God.

13. In a nature that differs not from its supposite, it is impossible to have several supposites of that nature: since for this reason is it possible to have several men in the one human nature, that the individual man is not his own humanity: wherefore the multiplication of individuals in the one human nature is consequent to the diversity of individual principles, which are not part of the common nature. Whereas in immaterial substances wherein the very nature of the species is the subsisting supposite, there cannot be several individuals of one species. Now in God there is the most complete identity of nature and supposite, because the divine being itself which is the divine nature, is subsist~nt. Therefore there cannot be in God several supposites or persons.

14. Person is the name of a thing: hence where there is not a number of things there is not a number of persons. Now there is not a number of things in God: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, xi) that in God the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are really one thing, though logically and in our way of thinking they are distinct. Therefore in God there is not a number of persons.

15. There cannot be a number of things in one without composition. Now God is one: wherefore if in God there are several persons which is the same as several things, it follows. that there is composition in him, and this is incompatible with his simplicity.

16. The absolute is more perfect than the relative. Now the absolute properties, namely the essential attributes such as wisdom, justice and so on, do not constitute so many persons in God. Neither therefore do the relative properties such as paternity and filiation.

17. That which differentiates things from one another stands in relation to them as their constituent difference. If then the divine persons are distinguished by their relations, these latter must be the constituent differences of the persons; and consequently there will be composition in

the divine persons, inasmuch as the difference constitutes the species by being added to the genus.

18. Things that are distinguished by specifically different, forms must themselves differ specifically: thus man and horse differ specifically as being rational and irrational. Now paternity and filiation are specifically different relations. If then the divine persons are distinguished by the relations only, they must differ specifically, and consequently will not be of one nature; which is against the faith.

19. It is inconceivable that several supposites have one being. Now in God there is but one being. Therefore there cannot be several supposites or persons in him.

20. Since creation is the proper act of God alone, it must proceed from each supposite of the divine nature. Now it is impossible that this action, inasmuch as it is one, proceed from several supposites, because one action is from but one agent. Therefore there cannot be several supposites or persons in the divine nature.

21. Here below, difference in properties does not make a difference in supposites: thus one supposite of human nature is not distinct from another through the one being white and the other black; but through the diversity of individual matter which is the substance of each individual. If then in God there is no distinction save that which arises from relative properties, there cannot be in him a number of supposites or persons.

22. The highest creatures are more like God than the lowest. Now in the lowest creatures there are several supposites in one nature, whereas in the highest creatures, which are the heavenly bodies, there are not. Therefore in God there are not several persons in one nature.

23. The Philosopher (De Coelo et Mun. i) says that when the whole perfection of a species is in one supposite there are not several supposites of that nature, and that for this reason there is but one world because it consists of its whole matter. Now the whole perfection of the divine nature is in one supposite. Therefore in the one nature there are not several supposites or persons.

24. To this it may be replied that the fullness of joy requires the companionship of several in the divine nature, because there is no pleasure in possessing a thing unless we share it with a companion, according to Boethius. Moreover perfect love is to love another as oneself.—On the

contrary, to depend on another for the fullness of one’s joy and love is an indication of insufficient goodness in oneself. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that the wicked through finding no pleasure in their own company seek the companionship of others: whereas the good seek to commune with themselves through finding pleasure in so doing. Now the divine nature cannot lack a sufficiency of goodness. Wherefore since one supposite of the divine nature has in himself all fullness of joy and love, there is no need to put several supposites, or persons in God.

On the contrary it is written (1 Jo. v, 7): There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word and the Holy Spirit.

Again Athanasius says in the Creed: “All the three Persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another.” Therefore in God there is a number of persons.

I answer that the plurality of persons in God is an article of faith, and natural reason is unable to discuss and adequately understand it though we hope to understand it in heaven when we shall see God in his essence, and faith will be succeeded by vision. The holy fathers, however, being pressed by those who gainsaid the faith, were compelled to discuss this and other matters of belief, yet humbly and reverently withal, and avoiding any pretence to comprehension. Nor is such a discussion without its use since it enables the mind to perceive some glimpse of the truth sufficient to steer clear of error. Wherefore Hilary (De Trin. ii) says: “Believing this,” namely the plurality of persons in God, “set forth, run, persevere, and though I may know that you will not reach, I shall acclaim your progress. He who religiously pursues the infinite, although he will never catch up with it, will progress so long as he continues.”

In order then to throw some light on this question and especially in accordance with the elucidations of Augustine, we must observe that we must attribute to God every perfection that is in creatures, as regards the essence of the perfection absolutely but not as regards the way in which it is in this or that one. Thus goodness or wisdom is not in God as an accident as it is in us, although in him is supreme goodness and perfect wisdom. Now in creatures nothing is more excellent or more perfect than to understand: a sign of which is that of all creatures intellectual substances are the highest and are said to be made to God’s image in respect of their intelligence. It follows then that understanding is in God as well as whatsoever is essential thereto, although it belongs to God in one way and to creatures in another. Now for the act of understanding it is essential that there be one who understands and something understood. And that which is understood in itself is not the thing that is known by the intellect, since this thing is at one time only potentially understood and is outside the person who understands, as when a man understands a material thing, for instance a stone, an animal or something of the kind: whereas the thing understood must be in the person who understands and must be one with him. Now the intelligible species is the likeness of the thing understood, which likeness informs the intellect for the purpose of understanding. For the intellect cannot understand except in so far as it is actuated by this likeness, just as nothing else can act as being in potentiality but only as actuated by a form. Accordingly this likeness is as the principle in the act of understanding, just as heat is the principle of calefaction, and not as the term of understanding, Consequently that which is the first and direct object in the act of understanding is something that the intellect conceives within itself about the thing understood, whether it be a definition or proposition according to the two operations of the intellect mentioned in De Anima, III. Now this concept of the intellect is called the interior word and is signified by means of speech: for the spoken word does not signify merely the thing understood, or the intelligible form thereof or the act of understanding, but the concept of the intellect through which it signifies the thing: as when I say, man, or, Man is an animal. And in this respect it matters not whether the intellect understands itself, or something else: since just as when it understands another thing from itself it forms a concept of that thing which is expressed orally, so also when it understands itself it forms a concept of itself which also can be expressed by word of mouth. Since then in God there is the act of understanding, and since in understanding himself he understands all other things, it follows that there must be in him an intellectual concept which is absolutely essential to the act of understanding. And if we were able to comprehend the divine act of understanding so as to grasp what it is and how it takes place, just as we grasp our own act of understanding, the conception of the divine Word would not surpass reason as neither does the conception of the human word. We can, however, know what it is not and understand how it is not: and thus we are able to know the difference between the Word conceived by God and the word conceived by us. Thus first of all we know that in God there is but one act of understanding and not many as in us: for our act of understanding a stone is distinct from our act of understanding a plant: whereas God by one act understands himself and all else. Hence our intellect conceives many words, but the Word conceived by God is but one. Again our intellect frequently understands both itself and other things imperfectly; whereas God's act of understanding cannot be imperfect. Hence God's Word is perfect, representing all things perfectly, while our word is often imperfect. Again, in our intellect, understanding and being are distinct, wherefore the word conceived in our intellect, since it proceeds from our intellect as such, is not united to it in nature but in the act of understandmg. Whereas God's act of understanding is his being, so that the Word which proceeds from God as understanding proceeds from him as existing: and for this reason the conceived Word has the same essence and nature as the conceiving intellect. And because that which in living things is the recipient of nature, is said to be begotten and is called a son, the Word of God is ‘ said to be begotten and is called the Son. Whereas our word cannot be described as begotten of our intellect or as its son, except metaphorically.

Accordingly since the word of our intellect is distinct from our intellect in two respects, namely in that it proceeds from it, and is of a different nature, and seeing that difference of nature must be removed from the divine Word (Q. viii, A. i), the only remaining distinction is that it proceeds from another. And whereas difference causes number it follows that the only number in God is that of relations. Now in God relations are not accidents, but each one is the divine essence in reality. Wherefore each of them like the divine essence is subsistent: and just as the Godhead is the same thing as God, so is Paternity the same thing as the Father, and therefore the Father is the same thing as God. Accordingly the number of relations is the number of things subsistent in the divine nature, and these are the three persons as appears from the preceding Article. For this reason then we place a number of persons in God.

Reply to the, First Objection. By these words Boethius means to exclude number from the divine essence: for this is the point of his discussion.

Reply to the Second Objection. Although the persons considered as subsistent do not detract from the idea of number, they do so considered as relations: because relative distinction is the least of all distinctions just as relation itself of all the genera has the least being.

Reply to the Third Objection. Unity and number are both attributed to God but not in the same respect: unity in respect of the essence, number in respect of the persons: or unity in respect of absolutes, number in respect of relations.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Since plurality of units is caused by a distinction, if this distinction be one of being the units must differ in being: but where the distinction is one of relation, the units that compose the number must differ only relatively from one another.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Any kind of distinction suffices to cause a plurality of like kind. Wherefore as in God there is no distinction in that which is absolute (which distinction is inseparable from composition) but only a distinction of relations, even so in God there is not plurality in respect of what is absolute, but only in respect of relations, as already stated.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The parts of a number are always units if we speak of absolute number whereby we count. But if we take number as it is in things, then the idea of whole and part does not apply to number itself but to the things numbered. Now the different relations in God are not parts: thus fatherhood and sonship are not parts of Socrates, although he is father of one and son of another. Wherefore neither are the units of the relations compared as parts to the number of relations.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. The creature differs from God in that it is produced in a number of essential principles. But this kind of number is not that of the persons.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The number which is a species of quantity is caused by a division of a continuous quantity: wherefore just as continuous quantity relates to mathematics, because it is separated from sensible matter logically and not in reality, so also number which is a species of quantity is the subject-matter of arithmetic the principle whereof is unity that is the first measure of quantity. Hence it is plain that number of this kind cannot be in immaterial things; but in them is multitude that is opposed to the unity that is convertible with being: and this is caused by formal division which is into opposite forms whether absolute or relative: and such is number in God.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Number that is a species of quantity is liable to such things: but this kind of number is not in God, as stated above.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. God is infinite in the perfection of greatness, wisdom and the like, wherefore it is written (Ps. cxlvi, 5) that of his wisdom there is no number: but procession in God, by reason of which there are several divine persons, does not tend to the indefinite, for as Augustine says (De Trin.) the divine generation is not immoderate: therefore neither is the number of persons infinite.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. God is said to be finite to himself, not that he knows himself to be finite, but because he is compared to himself as we to finite things, in that he comprehends himself.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. This is the definition of number as a kind of quantity to which the idea of measure is applicable.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. rn created things the principles of individuality exercise two functions. The one is that they are the principle of subsistence (since the common nature does not subsist by itself except in the individual): and the other is that they distinguish the supposites; of the common nature from one another. But in God the personal propertie& only disthigvish the supposites of the divine nature from one another, while they are not the principles of subsistence of the divine essence (since the divine essence is subsistent in itself) but on the contrary subsist by the essence; thus Paternity is a subsistent thing because. the divine essence with which it is identical is a subsistent thing: so that it follows that as the divine essence is God, so is Paternity the Father. And hence it follows likewise that the divine essence is not numerically multiplied by reason of the multiplicity of its supposites, as happens here below. Because a thing is multiplied on account of that which gives it subsistence: and although the divine essence is so to speak individualized by itself as regards its self-subsistence, yet though it is itself one in number there are several supposites in God mutually distinct by subsistent relations.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. If the Father, Son and Holy Spirit differed from one another logically and not really, there would be no reason why one should not be predicated of the other: even so a shirt and an undergarment may be predicated of each other; and in like manner the Father would be the Son and vice versa: which is the heresy of Sabellius. Hence we must reply that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three things, as

Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), provided thing be taken for a relative thing: for if it be taken as absolute, then they are but one thing, as again Augustine says. In this sense we must take the words of Damascene where he says that they are really one. And when he says that they differ only logically, this is generally understood to mean relatively. For although a relation as compared with the opposite relation makes a real distinction in God, it does not differ save logically from the divine essence. Moreover relation of all the genera is the least stable in point of reality.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. In God plurality of things is plurality of subsistent opposite relations, and this does not cause composition in God: because relation as compared to the divine essence differs not really but only logically. Hence it does not enter into composition with it, as neither does goodness nor any other of the essential attributes: whereas if we compare it with the opposite relation there are several things, but not composition; because opposite relations as such are distinct from each other: and composition is not of distinct things as such.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The essential attributes are in no way opposed to one another as the relations are: wherefore although like the relations they subsist, they do not constitute a plurality of mutually distinct supposites, since plurality follows distinction: and formal distinction arises from opposition.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In God there is no difference between what is signified as a form and what is signified as a supposite: for instance, Godhead and God, Paternity and Father. Hence although the relative properties are by way of constituent differences of the persons, it does not follow that they enter into composition with the persons thus constituted.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. Although the Father and the Son are not distinct from each other except by paternity and filiation, it does not follow that because paternity and filiation are specifically different relations in God there is therefore a kind of specific difference between Father and Son: for these relations do not specify the divine persons, but rather distinguish and constitute the supposites. That which specifies the divine persons is the divine nature wherein the Son is like the Father. Because the begetter begets his like in species and not in individual properties. Accordingly just as Socrates and Plato, even if the only difference between them as individuals were that one is black and the other white (which are specifically different qualities) would not differ themselves specifically; since that which is a species to white and black is not a species to Socrates and Plato: even so the specific difference between paternity and filiation does not cause a specific difference between Father and Son. And yet in God it cannot be said properly that anything differs specifically, inasmuch as species and genus are not in him.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. It must by no means be granted that there is more than one being in God: seeing that being always refers to essence and especially in God whose being is his essence. But the relations which distinguish the supposites in God do not add another being to the being of the essence, because they do not enter into composition with the essence, as already stated. And every form that adds being to the substantial being enters into composition with the substance, and its being is accidental, for instance, the being of white and black. Accordingly difference in respect of being follows plurality of supposites, just as difference of essence in creatures: but neither of these obtains in God.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Operation issues from the agent in ratio to the form or power that is the principle of the operation: wherefore there is no reason why the one creation should not proceed from the three Persons since they are of one nature and power: thus if three hot things had the same identical heat, one identical heating would issue from them.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. The individualizing forms in creatures are not subsistent as in God: hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. In creatures multiplication of essence entails multiplication of supposites,: but this is not the case in God; wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. Although the Godhead is wholly and perfectly in each of the three Persons according to its proper mode of existence, yet it belongs to the perfection of the Godhead that there be several modes of existence in God, namely that there be one from whom another proceeds yet proceeds from no other, and one proceeding from another. For there would not be absolute perfection in God unless there were in him procession of word and love.

Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. This argument takes it for granted that the divine persons differ in essence. For thus the fullness of delight that the Father has in the Son would be in something extrinsic and the Father would not have it in himself; but because the Son is in the Father as his Word, the Father could not have perfect joy in himself except in the Son; even so a, man does not delight in himself except through the concept he has of himself.

Q. IX: ARTICLE VI

IN SPEAKING OF GOD CAN THE WORD ‘PERSON’ BE RIGHTLY PREDICATED IN THE PLURAL?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXX, A. 4]

THE sixth point of inquiry is whether when we speak of God we may rightly use the word person in the plural: and seemingly not.

1. A person is a substance, as appears from the definition of Boethius. But substance in God is not predicated in the plural. Neither therefore is person.

2. Other absolute names in God are only predicated in the singular, for instance wise, good and so forth. Now the word person is an absolute term. Therefore in God it should not be predicated in the plural.

3. The word person apparently is taken from subsistence, inasmuch as it denotes an individual in the genus substance, and is so to speak one by itself (per se una). Now subsistence would seem to pertain to the essence, and this is not multiplied in God. Therefore the word person should not be predicated in the plural.

4. To this it will be replied that even if subsistence be derived from essence, we can still say that there are three subsistents in God, and likewise three persons.

On the contrary terms that signify the divine essence cannot be predicated in the plural unless they be adjectives which do not take their number from the form signified but from the supposites, whereas the contrary obtains in substantives. Hence we may say that in God there are three eternal, if eternal be an adjective, whereas if it be a substantive then the words of Athanasius are true: “Not three eternals but one eternal.” Now person is a substantive and not an adjective. Therefore it should not be predicated in the plural.

5. Although essential adjectives are predicated of God in the plural, the forms signified by them are not predicated in the plural but only in the singular. Thus although in a certain sense we may use the plural in predicating eternal of God, in no way do we speak of three eternities. Therefore although in a sense we may speak of three persons in God, by no means may we say that there are three personalities.

6. just as God signifies one who has Godhead, so a divine person denotes one who subsists in the Godhead. Now just as we speak of three subsisting in the Godhead so do we speak of three having the Godhead. If then this suffices for us to say that there are three persons in God, we may also say that there are three Gods, which is heretical.

7. Boethius (De Trin.) says that there are not three Gods because God does not differ from God in the Godhead. But in like manner seemingly one divine person does not differ from another by a personal difference, since it is common to them to be a person. Therefore person cannot be predicated of God in the plural.

On the contrary Augustine says (De Trin. vii. 4) that when we ask, “what are these three, Father, Son and Holy Spirit?” the reply is: “Three persons.” Therefore person is predicated of God in the plural.

Again Athanasius says (loc. cit.) that “one is the person of the Father, another that of the Son, another of the Holy Spirit.” Now otherness is the cause of number, therefore person must be predicated of God in the plural.

I answer that substantives, as stated above, take their number from the form signified, and adjectives from the supposites: and the reason of this is that substantives signify after the manner of a substance, while adjectives signify after the manner of an accident which is individualized and multiplied by its subject, but a substance by itself. Accordingly seeing that person is a substantive the possibility of its being predicated in the plural depends on the form signified thereby. Now the form signified by the word person is not the nature absolutely, for in that case man and human person would mean the same thing which is clearly false: but person formally signifies incommunicability or individuality of one subsisting in a nature, as we have clearly explained. Since then there are several properties which cause a distinct and incommunicable being in God, it follows that person is predicated of God in the plural, even as it is predicated of;nan on account of the manifold individualizing principles.

Reply to the First Objection. A person is an individual substance which is a hypostasis: and this is predicated in the plural as is evident from its use in Greek.

Reply to the Second Objection. person is an absolute term from its mode of signification: and yet it signifies a relation, as stated above.

Reply to the Third Objection. The word person indicates not only subsistence which apparently belongs to the essence, but also distinction and incommunicability, which are due to the relative properties in God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The form signified by the word person is not the essence taken absolutely, but is that which is the principle of incommunicability or individuation. For this reason is it predicated in the plural, although it is a substantive. And for this reason also, since there are several distinctive properties in God there are said to be several personalities. Wherefore the Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The word person signifies one that subsists in the divine nature distinctly and incommunicably: whereas the word God signifies one who has the divine nature without reference to distinction or incommunicability: hence the comparison fails.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although God differs not from God by a difference in the Godhead, for there is only one Godhead: yet divine person differs from divine person by a difference of personality, since in God personality includes also the property that distinguishes the persons.

Q. IX: ARTICLE VII

ARE NUMERAL TERMS PREDICATED OF THE DIVINE PERSONS?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXX, A. 3]

THE seventh point of inquiry is as to how numeral terms are predicated of the divine persons, whether positively or only negatively: and it would seem that they are predicated positively.

1. If they signify nothing positive in God, then by affirming three persons we do not speak of something that is in God. Therefore by denying three persons one would not deny anything that is in God: and consequently one would not say that which is untrue nor would one be a heretic.

2. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom.) things are predicated of God in three ways: negatively, eminently and causally. Now in whichever of these three senses numeral terms are predicated of God they must needs have’ a positive signification. This is evident if they be predicated eminently or causally: and likewise if they be predicated negatively. For as the same Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii; Div. Nom. iv, xi) we do not deny things of God as though he lacked them altogether, but because they are not appropriate to him in the same way as they are to us. Therefore in any way numeral terms must have a positive meaning as applied to God.

3. Whatsoever is predicated of God and creatures is affirmed in a more eminent sense of God than of creatures. Now numeral terms are predicated of creatures positively. Therefore with much more reason are they thus predicated of God.

4. Plurality and unity as implied by the numeral terms when predicated of God are not mere mental concepts, for thus there would not be three persons in God save logically, which belongs to the heresy of Sabellius. Therefore they must be something really in God, and consequently predicated of him positively.

5. As unity is in the genus of quantity, so is good in the genus of quality. Now in God there is neither quantity nor quality nor any accident, and yet goodness is predicated of God not negatively but positively. Therefore unity is predicated of him in the same way, and consequently plurality which is based on unity.

6. There are four transcendentals, namely being, unity, truth and goodness. Now three of these, to wit being, truth and goodness, are predicated of God positively. Therefore unity is also and consequently plurality.

7. Number and magnitude are two species of quantity, namely discrete and continuous quantity. Now magnitude is predicated of God positively (Ps. cxlvi, 5): Great is our Lord and great is his Power. Therefore multitude and unity are also.

8. Creatures are like God inasmuch as they bear a trace of the Godhead. Now according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 10) every creature bears a trace of the divine Trinity, inasmuch as it is “one particular thing, informed by a species,” and “has a certain order.” Therefore the creature is one in its

likeness to God. Now one is predicated of a creature positively: and therefore of God also.

9. If one be predicated of God in a privative sense, it follows that it removes something, and this can only be plurality. Now it does not remove plurality, since if there be one person it does not follow that there are not more. Therefore one is not said of God by way of remotion: and consequently neither is number.

10. Privation constitutes nothing: whereas unity constitutes number. Therefore the latter is not predicated in a privative sense.

11. There is no privation in God, since all privation is a defect. Now one is predicated of God. Therefore it does not denote a privation.

12. Augustine says (De Trin. v, 5) that whatsoever is predicated of God indicates either substance or relation. And Boethius (De Trin. iv) says that whatsoever is predicated of God refers to the substance except relative terms. If then numeral terms are predicated of God they must denote either the substance or a relation, and consequently must be predicated positively.

13. One and being are convertible terms and are apparently synonymous. Now being is predicated of God positively. Therefore one is also and consequently number.

14. If one be predicated of God by way of remotion, it must remove number as being contrary thereto. But this cannot be the case, since number is constituted by units: and one contrary is not made up of the other. Therefore one is not predicated of God by way of remotion.

15. If one indicate the removal of number, it follows that one is opposed to number as privation to habit. Now habit is naturally prior to privation: as well as logically, since privation cannot be defined except in reference to habit. Therefore number will precede unity both naturally and logically: which is apparently absurd.

16. If one and number are predicated of God by way of remotion, then one removes number and number removes unity. But this cannot be admitted, since it would lead to a vicious circle, namely that unity is where there is not number, and number where there is not unity, and we should be none the wiser. Therefore we must not say that one and number are said of God privatively.

17. Since one and many are as measure and measured it would seem that they are opposed to each other relatively. Now when terms are relatively

opposite both are predicated positively. Therefore both unity and number are predicated of God positively.

1. On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 13) “That Unity with Trinity in which we worship the supreme Godhead is not the same unity or trinity with which we or any other living being are acquainted.” Therefore seemingly numeral terms are predicated of God by way of remotion.

2. Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 4): The poor human tongue sought how to express the Three, and it called them substances or persons: not intending to imply that they are different, yet desirous to avoid saying that there is only one. Hence in speaking of God these numeral terms are employed negatively rather than positively.

3. One and many, i.e. number are in the genus of quantity. Now there is no quantity in God, seeing that quantity is an accident and a disposition, of matter. Therefore numeral terms indicate nothing positive in God.

4. To this it will be replied that although quantity as to its generic nature or considered as an accident cannot be in God, yet in its specific nature a certain kind of quantity may be predicated of God, even as a certain kind of quality such as knowledge or justice.

On the contrary only those species of quality can be predicated of God which in their specific nature contain no imperfection, such as knowledge, justice, equity, but not ignorance or whiteness. But all quantity by its specific nature implies imperfection: because since a thing that has quantity is divisible, the various species of quantity are distinguished according to various kinds of division: thus plurality is quantity divisible into non-continuous parts: a line is quantity divisible as to one dimension: while a surface is divisible as to two, and a body as to three. Now division is incompatible with the perfection of divine simplicity. Therefore no quantity as to its specific nature can be predicated of God.

5. But it will be argued that distinction according to the relations which causes the number of persons in God, does not imply perfection in him.

On the contrary every division or distinction causes plurality of some kind. Now not every kind of plurality is that number which is a species of quantity, inasmuch as many and one pervade all the genera. Hence not any division or distinction suffices to set up number which is a species of quantity, but only quantitative division, and such is not relative division.

6. But it will be objected that every plurality is a species of quantity, and every division suffices to cause a species of quantity.

On the contrary given substance, quantity does not necessarily follow, inasmuch as substance can be without accident. Now given substantial forms only, there follows distinction in substances. Therefore not every distinction causes number, which is an accident and a species of quantity.

7. Discreteness that causes number which is a species of quantity is opposed to continuity. Now discreteness is opposed to continuity because it consists in division of the continuous. Therefore only division of the continuous, which division is impossible in God, causes number that is a species of quantity: so that such a number cannot be predicated of God.

8. Every substance is one. Either then it is one by its essence, or by something else. If by something else, since this again must be one, it must be one either of itself or by something else, and this again by something else. But this cannot go on indefinitely: and hence we must stop somewhere. And it were better to stop at the beginning, so that substance be one of itself. Therefore unity is not something added to substance: and thus seemingly it does not signify anything positively.

9. But it will be argued that a substance is one not by itself but by accidental unity: and unity is one essentially, since the primary notions are named after themselves: thus goodness is good, truth is true and likewise unity is one. —On the contrary these are named after themselves because they are primary forms; whereas second forms are not named after themselves: thus whiteness is not white. Now things which result from addition to others are not primary. Therefore unity and goodness are not additional to substance.

10. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v) a thing is one in so far as it is undivided. Now to be undivided is nothing positive but only removes something. . Therefore unity is predicated of God not positively but negatively: and the same applies to number which is composed of units.

I answer that about unity and number there are various points which have given rise to various opinions among philosophers. As regards unity it is to be observed that it is the principle of number and that it is convertible with being: and as regards plurality it belongs to a species of quantity called number; moreover, it pervades all the genera like unity, which apparently is opposed to number.

Accordingly some philosophers failed to distinguish between unity which is convertible with being,’and unity which is the principle of number, and thought that in neither sense does unity add anything to substance, and that in either sense it denotes the substance of a thing. From this it followed that number which is composed of unities is the substance of all things: and this was the opinion of Pythagoras and Plato.

On the other hand others who failed to distinguish between unity that is convertible with being and unity that is the principle of number held the contrary opinion that in any sense unity adds a certain accidental being to substance: and that in consequence all number is an accident pertaining to the genus of quantity. This was the opinion of Avicenna: and apparently all the teachers of old followed him: for they did not understand by one and many anything else but something pertaining to discrete quantity.

There were others who, considering that there cannot be quantity of any kind in God, maintained that words signifying one or many have no positive signification when attributed to God, but only remove something from him. For they cannot ascribe to him save what they signify, to wit discrete quantity, and this can nowise be in God. Hence according to these one is predicated of God in order to remove the. plurality of discrete quantity; and terms signifying plurality are said of God in order to remove that unity which is the principle of discrete quantity. Apparently this was the view of the Master (I., D. xxiv): and granted the principle on which his opinion is based, namely that all multitude signifies discrete quantity, and all unity is the principle of such quantity, this opinion would seem of all the most reasonable. For Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) says that we are nearer the truth when we speak of God in the negative, and that all our affirmations about him are figurative. For we know not what God is, but rather what he is not, as Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. i, 4). Hence Rabbi Moses says that whatever we affirm about God is to be taken as removing something from him rather than as placing something in him. Thus we say that God is a living being in order to remove from him that mode of being which inanimate beings have, and not in order to ascribe life to him; since life and all such terms are employed to denote certain forms and perfections of creatures which are far distant from God. And yet this is not altogether true, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) wisdom and life and the like are not removed from God as though they were not in him; but because he has them in a higher degree than mind can conceive or words express: and from that divine perfection created perfections come down in an imperfect likeness to it. Wherefore things are said of God according to Dionysius (Myst. Theol. i: Coel. Hier. ii: Div. Nom. ii) not only negatively and causally but also eminently. Still whatever the truth may be with regard to spiritual perfections it is certain that material dispositions are altogether to be removed from God. Wherefore since quantity is a disposition of matter, if numeral terms signify nothing outside the genus of quantity it follows that they are not to be said of God except as removing what they signify, according to the Master’s opinion (loc. cit.), and although in his opinion unity removes plurality and plurality unity, this does not involve a vicious circle, because the unity and plurality removed from God are in the genus of quantity, neither of which can be ascribed to God. So that the unity ascribed to God which removes plurality is not removed, but that other unity which cannot be said of God.

Some, however, through not understanding how affirmative expressions can be predicated of God for the purpose of negation, and not conceiving unity and plurality except as included in the genus of discrete quantity, which they dared not ascribe to God, said that numeral terms are not predicated of God as though they expressed’ an idea with an objective reality, but as official expressions positing something in God, namely a kind of syncategorematic distinction, all of which is clearly absurd, since nothing of the kind can be had from the meaning of these terms.

Wherefore others, though holding that unity and multitude are only in the genus of quantity, said that these terms denote something positive in God. They say in effect that it is not unreasonable to ascribe some kind of quantity to God, although the genus is not to be attributed to him: even as certain species of quality, as wisdom and justice are predicated of God, although there cannot be quality in God. But as indicated in an objection (5) there is no comparison: because all the species of quantity from their specific nature are imperfect, but not all the species of quality. Moreover quantity properly speaking is a disposition of matter: so that all the species of quantity are mathematical entities which cannot exist apart from sensible matter, except time and place which are natural entities and which are better described as adjuncts of sensible matter. It is evident then that no species of quantity can be attributed. to spiritual things otherwise than metaphorically.

Whereas quality follows the form, wherefore certain qualities are altogether immaterial and can be ascribed to spiritual things. Accordingly the above opinions were based on the supposition that the one which is convertible with being is the same with that which is the principle of number, and that there is no plurality but number that is a species of quantity. Now this is clearly false. For since division causes plurality and indivision unity, we must judge of one and many according to the various kinds of division. Now there is a kind of division which altogether transcends the genus of quantity, and this is division according to formal opposition which has nothing to do with quantity. Hence the plurality resulting from such a division, and the unity which excludes such a division, must needs be more universal and comprehensive than the genus of quantity. Again there is a division of quantity which does not transcend the genus of quantity. Wherefore the plurality consequent to this division and the unity which excludes it are in the genus of quantity. This latter unity is an accidental addition to the thing of which it is predicated, in that it measures it: otherwise the number arising from this unity would not be an accident nor the species of a genus. Whereas the unity that is convertible with being, adds nothing to being except the negation of division, not that it signifies indivision only, but substance with indivision: for one is the same as individual being. In like manner the plurality that corresponds to this unity adds nothing to the many things except distinction, which consists in each one not being the other: and this they have not from anything added to them but from their proper forms. It is clear then that one which is convertible with being, posits being but adds nothing except the negation of division. And the number corresponding to it adds this to the things described as many, that each of them is one, and that each of them is not the other, wherein is the essence of distinction. Accordingly then, while one adds to being one negation inasmuch as a thing is undivided in itself; plurality adds two negations, inasmuch as a certain thing is undivided in itself, and distinct from another; i.e. one of them is not the other.

I say then that in speaking of God we do not predicate the unity and plurality which belong to the genus of quantity, but one that is convertible with being and the corresponding plurality. Wherefore one and many predicate in God that which they signify: but they add nothing besides distinction and indistinction, which is the same as to add negations as explained above. Hence we grant that as regards what they add to the things of which they are predicated, they are attributed to God by way of removal; but in so far as in their signification they include the things of which they are said they are predicated of God positively. We must now reply to the objections on both sides.

Reply to the First Objection. To speak of three persons in God is to indicate a distinction of persons: and to deny this is heresy. But this distinction adds nothing to the distinct persons.

Reply to the Second Objection. It is true that while we remove certain things from God we understand at the same time that these things are predicated of God eminently and causally: but some things are denied of God absolutely and in no way predicated of him; as for instance, God is not a body. In this way according to the Master’s opinion it might be said that numeral quantity is altogether denied of God: and in like manner according to our own opinion when we say: The divine essence is one, we altogether deny that God’s essence is divided.

Reply to the Third Objection. In created things numeral terms posit nothing in addition to the things to which they are affixed, except in so far as they signify something in the, genus of discrete quantity: in this way they are not predicated of God, and this pertains to his perfection.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. It is true that the unity and plurality signified by numeral terms predicated of God are not purely subjective but are really in God: and yet it does not follow that they signify something positive besides the things to which they are attributed.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The good that is a kind of quality is not the good that is convertible with being. The latter adds nothing real to being, whereas the former adds a quality in respect of which a man is said to be good. The same applies to unity, as already explained; yet there is this difference that good in either sense can be predicated of God, whereas unity cannot: because as already explained the comparison between quantity and quality fails.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. Of these primary notions being is the first, wherefore it must be predicated positively: because negation or privation cannot be the first thing conceived by the intellect, since we cannot understand a negation or privation unless we first understand what is denied or lacking. But the other three must add something that is not a contraction of being: for if they contracted being they would no longer be primary notions. Now this is impossible unless that which they add were purely logical, and this is either a negation which is added by unity as already stated, or relation or something which by its very nature is universally referable to being: and this is either the intellect to which the true bears a relation, or the appetite to which the good bears a relation, for the good is what all things seek (Ethic. i, i).

Reply to the Seventh Objection. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) we speak of a number of things in two senses: first absolutely, and then number is the opposite of one: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller number, and then number is opposed to a few. In like manner magnitude may be taken in two ways: first absolutely, in the sense of a continuous quantity which is called a magnitude: secondly comparatively, as denoting excess in relation to a smaller quantity. In the first sense magnitude is not predicated of God but in the second, and denotes his eminence over all creatures.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. The unity that pertains to the trace of God in his creatures is the one that is convertible with being. As we have already stated this posits something, namely being, to which it adds nothing but a negation.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. One opposite does not exclude the other except from the subject of which it is predicated. For supposing that Socrates is white it does not follow that nothing is black, but that he is, not black. Wherefore if the person of the Father is one it follows that there are not several persons of the Father, but not that there are not more than one person in God.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. One is not a constituent of a number, on the side of privation, but inasmuch as it posits being.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Privation may be taken in three ways (Metaph. v, text. 27). First strictly, when a thing lacks that which by nature it should have, and when by nature it should have it: thus to lack sight is in a man privation of sight. Secondly in an extended sense, when a thing lacks that which is due not to its specific but to its generic nature: thus lack of sight may be called a privation of sight in a mole. Thirdly in a very broad sense, when a thing lacks that which may be naturally due to anything else but not to it, nor to any other member of its genus: thus lack of sight may be called a privation in a plant. This last kind of privation is a mean between real privation and simple negation, and has something in common with both. With real privation in that it is the negation of something in a subject, so that it cannot be predicated simply of nonbeing: and with simple negation, in that it does not require aptitude in the subject. It is in this way that one denotes privation, and in this sense it can be predicated of God, like other things that can be predicated of God in the same way, as, for instance, invisible, immense and so forth.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Numerical terms add nothing to God besides the subject of which they are predicated. Hence when they are predicated of essentials they signify the essence, and when they are predicated of personal properties they signify the relations.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. One and being are convertible as to their supposites: yet one adds logically the privation of division and thus they are not synonymous, because synonyms are words which signify the same thing from the same point of view.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. One may be considered in two ways. First as to what it posits, and thus it is a constituent of number: secondly as to the negation which it adds, and thus it is opposed to number privatively.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), number precedes unity objectively, as the whole precedes its parts and the composite precedes the simple: but unity precedes number naturally and logically. But this seemingly is not sufficient in order that unity be opposed to number privatively. For privation logically is an afterthought, since in order to understand a privation we must first understand its opposite whence its definition is taken: unless perhaps this refer, merely to the definition of the term, in so far as one has a privative signification, while number has a positive meaning: since we name things according as we know them. Wherefore in order that a term have a privative signification it suffices that the thing signified come in any way whatsoever to our knowledge as an afterthought: although this is not enough to make the thing itself privative, unless it come afterwards logically. It would be better then to say that division is the cause of number and precedes it logically; and that one since it is undivided being is predicated privatively in relation to division, but not in relation to multitude. Hence division logically precedes being but number follows it: and this is proved as follows. The first object of the intellect is being; the second is the negation of being. From these two there follows thirdly the understanding of distinction (since from the fact that we understand that this thing is and that it is not that thing we realize that these two are distinct): and it follows fourthly that the intellect apprehends the idea of unity, in that it understands that this thing is not divided in itself; and fifthly the intellect apprehends number, in that it understands this as distinct from that and each as one in itself. For however much things are conceived as distinct from one another, there is no idea of number unless each be conceived as one. Wherefore there is not a vicious circle in the definitions of unity and number. And this suffices for the Reply to the Sixteenth Objection.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. The one which is a principle of number is compared to many as measure to the thing measured: and unity in this sense adds something positive to substance, as stated in the Article.

After what we have said the arguments on the other side present no difficulty to those who realize that they contain a certain amount of truth. We must, however, take notice of one point advanced in these objections, namely that these primary notions, essence, unity, truth and goodness denominate themselves inasmuch as one, true and good are consequent to being. Now seeing that being is the first object of the intellect, it follows that every other object of the intellect is conceived as a being, and therefore as one, true and good. Wherefore since the intellect apprehends essence, unity, truth and goodness in the abstract, it follows that being and the other three concretes must be predicated of them. Thus it is that they denominate themselves, whereas things that are not convertible with being, do not.

Q. IX: ARTICLE VIII

IS THERE ANY DIVERSITY IN GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXXI, A. 2]

THE eighth point of inquiry is whether there is diversity in God: and seemingly there is.

1. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v) unity of substance makes things the same, multitude in substance makes things diverse. Now in God there is multitude of substance: thus Hilary says (De Synod.) that Father,

Son and Holy Spirit “are three in substance, one in harmony.” Therefore there is diversity in God.

2. According to the Philosopher (Metaph. x) diversity is absolute, but difference is relative: wherefore all that differs is diverse, but not everything that is diverse is different. Now it is granted that there is difference in God, since Damascene (De Fid. Orth. iii) says: We acknowledge a difference between the persons arising from the three properties, namely Paternity, filiation and Procession. Therefore there is diversity in God.

3. Accidental difference only makes a thing other, but substantial difference makes another, i.e. a diverse, thing. Since then in God there is a difference, which must be substantial, seeing that it cannot be accidental, there must be diversity in him.

4. Number results from division, as stated above (A. 7, ad 15). Now where there is division there must be diversity. Therefore in God, since there is number, there must be diversity.

5. Identical and diverse are an adequate division of being. Now the Father is not the same as the Son, for it is not granted that in begetting the Son he begets God who is himself. Therefore the Son is diverse from the Father.

On the contrary Hilary says (De Trin. vii): In God nothing is new, nothing diverse, nothing foreign, nothing separable.

Again Ambrose says (De Trin.): Father and Son are one in Godhead, nor is there any substantial difference in them, nor any diversity whatsoever.

I answer that, as Jerome says, the careless use of terms leads to heresy: wherefore in speaking of God we must choose our words so as to avoid any occasion of error. Now about the divine nature there are two errors especially to be avoided by those who would discuss the unity and trinity of the Godhead: namely the error of Arius who denied the unity of the essence, and asserted a difference between the essence of the Father and that of the Son: and the error of Sabellius; who denied the distinction of the persons and asserted that the Father is the same as the Son. Accordingly to guard against the error of Arius there are four points on which we must be wary in confessing our belief. First, diversity which is incompatible with that unity of essence which we acknowledge when we profess our belief in one God; secondly, division which is incompatible with the divine simplicity; thirdly, inequality which is incompatible with the equality of the divine persons; fourthly, that we do not believe the Son to be alien to the

Father, whereby we would deny their likeness. Again against the error of Sabellius four points call for caution. First, singularity which excludes communicability of the divine nature; secondly, the word only which excludes the real distinction of the persons; thirdly, confusion which excludes the order existing between the divine persons; fourthly, dissociation (solitudo) which excludes the fellowship of the divine persons. Accordingly against diversity we acknowledge unity of essence; against division simplicity; against inequality equality; against difference likeness; not one only but several persons; distinction against identity; order against confusion; and against dissociation the harmony and bond of love.

Reply to the First Objection. In the words quoted substance stands for hypostasis, not for essence, multiplication of which causes diversity.

Reply to the Second Objection. Although some doctors of the Church use the term difference in reference to God, it should not be employed as a general rule, or enlarged upon: because difference denotes a distinction of form, and this is impossible in God since God’s form is his nature according to Augustine. But we must explain the term difference as standing for a distinction of the slightest kind: since some things are described as distinct in respect of a mere relation or even only logically. Again if we meet with the term diversity in connexion with God, we must explain it in the same way: for instance, if we find it stated that the person of the Father is diverse from that of the Son, we must take diverse to denote distinct. Yet in speaking of God we must be more wary of using the word diverse than the word different, because diversity refers more to an essential division: inasmuch as any multiplication whatsoever of forms causes a difference, whereas diversity arises only from substantial forms.

Reply to the Third Objection. Though there is no accident in God there is relation; and relative opposition causes distinction but not diversity in God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. Though properly speaking there is not division in God, there is relative distinction, and this suffices to make a number of persons.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. The Son is the same God as the Father, yet it cannot be said that the Father in begetting the Son begot God who was himself; because himself being reciprocal indicates identity in the supposite: whereas in God Father and Son are two supposites.

Q. IX: ARTICLE IX

ARE THERE ONLY THREE PERSONS IN GOD: OR ARE THERE MORE OR FEWER THAN THREE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXXI, A, I]

THE ninth point of inquiry is whether in God there are only three persons, or more or fewer than three. It would seem that there are more than three.

1. Augustine says (Con. Maxim. iii, 12): “The Son did not beget a creator, not that he could not but because it was unfitting.” Now in God, just as in all perpetual things, there is no difference between the actual and the possible (Phys. iii, text. 32). Therefore the Son begot another Son: and thus there are two Sons in God, and consequently more than three persons.

2. To this it may be replied that the words he could not mean that it was not due to his inability.

On the contrary the acts belonging to a particular nature are appropriate to every supposite of that nature, except through inability to execute them. Now generation is an act pertaining to the perfection of the divine nature, otherwise it would not be appropriate to the Father, in whom there is nothing that is not perfect. If then the Son begets not another Son, this will,be because he is unable to do so.

3. If the Son cannot beget he can be begotten — and therefore he has the power to be begotten but not the power to beget. Since then to beget differs from being begotten and since powers are distinguished in reference to their objects, the Father’s power will not be the same as the Son’s: and this is heretical.

4. in things active and passive action and passion are reduced to different principles, since in creatures a thing acts by reason of its form and is patient by reason of its matter. Now to beget and to be begotten express action and passion. Therefore they must be referred to different principles: so that it cannot be the same power whereby the Father begets and the Son is begotten.

5. But to this it might be replied that it is the same power inasmuch as on either hand it is rooted in the divine essence which is one in Father and Son.

On the contrary the power to heat and the power to dry are rooted in one subject, namely fire: and yet they are not one and the same power, since heat which is the principle of calefaction is a distinct quality from dryness which is the principle of desiccation. Wherefore the unity of the divine essence does not suffice to make one the Father’s power to beget and the Son’s power to be begotten.

6. Every wise and intelligent subject forms a concept by his wisdom. Now the Son is wise and intelligent even as the Father. Therefore he has a concept. But the Father’s concept is the Word which is the Son. Therefore the Son also has a Son.

7. To this it may be replied that word is predicated of God not only personally but also essentially, and thus the Word predicated essentially may be the concept of the Son.

On the contrary word denotes the species conceived and ordered for the purpose of manifestation, and thus it implies origin. Now those terms which indicate origin in God are predicated personally and not essentially. Therefore word cannot be predicated essentially,.

8. Anselm (Monalog.) says that “as the Father utters (dicit) himself, so do the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Now, as he says (ibid.), for the Father to utter himself is the same as to beget a Son. Therefore the Son begets another Son: and thus the same conclusion follows.

9. God is proved to beget from the fact that he bestows on others the faculty of begetting (Isa. lxvi, 9): Shall I that give generation to others be barren? saith the Lord. Now as the Father gives generation, even so does the Son: because the works of the Trinity are undivided. Therefore the Son begets a Son.

10. Augustine (Dial. ad Oros. lxv, 7) says that the Father begets the Son naturally: and Damascene (De Fide Orth. xxvii, 2) says that generation is a work of nature. Now the Father and the Son have the same nature. Therefore as the Father begets, so also does the Son: and consequently in God there are several Sons and more than three persons.

11. But someone will reply that there cannot be more than one Son in God since there can be but one filiation: because the form of one species is not multiplied otherwise than by division of matter, and there is no such thing in God.

On the contrary any difference whatsoever must naturally connote number. Now there can be more than one filiation, not only by reason of the matter but also because this filiation is thiswise and that filiation is thatwise.

Therefore nothing prevents several filiations being in God, although there is no matter in him.

12. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness from the sun, according to Hebrews i, 3, being the brightness of his glory. Now one brightness can produce another brightness. Therefore the Son can beget another Son: and thus there would be several Sons in God and more than three persons.

13. The Holy Spirit is the Father's love of the Son. Now the Father also loves the Holy Spirit. Therefore there must be another Spirit whereby the Father loves the Holy Spirit and thus there will be four persons in God.

14. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) the good is self-communicative. Now goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as power to the Father and wisdom to the Son.

Therefore one would think it most appropriate to the Holy Spirit that he should communicate the divine nature to another person: and thus there will be more than three persons in God.

15. According to the Philosopher (Meteor. iv) a thing is perfect when it can of itself produce its like. Now the Holy Spirit is perfect God. Therefore he can produce another person: and consequently... etc.

16. The Son does not receive the divine nature from the Father more perfectly than the Holy Spirit. Now the Son receives from the Father the divine nature not only passively (so to speak) as being begotten of him, but also actively, because he can communicate the same nature to another. Therefore the Holy Spirit also can communicate the divine nature to another person.

17. Whatsoever belongs to perfection in creatures must be attributed to God. Now it belongs to perfection in creatures to communicate nature, although the mode of communication has a certain imperfection in that it involves division or change in the generator. Therefore to communicate the divine nature belongs to perfection in God, and consequently it must be attributed to the Holy Spirit. Therefore a person proceeds from the Holy Spirit, and thus it follows that there are more than three persons in God.

18. Just as the Godhead is a good in the Father, so also is paternity. Now from the fact that no good is possessed with pleasure without others sharing in it, some prove that in God there are several persons having the divine nature. Therefore for the same reason there are several Fathers, and several

Sons and several Holy Spirits in God: and consequently more than three persons.

19. The Son and the Holy Spirit are seemingly distinguished from each other in that the Son proceeds from the Father by way of the intellect as his word, while the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of the will as his love. But there are other essential attributes besides the intellect and will, such as goodness, power and so forth. Therefore other persons proceed from the Father besides the Son and Holy Spirit.

20. Apparently the process of nature differs from the process of the intellect more than does the process of the will , inasmuch as in creatures the process of the intellect is always accompanied by that of the will, since whatever understands something also wills something: whereas the process of nature is not always accompanied by the process of intellect, thus not everything that can generate can understand. If then in God the person who proceeds by way of the will as love is distinct from the person who proceeds by way of the intellect as word, there will also be a person who proceeds by way of the intellect distinct from the person who proceeds by way of nature as Son. Hence there will be three persons proceeding in God and one who does not proceed: and thus there are four persons.

21. In God the persons are multiplied on account of the subsistent relations. Now in God there are five relative notions, viz. paternity, filiation, procession, innascibility and common spiration. Therefore there are five persons in God.

22. The relations which are attributed to God from eternity are not in creatures but in God. Now whatsoever is in God is subsistent, since in him there is no accident. Therefore any relation that belongs to God from eternity is subsistent and consequently is a person. Now such relations are infinite in number: thus the ideas of creatures are in God from eternity, and they are not mutually distinct except by their relation to creatures. Therefore the persons in God are infinite in number.

On the other hand it would seem that there are fewer than three.

1. In one nature there is but one mode of communication of that nature: wherefore, according to the Commentator (Phys. viii), animals generated from seed are not of the same species as those engendered from corrupt matter. Now the divine nature is supremely one: wherefore it can be communicated in one way only. Therefore there, cannot be more than two

persons, one that communicates the Godhead in some particular way, and another that receives the Godhead in that same way.

2. Hilary (De Synod.) shows that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally because he is such as God is, but that creatures proceed from God according to his win, because they are such as he wishes them to be, not such as he is. Now the Holy Spirit, like the Son, is such as God the Father is. Therefore the Holy Spirit, like the Son, proceeds from the Father naturally; and consequently there is no distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son through the Son proceeding naturally and the Holy Spirit not.

3. In God will and intellect differ not in nature but only logically: and consequently procession by nature, by intellect and by will differ but logically in God. Therefore if the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished through the one proceeding naturally and the other by the will, they will be but logically distinct: and they will not be two persons, since plurality of persons implies a real distinction.

4. The persons in God are distinct by relations of origin only. Now two relations suffice to indicate origin, namely one from whom is another, and one who is from another. Therefore there are but two persons in God.

5. Every relation requires two extremes. Since then in God the persons are not distinct save by the relations; it follows that in God there are either two relations, and consequently four persons; or one relation, and therefore only two persons.

On the contrary it is manifest that there are but three persons in God from 1 Jo. v, 7, There are three who bear witness in heaven: and if we ask “three what?” the Church replies: “Three persons,” as Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4). Therefore there are three persons in God.

Moreover for the perfection of divine goodness, happiness and glory there must be true and perfect charity in God: for nothing is better or more perfect than charity, as Richard says (De Trin. iii, 2). Now there is no happiness without enjoyment, and this arises chiefly from charity: for as we read (ibid. 5), “Nothing is sweeter than charity, nothing more enjoyable, the intellectual life affords no sweeter experience, or delight more exquisite.” And the perfection of glory consists in the splendour of perfect communication, which is effected by charity. And true and perfect charity requires the trinity of persons in God. For the love whereby a person loves himself is selfish love and is not true charity. But God cannot love supremely another who is not supremely lovable; and none is supremely lovable that is not supremely good. Hence it is evident that true charity cannot be supreme in God if there be but one person in him. Nor can it be perfect if there be but two persons: since perfect charity demands that the lover wish that what he loves himself be equally loved by another. For it is a sign of great imperfection to be unwilling to share one’s love, whereas to be willing to share it is a sign of great perfection: “The more one is pleased to receive a thing the greater our longing in seeking for it,” as Richard says (ibid.). In God therefore, since there is perfection of goodness, happiness and glory, there must be a trinity of persons.

Again, as goodness is self-communicative, the perfection of divine goodness requires that he communicate his perfections supremely. But if there were only one person in God he would not communicate his goodness supremely: for he does not communicate himself supremely to creatures: and if there were but two persons, the delights of mutual charity would not be communicated perfectly. Hence there must be a second person to whom the divine goodness is perfectly communicated, and a third to whom the delights of divine charity are perfectly communicated.

Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 1, 2), three things are required for love, the lover, the beloved and love itself. Now the two who love each other are the Father and the Son: and the love that is their mutual bond is the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are three persons in God.

Again, as Richard remarks (De Trin. v, 6), in mankind it is to be observed that a person proceeds from persons in three ways: first, immediately only, as Eve from Adam: secondly, mediately only, as Enoch from Adam: thirdly, both immediately and mediately, as Seth from Adam, immediately as his son, mediately as the son of Eve who proceeded from Adam. Now in God one person cannot proceed from another mediately only, since there would not be pe~ equality. Hence we must conclude that in God there is one person that does not proceed from another, i.e. the Father from whom two other persons proceed; one immediately only, i.e. the Son; and the other both mediately and immediately, i.e. the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son. Therefore there are three persons in God.

Again, to both give and receive the fulness of the Godhead comes between giving and not receiving it, and receiving without giving it. Now it belongs to the person of the Father to give the fulness of the Godhead without receiving it: and to receive the fulness of the Godhead without giving it belongs to the person of the Holy Spirit. Therefore there must be a third person who both gives and receives the fulness of the Godhead: and this is the person of the Son: and thus there are three persons in God.

I answer that according to the opinions of heretics it is impossible to assign a definite number of persons in God. Arius took the trinity of persons to mean that the Son and Holy Spirit are creatures: and Macedonius was of the same opinion in regard to the Holy Spirit. Now the procession of creatures from God is not necessarily limited to a certain number, seeing that the divine power being infinite surpasses all mode, species and number of the creature. Wherefore if God the Father almighty created two super-excellent creatures, whom Arius stated to be the Son and Holy Spirit, there is no reason why he should not create others equal to them or even greater than they. Sabellius contended that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are only nominally and logically distinct: and here again it is evident that there would be an indefinite multiplication, inasmuch as our reason can consider God in an infinite number of ways in respect of his various effects, and give him various names. The Catholic faith alone which acknowledges unity of the divine nature in persons really distinct, can assign a reason for the trinity in God. For it is impossible that one simple nature be in more than one as principle: wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.) that whosoever acknowledges two innascibles in God must acknowledge two gods. Now the nature of one innascible God demands that we should acknowledge but one God. Hence certain philosophers asserted that in immaterial things there cannot be plurality except in respect of origin. For one nature can be equally in several subjects on account of the division of matter, which does not apply to God. Wherefore there cannot be in God more than one innascible person that does not proceed from another. Now if other persons proceed from him this must be by some action. Not, however, by an action passing into a subject outside the agent, as heating and cutting are the actions of fire and saw, and as creation is the act of God himself: since then the proceeding persons would be outside the divine nature. It follows then that the procession of persons into the one divine nature is by reason of an action that does not pass into an extraneous subject but remains in the agent: and in the intellectual nature such actions are but two, to understand and to will. In each of these actions something is found to proceed when the action is performed. The action of understanding is not exercised without something being conceived in the mind of the one who. understands, and this is called the word: since before a concept of some kind is fixed in the mind we are not said to understand but to think about a thing in order to understand it. In like manner the act of willing is exercised by love proceeding from the lover through his will, for love is simply the fixation of the will in the good that is willed. In creatures word and love are not subsistent persons in the nature that is endowed with intelligence and will: for a creature’s acts of understanding and will are not its very being. Hence its word and love are accessories of and accidental to the understanding and willing creature. But seeing that in God, being, intelligence and will are one and the same, it follows of necessity that word and love in God arenot accidents but subsist in the divine nature For in God there is but one simple act of intelligence and one simple act of will, since by understanding his essence he understands all things, and by willing his goodness, he wills whatsoever he wills. Hence there is but one Word and one Love in God. Now the order of understanding and willing is not the same in God as in us. We receive our intellective knowledge from external things: and by our will we tend to something external as an end. Wherefore our act of intelligence is according to a movement from things to the soul: but our act of will is according to a movement from the soul to things. On the other hand God does not acquire knowledge from things, but by his knowledge is the cause of things: nor by his will does he tend to anything external as his end, but he directs all external things to himself as their end. Accordingly both in us and in God there is a certain rotation in the acts of the intellect and will: for the will returns to that whence came the beginning of understanding: but whereas in us the circle ends in that which is external, the external good moving the intellect and the intellect moving the will, and the will by appetite and love tending to the external good; in God, on the other hand, the circle ends in him. For God, by understanding himself, conceives his word which is the type of all things understood by him, inasmuch as he understands all things by understanding himself, and from this word he proceeds to love of all things and of himself. Thus someone has said that a “monad engendered an atom and reflected its own beat upon itself.” And the circle being closed nothing more can be added, so that a third procession within the divine nature is impossible, although there follows a procession towards external nature. Hence in God there must be but one person that does not proceed, and only two persons that proceed, one of whom proceeds as love, the other as word: and thus the persons in God are three in number.

In creatures a likeness to this trinity appears in three ways. First as an effect reflects its cause; and in this way the principle of the whole Godhead, i.e. the Father, is represented by that which holds the first place in the creature, namely by being in itself one subsistent thing. The Word is represented by the form of each creature; because in those things which are done by an intellectual agent the form of the effect derives from the concept of his intelligence. Love is represented it the order of creatures: because from the fact that God loves himself, he directs all things to himself in a certain order. Wherefore this likeness is called a vestigiary likeness in that this bears the trace of the foot as an effect bears a trace of its cause. Secondly, by reason of a similar kind of operation: and thus it is represented in the rational creature alone who like God can understand and love himself, and consequently produces his own word and love: and this is called the likeness of the natural image; because in order that one thing be the image of another it must present a like species. I Thirdly, on account of the unity of object, inasmuch as the rational creature understands and loves God: this is a kind of conformity of union that is found in the saints alone who understand and love the same thing as God understands and loves.

Of the first kind of likeness it is written (Job xi, 7) Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God? Of the second (Gen. i, 26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness: and this is called the image of creation. Of the third it is written (2 Cor. iii, 18): But we beholding the gloty of the Lord with open face are transformed into the same image: and this is called the image of re-creation.

Reply to the First Objection. The reason why Augustine says that it is not true that the Son was unable to beget, but that it was not fitting for him to beget, is that it was not through inability that the Son does not beget: so that the words was unable must be taken privatively and not simply negatively, and the words it was not fitting indicate that the consequence would be unfitting if in God the Son were to beget another Son. How true this is may be considered in four ways. First, seeing that in God the Son proceeds as word, if the Son begot a Son it would follow that in God word proceeds from word: and this is impossible except in an inquiring and discursive intellect, wherein word proceeds from word when the mind proceeds from the consideration of one truth to the consideration of another: whereas this is nowise consistent with the perfection and simplicity of the divine intellect which at one glance sees all things at the same time. Secondly, because that which renders a thing individual and incommunicable cannot possibly be common to several: thus that which makes Socrates to be this particular thing cannot even be conceived as being in others besides. Hence if in God filiation were common to several (persons) it would not make the personality of the Son incommunicable, and thus the Son would have to be made an individual person by something absolute, and this is incompatible with the unity of the divine essence. Thirdly, because nothing that is one in species can be more than one except by reason of matter: for which reason there can be but one essence in God, because the divine essence is utterly immaterial. Now if there were several Sons in God there would also be several filiations, and consequently they would have to be multiplied according to matter subjected to them: and this is incompatible with the divine immateriality. Fourthly, because a man is a son as resulting from a process of nature. Now nature is confined definitely to one effect: except when by accident several effects are produced on account of the matter being divided: and consequently where nature is utterly devoid of matter, there can be but one son.

Reply to the Second Objection. A thing may be of this or that nature in two ways. First, as considered absolutely: and thus whatsoever belongs to a particular nature must be appropriate to every supposite of that nature: in this sense it is competent to the divine nature to be almighty, creator and other similar attributes that are common to the three persons. Secondly, a thing belongs to a particular nature as considered in one particular supposite: and then whatsoever belongs to the nature does not necessarily belong to every supposite of that nature. Thus just as the generic nature includes something in one species which does not belong to another species (for instance, the sensible nature endows man with certain qualities with which it does not endow dumb, animals, such as a delicate sense of touch and memory and so forth); even so certain things belong to the specific nature in one individual, and not to another individual of the same species. For instance, it was peculiar to human nature considered as in Adam that it was not received by him through the natural process of generation, which does not apply to other individuals of human nature. In this way then the ability to beget belongs to the divine nature as in the person of the Father, precisely because the Father is not constituted an incommunicable person otherwise than by paternity which belongs to him as begetting: hence though the Son is a perfect supposite of the divine nature it does not follow that he can beget.

Reply to the Third Objection. Although the Father can beget whereas the Son cannot, it does not follow that the Father has a power which the Son has not: because in the Father and the Son it is the same power whereby the Father begets and the Son is begotten. For power is something absolute, wherefore it is not distinguished in God as neither is goodness nor anything else of the kind. On the other hand in God to beget and to be begotten do not denote something absolute, but merely a relation. Now opposite relations in God meet together in the one same absolute and do not divide it; thus it is clear that the one essence is in Father and Son; wherefore neither is power divided in God through being referred to begetting and being begotten. In fact not even in creatures does every difference of objects necessarily differentiate powers, but only when the objects differ formally within the same genus: thus the power of sight is not differentiated by seeing a man and seeing a horse, because these sensible objects do riot differ qua sensible: and in like manner the absolute is not divided by the relative in God.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. In every action that passes from the agent into an extraneous thing there must be a principle in the agent whereby it is agent, and another principle in the patient whereby it is patient. But in the operation which does not pass into anything extraneous, but remains in the agent, only one principle is required: thus in order to will a principle is necessary on the part of the willer that enables him to will. Now in creatures generation is an operation passing into something extraneous, wherefore the active power in the generator must be distinct from the passive power in the generated. Whereas the divine generation is an operation that does not pass into anything extraneous but remains within; consisting as it does in the conception of the Word. Wherefore there is no need for distinct powers, active in the Father and passive in the Son.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. Heat and dryness considered in themselves are qualities; however, we may Call them powers, inasmuch as they are principles of certain actions. Hence it is clear that although the primary and remote root, i.e. the subject, is but one, the proximate root which is the quality is not one.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. As the Father is God begetting and the Son God begotten, so must we say that the Father is wise and conceiving, while the Son is wise and conceived. Because the Son in that he is the Word is a conception of a wise being. But since whatsoever is in God Js God it follows that the very conception of a wise God is God, is wise, is powerful and whatsoever is appropriate to God.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Taken in its proper sense word cannot be attributed to God otherwise than personally: because in God there cannot be any origination but what is immaterial and consistent with an intellectual nature, such as the origination of word and love: wherefore if the procession of word and love is not enough to indicate a personal distinction, no distinction of persons will be possible in God. Thus John both in the beginning of his gospel and in his first epistle employs the term Word instead of Son, nor may we in speaking of God express ourselves in terms other than those of Holy Writ.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Dicere may be taken in two senses. First strictly and then it means to utter a word: and in this sense Augustine (De Trin. vii) says that in God each person does not speak, but the Father alone. Secondly, in a broad sense in which to speak denotes intelligence: and thus Anselm (loc. cit.) says that not only the Father speaks but also the Son and the Holy Spirit: and though there are three who speak there is but one Word which is the Son: because the Son alone is the concept who understands and conceives the Word.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. That there is generation in God is not proved from the mere fact that God gives generation to others as efficient cause, since it would follow in like manner that there is motion in God because he gives motion to others. Generation is proved to be in God from the fact that he gives generation to others as both efficient and exemplary cause: and the Father is the exemplar of generation as begetting, while the Son is the exemplar as begotten: wherefore it does not follow that he begets.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Generation is an operation of the divine nature as residing in the person of the Father, as we have already stated, hence it does not follow that it is appropriate to the Son.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Since filiation is a relation arising from a determinate mode of origin, i.e. according. to nature, it is impossible that filiation differ from filiation formally; unless perhaps by reason of a difference of natures communicated by generation: thus we might say that the species of filiation whereby a particular man is a son differs from the species of filiation whereby a particular horse is a son. But in God there is but one nature, wherefore there cannot be several formally different filiations: and it is evident that there cannot be several filiations differing in matter. Consequently in God there is but one filiation and one Son.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. One brightness proceeds from another by the diffusion of light on to another subject: wherefore this is clearly due to a division of matter, which is impossible in God.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. A thing is loved in so far as it is good: hence since one and the same goodness is that of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the Father with the same love, which is the Holy Spirit, loves himself, the Son, the Holy Spirit and all creatures. Even so by the same Word, which is the Son, he utters himself, the Son, the Holy Spirit and all creatures.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Goodness is something in which terminates the living being’s operation that abides in the operator. First a thing is understood as true, and then is desired as good: and there the internal operation stops and rests as in its end. But from this point begins the process of external operation: because through the intellect’s desire and love for that which it has already considered as good there follows an external operation towards that good. Wherefore from the very fact that goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit it is reasonable for us to conclude that the procession of the divine persons goes no further. What does follow, however, is the procession of nron +ures which is outside the divine nature.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Of all lines the circle is the most perfect, because it admits of no addition. Hence this belongs to the perfection of the Holy Spirit that as it were he closes the circle of the divine origin, so that no addition is possible, as we have shown above.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. In the reception or communication of the divine nature there is no other difference but that arising from the relations and this difference cannot cause inequality of perfection because as Augustine says (Cont. Maxim. iii, 18), when we ask who Proceeds from whom, it is a question of origin, not of equality of inequality.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Just as the communication of the divine nature by the Father to the Son belongs to their. perfection, so the perfect reception of the communicaied nature belongs to the perfection of the Holy Spirit: and both perfections differ not in quantity but only in resmet of relation which does not constitute imperfection,

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. As we have already observed, that which makes a person incommunicable cannot be common to many. Hence the result of sharing therein would be not enjoyment but the destruction of the distinction of the persons. Thus were the Father to have a companion in the Godhead to share his paternity there would be a confusion of persons: and the same applies to filiation and procession.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The other attributes have no intrinsic operation as the intellect and will have, whence could arise the procession of a divine person.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The process of nature and the process of the intellect have this in common that in either case one thing proceeds from one thing in likeness to that whence it proceeds. But love which proceeds from the will proceeds from two who love each other mutually: nor can we infer that because there is love there is a likeness of the lover. Wherefore in God the same (person) proceeds by way of nature and by way of the intellect, i.e. as Son and as Word: whereas it is another person that proceeds by way of the will as love.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Although there are five notions in God there are but three personal properties constituting the persons: and therefore there are but three persons.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. The ideal relations in God refer to things outside, i.e. to creatures: and consequently they do not cause a distinction of persons in him.

We must also reply to the other arguments which would prove that there are fewer than three persons in God.

1. In every created nature there are many modes of procession, yet the specific nature is not communicated in each of them: and the reason of this is to be found in the imperfection of created nature, inasmuch as not everything of a created nature subsists in itself: thus the word that proceeds from a man’s intellect is not subsistent, nor is the love that proceeds from his will: whereas the son who is begotten by an operation of nature subsists in human nature: wherefore this is the only way in which human nature is communicated, although there are several modes of procession. On the other hand whatsoever is in God is subsistent, wherefore in God the divine nature is communicated in every mode of procession.

2. There is no reason why something should proceed even nat urally from the will: for the will naturally wills and loves something, viz. happiness and the knowledge of the truth. Hence there is no reason why the Holy Spirit should not proceed from the Father and the Son, although he proceeds by way of the will.

3. Although will and intellect do not differ in God except logically, he that proceeds by way of the intellect must be really distinct from him who proceeds by way of the will: because the Word which proceeds by way of the intellect proceeds from one only as from the speaker: while the Holy Spirit who proceeds by way of the will as love, must needs proceed from two who love each other mutually, or from one who speaks and. his word. For nothing can be loved unless the intellect has first conceived it by its word. Hence he who proceeds by way of the will must proceed from him who proceeds by way of the intellect, and consequently must be distinct from him.

4. He that proceeds from another in God may do so in two ways, namely by way of word and by way of love. Hence to be from another in a general way is not enough to constitute an incommunicable person, and must be defined ,in reference to that which is proper.

5. In God there are four relations and not only two: yet only three of them are personal, for one, namely common spiration, is not a personal property, seeing that it is common to two persons: and for this reason there are only three persons in God.

We grant the remaining arguments.

QUESTION X

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS

THERE are five points of inquiry: (1) Is there procession in God? (2) Is there only one procession in God? (3) What is the order between procession and relation in God? (4) Does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son? (5) Would the Holy Spirit still be distinct from the Son if he did not proceed from him?

Q. X: ARTICLE I

ISTHERE PROCESSION IN GOD?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXVII: G.G. IV, II]

THE first point of inquiry is whether there be processions in the divine persons: and seemingly there are not.

1. Whatsoever proceeds from a thing is separated from it. But the divine persons are not separated from one another: thus the Son says (Jo. xiv, 10): I am in the Father and the Father in me: and the same applies to the Holy Spirit, namely that he is in the Father and the Son and vice versa. Therefore in God one person proceeds not from another.

2. Nothing savouring of motion, even as nothing pertaining to matter should be attributed to God in its proper sense. Now procession denotes motion. Therefore it cannot be attributed to God in its proper sense.

3. Whatsoever proceeds is logically prior to its procession, since it is the subject thereof. Now in God nothing that proceeds can be prior to its procession: for the divine essence does not proceed as neither is it begotten;

and relation is not prior to procession, but contrariwise as we have already stated (Q. viii, A. 3). Therefore procession is impossible in God.

4. Even as that which proceeds is from something so also is it to something. But that which proceeds to something is not self-subsistent. Therefore seeing that the divine persons are self-subsistent it would seem incompetent for them to proceed.

5. Inasmuch as the more excellent creatures are more like to God, that which is found in the lower creaturess and nott in the higher is not found in God: for instance, dimensive quantity, matter and so forth. Now procession is to be found in the lower creatures, where one individual engenders another of the same species: whereas this does not obtain in the higher creatures. Neither therefore in God is procession to be found.

6. We should by no means attribute to God anything that is derogatory to his dignity. Now God’s dignity consists chiefly in his being the first cause of existence, and not deriving existence from anything else: which would seem incompatible with procession, since whatsoever proceeds derives its existence in some way from another. ~ Therefore it niust not be said that anything proceeds in God.

7. A person is a “hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity.” But it does not savour of dignity that one receive from another (which is implied by procession). Therefore procession should not be ascribed to the divine persons as though it were a personal property.

8. A thing is in some way the cause of that which proceeds from it. But one divine person cannot be the cause of another: not an intrinsic cause, i.e. formal or material, since in God there is no composition of form and matter; nor extrinsic, since one person dwells within the other. Hence there is no procession in God.

9. Whatsoever proceeds issues from another as from its principium. Now one (divine) person cannot be described as the principium of another: for seeing that principium connotes that which is principiated, we should have to say that some divine person is principiated, and this seemingly is peculiar to creatures. Hence there is no procession in God.

10. The word principium would seem to indicate priority, whereas according to Athanasius there is no priority or posterity in God. Therefore one person is not the principium of another, and one should not be described as proceeding from the other.

11. Every principium is operative or productive. Now one person is not productive or operative of another, else in God there would be something made or created. Therefore a divine person has no principium and does not proceed.

12. If B proceeds from A, B must have something in common with A and communicated to it by A; and also something proper whereby it is distinguished from A; since nothing proceeds from itself. Now whereverthere is something and something else there is composition. Therefore wherever there is procession there is composition. But there is no composition in God: and consequently neither is there procession.

13. That which proceeds from another receives something from it: and whatsoever receives something is of a needy nature: for if it needed not it would not receive: for which reason in natural things receptivity is ascribed to matter. Therefore whatsoever proceeds is by nature needy. But in God there is no such thing as need for he is supremely perfect. Therefore there is no procession in God.

14. To this it will be replied that the recipient is imperfect when it exists before receiving, and when having received it is in possession and no longer needy. Now the Son and the Holy Spirit receive indeed from the Father, but they do not exist before receiving: and thus they are not in need.

On the contrary every creature is needy by nature, and yet it, does not exist before receiving existence from God. Therefore the fact of not existing before receiving does not disprove need.

15. Whatsoever has a thing only by receiving it from another, considered in itself lacks that thing: thus air considered in itself lacks light which it receives from something else. If then the Son and the Holy Spirit have being only through receiving it from the Father (which must be the case if they proceed from the Father) it follows of necessity that considered in themselves they do not exist. Now that which considered in itself is nothing, if it receive being from another, must necessarily come from nothing and consequently must be a creature. If then the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father they must be creatures; and this is the blasphemy of Arius. Therefore there is no procession in God.

16. That which proceeds from another proceeds that it may come into existence: and that which proceeds that it may exist did not always exist:

thus if a thing proceeds to a place it was not always in that place. But the divine persons are eternal. Therefore no divine person proceeds.

17. The principle whence a thing proceeds exercises a certain authority over that which proceeds from it as from a principle. If then one divine person proceeds from another, for instance, the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father, there must be in the Father some authority over the Son and the Holy Spirit: and thus, since authority is a kind of dignity there will be a dignity in the Father that is not in the Son and the Holy Spirit, and consequently there will be inequality in the divine persons, and this is contrary to the saying of Athanasius (Symb.) that in the Trinity "there is neither priority no posteriority, neither greater nor lesser: but all three persons are co-eternal and co-equal with one another." Therefore there is no procession in the divine persons.

On the contrary the Son says (Jo. viii, 42): From God I proceeded and came.

Again it is stated (Jo. xv, 26) that the Spirit of truth proceedeth from the Father. Therefore there is procession in the divine persons.

I answer that in us intellectual knowledge originates in the imagination and senses which do not transcend continuous matter. For this reason we take the terms that apply to continuous matter and transfer them to whatsoever we grasp with the intellect. Take, for instance, the word distance which is applied first to place and is afterwards transferred to any difference of forms: wherefore all contraries of any genus whatsoever are said to be the most distant, although distance is applied first of all to ubiety, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). In like manner the term procession was first employed to signify that local movement whereby a thing passes from one place through intermediate places to an extreme place in an ordinate manner: and thence it is transferred to denote the order between any two things one of which issues from or succeeds the other. Hence we apply the word procession to all kinds of movement: for instance, we say that a body proceeds from whiteness to blackness, or from a great to a small quantity or from non-being to being, and vice versa: and in like manner we use the word procession to indicate the emanation of one thing from another; thus we say that the ray proceeds from the sun, and the operation or even the thing produced from the operator; thus the thing made by a craftsman is said to proceed from him, and the thing generated from the generator, and in a general way we designate any such order as a procession. Now operation is twofold. There is an operation that passes from the operator into something extrinsic, as heating passes from fire into wood: this operation is not a perfection of the operator but of the thing operated, since the fire gains nothing by heating, whereas the thing heated acquires heat. Another operation does not pass into something outside but remains in the operator, such as understanding, sensation, willing and the like. These operations are perfections of the operator: for the intellect is not perfect except by understanding actually, and the senses except by sensing actually. The first kind of operation is common to animate and inanimate beings: whereas the second is proper to animate beings: wherefore, if we take movement in a wide sense for any kind of operation—as the Philosopher takes it (De Anima iii), where it is stated that sensation and understanding are a kind of movement—not indeed the movement which is the act of an imperfect thing (Phys. iii, i) but that which is the act of a perfect thing—it would seem proper to animate beings; and this is what is meant when we speak of a thing being the cause of its own movement. Because whenever we observe that a thing operates of itself and in itself in any way whatever we say that it lives: and in this sense Plato (Tim.) says that the first mover moves itself. In respect of both kinds of operation procession is found in creatures. In regard to the first kind we say that the thing generated proceeds from the generator and the thing made from the maker. With regard to the second kind we say that words proceed from the speaker, and love from the lover. And we attribute both kinds of operation to God, when we say that he creates, preserves and governs all things. Nor by this do we signify that any perfection accrues to God by such operation, but rather that the creature acquires perfection from the divine perfection. We attribute the other kind of operation to God when we escribe him as understanding and willing whereby we indicate his perfection. For he were not perfect did he ,not understand and will actually: and for this reason we acknowledge him to be living. In respect of either operation we attribute procession to God. As regards the first we speak of divine wisdom or goodness as proceeding to creatures, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), and of creatures as proceeding from God. As regards the second we acknowledge in God a procession of word and love; and this is the procession of the Son from the Father (for the Son is the Father’s word) and of the Holy Spirit who is his love and life-giving breath (spiritus). Hence Athanasius in a discourse pronounced in the Council of Nicea says that the Arians through maintaining that the Son and Holy Spirit are not consubstantial with the Father, seemed in consequence to say that God is not a living and intelligent being, but dead and unintelligent.

Reply to the First Objection. This argument considers the procession that is an operation passing into something extrinsic. But the divine persons do not proceed thus; and their procession partakes rather of the nature of an immanent operation: since that which proceeds in this way is not distant from that whence it proceeds: even so the human word is in the mind of the speaker and not distant from him.

Reply to the Second Objection. The procession attributed to the divine persons is not a local movement , but one that indicates order of emanation.

Reply to the Third Objection. That which proceeds by local movement must precede its procession since it is the subject thereof: but that which proceeds in the order of origin is the term of the procession. Hence if it be composed of matter and form and comes into being by generation, the matter precedes the procession as subject, while the form or even the composite follows logically the procession as term: as when fire proceeds from fire by generation. But when that which proceeds is not composite but a pure form; or again if it come into being by creation the term of which is the whole substance, then that which proceeds in no way precedes the procession but on the contrary: thus the creature is not conceived as existing before creation, nor brightness as preceding its emission from the sun, nor the Word as preceding his procession from the Father.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. In so far as procession may denote order of origin, a thing may proceed as self-subsistent and without relation to another thing: although by local movement a thing does not proceed so as to subsist in itself simply, but so as to be in a place. Such procession, however, is not in God.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In intellectual substances which are the most noble creatures there is also procession according to the operations of the intellect and will: and in this respect the image of the Trinity is in them. In them, however, word and love are not subsistent persons, because their understanding and willing are not their substance, and this is proper to God:

hence in God word and love proceed as subsistent persons, but not in intellectual creatures.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. It would be derogatory to God's dignity to originate from something essentially diverse, for this is proper to the creature: but to originate from that which is consubstantial pertains to the divine perfection. For there would not be perfection in the Godhead unless its understanding and willing were actual: and this being the case we must acknowledge in God the procession of word and love.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although receiving does not in itself connote perfection, it does imply perfection on the part of the one from whom something is received: and especially in the divine persons who receive the fulness of the Godhead.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Seldom or never do the Latin doctors employ the word cause to indicate the origin of the divine persons; both because with us cause connotes effect, wherefore lest we be forced to say that the Son and Holy Spirit are made, we do not say that the Father is their cause; and because with us the word cause signifies something essentially diverse, for we describe as a cause that whence something different follows; and again because the pagan philosophers apply the word cause to God to denote his relation to creatures: for they say that God is the first cause and that creatures are caused by him. Hence lest anyone think that the Son and the Holy Spirit should be reckoned among creatures differing essentially from God, we avoid the word cause when we speak of God. On the other hand the Greeks employ the word cause more absolutely when speaking of God, and indicate origin only thereby: wherefore they apply the word cause to the divine persons. For an expression may be objectionable in Latin whereas in Greek it is admissible on account of a peculiarity of idiom. And if in speaking of God we admit the use of the word cause in Greek it does not follow that it has the same sense as when applied to creatures, and as divided by philosophers into four kinds.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. Of all the terms relating to origin, the word principle is most appropriate to God. For since we are unable to comprehend the things of God it is better for us to indicate them by means of general terms which have an indefinite meaning, than to employ special words that have a definite signification. Wherefore the name He who is (Exod. iii, 13, 14) is said to be most appropriate, seeing that according to

Damascene (De Fide Orth. i. o) it signifies the boundless sea of substance. Now just as cause is a more general term than element which denotes something primary and simple in the genus of material cause, so is principle a more general term than cause; thus the first part of movement or of a line is called a principium but not a cause. From this it is clear that a principium may be something that is not essentially distinct, as a point in relation to a line; whereas a cause cannot, especially if we speak of an originating, i.e. an efficient, cause. Now though the Father is called the principium of the Son and the Holy Spirit, it does not seem right to say without qualification that the Son or Holy Spirit is principiated, although the Greeks use the expression, which may be allowed to pass if understood aright. Nevertheless we must avoid using words that seem to imply subjection, lest they be attributed to the Son or the Holy Spirit and we fall into the error of the Arians. Thus Hilary (De Trin. vii) while granting that the Father is greater than the Son on account of his pre-eminence as origin, denies that the Son is less than the Father since he received equality of essence from him. Likewise we must not stress such terms as subjection and principiation in the Son, although we employ the words authority and principium in speaking of the Father.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. Although the word principium is derived from priority, it is employed to signify not priority but origin: even as the word lapis is not employed to denote the hurt done to the foot, although it is thought that this is its derivation. Thus although the Father is not prior to the Son he is his principium.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Not every principium is operative or productive: for in neither way is a point the principium of a line.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In the Son there is something common to the Father, namely the essence; and something whereby he is distinguished from the Father, namely the relation. Yet there is not composition, because the relation is really the essence, as we have explained in previous discussions (Q. viii, A. 2).

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The recipient before receiving is in need, since he receives in order to supply his need: but after receiving he no longer needs, since he has what he needed. If then there be something that does not exist before receiving, and is always in the state of having received, it is by no means in need. Now the Son receives not from the

Father as though he previously lacked and afterwards received, but he receives his very being from the Father. Hence it does not follow that he is in need.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. The creature receives from God a certain existence which would not continue unless God preserved it: wherefore even after it has received existence, it needs the divine action to preserve it in being and consequently is of a needy nature. On the other hand the Son receives from the Father identically the same being and identically the same nature as that of the Father; wherefore he is not of a needy nature.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The Son is considered in himself in reference to that which he has absolutely, and this is the essence of the Father: and in this respect he is not nothing, but one with the Father. And if we consider him in reference to the Father, we conceive him as receiving being from the Father: wherefore thus again he is not nothing. Consequently in no sense is the Son nothing. He would, however, be nothing considered in himself if there were anything absolute in him distinct from the Father, as is the case with creatures.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Son does indeed proceed that he may exist: but his procession is eternal (even as the procession of light from the sun is coeval with the sun) wherefore the Son also is eternal.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Authority in the Father is nothing but the relation of principle. Now equality or inequality refer not to relation but to quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4; v, 6). Hence the Son is not unequal to the Father.

Q. X: ARTICLE II

IS THERE BUT ONE PROCESSION IN GOD OR ARE THERE MORE?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXVII, A. 3]

THE second point of inquiry is whether there is only one procession in God, or more than one: and seemingly there is but one.

1. Boethius (De Trin.) says that in God procession is substantial. Now in God what is substantial is not multiplied. Therefore there are not several processions in God.

2. To this it will be replied that the processions in God do not differ in respect of the substance which is communicated by procession and by reason of which the processions are said to be substantial, but by themselves.—On the contrary whenever a number of things are distinct from one another, their difference is either one of matter, as, for instance, individuals of the same species, or of form, as for example things of different genus or species. Now the processions in God are not distinguished in the same way as things that differ in matter, since God is altogether immaterial. Wherefore it follows that all distinction in God is after the manner of a formal distinction. Now all formal distinction is by reason of some opposition, especially in things of the same genus: because a genus~ is divided by contrary differences which differentiate the species (Metaph. x). Accordingly if there be a distinction between the divine processions, this must be by reason of some opposition. But processions, actions and movements are not mutually opposed except by reason either of their principles or of their terms; as, for example, heating and chilling, ascent and descent. Therefore the divine processions cannot be distinguished by themselves: but if they be distinguished at all, this must be either on the part of the principle of the procession, or on the part of the term, i.e. the person in whom the procession terminates.

3. Things that can exist side by side cannot constitute difference (thus white and sweet do not differentiate two substances, since they can be together in the same subject): because the reason why one thing is distinct from another is that the one cannot be the other. Now that certain things cannot be together in the same subject is due to some kind of opposition: for things are said to be opposite when they cannot coexist in the same subject. Hence there can be no distinction without opposition: thus even when things differ by reason of matter, there is opposition in regard to situation, since such a division is one of quantity. If then there cannot be opposite processions otherwise than by reason of the terms or principles, as stated above (Obj. 2), it is impossible that the processions be distinguished by themselves.

4. But it will be replied that the divine processions are distinguished in that one is by way of nature, i.e. the procession of the Son, and the other by way of will, i.e. the procession of the Holy Spirit.—On the contrary, that which proceeds naturally proceeds by way of nature: and the Holy Spirit

proceeds from the Father naturally: for Athanasius says that he is the natural Spirit of the Father. Therefore he proceeds by way of nature.

5. The will is free and consequently that which proceeds by way of will proceeds by way of liberty. If then the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will he must proceed by way of liberty. Now that which proceeds by way of liberty may or may not proceed, and may proceed in this or that degree, since what is done freely is not confined to this or that. Therefore the Father could produce the Holy Spirit or not, and could give him whatsoever degree of greatness he wished. Hence it follows that the Holy Spirit was a potential being and not an essentially necessary being, and thus he would not be of divine nature, which is the heresy of Macedonius.

6. Hilary (De Synod.) in assigning the difference between creatures and the Son, says that “the will of God gave all creatures their substance, while the Son received his substance from the Father by a natural birth”: Therefore if the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will it follows that he proceeds in the same way as creatures.

7. In God nature and will differ but logically. If then the processions of the Son and the Holy Spirit differ in that one is by way of nature and the other by way of will, it follows that these processions differ but logically: and thus the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinct persons.

8. But it will be replied that the spirative and generative powers in the Father differ but logically, and yet there is a real distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit: and likewise nature and will can cause a real distinction in processions and proceeding persons, although they differ but logically.—On the contrary, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinguished by things that are in them. But the generative power is not in the Son, nor is the spirative power in the Holy Spirit. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinguished by these things.

9. Generation which is procession by way of nature is proved to be in God by the fact that its likeness is communicated to the creature according to Isaiah lxvi, 9, Shall I that give generation to others be barren? But procession by way of will is not communicated to the creature, since nothing created receives its nature otherwise than by generation. Therefore in God there is no procession by way of will.

10. Mode adds somewhat to a thing and consequently induces composition, especially if there be a number of modes. Now in God there is

utter simplicity: and consequently there are not a number of modes in him to justify one’s saying that the Son has one mode of procession, i.e. the mode of nature, and the Holy Spirit another, i.e. the mode of the will.

11. In God will differs from nature no more than does the intellect. But there is not in God a procession by way of the intellect other than that by way of nature. Therefore neither is there another procession by way of the will besides that which is by way of nature.

12. It will be replied that the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from that of the Son in that the procession of the Son is solely from one who does not proceed, i.e. the Father, whereas the procession of the Holy Spirit is both from one who proceeds not and from one who proceeds, and simultaneously, namely from the Father and the Son.—On the contrary, if we allow that there are two processions in God,, they must differ either numerically only, or specifically. If only numerically, it follows that both must be called generation or birth, and each of the proceeding persons must be called a Son:, and if they differ specifically, the nature communicated by the procession must differ specifically: for thus the procession of a man and that of a horse from their respective principles differ specifically, whereas the procession of Socrates and that of Plato do not. Since then there is but one divine nature there cannot be several specifically different processions, although one is from one who proceeds and the other not.

13. The Son and the Holy Spirit are not distinct in the same way as creatures that differ specifically, for they are hypostases of one nature. Now processions whereby things proceed that are of the same species but are distinct numerically, do not themselves differ specifically, as, for instance, the generation of Socrates and the generation of Plato. Therefore the procession of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit are not specifically distinct processions.

14. Just as it is possible for one to proceed from one who proceeds so is it possible for one to be born of one who was born: for instance, A who is the son of B may himself have a son C. If then there are two processions in God through another person proceeding from one who proceeds, there will likewise be two generations through another person being begotten of one who is begotten.

15. If the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from the procession of the Son, in that the Holy Spirit proceeds from one who does not proceed and

from one who does, i.e. from Father and Son, then either he proceeds from them inasmuch as they are one or inasmuch as they are several. If inasmuch as they are several it follows that the Holy Spirit is composite, since one simple thing cannot proceed otherwise than from one as principle — and if he proceeds from them inasmuch as they,are one, it matters not whether he proceed from both or from one only. Consequently the procession of the Holy Spirit cannot differ from that of the Son by the fact that the Son proceeds from one only and the Holy Spirit from two.

16. Procession is condivided with paternity and filiation for these are called the three personal properties. Now in God there is but one paternity and one filiation. Therefore there is likewise but one procession.

17. In creatures there is but one kind of procession whereby the nature is communicated, for which reason the Commentator (Phys. vii) says that animals generated by seed are not of the same species as those which are engendered by corrupt matter and without seed. Now the divine nature is one only. Therefore it cannot be communicated by more than one kind of procession. Therefore there are not several processions in God.

18. The Son proceeds from the Father as brightness according to Hebrews i, 3, Who being the brightness of his glory: and this because he proceeds from the Father as co-eternal with him, as brightness from the sun or fire. But the Holy Spirit likewise proceeds from the Father as co-eternal with him. Therefore he proceeds from him in the same way as the Son, and thus there are not several processions in God.

19. The eternal procession of the divine person is the type and cause of the temporal procession of the creature and of whatsoever is in the creature. Hence Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 6) expounds the words of Genesis i, He spoke... and it was made, thus: He begot the Word in whom (the creature) was that it might be made. Now the Son is the perfect type and cause of the creature’s production. Therefore there is no need of another procession of a divine person besides that of the Son.

20. The more perfect a nature the fewer the things through which it works. Now the divine nature is most perfect. Since then one created nature is communicated by only one kind of procession, neither can the divine nature be communicated by more than one kind of procession.

21. From one simple thing only. one thing can proceed. Now the Father is one simple thing. Therefore there can be but one procession from him: and

thus there are not several processions in God.

22. A thing is said to be generated inasmuch as it receives a form: since in creatures generation is change terminating in a form. Now the Holy Spirit by proceeding receives a form, i.e. the divine essence, of which it is said (Phil. ii, 6): Who being in the form of God thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is generation; and thus it differs not from the generation of the Son.

23. Nativity is the way to nature as the very word implies. Now the divine nature is communicated to the Holy Spirit through his procession. Therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit is nativity: thus it differs not from the procession of the Son, and consequently there are not two processions in God.

On the other hand it would seem that there are more than two processions in God.

1. There is a procession by way of nature in respect of which the Son is named, and a procession by way of intellect, dn respect of which the Word is named, and a procession by way of will in respect of which the proceeding Love is named. Therefore there are three processions in God,

2. It will be replied that in God the procession by way of nature is one and the same as the procession by way of intellect: since the Son is the same person as the Word.—On the contrary processions in creatures are a representation of the processions of the divine persons; wherefore it is said of God the Father that of him all paternity in heaven and earth is named (Eph. iii, 15). Now in creatures the procession of nature whereby man begets man is distinct from the processions of the intellect whereby it produces its word. Therefore neither in God is there a distinction between procession by way of intellect and procession by way of nature.

3. According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) it belongs to the divine goodness that it proceed. Now the Father is supremely good. Therefore he proceeds. Hence in God there are three processions, one whereby the Father proceeds, another whereby the Son proceeds, and a third whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds.

On the contrary it would seem that in God there are but two processions. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that the procession of the Son is “a begetting or nativity, the Procession of the Holy Spirit is not a nativity, yet both are ineffable.” Therefore in God there are but two distinct processions.

I answer that the early doctors of the faith were compelled to discuss matters of faith on account of the insistence of heretics. Thus Arius thought that existence from another is incompatible with the divine nature, wherefore he maintained that the Son and the Holy Spirit, whom Holy Writ describes as being from another, are creatures. In order to refute this error the holy fathers. had to show that it is not impossible for someone to proceed from God the Father and yet be consubstantial with him, inasmuch as he receives from him the same nature as the Father has. Since, however, the Son in that he receives from the Father the nature of the Father is said to be born or begotten of the Father; whereas the Holy Spirit is not said in the Scriptures to be born or begotten while he is said to be from God, Macedonius thought that the Holy Spirit is not consubstantial with’the Father but his creature: for he did not believe it possible for anyone to receive from another the latter’s nature unless he were born of him (and were his son. Hence he thought that if the Holy Spirit receives from the Father the latter’s nature and essence it must infallibly follow that he is begotten and a Son. Wherefore to refute this error it was necessary for our doctors to show that the divine nature can be communicated by a twofold procession, one being a begetting or nativity, and the other not: and this is the same as to seek the difference between the divine processions. Accordingly some have maintained that the processions in God are distinct by themselves. The reason for this view was because they held that the relations do not differentiate the divine hypostases but only manifest their distinction: for they thought relations in God were like individual properties in creatures, which properties do not cause but only manifest the distinction between individuals. They say then that in God the hypostases are distinct only by their origin. And seeing that those things whereby certain things are distinguished primarily must be distinguished by themselves—thus opposite differences, whereby species differ, differ by themselves, otherwise we should go on for ever—they maintain that the divine processions are distinct by themselves. But this cannot be true: because one thing is distinguished from another specifically by that which gives it its species, and numerically by that which gives it individuality. Now the difference between the divine processions must not be merely like that which distinguishes things numerically; it must be like that which differentiates things specifically, since one is generation and the other not. Consequently the divine processions are distinguished by that which gives them their species. But no procession, operation or movement has its species from itself, but from its term or principle. Hence it is futile to say that any processions are distinguished by themselves: and they must differ in relation either to their principles or to their terms.

Wherefore some said that in God the processions are distinguished in relation to their principles: inasmuch as one procession is by way of nature or intellect, and the other by way of will, since the terms intellect and will would seem to indicate principles of operations and processions. But if we consider the matter carefully we shall easily see that this does not suffice for the distinction of the divine persons unless something else be added. For since that which proceeds must bear a resemblance to the principle of the procession, just as in creatures a likeness to the form of the generator must be in the thing generated; it follows—if processions in God are distinguished by the fact that the principle of one is the nature or intellect, while the principle of the other is the will—that in the person proceeding by the one procession there will be something pertaining only to nature or intellect, and in the other something that pertains only to the will: which is evidently false. Because by the one procession, i.e. of the Son from the Father, the latter communicates to the Son all that he has, nature, intelligence, power and will, and whatsoever is attributed to him absolutely; wherefore as the Son is the Word, i.e. Wisdom Begotten, so may he be called Begotten Nature, Will, or Power Begotten, i.e. received by generation, or rather the recipient of these by generation. Hence it is plain that since all the essential attributes concur towards the one procession of the Son, the difference between the processions cannot be ascribed to the different concepts of the attributes; as though one attribute were communicated by one procession, and another attribute by another procession. Now whereas the term of a procession is to have (since a divine person proceeds so as to have what he receives by proceeding), and whereas processions are distinguished by their terms, it follows of necessity that in God he who proceeds. is distinguished in the same way as he who has. Now in God haver is not distinguished from haver by the fact that the one has these attributes, and the other has those; but by the fact that the one has the same things from the other. For the Son has all that the Father has: yet in this is he distinguished from the Father, that he has them from the Father.

Accordingly one proceeding person is distinguished from the other proceeding person, not as though the one by proceeding receives some things, while the other receives other things, but because one of them receives from the other. Hence whatever is in a divine procession that can at once be conceived as being in one procession without any other procession being presupposed, belongs to one procession only: but there will be at once another procession if those same things that were received by the first procession are again received by another procession. Thus it is only the order of processions, which arises from their origin, that multiplies processions in God.

Hence not without reason some held that one procession being by way of intelligence and nature, and the other by way of will, the former procession does not presuppose another procession, whereas the latter does: because love of a thing cannot proceed from the will except on the presupposition that the conceived word of that thing has already proceeded: since good understood is the object of the will.

Reply to the First Objection. Procession in God is said to be substantial because it does not arise from an accident:. nevertheless thereby the proceeding person receives substance.

We grant the Second and Third Objections.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. There is nothing to prevent something proceeding from the will naturally. For the will naturally tends to the ultimate end, just as every other power naturally works to attain its object. Hence it is that man naturally desires happiness, and in like manner God naturally loves his own goodness, just as he naturally understands his own truth. Accordingly just as the Son as Word naturally proceeds from the Father, so the Holy Spirit naturally proceeds from him as Love. The Holy Spirit does not, however, proceed by way of nature, because in God to proceed by way of nature is to proceed in the same way as in creatures things are produced by nature and not by the will. Wherefore to be produced naturally and to be produced by way of nature differ inasmuch as a thing is said to be produced naturally on account of its natural connexion with its principle, whereas it is said to be produced by way of nature if it be produced by a principle in the same way as nature produces.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. As Augustine teaches (De Civ. Dei, v, 10) the natural necessity under which the will is said to will a thing of necessity

—happiness, for instance—is not incompatible with free-will: but free-will is opposed to violence or compulsion. Now there is no violence or compulsion when a thing is moved in accordance with the order of its nature, but there is if its natural movement be hindered, as when a heavy body is prevented from moving down towards the centre. Hence the will naturally desires happiness, although it desires it necessarily: and thus also God by his will loves himself freely, although he loves himself of necessity. Moreover it is necessary that he love himself as much as he is good, even as he understands himself as much as he is. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father freely, not however potentially but necessarily. Nor was it possible for him to proceed so as to be less than the Father: but it was necessary for him to be equal to the Father, even as the Son who is the Father's Word.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. The creature does not proceed naturally or necessarily from the divine will: for though God by his will naturally and necessarily, loves his goodness, and the love thus proceeding is the Holy Spirit, yet neither naturally nor necessarily does he will creatures to be produced, but gratuitously. For creatures are not the last end of the divine will, nor does God's goodness depend on them (which goodness is his last end), since it gains nothing from creatures: even so man of necessity desires happiness, but not the things ordained thereto.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Although nature and will in God differ not in reality but logically, nevertheless he who proceeds by way of will must be distinct from him who proceeds by way of nature, and the one procession must differ from the other. For we have already stated that to proceed by way of nature means to proceed in the same way as that which proceeds from nature, and that to proceed by way of will means to proceed as that which proceeds from the will. Now the will does not proceed without a previous procession; for it does tend to a thing without the previous procession of the intellect in forming its concept of that thing, since the good understood moves the will. Now the procession from a natural agent does not presuppose another procession unless accidentally, inasmuch as one natural agent depends on another natural agent: but this is not essential to nature qud nature. Therefore in God this procession by way of nature is one that presupposes no other: while the procession by way of will has its beginning from a procession that is presupposed. Hence there must needs be procession from procession, and proceeding person from a proceeding person: and this causes a real distinction in God.

We grant the Eighth Objection.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. God has implanted in the creature a likeness to both processions. By the procession that is by way of nature it is possible in created things for the nature to be communicated, since the effect is like the agent as such: wherefore by an action whereof nature is the principle, the effect can receive the nature: whereas by an action whereof the will is the principle, the effect can receive the likeness of that alone which is in the will, for instance, a likeness of the end in view; or of the form, as in the products of art. But whatsoever is in God is the divine nature: and consequently the nature must be communicated by either procession.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. When we speak of procession in God by way of nature or will, we do not ascribe to God a mode as though it were a quality added to the divine substance, but we indicate a comparative likeness between the divine processions and the processions to be observed in creatures.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. In God there is no distinction between procession by way of intelligence and procession by way of nature: but there is a distinction between both of these and the procession by way of will: and this for three reasons.—First, because just as procession by way of nature does not presuppose another procession, so neither does procession by way of intelligence: whereas procession by way of will necessarily presupposes procession by way of intelligence.—Secondly, because just as nature produces something in likeness to itself, so also does the intellect both within and without: within, since the word is the likeness of the thing understood, and of the intellect understanding itself: without , as when the form understood is introduced into the product of art. On the other hand the will does not produce its likeness either within or without. Not within, since love which is the intimate procession of the will is not a likeness of the will or the thing willed, but a kind of impression made on the will by the thing willed, or a kind of union between these two. Nor without, because the will imprints on the artifact the form which in the logical order was understood before it was willed, wherefore it is a likeness first of the intellect, though secondly of the will.—Thirdly, because the procession of nature is from only one agent, if the agent be perfect. Nor does it matter that in animals one is generated of two, namely the father and mother; since the father alone is agent in generation while the mother is patient. Likewise the procession of the intellect is from one only; whereas friendship or mutual love proceeds from two loving each other.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. Although strictly speaking genus and species, universal and particular, are not predicated of God, nevertheless as far as it is possible to compare God to creatures, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are distinguished from one another like several individuals of one species, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of considering the species in a particular individual of the genus of substance: we may consider the species of its hypostasis, or we may consider the species of its individual property. Thus given that Socrates is white and Plato black, and granted that white and black are properties individualising Socrates and Plato, it will be true to say that Socrates and Plato are one in species, in which their hypostases are contained. For they agree in humanity, but differ in the species of their property; since white and black differ specifically. It is t& same with the Father and the Son. For they are considered as one in the species of which their hypostases are supposites, in that they agree in the nature of the Godhead: but they differ in the species of a personal property: since paternity and filiation are relations of different species. It must also be observed that in creatures generation is Per se directed to the species, for nature intends to generate a man; wherefore the specific nature is multiplied by generation in created things. But in God procession is directed to the multiplication of hypostases in which the divine nature is numerically one: wherefore in God the processions are quasi-specifically different by reason of the difference between the personal properties, although in the proceeding persons there is one common nature.

This suffices for the Replies to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Objections.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two persons if we consider the spirating supposites: because since the Holy Spirit is the mutual love and bond of two he must needs be spirated by two. But if we consider that whereby they spirate, thus he proceeds from them as one in the divine nature: since from none but God can God proceed.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. Procession as condivided with paternity and filiation is the personal property of the Holy Spirit: and although it is a relation, yet since it has not a special name. as paternity and filiation have, it is indicated by the name procession, just as if filiation were unnamed, and signified under the name of nativity, which is the special name of the Son's procession. The procession of the Holy Spirit has no special name because, as already stated, in creatures a nature is not communicated in this way: and we transfer names from creatures in speaking of God. Hence it does not follow that in God there is but one common procession.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. In a creature which is susceptive of accidents there can be something in a thing b~sides its nature: but not in God. For this reason in God the nature is communicated by any mode of procession, but not in creatures: because although there are various processions in creatures, the nature is communicated in one way only.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The procession of the Son is co-eternal with the Father inasmuch as it is a divine procession, wherefore this applies also to the procession of the Holy Spirit: but it does not apply to the procession of the Son as distinct from that of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. The Son is a sufficient type of the temporal procession of the creature, if we consider him as Word and exemplar: but the Holy Spirit must needs be the type of that procession inasmuch as he is Love. For just as it is said (Wis. ix, I) that God made all things by his Word, so is it stated (ibid. xi, 23) that he loves all things that are and hates none of the things which he has made: and Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). that "God's love did not permit him to be barren."

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. Perfect nature is capable of many works although few things suffice it for each one.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. From the one Father alone there is only one procession, namely of the Son: but from the Father and Son together, there is another procession, that of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. The procession of the Holy Spirit is a procession of love. Now by a procession of love nothing is produced as a recipient of the form or nature of that whence it proceeds: and consequently it is not a generation or nativity. That the Holy Spirit receives by his procession the nature and form of God the Father is owing to the fact that he is God's love, wherein there is nothing that is not the divine nature.

This suffices for the Reply to the Twenty-third Objection.

We must also reply to the arguments which concluded that there are more than two processions in God.

1. As stated above (replies to seventh and eleventh objections) in God it is but one and the same procession by way of intelligence and by way of nature.

2. Human nature is material, that is to say composed of matter and form: wherefore in man there cannot be procession by way of nature save in respect of a natural transmutation. But procession by way of intelligence is always immaterial, wherefore in man procession by way of nature and procession by way of intelligence cannot be one and the same, whereas in God it is one and the same because the divine nature is immaterial.

3. Procession into differs from procession from. To proceed into something is to communicate one's likeness to something, and in this sense Dionysius means that the divine goodness proceeds into creatures. To proceed from a thing is to receive one's being from another, and as in this sense We are speaking of procession now, it is clear that procession is not to be attributed to the Father.

Q. X: ARTICLE III

THE ORDER BETWEEN PROCESSION AND RELATION IN GOD

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XIII, A. 3.]

THE third point of inquiry concerns the order between procession and relation in God: and it would seem that in God procession logically precedes relation.

1. The Master (I, D. 27) says that the Father is Father from eternity because from eternity he begot the Son. Now begot indicates procession and Father indicates relation. Therefore logically procession precedes relation in God.

2. The Philosopher (Metaph. v), says that relations result from action or quantity. But it is plain that the divine relations do not arise from quantity: therefore in our way of thinking they arise from action. Now processions in the divine persons are designated after the manner of divine actions. Therefore the divine processions logically precede the relations.

3. The absolute precedes the relative, even as unity precedes number. Now actions are more akin to the absolute than relations are. Therefore logically they precede.

4. A thing is said to be relative in relation to something else. Now there cannot be something else where there is ‘no distinction. Therefore relation presupposes distinction. But in God distinction in the divine persons is according to origin, inasmuch as one person proceeds from another. Therefore in God the processions precede logically the relations.

5. Logically every procession precedes its term. Now filiation which is the relation of the Son is the term of nativity which is his procession. Therefore the Son’s procession precedes filiation. But filiation and paternity not only in nature and time but also logically are simultaneous: because the one relative cannot be understood without the other. Therefore the Son’s nativity and a fortiori generation which is the act of the Father logically precede paternity: and consequently the procession is in God simply precede the relations logically.

On the contrary logically person precedes personal action. Now the divine relations constitute the persons, while the processions are personal actions as it were. Therefore the relations precede the processions logically.

Again procession must needs be from one thing to another, for just as nothing brings itself into being according to Augustine (De Trin. i, i) so nothing proceeds from itself: wherefore in God procession postulates distinction. But there is no distinction in God except by the relations. Therefore in God procession presupposes relation.

I answer that there is no order without distinction: hence where there is no real but only logical distinction there can be only a logical order. Now in God there is no real distinction except between the persons and opposite relations: wherefore in God there is not real order except as regards the persons between whom, according to Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv), there is order of nature inasmuch as one is from another, not one before another. Now in God processions and relations are not really but only logically distinct. Wherefore Augustine says that it is proper to the Father to beget the Son: whereby he gives us to understand that to beget the Son is the personal property of the Father; nor is there any other property besides paternity that is the personal property of the Father. Consequently we are not to look for real order but only, for logical order between the divine processions and relations. Now just as in God relation and procession are in reality the same thing, and do not differ except logically; even so relation itself, although but one in reality is in our way of thinking manifold. For we consider relation as constituting the person: and yet it does not do this qua relation: which is clear from the fact that in man relations do not constitute persons, since relations are accidents, while person is something subsistent in the genus of substance; and substance cannot be constituted by an accident. But in God relation constitutes a person inasmuch as it is a divine relation: because it is identical with the divine essence, since in God there cannot be any accidents: wherefore relation being in reality the divine essence can constitute a divine hypostasis. Consequently the consideration of a relation as constituting a divine person differs from the consideration of a relation qua relation. Wherefore there is nothing to prevent relation from presupposing procession if we consider relation from the one point of view, whereas the contrary obtains if we consider it from the other point of view. Accordingly we conclude that if we consider relation as such it presupposes procession logically, whereas if we consider it as constituting a person, the relation that constitutes the person from whom there is a procession precedes that procession logically: thus paternity as constituting the person of the Father logically precedes generation. On the other hand the relation that constitutes the proceeding person, even considered as constituting that person, is logically posterior to the procession as filiation is posterior to nativity: and this because the proceeding person is considered as the term of the procession.

Reply to the First Objection. The Master is speaking of paternity considered as a relation: and the same answer applies to the Second and Third Objections.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. In things where relations Are accidents relation must presuppose distinction: but in’ God the relations constitute three distinct persons,

Reply to the Fifth Objection. If we consider paternity and filiation as relations the one cannot be understood without the other: and in this sense we say that relations follow the processions in the logical order.

The remaining two objections consider the relations as constituting the persons.

Q. X: ARTICLE IV

DOES THE HOLY SPIRIT PROCEED FROM THE SON?

[SUM. TH. I, Q. XXXVI, A. 2: C.G. IV, XXIV, XXV]

THE fourth point of inquiry is whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son: and it would seem that he does not.

1. Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) says that “the Son and the Holy Spirit are as it were flowers of the God-bearing divinity.” Now flower does not proceed from flower. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not from the Son.

2. If the Son is the principle of the Holy, Ghost he has this either from himself or from another. He has it not from himself, since it belongs to the Son, as Son, to be from another rather than to be a principle. And if he has this from the Father he must needs be a principle in the same, way as the Father. But the Father is a principle by generation. Therefore the Son must be the principle of the Holy Spirit by generation, and thus the Holy Spirit will be the Son of the Son.

5. Whatsoever is common to the Father and the Son belongs to each in the same way. If then it is common to the Father and Son to be a principle, the Son will be a principle in the same way as the Father: and since the Father is a principle by generation the Son will be so also; and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

4. The Son is Son because he proceeds from the Father and is his Word. Now the Holy Spirit is the word of the Son, according to Basil (Contra Eunom. v), who gathers this from the statement of the Apostle (Heb. i, 3) that the Son upholds all things by the word of his Power. Therefore if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son he must be the Son of the Son.

5. Although in reality paternity and filiation are in God before being in us, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. iii, 15): Of whom, i.e. God the Father, all Paternity in heaven and earth is named: yet as regards the use of the terms they were transferred from human things to divine. Now among men the offspring of a son is a grandson: so, that if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son he will be the Father’s grandson, which is absurd.

6. The property of the Son consists in his receiving: for he is called Son because he receives the Father’s nature by generation. If then the Son sends

forth the Holy Ghost from himself there will be two contrary properties in the Son, which is inadmissible.

7. Whatsoever is in God is either common or proper. Now the emission of the Holy Spirit is not common to all the Trinity, since it does not apply to the Holy Spirit. Therefore it is proper to the Father and does not apply to the Son.

8. Augustine proves (De Trin. vi) that the Holy Spirit is love. Now the Father's love of the Son is gratuitous, since he loves the Son not as though he received something from him but only as giving him something: whereas the Son's love of the Father is a love that is due; because he loves the Father in that he receives from him. Now the love which is due is distinct from the love that is gratuitous Hence if the Holy Spirit is love proceeding from the Father and Son it follows that he is distinct from himself.

9. The Holy Spirit is gratuitous love: wherefore from him flow the diversities of graces according to 1 Cor. xii, 4: There are diversities of graces, but the same spirit. If then the Son's love of the Father is not gratuitous, the Holy Spirit will not be the Son's love, and thus he does not proceed from him.

10. If the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son as love, since the Son loves the Father as the Father loves the Son, it will follow that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son to the Father just as he proceeds from the Father to the Son. But this is apparently impossible: for it would follow that the Father receives from the Son, which is utterly inadmissible.

11. As the Father and Son love each other, so also do the Son and the Holy Spirit, or the Father and the Holy Spirit. If then the Holy Spirit proceeds from Father and Son because Father and Son love each other, in like manner because Father and Holy Spirit love each other, the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself: and this is impossible.

12. Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) says: "We must not dare to say or even think anything concerning the supersubstantial and hidden Godhead except what has been divinely revealed to us by the sacred oracles." Now Scripture does not assert that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but only that he proceeds from the Father, according to Jo. xv, 26; When the Paraclete cometh whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who Proceedeth from the Father. Therefore we must neither say nor think that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

13. In the Acts of the Council of Ephesus it is stated that after the reading of the Creed of the Council of Nicaea the holy synod decreed that “no one might Profess, write or devise any other faith other than that which was defined by the holy fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Spirit, and whosoever shall either presume to devise or teach or suggest another faith to such Pagans, Jews or heretics as are desirous of being converted to a knowledge of the truth, let them be deprived of their bishopric if they be bishops, and banished from the clergy if they be clerks: if they be laymen let them be excommunicated.” In like terms the Council of Chalcedon, after setting forth the decisions of other councils, continues: “Whosoever shall dare to devise another faith, or pyonounce, teach or deliver another Creed to pagans, Jews or heretics wishing to be converted, such, if they be bishops or clerks, shall be deprived of their sees in the case of bishops, and unfrocked if they be clerks; and if they be monks or laymen they shall be excommunicated.”

Now in the definitions of the foregoing councils it is not stated that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but only that he proceeds from the Father. Moreover we read in the profession of faith of the Council of Constantinople: “We believe in the Holy Spirit, Lord and Lifegiver, who proceedeth from the Father; with the Father and Son to be adored and glorified.” Therefore by no means should it have been added in the Creed that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

14. If it be asserted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, this statement is made either on the authority of Scripture or on account of some proof. But seemingly Scripture nowhere affords sufficient authority for this statement. It is true that Holy Writ speaks of the Holy Spirit as being of the Son, thus (Gal. iv, 6) it is said: God sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, and (Rom. viii, 9): If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his. Again we read that the Holy Spirit was sent by the Son; thus Christ said (Jo. xvi, 7): For if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you, but if I go, I will send him to you. Now it does not follow that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, from the fact that he is the Spirit of the Son, because according to the Philosopher the genitive case has many significations. Again it does not follow from the fact that the Holy Spirit is stated to be sent by the Son; since although the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, he is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit, according to the

words (Isa. xlviii, 16) spoken in Christ’s person: And now the Lord God and his Spirit hath sent me, and (Isa. lxi, I): The Spirit of the Lord is upon me... he hath sent me to preach to the meek: which words Christ declared to have been fulfilled in himself. Furthermore the statement cannot be upheld by any satisfactory argument. Thus even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son they would still remain distinct from each other, since they differ by their personal properties. Nothing therefore compels us to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

15. Whatsoever proceeds from another derives something from that other. If then the Holy Spirit proceeds from two, namely the Father and the Son, it follows that he receives from two, and thus apparently that he is composite.

16. It is essential to a principle that it derive not from another, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, 6). Now the Son proceeds from another, namely the Father. Therefore the Son is not a principle of the Holy Spirit.

17. The will moves the intellect to its act, since a man understands when he wills. But the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of will as love: and the Son proceeds by way of intellect as word. Therefore seemingly the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son but contrariwise.

18. Nothing proceeds from that wherein it abides. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and abides in the Son, as stated in the Acts of the Blessed Andrew. Therefore the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son.

19. A simple thing cannot proceed from two, since then the effect would be more simple than and prior to the cause. But the Holy Spirit is simple. Therefore he does not proceed from two, namely the Father and the Son.

20. If a thing proceeds perfectly from one it is superfluous for it to proceed from two. Now the Holy Spirit proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it would be superfluous for him to proceed from the Father and Son together.

21. As the Father and the Son are one in substance and nature, so also are the Father and the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit does not concur with the Father in the generation of the Son. Neither therefore does the Son concur with the Father in sending forth the Holy Spirit.

22. As Dionysius expresses it (Coelest. Hier. i) the Son is the ray of the Father. Now the Holy Spirit is brightness: and brightness does not issue from the ray. Therefore neither does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son.

23. The Son is a kind of light of the Father, since he is his word: and the Holy Spirit is like heat, for he is love: wherefore he appeared over the Apostles under the form of fire (Acts xi). But heat does not come from light. Neither then does the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son.

24. Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that the Holy Spirit is said to be of the Son but not from the Son.

On the contrary Athanasius says (Symb.): The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, but Proceeding.

Again, the Holy Spirit is said to the third person in the Trinity, the Son the second, the Father the first. Now the number three proceeds from unity through the number two. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son.

Again, since there is supreme agreement between the divine persons, each of them is immediately akin with the others. But this would not be the case if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, for then the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be immediately akin with each other, but only through the Father, inasmuch as both are from one. Therefore the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

Again, the divine persons are not distinct from one another otherwise than according to origin: so that if the Holy Spirit were not from the Soil he would not be distinguished from him; which is inadmissible.

I answer that according to what has already been concluded it is necessary that the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son. For since the Son and the Holy Spirit are two persons the procession of one must be distinct from the procession of the other. Now it has been proved (A. 2) that there cannot be two processions in God except by reason of order between processions, namely that there be a second procession from one who proceeds. It follows then of necessity that the Holy Spirit must be from the Son.

Besides this argument, however, there are other reasons which prove that the Holy Spirit is from the Son. All differences between any two things must arise from the original root of their distinction (except in the case of an accidental difference, as that between one who walks and one who sits) and this because whatsoever is in a thing Per se, is either essential to it or results from its essential principles, and these things are the original root of distinction between things. In God, however, nothing can be accidental: because whatsoever is in a thing accidentally, since it is outside the nature of that thing, must come to it from some external cause, and this cannot be said of God. Accordingly any difference between the divine persons must follow from the original root of their distinction. Now the original root of the distinction between the Father and the Son is paternity and filiation. Wherefore any difference between the Father and the Son must follow from the fact that this one is the Father and that one the Son. But it does not belong to the Father as Father by reason of paternity to be the principle of the Holy Spirit, since thus he is related to the Son only, and it would follow that the Holy Spirit is the Son. In like manner this is not repugnant to the notion of filiation, since filiation implies relation to none but the Father. Consequently the difference between the Father and the Son cannot arise from the fact that the Father is the principle of the Holy Spirit and the Son not.

Again, as stated in De Synod., it is proper to the creature that God produced it by his will: and Hilary proves this from the fact that the creature is not as Good is but as God wills it to be. Now because the Son is as the Father it is said that the Father begot him naturally. For the same reason the Holy Spirit is from the Father naturally because he is like and equal to the Father, since mature produces its like. Now the creature which proceeds from the Father according to his will must also proceed from the Son, since the Father and the Son have the same will. Likewise they both have the same nature. Consequently as the Holy Spirit is from the Father so also must he be from the Son. And yet it does not follow that the Son or the Holy Spirit is from the Holy Spirit, although he also has the same nature with the Father (whereas it does follow that the creature is from him inasmuch as he also has the same will with the Father) on account of the absurdity that would follow if one were to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself, or that the Son, who is his principle, proceeds from him.

The same conclusion may be proved in yet another way. No distinction is possible between the divine persons except according to the relations, since in God whatsoever is ascribed absolutely signifies the essence and is common, such as goodness, wisdom and so forth. But diverse relations cannot cause distinction except by reason of their opposition: since one and the same thing can have diverse relations to the same thing. Thus A may stand to B in the relation of son, disciple, equal or any other relation that does not imply opposition. Now it is plain that the Son is distinguished from the Father in that he stands in a certain relation to him, and likewise the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father by reason of a relation. Wherefore, their relations, however diverse they may appear to be by no means distinguish the Holy Spirit from the Son unless they be opposed to each other. But there can be no opposition in God other than that which is by reason of origin, in that one person is from another. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit can by no means be distinguished from each other simply because each is differently related to the Father, unless one of them be related to the other as proceeding from him. Now it is evident that the Son does not proceed from the Holy Spirit, since the notion of son consists in being related to father by receiving existence from him. It remains then of necessity that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

Since, however, someone might say that articles of faith should be confirmed not only by reasons but also by authorities, it remains for us to show by the authority of Holy Writ, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. In several passages of Scripture the Holy Spirit is mentioned as (the Spirit) of the Son. Thus (Rom. viii, 9) He that hath not the Spirit of Christ is none of his; (Gal. iv, 6) God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts; and (Acts xvi, 7) They attempted to go into Bithynia, and the Spirit of Jesus suffered them not. For we cannot take this as meaning that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ as to his humanity, filling him as it were, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of a man as haver and not giver: whereas the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son as giver, according to i Jo. iv, 13, In this we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit: and (Acts v, 32) it is said that God hath given his Spirit to them that obey him. Accordingly the Holy Spirit must be called the Spirit of the Son inasmuch as he is a divine person. Either then he is said to be his absolutely, or his as his spirit. If absolutely, then the Son must exercise authority over the Holy Spirit. Thus with us one may be said to be another’s in a restricted sense, as, for instance, Peter is John’s companion, but we cannot say that Peter is John’s absolutely, unless there be some kind of possession, thus a slave as to all that he is is his master’s. Now in God there is no slavery or subjection, and authority in him is only in respect of origin. Consequently the Holy Spirit must originate from the Son. The same conclusion follows if it be said that the Holy Spirit is the Son’s as his spirit: because Spirit as a personal name, implies the relation of origin to the Spirator, as the Son to the Begetter.

Moreover we find it stated in the Scriptures that the Son sends the Holy Spirit, as stated above. For the sender apparently always exercises authority over the one sent. Now as already stated authority in God is only in respect of origin. Hence it follows that the Holy Spirit originates from the Son. Now we have it from Holy Writ that by the Holy Spirit we are conformed to the Son, according to Rom. viii, 15, You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons; and Gal. iv, 6, Because you are sons God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts. But nothing is conformed to a thing except in its proper characteristics.

And in creatures that which conforms A to B is from B, thus the seed of man produces the like not of a horse but of a man whence it is. Now the Holy Spirit is from the Son as his proper characteristic, wherefore it is said of Christ (2 Cor. i, 22): Who hath sealed us and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts. More explicit still are the words spoken by Christ of the Holy Spirit (Jo. xvi, 4): He shall glorify me because he shall receive of mine. Now it is plain that the Holy Spirit does not receive from the Son as though he had not before, since thus he would be of a changeable and indigent nature. It is evident then that he received from the Son from eternity; nor could he receive anything that was not his from eternity. Therefore the Holy Spirit received the essence from the Son. The reason why the Holy Spirit received from the Son is stated by the Son himself when he says (ibid. 15): All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine: therefore I said that he shall receive of mine: as though to say: ‘Since mine and the Father’s is the same essence, the Holy Spirit cannot have the same essence as the Father without having mine.

Holy Scripture also states that the Son works through the Spirit: for instance (Rom. xv, 18, 19): Which, i.e. miracles and other blessings, Christ worketh by me, says the Apostle, in ... the Holy Spirit, i.e. through the Holy Spirit: and (Heb. ix, 4 it is stated that Christ offered himself by the Holy Spirit. Now whenever one person is said to work through another, either it is he who gives active power to the one through whom he works, as a king is said to work through a provost or bailiff, or contrariwise as when the bailiff is said to work by virtue of the king. Accordingly if the Son works through the Holy Spirit, either the Holy Spirit gives operative power to the

Son, or the Son to the Holy Spirit: and consequently one gives the essence to the other, since the operative power in each is not distinct from the essence. Now it is plain that the Holy Spirit does not give the essence to the Son, since the Son is Son of none but the Father. It follows therefore that the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

Yet another argument in support of the same conclusion may be taken from the points acknowledged by the Greeks. They believe that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, and that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit through the Son. Now that through which a thing is produced is always a principle thereof. Wherefore it follows that the Son is a principle of the Holy Spirit. If, however, they refuse to acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is from the Son because the Son is from another and consequently is not the first root of the Holy Spirit's origin, it is plain that this motive is unreasonable: since no one declines to allow that the stone is moved by the stick, although the stick is moved by the hand: or that Jacob was of Isaac although Isaac was of Abraham. In fact in the point at issue still less reason is there for this refusal: since Father and Son have one and the same productive power, which is not the case in created movements and agents. Therefore just as we must acknowledge that creatures are from the Son though the Son is from the Father, even so must we acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, though the Son is from the Father. It is evident then that those who assert that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son, but not from the Son, know not what they are talking about, as Aristotle said of Anaxagoras: and it is written: Desiring to be teachers of the law, understanding neither the things they say nor whereof they affirm (i Tim. i, 7).

Reply to the First Objection. The Son and the Holy Spirit are said to be flowers of the Godbearing, i.e. paternal Divinity, inasmuch as both are from the Father. But inasmuch as the Holy Spirit is from the Son, the Son may be called the root and the Holy Spirit the flower: for comparisons with corporeal things must not be extended to all things in God.

Reply to the Second Objection. The Son has this from the Father that of himself he sends forth the Holy Spirit: wherefore it belongs to him in the same way as to the Father. Now the Father is the principle of a divind person not in one way only, but in two ways, namely by generation and spiration. Wherefore we cannot conclude that the Son is the principle of the

Holy Spirit by generation: this is a fallacy of the consequent, and so much the more so, seeing that the Father is not the principle of the Holy Spirit by generation.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection.

Reply to the Fourth Objection. The Holy Spirit cannot be called the Word strictly speaking, but in a loose manner of speaking, for as much as anything that makes a thing known is the word of that thing. Thus the Holy Spirit makes the Son known as stated by this same Son concerning the Holy Spirit (Jo. xvi, 14): He shall glorify me because he will receive of mine. But the Son is called the Word in the strict sense, because he is the concept of the divine Intellect.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. In a human genealogy a grandson is one who proceeds from the son in the same way as the son from his father: whereas in God the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son in the same way as the Son from the Father: hence the objection fails.

Reply to the Sixth Objection. There is no opposition between being a principle and being from a principle except in respect of the same thing; thus A cannot be a principle of B if B is a principle of A. Hence it does not follow that there are contrary properties in the Son if he proceeds from the Father as his principle and is himself the principle of the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. Whatsoever is in God is indeed either proper or common. Proper, however, admits of a twofold application: it is said simply and absolutely of a thing to which it applies exclusively, thus risibility is proper to man: and it is said of a thing not simply but relatively, as, for instance, one might say that rationality is proper to a man in relation to a horse, although it applies to another, viz. an angel. Accordingly in God there is something common that applies to the three persons, for instance 'to be God' and so forth: something that is proper simply and applies to one person only: and something that is proper relatively, as, for instance, to, spirate the, Holy Spirit is proper to the Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit: since we must needs acknowledge this kind of property in God even if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, because 'to be from another' still remains proper to the Son and Holy Spirit as compared with the Father.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. If we are to come to a right decision on this point it seems hardly correct to speak of anything being due in the divine persons, since this word due implies subjection and obligation of a kind, and such things cannot be in God. Richard of St Victor, however (De Trin. iii, 3; v. 17, 18), distinguishes between due and gratuitous love: but by gratuitous love he means love not received from another, and by due love, that which is received from another. In this sense there is nothing to hinder the same love from being gratuitous as the Father's, and due as the Son's: since it is the same love whereby the Father loves and whereby the Son loves: yet this love the Son has from the Father, but the Father from none.

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The Holy Spirit is gratuitous love, only inasmuch as it is opposed to mercenary love whereby a thing is loved not for itself but for the sake of some benefit extrinsic to it. But if by gratuitous love we understand the love that originates from another, it is not incompatible with the Holy Spirit that he be gratuitous love, since the love whereby we love God through the Holy diost originates in God's benefits bestowed on us: and thus nothing prevents even the love of the Son who derives this love from another, from being the Holy Spirit.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father to the Son and from the Son to the Father, not as recipients but as objects of love. For the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father to the Son inasmuch as he is the love whereby the Father loves the Son; and in the same way it may be said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the son to the Father inasmuch as he is the love whereby the Son loves the Father. He may be understood, however, to proceed from the Father to the Son inasmuch as the Son receives from the Father the power to spirate the Holy Spirit, and in this sense he cannot be said to proceed from the Son to the Father, seeing that the Father receives nothing from the Son.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. This word love signifies not only the outpouring of love, but also a certain affection or disposition according to love. Now in God whatsoever is significative of outpouring must be taken as referring to the person only, as, for instance, begetting, spirating and so forth: while terms that do not denote outpouring but pertain rather to the information of the subject whereof they are predicated, must be taken as referring to the essence, as, for instance, being good, intelligent, and the like. For this reason the Holy Spirit is said to love not as emitting love—for thus it applies to the Father and the Son—but for as much as to love is an essential property in God.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In Holy Writ it must be regarded as a constant rule that what is said of the Father must be understood as applicable to the Son, and what is said of both or either of them must be taken as applicable to the Holy Spirit, even though the expression should contain an exclusive term, except when reference is made to the distinction between the divine persons. Take, for instance, the following: This is eternal life that they know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent (Jo. xvii, 3): for it cannot be denied that the Son is true God, although the Son himself affirms this of the Father alone, because since the Father and Son are one thing though not one person, it follows that what is said of the Father must be understood of the Son also. Nor again may we deny (seeing that no mention is made there of the Holy Spirit) that eternal life is in knowing the Holy Spirit, since there is but one knowledge of the Three. In like manner we are not to deny that the Holy Spirit knows the Father and the Son, although it is said (Mt. xi, 27): No one knoweth the Son but the Father, neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son. Wherefore since to have the Holy Spirit proceeding from oneself does not enter into the notion of Paternity or Filiation whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other, it follows that from the very fact that it is said in the Gospel that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father we must gather that he proceeds from the Son.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. The doctrine of the Catholic Faith was sufficiently laid down by the Council of Niceea: wherefore in the subsequent councils the fathers had no mind to make any additions. Yet on account of the heresies that arose they were at pains to declare explicitly what had already been implicitly asserted. Thus in the definition of the Council of Chalcedon it is said: “This holy, great and universal synod teaches this doctrine which has been constantly held from the beginning, the same which 318 holy fathers assembled at Nicaea defined to be the unalterable faith. On account of those who contend against the Holy Spirit, we confirm the doctrine delivered afterwards by the 150 fathers assembled at Constantinople concerning the substance of the Holy Spirit, which doctrine they made known to all, not indeed as though something were lacking in previous definitions, but by appealing to the authority of the Scriptures to explain what had already been defined against those who endeavoured to belittle the Holy Spirit.” Accordingly we must acknowledge that the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son was contained implicitly in the definition of the Council of Constantinople inasmuch as it is declared there that he proceeds from the Father: because what is said of the Father must be understood to be true of the Son, since they differ in nothing except in that one person is the Son and another the Father. However, on account of errors arising of those who denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, it was becoming that in the Creed should be made an insertion not by way of addition but by way of explicit interpretation of what it already contained implicitly. Thus were a heresy to arise denying the Holy Spirit to be the Maker of heaven and earth, it would be necessary to mention this explicitly, since in the Creed this is attested explicitly of the Father only. Now just as a subsequent Council has the power to interpret the Creed of a previous Council, and to insert an explanation of what that Creed contains, as appears from what has been said above; even so the Roman Pontiff can do this of his own authority, since by his authority alone can a council be convoked, and by him are its decisions confirmed, and since from the Council appeals can be made to him: all of which is clear from the Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. Nor does such an explanation require the assembling of an ecumenical council, since sometimes this is impossible on account of war: thus we read of the sixth Council that the Emperor Constantine found that he was prevented by the imminence of war from summoning all the bishops together: and yet those who met decided certain doubtful points of faith in accordance with the mind of Pope Agatho, to wit that in Christ there are two wills and two operations. In like manner the fathers assembled in the Council of Chalcedon adopted the view of Pope Leo who defined that after the Incarnation there were two natures in Christ.

We must observe, however, that we may gather from the definitions of the principal councils that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Thus as stated in its decree the Council of Chalcedon received the synodal letters of the Blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, addressed to Nestorius and others in the East. In one of these we read: “Seeing that Christ in Proof of his Godhead used his Spirit to Perform great works, asserted that he was glorified by him, even as a man might say of his own strength, knowledge or any other gift that they glorify him: even so is this true of the subsistent Spirit considered as a distinct person from the Son; although he is not of a different nature, for he is called and is the Spirit of truth and flows from him, as also from God the Father.” It does not signify that he says flows and not proceeds, because as we have already clearly stated this word proceed is the most general of all the terms denoting origin. Wherefore anything that is emitted or flows forth or in any way originates may be said for this very reason to proceed. Again in the definition of the fifth Council held at Constantinople it is said: “In all things we follow the holy doctors of the Church, Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Leo Cyril Proclus, and we receive all that they have taught in the true faith for the refutation of heretics.” Now it is plain that many of these taught that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and that this has not been denied by any one of them. Wherefore it is not contrary to but in hannony with the Councils to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. It is true that the genitive case of the personal pronoun has many significations, but in God it has no other signification than that of origin. As regards mission it must be observed that all doctors are agreed that no person is sent who does not. proceed from another: wherefore it is altogether inappropriate to the Father to be sent since he proceeds not from another. But as regards the person sending doctors are divided in opinion. Athanasius (in his epistle against those who said that the Holy Spirit is a creature: and beginning Literae tui sanctissimi) and others say that no person is sent temporally save by the person from whom he proceeds eternally: thus the Son is sent temporally by the Father from whom he proceeds eternally: and in accordance with this view it may be inferred without fear of error that if the Holy Spirit is sent by the Son, he proceeds from him eternally. And if the Son is said to be sent by the Holy Spirit this must be understood in reference to the Son in his human nature being sent to preach by the Holy Spirit. Wherefore it is said explicitly (Isa. lxi, i): He hath sent me to Preach to the meek! This is the interpretation given by Ambrose (De Spir. Sanct. iii, i): but Hilary (De Trin. viii) expounds the words as referring to the Father inasmuch as in God the word spirit may be, taken essentially. On the other hand Augustine (De Trin. et Unit. x) holds that a person who proceeds may be sent temporally even by one from whom he does not proceed eternally. For since the mission of a divine person is understood in reference to some effect in creatures who proceed from the whole Trinity, the person sent is sent by the whole Trinity:

so that mission does not imply authority of the sender over the person sent, but causality in reference to the effect, and with regard to this effect the person is said to be sent.

The argument proving that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son because they are distinct from each other is not refuted by saying that they are distinct by their properties, since these properties are relative and cannot cause distinction unless they be mutually opposed, as already stated (Q. viii, AA. 3, 4).

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. Although the Holy Spirit proceeds from two he is not composite: because those two, namely the Father and the Son, are one in essence.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Philosopher (Phys. i) says that principles derive from nothing else in so far as they are first principles: and the First Principle (so to say) is a Principle proceeding from no other, and that is the Father.

Reply to the Seventeenth Objection. Although the will moves the intellect to the act of understanding, it cannot will but what is already understood: wherefore since it is impossible to go on indefinitely, one must come at length to an act whereby the intellect understands something naturally and not at the will’s command. Now the Son proceeds from the Father naturally, so that although he proceeds by way of intelligence, it does not follow that he proceeds from the Holy Spirit but vice versa.

Reply to the Eighteenth Objection. The Holy Spirit may be said to abide in the Son in three ways. In one way in respect of the human nature, according to Isaiah xi, i: There shall come forth a rod out of the root of Jesse, and a flower shall rise up out of his root, and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him. In another way the Holy Spirit is said to rest in the Son, since the spirative power is given to the Son by the Father and extends no further. Thirdly, according as love is said to rest in the beloved, thereby staying the emotion of the lover. In none of these ways is the procession of the Holy Spirit excluded from the Son.

Reply to the Nineteenth Objection. It is not incompatible with the simplicity of the Holy Spirit that he proceeds from two, namely the Father and the Son, inasmuch they are of one essence.

Reply to the Twentieth Objection. The same perfection is that of Father and Son: wherefore the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father perfectly does not exclude his proceeding from the Son: else it would follow that the creature is not created by the Son, since it is created perfectly by the Father.

Reply to the Twenty-first Objection. Unity of essence does not involve confusion of persons: wherefore from unity of essence we cannot draw conclusions that are incompatible with relative distinction: thus from the fact that Father and Son are one thing, we cannot infer that the Son proceeds from the Holy Spirit although he proceeds from the Father, because the Holy Spirit proceeds from him: and again because it would follow that the Holy Spirit is the Father, seeing that to be the Father is nothing but to have the Son proceeding from him.

Reply to the Twenty-second Objection. Brightness comes indeed from the ray, since it is nothing else than the reflection of light shining on a clear body. Moreover brightness is attributed to the Son (Heb. i, 3), Who being the brightness of glory.

Reply to the Twenty-third Objection. Heat proceeds from brightness: for the heavenly bodies by their rays cause heat in the lower world.

Reply to the Twenty-fourth Objection. It was the contention of the Nestorians that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son: hence in one of their synods condemned by the Council of Ephesus it is said thus: “We hold that the Holy Spirit neither is the Son nor receives his essence from the Son.” For this reason Cyril in the epistle already quoted, affirmed against Nestorius that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Again Theodore in an epistle to John of Antioch expresses himself as follows: “The Holy Spirit does not come from the Son nor has he his substance from the Son, but he Proceeds from the Father: he is called the Spirit of the Son because he is consubstantial with him.” Now the above words were attributed by this Theodore to Cyril, as though he had written them in a letter which he wrote to John of Antioch, and yet they are not to be found there: but he expresses himself thus: “The Spirit of God the Father proceeds indeed from him, but he proceeds also from the Son, being one with him in essence.” Later on Damascene followed this opinion of Theodore, although the latter theologian’s teaching was condemned in the fifth Council. Wherefore in this we must not agree with Damascene.

Q. X: ARTICLE V

WOULD THE HOLY SPIRIT STILL BE DISTINGUISHED FROM THE SON IF HE DID NOT PROCEED FROM HIM?

THE fifth point of inquiry is whether the Holy Spirit would still be distinguished from the Son if he did not proceed from him: and seemingly he would.

1. Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. iv, 13, 15) says that the persons differ in origin in that one has an origin and the other not: or if they have an origin, in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other. Now the origin of the Holy Spirit differs from that of the Son, since the Holy Spirit proceeds as spirated, but the Son as begotten. Therefore the Holy Spirit would differ personally from the Son even if he did not proceed from him, on account of the difference of origin.

2. Anselm says (De Process. Sp. S. ii): “The Son and the Holy Spirit have their being from the Father, but each in a different way; one by birth, the other by procession, so that thus they are distinct from each other,” and afterwards he adds “For even if for no other reason were the Son and Holy Spirit distinct, this alone would distinguish them.” Therefore even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be a distinct person from the Son on account of the different manner of origin.

3. The divine persons are distinct from one another for the reason that one is from another according to a particular manner of origin. Now in God one person proceeds according to one manner of origin: and consequently if there be two manners of origin there will be two proceeding persons, even though one proceed not from the other. Now it is agreed that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father according to different ways of origin. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost are distinct persons even if we suppose that one does not proceed from the other.

4. No hypostasis can possibly proceed in respect of one nature by more than one procession, since a hypostasis receives its nature by proceeding: thus the Son has two nativities corresponding to his two natures. Now in God there are two processions, one in respect of nativity, the other in respect of spiration. Consequently it is impossible that one and the same Person proceed according to these two modes of procession. Therefore the Persons who proceed by these two processions must needs be distinct.

Therefore the Holy Ghost would still be personally distinct from the Son even if he did not proceed from him.

5. The eternal relations in God are neither accidental nor assistant, but are subsistent Persons. Consequently whatever causes plurality of relations in God suffices for a distinction of Persons. Now specific diversity of actions suffices for a diversity of relations. Thus from the action of governing follows the relation of Lordship, while from the action of begetting follows another relation which is Paternity. Even so different relations follow from specifically different quantities : thus the relation double results from the number two and treble from the number three. Now in God processions are indicated as actions : wherefore if there are two processions there must be two relations resulting from the processions and consequently two Persons : so that we come to the same conclusion as before.

6. Procession is more perfect in God than in creatures therefore the Apostle says (Eph. iii, 15) that of the heavenly Father all paternity in heaven and earth is named. Now in creatures procession suffices to distinguish the proceeding supposites : thus distinct men are born by distinct processions or births. Therefore in God a difference of procession suffices to distinguish the divine Persons, namely the Son and the Holy Ghost.

7. Procession by way of nature is not the same as procession by way of love. Now the name Son designates a Person proceeding by way of nature, while the name Holy Spirit indicates a person proceeding by way of love. Therefore even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would be distinct from him for the sole reason that their processions are different.

8. In the Father there are active generation and active spiration. Now generation and spiration distinguish the Persons in God. Therefore as the Son proceeds from the Father as a distinct Person by the fact that he is begotten of the Father; even so the Holy Ghost by the fact that he is spirated by the Father proceeds, as a distinct Person, from the Father. Thus then there are three Persons in God even if the Holy Ghost proceed not from the Son.

9. Anselm (De Process. Sp. S.) says that the Holy Ghost is as perfectly from the Father as from the Father and the Son. Now he proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from both. Therefore he would still be distinct from both even if he proceeded from the Father alone.

10. The Father is an adequate and perfect principle. Now the perfect principle of a thing needs not another in order to produce perfectly that whereof it is the principle. Consequently the Father needs not the Son in order to produce a third Person, namely the Holy Ghost. Therefore granted that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son, there would still be three distinct Persons in God.

11. The removal of that which follows does not of necessity involve the removal of what proceeds: thus if we remove man we do not thereby remove animal. Now three things are predicated of the divine Persons, to wit procession, communion and kinship. The notion of procession precedes the notion of community as also the notion of kinship. But there would be neither communion nor kinship in God without plurality of Persons multiplied by procession. Consequently if we remove communion and kinship from God procession still remains. Hence even if there were not community of Father and Son in spirating the Holy Ghost, nor kinship of the Holy Ghost to the Son resulting from his proceeding from him: there would still remain procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father, and thus there would still be three distinct persons, namely two proceeding and one from whom they proceed.

12. We speak of properties, relations and notions as being in God. Now property logically precedes relation or notion, since the persons are first understood as constituted with their, personal properties and afterwards as related to one another and be known. Moreover apart from the relations the properties still remain which constitute the persons. Therefore even if the Holy Spirit were not related to the Son as having existence from him, the Son and Holy Spirit would still be distinct persons by reason of their properties.

13. Filiation is the property of the Son constituting his person: and procession is the property of the Holy Spirit constituting his person. But Filiation is not procession nor is it opposed thereto relatively. Therefore even if we entirely remove relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son, the Son and Holy Spirit will still be distinct persons.

14. Many, the Greeks for instance, have denied that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and yet acknowledged three persons in God. Therefore even if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would still be distinct from him.

15. Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, ii) says: “We assert that the Holy Spirit Proceeds from the Father but not from the Son, but we call him the Spirit of the Son.” Consequently even if he proceed not from the Son he is still the Spirit of the Son and therefore distinct from him.

16. The Greek saints in speaking of the Son and Holy Spirit in comparison with the material world, say that they are like two rays of the Father’s splendour; as two streams of the Godhead that is in the Father; and as two flowers of the Father’s nature. Now rays, streams and flowers are mutually distinct even if one does not proceed from the other. Therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit are in like manner distinct from each other.

On the contrary, Boethius (De Trin. vi) says that in God “relation alone multiplies the Trinity.” But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son there will not be a relation of the Holy Spirit to the Son. Therefore he would not be personally distinct from him.

Again, Anselm (De Process. Sp. S. ii) says that “the Father and Son are in every respect one except in so far as they are distinguished by relative opposition”: and this by reason of the unity of essence. Now the Son and Holy Spirit are likewise one in essence. Therefore they are one in every respect, except in those things wherein relative opposition makes them distinct. But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son they would nowise be distinct by reason of relative opposition: and consequently they would in no way be distinct from each other.

Again, Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. v, 14) says that in the Trinity there can be but one person who proceeds from only one. Now if the Holy Spirit be not from the Son: then like the Son he will be from one person only, namely the Father: and consequently the Son and Holy Spirit will be but one person.

Again (ibid.) he says that in God there can be but one person from whom no other person proceeds. But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son, just as he has no person proceeding from him, so neither has the Son: and thus the Son and the Holy Spirit will be only one person.

Again, wherever persons are distinguished by relations the persons thus distinct must be related to each other. Now in God the persons are distinguished by relations: since they cannot be distinguished by anything absolute. Therefore in God there is no distinction where there is no relation.

But if the Holy Spirit proceed not from the Son he is not related to him: and consequently is not personally distinct from him.

Again, of two opposites the one does not differentiate its subject otherwise than from the subject of the other: thus whiteness does not differentiate a thing except from that which is black. Therefore a relation does not distinguish its subject except from the subject of the opposite relation. Now the relation proper to the Holy Spirit and whereby he is a distinct person is procession. Consequently he ‘ is not personally distinct save from the person in whom is the opposite relation which is active spiration: and this is not in the Son unless the Holy Spirit proceeds from him. Therefore if the Holy Spirit be not from the Son, he is not per. sonally distinct from him.

Again, in God two things belong in common to relation, one from whom another is and one who is from another. Now he from whom another is is not personally distinct by reason of a different mode of origin, since from the same person of the Father is the Son by generation, and the Holy Spirit by procession. Neither then is he who is from another by spiration (i.e., the Holy Spirit) distinct from him who is from another by generation (i.e. from the Son).

Again, Richard (De Trin. vi) states the difference between the two processions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit in the following terms: “Communion of majesty, so to speak, was the cause of the one’s origin,” namely the Son’s; “communion of love was the cause of the other’s origin,” namely the Holy Spirit’s. Now the procession of the Holy Spirit would not be caused by communion of love, unless the Father and the Son loved each other, and thus the Holy Spirit would proceed from them. Therefore if the Holy Spirit proceeded not from the Son there would be no difference between the procession of the Holy Spirit and the generation of the Son, and consequently neither would the Holy Spirit be personally distinct from the Son.

I answer that if we take careful note of the statements of the Greeks we shall find that they differ from us in words rather than in thought. Thus they will not grant that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, either through ignorance, obstinacy or sophistry or some other cause, no matter what, and yet they acknowledge that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and that he is of the Father through the Son, which would not be true if the procession of the Holy Spirit were entirely, independent of the Son. Hence we may infer that even the Greeks themselves understand that the procession of the Holy Spirit has some connection with the Son. But I say that if the Holy Spirit be not from the Son, and if the Son be in no way a principle of the Holy Spirit's procession, then it is impossible that the Holy Spirit be a distinct person from the Son, and further that the procession of the Holy Spirit cannot possibly differ from the generation of the Son.

This will be evident if we consider those things in reference to which various writers explain the distinction between the divine persons. Thus some refer the distinction of tile persons to the relations; others, to the mode of origin; others, to the essential attributes. If then we consider the manner of distinguishing the persons by the relations, it is evident that the Holy Spirit cannot be personally distinct from the Son if he does not proceed from him. First, because things cannot be properly distinct from one another otherwise than either by reason of matter, i.e. by a difference of quantity, or by reason of form. Now distinction in respect of material and quantitative division is to be found in corporeal things wherein there are several individuals of the same species by reason of the specific form being in various parts of matter according as it is divided quantitatively: wherefore if there be an individual consisting of all the matter wherein the specific form can be, there cannot be more than one individual of that species, as Aristotle proves (De Coelo et Mundo i). Now this kind of distinction is utterly foreign to God, seeing that in him there is neither matter nor corporeal quantity. Things that have a common, and at least generic, nature, cannot be distinct from one another by reason of a difference of forms except on account of some kind of opposition. Hence we find that the differences of any genus are in opposition to one another: and consequently it is impossible and even inconceivable that there be any distinction save one of opposition in the divine nature, seeing that it is one not only in genus but also in number. Wherefore since the divine persons are distinct from one another, this must be on account of a relative opposition, in that no other opposition is possible in God. This is sufficiently evident, since no matter how much certain things may differ in definition, for instance the essential attributes, they do not distinguish the persons, since they are not mutually opposed to one another. Thus again several notions are to be found in one divine person, for the reason that they are not opposed to one another: for instance, in the Father there are innascibility, paternity and active spiration. For there do we first find distinction where first there is relative opposition: for instance, in this that there are Father and Son. Accordingly in God where there is no relative opposition there can be no real distinction and this is a distinction of persons. Now if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, there will be no opposition between them and the Holy Spirit will not be a distinct person from the Son. Nor can it be said that for this distinction opposition of affirmation and negation is enough: because this kind of opposition follows and does not cause distinction, since that which already exists is distinct from another by something inherent either substantial or accidental: whereas that this is not that, is a result of their being distinct. Likewise it is evident that the truth of a negative statement about things in existence is based on the truth of a positive statement: thus the truth of this negation, An African is not white is based on the truth of this affirmation, An African is black: wherefore all differences in respect of affirmation and negation must be reducible to a difference of positive opposition. Consequently the primary reason for the distinction between the Son and Holy Spirit cannot be that the one is begotten and not spirated, the other spirated and not begotten, unless we presuppose the distinction ‘ between begetting and spirating and between Son and Holy Spirit by reason of an opposition between two affirmations.

Secondly, because according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 2) whatsoever is said of God absolutely is common to the three persons. Whence it follows that distinction between the divine persons can only be in respect of what is said relatively: for these two predicaments are applicable to God. Now the primary relative distinction to be found in God is that between one from whom is another and one who is from another. And if one of these must be subdivided, namely one that is from another, it must be subdivided by something that belongs to it per se. For as the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. viii) it is against the rules of subdivision to subdivide a thing in reference to that which is accidental to it and does not belong to it per se: thus, if one were to say animals are divided into rational and irrational, and irrational animals are divided into white and black, the division would not be right, because since things that are accidental do not combine to make that which is simply one, the ultimate species resulting from many differences would not be one simply. Accordingly, if in God he who is from another be distinguished or subdivided, this must be in reference to differences per se, namely that one of those who is from another be from the other: and this involves a difference of processions, which is indicated when we say that one proceeds by generation, the other by spiration. Hence Richard of S. Victor (De Trin. v, 10) distinguishes the person proceeding from another thus—one who has another proceeding from him and one who has not.

Thirdly, because whereas in the Father there are two relations, paternity and active spiration, paternity alone constitutes the person of the Father: wherefore it is said to be a personal property or relation: while active spiration, being adventitious, so to speak, to the already constituted person, is the relation of a person but not a personal relation. Hence it is plain that active generation or paternity, in the logical order, precedes active spiration. Consequently in like manner filiation which corresponds to paternity as its opposite must in some order be presupposed to passive spiration which is the procession of the Holy Spirit: and this must mean—either that passive spiration. is understood as supervening to filiation in the same person, just as active spiration supervenes to paternity, and thus the same person will be spirated and begotten just as the same person begets and spirates—or that there is some other order between filiation and passive spiration. But there is no order in God other than that of nature, in respect of which one is from another, as Augustine says (De Trin. et Unit. xiii). It follows then that either the Son and the Holy Spirit are one person, or the Holy Spirit is from the Son.

We shall come to the same conclusion if we consider the distinction of the divine persons in reference to their origin, but not to their relations of origin. This is evident for the following reasons. First, if we consider a property of the divine nature, we shall see how impossible it is that there be distinction between the divine persons unless one originate from another, and that the fact that two originate from one does not cause a personal distinction. This is made plain if we observe how various things are distinguished from one another. In the material world where, as stated above, it is possible for things to be multiplied by a division of matter and quantity, two individuals of the same species can be on an equal footing, thus two quantitative parts may be equal: but where the primary difference is one of form it is impossible for two individuals to be on a par with each other. For as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii) forms are like numbers in which the species vary by the addition or subtraction of unity: and formal differences consist in a certain order of perfection. Thus the species of the plant differs from that of the stone in that it has life in addition: and the species of the dumb animal from that of the plant in that it has sensation, and the species of man from that of the dumb animal in that reason is added to it. Wherefore in immaterial things which cannot be multiplied by a division of matter, there cannot be plurality without some kind of order. Thus in created immaterial substances there is order of perfection according as one angel is in nature more perfect than another. And as some philosophers thought that every imperfect nature is created by a more perfect one, they therefore contended that in separate substances there cannot be multiplication otherwise than by reason of cause and effect. The true Faith, however, does not hold this, since we believe that the various orders of immaterial substances were produced according to the disposition of divine wisdom. Now whereas in God there cannot be order of perfection, as the Arians, contended, saying that the Father is greater than the Son, and each of them greater than the Holy Spirit, we must conclude that plurality in the divine persons cannot even be conceived otherwise than according to the sole order of origin: so that, to wit,,he Son be from the Father, and ,the Holy Spirit from the Son. For if the Holy Spirit were not from the Son, they would be equally referred to the Father in point of origin: wherefore either they would not be two persons, or there would be order of perfection between them as the Arians pretended, or there would be a distinction of matter between them: which is impossible. Hilary follows this line of argument (De Synod.) when he says that to assert that in God there are two who are unbegotten, i.e. who do not derive existence from another, is to posit two Gods: since if multiplication be not by the order of origin, it must be by the order of nature: so that the same argument avails if we do not acknowledge order of origin between the Son and Holy Spirit.

Secondly, because that which proceeds naturally from one must itself be one: since nature is always confined to one effect: whereas things which proceed from the operation of the will may be many, although they proceed from one: thus from one God a diversity of creatures proceeded according to his will. Now it is certain that the Son proceeds from the Father naturally, and not through his will as the Arians maintained: and this because, as Hilary says (De Synod.), that which Proceeds from its source naturally is of the same nature as its source, but that which proceeds according to the direction of a will, is not of the same mature as he from whom it proceeds, but such as he wishes it to be. Now the Son is of the same nature as the Father: while creatures are such as God wished them to be. Hence the Son is from the Father naturally, and creatures proceed from him according to his will. In like manner the Holy Spirit is of the same nature as the Father, for he is not a creature as Arius and Macedonius asserted. Wherefore he must proceed from the Father naturally: for which reason he is said by Athanasius and other holy men to be the natural spirit of the Father and the Son. Consequently it is impossible that the Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father except in suchwise that from the Father alone one alone, i.e. the Son, proceeds, and from the Father and Son inasmuch as they are one the one Holy Spirit proceeds.

Thirdly, because as Richard (De Trin. v, 9) proves, there cannot be an indirect procession in God. Because since each divine person dwells in the other, each must be ordered immediately to the other. But if the Son and Holy Spirit were from the Father without the Holy Spirit being from the Son, there would not be immediate order between the Son and the Holy Spirit, since they would not be ordered to each other except through the one from whom they proceed; like two brothers begotten of the same father. Hence it is impossible that the Son and the Holy Spirit proceed from the Father as distinct persons, unless one proceed from the other.

Again, if we consider the distinction of the persons in reference to the essential attributes we shall come to the same conclusion. First, because in this respect we say that the Son proceeds by way of the nature, and the Holy Spirit by way of the will: and the procession of nature is the source and origin of every other kind of procession, for whatsoever things have their being through art and the will or the intellect, proceed from things that are according to nature. Hence Richard (De Trin. vi, 17) says that without doubt of all modes of procession the first and chief place belongs to the way in which the Son proceeds from the Father: since unless the Father had preceded neither of the other persons would have had any foundation for his existence. Secondly, this is evident if we realise that the Son proceeds by an intellectual procession as the Word, and the Holy Spirit b~ a procession of the will as Love. For it is both impossible and inconceivable that an object can be loved that has not first been understood by the intellect, wherefore in the intellectual nature all love proceeds from a word. Thirdly, it is evident, if we say with Athanasius that the Holy Spirit is the life-giving breath of the Godhead. Because all vital movement and action is directed by an intelligence, unless the contrary occur on account of an imperfection of nature. Hence from all that has been said we infer that the Holy Spirit would not be a distinct person from the Son if he proceeded not from him, nor would spiration be distinct from generation.

Reply to the First Objection. The Holy Spirit is personally distinct from the Son in that the origin of the one differs from the origin of the other: but this very difference of origin is due to the Son being from the Father alone, whereas the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son. Richard of S. Victor makes this plain when he says (De Trim. v, 20): “Observe that this difference of properties consists merely in the number of persons Producing, in that the first has being from no other, the second from one only, the third from two.”

Reply to the Second Objection. Anselm is quite correct in saying that the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct from each other by this alone that they proceed in different ways: but as we have already shown, they cannot proceed in different ways unless the Holy Spirit proceed from the Son: wherefore if it be denied that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, it must likewise be denied that he is distinct from the Son. However, it is Anselm’s intention (in his work on the Procession of the Holy Spirit) first to indicate the points in which we agree with those who deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son and yet assert that he is a distinct person from him. Wherefore the words quoted from Anselm are in the nature of an argumentative hypothesis rather than a statement of the truth.

Reply to the Third Objection. If there are two modes of origin in God it is right to infer that there are two persons; who proceed: but as we have shown there cannot be two modes of origin except by reason of the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Son.

The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection.

Reply to the Fifth Objection. There need not be as many subsistent persons in God as there are relations: since in the one person of the Father there are two relations, namely paternity whereby he is referred to the Son, and common spiration whereby he is referred to the Holy Spirit. For the relation of paternity constitutes a subsistent person; whereas the relation of common spiration is not a property constituting a person, but a relation inherent to a subsistent person. Thus if two relations result from generation and procession it does not follow that therefore there are only two subsistent persons: since one might reply that there are not two processions unless one of the proceeding persons proceed from the other, as we have already stated.

From this may be gathered the Reply to the Sixth Objection.

Reply to the Seventh Objection. As already explained, that which proceeds as love must proceed from that which proceeds by way of nature.

Reply to the Eighth Objection. Spiration. distinguishes the Holy Spirit from the Spirator, just as generation distinguishes the Begotten from the Begetter: but it does not follow that the Spirated is distinct from the Begotten, since both Spirator and Begetter are the same person. Nor does it follow from the fact that the same thing can proceed by two processions, that processions in God cannot differ except by reason of one proceeding person being from another, as proved above (A. 4).

Reply to the Ninth Objection. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as perfectly as from the Father and Son: yet he is distinct from the Son, not because he proceeds from the Father, but because he proceeds from the Son.

Reply to the Tenth Objection. The Father is the sufficient principle of the Holy Spirit, nor does he need another principle for the Holy Spirit's spiration: because in spirating the Holy Spirit the Son is not a distinct principle from the Father, but is one principle with him.

Reply to the Eleventh Objection. Although procession is logically prior to communion, as communion is to property: nevertheless in this particular kind of procession, namely that of the Holy Spirit who proceeds as love, communion and kinship of Father and Son is not logically prior to communion: wherefore it does not follow that if we remove communion procession remains: thus animal is prior to man logically, whereas rational animal is not.

Reply to the Twelfth Objection. In God property, relation and notion are one and the same in reality: except that there are but three properties, to wit paternity, filiation and procession, while there are four relations, common spiration being added to the three aforesaid relations, since it is a relation but not I property, inasmuch as it belongs not to one person but to two. The notions are five in number, since they include innascibility which is not a relation but a notion, inasmuch as by it the Father is known: besides which it is a property since it belongs to the Father alone, but not a personal property, since it does not constitute the person of the Father. Accordingly there can be no real order between the properties, relations and notions since the same thing is identified with all three. But if we consider their order in the light of their respective definitions, then notion precedes relation logically in the same way as one thing is prior to another from our point of view: while relation and property precede in the order of real priority. If, however, we seek the order between relation and property, we can find no such order in creatures: because some properties are relations, but not all, and in like manner some relations are properties, but not all. If, however, we consider property in something absolute, then property precedes in the order whereby the absolute precedes the relative. In the divine persons relation precedes property logically: because as the property is that which belongs to one alone, property logically presupposes distinction: and in God nothing is distinct otherwise than by reason of a relation. Wherefore relation which is the principle of distinction in God is logically prior to property. It must be observed, however, that neither property nor relation as such are defined as constituting a person. Because since a person is an individual substance of rational nature, that which is outside substance cannot constitute a person: wherefore in created things properties and relations are not constituent of, but are incidental to the persons already constituted: whereas in God the relation itself which is also a property is the divine essence: so that by this very fact that which is constituted thereby is a person: inasmuch as unless paternity were the divine essence, the name Father could by no means signify a person, but only a relative accident of a person, as in the case of human persons. Hence paternity inasmuch as it is the divine essence constitutes a hypostasis, subsisting in the divine nature; inasmuch as it is a relation it distinguishes; inasmuch as it is a property it belongs to one person only and not to another; inasmuch as it is a notion it is the principle whereby that person is known. Accordingly in the logical order, the first is that which constitutes the person, the second is that which distinguishes it, the third is the property, and the fourth is the notion.

Reply to the Thirteenth Objection. Although filiation is not opposed relatively to procession, nevertheless the person proceeding is opposed relatively to the Son; and this is the reason why procession is distinguished from filiation.

Reply to the Fourteenth Objection. Though the Greeks do not acknowledge that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, they believe that the Son in some way is the principle whence the Holy Spirit originates. This is plain from the fact that they state that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, and that he is the Spirit of the Son. And yet a statement may imply a contradiction, whereas one who is ignorant may grant it explicitly: and thus an unintelligent person might say that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son and yet is distinct from the Son.

Reply to the Fifteenth Objection. By acknowledging that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son Damascene implies that in some way the Holy Spirit originates from the Son.

Reply to the Sixteenth Objection. The Holy Spirit and the Son are said to be two streams inasmuch as both proceed from the Father. Yet the Greek doctors say that the Son is the fount of the Holy Spirit, but that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from him. The same applies to the other comparisons.

THE END

REFUTATION OF THE PERNICIOUS TEACHING OF THOSE WHO WOULD DETER MEN FROM ENTERING RELIGIOUS LIFE

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REFUTATION OF THE PERNICIOUS TEACHING OF THOSE WHO WOULD DETER MEN FROM ENTERING RELIGIOUS LIFE

CHAPTER 1

Object of the Author in Undertaking this Work

THE religion of Christ appears to aim chiefly it diverting the attention of mankind from material things, in order to concentrate their thoughts on the spiritual. Therefore Jesus, “the Author and finisher of our faith,” at His coming into this world, proposed to His faithful followers the contempt of earthly things. He taught this lesson both by His life and by His words.He taught it by His life.

To quote St. Augustine (De catechizandis rudibus), “the Lord Jesus, when He became man, despised the good things of earth, in order to show that they are contemptible. He likewise endured all those earthly trials which He has commanded us to bear, so that, from the chances of this world, we may neither expect happiness, nor fear unhappiness. He rejected all appearance of noble birth; for, although at the time of his conception the virginity of His Mother was intact and although she remained for ever inviolate, yet was she espoused to a carpenter. He did not will that any should glory in the splendour of an earthly city; therefore was He born in Bethlehem, the least of the cities of Judah. He to whom all things belong, and by whom all things are made, became poor that so none of those who would believe in Him might dare to be lifted up by earthly wealth. He came to point out the way of humility; therefore He refused to be chosen King by men. He who gives food to all, Himself hungered. He by whom all manner of drink was created, was thirsty. He who has made Himself our road to Heaven, was weary and wayworn. He who set an end to our sufferings, Himself was crucified. He died, who raised the dead.”

The same lesson He inculcated by His words. For, at the very beginning of His preaching, He promised to those who repented, not an earthly Kingdom, such as in the Old Testament they had looked for, but the Kingdom of Heaven. Not only did He teach His disciples that the first Beatitude consists in poverty of spirit, but He further pointed out that it is in this same poverty that all perfection consists. To the young man seeking the Kingdom of Heaven He said (Mt 19: 21), "If you would be perfect, go sell all that you have, give it to the poor, and follow Me."

His disciples followed in this road of poverty. Owning nothing temporally, by spiritual virtue they possessed all things; and having only what to eat and what to put on, they were content. But Satan, in his jealousy of our salvation, has never, since the earliest ages, ceased from hindering men in the holy and salutary exercise of poverty. For this purpose he has made use of carnal men, enemies of the Cross of Christ, and savouring of the things of this world. St. Augustine, in his work De Agone Christiano, says: "Men and women of all ages and every rank are attracted to the beauty of eternal life. Some, to the neglect of their temporal interests, give themselves wholly to divine things. Others yield the palm to the virtue of those that act in this wise, and praise the deeds which they themselves lack courage to imitate. But some few there are who, at the sight of such deeds, murmur and fret in impotent rage. These can scarcely be called Catholics; they are rather self-seekers, trying to serve their own interests by means of the Church; or else they are heretics, striving to glorify themselves in the name of Christ."

Among this number, in former years, two men arose, in different places indeed, but infected by the same folly. Jovinian appeared in Rome, and Vigilantius in Gaul—both of which places had hitherto been free from the pestilence of error. Jovinian dared to set matrimony on a level with virginity. Vigilantius asserted that wealth was as meritorious as poverty.

By this manifest perfidy, they stultified, as far as they were able, the evangelical and apostolic counsels. For, if wealth is equal to poverty, and matrimony to virginity, it was futile for our Lord to have given us the counsel to observe poverty, or for the Apostle to have recommended us to preserve virginity. By this argument, the great doctor St. Jerome has effectually refuted both the false teachers whom we have named.

But, just as one of the heads of the beast mentioned in the Apocalypse was, “as it were, slain to death, and his death-wound was healed,” so in Gaul followers of Valentian have reappeared who, by means of ingenuity and cunning, deter men from the observance of the counsels. Their first axiom is that no one ought, by entering the religious life, to undertake to practice the counsels, unless he is already exercised in the observance of the commandments. This regulation would exclude from the way of perfection all children, all sinners and all recent converts to the Faith.

Their next dictum is that no one should undertake the observance of the counsels without first seeking advice form many persons. We see at once that this rule would be a great obstacle in the way of those who desire to embrace perfection, since the advice of carnal men (who form the majority of mankind) tends rather to deter souls from spirituality than to draw them to it. Further, these followers of Vigilantius try to hinder men from laying themselves under an obligation to embrace religious life, though such an obligation strengthens the soul to embrace a life of perfection. Finally, they do not hesitate to take every means to diminish in men’s hearts the love of poverty.

These criminal efforts are prefigured in the words of Pharaoh, who, as we read in Exodus (5:4), when chiding Moses and Aaron for trying to lead the people of God out of Egypt, said to them, “Why do you, Moses and Aaron, draw off the people from their work? Origen in his Gloss comments on this passage as follows: “Today likewise should Moses and Aaron, that is to say, a prophetic and priestly word, call a soul to serve God and, leaving the world and renouncing all possessions, to devote itself to the law of God and the hearing of His word, you will hear the friends of Pharaoh saying: ‘See how men are seduced, and young man led astray.’” Origen adds in another place: “These were the words of Pharaoh; and in like manner do his friends speak today.” Such are the maxims whereby they seek to hinder those who aim at perfection. But, to quote the proverb of Solomon, “There is no counsel against the Lord.” Trusting, therefore, in the help of spiritual arms, which are the power of God, we will endeavour to refute the opinions which we, have quoted, and to overthrow the presumption of those who exalt themselves against the Divine Wisdom.

we will treat of each of the foregoing propositions in the following manner. First, we will state on what foundation they are based. Then we will examine in what particulars, and in what manner, each of the aforesaid propositions is repugnant to truth, which is in harmony with piety. And, thirdly, we will demonstrate that the arguments used in support of these propositions are empty and frivolous.

CHAPTER 2

Arguments Used by Those Who Maintain That None Should be Admitted to the Religious Life Who Are Not Practised in the Exercise of the Commandments

THE followers of Vigilantius strive, by sundry arguments, to prove that none should undertake to follow the Counsels, unless they are already exercised in obedience to the Commandments. First, they remind us that Our Saviour when He gave the Counsel of poverty, told the young man that if he desired to enter into life, he must keep the Commandments, and only when the youth professed to have kept the Commandments, did Christ give him the Counsel concerning poverty. This shows, they say, that obedience to the Commandments ought to precede observance of the Counsels. Again they bring forward, in defence of their opinion, the words of Jesus Christ (Mt 28:20), “ teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you.” They also quote the following commentary of Bede upon this Text: “The order herein commanded to be observed is equitable. For, first, a hearer must be taught; he must then be initiated into the mysteries of the Faith; and, finally, he must be instructed in the keeping of the Commandments.” From these words the conclusion is drawn that obedience to the Commandments must go before the practice of the Counsels.

They further allege in favour of their views the verse of Psalm 108, “By your commandments I have had understanding.” They cite too the words of the Gloss, “I do not say that I have understood your Commandments themselves, but that by them I have had understanding; for, by keeping the Commandments, David attained to sublime wisdom.” The verse of Ps. 30 is also, quoted in the same sense, “As a weaned child to his mother,” with the following commentary upon this text, which occurs in the Gloss, “As in physical so also in spiritual procreation and nourishment five periods occur. First we are conceived in the womb; we are nourished therein until we see the light; we are then carried in the arms of our mother and suckled with her milk until, being weaned, we are seated at the table of our father.” The Gloss then adds: “Holy Church likewise observes these five periods.” For the child of the Church is, so to speak, conceived on the Wednesday of the fourth week [of Lent]. He is, by exorcism and catechism, initiated in the rudiments of the Christian Faith. He is nourished in the womb of the Church until, on Holy Saturday, he is by baptism born into spiritual light. Then, until Pentecost, he may be said to be carried in the arm of the Church and fostered at her breast; for during this season nothing laborious is enjoined, neither rising by night nor fasting. But after he has been confirmed by the Holy Spirit, the Christian is weaned, and begins to fast and to observe other toilsome practices. But (say the followers of Vigilantius) many reverse this order. Such are heretics and schismatics, who prematurely forsake their mother’s milk, and therefore come to nought. As it is more difficult to practise the Counsels than to keep the Commandments, it is reversing the right order of things for a man who is not exercised in obedience to the Commandments to undertake to observe the Counsels. Such an error may end in heresy or schism.

They strive, further, to strengthen this argument by the order observed by our Saviour in the miracles whereby He fed the multitudes. For, first, as we read in Mat xiv, He fed five thousand men with five loaves and two fishes; and then in Mat 15 we see that He fed four thousand men with seven loaves and seven little fish. By the five thousand men are meant those who, living a secular life, know how to make good use of material possessions; but the four thousand fed by seven loaves, signify those who renounce the world completely, and are nourished on evangelical perfection and spiritual grace. Hence we are to learn that men must first be sustained by obedience to the commandments, and afterwards led to the perfection of the Counsels.

Another argument, brought forward by those who follow Vigilantius, is contained in the words of St. Jerome on the beginning of the Gospel of St. Matthew. “The Holy Gospel,” he says, “is composed of four elements, namely, precepts, commandments, testimonies, examples. Justice appears in the precepts, charity in the commandments, faith in the testimonies, perfection in the examples.” From this passage they conclude that it is from the justice of the precepts that we are to attain to the perfection of the examples, which perfection would seem to consist in the Counsels.

They further bring forward the following passage of St. Gregory (VI Moral.): “It was after the embrace of Lia that Jacob came to Rachel; for the perfect man is first engaged in the fruitfulness of active life and afterwards attains to the repose of contemplation:” Now the religious state, which professes the practice of the Counsels, belongs to the contemplative life. But the Commandments lead us to the active life. The Gloss says, concerning the passage in Matthew 12, where the Commandments of the Law are enumerated: “Behold the active life.” But when it comments on those words of our Lord in the same chapter, “If you would be perfect” etc., the Gloss adds: “Behold the contemplative life.” Therefore, it is not fitting that a man should embrace the religious life, unless, by keeping the Commandments, he has first been exercised in the active life.

Another argument, adduced by the disciples of Vigilantius in the defence of their cause, is contained in the commentary of St. Gregory on Ezekiel: “ No one becomes perfect at once. In true conversion a man must begin with the least things, in order that he may attain to great things.” Now the Commandments of the Decalogue would appear to be the lesser things, but the Counsels, which pertain to perfection, the greater. For St. Augustine, in his book De sermone Domini in Monte, says: “The things commanded by the Law are lesser; those which Christ was to command, were greater.” Let no man, therefore, proceed to the observance of the greater things, namely, the practice of the Counsels, unless he is first exercised in the lesser, that is to say, in keeping the Commandments. Again, St. Gregory says (Decretis, dist. 48, cap. Sicut): “While walls are still new and damp, we know that they cannot bear weight; and if a roof be placed upon them before they be dry, the whole building will fall to the ground.” Again, among the sayings of St. Gregory, we find the following: “He courts a fall who, despising steps, attempts to climb a height by a steep ascent.” Whence they conclude that it is dangerous for anyone to presume to attain to the high perfection of the counsels, unless he be first exercised in lesser things that is to say in the Commandments.

Those who hold this opinion, further observe that the Commandments, even in the order of nature, precede the counsels, for they are more common and more in harmony with nature. The Commandments can be kept together with the Counsels, but the Counsels cannot be practised apart from the Commandments. Hence it cannot be well ordered to aspire to the Counsels, unless the observance of the Commandments has gone first. Those who are of this opinion further add that if it were right that the Counsels should take precedence over the Commandments, those who did not practise the Counsels could not be saved, for they would not be keeping the Commandments.

These are the chief arguments used by those who hold that religious life should not be attempted by any, save those who are exercised in obedience to the Commandments.

CHAPTER 3

The Foregoing Arguments Do Not Hold Good in the Case of Children

SINCE this question regards morals, our first consideration must be whether what has been said, is congruous with good works. We must prove, first of all that the doctrine of the followers of Vigilantius is directly opposed to such works. For there are three classes of mankind who have had no practice in keeping the Commandments. The first class is composed of children who have not had time to be exercised in keeping them. The second class includes recent converts to the Faith who, before their conversion, had no opportunity of observing the Commandments, “for all that is not of faith is sin” (Rom 14:23), and “without faith, it is impossible to please God” (Heb 11:6). The third class of men who have not been in the habit of keeping the Commandments are those who have led a sinful life.

Now we shall show, in the case of each of these classes, the fallacy of the arguments which we have undertaken to refute.

If it were necessary that the observance of the Commandments should precede the practice of the Counsels and the entrance into the religious life, it would not be right, nor would the Church suffer parents to place their young children in religious houses, there to be educated in the exercise of the Counsels before they have kept the Commandments. But we know that such is her custom, a usage supported by grave authority, and confirmed by many passages of Scripture. St. Gregory says (XX, quaestione I, cap. Addidistis): “Is it lawful for a father or mother who have placed an infant son or daughter in a monastery to be there educated in regular discipline, to withdraw such a child when it has attained the age of puberty, and to give it in marriage? This question we will not discuss.” The question as to how far the obligation to regular observance is perpetually binding is not of great importance; for, if the practice of keeping the Commandments were a necessary introduction to the observance of the Counsels, no one could be educated in the regular observance of the Counsels who was not exercised in obedience to the Commandments. But the custom of dedicating children to the religious life is proved, not merely by many ecclesiastical statutes, but by the examples of the Saints. St. Gregory relates (II Dialog.) that "noble and religious men of the City of Rome flocked to blessed Benedict, to offer him their children to be trained for Almighty God. Then Euticius and Patricius Tertullus gave him their promising sons, Maurus and Placidus, of whom Maurus, the younger, being distinguished by his virtues, became assistant to the master, while Placidus was still, in disposition, a child." And, as St. Gregory narrates in the same book, Blessed Benedict himself, while still a child, being desirous to please none but God, turned his back on worldly learning and, leaving his parents' house, sought the usages of holy conversation.

This custom took its rise from the Apostles themselves. Dionysius, in the end of his book Eccles. Hierarch., says, "children, brought up to sublime things and kept from sin and error, will acquire the habit of holy living. This was the opinion of our blessed masters, and it seemed good to them to receive children." Dionysius, it is true, is here only alluding to the admission of children to Baptism, but his argument bears out our assertion, viz. that it is expedient to educate children in the principles which they are hereafter to practise, in order that they may acquire the habit of them. We must add, further that this rule is authorised by our Lord Himself. For we read in St. Matt. xix. 13, "Then were little children presented to Him, that He should impose hands upon them and pray. And the disciples rebuked them. But Jesus said to them: 'Allow the little children, and do not forbid them to come to me, for of such is the Kingdom of Heaven." St. Chrysostom, commenting on these words, says, "Who shall deserve to draw near to Christ, if innocent childhood is driven from Him? If these children are to be saints, why should they not approach their Father? If they are to be sinners, why should you pronounce sentence of condemnation upon them before their crimes are committed?" Now we know that it is by the way of the Counsels that man approaches most closely to Christ, for He said to the young man, " Sell all that you have, give to the poor and follow me" (Mt

19:21). Therefore children are by no means to be hindered from drawing near to Him by the way of the Counsels. But, as Origen says, on the same passage: “Some there are who, before they have learnt the doctrine of justice, rebuke those who, by simple teaching, offer to Christ infants and children, that is to say the unlearned. Our Lord exhorted His disciples, who were then grown men, to condescend to the service of children and to be, so to speak, children with children that so they might gain children, for ‘of such,’ He said, ‘is the Kingdom of Heaven.’ And He Himself, when He was in the form of God, became a child. We ought to bear this in mind, lest, in our esteem for our own superior wisdom, we should despise the little ones of the Church, forbidding the children to go to Jesus.”

We may remember, again, how in Luke 1:80 it is written of St. John the Baptist, “And the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was in the desert until the day of his manifestation to Israel.” Bede comments on this text in the following words: “He who was to be the preacher of penance passed his early years in the desert. He acted thus in order more easily to draw his hearers, by means of his instructions, from the vanities of the world. He would not, as St. Gregory of Nyssa says, allow himself to become accustomed to the allurements of the senses, lest he should be misled or perplexed in his judgment concerning the true good. And, because he was pure, and because, from the beginning of his life to the end, he offered to the divine regard desires free from every passion, therefore he was raised to such a height of grace that he received gifts surpassing those of the prophets.” Therefore, not only is it lawful but even most expedient in order to obtain greater grace that some men, leaving the world, even in their childhood, should live in the solitude of the religious life.

We read in Lamentations 3:27, “It is good for a man, when he has borne the yoke from his youth.” The reason given for these words being, “he shall sit solitary and hold his peace, because he has taken it up upon himself.” By this we are given to understand that they who bear the yoke of religious life from their youth upwards, arise above themselves and are rendered more fit for religious observance, which consists in silence and freedom from worldly care and disturbance. In the Book of Proverbs 22:6 the words occur, “A young man according to his way, even when he is old he will not depart from it.” Hence St. Anselm in his book De Similitudinibus compares those who have been brought up in monasteries to angels, while those who have been converted from an imperfect life he likens to men. This mode of thinking is not only confirmed by the authority of Holy Scripture, it is shared even by philosophers; for Aristotle in his Second Book of Ethics says, “It is by no means a matter of small moment whether from our youth we are accustomed to such or such a manner of life, but, on the contrary, it is of supreme importance that certain men should, from childhood, be instructed in those things which they must observe during the course of their life.” Again, in the Eighth book of his Politics, the same philosopher writes: “The chief concern of a legislator ought to be for the education of the young who should be trained in every good quality.”

We see likewise how this opinion is practically borne out by society, for men are, from their very childhood, brought up to those professions and offices for which they are destined. Those who are intended for clerics must, from their tender years, be educated in the clerical life; soldiers, as Vegetius says in book De re militari, must, in early years, be subject to military discipline; and, carpenters must, from childhood, learn their handicraft. Why then should the only exception to this rule be made with regard to the religious life? Why should not the young be formed to it from their youth? Surely the more arduous a profession may be, the more necessary it is that men should be early trained to it. Hence we see that the argument that it is necessary to be practised in keeping the Commandments before we observe the Counsels, does not hold good with regard to children.

CHAPTER 4

The Opinion Held by Vigilantius and His Followers Does Not Apply to Recent Converts to the Faith

VERY few words will suffice to show the absurdity of refusing the religious habit to recent converts on the ground that they are not exercised in the observance of the Commandments. The first followers of Christ, who formed His college, and who gave an example of perfection, far surpassing that of any religious order, were received by our Lord immediately after their conversion. St. Paul, who was the last by conversion, but the foremost in preaching, embraced evangelical perfection as soon as he was converted to the faith. This we know by his own words to the Galatians: “But when it pleased Him, who separated me from my mother’s womb, and exalted me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me that I might preach Him among the Gentiles, immediately I did not condescended to flesh and blood” (Gal 1:15). Christ teaches us the same lesson by His own example. We read in St. Matthew 4:1 that after His baptism, He “was led by the Spirit into the desert.” “Thus,” says the Gloss, “did He teach those that have been baptised to leave the world after their baptism to devote themselves to God in solitude.”

This teaching is confirmed by the praiseworthy practice of many who, being once converted from unbelief, immediately assume the religious habit. Who would be so ill-advised as to counsel these men rather to stay in the world than to withdraw into the Religious life, there to endeavour to preserve the Baptismal Grace which they have received? What right-minded man would dissuade them from putting on Christ by perfect imitation, when by baptism they have already been clothed with Him? The argument that no one ought to be admitted to the religious life who has not kept the Commandments is thus an absurdity in the case of recent converts to the Faith.

CHAPTER 5

This Argument is Equally Fallacious As Applied to Penitent Sinners

FINALLY, let us see whether penitent sinners, who are not yet exercised in observing the Commandments, are to be excluded from religious life. The example of St. Matthew is germane to our question. Our Lord called him from the profits of a custom collection to be His follower; and Matthew, although not at once admitted to the number of the Apostles, immediately embraced the perfection of the counsels, for, “leaving all things he rose up and followed him” (Luke v. 28). “He who had robbed others abandoned his own possessions,” says St. Ambrose. From this example, it is abundantly evident that penitents may, even after most heinous sins, enter on the observance of the Counsels. In fact, we may go further, and say that it is fitting that such repentant sinners should embrace a life of perfection; for, as St. Gregory says in his comment on the words of Luke iii., “Bring forth therefore fruits worthy of penance”: “He who has committed no unlawful act may rightfully be granted the enjoyment of lawful things. But he who has fallen into sin, ought to deprive himself of lawful goods, in proportion as he is conscious of having committed unlawful deeds.” Again, he says: “It is fitting that if a man has impoverished himself by sin, he should so much the more eagerly seek by penance the riches of good works.” Since then in the religious life men abstain even from lawful things, and seek the treasure of perfection, it is reasonable that they who abandon sin (whereby they have been exercised, not in the practice, but in the transgression of the Commandments) should walk in the way of the Counsels, by entering religion, which is the state of true penance. Again we find, in quaest. XXXIII. cap. II. Admonere, that Pope Stephen, addressing a certain

Astulphus, who had been guilty of great sins, says: “May our advice be pleasing to you. Go into a monastery: humble yourself to the Abbot; and, helped by the prayers of many brethren, perform in simplicity of heart whatever may be enjoined upon you.” “But,” he continues: “if you prefer to remain in your house or in the world and there to do public penance (which will be far more onerous and painful for you), we will tell you how you are to act.” The Pope then imposes severe penances upon him, telling him at the same time that it would be better and more advantageous for him to go into religion.

Thus we see that those who are practised, not in keeping the Commandments but in sinning against them, are advised to embrace religious life. Such penitent, sinners are, however, deterred from so doing by the admirable wisdom of certain advisers, whose counsel St. Paul thus refutes: “I speak a human thing because of the infirmity of your flesh, for, as you have yielded your members to serve uncleanness and iniquity unto iniquity, so now yield your members to serve justice unto sanctification” (Rom 6:19). “I speak a human thing,” comments the Gloss, “because you owe more service to justice than to sin.” And Baruch (4:28) says, “As it was your mind to go astray from God; so, when you return again, you shall seek him ten times as much.” For after sinning and thus forsaking God and disobeying His commands, a man ought to strive after the highest virtue, and not be content with half measures.

This teaching is borne out by the example of numerous saints. For many of both sexes, after leading lives of crime, have embraced the practice of the Counsels, and although they had formed no habit of keeping the Commandments, have devoted themselves to the observance of the strictest religious rule. Their conduct is approved even by philosophers. In the Second book of Ethics Aristotle writes: “When we withdraw from great sin, we shall come to the uniform line, even as they do who plane away the knots from wood.” For those who are knotted by sin, must be brought back to righteousness by practising the more perfect works of virtue.

Thus we have made it clear that the opinion of those who maintain that none should practise the Counsels who have not kept the Commandments, cannot be approved, with regard to any class of men.

CHAPTER 6

The Fundamental Error of These Opinions Exposed

IN order to refute this error, once and for all, we must examine the fallacy on which it is based. Now the premises on which the followers of Vigilantius construct their argument are erroneous, and for this reason. They assume that perfection consists, chiefly, in the observance of the Counsels; and that the Commandments, compared to the Counsels, are as the imperfect compared to the perfect. Therefore, they say, we must go from Commandments to Counsels, as from imperfection to perfection. But this proposition is false. We know from the very words of our Lord (Mt 22:37) that the first and chief commandment of the Law is the love of God and of our fellow-men. “The first commandment is, you shall love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul, and with your whole mind. And the second is like it: you shall love your neighbour as yourself.” The perfection of Christian life consists essentially, in obeying these two precepts, Hence the Apostle says to the Colossians (3:14), “ But above all these things, have charity, which is the bond of perfection.” On this passage the Gloss observes that charity makes other things perfect, in so far, that is to say, as they are ordered in charity. For charity binds all things together. Again, when our Lord had been giving the precepts of brotherly love (Mt 5:48), He added, “Be therefore perfect as also your Heavenly Father is perfect.”

St. Jerome says, commenting on the words in St. Matthew 19:27, “Behold, we have left all things and have followed you”: “Whereas it does not suffice to have left all things, he (Peter) adds ‘and have followed you.’ For the Apostles followed the Lord not so much in bodily presence, as in affections of the heart.” Again, St. Ambrose, alluding to the words, “follow me” (Luke 5), says: “Christ commands him (Levi) to follow Him, not with his feet, but with the desires of his mind.” It is thus abundantly evident that the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity towards God. And there is a very solid reason for this conclusion. The perfection of anything consists, as we know, in its attainment of its end. Now the end of the Christian life is that charity, to which all things must be ordered, and which, as St. Paul says (1 Tim 1:5), is “the end of the commandment,” or, as the Gloss says, in its comment on this text, “is the perfection of the precept, that is to say, of all precepts, for the love of God and of our neighbour is the fulfilment of all.”

We must distinguish between an end and the means to an end. In considering the means to an end, we must fix some certain measure by which the means may be proportioned to the end. But in what regards the end itself, there is no question of measure, but each one prosecutes his end to the best of his ability. A physician tempers his remedies, lest they should be in excess. He has no fear of excess in the health which he wishes to restore by those remedies, but he desires that such health should be as perfect as possible. In like manner, the commandment to love God, which is the end of the Christian life, knows no limits. No one can say that this degree or that of the love of God is enjoined by this precept, or that where the love of God exceeds the Commandment it becomes a Counsel. Every man is bound to love God as much as he can. This truth is embodied in the very words of the precept: “Love the Lord your God with your whole heart.” Every one must obey this commandment according to his ability, some with greater and some with less perfection. He totally fails to observe it who does not, in his affections, prefer God before all things. He who loves Him as His last End, above all other things, fulfils the precept more or less perfectly, according as he is more or less impeded by his aftection for created things. St. Augustine says (LXXXIII Quaest.): “The poison of charity is the hope of acquiring or retaining temporal things. That is to say, if such things are looked on as a last end. The food of charity is the lessening of cupidity. Its perfection consists in the extinction of earthly desire.”

But there is another perfect manner of observing this precept, which cannot be achieved in this life. For, as St. Augustine says in De perfectione justitiae, “In that fulness of charity which will reign it our heavenly country, the precept of charity ‘Love the Lord your God with your whole heart’ etc. will be perfectly obeyed.” “Why,” he continues, should not this perfection be anticipated by man, although, in this life he may not attain to it? He does not run aright, who does no know where he is running to. But how can he know, if he is not taught by any precepts Therefore, to this, as to their end, are directed the commandments of love of God and of our neighbour, together with all other counsels and commands. Hence St. Augustine says in Ench.: “God gives us certain commandments, such as: ‘Do not commit adultery’, while other things, such as ‘It is good for a man not to touch a woman,’ are not enjoined on us by precept, but set before us as a spiritual counsel. Such things are rightly done when they are referred to the love of God and to the love of our neighbour, for His sake.”

Nevertheless, the manner in which the precept of Charity is to be fulfilled by certain precepts of the Law is different to that in which it is to be accomplished by the Counsels. For some things are so designed to a particular end that the end cannot be attained without them. Such is the case with food and the maintenance of life. Other things, again, serve to attain an end with peculiar certainty and completeness. Thus, though food is necessary for the continuance of physical life? medicine serves for the more easy and certain preservation of health. Now some of the commandments are given for the first of these two reasons, namely as a necessary means of attaining to charity. For instance, no one can fulfil the precept of charity who worships false gods, and thus withdraws from the love of God, or who commits murder or theft, which are contrary to the love of our neighbour. But the Counsels are given to us in order that we may fulfil the precept of charity, in the second way of which we have spoken. Hence the Apostle, “king of the Counsel of virginity, expressly says that its object is to enable us to love God. “He who is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he who is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife” (1 Cor 7:32).

Again, we see from St. Matthew 19 that our Lord gave the Counsel of poverty as a means whereby He was to be followed; and following Him, as we have shown, consists in charity. Now charity is lessened by cupidity, but cupidity and love of money is diminished, or wholly eradicated, by the renunciation of earthly possemons. St. Augustine, in his Epistle to Paulinus and Therasia, says that “our love for the goods that we have acquired is much stronger than our desires for those that we do not possess. It is one thing, indeed, to have no will to gain those things that are lacking to us, but quite another to divest ourselves of those that we already possess.” Both these Counsels are also intended to facilitate charity towards our neighbour. All that our Lord lays down in St. Matthew 5 about brotherly love ought to be the abiding disposition of the soul. And it is clear that His precepts on this head will be most easily obeyed by the man who is not hampered by self-interest. He who has no will to possess anything will be better prepared to part with his coat and his cloak, than he who desires possessions.

Since charity is not only the end, but also the foundation of all virtues and of all the precepts given us for the attainment of virtue, it follows that as by means of the Counsels man advances towards more perfect love of God and of his neighbour, so likewise the more perfect observance of the Counsels is furthered by obedience to those Commandments which are necessary to charity. He who has the intention of practising continence or poverty for the love of Christ is a long way from committing adultery or theft. The various exercises of the religious life, such as watching, fasting and retirement from worldly affairs, tend furthermore to preserve man from vice, and to facilitate his practice of perfect virtue. Thus the observance of the Counsels leads to the observance of the other Commandments. Of course, we do not mean that keeping the Commandments is the end proposed by those who practise the Counsels. No one, for instance, embraces virginity in order that he may abstain from adultery, or leads a life of poverty as a safeguard against theft; but the Counsels are practised as a means of advancing in the love of God and of our neighbour. For greater things are not made for lesser ones as their end. From all this it becomes clear that the Counsels pertain to perfection of life, not because perfection necessarily consists in their observance, but because they are the way or means to perfection. St. Augustine bears this out in De moribus ecclesiae, where he says of the life of religious: “Let all our endeavour be to restrain concupiscence, and to preserve brotherly love.” Again, in the same work, he writes, “Charity is there (in religious life) chiefly cultivated: virtue, words, manner, countenance, all are agreeable to charity.”

Again, in the Collatio patrum, the Abbot Moses says, “For this (i.e. for the sake of purity of heart and charity), we do and suffer all things, and on this account we renounced kinsfolk, country, honours, riches and all manner of earthly joy. To gain these virtues we undertake fasting, watching, labour and nakedness, and for these we practise reading and all other virtues. For we desire to prepare our hearts and to keep them pare from defiling thoughts, and by these means to rise to the perfection of charity.” Hence we learn that obedience to the Commandments may be either perfect or imperfect, according as we practise a more or less perfect means of keeping them. For we may, as we have shown, practise by means of the Counsels perfect obedience to the Commandments; or we may, by living in the world without the Counsels, keep them imperfectly.

Therefore, to teach that a man must first be exercised in keeping the Commandments before he passes to the Counsels, is tantamount to saying that he must first obey the Commandments imperfectly, rather than at once strive to keep them perfectly. This is, of course, an absurdity, whether we consider the Commandments themselves or the mode of observing them. For who could be so foolish as to dissuade a man from loving God and his neighbour perfectly by telling him first to love them imperfectly? Is not such a fallacy condemned by the divine precept of charity: “Love the Lord your God with your whole heart”? Or need we fear lest we should learn to love God so quickly that we shall love Him beyond due measure? “Bless the Lord (says Sirach xliii. 30), exalt Him as much so you can, for He is above all praise.” And St. Paul says, “So run that you may obtain” (1 Cor. ix. 24). Again, “Let us hasten, therefore, to enter into that rest” (Heb. iv. 11). For with whatever energy a man enters on the road of perfection, he will still have much progress to make before he arrives at final perfection in his Heavenly home. The argument is equally absurd if we consider the means used for attaining to perfection. Who would tell a man who aspired to virginity or continence that it would be best for him first to live chastely in wedlock? Or who would tell a man who wished to practise poverty first to live justly in the enjoyment of riches, as if wealth were a preparation for poverty rather than an impediment to it? The young man who did not accept from our Lord the Counsel of poverty (Mt 19) went away sad, because of his possessions.

We have up to now been observing the connection between the Counsels and the precepts of charity, but our arguments hold equally good with regard to the other precepts of the Law. For, if the practice of the Counsels and the exercises of the Religious life are a safeguard against breaking the Commandments, is it not clear that some men may need them in order, by their means, to avoid the occasions of sin? Should we advise a young man to live among women and bad companions, in order that by practising chastity in the world he might afterwards observe it in the cloister? Is this virtue easier in the world than in the religious life? The same reasoning applies to other virtues and vices.

Those who hold the opposite opinion resemble generals, who would like to expose their raw recruits to the heat of battle. Those who live in the world and keep the Commandments can make greater progress in virtue if they become religious. For we must remember that if, on the one hand, a secular life spent in obedience to the Commandments is a good preparation for the practice of the Counsels, yet, on the other hand, a life in the world presents a great obstacle to the observance of the Counsels. Hence St. Gregory says in the beginning of his Morals: “When my conscience was urging me to leave the world, many secular cares began to press upon me, as if I were to be detained in the world, not from love of its beauty, but by that which was more serious, viz. anxiety of mind. But at length, escaping eagerly from all such cares, I sought the monastery gate.”

CHAPTER 7

The Arguments of Our Opponents Are Conclusively Refuted

THE arguments adduced in the foregoing chapters facilitate the complete refutation of our adversaries' opinion. Their first contention, namely that our Lord gave the Counsel of poverty to one who had already practised the keeping of the Commandments, is pulverised by St. Jerome. This father, commenting on the words in St. Matthew 19, "All these things have I kept from my youth," says: "This young man spoke untruly. For, if he had by his deeds fulfilled the command, 'Love your neighbour as yourself, why should he have gone away sad when Christ said to him: 'Go, sell what you have and give to the poor'?" Origen also, writing on the Gospel of St. Matthew, says, " It is related in the Hebrew version of the Gospel that when the Lord said to him (the rich young man), 'Go, sell what you have,' the youth began to hesitate. Then Jesus said to him, 'How then can you say that you have observed the Law and the prophets? It is written in the Law: 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself'; and see how many of your brethren, the sons of Abraham, are clothed in dung and perish with hunger. Your house is filled with plenty, but none of it goes forth to your brethren.' Then, rebuking him, the Lord said: 'If you would be perfect' etc. For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment to love our neighbour as ourselves if we are rich and abounding in possessions." This remark refers, of course, to the perfect observance of the precept of charity; and there is no reason why the rich young man may not have kept the Commandments imperfectly, and thus not have spoken untruly in his answer to the Lore. This is the opinion of St. Chrysostom and of other writers. But the fact that Christ gave the Counsel of poverty to one who was, even to a certain extent, practised in obedience to the Commandments, is no proof that such obedience is a necessary preliminary, or the sole preparation, for the exercise of the Counsels. St. Matthew was called from habits of sin to the practice of the Counsels, thereby showing us that the way of perfection is open both to sinners and to innocent souls.

In the second place, our opponents say that a catechumen must be taught to keep the Commandments after he has received the Sacraments of the Church. This argument is irrelevant to the point in question; for instruction in the Commandments, as well as the doctrine and Sacraments of the Faith, is necessary for all men, whether they remain in the world or embrace the perfect life of religious; for these things are common to both classes.

Their third argument, viz. that by keeping the Commandments man attains the fulness of wisdom, means nothing more than that obedience to the Commandments is rewarded by the knowledge of the things of God. Our opponents further quote the words given in one version of Sirach 1:26: “if you desire wisdom, keep the Commandments, and the Lord will give her to you.” This text, however, as is evident, has no bearing on the question.

Their fourth argument, founded on the Gloss on the verse in Psalm 130, “As a weaned child” etc., to which reference has already been made, we will carefully discuss. For, although in itself frivolous, it is considered by our adversaries to be very weighty. If we examine this passage in the Gloss, we shall see that it refers to the spiritual nourishment of recent converts to the Faith. It sets forth that “after Baptism we are instructed in good works and nourished by the milk of simple teaching until, being somewhat grown, we are admitted to our Father’s table.” This means to say that we progress from the more simple doctrine “The Word was made Flesh,” to the Word of the Father is in the beginning with God.” Now these words of the Gloss, evidently refer to the order to be observed in instruction.

Our opponents next adduce, as an argument, that the Church observes five seasons in the spiritual generation of her converts. They are first initiated, by exorcism and catechism, into the rudiments of the Faith. Then they are nourished in the womb of the Church until Holy Saturday when, by Baptism, they are born into light. After Baptism until Pentecost they are carried in the arms of the Church and nourished with her milk; for during that season neither fasting nor rising at night nor any other penitential practice is observed. After Pentecost, when they have been confirmed by the Holy Spirit, catechumens are, so to speak, weaned, and begin to fast and perform other laborious exercises. Now this example of the five seasons appears to support our adversaries’ argument, but it is fallacious in three respects.

There is a difference between the case of recent converts to the Faith who, like babes, require to be nourished, and that of penitent sinners who, like sick men, need to be healed. Those newly converted to the Faith need not necessarily, in the beginning, have difficult tasks laid upon them; they may be first exercised in easier things, and then be led on to those that are more laborious. Such men resemble children who are fed first on milk, and afterwards on stronger food; and it is to those who the Gloss refers. But if recent converts should, of their own accord, stretch forth their hands to higher things, who shall dare withhold them? In the smile used by the Gloss, we see that just as after the solemn Baptism on Easter Eve, the Church, for the sake of the sick, grants a certain rest from laborious works, so likewise after the solemn Baptism which precedes Pentecost, she immediately enjoins fasting, thus signifying that some who have in fervour of spirit been received to Baptism, subject themselves at once to a stricter life. But with penitent sinners the case is otherwise. Severe penance is imposed on them at first. This, by degrees, is mitigated; for they are like sick persons who, in the beginning of their illness are restricted to a strict diet which, when convalescence has set in, is somewhat relaxed. Thus, the Church im poses on innocent souls, from the very beginning, the burden of the Commandments, which must of necessity be kept. She does not lay the Counsels upon them as a necessity, but she does not forbid them to undertake their observance, if they have the will so to do. Stricter obligations are, however, imposed upon penitents, according to the statutes of the Canons of the Early Church.

The second fallacy into which our opponents fall, in the application of their argument, is that of saying that in every office or profession, transition is made from what is easier to what is more difficult. Now it is not necessary that everyone who undertakes an important post, should first have served in an inferior capacity. Neither is it essential that a man, desiring to practise a trade, should already have worked at another trade; but he must ascend from the less to the more difficult branches of the trade in which he wishes to become proficient. In like manner, it is not essential that they who wish to become religious should already have kept the Commandments in the world. What is necessary is that, when they enter religious life, the easier observances should be imposed upon them at first. Again, those who wish to become clerics need not first have led the life of laymen, nor need they who wish to live continently, have observed continence in married life.

The third error into which our adversaries fall, arises from the fact that there is a twofold difficulty in the work of practising the Counsels. The first difficulty arises from the greatness of the work itself, which, because it needs the perfection of virtue, is not imposed upon the imperfect. The second difficulty lies in the restraints imposed. And the more imperfect the persons, the more restraint they need. Thus children need closer watching while they are under the custody of their tutors, than when they have arrived at perfection, Now the religious life, as we have seen, is a certain course of discipline restraining men from sin and leading them on to perfection. Therefore, they who are the most imperfect, not being practised in the observance of the Commandments, stand in the greatest need of the safeguards of religious life, which render it more easy for them to abstain from sin than if they lived freely in the world. The words in the Gloss, "But many, such as heretics and schismatics, pervert this order," are clearly shown, by the context, to refer to order of doctrine. For the Gloss continues: "This man says indeed that he has kept the Commandments, thus laying himself under a curse as if he were humble, not merely in other matters, but also in knowledge. For he says, I thought humbly, being at first nourished by milk, which is the 'Word was made flesh,' in order that I might grow to the Bread of Angels, that is, 'the Word which in the beginning was with God.'" And thus he returns to what he said at first. By this passage we see that words, intended as a means, have been used as an example.

The next argument brought forward against us is so frivolous that it requires no answer. It concerns the five thousand men whom Christ fed with five loaves and the four thousand among whom seven loaves were distributed. It is not necessary that the order of things typified should correspond with the order of their types, for we often see that later things are prefigured by earlier ones, and e converso. Neither can any valid argument be drawn from symbolical things of this nature, as St. Augustine says in his Epistle against the Donatists. Dionysius likewise writes in his Epistle to Titus that allegorical theology is not argumentative. We will, notwithstanding, observe that by this order of miracles is typified the order of precepts and counsels, in so far as regards the whole human race. The Counsels were given not in the old Law but in the new; for, the Law brought nothing to perfection. The Gloss points this out by saying that the five loaves signify the legal precepts, and that the seven loaves are symbolical of evangelical perfection. But this is no reason why the same men should be exercised first in the precepts of the Law, and then in the Counsels in the religious life; for we do not read that the same individuals were first among the seven thousand, and that they then formed part of the four thousand who were miraculously fed by Jesus Christ.

Again, the point brought forward by our opponents, as to the four things of which the Gospel is composed, is not relevant to the question we are discussing. For the perfection proposed as an example does not refer to the Counsels, but to virtuous acts or the perfect way of keeping the Commandments as Christ kept them. Hence the Gloss goes on to quote other examples, e.g., "Learn of Me, for I am meek" etc., and elsewhere, "Be perfect as your Heavenly Father is perfect." "I have given you an example" etc.

We must examine with greater care the seventh argument, as it is one that our opponents are fond of using. It concerns the order to be observed between the active and the contemplative life. It is perfectly true that the active ought to precede the contemplative life, but the meaning of the active life is not always understood. It is sometimes thought that the active life consists merely in the management of temporal affairs; and therefore, as religious possess nothing, either individually or in common, they are believed to be incapable of sharing in the active life. St. Gregory, in the second part of the second homily on Ezekiel, points out that this view is a mistaken one. "The active life," he says, "consists in giving bread the hungry, instructing the ignorant, correcting those who err, recalling the proud to humility, caring for the sick, distributing to each one what is needful to him, and in seeing how each one may be maintained by those things that an entrusted to us." Thus we see that the active life regards not merely temporal matters, but also the guidance and correction of others in spiritual concerns, and that for such duties those men are the best fitted who own no worldly possessions. Consequently, when our Lord appointed the

Apostles to be the teachers of the whole earth, He stripped them of their property (Matt. 10).

We may further enquire whether the exercise of the moral virtues pertains to the active life. Aristotle (X Ethic.) answers this question in the affirmative, and adds that the intellectual virtues belong to the contemplative life. St. Augustine confirms this opinion in XII De Trinit., where he ascribes the inferior reason, which is exercised about temporal matters concerning either ourselves or others, to action, and the superior reason , which is occupied with eternal interests, to contemplation. In accordance with this view, it is quite reasonable to hold that the active must precede the contemplative life. For, unless a man has, by the exercise of the moral virtues, freed his soul from passion (which it is the business of the active life to do), he will not be fit for the contemplation of divine truth. “Blessed are the clean of heart,” says Christ, “for they shall see God” (Mt 5:8). They shall see Him here by imperfect contemplation, and hereafter by what is perfect. Thus the exercise of the active life pertains not only to laymen, but to religious also.

Three reasons go to prove that this is the case. First, because by the exercise of the moral virtues the passions are restrained. Secondly, because religious can show mercy to others by teaching and correcting, or by visiting the sick and comforting the sorrowful, be they seculars or religious of their own monastery. Thus they can verify the words of St. James (1:27), “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit the fatherless and the widow in their tribulation, and to keep one’s self unspotted from this world.” The third reason why religious share with seculars in the active life is because, at their entry into religion, they distributed their worldly possessions to the poor. It is not, therefore, because the precepts belong only to the active life that the Gloss says that the Commandments are the duty of the active, and the Counsels of the contemplative life. St. Gregory writes: “To live a contemplative life is to bear in mind with all diligence, charity to God and to our neighbour, which are the great precepts of the Law. The Counsels dispose the soul more particularly to the contemplative life. For without them, the mere observance of the Precepts will not suffice for contemplation, which requires greater perfection.” No one need remain in the world for the sake of leading an active life; for in religion he can have quite as much exercise in the active life as is necessary to dispose him for the contemplative.

The eighth argument, viz. that “no one arrives at once at the highest point,” is not much to the purpose, although great stress is laid upon it. For we may consider the highest and the lowest either as referring to the same condition and to the same man, or to different conditions and different men. If we consider these degrees as referring to the same condition and the same man, it is quite evident that no one arrives at once at the highest point; for every virtuous man is, during the whole course of his life, making progress towards perfection. But if these degrees are considered with regard to different conditions, there is no reason why a man should not fill the highest post without having served in an inferior capacity. It is not necessary for a cleric to have lived as a layman; for some men are admitted in their boyhood into the ranks of the clergy. Neither is the saying that no one reaches the highest point at once true, if we consider it as referring to different people; for one man may start from a degree of holiness far higher than that to which another will attain throughout the whole course of his life. St. Gregory says (Dialog. 11): “in order that all his contemporaries and all succeeding generations might know to what a height of perfection the child Benedict had arrived, when he received the grace of conversion.”

The ninth argument, viz. that “damp walls cannot bear a roof,” and the tenth that “he courts a fall who tries to climb a steep ascent without steps,” are both irrelevant to our subject. The authorities from whom these passages are drawn use these examples in speaking of the dignity of the episcopal state, which requires mature virtue and is, therefore, not to be conferred on those who are imperfect. But the Counsels are aids to perfection and safeguards from sin. Hence we may speak of them as serving to dry the moisture from newly erected walls, and as sure steps whereby the summit of perfection may be reached.

The eleventh argument used against us deals with the natural priority of the Commandments to the Counsels. Reference to what we have already said will show how much weight such an argument carries. If we speak of the final precepts, viz. the love of God and of our neighbour , it is clear that the Counsels are directed towards these precepts as to their end. The relation between the Counsels and these precepts is that which exists between things ordained for a certain end, and the end for which they are ordained. Now an end is the first thing, if we consider it with reference to the intention; but it is the last if we consider it with regard to the prosecution or consummation. If then the Counsels were so ordained with reference to the Commandments that unless the Counsels were practised the Commandments could not be observed, it would follow that man is bound to observe the Counsels before loving God or his neighbour. Such, of course, is not the case. But if the relations between the Counsels and the Precepts be in such wise that by means of the Counsels, the Precepts can be more easily and more perfectly kept, it follows that by means of the Counsels we can attain to the perfect love of God and of our neighbour. Hence we see that, although in intention this precept precedes the counsels, yet in prosecution the counsels precede this precept.

If we consider the relations between the Counsels and the other Precepts which are given as means to the love of God and our neighbour, we shall see that these relations are of a twofold nature. For, as the Counsels cannot be observed without the Precepts, and as the Precepts are kept by many without the Counsels, the Counsels can be compared to the Precepts if they be considered generally. Thus the relations between the Counsels and the Precepts would be that of particular to general. The particular will precede the general, not necessarily in order of time, but in order of nature. Therefore it is not essential to be exercised in obedience to the Precepts before passing to the observance of the Counsels. But another relation may be observed between the Counsels and the Precepts, which can be observed without the counsels. In this relation the counsels may be compared to the precepts as a perfect to an imperfect species, e.g. as a rational to an irrational animal. In this relation, the Counsels precede the precepts in the order of nature, for in every genus the perfect is naturally first. As Boethius says, “nature begins from the perfect.” It does not matter that in this relation the precepts precede the counsels in point of time, for a thing of an imperfect species may, in point of time, be prior to the thing of a perfect species to which it passes. What is essential is that an imperfect thing should pass to a perfect one of its own species.

The last argument, viz. that there can be no salvation without the Counsels if the Counsels precede the Precepts, is manifestly based on a misunderstanding of what I have been saying. For we do not affirm that the Counsels are so related to the Precepts that the latter cannot be kept without the former. What we assert is that by means of the Counsels the Precepts can be more perfectly obeyed.

CHAPTER 8

Arguments Used to Prove That Before Entering Religious Life A Man Ought to Deliberate for A Long Time, and Take Counsel of Many

WE will proceed to consider whether it is necessary for one who desires to become a religious to take the advice of many counsellors. It is urged that advice should be sought from many persons before taking a difficult step affecting one's whole life; and, as nothing can be conceived more difficult than to renounce oneself, leave the world, and spend one's whole life in religion, it must be necessary to take much advice and to spend a long time in reflection. This argument is based on the definition of a vow. A vow is said to be the promise of a better good, made with grave deliberation. The stringency of the vow depends upon the deliberation. No vow is so binding as the religious vows, which nothing can annul. Therefore, the religious vows require the gravest deliberation.

Those who hold this opinion seek to confirm it by these words, "Do not believe every spirit, but try the spirits to see whether they are of God" (1 John 4:1). This text applies to entrance into religion. St. Benedict, in his Rule, and Pope Innocent, in his Decretal, quote it in this sense. But the " trying," of which St. John speaks, requires careful examination, and this examination (they conclude) is best made in consultation with many. Therefore, he who desires to enter religion should take counsel of many.

Those who think thus, further add that counsel is most needed before taking a step wherein there is the greatest danger of being deceived. There is great danger of deception on entering religious life, since "Satan transforms himself into an angel of light” (2 Cor. ix. 14) and, under an appearance of good, misleads the unwary. Therefore it is only after grave deliberation that a man should enter on the religious life. Again, it is alleged that peculiarly diligent examination is required before undertaking anything that may come to a bad end. Now as we see in the case of apostates and despairing souls, entrance into religious life has often ended badly. Consequently, this step requires grave consideration. A last argument remains, and it is considered a very weighty one. In the Acts of the Apostles (v. 39) the following words occur: “If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought,” Now the counsel of entering religion has often come to nought by apostasy. Therefore, it was not from God. Hence much deliberation with many people is necessary before taking such a step.

These are the chief arguments, adduced by those who impress upon candidates for religious life the necessity for grave deliberation with many counsellors, in the hope that some obstacle may be placed in their way by one or other of their numerous advisers.

CHAPTER 9

Answers to the Foregoing Arguments

IN order to demonstrate the fallacy of the foregoing arguments, we will first consider the case of St. Peter and St. Andrew, who, as soon as our Lord called them, “leaving their nets, followed him” (Matt. 4). St. Chrysostom pronounces the following eulogium of them: “They were in the midst of their business; but, at His bidding, they made no delay, they did not return home saying: ‘let us consult our friends, but, leaving all things, they followed, Him, as Elisha followed Elijah. A similar unhesitating and instant obedience does Christ require of us.” Then, we have the example of St. James and St. John who, being called by God, immediately left their nets and their father and followed Him. St. Hilary, in his Commentary on St. Matthew’s Gospel, says: “ we are taught by their example in abandoning their trade and their father’s house, to follow Jesus and to be withheld neither by worldly anxieties nor by the ties of domestic life.”

Again, we read of St. Matthew (Mt 9) that, at the call of the Lord he “arose and followed Him.” St. Chrysostom comments: “See the obedience of this man thus called. He neither refuses to obey, nor begs that he may go home to acquaint his kinsfolk of his departure.” And Remigius also observes of St. Matthew that he made no account of the dangers which he might incur from the anger of the magistrates, when he left their business unfinished. Thus, it becomes plain that nothing human ought to deter us from the service of God. We read in the Gospel of St. Matthew (8:21), and again in that of Luke (9:59) that “one of His disciples said to Him: ‘Lord, let me first go and bury my father.’ But Jesus said to him: ‘Follow me, and let the dead bury their dead.’” St. Chrysostom, writing on these words, says: “Christ spoke thus, not as contemning the love which we owe to our parents, but to show us that nothing ought to seem more necessary to us than the affairs of the Kingdom of Heaven. He would teach us that with our whole heart, we ought to attach ourselves to them, letting nothing, however important or attractive, to be an obstacle in our way. What would seem more necessary than to bury one's father? What more easy? It would not have taken much time. But the devil is always on the alert to find some unguarded door, and if he perceive a slight negligence, he will cause it to become great cowardice. Therefore the wise man says: Defer not, from day to day. By these words he warns us not to waste a moment of time and, although numberless affairs may be pressing upon us, to prefer spiritual interests to all other things, even to such as are necessary." St. Augustine says in De verbis Domini: "Your father is to be honoured, yes, but God must be obeyed. Christ says, 'I call you to preach the Gospel. You are necessary to me for my task. My work is greater than is that which you desire to perform. There are others who can bury the dead. The first thing must not give place to the last. Love your parents, but prefer God to them.'" If then our Lord refused to grant His disciple a short time in which to perform so necessary a duty, how great is the presumption of those who teach that lengthy deliberation is necessary before embracing the Counsels?

Luke (9:61) tells us that " another said: I will follow you, Lord, but let me first take my leave of those who are at my house." St. Cyril, the great Greek doctor, comments: "This man's promise is admirable and worthy of imitation. But by his desire of going to take leave of those who were in his house, he showed that he was somewhat wavering in his attachment to the Lord, although in his mind he had determined to follow him. The fact of his wishing to take counsel of his kinsfolk, who would not approve of his intention, shows that he was somewhat unstable; and therefore Christ rebuked him saying: 'No man putting his hand to the plough and looking back, is fit for the Kingdom of God.' He had put his hand to the plough by his eagerness to follow our Lord, but he looked back, seeking an occasion of delay by visiting his home and conversing with his kinsmen. Not thus did the holy Apostles act, who at once left their boats and their father, and followed Christ. Neither did St. Paul condescend to flesh and blood. Such ought to be the conduct of those who desire to follow our Lord."

St. Augustine, in De verbis Domini, has this passage: "The Orient calls you; will you wait for the West?" Now by the Orient is meant Christ, as we know from the words in Zach. 6:12: "Behold a man, the Orient is his name.” By the West is signified man declining to the grave and liable to fall into the darkness of sin and ignorance. He, therefore, does an injury to Christ, in whom are contained all the treasures and the wisdom of God” (Col 2:3), who, having heard His call, thinks it necessary to take counsel with mortal man. Our opponents try to evade this argument by an equivocation. They say that the passages quoted by us only refer to the audible call of the Lord, and, of course, in that case no delay must be made nor human counsel asked. But if a man is interiorly called to enter religion, he needs long deliberation and many advisers, in order to find out whether his vocation is from God. This is begging the question; for we are to take the words of Christ, written in Scripture, as coming from His own mouth. For He Himself says: “What I say to you, I say unto all, Watch” (Mark 13:37). And in the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans 15:4, we find “For whatever was written, was written for our instruction.” As St. Chrysostom says: “If these things had only been said for them, they would not have been written, but they were said for them, and written for us.” And St. Paul brings forward the authority of the Old Testament in his Epistle to the Hebrews (xii. 5), “And you have forgotten the consolation which speaks to you as children: My son, do not neglect the discipline of the Lord.” From which it is clear that the words of Holy Scripture were spoken not only to those who heard them, but to future generations.

We, will especially examine whether the counsel given by Christ to the young man (Matt. 19:21): “If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have, and give to the poor” was addressed to that youth only, or to all men. We can best consider this passage by referring to its context, where Peter says: “See, we have left all things and have followed You.” And our Lord promises the reward to all men saying, “Everyone who has left house or brethren etc. for my name’s sake... shall receive a hundredfold and shall possess life everlasting.” Thus we see that this counsel is no less to be followed by all men than if it had been given to each individually. Hence St. Jerome, writing to the presbyter Paulinus, says: “You have heard our Saviour’s words: ‘If you would be perfect, go, sell what you have and give to the poor, and come, follow me.’ Put these words then into practice. Strip yourself of all, and thus, following the Cross of poverty, you will more speedily and more easily ascend Jacob’s ladder.” And, although our Lord addressed the counsel of poverty individually to the rich young man, He nevertheless gave the same advice to all mankind (Mt 16:24): “If anyone will come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow Me.” St. Chrysostom, commenting on this text, says, “He addresses this teaching to the whole world, saying, ‘If anyone’—be it man or woman, king, free man, or serf.” Now self-denial, according to St. Basil, means complete forgetfulness of past things and the abnegation of our own will. In it, therefore, is included the disposal of the property which we possess of our own will. Therefore the counsel given to the young man is to be understood as given to all.

But another point remains to be considered. We have already said that the words of our Lord quoted in Holy Scripture, carry the same weight as if spoken by His own lips. But there is another way whereby God speaks interiorly to men, viz. the way alluded to in Ps. 84:9: “I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.” Now this interior voice is to be preferred to any external speech. St. Gregory says (Homil. Pentecostes), “The Creator does not speak to the understanding of a man, unless He speak to that same man by the unction of the Holy Spirit. Before Cain slew his brother he heard a voice saying, “You have sinned; stop.” But as, on account of his sin, he was admonished by a voice alone, and not by the unction of the Spirit, he was indeed able to hear the word of God, but refused to obey it.” If then we are bound to obey immediately the audible voice of our Creator, how much more ought we not, unhesitatingly and unresistingly, to obey the interior whisper, whereby the Holy Spirit changes the heart of man. Hence, in Is 50:5, it is said by the mouth of the Prophet, or rather of Christ Himself: “The Lord God has opened my ear (i.e. by interior inspiration), and I do not resist. I have not gone back.” “Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before,” as we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (3:13). St. Paul, again, says (Rom 8:14), “Whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.” The Gloss of St. Augustine has the following comment: “Such men do not perform anything, but act under the impulse of grace.” But he who resists or hesitates, does not act by the impulse of the Holy Spirit.

It is then the distinguishing mark of the Sons of to be carried forward by grace to better things, without waiting for counsel. This impulse of grace is alluded to in the Prophet Isaiah (59:59), “When he comes as a violent stream, which the spirit of the Lord drives on.” St. Paul teaches us that this impulse of grace is to be obeyed: “Walk in the Spirit” (Gal 5:16), and again (5:25), “If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law.” St. Stephen thus reproached certain men, “You always resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51). St. Paul says (1 Thes 5:19), “Do not extinguish the Spirit.” On which words, the Gloss comments: “If the Holy Spirit should at any time reveal something to a certain man, do not forbid him to make known what he has heard.” Now, the Holy Spirit gives His revelations not only by teaching man what he ought to speak, but by suggesting to him what he ought to do (John 14). When, therefore, a man is inspired by this Holy Spirit to enter religious life, it is his duty to follow the inspiration at once, without waiting to take counsel of human advisers. This is shown us by the words of the Prophet Ezekiel (1:20), “Wherever the spirit went, they went, and the wheels rose along with them.”

We have further authority for our teaching, not merely in passages of Scripture, but in the examples of the Saints. St. Augustine, in the Eighth Book of his Confessions, tells us of two soldiers, one of whom, having read the life of St. Anthony, was so filled with Divine love, that he said to his, comrade: “I have determined to serve God, I begin at this hour and in this spot. If it is irksome for you to imitate me, at least do not withstand me.” But his comrade answered that he would stand by him in a combat which would bring so great reward.” Thus (O Lord) did both these servants of yours build up a tower at a befitting cost, by leaving all things and following you.” In the same book, St. Augustine reproaches himself with having delayed his conversion: “When I was convinced of the truth, I could not reply except in slow and drowsy words: ‘I am coming now; let me be a while longer.’ But my promised time had no limit, and my ‘little while’ was long protracted.” Again in the same book he says, “I was filled with shame for listening to the babble of worldly and carnal concerns, and hung wavering.” Thus, we see that, far from being praiseworthy, it is most reprehensible to hesitate or take counsel, as if we were in doubt, when we have heard an interior or exterior call, be it some word or some passage in Scripture.

Interior inspiration has efficacy to enable those to whom it is given to accomplish great deeds. We read in the Acts of the Apostles that when the disciples were gathered together, the Holy Spirit came upon them and made them speak of the wonders of God. The Gloss says on this passage: “The grace of the Holy Spirit of God knows no obstacles.” Again, the Book of Sirach (11:23) has these words: “It is easy in the eyes of God suddenly to make a poor man rich.” St. Augustine speaks of the efficacy of internal inspiration in his book De praedestinatione Sanctorum. He quotes the words recorded in St. John (6), “Everyone who has heard of the Father and has learned, comes to Me.” On these words he says, “This school where the Father is heard and teaches, in order that men may come to the Son, is far removed from the senses; for in it we hear not with ears of flesh, but with the hearing of the heart.” Again he says: “The grace which, by the Divine munificence, is secretly bestowed is not rejected by any hard heart; for it is given in order that hardness may be entirely taken away.” St. Gregory, in his Homilia Pentecostes, treats of the efficacy of interior inspiration: “Oh, how cunning a workman is this Spirit. He makes no delay in teaching what He wishes. As soon as He touches the heart, He teaches it. His touch is teaching. He changes the human mind as soon as He enlightens it; and the man taught by Him at once forsakes what he was, in order to show what he was not.” He who hesitates to obey the impulse of the Holy Spirit for the sake of taking counsel either knows not this impulse, or else resists it.

Philosophers, no less than sacred writers, condemn the error of acting thus. Aristotle, in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics on good fortune, says, “If we seek to know what is the principle of movement in the soul corresponding to God in the universe, we shall see that reason cannot be the principle of reason; that principle must be something better. But what, save God, can be better than knowledge and understanding?” He continues, in another place: “Those who are moved by God do not need to be counselled; for they have a principle surpassing counsel and understanding.” Shame then on him who, calling himself a Catholic, would send men inspired by God, to take advice of human counsellors, of whom even a heathen philosopher tells us they have no need.

But, let us further examine for what cause, those called by God to religious life can require counsel. First, it is sacrilegious to doubt whether the life counselled by Christ is the most perfect. Again, none but a soul enslaved by human love would hesitate as to whether it is right to abandon the intention of entering religious life for fear of grieving friends or incurring temporal loss. St. Jerome writes in his epistle to Heliodorus: “Even should your infant son hang round your neck, or your mother, with unkempt hair and dishevelled dress, show you the breasts that suckled you, or your father cast himself along your threshold, pass on. Shed no tear; tread your father underfoot and hasten to the standard of the Cross. In this case, cruelty is the only piety.” Elsewhere he adds, “My enemy, with drawn sword, is about to slay me, and shall I think of my mother’s tears? Shall I forsake the combat for love of my father, when I ought not to leave Christ even to bury my parents? In several places he writes in the same strain.

But perhaps some may think it necessary to take counsel, lest they should not be able to fulfil what is implied in entering religious life. The same doubt occurred to St. Augustine, as he tells us in the Eighth Book of his Confessions. He feared to undertake to observe the counsel of continence; and, speaking of himself, he uses these words: “On the side to which I turned my face, and where I feared to go, I saw the chaste dignity of continence. She was serene and cheerful, without wantonness. She beckoned me to approach her fearlessly, holding out to embrace me and uphold me, her gentle hands full of numberless good examples. With her were many youths and maidens, staid widows and venerable virgins.” He adds later on: “And she smiled at me, mocking, as if to say, ‘What these have done, can you not likewise do? Have these acted by their own might, and not by the power of their God? The Lord their God has given me to them. Why then do you stand on your own, without a foothold? Cast yourself on Him. Fear not. He will not draw away to let you fall. Cast yourself on Him with confidence. He will receive you and heal you.”

There are, nevertheless, two points on which those may take counsel who have the intention of entering religious life. Of these, one is the mode of becoming a religious; and the other is the existence of any obstacle to religious life, such as matrimony or the state of slavery. But advice should not be sought from kinsfolk. The book of Proverbs (25:9) says indeed, “Treat your cause with your friend, and discover not the secret to a stranger.” But, in the matter of entering religion, relations are not friends, but rather enemies. “A man’s enemies are those of his own household,” says Micah (7:6), and our Lord quotes his words (Mt 10:36). Therefore, with regard to this matter, the advice of our kinsmen is to be particularly avoided.

St. Jerome, in his epistle to Heliodorus, thus enumerates the obstacles which family ties may raise to entrance into religious life. “Your widowed sister will encircle you with her arms. The domestic slaves, among whom you grew up, will cry to you, ‘To whose service do you leave us?’ The aged nurse and the foster-father, who in fondness has been a second father to you, after your own, will call out: ‘Stay a little; we shall soon be dead; wait and bury us.’” St. Gregory likewise says (III Moral.): “Our crafty enemy, seeing himself banished from the hearts of good men, seeks out those by whom they are loved. He speaks by means of their caressing words, knowing that they are more loved than others. He hopes that as the violence of love overcomes their heart, he may easily destroy the fortifications of their virtue by means of the sword of persuasion.” For this reason it was that the Blessed Benedict, as St. Gregory tells us (II Dialog.), secretly fled from his nurse, and sought retirement in a desert place, but opened his mind to the monk Romanus, who kept his secret, and gave him assistance. Carnal men, to whom the wisdom of God is folly, are therefore not to be consulted. The following advice is given us in the Book of Sirach (37:12), “Do not consult a man without religion concerning holiness, nor with an unjust man concerning justice.” The same inspired writer adds: “Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel. But be continually with a holy man,” from whom. counsel may be sought if any should be needed.

CHAPTER 10

Answer to the Objections Raised Against the Foregoing Arguments

IT is easy to answer the objections which may be raised against our arguments. It is true, in the first place that advice should be sought in difficult and serious undertakings, when the way is not clear. When, however, the right path has been shown us by some higher counsellor, it is unwise to open the question again and to seek further advice.

The second argument adduced, that a vow is confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, is irrelevant to the matter in hand. For the deliberation spoken of consists in that choice, whereby a man elects the greater good to which he intends to devote himself. Now all that is done from choice, is done by deliberation or counsel; for choice is the desire for a thing commended to us, as Aristotle says (III Ethic.). The same Holy Spirit who is the spirit of strength and piety, and who moves men to a determination of embracing the religious life, is likewise the spirit of counsel and of knowledge, and directs their interior deliberation.

The third objection brought against us is equally irrelevant. “Try the spirits whether they be of God,” (1 John 4:1) we are told. But probation is only necessary where certainty does not exist. The Gloss comments on the words of St. John, which we have quoted: “Things that are certain need no discussion.” Nevertheless, those whose duty it is to admit others into religious life may be uncertain of the motive which may lead a candidate to present himself. For he may be inspired by desire for spiritual perfection; or he may be influenced by curiosity, or by a wish to do some harm. Again, uncertainty may exist as to the fitness of postulants for religious life. Therefore, the Church ordains, and religious rules require, that candidates should pass through a period of probation. But the postulants themselves cannot be in doubt as to the motive which leads them to seek the religious habit. Therefore, they do not need deliberation, especially if they are not doubtful about their health, which the year of probation is intended to put to a test.

The statement that “Satan transforms himself into an angel of light” and inspires good desires with the intention of deceiving us, is very true. But, as the Gloss says, when the devil deceives the bodily senses, he does not withdraw the mind from a praiseworthy and holy intention; for whoever leads a faithful life is in no danger. Even should Satan, pretending to be good, do or say things befitting the holy angels, and should he delude a man into believing him, the error would not be dangerous or harmful. But, when, by means of his pretence of good, he begins to draw men away to his own work, they need the greatest watchfulness, lest they should be led astray by him. Granted, then that the devil instigates someone to enter religious life, this undertaking is a good one, worthy of the holy angels, and a man who consents to it will run no risk. But he must be on his guard to resist temptations to pride or other vices. God makes use of the malice of the devil for the profit of the just, for whom, if they overcome, He prepares crowns; and thus the evil spirits are duped by the saints. But it must be understood that a suggestion to enter religious life proceeding either from man or from Satan has no efficacy, unless it be accompanied by the interior attraction of God. St. Augustine in his book De praedestinatione Sanctorum says “that all the saints are taught by God, not because all come to Christ, but because no one comes to him by any other means. Thus the desire to enter religion, from whomever such a suggestion may proceed, comes from God.”

The fifth argument, namely that advice is needed before going into religion, because the undertaking may end badly, needs some discrimination. The bad end of any undertaking may be the fault either of the enterprise itself, or of him who makes the attempt. If the undertaking itself is dangerous and frequently productive of ill effects, great deliberation would be needed before attempting it; or it might be better to abandon it entirely. But if danger from the enterprise accrue but to very few, much deliberation would not be required about the step itself. Great care and vigilance, however, would be necessary on the part of him who undertakes it, lest he should by any chance fall into danger. Otherwise he would make his enterprise a pretext for neglecting all human efforts. This is enforced by the words of Sirach (11:4). “He who observes the wind shall not sow; and he who considers the clouds shall never reap,” and those other words of Proverbs (26:13), “The slothful man says, ‘There is a lion in the way and a lioness on the roads.’” On this text the Gloss observes: “There are many who, when hey hear words of exhortation, say that they would never want to enter the way of justice, but are held back by Satan from making progress.”

It sometimes happens, however, that an undertaking, certainly good in itself, may come to an unfortunate termination. This failure is due to instability of purpose on the part of the person engaged in the affair. But the fact that some men who have become religious have changed for the worse, and have apostatised is no reason for delaying to enter religious life, on the plea of requiring longer deliberation. The same pretext might be used as an excuse for not embracing the Faith or approaching the Sacraments, for as we are told by St. Peter (2 Pet 2: 21), “It would have been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they had known it to turn back.” St. Paul also says (Heb. 10:29), “He deserves worse punishments who has esteemed the blood of the Testament unclean, and has offered an affront to the spirit of grace.” Neither would he return to works of justice, since we find it written (Sirach 26:27[19]), “He who passes over from justice to sin, God has prepared him for the sword.”

The sixth argument used against our proposition is one that must be carefully examined, both on account of the frequency with which it is adduced, and on account of the heresy which lurks under its cover. We are told that “a work that is of God cannot come to nought.” Two heresies have sprung up in our time through misunderstanding these words. The first error is that since the body becomes corrupted, it cannot be the work of God. The second is that any grace or charity received from God cannot be lost. We might as well say that because Satan sinned, he was not created by God; or that because Judas fell away from the Apostolic College, his calling was not from God; or that because Simon Magus lapsed into heresy after Baptism, it was not the will of God that Philip should have baptised him.

We may add one other argument, as weighty as the preceding, which is commonly used by our adversaries: If a man, they say, goes into religion and leaves his monastery, his vocation was not from God, nor did the advice given him by his counsellors proceed from Heaven. In refutation of this opinion, we may quote the words wherewith St. Augustine (I Contra Julianum) replies to those who held that no root of evil can exist in that which is the gift of God. St. Augustine argues: “ Manicheus will conquer, unless both he and you be resisted. Therefore, the truth of the Catholic Faith overcomes Manicheus, because it overcomes you.” In order, then that our opponents may be worsted, together with the Manicheans, let us say that the counsel of God is never brought to nought. To quote the words of Isaiah (46:10) : “My counsel shall stand, and all my will shall be done.” Now in God’s unchangeable counsel, He sometimes, as St. Augustine says, in De Perseverantia, gives temporal justice to those to whom He does not give the gift of perseverance; just as He gives temporal existence to corruptible things, on which He does not bestow eternal life. And thus the Manicheans are answered. For corruptible things are created by the immutable counsel of God, in order that they may enjoy temporal existence. Our opponents are likewise silenced, since, in the eternal wisdom of God, He gives the resolution of entering the religious life to those on whom He does not bestow the grace of perseverance.

CHAPTER 11

Arguments Used by Those Who Maintain That Men Should Not Bind Themselves by Vow to Embrace the Religious Life

WE must next examine the views held by those who endeavour to prevent men from binding themselves by vow to become religious. Some there are who seek to detract from the merit of any vows, contending that it is better to perform good works without being bound by any obligation. They support their opinion by the following words of Prosper (II De vita contemplativa): “We ought to fast and abstain, not as being bound thereto by necessity, lest, if we do these works unwillingly, we should be acting not through devotion, but from constraint.” Now he who makes a vow to fast, subjects himself to the necessity of fasting; and this is the case with all other good works. Therefore, it would not seem expedient to make a vow to fast, or to enter religion, or to perform any other pious action. Those who hold this view maintain, likewise that a good work loses in merit in proportion to the necessity for its performance. Now as a man who has vowed to enter religion, or to perform any other virtuous action, is bound to fulfil what he has promised to God, it is better and more praiseworthy if he executes such a good work without the obligation of a vow, rather than do it because he had taken a vow. Those who argue thus, endeavour likewise, in an especial manner, to prove that people should not be persuaded to enter religion on account of the obligation laid upon them by any vow or oath.

They support their opinion by the statute of the Council of Toledo, where (Dist. XLV, cap. De Judaeis) we find hese words: “Not unwilling, but willing souls, will be saved. For justice must be preserved intact. Man, of his own choice, obeyed the will of the serpent and perished. Therefore, each man must be saved by the response of his own soul in believing, when the grace of God calls him to do so. Therefore men are to be converted, not by force, but by their own free will and choice. Now these words apply far more forcibly to entrance into religious life, which is less necessary to salvation than is faith in the Christian religion. But those who enter religion on account of a vow or an oath do so not freely, but under constraint. Therefore such an obligation is not to be commended. The decree of Pope Urban (XIX, quaest. II, cap. Duae sunt) is considered an argument in support of this opinion. The Pope says that they who enter religious life are led by a private law, which is the law of the Holy Spirit. “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Now necessity, which constrains men by the obligation of a vow or oath, is opposed to liberty. Therefore, it is not seemly that men should be obliged to embrace religious life, on account of any oath or vow.

Another argument is drawn from the fall of those, who, having entered religion under the constraint of some obligation, have not persevered therein, but have returned to the world and abandoned themselves, in despair, to vice of every kind. In them is fulfilled what our Lord said to the Pharisees (Mt 23:15): “You go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves.”

It is further maintained that some men who were under vow to go into religion, have not fulfilled their obligation, and have nevertheless become good bishops or archdeacons. Had they kept their vow, these good results would not have been obtained. It is also urged that men must not be persuaded to embrace the religious state for the sake of any temporal advantages, such as gifts. The decree of Pope Boniface (I, quest. II, cap. Quam pio) is quoted in confirmation of this proposition, for the Pope says: “Nowhere do we read that the disciples of the Lord or their followers were converted to the worship of God by gifts.”

It is further alleged that it leads men into unfaithfulness to be bound, while still inexperienced, to the laborious obligations of religious life, such as the long morning office, trying vigils, fasts and disciplines. They are led like cattle to the slaughterhouse; and, as they do not fulfil what they have vowed to perform, these religious exercises are for them snares which entangle them in eternal death. Such obligations, it is urged, are unlawful, as being contrary to the statute of Innocent IV, which provides a year of probation for candidates to religious life, and forbids anyone to be bound before the age of fourteen years. This decree is in harmony with the rule of St. Benedict, which also, appoints a year of probation for those who enter the order. It is declared, furthermore, to be peculiarly unlawful for youths under the age of puberty to be bound to go into religion, for how can a youth accept obligations which may lawfully be made void by another? If any youths of tender years have bound themselves to become religious, they may be withheld from so doing by their parents or guardians. This is laid down in XX quaest. 2, where it is declared that “if a maiden, under the age of twelve years has taken the veil, her engagements may be annulled at the will of her parents or guardians.” Thus it is unlawful to bind, either by oath or vow, children under the age of puberty to the religious life.

It is further laid down that none, under this age, can be bound to religious life, even though he or she should be capable of fraud. St. Bernard, in the preparation of regulars and of those who embrace the religious state, comments on the decree Postulasti of Pope Innocent III: “If you desire to know what to expect of them when they are under the age of thirteen or fourteen years, you may be in doubt, for they are capable of craft, and may make up in cunning what they lack in age.” This has been proved in marriage, as we see in Extra de Despon. impub. cap. A nobis, and cap. Tuae, and, as they have been able to bind themselves to the devil, they may also be able to bind themselves to God. But the Pope replies that children under fourteen may, after they have been received, serve in the Church, but they may not be bound under obligations. He who is capable of fraud, the Pope continues in his reply to Hugh, is bound to good, and if he has become a monk he is under the obligations of the monastic life, since he was able to bind himself to the devil. Innocent III was of the same opinion, for in this same decretal he replies that entrance into religious life is a solemn engagement, “if age is supplied by malice.” This is also laid down in the old decretal, but it is of small import in our days.

These who argue against the propriety of persons being under an obligation to go into religion, quote the Summae of Raymund and Goffin. They also maintain (XXII, Quaest. V, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum) that children under fourteen years of age oughtnot to be bound by oath; neither, by the same reasoning, can they be bound by vow to enter religious life. They say further that, as the word religion signifies either re-binding or re-electing, according to St. Augustine (X De Civit. Dei), therefore children, who are not bound and have made no choice, cannot be re-bound, nor can they repeat their choice. From an these arguments they conclude that children who embrace, or are constrained to embrace religious life, are much to be pitied for their folly.

CHAPTER 12

Refutation of the Error Contained in the Last Chapter, Together with An Exposition of the Truth That Good Works, Done Under Vow, Are More Meritorious Than Those Performed Without Any Such Obligation

IN order that the truth may be made manifest with regard to each of the premises contained in the last chapter, we will investigate them one by one, beginning with those that concern common things, and proceeding to those who are more spiritual. We will first, examine whether it be true that good works, done under vow, are less meritorious than those performed without such obligation. And, although a great deal has been said on this subject in our little book on Perfection, we will nevertheless not hesitate to go over the ground again.

We must first remember that although the praiseworthiness of an action depends radically on the will, the work itself becomes outwardly more praiseworthy in proportion to the excellence of the will. Now one condition of a good will is that it be firm and stable. Proverbs (13: 4) reproaches the slothful in these words: “The sluggard wills and wills not.” Therefore an exterior work becomes praiseworthy and meritorious, in proportion to the stability of the will in good. Hence St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians (1 Cor 15:58), says: “Be steadfast and immoveable.” And Aristotle teaches that for the perfection of virtue, stability and constancy in operation are necessary. Lawyers also define justice as firmness and steadfastness of will. On the other hand, we know that the heinousness of sin depends upon the obstinacy in evil shown by the sinner. In fact, this obstinacy is itself called a sin against the Holy Spirit. Now it is clear that the will to do anything is strengthened by an oath. “ I have sworn,” says the Psalmist, “and am determined to keep the judgments of your Justice” (Ps 118:106). The will is likewise confirmed by a vow, since a vow is a promise, and he who promises to do a thing strengthens his determination to do it. Therefore, as we see in our experience of human life, a virtuous action is more meritorious and more praiseworthy, if it is performed when the will is strengthened by a vow.

So inconstant is the human will that it has become customary not to believe what men say they will do for one another, unless they confirm their words by promise, and further ratify those promises by lawful safeguards. Now we owe more to ourselves, especially in the affairs of our spiritual wellbeing, than we owe to other people. This we are taught by the words of Sirach 30:24 [23], “Have pity on your own soul, pleasing God.” Now by reason of the inconstancy of his will, a man may neglect to perform something that he intended for the temporal advantage of his neighbour; he therefore provides against this possible omission by confirming his promise by some oath or pledge. How much more fittingly then may he not bind, himself by oath or vow to carry out some good resolution which he has made? Hence St. Augustine says, in his epistle to Paulina and Armentarius, “Having made a vow, you have bound yourself, and cannot act otherwise.” And he further adds: “Never regret your vow, but rather rejoice that it is now no longer lawful for you to do what, to your detriment, you were able to do before.”

It is further to be remembered that a work of lesser intrinsic worth is rendered more meritorious, if it is inspired by some motive of superior virtue. Thus, abstinence is more meritorious if it is practised from charity, and the merit is further increased if the motive be latria, which is of greater value than abstinence. Now a vow is an act of latria. It is a promise made to God, concerning those things which relate to His worship. Hence Isaiah says (19:21), “The Egyptians shall know the Lord in that day, and shall worship Him with sacrifices and offerings, and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them.” Thus we see that fasting will be more meritorious and more praiseworthy, if it is performed under vow. A counsel or command concerning this matter is given us in the words of Ps 75:12:

"Vow, and pay to the Lord your God!" This command or exhortation would be futile, were not a good work done under vow more meritorious than one done without such an obligation.

These facts being premised, we must now consider whether it be justifiable or not for a man to bind himself to enter the religious life. If it be true that it is a virtuous action to embrace the religious state, and that virtuous actions become more meritorious if they be done in fulffiment of a vow, those men must be acting in a praiseworthy manner when, being unable to become religious at once, bind themselves by vow to do so at a future time. This argument must be patent to all. save to those who, with Vigilantius, hold that the secular state is equal in merit to the religious life, or who have the still grosser folly to outdo the heresy of Vigilantius by presuming to assert that the religious state, which enjoys the approbation of the Church, is not a state of salvation.

This audacious teaching does not only stultify the counsels of Christ, but is distinctly schismatical, as it contravenes the ordinances of the Church. But if, on the contrary, those who oblige themselves by vow to embrace the religious life, are inspired to do so by the Spirit of God and act in a praiseworthy manner, they also are to be commended who, working together with the Holy Spirit, endeavour by their exterior ministry to persuade their neighbours to do what the Spirit of God interiorly moves them to do. For, as St. Paul says (1 Cor 3:9), "We are God's coadjutors," that is, by our external ministry.

The foregoing remarks only apply to adults. We must now consider the question as to whether children, be they boys or girls, may lawfully bind themselves by vow to become religious. A distinction must be made between two kinds of vows: simple vows, and solemn vows. A simple vow consists in a mere promise. A solemn vow is a promise accompanied by some exterior manifestation, whereby a man actually offers himself to God. Thus the reception of Holy Order, the profession of a definite religious life made in the hands of a prelate, or the reception of the habit of professed religious, which is considered equivalent to religious profession, all solemnize a vow. Simple and solemn vows have different effects upon matrimony. A solemn vow is an obstacle to marriage, and annuls a contract of marriage already made. A simple vow does not annul a marriage, but is an impediment in the way of any contract of marriage after the vow is made.

Simple and solemn vows have, likewise different effects upon religious life. A solemn vow, made either by explicit or implicit profession, causes a man to become a monk or a brother in some religious order. A simple vow does not make a him a monk, for it leaves him with the ownership of his property, and does not annul his marriage, should he marry after taking such a vow. Now as a simple vow consists solely in a promise made to God, proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind, such a vow possesses an efficacy of which no human law can deprive it. There are, nevertheless, two conditions under which a simple vow may be invalidated. First, if such due deliberation as would ratify a promise, have been wanting; thus a vow taken by a mad or delirious man would not be binding, as is laid down in extra de regul. et transeuntibus ad relig. Sicut tenor. Neither would any obligation attach to the vow of a child as yet incapable of fraud, or who had not attained to the use of reason, which in children is developed at such different ages that no certain rule can be laid down coacerning it.

The other condition which would invalidate a simple vow is, in the event of a person vowing something to which he has not the power to give. Thus, if a slave makes a vow to go into religion, he (supposing him to have attained the use of reason) would be certainly bound to keep his vow, if his master permitted him to do so. But if his master would not ratify the vow, the slave could, without sin, revoke it. This is laid,down in the Decreta, dist. 44, Si servus, where it is said that “if a slave have, unknown to his master, been ordained, the master is entitled within a year of the ordination to prove that the slave is his property and to take him back.” And since a boy or girl is, during childhood, in the power of the father, the father may, if he so will, acknowledge the vow made by a child as an effect of divine inspiration. We read in the Book of Numbers (30:4), “If a woman vows anything, and binds herself by an oath, being in her father’s house, and but yet a girl in age: if her father knew the vow that she has promised, and the oath wherewith she has bound her soul, and held his peace, she shall be bound by the vow: whatsoever she promised and swore, she shall fulfil in deed. But if her father, as soon as he heard it, overruled it, both her vows and her oaths shall be void; neither shall she be bound to what she promised, because her father has overruled it.” From this passage it appears that boys or girls, under the age of puberty, are bound, as far as in them lies, to keep vows that they have made, unless their reason is defective. Nevertheless, as they are under the authority of their father, he can annul their vows. This is also made clear by the context of the passage in Numbers, which we have quoted, which speaks of the right of a husband to annul a vow made by his wife.

We cannot positively determine the age at which individuals reach the use of reason; but the period at which the subjection of one person to another ceases, can be distinctly defined. This time is for a girl the age of twelve years: for a boy the age of fourteen. This age is generally reckoned the time of puberty, as we see in XX quaest. 2, cap. Puella, cap. Si in qualibet. Thus with regard to a simple vow to enter religion, a person may be bound, in so far as it depends upon himself, by such a vow even before he has arrived at the age of puberty, provided that he is capable of fraud, and has attained the use of reason, so that he understands what he is doing. But this vow may be revoked by a father or a guardian who holds the place of a father. A solemn vow, on the other hand, made either explicitly or implicitly, requires certain exterior rites ordained by the Church. The Church exacts that both for the reception of Holy Orders, and for the making of a solemn vow, the candidate must have attained the age of puberty, which for a boy is fourteen years and for a girl twelve. Therefore a profession made by anyone under this age, even though the person is capable of fraud, does not render him a monk or brother of any religious order. This is the commonly accepted teaching of the Church, though Innocent III is said to have spoken otherwise.

CHAPTER 13

Refutation of the Arguments Adduced in the Last Chapter

OUR last chapter consisted in an exposition of the arguments brought forward to prove that a vow did not add to the merit of a good work. Our present task is to answer these arguments. This we can easily do.

The words of Prosper, “We ought to fast, not out of necessity,” refer to a forced fast, in contradistinction to a voluntary one. This is proved by the context, “lest we should, by not fasting voluntarily, show ourselves unwilling rather than devout.” These words do not refer to the necessity imposed by a vow, for by a vow devotion, is increased. This appears from the very etymology of the word.

The second argument, viz. that which is done out of necessity is less meritorious than that which is done freely, must be understood of the necessity imposed on a man against his own will. But when a man lays upon himself the necessity of doing good, his action is thereby rendered more praiseworthy, since he who performs it is “a servant of justice,” which St. Paul exhorts us all to become (Rom 6:18). Hence St. Augustine, in his epistle to Paulina and Armentarius, exclaims, “Blessed necessity which constrains us to better things.”

The third argument, which refers to the conversion of the Jews of their own free will, does not appear relevant to our subject. For the will may be confirmed in good without any violation of its liberty; otherwise neither God nor the blessed in Heaven would enjoy free will. But coercion, proceeding either from violence or fear, is repugnant to liberty. Therefore, the Canon De Judaeis expressly condemns it, saying, “The holy Synod henceforth forbids violence to be used towards anyone to make them believe.” But neither a vow nor an oath do violence to a man; they merely serve to confirm his will in good. Therefore, neither a vow nor an oath render a man unwilling, but rather cause him to will more strongly, and to begin, in so far as may lie in his power, to execute what he has bound himself to. No one in his senses will say that it is unlawful to persuade Jews to bind themselves by vow or oath to be baptized.

The fourth contention of our opponents is that sometimes those who have bound themselves by oath or vow to go into religion lapse, and falling into despair, abandon themselves to all manner of iniquity; and thus they become the children of hell, twofold more than they who led them to become religious. This objection is answered by St. Paul, “Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect?” (Rom 3:3). From which words we are to conclude that the fact that some men abuse grace is not detrimental to the perseverance of others in good. The Gloss says on this passage that the refusal of certain Jews to believe in no wise hinders others of their nation from accepting what God has promised to His faithful. In the same way, the fact that certain men, after taking a vow or an oath to embrace the religious life, change their minds and become worse than they were before, is no hindrance to others who, having taken a vow, persevere in its accomplishment. Therefore, they who persuade men to make a vow to become religious do not, so far as they are concerned, make them children of hell, but rather children of the Kingdom; since the number of those who persevere is greater than that of those who fall away.

It is nevertheless possible (though God forbid it!) that they may, as appears by the exposition of St. Jerome and St. Chrysostom, by their bad example lead those whom they influence into sin. Our argument seems to be supported by the words of St. Paul (1 Tim 5:11), “But the younger widows avoid,” an exhortation for which he gives the following reason: “Having damnation, because they have made void their first faith,” whereby, that is, they pledged themselves before God to continence. But, as St. Jerome says in his epistle De monogamia ad Agerunchiam, on account of those who have committed fornication against Christ their Spouse, the Apostle desires them to marry again, preferring a second marriage to fomication. For it is much better to be a wife for a second time, than to have commerce with a debauchee or with many adulterers. But St. Paul does not, on this account, forbid young widows to make a simple vow of continency

—In fact, he rather commends such a practice, saying, “it is good for them if they so continue,” i.e. in their widowhood (1 Cor 7:8)—but he forbids widows who are living in wantonness to be assisted by the alms of the Church. “But the younger widow avoid, for when they have grown wanton in Christ they will marry” (1 Tim 5:11).

As for the sixth argument, namely that some men who have made vows to go into religion have, nevertheless, remained in the world and become good bishops, it is patently contrary to fact. In the decree of Innocent, which treats of vows and their accomplishments, we find the following passage, “You state in your letters to us that you made a solemn vow in the church of Grenoble to assume the religious habit, and that you further promised, in the hands of the Bishop of the same church, to fulfil this vow within the period of two months on your return from the Apostolic See. Nevertheless, heedless that the time for accomplishing your promise has expired, although unfaithful to a vow, you have been called to the government of the Church of Geneva. We counsel you then that if you desire to give peace to your conscience, you should renounce the see, and shouldest pay to the Most High your vows.” Hence it is plain that a man who has vowed to go into religion cannot, with a good conscience, retain a bishopric or an archdeaconate; and should he retain it, he would not be a good bishop or archdeacon, but a traitor to his vow.

The next contention, viz. that men should not be bribed to enter religion, is answered by the very chapter quoted in support of it. For it declares that “unless someone has the intention of feeding the poor, no one of any profession whatsoever is to be refused maintenance.” Hence it appears that the practice of burses for poor scholars, and of supporting them during their studies in order that they may be more fit to enter religion, is by no means to be condemned. Neither is it unlawful to bestow some material benefit upon a man, in order that he may be encouraged, by such a favour, to do better; but it would be unlawful to enter into a compact or agreement with him. Hence in the same chapter, it is laid down that all compacts and agreements must be avoided. Were it unlawful to encourage persons to spiritual good by means of material assistance, the custom, prevalent in certain churches, of giving a largesse to those who assist at the divine office, would be unjustifiable.

The eighth argument, viz. that it leads to unfaithfulness to persuade young persons to adopt such painful practices as fasting, watching, and the like, contains a fallacy which may easily be detected. For those who are received to the religious life, or who are bound by vow to enter it, are, from the very outset, shown its hardships. It does not lead men to unfaithfulness if, in order to persuade them to embrace a life whose sufferings are manifest, we, after the example of Christ, hold out to them the prospect of spiritual consolations. “Take my yoke upon you,” said our Lord, “and learn of Me, for I am meek and humble of heart, and you shall find rest for your soul” (Mt 11:29). In these words, physical labour is symbolised by the “yoke,” and spiritual consolation by the “rest” promised to those that bear it. Hence St. Augustine, in De verbis Domini, says, “They who bravely submit to the yoke of the Lord, undergo such dangers and difficulties that they appear to be called, not from labour to rest, but from rest to labour. But the Holy Spirit who is with them by the abundance of heavenly delights and the hope of future blessedness, sweetens all present bitterness and lightens all present loads.” Therefore, they who judge that men deceive themselves by undertaking hardships for Christ’s sake, merely show that they have had no experience of heavenly delights.

The ninth argument is quite irrelevant to the matter in hand. The statute of Pope Innocent, which is quoted, refers to solemn vows made at professions, not to simple vows whereby people bind themselves out of devotion to go intoreligion.

The tenth objection, viz,that parents can annul the vows of children not yet arrived at the age of puberty, carries no weight. For the fact that an engagement may be broken does not make such an engagement sinful. It would be equally reasonable to say that whatever minors, that is persons under twenty-five years of age, may do to the detriment of their own interest is unlawful, because anything that they lose can be completely restored to them. Hence children commit no sin by taking a vow to go into religion, or by assuming the religious habit without their parents’ permission, even though such vows can be annulled. Were they to commit sin by taking such vows, the fact would be noted by the Canons, which grant faculties to parents to dissolve the vows of children.

The eleventh argument, which rests upon quotations from the decretals de apparatu, and from the Summae of the jurists Raymund and Goffin, does not bear upon our point. The passages quoted refer to the solemn vow which makes a person a religious or a professed member of some order. Doctors of Canon law held different opinions about their vow, although it would seem inconsistent and ridiculous for professors of sacred learning to quote as authorities the little glosses of jurists, or to make them a basis of argument.

The twelfth objection, that which concerns oaths, is likewise irrelevant, for the Canons do not forbid children to take oaths; they only prohibit their being obliged to do so.

The fallacy contained in the thirteenth argument is easily detected. Children are bound by that profession of Christian faith which they have chosen in the Sacrament of Baptism. Therefore, they may be bound anew, and can make a further choice of the state of perfection. This, however, is not a very correct way of speaking, since in Baptism children receive the Christian religion and are bound again to God, making afresh their choice of Him from whom the sin of our first parents had separated them.

Finally, the profane conclusion whereby these objections end, and which accuses children of folly, is an affront to pious ears. Who would presume to blame the holy child St. Benedict because, in his desire to please God alone, he left his father’s house, and sought for holy conversation and a solitary dwelling? Who but a heretic would blaspheme against St. John the Baptist, of whom we are told (Luke 1:80) that “the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and he was in the desert until the day of his manifestation to Israel”? Such presumptuous words show that they who speak them are carnal men, who reckon as folly what is of the spirit of God. St. Ambrose says, in his commentary on the Gospel of Luke, “The Holy Spirit is not limited to age, nor extinguished by death, nor shut out by the womb.” St. Gregory, in his Homilia Pentecostes, likewise says, “He fills the harp-playing youth, and makes of him a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman who was uprooting a fig tree, and makes of him a Prophet: He fills the abstemious youth, and makes of him a venerable judge: He fills the fisherman, and makes of him a preacher: He fills the persecutor, and makes of him a teacher of the nations; He fills the publican, and makes of him an Evangelist.” I will further quote the words of St. Paul (1 Cor 3:18), “If any man among you seems to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may become wise.” For he who is a fool in the wisdom of this world (which is folly in the sight of God) is no fool in the wisdom of God. The book of Proverbs (1:22), speaking to children, says, “O children, how long will you love childishness? Give heed to my reproof. I will utter my words [Vul: spirit] to you.”

CHAPTER 14

Arguments Against the Perfection of Religious Whose Possessions Are Not in Common

WE must now examine how the adversaries of the religious life seek to withhold men from embracing it by decrying the perfection of this state, and especially the perfection of those religious whose possessions are not in common. In order to uphold their opinion they quote the following words from Prosper in his book, De vita contemplativa (XII. quaest. I), “We should possess the goods of the Church and, for the love of poverty, spurn our own possessions. The property of the Church is not private, but common. Therefore, anyone who has relinquished or sold his own belongings despises private property; but, when he is set over a Church, he becomes the administrator of all the possessions of that Church. St. Paulinus, as is well known, sold his large property and gave the effects to the poor; but, when he became Bishop, far from despising the possessions of his Church, he administered them with the utmost fidelity. This fact is sufficient evidence that we ought to relinquish our private belongings, on account of the imperfection attaching to them, but that it is quite possible (without any detriment to poverty), to possess ecclesiastical property, which is common.” Hence, our adversaries draw the conclusion that it is imperfect not to hold common property.

They maintain their opinion by quoting the example of several Saints. Thus Gregory, with his money, built one monastery within the walls of Rome and six in Sicily. St. Benedict, that perfect guide of religious, accepted large donations for his monastery; and many other men, who have been zealous for evangelical perfection, have acted like manner. These great men, who were zealous seekers after evangelical perfection, would certainly not have pursued such a course, had the possession of goods in common been in any degree inconsistent with Apostolic and Evangelical perfection. Our opponents draw from this argument the further conclusion that those who possess nothing are not, therefore, the most perfect; and they add that the Apostles, whom our Lord commanded to possess nothing and to take nothing with them on their way, did nevertheless hold certain possessions in time of necessity. Hence, commenting on the words of Luke, “But now, he who has a purse let him take it, and likewise a bag,” the Gloss says that “now, when the hour of death was at hand, and the whole nation were in pursuit of the shepherd and the flock, Christ gave a rule befitting the occasion, allowing them to take what was necessary for the support of life.”

It is also argued that Christ Himself instituted the order of His disciples, whose successors, the bishops, and clerics, have property. Religious orders, on the other hand, whose members live in poverty without possessions, were formed by men. Now what Christ has instituted must be most perfect. Therefore it is more perfect to hold goods in common than to live without property. Our opponents likewise (incredible though it may appear) contend that the perfection taught by Christ has been in abeyance from the Apostolic times until now; and that it is in our days that certain orders have begun to live without possessing anything in common. The conclusion drawn from this proposition is that the absence of common property does not pertain to Evangelical perfection.

Another argument, brought forward by the enemies of the religious life, is that those who, after the time of the Apostles, held no goods in common, lived as did the Fathers of the desert, by the work of their hands. Therefore, they say, those who neither possess common property, nor live by their manual labour do not practise Evangelical perfection. They likewise hold that the counsel of renouncing wealth was given as a means whereby to free our minds from worldly care, as we learn from Luke 12:22, “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat,” and from St. Paul’s first Epistle to the Corinthians (7:32), “But I would have you be without solicitude.” Now they who have not sufficient property to provide them with the necessities of life are more disturbed by anxiety than those who hold certain possessions in common. Therefore the absence of common property is an obstacle to Evangelical perfection. It is further maintained that religious who possess nothing are compelled to busy themselves in the affairs of those who supply their necessities, and that this solicitude about temporal matters militates against Evangelical perfection. Therefore they who possess nothing are beset by impediments in the way of perfection. Finally, the adversaries of religious poverty say that it is impossible for anyone to possess nothing in common; for all must have food and clothing, which they could not obtain if they had no property. These are the arguments brought against the perfection of those who own no common property.

CHAPTER 15

Refutation of the Errors Quoted in the Last Chapter

WE must remember that the enemies of poverty impugn, not only the teaching, but the life of our Lord. Christ has taught us both by word and example to observe poverty in all things. St. Paul tells us (2 Cor 8:9), “that being rich, He became poor for our sakes.” The Gloss, commenting on these words, says that “He took poverty upon Himself, although He did not lose His riches. Interiorly He was rich, exteriorly He was poor. He concealed the treasure of His Godhead, and revealed the poverty of His Manhood.” Hence those who follow Christ in poverty acquire great dignity, as we shall presently show. “Therefore (the Gloss concludes) let no one despise Him who, though poor in His dwelling, was rich in conscience. If we consider His life, from His first entry into the world, we shall see that He chose a poor maiden for His Mother, and willed to be needy and in want, and to have for His birthplace the poorest of poor cities. The stable is a monument of His poverty, as we are reminded in a certain address delivered at one of the synods of the Council of Ephesus.” “See (we quote part of this address) the most humble dwelling of Him who enriches Heaven. A crib suffices Him who sits above the Cherubim; and He who has joined the sea to the dry land is Himself swathed in swaddling bands. Mark His poverty here below; consider the abundance of His riches above.” But if Christ, as St. Paul says, had not become poor for our sakes, not for His own, could He not have chosen a wealthy mother and might He not have been born in His own house? If the abnegation of earthly possessions is of no account in Christian perfection, why should our Lord have deprived

Himself even of a home? Therefore, let the enemies of poverty blush and be silent, while the glory of this virtue radiates from the crib of Christ.

But, lest we may imagine that in his more mature years our Lord abandoned the povert y which He bore in childhood, let us consider His own words. “The Son of man,” He said, “has nowhere to lay His head (Mt 8:20). St. Jerome makes the following comment on this text: “Christ spoke thus, as if to say, ‘Why should you desire to follow me for the sake of gaining worldly pomp and riches, since my poverty is so extreme that I have no dwelling of mine own, and since the roof under which I sleep belongs not to me?” And St. Chrysostom, writing on the same subject, says, “Observe how our Lord exemplifies in His deeds the poverty which He taught by His words. He had neither table nor lantern nor house nor any such thing,” And this poverty which He preached both by word and deed belongs to perfection. Thus we see that the entire abnegation of all earthly possessions forms part of the perfection of the Christian life.

We find a further proof of the poverty practised by our Lord in the words which He spoke to St. Peter concerning the tribute money, “Go to the sea, and cast in a hook: and the fish which shall first come up, take; and when you open its mouth you shall find a coin; take it and give it to them for me and for you” (Mt 17:26). In his exposition of this text, St. Jerome says: “These words, understood simply, edify the hearer, showing as they do that the Lord was so poor that He had not nothing with which to pay tribute for Himself and His Apostle.”

But, someone may object, how then could Judas carry money in his purse? We answer that our Lord considered it criminal to use the money intended for the poor for His own purposes and that, in this, He has left us an example. But it is clear, and cannot be called in question by any Christian, that Christ practised the most sublime perfection in the tenor of His life, and therefore He taught the perfection of poverty. “If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have and give to the poor, and come, follow me.” These words, according to St. Jerome, contain the highest rule of perfection. Therefore it is the perfection of poverty for men, after the example of Christ, to be destitute of all possessions and only to reserve something for the poor, especially for those dependent upon them, Thus our Lord took care of His disciples who had made themselves poor for His sake, reserving for their sustenance something from the things which were given Him.

But among all that Christ did and suffered during His mortal life, the example of His most holy Cross is, above all other things, proposed to Christians for their imitation. He Himself says, “If anyone would come after Me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow me” (Mt 16:24). St. Paul also, speaking as though crucified with Christ, and exulting only in His Cross, says (Gal 6:17), “I bear the marks of the Lord Jesus in my body,” being a diligent follower of the example of the Cross. Now among all that is conspicuous in the Cross, poverty is everywhere apparent. So utter, indeed, was the destitution of our Lord upon the Cross that He suffered even bodily nakedness and exclaims in the person of the Psalmist (21:19), “ They parted my garments among them, and upon my vesture they cast lots.” Now men imitate this nakedness of the Cross by voluntary poverty, especially when they renounce the revenues of their possessions. Thus St. Jerome, writing to the priest Paulinus, says, “Now that you have heard the counsel of our Saviour: ‘If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have and give to the poor and come, follow Me,’ put His words into practice and, stripped of all things, follow the nakedness of the Cross. So shall you more easily and more speedily scale Jacob’s ladder.” A little further on, he adds, “It is no great thing for a man to wear a sad and pallid countenance, to make a display of fasting, and to wear a beggarly cloak if, at the same time, he draws a princely income from his property.” Hence we see how truly those are enemies of the Cross of Christ who impugn poverty and, savouring earthly things, deem that material possessions tend to Christian perfection, and that the abnegation of such possessions detracts from such perfection.

Now that we have considered certain points in the life of Christ, in His birth, in His manhood, and in His death upon the Cross, let us proceed to reflect upon His teaching. In the instruction which He gave both to His disciples and to the multitudes, He began with poverty as a foundation, “Blessed are the poor in spirit” (Mt 5:3). St Jerome explains these words as follows: “By the poor in spirit are to be understood they who, by the grace of the Holy Spirit, have the will to be poor.” As St. Ambrose says, on the Gospel of Luke, “Both Evangelists mention the beatitude of poverty in the first place. And indeed poverty is the first in order of virtues, and the mother and producer of all others. For he who spurns earthly riches shall merit such as are eternal, neither can he deserve to receive the reward of the Kingdom of Heaven, who is possessed by the spirit of covetousness.”

St. Basil further shows us in these words what is specially meant by poverty of spirit: “Blessed is he who is poor as a true disciple of Christ, who bore poverty for us. For the Lord Himself accomplished every work that leads to perfection, giving Himself as an example to those who will learn of Him,” Now we never read that Christ owned any possessions. Therefore poverty is no hindrance to the perfection of those who desire to renounce what they possess, for the love of Christ; on the contrary such povtrty greatly increases their perfection. Hence, when our Lord was sending forth His twelve chosen Apostles to preach, and when He had given them the power to perform miracles, He impressed upon them, as their first rule of life, the exercise of poverty, saying, “Do not possess gold nor silver, nor money in your purses, nor bag for your journey” (Mt 10:9). Thus, as Eusebius of Caesaraea says, “He forbade them the present use of gold, silver or brass, and also solicitude for their future needs. For he know that they who were to be healed by the Apostles and delivered by them from the violence of their passions would share their goods with them.” Eusebius further adds that “our Lord judged it fitting that they who were attracted by heavenly riches should despise earthly junk and should possess neither gold, nor silver nor any other property valued by men, but should esteem the heavenly treasures they were endowed with, as worth more then all such things. Therefore He made them soldiers of the Kingdom of Heaven, and told them to cherish poverty.”

“No soldier of God who desires to please Him entangles himself in the affairs of this life.” St. Jerome, commenting on the Gospel of St. Matthew, says, “He who, in the foregoing words, had forbidden the Apostles to possess riches, now almost prohibits them from providing themselves with the necessities of life, in order that they, the teachers of true religion, who were trained to believe that all things were ordered by the Providence of God, should show that they themselves took no thought for the morrow.” Again, St. Chrysostom, writing on the Gospel of St. Matthew, observes, “Our Lord, by this precept, first frees his disciples from bondage to riches; secondly, He delivers them from all solicitude, in order that they may give their entire attention to the word of God; thirdly, He teaches them His virtue. Thus then the precepts of the Gospel point out to us what manner of man he ought to be who preaches the Kingdom of God. He ought to be one who seeks not the support of material assistance, but, relying entirely on his Faith, reflects that the less he strives after these material things, the more God can supply him with them.” St. Ambrose speaks, in his commentary on the Gospel of St. Luke, has this to say: “It is evident that if the Apostles had accepted property, they would have been not less, but far more open to suspicion than if they had owned gold and silver; for it would have been thought that they preached for the sake of what they could gain. They would likewise have been far more occupied with anxiety about the cultivation of their fields. For land or vineyards are a far greater source of material profit than are moveable chattels.”

It is evident then from these expositions that the Apostles were forbidden to possess lands, vineyards or any other fixed property. But who, save a heretic, would say that the first instruction of the disciples, given them by Christ Himself, was contrary to the principles of evangelical perfection? They therefore who say that it is less perfect for religious orders to be destitute of common property are falsifying the doctrineof the Faith.

But we must finally consider in what manner these precepts of our Lord were observed by the Apostles. For, as St. Augustine says in his book Contra mendacium: “Holy Scripture contains not only the divine precepts, but also the life and conduct of the just; in order that if, by any chance, we may be uncertain how some commandment is to be understood, we may be enlightened by studying the example of holy men.” Now we know that before the Passion the Apostles possessed nothing and carried no provision on their journeys. Luke (22: 35) reports that our Lord said to them, “When I sent you without purse, or bag or shoes, did you want anything? They said, ‘nothing’.” Immediately afterwards, however, “Then said He unto them, ‘But now he who has a purse, let him take it, and likewise a bag.” It might appear as if Christ, in these words, entirely rescinded His former precept; but the dispensation was only a temporary one, granted on account of impending persecution. Venerable Bede says, “He does not govern His disciples by the same rule in the time of persecution and in the time of peace. When He sent them to preach, He forbad them to take anything with them on the way; for it was His ordinance that those who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel. When, however, the danger of death was imminent, and the whole nation was persecuting the Shepherd and the flock, He gave His disciples a rule befitting the time, allowing them to provide themselves with the necessities of life, until such time as the fury of their persecutors should be appeased, and a convenient season for preaching the Gospel should return. Hereby He also teaches us that for certain just causes, we may, without sin, somewhat relax the severity of our customary exercises." We also see that absolute renunciation of earthly possessions forms part of the rigour of evangelical discipline.

If we enquire as to the manner in which, after the Passion, the Apostles observed this precept, and how they taught their successors to keep it, we shall find information in the fourth Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles, where we read, "And the multitude of belibvers had but one heart and one soul: neither did any one say that any of the things he possessed was his own , but all things were common to them." It cannot be held that they possessed common property, such as lands or vineyards or anything of the kind, for in the same chapter of the Acts we read, "For as many as were owners of lands or houses, sold them, and brought he price of the things they sold, and laid it down at the feet of the Apostles." It is thus made clear that the rule of the evangelical life was that the necessities of life were possessed in common, and that property was absolutely resigned by its owners. St. Augustine points out in De doctrina christiana that this practice is conducive to the highest perfection. "The believers among the Jewish nation," he says; "who formed the first Church, that of Jerusalem, proved most abundantly how advantageous it was for them to have grown up under the school master, viz., the Law. For they were so evidently under the influence of the Holy Spirit that they sold all their possessions, and laid the price at the feet of the Apostles to be distributed among the poor. We do not (he continues) find the same fact noted of any Church of the Gentiles; for they who had worshipped false gods, made by hands, were not found so open to the Holy Spirit."

Pope Melchiades, however, assigns a different reason for the same fact. In XII, quaest. 1 he says, "The Apostles, foreseeing that the future Church would be founded among the Gentiles, did not acquire much property from the Jews, but only money for the sustenance of the needy. Now however, amidst much storm and stress, the Church gradually acquired a footing in the world, and it came to pass that not only entire nations, but even the Roman emperors, the rulers of the whole earth, flocked to profess the Faith of Christ and to receive Baptism. Constantine, that most religious prince, was the first to give permission not only for his subjects to become Christians, but also for Churches to be erected; and he ordained that certain land should be given up to this purpose.” In the following chapter, Pope Urban says, “The High Priests and Levites and others and the rest of the faithful saw that it would be more profitable if the bishops were to make over to the churches which they governed te lands and other property which was customarily sold. By means of the charges on these estates, the Bishops would be able, both at the present time and in the future, to provide more abundantly and conveniently for the needs of the faithful, living a common life, than they could have done by the sums realised from the sale of the property. Therefore they began to assign to the mother churches the landed property which they had hitherto sold; and they lived on the income derived from it.”

Hence we see that it is better to have land in common, rather than chattels which can be sold to procure the necessities of life. Land was sold in the primitive Church, not because the Apostles esteemed that to be the best course, but because they foresaw that the Church would have no permanence among the Jews, partly on account of their infidelity, and partly because of the ruin which was to overwhelm their nation. The apparent inconsistency of these arrangements disappears, when we attentively consider the state of the case. For, in the early days of the Chutch, all her members were as holy as the most perfect of her children in later days. Therefore the Church had, in the order both of nature and of grace, to lay her foundations among the perfect; and consequently the Apostles ordained a mode of life consonant with perfection. St. Jerome, in his book De illustribus viris, says, “It seems as if at first the Church of believers had been of the standard that monks now endeavour and strive to reach. Nothing was the private property of anyone; among them were no rich nor poor; patrimonies were divided among the needy; and men devoted themselves to prayer, to perfect doctrine, and to continence.” This perfect mode of life was practised among the primitive believers not only in Judaea under the Apostle, but also in Egypt under St. Mark the Evangelist. This we learn from St. Jerome and also from Book II of the Ecclesiastical History.

In process of time, however, many were to enter the Church who would not live up to this standard of perfection. This was not to the case before the dispersion of the Jews, but afterwards, when the Church was disseminated among the Gentiles. When this state of things came to pass, the prelates of the Churches judged that landed property might advantageously be bestowed upon the churches, and this not as before, for the sake of the perfect, but on account of the weaker brethren who could not attain to the perfection of the earlier Christians. But there were, nevertheless, both at that time and later, certain men who were zealous for primitive perfection and who, like the monks of Egypt, gathered themselves into congregations and renounced all possessions. St. Gregory (III Dial.) mentions a certain holy Isaac who, coming from Syria into Italy, practised in the West the perfection which he had learned in the East. His disciples would frequently humbly beseech him to accept, for the use of the monastery, the property offered to him; but, anxious to preserve his property inviolate, he made the decisive reply that "a monk seeking earthly possessions is no monk." This saying cannot be understood to refer to private property, since we are told that what was offered to Isaac, was pressed on him for the use of his monastery. Neither is it to be inferred that all monks who hold possessions in common are deficient in religious perfection. The words of Isaac were instigated by his fear of his failing in the virtue of poverty, a danger which threatens many religious who own property in common. For, as St. Jerome says in his epitaph on Nepotian to the Bishop Hehodorus, "Some men are richer as religious than they were as laymen. Now that they belong to Christ the Poor, they own wealth which they never possessed when they belonged to Satan the opulent; and the Church mourns over the riches of those whom the world formerly regarded as beggars." Hence St. Gregory, speaking of St. Isaac, says, "He feared to lose the treasure of his poverty, just as a miser fears to lose his hoard of perishable wealth, and the Lord, to manifest his holiness, has glorified him." For, as St. Gregory tells us farther on, "he became known far and wide for his spirit of prophecy and his great gift of miracles." Hence it is evident that the absence of any possessions, either common or private, is for some men the path to sublime perfection.

We shall understand this more clearly, if we examine the motive underlying the counsels pertaining to evangelical perfection. These counsels are given in order that by their means men may be delivered from earthly solicitude, and thus be more free to serve God. St. Paul tells us as much, when he gives the council concerning virginity, "He who is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he who is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife, and he is divided" (1 Cor 7:32). Hence we we that the more any course of action delivers us from worldly anxiety, so much the more does it pertain to evangelical perfection. Now it is clear that the possession of wealth and property distracts the soul from divine things, for, to use our Lord's, simile, "He who received the seed among thorns is he who hears the word, and the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches chokes up the word and he becomes fruitless" (Mt 13:18). St. Jerome's commentary on these words runs as follows: "Riches ate flatterers, promising one thing and doing another. Their possession is most uncertain: for when they are carried here and there and seem likely to endure, they desert their owners or rejoice those who previously possessed them not."

The same thing is taught us in the parable of the supper (Luke 14:18), where one of the invited guests is represented as excusing himself from attendance by the words, "I have bought a farm, and I must go out and see it." "What," asks St, Gregory, "are we to understand by this farm except material possessions? That man then goes out to we his farm who thinks of nothing but exterior things." At the end of the parable the master of the supper says to his servants, "Bring in here the poor and the feeble." Commenting on which, St. Ambrose observes that "he who lacks the enjoyments of sin, sins more rarely; and he who has no worldly pleasures is more easily converted to God." Thus we see that the entire absence of property and wealth of any kind leads to evangelical perfection. St. Augustine likewise says in his book De verbis Domini, "The little ones of Christ are those who have renounced all things and have followed Him, All that they had, they have given to the poor, in order to serve God free from any earthly tie. Being thus delivered from the burdens of the world, they soar upwards as if on wings. They are little because they are humble; but weigh them, and you will find them very heavy." Now no sane person can say that the care of common property is not a worldly care. Therefore, it adds to their perfection when men serve God freed from such shackles.

Hence we see that those who teach that the renunciation of common property for the love of Christ does not pertain to perfection, are inculcating a most dangerous error, and spreading an opinion completely at variance with Christian doctrine. The Gloss on the verse of Psalm 6, "Let them be turned back, and shamed very speedily,” says, “This fate does not befall the sinner in this world where, on the contrary, the workers of iniquity mock and put to the blush the little ones of Christ who have renounced all things for his sake.” Rather do the following words of Psalm 13:6 seem to apply to them: “You have confounded the counsel of the poor man, but the Lord is his hope.” The Gloss thus comments on this verse, “The needy is a member of Christ; and you have acted thus towards him because the Lord is his hope.” That very reason which ought to make you revere him only causes you so much the more to despise him. For what else do these men do save endeavour to contemn those who follow in its perfection the counsel of Christian poverty? And why do they despise them, except because their hope is established not in possessions, but in God?

CHAPTER 16

An Answer to the Arguments Which Are Brought Forward Against the Propositions Contained in the Preceding Chapter

AFTER what has been already premised, it will be easy to answer the objections of those who maintain an opinion contrary to ours, and who hold that it is expedient to own property in common. It is certainly well to do so, for the sake of those who are not capable of that height of perfection practised by the faithful of the early Church, among whom, however, the imperfect were not wholly neglected. Thus, although they who followed sublime perfection did not own any property, yet even our Lord, to whom the angels ministered, kept a purse for the necessities of others, and because His Church was to possess funds, as St. Augustine says in his commentary on St. John’s Gospel. Therefore, if there is any congregation of which every member aspires to the highest perfection, it is expedient for such a congregation to own no possessions.

When, in the next place, it is stated that St. Benedict received ample possessions during his lifetime, this only proves that the possession of common property does not make monastic perfection absolutely impossible. It is no proof whatsoever that it is not more perfect to renounce possessions altogether, especially as St. Benedict declares in his Rule, that he had, in condescension to the weakness of the monks of his time, mitigated in certain particulars the rigour of the monastic life as it was ordained by earlier Fathers. The same remark applies to St. Gregory, who built monasteries, according to the rule drawn up by St. Benedict.

The third argument, viz, that our Lord allowed His apostles to take with them in time of persecution purse and bag, tells rather against our opponents than for them. If, in the time of persecution the rule Was suspended, it proves that the ordinary rule was that the apostles should take with them neither purse nor bag. We do not read that in time of persecution the Apostles procured for themselves any possessions in common. Thus the argument of their conduct during persecution is irrelevant to our subject.

The fourth assertion, viz. that our Lord did not establish an order of men possessing nothing, but an order of prelates who owned certain property, is a distinct falsehood. For when our Lord taught His disciples to possess neither gold nor silver, lest their hearts should be weighed down by temporal anxieties; and when He promised to those who, for His sake should renounce lands and houses, a reward not only in the next world but in this life also, so that they should resemble the Apostles in “having nothing yet possessing all things,” He made it clear that all who should hereafter follow this rule would be obeying His ordinance. Those who follow the saints who have founded various orders are, in reality, imitating not those holy founders, but Christ, whose precepts they preach. Our adversaries are either deceived on another point, or else they try to mislead us. Christ did not establish an order of bishops, or other clerics who were to own property, either in common or individually. He established such an order, indeed, but established it in perfect poverty. Later on, however, possessions were accepted by the Church in order, as we have seen, to be distributed by her.

As for the fifth assertion, viz. that Christian perfection has been in abeyance from the time of the Apostles until our own days, it is certain, on the contrary that far from being in abeyance, Christian perfection has flourished vigorously, both in Egypt and in other parts of the world. No man can set limits to God, or say that He is to draw all men to Himself at the same time, or in the same place; rather, according to the wisdom whereby He disposes all things sweetly, He provides at divers seasons the aids to man’s salvation peculiarly befitting those times. Has Christian teaching failed from the days of the masters and the doctors, Athanasius, Basil, Ambrose, Augustine, and the rest, until our times, in which men are even better instructed than they formerly were in Christian doctrine? Is it, according to the views of out opponents, unlawful to set again in motion any good work which for a while has been interrupted? If such be the case, it would be unlawful to suffer martyrdom or to work miracles, since both these good works have, for a time, been in abeyance.

The sixth argument, viz. that those who possessed no common property used to live by the work of their hands, is a calumny against others as well against religious; for the Apostle who preached the Gospel maintained himself by manual labour. Is it a sin, then, for Bishops, Archdeacons and all who are officially bound to preach the Gospel not to live by the work of their hands? If they are not bound thus to maintain themselves, because Stl Paul laboured not out of necessity, but as a work of supererogation, why should that work be enforced upon religious, which was onlly supererogatory with the holy Fathers? No one can fulfil all works of supererogation; for one thing is superfluous in one man, and another in another man. But, granted that it is not supererogatory, but necessary that they who own no common property should live by the work of their hands, that necessity only extends to such labour as may prevent idleness. But idleness is prevented, not only by manual labour, but far more,by the study of Holy Scripture; such idleness performs a great work, as St. Augustine says. And the Gloss on the words of Ps 48, “My eyes have failed” etc., says, “He is not idle who only studies the word of God; neither does he accomplish more who performs external work than he who exercises himself in the knowledge of divinity. For wisdom is of all works the greatest.”

Idleness is also prevented by the warfare which we wage against the enemies of the Faith, according to St. Paul’s injunction: “Labour like a good soldier of Jesus Christ (2 Tim 2:3). This the Gloss interprets to mean the preaching of the Gospel against the enemies of the Faith. This I acknowledge to be a necessary work, for those who have not otherwise a means of subsistence. For it is lawful for all preachers of the Gospel, even Monks, to live by the Gospel and by their ministry at the Altar. St. Augustine in De opere monachorum asks whether it is permissible for Monks to have any common property, save what they gain by their own labour. Is it not ridiculous to say that religious may receive large possessions as alms, and yet may not accept donations to provide for their simple daily needs? Therefore no necessity constrains those who do not possess common property to labour with their hands. We have, however, elsewhere spoken more fully on this point.

The seventh argument deserves ridicule, rather than reply. For, who does not see that the task of heaping up riches—a task which seculars can barely achieve—involves far more anxiety of mind than that of merely procuring from the charity of the faithful and the mercy of God a simple, daily provision for the necessities of life.

As for the eighth argument, viz. that religious must occupy themselves about the affairs of those who minister to them, I acknowledge that this is true. But the affairs about which they must be busied are such as concern the spiritual welfare of their benefactors, or their consolation when they are in trouble. Such solicitude is a work of charity by no means incompatible with religion. For, as St. James says, "Religion pure and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the orphan and the widow in their tribulation" (1:27).

The last argument is absolutely worthless. For the things used by religious for their support are not absolutely their own property or under their own control, but are ministered to them for their necessities by those who have the management of such things.

This is all that occurs to me at present to write against the pernicious end erroneous teaching which deters some men from entering religious life. If any man desires to contradict my words, let him not do so by chattering before boys but let him write and publish his writings, so that intelligent persons may judge what is true, and may be able to confute what is false by the authority of the Truth,

THE END

THE BREAD OF LIFE

OR SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE ADORABLE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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ARRANGED AS MEDITATIONS WITH Prayers and Thanksgivings for Holy Communion,

BY FATHER RAWES, D.D.

‘They shall live upon wheat, and they shall blossom like a vine.’ Osee 14:8.

LONDON: BURNS AND OATES.

1879.

WITH ADORATION AND LOVE AND UTTERMOST WORSHIP I LAY This Book AT THE FEET OF JESUS IN THE BLESSED SACRAMENT, THE WORD MADE FLESH DWELLING IN THE INACCESSIBLE LIGHT.

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THE BREAD OF LIFE: OR SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE ADORABLE SACRAMENT OF THE ALTAR

‘To THE REV. FATHER RAWES, S.T.D.

‘My dear Father,—When you founded the Confraternity of the Servants of the Holy Ghost a little more than two years ago, I felt a lively sense of joy and thankfulness. It was the embodiment of a devotion to which for more than thirty years I owe the chief blessings and graces of my life.

‘I see it now reorganised and blessed by the Vicar of Jesus Christ, and founded in an Archconfraternity in the Church of the Oblates of St. Charles. I rejoice all the more in this because I believe that devotion to the Holy Ghost ought to be the special devotion of priests. We are consecrated and anointed by Him. The grace that is in us by the imposition of hands is infused by Him, and our whole priestly and pastoral work depends on Him. If by His indwelling we are spiritual and supernatural, we shall draw souls to Him by His own light and power. If we are natural and external, or merely logical and learned, we shall be praised and followed by the world, and thereby have our reward. St. Gregory the Great says, “Nemo docenti homini tribuat quod ex ore docentis intelligit, quia nisi interius sit qui doceat doctoris lingua exterius in vacuum laborat.”

‘I am also greatly rejoiced to see your scheme for a “Library of the Holy Ghost.” For many years I have sought out all the writings and treatises I could find on this great subject, which, as it pervades the preaching and writing of the Apostles, so it is to be found with singular fulness in the Fathers and in the Saints of the Church.

‘My two poor books on the Temporal and Internal Mission of the Holy Ghost were written with the hope and prayer that they might rouse some of you to carry on more worthily what I had slightly begun. Your Library will, I hope, more than fulfil this desire.

‘May God give you many years to serve Him fervently in the light and the love of the Holy Ghost.—Believe me always, my dear Father, yours affectionately in Jesus Christ,

‘HENRY EDWARD,

Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster.
‘Archbishop’s House, Whitsuntide, 1879.’

PREFACE

TO THE SERVANTS OF THE HOLY GHOST

THERE is a very beautiful treatise of St. Thomas Aquinas on the adorable Sacrament of the Altar. It is hard to know which to admire more, the fulness and precision of its arrangement, or the way in which he brings in the words of the Holy Ghost from the Sacred Scriptures. From this treatise, and nearly always in its very words, I have arranged these Meditations for the Servants of the Holy Ghost. In fact, all that was needed was to number or letter the divisions of the book so that they could be easily seen. The prayers and thanksgivings I have added. I have put the teaching of the Saint by itself, and the words of the Holy Ghost by themselves. In this I have only carried out what St. Thomas has himself done in the treatise. For the more part he has, after stating and explaining his points, put the texts by themselves, referring to the first point, the second point, the third point, and so on. Putting them all together, therefore, is only carrying out what this Angelic Saint has done.

It will be always easy to see to what parts of the Meditations the texts refer, as they are marked with corresponding letters and figures. You must observe, however, that there are some divisions in the Meditations in which no texts are found. In this case, of course, you will not find the corresponding letters or figures among the texts.

This arrangement makes the treatise very easy to use as Meditations. Besides, I have made this book for the Servants of the Holy Ghost; and my one hope is that it may bring their souls nearer to God, and make them dearer to Him. Therefore I have called these texts, as they stand by themselves, ‘The Voice of the Holy Ghost.’ This is a voice in which His

Servants will rejoice, and in which they will ever find sweetness and strength, refreshment and light and rest. He is our Sanctifier and Comforter, who makes us and keeps us the children of God. When you understand the Meditations clearly you will go on finding new meanings in the words of Scripture which bear upon them. You would then be able to make a great number of most fruitful meditations day by day from the texts alone. We do not half enough use the words of the Holy Ghost in the Scriptures of God. If you read those words in a spirit of obedience to the Vicar of Christ and in the light of the Holy Ghost, whom you love, you will find in them untold heights and depths of meaning. They are practically inexhaustible, being 'ever ancient and ever new,' like God Himself. They are very bright with the finger of Him who spake by the Prophets. By themselves they seem to come to us with more of the power of God; with more of His light and more of His love. They are the former and latter rain of which the Prophet speaks: the dew of the light; a sea of the wisdom of God, in which our spirits are steeped. Call to mind the way in which the Saints have always loved and adored the words of the Holy Ghost in the Scriptures. St. Charles had a very great love and reverence for the Scriptures of God. For the last six years of his life he always read them on his bare knees and with uncovered head.

Acts of love and praise are left to yourselves, that you may make them out of your own hearts, by the help of the Spirit of God. You will see how He will teach you, if only you will let Him.

I have taken this wonderful little book of St. Thomas on the venerable Sacrament of the Altar for the first Volume of our 'Library of the Holy Ghost,' because the most adorable Sacrament of the Altar is part of the greatest work of the Holy Ghost. It is not that the Incarnation is His greatest work, and the Blessed Sacrament His next greatest. They are two parts of the greatest work that He has ever wrought. The mystery of the Tabernacle is a continuation of the mystery which St. John revealed when he said, 'The Word was made flesh.' The Holy Ghost, who overshadowed the Mother of God in Nazareth, overshadows the Tabernacle of God from the rising to the setting of the sun. Let all the Servants of the Holy Ghost strive, with ceaseless prayer, to have an ever-increasing love for the Heart of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament, and let them give an ever-growing adoration to that Heart of God. Jesus is truly God and truly man: God in His Divine nature, and man in His assumed human nature. But He is only one Person—the

Eternal Word, the Only-begotten Son of the Father. Therefore, as the Council of Ephesus teaches us to do, with one supplication we worship Emmanuel, that is, God with us in our nature; and we give Him one glory, because the Word was made flesh. We are also taught by the fifth Œcumenical Synod not so to adore Christ in His two natures as to bring in two adorations—one to the Godhead separately and one to the manhood separately; not in any way to confuse the Godhead and the manhood; but with one adoration to adore God, the Word Incarnate, with His Flesh, as the Holy Church has handed down from the beginning. Thus in the light of the Holy Ghost we adore the Heart of Jesus.

It may be fanciful; but it seems to me that the way in which St. Thomas’s reasons fall into threes is a wonderful sign and token that the Sacrament of the Altar is the work of the Blessed Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Even in the natural order we see something like this; as, for instance, in light. The Servants of the Holy Ghost will also see and bear in mind that there are seven great divisions of this book.

You will also observe how wonderfully St. Thomas illustrates our Sacrifice and our Sacraments by the Sacrifices and Sacraments of the Law. By his words about these things I feel sure that a flood of light will be poured for you on the Tabernacle and the Altar. I know, at any rate, that it has been so for myself; and I hope, therefore, that it will be so for other Servants of the Holy Ghost. God is one, and His works are one also, in a true sense. They are like the steps of Jacob’s ladder. From the offerings of Israel according to the flesh we learn lessons of Heaven, about the conquerors of the kingdom of the Spirit, and about the strength of the true Israel of God.

The kingdom of God, as St. Paul tells us, is justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost; and he tells us also that the fruit of the light is in all goodness and justice and truth. O Servants of the Holy Ghost, walk as children of the light, and live with Jesus in the adorable Sacrament of the Altar; for Jesus is the Light of the world.

May the Holy Ghost bless this book to your souls in love, joy, and peace, enriching you with all spiritual blessings, and giving you much grace from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ.

THE BREAD OF LIFE

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, ANGELIC DOCTOR, PRAY FOR US WHO LOVE TO LEARN ABOUT JESUS FROM THEE

PART I

THE FIRST CHIEF POINT TO BE NOTED IS THE REASON WHY OUR LORD HAS GIVEN US THIS HOLY SACRAMENT

I

About the three reasons for the institution of the Sacrament of the Body of Christ

a. JESUS invites us to His banquet, in which He has made ready most precious food, namely, His own Body and Blood. A holy secret is the Sacrament of the Altar, not known to unbelievers, but revealed to the faithful.

b. There are three reasons for the institution of the Blessed Sacrament: A, the memory of our Saviour; B, the Sacrifice of the Altar; C, the food of man.

In the Holy Sacrament the wisdom of God has given us these three things as remedies for the three ancient evils: 1, forgetfulness of God; 2, the debt that is on us because we took that which was another's; 3, the corruptions of the death-bringing apple. Into these three evils our first parents fell, being led astray by the wiles of the devil, and by these evils their children have been much changed for the worse.

c. When our Lord says, 'Do this in remembrance of Me,' we have the first reason, namely, that we may not forget our Saviour. When He says, 'which is given for you,' He tells us of the Sacrifice of the Lamb of God, and thus the Sacrifice of the Altar is offered against our robbery. When He says, 'Take and eat,' He tells us of the Food that is the medicine against corruption.

A. There is the remembrance of our Saviour. We often draw away our minds and all our senses from God, and wander far from Him, by bad thoughts and wrong pleasures, but by the grace of this holy Sacrament we must turn our thoughts from all that is evil and give ourselves altogether to God. Eusebius says, 'Since our Lord was going to take His assumed body from our sight it was needful that on the day of the Last Supper He should consecrate for us the Sacrament of His Body and Blood, that He might be always offered in a mystery who once was offered as a price, and that the deathless Victim might live in memory and be always present in grace.’

N. There are three signs of His love to keep His memory fresh in our hearts: 1, the forgiveness of our sins; 2, the redemption of those in bondage; 3, the ceaselessness of His kindness.

B. There is the Sacrifice of the Altar, which is offered against what we may call the daily robbery of our sins, that as our Lord’s Body was once offered on the Cross for the original debt, so it may be offered ceaselessly on the altar for our daily sins; and that in this the Church may have a gift for appeasing God far more precious and acceptable than all the sacrifices of the law. Pope Alexander says, ‘Nothing in the sacrifices of the Church can be greater than the Body and Blood of Christ. This is before all oblations. It must be offered to God with a pure conscience and taken with a pure mind. As it is greater than all sacrifices, so it is more adorable.’

N. To show the greatness of this Sacrifice, we mark three reasons for changing the ancient sacrifice: 1, the power of the Author of our Sacrifice; 2, the greatness of our debt; 3, the insufficiency of the sacrifices of the law.

1. Jesus is not only Lord and King of the whole earth, but also our High Priest after the order of Melchisedech. As the Priesthood is translated to Him, He has power to change the Sacrifice into what is better, and it is fitting that He should do so.

2. Next there is our great need. So heavy was the debt of our first parents, from the greatness of the theft, from the ingratitude of the stealer, from the majesty of their outraged Maker, that not only the sacrifices of the law, but even the whole world with every creature could not make satisfaction.

3. Then there is the weakness of the sacrifices of the law. This is shown by three things: a, they could not please God; b, they could not take away sin; c, they could not give grace.

C. There is the food of man: and this is the medicinal Food against the corruptions of the death-bringing apple. Now this corruption, brought by Adam and Eve on the human race, was so deep-seated that it would have been incurable but for that wondrous medicine which only the wisdom of God could make. St. Ambrose says, ‘The Body of Christ is that spiritual medicine which, tasted with reverence, purifies those that are devoted to it.’

1. To understand the need of this medicine, bear in mind that the serpent, by the poison of the forbidden fruit, brought on man a threefold corruption: a, the darkness of ignorance in his soul; b, the disease of evil desires in his body; c, death for both. But the medicine of the Body of Christ: a, lightens our darkness; b, heals the evils of desire; c, destroys death in us.

2. Hence it may be likened to three kinds of food, sweet and medicinal: a, to honey; b, to a fig; c, to the fruit of the tree of life. Honey signifies the sweet Body of Jesus; the figs twice mentioned also signify the sweet Body of Him who is God and man. With a lump of figs the prophet Isaias healed King Ezechias of a boil, which represents carnal desire. The lump of figs is the Body of our Lord, having in it the sweetness of many goods as a remedy for all bad desires. This Body, the fruit of the tree of life, is powerful to save us from hell and bring us to Heaven. St. Hilary says, ‘When we have eaten the Flesh of the Lord and drunk His Blood, then we are in Him and He in us. Christ dwelling by His Flesh in our bodies is the cause of our life, for He truly is life. We shall live by Him, as He lives by the Father, who is in Him.’

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About the Blessed Sacrament; Come eat of My bread, and drink of the wine that I have mingled for you. Prov. 9:5.

a. Treat thy cause with a friend, and discover not the secret to a stranger. Prov. 25:9.

b. Three evils; 1. Forgetfulness of God; The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God; because his heart is departed from Him. Ecclus. 10:14.

2. The robbery; The woman saw that the tree was good to eat and fair to the eyes and delightful to behold; and she took of the fruit thereof and did eat, and gave to her husband, who did eat. Gen. 3:6.

3. The corruption; Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat; for in what day soever thou shalt eat of it thou shalt die the death. Gen. 2:17.

They are corrupt and become abominable in their ways. Ps. 13:1.

c. Never did man speak like this Man. St. John 7:46.

A. The remembrance of our Saviour; Taking bread, He gave thanks and brake and gave to them, saying, This is My Body which is given for you. Do this for a commemoration of Me. In like manner the chalice also after

He had supped, saying, This is the chalice; the new testament in My Blood which shall be shed for you. St. Luke 22:19, 20.

N. Three signs of His love; 1. The forgiveness of sins; I am He that blots out thine iniquities, for My own sake, and I will not remember thy sins. Is. 43:25.

2. Deliverance from bondage; Forget not the kindness of thy surety; for He hath given His life for thee. Ecclus. 29:19.

Open to Me, My sister, My love, My dove, My undefiled, for My head is full of dew, and My locks of the drops of the night. Cantic. 5:2.

I am the good Shepherd. The good Shepherd giveth His life for the sheep. St. John 10:11.

3. God’s kindness; Take heed and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God and neglect His commandments … lest after thou hast eaten and art filled and shalt have plenty of all things, thy heart be lifted up and thou remember not the Lord thy God. Deut. 8:11–14.

B. The Sacrifice; The Sacrifice of Juda and Jerusalem shall please the Lord, as in the days of old and as in the ancient years. Mal. 3:4.

In every place there is Sacrifice, and there is offered to My name a clean oblation. Mal. 1:2.

N. Three reasons for changing Sacrifice; 1. Our Lord’s power; Thou art a Priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech. Ps. 109:4.

If then perfection were by the Levitical priesthood, for under it the people received the law, what further need was there that another Priest should rise according to the order of Melchisedech, and not be called according to the order of Aaron? For the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law. Heb. 7:11, 12.

2. The greatness of our debt; When He cometh into the world He saith, Sacrifice and oblation Thou wouldest not, but a body hast Thou fitted to Me. Heb. 10:5.

Then did I pay that which I took not away. Ps. 68:5.

3. Insufficiency of the legal sacrifices; a. They did not please God; Your whole burnt-offerings are not acceptable, nor are your sacrifices pleasing to Me. Jer. 6:20.

I desired mercy and not sacrifice, and the knowledge of God more than holocausts. Os. 6:6.

b. They did not take away sin; Holocausts for sin did not please Thee. Then said I, Behold, I come: in the head of the book it is written of Me that I should do Thy will, O God. Heb. 10:6, 7.

By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before Him; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. Rom. 3:20.

But knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, we also believe in Christ Jesus, that we may be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law; because by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified. Gal. 2:16.

It is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away. Heb. 10:4.

c. They did not give grace; I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live. Ezech. 20:25.

There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof. Heb. 7:18.

C. The food of man; The most High hath created medicines out of the earth, and a wise man will not abhor them. Ecclus. 38:4.

2. a. The Body of Jesus is sweet as honey; Eat honey, My son, because it is good, and the honeycomb most sweet to thy throat. Prov. 24:13.

You have seen yourselves that my eyes are enlightened because I tasted a little of the honey. 1 Kings 14:29.

Butter and honey shall every one eat that shall be left in the midst of the land. Is. 7:22.

b. It is also sweet as figs; The Lord said to me, What seest thou, Jeremias? And I said, Figs, the good figs, very good. Jer. 24:3.

Isaias said, Bring me a lump of figs; and when they had brought it and laid it upon his (Ezechias’) boil, he was healed. 4 Kings 20:7.

c. It is the fruit of life; She cried out with a loud voice, and said, Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb. St. Luke 1:42.

Blessed is the man that findeth Wisdom: … she is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her. Prov. 3:13, 18.

I will deliver them out of the hand of death: I will redeem them from death. O death, I will be thy death. O hell, I will be thy bite. Osee 13:14.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, help me to receive Jesus with love and reverence. Thou art my Teacher and my Sanctifier, and by Thee I live. Thou givest light and strength to my soul. Jesus, hidden in the Blessed Sacrament, is my Saviour and my God. I long to be with Him, that He may abide more in me and I in Him. He is the Bread of Life, the true Bread of God. I long to feed with adoration on that Living Bread. Be with me, O Blessed Spirit, as in this great light I draw near to the Altar, and give me always more faithfulness to Jesus and more love for Him.

II

About the first reason for the institution of the Holy Sacrament, that is, the remembrance of our Saviour

A. Our Lord instituted the Sacrament of the Altar that we may always remember Him. About this we must consider three things.

(1) First, there is the kind of evil that follows us, if we forget our Lord. That evil is threefold: 1, the loss of the grace of God; 2, subjection to the power of the devil; 3, the great hideousness of our guilt.

1. God hides His face; that is, we lose His grace. When the fountain ceases to flow, the river is dried up. Our souls become like deserts, because we forget God, our Maker.

2. We cease to be children of God, and become the children of the devil. He is a murderer from the beginning, and is always seeking to destroy us.

3. The guilt is often the guilt of mortal sin. We are spiritually dead, and are without God in the world.

(2) Next, we ask in what things we are to have the remembrance of our Saviour. As to this there are three things to be considered: 1, the past; 2, the present; 3, the future.

1. In the past we think of the great charity of Jesus, in which He loved us and gave Himself for us, that He might save us from eternal death by His own death. He is our Redeemer.

2. In the present we think of Him as the searcher of hearts, who by His hidden presence sees and knows our most secret thoughts, words, and deeds.

3. In the future we think of Him as the just Judge, who by His almighty power will destroy evil and judge the world by fire.

St. Jerome says, ‘Whether I eat or drink or whatever I do there is always ringing in my ears, like the shrilling of a trumpet, that voice of fear, Rise, ye dead, and come to judgment.’

N. We take the three together thus: God has given us food, that is, Himself, that we may bear in mind His wondrous works; how He redeemed us in the past; how He now knows everything about us; and how hereafter He will judge us one by one.

(3) Thirdly, there is the good that comes to us from bearing Jesus in mind, and that is to be considered in three ways:

1. The remembrance of the first thing, that is, our Lord’s Passion, kindles our hearts with love.

2. The remembrance of the second thing, that is, our Lord’s knowledge and watchfulness, keeps us from sin.

3. The remembrance of the third thing, that is, the judgment of the Son of man, makes us ready for His coming.

By the first we love what is good; by the second we hate what is evil; by the third we guard against the wrath to come.

1. Hardly can we help loving much if we think of the Passion of Jesus. St. Bernard says, ‘O good Jesus, that which endears Thee to me above all things is the chalice which Thou didst drink, that is, the work of my redemption.’ ‘The viler that my Lord was made for me, the dearer He is made to me.’

2. If we would always think of our Lord present, and seeing all things, and always judging us, hardly ever, or even never, would we sin. Boetius says, ‘A great necessity of good living is laid upon us, when we do everything before the eyes of the Judge from whom nothing is hid.’

3. We have to be ready for the third day. Our first day is the day of our birth; our second day is the day of our life; our third day is the day of our death or of the judgment.

N. In preparing for the judgment we must be careful to think about: a, the manner; b, watchfulness, not to share the punishment of the unprepared; c, the gain of entering into eternal life with those that are ready.

a. We must make ourselves ready for the day of the Lord, by keeping from sin and by doing penance.

b. We must be very careful not to follow others into sin, nor to share their forgetfulness of God.

c. We must set great store on that life of blessedness which the servants of God enjoy for ever in His kingdom.

R. Consider the greatness of the reward, if you are ready; you have: a, the possession of Heaven; b, the company of the beloved Spouse; c, the delights of the fulness of all good.

a. They entered the Heavenly City.

b. They entered it with Him, that is, with Jesus their Spouse.

c. They went in to the everlasting Bridal.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About the threefold evil of forgetting God; 1. The loss of grace; Thou hast forsaken the God that made thee, and hast forgotten the God that created thee. Deut. 32:18.

I will hide My face from them … for it is a perverse generation and unfaithful children. Deut. 32:20.

2. The bondage to the devil; The children of Israel did evil in the sight of the Lord; and the Lord delivered them up into the hands of Jabin, King of Chanaan. Judges 4:12.

They who in such manner receive matrimony as to shut out God from themselves and from their mind, and to give themselves to their lust, as the horse and mule that have not understanding, over them the devil hath power. Tob. 6:17.

3. The hideousness of the guilt; As they liked not to have God in their knowledge, God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient, being filled with all iniquity. Rom. 1:28.

The beasts have rotted … the barns are destroyed; the store-houses are broken down. Joel 1:17.

(2) The threefold way of thinking of our Saviour; 1. The past; Remember my poverty and transgression, the wormwood and the gall. I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish within me. These things will I think over in my heart, therefore will I hope. Lam. 3:19–21.

The Lord said to him, Go through the midst of the city, through the midst of Jerusalem, and mark Thau upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and mourn for all the abominations that are committed in the midst thereof. Ezech. 9:4.

2. The present; Know ye that the Lord is God. He made us, and not we ourselves. Ps. 99:3.

I set the Lord always in my sight; for He is at my right hand, that I be not moved. Ps. 15:8.

The works of all flesh are before Him; and there is nothing hidden from His eyes. Ecclus. 39:24.

Behold He standeth behind our wall, looking through the windows, looking through the lattices. Cantic. 2:9.

3. The future; Behold the name of the Lord cometh from afar; His wrath burneth and is heavy to bear; His lips are filled with indignation, and His tongue is as a devouring fire; His breath is as a torrent overflowing. Is. 30:27.

N. He hath made a remembrance of His wonderful works, being a merciful and gracious Lord. Ps. 110:4.

(3) The threefold fruit of the memory of our Lord; 1. It kindles our love; I am come to cast fire on the earth; and what will I but that it be kindled? St. Luke 12:49.

My heart grew hot within me; and in my meditation a fire shall flame out. Ps. 38:4.

2. It makes us watchful against sin; The fear of the Lord hateth evil. I hate arrogance and pride and every wicked way, and a mouth with a double tongue. Prov. 8:13.

Darkness compasseth me about, and the walls cover me, and no man seeth me. Whom do I fear? The most High will not remember my sins. And he understandeth not that His eye seeth all things, for such a man’s fear driveth from him the fear of God. Ecclus. 23:26, 27.

He said to me, Surely thou seest, O son of man, what the ancients of the house of Israel do in the dark, every one in private in his chamber; for they say, The Lord seeth us not; the Lord hath forsaken the earth. Ezech. 8:12.

3. It keeps the judgment before us; Let them be ready against the third day; for on the third day the Lord will come down, in the sight of all the people, upon Mount Sinai. Ex. 19:11.

Be you then also ready, for at what hour you think not the Son of man will come. St. Luke 12:40.

N. Preparation for the judgment in three things; a. The manner; Before judgment prepare thee justice, and learn before thou speakest.… Before judgment examine thyself, and thou shalt find mercy in the sight of God. Ecclus. 18:19, 20.

Do penance, for the kingdom of God is at hand. St. Matt. 3:2.

Now therefore said the Lord, Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in mourning and in weeping. Joel 2:12.

b. Not to be partakers in the doom of the unprepared; I heard another voice from Heaven saying, Go out from her, My people, that you be not partakers of her sins, and that you receive not of her plagues; for her sins have reached unto Heaven, and the Lord hath remembered her iniquities. Apoc. 18:4, 5.

This know ye, that if the householder knew at what hour the thief would come, he would surely watch, and not suffer his house to be broken open. St. Luke 12:39.

c. The great gain from being ready; Now, while they went to buy, the Bridegroom came; and they that were ready went in with Him to the marriage, and the door was shut. St. Matt. 25:10.

R. The threefold gain of being ready for the judgment; a. The possession of the kingdom of Heaven; Then shall the King say to them that shall be on His right hand, Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the beginning of the world. St. Matt. 25:34.

b. The company of the beloved Spouse; Then we who are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet Christ in the air, and so shall we be always with the Lord. 1 Thess. 4:16.

Father, I will that where I am, they also whom Thou hast given Me may be with Me, that they may see My glory which Thou hast given Me, because Thou hast loved Me before the foundation of the world. St. John 17:24.

c. The fulness of joy; Rejoice with Jerusalem and be glad with her, all ye that love her; rejoice for joy with her, all you that mourn for her. Is. 66:10.

Prayer

Jesus, Thou standest behind our wall, being hidden in the Blessed Sacrament. Thence Thou lookest through the lattices, searching our most secret thoughts. Give me grace to wait for Thee, and watch for Thee, that I may be always ready to meet Thee at Thy coming. Thy head is full of dew, for as God Thou art all-merciful; and Thy locks are full of the drops of the night, for Thou wast a man of sorrows, and didst carry Thy Cross for me. I love Thee and adore Thee, Jesus, God and man. With hunger and thirst of soul I long to receive Thee in the mystery of the Altar. Send forth Thy Spirit more and more into my soul, that I may be ever nearer to Thee, my King and my God.

III

About the second reason for the institution of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, that is to say, the Sacrifice of the Altar

B. The second reason is that there may be the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. As to this, three things have to be considered: (1) the manner of offering; (2) the question about the sacrifices of the law; (3) the excellence of our Sacrifice.

We will consider the first two points in this Meditation, and the third point in the next.

(1) First there is the form of offering, and that is threefold. It is seen: I, in the typical nature of the ancient sacrifices; 2, in the truth of the human form; 3, in the species of bread and wine. The first is of the synagogue, given under the law; the second is of the love of God, offered on the Cross; the third is of the faithful soul, consecrated on the Table of the Church. The first is given for a sign; the second for redemption; the third for comfort.

1. Jesus was offered under the law, not in person, but in figure. So the lamb without blemish which they slew at the Pasch and whose flesh they ate was, as St. Gregory says, a figure of Christ.

2. Jesus, in His manhood, died on the Cross. We are sanctified by the offering of that Body of Jesus Christ, once offered for sin.

3. As Melchisedech offered bread and wine, so Jesus gives His Body and Blood in the Sacrifice of the Altar, under the species of bread and wine.

(2) Next there is the question about the sacrifices of the law, in which three points are to be considered: 1, the difficulty about the insufficiency of

these sacrifices; 2, the solution of the difficulty; 3, the reason for those sacrifices is given.

1. Sometimes those sacrifices are spoken of as not being pleasing or acceptable to God, and therefore as not taking away sin. On the other hand they are also spoken of as pleasing God and blotting out sin. This is seen by the texts corresponding to this part.

2. The difficulty may be solved as follows: In a sacrifice there are always three things: the sacrifice itself, the person of the offerer, and the forgiveness of sin. As to each of these things two points have to be considered. Thus as to the sacrifice, there were the flesh and blood of the animal that was offered, and much more the spiritual gift or blessing which was signified by it. So Christ was signified by the lamb or the calf; penance by the she-goat; a life, strong and active, by the ox; a life, lifted up on high and contemplative, by the bird. Next as to the offerers, some are worthy, some are unworthy. The unworthy ones were those who only thought of these sacrifices in a carnal way. The worthy ones were those who looked at them spiritually. They saw Christ in them, either explicitly or implicitly; and they believed in Him. By this spiritual knowledge they guided their lives. Lastly, there was the forgiveness of sin; and this must be thought of as to two effects—that is, with regard to punishment because of the transgression of the law; and with regard to guilt, that is, the stain on the conscience.

If you think of these things, you easily reconcile those passages in the Sacred Scriptures where apparently contradictory words are used in speaking of the ancient sacrifices. For in truth those sacrifices in themselves—that is, ex opere operato—could not please God, nor for them did He put away guilt, so far as regards the guilt, that is the stain on the soul; but in the sight of men sins were reputed to be forgiven, that is with reference to the penalties of the law. But the sacrifices of the just pleased God, not indeed in themselves, but because the offerers had faith in the Saviour. They saw Him in them and believed that He would come, and they trusted to Him for the redemption of the world. So their sins were forgiven, not only as to punishment, but as to guilt. Thus the sacrifice of Abel was more acceptable to God and more availing than that of Cain. For Cain, like others who are unworthy, saw only the sacrifice; but, in the lamb which he offered to God, Abel saw a better victim—that is, the Saviour—and believed in Him. God therefore had regard to Abel and his offering.

3. The reason has to be given for the institution of the sacrifices of the law. For since they were instituted by God, who does nothing without a reason, and yet were changed, we naturally ask why they were instituted. As to this we may say briefly, that though in themselves they had no power to take away guilt, yet in many ways they were useful for the teaching of wisdom. They were given to servants, for a while, as signs of better things, and, as it were, to children, as letters of books, by whose properties and measures they might advance in the discipline of the true faith till these elements should cease in true knowledge; till signs and shadows should pass away in the unveiled truth.

N. The moral precepts of the law had always to be kept. These had to be set in their hearts. Some precepts were given for a time, and so had to be taken away. These were said to be hung up as a sign on their hands. Some sacrifices were said to be written on the posts and doors of their houses, as if they were letters for children. By these, however, many good things were to be learnt, and chiefly: a, faith in the Redeemer; b, a moral law; c, hope of a heavenly reward. The first they learnt from the sacrifice of sheep; the next from the sacrifice of bulls, calves, and rams; and the last from the sacrifice of the animals that were burnt outside the gate.

a. When a sheep was offered they learnt three things about the true faith; 1, the innocence of the Saviour; 2, His meekness; 3, the redemption of man by His death.

b. When horned animals were offered as a holocaust—that is, when they were reduced to ashes by the burning of fire—the worshippers could learn three things about the moral law: 1, that they should resist the devil and all their vices; 2, that they should have a great love of God and their neighbour; 3, that in all things they should be humble both in mind and body.

c. When the animals were burnt outside the gate, and their blood was brought by the priest into the holy place, as the blood signifies the souls of the just, they could learn three things about their hope of Heaven: 1, the penance of the living; 2, the office of the Redeemer; 3, the suffrage of gifts.

R. 1. As the bodies were burnt without the camp, the faithful should do penance and keep themselves free from the delights and pleasures of the world. To do penance here and to bear sufferings well here help us much in the hope of reaching Heaven at last.

2. As the blood was carried by the High Priest into the Holy of Holies, so the souls of the just after this life, by the kindness of our Lord, are taken to Heaven. So the lilies which the Spouse gathers in His garden are the souls that love Him.

3. This blood, carried by the Priest into the Holy of Holies, availed for the remission of the sins of the living; that is to say, the souls of the Blessed with God pray for the forgiveness of our sins, who are yet exiles and pilgrims in the world. The Saints offer their prayers for us to our Lord, and He offers them to His Father, that we may be forgiven and brought safely to our home.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About the form in three ways; 1. The ancient oblations were types; If all the multitude of Israel shall be ignorant, and through ignorance shall do that which is against the commandment of the Lord, and afterwards shall understand their sin, they shall offer for their sin a calf, and shall bring it to the door of the tabernacle. Lev. 4:13, 14.

2. The truth of the human form; He shall be led as a sheep to the slaughter, and shall be dumb as a lamb before his shearers. Is. 53:7.

He was offered because it was His own will. Is. 53:7.

Who needeth not daily, as the other priests, to offer sacrifices first for his own sin, and then for the people’s; for this He did once in offering Himself. Heb. 7:27.

3. The species of bread and wine; The Lord hath sworn, and He will not repent: Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech. Ps. 109:4.

Whilst they were at supper Jesus took bread, and blessed and broke, and gave to His disciples, and said, Take ye, and eat; this is My Body. And taking the chalice He gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink ye all of this. For this is My Blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many for the remission of sins. St. Matt. 26:26, 27.

(2) The sacrifices of the law; 1. and 2. The difficulty about them; Your holocausts are not acceptable, nor are your sacrifices pleasing to Me. Jer. 6:20.

If any one of the people of the land shall sin through ignorance, doing any of those things that by the law of the Lord are forbidden, and offending, and shall come to know his sin, he shall offer a she-goat without blemish; … and the priest shall burn it on the altar for a sweet savour to the Lord, and he shall pray for him, and it shall be forgiven him. Lev. 4:27–31.

It is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sins should be taken away. Heb. 10:4.

Almost all things according to the law are cleansed with blood, and without the shedding of blood there is no remission. Heb. 9:22.

If the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled to the cleansing of the flesh, how much more shall the Blood of Christ, who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works to serve the living God! Heb. 9:13, 14.

But that in the law no man is justified with God is manifest, because the just man liveth by faith. Gal. 3:11.

By faith Abel offered to God a sacrifice exceeding that of Cain, by which he obtained a testimony that he was just, God giving testimony to his gifts, and by it he being dead yet speaketh. Heb. 11:4.

The Lord had respect to Abel and his offerings. Gen. 4:4.

3. The reason for their institution; Lay up these My words in your hearts and minds, and hang them for a sign on your hands, and place them between your eyes; … thou shalt write them upon the posts and doors of thy house. Deut. 11:18–20.

The law was our pedagogue in Christ. Gal. 3:24.

N. Three chief goods; a. Faith in the Redeemer; This is what thou shalt sacrifice on the altar: two lambs of a year old continually; one lamb in the morning and another in the evening. Ex. 29:38, 39.

He shall be led as a sheep to the slaughter, and shall be dumb as a lamb before his shearers. Is. 53:7.

b. Moral teaching; Thou shalt offer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an oblation to the Lord, a most sweet savour of the victim of the Lord. Ex. 29:18.

Thus saith the Lord God, In the first month, the first of the month, thou shalt take a calf of the herd without blemish, and thou shalt cleanse the sanctuary. Ezech. 45:18.

Take of the herd a calf for sin, and a ram for a holocaust, both without blemish, and offer them before the Lord; … also a bullock and a ram for peace-offerings. Lev. 9:2–4.

In a contrite heart and humble spirit let us be accepted, as in holocausts of rams and bullocks. Dan. 3:39, 40.

c. Hope of Heaven; The bodies of those beasts whose blood is brought into the holies by the High Priest for sin are burned without the camp. Heb. 13:11.

R. Three things to be learned from this; 1. To do penance; If we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall live also together with Christ. Rom. 6:8.

I reckon that the sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come that shall be revealed in us. Rom. 8:18.

2. The office of our Saviour; I will come again, and will take you to Myself, that where I am you also may be. St. John 14:3.

Whither is thy Beloved gone, O thou most beautiful of women? Whither is thy Beloved turned aside, and we will seek Him with thee? My Beloved is gone down into His garden, to the bed of aromatical spices, to feed in the gardens and to gather lilies. Cantic. 5:17; 6:1.

3. The suffrage of gifts; It shall come to pass in that day, I will hear, saith the Lord; I will hear the heavens, and they shall hear the earth. Osee 2:21.

The smoke of the incense of the prayers of the Saints ascended before God from the hand of the Angel. Apoc. 8:4.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, brighten my faith in Jesus, my Redeemer and Lord, the Son of the most high God. Help me to be more faithful in using all the grace that Thou givest. Strengthen my hope of eternal life and my confidence in God. By Thee I can do acceptable penance; by Thee I can love Jesus; in Thee I offer my prayers. My Beloved is here with me in the Holy Sacrament of the Altar. Jesus, my Love, is waiting for me. He dwelleth in His garden among the lilies. I long to receive Him worthily, but my spirit is weak and my heart is cold. Still, in my weakness and darkness, I hunger for this living bread and this water of life. O Spirit of God, purify my soul more and more, that it may be a more fitting dwelling for Jesus.

IV

About the excellence of our Sacrifice

B. (3) Next, we must think of the excellence of our Sacrifice, the Body of Christ, which, in a threefold way, surpasses all the sacrifices of the law—that is, by, i. its beauty; ii. its dignity; iii. its goodness.

i. Now its beauty is proved by three things: 1, by the outward species; 2, by its virginal origin; 3, by its spiritual sweetness.

1. By no other kind of food could it be handled so sweetly, so beautifully, so reverently, as under the species of bread and wine. For thus there do not follow many inconveniences which were to be found in the blood-stained sacrifices of the law. Our dry morsel is the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass under the clean species of bread and wine.

2. Without corruption it took its beginning from a virginal flower. The flowers of modesty and virginity grew into fruit that was most glorious and beautiful. St. Augustin says, ‘The greatness of the Mother comes from the Godhead of her Son, and the greatness of the Son comes from the virginity of His Mother.’ Enlightened by faith, we see Jesus, the King, wearing His Mother’s crown, that is, living in our assumed flesh, which He took from a virgin.

3. With a great sweetness of love this Holy Sacrifice draws the souls of the faithful to itself. What is so full of sweetness as this Sacrifice of our Lord’s Body? There is a fragrance from the precious works of His Godhead and manhood. Hence all who truly believe hasten often and lovingly to the church to see this Sacrifice and to adore it. Here is their hope of grace and devotion.

ii. Its great dignity is proved by three very precious things of which it consists: a, the most pure Flesh of Christ; b, His most just Soul; c, His most glorious Godhead. These three things, perfected in our Sacrifice, were figured in the Paschal lamb. For, a, the feet signify His Flesh; b, the purtenance signifies His Soul; c, the head signifies His Divinity. Thus in Jesus there are a Body and a Soul and the Godhead; for which reason it is said, ‘Hail, Salvation of the world; perfect God, and true man of flesh and soul.’

Through the greatness of this dignity, our Sacrifice, above all others, has a triple prerogative: 1, it is in itself acceptable to God; 2, it is revered by Angels; 3, it is adored by men. The first is because of His just Soul; the second is because of His unstained Flesh; the third because of His supreme Godhead.

1. This Sacrifice is pleasing to God because the Father accepts the offered Body of our Lord. In that Body He greatly humbled Himself, even unto death, obeying the Father, triumphing over the devil, redeeming the race of men.

2. St. Leo says, ‘The eagles that gather round the Body of Jesus are those that fly on spiritual wings, that is the holy Angels, pure spirits, lovers of cleanness of heart, adoring the unspotted Body of our Lord, and protecting the faithful who are present.’ St. Gregory says, ‘Who of the faithful can doubt that in the hour of that Sacrifice the heavens are opened, that in this mystery of Christ are present the choirs of the Angels, and that here the highest and the lowest are joined together?’

3. The footstool of God signifies the Flesh of Christ, for by origin it is taken from the ground. This we must adore, because it is holy in that it is united to God. St. Augustin says, ‘You must know that in Christ that which is lower, I mean His Flesh, is rightly adored. For he who adores the earth does not regard the earth, but rather Him whose footstool it is, for whose sake he adores.’ Again he says, ‘The heretics ask us, How is it that you adore with the Godhead that Flesh which you allow to be a created thing, and worship that no less than God? I answer, I adore the Flesh of my Lord—that is, His perfect manhood—because it has been assumed by the Godhead, and is joined to the Godhead in unity of person. If you separate the man from God, I do not believe in Him nor serve Him.… In Christ, taking the manhood, not alone nor naked, but joined to the Godhead, that is, the one Son of God, true God and true man; if any one contemptuously refuse to adore this he shall die eternally.’

iii. Next there is its virtue, that is, the effect of its goodness. For it has a threefold good effect in the threefold state of the faithful: 1, in the world; 2, in Purgatory; 3, in Heaven. In the first it forgives sin; in the second it lightens bitter pain; and in the third it pours forth great joy. For this reason Masses are said for three ends: 1, the good of the living; 2, to gain rest for the dead; 3, the glory of the Blessed. For this reason also the Host is broken into three parts, that the power of the Sacrifice of Jesus may be shown in this threefold state.

1. St. Gregory says, ‘Our Lord has given us this Sacrament of salvation, that, as we daily sin, and He cannot die for us any more, by this Sacrament we may obtain forgiveness.’

2. The Flesh and Blood of Christ are rightly offered for the souls of the dead, that they may be freed from the purgatorial pain by which they have been bound for the remainder of their penance. St. Augustin says, ‘By the prayers and alms of the Holy Church, and by the healing Sacrifice, the souls of the dead are without doubt helped, so that God deals more mercifully with them than their sins in this world have deserved.’

3. In the sacrifices they had to eat the breast. This, being the best part of the animal and the sweetest, signifies the sweetness of the Body of Christ. But it had to be eaten in a most clean place, and this signifies the delight that it gives to the Blessed in Heaven; for they have very great gladness, and rejoice together because of this Sacrifice in their remembrance of the Redeemer, in their sight of our salvation, and in their admiration of the goodness of God. Certainly, at any rate, it is eaten in a most clean place, because the sweetness of the Body of our Lord, with which we are fed here, as it is veiled in the Holy Sacrament, is enjoyed by them in Heaven with open face. That is the manifestation of God. Now Jesus is the hidden manna; but He promises to give us Himself unveiled in the clearness of the heavenly light. In that vision is the fulness of joy for evermore, and there also is the fruition of every good.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

i. About the beauty of our Sacrifice; 1. The outward species; Better is a dry morsel with joy than a house full of victims with strife. Prov. 17:1.

What is the good thing of Him, and what is His beautiful thing, but the corn of the elect and wine springing forth virgins? Zach. 9:17.

2. Its virginal origin; As the vine I have given a pleasant odour; and My flowers are the fruit of honour and riches. Ecclus. 24:23.

Go forth, ye daughters of Sion, and see King Solomon in the diadem wherewith his mother crowned him in the day of his espousals, and in the day of the joy of his heart. Cantic. 3:11.

3. Its spiritual sweetness; The memory of Josias is like the composition of a sweet smell made by the art of a perfumer. Ecclus. 49:1.

Smelling sweet of the best ointment, thy name is as oil poured out. Cantic. 1:2.

ii. The dignity of our Sacrifice; On the tenth day of this month let every man take a lamb by their families and houses.… It shall be a lamb without blemish.… They shall eat the flesh that night roasted with fire.… You shall eat the head with the feet and the purtenance thereof. Ex. 12:3, 5, 8, 9.

1. The Soul of Jesus; They shall offer sacrifices to the Lord in justice. Mal. 3:3.

The sacrifice of the just is acceptable, and the Lord will not forget the memorial thereof. Ecclus. 35:9.

2. The Flesh of Jesus; Wheresoever the body shall be, there shall the eagles also be gathered together. St. Matt. 24:28.

3. The Godhead of Jesus; Exalt ye the Lord our God, and adore His footstool, for it is holy. Ps. 98:5.

Thus saith the Lord, Heaven is My throne and the earth My footstool. Is. 66:1.

iii. The goodness of our Sacrifice; 1. The faithful in the world; If any one shall sin through mistake … he shall offer for his offence a ram without blemish. Lev. 5:15.

2. In Purgatory; Because the life of the flesh is in the blood, I have given it to you, that you may make atonement with it on the altar for your souls. Lev. 17:11.

3. In Heaven; The breast that is offered … you shall eat in a most clean place, thou and thy sons and thy daughters with thee. Lev. 10:14.

He that hath an ear let him hear what the Spirit saith to the Churches, To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna. Apoc. 2:17.

Thou hast made known to me the ways of life; Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end. Ps. 15:10.

But as for me, I will appear before Thy sight in justice; I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear. Ps. 16:15.

Prayer

In the light of the Tabernacle I ask Thee, O Holy Ghost, to fill my heart with pure desire for Jesus, the Living Bread. Give me grace to adore Him with the holy Angels, that His will may be done on earth as it is in Heaven, and that His will may be done in my soul. Help me to thank Him for all His gifts, and most of all for Himself. By this Holy Sacrament He strengthens souls on earth, and gives rest to souls in Purgatory, and gladdens souls in Heaven. He is the hidden Manna, promised by Himself to all who overcome. Thy grace will bring me in safety to God. May I eat this Bread of life in a most clean place! May I taste the sweetness of Jesus! May my soul be kept by Thee very bright for the coming of my Spouse!

V

About the third reason for the institution of the Blessed Sacrament, namely, that it may be the food of man

C. There is a threefold reason of the wisdom of God why our Lord gives us His Body as food: I. the greatness of His bounty; II. the corruption of human nature; III. the condition of human nature. We will consider the first reason, I., now; and the other two, II. and III., in the next meditation.

I. Since God is good in the highest way, the highest bountifulness becomes Him; but no bountifulness can be greater than this. It is shown in three things: (1) the magnificence of the gift; (2) the lavishness of the giver; (3) the good of the receiver.

(1) The magnificence of the gift is seen from this, that the Giver of all things gives us Himself in this Sacrament, and that in the most lavish way, for He gives us His own Body as food. This is the highest step of the generosity of God, as to the gift. You will see this clearly if you consider six steps of God's bountifulness, in which He has given all His good things to man. Two of these steps regard creatures, and the last four regard our Lord Himself.

1. He has given man heaven and earth and all irrational creatures for service. By His benefits He has always witnessed, even to the creature, that He is God, and that He is a Redeemer.

2. He has given the Angels to man that they may minister to him. They are most glorious creatures, with great gifts of intellect, dwelling in the heavenly light. To each man, from his birth, is given a guardian Angel. Hence we read of the countless kindnesses they have shown to men, and of

the things they do daily by converting sinners, by saving many from evils, by taking the good to Heaven. They help us too in the fire of Purgatory.

3. He has given us Himself; but what this gift is we shall see best by four considerations.

a. He has given Himself to be the companion of our pilgrimage. For, being God, He made us and set us here on our probation, giving us commandments of good life that we may not fail. Then, lest the way should be too hard for us, He was made man Himself, that He might be the companion of our lonely way. Being truly and properly good, He made Himself a good companion. With the best of all words He strengthened the weary, saved those that were in danger, healed the sick, raised the dead.

b. He made Himself the servant of our necessities. He gave drink to the thirsty and food to the hungry. He washed the feet of His disciples.

c. He gave Himself as the price of our redemption. He was the good Shepherd, and He gave His life for His sheep, that they might know Him as He knows them.

d. The sixth and highest step is this: He gives us His Body for our food. St. Gregory says, ‘Our Lord, the good Shepherd, gave His life for the sheep, that in our Sacrament He might give us His Body and Blood, and that He might feed, with the nourishment of His own Flesh, the sheep whom He had redeemed.’ In this is the highest expression of His bounty and love. It is a great thing to give Himself as the companion of our pilgrimage and the servant of our necessities. It is a greater thing to give Himself as the price of our redemption. Still this gift is in a certain kind of separation from him to whom it is given. When, however, He gives Himself for food, He is not given in any kind of separation, but for union in every way. For thus the food and the feeder are joined together in unity of body. In this step, therefore, we see the highest bountifulness of the goodness of God.

(2) Next, we prove the liberality of God by the generosity of the giver. He gives His Body lavishly—that is, not only to His friends and those who love Him, but also to the bad who are His enemies. As He once allowed Himself to be crucified by the hands of the wicked, so now He allows Himself to be handled by those who hate Him, and, as it were, to be torn in His Sacrament by the teeth of the unclean. Thus, at the Last Supper, He is said to have given His Body to Judas with the others. He makes the truth of His presence, like the sun, rise on the just and on the unjust, though they receive

Him with very different effects. For as the sun acts differently on an eye that is diseased and on an eye that is whole, so His friends receive effects of the goodness of God, while His enemies receive effects of His anger.

N. Observe that it is much to give great gifts to near relatives and friends, but more to give them to servants, and still more to give them to strangers and the unknown; but the greatest thing of all is to give them to enemies. Hence if we do not love Him He taxes us with great thanklessness. When God in His goodness and kindness and bountifulness does so much for His enemies and those who sin against Him, and chiefly when He allows them to receive Him, He does it, that by such kindness He may turn them from sin to Himself.

(3) Thirdly, there are the benefits for the receiver. In this Sacrament the worthy receiver is made deiform, that is to say, by the grace of goodness or by the imitation of Christ he is made in a way like God. St. Ambrose says, ‘Because the Lord Jesus is partaker of Godhead and of flesh, thou also who dost receive His Body art made partaker of His divine substance by that food.’ The substance of God is goodness. Thus, therefore, to partake of Him in this food is by grace to be likened to the goodness of God. But grace is the flowing of God’s goodness into the soul, by which, being likened to God, it becomes pleasing to Him and worthy of everlasting life. So great is the bountifulness of God that it is not enough for Him in this Sacrament or in this food to enlighten the intellect, heal the will, gladden the memory, strengthen our whole nature in good, and join us to the mystical body; but, further, He makes us like Himself—here by grace, and hereafter by glory. Beyond that we cannot go.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About the food of man; My Flesh is meat indeed, and My Blood is drink indeed. He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood abideth in Me and I in Him. As the living Father hath sent Me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me. St. John 6:56–58.

I. The greatness of God’s bounty:

(1) The magnificence of His gift; 1. Inanimate and irrational creatures; God created man of the earth, and made him after His own image … and gave him power over all things that are upon the earth. Ecclus. 17:1, 3.

Let Us make man to Our image and likeness. Gen. 1:26.

Who made the great lights … the sun to rule the day … the moon and the stars to rule the night. Ps. 135:7–9.

The sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven … which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations. Deut. 4:19.

That you may be the children of your Father who is in Heaven, who maketh His sun to rise upon the good and bad, and raineth upon the just and the unjust. St. Matt. 5:45.

He left not Himself without testimony, doing good from Heaven, giving rain and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness. Acts 14:16.

What is man, that Thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that Thou visitest him? Ps. 8:5.

2. The holy Angels; Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation? Heb. 1:14.

I say to you that in Heaven their Angels always see the face of My Father who is in Heaven. St. Matt. 18:10.

Behold I will send My Angel, who shall go before, thee and keep thee in thy journey, and bring thee into the place that I have prepared. Ex. 23:20.

The Lord went before them to show the way by day in a pillar of a cloud, and by night in a pillar of fire, that He might be the guide of their journey at both times. Ex. 13:21.

3. Our Lord Himself; a. Our companion; He found out all the way of knowledge, and gave it to Jacob His servant, and to Israel His beloved. Afterwards He was seen upon earth and conversed with men. Bar. 3:37, 38.

He travelled through the cities and towns, preaching and evangelising the kingdom of God; and the twelve were with Him; and certain women who had been healed of evil spirits and infirmities; Mary, who is called Magdalene, out of whom seven devils were gone forth; and Joanna, the wife of Chusa Herod’s steward; and Susanna, and many others who ministered unto Him of their substance. St. Luke 8:1–3.

b. Our servant; Let this mind be in you which was also in Christ Jesus, who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but humbled Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. Philip. 2:5–7.

He riseth from supper and layeth aside His garments, and having taken a towel girded Himself. After that He putteth water into a basin, and began to wash the feet of the disciples, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith He was girded. St. John 13:4, 5.

Even as the Son of Man is not come to be ministered to, but to minister. St. Matt. 20:28.

I am in the midst of you, as He that serveth. St. Luke 22:27.

c. The price of our ransom; Walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us, and hath given Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odour of sweetness. Eph. 5:2.

The Son of Man came … to give His life a redemption for many. St. Matt. 20:28.

d. His Body our food; I was like a foster-father to Ephraim; I carried them in my arms; … I put his meat to him that he might eat. Osee 11:3, 4.

The bread that I will give is My Flesh for the life of the world. St. John 6:52.

(2) The lavishness of the Giver; The wicked draw near against Me to eat My Flesh. Ps. 26:2.

N. Why do you persecute me as God, and glut yourselves with my flesh? Job 19:22.

Knowest thou not that the goodness of God leadeth thee to penance? Rom. 2:4.

(3) The good of the receiver; As many as received Him He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.’ St. John 1:12.

He that is good shall draw grace from the Lord. Prov. 12:2.

Thanksgiving

O Jesus, Thou art all-bountiful, and there is no giver like Thee. Thou art the cheerful giver whom the Father loves with a great love. I thank Thee for Thy priceless gift. I thank Thee for coming to me in this morning-light. Even Thou couldest not give me more, for Thou hast given me Thyself. O loving Lord, my Friend and Brother and God, Thou didst make Thyself the servant of all. Hungry and thirsty and tired, Thou didst seek for us, as a shepherd seeks for his sheep that are scattered. From cloudy mountains Thou didst gather us in days of darkness and dread. I long to love Thee more, O Brother, who didst die for me. I long to keep Thee more lovingly in my heart, O Friend, who givest me Thyself in this Sacrament of Thy love. Let my soul be joined more and more to Thine; and let my body belong more and more to Thee. Thou givest me power to become a child of God. O Son of God, Thou hast come to me from the Altar, in healing and light.

VI

About the other two reasons why our Lord gives us His Body as food

C. II. The second reason for giving us this heavenly food is the corruption of human nature, which in three ways needs the medicine of food like this.

1. First, there is need of a fitting beginning of the healing: a, corruption and death began from the forbidden fruit, that is, from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; b, our justification and life must begin from food, that is, from the true tree of life, the Body of our Lord.

2. Next, there is need of food like this that the healing may be perfect. The cunning serpent by the poison of the forbidden food instilled into man a threefold corruption: a, the darkness of ignorance in the soul; b, the disease of bad desires in the flesh; c, death in both.

Of these three things St. Augustin says, ‘If an Angel falling from his own paradise had not been listened to, we should not have gone headlong into death; but having fallen from Heaven, he came outwardly as a serpent and spat forth venom of his own, and spoke from himself, Taste, and ye shall be as gods. Then they, desiring to be what they were not, lost what they had received—their intellectual power, the justice of their life, the possibility of not dying.’ As then by poisonous food there fell on them a triple corruption, it was needful for perfect healing that the Physician, our Saviour, should give them medicinal food against these evils; and this food is His Body, which does three things for those that worthily receive it: d, it enlightens the darkness of their souls; e, it heals the disease of bad desires; f, it triumphs by destroying death.

d. The Body of Christ is the word of God, that is, the true light in human flesh as in a lantern, and by this the faithful soul is enlightened.

e. The manna appeared like hoar-frost and dew, because the Body of our Lord cools in the soul the heat of wrong desire.

f. Jesus is the way, the truth, the life. He is the true light. He destroys death and hell, and leads us to everlasting life.

These three points have been spoken of in the first meditation, near the end.

3. This food was needed for the certain preservation of health; for some have deep sorrow for a while, and are healed in away, but in the time of temptation they again fall back. It has power to keep the soul in health, and in the incorruption of a good life. As myrrh keeps bodies uncorrupted, so the Blessed Sacrament worthily received is the incorruptibility of the soul.

III. The third reason of the wisdom of God for the gift of this food is the condition of our human nature, in which a rational soul is joined to a body. Now a rational creature may be looked at in three ways, and so needs a threefold food. First, it is incorporeal and purely spiritual, as the angelic nature. Secondly, it is joined to a body, as to that which is unlike, namely, spirit to flesh. Thirdly, these two natures, that is, body and soul, are joined together in the individual persons of men with friendly intercourse and wonderful love. But in whichever of these three ways a rational creature be considered, it needs fitting food because of its condition.

1. The angelic nature needs nourishment by which it may live and subsist. That nourishment is the Eternal Word of God, incorporeal in Himself, that is, the uncreated Wisdom of God. This sustains the Angels in Heaven.

2. Taking the second way, when a rational creature is joined to a body, as unlike with unlike, spirit with flesh, precious with worthless, then according to the condition of each nature it needs food fitting for each, but unlike; that is to say, the spirit needs spiritual food like an Angel, and the body needs bodily food like the brutes.

N. Of both together, St. Augustin says, ‘As the soul is the life of the body, but does not keep it alive without bodily food, so God is the life of the soul, but does not keep it alive without spiritual food, that is, without the Word of God. So both natures of man, being unlike, have unlike food, and eat in different ways, far apart from each other. The food of the body does not suit the soul, and the food of the soul does not suit the body.’

3. As to the third way, when two natures—that is to say, body and soul—are joined together in one person in friendly companionship and wondrous love, one food is needed for the salvation of both. This food must be at the same time spiritual and bodily, fitting for the whole man, that is, for each nature. Such food is the Word made flesh, whom in the same Sacrament they both eat. By His power the soul is brought from misery to the deathless joy, and the body is kept for a while in the earth that at last it may rise in glory. The Flesh of our Lord is truly food for the whole man, good both for soul and body. God created Wisdom by His Spirit. He assumed a body made of the body of our Lady, and united it to His own wisdom. According to His gift, that is, His bountifulness, He gives it as food to those who love Him, namely, the faithful, that, as has been said, it may profit them both in body and soul. When the prophet speaks of peace between the calf and bear, by the calf he signifies the body which is to be offered in sacrifice to God, and by the bear he means the spirit. For as the bear is terrible to beasts, so the spirit ought to be terrible to all fleshly desires and all that is of the earth earthy.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

II. About the corruption of human nature; 1. Fit beginning of healing: a. The tree of death; Of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat; for in what day soever thou shalt eat of it thou shalt die the death. Gen. 2:17.

b. The tree of life; Then Jesus said to them, Amen, amen I say to you, except ye eat the Flesh of the Son of Man and drink His Blood ye shall not have life in you. St. John 6:54.

In the midst of the street thereof and on both sides of the river was the tree of life bearing twelve fruits. Apoc. 22:2.

2. The perfect healing: a. Darkness in the soul; Man when he was in honour did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them. Ps. 48:13.

Darkness was upon the face of the deep. Gen. 1:2.

b. Evil desires; The flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh, for these are contrary one to another. Gal. 5:17.

I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin that is in my members. Rom. 7:23.

c. Death for both; By the envy of the devil death came into the world, and they follow him that are of his side. Wisdom 2:24, 25.

d. Jesus lightens our darkness; The Lord is my light and salvation. Ps. 26:1.

Come ye to Him and be enlightened. Ps. 33:6.

e. He heals evil desires; He rained down manna upon them to eat, and had given them the Bread of Heaven. Ps. 77:24.

In the morning a dew lay round the camp, and when it had covered the face of the earth it appeared in the wilderness … like unto the hoar-frost on the ground. Ex. 16:13, 14.

f. He destroys death; This is the Bread that came down from Heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna and are dead. He that eateth this Bread shall live for ever. St. John 6:59.

3. He preserves the health of the soul; My iniquities are gone over my head, and, as a heavy burden, are become heavy on me. My sores are putrified and corrupted through my foolishness. I am become miserable, and am bowed down even to the end; I walked sorrowful all the day long. Ps. 37:5–7.

A bundle of myrrh is my Beloved to me. Cantic. 1:12.

III. The condition of our human nature; 1. The Angels; I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you; but I use an invisible meat and drink which cannot be seen by men. Tobias 12:19.

By His wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew. Prov. 3:20.

The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom. Ecclus. 1:5.

Man ate the Bread of Angels. Ps. 77:25.

Our fathers … did all eat the same spiritual food and all drank the same spiritual drink; and they drank of the spiritual rock that followed them, and that rock was Christ, 1 Cor. 10:1, 3, 4.

If one be perfect among the children of men, yet if thy wisdom be not with him, he shall be nothing regarded. Wisdom 9:6.

2. Spirit and body in one way; The poor man had nothing at all but one little ewe lamb … eating of his bread and drinking of his cup. 2 Kings 12:3.

The principal things necessary for the life of man are water, fire, iron, salt, milk, bread of flour, honey, the cluster of the grape, oil, and clothing.

All these things shall be for good to the holy; so to the sinner and the ungodly they shall be turned to evil. Ecclus. 39:31, 32.

N. It is written, Not in bread alone doth man live, but in every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God. St. Matt. 4:4.

3. Spirit and body in another way; He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up in the last day. St. John 6:55.

He poured her (Wisdom) out upon all His works and upon all flesh, according to His gift, and hath given her to them that love Him. Ecclus. 1:10.

The calf and the bear shall feed. Is. 11:7.

Prayer

Come to me, life-giving Jesus, in Thy sweetness and might. Give me a greater longing for Thy gift of gifts. Satisfy my hunger with the Living Bread, and slake my thirst with the Wine of God. Now I see Thee dimly in Thy creatures, and now darkly I know Thy love. I feel the wickedness of my heart, and am cast down greatly when I think of my unfaithfulness to Thee. Purify me more and more, and cleanse me with the fire of Thy Heart. Wash me with Thy Precious Blood, and I shall be white; give me more of Thy Holy Spirit, and I shall be cleansed. I adore Thee, Jesus, in the Blessed Sacrament, and with all my heart I wish to make myself a fitting temple for Thee. Come to me, O loving Jesus.

Thanksgiving

O my God and King, I have received Thee, Body and Soul, in Thy gift of love. I thank Thee with my whole heart; but I cannot thank Thee as I ought. Come to me with greater gifts, O Holy Ghost, that I may love Jesus more. His kingdom is in my soul. I thank Thee, loving Lord, my Saviour, for all that Thou hast done for me; and for all that Thou givest to me now. I bear in mind Thy work of redemption; I love the Sacrifice of the Altar; I hunger for the Bread of Heaven. Come to me with greater gifts, O Holy Ghost, that I may know these things better, and may love Jesus more. O Son of the living God, may I live by Thee, and by Thee be brought to the home of Thy love! There Thy Saints and Angels praise Thee with Thy Father and Thy Holy Spirit. Blessing and praise and thanksgiving be to Thee now, Jesus, on this Altar, before which we, Thy servants, are gathered. Thou, Jesus, art my

Brother and my Friend. Thou, Jesus, art my King and my God. Thou, Jesus, with the Holy Ghost art most high in the glory of God the Father.

PART II

THE SECOND POINT TO BE CHIEFLY NOTED ABOUT THE BLESSED SACRAMENT IS THE MANNER OF THE GIFT

VII

About the manner of the gift, that is, why our Lord is given to us veiled in this Holy Sacrament

AS to this, three things are to be considered: A, our Lord gives us His Body veiled; B, He gives it veiled under the appearance of bread; C, He gives it veiled under the appearance of wheaten bread.

We will consider the first point, A, in this meditation and the next. The second point, B, will be considered in the ninth meditation, and the third point, C, in the tenth.

A. Because the sense of man is at a loss in this mystery, and wonders when it seems to be something else, there is a fourfold reason for this veiling of our Lord: (1) the unworthiness of the wicked; (2) the faith of the good; (3) moral instruction; (4) our weakness.

Points (1) and (2) will be considered in this meditation, and points (3) and (4) in the next.

(1) Our Lord must thus be veiled because of the unworthiness of the wicked; as the sun, or indeed any light, must be veiled from a weak eye. In this the mercy of our Saviour deals most gently with them; for if the wicked could see Him unveiled, and so received by the faithful, they would be scandalised by the very sight, and would perish wretchedly by a threefold destruction, namely: 1, by horror in the heart; 2, by detraction in the lips; 3, by spiritual death in the soul.

1. When our Lord told the disciples of this mystery, many of them went back and walked no more with Him, because they turned away from the words that He spoke about His Flesh. St. Ambrose says, ‘Perhaps you may

say, How is it true blood? for you do not see the likeness of flesh. Listen to the words of Christ. When they heard that He would give them His Flesh to eat they went back. Only Peter said, To whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life. Lest, therefore, more might be scandalised, and lest any one should shrink back from this food, and that, on the other hand, the glory of the Redeemer may be more seen, you receive this Sacrament in a similitude, but you gain the glory and virtue of His true nature.'

2. When the Jews murmured against Him and strove among themselves, their sin was detraction. For this also it is right that He should be veiled.

3. Once God smote many for looking on the ark; but that ark signifies the Body of Christ. This Body must be veiled from the wicked, lest they should die spiritually for ever if they were to see it. In many works of God you should not be curious; for it is not needful for you that your eyes should look on things that are hidden.

(2) He is also veiled because of the faith of the good. This reason may be divided into three, which require Him to be thus veiled: 1, the reality of faith; 2, the healing of unbelief; 3, the merit of faith.

1. The nature of faith requires that the Body of Christ should be hidden when it is given to us. Faith has to do with things that are not seen, and, as St. Augustin says, 'Faith is to believe what you do not see, or to trust words about a hidden thing which truly exists, though you cannot see it with your eyes. About the things that we see we have knowledge, and not faith.'

2. The healing of unbelief requires this veiling of our Lord, in order that a fitting manner of satisfaction may answer the guilt of unbelief. The unbelief of our first parents began from listening to the words of the devil, when he was persuading them to take food that had in it veiled death. Then their senses took a false delight in his words. So it is fitting that the faith of those to whom salvation is offered should begin from the words of the Redeemer, leading them to take food that has in it veiled life. It is also fitting that only by the hearing, from among our senses, we should know truly what that food is. Thus faith comes from hearing, and our hearing by the words of Christ. If you were to say of the Blessed Sacrament, 'This is the substance of bread,' or, 'This is the substance of wine,' nothing could be more untrue; but if you listen to the words of Jesus, 'This is My Body,' or, 'This is My Blood,' nothing can be truer: you are listening to God, who cannot lie. Thus the faithful soul is not deceived. The hands are the hands of Esau; we touch

the accidents of bread and wine: but the voice is the voice of the true Jacob, the prince of the Israel of God.

3. The veiling of the Incarnate Word is necessary for the merit of faith. St. Gregory says, ‘Faith has no merit if human reason give us a convincing proof. Our Lord willed to give us His Body veiled, because it is great merit to trust His words rather than our own senses. They who have not seen, and yet have believed, are blessed.’

N. In this merit of faith there is a threefold fruit: a, the fulness of spiritual good; b, abundance of earthly good; c, overflowing of eternal good. The dew of Heaven in the blessing that Isaac gave Jacob is the grace of God; the fatness of the earth is our daily bread, and all that God chooses to give us; the abundance of corn and wine is joy in God’s presence for evermore.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About our hidden gift; It is good to hide the secret of a king. Tobias 12:7.

(1) The unworthiness of the wicked; 1. Shrinking back in heart; My Flesh is meat indeed, and My Blood is drink indeed. St. John 6:56.

2. Detraction in the mouth; The Jews, therefore, murmured at Him because He had said, I am the Living Bread that came down from Heaven. … The Jews, therefore, strove among themselves, saying, How can this man give us His Flesh to eat? St. John 6:41, 53.

3. Death in the soul; Aaron and his sons shall go in, and they shall appoint every man his work, and shall divide the burdens that every man is to carry. Let not others, by any curiosity, see the things that are in the sanctuary before they be wrapped up, otherwise they shall die. Numb. 4:19, 20.

He slew of the men of Bethsames because they had seen the ark of the Lord; … and the people lamented because the Lord had smitten the people with a great slaughter. 1 Kings 6:19.

(2) The faith of the good; 1. The reality of faith; That the trial of your faith (much more precious than gold, which is tried by the fire) may be found unto glory and praise and honour at the appearing of Jesus Christ; whom having not seen you love; in whom also now, though you see Him not, you believe; and believing shall rejoice with joy unspeakable and glorified. 1 Pet. 1:7, 8.

2. The healing of unbelief; Faith then cometh by hearing; and hearing by the word of Christ. Rom. 10:17.

3. The merit of faith; Jesus saith to him, Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed; blessed are they that have not seen and have believed. St. John 20:29.

N. God give thee of the dew of heaven, and of the fatness of the earth, and abundance of corn and wine. Gen. 27:28.

a. Spiritual good; He that believeth in Me, as the Scripture saith, Out of His belly shall flow rivers of living water. Now this He said of the Spirit which they should receive who believed in Him. St. John 7:38, 39.

I will be as the dew: Israel shall spring as the lily, and his root shall shoot forth as that of Libanus. His branches shall spread, and his glory shall be as the olive-tree. Osee 14:6, 7.

b. Earthly good; Now faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not. For by this the ancients obtained a testimony.… All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth. For they that say these things do signify that they seek a country. Heb. 11:1, 2, 13, 14.

If you be willing and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. Is. 1:19.

Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you. St. Matt. 6:33.

c. Eternal good; Receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls. 1 Pet. 1:9.

He that shall hear Me shall rest without terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils. Prov. 1:33.

Prayer

Cleanse my heart, O Holy Spirit, by this heavenly food, wherein Jesus gives me Himself. Strengthen my faith, that I may see Jesus in this Sacrament of His Body and Blood. There is in me a law by which I am in danger of falling into the captivity of sin. I have often to go on my heavenward way through darkness and many temptations, but Thou art my light and my strength. In Thee I trust. By Thy grace I can do all things that Jesus wishes me to do. Be ever in my soul as the dew of the light. With utter trust I rest upon Thee, and believe the testimony which Thou givest. Set up more and more Thy kingdom in my soul, that I may keep my body under, and bring it to subjection, test I should be a castaway from Jesus and from Thee.

Thanksgiving

Glory be to Thee, O Jesus, King and Spouse, whom my soul loveth. Thou hast given me for my food the Living Bread. Thou art dwelling in me. I praise Thee and thank Thee, O Thou lover of souls, as Thou dwellest in the Tabernacle. I praise Thee and thank Thee, as Thou dwellest in the souls of all who have received Thee worthily this day, wherever they may be. I praise Thee and love Thee for giving Thyself to the unworthy, who gave no welcome to Thee. I hope and pray, dear Jesus, that Thou art dwelling in my soul and filling it with grace. Thou drivest the darkness from me and makest me glad. Thou art light to me in every danger and strength in every weakness. Thou art my comfort in all sorrow and my rest in all weariness and pain. Thou art the healer of every woe. Thy voice, O Thou Beloved of the Father, is in my heart like the song of the morning stars. Keep me faithful, Thou Lord of life and love, that I may rejoice with the sons of God.

VIII

About the other two reasons why our Lord’s Body is veiled

A. (3) The third reason for this veiling of Jesus is moral instruction.

Three things which perfect us in holiness are hidden in this Sacrament: 1, the person of our Saviour; 2, the beauty of His great brightness; 3, the wonderful work of the Almighty.

From this we learn that three things in us may sometimes be virtuously hidden: 1, our person; 2, bodily beauty; 3, the intention of good works. The first is hidden from the rage of persecutors; the second from the gaze of fools; the third from human respect.

1. The just man learns to hide himself for three reasons: a, that the rage of the persecutor may cease; b, that he may finish the work commanded him by God; c, that he may win a more glorious crown.

2. The just man learns to hide bodily beauty from the gaze of all, because outward beauty and its adornment have been to many an occasion of falling. Now bodily beauty is hidden in three ways: a, by poorness of dress; b, by austerity and fasting; c, by perseverance in good works.

3. The just man learns to hide the intentions of his virtues and good works from human respect. St. Gregory says, ‘Let your work be so done in public that your intention may be concealed. Thus shall we give an example to others by our good work, and yet as to our intention, by which we desire to please God alone, we shall always wish to be hidden.’

It is a threefold good that we ought chiefly to hide from men: a, almsdeeds; b, prayer; c, fasting.

(4) Fourthly, He is thus given to us veiled because of our weakness. It is proved in three ways that our weakness needs this.

1. From a figure of the law. The children of Israel, seeing that the face of Moses was horned from his communion with God, feared to come near; and he therefore put a veil on his face when he spoke to them. For the face of Moses caught such brightness from his nearness to the light of God that it seemed to the eyes of men to be horned. They could only bear the brightness of his face when veiled. Thus, then, nay, much more, must this be true of the Body of Jesus glorified in His Resurrection, and made spiritual and deiform. No one can look on it with mortal eye unless it be veiled under another appearance.

2. From the case of Mary, the Mother of God. Even she could not bear the brightness of her Son's presence and His glory until it was overshadowed. But when His majesty was veiled in her virginal flesh, by the overshadowing of the Holy Ghost, then it was possible that He could be looked on by Mary and even by us. Hence the Word was made flesh. When, however, that very flesh was glorified after His Passion by His Resurrection, and glorified to the likeness of God, it was made such that the eye of man could not look on it in its own form, but only when hidden by some kind of veil. The works of God are wonderful and glorious and hidden.

3. From natural reason; that is, from the very great dissimilarity between the light of our eyes and the brightness of the light of the Body of Jesus. Our eye is small, weak, corruptible. But His brightness is incorruptible, and in a certain sense immeasurable. Now the visibility of every kind of light depends on a certain likeness between the light and the eye that sees it. But the greater likeness there is to a very great light, the clearer the vision is, and the sweeter. Hence it is that a healthy eye can to some extent look on the sun, but not on the Body of Jesus, because the eye has a kind of likeness to the sun, that is, a likeness of light and corruptibility; but it has no such likeness to our Lord's Body. For unless the eye were in some way like the light of day, it could not possibly see it. So an ear or a finger or a blind eye could not see that light because of their too great unlikeness to it. So also because of our weakness and the exceedingly great splendour of our Lord's Body, glorified and strengthened to incorruption, we cannot sweetly look eye to eye on that brightness of the Body of Jesus. But still we ought to look upon Him with the eye of the mind, that is, the pure intention of the heart. It does indeed seem right that truth should find an entrance to the soul by the

upper windows of the eyes. But this, O my soul, is kept in store for us hereafter, when we shall see Him face to face. That vision will be everlasting life.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(3) About moral instruction; Wisdom is drawn out of secret places. Job. 28:18.

N. Three things hidden; 1. The person of our Saviour; Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour. Is. 45:15.

2. The great brightness; I will wait for the Lord, who hath hidden His face. Is. 8:17.

3. His almightiness; There are many things hidden from us that are greater than these; for we have seen but a few of His works. Ecclus. 43:3, 6.

Three things to be hidden in us; I. Ourselves; a. For rest Go, My people, enter into thy chambers, shut thy doors upon thee, hide thyself a little for a moment, till the indignation pass away. Is. 26:20.

b. For finishing our work; At Damascus, the governor of the nation under Aretas the king guarded the city of the Damascenes to apprehend me; and through a window in a basket was I let down by the wall, and so I escaped his hands. 2 Cor. 11:32, 33.

When King Sennacherib … slew many of the children of Israel, Tobias buried their bodies. But when it was told the king he commanded him to be slain, and took away all his substance. But Tobias, fleeing naked away with his son and with his wife, lay hid, for many loved him. Tob. 1:21–23.

c. For the crown; Behold David is hid in the hill of Hachila. 1 Kings 26:1.

2. Bodily beauty; a. By poorness of dress; I have sewn sackcloth upon my skin, and have covered my flesh with ashes. Job 16:16.

He said to her, That man is my master: but she quickly took her cloak and covered herself. Gen. 24:65.

If a woman be not covered, let her be shorn. But if it be a shame to a woman to be shorn or made bald, let her cover her head.… Therefore ought the woman to have a power over her head because of the Angels. 1 Cor. 11:6, 10.

b. By austerities; God forbid that I should glory save in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified to me, and I to the world. Gal. 6:14.

c. By perseverance in good; Thou hast made his soul to waste away like a spider. Ps. 38:12.

The yoke and the thong bend a stiff neck, and continual labours bow a slave. Ecclus. 33:27.

Do not consider me that I am brown, because the sun hath altered my colour. Cantic. 1:5.

There is no beauty in him nor comeliness; and we have seen him, and there was no sightliness that we should be desirous of him. Despised, and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows, and acquainted with infirmity; and his look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed him not. Is. 53:2, 3.

3. The intention of good works; The kingdom of Heaven is like unto a treasure hidden in a field: which a man having found hideth, and for joy thereof goeth and selleth all that he hath and buyeth that field. St. Matt. 13:44.

a. Alms-deeds; When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before there, as the hypocrites do in the synagogues and the streets, that they may be honoured by men. Amen I say to you, they have received their reward. But when thou dost alms let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doth; that the alms may be in secret; and thy Father who seeth in secret will repay thee. St. Matt. 6:2–4.

b. Prayer; When you pray you shall not be as the hypocrites, that love to stand and pray in the synagogues and corners of streets, that they may be seen by men. Amen I say to you, they have received their reward. But thou when thou shalt pray enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door pray to they Father in secret; and thy Father who seeth in secret will repay thee. St. Matt. 6:5, 6.

c. Fasting; When you fast, be not as the hypocrites, sad. For they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast. Amen I say to you, they have received their reward. But thou when thou fastest anoint thy head and wash thy face, that thou appear not to men to fast, but to they Father who is in secret; and thy Father who seeth in secret will reward thee. St. Matt. 6:16–18.

(4) Our weakness; 1. From a figure of the law; He was there with the Lord forty days and forty nights … When Moses came down from the Mount Sinai he knew not that his face was horned from the conversation of

the Lord.… Having done speaking he put a veil upon his face. Ex. 34:28, 29, 33.

The children of Israel could not steadfastly behold the face of Moses for the glory of his countenance. 2 Cor. 3:7.

2. The Mother of God; Now glorify Thou Me, O Father, with Thyself, with the glory which I had before the world was with Thee. St. John 17:5.

Thou canst not see My face, for man shall not see Me and live. Ex. 33:20.

The works of the Highest only are wonderful, and His works are glorious and secret and hidden. Ecclus. 11:4.

We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. 1 Cor. 13:12.

3. A reason of nature; The light of thy body is thy eye. If thy eye be single thy whole body will be lightsome; but if it be evil thy body also will be darksome. Take heed therefore that the light which is in thee be not darkness. If then thy whole body be lightsome, having no part of darkness, the whole shall be lightsome, and as a bright lamp shall enlighten thee. St. Luke 11:34–36.

Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when He shall appear we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is. 1 John 3:2.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, let my life be hidden with Jesus in God. Give me grace to live for God only, and to use creatures in Him and for His sake. Let the beauty of God blind me to the beauty of the world, and let the light of God blind me to the light of earth. Thou, O my God, art brighter than all things and sweeter. Take away from my soul all the dross, and purify it, giving it light and strength. To Thee, Spirit of deathless love, I turn for help. Take from me all human respect; for wrong regard of creatures blights the soul, so that its fruits are withered. Help me to be more faithful to Jesus, my Love, who is coming to me from His Altar. He is my life, as Thou art my life, and as the Eternal Father is my life. Give me more love, that I may welcome Jesus as He comes to me in the hidden light, and the freshness of the morning dew.

Thanksgiving

Thou art hidden, my Jesus, from every eye. Though Thou dwellest in the inaccessible light, yet clouds and thick darkness are round about Thy earthly dwelling. O dearest Lord, Thou art a hidden God. Thou art the God of Israel, my Saviour. I thank Thee for coming to me; and I thank Thee for bringing me to Thy banquet of love. I praise Thee and bless Thee in the Paradise of God; and I praise Thee and bless Thee in this dimness of the shadow of death. At Thy appearing I shall be like Thee, for I shall see Thee as Thou art. Make me more and more like Thyself here. One day, in the land of praise, in the great thanksgiving of eternity, I shall follow Thee whithersoever Thou goest over the mountains of the Israel of God. Give me grace to be faithful to Thee here, and to follow in Thy steps, day by day. Thou hast come to me, Jesus, in the Blessed Sacrament. By Thy gift Thou dost make me rich; and in Thy love Thou art the gladness of my life.

IX

About the form of the gift, by which it is given under the appearance of bread

B. (1) Our Lord gives us His Body under the species of bread because of the fitness of bread above all other foods for this purpose. For in what other kind of food could these acts be done, both as regards ministers and receivers? This is seen in three ways.

1. The species of bread is more convenient than that of any other food with regard to our getting it, for in every place and in every time it is more easily found than any other food.

2. It is also easier to keep; and as we have to lift it up or carry it or keep it safely, this can be done more conveniently than in the species of any other food.

3. Again, it is more convenient for giving Communion, because it can be handled in a cleanly and reverent way, and can be broken on the Altar better than any other food. So it is more easily given to the healthy or the sick.

(2) Next, He gives Himself to us under the species of bread that we may have a knowledge of the thing signified and faith in it. St. Augustin says, ‘A sign is a thing besides the species which is clear to the senses, and it makes something else besides itself come to our knowledge.’ But signs are of three kinds: 1, natural; 2, artificial; 3, sacramental.

1. A natural sign has a meaning according to nature, as smoke signifies a fire, or as an evening red signifies a fine day.

2. An artificial sign has a meaning according to the intention of man; and this meaning is twofold. In one case it does not contain what it signifies, as when a hoop is the sign of a wine-seller’s shop. In the other case it does

contain what it signifies, as a cloud contains showers and signifies them, or as a pasty signifies meat and contains it.

3. Sacramental signs have a meaning according to the intention of God; and this meaning also is twofold.

a. Some, as for instance the sacrifices of the law, do not contain what they signify. Thus the brazen serpent, set up in the desert, signified our Saviour, but did not contain Him; just as a hoop hung before a house signifies wine, which nevertheless it does not contain. The Paschal lamb also, and circumcision, signified the thing figured, but did not contain it, for of themselves they did not justify.

b. Others, such as the Sacraments of the Gospel, having a meaning also according to the intention of God, contain what they signify. Hugo says, ‘A Sacrament of our Lord’s is a material element instituted in some outward thing, that can be reached by the senses, by likeness representing, by institution signifying, and by sanctification containing some special grace.’ Thus Baptism signifies the purification of the soul, and contains it, for it effects what it figures, namely, the forgiveness of sin. Likewise the Sacrament of the Altar truly signifies and truly contains the Body of Christ; for, after the consecration of the bread, Christ, whole and undivided, is under the species, that is, under that sign of bread which God has instituted to signify our Lord’s Body. This bread has been made a sign by God. If, therefore, when I see a positive sign of man I believe that there is flesh under a little bread, much more when I see a positive sign of God, like the Sacrament of the Altar, I ought to believe that under the species of bread there is the true Body of our Lord, because of the likeness of the bread to the things signified.

N. For three things are there signified, of which that species of bread is the Sacrament, that is, the holy Sign, having in it an express likeness to those three things: 1, our Lord’s natural Body; 2, His mystical Body; 3, the effect of the Sacrament in the faithful soul. His natural Body is both signified and contained there, whereas His mystical Body is only signified and not contained.

1. The species of bread has a likeness to the first thing there signified, that is, to the true Body of Jesus, not by reason of itself, but by reason of the subject which it had before consecration, that is, by reason of the bread which it was before. For as bread is made of grains, many and pure, so the

Body of Christ is made of many members, pure and holy. The Ark signifies the Body of Christ. This was made of incorruptible setim-wood, because the members of our Lord's Body are most pure and free from all stain.

2. The species of bread has a likeness to the second thing signified, that is, the Church, the mystical Body of Christ, the oneness of the faithful. For as one loaf is made of many pure grains, so the unity of the Church consists in many faithful souls, free from mortal sin and bound together in the bond of charity.

R. Here we should remark that a threefold union is seen in bread, by which is signified a threefold brotherhood, or cause and bond of love, that ought to be found among the faithful. First, a, are chosen grains, large and like one another. Next, b, the flour is sprinkled with water, and dough is made. Then, c, that it may be hardened, it is baked with fire.

a. Now these like grains signify brotherhood and natural love, because we are all born of one parent, our first father, Adam.

b. Next, the dough, which is the flour mixed with water, signifies our sacramental love, because by one baptism we are all born again.

c. Then the bread hardened by fire signifies our spiritual love, because by one spirit we are gathered into one Church.

3. The species of bread, in that it once was bread, has in it a likeness to the third thing there signified, that is, the effect of the Sacrament in the faithful soul. For bread does three things: a, it strengthens; b, it satisfies; c, it preserves life. So the Bread of life does three things: a, it strengthens the faithful soul to get rid of all sin; b, it satisfies the soul, so that it despises the world; c, it keeps the soul in spiritual life, that it may always give praise to God.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(2) About signs; He answered and said to them, When it is evening you say, It will be fair weather, for the sky is red. St. Matt. 16:2.

3. a. Sacraments of the law; Moses therefore made a brazen serpent, and set it up for a sign, which when they that were bitten looked upon they were healed. Numb. 21:9.

Thy wrath endured not for ever; but they were troubled for a short time by Thy correction, having a sign of salvation to put them in remembrance of the commandment of Thy law. For he that turned to it was not healed by that which he saw, but by Thee, the Saviour of all. Wisd. 16:6, 7.

By the works of the law no flesh shall be justified before Him. Rom. 3:20.

b. Sacramental signs; Peter said to them, Do penance and be baptised, every one of you, in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of your sins, and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost. Acts 2:38.

While they were at supper Jesus took bread and blessed and broke, and gave to His disciples, and said, Take ye and eat; this is My Body. And taking the chalice He gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink ye all of this; for this is My Blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many for the remission of sins. St. Matt. 26:26–28.

Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that which endureth unto life everlasting, which the Son of Man will give you. For Him hath God the Father sealed. St. John 6:27.

N. 1. Our Lord’s natural Body; Thou art ‘like a heap of wheat set about with lilies.’ Cantic. 7:2.

Frame an ark of setim-wood. Ex. 25:10.

Beseleel made also the ark of setim-wood. Ex. 37:1.

2. His mystical Body; R. a. Natural brotherhood; So the ten brethren of Joseph went down to buy corn in Egypt. Gen. 42:3.

Every beast loveth its like; so also every man loveth him that is nearest to him. All flesh shall consort with the like to itself, and every man shall associate himself to his like. Ecclus. 13:19, 20.

b. Sacramental brotherhood; Purge out the old leaven, that you may be a new paste, as you are unleavened, 1 Cor. 5:7.

This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God love his brother also. 1 John 4:21.

c. Spiritual brotherhood; They baked the meal which a little before they had brought out of Egypt in dough; and they made hearth-cakes unleavened. Ex. 12:39.

3. Effect in soul; a. It strengthens; Thou waterest the hills … that Thou mayest bring bread out of the earth … and that bread may strengthen man’s heart. Ps. 103:13–15.

I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength.… My God is my helper, and in Him will I put my trust. Ps. 17:2, 3.

b. It satisfies; He filled them with the Bread of Heaven. Ps. 104:40.

A soul that is full shall tread upon the honeycomb. Prov. 27:7.

c. It keeps us in grace; The bread of the needy is the life of the poor. Ecclus. 34:25.

I will satisfy her poor with bread. Ps. 131:15.

I will praise Thee for ever. Ps. 51:11.

Every day will I bless Thee; and I will praise Thy name for ever, yea for ever and ever. Ps. 144:2.

Thanksgiving

Thou, Jesus, art the incorruptible Ark of the Covenant. By Thee and with Thee we are kept from sin and from everlasting death. I bless and praise Thee for Thine own holiness, and for the holiness Thou givest to Thy servants. Give me more love, dear Jesus, and more cleanness of heart, and bring me safely to the incorruptible kingdom where Thou dost ever dwell. There no rust consumes, and there no moth destroyeth. There all souls are bright with the fire of the love of God. Thou hast now come to me in Thy Holy Sacrament, that I may be strengthened for my journey to Thy home. Thou didst give corn to the brethren of Joseph in Egypt. Lead me into the lowest places, that by humility I may be pleasing to Thee. There, Jesus, give to me the corn of the elect, that I may praise Thee always as I am praising Thee now. Thou dost ever gird me with strength. Thou dost feed me with the Bread of Heaven, that I may feel no longing for the food of earth. I am needy; Thou, Jesus, art my bread. I am poor; Thou, Jesus, art my life. In Thy light, O Word of the Father, I shall see light. For all this I thank Thee and love Thee, and give Thee the praise of my heart.

X

About the form of the gift, namely, that it is given under the appearance of wheaten bread

C. Our Lord gives us Himself under the species of wheaten bread, and not of any other kind of bread; and He does this for three reasons.

(1) First, this kind of grain has a natural superiority over all other kinds, as may be proved by three things: 1, it is the purest; 2, it is most commonly used for bread; 3, it is most nutritious for the body.

1. This kind is the only kind that reaches perfection. Wheaten bread is bread simply and absolutely, because of its great purity and perfection.

2. The grain of wheat is most commonly used for bread, because it agrees with the whole and the sick. Nay, it best suits birds and beasts, for they eat it more readily than other kinds. Therefore wheaten bread is truly bread, because of its worth and common usefulness.

3. Grain of wheat is highly nutritious to the body, because, through its natural purity, its general usefulness, and its glutinous nature, the nourishment derived from it mingles with the members of the body in the best way. As to these three things it nourishes and strengthens in the highest degree. Thus wheaten bread is pure, and the grain of wheat is first in honour by reason of its worth and common usefulness. Again, it is fitting that the holiest body, which is the holiest bread of the sons of God, should be given to His sons under the species of that bread which is purest and best.

(2) Secondly, He gives His Body under the species of wheaten bread, because in it there is a very clear representation of the faithful. For as wheat must be considered in a threefold state, so the gathering of all the faithful is wont to be distinguished in three states. Thus, 1, wheat stands in the fields; 2, it is winnowed, and the chaff is cast away; 3, it is stored in the granaries.

In like manner there are three degrees among the faithful: 1, beginners; 2, the advanced; 3, the perfect.

1. The first are signified by the wheat standing in the fields; 2, the second, by the grains as they are winnowed from the chaff; 3, the third, by the purified grains as they are stored in the garners.

1, The first seek for the teaching of preachers; 2, the second for constant purification; 3, the third for the everlasting rest of the Blessed.

St. Gregory, speaking of the words of Job, says, ‘The elect are the wheat of God to be stored in the barns of Heaven. The corn desires the clouds, for all the elect greatly long for the presence of holy preachers. The clouds scatter the light, because holy preachers give examples of life, not only in their words, but also in their deeds. They go round about everywhere, because by the light of their preaching they enlighten the ends of the earth.’

2. Gedeon working among the wheat by the winepress signifies each elect one, who, in the shadow of the holy Cross, by uprightness of judgment and confession, cleanses his heart as it were with a rod from the chaff of his sins. The consolation of God strengthens such a soul against temptations. They who fear the Lord will prepare their hearts, and in His sight will sanctify their souls.

3. Do not despise the chastening of the Lord, and then you will reach your appointed place in the heavenly kingdom, and will be with all the Blessed for evermore.

(3) Thirdly, He gives us His Body under the appearance of wheaten bread, because in that bread there is an express likeness of His Body. For you can think of wheat in three ways: 1, as lying in a heap; 2, as falling in a field; 3, as made into bread. 1, It signifies the Body of Jesus conceived by the Blessed Virgin; 2, it signifies that holy Body as it suffered for us in the world; 3, it signifies His Body glorified in Heaven. 1, The Mother of Christ is greatly honoured; 2, the sinner is freed; 3, the Blessed are filled with gladness.

1. Very glorious is that woman of whom the Son of God was made according to the flesh. The womb, like a heap of wheat, is the womb of the Mother of God; for the heap of wheat is the spotless members of Christ as they were formed in that virginal womb. The lilies, that girdle the wheat, are the splendour of every kind of chastity with which all the members and senses of the Blessed Virgin are adorned.

2. Jesus by His death freed from death the human race; and because He says that He is a grain of wheat, it is the custom of His Church to consecrate His Body under no other species.

3. The prophet praises the wheat of the elect; for the sweetest bread is the Body of Christ in the glory of the Blessed.

N. Observe that the Blessed will have a triple gift from the sweet and beautiful Body of our Lord: 1, the preparation of all delights; 2, the fulfilling of all desires; 3, peaceful and everlasting enjoyment of all good.

Here the wicked eat with the good; there the wicked will be under the ceaseless curse, while the good will be in the safety of the marriage-feast of our Lord which never ends.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About wheaten bread; They shall be converted that sit under His shadow; they shall live upon wheat. Osee 14:8.

(2) Its likeness to the faithful; 1. Preachers; Corn desireth clouds, and the clouds spread their light. They go round about, whithersoever the will of Him that governeth them shall lead them, to whatsoever He shall command them upon the face of the whole earth. Job 37:11.

2. Purification; An Angel of the Lord came and sat under an oak that was in Ephra, and belonged to Joas, the father of the family of Ezri; and when Gedeon his son was thrashing and cleansing wheat by the winepress to flee from Madian, the Angel of the Lord appeared to him. Judges 6:11, 12.

They that fear the Lord will prepare their hearts, and in His sight will sanctify their souls. They that fear the Lord keep His commandments, and will have patience until His visitation. Ecclus. 2:20, 21.

3. Rest in Heaven; Thou shalt enter into the grave in abundance, as a heap of wheat is brought in its season. Job 5:26.

Whose fan is in His hand, and He will purge His floor, and will gather the wheat into His barn; but the chaff He will burn with unquenchable fire. St. Luke 3:17.

(3) Its likeness to His Body; 1. Jesus in the womb of Mary; Thy womb is like a heap of wheat set about with lilies. Cantic. 7:2.

Blessed is the womb that bare Thee. St. Luke 11:27.

2. His Passion; Amen, amen I say to you, unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground die, itself remaineth alone. St. John 12:24, 25.

3. His Body glorified; What is the good thing of Him, and what is His beautiful thing, but the corn of the elect and the wine budding forth virgins? Zach. 9:17.

N. 1. The preparation; The bread of Aser shall be fat, and he shall yield dainties to kings. Gen. 49:20.

In Thy sweetness, O God, Thou hast provided for the poor. Ps. 67:11.

Thou didst feed Thy people with the food of Angels, and gavest them bread from Heaven prepared without labour; having in it all that is delicious and the sweetness of every taste. Wisd. 16:20.

As it is written, That eye hath not seen nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him. 1 Cor. 2:9.

2. The fulfilling; Who hath placed peace in thy borders, and filleth thee with the fat of corn. Ps. 147:14.

Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem; praise thy God, O Sion. Ps. 147:12.

Bless the Lord, O my soul, and let all that is within me bless His holy name. Ps. 102:1.

I will fill the souls of the priests with fatness, and My people shall be filled with My good things, saith the Lord. Jerem. 31:14.

Thy sustenance showed Thy sweetness to Thy children, and serving every man’s will, it was turned to what every man liked. Wisd. 16:21.

3. The fruition; Blessed is he that shall eat bread in the kingdom of God. St. Luke 14:15.

The Lord hath sworn by His right hand and by the arm of His strength, Surely I will no more give thy corn to be meat for thy enemies, and the sons of the strangers shall not drink thy wine for which thou hast laboured; for they that gather it shall eat it, and shall praise the Lord, and they that bring it together shall drink it in My holy courts. Is. 62:8, 9.

Thou hast made known to me the ways of life; Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end. Ps. 15:10.

Thanksgiving

O Eternal Father, Thou hast set me here to try me and prove me, and Thou hast given me a work to do. For this I thank Thee and bless Thee and praise Thee. In all sorrow and in all pain, in the light of our eyes and in the gladness of life, Thou dost wisely and sweetly order all things from one end of the world to the other. Thou dost wisely and sweetly order all things about me. I am poor and weak and blind; but Thou hast always thought of me Thy child, and Thou hast always loved me, and lovest me now, with an everlasting love. However great my sufferings may be in body or in mind, keep me in Thy peace, and give me grace always to be stayed on Thee. Whatever loneliness or dread or shadows of terror may come to me, Thy hand holds me, and Thy right hand guides me. Thou art blessed in all that Thou givest, and blessed in all that Thou dost not give, and blessed in all that Thou takest away. O most loving Father, though Thou shouldest slay me, I will trust Thee.

Now I thank Thee for this living Bread which I have received. The crumbs from the table of Thy Son are more precious than all the feasts and riches of the world. Thou hast given me Thy Son; Thou hast given me Thy Holy Spirit. O my Father and my God, what a giver Thou art! But who am I that Thou shouldest be mindful of me, and what am I that Thou shouldest regard me? I am Thy child, and Thou art the Father who made me for Thyself. Thou hast been my Father from eternity: and beneath me are Thy everlasting arms. With all my heart and all my soul and all my strength I give thanks and love and praise to Thee. Thou art the unbeginning fountain of the Godhead. Thou art the principle of Thy uncreated Son, and with Him Thou art the principle of Thy uncreated Spirit. O Father, I love Thee.

PART III

THE THIRD THING TO BE CHIEFLY NOTED IS THE MIRACLES OF ALMIGHTY GOD WORKED ABOUT THE MOST HOLY SACRAMENT

XI

About the three miracles that are wrought in consecration

THE miracles worked about the Blessed Sacrament are signs or wonders of the power of God. They are to be considered in three ways: A, in the consecration of our Lord's Body; B, in its possession; C, in its reception. For, first, we consecrate it; then we possess it; then we receive it. In this Meditation and the next we consider, A, the three miracles of consecration. In the Thirteenth Meditation we consider, B, the three miracles of possession. In the Fourteenth Meditation we consider, C, the three miracles of reception.

A. The three miracles of consecration: (1) under the species of bread is the true Body of Christ; (2) the whole substance of bread is changed into the Body of Christ; (3) the whole substance of bread is changed into the Body of Christ, so that the accidents of bread remain.

The first miracle is wonderful; the second in more wonderful; the third is most wonderful of all.

In this Meditation we consider, A, (1) and (2), the first two miracles of consecration; and in the next Meditation we consider, A, (3), the third miracle.

(1) Under the species of bread is that true Body of Jesus which He took from the substance of the Blessed Virgin. Now this is proved by three things: 1, by the testimony of those who are worthy of belief; 2, by the testimony of positive signs; 3, by the demonstration of miracles.

1. The first miracle is proved by the testimony of those who are worthy of belief.

St. Augustin says, ‘A word is added to an element, and then there is a Sacrament; that is, a word of God, taught by Christ, is spoken over the bread, and then there is a thing holy and hidden;’ namely, the Body of our Saviour under the species of bread. Again he says, ‘This we strive to prove by every means, that the Sacrament of the Church is made up of two things, the visible species of the elements, and the invisible Flesh and Blood of Christ, as Christ Himself, a Divine Person, is God and man.’

St. Ambrose says, ‘That bread which we take in this holy mystery I know to be Him, who was formed in the womb of the Virgin by the hand of the Holy Ghost, and who on the Altar of the Cross was burnt up with the fire of His Passion. The Bread of Angels has been made the food of man.’

St. Gregory says, ‘Great, yea, fearful, is this mystery, where we seem to behold one thing, yet know that it is another. We look on the figure of bread and wine, and yet we know that there, by the power of God, are the Body and Blood of Christ.’

Eusebius says, ‘Truly the victim of the Church is one and perfect; to be judged by faith, not by the appearance; and pronounced upon by the inward understanding, and not by the outward sight. Hence He who came from Heaven says, “Take and eat; this is My Body.” Far, therefore, from us be the smallest doubt of unbelief, for the giver of the gift is the witness to its truth.’

2. Next, there is the proof from signs which God has chosen; and the force of these signs is in this, that as the sign is so is the thing signified. Now there is a twofold sign, a sign of God and a sign of man; but whereas a human sign is artificial, the sign of God is sacramental. Again, as we have already seen in Meditation IX., a sign of man has a meaning according to his intention, and is double. In one case it does not contain what it signifies, as the sign of a hoop, which contains no wine; but in the other case it does contain what it signifies, as a pasty signifies meat and contains it, hidden within. In like manner the signs which God has chosen for the Sacraments have a twofold meaning according to His intention. There were the Sacraments of the law, which did not contain what they signified, and did not effect what they figured, such as the Paschal lamb and the like, as we have already seen. But the Sacraments of the Gospel contain what they signify. Thus the Holy Eucharist contains what it signifies. For according to the intention of God it signifies a holy thing, that is, the Body of Christ, and

contains it. Hence He says, ‘This is My Body.’ The outward sign is the species of bread, and the inward gift is the Body of Christ. Thus there are new signs and new miracles; for the old signs, which did not contain the grace they signified, have passed away. St. Augustin says, ‘Hence they are called Sacraments, as being signs of a holy thing, because one thing is seen in them, and another thing is known to be there. That which is seen has a bodily appearance, but that which is known to be there has spiritual fruit. In the species of bread and wine, which we see, we honour our Lord, whom we do not see.’

3. Paschasius says, ‘No one who has read the lives of the Saints can fail to have seen that, either for those in doubt or for those who had a fervent love, the secret of the Blessed Sacrament has been often shown in visible species, in the form of a lamb or a boy, or in the colour of flesh or blood, in order that the hidden mystery of the Altar might be known by miracle. Once when St. Basil was offering the Sacrifice of the Mass on Easter Sunday, a certain Jew, being anxious to find out the mystery, pretended to be a Christian, and got among the worshippers. He saw an infant in the hands of Basil, and then he saw that infant come to all who received Communion.’ Other things happened, but the end of it was that the Jew and all his family were baptised the next day by St. Basil. Paschasius tells another wonderful thing about the Blessed Sacrament. ‘A certain very holy priest, called (Egidius, began to pray earnestly to God that He would show him the Body and Blood of our Lord. There came a day when he was celebrating the divine mysteries in his accustomed way. After the Agnus Dei he threw himself on his knees and prayed, and said, “O Almighty God, my Maker and my Redeemer, show to me in my unworthiness the Body of Christ in this mystery, that I may see it in the form of the Child who once cried on His Mother’s breast.” On this an Angel, coming suddenly from Heaven, said to him, “Rise quickly, if you wish to see Jesus. He is present here, wearing the bodily raiment which His holy Mother gave Him.” At these words the priest rose up in fear, and saw above the Altar a boy sitting. The Angel then said to him, “Thou dost wish to see Jesus, whom thou hast consecrated by words of mystery under the species of bread. Now look at Him with thine eyes, and touch Him with thy hands.” The priest, wonderful to say, trusting to the heavenly light, took the Child in his trembling arms and folded Him to his heart. With many embraces he gave sweet kisses to

God, and touched with his own lips the holy lips of his Lord. When this was done he put the boy back on the Altar, and, again prostrating himself on the ground, prayed that Jesus would vouchsafe to return to the former species. Rising, he found the Blessed Sacrament on the Altar, and so received our Lord in Communion.'

(2) The second miracle in consecration is that the substance of the bread is changed into our Lord's Body which He took of Mary; and this is done by the power of the word of God. That this is so may be proved in three ways: 1, from a power that is like; 2, from a power that is less; 3, from a power that is greater.

1. First, as to a like power: the word of God has changed one substance into another. We read that at the marriage-feast in Cana, Jesus changed water into wine. If He could do that, He can do this. For in like things there is a like judgment; and, where a like power commands, a like effect follows.

2. Next, as to a less power: things which are weaker than the word of God change one substance into another. Now as we know, God has willed that changes of things should be made in three ways besides sides those which He makes by His word: a, by art; b, by nature; c, by grace.

a. The art of man has power to change one substance into another; as is clear in the case of a glass-blower, who changes worthless ashes into clear and beautiful glass. Much more, then, the might of the word of God can change bread into His Body and wine into His Blood. Eusebius says, 'The invisible Priest by His word changes visible creatures into the substance of His Body and Blood, with hidden might.'

b. Nature changes one substance into another. In a vine water is changed into wine; and by the secret power of nature and the labour of bees the nectar of flowers is changed into honey. So also in us bread itself, which we eat daily, is changed by nature into flesh. Much more the might of the word of God can change bread into the substance of His Body and wine into the substance of His Blood.

c. Grace given to men sometimes changes one substance into another. Hence Moses by a special grace changed a rod into a serpent and water into blood. Much more, therefore, the might of the word of God can change bread and wine into His Body and Blood. St. Ambrose says, 'Moses took hold of his rod and threw it on the ground, and it became a serpent. Thus you see that nature was changed by prophetic grace, and that grace is stronger than nature. But if the blessing of a man avail to change nature, what shall we say of the consecration of God, in which the very words of our Saviour work the work? If, then, you ask me how the bread can become the Body of Christ, I answer, by consecration, which comes about by the word of Christ.'

3. Thirdly, as to greater power: the word of God does and can do much greater things than change bread into the Body of Christ. In the beginning was the Word, and all things were made by Him. St. Ambrose says, 'We read about God's works in creation, that He spoke and they were made. How, then, shall the word, which has power to make from nothing things that did not exist before, be unable to change those things which are into that which they are not? For it is not less to give new natures than to change natures which exist. Thus that substance which was bread before consecration is made the Body of Christ by consecration, for the word changes the creature.'

When an irrational and inanimate creature, like bread, is changed into something better, that is, into the Body of Christ, by the might of the word of God, it is indeed wonderful that sinful man cannot be converted from a bad life to a good one by many words or kindnesses or threatenings or promises.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About the wonders of God; I will praise Thee, for Thou art fearfully magnified; wonderful are Thy works, as my soul knoweth right well. Ps. 138:14.

(1) The first miracle of consecration; 2. The signs; Renew the signs and work new miracles. Ecclus. 36:6.

3. Miracles; Be ye sanctified, for … the Lord will do wonders among you. Jos. 3:5.

I will do signs such as were never seen on the earth, nor in any nation. Ex. 34:10.

Thy way, O God, is as the holy place; who is the great God like our God? Thou art the God that does wonders; Thou hast made Thy power known among the nations. Ps. 76:14, 15.

He doeth things great and incomprehensible and wonderful, of which there is no number. Job 9:10.

The heavens shall confess Thy wonders, O Lord. 88:6.

Who alone doeth great wonders, for His mercy endureth for ever. Ps. 135:4.

It hath seemed good to me therefore to publish His signs, because they are great, and His wonders, because they are mighty. Dan. 3:99, 100.

He is the Deliverer and Saviour, doing signs and wonders in heaven and in earth. Dan. 6:27.

I will show wonders in heaven. Joel 2:30.

(2) The second miracle of consecration; Behold a Virgin shall conceive, and bear a Son; and His name shall be called Emmanuel. Is. 7:14.

1. From like power; Thou hast kept the good wine until now. St. John 2:10.

2. From less power; a. Art; If He examine on a sudden, who shall answer Him? Or who can say, Why doest Thou so? Job 9:12.

His word is full of power; neither can any man say to Him, Why doest Thou so? Eccles. 8:4.

b. Nature; Let the earth bring forth the green herb and such as may seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after its kind. Gen. 1:11.

Praise the Lord from the earth … fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil His word. Ps. 148:7, 8.

c. Power given to men; Moses answered and said, They will not believe me nor hear my voice, but they will say, The Lord hath not appeared to thee. Then He said to him, What is it that thou holdest in thy hand? He answered, A rod; and the Lord said, Cast it down upon the ground. He cast it down, and it was turned into a serpent, so that Moses fled from it. And the Lord said, Put out thy hand and take it by the tail. He put forth his hand and took hold of it, and it was turned into a rod. Ex. 4:1–4.

The Lord said again, Put thy hand into thy bosom; and when he had put it into his bosom he brought it forth leprous as snow. And He said, Put back thy hand into thy bosom. He put it back and brought it out again, and it was like the other flesh. Ex. 4:6, 7.

3. From greater power; Let all Thy creatures serve Thee, because Thou hast spoken; because Thou hast spoken and they were made. Thou didst send forth Thy Spirit, and they were created; and there is no one that can resist Thy voice. Judith 16:17.

He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created. Ps. 32:9.

Whilst they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessing broke, and gave to them, and said, Take ye; this is My Body. St. Mark 14:22.

Thanksgiving

O Spirit of the Father and the Son, in the dawn of the world Thou didst move over the face of the waters. Thou didst overshadow the Mother of God in Nazareth, when the Word was made flesh, and God sent forth His Son made of a woman. Thou art He by whom Jesus offered Himself without spot to God on the Altar of the Cross. By Thee Jesus is offered now in this unbloody Sacrifice of the Altar. Thou art the Sanctifier, Almighty and Eternal God, and Thou dost ever bless the Sacrifice that is made ready for Thy name. O loving Spirit, strengthen my faith. Give me an ever-brighter love for Jesus. He is Emmanuel, God with us: God with us in our human nature, God with us in this Sacrament of His love. Dear Spirit, I live and move and am in Thee: and I love Thee.

Prayer

O Ever-blessed Trinity, One God, Thou hast given me bread in my hunger and drink in my thirst. I call to mind all Thy love and gentleness and compassion, in which Thou hast led me and guided me until now. With all my heart I pray for greater gifts of Thy grace and more overflowing treasure of Thy love. Dwell in me more and more, as the Lord of the harvest and the vintage, that I may wash my robe in wine and my raiment in the blood of the grape. Give to me, as Thou only canst give, the blessings of heaven above, and the blessings of the deep that lieth beneath. In the morning let me rise with Thee in faithfulness, that in the evening I may rest safely with Thee in love and joy and peace. O God, my soul resteth in Thee.

XII

About the third miracle wrought in consecration

A. (3) The third miracle, yea, the most miraculous sign in the consecration of the Sacrament of the Altar, is that the whole substance of the bread is changed into the Body of Jesus, in such a way that the accidents of bread remain; that is to say, colour, taste, and such things surrounding our Lord's Body, and evident to I our senses. It has been proved that bread is changed in consecration into the Body of Christ, and it is clear that the accidents remain, so that they can be reached by our senses. Such a change is supernatural, and is properly called conversion or transubstantiation: for anything altogether like it is not found in nature. But it can be shown by a threefold likeness that this may be done.

1. The first likeness to show that the substance of bread may be changed, while the accidents remain, is taken from the prophetic grace. Thus Eliseus threw salt into the bitter water, and it was changed to sweet. Now, in this example, four things are to be considered: the container and the contained, the worker and the work. The container is the species or outward brightness; the contained is the inward bitterness. This passes away, and is changed into the fourth, or the thing worked, that is, the sweetness; and it is done by the third, namely, the worker, that is, by the prophetic grace. So it is, in a way, when bread is changed into the Body of our Lord. The first thing, the container, that is, the outward species of bread, remains. The second thing, or the thing contained, that is, the substance of bread, is changed into the fourth, the Body of Christ; and this is done by the third or worker, that is, by the word of God.

2. The second likeness is taken from spiritual conversion. Samuel promised Saul that he should be changed and have spiritual life. In this conversion or change the same four things are to be considered, namely, the container and the contained, the worker and the work. For in the state of sin our outward man is fair and pleasant; but our inward man is sick, being full of poison and the bitterness of sin. Thus when a man is converted by the Spirit of God, though the outward body remain the same, the inward bitterness and weakness of sin are changed into the health and sweetness of grace. The first, that is, the outward species of the body, remains; the second, that is, the bitterness of sin, passes into the fourth, namely, the sweetness of grace: and this is done by the third, that is to say, by the Spirit of God. So it comes about, as has been said before, in the consecration of our Lord's Body.

To one converted Eugenius says, 'How great and how worthy of praise are those benefits which are worked by the might of the goodness of God! It ought not to be to you a new and impossible thing that earthly things are changed into the Body of Christ. You have only to look at yourself, and you will see that though, laying aside past wickedness, you have been suddenly clothed with new goodness, yet nothing has been added to the outside, but all the change is inward.'

3. The third likeness is taken from natural change. We see that eggs placed under a hen are changed into flesh, yea, into a living chicken. In this change also those four things just spoken of may be found. For there is the container, that is, the shell, as it were the outward species of the egg; the contained, that is, the yolk, as it were the inward substance of the egg; the worker, that is, nature; and the work, that is, the flesh of the chicken. The first, namely, the shell, the outward species, remains; the second, namely, the inside, or inward substance, passes on and is changed into the fourth, or the body of the living bird; and this is done by the third, namely, nature, the worker. This is indeed a wonderful likeness, for during some days the egg looks outwardly the same, when it is not really an egg, but the whole body of a living bird, veiled by the shell. As therefore in this case the hen works by nature, so in the Sacrament of the Altar the Holy Ghost works by His own almighty power. If therefore you put under a hen one egg or two eggs or more, and those are changed by nature into flesh, the outside remaining the same, how much more can the Holy Ghost by His own power, while the

species of bread remain outwardly the same, change one Host on the Altar, or most Hosts, into the Body of our Lord!

N. Note the verse about the Body of Christ: ‘Body born of bread, Body born of the Virgin.’ Speaking of the substance of bread, it does not say that bread is the matter for the Body of Christ, but that bread is changed into the Body of Christ. The first is conversion; the second is material.

R. Look at this from a moral point of view. When an inanimate creature, like bread, is changed into that which is better, by the word of God and His Spirit, can we describe the hardness of the hearts of sinners, who are not drawn to conversion even by many words and many works of the Holy Ghost? They are harder than rock, as Jeremias says, and will not return. This hardness is final impenitence, of which the course is threefold; a, a long habit of sinning; b, unbelief in the justice of God; c, the temptations of the enemy.

a. The evil custom, growing on us, becomes almost like a law; so that Scripture asks if the leopard can change his spots or the Ethiopian his skin. The habit of sinning becomes, as it were, a second nature; but things impossible to man are possible to God. Sinners who have gone on for long in sin seem to change their nature; but it is God who works in them. St. Augustin says, ‘Thou didst call me, O Lord, and I sighed, bound as I was, not by the iron of another, but by my own self-will. For an enemy had hold of my will, and by this he forged a chain and bound me. From my perverted will there sprang up lust. As I served that lust it grew up into a habit, and when I did not resist the habit it became a necessity.’

b. Such men do away with the providence of God. They do not understand that He rewards the good and punishes the wicked; but they think that all things are ruled by chance. Thus they are like the fool of whom David speaks, and are hardened and hateful.

c. A wicked spirit has hold of the souls of these men, and rules in them, and blinds them so that they do not see God. They listen to his lying promises, and he leads them away. They grow harder and harder, more unclean and more unbelieving; and their end is death, that is, death in the unutterable woe where God is not and cannot be.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(3) About the third miracle in consecration; 1. A prophetic grace; The men of the city said to Eliseus, … The waters are very bad.… He said,

Bring me a new vessel, and put salt in it. When they had brought it, he went out to the spring of the waters and cast the salt into it, and said, Thus saith the Lord, I have healed these waters, and there shall be no more in them death or barrenness. And the waters, were healed to this day, according to the word of Eliseus which he spoke. 4 Kings 2:19–22.

2. Spiritual conversion; The Spirit of the Lord shall come upon thee, and thou shalt prophesy with them, and shalt be changed into another man. When, therefore, these signs shall happen to thee, do whatsoever thy hand shall find, for the Lord is with thee, 1 Kings 10:6, 7.

3. Natural change; R. Hardness of heart; O Lord, Thy eyes are upon truth; Thou hast struck them, and they have not grieved; Thou hast bruised them, and they have refused to receive correction; they have made their faces harder than the rock, and have refused to return. Jer. 5:3.

a. A habit of sin; If the Ethiopaian can change his skin and the leopard his spots, you also may do well when you have learned evil. Jer. 13:23.

b. Unbelief in the justice of God; It shall come to pass at that time that I will search Jerusalem with lamps, and will visit upon the men that are settled on their lees; that say in their hearts, The Lord will not do good, nor will He do evil. Soph. 1:12.

The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God. They are corrupt, and are become abominable in their ways. Ps. 13:1, 2.

c. Temptations of the enemy; They will not set their thoughts to return to their God; for the spirit of fornication is in the midst of them, and they have not known the Lord. Osee 5:4.

Evil suretiship hath undone many of good estate, and hath tossed them as a wave of the sea. It hath made powerful men to go from place to place round about, and they have wandered in strange countries. Ecclus. 29:23, 24.

Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour. 1 Pet. 5:8.

Thanksgiving

O Holy Ghost, who doest wonders in nature and in grace, convert me to Thyself more and more. Take from me my heart of stone and make it a heart of flesh, on which may be written hymns of praise and love, for Thou art the Spirit of the living God. Thou art the light shining out of darkness. Shine in my heart, and give me the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. Strengthen me that I may always bear about in my body the dying of Jesus, that in me the life of Jesus may be manifested. Let Thy grace abound through many in thanksgiving to the glory of God; let it abound in my heart. Thy miracles are known on every Altar where Jesus gives to us the Bread of Life, His own Body and Blood. I have received Him into my soul; I have received the Incarnate Word, God and man. From Him with the Father Thou dost ever proceed. We give thanks and love and praise and glory and blessing to Thee. Thou, with Jesus, our Lord, art most high in the glory of God the Father.

XIII

About the three miracles in the possession of our Lord’s Body

B. These three miracles are worked by the power and perfection of consecration. They are to be noted in the possession of the Body of Jesus, which after consecration we still have with us. These are three wondrous signs: (1) a large body is contained under a little Host; (2) the same Body is in many places at the same time; (3) though this Body be in many places, it is not divided.

(1) The first wonderful sign: in the possession of our Lord’s Body a large thing, that is, our Lord’s Body, is contained under a small appearance of bread. For this there is a threefold reason:

1. The first reason is the proof of the greatness of His wisdom who made so wondrous a work, that is, the wisdom of the Holy Ghost. We see that the more skilful a sculptor is, the more delicate are his works. If you show a jeweller a very small stone, or a very small bit of metal, and ask him to make in it a very finely cut design, the less skilful workman will say it is impossible, while a very skilful workman will do it easily. So to prove His wisdom the Holy Ghost easily makes the whole Body of Christ to be present under the very smallest species of the Sacrament. Hence, in Scripture, the Holy Ghost is said to be ‘subtile.’ For it is not possible to put on the Altar a piece of bread so small that He does not know how to turn it into the true Body of Jesus. St. John of Damascus, speaking of the Holy Ghost overshadowing our Lady, says, ‘You ask me how bread can become the Body of Christ; and I say to you, The Holy Ghost will come upon it, and He will do those things which are above nature and above knowledge.’

2. The second reason is the likeness of the power of Jesus to the power of God. For whatever the Son of God can do by nature, this also the Son of Man can do, because of the unity of person. St. Ambrose, speaking of the fulness of power given to Him in Heaven and on earth, says, ‘He will be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High. This does not mean that He was not great before He was born of the Virgin, but it means that He will receive in time the power which as Son of God He had naturally from everlasting. This is so in the sense that He is one person, for thus the Son of God and the Son of Man agree in one power.’ But the Son of God, the Word of the Father, had that power, for He clothed Himself in a very small part of a body separated by the power of the Holy Ghost, and enclosed Himself in it, as it is said, ‘The Word was made flesh.’ A like power, therefore, has been given to our Lord as man, so that He is able to make His Body present under the smallest appearance of bread. It is said that the Lord is great in Sion; and Sion means a looking-glass, as Papias and Augustin say. Now there is no doubt that a large image is seen as clearly and wholly in a small glass as in a large one. God is therefore said to be great in Sion, or in a mirror, because the true Body of Christ is present, as we know by faith, as wholly in every way under a small appearance of bread as under a large appearance.

3. The third reason is, that this Sacrament is a sufficient cause for the end sought. Now the end of the Eucharist is to feed the faithful soul with spiritual food, and strengthen it against evil and in good. The efficient cause of this is the Body of our Lord, and that can be as truly and wholly under a small Host as under a large Host, because under each it is equally united to God, from whom comes all power in this Holy Sacrament. For however small the species of bread may be, there is the whole Body of Christ by conversion, His Blood by connection, His Soul by conjunction, and His whole Godhead by union. Hence it is certain that He has the fulness of power to feed the soul spiritually and give it strength. He who gathered little manna had no less than he who gathered much. St. Hilary says, ‘Where there is any part of His Body, that is, the smallest part of the Sacrament, there is His whole Body. For that which was true of the manna, a type of the Body of our Lord, is true of the Body itself. They who gather much have nothing over, and they who gather little have no want.’ For in this we have not to consider visible quantity but spiritual power. Hence he

who consecrates much bread, or a large Host, has for his salvation no more than the true Body of Christ.

(2) The second wonderful sign is that one and the same Body is in many places, in many Hosts, in many particles. This is proved in three ways.

1. First, it is proved by Moses and the prophet Malachias. Malachias teaches that in many places one oblation will be offered, that is, the clean oblation of the faithful. Moses speaks of the memory of the name of God. This memory is the Sacrifice of the Altar, that is, the Body of Jesus, for He commanded us to offer that Sacrifice in remembrance of Himself. Now this is done in many places, and in this our one Lord comes to give us His blessing.

2. Secondly, it is proved by a clear reason, which is this, that the Son of Man shares the power of the Son of God, because of the unity of person. St. Ambrose says, ‘As the Son of God and the Son of Man are one person, so they have one power.’ Hence, as the Son of God is essentially everywhere, He has given to the Son of Man that His Body shall be sacramentally present in many places. St. Augustin says, ‘The Body of Christ is in one place, that is, in Heaven, for visibly, in human shape, He went up to the right hand of the Father. His truth, however, that is, His Godhead, is everywhere; and His truth, that is, His true Body, is sacramentally on every Altar where Mass is said.’ Pope Innocent III. says, ‘The height of heavenly wisdom has ordained, that as there are Three Persons in unity of essence, namely, the Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost, so there should be three substances in unity of person, that is, the Godhead of Christ, His Soul, and His Body. Since, therefore, Christ in His divine nature exists in three ways in things created—that is to say, in all things by His essence; in the just, and only in the just, by grace; and in our assumed manhood by the hypostatic union—He willed also to exist in three ways as to His human nature. In Heaven He is locally, in the Word He is personally, and on the Altar He is sacramentally. Hence, as by His Godhead He is essentially in all things, so in His manhood He is whole in many places.’

3. Thirdly, this is proved by the visible likeness which is shown to all in a glass. If you set many glasses, so that your face can be seen in them, one face will appear in all equally and wholly. If, on the other hand, you break up a glass into many little bits, one face will be seen perfectly in each bit. Moreover, though the glass be broken into many pieces, your face remains

one in all, and is not changed. So is it in truth in this Sacrament of Jesus, who is called the mirror and image of the goodness of God. If then this glass, namely, the form of bread, be broken into many parts, in each it will be united to God, that is to say, will be the true Body of Christ. St. Jerome says, 'Each of the faithful receives Christ whole. He is whole in each part, and is not lessened in each part, but in each part gives Himself whole.'

(3) The third wonderful sign is that, though our Lord's Body be in many places, in many Hosts, in many fragments of the Host, yet it is not divided into parts, but remains whole and undivided. The Apostle asks if Christ be divided; as much as to say that, though He is in Heaven locally, in the hearts of the good spiritually, and in many places sacramentally, He is always one and whole. The explanation of this miracle is the unspeakable union of God and man, of flesh and the Word. For as the Word of God is everywhere, filling all Heaven and the whole universe, yet remaining undivided, so He granted power to His Body to be undivided; that is, the Body which He assumed of the Blessed Virgin and gave to His Apostles. As His Godhead is everywhere, it fills that Body and unites it with itself, and brings it about that as the Godhead is one, so the truth of the Body of Jesus is one Body in truth. St. Augustin says, 'When we eat Christ we do not make Him into parts; but in the Holy Sacrament He is that which each one receives. Each one receives his own part in this Sacrament, but our Lord remains whole and undivided in Himself. He abideth whole and undivided in Heaven; He abideth whole and undivided in your heart. For He was altogether whole with the Father when He came to the Blessed Virgin; but when He filled her with Himself He did not go away from God. He came in the flesh, that men might feed upon Him; and yet, that He might feed the Angels, He abode wholly with His Father.' We should therefore pray to our Lord that, though we may be bodily divided from one another, we may be always spiritually joined to Him in love. We should pray, too, that He will always so feed us sacramentally with Himself in this life that, with the Angels, we may hereafter feed for ever on the unveiled vision of His face.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About His Body in a small Host; 1. The wisdom of the Holy Ghost, the worker; Having all power, overseeing all things, and containing all spirits, intelligible, pure, subtile. Wisd. 7:23.

In the sixth month the Angel Gabriel was sent from God into a city of Galilee called Nazareth, to a Virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph, of the house of David; and the Virgin's name was Mary. And the Angel being come in said to her, Hail, full of grace, the Lord is with thee; blessed art thou among women. She, having heard, was troubled at his saying, and thought with herself what manner of salutation this should be. And the Angel said to her, Fear not, Mary, for thou hast found grace with God. Behold thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a Son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the Most High; and the Lord God shall give to Him the throne of David His father; and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever, and of His kingdom there shall be no end. And Mary said to the Angel, How shall this be done, because I know not man? And the Angel answering said to her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee; and therefore also the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God. St. Luke 1:26–35.

2. Our Lord's power like God's power; Jesus coming spoke to them, saying, All power is given to Me in Heaven and in earth. Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you; and behold I am with you all days, even to the end of the world. St. Matt. 28:18–20.

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing that was made. In Him was life, and the life was the light of men; and the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not … And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. St. John 1:1–5, 14.

The Lord hath reigned, let the people be angry: He sitteth on the cherubim, let the earth be moved. The Lord is great in Sion, and high above all people. Let them give praise to Thy great name. Ps. 98:1–3.

3. A sufficient cause for its end; The children of Israel did so, and they gathered, one more, another less: and they measured by the measure of a gomor; neither had he more that had gathered more, nor did he find less that

had provided less; but every one had gathered, according to what they were able to eat. Ex. 16:17, 18.

(2) His one Body in many places; 1. Malachias; From the rising of the sun even to the going down My name is great among the Gentiles; and in every place there is sacrifice, and there is offered to My name a clean oblation; for My name is great among the Gentiles, saith the Lord of hosts. Mal. 1:11.

You shall make an altar of earth to Me, and you shall offer upon it your holocausts and peace-offerings, your sheep and oxen, in every place where the memory of My name shall be: I will come to thee, and I will bless thee. Ex. 20:24.

3. By a similitude; The unspotted mirror of God's majesty, and the image of His goodness. Wisd. 7:26.

(3) His Body, though in many places, is not divided; Is Christ divided? Was Paul then crucified for you? 1 Cor. 1:13.

Prayer

Eternal Father, give me more love for Jesus, Thy Son, in the most Holy Sacrament of the Altar. Let me draw near to this table of Heaven in faith and hope and love, in confidence and humility and peace and joy. Dear Father, Thou art in Heaven, loving with an equal love Thy Eternal Son and Thy Eternal Spirit, giving joy to the Mother of Jesus, giving joy to Angels and Saints. But Thou art with me on earth, loving me and giving me help, giving me every help that I need; for I am Thy child, whom Thou hast made from the dust. Lead me in the light to Jesus, my elder Brother, that in the burning of a great love I may receive Him into my soul. He came down from Heaven for me, and dwelt on earth for me. He still dwells on earth for me in the Blessed Sacrament, though He has gone up to His throne. Let Him come down to me now from His Altar, that I may feed on Him, and drink of the streams of His grace, till my hunger and thirst shall be for ever satisfied in the fulness of bliss, in the changelessness of the vision of peace.

Thanksgiving

O Holy Ghost, I thank Thee for the Bread of Life which Jesus gives. It is His gift to me; it is Thy gift to me; it is a possession for ever. I bless and praise Thee for the miracles which Thou daily workest in order that Jesus may be the food of His people. In a hundred lands, in thousands of churches, in the heat of summer and in the winter cold, in the midst of the morning dew and when the sun is high, a pure Sacrifice is offered to God, and a banquet of Heaven is spread for all. Hungry and thirsty, our souls faint within us; but we cry to Thee, and Thou leadest us in a right way, a way that brings us to Thy storehouses and to the garners of Thy grace. We kneel before the Altar, and Thou dost satisfy the empty soul, and dost fill the hungry soul with good things. We wander in a wilderness, but Thy springs are always found in it. Jesus has redeemed us from the enemy. Thou art the Comforter whom He sent. Thou dost gather us from all lands, from the rising and the setting sun, from the north and from the sea. Thy mercies, O Lord, give glory to Thee, and Thy wonderful works for the children of men ever show forth Thy praise.

XIV

About the three miracles in receiving the Body of our Lord

C. Here we have to consider the last miracles worked about the Blessed Sacrament, that is, the three miracles in the reception of our Lord's Body.

(1) The first miracle is this, that the Body of our Lord when eaten is not lessened. This is against the heretics, who say that if our Lord's Body had been greater than a mountain it would have been long ago consumed. For this miracle, that is, the inconsumptibility of the Body of Jesus, there is a threefold reason.

1. The first reason is the power of consecrating daily. Every day, wherever the faithful are, and under as many Hosts as are needed for them, we can consecrate the true and only Body of Christ according to His command. When, therefore, we feed on that, we cannot consume it; we cannot even lessen it. For as in us the cause of salvation always abides as a desire for Communion, so also abide in us the power and effect of consecrating. Thus when we eat that which is consecrated we cannot in any way lessen our Lord's Body. Lest that which always remains truly whole in itself might fail sacramentally in the Church, we preserve it by always consecrating in the form of bread, that is, as it were, by nourishing and renewing the Holy Sacrament. This is beautifully typified in the shew-bread, which was to be set always on the table in the Tabernacle of Israel, that it might be ever in the sight of the Lord. The golden rings and the golden crowns, the gold being the purest that could be got, teach us the cleanness of heart with which we should approach the Altar, and the crowns which God has in store for those that love Him. So too the fire that had always to burn on the Altar tells us of the fire of the love of God which

should burn ceaselessly on the altar of our hearts. Now we see that the fire shall never fail from the Altar, and we see also that the table of Israel with the shew-bread and their Altar with the fire have passed away. What then? Is God a liar? God forbid. The shadow fails in the Synagogue; but the truth abides in the Church, and cannot fail. Our priests always nourish the Sacrament of the Altar by consecration, and the Body of Christ, which is in it, always the same, never fails by the eating of the faithful.

2. The second reason is the true incorruptibility of this Body of Jesus, which rose from the dead, glorified, deathless, changeless, impassible, and incapable of corruption. Hence when we eat this food it is not corrupted like other food, nor is it changed into our body; but, without corruption itself, it flows into us as our spiritual nourishment. This is typified in that miracle of Elias, where the pot of meal did not waste nor the cruse of oil fail in the house of the widow, for many days, that there might be food for all the family. St. Augustin says, ‘He who eateth Me, saith our Lord, shall live by Me: for when this Bread is eaten, life is eaten. He is not slain when He is eaten, nor does He slay us, but He gives life to the dead. He lives when eaten, because He rose from the dead when slain.’

3. The third reason for this is the infinite cause of feeding. They who come to Him find food enough. Hence He is the true fountain and the true light. He waters the whole earth, that is, He puts good thoughts into the heart. As a fountain pours forth its waters, making fruitful the grass and trees, so Jesus feeds His Church. As the sun fails not, though he gives light to the whole world, so our Lord does not fail, though He gives food to His whole Church. Thus, then, our Lord feeds us with Himself, and is not lessened.

(2) The second miraculous sign in receiving our Lord’s Body is this, that if He be not eaten He is in a certain sense lessened. But to understand so wonderful a thing, we must remember that there are two mystical bodies in the world, namely, the mystical Body of Christ and the mystical body of the devil or Antichrist, to one of which all men in the world belong.

1. The mystical Body of Christ is the Holy Church, His Spouse, pure and faithful. He is the head of this Church, and all the faithful without mortal sin are His members. But His members, as St. Paul tells us, are all who receive His Body worthily.

2. On the other hand, the body of the devil is the whole assembly of the wicked men, who are, as it were, his adulterous nurse. He is their head, and all the wicked are his members. St. Gregory says, ‘The body of the devil is all wicked men; and because they are hard in obstinacy, and frail in their lives, Job compares them to molten shields.’

N. Jesus, by His own work, and by the work of His servants, is always seeking to cut men off from the body of the devil, and incorporate them in His own. So the devil by his own work, and by the work of his servants, is always seeking to draw away the members of Christ, and join them to the vile members of his harlot. St. Augustin, says, ‘They cannot at the same time be members of Christ and members of a harlot; nor can they be said to eat the Body of Christ spiritually, though they eat it sacramentally.’ But by not eating the Body of Christ spiritually, and by living badly, they take the members of Christ and make them members of the devil, and so, as far as they can, they lessen our Lord’s Body. For the soul that is gained by the devil is lost to Christ; and in this way His mystical Body decreases.

(3) The third miraculous sign in receiving our Lord’s Body is this, that when it is eaten by the faithful it is increased. This is proved in two ways, namely, by reason and likeness.

1. First, it is proved by reason. When the Body of Jesus is eaten, it is not changed, like other food, into the eater; but, on the contrary, he who truly eats it is changed into it spiritually. If any one feed upon Him, Jesus makes him a member of His mystical Body, and, incorporating him into that Body which He took of the Blessed Virgin, makes him also, in a certain sense, one thing with Himself. St. Augustin says, ‘In this Sacrament Christ has given us His Body and His Blood, which He has also made us, for we have been made His Body.’ Our flesh united to His Body, and incorporated into it, is made one thing with Him; for Osee says that the faithful live by wheat, that is, by this most Holy Sacrament. It is called our Lord’s Shadow; for He gives Himself there, not in His own Light, but under a veil, in order that the eaters may be converted, because they will be changed into His Body. This, then, is clear: if many of the faithful eat the Body of Christ and are changed into it, being made His members, then His Body is increased while eaten.

2. Next, it is proved by a likeness of human knowledge; for the more that a man communicates his knowledge to others, the more it increases. So it was with the talents of which Jesus speaks. Boetius says, ‘Knowledge is a

noble possession of the mind, and it scorneth the greedy owner. If it be not made known, it glides away; but spread abroad, it is increased.’ Thus the Incarnate Wisdom of God, being given to many for food, makes them wise, and in a sense changes them into itself; and so being eaten is not lessened but increased. When God is said to have created wisdom in the Holy Ghost, it means that the Word, the Wisdom of God, was incarnate. In this the Wisdom of God increases, while He makes many increase in wisdom. Let us try to grow in all goodness, by faith, hope, and charity, that in deed and in truth we may be the mystical Body of our Lord, and know more and more of His wisdom and His love.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About His Body when eaten not being lessened; 1. Daily consecration; Thou shalt make a table also of setim-wood … and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold; and thou shalt make to it a golden ledge round about; and to the ledge itself a polished crown.… Thou shalt prepare also four golden rings.… Thou shalt set upon the table loaves of proposition in My sight always. Ex. 25:23–26, 30.

Thou shalt take also fine flour, and shalt bake twelve loaves thereof.… And thou shalt set them six and six, one against another, upon the most clean table before the Lord: and thou shalt put upon them the clearest frankincense, that the bread may be for a memorial of the oblation of the Lord. Lev. 24:5–7.

The fire on the Altar shall always burn, and the priest shall feed it, putting wood on it every day in the morning; and laying on the holocaust shall burn thereupon the fat of the peace-offerings. This is the perpetual fire which shall never go out on the Altar. Lev. 6:12, 13.

2. His Body incorruptible; Thou wilt not leave My soul in hell, nor wilt Thou give Thy Holy One to see corruption. Ps. 15:10.

The word of the Lord came to him (Elias), saying, Arise, and go to Sarephta of the Sidonians and dwell there: for I have commanded a widow woman there to feed thee. He arose and went to Sarephta: and when he was come to the gate of the city, he saw the widow woman gathering sticks; and he called her, and said to her, Give me a little water in a vessel, that I may drink. And when she was going to fetch it he called after her, saying, Bring me also, I beseech thee, a morsel of bread in thy hand. And she answered, As the Lord thy God liveth, I have no bread, but only a handful of meal in a pot and a little oil in a cruse; and behold I am gathering two sticks, that I may go in and dress it for me and my son, that we may eat it and die. And Elias said to her, Fear not, but go and do as thou hast said. But first make for me of the same meal a little hearth-cake and bring it to me; and after make for thyself and thy son. For thus saith the Lord, the God of Israel, The pot of meal shall not waste, nor the cruse of oil be lessened, until the day wherein the Lord will give rain upon the face of the earth. She went and did according to the word of Elias; and he ate, and she and her house: and from that day the pot of meal did not waste, and the cruse of oil was not lessened, according to the word of the Lord which He spoke in the hand of Elias. 3 Kings 17:8–16.

He set him upon a high land, that he might eat the fruits of the fields, that he might suck honey out of the rock, and oil out of the hardest stone. Deut. 32:13.

They drank of the spiritual rock that followed them, and that rock was Christ. 1 Cor. 10:4.

3. The cause of feeding; a. The fountain; A spring rose out of the earth, watering all the surface of the earth; … and a river went out of the place of pleasure to water Paradise. Gen. 2:6, 10.

My people have done two evils. They have forsaken Me, the fountain of living water, and have digged to themselves cisterns, broken cisterns that can hold no water. Jerem. 2:13.

b. The light; That was the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world. He was in the world, and the world was made by Him, and the world knew Him not. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. But to as many as received Him He gave power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name: who are born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. St. John 1:8–12.

The Lord is faithful in all His words and holy in all His works. The Lord lifteth up all that fall, and setteth up all that are cast down. The eyes of all hope in Thee, O Lord; and Thou givest them meat in due season. Thou openest Thy hand, and fillest every living creature with blessing. The Lord is just in all His ways, and holy in all His works. The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon Him; to all that call upon Him in truth. He will do the will of them that fear Him; and He will hear their prayer and will save them. The Lord keepeth all them that love Him, but the wicked He will destroy. My mouth shall speak the praise of the Lord; and let all flesh bless His holy name for ever, yea, for ever and ever. Ps. 144:13–21.

Thou in the beginning, O Lord, didst found the earth, and the heavens are the works of Thy hands. They shall perish, but Thou shalt endure; and they all shall grow old as a garment, and as a vesture shalt Thou change them, and they shall be changed; but Thou art the self-same, and Thy years shall not fail. Heb. 1:10–12.

(2) His Body lessened if not eaten; 1. The Body of Christ; You are the Body of Christ and members of member. 1 Cor. 12:27.

As the body is one and has many members; and all the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body; so also is Christ. 1 Cor. 12:12.

We being many are one bread, one body; all that partake of one bread. 1 Cor. 10:17.

2. The body of the devil; His body is like molten shields, shut close up, with scales pressing upon one another. Job 41:6.

N. Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, like a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour; whom resist ye strong in faith. 1 St. Pet. 5:8, 9.

When they have eaten, and are full and fat, they will turn away after strange gods and will serve them; and will despise Me and make void My covenant. Deut. 31:20.

Know you not that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take the members of Christ and make them the members of a harlot? God forbid. 1 Cor. 6:15.

(3) His Body increased if eaten; 1. Not like earthly food; We being many are one bread, one body; all that partake of one bread. 1 Cor. 10:17.

They shall be converted that sit under His shadow; they shall live upon wheat. Osee 14:8.

2. Human knowledge; There is one most high Creator, Almighty; … He created her (Wisdom) in the Holy Ghost.… He poured her out upon all His works, and upon all flesh according to His gift; and hath given her to them that love Him. Ecclus. 1:8–10.

He that had received the five talents, coming, brought other five talents, saying, Lord, Thou didst deliver to me five talents; behold I have gained other five over and above. St. Matt. 25:20.

Growth in Christ; Doing the truth in charity, we may in all things grow up in Him who is the head, even Christ; from whom the whole body, being compacted and fitly joined together, by what every joint supplieth, according to the operation in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in charity. Eph. 4:15, 16.

Prayer

Eternal Father, look upon Thy child whom Thou hast made, and help me to draw near to the Altar and receive the Body and Blood of my Jesus, as worthily as I can. O Father, whom I love, I am weak with a great weakness; give me strength and victory.

Eternal Son, look upon Thy brother whom Thou hast redeemed. Help me to receive Thee as worthily as I can in Thy Holy Sacrament. O Brother and Friend, whom I love, I am blind with a great blindness; give me wisdom and light.

Eternal Spirit, look upon Thy temple which Thou hast hallowed for Thyself, and on the sanctuary which Thy right hand hath made. O, help me to receive the Body and Blood of Jesus, as worthily as I can. O dear Spirit, Spirit of grace and supplication, whom I love, I am cold with a great coldness, and dark with a great darkness; give me fervour; give me more love.

O Ever-blessed Trinity, Three Persons and One God, help me as I go to the Altar of Jesus.

Thanksgiving

Eternal Father, I thank Thee for the gift that Thou hast given me. It is Thy beloved Son, in whom Thou art well pleased. In Him and by Him give me strength to keep all my good resolutions.

Eternal Son, I thank Thee for the gift that Thou hast given me. It is Thyself who didst die for me. Make me, dear Jesus, wiser with Thy heavenly wisdom, and show me clearly all the things I should do for God.

Eternal Spirit, I thank Thee for the gift that Thou hast given me. It is Jesus, whose Soul Thou didst sanctify with Thy holiest treasures. Make me, dear Spirit, more loving, that I may cling more closely to God.

O Ever-blessed Trinity, Three Persons and One God, help me to live according to this gift of gifts which I have received at the Altar of Jesus.

PART IV

THE FOURTH THING TO BE CHIEFLY NOTED ABOUT THE BLESSED SACRAMENT IS THE KIND OF PREPARATION THAT WE SHOULD MAKE FOR HOLY COMMUNION

XV

About our preparation for Holy Communion

WE have to prove ourselves, examine ourselves, purify ourselves. For it is in the highest degree right and fitting that, with great care and great devotion, we should make ourselves ready to receive food so holy and so adorable as this. In it we receive the Lord of all the earth. Priests and people alike must come with holy fear and love to this heavenly feast. Even in the old law, God ordered the priests to sanctify themselves when they drew near to Him, lest He should strike them. Much more should we prepare ourselves when we draw near to the very city of the living God, and to God Himself who is the Judge of all.

Now as to our preparation we have to consider three things: A, the majesty of this most holy Body; B, the Host of bread; C, the type of the Paschal lamb.

The first and second points, A and B, will be considered in this meditation, and the third point, C, in the next.

A. This Body of Jesus is a Body of the greatest purity. It is full of the living God, and hypostatically united to Him. For receiving it therefore we must with great care make ourselves ready by three things.

1. By fulness of faith. When St. Paul says, ‘With a true heart,’ he means that our intellect must be without error. When he says, ‘In fulness of faith,’ he means that we must believe, without any doubt, those things which we cannot see, namely, that under the species of bread there is the whole Body of Jesus Christ, true man and true God. Because of the great merit of faith, St. Peter promises that they who believe in Christ, whom they do not see, shall rejoice with joy unspeakable.

2. By cleanness of heart. It is fitting that a vessel which has to receive a most clean body should be clean itself. You will see how great that

cleanness should be. Moses told the children of Israel to take one vessel for the manna, as much as to say that it should be clean with a great cleanness. St. Paul says that the vessel for the manna in the Holy of Holies was of pure gold. Thus the heart which has to hold the Bread of Heaven must be in its great cleanness like the very purest gold. Pope Alexander says, in words quoted before and fittingly repeated here, ‘Nothing in sacrifices can be greater than the Body and Blood of Christ; nor is there any oblation better than this. It excels all others, and with a pure conscience it must be offered, and with a pure mind received.’ Hugo says, ‘A pure conscience is that which has on it no just accusation as to the past, and no unjust delight as to the present, but a just will as to the future.’ Joseph of Arimathea wrapped the Body of Jesus in clean linen. Now that clean linen in which Jesus was wrapped is the pure conscience with which you must receive Him. Hence comes the custom of the Church that Mass should be said, not on silk, nor on any dyed cloth, but on pure linen.

N. But, mark, in those three things by which the linen corporal is bleached to whiteness, there are seen three things which tend to our purification: a, it is washed; b, it is wrung; c, it is dried. If, then, any one wishes to be very clean in heart, so as to receive his Lord worthily, he must be: a, washed in the water of tears; b, wrung by works of penance; c, dried up as to all moisture of fleshly desires by the fire of the love of God.

3. By devout prayer. St. Mary Magdalen and the other holy women brought aromatic spices while they sought for the Body of our Lord. So when we are going to draw near to the Body of our Lord we must pour forth devout prayers, that if perchance we should be too little prepared by fasting and confession, the want may be supplied by spiritual incense, that is, by the sacrifice of prayer. A great part of the people who were not sanctified ate the phase, and King Ezechias prayed for them. St. Augustin says, ‘Though any one should be tormented with venial sin, yet if he have the will to sin no more, let him make satisfaction by tears and prayers, and then, trusting to the mercy of God, approach the Holy Eucharist in safety and without fear.’

B. Secondly, the manner of our preparation is learnt from the Host of bread. As the grains of wheat gradually, by the skill of man, are made into bread, so the sinful soul is brought, by the grace of God, to that good state in which it lawfully receives the Body of our Lord.

1. First, the grains of which the Host is made signify the state of the sinner for three reasons: a, they are hard; b, they are covered with bran; c, they are separate from one another. So the sinner is hard when he wills not to be converted from his iniquity to our sweet God. He is covered, as it were, with bran in being covered with the hideousness of sin. He is cut off from his neighbour by want of charity.

2. Next, the grains are brought to that state in which they are in the Host by three steps: a, their hardness is crushed in the mill, and they are broken into very small bits; b, they are cleansed from the bran; c, the flour is mixed with water, baked by fire, and hardened into bread. So the sinners who would be worthy to receive our Lord must prepare themselves by the three things which are signified in this: a, by contrition of heart; b, by confession of the lips; c, by the love of their neighbour.

a. We should have in our souls a spiritual mill of two grindstones by considering the mercy of God and His justice. This will soften the hardness of the heart. His mercy is the upper stone, which goes round now and does its work, but after this life will be at rest. His justice is the nether millstone, which now lies still and is at rest, but after this life will be raised and go round and work.

b. As bran is winnowed from the grain, the impure from the pure, so by confession the soul is cleansed from the filthiness of sin. Judas Machabeus and his brethren going up to cleanse the holy places stand for those who confess their sins. Blessed is he who daily purifies his heart that it may receive God as its indweller. He who has God can want no good, for in himself he has the Maker of all good things.

c. When the three men, representing God, stood before Abraham, he set before them a calf very tender and very good; but before this Sara mixed three measures of flour, and made cakes upon the hearth. Now this means that we, before we approach the Altar, should have true love for three classes of men, namely, those beneath us, our equals, and those above us. St. Augustin says, ‘He who receives the mystery of unity, and does not hold the bond of peace, receives the mystery, not for himself, but against himself.’ Again, the marriage-garment spoken of by our Lord is charity. Because of the things already noted about the bread, Israel at a certain time had to eat bread that was unleavened; and this was a sign and memorial to them. It signified, as has been said: a, contrition of heart; b, confession of lips; c, love of our neighbour. By these things we should make ourselves ready to draw near worthily to the Body of our Lord.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About preparation; The chalice of benediction which we bless, is it not the communion of the Blood of Christ? And the bread which we break, is it not the partaking of the Body of the Lord? 1 Cor. 10:16.

Let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of that bread and drink of the chalice: for he that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the Lord’s Body. 1 Cor. 11:28, 29.

The priests also that come to the Lord, let them be sanctified, lest He strike them. Ex. 19:22.

A. The majesty of the holy Body; 1. The fulness of faith; Let us draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith. Heb. 10:22.

Having the loins of your minds girt up, being sober, trust perfectly in the grace which is offered to you in the revelation of Jesus Christ. 1 Pet. 1:13.

2. Purity of heart; Take one vessel and put manna into it, … and lay it up before the Lord, to keep unto your generations. Ex. 16:33.

After the second veil the tabernacle, which is called the Holy of Holies, having the golden censer, and the ark of the testament covered about on every part with gold, in which was the golden pot that had manna. Heb. 9:3, 4.

When it was evening there came a certain rich man of Arimathea, named Joseph, who also himself was a disciple of Jesus. He went to Pilate, and asked the Body of Jesus. Then Pilate commanded that the Body should be delivered: and Joseph, taking the Body, wrapped it up in a clean linen cloth. St. Matt. 27:57–59.

N. The whiteness of the corporal; a. Cleansing by tears; Let us draw near, … having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience and our bodies washed with pure water. Heb. 10:22.

Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet in it, when they are going into the tabernacle of the testimony, and when they are to come to the Altar, to offer on it incense to the Lord, lest perhaps they die. Ex. 30:19–21.

Wash thy heart from wickedness, O Jerusalem, that thou mayest be saved; how long shall hurtful thoughts abide in thee? Jerem. 4:14.

Every night I will wash my bed and water my couch with tears. Ps. 6:7.

b. Works of penance; Thou shalt make the tabernacle in this manner: thou shalt make ten curtains of fine twisted linen and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed, diversified with embroidery. Ex. 26:1.

I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others I myself should become a castaway. 1 Cor. 9:27.

Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave; send him to work, that he be not idle; for idleness hath taught much mischief. Ecclus. 33:28, 29.

Many are the afflictions of the just, but out of them all will the Lord deliver them. Ps. 33:20.

c. The love of God; He hath set His tabernacle in the sun. Ps. 18:6.

Thou art all fair, O my Love, and there is not a spot in Thee. Cantic. 4:7.

3. Fervent prayer; They asked and the quail came, and He filled them with the bread of Heaven. Ps. 104:40.

Before I eat, I sigh. Job 3:24.

When the Sabbath was past, Mary Magdalen and Mary the mother of James and Salome bought sweet spices, that coming they might anoint Jesus. St. Mark 16:1.

Ezechias prayed for him, saying, The Lord who is good will show mercy to all them who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified: and the Lord heard him, and was merciful to the people. 2 Paralip. 30:18–20.

B. The Host of bread; 1. a. Hardness of the grains; They have made their faces harder than the rock, and they have refused to return. Jerem. 5:3.

b. Covered with bran; How exceedingly base art thou become; going the same ways over again. Jerem. 2:36.

c. Separation; Their heart is divided: now they have perished. Osee 10:2.

2. The bread-making; a. The mill; Take a millstone and grind meal. Is. 47:2.

Mercy of God; Thy mercy is great towards me: and Thou hast delivered my soul out of the nethermost hell. Ps. 85:13.

Thy mercy will follow me all the days of my life, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord for ever. Ps. 22:6.

Let Thy mercy, O Lord, be upon us, as we have hoped in Thee. Ps. 32:22.

Withhold not Thou, O Lord, Thy tender mercies from me; Thy mercy and Thy truth have always upheld me. Ps. 39:12.

Thy mercy is magnified to the heavens. Ps. 56:11.

The mercy of the Lord is from eternity and unto eternity upon them that fear Him. Ps. 102:17.

But Thou, O Lord, do with me for Thy name’s sake; because Thy mercy is sweet. Ps. 108:21.

Justice of God; I will judge thee according to thy ways.… My eye shall not spare thee, and I will show thee no pity. Ezech. 7:3, 4.

See then the goodness and the severity of God; towards them indeed that are fallen the severity; but towards thee the goodness of God, if thou abide in goodness; otherwise thou also shalt be cut off. Rom. 11:22.

Whosoever shall fall on this stone shall be broken; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it shall grind him to powder. St. Matt. 21:44.

b. The winnowing; Behold, I will command, and I will sift the house of Israel, among all nations, as corn is sifted in a sieve. Amos 9:9.

Then Judas and his brethren said, Behold, our enemies are discomfited; let us go up now to cleanse the holy places, and to repair them. 1 Mac. 4:36.

They that fear the Lord will prepare their hearts, and in His sight will sanctify their souls. Ecclus. 2:20.

c. The mixing; Abraham made haste into the tent to Sara, and said to her, Make haste; mix together three measures of flour, and make cakes upon the hearth. And he himself ran to the herd, and took from thence a calf very tender and very good; and gave it to a young man, who made haste and boiled it. He took also butter and milk, and the calf which he had boiled, and set before them; but he stood by them under the tree. Gen. 18:6–8.

Condemnation; The king went in to see the guests; and he saw there a man who had not on a wedding garment. And he said to him, Friend, how camest thou in hither, not having on a wedding garment? But he was speechless. Then the king said to the waiters, Bind his hands and feet, and cast him into the outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. St. Matt. 22:11–13.

If, therefore, thou offer thy gift at the Altar, and there thou remember that thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering before the Altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother; and then coming thou shalt offer thy gift. St. Matt. 5:23, 24.

Seven days shall you eat unleavened bread. Ex. 12:15.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, give me a great reverence for the Blessed Sacrament, because of the Majesty of Jesus, God and man, who dwells in it. Do Thou purify my heart and fill it with faith. Let it be as gold that is tried in the fire. Cleanse my conscience from dead works that I may love Thee, for Thou art my Sanctifier. Give me true sorrow for my sins. Give me strength to do works of penance, pleasing to Thee. Give me an ever-burning love for God. Let my prayers and my tears go up always in Thy sight. Fill my soul with adoration of Thy mercy and Thy justice; with adoration also of the mercy and the justice of the Father and the Son, from whom Thou dost proceed. O Spirit of justice, O Spirit of love, cleanse me and strengthen me and enlighten me, and make me more and more Thy temple and a sanctuary of Thy love. If I have Thee not, I have nothing, and the greatness of my poverty stares me in the face. If I have Thee, I desire and can desire nothing more, for Thou art God over all, blessed for ever. As I go up to the holy Altar, fill my soul with love and fear before the splendour of the Heart of Jesus, hypostatically united to the Word. Jesus is God, as Thou art God; and Thou dost ever love Him with an uncreated love. O adorable Spirit, give me a great love for Jesus in the Sacrament of the King.

XVI

About our preparation for Communion, as to the third point, that is, the Paschal lamb

C. We have to consider now, from the type of the Paschal lamb, how we may learn to prepare ourselves for Communion. This type must be divided into three parts. The first part (1) is the lamb itself that has to be eaten; the second part (2) is the accompaniments with which it had to be eaten; the third part (3) is the dress of the eaters. In the first, we learn to prepare ourselves by the wholeness of faith; in the second, by holiness of soul; in the third, by uprightness of life.

(1) The first part, then, is the lamb itself, which had to be eaten according to the law; and about this there are three considerations:

1. It was eaten at night, when things are not clearly seen, to signify our belief that it is good for us in this life to have the Body of Jesus given to us veiled in the Blessed Sacrament, and not seen clearly.

2. Its not being eaten uncooked shows us that we must not believe that Jesus is a mere man. Also, its not being cooked with water shows that we must not believe that Jesus was conceived or born like other men. Again, because they ate it cooked with fire, we must believe that the Incarnation of the Word and the consecration of His Body are worked by the power of the Holy Ghost.

3. They were commanded to eat the head of the lamb with the feet and the purtenance. From that we must believe that in this Sacrament, Christ is contained and received whole and undivided, with Godhead, Body, and Soul.

(2) The second part of this type is the three accompaniments with which they were wont to eat the lamb: 1, wild lettuce; 2, unleavened bread; 3, the

lamb’s blood. The wild lettuce signifies sorrow for sin; the unleavened bread signifies a pure intention with good works; the lamb’s blood signifies the memory and imitation of our Lord’s Passion, by which things the faithful soul ought to be ready.

1. St. Gregory says, ‘The wild lettuce is very bitter, and the flesh of the Paschal lamb is to be eaten with this, because we ought to have very great sorrow for our sins when we receive the Body of our Lord, that the bitterness of penance may take away all love of a sinful life.’

2. St. Paul tells us not to feast with the old leaven, that is, in the corruption of pride, which is against God; nor with the leaven of malice, which is against our neighbour; nor with the leaven of wickedness, which is against ourselves; but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth, that is, in freedom from sin and in the truth of good works; so that we may strive always to live in newness of life, without any deceitfulness of the olden leaven. St. Gregory says, ‘He eats unleavened bread who does good works without that corruption of vain-glory which comes from the leaven of malice.’ ‘He eats bread without the leaven of malice who does works of mercy without admixture of sin, taking care not to gain wrongly what in a sense he gives rightly. This is the sacrifice of praise about which Scripture speaks. He offers a sacrifice of praise with leaven who brings to the Lord a sacrifice of that which he has gained by robbery in the leaven of wickedness.’

Now, the soul that ate leavened bread in the forbidden time had to perish from Israel. To eat leavened bread thus is to take delight in any filthiness of sin which we commit in ourselves.

3. About the third accompaniment, St. Gregory says, ‘For us the Blood of the Lamb is put on each door-post, when we drink it not only with our bodily lips, but with the lips of our souls; and when we also strive very earnestly to follow our Lord. For he who so receives the Blood of his Redeemer as not to wish to follow Him in His Passion puts the blood only on one post of the door. Again, the blood has to be put on the lintels, because not only in memory, but openly, we must carry the Cross of the Passion of Jesus. So St. Paul gloried in nothing but the Cross of his Master.’

(3) The third part of this type is the dress, or the three ‘insignia,’ of those who ate the lamb: 1, the girdle of the loins; 2, the shoes of the feet; 3, the staff of the hands. The girdle signifies continence of flesh and soul. The

sandals signify watchfulness, according to the examples of the Fathers. The staff signifies the correction of our vices. These three things are needed as a preparation for Communion.

1. Continence of mind and flesh is typified in the girdle for the reins. St. Gregory says, ‘In the reins we understand fleshly delight. For this reason David prays to the Holy Ghost to burn his reins and his heart. Now he who eats the Paschal lamb girds his loins; because he who receives the Body of His Lord tames all wrong desires of this kind, and bridles all luxury of the flesh.’ This preparation of continence must be looked at with regard to three classes of persons: a, the married; b, those who do penance for impure acts, words, or deeds; c, spiritual persons. The first before Holy Communion should be continent for a little while; the second for a longer while; and the third altogether.

a. There are instances of this continence being required by God in the old law, as in the case of the giving of the law; and again in the case of David and the shew-bread. If such continence was kept in the figure, how much more should it be kept with regard to the very Body of our Lord!

b. Any one who had sinned in this way could not, by the law of Moses, eat of things hallowed to God till he was healed by penitence. For this reason the forty days of Lenten penance are appointed before Easter, in order that penitents, spending these days in fastings and prayers and good works and continence, may be able to communicate with other good Christians. St. Augustin, writing on the words of St. Paul, where he says that if we would judge ourselves we should not be judged of the Lord, says, ‘Let the penitent pass sentence on himself in his soul, and judge himself unworthy to partake of the Body and Blood of our Lord, that so by ecclesiastical discipline he may be kept for a time from the Sacrament of the Heavenly Bread. For he receives unworthily if he receive when he ought to be doing penance, that is, when he is a beginner. Therefore let him judge himself first, that so being self-judged he may not be judged by the Lord.’

c. Next, there is continence, ceaseless and eternal, in which chastity is kept inviolate in every way and for ever. Beda says, ‘If the priests of the old covenant, when about to enter the Temple in the order of their turn for offering sacrifice, had to abstain from the use of marriage, how much more must our priests live lives of chastity, continual and everlasting, when they must always keep themselves ready to offer the most Holy Body of our Lord!’

2. To follow the examples of the Fathers is the thing typified by the shoes for the feet. St. Gregory says, ‘To have sandals on our feet is to keep before our eyes the lives of the Fathers who are dead, and to guard our footsteps from the wounds of sin.’ The steps of the Bride are said to be beautiful, that is, her advance in well-doing, by consideration of the lives of the Fathers.

3. The discipline of correction is the thing figured by the staves for the hands. For the staff signifies the uprightness of justice in which we ought to judge ourselves before Communion. The sceptre of the kingdom of Jesus is a sceptre of uprightness. He is the first of the lovers of justice. St. Augustin says, ‘Ascend as judge the tribunal of your own mind. Then, when in your heart the judgment is set, let your thoughts be present as your accusers, and your conscience as witness, and the fear of God as executioner. So may the blood of a penitent soul flow forth in tears and the vengeance of God cease, for there will be confession and amendment. Thus will you be worthy to receive the Body of Jesus in His Sacrament now, and hereafter in perfect fruition.’

a. Because we are His children, God chastens us by poverty or sorrow or pain; and then He gives us for our comfort and strength the Heavenly Bread of His own Body.

b. Because we are His faithful children He brings us safely to His Home when the chastisement is over, and gives us there the most peaceable fruit of justice. Again, another preparation for receiving our Lord’s Body is spiritual eating, in which the perfect eat by devout meditation. This will be considered in the Nineteenth Meditation.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

C. About the Lamb of God; John saw Jesus coming to him, and he saith: Behold the Lamb of God; behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world. This is He of whom I said: After me there cometh a man who is preferred before me, because He was before me.… Again John stood, and two of his disciples; and seeing Jesus walking he saith, Behold the Lamb of God. And the two disciples heard him speak, and they followed Jesus. St. John 1:29, 35–37.

(1) The Lamb; 1. In the night; It is good to hide the Sacrament of the King. Tobias 12:7.

(2) The three accompaniments; They shall take of the blood, and put it upon both the side-posts and on the upper door-posts of the houses, wherein they shall eat it. And they shall eat the flesh that night roasted with fire, and unleavened bread with wild lettuce. You shall not eat of it anything raw nor boiled in water, but only roasted with fire; you shall eat the head with the feet and the purtenance thereof. Ex. 12:7–9.

1. Sorrow for sin; I will recount to Thee all my years in the bitterness of my soul. Is. 38:15.

2. A pure intention; Let us feast not with the old leaven, nor with the leaven of malice and wickedness, but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth. 1 Cor. 5:8.

I will sacrifice to Thee the sacrifice of praise; and I will call upon the name of the Lord. Ps. 115:17.

Let them sacrifice the sacrifice of praise; and declare His works with joy. Ps. 106:22.

He that shall eat leavened bread, his soul shall perish out of the assembly of Israel. Ex. 12:19.

3. The memory of the Passion; God forbid that I should glory save in the Cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom the world is crucified to me and I to the world.… From henceforth let no man trouble me, for I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus. Gal. 6:14, 17.

(3) The three ‘insignia;’ Thus shall you eat it (the Paschal lamb): you shall gird your loins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your hands. Ex. 12:11.

1. Continence; Prove me, O Lord, and try me; burn my reins and my heart. Ps. 25:2.

a. The married; If therefore thou have anything at hand, though it were but five loaves, give me, or whatsoever, thou canst find. And the priest answered David, saying, I have no common bread at hand, but only holy bread; if the young men be clean, especially from women. And David answered the priest and said to him, Truly as to what concerneth women, we have refrained ourselves from yesterday and the day before when we came out.… The priest therefore gave him hallowed bread. 1 Kings 21:3–6.

When they had washed their garments, he said to them, Be ready against the third day, and come not near your wives. And now the third day was come, and the morning appeared; and behold thunders began to be heard and lightning to flash, and a very thick cloud to cover the mount; and the noise of the trumpet sounded exceedingly loud, and the people that was in the camp feared.… And all Mount Sinai was on a smoke, because the Lord was come down upon it in fire; and the smoke rose from it as out of a furnace, and all the mount was terrible. Ex. 19:15, 16, 18.

b. The penitent; All the time that he is a leper and unclean he shall dwell alone without the camp. Lev. 13:46.

The first-fruits which the children of Israel shall vow and offer I have given to thee and to thy sons and to thy daughters by a perpetual law. He that is clean in thy house shall eat them. All the best of the oil and of the corn, whatsoever first-fruits they offer to the Lord, I have given them to thee. All the first ripe of the fruits, that the ground bringeth forth, and which are brought to the Lord, shall be for thy use; he that is clean in thy house shall eat them. Numb. 18:11–13.

If we would judge ourselves we should not be judged. But while we are judged we are chastised by the Lord, that we be not condemned with this world. 1 Cor. 11:31, 32.

c. Perpetual chastity; They shall be holy to their God, and shall not profane His name; for they offer the burnt-offering of the Lord and the bread of their God, and therefore they shall be holy. Lev. 21:6.

2. Good lives; How beautiful are thy steps in shoes, O prince’s daughter! Cantic. 7:1.

3. The discipline of correction; Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever; the sceptre of Thy kingdom is a sceptre of uprightness. Ps. 44:7.

a. Chastisement; He afflicted thee with want, and gave thee manna for thy food, which neither thou nor thy father knew. Deut. 8:3.

b. Reward; Now all chastisement for the present, indeed, seemeth not to bring with it joy, but sorrow; but afterwards it will yield to them that are exercised by it the most peaceable fruit of justice. Heb. 12:11.

Prayer

O Jesus, Lamb of God, hidden in the darkness, give me grace to come to Thee.

O Jesus, Thou art God and man, miraculously conceived, miraculously born; give me light that I may know Thee.

O Jesus, conceived of the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary, give me strength to come to Thee.

O Jesus, Thou art in this most Holy Sacrament with Thy Body and Soul and Godhead; give me grace to find Thee and love Thee.

My Saviour, give me true sorrow for sin as I draw near to Thy Altar, seeking for Thee.

My Saviour, take from me all pride, all malice, all wickedness; that in newness of life, without guile and without vain-glory, I may give Thee the praise of my life, and draw near to Thy Altar, seeking Thee.

My Saviour, sprinkle me with Thy Precious Blood, and lead me in the way of Thy Passion, and keep me beneath the shadow of Thy Cross, that I may draw near to Thy Altar, seeking Thee.

O most Holy Jesus, purify my soul from all uncleanness and from every spot displeasing to Thee, that in holiness of heart I may feed upon this Bread of God.

O most Holy Jesus, keep me from every wound of sin, and lead me in the right way, that I may walk in the footsteps of those who loved Thee, and feed now upon this Bread of God.

O most Holy Jesus, give me an upright heart and a just heart, that I may love Thee, the King in Jerusalem, and wait for Thy coming, and feed now upon this Bread of God.

O Jesus, Incarnate Word, my King and my Spouse, I come to Thee. Hungry and thirsty, my spirit fainteth within me; and I cry to Thee, O Thou Lover of my soul. Thou, my Jesus, art the giver of bread: set a table for me in the wilderness. Thou, my Jesus, art the giver of drink: let me slake my thirst with living water from the rock.

Draw me, my Lord and my God; then I will come to Thee. Speak to me, my Brother and my Friend; then I will listen to Thee and follow in Thy steps.

Fasten me, O sweetest Jesus, to Thyself with a chain of gold which will not break, and let me rest on Thy Heart. In the everlasting Home feed me with Thy beauty, with the vision of Thy face, with the vision of the face of God. O Jesus, Jesus, Jesus!

PART V

THE FIFTH THING TO BE CHIEFLY NOTED ABOUT THE SACRAMENT OF OUR LORD’S BODY IS THE MANNER OF EATING

XVII

About the threefold manner of eating; and first about the sacramental manner only

THIS manner is threefold: A, sacramental only; B, spiritual only; C, sacramental and spiritual together. In this Meditation and the next we consider, A, the sacramental way; in the Nineteenth Meditation we consider, B, the spiritual way; and in the Twentieth Meditation we consider, C, the way which is both sacramental and spiritual.

N. To understand these things we must bear in mind that in this food of the Altar there are two things, namely, the Sacrament and the virtue of the Sacrament. St. Augustin says, ‘This Sacrament consists of two things; that is, the visible species of bread and wine, and the invisible Body and Blood of Christ. Now the virtue of this Sacrament is our healing from the condemnation of everlasting death. This virtue of the Sacrament has been believed in and spiritually tasted by all who have been saved from the beginning of the world, even as it is daily tasted now by all good Christians. As to the Sacrament itself, it is eaten by good and bad alike, yet with a difference that is very great. The bad eat the Sacrament only, that is, the Body of Christ under the visible species of bread; but they do not eat the spiritual virtue of the Sacrament, that is, salvation to everlasting life. But the good eat both, namely, the Sacrament and the virtue of the Sacrament together.’ From this it is clear that there are three ways of eating: A, sacramental only; B, spiritual only; and, C, sacramental and spiritual at once. In the first way bad Christians eat; in the second way all who are saved; in the third way good Christians only. The first eat, and yet do not eat; the second do not eat, and yet eat; the third both eat and are eaten.

Leaving the second two ways of eating, B and C, for Meditations further on, as has been said, we consider the first way, A, in this Meditation and the next.

A. The first way of eating the Body of our Lord is the sacramental way only. Bad Christians eat in this way. Being in mortal sin, and thus receiving with polluted lips the adorable Body of Jesus, they shut up their souls by their uncleanness and their hardness, as if with mud and stone, against the inflowing of the virtue of His goodness. These eat and do not eat. They eat, indeed, because they receive the Lord's Body sacramentally; and yet they do not eat, because they do not receive the spiritual virtue of the Sacrament, that is, salvation of soul. St. Gregory says, 'In sinners and unworthy receivers there are indeed the true Flesh and the true Blood of Christ, that is, by presence and essence, but not with life-giving power.' St. Augustin says, 'He who is without Christ eats not His Flesh nor drinks His Blood; and if he daily receive the Sacrament of so great a thing, he receives it to judgment. He is without Christ who turns his heart away from Him and gives it up to sin. Such a one may be called wretched indeed, because so great a good as this comes to him often, and he neither receives nor perceives any spiritual gain.'

R. There are three kinds of persons among those who receive sacramentally only: (1) the malicious; (2) the deceitful; (3) the presumptuous. The first receive the Lord's Body with a will to go on in sin. The second are hypocrites, who, seeming outwardly good and being inwardly bad, yet come to the Altar as if they were in a state of grace. The third are those who are bad in the highest degree, and yet dare presumptuously to go to Communion. We will consider the first two kinds in this Meditation, and the presumptuous in the next.

(1) The first kind of bad communicants is the malicious. These draw near to God with their lips by receiving the Holy Sacrament, but their hearts are far from Him by their will to sin.

Three great evils follow them: a, deepening of their sin; b, further separation from the grace of Christ; c, condemnation to unending punishment.

a. St. Augustin says, 'Because they have a will to go on sinning, I assert that they are darkened and not purified by receiving the Holy Eucharist.'

b. The longer they cherish their bad thoughts the worse they grow, and the more they are separated by them from God.

c. St. Ambrose says in terrible words, ‘He is unworthy who comes to the Holy Eucharist with an indevout mind. He who abides in a will to sin is guilty of the Body and Blood of the Lord; that is, he shall be punished as if he had slain Christ.’

(2) The second kind of bad communicants is the deceitful, or the hypocrites. These have an appearance of godliness, because they have the same Sacraments as the good; but they deny the power of godliness, that is, charity, because they do much evil in secret, and make false excuses for it when it is known.

Three great evils follow these also: a, they will be made companions of the traitor Judas; b, they will be confounded before the whole universe; c, they will be cast out from the fellowship of the good.

a. Jesus spoke to Judas about his treachery words that He still speaks to all those who are like Judas, that is, His false friends. He who eats His Bread not for profit, but in hypocrisy, treads Him under foot and betrays Him. He, therefore, who tries to lie hid in his sin by a full pretence of religion, nay, even of Communion, becomes like Judas, and is made a companion of that traitor.

b. God will unveil the hiding-places of the hypocrites, and will show all their hidden things to the whole world. With great shame and confusion they will be cast down before the gaze of men and Angels, and still more before the piercing eyes of God.

c. Our Lord says that hypocrites are like whited sepulchres, and are full of dead men’s bones and all uncleanness, that is, of rottenness, the worm, and stench. They are full of hypocrisy and iniquity: of hypocrisy, from their habit of false praise; and of iniquity, from their longing for earthly goods and their hatred of the truth. Our Lord, by His prophet, says that these souls, being defiled by hypocrisy, shall perish from the people, that is, shall be cut off from the saved, and cast away into everlasting death.

N. But God in His mercy gives us a sweet remedy for these things and a safeguard against these three evils. He, and He only, can bring good out of evil. Since He is good three good things follow Him: a, forgiveness of punishment due; b, the restoration of the grace of God; c, the attainment of everlasting bliss.

a. When any one lives in the grace of God not a hair of his head can perish: that is, he keeps himself free from mortal sin.

b. The graces of God are poured down on those who love Him.

c. The servant in the parable is told to rejoice, because through his faithfulness here he reaches the fulness of everlasting joy in Heaven. There the Blessed Mother of God and all the Redeemed and all the Angels will praise God in the gladness of eternal life.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About bad Communions; Whosoever shall eat this Bread or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily shall be guilty of the Body and of the Blood of the Lord. 1 Cor. 11:27.

A. Sacramental only; The word of the Lord came to me, saying, Son of man, these men have placed their uncleannesses in their hearts, and have set up before their face the stumbling-block of their iniquity; and shall I answer when they inquire of Me? Ezech. 14:3.

There is also another evil which I have seen under the sun, and that frequent among men; a man to whom God hath given riches and substance and honour, and his soul wanteth nothing of all that he desireth, yet God doth not give him power to eat thereof, but a stranger shall eat it up. Eccles. 6:1, 2.

You cannot drink the chalice of the Lord and the chalice of devils; you cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of devils. 1 Cor. 10:21.

We have an Altar whereof they have no power to eat who serve the tabernacle. Heb. 13:10.

R. Bad communicants; (1) The malicious; The Lord said, Forasmuch as this people draw near Me with their mouth, and with their lips glorify Me, but their heart is far from Me, and they have feared Me with the commandments and doctrines of men: therefore behold I will proceed to cause a marvel in this people, by a great and a wonderful miracle; for the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent men shall be hid. Is. 29:13, 14.

a. Deepening of sin; It is not good to take the bread of the children, and to cast it to the dogs. St. Matt. 15:26.

b. Loss of God; Perverse thoughts separate from God. Wisd. 1:3.

c. Eternal punishment; He that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh judgment to himself, not discerning the Body of the Lord. 1 Cor. 11:29.

(2) The hypocrites; Know also this, that in the last days shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves, covetous, haughty, proud, blasphemous, disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked, without affection, without peace, slanderous, incontinent, unmerciful, without kindness, traitors, stubborn, puffed up, and lovers of pleasure more than lovers of God; having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the power thereof. 2 Tim. 3:1–5.

a. Companions of Judas; I speak not of you all; I know whom I have chosen; but that the Scripture may be fulfilled he that eateth bread with Me shall lift up his heel against Me. St. John 13:18.

b. Shame; Be not incredulous to the fear of the Lord, and come not to Him with a double heart. Be not a hypocrite in the sight of men; and let not thy lips be a stumbling-block to thee. Watch over them, lest thou fall and bring dishonour upon thy soul: and God reveal thy hidden things, and cast thee down in the midst of the congregation; because thou camest to the Lord wickedly, and thy heart is full of guile and deceit. Ecclus. 1:36–40.

Behold I come against thee, saith the Lord God of hosts; and I will discover thy shame to thy face, and will show thy nakedness to the nations and thy shame to kingdoms; and I will cast abominations upon thee, and will disgrace thee and will make an example of thee. Nah. 3:5, 6.

c. Loss of Heaven; Woe to you, Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites; because you are like whited sepulchres, which outwardly appear to men beautiful, but within are full of dead men’s bones and all filthiness. So you also outwardly indeed appear to men to be just, but inwardly you are full of hypocrisy and iniquity. St. Matt. 23:27, 28.

No hypocrite shall come before His presence. Job 13:16.

The hope of the hypocrite shall perish. Job 8:13.

If any one that is defiled shall eat of the flesh of the sacrifice of peace-offerings, which is offered to the Lord, he shall be cut off from his people. Lev. 7:20.

The sinners in Sion are afraid, trembling hath seized upon the hypocrites. Which of you can dwell with devouring fire? Which of you can dwell with everlasting burnings? Is. 33:14.

N. The remedy; a. Forgiveness; He said, As the Lord liveth there shall not one hair of thy son fall to the ground. 2 Kings 14:11.

If Heaven shall be shut up, and there shall be no rain because of their sins, and they praying in this place shall do penance in Thy name, and shall be converted from their sins by reason of their afflictions; then hear Thou them in Heaven, and forgive the sins of Thy servants and of Thy people Israel; and show them the good way in which they should walk, and give rain upon Thy land. 3 Kings 8:35, 36.

If the wicked do penance for all his sins which he hath committed, and keep all My commandments, and do judgment and justice, living he shall live, and shall not die. I will not remember all his iniquities that he has done. Ezech. 18:21, 22.

If I say to the wicked, Thou shalt surely die, and he do penance for his sin, and do judgment and justice … he shall surely live, and shall not die. Ezech. 33:14, 15.

b. Grace; Do good, O Lord, to those that are good, and to the upright of heart. Ps. 124:4.

He that is good shall draw grace from the Lord. Prov. 12:2.

c. Heaven; His lord said to him, Well done, good and faithful servant: because thou hast been faithful over a few things I will set thee over many things; enter thou into the joy of thy lord. St. Matt. 25:23.

Now they that are redeemed by the Lord shall return, and shall come into Sion singing praises, and everlasting joy shall be on their heads; they shall obtain gladness and joy; sorrow and mourning shall flee away. Is. 51:11.

They shall come and shall give praise in Mount Sion, and they shall flow together to the good things of the Lord, for the corn and wine and oil and the increase of cattle and herds: and their soul shall be as a watered garden, and they shall be hungry no more. Then shall the virgin rejoice in the dance, the young men and the old men together: and I will turn their mourning into joy and will comfort them, and make them joyful after their sorrow. And I will fill the souls of the priests with fatness; and My people shall be filled with My good things, saith the Lord. Jerem. 31:12–14.

Prayer

Eternal Father, purify me, Thy child, from all sin, that in the strength of Thy goodness I may welcome Jesus to my heart.

Eternal Son, purify me, Thy redeemed one, from all sin, that in the light of Thy goodness I may welcome Thee, my Saviour, to my heart.

Eternal Spirit, purify me, Thy sanctuary, from all sin, that in the sweetness of Thy love I may welcome Jesus to my heart.

O Ever-blessed Trinity, fountain of light and purity and love and truth and wisdom, keep me, Thy little one, from all malice and badness of the will, from all hypocrisy and guile, from all presumption and hardness of heart.

Save me, O Holy Ghost, whom I love, from the abandonment of Jesus, from living in sin, from the punishment of the damned.

Save me, O Holy Ghost, whom I love, from treachery like that of Judas, from confusion and shame of face before the Saints and Angels, from losing the fellowship of the good.

Give to me, O Holy Ghost, whom I love, forgiveness of punishment, abundance of grace, the light of Thy heavenly kingdom.

Thou, dear Spirit, art my sweet Comforter and my rest and my joy; give me now the adorable Body and Blood of Jesus, whom I love, and bring me safely to the vision of His face in Heaven.

XVIII

About the third kind of unworthy eaters, that is, the presumptuous

A. (3) These are they who are not afraid to communicate or to celebrate in mortal sin.

You must know that the Body of our Lord has a twofold effect: an effect of goodness on the good, and an effect of severity on the bad. That Body is indeed changeless, and always good in itself; but by the just judgment of God its effect is changed in those who make a bad use of it. St. Augustin says, ‘Holy things can injure the wicked, for he who eats the Body of the Lord unworthily eats judgment to himself, not that the thing itself is bad, but because he is bad who receives badly that which is good. You have an example of this in the sun and in wine. The same light of the sun, which gladdens and strengthens an eye that is whole, pains and injures an eye that is weak. So wine delights and strengthens a healthy man; but if it be taken by one in a fever it makes him worse, and perhaps kills him.’ Thus three evils follow presumptuous communicants: 1, great guilt; 2, the offence of God; 3, a manifold wound.

1. First, there is great guilt. St. Isidore says, ‘They who live wickedly in the Church of God, and keep on going to Communion, thinking that thus they may be cleansed, should know that this can give them no help toward newness of life. When the prophet speaks of those who sin in the house of God, and says that holy meats do not take away their sins, he means that all this increases their sin.’ There is a threefold reason for this:

a. There is a triple root or principle of every voluntary action, that is to say, nature or virtue or lust. Every action of which the root is nature or virtue is good; but every action of which the root is lust is bad. But if any one, being knowingly in mortal sin, take the Body of Jesus, the principle of his action cannot be nature, nor could virtue by any means lead him to put in a filthy place or vessel anything so precious and adorable as the Lord’s Body. Hence the root of action in a sinner who receives Jesus with defiled lips and a defiled body is lust; that is, a darkened will in seeking for earthly gain, or vain-glory, or some other deception.

b. The second reason for this guilt is the transgression of the commandment of God. For as God gave our first parents in the state of innocence the tree of life for food, but forbade them to touch it in the state of guilt and death, so our Lord’s Body is given to us for food when we are in a state of grace, but forbidden to us when we are in mortal sin.

c. The third reason of their guilt is their frightful ingratitude. For what thanklessness can be greater? They have a Lord from whom they have received every good that is theirs. He has given Himself for them in every way. He died for them on the Cross. They betray this Lord, and take Him into a most filthy stable of His enemy. There they trample on Him, and again crucify Him. With such a depth and height of ingratitude do they sin who receive the Blessed Sacrament in deadly guilt. St. Ambrose says, ‘He tramples on Christ who sins freely without fear and without sorrow; so too does he sin who receives Him unworthily.’ Again, ‘An unworthy receiver of Christ is a slayer of Christ.’ St. Augustin says, ‘How fearful a thing it is to handle the Son of the sinless Virgin with blood-stained hands! What hearing of the ears could bear this? What eye would not be blinded at the sight? What mind would not be stricken almost to death when the price of the world’s redemption is thrown on a dunghill? Not less fearful is it to put the Son of God in a polluted mouth than to fling Him into the mud.’

2. The second evil is the offence against God. Sins against ourselves and sins against our neighbours are not so full of evil as sins against God. The greater His glory is, the greater is the offence against Him. Malachias speaks of polluted bread on the Altar. In his words God reproves negligent bishops and negligent priests of His Church, and, indeed, all who bear the name of Christ, for despising His name. To them He shows the cause of His anger, in that they offer polluted bread. Now, he pollutes this Holy Bread, that is, this Body of Jesus, who comes unworthily to the Altar and despises the table of the Lord, if not by wicked words, yet by wicked deeds. When

the Holy Sacrament is dishonoured, He is dishonoured whose Sacrament it is.

3. Their third evil is manifold punishment. Heavy, indeed, is the just vengeance of God. In the old time the worst sin of the children of Israel and the cause of their heaviest punishments were that they cast away God by idolatry. Afterwards their worst sin was that they did not receive Jesus when He came. So, now, the greatest sin of Christians, and the reason for their punishment, is the receiving unworthily the Body of their Saviour. St. Gregory says, ‘The Maker of all things vouchsafed to visit Judea in the mystery of the Incarnation; but because she did not know the time of her visitation He gave her up often as a prey to the Gentiles. At last He gave her into the hands of the Romans; and there came upon her all the curses that are written in the book of the law. So to those who receive the grace of God with ingratitude there is sure condemnation. If a man broke the law of Moses he died without mercy; but how much greater are the punishments which he deserves who treads under foot the Son of God, and counts the Blood of the Covenant a polluted thing!’

N. These punishments may be called a triple wound: a, a great loss of spiritual gifts; b, barrenness of the earth or want of earthly goods; c, diseases and death.

a. Jeremias weeps because the enemy has laid his hand on the pleasant things of Israel, and because the Gentiles had trodden the forbidden sanctuary. It is said, ‘The old enemy lays his hands on the pleasant things of the Church; he takes from her children the ornaments of the Spirit; he denies their faith; he annuls their Baptism, that is, the grace given to them in Baptism; he corrupts their doctrine; he handles unworthily the Body and Blood of Christ; like a wolf he devours the precious vessels, that is, the sheep of our Lord. The reason for so fearful an evil is because Gentiles, that is, men who love the flesh and have not the circumcision of Christ are made ministers of the Altar.’

b. If we do not listen to the voice of the Lord our God, to keep His commandments, there come on us punishments of nature, as Moses threatens. Chiefly do these evils come on us when we break the command to treat our Lord’s Body with reverence.

c. St. Paul teaches us that for irreverence to the Body of Jesus many were sick, and many even slept the sleep of death.

R. Against these wounds and all the aforesaid evils there is a triple remedy: a, amendment of life by voluntary penance; b, correction of malice by the discipline of superiors; c, changing the incorrigible person by unerring justice.

a. When the field is wasted, and the harvest of things spiritual and temporal fails, the prophets exhort us to gird ourselves with the girdle of penance; to mourn in confession and prayer; to seek by sorrow what we have lost by sin; and by austerity of life to lessen God's anger against us, that is, the anger with which He is angry because of the evil pleasures and the delicacies in which we have often lived.

b. By just bishops God comes like a flaming fire to purify the ministers of the Altar, that His anger may be turned away.

c. He will cast away the wicked and transgressors who persevere in their sin, that is, the incorrigible, that the just may be put in their place.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(3) About receiving our Lord unworthily; He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself. 1 Cor. 11:29.

1. Their great guilt; What is the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My house? Shall the Holy Flesh take away from thee thy crimes in which thou hast boasted? Jerem. 11:15.

b. Disobedience; Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast you your pearls before swine. St. Matt. 7:6.

Whosoever of thy seed through their families hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God: neither shall he approach to minister to Him. Lev. 21:17, 18.

c. Great ingratitude; They repaid Me evil for good, and hatred for My love. Ps. 108:5.

My enemies have trodden on Me all the day long. Ps. 55:3.

How much more do you think he deserveth worse punishments who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the Blood of the Testament unclean by which he was sanctified, and hath offered an affront to the Spirit of grace? Heb. 10:29.

2. Great offence of God; I am angry with a great anger against the wealthy nations: for I was angry a little, but they helped forward the evil. Zach. 1:15.

If one man shall sin against another, God may be appeased in his behalf; but if a man shall sin against the Lord, who shall pray for him? 1 Kings 2:25.

To you, O priests, that despise My name, and have said, Wherein have we despised Thy name? You offer polluted bread upon My Altar, and you say, Wherein have we polluted Thee? Mal. 1:7.

3. Manifold punishment:

N. Triple wound; a. Spiritual loss; The enemy hath put out his hand to all her desirable things: for she hath seen the Gentiles enter into her sanctuary, of whom Thou gavest commandment that they should not enter into Thy church. Lam. 1:10.

b. Barrenness of earth; If thou wilt not hear the voice of the Lord thy God, to keep and to do all His commandments.… cursed shall be.… the fruit of thy ground, the herds of thy oxen, and the flocks of thy sheep.… The Lord will send upon thee famine and hunger, and a rebuke upon all the works which thou shalt do. Deut. 28:15, 18, 20.

To Adam He said, Because thou hast hearkened to the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat, cursed is the earth in thy work.… thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. Gen. 3:17, 18.

c. Pestilence and Death; Therefore are there many weak and infirm among you, and many sleep. 1 Cor. 11:30, 31.

While yet the flesh was between their teeth, neither had that kind of meat failed, behold, the wrath of the Lord was provoked against the people, and He smote them with an exceedingly great plague. Numb. 11:33.

R. The triple remedy; a. Amendment of life; The country is wasted; the ground hath mourned, for the corn is wasted, the wine is dried up, the oil hath languished. The husbandmen are ashamed, the vinedressers have howled for the wheat and the barley, because the harvest of the field is perished.… Gird yourselves and mourn, O ye priests; howl, ye ministers of the Altar; go, lie in sackcloth, ye ministers of my God; because sacrifice and libation are cut off from the house of your God. Joel 1:10, 11, 13.

b. Correction; Behold the day shall come, kindled as a furnace, and all the proud and all that do wickedly shall be as stubble; and the day that cometh shall set them on fire, saith the Lord of hosts, and shall not leave them root or branch. Mal. 4:1.

Behold He cometh, saith the Lord of hosts; and who shall be able to think of the day of His coming? and who shall stand to see Him? For He is like a refining fire and like the fuller’s herb: and He shall sit refining and cleansing the silver; and He shall purify the sons of Levi, and shall refine them as gold and as silver, and they shall offer sacrifices to the Lord in justice. Mal. 3:1–3.

c. Rejection; I will judge you, saith the Lord; and I will make you subject to My scepture, and will bring you into the bands of the convenant; and I will pick out from among you the transgressors and the wicked, and will bring them out of the land where they sojourn; and they shall not enter into the land of Israel, and you shall know that I am the Lord. Ezech. 20:36–38.

I will turn My hand to thee, and I will thoroughly purge away thy dross and take away all thy tin; and I will restore thy judges as they were before, and thy counsellors as of old. Is. 1:25, 26.

He (Judas Machabeus) considered about the Altar of holocausts that had been profaned, what he should do with it; and a good counsel came into their minds to pull it down, lest it should be a reproach to them, because the Gentiles had denied it. So they threw it down, and they laid up the stones in the mountain of the temple in a convenient place, till there should come a prophet and give answer concerning them. Then they took whole stones according to the law, and built a new Altar according to that which had been before; and they built up the holy places and the things that were within the temple; and they sanctified the temple and the courts. 1 Mac. 4:44–48.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, fill me with the fear of the Lord, and drive far from me all thoughts of presumption. Save me from guilt like this. Keep me from offending God; and keep me from the wounds of His anger. Make me feel His goodness, and fill my heart with thankfulness. If I am faithful to Thee, Thou wilt give me much grace; if I am unfaithful, Thou wilt give me little grace, or, it may be, none at all. Dwell in my soul more and more, that I may be faithful with a great faithfulness, and inherit the fulness of Thy promises. Lead me up to the table of Jesus, that I may receive Him, my King and Spouse, with great love and great reverence, with much confidence, yet with much holy fear. I long to receive Jesus in His most Holy Sacrament; Thou, beloved Spirit, wilt help me to receive Him as I ought.

XIX

About the second manner of eating, namely, that which is only spiritual

B. The second manner of receiving Jesus is that which is spiritual only, and in this way all those have eaten who have been saved from the beginning, and in this way all those who will be saved eat now. St. Ambrose says, ‘Though he does not eat, yet he eats, and though he eats, he does not eat, because he who does not eat sacramentally does yet eat spiritually; and he often does not eat spiritually who yet eats sacramentally.’ The Scripture speaks of a stranger who shall eat, that is to say, who will have a great desire of eating spiritually. About this spiritual eating three things have to be considered: (1) the difference between the persons thus eating; (2) the nature of spiritual eating; (3) the effect of this eating.

(1) There are three kinds of persons, namely, beginners, the advanced, and the perfect. When Jesus fed four thousand men besides women and children, we understand beginners by the children, the advanced by the women, and the perfect by the men.

(2) Then there is the way in which these persons eat spiritually. Now to understand this we must know that beginners eat spiritually by a life-giving faith; the advanced, by good lives; the perfect, by devout meditation.

1. St. Augustin says, ‘Believe, and thou hast eaten.’ For to believe in Christ is by believing to go to Him, to cling to Him with our hearts, to find our delight in Him, and by true charity to be united to His members.

2. The food of good lives consists of three virtues, as if of three accompaniments: a, innocence; b, penance; c, mercy.

a. St. Augustin says, ‘To eat bread spiritually at the Altar is to bring innocence to the Altar, and forgive those that trespass against us.’

b. When we sin we must do penance for our sins, and carry the Cross after our Divine Master.

c. When the poor are helped and comforted by us we ourselves are far more helped and comforted spiritually by God.

3. The perfect eat spiritually by devout meditation. In this kind of spiritual eating there are three things that are to be found in bodily eating: a, appetite; b, mastication c, pleasure. We ought to hunger spiritually, by longing with our inmost heart for Christ, our food; then we should masticate spiritually, by great length of thought; and lastly we ought to find delight in Him by choosing His sweetness.

a. We ought to have a great longing for Jesus, a great hunger and thirst for Him. St. Gregory says, ‘In spiritual delights, fulness gives an appetite, because the more that their sweetness is known and felt, the more thirstingly they are desired.’

b. We ought spiritually to masticate our Lord, in Himself and in His mystical Body, that is, by thinking for long about ourselves, about the Saints, and about the Saviour of the world: (a) by judging ourselves; (b) by studying the lives of the Saints, that we may imitate them; (c) by dwelling long and lovingly on the Incarnation of our Lord.

(a) The perfect diligently examine themselves and judge themselves. They judge themselves and not others. They judge the whole of themselves—eyes, hands, feet, tongue, heart, intellect, will.

(b) They love to think of the Saints who are dead, and of the good who are still living; and to dwell on their lives and follow in their steps. Our Lord in a parable tells us of the dinner for which beeves and fatlings were prepared. Now the beeves are the Prophets and Apostles, who, in the might of their faith, opposed, as it were, horns to the princes of the world, and then suffering at their hands have left us examples to follow. The fatlings, or fatted fowls, signify those holy souls that are filled with the love of God, and, lifted on the wings of contemplation, seek for the heavenly heights. They are said to be slain because their souls are stayed on God, either by penance, or by the death of the flesh. These things must be spiritually masticated by us, that is, diligently considered as our examples. Of those things that are clean we may eat, but not of those things that are dead of themselves. We should eat what is clean, that is, with truthful words and good deeds; and we should put it in our hearts for imitation; but that which is dead of itself, that is, defiled by sin, we should not feed on, either by doing the same, or by consent.

(c) The perfect spiritually masticate the Flesh of Jesus by meditating with great love and devotion on the Sacraments of the Incarnation, and all the benefits that come to us by the Incarnate Word. St. Augustin says, ‘This pertains to the virtue of the Sacrament, and not to the visible sign, that is, when a man eats inwardly and not outwardly, and when he eats in his heart and does not press with his teeth. This it is which St. Paul taught carefully about the good only, saying that they all ate the same food.’

c. Thirdly, we should have great delight in that inward sweetness which comes from masticating Christ by spiritual eating. The souls of those, who eat what is good, will according to God’s promise be delighted in fatness, that is, in the sweetness of the grace and the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Going into our house we should repose with wisdom, that is, with Jesus, God and man, for He is the true wisdom of God. No weariness will come in this to the faithful soul, but only joy and gladness, with refreshment and delight, because of the friendship of God. This spiritual sweetness will come to you in the silent joyfulness of your hearts. It is a foretaste of the heavenly joy, and of the delights that are for ever with God.

N. This is a great help against three evils that are in the world: a, false pleasure in the use of things pleasing; b, great bitterness in bearing trials; c, a sorrowful spirit in doing good.

a. The sweetness of the world is false, for it is the destruction of the soul. The bait gives delight outwardly, but the hook pierces inwardly.

b. There is a sea, deep and wide, because in this world bitterness is great and abounds. As the prophet says, we are fed with wormwood, and drink waters of gall. Our short lives are filled with many miseries.

c. When the young man heard what our Lord said he went away sorrowful. God did not accept the sacrifice of Cain because he offered badly, that is, with a sad heart and a sad face.

R. Against these things you have a safeguard in spiritual sweetness: a, it makes the false sweetness of the world tasteless; b, it makes great bitterness sweet; c, it makes the sad spirit joyful.

a. St. Gregory says, ‘All flesh is flavourless to him who has tasted the Spirit.’ To such a one Christ is all in all, and other things are worthless in themselves. See how St. Paul felt this.

b. If the soul be filled with the sweetness of God it does not care for the bitterness of the world. As Eliseus threw salt into the bitter waters and made them sweet, so Jesus sweetens all bitterness by that flavour of the Spirit which is the salt of Heaven. Thus the stones of the brook were sweet to Stephen, as they fell on him heavily. Thus many Saints have rejoiced in tribulation. To them the glowing coals were sweet, and their robes of fire were like fragrant roses.

c. As the faces of Daniel and the Three Children appeared fairer after they had fed on the king's food, because of their cheerfulness in doing good, so we should be better in cheerfulness and readiness to do good when we have fed on the food of our King, that is, on His most Holy Body.

(3) The third thing to be considered about this spiritual eating is its threefold effect: a, the forgiveness of sin; b, healing from eternal death; c, the partaking of the true Body of Jesus to everlasting life.

a. St. Ambrose says, 'Those who thus eat spiritually the virtue of the Flesh and Blood of Jesus Christ are said to take and to eat truly, because they daily receive the very efficacy of our Lord's Body:' that is, the forgiveness of their sins.

b. St. Augustin says, 'Our fathers ate the same spiritual food as we eat, but they ate a different bodily food. They ate manna, which signified Christ to them, and gave Him by faith to those who believed. Those, however, who did not believe ate and died eternally. But Moses and the other servants of God did not die in this way. How was this? It was because they understood spiritually the invisible food, hungered for it spiritually, tasted it spiritually, that they might be spiritually healed from everlasting death. So we, eating spiritually, are saved.'

c. St. Augustin says, 'There cannot be any doubt that each one is made a partaker of the Body and Blood of the Lord, when he is made a member of Christ: nor can there be any doubt that such a one is not cut off from the fellowship of that Bread, if before he eat it he should die in the unity of the Body of Christ. For he cannot be deprived of the benefits of this Sacrament when he is found with that which this Sacrament signifies. But he is found with that which is signified by this Sacrament, when he is made a member of Christ and spiritually eats by believing and loving; for thus he is truly changed into Christ's Body, that he may live with Him for ever.'

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About spiritual eating; I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and all in Moses were baptised in the cloud and in the sea, and did all eat the same spiritual food. 1 Cor. 10:1–3.

There is a man to whom God has given riches and substance and honour, and his soul wanteth nothing of all that he desireth; yet God doth not give him power to eat thereof, but a stranger shall eat it. Eccles. 6:2.

(1) The difference of persons; Jesus called together His disciples, and said, I have compassion on the multitude, because they continue with Me now three days and have nothing to eat; and I will not send them away fasting, lest they faint in the way. And the disciples say to Him, Whence, then, should we have so many loaves in the desert, as to fill so great a multitude? And Jesus saith to them, How many loaves have you? They said, Seven, and a few little fishes. And He commanded the multitude to sit down on the ground. And taking the seven loaves and the fishes, and giving thanks, He brake and gave to His disciples, and His disciples gave to the people; and they did all eat and had their fill. And they took up seven baskets full of what remained of the fragments. And they that did eat were four thousand men, besides women and children. St. Matt. 15:32–38.

(2) The nature of this eating; 1. Beginners; Behold his soul that is unbelieving shall not be right in him; but the just shall live in his faith. Heb. 2:4.

My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself he shall not please My soul. Heb. 10:38.

2. The advanced; He said to them, I have meat to eat which you know not.… My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, that I may finish His work. St. John 4:32, 34.

He that feareth God will do good.… With the bread of life and understanding she (Wisdom) will feed him. Ecclus. 15:1, 3.

a. Innocence; I am smitten as grass, and my heart is withered, because I forgot to eat my bread. Ps. 101:5.

b. Penance; It is vain for you to rise before the light: rise after you have sitten down, you that eat the bread of sorrow. Ps. 126:2.

He ate bread with mourning and fear: remembering the word which the Lord spoke by Amos the prophet, Your festival-days shall be turned into lamentation and mourning. Tobias 2:5, 6.

I ate ashes like bread, and mingled my drink with weeping. Ps. 101:10.

c. Mercy; A merciful man doeth good to his own soul; but he that is cruel casteth off his own kindred. Prov. 11:17.

3. The perfect; a. Desire; If the men of My tabernacle have not said, Who will give us of His Flesh, that we may be filled? Job 31:31.

In the way of Thy judgments, O Lord, we have patiently waited for Thee; Thy name and Thy remembrance are the desire of my soul. Is. 26:8.

Lord, all my desire is before Thee; and from Thee my groaning is not hidden. Ps. 37:10.

b. Mastication; He hath put all things under His feet, and hath made Him head over all the Church, which is His Body, and the fulness of Him who is filled all in all. Eph. 1:22, 23.

He is the head of the Body, the Church, who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead. Col. 1:18.

(a) Self-examination; Let a man examine himself. 1 Cor. 11:28.

(b) Following the Saints; Tell them that were invited, Behold, I have prepared my dinner; my beeves and fatlings are killed, and all things are ready; come ye to the marriage. St. Matt. 22:4.

All that is clean ye shall eat; but whatsoever is dead of itself eat not thereof. Deut. 14:20, 21.

For the rest, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely, whatsoever of good fame, if there be any virtue, if any praise of discipline, think of these things. The things that you have learned and received and heard and seen in me, these do ye; and the God of peace shall be with you. Phil. 4:8, 9.

(c) Meditation; He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood hath everlasting life; and I will raise him up in the last day.… He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood abideth in Me and I in him. St. John 6:55, 57.

All ate the same spiritual food. 1 Cor. 10:3.

c. Inward sweetness; Why do you spend money for that which is not bread, and your labour for that which does not satisfy you? Hearken diligently to Me, and eat that which is good, and your soul shall be delighted in fatness. Incline your ear and come to Me; hear and your soul shall live; and I will make an everlasting covenant with you, even the faithful mercies of David. Is. 55:2, 3.

When I go into my house I shall rest with her (the Wisdom of God); for her conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness. Wisd. 8:16.

O, taste and see that the Lord is sweet. Ps. 33:9.

O, how great is the multitude of Thy sweetness, O Lord, which Thou hast hidden for them that fear Thee. Ps. 30:20.

Thy lips, My spouse, are as a dropping honeycomb; honey and milk are under thy tongue. Cantic. 4:11.

N. Three evils in the world; a. False sweetness; To the fool she said, Stolen waters are sweeter; and hidden bread more pleasant. He did not know that giants are there, and that her guests are in the depths of hell. Prov. 9:17, 18.

Let mercy forget him: may worms be his sweetness; let him be remembered no more, but be broken in pieces as an unfruitful tree. Job 24:20.

Man knoweth not his own end; but as fishes are taken with the hook, and as birds are caught with the snare, so men are taken in the evil time when it shall suddenly come upon them. Eccles. 9:12.

They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment they go down to hell, who have said to God, Depart from us; we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways. Who is the Almighty that we should serve Him? and what doth it profit us if we pray to Him? Job 21:13–15.

b. Great bitterness; So is this great sea which stretcheth wide its arms; there are creeping things without number, things little and great. Ps. 103:25.

The Lord said, Because they have forsaken My law which I gave them, and have not heard My voice, and have not walked in it, but have gone after the perverseness of their own hearts … therefore, thus saith the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, Behold I will feed this people with wormwood, and give them water of gall to drink. Jerem. 9:13, 14.

Man, born of a woman, and living for a short time, is filled with many miseries. He cometh up like a flower, and is cut down and fleeth as a shadow, and continueth not in one state. Job 14:1, 2.

c. Sadness in good; One came and said to Him, Good Master, what good shall I do that I may have life everlasting? He said to him, Why asketh thou Me about good? One is good, that is, God. But if thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments.… The young man saith to Him, All these have I kept from my youth: what is yet wanting in me? Jesus saith to him, If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven; and come thou and follow Me. And when the young man had heard His word he went away sad, for he had great possessions. Then Jesus said to His disciples, Amen I say to you that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of Heaven. St. Matt. 19:16–23.

Let thy servants find favour in thy eyes; for we are come in a good day; whatsoever thy hand shall find give to thy servants, and to thy son David. And when David’s servants came they spoke to Nabal all these words in David’s name, and then held their peace. But Nabal answering the servants of David said, Who is David? and what is the son of Isai?… Shall I then take my bread and my water, and the flesh of my cattle which I have killed for my shearers, and give them to men whom I know not whence they are? 1 Kings 25:8–11.

It came to pass after many days that Cain offered of the fruits of the earth gifts to the Lord. Abel also offered of the firstlings of his flock and of their fat. And the Lord had respect to Abel and to his offerings; but to Cain and his offerings He had no respect. Gen. 4:3–5.

R. Spiritual sweetness; a. Against false sweetness; A soul that is full shall tread upon the honeycomb. Prov. 27:7.

The things that were gain to me the same I have counted loss for the excellent knowledge of Jesus Christ my Lord, for whom I have suffered the loss of all things, and count them but as dung that I may gain Christ: and may be found in Him not having my justice which is of the law, but that which is of the faith of Christ Jesus, which is of God, justice in faith; that I may know Him and the power of His resurrection and the fellowship of His sufferings, being made conformable to His death, if by any means I may attain to the resurrection from the dead.… One thing I do: forgetting the things that are behind, and reaching out to those that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Philip. 3:7–14.

b. Against bitterness; They shall call the people to the mountain; there shall they sacrifice the victims of justice; they shall suck as milk the abundance of the sea and the hidden treasures of the sands. Deut. 33:19.

The men of the city said to Eliseus, Behold the situation of this city is very good, as thou, my lord, seest; but the waters are very bad and the ground barren. And he said, Bring me a new vessel and put salt into it. And when they had brought it, he went out to the spring of the waters and cast the salt into it, and said, Thus saith the Lord, I have healed these waters, and there shall be in them no more death or barrenness. And the waters were healed to this day, according to the word of Eliseus which he spoke. 4 Kings 2:19–22.

They stoned Stephen, invoking and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit. And falling on his knees he cried with a loud voice, saying, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge. And when he had said this he fell asleep in the Lord. Acts 7:58, 59.

c. Against sadness; After ten days their faces appeared fairer and fatter than all the children that ate of the king's meat. Dan. 1:15.

A glad heart maketh a cheerful countenance. Prov. 15:13.

Now this I say, he who soweth sparingly shall also reap sparingly; and he who soweth in blessings shall also reap of blessings, every one as he hath determined in his heart: not with sadness or of necessity, for God loveth a cheerful giver. 2 Cor. 9:6, 7.

(3) The effect; a. Forgiveness; Give us this day our daily bread, and forgive us our sins. St. Luke 11:3.

b. Healing; This is the bread that cometh down from Heaven; that if any man eat of it he may not die. St. John 6:50.

c. The Body of Christ; We being many are one bread, one body, all who partake of that one bread. 1 Cor. 10:17.

Thanksgiving

I thank Thee, dear Jesus, for all Thy Sacraments. I thank Thee above all for Thyself. I thank Thee because I can feed upon Thee spiritually, even when I cannot come before Thy Altar. Give me a greater thirst for Thee, Thou lover of my soul, and let me sit beneath Thy shadow and taste of Thy sweetness more. Lift me to Thyself on high, and let my soul be steeped in Thy light. Give me a great love for all things holy and just and pure and lovely and true. Let me feed on the pleasures of Thy right hand, and let me drink of the torrent of Thy river. Thy land is ever flowing with milk and honey; but Thou, my own Jesus, my loved One, art far sweeter than honey and the honeycomb. Thy city has gates of pearl, and its jasper wall has foundations of precious stones; but Thou art the one Pearl without price, and for Thy love I would gladly sell all that I have.

Thy sweetness deadens my taste for the world’s gifts, and in all bitterness of sorrow the light of Thy face and the love of Thy heart are joy and rest and peace. I bless and praise Thee for forgiving my sins. I bless and praise Thee for saving me from the undying fire. I bless and praise Thee for all Thy spiritual gifts here, and for the hope of Thy heavenly joys hereafter. Thou art my Jesus in Heaven and my Jesus on the Altar. Thou art my Jesus in my heart. For this I love Thee, and bless Thee, and praise Thee, and glorify Thee, and adore Thee for ever and ever.

XX

About the third way of eating, or the way sacramental and spiritual at once

C. The third way of eating the Body of Jesus is the way in which good Christians communicate, that is, not only sacramentally, but also spiritually. Three things have to be considered about this:

(1) First, there is the multitude of those who do not go to Communion, that is, the multitude of the bad. For since there is a threefold way of eating —one sacramental only, in which bad Christians eat, and yet do not eat; one spiritual only, in which the good do not eat, and yet do eat; one sacramental and spiritual, in which only good Christians eat and are eaten—there remains to fill up this part of our subject the consideration of the multitude of bad persons who neither eat nor are eaten. These, indeed, do not eat the Body of Christ, and therefore they die everlastingly. There are three kinds or bands of these people: a, unbelievers; b, the careless; c, the despisers.

a. Unbelievers are they whose hearts are so blinded by malice and the guile of the devil that they do not believe, and do not know those heavenly Sacraments which the wonderful wisdom of God has instituted for the salvation of the world. If they think of it at all, they do not believe that our Lord can give us His Flesh to eat. They wander in error, ignorant of the Sacraments of God, because they are blinded by malice.

b. The careless are they who are so wrapped up in temporal gains and the business of the world that they neglect to receive Holy Communion at the proper time. As to the excuses made to the king by those whom he had invited, it is said, ‘To go to the farm is to give ourselves too earnestly to earthly work, and to go to the merchandise is to seek too greedily for worldly gain. They who neglect the banquet of this Divine Sacrament, though they may seem to have faith and to do certain works of charity, if they do not repent will perish.’ St. Paul speaks of the height and depth of the love of Christ, and of his words it is said, ‘The deeps of love are the Sacraments of the Church. Deep they are, nay, unfathomable; and they are also the foundation of charity, without which it availeth nothing, for the outward sign of charity will not bring to everlasting life those who make light of the Sacraments.’ In the old law the soul that was clean and neglected the Phase without a hindrance of necessity was cut off from the people for its neglect.

c. The despisers are they who cleave to their sin with such strong love that they count it but a little thing to receive the Body of the Lord. With just judgment they are condemned and cut off, because they love their sins more than their preparation to receive the Body of Jesus. There is a canon which says, ‘They who shall, through sin, stay away two or three years from Communion shall be excommunicated till they do penance.’

(2) The second thing to be considered about this way of receiving is the greatness of the happiness of the good who worthily receive the Body of their Lord. Now this is proved in three ways: a, by the choice of the best part; b, by being made partakers of the Holy Ghost; c, by the assured indwelling of Jesus Himself.

a. The great happiness of good communicants is proved by this, that, like Mary, they have chosen the best part. God gave the Blessed Virgin the choice of three things: to be a mother and not a virgin; or to be a virgin and not a mother; or to be a virgin and a mother. She chose the best, that is, to be a Virgin-Mother. So, out of the three ways of eating the Body of Jesus, they choose the best, that is, the way which is sacramental and spiritual at once. They choose this last way, that is, to eat sacramentally in the first way, and to eat spiritually in the second way; and so, by both together, they eat in the best way, and are indeed overflowingly blessed in their joy. The Wise Man praised this joy; as if he had said, ‘I have tried very many kinds of joys and delights, both of the flesh and the world; but they are all vanity, and their end is mourning and woe. Hence, before everything else I praise true joy, that is, the testimony of a good conscience; and I can see nothing better for any one in this world than to eat the Bread which came down from Heaven and drink the Blood of the Lord, that is, the wine that gladdens the heart of man.’

b. Secondly, their great happiness is proved by their being made true partakers of the Holy Ghost. Jesus is a rock and the giver of sweetness, and these happy ones drink in the sweetness of the Holy Ghost from His Body. The Church sings from words of Scripture, ‘How sweet, O Lord, is Thy Holy Spirit in us;’ as if from His Body His Spirit flowed to us. St. Augustin says, ‘When a man feeds on the Body and Blood of Christ he lives, not only receiving the Sacrament, which the wicked also do, but reaching even to a participation of the Spirit, so that he abides in our Lord’s Body as a member, and is fed by His Spirit.’

c. Thirdly, their great happiness is proved by the assured indwelling of Christ. St. Hilary says, ‘When we have fed on the Flesh of our Lord and drunk His Blood, we dwell in Him and He dwells in us. For He is in us by flesh when we receive His Flesh, and we are in Him when He, with that which we are, is in God.’

(3) The third thing to be considered about this way of eating is the manner in which worthy eaters are said to eat and be eaten. This mystery is thus explained. When the Body of our Lord is worthily eaten by the faithful, that Body is not, like other food, changed into the eater, but, on the contrary, he who rightly eats it is changed spiritually into it. For our Lord makes him who eats Him a member of His Body; incorporates him with Himself by love, and thus unites him in the closest way with Himself, making him like an image of His own goodness. Now, that our Lord is not changed into us when we eat His Body, but that we are changed into Him, is proved by a threefold likeness:

a. The first likeness is taken from the power of our love. For such is the strength of love, that the heart of the lover is changed into the heart of the loved one, that is, is made like the loved one in happiness and sorrow. Hugo says, ‘The might of love is so great that you cannot help being such as that is which you love, and to which you are joined by affection. You are in a sense changed into its likeness by a communion of love. Thus the Bride of Jesus longs to be a seal on the Heart of the Divine Bridegroom. Like wax, warm, pure, soft, she will receive an impression of that Heart. On the heart that is thus warm with the love of God, pure in its own cleanness, soft with the love of its neighbour, the Body of Jesus is laid as a seal; not that it should be changed into us, for it is unchangeable; but that we may be transfigured into the image of its goodness.’

b. The second likeness is taken from the power of that which is greater than something else. For if you let fall a drop of water into a large vessel of wine, the water is altogether changed into wine because of the greatness of the wine; but the virtue of the Body of our Lord is of unspeakable greatness, and we, in comparison with it, are less than can be said. The greatness therefore of the might and sweetness of Jesus being poured into our hearts, which are very little and poor, absorbs them, and, making them fail from themselves, changes them into itself. We are then no longer like worldly men, nor even like ourselves; but we are like Jesus in will and word and holy lives.

c. The third likeness is taken from the strength of a branch of a tree. If a shoot of a good tree be grafted on the stem of a wild tree, the natural goodness of the shoot has such power that it changes the natural bitterness of the wild tree into its own sweetness and goodness, so that the wild stem brings forth good fruit like the fruit of the tree from which the shoot was taken. Thus the Body of Christ grafted into us takes away our failings, and draws us into its own goodness. Then as He puts forth leafy branches, flowers, and fruits of justice, it gives us strength by Him to do the same. Thus the Holy Ghost tells us of the marrow of the high cedar, and of its topmost bough, and how it was planted on a lofty mountain, and blossomed and brought forth fruit. In this, the high cedar is God the Father; the higher branches are the ancient Saints; the top of the banches is the Blessed Virgin; the marrow of the cedar is the Eternal Wisdom of God; and the tender twig taken from the top of the branches is the flesh taken from the Mother of God. The Holy Ghost therefore took the marrow from the cedar, and the twig from the topmost boughs, because He wrought the Incarnation of the Word. Further, He plants this most noble shoot on a high mountain, when He gives the Sacrament of the Body of Jesus to the faithful whom He has drawn from the desires of earth to the desires of Heaven. Here, then, is a great abundance of fruit. The faithful heart leaves the bitterness of its own faults and sins by the might of the Body of its Lord, and then, like Him, brings forth the leafy branches and flowers and fruits of the Spirit. Hence it was said to St. Augustin, ‘I am the food of the mighty.’ Thus Jesus draws us to Himself. He grafts us into His own Body that the root of bitterness may be in us no more. He draws us to God by the greatness of our love for Himself and by the greatness of His love for us. Then the might and sweetness of His goodness win the victory over sin by working in us. This is the true life, when, as St. Paul says, Christ lives in us, and we live by Him who died for us on the Cross.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About the bad; a. Unbelievers; The Jews therefore strove among themselves, saying, How can this Man give us His Flesh to eat? St. John 6:53.

He that believeth in the Son hath life everlasting; but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him. St. John 3:36.

b. The careless; The kingdom of Heaven is likened to a king who made a marriage for his son; and he sent his servants to call them that were invited to the marriage; and they would not come. Again he sent other servants, saying, Tell them that were invited, Behold, I have prepared my dinner: my beeves and fatlings are killed, and all things are ready; come ye to the marriage. But they neglected, and went their way, one to his farm, and another to his merchandise. St. Matt. 22:2–5.

For this cause I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom all fatherhood in Heaven and earth is named, that He would grant you by the riches of His glory to be strengthened by His Spirit with might unto the inward man; that Christ may dwell in your hearts by faith; that you, being rooted and founded in charity, may be able to comprehend with all the Saints what is the breadth and length and depth and height; to know also the love of Christ, which passeth all knowledge, that you may be filled unto all the fulness of God. Eph. 3:14–19.

If any man is clean and was not on a journey, and did not make the Phase, that soul shall be cut off from among his people, because he offered not sacrifice to the Lord in due season; he shall bear his sin. Numb. 9:13.

c. The despisers; The posts went with letters by commandment of the king (Ezechias) and his princes to all Israel and Juda, proclaiming according to the king’s orders, Ye children of Israel, turn again to the Lord, the God of Abaham and of Isaac and of Israel; … yield yourselves to the Lord, and come to His sanctuary which He hath sanctified for ever; serve the Lord, the God of your fathers, and the wrath of His indignation shall be turned away from you.… So the posts went speedily from city to city, …

while they laughed at them and mocked them.… Nevertheless, some men yielding to the counsel came to Jerusalem. 2 Paralip. 30:6, 8, 10, 11.

This is the judgment because the light is come into the world; and men loved darkness rather than light, for their works were evil. St. John 3:19.

I say to you, that none of those men that were invited shall taste of my supper. St. Luke 14:24.

(2) Great happiness of good communicants; a. The good choice; I commended mirth, because there was no good for man under the sun but to eat and drink and be merry. Eccles. 8:15.

b. Partakers of the Holy Ghost; He filled them with honey out of the rock. Ps. 80:17.

O, how good and sweet is Thy Spirit, O Lord, in all things. Wisd. 12:1.

c. Indwelling of Christ; He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood abideth in Me and I in him. St. John 6:57.

Jesus answered and said to him, If any man love Me he will keep My word, and My Father will love him; and We will come to him, and make Our abode with him. St. John 14:23.

(3) Worthy receivers are themselves eaten; We being many are one bread, one body. 1 Cor. 10:17.

Now you are the Body of Christ and members of member. 1 Cor. 12:27.

a. Our love; Set me as a seal on Thy Heart, and as a seal on Thy arm; for love is strong as death. Cantic. 8:6.

b. Power of a greater thing; Great is our Lord, and great is His power; and of His wisdom there is no number. Ps. 146:5.

Behold Thou hast made my days as a handbreath, and my substance is as nothing before Thee: truly every man living is altogether vanity. Ps. 38:6.

Behold the nations are as a drop of a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain in a balance: behold the islands are as a little dust; and Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof enough for a burnt-offering. All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all, and are counted to Him as nothing and vanity. Is. 40:15–17.

My soul hath fainted after Thy salvation; and in Thy word I have hoped very much. Ps. 118:81.

c. The branch of a tree; Thus saith the Lord God, A large eagle with great wings, long-limbed, full of feathers and variety, came to Libanus, and took away the marrow of the cedar. He cropt off the top of the twigs thereof, and carried it away to the land of Chanaan; and set it in a city of merchants.… Thus saith the Lord God, I Myself will take of the marrow of the high cedar, and will set it. I will crop off a tender twig from the top of the branches thereof, and I will plant it on a mountain high and eminent. On the high mountains of Israel will I plant it; and it shall shoot forth into branches, and shall bear fruit, and shall become a great cedar; and all birds shall dwell under it, and every fowl shall make its nest under the shadow of its branches. Ezech. 17:3, 4, 22, 23.

Draw me; we will run after Thee to the fragrance of Thy ointments. The King hath brought me to His storerooms; we will be glad and rejoice in Thee. Cantic. 1:3.

I through the law am dead to the law, that I may live to God. With Christ I am nailed to the Cross; and I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me; and the life that I now live in the flesh I live in the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and gave Himself for me. Gal. 2:19, 20.

Prayer

My Jesus, Thou art in the clefts of the rock, where the peace and rest of Thy kingdom of love are never stirred by the wind or any storm. In Thy tenderness of pity Thou lookest on me, Thy little one, dwelling on the sand by the shore of the sea. Thou art wise, and Thy house cannot be shaken: but I am foolish, and my house is ever falling with a great fall. Round me, like a storm beating against a wall, are the blasts of the terrible ones. O my Jesus, my loved One, I come to Thee and find Thee in Thy Tabernacle. Thou givest me rest. Let me come to Thee as I ought to come, and let me be as dear to Thee as I can be, and as Thou, my God, willest me to be. Save me from all carelessness and from all forgetfulness of Thee. Save me from the guilt of ever counting Thy gifts a little thing. Save me always from the faintest shadow of unbelief. Let me find Thee more in Thy Holy Sacraments; and in them let me know more and more of Thy love. Let this Bread of Life be to me a foretaste of the Vision of Thyself; and let me see and know how this wine of God which I now drink in Communion is truly the new wine which I shall drink for ever with Thee in Thy Father’s kingdom.

Dear Jesus, coming to me now in Thy white raiment, give me more love for Thy Holy Spirit, and make Him far dearer to me and far more precious to me every day. Let me ever drink in His sweetness from Thy Body, for

Thou art the living rock. In the might of a great sweetness let Him be ever in my soul. Thou lovest Him with a love infinite and uncreated. Thou lovest Him in a created way with all the strength of Thy Soul, hypostatically united to Thy Godhead, and sanctified by Him.

Thou Thyself, my Saviour, dost dwell in me. When I feed on Thy adorable Body and most Precious Blood Thou abidest in me and I abide in Thee. O my Jesus, keep me holy for Thyself: and let me be transfigured into a likeness of Thee. Make me, by grace, flesh of Thy flesh and bone of Thy bone; for Thou art the Spouse and Bridegroom of my soul. Make me faithful, that Thou mayest be mine for ever, and that I may be Thine for ever in the marriage-banquet of the kingdom of God, the most Holy Trinity.

My Jesus, set me as a seal on Thy arm, and make me strong for God; and set me as a seal on Thy Heart, and make me loving for God. Let Thy love go through my soul; for Thy Holy Spirit is the river that makes glad the city of the King.

Thou art the true Vine, my Jesus; let me ever be a living branch in Thee. Thy Father is the husbandman: give me more love for that Father whom Thou lovest with a love uncreated and infinite: whom Thou lovest also in a created way with all the strength of Thy Soul. I pray that Thou mayest ever gather in my garden flowers and fruits according to Thy will. Let my branches be ever fruitful branches in Thee.

Now Thou art coming to me from Thy Altar in the light of Thy eternal Sacrifice, as the food which stays the hunger of the soul. As Thou art the light of our spirits, so Thou art the food of our spirits. Come to me, Jesus, King and Priest; come to me, Jesus, my Brother and my God. Touch me with Thy hand, and let me lay hold of the hem of Thy healing raiment. Lighten my heart with coals of fire from Thy Altar. Then draw me, and I will follow Thee. By Thy help, in my weakness, I will follow Thee whithersoever Thou goest, O Thou sweet One, O Thou dear One, O Thou Lover of souls! Draw me by Thy sorrow and by Thy gladness of Heart, by Thy Passion and Cross, by the bitterness of Thy dereliction, by the sprinkling of Thy Blood, by Thy justice and Thy mercy, by Thy tenderness and Thy avenging wrath, by Thy truth and Thy pity and Thy love. Thou didst die for me, my risen Jesus; let me live in Thy life. Live in me, that I may live in Thee, and that by Thee I may give my body and soul to God.

Let my life be ever hidden in God with Thee. My Jesus, with all my heart I ask Thee for Thyself.

My Jesus, whom can I desire but Thee? Thou art God, and hast life in Thyself. My Jesus, whom can I go to but to Thee? Thou art man, and hast the words of eternal life for me. Thou art the Way, and no man cometh to the Father but by Thee. Thou, Jesus, with Thy Father and Thy Spirit, art the God of my heart: Thou, Jesus, in the Blessed Sacrament, art the God who is my inheritance for ever. My Jesus, with all my heart I ask Thee for Thyself.

My Jesus, I love Thee for Thy own sake, and I seek Thee for Thy own great glory. Thou art now coming to me from Thy Altar. My Jesus, with all my heart I ask Thee for Thyself.

PART VI

THE SIXTH THING TO BE CHIEFLY NOTED ABOUT THE BLESSED SACRAMENT IS THE EFFECT OF ITS GOODNESS OR SPIRITUAL VIRTUE

XXI

About the twelve effects or fruits of the Body of Jesus which have power against our twelve evils: and now about the first four

BECAUSE our first parents, sin-stricken by eating the God-forbidden fruit, poured many miseries on their race, it became necessary that these miseries should be healed by the balm of the Saviour of men. It is Jesus who is the physician of souls.

Now you must know that our miseries, taken in general, are three: i., the chain of guilt; ii., the want of grace; iii., the wounds of death.

N. In each of these three general miseries are found four special evils, that is, twelve special weaknesses in all, for the healing of which are ordained the twelve effects or fruits of the Body of our Lord.

i. Our first four evils or weaknesses are, so to say, chains of guilt by which souls are tightly bound: 1, the temptation of the devil; 2, the resistance of sensuality; 3, the stain on the heart; 4, the anger of our Maker. Against these the fruit of the Mother of God, that is, the Body of our Saviour, has prevailing might.

1. The devil goes about as our enemy; he watches the walls that are guarded, and looks carefully everywhere to see if he can find any part of the wall weaker than the rest, that there he may make his way to the inside. He sets before our eyes pictures of unlawful things, and pleasures easy to gain, that by this he may destroy chastity. He tempts us in our ears by melodious sounds, that we may give up the hardness of Christian penance. He provokes the tongue by reproaches; and by irritating injuries leads the hands

to murder. He promises the honours of earth, that he may keep from us the rewards of Heaven.

2. St. Augustin, speaking of St. Paul’s words about the ‘other law’ in his members, says, ‘I see another law in my members, that is, the fuel of sin. It is in the eye for desire, in the tongue for evil-speaking, in the hand for evil-doing, and so on in the other members. This fights against the law of the mind, that is, the law of God.’

3. We are warned again and again by the Holy Ghost that no one can say that his heart is pure and free from sin, and that in our sin we are stained before God. No earthly remedies can make us clean.

4. St. Augustin says, ‘The justice of God does not suffer the ugliness of guilt to last without the beauty of vengeance.’

(i.) Against these four evils are given to us the first four fruits of the Body of our Lord, by which we are freed from the chain of guilt: 1, it drives away the devil; 2, it cools sensuality, or the fuel of sin; 3, it cleanses the stain of the heart; 4, it appeases the anger of God.

1. Tobias, by order of St. Raphael, took a large fish from the river. That river, in which are fishes, signifies the world; all the fishes there are the different races of men; the great fish is the Jewish nation; the heart of the fish, as its noblest member, and as the member from which life proceeds, signifies the Mother of God; and the little piece of the heart signifies that Body of Jesus which He assumed from the flesh of Mary. This Body must be put on hot coals, that is, given to the faithful, kindled and aflame with the fire of love. The smoke, then, that is, its spiritual virtue, drives away the devils.

2. David speaks of Selmon, the mount of God, a fat mountain. The mountain of God is Christ, and Selmon is interpreted shadow. He, therefore, is the shadow that refreshes us: for from His Body spreads the shadow of grace, which is to us a refuge against the incentives of vice and of all fleshly desire. Thus our Lady was overshadowed by the power of the Most High. There can only be a shadow where there are a body and light. The light is the Word of God, and the Body is the flesh of Christ. There came light to the Body, that is, the Word to flesh: for the Word was made flesh. When, therefore, the faithful soul receives the Body of Jesus, it feels the refreshment of the spirit, as it were the shadow of grace which flows from that Body. Jesus is like dew, and the faithful soul blossoms like a lily.

3. One of the Seraphim touched the lips of Isaias with a live coal brought from the Altar. That live coal signifies the Body of Jesus, and when He touches the lips of the heart venial sin is taken away. St. Gregory says, ‘Our Lord gave us the Sacrament of salvation, that as we sin daily, and He can now no more die for sin, by this we may obtain forgiveness.’

4. In the old law the bread baked in the fryingpan and offered and anointed with oil was a type of Christ, wholly anointed with the Spirit of God, suffering for us, and dying for us on the Cross. The memorial of this sacrifice is the Host, which is offered in remembrance of the Passion of our Lord. This must be burned on the Altar, that is to say, it must be kindled, because it should be received by the faithful soul with all fervour of desire and all fire of love. This is an odour of sweetness to God. It is so pleasing to Him that for the sake of it He turns away His anger, and reconciles us to Himself and leads us to His everlasting peace.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About the healing of Jesus; For the affliction of the daughter of My people I am afflicted and made sorrowful: astonishment hath taken hold of Me. Is there no balm in Galaad? Or is there no physician there? Why, then, is not the wound of the daughter of My people healed? Jerem. 8:21, 22.

i. The chains of guilt; They were all bound together with one chain of darkness. Wisd. 17:17.

[I am bowed down with a heavy chain of iron. Prayer of Manass.]

His own iniquities catch the wicked; and he is fast bound with the ropes of his own sins. Prov. 5:22.

The cords of the wicked have bound me. Ps. 118:61.

Pride hath held them fast. Ps. 72:6.

ii. The want of grace; Thy eyes did see my imperfect being, and in Thy book all shall be written. Ps. 138:16.

My soul is as earth without water before Thee. Hear me speedily, O Lord; my spirit hath fainted away. Ps. 142:6, 7.

iii. The wounds of death; The pangs of death have surrounded me; the floods of Belial have made me afraid. The cords of hell compassed me; the snares of death prevented me. 2 Kings 22:5, 6.

Remove Thy scourges from me; the strength of Thy hand hath made me faint in rebukes. Ps. 38:11.

He hath torn me with wound upon wound: He hath rushed in upon me like a giant. Job 16:15.

N. The twelve fruits of our Lord’s Body; He showed me a river of water of life, clear as crystal, flowing from the throne of God and of the Lamb. In the midst of the street thereof, and on both sides of the river, was the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits, yielding its fruits every month; and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. Apoc. 22:1, 2.

Bless the Lord, O my soul, and never forget all that He hath done for thee. He forgiveth all thy iniquities and healeth all thy diseases. He redeemeth thy life from destruction, and crowneth thee with mercy and pity. Ps. 102:2–4.

i. The chains; 1. The temptations of the devil; Put you on the whole armour of God, that you may be able to stand against the deceits of the devil. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against spirits of wickedness in the high places. Therefore take to yourselves the armour of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day and to stand in all things perfect. Eph. 6:11–13.

Many are the snares of the deceitful. Ecclus. 11:31.

Be sober and watch, because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour; whom resist ye, strong in faith. 1 Pet. 5:8, 9.

The enemy hath persecuted my soul; he hath brought down my life to the earth. He hath made me dwell in darkness, as those that have been dead of old; my spirit is in anguish within me, and my heart within me is troubled. Ps. 142:3, 4.

2. Sensuality, or the fuel of sin; Walk in the spirit, and you shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the spirit and the spirit against the flesh; for these are contrary to one another, so that you do not the things that you would. Gal. 5:16, 17.

I find, then, a law, that when I have a will to do good evil is present with me. For I delight in the law of God according to the inward man. But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin that is in my members. Wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God by Jesus Christ our Lord. Rom. 7:21–25.

3. The stain on the heart; Though thou wash thyself with nitre, and heap up to thyself the herb borith, thou art stained in thy iniquity before Me, saith the Lord God. How canst thou say, I am not polluted? Jerem. 2:22, 23.

Who can say, My heart is clean, I am pure from sin? Prov. 20:9.

There is no just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not. Eccles. 7:21.

4. The anger of God; Remember and forget not how thou didst provoke the Lord thy God to wrath in the wilderness.… In Horeb also thou didst provoke Him; and He was angry and would have destroyed thee.… Again the Lord said to me, I see that this people is stiffnecked; let Me alone, that I may destroy them. Deut. 9:7, 8, 13, 14.

I am angry with a great anger. Zach. 1:15.

(i.) The fruits of our Lord's Body: As to chains of guilt; 1. It drives away the devil; The Angel answering said to him, If thou put a little piece of its heart on coals the smoke thereof driveth away all kinds of devils, either from man or from woman, that they come to them no more. Tob. 6:8.

Let God arise and let His enemies be scattered, and let them that hate Him flee before His face. As smoke vanisheth so let them vanish away, and as wax melteth before the fire so let the wicked perish at the presence of God. Ps. 67:2, 3.

2. It cools desire; When He that is in Heaven appointeth kings over her, they shall be whited with snow in Selmon. The mountain of God is a fat mountain. Ps. 67:15, 16.

The Angel answering said to her, The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Most High shall overshadow thee. St. Luke 1:35.

I will be as the dew; Israel shall bud as the lily. Osee 14:6.

3. It cleanses the stain on the heart; One of the Seraphim flew to me, and in his hand was a live coal which he had taken with the tongs off the Altar; and he touched my mouth and said, Behold this hath touched thy lips; and thy iniquities shall be taken away, and thy sin shall be cleansed. Is. 6:6, 7.

4. It appeases the anger of God; A hidden gift quencheth anger, and a reward in the bosom the greatest wrath. Prov. 21:14.

If thy sacrifice be from the gridiron, in like manner the flour shall be mixed with oil; and when thou offerest it to the Lord thou shalt give it into the hands of the priest; and when he hath offered it he shall take a memorial out of the sacrifice, and burn it on his Altar for a sweet savour to the Lord. Lev. 2:7–9.

I will accept of you for an odour of sweetness when I shall have brought you out from the people, and shall have gathered you out of the lands into which you were scattered, and I will be sanctified in you. Ezech. 20:41.

An odour of sweetness, an acceptable sacrifice, pleasing God. Philip. 4:18.

Walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odour of sweetness. Eph. 5:2.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, my Helper and my Comforter, Thou knowest all the suffering through which I may have to go, and Thou knowest the chains by which I am bound. Thou knowest, Giver of holiness, how my soul cleaves to the dust. Thou knowest my need of grace, and how little I seek for it, and how I waste the graces which Thou in Thy goodness givest me. Thou knowest how I am stricken with the wounds of death, in pain and sorrow and wasting of life. These things lead me onward to my grave. Help me, Spirit of life, and comfort me and hold me up with Thy almighty hand.

In all temptations of the devil I come to Thee. In all temptations of my own heart I come to Thee. If I live according to the flesh, I die: but, if by Thee I kill the flesh, I live. If I am led by Thee as Thou longest to lead me, I am a child of God. Thou art the Spirit of adoption, and by Thee I say, ‘Our Father,’ and by Thee I say, ‘Jesus, my Lord.’ Thou, O Holy Ghost, most precious and most dearly loved dost bear witness with my spirit.

Wash me from all stain of sin, and save me from the anger of God; from Thy anger, Thou God of love and mercy; from the anger of Jesus, God and man; from the anger of the Eternal Father whom I love.

I pray that the most Holy Body of Jesus which I am going to receive may be in me as that balm of Galaad against which no diseases of the spirit can prevail. Let it be to me that light of salvation against which no thickness of darkness has power.

Jesus, coming to me from Thy Altar, fill my soul with love, and bring me at last safely to the whiteness of the streets in Thy Heavenly City, where Thy elect dwell with Thee for ever.

XXII

About the second four fruits of the Body of Jesus

ii. Our second chief misery, noted in the last Meditation, is want of grace. From this come our second four evils or weaknesses; and these are a grievous loss to many souls. They are: 1, want of self-knowledge; 2, want of brotherly love; 3, want of the spiritual taste; 4, want of perseverance in good. The fruit of the womb of Mary, that is, the Body of Jesus, prevails against these defects.

1. From the ancient days the heart of man has been wrapped up in ignorance of self. Who can understand the evil ways in which he has made others sin, or in which he has consented to the sins of others?

2. We love our brethren but little, and charity grows cold. This is proved by outward things. We do not help our neighbour when we can nor as much as we can. Diverse weights and measures are hateful to God, as the Scripture says. Now he has these unjust weights and these unjust measures in his house who measures and weighs in one way for himself and in another way for his neighbour, and who sees always in his own actions the things that are to be praised, but in the actions of his neighbour the things that are to be blamed. He who in things of the world strives always to give more to himself and less to his neighbour is displeasing to God. The same must be said about the man who by word or deed grieves his neighbour or hurts him or causes him loss.

3. Jeremias speaks of the sour grapes which the children eat; and of this St. Gregory says, ‘What are these sour grapes but sin? A grape that is sour is fruit before the time; and he who strives to satisfy himself with the delights of this life is trying to eat fruit before it is ripe. His teeth are set on

edge, because a man who feeds on the joys of this life and of the world has his inward senses so bound that he cannot taste the sweetness of spiritual things. The Israelites were so satisfied in Egypt with flesh and leeks and garlic, that they longed for them in the desert, and through that desire turned away even with loathing from the deliciousness of the manna, the bread from Heaven.' St. Paul tells us that the sensual man cannot perceive the things of the Spirit; and of this St. Augustin says, 'The sensual man is the fleshly man, who is borne headlong by the wild lasciviousness of his soul.'

4. There is no wonder if a man make good resolutions, and begin works that are good; but it is indeed wonderful if he go on with them, and persevere in his good intentions and his good works.

(ii.) Against these four evils we have the second four fruits of the Body of Jesus, for by them we are perfected in the life of grace: 1, He enlightens the understanding so that it may know itself; 2, He sets the will or the affections aflame with the love of God; 3, He delights the memory with spiritual sweetness; 4, He strengthens the whole man in what is good.

1. Honey is praised as food in Scripture, because it signifies the uncreated Wisdom of God given to us as very sweet food, and bringing with it enlightenment. When God enlightens us it is that He helps us to know ourselves better.

2. The live coal burning with fire brought to Isaias from the Altar signifies the Body of Jesus given in Communion. That Body is on fire with love, and it kindles a great love in the hearts of the faithful.

3. The memory of Josias is said to be like a fragrance made by the art of the perfumer, and to be sweet as honey in every mouth. Now Josias, the strength of God, signifies Christ. The memorial of Christ is the Sacrament of His Body, which He commanded to be offered in remembrance of Himself; and it is a fragrant work of the Holy Ghost, who made it of most precious things, that is, of the virginal flesh of Mary and of the Wisdom of God. This is a sweetness like honey in the mouth of the heart if you lovingly meditate on all that He has done for the salvation of the world. The more that you think of Him, the more you will love Him.

N. The Bride speaks of the shadow of the Spouse, and longs for it. Thus the faithful soul longs for Jesus, is inflamed with great love for Him, and is athirst for Him in the Spirit. Then she feels the shadow of her desire in the hope of finding fruit. Next she sits still, waits, and prays that He may pour

Himself out altogether as the fruit which she seeks, for life and for refreshment. Lastly, when He is poured forth, she tastes His sweetness in rapture of soul.

But you may say, ‘I prepare myself for Communion as often as I can; I receive the Body of my Lord; and yet I feel nothing of this consolation and spiritual sweetness of which you speak.’ To that I answer, This food or fruit is the medicine of man. Now a skilful physician gives to some persons medicine that is pleasant to the palate of the body, and to others that which is not sweet in this way, but pleasant to the palate of the mind. This may not be sweet to the throat, but it is sweet to the reason, because the reasonable patient knows that it is for his good. So our Lord gives His Body to the faithful. It is always sweet in itself; but to some He gives that sweetness in one way, and to some in another, just as He in His wisdom sees to be best for each soul. Hence there are two ways in which this sweetness of Jesus is felt:

a. Some taste this sweetness in their affections, having great joy in their hearts. By very fervent devotion they find consolation and peace in God. St. Ambrose says, ‘O Bread most shiningly white, having in Thyself every delight and the sweetness of every taste, Thou who dost always refresh us, let my heart feed on Thee and taste Thy gladness.’

b. Others taste the same sweetness by an understanding turned to God. In this they have all the refreshment and all the help that they desire. They believe, and thus they know that by this holy Food they have true life, that is, the everlasting life which God gives. When the Bride says that the fruit of the Divine Spouse is sweet to her taste, she means that it is sweet to the loving and faithful mind, which believes in God, and thus knows the exceedingly great profitableness of this holy Food. This fruit is sweet to the taste of the heart when it finds in it the principle of life, and perceives it even in a bodily way.

If, then, you should not feel inward delight after the first way, by love and devotion and sensible sweetness, you can feel it in the second way, by understanding all the good the Body of Jesus does to your soul.

This sweetness, as you have seen in the Nineteenth Meditation, has power against three evils of the world: a, false sweetness in using pleasant things; b, bitterness in bearing trials; c, sadness about doing good.

4. The Body of Jesus strengthens the faithful in the work of God. It lifts them up, and heartens them so that they do not fear. If we go on bravely, yet humbly, we shall reach our journey's end in safety.

N. These four fruits are set forth in the miracle by which Eliseus raised the son of the Sunamitess to life. By the boy is signified the faithful soul; by Eliseus, our Lord, who joins Himself to the soul like a seal on wax. He puts His eyes upon our eyes, because He enlightens our understanding; He warms our flesh, because He enkindles our hearts with love; He puts His mouth on our mouth, because He delights the taste of our memory with sweetness of the Spirit; He puts His hands upon our hands, because He helps us to persevere in good works to the end. Thus He perfects the whole man, and brings him safely to everlasting life.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

ii. About defects of grace; 1. Want of self-knowledge; Darkness was upon the face of the deep. Gen. 1:2.

The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable: who can know it? I am the Lord who searches the heart. Jer. 17:9.

Who can understand sins? From my secret sins cleanse me, O Lord. Ps. 18:13.

Why seest thou the mote that is in thy brother's eye, and seest not the beam that is in thine own eye? Or how sayest thou to thy brother, Let me cast the mote out of thy eye, and behold a beam is in thine own eye? St. Matt. 7:3, 4.

2. Our want of brotherly love; Because iniquity hath abounded, the love of many shall grow cold. St. Matt. 24:12.

The cold north wind bloweth, and the water is congealed into crystal: upon every gathering together of waters it shall rest, and shall clothe the waters as a breastplate. Ecclus. 43:22.

He that hath the substance of this world and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his compassion from him, how doth the love of God abide in him? My little children, let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth. 1 John 3:17, 18.

Let every man take heed of his neighbour, and let him not trust in any brother of his; for every brother will utterly supplant, and every friend will walk deceitfully. And a man shall mock his brother, and they will not speak the truth; for they have taught their tongues to speak lies; they have laboured to commit iniquity. Thy habitation is in the midst of deceit: through deceit they have refused to know Me, saith the Lord. Jer. 9:4–6.

Diverse weights and diverse measures are both abominable before God. Prov. 20:10.

3. Our want of spiritual taste; In those days they shall say no more the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the teeth of the children are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every man that shall eat of the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge. Jer. 31:29, 30.

A mixed multitude of people, that came up with them, burned with desire, sitting and weeping, the children of Israel being also joined with them, and said, Who shall give us flesh to eat? We remember the fish we ate in Egypt free cost: the cucumbers come into our minds, and the melons and the leeks and the onions and the garlic. Our soul is dry; and our eyes behold nothing else but manna. Numb. 11:4–6.

The sensual man perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God; for it is foolishness to him, and he cannot understand because it is spiritually examined. 1 Cor. 2:14.

4. Our want of perseverance; The Lord rained upon Sodom and Gomorrha brimstone and fire from the Lord out of Heaven; and He destroyed these cities and all the country about; all the inhabitants of the cities, and all things that spring from the earth; and his (Lot's) wife looking behind her was turned into a statue of salt. Gen. 19:24–26.

Are ye so foolish that, whereas you began in the Spirit, you would now be made perfect by the flesh? Gal. 3:3.

They leave the right way and walk by dark ways; and are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things. Their ways are perverse, and their steps infamous. Prov. 2:13–15.

They upon the rock are they who when they hear receive the word with joy; and these have no roots: they believe for a while, and in time of temptation fall away. St. Luke 8:13.

Jesus said to him, No man putting his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God. St. Luke 9:62.

Let us get up early to the vineyards; let us see if the vineyard flourish, if the flowers be ready to bring forth fruits, if the pomegranates flourish. Cantic. 7:12.

(ii.) The second four fruits of our Lord’s Body: As to defects of grace; 1. It gives self-knowledge to the understanding; Eat honey, my son, because it is good, and the honeycomb is most sweet to the taste. So also is the doctrine of wisdom to thy soul. Prov. 24:13, 14.

You have seen yourselves that my eyes are enlightened because I tasted a little of this honey. 1 Kings 14:29.

He shall eat butter and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good. Is. 7:15.

Come ye to Him and be enlightened. Ps. 33:6.

The Lord is my light and my salvation. Ps. 26:1.

2. It kindles the will with love of God; One of the Seraphim flew to me, and in his hand was a live coal; … and he touched my mouth. Is. 6:6.

3. It delights with spiritual sweetness; O, taste and see that the Lord is sweet; blessed is the man that hopeth in Him. Ps. 33:9.

The memory of Josias is like the composition of a sweet smell made by the art of the perfumer. His remembrance shall be sweet as honey in every mouth. Ecclus. 49:1, 2.

N. The shadow of the Spouse; I sat down under His shadow whom I desired. Cantic. 2:3.

a. Taste of the affections; Hearken diligently to Me and eat that which is good, and your soul shall be delighted in fatness. Is. 55:2.

b. Taste of the understanding; His fruit was sweet to my taste. Cantic. 2:3.

4. It strengthens the whole man in good; Thou waterest the hills from Thy chambers; the earth shall be filled with the fruits of Thy works, … that Thou mayest bring bread out of the earth … and that bread may strengthen man’s heart. Ps. 103:13–15.

N. The second four fruits together; Eliseus went into the house, and behold the child lay dead on his bed. And going in he shut the door upon him and upon the child, and prayed to the Lord. And he went up and lay upon the child; and he put his mouth on his mouth, and his eyes on his eyes, and his hands on his hands, and he bowed himself upon him, and the child’s flesh grew warm. 4 Kings 4:32–34.

Thanksgiving

Jesus, Lover of my soul, Thou hast told me that without Thee I can do nothing. Thou hast also told me by Thy great Apostle that I can do all things if only Thou strengthen me. Strengthen me, dear Lord, by Thy Holy

Spirit, that I may love Thee more and keep Thy commandments better; that I may live in Thee and for Thee; and that with Thee my life may always be hidden in God. Thou art the Fountain of grace in Thy Godhead and in Thy manhood. With the love of God Thou lovest all souls that Thou hast made. With the love of man Thou lovest all souls for whom Thou didst die. Thou art God, uncreated, everlasting, dwelling in the inaccessible light; who was and is, and is to come, the Almighty. Thou art Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. Thou art the man who lived and sorrowed and loved and suffered and died to bring me back to Thy Father. Thou art the Son of Mary, the Son of David, the Son of Abraham, the Son of Adam. Thou wast a man of sorrows, and Thy Soul was exceedingly sorrowful, even unto death. Thou wast dead, and didst lie in Thy garden-grave. Thou didst rise in the brightness of Thy might when Thy feet were on the high places of God. Thou art He who was dead and is alive for evermore. O Jesus, Thou holdest in Thy hands the keys of hell and death, and the keys of Heaven and life. Thou shuttest, and no man can open; Thou openest, and no man can shut. Thou art the Morning Star in Heaven, and the Morning Star in the most Holy Sacrament of the Altar. Thou hast come to me in the splendour of Thy love; in the might of Thy justice and the beauty of Thy truth; in the sweetness of Thy mercy; in the light of Thy sceptre and the glory of Thy indestructible kingdom. Body and Soul and Godhead, Thou hast given Thyself, my Jesus, to me. For this I love Thee and bless Thee, and praise Thee and glorify Thee, with all my heart and all my strength. Make me faithful in all things: faithful to Thy Holy Spirit; faithful to Thee. Give me knowledge of myself, that I may know my need of Thee. Give me love of my neighbour and my brethren, that I may love them in Thee. Give me spiritual sweetness when it may please Thee; but make me always love Thy will. Thou art blessed in what Thou givest, and blessed in what Thou givest not. Thou art blessed in what Thou takest away. Though Thou shouldest slay me, I will trust Thee. Fill me with love more and more, that I may ever desire Thee and sit beneath Thy shadow in the sweetness of Thy Garden. Fill me with faith more and more, that the knowledge of Thy presence in the Blessed Sacrament may be enough for me. Dear Jesus, it is more than enough. I bless Thee and thank Thee for joy and consolations and delight when Thou givest me these things; but Thou art to me far more than all of them, and I desire only Thee. O Jesus, Bread of Heaven, strengthen my heart. Thou art dwelling in me, uniting me in body and soul to Thyself. For this I bless Thee and praise Thee, and love Thee and magnify Thee, and give myself to Thee for ever and ever.

XXIII

About the third four fruits of the Body of Jesus

iii. Our third chief evil, as we saw at the beginning of the Twenty-first Meditation, is the wounds of death, by which many souls are heavily bowed down. In these wounds are found our third four evils or weaknesses: 1, the debt of everlasting death; 2, the wasting away of that life which is good; 3, our exile in the misery of the world; 4, the crumbling of our bodies to the dust. Against these evils the fruit of the womb of the Mother of God has power.

1. Our first parents for a small delight of sin sold themselves and their offspring into the slavery of the devil, that is, they gave themselves up to everlasting death. Adam knew that so soon as he had eaten the forbidden fruit he would die the death. He knew that by that deed he himself and all his descendants would die eternally. The Apostle tells us that death came by one man. This death is the certainty of the death of the body here, and the debt of everlasting death hereafter, from which none escape but by the salvation worked by the Redeemer.

2. We waste our time and waste our grace, and thus waste our lives, which God has given to us that we may work for Him. He gives us abundance of grace, but we do not correspond with it as we ought; so our good works are few, and our lives are but poor in His sight. We are weak when we might be strong; and our lives pass away like a shadow when they might be made fruitful and enduring and beautiful in God.

3. When the Patriarchs confessed that they were pilgrims and strangers on earth they showed that they were seeking for a heavenly country. If they had cared about the land from which they came they might have gone back

to it; but instead of this they sought for a better land, that is, the promised land of God. For this reason the Church says, with tears, to our Lady the Salve Regina,—‘Hail, thou Queen of Mercy.’ Do not feel it hard if the bad flourish in the world and if you have to suffer. It is not the part of Christian worth to be puffed up by worldly success, but rather to be cast down. The bad can have nothing in Heaven, and you have nothing in the world. So the hope of the good to which you are going should make you glad, whatever may happen to you on the way.

4. As the grass in the field and as the leaves on the trees so is our flesh. It grows, is strong, withers, is dried up, is laid aside. As the flower fadeth so fadeth the flesh of man.

(iii.) Against these four evils are ordained four fruits of the Body of our Lord, to save us from the wounds of death: 1, it frees us from everlasting death; 2, it increases the merits of good lives; 3, it leads us to the land of life; 4, it raises our bodies in the resurrection of everlasting life.

1. The fathers who ate manna died, but not for ever. They ate of the spiritual food of which we eat. They were, therefore, freed by the might of the Body of Christ, not only from death in hell, but also from the death which was in Limbus. What is more, our short death of the body is changed by our Lord’s Body into the life which lasts for ever in Heaven.

2. Our Lord gives Himself for the life of the world, because He gives Himself for the increase of the merits of a good life. As a child grows, by bodily food, in size, strength, and beauty, so the faithful soul, by spiritual food, grows in merit and in holy life.

3. Our Lord is the Living Bread, because He brings us from the misery of this exile to Heaven. St. Ambrose says, ‘A figure of our Lord’s Body went before when God rained manna on the fathers in the desert. For as that bread brought the people through the wilderness to the land of promise, so this heavenly food helps the faithful on their journey through the wilderness of the world, and brings them safely to the land of God.’ Rightly, then, is it called Viaticum, that is, food for the way, for, refreshing us on our journey, it brings us to our fatherland. As there was a tree of life in Paradise, so by Christ, who is the wisdom of God, life is given to the Church. We have now a pledge of everlasting life in the Sacrament of His Body and Blood. If, then, the Body of Christ, when taken by us, be a pledge of everlasting life, and if a pledge be not given back till that is received for which the pledge

was given, it follows that, in deed and in truth, we are brought to everlasting life by this Body of our Lord.

4. By one man, Adam, death passed on all; and by one man, Christ, there came life to all, and the resurrection of the dead. But the resurrection of the good is very different from the resurrection of the wicked. Though all rise, all are not changed. The reprobate rise in weakness and in ugliness; but the elect of God, because they have partaken either sacramentally or spiritually of the Body of Christ, rise far brighter than the sun. Isaias tells us how the countenances, of the wicked are like faces burnt; while Daniel tells us how the good shine like stars and like the brightness of the firmament to all eternity.

N. As is the seed that falls on the earth, so is the fruit that rises from the earth. In like manner, as your life is when you die, so in its own time will be your rising. Darnell is sown, and there springs up a worthless and troublesome weed; wheat is sown, and there rises a beautiful and useful grain. These things are figured in the King of Egypt’s dream.

1. The seven ears of corn, that were thin and blasted by the hot wind, signify the lost rising in all their hideousness, smitten and withered, in the judgment of the Son of Man.

2. The seven ears, full and very fair, on one stalk, are the elect, rising in their beauty and their brightness, with glorified bodies, in the love of Jesus.

R. With the lost or with the saved we all must be on that day. Let us take good heed, and work out our salvation with fear and trembling, now when it is the day, for the night cometh in which no man can work.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

iii. About the wound of death; 1. The debt of everlasting death; I am carnal, sold under sin. Rom. 7:14.

The Lord God took man, and put him in the Paradise of pleasure to dress it and keep it; and He commanded him, saying, Of every tree of Paradise thou shalt eat, but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat: for in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. Gen. 2:16, 17.

By one man sin entered into this world, and death by sin; and so death passed on all men, in that all have sinned. Rom. 5:12.

We all conversed in times past in the desires of our flesh, fulfilling the will of the flesh and of our thoughts, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest. Eph. 2:3.

2. The wasting away of good lives; My days have declined like a shadow, and I am withered like grass. Ps. 101:12.

Save me, O Lord, for there is now no Saint; truths are decayed from among the children of men. Ps. 11:2.

Joseph brought his father in to the king and presented him before him, and he blessed him. And being asked by him, How many are the days of the years of thy life? he answered, The days of my pilgrimage are a hundred and thirty years; few and evil, and they are not come up to the days of the pilgrimage of my fathers. Gen. 47:7–9.

The imagination and thoughts of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth. Gen. 8:21.

3. The misery of our exile; The Lord God had planted a Paradise of pleasure from the beginning, wherein He placed man whom He had made. Gen. 2:8.

The Lord God sent him out of the Paradise of pleasure to till the earth from which he was taken. And He cast out Adam, and placed before the Paradise of pleasure Cherubim and a flaming sword, which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life. Gen. 3:23, 24.

All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them, and confessing that they are strangers and pilgrims on the earth. Heb. 11:13.

4. The crumbling of our bodies into dust; In the sweat of thy face thou shalt eat bread till thou return to the earth out of which thou wast taken; for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return. Gen. 3:19.

Remember, I beseech Thee, that Thou hast made me as the clay, and wilt bring me to the dust again. Job. 10:9.

The voice of one saying, Cry; and I said, What shall I cry? All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field. The grass is withered and the flower is fallen because the Spirit of the Lord hath blown upon it. Surely the people is grass. Is. 40:6, 7.

All flesh shall fade as grass, and as the leaf that springeth out on a green tree. Ecclus. 14:18.

As the flower of the grass shall he pass away: for the sun rose with a burning heat and parched the grass, and the flower thereof fell, and the beauty of the shape thereof perished. St. James 1:10, 11.

(iii.) The third four fruits of our Lord’s Body: As to the wound of death; 1. It frees from everlasting death; This is the Bread that came down from Heaven: not as your fathers did eat manna and are dead. He that eateth this Bread shall live for ever. St. John 6:59.

I will deliver them out of the hand of death. Osee 13:14.

2. It increases the merit of good lives; The Bread that I will give is My Flesh for the life of the world. St. John 6:52.

I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly St. John 10:10.

In what day soever I shall call upon Thee, hear me; Thou shalt multiply strength in my soul. Ps. 137:3.

3. It brings us to Heaven; I am the Bread of Life.… I am the Living Bread which came down from Heaven. St. John 6:48, 51.

By His wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew. Prov. 3:20.

She (Wisdom) is a tree of life. Prov. 3:18.

4. It raises our bodies at the last day; He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day. St. John 6:55.

For by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead. And as in Adam all die, so in Christ all shall be made alive. 1 Cor. 15:21, 22.

Behold I tell you a mystery. We shall all indeed rise again; but we shall not all be changed: in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet; for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall rise again incorruptible, and we shall be changed. 1 Cor. 15:51, 52.

We must all be manifested before the judgment-seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil. 2 Cor. 5:10.

Pains shall take hold of them.… Every one shall be amazed at his neighbour; their countenances shall be as faces burnt. Isa. 13:8.

They shall go out and shall see the carcasses of the men who have transgressed against Me; their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh. Isa. 66:24.

In the day of judgment He will visit them: for He will give fire and worms into their flesh, that they may burn and feel for ever. Judith 16:21.

They that are learned shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that instruct many to justice as the stars for all eternity. Dan. 12:2.

Then shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. St. Matt. 13:43.

After six days Jesus taketh to Him Peter, and James, and John his brother, and bringeth them up into a high mountain apart; and He was transfigured before them. And His face did shine as the sun, and His garments became white as snow. St. Matt. 17:1, 2.

Being turned I saw seven golden candlesticks, and in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks one like to the Son of Man; … and His face was as the sun shineth in his strength. Apoc. 1:12, 13, 16.

Dearly beloved, we are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be: but, we know that when He shall appear, we shall be like Him, because we shall see Him as He is. 1 John 3:2.

N. Pharao awoke, and slept again, and dreamed another dream. Seven ears of corn came up on one stalk, full and fair; then seven other ears sprung up, thin and blasted. Gen. 41:4–6.

1. The blasted ears; Behold I come against thee, saith the Lord of hosts, and I will discover thy shame to thy face, and will show thy nakedness to the nations, and thy shame to kingdoms.… There shall the fire devour thee; thou shalt perish by the sword.… Thy destruction is not hidden; thy wound is grievous. Nahum 3:5, 15, 19.

2. The full ears; Star differeth from star in glory: so also is it in the resurrection from the dead. It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption. It is sown in dishonour, it shall rise in glory. It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in strength. It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body. 1 Cor. 15:41–43.

R. With fear and trembling work out your salvation: for it is God who worketh in you, both to will and to accomplish, according to His good-will. Phil. 2:12, 13.

Jesus answered, … I must work the works of Him that sent Me, while it is the day: the night cometh when no man can work. St. John 9:3, 4.

Prayer

Eternal Father, I am smitten with the wounds of death, and the shadow of pain rests upon me, as I go onward to the night in which I can work no more. I come to Thee for help, because Thou dost pity me, remembering the dust, and knowing whereof I am made. Thou art my Father, though Abraham be ignorant of me and Israel acknowledge me not. Thou art my Father from everlasting.

Save me, dear Father, from the pains of the endless woe, and from the breath of the unquenchable fire.

Save me, dear Father, from wasting Thy gifts of grace; from treading the Blood of thy Son under foot; from quenching Thy Holy Spirit in my soul.

Give me light and comfort and joy and peace in this exile of sorrow, in this banishment from Thy home.

Bring me to that home, where Thou art seen face to face and eye to eye: for there the bodies of Thy children are glorified; and there in subtilty and agility, in impassibility and brightness, they serve Thee for ever in the light of Thy kingdom.

Thy kingdom, O my Father, is justice and joy and peace in the Holy Ghost. Seeking for this, I go with the feet of my soul unsandalled and the eyes of my soul veiled to receive Jesus, the Son whom Thou lovest with an infinite love. I go with trembling to receive Him into my heart in the splendour of the Blessed Sacrament. In humility and confidence, in love and fear, I come to the Altar of Jesus for the Living Bread, my heavenly food. Help me to receive It with a soul very pure and loving.

Thanksgiving

I thank Thee, Eternal Father, for giving me this healing balm, this dew of the light, this living water, this Bread of Life. By this Body of Jesus I have life in Thee, and in Thy Son, and in Thy ever-blessed Spirit. If I am faithful, Jesus will raise me up at the last day in His love and light.

Thou, dear Father, hast condemned me to go back to the dust from which I came. I joyfully welcome Thy sentence, as the punishment of my sins, and I love Thee and bless Thee and praise Thee for it.

Thou, dear Father, hast given me for a while my pilgrimage through the desert, and for a while there stand before Paradise Thy Cherubim with flaming swords. But thou hast saved me from the piercing anguish of the endless pain, and from the bitterness of the unbearable woe: for so much didst Thou love us that Thou gavest Thy Son, that all who believe in Him may not perish, but have everlasting life. For this I love Thee and bless Thee and praise Thee.

Thou givest us pain and sorrow; Thou layest Thy dear hand often very heavily upon us, and through much suffering we have to come to Thee; but all that Thou doest is done in love and pity and kindness and compassion and tenderness. Thou chastenest those children whom Thou dost receive. Whatever Thou mayest do to me I will love Thee and bless Thee. In darkness and in storm, in the cold and wind and rain, in the lightning and the voice of Thy thunder, in famine and pestilence, I will always see Thy hand, and will always love Thee. In all things I will trust Thee: though Thou shouldest slay me, I will trust Thee with most utter trust. My heart leaps up with joy at the thought of Thy truth and justice and love.

Thou, dearest Father, art the keeper of Israel, who neither slumbers nor sleeps. Thy eyes are always over me, and Thy ears are always open to my prayers. Thy everlasting arms are round me; Thou hast given me Jesus for my help and safety; and though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death I will fear no evil, for He will be with me, the Shepherd of my soul, and His rod and staff will give me comfort and strength.

He is ever my food for the way; I thank Thee forgiving me that food now. Dear Father, give me evermore that Living Bread. For all that Thou ever hast done, for all that Thou doest now, for all that Thou ever wilt do, I love Thee and bless Thee and praise Thee for ever and ever.

XXIV

About the three chief effects of our Lord’s Body

The most Holy Body of Jesus has three chief effects: (1) it destroys sins; (2) it gives and increases spiritual gifts; (3) it strengthens souls, or gives everlasting life.

(1) The first chief effect of our Lord’s Body is the destruction of sin; and this it does in three ways: 1, it cleanses the stain of the heart; 2, it weakens the stings of the flesh; 3, it gives strength against bad thoughts.

1. Selmon, as we have already seen, the mountain of God, signifies the Body of Jesus. As shadow is from light and body, so in the Body of Christ there are human flesh and the light of His Godhead. On this mountain of shadow, that is, of grace, the faithful are made whiter than snow, being cleansed from their sins in the most wonderful way by the Body of their Lord.

2. The manna was like dew and hoar-frost, because the Body of Jesus cools the heat of sin. He rules the sea; for the sea signifies the many miseries of man, and the heaving of the waves signifies the movements of the flesh.

3. The myrrh to which the Bride compares her Beloved tells us of the Body of Jesus; for as myrrh keeps bodies uncorrupted and untouched by worms, so the Body of Jesus keeps the hearts of the faithful pure from evil thoughts. When we receive our loving Lord, all evil thoughts, like worms, are kept far from us, if we think tenderly and lovingly of the bundle of myrrh, that is, of the bitterness of His Passion.

(2) The second chief effect of the Body of Jesus is the increase of spiritual gifts and graces; and this in three ways; 1, in the beauty of chastity;

2, in the fervour of love; 3, in the taste of spiritual sweetness.

1. When Daniel and the Three Children seemed fairer than the others, their comeliness came from their chastity, and their chastity came from the Heavenly Bread, by which their souls were fed. As good food gives a healthy look to the body, so the deliciousness of spiritual food makes the soul beautiful with chastity. This food is spoken of by Ezechiel as fine flour, and honey, and oil.

2. The carbuncle set in gold, of which Scripture speaks, is the Body of our Lord, for that Holy Body adorns the heart of the receiver with chastity, and sets it on fire with love. A flame goes forth from the face of Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament, and kindles the souls of those who receive Him with love. As Eliseus bowed himself over the child till the flesh of the child grew warm, so our souls are warmed in Holy Communion, when Jesus not only bows Himself over us, but gives Himself to us and unites us to Himself.

3. He feeds His people with the food of Angels, and gives them Bread from Heaven which has in it everything that is delicious, and the sweetness of every taste. He shows His substance and that sweetness to the devout communicant; and, as He came not to be ministered unto but to minister, He serves every man’s will; and the Bread of Heaven which He gives is turned to every man’s liking, that all may find refreshment and strength in Him. When the Bride says that she eats the honeycomb with the honey, she means that her soul feeds on the sweetness of the Flesh of Jesus and on the sweetness of His Godhead. When she says that she drinks wine with milk, she means that she drinks the sweetness of the Blood of Jesus with the sweetness of all spiritual consolation in gladness and peace.

(3) The third chief effect of our Lord’s Body is the strengthening of souls; and that in three ways: 1, in crushing the devils; 2, in bearing sorrow and pain; 3, in doing good works.

1. When David’s men found the Egyptian in the field, and brought him to David, and gave him bread to eat and water to drink, he was refreshed and strengthened; then he went with David to the robbers and smote them. The Egyptian is the sinner whom preachers bring to Jesus by conversion. Such a one, being strengthened by the Bread of our Lord’s Body, often becomes one of the leaders of the army of God, and crushes the devils. As the Philistines fell before the holocaust of Samuel, when he offered a lamb, so

the devils fall before the Body of the spotless Lamb of God. Jesus, if we love Him, gives us strength against all the powers of darkness.

2. Achab, King of Israel, put the prophet Micheas in prison and fed him with bread of affliction. He is cast into prison who in this world suffers adversity; and the bread of affliction with which he is sustained is the bread of eternal life by which he is strengthened to bear all his trials. As St. Paul, in the great storm at sea when his ship was nearly lost, told those who were in danger with him to take food for the health of their bodies, so in every danger of our heavenward way Jesus gives us Himself for the health of the soul.

3. The valiant woman rose in the night, as the Scriptures tell us, and gave a prey to her servants and food to her maidens. That signifies the work of the Church of the Gentiles. She rose in the night, because by the hearing of the word she turns herself from the darkness of sins to Jesus. When the Jews refused the Sacraments that were offered to them, she took them away with all desire, and with them she feeds the faithful. By this food she strengthens them in three things: a, in works of mercy; b, in gain to the soul; c, in buying heavenly riches.

Hence it is said that this woman considered a field and bought it, and that she planted a vineyard with the fruit of her hands. Now works of mercy are signified by the fruit of her hands; the gain to the soul is signified by the planting of the vineyard; and the buying riches of God is signified by the field that she bought.

a. We are strengthened for good works by the food of our Lord. As fodder strengthens an ass to carry burdens, so Heavenly Bread strengthens the servant of God for good works. When you think rightly of God’s measureless bounty to you in this Holy Sacrament your hearts are greatly strengthened in the love of your neighbour.

b. We are strengthened in gain to the soul. For from the full Heart of Jesus the oil of grace is ever flowing for the salvation of souls.

c. We are strengthened for the buying of heavenly riches. The heritage of heavenly fields is bought with the money of virtue and good works; and these fields, as well as the names of the buyers, are written in the book of life. On the heart of the buyer are stamped as a sure pledge the sign of the Cross of Christ and the light of the image of God. There is a faithful witness, for in the day of judgment God will be witness before all, that truly by the price of good works you bought that kingdom of life.

N. You may, as was said, take the third chief effect to be the giving of everlasting life. This is seen in three things: 1, in the making ready of all delights; 2, in the fulfilling of all desires; 3, in the sureness of the everlasting enjoyment of all good. (See page 68.)

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About the destruction of sins; Thou sawest till a stone was cut out of a mountain without hands; and it struck the statue upon the feet thereof, that were of iron and clay, and broke them in pieces. Dan. 2:34.

For this end the Son of God appeared, that He might destroy the works of the devil. 1 John 3:8.

1. Washing the stain from the heart; They shall be whited with snow in Selmon. Ps. 67:15.

If your sins be as scarlet they shall be made as white as snow, and if they be red as crimson they shall be as wool. Is. 1:18.

Grace be unto you, and peace, … from Jesus Christ, the faithful witness, the first-begotten of the dead, and the Prince of the kings of the earth, who hath loved us and washed us from our sins in His own Blood. Apoc. 1:4, 5.

God is light, and in Him is no darkness; … and the Blood of Jesus Christ, His Son, cleanseth us from all sin.… If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity. 1 John 1:5, 7, 9.

I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake, and I will not remember thy sins. Is. 43:25.

2. Lessening the sting of the flesh; In the morning a dew lay round about the camp … like unto the hoar-frost on the ground. Ex. 16:13, 14.

Thou rulest the strength of the sea, and dost appease the motion of the waves thereof. Ps. 88:10.

3. Giving strength against bad thoughts; A bundle of myrrh is my Beloved to me. Cantic. 1:12.

(2) Giving or increasing spiritual gifts; He that is good shall draw grace from the Lord. Prov. 12:2.

He giveth greater grace; wherefore He saith, God … giveth grace to the humble. St. James 4:6.

1. The beauty of chastity; After ten days their faces appeared fairer. Dan. 1:15.

How beautiful art Thou, and how comely, my Dearest, in Thy delights. Cantic. 7:6.

Thou didst eat fine flour and honey and oil, and wast made exceedingly beautiful, and wast advanced to be a queen.… My bread which I give thee, and the fine flour and oil and honey with which I feed thee, thou hast set before them for a sweet odour; and thus was it done, saith the Lord God. Ezech. 16:13, 19.

2. The fervour of charity; (Our Lord) is a carbuncle set in gold, and as a signet of an emerald in a work of gold. Ecclus. 32:7, 8.

A fire flamed from His face; coals were kindled by it. He bowed the heavens and came down.… At the brightness that was before Him the clouds passed. Ps. 17:9, 10, 13.

3. The taste of spiritual sweetness; The bread of Aser shall be fat, and he shall yield dainties to kings. Gen. 49:20.

Thou didst feed Thy people with the food of Angels, and gavest them bread from Heaven, prepared without labour, having in it all that is delicious and the sweetness of every taste. For Thy sustenance showed Thy sweetness to Thy children. Wisd. 16:20, 21.

I have eaten the honeycomb with my honey; I have drunk my wine with my milk. Eat, O friends, and drink and be inebriated, my dearly Beloved. I sleep and my heart watcheth. The voice of my Beloved knocking, Open to Me, My sister, My love, My dove, My undefiled; for My head is full of dew, and My locks of the drops of the night. Cantic. 5:1, 2.

(3) The strengthening of souls; The earth shall be filled with the fruit of Thy works, … that bread may strengthen man’s heart. Ps. 103:13, 14.

1. Crushing devils; They found an Egyptian in the field, and they brought him to David; and they gave him bread to eat and water to drink.… When he had eaten them his spirit returned, and he was refreshed.… David said, Canst thou bring me to this company?… When he had brought him, behold they were lying spread upon all the ground eating and drinking.… And David slew them from evening unto evening of the next day. 1 Kings 30:11, 12, 15, 16.

Be strengthened in the Lord and in the might of His power; put you on the armour of God, that you may be able to stand against the deceits of the devil. Eph. 6:10, 11.

It came to pass, when Samuel was offering the holocaust the Philistines began the battle against Israel; but the Lord thundered with a great thunder on that day upon the Philistines, and terrified them; and they were overthrown before the face of Israel. 1 Kings 7:10.

2. Bearing trials; Thus saith the king, Put this man in prison, and feed him with bread of affliction and water of affliction till I return in peace. 3 Kings 22:27.

I pray you to take some meat for your health’s sake; for there shall not a hair of the head of any of you perish. And when he had said these things, taking bread he gave thanks to God in the sight of them all; and when he had broken it he began to eat. Then they were all of better cheer. Acts 27:34–36.

I can do all things in Him who strengtheneth me. Philip. 4:13.

3. Doing good works; Who shall find a valiant woman?… She hath risen in the night, and given a prey to her household and food to her maidens. She hath considered a field and bought it; with the fruit of her hands she hath planted a vineyard. Prov. 31:10, 15, 16.

a. Works of mercy; Fodder and a rod and a burden are for an ass; bread and correction and works for a servant. Ecclus. 33:25.

b. Gain to the soul; Thy name is as oil poured out; therefore young maidens have loved Thee. Cantic. 1:2.

c. The buying of heavenly riches; Fields shall be bought for money, and deeds shall be written and sealed, and witnesses shall be taken … round about Jerusalem, in the cities of Juda; … for I will bring back their captivity, saith the Lord. Jerem. 32:44.

The kingdom of Heaven is like to a merchant seeking pearls, who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went his way and sold all that he had and bought it. St. Matt. 13:45, 46.

N. He that eateth this Bread shall live for ever. St. John 6:59.

Prayer

My Jesus, I am going to receive Thy adorable Body and Blood in the Sacrament of Thy love. My Jesus, I have many things to ask Thee. Hear me, dearest Lord, and answer my prayer, according to Thy Will.

O Son of God, destroy all sin in me by Thy cleansing might.

O Son of God, wash my heart, and make it whiter than snow, by Thy cleansing Blood.

O Son of God, weaken in me all desires of the flesh, by the dew of Thy Heart.

O Son of God, drive far from my soul every thought that is dark, by Thy brightness and by the flames of Thy love.

O Son of Man, pour out Thy grace on my soul without stint, that I may live and grow in Thee.

O Son of Man, adorn my soul for Thyself with all gifts of chastity.

O Son of Man, fill me with Thy love, that my soul may be all aflame with desire for Thee.

O Son of Man, let me taste and know how sweet Thou art.

O Jesus, God and man, strengthen my soul, and grant that by Thy grace it may stand against the evil in rocky might.

O Jesus, God and man, give me grace to trust in Thee, that so all devils may be driven far away.

O Jesus, God and man, help me by Thy Passion to bear all pain and sorrow gladly, and always to kiss most lovingly Thy chastening hand.

O Jesus, God and man, give me grace to do good works pleasing to Thee.

My Saviour, let me do works of mercy in Thee, and get great gain for my soul and buy many heavenly treasures. Thou, my Saviour, the treasure of treasures, art coming to me now.

Thanksgiving

My Lord and my Love, I thank Thee for Thy heavenly gift. Thou art now within me, Body and Blood and Soul and Godhead. Now I carry God in my body; and I pray that I may be Thine for ever.

My Lord and my Love, Thou hast visited me with blessing, and Thou dost crown my heart with gladness. Thou, my Heavenly Spouse, hast come into my garden; let Thy sunshine and rain fall upon it, that it may be a watered garden, whose waters do not fail.

My Lord and my Love, I bless Thee and praise Thee for Thy wheat and Thy vines, for Thy harvest and Thy vintage, for Thy granary and Thy winepress, for Thy bread and Thy wine.

O Jesus, dwell in my soul, that the lilies there may please Thee by their whiteness and their fragrance, and that there the scarlet blossoms of the pomegranates may be dear to Thy Heart. Thou art strong and wise and loving, and I praise Thee. I bless Thee for the home Thou art making ready; for the hope of the fulfilment of every desire; for the fulness of joy that Thou dost promise me in Thy kingdom.

XXV

About three effects of the Body of Jesus, taken from three of its names

Our Lord’s Body is called by three names: (1) the true Bread; (2) the Sacrament of the Altar; (3) the Sacrament of Love.

(1) As the true Bread it has three effects; for as bread does chiefly three things for the body, in satisfying, in strengthening and preserving life, so this Bread, 1, satisfies the soul to the loathing of sweetness of the world; 2, strengthens it to the getting rid of all guilt; 3, preserves its life to God, who is to be praised for ever.

1. St. Gregory says, ‘When we have tasted of the Spirit all flesh is tasteless.’

2. They who are not strengthened by this Bread are easily slain by sin. The King of Babylon and his army besieged Jerusalem, and there was no bread for the people. Then the men of war fled by night to the king’s garden and to the plains of the wilderness. They fell into sins of the flesh, and went on the broad way that leads to death.

3. As Jesus lives by the Father, so we live by Him; and this is the life to God, who is to be praised for evermore.

(2) As the Sacrament of the Altar it has also a threefold effect, because of the threefold state of the faithful: 1, in this world; 2, in Purgatory; 3, in Heaven. In this world it forgives sin, in Purgatory it lessens suffering, in Heaven it increases glory.

1. It is by Jesus that we are freed from sin. The austerities of penance are useless without full confidence in His Sacrifice. He is the Lamb of God, whose Blood takes away sin. Paschasius says, ‘Though all sins are forgiven in Baptism, the weakness of sin, namely, desire in the flesh, abides; and

because we daily fall, at least, into venial sins, Christ is sacrificed for us daily, that He who once overcame death by dying may daily forgive by this Sacrament the sins into which we fall back.' St. Ambrose says, 'As that Body which is everywhere offered is one, so the Sacrifice is one. Christ once on the Cross offered a victim for all, and we offer that Victim now; but that which we do is the remembrance of His Sacrifice, offered not because of His weakness, but because of ours, in that we daily sin.'

2. The blood with which, over the Altar, they made atonement for their souls in the old law, was a sign that the Sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Jesus has power to help souls in the pain of Purgatory.

N. There are three companies of souls that leave this life: a, sinners; b, penitents; c, those without any debt of punishment. Mass cannot help the first; it lessens the pain of the second; the third go without punishment to Heaven.

a. God casts away the reprobate from His face, that is, from all good in Heaven and on earth. No prayer can be offered for them; no hand can bring them help.

b. When it is said that blood is given for expiation, the part is put for the whole, that is, for the body and the blood together. For the blood is not on the Altar without the body, nor the body without the blood. Mass helps the souls in Purgatory. St. Augustin says, 'By the prayers and alms of the Holy Church and by the Sacrifice of salvation it is certain that the souls of the dead are helped, and God deals more mercifully with them than their sins in this world have deserved.' When Zacharias says that two parts shall be scattered and perish, and that the third part shall be left and be drawn through the fire, he means that unbelievers and bad Christians will be lost, and that the third part, that is, penitents, will be saved by penance and the fire of Purgatory. The faithful on earth will pray and give alms and offer sacrifice for those who are led through the fire, that is, for the souls in Purgatory; and God will listen to them, and will lessen and shorten the pain of those for whom they pray.

c. A hidden gift turns away the anger of God, that is, saves from Purgatory those innocent souls who have suffered enough here by sorrows and chastisements. The hatred of God burns in hell; His anger burns in Purgatory; in this world flies the arrow of His love. If, then, you bear patiently the arrows of our Lord's correction, you will, God being your helper, escape unharmed from the rage of hell and from the fire of Purgatory. He, your Saviour, will always be with you, and He will save you, as He saved the Three Children from the fiery furnace. Then you will praise Him and walk before Him in joy.

3. The Sacrifice of the Altar, in a certain sense, increases the glory of the Blessed in Heaven. The breast of the Sacrifice, eaten in a most clean place, signifies the joy that Jesus gives to the souls in Heaven. They rejoice greatly and give thanks in the Mass, through their remembrance of our redemption, through the sight of our salvation, through wonder at the goodness of God. St. Gregory says, ‘In the same moment the Sacrifice is carried to Heaven by the ministry of Angels, to be joined to the Body of Christ, and is seen on the Altar before the eyes of the priest.’ To be joined to the Body of Jesus is to increase the joy of the Blessed.

(3) As the Sacrament of Love it has three effects, working in us chiefly three good things: 1, a true partaking of the Holy Ghost; 2, the sure indwelling of Jesus; 3, our transformation into the likeness of the image of God.

1. Some things that we have thought of before come in again here. From the Body of Jesus the faithful drink in the Holy Spirit. Very sweet in us is that Spirit of God. We live as members of our Lord’s Body, and feed on His Spirit.

2. St. Hilary says, ‘When we eat the Flesh of Christ and drink the chalice, it is brought about that we abide in Christ and Christ abides in us. For when we receive His Flesh He is in us by flesh and we are in Him, while He, with all that we are, is in God. The Word was made flesh.’ When the Word assumed our flesh He dwelt in it; and when we receive the Incarnate Word for food He dwells in us.

3. Jesus gives us power to become the sons of God, that is, to be deiform and like God. Now, no creature can be lifted higher than to be likened to its Maker. But man is made like God by the power of the Body of Christ in three ways: a, by inward goodness of heart; b, by outward fruitfulness in works; c, by the inheritance of the kingdom of God.

a. As St. Peter teaches us, God has given us very great and precious promises, that is, Himself, and we are made partakers of the Divine nature, that is, of the Divine goodness, for the nature of God is goodness. St. Ambrose says, ‘Because the Lord Jesus is both God and man, therefore thou who receivest His Flesh art a partaker of the Divine Substance in that food.’ Thus you will have true goodness in Him.

b. We have before seen what is signified by the high cedar. The shoot from the marrow and the top is the Body of Jesus, filled with His Godhead. This planted on a high mountain, that is, in the heart of the just, lifted up to Heaven, makes him like our Lord, and fruitful in good works.

N. Thus in both these ways Jesus dwells in us, and makes us like Himself by inward goodness and outward work. Hence it was said to St. Augustin, ‘I am the food of the great: grow, and thou shalt feed on Me; but thou wilt not change Me to thyself, but I will change thee to Myself.’

c. He gives us power to become the sons of God: He makes us heirs of Heaven and co-heirs with Himself. The heritage for which we wait is incorruptible, undefiled, and fadeth not away.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About the true Bread; My Father giveth you the true Bread from Heaven. St. John 6:32.

1. It satisfies; I will satisfy her poor with bread. Ps. 131:15.

A soul that is full shall tread upon the honeycomb. Prov. 27:7.

2. It strengthens; The earth shall be filled with the fruit of Thy works.… that bread may strengthen man’s heart. Ps. 103:13, 15.

Nabuchodonosor, King of Babylon, came, he and all his army, against Jerusalem; and they surrounded it and raised works round about it.… A famine prevailed in the city, and there was no bread for the people of the land.… All the men of war fled in the night between the two walls of the king’s garden; … and Sedecias fled by the way that leadeth to the plains of the wilderness.… The army of the Chaldees pursued after the king, and overtook him in the plains of Jericho.… So they took the king and brought him to the King of Babylon; … and he put out his eyes and bound him with chains. 4 Kings 25:1–7.

3. It preserves life; The bread of the needy is the life of the poor. Ecclus. 34:25.

I am the Living Bread which came down from Heaven.… As the living Father has sent Me, and I live by the Father, so he that eateth Me shall live by Me. St. John 6:51, 58.

Praise the Lord, O my soul; in my life I will praise the Lord; as long as I shall be I will sing to my God. Ps. 145:1.

(2) The Sacrament of the Altar; The Sacrifice of Juda and of Jerusalem shall please the Lord. Mal. 3:4.

1. The forgiveness of sin here; If any one shall sin through ignorance, transgressing the ceremonies in those things that are sacrificed to the Lord, he shall offer for his offence a ram without blemish out of the flocks. Lev. 5:15.

Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world. St. John 1:29.

2. The pain of Purgatory; The life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you that you may make atonement with it on the Altar for your souls, and that the blood may be for an expiation of the soul. Lev. 17:11.

a. Hardened sinners; I have sworn to the house of Heli that the iniquity of his house shall not be expiated with victims nor offerings for ever. 1 Kings 3:14.

Now, because you have done all these works, saith the Lord, and I have spoken to you, rising up early and speaking, and you have not heard; and I have called you, and you have not answered; I will do to this house in which My name is called upon and in which you trust, and to the place which I have given you and your fathers, as I did to Silo: and I will cast you away from before My face, as I have cast away all your brethren, the whole seed of Ephraim. Therefore do not thou pray for this people, nor take to thee praise and supplication for them: and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee. Jerem. 7:13–16.

He that is an adulterer for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul. He gathereth to himself shame and dishonour, and his reproach shall not be blotted out: because the jealousy and rage of the husband will not spare in the day of revenge; nor will he yield to any man’s prayers, nor will he accept for satisfaction ever so many gifts. Prov. 6:32–35.

b. Penitents; Him that cometh to Me I will not cast out. St. John 6:37.

A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, Thou wilt not despise. Ps. 51:10.

It shall come to pass that in all the earth two parts, saith the Lord, shall be scattered, and shall perish; but the third part shall be left therein. And I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined; and will try them as gold is tried. They shall call on My name, and I will hear them. I will say, Thou art My people; and they shall say, The Lord is my God. Zach. 13:8, 9.

c. The innocent; A secret present quencheth anger. Prov. 21:14.

Rebuke me not, O Lord, in Thy indignation; nor chasten me in Thy wrath. For Thy arrows are fastened in me; and Thy hand hath been strong upon me. Ps. 37:2, 3.

Now, saith the Lord that made thee, O Jacob, and formed thee, O Israel: fear not, for I have redeemed thee, and called thee by thy name: thou art Mine. When thou shalt pass through the waters I will be with thee, and the rivers shall not cover thee: when thou shalt walk in the fire thou shalt not be burnt, and the flames shall not kindle in thee; for I am the Lord thy God, the Holy One of Israel, thy Saviour. Isa. 43:1–3.

The flame mounted up above the furnace nine- and-forty cubits; and it broke forth and burnt such of the Chaldæans as were near the furnace. But the Angel of the Lord went down with Azarias and his companions into the furnace; and he drove the flame of the fire out of the furnace, and made the midst of the furnace like the blowing of a wind bringing dew. And the fire touched them not at all, nor troubled them, nor did them any harm. Then these three, as with one mouth, praised and glorified and blessed God in the furnace. Dan. 3:47–51.

You shall go out with joy, and be led forth with peace; the mountains and the hills shall sing praise before you, and all the trees of the country shall clap their hands. Isa. 55:12.

3. Increase of glory; The breast also that is offered … you shall eat in a most clean place, thou and thy sons and thy daughters with thee. Lev. 10:14.

(3) The Sacrament of Love; Great is the mystery of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh, was justified in the Spirit, appeared unto Angels, hath been preached to the Gentiles, is believed in the world, is taken up in glory. 1 St. Tim. 3:16.

1. Partaking of the Spirit; He filled them with honey out of the rock. Ps. 80:17.

O, how good and sweet is Thy Spirit, O Lord, in all things. Wisd. 12:1.

By Him we have access in one Spirit to the Father, … in whom you also are built together into a habitation of God in the Spirit. Eph. 2:18, 22.

2. The indwelling of Jesus; He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood abideth in Me, and I in him. St. John 6:56.

Abide in Me, and I in you. St. John 15:4.

The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us. St. John 1:14.

(3) The likeness of God; To as many as received Him He gave power to be made the sons of God. St. John 1:12.

a. Goodness of heart; Grace to you and peace be increased in the knowledge of God, and of Christ Jesus our Lord; according as His divine power hath given us all things that pertain to life and godliness through the knowledge of Him who hath called us by His own proper glory and virtue; by whom He has given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature. 2 St. Pet. 1:2–4.

The oath that He sware to Abraham our Father, that He would grant to us: that we, being delivered from the hand of our enemies, may serve Him without fear, in holiness and justice before Him all our days. St. Luke 1:73–75.

b. Works; Thus saith the Lord God, I myself will take of the marrow of the high cedar, and will set it. Ezech. 17:22.

N. Both; I live: now not I, but Christ liveth in me. Gal. 2:20.

c. Our inheritance; The Spirit Himself giveth testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also; heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ. Rom. 8:16, 17.

Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who, according to His great mercy, hath regenerated us to a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, unto an inheritance incorruptible and undefiled, and that cannot fade, reserved in Heaven for you. 1 St. Pet. 1:3, 4.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, give me a great hunger for the Bread of Life. Do Thou, by that Bread which is Jesus, satisfy my soul, and strengthen it, and make it full of life. I am needy with a great need: but this Bread of Heaven is the life of the poor; let it be my life. I am very poor and needy; but Thou, my own Lord, dost always care for me. Without Thee, Blessed Spirit, I cannot say, Jesus: without Thee, Helper of the needy, I cannot feed on Him who is the Bread from Heaven.

O Spirit of peace, give me a great love for the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass.

O Spirit of reconciliation, help all darkened souls, and bring them back to life.

O Spirit of mercy, help the souls that are now suffering in the fire of Purgatory. I ask Thee, by Thine own goodness, to give them refreshment and joy and white robes of consoling love.

O most pitiful Spirit, give me a great joy in this Sacrament of Love. Thou dwellest in me, and by Thee I live to God. Thou makest me a temple of Thyself and of the Father and the Son. Thou makest me an heir of God. Bring me now, dear Spirit, in light to the Altar; bring me in light to my grave; bring me in light to the city of the King and the song of the morning stars.

Thanksgiving

Glory be to Thee, O loving Spirit of God, for this food of life and light and joy. Blessed be God. Blessed be Jesus. Blessed be Thou, O Love of Father and of Son. Blessed be the Holy and Undivided and Adorable Trinity for ever. I have received Jesus, and my heart is sprinkled with dew. O Jesus: O life: O light: O love!

Glory be to Thee, O Holy Ghost: Thou art the fire kindled on Sion, and the furnace burning in Jerusalem. Thou art the river of God, that flows with a stream like crystal, and makes glad the city of the King. Thou art far brighter than the sunlit gardens of Heaven, and far more glorious than the waves of a sapphire sea. The swaying flames of the furnace of the Three Children is a dim type of Thee; and those waving arms of fire tell us of the cleansing of Thy love. In flames of piercing sweetness Thou art a dew-bringing wind. Thy breath of uncreated light is the sweetness of God. The soul that loves Thee with a great love is like a pomegranate branch with scarlet blossoms, dew-sprinkled, in the midst of flame. O Holy Ghost: O life: O light: O love!

I bless and praise Thee, O Lord, my loved One, Thou all-creating Spirit, for this Bread of Heaven, with which Jesus has filled my soul; for this wine of God, with which He has made glad my heart; for His presence here, and His delight in us; for the fadeless lilies of Paradise; for the undefiled inheritance; for the incorruptible Home; for the vision of peace. O Holy Ghost: O life: O light: O love!

XXVI

About three other effects of our Lord’s Body, taken from three other of its names

Our Lord’s Body has three other names: (1) the medicine of the soul; (2) manna, that is, Heavenly Bread; (3) the Holy Eucharist, that is, good grace of the faithful soul.

(1) St. Augustin says, ‘Christ took earth of earth, and, assuming flesh from Mary’s flesh, gave it to us to be eaten for our salvation.’

(2) To all those who gain the victory over their sins Jesus gives the hidden manna, that is, the Bread of Heaven, that is, His own Body, in which is privily hidden manifold good.

(3) The Master of the sentences says, ‘Rightly indeed is the Sacrament of the Altar called the Eucharist, that is, good grace: for in it there is not only increase of virtues and grace, but He is received whole who is the fountain of all grace.’

(1) As the medicine of the soul, His Body has three effects. The crafty serpent, by the poison of the forbidden fruit, brought on the race of man, as we saw in the First Meditation, a threefold corruption: 1, the darkness of ignorance in the soul; 2, the disease of evil desire in the flesh; 3, death in both. Now to heal these the medicine of the Body of Jesus has power; for, 1, it enlightens the darkness of ignorance; 2, it heals the disease of evil desire; 3, it triumphs by destroying death.

1. It enlightens the darkness of the mind: The Word was made flesh. He is the true light in sinless flesh; the great light ever shining, by which all darkness of ignorance is driven away.

2. Isaias healed King Ezechias of a sore wound which represents fleshly desire. The sweetness of Jesus heals us of such wounds as that.

3. When you say to our Lady that the fruit of her womb is blessed, it is so because that fruit of life saves us from everlasting death.

This threefold corruption and threefold medicine have been dwelt on at the beginning of the Sixth Meditation.

(2) As manna, the Body of Jesus has three effects: for the manna had a taste of, 1, wheat; 2, honey; 3, oil. Thus our Lord’s Body works in us: 1, uprightness of life; 2, sweetness of heart; 3, love of our neighbour: the first being signified by the wheat, the next by the honey, and the last by the oil.

1. Wheaten bread is not only good and beautiful in itself, but also in its effects, for it makes our bodies comely; so the good and beautiful Body of Christ gives us uprightness of life.

2. Honey is sweet to the taste, but Jesus is far sweeter to the heart. As His brightness overflows and enlightens the mind, so His sweetness overflows and gladdens the heart. They who love Him are made like Him, that is, like Him who dwells in them.

3. Eliseus told the woman who was in debt to sell the oil which God had given her by a miracle. The oil signifies brotherly kindness, which refreshes our neighbour, pays our debts, and feeds ourselves. You see the first in this, that she poured the oil into the vessels of her neighbours; the second in this, that by the oil she paid what she owed; the third in this, that she and her children lived by the oil.

Job speaks of the rock pouring forth rivers of oil, that is, of our hearts pouring forth kindness and love for our neighbour.

(3) As the Eucharist, that is, good grace, our Lord’s Body has three effects; for grace, as the Doctors say, is the influx of the Divine goodness into the soul, by which it is made like God, pleasing to Him, and worthy of eternal life. So the Body of Jesus makes the soul: 1, like God; 2, dear to God; 3, gives it life with God for ever.

1. It makes us partakers of the Divine Nature: that is, like God by true goodness.

2. The soul, fed with the Body and Blood of Jesus, is made very beautiful, and therefore very dear to God.

3. By this Body of God, sacramentally or spiritually received, we are raised at the last day and brought safely to Heaven.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(1) About the medicine of the soul; The Most High hath created medicines out of the earth, and a wise man will not abhor them. Ecclus. 38:4.

1. It lightens our darkness; I have prepared a lamp for My anointed. Ps. 131:17.

My eyes have seen Thy salvation, which Thou hast prepared before the face of all peoples; a light to the revelation of the Gentiles, and the glory of Thy people Israel. St. Luke 2:30–32.

The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light; to them that dwelt in the valley of the shadow of death light is risen. Is. 9:2.

The Lord is my light and my salvation: whom shall I fear? Ps. 26:1.

Come ye to Him and be enlightened. Ps. 33:6.

Rise, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee. Eph. 5:14.

2. It heals bad desires; Isaias had ordered that they should take a lump of figs and lay it as a plaster upon the wound, and that he (Ezechias) should be healed. Is. 38:21.

Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak; heal me, O Lord, for my bones are troubled. Ps. 6:3.

3. It destroys death; Elizabeth was filled with the Holy Ghost, and she cried with a loud voice and said, Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb. St. Luke 1:41, 42.

O death, I will be thy death. Osee 13:14.

She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her. Prov. 3:18.

(2) The Manna; To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna. Apoc. 2:17.

This is the Bread which cometh down from Heaven. St. John 6:50.

The taste thereof was like to flour with honey. Ex. 16:31.

Thou didst eat fine flour and honey and oil. Ezech. 16:13.

By the fruit of their corn and wine and oil they are multiplied. Ps. 4:8.

1. Uprightness; What is the good thing of Him, and what is the beautiful thing, but the corn of the elect? Zach. 9:17.

2. Sweetness of heart; Eat honey, my son, because it is good, and the honeycomb most sweet to thy taste. Prov. 24:13.

Bread from Heaven … having in it all that is delicious. Wisd. 16:20.

3. Love of our neighbour; Who will give me that I should be according to the months past, according to the days in which God kept me? As I was in the days of my youth, when God was secretly in my tabernacle … and the rock poured me out rivers of oil. Job 29:2, 4, 6.

There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwellings of the just. Prov. 21:20.

She said to Eliseus, Thy servant, my husband, is dead, and thou knowest that thy servant was one that feared God; and behold the creditor is come to take my two sons to serve him. And Eliseus said, What wilt thou have me do for thee? Tell me, what hast thou in thy house? And she answered, I thy handmaid have nothing in my house but a little oil to anoint me. And he said to her, Go borrow of all thy neighbours empty vessels not a few. And go in, and shut thy door when thou art within, and thy sons; and pour out thereof into all those vessels, and when they are full take them away. So the woman went and shut the door upon her and upon her sons; and they brought her the vessels, and she poured in. And when the vessels were full, she said to her son, Bring me yet a vessel; and he answered, I have no more: and the oil stood. She came and told the man of God; and he said, Go sell the oil and pay thy creditor; and thou and thy sons live of the rest. 4 Kings 4:1–7.

(3) The Holy Eucharist; Hear in silence, and for thy reverence good grace shall come to thee. Ecclus. 32:9.

1. Likeness to God; Very great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature. 2 St. Pet. 1:4.

2. Being dear to God; The vows of the just are acceptable.… He that followeth justice is beloved by Him. Prov. 15:8, 9.

Thou shalt be called, My pleasure is in her. Is. 62:4.

A book of remembrance was written before Him for them that fear the Lord and think on His name. Mal. 3:16.

The bridegroom shall rejoice over the bride, and thy God shall rejoice over thee. Is. 62:5.

The Lord thy God in the midst of thee is mighty, He will save; He will rejoice over thee with gladness; He will be silent in His love; He will be joyful over thee in praise. Soph. 3:17.

How beautiful art thou, My love, how beautiful art thou.… Thou art all fair, O My love.… Thou hast wounded My Heart, My sister, My spouse.…

A garden enclosed is My sister, My spouse, a garden enclosed, a fountain sealed. Cantic. 4:1, 7, 9, 12.

How beautiful are thy steps in shoes, O prince's daughter.… How beautiful art thou, and how comely my dearest in delights.… I am my Beloved's, and my Beloved is mine.… In our gates are all fruits: the new and the old, my Beloved, I have kept for Thee. Cantic. 7:1, 6, 10, 13.

3. Eternal life; If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments. St. Matt. 19:17.

They shall hear My voice, and there shall be one fold and one shepherd. St. John 10:16.

I will raise him up in the last day. St. John 6:55.

Prayer

O Blessed Trinity, Three Persons and One God, I am seeking now for the Living Bread that came down from Heaven. O the depths of the riches of Thy knowledge; O Thy incomprehensible judgments; O Thy unsearchable ways! I bless Thee, O Father, and Thee, O Son, and Thee, O Holy Ghost. I praise Thee, O Blessed Trinity, and magnify Thee for ever and ever. In the confession of a true faith I acknowledge Thy glory, Eternal Trinity; and in the power of Thy majesty I adore Thy unity. In this faith I draw near to Thee and kneel before Thy Altar, that Jesus may come to me in His most Holy Sacrament and dwell in me, and give me the fulness of His grace. Thou art the One God, Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity. Be present with me now, Thou Almighty One, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; be present with me and help me; for Thou art the Lord, the God of Israel, my God, who alone doest great wonders, and alone dwellest in the inaccessible light. O, let all the earth be filled with Thy majesty, and let all souls be satisfied with Thy goodness. Have mercy on me, O my God, and bless me and feed me. Thou art my hope and my salvation, O Blessed Trinity. Free me and save me, and give me life, O Blessed Trinity. O most Blessed God, fill my soul with love and light as I draw near to Jesus in the Blessed Sacrament. His throne is high and lifted up, and His glory fills the Temple. Before Him are the Seraphim. O Blessed Trinity, give me love, confidence, holy fear, faith, humility, cleanness of heart, forgivingness of spirit, that now I may receive Jesus with great joy. O Blessed Trinity: O Blessed Trinity.

Thanksgiving

Thou art one in substance, O God, and three in Persons. O Almighty Father, with Thine Only-begotten Son and with Thy Holy Spirit, Thou art one God and one Lord. What I believe of Thee, that without difference of separation I believe of Thy Son and of Thy Holy Spirit. I adore Thee, Eternal God, in Trinity of Persons, in oneness of Essence, in sameness of Majesty. I bless Thee for all Thy glory, and I thank Thee for all Thy gifts. I thank Thee and bless Thee now for giving me Jesus in this most Holy Sacrament of Love.

Glory be to Thee, O Blessed Trinity, one God, for ever and ever. Praise and blessing and honour be to Thee, O Father, and to Thee, O Son, and to Thee, O Holy Ghost, for ever and ever. Praise and blessing be given to Thee by the mouths of all and by the hearts of all for ever and ever. Praise and adoration be given by all to Thee, O Father; to Thee, O Word; to Thee, O Paraclete. O Incarnate Word, with one supplication and with one act of worship I adore Thy Godhead, and the Human Nature which Thou hast assumed; for Thou art Emmanuel, God with us, the Word made flesh. With one adoration I adore Thee in Thy two natures and oneness of Person. Without confusion of Thy Godhead and Thy Humanity, I adore Thee, God, the Word Incarnate, with Thy Body and Soul, as Thy Holy Church has taught us from the beginning. Thou, Jesus, God and man, art Lord of all, the Second Person of the Ever-blessed Trinity. My Lord and my God and my Saviour, Thou hast come to me as the food of my soul, and I bless Thee and praise Thee. Thou art the Bread of Heaven, my Jesus, and I find Thee at this Table of God. Thou art the medicine of the soul, and I find Thee the true Manna in the Holy Eucharist. Enlighten me, my Jesus, and purify me, and save me from the second death. Make me upright, truthful, and just. Fill my heart with the sweetness of Thy presence. Give me brotherly love, and make me patient, meek, gentle, forgiving, kind, unsuspicious, and forbearing. Fill my heart with the charity which thinketh no evil. Make me like Thyself and dear to Thy Heart; make me like God and dear to God; and give me life for ever in Thy kingdom.

O Blessed Trinity, every good gift comes from Thee. From Thee and by Thee and in Thee are all things. Thy great gift is the living Body of Jesus. He has come to me. He is the Bread which stays my hunger. He is the Bread which strengthens and enlightens my soul. He is the Bread by which I live.

O Blessed Trinity, evermore give me this Bread. O Blessed Trinity: O Blessed Trinity: O Blessed Trinity.

PART VII

THE SEVENTH THING TO BE CHIEFLY NOTED ABOUT THE SACRAMENT OF THE BODY OF JESUS IS THE PRECIOUS BLOOD

XXVII

About the consideration of the Blood of Jesus in three ways; and here about the first way, as that Blood was shed on the Cross

OUR Lord ever calls us to His life-giving banquet, in which He has made ready for us very precious meat and drink, that is, His own Body and Blood. We have already meditated on the Body of Jesus; we now go on to meditate on His Blood. We can do this in three ways: A, as that Blood is shed on the Cross for the salvation of all; B, as it is drunk by the faithful in the Holy Sacrament; C, as it is drunk spiritually apart from the Sacrament by the saved. The first way is considered in this Meditation and the next; the second way in the Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Meditations; the third way in the last Meditation but one. In the first way it is commended to us by its preciousness beyond all price; in the second way by its manifold usefulness; in the third way by its spiritual sweetness. As to the first way it is ever to be kept in mind; in the second way it is ever to be adored; in the third way it is ever to be desired. Now we consider it as commended to us by its priceless worth.

A. About this preciousness four things have to be noted: (1) the proof of its pricelessness; (2) the reason for paying so great a price; (3) the greatness of the power of this Blood; (4) the countless gathering of those that are redeemed by it.

The first two points we consider in this Meditation, and the other two in the next Meditation.

(1) There is the proof of the pricelessness of this Blood. This is shown in three ways: 1, by its virginal origin; 2, by the great worth of its innocence;

3, by its union with God.

1. The fruit of the vine, that is, of the Blessed Virgin, is grapes and wine, that is, the Body and Blood of Jesus. The wine of honour, therefore, born of the flower of the vine, is the Precious Blood of Jesus, drawn from a virginal source. Greatly indeed does it show us the worth and preciousness of the Blood of Jesus, that it took its beginning not as other blood from corruption, but from a virginal flower.

2. The more innocent that Blood is, the dearer it is and more precious. St. Peter contrasts the worthlessness of silver and gold with the preciousness of the Blood of Jesus, the sinless Lamb of God.

3. About the union of God and man Jeremias uses very strong words, saying that God has glued to Himself the whole house of Israel; that is, He has joined inseparably to Himself the whole nature of man, soul, body, and blood. As man has soul and flesh and blood, the Son of God, in being incarnate for his salvation, assumed the soul and body and blood of man to Himself, and so united them to Himself and so glorified them that they are truly called the Soul and Flesh and Blood of God. The Blood of Jesus, therefore, being the Blood of God, is so precious that one drop has more power than the whole world.

(2) The next thing about the Precious Blood is the reason for paying so great a price for the redemption of men; and this is threefold: 1, the necessity of paying so great a debt; 2, the proof of great love; 3, the recovery of the great good that had been lost.

1. The first reason for paying so great a price for man, that is, the Precious Blood of God, was the necessity of paying this great debt. The first man bound himself with the chain of a great debt; for he was bound to make satisfaction to God for himself and the whole human race, because he had robbed and slain by eating the forbidden fruit, and so justly might have been cast with all his offspring into hell, till by a sufficient victim he should pay what was owed. For it is just that satisfaction should be made according to the greatness of the sin and the dignity of the offended majesty; and this is seen by three steps: a, for a less fault, there is less satisfaction needed; b, for a greater fault, a greater satisfaction; c, for the greatest fault, the greatest satisfaction. Hence, in the law for the breaking of some commandments, it was decreed that some kind of animal should be offered or slain, and its blood poured forth; whereas for a greater sin, or for manslaughter itself, the

man who did it had to be slain and his blood poured forth. Hence, because of so many manslaughters of our first parent, who slew all men—for in him all die—and for the majesty of our most High Maker, which was hurt by this, it follows that there must be offered to God and slain, and its blood poured forth, a victim so precious, that at least it should be equal to all who were slain. Now, as such a one could not be found among creatures, it was needful for paying so great a debt and freeing man from the prison of hell that one better than every creature, that is, the Son of God Himself, should become man, and be slain, and pour forth His Blood.

a. In the law there was a cleansing from uncleanness by blood, and no remission of sin without it, that there might ever be a prophecy of the Blood of the Lamb.

b. When one man shed the blood of another, there was no expiation but by the shedding of his blood, that it might be understood how needful was the shedding of the Blood of Jesus, our Elder Brother. We are saved from the wound and debt of eternal death by the price of blood.

c. St. Bernard says, ‘The Son of God is bidden to be slain, that by the balsam of His Blood our wounds may be healed. See, O soul, how deep are those wounds for which our Lord Jesus Christ must in turn be wounded. Truly, if we had not been wounded to eternal death, the Son of God would never have died for us.

2. The next reason for so great a price is the proof of the strength of His love. The spirit which He breathed from His Body, the water which flowed from His side, and the Blood which He poured from His Heart are the witnesses of His very great love. St. Bernard says, ‘Copious in truth is the redemption of Christ, for lavishly through five wounds of His Body He poured the stream of Blood, when one drop of that Blood would have been enough for the redemption of all our race; but it was thus given abundantly that the value of the lover might be known by the greatness of the gift. For, that He might show thee how He loved thee, He chose to save thee from death in no other way but by dying for thee.’ St. Augustin says, ‘O my soul most precious, not redeemed by gold nor by riches, but by the Blood of a sinless Lamb; see what thou art worth, think of that which was given for thee. Do not give up to destruction thyself, for whom Christ shed His Precious Blood.’

3. The third reason for giving so great a price is the buying back again the lost good; and this is threefold: a, freedom from the slavery of the devil; b, an entrance to the kingdom of Heaven; c, the heritage of the sons of God.

a. They who feel the sinfulness of their own hearts, their poverty and weakness and nakedness before God, will know how to thank Jesus for giving them the freedom of God.

b. As Jesus, our High-Priest, went into the holy place, having redeemed us, so He has made us priests and has promised that He will make ready a home for us, and that where He is there we also shall be. St. Jerome says, ‘The Blood of Christ is the key of Paradise.’ In the Passion of our Lord, Heaven, which had been long shut, was opened by the price of Blood that had been paid. One of the soldiers opened the side of Jesus; and on this it is said, ‘He has used a word for those that watch to understand; he does not say “wounded,” but “opened,” for there a door of life was opened whence came the Sacraments of the Church, and without these there is no entrance to eternal life. His Blood was poured forth for the forgiveness of sin, and water for our washing; because the race of men, shut out from Paradise by the debt of sin and its hideousness, could only find a way of return when their debt was forgiven by the Blood of Christ, and when they in the water of Baptism were washed from the filth of sin.’

c. In the old law a brother could redeem the possessions of a brother; and thus the inheritance which a man could not recover for himself might be brought back to him by another. A penitent thief once hung near Jesus on the Cross, and was with Him that day in Paradise.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About the Blood of Jesus; Drink the wine that I have mingled for you. Prov. 9:5.

They sung a new canticle, saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to take the book and to open the seals thereof; because Thou wast slain and hast redeemed us to God in Thy Blood, out of every tribe and tongue and people and nation. Apoc. 5:9.

This is He that came by water and Blood, Jesus Christ; not by water only, but by water and Blood: and it is the Spirit which testifieth that Christ is the truth. 1 St. John 5:6.

He saith to them, My chalice indeed you shall drink. St. Matt. 20:23.

(1) The proof; 1. The virginal origin of this Blood; As the vine I have brought forth a pleasant odour, and my flowers are the fruit of honour and riches. I am the mother of fair love. Ecclus. 24:23, 24.

The Lord Himself shall give you a sign; behold, a Virgin shall conceive, and bear a Son. Is. 7:14.

2. Its innocence; They will hunt after the soul of the just, and will condemn innocent blood. Ps. 93:21.

Knowing that you were not redeemed by corruptible things … but with the precious Blood of Christ, as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled. 1 St. Pet. 1:18, 19.

3. Its union with God; As a girdle sticketh close to the loins of a man, so have I brought close to Me all the house of Israel and all the house of Judah, saith the Lord, that they might be My people, for a name and for a praise and for a glory. Jerem. 13:11.

Because the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He also Himself in like manner hath been partaker of the same. Heb. 2:14.

Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the Church of God which He hath purchased with His own Blood. Acts 20:28.

(2) The reason; 1. Necessity of paying debt; a. Small transgressions; If any one sin through ignorance, and do one of those things which by the law of the Lord are forbidden, and being guilty of sin shall understand his iniquity, he shall offer of the flocks a ram without blemish to the priest. Lev. 5:17, 18.

Almost all things according to the law are cleansed with blood, and without the shedding of blood there is no remission. Heb. 9:22.

b. Blood-shedding; Whosoever shall shed man’s blood his blood shall be shed, for man was made to the image of God. Gen. 9:6.

Defile not the land of your habitation, which is stained with the blood of the innocent; neither can it otherwise be expiated but by his blood that hath shed the blood of another. Numb. 35:33.

c. The sin to death; I will deliver them out of the hand of death: I will redeem them from death. Osee 13:14.

If we confess our sins He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all iniquity. 1 St. John 1:9.

My little children, these things I write to you that you may not sin. But if any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just; and He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world. 1 St. John 2:1, 2.

2. The proof of love in the price paid; There are three that give testimony on earth: the spirit and the water and the blood; and these three are one. 1 St. John 5:8.

With the Lord there is mercy, and with Him plentiful redemption; and He shall redeem Israel from all his iniquities. Ps. 129:7, 8.

Israel was a child, and I loved him. Osee 11:1.

With everlasting kindness have I had mercy on thee, saith the Lord thy Redeemer. Is. 54:8.

3. Recovery of good lost; a. Freedom from the slavery of the devil; The Lord hath redeemed Jacob, and hath delivered him out of the hand of one that was mightier than he. Jerem. 31:11.

Jesus answered them, Amen, amen I say unto you, that whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin. Now the servant abideth not in the house for ever; but the son abideth for ever. If therefore the son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed. St. John 8:34–36.

b. Entering the Heavenly Kingdom; Christ being come a High-Priest of the good things to come.… by His own Blood entered once into the holies, having obtained eternal redemption. Heb. 9:11, 12.

Having, therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the holies by the Blood of Christ, a new and living way which He hath dedicated for us through the veil, that is to say, His Flesh, and a High-Priest over the house of God, let us draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith. Heb. 10:19–22.

After they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead they did not break His legs. But one of the soldiers with a spear opened His side, and immediately there came out Blood and water: and he that saw it hath given testimony, and his testimony is true; and he knoweth that he saith true, that you also may believe. St. John 19:33–35.

c. The heritage of the sons of God; If thy brother being impoverished sell his little possession, his kinsman if he will may redeem what he has sold. Lev. 25:25.

If thou have a faithful servant let him be to thee as thy own soul; treat him as a brother; because in the blood of thy soul thou hast gotten him. Ecclus. 33:31.

N. The penitent thief; He said to Jesus, Lord, remember me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom. And Jesus said to him, Amen I say to thee, this day thou shalt be with Me in Paradise. St. Luke 23:42, 43.

Prayer

O Holy Ghost, give me a great love of the Blood of Jesus: and give me also great confidence in it, and by it great peace and joy. Let that Blood cleanse me from all my sins, and make me pleasing to God and dear to Him. Let me drink of that Blood of Jesus, with desire and love, in this most Holy Sacrament. Sprinkle my soul more and more with this Blood, for it is the dew of the light. Though I have been slain by sin, though I have been dead in sin, let me rise and live again in Thee, O most Blessed Spirit. Thou, in Thy love, wilt give me back the years that the cankerworm and the caterpillar have destroyed. I wish to live every day more in the kingdom of God. That kingdom is justice and peace and joy in Thee, O Holy Ghost. Make me understand better the preciousness of the Blood of God, in its virginal spring, in its innocence, in its union with the Word. As the Soul of Jesus and the Body of Jesus are hypostatically joined to His Divine Person, so also is His Blood. Make me understand the greatness of the guilt which needed so great a price. O Blood of my Jesus, wash me and cleanse me and hallow me more and more. O Spirit of grace, from the slavery of the devil that Blood has brought me; into the kingdom of light that Blood has led me; a heritage of ceaseless joy that Blood has given me. I long to love it always, and always to love it more. O Holy Ghost, let my soul be steeped in the Blood of Jesus: let it be like a lily of the valley drenched with dew in the noontide sun.

Now I am going to receive that Blood at the Altar. Jesus is offered now for me in the Sacrifice of the Mass, and yet dieth no more. Let me be drawn to Him, as the thief near His Cross was drawn to Him; and let me so love Him now, and so live by Him the hidden life in God, that He may remember me always till I see Him in His kingdom.

XXVIII

About the two other things to be noted with regard to the preciousness of the Blood of Jesus

A. (3) The third point to be chiefly noted about the preciousness of this Blood, as poured forth on the Cross, is the greatness of its might; and this is seen in three things: 1, in the destruction of the devil; 2, in the redemption of the world; 3, in reconciliation with God.

1. What Job says of Leviathan may be interpreted thus: Leviathan is the devil, and the hook in his food, with which he is drawn up, is the Son of God, hidden in His assumed human nature. With that hook the devil was caught and deceived: for in daring to gnaw to death the Flesh of the sinless Lamb on the Cross, and to pour forth its Blood unjustly, the hidden hook of the Godhead pierced his power and destroyed it. Next, the destruction of the great dragon in Babylon, with pitch and fat and hair by Daniel, is interpreted thus: The pitch and the hair signify the likeness of sinful flesh; and the fat signifies the Blood of Jesus. The lump into which they were made up signifies the holy limbs of Jesus put into the power of the enemy. While he unjustly seeks to devour these things, his power is justly destroyed.

2. It is by the Blood of Jesus that we are redeemed, and therefore the Church sings in the Te Deum: ‘We pray Thee, therefore, help Thy servants, whom Thou hast redeemed by Thy Precious Blood.’

N. Of both these together St. Augustin says, ‘What did the Redeemer do to our enslaver? He made His Cross a trap for him, and put there as bait His Body and Blood. Then, because the Evil One poured forth the Blood of one who was not a debtor, he was commanded to give back the debtors to freedom. Hence the Church sings, “O glorious Cross, on which the devil was crushed, and on which the world was redeemed by the Blood of Christ.” ’

3. It is Jesus who has made peace between God and man. He is the Head of the Church, and made this peace by the Blood of His Cross. Hence after His Passion and Resurrection He showed to His disciples His pierced hands and sides, and gave them His peace. Now this peace, that is, this reconciliation with God, is brought about by the Blood of Jesus in a threefold way: a, because of the sufficient price which by it He paid for our debts; b, because of the most burning love which He showed by this deed; c, because of the beauty by which it made us pleasing to God.

a. He paid what He did not take away, that is, He paid for our peace and our ransom the price of His Blood.

b. Jesus, because of His great love for us, gave Himself on the Cross to reconcile us to God. For this He offered His own Blood and gave His life.

c. From being culprits we are made just, and from being foul we are made fair, by Jesus, our Redeemer. When He poured water into the basin and began to wash the feet of His disciples, He showed us how He washes our souls with His Blood, making us fair in His eyes and dear to God. It is, indeed, true: God has washed sinners in His own Blood; has made them pleasing to Himself; and has so reconciled them to Himself that He has set them as princes in His own kingdom.

(4) The fourth thing to be noted about our Lord’s Blood is the countless gathering of the Redeemed. Three great armies have been redeemed by that Blood: 1, His open enemies; 2, the ancient just; 3, His doubtful friends. The first are saved from the fetters of sin; the second from Limbus; the third from doubtfulness of faith. Because of this He poured forth His Blood from three places: 1, from His hands; 2, from His feet; 3, from the wound in His side.

1. He shed the Blood from His hands for two reasons: a, to loose sinners from the chains of sin by the might of that Blood; b, having forgiven them, to bring them back to Himself.

a. St. Augustin says, ‘Christ shed His Blood to take away our sins. For that by which the devil held us fast was taken away by the Blood of the Redeemer. Now, we were held fast by nothing but by the chain of our sins.’

b. He brings them back forgiven. Jesus stretched forth His hands on the Cross, and held them out dripping with Blood. Thus He broke off the fetters of the wicked; and still with a bleeding hand He draws back the sinner who is flying from Him.

2. He shed His Blood from His feet to show that He would, a, save the ancient just from Limbus; b, bring them safely to the heavenly country.

a. The tree and the crookedness of the tree signify the Passion of Jesus on the wood of the Cross. There He truly treads in the wine-press, pouring forth with His feet the blood of the grape, and thus He makes many glad. Jesus, therefore, trod the wine-press for the virgin of Juda, when He shed His Blood in anguish on the Cross, and gladdened the just, who had an incorruptible faith, by bringing them from Limbus. The water that they did not have there is the heavenly bliss.

b. Bringing them from Limbus, He takes them to Heaven. He did not enter Heaven alone, but had with Him a great army of the just, a victorious host whom He had brought from the grave. By the strength of His arm He had saved them.

3. He poured His Blood from the wound in His side and Heart for life and warmth. He has disciples doubtful in the faith, and many others greatly tempted as to faith and morals, that is, as to the things they must believe and the things they must do. These are cold and as it were dead. But He does two things: a, He warms them and gives them life; b, when they live again by His Blood He shows them the heavenward road, that they may run swiftly after Him.

a. For this reason His side was opened, in which is the life of man, that He may warm the cold in faith and quicken to a holy life those that are as good as dead. So He was made like a pelican in the desert. Now, it is said of the pelican that she feeds her young ones with her blood. Jesus, with the Blood of His Heart, helps the cold in faith and the dead in sins.

b. To those who live again by His wound He shows the road to Heaven, and teaches them that they must follow it. He calls to the soul to look at Him wounded for it, to see His Blood, and to follow Him. He showed His wounds to His disciples after His resurrection, not only that He might strengthen them in faith, but also that He might teach them about the sufferings through which they must go. Fly, therefore, from delights of the flesh, and follow Jesus in His Passion. Ask Him to go before you, that by

His wounded Heart and Blood-sprinkled footsteps He may show you the road in which the wayfarers cannot err, and give you strength to walk in it till you know Him as you are known, and drink in the pleasures at His right hand for evermore.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(3) About the might of the Blood of Jesus; He hath loved us and washed us from our sins in His own Blood, and hath made us a kingdom and priests to God and His Father: to Him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen. Apoc. 1:5, 6.

1. The destruction of the devil; Canst Thou draw out the Leviathan with a hook, or canst Thou tie his tongue with a cord?.… Lay Thy hand upon him; remember the battle, and speak no more. Job 40:20, 27.

Daniel said, I adore the Lord my God, for He is the living God; but that (the dragon) is no living god. But give me leave, O king, and I will kill this dragon without sword or club. And the king said, I give thee leave. Then Daniel took pitch and fat and hair and boiled them together, and put them in the dragon’s mouth; and the dragon burst asunder. And he said, Behold him whom ye worshipped. Dan. 14:24–26.

2. The redemption of the world; You are bought with a great price. Glorify and bear God in your body. 1 Cor. 6:20.

In Him we have redemption through His Blood, the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of His grace. Eph. 1:7.

You were not redeemed by corruptible things like gold or silver … but with the Precious Blood of Christ, as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled. 1 St. Pet. 1:18, 19.

N. Both together; It behoved Him in all things to be made like His brethren, that He might become a merciful and faithful High-Priest before God, that He might be a propitiation for the sins of the people. Heb. 2:17.

3. Reconciliation with God; Now in Christ Jesus, you who sometime were afar off are made nigh by the Blood of Christ, for He is our peace. Eph. 2:13, 14.

He is the Head of the Church, … making peace by the Blood of His Cross, both as to the things on earth and the things that are in Heaven. Col. 1:18, 20.

a. The sufficient price; They are multiplied above the hairs of My head who hate Me without cause.… Then did I pay that which I took not away.

Ps. 68:5.

This is My Blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins. St. Matt. 26:28.

b. His most gracious love; Walk in love, as Christ also hath loved us, and hath given Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odour of sweetness. Eph. 5:2.

Noe was found perfect, just, and in the time of wrath he was made a reconciliation. Ecclus. 44:17.

c. The beauty of grace; God commended His love towards us, in that when we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us; much more therefore, being justified by His Blood, shall we be saved from wrath through Him. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more being reconciled we shall be saved by His life. And not only so, but also we glory in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received reconciliation. Rom. 5:8–11.

To all that are at Rome, the beloved of God called to be Saints, grace to you, and peace from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ. Rom. 1:7.

Jesus knowing that His hour was come, that He should pass out of this world to the Father, having loved His own who were in the world, He loved them to the end.… Knowing that the Father had given all things into His hands, and that He came from God, and goeth to God, He riseth from supper, and layeth aside His garments, and having taken a towel, girded Himself. After that He putteth water into a basin, and began to wash the feet of the disciples, and to wipe them with the towel wherewith He was girded. St. John 13:1–5.

Grace be unto you and peace … from Jesus Christ, who is the faithful witness, the first begotten of the dead, and the Prince of the kings of the earth; who hath loved us, and washed us from our sins in His own Blood, and hath made us a kingdom and priests to God and His Father. Apoc. 1:4–6.

(4) The Redeemed; 1. Open enemies: His hands; a. Forgiveness; He stretched out His hand to make a libation, and offered of the blood of the grape. He poured out at the foot of the Altar a divine odour to the most high prince. Ecclus. 1:16, 17.

b. Sinners brought back; I have blotted out thy iniquities as a cloud, and thy sins as a mist; return to Me, for I have redeemed thee. Is. 44:22.

2. The ancient Just: His feet; a. Brought from Limbus; The Lord hath taken away all my mighty men out of the midst of me; … the Lord hath trodden the wine-press for the virgin daughter of Juda. Lam. 1:15.

Thou also by the Blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, where is no water: return to the stronghold, ye prisoners of hope. Zach. 9:11, 12.

b. Taken to Heaven; He entered once into the holies, having obtained eternal redemption. Heb. 9:12.

Thou hast ascended on high, and hast led captivity captive, and hast received gifts in men. Ps. 67:19.

Who is this that cometh from Edom, with dyed garments from Bosra: this beautiful One in His robe, walking in the greatness of His strength? Is. 63:1.

3. Doubtful friends: The wound in His side and Heart; a. He gives life to dead souls; One of the soldiers with a spear opened His side. St. John 19:34.

I am become like a pelican of the wilderness. Ps. 101:7.

The King of Israel stood in his chariot against the Syrians: and he died in the evening, and the blood ran out of the wound. 3 Kings 22:35.

The blueness of a wound shall wipe away evils. Prov. 20:30.

Thy wound is grievous. Nah. 3:19.

Woe is me for my destruction: my wound is very grievous. Jer. 10:19.

I have wounded thee with a wound of an enemy. Jer. 30:14.

I will close up thy scar, and will heal thee of thy wounds, saith the Lord. Jer. 30:17.

A certain Samaritan, being on his journey, came near him; and seeing him was moved with compassion; and going up to him, bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine. St. Luke 10:33, 34.

b. He shows them the way to Heaven; Thou hast wounded My Heart, My sister, My spouse. Cantic. 4:9.

When He had said this He showed them His hands and His side. The disciples therefore were glad when they saw the Lord. St. John 20:20.

Unto this you are called; for Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow His steps. 1 St. Pet. 2:21.

Jesus also, that He might sanctify the people by His own Blood, suffered without the gate. Let us go forth therefore to Him without the camp, bearing

His reproach. For we have not here a lasting city, but we seek one that is to come. Heb. 13:12–14.

Flee away, O My beloved, and be like to the roe and to the young hart upon the mountains of aromatical spices. Cantic. 8:14.

A path and a way shall be there, and it shall be called the holy way; the unclean shall not pass over it: and this shall be to you a straight way, so that fools shall not err therein. Is. 35:8.

We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face. Now I know in part, but then I shall know even as I am known. 1 Cor. 13:12.

Prayer

My Jesus, Thy Soul was once sorrowful even unto death: now it is without sorrow, where sorrow cannot be. As Thy great prophet has told us, because it has laboured it is saturated with joy. To-day is for evermore the day of the gladness of Thy Heart. Thy Soul is the most beautiful soul that God has ever made; and it is the strongest soul. He has given Thee wisdom to judge Thy people. He has filled Thee with the fulness of grace. As the Godhead dwells bodily in Thee, giving Thy Soul the holiness of the hypostatic union, so, that Thou mayest be truly man, Thy Soul has a created holiness by the sanctification of the Holy Ghost. I adore the love with which Thy uncreated Spirit loves Thy created Soul. I adore the Holy Ghost dwelling in Thy Soul as His most chosen sanctuary. I adore the Father, and Thyself, the Word, and Thy Holy Spirit, loving Thy Soul, and making in it an abode of peace, which passeth not away. With one act of adoration I adore Thy Godhead, and the Soul which Thou didst assume to a personal union with Thyself. O most glorious Soul of my Saviour: O strongest Soul: O wisest Soul: O most loving Soul. In a few moments, my Jesus, Thy Soul will come to me in the Sacrament of Thy Body and Blood. O, bind me, tie me, fasten me to Thyself, that I may cling to Thee ceaselessly, and never be torn from Thee, nor tear myself from Thee again. O most Holy Soul of God, I draw near to the Table of Heaven in the splendour of Thy light.

XXIX

About the Blood of Jesus in the second way, that is, as received in the most Holy Sacrament

B. We have considered in the last two Meditations the priceless preciousness of the Blood of Jesus, as He shed it in the day of the agony of His Heart on the Cross. Now we think of it as it is drunk by the faithful in the Blessed Sacrament; and about this three things have to be thought of: (1) why the Holy Sacrament is given under two species; (2) why the people do not receive the Blood of Jesus under the species of wine as the priests do; (3) what is the benefit of the Blood of Jesus as His people receive it at the Altar.

(1) The twofold species of food and drink, that is, of bread and wine, is ordained for three reasons: 1, for the fulfilling of this kingly banquet; 2, for the redemption of our bodies and souls together, and for their nourishment together; 3, to set always before us the memory of the Passion of our Lord in a clearer way.

1. The great feast of Assuerus in the third year of his reign may be taken as teaching us about the feast which our King makes. He does this not in the first year nor the second year, that is, not before the law nor under the law, but in the third year, that is, the law of grace. Now for His faithful, great and little, He ever sets forth a banquet of food and drink. To show the beauty and perfection of His Feast and His Table, He gives us the Holy Sacrament under the species of bread and wine together. For if either of these were wanting a banquet would not be greatly praised.

2. Melchisedech offered bread and wine for a token, signifying the redemption of our bodies in the bread, and in the wine the redemption of our souls. The Master, in the fourth chapter of the Sentences, says, ‘Why is the Sacrament of the Altar taken under two species, when in each Christ is whole? It is indeed to show that He assumed our whole human nature, body and soul, and that He redeemed the whole. The bread is referred to the flesh which it nourishes, and the wine to the soul; … for in the blood is the life. Hence if it were only taken under one species it would be signified to have power only for one, that is, for body or soul, and not for both together:’ as indeed it has.

3. You drink His Blood in the Sacred Host in memory of His Passion. For the Passion of Jesus is brought more vividly before our minds by thoughts of His Blood than by thoughts of His Body. The blood in Egypt was for a sign. As the lamb without blemish was slain for the bringing Israel out of Egypt, so the Blood of Jesus is the proper and express memorial of His Passion. When the Moabites saw the waters red, they knew that, after fighting, the kings had been slain. Jesus is the King of the humble, and the devil is king of the children of pride. Jesus was grievously wounded in His Passion, when He saved His servants from the slavery of the devil. In this battle Jesus was wounded to death; but by death He destroyed him who had power of death, that is, the devil. When He was carried out of the battle dead He was the conqueror for evermore in His high places.

(2) The people do not receive the Precious Blood under the species of wine for a threefold reason: 1, we must have a fitting vessel to hold the Precious Blood; 2, we must avoid the danger of spilling it, because of the crowds that gather round the Altar; 3, we must guard against error in the faith.

1. The vessel in which wine is kept needs to be more carefully prepared than that which is made for bread, so it is granted only to priests to receive the Precious Blood under the species of wine; for they are, as it were, the vessels of the Lord specially consecrated for this, bound by holy religion, and adorned with the beauty of virtue. Hence in Scripture they are likened to a chosen vessel in three ways: a, to a consecrated Altar; b, to a bowl with bands; c, to a cup of gold.

a. The priest ought to be a vessel specially consecrated and specially holy. He ought also to be an Altar worthy of receiving the Blood of our

Lord. It is said, ‘The Altar of the holocaust signifies the life of the just, who daily crucify their flesh with its affections and desires, and offer themselves a living sacrifice to God. The Altar of the holocausts is the pure faith, the true doctrine, and the good lives of the ministers of Christ.’

b. Moses put half of the blood of the victims in bowls. The bowl is a vessel for wine, bound round about with many bands, signifying the life of religious priests, guarded by virtues, and fit to receive the Blood of the Lord. The Holy Ghost tells us to put our feet into the fetters of Wisdom, and our necks into her chains, promising that these chains will be to us the beauty of life and salvation. Religiousness guards the heart and gives it great gladness.

c. The priest should be like a vessel of solid gold, adorned with every precious stone, that is, with every kind of virtue. It is said, ‘Such a chosen vessel is needed to receive the Blood of Jesus under the species of wine.’

2. We must avoid the danger of spilling the Precious Blood; and there would be danger of this, because of the crowds that gather round the Altar. Hence it is that our Lord at the Last Supper gave to His Apostles, who were His priests, and few in number, not only His Body under the species of bread, but also His Blood under the species of wine; but to the crowd of men in the desert He gave bread without drink.

3. We must avoid the danger of error. If an ignorant people were to receive the Holy Blood under the species of wine, they could be hardly got to believe that it is also under the species of bread, whereas it is in deed and in truth under each species. As under the species of the consecrated wine there is the Blood of Jesus by transubstantiation, so there is His Body by annexion; and as under the species of bread there is the Body of Jesus by transubstantiation, so there also truly is His Blood by annexion. For these two things, the Body of Jesus and His Blood, nay, these four things, His Body and Blood and Soul and Godhead, can now never again be separated. Hence as the priest receives the Blood of Jesus sacramentally from the chalice, so the people receive it concomitantly under the species of bread from the very Body of Jesus; and it is just as profitable to them and just as sweet as it is to the priests, who receive it under the species of wine in the chalice. When the Bride says that her Beloved is a cluster of Cyprus to her, she means that two things are in the cluster. There is the grape, that is, the Body of Jesus for food, and from the grape flows the sweetness of His

Blood for drink. By this refreshing drink our Lord strengthens our souls till He brings them to everlasting life.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About the Blood of Jesus; Taking the chalice He gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink ye all of this; for this is My Blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many for the remission of sins. St. Matt. 26:27, 28.

Having taken the chalice, giving thanks He gave it to them; and they all drank of it. And He said to them, This is My Blood of the new testament, which shall be shed for many. St. Mark 14:23, 24.

(1) Bread and wine; 1. A kingly feast; In the third year of his reign he (Assuerus) made a great feast for all the princes and for his servants.… They that were invited drank in golden cups, and the meats were brought in divers vessels one after the other. Wine also in abundance, and of the best, was presented, as was worthy of a king’s magnificence. Esth. 1:3, 7.

2. Redemption of body and soul; Melchisedech, the King of Salem, bringing forth bread and wine, for he was the priest of the Most High God, blessed him and said, Blessed be Abram by the Most High God who made heaven and earth. Gen. 14:18, 19.

The Lord hath sworn, and He will not repent, Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech. Ps. 109:4.

3. The memory of His Passion; In like manner also the chalice, after He had supped, saying, This chalice is the new testament in My Blood; this do ye, as often as ye shall drink, for the commemoration of Me. 1 Cor. 11:25.

The blood shall be to you for a sign in the houses where you shall be; and I will see the blood, and will pass over you. Ex. 12:13.

They rose early in the morning, and the sun being now up and shining upon the waters, the Moabites saw the waters over against them red like blood. And they said, It is the blood of the sword; the kings have fought among themselves. 4 Kings 3:22, 23.

He beholdeth every high thing; He is king over all the children of pride. Job 41:25.

N. The kings; He hath gathered together his fury against Me, and threatening Me he hath gnashed with his teeth upon Me; My enemy hath beheld Me with terrible eyes.… He hath taken Me by My neck, and hath broken Me, and hath set Me up to be his mark. He hath compassed Me round about with his lances.… He hath torn Me with wound upon wound, and hath rushed in upon Me like a giant. Job 16:10, 13–15.

Arise, arise, put on thy strength, O arm of the Lord; arise as in the days of old, as in the ancient generations. Hast Thou not struck the proud one and wounded the dragon? Hast Thou not dried up the sea, the water of the mighty deep? Hast Thou not made the depth of the sea a way, that Thy ransomed might pass over? Is. 51:9, 10.

Turn thy hand and carry me out of the army, for I am grievously wounded. And the battle was fought that day: and the King of Israel stood in his chariot against the Syrians, and in the evening he died; and the blood ran out of the wound into the midst of the chariot. 3 Kings 22:34, 35.

He, the Conqueror, will lead me upon my high places singing psalms. Hab. 3:19.

That through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death, that is to say, the devil. Heb. 2:14.

(2) Communion in one kind; 1. A fitting vessel; a. A consecrated Altar; The blood of thy victims thou shalt pour on the Altar, and the flesh thou thyself shalt eat. Deut. 12:27.

Thy Altars, O Lord of hosts, my King and my God. Blessed are they that dwell in Thy house, O Lord; they shall praise Thee for ever and ever. Ps. 83:4, 5.

b. A bowl with bands; Then Moses took half of the blood and put it into bowls; and the rest he poured upon the Altar. Ex. 24:6.

Put thy feet into her (Wisdom’s) fetters, and thy neck into her chains.… Then shall her fetters be a strong defence for thee and a firm foundation, and her chain a robe of glory. For in her is the beauty of life, and her bands are a healthful binding. Thou shalt put her on as a robe of glory, and thou shalt set her upon thee as a crown of joy. Ecclus. 6:25, 30–32.

The fear of the Lord is the religiousness of knowledge. Ecclus. 1:17.

c. A golden cup; As a massive vessel of gold adorned with every precious stone. Ecclus. 50:10.

2. Few and many; When evening was come, He cometh with the Twelve: and when they were at table and eating, Jesus saith, Amen I say to you, one of you that eateth with Me shall betray Me. St. Mark 14:17, 18.

The men sat down, in number about five thousand. And Jesus took the loaves, and when He had given thanks He distributed to them that were sat down; in like manner also of the fishes as much as they would. St. John 6:10, 11.

3. Danger of error; A cluster of cyprus my Love is to me. Cantic. 1:13.

The Lord alone was his leader.… He set him on a high land … that he might drink the purest blood of the grape. Deut. 32:12–14.

My Blood is drink indeed.… He that … drinketh My Blood abideth in Me and I in him. St. John 6:56, 57.

Thanksgiving

O Jesus, Thou hast destroyed Leviathan and the dragon, for Thou hast taken our nature and hast redeemed us by Thy Blood. O Jesus, Thou art our peace. Thou hast made peace by the Blood of Thy Cross. Being justified in Thy Blood, we receive reconciliation from Thee. We adore Thy Blood flowing from the wounds in Thy hands and feet and side.

Thou hast trodden the wine-press for me. I come to Thee, for Thou hast redeemed me. Thou art my beautiful One, and my loved One, walking in the greatness of Thy strength. Thou comest to my heart from Edom, with Thy dyed raiment from Bosra. Thou comest to me in Thy white raiment that is sprinkled with Blood. Thou hast come to me now in Thy Sacrament of Love. I bless Thee and praise Thee and thank Thee, with all my soul, O King and Spouse and God. Coming to me now, Thy Five Wounds are on Thy Body, but pain and sorrow can fall on Thee no more. The glittering lance does not sink into Thy side. Thy people love Thee and adore Thee and rejoice in Thy light. For Thee the winter is past, and the rain over and gone. O King of my heart, what a feast is Thine which Thou ever makest for Thy princes and Thy children. There is abundance of corn and wine, the wheat of the elect and the wine of virgins. The plenteousness of Thy heavenly banquet is worthy of Thy magnificence and love.

Let me be a golden vessel for Thee, studded with precious stones. By this Bread of Life and this wine of God which Thou hast given me, let me be before Thee as the flower of roses in the days of the spring, and as the lilies that are on the brink of the water, and as the sweet-smelling frankincense in time of summer. Let me be as a bright fire, and as frankincense burning in that fire. Let me ever stretch forth my hands to pour forth a drink-offering to Thee, an offering of a soul thirsting for Thee, as a hart thirsts for the brooks of water. Let my voice ever be heard for a remembrance before Thee, my God. Now, at Thy Altar, by Thy love and pity, I have drunk the purest blood of the grape. I have drunk Thy Blood, my Jesus, in the Sacred Host. That Blood is in me a well-spring of holiness and joy and everlasting life. My Jesus, I love Thee and thank Thee for this, and will thank Thee for ever and ever. Thy name is the Word of God.

XXX

Of the third point about the Blood of Jesus, that is, the usefulness of this Blood when worthily received

B. (3) Having, in the last Meditation, considered two points about receiving our Lord’s Blood, we have now to consider the usefulness or effect of that Blood, as taken by the faithful in the Holy Sacrament. To understand this, we must bear in mind that the Blood of Jesus thus received may be looked at in three lights: 1, as a draught of living water; 2, as the wine of the Spirit; 3, as the most holy mystery of the Church. In the consideration and likeness of each of these three things the Blood of Jesus has a threefold effect.

1. The Blood of Jesus is a draught of living water. Now, a draught of water does three things: a, it moistens what is dry; b, it cools what is inflamed; c, it carries food to the members. So a draught of the Blood of Jesus, as signified by water, has three effects in the faithful soul: a, it moistens and binds together what is dry; b, it cools and quenches what is evilly heated; c, it carries the food of the Word of God to the members, that they may do their work well.

a. The soul is like dry dust through the failing of the springs; but God pours water on the thirsty soul, and streams upon the dry soul. Then the heart, prone to evil in itself, is steeped in the draught of the Blood of Jesus. Its powers are all bound together, nay, glued together, and so it is strengthened for all that is good. On the other hand, the wicked are like dust before the wind; for the temptations of the devil scatter their thoughts, their desires, their words, and their works through many kinds of vices. The people were scattered in Egypt. They sought for stubble, that is, the vanities of the world. But Jesus, by His Blood and His death, gathered together in one all who were scattered in the darkness. He does this by union of heart, by bridling of the tongue, by the discipline of the senses, by the discipline of morals, by the holiness of our lives, and by the love of our brethren. When St. Paul says that we are to be a new paste, as we are unleavened, he means that, being cleansed by Baptism from our guilt, we must be sprinkled by the Blood of Jesus, and so made into a paste bound together by a new life and a good life.

b. When the rock was smitten by Moses the water flowed to quench the thirst of the people. As water quenches a raging flame, so the Blood of Jesus, signified by water, quenches the burning of anger, of avarice, of sinful love, and of sinful desire. St. Augustin says, ‘Write, O Lord Jesus Christ, Thy wounds on my heart in Thy Precious Blood, that I may so read in them Thy sorrow, as to bear all sorrow for Thee; and that I may so read in them Thy love, as to despise all wrong love for Thee.’ Thus it is seen that the Blood of Jesus, like water, quenches evil flames in the soul.

c. Elias went in the strength of his miraculous food to the mount of God, that is Horeb. Drink carries food to the members, and moves them to go or to do; so a draught of the Blood of Jesus carries to the heart the word of God or His commandments, that all the powers of the soul and all the members of the body may live by that word, may be ruled by it, and by it may do good works. The Wise Man says that we have to eat and drink and leave childish things; that is to say, we must eat, for food, the word of God and His commandments, and drink the Blood of Jesus. Then He will bring home that commandment to our heart, our senses, and our members. So by His warning we shall leave all that is bad, and cleave to all that is good.

2. The Blood of Jesus is the wine of the Spirit. Looked at in this light it has three effects: a, it washes; b, it warms; c, it gladdens. It washes away the filth of guilt; it warms hearts with love; and it gladdens them with the sweetness of God.

a. Jesus washes His garments in the blood of the grape. His garments are faithful souls in which He is clothed. We have now fellowship with God, being brought from darkness to light, for the Blood of Jesus His Son cleanses us from our sins.

b. In the sweet Body of Jesus, received in the Sacred Host, we eat the marrow of wheat and drink the grape’s purest blood. That Blood is pure and warm: pure, to take away all stain of sin; warm, to inflame the heart with love. The cellar of wine, spoken of in Scripture, is the Church of God, where is set forth the warm wine of the Blood of Jesus, to kindle our hearts with love for God and for our neighbour.

c. The spiritual meaning of the praise of wine in Scripture is the joy that comes to the soul by the Blood of the Lamb, drunk according to the measure of faith. Jesus is to us a cluster of grapes, when with His Blood we drink in the sweetness of spiritual joy, which gives us forgetfulness of all the sorrow of life.

3. The Blood of Jesus is the most holy mystery of the Church; for it is that holy thing, that secret thing, in which the great power of God is hidden. In this way it has three supernatural effects: a, it routs the devils; b, it draws down grace; c, it keeps us in holiness of life till it brings us to life everlasting.

a. When God saw the blood on the doors of Israel in Egypt He would not suffer the destroyer to enter. So is it with the faithful soul. St. John Chrysostom says, ‘This Blood drives away the devils and keeps them far off.’ As the elephants at Bethzacharam were made to fight by the blood of grapes and mulberries, so Christian souls defeat and crush their spiritual enemies by the Blood of our Lord.

b. We have come to the Blood which speaketh better things than that of Abel; for the blood of Abel calls to God for vengeance, whereas the Blood of Jesus demands grace by right and brings it to us. St. Bernard says, ‘O Blood of Christ, worthy of the highest reverence: on the Altar, our drink; on the Cross, our ransom; in heaven, our advocate with the Father.’

c. This Blood is our eternal life. The philosopher says, ‘Corruption and old age are nothing but littleness of blood. When the body is without it then the body corrupts. Hence many die for want of blood.’ As therefore the life of the body is in the blood, so the preservation of the life of the spirit is in the Blood of Jesus. In that Blood also is our security for being brought to the deathless life of Heaven.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

(3) About the usefulness of the Blood of Jesus; He that.… drinketh My Blood hath everlasting life. St. John 6:55.

He struck the rock and the waters gushed out, and the stream overflowed. Ps. 77:20.

1. Living water; a. It moistens; I will pour out waters upon the thirsty ground, and streams upon the dry land. I will pour out My Spirit on thy seed, and My blessing on thy stock; and they shall spring up among the herbs, and as willows beside the running waters. Is. 44:3, 4.

Not so the wicked, not so; but they shall be like the dust which the wind driveth from the face of the earth. Ps. 1:4.

The people were scattered through all the land of Egypt to gather straw. Ex. 5:12.

Being the High-Priest of that year he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation; and not only for the nation, but to gather together in one the children of God that were dispersed. St. John 11:51, 52.

Purge out the old leaven, that you may be a new paste, as you are unleavened. 1 Cor. 5:7.

b. It cools what is inflamed; He struck the rock in the wilderness, and gave them to drink as out of the great deep. He brought forth water out of the rock, and made streams run down as rivers. Ps. 77:15, 16.

Water quencheth a flaming fire. Ecclus. 3:33.

c. It brings spiritual food; He (Elias) cast himself down and slept in the shadow of the juniper-tree: and behold an Angel of the Lord touched him and said to him, Arise, and eat. He looked, and behold there was at his head a hearth-cake and a vessel of water: and he ate and drank and fell asleep again. And the Angel of the Lord came again the second time, and touched him and said to him, Arise, eat, for thou hast yet a great way to go. And he arose and ate and drank, and walked in the strength of that food forty days and forty nights to the mount of God, Horeb. 3 Kings 19:5–8.

Come eat My bread, and drink the wine which I have mingled for you. Forsake childishness and live, and walk by the ways of prudence. Prov. 9:5, 6.

2. The wine of the Spirit; Drink ye all of this; for this is My Blood of the new testament. St. Matt. 26:27, 28.

a. It washes; Tying His foal to the vineyard, and His ass, O my son, to the vine; He shall wash His robe in wine, and His garment in the blood of the grape. Gen. 49:11.

If we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another; and the Blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth from all sin. 1 St. John 1:7.

If the blood of goats and of oxen and the ashes of a heifer being sprinkled sanctify such as are defiled to the cleansing of the flesh, how much more shall the Blood of Christ, who, by the Holy Ghost, offered Himself unspotted to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works to serve the living God? Heb. 9:13, 14.

Blessed are they that wash their robes in the Blood of the Lamb, that they may have a right to the tree of life, and may enter in by the gates to the city. Apoc. 22:14.

b. It warms; He set him on a high land that he might eat the fruit of the fields, that he might suck honey out of the rock, and oil out of the hardest stone; butter of the herd, and milk of the sheep, with the fat of rams, and of the rams of the breed of Basan; and goats with the marrow of wheat; and that he might drink the purest blood of the grape. Deut. 32:13, 14.

I am come to cast fire on the earth, and what will I but that it be kindled? St. Luke 12:49.

The Lord hath said it, whose fire is in Sion and His furnace in Jerusalem. Is. 31:9.

He brought me into the cellar of wine; He set charity in order in me. Stay me up with flowers; compass me about with apples, for I languish with love. His left hand is under my head, and His right hand shall embrace me. … My Beloved is mine, and I am His, who feedeth among the lilies. Cantic. 2:4–6, 16.

c. It gladdens; The earth shall be filled with the fruit of Thy works … that wine may cheer the heart of man. Ps. 103:13, 15.

Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart. Ecclus. 31:36.

A cluster of cyprus my Love is to me in the vineyards of Engaddi. Cantic. 1:13.

King Solomon hath made him a litter of the wood of Libanus; the pillars thereof he made of silver, the seat of gold, the going up of purple; the midst he covered with charity for the daughter of Jerusalem. Go forth, ye daughters of Sion, and see King Solomon in the diadem wherewith his mother crowned him in the day of his espousals, and in the day of the gladness of his heart. Cantic. 3:9–11.

Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind. Let them drink and forget their want, and remember their sorrow no more. Prov. 31:6, 7.

3. The holy mystery of the Church; Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own Blood, suffered without the gate. Heb. 13:12.

a. It drives away devils; The blood shall be to you for a sign in the houses where you shall be; and I will see the blood, and will pass over you, and the plague shall not be upon you to destroy you when I shall strike the land of Egypt. Ex. 12:13.

They showed the elephants the blood of grapes and mulberries to provoke them to fight. 1 Mac. 6:34.

There was a great battle in heaven; Michael with his Angels fought with the dragon, and the dragon fought and his Angels; and they prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in Heaven. And that great dragon was cast out, the old serpent who is called the devil and Satan, who seduceth the whole world; and he was cast to the earth, and his Angels were thrown down with him. And I heard a loud voice in Heaven, saying, Now is come salvation and strength, and the kingdom of our God, and the power of His Christ; because the accuser of our brethren is cast forth, who accused them before our God day and night. And they overcame him by the Blood of the Lamb, and by the word of the testimony, and they loved not their lives to the death. Apoc. 12:7–11.

b. It impetrates grace; Peter, an Apostle of Jesus Christ, … according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, unto the sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the Blood of Jesus Christ, grace unto you, and peace be multiplied. 1 St. Pet. 1:1, 2.

You are come … to Jesus, the Mediator of the new testament, and to the sprinkling of Blood which speaketh better things than that of Abel. Heb. 12:22, 24.

c. It gives perseverance; He that eateth My Flesh and drinketh My Blood hath everlasting life, and I will raise him up in the last day. St. John 6:55.

The life of all flesh is in the blood. Lev. 17:14.

My Blood is drink indeed. St. John 6:56.

Prayer

O Jesus, Thou art the living Water; be in me, dear Lord, a well of water springing up to everlasting life. O Soul of my Jesus, help me to pray. O most beautiful Soul, most glorious Soul, most majestic Soul, ever to be loved, ever to be reverenced, ever to be adored, in the hypostatic union, with the Eternal Word. Soul once sorrowful to death, now glad with the gladness of the everlasting espousals, enlighten me, strengthen me, help me to pray.

Eternal Father, water in me all that is dry. I am a desert of sand: make me a watered garden, bringing forth flowers of Paradise, and fruits of the tree of life.

Eternal Son, as one like Thee walked with the Three Children in the burning fiery furnace, softening the breath of the flame, and stilling the rage of the fire, so be with me, my Saviour, in this fiery furnace of the world, that its flame may not scorch me, and that not even the breath of its fire may pass upon my raiment. Quench in me by Thy Blood all evil desires and all thoughts of sinful longing.

Eternal Spirit, give me strength and light to work for God. Thou art my strength and my light. To Thee, dear Spirit, I come; be to me even here the beginning of the endless joy. Thou art the beginning and the end.

O Blessed Trinity, lead me, for the food and drink of my soul, to the Altar of Jesus, to Thy Table, O my God.

O Jesus, Thy Blood is the wine of the Spirit; let me be satisfied with the fulness of Thy house. I come, my Lord and my Love, to Thy Altar.

Eternal Father, wash me from my sins in the Blood of Jesus.

Eternal Son, fill me with the fire of Thy Heart.

Eternal Spirit, make me glad with the sweetness of the Soul of Jesus.

O Blessed Trinity, wash my soul in the wine of Heaven, that, being cleansed by the Blood of Jesus from all sin, I may live in newness of life.

O Jesus, Thy Blood is the holy mystery of the Church. I come with love and confidence and much fear to drink it at Thy Table. May it be to me a pledge that I shall one day, by Thy goodness, drink with Thee the new wine in Thy Father’s kingdom.

O Eternal Father, crush all the powers of evil under my feet. Let me walk upon the asp and the basilisk; let me trample under foot the lion and the dragon by the Blood of Thy Son.

O Eternal Son, pour into my soul abundant gifts of grace. Thou didst die for me on the Cross. There Thou didst merit for me the treasures of grace which now Thou givest. Thou didst give me Thyself in shedding of Blood and in dimness of death. Now Thou givest me Thyself in outpouring of gladness and in Thy deathless life. Thou wast dead, and art alive for ever.

O Eternal Spirit, hide me more and more with God. and let there be in me more and more of the mind of Jesus. Touch the lips of my soul and give me a taste for this Bread of God, that I may know the graciousness of my Jesus, and the sweetness of His Blood. The love of God is shed abroad in my heart, for Thou, O Holy Ghost, art given to me. O, lift me up, dear Spirit, from the dust. O, bring me in Thine own good time to the pavement of pure gold as clear as crystal. Fill my soul with Thy dew; fill it with Thy fire. There is no dew like Thine; and there is no fire like Thine. They mingle together in the fruitfulness of the garden of the Spouse. They mingle with the Blood of Jesus, and with the water from His side. O fire of the Holy Ghost, gentle and sweet as dew. O dew of the Holy Ghost, piercing and cleansing as fire. O Holy Ghost, whom I love, lift Thy little one to Thy uncreated Heart.

O Blessed Trinity, show me the hidden things of the Blood of Jesus, the holy mystery of Thy Church. O Blessed Trinity: O Blessed Trinity: O Blessed Trinity.

XXXI

About the Blood of Jesus taken in the third way, that is, as it is spiritually drunk by the faithful

C. We have thought, in the last two Meditations, of the Blood of Jesus as it is drunk in the Holy Sacrament; now we consider it as spiritually drunk, apart from the Altar, by the saved. Speaking of the fathers of Israel, St. Augustin says, ‘They drank the same spiritual draught as we, though the bodily draught was different; for the water which flowed from the rock was a sign of the Blood of Christ, which we also spiritually drink.’ Now in this third way three things have to be considered here: (1) the place where this drink is found; (2) the end for which it is sought; (3) the sweetness of grace which comes from its use.

(1) To those who ask where this spiritual draught is found, we must say that there are as many places as there are Wounds of Jesus. As the Jews drank the water from the clefts of the rock, so the faithful drink the Blood of Jesus spiritually from His Wounds. With joy they draw the water of life from the smitten Rock, that is, from those Wounds of Jesus, which are ever-springing fountains. By loving thoughts about His Passion, they destroy in their souls all thirst for evil. But what is that wound in His side and in His Heart? That wound is there that His sons and daughters may rise up at His side. When the sharpness of the lance pierced the side of Jesus on the Cross there streamed forth the Blood of Redemption. His sons will ever come to Him from afar, because the elect will love Him and do penance for their sins. His daughters will rise up at His side, because devout souls will always drink the Blood of Jesus in a spiritual way by thinking lovingly of

His Passion. Hence, in many places, there is painted on the right hand of the crucifix a crowned maiden, fair and glad-looking. She is reverently receiving the Blood of Jesus in the chalice. This is the Church. On the left is a maiden with head bowed down. Her eyes are bandaged with a cloth, and her crown is falling from her head. With contempt she is spilling the Blood. This is the Synagogue. She, like every soul that sins mortally, loses three great blessings of God, that is, the light of grace, the joy of the conscience, the crown of everlasting glory. The maiden on the right receives the Blood of Jesus in the chalice, because the faithful soul fastens itself with a clean heart to the Wounds of its Spouse, and drinks in His Blood spiritually with its uttermost devotion and love. Thus it gains a great light, that is, gladness in the heart here, and the crown of everlasting bliss hereafter.

(2) What is the profit for which we seek the Blood of Jesus? That Blood must be poured over the whole soul with its three powers, the understanding, the will, and the memory: or it must be drunk by all the powers of the soul. The door-posts and the lintel were sprinkled with the blood of the Paschal lamb. They sprinkled them with a bunch of hyssop. Now the hyssop signifies the perfection and integrity of the Faith; and the threshold of the house is Jesus, by whom we have an entrance to Heaven. To dip the bunch of hyssop in the blood of the threshold is by a pure faith to drink the Blood of Jesus, and to gain strength from it. But we must sprinkle not only the posts of the door, but the lintel also, that is, we must so steep the understanding, the affections, and the memory in the Blood of Jesus, and be so spiritually inebriated with it, that the understanding may clearly see the greatness of its might in the whole race of man; that the affections, aflame with love, may taste and see the greatness of its goodness in themselves; and that the memory may never forget, but always hold fast, the Sacrament of a love and a bounty so great as are this love and bountifulness of our Lord.

(3) What is the sweetness of the spirit and of grace which comes from the use or sprinkling of our Lord’s Blood? His Blood, by the sweetness of its grace, makes the soul, as it were, a Paradise of God. By it come to us grace and peace, as St. Peter says. By it, therefore, we have grace and all virtues, fruitfulness of soul, peace, gentleness of heart, and tranquillity. Thus the soul, watered by the Blood of Jesus, is likened to a Paradise of God, and its grace is like a Paradise in blessings. It is a garden, and a watered garden of

God, with all kinds of delightful fruits. Being drenched in the sweetness of the Precious Blood, the soul has a threefold glory of grace. For, 1, in virtues there are lovely flowers; 2, in words there are leafy branches; 3, in works there are fruits of the ripeness of Heaven.

1. From the spiritual pouring forth of this Divine Blood there spring up in the soul, as in God's Paradise, many very lovely flowers. The blood of man has three colours: when healthy, it is red; when much changed, as in milk, it is white; and when still more changed, it is blackish. So the spiritual might of our Lord's Blood makes in the soul many-coloured flowers of virtues, as in a garden of God: a, roses of love; b, lilies of chastity; c, violets of humility.

a. Scripture compares the just to spring roses; because, by the strength of their love, they have a ruddy colour like the Blood of Jesus. It is said of our Lord that His hair is like the purple of the king; and this is dyed by the blood of some animal. Now the hair of the head of Jesus is the faithful who honour Him by good lives. They are like the purple of the king, because, being drenched in the Blood of Jesus, they are ruddy as a rose by the strength of their love.

b. Scripture compares the just to lilies by the running waters; for they have the whiteness of love, and are well prepared in the heart by the sprinkling of the Precious Blood of our Lord. His eyes are said to be like the eyes of doves, washed in milk. Now His eyes are faithful souls looking onward, and waiting for Him. They are said to be washed in milk because these single-hearted ones are washed and made white and chaste in the Blood of the Lamb, well prepared in the hidden places of the heart. If Israel grow like a lily, it is because the Blood of Jesus is as dew.

c. When the winter is past the flowers are seen on the hedge-banks and in the meadows. Then quickly after the cold come violets with their dusky gleam, very beautiful, very fragrant, and hardly seen for their nearness to the earth. They tell us of humble souls that are made, as it were, of dusky hue by thinking of the Blood of Jesus and the anguish of His Passion. Such souls are vile in their own eyes, and despised by the proud. When God says that He will make the stars of Heaven grow dark, it may mean mystically that souls on fire with the Spirit of love, and gleaming with His word of truth, will be dimmed by the Passion of our Lord, so as to become violets with loveliness of dusky sheen by reason of their humility. This dimness of love and sorrow is comeliness of soul. The Bride of Jesus is black, but beautiful.

N. In the Lamentations these there kinds of flowers and their colours are spoken of. The Nazarites, that is, flowering ones, are whiter than milk and whiter than snow, for in their purity they are like lilies. They are ruddier than old ivory, for in their love they are like roses. They are lovelier than sapphires, for in their humility they are like violets.

2. From spiritual overpouring, or from the draught of Blood, there open out in the soul, as in a garden of God, leafy branches of holy words and sweet discourses. We have to flourish with flowers, and our branches have to grow in grace, because the elect, by drinking the Blood of Jesus, bring forth not only the flowers of virtues, but the leafy branches of good words; and this for a threefold grace: a, for the conversion of sinners; b, for the reconciliation of enemies; c, for the consolation of the sorrowful. Hence these watered trees bear three kinds of leaves: a, medicinal: b, very beautiful; c, green.

a. The leaves of the tree of life in the Paradise of God are for the healing of the nations, that is, for the conversion of sinners, because the waters ever go forth from the sanctuary. Now the water of the sanctuary—the spiritual drinking of the Blood of Jesus—gives strength to the words of holy preachers for the saving of souls.

b. Daniel tells us of the tree with lovely leaves, in whose shadow lay the beasts of the field, and in whose branches the birds of the air rested. He means to say that, under those lovely leaves, animals hostile to each other—as the wolf and the lamb, the dove and the eagle—dwell in peace together; for the words of the wise reconcile enemies. The melody of pipe and psalter, making a concord of sweet sounds, is far less than the melody of the tongue which makes peace between enemies. A gracious tongue is a tongue filled with much grace.

c. The Psalmist says that he who has trust in God is like a water-side tree whose leaves are green. Now the green colour which we see in grass and leaves refreshes the weary eye and strengthens it. Hence by leaves of this kind the words of the good are signified, for they comfort the sad and the sorrowful.

3. From the spiritual overpouring and draught of the Precious Blood ripen, as in the garden of God, the fruits of good works. When God says

that He will water the garden of His plants, and water abundantly the fruits of His meadow, He means that He will water the garden of the soul with the Blood of the Spouse, and inebriate it with the sweetness of Heaven by the fruit of good works. Thus the souls that have been watered with Blood bring forth the sweet fruit of good works to the benefit of their neighbour; but they themselves also eat these fruits in the heavenly reward. They make their gardens and eat the fruit thereof.

This fruit of good works is threefold: 1, a good life; 2, great devotion; 3, joyful godliness. These three fruits will be dwelt on in the next Meditation, near the end.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About drinking the Blood of Jesus spiritually; Our fathers … all drank the same spiritual drink: and they drank of the spiritual rock that followed them, and that rock was Christ. 1 Cor. 10:1, 4.

(1) It is found in the Wounds of Jesus; He struck the rock and the waters gushed out, and the streams overflowed. Ps. 77:20.

Who are these that fly as clouds and as doves to their windows? Is. 60:8.

They shall say to Him, What are these wounds in the midst of Thy hands? And He will say, With these I was wounded in the house of them that love Me. Zach. 13:6.

The Lord is my strength and my praise, and He is become my salvation. You shall draw waters with joy out of the Saviour’s fountains. Is. 12:2, 3.

Lift up Thine eyes round about and see: all these are gathered together; they are come to Thee; Thy sons shall come from afar, and Thy daughters shall rise up at Thy side. Is. 60:4.

The crown is fallen from our head; woe to us because we have sinned. Therefore are our hearts sorrowful; therefore are our eyes dim. Lam. 5:16, 17.

(2) The profit of this Blood; Dip a bunch of hyssop in the blood that is at the door, and sprinkle the transom of the door therewith and both the door-posts. Ex. 12:22.

(3) The spiritual sweetness of this Blood; Peter, an Apostle of Jesus Christ, to the strangers dispersed … elect, according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, to sanctification of the Spirit, to obedience and sprinkling of the Blood of Jesus Christ: grace be unto you and peace be multiplied. 1 St. Pet. 1:1, 2.

Grace is like a Paradise in blessings. Ecclus. 40:17.

Their soul shall be as a watered garden. Jerem. 31:12.

The Lord will give thee rest continually, and will fill thy soul with brightness; … and thou shalt be like a watered garden, and like a fountain of water whose waters shall not fail. Is. 58:11.

1. Flowers; a. Roses of love; He shone as the flower of roses in the days of the spring. Ecclus. 1:6, 8.

Bud forth as the rose, planted by the brooks of waters. Ecclus. 39:17.

Thy head is like Carmel, and the hairs of Thy head as the purple of the king. Cantic. 7:5.

b. Lilies of chastity; He shone … as the lilies that are on the brink of the water. Ecclus. 1:6, 8.

Send forth flowers as the lily. Ecclus. 39:19.

These are they who are come out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes and made them white in the Blood of the Lamb. Apoc. 7:14.

His eyes are as doves upon brooks of waters, which are washed with milk, and sit beside the plentiful streams. Cantic. 5:12.

I will be as the dew; Israel shall spring as the lily. Osee 14:6.

c. The violets of humility; Winter is now past, and the rain is over and gone. The flowers have appeared in our land. Cantic. 2:11, 12.

I will cover the heavens … and I will make the stars thereof dark. Ezech. 32:7.

I am black, but comely, O ye daughters of Jerusalem. Cantic. 1:4.

N. All these flowers of the garden of God; Her Nazarites were whiter than snow, purer than milk, more ruddy than the old ivory, fairer than the sapphire. Lam. 4:7.

2. The leafy branches; A tree hath hope; if it be cut it groweth green again, and the boughs thereof sprout. If its root be old in the earth, and its stock be dead in the dust, at the scent of water it shall spring and bring forth leaves as when it was first planted. Job 14:7–9.

Bring forth leaves in grace. Ecclus. 39:19.

a. Medicinal leaves; In the midst of the street thereof, and on both sides of the river, was the tree of life bearing twelve fruits, yielding its fruits every month, and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. Apoc. 22:2.

The law of truth was in his mouth, and iniquity was not found in his lips; he walked with Me in peace and in equity, and turned many away from sin. Mal. 2:6.

b. Very beautiful leaves; This was the vision of my head in my bed: I saw, and behold a tree in the midst of the earth, and the height thereof was exceedingly great. The tree was great and strong, and the height thereof reached to Heaven; and the sight thereof was even to the ends of the whole earth. Its leaves were most beautiful, and its fruit very plentiful; and in it was food for all. Under it dwelt cattle and beasts, and in the branches thereof the fowls of the air had their abode; and all flesh did eat of it. Dan. 4:7–9.

The flute and the psaltery make a sweet melody; but a pleasant tongue is above them both. Ecclus. 40:21.

A sweet word multiplieth friends and appeaseth enemies, and a gracious tongue in a good man aboundeth. Ecclus. 6:5.

c. Green leaves; Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and the Lord shall be his confidence. He shall be as a tree that is planted by the waters, that spreadeth out its root towards moisture; and it shall not fear when the heat cometh; and the leaf thereof shall be green. Jerem. 17:7, 8.

They eye desireth favour and beauty; but more than these it desireth green-sown fields. Ecclus. 40:22.

Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart; and the good counsels of a friend are sweet to the soul. Prov. 27:9.

With a great spirit he (Ezechias) saw the things that are to come to pass at the last, and comforted the mourners in Sion. Ecclus. 48:27.

When I sat as a king with his army standing about him, yet I was a comforter of them that mourned. Job 29:25.

3. The fruits in the garden of God; I said, I will water my garden of plants, and I will water abundantly the fruits of my meadow: and behold my brook became a great river, and my river came near to the sea. Ecclus. 24:42, 43.

They shall plant vineyards and drink the wine of them; and they shall make gardens and eat the fruits of them. Amos 9:14.

Prayer

O Wounds of my Jesus; filling my heart with love and sorrow. Jesus, I love Thee, and I sorrow for the greatness of Thy pain. Jesus, Thou art the smitten Rock, and from Thee the water of life is ever flowing in this desert. Thy people drink and are refreshed, and lift up their heads in the redemption that is drawing nigh. O Giver of living water, let me drink at Thy fountains, for Thou art my Saviour, and I come to Thee. Thirsty with a great thirst I come to Thee, for I have learnt of Thee who Thou art, and I ask of Thee the living water of which Thou didst tell me. Let this gift of Thine be in me a well of water springing up to everlasting life. I come to Thee in this thirst of death, O Thou who once wast dead, and now art alive for evermore. I trust Thee with the most utter trust, and I long to love Thee more. Thou art worthy of all love, far more than men and Angels can give. Let me drink, O my Saviour, of the streams from Thy hands and feet; let me drink, O my God and Spouse, of the streams from Thy side. Let my soul be steeped in the Blood of Thy Passion, and in the water that flowed from Thy stricken Heart. Blind me by Thy light to the glare of the world, that I may see Thee more clearly. Let the sweetness of Thy voice so sink into my ears, that I may hear Thee always among the waterfalls of the world. Deaden my taste for all pleasant things, that I may taste Thee better, my Jesus, my Love. Then will I always have a greater hunger for the corn of the elect, which has in it all deliciousness of Heaven and earth. Then will I have always a greater thirst for the wine of virgins, the wine of the Spirit, the new wine which even here Thou givest to me, my Jesus, veiled and hidden, in this beginning of the kingdom of Thy Father. O Wounds of my Jesus: O Precious Blood of my Jesus: O Heart of my Jesus. My Lord and my Love, Thou art Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last. Now Thou art going to give me all this in the Sacrament of Thy love. Help me in my poverty and blindness and wretchedness, that I may come to Thee.

O Holy Ghost, help me to pray on this threshold of the Temple of God, according to the words of Jesus.

Prayer

O Holy Soul of my Saviour, give me more love, more faith, more hope. Give me joy and peace, humility and cleanness of heart. Make me pleasing to God in word and deed. Keep me beneath the tree of life, that I may ever feed on its fruits, and be ever healed by its leaves.

Jesus, let me love Thee and keep Thy words in my heart. Then Thy Father will love me and come to me, and make His abode with me. Thy words are not Thine, but the words of Thy Father who sent Thee. Grant that the Holy Spirit, the Paraclete, whom the Father ever sends in Thy name, may teach me all things, and bring to my mind, when I need it most, all that Thou hast said. O Jesus, give me Thy peace, for Thou dost not give as the world giveth. I cannot fear nor can my heart be troubled when I am with Thee. I rejoice greatly because Thou hast gone to the Father. O, give me grace to follow in Thy steps, that I, Thy little one, may love the Father, and may strive with all my heart and soul to keep the commandment which Thy Father has given me, and to do His work. Thou hast said Thyself, ‘I go to My Father and to your Father, to My God and your God.’ Give me grace, O King and Spouse, to listen always to Thee, and see Thy light and follow Thee whithersoever Thou goest.

XXXII

Of the threefold draught of the Blood of Jesus

The draught of the Blood of Jesus is threefold, as is plain from what has been said: (1) sacramental; (2) by way of natural concomitance; (3) spiritual.

Sacramentally the Precious Blood is received by the priest in the holy chalice under the species of wine; concomitantly it is received by all Christian people under the species of bread in the Sacred Host, from the very Body of our Lord; spiritually it is received by all the saved in loving meditation on the Passion of the Word. Taken in the first way it forgives daily sins; taken in the second way it floods the faithful soul with the delight of its own sweetness; taken in the third way it waters the faithful soul and makes it fruitful.

(1) The Blood of Jesus is received sacramentally only by priests from the chalice of the Altar. That draught taken rightly forgives our venial sins; and this for three reasons. There are three evils in venial sin: 1, a kind of stain on the conscience; 2, a kind of punishment of sadness; 3, a kind of distress because we have displeased God. Against these three evils, the Blood of Jesus, truly and properly, has power, because it is, 1, pure; 2, gentle; 3, precious. Because it is pure it washes the soul; because it is gentle it heals the soul; because it is precious it appeases God. It washes the conscience by taking away the stain on the soul. It heals the punishment of sadness by filling the hearts of the faithful with comfort. It appeases the offended justice of God by ever making intercession for us.

1. Our Lord washes His robes in wine, that is to say, He washes our souls in His own Blood. He comes from the depth of His tribulation with dyed

raiment, because in all His sorrow He loved us and washed us with Blood, making us white and clean.

2. When the Scripture says that wine gladdens the heart, we take the mystical meaning of the words, and learn how the loving heart and the faithful soul are gladdened by the Blood of Jesus. The blood of the grape is the Blood of the Lamb which we all receive from the Altar. This draught gladdens the hearts of the good, for, giving the comfort of spiritual gladness, it heals the sadness which comes from guilt.

3. The Blood of the true Abel is always pleading with God for pardon and mercy. We rose up against Him and slew Him in the field amid His flocks and herds; and He forgave His murderers and died for them, and ever liveth to make intercession for them at the throne of God.

N. Now remember that three kinds of persons are terribly rebuked in Holy Scripture as sinning grievously against the Blood of our Saviour: a, the unclean in body; b, the hardened in heart; c, the wicked stewards. The first dare to drink the Blood of Christ unworthily, for they are in mortal sin; the second refuse to be converted by the Blood of Christ; the third make gain of the Blood of Christ, and turn that gain to their own bad ends.

a. St. Paul says in effect that sinners like these try to drink the cup of the Lord and the cup of devils at the same time. The cup of devils is luxury and filth, both of the flesh and of the world. Their wine is the gall of dragons, as the prophet says. They who make themselves drunk with the filthiness of this muddy drink, and then pour upon it the most Precious Blood of God, defile Him so far as they can, and, being guilty of a fearful sin, deserve a fearful punishment. They who do this do commit three sins, according to St. Paul: (a) they tread the Son of God under foot; (b) they count the Blood of the testament and unholy thing; (c) they insult, and so blaspheme, the Holy Ghost.

b. There are some so hardened in sin, so obstinate in malice, that their hearts are harder than rock, nay, harder than flinty adamant. Though this cannot be broken by any other thing, yet it may be cleft by the blood of a goat. Far harder are these souls, which will not be softened and will not be turned from evil by the power of our Lord’s Blood. Truly they are harder than rock, however hard it may be; for at the voice of Jesus on the Cross and the shedding of His Blood, the earth trembled and the rocks were rent. But these souls neither listen to the voice of the preacher when he speaks of the terrors of God, nor will they be softened and turned from sin by the justifying Blood of Him who died for them.

c. The prophet denounces woe on those who build their houses in injustice and paint them with vermilion, that is, with the redness of the Precious Blood. He who builds up a house with wicked gains, or adorns it superfluously with the Blood of Christ, that is, with goods of the Church which have been bought with our Lord’s Blood, sins mortally. But far more fearful is his sin who builds up a spiritual house, that is, a bad family unjustly, or adorns it with the Blood of Christ; for then there are bad women, sons, and daughters, as parts of the house. They are as windows by which the devil and his thieves enter; and as beams, which are the devil’s traps. Woe is denounced against these, that is, a heavy rebuke, and threats of the punishment of hell.

(2) The next draught of this Blood is by way of natural concomitance, being received under the species of bread from the very Body of our Saviour. For under the species of bread, when consecrated, there is the Body of Christ by transubstantiation, and with it is His Blood by annexion. So under the species of wine, when consecrated, there is the Blood of Christ by transubstantiation, and with it is His Body by annexion. Hence as the priest receives the Blood of Jesus sacramentally from the chalice, so the faithful receive it concomitantly from His very Body, when they receive the Sacred Host. Our Lord says that where the body is there will the eagles be gathered; and Job, speaking of the young of the eagle, says that they suck up blood, and that where the body is there shall she be immediately. The young of the eagle are the faithful who obey the Church. They drink the Blood of Jesus, not from the chalice, but from His very Body itself. This draught delights the faithful soul with its own sweetness. (It is the same to that soul in every way as if it were drunk from the chalice. The only difference is in the manner of giving; and this, as we have seen, is done, for one reason out of others, to guard the true doctrine of transubstantiation.) Unspeakably sweet is this Blood of Jesus. It is like honey from the rock. We have already seen how we drink in the Holy Ghost from the Body of our Lord; and in like manner from His Body we drink His Blood. The incorruptible Body of Jesus is the rock. The honey signifies the sweetness of His Blood. This the faithful drink from His Body. From those fountains of salvation, His Five Wounds, they drink it with joy. The deliciousness of

this drink does three things in the soul; it gives the soul: 1, a contempt for all vices; 2, graciousness of words; 3, a longing for God.

1. If your souls are steeped in the sweetness of the Blood of the Spouse they will utterly despise and loathe every attractiveness of the pleasures of sin. The fig-tree in the parable said, Can I leave my sweetness and be set over the other trees? This tree represents the loving soul, which tastes the goodness of God. That soul says, ‘I utterly despise all the glory of the world and all the delights of the world for the beauty and the sweetness of my God.’

2. When Jesus says that the lips of His spouse are as a dropping honeycomb He means that she abounds in profitable and pleasant words, because her heart is full of the sweetness of the Spirit. For He tells us in another place that a good man from the good treasure of his heart brings forth good words, the mouth speaking out of the abundance of the heart. A bowl filled with gall gives forth bitterness, whereas if it be filled with honey it gives forth sweetness.

3. St. Gregory says, ‘In bodily things appetite gives delight, and when we enjoy them their pleasure palls. But the more that the goodness of the Spirit is drunk the more we thirst for it. Drop by drop from a full fountain that sweetness flows gently into the clean of heart, and they taste what it is; so that the more they drink of its fulness the more they desire it.’ The comparison that comes to the mind of David, when he wishes to set forth the longing of his soul for God, is a hart panting for the brooks of water. (The more that we know what God is in His ‘uncreated beauty, ever ancient and ever new;’ the more that we understand what creatures are at their best, and still more what they are at their worst; and the more that we see ourselves in the light of the Spirit, the greater will be our thirst for God, and our longing for Him who inhabiteth eternity and yet dwelleth in a contrite soul.)

(3) The third draught of the Blood of Jesus is spiritual. In this way it is drunk by all the saved in devout meditation on the Passion. As the ancient fathers drank water from the clefts of the rock, and believed that in those streams was typified the Blood of the Passion, and tasted it by spiritual faith; so by devout meditation good Christians ever drink the Blood of their Saviour from His holy Wounds. This draught waters the whole soul as if it were a garden of God; and fills it with the fulness of all good fruits. God

waters His garden of plants; and faithful souls, watered with the Blood of Christ, are fruitful in good works. The fruit of these works is threefold: 1, upright lives; 2, great devotion; 3, joyful godliness. By the first a man gladdens himself; by the second he gladdens God; by the third he gladdens his neighbour.

1. We are children of the light; and St. Paul tells us that the fruits of the light are justice, truth, and all goodness. We have not even to speak of the things which the children of darkness do in secret. By a good life a man gladdens himself, planting his trees and eating of their fruits. Again, St. Paul tells us what joy it is to us that we dwell here in the simplicity and sincerity of God.

2. In the garden sealed the plants are a Paradise of pomegranates. These plants are fruits of devotion. Hence follow aromatical spices, signifying by their fragrance and virtue that devotion of the faithful which is pleasing to God. This devotion consists of holy desire, many kinds of virtues, mourning, and prayers. With these fruits the faithful soul gladdens God, and the Beloved comes into His garden and eats of the fruits of His apple-trees. Papias says, ‘Incense is a fragrant mixture for burning in the worship of God.’ This is the incense which God commanded Moses to make. St. Gregory says, ‘We make incense of aromatical spices when on the Altar of the heart we burn a great number of virtues.’ Our Lord’s delight is to be with us; because He rejoices to rest in our devotion and in our love.

3. By the fruit of godliness our neighbour is refreshed. The olive gives oil for light, for healing, and for refreshment. Thus it signifies those works of brotherly love which we do for our neighbour. When the Samaritan saw the wounded traveller, stripped of all he had, and half dead, being moved with pity, he drew near to him and bound up his wounds. Seeing his need, he gave him all the help that he could, pouring in oil and wine, as food and drink, and so took care of him. Godliness has not only promise of this life, but also of the life to come. To that life of ceaseless blessedness may He bring us who is blessed for ever and ever.

The Voice of the Holy Ghost

About the threefold draught; My Blood is drink indeed. St. John 6:56.

Thou hast visited the earth and hast plentifully watered it; Thou hast many ways enriched it. The river of God is filled with water: … fill up plentifully the streams thereof; multiply its fruits; it shall spring up and rejoice in its showers. Thou shalt bless the crown of the year of Thy goodness; and Thy fields shall be filled with plenty. The beautiful places of the wilderness shall grow fat; and the hills shall be girded about with joy. Ps. 64:10–13.

(1) The sacramental draught of our Lord’s Blood; Taking the chalice He gave thanks, and gave to them, saying, Drink ye all of this; for this is My Blood of the new testament. St. Matt. 26:27, 28.

1. It cleanses; How much more shall the Blood of Christ, who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted to God, cleanse our conscience from dead works to serve the living God? Heb. 9:14.

He shall wash His robe in wine and His garment in the blood of the grape. Gen. 49:11.

2. It heals; Their heart shall rejoice as through wine; and their children shall see and shall rejoice; and their heart shall be joyful in the Lord. Zach. 10:7.

My chalice which inebriateth, how goodly it is. Ps. 22:5.

3. It appeases God; You have come … to Jesus the Mediator of the new testament, and to the sprinkling of Blood which speaketh better than that of Abel. Heb. 12:22, 24.

Who is He that shall condemn? Christ Jesus that died; yea, that is risen again, who is at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us. Rom. 8:34.

For that He continueth for ever He hath an everlasting priesthood, whereby He is also able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us. Heb. 7:25.

N. Three great sins; a. Unclean hearts; I would not that you should be made partakers with devils. You cannot drink the chalice of the Lord and the chalice of devils. You cannot be partakers of the table of the Lord and of the table of devils. 1 Cor. 10:20, 21.

Their vines are of the vineyard of Sodom and of the outskirts of Gomorrha; their grapes are grapes of gall, and their clusters are most bitter. Their wine is the gall of dragons and the venom of asps, which cannot be cured. Deut. 32:32, 33.

Now therefore cursed shalt thou be on the earth, which hath opened her mouth and received the blood of thy brother at thy hand. Gen. 4:11.

A man making void the law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses: how much more do you think he deserveth worse punishments who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath counted the Blood of the testament unclean by which he was sanctified, and hath offered an affront to the Spirit of grace? Heb. 10:28, 29.

b. Hardened hearts; O Lord, Thine eyes are upon truth: Thou hast struck them, and they have not grieved: Thou hast bruised them, and they have refused to receive correction: they have made their faces harder than the rock, and have refused to return. Jerem. 5:3.

c. Wicked stewards; Woe to him that buildeth up his house by injustice, and his chambers not in judgment; that will oppress his friend without cause, and will not pay him his wages: who saith, I will build me a wide house and large chambers; who openeth to himself windows and maketh roofs of cedar, and painteth them with vermilion. Jerem. 22:13, 14.

(2) Receiving the Blood of Jesus with His Body; She (the eagle) abideth among the rocks.… From thence she looketh for the prey, and her eyes behold afar off. Her young ones shall suck up blood, and wheresoever the body shall be she is immediately there. Job 39:28–30.

They answering say to Him, Where, Lord? And He said to them, Wheresoever the body shall be, thither also will the eagles be gathered together. St. Luke 17:36, 37.

A cluster of cyprus my Love is to me. Cantic. 1:13.

He filled them with honey out of the rock. Ps. 80:17.

1. Contempt of sins; A soul that is full shall tread on the honeycomb. Prov. 27:7.

The trees said to the fig-tree, Come thou and reign over us. And it answered them, Can I leave my sweetness and my delicious fruits, and go to be promoted among the other trees? Judges 9:10, 11.

2. The grace of good words; Thy lips, My spouse, are as a dropping honeycomb: honey and milk are under thy tongue. Cantic. 4:11.

Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of a good treasure bringeth forth good things. St. Matt. 12:34, 35.

3. Longing for God; They that eat Me shall yet hunger; and they that drink Me shall yet thirst. Ecclus. 24:29.

It shall spring up and rejoice in its showers. Ps. 64:11.

As the hart panteth after the fountains of water, so my soul longeth after Thee, O God. My soul is athirst for the strong living God: when shall I come and appear before the face of God? Ps. 41:2, 3.

(3) The spiritual draught of the Blood of Jesus; I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that our fathers … all drank the same spiritual drink: and they drank of the spiritual rock that followed them, and the rock was Christ. 1 Cor. 10:1, 4.

I will water My garden of plants; and I will water abundantly the fruits of My meadow. Ecclus. 24:42.

We also … cease not to pray for you … that you may walk worthy of God in all things pleasing, being fruitful in every good work. Col. 1:9, 10.

In that day there shall be singing to the vineyard of pure wine. I am the Lord that keep it; I will suddenly give it drink; lest any hurt come to it, I keep it night and day. Is. 27:2, 3.

1. Good lives; As the vine I have brought forth a pleasant odour, and my flowers are the fruit of honour and riches. I am the mother of fair love and of fear and of knowledge and of holy hope. In me is all grace of the way and of the truth, and in me is all hope of life and of virtue. Come over to me, all ye that desire me, and be filled with my fruits. Ecclus. 24:23–26.

The fruit of the light is in all justice and goodness and truth; proving what is well pleasing to God: and have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness, but rather reprove them; for the things that are done by them in secret it is a shame even to speak of. But all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light, for all that maketh manifest is light. Wherefore He says, Rise, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall enlighten thee. See, brethren, how you walk watchfully; not as unwise, but as wise; redeeming the time because the days are evil. Wherefore become not unwise, but understanding what is the will of God. And be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury, but be ye filled with the Holy Spirit, speaking to yourselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles, singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord; giving thanks always for all things, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, to God and the Father. Eph. 5:9–20.

By their fruits you shall know them. Do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and every evil tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down and shall be cast into the fire. Wherefore by their fruits you shall know them. St. Matt. 7:16–20.

He that keepeth the fig-tree shall eat the fruit thereof. Prov. 27:18.

Say to the just man that it is well, for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Is. 3:10.

A secure mind is like a continual feast. Prov. 15:15.

Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience, that in simplicity of heart and sincerity of God, and not in carnal wisdom, but in the grace of God, we have conversed in this world. 2 Cor. 1:12.

2. Holy devotion; He struck the rock in the wilderness, and gave them to drink as out of the great deep.… They ate and were satisfied exceedingly; and He gave them their desire. Ps. 77:15, 29.

The smell of thy garments is as the smell of frankincense.… My sister, My Spouse is a garden enclosed; a garden enclosed and a fountain sealed. Thy plants are a Paradise of pomegranates with the fruits of the orchard: cyprus with spikenard; spikenard and saffron; sweet cane and cinnamon, with all the trees of Libanus; myrrh and aloes, with all the chief perfumes: the fountain of gardens, the well of living waters which run with a strong stream from Libanus. Arise, O north wind, and come, O south wind; blow through My garden, and let the aromatical spices thereof flow forth. Cantic. 4:11–16.

Let my Beloved come into His garden and eat the fruit of His apple-trees. I am come into My garden, O my sister, My Spouse; I have gathered My myrrh, with My aromatical spices. I have eaten the honeycomb with My honey; I have drunk My wine with My milk; eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated, O dearly beloved.

I sleep, but my heart is watching; it is the voice of my Beloved knocking: Open to Me, My sister, My love, My dove, My undefiled; for My head is full of dew and My locks of the drops of the nights.… I adjure you, O ye daughters of Jerusalem, if you find my Beloved, that you tell Him that I languish with love. Cantic. 5:1, 2, 8.

I will take hold of Thee and bring Thee into my mother’s house: there Thou shalt teach me, and I will give Thee a cup of spiced wine, and new wine of my pomegranates.… Who is this that cometh up from the desert, flowing with delights, leaning on her Beloved?.… Thou that dwellest in the gardens, the friends hearken; make me hear Thy voice. Cantic. 8:2, 5, 13.

The Lord said unto Moses, Take unto thee spices, stacte and onycha, galbanum of sweet savour and the clearest frankincense. All shall be of one weight. And thou shalt make incense compounded by the work of the perfumer, well mixed together, and pure, and most worthy of sanctification. And when thou hast beaten all into very small powder, thou shalt set of it before the tabernacle of the testimony, in the place where I will appear to thee. Most holy shall this incense be to you. You shall not make such a composition for your own uses, because it is holy to the Lord. Ex. 30:34–37.

My delights were to be with the children of men. Now, therefore, ye children, hear Me: Blessed are they that keep My ways. Prov. 8:31, 32.

3. Love of our neighbour; I, as a fruitful olive-tree in the house of God, have hoped in the mercy of God for ever. Ps. 51:10.

There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just. Prov. 21:20.

Exercise thyself unto godliness; for bodily exercise is profitable to little: but godliness is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come. 1 St. Tim. 4:7, 8.

Jesus answering said, A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho and fell among robbers, who also stripped him, and having wounded him went away, leaving him half dead. And it chanced that a certain priest went down the same way; and seeing him passed by. In like manner also a Levite, when he was near the place and saw him, passed by. But a certain Samaritan, being on his journey, came near him; and seeing him was moved with compassion. And going up to him bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine; and setting him on his own beast brought him to an inn and took care of him. And the next day he took out two pence and gave to the host, and said, Take care of him; and whatsoever thou shalt spend over and above, I at my return will repay thee. Which of these three, in thy opinion, was neighbour to him that fell among the robbers? But he said, He that showed mercy to him. And Jesus said to him, Go, and do thou in like manner. St. Luke 10:30–37.

Prayer

O my Beloved, I come into Thy garden to eat of the fruit of Thy apple-trees. Even the leaves are for my healing. Thou, my Jesus, art the fruit of life, bringing to my soul the deliciousness of the Spirit. Jesus, be to me all in all: and let the world with all that is in it be to me nothing. O my Beloved, I come into my mother's house to drink the new wine of Thy Father and the water ever flowing from the rock. Thy Body and Blood, O Incarnate Word, are the food for which I long with all the longing of my soul. Let me dwell here, under Thy shadow, O Thou whom my soul loveth, that Thy fruit may be very sweet to my taste. I taste Thy sweetness and know what Thou art, by the Holy Spirit whom Thou hast given me. Thou ever lovest Thy Eternal Spirit with an infinite love, for He is God as Thou art God: and He ever proceeds from Thy Father and from Thee, as an uncreated Bond of love. Thou ever lovest that Blessed Spirit, the sanctifier, with all the love of Thy Soul; for no soul, my Jesus, has been sanctified and filled by Him as Thy Soul has been sanctified, and as it is filled now with His light and love. The love of God is shed abroad in Thy Heart by the Holy Ghost who is given to Thee. Thou didst send Him to us and give Him to us. The Father sent Him to us in Thy name. In Thy Soul, Incarnate Word, more than in all souls, He pours forth the love of God with an overflowing stream. That love is like the deeps of the great sea. Thou art God over all, blessed for evermore, dwelling in the inaccessible light, the Only-begotten Son of the Father; and Thou art man, the Son of Mary, made of the dust as we are made of the dust. Thou art our Elder Brother and our God. As we are of flesh and blood, Thou in Thy love didst assume our nature to a personal union with Thyself. O Jesus, Word of God, only Son of the Father, second Person of the adorable Trinity, Thou wast made flesh and dwelt among us. Thou dwellest with us now in this sweetness of the corn and wine of Heaven. Thou art ever in the Tabernacle with Thy Body and Blood and Soul and Godhead. O my Brother, Thou didst die for me. For me Thou didst give Thyself in uttermost anguish on the Cross. Now Thou livest for me in the gladness of Thy Heart, in this mystery of the harvest and vintage of grace. Thou art coming to me in Holy Communion. Give me some little drops from the sea of the love of God, which is ever in Thy Soul. It is unfathomable and boundless. It is now flowing round His footstool with ceaseless tide, ever bathing His feet with ripples of sweetness, ever lying unruffled in His light. Give me, crowned Jesus, all the love and light and sweetness of grace that I can hold in my soul. Now in my hunger I come to Thee at Thy Table for Thy Holy Body; and in my thirst I come to Thee, the spiritual Rock, for Thy Precious Blood.

Thanksgiving

O Holy Ghost, Lord of life, Giver of life, Love of the Father and the Son, Thou ever spreadest a table for me in the desert. Thou ever leadest me to Him who is the Master of the house in which the heavenly banquet is always spread. Thou dost lead me to the abundance of wheat; and He is the Lord of the harvest. Thou dost lead me to the abundance of wine; and He is the Gleaner of the vintage. Thy light is ever falling on the vineyards of the Blood of Jesus, and on the cornfields of His Heart. In the white glory of His Godhead and in the ruddiness of His Passion He comes to me in the Sacred Host. Then I feed on Him, the Bread of God. Then I drink His Blood, the Blood of the Victim of eternity, the Lamb for ever slain. I call to mind, O Spirit of truth, the words that Thou hast spoken about Him. I feel the preciousness of those words and the greatness of their comfort. Now indeed I have a Tabernacle for a shadow in the daytime from the heat, and for a place of refuge and a covert from the whirlwind and rain. Now a Man is to me a hiding-place from the storm and a covert from the tempest. The Man Christ Jesus is to me rivers of water in a dry place, and the shadow of a great rock in a desert land. I eat the Bread of Life with thankfulness of heart; and I drink of the brook in the way and lift up my head. For this I bless Thee and praise Thee, as I bless and praise Jesus and His Father. I thank Thee, Eternal Spirit, whose servant I am, for all Thy gifts, and I implore Thee, O Spirit of kindness, to fill me with the spirit of thankfulness and adoration and praise. It seems to me sometimes in the shadow of the Tabernacle as if even here in Kedar there were no more death nor sorrow nor crying nor any more pain: as if even here, amid all weakness and darkness, Thy strength and light were revealed and seen; and as if even in this old world of sin all things were made new. For here the Lamb in the midst of the throne feeds me. Here my loving Jesus, signed with wounds and wearing His many crowns, leads me to the fountains of living water. Here God with His own Fatherly hands wipes away tears from my eyes. O Blessed Spirit, O gracious Comforter, O Paraclete of God, give me day by day a deeper spirit of adoration, and a brighter spirit of love when I receive Jesus at the Altar. By Thee I will ever fly to His Wounds. By Thee I will be ever bathed in His Blood. By Thee I will be ever hidden in His Heart. O Heart of Jesus; O Pearl of great price. O Spirit of the Father and the Son, fill my heart with gladness for all that I have. By Thee I will sing joyfully to God all the days of my life. By Thee I will serve Him with gladness. By Thee I will always come into the presence of Jesus in the Tabernacle, and rejoice before Him with exceedingly great joy. By Thee I will go through the doors of His house with praise; and enter His courts with a hymn of melody in my heart. By Thee I will give glory to Him in the Tabernacle, and praise His name as He dwells on the Altar. His truth is the changeless word of God: and He, the Lord of all, is very sweet, and His mercy endureth for ever, yea, for ever and ever.

Glory be to Jesus in the Sacrament of His Heart.

Glory be to Jesus in the Sacrament of His Blood.

Glory be to Jesus in the Sacrament of His Five Wounds.

Glory be to the Holy Ghost, who overshadowed the Mother of God.

Glory be to the Holy Ghost, by whom the Word was made flesh.

Glory be to the Holy Ghost, by whom Jesus offered Himself without spot to God.

Glory be to the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete, whom the Word Incarnate sent.

Glory be to the Holy Ghost, whom the Father sent in the name of Jesus.

Glory be to the Holy Ghost, who loved us and came to us at Pentecost.

Glory be to the Holy Ghost, by whom we say, ‘Jesus.’

Glory be to the Eternal Father, who loved us and gave us His Son and His Spirit.

Glory be to the Eternal Father, who comes to us and dwells in us.

Glory be to the Eternal Father, to whom we have access, by Jesus, in One Spirit.

THE PERFECTION OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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THE PERFECTION OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

PROLOGUE

In Which Is Set Forth the Author’s Intention

In Undertaking this Work

As certain persons, who know nothing about perfection, have nevertheless presumed to publish follies concerning this state, it is our purpose to draw up a treatise on perfection, explaining what is meant by the term; how perfection is acquired; what is the state of perfection; and what are the employments befitting those who embrace this state.

CHAPTER I

That the Perfection of the Spiritual Life Is to Be Understood Absolutely (simpliciter) According to Charity

AT the outset of our work we must bear in mind that the word “perfect” is used in several senses. A thing may be absolutely perfect (simpliciter), or it may be perfect relatively (secundum quid). That which is perfect absolutely attains the end to which, according to its own nature, it is adapted. That which is relatively perfect is that which attains to the perfection of one of those qualities which are concomitant to ita own nature. Thus, an animal is said to be perfect absolutely when it attains to its end in so far as to lack nothing necessary to the integrity of animal life, when, for instance, it possesses the requisite number and the proper disposition of its limbs, and the faculties necessary for performing the operations of animal life. An animal is, on the other hand, perfect relatively, if it be perfect in any attribute concomitant to its nature, its colour, for instance, its odour, etc.

In the spiritual life a man may be called perfect absolutely, i.e. perfect in that wherein the spiritual life principally consists. He may, also, be perfect relatively, i.e. perfect in some quality which is a condition of the spiritual life. Now, the spiritual life consists, principally, in charity. For he that is without charity is spiritually nought. Hence St. Paul says (1 Cor. xiii. 2), “If I should have all prophecy, and should know all mysteries and all knowledge; and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity I am nothing.” And the blessed apostle John declares, that the whole spiritual life consists in love, saying, “We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. He that does not love abides in death” (1 John iii. 14). Therefore, he that is perfect in charity is said to be perfect in the spiritual life absolutely. But he that is perfect relatively is perfect in something incidental to the spiritual life This is evident from the words of Holy Scripture.

St. Paul considers charity as the chief element in perfection. He enumerates several virtues, such as mercy, benignity, and humility, and then concludes by saying, “But above all these things, have charity which is the bond of perfection” (Col iii). Some men are also said to be perfect in point of understanding, “In malice be children and in sense be perfect,” writes St. Paul to the Corinthians (1 Epist. xiv. 20). Elsewhere in the same epistle, he bids them “be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (1 Cor. i. 10); although, as has been said, a man who has perfect knowledge, without charity, must be judged to be nothing. Thus also, a man may be said to be perfect in patience which “performs a perfect work,” as St. James says, perfect also in other virtues. There is nothing surprising in this manner of speaking, for persons may be perfect in their vices. Thus we may talk of a man being “a perfect thief” or “a perfect robber.” Indeed, this mode of expression is used in Holy Scripture, for Isaias says, “ his heart (i.e. the heart of the fool) will work iniquity to perfect hypocrisy” (xxxii. 6).

CHAPTER II

Perfection Is Understood to Mean Both the Love of God, and the Love of Our Neighbour

THE perfection of the spiritual life may be understood as signifying principally perfection, as it regards charity. Now there are two precepts of charity, one pertaining to the love of God; the other referring to the love of our neighbour. These two precepts bear a certain order to each other, proportioned to the order of charity. That which is chiefly to be loved, by charity, is the Supreme Good, which makes us happy, that is to say, God. In the next place, we are, by charity, to love our neighbour, who is, by certain social bonds, united to us, either by the anticipation of beatitude, or in the enjoyment of it. Hence, we are bound in charity to love our neighbour, in order that, together with him, we may arrive at beatitude.

Our Lord establishes this order of charity in the Gospel of St. Matthew (xxii. 37), where He says, “Love the Lord your God with your whole heart and your whole soul and your whole mind. This is the first and greatest commandment; and the second is like to this: love your neighbour as yourself.” Thus, the perfection of the spiritual life consists, primarily and principally, in the love of God. Hence the Lord, speaking to Abraham, says, “I am the Almighty God; walk before me and be perfect” (Gen. xvii. 1). We walk before God, not with bodily footsteps, but with the affections of the mind. The perfection of the spiritual life consists, secondarily, in the love of our neighbour. Therefore when our Lord had said, “Love your enemies “ (Matt. v. 44), and had added several other precepts regarding charity to our neighbour, He concluded by saying, “Be therefore perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”

CHAPTER III

The Perfection of Divine Love Which Exists in God Alone

IN each of the two divisions of charity there are many degrees. As regards the love of God, the first and supreme degree of perfection of Divine love belongs to God alone. This is the case on account both of the One who is loved, and of the one who loves. It is the case on account of the loved one, because every object is loved in proportion to the qualities which make it lovable. It is the case on account of the lover, because an object is loved in proportion to the whole capacity of the one who loves. Now, as every object is lovable in proportion to its goodness, the goodness of God, which is infinite, must be infinitely lovable. But no creature can love infinitely, because no finite power is able to elicit an infinite act. Therefore, God alone, whose power of loving equals His Goodness, can love Himself perfectly in the first degree of perfection.

CHAPTER IV

The Perfection of Divine Love Which Exists in Those Who Have Attained to Beatitude

THE only mode of loving God perfectly which is possible to rational creatures, is the mode which belongs to him that loves. In this manner a rational creature loves God with all the completeness of his nature. This is made clear in the precept of Divine love. We read in Deuteronomy (vi. 5), “Love the Lord your God with your whole heart, and with your whole soul and with all your strength.” St. Luke (x. 27) adds, “and with all your mind”; as if the “heart” regulated the intention, the “mind” the thought, the “soul” the affections, and the “strength” the activities. For all these must be devoted to the love of God. We must remember that this precept may be fulfilled in a two-fold manner. When anything is perfect, nothing is wanting to it. Hence, when the love of God is complete and perfect, He is loved with the whole heart, and soul, and strength; so that there is nothing within us which is not actually turned to God.

This perfect mode of love is not possible to those who are on the way to Heaven, but only to those who have reached their goal. Hence, St. Paul writing to the Philippians says (chap. iii. 12), “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend.” He writes as if he were hoping for perfection when he should have reached his goal, and when he should have received the palm of the blessed. But St. Paul does not use the word “attaining” in the sense of entire possession or perfect comprehension, for God in this sense is incomprehensible to every creature. By “attaining” he means reaching the end which he has been following and seeking. In Heaven, the understanding and the will of every rational creature is turned to God; since it is in the fruition of the Godhead that the beatitude of Heaven consists. For beatitude exists not in habit, but in act. And, since the rational creature will in Heaven cleave to God, the Supreme Truth, as to its last End, all its activities will, by intention, likewise be directed to that Last End, and will all be disposed towards the attainment of that End. Consequently, in that perfection of happiness, the rational creature will love God with its whole heart; since its whole intention in all its thoughts, deeds, and affections, will be wholly directed to Him. It will love God with its whole mind, for its mind will be ever actually fixed on Him, beholding Him, and seeing all things in Him, and judging of all things according to His truth. It will love God with its whole soul, for all its affection will be uninterruptedly fixed on Him, and for His sake it will love all things. It will love God with all its strength, since His love will be the motive governing all its exterior acts. This, then, is the second mode of perfect love, and this love is the portion only of the blessed.

CHAPTER V

The Perfection of Divine Love Which is Necessary to Salvation

THERE is another way in which we love God with our whole heart and soul and strength. We so love Him, if there be nothing in us which is wanting to divine love, that is to say, if there is nothing which we do not, actually or habitually, refer to God. We are given a precept concerning this form of Divine love.

First, we are taught to refer everything to God as to our End by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. x. 31), “Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God.” We fulfil this precept when we order our life to the service of God; and when, in consequence, all our actions are, virtually, directed to Him, save those that are sinful, and which, therefore, withdraw us from Him. While we act thus, we love God with our whole heart.

Secondly, we love God with our whole mind, when we subject our understanding to Him, believing what has been divinely transmitted to us, according to the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. x. 5), “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.”

Thirdly, we love God with our whole soul, when all that we love is loved in God, and when we refer all our affections to the love of Him. St. Paul expresses this love in the following words: “For whether we be transported in mind it is to God, or whether we be sober, it is for you; for the charity of Christ presses us” (2 Cor. v. 13).

Fourthly, we love God with our whole strength, when all our words and works are established in divine charity according to the precept of St. Paul, “Let all your things be done in charity” (1 Cor. xvi. 14). This, then, is the third degree of perfection of divine love, to which all are bound of necessity and by precept. But the second degree is not possible in this life, save to one who, like Our Lord Jesus Christ, is, at the same time, both travelling on the road to Heaven, and enjoying the happiness of the Blessed.”

CHAPTER VI

The Perfection of Divine Love Which is A Matter of Counsel

WHEN St. Paul had said to the Philippians, “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect,” he continued, “but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend.” Shortly afterwards he added, “Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded.” From these words it is plain that, although the perfection of the blessed is not possible to us in this life, we ought, nevertheless, to endeavour, as far as we can, to emulate it. Now, it is in this effort that consists the perfection in this life, to which we are invited by the counsels.

It is abundantly clear, that the human heart is more intensely attracted to one object, in proportion as it is withdrawn from a multiplicity of desires. Therefore, the more a man is delivered from solicitude concerning temporal matters, the more perfectly he will be enabled to love God. Hence St. Augustine says (De Diversis Quaestionibus Octaginta Tribus, Lib. lxxxiii. Quest.1) that, the hope of gaining, or keeping, material wealth, is the poison of charity; that, as charity increases, cupidity diminishes; and that, when charity becomes perfect, cupidity ceases to exist. Hence, all the counsels which call man to perfection tend to withdraw his affections from temporal objects; so that, his sour is enabled the more freely to turn to God by contemplating Him, loving Him, and fulfilling His will.

CHAPTER VII

The First Means of Perfection, Viz.: the Renunciation of Earthly Possessions

THE first among the material possessions to be renounced are those extrinsic goods that we call riches. Our Lord counselled us to relinquish them when He said, “If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in Heaven; and come, follow me” (Matt. xix. 21). The utility of this counsel is evident. First, we have the evidence of a fact. For, when the young man who was inquiring about perfection heard the words of Christ, he went away sad. And “Behold,” says St. Jerome in his commentary on St. Matthew, “the cause of this sadness. He had many possessions, which, like thorns and briars, choked the seed of the Lord’s words.” St. Chrysostom, writing on the same passage, says that, “they who possess but little, and they that abound in riches, do not encounter the same obstacles; for the renunciation of wealth enkindles a more mighty fire and causes avarice to grow greater.” St. Augustine likewise says, in his epistle to Paulinus and Therasia, that “when earthly things are inordinately loved, those that we already possess fetter us more closely than those that we desire; for why did this young man go away sad, save because he had great possessions? For, it is one thing not to be anxious to acquire the things that we lack, but quite another to be ready to divest ourselves of those that we possess. For the things that are not ours we can repudiate as extrinsic to ourselves, but our own possessions are dear to us as the limbs of our body.”

The utility of this counsel is again shown us by those words of our Lord, “A rich man shall hardly enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.” St. Jerome tells us the reason of this difficulty. “It is,” he says, “because it is hard to despise the riches that we possess. Our Lord does not say that it is impossible, but that it is hard, for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. For difficulty does not mean impossibility, but signifies infrequency of performance.” And, as St. Chrysostom, says on the Gospel of St. Matthew, If the Lord goes further, proving that it is impossible, “For,” He says, “it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.” “From these words,” says St. Augustine (lib. de Quest. Evang.), “the disciples understood that all they that covet riches are included in the number of the rich; otherwise, considering how small is the number of the wealthy in comparison to the vast multitude of the poor, they would not have asked, “Who then shall be saved?”

From these two utterances of Our Lord it is clearly evident, that he that possesses riches, will, with difficulty, enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. For, as He says elsewhere (Matt. xiii. 22), “The cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choke the Word, and it becomes fruitless.” In truth, it is impossible for those to enter Heaven who love money inordinately. Far easier is it for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. The latter feat would indeed be impossible without violating the laws of nature. Bit if a covetous man were admitted into Heaven it would be contrary to Divine Justice, which is more unfailing than any natural law. Hence, we see the reasonableness of Our Lord’s counsel; for a counsel is given concerning that which is most useful, according to the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. viii. 10), “Herein I give my advice, for this is profitable for you.”

If we wish to attain eternal life, it is more advantageous for us to renounce our possessions than to retain them. They that possess wealth will hardly enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; the reason being got it is difficult to prevent our affections fmm bling attached to riches, and that such an Attachment makes admission into Heaven impossible, Therefore, Our Lord, with good reason, has counselled the renunciation of riches as our most profitable course.

It may be objected, however, that St. Matthew St. Bartholomew, and Zaccheus were rich; nevertheless, they entered into Heaven. St. Jerome replies, that, “we must remember that they had ceased to be wealthy at the time of their admission to Heaven.”Abraham, however, never lost his wealth, but, as we read in Genesis, died a rich man, bequeathing his property to his sons. How then could he be perfect? Nevertheless God said to him, “Be perfect” (Gen. xvii. 1). This question cannot be answered if we hold that it is the mere renunciation of wealth which constitutes perfection. For, if such were the case, no one who was rich could be perfect. Our Lord does not say that perfection lies in giving up what we possess, but He mentions this renunciation of our possessions as a means to perfection. We see this by His own words, “If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you hast and give to the poor, and follow me.”The following of Christ constitutes perfection; the sacrifice of riches is a means to perfection.

St. Jerome, commenting on the Gospel of St. Matthew, says, “As if to show that merely giving up our possessions does not suffice to make us perfect, Peter mentions that wherein perfection consists, when he says, ‘We have followed you.’” Origen, again, says on the same passage, “We are not to gather from the words, ‘if you would be perfect’ that when a man has given his goods to the poor, he becomes perfect at once. What we are to understand is, that from that time, his contemplation of God begins to attract him to all virtues.” A rich man may be perfect if his affections be not entangled in his possessions, but devoted entirely to God. In this way Abraham was perfect. Although he possessed wealth, he was detached from it. The words of the Lord spoken to him, “Walk before me and be perfect,” make it clear, that the perfection of the Patriarch was to consist in walking before God, and in loving Him with a love so perfect that it reached to contempt of himself, and of all that belonged to him. So perfect, indeed, was his love of God, that he showed it by his readiness to slay his son. Wherefore the Lord said to him, “Because you have done this thing, and have not spared your only begotten son for my sake, I will bless you” (Gen. xxii. 16).

If anyone should still argue, that the counsel of Our Lord concerning the renunciation of possessions is futile, because Abraham, though a rich man, was perfect, we will refer him for an answer to what has been already said. Our Lord, we repeat, did not mean, by this counsel, that rich men cannot be perfect, or cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; but He meant that they cannot do so easily. The virtue of Abraham was very great; for, although possessed of great wealth, his heart was detached from riches. The virtue, likewise, of Samson was eminent, for, armed only with the jawbone of an ass, he slew many of his enemies; nevertheless the instruction which he gave to the soldier to take up arms in combat with his foes, was not unprofitable. Neither, then, is it useless to counsel those that seek perfection to part with their earthly goods, although Abraham was perfect with all his wealth.

We must not draw conclusions from wonderful deeds; for the weak among us are more capable of wondering at and praising such deeds, than of imitating them. Hence we read in Sirach xxxi. 8, “Blessed is the rich man who is found without blemish; who has not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor in treasures.” This passage proves that the rich man who does not sin by covetousness, nor by pride, must, indeed, be a man of tried virtue, with a heart adhering closely, by perfect charity, to God. St. Paul bids Timothy to “charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches”(1 Tim. vi. 17). The greater the blessedness and the virtue of the wealthy who obey this behest, the smaller is their number. Thus Sirach (xxxi) speaking of a virtuous and yet a wealthy man, says: “Who is he, and we will praise him? for he has done wonderful things in his life.” For truly, he who, while abounding in riches has not set his heart upon his treasures, has indeed done wonderful things, and without the shadow of a doubt has proved himself perfect. The same chapter of Sirach continues, “Who has been tried thereby,” that is to say, who has been tested as to whether he can live a sinless life in the midst of wealth, “and made perfect.” This is as much as to say: “such a man is indeed rare, and his virtue will merit for him eternal glory.” This test of Sirach bears out the saying of Our Lord, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.

This, then, is the first means of attaining perfection, to wit the-renunciation of riches, and the profession of poverty, from a desire of following Christ.

CHAPTER VIII

The Second Means of Perfection Which is the Renunciation, of Earthly Ties and of Matrimony

IN order the more clearly to understand this second means of perfection, we should reflect on the words of St. Augustine which occur in xii. de Trinit.: “The less a man loves his private possessions, the more closely will he cleave to God.”Hence, according to the order of the things which a man sacrifices for the love of God, will be the order of those things which will enable him to adhere perfectly to God.

The things to be first given up, are those least closely united to ourselves. Therefore, the renunciation of material possessions, which are extrinsic to. our nature, must be our first step on the road to perfection. The next objects to be sacrificed will be those which are united to our nature, by a certain communion and necessary affinity. Hence, Our Lord says, “If any man comes to me, and does not hate his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brothers, and sisters, yes, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple “(Luke xiv. 26).

But, as St. Gregory says, “It is permissible to inquire how we can be commanded to hate our parents and kinsfolk, when we are bidden to love even our enemies? If, however, we carefully consider this precept, we shall be able to obey it by means of discretion. For, when we refuse to listen to one who, savouring earthly things, suggests to us to do what is wrong, we at the same time love him and hate him. Thus we must bear this discreet hatred towards our kinsfolk, loving in them what they are in themselves, and hating them when they hinder our progress towards God. For, whosoever desires eternal life must, for the love of God, be independent of father and mother, of wife, children, and relations, yea, detached from self, in order that he may the better know God, for whose sake he loses sight of every other. For it is but too clear, that earthly affections warp the mind, and blunt its keenness."

Now amongst all relationships the conjugal tie does, more than any other, engross men's hearts. So that our first parent said (Gen. ii. 24): "A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." Hence, they who are aiming at perfection, must, above all things, avoid the bond of marriage, which, in a pre-eminent degree, entangles men in earthly concerns. This is the reason which St. Paul gives for his counsel concerning continence. "He that is without a wife, is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife" (1 Cor. vii. 32).

Therefore, the second means whereby a man may be more free to devote himself to God, and to cleave more perfectly to Him, is by the observance of perpetual chastity. But continence possesses the further advantage of affording a peculiar facility to the acquirement of perfection. For, the soul is hindered in its free access to God, not only by the love of exterior things, but much more by force of interior passions. And, amongst these passions, the lust of the flesh does, beyond all others, overpower reason. Hence in Soliloquiorum (lib. 1) St. Augustine says, "I know nothing which doth more cast a manly soul down from the tower of its strength, than do the caresses of a woman, and the physical contact essential to marriage." Thus, continence is most necessary to perfection. It is the way pointed out by St. Paul (1 Cor. vii. 25), "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel, as having obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful."

The advantage of virginity is also shown in St. Matthew (xix. 12). When the disciples said to Our Lord, "If the case of a man with his wife be so, it is not expedient to marry," He answered, "All men take not this word but those to whom it is given." By these words we see the difficulty involved in continence, and the inadequacy of human virtue to lead such a life without the grace of God. We read in the Book of Wisdom (viii. 21), "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent except God gave it; and this also was a point of wisdom to know whose gift it was.” This saying is also borne out by the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. vii. 7), “I wish all men were as myself” (i.e. a virgin), “but everyone has his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that.” In these words he distinctly asserts that continence is a gift of God.

But, lest anyone should, on the other hand, fail to use his own endeavour to obtain this gift, our Lord exhorts all men to it. He first gives an illustration, saying, “There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs”; “not,”as St. Chrysostom explains, “by mutilation, but by resisting evil thoughts.” Then Christ goes on to invite all men to follow this example, for the sake of its reward. “There are some,” He continues, “who have made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven.” The Book of Wisdom also says (iv. 2), “The chaste generation triumphs, crowned for ever, winning the reward of undefiled conflicts.” Finally, Our Lord exhorts men to continence, by the words, “He that can take, let him take it.” “This,” says St. Jerome, “is the voice of the Lord encouraging his soldiers to win the prize of chastity. It is as if He said: he that can fight, let him fight and conquer.”

If anyone should object to us the example of Abraham, and of other just men of old, who were perfect without refraining from matrimony, we will answer them in the words written by St. Augustine in his book, de bono conjugali. “The continence that is a virtue is that of the mind, not of the body. And virtue is sometimes revealed in deeds, and sometimes lies disguised as a habit. The patience of John who did not suffer martyrdom was equal in merit to that of Peter who was slain; and Abraham who fathered sons, was equal in continence to the virgin John. The marriage of the one and the celibacy of the other fought, each in their season, for Christ. Therefore, any one of the faithful who observes continence may say, “I am certainly no better than Abraham; but the chastity of celibacy is superior to the chastity of married life. Abraham practised the one actually, the other habitually. For he lived chastely as a husband, and could have lived continently had he been unmarried. The latter state, however, did not befit the time at which he lived. It is easier for me not to marry at all, (although Abraham married) than to live such a married life as he lived. Therefore, am I better than they, who could not, by continence of heart, do what I do; but I am not better than they, who, on account of the different time at which they lived, did not what I do. Had it been fitting, they, in their time, would have accomplished far better than I, that which I now do; but I, even were it now required, could not do what they achieved.”

This conclusion of St. Augustine agrees with what has already been said about poverty. For Abraham had arrived at such perfection that his heart never wavered. in love to God on account either of temporal possessions or of wedded life. But if another man who has not reached this height of virtue, strives to attain perfection, while retaining riches and engaging in matrimony, he will soon be made aware of his error in presuming to treat Our Lord’s words as of small account.

CHAPTER IX

Aids to the Preservation of Chastity

SINCE chastity is so difficult a virtue that, in Our Lord’s words, not all men “take it,” but those only “to whom it is given,” it is necessary for those who desire to live a life of continence, so to conduct themselves as to avoid all that might prove an obstacle in the prosecution of their design. Now there are three principal hindrances to continence. The first arises from the body. The second from the mind. The third from external circumstances, whether they be of persons or of things.

The body is an obstacle to continence. As St. Paul says, “The flesh lusts against the Spirit” (Gal. v. 17), and “the works of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, unchastity and the like.” Concupiscence is that law of the flesh, of which, in his epistle to the Romans, St. Paul says, “I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind” (Rom. vii. 23). Now the more the flesh is pampered, by superabundance of food, and by effeminacy of life, the more will its concupiscence increase. For, as St. Jerome says, “A man heated with wine will quickly give the rein to lust.” The book of Proverbs warns us against wine as “a luxurious thing” (Prov. xx.1). Job, again, tells us that Behemoth (by whom Satan is signified) “sleeps under the shadow, in the covert of the reed and in moist places” (chap. xl. 16). St. Gregory (33 Moral.) thus interprets this passage. “Moist places,” he says, “betoken voluptuous works. We do not slip on dry ground; but, we have no sure foothold on slippery soil. Hence, those men pursue the journey of this present life in moist places, who cannot hold themselves upright in justice.” He, then, who desires to undertake a life of continence, must chastise his flesh, by abstention from pleasure, and by fasts, vigils, and such like exercises.

St.Paul sets before us his own conduct as an example in this respect, “Every one who strives for mastery, refrains himself from all things... I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest, perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway” (1 Cor. ix. 25), What the Apostle practised in deed, he taught in word. In his Epistle to the Romans (xiii. 14), after his warning against “chambering and impurities,” he concludes, “make no provision for the flesh in its concupiscences.” He rightly lays stress upon the concupiscences of the flesh, i.e. its desire for pleasure; for it is incumbent on us to make provision for what is necessary for our body, and St. Paul himself says (Eph. v. 29), “No man ever hated his own flesh, but he nourishes and cherisheth it.”

An obstacle to continence arises also from the mind, if we dwell on unchaste thoughts. The Lord says by His prophet, “Take away the evil of your devices from my eyes” (Isa. i. 16). For, evil thoughts often lead to evil deeds. Hence the Prophet Micah says (ii. 1), “Woe to you who devise that which is unprofitable,” and he immediately continues, “and work evil in your beds.” Amongst all evil thoughts, those which most powerfully incline unto sin, are thoughts concerning carnal gratification. Philosophers assign two reasons for this fact. First, they say, that as concupiscence is innate in man, and grows with him from youth upwards, he is easily carried away by it, when his imagination sets it before him. Hence Aristotle says (2 Ethics), that “we cannot easily judge of pleasure, unless we enjoy it.” The second reason is given by the same philosopher (3 Ethics), “Pleasure is more voluntary in particular cases than in general.” It is clear that by dallying with a thought we descend to particulars; hence, by daily thoughts we are incited to lust. On this account St. Paul (1 Cor. vi 18) warns us to “Flee from fornication”; for, as the Gloss says, “It is permissible to await a conflict with other vices; but this one must be shunned; for in no other means can it be overcome.”

But, as there are many obstacles in the way of chastity, there are also many remedies against such obstacles. The first and chief remedy is to keep the mind busied in prayer and in the contemplation of Divine things. This lesson is taught us in St. Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians (v. 18), wherein he says, “Be not drunk with wine wherein is luxury; but be filled with the Holy Spirit, speaking to yourselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles” (which pertain to contemplation), “singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord” (whereby prayer is implied). Hence in Isaiah (xlviii. 9), the Lord says, “For by my praise I will bridle you, lest you should perish.”For the divine praise is, as it were, a bridle on the soul, checking it from sin.

The second remedy against lust is the study of the Scriptures. “Love the study of Holy Writ,”says St. Jerome to the monk Rusticus, “and you will not love the vices of the flesh.”‘ And St. Paul in his exhortation to Timothy (1 Tim. iv. 12) says, Be an example of the faithful in word, in conversation, in charity, in faith, in chastity,”immediately adding, “Till I come, attend unto reading.”

The third preservative against concupiscence, is to occupy the mind with good thoughts. St. Chrysostom, in his commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, says that, “physical mutilation is not such a curb to temptation, and such a source of peace to the mind, as is a habit of bridling the thoughts.” St. Paul also says to the Philippians (iv. 8), “For the rest, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely, whatsoever of good fame, if there be any virtue, if any praise of discipline, think on these things.”

The fourth help to chastity is to shun idleness, and to engage in bodily toil. We read in the book of Sirach (xxxiii. 29), “Idleness has taught much evil.” Idleness is pre-eminently an incentive to sins of the flesh. Hence Ezechiel says (xvi. 49), “Behold, this was the iniquity of Sodom your sister, pride, fulness of bread, abundance, and idleness.” St. Jerome likewise writes, in his letter to the monk Rusticus, “Do some work, that so the devil may always find you employed.”

A fifth remedy for concupiscence lies in certain kinds of mental disquietude. St. Jerome relates, in the epistle quoted above, that, in a congregation of cenobites there dwelt a young man who could not, by means of fasting or any laborious work, free himself from temptations of the flesh. The superior of the monastery, seeing that the youth was on the point of yielding, adopted the following means for his relief. He commanded one of the most discreet among the fathers to constantly upbraid the young man, to load him with insults and reproach, and, after treating him thus, to lodge complaints against him with the Superior. Witnesses were called, who all took the senior father’s part, This treatment was continued for a year. At the end of that time, the superior questioned the youth about his old train of thought. “Father,”was the reply, “I am scarcely permitted to live. How, in such straits, shall I be inclined to sin?”

A great obstacle to continence arises from extrinsic circumstances, such as constant intercourse with women. We read in Sirach (ix. 9), “Many have perished by the beauty of a woman, and hereby lust is enkindled as a fire..., for her conversation burns as fire.” And, in the same chapter, the following safeguard is proposed against these dangers: “Do not look upon a woman who has a mind for many, lest you fall into her snares. Do not frequent the company of a dancer, and do not listen to her lest you perish by the force of her charms.” Again (chapter xlii. 12), “Do not gaze on everybody’s beauty; and do not tarry among women. For from garments comes a moth, and from a woman the iniquity of a man.” St. Jerome, in his book against Vigilantius, writes that a monk, knowing his own frailty, and how fragile is the vessel which he carries, will fear to slip or stumble, lest he fall and be broken. Hence, he will chiefly avoid gazing at women, and especially at young ones, lest he be caught by the eyes of a harlot, and lest beauty of form lead him on to unlawful embraces.

Abbot Moses, in his conferences to the fathers, says that, in order to preserve purity of heart, “we ought to seek solitude and to practise fasting, watching, and bodily labour: to wear scant clothing; and to attend to reading; in order, by these means, to be able to keep our heart uncontaminated by passion, and to ascend to a high degree of charity.” It is for this reason, that such exercises are practised in the religious life. Perfection does not consist in them; but they are, so to speak, instruments whereby perfection is acquired. Abbot Moses, therefore, continues, “Fasting, vigils, hunger, meditation on the scriptures, nakedness, and the privation of all possessions, are not themselves perfection; but they are the instruments of perfection. The end of discipline does not lie in them ; but, by their means we arrive at the end.”

But, perchance, someone may object, that it is possible to acquire perfection without fasting or vigils or the like, for we read that “the Son of Man came eating and drinking” (Matt. xi. 19), nor did His disciples fast, as did the Pharisees, and the followers of St. John. To this argument we find in the Gloss the following answer: “John drank no wine nor strong drink; for abstinence increases merit, though nature has no power to do so. But, why should the Lord, to Whom it belongs to forgive sin, turn away from sinners who feast, when he is able to make them more righteous than those who fast?” The disciples and Christ had no need to fast; for the presence of the Bridegroom gave them more strength than the followers of John gained by fasting. Hence our Lord says (Matt. ix. 15), “But the days will come when the Bridegroom shall be taken away from them, and then they shall fast.” St. Chrysostom makes the following comment on these words, “Fasting is not naturally grievous, save to those whose weakness is indisposed to it. They who desire to contemplate heavenly wisdom rejoice in fasting. Now, as when our Lord spoke the words we have just quoted, the disciples were still weak in virtue, it was not the fitting season to bring sadness upon them. It was more meet to wait until they were strengthened in faith. They were dispensed from fasting, not by reason of their gluttony, but by a certain privilege.”

St. Paul, however, writing to the Corinthians (2 Ep. vi. 3), expressly shows how fasting enables men to avoid sin, and to acquire perfection. He says, “Giving no offence to any man, that our ministry be not blamed; but in all things let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distress, in stripes, in prisons, in seditions, in labours, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity.”

CHAPTER X

Of the Third Means of Perfection, Namely, the Abnegation of Our Own Will

IT is not only necessary for the perfection of charity that a man should sacrifice his exterior possessions: he must also, in a certain sense, relinquish himself. Dionysius, in Chapter IV. De Divinis Nominibus, says that, “divine love causes a man to be out of himself, meaning thereby, that this love suffers him no longer to belong to himself but to Him whom he loves.”St. Paul, writing to the Galatians (ii. 20), illustrates this state by his own example, saying, “I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me,” as if he did not count his life as his own, but as belonging to Christ, and as if he spurned all that he possessed, in order to cleave to Him. He further shows that this state reaches perfection in certain souls; for he says to the Colossians (iii. 3), “For you are dead, and your life is hidden with Christ in God.”Again, he exhorts others to the same sublimity of love, in his second Epistle to the Corinthians (v. 15), “And Christ died for all, that they also who live, may not now live to themselves, but unto Him who died for them, and rose again.” Therefore, when our Lord had said (Luke xiv. 26), “If any man comes to me, and does not hate his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters,” He added something greater than all these, saying, “yes, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.” He teaches the same thing in the Gospel of St. Matthew (xvi. 24) when He says, “If any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow Me.”

This practice of salutary self-abnegation, and charitable self-hatred, is, in part, necessary for all men in order to salvation, and is, partly, a point of perfection. As we have already seen from the words of Dionysius quoted above, it is in the nature of divine love that he who loves should belong, not to himself, but, to the one beloved. It is necessary, therefore, that self-abnegation and self-hatred be proportionate to the degree of divine love existing in an individual soul. It is essential to salvation that a man should love God to such a degree, as to make Him his end, and to do nothing which be believes to be opposed to the Divine love. Consequently, self-hatred and self-denial are necessary for salvation. Hence St. Gregory says, in his Homily, “We relinquish and deny ourselves when we avoid what we were wont (through the old man dwelling in us) to be, and when we strive after that to which (by the new man) we are called.” In another Homily he, likewise, says, “We hate our own life when we do not condescend to carnal desires, but resist the appetites and pleasures of the flesh.”

But, in order to attain perfection, we must further, for the love of God, sacrifice what we might lawfully use, in order, thus to be more free to devote ourselves to Him. It follows, therefore, that self-hatred, and self-denial, pertain to perfection. We see that our Lord speaks of them as if they belonged to it. For, just as in the Gospel of St. Matthew (xix. 21) He says, “If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have and give to the poor,” but does not lay any necessity on us to do so, leaving it to our own will, so He likewise says (Matt. xvi. 24), “if any man would come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow Me.” St. Chrysostom thus explains these words, “Christ does not make his saying compulsory; He does not say, ‘whether you like it or not, you must bear these things.’” In the same manner, when He says: “If any man will come after Me and hate not his father” etc. (Luke xiv. 28), He immediately asks, “Which of you having a mind to build a tower, does not first sit down, and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether) he have enough to finish it?” St. Gregory in his Homily thus expounds these words, “The precepts which Christ gives are sublime, and, therefore, the comparison between them and the building of a high tower shortly follows them.” And he says again, “That young man could not have had enough to finish his tower who, when he heard the counsel to leave all things, went away sad.” We may hence understand, that these words of our Lord refer, in a certain manner, to a counsel of perfection.

The martyrs carried out this counsel of perfection most perfectly. Of them St. Augustine says (in his sermon De martyribus, that “none sacrifice so much as those who sacrifice themselves.” The martyrs of Christ, denying themselves, did, in a certain manner, hate their lives, for the love of Christ. St. Chrysostom, again, says, writing on the Gospel of St. Matthew, “He who denies another, be it his brother, or his servant, or whomsoever it may be, will not assist him if he sees him suffering from the scourge or any other torture. And we, in like manner, ought to have so little regard for our body, that, if men should scourge, or in any other way maltreat, us, we ought not to spare ourselves.”

Our Lord would not have us to think that we are to deny ourselves, only so far as to endure insults and hard words. He shows us that we are to deny ourselves unto death, even unto the shameful death of the cross. For He says: “Let him take up his cross and follow Me.” We, therefore, say that the martyrs did a most perfect work; for they renounced, for the love of God, life itself, which others hold so dear, that, for its sake, they are content to part with all temporal goods, and are willing to purchase it by any sacrifice whatsoever. For a man will prefer to lose friends and wealth, and to suffer sickness, or even slavery, rather than to be deprived of life. Conquerors will grant to their defeated foes the privilege of life, in order that they may keep them subject to them in slavery. Satan said to the Lord (Job ii. 4), “Skin for skin, and all that a man has he will give for life,” i.e. to preserve his body.

Now, the more dearly a thing is loved according to nature, the more perfect it is to despise it, for the sake of Christ. Nothing is dearer to any man than the freedom of his will, whereby he is lord of others, can use what he pleases, can enjoy what he wills, and is master of his own actions. Just, therefore, as a person who relinquishes his wealth, and leaves those to whom be is bound by natural ties, denies these things and persons; so, he who renounces his own will, which makes him master, does truly deny himself. Nothing is so repugnant to human nature as slavery; and, therefore, there is no greater sacrifice (except that of life), which one man can make for another, than to give himself up to bondage for the sake of, that other. Hence, the younger Tobias said to the angel (Tobias ix. 2), “if I should give myself to be your servant, I should not make a worthy return for your care.”

Some men deprive themselves, for the love of God, of some particular use of their free will, binding themselves by vow, to do, or not to do, some specific thing. A vow imposes a certain obligation on him that makes it; so that, for the future, he is not at liberty to do, or not to do, what was formerly permissible to him; for he is bound to accomplish his vow. Thus, we read in Ps. 1xv. 13, “I will pay you my vows which my lips have uttered,”and again (Eccles. v. 3), “If you have vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him.”

Others there are, however, who make a complete sacrifice of their own will, for the love of God, submitting themselves to another by the vow of obedience, of which virtue Christ has given us a sublime example. For, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans (v. 19), “As by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just.” Now this obedience consists in the abnegation of our own will. Hence, our Lord said, “Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me: nevertheless not as I will but as you will” (Matt. xxvi. 39). Again He said (John vi. 38), “I came down from Heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of Him who sent Me.”By these words He shows us, that, as He renounced His own will, submitting it to the Divine will, so we ought wholly to subject our will to God, and to those whom He has set over us as His ministers. To quote the words of St. Paul, “obey your prelates and be subject to them “ (Heb. xiii. 17).

CHAPTER XI

The Three Means of Perfection, of Which We Have Hitherto Been Speaking, Belong, Peculiarly, to the Religious State

WE find the three ways to perfection in religious life, embodied in the three vows of perpetual poverty, chastity, and obedience. Religious follow the first road to perfection by the vow of poverty, whereby they renounce all property. By the vow of chastity, whereby they renounce marriage, they enter on the second road to perfection. They set forth on the third road to perfection, by the vow of obedience, whereby they sacrifice their own will. Now these three vows well beseem the religious life. For, as St. Augustine says (lib. x. de Civitate Dei), “The word religion means, not any sort of worship, but the worship of God.” And Tully says, in his Rhetorica, that “religion is a virtue, paying worship and reverence to a certain higher nature which men term the Divine nature.”

Now the worship which is due to God alone, consists in the offering of sacrifice. Such sacrifices may consist in external things, when they are given for the love of God. Thus, St. Paul says, (Hebrews xiii. 3), “Do not forget to do good and to impart; for by such sacrifices God’s favour is obtained.” We also offer to God the sacrifice of our own bodies, when, as St. Paul says (Gal. v. 24), “we crucify the flesh with its vices and concupiscences,” or, when we obey, his exhortation to the Romans (xii. 1), “Present your bodies a living , sacrifice, holy, pleasing, unto God.” There is, again, a third and most agreeable sacrifice to God, spoken of in the 50th Psalm (v. 19), “a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.”

The difference, says St. Gregory, in his Commentary on Ezechiel, between a sacrifice and a holocaust is, that, whereas every holocaust is a sacrifice, every sacrifice is not a holocaust, In a sacrifice a part of the victim was immolated; but in a holocaust the entire offering was consumed.” When, therefore, a man vows one thing to God, and does not vow another, he offers a sacrifice. When, however, he dedicates to the Almighty all that he has, all that he takes pleasure in, and his entire life, he is offering a holocaust.” This he does, most perfectly, by the three religious vows. Hence, it is clear that the name of religious is strictly applied, according to the very meaning of the word, to those who pay their vows as a holocaust to God.

According to the Levitical law the offering of sacrifice was ordained for the atonement of sin. Again, in Psalm Iv., immediately after the verse, “the things you say in your hearts, be sorry for them upon your beds,” we read, “offer up the sacrifice of justice,” that is to say (as the Gloss explains), “perform works of justice after your lamentations of penitence.” Since, then, a holocaust is a perfect sacrifice, a man who makes the religious vows, (thereby offering, of his own will, a holocaust to God), makes perfect satisfaction for his sins. Hence we see, that the religious life, is not only the perfection of charity, but likewise the perfection of penitence, since, however heinous may be the sins committed by a man, he cannot be enjoined, as a penance for them, to go into religion; for the religious state transcends all satisfaction. We see (in Gratian, 33, Quest. II. cap. Admonere, that Astulplus, who had killed his wife, was advised to go into a monastery as the easiest and best course to pursue; for, if he remained in the world, a very severe penance would be imposed upon him.

The vow which, of all the three religious vows, belongs most peculiarly to the religious life, is that of obedience. This is clear for several reasons. First, because, by obedience man sacrifices to God his own will; by chastity, on the other hand, he offers his body, and by poverty his external possessions. Now, since the body is worth more than material goods the vow of chastity is superior in merit to that of poverty, but the vow of obedience is of more value than either of the other two. Secondly, because it is by his own will that a man makes use either of his body or his goods: therefore, he who sacrifices his own will, sacrifices everything else that he has. Again, the vow of obedience is more universal than is that of either poverty or chastity, and hence it includes them both. This is the reason why Samuel preferred obedience to all other offerings and sacrifices, saying, “Obedience is better than sacrifices” (1 Kings xv. 22).

CHAPTER XII

Refutation of the Errors of Those Who Presume to Detract From the Merit of Obedience, Or of Vows

SATAN, in his jealousy of human perfection, has raised up several foolish and misleading men, who, by their teaching, have shown themselves hostile to the different modes of perfection of which we have been speaking. Vigilantius attacked the first counsel of perfection. St. Jerome thus combats his objections to it: “Some men hold that they act more virtuously who keep the use of their fortune, and divide the fruit of their possessions piecemeal among the poor, than they do who sell their goods, and, at once, give all they possess to the poor. The fallacy of this assertion is proved not by my words but by those of the Lord Himself, “If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have and give to the poor, and come follow me.” Christ is here speaking to one who desires to be perfect, and who, with the Apostles, leaves father, ship, and net. The man who is praised for retaining the use of his possessions, is in the second or third degree of perfection; and we know that the first degree is preferable to either the second or the third.” Hence, in order to exclude error on this point, we find in the book, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus the following words: “It is good to distribute one’s goods prudently among the poor; but it is better if it be done with the intention of following the Lord, to give them all away at once, and, in our dealings with Christ, to be free from all earthly solicitude.”

Jovinian argued against the second counsel of perfection, and declared that marriage was equal in merit to virginity. St. Jerome refuted his opinions, in the book which he wrote against him. St. Augustine, likewise, thus speaks of his error, in his book Retractationum: “The heresy of Jovinian asserted that the merit of consecrated virgins was equalled by conjugal chastity. Hence, it is said that in Rome, certain nuns who had not hitherto been suspected of immorality, contracted marriage. Our holy mother the Church has always stoutly resisted this error. In the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus we find the following declaration: “It is not Christian but Jovinian to set virginity on a level with matrimony, or to deny an increase of merit to those who, for the sake of mortifying the flesh, refrain from wine or flesh meat.”

But the devil is not content with these old devices. Even in our own days he has stirred up some men to declaim against the vow of obedience and all other vows, and to preach that good works are more meritorious when performed without obedience or vow, than when executed under such obligations. Others, again, say that a vow made to enter religion may, without danger to salvation, be broken, and they strive to confirm their opinion by frivolous and empty arguments. For they contend that an act is meritorious ih. proportion as it is voluntary, and that, if such an act be less voluntary in proportion as it is more necessary, good works done at a man’s pleasure, without the constraint of obedience or vow of any kind, are worth more than such as are performed under the obligation of a vow, either of obedience or of some other nature. They quote in support of their teaching the words of Prosper (Book II. De vita contemplativa), “We ought to fast and abstain, not as though forced by necessity, lest by acting reluctantly we should be called unwilling rather than devout,” They might also bring forward the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. ix. 7), “Every one as he has determined in his heart, not with sadness or of necessity; for God loves a cheerful giver.”

We must now show the fallacy of these arguments, and confute this foolish reasoning. First, in order to manifest the error of these arguments we will quote the Gloss on the verse of Ps. lxxv. 12, “Vow and pay to the Lord your God.” “We must observe,”says the Gloss, “that some vows made to God are common to all men, and are necessary to salvation: such are our Baptismal promises and the like, which we should be bound to keep, even if we had not made them. The verse, ‘Vow and pay,’ alludes to such vows as these, and is addressed to all men. There are also other vows made by individuals, such as chastity, virginity, and the like. The Psalmist invites us, but does not command us, to make such vows as these, and to pay them when we have made them. For the emission of a vow is a decision of the will; but the payment of such a vow is a decided necessity."

Hence a vow is, in one sense, a matter partly of counsel, and, in another sense, a matter of precept. But, from whichever point of view we consider it, we shall see plainly that good works performed under vow, are more meritorious than those executed without a vow. For, it is clear, that, in all that is necessary for salvation, all men are bound by the precept of God; neither would it be Tight to think that God would give a command without a purpose. For, as St. Paul says (1 Tim. i. 5), "Now the end of the Commandment is charity." In vain, then, would God have given a commandment concerning the performance of anything, if the execution of such a thing had not tended more towards the increase of charity than its omission would have done. Now we are not only bidden by precept to believe, and forbidden to steal, but, further, we are commanded to make a vow to believe and to abstain from theft. Therefore, believing on account of our vow, and abstention from theft on the same account, tend more to augment charity than would be the case if we had no vow. Again, the more anything increases charity, the more it is praiseworthy and meritorious. Hence it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to perform any work under vow, than without such an obligation. Once more, the counsel is given to us not only to preserve virginity or chastity, but (as the Gloss points out) to make a vow to do so. But since, as we have said, a counsel is only given concerning that which is the greater good, it must be better to observe chastity under a vow than without one.

The same argument holds good concerning the other counsels, Now, amongst other good works virginity meets with special commendation. our Lord speaking of it says, "He who can take it, let him take it" (Matt. xix. 12). It is, however, the vow of virginity which renders that state so praiseworthy. St. Augustine says, in his book, Do virginitate, "Virginity is honourable, not because it is virginity, but because it is consecrated to God, and because it vows to Him, and preserves for Him, the continence of piety." And, again, he says, "We do not praise virgins because they are virgins, but because they are consecrated to God by the holy continence of virginity." Hence we see, that the fact of their being performed under a vow, renders good works the more meritorious.

Again, every finite good acquires additional value by bearing a promise of some other good. There is no doubt that the promise of good is in itself a good. Hence, when one man makes a promise to another, he is considered to confer some advantage upon him; and he to whom the promise is made returns thanks. Now a vow, is a promise made to God, as we see from Ecclesiastes (v. 3), “If you have vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him.” It is better, therefore, to make a vow and to perform it, than simply to execute a good work without being bound thereto by vow.

Again, the more one person gives to another, the more he deserves from that other. Now, he that does a good work without a vow, offers to God only that single act which he performs for love of him: he, on the contrary, who not only accomplishes a good work, but also makes a vow to perform it, gives to God not only that which he does, but also the power whereby he does it. For he puts it out of his power not to do such a good work; although, before making his vow, he might legitimately have omitted it. Hence he merits far more from God who acts under vow, than be who is not under any obligation.

Once more, the merit of a good work is increased in proportion as the will is confirmed in good, just as the heinousness of sin is aggravated in proportion to the obstinate malice of the will. Now it is evident, that he who makes a vow, confirms his will to accomplish that which he promises; and that when he accomplishes the good work which he has vowed to do, its consummation proceeds from the strength which his will has acquired. Just as the gravity of a crime proceeds from the fact that he who commits it acts from a determined purpose, or, as is usually said, sins out of malice; so the merit of any good work is enhanced by the fact that it is done under a vow.

Again, the more excellent the virtue from which any action proceeds, the more meritorious does that action become, since an action derives all its merit from the virtue which inspires it. Now, it may sometimes happen that an action of inferior virtue may have its origin in a superior virtue. For example we might do an act of justice from a motive of charity. Hence, it is far best to perform acts of inferior virtue from motives of superior virtue; just as an. act of justice is enhanced in value, if it be performed out of charity. Now, we know, that,, the particular good works that we accomplish proceed from inferior virtues; fasting, for instance, is an act of abstemiousness; continence proceeds from chastity, and so of the rest. But, on the other hand, a vow is, strictly speaking, an act of latria, which, undoubtedly, is a higher virtue than abstemiousness, chastity, or any other virtue. For it is more meritorious to worship God, than to order ourselves rightly, towards, either our neighbour or ourselves. Hence chastity, abstemiousness, or any other virtue, inferior to latria, derives additional value if it be performed under a vow.

This opinion is supported by the pious desire of the Church which invites men to make a vow to go to the Holy Land, or elsewhere, in her defence, and grants indulgences and other privileges to such as make this vow. She would certainly not invite the faithful to bind themselves by vow, were good works, done without such obligation, more meritorious than those done under vow. Did she act thus, she would be disobeying the exhortation of St. Paul (1 Cor. xii. 31), “Be zealous for the better gifts.” If the good works done without a vow were the most praiseworthy, the Church, far from encouraging her children to bind themselves by vow, would withhold them from so doing, either by prohibition or dissuasion; and, as it is her desire that the faithful should be in the most meritorious state, she would absolve them all from their vows, in order, as far as possible, to enhance the merit of their good works. Hence, the opinion that vows detract from the value of good works, is repugnant to the spirit of the Church, and must be rejected as heretical.

All the arguments alleged in favour of this opinion, may be easily answered. First, the proposition, that a good work performed under vow, is less voluntary than one done without an obligation, is by no means universally true. For many persons perform what they have vowed to do, so promptly, that even had they not already made vows, they would not only have done those same good works, but they would have also vowed to do them. Secondly, granted that a deed performed under vow, or under obedience, be in a sense involuntary, nevertheless, he who accomplishes such a deed, does so from the necessity of his vow or of obedience, which he has no desire to violate. Hence he acts in a more praiseworthy and meritorious manner, than if he were performing a good work at his own pleasure and without a vow. And, even if he have not a will to do some particular thing (e.g. to fast), he, nevertheless, desires to accomplish his vow, or to practise obedience, which is much more meritorious than fasting.

Hence, he who fasts out of obedience performs a more acceptable work than he who fasts by his own desire. And the will to fulfil a vow, or to practise obedience, is held to be so much the more perfect in proportion as the deed accomplished for the sake of obedience, or of keeping a vow, is repugnant to nature. Hence St. Jerome says to Rusticus, "My principal exhortation to you is, not to be guided by your own judgment." Then he adds, "Nor should you act according to your own will; but you shall eat as you are bidden; you shall have as much as is given you; you shall wear the raiment appointed you; you shall perform the whole task allotted to you; you shall be subject to him to whom you would rather not submit; you shall go weary to bed; you shall fall asleep on your feet and shall be forced to rise before you have slumbered your fill."

The passage just cited shows us, that the merit of a good work consists in a man doing or suffering something for the love of God, which is contrary to his own will. For, alacrity of will, and fervour of divine love, are chiefly shown when that which we do for God is repugnant to our own inclinations. The martyrs are commended inasmuch as, for the love of God, they endured many things repugnant to nature. Hence, when Eleazar was tortured he said, "I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul I am well content to suffer these things because I fear you."

It is argued, that a man may not perchance retain the will to fulfil his vow, or to practise obedience; but God, as we know, judges the heart, and will hold such an one unfaithful to his vow and to obedience. If a man perform what he has vowed, or obey an order, solely out of motives of fear or human respect he gains no merit before God; for he acts, not from a desire to please Him, but solely under compulsion. Nevertheless, his vow, if it were made out of charity, is not unprofitable to him; for he has merited more by making it, than others have done by fasting without any vow. Moreover, the merit of his vow remains to him if he repent of the infidelity of his heart. This is our answer to the authorities adduced. They apply to the cases wherein men keep their vows under the compulsion of human motives, such as fear, or shame; but they do not speak of the necessity whereby men are constrained, from motives of Divine love, to do or suffer what is naturally repugnant to them, in order thereby to fulfil the will of God. This is made clear by the words of St. Paul, "Not with sadness or of necessity “(2 Cor. ix. 7). For human necessity induces sadness; whereas the constraining of divine love dissipates, or lessens it.

We may, in support of what we have said, quote the words of Prosper. “Lest we should act not devoutly but unwillingly. For the necessity which proceeds from divine love does not diminish love, but increases it.” And St. Augustine, in his epistle (127) to Armentarius and Paulina, shows that this necessity is desirable and praiseworthy. “Since,” he says, “you now have bound yourself, it is not lawful for you to act otherwise. Before you were under a vow, you were free to do as you wouldst: now, however, you art subject to your vow. Nevertheless, liberty is not a matter of congratulation, since it renders man debtor for what he cannot repay with money. But now that your promise is made to God, I do not invite you to great justice (i.e. to the chastity which you have vowed), but I warn you against great iniquity. For, if you do not perform what you have vowed, you will not remain as you were before your vow. Before your vow you were lower than at present, not worse; now, if (which God forbid) you break your faith with Him, you will be as much the more accursed as you will be blessed if you dost keep your vow. Repent not of your promise to God; but rather rejoice that now it is no longer lawful for you to do that which formerly, to your detriment, was permissible to you. Act firmly and fulfil in deed what you have promised by word. He will help you who asks for your vows. Blessed necessity which constrains us to better things.” From these words we see, how erroneous is the doctrine, that persons are not bound to keep a vow that they may have made to go into religion.

CHAPTER XIII

The Pefection of Brotherly Love Which is Necessary for Salvation

WE may fittingly conclude these considerations about the perfection of charity, as it regards God, with some reflections touching perfect charity as it concerns our neighbour. There are several degrees of perfect love of our neighbour, just as there are several degrees of perfect love of God. There is a certain perfection of this virtue which is a matter of precept, and which is necessary to salvation. There is, further, a supererogatory perfection, which is a matter of counsel. The perfection of brotherly love necessary to salvation, is of the nature prescribed by the precept, “Thou shall love your neighbour as your self.”As God is the universal Good, existing above us, it is necessary, as we have before said, for the perfection of divine love that the whole heart should be, in a certain sense, turned to God. This degree of divine love is expressed by the precept, “Love the Lord your God with your whole heart.” But our neighbour is not the universal good existing above ourselves; he is a particular good beneath us. Therefore, we are not bidden to love him with our whole heart, but as ourselves. Three consequences follow from this proposition.

First, our love must be sincere. It is in the nature of love to wish well to the object beloved. Hence, love tends towards two things: to the one to whom we are wishing well, and to the good which we desire for him. And, although both these things are said to be loved, that object is truly loved to which we wish some good. For the good which we wish to another person is only loved per accidens, because it falls within the limits of the act of love. Now it is incorrect to say that we really and sincerely love an object which we desire to destroy; and as many of the things which we use are destroyed, we only love such things per accidens. For instance, we consume wine in drinking, we expose a horse to death in battle; in such cases, we are truly loving ourselves and are only loving these other things per accidens, on account of the use which they are to us.

It is clear, likewise, that every man does, by nature, love himself truly, in so far as to wish benefits to himself, happiness, for instance, virtue, knowledge, and the necessaries of life. But those things of which he avails himself he does not truly love in themselves; rather, he loves the service they render him, and he prefers himself to them. Now this proposition is as true with regard to persons, as it is with regard to things. We love some men only because they are of use to us; and when this is the case, it is evident that we do not truly love them as we love ourselve&) He that loves another because he is of service- to him, or affords him gratification, proves that he loves himself. As he seeks only convenience and profit from his friend and not his friend himself, he can only be said to love his friend in the sense in which we are said to love wine or horses, i.e. not as ourselves by wishing well to them, but rather as valuing them as an advantage to ourselves.

It is not difficult to prove, that sincerity is necessary to perfect charity. We see this, first, from the precept which bids us to love our neighhour as ourselves. “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith,”says St. Paul (1 Tim. i. 5). Again he says, “Charity does not seek her own” (1 Cor. xiii. 5), but wishes well to those whom she loves. He gives his own example, as a lesson of charity, “not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved” (1 Cor. x. 33).

Secondly, the way in which we are commanded to love our neighbour, viz. “as ourselves,” proves that our charity ought to be rightly ordered and sincere. For true and rightly ordered love prefers the greater to the lesser good. Now it is clear, that, of all human good, the welfare of the soul is the greatest: next in degree comes physical well-being; and external goods occupy the last place. It is natural to man to observe this order in his preference. For who would not rather lose bodily eyesight than the use of reason? Who would not part with all his property in order to save his life? “Skin for skin,” said Satan to the Lord, “and all that a man has he will give for his life” (Job ii. 4). Very few, if any, fail to observe this order in their preference concerning the natural goods of which we have given examples.

There are, nevertheless, many who pervert this order of charity, in the case of the other goods which exist in addition to the purely natural ones of which we have spoken. They will, for instance, prefer physical health or comfort, to the acquisition of virtue or learning; and they will expose their bodies to danger and hardship, in order to gain material wealth. Now this, as we shall show more at large, is not true love. Neither do they who act thus, love themselves sincerely. It is quite clear that the chief part of a thing is really the thing itself. When we say that a city acted thus or thus, we mean that the chief citizens acted in such or such a manner. Now we know, that the principal thing in man is the soul, and that the chief among the powers or faculties of the soul, is the reason or understanding. He, therefore, who despises the good of the rational soul, for the sake of physical welfare, or of the advantage of the sensitive soul, plainly show that he does not truly love himself. “He who loves iniquity, hates his own soul” (Pa. x. 6).

Now we are commanded to observe the same order in the love of our neighbour that we ought to observe in the love of ourselves. Hence we must desire his welfare in the same manner as we ought to desire our own, i.e. first his spiritual good, secondly his physical prosperity, including in the latter category such good as consists in extrinsic possessions. But, if we wish our neighbour to have material goods harmful to his health of body, or physical welfare opposed to his spiritual profit, we do not truly love him.

We see, thirdly, from the precept concerning charity, that our love of our neighbour must be holy. That is called holy which is directed to God. An altar, and the other things used in the sacred ministry, are holy, because they are dedicated to His service. Now, when one man loves another as himself, there must be intercommunion between them; and, in so far as the two persons are united together, they are considered as forming one; and the one behaves to the other as to himself. There are, however, several ways in which two persons may be joined together. They may be joined by ties of blood, i.e. by being born of the same parents. They may be joined by certain social ties—they may be fellow-citizens, under the same ruler and the same laws. Or, they may be joined by certain professional or commercial bonds—they may be fellow-workmen, or fellow-soldiers. Now the neighbourly love which may exist between men, united by these various bonds, may be just and seemly, but it cannot, on that account, be called holy. For love can only be called holy in so far as it is directed to God.

Fellow-citizens agree in being subject to the same ruler whose laws they obey; and all men, inasmuch as they naturally aspire to happiness, are united in their inclinations towards God, the Beginning of all things, the Source of happiness, and the Principle of justice. But, we must remember, that, in the right order, the general is preferable to the particular good. A part is, by a natural instinct governed by the good of the whole. The hand, for example, is exposed to danger in order to shield the head or heart, the source of life. Now, in the communion, whereof we have been speaking, and in which all men are united by their natural tendency towards happiness, each individual must be considered as a part, and God, in whom the happiness of all consists, must be regarded as the universal Good of the whole. Hence, according to right reason and natural instinct, each man orders himself towards God, as a part is ordered to the whole; and this orderlis made perfect by charity, whereby man loves himself for God's sake. Now, when he also loves his neighbour for God's sake, he loves him as himself; and his love thus becomes holy. This is plainly expressed by St. John, in the following words: "This commandment we have from God that he who loves God, should also love his brother" (1 John iv. 21).

The precept to love our neighbour as ourselves teaches us, fourthly, that our love of our neighbour must be practical and fruitful. Men love themselves, not only by wishing good to befall them, and by desiring protection from-evil; but also, by endeavouring, by all means in their power, to procure prosperity for themselves, and to defend themselves from adversity. Hence, when a man truly loves another as himself, he will show his love not only by good wishes, but by practical benefits. He will obey the teaching of St. John (1 Jn. iii. 18), "My little children, let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth."

CHAPTER XIV

The Perfection of Love of Our Neighbour Considered As A Matter of Counsel

WE devoted the last chapter to the consideration of the perfection of brotherly love, as exhibited in the degree necessary to salvation. We will now treat of the same virtue, as manifested in a degree exceeding common perfection, and thus forming a matter of counsel. This perfection of fraternal charity may be regarded from a triple point of view. First we may consider its comprehensiveness; for love is perfect in proportion to the number of persons whom it includes.

Now there are three degrees in the comprehensiveness of charity. Some men love their neighbours, either on account of the benefits they receive from them, or by reason of some tie of blood or of social life. This love is bounded by the limits of human friendship, and of it our Lord says, “It you love those who love you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this? And if you salute your brethren only, what do you more? Do not even the heathens this?” (Matt. v. 46). Others, again, include strangers in their charity, as long as they meet with nothing in these strangers antipathetic to themselves. This degree of charity is limited by natural feeling; for as all men form one species, each individual man is by nature the friend of all others. Thus, it is natural to us to put one who has lost his way on the right road, to help a man who has fallen down, and to perform similar kindly offices. As, however, we naturally prefer ourselves to others, it follows, that we shall love one thing and hate what is opposed to it. Therefore a merely natural love never includes the love of our enemies. But the third degree of charity is the love extended even to our enemies. Speaking of this love, our Lord says (Matt. v. 44), “Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you."He shows that this love constitutes the perfection of charity, by concluding His instruction with the words, "Be, therefore, perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect."

The fact that this perfection is beyond ordinary perfection, appears in the words of St. Augustine (Enchirid.), "These things belong to the perfect among the sons of God. Nevertheless, all the faithful ought to strive to fulfil them; and by prayer and self-conquest the soul of man ought to be brought to these sentiments. But this sublime virtue is not found in the generality of mankind, although we believe that the prayer: 'Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us,' is heard by God."

But, as by the term "our neighbour"all men are understood; and as no exception is made in the precept of loving our neighbour as ourselves; it may be thought, that the love of our enemies is commanded as necessary to salvation. This difficulty is easily solved, if we call to mind what has been said about the perfection of Divine love. The precept, "Love the Lord your God with your whole heart," etc., may be understood as a matter either of precept, to be obeyed as a necessity, or as a counsel, or as perfection attained only by the Blessed in Heaven. If the command, "Love the Lord your God with your whole heart" be understood to mean that man's heart is to be always actually fixed on God, it can only be obeyed by the Blessed in Heaven. If it be taken as signifying that man is not. to admit anything into his heart contrary to Divine love, it is, in this sense, a precept which must of necessity be obeyed. If, again, we understand by these words, the renunciation of all things for the sake of greater freedom in communion with God, it is a counsel of perfection. In the same way we may say that it is a precept not to exclude even our enemies from the universal love of our neighbour enjoined upon us, nor to admit within our heart anything opposed to this love.

But to love our enemies with an actual love when there is no necessity for so doing, is a counsel of perfection. Of course it is necessary for salvation to love our enemies by doing them actual service and assisting them, if they be in any extremity, if, for example, they be dying of hunger. The precept of brotherly love does not ' however, bind us to show any special affection nor to do any particular service to our enemies, unless they be in the extreme distress of which we have spoken; neither are we bound by precept to do any special service to any other of our neighbours. Love of our enemies springs, directly and purely, from love of God; whereas our love for other men arises from divers motives, e.g., from gratitude, from kinship, from fellow-citizenship, and the like. But nothing save the love of God can make us love our enemies; for we love them because they are His creatures, made in His image, and capable of enjoying Him. And, as charity prefers God before all other good, the consideration of the Divine Good which inclines it to love its enemies, outweighs the consideration of any injury received from them which would incline our nature to hate them. Thus, in proportion to the love of God in a man's soul, will be his readiness to love his enemies.

The perfection of brotherly love depends, secondly, upon its intensity. We know that the more intensely a man loves one object, the more easily will he for its sake despise other things. Hence the perfection of his love for his neighbour, may be gauged by what he sacrifices on his neighbour's account. Some men, in their love of others, will give up their material possessions, either dispensing them to their neighbours at their discretion, or relinquishing them entirely, in order to supply the necessities of other men. St. Paul seems to refer to this form of charity in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (xiii. 3), where he says, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor." In the book of Canticles, also, we are told that, "If a man should give all the substance of his house for love, he shall despise it as nothing" (Cant. viii. 7). our Lord includes this in the counsel of perfection, which He gave when He said, "If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you hast, and give to the poor and you shall have treasure in Heaven; and come follow me" (Matt. xix. 2 1). In this passage the sacrifice of material possession seems to be recommended for two ends. The words, "give to the poor," point to love of our neighbour; the other words, "follow Me," indicate love of God. But a man fulfils the same end, whether he suffers the loss of his material goods for the love of God, or for the sake of his neighbour. St. Paul commends the charity of the Hebrews in these words, "You took with joy the being stripped of your own goods" (Heb. x. 34). In the Book of Proverbs (xii. 26) we are told also that, "He who neglects a loss for the sake of a friend is just." St. John says in like manner (1 Ep. iii. 17), "He who has the substance of this world and sees his brother in need, and shuts up his bowels from him, how does the charity of God abide in him?"

The second degree of love of our neighbour, consists in exposing ourselves to physical hardships for his sake. St. Paul gives us an example of this kind of charity when he says, “In labour and toil we worked day and night, lest we should be chargeable to any of you” (2 Thess. iii. 8). This second degree of charity also includes a willingness to bear suffering and persecution for the love of our neighbour. St. Paul mentions this charity in the 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians (i. 6), “Whether we be in tribulation, it is for your exhortation and salvation,”and also in his Epistle to Timothy, “Wherein I labour even unto bands as an evil doer; but the word of God is not bound. Therefore I endure all things, for the sake of the elect, that they may obtain salvation” (2 Tim. ii. 9). Those fail to attain to this degree of charity who will deprive themselves of no luxury, and submit to no inconvenience for the sake of others. It is to such men as these that Amos (vi. 4) addresses the following words: “You that sleep upon beds of ivory, and are wanton on your couches: you that eat the lambs out of the Rock, and the calves out of the midst of the herd; you that sing to the sound of the psaltery: they have thought themselves to have instruments of music like David; that drink wine in bowls, and anoint themselves with the best ointments; and they are not concerned for the affliction of Joseph.” And Ezechiel also says (xiii. 5), “You have not gone up to face the enemy, nor have you set up a wall for the house of Israel, to stand in battle in the day of the Lord.”

The third degree of charity consists in sacrificing our life for another. St. John (1 Jn iii. 16) says, “In this we have known the charity of God, because He has laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” Our Lord Himself declares that, “Greater love than this has no man, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John xv. 13). Hence it is in this sacrifice of life that the perfection of charity consists.

The word “life “may be understood, however, in two senses. There is the spiritual life whereby God Himself animates the soul. We may not sacrifice this life. For our love of our soul is proportionate to our love of God; and we ought to love God more than we love our neighbour. Therefore, we may not, in order to save another, injure our own soul by sin. We have also the physical life which animates our body. This life we ought to lay down for the brethren. For, it is Qur duty to prefer our neighbour to our body; and therefore it is right to sacrifice our physical life for the spiritual welfare of others. We are bound by precept to act thus if we see our neighbour exposed to any extreme spiritual danger. Thus, if we were to see another seduced from the Faith by unbelievers, we should be bound to expose ourselves to death if, thereby, we could save him from such ruin. But it pertains to the perfection of justice, and is a matter of counsel, to sacrifice life for the salvation of those who are not in grave spiritual necessity. St. Paul teaches us to do so by his own example, for he says, “But I, most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your souls” (2 Cor. xii. 15). On this passage the Gloss remarks, “It is perfect charity to be prepared to die for the brethren.”The state of slavery does in some sort resemble death, and is therefore called civil death. For life is chiefly manifested in ability to move; he that cannot move save by the agency of others, may be accounted dead. Now, a slave has no power over himself, but is governed by the will of his master; and therefore this condition of bondage may be compared to death. Hence a man, who, for the love of another, delivers. himself to bondage, practises the same perfection of charity, as he who exposes himself to death. Nay, we may say that he does more; for slavery is more abhorrent to our nature than is death.

The perfection of fraternal charity must next be considered as manifested by the value of what we do for others. For our love for our neighbour is proved by the value of the gifts that we bestow upon him. Now there are three degrees in this charity. The first degree consists in ministering to the bodily wants of our brethren by clothing the naked, feeding the hungry, tending the sick, and the like. our Lord promises to consider as done to Himself, everything of this nature that we do for others. The second degree of charity consists in bestowing upon our neighbour such spiritual benefits as do not exceed the capability of human nature. Among such benefits we may mention the instruction of the ignorant, advice given to those in doubt, or the conversion of such as have gone astray. Such works of mercy are commended in Job iv. 3, “Behold, you have taught many, and you have strengthened the weary hands: your words have confirmed them that were staggering, and you have strengthened the trembling knees.”

The third degree of charity consists in enriching our neighbour with such spiritual benefits as are supernatural and exceed human reason. Such benefits are, instruction in divine truth, direction to God, and the spiritual communication of the Sacraments. Of gifts such as these, St. Paul says, “He who gives you the Spirit, and works miracles among you “(Gal. iii. 5). Again he says (1 Thess. ii. 13), “When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God.” And writing to the Corinthians the Apostle, after saying, “I have espoused you to one husband,” continues, “for if someone comes and preaches another Christ whom we have not preached, or if you receive another Spirit whom you have not received, or another Gospel which you have not received, you might well bear with him” (2 Cor. xi. 2). He who bestows upon others gifts of this nature practises a singular perfection of brotherly love; for, it is by means, of these gifts, that man attains to union with his last End, in which consists his highest perfection.

Job was asked by one of his friends, “Do you know the great paths of the clouds, and perfect knowledge?” (Job xxxvii. 16). The clouds, says St. Gregory, typify holy preachers. For these clouds have most intricate “paths,” or ways of holy preaching, and “perfect knowledge” when they recognise that of their own merits, they are nothing, and that all that they impart to their neighbours is above them. A further degree of perfection is attained when spiritual gifts of this nature are bestowed not on one alone, or on two, but on a whole multitude. For, according to the Philosopher, the good of a nation is better and more divine, than is the good of an individual man. Hence St. Paul writes to the Ephesians (iv. 13), “Other some pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ,” i.e. the Church. And again, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (xiv. 12), he says, “Forasmuch as you are zealous of spirits, seek to abound unto the edifying of the Church.”

CHAPTER XV

What is Required to Constitute the State of Perfection

IT must, as we have before said, be borne in mind that perfection does not consist in the mere accomplishment of a perfect work, but, likewise, in the vow to accomplish such a work. A counsel, as we have already observed, has been given us on each of these two points. He therefore who performs a perfect work under a vow attains to a twofold perfection. For, just as a man who observes continence is practising one form of perfection; so, he who obliges himself by vow to live in continence and who keeps his vow, practises both the perfection of continence and the perfection of a vow. For that perfection which comes from the observance of a vow changes the state and condition of a man as completely, as freedom alters the state and condition of a slave. This proposition is established in Gratian, II quaestio IX, where Pope Hadrian says, “If at any time we are called upon for judgment in a capital cause, or in a cause affecting a state of life, we must act at our own discretion, and not depend upon others to examine the case.” For, if a man make a vow to observe chastity, be deprives himself of liberty to marry. But he who simply observes chastity without a vow, is not deprived of his liberty. Therefore, he is not in an altered condition, as is the case with a man bound by a vow. Again, if one man serve another, his state is not thereby changed, as it is if, he lay himself under an obligation to serve him.

We must remember, however, that a man may deprive himself of liberty either absolutely (simpliciter) or relatively (secundum quid). If he bind himself, either to God or man, to perform some specific work for some allotted time, he renounces his freedom, not absolutely but partially, i.e., with regard to the particular matter, about which he has laid himself under an obligation. If, however, he place himself entirely at the disposal of another, reserving to himself no liberty whatsoever, he makes himself a slave absolutely, and thereby absolutely alters his condition. Thus, if a person make a vow to God to perform some specified work, such as a pilgrimage or a fast, he does not change his condition entirely, but only partially, i.e., with regard to that particular work which he vows to accomplish. If he dedicate his whole life to serve God in works of perfection he absolutely embraces the condition or state of perfection. But, as some men perform works of perfection without any vow, and others fail to accomplish the works of perfection to which they have vowed their whole lives, it is perfectly possible for persons to be perfect without being in the state of perfection, or to be in a state of perfection without being perfect.

CHAPTER XVI

The State of Perfection is A Condition Befitting Bishops and Religious

FROM all that has been said it is easy to see which are the classes of men whom the state of perfection befits. We know that there are three roads to the perfection of divine love, to wit the giving up of material possessions; the sacrifice of marriage and of earthly ties; and total self-denial either by death for Christ, or by the abnegation of self-will. Now, they who by vow dedicate their whole lives to these works of perfection, manifestly embrace the state of perfection. And, as in every religious order these three vows are made, it is plain that every form of religious life is included in the state of perfection.

Again, we have pointed out that there are three elements in the perfection of brotherly love. It is necessary to perfect brotherly love, first, that a man love his enemies and assist them; secondly, that he lay down his life for the brethren either by exposing himself to the danger of death or by devoting his whole life to their service; and thirdly, that he minister to their spiritual needs. Now, bishops are bound to fulfil these three offices of charity. As they undertake the entire charge of their churches, wherein oftentimes many will be found to hate, persecute, and revile them, they are under the obligation of repaying their enemies and persecutors by benevolence and charity, after the example of the Apostles, whose successors they are, and who dwelt among those most hostile to them and laboured for their conversion. Thus were verified the words of our Lord (Matt. x. 16), “Behold I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves.” For, although the Apostles were, so to speak, torn by their enemies, they were not destroyed, but, on the contrary, they converted those who maltreated them. St.

Augustine in his book, De Sermone Domini in monte, has the following commentary on the words, “If one strike you on your right cheek, turn to him the other also” (Matt. v. 39): “These words (he says), inviting us to mercy, appeal most to such as have to minister to those whom they love, whether they be children, or men of frenzied brain. For, from such persons they suffer much; and they are prepared, if need be, to suffer more. Thus, the great Physician and Master of souls instructs His disciples, that they must bear, with serenity, the follies of those whose salvation they desire to secure. For crime is an indication of a weak mind, as innocence is a proof of perfect strength.” Hence St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians, says, “We are reviled and we bless; we are persecuted and we suffer it; we are blasphemed and we entreat”(1 Cor. iv. 12).

Bishops are farther bound to sacrifice their lives for the salvation of those committed to them, and thus to put in practice the words of our Lord, “I am the Good Shepherd: the Good Shepherd lays down his life for his sheep” (John x. 11). Speaking of these words, St. Gregory says, “In the Gospel which has been read to you, beloved brethren, you learn both a lesson for yourselves, and the danger which threatens us, There is set before us both the contempt of death, with which we ought to be inspired, and the model that we ought to imitate.”He further adds, “Our first duty is, in charity, to distribute our goods to our sheep; and we are further bound, if need be, to serve them by our death.... The wolf that comes upon the sheep signifies any unjust seducer or oppressor of the faithful and the lowly. He that is no true shepherd but only bears the semblance of such, will leave his sheep and take to flight, being too fearful of death to dare to resist iniquity.” From these words it is clear, that it is one of the duties of those discharging the episcopal office to face death for the sake of the church committed to them.

Hence, those who undertake this office are bound to practise such perfection of charity as consists in the sacrifice of their life for the brethren. In the same manner, a bishop is bound by his office to dispense spiritual gifts to his neighbour, and thus to become a mediator between God and man, acting in the place of Him who is “the one Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tim. ii). Moses, speaking as a type of our Lord, said, “I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time” (Deut. v. 1). Hence, a bishop must, in the name of his people, offer up prayers and supplications to God. “For every high priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins” (Heb. v. 1). And, on the other hand, he must act with regard to his people as the vicar of God, giving to his flock by the power of the Lord, judgment, instruction, example, and sacraments. St. Paul says, “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ” (2 Cor. ii. 10). Again, in the same epistle (xiii. 3) he says, “Do you seek a proof of Christ who speaks in me?” Again (1 Cor. ix. 11), he uses these words, “If we have sown for you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?” Now a bishop, at his ordination or consecration, and a religious at his profession, engages himself to this degree of perfection. St. Paul encourages St. Timothy to its practice, in the following words: “Fight the good fight of faith: lay hold on eternal life, to which you were called when you made a good confession before many witnesses” (1 Tim. vi. 12). This “good confession” is interpreted by the Gloss to mean ordination. Hence, bishops, as well as religious, are bound to a state of perfection. And, as human contracts are drawn up with certain ceremonies, so, both the consecration of bishops and the profession of religious are solemnized by certain rites and blessings. Dionyaius (VI. Cap. Eccles. Hierarch.) speaking of monks, says, “On this account the holy law has given them perfect grace, and has granted it to them with a certain sanctifying ceremonial (invocatione).”

CHAPTER XVII

The Episcopal Office is More Sacred Than is the Religious Life

TO one who has not duly considered the subject, the religious state might appear to be more sublime than the episcopal office. For the love of God, to the perfection of which religious dedicate their lives, far surpasses the love of our neighbour to which the pontifical state is devoted; just as the contemplative life, in which religious are engaged, is nobler than the active life, to which bishops are ordained. Dionysius (VI. Cap. Recles. Hierarch.) says that, "Some persons call religious servants, and others call them monks, on account of their pure service and ministry to God, and by reason of their simple undivided life which lifts them by holy contemplation of those things which are unseen, to a godlike oneness and to perfection pleasing to the Lord." Again the episcopal office may appear to fall short of perfection, because bishops are allowed to possess money, notwithstanding the words of our Lord, "If you will be perfect, go, sell what you hast, and give to the poor" (Matt. xix 21).

But this way of thinking is not in accordance with truth. Dionysius says (V. Cap. Eccles. Hierarch.) that the "duty of bishops is to produce perfection," and elsewhere (Cap. VI.), he says, that "the life of monks is a state of the perfect." Now it is evident that greater perfection is needed in order to make others perfect than is required in a state which in itself is perfect; just as it is better to do something than to be something, and just as a cause is more powerful than its effect. Hence, the episcopal state is one of greater perfection, than is that of any religious order.

This conclusion is still more clearly established, if we consider the obligations attached to the episcopal office, and those belonging to the religious life. Religious are bound to renounce material possessions, to observe chastity, and to live in obedience. But the duties of bishops are far more onerous and difficult of fulfilment. For they, as we have seen, are obliged to lay down their lives for their flocks. Hence the obligation of a bishop is much weightier than is that of a religious.

Bishops are further bound by the same obligations as those imposed upon religious. For, as it is their duty to feed their flocks, not only by word and example, but likewise by temporal assistance, they are obliged, if need arise, to distribute their worldly goods among those committed to their care. St. Peter was three times commanded by our Lord to feed His sheep. The exhortation Bank into his mind, and he recalls it in his epistle, saying, “Feed the flock of God which is among you” (1 St. Peter v. 2). St. Gregory, likewise, speaking as though in the person of bishops, says: “We ought in charity to distribute our goods among our sheep... for how shall he who will not of his temporal substance minister unto his flock, be ready for its sake to sacrifice his life?”

Bishops, likewise, are bound to live in chastity. For it is only meet that they who are to preach purity to others, should themselves lead spotless lives. Hence Dionysius (III. cap. Coelest. Hierarch.) says that from the abundance of their own chastity, they must impart purity to others.

Religious, by their vow of obedience, bind themselves to submit to one superior; but a bishop constitutes himself the servant of all of whom he undertakes the care. He is bound to imitate the example of St. Paul, who tells us that he sought not that which was profitable to himself but to many, that they might be saved (1 Cor. x. 33). Again the Apostle says of himself, “For whereas I was free unto all, I made myself the servant of all” (1 Cor. ix. 19). “For we preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ our Lord; and ourselves your servants through Jesus” (2 Cor. iv. 5). Hence it is the custom for the Sovereign Pontiff to subscribe himself as “the servant of the servants of God.” We must conclude, then, that the episcopal office is a condition of higher perfection than is the religious life.

Dionysius, again, writes (VI. Cap. Eccles. Hierarch.) “The monastic state is not intended to lead others forward, but is ordained for its own sake, and remains on its own peculiar and sacred basis.” Bishops, on the other hand, are under the obligation of guiding others to God. St. Gregory, writing on the book of Ezechiel, says that, “no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than is zeal for souls.” These words clearly point out that the episcopal is, of all states, the most perfect. This conclusion is further proved by the custom of the church, which, when a religious is appointed to a bishopric, releases him from obedience to the superiors of his order. For this could not be done, were not the episcopal state one of greater perfection than the religious. In acting thus the Church of God obeys the counsel of St. Paul, “Be therefore zealous for the better gifts” (1 Cor. xii. 31).

CHAPTER XVIII

An Answer to Certain Arguments Which May Seem to Call in Question the Perfection of the Episcopal State

IT is not difficult to answer the objections brought against the perfection of the Episcopal office. The perfection of fraternal charity springs, as we have seen, from the perfection of the love of God, which in the hearts of some men is so vigorous that it urges them, not only to desire to enjoy God and to serve Him, but likewise for His sake to assist their neighbours. Hence in the 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians (v. 13), St. Paul says, “Whether we be transported in mind” (by contemplation) “it is to God” (i.e. to the. glory of God), “or whether we be sober” (in condescension. to you) “it is to you,” i.e. for your profit; “for the love of Christ presses us,” “causing us (as the Gloss explains) to do all things for you.” For it is clear that it is a greater sign of love if a man, for the sake of his friend, be willing to serve another, than if he will only render service to his friend in his own person.

The argument drawn from the comparison between the perfection of the contemplative and the active life, does not seem to have much bearing on the point in question. A bishop, being singled out as mediator between God and men, must, as minister to men, be pre-eminent in the active life. At the same time he must excel in contemplation, in order to draw from God the spiritual wisdom which he is bound to impart to those committed to his care. Hence St. Gregory says (in Liber regulae pastoralia), “A bishop should be foremost in action, and he should be raised above all men by contemplation. He should be solicitous, lest, on account of external occupation, he relax in his zeal for spiritual affairs; neither should his care for spiritual things lessen his diligence concerning such as are temporal.” It may happen, indeed, that a man occupied in the service of others, may suffer some loss of sweetness in contemplation; but this very sacrifice is a proof of the perfection of his love of God. For if, for the sake of doing service to one whom we love, we deprive ourselves of the happiness of being in his presence, we show stronger affection for him, than if we endeavoured. always to enjoy his company. St. Paul writing to the Romans (ix. 3) says, “Neither death, nor life shall separate me from the love of God”; he then continues, “I wished myself to be anathema from Christ for my brethren.” St. Chrysostom, in his book, De compunctione cordis has the following commentary on these words: “The love of Christ had thus so completely conquered the heart of this Apostle, that, in order to please Him, he was ready to sacrifice His presence, which to him was the thing dear above all others.”

The third objection brought against the perfection of the episcopal state admits of a double answer. First, although a bishop holds certain possessions, he does not regard them as his own; but he distributes them as common property; and thus he does not violate evangelical perfection. On this point Prosper says (XII. quaestione 1), “It is right to possess the property of the Church and to renounce one’s own belongings for the love of perfection.”Again in the same chapter, after quoting the example of St. Paulinus, he says, “By this action we clearly learn, that it befits us to part with. our own possessions for the sake of perfection, and that, without any imperfection, we may possess the common property of the Church.”

We must bear in mind that if anyone has charge of the goods of the Church, and does not gain any personal profit from them, but only acts as a steward or dispenser, he does not fail in evangelical perfection. Were this so, abbots and superiors of monasteries would sin against their vow of poverty and would fail in religious perfection, which cannot at all be admitted. Of course, if a bishop, not content with dispensing the revenues of his see, should make himself their owner by using them to his own personal profit, he would plainly be the possessor of private property; and he would thus, fail to attain to the perfection of those who renounce everything, and live with nothing of their own. But, it may be thought that bishops fail in the evangelical perfection set forth in the words, “If you would be perfect,” etc. (Matt. xix. 21), since they are not only at liberty to possess the property of their Church, but are also free to keep their own patrimony, and to dispose of it by will. This objection is easily answered, if the preceding remarks be called to mind. As we have already said, the renunciation of riches does not constitute perfection; it is merely a means to it. It is quite possible for a man to acquire perfection, without actually giving up what he possesses. This may be made clear by the following example. our Lord, amongst other counsels of perfection, gave this: “If someone strikes you on your right cheek, turn to him the other: and if a man contends with you in judgment and takes away your coat, let him take your cloak also. And whoever forces you to go one mile, go two miles with him” (Matt. v. 39-41). But even the perfect do not obey these words literally. Nay, our Lord Himself when He suffered a blow on the face, did not turn His other cheek. He said, “If I have spoken evil, give testimony of the evil, but if well why do you strike me?” (John xviii. 23). Neither did St. Paul, when he was smitten, offer his cheek. He exclaimed, “God shall strike you, you whited wall” (Acts xxiii. 3).

Hence, we see that it. is not necessary that these counsels should be actually obeyed; but, as St. Augustine says in his book De Sermone Domini in Monte, they are to be understood as signifying the preparation of the heart. For, perfection consists in a man’s readiness to perform any work that may be required of him. In like manner St. Augustine cites in his book Quaestionum Evangelii (and we find the same in Decretis, Dist. xli.), our Lord’s words, “Wisdom is justified by all her children,” as proving that the sons of wisdom understand that justice consists neither in eating nor in abstinence, but in suffering want with patience. St. Paul expresses the same thought when he writes to the Philippians (iv. 12), “I know both how to abound and to suffer need.”

Religious learn this serenity and patience in bearing poverty, by their practice of possessing nothing. Bishops, on the other hand, may attain to it, by exercising solicitude about their church and by fraternal charity, which ought to make them willing not merely to sacrifice their money, but, if need be, their very life for their flocks. St. Chrysostom says in his Dialogue, “Monks do in truth wage a severe war.” He then adds, “For the fasting, and vigils, and other penitential exercises of the monastic state are very hard and painful. But in the episcopal state, the conflict is more felt by the soul than by the body.” The saint further, by way of example, draws a comparison between a craftsman, who, by means of various instruments, produces marvellous pieces of mechanism, and a philosopher who displays his skill merely by the operations of his intellect.

It may be urged, that bishops are bound to practise this perfection of the renunciation of riches, not in will alone, but also in deed. For, when our Lord sent His disciples on their mission, He said to them: “Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money . in your purses: nor scrip for your journey, nor two coats, nor shoes, nor a staff” (Matt. x. 9). Now, as bishops are the successors of the Apostles, they ought to obey the precept given to the Apostles. But this conclusion is clearly fallacious. For some of the most saintly bishops of the Church, whose holiness is beyond question, such as Athanasius, Hilary, and many of their successors, have not observed this command of our Lord. As St. Augustine says, in his book Contra mendacium, “We must not only bear in mind the precepts of God, but we must also be attentive to the lives and customs of the just.” For, although we fail to understand many things that are written for us, we can gather their meaning from the deeds of the saints, and thus learn in what sense we are to interpret them. It is on this account, that the Holy Spirit, Who speaks by the Scriptures, inspires the actions of the Saints. St. Paul tells us the same truth when he says, “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God (Rom. viii. 14). Hence, we have no right to conclude that what is commonly done by holy men, is contrary to the Divine commandments. our Lord, in the chapter of St. Matthew already quoted, gives a reason for His words to His Apostles, bidding them not to possess anything, nor to take anything on their journey. “The labourer,” He says, “is worthy of his hire.” Thus He gives a permission, not a command, to His disciples, to accept hospitality. Therefore, if any one of them desired not to avail himself of this permission, but preferred to carry provisions with him, be would not be disobeying a precept of his Master. For there is a difference between disobeying a command, and omitting (after the example of St. Paul) to make use of a permission.

We may further understand these words of Christ to the Apostles, by remembering that He was sending them to preach to the Jews, with whom it was customary for the teachers to Eve by the contributions of their disciples. our Lord (says St. Chrysostom) desired, first, that His disciples should be above suspicion, and should not be thought to be preaching for the sake of gain. Secondly, He wished them to be free from anxiety about material things. Thirdly, He willed that they should, by experience, learn that, without anxiety on their part, His power could provide them with all that they might need. But He acted differently on the Eve of His Passion, when He was about to send them forth to preach to the Gentiles. For, then, He said to them, “When I sent you without purse, and scrip, and shoes) did you want anything? But they said: nothing. Then said He unto them: But now he that has a purse let him take it, and likewise a scrip” (Luke xxii). These words prove that bishops, as successors of the Apostles, are not bound to possess nothing, nor to carry nothing with them on their journeys.

CHAPTER XIX

The Episcopal Office, Although A State of Greater Perfection Than is the Religious Life, Is, Nevertheless, Not to Be Coveted

ST. PAUL exhorts the Corinthians (1 Ep. xii. 31) to be “zealous for the better gifts.” Seeing, then, how far the episcopal office exceeds, in perfection, the religious life, ought men not to be more eager to be made bishops, than to become religious? If anyone who asks this question will give a little consideration to the matter, he will see that while there is abundant reason why the religious life should be desired, the episcopal office, on the contrary, should, by no means, be coveted. For he who enters religion, renounces himself together with all that belongs to him, and, for the love of God, submits himself to the government of another. On the other hand, he who is promoted to a bishopric, is raised to an exalted position in God’s kingdom upon earth. Consequently, as honour and power are not rightfully bestowed on any save on the best among men, it would be presumptuous to aspire to such a dignity.

St. Augustine, in chapter xix. De civitate Dei, says that, “the Apostle wished to explain what is meant by the episcopate, for it is a title not of honour but of labour. The Latin word episcopus (from which is derived our word episcopate) is precisely the same word as the Greek episkopos, signifying an overseer or superintendent. Hence he is no true bishop who desires to be placed above others, rather than to be of use to them. We need not disguise the truth, that the episcopate is accompanied by honourable leisure. Nevertheless, it is a sublime post, essential in the government of a people, and so much is required for the due performance of the duties connected with it, that no man possessed of common modesty, could aspire to such an office. For, although the love of truth may seek holy leisure; the necessity of charity accepts fitting employment; and if no one lay this burden upon us, we must devote ourselves to truth, both of perception and study. But if the burthen be imposed upon us, we must accept it as a duty of charity."St. Chrysostom, commenting on the words in the Gospel of St. Matthew, "the rulers of the Gentiles have dominion over them," says: "It is well to wish for a good thing, because it be according to our will, and is our reward; but it is vanity to desire a supremacy of honour. The Apostle was not exalted by God because he was an apostle, but because he duly accomplished the work of his apostolate. Worthiness of life is to be desired, not superior dignity."

We must, further, remark that the religious life leads indeed to perfection, but does not presuppose it; whereas the episcopal dignity presupposes perfection. For he who enters the episcopal state takes upon himself the office of a spiritual teacher. As St. Paul says (1 Tim. ii. 7), "I am appointed a preacher, an Apostle (I say the truth, I lie not), a teacher of the Gentiles, in faith and, truth." It would be an absurdity to undertake to teach others to be perfect, without previous personal experience of perfection. St. Gregory says in his Pastoral, "The deeds of a bishop ought to surpass those of his flock, as greatly as his life is removed from theirs." This distinction is clearly expressed by our Lord. For, when He gave the counsel of poverty, He merely said, "If you would be perfect, go, sell what you have, and give to the poor." This shows that the practice of poverty does not presuppose perfection, although it leads men to it. But when He gave St. Peter supremacy over his brethren, He said, "Simon, son of John, do you love me?" And when St. Peter answered: "You know that I love you," Christ replied, in turn, "Feed my sheep."

Hence, it is evident, that elevation to the episcopate assumes perfection in the person thus honoured; and that it would be the height of presumption, for any man to consider himself perfect. Even St. Paul says, "Not as though I had already attained or were already perfect" (Philipp. iii. 12). Again, in the same chapter, he adds, "Let us, therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded." To desire perfection, and to strive to follow after it, is not presumption. It is that holy zeal to which St. Paul exhorts us, saying, "Be, therefore, zealous for the better gifts" (1 Cor. xii. 31). Hence, it is praiseworthy to wish to embrace the religious life, although a desire for the episcopate is gross presumption. St. Gregory says, in his Pastoral, “He who has refused a bishopric has not completely resisted it; and he who has willed to be raised to it, has first seen himself cleansed by the stone of the altar.” By these words we are to understand, that a man, chosen for the episcopate, should not absolutely refuse this honour. Nor yet should he aspire to it, unless he knows that he be cleansed in preparation for it. Nor should anyone, who is not thus purified, dare to approach the sacred mysteries. Neither, if he be chosen by divine grace, for this dignity, ought he, through pride disguised as humility, to decline to accept it. But, as it is exceedingly difficult for any man to know whether he be purified or not, the safest course is to decline a bishopric.

Another point must be considered in our comparison between the religious and episcopal state The religious life implies a renunciation of earthly possessions; whereas a bishopric is accompanied by great additional wealth. They who become religious give up all they possess, thus showing that they seek not temporal but spiritual goods. They who undertake the episcopal office are frequently wont to think more of temporal, than of eternal riches. St. Gregory says in his Pastoral, “that the truly praiseworthy condition under which to accept a bishopric, would be, if a man were to know, as a certainty, that such an office would inv be severe torture.” Again, he says, “It is not every man who loves the sanctity of the episcopal office. But that sanctity is completely ignored by those, who, aspiring to such a dignity, are entranced by the idea of having others subject to them, are rejoiced at the thought of being praised, set their hearts on being honoured, and rejoice at the prospect of affluence. In such a case as that, men are coveting worldly advancement under the disguise of an office, in which it is their duty to try to extirpate earthly ambition.”

Again, we must remember that bishops are exposed to many risks. We may, on this point, again quote St. Gregory. He writes in his Pastoral, “It often happens that in the office of governing, others, a man loses the habit of good works, which he practised in private life. For on a calm sea, even an inexperienced seaman can steer a vessel; whereas, in a gale, the most experienced mariner may lose his bearings. And may not a position of great power be fitly compared to a tempest of the mind, where the heart is incessantly rocked to and fro by waves of thought, to be dashed to pieces (as by rocks) by some sudden excess of word or deed?” David is quoted by St. Gregory as an example of the dangers to which men in an exalted position are exposed. “David,” he says, “whose every act was pleasing in the sight of the Supreme Judge, became, after he was raised to kingly magnificence, puffed up with pride, and so cruelly hardened, as to cause the death of a man. He, who, in former times, refused to slay his captured enemy, was, in his later days, so led away by his desire for a woman, that, to the detriment of his, own army, he artfully caused the death of a most loyal soldier.”

He who embraces the religious life escapes the danger of sin. Hence St. Jerome, speaking in the person of a monk, writes in his Epistle against Vigilantius, “When I forsake the world, I shall not be overcome, because I have fled it; but I shall flee from it, lest by it I should be overcome. There is no security in sleeping near a serpent; for, though perchance it may not molest me, it may on the other hand inflict on me a grievous wound. Thus, it is an act of prudence to enter religious life, in order to avoid the occasions of sin. But he who aspires to the episcopate, has either the extreme presumption to consider that he will be safe in the midst of dangers, or else he is so heedless of his salvation, that he cares not to escape from the occasions of sinning.” Hence, we must conclude, that, although the episcopal office be a state of perfection, it cannot, without the sin of covetousness, be desired.

CHAPTER XX

Arguments Used by Certain Men to Prove That Parish Priests and Archdeacons Are in A State of Higher Perfection Than Are Religious. Answers to These Arguments

THERE are certain men, who, not content with teaching that the episcopate is a condition of superior perfection to the religious life, also maintain that deans, parish priests, archdeacons, and all others entrusted with the care of souls, are in a more perfect state than are religious. They base their arguments on various grounds.

First, they quote the following words of St. Chrysostom. (Dialogue, lib. VT). “Let any man show me a monk resembling even Elijah, and let us grant that this monk, living alone, without annoyance or vexation of any kind, is not troubled by temptation, and does not fall into grave sin. I tell you, nevertheless, that such a man is not to be compared to one, who, although the minister of the people, and laden with the sins of men, perseveres with energy and fidelity.” These words naturally convey the impression that no monk, howsoever perfect he may be, can bear comparison with a priest who is entrusted with the cure of souls, and who discharges his trust with diligence. Again, St. Chrysostom says, “Were I given my choice as to whether I would prefer to serve God in the functions of the priesthood, or in monastic solitude, I should, without hesitation, choose the first of these conditions.” Hence the cure of souls is, indubitably, to be preferred to religious solitude, which is reckoned as the most perfect state of life.

Again, St. Augustine, in his epistle to Valerius, says, “Do thou, in your religious prudence, mark well the following truth. Of all things in the world, especially in our days, there is nothing so easy, so pleasant, so attractive to human nature, as to be a perfunctory and time-serving bishop, priest, or deacon. Yet, in the eyes of God, no sight is so execrable, so sad, or so worthy of condemnation, as these sacred offices fulfilled in such a manner. On the other hand, there is nothing in life, especially in our days, more difficult, more laborious or more beset by danger, than is the office of bishop, priest, or deacon. Yet, in the eyes of God, no one presents a more glorious spectacle, than he who, in such an office, fights manfully, according to the precepts of our Sovereign Master.” Hence, the religious life is not a more perfect state than is that of priests or deacons, who have the cure of souls, and whose duty it is to mingle with men.

Again, St. Augustine says to Aurelius, “It is, indeed, lamentable, if we puff monks up with pride, and decry the dignity of the clergy, to whose order we belong. Shall we suffer ignorant people to say of us: ‘a bad monk will make a good cleric,’ when as we know that even a good monk is not always a good cleric?” The perfection of a good cleric is, therefore, greater than is that of a good monk. The same Saint had previously written, “We must not open a way to the servants of God (i.e., to monks), whereby they may think that it may be easier for them to be chosen for some better office (i.e., for some clerical post), if, by such a step, leaving their monastery they should grow worse.” The clerical office is, consequently, better than the monastic state. In the same spirit St. Jerome writes to Rusticus, “So live in your monastery, that you may deserve to be made a cleric.” The clerical office is, therefore, superior to the monastic life.

Again, it is not permissible to pass from a higher to a lower state. Nevertheless, it is lawful to pass from the monastic life to that of a cleric, entrusted with the cure of souls. We learn this fact from the words of Pope Gelasius (XVI. question I), “If there be any monk, who, by virtue of his holy life, should seem worthy to be raised to the priesthood, and if the abbot, under whose rule such a monk is fighting in the army of Christ, should beg this favour for him from the bishop, that monk ought to be chosen. Further a monk so elected, whether by the bishop or the people, must discreetly and uprightly fulfil all the duties of the priesthood in the place wherein it shall have seemed good to ordain him.” Several other rules about the same matter are laid down in this chapter and in dist. 47. Hence, it is plain to all men, that the state of any clerics, and especially of such as have the care of souls, is superior to the religious life.

Now the reasons for these propositions will be easily perceived, if we recall to mind (what has already been said. We have seen that a perfect work is one thing, and a perfect state another. The state of perfection does nothing save impose perpetual obligation of accomplishing those things which pertain to perfection. Now, many accomplish the works of perfection, without any vow; thus, many observe continence and practise poverty.

We must also remember that, in speaking of priests and archdeacons charged with the cure of souls, two points must be taken into consideration, to wit, the office of the cure of souls, and the dignity of their orders. Now, as parish priests and archdeacons often leave their parishes and archidiaconates to go into religion, it is clear, that, by accepting the cure of souls, they do not contract any perpetual obligation. But, from what has been already said, we know that no state of perfection can exist without a perpetual obligation. Hence, we cannot say that archdeacons, or parish priests, or candidates for ordination, have embraced a state of perfection, any more than we can say that novices, before their profession, have embraced this state.

It may, however, happen, as we have already observed, that a man who does not live in a state of perfection may perform works of perfection, and may be perfect according to the habit of charity. Thus, archdeacons and parish priests may be perfect according to the habit of charity, and may share in certain offices of perfection, although they are not living in a perfect state. A token that they are not living in a state of perfection lies in the fact that, when a man is deputed to, or bound in perpetuity to, some office, this obligation is imposed upon him with the accompaniment of some ecclesiastical solemnity. For instance, bishops are consecrated, and religious received to profession by an ancient rite of the Church, as Dionysius observes (de Eclesiast. Hierarch. cap. VI.). Nothing of the sort, however, takes place at the election of an archdeacon or parish priest He is invested, merely, with a ring, or some other symbol of the same description. Hence it is clear that no archdeacon, or parish priest embraces a state implying perpetual obligation. This conclusion will enable us easily to answer the arguments wherewith this chapter began.

When St. Chrysostom says, “Even if you can show me a monk, who vies with Elias in holiness, he is not to be compared to a priest who is compelled to bear the sins of his people,” it is clear that the Saint is not drawing a comparison. between the priesthood and the religious state. He only wishes (as we shall see if we read the context of the words) to point out that the difficulty~of perseverance in virtue, is far greater for one set over a flock, than for a monk in solitude. St. Chrysostom does not say absolutely, that a monk is not to be compared to a priest who bears the sine of his people upon his shoulders. What he says, is, that the perseverance of a monk, who, living a solitary life, is not tempted, and does not fall into grievous sin, is not to be compared to the constancy of a priest who perseveres, with valour and fidelity, though surrounded on all sides by his people. The courage of self-defence is chiefly shown in positions of great danger. Hence, St. Chrysostom prefaces the remark which we have quoted, by saying, “The mariner who is able to save his vessel when she is in danger of being submerged by a tempest, is deservedly held by. all men to be an experienced seaman.” In the same manner we may say, that he who is able to live uprightly in the midst of bad men, gives proof of greater virtue than he who leads a worthy life amongst good men. Hence, St. Peter says, in praise of Lot (2 Pet. ii. 8), that “in sight and hearing he was just: dwelling among them, who, from day to day, vexed the just soul with unjust works.” But we cannot say, that to live among wicked men belongs to the state of perfection, since, according to the teaching of the Holy Scripture, prudence instructs us to shun their company. We see, then, that the state of priests, charged with the care of souls, is not more perfect; but that it is more exposed to danger, than is that of religious.

This gives us the key to those other words of St. Chrysostom which were quoted above, “If I were given my choice of pleasing God in the performance of the duties of the priesthood, or in monastic solitude, I should unhesitatingly choose to please Him in the priestly office.” The Saint does not say that he would rather be a priest than a monk, but that he would prefer to please God rather as a priest than as a monk. For, it is more difficult to avoid sin in the performance of the sacerdotal functions, than in the solitude of a monastery. As we have before said, the greater the perils which we encounter, the greater the virtue that we exhibit. But, although a wise man must desire that his virtue were so solid as to remain intact in the midst of danger, no one but a fool would, on account of its danger, prefer a perilous position to one more secure. St. Augustine, in words already cited, points out that no duties can be more laborious and more beset by danger, than are those of bishops, priests, and deacons; though, if these duties be rightly performed they are the most agreeable offering that can be made to God. It is because it is so difficult to avoid sin in the episcopate or priesthood, that a virtuous bishop or priest is so acceptable to God. This, however, does not prove that the state of parish priests or archdeacons, is one of higher perfection than is that of religious.

To all the arguments which follow those which we have been answering, there is but one reply which is the same for all. In the quotations given above, the authors cited do not compare the religious state to the state of parish priests, but the state of monks, as monks, to the clerical state. For monks are not necessarily clerics. There are multitudes of lay brethren. Indeed, in former days almost all monks were laymen (cf. XVI, quiest. I). It is plain that the clergy occupy a higher position in the Church than do laymen. Hence, when a layman is chosen for the priesthood, he is promoted to a superior rank than that which he already holds; and, as he ascends to a higher position, he naturally requires more virtue to be a good cleric than to be a good layman, although, as a layman, he was a monk. But a monk who becomes a priest, is, at the same time, both in the clerical and in the religious state; just as a priest who has the care of souls is invested with both the pastorate and the priesthood. When, therefore, parish priests are said to be in a superior position to monks, it does not mean, that, regarded merely as parish priests, they are superior to monks. It means, that if they perform their duties well, and live without sin, they give proof, as we have already said, of a greater degree of virtue, than does a monk who lives innocently in his monastery. But if a religious be entrusted with the care of souls in a parish church, this does not prove that the state of parish priests, as parish priests, is more perfect than is that of religious. For the religious who takes charge of a parish is not, on that account, released from his religious life. In Gratian, XIV, Quest. I, De monachis, we find the following words: “We ordain that they, who after living long in monasteries, are enrolled among the clergy, are not, for that reason, to quit their former life.” Hence, there is no proof, that the state of a priest entrusted with the cure of souls, is more perfect than is that of a religious; for, religious may accept this same office while remaining in their orders. They, however, who are promoted to the episcopate, ascend to a higher position.

CHAPTER XXI

Other Arguments Used to Overthrow the Conclusion At Which We Have Arrived

AFTER I had finished writing that upon which I have just been engaged, certain objections to my arguments came to my ears made by men who are too fond of disputing, to bestow much reflection either upon what they say or what they hear. In order to confute their arguments, I must return to what has already been said.

First, these objectors endeavour to prove, by divers arguments, that archdeacons and parish priests are in a higher and more perfect state than are religious. For, if a priest fall into sin, he is ordered by the Canons to be deposed from his state (cf. Gratian, LXXXI, distinction: “Si quis amodo episcopus” and XIV. Quest. IV: “Si quis oblitus”). Hence he must have been in a certain state, or he could not be deposed from it. Now a state can be used in a threefold signification. First, it implies uprightness of life; the elect are spoken of as “standing in justice.” St. Gregory says (VII. Moral.), “They who sin by mischievous words, fall from the state of rectitude.” Again, a state conveys an idea of permanence and, stability, as we see from the words of St. Gregory (VIII. Moral.), “It is the care and protection of our Creator that keeps us in a state of being.”Again, in the ninth Homily (2nd part) on Ezechiel, “A stone is square; and, by means of each of its four sides, it is kept in such a state, that it will not fall, howsoever its position may be altered.” State (derived from stare and stando) also signifies greatness or length. Now archdeacons and parish priests have a certain spiritual greatness, since, on account of. their zeal, they undertake the cure of souls. They, likewise, give proofs of stability, for they remain firm and constant in the midst of dangers. They are further upright in intention, and just in their dealings Why, then, should we deny that they are in a state of perfection. Thus, St. Paul writes to Timothy (1 Ep. v. 17), “Let the priests who rule well,” to wit by good life and doctrine, “be esteemed worthy of a double honour”; let them, that is to say, be obeyed in spiritual matters, and be provided for in their temporal wants. If, then, before the existence of religious orders, priests were in a state of perfection, the same must also be the case since the religious life has been established.

It is further said, that in the days of St. Jerome, the titles bishops and priests were synonymous. The following words of this Saint (super Epist. ad Titum) are quoted in proof of this assertion: “Formerly bishop and priest were one and tho same, but now, it is decreed throughout the whole world, that one man should be set over priests, in order that the seeds of schism may be extirpated.” If, then, the episcopate be a state of greater perfection than the religious life, why is not the priesthood, likewise, a state of greater perfection?

Again, the more sublime and important the ecclesiastical office to which a man is appointed, the higher his state is accounted. Now, archdeacons and parish priests exercise a more exalted office than do religious. For, although the contemplative life be the safer, the active life is by far the more fruitful of the two (cf. Gratian, Extra de renuntiatione: Nisi cum pridem). It follows therefore, that parish priests are in a state of greater perfection than is the case with religious.

Further, our Lord says, “Greater love than this has no man, that a man lay down his life for his friend” (John xv. 13). Now, good parish priests do sacrifice their lives for their flocks, and make themselves the servants of their people. In this they imitate St. Paul, who says (1 Cor. ix. 19), “For, whereas I was free as to all, I made myself the servant of all.”It would seem, then, that theirs must be the greater merit, since theirs is the severer toil. “I have laboured more abundantly than all they,” says St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 15). And again he writes, “Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labour “(1 Cor., iii. 8). Hence, parish priests should be regarded as in a more perfect state than religious. The same must be said of archdeacons; for the seven deacons elected by the Apostles were in a state of eminent perfection. We are told (Acts vi. 3), “Wherefore, brethren, look ye out among you seven men of good repute, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business.” On which words

Venerable Bede says in his Gloss, “The Apostles designed that the Churches should establish seven deacons, who should be in a superior position to others, and who should stand round the altar, like columns.” If they were to be superior to others, and if they were to be set apart as columns round the altar, they must have been in a state of perfection. Now, according to the Gloss of Ven. Bede, their representatives are the archdeacons, who themselves minister, and who also superintend the ministry of others. Hence, it would appear that archdeacons are in a state of higher perfection than are the parish priests, over whom they are set; and that they are, consequently, in a more perfect state than are religious.

It would be absurd to say that the holy martyrs and deacons Lawrence and Vincent were not in a state of perfection. Parish priests, then, and archdeacons resemble bishops, rather than monks and religious, who are in the lowest rank of subjection. Hence, priests are sometimes called by the name of bishops as appears from Acts xx., “Take heed to yourselves and to t he whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost has placed you bishops, to rule the church of God.”These words are considered by the Gloss to have been addressed to the priests of Ephesus. This is, consequently, a still further proof that parish priests are in a state of perfection.

Again, as we know from Gratian, XII. quest. I, cap. Expdit, that the administration of the goods of the Church is not detrimental to the state of perfection, since these goods are common property it is clear that neither parish priests nor archdeacons fail in perfection, because they have the management of ecclesiastical revenues. Furthermore, both parish priests and archdeacons are bound to exercise hospitality (cf. Gratian, XLII, distinct cap. I), which a monk cannot do, as he possesses nothing of his own. Therefore, a parish priest gains more merit than does a monk. St. Gregory says that, “there is no sacrifice so agreeable to God as zeal for souls.” St. Bernard, likewise, in his book De amore Dei, says that, “the love of God is strongest in him who draws most souls to God.” This saying applies to an archdeacon, or parish priest, but not to a monk, who has no duty of leading souls to God.

Further, a patriarch rules in his patriarchate, and a bishop in his see. In the same manner, an archdeacon governs in his archidiaconate; and a parish priest in his parish. But what (with the exception of ordinations) does a bishop do that a parish priest does not likewise do? (cf. Gratian, dist. XCIII.

cap. Legiraus). All that is said, according to the fourteen Apostolic rules, about bishops or bishops elect, is equally applicable to parish priests and archdeacons (Gratian, LXXXI, dist. cap. I.). If, then, a bishop be in a state of greater perfection than a monk, the same fact must be true of a parish priest, and also of an archdeacon. Again, it is appointed (Gratian, LXXXI, dist. cap. Dictum est, et cap. Si quis clericus), that a lapsed priest or deacon is to be banished from his office, and imprisoned in a monastery, to do penance. Hence, it would appear as though the condition of an archdeacon or parish priest is truly to be called a state; where entrance into religion is not a state but rather a degradation or downfall.

These are the chief objections, though placed in a somewhat different order, which I have been able to gather from the writings of those who argue against me.

As we have already shown that archdeacons and parish priests are not in a state of perfection, we must now examine what answer has been made to the proofs which we have brought forward in support of our proposition. It has been said that entrance into any state of perfection, is accompanied by some solemn rite or blessing; and that this is not the case with the election of a parish priest or archdeacon. Now this is, by our adversaries, denied on several grounds. First, they say that the same words are used in the ordination of a priest as in the consecration of a bishop, to wit, “May these hands, O Lord, be consecrated and sanctified,” etc. When we point out that the head of a bishop is anointed with oil, but that priests do not receive this unction, they reply that this fact does not touch the matter in hand; for kings, who lay no claim to a state of perfection, are anointed. Again, they say that merit lies not in consecration, but in good works; and that, when a bad man is raised to the episcopate, he, by his consecration, incurs a greater chastisement. For it is not they who receive the greatest honour who are the most righteous, but they are the greatest whose justice is greatest (cf. Gratian, dist. cap. Multi). And in the same distinction it is remarked, that, “it is not places nor offices which give us access to our Creator, but that virtue unites us to Him; whereas sin separates us from Him. Neither are they to be considered the children of the Saints who occupy the places of the Saints, but they, rather, who do the work of the Saints.” Bishops, then, because their consecration is greater, are not, therefore, in a more perfect state than priests who have cure of souls.

Again, it is urged, that the anointing of the head is a sign of a certain rank in the priesthood. For the episcopate is not a new order but a grade of Orders; otherwise there would be more orders than seven. Now the perfection of charity is a question not of rank, but of holiness. Hence bishops, who, by the unction of the head are raised to a superior grade of the priesthood, are not thereby placed in a more perfect state. Again, a bishop appoints an archdeacon, a parish priest or a curate by giving him a ring or a book, as is laid down in "De sententia et re judicata," just as when the pope sends anyone to be attached. to any church as a canon or brother, he desires him to be appointed with complete honours, as we learn in Extra de concessione ecclesiae, cap. Proposuit. Thus, the state of parish priests or archdeacons appears to be a true state from which a man can be ejected.

CHAPTER XXII

Showing That the Liability to Suspension Does Not Suffice to Prove, That Parish Priests Or Archdeacons Are in A State of Perfection

MANY objections are made to the proposition, that archdeacons or parish priests are not in a state of perfection because they can, without sin, resign their office. We are told, first, that pastors of souls may resign their posts and retire into religion; because while the pastorate is a more useful and more perfect state than the religious, the religious life is the safer of the two. In proof of this, the passage, Nisi cum priden from Extra de renuntiat. is quoted. A husband may not put his wife away against her will, in order to become a religious (Extra de conversione conjugatorum, cap. Uxoratus). This, however is not because the married state is more perfect than, or even equal to, the religious, but because a husband binds himself indissolubly to his wife. And, a pari, the fact that a parish priest can pass into the religious life, does not prove that the religious state exceeds, or even equals, the pastorate in perfection.

The example of David is also alleged as an argument against our proposition. Being unable to meet Saul with ordinary armour, which would have been too heavy for him, David provided himself with lowlier weapons, to wit with a sling and stones; and with these alone he overthrew the mighty Philistine. After this example, a parish priest may, likewise, take to himself arms of greater humility, i.e., he may transfer himself from his own more perfect state to the religious life.

It is further objected, that, if the essence of a state depend upon the fact that that state cannot be changed, it would not be lawful for a man to pass from one state to another. Hence, immutability is not essential to a state. Again, according to the written law, a prelate can recall to a parish one of his priests who has entered religion, if he know that he is likely to be of use in the diocese; and if a priest go into a monastery, without the consent of his bishop, he is liable to a canonical penance (Extra de renuntiatione, cap. Amovet; et de privilegiis et exceau privilegiatorum, can. Cum et plantare in ecclesiis, and VII. Quest. I. can. Episcopus de loco). Hence, it is not true to say, that the religious state is more perfect than that of parish priests, because the latter can embrace the religious life. But, on the other band, a monk may, for the good of the Church, and for the welfare of souls, pass from the religious life to a secular church with parish work (XVI. quaest I. cap. Vos autem, and cap. Monachos). For, the profit of many is to be preferred to the advantage of a individual (VII. q. 1. cap. Scias).

Again, the fact that men are liable to fall from th perfection of charity, is no proof that they neve were in the perfection of charity. Their fall is rather a witness to the contrary. Hence, the laps of a parish priest does not prove that before his sin he was not in a state of perfection.

An ecclesiastical decree, promulgated in the time of Pope Innocent, forbids prelates of the highest rank (i.e. bishops) to become religious, without the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff. This appears in the decretal Extra de renuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem. But before the promulgation of this decree, the highest in the Church as well as the lowest, were free to become religious; and yet bishops are in a more perfect state than are the inferior clergy. The fact, then, that parish priests can become religious without the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff, does not prevent their being in a more perfect state than are religious.

Again, no one can be consecrated bishop who has not already received Holy Orders (LX. distinct. Nullus in episcopun). But no ordained person can marry. Hence it is untrue to say that a bishop elect can marry.

CHAPTER XXIII

An Answer to the Foregoing Arguments, in Which An Attempt Was Made to Show That Archdeacons and Parish Priests Are in A Higher Degree of Perfection Than Are Religious

WE will now carefully examine each of the arguments quoted in the last chapter, in order to show how truly they may be set aside, as frivolous, absurd, and erroneous.

First. We are told that certain canonical decrees prove that archdeacons and pastors of souls are in a fixed state. This argument is worthless, for the Canons in question speak, not of the state, of the clergy, but of their rank. The words used in distinction LXXXI are, “Henceforth, should any bishop, priest, or deacon, take a wife, or keep one whom he has married, let him be degraded from his rank.”Again (in XIV, question IV, can. “Si quis dicetur”), we find the following passage, “If any man, forgetful of the Law of the Lord, and of the words of Holy Scripture ‘who has not given his money out at usury’ shall, after the constitution of the Great Council, have committed usury, or received interest on his money, or enriched himself by any dishonest practice, or by selling or buying wine, corn or property of any kind, let him be degraded from his rank; and let him be considered an outcast from the clergy.” Thus, these words cannot be understood to speak of clerical state, but of that clerical rank which must necessarily exist. For, wheresoever there be any order or superiority, there must be specified degrees of rank.

With regard to the second argument, we may say that its absurdity is so patent, that none can fail to see it. No one doubts that the word state is used with several meanings. For he who is erect is said to stand. We also distinguish between the state of beginners, of proficients, and of the perfect. To stand also means to be firm. Thus St. Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 58), “Be steadfast and immoveable: always abounding in the work of the Lord.” But this is not the usual way in which the word state is used. We employ it, rather, to indicate a certain condition; we say, a state of liberty, or a state of slavery. It is made use of in this sense in II, Quest. VI., where these words occur, “If we should by chance be appealed to in a capital charge, or in a suit concerning a state, we must act at our own discretion, not by means of examiners.” If we accept the word state in this sense, it is true to say, that they embrace the state of perfection who, as we have before said, bind themselves to the service of works of perfection. This cannot be the case save by a vow, implying a perpetual obligation of service or servitude, as opposed to liberty. As long, then, as a man is free to abandon the works of perfection, he is not in a state of perfection.

The third objection is, likewise, so frivolous, that it would seem hardly to need an answer. In the words, “Priests who govern well,”there is no mention either of a state, or of perfection. Government does not indicate a state, but a rank. Honour is due, not only to perfection, but to all who do good works; and this fact is shown by the very words, “they who govern well.” We read, also, in the Epistle to the Romans (ii. 10), “Glory and peace and honour to everyone who does good.”

The fourth argument contains a manifest untruth. We are told, that, in the days of Sts. Jerome and Augustine, a bishop and priest were one and the same. Now, St. Augustine expressly says the opposite in his epistle ad Hieronymum. We give his words. “Although,” he says, “in the language of good men, which has become current in the Church, the episcopate is accounted greater than the priesthood, it is nevertheless, in many things less.” But as some men may deny, that, in the days of St. Jerome, bishops were generally regarded as superior to priests, we will quote the authority of Dionysius, who wrote concerning the order of ecclesiastical hierarchy, as it was established in the primitive Church. These are his words: “There are three orders in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to wit, bishops, priests, and deacons” (V. cap. Eccl. hierarch.). We may remark, that the same writer speaks of deacons as composing the purifying order, of priests as forming the illuminative order, and of bishops as being the order producing perfection. “There are further,” he continues, “three other orders corresponding to the three already mentioned. For, the order of the unpurified is subject to that of the deacons, whose duty it is to cleanse. The order of those needing light (i.e., the holy people of God) is subject to the order of priests, whose office it is to illuminate by the administration of the Sacraments. The order of the perfect (i.e., the monks) is subject to the order of bishops, and is by them, instructed in, and elevated to, sublime perfection.” Hence, we see that Dionysius attributes perfection only to bishops and monks: to bishops as to the more perfect, to monks as perfect. But, lest anyone should make the objection, that he describes an ecclesiastical hierarchy established by the Apostles, whereas, by the institution of our Lord, bishops and priests were one and the same, we will disprove this fallacy by quoting the words of the Gloss on St. Luke (x. 1), “After these things the Lord appointed, etc.” The Gloss observes that, “whereas the first order, that of the bishops, is represented by the Apostles, the second order, that of the priesthood, is typified by the seventy-two disciples.”

It is strange how those who uphold this argument, appear to misunderstand simple words. They assert, that it is only since the days of St. Jerome, that bishops have been distinguished from priests. Yet, if anyone will examine the Old Law, of which the priesthood prefigured our priesthood, he will see that the High Priests were an order distinct from the priests. It is stated (distinct. XXI. cap. De quibus), that, “The High Priests and inferior priests were instituted by Moses, who, at the bidding of the Lord, anointed Aaron to be High Priest, and his sons inferior priests.”This passage proves that the words of St. Jerome have been misinterpreted. For, the Saint does not say, that in the primitive Church the order, or state, of the episcopate and that of the priesthood was one and the same. What he says is, that the same word was used to designate the two orders. For priests spoke of bishops, literally, as superintendents; and bishops used the same word of priests, on account of their priestly dignity. Hence Isidore says (and it is laid down, distinct. XXI, cap. Cleros) that, “the inferior clergy, although priests, have not attained to the highest dignity of the pontificate; for their foreheads are not anointed with chrism; neither have they power to confer the Holy Ghost, a power, as we know from the Acts of the Apostles, reserved to bishops. Hence (he concludes), in the early Church the same word was used both for bishops and priests; for the name denotes dignity and not age.” There is a difference in the thing signified; but the same word is, on account of the priestly dignity, used both for bishops and priests, In later times, however, it was found necessary, for the removal of a schism, arising from the similarity of name, to make a distinction in the appellation of the ranks of the clergy. Since then, the superior priesthood only has been called the episcopate; and the inferior clergy are known, simply, as priests.

The argument brought forward in the fifth objection is not tenable. The contemplative life is superior to the active, not, merely, because it is more secure, but simply because it is better. This, our Lord’s own words point out: “Mary has chosen the better part” (Luke x. 43). And in so far as contemplation is superior to activity, so much the more would he seem to do for God, who, at the expense of his much loved contemplation, devotes himself, for God’s sake, to his neighbour’s salvation. Hence, it is a proof of a greater perfection of charity, to be willing, for the love of God and of our neighbour, to labour for the salvation of others, even though, by so doing, contemplation be somewhat impaired, than to cleave so closely to the sweetness of contemplation as to be unwilling to sacrifice it, even for the salvation of others. St. Paul was so zealous for the salvation of his brethren, that he desired, for their sake, not merely the prolongation of this present life, but also the temporary postponement of the Beatific vision. His own words to the Philippians (i. 23) are a proof of his disposition. “I am straitened,” he says, “between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, a thing by far the better. But to abide still in the flesh, is needful for you.”

If by perfection of charity we mean (according to the teaching of St. Augustine), preparation of heart, many who lead a contemplative life have attained to a degree of charity not found in some who are entirely occupied in labouring for the salvation of their neighbour. For, many contemplatives are ready, in order to please God, to suspend for a time their cherished contemplation, in order to devote themselves to the welfare of their brethren. Whereas, those who are busied in exterior works, are often led to engage in them, rather from the tedium which they experience in contemplation, than from the desire of attaining to the fulness of divine love, which would induce them to lay aside for a time that contemplation which is their delight. But, the faults of individuals do not detract from the merit of any state or office; and care for the salvation of others must always be esteemed an act of perfection, since it pertains to the love, both of God, and of our neighbour.

But, here we must remember, that not everyone who performs acts of perfection, is necessarily in a state of perfection. No one doubts, that a life of virginity pertains to perfection. our Lord says of it: “He that can take let him take” (Matt. xix. 12). And St. Paul writes to the Corinthians, (1 Ep. vii. 25), “Concerning virgins I have no commandment from the Lord, but I give a counsel.” Now there are counsels concerning the works of perfection; nevertheless a life of virginity without a vow, does not constitute a state of perfection. St. Augustine says, in his book, De virginibus, “Virginity is not honoured because it is virginity, but because it is dedicated to God. And by this consecration, even virginity of the body, preserved by piety, becomes spiritual.”And, again, he says, “That continence is to be numbered among the goods of the soul, by which the body is preserved inviolate, for the Creator of soul and body, and which is dedicated and consecrated to Him.”

Now, it is clear, that neither archdeacons nor parish priests, even if they are entrusted with the care of souls, are bound by vow to that office. If they were, they could not relinquish an archidiaconate or a parish, without a dispensation from him who has power to annul perpetual vows. Hence, although an archdeacon, or a parish priest performs a work of perfection or accepts a position involving such work, he is, nevertheless, not in a state of perfection. And, if we reflect carefully, we shall see that the religious life is, really, the state of perfection; since, by the vow of their order, religious are obliged, more strictly than are archdeacons or priests, to submit to their bishops, in all that regards the cure of souls, such as preaching and hearing confessions.

With regard to the sixth objection, we declare that, as has been already shown, it is untrue to say that there cannot be increase, or perfection of charity, in a person who is not living in a state of perfection. Some men live in a state of perfection, while their charity is either very imperfect, or does not exist; for there are many religious and bishops living in a state of mortal sin. But, on the other hand, the fact that there are many good parish priests, whose charity is perfect, and who are ready to lay down their lives for others, does not prove that they are in a state of perfection. For there are many laymen, even married people, who have attained to such perfection of charity, that they, also, are willing to die for their neighbour. This virtue, however, does not prove such persons to be in a state of perfection.

As for the seventh objection, viz. that the deacons pointed by the Apostles were in a state of perfection, there is no proof of the truth of this assertion, either in the text of the Bible, or in the Gloss. We are told that the deacons were “filled with the Holy Spirit and with wisdom”; but this merely shows, that they possessed that perfection of grace which may exist in those who are not in a state of perfection. And the fact that they ministered around the altar, only points out that they held a certain high rank in the Church. For, as we have before said, there is a difference between a state and a rank. It is, nevertheless, true that the deacons were in that state of perfection, to which our Lord referred when He said, “If you will be perfect, go, sell what you hast, and follow Me” (Matt. xix. 21). For the deacons followed Christ, forsaking all things, and possessing nothing of their own, but having all things in common (Acts iv.). It is on their example that religious orders are moulded.

In the eighth objection it is maintained that the archdeacons SS. Stephen, Lawrence, and Vincent, were in a state of perfection. They most certainly were. But this state was due, not to the fact that they were archdeacons, but that they were martyrs. Martyrdom surpasses all religious perfection. St. Augustine in his book De virginibus, says, “Ecclesiastical authority gives us the plainest evidence of this fact. For, by the authority of the Church, it is made known to the faithful, in what places the names of martyrs and of holy women deceased, are mentioned at the mysteries of the altar.” Yet, I say, that even though Sebastian and George were in a state of perfection, we cannot, on their account, call the military life a state of perfection.

The ninth objection brought against us, is, that parish priests and archdeacons resemble bishops rather than religious. This is true as regards their work, to wit the care of souls committed to them. But it is not the case with regard to that perpetual obligation, which is essential to a state of perfection. From the point of view of obligation, religious, as has been pointed out, resemble bishops more closely than do archdeacons or parish priests.

We fully agree with the tenth proposition, viz. that the administration of ecclesiastical property does not detract from the state of perfection. Were this the case, the superiors and ministers of temporal affairs in religious orders would become imperfect. But perfection is weakened in those who do not renounce all that they possess, for the sake of Christ, and who make a profit out of the revenues of the Church, as if they were their own property.

They who put forward the eleventh objection, are plainly led astray by the folly of Vigilantius, against whom St. Jerome thus writes, “Those who assert that it is more perfect to keep the use of their own goods and to distribute their income among the poor in driblets, rather than to renounce and give away all their possessions at once, must take their answer, not from me, but from the Lord, who said, ‘If you would be perfect, go, sell all that you have, and give to the poor, and come follow me.’ He is speaking to those who desire to be perfect, and who, with the Apostles, leave father, boat, and net. He whose example you praise, is in the second or third rank of perfection.” Further, it is incorrect to say that archdeacons and parish priests are more perfect than monks, because they show hospitality and monks do not. For, as religious renounce all that they possess, they have no means of entertaining guests.

The twelfth argument, viz. that the most agreeable offering that can be made to God is zeal for souls, is undoubtedly true. But a certain order must be observed in this zeal. A man must, first, have zeal for his own soul, and strip it of all earthly affections in accordance with those words of the wise man (Eccles. xxx. 24), “Have pity on thine own soul, pleasing God.” This duty is pointed out by St. Augustine (XXI. De civitate Dei). Now, if a man, having arrived at contempt for earthly concerns, and even for himself, proceed, further, to zeal for the soul of others, he will, thereby, offer a more perfect sacrifice to God, than he would have presented by zeal only for his own salvation. But the most perfect of all offerings that can be made to the Almighty, is the obligation, whereby bishops and religious are bound, by vow or profession, to live a life of zeal for souls.

The thirteenth argument, viz. that, as a patriarch presides in his patriarchate, and a bishop in his see, so, likewise, an archdeacon rules in his archidiaconate, and a pastor in his parish, is manifestly faulty. For, a bishop rules the whole of his diocese; whereas archdeacons and parish priests have their sphere of government allotted to them by their bishop; they are, so to speak, his lieutenants, The Gloss, commenting on the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. xii. 28), “helps, governments,” interprets these “helps” as coadjutors to their superiors as was Titus to St. Paul, or as archdeacons are to their bishops. “Governments,” according to the Gloss, signify the clergy of inferior rank, such as priests, whose duty it is to teach. This interpretation is borne out by the words used by the bishop in the ordination of priests: “Inasmuch as we are weaker than they (i.e. than the Apostles), by so much the more do we need these helps.” Hence, it is laid down (XVI. Quest. I. cap. Cunctis), “That all priests, deacons and other clerics, must do nothing, without the permission of their own bishop.” Thus, without the license of his bishop, a priest cannot celebrate Mass, nor baptize in his own parish. This rule is again established in distinct. LXXX., “Priests shall do nothing without the command and advice of their bishop.”

The fourteenth objection bears witness to the sentiments of those that make it. It is founded on the fact, that priests when guilty of heinous crimes, are imprisoned in monasteries. “When crafty people say what is true,” observes St. Gregory (X. Moral.), “it is very difficult for them to conceal their secret ambition.” Those who bring forward the argument about the imprisonment of criminal priests, conclude that priests are in a state of perfection in which monks are not, because guilty priests are condemned to a rigorous penance, which innocent religious voluntarily embrace. But that state is highest before God which is the most lowly in the eyes of the world. For, “he who humbles himself shall be exalted” (Luke xiv. 11), and “God has chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith and heirs of the Kingdom” (James ii. 5). But those who are ambitious of the glory of this world, reckon earthly honour to be a state; and they account as abject, whatsoever the world despises.

CHAPTER XXIV

An Answer to the Argument, Whereby Certain Persons Endeavour to Prove, That the Defect of A Solemn Blessing Or Consecration Does Not Hinder Archdeacons Or Parish Priests From Being in A State of Perfection

WE have already shown the absurdity of the arguments, on which is based the theory that archdeacons and parish priests are in a more perfect state than are religious. We will now, therefore, point out the frivolity of the objections raised against the proposition, that a man is placed in a state of perfection by means of a solemn blessing or consecration.

But, first, we must remember that a solemn rite of this nature, is not a cause, but a sign, of a state of perfection. It is not bestowed on any save on those who are entering some state of life; though that state need not necessarily be one of perfection. Those who are joined in matrimony embrace a state, in which neither husband nor wife will hereafter belong to themselves (1 Cor. vii.). For, matrimony is a perpetual bond uniting one to the other. Hence, the Church, to signify this state of perpetuity (though it be not a state of perfection), pronounces a solemn nuptial blessing over man and wife. In the same way, when a state is changed in social life, a certain form is used; thus, when a slave receives his freedom a deed of manumission is drawn up.

We are not speaking at random. For, all that we say, is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, who says (VI. cap. Eccles. hieiarch.) that, “our divine masters (to wit the Apostles), have vouchsafed to distinguish men by certain holy appellations,” namely, those who are in the state of the perfect; “some are servants, while others are called monks by reason of their pure service and ministry to God, and their single and undivided life which unites them, by holy ties, to godlike unity and perfection most pleasing to God. On this account, the holy law has given them perfect grace, and has deemed them worthy of invocation.” We are, also, expressly told, that, as monks embrace a state of perfection, they are blessed by a solemn rite, handed down by Apostolical tradition.

The argument, that both in the consecration of a bishop and in the ordination of a priest, the same words are used, viz., “may these hands be sanctified and consecrated,”is irrelevant to our point. For, we are not now speaking of a priest in his priestly character. For, by his solemn consecration, he is placed not in a state of perfection, be it active or passive, but (as Dionysius tells us), in an illuminative state. We are speaking of a priest, in so far as he receives a certain charge or commission. And, when this charge is laid upon him, it is not accompanied by any special blessing; for he does not, by it, embrace a state, but merely accepts an office. A bishop, on the other hand, is solemnly consecrated to the pastoral office, by reason of the perpetual obligation, whereby be binds himself to it.

With regard to the second objection (viz., that regarding the anointing of kings), we answer that this unction was a sign, that be who received it, was entering a state involving the chief government of the kingdom. The other officers of the kingdom were not anointed, because they had no plenitude of power. In like manner in the Kingdom of the Church, a bishop receives unction on his head, to signify that he is the principal ruler of his diocese , while archdeacons and parish priests, who only hold a commission from the bishop, and who act as his lieutenants, are not anointed. But the fact of his receiving unction, is no proof that a king enters a state of perfection ; since his charge extends only to temporal matters. It is not like that of bishops, which extends to such as are spiritual. Charity, wherein perfection consists, regards the spiritual welfare of others. Hence, solicitude about the spiritual, not about the temporal, wants of our neighbour, is essential to perfection; although perfect charity may, likewise, occupy itself about the material needs of others.

The third argument is quite irrelevant to the matter of which we are treating. The point with which we are at present dealing, is not that of perfection of merit, which may of course be greater in a parish priest, or even in a married man, than in a bishop or religious. The subject with which we are occupied is the state of perfection. It would seem, by the argument of our adversaries, that they do not understand the meaning of their own words; since, according to their reasoning, even bishops themselves, are not in a higher state of perfection than priests; for it may happen that their lives are less meritorious than are the lives of priests.

The fourth objection, i.e., that the episcopate is not an order, contains, if it be taken in its literal meaning, a palpable falsehood. For Dionysius expressly says that there are three orders of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to wit, bishops, priests, and deacons. Again, in the distinct. XXI. cap. Cleros, it is said, that the order of bishops is divided into four parts. A bishop has a certain order with respect to the mystical body of Christ, i.e., the Church in whose government he takes the chief part. But, with regard to the true Body of Christ which is contained in the Blessed Sacrament, he has no superiority over a priest. The proof that a bishop has a certain order, and not merely jurisdiction, like an archdeacon or parish priest, lies in the fact, that a bishop can do many things, such as administering Confirmation and Holy Orders, and consecrating churches, which he cannot commission others to do. The duties which are matters of jurisdiction only, he can transfer to others. Another proof that the episcopate is an order, lies in the fact, that, if a bishop be suspended, and then be ultimately restored to his see, he is not reconsecrated; for he has never lost the power of his order. This too is the case with men who are in other orders.

The fifth argument, viz., that an archdeacon or parish priest, is solemnly appointed, because he is invested with a ring, or some other symbol of the sort, is absolutely ridiculous. This investiture resembles certain civil ceremonies, whereby men when invested with a fief are presented with a ring or staff, rather than the rites of the Church, which consist in a solemn blessing or consecration.

CHAPTER XXV

An Answer to the Arguments Which Are Brought Forward, to Prove That the Power of An Archdeacon Or Parish Priest to Resign His Duties is No Hindrance to His Being in A State of Perfection

WE must next point out, that they argue with great inconsistency, who say that archdeacons and parish priests, in spite of their being able to resign their office, are in a state of perfection, equal to that of the episcopate or of the religious life. With regard to this point, it must be remembered, that, whoever leaves a state of perfection for one less perfect, is considered an apostate. Hence St. Paul writes concerning widows, “For when they have grown wanton in Christ they will marry; having damnation, because they have made void their first faith” (1 Tim. v. 11). On these words, the Gloss remarks, “Violation of a vow is damnable. Fidelity to a broken vow is, likewise, damnable. And they are in a state of damnation who make void their first promise of continence, and who, like the wife of Lot, look back; for this is apostasy.” Hence, if archdeacons or parish Priests were in a state of perfection, they would, by renouncing the archidiaconates or parishes, put themselves in a state of damnation by becoming apostates.

Those who argue against us, maintain, first, that archdeacons and parish priests can embrace the religious life, not because the religious state is more perfect than that in which they have been living, but because it is safer. This, however, is eminently untrue. It is distinctly stated, XIX. Quest. I., that, “such of the clergy as desire to become religious, in order that, thus, they may be able to lead a better life, shall be permitted by their bishops to enter monasteries.” Hence, it is clear, that their desire of embracing the religious state, must be on account of its greater perfection, not by reason of the security which it offers. Archdeacons and parish priests may not only resign their archidiaconates or parishes in order to go into monasteries, but they are free to resign them and stay in the world. This is done by those who become prebendaries of a cathedral. Likewise, if they be not in Holy Orders, they are free to marry. We thus have an incontestable proof that they are not in a state of perfection.

The second argument brought against us is, that if the inability of a religious man to leave his order be a proof that he is in a state of perfection, a married man must also be in a perfect state, because he may not forsake his wife. The absurdity of this reasoning is made clear by what we have already said. The religious life and the wedded life have this one circumstance in common, that they both entail a perpetual obligation. But while obligations of matrimony are not undertaken with a view to the accomplishment of works of perfection but to render a carnal debt, the ties of the religious life bind men solely to works of perfection, i.e., to poverty, chastity, and obedience. Hence, the religious state is one of perfection.

The third argument is partly true and partly false. It embodies the proposition, that, as David laid aside his armour for a sling and stones, so, likewise, it is permissible for men to abandon a more perfect state for one more lowly. A religious may, by reason of his weakness, and with a dispensation, quit his order for one less severe. But the Church never allows a religious to leave the religious life for that of a secular priest, be it as archdeacon, or as parish priest. Hence, we see that there is far more difference between the excellence of the religious state and the state of the archidiaconate or of parish priests (If theirs is to be called a state), than there is between the superiority of the more severe religious orders, and that of the less rigorous ones.

The fourth objection, to wit, that if immutability be essential to the perfection of a state, it cannot be permissible to pass from one state to another, is absolutely frivolous. It is lawful to pass from a lower to a higher state, but not vice versa (Extra de regularibus). For, a more perfect state embraces all that is contained in that which is less perfect; but the less perfect state does not contain what is included in a state of greater perfection. Therefore, a man who has bound himself to that which is less, cannot be blamed for embracing that which is greater.

The fifth assertion, viz. that a bishop can recall one of his clergy from the religious life to resume the charge of his parish, is untrue, and is contrary to the sacred canons. The following words occur in Extra de renuntiatione, cap. Admonet, “You are strictly to forbid the priests belonging to your see, to enter, to hold, or to leave, without your permission, the churches of your diocese, coming under your jurisdiction. Should any priest dare to come to one of your churches without your license, he will incur canonical penalties.” In like manner it is laid down (et de privileg. Cum et plantare) that “Religious who are in churches which do not absolutely belong to them, must present to the bishops, for ordination, the priests who shall be responsible for the care of such churches. Further, they must render to such priests an account of the temporal concerns of these churches. Nor must they presume, without consulting the bishop, to remove these priests from their charge.” These words are only tantamount to saying, that parish priests, who, without consulting their bishop, resign their cures, render themselves liable to canonical penalties. But it is illogical to apply this general rule to a particular case, and to say, that priests cannot leave their parishes to enter religion. For in XIX. Quest. I. cap. Duae, it is expressly stated that, “even against the desire of their bishop, secular priests may quit their churches and enter monasteries.” Hence the words which occur in VII. Quest. I. Episcopus de loco, etc., manifestly apply to the passing of the clergy from one church to another, not from the secular to the religious life.

The sixth objection does not touch the point in question. It is urged, that religious pass from the religious life to a secular church, to which the cure of souls is attached. This is true. But they do not, in undertaking charge of a church, abandon the religious state. For it is established by XVI. Quest. I. De monachis, that “they, who, having lived a long while in religion, are admitted to Holy Orders, do not, on, that account, relinquish their former state.” But an archdeacon or parish priest can resign his office, and embrace the religious life; since, he is thereby passing from a less to a more perfect state under the guidance of the Divine Spirit (XIX. Quest. I. Duae).

The seventh argument is too foolish to need an answer. It is urged, that because a man who was in charity can fall from charity, therefore, it does not follow that he who falls from a state of perfection, was not in a state of perfection. No one falls from charity except, by sin; and by sin, likewise, a man falls from a state of perfection. For as men are bound by a common law to the love of charity, they are also bound to a state of perfection by particular vows.

The eighth proposition, viz., that by ecclesiastical constitution no bishop can become a religious without the permission of the Pope, from the practice of the Church is evidently untrue. The obstacle is, rather, on account of the perpetual obligation whereby bishops bind themselves to the care of their flocks. Hence St. Paul says (1 Cor. ix. 16), “Necessity is laid upon me; for woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel.” He adds the cause of this necessity, when he says, “For whereas I was free unto all, I made myself the servant of all.” Hence this prohibition is not laid down in the Decretals as a statute, but as a fact, approved by reason.

The ninth objection is worthless. It is certain, as a general rule, that no one who has not received Holy Orders according to the ecclesiastical. statute, is eligible to a bishopric, an archidiaconate, or to the care of a parish. But the Pope has, in this matter, power of granting dispensation, a power which at times he exercises. In such a case those in charge of an archidiaconate or parish, or even of an episcopal see, can resign their office, and marry. By so doing they are not breaking any contract. A religious, however, who marries, breaks his vow, or contract, of celibacy.

CHAPTER XXVI

Concerning the Works That A Religious May Lawfully Undertake

IT remains, now, for us to consider which are the works befitting those living in the religious state. We have already fully treated of this matter elsewhere. We will, therefore merely add a few words, in the hope of putting the calumniators of religious to silence. The following words of St. Jerome which are found in the decrees (distinct. LXV. Olim) are quoted by the enemies of the religious life. “Before study was, by the suggestion of Satan, introduced into the religious life,”etc. I wonder if they who quote these words are of opinion that religious ought not to study? For study, especially of Holy Scripture, peculiarly befits men consecrated to a life of contemplation. St. Augustine thought study a fit occupation for religious. He writes, (XIX. De Civitate Doi), “None ought to be hindered from knowledge of the truth, a knowledge which beseems meritorious leisure.” If they who quote the saying of St. Jerome, intend to prove that study is reprehensible in religious, the words that follow in the same chapter ought to convince them of their error. “The people will say among themselves: I am of Paul, I am of Apollo.” Whence it is clear what is meant by the words cited, “Before, by the suggestion of the devil, there was study,” i.e. dissensions in the Christian religion.

It is also maintained, that the power of binding and loosing, or rather the right to exercise this power, does not belong to religious who are priests. I wonder what those who speak thus, mean by their words. If they mean, that because monks are ordained priests, they cannot ipso facto exercise the power of the keys, they are perfectly right. This applies, likewise, to secular priests. For a secular priest does not receive faculties to exercise the power of the keys because he is ordained priest. He has these faculties given him on account of the cure of souls, wherewith he is entrusted. Therefore, if it be argued, that monks, as monks, may not exercise the power of the keys, it is a plain falsehood. This is evident from the following words (XVI. Quest. L.): "Certain men, supported by no authority whatsoever, and inflamed rather, by presumptuous and bitter zeal than by charity, assert that monks, being dead to the world, and living only to God, are unworthy to exercise the functions of the priesthood. They hold that monks cannot instruct men in penance, or in the truths of Christianity, and that they are unable, by the power divinely committed to them in their priestly office, to absolve sinners. But this is completely erroneous. Blessed Benedict, the gentle guide of monks, has never prohibited them from performing this office. And, it is observed, that those things only, are unlawful to religious, which are forbidden them by their rule."

Those who would fain limit the sphere of activity open to religious, also quote the following words: "The office of a monk is not that of a doctor, but of a mourner"(XVI. Quest. I.). If, by these words, they intend to prove that because a man is a monk, he need not, necessarily, be a teacher, the proposition is perfectly true. Otherwise, every monk must needs be a teacher. But, if they mean that the fact that a man is a monk, is in some way incompatible with his being, likewise, a teacher, their opinion is clearly erroneous. On the contrary, the office of teaching, especially of teaching Holy Scripture, belongs, pre-eminently, to religious. On the words of St. John's Gospel, "The woman therefore left her water pot," etc., the Gloss says, quoting St. Augustine: "From these words let those intending to preach the Gospel learn to put away worldly anxieties and cares. our Lord entrusted to those who had left all things and followed Him, the office of universal teaching, saying to His disciples, 'Go, therefore, teach all nations'" (Matt. xxviii.).

The same answer may be made to all other objections of the same sort: as, for instance, to the argument, that the position of the cleric and the monk differ, for the cleric having charge of souls, says "I feed my sheep," but the monk says "I am fed." The same reply must, also, be made to those who say, "Let the monk sit solitary and hold his peace." These words, and others resembling them, certainly point out the conduct beseeming a monk as a monk; but they do not forbid him to undertake superior offices, if such be entrusted to him. A secular priest cannot, by reason of his being a priest, pronounce excommunication; but he has, nevertheless, power to do so, if he be commissioned by his bishop to excommunicate.

Again, it is urged that only two orders were established by our Lord: one being that of the twelve Apostles, represented by bishops; the other that of the seventy-two disciples, represented by priests exercising the pastoral office. If, from these premises, it be argued that monks, unless they be bishops or pastors, have not, as a matter, of course, the care of souls, the conclusion is perfectly true. But, if it be maintained that religious have not power to preach, or to hear confessions, even with the sanction of their bishop, the conclusion is clearly false. For the higher the dignity of any man, the greater is his power (XVI. Quest. I. Sunt nonnulli). Hence, if secular priests, not engaged in pastoral work, can, with the permission of a bishop, discharge these functions, religious are certainly better entitled to do so, if they have the same commission.

It has occurred to me to say these things in answer to those who strive to detract from the perfection of religious life. Nevertheless, I abstain from reproaches. For, “he who utters reproach is foolish” (Prov. x. 18), and “all fools are meddling with reproaches” (Prov. xx. 3). If anyone desire to send me a reply, his words will be very welcome to me. For the surest way to elucidate truth and to confound error is by confuting the arguments brought against the truth. Solomon says, “Iron sharpens iron, so a man sharpens the countenance of a friend” (Prov. xxvii. 17).

And may the Lord God, blessed for ever, judge between us and them. Amen.

THE RELIGIOUS STATE

THE EPISCOPATE AND THE PRIESTLY OFFICE

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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THE RELIGIOUS STATE: THE EPISCOPATE AND THE PRIESTLY OFFICE

PREFATORY NOTICE

AMONGST the seventy-two Opuscula, or minor works, of St. Thomas Aquinas there are three which treat of the religious life and calling. The first of these is now offered to the English reader. The two others have a special interest of their own. They were the outcome of the historic controversy on the religious orders, raised, in St. Thomas's day, by a powerful and influential anti-regular party, of which William of St. Amour was the recognised and indomitable champion and leader. These two Opuscula will appear in English in a subsequent volume. I venture to predict that they will not fail to attract the attention of many readers in the English-speaking world. They are more than old enough to have made history, yet they are singularly appropriate and apposite to-day—more than six hundred years after they were written—when, as in the thirteenth century, the religious orders are again on their trial in several countries in Europe.

Touron is of opinion that the treatise which follows these words was written after the other two, or, at least, after the first of them. Echard is of the same mind. The order of reproduction is transposed in this translation, not as challenging this view, but for the obvious reason that the generality of English readers will be more interested in following the controversy, when they have clearly realised the meaning and object of the religious life, as explained in the following pages.

There is no intrinsic evidence to show that the treatise on "The Perfection of the Spiritual Life" formed part of the controversy to which I have alluded. It was, apparently, written in the days of peace. It was, evidently, composed before the other two, or at least before one of them. The Saint refers to it in the "Contra Impugnantes." "Although we have said much on this subject in another of our little books on PERFECTION, we are not ashamed to repeat what we have written" (chapter 9). The learned Dominican also treats of the Religious Life in his SUMMA THEOLOGICA

(2 2 Quaest. 186 to 189), but in a more concise and scholastic manner than in the following pages.

His style in this tract is more discursive; whilst, at the same time, he retains his own peculiarly argumentative form. It has been called “a constructive treatise.” It is, however, analytic as well as synthetic. In it, as the reader will perceive, the author, without unnecessarily multiplying his pages, discusses the object of the religious life, which is the attainment of the love of God in a higher degree than is compatible with the cares of a life spent in the world. He treats of the helps to this growth in charity, that is “the vows of perfection,” as they are called, by which the religious man or woman renounces worldly goods, earthly pleasures, and even his or her own will. He speaks of the duties which religious owe to their fellow men. Incidentally St. Thomas draws a distinction between the perfection which is expected of a religious, and the perfection which belongs to the episcopal state, showing that Bishops are in a higher state of perfection than are religious; and that, yet, for reasons given in chapter 11, the one state may be ambitioned, but the other must not be coveted. The Saint, also, proves in the five subsequent chapters that although priests are engaged in a holier work than are contemplative religious, and although individual priests may be more perfect than individual monks or nuns, yet the priesthood is not a state of perfection.

This short treatise on their life will be of spiritual help to religious men and women, whether cloistered or leading an active life in the world. It will be to them, in the words of St. Augustine’s Rule, “a mirror” into which they can look and see whether they are falling short of the Ideal. So that, if they find that they are thoughtless and negligent, they may “grieve over the past; they may be guarded in the future; they may pray that their debt be cancelled, and that they be not led astray by temptation.” If, on the other hand, “they are following that which is written, they can give thanks to God, the giver of all good things.”

This little book will, I doubt not, be of spiritual help to Bishops and to priests, reminding them of the sacredness either of their state or of their vocation.

These pages, from the pen of “the Angel of the Schools,” together with The Apology for the Religious Orders, which may be regarded as the sequel of the present little volume, will, also, serve as a mine of wealth to chaplains of nuns, and to preachers of retreats to religious. It is a quarry, from which they may, one and all, draw the stones with which to build up the edifice of the spiritual life and of religious perfection—that life which must necessarily be “built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner-stone; in whom all the building framed together groweth unto a holy temple in the Lord” (Eph. 2:20, 21).

JOHN PROCTER, O. P.

THE RELIGIOUS STATE, ETC. OR THE PERFECTION OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

OPUSCULUM XVIII. (PARMA EDITION II.)

PROLOGUE

IN WHICH IS SET FORTH THE AUTHOR’S INTENTION IN UNDERTAKING THIS WORK

AS certain persons, who know nothing about perfection, have, nevertheless, presumed to publish follies concerning this state, it is our purpose to draw up a treatise on perfection, explaining what is meant by the term; how perfection is acquired; what is the state of perfection; and what are the employments befitting those who embrace this state.

CHAPTER I

THAT THE PERFECTION OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD ABSOLUTELY (simpliciter) ACCORDING TO CHARITY

AT the outset of our work we must bear in mind that the word “perfect” is used in several senses. A thing may be absolutely perfect (simpliciter), or it may be perfect relatively (secundum quid). That which is perfect absolutely attains the end to which, according to its own nature, it is adapted. That which is relatively perfect is that which attains to the perfection of one of those qualities which are concomitant to its own nature. Thus, an animal is said to be perfect absolutely when it attains to its end in so far as to lack nothing necessary to the integrity of animal life, when, for instance, it possesses the requisite number and the proper disposition of its limbs, and the faculties necessary for performing the operations of animal life. An animal is, on the other hand, perfect relatively, if it be perfect in any attribute concomitant to its nature, its colour, for instance, its odour, etc.

In the spiritual life a man may be called perfect absolutely, i.e. perfect in that wherein the spiritual life principally consists. He may, also, be perfect relatively, i.e. perfect in some quality which is a condition of the spiritual life. Now, the spiritual life consists, principally, in charity. For he that is without charity is spiritually nought. Hence St. Paul says (1 Cor. 13:2), “If I should have all prophecy, and should know all mysteries and all knowledge; and if I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.” And the blessed apostle John declares, that the whole spiritual life consists in love, saying, “We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. He that loveth not abideth in death” (1 John 3:14). Therefore, he that is perfect in charity is said to be perfect in the spiritual life absolutely. But he that is perfect relatively is perfect in something incidental to the spiritual life. This is evident from the words of Holy Scripture.

St. Paul considers charity as the chief element in perfection. He enumerates several virtues, such as mercy, benignity, and humility, and then concludes by saying, “But above all these things, have charity which is the bond of perfection” (Col. 3). Some men are also said to be perfect in point of understanding, “In malice be children and in sense be perfect,” writes St. Paul to the Corinthians (1 Epist. 14:20). Elsewhere in the same epistle, he bids them “be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (1 Cor. 1:10); although, as has been said, a man who has perfect knowledge, without charity, must be judged to be nothing. Thus also, a man may be said to be perfect in patience which “worketh a perfect work,” as St. James says, perfect also in other virtues. There is nothing surprising in this manner of speaking, for persons may be perfect in their vices. Thus we may talk of a man being “a perfect thief” or “a perfect robber.” Indeed, this mode of expression is used in Holy Scripture, for Isaias says, “his heart (i.e. the heart of the fool) will work iniquity to perfect hypocrisy” (32:6).

CHAPTER II

PERFECTION IS UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN, BOTH THE LOVE OF GOD, AND THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR

THE perfection of the spiritual life may be understood as signifying principally perfection, as it regards charity. Now there are two precepts of charity, one pertaining to the love of God; the other referring to the love of our neighbour. These two precepts bear a certain order to each other, proportioned to the order of charity. That which is chiefly to be loved, by charity, is the Supreme Good, which makes us happy, that is to say, God. In the next place, we are, by charity, to love our neighbour, who is, by certain social bonds, united to us, either by the anticipation of beatitude, or in the enjoyment of it. Hence, we are bound in charity to love our neighbour, in order that, together with him, we may arrive at beatitude.

Our Lord establishes this order of charity in the Gospel of St. Matthew (22:37), where He says, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart and thy whole soul and thy whole mind. This is the first and greatest commandment; and the second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” Thus, the perfection of the spiritual life consists, primarily and principally, in the love of God. Hence the Lord, speaking to Abraham, says, “I am the Almighty God; walk before me and be perfect” (Gen. 17:1). We walk before God, not with bodily footsteps, but with the affections of the mind. The perfection of the spiritual life consists, secondarily, in the love of our neighbour. Therefore when our Lord had said, “Love your enemies” (Matt. 5:44), and had added several other precepts regarding charity to our neighbour, He concluded by saying, “Be ye therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.”

CHAPTER III

OF THE PERFECTION OF DIVINE LOVE WHICH EXISTS IN GOD ALONE

IN each of the two divisions of charity there are many degrees. As regards the love of God, the first and supreme degree of perfection of Divine love belongs to God alone. This is the case on account both of the One who is loved, and of the one who loves. It is the case on account of the loved one, because every object is loved in proportion to the qualities which make it lovable. It is the case on account of the lover, because an object is loved in proportion to the whole capacity of the one who loves. Now, as every object is lovable in proportion to its goodness, the goodness of God, which is infinite, must be infinitely lovable. But no creature can love infinitely, because no finite power is able to elicit an infinite act. Therefore, God alone, whose power of loving equals His Goodness, can love Himself perfectly in the first degree of perfection.

CHAPTER IV

OF THE PERFECTION OF DIVINE LOVE WHICH EXISTS IN THOSE WHO HAVE ATTAINED TO BEATITUDE

THE only mode of loving God perfectly which is possible to rational creatures, is the mode which belongs to him that loves. In this manner a rational creature loves God with all the completeness of his nature. This is made clear in the precept of Divine love. We read in Deuteronomy (6:5), “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul and with all thy strength.” St. Luke (10:27) adds, “and with all thy mind”; as if the “heart” regulated the intention, the “mind” the thought, the “soul” the affections, and the “strength” the activities. For all these must be devoted to the love of God. We must remember that this precept may be fulfilled in a two-fold manner. When anything is perfect, nothing is wanting to it. Hence, when the love of God is complete and perfect, He is loved with the whole heart, and soul, and strength; so that there is nothing within us which is not actually turned to God.

This perfect mode of love is not possible to those who are on the way to Heaven, but only to those who have reached their goal. Hence, St. Paul writing to the Philippians says (chap. 3:12), “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend.” He writes as if he were hoping for perfection when he should have reached his goal, and when he should have received the palm of the blessed. But St. Paul does not use the word “attaining” in the sense of entire possession or perfect comprehension, for God in this sense is incomprehensible to every creature. By “attaining” he means reaching the end which he has been following and seeking. In Heaven, the understanding and the will of every rational creature is turned to God; since it is in the fruition of the Godhead that the beatitude of Heaven consists. For beatitude exists not in habit, but in act. And, since the rational creature will in Heaven cleave to God, the Supreme Truth, as to its last End, all its activities will, by intention, likewise be directed to that Last End, and will all be disposed towards the attainment of that End. Consequently, in that perfection of happiness, the rational creature will love God with its whole heart; since its whole intention in all its thoughts, deeds, and affections, will be wholly directed to Him. It will love God with its whole mind, for its mind will be ever actually fixed on Him, beholding Him, and seeing all things in Him, and judging of all things according to His truth. It will love God with its whole soul, for all its affection will be uninterruptedly fixed on Him, and for His sake it will love all things. It will love God with all its strength, since His love will be the motive governing all its exterior acts. This, then, is the second mode of perfect love, and this love is the portion only of the blessed.

CHAPTER V

OF THE PERFECTION OF DIVINE LOVE WHICH IS NECESSARY TO SALVATION

THERE is another way in which we love God with our whole heart and soul and strength. We so love Him, if there be nothing in us which is wanting to divine love, that is to say, if there is nothing which we do not, actually or habitually, refer to God. We are given a precept concerning this form of Divine love.

First, we are taught to refer everything to God as to our End by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:31), “Whether you eat or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of God.” We fulfil this precept when we order our life to the service of God; and when, in consequence, all our actions are, virtually, directed to Him, save those that are sinful, and which, therefore, withdraw us from Him. While we act thus, we love God with our whole heart.

Secondly, we love God with our whole mind, when we subject our understanding to Him, believing what has been divinely transmitted to us, according to the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. 10:5), “bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ.”

Thirdly, we love God with our whole soul, when all that we love is loved in God, and when we refer all our affections to the love of Him. St. Paul expresses this love in the following words: “For whether we be transported in mind it is to God, or whether we be sober, it is for you; for the charity of Christ presseth us” (2 Cor. 5:13).

Fourthly, we love God with our whole strength, when all our words and works are established in divine charity according to the precept of St. Paul, “Let all your things be done in charity” (1 Cor. 16:14). This, then, is the third degree of perfection of divine love, to which all are bound of necessity and by precept. But the second degree is not possible in this life, save to one who, like Our Lord Jesus Christ, is, at the same time, both travelling on the road to Heaven, and enjoying the happiness of the Blessed.

CHAPTER VI

THE PERFECTION OF DIVINE LOVE WHICH IS A MATTER OF COUNSEL

WHEN St. Paul had said to the Philippians, “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect,” he continued, “but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend.” Shortly afterwards he added, “Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded.” From these words it is plain that, although the perfection of the blessed is not possible to us in this life, we ought, nevertheless, to endeavour, as far as we can, to emulate it. Now, it is in this effort that consists the perfection in this life, to which we are invited by the counsels.

It is abundantly clear, that the human heart is more intensely attracted to one object, in proportion as it is withdrawn from a multiplicity of desires. Therefore, the more a man is delivered from solicitude concerning temporal matters, the more perfectly he will be enabled to love God. Hence St. Augustine says (Lib. 83. Quaest.) that, the hope of gaining, or keeping, material wealth, is the poison of charity; that, as charity increases, cupidity diminishes; and that, when charity becomes perfect, cupidity ceases to exist. Hence, all the counsels which call man to perfection tend to withdraw his affections from temporal objects; so that, his soul is enabled the more freely to turn to God by contemplating Him, loving Him, and fulfilling His will.

CHAPTER VII

OF THE FIRST MEANS OF PERFECTION, VIZ.: THE RENUNCIATION OF EARTHLY POSSESSIONS

THE first among the material possessions to be renounced are those extrinsic goods that we call riches. Our Lord counselled us to relinquish them when He said, “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven; and come, follow me” (Matt. 19:21).

The utility of this counsel is evident. First, we have the evidence of a fact. For, when the young man who was inquiring about perfection heard the words of Christ, he went away sad. And “Behold,” says St. Jerome in his commentary on St. Matthew, “the cause of this sadness. He had many possessions, which, like thorns and briars, choked the seed of the Lord’s words.” St. Chrysostom, writing on the same passage, says that, “they who possess but little, and they that abound in riches, do not encounter the same obstacles; for the renunciation of wealth enkindles a more mighty fire and causes avarice to grow greater.” St. Augustine likewise says, in his epistle to Paulinus and Therasia, that, “When earthly things are inordinately loved, those that we already possess fetter us more closely than those that we desire; for why did this young man go away sad, save because he had great possessions? For, it is one thing not to be anxious to acquire the things that we lack, but quite another to be ready to divest ourselves of those that we possess. For the things that are not ours we can repudiate as extrinsic to ourselves, but our own possessions are dear to us as the limbs of our body.”

The utility of this counsel is again shown us by those words of our Lord, “A rich man shall hardly enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.” St. Jerome tells us the reason of this difficulty. “It is,” he says, “because it is hard to despise the riches that we possess. Our Lord does not say that it is impossible, but that it is hard, for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven. For difficulty does not mean impossibility, but signifies infrequency of performance.” And, as St. Chrysostom says on the Gospel of St. Matthew, “the Lord goes further, proving that it is impossible, ‘For,’ He says, ‘it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter the Kingdom of Heaven.’ ” “From these words,” says St. Augustine (lib. de quaest. Evang.), “the disciples understood that all they that covet riches are included in the number of the rich; otherwise, considering how small is the number of the wealthy in comparison to the vast multitude of the poor, they would not have asked, ‘Who then shall be saved?’ ”

From these two utterances of Our Lord it is clearly evident, that he that possesses riches, will, with difficulty, enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. For, as He says elsewhere (Matt. 13:22), “The cares of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches choketh up the Word, and it becometh fruitless.” In truth, it is impossible for those to enter Heaven who love money inordinately. Far easier is it for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. The latter feat would indeed be impossible, without violating the laws of nature. But, if a covetous man were admitted into Heaven it would be contrary to Divine Justice, which is more unfailing than any natural law. Hence, we see the reasonableness of Our Lord’s counsel; for a counsel is given concerning that which is most useful, according to the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. 8:10), “Herein I give my advice, for this is profitable for you.”

If we wish to attain eternal life, it is more advantageous for us to renounce our possessions than to retain them. They that possess wealth will hardly enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; the reason being that it is difficult to prevent our affections from being attached to riches, and that such an attachment makes admission into Heaven impossible. Therefore, Our Lord, with good reason, has counselled the renunciation of riches as our most profitable course.

It may be objected, however, that St. Matthew, St. Bartholomew, and Zaccheus were rich; nevertheless, they entered into Heaven. St. Jerome replies, that, “we must remember that they had ceased to be wealthy at the time of their admission to Heaven.” Abraham, however, never lost his wealth, but, as we read in Genesis, died a rich man, bequeathing his property to his sons. How then could he be perfect? Nevertheless God said to him, “Be perfect” (Gen. 17:1). This question cannot be answered if we hold that it is the mere renunciation of wealth which constitutes perfection. For, if such were the case, no one who was rich could be perfect. Our Lord does not say that perfection lies in giving up what we possess, but He mentions this renunciation of our possessions as a means to perfection. We see this by His own words, “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and follow me.” The following of Christ constitutes perfection; the sacrifice of riches is a means to perfection.

St. Jerome, commenting on the Gospel of St. Matthew, says, “As if to show that merely giving up our possessions does not suffice to make us perfect, Peter mentions that wherein perfection consists, when he says, ‘We have followed thee.’ ” Origen, again, says on the same passage, “We are not to gather from the words, ‘if thou wilt be perfect’ that, when a man has given his goods to the poor, he becomes perfect at once. What we are to understand is, that from that time, his contemplation of God begins to attract him to all virtues.” A rich man may be perfect if his affections be not entangled in his possessions, but devoted entirely to God. In this way Abraham was perfect. Although he possessed wealth, he was detached from it. The words of the Lord spoken to him, “Walk before me and be perfect,” make it clear, that the perfection of the Patriarch was to consist in walking before God, and in loving Him with a love so perfect that it reached to contempt of himself, and of all that belonged to him. So perfect, indeed, was his love of God, that he showed it by his readiness to slay his son. Wherefore the Lord said to him, “Because thou hast done this thing, and hast not spared thy only begotten son for my sake, I will bless thee” (Gen. 22:16).

If anyone should still argue, that the counsel of Our Lord concerning the renunciation of possessions is futile, because Abraham, though a rich man, was perfect, we will refer him for an answer to what has been already said. Our Lord, we repeat, did not mean, by this counsel, that rich men cannot be perfect, or cannot enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; but He meant that they cannot do so easily. The virtue of Abraham was very great; for, although possessed of great wealth, his heart was detached from riches. The virtue, likewise, of Samson was eminent, for, armed only with the jawbone of an ass, he slew many of his enemies; nevertheless the instruction which he gave to the soldier to take up arms in combat with his foes, was not unprofitable. Neither, then, is it useless to counsel those that seek perfection to part with their earthly goods, although Abraham was perfect with all his wealth.

We must not draw conclusions from wonderful deeds; for the weak among us are more capable of wondering at and praising such deeds, than of imitating them. Hence we read in Eccles. 31:8, “Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish; and that hath not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor in treasures.” This passage proves that the rich man who does not sin by covetousness, nor by pride, must, indeed, be a man of tried virtue, with a heart adhering closely, by perfect charity, to God. St. Paul bids Timothy to “charge the rich of this world not to be highminded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches” (1 Tim. 6:17). The greater the blessedness and the virtue of the wealthy who obey this behest, the smaller is their number. Thus Ecclesiasticus (31) speaking of a virtuous and yet a wealthy man, says: “Who is he, and we will praise him? for he hath done wonderful things in his life.” For truly, he who, while abounding in riches has not set his heart upon his treasures, has indeed done wonderful things, and without the shadow of a doubt has proved himself perfect. The same chapter of Ecclesiasticus continues, “Who hath been tried thereby,” that is to say, who has been tested as to whether he can live a sinless life in the midst of wealth, “and made perfect.” This is as much as to say: “such a man is indeed rare, and his virtue will merit for him eternal glory.” This test of Ecclesiasticus bears out the saying of Our Lord, that a rich man shall hardly enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.

This, then, is the first means of attaining perfection, to wit the renunciation of riches, and the profession of poverty, from a desire of following Christ.

CHAPTER VIII

OF THE SECOND MEANS OF PERFECTION WHICH IS THE RENUNCIATION OF EARTHLY TIES AND OF MATRIMONY

IN order the more clearly to understand this second means of perfection, we should reflect on the words of St. Augustine which occur in xii. de Trinit.: “The less a man loves his private possessions, the more closely will he cleave to God.” Hence, according to the order of the things which a man sacrifices for the love of God, will be the order of those things which will enable him to adhere perfectly to God.

The things to be first given up, are those least closely united to ourselves. Therefore, the renunciation of material possessions, which are extrinsic to our nature, must be our first step on the road to perfection. The next objects to be sacrificed will be those which are united to our nature, by a certain communion and necessary affinity. Hence, Our Lord says,” If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple” (Luke 14:26).

But, as St. Gregory says, “It is permissible to inquire how we can be commanded to hate our parents and kinsfolk, when we are bidden to love even our enemies? If, however, we carefully consider this precept, we shall be able to obey it by means of discretion. For, when we refuse to listen to one who, savouring earthly things, suggests to us to do what is wrong, we at the same time love him and hate him. Thus we must bear this discreet hatred towards our kinsfolk, loving in them what they are in themselves, and hating them when they hinder our progress towards God. For, whosoever desires eternal life must, for the love of God, be independent of father and mother, of wife, children, and relations, yea, detached from self, in order that he may the better know God, for whose sake he loses sight of every other. For it is but too clear, that earthly affections warp the mind, and blunt its keenness."

Now amongst all relationships the conjugal tie does, more than any other, engross men's hearts. So that our first parent said (Gen. 2:24): "A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." Hence, they who are aiming at perfection, must, above all things, avoid the bond of marriage, which, in a pre-eminent degree, entangles men in earthly concerns. This is the reason which St. Paul gives for his counsel concerning continence. "He that is without a wife, is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife" (1 Cor. 7:32).

Therefore, the second means whereby a man may be more free to devote himself to God, and to cleave more perfectly to Him, is by the observance of perpetual chastity. But continence possesses the further advantage of affording a peculiar facility to the acquirement of perfection. For, the soul is hindered in its free access to God, not only by the love of exterior things, but much more by force of interior passions. And, amongst these passions, the lust of the flesh does, beyond all others, overpower reason. Hence in lib. 1 Soliloquiorum, St. Augustine says, "I know nothing which doth more cast a manly soul down from the tower of its strength, than do the caresses of a woman, and the physical contact essential to marriage." Thus, continence is most necessary to perfection. It is the way pointed out by St. Paul (1 Cor. 7:25), "Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel, as having obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful."

The advantage of virginity is also shown in St. Matthew (19:12). When the disciples said to Our Lord, "If the case of a man with his wife be so, it is not expedient to marry," He answered, "All men take not this word but they to whom it is given." By these words we see the difficulty involved in continence, and the inadequacy of human virtue to lead such a life without the grace of God. We read in the Book of Wisdom (8:21), "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent except God gave it; and this also was a point of wisdom to know whose gift it was." This saying is also borne out by the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. 7:7), “I would that all men were even as myself” (i.e. a virgin), “but everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that.” In these words he distinctly asserts that continence is a gift of God.

But, lest anyone should, on the other hand, fail to use his own endeavour to obtain this gift, Our Lord exhorts all men to it. He first gives an illustration, saying, “There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs”; “not,” as St. Chrysostom explains, “by mutilation, but by resisting evil thoughts.” Then Christ goes on to invite all men to follow this example, for the sake of its reward. “There are some,” He continues, “who have made themselves eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven.” The Book of Wisdom also says (4:2), “The chaste generation triumpheth, crowned for ever, winning the reward of undefiled conflicts.” Finally, Our Lord exhorts men to continence, by the words, “He that can take, let him take it.” “This,” says St. Jerome, “is the voice of the Lord encouraging his soldiers to win the prize of chastity. It is as if He said: he that can fight, let him fight and conquer.”

If anyone should object to us the example of Abraham, and of other just men of old, who were perfect without refraining from matrimony, we will answer them in the words written by St. Augustine in his book, de bono conjugali. “The continence that is a virtue is that of the mind, not of the body. And virtue is sometimes revealed in deeds, and sometimes lies disguised as a habit. The patience of John who did not suffer martyrdom was equal in merit to that of Peter who was slain; and Abraham who begat sons, was equal in continence to the virgin John. The marriage of the one and the celibacy of the other fought, each in their season, for Christ. Therefore, any one of the faithful who observes continence may say, “I am certainly no better than Abraham; but the chastity of celibacy is superior to the chastity of married life. Abraham practised the one actually, the other habitually. For he lived chastely as a husband, and could have lived continently had he been unmarried. The latter state, however, did not befit the time at which he lived. It is easier for me not to marry at all, (although Abraham married) than to live such a married life as he lived. Therefore, am I better than they, who could not, by continence of heart, do what I do; but I am not better than they, who, on account of the different time at which they lived, did not what I do. Had it been fitting, they, in their time, would have accomplished far better than I, that which I now do; but I, even were it now required, could not do what they achieved.”

This conclusion of St. Augustine agrees with what has already been said about poverty. For Abraham had arrived at such perfection that his heart never wavered in love to God on account either of temporal possessions or of wedded life. But if another man who has not reached this height of virtue, strives to attain perfection, while retaining riches and engaging in matrimony, he will soon be made aware of his error in presuming to treat Our Lord’s words as of small account.

CHAPTER IX

AIDS TO THE PRESERVATION OF CHASTITY

SINCE chastity is so difficult a virtue that, in Our Lord’s words, not all men “take it,” but those only “to whom it is given,” it is necessary for those who desire to live a life of continence, so to conduct themselves as to avoid all that might prove an obstacle in the prosecution of their design. Now there are three principal hindrances to continence. The first arises from the body. The second from the mind. The third from external circumstances, whether they be of persons or of things.

The body is an obstacle to continence. As St. Paul says, “The flesh lusteth against the Spirit” (Gal. 5:17), and “the works of the flesh are fornication, uncleanness, unchastity and the like.” Concupiscence is that law of the flesh, of which, in his epistle to the Romans, St. Paul says, “I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind” (Rom. 7:23). Now the more the flesh is pampered, by superabundance of food, and by effeminacy of life, the more will its concupiscence increase. For, as St. Jerome says, “A man heated with wine will quickly give the rein to lust.” The book of Proverbs warns us against wine as “a luxurious thing” (Prov. 20:1). Job, again, tells us that Behemoth (by whom Satan is signified) “sleepeth under the shadow, in the covert of the reed and in moist places” (chap. 40:16). St. Gregory (33 Moral) thus interprets this passage. “Moist places,” he says, “betoken voluptuous works. We do not slip on dry ground; but, we have no sure foothold on slippery soil. Hence, those men pursue the journey of this present life in moist places, who cannot hold themselves upright in justice.” He, then, who desires to undertake a life of continence, must chastise his flesh, by abstention from pleasure, and by fasts, vigils, and such like exercises.

St. Paul sets before us his own conduct as an example in this respect, “Every one that striveth for the mastery, refraineth himself from all things. … I chastise my body and bring it into subjection, lest, perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway” (1 Cor. 9:25). What the Apostle practised in deed, he taught in word. In his Epistle to the Romans (13:14), after his warning against “chambering and impurities,” he concludes, “make not provision for the flesh in its concupiscences.” He rightly lays stress upon the concupiscences of the flesh, i.e. its desire for pleasure; for it is incumbent on us to make provision for what is necessary for our body, and St. Paul himself says (Eph. 5:29), “No man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth it and cherisheth it.”

An obstacle to continence arises also from the mind, if we dwell on unchaste thoughts. The Lord says by His prophet, “Take away the evil of your devices from my eyes” (Isa. 1:16). For, evil thoughts often lead to evil deeds. Hence the Prophet Michæas says (2:1), “Woe to you that devise that which is unprofitable,” and he immediately continues, “and work evil in your beds.” Amongst all evil thoughts, those which most powerfully incline unto sin, are thoughts concerning carnal gratification. Philosophers assign two reasons for this fact. First, they say, that as concupiscence is innate in man, and grows with him from youth upwards, he is easily carried away by it, when his imagination sets it before him. Hence Aristotle says (2 Ethics), that “we cannot easily judge of pleasure, unless we enjoy it.” The second reason is given by the same philosopher (3 Ethics), “Pleasure is more voluntary in particular cases than in general.” It is clear that by dallying with a thought we descend to particulars; hence, by daily thoughts we are incited to lust. On this account St. Paul (1 Cor. 6:18) warns us to “Fly fornication”; for, as the Gloss says, “It is permissible to await a conflict with other vices; but this one must be shunned; for in no other means can it be overcome.”

But, as there are many obstacles in the way of chastity, there are also many remedies against such obstacles. The first and chief remedy is to keep the mind busied in prayer and in the contemplation of Divine things. This lesson is taught us in St. Paul’s epistle to the Ephesians (5:18), wherein he says, “Be ye not drunk with wine wherein is luxury; but, be ye filled with the Holy Spirit, speaking to yourselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual canticles” (which pertain to contemplation), “singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord” (whereby prayer is implied). Hence in Isaias (48:9), the Lord says, “For by my praise I will bridle thee, lest thou shouldst perish.” For the divine praise is, as it were, a bridle on the soul, checking it from sin.

The second remedy against lust is the study of the Scriptures. “Love the study of Holy Writ,” says St. Jerome to the monk Rusticus, “and thou wilt not love the vices of the flesh.” And St. Paul in his exhortation to Timothy (1 Tim. 4:12) says, “Be thou an example of the faithful in word, in conversation, in charity, in faith, in chastity,” immediately adding, “Till I come, attend unto reading.”

The third preservative against concupiscence, is to occupy the mind with good thoughts. St. Chrysostom, in his commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew, says that, “physical mutilation is not such a curb to temptation, and such a source of peace to the mind, as is a habit of bridling the thoughts.” St. Paul also says to the Philippians (4:8), “For the rest, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever modest, whatsoever just, whatsoever holy, whatsoever lovely, whatsoever of good fame, if there be any virtue, if any praise of discipline, think on these things.”

The fourth help to chastity is to shun idleness, and to engage in bodily toil. We read in the book of Ecclesiasticus (33:29), “Idleness hath taught much evil.” Idleness is pre-eminently an incentive to sins of the flesh. Hence Ezechiel says (16:49), “Behold, this was the iniquity of Sodom thy sister, pride, fulness of bread, abundance, and idleness.” St. Jerome likewise writes, in his letter to the monk Rusticus, “Do some work, that so the devil may always find thee employed.”

A fifth remedy for concupiscence lies in certain kinds of mental disquietude. St. Jerome relates, in the epistle quoted above, that, in a congregation of caenobites there dwelt a young man who could not, by means of fasting or any laborious work, free himself from temptations of the flesh. The superior of the monastery, seeing that the youth was on the point of yielding, adopted the following means for his relief. He commanded one of the most discreet among the fathers to constantly upbraid the young man, to load him with insults and reproach, and, after treating him thus, to lodge complaints against him with the Superior.

Witnesses were called, who all took the senior father’s part. This treatment was continued for a year. At the end of that time, the superior questioned the youth about his old train of thought. “Father,” was the reply, “I am scarcely permitted to live. How, in such straits, shall I be inclined to sin?”

A great obstacle to continence arises from extrinsic circumstances, such as constant intercourse with women. We read in Ecclesiasticus (9:9), “Many have perished by the beauty of a woman, and hereby lust is enkindled as a fire … for her conversation burneth as fire.” And, in the same chapter, the following safeguard is proposed against these dangers: “Look not upon a woman that hath a mind for many, lest thou fall into her snares. Use not much the company of her that is a dancer, and hearken not to her lest thou perish by the force of her charms.” Again (chapter 42:12), “Behold not everybody’s beauty; and tarry not among women. For from garments cometh a moth, and from a woman the iniquity of a man.” St. Jerome, in his book against Vigilantius, writes that a monk, knowing his own frailty, and how fragile is the vessel which he carries, will fear to slip or stumble, lest he fall and be broken. Hence, he will chiefly avoid gazing at women, and especially at young ones, lest he be caught by the eyes of a harlot, and lest beauty of form lead him on to unlawful embraces.

Abbot Moses, in his conferences to the fathers, says that, in order to preserve purity of heart, “we ought to seek solitude and to practise fasting, watching, and bodily labour: to wear scant clothing; and to attend to reading; in order, by these means, to be able to keep our heart uncontaminated by passion, and to ascend to a high degree of charity.” It is for this reason, that such exercises are practised in the religious life. Perfection does not consist in them; but they are, so to speak, instruments where by perfection is acquired. Abbot Moses, therefore, continues, “Fasting, vigils, hunger, meditation on the scriptures, nakedness, and the privation of all possessions, are not themselves perfection; but they are the instruments of perfection. The end of discipline does not lie in them; but, by their means we arrive at the end.”

But, perchance, someone may object, that it is possible to acquire perfection without fasting or vigils or the like, for we read that “the Son of Man came eating and drinking” (Matt. 11:19), nor did His disciples fast, as did the Pharisees, and the followers of St. John. To this argument we find in the Gloss the following answer, “John drank no wine nor strong drink; for abstinence increases merit, though nature has no power to do so. But, wherefore should the Lord, to Whom it belongs to forgive sin, turn away from sinners who feast, when he is able to make them more righteous than they who fast?” The disciples and Christ had no need to fast; for the presence of the Bridegroom gave them more strength than the followers of John gained by fasting. Hence Our Lord says (Matt. 9:15), “But the days will come when the Bridegroom shall be taken away from them, and then they shall fast.” St. Chrysostom makes the following comment on these words, “Fasting is not naturally grievous, save to those whose weakness is indisposed to it. They who desire to contemplate heavenly wisdom rejoice in fasting.

“Now, as when Our Lord spoke the words we have just quoted, the disciples were still weak in virtue, it was not the fitting season to bring sadness upon them. It was more meet to wait until they were strengthened in faith. They were dispensed from fasting, not by reason of their gluttony, but by a certain privilege.” St. Paul, however, writing to the Corinthians (2 Ep. 6:3), expressly shows how fasting enables men to avoid sin, and to acquire perfection. He says, “Giving no offence to any man, that our ministry be not blamed; but in all things let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses, in stripes, in prisons, in seditions, in labours, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity.”

CHAPTER X

OF THE THIRD MEANS OF PERFECTION, NAMELY, THE ABNEGATION OF OUR OWN WILL

IT is not only necessary for the perfection of charity that a man should sacrifice his exterior possessions: he must also, in a certain sense, relinquish himself. Dionysius, in Chapter 4. de Divinis Nominibus, says that, “divine love causes a man to be out of himself, meaning thereby, that this love suffers him no longer to belong to himself but to Him whom he loves.” St. Paul, writing to the Galatians (2:20), illustrates this state by his own example, saying, “I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me,” as if he did not count his life as his own, but as belonging to Christ, and as if he spurned all that he possessed, in order to cleave to Him. He further shows that this state reaches perfection in certain souls; for he says to the Colossians (3:3), “For you are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God.” Again, he exhorts others to the same sublimity of love, in his second Epistle to the Corinthians (5:15), “And Christ died for all; that they also who live, may not now live to themselves, but unto Him who died for them, and rose again.” Therefore, when Our Lord had said (Luke 14:26), “If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters,” He added something greater than all these, saying, “yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.” He teaches the same thing in the Gospel of St. Matthew (16:24), when He says, “If any man will come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross and follow Me.”

This practice of salutary self-abnegation, and charitable self-hatred, is, in part, necessary for all men in order to salvation, and is, partly, a point of perfection. As we have already seen from the words of Dionysius quoted above, it is in the nature of divine love that he who loves should belong, not to himself, but, to the one beloved. It is necessary, therefore, that self-abnegation and self-hatred be proportionate to the degree of divine love existing in an individual soul. It is essential to salvation that a man should love God to such a degree, as to make Him his end, and to do nothing which he believes to be opposed to the Divine love. Consequently, self-hatred and self-denial are necessary for salvation. Hence St. Gregory says, in his Homily, “We relinquish and deny ourselves when we avoid what we were wont (through the old man dwelling in us) to be, and when we strive after that to which (by the new man) we are called.” In another Homily he, likewise, says, “We hate our own life when we do not condescend to carnal desires, but resist the appetites and pleasures of the flesh.”

But, in order to attain perfection, we must further, for the love of God, sacrifice what we might lawfully use, in order, thus to be more free to devote ourselves to Him. It follows, therefore, that self-hatred, and self-denial, pertain to perfection. We see that Our Lord speaks of them as if they belonged to it. For, just as in the Gospel of St. Matthew (19:21) He says, “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor,” but does not lay any necessity on us to do so, leaving it to our own will, so He likewise says (Matt. 16:24), “If any man will come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow Me.” St. Chrysostom thus explains these words, “Christ does not make his saying compulsory; He does not say, ‘whether you like it or no, you must bear these things.’ ” In the same manner, when He says: “If any man will come after Me and hate not his father” etc. (Luke 14:28), He immediately asks, “Which of you having a mind to build a tower, doth not first sit down, and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have where withal to finish it?” St. Gregory in his Homily thus expounds these words, “The precepts which Christ gives are sublime, and, therefore, the comparison between them and the building of a high tower shortly follows them.” And he says again, “That young man could not have had wherewithal to finish his tower who, when he heard the counsel to leave all things, went away sad.” We may hence understand, that these words of our Lord refer, in a certain manner, to a counsel of perfection.

The martyrs carried out this counsel of perfection most perfectly. Of them St. Augustine says (in his sermon De martyribus), that “none sacrifice so much as they that sacrifice themselves.” The martyrs of Christ, denying themselves, did, in a certain manner, hate their lives, for the love of Christ. St. Chrysostom, again, says, writing on the Gospel of St. Matthew, “He that denies another, be it his brother, or his servant, or whomsoever it may be, will not assist him if he see him suffering from the scourge or any other torture. And we, in like manner, ought to have so little regard for our body, that, if men should scourge, or in any other way maltreat, us, we ought not to spare ourselves.”

Our Lord would not have us to think that we are to deny ourselves, only so far as to endure insults and hard words. He shows us that we are to deny ourselves unto death, even unto the shameful death of the cross. For He says: “Let him take up his cross and follow Me.” We, therefore, say that the martyrs did a most perfect work; for they renounced, for the love of God, life itself, which others hold so dear, that, for its sake, they are content to part with all temporal goods, and are willing to purchase it by any sacrifice whatsoever. For a man will prefer to lose friends and wealth, and to suffer sickness, or even slavery, rather than to be deprived of life. Conquerors will grant to their defeated foes the privilege of life, in order that they may keep them subject to them in slavery. Satan said to the Lord (Job 2:4), “Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for life.” i.e. to preserve his body.

Now, the more dearly a thing is loved according to nature, the more perfect it is to despise it, for the sake of Christ. Nothing is dearer to any man than the freedom of his will, whereby he is lord of others, can use what he pleases, can enjoy what he wills, and is master of his own actions. Just, therefore, as a person who relinquishes his wealth, and leaves those to whom he is bound by natural ties, denies these things and persons; so, he who renounces his own will, which makes him master, does truly deny himself. Nothing is so repugnant to human nature as slavery; and, therefore, there is no greater sacrifice (except that of life), which one man can make for another, than to give himself up to bondage for the sake of that other. Hence, the younger Tobias said to the angel (Tobias 9:2), “If should give myself to be thy servant, I should not make a worthy return for thy care.”

Some men deprive themselves, for the love of God, of some particular use of their free will, binding themselves by vow, to do, or not to do, some specific thing. A vow imposes a certain obligation on him that makes it; so that, for the future, he is not at liberty to do, or not to do, what was formerly permissible to him; for he is bound to accomplish his vow. Thus, we read in Ps. 65:13, “I will pay thee my vows which my lips have uttered,” and again (Eccles. 5:3), “If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him.”

Others there are, however, who make a complete sacrifice of their own will, for the love of God, submitting themselves to another by the vow of obedience, of which virtue Christ has given us a sublime example. For, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans (5:19), “As by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just.” Now this obedience consists in the abnegation of our own will. Hence, Our Lord said, “Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me: nevertheless not as I will but as Thou wilt” (Matt. 26:39). Again He said (John 6:38), “I came down from Heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of Him that sent Me.” By these words He shows us, that, as He renounced His own will, submitting it to the Divine will, so we ought wholly to subject our will to God, and to those whom He has set over us as His ministers. To quote the words of St. Paul, “obey your prelates and be subject to them” (Heb. 13:17).

CHAPTER XI

THE THREE MEANS OF PERFECTION, OF WHICH WE HAVE HITHERTO BEEN SPEAKING, BELONG, PECULIARLY, TO THE RELIGIOUS STATE

WE find the three ways to perfection in religious life, embodied in the three vows of perpetual poverty, chastity, and obedience. Religious follow the first road to perfection by the vow of poverty, whereby they renounce all property. By the vow of chastity, whereby they renounce marriage, they enter on the second road to perfection. They set forth on the third road to perfection, by the vow of obedience, whereby they sacrifice their own will. Now these three vows well beseem the religious life. For, as St. Augustine says (lib. 10. de Civitate Dei), “The word religion means, not any sort of worship, but the worship of God.” And Tully says, in his Rhetorica, that “religion is a virtue, paying worship and reverence to a certain higher nature which men term the Divine nature.”

Now the worship which is due to God alone, consists in the offering of sacrifice. Such sacrifices may consist in external things, when they are given for the love of God. Thus, St. Paul says, (Hebrews 13:3), “Do not forget to do good and to impart; for by such sacrifices God’s favour is obtained.” We also offer to God the sacrifice of our own bodies, when, as St. Paul says (Gal. 5:24), “we crucify the flesh with its vices and concupiscences,” or, when we obey his exhortation to the Romans (12:1), “Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing, unto God.” There is, again, a third and most agreeable sacrifice to God, spoken of in the 50th Psalm (v. 19), “a sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.”

The difference, says St. Gregory, in his Commentary on Ezechiel, between a sacrifice and a holocaust is, that, whereas every holocaust is a sacrifice, every sacrifice is not a holocaust. In a sacrifice a part of the victim was immolated; but in a holocaust the entire offering was consumed. “When, therefore, a man vows one thing to God, and does not vow another, he offers a sacrifice. When, however, he dedicates to the Almighty all that be has, all that he takes pleasure in, and his entire life, he is offering a holocaust.” This he does, most perfectly, by the three religious vows. Hence, it is clear that the name of religious is strictly applied, according to the very meaning of the word, to those who pay their vows as a holocaust to God.

According to the Levitical law the offering of sacrifice was ordained for the atonement of sin. Again, in Psalm 55., immediately after the verse, “the things you say in your hearts, be sorry for them upon your beds,” we read, “offer up the sacrifice of justice,” that is to say (as the Gloss explains), “perform works of justice after your lamentations of penitence.” Since, then, a holocaust is a perfect sacrifice, a man who makes the religious vows, (thereby offering, of his own will, a holocaust to God), makes perfect satisfaction for his sins. Hence we see, that the religious life, is not only the perfection of charity, but likewise the perfection of penitence, since, however heinous may be the sins committed by a man, he cannot be enjoined, as a penance for them, to go into religion; for the religious state transcends all satisfaction. “We see (in 33, quaest. II. cap. Admonere), that Astulplus, who had killed his wife, was advised to go into a monastery as the easiest and best course to pursue; for, if he remained in the world, a very severe penance would be imposed upon him.

The vow which, of all the three religious vows, belongs most peculiarly to the religious life, is that of obedience. This is clear for several reasons. First, because, by obedience man sacrifices to God his own will; by chastity, on the other hand, he offers his body, and by poverty his external possessions. Now, since the body is worth more than material goods the vow of chastity is superior in merit to that of poverty, but the vow of obedience is of more value than either of the other two. Secondly, because it is by his own will that a man makes use either of his body or his goods: therefore, he who sacrifices his own will, sacrifices everything else that he has. Again, the vow of obedience is more universal than is that of either poverty or chastity, and hence it includes them both. This is the reason why Samuel preferred obedience to all other offerings and sacrifices, saying, “Obedience is better than sacrifices” (1 Kings 15:22).

CHAPTER XII

REFUTATION OF THE ERRORS OF THOSE WHO PRESUME TO DETRACT FROM THE MERIT OF OBEDIENCE, OR OF VOWS

SATAN, in his jealousy of human perfection, has raised up several foolish and misleading men, who, by their teaching, have shown themselves hostile to the different modes of perfection of which we have been speaking. Vigilantius attacked the first counsel of perfection. St. Jerome thus combats his objections to it: “Some men hold that they act more virtuously who keep the use of their fortune, and divide the fruit of their possessions piecemeal among the poor, than they do who sell their goods, and, at once, give all they possess to the poor. The fallacy of this assertion is proved not by my words but by thosè of the Lord Himself, ‘If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast and give to the poor, and come follow me.’ Christ is here speaking to one who desires to be perfect, and who, with the Apostles, leaves father, ship, and net. The man who is praised for retaining the use of his possessions, is in the second or third degree of perfection; and we know that the first degree is preferable to either the second or the third.” Hence, in order to exclude error on this point, we find in the book, De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus the following words: “It is good to distribute one’s goods prudently among the poor; but it is better if it be done with the intention of following the Lord, to give them all away at once, and, in our dealings with Christ, to be free from all earthly solicitude.”

Jovinian argued against the second counsel of perfection, and declared that marriage was equal in merit to virginity. St. Jerome refuted his opinions, in the book which he wrote against him. St. Augustine, likewise, thus speaks of his error, in his book Retractationum: “The heresy of Jovinian asserted that the merit of consecrated virgins was equalled by conjugal chastity. Hence, it is said that in Rome, certain nuns who had not hitherto been suspected of immorality, contracted marriage. Our holy mother the Church has always stoutly resisted this error. In the book De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus we find the following declaration: “It is not Christian but Jovinian to set virginity on a level with matrimony, or to deny an increase of merit to those who, for the sake of mortifying the flesh, refrain from wine or flesh meat.”

But the devil is not content with these old devices. Even in our own days he has stirred up some men to declaim against the vow of obedience and all other vows, and to preach that good works are more meritorious when performed without obedience or vow, than when executed under such obligations. Others, again, say that a vow made to enter religion may, without danger to salvation, be broken, and they strive to confirm their opinion by frivolous and empty arguments. For they contend that an act is meritorious in proportion as it is voluntary, and that, if such an act be less voluntary in proportion as it is more necessary, good works done at a man’s pleasure, without the constraint of obedience or vow of any kind, are worth more than such as are performed under the obligation of a vow, either of obedience or of some other nature. They quote in support of their teaching the words of Prosper (Book II. De vita contemplativa), “We ought to fast and abstain, not as though forced by necessity, lest by acting reluctantly we should be called unwilling rather than devout,” They might also bring forward the words of St. Paul (2 Cor. 9:7), “Every one as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness or of necessity; for God loveth a cheerful giver.”

We must now show the fallacy of these arguments, and confute this foolish reasoning. First, in order to manifest the error of these arguments we will quote the Gloss on the verse of Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God.” “We must observe,” says the Gloss, “that some vows made to God are common to all men, and are necessary to salvation: such are our Baptismal promises and the like, which we should be bound to keep, even if we had not made them. The verse, ‘Vow ye and pay,’ alludes to such vows as these, and is addressed to all men. There are also other vows made by individuals, such as chastity, virginity, and the like. The Psalmist invites us, but does not command us, to make such vows as these, and to pay them when we have made them. For the emission of a vow is a decision of the will; but the payment of such a vow is a decided necessity."

Hence a vow is, in one sense, a matter partly of counsel, and, in another sense, a matter of precept. But, from whichever point of view we consider it, we shall see plainly that good works performed under vow, are more meritorious than those executed without a vow. For, it is clear, that, in all that is necessary for salvation, all men are bound by the precept of God; neither would it be right to think that God would give a command without a purpose. For, as St. Paul says (1 Tim. 1:5), "Now the end of the Commandment is charity." In vain, then, would God have given a commandment concerning the performance of anything, if the execution of such a thing had not tended more towards the increase of charity than its omission would have done. Now we are not only bidden by precept to believe, and forbidden to steal, but, further, we are commanded to make a vow to believe and to abstain from theft. Therefore, believing on account of our vow, and abstention from theft on the same account, tend more to augment charity than would be the case if we had no vow. Again, the more anything increases charity, the more it is praiseworthy and meritorious. Hence it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to perform any work under vow, than without such an obligation. Once more, the counsel is given to us not only to preserve virginity or chastity, but (as the Gloss points out) to make a vow to do so. But since, as we have said, a counsel is only given concerning that which is the greater good, it must be better to observe chastity under a vow than without one.

The same argument holds good concerning the other counsels. Now, amongst other good works virginity meets with special commendation. Our Lord speaking of it says, "He that can take, let him take" (Matt. 19:12). It is, however, the vow of virginity which renders that state so praiseworthy. St. Augustine says, in his book, De virginitate, "Virginity is honourable, not because it is virginity, but because it is consecrated to God, and because it vows to Him, and preserves for Him, the continence of piety." And, again, he says, "We do not praise virgins because they are virgins, but because they are consecrated to God by the holy continence of virginity." Hence we see, that the fact of their being performed under a vow, renders good works the more meritorious.

Again, every finite good acquires additional value by bearing a promise of some other good. There is no doubt that the promise of good is in itself a good. Hence, when one man makes a promise to another, he is considered to confer some advantage upon him; and he to whom the promise is made returns thanks. Now a vow, is a promise made to God, as we see from Ecclesiastes (5:3), "If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him." It is better, therefore, to make a vow and to perform it, than simply to execute a good work without being bound thereto by vow.

Again, the more one person gives to another, the more he deserves from that other. Now, he that does a good work without a vow, offers to God only that single act which he performs for love of him: he, on the contrary, who not only accomplishes a good work, but also makes a vow to perform it, gives to God not only that which he does, but also the power whereby he does it. For he puts it out of his power not to do such a good work; although, before making his vow, he might legitimately have omitted it. Hence he merits far more from God who acts under vow, than he who is not under any obligation.

Once more, the merit of a good work is increased in proportion as the will is confirmed in good, just as the heinousness of sin is aggravated in proportion to the obstinate malice of the will. Now it is evident, that he who makes a vow, confirms his will to accomplish that which he promises; and that when he accomplishes the good work which he has vowed to do, its consummation proceeds from the strength which his will has acquired. Just as the gravity of a crime proceeds from the fact that he who commits it acts from a determined purpose, or, as is usually said, sins out of malice; so the merit of any good work is enhanced by the fact that it is done under a vow.

Again, the more excellent the virtue from which any action proceeds, the more meritorious does that action become, since an action derives all its merit from the virtue which inspires it. Now, it may sometimes happen that an action of inferior virtue may have its origin in a superior virtue. For example we might do an act of justice from a motive of charity. Hence, it is far best to perform acts of inferior virtue from motives of superior virtue; just as an act of justice is enhanced in value, if it be performed out of charity. Now, we know, that the particular good works that we accomplish proceed from inferior virtues; fasting, for instance, is an act of abstemiousness; continence proceeds from chastity, and so of the rest. But, on the other hand, a vow is, strictly speaking, an act of latria, which, undoubtedly, is a higher virtue than abstemiousness, chastity, or any other virtue. For it is more meritorious to worship God, than to order ourselves rightly, towards, either our neighbour, or ourselves. Hence chastity, abstemiousness, or any other virtue, inferior to latria, derives additional value if it be performed under a vow.

This opinion is supported by the pious desire of the Church which invites men to make a vow to go to the Holy Land, or elsewhere, in her defence, and grants indulgences and other privileges to such as make this vow. She would certainly not invite the faithful to bind themselves by vow, were good works, done without such obligation, more meritorious than those done under vow. Did she act thus, she would be disobeying the exhortation of St. Paul (1 Cor. 12:31), “Be zealous for the better gifts.” If the good works done without a vow were the most praiseworthy, the Church, far from encouraging her children to bind themselves by vow, would withhold them from so doing, either by prohibition or dissuasion; and, as it is her desire that the faithful should be in the most meritorious state, she would absolve them all from their vows, in order, as far as possible, to enhance the merit of their good works. Hence, the opinion that vows detract from the value of good works, is repugnant to the spirit of the Church, and must be rejected as heretical.

All the arguments alleged in favour of this opinion, may be easily answered. First, the proposition, that a good work performed under vow, is less voluntary than one done without an obligation, is by no means universally true. For many persons perform what they have vowed to do, so promptly, that even had they not already made vows, they would not only have done those same good works, but they would have also vowed to do them. Secondly, granted that a deed performed under vow, or under obedience, be in a sense involuntary, nevertheless, he who accomplishes such a deed, does so from the necessity of his vow or of obedience, which he has no desire to violate. Hence he acts in a more praiseworthy and meritorious manner, than if he were performing a good work at his own pleasure and without a vow. And, even if he have not a will to do some particular thing (e.g. to fast), he, nevertheless, desires to accomplish his vow, or to practise obedience, which is much more meritorious than fasting. Hence, he who fasts out of obedience performs a more acceptable work than he who fasts by his own desire. And the will to fulfil a vow, or to practise obedience, is held to be so much the more perfect in proportion as the deed accomplished for the sake of obedience, or of keeping a vow, is repugnant to nature. Hence St. Jerome says to Rusticus, “My principal exhortation to thee is, not to be guided by thine own judgment.” Then he adds, “Neither shalt thou do according to thine own will; but thou shalt eat as thou art bidden; thou shalt have as much as is given thee; thou shalt wear the raiment appointed thee; thou shalt perform the whole task allotted to thee; thou shalt be subject to him to whom thou wouldst fain not submit; thou shalt go weary to bed; thou shalt fall asleep on thy feet and shalt be forced to rise before thou hast slumbered thy fill.”

The passage just cited shows us, that the merit of a good work consists in a man doing or suffering something for the love of God, which is contrary to his own will. For, alacrity of will, and fervour of divine love, are chiefly shown when that which we do for God is repugnant to our own inclinations. The martyrs are commended inasmuch as, for the love of God, they endured many things repugnant to nature. Hence, when Eleazar was tortured he said, “I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul I am well content to suffer these things because I fear thee.”

It is argued, that a man may not perchance retain the will to fulfil his vow, or to practise obedience; but God, as we know, judgeth the heart, and will hold such an one unfaithful to his vow and to obedience. If a man perform what he has vowed, or obey an order, solely out of motives of fear or human respect he gains no merit before God; for he acts, not from a desire to please Him, but solely under compulsion. Nevertheless, his vow, if it were made out of charity, is not unprofitable to him; for he has merited more by making it, than others have done by fasting without any vow. Moreover, the merit of his vow remains to him if he repent of the infidelity of his heart. This is our answer to the authorities adduced. They apply to the cases wherein men keep their vows under the compulsion of human motives, such as fear, or shame; but they do not speak of the necessity whereby men are constrained, from motives of Divine love, to do or suffer what is naturally repugnant to them, in order thereby to fulfil the will of

God. This is made clear by the words of St. Paul, “Not with sadness or of necessity” (2 Cor. 9:7). For human necessity induces sadness; whereas the constraining of divine love dissipates, or lessens it.

We may, in support of what we have said, quote the words of Prosper. “Lest we should act not devoutly but unwillingly. For the necessity which proceeds from divine love does not diminish love, but increases it.” And St. Augustine, in his epistle (127) to Armentarius and Paulina, shows that this necessity is desirable and praiseworthy. “Since,” he says, “thou now hast bound thyself, it is not lawful for thee to act otherwise. Before thou wert under a vow, thou wert free to do as thou wouldest: now, however, thou art subject to thy vow. Nevertheless, liberty is not a matter of congratulation, since it renders man debtor for what he cannot repay with money. But now that thy promise is made to God, I do not invite thee to great justice (i.e. to the chastity which thou hast vowed), but I warn thee against great iniquity. For, if thou dost not perform what thou hast vowed, thou wilt not remain as thou wert before thy vow. Before thy vow thou wert lower than at present, not worse; now, if thou dost (which God forbid) break thy faith with Him, thou wilt be as much the more accursed as thou wilt be blessed if thou dost keep thy vow. Repent not of thy promise to God; but rather rejoice that now it is no longer lawful for thee to do that which formerly, to thy detriment, was permissible to thee. Act firmly and fulfil in deed what thou hast promised by word. He will help thee who asks for thy vows. Blessed necessity which constrains us to better things.” From these words we see, how erroneous is the doctrine, that persons are not bound to keep a vow that they may have made to go into religion.

CHAPTER XIII

THE PERFECTION OF BROTHERLY LOVE WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR SALVATION

WE may fittingly conclude these considerations about the perfection of charity, as it regards God, with some reflections touching perfect charity as it concerns our neighbour. There are several degrees of perfect love of our neighbour, just as there are several degrees of perfect love of God. There is a certain perfection of this virtue which is a matter of precept, and which is necessary to salvation. There is, further, a supererogatory perfection, which is a matter of counsel. The perfection of brotherly love necessary to salvation, is of the nature prescribed by the precept, “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.” As God is the universal Good, existing above us, it is necessary, as we have before said, for the perfection of divine love that the whole heart should be, in a certain sense, turned to God. This degree of divine love is expressed by the precept, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” But our neighbour is not the universal good existing above ourselves; he is a particular good beneath us. Therefore, we are not bidden to love him with our whole heart, but as ourselves. Three consequences follow from this proposition.

First, our love must be sincere. It is in the nature of love to wish well to the object beloved. Hence, love tends towards two things: to the one to whom we are wishing well, and to the good which we desire for him. And, although both these things are said to be loved, that object is truly loved to which we wish some good. For the good which we wish to another person is only loved per accidens, because it falls within the limits of the act of love. Now it is incorrect to say that we really and sincerely love an object which we desire to destroy; and as many of the things which we use are destroyed, we only love such things per accidens. For instance, we consume wine in drinking, we expose a horse to death in battle; in such cases, we are truly loving ourselves and are only loving these other things per accidens, on account of the use which they are to us.

It is clear, likewise, that every man does, by nature, love himself truly, in so far as to wish benefits to himself, happiness, for instance, virtue, knowledge, and the necessaries of life. But those things of which he avails himself he does not truly love in themselves; rather, he loves the service they render him, and he prefers himself to them. Now this proposition is as true with regard to persons, as it is with regard to things. We love some men only because they are of use to us; and when this is the case, it is evident that we do not truly love them as we love ourselves. He that loves another because he is of service to him, or affords him gratification, proves that he loves himself. As he seeks only convenience and profit from his friend and not his friend himself, he can only be said to love his friend in the sense in which we are said to love wine or horses, i.e. not as ourselves by wishing well to them, but rather as valuing them as an advantage to ourselves.

It is not difficult to prove, that sincerity is necessary to perfect charity. We see this, first, from the precept which bids us to love our neighbour as ourselves. “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith,” says St. Paul (1 Tim. 1:5). Again he says, “Charity seeketh not her own” (1 Cor. 13:5), but wishes well to those whom she loves. He gives his own example, as a lesson of charity, “not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved” (1 Cor. 10:33).

Secondly, the way in which we are commanded to loved our neighbour, viz. “as ourselves,” proves that our charity ought to be rightly ordered and sincere. For true and rightly ordered love prefers the greater to the lesser good. Now it is clear, that, of all human good, the welfare of the soul is the greatest: next in degree comes physical well-being; and external goods occupy the last place. It is natural to man to observe this order in his preference. For who would not rather lose bodily eyesight than the use of reason? Who would not part with all his property in order to save his life? “Skin for skin,” said Satan to the Lord, “and all that a man hath he will give for his life” (Job 2:4). Very few, if any, fail to observe this order in their preference concerning the natural goods of which we have given examples. There are, nevertheless, many who pervert this order of charity, in the case of the other goods which exist in addition to the purely natural ones of which we have spoken. They will, for instance, prefer physical health or comfort, to the acquisition of virtue or learning; and they will expose their bodies to danger and hardship, in order to gain material wealth. Now this, as we shall show more at large, is not true love. Neither do they who act thus, love themselves sincerely. It is quite clear that the chief part of a thing is really the thing itself. When we say that a city acted thus or thus, we mean that the chief citizens acted in such or such a manner. Now we know, that the principal thing in man is the soul, and that the chief among the powers or faculties of the soul, is the reason or understanding. He, therefore, who despises the good of the rational soul, for the sake of physical welfare, or of the advantage of the sensitive soul, plainly shows that he does not truly love himself. “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul” (Ps. 10:6).

Now we are commanded to observe the same order in the love of our neighbour that we ought to observe in the love of ourselves. Hence we must desire his welfare in the same manner as we ought to desire our own, i.e. first his spiritual good, secondly his physical prosperity, including in the latter category such good as consists in extrinsic possessions. But, if we wish our neighbour to have material goods harmful to his health of body, or physical welfare opposed to his spiritual profit, we do not truly love him.

We see, thirdly, from the precept concerning charity, that our love of our neighbour must be holy. That is called holy which is directed to God. An altar, and the other things used in the sacred ministry, are holy, because they are dedicated to His service. Now, when one man loves another as himself, there must be intercommunion between them; and, in so far as the two persons are united together, they are considered as forming one; and the one behaves to the other as to himself. There are, however, several ways in which two persons may be joined together. They may be joined by ties of blood, i.e. by being born of the same parents. They may be joined by certain social ties—they may be fellow-citizens, under the same ruler and the same laws. Or, they may be joined by certain professional or commercial bonds—they may be fellow-workmen, or fellow-soldiers. Now the neighbourly love which may exist between men, united by these various bonds, may be just and seemly, but it cannot, on that account, be called holy. For love can only be called holy in so far as it is directed to God.

Fellow-citizens agree in being subject to the same ruler whose laws they obey; and all men, inasmuch as they naturally aspire to happiness, are united in their inclinations towards God, the Beginning of all things, the Source of happiness, and the Principle of justice. But, we must remember, that, in the right order, the general is preferable to the particular good. A part is, by a natural instinct, governed by the good of the whole. The hand, for example, is exposed to danger in order to shield the head or heart, the source of life. Now, in the communion, whereof we have been speaking, and in which all men are united by their natural tendency towards happiness, each individual must be considered as a part, and God, in whom the happiness of all consists, must be regarded as the universal Good of the whole. Hence, according to right reason and natural instinct, each man orders himself towards God, as a part is ordered to the whole; and this order is made perfect by charity, whereby man loves himself for God's sake. Now, when he also loves his neighbour for God's sake, he loves him as himself; and his love thus becomes holy. This is plainly expressed by St. John, in the following words: "This commandment we have from God that he, who loveth God, love also his brother" (1 John 4:21).

The precept to love our neighbour as ourselves teaches us, fourthly, that our love of our neighbour must be practical and fruitful. Men love themselves, not only by wishing good to befall them, and by desiring protection from evil; but also, by endeavouring, by all means in their power, to procure prosperity for themselves, and to defend themselves from adversity. Hence, when a man truly loves another as himself, he will show his love not only by good wishes, but by practical benefits. He will obey the teaching of St. John (1 Ep. 3:18), "My little children, let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth."

CHAPTER XIV

THE PERFECTION OF LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR CONSIDERED AS A MATTER OF COUNSEL

WE devoted the last chapter to the consideration of the perfection of brotherly love, as exhibited in the degree necessary to salvation. We will now treat of the same virtue, as manifested in a degree exceeding common perfection, and thus forming a matter of counsel. This perfection of fraternal charity may be regarded from a triple point of view. First we may consider its comprehensiveness; for love is perfect in proportion to the number of persons whom it includes.

Now there are three degrees in the comprehensiveness of charity. Some men love their neighbours, either on account of the benefits they receive from them, or by reason of some tie of blood or of social life. This love is bounded by the limits of human friendship, and of it Our Lord says, "If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this? And if you salute your brethren only, what do you more? do not even the heathens this?" (Matt. 5:46). Others, again, include strangers in their charity, as long as they meet with nothing in these strangers antipathetic to themselves. This degree of charity is limited by natural feeling; for as all men form one species, each individual man is by nature the friend of all others. Thus, it is natural to us to put one who has lost his way on the right road, to help a man who has fallen down, and to perform similar kindly offices. As, however, we naturally prefer ourselves to others, it follows, that we shall love one thing and hate what is opposed to it. Therefore a merely natural love never includes the love of our enemies. But the third degree of charity is the love extended even to our enemies. Speaking of this love, Our Lord says (Matt. 5:44), “Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.” He shows that this love constitutes the perfection of charity, by concluding His instruction with the words, “Be ye, therefore, perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.”

The fact that this perfection is beyond ordinary perfection, appears in the words of St. Augustine (Enchirid.), “These things belong to the perfect among the sons of God. Nevertheless, all the faithful ought to strive to fulfil them; and by prayer and self-conquest the soul of man ought to be brought to these sentiments. But this sublime virtue is not found in the generality of mankind, although we believe that the prayer: ‘Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us,’ is heard by God.”

But, as by the term “our neighbour” all men are understood; and as no exception is made in the precept of loving our neighbour as ourselves; it may be thought, that the love of our enemies is commanded as necessary to salvation. This difficulty is easily solved, if we call to mind what has been said about the perfection of Divine love. The precept, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” etc., may be understood as a matter either of precept, to be obeyed as a necessity, or as a counsel, or as perfection attained only by the Blessed in Heaven. If the command, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart” be understood to mean that man’s heart is to be always actually fixed on God, it can only be obeyed by the Blessed in Heaven. If it be taken as signifying that man is not to admit anything into his heart contrary to Divine love, it is, in this sense, a precept which must of necessity be obeyed. If, again, we understand by these words, the renunciation of all things for the sake of greater freedom in communion with God, it is a counsel of perfection. In the same way we may say that it is a precept not to exclude even our enemies from the universal love of our neighbour enjoined upon us, nor to admit within our heart anything opposed to this love.

But to love our enemies with an actual love when there is no necessity for so doing, is a counsel of perfection. Of course it is necessary for salvation to love our enemies by doing them actual service and assisting them, if they be in any extremity, if, for example, they be dying of hunger. The precept of brotherly love does not, however, bind us to show any special affection nor to do any particular service to our enemies, unless they be in the extreme distress of which we have spoken; neither are we bound by precept to do any special service to any other of our neighbours. Love of our enemies springs, directly and purely, from love of God; whereas our love for other men arises from divers motives, e.g., from gratitude, from kinship, from fellow-citizenship, and the like. But nothing save the love of God can make us love our enemies; for we love them because they are His creatures, made in His image, and capable of enjoying Him. And, as charity prefers God before all other good, the consideration of the Divine Good which inclines it to love its enemies, outweighs the consideration of any injury received from them which would incline our nature to hate them. Thus, in proportion to the love of God in a man's soul, will be his readiness to love his enemies.

The perfection of brotherly love depends, secondly, upon its intensity. We know that the more intensely a man loves one object, the more easily will he for its sake despise other things. Hence the perfection of his love for his neighbour, may be gauged by what he sacrifices on his neighbour's account. Some men, in their love of others, will give up their material possessions, either dispensing them to their neighbours at their discretion, or relinquishing them entirely, in order to supply the necessities of other men. St. Paul seems to refer to this form of charity in his First Epistle to the Corinthians (13:3), where he says, "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor." In the book of Canticles, also, we are told that, "If a man should give all the substance of his house for love, he shall despise it as nothing" (Cant. 8:7). Our Lord includes this in the counsel of perfection, which He gave when He said, "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor and thou shalt have treasure in Heaven; and come follow me" (Matt. 19:21). In this passage the sacrifice of material possession seems to be recommended for two ends. The words, "give to the poor," point to love of our neighbour; the other words, "follow Me," indicate love of God. But a man fulfils the same end, whether he suffers the loss of his material goods for the love of God, or for the sake of his neighbour. St. Paul commends the charity of the Hebrews in these words, "You took with joy the being stripped of your own goods" (Heb. 10:34). In the Book of Proverbs (12:26) we are told also that, "He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend is just." St. John says in like manner (1 Ep. 3:17), "He that hath the substance of this world and shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?"

The second degree of love of our neighbour, consists in exposing ourselves to physical hardships for his sake. St. Paul gives us an example of this kind of charity when he says, "In labour and toil we worked day and night, lest we should be chargeable to any of you" (2 Thess. 3:8). This second degree of charity also includes a willingness to bear suffering and persecution for the love of our neighbour. St. Paul mentions this charity in the 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians (1:6), "Whether we be in tribulation, it is for your exhortation and salvation," and also in his Epistle to Timothy, "Wherein I labour even unto bands as an evil doer; but the word of God is not bound. Therefore I endure all things, for the sake of the elect, that they may obtain salvation" (2 Tim. 2:9). Those fail to attain to this degree of charity who will deprive themselves of no luxury, and submit to no inconvenience for the sake of others. It is to such men as these that Amos (6:4) addresses the following words: "You that sleep upon beds of ivory, and are wanton on your couches: you that eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the midst of the herd; you that sing to the sound of the psaltery: they have thought themselves to have instruments of music like David; that drink wine in bowls, and anoint themselves with the best ointments; and they are not concerned for the affliction of Joseph." And Ezechiel also says (13:5), "You have not gone up to face the enemy, nor have you set up a wall for the house of Israel, to stand in battle in the day of the Lord."

The third degree of charity consists in sacrificing our life for another. St. John (1:3) says, "In this we have known the charity of God, because He hath laid down his life for us; and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren." Our Lord Himself declares that, "Greater love than this hath no man, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (John 15:13). Hence it is in this sacrifice of life that the perfection of charity consists.

The word "life" may be understood, however, in two senses. There is the spiritual life whereby God Himself animates the soul. We may not sacrifice this life. For our love of our soul is proportionate to our love of God; and we ought to love God more than we love our neighbour. Therefore, we may not, in order to save another, injure our own soul by sin. We have also the physical life which animates our body. This life we ought to lay down for the brethren. For, it is our duty to prefer our neighbour to our body; and therefore it is right to sacrifice our physical life for the spiritual welfare of others. We are bound by precept to act thus if we see our neighbour exposed to any extreme spiritual danger. Thus, if we were to see another seduced from the Faith by unbelievers, we should be bound to expose ourselves to death if, thereby, we could save him from such ruin. But it pertains to the perfection of justice, and is a matter of counsel, to sacrifice life for the salvation of those who are not in grace spiritual necessity. St. Paul teaches us to do so by his own example, for he says, "But I, most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your souls" (2 Cor. 12:15). On this passage the Gloss remarks, "It is perfect charity to be prepared to die for the brethren." The state of slavery does in some sort resemble death, and is therefore called civil death. For life is chiefly manifested in ability to move; he that cannot move save by the agency of others, may be accounted dead. Now, a slave has no power over himself, but is governed by the will of his master; and therefore this condition of bondage may be compared to death. Hence a man, who, for the love of another, delivers himself to bondage, practises the same perfection of charity, as he who exposes himself to death. Nay, we may say that he does more; for slavery is more abhorrent to our nature than is death.

The perfection of fraternal charity must next be considered as manifested by the value of what we do for others. For our love for our neighbour is proved by the value of the gifts that we bestow upon him. Now there are three degrees in this charity. The first degree consists in ministering to the bodily wants of our brethren by clothing the naked, feeding the hungry, tending the sick, and the like. Our Lord promises to consider as done to Himself, everything of this nature that we do for others. The second degree of charity consists in bestowing upon our neighbour such spiritual benefits as do not exceed the capability of human nature. Among such benefits we may mention the instruction of the ignorant, advice given to those in doubt, or the conversion of such as have gone astray. Such works of mercy are commended in Job 4:3, "Behold, thou hast taught many, and thou hast strengthened the weary hands: thy words have confirmed them that were staggering, and thou hast strengthened the trembling knees." The third degree of charity consists in enriching our neighbour with such spiritual benefits as are supernatural and exceed human reason. Such benefits are, instruction in divine truth, direction to God, and the spiritual communication of the Sacraments. Of gifts such as these, St. Paul says, “He who giveth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among you” (Gal. 3:5). Again he says (1 Thess. 2:13), “When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but (as it is indeed) the word of God.” And writing to the Corinthians the Apostle, after saying, “I have espoused you to one husband,” continues, “for if he that cometh preacheth another Christ, whom we have not preached; or if you receive another Spirit whom you have not received; or another Gospel which you have not received, you might well bear with him” (2 Cor. 11:2). He who bestows upon others gifts of this nature practises a singular perfection of brotherly love; for, it is by means of these gifts, that man attains to union with his last End, in which consists his highest perfection.

Job was asked by one of his friends, “Knowest thou the great paths of the clouds, and the perfect knowledges?” (Job 37:16). The clouds, says St. Gregory, typify holy preachers. For these clouds have most intricate “paths,” or ways of holy preaching, and “perfect knowledges” when they recognise that of their own merits, they are nothing, and that all that they impart to their neighbours is above them. A further degree of perfection is attained when spiritual gifts of this nature are bestowed not on one alone, or on two, but on a whole multitude. For, according to the Philosopher, the good of a nation is better and more divine, than is the good of an individual man. Hence St. Paul writes to the Ephesians (4:13), “Other some pastors and doctors, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ,” i.e. the Church. And again, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians (14:12), he says, “Forasmuch as you are zealous of spirits, seek to abound unto the edifying of the Church.”

CHAPTER XV

WHAT IS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE THE STATE OF PERFECTION

IT must, as we have before said, be borne in mind that perfection does not consist in the mere accomplishment of a perfect work, but, likewise, in the vow to accomplish such a work. A counsel, as we have already observed, has been given us on each of these two points. He therefore who performs a perfect work under a vow attains to a twofold perfection. For, just as a man who observes continence is practising one form of perfection; so, he who obliges himself by vow to live in continence and who keeps his vow, practises both the perfection of continence and the perfection of a vow. For that perfection which comes from the observance of a vow changes the state and condition of a man as completely, as freedom alters the state and condition of a slave. This proposition is established in II. question. IX., where Pope Adrian says, “If at any time we are called upon for judgment in a capital cause, or in a cause affecting a state of life, we must act at our own discretion, and not depend upon others to examine the case.” For, if a man make a vow to observe chastity, he deprives himself of liberty to marry. But he who simply observes chastity without a vow, is not deprived of his liberty. Therefore, he is not in an altered condition, as is the case with a man bound by a vow. Again, if one man serve another, his state is not thereby changed, as it is if he lay himself under an obligation to serve him.

We must remember, however, that a man may deprive himself of liberty either absolutely (simpliciter) or relatively (secundum quid). If he bind himself, either to God or man, to perform some specific work for some allotted time, he renounces his freedom, not absolutely but partially, i.e., with regard to the particular matter, about which he has laid himself under an obligation. If, however, he place himself entirely at the disposal of another, reserving to himself no liberty whatsoever, he makes himself a slave absolutely, and thereby absolutely alters his condition. Thus, if a person make a vow to God to perform some specified work, such as a pilgrimage or a fast, he does not change his condition entirely, but only partially, i.e., with regard to that particular work which he vows to accomplish. If he dedicate his whole life to serve God in works of perfection he absolutely embraces the condition or state of perfection. But, as some men perform works of perfection without any vow, and others fail to accomplish the works of perfection to which they have vowed their whole lives, it is perfectly possible for persons to be perfect without being in the state of perfection, or to be in a state of perfection without being perfect.

CHAPTER XVI

THE STATE OF PERFECTION IS A CONDITION BEFITTING BISHOPS AND RELIGIOUS

FROM all that has been said it is easy to see which are the classes of men whom the state of perfection befits. We know that there are three roads to the perfection of divine love, to wit the giving up of material possessions; the sacrifice of marriage and of earthly ties; and total self—denial either by death for Christ, or by the abnegation of self-will. Now, they who by vow dedicate their whole lives to these works of perfection, manifestly embrace the state of perfection. And, as in every religious order these three vows are made, it is plain that every form of religious life is included in the state of perfection.

Again, we have pointed out that there are three elements in the perfection of brotherly love. It is necessary to perfect brotherly love, first, that a man love his enemies and assist them; secondly, that he lay down his life for the brethren either by exposing himself to the danger of death or by devoting his whole life to their service; and thirdly, that he minister to their spiritual needs. Now, bishops are bound to fulfil these three offices of charity. As they undertake the entire charge of their churches, wherein oftentimes many will be found to hate, persecute, and revile them, they are under the obligation of repaying their enemies and persecutors by benevolence and charity, after the example of the Apostles, whose successors they are, and who dwelt among those most hostile to them and laboured for their conversion. Thus were verified the words of Our Lord (Matt. 10:16), “Behold I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves.” For, although the

Apostles were, so to speak, torn by their enemies, they were not destroyed, but, on the contrary, they converted those who maltreated them. St. Augustine in his book, De Sermone Domini in monte, has the following commentary on the words, “If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also” (Matt. 5:39): “These words (he says), inviting us to mercy, appeal most to such as have to minister to those whom they love, whether they be children, or men of frenzied brain. For, from such persons they suffer much; and they are prepared, if need be, to suffer more. Thus, the great Physician and Master of souls instructs His disciples, that they must bear, with serenity, the follies of those whose salvation they desire to secure. For crime is an indication of a weak mind, as innocence is a proof of perfect strength.” Hence St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians, says, “We are reviled and we bless; we are persecuted and we suffer it; we are blasphemed and we entreat” (1 Cor. 4:12).

Bishops are further bound to sacrifice their lives for the salvation of those committed to them, and thus to put in practice the words of Our Lord, “I am the Good Shepherd: the Good Shepherd layeth down his life for his sheep” (John 10:11). Speaking of these words, St. Gregory says, “In the Gospel which has been read to you, beloved brethren, you learn both a lesson for yourselves, and the danger which threatens us. There is set before us both the contempt of death, with which we ought to be inspired, and the model that we ought to imitate.” He further adds, “Our first duty is, in charity, to distribute our goods to our sheep; and we are further bound, if need be, to serve them by our death.… The wolf that cometh upon the sheep signifies any unjust seducer or oppressor of the faithful and the lowly. He that is no true shepherd but only bears the semblance of such, will leave his sheep and take to flight, being too fearful of death to dare to resist iniquity.” From these words it is clear, that it is one of the duties of those discharging the episcopal office to face death for the sake of the church committed to them.

Hence, those who undertake this office are bound to practise such perfection of charity as consists in the sacrifice of their life for the brethren. In the same manner, a bishop is bound by his office to dispense spiritual gifts to his neighbour, and thus to become a mediator between God and man, acting in the place of Him who is “the one Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus” (1 Tim. 2). Moses, speaking as a type of Our Lord, said, “I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time”

(Deut. 5:1). Hence, a bishop must, in the name of his people, offer up prayers and supplications to God. “For every high priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins” (Heb. 5:1). And, on the other hand, he must act with regard to his people as the vicar of God, giving to his flock by the power of the Lord, judgment, instruction, example, and sacraments. St. Paul says, “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ” (2 Cor. 2:10). Again, in the same epistle (13:3) he says, “Do you seek a proof of Christ that speaketh in me?” Again (1 Cor. 9:11), he uses these words, “If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?” Now a bishop, at his ordination or consecration, and a religious at his profession, engages himself to this degree of perfection. St. Paul encourages St. Timothy to its practice, in the following words: “Fight the good fight of faith: lay hold on eternal life, whereunto thou art called, and hast confessed a good confession before many witnesses” (1 Tim. 6:12). This “good confession” is interpreted by the Gloss to mean ordination. Hence, bishops, as well as religious, are bound to a state of perfection. And, as human contracts are drawn up with certain ceremonies, so, both the consecration of bishops and the profession of religious are solemnized by certain rites and blessings. Dionysius (VI. Cap. Eccles. Hierarch.) speaking of monks, says, “On this account the holy law has given them perfect grace, and has vouchsafed to bestow it on them with a certain sanctifying ceremonial (invocatione).”

CHAPTER XVII

THE EPISCOPAL OFFICE IS MORE SACRED THAN IS THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

TO one who has not duly considered the subject, the religious state might appear to be more sublime than the episcopal office. For the love of God, to the perfection of which religious dedicate their lives, far surpasses the love of our neighbour to which the pontifical state is devoted; just as the contemplative life, in which religious are engaged, is nobler than the active life, to which bishops are ordained. Dionysius (VI. Cap. Eccles. Hierarch.) says that,” Some persons call religious servants, and others call them monks, on account of their pure service and ministry to God, and by reason of their simple undivided life which lifts them by holy contemplation of those things which are unseen, to a godlike oneness and to perfection pleasing to the Lord.” Again the episcopal office may appear to fall short of perfection, because bishops are allowed to possess money, notwithstanding the words of Our Lord, “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor” (Matt. 19:21).

But this way of thinking is not in accordance with truth. Dionysius says (V. Cap. Eccles. Hierarch.) that the “duty of bishops is to produce perfection,” and elsewhere (Cap. VI.), he says, that “the life of monks is a state of the perfect.” Now it is evident that greater perfection is needed in order to make others perfect than is required in a state which in itself is perfect; just as it is better to do something than to be something, and just as a cause is more powerful than its effect. Hence, the episcopal state is one of greater perfection, than is that of any religious order.

This conclusion is still more clearly established, if we consider the obligations attached to the episcopal office, and those belonging to the religious life. Religious are bound to renounce material possessions, to observe chastity, and to live in obedience. But the duties of bishops are far more onerous and difficult of fulfilment. For they, as we have seen, are obliged to lay down their lives for their flocks. Hence the obligation of a bishop is much weightier than is that of a religious.

Bishops are further bound by the same obligations as those imposed upon religious. For, as it is their duty to feed their flocks, not only by word and example, but likewise by temporal assistance, they are obliged, if need arise, to distribute their worldly goods among those committed to their care. St. Peter was three times commanded by our Lord to feed His sheep. The exhortation sank into his mind, and he recalls it in his epistle, saying, "Feed the flock of God which is among you" (1 St. Peter 5:2). St. Gregory, likewise, speaking as though in the person of bishops, says: "We ought in charity to distribute our goods among our sheep … for how shall he who will not of his temporal substance minister unto his flock, be ready for its sake to sacrifice his life?"

Bishops, likewise, are bound to live in chastity. For it is only meet that they who are to preach purity to others, should themselves lead spotless lives. Hence Dionysius (III. Cap. Cœlest. Hierarch.) says that from the abundance of their own chastity, they must impart purity to others.

Religious, by their vow of obedience, bind themselves to submit to one superior; but a bishop constitutes himself the servant of all of whom he undertakes the care. He is bound to imitate the example of St. Paul, who tells us that he sought not that which was profitable to himself but to many, that they might be saved (1 Cor. 10:33). Again the Apostle says of himself, "For whereas I was free unto all, I made myself the servant of all" (1 Cor. 9:19). "For we preach not ourselves, but Jesus Christ Our Lord; and ourselves your servants through Jesus" (2 Cor. 4:5). Hence it is the custom for the Sovereign Pontiff to subscribe himself as "the servant of the servants of God." We must conclude, then, that the episcopal office is a condition of higher perfection than is the religious life.

Dionysius, again, writes (VI. Cap. Eccles. Hierarch.), "The monastic state is not intended to lead others forward, but is ordained for its own sake, and remains on its own peculiar and sacred basis." Bishops, on the other hand, are under the obligation of guiding others to God. St. Gregory, writing on the book of Ezechiel, says that, "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than is zeal for souls.” These words clearly point out that the episcopal is, of all states, the most perfect. This conclusion is further proved by the custom of the church, which, when a religious is appointed to a bishopric, releases him from obedience to the superiors of his order. For this could not be done, were not the episcopal state one of greater perfection than the religious. In acting thus the Church of God obeys the counsel of St. Paul, “Be ye therefore zealous for the better gifts” (1 Cor. 12:31).

CHAPTER XVIII

AN ANSWER TO CERTAIN ARGUMENTS WHICH MAY SEEM TO CALL IN QUESTION THE PERFECTION OF THE EPISCOPAL STATE

IT is not difficult to answer the objections brought against the perfection of the Episcopal office. The perfection of fraternal charity springs, as we have seen, from the perfection of the love of God, which in the hearts of some men is so vigorous that it urges them, not only to desire to enjoy God and to serve Him, but likewise for His sake to assist their neighbours. Hence in the 2nd Epistle to the Corinthians (5:13), St. Paul says, “Whether we be transported in mind” (by contemplation) “it is to God” (i.e. to the glory of God), “or whether we be ober” (in condescension to you) “it is to you,” i.e. for your profit; “for the love of Christ presseth us,” “causing us (as the Gloss explains) to do all things for you.” For it is clear that it is a greater sign of love if a man, for the sake of his friend, be willing to serve another, than if he will only render service to his friend in his own person.

The argument drawn from the comparison between the perfection of the contemplative and the active life, does not seem to have much bearing on the point in question. A bishop, being singled out as mediator between God and men, must, as minister to men, be pre-eminent in the active life. At the same time he must excel in contemplation, in order to draw from God the spiritual wisdom which he is bound to impart to those committed to his care. Hence St. Gregory says (in Pastoral), “A bishop should be foremost in action, and he should be raised above all men by contemplation. He should be solicitous, lest, on account of external occupation, he relax in his zeal for spiritual affairs; neither should his care for spiritual things lessen his diligence concerning such as are temporal.” It may happen, indeed, that a man occupied in the service of others, may suffer some loss of sweetness in contemplation; but this very sacrifice is a proof of the perfection of his love of God. For if, for the sake of doing service to one whom we love, we deprive ourselves of the happiness of being in his presence, we show stronger affection for him, than if we endeavoured always to enjoy his company. St. Paul writing to the Romans (9:3) says, “Neither death, nor life shall separate me from the love of God”; he then continues, “I wished myself to be anathema from Christ for my brethren.” St. Chrysostom, in his book, De compunctione cordis has the following commentary on these words: “The love of Christ had thus so completely conquered the heart of this Apostle, that, in order to please Him, he was ready to sacrifice His presence, which to him was the thing dear above all others.”

The third objection brought against the perfection of the episcopal state admits of a double answer. First, although a bishop holds certain possessions, he does not regard them as his own; but he distributes them as common property; and thus he does not violate evangelical perfection. On this point Prosper says (XII. quaestione I.), “It is right to possess the property of the Church and to renounce one’s own belongings for the love of perfection.” Again in the same chapter, after quoting the example of St. Paulinus, he says, “By this action we clearly learn, that it befits us to part with our own possessions for the sake of perfection, and that, without any imperfection, we may possess the common property of the Church.”

We must bear in mind that if anyone has charge of the goods of the Church, and does not gain any personal profit from them, but only acts as a steward or dispenser, he does not fail in evangelical perfection. Were this so, abbots and superiors of monasteries would sin against their vow of poverty and would fail in religious perfection, which cannot at all be admitted. Of course, if a bishop, not content with dispensing the revenues of his see, should make himself their owner by using them to his own personal profit, he would plainly be the possessor of private property; and he would, thus, fail to attain to the perfection of those who renounce everything, and live with nothing of their own. But, it may be thought that bishops fail in the evangelical perfection set forth in the words, “If thou wilt be perfect,” etc. (Matt. 19:21), since they are not only at liberty to possess the property of their Church, but are also free to keep their own patrimony, and to dispose of it by will. This objection is easily answered, if the preceding remarks be called to mind. As we have already said, the renunciation of riches does not constitute perfection; it is merely a means to it. It is quite possible for a man to acquire perfection, without actually giving up what he possesses. This may be made clear by the following example. Our Lord, amongst other counsels of perfection, gave this: “If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other: and if a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him. And whomsoever will force thee one mile, go with him other two” (Matt. 5:39). But even the perfect do not obey these words literally. Nay, Our Lord Himself when He suffered a blow on the face, did not turn His other cheek. He said, “If I have spoken evil, give testimony of the evil, but if well why strikest thou me?” (John 18:23). Neither did St. Paul, when he was smitten, offer his cheek. He exclaimed, “God shall strike thee, thou whited wall” (Acts 23:3).

Hence, we see that it is not necessary that these counsels should be actually obeyed; but, as St. Augustine says in his book De Sermone Domini in Monte, they are to be understood as signifying the preparation of the heart. For, perfection consists in a man’s readiness to perform any work that may be required of him. In like manner St. Augustine cites in his book Quaestionum Evangelii (and we find the same in Decretis, Dist. 41.), Our Lord’s words, “Wisdom is justified by all her children,” as proving that the sons of wisdom understand that justice consists neither in eating nor in abstinence, but in suffering want with patience. St. Paul expresses the same thought when he writes to the Philippians (4:12), “I know both how to abound and to suffer need.”

Religious learn this serenity and patience in bearing poverty, by their practice of possessing nothing. Bishops, on the other hand, may attain to it, by exercising solicitude about their church, and by fraternal charity, which ought to make them willing not merely to sacrifice their money, but, if need be, their very life for their flocks. St. Chrysostom says in his Dialogue, “Monks do in truth wage a severe war.” He then adds, “For the fasting, and vigils, and other penitential exercises of the monastic state are very hard and painful. But in the episcopal state, the conflict is more felt by the soul than by the body.” The saint further, by way of example, draws a comparison between a craftsman, who, by means of various instruments, produces marvellous pieces of mechanism, and a philosopher who displays his skill merely by the operations of his intellect.

It may be urged, that bishops are bound to practise this perfection of the renunciation of riches, not in will alone, but also in deed. For, when Our Lord sent His disciples on their mission, He said to them: “Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses: nor scrip for your journey, nor two coats, nor shoes, nor a staff” (Matt. 10:9). Now, as bishops are the successors of the Apostles, they ought to obey the precept given to the Apostles. But this conclusion is clearly fallacious. For some of the most saintly bishops of the Church, whose holiness is beyond question, such as Athanasius, Hilary, and many of their successors, have not observed this command of Our Lord. As St. Augustine says, in his book Contra mendacium, “We must not only bear in mind the precepts of God, but we must also be attentive to the lives and customs of the just.” For, although we fail to understand many things that are written for us, we can gather their meaning from the deeds of the saints, and thus learn in what sense we are to interpret them. It is on this account, that the Holy Spirit, Who speaks by the Scriptures, inspires the actions of the Saints. St. Paul tells us the same truth when he says, “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God” (Rom. 8:14). Hence, we have no right to conclude that what is commonly done by holy men, is contrary to the Divine commandments. Our Lord, in the chapter of St. Matthew already quoted, gives a reason for His words to His Apostles, bidding them not to possess anything, nor to take anything on their journey. “The labourer,” He says, “is worthy of his hire.” Thus He gives a permission, not a command, to His disciples, to accept hospitality. Therefore, if any one of them desired not to avail himself of this permission, but preferred to carry provisions with him, he would not be disobeying a precept of his Master. For there is a difference between disobeying a command, and omitting (after the example of St. Paul) to make use of a permission.

We may further understand these words of Christ to the Apostles, by remembering that He was sending them to preach to the Jews, with whom it was customary for the teachers to live by the contributions of their disciples. Our Lord (says St. Chrysostom) desired, first, that His disciples should be above suspicion, and should not be thought to be preaching for the sake of gain. Secondly, He wished them to be free from anxiety about material things. Thirdly, He willed that they should, by experience, learn that, without anxiety on their part, His power could provide them with all that they might need. But He acted differently on the Eve of His Passion, when He was about to send them forth to preach to the Gentiles. For, then, He said to them, “When I sent you without purse, and scrip, and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: nothing. Then said He unto them: But now he that hath a purse let him take it, and likewise a scrip” (Luke 22). These words prove that bishops, as successors of the Apostles, are not bound to possess nothing, nor to carry nothing with them on their journeys.

CHAPTER XIX

THE EPISCOPAL OFFICE, ALTHOUGH A STATE OF GREATER PERFECTION THAN IS THE RELIGIOUS LIFE, IS, NEVERTHELESS, NOT TO BE COVETED

ST. PAUL exhorts the Corinthians (1 Ep. 12:31) to be “zealous for the better gifts.” Seeing, then, how far the episcopal office exceeds, in perfection, the religious life, ought men not to be more eager to be made bishops, than to become religious? If anyone who asks this question will give a little consideration to the matter, he will see that, while there is abundant reason why the religious life should be desired, the episcopal office, on the contrary, should, by no means, be coveted. For he who enters religion, renounces himself together with all that belongs to him, and, for the love of God, submits himself to the government of another. On the other hand, he who is promoted to a bishopric, is raised to an exalted position in God’s kingdom upon earth. Consequently, as honour and power are not rightfully bestowed on any save on the best among men, it would be presumptuous to aspire to such a dignity.

St. Augustine, in chapter 19. De civitate Dei, says that, “the Apostle wished to explain what is meant by the episcopate, for it is a title not of honour but of labour. The Latin word episcopus (from which is derived our word episcopate) is precisely the same word as the Greek episkopos, signifying an overseer or superintendent. Hence he is no true bishop who desires to be placed above others, rather than to be of use to them. We need not disguise the truth, that the episcopate is accompanied by honourable leisure. Nevertheless, it is a sublime post, essential in the government of a people, and so much is required for the due performance of the duties connected with it, that no man possessed of common modesty, could aspire to such an office. For, although the love of truth may seek holy leisure; the necessity of charity accepts fitting employment; and if no one lay this burden upon us, we must devote ourselves to truth, both of perception and study. But if the burthen be imposed upon us, we must accept it as a duty of charity." St. Chrysostom, commenting on the words in the Gospel of St. Matthew, "the rulers of the Gentiles have dominion over them," says: "It is well to wish for a good thing, because it be according to our will, and is our reward; but it is vanity to desire a supremacy of honour. The Apostle was not exalted by God because he was an apostle, but because he duly accomplished the work of his apostolate. Worthiness of life is to be desired, not superior dignity."

We must, further, remark that the religious life leads indeed to perfection, but does not presuppose it; whereas the episcopal dignity presupposes perfection. For he who enters the episcopal state takes upon himself the office of a spiritual teacher. As St. Paul says (1 Tim. 2:7), "I am appointed a preacher, an Apostle (I say the truth, I lie not), a teacher of the Gentiles, in faith and truth." It would be an absurdity to undertake to teach others to be perfect, without previous personal experience of perfection. St. Gregory says in his Pastoral, "The deeds of a bishop ought to surpass those of his flock, as greatly as his life is removed from theirs." This distinction is clearly expressed by Our Lord. For, when He gave the counsel of poverty. He merely said, "If thou wilt be perfect, go, seel what thou hast, and give to the poor." This shows that the practice of poverty does not presuppose perfection, although it leads men to it. But when He gave St. Peter supremacy over his brethren, He said, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou me"? And when St. Peter answered: "Thou knowest that I love thee," Christ replied, in turn, "Feed my sheep."

Hence, it is evident, that elevation to the episcopate assumes perfection in the person thus honoured; and that it would be the height of presumption, for any man to consider himself perfect. Even St. Paul says, "Not as though I had already attained or were already perfect" (Philipp. 3:12). Again, in the same chapter, he adds, "Let us, therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded." To desire perfection, and to strive to follow after it, is not presumption. It is that holy zeal to which St. Paul exhorts us, saying, "Be ye, therefore, zealous for the better gifts” (1 Cor. 12:31). Hence, it is praiseworthy to wish to embrace the religious life, although a desire for the episcopate is gross presumption. St. Gregory says, in his pastoral, “He who has refused a bishopric has not completely resisted it; and he who has willed to be raised to it, has first seen himself cleansed by the stone of the altar.” By these words we are to understand, that a man, chosen for the episcopate, should not absolutely refuse this honour. Nor yet should he aspire to it, unless he knows that he be cleansed in preparation for it. Nor should anyone, who is not thus purified, dare to approach the sacred mysteries. Neither, if he be chosen by divine grace, for this dignity, ought he, through pride disguised as humility, to decline to accept it. But, as it is exceedingly difficult for any man to know whether he be purified or not, the safest course is to decline a bishopric.

Another point must be considered in our comparison between the religious and episcopal state. The religious life implies a renunciation of earthly possessions; whereas a bishopric is accompanied by great additional wealth. They who become religious give up all they possess, thus showing that they seek not temporal but spiritual goods. They who undertake the episcopal office are frequently wont to think more of temporal, than of eternal riches. St. Gregory says in his Pastoral, “that the truly praiseworthy condition under which to accept a bishopric, would be, if a man were to know, as a certainty, that such an office would involve severe torture.” Again, he says, “It is not every man who loves the sanctity of the episcopal office. But that sanctity is completely ignored by those, who, aspiring to such a dignity, are entranced by the idea of having others subject to them, are rejoiced at the thought of being praised, set their hearts on being honoured, and rejoice at the prospect of affluence. In such a case as that, men are coveting worldly advancement under the disguise of an office, in which it is their duty to try to extirpate earthly ambition.”

Again, we must remember that bishops are exposed to many risks. We may, on this point, again quote St. Gregory. He writes in his Pastoral, “It often happens that in the office of governing others, a man loses the habit of good works, which he practised in private life. For on a calm sea, even an inexperienced seaman can steer a vessel; whereas, in a gale, the most experienced mariner may lose his bearings. And may not a position of great power be fitly compared to a tempest of the mind, where the heart is incessantly rocked to and fro by waves of thought, to be dashed to pieces (as by rocks) by some sudden excess of word or deed?” David is quoted by St. Gregory as an example of the dangers to which men in an exalted position are exposed. “David,” he says, “whose every act was pleasing in the sight of the Supreme Judge, became, after he was raised to kingly magnificence, puffed up with pride, and so cruelly hardened, as to cause the death of a man. He, who, in former times, refused to slay his captured enemy, was, in his later days, so led away by his desire for a woman, that, to the detriment of his own army, he artfully caused the death of a most loyal soldier.”

He who embraces the religious life escapes the danger of sin. Hence St. Jerome, speaking in the person of a monk, writes, in his Epistle against Vigilantius, “When I forsake the world, I shall not be overcome, because I have fled it; but I shall flee from it, lest by it I should be overcome. There is no security in sleeping near a serpent; for, though perchance it may not molest me, it may on the other hand inflict on me a grievous wound. Thus, it is an act of prudence to enter religious life, in order to avoid the occasions of sin. But he who aspires to the episcopate, has either the extreme presumption to consider that he will be safe in the midst of dangers, or else he is so heedless of his salvation, that he cares not to escape from the occasions of sinning.” Hence, we must conclude, that, although the episcopal office be a state of perfection, it cannot, without the sin of covetousness, be desired.

CHAPTER XX

ARGUMENTS USED BY CERTAIN MEN TO PROVE THAT PARISH PRIESTS AND ARCHDEACONS ARE IN A STATE OF HIGHER PERFECTION THAN ARE RELIGIOUS. ANSWERS TO THESE ARGUMENTS

THERE are certain men, who, not content with teaching that the episcopate is a condition of superior perfection to the religious life, also maintain that deans, parish priests, archdeacons, and all others entrusted with the care of souls, are in a more perfect state than are religious. They base their arguments on various grounds.

First, they quote the following words of St. Chrysostom (Dialogue, lib. VI.). "Let any man show me a monk resembling even Elias, and let us grant that this monk, living alone, without annoyance or vexation of any kind, is not troubled by temptation, and does not fall into grave sin. I tell you, nevertheless, that such a man is not to be compared to one, who, although the minister of the people, and laden with the sins of men, perseveres with energy and fidelity." These words naturally convey the impression that no monk, howsoever perfect he may be, can bear comparison with a priest who is entrusted with the cure of souls, and who discharges his trust with diligence. Again, St. Chrysostom says, "Were I given my choice as to whether I would prefer to serve God in the functions of the priesthood, or in monastic solitude, I should, without hesitation, choose the first of these conditions.” Hence the cure of souls is, indubitably, to be preferred to religious solitude, which is reckoned as the most perfect state of life.

Again, St. Augustine, in his epistle to Valerius, says, “Do thou, in thy religious prudence, mark well the following truth. Of all things in the world, especially in our days, there is nothing so easy, so pleasant, so attractive to human nature, as to be a perfunctory and time-serving bishop, priest, or deacon. Yet, in the eyes of God, no sight is so execrable, so sad, or so worthy of condemnation, as these sacred offices fulfilled in such a manner. On the other hand, there is nothing in life, especially in our days, more difficult, more laborious or more beset by danger, than is the office of bishop, priest, or deacon. Yet, in the eyes of God, no one presents a more glorious spectacle, than he who, in such an office, fights manfully, according to the precepts of our Sovereign Master.” Hence, the religious life is not a more perfect state than is that of priests or deacons, who have the cure of souls, and whose duty it is to mingle with men.

Again, St. Augustine says to Aurelius, “It is, indeed, lamentable, if we puff monks up with pride, and decry the dignity of the clergy, to whose order we belong. Shall we suffer ignorant people to say of us: ‘a bad monk will make a good cleric,’ when as we know that even a good monk is not always a good cleric?” The perfection of a good cleric is, therefore, greater than is that of a good monk. The same Saint had previously written, “We must not open a way to the servants of God (i.e., to monks), whereby they may think that it may be easier for them to be chosen for some better office (i.e., for some clerical post), if, by such a step, leaving their monastery they should grow worse.” The clerical office is, consequently, better than the monastic state. In the same spirit St. Jerome writes to Rusticus, “So live in thy monastery, that thou mayest deserve to be made a cleric.” The clerical office is, therefore, superior to the monastic life.

Again, it is not permissible to pass from a higher to a lower state. Nevertheless, it is lawful to pass from the monastic life to that of a cleric, entrusted with the cure of souls. We learn this fact from the words of Pope Gelasius (XVI. quaestione I.), “If there be any monk, who, by virtue of his holy life, should seem worthy to be raised to the priesthood, and if the abbot, under whose rule such a monk is fighting in the army of Christ, should beg this favour for him from the bishop, that monk ought to be chosen. Further a monk so elected, whether by the bishop or the people, must discreetly and uprightly fulfil all the duties of the priesthood in the place wherein it shall have seemed good to ordain him.” Several other rules about the same matter are laid down in this chapter and in dist. 47. Hence, it is plain to all men, that the state of any clerics, and especially of such as have the care of souls, is superior to the religious life.

Now the reasons for these propositions will be easily perceived, if we recall to mind what has already been said. We have seen that a perfect work is one thing, and a perfect state another. The state of perfection does nothing save impose perpetual obligation of accomplishing those things which pertain to perfection. Now, many accomplish the works of perfection, without any vow; thus, many observe continence and practise poverty.

We must also remember that, in speaking of priests and archdeacons charged with the cure of souls, two points must be taken into consideration, to wit, the office of the cure of souls, and the dignity of their orders. Now, as parish priests and archdeacons often leave their parishes and archidiaconates to go into religion, it is clear, that, by accepting the cure of souls, they do not contract any perpetual obligation. But, from what has been already said, we know that no state of perfection can exist without a perpetual obligation. Hence, we cannot say that archdeacons, or parish priests, or candidates for ordination, have embraced a state of perfection, any more than we can say that novices, before their profession, have embraced this state.

It may, however, happen, as we have already observed, that a man who does not live in a state of perfection may perform works of perfection, and may be perfect according to the habit of charity. Thus, archdeacons and parish priests may be perfect according to the habit of charity, and may share in certain offices of perfection, although they are not living in a perfect state. A token that they are not living in a state of perfection lies in the fact, that, when a man is deputed to, or bound in perpetuity to, some office, this obligation is imposed upon him with the accompaniment of some ecclesiastical solemnity. For instance, bishops are consecrated, and religious received to profession by an ancient rite of the Church, as Dionysius observes (de Ecclesiast. Hierarch. Cap. VI.). Nothing of the sort, however, takes place at the election of an archdeacon or parish priest. He is invested, merely, with a ring, or some other symbol of the same description. Hence it is clear that no archdeacon or parish priest embraces a state implying perpetual obligation. This conclusion will enable us easily to answer the arguments wherewith this chapter began.

When St. Chrysostom says, “Even if you can show me a monk, who vies with Elias in holiness, he is not to be compared to a priest who is compelled to bear the sins of his people,” it is clear that the Saint is not drawing a comparison between the priesthood and the religious state. He only wishes (as we shall see if we read the context of the words) to point out that the difficulty of perseverance in virtue, is far greater for one set over a flock, than for a monk in solitude. St. Chrysostom does not say absolutely, that a monk is not to be compared to a priest who bears the sins of his people upon his shoulders. What he says, is, that the perseverance of a monk, who, living a solitary life, is not tempted, and does not fall into grievous sin, is not to be compared to the constancy of a priest who perseveres, with valour and fidelity, though surrounded on all sides by his people. The courage of self—defence is chiefly shown in positions of great danger. Hence, St. Chrysostom prefaces the remark which we have quoted, by saying, “The mariner who is able to save his vessel when she is in danger of being submerged by a tempest, is deservedly held by all men to be an experienced seaman.” In the same manner we may say, that he who is able to live uprightly in the midst of bad men, gives proof of greater virtue than he who leads a worthy life amongst good men. Hence, St. Peter says, in praise of Lot (2 Pet. 2:8), that “in sight and hearing he was just: dwelling among them, who, from day to day, vexed the just soul with unjust works.” But we cannot say, that to live among wicked men belongs to the state of perfection, since, according to the teaching of the Holy Scripture, prudence instructs us to shun their company. We see, then, that the state of priests, charged with the care of souls, is not more perfect; but that it is more exposed to danger, than is that of religious.

This gives us the key to those other words of St. Chrysostom which were quoted above, “If I were given my choice of pleasing God in the performance of the duties of the priesthood, or in monastic solitude, I should unhesitatingly choose to please Him in the priestly office.” The Saint does not say that he would rather be a priest than a monk, but that he would prefer to please God rather as a priest than as a monk. For, it is more difficult to avoid sin in the performance of the sacerdotal functions, than in the solitude of a monastery. As we have before said, the greater the perils which we encounter, the greater the virtue that we exhibit. But, although a wise man must desire that his virtue were so solid as to remain intact in the midst of danger, no one but a fool would, on account of its danger, prefer a perilous position to one more secure. St. Augustine, in words already cited, points out that no duties can be more laborious and more beset by danger, than are those of bishops, priests, and deacons; though, if these duties be rightly performed they are the most agreeable offering that can be made to God. It is because it is so difficult to avoid sin in the episcopate or priesthood, that a virtuous bishop or priest is so acceptable to God. This, however, does not prove that the state of parish priests or archdeacons, is one of higher perfection than is that of religious.

To all the arguments which follow those which we have been answering, there is but one reply which is the same for all. In the quotations given above, the authors cited do not compare the religious state to the state of parish priests, but the state of monks, as monks, to the clerical state. For monks are not necessarily clerics. There are multitudes of lay brethren. Indeed, in former days, almost all monks were laymen (cf. XVI. quæst. I.). It is plain that the clergy occupy a higher position in the Church than do laymen. Hence, when a layman is chosen for the priesthood, he is promoted to a superior rank than that which he already holds; and, as he ascends to a higher position, he naturally requires more virtue to be a good cleric than to be a good layman, although, as a layman, he was a monk. But a monk who becomes a priest, is, at the same time, both in the clerical and in the religious state; just as a priest who has the care of souls is invested with both the pastorate and the priesthood. When, therefore, parish priests are said to be in a superior position to monks, it does not mean, that, regarded merely as parish priests, they are superior to monks. It means, that if they perform their duties well, and live without sin, they give proof, as we have already said, of a greater degree of virtue, than does a monk who lives innocently in his monastery. But if a religious be entrusted with the care of souls in a parish church, this does not prove that the state of parish priests, as parish priests, is more perfect than is that of religious. For the religious who takes charge of a parish is not, on that account, released from his religious life. In XIV. quaest. I. De monachis, we find the following words: “We ordain that they, who after living long in monasteries, are enrolled among the clergy, are not, for that reason, to quit their former life.” Hence, there is no proof, that the state of a priest entrusted with the cure of souls, is more perfect than is that of a religious; for, religious may accept this same office while remaining in their orders. They, however, who are promoted to the episcopate, ascend to a higher position.

CHAPTER XXI

OTHER ARGUMENTS USED TO OVERTHROW THE CONCLUSION AT WHICH WE HAVE ARRIVED

AFTER I had finished writing that upon which I have just been engaged, certain objections to my arguments came to my ears made by men who are too fond of disputing, to bestow much reflection either upon what they say or what they hear. In order to confute their arguments, I must return to what has already been said.

First, these objectors endeavour to prove, by divers arguments, that archdeacons and parish priests are in a higher and more perfect state than are religious. For, if a priest fall into sin, he is ordered by the canons to be deposed from his state (cf. LXXXI. distinctione: “Si quis amodo episcopus” et XIV. quaest. IV.: “Si quis oblitus”). Hence he must have been in a certain state, or he could not be deposed from it. Now a state can be used in a threefold signification. First, it implies uprightness of life; the elect are spoken of as “standing in justice.” St. Gregory says (VII. Moral), “They who sin by mischievous words, fall from the state of rectitude.” Again, a state conveys an idea of permanence and stability, as we see from the words of St. Gregory (VIII. Moral), “It is the care and protection of our Creator that keeps us in a state of being.” Again, in the ninth Homily (2 part) on Ezechiel, “A stone is square; and, by means of each of its four sides, it is kept in such a state, that it will not fall, howsoever its position may be altered.” State (derived from stare and stando) also signifies greatness or length. Now archdeacons and parish priests have a certain spiritual greatness, since, on account of their zeal, they undertake the cure of souls.

They, likewise, give proofs of stability, for they remain firm and constant in the midst of dangers. They are further upright in intention, and just in their dealings. Why, then, should we deny that they are in a state of perfection?

Moreover, the institution of the religious life could not be detrimental to archdeacons and priests entrusted with the care of souls. Yet, before the existence of religious orders, the clergy were considered to be living in a state of perfection. Thus, St. Paul writes to Timothy (1 Ep. 5:17), “Let the priests who rule well,” to wit by good life and doctrine, “be esteemed worthy of a double honour”; let them, that is to say, be obeyed in spiritual matters, and be provided for in their temporal wants. If, then, before the existence of religious orders, priests were in a state of perfection, the same must also be the case since the religious life has been established.

It is further said, that in the days of St. Jerome, the titles bishops and priests were synonymous. The following words of this Saint (super Epist. ad Titum) are quoted in proof of this assertion: “Formerly bishop and priest were one and the same, but now, it is decreed throughout the whole world, that one man should be set over priests, in order that the seeds of schism may be extirpated.” If, then, the episcopate be a state of greater perfection than the religious life, why is not the priesthood, likewise, a state of greater perfection?

Again, the more sublime and important the ecclesiastical office to which a man is appointed, the higher his state is accounted. Now, archdeacons and parish priests exercise a more exalted office than do religious. For, although the contemplative life be the safer, the active life is by far the more fruitful of the two (cf. Extra de renuntiatione: Nisi cum pridem). It follows, therefore, that parish priests are in a state of greater perfection than is the case with religious.

Further, Our Lord says, “Greater love than this hath no man, that a man lay down his life for his friend” (John 15:13). Now, good parish priests do sacrifice their lives for their flocks, and make themselves the servants of their people. In this they imitate St. Paul, who says (1 Cor. 9:19), “For, whereas I was free as to all, I made myself the servant of all.” It would seem, then, that theirs must be the greater merit, since theirs is the severer toil. “I have laboured more abundantly than all they,” says St. Paul (1 Cor. 15:15). And again he writes, “Every man shall receive his own reward, according to his own labour” (1 Cor. 3:8). Hence, parish priests should be regarded as in a more perfect state than religious. The same must be said of archdeacons; for the seven deacons elected by the Apostles were in a state of eminent perfection. We are told (Acts 6:3), “Wherefore, brethren, look ye out among you seven men of good repute, full of the Holy Ghost and wisdom, whom we may appoint over this business.” On which words Venerable Bede says in his Gloss, “The Apostles designed that the Churches should establish seven deacons, who should be in a superior position to others, and who should stand round the altar, like columns.” If they were to be superior to others, and if they were to be set apart as columns round the altar, they must have been in a state of perfection. Now, according to the Gloss of Ven. Bede, their representatives are the archdeacons, who themselves minister, and who also superintend the ministry of others. Hence, it would appear that archdeacons are in a state of higher perfection than are the parish priests, over whom they are set; and that they are, consequently, in a more perfect state than are religious.

It would be absurd to say that the holy martyrs and deacons Lawrence and Vincent were not in a state of perfection. Parish priests, then, and archdeacons resemble bishops, rather than monks and religious, who are in the lowest rank of subjection. Hence, priests are sometimes called by the name of bishops as appears from Acts 20., “Take heed to yourselves and to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the church of God.” These words are considered by the Gloss to have been addressed to the priests of Ephesus. This is, consequently, a still further proof that parish priests are in a state of perfection.

Again, as we know from XII. quaest. I., cap. Expedit, that the administration of the goods of the Church is not detrimental to the state of perfection, since these goods are common property; it is clear that neither parish priests nor archdeacons fail in perfection, because they have the management of ecclesiastical revenues. Furthermore, both parish priests and archdeacons are bound to exercise hospitality (cf. XLII. distinct. cap. I.), which a monk cannot do, as he possesses nothing of his own. Therefore, a parish priest gains more merit than does a monk. St. Gregory says that, “there is no sacrifice so agreeable to God as zeal for souls.” St. Bernard, likewise, in his book De amore Dei, says that, “the love of God is strongest in him who draws most souls to God.” This saying applies to an archdeacon, or parish priest, but not to a monk, who has no duty of leading souls to God.

Further, a patriarch rules in his patriarchate, and a bishop in his see. In the same manner, an archdeacon governs in his archidiaconate; and a parish priest in his parish. But what (with the exception of ordinations) does a bishop do that a parish priest does not likewise do? (cf. dist. XCIII. cap. Legimus). All that is said, according to the fourteen Apostolic rules, about bishops or bishops elect, is equally applicable to parish priests and archdeacons (LXXXI. dist. cap. I.). If, then, a bishop be in a state of greater perfection than a monk, the same fact must be true of a parish priest, and also of an archdeacon. Again, it is appointed (LXXXI. dist. cap. Dictum est, et cap. Si quis clericus), that a lapsed priest or deacon is to be banished from his office, and imprisoned in a monastery, to do penance. Hence, it would appear as though the condition of an archdeacon or parish priest is truly to be called a state; whereas entrance into religion is not a state but rather a degradation or downfall.

These are the chief objections, though placed in a somewhat different order, which I have been able to gather from the writings of those who argue against me.

As we have already shown that archdeacons and parish priests are not in a state of perfection, we must now examine what answer has been made to the proofs which we have brought forward in support of our proposition. It has been said that entrance into any state of perfection, is accompanied by some solemn rite or blessing; and that this is not the case with the election of a parish priest or archdeacon. Now this is, by our adversaries, denied on several grounds. First, they say that the same words are used in the ordination of a priest as in the consecration of a bishop, to wit, “May these hands, O Lord, be consecrated and sanctified,” etc. When we point out that the head of a bishop is anointed with oil, but that priests do not receive this unction, they reply that this fact does not touch the matter in hand; for kings, who lay no claim to a state of perfection, are anointed. Again, they say that merit lies not in consecration, but in good works; and that, when a bad man is raised to the episcopate, he, by his consecration, incurs a greater chastisement. For it is not they who receive the greatest honour who are the most righteous, but they are the greatest whose justice is greatest (cf. dist. cap. Multi). And in the same distinction it is remarked, that, “it is not places nor offices which give us access to our Creator, but that virtue unites us to Him; whereas sin separates us from Him. Neither are they to be considered the children of the Saints who occupy the places of the Saints, but they, rather, who do the work of the Saints.” Bishops, then, because their consecration is greater, are not, therefore, in a more perfect state than priests who have cure of souls.

Again, it is urged, that the anointing of the head is a sign of a certain rank in the priesthood. For the episcopate is not a new order but a grade of Orders; otherwise there would be more orders than seven. Now the perfection of charity is a question not of rank, but of holiness. Hence bishops, who, by the unction of the head are raised to a superior grade of the priesthood, are not thereby placed in a more perfect state. Again, a bishop appoints an archdeacon, a parish priest or a curate by giving him a ring or a book, as is laid down in “de sententia et re judicata,” just as when the pope sends anyone to be attached to any church as a canon or brother, he desires him to be appointed with complete honours, as we learn in De concessione ecclesiae, cap. Proposuit. Thus, the state of parish priests or archdeacons appears to be a true state from which a man can be ejected.

CHAPTER XXII

SHOWING THAT THE LIABILITY TO SUSPENSION DOES NOT SUFFICE TO PROVE, THAT PARISH PRIESTS OR ARCHDEACONS ARE IN A STATE OF PERFECTION

MANY objections are made to the proposition, that archdeacons or parish priests are not in a state of perfection because they can, without sin, resign their office. We are told, first, that pastors of souls may resign their posts and retire into religion; because, while the pastorate is a more useful and more perfect state than the religious, the religious life is the safer of the two. In proof of this, the passage, Nisi cum pridem from Extra de renuntiat. is quoted. A husband may not put his wife away against her will, in order to become a religious (Extra de conversione conjugatorum, cap. Uxoratus). This, however, is not because the married state is more perfect than, or even equal to, the religious, but because a husband binds himself indissolubly to his wife. And, a pari, the fact that a parish priest can pass into the religious life, does not prove that the religious state exceeds, or even equals, the pastorate in perfection.

The example of David is also alleged as an argument against our proposition. Being unable to meet Saul with ordinary armour, which would have been too heavy for him, David provided himself with lowlier weapons, to wit with a sling and stones; and with these alone he overthrew the mighty Philistine. After this example, a parish priest may, likewise, take to himself arms of greater humility, i.e., he may transfer himself from his own more perfect state to the religious life.

It is further objected, that, if the essence of a state depend upon the fact that that state cannot be changed, it would not be lawful for a man to pass from one state to another. Hence, immutability is not essential to a state. Again, according to the written law, a prelate can recall to a parish one of his priests who has entered religion, if he know that he is likely to be of use in the diocese; and if a priest go into a monastery, without the consent of his bishop, he is liable to a canonical penance (Extra de renuntiatione, cap. Amovet; et de privilegiis et excessu privilegiatorum, can. Cum et plantare in ecclesiis, and VII. quaest. I. can. Episcopus de loco). Hence, it is not true to say, that the religious state is more perfect than that of parish priests, because the latter can embrace the religious life. But, on the other hand, a monk may, for the good of the Church, and for the welfare of souls, pass from the religious life to a secular church with parish work (XVI. quaest. I. cap. Vos antem, and cap. Monachos). For, the profit of many is to be preferred to the advantage of an individual (VII. q. I. cap. Scias).

Again, the fact that men are liable to fall from the perfection of charity, is no proof that they never were in the perfection of charity. Their fall is rather a witness to the contrary. Hence, the lapse of a parish priest does not prove that before his sin he was not in a state of perfection.

An ecclesiastical decree, promulgated in the time of Pope Innocent, forbids prelates of the highest rank (i.e. bishops) to become religious, without the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff. This appears in the decretal Extra de renuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem. But before the promulgation of this decree, the highest in the Church as well as the lowest, were free to become religious; and yet bishops are in a more perfect state than are the inferior clergy. The fact, then, that parish priests can become religious without the permission of the Sovereign Pontiff, does not prevent their being in a more perfect state than are religious.

Again, no one can be consecrated bishop who has not already received Holy Orders (LX. distinct. Nullus in episcopum). But no ordained person can marry. Hence it is untrue to say that a bishop elect can marry.

CHAPTER XXIII

AN ANSWER TO THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, IN WHICH AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO SHOW THAT ARCHDEACONS AND PARISH PRIESTS ARE IN A HIGHER DEGREE OF PERFECTION THAN ARE RELIGIOUS

WE will now carefully examine each of the arguments quoted in the last chapter, in order to show how truly they may be set aside, as frivolous, absurd, and erroneous.

First. We are told that certain canonical decrees prove that archdeacons and pastors of souls are in a fixed state. This argument is worthless, for the Canons in question speak, not of the state, of the clergy, but of their rank. The words used in LXXXI. distinctione are, “Henceforth, should any bishop, priest, or deacon, take a wife, or keep one whom he has married, let him be degraded from his rank.” Again (in XIV. quaestion. IV. can. “Si quis dicetur”), we find the following passage, “If any man, forgetful of the Law of the Lord, and of the words of Holy Scripture ‘who has not given his money out at usury’ shall, after the constitution of the Great Council, have committed usury, or received interest on his money, or enriched himself by any dishonest practice, or by selling or buying wine, corn or property of any kind, let him be degraded from his rank; and let him be considered an outcast from the clergy.” Thus, these words cannot be understood to speak of clerical state, but of that clerical rank which must necessarily exist. For, wheresoever there be any order or superiority, there must be specified degrees of rank.

With regard to the second argument, we may say that its absurdity is so patent, that none can fail to see it. No one doubts that the word state is used with several meanings. For he who is erect is said to stand. We also distinguish between the state of beginners, of proficients, and of the perfect. To stand also means to be firm. Thus St. Paul says (1 Cor. 15:58), "Be ye steadfast and immoveable: always abounding in the work of the Lord." But this is not the usual way in which the word state is used. We employ it, rather, to indicate a certain condition; we say, a state of liberty, or a state of slavery. It is made use of in this sense in II. quaest. VI., where these words occur, "If we should by chance be appealed to in a capital charge, or in a suit concerning a state, we must act at our own discretion, not by means of examiners." If we accept the word state in this sense, it is true to say, that they embrace the state of perfection who, as we have before said, bind themselves to the service of works of perfection. This cannot be the case save by a vow, implying a perpetual obligation of service or servitude, as opposed to liberty. As long, then, as a man is free to abandon the works of perfection, he is not in a state of perfection.

The third objection is, likewise, so frivolous, that it would seem hardly to need an answer. In the words, "Priests who govern well," there is no mention either of a state, or of perfection. Government does not indicate a state, but a rank. Honour is due, not only to perfection, but to all who do good works; and this fact is shown by the very words, "they that govern well." We read, also, in the Epistle to the Romans (2:10), "Glory and peace and honour to every one that worketh good."

The fourth argument contains a manifest untruth. We are told, that, in the days of SS. Jerome and Augustine, a bishop and priest were one and the same. Now, St. Augustine expressly says the opposite in his epistle ad Hieronymum. We give his words. "Although," he says, "in the language of good men, which has become current in the Church, the episcopate is accounted greater than the priesthood, it is nevertheless, in many things less." But as some men may deny, that, in the days of St. Jerome, bishops were generally regarded as superior to priests, we will quote the authority of Dionysius, who wrote concerning the order of ecclesiastical hierarchy, as it was established in the primitive Church. These are his words: "There are three orders in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to wit, bishops, priests, and deacons” (V. cap. Eccl. hierarch.). We may remark, that the same writer speaks of deacons as composing the purifying order, of priests as forming the illuminative order, and of bishops as being the order producing perfection. “There are further,” he continues, “three other orders corresponding to the three already mentioned. For, the order of the unpurified is subject to that of the deacons, whose duty it is to cleanse. The order of those needing light (i.e., the holy people of God) is subject to the order of priests, whose office it is to illuminate by the administration of the Sacraments. The order of the perfect (i.e., the monks) is subject to the order of bishops, and is by them, instructed in, and elevated to, sublime perfection.” Hence, we see that Dionysius attributes perfection only to bishops and monks: to bishops as to the more perfect, to monks as perfect. But, lest anyone should make the objection, that he describes an ecclesiastical hierarchy established by the Apostles, whereas, by the institution of Our Lord, bishops and priests were one and the same, we will disprove this fallacy by quoting the words of the Gloss on St. Luke (10:1), “After these things the Lord appointed, etc.” The Gloss observes that, “whereas the first order, that of the bishops, is represented by the Apostles, the second order, that of the priesthood, is typified by the seventy-two disciples.”

It is strange how those who uphold this argument, appear to misunderstand simple words. They assert, that it is only since the days of St. Jerome, that bishops have been distinguished from priests. Yet, if anyone will examine the Old Law, of which the priesthood prefigured our priesthood, he will see that the High Priests were an order distinct from the priests. It is stated (distinct. XXI. cap. De quibus), that, “The High Priests and inferior priests were instituted by Moses, who, at the bidding of the Lord, anointed Aaron to be High Priest, and his sons inferior priests.” This passage proves that the words of St. Jerome have been misinterpreted. For, the Saint does not say, that in the primitive Church the order, or state, of the episcopate and that of the priesthood was one and the same. What he says is, that the same word was used to designate the two orders. For priests spoke of bishops, literally, as superintendents; and bishops used the same word of priests, on account of their priestly dignity. Hence Isidore says (and it is laid down, distinct. XXI. cap. Cleros) that, “the inferior clergy, although priests, have not attained to the highest dignity of the pontificate; for their foreheads are not anointed with chrism; neither have they power to confer the Holy Ghost, a power, as we know from the Acts of the Apostles, reserved to bishops. Hence (he concludes), in the early Church the same word was used both for bishops and priests; for the name denotes dignity and not age.” There is a difference in the thing signified; but the same word is, on account of the priestly dignity, used both for bishops and priests. In later times, however, it was found necessary, for the removal of a schism, arising from the similarity of name, to make a distinction in the appellation of the ranks of the clergy. Since then, the superior priesthood only has been called the episcopate; and the inferior clergy are known, simply, as priests.

The argument brought forward in the fifth objection is not tenable. The contemplative life is superior to the active, not, merely, because it is more secure, but simply because it is better. This, Our Lord’s own words point out: “Mary hath chosen the better part” (Luke 10:42). And in so far as contemplation is superior to activity, so much the more would he seem to do for God, who, at the expense of his much loved contemplation, devotes himself, for God’s sake, to his neighbour’s salvation. Hence, it is a proof of a greater perfection of charity, to be willing, for the love of God and of our neighbour, to labour for the salvation of others, even though, by so doing, contemplation be somewhat impaired, than to cleave so closely to the sweetness of contemplation as to be unwilling to sacrifice it, even for the salvation of others. St. Paul was so zealous for the salvation of his brethren, that he desired, for their sake, not merely the prolongation of this present life, but also the temporary postponement of the Beatific vision. His own words to the Philippians (1:23) are a proof of his disposition. “I am straitened,” he says, “between two: having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, a thing by far the better. But to abide still in the flesh, is needful for you.”

If by perfection of charity we mean (according to the teaching of St. Augustine), preparation of heart, many who lead a contemplative life have attained to a degree of charity not found in some who are entirely occupied in labouring for the salvation of their neighbour. For, many contemplatives are ready, in order to please God, to suspend for a time their cherished contemplation, in order to devote themselves to the welfare of their brethren. Whereas, those who are busied in exterior works, are often led to engage in them, rather from the tedium which they experience in contemplation, than from the desire of attaining to the fulness of divine love, which would induce them to lay aside for a time that contemplation which is their delight. But, the faults of individuals do not detract from the merit of any state or office; and care for the salvation of others must always be esteemed an act of perfection, since it pertains to the love, both of God, and of our neighbour.

But, here we must remember, that not everyone who performs acts of perfection, is necessarily in a state of perfection. No one doubts, that a life of virginity pertains to perfection. Our Lord says of it: “He that can take let him take” (Matt. 19:12). And St. Paul writes to the Corinthians, (1 Ep. 7:25), “Concerning virgins I have no commandment from the Lord, but I give a counsel.” Now there are counsels concerning the works of perfection; nevertheless a life of virginity without a vow, does not constitute a state of perfection. St. Augustine says, in his book, De virginibus, “Virginity is not honoured because it is virginity, but because it is dedicated to God. And by this consecration, even virginity of the body, preserved by piety, becomes spiritual.” And, again, he says, “That continence is to be numbered among the goods of the soul, by which the body is preserved inviolate, for the Creator of soul and body, and which is dedicated and consecrated to Him.”

Now, it is clear, that neither archdeacons nor parish priests, even if they are entrusted with the care of souls, are bound by vow to that office. If they were, they could not relinquish an archidiaconate or a parish, without a dispensation from him who has power to annul perpetual vows. Hence, although an archdeacon, or a parish priest performs a work of perfection or accepts a position involving such work, he is, nevertheless, not in a state of perfection. And, if we reflect carefully, we shall see that the religious life is, really, the state of perfection; since, by the vow of their order, religious are obliged, more Strictly than are archdeacons or priests, to submit to their bishops, in all that regards the cure of souls, such as preaching and hearing confessions.

With regard to the sixth objection, we declare that, as has been already shown, it is untrue to say that there cannot be increase, or perfection of charity, in a person who is not living in a state of perfection. Some men live in a state of perfection, while their charity is either very imperfect, or does not exist; for there are many religious and bishops living in a state of mortal sin. But, on the other hand, the fact that there are many good parish priests, whose charity is perfect, and who are ready to lay down their lives for others, does not prove that they are in a state of perfection. For there are many laymen, even married people, who have attained to such perfection of charity, that they, also, are willing to die for their neighbour. This virtue, however, does not prove such persons to be in a state of perfection.

As for the seventh objection, viz. that the deacons appointed by the Apostles were in a state of perfection, there is no proof of the truth of this assertion, either in the text of the Bible, or in the Gloss. We are told that the deacons were "filled with the Holy Spirit and with wisdom"; but this merely shows, that they possessed that perfection of grace which may exist in those who are not in a state of perfection. And the fact that they ministered around the altar, only points out that they held a certain high rank in the Church. For, as we have before said, there is a difference between a state and a rank. It is, nevertheless, true that the deacons were in that state of perfection, to which Our Lord referred when He said, "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and follow Me" (Matt. 19:21). For the deacons followed Christ, forsaking all things, and possessing nothing of their own, but having all things in common (Acts 4.). It is on their example that religious orders are moulded.

In the eighth objection it is maintained that the archdeacons SS. Stephen, Lawrence, and Vincent, were in a state of perfection. They most certainly were. But this state was due, not to the fact that they were archdeacons, but that they were martyrs. Martyrdom surpasses all religious perfection. St. Augustine in his book De virginibus, says, "Ecclesiastical authority gives us the plainest evidence of this fact. For, by the authority of the Church, it is made known to the faithful, in what places the names of martyrs and of holy women deceased, are mentioned at the mysteries of the altar." Yet, I say, that even though Sebastian and George were in a state of perfection, we cannot, on their account, call the military life a state of perfection.

The ninth objection brought against us, is that parish priests and archdeacons resemble bishops rather than religious. This is true as regards their work, to wit the care of souls committed to them. But it is not the case with regard to that perpetual obligation, which is essential to a state of perfection. From the point of view of obligation, religious, as has been pointed out, resemble bishops more closely than do archdeacons or parish priests.

We fully agree with the tenth proposition, viz. that the administration of ecclesiastical property does not detract from the state of perfection. Were this the case, the superiors and ministers of temporal affairs in religious orders would become imperfect. But perfection is weakened in those who do not renounce all that they possess, for the sake of Christ, and who make a profit out of the revenues of the Church, as if they were their own property.

They who put forward the eleventh objection, are plainly led astray by the folly of Vigilantius, against whom St. Jerome thus writes, “Those who assert that it is more perfect to keep the use of their own goods and to distribute their income among the poor in driblets, rather than to renounce and give away all their possessions at once, must take their answer, not from me, but from the Lord, who said, ‘If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and come follow me.’ He is speaking to those who desire to be perfect, and who, with the Apostles, leave father, boat, and net. He whose example thou dost praise, is in the second or third rank of perfection.” Further, it is incorrect to say that archdeacons and parish priests are more perfect than monks, because they show hospitality and monks do not. For, as religious renounce all that they possess, they have no means of entertaining guests.

The twelfth argument, viz. that the most agreeable offering that can be made to God is zeal for souls, is undoubtedly true. But a certain order must be observed in this zeal. A man must, first, have zeal for his own soul, and strip it of all earthly affections in accordance with those words of the wise man (Eccles. 30:24), “Have pity on thine own soul, pleasing God.” This duty is pointed out by St. Augustine (XXI. De civitate Dei). Now, if a man, having arrived at contempt for earthly concerns, and even for himself, proceed, further, to zeal for the soul of others, he will, thereby, offer a more perfect sacrifice to God, than he would have presented by zeal only for his own salvation. But the most perfect of all offerings that can be made to the Almighty, is the obligation, whereby bishops and religious are bound, by vow or profession, to live a life of zeal for souls.

The thirteenth argument, viz. that, as a patriarch presides in his patriarchate, and a bishop in his see, so, likewise, an archdeacon rules in his archidiaconate, and a pastor in his parish, is manifestly faulty. For, a bishop rules the whole of his diocese; whereas archdeacons and parish priests have their sphere of government allotted to them by their bishop; they are, so to speak, his lieutenants. The Gloss, commenting on the words of St. Paul (1 Cor. 12:28), “helps, governments,” interprets these “helps” as coadjutors to their superiors as was Titus to St. Paul, or as archdeacons are to their bishops. “Governments,” according to the Gloss, signify the clergy of inferior rank, such as priests, whose duty it is to teach. This interpretation is borne out by the words used by the bishop in the ordination of priests: “Inasmuch as we are weaker than they (i.e. than the Apostles), by so much the more do we need these helps.” Hence, it is laid down (XVI. quaest. I. cap. Cunctis), “That all priests, deacons and other clerics, must do nothing, without the permission of their own bishop.” Thus, without the license of his bishop, a priest cannot celebrate Mass, nor baptize in his own parish. This rule is again established in distinct. LXXX., “Priests shall do nothing without the command and advice of their bishop.”

The fourteenth objection bears witness to the sentiments of those that make it. It is founded on the fact, that priests when guilty of heinous crimes, are imprisoned in monasteries. “When crafty people say what is true,” observes St. Gregory (X. Moral), “it is very difficult for them to conceal their secret ambition.” Those who bring forward the argument about the imprisonment of criminal priests, conclude that priests are in a state of perfection in which monks are not, because guilty priests are condemned to a rigorous penance, which innocent religious voluntarily embrace. But that state is highest before God which is the most lowly in the eyes of the world. For, “he that humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Luke 14:11), and “God hath chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith and heirs of the Kingdom” (James 2:5). But those who are ambitious of the glory of this world, reckon earthly honour to be a state; and they account as abject, whatsoever the world despises.

CHAPTER XXIV

AN ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENT, WHEREBY CERTAIN PERSONS ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE, THAT THE DEFECT OF A SOLEMN BLESSING OR CONSECRATION DOES NOT HINDER ARCHDEACONS OR PARISH PRIESTS FROM BEING IN A STATE OF PERFECTION

WE have already shown the absurdity of the arguments, on which is based the theory that archdeacons and parish priests are in a more perfect state than are religious. We will now, therefore, point out the frivolity of the objections raised against the proposition, that a man is placed in a state of perfection by means of a solemn blessing or consecration.

But, first, we must remember that a solemn rite of this nature, is not a cause, but a sign, of a state of perfection. It is not bestowed on any save on those who are entering some state of life; though that state need not necessarily be one of perfection. Those who are joined in matrimony embrace a state, in which neither husband nor wife will hereafter belong to themselves (1 Cor. 7.). For, matrimony is a perpetual bond uniting one to the other. Hence, the Church, to signify this state of perpetuity, (though it be not a state of perfection), pronounces a solemn nuptial blessing over man and wife. In the same way, when a state is changed in social life, a certain form is used; thus, when a slave receives his freedom a deed of manumission is drawn up.

We are not speaking at random. For, all that we say, is confirmed by the authority of Dionysius, who says (VI. cap. Eccles. hierarch.) that, “our divine masters (to wit the Apostles), have vouchsafed to distinguish men by certain holy appellations,” namely, those who are in the state of the perfect; “some are servants, while others are called monks by reason of their pure service and ministry to God, and their single and undivided life which unites them, by holy ties, to godlike unity and perfection most pleasing to God. On this account, the holy law has given them perfect grace, and has deemed them worthy of invocation.” We are, also, expressly told, that, as monks embrace a state of perfection, they are blessed by a solemn rite, handed down by Apostolical tradition.

The argument, that both in the consecration of a bishop and in the ordination of a priest, the same words are used, viz., “may these hands be sanctified and consecrated,” is irrelevant to our point. For, we are not now speaking of a priest in his priestly character. For, by his solemn consecration, he is placed not in a state of perfection, be it active or passive, but (as Dionysius tells us), in an illuminative state. We are speaking of a priest, in so far as he receives a certain charge or commission. And, when this charge is laid upon him, it is not accompanied by any special blessing; for he does not, by it, embrace a state, but merely accepts an office. A bishop, on the other hand, is solemnly consecrated to the pastoral office, by reason of the perpetual obligation, whereby he binds himself to it.

With regard to the second objection (viz., that regarding the anointing of kings), we answer that this unction was a sign, that he who received it, was entering a state involving the chief government of the kingdom. The other officers of the kingdom were not anointed, because they had no plenitude of power. In like manner in the Kingdom of the Church, a bishop receives unction on his head, to signify that he is the principal ruler of his diocese; while archdeacons and parish priests, who only hold a commission from the bishop, and who act as his lieutenants, are not anointed. But the fact of his receiving unction, is no proof that a king enters a state of perfection; since his charge extends only to temporal matters. It is not like that of bishops, which extends to such as are spiritual. Charity, wherein perfection consists, regards the spiritual welfare of others. Hence, solicitude about the spiritual, not about the temporal, wants of our neighbour, is essential to perfection; although perfect charity may, likewise, occupy itself about the material needs of others.

The third argument is quite irrelevant to the matter of which we are treating. The point with which we are at present dealing, is not that of perfection of merit, which may of course be greater in a parish priest, or even in a married man, than in a bishop or religious. The subject with which we are occupied is the state of perfection. It would seem, by the argument of our adversaries, that they do not understand the meaning of their own words; since, according to their reasoning, even bishops themselves, are not in a higher state of perfection than priests; for it may happen that their lives are less meritorious than are the lives of priests.

The fourth objection, i.e., that the episcopate is not an order, contains, if it be taken in its literal meaning, a palpable falsehood. For Dionysius expressly says that there are three orders of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, to wit, bishops, priests, and deacons. Again, in the distinct. XXI. cap. Cleros, it is said, that the order of bishops is divided into four parts. A bishop has a certain order with respect to the mystical body of Christ, i.e., the Church in whose government he takes the chief part. But, with regard to the true Body of Christ which is contained in the Blessed Sacrament, he has no superiority over a priest. The proof that a bishop has a certain order, and not merely jurisdiction, like an archdeacon or parish priest, lies in the fact, that a bishop can do many things, such as administering Confirmation and Holy Orders, and consecrating churches, which he cannot commission others to do. The duties which are matters of jurisdiction only, he can transfer to others. Another proof that the episcopate is an order, lies in the fact, that, if a bishop be suspended, and then be ultimately restored to his see, he is not reconsecrated; for he has never lost the power of his order. This too is the case with men who are in other orders.

The fifth argument, viz., that an archdeacon or parish priest, is solemnly appointed, because he is invested with a ring, or some other symbol of the sort, is absolutely ridiculous. This investiture resembles certain civil ceremonies, whereby men when invested with a fief are presented with a ring or staff, rather than the rites of the Church, which consist in a solemn blessing or consecration.

CHAPTER XXV

AN ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE BROUGHT FORWARD, TO PROVE THAT THE POWER OF AN ARCHDEACON OR PARISH PRIEST TO RESIGN HIS DUTIES IS NO HINDRANCE TO HIS BEING IN A STATE OF PERFECTION

WE must next point out, that they argue with great inconsistency, who say that archdeacons and parish priests, in spite of their being able to resign their office, are in a state of perfection, equal to that of the episcopate or of the religious life. With regard to this point, it must be remembered, that, whoever leaves a state of perfection for one less perfect, is considered an apostate. Hence St. Paul writes concerning widows,” For when they have grown wanton in Christ they will marry; having damnation, because they have made void their first faith” (1 Tim. 5:11). On these words, the Gloss remarks, “Violation of a vow is damnable. Fidelity to a broken vow is, likewise, damnable. And they are in a state of damnation who make void their first promise of continence, and who, like the wife of Lot, look back; for this is apostasy.” Hence, if archdeacons or parish priests were in a state of perfection, they would, by renouncing the archidiaconates or parishes, put themselves in a state of damnation by becoming apostates.

Those who argue against us, maintain, first, that archdeacons and parish priests can embrace the religious life, not because the religious state is more perfect than that in which they have been living, but because it is safer. This, however, is eminently untrue. It is distinctly stated, XIX. quaest. I., that, “such of the clergy as desire to become religious, in order that, thus, they may be able to lead a better life, shall be permitted by their bishops to enter monasteries.” Hence, it is clear, that their desire of embracing the religious state, must be on account of its greater perfection, not by reason of the security which it offers. Archdeacons and parish priests may not only resign their archidiaconates or parishes in order to go into monasteries, but they are free to resign them and stay in the world. This is done by those who become prebendaries of a cathedral. Likewise, if they be not in Holy Orders, they are free to marry. We thus have an incontestable proof, that they are not in a state of perfection.

The second argument brought against us is, that if the inability of a religious man to leave his order be a proof that he is in a state of perfection, a married man must also be in a perfect state, because he may not forsake his wife. The absurdity of this reasoning is made clear by what we have already said. The religious life and the wedded life have this one circumstance in common, that they both entail a perpetual obligation. But while obligations of matrimony are not undertaken with a view to the accomplishment of works of perfection but to render a carnal debt, the ties of the religious life bind men solely to works of perfection, i.e., to poverty, chastity, and obedience. Hence, the religious state is one of perfection.

The third argument is partly true and partly false. It embodies the proposition, that, as David laid aside his armour for a sling and stones, so, likewise, it is permissible for men to abandon a more perfect state for one more lowly. A religious may, by reason of his weakness, and with a dispensation, quit his order for one less severe. But the Church never allows a religious to leave the religious life for that of a secular priest, be it as archdeacon, or as parish priest. Hence, we see that there is far more difference between the excellence of the religious state and the state of the archidiaconate or of parish priests (if theirs is to be called a state), than there is between the superiority of the more severe religious orders, and that of the less rigorous ones.

The fourth objection, to wit, that if immutability be essential to the perfection of a state, it cannot be permissible to pass from one state to another, is absolutely frivolous. It is lawful to pass from a lower to a higher state, but not vice versâ (Extra de regularibus). For, a more perfect state embraces all that is contained in that which is less perfect; but the less perfect state does not contain what is included in a state of greater perfection. Therefore, a man who has bound himself to that which is less, cannot be blamed for embracing that which is greater.

The fifth assertion, viz. that a bishop can recall one of his clergy from the religious life to resume the charge of his parish, is untrue, and is contrary to the sacred canons. The following words occur in Extra de renuntiatione, cap. Admonet, "You are strictly to forbid the priests belonging to your see, to enter, to hold, or to leave, without your permission, the churches of your diocese, coming under your jurisdiction. Should any priest dare to come to one of your churches without your license, he will incur canonical penalties." In like manner it is laid down (et de priviley. Cum et plantare) that, "Religious who are in churches which do not absolutely belong to them, must present to the bishops, for ordination, the priests who shall be responsible for the care of such churches. Further, they must render to such priests an account of the temporal concerns of these churches. Nor must they presume, without consulting the bishop, to remove these priests from their charge." These words are only tantamount to saying, that parish priests, who, without consulting their bishop, resign their cures, render themselves liable to canonical penalties. But it is illogical to apply this general rule to a particular case, and to say, that priests cannot leave their parishes to enter religion. For in XIX. quaest. I. cap. Duae, it is expressly stated, that, "even against the desire of their bishop, secular priests may quit their churches and enter monasteries." Hence the words which occur in VII. quaest. I. Episcopus de loco, etc., manifestly apply to the passing of the clergy from one church to another, not from the secular to the religious life.

The sixth objection does not touch the point in question. It is urged, that religious pass from the religious life to a secular church, to which the cure of souls is attached. This is true. But they do not, in undertaking charge of a church, abandon the religious state. For it is established by XVI. quaest. I. De monachis, that "they, who, having lived a long while in religion, are admitted to Holy Orders, do not, on that account, relinquish their former state." But an archdeacon or parish priest can resign his office, and embrace the religious life; since, he is thereby passing from a less to a more perfect state under the guidance of the Divine Spirit (XIX. quaest. I. Duae).

The seventh argument is too foolish to need an answer. It is urged, that because a man who was in charity can fall from charity, therefore, it does not follow that he who falls from a state of perfection, was not in a state of perfection. No one falls from charity except by sin; and by sin, likewise, a man falls from a state of perfection. For as men are bound by a common law to the love of charity, they are also bound to a state of perfection by particular vows.

The eighth proposition, viz., that by ecclesiastical constitution no bishop can become a religious without the permission of the Pope, from the practice of the Church is evidently untrue. The obstacle is, rather, on account of the perpetual obligation whereby bishops bind themselves to the care of their flocks. Hence St. Paul says (1 Cor. 9:16), “A necessity lieth upon me; for woe is unto me if I preach not the Gospel.” He adds the cause of this necessity, when he says, “For whereas I was free unto all, I made myself the servant of all.” Hence this prohibition is not laid down in the decretals as a statute, but as a fact, approved by reason.

The ninth objection is worthless. It is certain, as a general rule, that no one who has not received Holy Orders according to the ecclesiastical statute, is eligible to a bishopric, an archidiaconate, or to the care of a parish. But the Pope has, in this matter, power of granting dispensation, a power which at times he exercises. In such a case those in charge of an archidiaconate or parish, or even of an episcopal see, can resign their office, and marry. By so doing they are not breaking any contract. A religious, however, who marries, breaks his vow, or contract, of celibacy.

CHAPTER XXVI

CONCERNING THE WORKS THAT A RELIGIOUS MAY LAWFULLY UNDERTAKE

IT remains, now, for us to consider which are the works befitting those living in the religious state. We have already fully treated of this matter elsewhere. We will, therefore merely add a few words, in the hope of putting the calumniators of religious to silence. The following words of St. Jerome which are found in the decrees (distinct. LXV. Olim) are quoted by the enemies of the religious life. “Before study was, by the suggestion of Satan, introduced into the religious life,” etc. I wonder if they who quote these words are of opinion that religious ought not to study? For study, especially of Holy Scripture, peculiarly befits men consecrated to a life of contemplation. St. Augustine thought study a fit occupation for religious. He writes, (XIX. De Civitate Dei), “None ought to be hindered from knowledge of the truth, a knowledge which beseems meritorious leisure.” If they who quote the saying of St. Jerome, intend to prove that study is reprehensible in religious, the words that follow in the same chapter ought to convince them of their error. “The people will say among themselves: I am of Paul, I am of Apollo.” Whence it is clear what is meant by the words cited, “Before, by the suggestion of the devil, there was study,” i.e. dissensions in the Christian religion.

It is also maintained, that the power of binding and loosing, or rather the right to exercise this power, does not belong to religious who are priests. I wonder what those who speak thus, mean by their words. If they mean, that because monks are ordained priests, they cannot ipso facto exercise the power of the keys, they are perfectly right. This applies, likewise, to secular priests. For a secular priest does not receive faculties to exercise the power of the keys because he is ordained priest. He has these faculties given him on account of the cure of souls, wherewith he is entrusted. Therefore, if it be argued, that monks, as monks, may not exercise the power of the keys, it is a plain falsehood. This is evident from the following words (XVI. quaest. L.): "Certain men, supported by no authority whatsoever, and inflamed rather by presumptuous and bitter zeal than by charity, assert that monks, being dead to the world, and living only to God, are unworthy to exercise the functions of the priesthood. They hold that monks cannot instruct men in penance, or in the truths of Christianity, and that they are unable, by the power divinely committed to them in their priestly office, to absolve sinners. But this is completely erroneous. Blessed Benedict, the gentle guide of monks, has never prohibited them from performing this office. And, it is observed, that those things only, are unlawful to religious, which are forbidden them by their rule."

Those who would fain limit the sphere of activity open to religious, also quote the following words: "The office of a monk is not that of a doctor, but of a mourner" (XVI. quaest. I.). If, by these words, they intend to prove that because a man is a monk, he need not, necessarily, be a teacher, the proposition is perfectly true. Otherwise, every monk must needs be a teacher. But, if they mean that the fact that a man is a monk, is in some way incompatible with his being, likewise, a teacher, their opinion is clearly erroneous. On the contrary, the office of teaching, especially of teaching Holy Scripture, belongs, pre-eminently, to religious. On the words of St. John's Gospel, "The woman therefore left her water pot," etc., the Gloss says, quoting St. Augustine "From these words let those intending to preach the Gospel learn to put away worldly anxieties and cares. Our Lord entrusted to those who had left all things and followed Him, the office of universal teaching, saying to His disciples, 'going, therefore, teach ye all nations' " (Matt. 28.).

The same answer may be made to all other objections of the same sort: as, for instance, to the argument, that the position of the cleric and the monk differ, for the cleric having charge of souls, says "I feed my sheep," but the monk says "I am fed." The same reply must, also, be made to those who say, "Let the monk sit solitary and hold his peace." These words, and others resembling them, certainly point out the conduct beseeming a monk as a monk; but they do not forbid him to undertake superior offices, if such be entrusted to him. A secular priest cannot, by reason of his being a priest, pronounce excommunication; but he has, nevertheless, power to do so, if he be commissioned by his bishop to excommunicate.

Again, it is urged that only two orders were established by Our Lord: one being that of the twelve Apostles represented by bishops; the other that of the seventy-two disciples, represented by priests exercising the pastoral office. If, from these premises, it be argued that monks, unless they be bishops or pastors, have not, as a matter of course, the care of souls, the conclusion is perfectly true. But, if it be maintained that religious have not power to preach, or to hear confessions, even with the sanction of their bishop, the conclusion is clearly false. For the higher the dignity of any man, the greater is his power (XVI. quaest. I. Sunt nonnulli). Hence, if secular priests, not engaged in pastoral work, can, with the permission of a bishop, discharge these functions, religious are certainly better entitled to do so, if they have the same commission.

It has occurred to me to say these things in answer to those who strive to detract from the perfection of religious life. Nevertheless, I abstain from reproaches. For, “he that uttereth reproach is foolish” (Prov. 10:18), and “all fools are meddling with reproaches” (Prov. 20:3). If anyone desire to send me a reply, his words will be very welcome to me. For the surest way to elucidate truth and to confound error is by confuting the arguments brought against the truth. Solomon says, “Iron sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the countenance of a friend” (Prov. 27:17).

And may the Lord God, blessed for ever, judge between us and them. Amen.

THE SOUL

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE ANIMA

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THE SOUL

ARTICLE 1

WHETHER THE SOUL CAN BE A FORM AND A PARTICULAR THING

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.75, A.2; Q.76, A.1; CONTRA GENTILES, II, CHAPS. 56, 57, 59, 68, 69, AND 70; DE POTENTIA, Q.3, A.9 AND 11; DE SPIR. CREAT., A. 2; COMM. IN DE ANIMA, BK. II, LECT. 4; BK. III, LECT. 7; DE UNIT. INTELL.]

In the first article we examine this question: Whether the human soul can be a form and a particular thing.

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1. It seems that the human soul cannot be a form and a particular thing. For if the human soul is a particular thing, it is a subsisting thing having a complete act of existing (esse) in virtue of its own nature. Now whatever accrues to a thing over and above, its complete [substantial] existence, is an accident of that thing as whiteness and clothing are accidents of man. Therefore, when the body is united to the soul, it is united to it accidentally. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not the substantial form of the body.

2. Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it must be an individuated thing, for a universal is not a particular thing. Now the soul is individuated either by something other than itself, or by itself. If the soul is individuated by something other than itself, and is the form of the body, it must be individuated by the body (for forms are individuated by their proper matter). And thus it follows that when the body is separated from the soul, the latter loses its individuation. In that case the soul could not subsist of itself nor be a particular thing. On the other hand, if the soul is individuated by itself, it is either a form in its entirety (simplex) or is something

composed of matter and form. If it is a form in its entirety, it follows that one individuated soul could differ from another only according to form. But difference in form causes difference in species. Hence it would follow that the souls of different men are specifically diverse; and if the soul is the form of the body, men differ specifically among themselves, because each and every thing derives its species from its proper form. On the other hand, if the soul is composed of matter and form, it would be impossible for the soul as a whole to be the form of the body, for the matter of a thing never has the nature of a form. It follows, then, that the soul cannot be at once both a particular thing and a form.

3. Further, if the soul is a particular thing, it follows that it is an individual. Now every individual belongs to a species and a genus. Consequently the soul will have a proper species and a proper genus. But a thing possessing its own species cannot have anything else super-added to it in order to give it its species, because, as the Philosopher, points out [Metaph., VIII, 3 (1043b 36)], the forms or species of things are like numbers whose species change if a unit is added or subtracted. Matter and form, however, are united in order to constitute a species. Therefore, if the soul is a particular thing, it is not united to the body as a form to matter.

4. Further, since God made things because of His goodness, which is manifested in the different grades of things, He instituted as many grades of beings as nature could admit. Hence, if the human soul can subsist in itself (which must be maintained if it is a particular thing), it would then constitute a distinct grade of being. But forms without matter do not themselves constitute a distinct grade of being. Thus, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of any matter.

5. Further, if the soul is a particular thing, subsisting in itself, it must be incorruptible, for neither has it a contrary, nor is it composed of contraries . But if the soul is incorruptible, it cannot be proportioned to a corruptible body such as the human body is. Now every form is proportioned to its matter. So if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be the form of the human body.

6. Further, the only subsisting being that is Pure Act, is God. Therefore, if the soul is a particular self-subsisting thing, it will be composed of act and potentiality, and thus will not be a form, because no potentiality is an act. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it will not be a form.

7. Further, if the soul is a particular thing capable of subsisting in itself, it would need to be united to a body only for a good accruing to the soul, either for an essential good or an accidental one. Not for an essential good, however, because it can subsist without the body. Nor even for an accidental good; for the knowledge of truth which the human soul can acquire through the senses (themselves incapable of existing without bodily organs) is evidently a pre-eminent good of this sort; but some hold that the souls of still-born infants have a perfect knowledge of things, and these certainly never acquired that knowledge through their senses. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, there is no reason why it should be united as a form to the body.

8. Further, a form and a particular thing are distinguished from each other as opposites; for the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 2 (414a 15)], that substance has a threefold division: the first is form, the second, matter, and the third, this particular thing. But opposites are not predicated of one and the same thing. Therefore the human soul cannot be a form and a particular thing.

9. Further, it belongs to the very essence of a particular thing to subsist of itself. But it is proper to a form to exist in something else. These seem to be contradictory. Consequently, if the soul is a particular thing, it is apparently not a form.

10. But it might be said that when the body corrupts, the soul still remains a particular self-subsisting thing, but then loses the nature of a form. On the other hand, whatever can exist apart from a thing and retain the nature of a substance, exists in that thing accidentally. Therefore, if the soul continues to exist after the body corrupts, the soul ceases to have the character of a form; and thus the nature of a form belongs to it only accidentally. But it is only as a form that the soul is united to the body in order to constitute a man. Hence the soul is united to the body accidentally, and thus man will be a being per accidens. This is incongruous.

11. Further, if the human soul is a particular self-subsisting thing, it must have an operation of its own, because a thing that exists of itself has its own proper operation. But the human soul does not have its own proper operation, because the act of intellection itself, which seems to be proper above all to the soul, is not an activity of the soul, but that of a man through

his soul, as is stated in the De anima [I, 4 (408a 14)]. Therefore the human soul is not a particular thing.

12. Further, if the human soul is the form of the body, it must depend in some way on the body, for form and matter depend on each other. But whatever depends on something else [in this way] is not a particular thing. Therefore, if the soul is the form of the body, it will not be a particular thing.

13. Further, if the soul is the form of the body, there must be one act of existing (esse) common to the soul and the body; because from the union of matter and form there results a thing having one act of existing. But there cannot be one act of existing common to the soul and the body, since they are generically diverse; for the soul belongs to the genus of incorporeal substance, and the body to that of corporeal substance. Hence the soul cannot be the form of the body.

14. Further, the body's act of existing is a corruptible one resulting from quantitative parts. The soul's act of existing, on the other hand, is incorruptible and simple. Therefore there is not one act of existing possessed in common by the body and the soul.

15. But it might be said that the human body itself has the act of existing of a body through the soul. On the contrary, the Philosopher says [Ibid., II, 1 (412b 5)] that the soul is the act of a physical organic body. Therefore that entity which is related to the soul as matter to act, is now a physical organic body; and this body can exist only through a form whereby it is placed in the genus of body. Consequently the human body possesses its own act of existing distinct from that of the soul.

16. Further, the essential principles of matter and form are ordered to the act of existing (esse). But whatever can be brought about in nature by one principle, does not require two. Therefore, if the soul has in itself its own act of existing because it is a particular thing, then the body by nature is united to the soul only as a matter to a form.

17. Further, the act of existing is related to the substance of the soul as its act. Hence the act of existing must be supreme in the soul. But an inferior being is not related to a superior one with respect to that which is supreme in the superior, but rather with respect to that which is lowest in it. For Dionysius says [De divinis nominibus, VII, 2] that divine wisdom joins that which is highest (fines) in primary things [i.e., those having less perfection]

to that which is lowest (principiis) in secondary ones [i.e., those having greater perfection]. Therefore the body, which is inferior to the soul, does not attain to that act of existing which is supreme in the soul.

18. Further, things having one and the same act of existing, have one and the same operation. Therefore, if the act of existing of the human soul, when joined to the body, belongs also to the body, the act of understanding, which is the operation of the soul, will belong both to the soul and the body. This is impossible, as is proved in the De anima [, 4 (429a 18)]. Consequently there is not one act of existing for both the human soul and the body. Hence it follows that the soul is not the form of the body and a particular thing.

On the contrary, a thing receives its species through its proper form. But man is man because he is rational. Hence the rational soul is the proper form of man. Moreover the soul is a particular self-subsisting thing because it operates of itself; for its act of understanding is not performed through a bodily organ, as is proved in the De anima [III, 4 (429a 24)]. Consequently the human soul is a particular thing and a form.

Further, the highest perfection of the human soul consists in knowledge of truth which is acquired through the intellect. Moreover the soul must be united to the body in order to be ‘perfected in knowledge of truth, because it understands through phantasms which are non-existent without the body. Consequently the soul must be united as a form to the body and must be a particular thing as well.

I answer: “A particular thing,” properly speaking, designates an individual in the genus of substance. For the Philosopher says, in the Categories [V, 2a 10], that first substances undoubtedly signify particular things; second substances, indeed, although they seem to signify particular things, rather signify the specific essence (quale quid). Furthermore, an individual in the genus of substance is capable not only of subsisting of itself, but is also a complete entity belonging to a definite species and genus of substance. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the Categories [V, 3a 28], also calls a hand and a foot, and things of this sort, parts of substances rather than first or second substances. For although they do not exist in another as a subject (which is characteristic of a substance), they still do not possess completely the nature of a species. Hence they belong to a species or to a genus only by reduction.

Now some men have denied that the human soul possesses these two real characteristics belonging to a particular thing by its very nature, because they said that the soul is a harmony, as Empedocles did, or a combination [of the elements], as Galen did, or something of this kind. For then the soul will neither be able to subsist of itself, nor will it be a complete thing belonging to a species or genus of substance, but will be a form similar only to other material forms.

But this position is untenable as regards the vegetal soul, whose operations necessarily require some principle surpassing the active and passive qualities [of the elements] which play only an instrumental role in nutrition and growth, as is proved in the De anima [II, 4. 415b 28]. Moreover, a combination and a harmony do not transcend the elemental qualities. This position is likewise untenable as regards the sentient soul, whose operations consist in receiving species separated from matter, as is shown in the De anima [II, 12, 424a 16]. For inasmuch as active and passive qualities are dispositions of matter, they do not transcend matter. Again, this position is even less tenable as regards the rational soul, whose operation consists in understanding, and in abstracting species not only from matter, but from all individuating conditions, this being required for the understanding of universals. However, in the case of the rational soul something of special importance must still be considered, because not only does it receive intelligible species without matter and material conditions, but it is also quite impossible for it, in performing its proper operation, to have anything in common with a bodily organ, as though something corporeal might be an organ of understanding, just as the eye is the organ of sight, as is proved in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 24]. Thus the intellective soul, inasmuch as it performs its proper operation without communicating in any way with the body, must act of itself. And because a thing acts so far as it is actual, the intellective soul must have a complete act of existing in itself, depending in no way on the body. For forms whose act of existing depends on matter or on a subject do not operate of themselves. Heat, for instance, does not act, but something hot.

For this reason the later Greek philosophers came to the conclusion that the intellective part of the soul is a self-subsisting thing. For the Philosopher says, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 24], that the intellect is a substance, and is not corrupted. The teaching of Plato [Phaedrus, 24] who maintains that the soul is incorruptible and subsists of itself in view of the fact that it moves itself, amounts to the same thing. For he took “motion” in a broad sense to signify every operation; hence he understands that the soul moves itself because it moves itself by itself.

But elsewhere [Alcibiades, 25-26] Plato maintained that the human soul not only subsisted of itself, but also had the complete nature of a species. For he held that the complete nature of the [human] species is found in the soul, saying that a man is not a composite of soul and body, but a soul joined to a body in such a way that it is related to the body as a pilot is to a ship, or as one clothed to his clothing. However, this position is untenable, because it is obvious that the soul is the reality which gives life to the body. Moreover, vital activity (vivere) is the act of existing (esse) of living things. Consequently the soul is that, which gives the human body its act of existing. Now a form is of this nature. Therefore the human soul is the form of the body. But if the soul were, in the body as a pilot is in, a ship, it would give neither the body nor its parts their specific nature. The contrary of this is seen to be true, because, when the soul leaves the body, the body’s individual parts retain their original names only in an equivocal sense. For the eye of a dead man, like the eye of a portrait or that of a statue, is called an eye equivocally; and similarly for the other parts of the body. Furthermore, if the soul were in the body as a pilot in a ship, it would follow that the union of soul and body would be an accidental one. Then death, which brings about their separation, would not be a substantial corruption; which is clearly false. So it follows that the soul is a particular thing and that it can subsist of itself, not as a thing having a complete species of its own, but as completing the human species by being the form of the body. Hence it likewise follows that it is both a form and a particular thing.

Indeed, this can be shown from the order of natural forms. For we find among the forms of lower bodies that the higher a form is, the more it resembles and approaches higher principles. This can be seen from the proper operation of forms. For the forms of the elements, being lowest [in the order of forms] and nearest to matter, possess no operation surpassing their active and passive qualities, such as rarefaction and condensation, and the like, which appear to be material dispositions. Over and above these forms are those of the mixed bodies and these forms have (in addition to the above mentioned operations) a certain activity, consequent upon their species, which they receive from the celestial bodies. The magnet, for instance, attracts iron not because of its heat or its cold or anything of this sort, but because it shares in the powers of the heavens. Again, surpassing these forms are the souls of plants, which resemble not only the forms of earthly bodies but also the movers of the celestial bodies inasmuch as they are principles of a certain motion, themselves being moved. Still higher are brute beasts' forms, which now resemble a substance moving a celestial body not only because of the operation whereby they move bodies but also because they are capable of knowledge, although their knowledge is concerned merely with material things and belongs to the material order (for which reason they require bodily organs). Again, over and above these forms, and in the highest place, are human souls, which certainly resemble superior substances with respect to the kind of knowledge they possess, because they are capable of knowing immaterial things by their act of intellection. However, human souls differ from superior substances inasmuch as the human soul's intellective power, by its very nature, must acquire its immaterial knowledge from the knowledge of material things attained through the senses.

Consequently the human soul's mode of existing can be known from its operation. For, inasmuch as the human soul has an operation transcending the material order, its act of existing transcends the body and does not depend on the body. Indeed, inasmuch as the soul is naturally capable of acquiring immaterial knowledge from material things, evidently its species can be complete only when it is united to a body. For a thing's species is complete only if it has the things necessary for the proper operation of its species. Consequently, if the human soul, inasmuch as it is united as a form to the body, has an act of existing which transcends the body and does not depend on it, obviously the soul itself is established on the boundary line dividing corporeal from separate substances.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Although the soul has a complete act of existing of its own, it does not follow that the body is united to it accidentally: first, because the same act of existing that belongs to the soul is conferred on the body by the soul so

that there is one act of existing for the whole composite; secondly, because, while the soul can subsist of itself, it does not have a complete species, for the soul needs the body in order to complete its species.

2. The act of existing (esse) and individuation (individuatio) of a thing are always found together. For universals do not exist in reality inasmuch as they are universals, but only inasmuch as they are individuated. Therefore, although the soul receives its act of existing from God as from an active principle, and exists in the body as in matter, nevertheless the soul's act, of existing does not cease when the body corrupts, nor does the soul's individuation cease when the body corrupts, even though it has a relationship to the body.

3. The human soul is not a particular thing as though it were a substance having a complete species in itself, but inasmuch as it is part of a thing having a complete species, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore the conclusion in the objection is false.

4. Although the human soul subsists of itself, it does not have a complete species in virtue of its very nature. Consequently souls existing apart from bodies cannot constitute a distinct grade of being.

5. The human body is the matter proportioned to the human soul, for the body is related to the soul as potentiality is to act. However, as regards its capacity for existing the soul need not be on a par with the body, because the human soul is not a form totally embraced by matter. This is evident from the fact that one of the soul's operations transcends matter. However, another explanation can be given in accordance with the position of faith, namely, that in the beginning the human body was in some way created incorruptible and incurred the necessity of dying through sin, from which necessity it will be freed once again at the resurrection. Hence it is accidental that the body does not share in the incorruptibility of the soul.

6. Since the human soul is a subsisting being, it is composed of potentiality and act. For the substance itself of the soul is not its own act of existing, but is related to its act of existing as potentiality is to act. However, it does not follow that the soul cannot be the form of the body, because, even in the case of other forms, whatever is like form and act in relation to one thing is like potentiality in relation to something else; just as transparency is formally present to the atmosphere, which is in potency in relation to light.

7. The soul is united to the body both for a good which is a substantial perfection, namely, the completion of the human species; and for a good which is an accidental perfection, namely, the perfecting of the soul in intellectual knowledge which it acquires from the senses; for this mode of understanding is natural to man. Nor is this position rendered untenable if the separated souls of infants and those of other men employ a different mode of understanding, for these souls are capable of such intellection rather by reason of being separated from the body than by reason of their human species.

8. It is not of the very nature of a particular thing to be composed of matter and form, but only to be capable of subsisting in itself. Consequently, although a composite [of matter and form] is a particular thing, this does not prevent other beings [i.e., those not composed of matter and form] from being particular things.

9. For a thing to exist in another as an accident in a subject, prevents that thing from having the nature of a particular thing. However, for a thing to exist in another as part of it (and the soul exists in man in this way) does not altogether prevent a thing having such an existence from being called a particular thing.

10. When the body is corrupted the soul does not lose the nature which belongs to it as a form, despite the fact that it does not actually perfect matter as a form.

11. Intellection is the operation proper to the soul, if the soul is considered to be the principle from which the operation flows, for this operation is not exercised by the soul through some bodily organ as sight is exercised through the eye. Nevertheless the body shares in this operation on the side of the object, for phantasms, which are the objects of the intellect, cannot exist without bodily organs.

12. Although the soul has some dependence on the body inasmuch as the soul’s species is not complete without the body, the soul does not depend on the body in such a way that it cannot exist without the body.

13. If the soul is the form of the body, the soul and the body must have one common act of existing which is the act of existing of the composite. Nor is this prevented by the fact that the soul and the body belong to two different genera, for the soul and the body belong to the same species or

genus only by reduction, just as the parts of a whole are reduced, to the species or genus of the whole.

14. The thing that is properly corrupted is neither the form nor the matter nor the act of existing itself but the composite. Moreover, the body's act of existing is said to be corruptible inasmuch as the body by corrupting is deprived of the act of existing which it possessed in common with the soul; which act of existing remains in the subsisting soul. The same thing is to be said also for the parts composing the body, because the body is constituted of its parts in such a way that it can receive its act of existing from the soul.

15. Sometimes in the definitions of forms a subject is considered independently of its form (informe), as when it is said that motion is the act of a being in potentiality. Sometimes, however, the subject is regarded as informed (formatum) as when it is said that motion is the act of a mobile thing, just as light is the act of that which is transparent. Now it is in this way that the soul is said to be the act of a physical organic body, because the soul causes it to be a physical organic body just as light makes something to be lucid.

16. The essential principles of a species are not related merely to an act of existing, but to the act of existing of this [particular] species. Consequently, although the soul can exist of itself, it cannot be complete in its species without the body.

17. While the act of existing is the most formal of all principles, it is also the most communicable, although it is not shared in the same measure both by inferior beings and by superior ones. Hence the body shares in the soul's act of existing, but not as perfectly as the soul does.

18. Although the soul's act of existing belongs in a certain measure to the body, the body does not succeed in sharing in the souls's act of existing to the full extent of its perfection and actuality; and therefore the soul has an operation in which the body does not share.

ARTICLE 2

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL, SO FAR AS ITS ACT OF EXISTING IS CONCERNED, IS SEPARATED FROM THE BODY

[SUMMA THEOL., LA, Q-75, A-4; CONTRA GENTILES, 11 1 57; SENT., BK. III, DIST., 5, Q. 3, A. 2; DIST., 22, Q. I, A. I; DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA, CHAP. 2; DE UNIT. INTELL.; COMM. IN METAPH., VII, LECT. 9]

In the second article we examine this question: Whether the human soul, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is separated from the body.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that it is. For the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 4] that no sentient power exists without a body. But the intellect is separate and the intellect is the human soul. Therefore the human soul, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is separated from the body.

2. Further, the soul is the act of a physical organic body inasmuch as the body is its organ. Hence, if the intellect, with respect to its very act of existing, is united as a form to the body, the body must be its organ. This is impossible, as the Philosopher proves in the De anima [ibid.].

3. Further, a form is united to matter more intimately than a power is to an organ. But the intellect cannot be united to the body as a power is to an organ, because the intellect is simple.

4. But it might be said that the intellect, that is, the intellective power, does not have an organ, but that the essence itself of the intellective soul is united as a form to the body. On the other hand, no effect is simpler than its

cause. Now a power of the soul is an effect of its essence, because all powers of the soul flow from its essence (esse). Consequently no power of the soul is simpler than its essence. If, then, the intellect cannot be the act of the body, as is proved in the De anima [III. 4, 420a 24; 420b 4] neither can the intellective soul be united as a form to the body.

5. Further, every form united to matter is individuated by matter. Therefore, if the intellective soul is united to the body as the form of the latter, the soul must be an individuated [form]. Then the forms received in the soul are individuated forms. Consequently the intellective soul will be incapable of knowing universals; which is clearly false.

6. Further, a universal form does not acquire its universality from the thing existing outside the soul, because all forms existing in such things are individuated. Thus, if the forms in the intellect are universal, they must acquire this universality from the intellective soul. Consequently the intellective soul is not an individuated form, and therefore is not united to the body so far as its act of existing is concerned.

7. However, it might be said that inasmuch as intelligible forms inhere in the soul they are individuated; but as the likenesses of things they are universals representing things according to their common nature and not according to their individuating principles. On the contrary, since a form is a principle of operation, an operation proceeds from a form in accordance with the manner in which that form inheres in a subject. For instance, the hotter something is, the more it is capable of heating. Therefore, if the species of things in the intellective soul are individuated because they inhere in the soul, then the knowledge which results will be knowledge only of the individual [as such] and will not be universal.

8. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 3, 414b 27], that just as the triangle is contained in the quadrilateral and the quadrilateral in the pentagon, so also is the nutritive part of the soul contained in the sentient part and the sentient in turn contained in the intellective. However, the triangle is not contained actually in the quadrilateral, but only potentially; nor is the quadrilateral contained actually in the pentagon. Therefore, neither is the nutritive nor sentient part of the soul contained, actually in the intellective. Consequently, since the intellective part of the soul is united to the body only through the intermediary of the nutritive and sentient parts, because the sentient and nutritive parts of the soul are not actually

contained in the intellective part, the intellective part of the soul will not be united to the body.

9. Further, the Philosopher says in the De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736b 2] that a man is not at once both an animal and a man, but first is an animal and then a man. Consequently the principle whereby he is an animal and that whereby he is a man are not one and the same. But he is an animal because of his sentient part and a man because of his intellective part. Therefore the sentient and intellective parts are not united in one and the same substance of the soul. Hence the conclusion is the same as the foregoing.

10. Further, a form belongs to the same genus as the matter to which it is united. But the intellect does not belong to the genus of corporeal things. Therefore the intellect is not a form united to the body as to matter.

11. Further, one being does not result from the union of two actually existing substances. But both the body and the intellect [i.e., the intellective soul] are two actually existing substances. Hence the intellect cannot be united to the body so that one being results from their union.

12. Further, every form united to matter is given actual existence by moving and changing matter. But the intellective soul is not given actual existence [by being educed] from the potentiality of matter, but receives its act of existing from an extrinsic agent, as the Philosopher says in the De generatione animalium [ibid., 736b 27]. Therefore the soul is not a form united to matter.

13. Further, a thing operates in accordance with its nature. But the intellective soul has an operation of its own without the body, namely, the act of intellection. Therefore, so far as its act of existing is concerned, the intellective soul is not united to the body.

14. Further, even the slightest impropriety is impossible for God.” But it is improper for an innocent soul to be united to a body which is like a prison. Therefore it is impossible for God to unite an intellective soul to a body.

15. Further, a wise artifex does not place an obstacle in the way of his work. But the body is the greatest obstacle to the intellective soul in acquiring knowledge of truth, in which its perfection consists, according to that text in the Book of Wisdom: “The body which is corrupted, weighs

down upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Therefore God did not unite the intellective soul to the body.

16. Further, things which are united one to another have an affinity for each other. But the intellective soul and the body are opposed to each other, because “The flesh desires the opposite of the spirit, and the spirit, the opposite of the flesh” (Gal. 5:17). Consequently the intellective soul is not united to the body.

17. Further, the intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms having none actually, just as prime matter is in potency to all sensible forms having none actually. But it is for this reason that there is one prime matter for all things. Therefore there is also one intellect for all men. Hence it is not united to a body which would individuate it.

18. Further, the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 18] that, if the possible intellect had a bodily organ, it would have a certain determinate sensible nature, and thus could not receive and know all sensible forms. But a form is united to matter more intimately than a power is to an organ. Therefore, if the intellect is united as a form to the body, it will have a certain determinate sensible nature, and thus will be incapable of perceiving and knowing all sensible forms. This is impossible.

19. Further, every form united to matter is received in matter. But whatever is received in a thing exists therein in accordance with the mode of the recipient. Therefore every form united to matter exists in matter according to the mode of matter. But the mode of sensible and corporeal matter is not the one that a thing receives through an intelligible mode. Consequently, since the intellect has an intelligible mode of existing, it is not a form united to corporeal matter.

20. Further, if the soul is united to corporeal matter, it must be received in it. But whatever is received in a thing that has received its act of existing from matter, is received in matter. Therefore, if the soul is united to matter, then whatever is received in the soul is received in matter. But the forms of the intellect cannot be received in prime matter. On the contrary, they are made intelligible by abstraction from matter. Consequently, a soul which is united to corporeal matter is not capable of receiving intelligible forms, and thus the intellect, which is capable of receiving intelligible forms, will not be united to corporeal matter.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 1, 412b 6], that it is unnecessary to ask whether the soul and the body are one, just as it is unnecessary to ask whether the wax and its impression are one. But with respect to its act of existing, the impression cannot be separated in any way from the wax. Consequently, with respect to its act of existing, the soul is not separated from the body. But the intellect is a part of the soul, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 15]. Therefore the intellect, so far as its act of existing is concerned, is not separated from the body.

Further, so far as its act of existing is concerned, no form is separated from matter. But the intellective soul is the form of the body. Therefore, with respect to its act of existing, the soul is not separated from matter.

I answer: In order to settle this issue we must take into consideration that, whenever a thing is found to be sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, there must be some principle by which it is in potency; just as a man is sometimes actually sensing and sometimes only potentially. Now on account of this it is necessary to maintain that in man there exists a sentient principle which is in potency to sensible things; for if he were always actually sensing, the forms of sensible things would always actually exist in his sentient principle. Similarly, since a man is found sometimes to be actually understanding and sometimes only potentially, it is necessary to maintain that in man there exists an intellective power which is in potency to intelligibles; and the Philosopher, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15], calls this principle the possible intellect. Consequently this possible intellect must be in potency to all things intelligible to man; it must be capable of receiving them and therefore must be devoid of them, because anything capable of receiving other things is in potency to them inasmuch as it lacks them; just as the pupil of the eye, which is capable of receiving all colors, lacks every color. Now man is determined by nature to understand the forms of all sensible things. Therefore, by its very nature the possible intellect must be devoid of all sensible forms and natures, and so also must have no bodily organ. For if it had a bodily organ, it would be limited to some sensible nature, just as the power of vision is limited to the nature of the eye. By means of this proof we exclude the position of the ancient philosophers, who held that the intellect did not differ from the sentient powers, as well as the position of those who maintained that the principle by which a man understands is a certain form or power which is united to the body as other material forms or powers are.

But certain other men avoiding this position, fall into the opposite error. For they think that the possible intellect is devoid of every sensible nature and that it is not present in the body, because it is a certain substance which exists in separation from the body and is in potency to all intelligible forms. But this position cannot be maintained, because we acquire our knowledge of the possible intellect only so far as a man understands by it. Indeed, this is the way Aristotle obtains his knowledge of it, as is evident from what he says in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 10] when he begins to discuss the possible intellect: “Concerning that part of the soul by which the soul knows and perceives... it must be considered...”; and in another place he says: “I speak of the possible intellect by which the soul understands.” But if the possible intellect were a separate substance, it would be impossible for a man to understand by means of it; because, if a substance performs an operation, that operation cannot belong to any other substance than the one performing it. For although one of two substances can be the cause of the other’s operation, as the principal agent is the cause of the activity of the instrument, nevertheless the action of the principal agent is not numerically the same as that of the instrument. For the action of the principal agent consists in moving the instrument, whereas that of the instrument consists in being moved by the principal agent and in moving something else. Consequently, if the possible intellect is a substance existing apart from this or that particular man, it is impossible for the possible intellect’s act of intellection to be the act of any particular man. From this it follows that no man understands anything, because the act of intellection is not attributed to any principle in man except the possible intellect. Hence the same manner of arguing is opposed to this position and to those who deny its principles, as is evident from Aristotle’s arguments against them in the Metaphysics [IV, 3, 1005b 25].

Now Averroes who is a follower of this position, intending to avoid its incongruity maintained that, although the possible intellect existed apart from the body, it must be united to man through the intermediary of phantasms. For phantasms, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 14], are related to the possible intellect as sensible things are to sense, and colors to sight. Thus an intelligible species has two subjects: one in which it exists with an intelligible mode of existing, and this is the possible intellect: another in which it exists with a real mode of existing, and this subject is the phantasms. Therefore [according to Averroes] there is a certain union of the possible intellect with the phantasms inasmuch as an intelligible species exists in a certain manner in each of these subjects; and a man understands through the [supposedly separate] possible intellect as a result of this union with the phantasms.

However, this union is still not sufficient [to account for man's knowledge], for a thing is capable of knowing, not because intelligible species are present to it, but because it possesses a cognitive power. Now evidently, from what has been said, intelligible species alone will be present to man, whereas the power of understanding, that is, the possible intellect,. exists in complete separation from him. Therefore it does not follow from the aforesaid union that a man will have what is necessary for understanding, but only that a species or something in that intellect will be understood. This clearly appears to be the case from the simile introduced above. For if phantasms are related to the intellect as colors are to sight, the union of the [supposedly separate] possible intellect with us through our phantasms, will be the same as that of sight with a wall through its colors. Now it does not follow that a wall sees because it has colors, but only that it is seen. Nor, similarly, does it follow that a man will understand because phantasms are present within him, but only that he will be understood.

Furthermore, a phantasm is not the subject of an intelligible species inasmuch as the latter is actually understood. On the contrary, an intelligible species is made to be actually understood by abstraction from phantasms. Moreover, the possible intellect is the subject of an intelligible species only inasmuch as an intelligible species is now actually understood and abstracted from phantasms. Therefore the species existing in the possible intellect, and that existing in the phantasms. through which the [supposedly separate] possible intellect is united to us, are not one and the same.

Furthermore, if anyone understands through intelligible species only when they are actually understood, it follows, according to the aforesaid position, that we are incapable of understanding anything in any way, for then intelligible species would be present to us only inasmuch as they exist in phantasms, and here they are only potentially understood. Consequently it is evident on the side of our human nature that the above-mentioned position is impossible. This is also apparent from the nature of separate substances. Since these are most perfect, it is impossible for them in their own operations to stand in need of the operations of material things; nor need they be in potency to any things of this kind, for not even the celestial bodies, which are below the separate substances, require things of this sort. Hence, since the possible intellect is in potency to the species of sensible things, and since its operation may not be completed without phantasms, which depend on our operations, it is impossible and inconceivable for the possible intellect to be one of the separate substances.

Consequently, we must say that the possible intellect is a certain faculty or power of the human soul. For although the human soul is a form united to the body, it is not embraced completely by the body as though immersed in it as other material forms are, but transcends the capacity of the whole of corporeal matter. And so far as the soul transcends corporeal matter, the potentiality for intelligibles exists in the soul and this [potentiality] belongs to the possible intellect. Certainly the soul, so far as it is united to the body, has operations and powers in common with the body; such, for example, are the powers of the nutritive and sentient part. Thus the nature of the possible intellect is as Aristotle proves it to be,110 for the possible intellect is not a power rooted in any bodily organ. However, a man understands formally by means of it inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of the human soul, which is the form of man.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. The intellect is said to be separate but not the senses; because the intellect remains in the separated soul when the body has corrupted, whereas the senses do not. Or a better way of stating it is to say that the intellect is said to be separate because it does not employ a bodily organ in its operation as the senses do.

2. The human soul is the act of an organic body because the body is its organ. However, the body need not be the organ of all the soul’s active and passive powers, since the human soul exceeds the capacity of the body, as we have explained.

3. The organ of a power is the principle of that power’s operation. Hence, if the possible intellect were united to an organ, its operation would also be

the operation of that organ, and thus it would be impossible for the principle by which we understand, to lack every sensible nature. For this principle by which we understand would then be the possible intellect together with its organ, just as the principle whereby we see, namely, the power of vision, exists concurrently with the pupil of the eye. However, even though the human soul is the form of the body and the possible intellect is one of the soul's powers, it. does not follow that the possible intellect is limited to some sensible nature; because the human soul transcends the capacity (proportionem) of the body, as we have explained.

4. The possible intellect belongs to the human soul inasmuch as the soul is elevated above corporeal matter. Consequently, because the intellect is not the act of an organ, it does so Aristotle proved that the intellect is "separate," not in the sense of existing apart from man, but as being free from matter in its operation.

5. The human soul is an individuated form and so also is its power which is called the possible intellect, as well as the intelligible forms which are received in the possible intellect. But this does not prevent these forms from being actually known, for a thing is actually known because it is immaterial, not because it is universal. Indeed, the universal is intelligible because it is abstracted from material individuating conditions. Moreover, it is evident that separate substances are actual intelligibles and yet are certain individual entities; just as Aristotle says in the Metaphysics [VII, 14, 1039a 23], that the separated forms which Plato claimed to exist, were individual things. Therefore if individuation is incompatible with intelligibility it is evident that the same difficulty remains when the intellect is considered to be a separate substance; for then the possible intellect would be individuated as well as the species which are receivcd in it. Consequently we must understand that, although the intelligible species received in the possible intellect are individuated inasmuch as they exist in the possible intellect, still the universal, which is conceived by abstraction from individuating principles, is known in these species inasmuch as they are immaterial. For universals with which the sciences are concerned, are what are known (through intelligible species) and not the intelligible species themselves. Moreover, concerning these intelligible species, not all sciences study them, but only physics and metaphysics. For an intelligible species is that by which the intellect knows, but not that which it knows—except by

reflection inasmuch as it knows that by which it knows in order to know itself.

6. The intellect gives universality to the forms known inasmuch as it abstracts them from material individuating conditions. Consequently it is not necessary that the intellect be universal, but that it be immaterial.

7. The species of an operation is a natural effect of the species of the form which is the principle of that operation, whereas the ineffectiveness of an operation is a natural effect of the form inasmuch as it inheres in a subject. For a thing heats because it is hot, but it heats more or less effectively according as heat perfects it to a greater or lesser degree. Now to understand universals pertains to the species of intellectual operation. Hence this activity is the natural effect of an intellectual species as its proper operation; but so far as this activity is exercised more or less perfectly by the one understanding, it follows that the one understanding does so in a more or less perfect way.

8. The resemblance which the Philosopher observes between geometrical figures and the parts of the soul is to be regarded in this way: that just as a quadrilateral contains the elements of a triangle and additional characteristics; and a pentagon, the elements of a quadrilateral; so also does the sentient soul possess the characteristics of the nutritive, and the intellective possesses the characteristics of the sentient and others as well. Therefore it is not shown in this way that the nutritive and sentient parts of the soul differ essentially from the intellective, but rather that one of these [parts] contains another.

9. just as animal and man are not conceived simultaneously, so neither are animal and horse, as the Philosopher points out in the same place. Therefore this statement [of the Philosopher] is not based on the argument that the sentient soul, existing substantially in man, is a principle by which he is an animal, and the intellective soul another principle by which he is a man. For it cannot be said that there are many different principles in a horse, one making it an animal, another, a horse. But this statement [of the Philosopher] is made for this reason, that in the concept of animal the imperfect operations appear first, and then the more perfect; just as every generation is a transition from the imperfect to the perfect.

10. A form does not belong to a genus, as has been shown (Art. 1). Consequently, since the intellective soul is the form of man, it does not

belong to a different genus from that of the body. But each belongs to the genus animal and the species man, by reduction.

11. One being does not result from the union of two actually existing substances complete in their species and nature. Now the soul and the body are not substances of this sort, because they are parts of human nature. Therefore nothing prevents them from being united to form one being [substantially].

12. Although the human soul is a form united to a body, it totally transcends the capacity of the whole of corporeal matter, and therefore cannot derive actual existence from the potentiality of matter as a result of any motion or change, as do other forms which are immersed in matter.

13. The soul, through that part of it whereby it exceeds every capacity of the body, has an operation in which the body does not share. However this does not prevent the soul from being united to the body in some way.

14. This objection agrees with the position of Origen, who maintained that in the beginning souls were created without bodies together with the spiritual substances [i.e., the angels] and afterwards were united to bodies as though shut up in prisons. However, he did not say souls suffered that innocently, but because of a preceding sin. Hence Origen, in accordance with the position of Plato, held that the human soul was a complete species in itself, and that the body was joined to it accidentally. But since this is false, as we have shown above (Art. 1), it is not detrimental to the soul to be united to a body; on the contrary this union makes for the perfection of its nature. However, that the body is the prison of the soul and taints the soul, is merited by the first sin.

15. It is natural to the human soul to apprehend intelligible truth in a manner inferior to that proper to superior spiritual substances, namely, by abstraction from sensible things. But in this also the soul suffers an impediment through the corruption of the body which results from the sin of the first parent.

16. The fact that the flesh desires things that are opposed to the spirit, shows the affinity of the soul for the body. For “spirit” signifies the superior part of the soul whereby man surpasses other animals, as Augustine says in the Super Genesi contra Manichaeos [II, 8]. But the flesh is said to desire because the parts of the soul joined to the flesh desire those things, which

delight the flesh, and now and again these concupiscences fight against the spirit.

17. The possible intellect does not possess any intelligible form actually, but only potentially, just as prime matter does not have any sensible form actually. Therefore it is not necessary, nor does the argument prove, that the possible intellect is one and the same for all men. It only shows that their intellect is ope with respect to all intelligible forms, just as prime matter is one with respect to all sensible forms.

18. If the possible intellect had a bodily organ, that organ would have to be a principle [of understanding] together with the possible intellect which is the cause of intellection; just as the pupil of the eye together with the power of vision is the principle of vision; and thus the principle by which we understand would have a determinate sensible nature. This is evidently false in view of Aristotle's demonstration which was given above. However, this does not follow from the fact that the soul is the form of the body, because the possible intellect is a power of the soul so far as it transcends the capacity of the body.

19. Although the soul is united to the body in accordance with the body's mode of existing, still the soul has an intellectual nature in virtue of that part whereby it transcends the capacity of the body; and thus the forms received in the soul are intelligible and not material.

Whence the solution to the twentieth objection is evident.

ARTICLE 3

WHETHER THERE IS ONE POSSIBLE INTELLECT, OR INTELLECTIVE SOUL, FOR ALL MEN

[SUMMA THEOL., LA, Q.76, A.2; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 59, 73, 75; SENT., I, DIST., 8, Q.5, A.2, AD 6; II, DIST., 17, Q.2, A.1; DE SPIR. CREAT., A.9; DE UNIT. INTELL.; COMPEND. THEOL., 58.]

In the third article we examine this question: Whether there is one possible intellect, or intellective soul, for all men.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that there is. For a perfection is proportioned to what is perfectible. But truth is the perfection of the intellect, for truth is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics [VI, 2, 1139b 11]. Therefore, since truth, which. all men understand, is one, it seems that there is one possible intellect for all men.

2. Further, Augustine says, in the book De quantitate animae [32] “I know what I will say to you about the number of souls.... For if I say there is one soul, you will be disturbed, because it is happy in one and sad in another, and one and the same thing cannot be happy and sad. If I say one and many at the same time, you will laugh; nor is it easy for me to know how to suppress your laughter. For if I say there are many only, I will laugh at myself, and I will maintain that I am less displeasing to myself than to you.” Therefore the existence of many souls, one for each man, seems to be ridiculous.

3. Further, things that differ from each other, differ because of the determinate nature which each possesses. But the possible intellect is in potency to all forms, having none actually. Consequently the possible intellect [in one man] cannot differ [from that in another], and thus there cannot be many possible intellects, one for each man.

4. Further, the possible intellect totally lacks everything that it knows, because, prior to actual intellection, it possesses none of the things that it is cognizant of, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 18]. But, as is said in the same book, it completely lacks any nature of its own; and thus it cannot have a multiple existence among different individuals.

5. Further, there must be something in common in all things that are distinct and multiple, for man is common to many men, and animal to many animals. But the possible intellect does not have anything in common with other things, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 23]. Therefore the possible intellect in one man cannot differ from that in another, and thus there cannot be many possible intellects, one for each man.

6. Further, as Rabbi Moses points out, there is multiplicity with respect to cause and thing caused only in things existing in separation from matter. But the intellect or soul of one man is not the cause of the intellect or soul of another. Therefore, since the possible intellect is separate, as is said in the De anima [III, 5, 429a 24], there will not be many possible intellects, one for each man.

7. Further, the Philosopher says, in the De anima [III, 7&8, 431a 1; 431b 21], that the intellect and what is understood are one and the same. But what is understood is one and the same for all men. Therefore there is one possible intellect for all men.

8. Further, that which is understood is a universal, which is a one-in-many (unum in multis). But the form understood does not derive this unity from the thing [of which it is the form], for the form man is present in men themselves only as individuated and multiplied among diverse men. Therefore the form derives this unity from the intellect. Consequently there is one [possible] intellect for all men.

9. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 26] that the soul is the place (locus) of species. But place is common to different things in place. Therefore there are not many souls, one for each man.

10. But it must be said that the soul is the place of species because if contains species. On the other hand, just as the intellect contains intelligible species, so does sense contain sensible species. Therefore, if the intellect is the place of species because it contains them, sense, for a similar reason, will also be the place of species. This is contrary to what the Philosopher says, in the De anima [ibid.] that not every soul is the place of species, but only the intellective soul.

11. Further, a thing operates only in the place in which it is located. But the possible intellect operates everywhere, for it understands things existing in heaven, those existing on earth, and everywhere. Therefore the possible intellect is everywhere, and thus is one for all men.

12. Further, whatever is limited (definitum) to some one particular thing, has a determinate matter, because the principle of individuation is matter. But the possible intellect does .not have a determinate matter, as is proved in the De anima [III, 8, 431b 30]. Therefore it is not found to exist in each particular man, and thus is one for all men.

13. But it must be said that the possible intellect has matter in the thing in which it exists, namely, in the human body in which it is confined. On the other hand, the principle of individuation should belong to the individuated essence. But the body is not an essential part of the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect cannot be individuated by the body, and consequently cannot have a multiple existence.

14. Further, the Philosopher says in the De caelo [I, 9, 279a 8] that if there were many worlds, there would be many first heavens. But if there were many first heavens, there would be many first movers; and thus these first movers would be material. Therefore, for a similar reason, if there were many possible intellects, one for each man, the possible intellect would be material; which is impossible.

15. Further, if there are many possible intellects, one for each man, they must remain many when their bodies have corrupted. But then, since they can differ only as regards form, they will have to differ specifically. Therefore, since possible intellects do not become specifically different when their bodies have corrupted (because nothing is changed from one species into another unless it is corrupted), possible intellects were specifically different before their bodies corrupted. But man acquires his

species from the intellective soul. Therefore diverse men do not possess the same species; which is clearly false.

16. Further, whatever exists in separation from a body cannot be given a multiple existence by bodies. But the possible intellect is separate from the body, as the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 79]. Therefore the possible intellect cannot be multiplied nor be individuated by bodies. Consequently there are not many possible intellects, one for each man.

17. Further, if a possible intellect exists in each man, intelligible species must exist in each man; and thus it follows that intelligible species are individuated forms. But individuated forms are only potentially intellected, for the universal, which is the proper object of intellection, must be abstracted from such forms. Therefore the forms which are in the possible intellect will only be potentially intelligible, and thus the possible intellect will be unable to be actually understood; which is incongruous.

18. Further, an agent and patient, mover and thing moved, have something in common. Now a phantasm is related to the possible intellect, existing in us, as an agent to a patient, and as a mover to something moved. Therefore the intellect existing in us has something in common with phantasms. But the possible intellect has nothing in common with the latter, as is pointed out in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 22]. Therefore the [supposedly separate] ‘possible intellect differs from the intellect which is present in us, and so is not multiplied among diverse men.

19. Further, a thing, inasmuch as it exists, is one. Therefore neither its act of existing nor its unity depends on another. But the possible intellect’s act of existing does not depend on the body, otherwise it would be corrupted when the body corrupts. Consequently the unity of the possible intellect does not depend on the body; and so neither does its multiplicity. Therefore the possible intellect is not multiplied among different bodies [in such a way that each man possesses his own].

20. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Metaphysics [VII, 2, 1043b 1] that in those things which are forms alone [i.e., not composed of matter and form], the thing and its quiddity (quod quid erat esse), that is, the nature of its species, are one and the same. But the possible intellect, or intellective soul, is a form alone, for, ‘if it were composed of matter and form, it would not be the form of anything else. Hence the intellective soul is the nature itself of its species. So, if the nature of the species is one and the same in

every intellective soul, the intellective soul is incapable of having a multiple existence among diverse individuals [in such a way that each possesses his own].

21. Further, the soul has a multiple existence among different bodies only by being united thereto. But the possible intellect belongs to that part of the soul which transcends bodily union. Hence the possible intellect does not have a multiple existence among diverse men [in such a way that each possesses his own intellect].

22. Further, if many human souls exist because of the multiplicity of bodies, and many possible intellects because of the multiplicity of souls, and since it is certain that there must be many intelligible species if there are many possible intellects, it follows that the first principle of multiplicity must be corporeal matter. But whatever is made multiple by matter is individual, and is not actually intelligible. Therefore the species which are in the possible intellect will not be actually intelligible objects; which is incongruous. Hence there will not be many human souls and possible intellects, one in each man.

On the contrary, man understands by the possible intellect. For it is said in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15] that the possible intellect is that by which the soul understands. Consequently, if there is one possible intellect for all men, it follows that one man understands what another does; which is clearly false.

Further, the intellective soul is related to the body as a form to matter, and as a mover to an instrument. But every form requires a determinate matter, and every mover a determinate instrument. It is impossible, therefore, that there be one intellective soul for all men.

I answer: This question depends in a certain way on the preceding one. For if the possible intellect is a substance having existence separate from the body, it must be unique; because those things which have existence apart from a body can in no way have a multiple existence as a result of a multiplicity of bodies. However, the unicity of the intellect must be given special consideration because it involves a peculiar difficulty. For it is at once apparent that there cannot be one [possible] intellect for all men. It is, indeed, clear that the possible intellect is related to the perfections, which sciences are, as a primary perfection to a secondary one, and that we have scientific knowledge potentially because of a possible intellect. This fact compels us to maintain that a possible intellect exists. Moreover, it is obvious that not all men possess the same scientific knowledge, because some know sciences which others do not. Now it is evidently incongruous and impossible for one and the same primary subject to be in act and in potency with regard to the same form. For example, [it is impossible that] a surface be at,the same time potentially and actually white.

Now those maintaining that there is one possible intellect for all men try to avoid the absurdity of this position by pointing to the fact that the intelligible species, on which the perfection of science is based, have a twofold subject, as was shown above (Art. 2), namely, the phantasms, themselves, and the possible intellect. And they argue that intelligible species are not the same in all men, because phantasms are not the same in all. In fact, as existing in the possible intellect, intelligible species are not multiple. So it is that one man possesses a science which another lacks, because he has different phantasms. But this is evidently foolish in view of what has previously been said. For species are actually intelligible only by being abstracted from phantasms and by existing in the possible intellect. Therefore diversity of phantasms cannot be the cause of the unity or multiplicity of a perfection having the character of scientific knowledge. Nor do scientific habits exist in some part of the sentient soul as their subject, as these men claim.

But an even greater difficulty faces those who maintain that there is one possible intellect for all men. For it is evident that the act of intellection has its origin in the possible intellect as the first principle whereby we understand, just as the operation of sensing has its origin in a sentient power. Also, while it was shown above (Art. 2) that if the possible intellect exists apart from man, the act of understanding, which belongs to the possible intellect, cannot be the operation of this or that man; nevertheless, from the hypothesis of one possible intellect for all men, it follows that this or that man understands by the possible intellect’s own act of understanding. Yet an operation can be multiplied in only two ways: either on the side of the objects [known], or on that of the principle operating. A third way [of multiplying operation] can also be envisaged from the point of view of time, as, for instance, when an operation involves temporal changes. Hence the act of understanding, which is the operation of the intellect, can be multiplied with respect to objects known, so that it is one thing to know a man, another thing to know a horse. The act of understanding can also be multiplied with respect to time, so that to understand what happened yesterday is one act, and to understand what happens today, another, if, of course, the operation is not continuous. However, the act of understanding cannot be multiplied respecting the principle operating, if there is only one possible intellect. Therefore, if the possible intellect's own act of understanding is this or that man's act of understanding, this man's act of understanding, and that man's, could be different if they were understanding different things. A reason for this can be found in the diversity of phantasms. The act of understanding by different men understanding the same thing, according to the one possible intellect theory, could be multiplied similarly, so that one understands today and another tomorrow. This can also be attributed to the different use of phantasms. But in the case of two men who understand the same thing at the same time, their act of understanding would have to be numerically one and the same; which is clearly impossible. Therefore it is impossible for the possible intellect, by which we understand formally, to be one and the same for all men.

However, it would be more reasonable to hold that we understand by the possible intellect as an active principle existing in us, and causing in us actual understanding. For one mover puts different things into operation; but that different things should act through some one thing formally, is absolutely impossible.

Moreover, the forms and species of natural things are known through their proper operations; but the proper operation of man, as man, is understanding and reasoning. Hence the principle of this operation, whereby man is made to be specifically what he is, must be the intellect. It cannot be the sensory soul, nor any other power of man. Therefore, if the possible intellect, existing as a separate substance, is one for all men, then all men are made to be specifically what they are by one substance existing apart from them. This position is reminiscent of the doctrine of Ideas, and labors under the same difficulty.

Consequently it must be said absolutely that there is not one possible intellect for all men, but that there are many intellects, one for each man. And since the intellect is a certain power or capacity of the human soul, it is multiplied according as the substance of the soul itself is multiplied; which multiplication can be considered in the following way. For if a thing having a certain common character is multiplied materially, it must be multiplied numerically while remaining specifically the same. For instance, flesh and bones belong to the very notion of animal. Hence the distinction between animals, which is based on individual bodily differences, makes them numerically, but not specifically, diverse. Moreover, it is clear from what was said above (Arts. 1 and 1) that the human soul by its very nature is capable of union with the human body, because the human soul is not a complete species in itself, but acquires the completion of its species in the composite itself. Hence the fact that the soul is capable of being united to this or to that body, multiplies the soul numerically, not specifically; just as this whiteness differs numerically from that, because it belongs to this or that subject. But the human soul differs from other forms in this way, that its act of existing does not depend on the body. Nor does this individuated act of existing which it has, depend on the body; for inasmuch as a thing is one, it is undivided in itself and distinct from other things.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Truth is the conformity of the intellect with the thing [known]. Therefore there is one truth which different men understand, inasmuch as their conceptions conform to the same known object.

2. Augustine acknowledges that his position is ridiculous, not if he says many souls, but if he says many without qualification, so that souls would be many both numerically and specifically.

3. The possible intellect is not multiplied among different individuals because of any formal diversity, but because the substance of the soul, of which the intellect is a power, has a multiple existence.

4. It is not necessary for the intellect as such (commune) to completely lack what it understands, but only the intellect in potency; just as every recipient lacks the nature received. Hence, if there exists an intellect which is Act alone (as the divine intellect is), it understands itself through itself. But the, possible intellect is said to be intelligible, just as other intelligible things are, because it understands itself through the intelligible species of other intelligible things. For it knows its operation with respect to an object, and acquires knowledge of itself through this operation.

5. The possible intellect must be understood to have nothing in common with any of the sensible natures from which it derives its intelligible species. However, one possible intellect is specifically the same as another.

6. Those things which exist apart from matter can differ from one another only specifically. Moreover, things which are specifically diverse belong to different grades [of being]. Hence they resemble numbers which differ specifically from one another as a result of the addition and subtraction of a unit. Consequently it follows, from the position of those who maintain that inferior beings are caused by superior ones, that in the case of beings existing in separation from matter there is multiplicity so far as cause and thing caused are concerned. But this position may not be held according to faith . Therefore the possible intellect is not a substance existing apart from matter. Hence the reason given does not support the argument.

7. The intelligible species through which the intellect understands formally, is present in the possible intellect of this and of that particular man, and for this reason it follows that there are many possible intellects. Nevertheless the quiddity (quod) known through such a species is one, if we consider this quiddity in relation to the thing known; because the universal which is understood by both of these men is the same in all the things [of which it is the universal representation]. Moreover, the fact that what is one-in-all [i.e., the universal] can be understood through species multiplied among diverse individuals, is made possible by the immateriality of these species. For species represent a thing without the material individuating conditions which give the simple specific nature a multiple existence among diverse things.

8. According to the Platonists the reason why something is understood as a one-in-many [i.e., universally], is not to be attributed to the intellect, but to the thing. They argue that, because our intellect knows a thing as a one-in-many, it would apparently be empty of any real content unless there were one real nature shared by many individuals. For in that case the intellect would have in itself nothing corresponding to this one-in-many in reality. Hence the Platonists felt obliged to posit Ideas, by participation in which both natural things are given their specific nature, and our intellects made cognizant of universals. But according to Aristotle, the fact that the intellect understands a one-in-many in abstraction from individuating principles, is to be attributed to the intellect itself. And though nothing abstract exists in

reality, the intellect is not void of any real content, nor is it misrepresentative of things as they are; because, of those things which necessarily exist together, one can be truly understood or named without another being understood or named. But it cannot be truly understood or said of things existing in this way, that one exists without the other. Thus whatever exists in an individual which pertains to the nature of its species, and in respect of which it is like other things, can be known and spoken of truly without taking into consideration its individuating principles, which distinguish it from all other individuals [of the same species]. Consequently, by its abstractive power the intellect makes this universal unity itself, not as though it were a unity existing in things themselves, but as an immaterial representation of them.

9. The intellect is the place of species because it contains them. Hence it does not follow that there is one possible intellect for all men, but that it is one and common to the whole species.

10. Sense does not receive species without an organ, and therefore sense is not said to be the place of species in the same manner as the intellect is.

11. The possible intellect can be said to operate everywhere, not because it actually does so, but because its intellectual operation comprehends things which exist everywhere.

12. Although the possible intellect has no determinate matter, the substance of the soul, of which the intellect is a power, has a determinate matter. However it does not have matter as a constituent part, but as something in which it exists.

13. The individuating principles of all forms are not of the very essence of these forms. This is true only in the case of things composed of matter and form.

14. The Prime Mover of the heavens exists in complete separation from matter. Therefore He cannot be multiplied numerically in any way whatever. However, the same thing is not true of the human soul.

15. Souls existing apart from bodies do not differ specifically, but numerically, because they are capable of being united to this or to that particular body.

16. Although the possible intellect is separated from the body so far, as its operation is concerned, nevertheless it is a power of the soul which is the act of the body.

17. Something is potentially known, not because it is individual, but because it is material. Hence the intelligible species that are received in the intellect immaterially are actually known, even though they are individuated. Furthermore, the same [incongruity set forth in this objection] follows logically from the position of those who maintain that there is one possible intellect for all men. For if there is one possible intellect existing as a separate substance, it must be an individual thing. This is the argument that Aristotle employs against Plato’s Ideas. The intelligible species in the intellect would be individuated for the same reason, and would differ in diverse separate intellects as well, because every intelligence is filled with intelligible forms.

18. A phantasm moves the intellect so far as the possible intellect is made actually cognizant by the power of the agent intellect to which the possible intellect is related as potency is to act. This is the way in which the intellect has something in common with a phantasm.

19. Although the soul’s act of existing does not depend on the body, nevertheless it is related by its very nature to the body for the completion of its species.

2o. Although the human soul does not contain matter as an intrinsic part of itself, it is still the form of the body. Therefore its nature involves relationship with the body.

2 1. Although the possible intellect transcends the body, it does not transcend the entire substance of the soul, which has a multiple existence because it inhabits diverse bodies.

22. This argument would be true if the body were united to the soul in such a way as to embrace the whole essence and power of the soul, for then whatever exists in the soul would necessarily be material. But this is not the case as was shown above, and therefore this argument is not legitimate.

ARTICLE 4

WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO ADMIT THAT AN AGENT INTELLECT EXISTS

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 79, A. 3; Q. 54, A.4; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 77; DE SPIR. CREAT., A.9; COMPEND. THEOL., CHAP. 83; COMM. IN DE ANIMA, III, LECT. 10.]

In the fourth article we examine this question: Whether it is necessary to admit that an agent intellect exists.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists. For whatever can be accomplished in nature by one thing is not done by many. Now a man can understand quite well by means of one intellect, namely, the possible intellect. Therefore it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists. The minor proposition is proved thus: powers that are rooted in one and the same essence of the soul influence one another. It is for this reason that an impression is made on the imagination as a result of a change in the [external] sense powers, for the imagination is moved [i.e., actuated or informed] when the external senses are actuated, as is said in the De anima [III, 3, 429a 1]. Therefore, if the possible intellect belongs to our soul, and is not a separate substance, as we have explained above (Art. 2), it must belong to the same essence of the soul as the imagination does. Hence a change in the imagination flows into the possible intellect, and thus it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists which makes phantasms intelligible by abstracting [species] from the phantasms themselves.

2. Further, touch and sight are different powers. Now in the case of one who is [born] blind, it happens that the imagination is moved to imagine something that belongs to the sense of sight from a change produced in the imagination by the sense of touch, and this occurs because sight and touch are rooted in one and the same essence of the soul. Therefore, if the possible intellect is a certain power of the soul, then, for a similar reason, an impression will be produced in the possible intellect from a change in the imagination. Thus it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists.

3. Further, an agent intellect is held to exist in order that the potentially intelligible may be made actually intelligible. Moreover, some things are made actually intelligible by being abstracted from matter and from material conditions. Thus an agent intellect is held to exist in order that intelligible species may be abstracted from matter. However, this can be accomplished without an agent intellect, for, since the possible intellect is immaterial, it must receive things in an immaterial way, because whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore it is unnecessary to admit that an agent intellect exists.

4. Further, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15],Aristotle compares the agent intellect to light. But light is necessary for sight only inasmuch as it makes the medium (diaphanus) to be actually luminous; for color is visible in virtue of its own nature, and moves the medium which is actually luminous, as is explained in the De anima [II, 7, 418a 26; 418b 27]. However, the agent intellect is not required in order to prepare the possible intellect for the reception of species, because the possible intellect is in potency to intelligible species by its very nature. Therefore it is unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists.

5. Further, just as our intellect is related to intelligible things, so are our senses related to sensible things. Now sensible things require no agent [sense] in order that they may move the senses, yet sensible things are present with an immaterial mode of existence, both in the senses, which are receptive of sensible things without matter, as is said in the De anima [III, 8, 431b 25], as well as in the medium [e.g., the air], which receives the species of sensible things in an immaterial way. This is evident from the very fact that the species of contrary qualities, such as white and black, are received in the same part of the medium. Therefore neither do intelligible things require an agent intellect.

6. Further, in order for something in potency to be made actual in the case of natural things, something actual belonging to the same genus is sufficient; for example, in the case of matter, whatever is ablaze potentially is set ablaze actually by fire, which is in act. Therefore, for our intellect, which is in potency, to be actuated, nothing more is required than the intellect in act, either of the knower himself, as when we proceed from a knowledge of principles to a knowledge of conclusions, or of someone else, as when someone learns from a teacher. Consequently it seems unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists.

7. Further, an agent intellect is held to exist in order that it may illuminate our phantasms, just as the light of the sun illuminates colors. But the divine light, “which illuminates every man coming into this world” (John 1:9), suffices for our illumination. Consequently it is unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists.

8. Further, intellection is the activity of an intellect. Therefore, if there are two intellects, that is, an agent and a possible intellect, the intellection of one and the same man will be twofold. This is incongruous.

9. Further, it is seen that an intelligible species perfects our intellect. Therefore, if there are two intellects, namely, a possible and an agent intellect, there are two distinct acts of intellection. This seems unnecessary.

On the contrary, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 10], Aristotle concludes that, since in every nature there is something active and something potential, these two things must be found within the soul itself, and one of these is the agent intellect, the other the possible intellect.

I answer: We must admit that an agent intellect exists. To make this evident we must observe that, since the possible intellect is in potency to intelligibles, the intelligibles themselves must move [i.e., actuate] the possible intellect. But that which is non-existent cannot move anything. Moreover, the intelligible as such, that which the possible intellect understands, does not exist in reality; “ for our possible intellect understands something as though it were a one-in-many and common to many [i.e., universal]. However, such an entity is not found subsisting in reality, as Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics [VII, 13, 1039a 15]. Therefore, if the possible intellect has to be moved by an intelligible, this intelligible must be produced by an intellective power. And since it is impossible for anything in potency, in a certain respect, to actuate itself, we must admit that an agent intellect exists, in addition to the possible intellect, and that this agent intellect causes the actual intelligibles which actuate the possible intellect. Moreover, it produces these intelligibles by abstracting them from matter and from material conditions which are the principles of individuation. And since the nature as such of the species does not possess these principles by which the.nature is given a multiple existence among different things, because individuating principles of this sort are distinct from the nature itself, the intellect will be able to receive this nature apart from all material conditions, and consequently will receive it as a unity [i.e., as a one-in-many]. For the same reason the intellect receives the nature of a genus by abstracting from specific differences, so that it is a one-in-many and common to many species.

However, if universals subsisted in reality in virtue of themselves, as the Platonists maintained, it would not be necessary to admit than an agent intellect exists; because things which are intelligible in virtue of their own nature move the possible intellect. Therefore it appears that Aristotle was led by this necessity to posit an agent intellect, because he did not agree with the opinion of Plato on the question of Ideas. Nevertheless there are some subsistent things in the real order which are actual intelligibles in virtue of themselves; the immaterial substances, for instance, are of this nature (see Art. 7). However, the possible intellect cannot attain a knowledge of these immediately, but acquires its knowledge of them through what it abstracts from material and sensible things (see Art. 16).

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Our act of intellection cannot be accomplished by the possible intellect alone, for the possible intellect can understand only when it is moved by an intelligible, and this intelligible, since it does not already exist in the real order, must be produced by the agent intellect. Moreover, it is true that two powers, which are rooted in one and the same substance of the soul, do influence each other; but this influence can be understood to occur in two ways: first, inasmuch as one power is hindered or totally prevented from performing its operation when another power operates intensely; however, this has no bearing on the problem; secondly, inasmuch as one power is moved by another, as the imagination is moved by the [external] senses.

Now this is possible because the forms in the imagination and those in the external senses are generically the same, for all are individual forms. Therefore the forms which are in the external senses can impress those forms which exist in the imagination by moving the imagination, because they are similar to these forms. However, the forms in the imagination, since they represent things as individuals, cannot cause intelligible forms, because these are universal.

2. The species received in the imagination from the sense of touch are not enough to cause the imagination to produce forms belonging to the sense of sight, unless forms previously received by the sense of sight are stored up in the repertory of memory or imagination. For one who is born blind cannot imagine color by any other kind of sensible species whatever.

3. The condition of the recipient cannot cause a species which has been received, to be transferred from one genus to another; however, it can alter a received species of, the same genus according to some mode of being. Hence, since a universal species and a particular species differ generically, it follows that the cognitive activity of the possible intellect alone is not enough to give the particular species in the imagination the universality which they possess in the intellect, but that an agent intellect is required to do this.

4. There are two opinions concerning light, as the Commentator points out in the De anima [II, 67]. For some said that light is necessary for sight inasmuch as it gives to colors the power of moving the sense of sight, as if color were not visible of itself, but only through light. But this seems to contradict Aristotle, since he points out in the De anima [II, 7, 418a 29]. that color is visible in virtue of itself, and this would not be the case if it were made visible by light alone. For this reason others offer a different and more acceptable explanation, namely, that light is necessary for sight inasmuch as it perfects the medium, making it to be actually luminous. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 7, 418a 33] that color has the power of moving what is actually luminous. Nor is this position rendered untenable by the fact that someone in the dark sees things which are in the light, but not vice versa. For this occurs because the medium, which surrounds a visible thing, must be illuminated in order that the medium may receive the visible species; and this remains visible as long as the act of light continues to illuminate the medium, although it illuminates it

more perfectly the nearer it is, and more weakly the farther it is away. Consequently the comparison between light and the agent intellect does not hold in all respects, because the agent intellect is necessary for this reason, that it may make the potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible. Aristotle pointed this out in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15] when he said that the agent intellect is like light in some respects.

5. Since a sensible is something particular, it does not impress a species of a higher genus, either on the sense or on the medium, because the species existing in the medium and in the sense is a particular and nothing more. The possible intellect, however, receives species of a higher genus than those present in the imagination; because the possible intellect receives universal species, whereas the imagination contains only particular species. Therefore we require an agent intellect in the case of intelligible things, but need no additional agent power in the case of sensible things. Indeed, all the sentient powers are passive powers.

6. The possible intellect in act is not sufficient to, cause knowledge in us unless an agent intellect is presupposed. For if we speak of the intellect in act of one who is learning, it so happens that his possible intellect is in potency with respect to some things, and in act with respect to others; and his intellect can be put into act, so far as the things to which it is in potency are concerned, by the things that are already actually known; just as one is made to be actually knowing conclusions,, which were previously known only potentially, by actually knowing principles. However, the possible intellect can be actually knowing principles only through the activity of the agent intellect; for our knowledge of principles is received from sensible things, as is stated at the end of the Posterior Analytics [II, 19, 100a 10]. Moreover, intelligibles can be derived from sensible things only by the abstractive activity of the agent intellect. Thus it is evident that the intellect in act with respect to principles, does not suffice to move the possible intellect from potentiality to act without the agent intellect. Indeed, in this actuating of the possible intellect, the agent intellect acts like an artisan and the principles of demonstration like tools. However, if we speak of the intellect in act of the teacher, it is evident that when the teacher causes knowledge in one who is learning, he does not act as an interior agent, but as an external administrator, just as in the production of health a physician

acts as an external administrator, whereas the nature of the patient acts as an interior agent.

7. Just as real things of any kind require proper active principles, even though God is the first and universal agent, so too does man require a proper intellective light, even though God is the First Light illuminating all men in common.

8. There is a proper activity for each one of the two intellects, that is, the possible intellect and the agent intellect. For the activity of the possible intellect consists in receiving intelligibles, whereas that of the agent intellect consists in abstracting them. Nor does it follow that there are two distinct acts of understanding in a man, because it is necessary that the activities of both intellects concur to produce one act of understanding.

9. The same intelligible species is related to the agent intellect and to the possible intellect. However, it is related to the possible intellect as a recipient, and to the agent intellect as the one producing species of this sort by abstraction.

ARTICLE 5

WHETHER THERE IS ONE SEPARATELY EXISTING AGENT INTELLECT FOR ALL MEN

[SUMMA THEOL., I. Q.79. A.4, 5; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 76, 78; SENT., II DIST. 17, Q.2, A. 1; DE SPIR. CREAT., A. 10; COMM. IN DE ANIMA, III, LECT. 10; COMPEND. THEOL., CHAP. 86.]

In the fifth article we examine this question: Whether there is one separately existing agent intellect for all men.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that there is. Because the Philosopher says, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 22], that the agent intellect is not at one time knowing and at another not. But nothing of this nature exists in us. Hence the agent intellect exists apart from men, and therefore is one and the same for all men.

2. Further, nothing can be in potency and in act with respect to the same thing simultaneously. Now the possible intellect is in potency with respect to every intelligible species. However, the agent intellect is in act with respect to them, because it is the act [producing] them. Therefore it seems that the possible and agent intellect cannot be rooted in the same substance of the soul. Hence, since the possible intellect is rooted in the essence of the soul, as is evident from the preceding articles (Arts. 1, 2 and 2), the agent intellect will exist apart from the soul.

3. But it might be said that the possible intellect is in potency to intelligible species, and the agent intellect in act with respect to them according to different modes of existence.

On the other hand, the possible intellect is not in potency to intelligible species when it possesses them, because then it is actuated by them. Hence it is in potency to intelligible species as existing in phantasms. But the agent intellect is related to such species as the act [which produces them], because it makes them actually intelligible by abstraction. Hence the possible intellect is in potency to intelligible species with respect to that mode of existence according to which the agent intellect is related to them as the one producing them.

4. Further, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 17] the Philosopher attributed to the agent intellect certain properties which seem to belong only to separate substances. For he says that “this [i.e., the intellect] alone is perpetual, incorruptible, and separate.” Therefore its seems that the agent intellect is a separate substance.

5. Further, the intellect does not depend on any bodily disposition, because it is not united to a bodily organ. But our faculty of understanding is affected by different physical dispositions .5 Consequently this [intellective] faculty of ours is not identical with this intellect which is present in us; so it seems that the agent intellect has a separate existence.

6. Further, in order to have activity, an agent and a patient alone are necessary. Therefore, if the possible intellect, which is the patient in cognition, is a part of our substantial principle, as was previously shown (Art. 3), and the agent intellect is also a part of our soul, it seems that we possess within ourselves everything necessary in order that we may be able to understand. Hence we require nothing more in order to be able to do so. But this is clearly false. For we need the senses through which we acquire the experience necessary for cognition. This is the reason why a man deprived of a sense, for instance, sight, lacks a knowledge of colors. In order to learn we also require instruction, which is given by a teacher. And above all we stand in need of the illumination given by God, for it is said: “It was the true Light that enlightens every man who comes into this world” (John 1:9).

7. Further, the agent intellect is related to intelligible objects as light is to visible objects, as is evident in the De anima [ibid., 430a 14]. But one light existing apart from things, that is, the sun, suffices to make all things actually visible. Consequently one [intellectual] light existing apart from

men, suffices to make everything actually intelligible. Hence it is unnecessary to maintain that an agent intellect exists in each one of us.

8. Further, the agent intellect is similar to an art, as is clear in the De anima [ibid., 430a 15] But an art is a principle separate from the objects produced by it. Therefore the agent intellect is also a separate principle.

9. The perfection of a nature consists in being like its agent, for a thing generated is perfect when it resembles the thing producing it. A thing produced by art is also perfect when it resembles the form in the mind of the artisan. Therefore, if the agent intellect belongs to our soul, the ultimate perfection and happiness of our soul will be found in some part of the soul itself; which is evidently false. For in that case the ultimate happiness of the soul would be the enjoyment of itself. Consequently the agent intellect is not something that exists within ourselves.

10. Further, an agent is nobler than a patient, as is pointed out in the De anima [ibid., 430a 17]. Therefore, if the possible intellect is separated in some measure from the body, the agent intellect will be separated to an even greater degree; and we see that this can be so, only if the agent intellect is held to bp completely separated from the substance of the soul.

On the contrary, there is this statement in the De anima [ibid., 430a 10] that since there is something in every nature like matter [i.e., potential] and something which is productive [i.e., active], these two distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul. The possible intellect corresponds to one of these, the agent intellect to the other. Therefore both the possible and agent intellect belong to the soul.

Further, the operation of the agent intellect is to abstract intelligible species from phantasms. Now it is certain that this operation is not continually taking place in us. However, there would be no reason why such abstraction should sometimes occur and sometimes not, as is seen to be the case if the agent intellect were a separate substance. Consequently the agent intellect is not a separate substance.

I answer: It is obviously more reasonable to maintain that the agent intellect is unique and separate, than to hold that this is true of the possible intellect. For the possible intellect, in virtue of which we are capable of understanding, is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act. The agent intellect, on the other hand, is that which makes us actually understanding. Now an agent exists in separation from the things which it brings into actuality, but obviously whatever makes a thing potential is wholly within that thing.

For this reason many maintained that the agent intellect is a separate substance, and that the possible intellect is a part of our soul. Furthermore they held that this agent intellect is a specific kind of separate substance, which they call an intelligence. They held that it is related to our souls, and to the entire sphere of active and passive qualities, as superior separate substances (which they also call intelligences) are related to the souls of the celestial bodies (for they considered these to be animated), and to the celestial bodies themselves. Hence they maintained that, as superior bodies receive their motion from these separate substances, and the souls of the heavenly bodies .their intelligible perfections, so also do all the bodies of this inferior sphere receive their forms and movements from the separate agent intellect, while our soul receives its intelligible perfections from it. But because the Catholic Faith maintains that God is the agent operating in our souls and not some separate substance in nature, some Catholics asserted that the agent intellect is God himself, who is "the true Light that enlightens every man who comes into this world" (John 1: 9).

But this position, if anyone examines it carefully, is seen to be implausible, because the superior substances are related to our souls as celestial bodies are to inferior bodies. For, as the powers of superior bodies are certain universal active principles in relation to inferior bodies, so also are the divine power and the powers of different secondary substances (if the latter do influence us in any way) related to our souls as universal active principles.

However, we see that there must exist in addition to the universal active principles of the celestial bodies, certain particular active principles which are powers of inferior bodies, limited to the proper operation of each and every one of them. This is particularly necessary in the case of perfect animals, because certain imperfect animals are found, for whose production the power of a celestial body suffices, as is evident in the case of animals generated from decomposed matter." However, in the generation of perfect animals a special power is also required in addition to the celestial power, and this power is present in the seed. Therefore, since intellectual operation is the most perfect thing existing in the entire order of inferior bodies, we need in addition to universal active principles (namely, the power of God enlightening us, or the powers of any other separate substance) an active principle existing within us by which we are enabled to understand actually. This power is the agent intellect.

We must also consider this, that, if the agent intellect is held to exist as a separate substance along with God, a consequence repugnant to our faith will follow: namely, that our ultimate perfection and happiness consists not in a certain union of our soul with God, as the Gospel teaches, saying. “This is life eternal, that you may know the true God” (John 17:3), but with some other separate substance. For it is evident that man’s ultimate beatitude or happiness depends upon his noblest operation, intellection, which operation, in order to be fully completed, requires the union of our [possible] intellect with its active principle. For, indeed, anything passive in any way whatever is perfected [i.e., fully actuated] only when joined with the proper active principle which is the cause of its perfection. Therefore those maintaining that the agent intellect is a substance existing apart from matter, say that man’s ultimate happiness consists in being able to know the agent intellect.

Moreover, if we give the matter further careful consideration, we will find that the agent intellect cannot be a separate substance for the same reason that the possible intellect cannot be, as was shown above (Arts. 1-3). For, as the operation of the possible intellect consists in receiving intelligible [species], so also does the proper operation of the agent intellect consist in abstracting them, for it makes them actually intelligible in this way. Now we experience both of these operations in ourselves, because we receive our intelligible species, and abstract them as well. However, in anything that operates there must be some formal principle whereby it operates formally, because a thing cannot operate formally through something that possesses existence distinct from itself. But, although the motive principle of an activity [i.e., an efficient cause] is separate from the thing which it causes, nevertheless there must be some intrinsic principle whereby a thing operates formally, whether it be a form or some sort of impression. Therefore there must exist within us a formal principle through which we receive intelligible species, and one whereby we abstract them. These principles are called the possible and the agent intellect respectively. Consequently each exists within us. Moreover, [the formal intrinsic existence in us of the agent intellect] is not accounted for simply by the fact that the action of the agent intellect, namely, the abstracting of intelligible species, is carried out through phantasms illumined in us by its action. For every object produced by art is the effect of the action of an artificer, the agent intellect being related to the phantasms illumined by it as an artificer is to the things made by his art.

Now it is not difficult to see how both of these can be present in one and the same substance of the soul: that is, the possible intellect, which is in potency to all intelligible objects, and the agent intellect which makes them actually intelligible; because it is not impossible for a thing to be in potency and in act with respect to one and the same thing in different ways. Therefore, if we consider the phantasms themselves in relation to the human soul, in one respect they are found to be in potency, inasmuch as they are not abstracted from individuating conditions, although capable of being abstracted. In another respect they are found to be in act in relation to the soul, namely, inasmuch as they are [sensible] likenesses of determinate things. Therefore potentiality with respect to phantasms must be found within our soul so far as these phantasms are representative of determinate things. This belongs to the possible intellect which is, by its very nature, in potency to all intelligible objects, but is actuated by this or that object through species abstracted from phantasms. Our soul must also possess some active immaterial power which abstracts the phantasms themselves from material individuating conditions. This belongs to the agent intellect, so that it is, as it were, a power participated from the superior substance, God. Hence the Philosopher says [De Anima, III, 5, 430a 14] that the agent intellect is like a certain habit and light. In the Psalms it is also said: “The light of Thy countenance is signed upon us, O Lord” (Ps. 4:7). Something resembling this in a certain degree is apparent, in animals who see by night. The pupils of their eyes are in potency to every color inasmuch as they have no one determinate color actually, but make colors actually visible in some way by means of a certain innate light.

Indeed, some men thought that the agent intellect does not differ from our habitus of indemonstrable principles. But this cannot be the case, because we certainly know indemonstrable principles by abstracting them from singulars, as the Philosopher teaches in the Posterior Analytics [II, 19, 100b 4]. Consequently the agent intellect must exist prior to the habitus of first indemonstrable principles in order to be the cause of it. Indeed, the principles themselves are related to the agent intellect as certain of its instruments, because the intellect makes things actually intelligible by means of such principles.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. The Philosopher’s statement that “the intellect is not at one time knowing and at another not” [De Anima, III, 5, 430a 22] is not understood of the agent intellect, but of the intellect-in-act. For after Aristotle had determined the role of the possible and agent intellect, he had to determine the role of the intellect-in-act. He first distinguishes it in relation to the possible intellect, because the possible intellect and the thing known are not one and the same. However, the intellect or science-in-act is the same as the thing actually known. Aristotle had said the same thing about sense, namely, that sense and what is potentially sensible differ from each other, but that sense and what is actually sensed are one and the same. Secondly, he shows how the possible intellect is related to the intellect-in-act, because in one and the same individual, intellect in potency precedes intellect-in-act. However, it does not precede it absolutely, for he very often uses this manner of speaking concerning things that pass from potentiality to actuality. Then he makes the statement quoted above, in which he shows the difference between the possible intellect and the intellect-in-act, because the possible intellect sometimes understands and sometimes does not, which cannot be said of the intellect-in-act. He points out a similar difference, in the Physics [III, 1, 201a 20] between causes in potency and causes in act.

2. The substance of the soul is in potency and in act with respect to the same phantasms, but not in the same way, as was shown above.

3. The possible intellect is in potency with respect to intelligible species, and the agent intellect in act with respect to them, in relation to the existence which such species have in phantasms; but for different reasons, as was shown.

4. Those words of the Philosopher, “This alone is separate, immortal, and perpetual,” cannot be understood to apply to the agent intellect. For Aristotle had also previously stated that the possible intellect is separate. However, they must be understood to apply to the intellect-in-act in view of the context in which they occur, as was shown above (Ans. obj. 1). For intellect-in-act embraces both the possible intellect and the agent intellect.

And only that part of the soul which contains the agent and possible intellects is separate, perpetual, and immortal. For the other parts of the soul have no existence without the body.

5. Diversity of dispositions causes the intellective faculty to understand more or less perfectly by reason of the powers which aid the intellect in abstracting. These are the powers employing corporeal organs, such as imagination, memory, and the like.

6. Although our soul possesses an agent and a possible intellect, nevertheless something extrinsic is required so that we may be able to understand. First of all, indeed, we need phantasms, derived from sensible things, by means of which the likenesses of particular things are presented to the intellect. For the agent intellect is not an act in which the determinate species of all things can be received in order to be known, any more than light can cause sight to apprehend particular kinds of colors, unless those particular kinds of colors are present to sight. Moreover, since we maintained above that the agent intellect is a certain power in which our souls share, as a kind of light, we must maintain that some exterior cause exists from whom such light is participated, and we call this exterior cause, God, who teaches within us inasmuch as He infuses light of this kind into our soul. Because of His munificence He bestows upon us, in addition to this natural light, a richer one in order that we may be, able to know those things which the natural light of reason cannot attain. Such, for instance, is the light of faith and of prophecy.

7. The, colors moving the sense of sight are outside the soul. However, the phantasms which move the possible intellect are within us. Therefore, although the exterior light of the sun is adequate for making colors actually visible, nevertheless in order that phantasms may be made actually intelligible, an interior light is required, and this is the light of the agent intellect. Furthermore, the intellective part of the soul is more perfect than the sensory. Hence it is even more necessary that adequate principles be present to the intellect for the performance of its proper operation. Also, for this reason: it is a matter of experience that by the intellective part of our soul we both receive intelligible species and abstract them, which indicates that there exists in us intellectually not only a passive but also an active power. This is not true in the case of the senses.

8. Although there is a certain likeness between the agent intellect and an art, the likeness need not hold in all respects.

9. The agent intellect is not sufficient of itself to actuate completely the possible intellect, because the determinate natures of all things do not exist in it, as has been explained. Therefore, to acquire complete perfection, the possible intellect needs to be united in a certain way to that Agent in whom the exemplars of all things exist, namely, God.

10. The agent intellect is nobler than the possible intellect, because an active power is nobler than a passive power. It is also more independent of matter than the possible intellem. inasmuch as it is further removed from any participation in matter. But its independence is not that of a separate substance.

ARTICLE 6

WHETHER THE SOUL IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 75, A. 5; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 50; SENT., I DIST. 8, Q.5, A. 2; II, DIST. 17, A. 1, A.2; QUODL., III, Q.8, A. 1; IX, Q.4, A. 1; DE SPIR. CREAT., A. 1; A.9, AD 9; DE SUBST. SEPARATIS, CHAP. 7.]

In the sixth article we examine this question: Whether the soul is composed of matter and form.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul is composed of matter and form. For Boethius says in his book, the De Trinitate: “A simple form cannot be a subject.” But the soul is the subject of sciences and virtues. Therefore the soul is not a form in its entirety (simplex) and, consequently, is composed of matter. and form.

2. Further Boethius says in the De hebdomadibus, “Whatever exists, can participate in something else; but the act of existing (esse) itself cannot participate in anything.” For a similar reason, subjects participate in something but forms do not; for example, a white thing can participate in something besides whiteness, but whiteness itself cannot participate in anything. Now the soul participates in something, namely, in those things by which it is informed. Therefore the soul is not a form alone, but is composed of matter and form.

3. Further, if the soul is a form in its entirety and is in potency to something, it seems that its act of existing (esse) above all is its act, for the soul is not its own act of existing. But act will be the simplest thing belonging to a simple potency. Therefore the soul could not be the subject of anything else than its own act of existing. However, it is evident that it is

the subject of other things. Therefore the soul is not a simple substance, but is composed of matter and form.

4. Further, accidents proceeding from the form belong to the entire species; however, those coming from matter belong to this or to that individual; for the form is the principle of the species, whereas matter is the principle of individuation. Therefore, if the soul is a form alone, all of its accidents will belong to the entire species. This appears to be false, however, because music and grammar and things of this sort do not belong to the entire species. Therefore the soul is not a form alone, but is composed of matter and form.

5. Further, a form is a principle of action, and matter, the principle of passion [i.e., being-acted-upon]. Therefore anything in which there is action and passion is composed of matter and form. But action and passion are found in the soul itself, because the operation of the possible intellect consists in being-acted-upon (patiendo), and for this reason the Philosopher says [De Anima, III, 4, 429b 32] that to understand is to undergo something. The operation of the agent intellect, on the other hand, consists in acting, for it makes the potentially intelligible, actually intelligible, as is said in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 14]. Consequently the soul is composed of form and matter.

6. Further, matter must enter into the composition of anything in which the properties of matter are found to exist. But the properties of matter are present in the soul, namely, to be in potency, to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this kind. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form. Further, agents and patients must have a common matter,” as is shown in the De generatione et corruptione [I, 7, 324a, 34]. Hence anything that can be acted upon by something material possesses matter. But the soul can be acted upon by something material, namely, by the fire of hell, which is corporeal fire, as Augustine proves in the De civitate Dei [21:10]. Therefore the soul possesses matter.

8. Further, the action of an agent does not terminate in a form, but in a composite of matter and form, as is shown in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045b5]. But the action of one agent, namely, God, terminates in the soul. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form.

9. Further, whatever is a form in its entirety, is at once a being and a unity, and does not require anything to make it a being and a unity, as the

Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045b 5]. The soul, however, requires something which makes it a being and a unity, namely, God, who creates it. Therefore the soul is not a form in its entirety.

10. Further, an agent is necessary in order that something may be reduced from potentiality to actuality. But to be brought from potentiality to actuality belongs only to those things in which there is matter and form. Therefore, if the soul is not composed of matter and form, it does not require an efficient cause; which is clearly false.

11. Further, Alexander says, in the book De intellectu, that the soul has a hyleic intellect. Now “hyle” means prime matter. Therefore the soul contains prime matter as a constituent part.

12. Further, whatever exists, is either pure act, pure potency, or is composed of potency and act. However, the soul is not pure act, because this is characteristic of God alone; nor is the soul pure potentiality, for in that case it would not differ from prime matter. Hence the soul is composed of potency and act, and consequently is not a form in its entirety, because a form is an act.

13. Further, whatever is individuated, is individuated by matter. But the soul is not individuated by the matter in which it exists, that is, by the body, because when the body corrupted the individuation of the soul would cease. Therefore the soul is individuated by matter which enters into its constitution, and thus contains matter as an integral part.

14. Further, an agent and a patient must have something in common, as is shown in the De generatione et corruptione [I, 7, 324a 34]. But the soul is acted upon by sensible things which are material; nor can it be said that the substance of the sentient soul differs from that of the intellective. Consequently the soul has something in common with material things; and thus it seems that it contains matter.

15. Further, since the soul is not simpler than an angel, it must belong to a genus as a species of that genus, for this is proper to an angel. But whatever belongs to a genus, as one of its species, seems to be composed of matter and form, for a genus has the character of matter, and a specific difference has the character of form. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form.

16. Further, a form common to [several individuals] is multiplied among these individuals as a result of material division. But intellectuality is a

form which is common not only to the souls of men, but to the angels as well. Therefore there must be some matter in the angels and in human souls, through whose division a form of this kind is multiplied among many individuals.

17. Further, whatever is moved contains matter. But the soul is moved, for Augustine shows [De spir. et an., 40], in this way, that the nature of the soul is not divine, because it is subject to change. Therefore the soul is composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, everything composed of matter and form, has a form. Therefore, if the soul is composed of matter and form, the soul itself has a form. But the soul is a form. Therefore a form has a form; but this is evidently impossible, because it would result in an infinite regression.

I answer: There are different opinions about this question. Some say that the soul and, indeed, every substance, with the exception of God, is composed of matter and form. The first to maintain this position is Avicebron, the author of the Fons vitae. The reason for this position, which is also mentioned in one of the objections (Obj. 6), is this: that matter is found wherever the properties of matter exist. Wherefore, since the properties of matter are found in the soul, namely, to receive, to be in potency, and other things of this kind, Avicebron is of the opinion that there must be matter in the soul. But this argument is silly, and the position itself is impossible.

Now the weakness of this argument become’s apparent if we consider that to receive, to be a subject, and other things of this sort, are not found in the soul and in prime matter in the same specific way. For prime matter is actuated by means of change and motion, and since every change and motion may be reduced to local motion, as the primary and most universal type of motion, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 7, 260b 6], it follows that matter is present only in those things in which there is potency to place (ab ubi). Moreover, things of this kind, which are circumscribed by place alone, are corporeal. Hence, in accordance with the way in which the philosophers have spoken about matter, matter is present only in corporeal things; unless, of course, someone wishes to employ matter in an equivocal sense. The soul, however, does not receive something by means of motion and change, but, on the contrary, by being separated from motion and from movable things. Accordingly, it is said in the Physics [VII, 3, 247b 10] that the soul becomes cognitive and possesses prudence when at rest. Wherefore the Philosopher also states, in the De anima [III, 4, 429a 30] that intellection is referred to as a passion, but is a passion of a different nature from that present in corporeal things. Therefore, if anyone wishes to conclude that the soul is composed of matter because it is receptive or is acted upon, he is clearly deceived by an equivocation. Consequently it is evident that the aforesaid argument is foolish.

Moreover, it can be shown in several ways that this position is impossible. First, for this reason, that when a form accrues to matter, it constitutes a species. Therefore, if the soul is composed of matter and form, a certain species will be established in the natural order, as a result of the union itself of the form and matter of the soul. However, a thing which possesses a specific nature in its own right, is not united to some other thing in order to constitute a species, unless each is corrupted in some manner: just as, for example, the elements are united in order to constitute the species of the mixed bodies. The soul, therefore, is not united to the body in order to constitute the human species, but the complete human species is comprised of the soul alone. This is clearly false, for if the body does not belong to the human species, it is joined to the soul in an accidental way.

Moreover, it cannot be said, according to this, that the hand is not composed of matter and form because it does not have a complete species of its own, but is a part of a species; for it is evident that the matter of the hand is not perfected separately by its own form, but that there is one form which perfects at the same time the matter of the whole body and that of all its parts. This could not be said of the soul if it were composed of matter and form. For in that case the matter of the soul would first have to be perfected in the order of nature by its own form, and the body in turn perfected by the soul; unless, perhaps, someone might care to say that the soul’s matter is some part of corporeal matter, which is utterly absurd.

The position of Avicebron is also shown to be impossible for this reason, that in everything composed of matter and form, matter occupies the position of that which receives existence, and not that by which something exists; for this is peculiar to the form alone. Therefore, if the soul is composed of matter and form, it is impossible for the entire soul to be the formal principle which gives to the body its act of existing. The whole soul, therefore, will not be the form of the body, but only a part of the soul will be so. The soul, however, is certainly that entity which is the form of the body. Therefore the soul is not that thing which was considered to be a composite of matter and form, but the form of it alone.

This position [of Avicebron] is seen to be impossible also for another reason. For if the soul is composed of matter and form, and the body as well, each of them will have its unity in virtue of itself, and then it will be necessary to admit that some third entity exists which unites the soul to the body. Indeed, some of the adherents of the aforesaid position do maintain this. For they say that a soul is united to its body by the instrumentality of light; the vegetal soul by the mediating light of the sidereal heaven, the sentient soul by the mediating light of the crystalline heaven, and the rational soul by the mediating light of the empyrean heaven. These explanations are entirely fictitious, because the soul must be united to the body without any intermediary, just as act is to potency, as is shown in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, `1045b 16].

It becomes evident, then, that the soul cannot be composed of matter and form. However, act and potency are not excluded from the soul, for potency and act are found not only in immovable things, but in movable things as well; and they are more common here, as the Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics [VIII, 5, 1044b 26], because matter itself may not exist in immovable things. Now the manner in which act and potency are found in the soul must be discovered by proceeding from material things to immaterial ones. For we observe three things in substances composed of matter and form: namely, matter, form, and the act of existing itself, the principle of which is the form; for matter receives an act of existing because it receives a form. Therefore a thing’s act of existing is the natural effect of the form itself of that thing. However, the form is not identical with its own act of existing, because the form is the principle of that act of existing. And although matter receives its act of existing only through some form, yet a form as such does not stand in need of matter in order to exist, because the act of existing is the natural effect of the form itself. However, a form requires matter in order to exist when it is a form of that specific type which does not subsist of itself. Consequently a form having its act of existing in itself is not prevented in any way from existing apart from matter and the act of existing is found in a form of this kind. For the very essence of a form is related to its act of existing as a potency is to its proper act.

It is in this way, then, that both potency and act are found in forms which subsist of themselves, inasmuch as the act of existing itself is the act of a subsisting form which is not its own act of existing. Moreover, if there is a thing which is its own act of existing, and this is proper to God alone, it does not contain potency and act, but is pure act. It is for this reason that Boethius says, in his De hebdomadibus, that in the beings which are beneath God in perfection, the act of existing (esse) and quiddity (quod est) are really distinct; or as some say, that which is (quod est) and that by which it is (quo est) differ from each other.” For the act of existing itself of a thing is that by which a thing exists; just as running is that by which someone runs. Consequently, since the soul is a certain form which subsists of itself, it can be composed of act and potency, that is, of an act of existing and an essence, but not of form and matter.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Boethius is speaking here of that form which is absolutely simple, namely, of the divine essence itself, which cannot be a subject in any way whatever because it contains no potency, but is pure act. However, other simple forms such as the angels and the human soul, even though they are subsisting beings, can, nevertheless, be subjects inasmuch as they possess some degree of potentiality which enables them to receive new perfection.

2. The act of existing itself is the highest act in which all things are capable of participating, but the act of existing itself does not participate in anything. Therefore, if there is a being which is itself a subsisting act of existing (ipsum esse subsistens), just as we speak of God, we say that it does not participate in anything. However, this is not true of other subsisting forms which necessarily participate in the act of existing itself, and which are related to it as potency is to act; and thus, since these forms are in potentiality in some measure, they can participate in something else.

3. Not only is a form related to its act of existing as potency is to act, but, indeed, nothing prevents one from being related to another as potency is to act; just as the transparent medium is related to light, and light in turn to color. Hence, if transparency were a separate form subsisting in virtue of its own nature, it would be receptive not only of an act of existing, but of light as well. Similarly, nothing prevents subsisting forms like the angels and the

soul from receiving not only the act of existing itself, but other perfections as well. However, the more perfect subsisting forms of this kind are, the less do they participate in their perfection, seeing that they have more of that perfection in the very principles of their nature.

4. Although human souls are forms in their entirety, nevertheless they are forms individuated in bodies, and are multiplied numerically because of the multiplication of bodies. Consequently, nothing prevents certain accidents which do not belong to the entire species from belonging to these forms inasmuch as they are individuated.

5. The sort of passion which is in the soul, and which is attributed to the possible intellect, does not belong to the same genus as the passions attributed to matter; for in these two cases matter is spoken of equivocally, as is evident from what the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 430a 3] because the passion of the possible intellect consists in a reception inasmuch as it receives something immaterially. In like manner, the action of the agent intellect is not of the same mode as the action of natural forms, for the action of the agent intellect consists in abstracting forms from matter, whereas the action of natural agents consists in impressing forms on matter. Consequently it does not follow, from the kind of action and passion present in the soul, that the soul is composed of matter and form.

6. To receive, to be a subject, and other things of this kind, are proper to the soul in a different way from the way they are to prime matter. Therefore it does not follow that the properties of matter are found in the soul.

7. Although the fire of hell, by which the soul is acted upon, is material and corporeal, nevertheless the soul is not acted upon by it in a material way, as material bodies themselves are, but undergoes a spiritual affliction by means of it, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the judgment of divine justice.

8. The action of a generator terminates in something composed of matter and form, because a natural generator only produces something from matter; creative activity, however, does not depend upon matter. Consequently, creative activity does not necessarily have to terminate in a composite of matter and form.

9. Those things which are subsisting forms, in that each is a unity and a being, do not require a formal cause, because they themselves are forms. However, they do require an external cause which gives them existence.

10. An agent, by its motion, brings something from potentiality to act. However, an agent that acts without any motion does not bring something from potentiality to actuality, but gives actual existence to what by nature is potentially existing. Creating is action of this kind.

11. The hyleic intellect, that is, the material intellect, is the name which some men give to the possible intellect, not because it is a material form, but because it bears some likeness to matter inasmuch as it is in potency to intelligible forms, as matter is to sensible forms.

12. Although the soul is neither pure act nor pure potency, yet it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form, as was shown above (in the Answer to this Art.).

13. The soul is not individuated by any matter of which it is composed, but by reason of its relationship to the matter in which it exists. How this is possible was shown in the preceding questions.

14. The sensitive soul is not acted upon by sensible things, but the soul conjointly with the body; for sensing, which is to undergo something, does not belong to the soul alone, but to the animated organ.

15. The soul does not belong properly to a genus as a species thereof, but as a part of the human species. Therefore it does not follow that it is composed of matter and form.

16. Intelligibility does not belong to many beings, as though it were one specific form divided among many because of a division of matter, for it is a spiritual and immaterial form; rather is it diversified because of a diversity of forms, whether the forms be specifically different, like the soul of a man and an angel, or numerically different only, like the souls of different men.

17. The soul and an angel are called changeable spirits inasmuch as they can be changed by choice; which change, indeed, is from one operation to another. Matter is not required for this kind of change, but only for natural changes, which are changes from one form to another, or from one place to another.

ARTICLE 7

WHETHER THE ANGEL AND THE SOUL ARE OF DIFFERENT SPECIES

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 75, A. 7; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 94; SENT., II, DIST. 3, Q. 1, A. 6.]

In the seventh article we examine this question: Whether the angel and the soul are of different species.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that they are not. For things which possess the same proper and natural operation have the same species, because the nature of a thing is known by its operations. Now the same proper and natural operation of intellection belongs to the soul and to the angel. Consequently the soul and the ancel are of the same species.

2. But it will be said that the soul's act of understanding is discursive whereas the angel's is not. Thus the [proper] operation of the soul and that of the angel are not specifically the same. On the other hand, operations which are specifically diverse are not operations of the same power. But by one and the same power, that is, the possible intellect, we understand certain things without discourse, namely, first principles, and understand certain other things discursively, namely, conclusions. Hence understanding discursively and understanding without discourse do not diversify species.

3. Further, to understand discursively and to do so without discourse, are seen to differ as being-in-motion differs from being-at-rest, for discourse is a certain movement of the intellect from one thing to another. But to be in motion and to be at rest do not differ specifically, because a motion belongs to that genus wherein the termination of the motion is found, as the

Commentator says in the Physics [III, 1]. Hence the Philosopher also says, in the same work [III, 1, 201a 8], that “there are as many species of motion as there are species of being,” that is, terminations of motion. Consequently, to understand discursively and to do so without discourse do not differ specifically from each other.

4. Further, as the angels understand things in the Word, so also do the souls of the blessed. But the knowledge contained in the Word is not discursive. Hence Augustine says, in the De Trinitate,” that there will be no discursive knowledge in heaven. Therefore the soul does not differ from an angel because the former understands discursively, the latter without discourse.

5. Further, all angels are not specifically the same as many maintain. But every angel understands without discourse. Therefore to understand discursively and to do so without discourse do not cause specific diversity in the case of intellectual substances.

6. But it must be said too that some angels understand more perfectly than others. On the other hand, more and less do not diversify species. But to understand more perfectly and to do so less perfectly, differ only in terms of more and less. Therefore angels do not differ in species because some understand more perfectly, others less perfectly.

7. Further, all human souls are of the same species. However, all do not understand equally well. Therefore intellectual substances do not differ specifically from one another because the act of understanding of one is more perfect than that of another.

8. Further, the human soul is said to understand discursively, in view of the fact that it understands a cause through its effect, and vice versa. But this also occurs in angels, for it is said in the book De causis [VIII], that an intelligence is cognizant of the being that is above it, because it is caused by that being. It also knows the being beneath it because it is the cause of this being. Hence the angel does not differ specifically from the soul because the latter understands discursively and the former without discourse.

9. Further, things perfected by the same perfections evidently belong to the same species, for a particular actuality perfects a particular potency. But the angel and the soul are perfected by the same perfections, namely, grace, glory, and charity. Therefore they are specifically the same.

10. Further, things having the same end are seen to be specifically the same, for a thing is directed to its end by its form, which is the principle of its species. But the end of the angel and that of the soul is the same, namely, eternal beatitude, as is clear from the statement that the children of the resurrection shall be as the angels in heaven (Matt. 22:30). Gregory also says that souls are elevated to the ranks of the angels [In Evang., II, 34]. Therefore the angel and the soul are specifically the same.

11. Further, if the angel and the soul differ specifically, the angel must be superior to the soul in the order of nature, and so will be midway between the soul and God. But there is nothing midway between our soul and God, as Augustine says [De Trin., XV, 1]. Consequently the angel and the soul are not specifically diverse.

12. Further, impressions of the same image in different individuals are not thereby made specifically diverse, for the image of Hercules in gold and that in silver are specifically the same. Now the image of God is present in the soul and in the angel as well. Therefore the angel and the soul do not differ specifically.

13. Further, things having the same definition are specifically the same. But the definition of the angel is the same as that of the soul, for Damascene says [De fide orth., II, 3] that an angel is “an incorporeal substance always moved by free choice, ministering to God by grace, not by nature, and remaining unchanged.” Now this is proper to every human soul. Consequently the soul and the angel are specifically the same.

14. Further, things agreeing in an ultimate difference are specifically the same, because an ultimate difference determines the species. But the angel and the soul share a common ultimate difference, namely, the possession of intellectual being. This must be an ultimate difference, because there is nothing nobler than this in the nature of the soul or in that of the angel, for an ultimate difference is always most complete. Therefore the angel and the soul do not differ specifically.

15. Further, things not found in a species, cannot differ specifically. Now the soul is not found in a species, rather is it part of a species. Hence it cannot differ specifically from an angel.

16. Further, the definition coincides expressly with the species. Consequently things not definable apparently do not exist in a species. But the angel and the soul are not definable, because they are not composed of

matter and form, as has been shown above (Art. 2). For in every definition there is something like matter and something like form, as is evident from what the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics [VII, 6, 1031b4] where he himself points out that, if the species of things were devoid of matter, as Plato held, they would not be definable. Therefore the angel and the soul cannot properly be said to differ in species.

17. Further, every species is comprised of a genus and a [specific] difference. Now genus and difference have their foundation in different things. For instance, the genus of man, which is "animal," has its foundation in his sensory nature, and his difference, which is "rational," is rooted in his intellective nature. However, in the angel and the soul there are no diversities on which genus and difference can be based, because their essence is constituted of form alone. Furthermore, their act of existing can be neither a genus nor a difference, for the Philosopher proves in the Metaphysics [III, 3, 998b 20] that the act of existing is neither a genus nor a species. Consequently the angel and the soul have neither a genus nor a specific difference, and so cannot differ specifically.

18. Further things differing specifically, differ through contrary differences. But there is no contrariety in immaterial substances, for contrariety is the principle of corruption. Hence the angel and the soul do not differ specifically.

19. Further, the angel and the soul are seen to differ above all because the angel is not united to a body, whereas the soul is. But this cannot make the soul differ specifically from the angel, since the body is related to the soul as matter, and matter does not give species to form, but rather the reverse. Therefore the angel and the soul do not differ specifically in any way whatever.

On the contrary, things differing not specifically, but numerically, differ only because of matter. But the angel and the soul do not have matter, as is clear from the preceding question. Therefore, if the angel and the soul do not differ specifically, neither do they differ numerically; which is evidently false. Therefore it follows that they differ specifically.

I answer: Some say that the human soul and the angels are of the same species, and this seems to have been maintained first by Origen. Wishing to avoid the errors of the ancient heretics, who attributed the diversity of things to different principles by introducing a duality of good and evil, Origen held that the diversity of all things had proceeded from free choice. For he said that God made all rational creatures equally perfect in the beginning: certain of these adhering to God, acquired greater perfection in proportion to the measure of their adherence; others, falling away from God through an act of free choice, descended to positions of lesser importance in proportion to the extent of their fall. Accordingly some were incorporated into the celestial bodies, others were perverted to the point of demonic maliciousness, though all were equally perfect in the beginning. So far as Origen's position [Peri Archon, I, 7] is concerned, it can be seen that he regarded the good of singular creatures and neglected to consider the good of the whole. Now a wise artificer arranging the parts [of his work], takes into consideration not only the good of the individual parts, but the good of the whole even more. For this reason a builder does not make all parts of a house equally valuable, but gives them greater or lesser importance inasmuch as this is required for the good disposition of the house. Likewise, in an animal's body, not all parts have the transparency of the eye, because the animal would then be imperfect, but in an animal's parts there is diversity in order than the animal may be perfect. In the same way, God, in His wisdom, did not make all things in the universe of equal worth, because if He had, the universe, lacking many grades of being, would be imperfect. Consequently to inquire why God, by His activity, made one creature better than another, is the same as asking why an artificer introduced a diversity of parts into his work.

Hence this view of Origen having been shown to be false, there are some who adopt a similar position, claiming that all intellectual substances are specifically the same for the reasons mentioned in the objections. However, this position is seen to be impossible. For if angels and the soul are not composed of matter and form, but are forms alone, as was explained in the preceding question, every difference whereby angels are distinguished from one another, or from the soul as well, must be a formal one; unless perhaps it might be maintained that angels, like souls, were also united to bodies in order that there might be a material difference in them resulting from this relationship with bodies, as we explained above is true of souls. But this view is not commonly held, and even if it were it would not lend any weight to this position, because it is evident that the bodies [which angels would have] would, differ specifically from human bodies to which souls are united. Moreover, there must be different specific perfections for bodies that are specifically diverse. Therefore, this position that angels are forms of bodies having been shown to be false, since they are not composed of matter and form, it follows that angels differ from one another, or from the soul, only by reason of a formal difference. But a formal difference diversifies species, for the form gives a thing its mode of existing. Hence it follows that angels not only differ specifically from the soul, but also from each other.

However, even if someone claims that angels and souls are composed of matter and form, this position [that souls and angels are specifically the same] cannot be upheld. For if there were one matter common to angels and souls alike (just as there is one matter for inferior bodies, diversified only by form), the division of that one common matter would have to be the principle whereby angels are made distinct from one another, and from the soul. Now since it is of the very nature of matter in itself to be void of all form, the division of matter could not be understood to exist before it received a form (which form is given a multiple existence as a result of the division of matter), unless matter itself were divided by quantitative dimensions. Hence the Philosopher says in the Physics [I, 2, 185b3] that substance remains indivisible when quantity is removed. However, things which are composed of matter determined by dimensions are themselves bodies, not merely things united to a body. According to this argument, therefore, the angel and the soul are bodies. Now no one of sound mind maintained this, particularly because it has been proved that intellection cannot be the act of a body. Certainly, if the matter of the angels and that of the soul is not one and common (just as it is maintained that there is not one common matter for celestial and earthly bodies), but belongs to diverse orders, this can only be because it is ordered to different forms and thus material diversity of this sort causes specific diversity.

For this reason it is clearly impossible for the angels and the soul to be specifically the same. However, the way they differ remains to be investigated. We must acquire our knowledge of intellectual substances by considering material substances. Now in material substances different grades of natural perfection constitute different species. Indeed this becomes quite obvious if we reflect upon the genera of material substances. For it is evident that mixed bodies surpass the elements in the order of perfection; plants surpass minerals; animals surpass plants; and in singular genera a diversity of species is found in accordance with the order of natural perfection. For among the elements, earth is lowest, and fire most noble. Likewise in the case of minerals [i.e., mixed bodies], nature is found to ascend by degrees through diverse species up to the species of gold. In plants also, nature ascends progressively up to the species of perfect trees; and in animals up to the species of man. Moreover, certain animals are more like plants, that is the immobile ones which have touch only. Similarly, certain plants are more like inanimate bodies, as is clear from what the Philosopher says in the book De plantis [I, 1, 815b 35].

For this reason the Philosopher, in the Metaphysics [VIII, 3, 1043b 33] says that the species of natural things are like the species of numbers, wherein the addition or subtraction of a unit changes the species. Consequently in immaterial substances also a different grade of natural perfection causes difference in species. But a grade of perfection is in some respect different in the case of immaterial substances from what it is in the case of material substances. For wherever diversity of grades exists, the grades must be considered through their order to some one principle. Therefore in material substances diverse grades acre observed to diversify species in relation to the first principle, matter. For this reason first species [i.e., those nearest to matter] are most imperfect, whereas species farther removed [from matter] are more perfect, and related to the first by the addition [of higher perfections]. For instance, mixed bodies have a more perfect species than the elements have, because they possess in themselves the perfections of the elements and higher perfections as well. Hence the relation of plants to mineral bodies, and that of animals to plants, is similar.

In the case of immaterial substances the order of diverse grades of species is certainly not considered in relationship to matter, which they do not have, but in relationship to the First Agent [i.e., God], who must be most perfect. Consequently in the case of immaterial substances the first species [i.e., the one nearest to God] is more perfect than the second, inasmuch as the former bears greater likeness to the First Agent. The second species has less perfection than the first, and so on successively down to the last of them. Now the entire perfection of the First Agent consists in this, that He has in one simple nature all His goodness and perfection. Therefore the nearer an immaterial substance is to the First

Agent, the more does it have its perfection and goodness in one simple nature, and the less does it require inhering forms for its perfection. This continues progressively down to the human soul which occupies the lowest place [among immaterial substances], just as prime matter holds the lowest place in the genus of sensible things. Hence the soul does not have intelligible forms in its very nature, but is in potency to them, just as matter is to sensible forms. Therefore in order to perform its proper operation, the soul requires to be actuated by intelligible forms by acquiring them from external realities through its sensory powers. And since the operation of a sense is performed through a bodily organ, it is proper to the soul, according to the very condition of its nature, to be united to the body, and to be part of the human species, not having a complete species in itself.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. The act of understanding of the angel and that of the soul are not specifically the same. For it is evident that if forms, which are principles of operation, differ in species, their operations must differ in species as well. For instance, the act of heating and that of cooling differ from each other because heat and cold differ. Now the intelligible species, through which the soul understands, are abstracted from phantasms, and thus are not of the same nature as the intelligible species through which angels understand, because these are innate in the angels. Accordingly it is said in the book De causis [X] that every intelligence is filled with forms. Therefore the act of understanding of a man and that of an angel are not specifically the same. In view of this difference it follows that the angel understands without any discourse, whereas the human soul understands discursively. It does this of necessity in order to know the powers of causes from their sensible effects, and to understand the essences of things, not perceived by the senses, from their sensible accidents.

2. Therefore the act of understanding discursively and that of understanding without discourse do not differ specifically from each other.

3. A motion is reduced to the genus and species of that particular order in which the motion is terminated, inasmuch as it is the same form that is in potency only before the motion begins, midway between act and potency during the motion itself, in complete act at the termination of the motion.

However, an angel's act of understanding, which takes place without any discourse, is not specifically the same as that of the soul so far as the form is concerned. Consequently it is not necessary that these two ways of understanding be specifically one and the same.

4. A thing's species is declared to be such in virtue of the operation that belongs to it by its own nature, and not in virtue of one that belongs to it because it participates in a higher nature. The species of iron, for instance, is not judged to be such because it is combustible, which belongs to it inasmuch as it is set on fire, for then the species of iron and that of wood, which also may be set on fire, would be considered to be the same. Moreover, I say that the act of intellection in the Word is an operation surpassing the nature of the soul and that of an angel, yet proper to each according as they participate in a superior nature, namely, the divine nature, through the light of glory. Consequently it cannot be concluded that an angel and the soul are specifically the same.

5. Intelligible species are not of the same nature in different angels; for the more superior an intellectual substance is, and the nearer to God (whom all understand through one thing, His essence), the more elevated are the intelligible forms within that substance, and thus more capable of knowing many things. Wherefore it is said in the book De causis [ibid.] that superior intelligences understand through more universal forms. Dionysius also says [De cael. hier., XII, 2] that superior angels have greater universal knowledge. Therefore the act of understanding of different angels is not specifically the same, although each takes place without discourse, because they understand through innate species and not through species received in some other way.

6. More and less are found in things in two ways. First, according as matter participates in different ways in the same form, as wood participates in whiteness. In this way more and less do not cause things to differ in species. Secondly, according as more and less are found in the different grades of perfection of forms. This causes difference in species. For colors differ in species by being related more or less closely to light. This is the way in which more and less are found in different angels.

7. Although all souls do not understand equally well, nevertheless all understand through species of the same nature, namely, those derived from phantasms. Hence the fact that men do not understand equally well is a

result of the difference in their sensory powers through which species are abstracted. This results in turn from the different disposition of their bodies. Consequently it is evident, according to this, that more and less do not cause difference in species, since they are a consequence of material diversity.

8. To be cognizant of one thing through another occurs in two ways. First, when something known is understood through the knowledge of some other thing in such a way that there is a distinct knowledge of each, as a man knows conclusions from principles by considering both [the principles and the conclusions] separately. Secondly, when something known is understood through the species whereby it is understood, as when we see a stone through the species of the stone, which [species] exists in the eye. Now it is in this way that angels know a cause through an effect and an effect through a cause, inasmuch as the essence itself of the angel bears some likeness to its cause, while the angel in turn causes its effect to be like itself.

9. The perfections of grace befit the soul and the angel by a participation in the divine nature. Hence it is said: “By whom He hath given us most great and precious promises: that by these you may be made partakers of the divine nature: flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is the world” (II Pet. 1:4). Therefore it cannot be concluded that the angel and the soul are specifically the same because they have these perfections in common.

10. things having one and the same proximate and natural -end are one and the same specifically. However, eternal beatitude is an ultimate and supernatural end. Therefore the conclusion stated in the objection does not follow.

11. Augustine understands that there is nothing midway between our mind and God so far as the grades of dignity and of nature are concerned, not because one nature is not nobler than another, but because our mind is immediately justified by God and beatified in Him; just as if it might be said, for example, that a simple soldier is immediately under the king, not because there are no others superior to him under the king, but because no one has dominion over him except the king.

12. Neither the soul nor an angel is a perfect image of God, but the Son alone. Consequently it is not necessary that the angel and the soul possess

the same species.

13. The aforesaid definition is not applicable to the soul in the same way as it is to an angel, for an angel is an incorporeal substance, because it is not a body nor is it united to a body. This cannot be said of the soul.

14. To maintain that the soul and the angel are specifically the same makes them, for this reason, equal in power. But this does not necessarily follow, for the ultimate difference should be nobler, not only with respect to nobility of nature, but also with respect to the way in which the nature is determined; because the ultimate difference is like an act in relation to all preceding differences. Consequently the angel is nobler than the soul not because it is intellectual, but because it is intellectual in some particular way. This is evident in sensible things, otherwise all brute animals would be of the same species.

15. The soul is a part of a species, and is also a principle conferring species. The species of the soul is investigated in this way.

16. Although a species alone may be properly defined, yet it is not necessary that every species be definable. For the species of immaterial things are known neither by definition nor by demonstration, as something is known in the speculative sciences, but some of them are known by a simple intuition. Consequently an angel cannot properly be defined, for we do not know what its essence is; but it can be known by certain negations or distinguishing characteristics. Again, the soul is defined inasmuch as it is the form of the body.

17. Genus and difference can be regarded in two ways. First, from an existential point of view, so far as they are considered by metaphysics and by natural philosophy. Here it is manifest that genus and difference are based on different natures. Thus nothing prevents us from saying that there is no genus and difference in spiritual substances, but that they are forms in their entirety, and simple species. Genus and difference can also be regarded from the logical point of view. In this case it is not necessary that genus and difference be founded on different natures, but on one and the same nature in which something proper and something common may be distinguished. In this way nothing prevents us from distinguishing genus and difference in spiritual substances.

18. Speaking of genus and difference from the point of view of the real order, differences must be contraries. For matter, on which the nature of

genus is based, is receptive of contrary forms. However, from the point of view of logic, any opposition whatever in differences is sufficient, as is clear in the differences between numbers in which there is no contrariety. It is similar in the case of spiritual substances.

19. Although matter is not the basis of species, nevertheless the nature of a form is considered according to the relationship of matter to form.

ARTICLE 8

WHETHER THE RATIONAL SOUL SHOULD BE UNITED TO A BODY SUCH AS MAN POSSESSES

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.76, A.5; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 90; SENT., II, DIST. 1, Q.2, A.5; DE MALO, Q.5, A.5.]

In the eighth article we examine this question: Whether the rational soul should be united to a body such as man possesses.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that it should not. For the rational soul is the subtlest of all forms united to a body. Now earth is the lowest of all [elemental] bodies. Therefore the soul is not fittingly united to an earthly body.

2. But in view of the fact that an earthly body is reduced to a harmonious combination [ofthe elements], it must be said that such a body is similar to a celestial body, which is without contraries altogether, and thus is ennobled in order that a rational soul may be fittingly united to it. On the other hand, if the nobility of the human body consists in its likeness to a celestial body, it follows that a celestial body is nobler. But the rational soul is nobler than all other forms, because it transcends all bodies by its intellectual capacity. Therefore the rational soul should be united rather to a celestial body.

3. But it must be said that a celestial body is perfected by a nobler perfection than the rational soul. On the other hand, if the perfection of a celestial body is nobler than that of a rational soul, it must be intelligent, because any intelligent being is nobler than any non-intelligent being whatever. Therefore, if a celestial body is perfected by an intellectual

substance, this substance will be either the mover only of such a body, or will be its form. If it is only a mover, it follows that the human body is perfected in a nobler way than a celestial body is, for a form gives species to the thing of which it is the form, whereas a mover does not. Again, nothing prevents certain things ignoble by nature from being instruments of the noblest agent. However, if an intellectual substance is the form of a celestial body, such a substance has either an intellect alone, or senses and other powers together with an intellect. If it has senses and other powers, it follows that a celestial body is an organic body, because powers of this sort must be the acts of organs, which are required for the operations of such powers. This is opposed to the simplicity, uniformity, and unity of a celestial body. If, indeed, such a substance has an intellect alone and receives nothing from sense, then it does not need to be united to a body, because the operation of an intellect is not performed through a bodily organ. Therefore, since the body is united to the soul not for the sake of the body but for that of the soul (because any matter exists for the sake of form, and not vice versa), it follows that an intellectual substance is not united as a form to a celestial body.

4. Further, every created intellectual substance is capable of sinning by reason of its nature, because it can turn away from the Highest Good, which is God. Therefore, if intellectual substances were united [substantially] as forms to celestial bodies, it would follow that they could commit sin. But the punishment for sin is death, that is, the separation of the soul from the body, and the punishment of the sinners in hell. Consequently it could happen that celestial bodies would corrupt by having their souls separated from them, and that these souls would be cast into hell.

5. Further, every intellectual substance is capable of attaining beatitude. Therefore, if celestial bodies are animated by intellectual souls, such souls are capable of beatitude; and thus not only angels and men, but also certain intermediate natures enjoy eternal beatitude. However, when the holy doctors consider this matter, they say that the society of the blessed is composed of men and angels.

6. Further, the body of Adam was proportioned to a rational soul. But our body is unlike his, for his body was immortal and unchangeable before he sinned. Our bodies do not have these characteristics. Therefore bodies such as we possess are not proportioned to a rational soul.

7. Further, the best disposed instruments, and those which cooperate in operation, belong to the noblest mover. Now the rational soul is nobler than all other inferior movers.8 Hence the rational soul should have a body that cooperates with it to the fullest extent in carrying out its operations. However, a body such as ours is not of this sort, because the flesh lusts against the spirit (Gal- 5:17), and the soul is drawn here and there as a result of the struggle between concupiscences. Consequently the rational soul should not be united to a body such as we possess.

8. Further, an abundance of spirits falls to the lot of a rational soul in a perfectible body. Hence in contrast to other animals, the heart of man is the hottest so far as the power of generating spirits is concerned. The human body's erectness, resulting from the power of heat and spirits, is a sign of this. Therefore it would be most fitting for the rational soul to be united entirely to a spiritual body.

9. Further, the soul is an incorruptible substance. However our bodies are corruptible. Consequently rational souls are not fittingly united to bodies such as we possess.

10. Further, the rational soul is united to the body in order to constitute the human species. Now the human species would be better preserved if the body to which the rational soul is united, were incorruptible, because then it would not be necessary for the human species to be preserved by generation, for it would be preserved numerically in the same individuals. Hence the human soul should be united to an incorruptible body.

11. Further, the human body, being the noblest of inferior bodies, should resemble most a celestial body, which is the noblest of bodies. However, a celestial body lacks contrariety altogether. Therefore the human body ought to have the least contrariety. But our bodies do not have the least contrariety, because other bodies, such as stones and trees, are more enduring, and contrariety is the principle of disintegration. Consequently the rational soul should not be united to bodies such as we have.

12. Further, the soul is a simple form. Now a simple matter befits a simple form. Hence the rational soul should be united to some simple body such as fire or gold or something of this kind.

13. Further, the human soul seems to have something in common with principles. Hence the ancient philosophers maintained that the soul is composed of principles, as is clear in the De anima [I, 2, 404b 7]. Now the

principles of bodies are the elements. Therefore, if the soul is not an element, nor composed of elements, it should at least be united to some elementary body such as fire or gold, or something of this sort.

14. Further, bodies composed of similar parts come closer to being simple than bodies composed of dissimilar parts. Consequently the soul should be united to a body composed of similar parts rather than to one composed of dissimilar parts, because the soul is a form in its entirety (simplex).

15. Further, the soul is united both as a form and as a mover to the body. Therefore the rational soul, which is the noblest of forms, should be united to a body best adapted for movement. But we see that the contrary of this is true, for the bodies of birds and those of many other animals as well, are better adapted for movement than the human body is.

16. Further, Plato says” that forms are conferred by the giver of forms according to the merits of matter, which are called material dispositions. But apparently the human body does not have a disposition in keeping with the nobility of its form, for the body is “gross” and corruptible. Therefore the soul should not be united to such a body.

17. Further, the intelligible forms existing in the human soul, in contrast to those in superior intellectual substances, are in the highest degree representative of particulars. But such forms befit the operation of a celestial body, which is the cause of the generation and corruption of these particulars. Consequently the human soul should be united to a celestial body.

18. Further, nothing is moved naturally so long as it occupies its [proper place], but only when it is outside its proper place. However, a heaven is moved while it exists in its [proper] place. Therefore it is not moved naturally. Consequently it is moved with respect to place by a soul, and thus has a soul united to it.

19. Further, “to proclaim” is an act of an intellectual substance. But “the heavens proclaim the glory of God,” as is said in the Psalms (Ps. 18:5). Hence the heavens are intelligent, and therefore possess an intellective soul.

20. Further, the soul is the most perfect of forms. Therefore it should be united to a most perfect body. However, the human body seems to be most imperfect, for it neither has arms to defend itself and to fight, nor covering nor anything of this sort which nature has bestowed on the bodies of other

animals. Therefore a soul of this kind should not be united to a body such as ours.

On the contrary, it is said: “God created man of the earth and made him after His image” (Eccles. 17:1). But the works of God are fitting works, for it is said: “God saw what He had made and that His works were good” (Gen. 1:4). Therefore the rational soul, in which the image of God exists, is fittingly united to an earthly body.

I answer: Since matter exists for the sake of form and not vice versa, we must discover, on the side of the soul, the reason why the body should be united to it. Hence it is said, in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 10] that the soul is not only the form and mover of the body but also its end. Moreover, it is evident, from the preceding Disputed Questions [De spiritualibus creaturis, 3] that it is natural for the human soul to be united to the body. For, although the soul is lowest in the order of intellectual substances (as primary matter is lowest in the order of sensible things), it does not have intelligible species naturally impressed on it, as superior intellectual substances have, whereby it can perform its proper operation of intellection; but is in potency to them because it is like “ a wax tablet on which nothing is written, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 32]. For this reason it must receive its intelligible species from external things through its sensory powers, which cannot perform their proper operations without bodily organs. Consequently it is necessary for the human soul to be united to a body.

Therefore, if the human soul is capable of being united to a body, because it needs to receive intelligible species from things through the intermediary of the senses, then the body, to which the rational soul is united, must be one which can most adequately present to the intellect those sensible species from which are derived the intelligible species existing in the intellect. Hence the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for sensory operation. But although there are several sensory powers, still there is one which is the basis of the others, namely, touch, in which every sensible nature is principally rooted. For this reason it is also said in the De anima [II, 2, 413b8] that an animal derives its name from this sense. This is the reason why, when this sense is unmoved, as occurs during sleep, all other senses are unmoved. Again, not only are all the other senses rendered inactive by an excess of their proper sensible [objects] as sight, for instance, is made inoperative by very bright objects, and hearing by too intense sounds, but so also is the sense of touch rendered incapable of performing its proper operation (solvuntur) by an excess of its sensible object, for example, excessive warmth or cold. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for a sentient nature, it must have the most competent organ of touch. And so it is said in the De anima [II, 9, 421a 20] that among all animals we have this sense to a greater degree, and also that one man is more adept than another in intellectual operations as a result of this sense. For we see that those who have tender flesh (those who are of good touch) are well-endowed mentally.

Now since the organ of any sense must not possess actually any of the contraries of which a sense is perceptive, but must be in potency to them in order that it may be able to receive them (because the recipient must be deprived of the thing received), the case must be otherwise for the organ of touch than it is for the organs of the other senses. For the organ of sight, that is, the pupil of the eye, is deprived completely of white and of black, and of every kind of color whatever. It is similar in the case of hearing and smell. But this cannot occur in the case of the sense of touch, for touch is capable of experiencing those qualities which the animal body must be composed of, namely, hot and cold, wet and dry. For this reason it is impossible for the organ of touch to be deprived completely of its sensible objects; rather must it be reduced to a mean, because in this way it is in potency to contraries. Therefore, since the body to which the rational soul is united must be best disposed for the sense of touch, it must be brought in the fullest measure to an intermediate state by the harmonious combination [of its constituent elements and their qualities].

In this way it is evident that the total operation of an inferior nature reaches its highest peak in man as a most perfect being. For we see that the operation of nature ascends progressively from the simple elements, by blending them, until it reaches the most perfect mode of combination, which is the human body. Consequently this disposition of the human body, to which the rational soul is united, must exist in order that the body may possess the most tempered combination.

Moreover, if anyone also wishes to examine the particular dispositions of the human body, he will find them ordered to this end, that man may have the best sense. Therefore man, in proportion to his size, has a larger brain than any other animal, because a good disposition of the brain is necessary for the good condition of the internal sentient powers, namely, the imagination, the memory, and the cogitative power. And in order that his operation may be freer, he has his head placed on high. For man is the only erect animal, the others, indeed, are bent over. Furthermore, in order to have this erectness and to preserve it, there must exist in the heart an abundance of heat (by which many spirits are generated) so that the body may be maintained erect by this copious amount of heat and spirits. The fact that a man stoops over when he is old is a sign of this, because his natural heat is diminished.

In the light of what is stated above, the nature of a disposition of the human body must be determined in relation to the particular [dispositions] proper to man. However, we must take into consideration that in those things which are constituted of matter, some dispositions exist in the matter itself, and that on account of these a definite matter is chosen for a definite form. There are also some dispositions which proceed from the necessary character of matter, and not from the choice of the agent. For instance, when an artisan chooses hardness in iron to make a saw in order that it may be useful for sawing. But the fact that sharpness can be given to iron, and that it can rust, results from the necessary character of matter. For the artisan would rather choose a matter in which defects are not present, if it could be found. But because it cannot be found, the artisan does not neglect to work with the available matter of this kind simply because of the defects intrinsic to such matter. This also occurs in the human body, for, likewise, whatever is combined and disposed according to parts in order that such a body may be best fitted for sentient operations, is selected in this matter by the Maker of man. But that this body is corruptible, that it may become fatigued, and have defects of this kind, follows from the necessary character of this matter. For the body, as a mixture of contraries, must be subject to such defects. Nor can any objection be raised in view of the fact that God could make it otherwise, because we do not investigate what God could make in the establishment of nature, but what the nature of things undergoes as made, as Augustine says in the Super Genesim ad litteram [II, 1].

Moreover, it must be recognized that when God remedied these defects in man at his creation, He employed the help of original justice whereby the body was made subject completely to the soul and the soul to God, so that neither death nor passion nor any defect could affect man unless the soul were first separated from God. But when the soul turned away from God through sin, man was deprived of this gift, and is subject to the defects which are intrinsic to the nature of matter.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. The soul, being intellectual, is the subtlest of forms, but it is lowest in the order of intellectual forms, and must be united to a body in order to acquire intelligible species through the senses. This union is effected through a combination of the elements. The body, to which the soul is united, had to contain a greater quantity of the heavy elements, namely, of earth and water [than the light elements, fire and air]. For fire is the most active of all the elements. If the lower elements [earth and water] were not present in greater quantity, the aforesaid combination could not be brought about nor above all be reduced to a mean, because fire would consume the other elements. For this reason the Philosopher, in the De generatione et corruptione [II, 8, 334b 31], states that earth and water are more abundant [than air and fire] in mixed bodies.

2. The rational soul is united to this kind of body, not because it is like a celestial body, but because it is composed of a harmonious combination [of the elements]. But it follows that it bears some likeness to a celestial body, in this way, by being relatively independent of contraries. However, according to the opinion of Avicenna, the soul is united to such a body particularly because of its likeness to a celestial body. For he desired that inferior things be caused by the superior beings, in order that inferior bodies might be caused by the celestial bodies. And [he maintained] that these inferior bodies possess a form similar to that of a celestial body (which is considered to be animated), since such inferior bodies bear some likeness to celestial bodies because of their harmonious combination.

3. There is a diversity of opinion, both among philosophers and among the doctors of the faith, concerning the animation of the celestial bodies. For among the philosophers, Anaxagoras maintained that the agent intellect was altogether simple (immixtum) and existed apart from things, and that the celestial bodies were inanimate. Hence it is said that he was even

condemned to death because he claimed that the sun was a fiery stone, as Augustine relates in the work De civitate Dei [18:41]. Other philosophers, indeed, maintained that the celestial bodies are animated. Some of these stated that God is the soul of the heavens, which was idolatrous inasmuch as it attributed divine worship to the heavens and the heavenly bodies. Others, indeed, such as Plato and Aristotle, who, although they claimed that the celestial bodies are animated, nevertheless maintained that God is a supreme being, quite distinct from the soul of the heavens. Among the doctors of the faith as well, Origen [Peri Archon, II, 7]and his followers held that such bodies are inanimate, as Damascene did [De fide ortho., II, 6]. This is also the more common position among modern theologians. That Augustine remained in doubt [on the question, is shown in] the Super Genesim ad litteram [II, 18] and in the work Enchiridion [58]. Therefore, holding this for a fact, that the celestial bodies are moved by an intellect which is separate, we say (maintaining both positions on account of the arguments supporting both sides) that an intellectual substance, as a form, is the perfection of the celestial body, and that it has an intellective power alone but no sensory power, as can be seen from the words of Aristotle in the De anima [II, 1, 413a6] and in the Metaphysics [XI, 2, 1060a 10], even though Avicenna maintains that the soul of the heavens has an imagination in addition to its intellect. However, if it has an intellect only, it is still united as a form to the body, not for the sake of intellectual operation, but for the sake of executing its active power according to which it can attain a certain likeness to divine causality by moving the, heavens.

4. Although all created intellectual substances by nature are capable of committing sin, still many are preserved from so doing by divine choice and predestination through the aid of grace. One can maintain that the souls of the celestial bodies are among this number, particularly if the demons who sinned were of an inferior order, as Damascene held [De fide orth., II, 4].

5. If the celestial bodies are animated, their souls belong to the society of the angels. For Augustine says in the Enchiridion [58]: “I do not hold for certain that the sun and moon, and the other stars belong to the same society,” namely, that of the angels, “for although some are luminous bodies, still they do not appear to be sentient or intellective.”

6. The body of Adam was made proportionate to a human soul, as was explained, not only with respect to what nature requires, but also with

respect to what grace conferred. Now, we are deprived of this grace, but our nature remains the same.

7. The struggle which occurs in man as a result of contrary concupiscences, also results from the necessary character of matter. For, given the fact that man has sense, it is necessary that he sense delectable objects, and that he pursue his concupiscence for such objects, which is generally opposed to reason. But in the state of innocence, man was also given a remedy against this through grace so that the inferior powers were not moved in any way contrary to reason. However, man lost this through sin.

8. Although spirits are the vehicles of powers, they still cannot be organs of the senses. Therefore the human body could not be composed of spirits alone.

9. Corruptibility is a result of the defects which belong intrinsically to the human body from the necessary character of matter. This is particularly true after man sinned, because sin removes the assistance of grace.

10. Whatever is better must necessarily exist in those things which exist for an end, but not in those things which are a result of the necessary character of matter. For it would be better if an animal body were incorruptible, and if this were permitted by nature, an animal form would require such a matter.

11. Those things which are most akin in nature to the elements, and possess greater contrariety, such as stones and metals, are more enduring, because in them the elements are less subtly proportioned (harmonia), and thus they are not easily disintegrated. For the blending of the elements in those things which are subtly proportioned, is easily destroyed. Notwithstanding, the cause of longevity in animals is attributed to the fact that the moisture which they contain is not easily dried up or made inactive, nor is their heat easily extinguished, because heat and moisture are indispensable for life. Moreover, this is found in man to the extent that it is necessary for a combination [of the elements] reduced to a mean. Hence in men some combinations are more enduring, others less so, and as a result of this some men live longer than others.

12. The human body could not be a simple body, nor could it be a celestial body, because of the determinable character of a sense organ, particularly that of touch. Nor could it be a simple elementary body,

because actual contraries exist in an element, whereas the human body must be reduced to a mean.

13. The nature philosophers of antiquity thought that the soul, which knows all things, must actually be like all things. And therefore they maintained that the soul possessed the nature of an element, which they held was the principle from which all things are said to be constituted, so that in this way the soul knew all things inasmuch as it was like all things. However, Aristotle later showed that the soul knows all things inasmuch as it is like all things potentially, not actually. Consequently the body to which it is united must be composed not of extremes but of a mean, so that it may thus be in potency to contraries.

14. Although a soul is simple in essence, yet it has many powers. And the more numerous its powers, the more perfect will it be. For this reason it requires an organic body constituted of dissimilar parts.

15. The soul is not united to the body for the sake of local motion; rather is the local motion of man, like that of other animals, directed to conserving the body which is united to the soul. But the soul is united to the body for the sake of intellection, which is its proper and principal operation. For this reason the body, being united to the rational soul, must be best disposed to serve the soul with respect to the things necessary for intellection. It is also necessary that the body possess agility and other things of this kind, so far as such a disposition permits this.

16. Plato maintained that the form of things subsisted of themselves, and that the participation of forms by material things is for the sake of material things inasmuch as they are thereby perfected, and not for the sake of the forms themselves, which subsist of themselves. From this it follows that forms are given to material things so far as they merit them. Now according to the view of Aristotle, natural forms do not subsist of themselves. Hence a form is united to matter not for the sake of matter, but for the sake of form. Therefore a certain form is given to matter not because matter is so disposed, but because a certain form requires matter to be so disposed. For this reason it was said above that the human body is disposed in a manner befitting such a form as the human soul.

17. Although a celestial body is the cause of the particular things which are generated and corrupted, nevertheless it causes them as a common agent. For this reason determinate agents of a particular species are required

beneath it. Hence it is not necessary for the mover of a celestial body, whether it be a soul or a separate mover, to have particular forms, but only universal ones. Now Avicenna maintained that the soul of a celestial body had to have an imagination through which it could apprehend particulars. For the soul of a heaven, being the cause of its motion, must know the here and the now, and therefore must have some sensory power, because it is the cause of the celestial motion whereby a heaven revolves in this or that [particular] place. But this is not necessary. First, indeed, because celestial motion is always uniform and is not hindered, and therefore a universal conception is sufficient to cause such movement. For a knowledge of the particular is required in the case of animal movements on account of the irregularity of such movement, and because obstacles can hinder such movement. Secondly, because superior intellectual substances can apprehend particulars without a sensory power, as was shown elsewhere.

18. The movement of a heaven is natural on account of a passive principle or of movement received, because such movement belongs naturally to such a body. But the active principle of this movement is a certain intellectual substance. Now the statement that no body is moved naturally when it is in its proper place, is understood of a body moved by rectilinear movement, and this body changes place with respect to the whole of itself not only from the point of view of reason, but also from that of the subject itself. But a body which is moved circularly does not change place with respect to the whole of itself [from the point of view of the subject] but only from that of reason. Hence it never is outside its [proper] place.

19. This argument is foolish despite the fact that Rabbi Moses proposes it. Because, if “to proclaim” is taken in its proper sense, when it is said that “the heavens proclaim the glory of God,” the heavens would require not only an intellect but also a ton(rue. Therefore the heavens are said to proclaim the glory of God, if taken in a literal sense, inasmuch as through them the glory of God is made manifest to men. In this way, also, insensible creatures are said to praise God.

20. Other animals have a natural estimative power directed to definite activities, and therefore nature could provide them sufficiently with certain definite aids. But not so in the case of man who is capable of an unlimited number of conceptions because of his reason. And therefore, in place of all

the aids which other animals possess by nature, man has an intellect, which is a mirror of all forms, and hands, which are the organs of organs, whereby he can provide for himself whatever he requires.

ARTICLE 9

WHETHER THE SOUL IS UNITED TO CORPOREAL MATTER THROUGH A MEDIUM

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 76, A. 6; A. 7; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 71; SENT., II, DIST. 1, Q.2, A.4, AD 3; QUODL., XII, Q.6, A.9; DE SPIR. CREAT., A.3; COMM. IN METAPH., VIII, LECT 5.]

In the ninth article we examine this question: Whether the soul is united to corporeal matter through a medium.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul is united to the body in this way, because it is stated in the work De spiritu et anima, [X] that the soul has powers (vires) by which it is united to the body. But the powers of the soul are distinct from the soul’s essence. Therefore the soul is united to the body through some medium.

2. But it must be said that the soul is united through the medium of its powers to the body as the mover of the latter and not as its form. On the other hand, the soul is the form of the body inasmuch as it is an act, but is a mover inasmuch as it is a principle of operation. And certainly a thing is a principle of operation inasmuch as it is an act, because a thing acts inasmuch as it is actual. Hence the soul is the form and mover of the body in the same respect. Consequently no distinction is to be drawn between the soul as the mover of the body and as its form.

3. Further, inasmuch as the soul is the mover of the body, it is not united to the body accidentally, because then a being that is substantially one (unum per se) would not result from the union of soul and body. Therefore

the soul is united to the body substantially. But whatever is united to a thing substantially, is united to it without a medium. Consequently the soul is not united as a mover to the body through a medium.

4. Further, the soul is united as a mover to the body inasmuch as it is the body's principle of operation. However, the soul's operations do not belong to the soul alone, but to the composite, as is pointed out in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 11] and thus there is no medium between the soul and the body so far as the soul's operations are concerned. Hence the soul, inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, is not united to the body through a medium.

5. Further, it seems that the soul, as a form, is united to the body through a medium. For a form is not united to any kind of matter but to one befitting it (propria). Now the matter of any particular form is prepared to receive that form through proper dispositions which are proper accidents of a thing, just as hot and dry are proper accidents of fire. Therefore, a form is united to its matter through the medium of proper accidents. But the proper accidents of living things are the powers of their soul. Therefore, as a form, the soul is united through the medium of its powers to the body.

6. Further an animal is a thing that moves itself. But a thing that moves itself is divided into two parts, one of which is a mover, the other a thing moved, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 4, 254b 15]. Now the part causing movement is a soul; however, the moved part cannot be matter alone, because whatever is in potency only is not moved, as is said in the Physics [V, 1, 225a 20]. Hence although heavy and light bodies have movement in themselves, they do not move themselves because they are divided only into matter and into form, which cannot be moved. It follows, then, that an animal is divided into a soul and into some part which is composed of matter and form. Consequently the soul is united to corporeal matter by means of some form.

7. Further, the proper matter of any form is given in the definition of that form. Now "a physical organic body potentially having life" is given in the definition of the soul inasmuch as it is the form of the body, as is evident in the De anima [II, 1, 412a 28]. Consequently the soul is united to such a body as its proper matter. But "a physical organic body potentially having life" can exist as such only because of some form. Therefore the soul is united to its matter through some form which first perfects its matter.

8. Further, it is said: “God made man from the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life” (Gen. 2:7)Now the breath of life is the soul. Hence some form exists in matter prior to its union with the body, and thus the soul is united to corporeal matter through the medium of some other form.

9. Further, forms are united to matter so far as matter is in potency to them. But matter is first in potency to the forms of the elements rather than to other forms. Consequently the soul and other forms are united to matter only through the intermediary forms of the elements.

10. Further, the body of a man and that of an animal are mixed bodies. But the forms of the elements must remain essentially in a mixed body, otherwise there would be a corruption of the elements and not a mixture. Therefore the soul is united to matter through the medium of other forms.

11. Further, the intellective soul as such is a form. But its act of understanding is accomplished with the aid of its other powers. Therefore the soul, inasmuch as it is a form, is united to the body through the medium of these other powers.

12. Further, the soul is not united to any sort of body, but to one proportioned to it. Therefore there must be a proportion between the soul and the body; and thus the soul is united to the body by means of a proportion.

13. Further, a thing operates in something remote through that which is closest to itself. But the powers of the soul are diffused throughout the whole body by the heart. Therefore the heart is nearer to the soul than the other parts of the body, and thus the soul is united to the body by means of the heart.

14. Further, a diversity of parts mutually related are present in the body. However, the soul is simple so far as its essence is concerned. Therefore, since a form is proportioned to the matter that is capable of being perfected by it, it seems that the soul is united first to one part of the body, and then to the other parts of the body through the intermediary of this [first] part.

15. Further, the soul is superior to the body. But the inferior powers of the soul are united to the superior parts of the body, for the intellect requires the body only because of the imagination and the external senses from which it receives species. Therefore, conversely, the soul is united to the body

through those things which are highest and simplest, as through spirits and humors.

16. Further, that which when taken away destroys the unity among things united to one another, is seen to be a medium between them. But the union of soul and body is dissolved when the spirits have been removed, the natural heat extinguished, and the basic moisture exhausted. Therefore these things are media between the soul and the body.

17. Further, as a soul is naturally united to a body, so is this soul united to this body. But this body is this [particular] body through the fact that it possesses certain terminated dimensions. Therefore the soul is united to the body by the medium of terminated dimensions..

18. Further, things which differ from one another are united only through a medium. But the soul and the human body are seen to differ from each other to the greatest degree, because one of them is incorporeal and simple, the other corporeal and particularly complex. Therefore the soul is united to the body only through a medium.

19. Further, the human soul is similar in intellectual nature to the separate substances which move the celestial bodies. Now these are seen to be related to one another as movers and things capable of being moved. Consequently it seems that the human body, which is moved by the soul, has within itself something of the nature of a celestial body, and that the soul is united to the body by means of this.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics [VIII, 6, 1045b 16] that a form is united to its matter directly. Now the soul is united as a form to the body. Therefore it is united to the body directly.

I answer: Among all [principles] the act of existing (esse) is that which most immediately and intimately belongs to things, as is pointed out in the book De causis [IV]. Hence the form which gives matter its act of existing, must be understood to come to matter prior to anything else, and to be present in it more immediately than anything else, because matter receives its act of existing from a form. Moreover, it is proper to a substantial form to give matter its act of existing pure and simple (esse simpliciter), because it is through its form that a thing is the very thing that it is. For a thing is not given an act of existing pure and simple through accidental forms, but only a relative one (esse secundum quid), such as to be large or colored, and so on. Therefore, if there is a form which does not give to m atter its act of existing pure and simple, but comes to matter already possessing an act of existing through some form, such a form will not be a substantial one. From this it is obvious that an intermediary substantial form cannot intervene between a substantial form and matter, as some wished to maintain. For these men held that there exists in matter an order of diverse forms, one of which is arranged under another in accordance with the order of genera; as if one were to say, for instance, that matter is given the act of existing of a substance through one form; the act of existing of a body through another; the act of existing of a living body through still another; and so on.

But if this position is adopted, only the first form which gives a thing its act of existing as a substance, would be a substantial one. The other forms, indeed, would all be accidental ones, because it is a thing’s substantial form that makes it be a substance (hoc aliquid), as we have already shown (Art. 1). Therefore it is necessary to say that a thing has substantiality, exists in the ultimate species, under which there are no other species (specialissima), and in all intermediate genera, through one and the same form. Now the forms of natural things are like numbers, whose species change when a unit is added or subtracted, as is pointed out in the Metaphysics.” It follows, therefore, that the diversity of natural forms, in accordance with which matter is constituted in diverse species, is to be understood as resulting from this fact, that one adds a perfection over and above another. For example, one form gives matter corporeal existence only. (This must be below the grade of animal forms, because matter is in potency only to corporeal forms. For those things which are incorporeal are immaterial, as was shown in the preceding question.) A second more perfect form gives matter vital existence in addition to corporeal existence. Another, still higher, form confers on it sensory existence in addition to vital and corporeal existence; and so on successively.

Therefore a more perfect form, constituting with matter a composite being in the perfection of an inferior grade, must be considered as matter with respect to a higher perfection; and so on up the scale. For instance, prime matter, so far as it now exists in a corporeal mode, is matter with respect to the higher perfection of life. (And so body is the genus of living body, and animated or living is the specific difference. For genus is derived from matter, and difference from form.) Thus, in a certain way, one and the same form actualizing matter in a lower grade of perfection, is midway between matter and that same form actualizing matter in a superior grade. But matter, so far as it is understood to have substantial existence as a perfection of an inferior grade, can, therefore, be regarded as the subject of accidents. For a substance in that inferior grade of perfection must have a proper accident which necessarily inheres in it. Likewise, from the fact that matter has corporeal existence through forms, it immediately follows that there are dimensions in matter whereby it is understood to be divisible into different parts, so that it can receive different forms corresponding to its different parts. Furthermore, from the fact that matter is known to have a certain substantial mode of existing, matter can be understood to receive accidents by which it is disposed to a higher perfection’ so far as it is fittingly disposed to receive that higher perfection. Moreover dispositions of this kind are understood to exist in matter prior to the form, inasmuch as they are given existence in matter by an agent, although there are some improper accidents of the form that are caused in the matter only by the form itself. Hence such accidents are not understood to exist as dispositions in matter prior to the form; rather is the form understood to be prior to the proper accidents as a cause is to its effects.

Consequently, since the soul is a substantial form, because it places man in a determinate species of substance, no other substantial form intervenes between the soul and prime matter. But man is perfected in different grades of perfection by the rational soul itself, so that he is a body, a living body, and a rational animal. However, matter (being understood to receive from the rational soul itself, perfections of an inferior grade, for instance, that of being a body, a living body, and an animal) must also be understood to have, at the same time, appropriate dispositions so that it may be a matter befitting a human soul, inasmuch as the soul gives the body its ultimate perfection. So, therefore, the soul inasmuch as it is the form which gives the act of existing absolutely, does not have any intermediary between itself and prime matter. But because the same form which gives matter its act of existing, is also a principle of operation (for a thing acts so far as it is in act), then the soul like any other form must be a principle of operation.

But it must be considered that a gradation of forms in the order of operation corresponds to the gradation of forms in the order of existence, for an operation is an act of an agent in act. Therefore the greater perfection a form possesses with respect to conferring the act of existing, so much the greater is its power of operating. Hence more perfect forms have a greater number of operations and more diverse ones than less perfect forms. And so it is that a diversity of accidents suffices for a diversity of operations in the case of less perfect things. But in the case of more perfect things a diversity of parts is required as well; and the greater the diversity of parts, the more perfect the form will be. For we see that diverse operations are proper to fire because its accidents differ, for example, to rise upward in virtue of its lightness; to heat in virtue of its heat; and so on. However’ any one of these operations belongs to any part of fire. But in animate bodies which have nobler forms, different operations are allotted to different parts, for instance, in plants there is one operation performed by the roots, another by the trunk, and still another by the branches. And the more perfect that living bodies are, so much the more diverse must their parts be in view of their greater perfection. Therefore, since the rational soul is the most perfect of natural forms, there is found in man the greatest diversity of parts because of his different operations. Furthermore the one soul performing these operations confers substantial existence in a manner befitting the operations of the parts themselves. An indication of this fact is that, when the soul ceases to animate the body, neither flesh nor eye remains except in an equivocal sense. But since there must be an order of instruments in keeping with the order of operations, and since there is a natural precedence among the different operations which flow from the soul, one part of the body must be moved to perform its operations by another part. Thus a medium intervenes between the whole body and the soul as the mover and principle of its operations. For after a certain primary mediating part of the body has been moved, that part moves the other parts to perform their operations. So it is that the soul, by means of the heart, moves the other members of the body to perform their vital operations. But since the soul gives to the body its act of existing, it immediately gives to all parts of the body their substantial and specific mode of existing. And this is what many assert, namely, that as a form the soul is united to the body without an intermediary, but that as a mover it is united to the body through an intermediary.

Moreover, this view is in keeping with the position of Aristotle, who maintains that the soul is the substantial form of the body. However, some who, following Plato’s theory, hold that the soul is united to the body as one substance is to another, had to posit media through which the soul is united to the body. For diverse and disparate substances are unified only if something exists to unite them. For this reason some held that there is a certain spirit and humor existing as a medium between soul and body; other posited light; still others, the powers of the soul, or something else of this sort. But none of these [entities] are necessary if the soul is the form of the body, because anything whatever, inasmuch as it is a being, is one. Hence a form is united to prime matter by virtue of itself and not by any other bond, because a form, by its very nature, gives to matter its act of existing.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. The powers of the soul are the qualities by which it operates. Therefore they serve as intermediaries between the soul and the body inasmuch as the soul moves the body, but not inasmuch as it gives to the body its act of existing. Moreover, it must be understood that the work which is called De spiritu et anima is not a work of Augustine, and that its author is of the opinion that the soul is its powers. Hence the objection fails completely.

2. Although the soul is a form inasmuch as it is an act, and similarly is a mover inasmuch as it is an act, and thus is a form and a mover in one and the same respect, nevertheless the effect which it produces as a form differs from that which it produces as a mover. The distinction is made for this reason.

3. One being pure and simple (unum per se) does not result from the union of a mover and a thing moved inasmuch as they are mover and moved, but from [the union of] this mover which is the soul, inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, and this mobile thing which is the body.

4. Nothing intervenes between the soul and any part of the body with respect to any operation of the soul which is an operation of the composite. However, there is one part of the body through which the soul first exercises its operation, which [part] falls midway between the soul, so far as it is the principle of that operation, and all the other parts of the body which share in that operation.

5. The accidental dispositions which dispose matter properly for [receiving] some form are not media absolutely between form and matter, but between form inasmuch as it bestows the highest perfection, and matter inasmuch as it is already perfected by some perfection of an inferior order.

For matter by its very nature is first with respect to the lowest grade of perfection, because matter of itself is in potency to substantial corporeal existence. Moreover, it does not require to be disposed in this way. But matter, having this perfection already in existence, requires dispositions to a higher perfection. Moreover it must be recognized that the powers of the soul are its proper accidents and do not exist without the soul. Therefore, inasmuch as they are its powers, they do not have the nature of a disposition in relation to the soul except so far as the powers of the inferior part of the soul are called dispositions in relation to the powers of the superior part, just as the powers of the vegetal soul are dispositions in relation to the sentient soul, as can be seen from the preceding argument.

6. This argument concludes that the soul or the animal is divided into two parts, one of which is like a mobile thing, the other like a mover. This, indeed, is true, but we must understand that the soul moves the body through knowledge and appetite. Now knowledge and appetite in man are of two kinds. First, that which belongs to the soul alone and which does not depend on a bodily organ. This belongs to the intellective part of the soul. Secondly, that which belongs to the composite. This belongs to the sentient part of the soul. Now whatever belongs to the intellective part moves the body only by means of that which belongs to the sentient part. For when a movement has to do with some particular thing, the universal apprehension which belongs to the intellect causes movement only by means of something particular belonging to sense. Hence when we divide a man or an animal into a part that causes movement and one that is moved, we do not divide them into a soul and a body exclusively, but into a soul and an animated body. For that part of the animated body whose operation it is to apprehend and to desire, moves the whole body. But if it be supposed that the intellective part moves [the body] directly, so that the, part causing movement in man is the soul alone, then the answer will be in accordance with the preceding explanation (i.e., the one given in the Answer). For the human soul will be a mover in virtue of what is supreme in itself, namely, its intellective part. Moreover, the moved part will not be prime matter alone, but prime matter inasmuch as it is given a corporeal and vital act of existing (esse). Nor will it be moved by any other form than the soul. Hence it will not be necessary to maintain that a substantial form acts as an intermediary between the soul and prime matter. However, there is a certain

movement in the animal which is not the result of apprehension and desire, that is, the movement of the heart, the movement also of growth and decay, and the movement of nutrition which is diffused throughout the whole body, and which the animal has in common with plants. Now with respect to this kind of movement, we must maintain that, as inferior forms are the principles of movement in natural bodies, so also is the soul the principle of movement in animal bodies. For the animal soul not only bestows what is proper to its nature as such, but also gives those perfections which belong to a lower order of forms, as is evident from what has been said. Hence the Philosopher says, in the De anima [II, 2, 414a 18] that the soul is the nature of this specific type of body. For this reason the operations of the soul are divided into animal operations and natural operations. That is to say, those operations which proceed from the soul in keeping with its proper nature, are called animal operations, whereas those which come from the soul inasmuch as it produces the effect of inferior natural forms, are called natural operations. According to this, therefore, it must be said that, as fire through its natural form has a natural movement whereby it tends upwards, so also does any part of an animated body in which there is found movement not resulting from apprehension, have this movement naturally through its soul. For as fire tends upward by nature, so also is the blood moved naturally to its proper and determinate place. Similarly, the heart is moved naturally by its proper movement, although the dissolution of spirits, made from the blood, by which the heart is expanded and contracted, cooperates in this activity, as Aristotle points out in the place where he treats of exhalation and inhalation. Consequently the first part of the body in which such movement is found is not a self-mover, but is moved naturally, just as fire is. However, this part moves another part, and thus the whole animal is a self-mover, because one part of it is a mover, and another is moved.

7. A physical organic body is related to the soul as matter to form, not that it is such a body as a result of some other form, but because it has this nature through . the soul, as was shown above.

8. The eighth argument must be answered similarly. For the statement in Genesis: “God formed man out of the slime of the earth,” is not prior in time to the following: “And breathed into his face the breath of life”; but is prior in the order of nature only.

9. Matter is in potency to forms with respect to a certain order, not that it receives different substantial forms in a certain order, but because it receives whatever is proper to a superior form only through the medium of what is proper to an inferior form, as was shown. In this way matter is understood to receive other forms by way of the forms of the elements.

10. The forms of the elements do not exist according to their very essence in a mixed body, although Avicenna maintained this, for they cannot exist in one and the same part of matter. However, if they were to exist in different parts of matter, there would not be a mixture with respect to the whole, as is the case in a true mixture,13 but there would be a mixture of the most insignificant kind, that is to say, one which appears to be a mixture to the senses. Again, to say that the forms of the elements may receive more and less, as Averroes does, is ridiculous, because there are substantial forms which cannot receive more and less. Nor is there a medium between a substance and an accident as he imagined. Moreover it must be said that the forms of the elements are not corrupted completely, but that they remain virtually, as Aristotle says. And they are virtually present inasmuch as the proper accidents of the elements, in which the power of the elements is found, remain in some measure.

11. The intellective soul is the form of the body according to its very essence, but not according to its intellectual operation.

12. The proportion that exists between the soul and the body is in the things proportioned. Consequently it does not necessarily have to be an intermediary between soul and body.

13. The heart is the first instrument through which the soul moves the other parts of the body. Therefore, as a mover, the soul is united to the other parts of the body through the medium of the heart. However, as a form, the soul is united to every part of the body essentially and directly.

14. Although the soul is a form in its entirety so far as its essence is concerned, yet it is many by its powers inasmuch as it is the principle of different operations. Furthermore, because a form perfects a matter not only with respect to its act of existing, but also with respect to its operation, it is necessary that the parts of the body be perfected in different ways by the soul, even though it is a form in its entirety, and that each part be perfected in a way befitting its operation. For this reason there must be an order among the parts of the body in accordance with the order among operations,

as was explained. However, this order exists inasmuch as the operation of the body belongs to the soul as the mover of the body.

15. The inferior powers of the soul, so far as their operations are concerned, can be understood to unite the superior powers to the body inasmuch as the superior powers stand in need of the operations of the inferior powers which are exercised through the body. Similarly the body, so far as operation and movement are concerned, is joined through its superior parts to the soul.

16. A form accrues to matter only when matter is properly disposed by fitting dispositions, and thus a form cannot remain in matter when the proper dispositions cease to exist. In this way, when the heat, natural humidity, and the like, are removed from the body, the union of soul and body is destroyed, because the body is disposed to receive the soul by means of these things. Hence things of this kind intervene as dispositions between the soul and the body. The explanation of this was given above.

17. Dimensions can be considered to exist in matter only so far as matter is given substantial corporeal existence through a substantial form. In man this kind of existence is not bestowed by any other form than the soul, as has been explained. Consequently these dimensions are not understood actually to precede the existence of the soul in matter absolutely, but relative to the highest grades of perfection, as was explained above.

18. The soul and the body do not differ from each other as things of different genera and species do, because neither of them exists in a genus or a species, but only the composite of which they are parts, as we have shown in the preceding questions. However, the soul by its very essence is the form of the body giving it its act of existing. Hence it is united to the body essentially and directly.

19. The human body has something in common with a celestial body; not inasmuch as something characteristic of a celestial body, such as light, intervenes as a medium between the soul and the body, but inasmuch as the human body is given a certain tempered combination lacking contrariety, as was shown in preceding questions.

ARTICLE 10

WHETHER THE SOUL EXISTS IN THE WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH OF ITS PARTS

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.76, A.8; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 72; SENT., I. DIST., 8, Q.5, A.3; DE SPIR. CREAT., A.4.]

In the tenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul does not. For the soul exists in the body as a perfection in something perfectible. But the thing capable of being perfected by the soul is an organic body, because the soul is “the actuality of a physical organic body having life potentially,” as is stated in the De anima [II, 1, 412a 28]. Therefore the soul exists only in an organic body. But each part of the body is not an organic body. Therefore the soul does not exist in each part of the body.

2. Further, a form is proportioned to a matter. But the soul as the form of the body is a certain simple essence. Therefore a complex matter is not proportioned to the soul. But the diverse parts of the body, either of a man or of an animal, are certainly complex matter, because these parts differ greatly from one another. Therefore the soul is not the form of each part of the body, and so does not exist in each part of the body.

3. Further, no part of a whole exists in separation from the whole. Therefore, if the whole soul exists in one part of the body, no part of the

soul can exist outside that part of the body. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to exist in each part of the body.

4. Further, the Philosopher says in the work De causa motus animalium [X, 703a 30] “The animal must be considered as similar to a state which is well governed by laws. For when order is once established in it, there is no further need of a separate monarch to preside over each particular work. But each individual performs the task to which he is directed by the authority of the ruler, and these things are done continually in a customary manner. In animals, however, the same order results from their nature, and each part performs the proper work for which it has been constituted by nature. Hence there is not a soul for each part, but one single principle of the body exists, and the different parts of the body live because they are connected to one another. Moreover, they perform the proper operation allotted to them by nature.” Therefore the soul does not exist in each part of the body, but only in one part.

5. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Physics [VIII, 10, 267b 6] that the mover of the heavens must occupy either the center or some sign of the circumference, since these two things are the principles of circular motion. Now he proves that it cannot occupy the center but must exist at the circumference, for the nearer things are to the circumference and the farther away from the center, the swifter is their motion. Therefore, similarly the movement of the soul must exist in that part of the animal in which movement is most apparent. Now this part is the heart. Therefore the soul exists only in the heart.

6. Further, the Philosopher says in the book De juventute et senectute [II, 468a 20] that plants have a nutritive principle midway between their upper and lower parts. But upper and lower are found not only in plants, but in animals as well, and these also have a right and left side, a front and a back. Therefore the principle of life, namely, the soul, exists in an animal in the midst of its particular parts. But this [position is occupied by] the heart. Therefore the soul exists only in the heart.

7. Further, every form existing in a whole and in each of its parts, is predicated of the whole and of each of its parts, as is evident in the case of fire, for each part of fire is fire. However, each part of an animal is not an animal. Therefore the soul does not exist in each part of the body.

8. Further, the act of intellection belongs to a part of the soul. But this act is not present in any part of the body. Therefore the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body.

9. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 1, 412b 25] that as the soul is related to the body, so also is a part of the soul related to a part of the body. Therefore, if the soul exists in the whole body, the whole soul will not exist in each part of the body, but a part of the soul only will exist in a part of the body.

10. But it has been said that the Philosopher is speaking of the soul and of its parts inasmuch as it is a mover and not a form. On the other hand, the Philosopher says in another place, that if the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul. But the soul is the form of an animal. Hence, in the body, part of the soul has the character of a form, so that the soul is not merely a mover.

11. Further, the soul is the principle of life in an animal. Therefore, if the soul were in each part of the body, each part would receive life directly from the soul. Then one part would not depend on another for life, which is clearly false, for the other parts of the body depend on the heart for life.

12. Further, the soul is moved accidentally by the movement of the body in which it exists. Similarly it is at rest accidentally when the body in which it exists is at rest. However, it happens that when one part of a body is at rest, another is moved. Therefore, if the soul exists in each part of the body, the soul must be moved and at rest simultaneously; which is evidently impossible.

13. Further, all powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. Therefore, if the essence of the soul exists in each part of the body, each power of the soul must exist in each part of the body. This is obviously false, for the sense of hearing does not exist in the eye but in the ear alone; and similarly for the other powers.

14. Further, whatever exists in another exists there according to the mode of the thing in which it exists. Therefore, if the soul exists in the body, it must exist there in a manner proper to the body. But it is proper to a body that no part of it may exist where another part exists. Therefore, where one part of the soul exists, another does not exist; and thus the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body.

15. Further, certain imperfect animals, called ring-worms, continue to live after they have been dissected, because a soul exists in each part of the body after its dissection. But man and the other perfect animals do not live after they have been dissected. Consequently in them the soul does not exist in each part of the body.

16. Further, as a man and an animal are certain wholes composed of different parts, so also is a house. But the form of a house does not exist in each of its parts but in the whole [house]. Therefore the whole soul, which is the form of the animal, does not exist in each part of the animal but in the whole [animal].

17. Further, the soul as a form gives to the body its act of existing (esse). However, the soul is the form of the body through its essence, which is simple. Therefore the simple essence of the soul gives to the body its act of existing. But only one thing comes naturally from something that is one. Therefore, if the soul as a form were in each part of the body, it would follow that it would give existence uniformly to each part of the body.

18. Further, a form is united to matter more intimately than a thing in place is united to its place. But a thing existing in one place cannot exist in different places simultaneously, especially if it is a spiritual substance. For the teachers [of theology] do not admit that an angel exists in different places simultaneously. Therefore the soul cannot exist in different parts of the body.

On the contrary, Augustine says in the De Trinitate [VI, 5] that the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.

Further, the soul gives to the body its act of existing, only by being united to the body. But the soul confers the act of existing on the whole body and on each of its parts. Therefore the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.

Further, the soul operates only where it exists. But the operations of the soul are seen to exist in each part of the body. Therefore the soul exists in each part of the body.

I answer: The true solution to this question depends on the preceding one. For it was shown that the soul as the form of the body is not united to the whole body through the medium of any of its parts, but is united directly to the whole body, because it is the form of the body as a whole and of each of its parts. And this must be maintained, for, since the body of a man or that of any other animal is a certain natural whole, it will be said to be one because it has one form whereby it is perfected, and not simply because it is an aggregate or a composition, as occurs in the case of a house and other things of this kind. Hence each part of a man and that of an animal must receive its act of existing and species from the soul as its proper form. Therefore the Philosopher says [De anima, II, 1, 412b 20] that when the soul leaves the body, neither the eye nor the flesh nor any part remains except in an equivocal sense. Moreover, it is impossible for a thing to receive its act of existing and species, as it does from a form, from a principle existing in separation from it, because this would he similar to the position of the Platonists, who maintained that such sensible things receive their act of existing and species by participating in forms which exist apart from things themselves. But a form must be an intrinsic principle of the thing whose act of existing it is responsible for, because form and matter are the intrinsic principles constituting the essence of a [corporeal] thing.

Hence, according to the teaching of Aristotle, if the soul as a form gives to each part of the body its act of existing and species, it must be present as a form in each part of the body. And for this reason the soul is said to exist in the whole body because it is the form of the whole. Therefore, if it is the form of each part [of the body], it must exist in each part and not in the whole alone, nor in one part alone. Moreover, this definition of the soul is an appropriate one, for the soul is the act of an organic body. However, an organic body is composed of different organs. Hence, if the soul as a form existed in one part of the body only, it would not be the act of an organic body, but that of one organ alone, for instance, the heart or some other part; and the remaining parts would be perfected by different forms. And thus the whole would not be one thing by nature but merely by composition. Hence it follows that the soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts.

But since it is also asked whether the whole soul exists in the whole body and in each of its parts, we must consider how this is to be explained. For totality can be attributed to a form in a threefold manner, according to the three ways in which it is proper for a thing to have parts. For a thing has parts, in one way, resulting from quantitative division, that is, according as a number or a magnitude is divided. However, totality of number or that of magnitude does not apply to a form, except perhaps in an accidental way; for instance, in the case of forms which are divided accidentally by the division of a continuum, as whiteness is divided as a result of dividing a surface. A thing is said to be a totality in another way in relation to the essential parts of its species, as matter and form are said to be parts of a composite, and genus and difference, in a certain respect, parts of a species. This kind of totality is also attributed to simple essences by reason of their perfection, in this way, that as composites have a perfect species from the union of their essential principles, so also do substances and simple forms which have a perfect species in virtue of themselves. A thing is said to be a totality in a third way in relation to its active and passive powers, inasmuch as these are considered to be parts of it which are distinguished from one another because their operations differ.

Therefore, if we take a form which is divided as a result of dividing a continuum, and inquire whether the whole form is in each part of the body (for example, whether whiteness exists in its entirety in a part of the surface), and if the form is considered in relation to quantitative parts (which totality, indeed, pertains to whiteness accidentally), then the whole form does not exist in each part [of the body], but the whole form exists in the whole [body], and a part of the form in a part of the whole. However, if it is a question of totality so far as the species is concerned, then the whole [form] exists in each part [of the body]; for whiteness is as equally intense in any part [of the surface] as it is in the whole. But so far as its power is concerned, it is true that the whole form does not exist in each part [of the body], for the whiteness existing in a part of the surface cannot disperse as much light as the whiteness existing in the whole surface; just as the heat in a small fire alone, cannot cause warmth like the heat in a large fire.

Now if we suppose, for the present, that there is only one soul in the human body (we will explain this later), we must maintain that it is not divided by dividing that species of quantity which is numerical in nature. It is also obvious that the soul is not divided by dividing a continuum. This is particularly true of the souls of perfect animals which do not live when dissected. However, it would perhaps be different in the case of the souls of ring-worms, in which there is one soul actually and many potentially, as the Philosopher teaches [De anima, II, 2, 413b 13]. Therefore, in the case of the soul of man and that of any perfect animal, it follows that totality can be considered only so far as the soul’s species and its passive or active power are concerned. Hence we say that the soul by its very essence is the form of the body, and that it exists as such in each part of the body, as has been shown, because the perfection of the species comes from the soul in virtue of its very essence. Consequently the whole soul exists in each part of the body according to the whole of its specific perfection.

However, if totality is taken so far as the soul's active and passive powers are concerned, then the whole soul does not exist in each part of the body. Nor, if we speak of the soul of man, does the whole soul [according to the totality of its powers] exist in the whole body. For it was shown in the preceding articles (Arts. 1, 2 and 5) that the human soul possesses the power of performing certain operations without communicating in any way with the body, that is, the acts of understanding and willing, as it exceeds the capacity of the body. Hence the intellect and the will are not the acts of any bodily organ. However, with respect to those operations which the soul exercises through bodily organs, the soul's active and passive powers as a whole exist in the whole body, although not in each part of the body, because different parts of the body are proportioned to different operations of the soul. Consequently, with respect to any one power, the soul exists only in that part of the body which takes care of the operations exercised by that particular part.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Since matter exists for the sake of form, and since a form is directed to a proper operation, the matter to which a form is united must be one that is suitable for the proper operations of that form, just as the matter of a saw must be iron, which is suitable for sawing due to its hardness. Hence, since the soul can exercise different operations because of the perfect power which it has, its matter must be a body composed of different parts (which parts are called organs) suitable for the different operations of the soul. And for this reason the whole body, to which the soul is related principally as a form, is the organ of the soul. However, parts exist for the sake of the whole. Hence it is only by being intrinsically related to the body as a whole, that a part of the body is related to the soul as that which is properly and principally capable of being perfected by the soul. Consequently it is not necessary for each part of an animal to be an organic body, even though the soul is the form of each of the animal's parts.

2. Since matter exists for the sake of form, form gives an act of existing and species to matter inasmuch as matter is disposed for the operations of the form. And therefore the soul, even though it is one and simple in its essence, perfects the parts of the body in different ways, because the body, which is capable of being perfected by the soul, requires diversity in its parts in order that it may be disposed for the different operations of the soul.

3. Since the soul exists in a part of the body in the manner just described, no part of the soul is found outside the soul which is in this part of the body. However, it does not follow that no part of the soul exists outside this part of the body, but rather than no part of the soul exists outside the whole body which the soul perfects as a principle.

4. In this passage the Philosopher is speaking about the motive power of the soul. For the body's principle of motion exists in one part, namely, in the heart, and moves the whole body through this part. This is clear from the example which he gives of the ruler.

5. The mover of the heavens, so far as its substance is concerned, is not confined to some particular place [as bodies are].

6. The soul in plants, inasmuch as it is the principle of certain operations, is also said to exist in the midst of their upper and lower parts. The soul exists in animals in the same way.

7. Therefore each part of an animal is not an animal as each part of fire is fire, because every operation of fire is found in each part of fire. However, all the operations of an animal are not found in each of its parts. This is particularly true of perfect animals.

8. The conclusion of this argument is that the whole soul, so far as its power is concerned, does not exist in each part of the body. This was shown to be true.

9. The Philosopher does not distinguish parts in the soul with respect to its essence, but with respect to its powers. Hence he says that, as the soul exists in the whole body, so also does a part of the soul exist in a part of the body. For as the whole organic body is so constituted that it may serve the operations of the soul which are exercised through it, so also is one organ disposed to one particular operation.

10. A power of the soul is rooted in its essence. Therefore, wherever a power of the soul exists, there also does the essence of the soul exist. Hence the Philosopher's statement that, if the eye of an animal were itself an

animal, sight would be its soul, is not to be understood of a power of the soul without its essence; just as the sentient soul is said to be the form of the whole body through its essence, not through its sensory power.

11. Since the soul operates in different parts of the body through one particular power (moreover the body is disposed in this way that it is proportioned to the soul's act of existing through the action of the soul itself which is the efficient cause of the body, as Aristotle says in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 9]) it is necessary that the disposition of the different parts of the body, inasmuch as they are capable of being perfected by the soul, depend on one first part of the body, namely, on the heart. For this reason the life of the other parts depends upon the heart, because, after the necessary dispositions cease to exist, the soul is not united as a form to the body. However, this does not prevent the soul from being the form of each part of the body directly.

12. The soul is moved or at rest only in an accidental way when the body is moved or at rest. Moreover, it is not incongruous for a thing to be moved and at rest accidentally at one and the same time, just as it is not implausible for a thing to be moved accidentally by contrary movements, as for instance, when someone on a ship walks in the direction opposite to that of the course of the ship.

13. Although all powers of the soul are rooted in its essence, yet each part of the body is informed by the soul in the manner befitting each. Therefore different powers of the soul exist in different parts of the body. But it is not necessary that all of the soul's powers exist in each part of the body.

14. When it is said that one thing exists in another in accordance with the mode of the thing in which it exists, this is understood of the mode of its capacity, not of its nature. For it is not necessary that whatever exists in something else have the nature and Properties of that thing in which it exists, but that it be received in that thing according to the thing's capacity; because it is obvious that water does not have the nature of the vessel [in which it exists]. Hence it is not necessary for the soul to possess this characteristic of a body, namely, that wherever one part exists, another may not exist.

15. Ring-worms continue to live after they have been dissected, not only because their soul exists in each part of the body, but because their soul, being imperfect and performing a minimum of operations, requires the least

diversity of parts. This is also found in any part segregated from a living thing of this sort. Hence a soul remains in each part because each part retains that disposition whereby the whole body is made capable of being perfected by a soul. However, the soul exists differently in perfect animals.

16. The form of a house, like other artificial forms, is an accidental one. Hence it does not give to the whole house and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Indeed, a whole [of this sort] is not a substantial unity, but is a one by aggregation. However, the soul is the substantial form of the body, giving to the whole body and to each of its parts their act of existing and species. Furthermore, the whole constituted of these parts is a substantial unity. Hence there is no similarity.

17. Although the soul is one and simple in essence, yet it is capable of performing different operations. And because the soul by nature gives to its perfectible its act of existing and species, inasmuch as it is the form of the body by its very essence (moreover, those things existing naturally, exist for an end), the soul must establish a diversity of parts in the body inasmuch as this is required for its different operations. It is also true in the light of such diversity (which is to be attributed to the end, and not to the form alone) that it is more apparent that nature acts for an end in the constitution of living things than it is in the case of other natural things in which one form perfects, in a uniform way, the thing capable of being perfected by it.

18. The simplicity of the soul and that of an angel must not be thought of in terms of the simplicity of the point, which has a definite position in a continuum, and, therefore, because it is simple cannot exist in different parts of the continuum at one and the same time. But the angel and the soul are said to be simple because they lack quantity altogether, and thus are related to a continuum only by contact of power. Hence that whole, which it contacted by an angel’s power, is present to the angel (which is not united to it as a form) as a single place; and it is present to the soul (which is united to it as a form) as a single perfectible thing. And just as the whole angel exists in each part of the place it is present in [by contact of power], so also does the whole soul exist in each part of the thing perfectible by it.

ARTICLE 11

WHETHER THE RATIONAL, SENTIENT, AND VEGETAL SOULS IN MAN ARE SUBSTANTIALLY ONE AND THE SAME

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 76, A. 3; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 58; DE POTENTIA, Q. 3, A. 9, AD 9; QUODL. XI, Q. 5, A. 1; DE SPIR. CREAT., A. 3; COMPEND. THEOL., CHAPS. 90-92.]

In the eleventh article we examine this question: Whether the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls in man are substantially one and the same.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that they are not substantially one and the same. For wherever an act of a soul exists, there also does a soul exist. Now in the embryo the act of a vegetal soul precedes that of a sentient soul, and the act of a sentient soul precedes that of a rational soul. Therefore in pregnancy the vegetal soul is prior to the sentient, and the sentient is prior to the rational. Consequently they are not substantially one and the same.

2. But it has been said that the act of a vegetal soul and that of a sentient soul which are present in the embryo, do not belong to a soul existing in the embryo, but to a power of the parent's soul existing therein. On the other hand, a finite agent acts by its power only with respect to a limited distance, as is evident in the motion of throwing. For a thrower casts an object to a definite place according to the power which he possesses. But the movements and operations of a soul appear in the embryo no matter how distant the [male] parent may be, although his power is finite. Therefore the operations of a soul do not exist in the embryo as a result of a power of the parent's soul.

3. Further, the Philosopher states, in the work De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736a 35], that the embryo is an animal before it is a man. But an animal is such because of its sentient soul, and a man is a man because of his rational soul. Therefore a sentient soul, and not merely a power of such a soul, exists in the embryo prior to a rational soul.

4. Further, living and sensing are operations which can issue only from an intrinsic principle, because they are acts of a soul. Hence, since the embryo lives and senses before it has a rational soul, the acts of living and sensing in the embryo will not come from the soul of the external parent, but from a soul existing within the embryo itself.

5. Further, the philosopher says in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 9] that the soul is not only the formal cause of the body, but its efficient and final cause as well. But it would not be the efficient cause of the body unless it were present to the body when it is formed. However, the body is formed before the rational soul is infused. Therefore there is a soul and not merely a power of a soul in the embryo preceding the infusion of the rational soul.

6. But it has been said that the formation of the body is brought about, not by a soul existing in the embryo, but by the soul of the parent. On the other hand, living bodies move themselves by their own movements. But the generation of a living body is a certain movement of its own, because the generative power is one of its principles. Therefore with respect to this activity, a living thing moves itself. But a thing .that moves itself is composed of a part that causes movement and one that is moved, as is proved in the Physics [VIII, 4, 254b 30]. Hence the principle of generation, which forms the living body, is a soul existing in the embryo.

7. Further, it is obvious that the embryo increases in size. Now increase is a species of local motion, as is stated in the Physics [IV, 6, 213b 19]. Therefore, since the animal moves itself locally, it will also move itself augmentatively. Hence this movement must come from a principle existing in the embryo and not from an extrinsic soul.

8. Further, the Philosopher says, in the book De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736a 35] that it cannot be said that no soul exists in the embryo, but that first a vegetative soul exists there and then a sentient soul.

9. But it has been argued that the Philosopher does not mean that a soul exists in the embryo actually, but only potentially. On the other hand, a thing acts only so far as it is in act. But there are actNities of a soul in the

embryo. Therefore a soul actually exists there, and thus it follows that [the souls in the embryo] are not substantially one and the same.

10. Further, it is impossible for one and the same thing to be caused both by an intrinsic principle and by an extrinsic one. But the rational soul in man is caused by an extrinsic principle. The vegetal and sentient souls, however, are caused by an intrinsic principle contained in the semen, as is clear from what the Philosopher says in the book De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736b, 21]. Therefore in man the vegetal, sentient, and rational souls are not substantially one and the same.

11. Further, it is impossible for a substantial principle of one thing to be an accident of another. Consequently the Philosopher says in the Metaphysics,” that heat is not the substantial form of fire, because heat is an accident of other things. But the sentient soul is a substantial principle in brute animals. Therefore it is not merely a power in man, because powers are certain properties and accidents of a soul.

12. Further, man is a nobler animal than the brute. Now an animal is said to be such because it possesses a sentient soul. Therefore the sentient soul in man is nobler than that in brute animals. But it is a certain substantial entity in brute animals, and not merely a power of their soul. Consequently in man the sentient soul is a substance in virtue of its very nature to an even greater degree.

13. Further, it is impossible for the substance of one and the same being to be both corruptible and incorruptible. Now the rational soul is incorruptible. Sentient and vegetal souls, however, are corruptible. Therefore it is impossible for the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls to be substantially one and the same.

14. But it has been said that the sentient soul in man is incorruptible. On the other hand, the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically, as the Philosopher states in the Metaphysics [X, 10, 1058b 26]. Now the sentient soul in brutes is corruptible. Therefore, if the sentient soul in man is incorruptible, the sentient soul in man and that in a horse will not be generically the same. Hence, since an animal is said to be such because of its sentient soul, a man and a horse would not exist in one and the same genus; which is obviously false.

15. Further, it is impossible for the substance of the same being to be both rational and irrational, because a contradiction is not true of one and the

same being. But sentient and vegetal souls are irrational. Therefore they cannot be substantially the same as the rational soul.

16. Further, the body is proportioned to the soul. But in a body there are diverse principles of operation of the soul which are called principal members. Therefore in man there is not one soul alone but many souls.

17. Further, the powers of a soul flow naturally from its essence. However, only one thing proceeds naturally from one thing. Therefore, if there were only one soul in man, there would not come from this soul certain powers that operate through organs, and others that do not.

18. Further, genus is taken from matter, difference from form. But the genus of man is “animal,” his difference, “rational.” Therefore, since an animal is said to be such because of its sentient soul, it appears that not only the body but also the sentient soul is related as matter to the rational soul. Therefore the rational and sentient souls are not substantially one and the same.

19. Further, a man and a horse share animality in common. Moreover, an animal is said to be such because of its sentient soul. Therefore their sentient souls are the same. But the sentient soul in a horse is not rational. Therefore it is not rational in man.

20. Further, if in man the rational, sentient, and vegetal souls are substantially one and the same, then in every part of the body in which one of them exists, another must exist. But this is false. For the vegetal soul is in the bones, because they are nourished and increased in size. However, the sentient soul does not exist there, because the bones lack sense. Therefore these souls are not substantially one and the same.

On the contrary, it is pointed out in the work De ecclesiae dogmatibus [XV, of Gennadius of Marseilles] “We do not say that there are two souls in man as Jacobus and other Syrians write: an animal soul by which the body is animated..., and a rational soul which exercises reasoning; but in man we speak of one and the same soul which gives life to the body by being united to it, and which disposes itself by its reason.”

I answer: There are different opinions about this question, not only among the moderns, but also among the ancients. For Plato maintained [Timaeus 32, Phaedrus 34] that there are different souls in the body and, indeed, this followed from his principles; because he maintained that the soul is united as a mover and not as a form to the body, saying that the soul exists in the body as a sailor in a ship. Moreover he maintained that it is necessary to posit different movers wherever there are generically different operations. For instance, in a ship there is one who steers, and another who rows. [Hence Plato argued in this way]: the fact that these movers hold different positions does not destroy the unity existing in the ship, because just as the actions of these movers are subordinated to one another, so also are the movers themselves. In like manner it does not seem to be inconsistent with the unity of a man or that of an animal, if in one body there exist many souls subordinated to one another as movers in accordance with the subordination of operations.

However, according to this position, neither a man nor an animal would have its unity absolutely and in virtue of its~ very nature, because a being that has unity absolutely and in its own right, does not result from the conjunction of a mover and something movable. Nor, on Plato’s hypothesis, would generation and corruption strictly speaking exist when a body receives a soul or loses it. Consequently it must be said that the soul is united to the body not only as a mover but as a form. This is also evident from the preceding arguments (Arts. 8 and 9).

But even if this position is adopted, it still follows from Plato’s principles that there are several souls in man and in the animal. For the Platonists maintained that universals are separate forms [i.e., existing apart from things] which are predicated of sensible things inasmuch as sensible things participate in them. For example, Socrates is called an animal inasmuch as he participates in the Idea, “animal,” and a man inasmuch as he participates in the Idea, “man.” The consequence of this is that there is one form essentially in virtue of which Socrates is said to be an animal, and another in virtue of which he is said to be a man. Whence it follows in turn that the sentient and rational soul differ substantially. But this cannot be maintained, for a being having unity in its own right cannot be constituted of diverse things having actual existence [in their own right]; because if terms are predicated of some subject by reason of diverse forms having existence of themselves, one is predicated of another accidentally. For instance, it is said of Socrates that he is white according to whiteness, and musical according to music. Therefore musical is predicated of white accidentally. Hence, if Socrates is said to be a man and an animal according to different forms, it would follow that this predication, man is an animal, is an accidental one, and that man is not really what an animal is. However, it happens that an essential predication is made through different forms when they are intrinsically related to one another, as when it is said that a thing having surface is colored. For color exists in a substance through the medium of its surface. But this mode of essential predication occurs, not because the thing predicated is placed in the definition of the subject, but rather the reverse. For surface is placed in the definition of color just as number is placed in the definition of the equal. Therefore, if animal were predicated of man through this mode of essential predication, when the sentient soul is related as matter to the rational soul, assuming they are diverse, it would follow that animal is not predicated essentially of man but rather the reverse.

An additional difficulty follows. For a being having unity absolutely cannot be constituted of diverse things having actual existence [in their own right], unless there is something uniting them and binding them to one another in some manner. Therefore, if Socrates were an animal and rational according to different forms, these two forms would need a unitary principle to make them substantially one. Therefore, since, on Plato's hypothesis, no such unitary principle is to be found, it will follow that the unity of a man will be a unity of aggregation alone, like that of a heap of things which is relatively one and absolutely many. So neither will man be a being absolutely, because so far as a thing is a being to that extent it is one.

Still another incongruity follows. For the form in accordance with which an individual substance receives a generic predication, must be a substantial one, because a genus is a substantial predicate. And thus the sentient soul in virtue of which Socrates is said to be an animal, must be his substantial form, and so must give to the body its act of existing in the absolute sense (per se), and make it to be this particular thing (hoc aliquid). Therefore, if the rational soul differs substantially from the sentient, it does not make the body to be this particular thing, nor does it give to the body an act of existing in the absolute sense, but only relatively. For in that case a rational form will accrue to a thing already actually subsisting. Consequently it will not be a substantial form but an accidental one, and thus will not make Socrates to be specifically what he is, for a species also is a substantial predicate.

It follows, therefore, that a man's soul, which is rational, sentient, and vegetal, is substantially one only. This is a consequence of the argument given in a preceding article (Art. 9) concerning the order of substantial forms, namely, that no substantial form is united to matter through the medium of another, but that a more perfect form gives to matter whatever an inferior form does, and something over and above. Hence the rational soul gives to the human body everything that the sentient soul gives to the brute and the vegetal soul gives to the plant, and something over and above. For this reason the soul in man is both vegetal, sentient, and rational.

The following example also attests to this, namely, that when the operation of one power is intense, that of another is impeded; and contrariwise, there is an overflowing of one power into another, which would occur only if all the powers were rooted in one and the same essence of the soul.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Having premised that the soul existing in the human body is substantially one only, this argument is answered in different ways by diverse men. For some claim that no soul exists in the embryo prior to the rational soul, but a certain power deriving from the soul of the parent. They maintain that the operations perceived in the embryo are caused by this power, which is called a formative one. But this is not altogether true, because there appears in the embryo not only the forming of the body (which can be attributed to the aforesaid power) but other operations as well; and these cannot be attributed to anything but a soul, such as growth, sensation, and the like. Nevertheless this position could be held if the aforesaid active principle in the embryo were called a power of a soul temporarily, and not a soul, because it is not yet a perfect one, just as the embryo is not a perfect animal. But then the same difficulty will remain. For some say that the vegetal soul exists in the embryo before the sentient soul, and the sentient before the rational, but not concomitantly. Indeed, they maintain that the semen gives rise to an actual vegetal soul as a result of an active principle existing in the semen. This soul in the course of time is brought to a higher degree of perfection by the process of generation and itself becomes a sentient soul, which in turn is brought to a still higher degree of perfection by an extrinsic principle, and becomes the rational soul. Now according to this position it follows that the substance itself of the rational soul comes from an active

principle existing in the semen, but that an additional perfection accrues to it finally from an extrinsic principle. And thus it would follow that the very substance of the rational soul is corruptible. For that cannot be incorruptible which is caused by a power existing in the semen. Therefore our explanation must be different, namely, that the generation of an animal is not one simple generation alone, but that many generations and corruptions follow one another. For it is said that first the animal has the form of semen, then the form of blood, and so on successively until generation is completed. And therefore since corruption and generation do not take place without the loss of one form and the acquisition of another, the imperfect form which first exists within the embryo must be discarded and a more perfect one assumed. This continues until the thing conceived has acquired its perfect form. Consequently it is said that the vegetal soul first exists in the semen, but that it is lost in the process of generation, and that another soul succeeds it which is not only vegetal, but also sentient. Then another soul is added to this which is at once vegetal, sentient, and rational.

2. The power existing in the semen which is derived from the father is a permanent intrinsic power, not one coming from an extrinsic principle, just as the power of the mover which exists in the thing thrown is intrinsic. Hence the power which is in the semen operates no matter how far away the father may be. For the active power which is in the semen cannot be caused by the mother (although some indeed maintain this), because the woman is not an active principle but a passive one. Nevertheless there is some similarity here, because, just as the thrower’s power, which is finite, moves an object to a definite place some distance away by local motion, so does the power of one generating move a thing to a determinate form by the movement of generation.

3. That power has the nature of a soul as has been explained. Therefore the embryo can be called an animal because of it.

4-8. The fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth objections are answered in the same way.

9. Inasmuch as the soul exists actually, but imperfectly, in the embryo, to that extent does it perform imperfect operations.

10. Although the sentient soul in the brute comes from an intrinsic principle, nevertheless in man the substance of the soul, which is at once

vegetal, sentient, and rational, comes from an extrinsic principle, ag has just been shown.

11. The sentient soul does not exist in man accidentally, but substantially, because it is substantially the same as the rational soul. However, a sentient power is an accident in man just as it is in other animals.

12. The sentient soul in man is nobler than that in other animals, because in man it is not only sentient but also rational.

13. As regards its very substance the sentient soul in man is incorruptible, because its substance is the substance of the rational soul, although perhaps the sentient powers, which are acts of the body, do not remain in existence after the body has corrupted, as some maintain.

14. If the sentient soul existing in brutes and that existing in man could of themselves be placed in a genus and a species, they would belong to one genus only logically speaking, according to some common intention. But the thing that exists expressly in a genus and a species is the composite of body and soul, and this composite is corrupted both in the case of man and in that of the animal.

15. The sentient soul in man is not a non-rational soul but is at once a sentient and rational soul. However, it is true that the soul's sentient powers as such are, indeed, non-rational, but participate in reason inasmuch as they obey reason. Moreover, the powers of the vegetal soul are wholly non-rational, because they do not obey reason, as is clear from what the Philosopher says in the Ethics [I, 13, 1102b 30].

16. Although in the body there are several principal members in which the principles of certain operations of a soul are manifested, nevertheless all depend upon the heart as the first bodily principle.

17. Powers operating through organs spring from the human soul inasmuch as it is united to the body. But powers not operating through organs spring from the soul inasmuch as it exceeds by its power the capacity of the body.

18. As is clear from the preceding questions, matter receives different grades of perfection from one and the same form. And so far as matter is perfected by an inferior grade of perfection, the material disposition for a higher grade of perfection still remains. Thus so far as the body is perfected in sensible being by the human soul, the body retains to that extent the nature of matter with respect to a higher perfection. And according to this,

animal, which is a genus, is derived from matter, and “rational,” which is a difference, is derived from form.,

19. As an animal as such is neither rational nor non-rational (but rational animal is man, and non-rational animal is brute animal), so is the sentient soul as such neither rational nor nonrational, but is rational in man and non-rational in’the brute.

20. Although the sentient and vegetal soul is one soul, still it is not necessary that the operation of one appear wherever the operation of the other appears, because of the diverse dispositions of parts. For this reason it also happens that all of the sentient soul’s operations are not exercised through one part; but sight is exercised through the eye, hearing through the ear, and so on for the rest.

ARTICLE 12

WHETHER THE SOUL IS ITS POWERS

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.77, A. 1; Q.54, A. 3; SENT., I, DIST. 3. Q.4, A. 2; QUODL. X, Q. 3, A. 1; DE SPIR. CREAT., A. 1]

In the twelfth article we examine this question: Whether the soul is its powers.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul is its powers. For it is said in the work De spiritu et anima [XIII] “The soul has its own natural powers, and is all of these, for its active and passive powers are the same as itself. It has accidents, and these are not its powers, nor are its virtues itself; for it is not its own prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude.” According to this it seems to be clearly maintained that the soul is its powers.

2. Further, it is stated in the same work: “The soul is designated by different names in accordance with the way in which it operates. For it is called soul when it vegetates, sense when it senses, spirit when it knows, mind when it understands, reason when it discerns, memory when it remembers, and will when it wills. However, these do not differ substantially but only in name, because all of these are the soul itself.” According to this the same thing would be maintained as is stated above.

3. Further, Bernard says [Liber meditationum, I]: “I distinguish three powers in the soul: memory, understanding, and will; and these three are the soul itself.” But the same thing is also true of the other powers of the soul. Hence the soul is its powers.

4. Further, Augustine says in the De Trinitate [X, 11] that memory, understanding, and will, are one life, one essence. Now the essence of the

soul is nothing if not one. Therefore the powers of the soul are the same as its essence.

5. Further, no accident goes beyond its subject. Now memory, understanding, and will, go beyond the soul; for the soul not only remembers itself, and understands and wills itself, but other things as well. Therefore these three powers are not accidents of the soul. Hence they are the same as its essence, and so also are its other powers for the same reason.

6. Further, an image of the Trinity is found in the soul with respect to these three powers. But an image of the Trinity is present in the soul so far as the soul itself is concerned, and not merely so far as its accidents are concerned. Therefore the aforementioned powers are not accidents of the soul and, consequently, belong to its essence.

7. Further, an accident is something that can be present or absent without its subject being corrupted. But the powers of the soul cannot be withdrawn from the soul. Therefore they are not accidents of it. Thus the conclusion here is the same as the foregoing.

8. Further, no accident is a principle of substantial difference, because a difference completes a thing’s definition, which definition signifies what a thing is. Now powers of a soul are principles of substantial differences, for a thing is said to be sensible in virtue of sense, and to be rational in virtue of reason. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents of it, but are the soul itself, which is the form of the body; for the form is the principle of substantial difference.

9. Further, a substantial form is more efficacious than an accidental one. But an accidental form acts by itself and not by some intermediary power. Therefore, so also does a substantial form. Consequently, since the soul is a substantial form, its powers, whereby it operates, do not differ from itself.

10. Further, the principle which gives a thing its act of existing, and that responsible for its operations, are one and the same. Now the soul in itself is the principle that gives a living thing its act of existing, because it is a form according to its very essence. Therefore its essence is a principle of operation. But a power is nothing more than a principle of operation. Consequently the essence of the soul is identical with its powers.

11. Further, the substance of the soul, inasmuch as it is in potency to intelligibles, is the possible intellect. However, inasmuch as the soul is in act with respect to intelligibles, its substance is the agent intellect. But to be

in act and to be in potency refer only to the thing itself which is in potency and in act. Therefore the soul is the agent intellect and the possible intellect, and is its other powers for the same reason.

12. Further, just as prime matter is in potency to sensible forms so also is the intellective soul in potency to intelligible forms. But prime matter is its own potency. Therefore the intellective soul is its own powers.

13. Further, the Philosopher says, in the Ethics [IX, 4, 1166a 16], that man is an intellect. But he is an intellect only by reason of his rational soul. Therefore the soul is the intellect, and, for the same reason, it is also its other powers.

14. Further, the Philosopher says, in the De anima [II, 1, 412a 20], that the soul is a first act, just as any science is. Now a science is the immediate principle of that second act which is cogitation itself. Therefore the soul is the immediate principle of its own operations. But the immediate principle of an operation is called a power. Consequently the soul is its powers.

15. Further, all parts of a whole are consubstantial with the whole, because a whole is composed of its parts. Now the powers of the soul are its parts, as is shown in the De anima [II, 1, 413a 3]. Therefore they are substantial parts of the soul and not accidents of it.

16. Further, whatever is a form alone (simplex) cannot be a subject.” But the, soul is a form alone, as we have shown above (Art. 6). Therefore it cannot be a subject of accidents. Consequently the powers which are present in the soul are not accidents of it.

17. Further, if the powers are accidents of the soul, they must flow from its essence; for proper accidents are caused by the principles of a subject. But the essence of the soul, so far as it reveals itself in its powers, cannot be the cause of so great a diversity of accidents, because it is simple. Therefore the powers of the soul are not its accidents. Consequently it is to be concluded that the soul is its powers.

On the contrary, essence is related to the act of existing (esse) as power (posse) is to action (agere). Therefore just as to be and to act are proportionally related to each other, so also are power and essence. Now to exist and to act are one and the same in God alone. Therefore power and essence are one and the same in God alone. Consequently the soul is not its powers

Further, no quality is a substance. But a natural power is a particular species of quality, as is revealed in the Categories [VIII, 9a 13]. Consequently the natural powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul.

I answer: There are different opinions about this question For some say that the soul is its powers, and others deny this, holding that the powers of the soul are certain properties of it. In order to see wherein these opinions differ we must understand that a power is nothing but a thing's principle of operation, whether it be an action or a passion [i.e., the undergoing of an action]. Indeed, a principle is not the subject acting or undergoing an action, but that by which an agent acts or a patient undergoes an action; just as the art of building is a power in the builder who builds by means of that power; and as heat is a power of fire, which heats by means of its heat; and as dryness is a power in pieces of wood, because they are combustible in virtue of this dryness. Consequently those who maintain that the soul is its powers, think that the essence itself of the soul is the immediate principle of all its operations. They say that a man understands, senses, and acts, and other things of this sort, by the essence of the soul, and that the soul is referred to by different names inasmuch as its operations differ. It is called sense inasmuch as it is the principle of sensation, intellect inasmuch as it is the principle of intellection and so on for the other powers; just as if, for example, we were to call the heat of fire its liquifying power, its heating power, and its drying power, because it does all of these.

Now this opinion cannot be maintained. First, indeed, because anything whatever that acts, acts according as it is in act. For fire heats not inasmuch as it is actually bright, but inasmuch as it is actually hot. It is for this reason that every agent produces an effect similar to itself. Wherefore the principle by which an agent acts must be known from its effects (quod agitur), for both must conform. Hence it is said in the Physics [II, 7, 198a 25] that the form and the thing generating are specifically the same." Therefore when an effect does not result from the substantial mode of existing of the one acting, it is impossible that the principle by which such an effect is brought about, belong in any way to the essence itself of the thing acting. This is quite evident in natural agents. For since a natural agent in generating acts by changing matter with respect to some form (which change occurs inasmuch as matter is first disposed to receive the form, and then acquires it according as generation is the terminus of alteration), the principle which acts immediately on the side of the agent must be an accidental form corresponding to the disposition of the matter. Now an accidental form must act in virtue of a substantial form, and as an instrument of the latter, otherwise it would not induce a substantial form by its activity. For this reason no principles of action appear in the elements except their active and passive qualities," which still act in virtue of their substantial forms; and on account of this their action is terminated not only in accidental dispositions, but in substantial forms as well. For in things made by art the action of an instrument is terminated in the form intended by the artisan. Indeed, if there is an agent that produces a substance directly and immediately by its action (just as we speak of God who produces the substances of things by creating them, and as Avicenna speaks of the Agent Intellect, which, by virtue of its own power, infuses substantial forms into these inferior things), then an agent of this sort acts through its own essence, and thus its active power will not differ from its own essence.

Concerning passive power, it is clear that a passive power which is ordered to substantial act, belongs to the genus of substance, whereas one that is ordered to accidental act, belongs to the genus of accident by reduction as a principle and not as a complete species, because every genus is divided by potency and act. Accordingly a potential man belongs to the genus of substance, and potentially white belongs to the genus of quality. Now it is evident that the powers of the soul, whether active or passive, are spoken of directly with respect to something substantial, but not with respect to something accidental. Similarly, to be understanding or sensing actually, is not a substantial mode of existing, but an accidental one to which the intellect and sense are directed. It is similar with respect to being large or small, to which the augmentative power is ordered. Indeed, the generative and nutritive powers are directed to the production or conservation of a substance, but by changing matter. Wherefore an action of this kind, like that of other natural agents, is performed by a substance through the medium of an accidental principle. Hence it is evident that the essence of the soul is not the immediate principle of its operations, but that it operates through accidental principles. Consequently the powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul but are properties of it.

This is also evident from the very diversity of the soul’s actions, which differ generically and cannot be attributed to one immediate principle; because some are actions and some are passions, and are distinguished by other differences of this sort which must be attributed to different principles. Consequently, since the essence of the soul is one principle, it cannot be the immediate principle of all its actions, but must have many different powers corresponding to its different actions; for a power is said to be reciprocally related to its act. Hence there must be a diversity of powers in accordance with the diversity of operations. For this reason the Philosopher says, in the Ethics [VI, 1, 1139a 5] that the scientific power of the soul, which is concerned with necessary things, and the ratiocinative power, which is concerned with contingent things, are different powers, because the necessary and the contingent differ generically.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. This book De spiritu et anima was not written by Augustine but is said to have been written by a certain Cistercian monk. Nor is there much to be said for the things which are set forth therein. If it is taken in an orthodox manner, however, it can be said that the soul is its powers or faculties, because they are its natural properties. Wherefore it is said in the same book that all powers are one soul, differing in property it is true, but one power. It would be a similar way of speaking if we were to say that heat, clarity, and brightness are one with fire.

2-4. The second, third, and fourth arguments are to be answered in the same way.

5. So far as its act of existing is concerned an accident does not go beyond its subject, but in so far as its operation is concerned it does; for the heat of fire heats something external to fire. It is in this way that the powers of the soul go beyond the soul itself, inasmuch as the soul understands and seeks not only itself but other things as well. Moreover, Augustine introduces this notion when he relates knowledge and love to the mind, not as the thing knowing and loving, but as that known and loved. For if he were to relate them to the soul itself in this way, as an accident to a subject, it would follow that the soul would know and love only itself. Perhaps it is in accordance with this meaning that he said, they are one life, one essence;

because actual knowledge is the thing known in a certain respect, and actual love, the thing loved.

6. An image of the Trinity is found in the soul not only with respect to the soul's powers, but also with respect to its essence; for the one essence of the three persons is represented in the soul, although in a very imperfect way. Moreover, if the soul were its powers, its powers would differ from each other in name only. Consequently the distinction between the Persons which is found in God, is not adequately represented [in the soul].

7. There are three genera of accidents: some are caused by the principles of the species, and are called proper accidents, for example, risibility in man; others are caused by the principles of the individual, and this class is spoken of [in two ways]: first, those that have a permanent cause in their subject, for example, masculine and feminine, and other things of this kind, and these are called inseparable accidents; secondly, those that do not have a permanent cause in their subject, such as to sit and to walk, and these are called separable accidents. Now no accident of any kind ever constitutes part of the essence of a thing, and thus an accident is never found in a thing's definition. Hence we understand the essence (quod quid est) of a thing without thinking of any of its accidents. However, the species cannot be understood without the accidents which result from the principles of the species [i.e., the proper accidents], although the species can be understood without the accidents of the individual, even the inseparable accidents. Indeed, there can be not only a species but also an individual without the separable accidents. Now the powers of the soul are accidents in the sense of properties. Therefore, although the essence of the soul is understood without them, still the existence of the soul is neither possible nor intelligible without them.

8. Inasmuch as sensible and rational are essential differences, they are not derived from sense and intellect, but from the sentient and intellective soul.

9. For this reason the substantial form is not the immediate principle of acrion in inferior agents, as we have shown.

10. The soul is the principle of operation; however, it is the first principle, not a proximate one, for powers operate by virtue of the soul itself, just as the qualities of the elements operate by virtue of their substantial forms.

11. The soul itself is in potency to the intelligible forms themselves, but this potency is not the essence of the soul; just as the potency to be a statue,

which is in the copper, is not the essence of copper. For actual and potential existence do not belong to the essence of a thing, because act is not of the essence.

12. Prime matter is in potency to substantial act which is form; and therefore potency is the very essence of prime matter.

13. Man is said to be an intellect because the intellect is said to be the highest thing in man; just as the state is said to be the governor of the state. However, this does not mean that the essence of the soul is the intellective power itself.

14. The soul is seen to be similar to a science inasmuch as each is a first act, but such similarity does not exist in every respect. Consequently the soul is not necessarily the immediate principle of its operations, just as a science is.

15. The powers of the soul are not essential parts of it as though constituting its essence, but are potential parts, because a virtue of the soul is distinguished by powers of this kind.

16. Whatever is a form in its entirety and is not a subsisting thing, or if it is a subsisting thing that is pure act, cannot be the subject of an accident. Now the soul is a subsisting form and is not pure act, that is, if we speak of the human soul. Therefore it can be the subject of certain powers, such as the intellect and the will. Moreover, the powers of the sentient and nutritive parts are in the composite as a subject; because whatever has an act, has a power, as is shown by the Philosopher in the work De somno et vigilia [I, 458b 34].

159 17. Although the soul is one in essence, yet it contains potency and act and is diversely related to things. It is also related in a different way to the body; and for this reason different powers can proceed from one and the same essence of the soul.

ARTICLE 13

WHETHER THE POWERS OF THE SOUL ARE DISTINGUISHED FROM ONE ANOTHER BY THEIR OBJECTS

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 77, A. 3; COMM. IN DE ANIMA, II, LECT. 6. FOR A DETAILED TREATMENT OF THE VARIOUS POWERS OF MAN, SEE SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.78 TO 82.]

The distinction between the powers of the soul is examined in the thirteenth article, that is: Whether the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another by their objects.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the powers of the soul are not distinguished in this way. For the things which differ most from one another are contraries. But a contrariety of objects does not diversify powers, because the same power of vision apprehends both white and black. Therefore a difference [i.e., a specific diversity] of objects does not diversify powers.

2. Further, things which differ substantially differ more than those which differ accidentally. Now a man and a stone differ substantially, whereas a sound and something colored differ accidentally. Therefore, since a man and a stone are apprehended by the same power, so much the more so are a sound and something colored. Hence a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers.

3. Further, if a difference of objects were the cause of the diversity of powers, one and the same object would necessarily cause powers to be identical. Now we see that one and the same object is apprehended by different powers. For the same object is known and desired, because an

intelligible good is the object of the will. Consequently a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers.

4. Further, wherever the cause is the same, the effect is also the same. Therefore, if different objects diversified some powers, they would necessarily have to cause a diversity of powers in every case. However, we do not observe this. For sometimes different objects are certainly related to different powers, as sound and color are related to hearing and to vision respectively; and, at other times, these same objects are related to one and the same power, namely, to the imagination and to the intellect. Hence it follows that a diversity of objects is not the cause of the diversity of powers.

5. Further, habits (habitus) are perfections of powers. Moreover, perfectible things are distinguished from one another by their proper perfections. Consequently powers are distinguished by their habits and not by their objects.

6. Further, whatever exists in a thing exists in it according to the mode of the recipient. But the powers of the soul exist in the organs of the body, for they are the acts of these organs. Therefore the powers of the soul are distinguished by the organs of the body and not by their objects.

7. Further, the powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul, but are properties of it. Now the properties of a thing spring from its essence. However, only one thing comes directly from a single thing. Therefore, first of all one single power of the soul comes from its essence, and then the other powers proceed therefrom in a certain order through the medium of this [first] power. Hence the powers of the soul differ according to origin and not according to objects.

8. Further, if the powers of the soul are diverse, one of them must come from another, for all of them do not come directly from the essence of the soul, because it is one and simple. But it is seen to be impossible for one power of the soul to come from another. First, because all powers of the soul exist simultaneously. Secondly, because accidents have their existence in a subject, and one accident cannot be the subject of another. Therefore the diversity among the soul’s powers cannot be a result of the diversity among objects.

9. Further, the higher a substance is, the greater is its power and, as a result, less diversified (multiplicata), because every simple power is unlimited more than it is multiplied, as is said in the book De causis [27].

Now the soul is the most perfect of all inferior beings. Therefore its power is more unified than theirs, and still extends to many things. Consequently its power is not multiplied because of the diversity among objects.

10. Further, if the diversity among the soul's powers depends on the diversity among objects, the order among the soul's powers must also depend on the order among these objects. However, this is seen not to be the case, for the intellect, whose object is the quiddity (quod quid est) and substance, is subsequent to the senses, whose objects are accidents such as color and sound. Furthermore, touch is prior to sight, while the visible is prior to and more common than the tangible. Consequently there is not a diversity of powers merely because there is a difference of objects.

11. Further, every appetible object is either sensible or intelligible. Now the intelligible is the perfection of the intellect, and the sensible is the perfection of sense. Therefore, since any being naturally desires its perfection, it follows that intellect and sense naturally desire every appetible object. Hence it is unnecessary to admit the existence of any appetitive power other than the sentient.

12. Further, no appetite exists except the will and the irascible and concupiscible appetite. But the will belongs to the intellective order, and the concupiscible and irascible appetites belona to the order of sense, as is pointed out in the De anima [III, 9, 432b 5]. Therefore no appetitive power must be held to exist in addition to the sentient and intellective.

13. Further, the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 10, 433a 9] that the principles of local motion in an animal are sense or imagination, intellect and appetite. But a power in animals is nothing else than a principle of movement. Therefore there is no motive power except the cognitive and appetitive powers.

14. Further, the powers of the soul are directed to something higher than nature, otherwise there would be powers (vires) of the soul in all natural thinas. But the powers which are assigned to the vegetal soul do not appear to be directed to anything higher than nature. For the vegetal soul is directed to the conservation of the species through generation; to the preservation of the individual through nutrition; and to the [development] of the individual's proper size through augmentation. Now in natural things, nature too performs all of these activities. Consequently the powers of the soul must not be directed to such activities.

15. Further, the higher a power, the greater is its unity and the more numerous are the things to which it extends. But a power of the soul is higher than a power of nature. Therefore, since nature by one and the same power gives existence to a natural body, bestows on it its proper size, and preserves it in existence, it seems a fortiori that the soul does these things through one power. Therefore the generative, nutritive, and augmentative powers are not diverse powers.

16. Further, sense is cognizant of accidents. But certain other accidents differ from one another to a greater degree than do sound and color and the like, which exist not only in the same genus of quality, but also in the same species, namely, the third [kind of quality]. Therefore, if powers are distinguished according to the difference of objects, the powers of the soul should not be distinguished by accidents of this kind, but rather by others which differ from each other to a greater degree.

17. Further, there is one first contrary in any genus. Therefore, if the sentient powers are diversified because of the different genera of possible qualities, it seems that there are diverse sentient powers wherever there are diverse contraries. Now in some cases this does occur, for sight apprehends both white and black, and hearing apprehends both low and high notes; but in other cases it does not, for touch apprehends both hot and cold, wet and dry, soft and hard, and so on. Consequently powers are not distinguished from one another by’ their objects.

18. Further, memory does not appear to be a power distinct from sense. For, according to the Philosopher, memory is a passion of a first sense. However, their objects differ, because the object of sense exists in the present, and the object of memory, in the past. Hence powers are not distinguished from one another by their objects.

19. Further, all things known by the senses are also known by the. intellect, which is cognizant of many other things as well. Therefore, if the sentient powers are distinguished from one another by reason of a plurality of objects, the intellect must also be distinguished into different powers, just as sense is. This is evidently false.

20. Further, the possible and agent intellect are different powers, as has been shown above (Arts. 3-5). But the object of both is the same. Therefore powers are not distinguished from one another because of a difference of objects.

On the contrary, it is said in the De anima [II, 4, 415a 14] that powers are distinguished by acts, and acts by objects.

Further, perfectible things are distinguished from one another by their perfections. But the objects of powers are the perfections of powers. Therefore powers are distinguished by their objects.

I answer: A power as such is spoken of in relation to an act. Hence a power must be defined by its act, and powers in turn distinguished ‘from one another inasmuch as their acts are different. Now acts derive their species from their objects, because, if they are acts of passive powers, their objects are active. However, if they are the acts of active powers, their objects are as ends. Now the species of an operation must be considered in both of these ways. For the act of heating and that of making cold are distinguished from one another, because the principle of the former is heat, and that of the latter, cold. Besides, both are terminated in similar ends. For an agent acts in order that it may cause something similar to itself to exist in another. It follows, therefore, that the distinction between the powers of the soul is based on a difference [i.e., a specific diversity] of objects.

Now it is necessary to consider the difference between objects in this way and in this way alone, namely, that objects specifically differentiate the actions of the soul. For a species is differentiated in any genus only by the [specific] differences which essentially divide the genus. The species of “animal,” for instance, are not distinguished by white and by black, but by rational and non-rational. Furthermore, it is necessary to consider three grades in the actions of a soul. For the action of a soul transcends that of the nature operating in inanimate things. But this occurs in two ways. First, with respect to the manner of acting; secondly, with respect to what is produced by the action. ow with respect to the manner of acting, every action of a soul must transcend the operation or action of an inanimate nature. For every operation of a soul must proceed from some intrinsic agent, because an action of a soul is a vital action (moreover, every living thing is one that moves itself to operation). However, so far as the effect produced is concerned, not every action of a soul transcends an action of the nature of an inanimate thing. For the effect produced, that is, a natural mode of existing (esse naturale), and the things necessary for it, must be present in the case of inanimate bodies just as they are in the case of animate ones. But in the case of inanimate bodies, the effect is brought about by an extrinsic agent, whereas in the case of animate bodies, it is caused by an intrinsic agent. The actions to which the powers of a vegetal soul are directed, are of this sort. For the generative power is directed to giving existence to the individual thing; the augmentative power, to giving the thing its proper size; and the nutritive power, to preserving the thing in existence. But in inanimate things these effects are brought about only by an extrinsic agent. For this reason the aforementioned powers of a soul are said to be natural.

However, there are other higher actions of a soul which transcend the actions of natural forms, and also the effects produced by them, seeing that all things are disposed by nature to exist in the soul with an immaterial existence. For the human soul, in a certain respect, is all things by sensing and understanding. Moreover, there must be different grades of such immaterial existence. For there is one grade inasmuch as things exist in the soul without their proper matter, but with the singularity and individuating conditions which are the result of matter. This is the grade of sense, which is receptive of individual species without matter, yet receives them in a bodily organ. Now the intellect which receives species completely abstracted from matter and material conditions, and without [the aid of] a bodily organ, constitutes a higher and more perfect grade of immateriality. Furthermore, just as a thing has a natural inclination toward something, and has movement and action in order to pursue that toward which it is inclined through its natural form, so also does the inclination toward a thing apprehended by sense or by intellect, follow upon the apprehension of a sensible or intelligible form. This inclination belongs to the appetitive power. And again, as a consequence of this, there must be some movement by which the thing [having sense or intellect] attains the thing desired. This pertains to the motive power.

Moreover, five things are required for the perfect sense knowledge which an animal should have. First, that sense receive species from sensible things and this pertains to the proper sense. Secondly, that the animal make some judgment about the sensible qualities received, and distinguish them one from another, and this must be done by a power to which all sensible qualities are related. This power is called the common sense (sensuscommunis). Thirdly, that the species of sensible things which have been received be retained. Now an animal needs to apprehend sensible things not only when they are present, but also after they have disappeared. And it is necessary that this also be attributed. to some power. For in corporeal things there is one principle that receives, and another that retains, because things which are good recipients are sometimes poor retainers. This power is called imagination or “phantasy” (phantasia). In the fourth place, the animal must know certain intentions which sense [i.e., the external sense] does not apprehend, such as the harmful, the useful, and so on. Man, indeed, acquires a knowledge of these by investigation and by inference, but other animals, by a certain natural instinct. For example, the sheep flees naturally from the wolf as something harmful. Hence in animals other than man a natural estimative power is directed to this end, but in man there is a cogitative power which collates particular intentions. This is why it is called both particular reason and passive intellect.15 In the fifth place, it is necessary that those things which were, first apprehended by sense and conserved interiorly, be recalled again to actual consideration. This belongs to a memorative power, which operates without any investigation in the case of some animals, but with investigation and study in the case of men. Therefore in men there is not only memory but also reminiscence.”‘ Moreover it was necessary that a power distinct from the others be directed to this end, because the activity of the other sentient powers entails a movement from things to the soul, whereas the activity of the memorative power entails an opposite movement from the soul to things. But diverse movements require diverse motive principles, and motive principles are called powers.

Now because the proper sense, which is first in the order of sentient powers, is changed immediately by sensible objects, it was necessary for it to be divided into different powers in accordance with the diversity of sensible modifications. For the grade and order of modifications by which the senses are altered by sensible qualities, must be considered in relation to immaterial modifications, because sense is receptive of sensible species without matter. Hence there are some sensible objects whose species, although they are received immaterially in the senses, still cause a material modification in sentient animals. Now qualities which are also principles of change in material things are of this sort, for instance, hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like. Hence, because sensible qualities of this kind also modify us by acting upon us, and because material modification is made by contact, it was necessary that such sensible qualities be sensed by making contact with them. This is the reason why the sensory power experiencing such qualities is called touch. However, there are some sensible qualities which do not, indeed, change us materially, although their mutation has a material change connected with it. This occurs in two ways. First, in this way, that the material change affects the sensible quality as well as the one sensing. This pertains to taste. For, although the taste of a thing does not change the sense organ by making it the tasted thing itself, nevertheless this modification does not occur without some change taking place in the thing tasted as well as in the organ of taste, and particularly as a result of moisture. Secondly, in this way, that the material change affects the sensible quality alone. Now change of this sort is caused either by a dissipation and alteration of the sensible object, as occurs, for instance, in the sense of smell, or by a local change only, as occurs in the case of hearing. So it is that hearing and smell sense not by contact with an object, but through an extrinsic medium, because they occur without a material change on the side of the one sensing, although material change does take place in the sensible object. However, taste alone senses by contact, because it requires a material modification in the one sensing. Furthermore, there are other sensibilia which modify a sense without a material change being involved, such as light and color, and the sense which apprehends these is sight. Hence sight is the noblest of all the senses and extends to more objects than the other senses do (universalia), because the sensible qualities perceived by it are common both to corruptible and incorruptible bodies.

Similarly the appetitive power, which follows the apprehension of the senses, must be divided twofoldly. For a thing is appetible either because it is delightful and suitable to the senses, and the concupiscible power is directed to this; or because the capacity of enjoying things delightful to the senses is made possible through it, which sometimes occurs together with something that is displeasing to sense. For instance, when an animal by fighting makes possible the enjoyment of something properly delightful by driving away anything that hinders this. The irascible power is directed to this end.

Moreover, since the motive power is directed to local movement, it is diversified only with respect to different [local] movements. These movements may differ for different animals, since some of them are able to crawl, some to fly, some to walk, and some to move in other ways; or they may differ for different parts of one and the same animal, because the particular parts of the body have their own movements.

Again, the grades of intellectual powers are similarly distinguished into cognitive and appetitive. Moreover, movement is common to sense and to the intellect, for the same body is moved by each of these powers through one and the same movement. Again intellectual cognition requires two powers, namely, the agent intellect and the possible intellect, as is clear from the previous articles.

Consequently it is obvious that there are three grades of powers in the soul, namely, the vegetal, sentient, and rational. Moreover, there are five genera of powers, i.e., the nutritive, sentient, intellective, appetitive, and locomotive, and each of these contains many powers under itself, as has been pointed out.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Contraries are the things which differ most from each other, but within the same genus. Moreover, generically different objects befit diverse powers [or potencies], because a genus is also potential in a certain respect. Therefore contraries are r0ated to one and the same power [or potency].

2. Although sound and color differ as accidents, yet they differ essentially (per se) so far as the alteration which they produce in sense is concerned, as has been explained. However a man and a stone do not, because sense is modified in the same way by them. Therefore a man and a stone differ accidentally so far as they are sensed, although they differ substantially as substances. For nothing prevents a difference from being related substantially to one genus, and accidentally to another, as white and black differ essentially in the genus of color, but not in that of substance.

3. The same thing is not related to different powers of the soul, according to the same formal object (ratione objecti), but according to different objects.

4. The higher a power, the more numerous are the things to which it extends. Hence the formal object of such a power has greater scope. This is why certain things that convene in the formal object of a superior power, are separated from each other in the formal object of inferior powers.

5. Habits are not perfections of powers as though powers existed for the sake of habits, but habits exist for the sake of powers in order that powers may better attain their objects. For this reason powers are not distinguished by habits, but by objects, just as things made by art are not distinguished by objects but by ends.

6. Powers do not exist for the sake of organs but vice versa. Consequently organs are distinguished from one another by objects rather than the reverse.

7. A soul has some particular end, just as the human soul has an intelligible good as its end. Besides, it also has other ends ordered to this ultimate end, just as the sensible is ordered to the intelligible. And because the soul is directed to its object through its powers, it also follows that in man the sentient power exists for the sake of the intellective; and so on. Thus, with respect to the notion of end, one power arises from another because of the relationship of their objects. Hence the distinction between the powers of the soul from the point of view of origin and that of objects, involves no opposition.

8. Although an accident by its very nature cannot be the subject of another accident, nevertheless a subject is determined by one accident through the intermediary of another, just as a body is subject to color through the medium of its surface. Thus one accident proceeds from its subject through the medium of another accident, and one power of the soul proceeds from its essence through the medium of another power.

9. The soul by one power can bring itself to bear on more objects than a natural thing can, just as sight apprehends all visible objects. But the soul, by reason of its nobility, performs many more operations than inanimate things do, and therefore must have several powers.

10. The order among the soul’s powers is according to the order among their objects. But order can be observed in both, either in relation to perfection, and in this case the intellect is prior to sense; or in relation to the process of generation, and in this case sense is prior to the intellect. For in the process of generation an accidental disposition is induced prior to the substantial form.

11. The intellect naturally desires the intelligible as such. For the intellect by nature desires to know, and sense desires to sense. But there must be an appetitive power in addition to sense and intellect, because the sensible or

intelligible object is desired not merely in order that it may be sensed and understood, but also for some other end. Therefore there must be an appetitive power in addition to sense and intellect. The will exists in the intellective order inasmuch as it follows the apprehension of the intellect. Indeed, the will belongs to the same grade of operation, namely, operations of the soul, but not to the same genus. The same thing must be said for the irascible and concupiscible appetite in relation to sense.

13. The intellect and appetite cause movement inasmuch as they command movement. But there must exist a motive power which executes movement according as the members of the body follow the command of appetite, intellect, or sense.

14. The powers of the vegetal soul are called natural powers because they operate only as nature does in bodies. But they are called powers of a soul because such powers do the things that nature does, in a more superior way, as was previously shown.

15. A real inanimate being receives its species and proper size at the same time. This is not possible in living things which require the least possible size at the beginning of generation, because they are generated from semen. Therefore in addition to the generative power which these things possess, there must exist also an augmentative power which produces their proper size. Moreover, this must occur in view of the fact that something is changed within a substance by augmentation and is added to that substance. Furthermore, this change is brought about by heat, which transforms both what is taken in from without, and also what exists within the thing itself. Hence a nutritive power is necessary for the conservation of the individual in order that whatever is lost may be continually restored; that whatever is lacking for the completion of its size may be added; and that whatever is necessary for the generation of semen may be produced. This nutritive power serves both the augmentative and the generative power, and thereby preserves the individual in existence.

16. Sound and color and things of this sort differ according to the different way in which they modify sense. However, they are not sensibilia of different genera. Therefore the sensory powers are not differentiated by them.

17. In the De anima [II, 6, 418a 14] the Philosopher concludes that touch is not one sense but many, because the contraries which touch experiences

are not brought together under one and the same genus, as the different contraries which can be considered in visible things are brought together under one and the same genus of color. Nevertheless all are alike in this respect, that they do not sense through an external medium; and all are called touch, so that there is one sense generically, divided into several species. However, it could be said that there is one sense pure and simple (simpliciter), because all the contraries of which touch is cognitive are known of themselves (per se); for they are known alternately and brought together under one genus, although this is unnamed, since the proximate genus both of heat and of cold is unnamed.

18. Since the powers of the soul are properties of it, memory is not prevented from being a power distinct from a first sense because memory is said to be a passion of a first sense. This statement shows the way in which memory is related to sense.

19. Sense receives the species of sensible things in the organs of the body and perceives singulars. However, the intellect receives o the species of things without a bodily organ and is cognizant of universals. Hence a diversity of objects requires a diversity of powers in the sentient part, which does not require a diversity of powers in the intellective part. For in material things reception and retention are not one and the same, whereas in immaterial things these activities are one and the same. It is also necessary to distinguish the senses from, one another with respect to the different modes of change involved. But this is unnecessary in the case of the intellect.

20. The same object, namely, the intelligible species in act, is related to the agent intellect as that which is produced by this intellect; and to the possible intellect as that which moves the possible intellect. Thus it is obvious that the same thing is not related in the same respect both to the agent intellect and to the possible intellect.

ARTICLE 14

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IS INCORRUPTIBLE

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.75, A.6; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 79, 80, 81; QUODL., X, Q.3, A.1; SENT., II, DIST. 19, A. 1; IV, DIST. 50, Q. 1, A. 1; COMPEND. THEOL., CHAP. 84.]

The incorruptibility of the human soul is examined in the fourteenth article.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul is corruptible, for we read: “The death of man and the beast is one and the condition of them both is equal” (Eccles. 3: 19). Now when beasts die their soul perishes with them. Consequently when a man dies, his soul perishes along with his body.

2. Further, it is said that the corruptible and the incorruptible are generically diverse. But the human soul and the soul of beasts are not generically diverse, because man belongs to the same genus [animal] as the beast. With respect to corruptibility and incorruptibility, therefore, the soul of man and that of the beasts do not differ. But the soul of the beast is corruptible. Therefore the human soul is not incorruptible.

3. Further, Damascene says [De fide orth. II, 3], that an angel is endowed with incorruptibility, not by virtue of its own nature but by the gift of grace. The angel, however, is not a soul inferior to the human. Consequently the soul is not incorruptible by its very nature.

4. Further, the Philosopher proves in the Physics [VIII, 10, 267b 19] that the Prime Mover has infinite power because He moves in infinite time. Hence, if the soul has the power of remaining in existence for an infinite length of time, it follows that this power is itself infinite. But the essence of an infinite power is not finite. Therefore, if the soul is incorruptible, its

essence is infinite. But this is impossible, for the divine essence alone is infinite. Consequently the human soul is not incorruptible.

5. It may be objected that the soul is incorruptible, not by virtue of its own essence but by virtue of the power of God. On the other hand, whatever does not belong to a thing by virtue of its own essence is not essential to it; and, as the Philosopher points out in the Metaphysics [X, 10, 1058b 36–1059a 9] corruptible and incorruptible are predicated essentially of everything whatever. Hence, if the soul is incorruptible, it must necessarily be incorruptible in virtue of its own essence.

6. Further, everything that exists is either corruptible or incorruptible. Hence, if the human soul is not incorruptible by virtue of its very nature, it follows that it is corruptible by virtue of its very nature.

7. Further, every incorruptible thing has the power of existing forever. Thus, if the human soul is incorruptible, it has the power of existing forever. In that case the human soul did not come into existence but always existed. This is contrary to faith.

8. Further, Augustine says [De civitate Dei, XIX, 26], that as God is the life of the soul, so the soul is the life of the body. But death is the privation of life. Therefore by death the soul is deprived of life and is destroyed.

9. Further, a form has actual existence only in the thing in which it exists. Thus, if the soul is the form of the body, it can exist only in a body. Hence it ceases to exist when the body corrupts.

10. The objection may be raised that, although this argument truly applies to the soul as a form, it does not hold so far as the essence of the soul is concerned. On the contrary, the soul is not the form of the body in an accidental way, otherwise, since the soul is constitutive of man inasmuch as it is the form of the body, it would follow that man would be a being per accidens. But whatever does not belong to a thing accidentally, belongs to it by its very essence. Consequently the soul is a form according to its very essence. Hence, if the soul is corruptible inasmuch as it is a form, it will likewise be corruptible according to its very essence.

11. Further, things having one and the same act of existing (esse) in common are so intimately related to each other that, if one of them is corrupted, the other or others are thereby corrupted also. But the soul and the body have one and the same act of existing in common, namely, the act

of existing of a man. Therefore, when the body is corrupted, the soul is also corrupted.

12. Further, in man the sentient soul and the rational soul are substantially one and the same. But the sentient soul is corruptible. Therefore the rational soul is also corruptible.

13. Further, a form ought to be proportioned to a matter. But the human soul exists in the body as a form in matter. Therefore, since the body is corruptible, so too is the soul.

14. Further, if the soul can exist in separation from the body, then the soul must be able to perform some operation without ‘the body, for no substance is functionless. Now without the body the soul can do nothing; it cannot even perform an act of knowledge. This is evident from the fact that intellection is impossible without a phantasm, as the Philosopher points out [De anima, III, 7, 431a 14], and there are no phantasms without the body. Consequently the soul cannot exist in separation from the body but ceases to exist when the body corrupts.

15. Further, the argument that the human soul is incorruptible could be based only on the assumption that it is intellective. But it seems that the soul is not intellective. For the highest part of a being of an inferior nature in some way strives to imitate the action of the being superior to it. Thus the ape in some way imitates the action of a man, and yet does not attain to the human level. Similarly, in view of the fact that man occupies the highest rank in the order of material things, it seems that he in some fashion imitates the action of the separate intellectual substances, namely, the act of intellection, and yet does not really attain to it. Hence there does not seem to be any necessary reason for holding that the human soul is immortal.

16. Further, either all or at least most of the members of any given species participate in the type of activity proper to that species. But actually very few men succeed in being intelligent. Intellectual operation, therefore, is not the type of operation proper to the human soul. Consequently the human soul need not be incorruptible simply because it is intellectual.

17. Further, the Philosopher points out in the Physics [I, 4, 187b 25] that every finite thing comes to an end, since something is always being taken away from it. But the natural good of the soul is a finite good. Therefore, since the natural good of the soul is .diminished through sin, it seems that in

the end this good will be totally removed; and hence that the human soul will at some time cease to exist.

18. Further, it is evident from our observation of the soul’s operations, that when the body grows weak the soul grows weak also. Therefore, when the body corrupts, the soul also corrupts.

19. Further, everything that is created can also be annihilated. Now the human soul has been created; therefore it can be annihilated; and thus it follows that the soul is corruptible.

20. Further, so long as a cause continues to operate, its effect continues to exist. Now the soul is the cause of life in the body. Therefore, if the soul always continues to exist, it seems that the body should go on living forever. This is clearly false.

21. Further, everything that subsists of itself is a particular thing (hoc aliquid) belonging to some species or genus. Now since the human soul is a form, it appears that it is not a particular thing, and that it does not belong to a species or to a genus as an individual member of the former or as a species of the latter. For to exist in a genus or in a species belongs to a composite [of matter and form], and not to matter or to form taken separately, except by reduction. Therefore the human soul is not a self-subsisting entity, and thus cannot continue to exist once the body has corrupted.

On the contrary, it is written: “God made man inexterminable, and in the image of His own likeness He made him” (Wis. 2:23); from which it may be inferred that man is inexterminable, that is, incorruptible, inasmuch as he is made in the image of God. But as Augustine says in the book De Trinitate [X, 12] it is with respect to man’s soul that he is made in the image of God. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.

Further, everything that is corrupted has contraries, or is made up of contraries. But the human soul is completely devoid of contrariety, for even those things which are themselves contraries are not contraries in the soul, because the concepts of contitries existing in the soul are not themselves actual contraries. Hence the human soul is incorruptible.

Further, the celestial bodies are said to be incorruptible because they do not have matter of the sort found in generable and corruptible things. But the human soul is absolutely immaterial. This is evident from the fact that it receives the species of things immaterially. Hence the soul is incorruptible.

Further, the Philosopher says [De Anima, II, 2, 413b 24-29] that the intellect differs [from other powers] as the eternal differs from the perishable. But the intellect is a part of the soul, as he himself points out. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.

I answer: It must necessarily be granted that the human soul is incorruptible. In proof of this we must take into consideration the fact that whatever belongs to a thing in virtue of its very nature (per se), cannot be taken away from it; for example, animality cannot be taken away from man, nor can the even and odd be taken away from number. Moreover it is evident that the act of existing in itself is a result of a form, for everything has its act of existing from its proper form; wherefore its act of existing can in no way be separated from its form. Therefore things composed of matter and form are corrupted by losing the form that gives them their act of existing. Moreover a form itself cannot be corrupted in itself (per se), but is corrupted accidentally as a result of the disintegration of the composite, inasmuch as the composite, which exists in virtue of its form, ceases to exist as a composite. This indeed, is the case if the form is one that does not have an act of existing in itself, but is merely that by which a composite exists.

Now if there is a form having an act of existing in itself, then that form must be incorruptible. For a thing having an act of existing (esse) does not cease to exist unless its form is separated from it. Hence if the thing having an act of existing is itself a form, it is impossible for its act of existing to be separated from it. Now it is evident that the principle by which a man understands is a form having its act of existing in itself and is not merely that by which something exists. For, as the Philosopher proves in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 3], intellection is not an act executed by any bodily organ. The main reason why there is no bodily organ capable of receiving the sensible forms of all natural things, is that the recipient must itself be deprived of the nature of the thing received; just as the pupil of the eye does not possess the color that it sees. Now every bodily organ possesses a sensible nature. But the intellect, by which we understand, is capable of apprehending all sensible natures. Therefore its operation, namely, understanding, cannot be carried out by a bodily organ. Thus it is clear that the intellect has an operation of its own in which the body does not share. Now a thing operates in accordance with its nature (quod est), for things that exist of themselves have an operation of their own, whereas things that do not exist of themselves have no operation of their own. For example, heat in itself does not produce warmth, but something hot. Consequently it is evident that the intellective principle, by which man understands, has it own mode of existing superior to that of the body and not dependent upon it.

It is also evident that an intellective principle of this sort is not a thing composed of matter and form, because the species of things are received in it in an absolutely immaterial way, as is shown by the fact that the intellect knows universals, which are considered in abstraction from matter and from material conditions. The sole conclusion to be drawn from all this, then, is that the intellective principle, by which man understands, is a form having its act of existing in itself. Therefore this principle must be incorruptible. This indeed agrees with the Philosopher’s dictum [De anima, III, 5, 430a 22] that the intellect is something divine and everlasting. Now it was shown in preceding articles (Articles 2 and 5), that the intellective principle, by which man understands, is not a substance existing apart from man but is something formally inhering in him which is either the soul or a part of the soul. Thus, from the foregoing considerations we conclude that the human soul is incorruptible.

Now all those who held that the human soul is corruptible missed’some of the points we have already made. Some of these people, holding that the soul is a body, declared that it is not a form in its entirety, but a thing composed of matter and form. Others held that the intellect does not differ from the senses, and so they declared that the intellect does not operate except through a bodily organ; that it does not have a higher mode of existence than that of the body, and, therefore, that it is not a form having an act of existing in its own right. Still others held that the intellect, by which man understands, is a separate substance. But the falsity of all these opinions has been demonstrated in preceding articles. It therefore remains that the human soul is incorruptible.

Two additional arguments can be considered as an indication of this: First, respecting the intellect itself, because we see that even those things which are corruptible in themselves are incorruptible so far as they are perceived by the intellect. For the intellect apprehends things in and through universal concepts, and things existing in this [universalized conceptual] mode are not subject to corruption. Secondly, the natural appetite also provides an argument for the incorruptibility of the soul. Natural appetite [desire springing from the nature of man] cannot be frustrated. Now we observe in men the desire for perpetual existence. This desire is grounded in reason. For to exist (esse) being desirable in itself, an intelligent being who apprehends existence in the absolute sense, and not merely the here and now, must desire existence in the absolute sense and for all time. Hence it is clear that this desire is not vain, but that man, in virtue of his intellective soul, is incorruptible.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. In the Book of Ecclesiastes (3:19) Solomon speaks as a popular orator, at one time representing the wisdom of the wise, at another, the stupidity of fools. The text quoted is an example of the latter. Or it may be said that the death of man and that of the beast is one and the same so far as the dissolution of the composite is concerned, since, for the one as for the other, this dissolution is brought about by the separation of the soul from the body. But there is this difference: after that separation occurs, the human soul remains in existence, whereas the soul of the brute does not.

2. Even if the human soul and the soul of brutes were brought under the same [logical] genus, nevertheless they would still exist in different natural genera; for the corruptible and the incorruptible are, of necessity, generically different in reality, although they can be ranged under one common concept; that is, from the standpoint of logic they can be considered under the same generic notion. Moreover, the soul does not exist in a genus as a species thereof, but as a part of a species. Yet both the composites in question are corruptible: the composite of which the human soul is a part, as well as the composite of which the soul of brutes is a part. Hence there is no reason why both types of soul may not belong to one and the same [logical] genus.

3. As Augustine says, true immortality and true immutability are the same. Moreover it is through grace that both the soul and the angel possess that immutability which results from free choice and which prevents them from changing from good to evil.

4. The act of existing (esse) is related to a form as something consequent upon the form in virtue of its very nature, and not as an effect to its efficient

cause, in the manner in which motion, for example, is related to the power of the thing that produces it. Consequently, although the fact that a thing can move in infinite time may prove that its movement is infinite, nevertheless the fact that a thing can exist in infinite time does not prove that the form whereby it exists is infinite; any more than the fact that a given quantity is always equal proves that it is infinite. On the contrary, the fact that a thing exists in infinite time proves the infinite power of that which is the cause of its being.

5. Corruptible and incorruptible are essential predicates because they belong to the essence of a thing as a formal or material Principle and not as an active principle. However, the active principle of the perpetual act of existing enjoyed by some things is external to them.

6. The answer to the sixth objection is clear from what was said above.

7. The soul has the power of existing forever, but it did not always [i.e., before it existed] have that power. Hence the soul need not always have existed, but it must never cease to exist in the future.

8. The soul is called the form of the body inasmuch as it is the cause of life, just as the form is the principle of a thing’s act of existing; because for living things, to live (vivere) is to exist (esse), as the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 4, 415b 8].

9. The soul is a form of such a kind that its act of existing does not depend on the subject of which it is the form. Its proper operation proves this, as was shown above (Arts. 8-9).

10. Although the soul is a form by its very essence, nevertheless inasmuch as it is a form of a particular kind, that is, a subsisting form, it can have a certain character which does not belong to it simply as a form; just as the act of understanding does not belong to man inasmuch as he is an animal, although he is an animal by his very essence.

11. Although the soul and the body of man have one and the same act of existing in common, nevertheless that act of existing is communicated to the body by the soul. Thus the human soul communicates to the body that very act of existing by which the soul itself subsists. This has been shown in preceding articles. Hence the soul continues to exist when the body has corrupted.

12. The sentient soul in brute animals is corruptible, but since in man the sentient soul is identical in substance with the rational soul, it is

incorruptible.

13. The human body is the matter belonging to the human soul and proportioned to the soul's operations. But, as was shown above (Art. 8), bodily disintegration and other defects occur by reason of the very nature of matter. Or we may reply that the death of the body is the result of [original] sin, and not an original determination of nature.

14. The Philosopher's statement that understanding cannot take place without a phantasm, applies to the state of the present life in which man understands by his soul. However, the separated soul will understand in a different way. (See below, Arts. 17 ff.).

15. Although the human soul does not attain to that mode of understanding which superior substances possess, nevertheless it does attain to understanding in a certain way [i.e., in a way proper to itself], and this suffices to show its incorruptibility.

16. Although few people arrive at perfect understanding, yet all people achieve some kind or degree of understanding. The first principles of demonstration are obviously common conceptions of the soul which are perceived by the intellect.

17. Sin takes away grace totally, but it does not take anything away from the essence of a thing. However, sin does take away something of the inclination toward or aptitude for grace; and inasmuch as every sin stems from a contrary disposition, sin is said to take away some part of that good of nature which is aptitude for grace. But sin never destroys completely the good of nature; because, under contrary dispositions, the potentiality for good always remains, though by sin that potentiality is further and further removed from actualization.

18. The soul does not grow feeble when the body grows feeble, not even the sentient soul. For, as the Philosopher observes in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 20], if an old man acquired the eye of a youth, he would see as well as the youth does. From this it is clear that functional debility does not result from a debility of the soul but from that of a bodily organ.

19. Whatever receives existence "from nothing" [i.e., is created] can be reduced to nothing [i.e., annihilated], unless it is conserved in being by a guiding hand. Yet it is not for this reason that a thing is said to be corruptible, but because some principle of corruption exists in the thing

itself. So it is clear that corruptible and incorruptible are essential predicates.

20. Although the soul, which is the cause of life, is incorruptible, nevertheless the body, which receives life from the soul, is subject to change; and because of this the body loses that disposition by which it prepared to receive life; and in this way the corruption of man is brought about.

21. Although the soul can exist of itself, yet it does not itself possess a species, for it is part of a species.

ARTICLE 15

WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, IS CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 89, A. 1: II-II, Q. 67, A.2; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 81; DE VERIT., Q. 19, A. 1; QUODL., III, Q. 9, A. 1; SENT., III, DIST. 31, Q. 2, A. 4; IV, DIST. 50, Q. 1, A. 1.]

In the fifteenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, is capable of understanding.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul, when separated from the body, is incapable of understanding. For no operation proper to the human composite remains in the soul when it exists apart from the body. Now understanding is an operation of the composite; for the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 4, 408b, 11] that to say that the soul understands is like saying that it weaves or builds. Therefore the act of understanding does not remain in the soul when it exists in separation from the body.

2. Further, the Philosopher states in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 14] that understanding in no way takes place without a phantasm. Now since phantasms exist in the sense organs, they cannot exist in the separated soul. Hence the soul does not understand when it is separated from the body.

3. But we must say that the Philosopher is speaking of the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body, and not of the separated soul. On the other hand, the separated soul can understand only by means of its intellective faculty. Now understanding is either [a form] of imagination or is impossible without imagination, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 1, 403a 8].

But the imagination does not exist without the body. Therefore neither is there any understanding without the body. Consequently the soul does not understand when it, is separated from the body.

4. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 16] that the intellect is related to phantasms as sight is to colors. But sight cannot see without colors. Therefore the intellect does not understand without the body.

5. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 18] that understanding is corrupted when certain things within [the body] are corrupted; for example, the heart or the natural heat of the body. However, this is what occurs after the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is incapable of understanding when it is separated from the body.

6. But it may be argued that the soul does understand when it is separated from the body, although not by abstracting from phantasms as it does in the present life. On the other hand, a form is not united to matter for the sake of the matter but for the sake of the form; for the form is the end and the perfection of the matter. Now a form is united to matter for the sake of fulfilling its own proper operation. Hence a form requires that specific type of matter by which its operation can be carried to completion, just as the form of a saw requires ferrous matter in order to accomplish the work of cutting. Now the soul is the form of the body. Consequently the soul is united to that specific type of body which is adapted to carrying out the soul's proper operation. Now the soul's proper operation consists in understanding. Therefore, if the soul can understand without the body, then the soul is united to the body in vain.

7. Further, if the separated soul is capable of understanding, it understands in a more excellent manner when apart from the body than when united to it. For beings which have no need of phantasms in order to understand, do so in a more excellent way than we, who understand through the medium of phantasms. Now the good of the soul lies in its act of understanding; for the perfection of every substance consists in its own proper operation. Therefore, if the soul is capable of understanding without the aid of phantasms, when separated from the body, then it would be harmful to the soul to be united to a body, and hence would not be natural to it.

8. Further, powers are diversified by their objects. But the objects of the intellective soul are phantasms, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 14]. Therefore, if the intellective soul when separated from the body understands without phantasms, it must have powers other than those which it possesses when united to the body. But that is impossible, since the soul’s powers are natural to it and inhere in it inseparably.

9. Further, if the separated soul understands, it must understand by means of some power. Now there are only two intellective powers in the soul: the agent intellect and the possible intellect. But it seems that the separated soul cannot understand by means of either of these powers. For the operation of each of them bears on phantasms: the agent intellect renders phantasms actually intelligible, whereas the possible intellect receives the intelligible species abstracted from phantasms. Consequently it seems that the separated soul is incapable of understanding in any way.

10. Further, there is but one proper operation for one thing, just as there is only one perfection for one perfectible thing. Therefore, if the operation of the soul consists in understanding by receiving [intelligible species] from phantasms, it seems that understanding without phantasms cannot be the operation of the soul, and hence that it does not understand when separated from the body.

11. Further, if the separated soul understands, it must understand by means of something, because understanding takes place when the likeness of the thing understood exists in the one understanding. It cannot be said, however, that the separated soul understands by its own essence. This is true only of God; for His essence, being infinite, possesses in itself from eternity every perfection, and thus is the likeness of all things. Nor can it be said that the separated soul understands through the essence of the thing understood, because in that case it would understand only those things which are in the soul in virtue of its essence alone. Moreover it seems that the separated soul cannot understand through any species whether innate or concreated, for this would apparently be a reversion to Plato’s theory that we are naturally endowed with all knowledge [Phaedo 18, Euthydemus 20, 22].

12. Further, species of this sort seem to be needlessly implanted in the soul because, so long as it remains in the body, the soul cannot understand

through them. However, intelligible species seem to have no other purpose than this, that the soul may understand through them.

13. Now it may be argued that, considered in itself, the soul is able to understand through innate species but that, as a matter of fact, it is hindered by the body from understanding through them. On the contrary, the more perfect a thing is in its nature, the more perfect it is in its operation. Now the soul is more perfect in its nature when united to the body than when it is separated from the body, just as every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole than when separated from, it. Therefore, if the soul existing in separation from the body is able to understand through innate species, it is even more capable of understanding through them when united to the body.

14. Further, none of the natural properties of a thing are totally impeded by anything which pertains to the nature itself. Now it pertains to the very nature of the soul to be united to the body, because the soul is the form of the body. Hence, if intelligible species are naturally implanted in the soul, the soul would not be prevented from understanding through them because of its union with the body. But experience shows that the contrary is true.

15. Further, though it seems to be the case, it cannot be said that the separated soul understands through species acquired previously, when united to the body. For many human souls will remain separated from their bodies and will never acquire any intelligible species of things, as is evident in the case of the souls of children, and especially of infants who are stillborn. Therefore, if separated souls can understand only through species previously acquired, it would follow that not all separated souls would have understanding.

16. Further, if the separated soul understands only through species previously acquired, it seems to follow that it could understand only those things which it understood in this life while united to the body. This seems untrue, however, for the separated soul knows many things concerning punishments and rewards which it does not know in this life. Hence the separated soul does not understand solely through species acquired before its separation from the body.

17. Further, the intellect is rendered intelligent in act by the intelligible species existing in it. But the intellect existing in act is understanding in act. Therefore the intellect in act understands all those things whose intelligible

species actually exist in it. Hence it seems that intelligible species are not retained in the intellect after it ceases to actually understand, and thus that those species through which it is capable of understanding do not remain in the soul after its separation from the body.

18. Further, acquired habits give rise to acts similar to those acts by which the habits were acquired, as is evident from the Philosopher’s observation in the Ethics [II, 1, 1103a 30]. For by building a man becomes a builder, and the man who thus becomes a builder can in turn engage in building. But the intellect acquires intelligible species by turning to phantasms. Hence it can understand through phantasms only by turning to them. Therefore when the soul is separated from the body it cannot understand through acquired species as seems to be the case.

19. Further, it cannot be said that the intellect understands through species infused by some higher substance. For every receptive entity has its own proper agent by which it is naturally disposed to receive that which it receives. Now the human intellect is naturally disposed to receive [its species] from the senses.

20. Further, in the case of those things which are naturally disposed to be caused by inferior agents, the action of a superior agent alone does not suffice to cause them; thus animals which are disposed by nature to be generated from seed, are not found to be generated by the action of the sun alone. Now the human soul by its very nature is disposed to receive species from sensible things. The influx of higher substances, therefore, does not alone suffice to account for its reception of intelligible species.

2 1. Further, an agent should be proportioned to a patient, and an inflowing power to a recipient. But the intelligence of a superior substance is not proportioned to the human intellect, since the former has knowledge which is more universal than ours and which is incomprehensible to us. Therefore the separated soul cannot understand through species infused by superior substances as seems to be the case. Consequently there is no way in which the separated soul can understand anything.

On the contrary, understanding is the highest and proper operation of the soul. Hence if intellection does not belong to the soul without the body, none of its other operations belong to it either. But if some operation does not belong to the soul without the body, then it is impossible for the soul to exist apart from the body. We maintain, however, that the soul does exist when separated from the body. Hence it is necessary to hold that it understands.

Further, those whom Scripture records as having been brought back to life, possessed the same knowledge after this event that they had possessed before. Therefore the knowledge of those things which a man possesses in this life is not taken away from him after death. Consequently the separated soul can understand through species acquired before death.

Further, the likeness of inferior beings is found in superior ones. Thus mathematicians 11 foretell the future by studying in the celestial bodies the likeness of things which are done here on earth. Now the soul is superior in nature to all corporeal things. Therefore the likeness of all corporeal things exists in the soul, and in an intelligible mode, because the soul is itself an intellective substance. Therefore, it is seen that the soul by its very nature is capable of understanding all corporeal things, even when it will exist in separation from the body.

I answer: The fact that our soul in its present condition needs sensible things in order to understand, is the cause of the difficulty encountered in solving the problem raised in this article. Therefore, to solve this problem, we must consider the various explanations for this need [of sensible things] that have been proposed. For some men (namely, the Platonists [Phaedo 10, 18, Meno], as Aristotle points out [Metaph., I, 6, 987b 4]) have maintained that, in order for the soul to understand it does not need the senses essentially (per se), as though knowledge were caused in us by the senses, but only accidentally inasmuch as our soul is stirred by the senses to recollect things which it knew in a previous existence, and of which it possesses a knowledge naturally endowed. To account for this mode of understanding Plato held that the species of things subsisted apart from them, and were actually intelligible entities. He called them “Ideas” and maintained that our soul knows and understands by participating in them, and by some kind of infusion. Moreover, according to Plato, the soul, prior to its union with the body, was able to use this knowledge freely, but as a result of that union it was so weighed down by the body, and somehow smothered by it, that it seemed to have forgotten the things it had previously known. and of which it had possessed connatural knowledge. They also maintained that the soul was in some way stimulated by the senses so that it turned back upon itself and recollected those things which it previously knew and of which it had innate knowledge; just as it sometimes happens that our sense experiences are the occasion for our recollecting vividly certain things which we seemed to have forgotten.

This position of Plato on knowledge and on sense-objects conforms with his position on the generation of natural things. For he held that the forms of natural things, through which each individual is placed in its proper species, result from a participation in the “Ideas” aforementioned, so that the sole function of inferior agents is to dispose matter for participation in the separated species.

Now if this theory be adopted, the whole problem with which we are dealing becomes simple and easy. For according to this view the soul does not by its essence (per se) require sensible things in order to understand; it requires them only accidentally (per accidens), and this accidental need ceases to exist as soon as the soul is separated from the body. For the body having ceased to weigh upon the soul, the soul will then have no need of the stimulus of sense. Existing by itself the soul will be, as it were, lightly clad and on the alert for all knowledge.

Now according to this theory, it appears that no explanation can be offered as to why the soul is united to the body. For [according to the Platonic view under consideration] this union is not for the sake of the soul, because when the soul is not united to the body it can still exercise perfectly its own proper operation, whereas its proper operation is impeded by its union with the body. Similarly, according to this view, it cannot be argued that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the body; for the soul does not exist for the sake of the body, but rather the body for the soul, because the soul is nobler than the body. Then, too, it seems incongruous that the soul should suffer a loss in its own operation for the sake of ennobling the body. It also seems to follow from this view that the union of the soul with the body is not natural, for whatever is natural to a thing does not impede the operation proper to that thing. Hence, if union with a body impeded the soul’s understanding, it would not be natural but contrary to the nature of the soul to be united to a body; and in that case man, who is constituted of a soul united to a body, would not be a natural being; which seems absurd.

Likewise; experience shows that our knowledge is not the result of participation in separated species, but is acquired from sensible things, because those who lack one sense lack knowledge of the sensible things apprehended by that sense; just as a person born blind cannot have a knowledge of colors.

Now there is another theory according to which the senses are not accidentally serviceable to the human soul in performing its function of understanding (as the theory just dealt with supposes), but essentially; not in order that we may acquire knowledge from sense-objects, but because the senses dispose the soul for acquiring knowledge from some other source. This is the opinion of Avicenna. For Avicenna maintains that there is a certain separate substance which he calls the intellect or “the Agent Intelligence; that the intelligible species through which we understand flow into our intellect from this Agent Intellect, and that by the operation of the sentient part, the imagination and other things of this sort, our intellect is prepared for orientating itself toward the Agent Intellect and for receiving the influx of intelligible species from it. This theory agrees with Avicenna’s view on the generation of natural things; for he maintains that all substantial forms flow from the Agent Intellect, and that natural agents only dispose the matter for receiving forms from the Agent Intellect.

According to this position, as in the preceding, this question seems to involve little or no difficulty. For if the senses are necessary for understanding only inasmuch as they dispose the soul to receive species from the Agent Intellect, because our soul is thus orientated toward the latter, then when the soul is separated from the body it will be orientated toward the Agent Intellect by itself alone, and will receive intelligible species from that Intellect. Thus the soul will have no need of the senses in order to understand; just as the ship in which a person has crossed the sea is no longer needed by him after the completion of the voyage.

Now it seems to follow from this view, that a man immediately acquires all knowledge, both of things which he perceives by his senses and of other things. For if we understand through species which flow into our minds from an Agent Intellect, and if all that is required for the reception of this infusion is the orientating of our soul toward this Intellect, then whenever the soul is so orientated it will be able to receive the infusion of any and every sort of intelligible species; because in that case it cannot be said that the soul is orientated toward the Agent Intellect with respect to one species and not with respect to another; and thus a person born blind will, by imagining sounds, be able to acquire a knowledge of colors, or of any other sensible object; which is manifestly false.

It is also evident that we have need to the sentient powers for understanding, not only in the acquisition of knowledge but also in the utilization of knowledge already acquired. For we cannot even reflect upon the things we know without turning to phantasms, although Avicenna himself is of a contrary opinion. It is for this reason that, even in reflecting upon things which it knows, the soul is impeded in its operation by injuries to the organs of the sentient powers whereby the phantasms are retained and apprehended. It is evident also that we have need of certain phantasms in things divinely revealed to us through the influence of superior substances. Thus Dionysius says [De cael. hier., I, 2]: “The divine light cannot shine upon us unless it is screened round about by many sacred veils.” Now this would not be so if we needed phantasms only to orientate us toward superior substances.

Consequently a different explanation must be given for the need which the soul has of sensory powers in order to understand. For they are not accidental in the manner of stimuli, as Plato held, nor, are they merely dispositive, as Avicenna claimed, but re-present to the intellective soul its proper object, as Aristotle says in the De anima [III, 7, 431a 14]: “Phantasms are to the intellect what sensible things are to sense.” Now just as colors are made actually visible by light, so phantasms are made actually intelligible only by the agent intellect. This agrees with what we hold about the generation of natural things. For as we maintain that superior agents produce natural forms by means of natural agents, so we maintain that the agent intellect produces knowledge in our possible intellect through phantasms rendered actually intelligible by the agent intellect. The question whether the agent intellect is a separate substance, as some held, or a light in which our soul participates in the manner of superior substances, has no bearing on this last point.

Now according to this latter theory it seems even more difficult to see how the separated soul can understand. For [on that hypothesis] there will be no phantasms requiring corporeal organs for their apprehension and retention. Yet if these be removed, it is seen that the soul cannot understand; just as the faculty of sight cannot function in the absence of colors. Now in order to solve this problem the fact must be borne in mind that the soul, being lowest in the order of intellectual substances, participates in intellectual light or in intellectual nature, in the lowest and weakest measure. For in the first intelligence, namely, God, intellectual nature is so powerful that He understands all things through one intelligible form, namely, His own essence. Inferior intellectual substances, on the other hand, understand through many species; and the higher each of these substances is, the fewer forms it possesses, and the more potent is its faculty of understanding all things through those few forms. However, even if an inferior intellectual substance possessed forms equally as universal as those of a superior substance, its knowledge would still remain incomplete, since it does not have so great a power of understanding, because that inferior intellectual substance would only know things universally; and, from the few universal forms it apprehends, it could not bring its knowledge to bear on singulars. Therefore, if the human soul, which is lowest in the order of intellectual substances and hence possesses the least intellectual power of them all, received forms abstractly and universally, as separate substances do, then it would have a most imperfect kind of knowledge: that of knowing things in the universal and indistinctly. Hence, in order that the soul's knowledge may be perfect in its kind and bear directly upon singulars, the soul must acquire a knowledge of truth from singular things. However, the light of the agent intellect is necessary in order that those things may be received in the soul and may exist there in a higher mode than that in which they exist materially. Hence it was necessary that the soul be united to a body for the perfection of its intellectual operation.

It is undoubtedly true, however, that bodily movements and the activity of the senses prevent the soul from receiving infused knowledge from separate substances. It is for this reason that certain things are revealed to persons during sleep, and to those who have [momentarily] lost their senses. Therefore, when the soul shall be separated completely from the body, it will be able to receive infused knowledge from superior substances more fully, because, thanks to such knowledge, it will be able to understand without a phantasm, which otherwise it cannot do. Nevertheless an influx of this sort will not produce knowledge as perfect and as directly related to singulars as the knowledge which we acquire here below through the senses, though a much more perfect knowledge will be had in addition to this natural influx by those souls that will enjoy the influx of a supernatural light by which they will know all things most fully and will see God Himself. Moreover, separated souls will have a determinate knowledge of those [singular] things which they had previously known here below, and whose intelligible species they retain in themselves.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. Those words do not represent Aristotle’s own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as the context of his statement shows.

2. The Philosopher is speaking of the intellectual operation of the soul so far as the soul is united to the body; for in that state the soul does not understand without a phantasm, as has been explained.

3. In its present state of union with the body, the soul does not participate in intelligible species flowing from superior substances, but only in intellectual light. Consequently the soul is in need of phantasms as objects from which it may receive intelligible species. But after its separation from the body, the soul will indeed participate more fully in intelligible species, and therefore will have no need of external objects.

4. This also answers the fourth objection.

5. It is clear from what has been said before that Aristotle refers in this place to the opinion of certain philosophers who held that the intellect has a bodily organ just as a sense faculty does. Now if this were maintained, the separated soul would be entirely incapable of understanding anything. Or we may reply that Aristotle is speaking of that mode of understanding which we possess here and now.

6. The soul is united to the body in virtue of the soul’s operation, which is understanding, not because it could in no way understand without the body, but because in the natural order it could not understand perfectly without the body, as has been shown.

7. Thus, the answer to the seventh objection is evident.

8. Phantasms are objects of the intellect only so far as they are rendered actually intelligible by the light of the agent intellect. Consequently all actually intelligible species which are received in the intellect, whencesoever they may come, will have no other formal object; and it is by their formal objects that the powers of the soul are differentiated.

9. The operation of the agent intellect and that of the possible intellect bear on phantasms so long as the soul remains united to the body; but when the soul will be separated from the body, it will receive, through its possible intellect, the species that flow into it from superior substances, and it will have the power of understanding through its agent intellect.

10. The proper operation of the soul is to understand things that are actually intelligible. Moreover, intellectual operation is not diversified specifically because actual intelligibles are received from phantasms or elsewhere.

11. The separated soul does not understand things through its own essence, nor through the essences of the things understood, but through species flowing into it from superior substances; nor does it, as the Platonists claimed, understand things from the very beginning of its existence.

12. Thus the reply to the twelfth objection is evident.

13. If the soul, when united to the body, possessed innate species, it would be able to understand through them, just as it understands through acquired species. Now although it is more perfect in its nature [when united to the body], nevertheless on account of bodily movements and sense activities, the soul is held in check, so that it cannot be united to superior substances in order to receive infused knowledge from them, as it does when it is separated from the body.

14. To understand through infused species is not natural to the soul when united to the body, but only after it has left the body, as we have pointed out.

15. Separated souls will indeed be able to understand through species acquired previously while they existed in the body, but not through them alone. They will also understand through infused species, as we have explained.

16. Thus the reply to objection sixteen is evident.

17. Intelligible species sometimes exist in the possible intellect only potentially; and when that is the case man knows only potentially, and thus needs to be made actually knowing either by teaching or by discovery. Sometimes, however, intelligible species exist in the possible intellect in a completely actual way, and when that is the case, it knows actually. Sometimes, however, they exist in it in a mode midway between potency

and act, that is to say, as a habit; and when that is the case the intellect can understand actually whenever it wishes. Moreover’ thanks to this mode of existing, acquired intelligible species exist in the possible intellect even when it is not performing acts of understanding.

18. As has already been pointed out, an intellectual operation’ whose actually understood object is received from phantasms, does not differ specifically from an intellectual operation whose object is derived from some other source. For the operation of a power is distinguished and specified by the formal nature of the object, not by its matter. Hence, if the separated soul understands through intelligible species which are retained in the intellect, and which were previously acquired from phantasms, and not by actually turning itself to phantasms, then the operation which results from the species so acquired, and the operation by which those species are acquired, will not be specifically different.

19. The possible intellect is disposed by nature to receive [species] from phantasms only so far as the phantasms are actualized by the light of the agent intellect, which is a kind of participation of the light of superior substances. Consequently the intellect is not prevented from being able to receive [species] from superior substances.

20. In its present state of union with the body, the soul, is disposed by nature to acquire knowledge from phantasms, and in this state its knowledge cannot be caused by superior agents alone. But this will be possible when the soul is separated from the body.

21. From the fact that the knowledge of separate substances is not proportioned to our soul, it does not follow that our soul is incapable of grasping any knowledge from the influx of those substances, but only that it cannot grasp a perfect and distinct knowledge, as has been explained.

ARTICLE 16

WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN UNITED TO THE BODY, CAN UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 88, A. 1; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 60; III, 42, 43, 44, 46; DE VERIT., Q. 10, A. 11; Q. 18, A. 5, AD 7& 8; DE TRIN., Q. 6, LECT. 3; COMM. IN METAPH., II, LECT. 1.]

In the sixteenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when united to the body, can understand separate substances.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul, when united to the body, can understand separate substances. For no form is prevented from attaining its end by the, matter to which it is naturally united. Now the end of the intellective soul seems to consist in knowing separate substances, which are in the highest degree intelligible; for the end of each and every thing is to attain perfection in its operation. Therefore the human soul is not prevented from understanding separate substances by being united to the body, which is the soul's own proper matter.

2. Further, the end of man is happiness. Now according to the Philosopher, in the Ethics [X, 7, 1177a 11; 8, 1178b 10], ultimate happiness consists in the operation of man's highest power, namely, the intellect, and is related to the noblest object, which seems to be none other than a separate substance. Hence man's last end consists in understanding separate substances. Now it would be incongruous if man failed completely to attain his end; for in that case his life would be meaningless. Therefore man can know separate substances. But it belongs to man's very essence to possess a

soul that is united to a body. Therefore the soul, when it is united to the body, can understand separate substances.

3. Further, every generative process reaches a terminus, for no process goes on to infinity. Now there is a certain intellectual generation whereby the intellect is brought from potency to act, that is to say, is made actually knowing. Therefore this process does not go on to infinity but at some time will reach a terminus, that is, it will be completely actualized. But this end can be attained only when the intellect understands all intelligible things, especially separate substances. Therefore the human intellect is capable of attaining a knowledge of separate substances.

4. Further, it seems to be more difficult to separate from matter things which do not exist in separation therefrom, and to apprehend those things, than to apprehend things which exist in themselves apart from matter. But even when united to the body, our intellect separates from matter things which do not in themselves exist apart from matter, inasmuch as it abstracts the intelligible species by which it apprehends material things. Therefore our intellect will be even more capable of apprehending separate substances.

5. Further, sense objects that are excessively intense (excellentia sensibilia) are sensed to a lesser degree than others, because they destroy the harmony of a sense organ. However, if there were a sense organ which was not affected adversely by the intensity of its sensible object, then the more intense the sensible object, the more fully would the sense organ experience that object. Now the intellect is not corrupted in any way by an intelligible object, rather is it perfected by it. Hence the more intelligible things are, the better the intellect knows them. But separate substances which are actually intelligible in themselves, because they are immaterial, are more intelligible than material substances, which are intelligible only potentially. Therefore, since the intellective soul when it is united to the body apprehends material substances, it is even more capable of apprehending separate substances.

6. Further, even when the intellective soul is united to the body it abstracts the quiddity from things having a quiddity; and, since it cannot regress to infinity, it must in this abstractive process eventually attain to a quiddity that is not a thing having a quiddity, but is a quiddity only. Therefore, since separate substances are nothing but certain quiddities

existing of themselves, it seems that the intellective soul, when united to the body, is capable of apprehending separate substances.

7. Further, it is natural for us to acquire a knowledge of causes from their effects. However, some of the effects caused by separate substances must be found in sensible and material things; for, as Augustine shows in the De Trinitate [III, 4], all corporeal things are governed by God through the agency of the angels. Therefore the soul, when united to the body, can apprehend separate substances through sensible objects.

8. Further, the soul understands itself when it is united to the body; for, as Augustine says in the De Trinitate [IX, 3], the mind understands itself and loves itself. But the mind itself possesses the nature of a separate intellectual substance. Therefore the soul,,when united to the body, can apprehend separate substances.

9. Further, in things nothing exists without a purpose. But to be an intelligible seems to be purposeless if the intelligible is not apprehended by any intellect. Therefore, since separate substances are intelligibles, our intellect can apprehend them. Further, as sight is to visible things, so intelligence is to intelligible things. But our sense of sight can perceive all visible things, even those that are incorruptible, although it is itself corruptible. Therefore, on the assumption that our intellect is corruptible, it would be capable of apprehending incorruptible separate substances because they are intelligibles in themselves.

On the contrary, the soul does not apprehend anything without a phantasm, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 7]. Therefore the soul, when united to the body, cannot apprehend separate substances.

I answer: Aristotle set out to solve the problem, posed in this article, in the De anima [ibid., 431b 19], but the solution is not found in those writings of his which have come down to us. This explains why Aristotle’s followers have proceeded to offer various solutions for this problem.

For some have maintained that our soul, even when united to the body, is capable of knowing separate substances, and that man’s ultimate happiness actually consists in knowing such substances. However, [these theorists] entertain different opinions as to the way in which we understand such substances. For some have maintained that our soul cannot acquire an understanding of separate substances in the way in which we -acquire an understanding of those other intelligible objects which we learn about in the speculative sciences. The latter type of knowledge is acquired through definitions and demonstrations, whereas a knowledge of separate substances, these theorists maintained, can be acquired only as a result, of the Agent Intellect itself being united to us. For they supposed that the Agent Intellect was a separate substance which by its own nature understands separate substances. Hence, when this Agent Intellect shall be united to us, enabling us thereby to understand through Itself (as we now understand through intellectual habits of scientific knowledge), we shall, consequently, apprehend separate substances.

Moreover, they explain the manner in which this Agent Intellect can be united to us so that we may understand. For it is evident, [they argue], from what the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 2, 414a 4] that whenever we are said to be so-and-so or to do so-and-so, two things are involved, one having the role of form, the other the role of matter; just as we are said to be made healthy by health and with respect to the body, so that health is related to the body as a form to matter. It is clear also [they say] that we understand by the Agent Intellect and through intelligible objects-known (speculata); for we arrive at a knowledge of conclusion through principles known naturally, and through the Agent Intellect. Therefore the Agent Intellect must be related to intelligible objects-known as a principal agent is to an instrument, and as a form is to matter, or as act is to potency. For of two things, the more perfect always has the character of an act with respect to the other. Moreover, whatever receives in itself that which has the character of a form, also receives that which has the character of matter; just as a body having a surface is also receptive of color, which is a kind of form possessed by that surface. Likewise, the pupil of the eye which receives color, also receives light, which is the act of color; for by light color is made actually visible. Consequently, in the same way, so far as the possible intellect receives intelligible objects-known, to that extent does it receive from the Agent Intellect. Hence, when the possible intellect receives all objects-known, then at that time it will receive the Agent Intellect unto itself completely; and thus the Agent Intellect will assume the character of a form in the possible intellect, and consequently will become one with us. Hence, as we at present understand through the possible intellect, so shall we then understand through the Agent Intellect; and we shall understand not only all natural things but separate substances as well.

On this point, however, there are differences of opinion among those who subscribe to the theory stated above. For some, holding that the possible intellect is corruptible, assert that the possible intellect is in no way able to know either the Agent Intellect or the separate substances; but that as long as we remain in a state of union with the Agent Intellect, we shall know the Agent Intellect and other separate substances as well through the Agent Intellect itself, inasmuch as it will be united to us as a form. But others, holding that the possible intellect is incorruptible, assert that the possible intellect is able to know the Agent Intellect as well as other separate substances.

Now it is impossible to maintain this position. It is gratuitous, and it is contrary to the meaning of Aristotle's doctrine."‘ It is impossible to maintain this position because it premises two contradictory affirmations (duo impossibilia): namely, that the Agent Intellect is a separate substance existing apart from us, and that we understand through the Agent Intellect as through a form. Now so far as we carry out an operation by means of something having the character of a form, to that extent do we cause something to exist actually, just as a hot thing heats by its heat inasmuch as it is actually hot. For a thing acts only so far as it is in act. Hence that by which a thing acts or operates formally, must be united to that thing with respect to its very act of existing. Hence in the case of two substances existing in separation from one another, it is impossible for one of them to operate formally through the other. Thus, if the Agent Intellect is a separate substance existing apart from us, we cannot understand by it formally, although we may be able to understand by it actively, as we are said to see by the light of the sun.

The aforesaid position is likewise gratuitous (vana), because the arguments advanced for it are not conclusive with necessity. Two considerations make this point clear. First, indeed, because if, as the advocates of this view maintain, the Agent Intellect is a separate substance, then this intellect will not be related to intelligible objects-known as light is to colors, but as the sun shining is to colors. Hence, simply because the possible intellect receives intelligible objects-known, that intellect is not thereby brought into substantial union with the Agent Intellect, but is united only to an effect of it; just as the eye by receiving colors is not united to the substance of the sun, but only to the sun's light. Secondly, because (supposing we grant that the possible intellect, being receptive of intelligible objects-known, is in some way united substantially to the Agent Intellect), even though the possible intellect receives all intelligible objects-known, the latter being abstracted from phantasms and known demonstratively through the principles of demonstration, it would not follow that the possible intellect had thus been perfectly united with the Agent Intellect. This could be the case only if it were proved that all those intelligible objects together were equivalent in power and in substance to the power and substance of the Agent Intellect itself. This is obviously untrue, for if the Agent Intellect is a separate substance, it is by that fact alone of a higher order of being than all those objects in the natural order which are rendered intelligible by it.

It is also remarkable that these people did not see the evident error in their reasoning. For, although they maintained that all intelligible objects-known were united by one or two of these objects, still it does not follow for this reason, according to them, that we shall know all the other intelligible objects-known. Now it is evident that separate intelligible substances surpass all those objects which they call intelligible objects-known to a far greater degree than all of the latter taken together exceed one or two or any number of themselves; for these objects are all of one genus and have the same mode of intelligibility, whereas separate substances are of a higher order, and have a higher mode of intelligibility. Hence if the Agent Intellect is brought into union with us as a form, and as the agent of those intelligibles, it does not for this reason follow that it is united to us as a knower of separate substances.

It is likewise clear that this whole position is contrary to the meaning of the doctrine of Aristotle, who says in the Ethics [I, 9, 1099b 18] that happiness is a common good which all who are not deprived of virtue may possess. But to understand all those things which these theorists call intelligible objects-known is impossible for any man, or at least is so rare that in this life no man ever did in fact attain such understanding, except Christ Himself, who was both God and man. Hence it is impossible that such knowledge should be required for human happiness. Now the ultimate happiness of man consists in knowing the noblest intelligible objects, as the Philosopher says in the Ethics [X, 7, 1177a 20]. Thus it is not necessary for a man to know all intelligible objects-known in order to know those substances which are the noblest intelligibles, and in the knowledge of which human happiness consists. in another way this whole position is evidently contrary to the meaning of Aristotle’s doctrine. For it is said in Ethics [I, 13, 1102a 5] that happiness consists in acting in accordance with perfect virtue. So in order to show clearly and precisely what happiness actually consists in, Aristotle found it necessary, as he says near the end of the Ethics [I, 11-2a 5], to determine the nature of all the virtues. He maintains that some of these are moral virtues, such as fortitude, temperance, and the like; however, others are intellectual virtues, which he held to be five in number: wisdom, understanding, science, prudence, and art. He says that the chief of these is wisdom, and that ultimate happiness consists in the exercise of wisdom, as appears in his text. Moreover, it is clear from his Metaphysics [I, 2, 982b 7], that wisdom is First Philosophy itself. Hence it follows, according to Aristotle, that the ultimate human happiness which can be had in this life, consists in such knowledge of separate substances as can be acquired through the principles of philosophy, and not through any union [with an Agent Intellect] such as some have vainly imagined.

Wherefore there is another theory according to which the human soul can attain to an understanding of separate substances through the principles of philosophy. The upholders of this theory proceeded to demonstrate their position as follows. It is evident [they point out], that the human soul can abstract quiddities from material things and can apprehend them; for this is precisely what happens whenever we grasp what (quid est) a material thing is. Now if that abstracted quiddity is not a pure quiddity but is itself a thing having a quiddity, then even so the intellect must eventually succeed in grasping the simple quiddity itself alone, because it is impossible to go on to infinity in the process of abstraction. And by contemplating simply quiddities, our intellect is, in fact, understanding separate substances because the latter are themselves nothing else than simple quiddities.

However, this argument is entirely inadequate: first of all because the quiddities of material things are of a different order from separate quiddities and have a different mode of existing; so it does not follow that our intellect understands separate quiddities simply because it grasps the quiddities of material things. In the second place, the diverse quiddities apprehended by the intellect, themselves differ specifically, so that a person who apprehends the quiddity of one material thing does not thereby apprehend the quiddity of another; for example, to understand what “stone” is, is not to understand what “animal” is. Thus, even if we granted that separate quiddities are of the same formal character (ratio) as material quiddities, it would follow that one who understands the latter likewise understands the former, unless one happened to subscribe to Plato’s view that separate substances are the species of these sensible things.

Consequently, in opposition to this doctrine, we must maintain that the intellectual soul of man, by being united to the body, has its vision turned toward phantasms, and is informed (informare) in its intellection only through species acquired from phantasms. This agrees with the statement of Dionysius in Book I of the De caelestia hierarchia [I, 2] for he says: “The divine light can shine upon us only when screened round about by many sacred veils.” Hence the soul, while united to the body, is capable of attaining a knowledge of separate substances only so far as it can be led thereto through species derived from phantasms. But in this way the soul will not attain quidditative knowledge of those substances, because their order of intelligibility transcends completely that of the intelligible species of material things abstracted from phantasms. However, we can in this way attain some [non-quidditative] knowledge of those separate substances, we can know that they exist (quia sunt); just as from lowly and deficient effects we proceed to lofty causes, but only to the extent that we know they exist. And while we know that these superior causes exist, at the same time we know that they are not of the same nature as their effects, and this knowledge consists in knowing what they are not, rather than what they are. Consequently it is true to say that, inasmuch as we grasp the quiddities which we abstract from material things, our intellect can, by turning to those quiddities, apprehend separate substances, so that it knows them to be immaterial, just as are the quiddities themselves which are abstracted from matter. Thus, thanks to the reflective power of our intellect, we are brought to a knowledge of intelligible separate substances. Nor is there cause for wonder if in this life we are incapable of knowing separate substances in their very essence, but can know only what they are not. For it is only in this way that we can know even the quiddity and nature of the celestial bodies. Thus in the De caelo et mundo [I, 10, 259b 5] Aristotle shows that the celestial bodies are neither heavy nor light, generable nor corruptible, nor subject to contrariety.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. The end to which the natural power (possibilitas) of the human soul is directed is to know separate substances in the manner explained above [in the body of this article], and the soul is not prevented from attaining this end because of its union with the body. Nor does the ultimate happiness of man, so far as it can be attained by his natural powers (per naturalia), consists in such knowledge.

2. Thus the answer to the second objection is evident.

3. Although the possible intellect is continually being brought from potency to act by understanding more and more, nevertheless this reduction or generation will find its term in understanding the supremely intelligible object, namely, the divine essence. But the intellect cannot attain to this understanding by its natural powers, but only by grace.

4. It is more difficult to separate and to understand things [which are not separate] than it is to understand things which are separate, if it is a question of the same things. But in the case of different things, this is not necessarily so; for more difficulty may be experienced merely in understanding one separate thing than in abstracting and understanding others.

5. With respect to sense objects of excessive intensity, a sensory power is subject to a twofold deficiency: one, in that such objects exceed the grasp of sense since they are out of proportion to its powers; another, in that, after the impact of such objects on the sense, the sense is incapable of perceiving sense-objects which are not as intense, because the sense organ has already been made inoperative (corrumpitur). Therefore, although the intellect does not have an organ which can be made inoperative by an intelligible object of great intensity, yet something supremely intelligible can exceed the intellective power of our intelligence. Such an object is a separate substance, which exceeds the ‘power of our intelligence, for our intelligence, inasmuch as it is united to the body, is naturally disposed to be actuated and perfected by species abstracted from phantasms. Nevertheless, if our intelligence did apprehend separate substances, it would have not less but greater understanding of other things.

6. As was shown, the quiddities abstracted from material things do not suffice as means through which we can acquire quidditative knowledge of separate substances.

7. The same answer applies to the seventh objection; for, as we have said above, effects that do not adequately reflect their causes do not suffice as means through which their causes can be known quidditatively.

8. Our possible intellect does not know itself directly by apprehending its own essence, but through a species abstracted from phantasms. For this reason the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 9] that the possible intellect is itself intelligible like other things. The reason for this is that nothing is intelligible so far as it is in potency, but only so far as it is in act, as is said in the Metaphysics [IX, 9, 1051a 30]. Hence, since the possible intellect is only in potency with respect to intelligible being, it can be known only through the form by which it is actuated, namely, by a species abstracted from phantasms; just as everything else is known through the form which it has. That acts are known through objects, powers through acts, and the soul through its powers, is indeed common to all the powers of the soul. So likewise the intellective soul is known through its own act of understanding. However, a species abstracted from phantasms is not the form of a separate substance through which that substance can be known, in the same way as the possible intellect is understood through that form.

9. This argument is entirely ineffective for two reasons: first, because intelligibles do not exist in order that intellects may know them; they rather exist as the ends and perfections of intellects. Consequently, if an intelligible substance existed which was not actually known by any intellect other than itself, this substance would not for that reason exist in vain. For the expression in vain (frustra) is said of that which concerns the end that a thing fails to reach. Secondly, the argument of this objection is ineffective because, even if separate substances are not apprehended by our intellect while united to the body, yet they are apprehended by separate substances.

10. The species of which the power of sight is receptive can be the likenesses of any sort of body, whether corruptible or incorruptible. But species abstracted from phantasms, of which the possible intellect is receptive, are not likenesses of separate substances. Hence there is no ground for a comparison between these two cases.

ARTICLE 17

WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, CAN UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 89, A. 2; CONTRA GENTILES, III, 45; QUODL. III, Q. 9, A. 1.]

In the seventeenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can understand separate substances.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the separated soul cannot understand separate substances. For a more perfect operation is characteristic of a more perfect substance. Now the soul is more perfect when united to the body than when existing apart from it. This is evident, because every part of a whole is more perfect when united to the whole than when separated from it. Therefore, if the soul is unable to understand separate substances when it is actually joined to the body, it seems that the soul cannot understand these substances when it exists apart from the body.

2. Further, our soul can know separate substances either by its nature or by grace alone. If it knows them by its own nature, then, since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, the soul is not prevented from knowing separate substances by being united to the body. However, if the soul knows them by grace alone, it follows that at least not all separated souls know separate substances, for not all souls existing apart from bodies possess grace.

3. Further, the soul is united to the body in order that the soul may be perfected therein by the sciences and the virtues. However, the greatest perfection of the soul consists in knowing separate substances. Therefore, if the soul understands separate substances in virtue of its separation alone, then the, soul is united to the body unnecessarily.

4. Further, if the soul, when separated from the body, knows a separate substance, it must know such a substance either through that substance’s essence, or through a species of it. But the soul does not know a separate substance through its essence, because the essence of a separate substance is not the same as that of a separated soul. Similarly, the soul cannot know a separate substance through a species of such a substance, for no species can be abstracted by the soul from separate substances, because they, are simple. Consequently, when the soul exists apart from the body, it can in no way know separate substances.

5. Further, if the soul, existing in separation from the body, knows a separate substance, the soul apprehends that substance either by its senses or by its intellect. Now it is obvious that the soul does not apprehend a separate substance by its senses, because separate substances are not sensible things. Neither are separate substances apprehended by the soul’s intellect, because its intellect does not know singulars, and separate substances are singular substances. Therefore the soul, existing apart from the body, can in no way understand separate substances.

6. Further, our possible intellect differs from an angel to a greater degree than our imagination does from our possible intellect, because our imagination and possible intellect are rooted in one and the same substance of the soul. Now our imagination can in no way understand our possible intellect. Consequently our possible intellect can in no way apprehend a separate substance.

7. Further, as our will is ordered to good, so is our intellect ordered to truth. But the will of some separated souls, namely, those of the damned, cannot be ordered to good. Therefore neither can their intellect in any way be ordered to truth which the intellect itself pursues above all else in its knowledge of a separate substance. Therefore not every separated soul can know a separate substance.

8. Further, as we have pointed out already, ultimate happiness, according to the philosophers, is thought to consist in the knowledge of separate

substances. Now if the souls of the damned understand separate substances, which we here on earth cannot understand, it seems that the damned are nearer to happiness than we are. This is incongruous.

9. Further, one intelligence knows another through knowing its own essence, as is pointed out in the work De causis [VIII]. Now apparently the separated soul cannot know its own essence, because the possible intellect can know itself only through species abstracted from phantasms, as is stated in the De anima [III, 8, 432a 6]. Consequently the separated soul cannot know separate substances.

10. Further, there are two ways of acquiring knowledge: first, by proceeding from what is subsequent to what is prior, and thus things which are better known absolutely (simpliciter) are known by us through those things which are less known absolutely. Secondly, by proceeding from what is prior to what is subsequent, and thus things which are better known absolutely are known first by us. Now the first manner of knowing cannot be found in souls existing apart from bodies for that manner of knowing is proper to us so far as we derive our knowledge from the senses. Consequently the separated soul understands in the second manner, namely, by proceeding from what is prior to what is subsequent; and then those things which are better known absolutely are known first by the soul. But that which is best known is the divine essence. Therefore, if the separated soul knows separate substances by its nature, it seems that it can grasp the divine essence, which is life eternal, through natural things alone. This is contrary to the Apostle, who says: “The grace of God is life eternal” (Rom. 4:23).

11. Further, a separate substance of an inferior order understands another separate substance of a higher order by reason of the fact that an impression of the superior substance is present in the inferior one. But the impression of a separate substance is present in the separated soul in a much more imperfect way than it is in the separate substance itself. Therefore the separated soul cannot understand a separate substance.

On the contrary, like things are known by like. Now the separated soul is a separate substance. Consequently it can understand separate substances.

I answer: In view of the things held by faith, it is seen that we must truly maintain that separated souls know separate substances. For the separate substances, to whose society the separated souls of men both good and bad are allotted, are called angels and demons. Now it does not seem credible that the souls of the damned do not know the demons whose society they share, and who are said to terrify the souls. Again, it seems even less likely that the souls of the good do not know the angels whose society they enjoy.

Moreover, the fact that souls existing apart from bodies know separate substances wherever they may be, is in accord with reason. For it is clear that the human soul, when joined to the body, has a direct knowledge of inferior things because of its union with the body. Wherefore the soul is perfected only by what it receives from inferior things, namely, by species abstracted from phantasms. Consequently the soul can acquire a knowledge of itself, and of other things, only inasmuch as it is led thereto through the aforementioned species, as was explained above (Art. 16).

However, when the soul really will be separated from the body, its vision will not be directed toward inferior beings in order, to receive species therefrom, rather will it be independent and capable of receiving infused species from superior substances without turning to phantasms which will then be wholly non-existent. The soul will be actuated by infused species of this kind and thus will know itself directly by understanding its own essence, and not in an a posteriori fashion as it does in its present state. Moreover, by its essence the soul belongs to the genus of separate intellectual substances, although it is the lowest in this genus, and possesses the same mode of subsisting; for every separate substance is a subsisting form. Therefore, just as one separate substance knows another by immediately understanding (intuendo) its own essence, inasmuch as there is in its own essence some likeness of the other substance which it knows (either because it receives infused species from that substance, or from a superior one that is the common cause of both of them), so also does the separated soul, by immediately understanding its own essence, know separate substances by reason of the infused species received from them, or from the highest cause, namely, God.

However, the soul does not by its natural knowledge understand separate substances as perfectly as they understand themselves, because the soul is the most inferior of all intelligences, and receives the emanation of intelligible light in the least degree.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. When the soul is united to the body, it is in a certain respect more perfect than when it is separated from the body.” However, with respect to its act of understanding, the soul has a certain perfection, when separated from the body, which it cannot have while united to the body. Nor is this incongruous, because intellectual operation is proper to the soul inasmuch as it surpasses the capacity (proportionem) of the body, for the intellect is not the act of any bodily organ.

2. We are speaking here of that knowledge of the separated souls which belongs to them by their nature; for when we speak of the knowledge which ‘ is given to them by grace, they are equal to the angels in knowing. Moreover, this knowledge whereby the soul knows separate substances in the aforesaid way [i.e., through an influx from separated substances], is not natural to the soul absolutely, but inasmuch as it is separated from the body. Therefore the soul is not capable of this knowledge inasmuch as it is united to the body.

3. The highest perfection of the human soul’s knowledge consists in understanding separate substances. But it can obtain possession of this knowledge more perfectly by being united to the body, because it is disposed to this end by study and particularly by merit. Consequently it is not united to the body unnecessarily.

4. When the soul is separated from the body, it does not know a separate substance through the essence of such a substance, but through a species and likeness of it. Moreover it must be observed that a species through which something is known is not always abstracted from the thing that is known through that species, but only when the knower receives the species from the thing itself. When this is the case the species is received in a simpler and more immaterial way in the knower than it is in the thing that is known through it. Indeed, if the opposite were true, namely, that the thing known is more immaterial and simpler than the knower, then the species of the thing known in the knower is not said to be abstracted, but to be impressed and infused. This is the way it is considered in this argument.

5. To know a singular is incompatible with our intellectual cognition only inasmuch as the singular is individuated by this matter; for our intelligible species must be abstracted from matter. Indeed, if any singulars exist in which the nature of the species is not individuated by matter, but each is a certain nature whose species subsists immaterially, each of them will be

intelligible in virtue of its own nature. Separate substances are singulars of this specific type.

6. An imagination and a human possible intellect are more appropriate to the human subject than a human possible intellect and an angelic intellect. However, these are more in keeping with the species and nature (ratio), because both of these belong to a thing having an intellective mode of existing. Moreover, an action is the natural effect of the form according to the nature of its species, and not of the subject itself. Therefore, so far as conformity of action is concerned, more attention must be paid to the conformity of two forms that are specifically the same existing in different substances, than to the conformity of specifically different forms existing in the same subject.

7. The damned are diverted from their ultimate end, and for this reason their wills do not tend to a good in keeping with this order [to the ultimate end]. Moreover, their wills do tend toward some good, because even the demons, as Dionysius says [De div. nom., IV, 23], desire what is good and best, to live, to exist, and to understand; but this good is not ordered to the highest good, and hence their wills are perverse. Therefore nothing prevents the souls of the damned from understanding many truths, but they do not understand the First Truth, namely, God, the vision of whom causes happiness.

8. The ultimate happiness of man does not consist in knowing any created thing, but in knowing God alone; wherefore Augustine says, in his Confessions: “Happy is he who knows you, though he does not know not these,” namely, creatures; “but unhappy is he who knows these and does not know you. And whoever knows both you and them, is not the happier for them but for you only” [V, 4]. Therefore, although the damned know some of the things that we know, nevertheless they are much farther away from true happiness than we are, for we can attain it whereas they are unable to do so.

9. The human soul will know itself in one way when it will be separated from the body, and in another way when it is united to the body, as we have explained above (Art. 15).

10. Although that mode of knowing by which the soul knows better the things which are better known in themselves, is proper to the separated soul, nevertheless it does not follow that the separated soul, or any other

created separate substance, through its own nature and essence, can understand God; for just as separate substances possess a more excellent mode of existing -than material substances do, so does God possess a more excellent mode of existing than all separate substances. For in material beings three things have to be taken into consideration, no one of which is the same as the others; namely, the individual, the specific nature, and the act of existing (esse). For we cannot say that this man is his humanity, because humanity is comprised only of the principles of the species; but this man adds individuating principles over and above the principles of the species inasmuch as the nature of the species is received and individuated in this matter. Likewise humanity is not a man's act of existing. However, in separate substances the nature of the species is not received in any individuating matter, because separate substances are immaterial, but the nature of the species is the nature itself subsisting in virtue of itself. Consequently in them the thing having a quiddity and the quiddity itself are one and the same, although their act of existing and quiddity differ from each other." Only God is His own subsisting act of existing. Therefore, as we cannot know separate substances by knowing material quiddities, neither can separate substances know the divine essence by knowing their own substance.

11. It does not follow, because the impressions of separate substances are received in the separated soul in an imperfect way, that separated souls cannot know separate substances, but only that they know them imperfectly.

ARTICLE 18

WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, KNOWS ALL NATURAL THINGS

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.89, A.3; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 101; DE VERIT., Q. 8, A. 4.]

In the eighteenth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows all natural things.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the soul does not understand all natural things when it exists apart from the body. For, as Augustine says [De divinat. daemon., III], the demons know many things through experience over a long time, experience which the soul does not possess as soon as it is separated from the body. Therefore, since the demon possesses a more penetrating intelligence than the soul, because the natural gifts of the demons remain clear and lucid, as Dionysius says [De div. nom., IV, 23], it seems that the soul does not know all natural things when it exists in separation from the body.

2. Further, the souls of men, when united to their bodies, do not know all natural things. Therefore, if souls existing in separation from bodies know all natural things, it seems that they acquire this knowledge after their separation from the body. But some souls acquire a knowledge of some natural things in this life. Consequently after separation from their bodies, these souls will possess a twofold knowledge of thee same things: one acquired in this life, another, when they exist apart from the body. This seems impossible, for two forms of the same species do not exist in the same subject.

3. Further, no finite power (virtus) can extend to infinite things. Now the power of the separated soul is finite, because its essence is finite. Therefore it cannot extend to infinite things. But natural things known by the soul are infinite, for example, the various kinds of numbers, figures, and proportions. Therefore the separated soul does not know all natural things.

4. Further, every cognition is brought about by the one knowing becoming like the thing known. Now it seems impossible for the separated soul to become like natural things, because they are material, whereas it is itself immaterial. Consequently it does not seem possible that the soul can know all natural things.

5. Further, the possible intellect stands in the same relation to intelligible things as prime matter does to sensible things. But prime matter receives only one form at a time. Therefore, since the possible intellect, when it exists apart from the body, has only one order [of objects], because in that state it is not attracted to different things by the senses, it seems that the possible intellect is capable of receiving only one intelligible form, and thus of knowing only one natural thing instead of all natural things.

6. Further, things belonging to different species cannot be like one and the same thing so far as species is concerned. But cognition is brought about by one thing becoming like another so far as species is concerned. Therefore one separated soul cannot know all natural things, since they are specifically diverse.

7. Further, if separated souls know all natural things, they must have in themselves forms which are the likenesses of natural things. Now knowledge of this kind extends either to genera and species alone [or to individuals as well]. In the first case, separated souls will not know individuals, and hence will fail to know all natural things, since individuals above all are seen to exist in reality. In the second case, since individuals are infinite in number, it would follow that an infinite number of likenesses exists in the separated soul. This seems impossible. Therefore the separated soul does not know all natural things.

8. It has been said, however, that only the likenesses of genera and species exist in the separated soul, and that by applying these to singulars it is enabled to apprehend singulars. On the contrary, the intellect can apply the universal knowledge which it has in its possession, only to the particulars which it now knows. For if I know that every [female] mule is

sterile, I can apply this knowledge only to this particular mule which I know. Now knowledge of the particular precedes the natural application of the universal to the particular; for an application of this sort cannot be the cause of our knowledge of particulars. Consequently particulars will remain unknown to the soul when it is separated from the body.

9. Further, wherever knowledge exists, there is found a certain order of the knower to the thing known. Now the souls of the damned do not have any order; for it is said that "there," i.e., in hell, "no order dwells, but eternal horror" (Job 15:22). Therefore the souls of the damned, at least, do not know natural things.

10. Further, Augustine says [De cura pro mort., 13] that the souls of the dead can have absolutely no knowledge of things that come to pass here below. But natural things are things that come to pass here below. Therefore the souls of the dead have no knowledge of natural things.

11. Further, everything that exists potentially is actualized by that which exists actually. However, it is evident that, so long as it remains united to the body, the human soul is in potency with respect either to all things, or at least to most of the things which can be known naturally, for the intellect does not know all things actually. Therefore if, after its separation from the body, the soul knows all natural things, it must be actuated by something. Now this is apparently none other than the agent intellect, "by which all things are made," as is said in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15]. But the agent intellect cannot actualize the soul with respect to all those intelligibles which it did not apprehend. Thus the Philosopher, in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 15; 7, 431a 14], compares the agent intellect to light, and phantasms to colors. Now light does not suffice to make all visible things actually visible unless colors be present also. Therefore neither will the agent intellect be able to actuate the possible intellect with respect to all intelligibles, for, since phantasms reside in bodily organs, they cannot be present to the separated soul.

12. But it has been said that, so far as all naturally knowable things are concerned, the soul is not actuated by an agent intellect, but by some higher substance. On the other hand, whenever a thing is actuated by an external agent differing generically from itself, such actuation is not natural. Thus if something curable is cured by art or by divine power, the cure will be either artificial [i.e., a work of medical art] or miraculous; however, a cure will be

natural only when it is effected through an intrinsic principle. Now the proper and connatural agent so far as the possible intellect of man is concerned, is the agent intellect. Therefore, if the possible intellect is not actuated by an agent intellect but by some higher agent, then the natural knowledge, of which we have been speaking, Will not exist. Hence no such knowledge will be had by all separated souls in common, because it is only with respect to natural things that all separated souls are united.

13. Further, if the separated soul is actuated with respect to all naturally intelligible objects, the actualizing agent must either be God or an angel. Now apparently it cannot be an angel, because an angel is not the cause of the nature itself of the soul; hence the natural knowledge of the soul does not seem to be attributable to the action of an angel. Likewise it would appear incongruous if ihe souls of the damned received from God, after death, such great perfection that they were cognizant of all natural things. Therefore it seems that separated souls do not in any way know all natural things.

14. Further, the ultimate perfection of everything existing in potency lies in this, that it be actualized with respect to all those things to which it is in potency. But man’s possible intellect is in a state of natural potency only with respect to all natural intelligible objects, that is to say, all those things which it is capable of knowing by natural cognition. Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends all natural things, then apparently every separate substance, simply because of the separate existence which it enjoys, truly possesses its own ultimate perfection, namely, happiness. Therefore, if mere separation from the body suffices to confer this perfection upon the soul, then the other helps employed in the effort to attain happiness exist to no purpose. This seems incongruous.

15. Further, delight follows upon knowledge. Therefore, if all separated souls know all natural things, it seems that the souls of the damned enjoy that knowledge thoroughly, taking the greatest delight therein. This seems incongruous.

16. Further, the Gloss on the text in Isaiah (63: 16), “Abraham did not know us,” reads: “The dead, even the saints, are ignorant of what the living do; they know not even what their own children do.” But the things that are done among the living are natural things. Therefore separated souls do not know all natural things.

Arguments against the conclusions of these objections:

1. The separated soul apprehends separate substances. But the species of all natural things are found in separate substances. Therefore the separated soul does know all natural things.

2. It may be said, however, that he who sees a separate substance need not see all the species existing in its intellect. On the contrary, there is Gregory's saying: "What is there that they, who see Him who sees all things, may not themselves see?" [Dial., IV, 33; XII, 13]. Thus they who see God see all the things that God sees. For the same reason, therefore, those who see the angels see those things that the angels see.

3. Further, the separated soul knows a separate substance so far as the latter is intelligible; for it does not see that substance by corporeal vision. But as the separate substance is intelligible, so also is a species existing in the intellect of that substance. Therefore the separated soul apprehends not only a separate substance but the intelligible species existing in it as well.

4. Further, the object actually known is the form of the knower and is one with him. Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends a separate substance, and if the latter is actually cognizant of all natural things, then apparently the separated soul would itself be cognizant of all natural things.

5. Further, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 1-5] he who understands greater intelligible objects, also understands lesser ones. Therefore, if the separated soul apprehends separate substances which are in the highest degree intelligible, as we have said above (see Art. 5), then it seems to follow that it apprehends all other intelligible objects.

6. Further, if something is in potency with respect to many things, it is actuated with respect to all of them by an active principle which is all of them actually; just as a matter which is potentially hot and dry, is made actually hot and dry by fire. Now the separated soul's possible intellect is in potency to all intelligibles. However the active principle from which it receives an influx (influentiam), namely, a separate substance, is in act with respect to all of these intelligible objects. Consequently the separate substance brings the soul from potentiality to act either with respect to all intelligible objects or to none. But obviously not with respect to none, for separated souls apprehend certain things of which they were not cognizant here below. Therefore it actuates them with respect to all intelligible objects. Consequently the separated soul apprehends* all natural things.

7. Further, Dionysius says [De div. nom., 5] that superior beings are the exemplars of inferior ones. Now separate substances are superior to natural things; hence they are the exemplars of natural things. Therefore it would seem that separated souls know all natural things in virtue of the intellectual vision that they have of separate substances.

8. Further, separated souls know things through infused forms. But infused forms are said to be forms of the order of the universe. Therefore separated souls know the entire order of the universe, and thus know all natural things.

9. Further, whatever exists in an inferior nature, exists in its entirety in a superior nature. Now the separated soul is superior to natural things. Hence all natural things in a certain respect exist in the soul. But the soul knows itself. Consequently it knows all natural things.

10. Further, as Gregory says [In Evang. hom. 40], the story of Lazarus and the rich man (Luke 16) is not a mere parable; it clearly related something that actually took place, because the person involved (Lazarus) is explicitly identified by name. Now it is recorded that the rich man in hell knows Abraham, whom he had not known before. Therefore separated souls, even those of the damned, likewise know things which they did not know in this life, and so it seems that they know all natural things.

I answer: The separated soul knows all natural things in a certain respect (secundum quid), but does not know them in an absolute sense (simpliciter).

In proof of this the fact should be borne in mind that the order among things is such that whatever exists in an inferior nature exists in a higher mode in a superior nature. Thus whatever is found in things susceptible of generation and corruption [terrestrial bodies], exists in a higher mode in celestial bodies as in their universal causes. For example, hot and cold, and other things of this sort, exist in inferior bodies as particular qualities and forms, but exist in celestial bodies as universal powers by which such qualities and forms are conveyed to those inferior bodies. In like manner, whatever exists in a corporeal nature, exists in a higher mode in an intellectual nature. Thus the forms of corporeal things exist materially and particularly in those corporeal things, whereas they exist immaterially and universally in intellectual substances. Wherefore it is said in the book De causis [X] that every intelligence is full of forms. Furthermore, everything that exists in the creature exists in a higher mode in God Himself. For the natures and forms of things exist in creatures in many diverse modes, but in God they exist unitedly, in a simple and undivided way.

This existence of things is expressed in three ways (Gen. 1:6 ff.): First, God said: “Let there be a firmament,” by which is understood the existence of things in the Word of God. Secondly, it is said: “And God made the firmament,” by which is understood the existence of the firmament in the angelic intelligence. Thirdly, it is said: “And it was made thus,” by which is understood the existence of the firmament in its proper nature, as Augustine explains. The same applies to the other creations of God. For just as things flowed from God that they might subsist in their proper nature, so from the divine wisdom the forms of things flowed into intellectual substances so that those things might be understood. Hence it must be borne in mind that the mode in which a thing exists in the order of natural perfection is the mode proper to it in the order of intelligible perfection. Now in the order of natural perfection singulars do not exist on their own account but for the sake of something else, namely, that in them the species to which they belong may be preserved. This indeed is what nature intends. For nature intends to generate man, not this man. Or rather, it generates this man only because the species cannot exist unless the individual man exists. Thus the Philosopher, in his work the De generatione animalium [V, 1, 778b 10], states that in assigning the causes of the accidents of a species we must go back to the final cause. But the accidents of the individual, he says, must be reduced to the efficient or material cause, thus suogesting that only what pertains to the species as such falls under the intention of nature. Thus knowledge of the species of things pertains to intellectual perfection, but not the knowledge of individuals, except perhaps accidentally.

Consequently, although this intellectual perfection is found in all intellectual substances, it does not exist in each of them to the same degree. For the intelligible forms of things exist in a more united and more universal mode in superior intellectual substances than they do in inferior [intellectual substances] where they are multiplied to a greater extent and are less universal according as they are further and further removed from the first simple Being [God], and come closer and closer to the particularity of things. But thanks to their greater intellective power, superior substances perfect their intelligence through a few forms, so that they know the natures of things down to their ultimate species. Now even if forms as universal as those existing in superior intellectual substances were possessed by inferior substances, the latter would not thereby attain that ultimate intellectual perfection which consists in knowing things down to their individual species, because inferior intellectual substances have an inferior intellective power. Hence their knowledge of things will remain more or less universal and indistinct; and generality and indistinctness are the marks of imperfect knowledge. For it is evident that the more active the intellect, the greater is its ability to acquire much from little. An indication of this is that things must be explained one by one to uncultivated people and to slow learners, and particular examples introduced for each single thing.

Now the human soul is obviously the lowest among all intellectu~l substances. Consequently it is capable by nature of receiving the forms of things in the material order. Thus the human soul is united to a body in order that the soul may receive intelligible species from material things through its possible intellect. Nor is its natural intellective power greater than that required for perfecting its knowledge through such forms. Hence the intelligible light in which the human soul participates and which is called the agent intellect, has as its function to actualize intelligible species of the type referred to. Therefore, since the soul is united to the body, the soul’s vision is turned toward inferior things; from these it abstracts intelligible species proportioned to its intellective power, and it is in this way that the soul is perfected in knowledge. But when the soul is separated from the body, its vision is directed toward higher things alone, and from these it receives an influx of universal intelligible species. And although the species thus received have ; less universal mode of existence in the separated soul than they enjoy in those higher substances, nevertheless the intellective power of the soul is not so efficacious that it can acquire a perfect knowledge of those intelligibles through this kind of species. That is to say, it cannot apprehend each one of them individually and determinately, but can know them only generally and indistinctly in the manner in which things are known through universal principles. Moreover, separated souls acquire this knowledge all at once by an influx, and not successively by instruction, as Origen says [Peri Archon, I, 6].

Consequently, we must say that separated souls know all natural things in a universal way by natural knowledge, but do not know each of them individually. This is not the case, however, with respect to the knowledge that the souls of the saints possess through grace. For as regards that knowledge the saints are made equal to the angels inasmuch as they, like the angels, see all things in the Word. The answers to the objections are now in order.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. According to Augustine [De dviniat. daemon., 3], the demons know things in three ways: First, some demons know things that transcend their natural knowledge through the revelation of the good angels, such as the mystery of Christ and the Church and others of this kind; secondly, some demons know things that are naturally knowable by the native acumen of their own intelligence; thirdly, some demons know the issue of future contingent events in individual cases through experience over a long time. Now as we have pointed out, knowledge of singulars does not pertain essentially to intellectual cognition as such. Consequently the objection is irrelevant, because here there is no question of such knowledge.

2. In those souls which have acquired the science of certain natural things knowable in this life, there will exist a knowledge of those things which bears directly on the individual. Their knowledge of other things, however, will be universal and indistinct, so that they will not have acquired knowledge uselessly in this life. Nor is there any incongruity in their possessing both types of knowledge with respect to the same objects, since those knowledges are formally diverse.

3. That argument is beside the point. For we do not allege that the separated soul knows all natural things in their individuality. Hence the infinity of species that is found in numbers, figures, and proportions, is not out of proportion to the soul’s cognitive power. But since that same argument would likewise apply to angelic knowledge, it must be said that the species of figures and numbers and things of this sort are not infinite actually but only potentially. Nor is it improper that the power of a finite intellectual substance should ex- ‘I tend ~o infinites of this kind. For an intellective power in a certain respect is itself infinite inasmuch as it is not limited by matter. This is why it can know the universal, which is also infinite in a certain respect inasmuch as it belongs to the universal by nature to contain infinites potentially.

4. The forms of material things exist in immaterial substances immaterially. Thus immaterial things become like material ones so far as the intelligible nature of the latter's forms is concerned, not so far as their mode of existing is concerned.

5. Prime matter is related to forms in a twofold manner only, because with respect to them it is either in pure potency or in complete act. For natural forms have their own operations as soon as they exist in matter, unless there be some impediment, because a natural form is directed to one thing only. Thus, as soon as the form fire exists in matter, it causes the matter to move upward. However, the possible intellect is related to intelligible species in a threefold manner: sometimes, as before learning, it is in pure potency; sometimes, as when actually reflecting upon something, it is in complete act; sometimes, as when possessing a habitus of science but not actually exercising it, it is in a state midway between potency and act. Therefore an apprehended form so far as it is apprehended actually, but not so far as it exists in the possible intellect "habitually," is related to the possible intellect as a natural form is to prime matter. Hence, as prime matter is informed with but one form at a time, so the possible intellect apprehends but one intelligible object at a time. Nevertheless it can know many things habitually in virtue of its habit of knowledge.

6. There can be a likeness between a thing and a knowing substance in two ways: either according to the thing's real mode of existing, and in this way no likeness exists between things specifically diverse and a knowing substance, since the latter belongs to one species only: or according to the thing's intelligible mode of existing, and in this way there can be a likeness between things specifically diverse and the soul, inasmuch as the knowing substance possesses diverse intelligible species, even though the soul itself belongs only to one species.

7. Separated souls know not only the species but also individuals, although not all individuals but only some. Consequently it is not necessary that an infinite number of species exist in the separated soul.

8. The application of universal knowledge to singulars is not the cause of the knowledge of singulars, but is a natural result of a knowledge of singulars. The problem of how the separated soul knows singulars will be treated later (Art. 20) .

9. Since, according to Augustine in his work De natura boni [3], the good consists in mode, species, and order; so far as order is found in a thing, to that extent good is found there. Now the good of grace does not exist in the damned but only the good of nature. Hence in them there exists not the order of grace but the order of nature, and the latter suffices for knowledge of natural things.

10. Augustine is speaking of singulars which come to pass here below. The knowledge of such things, we have said, does not pertain to intellectual cognition.

11. The possible intellect cannot be rendered actually cognizant of all natural things by the light of the agent intellect alone, but only by some superior substance which is actually cognizant of all natural things. And if one considers rightly, he will see that, according to the Philosopher's own treatment of the matter, the agent intellect is not active directly with respect to the possible intellect, but rather with respect to phanosms which the agent intellect makes actually intelligible. And it is by the phantasms thus actualized that the possible intellect is actualized when, as a result of its union with the body, its vision is turned to inferior things. And for the same reason, when, after its separation from the body, the possible intellect turns toward superior things, it is actualized, as by its own proper agent, by the actually intelligible species which exist in superior substances. And such knowledge, therefore, is natural.

12. Hence the reply to the twelfth objection is evident.

13. Separated souls receive this sort of perfection from God through the mediation of the angels. For, although the substance of the soul is created by God immediately, nevertheless intelligible perfections come from God through the mediation of the angels; and not only natural perfections but also those which pertain to the mysteries of grace, as Dionysius shows [De cael. hier., IV, 2].

14. The separated soul, having universal knowledge of natural intelligible objects, is not perfectly actualized. For to know a thing universally is to know it imperfectly and potentially. By such knowledge, therefore, the separated soul does not attain even natural happiness. Consequently it does not follow that the other helps for the attainment of happiness are superfluous.

15. The good of knowledge which the damned possess is itself a cause of sorrow to them, inasmuch as they know that they are deprived of the highest good to which they are directed through other goods.

16. That Gloss refers to particulars which, as was said, do not pertain to intellectual perfection.

Answers to the arguments against the conclusions of the objections.

1. The separated soul does not perfectly comprehend a separate substance. Hence it is not necessary that the separated soul know all the things which are present by their likeness in such a substance.

2. Gregory’s statement is true as regards knowledge of that intelligible object which is God: an object which in itself represents all intelligible objects. However, it is not necessary that he who sees God should know all the things that God knows, unless that person should know himself as God knows Himself.

3. The species existing in the angel’s intellect are intelligible to the intellect of the one of whom they are the forms, but not to the intellect of the separated soul.

4. Although the intellect is the form of an intellectual substance, it is not necessary that the separated soul, apprehending the separate substance, should apprehend the intellect of that substance, because the separated soul does not comprehend the latter.

5. Although the separated soul does in some way know separated substances, it is not necessary that it know all other things perfectly. For it does not know perfectly the separate substances themselves.

6. The separated soul is actualized with respect to all natural intelligible objects by a superior substance. However, it is not actualized perfectly but universally, as we have pointed out.

7. Although separate substances are in some way the exemplars of all natural things, it does not follow that all these are known when these natural things are known, unless the separate substances themselves are comprehended perfectly.

8. The separated soul knows through infused forms. But these are not forms of the order of the universe in an individual mode, such as superior substances possess, but only in a general mode, as was said.

9. Natural things exist in a certain respect in separate substances and in the soul. However the forms of natural things exist actually in the separate

substances, whereas they exist only potentially in the soul inasmuch as they are knowable.

10. The soul of Abraham was a separate substance. Consequently the soul of the rich man was able to know the soul of Abraham, just as it could know other separate substances.

27 That is, the separate substance exists in a higher order of being and so cannot be totally included within the scope of the intellectual power of the separated soul.

ARTICLE 19

WHETHER THE SENTIENT POWERS REMAIN ,IN THE SOUL WHEN IT EXISTS APART FROM THE BODY

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q. 77, A.8; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 81; SENT., IV, DIST. 44, Q. 3, A. 3, Q. 1 AND 2; DIST. 50, Q. 1, A. 1; QUODL. X, Q. 4, A. 2; DE VIRT. CARD., A. 4, AD 13.]

In the nineteenth article we examine this question: Whether the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems this is the case, because the powers of the soul are either essential parts of it or natural properties of it. But the essential parts of a thing cannot be separated from a thing so long as the thing itself remains in existence, and neither can its natural properties be separated from it. Therefore the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.

2. But it might be said that the sentient powers remain in the [separated]. soul as in their root. On the other hand, for a thing to exist in something else as in its root, is for ifto exist in that thing potentially, that is, virtually and not actually. Now the essential constituents of a thing and its natural properties must exist in it actually and not just virtually. Therefore the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul merely as in their root.

3. Further, Augustine says in the book De spiritu et anima [15] that when the soul leaves the body it takes with it sense and imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible appetites which belong to the sentient part.

Therefore the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists in separation from the body.

4. Further, a whole from which any of the parts are missing is not a complete one. But the sentient powers are parts of the soul. Hence, if they did not exist in the separated soul, the separated soul would not be a complete whole.

5. Further, as a man is such because of his reason and intellect, so also is an animal such because of its sense, for “rational” is the constitutive difference of “man,” “sensible” the constitutive difference of “animal.” Therefore, if sense is not one and the same, it will not be one and the same animal. Now if the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul, the same sense will not be present in man when he arises from the dead as is present in him now, because whatever lapses into nothingness cannot be brought back into existence as numerically the same thing. Therefore when a man rises from the dead he will not be the same animal. This is contrary to what is said: “Whom I myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and not another” (Job 19: 27).

6. Further, Augustine says in Super Genesim ad litteram [XII, 32] that the punishments which souls suffer in hell are similar to the dreams of people asleep, that is to say, according to the [sensible] likenesses of corporeal things. But such dreams of people asleep result from the imagination, which belongs to the sentient part of the soul. Therefore the sentient powers exist in the separated soul.

7. Further, it is evident that joy belongs to the concupiscible appetite, and anger to the irascible appetite. Now there is joy in the separated souls of good men, and sorrow and anger in the souls of evil men, for in hell “there is weeping and gnashing of teeth” (Matt. 8:12). Consequently, since the concupiscible and irascible appetites belong to the sentient part of the soul, as the Philosopher says in the De anima [III, 9, 432b 5], it seems that the sentient powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body.

8. Further, Dionysius says [De div. nom., IV, 23], that the wickedness of the demons is irrational fury, love of concupiscence, and a wanton imagination. But these belong to the sentient powers. Consequently there are sentient powers in the demon and, therefore, even more so in the soul when it is separated from the body.

9. Further, Augustine says in Super Genesim ad litteram [XII, 32] that the soul senses certain things without the body, namely, joy and sadness. But whatever belongs to the soul itself without the body, exists in the separated soul. Therefore sense exists in the separated soul.

10. Further, it is said in the book De causis [14] that sensible things exist in every soul. But sensible things are sensed because they are present in the soul. Consequently the separated soul senses sensible things, and thus sense exists in it.

11. Further, Gregory says [In Evang. hom. 40] that what our Lord relates about the wealthy reveler (Luke 16) is not a parable but a fact. Moreover, it is said there that when the rich man had gone to hell (no doubt so far as he was a separated soul), he saw Lazarus and heard Abraham speaking to him. Therefore the separated soul sees and hears, and thus sense exists in the separated soul.

12. Further, things that are the same so far as their act of existing and substance are concerned, cannot exist without each other. Now in man the sentient and rational soul are the same so far as their act of existing and substance are concerned. Hence it is impossible that sense should cease to remain in the rational soul when it exists in separation from the body.

13. Further, when that which ceases to exist, is brought back into existence again, it is not numerically the same thing as it was when it first existed. But if the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul, they must cease to exist. Consequently they will not be numerically the same at the resurrection; and thus, since the sentient powers are the acts oi bodily organs, neither will the organs be numerically the same, nor will the whole man be numerically the same. This is incongruous.

14. Further, rewards and punishments are in conformity with a man’s merit or lack of merit. Now what a man merits or fails to merit is to a great extent the result of the activities of his sentient powers, for we either give in to our passions or curb them. Therefore justice seems to demand that the acts of the sentient powers exist in separated souls which are either rewarded or punished.

15. Further, a power is nothing more than a principle of action or passion [i.e., being-acted-upon]. Now the soul is the principle of sentient operations. Therefore the sentient powers exist in the soul as their subject. Hence it is impossible that they should cease to exist in the separated soul, for

accidents lacking contraries are corrupted only by the corruption of their subject.

16. Further, according to the Philosopher [De mem. et rem., I, 450a 10], memory exists in the sentient part [of the soul]. Now memory is present in the soul when it exists apart from the body, as is apparent from what is said to the rich reveler by Abraham: “Remember that you have received good things in your lifetime” (Luke 16:25)Consequently the sentient powers exist in the separated soul.

17. Further, virtues and vices remain in souls when they exist apart from the body. But some virtues and vices exist in the sentient part of the soul, for the Philosopher says in the Ethics [III, 9, 1117b 22] that temperance and fortitude belong to the irrational part of the soul. Therefore the sentient powers remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.

18. Further, it is related of the dead who are brought back to life, as we read in many histories of the saints, that they said they saw certain imaginable objects, for example, houses, camps, rivers, and things of this kind. Therefore when souls exist apart from their bodies, they use imagination, which belongs to the sentient part [of the soul].

19. Further, the senses assist in intellectual knowledge, for, if anyone is deprived of one sense, he is deprived of one kind of knowledge. Now intellectual knowledge will be more perfect when the soul is separated from the body than when it is joined thereto. Therefore sense will be required to an even greater extent by the intellect [of the separated soul].

20. Further, the Philosopher says in the De anima [I, 4, 408b 20] that if an old man were to receive the eye of a youth, he would see just as well as a youth. From this it appears that, although the organs are weakened, the sensory powers are not weakened. Therefore neither are they destroyed when their organs cease to exist. Consequently it seems that the sentient powers remain in the separated soul.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says in the De anima [II, 2, 413b 25] when he speaks of the intellect, that “this alone is separate as the perpetual is separate from the corruptible.” Consequently the sentient powers do not remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body.

Further, the Philosopher says in the De generatione animalium [II, 3, 736b 21] that “The operations of some powers do not exist without the body, nor do these powers themselves exist without the body.” But the operations of the sentient powers do not exist without the body, for they are performed through bodily organs. Therefore the sentient powers do not exist in the soul without the body.

Further, Damascene says [De fide orth., II, 23] that nothing is bereft of its proper operation. Hence, if the sentient powers remain in ihe soul when it exists apart from the body, they have their proper operations. This is impossible.

Further, a power which is not exercised is purposeless. Now in the activities of God nothing is done without a purpose. Therefore the sentient powers do not remain in the separated soul, for they cannot be exercised.

I answer: the powers of the soul do not belong to the essence of the soul but are natural properties which flow from its essence, as can be learned from the preceding questions. Now an accident is corrupted in two ways. First, by its contrary, as cold is corrupted by heat. Secondly, by the corruption of its subject, for an accident cannot remain when its subject is corrupted. Consequently what does not have a contrary accident or form, is destroyed only by the destruction of the subject itself. Now it is evident that there is nothing contrary to the powers of the soul. And therefore if they are corrupted, they are corrupted only by the corruption of their subject.

Consequently, in order to discover whether the sentient powers are corrupted when the body is corrupted, or whether they remain in the soul when it exists apart from the body, we must accept the principle of this investigation so that we may learn what the subject of the aforementioned power is. Now it is evident that the subject of a power must be that which is capable of doing something in virtue of its power, for every accident designates its subject. Furthermore, an agent or a patient is nothing more than a thing which can act or undergo some change (pati). Hence, whatever is the subject of an action or undergoes a change, must be the subject of a power, the power itself being a principle. And this is what the Philosopher says in the book De somno et vigilia [I, 454a 7], namely, that an action belongs to the thing to which the power belongs. Now there has been a diversity of opinion about the operations of the senses. For Plato held that the sentient soul has a proper operation in virtue of its own nature, for he maintained that the sentient soul is a self-mover, and that it moves the body only inasmuch as it is moved by itself. Thus there is a twofold operation in sensing: one by which the soul moves itself, and another by which it moves the body. Wherefore the Platonists defined sense as the movement of the soul through the body. For this reason, certain followers of this position distinguish two operations in the sentient part of the soul, namely, certain interior operations by which the soul senses inasmuch as it moves itself, and certain external operations inasmuch as it moves the body. They also stated that there are two kinds of sentient powers: some which are principles of acts within the soul itself, and which remain together with their activities in the separated soul when the body is corrupted; others, which are principles of external acts, and these are present in the soul and the body simultaneously, and cease to exist when the body corrupts.

But this position cannot be held, for it is evident that anything whatever operates so far as it is a being. Therefore those things which exist of themselves, operate of themselves as individual substances. On the other hand, forms which cannot exist of themselves, but are called beings inasmuch as something exists by them, do not operate of themselves but are said to act inasmuch as their subjects act through them. For just as heat itself is not a thing having existence (id quod est), but is that by which something is hot, so heat itself does not heat anything, but is that by which a hot thing heats something. Therefore, if the sentient soul could operate of itself [i.e., without the body], it would follow that it would subsist of itself, and thus would not be corrupted when the body is corrupted; but then the souls of brute animals would also be immortal. This is impossible, yet Plato is said to have conceded this [Phaedo 21].

It is evident then that no operation of the sentient part can belong to the soul alone in such a way that it can be exercised by the soul alone; but such operations belong to the composite because of the soul, just as the act of heating belongs to the hot thing on account of its heat. Hence the composite sees, hears, and senses all things, but [it does this] through its soul. Consequently the composite is capable of seeing, hearing, and sensing, but [it performs these] because of its soul. Hence it is clear that the powers of the sentient part exist in the composite as their subject, but come from the soul as their principle. Therefore, when the body is corrupted the sentient powers cease to exist, although they remain in the soul as in their principle. This is what the other position maintains, namely, that the sentient powers remain in the separated soul as in their root.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. The sentient powers do not belong to the essence of the soul, but, in fact, are natural properties of the composite as their subject and of the soul as their principle.

2. Powers of this kind are said to remain in the soul as in their root, when it exists apart from the body, not because they are actually present in the soul, but because the separated soul's virtually such that, if it is united to a body, it can again cause these powers in the body, and life as well.

3. We do not have to accept this authority because this false book has authority in name only. For it was not written by Augustine but by some other person.'s Moreover, that authority can be openly exposed inasmuch as it says that the soul draws with it powers of this kind not actually but virtually.

4. The powers of the soul are neither essential parts nor integral parts but potential parts. However, some of these belong to the soul in virtue of itself, and others belong to the composite.

5. Sense is spoken of in two ways. In one way as the sentient soul itself which is the principle of powers of this kind, and in this way the animal is an animal by sense as by its proper form. For in this way "sensible" is taken from sense inasmuch as it is the constitutive difference of "animal." Sense is spoken of in another way as the sentient power itself, which, since it is a natural property, as has been pointed out, is not a constitutive part of the species, but is the natural effect of the species. Therefore sense does not remain in the separated soul in the latter way, but sense does remain in the first way spoken Of, for in man the essence of the rational soul and that of the sentient soul is one and the same. Consequently nothing prevents a man who rises from the dead from being the same man numerically, for, in order that something be numerically the same, it is enough that the essential principles remain numerically the same. However, it is not necessary that the properties and accidents be numerically the same.

6. Augustine seems to have revoked this in his Retractiones [II, 24]. For he says in Super Genesim ad litteram [II, 32] that the punishments of hell exist by reason of imaginary vision, and that this place hell is not corporeal but imaginary. Whereupon this view was withdrawn to conform with the reason that if hell is not a corporeal place, why is it said that hell is

underground. And he reproves himself for this, saying: “Concerning the damned, it seems to me that it should be taught that they are under the earth rather than question why they are believed to be or are said to be under the earth, as if this were not so.” However, what he said about the place of hell has been retracted, and all other things which pertain to this seem to be retracted.

7. In separated souls there is neither joy nor sorrow so far as these are acts of the irascible and concupiscible appetites which belong to the sentient part of the soul, but so far as the movement of the will, which is in the intellective part, is signified by these.

8. Because human evil is a result of one of three things, namely, a wanton imagination which is the principle of error, a love of concupiscence, and irrational anger, Dionysius describes the evil of the demons in likeness to human evil; not that it is to be understood that there is imagination in the demons, or irascible and concupiscible appetites which are in the sentient part of the soul, but that in them there is something proportionate to these as becomes their intellective nature.

9. We must not understand by these words of Augustine that the soul senses something without a bodily organ, but that it senses something without sensible bodies themselves, for instance, fear and sorrow. Again it senses other things through the body itself, for example, heat and cold.

10. Whatever exists in another, exists in that thing according to the mode of the recipient. Consequently sensible things do not exist in the separated soul according to a sensible mode but according to an intelligible one.

11. Nothing prevents us from speaking of certain facts metaphorically, for, although the story related in the Gospel about Lazarus and the rich man is a fact, still it is said metaphorically that Lazarus saw and heard, just as it is also said metaphorically that he had a tongue.

12. The substance of the sentient soul remains in man after death. However, the sentient powers do not.

13. just as sense, inasmuch as it is called a power, is not the form of the whole body but the sentient soul itself (moreover, sense is a property of the composite), so neither is the power of vision the act of the eye, but that of the soul itself as the principle of such a power; just as it may be said that the visive soul is the act of the eye as the sentient soul is the act of the body. Moreover the power of vision is a property consequent on this. Therefore it

is not necessary that there be a different eye for the resurrected individual, although there is a different sentient power.

14. Reward does not correspond to merit as rewarding, but as that on account of which some reward is given. Consequently it is not necessary that all the acts by which some one merits reward, should be brought back into existence again when the reward is actually given. It is sufficient that they exist in the divine memory. Otherwise it would be necessary for the saints to die a second time, which is absurd.

15. The soul is a principle of sensing, not as a thing that senses, but as that by which a sensing thing senses. Consequently the sentient powers do not exist in the soul as a subject, but come from the soul as a principle.

16. The separated soul does not remember through the memory which belongs to its sentient part, but through that which belongs to its intellective part, inasmuch as Augustine considers this to be part of the image [of God in us].

17. The virtues and vices which belong to the irrational part of the soul remain in the soul only in principle, for the seeds of all the virtues are found in the will and the reason.

18. The soul does not understand in the same manner when it exists apart from the body as it does when it exists in the body, as is evident from the preceding articles (Arts. XVII and XVIII). Therefore, concerning those things which the separated soul apprehends in the manner proper to it without phantasms, this knowledge remains in the soul after it returns to its former state. Having been joined to the body again, the soul now understands in a manner befitting it, that is, by turning to phantasms. And for this reason things grasped intelligibly are narrated imaginatively.

19. The intellect requires the aid of the senses because of the imperfect kind of knowledge which it has, that is, inasmuch as it receives [species] from phantasms. But this is not true with respect to the more perfect mode of knowledge possessed by the separated soul; just as a man requires milk in infancy but not when fully grown.

2o. The sentient powers are not weakened absolutely because their organs are weakened, but only accidentally. Consequently they are corrupted accidentally when their organs are corrupted.

ARTICLE 20

WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, KNOWS SINGULAR THINGS

[SUMMA THEOL., I, Q.89, A.4; CONTRA GENTILES, II, 100; SENT., IV. DIST. 50, Q. 1, A. 3; DE VER., Q. 19, A. 2.]

In the twentieth article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, knows singular things.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the separated soul does not know singular things, because of all the soul's powers, only the intellect remains in the soul when it exists apart from the body. Now the object of the intellect is the universal and not the singular, for science has to do with the universal, whereas the senses are directed to singulars, as is stated in the De anima [III, 5, 430a 10]. Therefore the separated soul does not know singulars but only universals.

2. Further, if the separated soul knows singulars, it does so either through the forms which it acquired previously while it existed in the body, or through infused forms. Now it does not know singulars through forms acquired previously, for some of the forms which the soul acquired through the senses while it existed in the body, are individual intentions, which are conserved in the sentient part [of the soul]; but these cannot remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, because powers of this kind do not remain in the soul, as has been shown (Art. 19). Some intentions, however, that is, those which are in the intellect, are universal; therefore these alone can remain in the separated soul. But singulars cannot be known through

universal intentions. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through the species acquired while it existed in the body. Similarly, it cannot know singulars through infused forms, because such forms represent all singulars equally. Therefore it would follow that the separated soul knows all singulars. This does not appear to be the case.

3. Further, the separated soul is prevented from knowing a thing that is located in a different place from itself. For Augustine says in the book De cura pro mortuis agenda [13] that the souls of the dead are in a place where they cannot know in any way whatever the things that occur here. But knowledge that is caused through infused species is not prevented because of a difference of place. Therefore the soul does not know singulars through infused species.

4. Further, infused species are related equally both to the present and to the future, for the infusion of intelligible species is not affected by time. Therefore, if the separated soul knows singulars through infused species-, it seems that it does not know the present or the past, but only the future. However, it appears that this cannot be the case, because knowledge of the future belongs to God alone; for it is said: “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that you are gods” (Isa. 41:23).

5. Further, singular things are infinite. Infused species, however, are not infinite. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused species.

6. Further, whatever is indistinct cannot be a principle of a distinct knowledge. But the knowledge of singulars is distinct. Therefore, since infused species are indistinct inasmuch as they are universal, it seems that the separated soul cannot know singular things through infused species.

7. Further, whatever is received in a thing is received according to the mode of the recipient. Now the separated soul is immaterial. Therefore infused forms are received in it immaterially. But what is immaterial cannot be the principle of a knowledge of singular things which are individuated by matter. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused forms.

8. But it may be said that singular things can be known by infused forms, even though they are immaterial, because singulars are likenesses of the ideal exemplars by which God knows both universals and singulars. On the contrary, God knows singulars through the ideal exemplars inasmuch as

they are productive of matter, which is the principle of individuation. But the forms infused in the separated soul are not productive of matter, because they do not create, for creation belongs to God alone. Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars through infused forms.

9. Further, the likeness which any creature bears to God cannot be a univocal likeness, but only an analogous one. Now a knowledge that is acquired because of some analogous similarity [between things] is the most imperfect sort of knowledge; for example, if one thing is known through something else inasmuch as it conforms with it in being. Therefore, if the separated soul knows singulars through infused species, inasmuch as they are like the ideal exemplars, it seems that it knows singulars in a most imperfect manner.

10. Further, it was shown in a preceding article (Art. 18), that the separated soul knows natural things through infused forms only indistinctly and in the universal. Now this is not to know them. Therefore the separated soul does not know singulars through infused species.

11. Further, those infused species through which the separated soul admittedly knows singular things, are not caused immediately by God; because, according to Dionysius, the divine law (lex divinitatis) is to change the lowest thing through an intermediary. On the other hand, neither are infused species caused by an angel; because an angel cannot cause species of this kind, either by creating them, since it never creates anything; or by changing something, because this requires a communicating medium. Therefore it seems that the separated soul does not possess infused species through which it may know singulars.

12. Further, if the separated soul knows singular things through infused species, this can occur only in one of two ways: either by applying species to singulars, or by turning itself toward the species themselves. If the soul knows singulars by applying species to singulars, it follows that such an application, is not made by deriving something from singular things themselves, because the separated soul does not have sentient powers naturally disposed to receive [species] from singulars. Therefore it remains that this application is made by premising something about singulars; and thus the soul will not know singulars themselves, but only what it premises about them. However, if the separated soul knows singulars through the aforesaid species by turning itself toward them, it follows that it will know

singulars only so far as they exist in the species themselves. But singulars exist only universally in the aforesaid species. Therefore the separated soul knows singulars only in the universal.

13. further, nothing finite can be superior to infinite things. But singulars are infinite. Therefore, since the power of the separated soul is finite, it seems that the separated soul does not know singulars.

14. Further, the separated soul can know a thing only by intellectual vision. Now Augustine says in the De Genesi ad litteram [XII, 24] that separated souls by their intellectual vision know neither bodies nor the likenesses of bodies. Therefore, since singular things are bodies, it seems that they cannot be known by the separated soul.

15. Further, wherever the nature is the same, the mode of operation is also the same. Now a separated soul possesses the same nature as a soul that is joined to a body. Therefore, since the soul by its intellect cannot know singulars when it is joined to the body, it seems that it cannot know singulars when it exists apart from the body.

16. Further, powers are distinguished by their objects. But the cause [in this case, the object] possesses that which it produces [viz., distinction] in a higher degree. Therefore the diversity among objects is greater than that found among powers. But a sense never becomes an intellect. Hence the singular, which is the object of sense, never becomes an object of the intellect.

17. Further, a cognitive power of a superior order is less complex (multiplicatur), with respect to the same cognizable object, than a power of an inferior order; for the common sense knows all things apprehended by the five external senses; and likewise an angel, by one cognitive power, namely, by its intellect, knows both the universals and singulars which a man apprehends by his senses and his intellect. Now no power of an inferior order can apprehend the object of another power which differs [specifically] from itself, just as sight can never apprehend the object of hearing. Therefore a man’s intellect can never apprehend a singular which is the object of sense, although an angel’s intellect knows and apprehends both.

18. Further, it is said in the work De causis [23] that an intelligence knows things inasmuch as it causes them or directs them. But the separated

soul can neither cause singulars nor direct them. Therefore it does not know singulars.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE CONCLUSIONS OF THESE OBJECTIONS

1. On the contrary, to form propositions belongs to the intellect alone. Now the soul, when still joined to the body, forms propositions, the subject of which is a singular, and the predicate of which is a universal; for example, when I say: Socrates is a man; but I cannot do this unless I know the singular and its relationship to the universal. Therefore the separated soul really knows singulars by its intellect.

2. Further, the soul is inferior in nature to every angel. Now the angels of a lower hierarchy receive illuminations about singular effects. In this way they are distinguished from the angels of an intermediary hierarchy, who receive illuminations according to the universal likenesses (rationes) of these effects. They are also distinguished from the angels of a supreme hierarchy, who receive their illuminations according to the universal likenesses existing in their cause [i.e., God]. Therefore, since the more particular in nature a knowledge is, the lower is, the order of existence of the substance possessing such knowledge, it seems that the soul knows singulars in a much more desirable way when it exists apart from the body.

3. Further, whatever an inferior power can do, a superior power can do. Now sense, which is inferior to the intellect, can know singulars. Therefore the separated soul can know singulars by its intellect.

I answer: We must say that, when the soul exists apart from the body it knows some singulars, but not all of them. Now it knows some of the singulars of which it first acquired knowledge while united to the body, otherwise it would not remember the things which it did in this life-, and thus remorse of conscience would vanish from the separated soul. It knows also those singulars of which it acquires knowledge after being separated from the body, otherwise it would not be punished by the fire of hell and by the other corporeal punishments which are said to exist in hell. However, that the separated soul does not know all singulars by its natural knowledge, is shown by the fact that the souls of the dead are not aware of things that occur here, as Augustine says [De cura pro mort., 13].

Therefore this inquiry involves two difficulties: one common [to intellectual nature as such] and one proper [to human nature]. The difficulty common to intellectual nature as such arises from the fact that our intellect does not seem to be capable of knowing singulars, but only universals. Therefore, since intelligence. is the only cognitive power proper to God, to the angels, and to the separated soul, it appears difficult to see how they can possess a knowledge of singulars. For this reason some men made the mistake of denying any knowledge of singulars to God and the angels; but this is altogether impossible. For if this position were adopted, divine providence would be excluded from things, the judgment of God concerning human acts would disappear, and the ministering of the angels would also be removed, for we believe that the angels are solicitous of the safety of man, as the Apostle says: “Are they not all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation?” (Heb. 1:14)

For this reason some said that God, the angels, and separated souls as well, know the whole order of the universe through a knowledge of universal causes; for there is nothing in singular things that is not derived from these universal causes. They offer the example that, if anyone should know the whole order of the stars and the heavens, and their measure and movement, he would know, by means of his intellect, all future eclipses, both their number, in what places they would occur, and at what time they would take place in the future. But this is insufficient for a true knowledge of singulars. For it is clear that, no matter how closely universals may be united, a complete singular never results from their union: just as if I say man, white, musical, and will have added whatever others are possible, a singular will never result from them; since it is possible for all these universals, which are joined together, to belong to many men. Therefore anyone who knows all causes universally, never knows expressly any singular effect as a result of such knowledge. Nor does one who knows the whole order of the heavens know this eclipse inasmuch as it is this [i.e., as a singular], for although he knows that a future eclipse will occur at such a position of the sun and moon, at such an hour, and whatever else is to be observed in eclipses of this kind, yet it is possible for an eclipse of this specific kind to occur frequently.

Therefore others, that they might ascribe a true knowledge of singulars to the angels, maintained that knowledge of this sort is derived from singulars themselves. But this is quite incongruous; for, since the greatest difference exists between an intelligible mode of existing and a material and sensible mode of existing, the form of a material thing is not received immediately by the intellect, but is carried to it through a number of intermediaries; for example, the form of a sensible thing first exists in a medium wherein it is more spirituals than in the sensible thing itself; next it exists in a sense organ; and from there is drawn into the imagination and the other inferior [sense] powers; and finally it is carried to the intellect. Now it is inconceivable that such media should play any role either in the knowledge of an angel or in that of a separated soul.

Therefore it must be said, on the contrary, that the forms of things through which the intellect knows, are related to things in a twofold manner: for some forms are productive of things, while others are derived from them; and forms which are productive of things lead to a knowledge of a thing inasmuch as they are productive of it. Thus the artisan who gives *the form to the thing made, or gives some disposition to matter, knows the thing made by the form of his art as regards that which he causes in the thing. And because no human art causes matter, which is the principle of individuation, but receives matter already in existence, therefore the artisan, for example, a builder, knows the house in a universal way by its form, but he does not know this house as this house, except so far as he acquires knowledge of it through the senses.

Now God, by His intellect, not only produces the form from which the universal notion (ratio) is derived, but also produces matter which is the principle of individuation. Consequently He knows by His art, both universals and singulars; for, as material things flow from the divine art, with the result that they subsist with their proper natures, so also by the same art do the likenesses of intelligible things flow into the separate intellectual substances, and these substances know the things produced by God, through these likenesses. Therefore the separate substances know not only universals, but singulars as well, inasmuch as the intelligible species which are infused in them by the divine art are the likenesses of things as regards both their form and their matter.

Nor is it improper for a form which is productive of a thing, even though the form itself is immaterial, to be the likeness of a thing as regards both its form and its matter, because a thing always exists more simply in a superior nature than it does in an inferior one. Therefore, although form and matter are diverse in the sensible nature, nevertheless that which is higher and the cause of both, is related to both as one existing thing; and for this reason superior substances know material things immaterially, and diverse things unitedly, as Dionysius says.' However, intelligible forms that are derived from things are acquired by abstraction. Hence they do not give rise to knowledge of the thing as such, but only to a knowledge of what is abstracted from the thing. Therefore, since the forms in our intellect, which are derived from things, are abstracted from matter and from all material conditions, they do not lead to a knowledge of singulars, but to a knowledge of universals alone. This, therefore, is the reason why separate substances can know singulars by their intellect, whereas, on the other hand, our intellect knows only universals.

Now an angelic intellect and a separated soul are differently situated so far as the knowledge of singulars is concerned. For we explained in a previous article (Art. 18) that the efficacy of the angels' intellective power is proportioned to the universality of the intelligible forms which they possess; and therefore they know through universal forms of this kind all the things to which these forms extend. Therefore, just as they know all the species of natural things existing under their genera, so they know all the singular natural things contained under their species. However, the efficacy of the separated soul's intellective power is not proportioned to the universality of infused forms, but, on the contrary, is proportioned to forms abstracted from things. For this reason it is natural for the soul to be united to a body. Therefore it was said above that the separated soul does not know all natural things determinately and completely, even with regard to their species, but that it can know them in a certain general and indeterminate manner. Consequently the infused species [which separated souls possess] are not sufficient for a knowledge of singulars to the point of enabling those souls to know all singulars as the angels do.

Nevertheless these infused species in the soul are limited to a knowledge of those singulars to which the soul is specifically ordered or inclined, for example, those things which act upon it, either things afflicting it, or things which leave impressions and traces upon it. For whatever is received is limited [or determined] in the recipient in accordance with the condition of the recipient’s mode of being. Hence it is evident that the separated soul knows singulars; not all singulars, however, but only some of them.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1. In this life our intellect knows through species derived from things, which species are abstracted from matter and from all material conditions; and therefore it cannot know singulars~ the principle of which is matter, but only universals. However, the separated soul’s intellect has infused forms through which it can know singulars, for the reason just given.

2. When the soul exists apart from the body, it does not know singulars by the species which it previously acquired while united to the body, but by infused forms. However, it does not follow that it knows all singulars, as has been shown.

3. Separated souls are prevented from knowing things that occur here, not because they exist in a different place, but because they do not possess a sufficiently efficacious intellectual power whereby they can know all singulars through infused species.

4. The angels do not know all future contingent things, for they know singulars through infused species inasmuch as they participate in these species. Hence future things, in whose species the angels do not yet participate, are not known by the angels inasmuch as they are future, but are known only inasmuch as they are present in their causes [i.e., as possibles].

5. The angels who know all singular natural things do not have as many intelligible species as there are singulars known through these species; but they know many things through one species, as we have shown above. Separated souls do not know all singulars. Consequently this objection does not apply so far as they are concerned.

6. If [infused] species were derived from things, they could not be the proper [intellectual] likenesses of the singulars from which they are abstracted; but the infused species, since they are the likenesses of the ideal forms which are in the divine mind, can distinctly represent singulars, especially those which the soul is somehow determined to know by its nature.

7. Although an infused species is immaterial and distinct, yet it is the likeness of a thing as regards its form as well as its matter, which matter is the principle of distinction and individuation, as we have shown.

8. Although intelligible forms are not creative of things, nevertheless they are similar to creative forms, not indeed because they create, but because they represent created things. For an artisan by his art can communicate something to the thing which he makes, although the virtue [of the artisan) which perfects the thing, is not itself present to that thing.

9. Because infused forms are only analogously similar to the ideal exemplars existing in the divine mind, it follows that these ideal exemplars cannot be known perfectly through forms of this kind. However, it does not follow that the things of which these are the ideal exemplars, are known imperfectly by the infused forms; for things of this sort are not more excellent than infused forms, but rather the reverse. Consequently they can be understood perfectly through infused forms.

10. The infused forms in the separated soul are limited to a knowledge of certain singular things because of the soul's own disposition, as we have shown.

11. Infused species are caused in the separated soul by God through the intervention of the angels. Nor does this prevent some of the separated souls from being superior to some of the angels. For we are not speaking now of the knowledge of glory, in accordance with which the soul can be either similar, or equal, or even superior to an angel, but we are speaking of that natural knowledge [of the soul] wherein the soul is inferior to an angel. Moreover, forms of this kind are caused in the separated soul by an angel, not in a creative manner, but as something actual brings something in its genus from potentiality to actuality. And because such action is not spatial, it is unnecessary here to examine a conveying spatial medium. But the order of nature operates here in the same was as the order of place (situs) does in corporeal things.

12. The separated soul knows singulars through infused species inasmuch as they are the likenesses of singulars in the manner just described. Moreover, application and conversion, mention of which is made in the objection, accompany knowledge of this kind rather than cause it.

13. Singulars are not actually infinite but potentially infinite. Nor is the intellect of an angel or that of a separated soul prevented from knowing an

infinite number of singulars one after another, because sense can also do this. And our intellect, in this way, knows infinite species of numbers, for the infinite exists in knowledge only successively, and according as act is allied with potency, as the infinite in material things is also considered to be.

14. Augustine did not intend to say that bodies and the likenesses of bodies are not known by the intellect, but that the intellect is not moved in its vision by bodies in the same way as the senses are, nor by the likenesses of bodies as the imagination is, but by intelligible truth.

15. Although a separated soul is of the same nature as a soul which is joined to a body, nevertheless, because of its separation from the body, the soul has the character proper to superior substances, so that it can receive from them the infused intelligible forms through which it knows singulars; which it cannot do while it is united to a body, as we have shown above (Art. 17).

16. The singular inasmuch as it is sensible, that is, so far as it is subject to corporeal change, never becomes intelligible; but it becomes intelligible so far as an immaterial form can represent it, as has been shown.

17. The separated soul receives intelligible species by means of its intellect, after the manner of a superior substance which knows by one power what man knows by two, namely, by his sense and his intellect. And thus the separated soul can know both.

18. Although the separated soul does not direct or cause those things, nevertheless it possesses forms similar to those which do cause and direct; for a being that causes and directs, knows what it directs and causes only inasmuch as it possesses the likeness of that thing.

WE MUST ALSO ANSWER THOSE ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE RAISED AS CONTRARY OBJECTIONS, BECAUSE THEY ARE FALSE

1. When the soul is joined to the body, it does not know singulars by its intellect directly, but by a certain reflection; that is, inasmuch as it apprehends its intelligible, it turns back to consider its act, the intelligible species (which is the principle of its operation) and the origin of its species; and in this way it proceeds to consider phantasms, and the singulars of which they are the phantasms. But this reflection can be completed only

with the cooperation of the cogitative power (ratio particularis) and the imagination, which are not present in the separated soul. Hence the intellect does not know singulars in this way.

2. The angels of an inferior hierarchy receive illumination regarding the natures of singular, effects, not through singular species, but through universal likenesses by which they can know singulars by reason of the efficacy of their intellectual power, wherein they surpass the separated soul; and although the likenesses perceived by them are universals absolutely, yet they are said to be particular in comparison to the more universal species, which superior angels receive.

3. Whatever an inferior power can do, a superior power can also do; not in the same way, however, but in a more excellent manner. Consequently those things which the senses perceive materially and singularly, the intellect knows immaterially and universally.

ARTICLE 21

WHETHER THE SOUL, WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY, CAN SUFFER PUNISHMENT BY CORPOREAL FIRE

[DE VERITATE, Q.26, A.1; QUODL. II, Q.7, A. 1; III, Q. 9, A. 21]

In the twenty-first article we examine this question: Whether the soul, when separated from the body, can suffer punishment by corporeal fire.

OBJECTIONS

1. It seems that the separated soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire. For a thing suffers (patitur) [i.e., is acted upon or undergoes a change] only so far as it is in potency. But when the soul exists in separation from the body it is in potency only so far as the intellect is concerned, because the sentient powers do not exist in the soul, as we have shown above (Art. 19). Consequently the separated soul can be acted upon by corporeal fire with respect to the intellect alone, namely, by understanding this fire. Now this is not punitive, but is, in fact, delightful. Therefore the separated soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire.

2. Further, an agent and a patient have the same matter, as is stated in the De generatione et corruptione [I, 7, 324a 324a 34]. But since the soul is immaterial it does not have any matter in common with corporeal fire. Therefore, when the soul exists in separation from the body, it cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.

3. Further, whatever does not make contact with a thing does not act upon that thing. Now corporeal fire cannot make contact with the soul, either by the elemental [contact] of quantity, because the soul is incorporeal, or by contact of power,3 because the power of a body cannot make an impression upon an incorporeal substance, but rather the reverse. Therefore the separated soul cannot be acted upon in any way whatever by corporeal fire.

4. Further, a thing is said to be acted upon in two ways: either as an object, as when wood is acted upon by fire, or as a contrary, as when something hot is acted upon by something cold. Now the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire as the subject of a passion, because in that case the form fire would have to arise in the soul, and, as a consequence, the soul would be made hot and would burn, which is impossible. In like manner, we cannot say that the soul is acted upon by corporeal fire as one contrary is acted upon by another: first, because the soul has no contrary, and secondly, because it would follow that the soul would be destroyed by corporeal fire; which is impossible. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.

5. Further, there must be some proportion between an agent and a patient. Now there does not seem to be any proportion between the soul and corporeal fire, because they belong to different genera. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire.

6. Further, whatever is acted upon is moved [i.e., passes from potency to act]. Now the soul is not moved, because it is not a body. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by fire.

7. Further, the soul is nobler than a body composed of the fifth essence. But a body composed of the fifth essence is altogether unchangeable. Consequently the soul is even more unchangeable.

8. Further, Augustine says in the De Genesi ad litteram [XII, 16] that an agent is nobler than a patient. But corporeal fire is not nobler than the soul. Therefore corporeal fire cannot act upon the soul.

9. But it was said that fire does not act upon the soul in virtue of what is proper and natural to fire, but inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine justice. On the contrary, it is characteristic of a wise builder to use suitable instruments for the end which he intends. Now corporeal fire does not seem to be an adequate instrument for punishing the soul, because this is not proper to fire by reason of its form; and it is by its form that an instrument

is adapted to its effect, as an axe for chopping and a saw for cutting, for a builder will not act with greater wisdom if he should use a saw for chopping and an axe for cutting. Therefore even less will God, who is most wise, use corporeal fire as an instrument for punishing the soul.

10. Further, since God is the Author of nature, He does nothing contrary to nature, as it says in a certain Gloss on the text: “It is implanted contrary to nature” (Rom. 11:24). But it is contrary to nature for the corporeal to act upon the incorporeal. Therefore God does not permit this.

11. Further, God cannot cause contradictories to be true simultaneously. Now this would occur if He were to withdraw from a thing a constitutive part of its essence; for example, if a man were not rational, it would follow that he would be a man and not be a man at the same time. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to be deprived of any of its essential parts. Now to be unchangeable is essential to the soul, for this is proper to it by reason of its immateriality. Consequently God cannot cause the soul to be acted upon by corporeal fire.

12. Further, everything possesses the power of acting in accordance with its nature. Therefore a thing cannot receive a power of acting which is not proper to itself but to something else instead, unless its proper nature is changed into some other nature; water, for example, will not heat unless it is changed [i.e., made hot] by fire. Now it is not proper to fire by nature to have the power of acting upon immaterial things, as we have already shown. Therefore, if God gives fire, as the instrument of divine justice, the power of acting upon the separated soul, it now seems that it is not corporeal fire, but fire of a different nature.

13. Further, what is done by the divine power is in accord with the proper and true specific nature of a thing existing in reality. For when by divine power a blind man is given the power of vision, he receives sight according to the true and proper natural notion of sight. Therefore, if the soul is acted upon by fire, as the instrument of divine justice, by virtue of the divine power itself, it follows that the soul really is acted upon in the true sense of “passion.” Now passion [i.e., being acted upon] is used in two ways. First, to signify merely the reception of something [by a patient], as when the intellect is acted upon by an intelligible, and a sense by a sensible. Secondly, to signify the loss of something on the side of the substance of the thing being acted upon, as when wood is acted upon by fire. Therefore,

if the separated soul is acted upon by corporeal fire, in virtue of the divine power, inasmuch as the nature of passion consists merely in receiving something, it follows that the separated soul is receptive of corporeal fire in an immaterial and incorporeal way in keeping with the soul's own mode; because whatever is received in something is received according to the mode of the recipient. However, a reception of this sort does not punish the soul, but perfects it. Consequently this will not be a punishment for the soul. Simi. larly the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire so far as passion consists in the loss of something on the side of the substance being acted upon, because then the substance of the soul would be corrupted. Therefore the soul cannot be acted upon by corporeal fire as the instrument of divine justice.

14. Further, an instrument acts as an instrument only by exercising its proper operation, just as a saw, by cutting, acts instrumentally in the production of a chest. Now fire by its proper natural operation cannot act upon thp soul, because it cannot make the soul hot. Consequently fire as the instrument of divine justice cannot act upon the soul.

15. But it has been said that fire acts upon the soul by a proper action inasmuch as it confines the soul in such a way as to imprison the latter. On the other hand, if the soul is imprisoned by fire and detained by it, the soul must be united to fire in some way. However, the soul is not united as a form to fire, because then the soul would give life to fire. Nor is the soul united as a mover to fire, because then fire would be acted upon by the soul, and not vice versa. Now there is no other way in which an incorporeal substance can be united to a body, so it follows that the separated soul cannot be detained by fire, nor be imprisoned by it.

16. Further, whatever is fettered by something cannot be separated from it. But the spirits of the damned are sometimes separated from the corporeal fire of hell, for the demons are said to be in this misty atmosphere, and the souls of the damned have occasionally appeared to certain individuals here, as well. Therefore the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire, as though imprisoned by it.

17. Further, whatever is fettered to something and detained by it, is thereby prevented from performing its proper operation. Now the proper operation of the soul is intellection; but the soul cannot be prevented from exercising this activity by being bound to something corporeal, because the

soul contains its intelligibles within itself, as is said in the De anima [III, 4, 429b 55]. Consequently it is not necessary for the soul to seek these things outside itself. Therefore the separated soul is not punished by being fettered to corporeal fire.

18. Further, just as fire can detain the soul in this way, so also can other bodies, or to an even greater extent inasmuch as they are larger and heavier. Therefore, if the soul is punished only by being detained and fettered, its punishment should be attributed not only to fire, but even more so to other bodies.

19. Further, Augustine says in the De Genesi ad litteram [XII, 32] that the substance of hell is not believed to be corporeal, but spiritual. Damascene also says that the fire of hell is not corporeal. Therefore it seems that the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire.

20. Further, Gregory says in the De moralibus [XXXIV, 19] that the delinquent servant is punished by his master in order that he may be corrected. But the damned in hell are incorrigible. Therefore they should not be punished by the corporeal fire of hell.

21. Further, punishments are inflicted by means of contraries. Now the soul sinned by subjecting itself to corporeal things, under the influence of passion. Therefore it should not be punished by being united to corporeal things, but rather by being separated from corporeal things.

22. Further, just as punishments are allotted to sinners by divine justice, so also are rewards to the just. Now corporeal rewards are not given to the just, but spiritual rewards only. Consequently, if in Scripture any rewards of a corporeal nature are said to be given to the just, they are to be understood metaphorically; for example, it is said: “That you may eat and drink at My table, in My kingdom” (Luke 22:30). Therefore corporeal punishments are not inflicted on sinners, but spiritual punishments only; and whatever is related in the Scriptures about corporeal punishments, is to be understood metaphorically. Consequently the soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire.

On the contrary, the fire by which the demons and the bodies and souls of the damned are punished, is the same, as is evident from this text: “Depart from Me ye cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels” (Matt. 25:41). But the bodies of the damned must be punished by corporeal fire. So likewise their separated souls must be punished by corporeal fire.

I answer: Men have spoken in many ways about the suffering (passio) of the soul by fire.

For some said that the soul did not suffer punishment by corporeal fire, but by a spiritual affliction which is referred to metaphorically in the Scriptures by the name of fire. This was the opinion of Origen [Peri Archon, II, 11]. But, such as it is, it does not seem satisfactory, because as Augustine says in the De civitate Dei [XXI, 10] we must understand that the fire by which the bodies of the damned are tormented, is corporeal; as is also the fire by which both the demons and the souls are tormented, inasmuch as this conclusion is inferred from it.

Wherefore it seemed to others that, although this fire is corporeal, nevertheless the soul does not suffer punishment by it directly, but by its likeness in the imagination; just as happens to people asleep who are truly tormented by the appearance of certain terrible things which they see themselves suffer, although the things by which they are tormented are not real bodies, but merely the likeness of bodies. But this position cannot be maintained, because we have shown above (Art. 19, ans. obj. 6) that the powers of the sentient part of the soul, of which one is the imaginative power itself, do not remain in the soul when it is separated from the body.

Therefore it must be said that the separated soul is acted upon by corporeal fire itself. However, it seems difficult to determine in what way it is acted upon by fire.

For some said that the separated soul suffers by the very fire which it sees. Gregory mentions this in his Dialogues [IV, 29] for he says: “The soul suffers by fire in the very things which it sees.” However, since the act of seeing is a perfection of the one seeing, every vision is delightful inasmuch as it is of this sort. Hence nothing is painful inasmuch as it is seen, but inasmuch as it is apprehended as harmful.

Wherefore others said that when the soul sees this fire and understands that fire is harmful to it, it is tormented by this fact. Gregory mentions this is his Dialogues [ibid.], for he says that the soul is consumed by fire, because it sees itself being consumed by fire. But then we still have to discover whether fire by its very nature is harmful to the soul or not. Indeed, if it is not by its very nature harmful to the soul, then it follows that the soul is deceived in that judgment wherein it apprehends fire as harmful. This seems unlikely, particularly so far as the demons are concerned, because they possess an extensive knowledge of the natural order by reason of their intellectual acumen.

Therefore it must be said that corporeal fire in virtue of its true nature is harmful to the soul. Hence Gregory concludes by saying: “We can gather from the aforesaid Gospels that the soul suffers not only by seeing fire but by experiencing it.” Therefore to discover how corporeal fire can be harmful to the soul or to a demon, we must bear in mind that harm does not befall a thing inasmuch as it receives something by which it is perfected, but inasmuch as it is hindered by its contrary. Hence the suffering of the soul by fire does not consist simply in its receiving something as the intellect suffers by an intelligible and sense by a sensible, but in this, that one thing is acted upon by another by way of contrariety and as an obstacle.

Now this happens in two ways. For sometimes a thing is hindered in one way by its contrary as regards its very act of existing which it receives from some inhering form; and in this way something is acted upon by its contrary through alteration and corruption, as wood, for example, is consumed by fire. Secondly, a thing is hindered by an obstacle or a contrary with respect to its inclination, just as the natural inclination of a stone is to tend downward, but it is hindered in this by some obstacle and opposing power so that it is brought to rest or is moved contrary to its nature.

However, neither of these ways of suffering punishment exists in a thing that lacks knowledge. For where sorrow and sadness cannot exist, the nature of affliction and punishment is not found. However, in a being which possesses knowledge, torment and punishment are the natural effects of both kinds of suffering, although in different ways. For the suffering [or being-acted-upon] which is the effect of change by a contrary, results in ‘affliction and punishment by sensible pain, as when a sensible object of the greatest intensity corrupts the harmony of a sense. Therefore when sensibilia are of too great intensity, particularly those of touch, they inflict sensible pain; but when moderate they cause delight, because then they are proportioned to sense. However, the second kind of suffering (foes not inflict punishment by sensible pain, but by that sadness which arises in a man or in an animal because something is apprehended by an interior power as being repugnant to the will or to some appetite. Hence things which are opposed to the will and to the appetite inflict punishment, and sometimes even more than those which are painful to sense. For some choose beforehand to be whipped and to undergo severe physical punishment rather than be scolded or the like, which is repugnant to the will.

Consequently the soul cannot suffer punishment by corporeal fire according to the first kind of suffering [i.e., being acted-upon], because it is impossible for the soul to be altered and corrupted by suffering of this specific kind. Hence the soul is not afflicted by fire in this way, namely, that it suffers sensible pain thereby. However, the soul can suffer by corporeal fire according to the second kind of suffering, inasmuch as it is hindered from its inclination or volition by fire of this kind. This is evident. For the soul and any incorporeal substance, inasmuch as this belongs to it by nature, is not physically confined in any place, but transcends the whole corporeal order. Consequently it is contrary to its nature and to its natural appetite for it to be fettered to anything and be confined in a place by some necessity; and I maintain that this is the case except inasmuch as the soul is united to the body whose natural form it is, and in which there follows some perfection.

Moreover, the binding of a spiritual substance to a body is not brought about by any power which a body has for detaining an incorporeal substance; but is the result of the power of some superior substance which unites a spiritual substance to such a body; just as by the magic arts, and with divine permission, some spirits are bound to certain things by the power of superior demons, either by signs or imaginary visions or other things of this kind. It is in this way, through the divine power, that the souls and the demons are confined in their punishment by corporeal fire. Wherefore Augustine says in the De civitate Dei [XXI, 10]: “If men’s souls, having been created incorporeal, are now in this life incarnate in bodily members, and shall one day be bound thereto forever, then why cannot we truly say, though you may marvel at it, that even incorporeal spirits may be afflicted by corporeal fire? Therefore these spirits, even though incorporeal, shall dwell in tormenting corporeal fires... and, instead of giving life to these fires, they shall receive punishment from them.”

Thus it is true that this fire, inasmuch as it detains the fettered soul, as a result of the divine power, acts upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice; and inasmuch as the soul apprehends that this fire is harmful to it, it is afflicted by interior sadness. Indeed, this sadness is greatest because the soul, which was born to be united to God through possession, meditates on the fact that it occupies a place below the lowest things in existence. Therefore the greatest affliction of the damned will be caused by the fact that they are separated from God; secondly, by the fact that they are situated below corporeal things, and in the lowest and meanest place.

ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS

1-7. As a result of this the solution to the first seven objections is evident. For we do not say that the soul is acted upon by corporeal fire in the manner of reception only or according to change by a contrary, as the preceding objections maintain.

8. An instrument does not act by its own power but by that of the principal agent. Therefore, when fire as the instrument of divine justice acts upon the soul, the dignity of fire is not considered, but that of divine justice.

9. Bodies are appropriate instruments for punishing the damned, because it is proper for those who are unwilling to be subject to their superior, that is, to God, to be made subject to inferior things as a punishment.

10. Although God does not act contrary to nature, yet He acts in a way superior to that of nature when He does what nature cannot do.

11. To be incapable of being changed by a corporeal thing after the manner of an alteration, is proper to the soul by reason of its very essence. However, the soul does not suffer in this way through the divine power, but as we have explained above (the body of this article).

12. Fire does not possess the power of acting upon the soul inasmuch as it acts in virtue of its proper power, as those things do which act naturally; it acts only in an instrumental way. Therefore it does not follow that its nature is changed.

13. The soul is not acted upon by corporeal fire in any of these ways, but as we have explained.

14. Although corporeal fire does not make the soul hot, nevertheless it has another operation or relationship to the soul; which relationship bodies are naturally disposed to have toward spirits in order that bodies may be united to them in some way.

15. The soul is not united as a form to the fire which punishes it, because the soul does not give life to fire, as Augustine says; “I but it is united to

fire in the way in which spirits are united to corporeal places by contact of power, although they are not the movers of these.

16. The soul is afflicted by corporeal fire inasmuch as the soul apprehends that fire is harmful to it as binding and confining it, as we have already pointed out. Moreover, this apprehension can torment the soul even when it is not actually confined by fire, simply because it sees that it is capable of being so confined; and for this reason the demons are said to bring’hell-fire with them wherever they go.

17. Although the soul is not prevented from performing its intellectual operation by being detained in this way; yet it is deprived of a certain natural liberty whereby it is wholly freed from being physically confined to a corporeal place.

18. The punishment of hell-fire (gehenna) belongs not only to the soul but also to the body. For this reason this fire above all is said to be the punishment of hell, because fire is particularly capable of tormenting bodies. However, there will also be other torments, according to this: “Fire and brimstone and the storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup” (Ps. 10:7). It is also appropriate to that inordinate love which is the principle of sin, so that as the empyrean heaven rewards the fire of charity, so does the fire of hell reward inordinate desire.

19. Augustine says this not by way of an answer but by way of an inquiry, or if he stated this as an opinion, he expressly revoked it afterward in the De civitate Dei [XXI, 2]. Or we can say that the substance of hell is said to be spiritual as to the proximate effect produced, namely, that fire is apprehended as harmful inasmuch as it confines and binds the soul.

20. Gregory introduces this as an objection against certain people who believed that all punishments inflicted by God belong to purgatory and are not perpetual; which indeed is false. For some punishments are inflicted by God, either in this life or after this life, for correction and purgation; others, indeed, for ultimate damnation. Nor are such punishments inflicted by God because He delights in punishment, but because He delights in justice inasmuch as punishment is due to sinners. This is the way it is among men, because some punishments are inflicted for the correction of the one who is punished, as when a father chastises his son, whereas others are inflicted as a final condemnation, as when a judge hangs a bandit.

21. Punishments take place by means of contraries so far as the intention of the sinner is concerned, for the sinner intends properly to satisfy his will. Punishment is also contrary to the will itself inasmuch as punishment results from the divine wisdom, so that that wherein someone seeks to satisfy his will is turned into its contrary, as is said in the Book of Wisdom: “That by which a man sins, by the same also is he tormented” (Wis. 11:17). Wherefore, because the soul sins by adhering to corporeal things, it is consistent with the divine wisdom that it be punished by corporeal things.

22. The soul is rewarded by enjoying things which are superior to it, but is punished by being subjected to things which are inferior to it. Therefore the rewards of the soul are fittingly understood only when regarded spiritually; punishments, however, are understood to be corporeal.

THE SUMMA
CONTRA GENTILES

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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THE SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

FIFTEEN years ago the English Dominican Fathers embarked on what was considered by many the hazardous and even useless venture of translating the Summa Theologica of the Angelic Doctor. Yet although there were critics adverse to the project, there were others, not a few, who approved and encouraged; these and the favour with which the effort, notwithstanding its many deficiencies, was received, heartened the translators to persevere, and enabled them to bring their work to a happy conclusion. For the venture has proved a success beyond the most sanguine expectations; and already the work has entered into a second edition.

During the progress of translating the Summa Theologica the translators were frequently asked why they had given preference to this work over the Summa Contra Gentiles. The reason is a simple one. The Latin text of the latter work, edited by P. A. Uccelli in 1857, was extremely defective, owing to the editor’s inability to read St. Thomas’s handwriting correctly. Father Peter Paul Mackey, who has been on the staff of the editors of the Leonine Edition of St. Thomas’s works for forty years, told the writer of this preface that it took him over two years to learn how to read St. Thomas’s autograph. It was not till 1918 that the above editors published the first two books of the Summa Contra Gentiles. Hence the delay in the translation. It is hoped that the English translation will receive the same indulgence and favour as that which has been accorded to the translation of the Summa Theologica.

E. L. S.

FIRST BOOK

CHAPTER I

IN WHAT CONSISTS THE OFFICE OF A WISE MAN

My mouth shall meditate truth, and my lips shall hate wickedness.—PROV. 8:7.

THE general use which, in the Philosopher’s opinion, should be followed in naming things, has resulted in those men being called wise who direct things themselves and govern them well. Wherefore among other things which men conceive of the wise man, the Philosopher reckons that it belongs to the wise man to direct things. Now the rule of all things directed to the end of government and order must needs be taken from their end: for then is a thing best disposed when it is fittingly directed to its end, since the end of everything is its good. Wherefore in the arts we observe that the art which governs and rules another is the one to which the latter’s end belongs: thus the medical art rules and directs the art of the druggist, because health which is the object of medicine is the end of all drugs which are made up by the druggist’s art. The same may be observed in the art of sailing in relation to the art of ship-building, and in the military art in relation to the equestrian art and all warlike appliances. These arts which govern others are called master-arts (architectonicæ), that is principal arts, for which reason their craftsmen, who are called master-craftsmen (architectores), are awarded the name of wise men. Since, however, these same craftsmen, through being occupied with the ends of certain singular things, do not attain to the universal end of all things, they are called wise about this or that, in which sense it is said (1 Cor. 3:10): As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation; whereas the name of being wise simply is reserved to him alone whose consideration is about the end of the universe, which end is also the beginning of the universe: wherefore, according to the Philosopher, it belongs to the wise man to consider the highest causes.

Now the last end of each thing is that which is intended by the first author or mover of that thing: and the first author and mover of the universe is an intellect, as we shall prove further on. Consequently the last end of the universe must be the good of the intellect: and this is truth. Therefore truth must be the last end of the whole universe; and the consideration thereof must be the chief occupation of wisdom. And for this reason divine Wisdom, clothed in flesh, declares that He came into the world to make known the truth, saying (Jo. 18:37): For this was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth. Moreover the Philosopher defines the First Philosophy as being the knowledge of truth, not of any truth, but of that truth which is the source of all truth, of that, namely, which relates to the first principle of being of all things; wherefore its truth is the principle of all truth, since the disposition of things is the same in truth as in being.

Now it belongs to the same thing to pursue one contrary and to remove the other: thus medicine which effects health, removes sickness. Hence, just as it belongs to a wise man to meditate and disseminate truth, especially about the first principle, so does it belong to him to refute contrary falsehood.

Wherefore the twofold office of the wise man is fittingly declared from the mouth of Wisdom, in the words above quoted; namely, to meditate and publish the divine truth, which antonomastically is the truth, as signified by the words, My mouth shall meditate truth; and to refute the error contrary to truth, as signified by the words, and my lips shall hate wickedness, by which is denoted falsehood opposed to divine truth, which falsehood is contrary to religion that is also called godliness, wherefore the falsehood that is contrary thereto receives the name of ungodliness.

CHAPTER II

THE AUTHOR’S INTENTION IN THIS WORK

NOW of all human pursuits, that of wisdom is the most perfect, the most sublime, the most profitable, the most delightful. It is the most perfect, since in proportion as a man devotes himself to the pursuit of wisdom, so much does he already share in true happiness: wherefore the wise man says (Ecclus. 14:22): Blessed is the man that shall continue in wisdom. It is the most sublime because thereby especially does man approach to a likeness to God, Who made all things in wisdom: wherefore since likeness is the cause of love, the pursuit of wisdom especially unites man to God by friendship: hence it is said (Wis. 7:14) that wisdom is an infinite treasure to men: which they that use, become the friends of God. It is the most profitable, because by wisdom itself man is brought to the kingdom of immortality, for the desire of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom (Wis. 6:21). And it is the most delightful because her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness (Wis. 8:16).

Wherefore, taking heart from God’s lovingkindness to assume the office of a wise man, although it surpasses our own powers, the purpose we have in view is, in our own weak way, to declare the truth which the Catholic faith professes, while weeding out contrary errors; for, in the words of Hilary, I acknowledge that I owe my life’s chief occupation to God, so that every word and every thought of mine may speak of Him. But it is difficult to refute the errors of each individual, for two reasons. First, because the sacrilegious assertions of each erring individual are not so well known to us, that we are able from what they say to find arguments to refute their errors. For the Doctors of old used this method in order to confute the errors of the heathens, whose opinions they were able to know, since either they had been heathens themselves, or had lived among heathens and were conversant with their teachings. Secondly, because some of them, like the Mohammedans and pagans, do not agree with us as to the authority of any Scripture whereby they may be convinced, in the same way as we are able to dispute with the Jews by means of the Old Testament, and with heretics by means of the New: whereas the former accept neither. Wherefore it is necessary to have recourse to natural reason, to which all are compelled to assent. And yet this is deficient in the things of God.

And while we are occupied in the inquiry about a particular truth, we shall show what errors are excluded thereby, and how demonstrable truth is in agreement with the faith of the Christian religion.

CHAPTER III

IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE TO MAKE KNOWN THE DIVINE TRUTH

SINCE, however, not every truth is to be made known in the same way, and it is the part of an educated man to seek for conviction in each subject, only so far as the nature of the subject allows, as the Philosopher most rightly observes as quoted by Boethius, it is necessary to show first of all in what way it is possible to make known the aforesaid truth.

Now in those things which we hold about God there is truth in two ways. For certain things that are true about God wholly surpass the capability of human reason, for instance that God is three and one: while there are certain things to which even natural reason can attain, for instance that God is, that God is one, and others like these, which even the philosophers proved demonstratively of God, being guided by the light of natural reason.

That certain divine truths wholly surpass the capability of human reason, is most clearly evident. For since the principle of all the knowledge which the reason acquires about a thing, is the understanding of that thing’s essence, because according to the Philosopher’s teaching the principle of a demonstration is what a thing is, it follows that our knowledge about a thing will be in proportion to our understanding of its essence. Wherefore, if the human intellect comprehends the essence of a particular thing, for instance a stone or a triangle, no truth about that thing will surpass the capability of human reason. But this does not happen to us in relation to God, because the human intellect is incapable by its natural power of attaining to the comprehension of His essence: since our intellect’s knowledge, according to the mode of the present life, originates from the senses: so that things which are not objects of sense cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, except in so far as knowledge of them is gathered from sensibles. Now sensibles cannot lead our intellect to see in them what God is, because they are effects unequal to the power of their cause. And yet our intellect is led by sensibles to the divine knowledge so as to know about God that He is, and other such truths, which need to be ascribed to the first principle. Accordingly some divine truths are attainable by human reason, while others altogether surpass the power of human reason.

Again. The same is easy to see from the degrees of intellects. For if one of two men perceives a thing with his intellect with greater subtlety, the one whose intellect is of a higher degree understands many things which the other is altogether unable to grasp; as instanced in a yokel who is utterly incapable of grasping the subtleties of philosophy. Now the angelic intellect surpasses the human intellect more than the intellect of the cleverest philosopher surpasses that of the most uncultured. For an angel knows God through a more excellent effect than does man, for as much as the angel's essence, through which he is led to know God by natural knowledge, is more excellent than sensible things, even than the soul itself, by which the human intellect mounts to the knowledge of God. And the divine intellect surpasses the angelic intellect much more than the angelic surpasses the human. For the divine intellect by its capacity equals the divine essence, wherefore God perfectly understands of Himself what He is, and He knows all things that can be understood about Him: whereas the angel knows not what God is by his natural knowledge, because the angel's essence, by which he is led to the knowledge of God, is an effect unequal to the power of its cause. Consequently an angel is unable by his natural knowledge to grasp all that God understands about Himself: nor again is human reason capable of grasping all that an angel understands by his natural power. Accordingly just as a man would show himself to be a most insane fool if he declared the assertions of a philosopher to be false because he was unable to understand them, so, and much more, a man would be exceedingly foolish, were he to suspect of falsehood the things revealed by God through the ministry of His angels, because they cannot be the object of reason's investigations.

Furthermore. The same is made abundantly clear by the deficiency which every day we experience in our knowledge of things. For we are ignorant of many of the properties of sensible things, and in many cases we are unable to discover the nature of those properties which we perceive by our senses. Much less therefore is human reason capable of investigating all the truths about that most sublime essence.

With this the saying of the Philosopher is in accord (2 Metaph.) where he says that our intellect in relation to those primary things which are most evident in nature is like the eye of a bat in relation to the sun.

To this truth Holy Writ also bears witness. For it is written (Job 11:7): Peradventure thou wilt comprehend the steps of God and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? and (36:26): Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge, and (1 Cor. 13:9): We know in part.

Therefore all that is said about God, though it cannot be investigated by reason, must not be forthwith rejected as false, as the Manicheans and many unbelievers have thought.

CHAPTER IV

THAT THE TRUTH ABOUT DIVINE THINGS WHICH IS ATTAINABLE BY REASON IS FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MAN AS AN OBJECT OF BELIEF

WHILE then the truth of the intelligible things of God is twofold, one to which the inquiry of reason can attain, the other which surpasses the whole range of human reason, both are fittingly proposed by God to man as an object of belief. We must first show this with regard to that truth which is attainable by the inquiry of reason, lest it appears to some, that since it can be attained by reason, it was useless to make it an object of faith by supernatural inspiration. Now three disadvantages would result if this truth were left solely to the inquiry of reason. One is that few men would have knowledge of God: because very many are hindered from gathering the fruit of diligent inquiry, which is the discovery of truth, for three reasons. Some indeed on account of an indisposition of temperament, by reason of which many are naturally indisposed to knowledge: so that no efforts of theirs would enable them to reach to the attainment of the highest degree of human knowledge, which consists in knowing God. Some are hindered by the needs of household affairs. For there must needs be among men some that devote themselves to the conduct of temporal affairs, who would be unable to devote so much time to the leisure of contemplative research as to reach the summit of human inquiry, namely the knowledge of God. And some are hindered by laziness. For in order to acquire the knowledge of God in those things which reason is able to investigate, it is necessary to have a previous knowledge of many things: since almost the entire consideration of philosophy is directed to the knowledge of God: for which reason metaphysics, which is about divine things, is the last of the parts of philosophy to be studied. Wherefore it is not possible to arrive at the inquiry about the aforesaid truth except after a most laborious study: and few are willing to take upon themselves this labour for the love of a knowledge, the natural desire for which has nevertheless been instilled into the mind of man by God.

The second disadvantage is that those who would arrive at the discovery of the aforesaid truth would scarcely succeed in doing so after a long time. First, because this truth is so profound, that it is only after long practice that the human intellect is enabled to grasp it by means of reason. Secondly, because many things are required beforehand, as stated above. Thirdly, because at the time of youth, the mind, when tossed about by the various movements of the passions, is not fit for the knowledge of so sublime a truth, whereas calm gives prudence and knowledge, as stated in 7 Phys. Hence mankind would remain in the deepest darkness of ignorance, if the path of reason were the only available way to the knowledge of God: because the knowledge of God which especially makes men perfect and good, would be acquired only by the few, and by these only after a long time.

The third disadvantage is that much falsehood is mingled with the investigations of human reason, on account of the weakness of our intellect in forming its judgments, and by reason of the admixture of phantasms. Consequently many would remain in doubt about those things even which are most truly demonstrated, through ignoring the force of the demonstration: especially when they perceive that different things are taught by the various men who are called wise. Moreover among the many demonstrated truths, there is sometimes a mixture of falsehood that is not demonstrated, but assumed for some probable or sophistical reason which at times is mistaken for a demonstration. Therefore it was necessary that definite certainty and pure truth about divine things should be offered to man by the way of faith.

Accordingly the divine clemency has made this salutary commandment, that even some things which reason is able to investigate must be held by faith: so that all may share in the knowledge of God easily, and without doubt or error.

Hence it is written (Eph. 4:17, 18): That henceforward you walk not as also the Gentiles walk in the vanity of their mind, having their understanding darkened: and (Isa. 54:13): All thy children shall be taught of the Lord.

CHAPTER V

THAT THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE INVESTIGATED BY REASON ARE FITTINGLY PROPOSED TO MAN AS AN OBJECT OF FAITH

IT may appear to some that those things which cannot be investigated by reason ought not to be proposed to man as an object of faith: because divine wisdom provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature. We must therefore prove that it is necessary also for those things which surpass reason to be proposed by God to man as an object of faith.

For no man tends to do a thing by his desire and endeavour unless it be previously known to him. Wherefore since man is directed by divine providence to a higher good than human frailty can attain in the present life, as we shall show in the sequel, it was necessary for his mind to be bidden to something higher than those things to which our reason can reach in the present life, so that he might learn to aspire, and by his endeavours to tend to something surpassing the whole state of the present life. And this is especially competent to the Christian religion, which alone promises goods spiritual and eternal: for which reason it proposes many things surpassing the thought of man: whereas the old law which contained promises of temporal things, proposed few things that are above human inquiry. It was with this motive that the philosophers, in order to wean men from sensible pleasures to virtue, took care to show that there are other goods of greater account than those which appeal to the senses, the taste of which things affords much greater delight to those who devote themselves to active or contemplative virtues.

Again it is necessary for this truth to be proposed to man as an object of faith in order that he may have truer knowledge of God. For then alone do we know God truly, when we believe that He is far above all that man can possibly think of God, because the divine essence surpasses man's natural knowledge, as stated above. Hence by the fact that certain things about God are proposed to man, which surpass his reason, he is strengthened in his opinion that God is far above what he is able to think.

There results also another advantage from this, namely, the checking of presumption which is the mother of error. For some there are who presume so far on their wits that they think themselves capable of measuring the whole nature of things by their intellect, in that they esteem all things true which they see, and false which they see not. Accordingly, in order that man's mind might be freed from this presumption, and seek the truth humbly, it was necessary that certain things far surpassing his intellect should be proposed to man by God.

Yet another advantage is made apparent by the words of the Philosopher (10 Ethic.). For when a certain Simonides maintained that man should neglect the knowledge of God, and apply his mind to human affairs, and declared that a man ought to relish human things, and a mortal, mortal things: the Philosopher contradicted him, saying that a man ought to devote himself to immortal and divine things as much as he can. Hence he says (11 De Animal.) that though it is but little that we perceive of higher substances, yet that little is more loved and desired than all the knowledge we have of lower substances. He says also (2 De Cœlo et Mundo) that when questions about the heavenly bodies can be answered by a short and probable solution, it happens that the hearer is very much rejoiced. All this shows that however imperfect the knowledge of the highest things may be, it bestows very great perfection on the soul: and consequently, although human reason is unable to grasp fully things that are above reason, it nevertheless acquires much perfection, if at least it hold things, in any way whatever, by faith.

Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): Many things are shown to thee above the understanding of men, and (1 Cor. 2:10, 11): The things … that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God: but to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.

CHAPTER VI

THAT IT IS NOT A MARK OF LEVITY TO ASSENT TO THE THINGS THAT ARE OF FAITH, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE ABOVE REASON

NOW those who believe this truth, of which reason affords a proof, believe not lightly, as though following foolish fables (2 Pet. 1:16). For divine Wisdom Himself, Who knows all things most fully, deigned to reveal to man the secrets of God’s wisdom: and by suitable arguments proves His presence, and the truth of His doctrine and inspiration, by performing works surpassing the capability of the whole of nature, namely, the wondrous healing of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, a marvellous control over the heavenly bodies, and what excites yet more wonder, the inspiration of human minds, so that unlettered and simple persons are filled with the Holy Ghost, and in one instant are endowed with the most sublime wisdom and eloquence. And after considering these arguments, convinced by the strength of the proof, and not by the force of arms, nor by the promise of delights, but—and this is the greatest marvel of all—amidst the tyranny of persecutions, a countless crowd of not only simple but also of the wisest men, embraced the Christian faith, which inculcates things surpassing all human understanding, curbs the pleasures of the flesh, and teaches contempt of all worldly things. That the minds of mortal beings should assent to such things, is both the greatest of miracles, and the evident work of divine inspiration, seeing that they despise visible things and desire only those that are invisible. And that this happened not suddenly nor by chance, but by the disposition of God, is shown by the fact that God foretold that He would do so by the manifold oracles of the prophets, whose books we hold in veneration as bearing witness to our faith. This particular kind of proof is alluded to in the words of Heb. 2:3, 4: Which, namely the salvation of mankind, having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed with us by them that heard Him, God also bearing witness by signs and wonders, and divers … distributions of the Holy Ghost.

Now such a wondrous conversion of the world to the Christian faith is a most indubitable proof that such signs did take place, so that there is no need to repeat them, seeing that there is evidence of them in their result. For it would be the most wondrous sign of all if without any wondrous signs the world were persuaded by simple and lowly men to believe things so arduous, to accomplish things so difficult, and to hope for things so sublime. Although God ceases not even in our time to work miracles through His saints in confirmation of the faith.

On the other hand those who introduced the errors of the sects proceeded in contrary fashion, as instanced by Mohammed, who enticed peoples with the promise of carnal pleasures, to the desire of which the concupiscence of the flesh instigates. He also delivered commandments in keeping with his promises, by giving the reins to carnal pleasure, wherein it is easy for carnal men to obey: and the lessons of truth which he inculcated were only such as can be easily known to any man of average wisdom by his natural powers: yea rather the truths which he taught were mingled by him with many fables and most false doctrines. Nor did he add any signs of supernatural agency, which alone are a fitting witness to divine inspiration, since a visible work that can be from God alone, proves the teacher of truth to be invisibly inspired: but he asserted that he was sent in the power of arms, a sign that is not lacking even to robbers and tyrants. Again, those who believed in him from the outset were not wise men practised in things divine and human, but beastlike men who dwelt in the wilds, utterly ignorant of all divine teaching; and it was by a multitude of such men and the force of arms that he compelled others to submit to his law.

Lastly, no divine oracles of prophets in a previous age bore witness to him; rather did he corrupt almost all the teaching of the Old and New Testaments by a narrative replete with fables, as one may see by a perusal of his law. Hence by a cunning device, he did not commit the reading of the Old and New Testament Books to his followers, lest he should thereby be convicted of falsehood. Thus it is evident that those who believe his words believe lightly.

CHAPTER VII

THAT THE TRUTH OF REASON IS NOT IN OPPOSITION TO THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN FAITH

NOW though the aforesaid truth of the Christian faith surpasses the ability of human reason, nevertheless those things which are naturally instilled in human reason cannot be opposed to this truth. For it is clear that those things which are implanted in reason by nature, are most true, so much so that it is impossible to think them to be false Nor is it lawful to deem false that which is held by faith, since it is so evidently confirmed by God. Seeing then that the false alone is opposed to the true, as evidently appears if we examine their definitions, it is impossible for the aforesaid truth of faith to be contrary to those principles which reason knows naturally.

Again. The same thing which the disciple's mind receives from its teacher is contained in the knowledge of the teacher, unless he teach insincerely, which it were wicked to say of God. Now the knowledge of naturally known principles is instilled into us by God, since God Himself is the author of our nature. Therefore the divine Wisdom also contains these principles. Consequently whatever is contrary to these principles, is contrary to the divine Wisdom; wherefore it cannot be from God. Therefore those things which are received by faith from divine revelation cannot be contrary to our natural knowledge.

Moreover. Our intellect is stayed by contrary arguments, so that it cannot advance to the knowledge of truth. Wherefore if conflicting knowledges were instilled into us by God, our intellect would thereby be hindered from knowing the truth. And this cannot be ascribed to God.

Furthermore. Things that are natural are unchangeable so long as nature remains. Now contrary opinions cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore God does not instil into man any opinion or belief contrary to natural knowledge.

Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 10:8): The word is nigh thee even in thy heart and in thy mouth. This is the word of faith which we preach. Yet because it surpasses reason some look upon it as though it were contrary thereto; which is impossible.

This is confirmed also by the authority of Augustine who says (Gen. ad lit. ii): That which truth shall make known can nowise be in opposition to the holy books whether of the Old or of the New Testament.

From this we may evidently conclude that whatever arguments are alleged against the teachings of faith, they do not rightly proceed from the first self-evident principles instilled by nature. Wherefore they lack the force of demonstration, and are either probable or sophistical arguments, and consequently it is possible to solve them.

CHAPTER VIII

IN WHAT RELATION HUMAN REASON STANDS TO THE TRUTH OF FAITH

IT would also seem well to observe that sensible things from which human reason derives the source of its knowledge, retain a certain trace of likeness to God, but so imperfect that it proves altogether inadequate to manifest the substance itself of God. For effects resemble their causes according to their own mode, since like action proceeds from like agent; and yet the effect does not always reach to a perfect likeness to the agent. Accordingly human reason is adapted to the knowledge of the truth of faith, which can be known in the highest degree only by those who see the divine substance, in so far as it is able to put together certain probable arguments in support thereof, which nevertheless are insufficient to enable us to understand the aforesaid truth as though it were demonstrated to us or understood by us in itself. And yet however weak these arguments may be, it is useful for the human mind to be practised therein, so long as it does not pride itself on having comprehended or demonstrated: since although our view of the sublimest things is limited and weak, it is most pleasant to be able to catch but a glimpse of them, as appears from what has been said.

The authority of Hilary is in agreement with this statement: for he says (De Trin.) while speaking of this same truth: Begin by believing these things, advance and persevere; and though I know thou wilt not arrive, I shall rejoice at thy advance. For he who devoutly follows in pursuit of the infinite, though he never come up with it, will always advance by setting forth. Yet pry not into that secret, and meddle not in the mystery of the birth of the infinite, nor presume to grasp that which is the summit of understanding: but understand that there are things thou canst not grasp.

CHAPTER IX

OF THE ORDER AND MODE OF PROCEDURE IN THIS WORK

ACCORDINGLY, from what we have been saying it is evident that the intention of the wise man must be directed to the twofold truth of divine things and to the refutation of contrary errors: and that the research of reason is able to reach to one of these, while the other surpasses every effort of reason. And I speak of a twofold truth of divine things, not on the part of God Himself Who is Truth one and simple, but on the part of our knowledge, the relation of which to the knowledge of divine things varies.

Wherefore in order to deduce the first kind of truth we must proceed by demonstrative arguments whereby we can convince our adversaries. But since such arguments are not available in support of the second kind of truth, our intention must be not to convince our opponent by our arguments, but to solve the arguments which he brings against the truth, because, as shown above, natural reason cannot be opposed to the truth of faith. In a special way may the opponent of this kind of truth be convinced by the authority of Scripture confirmed by God with miracles: since we believe not what is above human reason save because God has revealed it. In support, however, of this kind of truth, certain probable arguments must be adduced for the practice and help of the faithful, but not for the conviction of our opponents, because the very insufficiency of these arguments would rather confirm them in their error, if they thought that we assented to the truth of faith on account of such weak reasonings.

With the intention then of proceeding in the manner laid down, we shall first of all endeavour to declare that truth which is the object of faith's confession and of reason's researches, by adducing arguments both demonstrative and probable, some of which we have gathered from the writings of the philosophers and of holy men, so as thereby to confirm the truth and convince our opponents. After this, so as to proceed from the more to the less manifest, we shall with God's help proceed to declare that truth which surpasses reason, by refuting the arguments of our opponents, and by setting forth the truth of faith by means of probable arguments and authority.

Seeing then that we intend by the way of reason to pursue those things about God which human reason is able to investigate, the first object that offers itself to our consideration consists in those things which pertain to God in Himself; the second will be the procession of creatures from Him; and the third the relation of creatures to Him as their end. Of those things which we need to consider about God in Himself, we must give the first place (this being the necessary foundation of the whole of this work), to the question of demonstrating that there is a God: for unless this be established, all questions about divine things are out of court.

CHAPTER X

OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO AVER THAT IT CANNOT BE DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS A GOD, SINCE THIS IS SELF-EVIDENT

POSSIBLY it will seem to some that it is useless to endeavour to show that there is a God: they say that it is self-evident that God is, so that it is impossible to think the contrary, and thus it cannot be demonstrated that there is a God. The reasons for this view are as follow. Those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known: thus as soon as it is known what is a whole, and what is a part, it is known that the whole is greater than its part. Now such is the statement God is. For by this word God we understand a thing a greater than which cannot be thought of: this is what a man conceives in his mind when he hears and understands this word God: so that God must already be at least in his mind. Nor can He be in the mind alone, for that which is both in the mind and in reality is greater than that which is in the mind only. And the very signification of the word shows that nothing is greater than God. Wherefore it follows that it is self-evident that God is, since it is made clear from the very signification of the word.

Again. It is possible to think that there is a thing which cannot be thought not to exist: and such a thing is evidently greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore if God can be thought not to exist, it follows that something can be thought greater than God: and this is contrary to the signification of the term. Therefore it remains that it is self-evident that God is.

Further. Those propositions are most evident in which the selfsame thing is predicated of itself, for instance: Man is man; or wherein the predicate is included in the definition of the subject, for instance: Man is an animal. Now, as we shall show further on, in God alone do we find that His being is His essence, as though the same were the answer to the question, What is He? as to the question, Is He? Accordingly when we say, God is, the predicate is either identified with the subject, or at least is included in the definition of the subject. And thus it will be self-evident that God is.

Moreover. Things that are known naturally are self-evident, for it is not by a process of research that they become evident. Now it is naturally known that God is, since man's desire tends naturally to God as his last end, as we shall show further on. Therefore it is self-evident that God is.

Again. That whereby all things are known must needs be self-evident. Now such is God. For just as the light of the sun is the principle of all visual perception, so the divine light is the principle of all intellectual knowledge, because it is therein that first and foremost intellectual light is to be found. Therefore it must needs be self-evident that God is.

On account of these and like arguments some are of opinion that it is so self-evident that God is, that it is impossible for the mind to think the contrary.

CHAPTER XI

REFUTATION OF THE FOREGOING OPINION AND SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS

THE foregoing opinion arose from their being accustomed from the beginning to hear and call upon the name of God. Now custom, especially if it date from our childhood, acquires the force of nature, the result being that the mind holds those things with which it was imbued from childhood as firmly as though they were self-evident. It is also a result of failing to distinguish between what is self-evident simply, and that which is self-evident to us. For it is simply self-evident that God is, because the selfsame thing which God is, is His existence. But since we are unable to conceive mentally the selfsame thing which is God, that thing remains unknown in regard to us. Thus it is self-evident simply that every whole is greater than its part, but to one who fails to conceive mentally the meaning of a whole, it must needs be unknown. Hence it is that those things which are most evident of all are to the intellect what the sun is to the eye of an owl, as stated in Metaph. ii.

Nor does it follow, as the first argument alleged, that as soon as the meaning of the word God is understood, it is known that God is. First, because it is not known to all, even to those who grant that there is a God, that God is that thing than which no greater can be thought of, since many of the ancients asserted that this world is God. Nor can any such conclusion be gathered from the significations which Damascene assigns to this word God. Secondly because, granted that everyone understands this word God to signify something than which a greater cannot be thought of, it does not follow that something than which a greater cannot be thought of exists in reality. For we must needs allege a thing in the same way as we allege the signification of its name. Now from the fact that we conceive mentally that which the word God is intended to convey, it does not follow that God is otherwise than in the mind. Wherefore neither will it follow that the thing than which a greater cannot be thought of is otherwise than in the mind. And thence it does not follow that there exists in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of. Hence this is no argument against those who assert that there is no God, since whatever be granted to exist, whether in reality or in the mind, there is nothing to prevent a person from thinking of something greater, unless he grants that there is in reality something than which a greater cannot be thought of.

Again it does not follow, as the second argument pretended, that if it is possible to think that God is not, it is possible to think of something greater than God. For that it be possible to think that He is not, is not on account of the imperfection of His being or the uncertainty thereof, since in itself His being is supremely manifest, but is the result of the weakness of our mind which is able to see Him, not in Himself but in His effects, so that it is led by reasoning to know that He is.

Wherefore the third argument also is solved. For just as it is self-evident to us that a whole is greater than its part, so is it most evident to those who see the very essence of God that God exists, since His essence is His existence. But because we are unable to see His essence, we come to know His existence not in Himself but in His effects.

The solution to the fourth argument is also clear. For man knows God naturally in the same way as he desires Him naturally. Now man desires Him naturally in so far as he naturally desires happiness, which is a likeness of the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that God considered in Himself is naturally known to man, but that His likeness is. Wherefore man must needs come by reasoning to know God in the likenesses to Him which he discovers in God’s effects.

It is also easy to reply to the fifth argument. For God is that in which all things are known, not so that other things be unknown except He be known, as happens in self-evident principles, but because all knowledge is caused in us by His outpouring.

CHAPTER XII

OF THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD CANNOT BE PROVED, AND THAT IT IS HELD BY FAITH ALONE

THE position that we have taken is also assailed by the opinion of certain others, whereby the efforts of those who endeavour to prove that there is a God would again be rendered futile. For they say that it is impossible by means of the reason to discover that God exists, and that this knowledge is acquired solely by means of faith and revelation.

In making this assertion some were moved by the weakness of the arguments which certain people employed to prove the existence of God.

Possibly, however, this error might falsely seek support from the statements of certain philosophers, who show that in God essence and existence are the same, namely that which answers to the question, What is He? and that which answers to the question, Is He? Now it is impossible by the process of reason to acquire the knowledge of what God is. Wherefore seemingly neither is it possible to prove by reason whether God is.

Again. If, as required by the system of the Philosopher, in order to prove whether a thing is we must take as principle the signification of its name, and since according to the Philosopher (4 Metaph.) the signification of a name is its definition: there will remain no means of proving the existence of God, seeing that we lack knowledge of the divine essence or quiddity.

Again. If the principles of demonstration become known to us originally through the senses, as is proved in the Posterior Analytics, those things which transcend all sense and sensible objects are seemingly indemonstrable. Now such is the existence of God. Therefore it cannot be demonstrated.

The falseness of this opinion is shown to us first by the art of demonstration, which teaches us to conclude causes from effects. Secondly, by the order itself of sciences: for if no substance above sensible substance can be an object of science, there will be no science above Physics, as stated in 4 Metaph. Thirdly, by the efforts of the philosophers who have endeavoured to prove the existence of God. Fourthly, by the apostolic truth which asserts (Rom. 1:20) that the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.

Nor should we be moved by the consideration that in God essence and existence are the same, as the first argument contended. For this is to be understood of the existence by which God subsists in Himself, of which we are ignorant as to what kind of a thing it is, even as we are ignorant of His essence. But it is not to be understood of that existence which is signified by the composition of the mind. For in this way it is possible to prove the existence of God, when our mind is led by demonstrative arguments to form a proposition stating that God is.

Moreover. In those arguments whereby we prove the existence of God, it is not necessary that the divine essence or quiddity be employed as the middle term, as the second argument supposed: but instead of the quiddity we take His effects as middle term, as is the case in a posteriori reasoning: and from these effects we take the signification of this word God. For all the divine names are taken either from the remoteness of God’s effects from Himself, or from some relationship between God and His effects.

It is also evident from the fact that, although God transcends all sensibles and senses, His effects from which we take the proof that God exists, are sensible objects. Hence our knowledge, even of things which transcend the senses, originates from the senses.

CHAPTER XIII

ARGUMENTS IN PROOF OF GOD’S EXISTENCE

HAVING shown then that it is not futile to endeavour to prove the existence of God, we may proceed to set forth the reasons whereby both philosophers and Catholic doctors have proved that there is a God. In the first place we shall give the arguments by which Aristotle sets out to prove God’s existence: and he aims at proving this from the point of view of movement, in two ways.

The first way is as follows. Whatever is in motion is moved by another: and it is clear to the sense that something, the sun for instance, is in motion. Therefore it is set in motion by something else moving it. Now that which moves it is itself either moved or not. If it be not moved, then the point is proved that we must needs postulate an immovable mover: and this we call God. If, however, it be moved, it is moved by another mover. Either, therefore, we must proceed to infinity, or we must come to an immovable mover. But it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Therefore it is necessary to postulate an immovable mover.

This argument contains two propositions that need to be proved: namely that whatever is in motion is moved by another, and that it is not possible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved.

The first of these is proved by the Philosopher in three ways. First, thus. If a thing moves itself, it must needs have the principle of its movement in itself, else it would clearly be moved by another. Again it must be moved primarily, that is, it must be moved by reason of itself and not by reason of its part, as an animal is moved by the movement of its foot, for in the latter way not the whole but the part would be moved by itself, and one part by another. Again it must be divisible and have parts, since whatever is moved is divisible, as is proved in 6 Phys.

These things being supposed, he argues as follows. That which is stated to be moved by itself is moved primarily. Therefore if one of its parts is at rest, it follows that the whole is at rest. For if, while one part is at rest, another of its parts were in motion, the whole itself would not be moved primarily, but its part which is in motion while another is at rest. Now nothing that is at rest while another is at rest, is moved by itself: for that which is at rest as a result of another thing being at rest must needs be in motion as a result of the other's motion, and hence it is not moved by itself. Hence that which was stated to be moved by itself, is not moved by itself. Therefore whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another.

Nor is this argument traversed by the statement that might be made, that supposing a thing moves itself, it is impossible for a part thereof to be at rest, or again by the statement that to be at rest or in motion does not belong to a part except accidentally, as Avicenna quibbles. Because the force of the argument lies in this, that if a thing moves itself primarily and of itself, not by reason of its parts, it follows that its being moved does not depend on some thing; whereas with a divisible thing, being moved, like being, depends on its parts, so that it cannot move itself primarily and of itself. Therefore the truth of the conclusion drawn does not require that we suppose as an absolute truth that a part of that which moves itself is at rest, but that this conditional statement be true that if a part were at rest, the whole would be at rest. Which statement can be true even if the antecedent be false, even as this conditional proposition is true: If a man is an ass he is irrational.

Secondly, he proves it by induction, thus. A thing is not moved by itself if it is moved accidentally, since its motion is occasioned by the motion of something else. Nor again if it is moved by force, as is manifest. Nor if it is moved by its nature like those things whose movement proceeds from themselves, such as animals, which clearly are moved by their souls. Nor if it is moved by nature, as heavy and light things are, since these are moved by their generating cause and by that which removes the obstacle to their movement. Now whatsoever things are in motion are moved either per se or accidentally; and if per se, either by force or by nature: and if the latter, either by something in them, as in the case of animals, or not by something in them, as in the case of heavy and light bodies. Therefore whatever is in motion is moved by another.

Thirdly, he proves his point thus. Nothing is at the same time in act and in potentiality in respect of the same thing. Now whatever is in motion, as such, is in potentiality, because motion is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such. Whereas whatever moves, as such, is in act, for nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Therefore nothing is both mover and moved in respect of the same movement. Hence nothing moves itself.

We must observe, however, that Plato, who asserted that every mover is moved, employed the term movement in a more general sense than Aristotle. For Aristotle took movement in its strict sense, for the act of a thing that is in potentiality as such, in which sense it applies only to divisible things and bodies, as is proved in 6 Phys. Whereas according to Plato that which moves itself is not a body; for he took movement for any operation, so that to understand or to think is a kind of movement, to which manner of speaking Aristotle alludes in 3 De Anima. In this sense, then, he said that the first mover moves itself, in as much as it understands, desires and loves itself. This, in a certain respect, is not in contradiction with the arguments of Aristotle; for it makes no difference whether with Plato we come to a first mover that moves itself, or with Aristotle to something first which is altogether immovable.

He proves the other proposition, namely that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, by three arguments.

The first of these is as follows. If one were to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, all this infinite number of things would necessarily be bodies, since whatever is moved is divisible and corporeal, as is proved in 6 Phys. Now every body that moves through being moved is moved at the same time as it moves. Therefore all this infinite number of things are moved at the same time as one of them is moved. But one of them, since it is finite, is moved in a finite time. Therefore all this infinite number of things are moved in a finite time. But this is impossible. Therefore it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved.

That it is impossible for the aforesaid infinite number of things to be moved in a finite time, he proves thus. Mover and moved must needs be simultaneous; and he proves this by induction from each species of movement. But bodies cannot be simultaneous except by continuity or contact. Wherefore since all the aforesaid movers and things moved are bodies, as proved, they must needs be as one movable thing through their continuity or contact. And thus one infinite thing would be moved in a finite time, which is shown to be impossible in 6 Phys.

The second argument in proof of the same statement is as follows. In an ordinate series of movers and things moved, where namely throughout the series one is moved by the other, we must needs find that if the first mover be taken away or cease to move, none of the others will move or be moved: because the first is the cause of movement in all the others. Now if an ordinate series of movers and things moved proceed to infinity, there will be no first mover, but all will be intermediate movers as it were. Therefore it will be impossible for any of them to be moved: and thus nothing in the world will be moved.

The third argument amounts to the same, except that it proceeds in the reverse order, namely by beginning from above: and it is as follows. That which moves instrumentally, cannot move unless there be something that moves principally. But if we proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, they will all be like instrumental movers, because they will be alleged to be moved movers, and there will be nothing by way of principal mover. Therefore nothing will be moved.

We have thus clearly proved both statements which were supposed in the first process of demonstration whereby Aristotle proved the existence of a first immovable mover.

The second way is as follows. If every mover is moved, this statement is true either in itself or accidentally. If accidentally, it follows that it is not necessary: for that which is accidentally true is not necessary. Therefore it is a contingent proposition that no mover is moved. But if a mover be not moved, it does not move, as the opponent asserts. Therefore it is contingent that nothing is moved, since, if nothing moves, nothing is moved. Now Aristotle holds this to be impossible, namely, that at any time there be no movement. Therefore the first proposition was not contingent, because a false impossibility does not follow from a false contingency. And therefore this proposition, Every mover is moved by another, was not accidentally true.

Again, if any two things are found accidentally united in a certain subject, and one of them is to be found without the other, it is probable that the latter can be found without the former: thus if white and musical are found in Socrates, and musical without white is found in Plato, it is probable that it is possible to find white without musical in some subject. Accordingly if mover and moved be united together in some subject accidentally, and it be found that a certain thing is moved without its being a mover, it is probable that a mover is to be found that is not moved. Nor can one urge against this the case of two things one of which depends on the other; because those in question are united not per se but accidentally. If, however, the aforesaid proposition is true in itself, again there follows something impossible or unfitting. For the mover must needs be moved either by the same kind of movement or by another kind. If by the same kind, it follows that whatever causes alteration must itself be altered, and furthermore that the healer must be healed, that the teacher must be taught, and in respect of the same science. But this is impossible: for the teacher must needs have science, while the learner must needs not have it, and thus the same will be both possessed and not possessed by the same, which is impossible. And if it be moved by another kind of movement, so that, to wit, that which causes alteration be moved in respect of place, and that which moves in respect of place be increased, and so on, it will follow that we cannot go on indefinitely, since the genera and species of movement are finite in number. And thus there will be some first mover that is not moved by another. Unless, perchance, someone say that a recurrence takes place, in this way, that when all the genera and species of movement have been exhausted, a return must be made to the first; for instance, if that which moves in respect of place be altered, and that which causes alteration be increased, then again that which is increased be moved in respect of place. But the consequence of this will be the same as before; namely, that which moves by one kind of movement is itself moved by the same kind, not immediately indeed but mediately. It remains therefore that we must needs postulate some first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself.

Since however, given that there is a first mover that is not moved by anything outside itself, it does not follow that it is absolutely immovable, Aristotle proceeds further, saying that this may happen in two ways. First, so that this first mover is absolutely immovable. And if this be granted, our point is established, namely that there is a first immovable mover. Secondly, that this first mover is moved by itself. And this seems probable: because what is of itself is always prior to what is of another: wherefore also in things moved, it is logical that what is moved first is moved by itself and not by another.

But, if this be granted, the same consequence follows. For it cannot be said that the whole of that which moves itself is moved by its whole self, because then the absurd consequences mentioned above would follow, namely that a person might teach and be taught at the same time, and in like manner as to other kinds of movement; and again that a thing would be at the same time in act and in potentiality, since a mover, as such, is in act, while that which is moved is in potentiality. It remains, therefore, that one part thereof is mover only, and the other part moved. And thus we have the same conclusion as before, namely that there is something that moves and is itself immovable.

And it cannot be said that both parts are moved, so that one is moved by the other; nor that one part moves both itself and the other; nor that the whole moves a part; nor that part moves the whole, since the above absurdities would follow, namely that something would both move and be moved by the same kind of movement, and that it would be at the same time in potentiality and in act, and moreover that the whole would move itself not primarily but by reason of its part. It remains, therefore, that in that which moves itself, one part must be immovable, and must move the other part.

Since, however, in those things among us which move themselves, namely animals, the part which moves, namely the soul, though immovable of itself, is nevertheless moved accidentally, he goes on to show that in the first mover, the part which moves is not moved neither of itself nor accidentally.

For in those things which among us move themselves, namely animals, since they are corruptible, the part which moves is moved accidentally. Now those corruptible things which move themselves must needs be reducible to some first self-mover that is everlasting. Therefore that which moves itself must have a mover, which is moved neither of itself nor accidentally.

It is clear that, in accordance with his hypothesis, some self-mover must be everlasting. For if, as he supposes, movement is everlasting, the production of these self-movers that are subject to generation and corruption must be everlasting. But no one of these self-movers, since it does not always exist, can be the cause of this everlastingness. Nor can all of them together, both because they would be infinite, and because they do not exist all together. It follows therefore that there must be an everlasting self-mover, that causes the everlastingness of generation in these lower self-movers. And thus its mover is not moved, neither of itself nor accidentally. Again, we observe that in self-movers some begin to be moved anew on account of some movement whereby the animal is not moved by itself, for instance by the digestion of food or a change in the atmosphere: by which movement the mover that moves itself is moved accidentally. Whence we may gather that no self-mover, whose mover is moved per se or accidentally, is always moved. But the first self-mover is always in motion, else movement could not be everlasting, since every other movement is caused by the movement of the first self-mover. It follows therefore that the first self-mover is moved by a mover who is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally.

Nor is this argument rebutted by the fact that the movers of the lower spheres cause an everlasting movement, and yet are said to be moved accidentally. For they are said to be moved accidentally not by reason of themselves, but by reason of the things subject to their motion, which follow the motion of the higher sphere.

Since, however, God is not part of a self-mover, Aristotle goes on in his Metaphysics to trace from this motor that is part of a self-mover, another mover altogether separate, which is God. For since every self-mover is moved through its appetite, it follows that the motor that is part of a self-mover, moves on account of the appetite for some appetible object. And this object is above the motor in moving, because the appetent is a moved mover, whereas the appetible is a mover altogether unmoved. Therefore there must needs be a first mover separate and altogether immovable, and this is God.

Now two things would seem to weaken the above arguments. The first of these is that they proceed from the supposition of the eternity of movement, and among Catholics this is supposed to be false. To this we reply that the most effective way to prove God’s existence is from the supposition of the eternity of the world, which being supposed, it seems less manifest that God exists. For if the world and movement had a beginning, it is clear that we must suppose some cause to have produced the world and movement, because whatever becomes anew must take its origin from some cause of its becoming, since nothing evolves itself from potentiality to act, or from non-being to being.

The second is that the aforesaid arguments suppose that the first moved thing, namely the heavenly body, has its motive principle in itself, whence it follows that it is animated: and by many this is not granted.

To this we reply that if the first mover is not supposed to have its motive principle in itself, it follows that it is immediately moved by something altogether immovable. Hence also Aristotle draws this conclusion with an alternative, namely that either we must come at once to a first mover immovable and separate, or to a self-mover from which again we come to a first mover immovable and separate.

The Philosopher proceeds in a different way in 2 Metaph. to show that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in efficient causes, and that we must come to one first cause, and this we call God. This is how he proceeds. In all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate, whether the intermediate be one or several. Now if the cause be removed, that which it causes is removed. Therefore if we remove the first the intermediate cannot be a cause. But if we go on to infinity in efficient causes, no cause will be first. Therefore all the others which are intermediate will be removed. Now this is clearly false. Therefore we must suppose the existence of a first efficient cause: and this is God.

Another reason can be drawn from the words of Aristotle. For in 2 Metaph. he shows that those things which excel as true excel as beings: and in 4 Metaph. he shows that there is something supremely true, from the fact that we see that of two false things one is falser than the other, wherefore it follows that one also is truer than the other. Now this is by reason of approximation to that which is simply and supremely true. Wherefore we may further conclude that there is something that is supremely being. And this we call God.

Another argument in support of this conclusion is adduced by Damascene from the government of things: and the same reasoning is indicated by the Commentator in 2 Phys. It runs as follows. It is impossible for contrary and discordant things to accord in one order always or frequently except by someone’s governance, whereby each and all are made to tend to a definite end. Now we see that in the world things of different natures accord in one order, not seldom and fortuitously, but always or for the most part. Therefore it follows that there is someone by whose providence the world is governed. And this we call God.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT IN ORDER TO ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IT IS NECESSARY TO PROCEED BY THE WAY OF REMOTION

ACCORDINGLY having proved that there is a first being which we call God, it behoves us to inquire into His nature.

Now in treating of the divine essence the principal method to be followed is that of remotion. For the divine essence by its immensity surpasses every form to which our intellect reaches; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we have some knowledge thereof by knowing what it is not: and we shall approach all the nearer to the knowledge thereof according as we shall be enabled to remove by our intellect a greater number of things therefrom. For the more completely we see how a thing differs from others, the more perfectly we know it: since each thing has in itself its own being distinct from all other things. Wherefore when we know the definition of a thing, first we place it in a genus, whereby we know in general what it is, and afterwards we add differences, so as to mark its distinction from other things: and thus we arrive at the complete knowledge of a thing's essence.

Since, however, we are unable in treating of the divine essence to take what as a genus, nor can we express its distinction from other things by affirmative differences, we must needs express it by negative differences. Now just as in affirmative differences one restricts another, and brings us the nearer to a complete description of the thing, according as it makes it to differ from more things, so one negative difference is restricted by another that marks a distinction from more things. Thus, if we say that God is not an accident, we thereby distinguish Him from all accidents; then if we add that He is not a body, we shall distinguish Him also from certain substances, and thus in gradation He will be differentiated by suchlike negations from all beside Himself: and then when He is known as distinct from all things, we shall arrive at a proper consideration of Him. It will not, however, be perfect, because we shall not know what He is in Himself.

Wherefore in order to proceed about the knowledge of God by the way of remotion, let us take as principle that which is already made manifest by what we have said above, namely that God is altogether unchangeable. This is also confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ. For it is said (Malach. 3:6): I am God (Vulg., the Lord) and I change not; (James 1:17): With Whom there is no change; and (Num. 23:19): God is not as a man … that He should be changed.

CHAPTER XV

THAT GOD IS ETERNAL

FROM the foregoing it is also clear that God is eternal.

For whatever begins or ceases to be, suffers this through movement or change. Now it has been shown that God is altogether unchangeable. Therefore He is eternal, having neither beginning nor end.

Again. Only things which are moved are measured by time: because time is the measure of movement, as stated in 4 Phys. Now God is absolutely without movement, as we have already proved. Therefore we cannot mark before and after in Him. Therefore in Him there is not being after non-being, nor can He have non-being after being, nor is it possible to find any succession in His being, because these things cannot be understood apart from time. Therefore He is without beginning and end, and has all His being simultaneously: and in this consists the notion of eternity.

Moreover. If anywhen He was not and afterwards was, He was brought by someone out of non-being into being. Not by Himself; because what is not cannot do anything. And if by another, this other is prior to Him. Now it has been shown that God is the first cause. Therefore He did not begin to be. Therefore neither will He cease to be: because that which always was, has the power to be always. Therefore He is eternal.

Furthermore. We observe that in the world there are certain things which can be and not be, namely those that are subject to generation and corruption. Now whatsoever is possible to be has a cause, because, as in itself it is equally related to two things, namely being and not being, it follows that if it acquires being this is the result of some cause. But, as proved above by Aristotle’s argument, we cannot go on to infinity in causes. Therefore we must suppose some thing, which it is necessary to be. Now every necessary thing either has a cause of its necessity from without, or has no such cause, but is necessary of itself. But we cannot go on to infinity in necessary things that have causes of their necessity from without. Therefore we must suppose some first necessary thing which is necessary of itself: and this is God, since He is the first cause, as proved above. Therefore God is eternal, since whatever is necessary of itself is eternal.

Again. Aristotle proves the everlastingness of movement from the everlastingness of time: and thence he goes on to prove the everlastingness of the substance that is the cause of movement. Now the first moving substance is God. Therefore He is everlasting. And supposing the everlastingness of time and movement to be denied, there still remains the argument in proof of the everlastingness of substance. For if movement had a beginning, it must have had its beginning from some mover. And if this mover had a beginning, it had its beginning from some agent. And thus either we shall go on to infinity, or we shall come to something without a beginning.

Divine authority bears witness to this truth: wherefore the Psalm reads: But Thou, O Lord, endurest for ever, and again: But Thou art always the self-same, and Thy years shall not fail.

CHAPTER XVI

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO PASSIVE POTENTIALITY

NOW if God is eternal, it follows of necessity that He is not in potentiality.

For everything in whose substance there is an admixture of potentiality, is possibly non-existent as regards whatever it has of potentiality, for that which may possibly be may possibly not be. Now God in Himself cannot not be, since He is eternal. Therefore in God there is no potentiality to be.

Again. Although that which is sometimes potential and sometimes actual, is in point of time potential before being actual, nevertheless actuality is simply before potentiality: because potentiality does not bring itself into actuality, but needs to be brought into actuality by something actual. Therefore whatever is in any way potential has something previous to it. Now God is the first being and the first cause, as stated above. Therefore in Him there is no admixture of potentiality.

Again. That which of itself must necessarily be, can nowise be possibly, since what of itself must be necessarily, has no cause, whereas whatever can be possibly, has a cause, as proved above. Now God, in Himself, must necessarily be. Therefore nowise can He be possibly. Therefore no potentiality is to be found in His essence.

Again. Everything acts according as it is actual. Wherefore that which is not wholly actual acts, not by its whole self, but by part of itself. Now that which does not act by its whole self is not the first agent, since it acts by participation of something and not by its essence. Therefore the first agent, which is God, has no admixture of potentiality, but is pure act.

Moreover. Just as it is natural that a thing should act in so far as it is actual, so is it natural for it to be passive in so far as it is in potentiality, for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality. Now God is altogether impassible and immovable, as stated above. Therefore in Him there is no potentiality, namely that which is passive.

Further. We notice in the world something that passes from potentiality to actuality. Now it does not reduce itself from potentiality to actuality, because that which is potential is not yet, wherefore neither can it act. Therefore it must be preceded by something else whereby it can be brought from potentiality to actuality. And if this again passes from potentiality to actuality, it must be preceded by something else, whereby it can be brought from potentiality to actuality. But we cannot go on thus to infinity. Therefore we must come to something that is wholly actual and nowise potential. And this we call God.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO MATTER

FROM this it follows that God is not matter.

For matter, such as it is, is in potentiality.

Again. Matter is not a principle of activity: wherefore, as the Philosopher puts it, efficient and material causes do not coincide. Now, as stated above, it belongs to God to be the first efficient cause of things. Therefore He is not matter.

Moreover. For those who referred all things to matter as their first cause, it followed that natural things exist by chance: and against these it is argued in 2 Phys. Therefore if God, Who is the first cause, is the material cause of things, it follows that all things exist by chance.

Further. Matter does not become the cause of an actual thing, except by being altered and changed. Therefore if God is immovable, as proved above, He can nowise be a cause of things as their matter.

The Catholic faith professes this truth, asserting that God created all things not out of His substance, but out of nothing.

The ravings of David of Dinant are hereby confounded, who dared to assert that God is the same as primary matter, because if they were not the same, they would needs differ by certain differences, and thus they would not be simple: since in that which differs from another thing by a difference, the very difference argues composition. Now this proceeded from his ignorance of the distinction between difference and diversity. For as laid down in 10 Metaph. a thing is said to be different in relation to something, because whatever is different, differs by something, whereas things are said to be diverse absolutely from the fact that they are not the same thing. Accordingly we must seek for a difference in things which have something in common, for we have to point to something in them whereby they differ:

thus two species have a common genus, wherefore they must needs be distinguished by differences. But in those things which have nothing in common, we have not to seek in what they differ, for they are diverse by themselves. For thus are opposite differences distinguished from one another, because they do not participate in a genus as a part of their essence: and consequently we must not ask in what they differ, for they are diversified by their very selves. Thus too, God and primary matter are distinguished, since, the one being pure act and the other pure potentiality, they have nothing in common.

CHAPTER XVIII

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NO COMPOSITION

FROM the foregoing we are able to conclude that there is no composition in God. For in every composite thing there must needs be act and potentiality: since several things cannot become one simply, unless there be something actual there and something else potential. Because those things that are actually, are not united except as an assemblage or group, which are not one simply. In these moreover the very parts that are gathered together are as a potentiality in relation to the union: for they are actually united after being potentially unitable. But in God there is no potentiality. Therefore in Him there is no composition.

Again. Every composite is subsequent to its components. Therefore the first being, namely God, has no component parts.

Further. Every composite is potentially dissoluble, so far as its composite nature is concerned, although in some there is something else incompatible with dissolution. Now that which is dissoluble is in potentiality to not-being. But this cannot be said of God, since of His very essence He is necessarily. Therefore there is no composition in Him.

Moreover. Every composition requires a compounder: for if there be composition, it results from several things: and things that are several in themselves would not combine together unless they were united by a compounder. If then God were composite, He would have a compounder: for He could not compound Himself, since no thing is its own cause, for it would precede itself, which is impossible. Now the compounder is the efficient cause of the composite. Therefore God would have an efficient cause: and thus He would not be the first cause, which was proved above.

Again. In any genus the more simple a thing is the more excellent it is; such, in the genus hot, is fire which has no admixture of cold. Therefore that which obtains the summit of nobility among beings, must be in the summit of simplicity. Now that which obtains the summit of nobility in things is what we call God, since He is the first cause, because the cause is more excellent than its effect. Therefore there can be no composition in Him.

Moreover. In every composite thing the good does not belong to this or that part but to the whole, and I speak of good in reference to that goodness which is proper to, and is the perfection of, the whole: thus the parts are imperfect in relation to the whole: thus the parts of a man are not a man, nor have the parts of the number six the perfection of six, nor do the parts of a line attain to the perfection of the measure found in the whole line. Therefore if God is composite, His proper perfection and goodness are found in the whole of God but not in any of His parts. And thus the good that is proper to Him will not be purely in Him; and consequently He will not be the first and supreme good.

Further. Before every multitude it is necessary to find unity. Now in every composite there is multitude. Therefore that which is before all things, namely God, must needs be devoid of all composition.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT IN GOD THERE IS NOTHING VIOLENT OR BESIDE NATURE

HENCE the Philosopher concludes that in God there cannot be anything violent or outside nature. For whatever has in itself anything violent or beside nature, has something added to itself: since that which belongs to a thing's essence cannot be violent or beside nature. Now no simple thing has in itself anything that is added, for this would argue its being composite. Since then God is simple, as shown above, there can be nothing in Him that is violent or beside nature.

Further. The necessity resulting from compulsion is a necessity imposed by another. Now in God there is no necessity imposed by another, for He is necessary of Himself, and the cause of necessity in other things. Therefore nothing is compulsory in Him.

Moreover. Wherever there is violence, there can be something besides what belongs to a thing by its very nature: since violence is contrary to that which is according to nature. But it is not possible for anything to be in God that does not belong to Him according to His nature, since by His very nature He is necessary being, as shown above. Therefore there can be nothing violent in Him.

Again. Everything that is compelled or unnatural has a natural aptitude to be moved by another: because that which is done by compulsion has an external principle, without any concurrence on the part of the patient. Now God is altogether immovable, as shown above. Therefore nothing in Him can be violent or unnatural.

CHAPTER XX

THAT GOD IS NOT A BODY

FROM the foregoing we are also able to prove that God is not a body.

For since every body is a continuous substance, it is composite and has parts. Now God is not composite, as we have shown. Therefore He is not a body.

Further. Every quantitative substance is somehow in potentiality: for that which is continuous is potentially divisible to infinity; and number can be infinitely augmented. Now every body is a quantitative substance. Therefore every body is in potentiality. But God is not in potentiality, but is pure act, as shown above. Therefore God is not a body.

Again. If God were a body, He would needs be a physical body, for a mathematical body does not exist by itself, as the Philosopher proves, since dimensions are accidents. Now He is not a physical body; for He is immovable, as we have proved, and every physical body is movable. Therefore God is not a body.

Moreover. Every body is finite, which is proved in regard both to spherical and to rectilinear bodies in 1 Cœli et Mundi. Now we are able by our intellect and imagination to soar above any finite body. Wherefore, if God were a body, our intellect and imagination would be able to think of something greater than God: and thus God would not exceed our intellect: which is inadmissible. Therefore He is not a body.

Furthermore. Intellective knowledge is more certain than sensitive. Now among natural things we find some that are objects of sense: therefore there are also some that are objects of intellect. But the order of powers is according to the order of objects, in the same way as their distinction. Therefore above all sensible objects there is an intelligible object existing in natural things. But every body that exists among things is sensible.

Therefore above all bodies it is possible to find something more excellent. Wherefore if God were a body, He would not be the first and supreme being.

Again. A living thing is more excellent than any body devoid of life. Now the life of a living body is more excellent than that body, since thereby it excels all other bodies. Therefore that which is excelled by nothing, is not a body. But such is God. Therefore He is not a body.

Moreover. We find the philosophers proving the same conclusion by arguments based on the eternity of movement, as follows. In all everlasting movement the first mover must needs not be moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we have proved above. Now the body of the heavens is moved in a circle with an everlasting movement. Therefore its first mover is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally. Now no body causes local movement unless itself be moved, because moved and mover must be simultaneous; and thus the body that causes movement must be itself moved, in order to be simultaneous with the body that is moved. Moreover no power in a body causes movement except it be moved accidentally; since, when the body is moved, the power of that body is moved accidentally. Therefore the first mover of the heavens is neither a body nor a power residing in a body. Now that to which the movement of the heavens is ultimately reduced as to the first immovable mover, is God. Therefore God is not a body.

Again. No infinite power is a power residing in a magnitude. But the power of the first mover is an infinite power. Therefore it does not reside in a magnitude. And thus God, Who is the first mover, is neither a body nor a power residing in a body.

The first proposition is proved as follows. If a power residing in a magnitude be infinite, this magnitude is either finite or infinite. But there is no infinite magnitude, as proved in 3 Phys. and 1 Cœli et Mundi. And it is not possible for a finite magnitude to have an infinite power. Therefore in no magnitude can there be an infinite power.

That there cannot be an infinite power in a finite magnitude is proved thus. A great power produces in less time an equal effect, which a lesser power produces in more time: of whatever kind this effect may be, whether it be one of alteration, of local movement, or of any other kind of movement. Now an infinite power surpasses every finite power. It follows therefore that it produces its effect more rapidly, by causing a more rapid movement than any finite power. Nor can this greater rapidity be one of time. Therefore it follows that the effect is produced in an indivisible point of time. And thus moving, being moved, and movement will be instantaneous: the contrary of which has been proved in 6 Phys.

That an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in time, is proved thus. Let A be an infinite power; and AB a part thereof. This part therefore will cause movement in more time. And yet there must be proportion between this time and the time in which the whole power causes movement, since both times are finite. Suppose then these two times to be in proportion as 1 to 10, for it does not affect this argument whether we take this or any other ratio. Now if we increase the aforesaid finite power, we must decrease the time in proportion to the increase of the power, since a greater power causes movement in less time. If therefore we increase it tenfold, that power will cause movement in a time which will be one-tenth of the time occupied by the first part that we took of the infinite power, namely AB. And yet this power which is ten times the aforesaid power is a finite power, since it has a fixed proportion to a finite power. It follows therefore that a finite power and an infinite power cause movement in an equal time: which is impossible. Therefore an infinite power of a finite magnitude cannot cause movement in any time.

That the power of the first mover is infinite is proved thus. No finite power can cause movement in an infinite time. Now the power of the first mover causes movement in an infinite time, since the first movement is eternal. Therefore the power of the first mover is infinite. The first proposition is proved thus. If any finite power of a body causes movement in infinite time, a part of that body having a part of that power, will cause movement during less time, since the greater power a thing has, for so much the longer time will it be able to continue a movement, and thus the aforesaid part will cause movement in finite time, and a greater part will be able to cause movement during more time. And thus always according as we increase the power of the mover, we increase the time in the same proportion. But if this increase be made a certain number of times we shall come to the quantity of the whole or even go beyond it. Therefore the increase also on the part of the time will reach the quantity of time wherein the whole causes movement. And yet the time wherein the whole causes movement was supposed to be infinite. Consequently a finite time will measure an infinite time: which is impossible.

However, there are several objections to this chain of reasoning. One of these is that it might be held that the body which moves the first thing moved is not divisible, as is the case of a heavenly body: whereas the argument given above supposes it to be divided.

To this we reply that a conditional clause may be true though its antecedent be impossible. And if there be anything to disprove such a conditional, the antecedent is impossible. Thus if anyone disprove this conditional, If a man flies, he has wings, the antecedent would be impossible. It is in this way that we are to understand the process of the aforesaid reasoning. For this conditional is true, If a heavenly body be divided, its part will have less power than the whole. But this conditional is disproved if we suppose that the first mover is a body, on account of the impossibilities that follow. Wherefore it is clear that this is impossible. We can reply in the same way if objection be made to the increase of finite powers. Because it is impossible in natural things to find powers according to any proportion that there is between one time and any other time. And yet the conditional required in the aforesaid argument is true.

The second objection is that, although a body be divided, it is possible for a power of a body not to be divided when the body is divided, thus the rational soul is not divided when the body is divided.

To this we reply that by the above argument it is not proved that God is not united to the body as the rational soul is united to the human body, but that He is not a power residing in a body, as a material power which is divided when the body is divided. Wherefore it is also said of the human intellect that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. That God is not united to the body as its soul, is another question.

The third objection is that if the power of every body is finite, as is proved in the above process; and if a finite power cannot make its effect to endure an infinite time; it will follow that no body can endure an infinite time: and consequently that a heavenly body will be necessarily corrupted. Some reply to this that a heavenly body in respect of its own power is defectible, but acquires everlastingness from another that has infinite power. Apparently Plato approves of this solution, for he represents God as speaking of the heavenly bodies as follows: By your nature ye are corruptible, but by My will incorruptible, because My will is greater than your necessity.

But the Commentator refutes this solution in 11 Metaph. For it is impossible, according to him, that what in itself may possibly not be, should acquire everlastingness of being from another: since it would follow that the corruptible is changed into incorruptibility; and this, in his opinion, is impossible. Wherefore he replies after this fashion: that in a heavenly body whatever power there is, is finite, and yet it does not follow that it has all power; for, according to Aristotle (8 Metaph.) the potentiality to (be) somewhere is in a heavenly body, but not the potentiality to be. And thus it does not follow that it has a potentiality to not-be. It must be observed, however, that this reply of the Commentator is insufficient. Because, although it be granted that in a heavenly body there is no quasi-potentiality to be, which potentiality is that of matter, there is nevertheless in it a quasi-active potentiality, which is the power of being: since Aristotle says explicitly in 1 Cœli et Mundi, that the heaven has the power to be always. Hence it is better to reply that since power implies relation to act, we should judge of power according to the mode of the act. Now movement by its very nature has quantity and extension, wherefore its infinite duration requires that the moving power should be infinite. On the other hand being has no quantitative extension, especially in a thing whose being is invariable, such as the heaven. Hence it does not follow that the power of being a finite body is infinite though its duration be infinite: because it matters not whether that power make a thing to last for an instant or for an infinite time, since that invariable being is not affected by time except accidentally.

The fourth objection is that the statement that what causes movement in infinite time must have an infinite power, does not necessarily apply to those movers which are not altered by moving. Because such a movement consumes nothing of their power; wherefore they can cause movement for no less time after they have moved for a certain time, than before. Thus the power of the sun is finite, and, because its power is not diminished on account of its action, it can act on this lower world for an infinite time, according to nature.

To this we reply that a body moves not unless it be moved, as we have shown. Therefore, supposing a body not to be moved, it follows that it does not move. Now in anything that is moved there is potentiality to opposites, since the terms of movement are opposite to one another. Consequently, considered in itself, every body that is moved is possibly not moved. And that which is possibly not moved, is not apt of itself to be moved for an everlasting time: and consequently neither is it apt to move for a perpetual time.

Accordingly the demonstration given above is based on the finite power of a finite body; which power cannot of itself move in an infinite time. But a body which of itself is possibly moved and not moved, and possibly moves and does not move, can acquire perpetual movement from some cause; and this cause must needs be incorporeal. Wherefore the first mover must needs be incorporeal. Hence according to nature nothing hinders a finite body, which acquires from another cause perpetuity in being moved, from having also perpetuity in moving: since also the first heavenly body, according to nature, can cause a perpetual circular movement in the lower bodies, according as one sphere moves another. Nor is it impossible, as the Commentator maintains, for that which is, of itself, in potentiality to being moved and not moved, to acquire perpetual movement from something else, as he supposed it impossible as regards perpetuity of being. For movement is a kind of outflow from the mover to the thing movable, and consequently a movable thing can acquire perpetual movement from something else, without having it by nature. On the other hand to be is something fixed and quiescent in a being, and consequently that which is, of itself, in potentiality to not-be, cannot, as he says, in the course of nature, acquire from something else perpetuity of being.

The fifth objection is that according to the above reasoning there does not appear to be more reason why there should not be an infinite power in a magnitude than outside a magnitude: for in either case it would follow that it moves in not-time.

To this it may be replied that finite and infinite are found in a magnitude, in time and in movement in a univocal sense, as proved in 3 and 6 Phys., wherefore the infinite in one of them removes a finite proportion in the others: whereas in things devoid of magnitude there is neither finite nor infinite unless equivocally. Hence the above course of reasoning has ho place in suchlike powers.

But another and better answer is that the heaven has two movers. One is its proximate mover, which is of finite power, and thence it is that its movement is of finite velocity. The other is its remote mover, which is of infinite power, whence it is that its movement can be of infinite duration. Thus it is clear that an infinite power which is not in a magnitude, can move a body not immediately in time: whereas a power which is in a magnitude must needs move immediately, since no body moves without itself being moved. Wherefore, if it moved, it would follow that it moves in not-time.

Better still it may be replied that a power which is not in a magnitude is an intellect, and moves by its will. Wherefore it moves according to the requirement of the movable and not according to the proportion of its strength. On the other hand a power that is in a magnitude cannot move save by natural necessity, for it has been proved that the intellect is not a bodily force. Wherefore it causes movement necessarily according to the proportion of its quantity. Hence it follows that if it moves anything it moves it instantaneously. In this sense then, the foregoing objections being refuted, proceeds the reasoning of Aristotle.

Moreover. No movement that proceeds from a bodily mover can be continuous and regular: because a bodily mover, in local movement, moves by attraction or repulsion, and that which is attracted or repelled is not disposed in the same way towards its mover from the beginning to the end of the movement, since at one time it is nearer to it and at another time further from it: and thus no body can cause a continuous and regular movement. On the other hand the first movement is continuous and regular, as is proved in 8 Phys. Therefore the mover of the first movement is not a body.

Again. No movement that tends towards an end which passes from potentiality to actuality, can be perpetual: since, when it arrives at actuality, the movement ceases. If therefore the first movement is perpetual, it must be towards an end which is always and in every way actual. Now such is neither a body nor a power residing in a body; because these are all movable either per se or accidentally. Therefore the end of the first movement is not a body nor a power residing in a body. Now the end of the first movement is the first mover, which moves as the object of desire: and that is God. Therefore God is neither a body nor a power residing in a body.

Now though, according to our faith, it is false that the movement of the heavens is everlasting, as we shall show further on; it is nevertheless true that that movement will not cease, either on account of lack of power in the mover, or on account of the substance of the movable being corrupted, since we do not find that the movement of the heavens slackens in the course of time. Wherefore the aforesaid proofs lose nothing of their efficacy.

The truth thus demonstrated is in accordance with divine authority. For it is said (Jo. 4:24): God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth; and again (1 Tim. 1:17): To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God; and (Rom. 1:20): The invisible things of God … are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, for things that are clearly seen not by the eye but by the mind, are incorporeal.

Hereby is refuted the error of the early natural philosophers, who admitted none but material causes, such as fire, water and the like, and consequently asserted that the first principles of things were bodies, and called them gods. Among these also there were some who held that the causes of movement were sympathy and antipathy: and these again are refuted by the above arguments. For since according to them sympathy and antipathy are in bodies, it would follow that the first principles of movement are forces residing in a body. They also asserted that God was composed of the four elements and sympathy: from which we gather that they held God to be a heavenly body. Among the ancients Anaxagoras alone came near to the truth, since he affirmed that all things are moved by an intellect.

By this truth, moreover, those heathens are refuted who maintained that the very elements of the world, and the forces residing in them, are gods; for instance the sun, moon, earth, water and so forth, being led astray by the errors of the philosophers mentioned above.

Again, the above arguments confound the extravagances of the unlettered Jews, of Tertullian, of the Vadiani or Anthropomorphite heretics, who depicted God with human features; and again of the Manichees who affirmed God to be an infinite substance composed of light and spread abroad throughout boundless space. The occasion of all these errors was that in their thoughts about divine things they had recourse to their imagination, which can reflect none but corporeal likenesses. Wherefore it behoves us to put the imagination aside when we meditate on things incorporeal.

CHAPTER XXI

THAT GOD IS HIS OWN ESSENCE

FROM what has been laid down we are able to conclude that God is His own essence, quiddity or nature.

In everything that is not its own essence or quiddity there must needs be some kind of composition: for since each thing contains its own essence, if a thing contained nothing besides its own essence, all that a thing is would be its essence. Therefore if a thing were not its own essence, there must be something in it besides its essence: and consequently there must be composition therein. For which reason the essence in composite things has the signification of a part, as humanity in a man. Now it has been shown that in God there is no composition. Therefore God is His own essence.

Again. Seemingly that alone which does not enter into the definition of a thing is beside the essence of that thing: for a definition signifies what a thing is. Now only the accidents of a thing do not enter into its definition: and consequently only accidents are in a thing besides its essence. But in God there are no accidents, as we shall show further on. Accordingly, there is nothing in Him besides His essence. Therefore He is His own essence.

Moreover. Forms that are not predicated of subsistent things, whether the latter be taken universally or singly, are not single per se subsistent forms individualized in themselves. For we do not say that Socrates, or man, or an animal is whiteness, because whiteness is not singly per se subsistent, but is individualized by its subsistent subject. Likewise natural forms do not per se subsist singly, but are individualized in their respective matters: wherefore we do not say that this individual fire, or that fire in general is its own form. Moreover the essences or quiddities of genera or species are individualized by the signate matter of this or that individual, although indeed the quiddity of a genus or species includes form and matter in general: wherefore we do not say that Socrates, or man, is humanity. Now the divine essence exists per se singly and is individualized in itself, since it is not in any matter, as shown above. Hence the divine essence is predicated of God, so that we say: God is His own essence.

Further. The essence of a thing is either the thing itself, or is related to it in some way as cause: since a thing derives its species from its essence. But nothing can in any way be a cause of God: for He is the first being, as shown above. Therefore God is His own essence.

Again. That which is not its own essence, is related in respect of some part of itself to that essence, as potentiality to act: wherefore the essence is signified by way of form, for instance humanity. But there is no potentiality in God, as shown above, therefore it follows that He is His own essence.

CHAPTER XXII

THAT IN GOD EXISTENCE AND ESSENCE ARE THE SAME

FROM what has been shown above, we may go on to prove that in God essence or quiddity is not distinct from His existence.

For it has been shown above that there is a thing which exists of itself necessarily, and this is God. Now necessary existence, if it belong to a quiddity which is not that existence itself, is either inconsistent with or repugnant to that quiddity, as per se existence is to the quiddity of whiteness, or else is consistent or akin thereto, for instance that whiteness exist in some other thing. In the former supposition it will not belong to that quiddity to exist per se necessarily, for instance it becomes not whiteness to exist per se. In the second hypothesis, either this existence must be dependent on the essence, or both of them on some other cause, or the essence on the existence. The first two are in contradiction with the very notion of necessary per se existence: for if it depend on something else, it no longer exists necessarily. From the third supposition it follows that this quiddity is added accidentally to the thing which exists per se necessarily: because whatever follows on the essence of a thing is accidental thereto. Therefore God has not an essence distinct from His existence.

Against this, however, it might be urged that this existence does not depend absolutely on this essence, and in such a way that it would not be at all unless the essence were: but that it depends as regards the conjunction whereby they are united together. And thus this existence is per se necessary, while the conjunction is not per se necessary.

But this answer does not avoid the above impossibility. For if this existence can be understood without this essence, it will follow that this essence is related accidentally to this existence. Now this existence is that which exists per se necessarily. Therefore this essence is related accidentally to that which exists per se necessarily. Therefore it is not its quiddity. But God is that which exists per se necessarily. Therefore this existence is not God’s essence, but something subsequent thereto. On the other hand if this existence cannot be understood apart from this essence, then this existence depends absolutely on that on which depends its conjunction with this essence: and thus the same conclusion follows.

Further. Each thing exists by its own existence. Wherefore that which is not its own existence does not exist per se necessarily. But God exists per se necessarily. Therefore God is His own existence.

Moreover. If God’s existence is not His essence; and it cannot be a part of Him, since the divine essence is simple, as shown above; it follows that this existence is something besides His essence. Now whatever is becoming to a thing besides its essence, is becoming to it through some cause: for those things which are not one per se, if they be united together, must needs be united through some cause. Therefore existence is becoming to that quiddity through some cause. Either, then, this cause is something essential to that thing, or the essence itself, or else it is some other thing. If the former; and the essence exists according to that existence; it follows that a thing is a cause of its own existence. But this is impossible, because according to the understanding the cause exists before the effect; and consequently if a thing is the cause of its own existence, it would be understood to exist before having existence, which is impossible:—unless it be understood that a thing is the cause of its own accidental existence, which is a relative existence. For this is not impossible: for we find an accidental being caused by the principles of its subject, before the substantial being of the subject is understood to exist. Now, however, we are speaking, not of accidental, but of substantial existence. If, on the other hand, existence be becoming to the essence, by reason of some other cause; then whatever acquires existence from another cause, is caused and is not the first cause: whereas God is the first cause, having no cause, as shown above. Wherefore this quiddity that acquires existence elsewhere is not the quiddity of God. Therefore it is necessary that God’s existence be His own quiddity.

Moreover. Existence denotes a kind of actuality: since a thing is said to exist, not through being in potentiality, but through being in act. Now everything to which an act is becoming, and which is distinct from that act, is related thereto as potentiality to act: since act and potentiality are reciprocal terms. Accordingly, if the divine essence is distinct from its existence, it follows that His essence and existence are mutually related as potentiality and act. Now it has been proved that in God there is nothing of potentiality, and that He is pure act. Therefore God’s essence is not distinct from His existence.

Again. Whatsoever cannot exist unless several things concur, is composite. Now no thing in which essence and existence are distinct from one another can exist except several things concur, to wit its essence and existence. Therefore every thing, in which essence and existence are distinct, is composite. But God is not composite, as proved above. Therefore God’s existence is His essence.

Further. Everything exists through having existence. Therefore nothing the essence of which is not its existence, exists by its essence, but by participation of something, namely existence. Now that which exists by participation of something cannot be the first being, because that in which a thing participates in order to exist, is previous to that thing. But God is the first being, to which nothing is previous. Therefore God’s essence is His existence.

This sublime truth Moses was taught by the Lord: for when he asked the Lord (Exod. 3:13, 14): If the children of Israel should say to me: What is His name? what shall I say to them? the Lord answered: I AM WHO AM. … Thus shalt thou say to the children of Israel: HE WHO IS hath sent me to you; thus declaring His own name to be: HE WHO IS. Now every name is appointed to signify the nature or essence of a thing. Wherefore it follows that God’s very existence itself is His essence or nature.

Moreover. The Catholic doctors have professed this truth. For Hilary says (De Trin.): Existence is not an accident in God, but the subsisting truth, the abiding cause, and the natural property of His essence. And Boethius says (De Trin.) that the divine substance is existence itself, and all other existence proceeds therefrom.

CHAPTER XXIII

THAT THERE IS NO ACCIDENT IN GOD

FROM this truth it follows of necessity that nothing can accrue to God besides His essence, nor anything be accidentally in Him.

For existence itself cannot participate in something that is not of its essence; although that which exists can participate in something else. Because nothing is more formal or more simple than existence. Hence existence itself can participate in nothing. Now the divine substance is existence itself. Therefore He has nothing that is not of His substance. Therefore no accident can be in Him.

Moreover. Whatever is in a thing accidentally, has a cause of being there: since it is added to the essence of that in which it is. Therefore if anything is in God accidentally, this must be through some cause. Consequently the cause of the accident is either the divine substance itself, or something else. If it is something else, this other thing must act on the divine substance; since nothing introduces a form whether substantial or accidental, into some recipient, unless in some way it act upon that recipient: because to act is nothing but to make something to be actual, and it is this by a form. Wherefore God will be passive and movable to some agent: which is against what has been decided above. If, on the other hand, the divine substance itself is the cause of the accident that is in it, then it is impossible for it to be its cause as receiving it, since then the same thing in the same respect would make itself to be in act. Therefore, if there is an accident in God, it follows that He receives that accident in one respect, and causes it in another, even as bodies receive their proper accidents through the nature of their matter, and cause them through their form: so that God, therefore, will be composite, the contrary of which has been proved above.

Again. Every subject of an accident is compared thereto as potentiality to act: because an accident is a kind of form making a thing to exist actually according to accidental existence. But there is no potentiality in God, as shown above. Therefore there can be no accident in Him.

Moreover. Everything in which something is accidentally is in some way changeable as to its nature: since an accident, by its very nature, may be in a thing or not in it. Therefore if God has something that becomes Him accidentally, it follows that He is changeable: the contrary of which has been proved above.

Further. Everything that has an accident in itself, is not whatever it has in itself, because an accident is not of the essence of its subject. But God is whatever He has in Himself. Therefore no accident is in God. The middle proposition is proved as follows. A thing is always to be found more excellently in the cause than in the effect. But God is the cause of all things. Therefore whatever is in Him, is found in Him in the most perfect way. Now that which is most perfectly becoming to a thing, is that thing itself: because it is more perfectly one than when one thing is united to another substantially as form is united to matter: which union again is more perfect than when one thing is in another accidentally. It follows therefore that God is whatever He has.

Again. Substance is not dependent upon accident, although accident depends on substance. Now that which is not dependent upon another, can sometimes be found without it. Therefore some substance can be found without an accident: and this seemingly is most becoming to a supremely simple substance, such as the divine substance. Therefore the divine substance is altogether without accidents.

The Catholic tractarians also are in agreement with this statement. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin.) that there is no accident in God.

Having established this truth we are able to refute certain erroneous statements in the law of the Saracens to the effect that the divine essence has certain forms added thereto.

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT THE DIVINE BEING CANNOT BE SPECIFIED BY THE ADDITION OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE

AGAIN. From what we have said above, it can be shown that we cannot add anything to the divine being so as to specify it by an essential specification, as a genus is specified by differences. For it is impossible that a thing be in act unless there be also all those things whereby its substantial being is specified: for an animal cannot be in act unless it be either a rational or an irrational animal. Wherefore also the Platonists who postulated ideas, did not postulate per se existing ideas of genera, which derive specification from essential differences, but they postulated per se existing ideas of the species alone, which need not to be specified by essential differences. If, then, the divine being can receive an essential specification from something added to it, that being will not be in act without something added to it. But God's very being is His substance as shown above. Therefore the divine substance cannot be in act without some addition: the contrary of which has been shown above.

Again. Whatever needs something added to it, in order to exist, is in potentiality to that thing. But the divine substance is not in potentiality in any way, as proved above: and God's substance is His being. Therefore His being cannot receive essential specification from something added to it.

Moreover. Whatever makes a thing to be in act, and is intrinsic to that thing, is either the whole essence thereof or part of its essence. Now that which specifies a thing by an essential specification, makes a thing to be in act, and is intrinsic to the thing specified: otherwise the latter could not be specified essentially thereby. Therefore it must be either the very essence or part of the essence of that thing. But if something be added to the divine being, it cannot be the whole essence of God, for it has already been proved that God's existence is not distinct from His essence. Therefore it follows that it is a part of the divine essence: and thus God would be composed of essential parts, the contrary of which was proved above.

Again. That which is added to a thing by way of essential specification, does not constitute the notion of that thing, but only makes it to be in act: for rational added to animal makes animal to be in act, but does not constitute the notion of an animal as such: because the difference does not enter into the definition of the genus. Now if something be added to God to specify Him with an essential specification, it must give that to which it is added the notion of its proper quiddity or nature: since what is added thus, gives the thing actual being. Now this, namely actual being, is the divine essence itself, as shown above. It follows, therefore, that nothing can be added to the divine being to give it an essential specification, as a difference specifies a genus.

CHAPTER XXV

THAT GOD IS NOT IN ANY GENUS

HENCE it follows of necessity that God is not in any genus.

For whatever is in a genus, has in itself something whereby its generic nature is specified: for nothing is in a genus without being in some one of its species. But in God this is impossible, as shown above. Therefore it is impossible that God be in any genus.

Moreover. If God be in a genus, He is either in the genus of accident, or in that of substance. He is not in the genus of accident: for an accident cannot be the first being and first cause. Nor can He be in the genus of substance: for substance that is a genus is not being itself, otherwise every substance would be its own being, and thus would not be caused by something else, which is impossible, as is clear from what we have said above. Now God is being itself. Therefore He is not in any genus.

Again. Whatever is in a genus differs as to being from the other things contained in the same genus: otherwise a genus would not be predicated of several things. Now all things that are contained in one same genus, must agree in the whatness of the genus, because the genus is predicated of all in respect of what a thing is. Therefore the being of anything contained in a genus is beside the whatness of the genus. But this is impossible in God. Therefore God is not in a genus.

Further. A thing is placed in a genus by the nature of its whatness, for genus is predicated of what a thing is. But the whatness of God is His very being. Now a thing is not placed in a genus according to its being, because then being would be a genus signifying being itself. It remains therefore that God is not in a genus.

That being cannot be a genus is proved by the Philosopher as follows. If being were a genus, it would be necessary to find a difference in order to contract it to a species. Now no difference participates in the genus, so that, to wit, the genus be contained in the notion of the difference, for thus the genus would be placed twice in the definition of the species: but the difference must be something besides that which is contained in the notion of the genus. Now there can be nothing besides that which is understood by being, if being belong to the notion of those things of which it is predicated. And thus by no difference can being be contracted. It remains, therefore, that being is not a genus: wherefore it follows of necessity that God is not in a genus.

Wherefore it is likewise evident that God cannot be defined: since every definition is composed of genus and difference.

It is also clear that no demonstration is possible in regard to Him: because the principle of a demonstration is the definition of that about which the demonstration is made.

Someone, however, might think that, although the name of substance cannot properly be applied to God, because God does not subsist under (substat) accidents: yet the thing signified by that term is applicable to Him, and consequently He is in the genus substance. For substance is a per se being, and it is clear that this can be applied to God, from the fact that it has been proved that He is not an accident. But to this we reply, according to what has been said, that per se being is not in the definition of substance. For from the fact that it is described as a being it cannot be a genus, since it has been already proved that being has not the conditions of a genus: and again from the fact that it is described as being per se, for this would seem to denote nothing else than a negation, since it is said to be a per se being, through not being in another, which is a pure negation. And this cannot satisfy the conditions of a genus, for then a genus would not express what a thing is, but what it is not. Therefore we must understand the definition of substance in this way, that a substance is a thing to which it is fitting not to be in a subject: the word thing being taken from its quiddity, just as being is from existence: so that the meaning of substance is that it has a quiddity to which it is fitting to exist not in another. Now this does not apply to God, for He has no quiddity besides His existence. Hence it follows that He is nowise in the genus of substance: and consequently that He is in no genus, since it has been proved that He is not in the genus of accident.

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORMAL BEING OF ALL THINGS

FROM the foregoing we are able to refute the error of some who have asserted that God is nothing else than the formal being of everything.

For this being is divided into substantial and accidental being. Now the divine being is neither the being of a substance nor the being of an accident, as shown above. Therefore it is impossible for God to be the being whereby everything is formally.

Again. Things are not distinct from one another in that they have being, since in this they all agree. If, then, things differ from one another, it follows that either being itself is specified by certain differences added thereto, so that different things have a specifically different being, or that things differ in that being itself is attached to specifically different natures. But the former of these is impossible, because an addition cannot be attached to being in the same way as a difference is added to a genus, as already stated. It remains, therefore, that things differ because they have different natures, to which being is attached in different ways. Now the divine being is not attached to another nature, but is the nature itself, as shown above. If, therefore, the divine being were the formal being of all things, it would follow that all things are simply one.

Moreover. The principle is naturally prior to that which flows from it. Now in certain things being has something by way of principle: since the form is said to be the principle of being; and in like manner the agent which gives certain things actual being. Therefore if the divine being is the being of each thing, it will follow that God, Who is His own being, has a cause, and thus is not per se necessary being. The contrary of which has been shown above.

Further. That which is common to many is not something besides those many except only logically: thus animal is not something besides Socrates and Plato and other animals except as considered by the mind, which apprehends the form of animal as divested of all that specifies, and individualizes it: for man is that which is truly an animal, else it would follow that in Socrates and Plato there are several animals, namely animal in general, man in general, and Plato himself. Much less therefore being itself in general is something apart from all things that have being; except only as apprehended by the mind. If therefore God is being in general, He will not be an individual thing except only as apprehended in the mind. Now it has been shown above that God is something not merely in the intellect, but in reality. Therefore God is not the common being of all.

Again. Generation is essentially the way to being, and corruption the way to not-being. For the term of generation is the form, and that of corruption privation, for no other reason than because the form makes a thing to be, and corruption makes a thing not to be, for supposing a certain form not to give being, that which received that form would not be said to be generated. If, then, God were the formal being of all things it would follow that He is the term of generation. Which is false, since He is eternal, as we have shown above.

Moreover. It would follow that the being of every thing has been from eternity: wherefore there would be neither generation nor corruption. For if there were, it would follow that a thing acquires anew a being already pre-existing. Either then it is acquired by something already existing, or else by something nowise pre-existing. In the first case, since according to the above supposition all existing things have the same being, it would follow that the thing which is said to be generated, receives not a new being but a new mode of being, and therefore is not generated but altered. If on the other hand the thing nowise existed before, it would follow that it is made out of nothing, and this is contrary to the essence of generation. Consequently this supposition would wholly do away with generation and corruption: and therefore it is clear that it is impossible.

Moreover. The Sacred Doctrine refutes this error, by confessing that God is high and elevated (Isa. 6:1), and that He is over all things (Rom. 9:5). For if He were the being of all, He would be something in all, and not above all.

Those who erred thus are condemned by the same sentence as idolaters who gave the incommunicable name, i.e. of God, to wood and stones (Wis. 14:21). For if God is the being of all it would be no truer to say a stone is a being than to say a stone is God.

Now there are four things which apparently fostered this error. The first was a wrong understanding of certain authorities. For, they found Dionysius saying (Cœl. Hier. iv.): The being of all is the super-essential Godhead: and from this they wished to conclude that God is the formal being of all things, not perceiving that this meaning is irreconcilable with the words. For if the Godhead were the formal being of all, it would not be above all, but in the midst of all, in fact something of all. Wherefore when he said that the Godhead is above all, he declares It to be by Its nature distinct from all and placed above all. And by saying that the Godhead is the being of all, he declares that all things derive from God a likeness to the divine being. Moreover he elsewhere expressly proscribes their wrong interpretation (Div. Nom. ii.) where he declares that there can be no contact with God nor mingling of Him with other things, as of point with line, or of the shape of the seal on wax.

The second cause of this error was defective reason. For since that which is common is specified or individualized by addition, they deemed the divine being, to which nothing is added, not to be some proper being, but the common being of all, not perceiving that the common or universal cannot be without some addition, though it be considered apart from any addition: for animal cannot be apart from the difference of rational or irrational, although we think of it apart from these differences. Moreover although we think of the universal without an addition, we do not think of it apart from its receptivity of addition: for if no difference could be added to animal, it would not be a genus; and the same applies to all other names of things. Now the divine being is without addition, not only in thought but also in reality; and not only is it without addition, but also without receptivity of addition. Wherefore from the very fact that it neither receives nor can receive addition, we should conclude rather that God is not common but proper being; since His being is distinct from all others for the very reason that nothing can be added to it. Hence the Commentator says

(De causis) that the first cause, by reason of the very purity of its goodness, is distinct from others and, so to speak, individualized.

The third cause of this error is the consideration of the divine simplicity. For since God is the extreme of simplicity, they thought that if we make an analysis of all that is in us, the last thing, being the most simple, must be God; for we cannot proceed indefinitely in the composition of the things that are in us. In this again their reason was lacking, that they failed to observe that what is most simple in us, is not so much a complete thing as some part of a thing: whereas simplicity is ascribed to God as to a perfect subsistent being.

The fourth thing that might lead them into this error, is the expression whereby we say that God is in all things: for they failed to perceive that He is in things, not as part thereof, but as the cause of things, which is nowise wanting to its effect. For we do not say that the form is in the body in the same sense as we say that the sailor is in the boat.

CHAPTER XXVII

THAT GOD IS NOT THE FORM OF A BODY

ACCORDINGLY, having shown that God is not the being of all, it can be proved in like manner that God is not the form of any thing.

For the divine being cannot be the being of a quiddity that is not its own being, as shown above. Now that which is the divine being itself is no other than God. Therefore it is impossible for God to be the form of any other thing.

Further. The form of a body is not its very being but the principle of its being. But God is being itself. Therefore God is not the form of a body.

Again. The union of form and matter results in a composite, and this is a whole in respect of form and matter. Now the parts are in potentiality with respect to the whole: but in God there is no potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for God to be the form united to any thing.

Again. That which has being per se, is more excellent than what has being in another. Now every form of a body has being in another. Since then God is the most excellent being, as the first cause of being, He cannot be the form of any thing.

Moreover, this can also be proved from the eternity of movement, as follows. If God were the form of a movable thing, since He is the first mover, the composite will be its own mover. But that which moves itself can be moved and not moved. Therefore it is in it to be either. Now a thing of this kind has not of itself indefectibility of movement. Therefore above that which moves itself we must place something else as first mover, which confers on it perpetuity of movement. And thus God Who is the first mover is not the form of a body that moves itself.

This argument avails for those who hold the eternity of movement. Yet if this be not granted the same conclusion may be drawn from the regularity of the heavenly movement. For just as that which moves itself can both be at rest and be moved, so can it be moved with greater or less velocity. Wherefore the necessity of uniformity in the heavenly movement depends on some higher principle that is altogether immovable, and that is not the part, through being the form, of a body which moves itself.

The authority of Scripture is in agreement with this truth. For it is written in the psalm: Thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens; and (Job 11:8, 9): He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do?… the measure of Him is longer than the earth, and deeper than the sea.

Hence we are able to refute the error of the pagans who asserted that God was the soul of the heaven or even the soul of the whole world: which led them to defend the idolatrous doctrine whereby they said that the whole world was God, not in reference to the body but to the soul, even as man is said to be wise in reference not to his body but to his soul: which being supposed they deemed it to follow that divine worship is not unduly shown to the world and its parts. The Commentator also says (Metaph. xi.) that this occasioned the error of the Zabian people, i.e. of idolaters, because, to wit, they asserted that God was the soul of the heaven.

CHAPTER XXVIII

OF THE DIVINE PERFECTION

NOW although things that exist and live are more perfect than those which only exist, yet God Who is not distinct from His own existence, is universally perfect being. And by universally perfect I mean that He lacks not the excellence of any genus.

For every excellence of any being whatsoever is ascribed to a thing in respect of its being, since no excellence would accrue to man from his wisdom, unless thereby he were wise, and so on. Wherefore, according as a thing has being, so is its mode of excellence: since a thing, according as its being is contracted to some special mode of excellence more or less great, is said to be more or less excellent. Hence if there be a thing to which the whole possibility of being belongs, no excellence that belongs to any thing can be lacking thereto. Now to a thing which is its own being, being belongs according to the whole possibility of being: thus if there were a separate whiteness, nothing of the whole possibility of whiteness could be wanting to it: because something of the possibility of whiteness is lacking to a particular white thing through a defect in the recipient of whiteness, which receives it according to its mode and, maybe, not according to the whole possibility of whiteness. Therefore God, Who is His own being, as shown above, has being according to the whole possibility of being itself: and consequently He cannot lack any excellence that belongs to any thing.

And just as every excellence and perfection is in a thing according as that thing is, so every defect is in a thing according as that thing in some sense is not. Now just as God has being wholly, so is not-being wholly absent from Him, since according as a thing has being it fails in not-being. Therefore all defect is removed from God, and consequently He is universally perfect.

But those things which only exist are imperfect, not on account of an imperfection in absolute being itself, for they have not being according to its whole possibility, but because they participate being in a particular and most imperfect way.

Again. Every imperfect thing must needs be preceded by some perfect thing: for seed is from some animal or plant. Wherefore the first being must be supremely perfect. Now it has been shown that God is the first being. Therefore He is supremely perfect.

Moreover. A thing is perfect in so far as it is in act, and imperfect in so far as it is in potentiality and void of act. Wherefore that which is nowise in potentiality but is pure act, must needs be most perfect. Now such is God. Therefore He is most perfect.

Further. Nothing acts except according as it is in act: wherefore action follows upon the mode of actuality in the agent; and consequently it is impossible for the effect that results from an action to have a more excellent actuality than that of the agent, although it is possible for the actuality of the effect to be more imperfect than that of the active cause, since action may be weakened on the part of that in which it terminates. Now in the genus of efficient cause we come at length to the one cause which is called God, as explained above, from Whom all things proceed, as we shall show in the sequel. Wherefore it follows that whatever is actual in any other thing, is found in God much more eminently than in that thing, and not conversely. Therefore God is most perfect.

Again. In every genus there is some thing most perfect relatively to that genus, by which every thing in that genus is measured: since every thing is shown to be more or less perfect according as it approaches more or less to the measure of that genus: thus white is said to be the measure in all colours, and the virtuous among all men. Now the measure of all beings can be none other than God Who is His own being. Therefore no perfection that belongs to any thing is lacking to Him, otherwise He would not be the universal measure of all.

Hence it is that when Moses sought to see the face of God, the Lord answered him: I will show thee all good (Exod. 33:18, 19), giving thus to understand that the fulness of all good is in Him. And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.): God exists not in any single mode, but embraces and prepossesses all being within Himself, absolutely and without limit.

It must however be observed that perfection cannot fittingly be ascribed to God if we consider the meaning of the word in respect of its derivation: since what is not made, cannot seemingly be described as perfect. Yet since whatever is made has been brought from potentiality to act, and from not-being to being, when it was made; it is rightly described as perfect, i.e., completely made, when its potentiality is completely reduced to act, so that it retains nothing of not-being, and has complete being. Accordingly by a kind of extension of the term, perfect is applied not only to that which has arrived at complete act through being made, but also to that which is in complete act without being made at all. It is thus that we say that God is perfect, according to Matt. 5:48: Be ye perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect.

CHAPTER XXIX

OF THE LIKENESS OF CREATURES

IN sequence to the above we may consider in what way it is possible to find in things a likeness to God, and in what way it is impossible.

For effects that fall short of their causes do not agree with them in name and ratio, and yet there must needs be some likeness between them, because it is of the nature of action that a like agent should produce a like action, since every thing acts according as it is in act. Wherefore the form of the effect is found in its transcendent cause somewhat, but in another way and another ratio, for which reason that cause is called equivocal. For the sun causes heat in lower bodies by acting according as it is in act; wherefore the heat generated by the sun must needs bear some likeness to the sun's active power by which heat is caused in those lower bodies and by reason of which the sun is said to be hot, albeit in a different ratio. And thus it is said to be somewhat like all those things on which it efficaciously produces its effects, and yet again it is unlike them all in so far as these effects do not possess heat and so forth in the same way as they are found in the sun. Thus also God bestows all perfections on things, and in consequence He is both like and unlike all.

Hence it is that Holy Writ sometimes recalls the likeness between Him and His creatures, as when it is said (Gen. 1:26): Let Us make man to Our image and likeness: while sometimes this likeness is denied, according to the words of Isa. 40:18: To whom then have you likened God; or what image will you make for Him? and of the psalm: O God, who shall be like to Thee?

Dionysius is in agreement with this argument, for he says (Div. Nom. ix.): The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as they can, Who is not perfectly imitable; unlike, according as effects fall short of their causes.

However, according to this likeness, it is more fitting to say that the creature is like God than vice versa. For one thing is like another when it possesses a quality or form thereof. Since then what is in God perfectly is found in other things by way of an imperfect participation, that in which likeness is observed is God's simply but not the creature's. And thus the creature has what is God's, and therefore is rightly said to be like God. But it cannot be said in this way that God has what belongs to His creature: wherefore neither is it fitting to say that God is like His creature; as neither do we say that a man is like his portrait, although we declare that his portrait is like him.

And much less properly can it be said that God is assimilated to the creature. For assimilation denotes movement towards similarity, and consequently applies to one that receives its similarity from another. But the creature receives from God its similarity to Him, and not vice versa. Therefore God is not assimilated to His creature, but rather vice versa.

CHAPTER XXX

WHAT TERMS CAN BE PREDICATED OF GOD

AGAIN in sequel to the above we may consider what can and what cannot be said of God; also what is said of Him alone, and what is said of Him together with other beings.

For since every perfection of creatures is to be found in God, albeit in another and more eminent way, whatever terms denote perfection absolutely and without any defect whatever, are predicated of God and of other things; for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth. But any term that denotes suchlike perfections together with a mode proper to creatures, cannot be said of God except by similitude and metaphor, whereby that which belongs to one thing is applied to another, as when a man is said to be a stone on account of the denseness of his intelligence. Such are all those terms employed to denote the species of a created thing, as man and stone: for its proper mode of perfection and being is due to each species: likewise whatever terms signify those properties of things that are caused by the proper principles of the species, therefore they cannot be said of God otherwise than metaphorically. But those which express these perfections together with the mode of supereminence in which they belong to God, are said of God alone, for instance the sovereign good, the first being, and the like.

Now, I say that some of the aforesaid terms denote perfection without defect, as regards that which the term is employed to signify: for as regards the mode of signification every term is defective. For we express things by a term as we conceive them by the intellect: and our intellect, since its knowledge originates from the senses, does not surpass the mode which we find in sensible objects, wherein the form is distinct from the subject of the form, on account of the composition of form and matter. Now in those things the form is found to be simple indeed, but imperfect, as being non-subsistent: whereas the subject of the form is found to be subsistent, but not simple, nay more, with concretion. Wherefore whatever our intellect signifies as subsistent, it signifies it with concretion, and whatever it signifies as simple, it signifies it not as subsisting but as qualifying. Accordingly in every term employed by us, there is imperfection as regards the mode of signification, and imperfection is unbecoming to God, although the thing signified is becoming to God in some eminent way: as instanced in the term goodness or the good: for goodness signifies by way of non-subsistence, and the good signifies by way of concretion. In this respect no term is becomingly applied to God, but only in respect of that which the term is employed to signify. Wherefore, as Dionysius teaches, such terms can be either affirmed or denied of God: affirmed, on account of the signification of the term; denied, on account of the mode of signification. Now the mode of supereminence in which the aforesaid perfections are found in God, cannot be expressed in terms employed by us, except either by negation, as when we say God is eternal or infinite, or by referring Him to other things, as when we say that He is the first cause or the sovereign good. For we are able to grasp, not what God is, but what He is not, and the relations of other things to Him, as explained above.

CHAPTER XXXI

THAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND THE PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY

FROM what has been said we are also able to see that the divine perfection and the various names applied to God are not inconsistent with His simplicity.

For we asserted that all the perfections to be found in other things are to be ascribed to God in the same way as effects are found in their equivocal causes: which causes are in their effects virtually, as heat is in the sun. Now this virtue unless it were in some way of the genus of heat, the sun acting thereby would not generate its like. Wherefore by reason of this virtue the sun is said to be hot, not only because it causes heat, but because the virtue whereby it does this, is something in conformity with heat. Now by this same virtue by which the sun causes heat, it causes also many other effects in lower bodies, such as dryness. And so heat and dryness, which are distinct qualities in fire, are ascribed to the sun in respect of the one virtue. And so too, the perfections of all things, which are becoming to other things in respect of various forms, must needs be ascribed to God in respect of His one virtue. And this virtue is not distinct from His essence, since nothing can be accidental to Him, as we have proved. Accordingly God is said to be wise not only because He causes wisdom, but because in so far as we are wise, we imitate somewhat the virtue whereby He makes us wise. He is not however called a stone, although He made the stones, because by the term stone we understand a definite mode of being, in respect of which a stone differs from God. But a stone imitates God as its cause, in respect of being, goodness and so forth, even as other creatures do.

The like of this may be found in human cognitive powers and operative virtues. For the intellect by its one virtue knows all that the sensitive faculty apprehends by various powers, and many other things besides. Again, the intellect, the higher it is, the more things is it able to know by means of one, while an inferior intellect can arrive at the knowledge of those things only by means of many. Again the royal power extends to all those things to which the various subordinate powers are directed. And so too, God by His one simple being possesses all manner of perfections, which in a much lower degree other things attain by certain various means. Whence it is clear how it is necessary to give several names to God. For since we cannot know Him naturally except by reaching Him from His effects, it follows that the terms by which we denote His perfection must be diverse, as also are the perfections which we find in things. If however we were able to understand His very essence as it is, and to give Him a proper name, we should express Him by one name only: and this is promised in the last chapter of Zacharias to those who will see Him in His essence: In that day there shall be one Lord, and His name shall be one.

CHAPTER XXXII

THAT NOTHING IS PREDICATED UNIVOCALLY OF GOD AND OTHER THINGS

FROM the above it is clear that nothing can be predicated univocally of God and other things. For an effect which does not receive the same form specifically as that whereby the agent acts, cannot receive in a univocal sense the name derived from that form: for the sun and the heat generated from the sun are not called hot univocally. Now the forms of things whereof God is cause do not attain to the species of the divine virtue, since they receive severally and particularly that which is in God simply and universally. It is evident therefore that nothing can be said univocally of God and other things.

Further. If an effect attain to the species of its cause, the name of the latter will not be predicated of it univocally unless it receive the same specific form according to the same mode of being: for house in art is not univocally the same as house in matter, since the form of house has an unlike being in the one case and in the other. Now other things, even though they should receive entirely the same form, do not receive it according to the same mode of being: because there is nothing in God that is not the divine being itself, as shown above, which does not apply to other things. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

Moreover. Whatever is predicated of several things univocally is either genus, or species, or difference, or proper accident. Now nothing is predicated of God as genus or as difference, as we have proved above, and consequently neither as definition nor as species, which consists of genus and difference. Nor can anything be accidental to Him, as was shown above, and consequently nothing is predicated of God, either as accidental or as proper, for the proper is a kind of accident. It follows therefore that nothing is predicated of God and other things univocally.

Again. That which is predicated univocally of several things is more simple than either of them, at least in our way of understanding. Now nothing can be more simple than God, either in reality or in our way of understanding. Therefore nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Further. Whatever is predicated univocally of several things belongs by participation to each of the things of which it is predicated: for the species is said to participate the genus, and the individual the species. But nothing is said of God by participation, since whatever is participated is confined to the mode of a participated thing, and thus is possessed partially and not according to every mode of perfection. It follows therefore that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things.

Again. That which is predicated of several things according to priority and posteriority is certainly not predicated of them univocally, since that which comes first is included in the definition of what follows, for instance substance in the definition of accident considered as a being. If therefore we were to say being univocally of substance and accident, it would follow that substance also should enter into the definition of being as predicated of substance: which is clearly impossible. Now nothing is predicated in the same order of God and other things, but according to priority and posteriority: since all predicates of God are essential, for He is called being because He is very essence, and good because He is goodness itself: whereas predicates are applied to others by participation; thus Socrates is said to be a man, not as though he were humanity itself, but as a subject of humanity. Therefore it is impossible for any thing to be predicated univocally of God and other things.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THAT NOT ALL TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE PURELY EQUIVOCAL

IT is also clear from what has been said that things predicated of God and other things are not all pure equivocations, as are the effects of an equivocal cause. For in the effects of an equivocal cause we find no mutual order or relationship, and it is altogether accidental that the same name is applied to various things; since the name applied to one does not signify that thing to have any relationship to another. Whereas it is not so with the terms applied to God and creatures: for in employing these common terms we consider the order of cause and effect, as is clear from what we have said. Therefore certain things predicated of God and other things are not pure equivocations.

Moreover. Where there is pure equivocation, we observe no likeness of things, but merely sameness of name. Now there is some kind of likeness of things to God, as shown above. Therefore it follows that they are not said of God by pure equivocation.

Again. When one thing is predicated of several by pure equivocation, we cannot be led from one to the knowledge of the other, for the knowledge of things depends not on words but on the meaning of names. Now we come to the knowledge of things divine from our observation of other things, as shown above. Therefore the like are not pure equivocations when said of God and other things.

Further. The use of equivocal terms breaks the continuity of an argument. Therefore if nothing were said of God and creatures except by pure equivocation, no argument could be made by proceeding to God from creatures, whereas the contrary is evidenced by all who speak of divine things.

Moreover. It is useless to predicate a name of a thing unless by that name we understand something about that thing. Now if names are predicated altogether equivocally of God and creatures, we understand nothing of God by those names: since the meanings of those names are known to us only as applied to creatures. It would therefore be to no purpose to prove about God that God is being, good, or any thing else of the kind.

If, however, it be asserted that by suchlike terms we only know of God what He is not, so that, to wit, He be called living because He is not in the genus of inanimate beings, and so forth, it follows at least that living when said of God and creatures agrees in the negation of inanimate being: and thus it will not be a pure equivocation.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THAT TERMS APPLIED TO GOD AND CREATURES ARE EMPLOYED ANALOGICALLY

IT follows, then, from what has been said that those things which are said of God and other things are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically, that is according to an order or relation to some one thing.

This happens in two ways. First, according as many things have a relation to some one thing: thus in relation to the one health, an animal is said to be healthy as its subject, medicine as effective thereof, food as preserving it, and urine as its sign. Secondly, according as order or relation of two things may be observed, not to some other thing, but to one of them: thus being is said of substance and accident, in so far as accident bears a relation to substance, and not as though substance and accident were referred to a third thing.

Accordingly such names are not said of God and other things analogically in the first way, for it would be necessary to suppose something previous to God; but in the second way.

Now in this analogical predication the relationship is sometimes found to be the same both as to the name and as to the thing, and sometimes it is not the same. For the relationship of the name is consequent upon the relationship of knowledge, since the name is the sign of intellectual conception. Accordingly when that which comes first in reality is found to be first also in knowledge, the same thing is found to be first both as to the meaning of the name and as to the nature of the thing: thus substance is prior to accident both in nature, in as much as substance is the cause of accident, and in knowledge, in as much as substance is placed in the definition of accident. Wherefore being is said of substance previously to being said of accident, both in reality and according to the meaning of the word. On the other hand, when that which comes first according to nature, comes afterwards according to knowledge, then, in analogical terms, there is not the same order according to the reality and according to the meaning of the name: thus the healing power in health-giving (medicines) is naturally prior to health in the animal, as cause is prior to effect; yet as we know this power through its effect, we name it from that effect. Hence it is that health-giving is first in the order of reality, and yet healthy is predicated of animal first according to the meaning of the term.

Accordingly, since we arrive at the knowledge of God from other things, the reality of the names predicated of God and other things is first in God according to His mode, but the meaning of the name is in Him afterwards. Wherefore He is said to be named from His effects.

CHAPTER XXXV

THAT THE SEVERAL NAMES PREDICATED OF GOD ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS

FROM what we have said it is also proved that, although names predicated of God signify the same thing, they are not synonymous, because they do not convey the same meaning.

For just as various things are by their various forms like one simple thing which is God, so our intellect, by its various conceptions, is somewhat like Him, in so far as it is led to know Him by the various perfections of creatures. Wherefore our understanding is neither false nor vain in conceiving many things of one; because that simple divine being is such that certain things can be likened to Him according to their manifold forms, as we have proved above. And according to its various conceptions our intellect devises various names which it applies to God. Wherefore, since they are not applied with the same meaning, it is clear that they are not synonymous, although they signify a thing absolutely one: for the name has not the same meaning, since it denotes the concept of the intellect previously to the thing understood.

CHAPTER XXXVI

HOW OUR INTELLECT FORMS A PROPOSITION ABOUT GOD

FROM this it is moreover clear that our intellect does not vainly form propositions about a simple God by composition and division, although God is altogether simple.

For although our intellect arrives at the knowledge of God by various conceptions, as stated above, it understands that what corresponds to them all is absolutely one: because our intellect does not ascribe its mode of understanding to the things which it understands, even as neither does it ascribe immateriality to a stone, although it knows it immaterially. Consequently it enunciates the unity of the thing by a verbal composition implying identity, when it says: God is good or is goodness: so that if there be any diversity in the composition it is referred to the understanding, and unity to the thing understood. Similarly sometimes our intellect forms a proposition about God with an implication of diversity by inserting a preposition, as when we say: Goodness is in God: because here we imply both a certain diversity that is befitting the understanding, and a certain unity which must be referred to the thing.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THAT GOD IS GOOD

THE goodness of God may be concluded from His perfection which we have proved.

For that by reason of which a thing is said to be good is its own virtue, since the virtue of any thing is that which makes its subject good and renders its work good. Now virtue is a perfection: since we say that a thing is perfect when it attains its proper virtue, as stated in 7 Phys. Wherefore a thing is good from the fact of its being perfect: and consequently every thing desires its own perfection as its proper good. Now it has been proved that God is perfect. Therefore He is good.

Again. It has been proved above that there is an immovable first mover which is God. Now He moves as a mover absolutely immovable: and this moves as the object of desire. Wherefore God, since He is the first immovable mover, is the first object of desire. Now a thing is desired in two ways, either because it is good, or because it seems good. The former is that which is good, for the seeming good does not move per se, but according as it has some appearance of good; whereas the good moves per se. Therefore the first object of desire, which is God, is good.

Further. The good is that which all things desire, which the Philosopher quotes as very well said. Now all things desire to be in act according to their mode: which is evident from the fact that every thing, by its nature, shrinks from corruption. Wherefore the essential notion of the good is to be in act, and consequently evil which is opposed to good results from the privation of act by potentiality, as the Philosopher declares (9 Metaph.). Now God is a being in act and not in potentiality, as we have proved above. Therefore He is truly good.

Moreover. The bestowal of being and goodness proceeds from goodness. This is proved from the very nature of the good, and from the notion it conveys. For the good of a thing is naturally its act and perfection. Now a thing acts through being in act: and by acting it bestows being and goodness on other things. Wherefore it is a sign of a thing’s perfection that it is able to produce its like, as the Philosopher declares (4 Meteor.). Again, the notion of the good is that it is something appetible: and this is an end. And the end moves the agent to act. Hence good is said to be diffusive of self and being. Now, this diffusion is becoming to God: for it has been shown above that He is the cause of being in other things, since He is the per se necessary being. Therefore He is truly good.

Wherefore it is said in the psalm: How good is God to Israel, to them that are of a right heart; and (Lam. 3:25): The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THAT GOD IS GOODNESS ITSELF

FROM the above we are able to conclude that God is His own goodness.

For to be in act is for every thing its own good. Now, God is not only being in act, but is His own being, as proved above. Therefore He is goodness itself and not merely good.

Further. The perfection of a thing is its goodness, as we have shown above. Now the perfection of the divine being does not consist in something added thereto, but in its being perfect in itself, as proved above. Therefore God's goodness is not something added to His essence, but His essence is His goodness.

Again. Any good that is not its own goodness is good by participation. Now that which is by participation presupposes something antecedent to itself, from which it derives the nature of goodness. But it is not possible to continue thus to infinity: since in final causes there is no proceeding to infinity, for the infinite is inconsistent with finality: and the good has the nature of an end. We must therefore come to some first good, that is good not by participation in relation to something else, but by its essence. Now this is God. Therefore God is His own goodness.

Again. That which is can participate something, but being itself can participate nothing: because that which participates is potentiality, whereas being is act. Now, God is being itself, as we have proved. Therefore He is good not by participation, but essentially.

Moreover. In every simple thing, being and that which is are one: for if they be distinct, there is no longer simplicity. Now, God is absolutely simple, as we have proved. Therefore that He is good is not distinct from Himself. Therefore He is His own goodness.

These same arguments show that nothing else is its own goodness: hence it is said (Matth. 19:17): None is good but God alone.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THAT NO EVIL CAN BE IN GOD

HENCE it is manifestly apparent that evil cannot be in God.

For being and goodness and all essential predicates have nothing besides themselves added to them, although that which is or the good may have something besides being or goodness: since nothing hinders the subject of one perfection being the subject of another besides; thus that which is a body may be white and sweet: while every nature is confined within the bounds of its essence, so that it admits of nothing extraneous within itself. Now God is goodness and not merely good, as we have proved above. Therefore nothing that is not goodness can be in Him: and consequently evil can nowise be in Him.

Moreover. As long as a thing remains, that which is contrary to its essence is altogether incompatible with that thing: thus irrationality or insensibility is incompatible with man unless he cease to be man. Now the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have proved. Therefore evil which is contrary to good can have no place in God unless He cease to be God: which is impossible, since He is eternal, as was proved above.

Again. Since God is His own being, nothing can be said of Him by participation, as is clear from the argument given above. If, then, evil were predicated of Him, it would be a predicate not by participation, but by essence. But evil cannot be predicated of any thing in such a way as to be the essence of that thing: for it would lack being, which is a good, as we have shown above: and in evil there can be no extraneous admixture, as neither can there be in goodness. Therefore evil cannot be predicated of God.

Again. Evil is opposed to good. Now the notion of good consists in perfection: and therefore the notion of evil consists in imperfection. Now defect or imperfection cannot be in God, since He is universally perfect, as shown above. Therefore evil cannot be in God.

Further. A thing is perfect according as it is in act. Therefore it will be imperfect according as it is deficient in act. Therefore evil is either privation or includes privation. Now the subject of privation is a potentiality: and this cannot be in God, and consequently neither can evil.

Moreover. If good is what is desired by all, it follows that evil as such is shunned by every nature. Now that which is in a thing against the mode of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Therefore evil in a thing is violent and unnatural in so far as it is an evil to that thing, although in composite things it may be natural thereto in respect of some part. But God is not composite, nor can anything be violent or unnatural in Him, as shown above. Therefore evil cannot be in God.

This is moreover confirmed by Holy Writ. For it is written in the canonical epistle of John: God is light, and in Him there is no darkness; and (Job 34:10): Far from God be wickedness, and iniquity from the Almighty.

CHAPTER XL

THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF EVERY GOOD

IT is also proved from the foregoing that God is the good of every good.

For the goodness of a thing is its perfection, as we have stated. Now, since God is simply perfect, He contains in His perfection the perfections of all things, as we have shown. Therefore His goodness contains all goodnesses; and consequently He is the good of every good.

Again. A thing is not said to have a quality by participation, except in so far as it bears some resemblance to that which is said to have that quality essentially: thus iron is said to be fiery in so far as it partakes of a resemblance to fire. Now, God is good essentially, while all else is good by participation, as we have proved. Therefore nothing is said to be good except in so far as it bears some resemblance to the divine goodness. Therefore He is the good of every good.

Further. Since a thing is desirable for the sake of an end, and the aspect of good consists in its being desirable; it follows that a thing is said to be good, either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Therefore the last end is that from which all things take the aspect of good. Now this is God, as we shall prove further on. Therefore God is the good of every good.

Hence the Lord in promising Moses that he should see Him, said (Exod. 33:19): I will show thee all good. And it is said of divine wisdom (Wis. 8): All good things came to me together with her.

CHAPTER XLI

THAT GOD IS THE SOVEREIGN GOOD

FROM this it is proved that God is the sovereign good. For the universal good stands far above any particular good, even as the good of the nation is greater than the good of an individual: since the goodness and perfection of the whole stand above the goodness and perfection of the part. Now the divine goodness of God is compared to all other things as the universal good to the particular, for He is the good of every good, as we have proved. Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Moreover. That which is predicated essentially is said more truly than that which is predicated by participation. Now God is good by His essence; and other things, by participation, as shown above. Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Again. The greatest in any genus is the cause of others in that genus: since the cause is greater than its effect. Now all things derive their ratio of goodness from God, as we have shown. Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Moreover. Just as that is more white which has less admixture of black, so that is better which has less admixture of evil. Now God is most of all unmixed with evil, since in Him there can be no evil, neither in act nor in potentiality, and this becomes Him by His very nature, as we have proved. Therefore He is the sovereign good.

Hence it is said (1 Kings 2:2): There is none holy as the Lord is.

CHAPTER XLII

THAT GOD IS ONE

HAVING proved the foregoing, it is manifest that there is only one God.

For it is impossible that there be two sovereign goods: since that which is ascribed to a thing by way of superabundance is to be found in one alone. Now God is the sovereign good, as we have shown. Therefore God is one.

Further. We have shown that God is absolutely perfect, and that He lacks no perfection. If, then, there be several gods, it follows that there are several suchlike perfect things. But that is impossible: for if none of them lacks any perfection, nor has any admixture of imperfection, which is required for anything to be simply perfect, there will be nothing by which they can be distinguished. Therefore it is impossible that there be several gods.

Again. That which is sufficiently done if it be supposed to be done by one, is better done by one than by many. Now the order of things is the best possible: since the potency of the first agent does not fail the potentiality of things for perfection. And all things are sufficiently perfected by referring them to one first principle. Therefore a plurality of principles is inadmissible.

Moreover. It is impossible for one continual and regular movement to proceed from several movers. For if they move together, none of them is a perfect mover, but all together take the place of one perfect mover: which does not apply to the first mover, since the perfect precedes the imperfect. If, however, they move not together, each of them is at one time moving, and at another time not; whence it follows that the movement is neither continuous nor regular: because movement that is continuous and one is from one mover. Moreover a mover that is not always moving is found to move irregularly: as evidenced by movers of lower degree, wherein violent movement is intense at first and slackens at the end, while natural movement is the reverse. On the other hand, the first movement is one and continuous, as was proved by the philosophers. Therefore its first mover must needs be one.

Again. Corporeal substance is directed to spiritual substance as its good: for there is in the latter a fuller goodness to which corporeal substance seeks to be likened, since whatever exists desires to attain the greatest good as far as possible. Now all movements of the corporeal creature are found to be reduced to one first movement, beside which there is no other first movement not reducible to it. Therefore beside the spiritual substance which is the end of the first movement, there is no other that cannot be reduced to it. Now under this name we understand God. Therefore there is only one God.

Moreover. The mutual order of all diverse things that are directed to each other is on account of their order towards some one thing: even as the mutual order of the parts of an army is on account of the order of the whole army to the commander-in-chief. For that certain diverse things be united together in some relationship, cannot result from their own natures as distinct from one another, because from this there would rather result distinction among them. Nor can it result from different causes of order: because these could not possibly of themselves as differing from one another have one order in view. Accordingly either the mutual order of many is accidental, or it must be reduced to one first cause of that order, who sets all in order towards the end which he intends. Now, all the parts of this world are observed to be ordered to one another, in so far as certain things are aided by certain others: thus the lower bodies are moved by the higher, and the latter by incorporeal substances, as shown above. Nor is this accidental, since it happens always or for the most part. Wherefore this world has but one director and governor. But there is no other world besides this. Therefore there is but one governor of the universe, and Him we call God.

Again. If there be two things both of which are of necessity, they must needs agree in the intention of the necessity of being. It follows, therefore, that they must be differentiated by something added either to one or to both of them; and consequently that either one is composite, or both. Now no composite thing exists necessarily per se, as we have proved above.

Therefore there cannot possibly be several things each of which exists necessarily: and consequently neither can there be several gods.

Moreover. That in which they differ, on the supposition that they agree in the necessity of being, is either required as a complement in some way to this necessity of being, or is not required. If not, it follows that it is accidental: because whatever is added to a thing, that has nothing to do with its being, is an accident. Therefore this accident has a cause. And this cause is either the essence of that which exists of necessity, or something else. If it is its essence, since the very necessity of being is its essence, as shown above, the necessity of being will be the cause of that accident. But necessity of being is found in both. Therefore both have that accident: and consequently are not differentiated thereby. If, however, the cause of this accident be something else, it follows that unless this something else exist, this accident would not exist. And without this accident there would not be the aforesaid distinction. Therefore without that something else, these two things that are supposed to exist of necessity would be not two, but one. Therefore the proper being of both is dependent on a third: and consequently neither of them exists necessarily per se.

If, on the other hand, that in which they differ be necessary as a complement to their necessity of being, this will be either because it is included in the notion of the necessity of being, as animate is included in the definition of animal, or because necessity of being is specified thereby as animal is completed by rational. In the first case, it follows that wherever there is necessity of being, there is that which is included in its notion; thus to whatever we can apply animal we can apply animate. And thus, since we ascribe necessity of being to both the aforesaid, they cannot be differentiated thereby. In the second case, this is again impossible. For the difference that specifies a genus does not complete the generic idea, but the genus acquires thereby being in act: because the notion of animal is complete before the addition of rational, although animal cannot be in act except it be either rational or irrational. Now, this is impossible for two reasons. First, because the quiddity of that which has being of necessity, is its being, as we have proved above. Secondly, because thus necessary being would acquire being from something else: which is impossible. Therefore it is impossible to have several things each of which has necessary being per se.

Further. If there be two gods, this word god is predicated of both either univocally or equivocally. If equivocally, this is beside the present question: for nothing prevents any thing receiving an equivocal name, if the usual mode of speech allow. If, however, it be predicated univocally, it must be said of both in the same sense: and thus it follows that in both there is the same nature in common. Either, therefore, this nature is in both according to the same being, or else it is according to different beings. If according to one being, it follows that they are not two but only one: for two things have not one being if they differ substantially. If, however, there is a different being in both, the quiddity of neither will be its own being. But we must admit this to be the case in God, as we have proved. Therefore neither of them is what we understand by the name of God, and consequently it is impossible to admit the existence of two gods.

Again. None of the things that belong to a particular signate thing as such, can possibly belong to another: because the singularity of a particular thing belongs to no other but the singular thing itself. Now, its necessity of being belongs to that which is of necessity in as much as it is this signate thing. Therefore it cannot possibly belong to any other thing: and thus it is impossible that there be several things each of which exists of necessity. Therefore it is impossible that there be several gods.

Proof of the middle proposition: If that which is of necessity is not this signate thing as being of necessity, it follows that the designation of its being is not necessary in itself, but depends on something else. Now a thing according as it is in act is distinct from all else, and this is to be this signate thing. Therefore that which is of necessity depends on something else for being in act: and this is contrary to the notion of that which is of necessity. Therefore that which is of necessity must be of necessity according as it is this signate thing.

Again. The nature signified by this word God is individualized either by itself in this God or by something else. If by something else there must be composition therein. If by itself, it follows that it cannot be applied to another: for that which is the principle of individualization cannot be common to several. Therefore it is impossible that there be several gods.

Moreover. If there be several gods, it follows that the divine nature is not identically the same in each. Therefore there must be something to distinguish the divine nature is this one and that one. But this is impossible:

since the divine nature receives no addition whether of essential or of accidental differences, as proved above: nor is the divine nature the form of any matter, so as to be divided as the matter is divided. Therefore there cannot possibly be several gods.

Again. The being proper to each thing is but one. Now God is Himself His very being, as shown above. Therefore there can be but one God.

Further. A thing has being according as it has unity: wherefore every thing shuns division so far as it can, lest it thus tend to not-being. But the divine nature surpasses all in having being. Therefore there is supreme unity therein. Therefore it is nowise divided into several.

Moreover. We observe that in every genus multitude proceeds from some kind of unity: wherefore in every genus we find one first thing, which is the measure of all things found in that genus. Hence whatever things we find agreeing in one point, must proceed from some one principle. Now all things agree in the point of being. Therefore that which is the principle of all things must needs be one only: and this is God.

Again. In every government he who presides desires unity, wherefore the chief form of government is a monarchy or kingdom. And of our many members there is one head: and this is an evident sign that unity is due to whom headship is becoming. Wherefore we must confess that God, Who is the cause of all, is simply one.

We can moreover infer this confession of the divine unity from the sacred oracles. For it is said (Deut. 6:4): Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one; and (Exod. 20:3): Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me; and (Eph. 4:5): One Lord, one faith, etc.

By this truth the heathens who believe in many gods are refuted. And yet several of them affirmed the existence of one supreme god, by whom they asserted that the others whom they called gods were caused, for they ascribed the godhead to all eternal substances, especially by reason of wisdom, felicity and governance of the universe. This mode of expression is found even in Holy Writ, where holy angels or men or judges are called gods, as in the words of the psalm: There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord, and again: I have said: You are gods: and many like passages are found throughout Scripture.

Wherefore the Manichees would seem yet more opposed to this truth, since they assert two first principles, the one of which is not the cause of the other.

The Arians too impugned this truth by their errors, since they asserted that the Father and the Son are not one but distinct gods, and yet were compelled by the authority of Scripture to confess that the Son is true God.

CHAPTER XLIII

THAT GOD IS INFINITE

NOW while the infinite is a sequel of quantity, as philosophers teach, infinity cannot be ascribed to God in respect of multitude, seeing that it has been proved that there is but one God, and that there is no composition either of parts or of accidents in Him. Nor may we say that He is infinite in respect of continuous quantity, since we have shown that He is incorporeal. It remains therefore to inquire whether infinity is becoming to Him in respect of spiritual magnitude.

This spiritual magnitude is referable to two things: namely to power, and to the goodness or perfection of a thing's very nature. For a thing is said to be more or less white according to the degree of perfection in its whiteness. And the magnitude of power is gauged from the magnitude of deeds or of things made. Now in these things the magnitude of one follows the magnitude of the other, because from the very fact that a thing is in act it is active, and consequently according to the degree in which it is perfected in its act, is the degree of magnitude in its power. Wherefore spiritual things are said to be great according to their degree of perfection: for Augustine says that in things which are great not by bulk, to be great is to be good.

Accordingly we have to show that God is infinite according to this kind of magnitude. Not, however, so that infinite be understood privatively, as in dimensive or numeral quantity, for a quantity of this kind is naturally finite, so that we speak of infinity by subtraction of that which it has by nature, and for this reason infinity in those quantities denotes imperfection. But in God the infinite is understood only negatively, because there is no bound or end to His perfection, and He is the supremely perfect being: and it is thus that the infinite should be ascribed to God.

For whatever is finite by its nature is confined to some generic notion. Now God is in no genus, and His perfection contains the perfections of all genera, as we have shown above. Therefore He is infinite.

Moreover. Every act inherent to something else receives its limitation from that in which it is: since that which is in another is in it according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore an act that exists in no subject has no limitations: for instance, if whiteness were per se existent, the perfection of whiteness therein would not be limited from having whatever it is possible to have of the perfection of whiteness. Now God is an act nowise existing in another: because neither is He form in matter, as we have proved, nor is His being inherent to any form or nature, since He is His own being, as we have shown above. Therefore it follows that He is infinite.

Again. In things we find something that is pure potentiality; as primary matter; something that is pure act, namely God, as we have shown above; and something that is act and potentiality, namely other things. Now as potentiality, since it bears relation to an act, cannot exceed that act in any particular thing, so neither can it simply. Therefore, since primary matter is infinite in its potentiality, it follows that God, Who is pure act, is infinite in His actuality.

Again. An act is the more perfect, according as it is less mingled with potentiality. Wherefore every act that has an admixture of potentiality has a limit to its perfection: while the act which has no admixture of potentiality has no limit to its perfection. Now God is pure act without any potentiality, as we have proved above. Therefore He is infinite.

Again. Being itself, considered absolutely, is infinite; for it can be participated by an infinite number of things in an infinite number of ways. Hence if we take a thing with finite being, this being must be limited by some other thing which is in some way the cause of that being. Now there can be no cause of God’s being, since He is necessary of Himself. Therefore He has infinite being, and Himself is infinite.

Moreover. Whatever has a particular perfection is the more perfect according as it more fully participates that perfection. Now there cannot be, nor even be imagined, a way in which a perfection is possessed more fully, than by that which is perfect by its essence, and whose being is its goodness: and such is God. Therefore in no way can anything be imagined better or more perfect than God. Therefore He is perfect in goodness.

Further. Our intellect reaches the infinite in understanding: a sign of which is that given any finite quantity, our intellect can imagine a greater. Now it would be to no purpose for the intellect to be thus directed to the infinite unless there were infinite intelligible being. Therefore there must be some infinite intelligible thing, which must needs be the greatest of all beings: and this we call God. Therefore God is infinite.

Again. An effect cannot extend beyond its cause. Now our intellect cannot be but from God, Who is the first cause of all things. Therefore our intellect cannot think of anything greater than God. If then it is possible to think of something greater than every finite thing, it follows that God is not finite.

Moreover. Infinite power cannot be in a finite essence: because everything acts by its form, which is either its essence or part thereof: and power denotes a principle of action. But God has not a finite active power: for He moves in infinite time, and this cannot be save from an infinite power, as we have shown above. Therefore it follows that God's essence is infinite. This argument, however, avails for those who hold to the eternity of the world: and if this be not supposed, our opinion about the infinity of the divine power is confirmed yet more. For every agent is the more powerful to act according as it reduces to act a potentiality the further removed from act: thus a greater power is needed to heat water than air. Now that which is not at all, is infinitely distant from act, nor is it in any way in potentiality. Wherefore, if the world was made after previously not being at all, the maker's power must needs be infinite.

This argument, even for those who hold to the eternity of the world, avails to prove the infinity of the divine power. For they confess that God is the cause of the substance of the world, although they aver that it is eternal, since they say that the eternal God is the cause of an eternal world in the same way as a foot would have been from eternity the cause of a footprint, if it had trod on the dust from eternity. Now this opinion being presupposed, it follows none the less from the argument stated above, that the power of God is infinite. For whether He fashioned things from time, as we hold, or from eternity, as they maintain, there cannot be in things anything that He has not produced, since He is the universal sourse of being: and so He produced them without any pre-existing matter or potentiality. Now active power must needs be in proportion to passive potentiality; because the greater the passive potentiality that is pre-existent or presupposed, the greater the active power which completes its actuality. Hence it follows, since a finite power produces an effect if we presuppose the potentiality of matter, that God’s power, which presupposes no potentiality, is not finite but infinite: and that consequently His essence is infinite.

Moreover. A thing lasts so much the longer as its cause is more efficacious. Consequently, a thing which is of infinite duration must have being through a cause of infinite efficacy. Now God is of infinite duration, for it has been shown above that He is eternal. Since then He has no cause of His being besides Himself, it follows that He is infinite.

The authority of Holy Writ bears witness to this truth; for the psalmist says: Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised: and of His greatness there is no end.

The same truth is attested by the statements of the oldest philosophers, since all of them, compelled as it were by truth itself, asserted that the first principle of things is infinite. For they knew not what they said, believing the infinity of the first principle to be after the manner of a discrete quantity, as Democritus maintained, asserting an infinite number of atoms to be the principles of things, and as Anaxagoras held, stating that the principles of things are an infinite number of similar parts; or after the manner of continuous quantity, as those who held that some element, or some undefined infinite body, is the first principle of all. But since it was proved by the researches of subsequent philosophers that there is no infinite body, and if to this we add that the first principle must needs be infinite in some way, it follows that the infinite which is the first principle is neither a body nor a power residing in a body.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT GOD IS AN INTELLIGENT BEING

IT may be shown from the above that God is an intelligent being.

For it was proved that it is impossible to proceed to infinity in movers and things moved, and that all things moved must be reduced, as is probable, to one self-moving principle. Now a self-mover moves itself by appetite and apprehension: for suchlike things alone are found to move themselves, since it is in them to be moved and not to be moved. Wherefore the moving part in the first self-mover must needs be appetitive and apprehensive. Now in that movement which is by appetite and apprehension, the appetent and apprehender is a moved mover, while appetible and apprehended is a mover not moved. Since then that which is the first mover of all, which we call God, is a mover altogether unmoved, it follows that it is compared to the motor which is a part of the self-mover as the appetible to the appetent. Not, however, as the appetible to the sensitive appetite, because the sensitive appetite is not of the good simply, but of this particular good, since also sensitive apprehension is only of the particular; and that which is good and appetible simply, is prior to that which is good and appetible here and now. Therefore the first mover must be the appetible as an object of the understanding: and consequently the mover that desires itself must be an intelligent being. Much more therefore is the very first appetible an intelligent being; because that which desires it becomes actually understanding through being united to it as an intelligible object. Therefore it follows that God is intelligent, if it be supposed that the first mover moves itself, as the early philosophers maintained.

Again. The same conclusion follows necessarily, if movable things be reduced not to some first self-mover, but to a mover that is utterly immovable. For the first mover is the universal principle of movement.

Wherefore, since every mover moves by some form which it intends in moving, it follows that the form by which the first mover moves must be universal form and universal good. Now a form is not found under conditions of universality save in the intellect. Therefore the first mover, which is God, must be intelligent.

Moreover. In no order of movers do we find that a mover by the intellect is the instrument of that which moves without intellect; but rather the opposite. Now all movers that are in the world, are compared to the first mover which is God, as instruments to the principal agent. Since then we find in the world many movers by intellect, it is impossible that the first mover move without intellect. Therefore God must of necessity be intelligent.

Again. A thing is intelligent from the fact of its being without matter: in sign of which forms become understood by being abstracted from matter. Hence also understanding is of universals and not of singulars, because matter is the principle of individualization. Now forms actually understood become one with the intellect actually understanding. Wherefore, if forms are actually understood from the very fact that they are without matter, it follows that a thing is actually intelligent from the fact that it is without matter. Now it was shown above that God is absolutely immaterial. Therefore He is intelligent.

Again. God lacks no perfection that is to be found in any genus of things, as we have proved above: nor does it follow from this that there is any composition in Him, as was also shown above. Now the greatest among the perfections of things is that a thing is intellectual, because thereby it is, after a fashion, all things, having in itself the perfection of all. Therefore God is intelligent.

Moreover. Whatever tends definitely to an end, either prescribes that end to itself, or that end is prescribed to it by another: else it would not tend to this end rather than to that. Now natural things tend to definite ends, for they do not pursue their natural purposes by chance, since in that case those purposes would not be realized always or for the most part, but seldom, for of such is chance. Since then they do not prescribe the end to themselves, for they do not apprehend the notion of end, it follows that the end is prescribed to them by another, Who is the author of nature. This is He Who gives being to all, and Who necessarily exists of Himself, Whom we call

God, as shown above. Now He would be unable to prescribe nature its end unless He were intelligent. Therefore God is intelligent.

Moreover. Whatever is imperfect originates from something perfect: because the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect, as act precedes potentiality. Now the forms that exist in particular things are imperfect, since their existence is limited and does not extend to the full universality of their nature. Wherefore they must needs originate from certain perfect and not limited forms. Now such forms are impossible except as an object of the understanding, since no form is found in a state of universality except in the intellect. Consequently those forms must be intelligent if they are subsistent, for in no other way can they be operative. Therefore it follows that God Who is the first subsistent act, from which all others derive, is intelligent.

The Catholic faith confesses this truth. For it is said of God (Job 9:4): He is wise in heart and mighty in strength; and (12:16): With Him is strength and wisdom; and in the psalm: Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me; and (Rom. 11:33): O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God!

The truth of this belief took such hold on men that they named God from understanding: for Θεὸς, which is the Greek for God, is derived from θεᾶσθαι, which means to consider or to see.

CHAPTER XLV

THAT GOD’S ACT OF INTELLIGENCE IS HIS ESSENCE

FROM the fact that God is intelligent it follows that His act of intelligence is His essence.

For intelligence is the act of an intelligent being, existing within that being and not passing on to something outside of it, as heating passes into the thing heated: for the intelligible suffers nothing through being understood, but the one who understands is perfected. Now whatever is in God is the divine essence. Therefore God’s act of intelligence is the divine essence, the divine existence, and God Himself: since God is His essence and His existence.

Further. The act of intelligence is compared to the intellect as existence to essence. But God’s existence is His essence, as proved above. Therefore God’s act of intelligence is His intellect. Now the divine intellect is God’s essence, otherwise it would be accidental to God. Therefore the divine act of intelligence must needs be His essence.

Moreover. Second act is more perfect than first act, even as consideration is more perfect than knowledge. Now God’s knowledge or intellect is His very essence, if He is intelligent as shown above: since no perfection belongs to Him by participation, but by essence, as already proved. If, therefore, His act of consideration be not His essence, something will be more noble and perfect than His essence. And thus He will not be in the summit of perfection and goodness: and consequently He will not be first.

Again. Intelligence is the act of the intelligent. If then God being intelligent is not His act of intelligence, He must be compared to it as potentiality to act: and so there will be potentiality and act in God; which is impossible, as we have proved above.

Again. Every substance is for the sake of its operation. If therefore God’s operation is other than the divine substance, His end will be other than Himself. And thus God will not be His own goodness, since the good of a thing is its end.

If, however, God’s act of intelligence is His existence, His act of intelligence must be simple, eternal, unchangeable, existing only in act, and all those things Which have been proved about the divine existence. Wherefore God is not in potentiality to intelligence, nor does He begin to understand a thing anew, nor is His act of intelligence subject to any change or composition whatsoever.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS BY NOTHING ELSE THAN HIS ESSENCE

FROM what has been proved above it is made evident that the divine intellect understands by no other intelligible species but the divine essence.

For the intelligible species is the formal principle of the intellectual operation; even as the form of every agent is the principle of that agent’s proper operation. Now the intellectual operation of God is His essence, as we have shown. Wherefore something else would be the principle and cause of the divine essence, if the divine intellect understood by some intelligible species other than His essence: and this is in contradiction with what has been shown above.

Again. The intellect is made actually intelligent by the intelligible species: just as sense is made actually sentient by the sensible species. Hence the intelligible species is compared to the intellect as act to potentiality. And consequently if the divine intellect were to understand by a species other than itself, it would be in potentiality with respect to something: and this is impossible, as we have proved above.

Moreover. An intelligible species that is accessory to the essence of the intellect in which it is, has an accidental being: for which reason our knowledge is reckoned among the accidents. Now in God there can be no accident, as proved above. Therefore there is no species in His intellect besides the divine essence.

Further. An intelligible species is the image of something understood. Wherefore if in the divine intellect there be an intelligible species besides its essence, it will be the image of something understood. Either, therefore, it will be the image of the divine essence or of some other thing. But it cannot be the image of the divine essence: for then the divine essence would not be intelligible by itself, and this species would make it intelligible. Nor again can there be in the divine intellect a species distinct from its essence and representative of some other thing. For this image would be imprinted thereon by something. Not however by the divine intellect itself, because then the same thing would be agent and patient: and there would be an agent which imprints not its own but another's image on the patient, and thus not every agent would produce its like. Nor again by another: for then there would be an agent previous to the divine intellect. Therefore there cannot possibly be in it an intelligible species besides its essence.

Moreover. God's act of intelligence is His essence, as we have proved. Therefore if He understood by a species that is not His essence, it would be by something other than His essence. But this is impossible. Therefore He does not understand by a species that is not His essence.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS HIMSELF PERFECTLY

IT is furthermore clear from the above that God understands Himself perfectly.

For since the intellect is directed by the intelligible species to the thing understood, the perfection of intellectual operation depends on two things. One is that the intelligible species be perfectly conformed to the thing understood. The other is that it be perfectly united to the intellect; and this is all the more so, according as the intellect is endowed with greater efficacy in understanding. Now the divine essence which is the intelligible species whereby the divine intellect understands, is absolutely the same as God Himself, and is altogether identified with His intellect. Therefore God understands Himself most perfectly.

Further. A material thing is made intelligible by being abstracted from matter and from material conditions. Wherefore that which by its nature is severed from matter and from material conditions, is by its very nature intelligible. Now every intelligible is understood according as it is actually one with the intelligent: and God is Himself intelligent, as we have proved. Therefore since He is altogether immaterial, and is absolutely one with Himself, He understands Himself most perfectly.

Again. A thing is actually understood through the unification of the intellect in act and the intelligible in act. Now the divine intellect is always intellect in act: since nothing is in potentiality and imperfect in God. And God's essence is by itself perfectly intelligible, as shown above. Since, then, the divine intellect and the divine essence are one, as stated above, it is evident that God understands Himself perfectly: for God is both His own intellect and His own essence.

Moreover. Whatever is in anyone in an intelligible manner, is understood by him. Now the divine essence is in God in an intelligible manner: for God’s natural being and His intelligible being are one and the same, since His being is His act of intelligence. Therefore God understands His essence. Therefore He understands Himself, since He is His very essence.

Further. The acts of the intellect, as of the other powers of the soul, are distinguished according to their objects. Hence the more perfect the intelligible, the more perfect will the operation of the intellect be. Now the most perfect intelligible is the divine essence, since it is the most perfect act and the first truth. And the operation of the divine intellect is also the most excellent, since it is the divine being itself, as we have shown. Therefore God understands Himself.

Again. All the perfections of things are found eminently in God. Now among other perfections found in created things is that of understanding God: since the intellectual nature whose perfection it is to understand stands above others: and God is the most excellent intelligible. Therefore God, most of all, understands Himself.

This is confirmed by divine authority. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10) that the Spirit of God searcheth … the deep things of God.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT GOD KNOWS ONLY HIMSELF FIRST AND PER SE

FROM the foregoing it follows that God first and per se knows Himself alone.

For that thing alone is known first and per se by whose species the intellect understands, because the operation is proportionate to the form which is the principle of the operation. Now that by which God understands is nothing else than His essence, as we have proved. Therefore that which is understood by Him first and per se is nothing else than Himself.

Again. It is impossible to understand simultaneously several things first and per se: since one operation cannot terminate simultaneously in several things. Now God understands Himself sometimes, as we have proved. Therefore if He understands something else by way of an object understood first and per se, it follows that His intellect is changed from consideration to consideration of that thing. But this thing is less excellent than He. Therefore the divine intellect would be changed for the worse: which is impossible.

Moreover. The operations of the intellect are distinguished in relation to their objects. If, therefore, God understands Himself and something other than Himself as principal object, He will have several intellectual operations. Therefore either His essence will be divided into several parts, or He will have an intellectual operation that is not His substance: both of which have been proved to be impossible. Therefore it follows that nothing is known by God as understood first and per se, except His essence.

Again. The intellect, in so far as it is distinct from the object of its intelligence, is in potentiality in its regard. If then something else is understood by God first and per se, it will follow that He is in potentiality in respect of something else: and this is impossible as we have shown above.

Further. The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands: because the intellect is perfect in so far as it actually understands; and this is through its being one with the thing understood. Therefore if something other than God be first understood by Him, something else will be His perfection and more excellent than He. But this is impossible.

Moreover. The knowledge of one who understands is the product of many things understood. Accordingly if many things are known by God as known principally and per se, it follows that God’s knowledge is composed of many: and thus either God’s essence will be composite, or knowledge will be accidental to God. But either of these is clearly impossible from what has been said. It remains, therefore, that that which is understood by God first and per se is nothing else than His substance.

Further. The intellectual operation takes its species and excellence from that which is understood first and per se; since this is its object. If therefore God understood a thing other than Himself, as though it were understood first and per se, His intellectual operation would derive its species and excellence from that which is other than Himself. But this is impossible: since His operation is His essence, as we have shown. It is accordingly impossible for that which God understands first and per se to be other than Himself.

CHAPTER XLIX

THAT GOD KNOWS THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF

FROM the fact that God knows Himself first and per se, we must conclude that He knows things other than Himself in Himself.

For the knowledge of an effect is sufficiently obtained from knowledge of the cause: wherefore we are said to know a thing when we know its cause. Now God by His essence is the cause of being in other things. Since therefore He knows His own essence most fully, we must conclude that He knows other things also.

Further. The likeness of every effect pre-exists somewhat in its cause: since every agent produces its like. Now whatever is in something else, is therein according to the mode of the thing in which it is. If, therefore, God is the cause of certain things, since by His nature He is intellectual, the likeness of His effect will be in Him intelligibly. Now that which is in a subject intelligibly, is understood thereby. Therefore God understands things other than Himself in Himself.

Moreover. Whoever knows a thing perfectly, knows whatever can be said truly of that thing, and whatever is becoming thereto by its nature. Now it is becoming to God by His nature to be the cause of other things. Since then He knows Himself perfectly, He knows that He is a cause: and this is impossible unless He knows His effect somewhat. Now this is something other than Himself, for nothing is cause of itself. Therefore God knows things other than Himself.

Accordingly taking these two conclusions together, it is evident that God knows Himself as the first and per se object of His knowledge, and other things as seen in His essence.

This truth is explicitly declared by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii.) as follows: He looks upon singulars not by casting His eye on each one, but He knows all things as one, contained in their cause; and further on: Divine wisdom knows other things by knowing itself.

Moreover the authority of Holy Writ apparently bears witness to the same statement. For in the psalm it is said of God: He hath looked forth from His high sanctuary, as though He saw other things from His exalted self.

CHAPTER L

THAT GOD HAS PROPER KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS

SINCE however some have said that God has none but a universal knowledge of other things, in the sense that He knows them as beings, through knowing the nature of being from His knowledge of Himself; it remains to be shown that God knows all other things, as distinct from one another and from God. This is to know things by their proper ideas.

In evidence of this let us suppose that God is the cause of every being, which is clear to a certain extent from what has been said above, and will be more fully proved further on. Accordingly then there can be nothing in a thing without its being caused by Him indirectly or directly. Now if the cause be known its effect is Known. Wherefore all that is in anything whatsoever can be known if God be known as well as all the causes intervening between God and that thing. Now God knows Himself and all the causes that intervene between Him and any thing whatever. For it has been shown already that He knows Himself perfectly. And through knowing Himself He knows whatever proceeds from Him immediately: and again through knowing this, He knows whatever proceeds therefrom immediately, and so on as regards every intervening cause until the ultimate effect. Therefore God knows whatever is in a thing. Now this is to have proper and complete Knowledge of a thing, namely, to know whatever is in a thing, whether common or proper. Therefore God has proper knowledge of things, according as they are distinct from one another.

Further. Whatever acts by intellect, has knowledge of what it does, as regards the proper idea of the thing done: because the knowledge of the doer appoints the form to the thing done. Now God is cause of things by

His intellect: since His being is His act of intelligence, and every thing acts in so far as it is actual. Therefore He knows His effect properly, according as it is distinct from others.

Moreover. The distinction of things cannot arise from chance, for it has a fixed order. Hence it follows that the distinction among things proceeds from the intention of some cause. But it cannot proceed from the intention of a cause that acts from natural necessity: because nature is determined to one thing, so that nothing that acts from natural necessity can have an intention in relation to several things considered as distinct from one another. It remains therefore that the distinction among things arises from the intention of a cause endowed with Knowledge. Now it would seem proper to an intellect to consider the distinction among things: wherefore Anaxagoras declared that an intellect was the principle of distinction. But taken as a whole the distinction of things cannot proceed from the intention of any second cause, since all such causes are included in the universality of distinct effects. Wherefore it belongs to the first cause, which is of itself distinct from all others, to intend the distinction among all things. Therefore God knows things as distinct.

Again. Whatsoever God knows, He knows most perfectly: for in Him are all perfections as in that which is simply perfect, as shown above. Now that which is known only in general is not known perfectly: since the chief things belonging thereto are ignored, namely its ultimate perfections whereby its own being is perfected; wherefore by such knowledge as this a thing is known potentially rather than actually. Accordingly if God, by knowing His essence, knows all things in general, it follows that He has also proper knowledge of things.

Further. Whoever knows a nature knows the per se accidents of that nature. Now the per se accidents of being as such are one and many, as is proved in 4 Metaph. Wherefore if God, by knowing His essence, knows the nature of being in general, it follows that He knows multitude. Now multitude is inconceivable without distinction. Therefore He understands things as distinct from one another.

Moreover. Whoever knows perfectly a universal nature knows the mode in which that nature can be had: thus he who knows whiteness knows that it is susceptive of increase and decrease. Now the various degrees of being result from various modes of being. Therefore if God by knowing Himself knows the universal nature of being—and this not imperfectly, since all imperfection is far removed from Him, as we have proved above—it follows that He knows all the degrees of being: and so He has proper knowledge of things other than Himself.

Further. Whoever knows a thing perfectly, knows all that is in that thing. Now God knows Himself perfectly. Therefore He knows all that is in Him in relation to His active power. But all things according to their proper forms are in Him in relation to His active power: since He is the principle of all being. Therefore He has proper knowledge of all things.

Again. Whoever knows a nature, knows whether that nature is communicable: for one would not know the nature of an animal perfectly unless one knew that it is communicable to several. Now the divine nature is communicable according to likeness. Therefore God knows in how many ways a thing can be like His essence. But the diversity of forms arises from the different ways in which things reflect the divine essence: wherefore the Philosopher calls a natural form a godlike thing. Therefore God has knowledge of things in reference to their proper forms.

Moreover. Men and other beings endowed with knowledge know things as many and distinct from one another. Accordingly if God knows not things as distinct from one another, it follows that He is most foolish, as in the opinion of those who asserted that God is ignorant of discord, which all know, an opinion that the Philosopher considers inadmissible (1 De Anima v. 10; 3 Metaph.).

We are also taught this by the authority of canonical Scripture: for it is stated (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made and they were very good: and (Heb. 4:13): Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight: … all things are naked and open to His eyes.

CHAPTERS LI AND LII

REASONS FOR INQUIRING HOW THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF THINGS UNDERSTOOD IN THE DIVINE INTELLECT

LEST, however, from the fact that God understands many things we be led to conclude that there is composition in the divine intellect, we must examine in what way the things He understands are many.

Now they cannot be understood to be many, as though the many things God understands had a distinct being in Him. For these understood things would either be the same as the divine essence, and thus we should have multitude in the essence of God, which has been disproved above in many ways, or else they would be added to the divine essence, and thus there would be something accidental in God, and this again we have proved above to be impossible.

Nor again can it be admitted that these intelligible forms exist per se: as Plato, in order to avoid the above impossibilities, seems to have maintained by holding the existence of ideas. Because the forms of natural things cannot exist apart from matter, since neither are they understood without matter.

And even if the above supposition were admissible, it would not suffice to explain how God understands many things. For since the aforesaid forms are outside the essence of God, if God were unable without them to understand the multitude of things, as is requisite for the perfection of His intellect, it would follow that the perfection of His understanding depends on something else: and consequently the perfection also of His being, since

His being is His act of intelligence: the contrary of which has been shown above.

Again. Since all that is beside His essence is caused by Him, as we shall prove further on, it must needs be that if the aforesaid forms are outside God, they are caused by Him. Now He is the cause of things by His intellect, as we shall show further on. Therefore in order that these intelligible forms may exist, it is required that previously in the order of nature God should understand them. And consequently God does not understand multitude through the fact that many intelligible things exist per se outside Him.

Again. The intelligible in act is the intellect in act, even as the sensible in act is the sense in act. But so far as the intelligible is distinct from the intellect, both are in potentiality, as appears in the senses: for neither is the sight actually seeing, nor the visible actually seen, except when the sight is informed by the species of the visible object, so that one thing results from sight and visible. Accordingly if the intelligible objects of God are outside His intellect, it will follow that His intellect is in potentiality, and likewise His intelligible objects: and thus He will need something to reduce Him to actuality. But this is impossible, since this thing would be previous to Him.

Further. The object understood must be in the intellect. Therefore in order to explain how God understands the multitude of things it is not enough to suppose that the forms of things exist per se outside the divine intellect; but it is necessary that they be in the divine intellect itself.

From these very same reasons it appears that it cannot be admitted that the multitude of the aforesaid intelligibles is in some other beside the divine intellect, either that of the soul, or that of an angel or intelligence. For in that case the divine intellect, in respect of one of its operations, would depend on some secondary intellect: which also is impossible.

Even as things that subsist in themselves are from God, so are those that exist in a subject. Wherefore the existence of the aforesaid intelligibles in some secondary intellect presupposes God’s act of intelligence whereby He is their cause. It would also follow that God’s intellect is in potentiality: since His intelligibles would not be united to Him. Even as each thing has its proper being so has it its proper operation. Wherefore it is impossible that because one intellect is disposed to operate, therefore another exercises intellectual operation, but only that same intellect where we find the disposition: even as a thing is by its own essence and not by another’s. Hence it does not become possible for the first intellect to understand multitude, through the fact that many intelligibles are in some second intellect.

CHAPTER LIII

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DOUBT

THE foregoing doubt may be easily solved if we examine carefully how things understood are in the understanding.

And in order that, as far as possible, we may proceed from our intellect to the knowledge of the divine intellect, it must be observed that the external objects which we understand do not exist in our intellect according to their own nature, but it is necessary that our intellect contain their species whereby it becomes intellect in act. And being in act by this species as by its proper form, it understands the object itself. And yet the act of understanding is not an act passing into the intellect, as heating passes into the object heated, but it remains in the one who understands: although it bears a relation to the object understood, for the very reason that the aforesaid species, which is the formal principle of intellectual operation, is the image of that object.

It must furthermore be observed that the intellect informed by the species of the object, by understanding produces in itself a kind of intention of the object understood, which intention reflects the nature of that object and is expressed in the definition thereof. This indeed is necessary: since the intellect understands indifferently a thing absent or present, and in this point agrees with the imagination: yet the intellect has this besides, that it understands a thing as separate from material conditions, without which it does not exist in reality; and this is impossible unless the intellect forms for itself the aforesaid intention.

Now this understood intention, since it is the term, so to speak, of the intellectual operation, is distinct from the intelligible species which makes the intellect in act, and which we must look upon as the principle of the intellectual operation; albeit each is an image of the object understood: since it is because the intelligible species, which is the form of the intellect and the principle of understanding, is the image of the external object, that the intellect in consequence forms an intention like that object: for such as a thing is, such is the effect of its operation. And since the understood intention is like a particular thing, it follows that the intellect by forming this intention understands that thing. On the other hand the divine intellect understands by no species other than His essence, as we have proved. And yet His essence is the likeness of all things. Wherefore it follows from this that the concept of the divine intellect, according as He understands Himself, which concept is His Word, is the likeness not only of God Himself understood, but also of all things of which the divine essence is the likeness. Accordingly many things can be understood by God, by one intelligible species which is the divine essence, and by one understood intention which is the divine Word.

CHAPTER LIV

HOW THE DIVINE ESSENCE, THOUGH ONE AND SIMPLE, IS A PROPER LIKENESS OF ALL THINGS INTELLIGIBLE

AND yet it may seem to someone difficult or impossible that the one and same simple thing, such as God’s essence, be the proper type or likeness of diverse things. For, since the distinction of diverse things arises from their proper forms, that which by reason of its proper form is like one of them must needs be unlike another. Whereas, so far as diverse things have something in common, nothing hinders them from having one likeness, for instance a man and an ass, in as much as they are animals. Hence it would follow that God has not proper but common knowledge of things: because the operation of knowledge follows according to the mode by which the thing known is in the knower, even as heating follows the mode of heat: for the likeness of the thing known in the knower is as the form by which a thing acts. Therefore if God has proper knowledge of many things it follows that He is Himself the proper type of each. How this may be, we must investigate.

As the Philosopher says (8 Metaph.) forms of things, and their definitions which signify them, are like numbers. For in numbers, if one unit be added or subtracted the species of the number is changed; as appears in the numbers 3 and 4. Now it is the same with definitions: for the addition or subtraction of one difference changes the species: thus a sensible substance minus rational and plus rational differs specifically.

Now in things which include many, it is not the same with the intellect as with nature. For the nature of a thing does not allow of the separation of those things that are required essentially for that thing: thus the nature of an animal will not remain if the soul be taken away from the body. On the other hand the intellect is sometimes able to take separately those things which are essentially united, when one is not included in the notion of the other. Wherefore in the number 3 it can consider the number 2 alone, and in a rational animal it can consider that which is only sensible. Hence the intellect is able to consider that which includes several things as the proper notion of several, by apprehending one of them without the others. For it can consider 10 as the proper notion of 9, by subtracting one unit, and in like manner as the proper notion of each lesser number included therein. Again, in man, it can consider the proper type of an irrational animal as such, and of each of its species, unless they imply the addition of a positive difference. For this reason a certain philosopher, Clement by name, said that the things of higher rank are the types of those of lesser rank.

Now the divine essence contains the excellences of all beings, not indeed by way of composition, but by way of perfection, as we have shown above. And every form, whether proper or common, so far as it is something positive, is a perfection: nor does it include imperfection except in so far as it falls short of true being. Wherefore God's intellect can include within His essence that which is proper to each thing, by understanding wherein each thing imitates His essence, and wherein it falls short of His essence: for instance, by understanding His essence as imitable in respect of life and not of knowledge, it understands the proper form of a plant: or again as imitable in respect of knowledge but not of intellect, it understands the proper form of an animal, and so on. Hence it is clear that the divine essence, in as much as it is absolutely perfect, may be taken as the proper type of such thing. Wherefore God can have proper knowledge of all things thereby.

Since, however, the proper notion of one thing is distinct from the proper notion of another, and since distinction is the principle of plurality; we must consider a certain distinction and plurality of understood notions in the divine intellect, in so far as that which is in the divine intellect is the proper notion of diverse things. Wherefore, since this is according as God understands the proper relation of similarity which each creature bears to Him, it follows that the types of things in the divine intellect are not many nor different, except in so far as God knows that things can be like Him in many and divers ways. In this sense Augustine says that God makes man after one type and a horse after another, and that the types of things are manifold in the divine mind. Wherein also the opinion of Plato holds good, in that he held the existence of ideas according to which all that exists in material things would be formed.

CHAPTER LV

THAT GOD UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS AT THE SAME INSTANT

FROM the foregoing it is also made evident that God understands all things at the same instant.

For our intellect is unable actually to understand several things simultaneously, because since the intellect in act is the thing understood in act, if it were to understand actually several things at the same time, it would follow that the intellect is simultaneously several things according to one genus; which is impossible. And I say according to one genus, because nothing hinders the same subject receiving different forms of different genera, even as the one body receives shape and colour. Now the intelligible species by which the intellect is informed with the result that the things themselves are actually understood are all of one genus: for they have one essential nature although the things whereof they are the species do not agree in one essential nature: wherefore neither are they contrary to one another as are the things outside the mind. Hence it is that, when we consider a certain number of things in any way united together, we understand them at the same time: for we understand a continuous whole simultaneously, and not part by part: and in like manner we understand a proposition, and not the subject first and the predicate afterwards; because we know all the parts by one species of the whole. From this we may gather that whatever number of things are known by one species, they can be understood simultaneously. Now all that God knows, He knows by one species which is His essence. Therefore He can understand all things simultaneously.

Again. The cognitive power does not know a thing except the intention be there, wherefore at times we do not actually imagine the phantasms preserved in the organ, because the intention is not directed thereto: for the appetite moves the other powers to act, in voluntary agents. Hence we do not consider simultaneously a number of things if the intention be not directed to them simultaneously: and those things that must needs come under one intention must be understood simultaneously: since he who considers the comparison between two things, directs his intention simultaneously to both, and considers both at the same time. Now all those things that are in the divine knowledge must come under one intention. For God intends to see His essence perfectly: and this is to see it according to its whole power under which all things are comprised. Therefore God, in seeing His essence, sees all things simultaneously.

Moreover. The intellect of one who considers many things in succession cannot possibly have only one operation: for since operations differ according to their objects, the operation whereby the intellect considers the first thing must needs be distinct from that whereby it considers the second. But the divine intellect has only one operation, which is its essence, as proved above. Therefore it considers all that it knows, not simultaneously but successively.

Further. Succession is inconceivable apart from time, and time apart from movement: since time is the measure of movement according to before or after. Now no movement is possible in God, as may be gathered from what has been said above. Therefore in God’s thought there is no succession: and consequently whatever He knows He considers simultaneously.

Again. God’s act of understanding is His very being, as shown above. Now there is no before and after in the divine being, but it is all simultaneously, as proved above. Therefore neither is there before and after in God’s thought, but He understands all things simultaneously.

Moreover. Every intellect that understands one thing after another is at one time understanding potentially, and at another time actually: for while it understands the first thing actually, it understands the second potentially. But the divine intellect is never in potentiality, but is always understanding actually. Therefore it understands things, not successively, but altogether simultaneously.

Holy Writ bears witness to this truth: for it is said (James 1:17) that with God there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.

CHAPTER LVI

THAT GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT A HABIT

FROM the foregoing it follows that God’s knowledge is not a habit.

For wheresoever knowledge is habitual, all things are not known simultaneously, but some actually and others habitually. Now God knows all things actually in the same instant, as we have proved. Therefore in Him knowledge is not a habit.

Further. He who has a habit, while not using it, is somewhat in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning. Now it has been shown that the divine intellect is nowise in potentiality. Therefore nowise is there habitual knowledge in Him.

Again. The essence of any intellect that knows something habitually is distinct from its intellectual operation which is actual consideration: because the intellect that knows something by a habit lacks its operation: whereas it cannot lack its essence. Now in God His essence is His operation, as we have proved. Therefore there is no habitual knowledge in His intellect.

Again. The intellect that knows something only habitually is not in its ultimate perfection: wherefore happiness which is the best thing of all is held to be not a habit but an act. Therefore if God has habitual knowledge through His substance, He will not be universally perfect considered in regard to His substance. And the contrary of this was proved above.

Moreover. We have shown that He is intelligent by His essence, and not by any intelligible species added to His essence. Now every intellect with a habit understands by species: for habit is either ability of the intellect to receive intelligible species whereby it becomes actually understanding, or else it is the orderly collection of the species themselves residing in the intellect without complete actuality, and after a manner that lies between potentiality and act. Therefore in Him there is no habitual knowledge.

Further. Habit is a quality. Now neither quality nor any accident can be ascribed to God, as was proved above. Therefore habitual knowledge is not becoming to God. Since, however, the disposition by which one is only habitually considering or willing or acting, is like the disposition of one who sleeps, hence David in order to remove habitual knowledge from God, says: Behold He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel. For the same reason it is said (Ecclus. 23:28): The eyes of the Lord are far brighter than the sun, for the sun shines always actually.

CHAPTER LVII

THAT GOD’S KNOWLEDGE IS NOT DISCURSIVE

FURTHERMORE we gather from the foregoing that God’s thoughts are not argumentative or discursive.

Our thoughts are argumentative when we pass from one thought to another, as when we reason from principles to conclusions. For a person does not argue or discourse from the fact that he sees how a conclusion follows from its premisses, and considers both together: since this happens not by arguing but by judging of an argument: even so neither does material knowledge consist in judging of material things. Now, it was shown that God does not consider one thing after another successively as it were, but all things simultaneously. Therefore His knowledge is not argumentative or discursive: although He is cognizant of all discourse and argument.

Again. Whosoever argues views the premisses by one consideration and the conclusion by another: for there would be no need after considering the premisses to proceed to the conclusion, if by the very fact of considering the premisses one were to consider the conclusion also. Now God knows all things by one operation which is His essence, as we have proved above. Therefore His knowledge is not argumentative.

Further. All argumentative knowledge has something of potentiality and something of actuality: since conclusions are potentially in their premisses. But potentiality has no place in the divine intellect, as we have shown above. Therefore His intellect is not discursive.

Moreover. In all discursive knowledge something must needs be caused; since the premisses are, so to speak, the cause of the conclusion: wherefore a demonstration is described as a syllogism that produces knowledge. But nothing can be caused in the divine knowledge, since it is God Himself, as shown above. Therefore God's knowledge cannot be discursive.

Again. Those things which we know naturally, are known to us without our discoursing about them, as in the case of first principles. Now knowledge in God cannot be otherwise than natural, nor in fact otherwise than essential; since His knowledge is His essence, as we proved above. Therefore God's knowledge is not argumentative.

Further. Whatever is moved must be reduced to a first mover that is mover only and not moved. Wherefore that whence comes the first source of movement, must be absolutely a mover unmoved. Now this is the divine intellect, as we have shown above. Therefore the divine intellect must be an absolutely unmoved mover. But argument is a movement of the intellect in passing from one thing to another. Therefore the divine intellect is not argumentative.

Again. That which is highest in us is inferior to that which is in God: for the inferior does not touch the superior except in its summit. Now the summit in our knowledge is not reason, but understanding, which is the source of reason. Therefore God's knowledge is not argumentative, but purely intellectual.

Moreover. All defect is far removed from God, because He is simply perfect, as proved above. But argumentative knowledge results from an imperfection of the intellectual nature: since what is known through another thing is less known than what is known in itself: nor does the nature of the knower suffice to reach what is known through something else, without this thing through which the other is made known. Now in argumentative knowledge, one thing is made known through another: whereas what is known intellectually is known in itself, and the nature of the knower suffices for the knowledge thereof without any means from without. Hence it is clear that reason is a defective intellect: and consequently the divine knowledge is not argumentative.

Again. Without any discourse of reason those things are understood whose species are in the knower: for the sight does not discourse in order to know a stone the image of which is in the sight. Now the divine essence is the likeness of all things, as we have proved above. Therefore it does not proceed to know a thing by a discourse of reason.

It is also clear how to solve the arguments that would seem to prove the presence of discourse in the divine knowledge. First, because He knows other things through His essence. For it has been proved that this does not involve discoursing: since His essence is related to other things not as the premisses to a conclusion, but as species to things known. Secondly, because some might think it unfitting that God should be unable to argue. For He has the knowledge of arguing as judging, and not as discoursing by arguing.

Holy Writ bears witness to this truth which we have proved by reason. For it is said (Heb. 4:13): All things are naked and open to His eyes. Because the things that we know by reasoning are not in themselves naked and open to us, but are opened out and laid bare by reason.

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT GOD DOES NOT UNDERSTAND BY COMPOSITION AND DIVISION

IT may also be shown from the same principles that the divine intellect does not understand after the manner of a composing and dividing intellect. For He knows all things by knowing His essence. Now He does not know His essence by composition and division; since He knows Himself as He is, and in Him there is no composition. Therefore He does not understand by way of a composing and dividing intellect.

Again. Things composed and divided by the intellect are by nature such as to be considered by the intellect apart from one another: for there would be no need of composition and division, if from the very fact that one understood what a particular thing is, one knew what is or is not in that thing. Therefore if God understands by way of a composing and dividing intellect, it follows that He sees all things, not at one glance, but each one separately: and yet we have proved the contrary above.

Further. In God there cannot be before and after. Now composition and division come after the consideration of what a thing is, for this consideration is their foundation. Therefore composition and division are impossible in the divine intellect.

Again. The proper object of the intellect is what a thing is: wherefore about this the intellect is not deceived except accidentally; whereas it is deceived about composition and division; even as the senses are always true about their proper objects, but may be deceived about others. Now, in the divine intellect there is nothing accidental, and only what is essential. Wherefore in the divine intellect there is no composition and division, but only simple apprehension of a thing.

Moreover. The composition of a proposition formed by a composing and dividing intellect exists in the intellect itself, not in the thing that is outside the mind. Wherefore, if the divine intellect were to judge after the manner of a composing and dividing intellect, His intellect would be composite. But this is impossible as shown above.

Again. A composing and dividing intellect judges of various things by various compositions: because the composition of the intellect does not go beyond the limits of composition: wherefore the intellect does not judge that a triangle is a figure by the same composition whereby it judges that man is an animal. Hence, if God considers things by composing and dividing, it follows that His act of understanding is not one only but manifold. And thus again His essence will not be one only, since His intellectual operation is His essence, as we proved above.

Yet we must not therefore say that He is ignorant of enunciations. For His essence, since it is one and simple, is the type of all things multiple and composite: so that thereby God knows every multitude and composition both of nature and of reason.

Holy Writ is in agreement with this. For it is said (Isa. 55:8): For My thoughts are not your thoughts. And yet it is said in the psalm: The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men, which manifestly proceed from composition and division of the intellect.

Moreover. Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.): Wherefore divine Wisdom, by knowing itself knows all things, the material immaterially, divisible things indivisibly, multitude unitedly.

CHAPTER LIX

THAT GOD IS NOT IGNORANT OF THE TRUTH OF ENUNCIATIONS

IT follows from the foregoing that, although the knowledge of the divine intellect is not like that of a composing and dividing intellect, it is not ignorant of the truth which, according to the Philosopher, is solely about composition and division of the intellect.

For since the truth of the intellect is the equation of thought and thing, in so far as the intellect asserts that to be which is, and that not to be which is not, truth in the intellect belongs to that which the intellect asserts, not to the operation whereby it asserts. Because the truth of the intellect does not require that the act itself of understanding be equated to the thing, since sometimes the thing is material, whereas the act of understanding is immaterial. But that which the intellect in understanding asserts and knows, needs to be equated to the thing, namely to be in reality as the intellect asserts it to be. Now God, by His simple act of intelligence wherein is neither composition nor division, knows not only the essence of things, but also that which is enunciated about them, as proved above. Wherefore that which the divine intellect asserts in understanding is composition or division. Therefore truth is not excluded from the divine intellect by reason of the latter's simplicity.

Moreover. When something non-complex is said or understood, the non-complex in itself is neither equal nor unequal to the reality, since equality and inequality imply a comparison, and the non-complex in itself contains no comparison or application to a reality. Wherefore in itself it cannot be said to be either true or false: but only the complex which contains a comparison between the non-complex and the reality, expressed by composition or division. But the non-complex intellect by understanding what a thing is, apprehends the quiddity of a thing in a kind of comparison with the thing, since it apprehends it as the quiddity of this particular thing. Hence, although the non-complex itself, or even a definition, is not in itself true or false, nevertheless the intellect that apprehends what a thing is is said to be always true in itself, as stated in 3 De Anima, although it may be accidentally false, in so far as the definition includes complexion either of the parts of the definition with one another, or of the whole definition with the thing defined. Wherefore a definition, according as it is taken to be the definition of this or that thing, as understood by the intellect, will be said to be false either simply, if the parts of the definition do not hold together, as if we were to say an insensible animal, or false in its application to this particular thing, as if one were to apply the definition of a circle to a triangle. Hence, though it be granted, by an impossibility, that the divine intellect knows only non-complex things, it would still be true in knowing its quiddity as its own.

Again. The divine simplicity does not exclude perfection: because in its simple essence it has all the perfections to be found in other things by the aggregation of perfections or forms; as was proved above. Now, our intellect, by apprehending the incomplex, does not as yet reach to its ultimate perfection, since it is still in potentiality as regards composition and division: even as in natural things simple things are in potentiality in respect of mixed things, and parts in respect of the whole. Accordingly God, in respect of His simple act of intelligence, has that perfection of knowledge which our intellect has by both kinds of knowledge, whether of the complex or of the non-complex. Now truth is acquired by our intellect in its perfect knowledge thereof, when it arrives at composition. Therefore there is truth in God’s mere act of simple intelligence.

Again. Since God is the good of every good, through having in Himself all manner of goodness, as we have shown above, the goodness of the intellect cannot be lacking to Him. Now truth is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares (6 Ethic.). Therefore truth is in God.

And this is what is stated in the psalm: But God is true.

CHAPTER LX

THAT GOD IS TRUTH

IT follows from what has been said that God Himself is truth.

For truth is a perfection of the intelligence or intellectual operation, as stated above. Now God's act of intelligence is His substance: and since this very act of intelligence is God's being, as we have shown, it is not made perfect by some additional perfection, but is perfect in itself, just as we have said about the divine being. It remains therefore that the divine substance is truth itself.

Again. Truth is a good of the intellect, according to the Philosopher. Now God is His own goodness, as we have shown. Therefore He is also His own truth.

Further. Nothing can be said participatively of God: since He is His own being which participates nothing. Now truth is in God, as was shown above. If, then, it be not said of Him participatively, it follows that it is said essentially. Therefore God is His own truth.

Moreover. Although properly speaking the true is not in things but in the mind, according to the Philosopher, nevertheless sometimes a thing is said to be true, in so far as it attains to the act of its own nature. Hence, Avicenna says in his Metaphysics that the truth of a thing is a property of the nature immutably attached to it, in so far as that thing is naturally inclined to cause a true estimate of itself, and reflects the type of itself that is in the divine mind. Now God is His own essence. Therefore, whether we speak of the truth of the mind, or of the truth of the thing, God is His own truth.

This is confirmed by the authority of our Lord, Who says of Himself (Jo. 14:6): I am the way, the truth, and the life.

CHAPTER LXI

THAT GOD IS THE MOST PURE TRUTH

THE foregoing being established it is evident that in God there is pure truth, in which there can be no alloy of falsehood or deception.

For falsehood is incompatible with truth, even as black with white. Now God is not merely true, but is truth itself. Therefore there can be no falsehood in Him.

Moreover. The intellect is not deceived in knowing what a thing is, as neither is the sense about its proper sensible. Now all knowledge of the divine intellect is as the knowledge of one who knows what a thing is, as was proved above. Therefore it is impossible that there be error, deception or falsehood in the divine knowledge.

Further. The intellect does not err about first principles, whereas it does sometimes about conclusions, to which it proceeds by arguing from first principles. Now the divine intellect is not argumentative or discursive, as we proved above. Therefore there can be no falsehood or deception therein.

Again. The higher a cognitive power is, the more universal and the more comprehensive is its proper object: wherefore that which the sight knows accidentally, the common sense or the imagination apprehends as included in its proper object. Now the power of the divine intellect is absolutely supreme in knowledge. Therefore all things knowable are compared thereto as knowable properly and per se and not accidentally. But the cognitive power errs not about such things. Therefore it is impossible for the divine intellect to err about any knowable object.

Moreover. An intellectual virtue is a perfection of the intellect in knowing things. Now the intellect cannot, according to an intellectual virtue, speak false, but always speaks true: because to speak true is the good act of the intellect, and it belongs to virtue to perform a good act. Now the divine intellect is more perfect by its nature than the human intellect is by a habit of virtue, for it is in the summit of perfection. It remains, therefore, that falsehood cannot be in the divine intellect.

Further. The knowledge of the human intellect is somewhat caused by things; the result being that man’s knowledge is measured by its objects: since the judgment of the intellect is true through being in accordance with things, and not vice versa. Now the divine intellect is the cause of things by its Knowledge. Wherefore His knowledge must needs be the measure of things: even as art is the measure of the products of art, each of which is so far perfect as it accords with art. Hence the divine intellect is compared to things as things to the human intellect. Now falsehood resulting from inequality between man’s mind and things is not in things but in the mind. Wherefore if there were not perfect equality between the divine mind and things, falsehood would be in things but not in the divine mind. And yet there is no falsehood in things, because as much as a thing has of being, so much has it of truth. Therefore there is no inequality between the divine intellect and things: nor is any falsehood possible in the divine mind.

Again. As the true is the good of the intellect, so is falsehood its evil: for we naturally desire to know the true and shun to be deceived by the false. Now evil cannot be in God, as was proved above. Therefore falsehood cannot be in Him.

Hence it is said (Rom. 3:4): But God is true: and (Num. 33:19): God is not as a man, that He should lie: and (1 Jo. 1:5): God is light, and in Him there is no darkness.

CHAPTER LXII

THAT THE DIVINE TRUTH IS THE FIRST AND SUPREME TRUTH

FROM what has been proved it clearly follows that the divine truth is the first and supreme truth.

For the disposition of things in truth is as their disposition in being, according to the Philosopher (2 Metaph.), and this because truth and being are mutually consequent upon one another; since the true is when that is said to be which is, and that not to be, which is not. Now God's being is first and most perfect. Therefore His truth is also first and supreme.

Again. That which belongs to a thing essentially belongs thereto most perfectly. Now truth is ascribed to God essentially, as we have proved. Therefore His truth is the supreme and first truth.

Further. Truth is in our intellect through the latter being equated to the thing understood. Now the cause of equality is unity, as stated in 5 Metaph. Since then in the divine intellect, intellect and thing understood are absolutely the same, His truth must be the first and supreme truth.

Moreover. That which is the measure in any genus must be the most perfect in that genus, wherefore all colours are measured by white. Now the divine truth is the measure of all truth. For the truth of our intellect is measured by the thing that is outside the mind, since our intellect is said to be true from the very fact that it accords with the thing. And the truth of a thing is measured according to the divine intellect which is the cause of things, as we shall prove further on: even as the truth of art-products is measured by the art of the craftsman: for then is a casket true when it accords with art. Also, since God is the first intellect and the first intelligible, it follows that the truth of every intellect must be measured by

His truth: if each thing is measured by the first in its genus, as the Philosopher teaches in 10 Metaph. Hence the divine truth is the first, supreme and most perfect truth.

CHAPTER LXIII

THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD DENY TO GOD THE KNOWLEDGE OF SINGULARS

NOW there are some who endeavour to withhold knowledge of singulars from the perfection of God’s knowledge: and in support of their contention they proceed by seven ways. The first is from the very nature of singularity. For since the principle of singularity is signate matter, it seems impossible for singulars to be known by an immaterial power, if all knowledge result from some kind of assimilation. Wherefore in us those powers alone which use material organs apprehend singulars, for instance the imagination, the senses and so on: while our intellect, since it is immaterial, knows not singulars. Much less, therefore, is the divine intellect cognizant of singulars, since it is furthest removed from matter. Hence by no means does it seem possible that God should know singulars.

The second argument is that singulars are not always. Either therefore they are always known by God, or they are known at one time and unknown at another. The first is impossible, since about what is not there can be no knowledge, which is always about true things, and things which are not cannot be true. The second is also impossible, because the knowledge of the divine intellect is altogether unchangeable, as we have proved.

The third argument proceeds from the fact that singulars do not all happen of necessity, but some contingently. Wherefore there can be no certain knowledge about them except when they are. For certain knowledge is that which cannot be deceived, and every knowledge of contingencies, since these are future, can be deceived: because the event may prove the opposite of that to which the mind holds, since if the opposite could not happen, they would be necessary. Wherefore we can have no knowledge of future contingencies, but only a kind of conjectural estimate. Now we must suppose that all God’s knowledge is most certain and infallible, as we have proved above. Moreover it is impossible that God begin anew to know something, on account of His unchangeableness, as stated. Hence it would seem to follow that He knows not contingent singulars.

The fourth is based on the fact that the will is the cause of certain singulars. Now an effect, until it actually is, cannot be known save in its cause, for only thus can it be before it begins to be in itself. But the movements of the will cannot be known for certain by anyone except the willer in whose power they are. Wherefore it seems impossible for God to have eternal knowledge of such singulars as have their cause in the will.

The fifth proceeds from the infinity of singulars. For the infinite as such is unknown: because whatever is known is, in a way, measured by the comprehension of the knower, since measurement is nothing else than a kind of certification of the thing measured. Wherefore every act discards the infinite. Now singulars are infinite, at least in potentiality. Therefore it seems impossible for God to know singulars.

The sixth proceeds from the pettiness of singulars. For as the excellence of knowledge is gauged by the excellence of its object, so apparently the pettiness of the object conduces to pettiness of knowledge. Now the divine intellect is supremely excellent. Therefore it is incompatible with its excellence that God should know the most trivial of singulars.

The seventh argues from the presence of evil in certain singulars. For since the thing known is, in a manner, in the knower; and since evil cannot be in God, as proved above, it would seem to follow that evil and privation are entirely unknown to God, and known only by an intellect that is in potentiality, since privation can only be in that which is potential. Hence it follows that God has no knowledge of singulars wherein evil and privation are to be found.

CHAPTER LXIV

ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID ABOUT THE DIVINE KNOWLEDGE

IN order to refute this error, and moreover to show the perfection of the divine knowledge, we must carefully seek the truth about each of the aforesaid arguments, so as to disprove whatever is contrary to the truth. In the first place, then, we shall show that the divine intellect knows singulars; secondly, that it knows things that actually are not; thirdly, that it knows future contingencies with an unerring knowledge; fourthly, that it knows the movements of the will; fifthly that it knows infinite things; sixthly, that it knows all the most trivial and petty things; seventhly, that it knows all evils and privations or defects.

CHAPTER LXV

THAT GOD KNOWS SINGULARS

ACCORDINGLY, we shall prove first that God cannot be lacking in the knowledge of singulars.

For it has been shown that God knows other things in as much as He is their cause. Now God’s effects are singular things: because God causes things in the same way as He makes them to be actual; and universals are not subsistent, but have their being only in singulars, as is proved in 7 Metaph. Therefore God knows things other than Himself not only in the universal but also in the singular.

Again. As soon as one knows the constituent principles of a thing’s essence, one must needs know that thing: thus knowledge of the rational soul and of such a body implies knowledge of man. Now the essence of a singular is made up of signate matter and an individual form: thus the essence of Socrates is made up of this particular body and this particular soul, even as the essence of man in general is made up of soul and body, as stated in 7 Metaph. Wherefore, since the latter are included in the definition of man in general, so would the former be included in the definition of Socrates, if he could be defined. Hence whoever has knowledge of matter, and of those things whereby matter is designated, and of the form individualized by matter, cannot be lacking in knowledge of the singular. Now God’s knowledge reaches to matter, individualizing accidents, and forms. For, since His act of understanding is His essence, it follows that He understands all that is in any way whatever in His essence: wherein are virtually, as in their first origin, all that have being in any way whatever, forasmuch as He is the first and universal principle of being; and among these we must include matter and accident, since matter is being in potentiality, and accident, being in another. Therefore God lacks not knowledge of singulars.

Moreover. The nature of a genus cannot be known perfectly unless its first differences and proper passions be known: thus the nature of number would not be perfectly known if odd and even were unknown. Now universal and singular are differences or proper passions of being. Therefore if God, in knowing His essence, knows perfectly the common nature of being, it follows that He knows perfectly the universal and the singular. But, just as He would not know the universal perfectly, if He knew the intention of universality without knowing the thing in the universal, such as man or animal, so too He would not know the singular perfectly if He knew the nature of singularity without knowing this or that singular thing. Therefore God must needs know singulars.

Again. Just as God is His very being, so is He His own act of knowledge, as we have proved. Now from the fact that He is His own being it follows that in Him are all the perfections of being as in the first source of being, as we have shown above. Therefore it follows that every perfection of knowledge is found in His knowledge, as in the first fount of knowledge. But this would not be if He were lacking in the knowledge of singulars: since the perfection of some knowers consists in this. Therefore it is impossible for Him not to have knowledge of singulars.

Further. In every order of powers it is universally found that the higher power extends to more things and yet is but one, whereas the lower power extends to fewer things, and yet is multiple in relation to them. This appears in the imaginative power and sense; for the one power of imagination extends to all the things of which the five senses take cognizance, and to more besides. Now the cognitive power in God is higher than in man. Therefore whatever man knows by various powers, his intellect namely, imagination, and sense, God considers it by His one simple intellect. Therefore He knows singulars, which we apprehend by sense and imagination.

Moreover. God’s intellect does not derive its knowledge from things as ours does, rather is He the cause of things by His knowledge, as we shall prove further on: wherefore His knowledge of other things is after the manner of practical knowledge. Now practical knowledge is not perfect unless it extend to singulars: because the end of practical knowledge is operation, which is about singulars. Therefore the divine knowledge of other things extends to singulars.

Again. The first movable is moved by a motor that moves by intellect and appetite, as was shown above. Now a motor by intellect cannot cause movement unless it knows the movable as naturally inclined to local movement, and that is as existing here and now, and consequently as a singular. Wherefore the intellect that is the motor of the first movable knows the first movable as a singular. But this motor is either supposed to be God, and thus our point is proved, or else it is something beneath God. And if the intellect of this motor is able by its own power to know a singular which our intellect is unable to know, much more will the divine intellect be able to do so.

Again. The agent is more excellent than the patient and the thing done, as act is more excellent than potentiality. Wherefore a form of lower degree cannot by its action transmit its likeness to a higher degree, whereas a higher form is able by its action to transmit its likeness to a lower degree: thus corruptible forms are produced in this lower world by the incorruptible agency of the stars, while a corruptible agency cannot produce an incorruptible form. Now all knowledge is the result of assimilation between knower and known: yet there is this difference, that in human knowledge assimilation is brought about by the action of sensible things on the human cognitive powers, whereas contrariwise in God’s knowledge it arises from the action of the form of the divine intellect on things known. Accordingly the form of a sensible object, being individualized by its materiality, is unable to transmit the likeness of its singularity to that which is altogether immaterial, and it can only reach those powers which use material organs; but it is transmitted to the intellect by virtue of the active intellect, in so far as it is wholly stripped of material conditions: and so the likeness of the singularity of a sensible form cannot reach as far as the human intellect. On the other hand the likeness of the form in the divine intellect, since it extends to the smallest details to which His causality extends, reaches to the singularity of a sensible and material form. Therefore the divine intellect can know singulars, whereas the human intellect cannot.

Further. If God knows not singulars which even men know, this would involve the absurdity which the Philosopher urges against Empedocles, namely that God is most foolish.

The truth which we have established is confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ. For it is written (Heb. 4:13): Neither is there any creature invisible in His sight. The contrary error is rejected (Ecclus. 16:16): Say not: I shall be hidden from God, and who shall remember me from on high?

From what we have said it is also clear how the objection raised in the contrary sense does not conclude aright. For that which the divine intellect understands, although immaterial, is nevertheless the likeness of both the matter and the form, as the first productive principle of both.

CHAPTER LXVI

THAT GOD KNOWS THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT

IN the next place we must show that God lacks not the knowledge of things that are not.

For as stated above the divine knowledge stands in the same relation to the things known, as things knowable to our knowledge. Now the comparison of the thing knowable to our knowledge is that the knowable thing may exist without our having knowledge of it, whereof the Philosopher in the Predicaments gives the example of squaring the circle; but not conversely. Wherefore the relation of the divine knowledge to things must be such that it can also relate to non-existent things.

Again. The knowledge of God's intellect stands in the same relation to other things as the knowledge of a craftsman to the works of his craft: since He is cause of things by His knowledge. Now the craftsman by the knowledge of his art knows even those things which are not yet produced by his art: since the forms of his art pass from his knowledge into external matter so as to produce the works of his art: and consequently nothing prevents forms which have not yet materialized outwardly from being in the craftsman's knowledge. Therefore nothing prevents God from having knowledge of things that are not.

Further. God knows things other than Himself by His essence, in as much as He is the likeness of the things that proceed from Him, as shown above. But, since God's essence is infinitely perfect, as proved above, while all things else have limited being and perfection, it is impossible for all other things together to equal the perfection of the divine essence. Wherefore it is capable of representing many things besides those that exist. Hence if God knows the whole power and perfection of His essence, His knowledge extends not only to those things that are, but also to those that are not.

Moreover. Our intellect, in respect of the operation by which it knows what a thing is, can have knowledge of those things also that are not actually: since it is able to comprehend the essence of a lion or horse, even if all such animals were slain. Now the divine intellect knows, as one who knows what a thing is, not only definitions but also enunciations, as shown above. Therefore it can have knowledge of those things also that are not.

Again. An effect can be foreknown in its cause even before it exist: even so an astronomer foreknows a future eclipse by observing the order of the heavenly movements. Now God's knowledge is of all things through their cause: for by knowing Himself, Who is the cause of all, He knows other things as His effects, as we proved above. Nothing, therefore, prevents Him from knowing those things also that are not yet.

Moreover. There is no succession in God's act of understanding, any more than there is in His existence. Hence it is all at once everlasting, which belongs to the essence of eternity, whereas the duration of time is drawn out by the succession of before and after. Wherefore the proportion of eternity to the whole duration of time is as the proportion of the indivisible to the continuous, not indeed of the indivisible that is the term of the continuous, and is not present to each part of the continuous—for such is likened to an instant of time—but of the indivisible that is outside the continuous, and yet synchronizes with each part of the continuous, or with each point of a signate continuous: because, since time does not exceed movement, eternity, being utterly outside movement, is altogether outside time. Again, since the being of the eternal never fails, eternity synchronizes with every time or instant of time. Somewhat of an example of this may be seen in the circle: for a given point in the circumference, although indivisible, does not coincide in its position with any other point, since the order of position results in the continuity of the circumference; while the centre which is outside the circumference is directly opposite any given point in the circumference. Accordingly whatever exists in any part of time, is coexistent with the eternal as though present thereto, although in relation to another part of time it is present or future. Now a thing cannot be present to, and coexistent with, the eternal, except with the whole eternal, since this has no successive duration. Therefore whatever happens throughout the whole course of time is seen as present by the divine intellect in its eternity. And yet that which is done in some part of time was not always in existence. It remains therefore that God has knowledge of those things which are not as yet in relation to the course of time.

By these arguments it is made clear that God has knowledge of not-beings. Nevertheless not-beings have not all the same relation to His knowledge. For those things which neither are, nor shall be, nor have been, are known by God as possible to His power. Wherefore He knows them, not as existing in themselves in any way, but as merely existing in the divine power. Such things are said by some to be known to God according to His knowledge of simple intelligence.

On the other hand things which to us are present, past, or future, are known to God as being not only in His power, but also in their respective causes, and in themselves. Of such things God is said to have knowledge of vision, because God sees the existence of things which, in relation to us, are not as yet, not only in their causes but also in themselves, in as much as His eternity is by its indivisibility present to all time.

Yet God knows every manner of a thing’s being by His essence. For His essence is capable of being represented by many things that neither are, nor shall be, nor have been. Moreover it is the likeness of every cause’s power, in respect of which effects pre-exist in their causes. And the being that every single thing has in itself is drawn as a copy from Him.

Wherefore God knows not-beings in so far as they have being after a fashion, either in the divine power, or in their causes, or in themselves. And this is not contrary to the essential conditions of knowledge.

The authority of Holy Writ also bears witness to the foregoing. For it is written (Ecclus. 23:29): All things were known to the Lord God, before they were created; so also after they were perfected He knoweth all things: and (Jer. 1:5): Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee.

It is clear from what has been said, that we are not compelled to say, as some have said, that God knows all singulars universally, because He knows them in their universal causes only, even as one who knows a particular eclipse, not as this particular one, but as resulting from opposition: since it has been proved that the divine knowledge extends to singulars as existing in themselves.

CHAPTER LXVII

THAT GOD KNOWS FUTURE CONTINGENT SINGULARS

FROM the foregoing it is already somewhat evident that from eternity God has had unerring knowledge of singular contingencies, and that nevertheless they cease not to be contingent.

For contingency is not incompatible with certainty of knowledge except in so far as it is future, and not as it is present. Because a contingency, while future, may not be; so that the knowledge of one who thinks it will be, may be wrong, and it will be wrong if what he thinks will be, will not be. From the moment however that it is, for the time being it cannot not-be: although it may not be in the future, but this affects the contingency, not as present but as future. Hence sense loses nothing of its certainty when it sees that a man is running, although this statement is contingent. Accordingly all knowledge that bears on a contingency as present, can be certain. Now the vision of the divine intellect from eternity sees each thing that happens in time as though it were present, as we have shown above. Therefore it follows that nothing prevents God having unerring knowledge of contingencies from eternity.

Again. The contingent differs from the necessary, according as each is in its cause: for the contingent is in its cause in such a way that it may not result, or may result therefrom: whereas the necessary cannot but result from its cause. But according as each of them is in itself, they differ not as to being, on which the true is founded: because there is not in the contingent, considered as it is in itself, being and not-being, but only being, although it is possible for the contingent not to be in the future. Now the divine intellect knows things from eternity, not only as to the being which they have in their causes, but also as to the being which they have in themselves. Therefore nothing prevents it having eternal and unerring knowledge of contingencies.

Moreover. Even as the effect follows certainly from a necessary cause, so does it from a complete contingent cause unless it be hindered. Now, since God knows all things, as was proved above, He knows not only the causes of contingencies, but also that which may possibly hinder them. Therefore He knows certainly whether contingencies be or not.

Again. An effect does not happen to exceed its cause; but sometimes it falls short of it. Hence, since in us knowledge is caused from things, it happens at times that we know necessary things, by way not of necessity but of probability. Now, just as with us things are the cause of knowledge, so the divine knowledge is the cause of the things known. Nothing therefore prevents things whereof God has necessary knowledge being contingent in themselves.

Further. An effect cannot be necessary if its cause be contingent, for it would follow that an effect exists after its cause has been removed. Now the ultimate effect has both a proximate and a remote cause. Hence if the proximate cause be contingent, its effect must needs be contingent, even though the remote cause be necessary: thus plants do not necessarily bear fruit—although the motion of the sun is necessary—on account of the contingent intermediate causes. But God's knowledge, although it is the cause of the things it knows, is nevertheless their remote cause. Wherefore the contingency of the things it knows does not militate with its necessity: since it happens that the intermediate causes are contingent.

Again. God's knowledge would not be true and perfect, if things happened not in the same way as God knows them to happen. Now God, since He is cognizant of all being, whereof He is the source, knows each effect not only in itself, but also in its relation to every one of its causes. But the relation of contingencies to their proximate causes, is, that they result from them contingently. Therefore God knows that certain things happen and that they happen contingently. Wherefore the certainty and truth of the divine knowledge do not take away the contingency of things.

It is therefore clear from what has been said how we are to refute the objection gainsaying God's knowledge of contingencies. For change in that which is subsequent does not argue changeableness in that which precedes:

since it happens that contingent ultimate effects result from necessary first causes. Now the things known to God do not precede His knowledge, as is the case with us, but are subsequent thereto. Therefore it does not follow that, if what is known to God be changeable, His knowledge can err or in any way be changeable. It will therefore be a fallacy of consequence if, because our knowledge of changeable things is changeable, we think that this happens in all knowledge.

Again, when we say God knows or knew this future thing, we imply a kind of middle term between the divine knowledge and the thing known, namely the time at which the statement is made, in relation to which that which God is said to know is future. But it is not future in relation to the divine knowledge, which existing in the moment of eternity, is related to all things as though they were present. In relation to that knowledge, if we set aside the time at which the statement is made, there is no saying that the thing is known as non-existent, so as to allow of the question being raised as to whether it is possible for the thing not to be: but it will be said to be known by God as already seen in its existence. This being supposed, there is no room for the aforesaid question: since what is already, cannot, as regards that instant, not be. The fallacy arises then from the fact that the time at which we speak is coexistent with eternity, as also does past time (which is designated when we say God knew): wherefore the relation of past or present to future time is ascribed to eternity, which is altogether inapplicable thereto. The result is a fallacy of accident.

Further, if every single thing is known to God as seen present to Him, that which God knows will be so far necessary as it is necessary that Socrates is sitting from the fact that he is seen to be sitting. Now this is necessary, not absolutely or as some say by necessity of consequent, but conditionally, or by necessity of consequence. For this conditional statement is necessary: If he is seen to sit, he sits. Wherefore if the conditional be rendered categorically, so as to run, That which is seen to sit, necessarily sits, it is clear that if it be referred to the statement, and in a composite sense, it is true, and if referred to the thing and in a divided sense, it is false. And so in these and in all like arguments employed by those who gainsay God’s knowledge of contingencies, there is a fallacy of composition and division.

That God knows future contingencies is also proved by the authority of Holy Writ. For it is said (Wis. 8:8) about the divine Wisdom: She knoweth signs and wonders before they be done, and the events of time and ages: and (Ecclus. 39:24, 25): There is nothing hid from His eyes, He seeth from eternity to eternity: and (Isa. 48:5): I foretold thee of old; before they came to pass I told thee.

CHAPTER LXVIII

THAT GOD KNOWS THE MOVEMENTS OF THE WILL

IN the next place we must show that God knows our mind’s thoughts and our secret wills.

For everything, in whatever way it exists, is known by God, in as much as He knows His essence, as we have shown above. Now some things are in the soul, and some in things outside the soul. Wherefore God knows all these differences of things and whatever is contained under them. Now the things in the soul are those that are in our will or our thought. It remains, therefore, that God knows what we have in our thoughts and wills.

Moreover. God so knows other things in knowing His essence, as effects are known through their cause being known. Accordingly by knowing His essence God knows all the things to which His causality extends. Now this extends to the works of the intellect and will: for, since every thing acts by its form which gives the thing some kind of being, it follows that the highest source of all being, from which also every form is derived, must be the source of all operation; because the effects of second causes are to be referred in a still higher degree to first causes. Therefore God knows both the thoughts and the affections of the mind.

Again. Even as His being is first and consequently the cause of all being, so His act of intelligence is first, and consequently the cause of all intellectual operation. Wherefore just as God by knowing His being knows the being of everything, so by knowing His act of intelligence and will He knows every thought and will.

Further. God knows things not only as existing in themselves, but also as existing in their causes, as proved above: for He knows the relation between cause and effect. Now the products of art are in the craftsman through the intellect and will of the craftsman, even as natural things are in their causes through the powers of the causes: for, just as natural things liken their effects to themselves by their active powers, so the craftsman by his intellect gives his handiwork the form whereby it is likened to his art. It is the same with all things done of set purpose. Therefore God knows both our thoughts and our wills.

Again. Intelligible substances are no less known to God than sensible substances are known to Him or to us: since intelligible substances are more knowable, for as much as they are more actual. Now the informations and inclinations of sensible substances are known both to God and to us. Consequently, since the soul's thought results from its being informed, and since its affection is its inclination towards something—for even the inclination of a natural thing is called its natural appetite—it follows that God knows our secret thoughts and affections.

This is confirmed by the testimony of Holy Writ. For it is said in the psalm: The searcher of hearts and reins is God: and (Prov. 15:11): Hell and destruction are before the Lord: how much more the hearts of the children of men; and (Jo. 2:25): He knew what was in man.

The dominion which the will exercises over its own acts, and by which it is in its power to will and not to will, removes the determination of the power to one thing, and the violence of a cause acting from without: but it does not exclude the influence of a higher cause from which it has being and action. Thus causality remains in the first cause which is God, in respect of the movements of the will; so that God is able to know them by knowing Himself.

CHAPTER LXIX

THAT GOD KNOWS INFINITE THINGS

WE must next prove that God knows infinite things. For in knowing that He is the cause of things He knows things other than Himself, as was shown above. Now He is the cause of infinite things, if there be infinite things, since He is the cause of whatever is. Therefore He knows infinite things.

Again. God knows His own power perfectly, as was proved above. Now a power cannot be known perfectly unless all the things to which it extends be known, since its quantity is gauged in a manner according to them. But His power, being infinite as we have shown, extends to infinite things. Therefore God knows infinite things.

Moreover. If God's knowledge extends to all things that exist, in whatever way they exist, as we have shown, it follows that He knows not only actual being but also potential being. Now in natural things there is the infinite potentially although not actually, as the Philosopher proves in 3 Phys. Therefore God knows infinite things: even as unity, which is the principle of number, would know infinite species of numbers, if it knew whatever is potentially in it; for unity is every number potentially.

Again. God knows other things in His essence as in a prototypical medium. Now since He is infinitely perfect, as was shown above, it is possible for an infinite number of things with finite perfections to be copied from Him; since it is impossible for any single one, or any number of copies, to equal the example of their prototype, and thus there always remains some new way in which some copy can imitate it. Nothing therefore prevents Him from knowing infinite things by His essence.

Further. God's being is His act of understanding. Therefore even as His being is infinite, as shown above, so His act of understanding is infinite. Now as finite is to finite so is infinite to infinite. If therefore by our act of understanding which is finite we are able to understand finite things, God also by His act of understanding is able to understand infinite things.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (3 De Anima) an intellect which knows the supremely intelligible knows the less intelligible not less but more: and the reason for this is that the intellect is not corrupted by the excellence of the intelligible, as the sense is, but is the more perfected. Now if we take an infinite number of beings, whether they be of the same species —as an infinite number of men—or of an infinite number of species, even though some or all of them be infinite in quantity, if this were possible; all of them together would be of less infinity than God: since each one and all together would have being confined and limited to a certain species or genus, and thus would be in some way finite: wherefore it would fall short from the infinity of God Who is infinite simply, as we proved above. Since, therefore, God knows Himself perfectly, nothing prevents Him from also knowing that infinite number of things.

Further. The more efficacious and clear an intellect is in knowing, the greater the number of things is it able to know from one: even as every power, the stronger it is, the more united it is. Now the divine intellect is infinite in effiacy or perfection, as was shown above. Therefore it can know an infinite number of things by one which is His essence.

Further. The divine intellect like the divine essence is perfect simply. Wherefore no intellectual perfection is lacking thereto. Now that to which our intellect is in potentiality is its intellectual perfection: and it is in potentiality to all intelligible species. But these species are infinite in number: since the species of numbers and figures are infinite. It follows therefore that God knows all like infinite things.

Again. Since our intellect is cognizant of the infinite in potentiality, for as much as it is able to multiply the species of numbers indefinitely; if the divine intellect knew not also the infinite in act, it would follow either that our intellect knows more things than the divine intellect knows, or that the divine intellect knows not actually all the things that it knows potentially: and each of these is impossible, as proved above.

Further. The infinite is repugnant to knowledge in so far as it is incompatible with being counted: for it is in itself impossible, as implying a contradiction, for the parts of the infinite to be numbered. Now the knowledge of a thing by counting its parts belongs to an intellect that knows one part after another in succession, and not to one that understands the various parts together. Since then the divine intellect knows things together without succession, it is no more hindered from knowing the infinite than from knowing the finite.

Moreover. All quantity consists in a certain plurality of parts, for which reason number is the first of quantities. Accordingly where plurality involves no difference, neither does it cause any difference consequent upon quantity. Now in God's knowledge many things are known in the same way as one, since they are known, not by various species, but by one which is God's essence. Wherefore many things are known by God simultaneously: and consequently plurality makes no difference in God's knowledge. Neither therefore does the infinite which is consequent upon quantity. Therefore knowledge, whether of infinite or of finite things, differs not to the divine intellect. And consequently, since it knows finite things, nothing prevents it from knowing also infinite things.

The words of the psalm are in agreement with this: And of His wisdom there is no number.

From the foregoing it is clear why our intellect knows not the infinite, as the divine intellect does. For our intellect differs from the divine intellect in four respects, which constitute this difference. In the first place, our intellect is simply finite, whereas the divine intellect is infinite. Secondly our intellect knows different things by different species: wherefore it cannot grasp infinite things by one knowledge, as the divine intellect can. The third difference results from the fact that our intellect, since it knows different things by different species, cannot know many things at the same time, so that it cannot know an infinite number of things except by taking them one after the other. Whereas it is not so in the divine intellect, which considers many things simultaneously, as seen by one species. Fourthly, because the divine intellect is about things that are and things that are not, as we proved above.

It is also clear how the saying of the Philosopher that the infinite as such is unknown, is not in contradiction with this statement. For since, as he says, the notion of infinity is becoming to quantity, the infinite would be known as such, if it were known by the measuring of its parts: because this is proper knowledge of quantity. But God does not know thus. Wherefore, so to say, He knows the infinite, not as such, but in as much as in comparison with His knowledge it is finite, as we have shown.

It must be observed, however, that God does not know infinite things by His knowledge of vision, to use the expression employed by others, because the infinite neither is, nor was, nor will be actual; since, according to the Catholic faith, generation is not infinite on either part. Yet He knows the infinite by His knowledge of simple intelligence. For God knows the infinite number of things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, and nevertheless are in the power of a creature. He knows also the infinite things that are in His power, that neither are, nor have been, nor shall be.

Wherefore as regards the question about the knowledge of singulars, we might reply by denying the major premiss: since singulars are not infinite. If, however, they were, God would know them none the less.

CHAPTER LXX

THAT GOD KNOWS TRIVIAL THINGS

THIS being established, we must show that God knows trivial things and that this is not inconsistent with the nobility of His knowledge.

For the stronger an active power is, the further does its action extend, as appears even in the action of sensible things. Now the force of the divine intellect in knowing things is likened to an active power: since the divine intellect knows, not by receiving from things, but rather by pouring itself into them. Since, then, it is of infinite power in understanding, as shown above, it follows that its knowledge extends to the most remote things. Now the degrees of nobility and meanness in all beings depend on nearness to and distance from God, Who is in the summit of nobility. Therefore God, on account of the exceeding power of His intellect, knows things even though they be in the last degree trivial.

Further. Whatever is, for as much as it exists, or is such, is actual, and a likeness of the first act, and for this reason has nobility. Again whatever is in potentiality, has a share of nobility through its being ordained to actuality: for so is it said to be. It follows, therefore, that everything, considered in itself, is noble; but is said to be mean in comparison with that which is more noble. Now the noblest of things other than God are no less distant from Him than the lowest creatures are from the highest. If, therefore, this latter distance hindered God's knowledge, much more would the former: and thus it would follow that God knows nothing other than Himself; which has been disproved above. If, therefore, He knows something other than Himself, however most noble it may be, for the same reason He knows everything, no matter how mean we call it.

Moreover. The good of the order in the universe is more noble than any part of the universe, because each part is directed to the good of the order in the whole, as to its end, as the Philosopher states in 11 Metaph. If then God knows some other noble nature, most of all must He know the order, of the universe. But this cannot be known unless both noble and mean things be known, because the order of the universe consists in their mutual distances and relationships. It follows therefore that God knows not only noble things, but also those that are deemed trivial.

Further. The meanness of things known does not of itself reflect on the knower: for it belongs to the nature of knowledge that the knower contains the species of the things he knows, according to his mode. And yet the meanness of things known may reflect accidentally on the knower: either because while considering mean things he is withdrawn from the thought of noble things, or because through considering mean things he is inclined to certain undue affections. But this cannot take place in God, as appears from what has been said. Therefore the knowledge of trivial things is not derogatory to the nobility of God; rather does it belong to His perfection, for as much as He prepossesses all things in Himself, as we have shown above.

Again. A power is accounted little, not through being capable of little things, but through being confined to little results: since a power that is capable of great things is also capable of little ones. Accordingly knowledge that comprises both noble and trivial things is not to be accounted trivial, but only that which comprises none but trivial things, as happens with us: for our thoughts of divine things are distinct from our thoughts of human things, and of each we have a distinct knowledge; wherefore in comparison with the more noble, the less noble is accounted mean. But it is not thus in God: because He considers all things with the same thought and knowledge. Therefore no meanness is to be ascribed to His knowledge, on account of His knowing any mean things whatever.

In accord with this is the saying of Wis. 7:24, 25 about divine Wisdom, that She reacheth everywhere by reason of Her purity … and no defiled thing cometh into Her.

It is clear from what has been said that the argument put forward in opposition is not subversive of the truth we have demonstrated. For the nobility of a science depends on the principal object of that science and not on whatever may come under that science: because with us not only the highest but also the lowest beings come under the most noble of sciences:

for the treatise of Metaphysics extends from the first being to potential being, which is the lowest of all beings. Thus then the divine knowledge comprises the lowest beings as being known at the same time with the object known principally, for the divine essence is the principal object of God’s knowledge, and in it He knows all things, as we have shown above.

It is also evident that this truth is not in contradiction with the statements of the Philosopher in 11 Metaph. For there he intends to prove that the divine intellect knows not something other than Himself, that is a perfection of His intellect as the principal object of its knowledge. And in this sense he states that it is better not to know mean things than to know them: when, that is, knowledge of trivial things is distinct from the knowledge of noble things, and the thought of mean things is an obstacle to the thought of noble things.

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT GOD KNOWS EVIL THINGS

IT remains now to be proved that God knows evil things.

For if a good be known the opposite evil is known. Now God knows all the particular goods to which evils are opposed. Therefore God knows evil things.

Further. The notions of contraries in the mind are not opposed to one another, else they would not be together in the mind, nor would they be known at the same time. Therefore the aspect under which we know evil is not repugnant to good, rather is it connected with the idea of good. Accordingly if, as we have proved above, all the aspects of goodness are to be found in God, by reason of His absolute perfection, it follows that in Him is the notion by which evil is known. Therefore He knows evils also.

Again. The true is the good of the intellect: for an intellect is said to be good for as much as it knows the true. Now it is not only true that good is good, but also that evil is evil: for just as it is true that what is, is, so is it true that what is not, is not. Hence the good of the intellect consists even in the knowledge of evil. But, since the divine intellect is perfect in goodness, it cannot possibly lack any intellectual perfection. Therefore it has the knowledge of evils.

Moreover. God knows the distinction between things, as shown above. Now the notion of distinction includes negation, for when things are distinct, the one is not the other. Hence primaries which are distinguished by themselves, include mutual negation of one another, and for this reason negative propositions about them are self-evident, for instance, No quantity is a substance. Therefore God knows negation. Now privation is negation in a definite subject, as is proved in 4 Metaph. Therefore He knows privation, and consequently evil, which is nothing else than the privation of due perfection.

Further. If God knows all the species of things, as was proved above, and as granted and proved even by some philosophers, it follows that He knows contraries; both because the species of certain genera are contrary, and because the differences of genera are contrary, as stated in 10 Metaph. Now contraries include opposition of form and of privation, according to the same authority. Therefore it follows that God knows privation and, consequently, evil.

Again. God knows not only form but also matter, as was proved above. Now matter, since it is being in potentiality, cannot be known perfectly, unless it be known to what its potentiality extends, and this applies to all kinds of power. But the potentiality of matter extends to both form and privation: for that which can be, can also not be. Therefore God knows privation: and consequently He knows evil.

Again. If God knows anything besides Himself, most of all He knows that which is best: and this is the order of the universe, to which as their end all particular goods are directed. Now in the order of the universe there are certain things intended for the removal of harms that might result from certain other things, as evidenced by the means of defence with which animals are provided. Therefore God knows these harms: and thus He knows evils.

Further. We are never blamed for knowing evils, as regards that which belongs essentially to knowledge, that is, as regards judgment about evil, but only accidentally, for as much as sometimes one is inclined to evil through thinking about it. But it is not so in God, for He is unchangeable, as was proved above. Nothing therefore hinders God from knowing evils.

In agreement with this it is written (Wis. 8) that no evil can overcome God’s wisdom; and (Prov. 15:11) that Hell and destruction are before the Lord. Also in the psalm it is said: My offences are not hidden from Thee; and (Job 11:11): For He knoweth the vanity of men, and when He seeth iniquity, doth He not consider it?

It must however be observed that with regard to the knowledge of evil and privation there is a difference between the divine intellect and ours. For seeing that our intellect knows each thing by its respective proper and distinct species, it knows that which is in act by an intelligible species, whereby the intellect is made actual. Hence it is able to know potentiality, in as much as it is sometimes in potentiality to such a species: and thus just as it knows act by means of an act, so it knows potentiality by means of potentiality. And since potentiality belongs to the notion of privation, for privation is a negation the subject whereof is a being in potentiality, it follows that it is becoming to our intellect to know privation, in some way, in as much as it is naturally fitted to be in potentiality; although we may also say that the mere knowledge of actuality leads to the knowledge of potentiality and privation.

On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is nowise in potentiality, knows neither privation nor anything else in the above manner. For if He knew anything by a species other than Himself, it would follow of necessity that He is compared to that species as potentiality to act. It follows therefore that He understands only by a species that is His essence: and consequently that He understands Himself as the first object of His understanding: and yet in understanding Himself He understands other things, as shown above, and not only acts but potentialities and privations.

This is what the Philosopher means when he says (3 De Anima): How does it know evil, or black? For it knows contraries somewhat. And it must know them by a potentiality that is in itself. But if anything there be in which the contrary is not (namely in potentiality), it knows itself, and is in act and separable. Nor is it necessary to admit the explanation of Averroës who maintains that it follows from the above that the intellect which is pure act knows a privation not at all. But the sense is that it knows privation, not through being in potentiality to something else, but through knowing itself and being always in act.

Again, it must be observed that if God knew Himself in such a way that by knowing Himself He knew not other beings which are particular goods, He would have no knowledge whatever of privation or evil. Because there is no privation contrary to the good that is Himself: since a privation and its contrary are naturally adapted to be in relation to the same thing, and so no privation, and therefore no evil, is opposed to that which is pure act. Wherefore, supposing God to know Himself alone, He would not know evil through knowing the good which is Himself. But, since by knowing Himself He knows things in which there is a natural aptness for privations, it follows of necessity that He knows the opposite privation, and the evils contrary to particular goods.

It must also be observed that, just as God by knowing Himself knows other things without any discursion of His intellect, as shown above, so too there is no need for His knowledge to be discursive, if He knows evil through good. For good is the ratio as it were of the knowledge of evil, so that evil is known through good, as a thing through its definition, and not as conclusions through their premisses. Nor does it argue imperfection in the divine knowledge if God knows evil through the privation of good: because evil does not indicate being except in so far as it is a privation of good. Wherefore in this way alone is it knowable: since a thing is so far knowable as it has being.

CHAPTER LXXII

THAT IN GOD THERE IS WILL

AFTER discussing the matters concerning the knowledge of the divine intellect it remains for us to consider the divine will.

For from the fact that there is intelligence in God it follows that in Him there is will. Because, since the good understood is the proper object of the will, it follows that the good understood, as such, is willed. Now understood indicates a reference to one who understands. It follows therefore of necessity that one who understands good, as such, has a will. Now God understands good: for since He is perfectly intelligent, as shown above, He understands being simultaneously with the notion of good. Therefore in Him there is will.

Again. Whatever has a form, is thereby related to things actually existing: thus white timber by its whiteness is like some things and unlike others. Now in intelligent and sentient subjects there is the form of the thing understood and sensed, because all knowledge is through some likeness. Therefore there must be a relation in the intelligent or sentient subject to the things understood or sensed according as the latter actually exist. Now this is not due to the fact that they understand or sense, because in this respect rather is there a relation in things to the intelligent or sentient subject, since intelligence and sensation depend on things being in the intellect and sense, according to the respective modes of each. But the sentient and the intelligent subject have by the will and appetite a relation to things outside the mind. Wherefore every sentient and intelligent subject has an appetite and will, although properly speaking, will is in an intellect. Since then God is intelligent, it follows that He has a will.

Moreover. That which is consequent upon every being, belongs to being as such: and a thing of this kind must needs be found especially in that which is the first being. Now it is competent to every being to desire its own perfection and the preservation of its being: and to each one this is competent according to its mode, to intelligent beings by will, to animals by sensitive appetite, to those that are devoid of sense by natural appetite: to those however who have it otherwise than to those who have it not: for those who have it not, by the appetitive power of their genus tend with desire to acquire what is lacking to them, whereas those who have it are at rest therein. Wherefore this cannot be lacking to the first being, which is God. Since, then, He is intelligent, there is will in Him, whereby His being and His goodness are pleasing to Him.

Again. The more perfect the act of understanding is, the more delightful is it to the one who understands. Now God understands, and His act of understanding is most perfect, as was proved above. Therefore to understand is to Him most delightful. But intellectual delight is by the will, even as sensitive delight is by the appetite of concupiscence. Therefore there is will in God.

Further. A form considered by the intellect neither moves nor causes anything except through the medium of the will, whose object is an end and a good by which one is moved to act. Wherefore the speculative intellect does not move; nor does the sole imagination without the estimative power. Now the form of the divine intellect is the cause of being and movement in other things, for God moves things by His intellect, as we shall prove further on. Therefore it follows that He has a will.

Again. The first of motive powers in intelligent beings is the will: because the will applies every power to its act: for we understand because we will, we imagine because we will, and so forth. And the will has this because its object is the end—although the intellect, not by way of efficient and moving cause, but by way of final cause, moves the will, by putting its object before it, which object is the end. Therefore it is especially fitting that the first mover should have a will.

Further. The free is that which is its own cause: and so the free has the aspect of that which is of itself. Now liberty of action is seated primarily in the will, for in so far as one acts voluntarily, one is said to perform any action whatever freely. Therefore it is especially fitting that the first agent should act by will, since to Him it is most competent to act of Himself.

Moreover. The end and the agent intending the end are always of the same order in things: wherefore the proximate end which is proportionate to the agent, is of the same species as the agent, in works both of nature and of art: for the form of the art whereby the craftsman works is the species of the form that is in matter, and is the end of the craftsman; and the form of the generating fire, whereby the fire acts, is of the same species as the form of the fire generated, which form is the end of the generation. Now nothing is co-ordinate with God as though it were of the same order, except God Himself, otherwise there would be several first beings, and we have shown the contrary to be the case. He is therefore the first agent intending an end which is Himself. Therefore He not only is a desirable end, but also desires Himself, so to speak, as an end; and, since He is intelligent, He desires Himself by intellectual appetite; and this is will. Therefore in God there is will.

Holy Writ bears witness to this will of God. For it is said in the psalm: Whatsoever the Lord willed, He hath done: and (Rom. 9:19): Who resisteth His will?

CHAPTER LXXIII

THAT GOD’S WILL IS HIS ESSENCE

IT is evident from the foregoing that His will is not distinct from His essence.

For it belongs to God to have a will in as much as He has an intellect, as proved above. Now He is intelligent by His essence, as we have already shown: and consequently will also is in Him by His essence. Therefore God’s will is His very essence.

Again. Even as to understand is the perfection of one who is intelligent, so to will is the perfection of one who wills, for each is an action abiding in the agent, and not passing into something passive, as heating. Now God’s act of intelligence is His being, as we proved above; because, since God’s being is by itself supremely perfect, it admits of no additional perfection, as we have shown above. Therefore the divine willing is also His being: and consequently God’s will is His essence.

Moreover. Since every agent acts in so far as it is actual, it follows that God, Who is pure act, acts by His essence. Now willing is an operation of God. Therefore it follows that God wills by His essence. Therefore His will is His essence.

Again. If will were something added to the divine substance, since the divine substance is complete in being, it would follow that will would be adventitious to Him like an accident to its subject; that the divine substance would be compared thereto as potentiality to act; and that there is composition in God. All of which have been disproved above. It is therefore impossible for the divine will to be something in addition to the divine essence.

CHAPTER LXXIV

THAT THE PRINCIPAL OBJECT OF GOD'S WILL IS THE DIVINE ESSENCE

IT is also evident from the foregoing that the principal object of God's will is His essence.

For the good understood is the object of the will, as proved above. Now the principal object of God's intellect is the divine essence, as we have already proved. Therefore the divine essence is the principal object of the divine will.

Again. The appetible object is compared to the appetite as mover to the thing moved, as we have stated above. It is the same with the thing willed in relation to the will, since the will belongs to the genus of appetitive powers. Wherefore if something besides God's essence were the principal object of God's will, it would follow that something else is superior to, and moves the divine will: and the contrary of this was proved above.

Further. The principal thing willed is to every willer the cause of his willing: for when we say: I wish to walk that I may be healed, we consider that we are stating the reason, and if it be asked, Why do you wish to be healed? we shall continue to give reasons until we come to the last end which is the principal thing willed, and is of itself the cause of willing. Accordingly if God wills principally something other than Himself, it follows that something other than Himself is the cause of His willing. But His willing is His being, as we have shown. Therefore something else will be the cause of His being: and this is contrary to the notion of the first being.

Again. To every willer the thing willed principally is his last end: because the end is willed by reason of itself, and other things come to be willed by reason of it. Now God is the last end, because He is the sovereign good, as was proved. Therefore He is the principal object of His will.

Moreover. Every power is proportionate to its principal object according to equality: for the power of a thing is measured according to its object, as the Philosopher says (1 Cœli et Mundi). Therefore the will is proportionate according to equality to its principal object, as well as the intellect and the senses. Now nothing is proportionate according to equality to God’s will, except His essence. Therefore the principal object of the divine will is the divine essence. And since the divine essence is God’s act of understanding and whatsoever else is said to be in God, it is also clear that in the same way God wills principally, to will, to understand, to be one and so forth.

CHAPTER LXXV

THAT GOD IN WILLING HIMSELF WILLS ALSO OTHER THINGS

HENCE it may be proved that in willing Himself He wills other things also.

For He who wills the end principally, wills the means to the end for the sake of that end. Now God Himself is the last end of things, as appears sufficiently from what we have said. From the fact therefore that He wills Himself to be, He wills also other things, that are directed to Himself as their end.

Again. Every thing desires the perfection of that which it wills and loves for its own sake: because whatever we love for its own sake, we wish to be best, and ever to be bettered and multiplied as much as possible. Now God wills and loves His essence for its own sake: and it cannot be increased or multiplied in itself, as appears from what has been said: and can only be multiplied in respect of its likeness which is shared by many. Therefore God wishes things to be multiplied, because He wills and loves His essence and perfection.

Moreover. Whosoever loves a thing in itself and for its own sake, loves in consequence all the things wherein it is found: thus he who loves sweetness for its own sake, must needs love all sweet things. Now God wills and loves His own being, in itself and for its own sake, as we have proved above. And all other being is a participation, by likeness, of His being, as was made sufficiently clear by what we have said above. Therefore, from the very fact that God wills and loves Himself, it follows that He wills and loves other things.

Again. God, in willing Himself, wills all things that are in Him. Now all things pre-exist in Him somewhat by their proper types, as we have proved.

Therefore in willing Himself, God wills other things.

Again. As stated above, the greater a thing’s power, to so many more things, and to the greater distance does its causality extend. Now the causality of an end consists in other things being desired for its sake. Wherefore the more perfect and the more willed an end is, to so many more things does the will of him who wills that end extend by reason of that end. But the divine essence is most perfect considered under the aspect of goodness and end. Therefore it will extend its causality most of all to many things, so that many be willed for its sake, especially by God, Who wills it perfectly with all His might.

Further. Will is consequent upon intellect. Now God by His intellect understands Himself principally, and other things in Himself. Therefore in like manner He wills Himself principally, and in willing Himself, He wills all else.

This is confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ: for it is written (Wis. 11:25): For Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THAT GOD, BY THE ONE ACT OF HIS WILL, WILLS HIMSELF AND OTHER THINGS

THIS being proved, it follows that God, by one act of His will, wills Himself and other things.

For every power tends by one operation or act to its object and the formal aspect of that object: even as by the one sight, we see light and colour made visible by light. Now when we will something solely for the sake of an end, that which is desired for the sake of the end takes its aspect of thing willed from the end; and thus the end is compared to it as the formal aspect to an object, as light to colour. Since, then, God wills all things for His own sake as for the sake of an end, as we have proved, He wills Himself and other things by one act of His will.

Moreover. That which is perfectly known and desired is known and desired with respect to its whole virtue. Now the virtue of an end consists not only in its being desired for its own sake, but also in other things being made desirable for its sake. Wherefore he that desires an end perfectly, desires it in both these ways. But it cannot be admitted that God has an act whereby He wills Himself without willing Himself perfectly, since in Him there is nothing imperfect. Hence by every act in which God wills Himself, He wills Himself absolutely, and other things for His own sake. And He wills not things other than Himself, except because He wills Himself, as was proved above. It follows therefore that not by distinct acts but by one and the same act He wills Himself and other things.

Again. As appears from what has been said, discursion in the act of the cognitive faculty occurs when we know the premisses apart from the conclusions, and draw the conclusions from them: for if we were to see the conclusions in the premisses themselves, simply through knowing the premisses, there would be no discursion, as neither is there when we see something reflected in a mirror. Now just as the premisses are related to the conclusions in speculative matters, so are the ends to the means in practical and appetitive matters: because even as we know conclusions through their premisses, so does the end lead us to the appetite and practice of the means. Accordingly if a person will the end and the means separately, there will be discursion in his will. But there can be no such thing in God, since He is outside all movement. Therefore it follows that God wills Himself and other things simultaneously by the one same act of His will.

Again. Since God always wills Himself, if He will Himself by one, and other things by another act, it follows that there are two acts of will in Him at the same time. But this is impossible: since of one simple power there are not at the one time two operations.

Further. In every act of the will the thing willed is compared to the will as mover to moved. Wherefore if there be an act of the divine will, by which He wills things other than Himself, and which is distinct from the act whereby He wills Himself, there will be in Him something else that moves the divine will: and this is impossible.

Moreover. God’s willing is His being as we have proved. But in God there is only one being. Therefore in Him there is but one act of the will.

Again. It is becoming to God to will in as much as He is intelligent. Wherefore just as by one act He understands Himself and other things, in as much as His essence is the exemplar of all things, so by one act He wills Himself and other things, in as much as His goodness is the type of all goodness.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT THE MULTITUDE OF THINGS WILLED IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY

HENCE it follows that the multitude of things willed is not inconsistent with the oneness and simplicity of the divine substance.

For acts are distinguished according to their objects. If, then, the plurality of things willed by God indicated any kind of multitude in Him, it would follow that there is not only one operation of the will in Him: and this is contrary to what has been proved.

Again. It has been shown that God wills other things in as much as He wills His goodness. Wherefore things stand in relation to His will for as much as they are comprised in His goodness. Now all things are one in His goodness: because other things are in Him according to His mode, to wit material things immaterially and multitude unitedly, as we have shown above. Hence it follows that the plurality of things willed does not argue plurality in the divine substance.

Further. The divine intellect and will are of equal simplicity, since each is the divine substance, as we have proved. Now the multitude of things understood does not involve multiplicity in the divine essence, nor composition in His intellect. Neither therefore does the multitude of things willed prove either diversity in the divine essence or composition in His will.

Moreover. The difference between knowledge and appetite is, that knowledge results from the thing known being somehow in the knower, whereas appetite does not, but on the contrary, results from the appetite being referred to the appetible thing, which the appetent seeks and wherein it rests. For this reason good and evil which regard the appetite are in things, whereas true and false which regard knowledge are in the mind, as the Philosopher states in 6 Metaph. Now it is not inconsistent with the simplicity of a thing that it be referred to many, since even unity is the principle of the multitude of numbers. Therefore the multitude of things willed by God is not inconsistent with His simplicity.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THAT THE DIVINE WILL EXTENDS TO PARTICULAR GOODS

IT is also evident from the foregoing that in order to safeguard the divine simplicity it is not necessary for us to say that God wills other goods in a kind of universal way, in so far as He wills Himself to be the source of the goods which can flow from Him, and that He does not will them in particular.

For the act of willing is according to a comparison of the willer to the thing willed. Now the divine simplicity does not forbid God's being compared to many things, even to particulars: for He is said to be best or first even in comparison with singulars. Therefore His simplicity is not inconsistent with His willing things other than Himself even in special or particular.

Again. God's will is compared to other things in as much as they partake of His goodness through being ordered to the divine goodness which is to God the reason of His willing. Now not only the universe of good things, but also each one of them derives its goodness as also its being from the goodness of God. Therefore God's will extends to each single good.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (11 Metaph.) there is a twofold good of order in the universe: one consisting in the whole universe being directed to that which is outside the universe, just as the army is directed to the commander-in-chief: while the other consists in the parts of the universe being directed to each other, as the parts of an army: and the second order is for the sake of the first. Now God, through willing Himself as end, wills other things that are directed to Him as their end, as we have proved. Therefore He wills the good of the order of the whole universe in relation to

Himself, and the order of the universe as regards the mutual relation of its parts. Now the good of order arises from each single good. Therefore He wills also singular goods.

Further. If God wills not the singular goods of which the universe consists, it follows that the good of order is in the universe by chance: for it is not possible that some one part of the universe arranges all the particular goods so as to produce the order of the universe; and only the universal cause of the whole universe can do this, which cause is God Who acts by His will, as we shall prove further on. But it is impossible for the order of the universe to result from chance: since it would follow a fortiori that other things which come afterwards are the result of chance. Therefore it follows that God wills even each particular good.

Again. The good understood as such is the object of the will. But God understands also particular goods, as we have proved. Therefore He also wills particular goods.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture which sets forth (Gen. 1) the pleasure of the divine will in each work, in the words: God saw the light that it was good, and in like manner as to each work, and afterwards in reference to all the works: God saw all that He had made, and they were very good.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT GOD WILLS EVEN THE THINGS THAT ARE NOT YET

NOW if the act of willing is by comparison of the willer to the thing willed, someone might think that God wills only the things that are: since relatives must needs be simultaneous, and if one cease the other ceases, as the Philosopher teaches. Wherefore if the act of willing is by comparison of the willer to the thing willed, no one can will other things than those which are.

Moreover. Will relates to things willed, even as cause and creator. Now not even God can be called Creator, or Lord, or Father, except of the things that are. Neither therefore can He be said to will other things than those which are.

One might conclude further, if God's willing is unchangeable, just as the divine being, and if He wills nothing but what actually is, that He wills nothing but what always is.

To these arguments some answer that things which are not in themselves are in God and in His intellect. Wherefore nothing prevents God willing things even which are not in themselves, in so far as they are in Him.

This reply, however, is seemingly insufficient. For every willer is said to will a thing in so far as his will is referred to the thing willed. Wherefore, if the divine will is not referred to a thing willed that is not except in so far as it is in God or in His intellect, it would follow that God wills it merely because He wills it to be in Himself or in His intellect. Yet those who make the above statements do not mean this, but that God wills things which as yet are not to be also in themselves.

Again, if the will be referred to the thing willed through its object which is a good understood; the intellect understands that the good is not only in (the intellect) itself, but also in its own nature: and the will must be referred to the thing willed not only as it is in the knower, but also as it is in itself.

Accordingly we must say that, since the apprehended good moves the will, the act of willing must needs follow the condition of the apprehender, even as the movements of other movables follow the condition of the mover which is the cause of the movement. Now the relation of the apprehender to the thing apprehended is consequent upon the apprehension, because the apprehender is referred to the thing apprehended through its apprehension thereof. Now the apprehender apprehends the thing not only as it is in the apprehender, but also as it is in its proper nature: for we not only know that a thing is understood by us, which is the same as the thing being in our intellect, but also that it is, or has been, or will be in its proper nature. Wherefore although the thing is then only in the knower, yet the relation consequent upon the apprehension is referred thereto not as it is in the knower, but as it is in its proper nature which the apprehender apprehends.

Accordingly the relation of the divine will is to a non-existent thing, as it is in its proper nature in reference to a certain time, and not only as in God knowing it. Therefore God wills the thing that is not now to be in reference to a certain time, and He does not will merely to understand it. Nor does the comparison hold with the relation of willer to thing willed, nor of creator to creature, nor of maker to thing made, nor of Lord to the creature subject to Him. For to will is an act abiding in the willer, wherefore it does not necessarily imply anything existing outside. But to make, to create, and to govern denote an action terminating in an external effect, without the existence of which such an action is inconceivable.

CHAPTER LXXX

THAT GOD NECESSARILY WILLS HIS BEING AND HIS GOODNESS

FROM what has been proved above it follows that God wills necessarily His being and His goodness, and that He cannot will the contrary.

For it has been shown that God wills His being and goodness as principal object, which is the reason of His willing other things. Wherefore in everything willed by Him He wills His being and goodness, just as the sight sees light in every colour. Now it is impossible for God not to will a thing actually, for He would be only potentially willing; which is impossible, since His willing is His being. Therefore it is necessary for Him to will His being and His goodness.

Again. Whoever wills, of necessity wills his last end: thus man of necessity wills his own happiness, nor can he will unhappiness. Now God wills Himself as last end, as stated above. Therefore He necessarily wills Himself to be, nor can He will Himself not to be.

Moreover. The end in matters of appetite and action is as an undemonstrable principle in speculative matters: for just as in speculative matters conclusions are drawn from principles, so in active and appetitive matters the reason of all things to be done or desired is taken from the end. Now, in speculative matters, the intellect necessarily assents to the first undemonstrable principles, to the contraries of which it can nowise assent. Therefore the will necessarily adheres to the last end, so as to be unable to will the contrary. And thus, if the will of God has no other end than Himself, He necessarily wills Himself to be.

Again. All things, in as much as they are, are like to God, Who is being first and foremost. Now all things, in as much as they are, love their own being naturally in their own way. Much more therefore does God love His own being naturally. Now His nature is per se necessary being, as was proved. Therefore God necessarily wills Himself to be.

Further. Every perfection and goodness which is in creatures, belongs to God essentially, as we have proved above. But to love God is the highest perfection of the rational creature: since by so doing man is, in a way, united to God. Therefore this is in God essentially. Therefore He loves Himself necessarily, and so He wills Himself to be.

CHAPTER LXXXI

THAT GOD DOES NOT NECESSARILY WILL OTHER THINGS THAN HIMSELF

NOW if God wills the divine goodness and being necessarily, someone might think that He wills other things necessarily also: since He wills all else by willing His own goodness, as we have already proved. Yet to those who look at it aright it is clear that He wills other things not of necessity. For He wills other things as ordered to the end which is His goodness. Now the will is not necessarily directed to the means, if the end is possible without them: for the physician, supposing him to have the will to heal, has no need to prescribe to the patient those remedies without which He can heal the patient. Since, then, God's goodness can be without other things, nay more, since nothing accrues thereto from other things, He is under no necessity to will other things through willing His own goodness.

Again. Since the good understood is the proper object of the will, any concept of the intellect, provided it retains an aspect of goodness, can be an object of the will. Wherefore, although the being of a thing as such is good, and its not-being an evil, the not-being of a thing can be an object of the will by reason of some connected good which is retained, albeit not of necessity: because it is good for a thing to be, even though another be non-existent. Hence that good alone is the will, according to its nature, unable to will not to be, without the existence of which, the aspect of good is wholly done away. Now such a good is God alone. Wherefore the will, according to its nature, is able to will the not-being of anything whatever except God. Now will is in God according to its full capacity, since all things in Him are in every way perfect. Hence God can will the not-being of anything

Whatever except Himself. Therefore He does not necessarily will things other than Himself.

Moreover. God, by willing His own goodness, wills other things to be, in as much as they partake of His goodness. Now, since God’s goodness is infinite, it can be participated in an infinite number of ways, and in other ways besides those in which it is participated by those creatures which now are. If, then, through willing His own goodness, He willed of necessity the things which participate it, it would follow that He wills an infinite number of creatures partaking of His goodness in an infinite number of ways. But this is clearly false: for if He willed it, they would exist, since His will is the source of being to things, as we shall prove further on. Therefore He does not necessarily will those things also that are not.

Again. A wise man, through willing the cause, wills the effect which follows necessarily from the cause: for it would be foolish to will that the sun exist above the earth, and that there be no brightness of day. On the contrary, it is not necessary for one through willing the cause to will an effect which does not follow of necessity from the cause. Now other things proceed from God not necessarily, as we shall show further on. Therefore it is not necessary that God will other things through willing Himself.

Moreover. Things proceed from God as products of art from a craftsman, as we shall show further on. Now the craftsman, though he will himself to have his art, does not necessarily will to produce his work. Therefore neither does God necessarily will things other than Himself.

We must accordingly consider why it is that God knows of necessity other things than Himself, whereas He wills them not of necessity; and yet through understanding and willing Himself, He understands and wills other things. The reason is this. Because that the person who understands, understands something, is due to the understanding person being conditioned in a certain way, in so far as a thing is actually understood through its likeness being in the person who understands it. Whereas that the willer wills something, is due to the thing willed being conditioned in some way: since we will a thing either because it is an end, or because it is directed to an end. Now the divine perfection necessarily requires that all things should be in God, in order that they may be understood in Him: whereas the divine goodness does not necessarily demand that the other things which are directed to it as their end should exist. For this reason it is necessary that God should know, but not will, other things. Wherefore neither does He will all things that can possibly be directed to His goodness: although He knows all that can in any way be directed to His essence, whereby He understands.

CHAPTER LXXXII

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE STATEMENT THAT GOD WILLS NOT OF NECESSITY THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF, IN THAT IT INVOLVES IMPOSSIBILITIES

NEVERTHELESS it would seem to lead to impossibilities if God does not necessarily will the things that He wills.

For if God's will is not determined in respect of certain things that He wills, it would seem that He is indifferent. Now every power that is indifferent is somewhat in potentiality: since the indifferent is a species of possible contingency. Therefore God's will would be in potentiality: and consequently it would not be God's substance, wherein there is no potentiality, as we have shown above.

Again. If a potential being as such is naturally changeable, since what is possible to be, is possible to not-be, it follows also that the divine will is changeable.

Further. If it is natural for God to will something concerning His effects, it is necessary. Now nothing can be in Him that is not natural to Him, for nothing accidental or violent can be in Him, as we have proved above.

Again. If that which is indifferent to either of two alternatives does not tend to the one rather than to the other unless it be determined by something else, it follows that either God wills none of the things to which He is indifferent—the contrary of which has been proved above—or else He is determined to one alternative by something else. And thus something will be before Him that determines Him to one thing.

Now none of these consequences follow of necessity. For indifference may befit a power in two ways: first, on the part of the power itself; secondly, in respect of that to which it is said to be indifferent. On the part of the power itself, when it has not yet reached its perfection whereby it is determined to one thing. Wherefore this argues imperfection in the power, and potentiality is proved to be in it: as may be seen in the intellect of one who doubts, for it has not yet acquired the principles by which it may be determined to one alternative. On the part of the thing to which it is said to be indifferent, a power is found to be indifferent to either alternative, when the perfect operation of the power depends on neither, and yet either is possible: even as an art which can use various instruments that are equally adapted to perfect its work. Now this does not argue imperfection in the power, rather does it pertain to its perfection: in as much as it transcends both alternatives, and for this reason is determined to neither, being indifferent to both. It is thus with God's will in regard to other things than Himself: since its end depends on none of these other things, whereas it is most perfectly united to its end. Therefore it does not follow that there must be potentiality in the divine will.

Likewise neither does it follow that there is changeableness. For if there is no potentiality in God's will, the reason why, in His effects, He does not of necessity give preference to the one alternative, is not because He is considered to be indifferent to either alternative, so as to be at first potentially willing either, and afterwards willing actually (whereas He is always actually willing whatsoever He wills, with regard not only to Himself but also His effects); but it is because the thing willed is not necessarily related to the divine goodness, which is the proper object of the divine will; in the same way in which we say that an enunciation is not necessary but possible where the predicate is not necessarily related to the subject. Hence when we say: God wills this effect, this statement is clearly not necessary but possible, in the same way as a thing is said to be possible, not in reference to a potentiality, but because it is neither necessary nor impossible for it to be, as the Philosopher teaches (6 Metaph.). Thus the statement that a triangle has two equal sides is possible, yet not in reference to a potentiality, since in mathematics there is neither potentiality nor movement. Therefore the exclusion of the aforesaid necessity does not remove the unchangeableness of the divine will, to Which Holy Writ bears witness (1 Kings 15:29): The Triumpher in Israel … will not be moved to repentance.

Yet although God’s will is not determined to its effects, it does not follow that He wills none of them, or that He is determined by something outside to will them. For, since the apprehended good determines the will as the latter’s proper object, while God’s intellect is not outside His will, because each is His essence; if God’s will is determined by the will of His intellect to will something, the determination of the divine will is not effected by something outside. For the divine intellect apprehends not only the divine being which is His goodness, but also other goods, as we proved above. And it apprehends these as likenesses of the divine goodness, not as principles thereof. Wherefore the divine will tends to them as according with His goodness, not as necessary thereto. It is the same with our will, because when it tends to something as simply necessary to an end, it is moved by a kind of necessity towards it: whereas when it tends to something merely on account of some fittingness, it does not tend thereto of necessity. Therefore neither does the divine will tend necessarily to its effects.

Nor does it follow on account of what has been said, that we must admit the existence in God of something not natural. For His will, by the one and same act, wills Himself and other things. Now His relation to Himself is necessary and natural; whereas His relation to other things is by way of a kind of fittingness, not necessary and natural, nor violent and unnatural, but voluntary: since what is voluntary, must needs be neither natural nor violent.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

THAT GOD WILLS SOMETHING OTHER THAN HIMSELF BY A NECESSITY OF SUPPOSITION

WE may conclude from the foregoing that, although God wills none of His effects of absolute necessity, He wills something necessarily by supposition.

For it has been proved that the divine will is unchangeable. Now that which is once in an unchangeable thing cannot afterwards not be therein: since we say that a thing is changed when its condition is different now to what it was before. Therefore, if God's will is unchangeable, supposing that He will something, it is necessary by supposition that He will it.

Again. Everything eternal is necessary. Now that God will some particular effect to exist is eternal: for His willing, like His being, is measured by eternity. Therefore it is necessary. Not however if we consider it absolutely: because God's will has not a necessary relation to this particular thing willed. Therefore it is necessary by supposition.

Further. Whatsoever God could do, He can do, for His power is not diminished, as neither is His essence. But He cannot now not will what He is supposed to have willed, since His will is unchangeable. Therefore He never could not will whatever He has willed. Therefore it is necessary by supposition that He willed, as also that He will, whatever He willed: neither however is necessary absolutely, but possible in the aforesaid manner.

Moreover. Whosoever wills a thing, necessarily wills those things which are necessarily requisite to that thing, unless there be a defect on his part, either through ignorance, or because he is led astray from the right choice of means to the end in view, by some passion. But these things cannot be said of God. Wherefore if God, in willing Himself, wills something other than Himself, it is necessary for Him to will all that is necessarily required for What is willed by Him: even so is it necessary for God to will that there be a rational soul, supposing that He wills a man to be.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

THAT GOD’S WILL IS NOT OF THINGS IMPOSSIBLE IN THEMSELVES

HENCE it is clear that God’s will cannot be of things that are impossible in themselves.

For the like are those which imply a contradiction in themselves: for instance that a man be an ass, which implies that rational is irrational. Now that which is incompatible with a thing excludes some of those things which are required for that thing: for instance, to be an ass excludes man’s reason. If, then, He wills necessarily the things that are required for those He is supposed to will, it is impossible that He will those that are incompatible with them. Hence it is impossible for Him to will things that are simply impossible.

Again. As was proved above, God, by willing His own being, which is His own goodness, wills all things as bearing a likeness to Him. Now in so far as a thing is incompatible with the notion of being as such, it cannot retain a likeness to the first, that is, the divine being, which is the source of being. Wherefore God cannot will that which is incompatible with the notion of being as such. Now just as irrationality is incompatible with the notion of man as such, so is it incompatible with the notion of being as such, that anything be at the same time a being and a non-being. Hence God cannot will affirmation and negation to be true at the same time. Yet this is implied in everything which is in itself impossible, that it is incompatible with itself, in as much as it implies a contradiction. Therefore God’s will cannot be of things impossible in themselves.

Moreover. The will is only of some understood good. Wherefore that which is not an object of the intellect, cannot be an object of the will. Now things in themselves impossible are not an object of understanding, since they imply a contradiction, except perhaps through an error of one who understands not the property of things: and this cannot be said of God. Therefore things in themselves impossible cannot be an object of God’s will.

Further. According as a thing is related to being, so is it related to goodness. But impossibles are things that cannot be. Therefore they cannot be good. Neither therefore can they be willed by God, Who wills only the things that are or can be good.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE DIVINE WILL DOES NOT REMOVE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS, NOR IMPOSE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY ON THEM

FROM what has been said we may gather that the divine will does not exclude contingency, nor impose absolute necessity on things.

For God wills all that is requisite for the thing which He wills, as already stated. Now it is befitting some things, according to the mode of their nature, that they be contingent and not necessary. Therefore He wills certain things to be contingent. Now the efficacy of the divine will requires not only that what God wills to be should be, but also that it should be in the mode that God wills it to be: for even in natural agents, when the active force is strong, it likens its effects to itself not only in its species, but also in its accidents, which are a kind of mode of that thing. Therefore the efficacy of the divine will does not remove contingency.

Moreover. God wills the good of the universe the more especially than any particular good, according as the likeness of His goodness is more completely found therein. Now the completeness of the universe demands that some things should be contingent, else not all the degrees of being would be contained in the universe. Therefore God wills some things to be contingent.

Again. The good of the universe consists in a certain order, as stated in 11 Metaph. Now the order of the universe requires that certain causes be changeable; since bodies belong to the perfection of the universe and they move not unless they be moved. Now from a changeable cause contingent effects follow: since the effect cannot have more stable being than the cause. Hence we find that, though the remote cause be necessary, yet if the proximate cause be contingent, the effect is contingent. This is evidenced by what happens with the lower bodies: for they are contingent on account of the contingency of their proximate causes, although their remote causes, which are the heavenly movements, are necessary. Therefore God wills some things to happen contingently.

Further. Necessity by supposition in a cause cannot argue absolute necessity in its effect. Now God wills something in the creature not of absolute necessity, but only of necessity by supposition, as we have proved. Wherefore from the divine will we cannot argue absolute necessity in creatures. Now this alone excludes contingency, since even contingents that are indifferent to either of two alternatives become necessary by supposition: thus it is necessary that Socrates be moved if he runs. Therefore the divine will does not exclude contingency from the things willed.

Hence it does not follow, if God wills a thing, that it happens of necessity, but that this conditional proposition is true and necessary, If God wills a thing, it will be: and yet the consequence is not necessary.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THAT A REASON OF THE DIVINE WILL CAN BE ASSIGNED

WE can gather from what has been said that it is possible to assign a reason of the divine will.

For the end is the reason of willing the means. Now God wills His goodness as an end, and He wills all else as means to that end. Therefore His goodness is the reason why He wills other things which are different from Him.

Again. The particular good is directed to the good of the whole as its end, as the imperfect to the perfect. Now things are the object of the divine will according to their place in the order of good. Hence it follows that the good of the universe is the reason why God wills each particular good in the universe.

Again. As we have shown above, supposing God to will a certain thing, it follows of necessity that He wills whatever is required for that thing. Now that which imposes necessity on something else, is the reason why this other thing is. Therefore the reason why God wills that which is requisite for a thing, is that the thing for which it is requisite may be.

Accordingly we may proceed thus in assigning the reason of the divine will. God wills man to have reason that man may be; He wills man to be that the universe may be complete; and He wills the good of the universe because it is befitting His goodness.

Yet these three reasons do not indicate the same relationship. For the divine goodness neither depends on the perfection of the universe nor gains anything from it. While though the perfection of the universe depends necessarily on certain particular goods, which are the essential parts of the universe, it depends on others not of necessity, although a certain goodness or beauty accrues to the universe through them, for instance through such things as are merely for the protection or beauty of the other parts. And the particular good depends necessarily on those things which are absolutely required for it: although this also has certain things which are for its better being. Wherefore sometimes the reason of the divine will indicates only fittingness, sometimes utility, and sometimes necessity by supposition; but absolutely necessity only when God wills Himself.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THAT NOTHING CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE DIVINE WILL

NOW although it is possible to assign some reason of the divine will, it does not follow that anything is the cause of that will.

For the end is to the will the cause of willing. Now the end of God’s will is His goodness. Therefore this is the cause of God’s willing, and is the selfsame as the act of His will.

But none of the other things willed by God is the cause of His willing: although one of them is the cause of another being directed to the divine goodness. And it is in this sense that God wills one of them on account of another.

Nevertheless it is clear that there is no need to allow of any discursion in the divine will. Because where there is one act, we cannot find discursion, as we have proved above with regard to the intellect. Now God by one act wills His goodness and all else, since His action is His essence.

By what we have said we refute the error of some who say that all things proceed from God according to His simple will, so that no reason is to be given for anything except that God wills it.

Moreover. This is contrary to Divine Scripture which declares that God made all things in accordance with the order of His Wisdom, as expressed in the psalm: Thou hast made all things in wisdom. Again it is written (Ecclus. 1:10) that God poured out His wisdom upon all His works.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

THAT IN GOD THERE IS FREE-WILL

IT is possible to conclude from the foregoing that free-will is to be found in God.

For free-will is applied to those things that one wills not of necessity but of one’s own accord: wherefore in us there is free-will in regard to our wishing to run or walk. Now God wills not of necessity things other than Himself, as we have shown above. Therefore it is fitting that God should have free-will.

Again. The divine will, in those things to which it is not determined by its nature, is inclined in a way by the intellect, as we have shown above. Now man to the exclusion of other animals is said to have free-will, because he is inclined to will by the judgment of his reason, and not by natural impulse as brute animals are. Therefore there is free-will in God.

Again. According to the Philosopher (3 Ethic.) will is of the end, but choice is of the means to the end. Wherefore since God wills Himself as end, and other things as means to the end, it follows that in regard to Himself He has will only, but in respect of other things choice. Now choice is always an act of free-will. Therefore free-will is befitting God.

Further. Through having free-will man is said to be master of his own actions. Now this is most befitting the first agent, whose action depends on no other. Therefore God has free-will.

This may also be gathered from the very signification of the word. For the free is that which is its own cause according to the Philosopher at the beginning of the Metaphysics: and to none is this more befitting than to the first cause which is God.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THAT THE PASSIONS OF THE APPETITE ARE NOT IN GOD

FROM the foregoing we may conclude that the passions of the appetite are not in God.

For there is no passion in the intellective appetite, but only in the sensitive, as is proved in 7 Phys. Now no such appetite can be in God, since He has no knowledge through senses, as clearly results from what has been said. Therefore it follows that no passion of the appetite is in God.

Further. Every passion of the appetite is accompanied by a bodily change, for instance in respect of the contraction and dilatation of the heart or something of the kind. But none of these can possibly happen in God, since He is not a body nor a power in a body, as we have shown above. Therefore there is no passion of the appetite in Him.

Again. In every passion of the appetite the patient is somewhat drawn outside its ordinary, even, or connatural disposition: a sign of which is that these passions if they become intense cause an animal’s death. But it is impossible for God to be in any way drawn outside His natural disposition, since He is utterly unchangeable, as was shown above. It is therefore evident that these passions cannot be in God.

Moreover. Every emotion that is accompanied by a passion, has one definite object, according to the mode and measure of the passion. For a passion has an impulse to some one thing, even as nature has: and on this account it needs to be curbed and ruled by reason. Now the divine will is not in itself determined to one in things created, except by the ordering of His Wisdom, as was proved above. Therefore there is no emotional passion in Him.

Again. Every passion is in a subject that is in potentiality. But God is altogether free of potentiality, since He is pure act. Therefore He is agent only, and in no way can passion take place in Him.

Accordingly all passion by reason of its genus is absent from God.

Some passions, however, are absent from God not only by reason of their genus, but also on account of their species. For every passion takes its species from its object. Wherefore a passion whose object is wholly unbefitting God is absent from God on account of its proper species. Such a passion is sorrow or pain: for its object is an actually inherent evil, just as the object of joy is a good present and possessed. Sorrow, therefore, and pain by their very nature cannot be in God.

Again. The formality of a passion's object is taken not only from good or evil, but also from the fact that a person is referred in some mode to the one or the other: for thus it is that hope and joy differ. Wherefore if the mode in which a person is referred to the object—that mode being essential to the passion—is not becoming to God, neither can the passion itself be becoming to God, and this by reason of its proper species. Now although hope has a good for its object, this is a good not already acquired, but to be yet obtained. And this cannot be competent to God, on account of His perfection, which is so great that nothing can be added to it. Hope therefore cannot be in God, even by reason of its species: nor again desire of anything not possessed.

Moreover. Just as the divine perfection excludes from God the potentiality of acquiring any additional good, so too and much more it excludes the potentiality to evil. Now fear regards evil that may be imminent, even as hope regards a good to be acquired. Wherefore fear by reason of its species is absent from God on two counts: both because it is befitting only one that is in potentiality, and because its object is an evil that can become present.

Again. Repentance denotes a change in the appetite. Wherefore the idea of repentance is inapplicable to God, both because it is a kind of sorrow, and because it implies a change of will.

Further. Without error in the cognitive power, it is impossible for that which is good to be apprehended as evil. Nor does it happen that the evil of one can be the good of another, save in particular goods, wherein the corruption of one is the generation of another: while the universal good is nowise impaired by any particular good, but is reflected by each one. Now God is the universal good, and by partaking of His likeness all things are said to be good. Hence no one's evil can be to Him a good. Nor is it possible for Him to apprehend as evil that which is good simply, and is not evil to Him: because His knowledge is without error, as we have proved above. Hence envy cannot possibly be in God, even according to the nature of its species; not only because envy is a kind of sorrow, but because it grieves for the good of another, and thus looks upon another's good as its own evil.

Again. To grieve for a good is like desiring an evil: for the former results from a good being deemed an evil, while the latter results from an evil being deemed a good. Now anger is the desire of another's evil in revenge. Therefore anger is far removed from God according to its specific nature; not only because it is an effect of sorrow, but also because it is a desire for revenge on account of sorrow arising from a harm inflicted.

Also, whatsoever passions are species or effects of the above, are equally removed from God.

CHAPTER XC

THAT IN GOD ARE DELIGHT AND JOY, NOR ARE THEY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE DIVINE PERFECTION

THERE are, however, certain passions which, though unbecoming to God as passions, nevertheless contain nothing in their specific nature incompatible with the divine perfection.

Among these are joy and delight. For joy has for its object a present good. Wherefore neither by reason of its object which is a good, nor by reason of the way in which it is referred to that object, which is actually possessed, is joy, according to its specific nature, incompatible with the divine perfection.

Hence it is evident that joy or delight, properly speaking, is in God. Because just as good and evil apprehended are the object of the sensible appetite, so are they the object of the intellective appetite. For it belongs to both to ensue good and to avoid evil, whether so in truth, or in the estimation: except that the object of the intellective appetite is more universal than that of the sensitive appetite, since the intellective appetite regards good or evil simply, whereas the sensitive appetite regards good or evil according to the senses; even as the object of the intellect is more universal than that of the senses. Now the operations of the appetite take their species from their objects. Accordingly we find in the intellective appetite, which is the will, operations specifically similar to those of the sensitive appetite, differing in this, that in the sensitive appetite they are passions, on account of its connection with a bodily organ, whereas in the intellective appetite they are pure operations. For just as by the passion of fear which, in the sensitive appetite, one shuns a future evil, so, without passion, the intellective appetite has a like operation. Since then joy and delight are not inapplicable to God according to their species, but only as passions, while they are in the will according to their species, but not as passions, it follows that they are not absent from the divine will.

Again. Joy and delight are a kind of repose of the will in the object of its willing. Now God is supremely at rest in Himself, Who is the principal object of His will, as finding all sufficiency in Himself. Therefore by His will He rejoices and delights supremely in Himself.

Further. Delight is a perfection of operation, as the Philosopher teaches (10 Ethic.), for it perfects operation as beauty perfects youth. Now God has a most perfect operation in understanding, as shown above. Therefore if our act of understanding is delightful on account of its perfection, God's act of understanding will be most delightful to Him.

Moreover. Everything naturally rejoices in its like as being congenial to it; except accidentally, in so far as this thing is detrimental to it, thus potters quarrel among themselves, because one hinders the profit of another. Now every good is a likeness of the divine goodness, as stated above: nor is any good prejudicial to it. Therefore God rejoices in every good. Therefore joy and delight are in Him properly speaking. Yet joy and delight differ in aspect. For delight is caused by a good conjoined in reality, while joy does not require this conjunction, because the mere repose of the will in the thing willed suffices for the notion of joy. Hence delight is only in a conjoined good, if it be taken in its proper sense: whereas joy is in a separate good. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, God delights in Himself, but rejoices in Himself in other things.

CHAPTER XCI

THAT IN GOD THERE IS LOVE

IN like manner it follows that love is in God as an act of His will.

For it belongs properly to the nature of love that the lover wills the good of the beloved. Now God wills His own and others' good, as stated above. Accordingly then God loves both Himself and other things.

Again. True love requires one to will another's good as one's own. For a thing whose good one wills merely as conducive to another's good, is loved accidentally: thus he who wills wine to be preserved that he may drink it, or who loves a man that he may be useful or pleasing to him, loves the wine or the man accidentally, but himself properly speaking. Now God loves each thing's good as its own, since He wills each thing to be in as much as it is good in itself: although He directs one to the profit of another. God therefore truly loves both Himself and other things.

Moreover. Since everything naturally wills or desires its own good in its own way, if the nature of love is that the lover will or desire the good of the beloved, it follows that the lover is referred to the beloved as to a thing that is in a way one with him. Wherefore it appears that the proper notion of love consists in the affection of one tending to another as one with himself in some way: for which reason Dionysius describes love as a unitive force. Hence the greater the thing that makes the lover one with the beloved, the more intense is the love: for we love those more who are united to us by the origin of birth, or by frequent companionship, than those who are merely united to us by the bond of human nature. Again, the more the cause of union is deeply seated in the lover, the stronger the love: wherefore sometimes a love that is caused by a passion becomes more intense than a love arising from natural origin or from some habit, although it is more liable to be transitory. Now the cause of all things being united to God, namely His goodness, which all things reflect, is exceeding great and deeply seated in God, since Himself is His own goodness. Wherefore in God not only is there true love, but also most perfect and most abiding love.

Again. On the part of its object, love does not denote anything inconsistent with God: since that object is a good. Nor again, as regards the way in which it is referred to its object, since a thing when possessed is loved not less, but more, because a good is more closely united to us when possessed. Wherefore in natural things movement towards an end is more intense if the end be near (although the contrary happens accidentally sometimes, for instance when we discover something repugnant to love in the beloved, for then possession diminishes love). Accordingly love is not inconsistent with the divine perfection, as regards its specific nature. Therefore it is in God.

Further. It belongs to love to seek union as Dionysius says. For since, on account of likeness or becomingness between lover and beloved, the affection of the lover is somehow united to the beloved, the appetite tends to the completion of the union, namely that the union which was begun in the affections be completed in actions. Wherefore it belongs to friends to rejoice in mutual companionship, living together, and common pursuits. Now God moves all other things to union: for in as much as He gives them being and other perfections, He unites them to Himself as far as possible. Therefore God loves both Himself and other things.

Again. Love is the source of all the emotions. For joy and desire are only of a good that is loved; fear and sorrow are only of evil that is contrary to the beloved good; and from these all the other emotions arise. Now joy and delight are in God, as we have shown above. Therefore in God there is love.

Someone, however, might think that God loves not one thing more than another. For if intenseness and remissness are proper to a changeable nature, they cannot apply to God, from whom all change is far removed.

Again. None of the other things that are said of God by way of operation, are applied to Him more or less: since He knows not one thing more than another, nor rejoices more in this than in that.

Accordingly it must be observed that while other operations of the soul are about one object only, love alone appears to be directed to a twofold object. For if we understand or rejoice, it follows that we are referred somehow to some object: whereas love wills something to someone, since we are said to love that to which we will some good, in the way aforesaid. Hence when we want a thing, we are said simply and properly to desire it, and not to love it, but rather to love ourselves for whom we want it: and in consequence we are said to love it accidentally and improperly. Accordingly other operations are intense or remiss in proportion to the energy alone of the action. But this cannot apply to God: because energy of action is measured by the force from which it proceeds, and every divine action is of one and the same force. On the other hand love may be intense or remiss in two ways. In one way, as regards the good that we will someone; according to which we are said to love that person more for whom we will a greater good. In another way, as regards the energy of the action, according to which we are said to love that person more, for whom, although we will not a greater good, nevertheless we will an equal good with greater fervour and efficacy. In the first way, accordingly, nothing forbids us to say that God loves one thing more than another, according as He wills for it a greater good. But in the second way this cannot be said, for the same reason as we have stated in the case of other operations.

It is therefore clear from what has been said, that none of our emotions, properly speaking, can be in God, except joy and love: and yet even these are not in Him as they are in us, by way of passion.

That joy or delight is in God is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said in the psalm: At Thy right hand are delights even to the end: divine Wisdom, which is God, as we have proved, says (Prov. 9): I was delighted every day, playing before Him, and (Luke 15:10): There is joy in heaven upon one sinner doing penance. Also the Philosopher says (7 Ethic.) that God rejoices with one simple delight.

Scripture also makes mention of God’s love (Deut. 33:3): He hath loved the people; (Jerem. 31:3): I have loved thee with an everlasting love; (Jo. 16:27): For the Father Himself loveth you. Certain philosophers also taught that God’s love is the principle of things: in agreement with which is the saying of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv.) that God’s love did not allow Him to be unproductive.

It must, however, be observed that even other emotions which by their specific nature are inapplicable to God, are applied to God in Holy Writ, not indeed properly, as we have shown, but metaphorically, on account of a likeness either of effects, or of some preceding emotion.

I say of effects, because sometimes His will, by the ordering of His Wisdom, tends to an effect to which a person is inclined through a defective passion: thus a judge punishes out of justice, as an angry man out of anger. Accordingly sometimes God is said to be angry, in as much as by the ordering of His Wisdom He wills to punish someone, according to the saying of the psalm: When His wrath shall be kindled in a short time. He is said to be merciful, in as much as out of His good-will He removes man’s unhappiness, even as we do the same through the passion of mercy. Hence the psalm says: The Lord is compassionate and merciful, long-suffering and plenteous in mercy. Sometimes also He is said to repent, in as much as in accordance with the eternal and unchangeable decree of His providence, He makes what He destroyed before, or destroys what previously He made: even as those who are moved by repentance are wont to do. Hence (Gen. 6:7): It repenteth Me that I have made man. That this cannot be taken in the proper sense is clear from the words of 1 Kings 15:29: The Triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance.

I also say on account of a likeness to a preceding emotion. For love and joy, which are in God properly, are the principles of all the emotions: love by way of moving principle; joy by way of end: wherefore even an angry man rejoices while punishing, as having obtained his end. Hence God is said to grieve, in as much as certain things occur contrary to those He loves and approves: even as we grieve for what has happened against our will. This is instanced (Isa. 59:15, 16): God saw, and it appeared evil in His eyes, because there is no judgment. And He saw that there is not a man, and He stood astonished, because there is none to oppose Himself.

By what has been said we can refute the error of certain Jews who ascribed to God anger, sorrow, repentance, and all such passions in their proper sense, failing to discriminate between the proper and the metaphorical expressions of Scripture.

CHAPTER XCII

HOW VIRTUES ARE TO BE ASCRIBED TO GOD

IN sequence to what has been said we must show how virtues are to be ascribed to God. For just as His being is universally perfect, in some way containing within itself the perfection of all beings, so must His goodness in some way comprise the various kinds of goodness of all things. Now virtue is a kind of goodness of the virtuous person, since in respect thereof he is said to be good, and his work good. It follows therefore that the divine goodness contains in its own way all virtues.

Wherefore none of them is ascribed as a habit to God, as it is to us. For it is not befitting God to be good through something else added to Him, but by His essence: for He is altogether simple. Nor does He act by anything added to His essence, since His action is His being, as we have shown. Therefore His virtue is not a habit, but His essence.

Again. Habit is imperfect act, a mean as it were between potentiality and act: wherefore one who has a habit is compared to a person asleep. But in God there is most perfect act. Hence act in Him is not like a habit, as knowledge, but like to consider which is an ultimate and perfect act.

Again. Habit perfects a potentiality; but in God nothing is potential but only actual. Therefore a habit cannot be in Him.

Further. Habit is a kind of accident: and this is utterly foreign to God, as we have proved above. Neither therefore is virtue ascribed to God as a habit, but only as His essence.

Now since it is by human virtues that human life is regulated, and since human life is twofold, contemplative and active, those virtues which belong to the active life, as perfecting it, cannot be becoming to God.

For the active life of man consists in the use of bodily goods: wherefore those virtues regulate the active life, by which we use these goods aright. But these goods cannot be befitting God. Therefore neither can these virtues, in so far as they regulate this life.

Again. The like virtues perfect man's conduct in his civil life, wherefore they do not seem very applicable to those who have nothing to do with the civil life. Much less therefore can they be applied to God, whose conduct and life are far removed from the manner of human life.

Moreover. Some of the virtues that are concerned with the active life regulate us in regard to the passions. These we cannot ascribe to God. For those virtues which are concerned with the passions take their species from those very passions as from their proper objects: wherefore temperance differs from fortitude because the former is about desires, while the latter is about fear and daring. But in God there are no passions, as we have proved. Neither therefore can these virtues be in God.

Again. These same virtues are not in the intellective part of the soul, but in the sensitive part, wherein alone can the passions be, as is proved in 7 Phys. But there is no sensitive faculty in God, but only intellect. It follows, therefore, that these virtues cannot be in God, even according to their proper signification.

Some of the passions about which these virtues are concerned result from an inclination of the appetite to some bodily good that is pleasant to the senses, for instance, meat, drink, and sexual matters, and in respect of the desires for these things there are sobriety, chastity, and speaking in a general way, temperance and continency. Wherefore, since bodily pleasures are utterly removed from God, the aforesaid virtues neither apply to God properly, since they are about the passions, nor even are they applied to God metaphorically in the Scriptures, because no likeness to them is to be found in God, as regards a likeness in their effects.

And there are some passions resulting from an inclination of the appetite to a spiritual good, such as honour, dominion, victory, revenge, and so forth; and about our hopes, darings, and any acts whatsoever of the appetite in respect of these things, there are fortitude, magnanimity, meekness, and other like virtues. These cannot be in God properly, because they are about the passions; but they are applied metaphorically to God in Scripture, on account of a likeness of effect: for instance (1 Kings 2:2): There is none strong like our God; and (Mich. 6): Seek the meek, seek the good.

CHAPTER XCIII

THAT IN GOD THERE ARE THE MORAL VIRTUES WHICH ARE ABOUT ACTIONS

NOW there are some virtues which regulate man’s active life, and are concerned not with passions but with actions, such as truth, justice, liberality, magnificence, prudence, and art.

Now since virtue derives its species from its object or matter, while the actions that are the matter or object of these virtues are not inconsistent with the divine perfection; neither is there in these virtues according to their proper species, any thing for which they should be excluded from the divine perfection.

Again. These virtues are perfections of the will and intellect, which are principles of operation without passion. Now in God there are will and intellect wherein there is no lack of perfection. Therefore these virtues cannot be lacking in God.

Moreover. The proper reason about all things that take their being from God exists in the divine intellect, as we have proved above. Now the reason in the craftsman’s mind about the thing to be made, is art: wherefore the Philosopher says (6 Ethic.) that art is right reason about things to be made. Therefore art is properly in God: and for this reason it is said (Wis. 7:21): Wisdom, the Artificer of all things, taught me.

Again. God’s will, in things other than Himself, is determined to one particular thing by His knowledge, as was shown above. Now knowledge, directing the will to operation, is prudence, since prudence, according to the Philosopher (6 Ethic.) is right reason about things to be done. Therefore prudence is in God: and this is what is said (Job 26.): With Him is prudence and strength.

Again. It was shown above that through willing a particular thing, God wills whatever is required for that thing. Now that which is requisite for a perfection of a thing is due to it. Therefore in God there is justice, which consists in rendering to each one what is his. Wherefore it is said in the psalm: The Lord is just and hath loved justice.

Moreover. As shown above, the last end, for the sake of which God wills all things, nowise depends on the things directed to the end, neither as to its being nor as to any perfection. Wherefore He wills to communicate His goodness to a thing not that He may gain thereby, but because the very act of communicating is befitting Him as the source of goodness. Now to give not for a gain expected from the giving, but through goodness and becomingness, is an act of liberality, as the Philosopher teaches (4 Ethic.). Therefore God is most liberal, and as Avicenna says, He alone can properly be called liberal, since every other agent, except God, gains by his action some good which is the end in view. Scripture declares this His liberality when it says in the psalm: When Thou openest Thy hand they shall all be filled with good; and (James 1:5): Who giveth to all men abundantly and upbraideth not.

Again. All that receive being from God must needs bear His likeness, in as much as they are, and are good, and have their proper types in the divine intellect, as we have shown above. Now it belongs to the virtue of truth according to the Philosopher (4 Ethic.) that a man by his words and deeds show himself such as he is. Therefore in God is the virtue of truth. Hence it is said (Rom. 3:4): Now God is true, and in the psalm: All Thy ways are truth.

But whatever virtues are directed to certain actions of subjects in reference to superiors, are inapplicable to God: for instance, obedience, religion, and the like which are due to a superior.

Again, the aforesaid virtues cannot be ascribed to God in respect of any of their acts that may be imperfect. Thus prudence as to its act of taking good counsel is not befitting God. For since counsel is an inquiry (6 Ethic.), whereas the divine knowledge is not inquisitive, as was proved above, it cannot become it to take counsel. Wherefore we read (Job 26:3): To whom hast Thou given counsel? Perhaps to him that hath no wisdom? and (Isa.

40:14): With whom hath He consulted, and who hath instructed Him? On the other hand, as regards the act of judging of things counselled and the choice of those approved, nothing hinders prudence being ascribed to God. However, counsel is sometimes ascribed to God, either by reason of a likeness in the point of secrecy, for counsels are taken in secret; wherefore the secrets of the divine wisdom are called counsels metaphorically, for instance Isa. 25:1, according to another version: May Thy counsel of old be verified; or in the point of satisfying those who seek counsel of Him, for it belongs to one who understands even without discursion, to instruct inquirers.

Likewise justice as to its act of commutation cannot be ascribed to God: since He receives naught from any one. Hence we read (Rom. 11:35): Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? and (Job. 41:2): Who hath given Me before that I should repay him? However, we are said metaphorically to give certain things to God, in as much as God accepts our gifts. Hence it is befitting Him to have not commutative, but only distributive, justice. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii.) that God is praised for His justice, because He distributes to all according to their merits: as expressed by those words of Matt. 25:15: He gave … to everyone according to his proper ability.

It must be noted, however, that the actions about which the aforesaid virtues are concerned do not by their nature depend on human affairs, for to judge of what has to be done, and to give or distribute something, belongs not to man alone but to every intelligent being. But so far as they are confined to human concerns, they, to a certain extent, take their species from them, just as a crooked nose makes a species of ape. Accordingly the aforesaid virtues, so far as they regulate man’s active life, are directed to these actions as confined to human affairs and taking their species from them. In this way they cannot be ascribed to God. But so far as the aforesaid actions are understood in a general sense, they can be adapted even to things divine. For just as man is a dispenser of human things, such as money or honours, so is God the bestower of all the goods of the universe. Hence the aforesaid virtues in God have a more universal range than in man: for as justice in man relates to the state or the household, so God’s justice extends to the whole universe. Wherefore the divine virtues are called exemplar virtues: because things that are limited and particularized are likenesses of absolute beings, as the light of a candle in comparison with the light of the sun. But other virtues which properly are not applicable to God have no exemplar in the divine nature, but only in the divine Wisdom, which contains the proper types of all beings; as is the case with other corporeal things.

CHAPTER XCIV

THAT THE CONTEMPLATIVE VIRTUES ARE IN GOD

THERE can be no doubt that the contemplative virtues are most becoming to God.

For since wisdom consists in the knowledge of the highest causes, according to the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics, and since God knows Himself principally, nor knows aught save by knowing Himself, as we have proved, Who is the first cause of all; it is evident that wisdom ought to be especially ascribed to Him. Hence we read (Job 9:4): He is wise in heart; and (Ecclus. 1:1): All wisdom is from the Lord God and hath been always with Him. The Philosopher, too, says at the beginning of his Metaphysics that it is a divine, not a human, possession.

Again. Since science is the knowledge of a thing by its proper cause, and since He knows the order of all causes and effects, as we have shown above, it is evident that science is properly in Him: not that science however which is caused by reasoning, as our science is caused by a demonstration. Hence it is written (1 Kings 2:3): The Lord is a God of all knowledge.

Further. Since immaterial knowledge of things without discoursing is understanding; and since God has this kind of knowledge about all things, as proved above, it follows that in Him is understanding. Hence we read (Job 12:13): He hath counsel and understanding.

In God these virtues are the exemplars of ours, as the perfect of the imperfect.

CHAPTER XCV

THAT GOD CANNOT WILL EVIL

FROM what has been said it can be proved that God cannot will evil.

For the virtue of a thing is that by which one produces a good work. Now every work of God is a work of virtue, since His virtue is His essence, as we have shown above. Therefore He cannot will evil.

Again. The will never tends towards evil unless there be an error in the reason, at least as regards the particular object of choice. For since the object of the will is an apprehended good, the will cannot tend towards an evil unless, in some way, it is proposed to it as a good; and this cannot be without an error. Now there can be no error in the divine knowledge, as we have shown. Therefore God's will cannot tend to evil.

Moreover. God is the sovereign good, as was proved above. Now the sovereign good does not suffer the company of evil, as neither does the supremely hot suffer an admixture of cold. Therefore the divine will cannot be inclined to evil.

Further. Since good has the aspect of end, evil cannot be an object of the will except the latter turn away from its end. But the divine will cannot turn away from its end, because He cannot will anything except by willing Himself, as we have proved. Therefore He cannot will evil.

It is therefore evident that in Him free-will is naturally established in good.

This is expressed in the words of Deut. 32:4: God is faithful and without any iniquity, and Habac. 1:13: Thy eyes are … pure … and Thou canst not look on iniquity.

Hereby is confuted the error of the Jews who assert in the Talmud that God sins sometimes and is cleansed from sin; and also of the Luciferiani who say that God sinned in casting out Lucifer.

CHAPTER XCVI

THAT GOD HATES NOTHING, NOR CAN THE HATRED OF ANYTHING BE ASCRIBED TO HIM

HENCE it appears that hatred of a thing cannot be ascribed to God.

Because as love is related to good, so is hatred to evil: for we will good to those whom we love; but evil to those whom we hate. Therefore if God's will cannot be inclined to evil, as was proved above, it is impossible for Him to hate anything.

Again. As we have shown above, God's will tends to things other than Himself, in as much as, by willing and loving His being and goodness, He wills it to be poured forth, as far as possible, by communicating its likeness. Accordingly that which God wills in things other than Himself, is that the likeness of His goodness be in them. Now the goodness of each thing consists in its partaking of the divine likeness: since every other goodness is nothing but a likeness of the first goodness. Therefore God wills good to everything: and consequently He hates nothing.

Again. From the first being all others take the origin of their being. Wherefore if He hates any one of the things that are, He wills it not to be, because to be is a thing's good. Hence He wills His action not to be, whereby that thing is brought into being mediately or immediately; for it has been proved above, that if God wills a thing, it follows that He wills whatever is required for that thing. But this is impossible. And this is evident, if things are brought into being by His will, since in that case the action whereby things are produced must be voluntary: and likewise if He be the cause of things naturally, because just as His nature pleases Him, so also everything that His nature requires pleases Him. Therefore God hates not anything.

Further. That which is found naturally in all active causes, must most of all be found in the first active cause. Now every active cause loves its effect as such in its own way, for instance parents love their children, a poet his poems, a craftsman his handiwork. Much more therefore God hates nothing, since He is the cause of all.

This agrees with the saying of Wis. 11:25: Thou lovest all the things that are and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.

And yet God is said metaphorically to hate certain things: and this in two ways. First, from the fact that God in loving things, and willing their good to be, wills the contrary evil not to be. Wherefore He is said to hate evils, since we are said to hate that which we will not to be; according to Zach. 8:17, Let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against his friend; and love not a false oath, for all these are the things that I hate, saith the Lord. But such things are not His effects as subsistent things, to which hatred or love are directed properly speaking.

The other way is due to God willing some greater good that cannot be without the privation of a lesser good. And thus He is said to hate, since to do more than this were to love. For, in this way, for as much as He wills the good of justice or of the order of the universe, which good is impossible without the punishment or destruction of some, He is said to hate those whose punishment or destruction He wills; according to Mal. 1:3: I have hated Esau, and the words of the psalm: Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity, thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie: the bloody and the deceitful man the Lord will abhor.

CHAPTER XCVII

THAT GOD IS A LIVING BEING

FROM what has been already proved, it follows of necessity that God is a living being.

For it has been shown that in God there are intelligence and will. Now intelligence and will are only in that which lives. Therefore God is a living being.

Again. Life is ascribed to certain things in as much as they seem to be set in motion of themselves and not by another. For which reason, things which seem to be moved of themselves, the cause of which movement is not perceived by the unlearned, are described metaphorically as living: for instance we speak of the living water of a flowing source, but not of a tank or stagnant pond; and of ‘quick’-silver, which seems to have a kind of movement. For properly speaking those things alone are themselves in motion, which move themselves, being composed of mover and moved, such as animate beings. Wherefore such things alone are said to live, while all others are moved by some other thing, either as generating them, or as removing an obstacle, or as impelling them. And since sensible operations are accompanied by movement, furthermore whatever moves itself to its proper operations, although these be without movement, is said to live: wherefore intelligence, appetite and sensation are vital actions. Now God especially works not as moved by another but by Himself, since He is the first active cause. Therefore to live is befitting Him above all.

Again. The divine being contains every perfection of being, as was shown above. Now life is a kind of perfect existence; wherefore living beings are placed above not-living things in the order of beings. Therefore God’s being is life. Therefore He is a living being.

This is confirmed by the authority of divine Scripture. For it is said (Deut. 32:40) in the person of the Lord: I will say: I live for ever, and in the psalm: My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.

CHAPTER XCVIII

THAT GOD IS HIS OWN LIFE

FROM this it further appears that God is His own life.

For life in a living being is the same as to live expressed in the abstract; just as a running is in reality the same as to run. Now in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher declares (2 De Anima). For since an animal is said to be living because it has a soul whereby it has existence, as it were by its proper form, it follows that to live is nothing but a particular kind of existence resulting from a particular kind of form. Now God is His own existence, as proved above. Therefore He is His own living and His own life.

Again. Intelligence is a kind of life, as the Philosopher declares (2 De Anima): since to live is the act of a living being. Now God is His own act of intelligence, as we have proved. Therefore He is His own living and His own life.

Moreover. If God were not His own life, since He is a living being as shown above, it would follow that He is living by a participation of life. Now whatever is by participation is reduced to that which is by its essence. Wherefore God would be reduced to something preceding Him whereby He would live. But this is impossible, as is evident from what has been said.

Again. If God is a living being, as we have proved, it follows that life is in Him. Wherefore if He be not His own life, there will be something in Him that is not Himself: and consequently He will be composite. But this was disproved above. Therefore God is His own life.

This is What is said (Jo. 14:6): I am the life.

CHAPTER XCIX

THAT GOD’S LIFE IS ETERNAL

IT follows from this that God’s life is eternal. For nothing ceases to live except by being severed from life. But nothing can be severed from itself: for all severance results from the separation of one thing from another. Therefore it is impossible that God cease to live, since Himself is His own life, as we have proved.

Again. Whatever sometimes is and sometimes is not, results from a cause: for nothing brings itself from not-being to being: since what is not yet, acts not. Now the divine life has no cause, as neither has the divine existence. Therefore He is not sometimes living and sometimes not living, but is ever living. Therefore His life is eternal.

Again. In every operation the operator remains, although sometimes the operation is transitory by way of succession: wherefore in movement the thing moved remains the same identically though not logically. Hence where action is the agent itself, it follows that nothing passes by in succession, but that the whole is throughout the same simultaneously. Now in God to understand and to live are God Himself, as was proved. Therefore His life is without succession and is simultaneously whole. Therefore it is eternal.

Moreover. God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved above. But that which begins or ceases to live, or is subject to succession in living, is changeable: for the life of a being begins by generation and ceases by corruption, and succession results from change of some kind. Therefore God neither began to be, nor will cease to be, nor is subject to succession in living. Therefore His life is eternal.

Wherefore it is said (Deut. 32:40) in the person of the Lord: I live for ever; and (1 Jo. 5.): This is the true God and life eternal.

CHAPTER C

THAT GOD IS HAPPY

IT remains for us to show from the foregoing that God is happy. For happiness is the proper good of every intellectual nature. Since then God is intelligent, His proper good is happiness. Now He is compared to His proper good, not as that which tends to a good not yet possessed—for this belongs to a nature that is changeable and in potentiality, but as that which already possesses its proper good. Wherefore He not only desires happiness, as we do, but enjoys it. Therefore He is happy.

Moreover. An intellectual nature desires and wills above all that which is most perfect in it, and this is its happiness: and the most perfect thing in every being is its most perfect operation: for power and habit are perfected by operation; wherefore the Philosopher says that happiness is a perfect operation. Now the perfection of operation depends on four things. First, on its genus, namely that it abide in the operator: and by an operation abiding in the operator I mean one by which nothing else is done besides the operation, for instance to see or to hear. For the like are perfections of those things whose operations they are, and can be something ultimate, because they are not directed to something made as their end. On the other hand, an operation or action from which there follows something done besides the action itself, is a perfection of the thing done, not of the doer, and is compared to the doer as its end. Hence such an operation of the intellectual nature, is not beatitude or happiness. Secondly, on the principle of operation, that it should be an operation of the highest power. Hence happiness in us is not by an operation of the senses, but by an operation of the intellect perfected by a habit. Thirdly, on the object of the operation. For this reason ultimate happiness in us consists in understanding the highest object of our intellect. Fourthly, on the form of operation, namely that the operation should be performed perfectly, easily, constantly, and pleasurably. Now such is the operation of God. For He is intelligent; and His intellect is the sovereign power, nor needs to be perfected by a habit, since it is perfect in itself, as we proved above. He also understands Himself, Who is the highest of intelligible objects, perfectly, without any difficulty, and pleasurably. Therefore He is happy.

Again. Every desire is set at rest by happiness; because once it is possessed nothing remains to be desired, for it is the last end. Accordingly He must be happy, since He is perfect in all things that can be desired; wherefore Boethius says that happiness is a state made perfect by the assemblage of all good things. Now such is the divine perfection that it contains every perfection with simplicity, as shown above. Therefore He is truly happy.

Again. As long as a person lacks that which he needs, he is not yet happy: for his desire is not yet set at rest. Whosoever, therefore, is self-sufficient, needing nothing, is happy. Now it was proved above that God needs not other things, since His perfection depends on nothing outside Him: nor does He will other things for His own sake as their end, as though He needed them, but merely because this is befitting His goodness. Therefore He is happy.

Further. It has been proved that God cannot will what is impossible. Now it is impossible for anything to accrue to Him that He has not already, since He is nowise in potentiality, as we have shown. Therefore He cannot will to have what He has not. Whatever then He wills He has. Nor does He will anything ill, as we have proved. Therefore He is happy, according as some assert that a happy man is one who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.

Holy Writ also bears witness to His happiness (1 Tim. 6): Which in His times He shall show, Who is blessed and … mighty.

CHAPTER CI

THAT GOD IS HIS OWN HAPPINESS

IT follows from this that God is His own happiness.

For His happiness is His intellectual operation, as we have shown: and it was proved above that God’s act of intelligence is His substance. Therefore He is His own happiness.

Again. Happiness, since it is the last end, is that which everyone wills principally, whether he has a natural inclination for it, or possesses it already. Now it has been proved that God principally wills His essence. Therefore His essence is His happiness.

Further. Whatever a person wills he directs to his happiness: for happiness is what is not desired on account of something else, and is the term of the movement of desire in one who desires one thing for the sake of another, else that movement will be indefinite. Since then God wills all other things for the sake of His goodness Which is His essence, it follows that He is His own happiness, even as He is His own essence and His own goodness.

Moreover. There cannot be two sovereign goods: for if either lacked what the other has, neither would be sovereign and perfect. Now it has been shown above that God is the sovereign good. And it will be proved that happiness is the supreme good since it is the last end. Therefore happiness and God are one and the same. Therefore God is His own happiness.

CHAPTER CII

THAT GOD’S HAPPINESS IS PERFECT AND SINGULAR, SURPASSING ALL OTHER HAPPINESS

FURTHERMORE, from what has been said we are able to consider the excellence of the divine happiness.

For the nearer a thing is to happiness, the more perfectly is it happy. Hence, although a person be called happy on account of his hope of obtaining happiness, his happiness can nowise be compared to the happiness of one who has already actually obtained it. Now that which is happiness itself is nearest of all to happiness: and this has been proved to be true of God. Therefore He is singularly and perfectly happy.

Again. Since joy is caused by love, as was proved, where there is greater love there is greater joy in possessing the thing loved. Now, other things being equal, every being loves itself more than another: a sign of which is, that the nearer a thing is to one, the more is it naturally loved. Therefore God rejoices more in His own happiness, which is Himself, than the other blessed in their happiness, which is not themselves. Therefore His happiness sets His desire more at rest, and is more perfect.

Further. That which is by essence transcends that which is by participation: thus the nature of fire is found to be more perfect in fire itself than in that which is ignited. Now God is happy essentially. And this can apply to no other: for nothing besides Him can be the sovereign good, as may be gathered from what has been said. Hence it follows that whosoever besides Him is happy, is happy by participation. Therefore God’s happiness surpasses all other happiness.

Moreover. Happiness consists in the perfect operation of the intellect, as we have proved. Now no other intellectual operation is comparable with His operation. This is evident not only from its being a subsistent operation, but also because by the one operation God understands Himself perfectly as He is, as well as all things, both those which are and those which are not, both good and evil. Whereas in other intelligent beings their act of understanding themselves is not subsistent, but the act of a subsistence. Nor can anyone understand God, the supremely intelligible, as perfectly as He perfectly is: since no one's being is perfect as the divine being is perfect, and no being's operation can be more perfect than its substance. Nor is there any other intellect that knows all those things even which God can make, for then it would comprehend the divine power. Moreover whatsoever things another intellect knows, it knows them not all by one same operation. Therefore God is incomparably happy above all things.

Again. The more united a thing is, the more perfect its power and goodness. Now a successive operation is divided according to various portions of time. Wherefore its perfection can nowise be compared with the perfection of that operation which is simultaneously whole without any succession: especially if it pass not away in an instant but abide eternally. Now the divine act of intelligence is void of succession, since it exists eternally, simultaneously whole: whereas our act of understanding is successive, for as much as it is accidentally connected with continuity and time. Therefore God's happiness infinitely surpasses man's: even as the duration of eternity surpasses the passing now of time.

Again. Weariness, and the various occupations which in this life must needs interrupt our contemplation wherein especially consists human happiness, if there be any in this life; errors, doubts, and the various misfortunes to which the present life is subject—all these show that human happiness, especially in this life, cannot bear comparison with the happiness of God.

Moreover. The perfection of the divine happiness may be gathered from the fact that it comprises all manner of happiness in the most perfect way. In regard to contemplative happiness, it contains the most perfect everlasting consideration of Himself and other things: and in regard to active happiness, it comprises the governance, not of one man's life, or of one household or city or kingdom, but of the whole universe.

False and earthly happiness is but a shadow of that most perfect happiness. For it consists of five things, according to Boethius, namely pleasure, wealth, power, honour and renown. But God has the most supreme pleasure in Himself, and universal joy in all good things, without any admixture of the contrary. For wealth He possesses in Himself an all-sufficiency of all good things, as we have proved above. For power He has infinite might. For honour He has supremacy and governance over all things. For renown He has the admiration of every intellect which knows Him in any degree whatever.

TO HIM THEREFORE WHO IS SINGULARLY HAPPY, BE HONOUR AND GLORY FOR EVER AND EVER. AMEN.

SECOND BOOK

CHAPTER I

CONNECTION OF THE FOREGOING WITH THE SEQUEL

I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands (Ps. 142:5).

IT is impossible to know a thing perfectly unless we know its operation: since from the mode and species of its operation we gauge the measure and quality of its power, while the power of a thing shows forth its nature: because a thing has naturally an aptitude for work according as it actually has such and such a nature.

Now the operation of a thing is twofold, as the Philosopher teaches (9 Metaph.); one that abides in the very worker and is a perfection of the worker himself, such as to sense, to understand, and to will; and another that passes into an outward thing, and is a perfection of the thing made that results from it, such as to heat, to cut, and to build.

Now both of the aforesaid operations are competent to God: the former, in that He understands, wills, rejoices, and loves; the latter, in that He brings forth things into being, preserves them, and rules them. Since, however, the former operation is a perfection of the operator, while the latter is a perfection of the thing made, and since the agent is naturally prior to the thing made and is the cause thereof, it follows that the first of the aforesaid operations is the reason of the second, and naturally precedes it, as a cause precedes its effect. This is, in fact, clearly seen in human affairs: for the thought and will of the craftsman is the origin and reason of the work of building.

Accordingly the first of the aforesaid operations, as a simple perfection of the operator, claims for itself the name of operation, or again of action:

while the second, as being a perfection of the thing made, takes the name of work, wherefore those things which a craftsman brings into being by an action of this kind are said to be his handiwork.

Of the former operation of God we have already spoken in the foregoing Book, where we treated of the divine knowledge and will. Wherefore in order to complete our treatise of the divine truth, it remains for us to treat of the latter operation, whereby, to wit, things are made and governed by God.

We may gather this order from the words quoted above. For first he speaks of meditation on the first kind of operation, when he says: I meditated on all Thy operations, so that we refer operation to the divine intelligence and will. Then he refers to meditation on God’s works when he says, and I meditated on the works of Thy hands, so that by the works of His hands we understand heaven and earth, and all that is brought into being by God, as the handiwork produced by a craftsman.

CHAPTER II

THAT THE CONSIDERATION OF CREATURES IS USEFUL FOR BUILDING UP OUR FAITH

THIS meditation on the divine works is indeed necessary in order to build up man’s faith in God.

First, because through meditating on His works we are able somewhat to admire and consider the divine wisdom. For things made by art are indications of the art itself, since they are made in likeness to the art. Now God brought things into being by His wisdom: for which reason it is said in the psalm: Thou hast made all things in wisdom. Hence we are able to gather the wisdom of God from the consideration of His works, since by a kind of communication of His likeness it is spread abroad in the things He has made. For it is said (Ecclus. 1:10): He poured her out, namely wisdom, upon all His works: wherefore the psalmist after saying: Thy knowledge is become wonderful to me: it is high, and I cannot reach to it, and after referring to the aid of the divine enlightening, when he says: Night shall be my light, etc., confesses himself to have been helped to know the divine wisdom by the consideration of the divine works, saying: Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well.

Secondly, this consideration leads us to admire the sublime power of God, and consequently begets in men’s hearts a reverence for God. For we must needs conclude that the power of the maker transcends the things made. Wherefore it is said (Wis. 13:4): If they, the philosophers, to wit, admired their power and their effects, namely of the heavens, stars, and elements of the world, let them understand … that He that made them is mightier than they. Also it is written (Rom. 1:20): The invisible things of God … are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity. And this admiration makes us fear and reverence God. Hence it is said (Jerem. 10:6, 7): Great is Thy name in might. Who shall not fear Thee, O King of nations?

Thirdly, this consideration inflames the souls of men to the love of the divine goodness. For whatever goodness and perfection is generally apportioned among various creatures, is all united together in Him universally, as in the source of all goodness, as we proved in the First Book. Wherefore if the goodness, beauty, and sweetness of creatures are so alluring to the minds of men, the fountainhead of the goodness of God Himself, in comparison with the rivulets of goodness which we find in creatures, will draw the entranced minds of men wholly to itself. Hence it is said in the psalm, Thou hast given me, O Lord, a delight in Thy doings; and in the works of Thy hands I shall rejoice: and elsewhere it is said of the children of men: They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, that is of all creatures, and Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. For with Thee is the fountain of life. Again it is said (Wis. 13:1) against certain men: By these good things that are seen, namely creatures that are good by participation, they could not understand Him that is, good to wit, nay more, that is goodness itself, as we have shown in the First Book.

Fourthly, this consideration bestows on man a certain likeness to the divine perfection. For it was shown in the First Book that God, by knowing Himself, beholds all other things in Himself. Since then the Christian faith teaches man chiefly about God, and makes him to know, creatures by the light of divine revelation, there results in man a certain likeness to the divine wisdom. Hence it is said (2 Cor. 3:18): But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image.

Accordingly it is evident that the consideration of creatures helps to build up the Christian faith. Wherefore it is said (Ecclus. 42:15): I will … remember the works of the Lord, and I will declare the things I have seen: by the words of the Lord are His works.

CHAPTER III

THAT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF CREATURES AVAILS FOR REFUTING ERRORS AGAINST GOD

THE consideration of creatures is likewise necessary not only for the building up of faith, but also for the destruction of errors. For errors about creatures sometimes lead one astray from the truth of faith, in so far as they disagree with true knowledge of God. This happens in several ways.

First, because through ignorance of the nature of creatures men are sometimes so far misled as to deem that which can but derive its being from something else, to be the first cause and God, for they think that nothing exists besides visible creatures. Such were those who thought that any kind of body was God: of whom it is said (Wis. 13:2): Who … have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon to be the gods.

Secondly, because they ascribe to certain creatures that which belongs to God alone. This also results from error about creatures: for one does not ascribe to a thing that which is incompatible with its nature, unless one is ignorant of its nature: for instance if we were to ascribe three feet to a man. Now that which belongs to God alone is incompatible with the nature of a creature: even as that which belongs to man alone is incompatible with another thing’s nature. Hence the foregoing error arises from ignorance of the creature’s nature. Against this error it is said (Wis. 14:21): They gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood. Into this error fell those who ascribe the creation of things, or the knowledge of the future, or the working of miracles to causes other than God.

Thirdly, because something is withdrawn from the divine power in its working on creatures, through ignorance of the creature’s nature. This is evidenced in those who ascribe to things a twofold principle, and in those who aver that things proceed from God, not by the divine will, but by natural necessity, and in those who withdraw either all or some things from divine providence, or who deny that it can work outside the ordinary course of things. For all these are derogatory to the divine power. Against these it is said (Job 22:17): Who … looked upon the Almighty as if He could do nothing, and (Wis. 12:17): Thou showest Thy power, when men will not believe Thee to be absolute in power.

Fourthly. Man, who is led by faith to God as his last end, through ignoring the natures of things, and consequently the order of his place in the universe, thinks himself to be beneath certain creatures above whom he is placed: as evidenced in those who subject man’s will to the stars, and against these it is said (Jerem. 10:2): Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear; also in those who deem the angels to be the creators of souls, and human souls to be mortal; and in those who hold any like opinions derogatory to the dignity of man.

Accordingly it is clear that the opinion is false of those who asserted that it mattered not to the truth of faith what opinions one holds about creatures, so long as one has a right opinion about God, as Augustine relates in his book De Origine Animœ: since error concerning creatures by subjecting the human mind to causes other than God amounts to a false opinion about God, and misleads the minds of men from God, to Whom faith strives to lead them.

Wherefore Scripture threatens punishment to those who err about creatures, as to unbelievers, in the words of the psalm: Because they have not understood the works of the Lord and the operations of His hands, Thou shalt destroy them, and shalt not build them up; and (Wis. 2:21): These things they thought and were deceived, and further on: They esteemed not the honour of holy souls.

CHAPTER IV

THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN TREAT OF CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS

NOW it is evident from what has been said that the teaching of the Christian faith treats of creatures in so far as they reflect a certain likeness of God, and forasmuch as error concerning them leads to error about God. And so they are viewed from a different point by the aforesaid teaching, and by that of human philosophy. For human philosophy considers them as such; wherefore we find that the different parts of philosophy correspond to the different genera of things. On the other hand the Christian faith does not consider them as such, for instance it considers fire not as such, but as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to Him in any way whatsoever. For as it is stated (Ecclus. 42:16, 17), Full of the glory of the Lord is His work. Hath not the Lord made the saints to declare all His wonderful works? Hence also the philosopher and the believer consider different matters about creatures. For the philosopher considers such things as belong to them by their own nature: for instance that fire tends upwards. Whereas the believer considers about creatures only such things as belong to them in respect of their relation to God: for instance that they are created by God, are subject to God, and so forth.

Wherefore it argues not imperfection in the teaching of faith, if it overlooks many properties of things, such as the shape of the heavens, and the quality of its movement: since neither does the physicist consider the same characters of a line as the geometrician, but only such as are accidental thereto, as the term of a natural body.

Any matters, however, that the philosopher and the believer in common consider about creatures, are delivered through different principles on the one hand and on the other. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things: whereas the believer has recourse to the First Cause, for instance because it has been thus delivered by God, or because it conduces to God's glory, or because God's power is infinite. Hence (the teaching of faith) should be called the greatest wisdom, since it considers the highest cause, according to the saying of Deut. 4:6: For this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations. Wherefore human philosophy is a handmaid to her as mistress. For this reason sometimes divine wisdom argues from the principles of human philosophy: since also among philosophers the First Philosophy makes use of the teachings of all sciences in order to establish its purpose. Hence again both teachings do not follow the same order. For in the teaching of philosophy which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, the first consideration is about creatures, and the last of God: whereas in the teaching of faith which considers creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration about God takes the first place, and that about creatures the last. And thus it is more perfect: as being more like God's knowledge, for He beholds other things by knowing Himself.

Wherefore, according to this order, after what has been said in the First Book about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the things which proceed from Him.

CHAPTER V

ORDER OF THE THINGS TO BE SAID

WE shall treat of these things in the following order. First we shall discourse of the bringing forth of things into being: secondly, of their distinction: thirdly, of the nature of these same things brought forth and distinct from one another, so far as it concerns the truth of faith.

CHAPTER VI

THAT IT BECOMES GOD TO BE THE SOURCE OF BEING TO OTHER THINGS

TAKING then as granted the things that were proved in the foregoing Book, let us now proceed to prove that it becomes God to be the source and cause of being to other things.

For it was shown above by the proof of Aristotle that there is a first efficient cause which we call God. Now an efficient cause brings its effects into being. Therefore God is the cause of being to other things.

Again. It was shown in the First Book by the argument of the same author, that there is a first immovable mover, which we call God. Now the first mover in any order of movements is the cause of all the movements in that order. Since then many things are brought into being by the movements of the heaven, and since God has been proved to be the first mover in the order of those movements, it follows that God is the cause of being to many things.

Moreover. That which belongs to a thing by its nature, must needs be in that thing universally; as for man to be rational, and for fire to tend upwards. Now it belongs to a being in act that it should enact an effect; for every agent acts according as it is in act. Therefore it is natural to every being in act to enact something existing in act. Now God is being in act, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore it is competent to Him to produce something in act, to which He is the cause of being.

Further. It is a sign of perfection in things of the lower world, that they are able to produce their like, as stated by the Philosopher (4 Meteor.). Now God is supremely perfect, as was proved in the First Book. Therefore it is competent to Him to produce something in act like unto Himself, so that He is the cause of its being.

Again. It was shown in the First Book that God wills to communicate His being to other things by way of likeness. Now it belongs to the will's perfection to be the principle of action and movement, as stated in 3 De Anima. Since then God's will is perfect, it lacks not the power of communicating His being to a thing by way of likeness. And thus He will be the cause of its being.

Further. The more perfect the principle of a thing's action is, to so many more and further distant things can it extend its action: thus fire, if weak, heats only that which is nigh, but, if strong, heats even distant things. Now pure act, which is God, is more perfect than act mingled with potentiality, as it is with us. But act is the principle of action. Since, then, by the act which is in us we are able to proceed not only to actions that abide in us, such as intelligence and volition, but also to actions that pass on to outward things, and through which certain things are made by us; much more can God, in that He is in act, not only understand and will, but also produce an effect. And thus He can be the cause of being to other things.

Hence it is said (Job. 5:9): Who doth great things and unsearchable … things without number.

CHAPTER VII

THAT IN GOD THERE IS ACTIVE POWER

IT follows from this that God is powerful, and that active power is fittingly ascribed to Him.

For active power is the principle of acting on another as such. Now it becomes God to be the principle of being to other things. Therefore it becomes Him to be powerful.

Moreover. Just as passive potentiality is consequent upon being in potentiality, so active potency is consequent upon being in act: for a thing is active because it is in act, and passive because it is in potentiality. Now it becomes God to be in act. Therefore active power is becoming to Him.

Again. The divine perfection includes the perfection of all things, as was proved in the First Book. Now active power belongs to the perfection of a thing: since a thing is found to be the more perfect in proportion as it is more powerful. Therefore God cannot be devoid of active power.

Further. Whatever acts, has the power to act, since that which has not the power to act, cannot possibly act; and what cannot possibly act, of necessity does not act. Now God acts and moves, as was proved above. Therefore He has the power to act; and active but not passive potency is fittingly ascribed to Him.

Hence it is said in the psalm: Thou art mighty (potens), O Lord, and elsewhere: Thy power and Thy justice, O God, even to the highest great things Thou hast done.

CHAPTER VIII

THAT GOD’S POWER IS HIS SUBSTANCE

WE may also conclude from this that the divine power is God’s very substance.

For active power becomes a thing according as this is in act. Now God is very act; nor is He being in act by some act that is not Himself, since in Him there is no potentiality, as we have proved in the First Book. Therefore He is His own power.

Again. Whatever is powerful and is not its own power, is powerful by participating another’s power. But nothing can be ascribed to God by participation, for He is His own being, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore He is His own power.

Moreover. Active power belongs to a thing’s perfection, as stated above. Now every perfection of God is contained in His very being, as was shown in the First Book. Therefore the divine power is not other than His very being. Now God is His own being, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore He is His own power.

Again. In those things whose powers are not their substance, their powers are accidents: hence natural power is placed in the second species of accident. But in God there can be no accident, as was proved in the First Book. Therefore God is His own power.

Further. Whatever is by another is reduced to that which is by its very self, being thus reduced to that which is first. Now other agents are reduced to God as first agent. Therefore He is agent by His very self. But that which acts by its very self, acts by its essence: and that by which a thing acts is its active power. Therefore God’s very essence is His active power.

CHAPTER IX

THAT GOD’S POWER IS HIS ACTION

FROM this we can show that God’s power is not other than His action.

For things that are identical with one and the same thing, are identical with one another. Now God’s power is His substance, as we have proved: and His action is also His substance, as we showed in the First Book with regard to His intellectual operation: for this applies equally to His other operations. Therefore in God power is not distinct from action.

Again. The action of a thing is a complement of its power: for it is compared to power as second act to first. Now the divine power is not completed by another than Himself, since it is God’s very essence. Therefore in God power is not distinct from action.

Moreover. Just as active power is something acting, so is its essence something being. Now God’s power is His essence, as we have proved. Therefore His action is His being. But His being is His substance. Therefore God’s action is His substance, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Further. An action that is not the substance of the agent, is in the agent as an accident in its subject: wherefore action is reckoned among the nine predicaments of accident. Now there can be nothing accidental in God. Therefore God’s substance is not other than His power.

CHAPTER X

IN WHAT WAY POWER IS ASCRIBED TO GOD

SINCE, however, nothing is its own principle, and God’s action is not other than His power, it is clear from the foregoing that power is ascribed to God, not as the principle of action, but as the principle of the thing made. And since power implies relation to something else under the aspect of principle thereof,—for active power is the principle of acting on something else, according to the Philosopher (5 Metaph.)—it is evident that power is ascribed to God in relation to things made, according to reality, and not in relation to action, except according to our way of understanding, for as much as our intellect considers both, the divine power and action to wit, by different concepts. Wherefore, if certain actions are becoming to God, which do not pass into something made but remain in the agent, power is not ascribed to God in their respect, except according to our manner of understanding, and not according to reality. Such actions are intelligence and volition. Accordingly God’s power, properly speaking, does not regard suchlike actions, but only their effects. Consequently intellect and will are in God, not as powers, but only as actions.

It is also clear from the foregoing that the manifold actions ascribed to God, as intelligence, volition, the production of things, and the like, are not so many different things, since each of these actions in God is His own very being, which is one and the same thing. How one thing may remain true while having many significations, may be clearly seen from what has been shown in the First Book.

CHAPTER XI

THAT SOMETHING IS SAID OF GOD IN RELATION TO CREATURES

NOW as power is becoming to God in relation to His effects, and as power conveys the notion of a principle, as we have stated; and since principle denotes relationship to that which proceeds from it, it is evident that something can be said of God relatively, in relation to His effects.

Again. It is inconceivable that one thing be referred to another, unless conversely the latter be referred to it. Now we speak of other things in relation to God; for example as regards their being which they have from God, as already proved, they are dependent upon Him. Therefore conversely we may speak of God in relation to creatures.

Further. Likeness is a kind of relation. Now God, even as other agents, produces something like Himself. Therefore something is said of Him relatively.

Moreover. Knowledge denotes relation to the thing known. Now God has knowledge not only of Himself, but also of other things. Therefore something is said of God in relation to other things.

Again. Mover implies relation to thing moved, and agent to thing done. Now God is an agent, and an unmoved mover, as already proved. Therefore relations are predicated of Him.

Again. First implies some kind of relation, and so does supreme. Now it was proved in the First Book that He is the first being and the supreme good.

It is therefore evident that many things are said of God relatively.

CHAPTER XII

THAT RELATIONS SAID OF GOD IN REFERENCE TO CREATURES ARE NOT REALLY IN GOD

THESE relations however which refer to His effects cannot possibly be in God.

For they cannot be in Him as accidents in a subject, since no accident is in Him, as we proved in the First Book. Neither can they be God's very substance: because, since relative terms are those which essentially refer somehow to something else, as the Philosopher says (Predic.), it would follow that God's substance is essentially referred to something else. Now that which is essentially referred to another, depends in some way thereon, since it can neither exist nor be understood without it. Hence it would follow that God's substance is dependent on something else outside it: and thus it would not be of itself necessary being, as we have proved in the First Book. Therefore suchlike relations are not really in God.

Again. It was proved in the First Book that God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is compared to other beings as knowable things to our knowledge: since opinion or speech is true or false according as a thing is or is not, according to the Philosopher (Predic.). Now though a thing is said to be knowable in relation to knowledge, the relation is not really in the knowable, but only in the knowledge: wherefore according to the Philosopher (5 Metaph.), the knowable is so called relatively, not because it is itself related, but because something else is related to it. Therefore the said relations are not really in God.

Further. The aforesaid relations are said of God not only with respect to those things that are actual, but also with respect to those that are in potentiality: because He both has knowledge of them, and in reference to them is called the first being and the sovereign good. But that which is actual has no real relation to that which is not actual but potential: else it would follow that there are actually an infinite number of relations in the same subject, since potentially infinite numbers are greater than the number two which is prior to them all. Now God is not related to actual things otherwise than to potential things, for He is not changed by the fact that He produces certain things. Therefore He is not related to other things by a relation really existing in Him.

Moreover. Whatever receives something anew, must needs be changed, either essentially or accidentally. Now certain relations are said of God anew: for instance that He is Lord or governor of a thing which begins anew to exist. Wherefore if a relation were predicated of God as really existing in Him, it would follow that something accrues to God anew, and consequently that He is changed either essentially or accidentally: the contrary of which was proved in the First Book.

CHAPTERS XIII AND XIV

HOW THE AFORESAID RELATIONS ARE PREDICATED OF GOD

NEVERTHELESS it cannot be said that the aforesaid relations exist extraneously as something outside God.

For since God is the first being and sovereign good, it would be necessary to consider yet other relations of God to those relations that are realities. And if these also are realities, we shall again have to find third relations: and so on indefinitely. Therefore the relations by which God is referred to other things are not really existing outside God.

Again. A thing is predicated denominatively in two ways. For a thing may be denominated from that which is outside it; for instance from place a person is said to be somewhere, and from time somewhen: and a thing may be denominated from that which is in it, as a person is denominated white from whiteness. On the other hand a thing is not found to be denominated from a relation as extraneous, but as inherent: for a man is not denominated a father except from fatherhood which is in him. Therefore it is impossible for the relations whereby God is referred to creatures to be realities outside Him.

Since then it has been proved that they are not really in Him, and yet are predicated of Him, it remains that they are ascribed to Him according only to our way of understanding, from the fact that other things are referred to Him. For our intellect, in understanding one thing to be referred to another, understands at the same time that the latter is related to the former; although sometimes it is not really related at all.

Wherefore it is also evident that the aforesaid relations are not said of God in the same way as other things predicated of God. For all other things, as wisdom, will, predicate His essence, whereas the aforesaid relations do not by any means, but solely according to our way of understanding. And yet our understanding is not false. Because from the very fact that our intellect understands that the relations of the divine effects terminate in God Himself, it predicates certain things of Him relatively: even so we understand and express the knowable relatively from the fact that our knowledge is referred to it.

It is also clear from the foregoing that it is not prejudicial to God’s simplicity if many relations are predicated of Him, although they do not signify His essence: because they are consequent upon our way of understanding. For nothing hinders our intellect understanding many things, and being referred in many ways to that which is in itself simple, so as thus to consider the simple thing under a manifold relationship. And the more simple a thing is, the greater its virtue, and of so many more things is it a principle, and consequently it is understood as related in so many more ways: thus a point is a principle of more things than a line is, and a line of more things than a surface. Wherefore the very fact that many things are said of God relatively, bears witness to His supreme simplicity.

CHAPTER XV

THAT GOD IS TO ALL THINGS THE CAUSE OF BEING

NOW, since we have proved that God is the source of being to some things, we must further show that everything besides Himself is from Him.

For whatever belongs to a thing otherwise than as such, belongs to it through some cause, as white to a man: because that which has no cause is something first and immediate, wherefore it must needs belong to the thing essentially and as such. Now it is impossible for any one thing to belong to two and to both of them as such. For that which is said of a thing as such, does not go beyond that thing: for instance to have three angles equal to two right angles does not go beyond a triangle. Accordingly if something belongs to two things, it will not belong to both as such: wherefore it is impossible for any one thing to be predicated of two so as to be said of neither by reason of a cause, but it is necessary that either the one be the cause of the other,—for instance fire is the cause of heat in a mixed body, and yet each is called hot;—or else some third thing must be cause of both, for instance fire is the cause of two candles giving light. Now being is said of everything that is. Wherefore it is impossible that there be two things neither of which has a cause of its being, but either both the things in question must have their being through a cause, or else the one must be the cause of being to the other. Hence everything that, in any way whatever, is, must needs be from that to which nothing is a cause of being. Now we have proved above that God is this being to which nothing is a cause of its being. Therefore from Him is everything that, in any way whatever, is. If however it be said that being is not a univocal predicate, the above conclusion follows none the less. For it is not said of many equivocally, but analogically: and thus it is necessary to be brought back to one thing.

Moreover. That which belongs to a thing by its nature, and not by some other cause, cannot be diminished and deficient therein. For if something essential be subtracted from or added to a nature, there will be at once another nature: even as it happens in numbers, where the addition or subtraction of unity changes the species. And if the nature or quiddity of a thing remain entire, although something is found to be diminished, it is clear that this does not depend simply on that nature, but on something else, through the absence of which it is diminished. Wherefore that which belongs to one thing less than to others, belongs to it not through its nature alone, but through some other cause. Consequently that thing will be the cause of all in a certain genus, to which thing the predication of that genus belongs above all; hence that which is most hot is seen to be the cause of heat in all things hot, and that which is most light is the cause of all things that have light. Now God is being above all, as we have proved in the First Book. Therefore He is the cause of all of which being is predicated.

Further. The order of causes must needs correspond to the order of effects, since effects are proportionate to their causes. Wherefore, as proper effects are reduced to their proper causes, so that which is common in proper effects must needs be reduced to some common cause: even so, above the particular causes of the generation of this or that thing, is the sun the universal cause of generation; and the king is the universal cause of government in his kingdom, above the wardens of the kingdom and of each city. Now being is common to all. Therefore above all causes there must be a cause to which it belongs to give being. But God is the first cause, as shown above. Therefore it follows that all things that are, are from God.

Again. That which is said to be essentially so and so is the cause of all that are so by participation: thus fire is the cause of all things ignited as such. Now God is being by His essence, because He is being itself: whereas everything else is being by participation: for there can be but one being that is its own being, as was proved in the First Book. Therefore God is the cause of being to all other things.

Further. Everything that is possible to be and not to be has a cause: because considered in itself it is indifferent to either, so that there must needs be something else that determines it to one. Wherefore, since we cannot proceed to infinity, there must needs be some necessary thing that is the cause of all things that it is possible to be and not to be. Now there is a necessary thing that has a cause of its necessity: and here again we cannot proceed to infinity, so that we must come to something that is of itself necessary to be. And this can be but one, as we showed in the First Book: and this is God. Therefore everything other than Him must be reduced to Him as the cause of its being.

Moreover. God is the maker of a thing, inasmuch as He is in act, as we have proved above. Now by His actuality and perfection He contains all the perfections of things, as we have shown in the First Book; and thus He is virtually all things. Therefore He is the maker of all. But this would not be if something else were of a nature to be otherwise than from Him: for nothing is of a nature to be from another, and not to be from another, since if it be of a nature not to be from another, it is of itself necessary to be, and thus can never be from another. Therefore nothing can be except from God.

Again. The imperfect originate from the perfect, as seed from an animal. Now God is the most perfect being and the sovereign good, as was shown in the First Book. Therefore He is to all things the cause of being, especially since it was proved that there can be but one such thing.

This is confirmed by divine authority. For it is said in the psalm: Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all the things that are in them: and (Jo. 1:3): All things were made by Him, and without Him was made nothing: and (Rom. 11:36): Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things: to Him be glory for ever.

This sets aside the error of the ancient physicists who asserted that certain bodies had no cause of their being: likewise of some who say that God is not the cause of the substance of heaven, but only of its movement.

CHAPTER XVI

THAT GOD BROUGHT THINGS INTO BEING OUT OF NOTHING

FROM this it is clear that God brought things into being out of no pre-existing thing as matter.

For if a thing is an effect of God, either something exists before it, or not. If not, our point is proved, namely that God produces an effect from no pre-existing thing. If however something exists before it, we must either go on to infinity,—which is impossible in natural causes, as the Philosopher proves (2 Metaph.)—or we must come to some first thing that presupposes no other. And this can only be God. For it was shown in the First Book that He is not the matter of any thing, nor can there be anything other than God the being of which is not caused by God, as we have proved. It follows therefore that God in producing His effects requires no prejacent matter out of which to produce His work.

Further. Every matter is constricted to some particular species by the form with which it is superendued. Hence to produce an effect out of prejacent matter by enduing it with a form in any way belongs to an agent that aims at some particular species. Now a like agent is a particular agent, since causes are proportionate to their effects. Therefore an agent that requires of necessity prejacent matter out of which to work its effect, is a particular agent. But God is an agent as being the universal cause of being, as was proved above. Therefore He needs no prejacent matter in His action.

Again. The more universal an effect, the higher its proper cause: because the higher the cause, to so many more things does its virtue extend. Now to be is more universal than to be moved: since some beings are immovable, as also philosophers teach, for instance stones and the like. It follows therefore that above the cause which acts only by causing movement and change, there is that cause which is the first principle of being: and we have proved that this is God. Therefore God does not act merely by causing movement and change. Now everything that cannot bring things into being save from prejacent matter, acts only by causing movement and change, since to make aught out of matter is the result of movement or change of some kind. Consequently it is not impossible to bring things into being without prejacent matter. Therefore God brings things into being without prejacent matter.

Again. That which acts only by movement and change is inconsistent with the universal cause of being; since by movement and change a being is not made from absolute non-being, but this being from this non-being. Now God is the universal cause of being, as we have proved. Therefore it is not becoming to Him to act only by movement or change. Neither then is it becoming to Him to need preexisting matter, in order to make something.

Moreover. Every agent produces something like itself in some way. Now every agent acts according as it is actually. Consequently to produce an effect by causing in some way a form inherent to matter, will belong to that agent, which is actualized by a form inherent to it, and not by its whole substance. Hence the Philosopher proves (7 Metaph.) that material things, which have forms in matter, are engendered by material agents that have forms in matter, and not by per se existing forms. Now God is actual being not by a form inherent to Him, but by His whole substance, as we have proved above. Therefore the proper mode of His action is to produce a whole subsistent thing, and not merely an inherent thing, namely a form in matter. And every agent that requires no matter for its action, acts in this way. Therefore God requires no preexisting matter in His action.

Further. Matter is compared to an agent as the recipient of the action proceeding from the agent: for the action which is the agent’s as proceeding therefrom, is the patient’s as residing therein. Wherefore matter is required by an agent that it may receive the agent’s action: since the agent’s action received in the patient is the patient’s act and form, or some beginning of a form therein. Now God does not act by an action that requires to be received in a patient: because His action is His substance, as already proved. Therefore He requires no prejacent matter in order to produce an effect.

Further. Every agent that requires prejacent matter in acting, has a matter proportionate to its action, so that whatever is in the potency of the agent, is all in the potentiality of the matter: otherwise it could not bring into act all that are in its active power, and thus would have that power, with regard to such things, to no purpose. Now matter has no such proportion to God. For matter is not in potentiality to any particular quantity, as the Philosopher declares (3 Phys.): whereas the divine power is simply infinite, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore God requires no prejacent matter as necessary for His action.

Again. Of different things there are different matters: for the matter of spiritual things is not the same as that of corporeal things, nor that of heavenly bodies the same as that of corruptible bodies. This is evident from the fact that receptivity which is a property of matter is not of the same kind in the aforesaid: for receptivity in spiritual things is intelligible, thus the intellect receives the species of intelligible objects, but not according to their material being: while heavenly bodies receive newness of situation, but not newness of being, as lower bodies do. Therefore there is not one matter that is in potentiality to universal being. But God’s activity regards all being universally. Therefore no matter corresponds proportionately to Him. Therefore He requires not matter of necessity.

Moreover. Wherever in the universe certain things are in mutual proportion and order, one of them must proceed from the other, or both from some one: for order must be founded in one by its corresponding with another; else order or proportion would be the result of chance, which is inadmissible in the first principles of things, because it would follow yet more that all else are from chance. If, then, there be any matter proportionate to the divine action, it follows that either the one is from the other, or both from a third. But since God is the first being and the first cause, He cannot be the effect of matter, nor can He be from any third cause. Therefore it follows that if there be matter proportionate to God’s action, He is the cause thereof.

Again. That which is the first of beings, must needs be the cause of the things that are: for if they were not caused they would not be set in order thereby, as we have already proved. Now between act and potentiality there is this order, that, although in the one and same thing which is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act, potentiality precedes act in point of time, whereas act precedes by nature; nevertheless, speaking simply, act must needs precede potentiality, which is evidenced by the fact that potentiality is not reduced to act save by a being in act. But matter is a being in potentiality. Therefore God Who is pure act must needs be simply prior to matter, and consequently the cause thereof. Therefore matter is not necessarily presupposed for His action.

Again. Primary matter is in some way, for it is a being in potentiality. Now God is the cause of all things that are, as we have proved. Therefore God is the cause of primary matter: to which nothing is pre-existent. Therefore the divine action needs no pre-existing nature.

Divine Scripture confirms this truth, saying (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth. For to create is nothing else than to bring something into being without prejacent matter.

Hereby is refuted the error of the ancient philosophers who asserted that matter has no cause whatever, because they observed that in the actions of particular agents something is always prejacent to action: whence they drew the opinion common to all that from nothing naught is made. This is true in particular agents. But they had not yet arrived at the knowledge of the universal agent, which is the active cause of all being, and of necessity presupposes nothing for His action.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT CREATION IS NEITHER MOVEMENT NOR CHANGE

HAVING proved the foregoing, it is evident that God’s action, which is without prejacent matter and is called creation, is neither movement nor change, properly speaking.

For all movement or change is the action of that which is in potentiality as such. Now in this action there pre-exists nothing in potentiality to receive the action, as we have proved. Therefore it is neither movement nor change.

Again. The extremes of a movement or change are included in the same order: either because they come under one genus, as contraries, for instance in the movement of growth and alteration, and when a thing is carried from one place to another; or because they have one potentiality of matter in common, as privation and form in generation and corruption. But neither of these applies to creation: for it admits of no potentiality, nor of anything of the same genus that may be presupposed to creation, as we have proved. Therefore there is neither movement nor change therein.

Further. In every change or movement there must be something that is conditioned otherwise now and before: since the very name of change shows this. But when the whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there can be no same thing that is conditioned in one way and in another, for it would not be produced, but presupposed to production. Therefore creation is not a change.

Further. Movement and change must needs precede that which is made by change or movement: because having been made is the beginning of rest and the term of movement. Wherefore all change must be movement or the term of a movement that is successive. For this reason, what is being made, is not: for as long as movement lasts, something is being made and is not: whereas in the term itself of movement, wherein rest begins, no longer is a thing being made, but it has been made. Now in creation this is impossible: for if creation preceded as movement or change, it would necessarily presuppose a subject, and this is contrary to the nature of creation. Therefore creation is neither movement nor change.

CHAPTER XVIII

HOW TO SOLVE THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST CREATION

FROM this we may see the vacuity of those who gainsay creation by arguments taken from the nature of movement and change: such as that creation must needs, like other movements and changes, take place in some subject, and that it implies the transmutation of non-being into being, like that of fire into air.

For creation is not a change, but the very dependence of created being on the principle whereby it is produced. Hence it is a kind of relation. Wherefore nothing prevents its being in the creature as its subject. Nevertheless creation would seem to be a kind of change according only to our way of understanding: in so far, to wit, as our intellect grasps one and the same thing as previously non-existent, and as afterwards existing.

It is clear however that if creation is a relation, it is a thing: and neither is it uncreated, nor is it created by another relation. For since a created effect depends really on its creator, this relation must needs be some thing. Now every thing is brought into being by God. Therefore it receives its being from God. And yet it is not created by a different creation from the first creature which is stated to be created thereby. Because accidents and forms, just as they are not per se, so neither are they created per se, since creation is the production of a being, but just as they are in another, so are they created when other things are created.

Moreover. A relation is not referred through another relation,—for in that case one would go on to infinity,—but is referred by itself, because it is essentially a relation. Therefore there is no need for another creation whereby creation itself is created, so that one would go on to infinity.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT IN CREATION THERE IS NO SUCCESSION

IT is also clear from the foregoing that all creation is without succession.

For succession is proper to movement: while creation is not a movement nor the term of a movement, as change is. Therefore there is no succession therein.

Again. In every successive movement there is some mean between its extremes: for a mean is that which a continuously moved thing reaches first before reaching the term. Now between being and non-being which are as the extremes of creation, no mean is possible. Therefore there is no succession therein.

Moreover. In every making wherein there is succession, a thing is becoming before it has been made, as is proved in 6 Phys. Now this cannot happen in creation. Because the becoming which would precede being made, would need a subject. And this could not be the creature itself whose creation is in question, since it is not before it is made. Nor would it be in the maker, because to be moved is the act not of the mover, but of the thing moved. It follows that becoming would have for its subject some pre-existing matter of the thing made. But this is incompatible with creation. Therefore there can be no succession in creation.

Further. Every making that proceeds by succession must needs take time: since before and after in movement are reckoned by time. Now time, movement, and the thing subject to movement are all simultaneously divided. This is evident in local movement: for that which is moved with regularity passes through half a magnitude in half the time. Now the division in forms that corresponds to division of time is according to intensity and remissness: thus if a thing is heated to such a degree in so much time, it is heated to a less degree in less time. Accordingly succession in any movement or making is possible according as the thing in respect of which there is motion is divisible: either according to quantity, as in local movement and increase; or according to intensity and remission, as in alteration. Now the latter occurs in two ways. First, because the form which is the term of movement is divisible in respect of intensity and remission, as when a thing is in motion towards whiteness: secondly, because such a division happens in dispositions to such a form; thus the becoming of fire is successive on account of the previous alteration as regards the dispositions to the form. But the substantial being itself of a creature is not divisible in this way, for substance cannot be more or less. Nor do any dispositions precede creation, since there is no pre-existing matter, for disposition is on the part of matter. It follows therefore that there cannot be succession in creation.

Further. Succession in the making of things results from a defect of the matter, that is not suitably disposed from the beginning for the reception of the form: wherefore, when the matter is already perfectly disposed for the form, it receives it in an instant. For this reason, since a diaphanous body is always in the last disposition for light, it is actually illumined as soon as the luminous body is present: nor does any movement precede on the part of the illuminable body, but only local movement on the part of the illuminant, which becomes present. But in creation nothing is required beforehand on the part of matter: nor does the agent lack anything for His action, that may afterwards accrue to Him through movement, since He is utterly immovable, as we have shown in the First Book of this Work. It follows therefore that creation is instantaneous. Hence in the same instant a thing is being created and is created, just as in the same instant a thing is being illumined and is illumined.

Hence divine Scripture declares that the creation of things took place in an indivisible instant, when it says: In the beginning God created heaven and earth: which beginning Basil expounds as the beginning of time, and this must be indivisible as is proved in 6 Phys.

CHAPTER XX

THAT NO BODY CAN CREATE

HENCE it is evident that no body can produce anything by creation.

For no body acts unless it be moved: since agent and patient must be together, as also maker and that which is made: and those things are together which are in the same place, as stated in 6 Phys., and a body does not acquire a place except by movement. But no body is moved except in time. Wherefore whatever is done by the action of a body is done successively: whereas creation, as we have proved, is without succession. Therefore nothing can be produced by way of creation by any body whatever.

Further. Every agent that acts through being moved, of necessity moves that on which it acts, for the thing made and the thing patient are consequent upon the disposition of maker and agent, since every agent produces its like. Hence, if the agent, while varying in disposition, acts in as much as it is changed by movement, it follows that also in the patient and the thing made there is a succession of dispositions, which is impossible without movement. Now no body moves unless it be moved, as we have proved. Therefore nothing results from the action of a body, except by the movement or change of the thing made. But creation is neither change nor movement, as proved above. Therefore no body can cause a thing by creating it.

Again. Since agent and effect must needs be like each other, a thing cannot produce the whole substance of the effect, unless it act by its entire substance; thus the Philosopher proves conversely (7 Metaph.), that if a form without matter acts by its whole self, it cannot be the proximate cause of generation wherein the form alone is brought into act. Now no body acts by its whole substance, although the whole of it acts: for since every agent acts by the form whereby it is actual, that alone is able to act by its whole substance, the whole of whose substance is a form: and this can be said of no body, because every body has matter, since every body is changeable. Therefore no body can produce a thing as to the whole substance of that thing, and this is essential to creation.

Further. To create belongs exclusively to an infinite power. For an agent's power is so much the greater, according as it is able to bring into act a potentiality more distant from act: for instance that which can produce fire from water in comparison with that which can produce it from air. Hence where pre-existing potentiality is altogether removed, all proportion to a determinate distance is surpassed; and thus the power of an agent that produces something without any pre-existing potentiality, must surpass all conceivable proportion to the power of an agent that produces something out of matter. But no power of a body is infinite, as the Philosopher proves in 8 Phys. Therefore no body can create a thing, for this is to make something out of nothing.

Moreover. Mover and moved, maker and made must be together, as proved in 7 Phys. Now a bodily agent cannot be present to its effect except by contact, whereby the extremes of contiguous things come together. Wherefore it is impossible for a body to act save by contact. But contact is of one thing in relation to another. Hence where there is nothing pre-existent besides the agent, as happens in creation, there can be no contact. Therefore no body can act by creating.

Thus we may see the falseness of the position of those who say that the substance of the heavenly bodies causes the matter of the elements, since matter can have no cause except that which acts by creating: because matter is the first subject of movement and change.

CHAPTER XXI

THAT IT BELONGS TO GOD ALONE TO CREATE

IT can also be shown from the foregoing that creation is an action proper to God, and that He alone can create.

For since the order of actions is according to the order of agents, because the more excellent the agent the more excellent the action: it follows that the first action is proper to the first agent. Now creation is the first action; since it presupposes no other, while all others presuppose it. Therefore creation is the proper action of God alone, Who is the first agent.

Again. It was proved that God creates things, from the fact that there can be nothing besides Himself that is not created by Him. Now this cannot be said of anything else: because nothing else is the universal cause of being. To God alone, therefore, does creation belong as His proper action.

Further. Effects correspond proportionately to their causes: so that, to wit, we ascribe actual effects to actual causes, and potential effects to potential causes; and in like manner particular effects to particular causes, and universal effects to universal causes, as the Philosopher teaches (2 Phys.). Now being is the first effect; and this is evident by reason of its universality. Wherefore the proper cause of being is the first and universal agent, which is God. Whereas other agents are the causes, not of being simply, but of being this, for example, of being a man, or of being white. But being simply is caused by creation which presupposes nothing, since nothing can pre-exist outside being simply. By other makings this or such a being is made: because this or such a being is made from an already existing being. Therefore creation is God’s proper action.

Moreover. Whatever is caused with respect to some particular nature, cannot be the first cause of that nature, but only a second and instrumental cause. For Socrates, since he has a cause of his humanity, cannot be the first cause of human nature: because, seeing that his human nature is caused by some one, it would follow that he is the cause of himself, since he is what he is by human nature. Consequently a univocal generator must be like an instrumental agent in relation to that which is the primary cause of the whole species. Hence it is that all the lower active causes must be compared to the higher causes as instrumental to primary causes. Now every substance other than God has being caused by another, as was proved above. Wherefore it is impossible for it to be a cause of being otherwise than as instrumental and as acting by virtue of another. But an instrument is never employed save in order to cause something by the way of movement: for the very notion of an instrument is that it is a mover moved. Creation, however, is not movement, as we have proved. Therefore no substance besides God can create anything.

Again. An instrument is employed on account of its being adapted to the effect, that it may be a medium between the first cause and the effect, and be in contact with both, and thus the influence of the first reaches the effect through the instrument. Hence there must be something that receives the influence of the first, in that which is caused by the instrument. But this is contrary to the nature of creation; since it presupposes nothing. It follows therefore that nothing besides God can create, neither as principal agent nor as instrument.

Further. Every instrumental agent carries out the action of the principal agent by some action proper and connatural to itself: thus natural heat produces flesh by dissolving and digesting, and a saw works for the completion of a bench by cutting. Accordingly if there is a creature that works for the purpose of creating as an instrument of the first creator, it must do so by some action due and proper to its own nature. Now the effect corresponding to the instrument’s proper action precedes in the order of generation the effect which corresponds to the principal agent, whence it is that the ultimate end corresponds to the first agent: for the cutting of the wood precedes the form of the bench, and digestion of food precedes the generation of flesh. Consequently there must be effected by the proper operation of the creating instrument something which, in the order of generation, precedes being, which is the effect corresponding to the action of the first creator. But this is impossible: because the more common a thing is the more does it precede in the order of generation: thus animal precedes man in the generation of a man, as the Philosopher says in his book on the Generation of Animals. Therefore it is impossible for a creature to create, whether as principal or as instrumental agent.

Again. That which is caused in respect of some nature, cannot be the cause of that nature simply, for it would be its own cause: whereas it can be the cause of that nature in this individual; thus Plato is the cause of human nature in Socrates, but not simply, since he is himself caused in respect of human nature. Now that which is the cause of something in this individual, communicates the common nature to some particular thing whereby that nature is specified or individualized. But this cannot be by creation, which presupposes nothing to which something can be communicated by an action. Therefore it is impossible for anything created to be the cause of something else by creation.

Moreover. Since every agent acts in so far as it is actual, it follows that the mode of action must follow the mode of a thing’s actuality: wherefore the hot thing which is more actually hot, gives greater heat. Consequently anything whose actuality is determined to genus, species, and accident, must have a power determined to effects like the agent as such: since every agent produces its like. Now nothing that has determinate being can be like another of the same genus or species, except in the point of genus or species: because in so far as it is this particular thing, one particular thing is distinct from another. Nothing, therefore, that has a finite being, can by its action be the cause of another, except as regards its having genus or species —not as regards its subsisting as distinct from others. Therefore every finite agent postulates before its action that whereby its effect subsists as an individual. Therefore it does not create: and this belongs exclusively to an agent whose being is infinite, and which contains in itself the likeness of all beings, as we have proved above.

Again. Since whatever is made, is made that it may be, if a thing is said to be made that was before, it follows that it is not made per se but accidentally; whereas that is made per se which was not before. Thus, if from white a thing is made black, a black thing is made and a coloured thing is made, but black per se, because it is made from not-black, and coloured accidentally, since it was coloured before. Accordingly, when a being is made, such as a man or a stone, a man is made per se, because he is made from not-man; but a being is made accidentally, since he is not made from not-being simply, but from this particular not-being, as the Philosopher says (1 Phys.). When therefore a thing is made from not-being simply, a being is made per se. Therefore it follows that it is made by that which is per se the cause of being: since effects are referred to their proportionate causes. Now this is the first being alone, which is the cause of a being as such; while other things are causes of being accidentally, and of this particular being per se. Since then to produce a being from no pre-existing being is to create, it follows that it belongs to God alone to create.

The authority of Holy Writ bears witness to this truth, for it declares that God created all things (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth. And Damascene says in the second part of his book: All those who say that the angels are creators of any substance whatsoever, are children of their father the devil; for those who are creatures are not creators.

Hereby is refuted the error of certain philosophers who said that God created the first separate substance, by whom the second was created, and so on, in a certain order, to the last.

CHAPTER XXII

THAT GOD CAN DO ALL THINGS

HENCE it is clear that the divine power is not determined to one particular effect.

For if it belongs to God alone to create, it follows that what things soever cannot be produced by their cause save by way of creation, must be immediately produced by Him. Now the like are all separate substances, which are not composed of matter and form, and the existence of which we will suppose for the present: and likewise all corporeal matter. These things then, being distinct from one another, are the immediate effect of the aforesaid power. Now no power that produces immediately a number of effects, otherwise than from matter, is determined to one effect. I say immediately: for, if it produced them through intermediaries, the diversity might be owing to the intermediary causes. And I say otherwise than from matter: because the same agent by the same action causes different effects according to the diversity of matter; thus the heat of fire hardens clay and melts wax. Therefore God's power is not determined to one effect.

Again. Every perfect power extends to all those things to which its per se and proper effect can extend: thus the art of building, if perfect, extends to whatever can have the nature of a house. Now God's power is the per se cause of being, and being is its proper effect, as stated above. Therefore it extends to all that is not incompatible with the notion of being: for if His power were confined to one effect alone, it would be the cause of a being, not as such, but as this particular being. Now the opposite of being, which is non-being, is incompatible with the notion of being. Wherefore God can do all things but those which include the notion of non-being: and such are those that imply a contradiction. It follows, therefore, that God can do whatever does not imply a contradiction.

Again. Every agent acts in so far as it is actual. Wherefore the mode of an agent’s power in acting follows its mode of actuality: for man begets man, and fire begets fire. Now God is perfect act, possessing in Himself the perfections of all things, as was proved above. Therefore His active power is perfect, and extends to all things whatsoever that are not incompatible with the notion of actuality. But these are only those which imply a contradiction. Therefore God can do all except these things.

Moreover. To every passive potentiality there corresponds an active potentiality: since potentiality is for the sake of act, as matter for the sake of form. Now a being in potentiality cannot come to be in act save by the power of something in act. Wherefore potentiality would be without purpose were there no active power of an agent that could reduce it to act: and yet nothing in the things of nature is void of purpose. Thus we find that all things that are in the potentiality of matter in things subject to generation and corruption, can be reduced to act by the active power which is in the heavenly body which is the first active force in nature. Now just as the heavenly body is the first agent in regard to lower bodies, so God is the first agent in respect of all created being. Wherefore God can do by His active power all whatsoever is in the potentiality of created being. And all that is not incompatible with created being is in the potentiality of created being, just as whatever destroys not human nature is in the potentiality of human nature. Therefore God can do all things.

Further. That some particular effect is not subject to the power of some particular agent, may be due to three things. First, because it has no affinity or likeness to the agent: for every agent produces its like in some way. Hence the power in human seed cannot produce a brute animal or a plant, and yet it can produce a man who surpasses the things mentioned. Secondly, on account of the excellence of the effect, which surpasses the capacity of the active power: thus the active power of a body cannot produce a separate substance. Thirdly, because the effect requires a particular matter on which the agent cannot act: thus a carpenter cannot make a saw, because his art does not enable him to act on iron of which a saw is made. Now in none of these ways can any effect be withheld from the divine power. For neither on account of unlikeness in the effect can anything be impossible to Him: since every thing, in so far as it has being, is like Him, as we have proved above:—nor again on account of the excellence of the effect: since it has been proved that God is above all beings in goodness and perfection:—nor again on account of a defect in matter, since He is the cause of matter, which cannot be caused except by creation. Moreover in acting He needs no matter: since He brings a thing into being without anything pre-existent. Wherefore lack of matter cannot hinder His action from producing its effect.

It remains therefore that God’s power is not confined to any particular effect, but is able to do simply all things: and this means that He is almighty.

Hence also divine Scripture teaches this as a matter of faith. For it is said (Gen. 17:1) in the person of God: I am the Almighty God: walk before Me and be perfect: and (Job 42:2): I know that Thou canst do all things: and (Luke 1:37) in the person of the angel: No word shall be impossible with God.

Hereby is refuted the error of certain philosophers who asserted that only one effect was immediately produced by God, as though His power were confined to the production thereof; and that God cannot do otherwise than act according to the course of natural things, of which it is said (Job 22:17): (Who) … looked upon the Almighty as if He could do nothing.

CHAPTER XXIII

THAT GOD DOES NOT ACT OF NATURAL NECESSITY

FROM this it may be proved that God acts among creatures not by necessity of His nature, but by the judgment of His will.

For the power of every agent that acts of natural necessity is confined to one effect. The consequence is that all natural things always happen in the same way, unless there be an obstacle; whereas voluntary things do not. Now the divine power is not directed to only one effect, as we have proved above. Therefore God acts, not of natural necessity, but by His will.

Again. Whatever implies no contradiction, is subject to the divine power, as we have proved. Now many things are not among those created, which nevertheless, if they were, would not imply a contradiction: as is evident chiefly with regard to number, the quantities and distances of the stars and other bodies, wherein if the order of things were different, no contradiction would be implied. Wherefore many things are subject to the divine power that are not found to exist actually. Now whoever does some of the things that he can do, and does not others, acts by choice of his will and not by necessity of his nature. Therefore God acts not of natural necessity but by His will.

Again. Every agent acts according as the likeness of its effect is in it: for every agent produces its like. Now whatever is in something else, is in it according to the mode of the thing in which it is. Since, then, God is intelligent by His essence, as we have proved, it follows that the likeness of His effect is in Him in an intelligible way. Therefore He acts by His intellect. Now the intellect does not produce an effect except by means of the will, the object whereof is a good understood, which moves the agent as his end. Therefore God works by His will, and not by a necessity of His nature.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (9 Metaph.), action is twofold: one which remains in the agent and is its perfection, for instance to see; the other, which passes into outward things and is a perfection of the thing done, as to burn in the case of fire. Now God's action cannot belong to the kind of actions which are not in the agent: since His action is His substance, as already proved. Therefore it must be of that kind of actions which are in the agent, and are as a perfection thereof. But the like are only the actions of one who has knowledge and appetite. Therefore God works by knowing and willing: and consequently not by a necessity of His nature, but by the judgment of His will.

Further. That God works for an end can be evident from the fact that the universe is not the result of chance, but is directed to a good, as stated by the Philosopher (11 Metaph.). Now the first agent for an end must be an agent by intellect and will: because things devoid of intellect, work for an end as directed to the end by another. This is evident in things done by art: for the flight of the arrow is directed towards a definite mark by the aim of the archer. And so likewise must it be in the works of nature. For in order that a thing be rightly directed to a due end, it is necessary that one know the end itself, and the means to that end, as also the due proportion between both; and this belongs only to an intelligent being. Since, therefore, God is the first agent, He works not by a necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will.

Moreover. That which acts by itself precedes that which acts by another: because whatever is by another must be reduced to that which is by itself, lest we proceed to infinity. Now that which is not master of its own action, does not act by itself; since it acts as directed by another and not as directing itself. Therefore the first agent must act in such a way that it is master of its own action. But one is not master of one's own action except by the will. Therefore it follows that God, Who is the first agent, acts by His will and not by a necessity of His nature.

Again. The first action belongs to the first agent, as the first movement to the first movable. Now, the action of the will naturally precedes the action of nature: because the more perfect is naturally first, although in some particular thing it may be last in time. Now the action of a voluntary agent is more perfect: a proof of which is that among us agents which act by will are more perfect than those which act by natural necessity. Therefore to God, Who is the first agent, that action is due which is by the will.

Further. The same is evident from the fact that where both actions are united, the power which acts by will is above that which acts by nature, and uses the latter as an instrument: for in man the intellect which acts by the will is higher than the vegetative soul which acts by a necessity of its nature. Now the divine power is above all beings. Therefore it acts on all things by will, not by natural necessity.

Again. The will has for its object a good considered as a good: whereas nature does not compass the idea of good in general, but the particular good which is its perfection. Since, then, every agent acts for as much as it intends a good, because the end moves the agent, it follows that the agent by will is compared to the agent by natural necessity as a universal to a particular agent. Now the particular agent is compared to the universal agent, as posterior thereto, and as its instrument. Therefore the first agent must be voluntary and not an agent by natural necessity.

Divine Scripture teaches us this truth. For it is said in the psalm: Whatsoever the Lord pleased He hath done, and (Eph. 1:11): Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.

Hilary also in his book De Synodis says: God’s will gave substance to all creatures. And further on: All things were created such as God willed them to be.

Hereby also is refuted the error of certain philosophers who asserted that God works by natural necessity.

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT GOD WORKS ACCORDING TO HIS WISDOM

FROM the foregoing it is clear that God produces His effects according to His wisdom.

For the will is moved to act by some kind of apprehension: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. Now God is a voluntary agent, as we have proved. Since, then, in God there is none but intellectual apprehension, and since He understands nothing except by understanding Himself, to understand Whom is to be wise, it follows that God works according to His wisdom.

Again. Every agent produces its like. Hence it follows that every agent works by that according to which it bears a likeness to its effect: thus fire heats according to the mode of its heat. Now in every voluntary agent, as such, the likeness to his effect is in respect of the apprehension of his intellect: for if the likeness to his effect were in a voluntary agent according only to the disposition of his nature, he would only produce one effect, since the natural reason of one is only one. Therefore every voluntary agent produces an effect according to the reason of his intellect. Now God works by His will, as already proved. Therefore He brings things into being by the wisdom of His intellect.

Moreover. According to the Philosopher (1 Metaph.) it belongs to a wise man to set things in order: because the ordering of things cannot be done except by the knowledge of the things ordered as to their relation and proportion both to one another and to something higher which is their end: since the mutual order of certain things is on account of their order to the end. Now knowledge of the mutual relations and proportions of certain things belongs only to one who has an intellect; while it belongs to wisdom to judge of certain things by the highest cause. Wherefore it follows that all ordering is done by the wisdom of an intelligent being. Thus in mechanics those who direct the order of buildings are called the wise men of the building craft. Now the things produced by God have a mutual order which is not casual, as it is the same always or for the most part. Hence it is evident that God brought things into being by ordering them. Therefore God brought things into being by His wisdom.

Further. Things that proceed from the will are either things that may be done, such as acts of virtue, which are the perfections of the doer: or they pass into outward matter and are things that can be made. Wherefore it is clear that created things proceed from God as made. Now the reason about things to be made is art, as the Philosopher says. Therefore all created things are compared to God as products of art to the craftsman. But the craftsman brings his handiwork into being by the ordering of his wisdom and intellect. Therefore God also made all creatures by the ordering of His intellect.

This is confirmed by divine authority: for it is said in the psalm: Thou hast made all things in wisdom, and (Prov. 3:19): The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth.

Hereby is set aside the error of some who said that all things depend on God’s simple will without any reason.

CHAPTER XXV

HOW THE ALMIGHTY IS SAID TO BE UNABLE TO DO CERTAIN THINGS

FROM the foregoing we may gather that though God is almighty, He is nevertheless said to be unable to do certain things.

For it was shown above that in God there is active potentiality: while it had already been proved in the First Book that there is no passive potentiality in Him: whereas we are said to be able in respect of either potentiality. Wherefore God is unable to do those things the possibility of which belongs to passive potentiality. What suchlike things are must be the subject of our inquiry.

In the first place, then, active potentiality is directed to action, while passive potentiality is directed to being. Consequently potentiality to being is in those things only which have matter subject to contrariety. Since therefore passive potentiality is not in God, He is unable as regards anything that appertains to His being. Therefore God cannot be a body, and so forth.

Again. The act of this passive potentiality is movement. Wherefore God, to Whom passive potentiality is unbecoming, cannot be changed. It may be further concluded that He cannot be changed in respect of each kind of movement: for instance that He cannot be increased, nor diminished, nor altered, nor generated, nor corrupted.

Moreover. Since to fail is a kind of corruption, it follows that He is unable to fail in anything.

Further. Every failing is in respect of some privation. But the subject of privation is the potentiality of matter. Therefore He can nowise fail.

Again. Since weariness results from defect of power, and forgetfulness from defect of knowledge, it is clear that He can neither be weary nor forget.

Moreover. Nor can He be overcome or suffer violence. For these things happen only to those things that are of a movable nature.

Likewise neither can He repent, nor be angry or sorrowful: since all these denote passion and defect.

Again. Since the object and effect of an active potentiality is something made, and since no potentiality is operative, if the ratio of object be lacking, —thus the sight sees not if the actually visible be lacking:—it follows that God is unable to do whatever is contrary to the ratio of being as being, or of made being as made. What these things are, we must inquire.

In the first place that which destroys the ratio of being is contrary to the ratio of being. Now the ratio of being is destroyed by the opposite of being: as the ratio of man is destroyed by the opposite of man or of his parts. Now the opposite of being is not-being. Consequently God is unable to do this, so as to make the one and same thing to be and not to be at the same time; which is for contradictories to be simultaneous.

Again. Contradiction is included in contraries and privative opposites: for to be white and black is to be white and not white, and to be seeing and blind is to be seeing and not seeing. Hence it amounts to the same that God is unable to make opposites to be simultaneously in the same subject and in the same respect.

Moreover. The removal of an essential principle of a thing implies the removal of the thing itself. If, then, God cannot make a thing at the same time to be and not to be, neither can He make a thing to lack any of its essential principles while the thing itself remains: for instance that a man have no soul.

Further. Since the principles of certain sciences, for instance of logic, geometry, and arithmetic, are taken only from the formal principles of things, on which the essence of those things depends, it follows that God cannot make the contraries of these principles: for instance, that genus be not predicable of species, or that lines drawn from centre to circumference be not equal, or that the three angles of a rectilinear triangle be not equal to two right angles.

Hence it is also evident that God cannot make the past not to have been. Because this also includes a contradiction, since it is equally necessary for a thing to be while it is, and to have been while it was.

There are also some things which are incompatible with the ratio of thing made, as made. These also God cannot do, since whatever God makes, must be something made. Hence it is evident that God cannot make God. For it belongs to the ratio of thing made that its being depends on another cause. And this is contrary to the ratio of that which we call God, as is evident from the foregoing.

For the same reason God cannot make a thing equal to Himself. Because a thing whose being depends not on another, is greater in being and other excellencies than that which depends on another, which belongs to the ratio of a thing made.

Likewise God cannot make a thing to be preserved in being without Himself. For the preservation of a thing in being depends on its cause. Wherefore if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed. Consequently, if there could be a thing that is not preserved in being by God, it would not be His effect.

Again. Since He is an agent by will, He cannot do those things which He cannot will. Now we may realize what He cannot will if we consider how it is possible for necessity to be in the divine will: since what is of necessity is impossible not to be, and what is impossible to be, necessarily is not.

It is therefore evident that God cannot make Himself not to be, or not to be good or happy: because He necessarily wills Himself to be, and to be good and happy, as we proved in the First Book.

Again, it was shown above that God cannot will anything evil. Therefore it is evident that God cannot sin.

Likewise it was proved above that God's will cannot be changeable: and consequently it cannot make that which is willed by Him, not to be fulfilled. It must however be observed that He is said to be unable to do this in a different sense from that in which He is said to be unable to do the things mentioned before. Because God is simply unable either to will or to make the foregoing. Whereas God can do or will these, if we consider His power or will absolutely, but not if we presuppose Him to will the opposite: for the divine will, in respect of creatures, has no necessity, except on a supposition, as we proved in the First Book. Hence all these statements, God cannot do the contrary of what He has decreed to do, and any like sayings are to be understood in the composite sense: for thus they imply a supposition of the divine will with regard to the opposite. But if they be understood in the divided sense, they are false, because they refer to God’s power and will absolutely.

And as God acts by will, so also does He act by intellect and knowledge, as we have proved. Hence He cannot do what He has foreseen that He will not do, or omit to do what He has foreseen that He will do, for the same reason that He cannot do what He wills not to do, or omit to do what He wills. Also, each assertion is conceded and denied in the same sense, namely that He be said to be unable to do these things, not indeed absolutely, but on a certain condition or supposition.

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT THE DIVINE INTELLECT IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN DETERMINED EFFECTS

FORASMUCH as it has been proved that the divine power is not limited to certain determined effects, and this because He acts not by a necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will; lest some one perhaps should think that His intellect or knowledge can only reach to certain effects, and that consequently He acts by a necessity of His knowledge, although not by a necessity of His nature: it remains to be shown that His knowledge or intellect is not confined to any limits in its effects.

For it was proved above that God comprehends all other things that can proceed from Him, by understanding His essence, in which all such things must necessarily exist by a kind of likeness, even as effects are virtually in their causes. If, then, the divine power is not confined to certain definite effects, as we have shown above, it is necessary to pronounce a like opinion on His intellect.

Further. We have already proved the infinity of the divine intellect. Now, no matter how many finite things we add together, even though there were an infinite number of finite things, we cannot equal the infinite, for it infinitely exceeds the finite, however great. Now it is clear that nothing outside God is infinite in its essence: since all else are by the very nature of their essence included under certain definite genera and species. Consequently, however many and however great divine effects be taken, it is always in the divine essence to exceed them: and so it can be the ratio of more. Wherefore the divine intellect, which knows the divine essence perfectly, as we have shown above, surpasses all finitude of effects. Therefore it is not necessarily confined to these or those effects.

Again. It was shown above that the divine intellect knows an infinite number of things. Now God brings things into being by the knowledge of His intellect. Therefore the causality of the divine intellect is not confined to a finite number of effects.

Moreover. If the causality of the divine intellect were confined to certain effects, as though it produced them of necessity, this would be in reference to the things which it brings into being. But this is impossible; for it was shown above that God understands even those things that never are, nor shall be, nor have been. Therefore God does not work by necessity of His intellect or knowledge.

Further. God's knowledge is compared to things produced by Him, as the knowledge of the craftsman to his handiwork. Now every art extends to all the things that can be comprised under the genus subject to that art: thus the art of building extends to all houses. Now the genus subject to the divine art is being: since God by His intellect is the universal principle of being, as we have proved. Therefore the divine intellect extends its causality to whatever is not incompatible with the notion of being: for all such things, considered in themselves, are of a nature to be contained under being. Therefore the divine intellect is not confined to certain determined effects.

Hence it is said in the psalm: Great is the (Vulg., our) Lord, and great is His power, and of His wisdom there is no number.

Hereby we set aside the opinion of certain philosophers who say that from the very fact that God understands Himself, this particular disposition of things flows from Him necessarily: as though He did not give each thing its limits, and all things their disposition by His own counsel, as the Catholic faith declares.

It is to be observed, however, that although God's intellect is not confined to certain effects, yet He decides on certain determinate effects with a view to producing them ordinately by His wisdom. Thus it is said (Wis. 11:21): Lord, Thou hast ordered all things in number, weight, and measure.

CHAPTER XXVII

THAT THE DIVINE WILL IS NOT CONFINED TO CERTAIN EFFECTS

IT may also be proved from the foregoing that neither is His will, by which He works, necessitated to produce certain determinate effects.

For it behoves the will to be proportionate to its object. Now the object of the intellect is a good understood, as stated above. Hence the will has a natural aptitude to extend to whatever the intellect can propose to it under the aspect of good. If, then, the divine intellect is not confined to certain effects, as we have shown, it follows that neither does the divine will produce certain determinate effects of necessity.

Further. Nothing acting by will produces a thing without willing. Now it was proved above that God wills nothing other than Himself of absolute necessity. Therefore effects proceed from the divine will not of necessity but by its free ordinance.

CHAPTERS XXVIII AND XXIX

HOW THERE IS ANYTHING DUE IN THE PRODUCTION OF THINGS

AGAIN. From what has been said it may be shown that God in the creation of things did not work of necessity, as though He brought things into being as a debt of justice.

For justice, according to the Philosopher (5 Ethic.), is towards another person to whom it renders his due. But nothing, to which anything may be due, is presupposed to the universal production of things. Therefore the universal production of things could not result from a debt of justice.

Again. Since the act of justice is to render to each one that which is his own, the act by which a thing becomes one's own precedes the act of justice, as appears in human affairs: for a man by working has a right to call his own that which, as an act of justice, is rendered to him by the person who pays him. Therefore the act whereby a person first acquires something of his own cannot be an act of justice. Now a created thing begins to have something of its own by creation. Therefore creation does not proceed from a debt of justice.

Further. No one owes something to another except from the fact that in some way he depends on him or receives something either from him or from a third, on whose account he owes something to the other: for thus a son is a debtor to his father, because he receives being from him; a master to his servant, because he receives from him the service he requires; and every man is a debtor to his neighbour for God's sake, from Whom we have received all good things. But God is dependent on no one, nor needs He to receive anything from another, as is manifestly clear from what has been said. Therefore it was not on account of a debt of justice that God brought things into being.

Moreover. In every genus that which is on account of itself precedes that which is on account of another. Consequently that which is simply first of all causes, is a cause on its own account only: whereas that which acts by reason of a debt of justice does not act on its own account only, for it acts on account of the thing to which the debt is due. Therefore God, since He is the first cause and the first agent, did not bring things into being from a debt of justice.

Hence it is said (Rom. 11:35, 36): Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him? For of Him, and by Him, and in Him, are all things; and (Job 41:2): Who hath given Me before that I should repay him? All things that are under heaven are Mine.

Hereby is refuted the error of some who strive to prove that God cannot do save what He does, because He cannot do except what He ought to do. For He does not produce things from a debt of justice, as we have proved.

Nevertheless, although nothing to which anything can be due precedes the universal creation of things, something uncreated precedes it, and this is the principle of creation. This may be considered in two ways. For the divine goodness precedes as the end and first motive of creation, according to Augustine, who says: Because God is good we exist. Also His knowledge and will precede, as by them things are brought into being.

Accordingly if we consider the divine goodness absolutely, we find nothing due in the creation of things. For in one way a thing is said to be due to someone on account of another person being referred to him, in that it is his duty to refer to himself that which he has received from that person: thus it is due to a benefactor that he be thanked for his kindness, inasmuch as he who has received the kindness owes this to him. But this kind of due has no place in the creation of things: since there is nothing pre-existent to which it can be competent to owe anything to God, nor does any favour of His pre-exist. In another way something is said to be due to a thing in itself: since that which is required for a thing’s perfection is necessarily due to it: thus it is due to a man to have hands or strength, since without these he cannot be perfect. Now God’s goodness needs nothing outside Him for its perfection. Therefore the production of creatures is not due to Him by way of necessity.

Again. God brings things into being by His will, as we have shown above. Now it is not necessary, if God wills His own goodness to be, that He should will other things than Himself to be produced: because the antecedent of this conditional proposition is necessary, but not the consequent: for it was shown in the First Book that God necessarily wills His own goodness to be, but does not necessarily will other things. Therefore the production of creatures is not necessarily due to the divine goodness.

Moreover. It has been proved that God brings things into being neither by necessity of His nature, nor by necessity of His knowledge, nor by necessity of His will, nor by necessity of His justice. Therefore by no manner of necessity is it due to the divine goodness that things be brought into being.

It may be said however that it is due to Him by way of a certain becomingness. But justice properly speaking requires a debt of necessity: since what is rendered to someone out of justice, is due to him by a necessity of right.

Accordingly it cannot be said that the production of creatures arose either from a debt of justice whereby God is the creature's debtor, or from a debt of justice whereby He is a debtor to His goodness, if justice be taken in the proper sense. But if justice be taken in a broad sense, we may speak of justice in the creation of things, in so far as the creation is becoming to the divine goodness.

If, however, we consider the divine ordinance whereby God decided by His intellect and will to bring things into being, then the production of things proceeds from the necessity of the divine ordinance: for it is impossible that God should decide to do a certain thing which afterwards He did not, otherwise His decision would be either changeable or weak. It is therefore necessarily due to His ordinance that it be fulfilled. And yet this due is not enough for the notion of justice properly so called in the creation of things, wherein we can consider nothing but the action of God in creating: and there is no justice properly speaking between one same person and himself, as the Philosopher says (5 Ethic.). Therefore it cannot be said properly that God brought things into being from a debt of justice, for the reason that He ordained by His knowledge and will to produce them.

If, however, we consider the production of a particular creature, it will be possible to find therein a debt of justice by comparing a subsequent creature to a preceding one. And I say preceding, not only in time but also in nature.

Accordingly in those divine effects which were to be produced first, we find no due: but in the subsequent production we find a due, yet in a different order. For if those things that are first naturally, are also first in being, those which follow become due on account of those which precede: for given the causes, it is due that they should have actions whereby to produce their effects. On the other hand if those which are first naturally are subsequent in being, then those which are first become due on account of those which come afterwards; thus it is due that medicine precede in order that health may follow. And in either case there is this in common,—that what is due or necessary is claimed by that which is naturally first from that which is naturally subsequent.

Now the necessity that arises from that which is subsequent in being, and yet is first by nature, is not absolute but conditional necessity: namely, if this must be done, then that must precede. Accordingly with regard to this necessity, a due is found in the production of creatures in three ways. First, so that the conditional due is on the part of the whole universe of things in relation to each part thereof that is necessary for the perfection of the universe. For if God willed such a universe to be made, it was due that He should make the sun and moon, and suchlike things without which the universe cannot be. Secondly, so that the conditional due be in one creature in relation to another: for instance, if God willed the existence of plants and animals, it was due that He should make the heavenly bodies, whereby those things are preserved; and if He willed the existence of man, it behoved Him to make plants and animals and the like, which man needs for perfect existence: although God made both these and other things of His mere will. Thirdly, so that the conditional due be in each creature in relation to its parts, properties, and accidents, on which the creature depends either for its being, or for some one of its perfections: thus, given that God willed to make man, it was due, on this supposition, that He should unite in him soul and body, and furnish him with senses and other like aids, both within and without. In all of which, if we consider the matter rightly, God is said to be a debtor not to the creature, but to the fulfilment of His purpose. There is also in the universe another kind of necessity whereby a thing is said to be necessary absolutely. This necessity depends on causes which precede in being, for instance on essential principles, and on efficient or moving causes. But this kind of necessity cannot find place in the first creation of things, as regards efficient causes. For there God alone was the efficient cause, since to create belongs to Him alone, as we have proved above; while in creating, He works not by a necessity of His nature, but by His will, as we have shown above; and those things which are done by the will cannot be necessitated, except only by the supposition of the end, on account of which supposition it is due to the end that those things should be whereby the end is obtained. On the other hand, with regard to formal and material causes, nothing hinders us from finding absolute necessity even in the first creation of things. For from the very fact that certain bodies were composed of the elements, it was necessary for them to be hot or cold: and from the very fact that a superficies was drawn in the shape of a triangle, it was necessary that it should have three angles equal to two right angles. Now this necessity results from the relation of an effect to its material or formal cause. Wherefore on this account God cannot be said to be a debtor, but rather does the debt of necessity affect the creature. But in the propagation of things, where the creature is already an efficient cause, an absolute necessity can arise from the created efficient cause: thus the lower bodies are necessarily influenced by the movement of the sun.

Accordingly from the aforesaid kinds of due, natural justice is found in things, both as regards the creation of things, and as regards their propagation. Wherefore God is said to have produced and to govern all things justly and reasonably.

Wherefore by what we have said we remove a twofold error: of those, namely, who, setting limits to the divine power, said that God cannot make except what He makes, because He is bound so to make: and of those who assert that all things result from His simple will, without any other reason, either to be sought in things, or to be assigned.

CHAPTER XXX

HOW THERE CAN BE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY IN CREATED THINGS

NOW though all things depend on God’s will as their first cause, which is not necessitated in operating except by the supposition of His purpose, nevertheless absolute necessity is not therefore excluded from things, so that we, be obliged to assert that all things are contingent:—which some one might think to be the case, for the reason that they have arisen from their cause, not of absolute necessity: since in things a contingent effect is wont to be one that does not necessarily result from a cause. Because there are some created things which it is simply and absolutely necessary must be.

For it is simply and absolutely necessary that those things be in which there is no possibility of not being. Now some things are so brought by God into being, that there is in their nature a potentiality to non-being. This happens through their matter being in potentiality to another form. Wherefore those things, wherein either there is no matter, or, if there is, it has not the possibility of receiving another form, have not a potentiality to non-being. Hence it is simply and absolutely necessary for them to be.

If, however, it be said that things which are from nothing, so far as they are concerned, tend to nothing, and that in consequence there is in all creatures a potentiality to non-being:—it is clear that this does not follow. For created things are said to tend to nothing in the same sense as they are from nothing: and this is not otherwise than according to the power of the agent. Wherefore in created things there is not a potentiality to non-being: but there is in the Creator the power to give them being or to cease pouring forth being into them: since He works in producing things, not by a necessity of His nature, but by His will, as we have proved.

Again. Since created things come into being through the divine will, it follows that they are such as God willed them to be. Now the fact that God is said to have brought things into being by His will, and not of necessity, does not exclude His having willed certain things to be which are of necessity, and others which are contingently, so that there may be an ordinate diversity in things. Nothing, therefore, prevents certain things produced by the divine will being necessary.

Further. It belongs to God's perfection that He bestowed His likeness on created things, except as regards those things with which created being is incompatible: since it belongs to a perfect agent to produce its like as far as possible. Now to be simply necessary is not incompatible with the notion of created being: for nothing prevents a thing being necessary which nevertheless has a cause of its necessity, for instance, the conclusions of demonstrations. Therefore nothing prevents a certain thing being so produced by God, that nevertheless it is simply necessary for it to be: in fact, this is a proof of the divine perfection.

Moreover. The further distant a thing is from that which is being of itself, namely God, the nearer is it to non-being. Wherefore the nearer a thing is to God, the further is it removed from non-being. Now things that already are, are near to non-being through having a potentiality to non-being. Consequently, those things which are nearest to God, and for that reason most remote from non-being, must be such that there is no potentiality to non-being in them, so that the order in things be complete: and the like are necessary absolutely. Therefore some created things have being necessarily.

Accordingly it must be observed that if the universe of created beings be considered as coming from their first principle, we find that they depend on the will, not on a necessity of their principle, except on a necessity of supposition, as already stated. If, however, they be considered in relation to their proximate principles, they are found to have absolute necessity. For nothing prevents certain principles being produced, not of necessity, and yet, these being supposed, such and such an effect follows of necessity: thus the death of this animal has absolute necessity from the very fact that it is composed of contraries, although it was not absolutely necessary for it to be composed of contraries. In like manner that such and such natures were produced by God, was voluntary: and yet, once they are so constituted, something results or happens that has absolute necessity.

In created things, however, necessity is to be taken in various ways in relation to various causes. For since a thing cannot be without its essential principles which are matter and form, that which belongs to a thing by reason of its essential principles must needs have absolute necessity in all things.

Now from these principles, in so far as they are principles of being, a threefold absolute necessity is found in things. First in relation to the being of the thing of which they are the principles. And since matter, as regards what it is, is being in potentiality; and since what can be, can also not be; in relation to their matter certain things are necessarily corruptible; for instance, an animal, through being composed of contraries, and fire, through its matter being susceptive of contraries. But form, as regards what it is, is act, and by it things exist actually. Wherefore from it there results necessity in some things. This happens either because those things are forms without matter,—and thus there is no potentiality to non-being in them, but by their forms they are always in the act of being, as in the case of separate substances—or because their forms are so perfect as to equal the whole potentiality of their matter, wherefore there remains no potentiality to another form, nor, in consequence, to non-being, as in the case of heavenly bodies. But in those things wherein the form does not fulfil the whole potentiality of matter, there still remains a potentiality to another form. Wherefore in them there is not necessity of being, but the act of being is, in them, the result of form overcoming matter, as in the case of the elements and things composed of them. Because the form of an element does not reach matter in its whole potentiality: for matter does not receive the form of one element, except by being subjected to the one of two contraries. While the form of a mixed body reaches matter as disposed by a determinate mode of mixture. Now there must be one same subject of contraries, and of all intermediaries resulting from the mixture of the extremes. Wherefore it is evident that all things which either have contraries, or are composed of contraries, are corruptible. And things which are not so, are everlasting: unless they be corrupted accidentally, as forms which are not subsistent, and have being through being in matter.

In another way there is absolute necessity in things from their essential principles, by relation to the parts of their matter or form, if it happens that in certain things these principles are not simple. For since the proper matter of man is a mixed body, with a certain temperament and endowed with organs, it is absolutely necessary that a man should have in himself each of the elements, humours, and principal organs. Likewise if man is a rational mortal animal, and this is the nature or form of a man, it is necessary for him to be both animal and rational.

Thirdly, there is absolute necessity in things through the relations of their essential principles to the properties consequent upon their matter or form: thus it is necessary that a saw be hard, since it is of iron, and that a man be capable of learning.

But necessity of the agent may regard either the action itself, or the consequent effect. The former kind of necessity is like the necessity of an accident which it owes to the essential principles. For just as other accidents result from the necessity of essential principles, so does action from the necessity of the form whereby the agent actually is: since it acts so far as it is actual. Yet this happens differently in the action which remains in the agent, such as to understand and to will, and in the action which passes into something else, such as to heat. For in the former kind of action, the form by which the agent becomes actual causes necessity in the action itself, since for its being nothing extrinsic is required as term of the action. Because when the sense is made actual by the sensible species, it is necessary for it to perceive, and in like manner, when the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species. But in the second kind of action, necessity of action results from the form, as regards the power to act: for if fire is hot, it is necessary that it have the power to heat, although it is not necessary that it heat, since it may be hindered by something extrinsic. Nor does it affect the point at issue, whether by its form one agent be sufficient alone for the action, or whether it be necessary to have an assemblage of many agents in order to do the one action; for instance many men to row a boat: since all are as one agent, who is made actual by their being united together in one action.

The necessity which results from an efficient or moving cause in the effect or thing moved, depends not only on the agent, but also on a condition of the thing moved and of the recipient of the agent’s action, which recipient either is nowise in potentiality to receive the effect of such an action,—as wool to be made into a saw,—or else its potentiality is hindered by contrary agents, or by contrary dispositions inherent to the movable, or by contrary forms, offering an obstacle that is stronger than the power of the agent in acting; thus iron is not melted by a feeble heat.

Hence, in order that the effect follow, it is necessary that there be in the patient potentiality to receive, and in the agent conquest of the patient, so that it be able to transform it to a contrary disposition. And if the effect, resulting in the patient through its conquest by the agent, be contrary to the natural disposition of the patient, there will be necessity of violence, as when a stone is thrown upwards. But if it be not contrary to the natural disposition of the subject, there will be necessity not of violence, but of the natural order, as in the movement of the heavens, which results from an extrinsic active principle, and nevertheless is not contrary to the natural disposition of the movable subject, wherefore it is not a violent but a natural movement. It is the same in the alteration of lower bodies by the heavenly bodies: for there is a natural inclination in the lower bodies to receive the influence of the higher bodies. It is also thus in the generation of the elements: since the form to be introduced by generation is not contrary to primary matter, which is the subject of generation, although it is contrary to the form to be cast aside, because matter under a contrary form is not the subject of generation. Accordingly it is clear from what we have said that the necessity resulting from an efficient cause depends, in some things, on the disposition of the agent alone, but in others on the disposition of both agent and patient. If then this disposition, by reason of which the effect follows of necessity, be absolutely necessary in both agent and patient, there will be absolute necessity in the efficient cause: as in those things which act necessarily and always. On the other hand, if it be not absolutely necessary but may be removed, no necessity will result from the efficient cause except on the supposition that both have the disposition required for action: as, for instance, in those things which are sometimes hindered in their operation either through defective power, or through the violence of a contrary: wherefore they do not act always and necessarily, but in the majority of cases.

From a final cause there results necessity in things in two ways. In one way, forasmuch as it is first in the intention of the agent. In this respect necessity results from the end in the same way as from the agent: since the agent acts in so far as it intends the end, both in natural and in voluntary actions. For in natural things, the intention of the end belongs to the agent according to the latter’s form, whereby the end is becoming to it: wherefore the natural thing must needs tend to the end according to the virtue of its form: thus a heavy body tends towards the centre according to the measure of its gravity. And in voluntary matters, the will inclines to act for the sake of an end forasmuch as it intends that end: although it is not always inclined to do this or that, which are on account of the end, as much as it desires the end, when the end can be obtained not by this or that alone, but in several ways.

In another way necessity results from the end according as this is posterior in being. This is not absolute but conditional necessity: thus we say that it will be necessary for a saw to be made of iron, if it is to do the work of a saw.

CHAPTER XXXI

THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR CREATURES TO HAVE BEEN ALWAYS

IT remains for us to prove from the foregoing that it is not necessary for created things to have been from eternity.

Because if it be necessary for the universe of creatures, or any particular creature whatsoever, to be, it must have this necessity either of itself or from another. But it cannot have it of itself. For it was proved above that every being must be from the first being. Now that which has being, not from itself, cannot possibly have necessity of being from itself: since what must necessarily be, cannot possibly not be; and consequently that which of itself has necessary being, has of itself the impossibility of not being; and therefore it follows that it is not a non-being; wherefore it is a being.

If, however, this necessity of a creature is from something else, it must be from a cause that is extrinsic; because whatever we may take that is within the creature, has being from another. Now an extrinsic cause is either efficient or final. From the efficient cause, however, it follows that the effect is necessarily, when it is necessary for the agent to act: for it is through the agent's action that the effect depends on the efficient cause. Accordingly if it is not necessary for the agent to act in order that the effect be produced, neither is it absolutely necessary for the effect to be. Now God does not act of necessity in producing creatures, as we have proved above. Wherefore it is not absolutely necessary for the creature to be, as regards necessity dependent on the efficient cause. Likewise neither is it necessary as regards the necessity that depends on the final cause. For things directed to an end do not derive necessity from the end, except in so far as without them the end either cannot be,—as preservation of life without food,—or cannot be so well,—as a journey without a horse. Now the end of God's will, from which things came into being, can be nothing else but His goodness, as we proved in the First Book. And this does not depend on creatures, neither as to its being,—since it is per se necessary being,—nor as to well-being,—since it is by itself good simply; all of which were proved above. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary for the creature to be: and consequently neither is it necessary to suppose that the creature has been always.

Again. That which proceeds from a will is not absolutely necessary, except perhaps when it is necessary for the will to will it. Now God, as proved above, brought things into being, not by a necessity of His nature, but by His will: nor does He necessarily will creatures to be, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore it is not absolutely necessary for the creature to be: and therefore neither is it necessary that it should have been always.

Moreover. It has been proved above that God does not act by an action that is outside Him, as though it went out from Him and terminated in a creature, like heating which goes out from fire and terminates in wood. But His will is His action; and things are in the way in which God wills them to be. Now it is not necessary that God will the creature always to have been; since neither is it necessary that God will a thing to be at all, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore it is not necessary that creatures should have been always.

Again. A thing does not proceed necessarily from a voluntary agent except by reason of something due. But God does not produce the creature by reason of any debt, if we consider the production of all creatures absolutely, as we have shown above. Therefore God does not necessarily produce the creature. Neither therefore is it necessary, because God is eternal, that He should have produced the creature from eternity.

Further. It has been proved that absolute necessity in created things results, not from a relation to a principle that is of itself necessary to be, namely God, but from a relation to other causes which are not of themselves necessary to be. Now the necessity resulting from a relation which is not of itself necessary to be, does not necessitate that something should have been always: for if something runs it follows that it is in motion, but it is not necessary for it to have been always in motion, because the running itself is not necessary. Therefore nothing necessitates that creatures should always have been.

CHAPTER XXXII

ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WISH TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM GOD'S SIDE OF THE QUESTION

SINCE, however, many have held that the world has been always and of necessity, and have endeavoured to prove this, it remains for us to give their arguments, so as to show that they do not necessarily prove the eternity of the world. In the first place we shall set forth the arguments that are taken from God's side; secondly, those which are taken from the side of creatures; thirdly, those which are taken from the manner of their making, on account of which they are said to begin to be anew.

On the part of God the following arguments are produced in order to prove the eternity of the world.

Every agent that acts not always, is moved either per se or accidentally: per se, as fire which was not always burning, begins to burn, either because it is newly lit, or because it is newly transferred so as to be near the fuel:—accidentally, as the mover of an animal begins anew to move the animal with some movement made in its regard; either from within,—as an animal begins to be moved when it awakes after its digestion is complete,—or from without, as when there newly arise actions that lead to the beginning of a new action. Now God is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore God always acts in the same way. But created things are established in being by His action. Therefore creatures always have been.

Again. The effect proceeds from the active cause by the latter's action. But God's action is eternal: else He would become an actual agent from being an agent in potentiality: and it would be necessary for Him to be reduced to actuality by some previous agent, which is impossible. Therefore the things created by God have been from eternity.

Moreover. Given a sufficient cause, its effect must necessarily be granted. For if, given the cause, it were still unnecessary to grant its effect, it would be therefore possible that, given the cause, the effect would be or not be. Therefore the sequence of the effect to its cause would only be possible: and what is possible, requires something to reduce it to actuality. Hence it will be necessary to suppose some cause whereby it comes about that the effect is made actual, and thus the first cause was not sufficient. But God is the sufficient cause of creatures being produced: else He would not be a cause; rather would He be in potentiality to a cause: since He would become a cause by the addition of something: which is impossible. Therefore it would seem necessary, since God is from eternity, that the creature was also from eternity.

Again. A voluntary agent does not delay to carry out his purpose of making a thing, except on account of something expected and not yet present: and this latter is either sometimes in the agent himself, as where one awaits perfect capability to do something, or the removal of an obstacle to one’s capability; and sometimes it is outside the agent, as when one awaits the presence of a person in whose presence the action is to be done; or at least when one awaits the presence of a suitable time which has not yet arrived. For if the will be complete, the power follows suit at once, unless there be a fault therein: thus at the command of the will the movement of a limb follows at once, unless there be a fault in the motive power which carries out the movement. Hence it is clear that, when one wills to do a thing and it is not done at once, it must be either that this is owing to a fault in the power, of which fault one awaits the removal, or else the will to do it is not complete. And by the will being complete I mean that it wills to do this thing absolutely and from every point of view, whereas the will is incomplete when one does not will absolutely to do this thing, but on a certain condition that does not yet obtain, or when one does not will it except a present obstacle be removed. Now it is evident that whatever God now wills to be, He has willed from eternity to be: for a new movement of the will cannot accrue to Him. Neither could any fault or obstacle affect His power: nor could anything else be awaited for the universal production of creatures, since nothing besides Him is uncreated, as we have proved above. Therefore it is seemingly evident that He produced the creature from eternity.

Further. An intellectual agent does not choose one thing rather than another except on account of the one preponderating over the other. But where there is no difference there can be no preponderance. Hence where there is no difference, there is no choice of the one rather than of the other. And for this reason there will be no action of an agent equally indifferent to both of two alternatives, as neither is there of matter; for such a potentiality is like the potentiality of matter. Now, there can be no difference between non-being and non-being. Therefore one non-being is not more eligible than another non-being. But besides the whole universe of creatures there is nothing but the eternity of God. And in nothingness it is impossible to assign any difference of moments, so that it be more fitting to make a certain thing in one moment than in another: nor, again, in eternity, the whole of which is uniform and simple, as we proved in the First Book. It follows, therefore, that God’s will is indifferent to produce creatures through the whole of eternity. Consequently His will is either that the creature should never be produced in His eternity, or that it should always have been produced. But it is clear that His will is not that the creature should never be made in His eternity, since it is evident that creatures were formed by His will. Therefore it remains that necessarily, as it seems, the creature has been always.

Again. Things directed to an end take their necessity from the end, especially in those that are done voluntarily. Hence it follows, that as long as there is no change in the end, things directed to the end suffer no change or are produced invariably, unless there arise some new relation between them and the end. Now the end of creatures, that proceed from the divine will, is the divine goodness, which alone can be the end of the divine will. Wherefore since the divine goodness is unchangeable both in itself and in relation to the divine will throughout all eternity, it would seem that creatures are brought into being by the divine will in the same way through the whole of eternity: for it cannot be said that any new relation to the end accrued to them, if it be supposed that they were utterly non-existent before a particular time from which they are supposed to have begun their existence.

Further. Since the divine goodness is most perfect, when we say that all things came from God on account of His goodness, the sense is not that anything accrued to Him from creatures; but that it belongs to goodness to communicate itself to others as far as possible, and it is by doing so that goodness makes itself known. Now since all things partake of God’s goodness in so far as they have being, the more lasting they are the more they participate the goodness of God: wherefore the everlasting being of a species is called a divine being. But the divine goodness is infinite. Consequently it belongs thereto to communicate itself in an infinite manner, and not only at a particular time. Therefore it would seem to belong to the divine goodness that some creatures should have existed from eternity.

Accordingly these are the arguments taken from God’s side, which would seem to show that creatures have been always.

CHAPTER XXXIII

ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CREATURES

THERE are also other arguments, taken from the point of view of creatures, that would seem to prove the same conclusion.

For things which have no potentiality to non-being, cannot possibly not be. Now there are some creatures in which there is no potentiality to non-being. For there cannot be potentiality to non-being except in those things which have matter subject to contrariety: since potentiality to being and to non-being is a potentiality to privation and form, of which matter is the subject; and privation is always connected with the opposite form, since it is impossible for matter to be without any form at all. But there are certain creatures in which the matter is not subject to contrariety: either because they are entirely devoid of matter; for instance intellectual substances, as we shall show further on, or because they have no contrary, as heavenly bodies, and this is proved by their movement, which has no contrary. Therefore it is impossible for certain creatures not to exist: and consequently it is necessary that they exist always.

Again. A thing's endurance in being is in proportion to its power of being, except accidentally, as in those which are corrupted by violence. But there are certain creatures in which there is a power of being not for any definite time, but for ever; for instance the heavenly bodies and intellectual substances, because they are incorruptible through having no contrary. It follows, then, that it is competent to them to be always. But that which begins to exist, is not always. Therefore it is not becoming to them that they begin to exist.

Further. Whenever a thing begins to be moved anew, the mover, or the moved, or both, must be conditioned otherwise now while the movement is, than before when there was no movement: for there is a certain habitude or relation in the mover to the thing moved, for as much as it moves actually; and the new relation does not begin without a change either in both or at least in one or other of the extremes. Now that which is conditioned otherwise now and heretofore, is moved. Therefore, before the movement that begins anew, there must be a previous movement either in the movable or in the mover. It follows, in consequence, that every movement is either eternal, or has another movement preceding it. Therefore movement always has been; and consequently movable also. Therefore there have always been creatures: since God is utterly immovable, as we proved in the First Book.

Further. Every agent that engenders its like, intends to preserve perpetual being in the species, for it cannot be preserved perpetually in the individual. But it is impossible for the desire of nature to be frustrated. Therefore it follows that the species of generable things are everlasting.

Again. If time is everlasting, movement must be everlasting, since it is the reckoning of movement: and consequently movables must be everlasting, since movement is the act of a movable. Now time must needs be perpetual. For time is inconceivable without a now: even as a line is inconceivable without a point. But now is always the end of the past and the beginning of the future, for this is the definition of the now. Wherefore every given now has time preceding it and following it: and consequently no now can be either first or last. It follows therefore that movables which are created substances are from eternity.

Again. One must either affirm or deny. If, therefore, by denying a thing we suppose its existence, that thing must needs be always. Now time is a thing of this kind. For if time was not always, we can conceive it as not being previously to being: and in like manner, if it will not be always, its non-being must follow its being. Now there can be no before and after in duration unless there be time; since the reckoning of before and after is time. Consequently time must have been before it began to be, and will be after it has ceased to be: and therefore time is eternal. But time is an accident: and an accident cannot be without a subject. And its subject is not

God, Who is above time; since He is utterly immovable, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore it follows that some created substance is eternal.

Moreover. Many propositions are such that to deny them is to affirm them: for instance whoso denies that truth exists, supposes the existence of truth, for he supposes that the denial which he utters is true. It is the same with one who denies this principle that contradictories are not simultaneous: since by denying this he asserts that the negative which he utters is true, and that the opposite affirmative is false, and thus that both are not true about the same thing. Accordingly if, as we have proved, a thing which through being denied has to be admitted, must be always, it follows that the aforesaid propositions, and all that result from them, are everlasting. But such propositions are not God. Therefore something beside God must be eternal.

These, then, and similar arguments may be taken from the standpoint of creatures to prove that creatures have been always.

CHAPTER XXXIV

ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE MAKING

AGAIN, other arguments may be taken from the point of view of the making, in order to prove the same conclusion.

For what is asserted by all in common cannot possibly be entirely false: because a false opinion is a weakness of the understanding, even as a false judgment about its proper sensible results from a weakness of the sense. Now defects are accidental, since they are beside the intention of nature. And what is accidental cannot be always and in everything: for instance, the judgment given by all tastes about savours cannot be false. Consequently the judgment given by all about a truth cannot be erroneous. Now it is the common opinion of all philosophers that from nothing, naught is made. Wherefore this must be true. Hence if a thing is made, it must be made from something: and if this also is made, it must also be made from something. But this cannot go on indefinitely, for then no generation would be completed, since it is not possible to go through an infinite number of things. Therefore we must come to some first thing that was not made. Now every thing that has not always been, must have been made. Therefore the thing from which all things were first made, must be eternal. But this is not God, since He cannot be the matter of a thing, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore it follows that something beside God is eternal, namely primary matter.

Moreover. If a thing is not in the same state now and before, it must be, in some way, changed, for to be moved is not to be in the same state now as before. Now everything that begins to be anew, is not in the same state now as before. Therefore this must result from some movement or change. But every movement or change is in a subject, for it is the act of a movable. Now, since movement precedes that which is made by movement, for movement terminates therein, it follows that before anything made there pre-exists a movable subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must necessarily come to some first subject that begins not anew but always has been.

Again. Whatever begins to be anew, it was possible, before it was, that it would be. For if not, it was impossible for it to be and necessary for it not to be: and so it would always have been a non-being and it never would have begun to be. Now that for which it is possible to be is a subject potentially a being. Therefore before everything that begins to be anew, there must pre-exist a subject which is a potential being. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, we must suppose some first subject which did not begin to be anew.

Again. No permanent substance is while it is being made: for it is made in order that it may be, wherefore it would not have to be made if it were already. But while it is being made, there must be something that is the subject of the making: since a making, seeing that it is an accident, cannot be without a subject. Therefore whatever is made has a pre-existing subject. And since this cannot go on indefinitely, it follows that the first subject was not made, but is eternal. Whence it also follows that something beside God is eternal, because He cannot be the subject of making or movement.

Accordingly these are the arguments, through clinging to which as though they were demonstrations some people say that things created have necessarily been always. Wherein they contradict the Catholic faith, which affirms that nothing beside God has always been, and that all things have begun to be, save the one eternal God.

CHAPTER XXXV

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, AND FIRST OF THOSE THAT WERE TAKEN FROM THE STANDPOINT OF GOD

WE must, accordingly, show that the foregoing reasons do not necessarily conclude: and first, those that are produced on the part of the agent.

For it does not follow that God is moved either per se or accidentally if His effect begin to be anew; as the first argument pretended. Because newness of effect may argue change of the agent in so far as it proves newness of action: since it is impossible for a new action to be in the agent, unless the latter be in some way moved, at least from inaction to action. But newness of effect does not prove newness of action in God, since His action is His essence, as we have proved above. Neither therefore can newness of effect argue change in God the agent.

And yet it does not follow, if the action of the first agent is eternal, that His effect is eternal, as the second argument inferred. For it has been shown above, that in producing things God acts voluntarily. Not, however, as though there were an intermediate action of His,—as in us the action of the motive power intervenes between the act of the will and the effect,—as we have proved in a foregoing chapter: but His act of understanding and willing must be His act of making. Now the effect follows from the intellect and the will according to the determination of the intellect and the command of the will. And just as every other condition of the thing made is determined by the intellect, so is time appointed to it: for art determines not only that this thing is to be such and such, but that it is to be at this particular time, even as a physician determines that a draught is to be taken at such and such a time. Wherefore, if his willing were per se efficacious for producing the effect, the effect would follow anew from his former will, without any new action on his part. Therefore nothing prevents our saying that God's action was from eternity, whereas His effect was not from eternity, but then when from eternity He appointed.

Hence it is also clear that, although God is the sufficient cause of bringing things into being, it is not necessary to suppose that because he is eternal His effect is eternal; as the third argument contended. For if we suppose a sufficient cause, we suppose its effect, but not an effect outside the cause: for this would be through insufficiency of the cause, as if for instance a hot thing failed to give heat. Now the proper effect of the will is for that thing to be which the will wills: and if something else were to be than what the will wills, this would be an effect that is not proper to the cause but foreign thereto. But just as the will, as we have said, wills this thing to be such and such, so does it will it to be at such and such a time. Wherefore, for the will to be a sufficient cause, it is not necessary for the effect to be when the will is, but when the will has appointed the effect to be. On the other hand, it is different with things which proceed from a cause acting naturally: because the action of nature is according as nature is; wherefore the effect must necessarily follow if the cause exist. Whereas the will acts, not according to the mode of its being, but according to the mode of its purpose. And consequently, just as the effect of a natural agent follows the being of the agent, so the effect of a voluntary agent follows the mode of his purpose.

From the foregoing it is again clear that the effect of the divine will is not delayed, although it was not always, whereas it was always willed, as the fourth reason argued. Because the object of the divine will is not only the existence of the effect, but also the time of its existence. Wherefore the thing willed, namely that a creature should exist at such and such a time, is not delayed: because the creature began to exist at the time appointed by God from eternity.

Nor can we conceive a diversity of parts of any duration before the beginning of the whole creature, as was supposed in the fifth argument. For nothingness has neither measure nor duration. And the duration of God which is eternity, has no parts, but is utterly simple, having no before and after, since God is immovable, as stated in the First Book. Wherefore there is no comparison between the beginning of the whole creature and any various signate parts of an already existing measure, to which parts the beginning of creatures can be related in a like or unlike manner, so that there need be a reason in the agent why He should have produced the creature at this particular point of that duration, and not at some particular or subsequent point. Such a reason would be necessary if there were some duration divisible into parts, beside the whole creature produced, as happens in particular agents, who produce their effect in time but do not produce time itself. But God brought into being both the creature and time together. Hence in this matter we have not to consider the reason why He produced them now and not before, but only why not always. This may be made clear by a comparison with place. For particular bodies are produced not only at a determined time, but also in a determined place; and since time and place by which they are contained are extraneous to them, there must needs be a reason why they are produced in this place and time rather than in another: whereas in the whole heaven, outside which there is no place, and together with which the entire place of all things is produced, we have not to consider the reason why it is produced here and not there: and through thinking that this reason ought to be a matter of consideration, some have fallen into error, so as to place the infinite in bodies. In like manner, in the production of the entire creature, outside which there is no time, and together with which time is produced simultaneously, we have not to consider the reason why it was produced now and not before, so that we be led to grant the infinity of time; but only why it was not always produced, or why after non-being, or so as to imply a beginning.

For the purpose of inquiring into this question, the sixth argument was adduced on the part of the end, which alone can bring about necessity in those things which are done voluntarily. Now the end of God's will can only be His goodness. And He does not act in order to bring this end into being, as a craftsman works in order to produce his handiwork: since His goodness is eternal and unchangeable, so that nothing can accrue thereto. Nor could it be said that God works for His betterment. Nor again does He act in order to obtain this end for Himself, as a king fights in order to obtain possession of a city: for He is His own goodness. It remains therefore that He acts for an end, by producing an effect, so that it participate His end.

Accordingly in thus producing an effect on account of an end, the uniform relation of the end to the agent is not to be taken as a reason for His work being eternal: but rather we should consider the relation of the end to the effect which is made on account of the end, so that the effect be produced in such a way as to be most fittingly directed to the end. Consequently from the fact that the end is uniformly related to the agent, we cannot conclude that the effect is eternal.

Nor is it necessary that the divine effect should have been always, because thus it is more fittingly directed to the end, as the seventh argument seemed to infer: but it is more fittingly directed to the end by the fact that it was not always. For every agent that produces an effect in participation of his own form, intends to produce his likeness therein. Wherefore it was becoming to God’s will to produce the creature in participation of His goodness, so that it might reflect the divine goodness by its likeness. But this reflection cannot be by way of equality, as a univocal effect reflects its cause,—so that it be necessary for eternal effects to be produced by the divine goodness: but it is after the manner in which the transcendent is reflected by that which is transcended. Now the transcendence of the divine goodness over the creature is especially manifested by the fact that creatures have not been always. For thereby it is manifest that all else beside Him has Him as the author of its being; and that His power is not constrained to produce these effects, as nature is to natural effects; and consequently that He is a voluntary and intelligent agent. The opposite of which some have affirmed, through maintaining the eternity of creatures.

Accordingly on the part of the agent there is nothing to oblige us to hold the eternity of creatures.

CHAPTER XXXVI

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS PRODUCED ON THE PART OF THE THINGS MADE

IN like manner again, neither is there, on the part of creatures, anything to induce us to assert their eternity.

For the necessity of being that we find in creatures, from which the first argument is taken, is a necessity of order, as was shown above: and a necessity of order does not compel the subject of a like necessity to have been always, as we proved above. For although the substance of heaven, through being devoid of potentiality to non-being, has a potentiality to being, yet this necessity follows its substance. Wherefore its substance once brought into being, this necessity involves the impossibility of not being: but it does not make it impossible for the heaven not to be, from the point of view where we consider the production of its very substance.

Likewise the power to be always, from which the second argument proceeded, presupposes the production of the substance. Hence where the production of the heaven's substance is in question, this power cannot be a sufficient argument for that substance's eternity.

Again, the argument adduced in sequence does not compel us to admit the eternity of movement. For it has been made clear that without any change in God the agent, it is possible for Him to do something new that is not eternal. And if it is possible for something to be done by Him anew, it is evident that something can also be moved by Him anew: since newness of movement is consequent upon the ordinance of the eternal will to the effect that movement be not always.

Likewise the intention which natural agents have of perpetuating the species, which was the starting point of the fourth argument, presupposes that natural agents are already in being. Wherefore this argument has no place, save in natural things already brought into being, but not when it is a question of the (first) production of things. The question as to whether it is necessary to admit that generation will go on for ever will be discussed in the sequel.

Also the fifth argument, taken from time, supposes rather than proves the eternity of movement. For since before and after and continuity of time are consequent upon before and after and continuity of movement, according to the teaching of Aristotle, it is clear that the same instant is the beginning of the future, and the end of the past, because in movement there is something assignable that is the beginning and end of the various parts of movement. Wherefore it will not be necessary for each instant to be thus, unless every assignable instant that we conceive in time be between before and after in movement, and this is to suppose that movement is eternal. But he who supposes that movement is not eternal, can say that the first instant of time is the beginning of the future, and the end of no past. Nor is it incompatible with the succession of time, if we place therein a now that is a beginning and not an end, because a line in which we place a point that is a beginning and not an end, is stationary and not transitory; since even in a particular movement which also is not stationary but transitory, it is possible to designate something as only a beginning and not an end of movement: for otherwise all movement would be perpetual, which is impossible.

That we suppose the non-being of time to precede its being, if time began, does not compel us to say that time is, if we suppose that it is not, as the sixth argument inferred. For the before that we speak of as being before time was, does not imply any part of time in reality but only in our imagination. Because when we say that time has being after non-being, we mean that there was no part of time before this signate now: thus, when we say that there is nothing above the heaven, we do not mean that there is a place outside the heaven which can be said to be above in relation to the heaven, but that there is no place above it. In either case the imagination can apply a measure to the already existing thing: and just as this measure is no reason for admitting infinite quantity in a body, as stated in 3 Phys., so neither is it a reason for supposing that time is eternal.

The truth of propositions which one has to grant even if one denies them, and from which the seventh argument proceeded, has the necessity of that relation which is between predicate and subject. Wherefore it does not compel a thing to be always: except perhaps (as understood by) the divine intellect in which all truth is rooted, as we showed in the First Book.

Hence it is clear that the arguments taken from creatures do not compel one to assert the eternity of the world.

CHAPTER XXXVII

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN FROM THE MAKING OF THINGS

IT remains for us to show that neither does any argument taken from the point of view of the making of things compel us to draw the aforesaid conclusion.

The common opinion of the philosophers who asserted that from nothing naught is made, on which the first argument was based, holds good for that particular making which they had under consideration. For since all our knowledge begins from the senses which are about singulars, human speculations proceeded from particular to universal considerations. Wherefore those who sought the principle of things considered only the particular makings of beings, and inquired in what manner this particular fire or this particular stone was made. At first, considering the making of things more from an outward point of view than it behoved them to do, they stated that a thing is made only in respect of certain accidental dispositions, such as rarity, density, and so forth; and they said, in consequence, that to be made was nothing else than to be altered, for the reason that they understood everything to be made from an actual being. Later on, they considered the making of things more inwardly, and made a step forward to the making of things in regard to their substance: for they asserted that a thing does not need to be made, except accidentally, from an actual being, and that it is made per se from a being in potentiality. But this making, which is of a being from any being whatsoever, is the making of a particular being, which is made for as much as it is this being, for instance a man or a fire, but not for as much as it is considered universally: for there was previously a being which is transformed into this being. Entering still more deeply into the origin of things, they considered at last the procession of all created being from one first cause; as appears from the arguments given above which prove this. In this procession of all being from God it is not possible for anything to be made from something already existing: since it would not be the making of all created being.

The early natural philosophers had no conception of such a making, for it was their common opinion that from nothing naught is made. Or if any of them conceived the idea, they did not consider that the name of making was applicable thereto, since the word making implies movement or change, whereas in this origin of all being from one first being, the transformation of one being into another is inconceivable, as we have proved. For which reason neither does it belong to the natural philosophers to consider this same origin of things, but to the metaphysician, who considers universal being and things that are devoid of movement. We, however, by a kind of metaphor transfer the name making even to that origin, so that we say that anything whatsoever is made, if its essence or nature originates from something else.

Wherefore it is clear that neither is the second argument cogent, which was taken from the nature of movement. For creation cannot be described as a change save metaphorically, in so far as the created thing is considered to have being after non-being: in which way one thing is said to be made out of another, even in those things where the one is not changed into the other, for the sole reason that one succeeds the other, as day out of night. Nor does the nature of movement that is brought into the argument justify the conclusion (since what nowise exists is not in any particular state) that when it begins to exist, it is in a different state now and before. Hence again it is evident that there is no need for a passive potentiality to precede the existence of all created being, as the third argument inferred. For this is necessary in those things which take their origin of being from movement, since movement is the act of a potential being. But before a created thing was, it was possible for it to be, through the power of the agent, by which power also it began to be: or it was possible on account of the habitude of the terms, in which no incompatibility is found, which kind of possibility is said to be in respect of no potentiality, as the Philosopher says (5 Metaph.).

For this predicate being is not incompatible with this subject world or man, as measurable is incompatible with diameter; and thus it follows that it is not impossible for it to be, and consequently that before it was, it was possible for it to be, apart from all potentiality. But in those things which are made by movement, it is necessary that they be previously possible in respect of a passive potentiality: and it is with regard to these that the Philosopher employs this argument (7 Metaph.).

From this it is also clear that neither is the fourth argument conclusive for the purpose. For in things made by movement, to be made and to be are not simultaneous, because succession is found in their making. Whereas in things that are not made by movement, their making is not before their being.

It is therefore evident that nothing prevents our asserting that the world has not been always: and this is affirmed by the Catholic faith (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth; and (Prov. 8:22) it is said of God: Before He made anything from the beginning, etc.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

ARGUMENTS BY WHICH SOME ENDEAVOUR TO PROVE THAT THE WORLD IS NOT ETERNAL

NOW there are some arguments brought forward by certain people to prove that the world was not always: they are taken from the following.

For it has been proved that God is the cause of all things. But a cause must precede in duration the things made by its action.

Again. Since all being is created by God, it cannot be said to be made from some being, so that it must be made from nothing, and consequently has being after non-being.

Also, because it is not possible to pass by an infinite number of things. Now if the world were always, an infinite number of things would have now been passed by: since what is past, is passed by, and if the world was always, there is an infinite number of days or an infinite number of solar revolutions.

Further. It follows that an addition is made to the infinite, since every day something is added to the past days or revolutions.

Moreover. It follows that it is possible to go on to infinity in efficient causes, if there was always generation; and we are bound to admit this latter if the world was always: because the son’s cause is his father, and another man is the latter’s father, and so on indefinitely.

Again. It will follow that there is an infinite number of things: namely the immortal souls of an infinite number of men.

Now since these arguments do not conclude of absolute necessity, although they are not devoid of probability, it is enough merely to touch upon them, lest the Catholic faith seem to be founded on empty reasonings, and not, as it is, on the most solid teaching of God. Wherefore it seems right that we should indicate how those arguments are met by those who asserted the eternity of the world.

For the first statement that an agent necessarily precedes the effect brought about by its operation, is true of those things which act by movement, because the effect is not until the movement is ended, and the agent must necessarily exist even when the movement begins. On the other hand in those things which act instantaneously, this is not necessary: thus as soon as the sun reaches the point of the East, it enlightens our hemisphere.

Also, that which is said in the second place is of no avail. For in order to contradict the statement, Something is made from something, if this be not granted, we must say Something is not made from something, and not, Something is made from nothing, except in the sense of the former: whence we cannot conclude that it is made after not being.

Again, the third argument is not cogent. For though the infinite in act be impossible, it is not impossible in succession, since any given infinite taken in this sense is finite. Hence each of the preceding revolutions could be passed by, since it was finite. But in all of them together, if the world had been always, there would be no first revolution. Wherefore there would be no passing through them, because this always requires two extremes.

Again, the fourth argument put forward is weak. For nothing hinders the infinite receiving an addition on the side on which it is finite. Now supposing time to be eternal, it follows that it is infinite anteriorly but finite posteriorly, since the present is the term of the past.

Nor is the argument cogent which is given in the fifth place. For it is impossible, according to philosophers, to have an infinite number of active causes which act together simultaneously: because the effect would have to depend on an infinite number of simultaneous actions. Such are causes that are per se infinite, because their infinity is required for their effect. On the other hand in causes that do not act simultaneously, this is not impossible, according to those who assert that generation has always been. And this infinity is accidental to the causes, for it is accidental to the father of Socrates that he is another man’s son or not. Whereas it is not accidental to the stick forasmuch as it moves the stone, that it be moved by the hand, since it moves forasmuch as it is moved.

The objection taken from souls is more difficult. And yet the argument is not of much use, since it takes many things for granted. For some of those who maintained the eternity of the world, asserted that human souls do not survive the body. Some said that of all souls there survives only the separate intellect, or the active intellect according to some, or even the passive intellect according to others. Some have held a kind of rotation in souls, saying that the same souls after several centuries return to bodies. And some do not consider it incongruous that there should be things actually infinite in those which have no order.

Nevertheless one may proceed to prove this more efficiently from the end of the divine will, as we have indicated above. For the end of God’s will in the production of things, is His goodness as manifested in His effects. Now God’s might and goodness are especially made manifest in that things other than Himself were not always. For the fact that they have not always been clearly shows that other things beside Himself have their being from Him. It also shows that He does not act by a necessity of His nature, and that His power is infinite in acting. Therefore it was most becoming to the goodness of God, that He should give His creatures a beginning of their duration.

From what has been said we are able to avoid the various errors of the pagan philosophers. Some of whom asserted the eternity of the world; others asserted that the matter of the world is eternal, out of which at a certain time the world began to be formed; either by chance; or by some intellect; or else by attraction and repulsion. For all these suppose something eternal beside God: which is incompatible with the Catholic faith.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT FROM CHANCE

HAVING disposed of those matters which relate to the production of things, it remains for us to treat of those which call for our consideration as regards the distinction of things. Of these the first that we have to prove is that the distinction of things is not from chance.

For chance occurs only in those things which it is possible to be otherwise, since we do not ascribe to chance those that are necessarily and always. Now it was shown above that certain things have been created in whose nature there is no possibility of not being, such as immaterial substances and those which are not composed of contraries. Wherefore it is impossible that their substances be from chance. But it is by their substances that they are mutually distinct. Therefore their distinction is not from chance.

Moreover. Since chance is only in those things that are possibly otherwise, and since the principle of this possibility is matter and not their form, which in fact determines the possibility of matter to one; it follows that those things which are distinct by their forms are not distinct by chance, but perhaps those things are, whose distinction is from matter. But the distinction of species is from the form, and the distinction of singulars in the same species, is from matter. Wherefore the specific distinction of things cannot be from chance, but perhaps chance causes the distinction of certain individuals.

Also. Since matter is the principle and cause of casual things, as we have shown, there may be chance in the making of things produced from matter. But it was proved above that the first production of things into being was not from matter. Wherefore there is no place for chance in them. Yet the first production of things must needs have included their distinction: since there are many created things which are neither produced from one another, nor from something common, because they do not agree in matter. Therefore it is impossible for the distinction of things to be from chance.

Again. A per se cause is before an accidental cause. Hence if later things are from a determinate per se cause, it is unfitting to say that the first things are from an undeterminate accidental cause. Now the distinction of things naturally precedes their movements and operations: since determinate movements and operations belong to things determinate and distinct. But movements and operations of things are from per se and determinate causes, since we find that they proceed from their causes in the same way either always or for the most part. Therefore the distinction of things is also from a per se determinate cause, and not from chance, which is an indeterminate accidental cause.

Moreover. The form of anything that proceeds from an intellectual voluntary agent is intended by the agent. Now the universe of creatures has for its author God Who is an agent by His will and intellect, as proved above. Nor can there be any defect in His power, so that He fail of His intention: since His power is infinite, as was proved above. It follows therefore that the form of the universe is intended and willed by God. Therefore it is not from chance: for we ascribe to chance those things which are beside the intention of the agent. Now the form of the universe consists in the distinction and order of its parts. Therefore the distinction of things is not from chance.

Further. That which is good and best in the effect is the end of its production. But the good and the best in the universe consists in the mutual order of its parts, which is impossible without distinction: since by this order the universe is established as one whole, and this is its best. Therefore the order of the parts of the universe and their distinction is the end of the production of the universe. Therefore the distinction of things is not from chance.

Holy Writ bears witness to this truth, as is clear from Gen. 1:1, where after the words, In the beginning God created heaven and earth, the text continues (verse 4), God … divided the light from the darkness, and so on: so that not only the creation of things, but also their distinction is shown to be from God, and not from chance, but as the good and the best of the universe. Wherefore it is added (verse 31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers who affirmed that there was only a material cause, and no other, from which all things were made by expansion and cohesion. For these are compelled to say that the distinction of things which we observe in the universe resulted, not from the intentional ordinance of one, but from the chance movement of matter.

Likewise is excluded the opinion of Democritus and Leucippus, who postulated an infinite number of material principles, namely indivisible bodies of the same nature, but differing in shape, order, and position, to whose convergence—which must needs be fortuitous, since they denied the existence of an active cause—they ascribed the diversity among things, on account of the three aforesaid differences of atoms, to wit, of shape, order, and position: wherefore it followed that the distinction of things was by chance: and from what has been said this is clearly false.

CHAPTER XL

THAT MATTER IS NOT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS

FURTHERMORE, it is evident from the foregoing that the distinction of things is not on account of a diversity of matter as its first cause. For nothing determinate can proceed from matter except by chance: because matter is in potentiality to many things, of which if only one were to result, it must needs be that this happens in the minority of cases, and such is that which happens by chance, especially if we remove the intention of an agent. Now it was proved that the distinction of things is not from chance. It follows therefore that it is not on account of a diversity of matter, as its first cause.

Again. Those things which result from the intention of an agent, are not on account of matter as their first cause. For an active cause precedes matter in acting: because matter does not become an actual cause except in so far as it is moved by an agent. Wherefore if an effect is consequent upon a disposition of matter and the intention of an agent, it does not result from matter as its first cause. For this reason we find that those things which are referable to matter as their first cause, are beside the intention of the agent; for instance monsters and other mischances of nature. But the form results from the intention of the agent. This is proved thus. The agent produces its like according to its form, and if sometimes this fails, it is from chance on account of a defect in the matter. Therefore forms do not result from a disposition of matter as their first cause; on the contrary, matters are disposed in such a way that such may be their forms. Now the specific distinction of things is according to their forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the diversity of matter as its first cause.

Moreover. The distinction of things cannot result from matter except in those which are made from pre-existing matter. Now many things are distinguished from one another which cannot be made from pre-existing matter: for instance, the celestial bodies, which have no contrary, as their movement shows. Therefore the diversity of matter cannot be the first cause of the distinction of things.

Again. Whatever things having a cause of their being are distinct from one another, have a cause of their distinction: because a thing is made a being according as it is made one, undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now if matter, by its diversity, is the cause of the distinction of things, we must suppose that matters are in themselves distinct. Moreover it is evident that every matter has being from something else, since it was proved above that everything, that is in any way whatsoever, is from God. Therefore something else is the cause of distinction in matters: and consequently the first cause of the distinction of things cannot be a diversity of matter.

Again. Since every intellect acts for the sake of good, it does not produce a better thing for the sake of an inferior thing: and it is the same with nature. Now all things proceed from God Who acts by His intellect, as stated above. Therefore inferior things proceed from God for the sake of better things, and not vice versa. But form is more noble than matter, since it is its perfection and act. There fore He does not produce such and such forms for the sake of such and such matters, but rather He produced such and such matters that there might be such and such forms. Therefore the specific distinction in things, which is according to their form, is not on account of their matter: but on the contrary matters were created diverse, that they might be suitable for diverse forms.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of Anaxagoras, who postulated an infinite number of material principles, which at first were mixed together in one confused mass, but which an intellect subsequently separated, thus establishing a distinction among things: as well as the opinions of any who held the distinction of things to be the result of various material principles.

CHAPTER XLI

THAT THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT ON ACCOUNT OF A CONTRARIETY OF AGENTS

FROM the above we may also prove that the cause of distinction among things is not a diversity or even a contrariety of agents.

For if the diverse agents who cause the diversity among things, are ordered to one another, there must be some cause of this order: since many are not united together save by some one. And thus the principle of this order will be the first and sole cause of the distinction of things. If, on the other hand, these various agents are not ordered to one another, their convergence to the effect of producing the diversity of things will be accidental: wherefore the distinction of things will be by chance; the contrary of which has been proved above.

Again. Ordered effects do not proceed from diverse causes having no order, except perhaps accidentally, for diverse things as such do not produce one. Now things mutually distinct are found to have a mutual order, and this not by chance: since for the most part one is helped by another. Wherefore it is impossible that the distinction among things thus ordered, be on account of a diversity of agents without order.

Moreover. Things that have a cause of their distinction cannot be the first cause of the distinction of things. Now, if we take several co-ordinate agents, they must needs have a cause of their distinction: because they have a cause of their being, since all beings are from one first being, as was shown above; and the cause of a thing’s being is the same as the cause of its distinction from others, as we have proved. Therefore diversity of agents cannot be the first cause of distinction among things.

Again. If the diversity of things comes of the diversity or contrariety of various agents, this would seem especially to apply, as many maintain, to the contrariety of good and evil, so that all good things proceed from a good principle, and evil things from an evil principle: for good and evil are in every genus. But there cannot be one first principle of all evil things. For, since those things that are through another, are reduced to those that are of themselves, it would follow that the first active cause of evils is evil of itself. Now a thing is said to be such of itself, if it is such by its essence. Therefore its essence will not be good. But this is impossible. For everything that is, must of necessity be good in so far as it is a being; because everything loves its being and desires it to be preserved; a sign of which is that everything resists its own corruption; and good is what all desire. Therefore distinction among things cannot proceed from two contrary principles, the one good, and the other evil.

Further. Every agent acts in as much as it is actual; and in as much as it is in act, everything is perfect: and everything that is perfect, as such, is said to be good. Therefore every agent, as such, is good. Wherefore if a thing is essentially evil, it cannot be an agent. But if it is the first principle of evils, it must be essentially evil, as we have proved. Therefore it is impossible that the distinction among things proceed from two principles, good and evil.

Moreover. If every being, as such, is good, it follows that evil, as such, is a non-being. Now, no efficient cause can be assigned to non-being, as such, since every agent acts for as much as it is an actual being, and every agent produces its like. Therefore no per se efficient cause can be assigned to evil, as such. Therefore evils cannot be reduced to one first cause that is of itself the cause of all evils.

Further. That which results beside the intention of the agent, has no per se cause, but befalls accidentally: for instance when a man finds a treasure while digging to plant. Now evil cannot result in an effect except beside the intention of the agent, for every agent intends a good, since the good is what all desire. Therefore evil has not a per se cause, but befalls accidentally in the effects of causes. Therefore we cannot assign one first principle to all evils.

Further. Contrary agents have contrary actions. Therefore we must not assign contrary principles to things that result from one action. Now good and evil are produced by the same action: thus by the same action water is corrupted and air generated. Therefore the difference of good and evil that we find in things is no reason for affirming contrary principles.

Moreover. That which altogether is not, is neither good nor evil. Now that which is, for as much as it is, is good, as proved above. Therefore a thing is evil forasmuch as it is a non-being. But this is a being with a privation. Wherefore evil as such is a being with a privation, and the evil itself is this very privation. Now privation has no per se efficient cause: since every agent acts inasmuch as it has a form: wherefore the per se effect of an agent must be something having that form, because an agent produces its like, except accidentally. It follows, then, that evil has no per se efficient cause, but befalls accidentally in the effects of causes which are effective per se.

Consequently there is not one per se principle of evil: but the first principle of all things is one first good, in whose effects evil is an accidental consequence.

Hence it is said (Isa. 45:6, 7): I am the Lord and there is none other God: I form the light and create darkness, I make peace and create evil: I am the Lord that do all these things: and (Ecclus. 11:14): Good things and evil, life and death, poverty and riches, are from God: and (ibid. 33:15): Good is set against evil … so also is the sinner against a just man. And so look upon all the works of the Most High. Two and two, and one against another.

God is said to make or create evils, in so far as He creates things that are good in themselves, and yet hurtful to others: for instance, the wolf, although in his species he is a good of nature, is nevertheless evil to the sheep, and likewise fire to water, inasmuch as it is corruptive thereof. In like manner He causes in men those evils which are called penal. Wherefore it is said (Amos 3:6): Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done? In this sense Gregory says: Even evils, which have no natural subsistence of their own, are created by the Lord. But He is said to create evils when He employs creatures that are good in themselves to punish us who do evil.

Hereby is excluded the error of those who asserted contrary first principles. This error began with Empedocles. For he held that there are two first active principles, attraction and repulsion, of which he asserted that attraction is the cause of generation, and repulsion the cause of corruption. Wherefore it would seem as Aristotle says (1 Metaph.) that he was the first to assert two contrary principles, good and evil.

Pythagoras asserted two primaries, good and evil, as formal however and not as active principles. For he stated that these two are the genera under which all other things are comprised, as the Philosopher declares (1 Metaph.).

Now, though these errors of the earlier philosophers were refuted by those of later times, certain men of perverted sense have presumed to combine them with Christian doctrine. The first of these was Marchius,—from whom the Marchians take their name,—who under the guise of a Christian founded a heresy, holding the existence of two contrary principles. He was followed by the Cerdonians, afterwards by the Marchianists, and lastly by the Manichees, who especially spread this error abroad.

CHAPTER XLII

THAT THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IS NOT THE ORDER OF SECONDARY AGENTS

WE may also prove from the same premisses that the distinction of things is not caused by the order of secondary agents; as those maintained who held that God, since He is one and simple, produces but one effect, which is the first created substance: and that this, because it cannot equal the simplicity of the first cause,—not being pure act, but having a certain admixture of potentiality—has a certain multiplicity, so that it is able to produce some kind of plurality; and that in this way, effects ever failing of the simplicity of their causes, the multiplication of effects results in the diversity of the things whereof the universe consists.

Accordingly this opinion does not assign one cause to the entire diversity of things, but a different cause to each particular effect: and the entire diversity of things it ascribes to the concurrence of all causes. Now we say that those things happen by chance, which result from the concurrence of various causes, and not from one determinate cause. Wherefore the distinction of things and the order of the universe would be the result of chance.

Moreover. That which is best in things caused is reduced, as to its first cause, to that which is best in causes: for effects must be proportionate to their causes. Now the best among all things caused is the order of the universe, wherein the good of the universe consists, even as in human affairs the good of the nation is more God-like than the good of the individual. Hence we must reduce the order of the universe to God as its proper cause, Whom we have proved above to be the sovereign good. Therefore the distinction of things, wherein consists the order of the universe, is the result not of secondary causes, but rather simplicity of the first cause.

Further. It seems absurd to assign a defect in things as cause of that which is best in things. Now the best in things caused is their distinction and order, as shown above. Therefore it is unreasonable to assert that this distinction is the result of secondary causes failing of the simplicity of the first cause.

Again. In all ordered active causes, where action is directed to an end, the ends of the secondary causes must be directed to the end of the first cause: thus the ends of the arts of war, horsemanship, and bridle-making are directed to the end of the political art. Now the origin of beings from the first being is by an action directed to an end: since it is according to intellect, as we have proved; and every intellect acts for an end. If, therefore, in the production of things there are any secondary causes, it follows that their ends and actions are directed to the end of the first cause, and this is the last end in things caused. And this is the distinction and order of the parts of the universe, which order is the ultimate form, so to speak. Therefore the distinction and order in things is not on account of the actions of secondary causes; but rather the actions of secondary causes are on account of the order and distinction to be established in things.

Further. If the distinction of the parts of the universe and their order is the proper effect of the first cause, through being the ultimate form and the greatest good in the universe, it follows that the distinction and order of things must be in the intellect of the first cause: because in things that are made by an intellect, the form produced in the things made proceeds from a like form in the intellect: for instance, the house which exists in matter proceeds from the house which is in an intellect. Now the form of distinction and order cannot be in an active intellect, unless the forms of the things which are distinct and ordered be therein. Wherefore in the divine intellect there are the forms of various things distinct and ordered, nor is this incompatible with His simplicity, as we have proved above. Accordingly, if things that are outside the mind proceed from forms that are in the intellect, it will be possible, in things that are effected by an intellect, for many and diverse things to be caused immediately by the first cause, notwithstanding the divine simplicity, on account of which some fell into the aforesaid opinion.

Again. The action of one who acts by intellect terminates in the form which he understands, and not in another, except accidentally and by chance. Now God is an agent by His intellect, as we have proved: nor can His action be affected by chance, since He cannot fail of His action. It follows, therefore, that He produces His effect for the very reason that he understands and intends that same effect. But by the same idea that He understands one effect, He can understand many effects other than Himself. Wherefore He can at once cause many things without any intermediary.

Moreover. As we have shown above, the power of God is not confined to one effect, and this is befitting His simplicity: because the more a power is united, the nearer it approaches to infinity, being able to extend to so many more things. But it does not follow that one thing only can be made by one, except when the agent is determined to one effect. Wherefore, we are not bound to conclude that, because God is one and utterly simple, therefore many things cannot proceed from Him, except by means of certain things that fail of His simplicity.

Further. It was shown above that God alone can create. Now there are many things which cannot come into being except by creation: such as all those which are not composed of form and matter subject to contrariety; because the like must needs be incapable of being generated, since all generation is from a contrary and from matter. Such are all intellectual substances, and all heavenly bodies, and even primary matter itself. We must therefore assert that all such things have taken the origin of their being from God immediately.

Hence it is said (Gen. 1:1): In the beginning God created heaven and earth: and (Job 37:18): Thou perhaps hast made the heavens with Him, which are most strong as if they were of molten brass.

By the foregoing we exclude the opinion of Avicenna, who says that God, by understanding Himself, produced one first intelligence, in which there is already potentiality and act; that this, through understanding God, produces the second intelligence; through understanding itself as being in act, produces the soul of the sphere; and through understanding itself as being in potentiality, produces the substance of the first sphere. And thus starting from this point he explains the causing of the diversity of things by secondary causes.

We also exclude the opinion of certain early heretics who said that not God but the angels created the world: of which error Simon Magus is said to have been the original author.

CHAPTER XLIII

THAT THE DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DOES NOT RESULT FROM SOME SECONDARY AGENT INTRODUCING VARIOUS FORMS INTO MATTER

CERTAIN modern heretics say that God created the matter of all things visible, but that this was diversified with various forms by an angel. The falseness of this opinion is evident. For the heavenly bodies, wherein no contrariety is to be found, cannot have been formed from any matter: since whatever is made from pre-existing matter, must needs be made from a contrary. Wherefore it is impossible that any angel should have formed the heavenly bodies from matter previously created by God.

Moreover. The heavenly bodies either have no matter in common with the lower bodies, or they only have primary matter in common with them: for the heaven neither is composed of elements, nor is of an elemental nature: which is proved by its movement which differs from that of all the elements. And primary matter could not by itself precede all formed bodies, since it is nothing but pure potentiality, and all actual being is from some form. Therefore it is impossible that an angel should have formed all visible bodies from matter previously created by God.

Again. Everything that is made, is made to be, since making is the way to being. To each thing caused, therefore, it is becoming to be made as it is becoming to be. Now being is not becoming to form alone, nor to matter alone, but to the composite: for matter is merely in potentiality, while form is whereby a thing is, since it is act. Hence it follows that the composite, properly speaking, is. Therefore it belongs to it alone to be made, and not to matter without form. Therefore there is not one agent that creates matter only, and another that induces the form.

Again. The first induction of forms into matter cannot be from an agent acting by movement only, for all movement towards a form is from a determinate form towards a determinate form: because matter cannot be without all form, wherefore some form is presupposed in matter. But every agent intending a merely material form must needs be an agent by movement: for since material forms are not subsistent of themselves, and their being is to be in matter, they cannot be brought into being except either by the production of the whole composite, or by the transmutation of matter to this or that form. Therefore it is impossible that the first induction of forms into matter be from someone creating the form only, but it must be from Him Who is the Creator of the whole composite.

Further. Movement towards a form comes naturally after local movement: for it is the act of that which is more imperfect, as the Philosopher proves. Now in the natural order things that come afterwards are caused by those which come before. Wherefore movement towards a form is caused by local movement. But the first local movement is the movement of the heaven. Therefore all movement towards a form takes place through the means of the heavenly movement. Hence those things that cannot be made through the means of the heavenly movement, cannot be made by an agent that cannot act except by movement: and such must be the agent that cannot act except by inducing form into matter, as we have proved. Now many sensible forms cannot be produced by the heavenly movement except by means of certain presupposed determinate principles: thus certain animals are not made except from seed. Therefore the original production of these forms, for producing which the heavenly movement is not sufficient without the pre-existence of those forms in the species, must needs proceed from the Creator alone.

Again. Just as local movement of fart and whole are the same, like that of the whole earth and of one clod, so the change of generation is the same in the part and in the whole. Now the parts of those things that are subject to generation and corruption are generated by acquiring actual forms from forms in matter, and not from forms existing outside matter, since the generator must be like the thing generated, as the Philosopher proves in 7 Metaph. Neither therefore can the total acquisition of forms by matter be effected by any separate substance, such as an angel: but this must be done either by means of a corporeal agent, or by a creative agent, acting without movement.

Further. Even as being is first among effects, so does it correspond to the first cause as its proper effect. Now being is by form and not by matter. Therefore the first causation of forms is to be ascribed especially to the first cause.

Moreover. Since every agent produces its like, the effect obtains its form from that to which it is likened by the form it acquired: even as the material house acquires its form from the art, which is the likeness of the house in the mind. Now all things are like God Who is pure act, inasmuch as they have forms whereby they become actual: and inasmuch as they desire forms, they are said to desire the divine likeness. Therefore it is absurd to say that the formation of things belongs to another than God the Creator of all.

Hence it is that in order to exclude this error, Moses after saying (Gen. 1:1) that God, in the beginning, created heaven and earth, added how He distinguished all things by forming them in their respective species. Moreover the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:16) that in Christ were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT DISTINCTION AMONG THINGS DID NOT RESULT FROM THE DIVERSITY OF MERITS OR DEMERITS

IT remains now for us to show that the distinction among things did not result from different movements of the free-will of rational creatures, as Origen maintained in his Peri Archon. For he wished to refute the objections and errors of the early heretics, who strove to prove that the different nature of good and evil in things is owing to contrary agents. But on account of the great difference which he observed both in natural and in human things, which difference apparently is not preceded by any merits,—for instance that some bodies are lightsome, some dark, that some are born of pagans, some of Christians,—he was compelled to assert that all differences to be found in things have proceeded from a difference of merits, in accordance with the justice of God. For he says that God, of His mere goodness, first made all creatures equal, all of them being spiritual and rational: and these by their free-will were moved in divers ways, some adhering to God more, and some less, some withdrawing from God more, and some less; and in this way there resulted through divine justice, various grades in spiritual substances, so that some were angels in their various orders, some human souls in their various states, some demons in their various states: and on account of the diversity among rational creatures, he said that God had established diversity among corporeal creatures, so that the more noble spiritual substances were united to the more noble bodies, and thus the corporeal creature would minister in all other various ways to the diversity of spiritual substances.

But this opinion is clearly convicted of falsehood. For among effects, the better a thing is, the more does it obtain precedence in the intention of the agent. Now the greatest good in things created is the perfection of the universe, consisting in the order of distinct things: because in all things the perfection of the whole takes precedence of the perfection of each part. Wherefore the diversity of things results from the principal intention of the first agent, and not from a diversity of merits.

Again. If all rational creatures were created equal from the beginning, we must say that one of them does not depend on another in its action. Now that which results from the concurrence of various causes, one of which does not depend on another, is casual. Therefore according to the aforesaid opinion, this distinction and order of things is casual: and this is impossible, as proved above.

Moreover. That which is natural to a person, is not acquired by him by his will: for the movement of the will, or free-will, presupposes the existence of the willer, and for this his nature is required. Accordingly, if the various grades of rational creatures were derived from a movement of the free-will, all rational creatures would have their respective grade not naturally but accidentally. But this is impossible. For since the specific difference is natural to each thing, it would follow that all created rational substances are of one species, namely angels, demons, human souls, and the souls of the heavenly bodies (which Origen supposed to be animated). That this is false is proved by the diversity of natural actions: because the mode by which the human intellect naturally understands is not the same as that which sense and imagination, or the angelic intellect and the soul of the sun demand: unless perhaps we picture the angels and heavenly bodies with flesh and bones and like parts, so that they may have organs of sense, which is absurd. It follows, therefore, that the diversity of intellectual substances is not the result of a diversity of merits which are according to movements of the free-will.

Again. If things that are natural are not acquired by a movement of the free-will; whereas the union of a rational soul with such a body is acquired by the soul on account of preceding merit or demerit according to the movement of the free-will; it would follow that the union of this soul with this body is not natural. Therefore neither is the composite natural. Yet man and the sun and the stars, according to Origen, are composed of rational substances and such and such bodies. Therefore all these things which are the noblest of corporeal substances, are unnatural.

Again. If the union of this rational substance with this body is becoming to this rational substance not as such a substance, but as having so merited, its union with this body is not an essential but an accidental union. Now, a species does not result from things united accidentally, because from such a union there does not result a thing essentially one: for white man or clothed man is not a species. It would follow, therefore, that man is not a species, nor yet the sun, nor the moon, nor anything of the kind.

Moreover. Those things which result from merit may be changed for better or for worse: because merits and demerits may increase or diminish, especially according to Origen, who said that the free-will of every creature is always flexible to either side. Wherefore, if a rational soul has been allotted this body on account of preceding merit or demerit, it will follow that it can be united again to another body, and not only that the human soul takes another human body, but also that it may sometimes take a sidereal body, which is in accordance with the Pythagorean fable, that any soul enters any body. This is both erroneous according to philosophy,—which teaches that determinate matters and movables are allotted to determinate forms and movers,—and heretical according to faith, which declares that in the resurrection the soul resumes the same body which it has left.

Further. Since there can be no multitude without distinction, if from the beginning rational creatures were formed in any number, they must have had some diversity. Therefore one of them had something which another had not. And if this was not the result of a difference in merit, for the same reason neither was it necessary for the difference of grades to result from a difference of merits.

Again. Every distinction is either according to a division of quantity, which is only in bodies,—wherefore, according to Origen, it could not be in the bodies first created,—or according to formal division. But this latter cannot be without distinction of grades, since such a distinction is reduced to that of privation and form: and thus one of the condivided forms must needs be better and the other less good. Hence, according to the Philosopher, the species of things are like numbers, one of which is in addition to or in subtraction from the other. Accordingly, if there were many rational substances created from the beginning, there must have been a distinction of grades among them.

Again. If rational creatures can subsist without bodies, there was no need to set up a distinction in the corporeal nature on account of the various merits of rational creatures: since even without a diversity of bodies it was possible to find various grades in rational substances. And if rational substances cannot subsist without bodies, it follows that the corporeal creature also was formed from the beginning together with the rational creature. Now the corporeal creature is further removed from the spiritual, than spiritual creatures are from one another. If, therefore, God from the beginning established such a great distance among His creatures without any previous merits, there was no need for a difference of merits to precede in order that rational creatures should be established in different grades.

Further. If the diversity of corporeal creatures corresponds to the diversity of spiritual creatures, for the same reason the uniformity of corporeal nature would correspond to the uniformity of rational creatures. Therefore the corporeal nature would have been created even if the preceding merits of the rational creature had been not different but uniform. Hence primary matter would have been created, which is common to all bodies,—but under one form only. But in it there are many forms in potentiality. Wherefore it would have remained imperfect, its one form alone being reduced to act: and this is unbefitting the divine goodness.

Again. If the diversity of the corporeal creature results from the different movements of the rational creature’s free-will, we shall have to say that the reason why there is only one sun in the world, is because only one rational creature was moved by its free-will in such a way as to merit to be united to such a body. Now it was by chance that only one sinned thus. Therefore it is by chance that there is only one sun in the world, and not for the need of corporeal nature.

Further. Since the spiritual creature does not merit to be degraded except for sin,—yet it is degraded from its height, wherein it is invisible, through being united to visible bodies,—it would seem to follow that visible bodies are joined to spiritual creatures on account of sin. And this would seem to approach to the error of the Manichees who said that these visible things proceeded from the evil principle.

The authority of Holy Writ is in evident contradiction with this error. For in each making of visible creatures Moses speaks in terms such as these: God saw that it was good, etc., and afterwards in reference to all, he adds: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good. Hence we are clearly given to understand that the corporeal and visible creatures were made because it is good for them to be, and this is in keeping with the divine goodness, and not on account of any merits or sins of rational creatures.

Origen seems not to have taken into consideration that, when we give a thing not as a due, but as a free gift, it is not contrary to justice if we give unequal things, without weighing the difference of merits, since payment is due to those who merit. Now God, as stated above, brought things into being, not as though it were due to them, but out of mere bounty. Therefore the diversity of creatures does not presuppose diversity of merits.

Again, since the good of the whole is better than the good of each part, it does not befit the best maker to lessen the good of the whole in order to increase the good of some of the parts: thus a builder does not give to the foundation the goodness which he gives to the roof, lest he should make a crazy house. Therefore God the maker of all would not make the whole universe the best of its kind, if He made all the parts equal, because many degrees of goodness would be wanting to the universe, and thus it would be imperfect.

CHAPTER XLV

WHAT IS IN TRUTH THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS

FROM what we have said it may be shown what is truly the first cause of the distinction of things.

Since every agent intends to induce its likeness into its effect, as far as the effect can admit of it, it does this the more perfectly, according as it is more perfect itself: for it is clear that the hotter a thing is, the hotter it makes a thing, and the better the craftsman, the more perfectly he induces the form of his art into matter. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore it belonged to God to induce His likeness into created things most perfectly, as far as is befitting to a created nature. But created things cannot come by a perfect likeness to God, with respect to only one species of the creature: because, since the cause surpasses its effect, that which in the cause is simply and unitedly, is found in the effect to have a composite and multiple nature,—unless the effect reach to the species of the cause, which does not apply to the case in point, since the creature cannot be equal to God. Therefore there was need for multiplicity and variety in things created, in order that we might find in them a perfect likeness to God according to their mode.

Moreover. Just as things made of matter are in the passive potentiality of matter, so things made by an agent must be in the active potentiality of the agent. Now the passive potentiality of matter would not be perfectly reduced to act if one only of those things to which matter is in potentiality were reduced to act. Therefore if an agent, whose potentiality embraces several effects, were to make only one of them, its potentiality would not be so perfectly reduced to act as when it makes several. Now by the active potentiality being reduced to act, the effect receives the likeness of the agent. Therefore there would not be a perfect likeness of God in the universe, if all things were of one degree. For this reason therefore is there distinction in created things, in order that they may receive God’s likeness more perfectly by multiplicity than by unity.

Further. A thing approaches the more perfectly to God’s likeness, according as it is like Him in more things. Now in God is goodness, and the outpouring of that goodness into other things. Therefore the creature approaches more perfectly to God’s likeness if it is not only good, but can also act for the goodness of other things, than if it were merely good in itself: even as that which both shines and enlightens is more like the sun than that which only shines. Now a creature would be unable to act for the goodness of another creature, unless in creatures there were plurality and inequality: because the agent is distinct from and more noble than the patient. Therefore it was necessary that there be also different species of things, and consequently different degrees in things.

Again. A plurality of goods is better than one finite good, since they contain this and more besides. Now all goodness of the creature is finite, for it fails of God’s infinite goodness. Therefore the universe of creatures, if they are of many degrees, is more perfect than if things were of but one degree. But it becomes the sovereign good to make what is best. Therefore it was becoming that It should make many degrees of creatures.

Further. The goodness of the species surpasses the good of the individual, even as the formal exceeds that which is material. Hence multitude of species adds more to the goodness of the universe than multitude of individuals in one species. Therefore it concerns the perfection of the universe, that there be not only many individuals, but that there be also different species of things, and consequently different degrees in things.

Again. Whatever acts by intellect, reproduces the species of its intellect in the thing made; for thus an agent by art produces his like. Now God made the creature as an agent by intellect and not by a necessity of His nature, as we proved above. Therefore the species of God’s intellect is reproduced in the creature made by Him. But an intellect that understands many things is not sufficiently reproduced in one only. Since, then, the divine intellect understands many things, as was proved in the First Book, It reproduces itself more perfectly if It produces many creatures of all degrees than if It had produced one only.

Moreover. Supreme perfection should not be wanting to a work made by the supremely good workman. Now the good of order among diverse things is better than any one of those things that are ordered taken by itself: for it is formal in respect of each, as the perfection of the whole in respect of the parts. Therefore it was unbecoming that the good of order should be wanting to God's work. Yet this good could not be if there were no diversity and inequality of creatures.

Accordingly, there is diversity and inequality in things created, not by chance, not as a result of a diversity of matter, not on account of certain causes or merits intervening, but from God's own intention in that He willed to give the creature such perfection as it was possible for it to have.

Hence it is said (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good, after it had been said of each that they are good. For each one in its nature is good, but all together are very good, on account of the order of the universe, which is the ultimate and noblest perfection in things.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT FOR THE PERFECTION OF THE UNIVERSE IT WAS NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE SOME INTELLECTUAL CREATURES

SUCH being the cause of diversity among things, it remains for us to inquire into the diverse things, as far as this concerns the truth of faith: for this was the third thing we proposed to do. We shall show, first, that as a result of the divine ordinance allotting to creatures that perfection which is best in keeping with their mode, certain creatures were made intellectual so as to occupy the highest point in the universe.

For then is an effect most perfect when it returns to its source; wherefore of all figures the circle, and of all movements the circular, are the most perfect, because in them a return is made to the beginning. Hence, in order that the universe of creatures may attain its ultimate perfection, creatures must return to their principle. Now each and every creature returns to its principle, in so far as it bears a likeness to its principle, in keeping with its being and nature, wherein it has a certain perfection: even as all effects are most perfect when they are most like their effective cause, as a house when it is most like art, and fire when it is most like its generator. Since then God’s intellect is the principle of the creature’s production, as we proved above, it was necessary for the creature’s perfection that some creatures should be intelligent.

Moreover. Second perfection in things adds to first perfection. Now, as the being and nature of a thing is considered as pertaining to its first perfection, so is operation considered as belonging to its second perfection.

Wherefore, for the complete perfection of the universe, there should be some creatures which return to God not only in likeness of nature, but also by their operation. And this cannot be save by the act of the intellect and will: since not even God Himself has any other operation towards Himself than these. Therefore it was necessary for the greatest perfection of the universe that there should be some intellectual creatures.

Further. In order that creatures might render perfectly a representation of the divine goodness, it was necessary, as above stated, that things should not only be made good, but also that they should operate for the goodness of others. Now a thing is perfectly likened to another in its operation, when not only the action is of the same species, but also the mode of acting is the same. Hence it was necessary, for the highest perfection of things, that there should be some creatures who act in the same way as God. But it has been proved above that God acts by intellect and will. Therefore it was necessary for some creatures to have intelligence and will.

Moreover. Likeness of the effect to its efficient cause is considered on the part of the effect's form which pre-exists in the agent: for an agent produces its like as regards the form whereby it acts. Now the form of the agent is received in the effect sometimes indeed according to the same mode of being as it has in the agent,—thus the form of the fire generated has the same mode of being as the form of the generating fire,—and sometimes, according to another mode of being,—thus the form of the house which exists intelligibly in the craftsman's mind, is received in the house that is outside the mind, according to a material manner: and it is clear that the former likeness is more perfect than the latter. Now, the perfection of the universe of creatures consists in a likeness to God, just as the perfection of every effect consists in a likeness to its efficient cause. Therefore the highest perfection of the universe requires not only the second likeness of the creature to God, but also the first, as far as possible. But the form whereby God produces the creature, is an intelligible form in Him, since He is an agent by intellect, as proved above. Therefore the highest perfection of the universe requires that there should be some creatures in which the form of the divine intellect is reproduced according to an intelligible mode of being: and this means that there should be creatures of an intellectual nature.

Again. Nothing but His goodness moves God to the production of creatures, which goodness He wished to communicate to other things by way of likeness to Himself, as shown above. Now likeness to another is found in a thing in two ways: in one way, as regards natural being, as the likeness of fiery heat is in the thing heated by fire; in another way, as regards knowledge, as the likeness of fire is in sight or touch. In order, therefore, that the likeness of God might be in things in such ways as are possible, it behoved that the divine goodness should be communicated by likeness not only in being but also in knowledge. But an intellect alone is capable of knowing the divine goodness. Therefore it was necessary that there should be intellectual creatures.

Further. In all things becomingly ordered the relation of second to last imitates the order of first to all both second and last, though sometimes defectively. Now it has been proved that God comprises all creatures in Himself. And this is reproduced in corporeal creatures, although in a different way: for the higher body is even found to comprise and contain the lower, yet according to quantitative extension, whereas God contains all creatures in a simple manner, and not by extension of quantity. Hence, in order that the imitation of God in this way also might not be lacking to creatures, intellectual creatures were made that prise and contain the lower, yet according to quantitative extension, but simply by way of intelligibility: since what is understood is in the intelligent subject, and is grasped by his intellectual operation.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE CAPABLE OF WILLING

NOW these intellectual substances must needs be capable of willing.

For there is in all things a desire for good, since the good is what all desire, as philosophers teach. This desire, in things devoid of knowledge, is called natural appetite: thus a stone desires to be below. In those which have sensitive knowledge, it is called animal appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible. In those which understand, it is called intellectual or rational appetite, which is the will. Therefore intellectual substances have a will.

Again. That which is by another is reduced to that which is by itself as preceding it; wherefore according to the Philosopher (8 Phys.), things moved by another are reduced to the first self-movers: also, in syllogisms, the conclusions which are known from other things, are reduced to first principles which are self-evident. Now, in created substances, we find some which do not move themselves to act, but are moved by force of nature, for instance inanimate things, plants and dumb animals, for it is not in them to act or not to act. Therefore there must be a reduction to some first things which move themselves to action. But the first in created things are intellectual substances, as shown above. Therefore these substances move themselves to act. Now this is proper to the will, whereby a substance has the dominion of its action, because it is in it to act and not to act. Therefore created intellectual substances have a will.

Moreover. The principle of every operation is the form whereby a thing is actual, since every agent acts for as much as it is actual. Wherefore the mode of an operation consequent upon a form must be in accordance with that form. Hence a form that does not proceed from that which acts by that form, causes an operation over which the agent has no dominion: whereas if there be a form that proceeds from that which acts thereby, the agent will have dominion over the consequent operation. Now natural forms, consequent upon which are natural movements and operations, do not proceed from those things whose forms they are, but wholly from extrinsic agents, since by a natural form a thing has being in its own nature, and nothing can be cause of its own being. Wherefore things that are moved naturally do not move themselves: for a heavy body does not move itself downwards, but its generator which gave it its form. Again, in dumb animals, the forms, sensed or imagined, which result in movement, are not discovered by the dumb animals themselves, but are received by them from exterior sensibles which act on their senses, and judged of by their natural estimative faculty. Hence, though they are said after a fashion to move themselves, in so far as one part of them moves, and another is moved, yet the actual moving is not from themselves, but partly from external objects sensed, and partly from nature. For in so far as their appetite moves their members, they are said to move themselves, wherein they surpass inanimate beings and plants; and in so far as the act of their appetite is in them a necessary sequel to the forms received through their senses and the judgment of their natural estimative power, they are not the cause of their own movement. Hence they have not dominion over their own action. But the form understood, whereby the intellectual substance acts, proceeds from the intellect itself, being conceived and, after a fashion, thought out by it: as may be seen in the form of art, which the craftsman conceives and thinks out, and whereby he works. Accordingly, intellectual substances move themselves to act, as having dominion over their actions. Therefore they have a will.

Again. The active force should be proportionate to the patient, and motive power to the movable. Now in things possessed of knowledge the apprehensive power is related to the appetitive, as the motive power to the movable: since that which is apprehended by the sense, imagination, or intellect, moves the intellectual or animal appetite. But intellective apprehension is not confined to certain objects, but is of all things: wherefore the Philosopher says of the passive intellect (3 De Anima) that it is that whereby we become all things. Hence the appetite of an intellectual substance has a habitude to all things. Now it is proper to the will to have a habitude to all things: wherefore the Philosopher says (3 Ethic.) that it is of both the possible and the impossible. Therefore intellectual substances have a will.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE OF FREE-WILL IN ACTING

FROM this it is clear that the aforesaid substances are of free-will in acting.

That they act by judgment is clear, since through their intellective knowledge they judge of things to be done. And they must needs have freedom if, as proved, they have dominion over their action. Therefore the aforesaid substances are of free-will in acting.

Again. The free is that which is its own cause. Wherefore that which is not the cause of its own acting is not free in acting. Now whatever things are not moved, nor act except they be moved by others, are not a cause of their own acting. Therefore self-movers alone have liberty in acting. These alone act by judgment: because the self-mover is divided into mover and moved; and the mover is the appetite moved by intellect, imagination, or sense, to which faculties judgment belongs. Of these then those alone judge freely which in judging move themselves. Now, no judging power moves itself to judge unless it reflect on its own action: for if it moves itself to judge it must needs know its own judgment: and this belongs to the intellect alone. Hence irrational animals have, in a sense, free movement or action, but not free judgment: whereas inanimate beings, which are moved only by others, have not even free action or movement; while intellectual beings have freedom not only of action, but also of judgment, and this is to have free-will.

Further. The apprehended form is a moving principle according as it is apprehended under the aspect of good or fittingness: because the external action in self-movers comes from the judgment whereby it is judged that something is good or fitting through the aforesaid form. Accordingly, if he who judges moves himself to judge, he must needs, by some higher form, move himself to judge. And this form can be no other than the idea itself of good or fittingness, whereby one judges of any determinate good or fitting thing. Wherefore those alone move themselves to judge who apprehend the common notion of goodness or fittingness. And these are intellectual beings alone. Therefore intellectual beings alone move themselves not only to act, but also to judge. Therefore they alone are free in judging, and this is to have free-will.

Moreover. Movement and action do not follow from a universal concept save through the medium of a particular apprehension: because movement and action are about particular things. Now the intellect is naturally apprehensive of universals. Wherefore, in order that movement and action of any kind follow from the apprehension of the intellect, it is necessary for the universal concept of the intellect to be applied to particulars. But the universal contains many particulars potentially. Hence application of the intellectual concept may be made to many and divers things. Consequently the judgment of the intellect about matters of action is not determined to one thing only. Therefore all intellectual beings have free-will.

Further. Certain things lack liberty of judgment, either because they have no judgment at all, as plants and stones; or because they have a judgment determined by nature to one thing, as irrational animals, for the sheep by its natural estimate judges the wolf to be harmful to it, and as a result of this judgment flies from the wolf; and the same applies to others. Whatever beings therefore have a judgment that is not determined to one thing by nature, must needs have free-will. Now such are all intellectual beings. For the intellect apprehends not only this or that good, but good itself in general. Wherefore, since the intellect moves the will by the form apprehended; and since in all things mover and moved must needs be mutually proportionate; the will of an intellectual substance will not be determined by nature otherwise than to the good in general. Hence, whatever be offered to it under the aspect of good, it is possible for the will to be inclined thereto, since there is no natural determination to the contrary to prevent it. Therefore in all intellectual beings the will's act resulting from the judgments of the intellect is free: and this is to have free-will which is defined as the free judgment of reason.

CHAPTER XLIX

THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A BODY

FROM the foregoing it is shown that no intellectual substance is a body.

For no body is found to contain anything except by quantitative commensuration: wherefore also if a thing contain a whole thing in the whole of itself, each part will contain a part, the greater part a greater part, and the lesser part a lesser part. But an intellect does not contain a thing understood by quantitative commensuration: because by its whole self it understands and comprehends both whole and part, things both great and small in quantity. Therefore no intelligent substance is a body.

Moreover. No body can receive the substantial form of another body, unless it lose its own form by corruption. But an intellect is not corrupted, but rather is it perfected by receiving the forms of all bodies; since it is perfected by understanding, and understands by having in itself the forms of things understood. Therefore no intellectual substance is a body.

Further. The principle of distinction between individuals of the same species is the division of matter in respect of quantity: because the form of this fire differs not from the form of that fire, except by the fact of its being in different parts into which matter is divided; nor is this otherwise than by division of quantity, without which substance is indivisible. Now that which is received into a body, is received into it according to quantitative division. Therefore a form is not received into a body, except as individualized. If, therefore, an intellect were a body, the intelligible forms of things would not be received into it except as individualized. But the intellect understands things by their forms which it has at its disposal. Consequently the intellect would not understand universals but only particulars. Now this is clearly false. Therefore no intellect is a body.

Again. Nothing acts except in accordance with its species, because the form is the principle of action in everything. If, therefore, an intellect be a body, its action will not transcend the order of bodies. Wherefore it would understand nothing but bodies. Now this is clearly false: since we understand many things that are not bodies. Therefore the intellect is not a body.

Again. If an intelligent substance is a body, it is either finite or infinite. Now, it is impossible for a body to be infinite actually, as is proved in the Physics. Therefore it is a finite body, if we suppose it to be a body at all. But this is impossible, since in no body can there be infinite power, as we have proved above. Now the power of the intellect in understanding is in a manner infinite, for by adding it understands species of numbers to infinitude, and likewise species of figures and proportions. Moreover it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite in its compass, since it contains individuals which are potentially infinite. Therefore the intellect is not a body.

Moreover. It is impossible for two bodies to contain one another, since the container exceeds the contained. Yet two intellects contain and comprehend one another, when one understands the other. Therefore the intellect is not a body.

Again. No body's action reflects on the agent: for it is proved in the Physics, that no body is moved by itself except in respect of a part, so that, namely, one of its parts be mover and the other moved. Now the intellect by its action reflects on itself, for it understands itself not only as to a part, but as to the whole. Therefore it is not a body.

Again. A body's action is not the object of that body's action, nor is its movement the object of its movement, as proved in the Physics. But the action of the intellect is the object of its action: for just as the intellect understands a thing, so does it understand that it understands, and so on indefinitely. Therefore an intellectual substance is not a body.

Hence it is that Holy Writ calls intellectual substances spirits: in which way it is wont to name God Who is incorporeal, according to Jo. 4:24, God is a spirit. And it is said (Wis. 7:22, 23): For in her, namely Divine Wisdom, is the spirit of understanding, … containing all intelligible spirits.

Hereby is excluded the error of the early natural philosophers, who held that there was none but corporeal substance: wherefore they said that even the soul is a body, either fire, air, or water, or something of the kind. Which opinion some have endeavoured to introduce into the Christian faith, by saying that the soul is the effigy of a body, like a body outwardly imitated.

CHAPTER L

THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE IMMATERIAL

IT follows from this that intellectual substances are immaterial. For everything composed of matter and form is a body: since matter cannot receive various forms except in respect of its various parts. And this diversity of parts cannot be in matter except inasmuch as common matter is divided into several by the dimensions existing in matter: for without quantity substance is indivisible. Now it has been proved that an intelligent substance is a body. It follows therefore that it is not composed of matter and form.

Moreover. Just as man does not exist apart from this man, so matter exists not apart from this matter. Accordingly, whatever subsistent thing is composed of matter and form, is composed of individual form and matter. Now the intellect cannot be composed of individual matter and form. For the species of things understood become actually intelligible through being abstracted from individual matter. And according as they are actually intelligible, they become one with the intellect. Therefore the intellect also must be without individual matter. Therefore the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form.

Further. The action of anything composed of matter and form, belongs not to the form alone, nor to the matter alone, but to the composite: because to act belongs to that which has being, and being belongs to the composite through its form: wherefore the composite also acts through its form. Accordingly, if the intelligent substance be composed of matter and form, to understand will be the act of the composite. But action terminates in a thing like the agent, wherefore the composite in generating, produces not a form but a composite. If, therefore, to understand be an action of the composite, it would understand neither form nor matter, but only the composite. Therefore the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form.

Again. The forms of sensible things have a more perfect being in the intellect than in sensible things; since they are more simple and extend to more objects: for by the one intelligible form of man, the intellect knows all men. Now a form existing perfectly in matter makes a thing to be actually such, for instance to be fire or to be coloured: and if it does not make a thing to be actually such, it is in that thing imperfectly, for instance the form of heat in the air that carries it, and the power of the first agent in its instrument. Consequently were the intellect composed of matter and form, the forms of the things understood would make the intellect to be actually of the same nature as that which is understood. And this leads to the error of Empedocles, who said that the soul knows fire by fire, and earth by earth, and so on. But this is clearly unreasonable. Therefore the intelligent substance is not composed of matter and form.

Further. Whatever is in something is therein according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore if the intellect be composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be in the intellect materially, just as they are outside the mind. Consequently, just as outside the mind they are not actually intelligible, neither would they be when they are in the intellect.

Again. Forms of contraries, according to the being which they have in matter, are contrary: hence they exclude one another. But according as they are in the intellect they are not contrary: in fact one contrary is the intelligible ratio of the other, since one is understood through the other. Consequently they have not a material being in the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not composed of matter and form.

Further. Matter does not receive a fresh form except by movement or change. But the intellect is not moved through receiving forms; rather is it perfected, and is at rest, while understanding, whereas its understanding is hindered by movement. Consequently forms are not received by the intellect as by matter or a material thing. Wherefore it is clear that intelligent substances are immaterial as well as incorporeal.

Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.): On account of the rays of the divine goodness all intellectual substances are subsistent, and are known to be both incorporeal and immaterial.

CHAPTER LI

THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS NOT A MATERIAL FORM

FROM the same premisses it may be shown that intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and do not exist in matter as though their being depended on matter.

Because forms dependent on matter as regards their being properly speaking have not being themselves, but the composites through them. Hence if intellectual substances were forms of this kind, it would follow that they have material being, just as they would if they were composed of matter and form.

Again. Forms that subsist not of themselves cannot act of themselves, but the composites act through them. If therefore intellectual natures were forms of this kind, it would follow that they do not themselves understand, but the things composed of them and matter. Consequently an intelligent being would be composed of matter and form. And this has been proved to be impossible.

Moreover. If the intellect were a form in matter and not self-subsistent, it would follow that what is received into the intellect is received into matter: because such forms as have their being tied to matter, do not receive anything without its being received into matter. Since, then, the reception of forms into the intellect is not a reception of forms into matter, it is impossible that the intellect be a material form.

Further. To say that the intellect is a non-subsistent form and buried in matter, is the same in reality as to say that the intellect is composed of matter and form, and the difference is merely nominal: for in the former case the intellect will be indicated as the form of the composite, while in the latter, the intellect denotes the composite itself. Wherefore if it is false that the intellect be composed of matter and form, it will be false that it is a non-subsistent and material form.

CHAPTER LII

THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BEING AND WHAT IS

NOW although intellectual substances are not corporeal, nor composed of matter and form, nor existing in matter as material forms, we must not think that they equal the divine simplicity. For a certain composition is to be found in them, forasmuch as in them being is not the same as what is.

For if being is subsistent, nothing besides being is added thereto. Because even in those things whose being is not subsistent, that which is in an existing thing beside its being, is indeed united to the existing thing, but it is not one with its being, except accidentally, in so far as there is one subject having being and that which is beside being: thus it is clear that in Socrates, beside his substantial being, there is white, which is distinct from his substantial being, since to be Socrates and to be white are not the same save accidentally. Consequently if being is not in a subject, there will remain no way in which that which is beside being can be united to it. Now being, as being, cannot be diverse, but it can be differentiated by something beside being: thus the being of a stone is other than the being of a man. Hence that which is subsistent being can be one only. Now it was shown above that God is His own subsistent being: wherefore nothing beside Him can be its own being. Therefore in every substance beside Him, the substance itself must needs be distinct from its being.

Moreover. A common nature, if considered in the abstract, can only be one: although those that have that nature may be found to be many. For if the nature of animal subsisted as separate by itself, it would not have the things belonging to a man or to an ox. Now if we remove the differences which constitute a species, there remains the nature of the genus without division, since the same differences constitute the species, which divide the genus. Accordingly, if being itself is common like a genus, a separate self-subsistent being can only be one. If, however, it be not divided by differences, as a genus is, but, as it is in truth, by the fact that it is the being of this or that, it is yet more evident that what exists of itself can only be one. It follows, therefore, since God is subsistent being, that nothing beside Him is its own being.

Again. There cannot possibly be a twofold being absolutely infinite, for being that is absolutely infinite contains every perfection of being, so that if two things had such an infinity, there would be nothing in which they differed. Now subsistent being must needs be infinite, because it is not limited by any recipient. Therefore there cannot be any subsistent being outside the first.

Again. If there is a self-subsistent being, nothing is applicable to it except that which belongs to a being as being: since what is said of a thing, not as such, is not applicable thereto except accidentally, by reason of the subject: so that if we suppose it to be separated from its subject, it is nowise applicable to it. Now to be caused by another is not applicable to a being, as being, otherwise every being would be caused by another, and consequently we should have to proceed to infinity in causes, which is impossible, as shown above. Therefore that being which is subsistent, must needs not be caused. Therefore no caused being is its own being.

Moreover. The substance of a thing appertains to it of itself and not by another: wherefore to be actually lightsome is not of the air’s substance, since it comes to it from something else. Now every created thing has being from another, else it would not be caused. Therefore in no created being is its being the same as its substance.

Again. Since every agent acts in so far as it is actual, it belongs to the first agent which is most perfect to be actual in the most perfect way. Now a thing is the more perfectly actual, the more its actuality is posterior in the order of generation, for actuality is posterior in time to the potentiality in the one and same subject which passes from potentiality to actuality. Also act itself is more perfectly actual than that which has act, for the latter is actual on account of the former. Accordingly, these premisses being supposed, it is clear from what has been already proved that God alone is the first agent. Therefore it belongs to Him alone to be actual in the most perfect way, to be, that is, the most perfect act. Now this is being, in which generation and all movement terminates: since every form and act is in potentiality before it acquires being. Therefore it belongs to God alone to be His own being, just as it belongs to Him alone to be the first agent.

Moreover. Being itself belongs to the first agent in respect of His proper nature: for God’s being is His substance, as we have proved above. Now that which belongs to a thing in respect of its proper nature, does not belong to others except by way of participation; as heat to other bodies than fire. Wherefore being itself belongs to all others except the first agent by a kind of participation. But that which belongs to a thing by participation is not its substance. Therefore it is impossible that the substance of a thing other than the first agent, should be being itself.

Hence (Exod. 3:14) the name proper to God is stated to be WHO IS, because it is proper to Him alone that His substance is not distinct from His being.

CHAPTER LIII

THAT IN CREATED INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES THERE IS ACT AND POTENTIALITY

FROM the foregoing it is evident that in created intellectual substances there is composition of act and potentiality.

For in whatever thing we find two, of which one is the complement of the other, the ratio of one of them to the other is as the ratio of potentiality to act: since nothing is completed save by its proper act. Now in the created intellectual substance we find two things, namely its substance and its being, which is not its very substance, as we have proved. Now this very being is the complement of the existing substance, since a thing is actual by the fact that it has being. It follows therefore that in each of the aforesaid substances there is composition of act and potentiality.

Moreover. That which is received by a thing from an agent, must be an act: since it belongs to an agent to make a thing actual. Now it was proved above that all other substances have being from the first agent: and it is through having being from another that the substances thus caused exist. Consequently being is in the substances caused as an act of theirs. But that in which there is act, is a potentiality: since act as such refers to potentiality. Therefore in every created substance there is potentiality and act.

Again. Whatsoever participates a thing is compared to the thing participated as potentiality to act: since by that which is participated the participator is made to be actually such. Now it was shown above that God alone is essentially being, and all other things participate being. Therefore every created substance is compared to its being as potentiality to act.

Further. The likeness of a thing to its efficient cause results from act: because the agent produces its like in so far as it is in act. Now the likeness of every created substance to God is by being itself, as shown above. Therefore being is compared to all created substances as their act. Whence it follows that in every created substance there is composition of act and potentiality.

CHAPTER LIV

THAT COMPOSITION OF SUBSTANCE AND BEING IS NOT THE SAME AS COMPOSITION OF MATTER AND FORM

NOW composition of matter and form is not of the same nature as composition of substance and being, although both result from potentiality and act.

First, because matter is not the very substance of a thing, else it would follow that all forms are accidental, as the early natural philosophers maintained; but matter is part of the substance.

Secondly, because being itself is the proper act, not of matter, but of the whole substance: for being is the act of that whereof we can say that it is. Now being is said, not of matter but of the whole. Therefore we cannot say of matter that it is, but the substance itself is that which is.

Thirdly, because neither is the form being itself, but they are related as things in an order: because form is compared to being as light to enlightening, or whiteness to being white.

Also, because being itself is compared as act even to the very form. For in things composed of matter and form, the form is said to be the principle of being, for the reason that it is the complement of substance, whose act being is: even as transparency is to the air the principle of being lightsome, in that it makes the air the proper subject of light.

Wherefore in things composed of matter and form, neither matter nor form, nor even being itself, can be described as that which is. Yet the form can be described as that whereby it is, forasmuch as it is the principle of being: but the whole substance is what is; and being is that whereby the substance is called a being.

But in intellectual substances, which are not composed of matter and form, as shown above, and wherein the form itself is a subsistent substance, the form is what is, and being is the act whereby it is.

Consequently in them there is but one composition of act and potentiality, a composition namely of substance and being, which by some is said to be of what is and being, or of what is and whereby it is.

On the other hand in things composed of matter and form there is a twofold composition of act and potentiality: the first, of the substance itself which is composed of matter and form; the second, of the already composite substance, and being, which composition can also be said to be of what is and being, or of what is and whereby it is.

It is therefore evident that composition of act and potentiality covers more ground than composition of form and matter. Wherefore matter and form divide a natural substance, while potentiality and act divide being in general. For this reason whatever is consequent upon potentiality and act, as such, is common to created substances whether material or immaterial; for instance to receive and to be received, to perfect and to be perfected. Whereas whatsoever things are proper to matter and form, as such, for instance to be generated and to be corrupted and so forth, are proper to material substances, and are nowise applicable to created immaterial substances.

CHAPTER LV

THAT INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE INCORRUPTIBLE

FROM the foregoing it is clearly shown that every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

For all corruption consists in separation of form from matter: simple corruption, from separation of the substantial form, relative corruption from separation of an accidental form. Because so long as the form remains, the thing must exist, since by the form the substance is made the proper recipient of being. But where there is not composition of form and matter, there can be no separation of the same: wherefore neither can there be corruption. Now it has been proved that no intellectual substance is composed of matter and form. Therefore no intellectual substance is corruptible.

Moreover. That which belongs to a thing per se, is necessarily in it always and inseparably: thus roundness is per se in a circle and accidentally in a coin, wherefore it is possible for a coin to be made not round, whereas it is impossible for a circle not to be round. Now, being is a per se consequence of form, for per se means according as it is such; and a thing has being according as it has a form. Hence substances that are not themselves forms, can be deprived of being, in so far as they lose a form, just as a coin is deprived of roundness according as it ceases to be round. Whereas substances that are themselves forms can never be deprived of being: thus if a substance were a circle, it could never be made not round. Now, it was shown above that intellectual substances are themselves subsistent forms, therefore they cannot possibly cease to exist: and consequently they are incorruptible.

Further. In every corruption potentiality remains after the removal of act: for a thing is not corrupted into non-being, just as neither is a thing generated from absolute non-being. But in intellectual substances, as we have proved, the act is being itself, while the substance is by way of potentiality. Consequently if an intellectual substance were corrupted, it will remain after its corruption: which is utterly impossible. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Again. In every thing that is corrupted there must be potentiality to non-being. Wherefore if there be a thing wherein there is not potentiality to non-being, such a thing is not corruptible. Now there is no potentiality to non-being in an intellectual substance. For it is clear from what we have said that a complete substance is the proper recipient of being. But the proper recipient of an act is compared as potentiality to that act in such a way that it is nowise in potentiality to the opposite: thus fire is compared to heat in such a way that it is nowise in potentiality to cold. Consequently neither in corruptible substances is there potentiality to non-being in the complete substance except by reason of the matter. But there is no matter in intellectual substances, for they are complete simple substances. Hence there is no potentiality to non-being in them. Therefore they are incorruptible.

Further. In whatsoever things there is composition of potentiality and act, that which holds the place of first potentiality, or of first subject, is incorruptible: wherefore even in corruptible substances primary matter is incorruptible. Now in intellectual substances that which holds the place of first potentiality and subject, is their complete substance. Therefore their substance is itself incorruptible. But nothing is corruptible except through its substance being corruptible. Therefore all intellectual natures are corruptible.

Moreover. Whatsoever is corrupted, is corrupted either per se or accidentally. But intellectual substances cannot be corrupted per se. Because all corruption is by a contrary. For an agent, since it acts according as it is an actual being, always brings something into actual being by its action. Consequently, if by this same actual being, something is corrupted through ceasing from actual being, this must result from their mutual contrariety, since contraries are things which exclude one another. Hence whatsoever is corrupted per se must either have a contrary, or be composed of contraries. But neither of these can be said of intellectual substances. A sign of this is that in the intellect things even of contrary nature cease to be contraries: for white and black are not contraries in the intellect, since they do not exclude one another, in fact rather do they follow from one another, seeing that by understanding the one we understand the other. Therefore intellectual substances are not corruptible per se. Moreover, neither are they corrupted accidentally. For thus accidents and non-subsistent forms are corrupted. Now it was shown above that intellectual substances are subsistent. Therefore they are altogether incorruptible.

Further. Corruption is a kind of change: and change must needs be the term of a movement, as is proved in the Physics. Consequently whatsoever is corrupted must be moved. Now it was proved in the Physics that whatsoever is moved is a body. Hence it follows that whatsoever is corrupted is moved,—if it be corrupted per se,—or else that it is a form or a bodily force dependent on a body, if it be corrupted accidentally. But intellectual substances are neither bodies, nor forces or forms dependent on a body. Therefore they are not corrupted either per se or accidentally: and consequently they are altogether incorruptible.

Again. Whatsoever is corrupted, is corrupted through being passive to something, since to be corrupted is itself to be passive. Now no intellectual substance can be passive with such a passion as leads to corruption. Because to be passive is to be receptive: and that which is received into an intellectual substance, must needs be received according to the mode thereof, namely intelligibly. Now that which is thus received into an intellectual substance, perfects the intellectual substance and does not corrupt it, since the intelligible is the perfection of the intelligent. Therefore an intelligent substance is incorruptible.

Further. Just as the sensible is the object of sense, so the intelligible is the object of the intellect. But the sense is not corrupted by a proper corruption except through being excelled by its object, for instance the sight by very brilliant objects, and the hearing by very loud sounds, and so on. And I say by proper corruption: because the sense is corrupted also accidentally on account of its subject being corrupted. This kind of corruption, however, cannot happen to the intellect, since it is not the act of any body, as depending on the body, as we have proved above. And it is clear that it is not corrupted through being excelled by its object, because he who understands very intelligible things, understands things less intelligible not less but more. Therefore the intellect is nowise corruptible.

Moreover. The intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect: hence the intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one. Accordingly, whatever is applicable to the intelligible, as such, must be applicable to the intellect, as such, since perfection and perfectible belong to the one genus. Now the intelligible, as such, is necessary and incorruptible, for necessary things are perfectly knowable by the intellect: whereas contingent things, as such, are only deficiently knowable, because about them we have not science but opinion, so that the intellect has science about corruptibles in so far as they are incorruptible, that is, according as they are universal. Therefore it follows that the intellect is incorruptible.

Again. A thing is perfected according to the mode of its substance. Consequently, we can gather the mode of a thing's substance from the mode of its perfection. Now the intellect is not perfected by movement, but by the fact of its being outside movement: for we are perfected, as regards the intellective soul, by science and prudence, when the movement both of the body and of the soul's passions are subdued, as the Philosopher states (7 Phys.). Hence the mode of an intelligent substance is that its being is superior to movement, and consequently superior to time: whereas the being of every corruptible thing is subject to movement and time. Therefore it is impossible that an intelligent substance be corruptible.

Further. It is impossible for a natural desire to be vain: since nature does nothing vainly. Now every intelligent being naturally desires everlasting being, and to be everlastingly not merely in its species, but also in the individual. This is proved as follows. The natural appetite, in some, results from apprehension: thus the wolf naturally desires the slaying of the animals on which it feeds, and man naturally desires happiness. In some it results without apprehension from the sole inclination of their natural principles, which inclination is, in some, called the natural appetite; thus a heavy body desires to be below. In both ways things have a natural desire for being: a sign of which is that not only things devoid of knowledge resist corruptives according to the power of their natural principles, but also those which have knowledge resist the same according to the mode of their knowledge. Consequently those things lacking knowledge in whose principles there is a power of perpetuating their being, so that they remain ever the same as to individual identity, naturally desire to be perpetuated even in their individual identity: whereas those whose principles contain no such power, but only the power of perpetuating their being in the same species, desire also to be perpetuated in this way. Hence we must observe this same difference in those things which have a desire of being, together with knowledge, so that, to wit, those who have no knowledge of being except as now, desire to be as now, but not to be always, because they do not apprehend perpetual being. Yet they desire perpetuity of the species, albeit without knowledge, because the generative power, which conduces to this effect, is a preamble and not a subject of knowledge. Wherefore those things which know and apprehend perpetual being, desire it with the natural desire. Now this applies to all intelligent substances. Therefore all intelligent substances, by their natural appetite, desire to be always: and consequently it is impossible that they cease to be.

Further. Whatsoever things begin to be, and cease, have both through the same potentiality: because the same potentiality regards being and not being. Now intelligent substances could not begin to be except through the potentiality of the first agent: since they are not made out of matter that could exist before them, as we have proved. Consequently there is no potentiality in respect of their not being, except in the first agent, inasmuch as He is able not to pour being into them. But nothing can be said to be corruptible by reason of this potentiality alone:—both because things are said to be necessary and contingent according to a potentiality that is in them, and not according to God's potentiality, as we proved above:—and because God, the Author of nature, does not take from things that which is proper to their respective natures; and it was shown above that perpetual being is a property of intellectual natures, wherefore God will not take this from them. Therefore intellectual substances are in every way incorruptible.

Hence in the psalm, Praise ye the Lord from the heavens, after mentioning together the angels and heavenly bodies, the text continues: He hath established them for ever and for ages of ages, thus designating the perpetuity of the aforesaid.

Dionysius also (Div. Nom. iv.) says that on account of the rays of the divine goodness the intelligible and intellectual substances subsist, are, and live: and their life never fails nor diminishes, for they are free from the universal corruption, knowing neither generation nor death, and they are raised above restless and ever-flowing change.

CHAPTER LVI

IN WHAT WAY IT IS POSSIBLE FOR AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE TO BE UNITED TO THE BODY

NOW since it has been shown that an intellectual substance is neither a body, nor a force dependent on a body, it remains for us to inquire whether an intellectual substance can be united to the body.

In the first place it is clear that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of a mixture. For things that are mixed together must needs be altered in relation to one another. And this does not happen except in those things whose matter is the same, and which can be active and passive in relation to one another. But intellectual substances have no matter in common with corporeal substances, since they are immaterial, as we have proved above. Therefore they cannot be mixed with bodies.

Further. Things that are mixed, remain not actually but only virtually, after the mixture is made: for were they to remain actually it would not be a mixture but only an accumulation, wherefore a body formed by a mixture of elements is no one of them. But this cannot possibly happen to intellectual substances, since they are incorruptible, as we have proved above.

Therefore an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of a mixture.

It is likewise evident that an intellectual substance cannot be united to the body by way of contact properly so called. For contact is only between bodies, since things are in contact when they come together at their extremes, as the points, lines, or superficies which are the extremes of bodies. Therefore it is not possible for an intellectual substance to be united to the body by way of contact.

Hence it follows that neither by continuity, nor fellowship or connecting tie is it possible for one thing to result from an intellectual substance with the body. For none of these is possible without contact.

And yet there is a kind of contact whereby it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to a body. For natural bodies are mutually alterative when in contact with one another: so that they are united to one another not only as to their quantitative extremes, but also in like manner to qualities or forms, when an alterative impresses its like on the thing altered. And although, if we consider only the quantitative extremes, there is need in all cases for contact to be mutual, nevertheless if we consider action and passion, we shall find certain things to be touching only, and others only touched: since the heavenly bodies touch the elemental bodies in this way, in so far as they alter them; and yet they are not touched by them, since they do not suffer from them. Accordingly if there be any agents which are not in contact by their quantitative extremes, they will be said nevertheless to touch, in so far as they act, in which sense we say that a person who makes us sorrowful touches us. Wherefore it is possible for an intellectual substance to be united to a body by contact, by touching it in this way. For intellectual substances act on bodies and move them, since they are immaterial and more actual.

This contact however is not quantitative but virtual. Wherefore this contact differs from bodily contact in three ways. First, because by this contact the indivisible can touch the divisible. Now this cannot happen in bodily contact, because nothing but what is indivisible can be touched by a point. Whereas an intellectual substance, although indivisible, can touch a divisible quantity, in so far as it acts upon it. For a point is indivisible in one way, and an intellectual substance in another. A point is indivisible as being the term of a quantity, wherefore it has a determined position in a continuous quantity, beyond which it cannot stretch. But an intellectual substance is indivisible, as being outside the genus of quantity: so that no quantitative indivisible is assigned with which it can come into contact. Secondly, because quantitative contact is only in respect of extremes, whereas virtual contact regards the whole thing touched. For it is touched inasmuch as it suffers and is moved. Now this is according as it is in potentiality: and potentiality regards the whole and not the extremes of the whole. Wherefore the whole is touched. Whence follows the third difference. Because in quantitative contact which takes place in regard to the extremes, that which touches must be outside that which is touched, and cannot pierce it, since it is hindered by it. Whereas virtual contact, which applies to intellectual substances, since it reaches inwards, makes the touching substance to be within the thing touched, and to penetrate it without hindrance.

Accordingly an intellectual substance can be united to a body by virtual contact. Now things united by contact of this kind are not one simply. For they are one in action and passion, which is not to be one simply. For one is predicated in the same way as being. But to be an agent does not signify being simply. Consequently neither is to be one in action to be one simply.

Now one simply is taken in three ways: either as being indivisible, or as being continuous, or as being logically one. But the one which is indivisible cannot result from an intellectual substance and a body: for the one of this latter kind must needs be composed of the two. Nor again can the one that is continuous, because the parts of the continuous are parts of quantity. It remains therefore for us to inquire whether from an intellectual substance and a body can be formed the one which is one logically.

Now from two things that stay there does not result something logically one, except from substantial form and matter: since from subject and accident there does not result one logically, for the idea of man is not the same as the idea of white. Hence it remains for us to inquire whether an intellectual substance can be the substantial form of a body. And to those who consider the question reasonably it would seem that this is impossible.

For from two actually existing substances there cannot be made something one: because the act of a thing is that whereby it is distinguished from another. Now an intellectual substance is an actually existing substance, as is clear from what has been said: and so likewise is a body. Therefore, seemingly, something one cannot be made from an intellectual substance and a body.

Again. Form and matter are contained in the same genus: since every genus is divided into act and potentiality. But intellectual substance and body are of different genera. Therefore it does not seem possible that one be the form of the other.

Moreover. Everything whose being is in matter must be material. Now if an intellectual substance is the form of a body, its being must be in corporeal matter, since the being of the form is not beside the being of the matter. Hence it will follow that an intellectual substance is not immaterial, as above it was proved to be.

Again. That which has its being in a body cannot possibly be separated from that body. Now it is proved by philosophers that the intellect is separate from the body, and that it is neither a body nor a power in a body. Therefore an intellectual substance is not the form of a body, for thus its being would be in a body.

Further. That which has its being in common with a body, must have its operation in common with a body, because a thing acts inasmuch as it is a being: nor can the active power of a thing surpass its essence, since power results from the essential principles. But if an intellectual substance be the form of a body, its being must be common to it and the body: because from form and matter there results one thing simply, that exists by one being. Consequently an intellectual substance will have its operation in common with the body, and its power will be a power in a body: which has been proved to be impossible.

CHAPTER LVII

THE OPINION OF PLATO CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL WITH THE BODY

MOVED by these and like reasons some have asserted that no intellectual substance can be the form of a body. But since man’s very nature seemed to controvert this opinion, in that he appears to be composed of intellectual soul and body, they devised certain solutions so as to save the nature of man.

Accordingly, Plato and his school held that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as form to matter, but only as mover to movable, for he said that the soul is in the body as a sailor in a boat. In this way the union of soul and body would only be by virtual contact, of which we have spoken above. But this would seem inadmissible. For according to the contact in question, there does not result one thing simply, as we have proved: whereas from the union of soul and body there results a man. It follows then that a man is not one simply, and neither consequently a being simply, but accidentally.

In order to avoid this Plato said that a man is not a thing composed of soul and body, but that the soul itself using a body is a man: thus Peter is not a thing composed of man and clothes, but a man using clothes.

But this is shown to be impossible. For animal and man are sensible and natural things. But this would not be the case if the body and its parts were not of the essence of man and animal, and the soul were the whole essence of both, as the aforesaid opinion holds: for the soul is neither a sensible nor a material thing. Consequently it is impossible for man and animal to be a soul using a body, and not a thing composed of body and soul.

Again. It is impossible that there be one operation of things diverse in being. And in speaking of an operation being one, I refer not to that in which the action terminates, but to the manner in which it proceeds from the agent:—for many persons rowing one boat make one action on the part of the thing done, which is one, but on the part of the rowers there are many actions, for there are many strokes of the oar,—because, since action is consequent upon form and power, it follows that things differing in forms and powers differ in action. Now, though the soul has a proper operation, wherein the body has no share, namely intelligence, there are nevertheless certain operations common to it and the body, such as fear, anger, sensation, and so forth; for these happen by reason of a certain transmutation in a determinate part of the body, which proves that they are operations of the soul and body together. Therefore from the soul and body there must result one thing, and they have not each a distinct being.

According to the opinion of Plato this argument may be rebutted. For it is not impossible for mover and moved, though different in being, to have the same act: because the same act belongs to the mover as wherefrom it is, and to the moved as wherein it is. Wherefore Plato held that the aforesaid operations are common to the soul and body, so that, to wit, they are the soul's as mover, and the body's as moved.

But this cannot be. For as the Philosopher proves in 2 De Anima, sensation results from our being moved by exterior sensibles. Wherefore a man cannot sense without an exterior sensible, just as a thing cannot be moved without a mover. Consequently the organ of sense is moved and passive in sensing, but this is owing to the external sensible. And that whereby it is passive is the sense: which is proved by the fact that things devoid of sense are not passive to sensibles by the same kind of passion. Therefore sense is the passive power of the organ. Consequently the sensitive soul is not as mover and agent in sensing, but as that whereby the patient is passive. And this cannot have a distinct being from the patient. Therefore the sensitive soul has not a distinct being from the animate body.

Further. Although movement is the common act of mover and moved, yet it is one operation to cause movement and another to receive movement; hence we have two predicaments, action and passion. Accordingly, if in sensing the sensitive soul is in the position of agent, and the body in that of patient, the operation of the soul will be other than the operation of the body. Consequently the sensitive soul will have an operation, proper to it: and therefore it will have its proper subsistence. Hence when the body is destroyed it will not cease to exist. Therefore sensitive souls even of irrational animals will be immortal: which seems improbable. And yet it is not out of keeping with Plato's opinion. But there will be a place for inquiring into this further on.

Moreover. The movable does not derive its species from its mover. Consequently if the soul is not united to the body except as mover to movable, the body and its parts do not take their species from the soul. Wherefore at the soul's departure, the body and its parts will remain of the same species. Yet this is clearly false: for flesh, bone, hands, and like parts, after the soul's departure, are so called only equivocally, since none of these parts retains its proper operation that results from the species. Therefore the soul is not united to the body merely as mover to movable, or as man to his clothes.

Further. The movable has not being through its mover, but only movement. Consequently if the soul be united to the body merely as its mover, the body will indeed be moved by the soul, but will not have being through it. But in the living thing to live is to be. Therefore the body would not live through the soul.

Again. The movable is neither generated through the mover's application to it nor corrupted by being separated from it, since the movable depends not on the mover for its being, but only in the point of being moved. If then the soul be united to the body merely as its mover, it will follow that neither in the union of soul and body will there be generation, nor corruption in their separation. And thus death which consists in the separation of soul and body will not be the corruption of an animal: which is clearly false.

Further. Every self-mover is such that it is in it to be moved and not to be moved, to move and not to move. Now the soul, according to Plato's opinion, moves the body as a self-mover. Consequently it is in the soul's power to move the body and not to move it. Wherefore if it be united to it merely as mover to movable, it will be in the soul's power to be separated from the body at will, and to be reunited to it at will: which is clearly false.

That the soul is united to the body as its proper form, is proved thus. That whereby a thing from being potentially is made an actual being, is its form and act. Now the body is made by the soul an actual being from existing potentially: since to live is the being of a living thing. But the seed before animation is only a living thing in potentiality, and is made an actually living thing by the soul. Therefore the soul is the form of the animated body.

Moreover. Since both being and operation belong neither to the form alone, nor to the matter alone, but to the composite, being and action are ascribed to two things, one of which is to the other as form to matter; for we say that a man is healthy in body and in health, and that he is knowing in knowledge and in his soul, wherein knowledge is a form of the soul knowing, and health of the healthy body. Now to live and to sense are ascribed to both soul and body: for we are said to live and sense both in soul and body: but by the soul as by the principle of life and sensation. Therefore the soul is the form of the body.

Further. The whole sensitive soul has to the whole body the same relation as part to part. Now part is to part in such a way that it is its form and act, for sight is the form and act of the eye. Therefore the soul is the form and act of the body.

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT THE NUTRITIVE, SENSITIVE, AND INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES IN MAN ARE NOT THREE SOULS

BUT the foregoing arguments, according to the opinion of Plato, can be answered, so far as the matter in hand is concerned. For Plato holds that in us the same soul is not intellective, nutritive, and sensitive. Hence, even if the sensitive soul were the form of the body, we should not have to conclude that an intellectual substance can be the form of a body. That this opinion is impossible, we must show as follows. Things that are ascribed to one same thing according to various forms, are predicated of one another accidentally: for a white thing is said to be musical accidentally, because whiteness and music are ascribed to Socrates. Consequently if in us the intellective, sensitive, and nutritive soul are various forces or forms, those things which are ascribed to us in respect of these forms will be predicated of one another accidentally. Now in respect of the intellective soul we are said to be men, according to the sensitive soul animals, according to the nutritive soul living. Therefore this predication Man is an animal, or An animal is a living thing, will be accidental. But it is a per se predication, since man, as man, is an animal, and animal, as animal, is a living thing. Therefore it is from the same principle that one is a man, an animal, and a living thing.

If, however, it be said that even if the aforesaid souls be distinct, it does not follow that the predication mentioned will be accidental, because these souls are mutually subordinate: we reply to this also. For the sensitive power is subordinate to the intellect, and the nutritive power to the sensitive, as potentiality is subordinate to act: for the intellect comes after the sensitive, and the sensitive after the nutritive in the order of generation; since in generation an animal is made before a man. Consequently if this order makes the aforesaid predications to be per se, this will not be taking per se in the sense that arises from the form, but in that which arises from matter and subject, as a superficies is said to be coloured. But this is impossible. Because when we use per se in this sense, that which is formal is predicated per se of the subject, as when we say: The superficies is white or The number is even. Again when we use per se in this way, the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate, as number in the definition of even. But here the contrary happens: because man is not predicated of animal per se, but contrariwise: and again the subject is not placed in the definition of the predicate, but vice versa. Therefore the aforesaid definitions are not made per se by reason of the order in question.

Further. A thing has unity. from the same cause as it has being; for one is consequent upon being. Since then a thing has being from its form, it will have unity also from its form. Consequently if we say that there are in man three souls, as different forms, man will not be one being but several. Nor will the order of forms suffice for the unity of man: because to be one with respect to order is not to be one simply; since unity of order is the least of unities.

Again. The aforesaid difficulty will again arise, namely that from the intellective soul and the body there results one thing not simply but only accidentally. For whatever accrues to a thing after its complete being, accrues thereto accidentally, since it is outside its essence. Now every substantial form makes a complete being in the genus of substance, for it makes an actual being and this particular thing. Consequently whatever accrues to a thing after its first substantial form, will accrue to it accidentally. Hence, since the nutritive soul is a substantial form,—for living is predicated substantially of man and animal,—it will follow that the sensitive soul accrues accidentally, and likewise the intellective. And so neither animal nor man denotes one thing simply, nor a genus or species in the category of substance.

Moreover. If man, in Plato’s opinion, is not a thing composed of body and soul, but a soul using a body, this is to be understood either of the intellective soul only, or of the three souls, if there be three, or of two of them. If of three or two, it follows that man is not one thing, but two or three, for he is three souls or at least two. And if this be understood of the intellective soul only, so that the sensitive soul be understood to be the body's form, and the intellective soul, using the animated and sensified body, to be a man, this would again involve absurdities, namely that man is not an animal, but uses an animal; and that man does not sense but uses a sentient thing. And since these statements are inadmissible, it is impossible that there be in us three souls differing in substance, the intellective, the sensitive, and the nutritive.

Further. One thing cannot be made of two or three, without something to unite them, unless one of them be to the other as act to potentiality: for thus are matter and form made one thing, without anything outside uniting them. Now if there be several souls in man, they are not mutually related as matter and form, but are only supposed to be acts and principles of action. It follows consequently, if they be united to form one thing, for instance a man or an animal, that there is something to unite them. But this cannot be the body, since rather is the body united together by the soul, a sign of which is that when the soul departs, the body perishes. It results then that there must be something more formal to make these several things into one. And this will be the soul rather than those several that are united by this thing. Wherefore if this again has various parts, and is not one thing in itself, there will still be need of something to unite them. Since then we cannot go on indefinitely, we must come to something that is one in itself. And such especially is the soul. Therefore there must be but one soul in one man or in one animal.

Again. If that which belongs to the department of the soul in man is composed of several things, it follows that as the whole together is to the whole body, so each of them is to each part of the body. Nor does this disagree with Plato's opinion: for he placed the rational soul in the brain, the nutritive in the liver, and the appetite in the heart. But this is shown to be false, for two reasons. First, because there is a part of the soul which cannot be ascribed to any part of the body, namely the intellect, of which it has been proved that it is not the act of any part of the body. Secondly, because it is evident that the operations of different parts of the soul are observed in the same part of the body: as evidenced in animals which live after being cut in two, since the same part has the movement, sensation, and appetite whereby it is moved; and again the same part of a plant, after being cut off, is nourished, grows and blossoms, whence it is evident that the various parts of the soul are in the one and same part of the body. Therefore there are not different souls in us, allotted to different parts of the body.

Moreover. Different forces that are not rooted in one principle do not hinder one another in acting, unless perhaps their action be contrary, which does not happen in the case in point. Now we find that the various actions of the soul hinder one another, since when one is intense another is remiss. It follows, then, that these actions, and the forces that are their proximate principles, must be reduced to one principle. But this principle cannot be the body, both because there is an action in which the body has no part, namely intelligence; and because, if the body as such were the principle of these forces and actions, they would be found in all bodies, which is clearly false. Consequently it follows that their principle is some one form, by which this body is such a body: and this is the soul. Therefore it follows that all the soul's actions which are in us, proceed from one soul. Wherefore there are not several souls in us.

This is in agreement with what is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus: Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which supplies the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reason.

CHAPTER LIX

THAT MAN’S POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE

OTHERS there have been, who discovered another reason for maintaining that the intellectual soul cannot be united to the body as its form. For they say that the intellect which Aristotle calls possible, is a separate substance not united to us as a form.

They endeavour to prove this from the words of Aristotle, who says, speaking of this intellect, that it is separate, not mixed with the body, simple, impassible; which could not be said of it, if it were the body’s form.

Also, from the demonstration whereby he proves that, since the possible intellect receives all the species of sensible things through being in potentiality to them, it must needs lack them all. Even so the pupil which receives the species of all colours, lacks all colour; for if by itself it had any colour, that colour would prevent it seeing other colours; in fact it would see nothing but under that colour. The same would happen with the possible intellect, if by itself it had any form or nature of sensible things. Yet it would have to be so if it were bound up with the body. Likewise, if it were the form of a body: because, since from form and matter there is made one thing, the form must participate something of the nature of which it is the form. Consequently it is impossible that the possible intellect be bound up with the body, or be the act or form of a body.

Further. If it were the form of a material body, the receptivity of such an intellect would be of the same kind as the receptivity of primary matter; because that which is the form of a body, receives nothing without its matter. Now primary matter receives individual forms, in fact they are individualized through being in matter. Therefore the possible intellect would receive forms as they are individual: and consequently would not be cognizant of universals, which is clearly false.

Further. Primary matter is not cognizant of the forms which it receives. Consequently if the receptivity of the possible intellect were the same as of primary matter, neither would the possible intellect know the forms it receives: and this is false.

Moreover. There cannot possibly be an infinite power in a body, as proved by Aristotle (8 Phys.). Now the possible intellect is, in a manner, of infinite power, since by it we judge of an infinite number of things, inasmuch as by it we know universals, under which potentially infinite particulars are contained. Therefore the possible intellect is not a power in a body.

For these reasons Averroes was moved, and likewise some of the ancients, as he says, to hold that the possible intellect, by which the soul understands, has a separate being from the body, and is not the form of the body.

Since however such an intellect would nowise belong to us, nor should we understand thereby, unless it were in some way united to us, he defines the way in which it comes into touch with us, saying that the species actually understood is the form of the possible intellect, just as the actually visible is the form of the visual power. Hence there results one thing from the possible intellect and the actually understood form. Consequently the possible intellect is united to whomsoever the aforesaid understood form is united. Now it is united to us by means of the phantasm which is a kind of subject of that understood form: and in this way the possible intellect also is in touch with us.

But it is easy to see that all this is nonsensical and impossible. For the one who understands is the one who has intellect. And the thing understood is the thing whose intelligible species is united to the intellect. Consequently though the intelligible species united to the intellect is in a man in some way, it does not follow that the man is the one who understands, but only that he is understood by the separate intellect.

Further. The actually understood species is the form of the possible intellect, as the visible species in act is the form of the visual power, or of the eye itself. Now the understood species is compared to the phantasm as the visible species in act is compared to the coloured object outside the soul: in fact he uses this comparison himself, as also does Aristotle. Therefore by the intelligible form the possible intellect is in touch with the phantasm which is in us, in the same way as the visual power with the colour that is in the stone. But this contact does not make the stone to see but to be seen. Therefore also the aforesaid contact of the possible intellect with us, does not make us to understand, but only to be understood. Now it is clear that it is properly and truly said that man understands, for we would not inquire into the nature of the intellect except for the fact that we understand ourselves. Therefore the aforesaid manner of contact is not sufficient.

Again. Every knower by its cognitive power is united to its object, and not vice versa, just as every operator by its operative power is united to the thing operated. Now man is intelligent by his intellect as by his cognitive power. Therefore he is not united to the intellect by the intelligible form, but by the intellect he is united to the intelligible.

Moreover. That by which a thing operates must be its form, for nothing acts except in so far as it is in act, and a thing is not in act except by that which is its form; wherefore Aristotle proves that the soul is a form, from the fact that an animal lives and senses through the soul. Now man understands, and this by his intellect only: wherefore Aristotle when inquiring into the principle whereby we understand describes to us the nature of the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect must be united to us formally and not merely by its object.

Further. The intellect in act and the intelligible in act are one, just as the sense in act and the sensible in act. Not so however are the intellect in potentiality and the intelligible in potentiality, nor the sense in potentiality and the sensible in potentiality. Wherefore the species of a thing according as it is in the phantasms is not actually intelligible, for it is not thus that it is one with the intellect in act, but as abstracted from the phantasms: even so neither is the species of colour actually perceived according as it is in the stone, but only according as it is in the pupil. Now according to the opinion stated above the intelligible species is in contact with us only according as it is in the phantasms. Therefore it is not in contact with us according as it is one with the possible intellect as its form. Consequently it cannot be the means of bringing the possible intellect into contact with us: since according as it is in contact with the possible intellect it is not in contact with us, nor vice versa.

Now it is evident that he who devised this opinion was deceived by an equivocation. For colours existing outside the soul, given the presence of light, are actually visible as being able to move the sight, and not as actually perceived, according as they are one with the sense in act. In like manner the phantasms are made actually intelligible by the light of the active intellect, so that they can move the possible intellect, but not so that they be actually understood, according as they are one with the possible intellect made actual.

Again. Where the living thing has a higher operation, there is a higher kind of life corresponding to that operation. For in plants we find only an action pertaining to nutrition. In animals we find a higher operation, namely sensation and local movement: wherefore the animal lives by a higher kind of life. But in man we find a yet higher vital operation than in the animal, namely intelligence. Therefore man must have a higher kind of life. Now life is through the soul. Therefore man will have a higher soul, whereby he lives, than is the sensitive soul. But none is higher than the intellect. Therefore the intellect is man’s soul: and consequently it is his form.

Further. That which is consequent on the operation of a thing, does not give a thing its species: because operation is a second act, whereas the form whereby a thing has species is the first act. Now the union of the possible intellect with man, according to the above opinion, is consequent on man’s operation: for it takes place through the medium of the phantasm which, according to the Philosopher, is a movement resulting from the sense in act. Therefore man does not take his species from that union: and consequently man differs from dumb animals by the fact that he has an intellect.

Moreover. If man takes his species from being rational and having an intellect, whoever is in the human species, is rational and intelligent. But a child, even before leaving the womb, is in the human species: and yet it has not phantasms that are actually intelligible. Therefore a man has not an intellect through the intellect being in contact with man by means of an intelligible species the subject of which is a phantasm.

CHAPTER LX

THAT MAN DERIVES HIS SPECIES NOT FROM THE PASSIVE, BUT FROM THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

TO these arguments there is a reply on the lines of the foregoing opinion. For the said Averroes maintains that man differs in species from brutes by the intellect which Aristotle calls passive, which is the same as the cogitative power that is proper to man, in place of which other animals have a certain natural estimative power. And it belongs to this cogitative power to distinguish individual intentions and to compare them with one another: just as the intellect which is separate and unmixed compares and distinguishes universal intentions. And since by this power, together with the imagination and memory, the phantasms are prepared to receive the addition of the active intellect, whereby they are made actually intelligible—just as certain arts prepare the matter for the master craftsman—therefore the aforesaid power is called by the name of intellect or reason, which physicians declare to be seated in the middle cell of the head. And according to the disposition of this power, one man differs from another in genius and other points pertaining to intelligence. Also by the use and practice thereof man acquires the habit of science: so that the habits of science are in this passive intellect as their subject. Moreover this passive intellect is in the child from the beginning, and through it the child receives its human species before understanding actually.

But it is easy to see that all this is untrue and an abuse of terms. For vital operations are compared to the soul, as second acts to the first, as Aristotle declares in 2 De Anima. Now in the one subject first act precedes the second in point of time, just as knowledge precedes consideration. Hence in whatever thing we find a vital operation, we must place some part of the soul that will be compared to that operation as first to second act. Now man above other animals has a proper operation, namely intelligence and reasoning, which is the operation of man, as man, as Aristotle states (1 Ethic.). Therefore we must place in man a principle that properly gives him his species, and is compared to the act of intelligence as first to second act. But this cannot be the aforesaid passive intellect, since the principle of this same operation must needs be impassible and not mixed with the body, as the Philosopher proves, whereas it is clearly the contrary with the passive intellect. Therefore it is not possible that the species whereby man differs from other animals, should come to him through the cogitative power that is called the passive intellect.

Again. That which is a passion of the sensitive part cannot place a thing in a higher kind of life than the sensitive life: just as that which is a passion of the nutritive soul, does not place a thing in a higher kind of life than the nutritive. Now it is clear that the imagination and the like powers which are consequent upon it, such as the memory and so forth, are passions of the sensitive faculty, as the Philosopher proves in his book De Memoria. Consequently an animal cannot be placed by these powers or by any one of them, in a higher kind of life than the sensitive. But man is in a higher kind of life, as is proved from the Philosopher (2 De Anima), who in distinguishing the kinds of life, places the intellective which he ascribes to man, above the sensitive which he ascribes to all animals in common. Therefore it is not through the aforesaid cogitative power that man is a living being with a life proper to himself.

Moreover. Every self-mover, as the Philosopher proves (8 Phys.), is composed of mover and moved. Now man, like the animals, is a self-mover. Therefore mover and moved are parts of him. But the first mover in man is the intellect, for the intellect by its intelligible object moves the will. Nor can it be said that the passive intellect alone is the mover, since the passive intellect is only of particulars, while in moving there comes into play both the universal opinion which belongs to the possible intellect, and the particular statement which may belong to the passive intellect, as we gather from Aristotle (3 De Anima, and 7 Ethic.). Therefore the possible intellect is a part of man: and is the most noble and most formal thing in him: and consequently he takes his species from it and not from the passive intellect.

Further. The possible intellect is proved not to be the act of a body from the fact of its taking cognizance of all sensible forms in the universal. Therefore no power, the operation of which can extend to the universals of all sensible forms, can be the act of a body. Now such is the will: since our will can extend to all the things that we can understand, at least so that we will to know them. Moreover the act of the will is clearly directed to the universal: since, as Aristotle says in his Rhetoric, we hate the robber-kind in the universal, but are enraged only with the individuals. Consequently the will cannot be the act of a part of the body, nor can it be consequent upon a power that is an act of the body. Now any part of the soul is an act of the body, except the intellect alone properly so called. Hence the will is in the intellective part, wherefore also Aristotle says (3 De Anima) that the will is in the reason, but the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. On account of this the acts of the concupiscible and irascible are associated with passion; whereas the act of the will is not, but with choice. Now man's will is not outside man, as though it were vested in a separate substance, but is in man himself. Else he would not be master of his own actions, for he would be acted upon by the will of a separate substance: and in him there would only be the appetitive powers that operate with passion, namely the irascible and the concupiscible, which are in the sensitive part, as in other animals which are acted upon rather than act themselves. But this is impossible and would do away with all moral philosophy and social intercourse. Wherefore the possible intellect must be in us, so that we differ thereby from dumb animals, and not only by the passive intellect.

Again. Just as nothing is able (potens) to act except through an inherent active potentiality, so nothing is able to be passive except through an inherent passive potentiality: for the combustible is not only able to be burnt because there is something able to burn it, but also because it has in itself a potentiality to be burnt. Now to understand is a kind of passion, as stated in 3 De Anima. Since then a child is potentially understanding, although he understands not actually, there must be in him a potentiality whereby he is able to understand: and this potentiality is the possible intellect. Consequently the possible intellect must already be in touch with the child before he understands actually. Therefore the contact of the possible intellect with man is not through the actually understood form; but the possible intellect itself is in a man from the beginning as a part of him.

The said Averroes replies to this argument. For he says that a child is said to be understanding potentially in two ways. First, because the phantasms in him are potentially intelligible; secondly, because the possible intellect is able (potens) to come in touch with him, and not because the intellect is already united to him.

Now we have to prove that either way is insufficient. For the potentiality by which the agent is able to act is distinct from the potentiality whereby the patient is able to be passive, and they differ as being opposite to one another. Consequently from the fact that a thing is able to be active, it is not competent to it to be passive. Now to be able to understand is to be able to be passive, since to understand is a kind of passion, according to the Philosopher. Therefore the child is not said to be able to understand, from the mere fact that the phantasms in him are able to be actually understood, since this pertains to being able to act; for the phantasms move the possible intellect.

Again. A potentiality consequent on the species of a thing does not belong to it by reason of that which does not give that thing its species. Now ability to understand is consequent on the human species, for understanding is an operation of man as such. Whereas the phantasms do not give man his species, on the contrary they are consequent on his operation. Therefore the child cannot be said to be potentially understanding by reason of the phantasms.

Likewise, neither can a child be said to be potentially understanding, because the possible intellect is able to be in touch with him. For a person is said to be able to act or to be passive by active or passive potentiality, just as he is said to be white by whiteness. Now he is not said to be white before whiteness is united to him. Therefore neither is one said to be able to act or to be passive before the active or passive potentiality is in him. Consequently it cannot be said of a child that he is able to understand before the possible intellect, which is the power of understanding, is in touch with him.

Further. A person is said in one way to be able to act before having the nature whereby he acts, and in another way after he has the nature already, but is accidentally hindered from acting: even as a body is said in one way to be able to be lifted upwards before it is light, and in another way after it is made light, but is hindered in its movement. Now a child is potentially understanding, not as though he has not yet the nature to understand, but as having an obstacle to understanding, for he is hindered from understanding on account of the manifold movements in him, as stated in 7 Physic. Wherefore he is not said to be potentially understanding, on account of the possibility of coming in touch with the possible intellect which is the principle of understanding, but because it is already in touch with him and is hindered from its proper action; so that as soon as the obstacle is removed, he understands.

Again. A habit is that whereby one acts at will. Consequently a habit must be in the same subject as the operation that is according to that habit. But to consider by understanding, which is the act of the habit of science, cannot be in the passive intellect, but belongs to the possible intellect, because in order that a power understand, it behoves it not to be the act of a body. Therefore the habit of science is not in the passive but in the possible intellect. Now science is in us, since according thereto we are said to know scientifically. Therefore the possible intellect also is in us, and has not a being separate from us.

Further. The assimilation of science is of the knower to the thing known. Now the knower is not assimilated to the thing known, as such, except in respect of universal species, for science is about such things. But universal species cannot be in the passive intellect,—since it is a power using an organ,—but only in the possible intellect. Therefore science is not in the passive, but only in the possible intellect.

Moreover. The intellect in habit, as the opponent admits, is the effect of the active intellect. Now the effects of the active intellect are things actually intelligible, the proper recipient of which is the possible intellect, to which the active intellect is compared as art to material, according to Aristotle (3 De Anima). Consequently the intellect in habit, which is the habit of science, must be in the possible, and not in the passive intellect.

Further. It is impossible that the perfection of a higher substance depend on a lower. Now the perfection of the possible intellect depends on the action of man, for it depends on the phantasms which move the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is not a higher substance than man. Therefore it must be part of man as his act and form.

Again. Whatsoever things are separate as to being, are also separate as to operation, because things are for the sake of their operations, as first act for the sake of the second: wherefore Aristotle says (1 De Anima), that if any operation of the soul is apart from the body, it is possible for the soul to be separated. Now the operation of the possible intellect requires the body: for the Philosopher says (3 De Anima) that the intellect can act by itself, that is it can understand, when it has been made actual by a species abstracted from phantasms, which are not apart from the body. Therefore the possible intellect is not altogether separate from the body.

Moreover. A thing has by nature those attributes without which its connatural operation cannot be accomplished: thus Aristotle proves (2 De Cœlo) that if the movement of the stars were progressive like that of animals, nature would have given them the organs of progressive movement. Now the operation of the possible intellect is accomplished through corporeal organs, which are necessary as subjects of the phantasms. Therefore nature has united the possible intellect to corporeal organs: and consequently it has not a being separate from the body.

Again. If it had a being separate from the body, it would understand substances that are separate from matter rather than sensible forms, for they are more intelligible, and more conformed to the intellect. Yet it cannot understand substances that are altogether separate from matter, since there are no phantasms of them: whereas this intellect nowise understands without phantasms, as Aristotle says (3 De Anima); because the phantasms are to it as sensibles to the senses, and without these the sense has no sensation. Therefore it is not a substance separate from the body in being.

Further. In every genus the passive potentiality extends as far as the active potentiality of that genus; wherefore there is not in nature a passive potentiality, to which there does not correspond a natural active potentiality. But the active intellect makes only the phantasms to be intelligible. Therefore neither is the passive intellect moved by other intelligibles than the species abstracted from the phantasms: and thus it is unable to understand separate substances.

Moreover. The species of sensible things are in separate substances intelligibly, and by those species they have knowledge of sensibles. If therefore the possible intellect understood separate substances, it would receive in them the knowledge of sensibles. Consequently it would not receive this knowledge from phantasms, since nature’s abundance does not consist of superfluities.

If, however, it be said that separate substances have no knowledge of sensibles, it must at least be granted that they have a higher knowledge. And this knowledge must not be lacking to the possible intellect, if it understands the said substances. Consequently it will have a twofold knowledge: one after the manner of separate substances, the other received from the senses: one of which would be superfluous.

Further. It is the possible intellect whereby the soul understands, as stated in 3 De Anima. If therefore the possible intellect understands separate substances, we also understand them. Yet this is clearly untrue, for we stand in relation to them as the eye of the owl to the sun, as Aristotle says.

To these arguments it is replied according to the aforesaid opinion. The possible intellect, so far as it is self-subsistent, understands separate substances, and is in potentiality to them as a transparent body to the light. Whereas in so far as it is in touch with us, it is in potentiality from the beginning to forms abstracted from the phantasms. Hence we do not from the beginning understand separate substances by it. But this will not hold. For the possible intellect, according to them, is said to be in touch with us, through being perfected by intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms. Consequently the intellect is to be considered as in potentiality to these species before being in touch with us. Wherefore it is not by its being in touch with us that it is in potentiality to these species.

Further. According to this, the fact of its being in potentiality to these species would belong to it not in itself but through something else. Now a thing ought not to be defined by those things which do not belong to it in itself. Therefore the definition of the possible intellect should not be taken from its being in potentiality to the aforesaid species, as Aristotle defines it in 3 De Anima.

Further. It is impossible for the possible intellect to understand several things at the same time, unless it understand one through another: since one power is not perfected at the same time by several acts except according to order. If, therefore, the possible intellect understands separate substances, and species abstracted from phantasms, it must either understand separate substances through these species, or vice versa. Now whichever be granted, it follows that we understand separate substances. For if we understand the natures of sensibles forasmuch as the possible intellect understands them, and the possible intellect understands them through understanding separate substances, we must understand them in the same way. And in like manner if the case be the reverse. But this is clearly false. Therefore the possible intellect does not understand separate substances: and consequently it is not a separate substance.

CHAPTER LXI

THAT THE AFORESAID OPINION IS CONTRARY TO THAT OF ARISTOTLE

SINCE, however, Averroes endeavours to strengthen his position by appealing to authority, and says that Aristotle was of the same opinion, we shall prove clearly that the aforesaid opinion is contrary to that of Aristotle.

First, because Aristotle (2 De Anima) defines the soul by saying that the soul is the first act of an organic physical body having life potentially, and afterwards he adds that this definition applies universally to every soul, not, as the said Averroes pretends, expressing a doubt on the point, as evidenced by the Greek text and the translation of Boethius. Afterwards in the same chapter he adds that certain parts of the soul are separable. Now these are no other than the intellective parts. It follows therefore that these parts are acts of the body.

Nor is this gainsaid by what he says afterwards: Nothing so far is clear about the intellect and the power of understanding, but it would seem to be another kind of soul. For he does not wish by this to except the intellect from the common definition of a soul, but to exclude it from the natures proper to the other parts: thus he who says Animals that fly are of another kind from those that walk, does not remove the common definition of animal from those that fly. Wherefore, to show in what sense he said another he adds: And this alone can be separated as the everlasting from the corruptible. Nor is it Aristotle’s intention, as the said Commentator pretends, to say that he has not yet made it clear concerning the intellect, whether the intellect be the soul, as he had done concerning the other principles. For the genuine text does not read, nothing has been declared or nothing has been said, but nothing is clear; which we must understand as referring to that which is proper to the soul, and not as referring to the common definition. And if, as he says, soul is said equivocally of the intellect and other (souls), he (Aristotle) would first have explained the equivocation, and given the definition afterwards, as is his wont. Else his argument would have laboured under an equivocation; which is not allowable in demonstrative sciences.

Again. In 2 De Anima he reckons the intellect among the powers of the soul: and in the passage quoted he calls it the power of understanding. Therefore the intellect is not outside the human soul, but is one of its powers.

Again. In the 3 De Anima, when he begins to speak of the possible intellect, he calls it a part of the soul, for the text reads: Of the part of the soul whereby the soul has knowledge and wisdom: thus clearly indicating that the possible intellect is a part of the soul.

He is yet more explicit when he goes on to declare the nature of the possible intellect, in these words: By the intellect I mean that by which the soul knows and understands. This evidently denotes that the intellect is a part of the human soul, whereby the soul understands.

Therefore the aforesaid position is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, and to the truth: and consequently is to be rejected as a mere fabrication.

CHAPTER LXII

AGAINST THE OPINION OF ALEXANDER ABOUT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

HAVING taken these sayings of Aristotle into consideration, Alexander asserted that the possible intellect is a power in us, so that the common definition of a soul given by Aristotle (2 De Anima) might apply thereto. But as he could not understand how an intellectual substance could be the form of a body, he said that the aforesaid power is not rooted in an intellectual substance, and that it is consequent on the mixture of the elements in the human body. For the particular mode of mixture in the human body makes man to be in potentiality to receive the inflow of the active intellect, which is always in act, and according to him is a separate substance, the result of which inflow is that man is made to understand actually. Now in man that whereby he is potentially understanding is the possible intellect. Consequently it followed apparently that the possible intellect in us is a result of a particular mixture.

But at the first glance this opinion is seen to be in contradiction with both the words and the proof of Aristotle. For as already stated Aristotle proves in the 3 De Anima that the possible intellect is not mixed with the body. Now this could not be said of a power resulting from the mixture of the elements: for a thing of the kind must needs be rooted in the mixture itself of the elements, as we see in the case of taste, smell, and the like. Therefore seemingly the aforesaid opinion of Alexander is inconsistent with the words and proof of Aristotle.

To this Alexander replies that the possible intellect is merely the preparedness in the human nature to receive the inflow of the active intellect. And preparedness is not a particular sensible nature, nor is it mixed with the body: for it is a relation and the order of one thing to another.

But this clearly disagrees with the intention of Aristotle. For Aristotle proves that the reason why the possible intellect is not confined to any particular sensible nature, and consequently is not mixed with the body, is because it is receptive of all the forms of sensibles, and cognizant of them. Now this cannot be understood of preparedness, for it denotes not receiving but being prepared to receive. Therefore Aristotle’s proof refers not to preparedness, but to a prepared recipient.

Moreover. If what Aristotle says of the possible intellect applies to it inasmuch as it is a preparedness, and not on account of the nature of the subject prepared, it follows that it applies to every preparedness. Now in the senses there is a preparedness to receive sensibles actually. Therefore the same applies to the senses as to the possible intellect. And yet Aristotle clearly says the contrary, when he shows the difference between the receptivity of sense and of intellect, from the fact that sense is corrupted by the excellence of its objects, but not the intellect.

Again. Aristotle says of the possible intellect that it is passive to the intelligible, that it receives intelligible species, that it is in potentiality to them. He also compares it to a tablet whereon nothing is written. None of which things can be said of preparedness, but only of the subject prepared. It is therefore contrary to the intention of Aristotle that the possible intellect should be the same as preparedness.

Again. The agent is more noble than the patient, and the maker than the thing made, as act in comparison with potentiality. Now the more immaterial a thing is the more noble it is. Therefore the effect cannot be more immaterial than the cause. But every cognitive power, as such, is immaterial: hence Aristotle says of sense (2 De Anima) that it is receptive of sensible species without matter. Consequently it is impossible for a cognitive power to result from a mixture of elements. Now the possible intellect is the highest cognitive power in us: for Aristotle says (3 De Anima) that the possible intellect is whereby the soul knows and understands. Therefore the possible intellect is not caused by the mixture of the elements.

Moreover. If the principle of an operation proceeds from certain causes, that operation must not surpass those causes, since the second cause acts by virtue of the first. Now even the operation of the nutritive soul exceeds the power of the elemental qualities: for Aristotle proves (2 De Anima) that fire is not the cause of growth, but its concause so to speak, while its principal cause is the soul, to which heat is compared as the instrument to the craftsman. Consequently the vegetative soul cannot be produced by the mixture of the elements, and much less, therefore, the sense and possible intellect.

Again. To understand is an operation in which no bodily organ can possibly communicate. Now this operation is ascribed to the soul, as also to man; for we say that the soul understands or man, by his soul. Consequently there must needs be in man a principle, independent of the body, which is the source of that operation. But the preparedness that results from the mixture of the elements is clearly dependent on the body. Therefore preparedness is not this principle. And yet this latter is the possible intellect, since Aristotle says (3 De Anima) that the possible intellect is whereby the soul knows and understands. Therefore preparedness is not the possible intellect.

If, however, it be said that the principle of the aforesaid operation in us is the intelligible species made actual by the active intellect: this is seemingly insufficient. For, since man from being intentionally understanding is made actually understanding, it follows that not only does he understand by the intelligible species, by which he is made to understand actually, but also by an intellective power, which is the principle of the aforesaid operation, as happens also with the senses. Now Aristotle affirms that this power is the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is independent of the body.

Further. The species is not actually intelligible except in so far as it is expurgated of material being. But this cannot happen so long as it is in a material potentiality, which namely is caused from material principles, or is the act of a material organ. Therefore it must be granted that we have in ourselves an intellective power which is immaterial.

Again. The possible intellect is described by Aristotle as being part of the soul. Now the soul is not a preparedness but an act, since preparedness is the order of potentiality to act. And yet act is followed by a certain preparedness to a further act, for instance the act of transparency is followed by an order to the act of light. Therefore the possible intellect is not a mere preparedness, but is an act.

Moreover. Man obtains species and human nature according to that part of the soul which is proper to him, namely the possible intellect. Now nothing obtains species and nature according as it is in potentiality, but according as it is in act. Since then preparedness is nothing more than order of potentiality to act, it is impossible that the possible intellect be merely a certain preparedness in human nature.

CHAPTER LXIII

THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A TEMPERAMENT, AS GALEN ASSERTED

THE opinion of the physician Galen about the soul is akin to the aforesaid opinion of Alexander concerning the possible intellect.

For he says that the soul is a temperament. He was moved to make this assertion by the fact that we see resulting from various temperaments in us, various passions which are ascribed to the soul: for some who have, for example, a choleric temperament, are easily angered, while melancholic persons are prone to be sad. Consequently the same arguments avail to disprove this opinion, as were adduced against the opinion of Alexander, as well as some that apply specially thereto.

For it was proved above that the operation of the vegetative soul, sensitive knowledge and, much more, the operation of the intellect surpass the power of the active and passive qualities. Therefore the temperament cannot be the principle of the soul's operations: and consequently it is impossible for the soul to be the temperament.

Again. Seeing that the temperament is something set up by contrary qualities as a kind of mean between them, it cannot possibly be a substantial form; because substance has no contrary, nor is it a recipient of more or less. But the soul is a substantial, not an accidental, form: else a thing would not obtain species or form from its soul. Therefore the soul is not the temperament.

Further. The temperament does not move an animal's body by local movement: for it would follow the movement of the predominant element, and thus would always be moved downwards. But the soul moves the body in all directions. Therefore the soul is not the temperament.

Moreover. The soul rules the body, and curbs the passions that result from the temperament. For by temperament some are more prone than others to desire or anger, and yet refrain more from these things, on account of something that keeps them in check, as may be seen in those who are continent. But the temperament does not this. Therefore the soul is not the temperament.

Apparently he was deceived through failing to observe that passions are ascribed to the temperament in one way, and to the soul in another. For they are ascribed to the temperament as causing a disposition, and in respect of that which is material in the passions, for instance the heat of the blood and the like; whereas they are ascribed to the soul as their principal cause, and in respect of what is formal in the passions, for instance the desire of vengeance in anger.

CHAPTER LXIV

THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A HARMONY

NOT unlike the foregoing opinion is the view of those who say that the soul is a harmony. For they meant that the soul is a harmony not of sound, but of contraries, whereof they observed animate bodies to be composed. In the De Anima this opinion is apparently set down to Empedocles: Gregory of Nyssa ascribes it to Dinarchus: and it is to be refuted in the same way as the foregoing opinion, as well as by arguments proper to itself.

For every mixed body has harmony and temperament. Nor can harmony move a body, nor rule it, nor curb the passions, any more than temperament can do so. Again, it is subject to intension and remission, like temperament. All of which show that the soul is neither harmony nor temperament.

Again. The notion of harmony applies more to the qualities of the body than to those of the soul: for health is harmony of the humours; strength, of sinews and bones; beauty, of limbs and colours. Whereas it cannot be said of what things sense or intellect or other parts of the soul are the harmony. Therefore the soul is not a harmony.

Moreover. Harmony is taken in two senses. In one way, for the composition itself, in another for the manner of composition. Now the soul is not a composition: because each part of the soul would have to be the composition of some of the parts of the body; and this cannot be verified. Likewise, it is not the manner of a composition: because, since in the various parts of the body there are various manners or proportions of composition, each part of the body would have a distinct soul, for bone, flesh, and sinew would have different souls, since they are composed in different proportions: which is clearly false. Therefore the soul is not a harmony.

CHAPTER LXV

THAT THE SOUL IS NOT A BODY

THERE were also others who wandered further from the truth, by asserting that the soul is a body. And although these had different and various opinions, it will suffice to refute them here in general.

For living things, since they are physical beings, are composed of matter and form. Now they are composed of a body, and of a soul which makes them actually living. Therefore one of these must be the form, and the other the matter. But the body cannot be the form, since the body is not in something else as its matter and subject. Therefore the soul is the form. Consequently it is not a body, since no form is a body.

Again. It is impossible for two bodies to coincide. Now the soul is not apart from the body while the latter lives. Therefore the soul is not a body.

Moreover. Every body is divisible. And whatever is divisible requires something to keep together and unite its parts. Consequently if the soul were a body, it would have something else to hold it together, and this yet more would be the soul: since we observe that when the soul departs the body perishes. And if this again be divisible, we must at length either come to something indivisible and incorporeal, which will be the soul, or we shall go on to infinity, which is impossible. Therefore the soul is not a body.

Again. As we proved above, and as it is proved in 8 Phys., every self mover is composed of two parts of which the one is mover, the other moved. Now an animal is a self-mover, and the mover therein is the soul, while the body is moved. Consequently the soul is an unmoved mover. But no body moves without being moved, as we proved above. Consequently the soul is not a body.

Further. It was proved above that intelligence cannot be the act of a body. But it is the act of a soul. Therefore, at least the intellective soul is not a body.

As to the arguments by which some have tried to prove that the soul is a body, it is easy to solve them. For they prove that the soul is a body from the son being like his father even in the accidents of the soul, notwithstanding that the son is begotten of his father by bodily detachment. Also because the soul suffers with the body. Also because it is separate from the body, and separation is between bodies that touch one another.

But against this it has been already stated that the bodily temperament is somewhat the cause of the soul’s passions by way of a dispositive cause. Again, the soul does not suffer with the body except accidentally because, since it is the form of the body, it is moved accidentally through the body being moved. Also the soul is separate from the body, not as that which touches from that which is touched, but as form from matter: although there is a certain contact between the incorporeal and a body, as we have shown.

Moreover many men were moved to take up this position through believing that there is nothing that is not a body, being unable to outstrip their imagination which is only about bodies. Wherefore this opinion is put forward in the person of the foolish as saying of the soul (Wis. 2:2): The breath in our nostrils is smoke, and speech a spark to move our heart.

CHAPTER LXVI

AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT INTELLECT AND SENSE ARE THE SAME

SOME of the early philosophers came near to these through thinking that intellect differs not from sense. But this is impossible.

For sense is found in all animals: whereas animals other than man have no intellect. This is evident from the fact that they do diverse and opposite things, not as though they had intelligence, but as moved by nature, performing certain determinate operations that are uniform within the same species: thus every swallow builds its nest in the same say. Therefore intellect is not the same as sense.

Further. Sense is not cognizant except of singulars: for every sensitive power knows by individual species, since it receives the species of things in corporeal organs. But the intellect is cognizant of universals, as evidenced by experience. Therefore intellect differs from sense.

Moreover. The knowledge of the senses does not extend beyond things corporeal. This is clear from the fact that sensible qualities, which are the proper objects of the senses, are only in corporeal things, and without them the senses know nothing. On the other hand the intellect knows things incorporeal, for instance, wisdom, truth, and the relations of things. Therefore intellect and sense are not the same.

Again. Sense knows neither itself nor its operation: for sight neither sees itself, nor sees that it sees, but this belongs to a higher power, as is proved in De Anima. But the intellect knows itself, and knows that it understands. Therefore intellect is not the same as sense.

Further. Sense is corrupted by an excelling sensible. But intellect is not corrupted by the excellence of the intelligible; in fact, he who understands greater things, can afterwards better understand lesser things. Therefore the sensitive power differs from the intellective.

CHAPTER LXVII

AGAINST THOSE WHO SAY THAT THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IS THE IMAGINATION

THE opinion of those who held that the possible intellect is not distinct from the imagination was akin to the foregoing. But this is evidently false.

For imagination is also in other animals. A sign of this is that in the absence of sensibles they shun or seek them, which would not be the case did they not retain an imaginary apprehension of them. But intellect is not in them, since they offer no evidence of intelligent action. Therefore imagination and intellect are not the same.

Further. Imagination is only about things corporeal and singular: since the fancy is a movement caused by actual sensation, as stated in De Anima. But the intellect is about universals and incorporeal things. Therefore the possible intellect is not the imagination.

Moreover. It is impossible for the same thing to be mover and moved. Now the phantasms move the possible intellect, as sensibles move the senses, as Aristotle states (3 De Anima). Therefore the possible intellect cannot be the same as the imagination.

Further. It is proved in 3 De Anima that the intellect is not an act of a part of the body: whereas the imagination has a determinate bodily organ. Therefore the imagination is not the same as the possible intellect.

Hence it is said (Job 35:11): Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructeth us more than the fowls of the air. Whereby we are given to understand that man has a cognitive power above sense and imagination, which are in other animals.

CHAPTER LXVIII

HOW AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE FORM OF THE BODY

ACCORDINGLY from the foregoing arguments we are able to conclude that an intellectual substance can be united to the body as its form. For if an intellectual substance is not united to the body merely as its mover, as Plato stated, nor is in contact with it merely by the phantasms, as Averroes held, but as its form; and if the intellect whereby man understands is not a preparedness in human nature, as Alexander maintained, nor the temperament, as Galen said, nor harmony, according to Empedocles, nor a body, nor the senses or imagination, as the ancients asserted, it follows that the human soul is an intellectual substance united to the body as its form. This can be made evident as follows.

For one thing to be another's substantial form, two conditions are required. One of them is that the form be the principle of substantial being to the thing of which it is the form: and I speak not of the effective but of the formal principle, whereby a thing is, and is called a being. Hence follows the second condition, namely that the form and matter combine together in one being, which is not the case with the effective principle together with that to which it gives being. This is the being in which a composite substance subsists, which is one in being, and consists of matter and form. Now an intellectual substance, as proved above, is not hindered by the fact that it is subsistent, from being the formal principle of being to matter, as communicating its being to matter. For it is not unreasonable that the composite and its form itself should subsist in the same being, since the composite exists only by the form, nor does either subsist apart from the other.

It may however be argued that an intellectual substance cannot communicate its being to corporeal matter, so that the intellectual substance and the corporeal matter have together one being: because different genera have different modes of being, and a more noble mode belongs to a more noble substance. This would be said reasonably if this being belonged in the same way to matter as to the intellectual substance. But it is not so. For it belongs to corporeal matter as its recipient and subject raised to something higher, while it belongs to the intellectual substance as its principle, and in accordance with its very nature. Wherefore nothing prevents an intellectual substance from being the human body's form, which is the human soul.

In this way we are able to perceive the wondrous connection of things. For we always find the lowest in the higher genus touching the highest of the lower genus: thus some of the lowest of the animal kind scarcely surpass the life of plants, such as oysters which are immovable, have only the sense of touch, and are fixed to the earth like plants. Hence Blessed Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.) that Divine wisdom has united the ends of higher things with the beginnings of the lower. Accordingly we may consider something supreme in the genus of bodies, namely the human body equably attempered, which touches the lowest of the higher genus, namely the human soul, and this occupies the last degree in the genus of intellectual substances, as may be seen from its mode of understanding. Hence it is that the intellectual soul is said to be on the horizon and confines of things corporeal and incorporeal, inasmuch as it is an incorporeal substance, and yet the form of a body. And a thing is not less one that is composed of an intellectual substance and corporeal matter, than that which results from the form of fire and its matter, but perhaps more so: since the more a form overcomes matter, the more one is that which is made from it and matter.

Now though form and matter have one being, it does not follow that matter always equals the being of the form. In fact, the more noble the form, the more it surpasses matter in its being. This is clear to one who looks into the operations of forms, from the consideration of which we know their natures, since a thing operates according as it is. Consequently a form whose operation surpasses the condition of matter, itself also surpasses matter in the excellence of its being.

For we find certain lowest forms, which are capable of no operation except such as comes within the compass of the qualities which are the dispositions of matter, for instance heat, cold, moisture and dryness, rarity, density, gravity and levity, and the like; such are the elemental forms. Consequently these forms are altogether material, and wholly merged in matter.

Above these we find the forms of mixed bodies: and these, although they do not extend to any operations that cannot be accomplished through the aforesaid qualities, nevertheless sometimes produce those effects by a higher power which they receive from the heavenly bodies, and which is consequent upon their species; thus the loadstone attracts iron.

Again, above these we find certain forms whose operations include some which surpass the power of the aforesaid qualities, although the same qualities assist organically in their operation; such are the souls of plants; and these again are like not only to the powers of heavenly bodies, in surpassing the active and passive qualities, but also to the movers of heavenly bodies, inasmuch as they are the principles of movement in living things, which move themselves.

Above these forms we find other forms like the higher substances, not only in moving, but also in knowing, and thus they are capable of operations to which the aforesaid qualities do not help even organically, and yet these operations are not accomplished save by means of a corporeal organ: such are the souls of dumb animals. For sensation and imagination are not accomplished by heating and cooling, although these are necessary for the due disposition of the organ.

And above all these forms we find a form like the higher substances even as regards the kind of knowledge, which is intelligence: and thus it is capable of an operation which is accomplished without any corporeal organ at all. This is the intellective soul, for intelligence is not effected by a corporeal organ. Consequently it follows that this principle whereby man understands, namely the intellective soul, which surpasses the condition of corporeal matter, is not wholly encompassed by and merged in matter, as are other material forms. This is indicated by its operation, in which corporeal matter has no part. And yet since the human soul's act of intelligence needs powers, namely imagination and sense which operate through corporeal organs, this by itself shows that the soul is naturally united to the body in order to complete the human species.

CHAPTER LXIX

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT WAS PROVED ABOVE THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM

TAKING the foregoing into consideration, it is not difficult to solve the arguments given above against the aforesaid union. In the first argument something false is taken for granted. Because body and soul are not two actually existing substances, but one actually existing substance is made from them: for man’s body is not actually the same while the soul is present, and when the soul is absent: and it is the soul that makes it to be actually.

The statement, contained in the second objection, that form and matter belong to the same genus, is true, not as though they were both species of the same genus, but because they are the principles of the same species. Accordingly, the intellectual substance and the body, which if they existed apart would be species of different genera, through being united are of the same genus as principles thereof.

Nor does it follow that the intellectual substance is a material form, although its being is in matter; as the third argument contended. For it is not in matter as merged in matter, or wholly encompassed by matter, but in another way, as stated.

Nor does the intellectual substance being united to the body as its form prevent the intellect beings separate from the body, as the philosophers say.

For we must consider in the soul, both its essence and its power. According to its essence it gives being to such and such a body, while according to its power it accomplishes its proper operations. If therefore an operation of the soul be accomplished by means of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which is the principle of that operation, is the act of that part of the body by which its operation is accomplished: thus sight is the act of the eye. If, however, its operation be not accomplished by means of a corporeal organ, its power will not be the act of a body. It is in this sense that the intellect is said to be separate, and this does not preclude the substance of the soul of which the intellect is a power, otherwise the intellective soul, from being the act of the body, as the form which gives being to such a body.

And although the soul by its substance is the form of the body, it is not necessary that its every operation be performed by means of the body, and that consequently its every power be the act of a body, as the fifth argument supposed. For it has been already shown that the human soul is not such a form as is wholly merged in matter, but is of all other forms raised highest above matter. Consequently it can produce an operation without the body, as being independent of the body, in operating: since not even in being does it depend on the body.

In the same way it is clear that the reasons whereby Averroes tries to confirm his opinion, do not prove that the intellectual substance is not united to the body as its form.

For the expressions used by Aristotle in reference to the possible intellect, when he says that it is impassible, unmixed, and separate, do not oblige us to admit that the intellective substance is not united to the body as the form whence the latter has being. For they are also true if we say that the intellective power, which Aristotle calls the power of understanding, is not the act of an organ, as though it exercised its operation thereby. This is in fact shown by his proof: since he proves that it is unshackled and separate, from its operation whereby it understands all things; and because operation belongs to a power as to its principle.

It is consequently clear that neither does Aristotle’s proof show that the intellective substance is not united to the body as its form. For if we suppose that the soul’s substance is thus united to the body in being, and that the intellect is not the act of any organ, it will not follow that the intellect has a particular nature,—I refer to the natures of sensibles: since it is not admitted to be a harmony, nor the reason of an organ,—as Aristotle says (2 De Anima) of sense that it is like the reason of an organ:—for the intellect has not a common operation with the body.

That Aristotle, by saying that the intellect is unshackled or separate, does not mean to exclude its being a part or power of the soul which is the form of the whole body, is clear from what he says at the end of the First Book of De Anima, against those who said that different parts of the soul are in different parts of the body: If the whole soul contains the whole body it is meet that each of its parts should contain some part of the body. But this seems impossible. For it is difficult to conceive what part the intellect contains and how.

It is also evident, since the intellect is not the act of any part of the body, that its receptiveness is not that of primary matter: forasmuch as its receptiveness and operation are altogether without a corporeal organ.

Nor again is the infinite power of the intellect excluded, since its power is not ascribed to a magnitude, but is founded on the intellectual substance, as stated.

CHAPTER LXX

THAT ACCORDING TO THE WORDS OF ARISTOTLE WE MUST SAY THAT THE INTELLECT IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM

NOW, since Averroes endeavours to confirm his opinion especially by appealing to the words and proof of Aristotle, it remains to be shown that according to Aristotle's opinion we must say that the intellect as to its substance is united to a body as its form.

For Aristotle in the Eighth Book of Physics proves that in movers and things moved it is impossible to go on to infinity. Whence he concludes that we must needs come to some first moved thing, which either is moved by an immovable mover, or moves itself. Of these two he takes the latter, namely that the first movable moves itself, for this reason, that what is per se always precedes that which is by another. Then he shows that a self-mover is of necessity divided into two parts, one of which is mover and the other moved. Consequently the first self-mover must consist of two parts, the one moving, the other moved. Now every such thing is animate. Wherefore the first movable, namely the heaven, is animate according to the opinion of Aristotle. Hence in 2 De Cœlo it is expressly stated that the heaven is animate, and for this reason we must ascribe to the heaven differences of position not only in relation to us, but also in relation to itself. Let us then inquire with what kind of soul, according to Aristotle's opinion, the heaven is animated.

In 11 Metaph. he proves that in the heaven's movement we may consider something that moves and is wholly unmoved, and something that moves and is also moved. Now that is which moves and is wholly unmoved, moves as an object of desire, desirable of course by that which is moved. And he shows that it moves not as desirable by the desire of concupiscence, which is the desire of sense, but as desirable by intellectual desire: wherefore he says that the first unmoved mover is desirable and intellectual. Consequently that which is moved by it, namely the heaven, is desiring and understanding in a more noble way than we are, as he proves further on. Therefore the heaven is composed, according to Aristotle's opinion, of an intellectual soul and a body. He refers to this when he says (2 De Anima) that in certain things there is the faculty and act of understanding, for instance in men, and in any other like or more noble things, namely the heaven.

Now it is clear that the heaven has not a sensitive soul, according to the opinion of Aristotle: since it would have various organs, which is not in keeping with the heaven's simplicity. In order to point this out Aristotle goes on to say that those corruptible things which have intellect have all the other powers, so as to imply that some incorruptible things, namely the heavenly bodies, have intellect without the other powers of the soul.

Therefore it cannot be said that the intellect comes into contact with the heavenly bodies through phantasms: but we must say that the intellect, by its substence, is united to the heavenly body as its form.

Consequently, since the human body is the most noble of all lower bodies, and by the equability of its temperament is most like the heaven which is free of all contrariety, it follows that in the opinion of Aristotle, the intellectual substance is united to the human body not by any phantasms, but as its form.

As regards what we have said about the heaven being animate, we have not said it as though we asserted it to be in keeping with the teaching of faith, to which it matters not whether we state it to be so or otherwise. Hence Augustine says (Enchir.): Nor do I consider it as certain whether the sun, moon, and all the stars belong to the same company, i.e. of the angels; although some think them to be bodies endowed with light, without sense or intelligence.

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE BODY IMMEDIATELY

WE are able to conclude from the foregoing that the soul is united to the body immediately, nor must we admit any medium as uniting the soul to the body; whether it be the phantasms, as Averroes maintained; or its powers, as some say; or the corporeal spirit, as others have asserted.

For it has been proved that the soul is united to the body as its form. Now a form is united to matter without any medium whatever: since to be the act of such and such a body is competent to a form by its very nature and not by anything else. Consequently neither is there anything that makes one thing out of matter and form, except the agent which reduces the potentiality to act, as Aristotle proves (8 Metaph.): for matter and form are related as potentiality and act.

It may be said however that there is a medium between the soul and the body, not in the point of being, but as regards movement and in the order of generation. As regards movement, since in the movement whereby the soul moves the body there is a certain order among moved and movers. For the soul produces all its operations through its powers, so that it moves the body by means of its power, and again the members by means of the vital spirit, and again one organ by means of another. In the order of generation dispositions to a form precede the form in matter, although they are posterior thereto in being. Consequently the body’s dispositions whereby it is rendered the proper perfectible subject of such and such a form, may in that sense be described as a medium between the soul and body.

CHAPTER LXXII

THAT THE WHOLE SOUL IS IN THE WHOLE BODY AND IN EACH PART THEREOF

FROM the same premisses we can prove that the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part thereof.

For the proper act must be in its proper perfectible subject. Now the soul is the act of an organic body, not of one organ only. Therefore it is in the whole body, and not only in one part, according to its essence whereby it is the form of the body.

And the soul is the form of the whole body in such a way as to be also the form of each part. For were it the form of the whole and not of the parts, it would not be the substantial form of that body: thus the form of a house, which is the form of the whole and not of each part, is merely an accidental form. That it is the substantial form both of the whole and of the parts, is clear from the fact that both the whole and the parts take their species from it. Wherefore, when it departs, neither whole nor parts retain the same species: for the eye or flesh of a dead person are only so called equivocally. Accordingly if the soul is the act of each part, and an act is in the thing of which it is the act, it follows that it is by its essence in each part of the body.

That this applies to the whole soul is evident. For since whole denotes relation to parts, it follows that whole is taken in various senses, according to the various meanings of parts. Now part is taken in two ways. First, forasmuch as a thing is divided according to quantity; thus two cubits is a part of three cubits. Secondly, forasmuch as a thing is divided by a division of its essence; thus form and matter are said to be parts of a composite.

Hence a whole is spoken of in reference both to quantity and to essential perfection. Now whole and part in reference to quantity are not applicable to forms save accidentally, namely in so far as they are divided when the quantitative subject is divided. On the other hand whole or part in reference to essential perfection is found in forms by their very nature. Speaking then of this kind of totality, which is applicable to forms by their very nature, it is clear regarding every form that the whole of it is in the whole (subject), and the whole of it in each part thereof: for just as whiteness is in a whole body in respect of the whole essence of whiteness, so is it in each part thereof. It is otherwise with the totality which is ascribed to forms accidentally: for in this sense we cannot say that the whole whiteness is in each part. Accordingly, if there be a form that is not divided when its subject is divided, as the souls of perfect animals, there will be no need for a distinction, since only one totality is applicable to them: and we must say absolutely that the whole of it is in each part of the body. Nor is this difficult to conceive for one who understands that the soul is not indivisible in the same way as a point, and that an incorporeal is not united to a corporeal being in the same way as bodies are united together, as we have expounded above.

Nor is it inconsistent that the soul, since it is a simple form, should be the act of parts so various. Because the matter of every form is adapted to it according to its requirements. Now the more noble and simple a form is, the greater is its power: and consequently the soul which is the noblest of the lower forms, though simple in substance, is manifold in power and has many operations. Wherefore it needs various organs in order to accomplish its operations, of which organs the various powers of the soul are said to be the acts; for instance sight of the eye, hearing of the ears, and so forth. For this reason perfect animals have the greatest variety of organs, while plants have the least.

This explains why certain philosophers have stated that the soul is in some particular part of the body: thus Aristotle (De Causa Motus Anim.) says that it is in the heart, because one of its powers is ascribed to that part of the body. For the motive power, of which Aristotle was treating in that book, is chiefly in the heart, by which the soul communicates movement and other like operations to the whole body.

CHAPTER LXXIII

THAT THERE IS NOT ONE POSSIBLE INTELLECT IN ALL MEN

FROM what has been said it is evidently shown that there is not one possible intellect of all present, future, and past men, as Averroes fancies (3 De Anima).

For it has been proved that the substance of the intellect is united to the human body as its form. Now one form cannot possibly be in more than one matter, because the proper act is produced in its proper potentiality, since they are mutually proportionate. Therefore there is not one intellect of all men.

Again. To every mover proper instruments are due, for the piper uses one kind of instrument, and the builder another. Now the intellect is compared to the body as the latter's mover, as Aristotle declares (3 De Anima). Just as, therefore, it is impossible for the builder to use the instruments of a piper, so is it impossible for the intellect of one man to be the intellect of another.

Further. Aristotle (1 De Anima) reproves the ancients for that while treating of the soul, they said nothing about its proper recipient: as though it could happen that, according to the Pythagorean fables, any soul might put on any body. It is therefore not possible for the soul of a dog to enter the body of a wolf, or for a man's soul to enter any body other than a man's. Now, the proportion between man's soul and man's body is the same as between the soul of this man and the body of this man. Consequently it is impossible for the soul of this man to enter a body other than this man's. But it is the soul of this man whereby this man understands, since according to Aristotle's opinion (3 De Anima) man understands by his soul. Therefore the intellect of this and that man is not the same.

Moreover. A thing has being and unity from the same cause: for one and being are consequent upon one another. Now every thing has being through its form. Therefore the unity of a thing is consequent upon the unity of the form. Consequently it is impossible that there should be one form of several individuals. Now the form of this individual man is his intellective soul. Therefore there cannot possibly be one intellect of all men.

If, however, it be said that the sensitive soul of this man is distinct from the sensitive soul of that one, and to that extent there is not one man, although there is one intellect; this cannot stand. For each thing's proper operation is a consequence and an indication of its species. Now just as the proper operation of an animal is sensation, so the operation proper to man is understanding, as Aristotle says (1 Ethic.). Hence it follows that just as this individual is an animal by reason of sense, according to Aristotle (2 De Anima), so is he a man by reason of that whereby he understands. But that whereby the soul,—or man through the soul—understands, is the possible intellect, as stated in 3 De Anima. Therefore this individual is a man through the possible intellect. Consequently if this man has a distinct sensitive soul from that man's, and yet not a distinct possible intellect but one and the same, it will follow that they are two animals, but not two men: which is clearly impossible. Therefore there is not one possible intellect of all men.

The said Commentator replies to these arguments (3 De Anima), by saying that the possible intellect comes into contact with us by its form, that is by the intelligible species, the subject of which is the phantasma existing in us, and which is distinct in distinct subjects. Wherefore the possible intellect is individualized in different subjects, not by reason of its substance, but by reason of its form.

It is clear from what has been said above that this reply is of no avail. For it was shown above that it is impossible for man to understand if the possible intellect merely comes thus into contact with us.

And granted that the said contact were sufficient for man to have intelligence, nevertheless the reply adduced does not solve the arguments given above. For according to the opinion in question, nothing pertaining to the intellect will be individualized according to the number of men, excepting only the phantasm. And this very phantasm will not be individualized according as it is actually understood, because thus it is in the possible intellect, and abstracted from material conditions by the active intellect. Now the phantasm, as understood potentially, does not surpass the degree of the sensitive soul. Consequently this man will still remain indistinct from that one, except as regards the sensitive soul: and there will follow the absurdity already indicated, that this and that man are not several men.

Further. Nothing derives its species through that which is in potentiality, but by that which is in act. Now the phantasm as individualized is merely in potentiality to intelligible being. Therefore this individual does not derive the species of intellective animal, that is the nature of man, from the phantasm as individualized. And consequently it will still follow that what gives the human species is not individualized in different subjects.

Again. That through which a living thing derives its species is its first and not its second perfection, as Aristotle states in 2 De Anima. But the phantasm is not the first but a second perfection; because the imagination is movement caused by sense in act, as stated in De Anima. Therefore it is not from the individual phantasm that man derives his species.

Moreover. Phantasms that are understood potentially, are of various kinds. Now that from which a thing derives its species ought to be one, since of one thing there is one species. Therefore man does not derive his species through the phantasms as individualized in various subjects, in which way they are understood potentially.

Again. That from which a man derives his species, must needs always remain the same in the same individual as long as the individual lasts: else the individual would not always be of one and the same species, but sometimes of this one, and sometimes of that one. Now the phantasms do not always remain the same in one man; but some come anew, while other previous ones pass away. Therefore the human individual neither derives his species through the phantasm, nor comes thereby into touch with the principle of his species, which is the possible intellect.

If, however, it be said that this man derives his species, not from the phantasms themselves, but from the powers in which the phantasms reside, namely those of imagination, memory, and cogitation, which latter is proper to man and is called by Aristotle (3 De Anima) the passive intellect, still the same impossibilities follow. Because, since the cogitative power has an operation only about particulars, the intentions whereof it composes and divides, and has a corporeal organ whereby it acts, it does not surpass the genus of the sensitive soul. Now man, by his sensitive soul, is not a man but an animal. Therefore it still remains that the only thing which is numbered in us is that which belongs to man as an animal.

Further. The cogitative power, since it operates through an organ, is not that whereby we understand: because understanding is not the operation of an organ. Now that whereby we understand is that by which man is man: because understanding is man's proper operation consequent upon his species. Therefore it is not by the cogitative power that this individual is a man, nor is it by this power that man differs essentially from dumb animals, as the Commentator imagines.

Further. The cogitative power is not directed to the possible intellect whereby man understands, except through its act by which the phantasms are prepared, so that by the active intellect they may be made actually intelligible, and perfect the possible intellect. Now this operation does not always remain the same in us. Consequently it is impossible for man either to be brought into contact thereby with the principle of the human species, or to receive its species therefrom. It is therefore evident that the above reply is to be utterly rejected.

Again. That by which a thing operates or acts is a principle to which the operation is a sequel not only as to its being, but also in the point of multitude or unity: since from the same heat there is only one heating or active calefaction, although to be heated or passive calefaction may be manifold, according to the diversity of things heated simultaneously by the same heat. Now the possible intellect is whereby the soul understands, as Aristotle states (3 De Anima). Consequently if the possible intellect of this and that man is one and the same in number, the act of intelligence will of necessity be one and the same in both. But this is clearly impossible: since the one operation cannot belong to different individuals. It is therefore impossible for this and that man to have the one possible intellect. And if it be said that the very act of understanding is multiplied according to the difference of phantasms; this cannot stand. For as we have stated, the one action of the one agent is multiplied only according to the different subjects into which that action passes. But understanding, willing, and the like are not actions that pass into outward matter, but remain in the agent himself, as perfections of that same agent, as Aristotle declares (9 Metaph.). Therefore one act of understanding of the possible intellect cannot be multiplied by reason of a diversity of phantasms.

Further. The phantasms are related to the possible intellect somewhat as agent to patient: in which sense Aristotle says (3 De Anima) that to understand is in a sense to be passive. Now the passiveness of the patient is differentiated according to the different forms or species of the agents, and not according to their numerical distinction. For the one passive subject is heated and dried at the same time as the result of two active causes, namely heating and drying: whereas from two heating agents there do not result two heatings in one heatable subject, but only one; unless the agents happen to differ in species. For since two heats of the same species cannot be in one subject, and movement is counted according to the term whereto, if the movement be at one time and in the same subject, there cannot be a double heating in one subject. And I say this unless there be more than one species of heat: thus in the seed there is said to be the heat of fire, of heaven, and of the soul. Wherefore the possible intellect's act of understanding is not multiplied according to the diversity of phantasms, except in respect of its understanding various species,—so that we may say that its act of understanding is different when it understands a man, and when it understands a horse—but one act of understanding these things is at the same time becoming to all men. Consequently it will still follow that the act of understanding is identically the same in this and that man.

Again. The possible intellect understands man, not as this man, but as man simply, as regards his specific nature. Now this nature is one, however much the phantasms of man be multiplied, whether in one man or in several, according to the various human individuals, which properly speaking the phantasms represent. Consequently the multiplication of phantasms cannot cause the multiplication of the possible intellect's act of understanding in respect of one species. Hence it will still follow that there is one identical act of several men.

Again. The possible intellect is the proper subject of the habit of science: because its act is to consider according to science. Now an accident, if it be one, is not multiplied except according to the subject. Consequently if there be one possible intellect of all men, it will follow of necessity that the same specific habit of science, for instance the habit of grammar, is identically the same in all men: which is unthinkable. Therefore the possible intellect is not one in all.

To this, however, they reply that the subject of the habit of science is not the possible intellect, but the passive intellect and the cogitative power.

But this cannot be. For as Aristotle proves (2 Ethic.), from like acts like habits are formed which again produce like acts. Now the habit of science is formed in us by acts of the possible intellect, and we are capable of performing the same acts according to the habit of science. Wherefore the habit of science is in the possible, not the passive, intellect.

Further. Science is about the conclusions of demonstrations: for a demonstration is a syllogism that makes us know scientifically, as Aristotle states (1 Poster.). Now the conclusions of demonstrations are universal like their premisses. Therefore science will be in the power that is cognizant of universals. Now the passive intellect is not cognizant of universals, but of particular intentions. Therefore it is not the subject of the scientific habit.

Further. This is refuted by several arguments adduced above, when we were discussing the union of the possible intellect to man.

Seemingly the fallacy of placing the habit of science in the passive intellect arose from the fact that men are observed to be more or less apt for the considerations of sciences according to the various dispositions of the cogitative and imaginative powers.

But this aptitude depends on these powers as on remote dispositions, in the same way as it depends on perfection of touch and bodily temperament; in which sense Aristotle says (2 De Anima) that men of perfect touch and of soft flesh are well apt of mind. But from the habit of science there results an aptitude for consideration as from the proximate principle of that action: because the habit of science must perfect the power whereby we understand, so that it act easily at will even as other habits perfect the powers in which they reside.

Again. The dispositions of the aforesaid powers are on the part of the object, namely of the phantasm, which on account of the goodness of these powers is prepared in such a way as easily to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect. Now the dispositions on the part of the objects are not habits, but those dispositions are, which are on the part of the powers: for the habit of fortitude is not the disposition whereby fearsome objects become objects of endurance, but a habit whereby a part of the soul, namely the irascible, is disposed to endure fearsome objects. It is consequently evident that the habit of science is not in the passive intellect, as the said Commentator asserts, but rather in the possible intellect.

Again. If there is one possible intellect for all men, it must be allowed that if, as they assert, men have been always, the possible intellect has always existed: and much more the active intellect, since the agent is more noble than the patient, as Aristotle says (3 De Anima). Now if the agent is eternal, and the recipient eternal, the things received must be eternal. Consequently the intelligible species were from eternity in the possible intellect. Hence it does not receive any intelligible species anew. But sense and imagination are not required for anything to be understood except that the intelligible species may be derived from them. Wherefore neither sense nor imagination will be necessary for understanding. And we shall come back to Plato’s opinion that we do not acquire knowledge from the senses, but that we are awakened by them to the recollection of things we knew before.

To this the said Commentator replies that the intelligible species have a twofold subject, from one of which, namely the possible intellect, they derive eternity, while from the other, the phantasm to wit, they derive newness: even as the subject of the visible species is twofold, namely the object outside the soul, and the faculty of sight.

But this reply cannot stand. For it is impossible that the action and perfection of an eternal thing should depend on something temporal. Now phantasms are temporal, being renewed daily by virtue of the senses. Consequently the intelligible species by which the possible intellect is made actual and operates cannot depend on the phantasms, as the visible species depends on things that are outside the soul.

Moreover. Nothing receives what it already has: because the recipient must needs be void of the thing received, according to Aristotle. Now the intelligible species, before my sensation or yours, were in the possible intellect, for those who were before us would not have understood, unless the possible intellect had been reduced to act by the intelligible species. Nor can it be said that these species already received into the possible intellect, have ceased to exist: because the possible intellect not only receives but also keeps what it receives; wherefore in the 3 De Anima, it is called the abode of species. Consequently species are not received from our phantasms into the possible intellect. Therefore it were useless for our phantasms to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect.

Again. The thing received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient. But the intellect is in itself above movement. Wherefore what is received into it, is received fixedly and immovably.

Further. Since the intellect is a higher power than the senses, it follows that it is more united: and for this reason we observe that one intellect exercises judgment on various kinds of sensibles which appertain to various sensitive powers. Hence we are able to gather that the operations appertaining to the various sensitive powers, are united in the one intellect. Now some of the sensitive powers receive only, for instance the senses, while some retain, as imagination and memory, wherefore they are called store-houses. It follows therefore that the possible intellect both receives and retains what it has received.

Moreover. It is useless to say that in natural things what is acquired by movement remains not but forthwith ceases to be: since the opinion of those who say that all things are ever in motion is repudiated, because movement must terminate in repose. Much less therefore can it be said that what is received into the possible intellect is not retained.

Again. If from the phantasms that are in us the possible intellect does not receive any intelligible species, because it has already received from the phantasms of those who were before us; for the same reason it receives from none of the phantasms of those who were preceded by others. But if the world is eternal, as they say, every one was preceded by some others. Consequently the possible intellect never receives any species from the phantasms. Wherefore it was useless for Aristotle to place the active intellect, in order to make the phantasms actually intelligible.

Further. It follows from this seemingly that the possible intellect needs not the phantasms in order to understand. Now we understand by the possible intellect. Neither therefore would we stand in need of phantasms in order to understand: and this is clearly false, and contrary to Aristotle’s opinion. And if it be said that for the same reason we should not need a phantasm in order to consider the things the species of which are retained in the possible intellect, even if different persons have different possible intellects:—which is contrary to Aristotle, who says that the soul by no means understands without a phantasm:—it is evident that this objection is to no purpose. For the possible intellect like every substance operates according to the mode of its nature. Now, according to the mode of its nature it is the form of the body. Wherefore it understands immaterial things indeed, but it considers them in something material. A sign of this is that in teaching universal principles we propose particular examples, so that our statements are viewed in them. Consequently the possible intellect is related in one way to the phantasm which it needs, before having the intelligible species, and in another way after receiving the intelligible species. For before, it needs it in order to receive from it the intelligible species; wherefore it stands in relation to the possible intellect as the object moving it. But after the species has been received into it, it needs the phantasm as the instrument or foundation of its species: wherefore it is related to the phantasm as efficient cause. For by the command of the intellect there is formed in the imagination a phantasm corresponding to such and such an intelligible species, and in this phantasm the intelligible species is reflected as an exemplar in the exemplate or image. Accordingly, if the possible intellect had always had the species, it would never be compared to the phantasms as the recipient to the object moving it.

Again. The possible intellect is whereby the soul and man understand, according to Aristotle. If, however, the possible intellect be one in all and eternal, it follows that in it are already received all the intelligible species of the things that are or have been known by any men whatsoever. Wherefore each one of us, who understands by the possible intellect, in fact whose act of understanding is the act itself of understanding of the possible intellect, will understand all that is or has been understood by anyone whatsoever: which is clearly false.

To this the aforesaid Commentator replies by saying that we do not understand by the possible intellect, except forasmuch as it is in contact with us through our phantasms. And since phantasms are not the same in all, nor arranged in the same way, neither is whatever one person understands, understood by another. Also this reply would seem to accord with what has been stated above. Because, even if the possible intellect is not one, we do not understand the things the species of which are in the possible intellect, without the presence of phantasms disposed for that purpose.

That this reply cannot wholly avoid the difficulty, is proved thus. When the possible intellect has been made actual by the reception of the intelligible species, it can act of itself, as Aristotle says (3 De Anima). Hence we observe that when we have once received knowledge of a thing, it is in our power to consider it again at will. Nor are we hindered on account of phantasms: because it is in our power to form phantasms adapted to the consideration that we wish to make; unless perchance there be an obstacle on the part of the organ to which the phantasm appertains, as happens in madmen and those suffering from lethargy, who cannot freely exercise their imagination and memory. For this reason Aristotle says (8 Phys.) that one who already has the habit of science, although he be considering potentially, needs no mover to reduce him from potentiality to act, except one that removes an obstacle; but is able at will to proceed to actual consideration. Now if the intelligible species of all sciences be in the possible intellect, which we must needs admit if it be one and eternal, the intellect will need phantasms in the same way as one who already has science needs them in order to consider according to that science, which also it cannot do without phantasms. Since then every man understands by the possible intellect forasmuch as it is reduced to act by the intelligible species, every man will be able to consider at will the things known in every science. This is clearly false, for thus no one would need a teacher in order to acquire a science. Therefore the possible intellect is not one and eternal.

CHAPTER LXXIV

OF THE OPINION OF AVICENNA, WHO ASSERTED THAT INTELLIGIBLE FORMS ARE NOT PRESERVED IN THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

THE position of Averroes, however, seems to clash with the arguments given above. For he says in his book De Anima that the intelligible species do not remain in the possible intellect, except when they are being actually understood.

He endeavours to prove this, because, as long as the apprehended forms remain in the apprehensive power, they are actually apprehended; since sense is made actual through being identified with the thing actually sensed, and likewise the intellect when actual is identified with the thing actually understood. Hence, seemingly, whenever sense or intellect becomes one with the thing sensed or understood, through having its form, there is actual apprehension through sense or intellect. And he says that the powers which preserve the forms that are not actually apprehended, are not apprehensive powers, but store-houses of the apprehensive faculties; for instance the imagination, which is the storehouse of forms apprehended by the senses, and the memory, which, according to him, is the store-house of intentions apprehended without the senses, as when the sheep apprehends the enmity of the wolf. And it so happens that these powers preserve forms which are not actually apprehended, inasmuch as they have certain corporeal organs wherein forms are received in a manner akin to apprehension. For which reason the apprehensive power by turning to these store-houses apprehends actually. Whence he concludes that it is impossible for the intelligible species to be preserved in the possible intellect, except while it understands actually. It follows then—either that the intelligible species themselves are preserved in some corporeal organ or some power having a corporeal organ,—or else that intelligible forms exist of themselves, and that our possible intellect is compared to them as a mirror to the things which are seen in a mirror;—or again that whenever the possible intellect understands actually, the intelligible species are infused anew into the possible intellect by a separate agent. Now the first of these three is impossible, because forms existing in powers which use corporeal organs are only potentially intelligible: while the second is the opinion of Plato, which Aristotle refutes in his Metaphysics. Wherefore he concludes by accepting the third, namely that whenever we understand actually, the intelligible species are infused into our possible intellect by the active intellect, which he asserts to be a separate substance.

And if anyone argues against him that then there is no difference between a man when he first learns, and when afterwards he wishes to consider actually what he has previously learnt, he replies that to learn is merely to acquire the perfect aptitude for uniting oneself with the active intelligence so as to receive the intelligible form therefrom. Wherefore before learning there is in man a mere potentiality for such a reception, and to learn is as it were the potentiality adapted.

Moreover, it would seem to be in agreement with this position, that Aristotle in his book De Memoria, proves that the memory is not in the intellective faculty, but in the sensitive part of the soul. Whence it follows, seemingly, that the preserving of the species does not belong to the intellective part.

Nevertheless, if we consider it carefully, this position, as regards its origin, differs little or not at all from that of Plato. For Plato asserted that intelligible forms are separate substances, from which knowledge flows into our souls: while he (Avicenna) affirms that knowledge flows into our souls from one separate substance which, according to him, is the active intellect. Now it matters not, as regards the manner of acquiring knowledge, whether our knowledge be caused by one or several separate substances, since in either case it follows that our knowledge is not caused by sensible objects: whereas the contrary is proved by the fact that a person who lacks one sense, lacks also the knowledge of those sensibles that are known through that sense.

Moreover, the statement that through considering singulars which are in the imagination, the possible intellect is enlightened with the light of the active intellect so as to know the universal: and that the actions of the lower powers, namely of the imagination, memory, and cogitative powers, adapt the soul to receive the emanation of the active intellect is a pure invention. For we see that our soul is the more disposed to receive from separate substances, according as it is further removed from corporeal and sensible things: since by withdrawing from that which is below one approaches to that which is above. Therefore it is not likely that the soul is disposed to receive the influence of a separate intelligence, by considering corporeal phantasms.

Plato, however, was more consistent with the principle on which his position was based. Because he held that sensibles do not dispose the soul to receive the influence of separate forms, but merely arouse the intellect to consider the things the knowledge of which it had received from an external cause. For he maintained that knowledge of all things knowable was caused in our souls from the outset by separate forms; hence he said that to learn is a kind of remembering. In fact this is a necessary consequence of his position: because, since separate substances are immovable and unchangeable, the knowledge of things is always reflected from them in our soul, which is capable of that knowledge.

Moreover. That which is received in a thing is therein according to the mode of the recipient. Now the being of the possible intellect is more stable than the being of corporeal matter. Therefore, since forms that flow into corporeal matter from the active intelligence are, according to him, preserved in that matter, much more are they preserved in the possible intellect.

Again. Intellective knowledge is more perfect than sensitive. Wherefore, if there is something to preserve things apprehended in sensitive knowledge, a fortiori will this be the case in intellective knowledge.

Again. We find that when, in a lower order of powers, various things belong to various powers, in a higher order they belong to one: thus the common sense apprehends the objects sensed by all the proper senses. Hence to apprehend and to preserve, which, in the sensitive part of the soul, belong to different powers, must needs be united in the highest power, namely the intellect.

Further. The active intelligence, according to him, causes all scientific knowledge. Wherefore if to learn is merely to be adapted to union with the active intelligence, he who learns one science, does not learn that one more than another: which is clearly false.

It is also clear that this position is in conflict with the opinion of Aristotle, who says (3 De Anima) that the possible intellect is the abode of the species: which is the same as to say that it is the store-house of intelligible species, to use the words of Avicenna.

Again. He adds further on that, when the possible intellect acquires knowledge, it is capable of acting by itself, although it understand not actually. Therefore it needs not the influence of any higher agent.

He also says (8 Phys.) that before learning, man is in essential potentiality to knowledge, and consequently needs a mover by which to be reduced to actuality; whereas after he has already learnt, he needs no mover per se. Therefore he does not need the influence of the active intellect.

He also says (3 De Anima) that the phantasms are to the possible intellect what sensibles are to the senses. Wherefore it is clear that the intelligible species result in the possible intellect from the phantasms and not from a separate substance.

As to the arguments which would seem to favour the contrary it is not difficult to solve them. For the possible intellect is in perfect act in respect of the intelligible species, when it considers actually; but when it does not actually consider, it is not in perfect act, but is in a state between potentiality and act. This is what Aristotle says (3 De Anima), namely that when this part, the possible intellect to wit, is identified with a thing, it is said to know it actually. And this happens when it is capable of acting by itself. Even thus it is also somewhat in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning or discovering.

The memory is assigned to the sensitive part, because it is of something as conditioned by a determinate time, for it is only of what is past. Consequently, since it does not abstract from singular conditions, it does not belong to the intellective part which is of universals. Yet this does not preclude the possible intellect being able to preserve intelligibles which abstract from all particular conditions.

CHAPTER LXXV

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS WHICH WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THE UNITY OF THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT

WE must now show the inefficacy of such arguments as are adduced to prove the unity of the possible intellect.

For seemingly every form that is one specifically and many in number is individualized by matter: since things that are one in species and many in number, agree in form and differ in matter. Wherefore if the possible intellect is multiplied numerically in different men, whereas it is one in species, it must needs be individualized in this and that man by matter. This is not however by matter which is a part of the intellect itself, because then its reception would be of the same kind as that of primary matter, and it would receive individual forms; which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. It follows, therefore, that it is individualized by matter which is the human body of which it is supposed to be the form. Now every form that is individualized by matter whereof it is the act, is a material form. Because the being of a thing must needs depend on that from which it has its individuality: for just as common principles belong to the essence of the species, so individualizing principles belong to the essence of this particular individual. Hence it follows that the possible intellect is a material form: and consequently that it neither receives anything nor operates without a corporeal organ. And this again is contrary to the nature of the possible intellect. Therefore the possible intellect is not multiplied in different men, but is one for all.

Again. If there were a different possible intellect in this and that man, it would follow that the species understood is numerically distinct in this and that man, though one specifically: for, since the possible intellect is the proper subject of species actually understood, if there be many possible intellects, the intelligible species must needs be multiplied numerically in different intellects. Now species or forms that are the same specifically and different numerically, are individual forms. But these cannot be intelligible, since intelligibles are universal, not particular. Therefore it is impossible for the possible intellect to be multiplied in different human individuals: and consequently it must be one in all.

Again. The master imparts the knowledge that he possesses to his disciple. Either, then, he imparts the same knowledge numerically, or he imparts a knowledge that is different numerically but not specifically. The latter is apparently impossible, since then the master would cause his knowledge to be in his disciple, as he causes his form to be in another by begetting one like to him in species; and this would seem to apply to material agents. It follows, therefore, that he causes the same knowledge numerically to be in his disciple. But this would be impossible unless there were one possible intellect for both. Therefore seemingly there must needs be but one possible intellect for all men.

Nevertheless, just as the aforesaid position is void of truth, as we have proved, so the arguments adduced in support thereof are easy of solution.

For we contend that while the possible intellect is specifically one in different men, it is nevertheless many numerically: yet so as not to lay stress on the fact that the parts of a man do not by themselves belong to the genus or species, but only as principles of the whole. Nor does it follow that it is a material form dependent, as to its being, on the body. For just as it is competent to the human soul in respect of its species to be united to a body of a particular species, so this particular soul differs only numerically from that one through having a habitude to a numerically different body. Thus human souls are individualized,—and consequently the possible intellect also which is a power of the soul,—in relation to the bodies, and not as though their individuality were caused by their bodies.

His second argument fails through not distinguishing between that whereby one understands, and that which is understood. For the species received into the intellect is not that which is understood. Because, since all arts and sciences are about things understood, it would follow that all sciences are about species existing in the possible intellect. And this is clearly false, for no science takes any consideration of such things except Logic and Metaphysics. Nevertheless whatever there is in all the sciences is known through them. Consequently in the process of understanding the species received into the possible intellect is as the thing by which one understands, and not as that which is understood: even as the coloured image in the eye is not that which is seen, but that by which we see. On the other hand that which is understood is the very essence of the things existing outside the soul, even as things outside the soul are seen by corporeal sight: since arts and sciences were devised for the purpose of knowing things as existing in their respective natures.

Nor does it follow that, because science is about universals, universals are subsistent of themselves outside the soul, as Plato maintained. For, although true knowledge requires that knowledge correspond to things, it is not necessary that knowledge and thing should have the same mode of being. Because things that are united in reality are sometimes known separately: thus a thing is at once white and sweet, yet sight knows only the whiteness, and taste only the sweetness. So too the intellect understands a line existing in sensible matter, apart from the sensible matter, although it can also understand it with sensible matter. Now this difference occurs according to the difference of intelligible species received into the intellect: for the species is sometimes an image of quantity alone, and sometimes is an image of a quantitative sensible substance. In like manner, although the generic and specific natures are never save in particular individuals, yet the intellect understands the specific and generic natures without understanding the individualizing principles: and this is to understand universals. And thus these two are not incompatible, namely that universals do not subsist outside the soul, and that the intellect, in understanding universals, understands things that are outside the soul. That the intellect understands the generic or specific nature apart from the individualizing principles results from the condition of the intelligible species received into it, for it is rendered immaterial by the active intellect, through being abstracted from matter and material conditions whereby a particular thing is individualized. Consequently the sensitive powers are unable to know universals: because they cannot receive an immaterial form, since they always receive in a corporeal organ.

Therefore it does not follow that the intelligible species is numerically one in this and that person who understand: for the result of this would be that the act of understanding in this and that person is numerically one, since operation follows the form which is the principle of the species. But in order that there be one thing understood, it is necessary that there be an image of one and the same thing. And this is possible if the intelligible species be numerically distinct: for nothing prevents several distinct images being made of one thing, and this is how one man is seen by several. Hence it is not incompatible with the intellect’s knowledge of the universal that there be several intelligible species in several persons. Nor does it follow from this, if intelligible species be several in number and specifically the same, that they are not actually intelligible but only potentially, like other individual things. For individuality is not incompatible with actual intelligibility: since it must be admitted that both possible and active intellects are individual things, if we suppose them to be separate substances, not united to the body and subsistent of themselves, and yet they are intelligible. But it is materiality which is incompatible with intelligibility: a sign of which is that for forms of material things to be actually intelligible, they need to be abstracted from matter. Consequently in those things in which individualization is effected by particular signate matter, the things individualized are not actually intelligible; whereas if individualization is not the result of matter, nothing prevents things that are individual from being actually intelligible. Now intelligible species, like all other forms, are individualized by their subject which is the possible intellect. Wherefore, since the possible intellect is not material, it does not deprive of actual intelligibility the species which it individualizes.

Further. In sensible things, just as individuals are not actually intelligible if there be many in one species, for instance horses or men, so neither are those individuals which are alone in their species, as this particular sun or this particular moon. Now species are individualized in the same way by the possible intellect, whether there be several possible intellects or one; whereas they are not multiplied in the same way in the one species. Therefore it matters not, as regards the actual intelligibility of the species received into the possible intellect, whether there be one or several possible intellects in all.

Again. The possible intellect, according to the same Commentator, is the last in the order of intelligible substances, which in his opinion are several. Nor can it be denied that some of the higher substances are cognizant of the things which the possible intellect knows: since, as he says himself, the forms of the effects caused by the movement of a sphere are in the movers of the spheres. Hence it will still follow that, even if there be one possible intellect, the intelligible forms are multiplied in different intellects. And although we have stated that the intelligible species received into the possible intellect, is not that which is understood, but that whereby one understands, this does not prevent the intellect, by a kind of reflexion, from understanding itself and its act of intelligence, and the species whereby it understands. In fact it understands its act of intelligence in two ways: first in particular, for it understands that it understands in a particular instance; secondly, in general, in as much as it argues about the nature of its act. Consequently it understands both the intellect and the intelligible species in like manner in two ways: both by perceiving its own existence and that it has an intelligible species, which is a kind of particular knowledge, and by considering its own nature and that of the intelligible species, which is a kind of universal knowledge. In this latter sense we treat of the intellect and things intelligible in sciences.

From what has been said the solution to the third argument is also evident. For his statement that knowledge in the disciple and in the master is numerically one, is partly true and partly false. It is numerically one as regards the thing known, but not as regards the intelligible species whereby it is known, nor again as regards the habit itself of knowledge. And yet it does not follow that the master causes knowledge in the disciple in the same way as fire generates fire: since things are not in the same way generated by nature as by art. For fire generates fire naturally, by reducing matter from potentiality to the act of its form, whereas the master causes knowledge in his disciple after the manner of art, since to this purpose is assigned the art of demonstration which Aristotle teaches in the Posterior Analytics, for a demonstration is a syllogism that makes us know.

It must, however, be observed, in accordance with Aristotle’s teaching in 7 Metaph., that there are some arts in which the matter is not an active principle productive of the art’s effect; such is the art of building, since in timber and stone there is not an active force tending to the production of a house, but merely a passive aptitude. On the other hand there is an art the matter of which is an active principle tending to produce the effect of the art; such is the medical art, since in the sick body there is an active principle conducive to health. Consequently the effect of an art of the first kind is never produced by nature but is always the result of the art. But the effect of an art of the second kind is the result both of art, and of nature without art: for many are healed by the action of nature without the art of medicine. In those things that can be done both by art and by nature, art copies nature; for if a person is taken ill through a cold cause, nature cures him by heating. Now the art of teaching is like this art. For in him that is taught there is an active principle conducive to knowledge, namely the intellect, and those things which are naturally understood, namely first principles. Wherefore knowledge is acquired in two ways, both by discovery without teaching, and by teaching. Consequently the teacher begins to teach in the same way as the discoverer begins to discover, namely by offering to the disciple’s consideration principles known by him, since all learning results from pre-existing knowledge; and by drawing conclusions from those principles; and again by proposing sensible examples, from which there result, in the disciple’s mind, the phantasms which are necessary that he may understand. And since the outward action of the teacher would have no effect, without the inward principle of knowledge, which is in us from God, hence among theologians it is said that man teaches by outward ministration, but God by inward operation: even so the physician is said to minister to nature when he heals. Accordingly knowledge is caused in the disciple by his master, not by way of natural action, but after the manner of art, as stated.

Further. Since the same Commentator places the habits of science in the passive intellect as their subject, the unity of the possible intellect nowise causes numerical unity of knowledge in disciple and master. For it is evident that the passive intellect is not the same in different individuals, since it is a material power. Consequently this argument consistently with his position is not to the point.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THAT THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS NOT A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE BUT PART OF THE SOUL

FROM the foregoing we may also conclude that neither is there one active intellect in all, as Alexander and Avicenna maintained, who do not hold that there is one possible intellect in all.

For since agent and recipient are mutually proportionate, it follows that to every patient there corresponds a proper agent. Now the possible intellect is compared to the active as the proper patient or recipient of the latter, since it is related to it as art to matter, as stated in 3 De Anima. Hence if the possible intellect is part of the human soul, and multiplied according to the number of individuals, as we have shown, the active intellect also will be the like, and not one for all.

Again. The active intellect makes the species to be actually intelligible, not that itself may understand by them, especially as a separate substance, since it is not in potentiality, but that the possible intellect may understand by them. Therefore it does not make them to be otherwise than as required by the possible intellect in order that it may understand. But it makes them to be such as it is itself, since every agent produces its like. Therefore the active intellect is proportionate to the possible intellect: and consequently, since the possible intellect is a part of the soul, the active intellect is not a separate substance.

Moreover. Just as primary matter is perfected by natural forms which are outside the soul, so the possible intellect is perfected by forms actually understood. Now natural forms are received into primary matter, not by the action of only one separate substance, but by the action of a form of the same kind,—of a form, namely, that is in matter: even as this particular flesh is begotten through a form that is in this particular flesh and bones, as Aristotle proves in 7 Metaph. Consequently if the possible intellect is a part of the soul and not a separate substance, as we have shown, the active intellect, by whose action the intelligible species result therein, will not be a separate substance, but an active force of the soul.

Again. Plato held that knowledge in us is caused by ideas, which he affirmed to be separate substances; and Aristotle refutes this opinion in 1 Metaph. Now it is clear that our knowledge depends on the active intellect as its first principle. If, then, the active intellect were a separate substance, there would be little or no difference between this opinion and Plato's which was refuted by the Philosopher.

Again. If the active intellect be a separate substance, its action must needs be continuous and uninterrupted: or at least we must say that it is not continued or interrupted at our will. Now its action is to make phantasms actually intelligible. Either, therefore, it will do this always, or not always. If not always, this will nevertheless not be at our discretion. Now, we understand actually when the phantasms are made actually intelligible. Consequently it follows that either we always understand, or that it is not in our power to understand actually.

Further. A separate substance stands in the same relation to all the phantasms that are in any men whatsoever: even as the sun stands in the same relation to all colours. Now sensible things are perceived by those who know as well as by those who are ignorant: and consequently the same phantasms are in both. Hence they will be made intelligible by the active intellect in either case: and consequently both will equally understand.

It may be said, however, that the active intellect for its own part is always active, but that the phantasms are not always made actually intelligible, but only when they are disposed thereto. Now, they are disposed thereto by the act of the cogitative power, the use of which is in our power. Consequently to understand actually is in our power. It is for this reason that not all men understand the things whereof they have the phantasms, since not all have the requisite act of the cogitative power, but only those who are instructed and accustomed.

Nevertheless this reply is seemingly not quite sufficient. For this disposition to understand, which is effected by the cogitative power, must either be a disposition of the possible intellect to receive intelligible forms, emanating from the active intellect, as Avicenna maintains, or a disposition of the phantasms to be made actually intelligible, as Averroes and Alexander assert. Now, the former would seem improbable. Because the possible intellect by its very nature is in potentiality with regard to species actually intelligible, wherefore it stands in the same relation to them as a transparent body to light or to coloured images. And if a thing by its very nature is capable of receiving a certain form, it needs no further disposition to that form: unless perchance it contain contrary dispositions, as the matter of water is disposed to the form of air by the removal of cold and density. But there is nothing contrary in the possible intellect to prevent it receiving any intelligible species whatsoever: since the intelligible species even of contraries are not themselves contrary in the intellect, as Aristotle proves in 7 Metaph., for one is the reason for knowing the other. And the falsity which is incidental to the intellect's judgment in composition and division, results not from the presence in the intellect of certain things understood, but from its lack of certain things. Therefore the possible intellect, for its own part, requires no preparation in order to receive the intelligible species emanating from the active intellect.

Further. Colours which light has made actually visible, without fail impress their likeness on the diaphanous body and consequently on the sight. Consequently if the phantasms themselves on which the active intellect has shed its light did not impress their likeness on the possible intellect, but merely disposed it to receive them, the phantasms would not stand in the same relation to the possible intellect as colours to the sight, as Aristotle asserts.

Again. According to this the phantasms, and consequently the senses would not be of themselves necessary for us to understand; but only accidentally, as it were inciting and preparing the possible intellect to receive. This is part of the Platonist theory, and contrary to the order which Aristotle assigns to the generation of art and science, in the first Book of Metaphysics and the last Book of Posterior Analytics; where he says that memory results from sensation; experience from many memories; from many memories the universal apprehension which is the beginning of science and art. This opinion of Avicenna, however, is in keeping with what he says about the generation of natural things. For he holds that all lower agents, by their actions, prepare matter to receive the forms which emanate from a separate active intelligence into their respective matters. Hence also, for the same reason, he holds that the phantasms prepare the possible intellect; and that the intelligible forms emanate from a separate substance.

In like manner, if it be supposed that the active intellect is a separate substance, it seems unreasonable that the phantasms should be prepared by the cogitative power in order that they be actually intelligible and move the possible intellect. For this is seemingly in keeping with the opinion of those who say that the lower agents merely dispose to the ultimate perfection, and that this ultimate perfection is caused by a separate agent: which is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle in 7 Metaph. For it would seem that the human soul is not less perfectly equipped for understanding than the lower things of nature for their proper operations.

Moreover. In this lower world the more noble effects are produced not by higher agents alone, but also require agents of their own genus, for the sun and man generate a man. In like manner we observe that in other perfect animals, some of the lower animals are generated by the mere action of the sun, without an active principle of their own genus; for instance animals engendered of putrefaction. Now understanding is the most noble effect that takes place in this lower world. Therefore it is not enough to ascribe it to a remote agent, unless we suppose it to have also a proximate cause. This argument however does not avail against Avicenna, because he holds that any animal can be generated without seed.

Again. The intention of the effect shows the agent. Wherefore animals engendered of putrefaction are not intended by a lower nature but only by a higher, since they are produced by a higher nature only: for which reason Aristotle (7 Metaph.) says that they are effects of chance. Whereas animals that are produced from seed, are intended both by the higher and the lower nature. But this effect which is to abstract universal forms from the phantasms, is in our intention, and not merely in the intention of the remote agent. Therefore it follows that in us there must be a proximate principle of such an effect: and this is the active intellect. Therefore it is not a separate substance, but a power of our soul.

Again. The nature of every mover includes a principle sufficient for the natural operation thereof: and if this operation consists in an action, that nature includes an active principle, as appears in the powers of the nutritive soul of plants; while if this operation is a passion, it includes a passive principle, as appears in the sensitive powers of animals. Now man is the most perfect of all lower movers. And his proper and natural operation is to understand: which is not completed without some passion, in so far as the intellect is passive to the intelligible; nor again without action, in so far as the intellect makes things that are potentially intelligible to be intelligible actually. Therefore the respective principles of both, namely the active and possible intellects, must be in man's nature and neither of these must be separate, as to its being, from the soul of man.

Again. If the active intellect be a separate substance, it is evident that it is above man's nature. Now an operation which man performs by the power alone of a higher substance is a supernatural operation; such as the working of miracles, prophesying, and other like things which men do by God's favour. Since, then, man cannot understand except by the power of the active intellect, if the active intellect be a separate substance, it will follow that intelligence is not a natural operation to man: and consequently man cannot be defined as being intellectual and rational.

Further. Nothing operates save by a power that is in it formally: wherefore Aristotle (2 De Anima) proves that the thing whereby we live and sense is a form and an act. Now both actions, namely of the active and possible intellects, are competent to man: for man abstracts from phantasms, and receives in his mind actual intelligibles; since otherwise we should not have become cognizant of these actions unless we experienced them in ourselves. Therefore the principles to which these actions are ascribed, namely the possible and active intellects, must be powers formally existing in us.

If, however, it be said that these actions are ascribed to man in so far as the aforesaid intellects are in conjunction with us, as Averroes says, it has already been shown that the possible intellect's conjunction with us, if it be a separate substance, such as he holds it to be, does not suffice for us. to understand by its means. The same evidently applies to the active intellect. For the active intellect is to the intelligible species that are received into the possible intellect, as art to the artificial forms which art produces in matter, as appears from the example given by Aristotle in 3 De Anima. Now art-forms do not acquire the action of art, but only a formal likeness, so that neither can the subject of these forms exercise the action of the craftsman. Therefore neither can man exercise the operation of the active intellect, through the intelligible species being made actual in him by the active intellect.

Again. A thing that cannot set about its proper operation unless it be moved by an outward principle, is moved to operate rather than moves itself: wherefore irrational animals are moved to operate rather than move themselves, since their every operation depends on the outward principle which moves them: for their sense, moved by the outward sensible, makes an impression on their imagination, and thus there is an orderly process in all their powers down to the motive powers. Now man's proper operation is intelligence, the first principle whereof is the active intellect which produces the intelligible species, to which in a sense the possible intellect is passive, and this being made actual moves the will. If, then, the active intellect is a substance outside man, all man's operation depends on an outward principle: and consequently he will not move himself but will be moved by another. Hence he will not be the master of his own operations, nor will he be deserving of praise or blame; and there will be an end to all moral science and social intercourse, which is absurd. Therefore the active intellect is not a substance separate from man.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE POSSIBLE AND ACTIVE INTELLECT TO CONCUR IN THE ONE SUBSTANCE OF THE SOUL

PERHAPS it will seem impossible to someone that one and the same substance, namely, that of our soul, should be in potentiality to all intelligibles,—which belongs to the possible intellect,—and should make them actual,—which belongs to the active intellect: since a thing acts not as it is in potentiality, but as it is in act. Wherefore it does not appear how the active and possible intellect can concur in the one substance of the soul.

If, however, one look into the matter rightly, nothing impossible or difficult follows. For nothing hinders one thing from being in one respect in potentiality with regard to some other thing, and in act in another respect, as we observe in natural things: for air is actually damp and potentially dry, whereas with earth it is the other way about. Now we find this same comparison between the intellective soul and the phantasms. For the soul has something in act to which the phantasm is in potentiality, and is in potentiality to something which is found actually in the phantasms. Because the substance of the human soul has immateriality, and, as is evident from what has been said, it consequently has an intellectual nature, since such is every immaterial substance. Yet it does not follow that it is likened to this or that determinate thing, which is required in order that our soul may know this or that thing determinately: for all knowledge results from the likeness of the known in the knower. Hence the intellective soul remains itself in potentiality to the determinate likenesses of things that can be known by us, and these are the natures of sensible things. It is the phantasms that offer us these determinate natures of sensible things: which phantasms, however, have not yet acquired intelligible being,—since they are images of sensible things even as to material conditions, which are the individual properties,—and moreover are in material organs. Wherefore they are not actually intelligible. And yet, since in the individual man whose image the phantasms reflect it is possible to conceive the universal nature apart from all the individualizing conditions, they are intelligible potentially. Accordingly they have intelligibility potentially, though they are actually determinate as images of things: whereas it was the other way about in the intellective soul. Consequently there is in the intellective soul an active power in respect of the phantasms, rendering them actually intelligible, and this power of the soul is called the active intellect. There is also in the soul a power that is in potentiality to the determinate images of sensible things; and this is the power of the possible intellect.

Nevertheless that which is found in the soul differs from what is found in natural agents. Because in the latter one thing is in potentiality to something according to the same mode as it is actually found in another: for the matter of the air is in potentiality to the form of water in the same way as it is in water. Hence natural bodies which have a common matter are mutually active and passive in the same order. Whereas the intellective soul is not in potentiality to the likenesses of things which are in the phantasms, according to the mode in which they are there, but according as these images are raised to something higher, by being abstracted from the individualizing conditions of matter, so that they become actually intelligible. Consequently the action of the active intellect on the phantasm precedes the reception by the possible intellect. Wherefore the pre-eminence of the action is ascribed, not to the phantasms but to the active intellect. For this reason Aristotle says that it is compared to the possible intellect as art to matter.

We should have a perfect example of this if the eye, besides being a diaphanous body and receptive of colours, had sufficient light to make colours actually visible; even as certain animals are said to throw sufficient light on objects by the light of their eyes, for which reason they see more by night and less by day, because their eyes are weak, since they are moved by a dim, and confused by a strong light. There is something like this in our intellect forasmuch as with regard to things most manifest it is as the eye of the owl with regard to the sun: so that the little intellectual light which is connatural to us is sufficient for our act of intelligence.

It is clear that the intellectual light connatural to our soul suffices to cause the action of the active intellect, if we consider why it is necessary to place an active intellect in the soul. For the soul was found to be in potentiality to intelligibles, as the senses to sensibles: since just as we do not always sense, so neither do we always understand. Now these intelligibles which the human intellective soul understands were asserted by Plato to be intelligible of themselves, namely ideas: wherefore it was unnecessary for him to admit an active intelligence in respect of intelligibles. But if this were true, it would follow that the more things are intelligible of themselves, the more would they be understood by us. Yet this is clearly false: because the nearer things are to our senses the more intelligible are they to us, though in themselves they are less intelligible. Consequently Aristotle was moved to assert that those things which are intelligible to us, are not certain things that are intelligibles in themselves, but that they are made intelligible from sensibles. Hence he had to place a power which would do this; and this is the active intellect. Wherefore the reason for placing the active intellect is that it may make intelligibles proportionate to us. Now this does not exceed the mode of the intellectual light connatural to us. Therefore nothing hinders us from ascribing the action of the active intellect to the light of our soul, and especially since Aristotle compares the active intellect to a light.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THAT ARISTOTLE’S OPINION CONCERNING THE ACTIVE INTELLECT WAS NOT THAT IT IS A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE, BUT RATHER THAT IT IS PART OF THE SOUL

SINCE however some agree with the above opinion in the belief that it reflects the mind of Aristotle, we must show from his words that in his opinion the active intellect is not a separate substance.

For he says, in the first place, that just as in every nature there is something like the matter in every genus, which is in potentiality to all that comes under that genus; while there is also a cause like the efficient cause, as art in relation to matter, so must these differences be in the soul. The latter, namely that which is as matter in the soul, is the (possible) intellect wherein all things intelligible are made: whereas the former, which is as the efficient cause in the soul, is the intellect by which we make all things (namely actually intelligible), and this is the active intellect, which is like a habit, and not a power. In what sense he calls the active intellect a habit, he explains by adding that it is as a light, since in a manner light makes potential colours to be colours actually, in so far, to wit, as it makes them to be actually visible: because this is what is ascribed to the active intellect in regard to intelligibles.

From this we gather that the active intellect is not a separate substance but rather a part of the soul: for he says explicitly that the possible and active intellect are differences of the soul and that they are in the soul. Therefore neither of them is a separate substance.

Again. His argument proves this also. Because in every nature wherein we find potentiality and act, there is something by way of matter that is in potentiality to the things of that genus, and something by way of agent, that reduces the potentiality to act: even as in the products of art, there is art and matter. Now the intellective soul is a nature in which we find potentiality and act, since sometimes it is actually understanding and sometimes potentially. Therefore in the nature of the intellective soul there is something by way of matter, that is in potentiality to all intelligibles, and this is called the possible intellect, and there is something by way of efficient cause which makes all things actual and is called the active intellect. Consequently both intellects, according to the argument of Aristotle, are in the nature of the soul, and are not something separate as to being from the body of which the soul is the act.

Moreover. Aristotle says that the active intellect is like a habit that is a light. Now a habit does not designate something existing by itself, but something belonging to one who has it (habentis). Therefore the active intellect is not a substance existing separately by itself, but is part of the human soul.

The text of Aristotle, however, does not mean that the effect of the active intellect may be described as a habit, as though the sense were: The active (intellect) makes man to understand all things, which is like a habit. For the meaning of habit, as the commentator Averroes says on this very passage, is that he who has the habit understands by that which is proper to him, by himself, and whenever he will, without any need therein of something extrinsic: since he explicitly likens to a habit, not the effect itself, but the intellect by which we make all things. And yet we are not to understand that the active intellect is a habit in the same way as a habit is in the second species of quality, in which sense some have said that the active intellect is the habit of principles. Because this habit of principles is derived from sensibles, as Aristotle proves (2 Poster.); and consequently it must needs be the effect of the active intellect, to which it belongs to make actually intelligible the phantasms that are understood potentially. But habit is to be taken as contrasted with privation and potentiality: in which sense every form and act may be called a habit. This is evident since he asserts that the active intellect is a habit in the same way as light is a habit.

After this he adds that this, namely the active, intellect is separate, unmixed, impassible, and an actually existing substance. Now of these four conditions which he ascribes to the active intellect, he had already explicitly ascribed two to the possible intellect, namely that it is unmixed and separate. He had applied the third, namely that it is impassible, with a distinction; for he proves in the first place that it is not passible as the senses are, and afterwards he shows that, taking passion broadly, it is passive in so far as it is in potentiality to intelligibles. But as to the fourth he absolutely denies it of the possible intellect, and says that it was in potentiality to intelligibles, and none of these things was actual before the act of intelligence. Accordingly in the first two the possible intellect agrees with the active; in the third it agrees partly, and partly differs; while in the fourth the active differs altogether from the possible intellect. He proves these four conditions of the active intellect by one argument, when he goes on to say: For the agent is always more noble than the patient, and the active principle than matter. For he had said above that the active intellect is like an efficient cause, and the possible intellect like matter. Now by this middle proposition the two first conditions are proved, thus: “The agent is more noble than the patient and matter. But the possible intellect, which is as patient and matter, is separate and untrammelled, as proved above. Much more therefore is the agent.” The others are proved by this middle proposition thus: “The agent is more noble than the patient and matter, in that it is compared thereto as agent and actual being to patient and potential being. Now, the possible intellect is, in a sense, patient and potential being. Therefore the active intellect is a non-passive agent and an actual being.” And it is evident that neither from these words of Aristotle can we gather that the active intellect is a separate substance: but that it is separate in the same sense as he had already said of the possible intellect, namely as not having an organ. When he says that it is an actually existing substance, this is not inconsistent with the substance of the soul being in potentiality, as we have shown above. Then he goes on to say: Now knowledge when actual is identical with the thing: where the Commentator says that the active intellect differs from the possible, because that which understands and that which is understood are the same in the active, but not in the possible intellect. But this is clearly contrary to the meaning of Aristotle. For he had employed the same words before in speaking of the possible intellect, where he says of the possible intellect that it is intelligible as intelligibles are: since in things void of matter, understanding and that which is understood are the same, because speculative knowledge is identified with that which it speculates. For he clearly wishes to show that the possible intellect is understood like other intelligibles, from the fact that the possible intellect, as understanding actually, is the same as that which is understood. Moreover he had said a little earlier that, in a manner, the possible intellect is potentially the intelligibles, but is nothing actually before it understands, where he clearly gives one to understand that by understanding actually it becomes the intelligibles. Nor is it surprising that he should say this of the possible intellect: since he had already said this of sense and the sensible in act. For the sense becomes actual by the species actually sensed; and in like manner the possible intellect becomes actual by the intelligible species in act; and for this reason the intellect in act is said to be the intelligible itself in act. Accordingly we must say that Aristotle, after defining the possible and active intellects, begins here to describe the intellect in act, when he says that actual knowledge is the same as the thing actually known.

Afterwards he says: But that which is in potentiality, in point of time, precedes in one subject, but not altogether in point of time. Which distinction between potentiality and act is employed by him in several places: namely that act is naturally prior to potentiality, but that in point of time, potentiality precedes act in one and the same subject that is changed from potentiality to act: and yet that absolutely speaking potentiality does not precede act even in point of time, since potentiality is not reduced to act except by an act. He says, therefore, that the intellect which is in potentiality, namely the possible intellect considered as being in potentiality, precedes the intellect in act in point of time; and this, be it said, in one and the same subject. But not altogether, i.e. universally: because the possible intellect is reduced to act by the active intellect, which again is in act, as he said, by some possible intellect made actual; wherefore he said (3 Phys.) that before learning a man needs a teacher to reduce him from potentiality to act. Accordingly in these words he shows the relation of the possible intellect, as in potentiality, to the intellect in act.

Then he says: But it does not sometimes understand, and sometimes not understand. Whereby he indicates the difference between the intellect in act and the possible intellect. For he said above of the possible intellect that it does not understand always, but sometimes does not understand, when it is in potentiality to intelligibles, and sometimes understands, when, to wit, it is them actually. Now the intellect becomes actual by becoming the intelligibles, as he had already stated. Consequently it is not competent to it to understand sometimes, and sometimes not to understand.

Afterwards he adds: But that alone is separate which is (intellect) truly. This cannot apply to the active intellect, since it alone is not separate, for he had already said the same of the possible intellect. Nor can it apply to the possible intellect, since he had already said this of the active intellect. It follows, then, that it is said of that which includes both, namely the intellect in act, of which he was speaking: because this alone in our soul is separate and uses no organ, which belongs to the intellect in act, namely that part of the soul whereby we understand actually and which includes both the possible and active intellect. Wherefore he adds that only this part of the soul is immortal and everlasting, as being independent of the body, through being separate therefrom.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

FROM the foregoing, then, we can clearly show that the human soul is not corrupted when the body is corrupted.

For it was proved above that every intellectual substance is incorruptible. Now man’s soul is an intellectual substance, as we have proved. Therefore it follows that the human soul is incorruptible.

Again. Nothing is corrupted on account of that wherein its perfection consists: for these changes are contrary to one another, those namely which tend to perfection and corruption. Now the perfection of the human soul consists in a certain abstraction from the body: for the soul is perfected by knowledge and virtue; and as to knowledge it is perfected the more it considers immaterial things, while the perfection of virtue consists in man not following the passions of the body, but tempering and curbing them according to reason. Therefore the soul is not corrupted through being separated from the body.

If, however, it be said that the soul’s perfection consists in its being separated from the body as regards operation; and its corruption, in its being separated as regards being, this reply is not to the point. Because a thing’s operation points to its substance and being, since a thing acts according as it is a being, and a thing’s proper operation follows its proper nature. Wherefore the operation of a thing cannot be perfected except in so far as that thing’s substance is perfected. Hence if the soul is perfected, as to its operation, in quitting the body, its incorporeal substance will not fail in its being, through being separated from the body.

Again. That which properly perfects man in his soul is something incorruptible: because the proper operation of man, as man, is to understand; since it is in this that he differs from brutes, plants, and inanimate things. Now the object of the act of understanding is properly the universal and the incorruptible as such: and perfection should be proportionate to the perfectible. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.

Moreover. The natural appetite cannot possibly be frustrated. Now man naturally desires to exist always: which is evidenced by the fact that being is that which all things desire; and man by his intellect apprehends being not merely as now, as dumb animals do, but simply. Therefore man acquires perpetuity in regard to his soul, which apprehends being simply and for all time.

Again. Whatever is received in a thing is received therein according to the mode of that in which it is. Now the forms of things are received in the possible intellect according as they are actually intelligible. And they are actually intelligible according as they are immaterial, universal, and consequently incorruptible. Therefore the possible intellect is incorruptible. But, as we proved above, the possible intellect is part of the human soul. Therefore the human soul is incorruptible.

Again. Intelligible being is more lasting than sensible being. Now in sensible things that which is by way of first recipient, namely primary matter, is incorruptible as to its substance. Much more so therefore is the possible intellect which is the recipient of intelligible forms. Therefore the human soul also, whereof the intellect is a part, is incorruptible.

Moreover. The maker is more noble than the thing made, as also Aristotle says. But the active intellect makes things actually intelligible, as shown above. Since, then, things actually intelligible, as such, are incorruptible, much more will the active intellect be incorruptible. Therefore such is also the soul, the light of which is the active intellect, as appears from what has been already stated.

Again. No form is corrupted except either by the action of its contrary, or by the corruption of its subject, or by the failing of its cause: by the action of its contrary, as heat is destroyed by the action of cold; by the corruption of its subject, as the faculty of sight is destroyed through the destruction of the eye: and by the failing of its cause, as the light of the air fails through the sun, which was its cause, failing to be present. But the human soul cannot be destroyed by the action of a contrary, for nothing is contrary thereto, since by the possible intellect it is cognizant and receptive of all contraries. Likewise it cannot be corrupted through the corruption of its subject; for it has been proved above that the human soul is a form independent of the body as to its being. Moreover it cannot be destroyed through the failing of its cause, since it can have none but an eternal cause, as we shall show further on. Therefore the human soul can nowise be corrupted.

Again. If the soul be corrupted through the corruption of the body, it follows that its being is weakened through the body being weakened. Now if a power of the soul is weakened through the weakening of the body, this is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as the power of the soul needs a bodily organ; thus the sight is weakened, accidentally however, through the weakening of the organ. This is made clear as follows. If some weakness were essentially attached to the power, the latter would never be repaired through the organ being repaired: yet we see that, however much the power of sight may seem to be weakened, if the organ be repaired, the sight is repaired: wherefore Aristotle says (1 De Anima) that if an old man were to be given the eye of a young man, he would certainly see as well as a young man does. Accordingly, since the intellect is a power of the soul that needs no organ, as shown above, it is not weakened, either essentially or accidentally, by old age or any other bodily weakness. If, on the other hand, the operation of the intellect happen to be affected by fatigue or some hindrance on account of the weakness of the body, this is owing not to weakness of the intellect itself, but to the weakness of the powers which the intellect needs, namely of the imagination, memory, and cogitative power. It is therefore clear that the intellect is incorruptible. Consequently the human soul is also, since it is an intellective substance.

This is also proved from the authority of Aristotle. For he says (1 De Anima) that the intellect is clearly a substance and incorruptible: and it may be gathered from what has been already said that this cannot refer to a separate substance that is either the possible or the active intellect.

It also follows from the very words of Aristotle (11 Metaph.), where he says, speaking against Plato, that moving causes pre-exist, whereas formal causes are simultaneous with the things whereof they are causes: for when a man is healed, then is there health, and not before; against Plato’s statement that the forms of things exist before the things themselves. And, after saying this, he goes on to say: As to whether anything remains afterwards, this must be inquired into. For in some this is not impossible: for example, if the soul be of a certain kind, not of any kind, but if it be intellectual. From which it is clear, since he is speaking of forms, that he means that the intellect which is the form of man, remains after the matter, namely after the body.

It is also clear from the foregoing words of Aristotle that, although he states the soul to be a form, he does not assert it to be non-subsistent and therefore corruptible, as Gregory of Nyssa would have him mean: since he excludes the intellective soul from the generality of other forms, by saying that it remains after the soul, and that it is a substance.

The teaching of the Catholic Faith is in keeping with the foregoing. For it is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus: We believe that man alone has a subsistent soul, which survives even after it has put off the body, and is the life-giving source of the senses and faculties; neither does it die when the body dies, as the Arabian asserts, nor after a short interval of time, as Zeno pretends, because it is a living substance.

Hereby is set aside the error of the ungodly in whose person Solomon says (Wis. 2:2): We are born of nothing, and after this we shall be as if we had not been; and in whose person Solomon says (Eccles. 3:19): The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both is equal: as man dieth, so they also die: all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than beast. For it is clear that he speaks not in his own person but in that of the ungodly, since at the end of the book he says as though deciding the point: Before … the dust return into its earth from whence it was, and the spirit return to Him (Vulg.,—to God) Who gave it. Moreover there are innumerable passages of Holy Writ that declare the immortality of the soul.

CHAPTERS LXXX AND LXXXI

ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THAT THE SOUL IS CORRUPTED WHEN THE BODY IS CORRUPTED

CERTAIN arguments would seem to show that human souls cannot possibly remain after the body.

For if human souls are multiplied according to the multiplication of bodies, as we have proved above, it follows that when the bodies are destroyed, the souls cannot remain in their multitude. Wherefore one of two alternatives must follow: either that the human soul altogether ceases to exist; or that only one remains. And this would seem to concur with the opinion of those who state that only that which is one in all men is incorruptible, whether this be the active intellect alone, as Alexander says, or the possible besides the active intellect, according to Averroes.

Moreover. The formal ratio is the cause of specific difference. Now, if many souls remain after the corruption of bodies, they must differ from each other: because, as there is identity where there is oneness of substance, so is there difference where there are many in substance. But in souls that survive bodies there can be no difference other than formal, since they are not composed of matter and form, as we have proved above of every intellectual substance. Hence it follows that they differ specifically. And yet souls are not changed to another species by the corruption of the body, since whatever is changed from species to species is corrupted. It follows therefore that even before they were separated from their bodies, they were different in species. Now composites derive their species from their form. Consequently individual men will differ specifically. Which is absurd.

Therefore it is seemingly impossible that many souls should survive their bodies.

Again. According to those who hold the eternity of the world it would seem altogether impossible to maintain that human souls remain in their multitude after the death of he body. For if the world exists from eternity, movement is from eternity: and consequently generation also is eternal. But if generation be eternal, an infinite number of men have died before us. Consequently, if the souls of the dead remain in their multitude after death, we must say that there is actually an infinite number of souls of men already dead. But this is impossible: since the actually infinite cannot exist in nature. Therefore it follows, if the world is eternal, that souls do not remain many after death.

Again. That which accrues to a thing and departs from it without the latter being corrupted, accrues to it accidentally, for this is the definition of an accident. Hence if the soul be not corrupted when parted from the body, it would follow that the soul is united to the body accidentally. Consequently man is an accidental being, composed of soul and body. And it will follow moreover that there is no human species, since one species does not result from things united accidentally; for white man is not a species.

Moreover. There cannot possibly be a substance that has no operation. Now all operation of the soul ends with the body: which is proved by induction. For the nutritive powers of the soul operate through the bodily qualities, and through a bodily instrument, and act on the body which is perfected by the soul, is nourished and increased, and from which is severed the seed for the purpose of generation. Again, all the operations of the powers belonging to the sensitive soul are accomplished through bodily organs: some of them being accomplished with a certain bodily transmutation, for instance those which are called passions of the soul, such as love, joy, and the like. Moreover, though understanding is not an operation fulfilled through a bodily organ, yet its objects are the phantasms which stand in relation to it, as colours to the sight: wherefore, as the sight cannot see without colours, so the intellective soul cannot understand without phantasms.

Further, the soul, in order to understand, needs the powers which prepare the phantasms so as to make them actually intelligible, namely the cogitative power and the memory, which clearly cannot remain after the body, since they are acts of certain organs of the body, and operate through those organs. Hence Aristotle says that the soul does not understand without phantasms, and that it understands nothing without the passive intellect, which he calls the cogitative power, and which is corruptible. For this reason he says (1 De Anima) that man’s act of understanding is corrupted when something within him is corrupted, namely the phantasm or the passive intellect. And it is stated in 3 De Anima that after death we do not remember what we knew in life. It is accordingly evident that no operation of the soul can remain after death. Therefore neither does its substance remain, since no substance can be without operation.

Now, since these arguments lead to a false conclusion, as was shown above, we must endeavour to answer them. And, in the first place, it must be observed that whatever things have to be adapted and proportionate to one another, are together multiplied or unified, each by its own cause. Wherefore if the being of one depends on the other, its unity or multiplicity depends also thereon; otherwise it depends on some other extrinsic cause. Now form and matter need always to be mutually proportionate and naturally adapted, so to speak, because the proper act is produced in its proper matter. Consequently matter and form must always agree in point of multitude and unity. Hence if the being of the form depend on matter, its multiplication, as also its unity, depends on matter. But if not, the form must needs be multiplied according to the multiplication of the matter, that is together with matter, and in proportion thereto: yet not so that the unity or multiplicity of the very form depend on matter. Now it has been shown that the human soul is a form independent of matter as to its being. Wherefore it follows that souls are indeed multiplied according as bodies are multiplied, and yet the multiplication of bodies is not the cause of the multiplication of souls. Therefore it does not follow that the plurality of souls ceases with the destruction of bodies, as the first argument concluded.

From this the reply also to the second argument is clear. For it is not every difference of forms that causes a difference of species, but only that which is in respect of formal principles, or of a different kind of form; since it is clear that the form is essentially distinct in this and that fire, and yet neither fire nor form is specifically different. Accordingly multitude of souls separated from their bodies results from the substantial distinction of forms, since one soul is substantially distinct from another; and yet this distinction does not result from a distinction in the essential principles of the soul, nor from a different kind of soul, but from the various co-aptation of souls to bodies, because this soul is adapted to this and not to that body, and that soul to another body, and so on. And this co-aptation remains in the soul even after the body has perished, even as the soul's substance remains through being independent of the body in the point of being. For the soul according to its substance is the form of the body, else it would be united to the body accidentally, and consequently the union of body and soul would result in one thing not essentially but accidentally. Now it is as forms that souls need to be adapted to their bodies. Therefore it is clear that these same various co-aptations remain in separated souls, and consequently the plurality of souls remains also.

The third argument given above has been the occasion for some who held the world to be eternal, to fall into various strange opinions. For some granted the conclusion absolutely, and said that human souls perish altogether with their bodies. Others said that of all souls there remains some one thing separate that is common to all, namely the active intellect according to some, or besides this the possible intellect, according to others. Others however held that souls remain in their multitude after bodies, but lest they should be compelled to admit an infinite number of souls, they said that the same souls are united to different bodies after a certain time. This was the Platonists' opinion, of which we shall treat further on. Others again, avoiding all the above statements, said that it is not impossible for separate souls to be actually infinite in number. Because in things not ordered to each other to be actually infinite is to be infinite accidentally, and they hold that there is no reason not to admit this. This is the opinion of Avicenna and Algazel. We do not find it expressly stated by Aristotle to which of these opinions he adhered, although he holds explicitly the eternity of the world. The last however of the above opinions is not inconsistent with the principles laid down by him. For in 3 Phys. and 1 Cœl. et Mund., he proves that the actually infinite is impossible in natural bodies, but not in immaterial substances. Nevertheless it is certain that this question offers no difficulty to those who profess the Catholic faith, since they do not admit the world to be eternal.

Again, if the soul remain after the destruction of the body, it does not follow that it must have been accidentally united to it, as the fourth argument concluded. For an accident is described as that which may be present or absent without the corruption of the subject composed of matter and form. Now, if this be referred to the principles of the composite subject, it is found to be untrue. For it is clear that primary matter is not subject to generation and corruption, as Aristotle proves (1 Phys.). Wherefore it remains in its essence when the form departs. And yet the form was united to it not accidentally but essentially, since it was united to it in one being. Likewise the soul is united to the body in one being, as we proved above. Wherefore, though it survive the body, it is united to it essentially and not accidentally. That primary matter does not remain actually after the form except in respect of the act of another form, whereas that the human soul remains in the same act, is due to the fact that the human soul is form and act, whereas primary matter is a being in potentiality.

As to the statement put forward in the fifth argument, that no operation can remain in the soul when separated from the body, we say that it is false; since those operations remain which are not exercised through organs. Such are to understand and to will. But those operations do not remain which are performed through bodily organs, such as the operations of the nutritive and sensitive powers.

It must be observed, however, that the soul understands in a different way when separated from the body and when united to it, even as it has a different mode of existence: because a thing acts according as it is. For although the being of the soul while united to the body, is absolute and independent of the body, nevertheless the body is the lodging as it were and the subject that receives it. Wherefore in consequence its proper operation, which is to understand, though not depending on the body as though it were performed through a bodily organ, has its object in the body, namely the phantasms. Hence, as long as the soul is in the body, it cannot understand without a phantasm; neither can it remember except through the powers of cogitation and memory, by which the phantasms are prepared, as stated above. For this reason understanding, as regards this mode, as also remembering, is destroyed when the body perishes. On the other hand the separated soul has its being apart from the body. Wherefore neither will its operation, which is to understand, be performed in dependence upon certain objects existing in bodily organs, which are the phantasms; but it will understand by itself after the manner of substances wholly separate from bodies as to their being, of which we shall speak further on. From which substances, moreover, as from things higher than itself, it will be able to receive a more abundant inflow so as to understand more perfectly. We have a sign of this in the young. For the soul, the more it is withdrawn from being occupied about its own body, is rendered more apt to understand certain higher things: wherefore the virtue of temperance, which withdraws the soul from bodily pleasures, above all makes men apt in understanding. Moreover, men while asleep and not using their bodily senses, and when there is no disturbance of the humours or vapours to hinder them, are influenced by higher beings so as to perceive certain future things that surpass the purview of human reasoning: and this is much more the case with those who are in a faint or an ecstasy; forasmuch as they are the more withdrawn from the senses of the body. Nor does this happen unreasonably: because, since the human soul, as shown above, is on the boundary line of corporeal and incorporeal substances, as though it were on the horizon of eternity and time, by withdrawing from the lower world it approaches to the higher. Wherefore when it shall be wholly separated from the body, it will be perfectly likened to separate substances as to the manner of understanding and will receive their influence abundantly.

Accordingly, though our act of understanding as regards its mode in the present life ceases when the body perishes, another and higher mode of understanding will take its place.

Remembrance however, since it is an act performed through a bodily organ, as Aristotle proves in his book De Memoria et Reminiscentia, cannot remain in the soul after the body, unless remembrance be taken equivocally for the understanding of those things which the soul knew before: for the soul must needs remember what it knew in life, since the intelligible species are received indelibly into the possible intellect, as we have shown above.

With regard to the other operations of the soul, such as to love, to rejoice, and the like, we must beware of equivocation. Because sometimes they are taken for passions of the soul: and thus they are acts of the sensible appetite in respect of the irascible and concupiscible faculties, together with a certain bodily transmutation. And thus they cannot remain in the soul after death, as Aristotle proves in his book De Anima. But sometimes they are taken for a simple act of the will, that is without any passion. Wherefore Aristotle says in the seventh book of Ethics that God rejoices by one simple operation, and in the tenth book that in the contemplation of wisdom there is wonderful pleasure, and in the eighth book, he distinguishes the love of friendship from the love that is a passion. Now since the will is a power that uses no organ, as neither does the intellect, it is clear that these things, in so far as they are acts of the will, remain in the separated soul.

Hence it cannot be concluded from the foregoing arguments that man’s soul is mortal.

CHAPTER LXXXII

THAT THE SOULS OF DUMB ANIMALS ARE NOT IMMORTAL

FROM what has been said it may be clearly proved that the souls of dumb animals are not immortal.

For it has been already shown that no operation of the sensitive part can possibly be without the body. Now we cannot find in the souls of dumb animals any operation superior to those of the sensitive part, for they neither understand nor reason. This appears from the fact that all animals of the same species operate in the same way, as though moved by nature and not as operating by art: thus every swallow builds its nest, and every spider spins its web, in the same way. Therefore the souls of dumb animals have no operation that is possible without the body. Since, then, every substance has some operation, the soul of a dumb animal cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore it perishes when the body perishes.

Again. Every form that is separate from matter is actually understood: for the active intellect makes species to be actually intelligible, in so far as it abstracts them, as appears from what has been said. But, if the dumb animal's soul remains after its body has perished, it will be a form separate from matter. Therefore it will be a form actually understood. Now, in things separate from matter, that which understands is the same as that which is understood, as Aristotle says in 3 De Anima. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal, if it survive the body, will be intellectual: which is impossible.

Again. In everything that is able to attain to a certain perfection we find a natural desire for that perfection, since good is what all desire, yet so that each thing desires the good proper to it. Now, in dumb animals we do not find a natural desire for perpetual existence, except as regards perpetuity of species, inasmuch as we find in them the desire for begetting whereby the species is perpetuated, which desire is found in both plants and inanimate things, but not as regards the appetite that is proper to an animal as such, which appetite is consequent upon apprehension. For, since the sensitive soul does not apprehend except here and now, it cannot possibly apprehend perpetual existence. Neither therefore does it desire it with animal appetite. Therefore the soul of a dumb animal is not capable of perpetual existence.

Moreover. Since pleasures perfect operations, as Aristotle says in 10 Ethic., the operation of a thing is directed to that in which it takes pleasure as in an end. Now all pleasures of dumb animals are referred to the preservation of the body: for they delight not in sounds, perfumes, and sights, except in so far as they are indicative of foods or venereal matters, which are the objects of all their pleasures. Hence all their operations are directed to the preservation of their bodily existence, as their end. Therefore they have no existence apart from the body.

The teaching of the Catholic faith is in keeping with this statement. For it is said (Gen. 9) of the dumb animal’s soul: The life thereof (Vulg., of all flesh) is in the blood, as though to say: Its existence depends on the permanence of the blood. It is also said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus: We declare that man alone has a subsistent soul, that is, which has life of itself: and that the souls of dumb animals perish with the body.

Moreover, Aristotle (2 De Anima) says that the intellective part of the soul is distinguished from the other parts as incorruptible from corruptible.

This puts out of court the opinion of Plato who held that the souls even of dumb animals are immortal.

And yet it would seem possible to prove that the souls of dumb animals are immortal. For if a thing has a per se operation belonging to itself, it also is self-subsistent. Now the sensitive soul in dumb animals has a per se operation wherein the body has no part, namely to move: because a mover is composed of two parts, one of which is mover and the other moved; wherefore, since the body is something moved, it follows that the soul alone is mover: therefore it is self-subsistent. Consequently it cannot be corrupted accidentally when the body perishes: since those things alone are corrupted accidentally which have not per se being. Nor can it be corrupted per se: seeing that it has no contrary, nor is it composed of contraries. It follows therefore that it is altogether incorruptible.

The argument of Plato, whereby he proved that every soul is immortal, would seem to come to the same as this; because, to wit, the soul moves itself; and whatever moves itself must needs be immortal. For the body dies not except when it is abandoned by that which moved it; and a thing cannot abandon itself: and consequently, according to him, that which moves itself cannot die. And so he concluded that every moving soul, even that of dumb animals, is immortal. We have said that this argument comes to the same as the preceding, because, since in Plato’s opinion nothing moves unless it be moved, that which moves itself is a per se mover and therefore has a per se operation.

Again, Plato held that the sensitive soul has an operation of its own, not only in moving but also in sensing. For he declared that sensation is a movement of the soul itself which senses: and that the soul, being moved thus, moved the body to sensation. Wherefore when he defined sense he said that it is the movement of the soul through the body.

Now it is clear that these statements are false. For to sense is not to move, but to be moved: because from being potentially sentient the animal is made actually sentient through the sensible objects by which the senses are impressed. But it cannot be said that the sense is passive to the sensible in the same way as the intellect is passive to the intelligible object, so that sensation could be an operation of the soul without a bodily instrument, in the same way as understanding is. For the intellect apprehends things as abstracted from matter and material conditions which are the principles of individuality; whereas the sense does not. This is evidenced by the sense being confined to particular objects, while understanding is of universals. It is therefore clear that the senses are passive to things as existing in matter: while the intellect is not, but according as they are subject to abstraction. Therefore the passion of the intellect is without corporeal matter, whereas the passion of the senses is not.

Again. Different senses are receptive of different sensibles, sight, for instance, of colours, hearing of sounds. Now this difference clearly arises from the different dispositions of the organs: for the organ of sight needs to be in potentiality to all colours, and the organ of hearing to all sounds. But if this reception took place without any corporeal organ, the same faculty would be receptive of all sensible objects: since an immaterial power, for its own part, stands in an equal relation to all such qualities: wherefore the intellect, through not using a corporeal organ, takes cognizance of all sensible objects. Therefore there is no sensation without a corporeal organ.

Further. Sense is corrupted by excellence of its object; but the intellect is not, because he who understands higher objects of intelligence, is able to understand others, not less but more. Consequently the passion caused in the sense by the sensible differs in kind from that which is caused in the intellect by the intelligible: the passion of the intellect, occurring without a corporeal organ, while the passion of the sense is connected with a corporeal organ, the harmony of which is destroyed by the excellence of the sensible.

Plato’s statement that a soul moves itself may seem to be well founded by reason of what we observe in regard to bodies. For seemingly no body moves unless it is moved: wherefore Plato said that every mover is moved. And since we cannot go on to infinity as though every thing moved were moved by another, he stated that in each order the first mover moved itself. From this it followed that the soul, which is the first mover in the movement of animals, is something that moves itself.

But this is shown to be false, on two counts. First, because it has been proved that whatever is moved per se is a body: wherefore, since a soul is not a body, it is impossible for it to be moved save accidentally.

Secondly, because, since a mover, as such, is in act, while the thing moved, as such, is in potentiality, and since nothing can be, in the same respect, in act and potentiality; it will be impossible for the same thing to be, in the same respect, mover and moved, but if a thing is stated to move itself, one part thereof must needs be mover and the other part moved. It is in this way that an animal is said to move itself, because the soul is mover and the body moved. Since, however, Plato did not hold that the soul is a body, although he made use of the word movement which properly speaking belongs to bodies, he did not mean movement in this strict sense but referred it in a more general way to any operation: in which sense Aristotle also says (3 De Anima) that sensation and understanding are movements: but in this way movement is the act, not of that which is in potentiality but of that which is perfect. Consequently, when he said that the soul moves itself, by this he meant to say that it acts without the help of the body, whereas it is the other way about with other forms which exercise no action apart from matter: for that which heats is not heat by itself but something hot. Hence he wished to conclude that every soul which causes movement is immortal: because that which has a per se operation must needs also have per se existence.

But it has been already proved that the operation of the soul of a dumb animal, sensation to wit, cannot be without the body. And this is much more evident as regards its operation of appetite. Because all things pertaining to the appetite of the sensitive faculty, are manifestly accompanied by a certain bodily transmutation, and are known as passions of the soul.

From this it follows that not even is movement an operation of the sensitive part without an organ. For the soul of a dumb animal moves not except through sense and appetite: because the power which is said to execute movement, makes the members obedient to the command of the appetite: so that the body is perfected with powers directed to its being moved rather than with powers of moving.

It is accordingly clear that no operation of the dumb animal’s soul can be independent of the body: and from this we necessarily conclude that the dumb animal’s soul perishes with the body.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

THAT THE HUMAN SOUL BEGINS TO EXIST WITH THE BODY

SINCE, however, the same things are found to have both a beginning of being and an end of being, it may seem to some one that, since the human soul has no end of its being, neither has it had any beginning of being, but always has been. And seemingly this can be proved by the following arguments.

For that which will never cease to be, has the power to be always. And that which has the power to be always, can never be truly said not to be: since a thing's duration in existence extends as far as its power to exist. Now of everything that has begun to be it is at some time true to say that it is not. Therefore that which will never cease to be, at no time begins to be.

Further. The truth of intelligibles is not only incorruptible, but, for its own part, is eternal: because it is necessary; and whatever is necessary is eternal, since for that which necessarily is, not to be is an impossibility. Now it is from the incorruptibility of intelligible truth that the soul is proved to have incorruptible being. Therefore by similar reasoning, from its eternity we can prove the eternity of the soul.

Moreover. A thing is not perfect if it lack several of its principal parts. Now it is clear that the principal parts of the universe are intellectual substances, to which genus, as shown above, human souls belong. Consequently if every day as many human souls begin to exist as men are born, it is evident that many of its principal parts are added to the universe every day, and that it lacks many such parts. Therefore it follows that the universe is imperfect: which is impossible.

Furthermore some argue from the authority of Holy Writ. For it is stated (Gen. 1) that on the seventh day God ended His work which He had made: and He rested … from all His work which He had done. But this would not be so, if He made new souls every day. Therefore new human souls do not begin to exist, but they have existed from the beginning of the world.

For these, then, and like reasons some, supposing the world to be eternal, have said that as the human soul is incorruptible, so has it existed from eternity. Hence those, namely the Platonists, who maintained that human souls in their universality are immortal, held that they have also existed from eternity, and are united to bodies at one time, at another separated from them, this vicissitude depending on certain fixed periods of years. On the other hand, those who maintained that human souls are immortal in respect of some one thing which remains over from all men after death, held that this same one thing has existed from eternity; whether it be the active intellect alone, as Alexander said, or, besides this, the passive intellect, as Averroes asserted. This too is apparently the meaning of Aristotle’s words: since, speaking of the intellect, he says that it is not only incorruptible, but also perpetual.

Some, however, professing the Catholic faith, yet imbued with the teachings of the Platonists, have held a middle course. For since, according to the Catholic faith, nothing is eternal besides God, they maintained, not that human souls are eternal, but that they were created with or rather before the visible world, and yet are united anew to bodies. Of those who professed the Christian faith Origen was the first to hold this opinion, and afterwards several followed him. In fact, this opinion survives to this day among heretics, of whom the Manichees agree with Plato in asserting the eternity and transmigration of souls.

But it can be easily proved that the foregoing opinions are not founded upon truth. For we have already shown above that there is not but one possible or active intellect for all. Wherefore it remains for us to proceed against those opinions which state that there are many human souls, but that they existed before bodies, either from eternity or from the formation of the world. This would seem unreasonable for the following reasons.

For it was shown above that the soul is united to the body as its form and act. Now although act is naturally prior to potentiality, yet in one and the same subject it is posterior to it in time: since a thing is moved from potentiality to act. Wherefore the seed that is potentially living precedes the soul which is the act of life.

Again. It is natural to every form to be united to its proper matter: else that which is made of form and matter would be something beside nature. Now that which is becoming to a thing according to nature is ascribed to it before that which is becoming thereto beside nature: since what becomes a thing beside nature is in that thing accidentally, whereas what is becoming to it according to nature is in it per se; and that which is accidental always comes after that which is per se. Therefore it is becoming to the soul to be united to the body before being separated from the body. Therefore it was not created before the body to which it is united.

Moreover. Every part that is separated from its whole is imperfect. Now the soul, since it is a form, as proved above, is a part of the human species. Consequently as long as it exists by itself apart from the body, it is imperfect. But the perfect precedes the imperfect in the order of natural things. Therefore it is not becoming to the order of nature that the soul should have been created apart from the body before being united to the body.

Moreover. If souls were created without their bodies, we must inquire how they came to be united to those bodies. For this was either by force or by nature. If by force; since whatever is the result of force is against nature, it follows that the union of soul and body is unnatural. Wherefore man, who is composed of both, is something unnatural: and this is clearly false. Moreover, intellectual substances are of a higher order than heavenly bodies. Now nothing violent or contrary is to be found in heavenly bodies. Much less, therefore, is there in intellectual substances. On the other hand, if souls are united to bodies naturally, it follows that as soon as they were created souls had a natural desire to be united to bodies. Now the natural appetite is forthwith brought into act unless there be an obstacle, as instanced in the movement of heavy and light bodies: because nature always works in the same way. Consequently, from the very moment of their creation they would have been united to bodies unless there were something to prevent it. But everything that hinders the realization of the natural appetite does violence thereto. Therefore it was by violence that at some time souls were separate from bodies. Now this is unreasonable: both because in such substances there can be nothing violent, as we have proved;

and because the violent and the unnatural, since they are accidental, cannot precede that which is according to nature, nor can they be consequent upon the whole species.

Further. Since everything naturally desires its own perfection, it is for matter to desire form and not vice versa. Now the soul is compared to the body as form to matter, as was shown above. Therefore the union of the soul and body answers to the desire not of the soul but rather of the body.

If, however, it be said that both are natural to the soul, namely union with the body and separation from the body, according to different times:—this is seemingly impossible. Because changes that occur naturally in a subject are accidental, such as youth and old age. Hence if union with and separation from the body are natural changes as regards the soul, union with the body will be an accident of the soul: and consequently the man resulting from this union will not be a per se but an accidental being.

Further. Whatever is subject to alteration according to a difference of time, is subject to the heavenly movement, which the whole course of time follows. Whereas intellectual and incorporeal substances, among which are separate souls, are above the whole order of bodies: wherefore they cannot be subject to heavenly movements. Therefore it is impossible for them that, according to a difference of time, they should be naturally, now united, now separated, or desire naturally this at one time, and that at another.

If, however, it be said that they are united to bodies neither by violence nor by nature, but by deliberate choice:—this is impossible. For no one wishes to come to a worse state except he be deceived. Now the separate soul is of a higher state than when united to the body; especially according to the Platonists, who say that through being united to the body it forgets what it knew before and is balked in the pure contemplation of truth. Therefore it is not willingly united to the body except it be deceived. But there cannot be in the soul any cause of deception, since according to them it is supposed to have all knowledge. Nor can it be said that its judgment in a particular matter of choice, proceeding from its universal knowledge, is upset on account of the passions, as happens in the incontinent: because passions of this kind are not without a bodily alteration, so that they cannot be in the separate soul. It remains therefore that if the soul existed before the body, it would not be united to the body of its own will.

Further. Any effect resulting from the concurrence of two mutually independent wills, is a casual effect: for instance, when a person intent on buying meets his creditor on the market place without the latter having agreed with him to go there. Now the will of the begetter, on which the begetting of the body depends, is not dependent on the will of the separate soul which desires to be united. Since then the union of soul and body cannot take place without the concurrence of both wills, it follows that such union is casual: so that the begetting of a man is not from nature but from chance: which is clearly false, since it results in the majority of cases.

And again, if it be said that the soul is united to the body not from nature, nor of its own will, but by divine ordinance;—this also seems inadmissible, if souls were created before bodies. For God fashioned each thing according to a manner becoming its nature: hence it is said of each creature (Gen. 1) God seeing (Vulg.,—saw) that it was good, and of all together: God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good. Consequently, if He created souls separate from bodies, we must needs say that this manner of being is more becoming their nature. Now, it is not in keeping with the ordinance of the divine goodness to bring things down to a lower state, but rather to raise them to a better. Therefore it could not have been by divine ordinance that the soul was united to the body.

Further. It is not in keeping with the order of divine wisdom to raise up lower things to the detriment of higher. Now bodies that are subject to generation and corruption obtain the lowest place in the order of things. Therefore it was not becoming the order of divine wisdom to raise up human bodies by uniting pre-existing souls to them: since this could not be done without detriment to the latter, as proved from what has been said.

Origen took note of this, and since he maintained that human souls were created from the beginning, he said that they were united to bodies by divine ordinance, but as a punishment. For he was of opinion that they had sinned before bodies were formed, and that according to the gravity of their sin they were enclosed in bodies more or less noble as in so many prisons.

But this opinion cannot stand. Because punishment is something contrary to a good of nature, and for this reason is said to be evil. If, therefore, the union of soul and body is something penal, it is not a good of nature. Yet this is impossible: for it is intended by nature, since it is the end of natural generation. Moreover it would follow that to be a man is not good according to nature; whereas it is said (Gen. 1:31) after the creation of man: God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.

Further. Good does not result from evil except by accident. Consequently, if it was appointed that the soul should be united to the body on account of a sin of the separate soul, since this union is a good, it follows that it is accidental. Therefore it was by chance that man was made. But this is derogatory to divine wisdom, whereof it is said (Wis. 11:21) that It ordered all things in number, weight, and measure.

This is also clearly opposed to the teaching of the Apostle. For it is said (Rom. 9:11, 12) of Jacob and Esau, that when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil … it was said that the elder shall serve the younger. Therefore, before this was said, their souls had not committed any sin: and yet this was said after their conception, as appears from Gen. 25:23.

When we were treating of the distinction of things, we adduced against the position of Origen several arguments, which may also be employed here. Wherefore, omitting them, let us pass on to others.

Again. We must admit that the human soul either needs the senses, or not. Now experience would seem to make it clear that it needs the senses: because whoever lacks a certain sense, has no knowledge of the sensibles that are known through that sense: thus one born blind has neither knowledge nor any understanding whatever of colours. Moreover if the soul need not the senses in order to understand, we should not find in man any relation between sensitive and intellective knowledge. Yet we observe the contrary: for sensation leads to memories, and these lead us to take observation of things, whereby we arrive at the understanding of the universal principles of sciences and arts. Accordingly, if the human soul needs the senses in order to understand; since nature fails no thing in what is necessary for the accomplishment of its proper operation,—thus it supplies with fitting organs of sense and movement those animals which are animated with the powers of sense and movement,—the human soul must not have been fashioned without the necessary assistance of the senses. But the senses are inoperative without corporeal organs, as shown above. Therefore the soul was not made without the organs of the body.

If, however, the human soul does not need the senses in order to understand, and for this reason is said to have been created apart from the body: we are compelled to say that before being united to the body, it understood by itself all scientific truths. In fact the Platonists granted this, when they held that ideas,—which in Plato's opinion are the separate intelligible forms of things,—are the cause of knowledge: wherefore the separate soul, since there was no obstacle in the way, received full knowledge of all sciences. We must therefore say, since it is found to be ignorant when united to the body, that it forgets the knowledge it had previously. The Platonists grant this also, and allege as a proof of this that however ignorant a man may be, if he be questioned methodically about things that are taught in the sciences, he will answer the truth: thus if a man has forgotten some of the things which he knew before, and some one suggests to him consecutively the things which he has forgotten, he recalls them to his memory. Whence it also followed that to learn is nothing else than to remember. Accordingly it follows, as a necessary consequence of this opinion, that union with the body hinders the soul from understanding. Now nature does not unite a thing to that which causes an obstacle to its operation, rather does it unite it to that whereby its operation is rendered more prompt. Consequently the union of body and soul will not be natural: and so man will not be a natural thing, nor will his generation be natural: which statements are clearly false.

Further. The last end of anything is that which it strives to obtain by its operations. Now man by all his well ordered and right operations strives to attain the contemplation of truth: for the operations of the active powers are so many preparations and dispositions to the contemplative powers. Therefore the end of man is to arrive at the contemplation of truth. For this purpose, then, was the soul united to the body, whereby a man comes into being. Therefore it is not through union with the body that the soul loses knowledge; on the contrary, it is united to the body that it may acquire knowledge.

Again. If a man who is ignorant of the sciences be questioned about matters pertaining to the sciences, he will not answer the truth except as regards universal principles which no one ignores, since they are known to all in the same way and naturally. Afterwards however, if he be questioned consecutively, he will answer the truth about things closely connected with the principles, while bearing those principles in mind; and he will continue to do so, as long as he is able to apply the force of those principles to the matters on which he is questioned. From this, accordingly, it is clear that knowledge is caused anew in the person questioned by the first principles; and not by the remembrance of a knowledge he had possessed before.

Further. If the knowledge of conclusions were as natural to the soul as knowledge of principles, all would have the same opinion about conclusions as they have of principles: since things that are natural are the same for all. Now all have not the same opinion about conclusions, but only about principles. It is therefore clear that the knowledge of principles is natural to us, but not the knowledge of conclusions. Now from that which is natural to us we acquire that which is not natural: even as in external things we make with our hands all the products of art. Therefore we have no knowledge of conclusions save that which we obtain from principles.

Again. Forasmuch as nature is ever directed to one thing, it follows that of one power there is naturally one object, for instance colour is the object of sight, sound of hearing. Wherefore the intellect, since it is one power, has one natural object, of which it has knowledge per se and naturally. And this object must be that under which are comprised all things known by the intellect: just as under colour are comprised all colours, which are per se visible. Now this is no other than being. Therefore our intellect knows being naturally, and whatever is per se comprised under being as such; and on this knowledge is based the knowledge of first principles, such as the incompatibility of affirmation and negation, and the like. Consequently, these principles alone are known naturally by our intellect; while conclusions are known through them: even as through colour the sight knows both common and accidental sensibles.

Further. That which we acquire through the senses was not in the soul before (its union with) the body. Now, knowledge of principles is caused in us from sensibles: for had we not perceived some whole by our senses, we should be unable to understand that a whole is greater than its part: just as a man born blind is unable to have an idea of colours. Neither, therefore, had the soul any knowledge of principles before (its union with) the body: and much less, of other things. Consequently Plato’s proof of the existence of the soul before its union with the body cannot stand.

Again. If all souls existed before the bodies to which they are united, it would seem to follow that the same soul is united to different bodies according to the vicissitudes of time. In fact this is an evident consequence of the opinion of those who hold the eternity of the world. For, if men have been begotten from eternity, it follows that an infinite number of human bodies have been begotten and corrupted during the whole course of time. Therefore we must say either that an actually infinite number of souls pre-existed, if each soul is united to a single body, or—if the number of souls be finite—that the same soul is united at one time to this, at another time to that body. And the same would seem to follow if we suppose that souls existed before bodies, but that generation was not from eternity. For although it be supposed that the begetting of men has not always been, one cannot doubt that it can be of infinite duration: because each man is so formed by nature, that unless he be accidentally hindered, he is able to beget another even as he himself was begotten of another. Yet this is impossible if, supposing a finite number of souls, one soul cannot be united to several bodies. Wherefore several who have asserted the existence of souls before bodies, maintained the transmigration of souls. But this is impossible. Therefore souls did not exist before bodies.

That one soul cannot possibly be united to different bodies is proved thus. Human souls do not differ specifically from one another, but only numerically: else men also would differ in species from one another. Now numerical distinction arises from material principles. Consequently the distinction among human souls will have to be taken from something material. Not, however, as though matter were part of the soul: for it has been shown above that the soul is an intellectual substance and that no such substance has any matter. It remains, therefore, that in the manner indicated above the distinction and plurality of souls must be taken from their relation to the different matters to which souls are united. Consequently if there are different bodies, they must needs have different souls united to them. Therefore one is not united to several.

Again. It has been proved above that the soul is united to the body as its form. Now forms must be proportionate to their respective matters: since they are related the one to the other as potentiality to act: for the proper act corresponds to the proper potentiality. Therefore one soul is not united to several bodies.

Moreover. The power of the mover should be proportionate to its mobile: for not every power moves every movable. Now it cannot be said that the soul, even were it not the form of the body, is not its mover, for the animate differs from the inanimate by sense and movement. Therefore different souls must correspond to different bodies.

Again. In things subject to generation and corruption, the same identical thing cannot be reproduced by generation: for, since generation and corruption are movements towards substance, in things that are generated and corrupted, the substance does not remain the same, as it does in things that are moved locally. Now, if the one soul is united successively to various generated bodies, the same identical man will be reproduced by generation. This is a necessary consequence for Plato, who said that man is a soul clad with a body. It follows also for all the others: because, since the unity, even as the being, of a thing follows its form, it follows that those things are one in number, whose form is one in number. Therefore it is not possible for one soul to be united to several bodies: and from this it follows also that neither were souls before bodies.

The Catholic faith declares itself in agreement with this truth. For it is said in the psalm: He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them: because, to wit, God fashioned a soul for each one separately, and neither created them all together, nor united one to different bodies. Hence it is also declared in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus: We affirm that the souls of men were not created from the beginning together with other intellectual natures, nor all at the same time, as Origen pretended.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS

THE arguments whereby it is proved that souls have existed from eternity, or that, at least, they existed before bodies, are easily solved.

For the first statement, that the soul has the power to be always, must be granted: but it must be observed that the power and potentiality of a thing extend not to what has been, but to what is or will be: wherefore possibility has no place in the past. Therefore from the fact that the soul has the power to be always we may conclude, not that it always was, but that it always will be.

Further. That to which a power is directed does not follow from the power unless the power be supposed. Hence, although the soul has the power to be always, we cannot infer that the soul is always, except after it has already received this power. And if we presume that it received this power from eternity, we shall be begging the question at issue, namely whether the soul has been from eternity.

As to the second objection about the eternity of the truth which the soul understands:—we must observe that the eternity of a truth understood may be taken in two ways: in one way, as to the thing understood; in another as to that whereby it is understood. If the understood truth be eternal as regards the thing understood, it follows that the thing understood is eternal, but not the one who understands: whereas if the understood truth be eternal as to that whereby it is understood, it would follow that the soul which understands it is eternal. Now the understood truth is eternal not in the latter but in the former way: for it is clear from what has been said that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands truth, are acquired by us from the phantasms through the active intellect. Hence it cannot be inferred that the soul is eternal, but that the truths understood are based on something eternal, for their foundation is in the first truth, as in the universal cause which contains all truth. But the soul is compared to this eternal thing, not as subject to form, but as a thing to its proper end, because the true is the good of the intellect and the end thereof. Now from a thing's end we can argue about its duration, just as we can argue about its beginning from its efficient cause: since what is directed to an eternal end must be capable of enduring for ever. Consequently, from the eternity of intelligible truth we can prove that the soul is immortal, but not that it is eternal. That neither can the latter be proved from the eternity of the agent is clear from what has been said above when we were discussing the eternity of creatures.

The third objection which refers to the perfection of the universe is not cogent. For the perfection of the universe regards the species, not the individuals: since the universe is continually receiving an addition of individuals to the pre-existing species. Now human souls do not differ specifically among themselves, but only numerically, as we have proved. Consequently it is not inconsistent with the perfection of the universe, if new souls be created.

Hence we may gather the reply to the fourth objection. For it is stated at the same time (Gen. 1) that God ended His work, and that He rested … from all His work which He had done. Since, then, the ending or perfecting of creatures regards the species and not the individuals, so God's rest must be understood to refer to the cessation from forming new species, but not new individuals, the like of which, in the species, have existed before. Accordingly, as all human souls are of one species, even as are all men, it is not incompatible with the aforesaid rest if God creates new souls from day to day.

It must, however, be observed that we do not find it stated by Aristotle that the human intellect is eternal; and yet he is wont to say this of those things which, in his opinion, always have been. But he declares that it is everlasting; and this can be said of those things that always will be, although they have not always been. Hence (11 Metaph.) in excluding the intellective soul from the conditions of other forms, he did not say that this form was before matter,—and yet Plato said this of ideas, so that it would seem consistent with the subject of which he was treating that he should say something of the kind of the soul,—but he said that it remains after the body.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE SOUL IS NOT MADE OF GOD’S SUBSTANCE

FROM the foregoing it is clear that the soul is not of God’s substance.

For it has been shown above that the divine substance is eternal, and that nothing pertaining thereto begins anew. Whereas human souls did not exist before bodies, as we have proved. Therefore the soul cannot be of the divine substance.

Moreover. It was shown above that God cannot be the form of anything. Whereas the soul is the form of the body, as we have proved. Therefore it is not of the divine substance.

Further. Everything from which something is made is in potentiality to that which is thus made from it. But God’s substance is not in potentiality to anything: for it is pure act, as we proved above. Therefore it is impossible that the soul or any other thing whatsoever be made from God’s substance.

Again. That from which something is made is changed in some way. But God is utterly unchangeable, as we proved above. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made from Him.

Moreover. The soul shows evident signs of variation in knowledge and virtue, and their opposites: whereas in God there is no variation whatever, neither per se, nor accidental.

Again. It was shown above that God is pure act, wherein there is no potentiality: whereas in the human soul we find both potentiality and act; for it contains the possible intellect which is in potentiality to all that is intelligible, besides the active intellect, as shown above. Therefore the human soul is not from the divine nature.

Again. Since the divine substance is altogether indivisible, the soul cannot be part thereof, but only the whole. Now the divine substance cannot possibly be but one, as we showed above. It follows, therefore, that there would be for all men only one soul as regards the intellect: and this has been refuted above. Therefore the soul is not from the divine substance.

This opinion arose apparently from a triple source. For some maintained that no substance is incorporeal. Consequently they asserted that God is the most noble body, whether this be air, fire, or any other thing that they considered to be a principle, and they affirmed that the soul was of the nature of this body. For they all ascribed to the soul, whatever they considered to be a principle, as Aristotle says (1 De Anima): and thus it followed that the soul is from the divine substance. From this root sprang the opinion of Manes who thought that God is a bright body extending through infinite space, whereof, said he, the human soul is a fragment.

But this opinion was refuted above, both because we proved that God is not a body; and because we have shown that neither the human soul nor any intellectual substance is a body.

Some have maintained that for all men there is but one intellect, whether active only, or both active and possible, as stated above. And since the ancients asserted that every separate substance is God, it followed that our soul, namely the intellect whereby we understand, is of the divine nature. Wherefore even nowadays certain adherents to the Christian faith, who hold that the active intellect is a separate being, say expressly that the active intellect is God.

But this opinion about the unity of our active intellect was disproved above.

Possibly also, this opinion may have arisen from the very likeness of our soul to God. For it is on account of man’s soul that intelligence, which is esteemed most proper to God, is found to be befitting to no substance in this lower world, save man alone. Hence it might seem that the soul was allied to the divine nature: and especially so to those men who were convinced of the human soul’s immortality.

Moreover this would seem to be confirmed by the fact that after it had been said (Gen. 1): Let Us make man to Our image and likeness, it is added: God formed man of the slime of the earth; and breathed into his face the breath of life. From which text some wished to conclude that the soul is of the divine nature: since he who breathes into another’s face, puts forth into another the identical thing which was in himself. And so Scripture would seem to imply that God put into man something divine in order to give him life.

But the aforesaid likeness does not prove that man is a part of the divine substance: for in understanding he suffers from manifold defects, which cannot be said of God. Wherefore this likeness indicates an imperfect image rather than consubstantiality. In fact Scripture indicates this when it says that man was made to God’s image. Hence the aforesaid breathing shows that life came forth from God into man by way of a certain likeness, and not according to identity of substance. For which reason also the spirit of life is stated to have been breathed into his face: because, since the organs of several senses are situate in this part of the body, the signs of life are more evidenced in the face. Accordingly God is said to have breathed the spirit into man’s face, because He gave man the spirit of life, but not by parting it from His own substance. For he who breathes the breath of his body into the face of someone, whence the metaphor is apparently taken, blows into his face the air, but does not send forth part of his substance into him.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS NOT TRANSMITTED WITH THE SEMEN

IT may be shown from the foregoing that the human soul is not transmitted with the semen, as though it were sown by coition.

For any principles whatsoever that cannot exercise their operations without the body cannot begin to exist apart from the body: because a thing's being is proportionate to its operation, since everything operates according as it is a being. On the other hand, those principles which exercise their operations without the body, are generated apart from the generation of the body. Now the operation of the nutritive and sensitive soul cannot be without the body, as is evident from what has been said: whereas the operation of the intellective soul is not exercised through an organ of the body, as stated above. Consequently the nutritive and sensitive souls are generated through the generation of the body; but not the intellective soul. Now the transmission of the semen is directed to the generation of the body. Therefore the nutritive and sensitive souls begin to exist through the transmission of the semen; but not the intellective soul.

Again. If the human soul began to exist by transmission with the semen, this could only be in two ways. In one way, so that we understand it to be in the semen actually, as though it were accidentally severed from the soul of the generator, just as the semen is severed from the body. This may be seen in annulose animals, that live after being cut in two, and in which there is one soul actually and several in potentiality: for when the body of such an animal is divided, the soul begins to be actually in each living part. In another way, so that we understand the semen to possess a virtue productive of the intellective soul: and thus the intellective soul would be in the semen virtually, but not actually.

But the former of these is impossible for two reasons. First, because, since the intellective soul is the most perfect of souls and endowed with the highest power, its proper matter is a body having a great variety of organs, whereby its manifold operations can be accomplished. Consequently it cannot possibly be actually in the separated semen; since not even the souls of perfect irrational animals are multiplied by division as happens in annulose animals. Secondly, because, since the intellect, which is the proper and principal power of the intellective soul, is not the act of any part of the body, it cannot be accidentally divided through the body being divided: and consequently neither can the intellective soul.

The second is also impossible. For the active force in the semen promotes the generation of the animal by transmuting the body: because a material force cannot act otherwise. Now every form that begins to exist through the transmutation of matter, has a being dependent on matter: because the transmutation of matter reduces it from potentiality to act, and thus terminates in the actual being of matter, which results from its union with a form; wherefore, if thereby the being of the form also begins simply, the being of the form will consist merely in its being united to matter, and consequently the form will be dependent on matter for its being. Therefore, if the human soul is brought into being by an active force in the semen, it follows that its being is dependent on matter, like the being of other material forms: whereas the contrary of this has been proved above. Therefore the intellective soul is nowise brought into being through the transmission of the semen.

Moreover. Every form that is brought into being through the transmutation of matter, is brought forth from the potentiality of matter: since the transmutation of matter is its reduction from potentiality to act. Now the intellective soul cannot be brought forth from the potentiality of matter: for it has been shown above that the intellective soul surpasses the whole potentiality of matter, since it has an operation apart from matter, as was proved above. Therefore the intellective soul is not brought forth into being through the transmutation of matter; and neither, consequently, by the action of a power residing in the semen.

Further. No active force acts beyond its genus. But the intellective soul surpasses the whole genus of bodies: since it has an operation that is raised above all bodies, namely intelligence. Therefore no bodily force can produce an intellective soul. Now whatever action proceeds from a force that is in the semen, results from a bodily force; because the formative force acts through the medium of the threefold heat, of fire, of heaven, and of the soul. Therefore the intellective soul cannot be brought into being by a force residing in the semen.

Further. It is absurd to state that an intellective substance is either divided through a body being divided, or produced by a bodily virtue. Now the human soul is an intellective substance, as we proved above. Therefore it cannot be said that it is divided through the semen being divided, or that it is brought into being by an active virtue in the semen. Consequently the human soul nowise begins to exist through the transmission of the semen.

Further. If the generation of a thing causes a certain thing to exist, the corruption of the former will cause the latter to cease to exist. Now the corruption of the body does not cause the soul to cease to exist, for the latter is immortal, as we have proved above. Neither, therefore, is the generation of the body the cause of the soul beginning to exist. But the transmission of the semen is the proper cause of the generation of the body. Therefore the transmission of the semen is not the cause of the soul being brought into existence.

Hereby is excluded the error of Apollinaris and his followers who said that souls are generated by souls, as bodies by bodies.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS BROUGHT INTO BEING THROUGH CREATION BY GOD

FROM what has been said it can be proved that God alone brings the human soul into being.

For whatever is brought into being, is either generated per se or accidentally, or is created. Now the human soul is not generated per se: since it is not composed of matter and form, as shown above. Neither is it generated accidentally: for, since it is the form of the body, it would be generated through the body being generated, which results from the active force in the semen, and this has been disproved. Since then the human soul has a beginning of its existence, for it is neither eternal nor exists before the body, as we have shown, it follows that it comes forth into being by creation. Now we have proved that God alone can create. Therefore He alone brings forth the human soul into being.

Moreover. Everything whose substance is not its being has an author of its being, as shown above. Now the human soul is not its own being: for this is peculiar to God alone, as already proved. Therefore it has an active cause of its being. But that which has being per se, is also caused per se: whereas that which has not being per se, but only together with some other thing, is caused, not per se, but through this other thing being caused: thus the form of fire is caused when the fire is made. Now it is proper to the human soul, as compared with other forms, to be subsistent in its own being, and to communicate to the body the being proper to itself. Therefore the human soul has its becoming per se, in contrast to other forms which have their becoming accidentally, through the making of the composite. But, since the human soul has not matter as part of itself, it cannot be made from something. It remains, therefore, that it is made from nothing: and thus it is created. And seeing that creation is the proper work of God, as we proved above, it follows that it is created immediately by God alone.

Further. Things belonging to the same genus come into being in the same way, as we proved above. Now the soul belongs to the genus of intellectual substances: and it is inconceivable that these should come into being save by the way of creation. Therefore the human soul comes into being through creation by God.

Again. Whatsoever is brought into being by an agent, acquires from the latter, either something that is the principle of being in that particular species, or absolute being itself. Now the soul cannot be brought into being in such a way as to acquire something as the principle of its being, as happens in things composed of matter and form, which are generated through acquiring a form in act: because the soul does not contain something in itself by way of principle of its being, for it is a simple substance, as was shown above. Hence it remains that it is not brought into being by an agent except by receiving from it being absolutely. Now being is the proper effect of the first and universal agent: for secondary agents act by impressing the likeness of their forms on the things they make, which likenesses are the forms of the things made. Therefore the soul cannot be brought into being except by the first and universal agent, which is God.

Further. The end of a thing corresponds to its principle: for a thing is perfect when it attains its proper principle, whether by likeness, or in any way whatever. Now the end and ultimate perfection of the human soul is to soar above the whole order of creatures and to reach the First Principle, which is God. Therefore the proper principle of the soul’s origin is God.

We also find this implied in Holy Writ (Gen. 1). For whereas while speaking of the formation of other animals, it ascribes their souls to other causes, for instance when it says: Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature with a living soul, and in like manner as to other things; when it comes to man, it indicates the creation of the soul by God, by saying: God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life.

Hereby is excluded the error of those who hold that souls were created by angels.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

ARGUMENTS FOR PROVING THAT THE HUMAN SOUL IS FORMED FROM THE SEMEN

NEVERTHELESS there are some objections to the foregoing.

For since man is an animal inasmuch as he has a sensitive soul; and the notion of animal applies univocally to man and other animals; it would seem that man's sensitive soul is of the same genus as the souls of other animals. Now things of the same genus have the same manner of coming into being. Wherefore the sensitive soul of man, as also of other animals, comes into being through a force residing in the semen. But the intellective and sensitive soul are the same in man, as we proved above. Consequently it would seem that the intellective soul also comes into being through a seminal virtue.

Further. As Aristotle teaches (De Gener. Animal.), in point of time the fetus is an animal before it is a man. Now, while it is an animal and not a man, it has a sensitive and not an intellective soul: and there can be no doubt that this sensitive soul, even as in other animals, is formed by the active virtue of the semen. But that very same sensitive soul is potentially intellective, just as that animal is potentially a rational animal,—unless by chance it be said that the supervening intellective soul is a distinct substance, which has been refuted above. Therefore, seemingly, the substance of the intellective soul is caused by a virtue in the semen.

Again. Since the soul is the form of the body, it is united to the body in being. Now, things that are one in being are the term of one action and of one agent: for if there were several agents and consequently several actions, effects diverse in being would result. Consequently the being of soul and body must be the term of the one action of one agent. But, it is clear that the body results from the action of a virtue in the semen. Therefore the soul which is its form is the effect of the same action, and not of some separate agent.

Moreover. Man generates his like in species by a virtue residing in the semen after separation. Now, every univocal agent generates its like in species through causing the form of the thing generated, which derives its species from that form. Therefore the human soul, whence man derives his species, is produced by a virtue residing in the semen.

Again. Apollinaris argues as follows. Whoever completes a work, co-operates with the agent. But, if souls are created by God, He completes the generation of children who are sometimes born of adulterers. Therefore God co-operates with adulterers; and this seemingly is inadmissible.

Again, in a book ascribed to Gregory of Nyssa we find arguments in support of the same statement. This is how he argues. Soul and body together make one thing, and this is one man. If therefore the soul is made before the body, or the body before the soul, one and the same thing will precede and follow itself: which is seemingly impossible. Therefore body and soul are made at the same time. But the body begins to exist at the separation of the semen. Therefore the soul also is brought into being through the separation of the semen.

Again. The operation of an agent would seem to be imperfect, if he does not bring an entire thing into being, but only some part thereof. Therefore if God were to bring the soul into being, while the body was formed by the virtue of the semen, which two things are parts of one, namely man, the operation of both God and the seminal virtue would seem to be imperfect; which is clearly inadmissible. Hence man’s soul and body are produced by one and the same cause. Now, it is clear that man’s body is produced by the virtue of the semen. Therefore the soul is also.

Again. In everything generated from seed, all the parts of the thing generated are together virtually contained in the seed, though they appear not actually. Thus in wheat or any other seed we see that the grass with stem, stalks, fruit, and beard are virtually contained in the original seed; afterwards the seed spreads forth and by a kind of natural consequence reaches perfection without taking to itself anything outside itself. Now it is clear that the soul is part of man. Therefore the human seed contains virtually the human soul; and this does not take its origin from any external principle.

Moreover. Things that have the same process and term must have the same principle of origin. Now in the generation of a man we find the same process and term in the body as in the soul. For the soul's operations become more and more manifest, as the members are developed in shape and size: thus the operation of the nutritive soul is apparent at first; afterwards, the operation of the sensitive soul, and lastly, the body being fully developed, the operation of the intellective soul. Therefore the body and soul have the same principle. But the principle of origin in the body is through the separation of the semen. Therefore the same is the principle of the soul's origin.

Again. That which is conformed to a thing, is fashioned by the action of the thing to which it is conformed: for instance the wax that is conformed to the seal, receives this conformity from the impression of the seal. Now it is evident that the body of a man or of any animal is conformed to its own soul; because its organs are so arranged as required by the soul's operations to be exercised by them. Therefore the body is formed by the action of the soul: wherefore Aristotle says (2 De Anima) that the soul is the efficient cause of the body. But this would not be so were not the soul in the semen: because the body is fashioned by the power that is in the semen. Therefore the human soul is in the semen: and consequently takes its origin from the separation of the semen.

Again. Nothing lives except by a soul. Now the semen is living. This is proved in three ways. First, because it is severed from a living being. Secondly, because the semen gives signs of vital heat and vital operations, which are indications of a living thing. Thirdly, because the seeds of plants when put into the soil, unless they had life in themselves, could not gather heat from the soil, which is inanimate, so as to live. Therefore the soul is in the semen: and consequently it originates with the severing of the semen.

Moreover. If the soul were not before the body, as we have proved; and did not begin to be at the severance of the semen, it follows that the body is formed first, and the newly created soul infused into the body afterwards. Now, were this true, it would further follow that the soul is for the sake of the body: because that which is on another's account is found to come after it; even so clothes are made for man. But this is false, since on the contrary the body is for the soul’s sake, since the end is always of greater excellence. We must therefore conclude that the soul originates together with the severance of the semen.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS

FOR the easier solution of the foregoing arguments, we must first of all set down certain points, in order to explain the order and process of the generation of man, as well as of animals in general.

In the first place then it must be observed that the opinion of those is false who say that the vital operations that appear in the embryo before its ultimate completion, do not proceed from a soul or soul’s power, existing therein, but from the soul of the mother. For if this were true, the embryo will no longer be an animal: since every animal consists of soul and body. Moreover vital operations do not proceed from an extrinsic active principle, but from an internal force; and it is in this that inanimate things differ from the living, to which it properly belongs to move themselves. Because that which is nourished assimilates nourishment: wherefore in the subject nourished there must needs be an active nutritive power, since the agent produces its like. And much more evident is this in the operation of the senses: because to see and to hear are competent to a person through some faculty existing in him and not in another. Wherefore if the embryo is observed to be nourished and even to sense before its final development, that cannot be ascribed to the soul of the mother.

And yet it cannot be said that the soul, as to its complete essence, is in the semen from the very beginning, and that the operations of the soul are not apparent on account of the lack of organs. For, since the soul is united to the body as its form, it is not united to a body other than one of which it is properly the act. Now the soul is the act of an organic body. Consequently the soul is not actually in the semen before the organization of the body, but only potentially or virtually. Wherefore Aristotle says (2 De Anima) that seed and fruit are potentially living as long as they put aside, i.e., are without, the soul; yet the thing of which the soul is the act, is potentially living, but is not without a soul. It would also follow, if the soul were in the semen from the beginning, that the generation of an animal would be by the mere severance, as happens in annulose animals, where two are made from one. For if the semen were animated as soon as severed, it would at once have a substantial form. Now every substantial generation precedes, and does not follow, the substantial form; and if any changes follow the substantial form, they are directed, not to the being but to the well-being of the thing generated. Accordingly the generation of the animal would be completed in the mere severance of the semen: and all subsequent changes would have nothing to do with generation.

Even more absurd would this be if applied to the rational soul:—both because it cannot possibly be divided according to the division of the body, so that it be possible for it to be in the semen after severance:—and because it would follow that whenever pollution occurs without conception taking place, rational souls would nevertheless be multiplied.

Nor can it be asserted, as some say, that although from the moment of severance the soul is not in the semen actually but virtually, on account of the lack of organs; yet this very virtue of the semen (which is a body capable of receiving organs though it has them not actually) is proportionately a potential but not an actual soul to the semen; and that, since the life of a plant requires fewer organs than the life of an animal, when first the semen is sufficiently prepared for plant-life, this same virtue of the semen becomes a vegetative soul; and then, when the organs have been yet more perfected and multiplied, the same virtue advances to the state of a sensitive soul; and further still, the form of the organs being perfected, the same soul becomes rational, not indeed by the action of this seminal virtue, but by the action of an external agent, for which reason they imagine Aristotle to have said that the intellect is from without (De Gener. Animal.). For according to this opinion it would follow that the same identical virtue is at one time a purely vegetative soul, and afterwards a sensitive soul: so that the substantial form itself would be perfected more and more by stages. It would also follow that the substantial form would be brought from potentiality to act not at once but by degrees. And again, that generation, like alteration, is a continuous movement. All of which things are impossible in nature. A conclusion still more inadmissible would follow, namely that the rational soul is mortal. For nothing that accrues as a form to that which is corruptible makes it naturally incorruptible, else a corruptible thing would be changed into an incorruptible one, which is impossible, since they differ in genus, as stated in 10 Metaph. Now the substance of the sensitive soul, since in the aforesaid process it is stated to be generated accidentally by the generated body, must needs be corruptible at the corruption of the body. If therefore the same soul becomes rational by a light introduced within it, which light is related to it as a form (for the sensitive is potentially intellective); it follows of necessity that the rational soul perishes when the body perishes. And this is impossible: as we proved above, and as the Catholic faith teaches.

Therefore the self-same virtue which is severed together with the semen and is called the formative virtue, is not the soul, nor does it become the soul in the process of generation: but, since it is based, as on its proper subject, on the (vital) spirit contained in the frothy semen, it causes the formation of the body in so far as it operates by virtue of the father’s soul, to whom generation is ascribed as the principal agent, and not by virtue of the soul of the person conceived, even after the soul is in that person: for the subject conceived does not generate itself, but is generated by the father. This is clear to anyone who considers each power of the soul separately. For it cannot be ascribed to the soul of the embryo by reason of the generative power; not only because the generative power does not exercise its operation until the work is completed of the nutritive and augmentative powers which are its auxiliaries, since to generate belongs to that which is perfect; but also because the work of the generative power is directed, not to the perfection of the individual, but to the preservation of the species. Nor again can it be ascribed to the nutritive power, the work of which is to assimilate nourishment to the subject nourished, which is not apparent here; since in the process of formation the nourishment is not assimilated to something already existing, but is advanced to a more perfect form and more approaching to a likeness to the father. Likewise neither can it be ascribed to the augmentative power: since it belongs to this power to cause a change, not of form, but of quantity. As to the sensitive and intellective part, it is clear that it has no operation appropriate to such a formation. It remains then that the formation of the body, especially as regards the foremost and principal parts, is not from the form of the subject generated, nor from a formative power acting by virtue of that form, but from (a formative power) acting by virtue of the generative soul of the father, the work of which soul is to produce the specific like of the generator.

Accordingly this formative power remains the same in the aforesaid spirit from the beginning of the formation until the end. Yet the species of the subject formed remains not the same: because at first it has the form of semen, afterwards of blood, and so onwards until it arrives at its final complement. For although the generation of simple bodies does not proceed in order, since each of them has an immediate form of primary matter; in the generation of other bodies, there must be an order in the generations, by reason of the many intermediate forms between the first elemental form and the final form which is the term of generation: wherefore there are a number of generations and corruptions following one another.

Nor is it unreasonable if one of the intermediates be generated and then at once interrupted, because the intermediate stages have not a complete species but are on the way to a species: hence they are generated, not that they may remain, but that the final term of generation may be reached through them. Nor need we wonder if the transmutation of generation be not throughout continuous, and that there are many intermediate generations; for this happens also in alteration and growth, since neither alteration nor growth is continuous throughout, but only local movement is truly continuous, as we find proved in 8 Physic.

Accordingly, the more noble a form is and the further removed it is from the elemental form, the more numerous must needs be the intermediate forms, through which the ultimate form is reached by degrees, and consequently the more numerous will be the intermediate generations. Wherefore in the generation of an animal or a man in which the form is most perfect, there are many intermediate forms and generations, and consequently corruptions, since the generation of one is the corruption of another. Therefore the vegetative soul, which comes first, when the embryo lives the life of a plant, is corrupted, and is succeeded by a more perfect soul which is both nutritive and sensitive, and then the embryo lives an animal life; and when this is corrupted it is succeeded by the rational soul introduced from without: although the preceding souls were produced by the virtue in the semen.

Keeping these points before the mind, it is easy to answer the objections.

For in reply to the first objection, where it is stated that the sensitive soul must have the same manner of origin in man and in irrational animals, because animal is predicated of both univocally,—we say that this is not necessary. Because although the sensitive souls in man and dumb animals agree generically, they differ specifically, like the things of which they are the forms. For just as the animal that is a man differs specifically from other animals in the point of being rational, so the sensitive soul of man differs specifically from the sensitive soul of a dumb animal in this, that it is also intellective. Wherefore the sensitive soul in the dumb animal has no more than the sensitive faculty, and consequently neither its being nor its operation is raised above the body; and so it must needs be generated together with the body, and perish when the body perishes. On the other hand the sensitive soul in a man, through having besides the sensitive nature an intellective power in consequence of which it follows that it is raised above the body both in being and in operation, is neither generated through the generation of the body, nor perishes through the body's corruption. Hence the different manner of origin in the aforesaid souls is not on the part of the sensitive faculty whence the generic nature is taken, but on the part of the intellective faculty, whence the specific difference is derived. Therefore we can conclude a difference not of genus but only of species.

When it is objected in the second place that the thing conceived is an animal before a man, this does not prove that the rational soul is transmitted together with the semen. Because the sensitive soul whereby it was an animal does not remain, but is succeeded by a soul that is both sensitive and intellective, whereby it is at the same time both animal and man, as explained above.

The statement in the third objection, that the actions of different agents do not terminate in one thing made, must be understood as referring to different agents of which one is not ordered to the other. For if they be ordered the one to the other, they must have one effect: for the first active cause acts on the effect of the secondary active cause more intimately than does the secondary cause: hence we find that an effect produced by a principal agent through an instrument is more properly ascribed to the principal agent than to the instrument. Now it happens sometimes that the action of the principal agent attains to something in the effect produced, to which the action of the instrument does not attain: thus the vegetative power produces the species of flesh, which the heat of fire that is its instrument cannot produce, although it acts dispositively thereto by dissolving and consuming. Since then every active force of nature is compared to God as an instrument is compared to the first and principal agent, nothing hinders the action of nature, in one and the same subject generated which is a man, from terminating in a part of man and not in the whole which is the effect of God's action. Accordingly the human body is fashioned at the same time both by the power of God as the principal and first agent, and by the power of the semen as secondary agent: but God's action produces the human soul, which the seminal power cannot produce, but to which it disposes.

Hence the reply to the fourth objection is clear: because a man begets his like in species, in so far as the seminal virtue in him operates dispositively towards the ultimate form whence man derives his species.

That God should co-operate with adulterers in the action of nature involves no contradiction. For it is not the nature but the will that is evil in adulterers: and the action which proceeds from their seminal virtue is natural and not voluntary. Wherefore it is not unreasonable that God co-operate in their action by giving it its ultimate perfection.

As to the sixth objection, it is clear that the conclusion does not necessarily follow. For even if we grant that man's body is fashioned before the soul is created, or vice versa, it does not follow that the self-same man precedes himself: since a man is not his body nor his soul. But it follows that some part of him precedes the other. In this there is nothing unreasonable: because matter precedes form in point of time; matter, that is to say, considered as being in potentiality to form, but not as actually perfected by a form, for as such it is simultaneous with the form. Accordingly the human body, considered as in potentiality to the soul, and as not yet having a soul, precedes the soul in point of time: but then it is human, not actually, but only potentially. On the other hand when it is human actually, as being perfected by the human soul, it neither precedes nor follows the soul, but is simultaneous with it.

Nor again does it follow, if the soul is not produced by the seminal virtue, but only the body, that the operation both of God and of nature is imperfect, as the seventh argument inferred. Because both body and soul are made by the power of God: although the fashioning of the body is from Him by means of the natural virtue in the semen, whereas He produces the soul immediately. Neither does it follow that the action of the seminal virtue is imperfect; since it fulfils the purpose for which it is intended.

It must also be noted that the seed contains virtually whatever does not surpass a corporeal virtue, for instance the grass with the stem, stalks, and so forth. Whence we cannot conclude that the part of man which surpasses the whole corporeal virtue, is contained virtually in the seed, as the eighth argument inferred.

That the operations of the soul seem to develop in the process of human generation, according as the parts of the body develop, does not prove that the human soul and body have the same principle, as the ninth argument suggested: but it proves that the disposition of the body's parts is necessary for the soul's operation.

The statement of the tenth objection, that the body is conformed to the soul, and that for this reason the soul fashions a body like to itself, is partly true and partly false. For if it be understood of the soul of the begetter, the statement is true; whereas it is false if it be referred to the soul of the begotten. Because the body is not formed by the virtue of the soul of the begotten, as regards the body's foremost and principal parts, but by the virtue of the soul of the begetter, as we proved above. For all matter is similarly configured to its form; and yet this configuration results not from the action of the subject generated but from the action of the generator.

As to the eleventh objection about the life of the semen at the beginning of its severance:—it is clear from what has been said that it is not living except potentially: wherefore it has a soul then not actually but virtually. In the process of generation it has a vegetative and a sensitive soul by the virtue of the semen, which do not remain but pass away when the rational soul takes their place.

Nor again, if the fashioning of the body precedes the human soul, does it follow that the soul is for the sake of the body, as the twelfth objection inferred. For one thing is for another's sake in two ways. First, for the sake of its operation, or preservation, or any like thing consequent upon being:

and the like are posterior to the thing for the sake of which they are: thus clothes are for man, and tools for the workman. Secondly, a thing is for another’s sake, i.e. for the sake of its being; and thus a thing which is for the sake of another precedes the latter in the order of time but follows it in the order of nature. It is in this way that the body is for the sake of the soul: just as all matter is for the sake of a form. It would be otherwise if from soul and body there resulted a thing that is not one in being; as those assert who deny that the soul is the form of the body.

CHAPTER XC

THAT AN INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE IS UNITED AS A FORM TO NO OTHER THAN THE HUMAN BODY

SINCE it has been proved that a certain intellectual substance, the human soul to wit, is united to a body as its form, it remains for us to ask whether any intellectual substance can be united as form to any other body. Indeed, as regards heavenly bodies, we have shown above what was Aristotle’s opinion as to their being animated with an intellective soul, and that Augustine leaves the question unsolved. Wherefore the present inquiry must be confined to elemental bodies. That an intellectual substance is not united as form to any elemental body save that of man is evidently clear. For were it united to some other, it would be united either to a mixed or to a simple body. But it cannot be united to a mixed body. Because that body, in respect of its genus, would have to surpass other mixed bodies, in evenness of temperament: since we see that mixed bodies have forms so much the more noble, the nearer they approach to an even temperament; and so if that which has a most noble form, such as an intellectual substance, be a mixed body, it must have a most even temperament. For this reason we find that a soft flesh and a delicate touch are signs of a keen understanding. Now the most even temperament is that of the human body. Consequently, if an intellectual substance be united to a mixed body, the latter must have the same nature as the human body. Moreover its form would be of the same nature as the human soul, if it were an intellectual substance. Therefore there would be no specific difference between that animal and man. Again, neither can an intellectual substance be united as form to a simple body, such as air, water, fire, or earth. Because each of these bodies is like in the whole and in the parts: since a part of air has the same nature and species as the whole air, for it has the same movement; and the same applies to the others. Now like movers have like forms. Accordingly if any part of any one of the aforesaid bodies, air for instance, be animated with an intellectual soul, for the same reason the whole air and all its parts will be animated. But this is seen clearly to be false: because there is no sign of vital operations in the parts of the air or of other simple bodies. Therefore an intellectual substance is not united as form to any part of the air or of similar bodies.

Again. If an intellectual substance be united as form to one of the simple bodies, it will have either an intellect only, or it will have other powers, for instance those which belong to the sensitive or to the nutritive part, as in man. If it have the intellect only, there is no use in its being united to the body. For every form of a body exercises a proper operation through the body. And the intellect has no operation pertaining to the body, except in so far as it moves the body: because understanding is not an operation that can be exercised by an organ of the body; nor is willing, for the same reason. Again, the movements of the elements are from natural movers, namely their generators, and they move not themselves. Wherefore it does not follow that they are animated because they have movement. If, on the other hand, the intellectual substance, which is supposed to be united to an element or to a part thereof, have other parts of the soul, since these parts are parts of certain organs, it follows that we shall find diversity of organs in the body of the element. But this is inconsistent with its simplicity. Therefore an intellectual substance cannot be united as form to an element or to a part thereof.

Moreover. The nearer a body is to primary matter, the less noble it is, according as it is more in potentiality and less in complete actuality. Now the elements are nearer than mixed bodies to primary matter, since they are the proximate matter of mixed bodies. Consequently the elemental bodies are less noble than mixed bodies as to their species. Wherefore, since the more noble bodies have more noble forms, it is impossible that the noblest form of all, which is the intellective soul, be united to the bodies of the elements.

Again. If the elemental bodies or any parts thereof, were animated by the noblest kind of soul, which is the intellective soul, it would follow that the more akin a body is to the elements, the nearer it approaches to life. Now this does not appear to be the case, but rather the contrary: for plants have less of life than animals, and yet they are more akin to earth; while minerals, which are still more akin, have no life at all. Therefore an intellectual substance is not united as form to an element or to a part thereof.

Further. Exceeding contrariety is destructive of life in all corruptible movers: for excessive heat or cold, wet or dryness, are fatal to animals and plants. Now these contraries exceed especially in the elemental bodies. Therefore life cannot possibly be in them. Therefore it is impossible for an intellectual substance to be united to them as their form.

Moreover. Although the elements are incorruptible as a whole, each of their parts is corruptible as having contrariety. If, therefore, some parts of the elements have cognitive substances united to them, it seems that the power of discerning corruptives should especially be ascribed to them. Now this is the sense of touch, which discriminates between hot and cold and like contraries: and for this very reason it is in all animals, as though it were necessary for preservation from corruption. But this sense cannot possibly be in a simple body: since the organ of touch needs to have contraries not actually but potentially; and this is the case only in mixed and tempered bodies. Therefore it is not possible that any parts of the elements be animated with an intellective soul.

Again. Every living body has some kind of local movement proceeding from its soul: for the heavenly bodies (if indeed they be animated) have a circular movement; perfect animals a progressive movement; shell-fish a movement of expansion and contraction; plants a movement of increase and decrease; all of which are kinds of local movement. Whereas in the elements there is no sign of movement proceeding from a soul, but only such as is natural. Therefore they are not living bodies.

If, however, it be said that although an intellectual substance be not united as a form to an elemental body or part thereof, yet it is united thereto as its mover:—the former is impossible if applied to the air. For since a part of the air has no bounds of its own, no determinate part of the air can have its own proper movement on account of which an intellectual substance be united to it.

Moreover. If an intellectual substance be naturally united to a body as a mover to its proper movable, the motive power of that substance must be confined to the movable body to which it is naturally united; since the power of every proper mover does not, in moving, go beyond its proper movable. Now it seems absurd to say that the power of an intellectual substance does not, in moving, exceed a determinate part of an element, or some mixed body. Therefore seemingly it must not be said that an intellectual substance is naturally united to an elemental body as its mover, unless it be united thereto also as its form.

Again. The movement of an elemental body can proceed from other principles besides an intellectual substance. Wherefore this movement is not a sufficient reason for intellectual substances to be naturally united to elemental bodies.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of Apuleius and certain Platonists, who asserted that the demons are animals with an aerial body, a rational mind, passive in soul, and eternal in duration: and of certain heathens who held the elements to be animated, wherefore they offered them divine worship. Again, the opinion is refuted of those who said that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them, which respectively partake of the nature of the higher or lower elements.

CHAPTER XCI

THAT THERE ARE SOME INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES WHICH ARE NOT UNITED TO BODIES

IT may be shown from the foregoing that there are some intellectual substances which are in no way united to bodies.

For it has been proved above that when the body perishes the substance of the intellect remains inasmuch as it is everlasting. And if the substance of the intellect which remains be one in all, as some assert, it follows of necessity that it is, in its being, separate from the body. And thus our point is proved, namely that some intellectual substance subsists apart from a body. If, however, many intellectual souls survive the destruction of bodies, it will be competent to some intellectual substances to subsist apart from a body: especially since it has been proved that souls do not pass from one body to another. Now this separation from bodies is accidentally competent to souls, since they are naturally forms of bodies. But that which is accidental must be preceded by that which is per se. Therefore there are some intellectual substances, naturally prior to souls, to which it is per se competent to subsist apart from a body.

Moreover. Whatever belongs to the generic nature must belong to the specific nature: whereas certain things belong to the specific nature which are not in the generic nature. Thus rational belongs to the essence of man, but not to the essence of animal. Now that which belongs to the specific nature and not to the generic nature, does not of necessity belong to every species of the genus: for there are many species of irrational animals. And it belongs to the intellectual substance, by reason of its genus, to be per se subsistent, since it has a per se operation, as we have shown above. Now it belongs to the nature of a per se subsistent thing, not to be united to another. Therefore it does not belong to the nature of an intellectual substance to be united to another, although it does belong to the nature of some intellectual substance, namely the soul. Therefore there are some intellectual substances that are not united to a body.

Again. The higher nature in its lowest degree touches the lower nature in its highest degree. Now the intellectual nature is higher than the corporeal: and it touches it in respect of one of its parts, namely the intellective soul. Therefore it follows that, just as the body that is perfected by the intellective soul is the highest in the genus of bodies, so the intellective soul that is united to a body is the lowest in the genus of intellectual substances. Therefore there are some intellectual substances not united to bodies which, in the order of nature, are higher than the soul.

Again. If, in a genus, there be something imperfect, we find that there is something above it which, in the order of nature, is perfect in that genus. Now forms that are in matter are imperfect acts: since they have not complete being. Wherefore there are some forms that are complete acts, subsistent in themselves, and having a complete species. But every form that subsists in itself without matter is an intellectual substance: since immunity from matter gives intellectual being, as was shown above. Therefore there are some intellectual substances that are not united to bodies: for every body is material.

Moreover. Substance can be without quantity, although there cannot be quantity apart from substance: because substance precedes the other genera in time, idea, and knowledge. But no corporeal substance is without quantity. Therefore there can be some things in the genus of substance that are altogether without a body. Now all possible natures are found in the order of things: otherwise the universe would be imperfect. Moreover in everlasting things there is no difference between actual and possible being. Therefore there are some substances subsistent apart from a body, below the first substance which is God, Who is in no genus, as we proved above; and above the soul which is united to a body.

Further. If we find a thing composed of two, and one of these which is the less perfect be found to exist by itself, the one which is more perfect and less dependent on the other is also to be found by itself. Now a certain substance is found to be composed of an intellectual substance and a body, as shown above. And a body is found existing by itself, as evidenced in all inordinate bodies. Much more therefore are some intellectual substances found existing without being united to bodies.

Again. The substance of a thing should be proportionate to its operation: because operation is the act and the good of the operator's substance. Now understanding is the proper operation of an intellectual substance. Wherefore an intellectual substance should be such as is competent to exercise the aforesaid operation. But since understanding is an operation that is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ, it needs not the body except in so far as intelligible objects are taken from sensibles. Yet this is an imperfect way of understanding: since the perfect way of understanding is to understand things that are intelligible by their nature: whereas that only those things be understood which are not intelligible in themselves, but are rendered intelligible by the intellect, is an imperfect way of understanding. Therefore, if before every imperfect thing there must needs be something perfect in the same genus, it follows that above human souls which understand by receiving from phantasms, there are some intellectual substances which understand things that are intelligible in themselves, without receiving knowledge from sensibles, and for this reason are by their nature altogether separate from bodies.

Further. Aristotle argues (11 Metaph.) as follows. A movement that is continuous, regular, and so far as it is concerned, unfailing, must needs be from a mover which is not moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we have proved above. Also, several movements must proceed from several movers. Now the movement of the heaven is continuous, regular, and so far as it is concerned, unfailing: and besides the first movement, there are many such movements in the heaven, as is proved by the observations of astronomers. Hence there must be several movers who are not moved, neither per se nor accidentally. But no body moves unless itself be moved, as we proved above. Moreover an incorporeal mover that is united to a body, is moved accidentally according as the body is moved, as instanced by the soul. Therefore there must be several movers, that are neither bodies nor united to bodies. Now the heavenly movements proceed from an intellect, as was shown above. Therefore there are several intellectual substances that are not united to bodies. This agrees with the opinion of

Dionysius who says (Div. Nom. iv.) in speaking of the angels, that they are understood to be immaterial and incorporeal.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Sadducees who said that there is no spirit: as also the assertion of the philosophers of old who said that every substance is corporeal: and the opinion of Origen who said that with the exception of the Divine Trinity, no substance can subsist apart from a body: and of all those others who hold that all the angels, both good and bad, have bodies naturally united to them.

CHAPTER XCII

OF THE GREAT NUMBER OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

IT must here be noted that Aristotle attempts to prove that not only some intellectual substances exist apart from a body, but also that they are of the same number, neither more nor less, as the movements observed in the heaven.

Thus, he proves that in the heaven there are no movements that cannot be observed by us, from the fact that every movement in the heaven is on account of the movement of some star, which is perceptible to the senses: since the spheres carry the stars and the movement of the carrier is on account of the movement of the carried. Again he proves that there are no separate substances from which some movement does not result in the heaven: because, since the heavenly movements are directed to the separate substances as their respective ends; if there were any separate substances besides those which he enumerates, there would be certain movements directed to them as an end: otherwise such movements would be imperfect. Wherefore he concludes from these premisses that separate substances are not more numerous than the movements that are and can be observed in the heaven: and all the more since there are not several heavenly bodies within the same species, so that there might also be several movements unknown to us.

But this argument is not cogent. For in things directed to an end, necessity depends on the end, as he himself teaches (2 Phys.), and not vice versa. Wherefore if as he states the heavenly movements are directed to separate substances as their respective ends; we cannot necessarily conclude the number of the aforesaid substances from the number of the movements.

For it might be said that there are some separate substances of a higher nature than those which are the proximate ends of the heavenly movements; even as, if tools be on account of the men who work by means of them, this does not hinder there being other men who do not work immediately with those tools, but direct the workers. Hence Aristotle himself adduces this argument, not as cogent but as probable: for he says: Wherefore it is reasonable to reckon such to be the number of unchangeable substances and principles: for we may leave it to more capable persons to decide the point with certainty.

It remains, then, to be shown that the intellectual substances that are separate from bodies are far more numerous than the heavenly movements. For intellectual substances transcend, in their genus, all corporeal nature. Wherefore we must mark the degrees of the aforesaid substances according to their transcendency above corporeal nature. Now some intellectual substances are raised above corporeal substance in their generic nature alone, and are nevertheless united to bodies as forms, as shown above. And since the being of intellectual substances, as regards its genus, is nowise dependent on a body, as we have proved, we find a higher grade of the aforesaid substances, which, though not united to bodies as forms, are nevertheless the proper movers of certain definite bodies. In like manner the nature of an intellectual substance does not depend on its causing movement, since to move is consequent upon their principal operation which is to understand. Hence there will be a yet higher grade of intellectual substances, which are not the proper movers of certain bodies, but are raised above movers.

Moreover. Even as that which acts by its nature, acts by its natural form, so that which acts by its intelligence acts by its intellectual form, as instanced in those who act by their art. Accordingly, as the natural agent is proportionate to the patient by reason of its natural form, so the intelligent agent is proportionate to the patient and to the thing made, through the form of its intellect; so that, in effect, the intellective form is such that it can be induced by the agent's action into the matter which receives it. Hence the proper movers of the spheres,—since they move by their intellect (if we wish to uphold the opinion of Aristotle on this point)—must needs have such intelligences as are in harmony with the movements of the spheres, and reproducible in natural things. But above these intelligible concepts we can apprehend some that are yet more universal: because the intellect apprehends the forms of things in a manner that is more universal than is their being in things: for which reason we find that the form of the speculative intellect is more universal than that of the practical intellect, and among the practical arts, the concept of the commanding art is more universal than that of the executive art. Now we must assign degrees to intellectual substances according to the degree of intellectual operation proper to them. Therefore there are some intellectual substances above those which are the proper and proximate movers of certain definite spheres.

Again. Seemingly the order of the universe requires that whatever is more noble among things should exceed in quantity or number the less noble: since the less noble would seem to be for the sake of the more noble. Hence the more noble things, as existing for their own sake, should be as numerous as possible. Hence we find that incorruptible, i.e. the heavenly, bodies so far surpass corruptible, i.e. the elemental, bodies, that the latter are inconsiderable in quantity as compared with the former. Now just as the heavenly bodies, being incorruptible, are more noble than the elements which are corruptible, so intellectual substances are more noble than all bodies, even as the immovable and the immaterial is more noble than the movable and material. Therefore separate intellectual substances surpass in number the whole multitude of material things: and consequently they are not confined to the number of heavenly movements.

Again. The species of material things are multiplied not through their matter but through their form. Now, forms existing apart from matter, have a more complete and universal being than forms existing in matter: because forms are received into matter according to the receptivity of matter. Wherefore seemingly forms existing apart from matter, which we call separate substances, are not less in number than the species of material things.

Yet we do not therefore say that separate substances are the species of these sensible things, as the Platonists maintained. For since they could not attain to the knowledge of the aforesaid substances except from sensibles, they supposed those substances to be of the same species as these, or rather to be the species of these latter: even as a person who had not seen the sun, moon, and stars, and heard that they were incorruptible bodies, might call them by the names of these corruptible bodies, thinking them to be of the same species as these: which would not be possible. In like manner it is impossible that immaterial substances be of the same species as material, or that they be the species of the latter substances: because the specific nature of these sensible things requires matter, though not this matter, which is the proper principle of the individual: even as the specific nature of man requires flesh and bones, but not this flesh and these bones, which are the principles of Socrates and Plato. Accordingly we do not say that separate substances are the species of these sensibles, but that they are other species more noble than these, forasmuch as the pure is raised above the mixture. And thus those substances must needs be more numerous than the species of these material things.

Further. The possibility of multiplication applies to a thing in its intelligible being rather than in its material being. For we grasp, with our intellect, many things which cannot have being in matter; the result being that any straight line can be produced mathematically, but not in nature; while it is possible for the rarefaction of bodies, the velocity of movements, the diversity of shapes to be multiplied indefinitely in thought, although it is impossible in fact. Now, separate substances have intelligible being by their nature: and consequently a greater multiplicity is possible in them than in material substances, taking into account their respective properties and natures. Now in things everlasting there is no distinction between actual and possible being. Therefore the multitude of separate substances surpasses that of material bodies.

Holy Writ bears witness to this. For it is stated (Dan. 7:10): Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him. And Dionysius (Cœl. Hier. xiv.) says that the number of those substances surpasses all material multitude.

Hereby we set aside the error of those who said that the number of the separate substances corresponds to the number of heavenly movements, or of the heavenly spheres: as well as the error of Rabbi Moses, who said that the number ascribed by Scripture to the angels is not the number of separate substances, but of forces in this lower world; as if one were to give to the concupiscible power the name of spirit of concupiscence, and so on.

CHAPTER XCIII

THAT THERE ARE NOT SEVERAL SEPARATE SUBSTANCES OF ONE SPECIES

FROM what has been said concerning these substances, it may be shown that there are not several separate substances of one species.

For it has been proved above that separate substances are subsistent quiddities. Now, the species of a thing is signified by its definition, for this is the sign of a thing's quiddity. Hence a subsistent quiddity is a subsistent species. Therefore there cannot be several separate substances unless they be several species.

Further. Whatever things are the same in species but differ numerically, have matter: since a difference resulting from form, involves a specific difference: whereas that which results from matter, causes a diversity of number. Now, separate substances are utterly devoid of matter, whether as part of themselves, or by being united to matter as its form. Therefore they cannot possibly be several of one species.

Moreover. The purpose for which, in corruptible things, there are several individuals in one species, is that the specific nature which cannot be preserved for ever in one individual, may be preserved in many: wherefore even in incorruptible bodies there is but one individual in one species. Now the nature of a separate substance can be preserved in one individual, since they are incorruptible, as we proved above. Therefore there is no need for several individuals of the same species in those substances.

Again. In each individual, that which belongs to the species is more noble than that which is the principle of individuality, existing apart from the specific nature. Consequently the multiplicity of species adds more nobility to the universe, than the multiplicity of individuals of one species. Now, the perfection of the universe applies especially to separate substances. Therefore it is more in keeping with the perfection of the universe, that they should be many differing in species, than that they should be multiplied numerically within the same species.

Further. Separate substances are more perfect than the heavenly bodies. Now, in the heavenly bodies, by reason of their perfection, one species contains but one individual: both because each one of them consists of the whole matter pertaining to its species, and because the one individual possesses perfectly the power of its species for the fulfilment of the purpose to which that species is directed in the universe, as especially may be seen in the sun and moon. Much more therefore should we find but one individual of the one species in the separate substances.

CHAPTER XCIV

THAT THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE AND THE SOUL ARE NOT OF ONE SPECIES

FURTHERMORE it can be proved from the foregoing that the soul is not of the same species with separate substances.

For there is a greater difference between the human soul and a separate substance than between one separate substance and another. Now, separate substances are all specifically distinct from one another, as we have proved. Much more, therefore, is a separate substance specifically distinct from the soul.

Moreover. Each thing has its proper being according to its specific nature: because things which have a different kind of being have a different species. Now, the being of the human soul and that of a separate substance are not of the same kind; since the body cannot communicate in the being of a separate substance, whereas it can communicate in the being of the human soul, which is united in being to the body as form to matter. Therefore the human soul differs in species from separate substances.

Again. That which is specified by itself, cannot be of the same species as that which is not specified by itself but is part of a species. Now, the separate substance is specified by itself: whereas the soul is not, but is part of the human species. Hence it is impossible that the soul be of the same species as separate substances; except on the supposition that man be of the same species as they, which is clearly impossible.

Further. The species of a thing is gathered from its operation: since operation indicates the power which reveals the essence. Now, the proper operation of a separate substance and of the intellective soul is understanding. But the separate substance's mode of understanding is wholly different from that of the soul: because the soul understands by receiving from the phantasms; but not so the separate substance, since it has no corporeal organs, wherein phantasms must needs be. Therefore the human soul and the separate substance are not of the same species.

CHAPTER XCV

HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND GENUS AND SPECIES IN SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

IT is necessary to consider wherein species differ in separate substances. For in material things of the same genus and differing in species, the ratio of the genus is derived from the material principle, and the specific difference from the formal principle. Thus the sensitive nature, whence is derived the ratio of animal, is, in man, material in respect of the intellective nature, whence is derived the specific difference of man, namely rational. Consequently, if separate substances are not composed of matter and form, as is evident from what has been said, it is not clear how we are to ascribe to them genus and specific difference.

Accordingly it must be observed that the various species of things possess the nature of being in degrees. For in the first division of being we find at the very outset something perfect, namely substantial (per se) being and actual being, and something imperfect, namely, accidental being and potential being. In like manner if we run through the various species, we find that one species has an additional grade of perfection over another, for instance animals over plants, and animals endowed with locomotion over those that are immovable. Again, in colours one species is seen to be more perfect than another, according as it approaches to whiteness. Hence Aristotle (8 Metaph.) says that the definitions of things are like a number, the species of which is changed by the subtraction or addition of unity: in the same way as a different species results in definitions, if a difference be removed or added. Wherefore the ratio of a determinate species consists in this, that the common nature is placed in a determinate degree of being. And since in things composed of matter and form, the form is the term as it were, and that which is determined thereby is the matter or something material: it follows that the ratio, of the genus must be taken from the material, and the specific difference from the formal element. Hence there results one thing from difference and genus, even as from matter and form. And just as it is one and the same nature that results from matter and form, so the difference does not add an extraneous nature to the genus, but is a determination of the generic nature itself: for instance if we take as a genus an animal with feet, a difference thereof will be an animal with two feet, which difference clearly adds nothing extraneous to the genus.

It is therefore evident that it is accidental to the genus and difference, that the determination denoted by the difference be caused by a principle other than the generic nature, since the nature signified by the definition is composed of matter as determined, and form as determining. Hence if there be a simple nature, it will be determined by itself, nor will it need to have two parts, one determining and the other determined. Consequently the ratio of genus will be derived from the ratio of its nature, and its specific difference will be derived from its determination in that it is placed in a determinate grade of being.

It also follows from this that if any nature be without limits and infinite in itself, as we have shown to be the case with the divine nature, we cannot ascribe to it either genus or species: and this agrees with what, we have proved about God.

Moreover, since the difference of species is attributed to separate substances according as various degrees are ascribed to them, and since there are not several individuals in one species, it is clear, from what has been said, that no two separate substances are equal in degree, but that one is naturally above another. Hence it is stated (Job 38:33): Dost thou know the order of heaven? And Dionysius says (Cœl. Hier. x.) that even as in the whole multitude of angels there is a supreme, middle, and lowest hierarchy, so in each hierarchy there is a highest, a middle, and a lowest order, and in each order, highest, middle, and lowest angels.

Hereby is excluded the opinion of Origen, who said that all spiritual substances were created equal from the beginning, among which he reckoned even souls; and that the difference which we find among these substances, in that this one is united to a body, and that one not, that this one is higher and that one lower, results from a difference of merits. For we have shown that this difference of degree is natural; that the soul is not of the same species as separate substances; nor the separate substances themselves of the same species with one another, and that they are not equal in the order of nature.

CHAPTER XCVI

THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT GATHER THEIR KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSIBLES

FROM what has been laid down it may be shown that separate substances do not receive intellective knowledge from sensible things.

For sensibles by their very nature are adapted to be apprehended by the sense, as intelligibles by the intellect. Wherefore every substance that is capable of knowledge, and derives that knowledge from sensibles, is endowed with sensitive cognition; and consequently has a body united to it naturally, since sensitive knowledge is impossible without a bodily organ. But separate substances have not a body naturally united to them, as we proved above. Therefore they do not derive intellective knowledge from sensible things.

Moreover. A higher power must needs have a higher object. Now the intellective power of a separate substance is higher than that of the human soul: since the human soul's intelligence is the lowest in the order of intellects, as we proved above. And the object of the human soul's intelligence is a phantasm, as stated above; and this is higher in the order of objects than a sensible thing existing outside the mind, as appears from the order of cognitive powers. Consequently the object of a separate substance cannot be a thing existing outside the mind, as the direct object whence it derives its knowledge; nor can it be a phantasm. It follows, in consequence, that the object of the separate substance's intellect is something higher than a phantasm. Now, nothing is higher than a phantasm, in the order of knowable objects, save that which is intelligible actually. Wherefore separate substances do not derive intellectual knowledge from sensibles, but they understand things which are intelligible even in themselves.

Again. The order of intelligibles is in accordance with the order of intellects. Now things intelligible in themselves are, in the order of intelligibles, above those things which are not intelligible but for the fact that we make them intelligible: and such must needs be all intelligibles taken from sensibles; because sensibles are not in themselves intelligible. But such are the intelligibles which our intellect understands. Therefore the intellect of the separate substance, since it is above our intellect, does not understand intelligibles received from sensibles, but it understands those which are intelligible actually.

Moreover. The mode of a thing's proper operation is in keeping with the mode of that thing's substance and nature. Now a separate substance is an intellect existing by itself and not in a body. Consequently, its intellectual operation will be directed to intelligibles that are not founded on a body. But all intelligibles taken from sensibles are somewhat founded on bodies, for instance our intelligibles are founded on the phantasms which are in bodily organs. Therefore separate substances do not derive knowledge from sensibles.

Further. Just as primary matter is the lowest in the order of things sensible, and is consequently only in potentiality to all sensible forms, so the possible intellect, being the lowest in the order of things intelligible, is in potentiality to all intelligibles, as is clear from what has been said. Now those things which, in the order of sensibles, are above primary matter, have their form actually, whereby they are established in sensible being. Therefore separate substances, which, in the order of intelligibles, are above the human possible intellect, are actually in intelligible being: for the intellect that receives knowledge from sensibles is in intelligible being not actually, but potentially. Therefore a separate substance does not receive knowledge from sensibles.

Again. The perfection of a higher nature does not depend on a lower nature. Now the perfection of separate substances, since they are intellectual, consists in understanding. Therefore their understanding does not depend on sensible things, in such a way as to derive knowledge from them.

Hence it is evident that in separate substances there is not an active and a possible intellect, except perhaps in an equivocal sense. Because a possible and an active intellect are found in the intellective soul forasmuch as it derives its knowledge from sensibles: since it is the active intellect that makes the species received from sensibles to be actually intelligible, and the possible intellect is that which is in potentiality to the knowledge of all forms of sensible things. Wherefore, since separate substances do not derive their knowledge from sensibles, there is not in them an active and a possible intellect. Hence Aristotle (3 De Anima) in establishing the possible and active intellects, states that we need to place them in the soul.

It is also evident that in these same substances local distance cannot hinder the knowledge of separate substances. For local distance is per se referable to sense, and not to the intellect except accidentally, in so far as it receives from sense, because sensibles move the senses at a determinate distance. Now things intelligible actually, in so far as they move the intellect, are not in place, for they are separate from corporeal matter. Since then separate substances do not derive intellective knowledge from sensibles, local distance has no effect on their knowledge.

Again, it is clear that time has nothing to do with their intellectual operation. For just as things actually intelligible are apart from place, so are they apart from time: because time is consequent upon local movement; wherefore it measures only such things as are somehow in place. Consequently the understanding of a separate substance transcends time: whereas time is incidental to our intellectual operation, since we derive our knowledge from phantasms which relate to a determinate time. Hence it is that in composition and division our intellect always includes time past or future, but not in understanding what a thing is. For it understands what a thing is by abstracting intelligibles from sensible conditions: wherefore, in respect of that operation, it understands the intelligible apart from time and all conditions of things sensible. Whereas it composes and divides by applying previously abstracted intelligibles to things, and in this application time must of necessity be implied.

CHAPTER XCVII

THAT THE INTELLECT OF A SEPARATE SUBSTANCE ALWAYS UNDERSTANDS ACTUALLY

FROM the foregoing it is also clear that the intellect of a separate substance always understands actually.

For that which is sometimes in act and sometimes in potentiality, is measured by time. But the intellect of a separate substance transcends time, as we have proved. Therefore it is not sometimes actually understanding and sometimes not.

Moreover. Every living substance exercises actually some operation by virtue of its nature, although other operations are in it potentially: thus animals are always in the process of nourishment, although they do not always sense. Now, separate substances are living substances, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore by their nature they must needs be always actually understanding.

Again. The separate substances, according to the teaching of philosophers, move the heavenly bodies by their intellect. Now the movement of the heavenly bodies is always continuous. Therefore the understanding of separate substances is continuous and perpetual.

The same conclusion follows even if we deny that they move the heavenly bodies, since they are higher than the heavenly bodies. Wherefore, if the proper operation of a heavenly body, which is its movement, is continuous, much more will the proper operation of separate substances, namely understanding, be continuous.

Moreover. Whatever sometimes operates and sometimes does not operate, is moved either per se or accidentally. Wherefore the fact that we are sometimes understanding and sometimes not understanding, is due to an alteration in the sensible faculty, as stated in 7 Phys. But separate substances are not moved per se, since they are not bodies; nor are they moved accidentally, since they are not united to bodies. Therefore their proper operation, which is to understand, is continual in them without any interruption.

CHAPTER XCVIII

HOW ONE SEPARATE SUBSTANCE UNDERSTANDS ANOTHER

IF separate substances understand things that are by themselves intelligible, as we have proved; and if separate substances are by themselves intelligible, since freedom from matter makes a thing intelligible by itself, as appears from the foregoing, it follows that separate substances understand separate substances as their proper objects. Wherefore each of them knows itself and others.

Each one indeed knows itself otherwise than the possible intellect knows itself. For the possible intellect is in potentiality in intelligible being, and is made actual by the intelligible species, even as primary matter is made actual in sensible being by a natural form. Now nothing is known according as it is only in potentiality, but a thing is known according as it is in act; hence the form is the principle whereby we know the thing which is made actual thereby, and in like manner the cognitive power is made actually cognizant by some species. Accordingly our intellect does not know itself except by the species whereby it is made actual in intelligible being; for which reason Aristotle (3 De Anima) says that it is knowable in the same way as other things, namely by species derived from phantasms, as by their proper forms. On the other hand separate substances, by their nature, exist actually in intelligible being. Wherefore each one of them knows itself by its essence, and not by the species of another thing. Since, however, all knowledge is according as the image of the thing known is in the knower; and since one separate substance is like another as regards the common generic nature, while they differ the one from the other in regard to the species, as appears from the foregoing; it would seem to follow that the one does not know the other, as regards its proper specific nature, but only as regards the common nature of their genus.

Accordingly some say that one separate substance is the efficient cause of another. Now in every efficient cause there must be the image of its effect, and likewise in every effect there must be the likeness of its cause: because every agent produces its like. Hence in the higher separate substance there exists the likeness of the lower, as in the cause there is the likeness of its effect; while in the lower there is the likeness of the higher, as in the effect there is the likeness of its cause. Now if we consider non-univocal causes, the likeness of the effect exists in the cause in a more eminent manner, and the likeness of the cause is in its effect in a less eminent manner. And the higher separate substances must needs be causes of this kind with respect to the lower separate substances: because they are placed in various degrees which are not of one species. Therefore a lower separate substance knows a higher according to the mode of the substance knowing, and not according to the mode of the substance known, but in a lower manner: whereas the higher knows the lower in a more eminent way. This is the meaning of the statement in De Causis, that an intelligence knows what is below it, and what is above it, according to the mode of its substance: because the one is the cause of the other.

But since we have shown above that intellectual separate substances are not composed of matter and form, they cannot be caused except by way of creation. Now to create belongs to God alone, as we proved above. Therefore one separate substance cannot be the cause of another.

Further. It has been proved that the principal parts of the universe are all created immediately by God. Therefore one of them is not caused by another. Now each of the separate substances is a principal part of the universe, much more than the sun or moon: since each of them has its proper species, which is also more noble than any species of things corporeal. Therefore one of them is not caused by another, but all are produced immediately by God.

Hence, according to the foregoing, each of the separate substances knows God by its natural knowledge, according to the mode of its substance, whereby they are like God as their cause. But God knows them as their proper cause, having in Himself the likeness of them all. Yet one separate substance is unable to know another in this way, since one is not the cause of another.

We must, therefore, observe that, since none of these substances according to its essence is an adequate principle of the knowledge of all other things, it is necessary for each of them, in addition to its own substance, to have some intelligible images, whereby each of them is enabled to know another in its proper nature.

This can be made clear in the following manner. The proper object of an intellect is an intelligible being: and this includes all possible differences and species of being: because whatever can be, is intelligible. Now, since all knowledge is caused by some kind of likeness, the intellect is unable to know its object wholly, unless it has in itself the likeness of all being and of all its differences. But such a likeness of all being can only be an infinite nature, which is not confined to any species or genus of being, but is the universal principle and active force of all being: and this is the divine nature alone, as we proved in the First Book. And every other nature, since it is confined to some genus or species of being, cannot be a universal likeness of all being. It follows, therefore, that God alone, by His essence, knows all things; while every separate substance, by its nature, knows its own species alone with a perfect knowledge: whereas the possible intellect does not know itself at all thus, but by its intelligible species, as stated above.

Now from the very fact that a particular substance is intellectual, it is capable of understanding all being. Wherefore, as a separate substance is not, by its nature, made actually to understand all being, that substance, considered in itself, is in potentiality, as it were, to the intelligible images whereby all being is known, and these images will be its acts, according as it is intellectual. But it is not possible that these images be otherwise than several: for it has been already proved that the perfect image of the whole universal being cannot but be infinite; and just as the nature of a separate substance is not infinite, but limited, so an intelligible image existing therein cannot be infinite, but is confined to some species or genus of being: wherefore several such images are requisite for the comprehension of all being. Now, the higher a separate substance is, the more is its nature similar to the divine; and consequently it is less limited, as approaching nearer to the perfection and goodness of the universal being, and for this reason it has a more universal participation of goodness and being. Consequently the intelligible images that are in the higher substance are less numerous and more universal. This agrees with the statement of Dionysius (Cœl. Hier. xii.) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge: and it is said in De Causis that the higher intelligences have more universal forms. Now, the highest point of this universality is in God, Who knows all things by one, namely His essence: whereas the lowest is in the human intellect, which, for each intelligible object, requires an appropriate intelligible species commensurate with that object.

It follows that with the higher substances knowledge through more universal forms is not more imperfect, as it is with us. For through the image of animal, whereby we know something in its genus only, we have a more imperfect knowledge than through the image of man, whereby we know the complete species: since to know a thing as to its genus only, is to know it imperfectly and potentially as it were, whereas to know a thing as to its species, is to know it perfectly and actually. Now our intellect, since it obtains the lowest place in intellectual substances, requires images particularized to that extent that to each proper object of its knowledge there must needs correspond a proper image in it: wherefore, by the image of animal it knows not rational, and consequently neither does it know man, except in a certain respect. On the other hand the intelligible image that is in a separate substance is of more universal virtue, and suffices to represent more things. Consequently it argues not a more imperfect but a more perfect knowledge: because it is virtually universal, like the active form in a universal cause which, the more universal it is, the greater the extent of its efficiency, and the more efficacious its production. Therefore by one image it knows both animal and the differences of animal: or again it knows them in a more universal or more limited way according to the order of the aforesaid substances.

Hence we may take examples of this, as we have stated, in the two extremes, namely in the divine and human intellects. For God knows all things by one, namely His essence: while man requires different likenesses to know different things. Moreover the higher his intellect, the more things is he able to know through fewer: wherefore we need to give particular examples to those who are slow of intelligence, in order that they may acquire knowledge about things.

Now since a separate substance, considered in its nature, is in potentiality to the images by which all being is known, we must not think that it is devoid of all such images: for such is the disposition of the possible intellect before it understands, as stated in 3 De Anima. Nor again must we think that it has some of them actually, and others potentially only: even as primary matter in the lower bodies has one form actually and others potentially; and as our possible intellect, when we are already possessed of knowledge, is in act in respect of some intelligibles, and in potentiality in respect of others. For since these separate substances are not moved, neither per se nor accidentally, as we have proved, whatever is potential in them, must be actual; else they would pass from potentiality to act, and thus they would be moved per se or accidentally. There is, therefore, in them potentiality and act as regards intelligible being, just as there is in the heavenly bodies as regards natural being. For the matter of a heavenly body is so perfected by its form, that it does not remain in potentiality to other forms: and in like manner the intellect of a separate substance is wholly perfected by intelligible forms, with respect to its natural knowledge. On the other hand our possible intellect is proportionate to the corruptible bodies to which it is united as a form: because it is made to have certain intelligible forms actually in such a way that it remains in potentiality to others. For this reason it is stated in De Causis that an intelligence is full of forms, since, to wit, the whole potentiality of its intellect is perfected by intelligible forms. And thus one separate substance is able to understand another through these intelligible forms.

Someone, however, may think that, since a separate substance is intelligible by its nature, there is no need to assert that one is understood by another through intelligible species, but that they understand one another by the very essence of the substance understood. For it would seem that the fact of a substance being understood through an intelligible species is accidental to material substances, from their not being actually intelligible through their essence: wherefore it is necessary for them to be understood through abstract intentions. Moreover this seems in accord with the statement of the Philosopher who says (11 Metaph.) that in separate substances there is no distinction between matter, intellect, the act of understanding, and the thing understood.

And yet if this be granted it involves not a few difficulties. First, because the intellect in act is the thing understood in act according to the teaching of Aristotle: and it is difficult to see how one separate substance is identified with another when it understands it.

Again. Every agent or operator acts through its form, to which its operation corresponds, as heating corresponds to heat; wherefore we see the thing whose species informs the sight. Yet it does not seem possible for one separate substance to be the form of another, since each has its being separate from the other. Therefore it is seemingly impossible for the one to be seen by the other through its essence.

Moreover. The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands. Now a lower substance cannot be a perfection of a higher. It would follow, therefore, that the higher would not understand the lower, if each were understood through its essence and not by another species.

Further. The intelligible object is within the intellect as to that whereby it is understood. Now no substance enters into the mind save God alone, Who is in all things by His essence, presence, and power. Therefore it is seemingly impossible for a separate substance to be understood by another through its essence, and not through its image in that other.

This must indeed be true according to the opinion of Aristotle who says that understanding takes place through the fact that the thing understood in act is one with the intellect in act. Wherefore a separate substance, although it is by itself actually intelligible, is nevertheless not understood in itself except by an intellect with which it is one. And it is thus that a separate substance understands itself by its essence: so that according to this the intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding are the same thing.

But according to the opinion of Plato, understanding takes place through contact of the intellect with the thing understood. So that, in consequence, one separate substance can understand another through its essence, when it is in spiritual contact with it; the higher understanding the lower, by enclosing and containing it by its power as it were, and the lower understanding the higher, as though it grasped it as its own perfection. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that the higher substances are intelligible as the food of the lower substances.

CHAPTER XCIX

THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW MATERIAL THINGS

BY these aforesaid forms, then, a separate substance knows not only other separate substances, but also the species of corporeal things.

For, since their intellect is perfect in respect of its natural perfection, being wholly in act, it follows that it comprehends its object, intelligible being to wit, in every respect. Now intelligible being comprises also the species of corporeal things. Therefore a separate substance knows them.

Again. Since the species of things are differentiated as the species of numbers, as stated above, it follows that the higher species contains in some way that which is in the lower, even as the greater number contains the lesser. Seeing then that separate substances are above corporeal substances, it follows that whatever is contained in corporeal substances materially, is contained in separate substances intelligibly; for that which is in a thing, is there according to the mode of the thing in which it is.

Again. If the separate substances move the heavenly bodies, as philosophers say, whatever results from the movement of the heavenly bodies is ascribed to those same bodies as instruments, since they move through being moved; and to the separate substances that move them, as principal agents. Now they act and move by their intellect. Consequently they cause whatever is done by the movement of the heavenly bodies, just as the craftsman works through his tools. Hence their forms which are generated and corrupted are in separate substances intelligibly. Wherefore Boethius, in his book De Trinitate, says that from forms that are without matter came the forms that are in matter. Therefore separate substances know not only separate substances, but also the species of material things.

For if they know the species of bodies subject to generation and corruption as being the species of their proper effects, much more do they know the species of heavenly bodies, as being the species of their proper instruments.

Wherefore, since the intellect of a separate substance is in act, having all the images to which it is in potentiality; and since it has the power to comprehend all the species and differences of being, it follows of necessity that every separate substance knows all natural things and their whole order.

Yet seeing that the intellect in act is the thing actually understood, someone might think that a separate substance does not understand material things; for it would seem incongruous that a material thing should be the perfection of a separate substance.

But if the point be considered aright, the thing understood is a perfection of the one who understands, according to the image thereof in the intellect, for the stone which is outside the soul is not a perfection of our possible intellect. Now the image of the material thing is in the intellect of a separate substance immaterially, according to the mode of a separate substance, and not according to the mode of a material substance. Wherefore there is no reason why we should not say that this image is a perfection of the separate substance's intellect, as its proper form.

CHAPTER C

THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW SINGULARS

SINCE in the intellect of a separate substance the images of things are more universal than in our intellect, and more efficacious as a medium of knowledge, it follows that separate substances, through the images of material things, know material things not only according to their generic or specific nature, but also according to their individual nature.

For seeing that the species of things in the intellect must needs be immaterial, they cannot, as existing in our intellect, be the principle of knowing singulars, which are individualized by matter: because the species of our intellect are of such limited virtue, that one leads to the knowledge only of one. Wherefore, just as the image of the generic nature cannot lead to the knowledge of genus and difference, so that the species be known thereby, in like manner the image of the specific nature cannot lead to the knowledge of the principles of individuality, which are material principles, so that the individual be known thereby in its singularity. On the other hand the image in the intellect of a separate substance, since it is of a more universal virtue, being at the same time one and immaterial, is able to lead to the knowledge of both the specific and the individualizing principles, so that through it the separate substance is able by its intellect to know not only the generic and specific natures, but also the individual nature. Nor does it follow that the form through which it knows is material; nor that such forms are infinite according to the number of individuals.

Further. Whatever a lower power can do, that can a higher power do, but in a higher way. Hence the lower power works by many instruments, whereas the higher power works by one only. For a power, the higher it is, the more is it consolidated and unified, whereas, on the other hand, the lower power is disunited and multiplied. Hence we observe that the one power of the common sense apprehends the various kinds of sensibles which the five external senses perceive. Now the human soul is lower than a separate substance in the order of nature: and it is cognizant of universals and singulars through two principles, namely, sense and intellect. Consequently a separate substance, being higher, knows both in a higher way by one principle, namely the intellect.

Again. The order in which the intelligible species of things reach our intellect is contrary to the order in which they reach the intellect of a separate substance. For they reach our intellect by a process of analysis, and by abstraction from material and individualizing conditions; so that it is not possible for us to know singulars through them. On the other hand they reach the intellect of a separate substance by a process of synthesis as it were: since it has intelligible species through its likeness to the first intelligible species, viz. the divine intellect, which is not abstracted from things, but productive of them. Now, it is productive not merely of the form but also of the matter which is the principle of individuality. Wherefore the species of the intellect of a separate substance represent the whole thing, not only the principles of its species, but also the principles of its individuality. Consequently we must not deny separate substances the knowledge of singulars, although our intellect is unable to know singulars.

Further. If the heavenly bodies are moved by the separate substances, according to the statement of philosophers, since separate substances act and move by their intellect, they must needs know the movable that they move: and this is some particular thing, for universals are immovable. Their positions also, which are changed by their movement, are singular things, and cannot be unknown to the substance which moves them by its intellect. We must, therefore, say that separate substances know singulars connected with these material things.

CHAPTER CI

WHETHER SEPARATE SUBSTANCES KNOW ALL THINGS AT THE SAME TIME BY THEIR NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

NOW since the intellect in act is the thing actually understood, as the sense in act is the thing actually sensed; and since the same thing cannot be several things actually at the same time, it would seem impossible for the intellect of a separate substance to have various species of things intelligible, as we have stated above.

But it must be noted that not all is actually understood, the intelligible species of which is actually in the intellect. For since a substance which has understanding has also a will, and consequently has the control of its action, it is in its power, when it already has an intelligible species, to make use of it for understanding actually; or, if it have several species, to use one of them. Wherefore we do not actually consider all the things whereof we possess knowledge. Therefore an intellectual substance that has knowledge through several species, uses one of them as it will, and thereby knows actually at the same time all that he knows by one species; for they are all as one intelligible thing in so far as they are known through one (species), even as our intellect knows at the same time several things compared or related to one another as one individual thing. But it does not know at the same time the things which it knows through different species. Therefore as there is one understanding so is there one thing actually understood.

Accordingly in the intellect of a separate substance there is a certain succession of understandings: there is not, however, movement properly speaking, since act does not succeed potentiality, but act succeeds act. Whereas the divine intellect, forasmuch as it knows all things through one, namely the divine essence, and because its act is its essence, knows all things at the same time. Consequently there is no succession in His understanding, but His act of intelligence is wholly perfect at the same time, and endureth through all ages. Amen.

THIRD BOOK

CHAPTER I

FOREWORD

The Lord is a great God and a great King above all gods. For the Lord will not reject His people. For in His hands are all the ends of the earth and the heights of the mountains are His. For the sea is His and He made it, and His hands formed the dry land (Ps. 94:3 seqq.)

WE have shown in the preceding books that there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of all being, whom we call God, and who of the abundance of His perfection, bestows being on all that exists, so that He is proved to be not only the first of beings, but also the beginning of all. Moreover He bestows being on others, not through natural necessity, but according to the decree of His will, as we have shown above. Hence it follows that He is the Lord of the things made by Him: since we dominate over those things that are subject to our will. And this is a perfect dominion that He exercises over things made by Him, forasmuch as in their making He needs neither the help of an extrinsic agent, nor matter as the foundation of His work: since He is the universal efficient cause of all being.

Now everything that is produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by that agent: because the good and the end are the proper object of the will, wherefore whatever proceeds from a will must needs be directed to an end. And each thing attains its end by its own action, which action needs to be directed by him who endowed things with the principles whereby they act.

Consequently God, who in Himself is perfect in every way, and by His power endows all things with being, must needs be the Ruler of all, Himself ruled by none: nor is any thing to be excepted from His ruling, as neither is there any thing that does not owe its being to Him. Therefore as He is perfect in being and causing, so is He perfect in ruling.

The effect of this ruling is seen to differ in different things, according to the difference of natures. For some things are so produced by God that, being intelligent, they bear a resemblance to Him and reflect His image: wherefore not only are they directed, but they direct themselves to their appointed end by their own actions. And if in thus directing themselves they be subject to the divine ruling, they are admitted by that divine ruling to the attainment of their last end; but are excluded therefrom if they direct themselves otherwise.

Others there are, bereft of intelligence, which do not direct themselves to their end, but are directed by another. Of these some being incorruptible, even as they are not patient of defect in their natural being, so neither do they wander, in their own action, from the direction to their appointed end, but are subject, without fail, to the ruling of the supreme ruler; such are the heavenly bodies, whose movements are invariable. Others, however, being corruptible, are patient of defects in their natural being; yet this defect is supplied to the advantage of another: since when one thing is corrupted, another is generated. Likewise, they fail from their natural direction in their own actions, yet this failing is compensated by some resultant good. Whence it is clear that not even those things which are seen to wander from the direction of the supreme ruling, escape from the power of the supreme ruler: because also these corruptible bodies, even as they are created by God, so too are they perfectly subject to Him. Wherefore, considering this, the Psalmist, filled with the divine spirit, in order to give us an illustration of the divine government, first describes to us the perfection of the supreme governor,—as to His nature when he says, God: as to His power, when he says, a great Lord, implying that He needs no one for His power to produce its effect: as to His authority, when he says, A great king above all gods, since, although there be many rulers, yet are all subject to His rule. Secondly, he describes to us the manner of this government. As regards intellectual beings, which, if they submit to His rule, receive from Him their last end which is Himself; wherefore he says, For the Lord will not reject His people. As regards things corruptible which, albeit at times they wander from their proper mode of action, never escape the power of the supreme ruler, he says, Because in His hands are all the ends of the earth. And as regards the heavenly bodies, which transcend the highest summits of the earth, that is of corruptible bodies, and always maintain the order of the divine government, he says, And the mountain heights are His. Thirdly, he assigns the reason of this universal government, for the things that God made must needs be governed by Him. To this he refers when he says, For the sea is His, etc.

Since then in the First Book we have treated of the perfection of the divine nature, and, in the Second, of the perfection of the divine power, inasmuch as He is the creator and lord of all: it remains for us in this Third Book to treat of His perfect authority or dignity, inasmuch as He is the end and governor of all. We must therefore proceed in this wise, so as first to treat of Him as the end of all things; secondly of His universal government, inasmuch as He governs every creature: thirdly, of that special government, whereby He governs creatures endowed with intelligence.

CHAPTER II

THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR AN END

ACCORDINGLY we must first show that every agent, by its action, intends an end.

For in those things which clearly act for an end, we declare the end to be that towards which the movement of the agent tends: for when this is reached, the end is said to be reached, and to fail in this is to fail in the end intended; as may be seen in the physician who aims at health, and in a man who runs towards an appointed goal. Nor does it matter, as to this, whether that which tends to an end be cognitive or not: for just as the target is the end of the archer, so is it the end of the arrow’s flight. Now the movement of every agent tends to something determinate: since it is not from any force that any action proceeds, but heating proceeds from heat, and cooling from cold; wherefore actions are differentiated by their active principles. Action sometimes terminates in something made, for instance building terminates in a house, healing ends in health: while sometimes it does not so terminate, for instance, understanding and sensation. And if action terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends by that action towards that thing made: while if it does not terminate in something made, the movement of the agent tends to the action itself. It follows therefore that every agent intends an end while acting, which end is sometimes the action itself, sometimes a thing made by the action.

Again. In all things that act for an end, that is said to be the last end, beyond which the agent seeks nothing further: thus the physician’s action goes as far as health, and this being attained, his efforts cease. But in the action of every agent, a point can be reached beyond which the agent does not desire to go; else actions would tend to infinity, which is impossible, for since it is not possible to pass through an infinite medium, the agent would never begin to act, because nothing moves towards what it cannot reach. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Moreover. If the actions of an agent proceed to infinity, these actions must needs result either in something made, or not. If the result is something made, the being of that thing made will follow after an infinity of actions. But that which presupposes an infinity of things, cannot possibly be, since an infinite medium cannot be passed through. Now impossibility of being argues impossibility of becoming: and that which cannot become, it is impossible to make. Therefore it is impossible for an agent to begin to make a thing for the making of which an infinity of actions are presupposed.—If, however, the result of such actions be not something made, the order of these actions must be either according to the order of active forces, (for instance if a man feel that he may imagine, and imagine that he may understand, and understand that he may will): or according to the order of objects, (for instance I consider the body that I may consider the soul, which I consider in order to consider a separate substance, which again I consider so that I may consider God). Now it is not possible to proceed to infinity, either in active forces, as neither is this possible in the forms of things, as proved in 2 Metaph., since the form is the principle of activity: or in objects, as neither is this possible in beings, since there is one first being, as we have proved above. Therefore it is not possible for agents to proceed to infinity: and consequently there must be something, which being attained, the efforts of the agent cease. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Further. In things that act for an end, whatsoever comes between the first agent and the last end, is an end in respect to what precedes, and an active principle in respect of what follows. Hence if the effort of the agent does not tend to something determinate, and if its action, as stated, proceeds to infinity, the active principles must needs proceed to infinity: which is impossible, as we have shown above. Therefore the effort of the agent must of necessity tend to something determinate.

Again. Every agent acts either by nature or by intelligence. Now there can be no doubt that those which act by intelligence act for an end; since they act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action, and act through such preconception, for this is to act by intelligence. Now just as in the preconceiving intellect there exists the entire likeness of the effect that is attained by the action of the intellectual being, so in the natural agent there pre-exists the similitude of the natural effect, by virtue of which similitude its action is determined to the appointed effect: for fire begets fire, and an olive produces an olive. Wherefore even as that which acts by intelligence tends by its action to a definite end, so also does that which acts by nature. Therefore every agent acts for an end.

Moreover. Fault is not found save in those things which are for an end: for we do not find fault with one who fails in that to which he is not appointed; thus we find fault with a physician if he fail to heal, but not with a builder or a grammarian. But we find fault in things done according to art, as when a grammarian fails to speak correctly; and in things that are ruled by nature, as in the case of monstrosities. Therefore every agent, whether according to nature, or according to art, or acting of set purpose, acts for an end.

Again. Were an agent not to act for a definite effect, all effects would be indifferent to it. Now that which is indifferent to many effects does not produce one rather than another: wherefore from that which is indifferent to either of two effects, no effect results, unless it be determined by something to one of them. Hence it would be impossible for it to act. Therefore every agent tends to some definite effect, which is called its end.

There are, however, certain actions which would seem not to be for an end, such as playful and contemplative actions, and those which are done without attention, such as scratching one’s beard, and the like: whence some might be led to think that there is an agent that acts not for an end.—But we must observe that contemplative actions are not for another end, but are themselves an end. Playful actions are sometimes an end, when one plays for the mere pleasure of play; and sometimes they are for an end, as when we play that afterwards we may study better. Actions done without attention do not proceed from the intellect, but from some sudden act of the imagination, or some natural principle: thus a disordered humour produces an itching sensation and is the cause of a man scratching his beard, which he does without his mind attending to it. Such actions do tend to an end, although outside the order of the intellect. Hereby is excluded the error of certain natural philosophers of old, who maintained that all things happen by natural necessity, thus utterly banishing the final cause from things.

CHAPTER III

THAT EVERY AGENT ACTS FOR A GOOD

HENCE we must go on to prove that every agent acts for a good.

For that every agent acts for an end clearly follows from the fact that every agent tends to something definite. Now that to which an agent tends definitely must needs be befitting to that agent: since the latter would not tend to it save on account of some fittingness thereto. But that which is befitting to a thing is good for it. Therefore every agent acts for a good.

Further. The end is that wherein the appetite of the agent or mover is at rest, as also the appetite of that which is moved. Now it is the very notion of good to be the term of appetite, since good is the object of every appetite. Therefore all action and movement is for a good.

Again. All action and movement would seem to be directed in some way to being: either for the preservation of being in the species or in the individual; or for the acquisition of being. Now this itself, being to wit, is a good: and for this reason all things desire being. Therefore all action and movement is for a good.

Furthermore. All action and movement is for some perfection. For if the action itself be the end, it is clearly a second perfection of the agent. And if the action consist in the transformation of external matter, clearly the mover intends to induce some perfection into the thing moved: towards which perfection the movable tends, if the movement be natural. Now when we say a thing is perfect, we mean that it is good. Therefore every action and movement is for a good.

Also. Every agent acts according as it is actual. Now by acting it tends to something similar to itself. Therefore it tends to an act. But an act has the ratio of good: since evil is not found save in a potentiality lacking act. Therefore every action is for a good.

Moreover. The intellectual agent acts for an end, as determining on its end: whereas the natural agent, though it acts for an end, as proved above, does not determine on its end, since it knows not the ratio of end, but is moved to the end determined for it by another. Now an intellectual agent does not determine the end for itself except under the aspect of good; for the intelligible object does not move except it be considered as a good, which is the object of the will. Therefore also the natural agent is not moved, nor does it act for an end, except in so far as this end is a good: since the end is determined for the natural agent by an appetite. Therefore every agent acts for a good.

Again. To shun evil and to seek good are in the same ratio: even as movement from below and upward movement are in the same ratio. Now we observe that all things shun evil: for intellectual agents shun a thing for the reason that they apprehend it as an evil: and all natural agents, in proportion to their strength, resist corruption which is the evil of everything. Therefore all things act for a good.

Again. That which results from the agent’s action beside his intention, is said to happen by chance or luck. Now we observe in the works of nature that either always or more often that happens which is best: thus in plants the leaves are so placed as to protect the fruit; and the parts of an animal are so disposed as to conduce to the animal’s safety. Wherefore, if this happens beside the intention of the natural agent, it will be the result of chance or luck. But that is impossible: because things that happen always or frequently, are not casual or fortuitous, but those which occur seldom. Therefore the natural agent tends to that which is best: and much more evidently is this so with the intellectual agent. Therefore every agent intends a good in acting.

Moreover. Whatever is moved is brought to the term of movement by the mover and agent. Therefore mover and moved tend to the same term. Now that which is moved, since it is in potentiality, tends to an act, and consequently to perfection and goodness: for by its movement it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore mover and agent by moving and acting always intend a good.

Hence the philosophers in defining the good said: The good is the object of every appetite; and Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv.) says that all things desire the good and the best.

CHAPTER IV

THAT EVIL IS UNINTENTIONAL IN THINGS

IT follows from the above that evil is incidental to things beside the intention of an agent.

For when the result of an action differs from the intention of the agent, it is clear that such result occurs unintentionally. Now evil differs from good which every agent intends. Therefore evil happens beside the intention.

Also. Defect in effect and action results from defect in the principle of action: thus a monstrosity results from a defect in the seed, and limping results from a curvature of the leg. Now an agent acts according as it is possessed of active force, and not according as it suffers from defective power. And according as it acts, it intends the end. Wherefore it intends an end corresponding to its power. Hence whatever follows corresponding to the defective power, will be beside the agent's intention. And this is evil. Therefore evil occurs beside the intention.

Again. The movement of the thing moved has the same tendency as the motion of the mover. Now the thing moved tends per se to good, but to evil it tends accidentally and unintentionally. This is most evident in generation and corruption. For matter, while it underlies one form, is in potentiality to another form, and to the privation of the form which it has already: thus when it is under the form of air, it is in potentiality to the form of fire and the privation of the form of air. And the transformation of matter terminates in both at the same time: in the form of fire by reason of fire being generated, and in the privation of the form of air, by reason of the air being corrupted. But the intention and appetite of matter is not towards the privation, but towards the form: for it does not tend towards the impossible;

and it is impossible for matter to be alone under a privation, whereas it is possible for it to be under a form. Therefore it is unintentional that it terminate in privation: and it terminates therein in so far as it attains the form which it intends, the necessary result whereof is the privation of the other form. Therefore in generation and corruption the transformation of matter is directed per se to the form, and privation results unintentionally. And the same must needs apply to all manner of movement: so that in every movement there is generation and corruption in some respect: for instance, when a thing is changed from white to black, a white thing is corrupted and a black one is made. Now the good is according as matter is perfected by the form, and potentiality by its proper act: while evil is according as it is deprived of its proper act. Consequently, whatever is moved intends in its movement, to attain some good; and it attains evil beside its intention. Hence, since every agent and mover tends to the good, evil occurs beside the intention of the agent.

Moreover. In those things that act by intelligence or any kind of instinct, intention follows apprehension; because the intention is towards that which is apprehended as an end. Accordingly if something is attained that has no species in the apprehension, it will be beside the intention: for instance, if one were to intend to eat honey, and were to eat gall thinking that it was honey, this will be beside the intention. But every intellectual agent tends to something in so far as he considers it under the aspect of good, as we have shown above. Wherefore if this be not a good but an evil, it will be beside the intention. Therefore that which acts by intelligence does not work evil except unintentionally. Therefore, since to tend to a good is common to intellectual and natural agents, evil does not ensue from the intention of an agent except beside that intention. In this sense Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv.) that evil is unintentional and, involuntary.

CHAPTERS V AND VI

ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT EVIL IS NOT BESIDE THE INTENTION

THERE are, however, some objections that would seem to run counter to this conclusion.

For that which occurs beside the intention of the agent is said to happen fortuitously, casually and seldom. But evil is not said to happen fortuitously and casually, nor does it occur seldom but always or frequently. For in the physical order generation is ever accompanied by corruption. And in voluntary agents sin is of frequent occurrence, since it is as difficult to behave virtuously, as to find the centre of a circle, as Aristotle states (2 Ethic. ix.). Therefore it would seem that evil is not an unintentional occurrence.

Again. Aristotle says (3 Ethic. v.) expressly that vice is voluntary; and he proves this from the fact that a man does an injustice voluntarily, and it is absurd to suppose that the man who does unjust actions voluntarily does not wish to be unjust, and that he who rapes voluntarily does not wish to be incontinent; and again from the fact that legislators punish evil-doers as doing evil voluntarily. Therefore evil would seem not to be unintentional or involuntary.

Further. Every natural movement has an end intended by nature. Now corruption is a natural movement, even as generation. Therefore its end, which is privation having the aspect of evil, is intended by nature; even as the form and the good, which are the end of generation.

In order that the solution of the arguments here given may be made clear we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance, or as in its action. In a substance that is evil through its lacking something natural and due to it, for that a man have not wings, is not an evil to him, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man have not fair hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he have no hands, which are natural and due to him, if he be perfect; and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due; and consequently the aspect of evil is always in a privation thus understood.

Matter, since it is in potentiality to all forms, is adapted by nature to all of them, yet no one is due to it; since it can be actually perfect without any particular one. Nevertheless, some one of them is due to one of those things that are made of matter: for there can be no water without the form of water, nor can there be fire without the form of fire. Accordingly the privation of such a form, in relation to matter, is not an evil to matter: but in relation to that thing of which it is the form, it is an evil thereof; thus the privation of the form of fire is an evil of fire. And since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to exist except forasmuch as they are in a subject, if privation be an evil in relation to the subject wherein it is, it will be an evil simply: otherwise it will be the evil of something but not simply. Hence that a man be deprived of a hand is an evil simply; but that matter be deprived of the form of air is not an evil simply, but an evil of the air. On the other hand, privation of order or due proportion in an action, is an evil of the action. And since to every action order and proportion are due, such a privation in an action must needs be an evil simply.

Accordingly, taking these remarks into account, we must note that what is unintentional is not always fortuitous or casual, as the first argument stated. For if that which is unintentional be always or frequently the result of that which was intended, it will not happen fortuitously or casually: thus if a man intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, and becomes drunk through drinking, this will be neither fortuitous nor casual: but it would be casual if such a result were to occur seldom.

Therefore the evil of natural corruption, although it ensue beside the intention of the generator, follows nevertheless always, since the presence of one form is ever accompanied by the privation of another. Wherefore corruption does not ensue casually, nor even seldom: although sometimes privation is not an evil simply, but the evil of some particular thing, as stated above. If, however, the privation be such as to deprive the thing generated of that which is due to it, it will be casual and an evil simply, as in the birth of monstrosities: for this does not follow of necessity from that which was intended, but is opposed thereto; since the agent intends the perfection of the thing generated.

Evil of action occurs in natural agents through a defect in the active force. Hence if the agent's force be defective, this evil ensues beside the intention; yet it will not be casual, because it follows of necessity from such an agent: provided always that the agent in question always or frequently suffer this defect. But it will be casual if this defect seldom accompanies this agent. In voluntary agents the intention is directed to some particular good, if the action is to follow: for movement is not caused by universals but by particulars about which actions are. Accordingly, if the good that is intended is accompanied always or frequently by the privation of a rational good, moral evil ensues not casually, but either always or frequently: as in the case of a man who desires intercourse with a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure is connected the inordination of adultery: wherefore the evil of adultery is not a casual sequel. It would, however, be a casual evil, if sin were to ensue seldom from what he intends: as in one who while firing at a bird, kills a man.

That anyone should intend suchlike goods which frequently result in privation of a rational good, is due to the fact that many live a sensuous life; because sensible things are the more manifest to us, and move more efficaciously in a world of individual things among which operation takes place: and privation of the rational good ensues from many goods of that kind. Hence it follows that, although evil is beside the intention, it is nevertheless voluntary, as the second argument states, accidentally however and not per se. For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake: while the will is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it simply: for instance the man who throws his cargo overboard for the sake of safety, intends not the throwing of his cargo, but safety, and he wills the throwing of the cargo, not simply but for the sake of safety. In like manner for the sake of obtaining a sensible good a man wills to perform an inordinate action, neither intending the inordinateness nor willing it simply, but for the sake of something in particular. In the same way, therefore, sin and vice are said to be voluntary, as the throwing of a ship's cargo into the sea.

The third objection is solved on the same lines. For the change of corruption is never found without the change of generation: and consequently neither is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. Hence nature does not intend the end of corruption apart from the end of generation, but both at the same time. For it is not the absolute intention of nature that there be no water, but that there be air, the existence of which precludes the existence of air. Accordingly nature intends directly that there should be air; but it does not intend that there should not be water except in so far as this is involved by the existence of air. Wherefore privations are not intended by nature directly, but accidentally: whereas forms are intended directly.

From the foregoing it is clear that what is evil simply, is utterly beside the intention in the operations of nature, for example the birth of monstrosities: but what is evil not simply but relatively, is intended by nature, not directly but accidentally.

CHAPTER VII

THAT EVIL IS NOT AN ESSENCE

FROM this it follows that no essence is evil in itself.

For evil, as we have said, is nothing else but the privation of what is connatural and due to anyone: for the word evil is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, but is the non-existence of something in a substance. Therefore evil is not a real essence.

Again. A thing has being in respect of its essence. Now in so far as it has being, it has a share of good: for if good is what all desire, being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore a thing is good in so far as it has an essence. But good and evil are opposed to each other. Therefore nothing is evil in so far as it has an essence. Therefore no essence is evil.

Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something made. But evil cannot be an agent, for that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is actually existing and perfect. In like manner neither can it be something made: since the term of every generation is a form and a good. Therefore nothing is evil as to its essence.

Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything desires what is like and becoming to it. Now everything by acting intends a good, as we proved above. Therefore no being as such is evil.

Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For if it be in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of that thing. And if it be in the genus of accident, it must needs flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance: although perchance it may not be natural to some other substance; thus heat is natural to fire, whereas it is not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself, cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil; since it is the privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore no essence is evil in itself.

Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form: since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the ratio of goodness: for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends; and is the act whereby whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Further. Being is divided into act and potentiality. Now act, as such, is a good: because, in so far as a thing is in act, it is perfect. Again potentiality is a good: for potentiality tends to act, as clearly may be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary thereto. Moreover it is in the same genus as act. Also privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore everything that is, in whatever way it is, in so far as it is a being, is a good. Therefore evil has not an essence.

Again. It has been proved in the Second Book of this work, that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God: and we have shown in the First Book that God is perfect goodness. Since, then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil. Hence it is that it is said (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good: and (Eccles. 3:11): He hath made all things good in their time: and (1 Tim. 4:4): Every creature of God is good.

Again Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv.) that evil is not a thing that exists, per se to wit, nor is it something in things that exist, as an accident, like whiteness or blackness.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature.

CHAPTERS VIII AND IX

ARGUMENTS WHEREBY SEEMINGLY IT IS PROVED THAT EVIL IS A NATURE OR A THING

IT would seem that certain arguments militate against the aforesaid statement.

For each thing derives its species from its proper difference. Now evil is a specific difference in certain genera, namely in moral habits and acts: because as virtue according to its species is a good habit, so the contrary vice is an evil habit according to its species: and the same applies to virtuous and vicious acts. Therefore evil gives certain things their species. Therefore it is an essence, and is natural to certain things.

Further. Each of two contraries is a nature: for if it predicated nothing, one of the contraries would be a pure privation or negation. But good and evil are stated to be contraries. Therefore evil is a nature.

Again. Aristotle in his Predicaments (Categor. viii. 27) says that good and evil are the genera of contraries. Now every genus has an essence or nature: for there are no species or differences of non-being, so that what is not cannot be a genus. Therefore evil is an essence and a nature. Also. Whatever is active is a thing. Now evil as such is active: for it counteracts and corrupts good. Therefore evil as such is a thing.

Moreover. Whatever can be more or less must be a thing admitting of degrees: since negations and privations do not admit of being more or less. Now among evils we find one to be worse than another. Therefore seemingly, evil must be a thing.

Furthermore. Thing and being are convertible terms. Now evil exists in the world. Therefore it is a thing and a nature.

These objections, however, are easily solved. For evil and good in morals are said to be specific differences, as the first argument stated, because morality depends on the will: for a thing comes under the head of morals so far as it is voluntary. Now the will's object is the end and the good. Hence moral matters are specified by their end: even as natural actions are by the form of their active principle, for instance, the action of heating is specified by heat. Since then good and evil are predicated in respect of the universal direction to an end, or the privation of that direction, it follows that in morals the first difference is that of good and evil. Now for one genus there must be one first measure: and the measure in morals is reason. Consequently good and evil in moral matters must depend on the end appointed by reason. Accordingly, in morals, that which derives its species from an end that is in accord with reason, is said to be specifically good: and that which derives its species from an end discordant from reason, is said to be specifically bad. And yet this end, though it sets aside the end appointed by reason, is nevertheless some kind of good, such as a pleasurable object of the senses, or something similar, so that in some animals this end is good, and even in man when it is moderated by reason. Also it happens that what is evil for one, is good for another. Wherefore evil, so far as it is a specific difference in the moral genus, does not denote a thing essentially evil; but something that is good in itself, but evil for man, in so far as it removes the order of reason, which is man's good. From this it follows that evil and good are contraries forasmuch as they are applied to the moral genus; and not in their absolute signification, as the second objection stated: but evil, as such, is a privation of good.

In the same way we may understand the saying that evil and good, taken in the moral order, are the genera of contraries, on which the third objection was based. For of all moral contraries, either both are evil, as prodigality and stinginess; or one is good and the other evil, as liberality and stinginess. Hence moral evil is both a genus and a difference, not through being the privation of a good appointed by reason, whence it is called evil, but through the nature of the action or habit that is directed to an end incompatible with the right end appointed by reason: thus a blind man is a human individual, not as being blind, but as being this particular man: and irrational is a difference of animal, not through the privation of reason, but on account of this particular nature to which privation of reason is consequent. It may also be said that Aristotle asserts evil and good to be genera, not in his own opinion, since he does not number them among the ten first genera in each of which some contrariety is found, but according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who affirmed that good and evil are supreme genera and first principles. Under each of them he placed ten supreme contraries: so that we have the good which is definite, which is equal, which is one, which is on the right hand, the male, the restful, the straight, the luminous, the square, and lastly, the good: while under evil he placed the indefinite, the unequal, the manifold, the left-hand, the female, the moving, the crooked, the darksome, the oblong, and lastly, the evil. In this way and in several passages of his works on logic, he employs examples according to the opinions of other philosophers, as being probable at the time.

Moreover this saying contains a certain amount of truth: for it is impossible that a probable statement should be utterly false. Now of all contraries one is perfect, while the other is incomplete, as containing some kind of privation: thus white and hot are perfect, while cold and black are imperfect, as indicating a kind of privation. Since then incompleteness and privation are a kind of evil, while every perfection and completeness comes under the head of good: it follows that in contraries, one seems to be comprised under good, while the other approaches to the notion of evil. In this way good and evil are seemingly genera of all contraries. In this way too it is clear how evil is opposed to good, which was the line taken by the fourth objection. Because in so far as form and end, which have the aspect of good, and are the true principles of action, involve privation of a contrary form and end, the action that is consequent upon this form and end, is ascribed to privation and evil: accidentally however, since privation, as such, is not a principle of action. Rightly therefore does Dionysius say (De Div. Nom. iv.) that evil does not oppose good, except by virtue of a good: and in itself it is powerless and weak, as not being a principle of action. Evil, however, is said to corrupt good, not only as acting by virtue of a good, as explained: but formally by itself; even as blindness is said to corrupt the sight, through being the very corruption of sight: in the same way whiteness is said to colour the wall, because it is the very colour of the wall.

A thing is said to be a greater or lesser evil by reason of its distance from the good. For thus it is that things which imply privation admit of degrees, as inequality and unlikeness: thus to be more unequal is to be more distant from equality: and to be more unlike is to go further from likeness.

Wherefore that is said to be more evil, which is more deprived of good, as being more distant from good. But privations are subject to increase not as having a kind of essence, as qualities and forms, as the fifth argument presumed, but through the increase of the cause of privation: thus air is more darksome, according as the light is impeded by the interposition of more obstacles, for thus it is further removed from a participation of light.

Again evil is said to be in the world, not as though it had an essence, or were some thing, as the sixth argument supposed, but forasmuch as a thing is said to be evil with evil: even as blindness and privation of any kind is said to be, because an animal is blind with blindness.

For being is predicated in two ways, as the Philosopher teaches (4 Metaph. vii.). First as indicating the essence of a thing; and thus it is divided into the ten categories: in this way no privation can be called a being. Secondly as denoting a synthetical truth: in this way evil and privation are called a being, forasmuch as a thing is said to be deprived by a privation.

CHAPTER X

THAT THE CAUSE OF EVIL IS A GOOD

WE may conclude from the foregoing that evil is not caused except by a good.

For were some evil caused by an evil; since evil does not act save by virtue of a good, as proved above, it follows that good itself is the primary cause of evil.

Again. That which is not, is not the cause of anything. Therefore every cause must be some being. Now evil is not a being, as shown above. Therefore evil cannot be the cause of anything. Hence if evil be caused by something, this must be a good.

Again. Whatever is properly and by itself the cause of something intends its proper effect. Hence, if evil by itself be the cause of something, it would intend its proper effect, namely evil. But this is false, for it has been shown that every agent intends a good. Therefore evil is not the cause of anything by itself, but only accidentally. Now every accidental cause is reduced to a per se cause. But good alone can be a per se cause, and evil cannot be a per se cause. Therefore evil is caused by good.

Further. Every cause is either matter, or form, or agent, or end. But evil cannot be either matter or form: for it has been shown above that being whether actual or potential is a good. Neither can it be an agent: since a thing acts forasmuch as it is actual and has a form. Nor again can it be an end, since it is beside the intention, as we have shown. Therefore evil cannot be the cause of a thing: and if anything be the cause of an evil, that evil must be caused by a good.

Since, however, evil and good are opposite to each other: and one opposite cannot be the cause of the other except accidentally; thus a cold thing causes heat as stated in Phys. viii. 1; it follows that good cannot be the effective cause of evil except accidentally.

In the physical order, this accident may be on the part of the agent, or on the part of the effect. On the part of the agent, as when the agent's power is defective, the result being that the action is defective, and the effect deficient: thus when the power of the digestive organ is defective, the result is imperfect digestion of the food and an indigested humour, which are physical evils. Now it is accidental to the agent as such, that its power be defective: for it acts, not as having a defective power, but as having some power: for if it lacked power altogether, it would not act at all. Accordingly evil is caused accidentally on the part of the agent, forasmuch as the agent's power is defective. Hence it is said that evil has not an efficient, but a deficient, cause: because evil does not follow from an active cause, except in so far as this cause is defective in power, and in this respect it is not effective.—And it comes to the same if defect in the action and effect, results from a defect in the instrument, or in any thing else required for the agent's action: as when the motive power causes a limp on account of crookedness in the tibia: for the agent acts by both, its power and its instrument.

On the part of the effect, evil is caused by good accidentally, either on the part of the matter of the effect, or on the part of its force. For if the matter be indisposed to receive the impression of the agent the effect must needs be defective: thus a deformed offspring results from an indisposition of matter. Nor is it put down to defect in the agent, if it fail to transform an indisposed matter to perfect actuality: since to each natural agent there is appointed a power in proportion to its nature, and if it go not beyond that power, it will not on that account fall short of its power, but only when it falls short of the measure of power due to it by nature.

On the part of the effect's form, evil occurs accidentally, in so far as one form necessarily involves the privation of another, wherefore the generating of one thing is necessarily followed by the corruption of another. But this evil is not an evil of the effect intended by the agent, as was made clear above, but of the other thing.

Accordingly it is evident that evil is caused only accidentally by a good. —And the same applies to things produced by art, for Art, in its work, copies nature, and faults occur in both in the same way.

In morals, however, the case would seem to be different: because moral fault does not apparently follow from a defective power: since weakness of power either wholly excludes, or at least diminishes, moral fault: for weakness does not deserve punishment which is due to guilt, but rather mercy and pardon: seeing that moral fault must be voluntary and not necessary. But if we consider the matter carefully, we shall find that there is a likeness in one respect, and unlikeness in another. There is unlikeness in that moral fault is considered in the action alone, and not in some effect produced, for moral virtues are directed not to making but to doing. Whereas the arts are directed to making, for which reason it has been stated that faults occur in them in the same way as in nature. Therefore moral evil is considered as resulting not from the matter or form of the effect, but only from the agent.

Now, in moral actions four active principles are to be found in due order. The first of these is the executive power, namely the motive force, whereby the members are moved to execute the will’s command. Hence this power is moved by the will which is a second principle. And the will is moved by the judgement of the apprehensive power, which judges that a particular thing is good or evil, which are objects of the will, the one moving to pursuit, the other to flight. Again the apprehensive power is moved by the thing apprehended. Hence the first active principle in moral actions is the thing apprehended; the second is the apprehensive power; the third is the will; and the fourth is the motive force, which carries out the command of reason.

Now the act of the executive power already presupposes moral good or evil. For these external acts do not belong to morals, except forasmuch as they are voluntary. Wherefore if the act of the will be good, the external act will also be good, and evil, if it be evil. And there would be nothing savouring of moral evil if the defect in a defective external act has nothing to do with the will: for limping is not a moral but a physical evil. Therefore a defect in this executive power, either wholly excuses or diminishes moral fault.—Again, the act whereby the object moves the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault: for the visible object moves the sight according to the natural order of things; and so too does every object move a passive power.—Again the act, considered in itself, of the apprehensive power is devoid of moral fault; since a defect therein either excuses or diminishes moral fault, in the same way as a defect in the executive power: for weakness and ignorance equally excuse or diminish sin.—It follows, then, that moral fault is found first and chiefly in the sole act of the will: and an act is logically called moral, precisely because it is voluntary. Therefore the root and origin of moral fault is to be sought in the act of the will.

But there is a difficulty, seemingly, attendant upon this inquiry. For since a defective act results from a defect in the active principle, we must presuppose a defect in the will to precede the moral fault. And if this defect be natural, it will always adhere to the will: so that the will must be guilty of moral fault whenever it acts: whereas acts of virtue prove this to be false. But if the defect be voluntary, it is already a moral fault, the cause whereof will still remain to be sought: and thus the reason will carry on indefinitely. Accordingly we must say that the defect already existing in the will is not natural, lest it follow that the will sins in every act: and that neither is it casual or fortuitous, for then there would be no moral fault in us, since casual things are unforeseen and outside the domain of reason. Therefore it is voluntary. Yet it is not a moral fault: lest we be forced to proceed indefinitely. How this may be, remains to be considered.—The perfection of every active principle depends on a higher active principle; for the second agent acts by virtue of the first. While, therefore, the second agent remains subordinate to the first, it acts unfailingly: but it fails in acting, if it happen to stray from the order of the first agent: as in the case of an instrument that falls short of the first agent’s movement. Now it has been said that, in the order of moral actions, two principles precede the will; to wit, the apprehensive power, and the apprehended object, which is the end. And since for each movable there is a corresponding proper motive power, every apprehensive power is not the motive force due to every appetitive power, but this one belongs to this, and another to that. Accordingly, just as the proper motive force of the sensitive appetite is the apprehensive power of the senses, so the proper motive force of the will is the reason.

Again, since the reason is able to apprehend many goods and many ends; and each one has its proper end: the will also must have as its end and first motive force, not any, but a definite good. Hence when the will tends to its act, through being moved by the apprehension of reason that presents to it its proper good, a right action follows. Whereas when the will breaks away at the apprehension of the sensitive power, or even of the reason which presents some good other than its proper good, there follows in the will’s act a moral fault.

Consequently, the sin of action in the will is preceded by lack of order to reason, and to its proper end: to reason, as when the will, on the sudden apprehension of a sense, tends to a good that is pleasurable to sense:—to its due end, as when by deliberating the reason arrives at some good which is not good now, or in some particular way; and yet the will tends to that good as though it were its proper good. Now this lack of order is voluntary: for it is in the will’s power to will or not to will. Again it is in the will’s power that the reason actually consider the matter, or cease from considering it; or that it consider this matter, or that. Nor is this lack of order a moral evil: for if the reason were to consider nothing, or to consider any good whatever, as yet there is no sin, until the will tends to an undue end: and this itself is an act of the will.

Accordingly both in the physical and in the moral order it is clear that evil is not caused by good except accidentally.

CHAPTER XI

THAT THE SUBJECT OF EVIL IS A GOOD

FROM what we have said it can be shown that every evil is seated in some good.

For evil cannot exist by itself: since it has no essence, as was proved above. Therefore evil needs to be in some subject. Now every subject, as it is a substance, is a good, as is evident from what has been said. Therefore every evil is in a good.

Also. Evil is a privation, as we have shown. Now privation and the lacking form are in the same subject. But the subject of a form is a being in potentiality to that form, and this being is a good: for potentiality and act are in the same genus. Therefore privation, that is an evil, is in some good as its subject.

Moreover. A thing is called evil because it hurts: nor otherwise than because it hurts a good: for it is good to hurt evil, since the corruption of evil is good. Now it would not hurt a good formally, unless it were in that good: thus blindness is hurtful to a man forasmuch as it is in him. Therefore evil must be in a good.

Again. Evil is not caused except by good, and then only accidentally. Now whatever is accidental is reducible to that which is per se. Consequently together with the evil effect that is caused accidentally by a good, there must be some good which is the per se effect of that good, so as to be the foundation of that evil: because what is accidental is founded on what is per se.

Seeing, however, that good and evil are mutually opposed; and that one of two opposites cannot be the subject of the other, but expels it: someone at a cursory glance might think it unreasonable to state that good is the subject of evil.

And yet it is not unreasonable if the truth be sought thoroughly. For good, even as being, is predicated universally: since every being, as such, is good, as we have shown. Now it is not unreasonable that non-being should have being for its subject: because every privation is a non-being, and yet its subject is a substance, which is a being. But non-being is not in an opposite being as its subject: for blindness is not universal non-being, but a particular kind of non-being, namely privation of sight: therefore it is not in sight, as its subject, but in an animal. In like manner evil has for its subject, not the opposite good;—for it is the privation of this good,—but some other good: thus moral evil is in a natural good; and an evil of nature, to wit privation of a form, is in matter, which is a good as a being in potentiality.

CHAPTER XII

THAT EVIL DOES NOT ENTIRELY DESTROY GOOD

IT is clear from the foregoing that however much evil be increased it can never destroy good entirely: since there must always remain the subject of evil, as long as evil remains. Now the subject of evil is a good. Therefore, some good must always remain. But seeing that evil may be increased indefinitely, and that good is always diminished by the increase of evil: it would seem that good is decreased by evil indefinitely. Now a good that can be diminished by evil must needs be finite: because infinite good is incompatible with evil, as we proved in the First Book. Seemingly, therefore, sometimes a good is wholly destroyed by evil: since if something is subtracted indefinitely from the finite, this must at length be destroyed through such subtraction.

Nor may it be said, as some say, that if the subsequent subtraction be made in the same proportion as the preceding one, and continue thus indefinitely, the good cannot be destroyed, as may be seen in the division of a continuous quantity. Thus if from a line two cubits long you subtract half, and from the remainder subtract half, and continue thus indefinitely, there will always remain something to be divided. But in this process of division that which is subtracted afterwards must always be less in quantity: for half of the whole which was subtracted at first, is greater in absolute quantity than half of the half, albeit the same proportion remains. This, however, nowise applies to the diminution of good by evil. Because the more a good is diminished by an evil, the weaker it becomes, and thus it will be more capable of diminution by the subsequent evil. Again this subsequent evil may be equal to or greater than the previous one: wherefore it will not happen that a smaller quantity of good will always be subsequently subtracted from the good, even if the same proportion be observed.

We must therefore find a different solution. It is clear from what has been already said, that evil entirely destroys the opposite good, as blindness destroys sight: yet there must needs remain the good which is the subject of that evil. And this subject, as such, has the aspect of a good, considered as in potentiality to the actuality of the good which is removed by the evil. Wherefore the less it is in potentiality to that good, the less good will it be. Now a subject becomes less in potentiality to a form, not indeed by the mere subtraction of some part of that subject; nor by the subtraction of some part of its potentiality; but by the fact that the potentiality is hindered by a contrary actuality from reaching to the actuality of the form: thus according as heat is the more increased in a subject, the less is that subject potentially cold. Wherefore good is diminished by evil more by the addition of its contrary, than by the subtraction of good. This applies also to what we have said of evil. For we have said that evil is incidental beside the intention of the agent, which always intends some good, the result of which is the exclusion of some other good opposed thereto. Hence the more we increase that intended good, the result of which is an evil beside the agent’s intention, the more the potentiality to the contrary good will be diminished: and it is thus that the diminution of good by evil increases.

Now this diminution of good by evil cannot go on indefinitely in the physical order. Because all physical forms and forces are limited, and reach a certain term beyond which they cannot reach. Consequently neither can a contrary form, nor can the power of a contrary agent, be increased indefinitely, so as to result in the indefinite diminution of good by evil.

On the other hand this diminution can proceed indefinitely in moral matters. Because the intellect and will have no limit fixed to their actions: for the intellect can proceed indefinitely in understanding: wherefore the mathematical species of numbers and figures are infinite. In like manner the will goes on indefinitely in willing: since he who wills to commit a theft, can so will again, and so on to infinity. Now the more the will tends to undue ends, the more difficult is it for it to return to its proper and due end: as is evident in those who have acquired a vicious habit through sinning frequently. Hence the good of natural aptitude may be diminished indefinitely by moral evil; yet it will never be entirely destroyed, and will always accompany the nature that remains.

CHAPTER XIII

THAT EVIL HAS A CAUSE OF SOME KIND

IT can be shown from what precedes that although evil has no per se cause, yet every evil must needs have an accidental cause.

For whatever is in a thing as its subject, must needs have a cause: since it results either from the principles of the subject, or from some external cause. Now evil is in good as its subject, as shown above. Therefore evil must have a cause.

Again. That which is in potentiality to either of two opposites, is not actuated by either except by some cause: for no potentiality actuates itself. Now evil is the privation of that which is connatural and due to anyone: since it is on account of this that a thing is said to be evil. Therefore evil is in a subject that is in potentiality to evil and its opposite. Therefore evil must have some cause.

Moreover. Whatever is in a thing in addition to its nature, supervenes through some other cause; for whatever is natural to it is permanent, unless something else be in the way: wherefore a stone is not borne upwards, unless someone throw it, and water is not heated unless something make it hot. Now evil, in whatever subject it be, is always there in addition to the nature of that subject, since it is the privation of what is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore evil must always have a cause, either per se or accidental.

Further. Every evil is consequent to some good; thus corruption is consequent to generation. Now every good has a cause, except the Sovereign Good, in which there is no evil, as proved in the First Book. Therefore every evil has a cause, from which it results accidentally.

CHAPTER XIV

THAT EVIL IS AN ACCIDENTAL CAUSE

FROM the same premises it is clear that although evil is not a per se cause, it is nevertheless an accidental cause. For if A is the cause of B per se, whatever is accidental to A is the accidental cause of B: thus white which is accidental to the builder, is the accidental cause of the house. Now every evil is in some good. And every good is in some way the cause of something: for matter is in some way the cause of form; while the converse is true in a sense: and the same applies to the agent and the end. Wherefore there does not follow an indefinite sequence in causes, if each thing be the cause of something else, because the circle to be observed in causes and effects is composed of various kinds of cause. Therefore evil is an accidental cause.

Again. Evil is a privation, as shown above. Now privation is an accidental principle in movable things, even as matter and form are per se principles. Therefore evil is an accidental cause of something.

Moreover. From a defect in the cause there follows defect in the effect. Now defect in a cause is an evil. And yet it cannot be a per se cause; since a thing is not a cause in that it is defective, but in that it is a being: since were it wholly defective, it would be the cause of nothing. Therefore evil is a cause of something, not per se, but accidentally.

Further. If we run through all the kinds of cause, we find that evil is an accidental cause. In the species of efficient cause, because defect in effect and action results from a defect in the efficient cause. In the species of material cause, because a fault in the effect arises from indisposition in the matter. In the species of formal cause, because every form is accompanied by the privation of the opposite form. And in the species of final cause, because evil is united to the undue end, inasmuch as the due end is hindered thereby. It is therefore evident that evil is an accidental cause, and cannot be a cause per se.

CHAPTER XV

THAT THERE IS NO SOVEREIGN EVIL

IT follows from this that there cannot be a sovereign evil, that is the principle of all evils.

For a sovereign evil must needs exclude the association of all good: just as the sovereign good is that which is wholly disconnected from all evil. Now there cannot be an evil entirely apart from good: for it has been proved that evil is seated in some good. Therefore nothing is supremely evil.

Again. If anything be supremely evil, it must be essentially evil: even as the supreme good is that which is essentially good. But this is impossible: since evil has no essence, as was shown above. Therefore it is impossible to suppose a supreme evil that is the principle of evils.

Also. That which is a first principle is not caused by anything. Now every evil is caused by a good, as we have proved. Therefore evil is not a first principle.

Further. Evil does not act except by virtue of a good; as we have proved. But a first principle acts by its own virtue. Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Moreover. Since that which is accidental is subsequent to that which is per se, the accidental cannot be first. Now evil does not occur except accidentally and unintentionally, as we have proved. Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Again. Every evil has an accidental cause, as we have shown. But a first principle has no cause, either per se, or accidental. Therefore evil cannot be the first cause in any genus.

Furthermore. A per se cause precedes one that is accidental. But evil is none but an accidental cause, as we have proved. Therefore evil cannot be a first principle.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Manichees, who maintained the existence of a sovereign evil, that is the first principle of all evils.

CHAPTER XVI

THAT THE END OF EVERYTHING IS A GOOD

ACCORDINGLY if every agent acts for some good, as we have shown above, it follows that good is the end of each thing. For everything is directed by its action to some end; since either the action itself is an end; or the end of the action is also the end of the agent: and this is its good.

Again. The end of a thing is the term of its appetite. Now the appetite of a thing terminates in a good: for the Philosopher defines good as the object of all appetite. Therefore the end of everything is a good.

Moreover. That toward which a thing tends while it is without it, and wherein it rests when it has it, is its end. Now anything that is without its proper perfection, is moved towards it, as far as in it lies: and if it have that perfection, it rests therein. Therefore the end of a thing is its perfection. But the perfection of a thing is its good. Therefore every thing is directed to good as its end.

Further. Things that know the end, and things that do not know the end, are equally directed to the end: although those which know the end are moved thereto per se; whereas those which do not know it, tend thereto as directed by another, as may be seen in the archer and the arrow. Now those that know the end, are always directed to a good as their end; because the will which is the appetite of a previously known end, does not tend towards a thing except under the aspect of good, which is its object. Therefore also those things that do not know the end, are directed to a good as their end. Therefore the end of all is a good.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT ALL THINGS ARE DIRECTED TO ONE END, WHICH IS GOD

FROM the foregoing it is clear that all things are directed to one good as their last end.

For if nothing tends to something as its end, except in so far as this is good, it follows that good, as such, is an end. Consequently that which is the supreme good is supremely the end of all. Now there is but one Supreme good, namely God, as we have shown in the First Book. Therefore all things are directed to the Supreme good, namely God, as their end.

Again. That which is supreme in any genus, is the cause of everything in that genus: thus fire which is supremely hot is the cause of heat in other bodies. Therefore the supreme good, namely God, is the cause of goodness in all things good. Therefore He is the cause of every end being an end: since whatever is an end, is such, in so far as it is good. Now the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so. Therefore God is supremely the end of all things.

Further. In every series of causes, the first cause is more a cause than the second causes: since the second cause is not a cause save through the first. Therefore that which is the first cause in the series of final causes, must needs be more the final cause of each thing, than the proximate final cause. Now God is the first cause in the series of final causes: for He is supreme in the order of good things. Therefore He is the end of each thing more even than any proximate end.

Moreover. In all mutually subordinate ends the last must needs be the end of each preceding end: thus if a potion be mixed to be given to a sick man; and is given to him that he may be purged; and he be purged that he may be lowered, and lowered that he may be healed, it follows that health is the end of the lowering, and of the purging, and of those that precede. Now all things are subordinate in various degrees of goodness to the one supreme good, that is the cause of all goodness: and so, since good has the aspect of an end, all things are subordinate to God as preceding ends under the last end. Therefore God must be the end of all.

Furthermore. The particular good is directed to the common good as its end: for the being of the part is on account of the whole: wherefore the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man. Now the supreme good, namely God, is the common good, since the good of all things depends on him: and the good whereby each thing is good, is the particular good of that thing, and of those that depend thereon. Therefore all things are directed to one good, God to wit, as their end.

Again. Order among ends is consequent to the order among agents: for just as the supreme agent moves all second agents, so must all the ends of second agents be directed to the end of the supreme agent: since whatever the supreme agent does, it does for its own end. Now the supreme agent is the active principle of the actions of all inferior agents, by moving all to their actions, and consequently to their ends. Hence it follows that all the ends of second agents are directed by the first agent to its proper end. Now the first agent in all things is God, as we proved in the Second Book. And His will has no other end but His own goodness, which is Himself, as we showed in the First Book. Therefore all things whether they were made by Him immediately, or by means of secondary causes, are directed to God as their end. But this applies to all things: for as we proved in the Second Book, there can be nothing that has not its being from Him. Therefore all things are directed to God as their end.

Moreover. The last end of every maker, as such, is himself: for what we make we use for our own sake: and if at any time a man make a thing for the sake of something else, it is referred to his own good, whether his use, his pleasure, or his virtue. Now God is the cause of all things being made; of some immediately, of others by means of other causes, as we have explained above. Therefore He is the end of all things.

And again. The end holds the highest place among causes, and it is from it that all other causes derive their actual causality: since the agent acts not except for the end, as was proved. And it is due to the agent that the matter is brought to the actuality of the form: wherefore the matter is made actually the matter, and the form is made the form, of this particular thing, through the agent’s action, and consequently through the end. The later end also, is the cause of the preceding end being intended as an end: for a thing is not moved towards a proximate end, except for the sake of the last end. Therefore the last end is the first cause of all. Now it must needs befit the First Being, namely God, to be the first cause of all, as we proved above. Therefore God is the last end of all.

Hence it is written (Prov. 16:13): The Lord hath made all things for himself: and (Apoc. 22:13), I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last.

CHAPTER XVIII

HOW GOD IS THE END OF THINGS

IT remains to ask how God is the end of all things: and this shall be made clear from what has been said.

For He is the end of all things, yet so as to precede all in being. Now there is an end which, though it holds the first place in causing forasmuch as it is in the intention, is nevertheless last in execution. This applies to any end which the agent sets up by his action: thus the physician by his action sets up health in the sick man, which is nevertheless his end. There is also an end which, just as it precedes in causing, so also does it precede in being: even so that which one intends to acquire by one’s motion or action, is said to be one’s end, for instance fire seeks to reach a higher place by its movement, and the king seeks to take a city by fighting. Accordingly God is the end of things as something to be obtained by each thing in its own way.

Again. God is at once the last end of things, and the first agent, as we have shown. Now the end effected by the agent’s action, cannot be the first agent, but rather is it the agent’s effect. God, therefore, cannot be the end of things, as though He were something effected, but only as something already existing and to be acquired.

Further. If a thing act for the sake of something already in existence, and if by its action some result ensue; something through the agent’s action must accrue to the thing for the sake of which it acts: thus soldiers fight for the cause of their captain, to whom victory accrues, which the soldiers bring about by their actions. Now nothing can accrue to God from the action of anything whatever: since His goodness is perfect in every way, as we proved in the First Book. It follows, then, that God is the end of things, not as something made or effected by them, nor as though He obtained something from things, but in this way alone, that things obtain Him.

Moreover. The effect must tend to the end, in the same way as the agent acts for the end. Now God, who is the first agent of all things, does not act as though He gained something by His action, but as bestowing something thereby: since He is not in potentiality so that He can acquire something, but solely in perfect actuality, whereby He is able to bestow. Things therefore are not directed to God, as to an end that can gain something, but that they may obtain Himself from Him according to their measure, since He is their end.

CHAPTER XIX

THAT ALL THINGS TEND TO BE LIKE UNTO GOD

FROM the fact that they acquire the divine goodness, creatures are made like unto God. Wherefore if all things tend to God as their last end, so as to acquire His goodness, it follows that the last end of things is to become like unto God.

Moreover. The agent is said to be the end of the effect forasmuch as the effect tends to be like the agent: wherefore the form of the generator is the end of the act of generation. Now God is the end of things in such wise as to be also their first active cause. Therefore all things tend to a likeness to God, as their last end.

Again. Things give evidence that they naturally desire to be: so that if any are corruptible, they naturally resist corruptives, and tend to where they can be safeguarded, as the fire tends upwards and earth downwards. Now all things have being in so far as they are like God, who is self-subsistent being: for they are beings only by participation. Therefore all things desire as their last end to be like God.

Further. All creatures are images of the first agent, namely God: since the agent produces its like. Now the perfection of an image consists in representing the original by its likeness thereto: for this is why an image is made. Therefore all things are for the purpose of acquiring a divine similitude, as their last end.

Again. Each thing by its movement or action tends to some good as its end, as proved above. Now a thing partakes of the good, in so far as it is like to the sovereign goodness, which is God. Therefore all things, by their movements and actions, tend to a divine likeness as their last end.

CHAPTER XX

HOW THINGS IMITATE THE DIVINE GOODNESS

FROM what has been said it is clear that the last end of all things is to become like God. Now, that which has properly the aspect of an end, is the good. Therefore, properly speaking, things tend to become like to God forasmuch as He is good.

Now, creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God: although each thing imitates the divine goodness, according to its mode. For the divine goodness is simple, being, as it were, all in one. Because the divine being contains the whole fulness of perfection, as we proved in the First Book. Wherefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God's being is His perfect goodness: for in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same in God, as though the sum total of His goodness were God's very being. Again, God's being is the substance of the existing God. But this cannot be so in other things. For it was proved in the Second Book, that no created substance is its own being. Wherefore, if a thing is good so far as it is: and nothing is its own being: none is its own goodness, but each one is good by having a share of good, even as by having a share of being it is a being.

Also. All creatures are not placed on the same level of goodness. For in some the substance is both form and actuality: such, to wit, as are competent, by the mere fact that they exist, to be actually and to be good. Whereas in others, the substance is composed of matter and form: and such are competent to be actually and to be good, but by some part of their being, namely their form. Accordingly God's substance is His goodness: whereas a simple substance participates goodness, by the very fact that it exists: and a composite substance, by some part of itself.

In this third degree of substances, diversity is to be found again in respect of being. For in some composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potentiality of matter: so that the matter retains no potentiality to another form: and consequently neither is there in any other matter a potentiality to this same form. Such are the heavenly bodies, which consist of their entire matter.—In others the form does not fill the whole potentiality of matter: so that the matter retains a potentiality to another form: and in another part of matter there remains potentiality to this form; for instance in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in substance, it is clear that together with this form which does not fill the whole potentiality of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potentiality of matter, nor with that which is a form essentially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potentiality to something else, for movement is the act of that which is in potentiality; and since evil is the privation of good: it is clear that in this last order of substances, good is changeable, and has an admixture of the opposite evil; which cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore the substance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness.

We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of this substance composed of matter and form. For since matter considered in itself is being in potentiality, and since form is its act; and again since a composite substance derives actual existence from its form: it follows that the form is, in itself, good; the composite substance is good as having its form actually; and the matter is good, as being in potentiality to the form. And although a thing is good in so far as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is only being potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order, for a thing is said to be good, not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end; but even though it has not attained the end, so long as it is directed to the end, for this very reason it is said to be good. Accordingly matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because it is a potential being, whereby it is shown to have an order towards being: and yet this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely, on account of this very order. This shows that the good, in a sense, extends further than being; for which reason Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. iv.) that the good includes both existing and non-existing things. For even non-existent things, namely matter considered as subject to privation, seek a good, namely to exist. Hence it follows that matter also is good; for nothing but the good seeks the good.

In yet another way the creature's goodness falls short from God's. For, as we have stated, God, in His very being, has supreme perfection of goodness. Whereas the creature has its perfection, not in one thing but in many: because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Wherefore, in respect of one and the same thing, virtue, wisdom, and operation are predicated of God; but of creatures, in respect of different things: and the further a creature is from the sovereign goodness, the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that although the first and sovereign good is utterly simple, and the substances nearest to it in goodness, approach likewise thereto in simplicity; yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher; elements, for instance, than animals and men, because they are unable to reach the perfection of knowledge and understanding, to which animals and men attain.

From what has been said, it is evident that, although God possesses His perfect and entire goodness in respect of His simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Wherefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness: thus a man who being despoiled of virtue is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense, namely as a being, and as a man; but not absolutely; in fact rather should he be called evil. Accordingly it is not the same in every creature, to be and to be good: although each one is good, inasmuch as it exists: whereas in God to be and to be good are simply one and the same.

If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God's goodness as its end; and a thing is like God's goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved: it is clear that things are directed to God as their end, not only in respect of their substantial being, but also in respect of such things as are accidental thereto and belong to its perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing’s perfection.

CHAPTER XXI

THAT THINGS HAVE A NATURAL TENDENCY TO BE LIKE GOD FORASMUCH AS HE IS A CAUSE

IT is clear from the foregoing that things have a tendency to be like God also in the point of their being causes of others.

For the creature tends to be like God by its operation. Now, by its operation, one thing is the cause of another. Therefore things tend to a divine similitude in this also, that they are causes of other things.

Again. Things tend to be like God, forasmuch as He is good, as stated above. Now it is out of His goodness that God bestows being on others; for all things act forasmuch as they are actually perfect. Therefore all things seek to be like God, by being causes of others.

Moreover. Order towards good, is itself a good, as we have shown above. Now every thing forasmuch as it is the cause of another, is directed to a good: for good alone is caused per se, and evil is caused only by accident, as we have proved. Therefore it is a good to be a cause of others. Now in respect of any good to which a thing tends, that thing's tendency is to a divine similitude; since every created good is by reason of a share in the divine goodness. Therefore things tend to a divine likeness by being causes of other things.

Again. That the effect tends to be like the agent, amounts to the same as that the agent causes its likeness in its effect: for the effect tends to the end towards which it is directed by the agent. Now the agent tends to assimilate the patient to itself, not only in respect of its being, but also in respect of its causality: because the agent gives to its natural effect not only those natural principles whereby it subsists, but also those whereby it is a cause of other things; thus the animal, when begotten, receives from its begetter both the power of self-nourishment, and the power of generation. Therefore the effect tends to be like the agent, not only in the point of species, but also in the point of its causality of other things. Now things tend to be like God, even as effects tend to be like the agent, as proved above. Therefore things have a natural tendency towards a divine likeness in this, that they are causes of other things.

Moreover. A thing is most perfect when it is able to produce its like: for that light shines perfectly, which gives light to others. Now whatever tends to its own perfection, tends to a divine likeness. Wherefore a thing tends to a divine likeness from the very fact that it tends to be the cause of other things.

Since however a cause, as such, is higher than its effect, it is evident that to tend in this way to a divine likeness, so as to be a cause of other things, belongs to the highest grade among things.

Furthermore. A thing is perfect in itself before being able to cause another, as we have stated already. Hence to be the cause of other things is a perfection that accrues, to a thing last. Since then the creature tends to a divine likeness in many points, this remains last, that it seek a likeness to God by being a cause of others. Wherefore Dionysius says (Cœl. Hier. iii.) that it is of all things most godlike to be God’s co-operator; in which sense the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:9): We are God’s coadjutors.

CHAPTER XXII

HOW THINGS ARE DIRECTED IN VARIOUS WAYS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ENDS

IT may be shown from the foregoing that the last means whereby a thing is directed to its end is its operation; in various ways, however, according to the variety of operations. For some things have an operation whereby they move something else; such are heating, and cutting: and some have an operation in being moved by another: such are being heated, and being cut. Some operations are a perfection of an actually existing operator, and do not tend to the transmutation of something else: in the former respect these differ from passion and movement, and in the latter from an action which effects a transmutation on some external matter: as an instance of such an operation we have understanding, sensation, will. Wherefore it is clear that things which are set to move or operate only, without moving or making any thing themselves, tend to the divine likeness in that they are perfect in themselves; while those which make and move, as such, tend to a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things; and that those which move through being moved tend to the divine likeness in both ways.

The lower bodies, in so far as they are moved with natural movements, are considered to be moved only, and not to move except accidentally: for if a stone in its descent puts into motion something that stood in its path, it is an accident: and the same applies to alteration and other movements. Wherefore the end of such movements is that they attain to a divine likeness in the point of their being perfect in themselves, as having their proper form and their proper place.

The heavenly bodies, however, move because they are moved: so that the end of their movement is to attain to a divine likeness in both respects. As regards their own perfection, inasmuch as a heavenly body may be actually where previously it was potentially.—Nor does it for this reason attain less to its perfection, although it retains its potentiality to be where it was before. For in the same way does primary matter tend to its perfection by acquiring actually the form which it had potentially before, although it ceases to have the one which it had before actually: for thus matter receives successively all the forms to which it has a potentiality, so that its whole potentiality is actualized successively; which could not happen all at one time. Wherefore, since a heavenly body is in potentiality to a particular whereabouts, even as primary matter is to a particular form, it attains to its perfection by the fact that its entire potentiality to a particular whereabouts is successively actualized, which could not happen simultaneously.

Inasmuch as they move by moving, the end of their movement is the attainment of a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. Now they are the causes of other things, by causing generation and corruption and other movements in this lower world. Accordingly the movements of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are principles of movement, are directed to generation and corruption in the world beneath them. And it is not unreasonable that the movements of heavenly bodies conduce to the generation of these lower things, although these inferior bodies are of small account in comparison with the heavenly bodies, and yet the end should be of greater account than the means. For the generator’s action tends to the form of the generated: and yet that which is generated is not of greater worth than the generator, but, in univocal agents, is of the same species with it. Because the generator intends as its ultimate end not the form of the generated (which form is the end of generation); but the likeness to the Divine Being in the perpetuation of the species, and the diffusion of His goodness, by bestowing its specific form on others, and being the cause of other things. Likewise the heavenly bodies, although of more account than the lower bodies, nevertheless intend by means of their movements the generation of the latter bodies, and to bring to actuality the forms of things generated; not indeed as though this were their ultimate end; but as a means whereby to attain to an ultimate end, the divine likeness, to wit, in that they are causes of other things.

We must take note, however, that a thing, according as it participates in a likeness to God's goodness, which is the object of His will, so too has it a share in a similitude to God's will, whereby things are brought into being and preserved. The higher beings, however, participate in a likeness to the divine goodness in a more simple and universal manner; but the lower beings, in a more particular and divided way. Wherefore between heavenly and lower bodies, we observe a likeness, not of equiparance, as in things belonging to the same species; but as that which is to be observed between the universal agent and a particular effect. Wherefore just as in this lower world the intention of the particular agent is confined to good of this or that species, so is the intention of the celestial body inclined to the common good of the corporeal substance, which by generation is preserved, multiplied, and increased.

But since, as already stated, everything moved, as such, tends, as towards a divine likeness, to be perfect in itself; and since a thing is perfect in so far as it becomes actual: it follows that the intention of every thing that is in potentiality is to tend to actuality by way of movement. Consequently the more an act is posterior and perfect, the more is the appetite of matter inclined thereto. Therefore the appetite whereby matter seeks a form, must tend towards the last and most perfect act to which matter can attain, as to the ultimate end of generation. Now certain grades are to be found in the acts of forms. For primary matter is in potentiality, first of all, to the elemental form. While under the elemental form, it is in potentiality to the form of a mixed body: wherefore elements are the matter of a mixed body. Considered as under the form of a mixed body, it is in potentiality to a vegetative soul: for the act of such a body is a soul. Again, the vegetative soul is in potentiality to the sensitive, and the sensitive to the intellective. This is proved by the process of generation: for in generation we have first the fetus living with a plant life, afterwards with animal life, and lastly with human life. After this no later or more noble form is to be found in things subject to generation and corruption. Therefore the last end of all generation is the human soul, and to this does matter tend as its ultimate form. Consequently the elements are for the sake of the mixed body, the mixed body for the sake of living things: and of these plants are for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man. Therefore man is the end of all generation. And whereas the same thing is the cause of generation and preservation of things, the order of the preservation of things is in keeping with the aforesaid order of their generation. Hence we find that mixed bodies are preserved by the qualities becoming to the elements: plants are nourished by mixed bodies; animals derive their nourishment from plants; and some that are more perfect and powerful from the imperfect and weak. Man employs all kinds of things for his own use: some for food, some for clothing. Hence by nature he was made naked, as being able to make himself clothes from other things; even as nature provided him with no becoming nourishment except milk, so that he might supply himself with food from a variety of things. Some he employs as a means of transit: for he is inferior to many animals in swiftness and sustaining power, as though other animals were furnished for his needs. And over and above he employs all things endowed with a sensitive life for the perfection of his intellectual knowledge. Wherefore of man is it said in Psalm 8:8, the words being addressed to God: Thou hast subjected all things under his feet. And Aristotle says (1 Polit. xi., xii.) that man exercises a natural sovereignty over all animals.

If, therefore, the movement of the heaven is directed to generation; and all generation is directed to man as the last end of this genus: it is evident that the end of the heavenly movement is directed to man as its last end in the genus of things subject to generation and movement.

This is expressed (Deut. 4:19) where it is said that God made the heavenly bodies for the service of all the nations.

CHAPTER XXIII

THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE HEAVEN IS FROM AN INTELLECTIVE PRINCIPLE

IT can also be shown from the foregoing that the first principle that causes the heavenly movement is intellective.

For nothing that acts according to its own species intends a form higher than its own, since every agent intends its like. Now a heavenly body, forasmuch as it acts by its own movement, intends the ultimate form, which is the human intellect, which is higher than any corporeal form, as we have proved above. Therefore the heavenly body acts to the effect of generation, not in respect of its own species, as the principal agent does, but in respect of the species of some higher intellectual agent, in relation to which the heavenly body is like an instrument in relation to a principal agent. Now the heaven acts to the effect of generation, inasmuch as it is moved. Therefore the heavenly body is moved by some intellectual substance.

Again. Whatever is in motion must needs be moved by another, as we proved above. Therefore the body of heaven is moved by another. Now this other is either wholly separated from it; or else it is united to it, so that what is composed of heaven and its mover is said to move itself, inasmuch as one part thereof is moved, and the other is mover. If this be the case; since whatever moves itself is living and animate, it follows that the heaven is animate. And not otherwise than with an intellectual soul; for it could not be animated with a nutritive soul, since in the heavenly body there is no generation or corruption; nor with a sensitive soul, since the heavenly body has no variety of organs. Therefore it follows that it is moved by an intellective soul.—If, on the other hand, it be moved by an extrinsic mover, this will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it be corporeal, it does not cause movement without being moved, for no body moves unless it be moved, as was shown above. So that this too will require to be moved by another. But as it is not possible to have an infinite series of bodies, we must come to some incorporeal first mover. Now that which is utterly separated from a body must be intellectual, as we have shown. Therefore the movement of the heaven which is first among corporeal beings, is caused by some intellectual substance.

Moreover. Heavy and light bodies are moved by their generator and by that which removes obstacles, as is proved in 8 Phys. iv.: for it is impossible that their form be mover and the matter moved, for nothing is moved except a body. Now as the elemental bodies are simple, and there is no composition in them, except that of matter and form, so too are the heavenly bodies simple. Hence if they be moved as heavy and light bodies, it follows that they are moved per se by their generator, and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle. But this is impossible: for these bodies cannot be generated, because there is no contrariety in them: and their movements cannot be hindered. Therefore these bodies must needs be moved by things that cause movement by a power of apprehension: which power cannot be sensitive, as we have proved. Therefore it must be an intellective power.

Further. If the principle of the heavenly movement be from nature alone, without any kind of apprehension, it follows that it must be the form of the heavenly body, as is the case with the elements: for although simple forms do not cause movement, they are principles of movements, since natural movements, like all other natural properties, follow from them. Now it is impossible that the heavenly movement follow the form of the heavenly body as its active principle: because thus the form is the principle of local movement, inasmuch as to a particular body, in respect of its form, is due a particular place, to which it is moved by virtue of its form that tends to that place: and because the generator gives this form, it is said to be a mover: even so it is due to fire, in respect of its form, to be in a higher place. Now one place is not more due to a heavenly body in respect of its form, than another. Therefore nature alone is not the principle of the heavenly movement: and consequently the principle of its movement must be something that moves it by apprehension.

Again. Nature always tends to one thing: wherefore things that come from nature, come always in the same way, unless they be hindered: and this seldom happens. Therefore that which is essentially difform cannot possibly be an end towards which nature tends. Now movement is essentially such; for that which is moved, as such, is conditioned otherwise now and before. Consequently nature cannot intend movement for its own sake. Therefore it intends through movement to obtain rest which in relation to movement is as one to many: for a thing is at rest which is conditioned in the same way now as before. Accordingly if the heavenly movement were from nature alone, it would be directed to some kind of rest: whereas the contrary is the case, for it is unceasing. Therefore the movement of the heaven is not from nature as its active principle, but from an intelligent substance.

Also. In every movement that is of nature as its active principle, if approach to a particular term be natural, recession from that term must be unnatural and contrary to nature: thus a heavy body naturally seeks a lower place, and recedes therefrom unnaturally. Therefore if the movement of the heaven were natural, since it tends to the west naturally, it would be contrary to nature for it to return from the west to the east. But this is impossible: for nothing in the heavenly movement is violent or unnatural. Consequently it is impossible for nature to be the active principle of the heavenly movement. Therefore its active principle is some apprehensive power, which must be an intelligence, as we have proved above. Therefore the heavenly body is moved by an intelligent substance.

And yet we must not deny that the heavenly movement is natural. For a movement is said to be natural, not only on account of its active principle, but also on account of its passive principle. This is evident in the generation of simple bodies: since such generation cannot be called natural in relation to the active principle. Because for a thing to be moved naturally by an active principle, it must have this active principle within itself, for nature is a principle of movement in a thing in which it is: whereas the active principle in the generation of a simple body, is without. Therefore it is not natural by reason of its active principle, but only by reason of its passive principle, namely matter, wherein there is a natural appetite for its natural form. Accordingly the movement of the heavenly body, as to its active principle, is not natural, but voluntary and intellectual: while as to its passive principle it is natural; since a heavenly body has a natural inclination for that movement.

This is made clear if we consider the relation of a heavenly body to its place. For a thing is passive and moved according as it is in potentiality, and it is active and moves according as it is in a state of actuality. Now a heavenly body considered in its substance, and as in potentiality, is indifferent to any place, even as primary matter is indifferent to any form, as we have stated. But it is otherwise with a heavy or light body, which, considered in itself, is not indifferent to any place, and has a definite place appointed to it by reason of its form. Wherefore the nature of heavy and light bodies is the active principle of their movements, while the nature of a heavenly body is the passive principle of its movement. Consequently we must not think that it is moved by violence, like heavy and light bodies, which are moved by us through our intelligence. For heavy and light bodies have a natural aptitude for a movement contrary to that with which they are moved by us; and so they are moved by us violently; albeit the movement of an animal's body, whereby that body is moved by the soul, is not violent to that body as animated, although it is violent in so far as that body is something heavy. On the other hand the heavenly bodies have no aptitude for a contrary movement, but only for that wherewith they are moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is both voluntary, as regards its active principle, and natural, as to its passive principle.

That the heavenly movement be voluntary in respect of its active principle, is not inconsistent with the fact that it is one and uniform, for all that the will is indifferent to many things and is not determined to any one. For just as nature is determined to one by its power, so is the will determined to one by its wisdom, by which the will is unerringly directed to one end.

It is evident from the foregoing that neither approach to any one place nor recession therefrom is contrary to nature. For this happens in the movement of heavy and light bodies for two reasons. First, because the intention of nature, in heavy and light bodies, is determined towards one place: wherefore just as the body naturally tends thereto, so does it recede therefrom against nature: secondly, because two movements, one of which approaches a given term and the other recedes therefrom, are contrary. If, however, we take not the last but a middle place in the movement of heavy and light bodies, both approach thereto and recession therefrom are natural: because the whole movement comes under the intention of nature: and the movements are not contrary, but are one continuous movement.

It is the same in the movement of heavenly bodies: because the intention of nature is not towards one determinate place, as we have said already: moreover the movement with which a body moved in a circle recedes from any given place, is not contrary to the movement with which it approaches towards it, but is one continuous movement: so that any given point in the heavenly movement is like a middle point, and not like the term in a straight movement.

Nor does it make any difference, as to the present question, whether the heavenly body be moved by an intellectual substance united to it, so as to be its soul, or by a separate substance: nor whether each heavenly body be moved by God immediately; or none, and each be moved by the intermediary of created intellectual substances: or only the first heavenly body by God immediately, and the others through the intermediary of created substances: so long as we admit that the heavenly movement is caused by an intellectual substance.

CHAPTER XXIV

HOW EVEN THINGS DEVOID OF KNOWLEDGE SEEK THE GOOD

IF, as we have shown, the heavenly body is moved by an intelligent substance, and the movement of the heavenly body is directed to generation in this lower world: it follows that the generations and movements of these lower bodies proceed from the intention of an intelligent substance. For the intention of the principal agent bears on the same thing as that of the instrument. Now the heaven is the cause of the movements of lower bodies by reason of its movement with which it is moved by an intelligent substance. Consequently it is as an instrument of an intelligent substance. Therefore the forms and movements of the lower bodies are caused by an intelligent substance; and are intended by it as by a principal agent, and by the heavenly body, as by an instrument.

Now the species of things caused and intended by an intellectual agent must pre-exist in his intellect: just as the forms of the products of art pre-exist in the mind of the craftsman and flow thence into his work. Consequently all forms that are in these lower bodies, and all their movements flow from intellectual forms which are in the intellect of some substance or substances. Hence Boetius says (De Trin. ii.) that forms which are in matter originated in forms that are immaterial. In this respect the saying of Plato is verified, that separate forms are the principles of forms that exist in matter: although Plato held them to be per se subsistent, and to be the immediate cause of the forms of sensible bodies: whereas we hold them to exist in an intellect, and to cause lower forms through the heavenly movement.

And since whatever is moved by anything per se and not accidentally, is directed thereby towards the end of its movement; and since the heavenly body is moved by an intellectual substance; and the heavenly body, by its movement, causes all movement in this lower world; it follows of necessity that the heavenly body is directed to the end of its movement, by an intellectual substance, and consequently all lower bodies to their respective ends.

Accordingly it is easy to understand how natural bodies devoid of knowledge are moved and act for the sake of an end. For they tend to an end, as directed thereto by an intelligent substance: in the same way as an arrow, directed by the archer, tends to the mark. Because as the arrow receives its direction to a fixed end through the aim of the archer, so too natural bodies receive an inclination to their natural ends from their natural movers, whence they derive their forms, powers and movements.

Wherefore it is also clear that every work of nature is the work of an intelligent substance: because an effect is ascribed more especially to the direction of the first mover towards the end, than to the instruments which receive that direction. For this reason the operations of nature are seen to proceed in an orderly manner even as the operations of a wise man.

It is therefore evident that even things devoid of knowledge can work for an end, and desire good with a natural appetite. Also that they seek a divine likeness, as well as their own perfection. Nor does it matter in which way we express it, the former or the latter. Because by tending to their own perfection, they tend to a good, since a thing is good forasmuch as it is perfect. And according as a thing tends to be good, it tends to a divine likeness: since a thing is like unto God forasmuch as it is good. Now this or that particular good is so far appetible as it bears a likeness to the first goodness. Therefore the reason why a thing tends to its own good, is because it tends to a divine likeness, and not vice versa. It is clear therefore that all things seek a divine likeness as their last end.

A thing’s own good can be understood in several ways. First, in the sense that it is proper to that thing on the part of the individual. Thus an animal desires its own good, when it desires food, whereby its existence is preserved.—Secondly, as being proper to that thing on the part of its species. Thus an animal desires its own good, forasmuch as it desires to beget offspring and to feed it, as well as whatever else conduces to the preservation or defence of the individuals of its species.—Thirdly, on the part of the genus. And thus an equivocal agent, for instance the heaven, desires its own good, in causing.—Fourthly, on the part of a likeness of analogy between effect and cause. Thus God, who is outside all genera, gives being to all things on account of his own goodness.

This clearly proves that the more perfect a thing's power, and the higher its degree of goodness, the more universal its desire for good, and the greater the range of goodness to which its appetite and operation extend. For imperfect things extend no further than their own individual good; but perfect things extend to the good of the species; more perfect things, to the good of the genus; and God who is most perfect in goodness, to the good of all being. Wherefore it is said by some, not without reason, that good, as such, is self-diffusive, because the better a thing is, the further does the outpouring of its goodness extend. And since, in every genus, that which is most perfect is the exemplar and measure of all that belongs to that genus, it follows that God, who is most perfect in goodness, and pours forth his goodness most universally, is in his outpouring the exemplar of all things that pour forth goodness. Now one thing becomes a cause of another by pouring forth its own goodness into that other. And so it is again evident that whatever tends to be the cause of something else, tends to a divine likeness, and yet tends to its own good. Consequently it is not unreasonable to say that the movements of heavenly bodies, and the actions of their movers, are in a way for the sake of these bodies that are generated and corrupted, and of less account than they are. For they are not for the sake of these as their last end: but by intending the generation of these, they intend their own good, and the divine likeness as their last end.

CHAPTER XXV

THAT TO KNOW GOD IS THE END OF EVERY INTELLIGENT SUBSTANCE

NOW, seeing that all creatures, even those that are devoid of reason, are directed to God as their last end: and that all reach this end in so far as they have some share of a likeness to him: the intellectual creature attains to him in a special way, namely through its proper operation, by understanding him. Consequently this must be the end of the intelligent creature, namely to understand God.

For, as we have shown above, God is the end of each thing: wherefore as far as it is possible to it each thing intends to be united to God as its last end. Now a thing is more closely united to God by reaching in a way to the very substance of God; which happens when it knows something of the divine substance,—than when it reaches to a divine likeness. Therefore the intellectual substance tends to the knowledge of God as its last end.

Again. The operation proper to a thing is the end thereof: for it is its second perfection; so that when a thing is well conditioned for its proper operation it is said to be efficient and good. Now understanding is the proper operation of the intellectual substance: and consequently it is its end. Therefore whatever is most perfect in this operation, is its last end; especially in those operations which are not directed to some product, such as understanding and sensation. And since operations of this kind take their species from their objects, by which also they are known, it follows that the more perfect the object of any such operation, the more perfect is the operation. Consequently to understand the most perfect intelligible, namely God, is the most perfect in the genus of this operation which is to understand. Therefore to know God by an act of intelligence is the last end of every intellectual substance.

Someone, however, might say that the last end of an intellectual substance consists indeed in understanding the best intelligible: but that what is the best intelligible for this or that intellectual substance, is not simply the best intelligible; and that the higher the intellectual substance, the higher is its best intelligible. So that possibly the supreme intellectual substance has for its best intelligible that which is best simply, and its happiness will consist in understanding God: whereas the happiness of any lower intellectual substance will consist in understanding some lower intelligible, which however will be the highest thing understood by that substance. Especially would it seem not to be in the power of the human intellect to understand that which is simply the best intelligible, on account of its weakness: for it is as much adapted for knowing the supreme intelligible, as the owl's eye for seeing the sun.

Nevertheless it is evident that the end of any intellectual substance, even the lowest, is to understand God. For it has been shown above that God is the last end towards which all things tend. And the human intellect, although the lowest in the order of intelligent substances, is superior to all that are devoid of understanding. Since then a more exalted substance has not a less exalted end, God will be the end also of the human intelligence. Now every intelligent being attains to its last end by understanding it, as we have proved. Therefore the human intellect attains to God as its end, by understanding Him.

Again. Just as things devoid of intelligence tend to God as their end, by way of assimilation, so do intelligent substances by way of knowledge, as clearly appears from what has been said. Now although things devoid of reason tend towards a likeness to their proximate causes, the intention of nature does not rest there, but has for its end a likeness to the sovereign good, as we have proved, although they are able to attain to this likeness in a most imperfect manner. Therefore however little be the knowledge of God to which the intellect is able to attain, this will be the intellect's last end, rather than the perfect knowledge of lower intelligibles.

Moreover. Everything desires its last end most of all. Now the human intellect desires, loves and enjoys the knowledge of divine things, although it can grasp but little about them, more than the perfect knowledge which it has of the lower world. Therefore man's last end is to understand God in some way or other.

Further. Everything tends to a divine likeness as its own end. Therefore a thing's last end is that whereby it is most of all like unto God. Now the intellectual creature is especially likened to God in that it is intellectual: since this likeness belongs to it above other creatures, and includes all other likenesses. And in this particular kind of likeness it is more like God in understanding actually than in understanding habitually or potentially: because God is always actually understanding, as we proved in the First Book. And in understanding actually he is especially like God, in understanding God: because by understanding Himself God understands all other things, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore the last end of every intelligent substance is to understand God.

Again. That which is lovable only on account of another, is for the sake of that which is lovable for its own sake alone: because we cannot go on indefinitely in the appetite of nature, since then nature's desire would be in vain, for it is impossible to pass through an infinite number of things. Now all practical sciences, arts and powers are lovable only for the sake of something else, since their end is not knowledge, but work. But speculative sciences are lovable for their own sake, for their end is knowledge itself. Nor can we find any action in connexion with man, that is not directed to some other end, with the exception of speculative consideration. For even playful actions, which would seem to be done without any purpose, have some end due to them, namely that the mind may be relaxed, and that thereby we may afterwards become more fit for studious occupations: else we should always have to be playing, if play were desirable for its own sake, and this is unreasonable. Accordingly practical art is directed to speculative art, and again every human operation, to intellectual speculation, as its end. Now, in all sciences and arts that are mutually subordinate, the last end apparently belongs to the one from which others take their rules and principles: thus the art of sailing, to which belongs the ship's end, namely its use, provides rules and principles to the art of ship-building. And such is the relation of metaphysics to other speculative sciences, for all others depend thereon, since they derive their principles from it, and are directed by it in defending those principles; moreover metaphysics is wholly directed to God as its last end, wherefore it is called the divine science. Therefore the knowledge of God is the last end of all human knowledge and actions.

Furthermore. In all mutually subordinate agents and movers, the end of the first agent must be the end of all: even as the end of the commander in chief is the end of all who are soldiering under him. Now of all the parts of man, the intellect is the highest mover: for it moves the appetite, by proposing its object to it; and the intellective appetite or will, moves the sensitive appetites, namely the irascible and concupiscible, so that we do not obey the concupiscence, unless the will command; and the sensitive appetite, the will consenting, moves the body. Therefore the end of the intellect is the end of all human actions. Now the intellect’s end and good are the true, and its last end is the first truth. Therefore the last end of all man and of all his deeds and desires, is to know the first truth, namely God.

Moreover. Man has a natural desire to know the causes of whatever he sees: wherefore through wondering at what they saw, and ignoring its cause, men first began to philosophize, and when they had discovered the cause they were at rest. Nor do they cease inquiring until they come to the first cause; and then do we deem ourselves to know perfectly when we know the first cause. Therefore man naturally desires, as his last end, to know the first cause. But God is the first cause of all. Therefore man’s last end is to know God.

Besides. Man naturally desires to know the cause of any known effect. Now the human intellect knows universal being. Therefore it naturally desires to know its cause, which is God alone, as we proved in the Second Book. Now one has not attained to one’s last end until the natural desire is at rest. Therefore the knowledge of any intelligible object is not enough for man’s happiness, which is his last end, unless he know God also, which knowledge terminates his natural desire, as his last end. Therefore this very knowledge of God is man’s last end.

Further. A body that tends by its natural appetite to its place, is moved all the more vehemently and rapidly, the nearer it approaches its end: wherefore Aristotle proves (1. De Cœl. viii.) that a natural straight movement cannot be towards an indefinite point, because it would not be more moved afterwards than before. Hence that which tends more vehemently to a thing afterwards than before, is not moved towards an indefinite point but towards something fixed. Now this we find in the desire of knowledge: for the more one knows, the greater one's desire to know. Consequently man's natural desire in knowledge tends to a definite end. This can be no other but the highest thing knowable, which is God. Therefore the knowledge of God is man's last end.

Now the last end of man and of any intelligent substance is called happiness or beatitude: for it is this that every intelligent substance desires as its last end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore the last beatitude or happiness of any intelligent substance is to know God.

Hence it is said (Matth. 5:8): Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God: and (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life: that they may know thee, the only true God. Aristotle agrees with this statement (10 Ethic. vii.) when he says that man's ultimate happiness is contemplative, in regard to his contemplating the highest object of contemplation.

CHAPTER XXVI

DOES HAPPINESS CONSIST IN AN ACT OF THE WILL?

SINCE the intellectual substance attains to God by its operation, not only by an act of understanding but also by an act of the will, through desiring and loving Him, and through delighting in Him, someone might think that man’s last end and ultimate happiness consists, not in knowing but in loving God or in some other act of the will towards Him: especially seeing that the object of the will is the good, which has the aspect of an end, whereas the true, which is the object of the intellect, has not the aspect of an end except forasmuch as it also is a good. Wherefore seemingly man does not attain to his last end by an act of his intellect, but rather by an act of his will.

Further. The ultimate perfection of operation is delight, which perfects operation as beauty perfects youth, as the Philosopher says (10 Ethic. iv.). Hence if the last end be a perfect operation, it would seem that it must consist in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

Again. Delight apparently is desired for its own sake so that it is never desired for the sake of something else: for it is silly to ask of anyone why he seeks to be delighted. Now this is a condition of the ultimate end, namely that it be sought for its own sake. Therefore seemingly the last end consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

Moreover. All agree in their desire for the last end, for it is a natural desire. Now more people seek delight than knowledge. Therefore delight would seem to be the last end rather than knowledge.

Furthermore. The will is seemingly a higher power than the intellect: for the will moves the intellect to its act; since when a person wills, his intellect considers by an act what he holds by a habit. Wherefore seemingly the act of the will is higher than the act of the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the last end, which is beatitude, consists in an act of the will rather than of the intellect.

But this can be clearly shown to be impossible. For since happiness is the proper good of the intellectual nature, it must needs become the intellectual nature according to that which is proper thereto. Now appetite is not proper to the intellectual nature, but is in all things, although it is different in different things. This difference, however, arises from things having a different relation to knowledge. For things wholly devoid of knowledge have only a natural appetite: those that have a sensitive knowledge, have also a sensitive appetite, under which the irascible and concupiscible appetites are comprised. And those which have intellective knowledge, have also an appetite proportionate to that knowledge, namely the will. The will therefore, forasmuch as it is an appetite, is not proper to the intellectual nature, but only in so far as it is dependent on the intellect. On the other hand the intellect is in itself proper to the intellectual nature. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists principally and essentially in an act of the intellect, rather than in an act of the will.

Again. In all powers that are moved by their objects, the object is naturally prior to the acts of those powers: even as the mover is naturally prior to the movable being moved. Now such a power is the will: for the appetible object moves the appetite. Therefore the will’s object is naturally prior to its act: and consequently its first object precedes its every act. Therefore an act of the will cannot be the first thing willed. But this is the last end, which is beatitude. Therefore beatitude or happiness cannot be the very act of the will.

Besides. In all those powers which are able to reflect on their acts, their act must first bear on some other object, and afterwards the power is brought to bear on its own act. For if the intellect understand that it understands, we must suppose first that it understands some particular thing, and that afterwards it understands that it understands: for this very act of intelligence which the intellect understands, must have an object. Hence either we must go on for ever, or if we come to some first thing understood, this will not be an act of understanding, but some intelligible thing. In the same way the first thing willed cannot be the very act of willing, but must be some other good. Now the first thing willed by an intelligent nature, is beatitude or happiness: because for its sake we will whatever we will. Therefore happiness cannot consist in an act of the will.

Further. The truth of a thing's nature is derived from those things which constitute its essence: for a true man differs from a man in a picture, by the things which constitute man's essence. Now false happiness does not differ from true in an act of the will: because whatever be proposed to the will as the supreme good, whether truly or falsely, it makes no difference to the will, desiring, loving, or enjoying that good: the difference is on the part of the intellect, as to whether the good proposed as supreme be truly so or not. Therefore beatitude or happiness consists essentially in an act of the intellect rather than of the will.

Again. If an act of the will were happiness itself, this act would be either desire, or love, or joy. But desire cannot possibly be the last end. For desire implies that the will is tending to what it has not yet; and this is contrary to the very notion of the last end.—Nor can love be the last end. For a good is loved not only while it is in our possession, but even when it is not: because it is through love that we seek by desire what we have not: and if love of a thing we possess is more perfect, this arises from the fact that we possess the good we love. It is one thing, therefore, to possess the good which is our end; and another to love it, which love before we possessed was imperfect, and perfect after we obtained possession.—Nor again is delight the last end. For it is possession of the good that causes delight; whether we are conscious of possessing it actually; or call to mind our previous possession; or hope to possess it in the future. Therefore delight is not the last end.—Therefore no act of the will can be happiness itself essentially.

Furthermore. If delight were the last end, it would be desirable for its own sake. But this is not true. Because the desirability of a delight depends on what gives rise to the delight: since that which arises from good and desirable operations, is itself good and desirable, but that which arises from evil operations, is itself evil and to be avoided. Therefore its goodness and desirability are from something else: and consequently it is not itself the last end or happiness.

Moreover. The right order of things agrees with the order of nature: for in the natural order things are directed to their end without any error. Now, in the natural order delight is on account of operation and not conversely. For it is to be observed that nature has joined delight with those animal operations which are clearly directed to necessary ends; for instance to the use of food that is directed to the preservation of the individual; and to sexual matters, that are appointed for the preservation of the species: since were there no pleasure, animals would abstain from the use of these necessary things. Therefore delight cannot be the last end.

Again. Delight, seemingly, is nothing else than the quiescence of the will in some becoming good, just as desire is the inclining of the will towards the attaining of some good. Now just as by his will, a man is inclined towards an end, and rests in it; so too have natural bodies a natural inclination to their respective ends, and are at rest when they have once attained their end. Now it is absurd to say that the end of the movement of a heavy body is not to be in its proper place, but that it is the quiescence of the inclination towards that place. For if it were nature's chief intent that this inclination should be quiescent, it would not give such an inclination: but it gives it so that the body may tend towards its place: and when it has arrived there, as though it were its end, quiescence of the inclination follows. Hence this quiescence is not the end, but accompanies the end. Neither therefore is delight the ultimate end, but accompanies it. Much less therefore is happiness any act of the will.

Besides. If a thing have something extrinsic for its end, the operation whereby it first obtains that thing will be called its last end: thus for those whose end is money, possession is said to be their end, but not love or desire. Now the last end of the intellective substance is God. Hence that operation of man whereby he first obtains God is essentially his happiness or beatitude. And this is understanding: since we cannot will what we do not understand. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is essentially to know God by the intellect, and not an act of the will.

From what has been said we can now solve the arguments that were objected in the contrary sense. For it does not necessarily follow that happiness is essentially the very act of the will, from the fact that it is the object of the will, through being the highest good, as the first argument reasoned. On the contrary the fact that it is the first object of the will, shows that it is not an act of the will, as appears from what we have said.

Nor does it follow that whatever perfects a thing in any way whatever, must be the end of that thing; as the second objection argued. For a thing perfects another in two ways: first it perfects a thing that has its species;

secondly it perfects a thing that it may have its species. Thus the perfection of a house considered as already having its species, is that to which the species "house" is directed, namely to be a dwelling: for one would not build a house but for that: and consequently we must include this in the definition of a house, if the definition is to be perfect. On the other hand the perfection that conduces to the species of a house, is both that which is directed to the completion of the species, for instance its essential principles; and that which conduces to the preservation of the species, for instance the buttresses which are made to support the building; and those things which make the house more fit for use, for instance, the symmetry of the building. Accordingly that which is the perfection of a thing considered as already having its species, is its end; as the end of a house is to be a dwelling. Likewise, the operation proper to a thing, its use, as it were, is its end. On the other hand whatever perfects a thing by conducing to its species, is not the end of that thing: in fact the thing is its end; thus matter and form are for the sake of the species. For although the form is the end of generation, it is not the end of the thing already generated and having its species, but is required in order that the species be complete. Again, things that preserve the thing in its species, such as health and the nutritive power, although they perfect the animal, are not the animal's end, but vice versa. And again, those things that adapt a thing for the perfection of its proper specific operations, and for the easier attainment of its proper end, are not the end of that thing, but vice versa: for instance, a man's comeliness and bodily strength, and the like, of which the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. viii., ix.) that they conduce to happiness instrumentally.—Now delight is a perfection of operation, not as though operation were directed thereto in respect of its species, for thus it is directed to other ends; thus eating, in respect of its species, is directed to the preservation of the individual: but it is like a perfection that is conducive to a thing's species: since for the sake of the delight we perform more attentively and becomingly an operation we delight in. Wherefore the Philosopher (10 Ethic. iv.) says that delight perfects operation as beauty perfects youth: for beauty is for the sake of the one who has youth.—Nor is the fact that men seek delight not for the sake of something else but for its own sake, a sufficient indication that delight is the last end, as the third objection argued. Because delight, though it is not the last end, nevertheless accompanies the last end: since delight arises from the attainment of the end.

Nor do more people seek the pleasure that comes from knowledge, than knowledge itself. But more there are who seek sensible delights than intellectual knowledge and the delight consequent thereto: because those things that are without, are better known to the majority, in that human knowledge takes its beginning from sensible objects.

The suggestion put forward by the fifth argument, that the will is a higher power than the intellect, as being the latter’s motive force, is clearly untrue. Because the intellect moves the will, first and per se: for the will, as such, is moved by its object, which is the apprehended good: whereas the will moves the intellect accidentally as it were, in so far, to wit, that the act of intelligence is itself apprehended as a good, and on that account is desired by the will, the result being that the intellect understands actually. Even in this, the intellect precedes the will, for the will would never seek the act of intelligence, did not the intellect first apprehend its act of intelligence as a good.—And again, the will moves the intellect to actual operation, in the same way as an agent is said to move; whereas the intellect moves the will in the same way as the end moves, for the good understood is the end of the will. Now the agent in moving comes after the end, for the agent does not move except on account of the end. It is therefore clear that the intellect is simply higher than the will; while the will is higher than the intellect accidentally and in a restricted sense.

CHAPTER XXVII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN CARNAL PLEASURES

FROM what has been said it is clearly impossible that human happiness consist in pleasures of the body, the chief of which are pleasures of the table and of sex.

It has been shown that according to nature’s order, pleasure is on account of operation, and not conversely. Wherefore if an operation be not the ultimate end, the consequent pleasure can neither be the ultimate end, nor accompany the ultimate end. Now it is manifest that the operations which are followed by the pleasures mentioned above, are not the last end: for they are directed to certain manifest ends; eating, for instance, to the preservation of the body, and carnal intercourse to the begetting of children. Therefore the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore happiness does not consist in them.

Again. The will is higher than the sensitive appetite: for it moves it, as stated above. But happiness does not consist in an act of the will, as we have already proved. Much less therefore does it consist in the aforesaid pleasures which are seated in the sensitive appetite.

Moreover. Happiness is a good proper to man: for it is an abuse of terms to speak of dumb animals as being happy. Now these pleasures are common to man and beast. Therefore we must not assign happiness to them.

Besides. The highest perfection of man cannot consist in his being united to things lower than himself, but consists in his being united to something above him; for the end is better than that which tends to the end. Now these pleasures consist in man being united through his senses to things beneath him, namely certain sensible objects. Therefore we must not assign happiness to suchlike pleasures.

Further. That which is not good unless it be moderate, is not good in itself, but receives its goodness from its moderator. Now the use of the aforesaid pleasures is not good for man unless it be moderate: for otherwise they would frustrate one another. Therefore these pleasures are not in themselves man’s good. But the sovereign good is good essentially, because that which is good of itself is better than what is good through another. Therefore suchlike pleasures are not man’s supreme good, which is happiness.

Again. In all per se predications, if A be predicated of B simply, an increase in A will be predicated of an increase in B: thus if a hot thing heats, a hotter thing heats more, and the hottest thing heats most. Accordingly if the pleasures in question were good in themselves, it would follow that to use them very much is very good. But this is clearly false: because it is considered sinful to use them too much: besides it is hurtful to the body, and hinders pleasures of the same kind. Therefore they are not per se man’s good: and human happiness does not consist in them.

Again. Acts of virtue are praiseworthy through being directed to happiness. If therefore human happiness consisted in the aforesaid pleasures, an act of virtue would be more praiseworthy in acceding to them than in abstaining from them. But this is clearly untrue: for the act of temperance is especially praised in abstinence from pleasures; whence that act takes its name. Therefore man’s happiness is not in these pleasures.

Furthermore. The last end of everything is God, as was proved above. We must therefore posit as man’s last end that by which especially man approaches to God. Now man is hindered by the aforesaid pleasures from his chief approach to God, which is effected by contemplation, to which these same pleasures are a very great hindrance, since more than anything they plunge man into the midst of sensible things, and consequently withdraw him from intelligible things. Therefore human happiness is not to be placed in bodily pleasures.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Epicureans who ascribed man’s happiness to pleasures of this kind: in their person Solomon says (Eccles. 5:17): This therefore hath seemed good to me, that a man should eat and drink, and enjoy the fruit of his labour … and this is his portion: and (Wis.

2:9): Let us everywhere leave tokens of joy: for this is our portion, and this is our lot.

The error of the Cerinthians is also refuted: for they pretended that, in the state of final happiness, after the resurrection Christ will reign for a thousand years, and men will indulge in the carnal pleasures of the table: wherefore they are called ‘Chiliastae,’ or believers in the Millennium.

The fables of the Jews and Mohammedans are also refuted: who pretend that the reward of the righteous consists in suchlike pleasures: for happiness is the reward of virtue.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN HONOURS

FROM the foregoing it is also clear that neither does man’s supreme good, or happiness, consist in honours.

For man’s ultimate end and happiness is his most perfect operation, as we have shown above. But man’s honour does not consist in something done by him, but in something done to him by another who shows him honour. Therefore man’s happiness must not be placed in honours.

Again. That which is on account of another good and desirable thing is not the last end. Now such is honour: for a man is not rightly honoured, except on account of some other good in him. For this reason do men seek to be honoured, as though wishing to have a voucher for some good that is in them: so that they rejoice more in being honoured by the great and the wise. Therefore we must not assign man’s happiness to honours.

Besides. Happiness is obtained through virtue. Now virtuous deeds are voluntary, else they were not praiseworthy. Therefore happiness must be a good obtainable by man through his will. But it is not in a man’s power to secure honour, rather is it in the power of the man who pays honour. Therefore happiness is not to be assigned to honours.

Moreover. Only the good can be worthy of honour: and yet it is possible even for the wicked to be honoured. Therefore it is better to become worthy of honour, than to be honoured. Therefore honour is not man’s supreme good.

Furthermore. The supreme good is the perfect good. Now the perfect good is incompatible with any evil. But that which has no evil in it cannot possibly be evil. Therefore that which is in possession of the supreme good cannot be evil. Yet it is possible for an evil person to receive honour. Therefore honour is not man’s supreme good.

CHAPTER XXIX

THAT MAN’S HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN GLORY

WHEREFORE it is evident also that man’s supreme good does not consist in glory which is the recognition of one’s good name.

For glory, according to Cicero, is the general recognition and praise of a person’s good name, and in the words of Ambrose consists in being well known and praised. Now men seek praise and distinction through being famous, so that they may be honoured by those whom their fame reaches. Therefore glory is sought for the sake of honour: and consequently if honour be not the sovereign good, much less is glory.

Again. Those goods are worthy of praise, whereby a man shows himself to be directed to his end. Now he who is directed to his end has not yet reached his last end. Therefore praise is not bestowed on one who has reached his last end: rather does he receive honour as the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. xii.). Therefore glory cannot be the supreme good: since it consists chiefly in praise.

Besides. It is better to know than to be known: because only the higher things know; whereas the lowest are known. Therefore man’s supreme good cannot be glory, which consists in a man being known.

Further. A man does not seek to be known except in good things: and in evil things he seeks to be hidden. Therefore to be known is good and desirable, on account of the good things that are known in a man. Therefore these good things are better still. Consequently glory, which consists in a man being known, is not his supreme good.

Moreover. The supreme good must needs be perfect, for it satisfies the appetite. But the knowledge of one’s good name, wherein glory consists, is imperfect: for it is beset with much uncertainty and error. Therefore glory of this kind cannot be the supreme good.

Furthermore. Man’s supreme good must be supremely stable in human things: for it is natural to desire unfailing endurance in one’s goods. Now glory, which consists in fame, is most unstable; since nothing is more changeable than human opinion and praise. Therefore such glory is not man’s supreme good.

CHAPTER XXX

THAT MAN’S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN WEALTH

HENCE it is evident that neither is wealth man’s supreme good. For wealth is not sought except for the sake of something else: because of itself it brings us no good, but only when we use it, whether for the support of the body, or for some similar purpose. Now the supreme good is sought for its own, and not for another’s sake. Therefore wealth is not man’s supreme good.

Again. Man’s supreme good cannot consist in the possession or preservation of things whose chief advantage for man consists in their being spent. Now the chief advantage of wealth is in its being spent; for this is its use. Therefore the possession of wealth cannot be man’s supreme good.

Moreover. Acts of virtue deserve praise according as they lead to happiness. Now acts of liberality and magnificence which are concerned with money, are deserving of praise, on account of money being spent, rather than on account of its being kept: and it is from this that these virtues derive their names. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in the possession of wealth.

Besides. Man’s supreme good must consist in obtaining something better than man. But man is better than wealth: since it is something directed to man’s use. Therefore not in wealth does man’s supreme good consist.

Further. Man’s supreme good is not subject to chance. For things that happen by chance, escape the forethought of reason: whereas man has to attain his own end by means of his reason. But chance occupies the greater place in the attaining of wealth. Therefore human happiness consists not in wealth.

Moreover. This is evident from the fact that wealth is lost unwillingly. Also because wealth can come into the possession of evil persons, who, of necessity, must lack the sovereign good. Again because wealth is unstable. Other similar reasons can be gathered from the arguments given above.

CHAPTER XXXI

THAT HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN WORLDLY POWER

IN like manner neither can worldly power be man's supreme happiness: since in the achievement thereof chance can effect much. Again it is unstable; and is not subject to man's will; and is often obtained by evil men. These are incompatible with the supreme good, as already stated.

Again. Man is said to be good especially according as he approaches the supreme good. But in respect to his having power, he is not said to be either good or evil: since not everyone who can do good deeds is good, nor is a person evil because he can do evil deeds. Therefore the supreme good does not consist in being powerful.

Besides. Every power implies reference to something else. But the supreme good is not referred to anything further. Therefore power is not man's supreme good.

Moreover. Man's supreme good cannot be a thing that one can use both well and ill: for the better things are those that we cannot abuse. But one can use one's power both well and ill: for rational powers can be directed to contrary objects. Therefore human power is not man's supreme good.

Further. If any power be man's supreme good, it must be most perfect. Now human power is most imperfect: for it is based on human will and opinion, which are full of inconsistencies. Also the greater a power is reputed to be, the greater number of people does it depend on: which again conduces to its weakness, since what depends on many, is in many ways destructible. Therefore man's supreme good does not consist in worldly power. Consequently man's happiness consists in no external good: for all external goods, which are known as goods of chance, are contained under those we have mentioned.

CHAPTER XXXII

THAT HAPPINESS CONSISTS NOT IN GOODS OF THE BODY

LIKE arguments avail to prove that man’s supreme good does not consist in goods of the body, such as health, beauty and strength. For they are common to good and evil: and are unstable: and are not subject to the will.

Besides. The soul is better than the body, which neither lives, nor possesses these goods, without the soul. Wherefore the soul’s good, such as understanding and the like, is better than the body’s good. Therefore the body’s good is not man’s supreme good.

Again. These goods are common to man and other animals: whereas happiness is a good proper to man. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in the things mentioned.

Moreover. Many animals surpass man in goods of the body: for some are fleeter than he, some more sturdy, and so on. Accordingly, if man’s supreme good consisted in these things, man would not excel all animals: which is clearly untrue. Therefore human happiness does not consist in goods of the body.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS IS NOT SEATED IN THE SENSES

BY the same arguments it is evident that neither does man’s supreme good consist in goods of his sensitive faculty. For these goods again, are common to man and other animals.

Again. Intellect is superior to sense. Therefore the intellect’s good is better than the sense’s. Consequently man’s supreme good is not seated in the senses.

Besides. The greatest sensual pleasures are those of the table and of sex, wherein the supreme good must needs be, if seated in the senses. But it does not consist in them. Therefore man’s supreme good is not in the senses.

Moreover. The senses are appreciated for their utility and for knowledge. Now the entire utility of the senses is referred to the goods of the body. Again, sensitive knowledge is directed to intellective: wherefore animals devoid of intelligence take no pleasure in sensation except in reference to some bodily utility, in so far as by sensitive knowledge they obtain food or sexual intercourse. Therefore man’s supreme good which is happiness is not seated in the sensitive faculty.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THAT MAN’S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN ACTS OF MORAL VIRTUE

IT is clear that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral works.

For human happiness, if ultimate, cannot be directed to a further end. But all moral deeds can be directed to something else. This is clear from a consideration of the principal among them. Because deeds of fortitude in time of war are directed to victory and peace: for it were foolish to go to war merely for its own sake. Again deeds of justice are directed to keeping peace among men, through each one possessing his own in peace. The same applies to all other virtues. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in moral deeds.

Again. The purpose of the moral virtues is that through them we may observe the mean in the passions within us, and in things outside us. Now it is impossible that the moderation of passions or of external things be the ultimate end of man’s life; since both passions and external things can be directed to something less. Therefore it is not possible that the practice of moral virtue be man’s final happiness.

Further. Since man is man through having reason, his proper good which is happiness must needs be in accordance with that which is proper to reason. Now that which reason has in itself is more proper to reason than what it effects in something else. Seeing then that the good of moral virtue is something effected by reason in something other than itself, it cannot be man’s greatest good which is happiness: rather must it be a good that is in reason itself.

Moreover. We have already proved that the last end of all is to become like God. Therefore that in which man chiefly becomes like God, is his happiness. Now this is not in regard to moral actions, since suchlike actions cannot be ascribed to God, except metaphorically; for it is not becoming to God to have passions, or the like, with which moral virtue is concerned. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness, which is his last end, does not consist in moral actions.

Furthermore. Happiness is man’s proper good. Therefore that good, which of all goods is most proper to man in comparison with other animals, is the one in which we must seek his ultimate happiness. Now this is not the practice of moral virtue; for animals share somewhat either in liberality, or in fortitude: whereas no animal has a share in intellectual action. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in moral actions.

CHAPTER XXXV

THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE ACT OF PRUDENCE

IT is also evident from the foregoing that neither does man’s happiness consist in the act of prudence.

For acts of prudence are solely about matters of moral virtue. But human happiness does not consist in the practice of moral virtue. Neither therefore does it consist in the practice of prudence.

Again. Man’s ultimate happiness consists in man’s most excellent operation. Now man’s most excellent operation in respect of what is proper to man, is in relation to most perfect objects. But the act of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect objects of intellect or reason: since it is not about necessary things, but about contingent practical matters. Therefore its act is not man’s ultimate happiness.

Besides. That which is directed to another as its end, is not man’s ultimate happiness. Now the act of prudence is directed to another as its end: both because all practical knowledge, under which prudence is comprised, is directed to operation: and because prudence gives man a good disposition as regards things directed to the end, as may be gathered from Aristotle (6 Ethic, xiii.). Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not in the practice of prudence.

Furthermore. Irrational animals have no share of happiness: as Aristotle proves (1 Ethic, ix.). Yet some of them have a certain share of prudence: as may be gathered from the same authority (1 Metaph. i., ii.). Therefore happiness does not consist in an act of prudence.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THAT HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE PRACTICE OF ART

IT is also evident that it cannot consist in the practice of art.

For even the knowledge of art is practical, and so is directed to an end, and is not the ultimate end.

Besides. The end of the practice of art is the thing produced by art: and such a thing cannot be the ultimate end of human life; since rather is it we who are the end of those products, for they are all made for man's use. Therefore final happiness cannot consist in the practice of art.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THAT MAN’S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS CONSISTS IN CONTEMPLATING GOD

ACCORDINGLY if man’s ultimate happiness consists not in external things, which are called goods of chance; nor in goods of the body; nor in goods of the soul, as regards the sensitive faculty; nor as regards the intellective faculty, in the practice of moral virtue; nor as regards intellectual virtue in those which are concerned about action, namely art and prudence; it remains for us to conclude that man’s ultimate happiness consists in the contemplation of the truth.

For this operation alone is proper to man, and none of the other animals communicates with him therein.

Again. This is not directed to anything further as its end: since the contemplation of the truth is sought for its own sake.

Again. By this operation man is united to things above him, by becoming like them: because of all human actions this alone is both in God and in separate substances. Also, by this operation man comes into contact with those higher beings, through knowing them in any way whatever.

Besides, man is more self-sufficing for this operation, seeing that he stands in little need of the help of external things in order to perform it.

Further. All other human operations seem to be directed to this as their end. Because perfect contemplation requires that the body should be disencumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of art that are necessary for life. Moreover, it requires freedom from the disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the moral virtues and prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to which all the regulations of the civil life are directed. So that, if we consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations are brought into the service of those who contemplate the truth. Now, it is not possible that man’s ultimate happiness consist in contemplation based on the understanding of first principles: for this is most imperfect, as being universal and containing potential knowledge of things. Moreover, it is the beginning and not the end of human study, and comes to us from nature, and not through the study of the truth. Nor does it consist in contemplation based on the sciences that have the lowest things for their object: since happiness must consist in an operation of the intellect in relation to the highest objects of intelligence. It follows then that man’s ultimate happiness consists in wisdom, based on the consideration of divine things. It is therefore evident by way of induction that man’s ultimate happiness consists solely in the contemplation of God, which conclusion was proved above by arguments.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

THAT HUMAN HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD WHICH IS POSSESSED GENERALLY BY THE MAJORITY

IT remains for us to inquire in what kind of knowledge of God the ultimate happiness of the intellectual substance consists. For there is a certain general and confused knowledge of God, which is in almost all men, whether from the fact that, as some think, the existence of God, like other principles of demonstration, is self-evident, as we have stated in the First Book: or, as seems nearer to the truth, because by his natural reason, man is able at once to arrive at some knowledge of God. For seeing that natural things are arranged in a certain order,—since there cannot be order without a cause of order—men, for the most part, perceive that there is one who arranges in order the things that we see. But who or of what kind this cause of order may be, or whether there be but one, cannot be gathered from this general consideration: even so, when we see a man in motion, and performing other works, we perceive that m him there is a cause of these operations, which is not in other things, and we give this cause the name of soul, but without knowing yet what the soul is, whether it be a body, or how it brings about operations in question.

Now, this knowledge of God cannot possibly suffice for happiness.

For the operation of the happy must be without any defect: and this knowledge is subject to an admixture of many errors. Some believed that there is no other ordainer of mundane things than the heavenly bodies; wherefore they said that the heavenly bodies are gods.—Some ascribed this order to the elements and to the things generated from them; as though they deemed the movements and natural operations thereof, not to be due to another ordainer, and the order in other things to be caused by them.—Some, deeming human acts not to be subject to any but a human ordinance, declared that men who cause order in other men are gods.—Accordingly this knowledge of God is not sufficient for happiness.

Moreover. Happiness is the end of human acts. But human acts are not directed to the aforesaid knowledge as their end: indeed, it is in everyone almost from the very beginning. Therefore happiness does not consist in this kind of knowledge of God.

Again. No one appears to be blamed for lacking happiness: nay, those who have it not and seek it are praised. Whereas he who lacks the aforesaid knowledge of God, is seemingly very much to be blamed: since it is a very clear sign of a man's dullness of perception, if he fail to perceivesuch evident signs of God's existence: even as a man would be deemed dull who, seeing man, understood not that he has a soul. Hence it is said in the Psalm (13:1–52:1): The fool hath said in his heart: There is no God.

Further. Knowledge of a thing in general only, and not in respect of a property thereof, is most imperfect; for instance knowledge of man from the fact that he is moved, for this is a knowledge whereby a thing is known only potentially: because the proper is only potentially contained in the common. Now happiness is a perfect operation: and man's supreme good must needs be in respect of what he is actually, and not in respect of what he is only potentially: since potentiality perfected by act has the aspect of a good. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge of God is not sufficient for our happiness.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THAT MAN’S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD ACQUIRED BY DEMONSTRATION

THERE is also another knowledge of God, higher than the one just mentioned, which is acquired by means of a demonstration, and which approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of him: since by means of a demonstration many things are removed from him, so that in consequence we understand him as something apart from other things. For demonstration proves that God is immovable, eternal, incorporeal, utterly simple, one, and the like, as we have shown in the First Book. Now we arrive at the proper knowledge of a thing not only by affirmation, but also by negation: for just as it is proper to man to be a rational animal, so is it proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. Yet there is this difference between these two modes of knowledge, that when we have proper knowledge of a thing by affirmation, we know what that thing is, and how it is distinguished from others: whereas when we have proper knowledge of a thing by negations, we know that it is distinct from others, but remain ignorant of what it is. Such is the proper knowledge of God, that can be obtained by demonstrations. But neither does this suffice for man’s ultimate happiness. For things belonging to one species for the most part attain to the end of that species, because nature achieves its purpose always or nearly always, and fails in a few instances on account of some corruption. Now happiness is the end of the human species; since all men naturally desire it. Therefore happiness is a common good that can be attained by all men, unless some obstacle occur to some whereby they be debarred from it. Few, however, attain to the possession of the aforesaid knowledge of God by way of demonstration, on account of the obstacles to this knowledge, mentioned at the beginning of this work. Therefore this knowledge is not essentially man’s happiness.

Again. Actual existence is the end of that which exists potentially, as was made clear above. Wherefore happiness that is the last end, is an act free of any potentiality to a further act. Now this knowledge of God that is acquired by way of demonstration is still in potentiality to a further knowledge of God, or to the same knowledge, but by a better way: because those who came afterwards endeavoured to add something to the knowledge of God besides that which they found handed down to them by those who preceded them. Therefore such knowledge is not man’s ultimate happiness.

Further. Happiness excludes all unhappiness: for no man can be at the same time happy and unhappy. Now deception and error have a large place in unhappiness, since all naturally avoid them. But the aforesaid knowledge of God is subject to the admixture of many errors: as evidenced by many who knew some truths about God through demonstration, yet, following their own opinions, when they lacked proof, fell into many errors. And if some there were who by the way of demonstration discovered the truth about divine things, without any admixture of error in their opinions, it is evident that they were very few: which is inconsistent with happiness which should be the common end. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness is not seated in such knowledge as this.

Moreover. Happiness consists in a perfect operation. Now perfect knowledge requires certitude: hence we cannot be said to know, unless we be certain that it cannot be otherwise, as stated in 1 Poster. ii. But the aforesaid knowledge is beset with uncertainty: as evidenced by the diversity of sciences about divine things, elaborated by those who endeavoured to discover something about them by the way of demonstration. Therefore ultimate happiness does not consist in suchlike knowledge.

Besides. When the will has obtained its last end, its desire is at rest. Now the ultimate end of all human knowledge is happiness. Therefore happiness is essentially that knowledge of God the possession of which leaves no knowledge to be desired of anything knowable. Such, however, is not the knowledge which philosophers were able to have about God by the way of demonstration: because even when we have that knowledge we still desire to know something more;—things that we know not by means of the aforesaid knowledge. Therefore happiness does not consist in suchlike knowledge of God.

Furthermore. The end of everything that is in potentiality is that it be brought to actuality: for to this does it tend by means of the movement with which it is moved to its end. Now everything that is in potentiality tends to be actualized as far as possible. For there are things in potentiality in that their whole potentiality is reducible to act: so that the end of such a thing is that its whole potentiality be actualized: thus a heavy body, that is outside its medium, is in potentiality to its proper place. There are also things whose potentiality cannot be actualized all at once,—for instance primary matter: so that by its movement it is appetent of actualization by various forms in succession, which cannot be in matter at the same time on account of their diversity. Now our intellect is in potentiality to all things intelligible, as stated in the Second Book. And it is possible for two intelligible objects to be in the possible intellect at the same time in respect of the first act which is science: although perhaps not in respect of the second act which is consideration. Accordingly it is clear that the whole potentiality of the possible intellect can be actualized at one time: and consequently this is required for its ultimate end which is happiness. But the aforesaid knowledge which can be acquired about God by the way of demonstration, does not effect this: since when we have it we still are ignorant of many things. Therefore suchlike knowledge of God does not suffice for ultimate happiness.

CHAPTER XL

THAT MAN'S HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY FAITH

THERE is yet another knowledge of God, in one respect superior to the knowledge we have been discussing, namely that whereby God is known by men through faith. In this respect it surpasses the knowledge of God through demonstration, because by faith we know certain things about God, which are so sublime that reason cannot reach them by means of demonstration, as we have stated at the beginning of this work. But not even in this knowledge of God can man's ultimate happiness consist.

For happiness is the intellect's perfect operation, as already declared. But in knowledge by faith the operation of the intellect is found to be most imperfect as regards that which is on the part of the intellect:—although it is most perfect on the part of the object:—for the intellect in believing does not grasp the object of its assent. Therefore neither does man's happiness consist in this knowledge of God.

Again. It has been shown that ultimate happiness does not consist chiefly in an act of the will. Now in knowledge by faith the will has the leading place: for the intellect assents by faith to things proposed to it, because it wills, and not through being constrained by the evidence of their truth. Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in this knowledge.

Besides. The believer assents to things proposed to him by another, but not seen by himself: so that the knowledge of faith resembles hearing rather than seeing. Now a man does not believe in what is unseen by him, and proposed to him by another, unless he thinks this other to have a more perfect knowledge of the things proposed, than he himself has who sees not. Either therefore the believer thinks wrong: or the proposer must have more perfect knowledge of the things proposed. And if the latter also knows these things only through hearing them from another, we cannot proceed thus indefinitely: for then the assent of faith would be without foundation or certitude; since we should not come to some first principle certain in itself, to give certitude to the faith of believers. But it is not possible that the assent of faith be false and without foundation, as is clear from what we have said at the beginning of this work: and yet if it were false and baseless, happiness could not consist in suchlike knowledge. There is therefore some knowledge of God that is higher than the knowledge of faith: whether he who proposes faith sees the truth immediately, as when we believe Christ: or receive the truth from him who sees it immediately, as when we believe the Apostles and prophets. Since then man’s happiness consists in the highest knowledge of God, it cannot consist in the knowledge of faith.

Moreover. Since happiness is the last end, the natural desire is set at rest thereby. But the knowledge of faith does not set the desire at rest, but inflames it: because everyone desires to see what he believes. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in the knowledge of faith.

Further. Knowledge of God has been declared to be the end, inasmuch as it unites us to the last end of all, namely God. Now the knowledge of faith does not make the thing believed to be perfectly present to the mind: since faith is of distant, and not present things. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7) that so long as we walk by faith, we are pilgrims from the Lord. Yet faith makes God to be present to the heart, since the believer assents to God voluntarily, according to the saying of Ephes. 3:17: That Christ may dwell by faith in our hearts. Therefore the knowledge of faith cannot be man’s ultimate happiness.

CHAPTER XLI

IS IT POSSIBLE FOR MAN, IN THIS LIFE, TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES BY THE STUDY AND INQUIRY OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCES?

THE intellectual substance has yet another knowledge of God. For we have said in the Second Book that the separate intellectual substance, by knowing its own essence, knows both what is above it, and what is below it, in a way proportionate to its substance. This must especially be the case, if that which is above it, be its cause, since the likeness to the cause must be found in the effect. Wherefore, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances, as proved above, it follows that separate intellectual substances, by knowing their own essence, know God Himself by the way of some kind of vision: for the intellect knows by the way of vision the thing whose likeness is in the intellect; just as the likeness of the thing seen by the body, is in the sense of the seer. Whatever intellect, therefore, apprehends a separate substance, by knowing what it is, sees God in a higher way than he is known by any of the kinds of knowledge mentioned above. Accordingly, whereas some have deemed man’s ultimate happiness to be in this life, for the reason that he knows separate substances, we must inquire whether in this life man be able to know separate substances: and it is a point that may well be questioned. For our intellect, according to its present state, understands nothing without a phantasm, which stands in the same relation to the possible intellect, whereby we understand, as colours to the sight, as was made clear in the Second Book. Hence if, through the intellectual knowledge which is acquired from phantasms, it be possible for any of us to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be possible in this life for someone to understand these same separate substances; and in consequence, by seeing these separate substances, he will participate in that mode of knowledge with which the separate substance, by understanding itself, understands God. If, on the other hand, by knowledge derived from phantasms, it be altogether unable to succeed in understanding separate substances, it will be impossible for man in the present state of life to acquire the above mode of divine knowledge.

The possibility of succeeding in understanding separate substances, through knowledge derived from phantasms, has been explained by some in various ways. Avempace maintained that by the study of speculative sciences, it is possible to arrive at a knowledge of separate substances, from understanding those things which we know through phantasms. For we are able by the action of the intellect to extract the quiddity of a thing which has quiddity without being its quiddity. Because the intellect is naturally adapted to know any quiddity as such: since the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is. Now if that which is first understood by the possible intellect is something that has a quiddity, we can, by the possible intellect, abstract the quiddity of the thing first understood; and if this quiddity has again a quiddity, it will be again possible to abstract the quiddity of this quiddity. And since we cannot go on indefinitely, we must stop somewhere. Therefore by way of analysis our intellect can arrive at knowing a quiddity that has no quiddity: and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Consequently, through its knowledge of these sensibles, that is acquired from phantasms, our intellect can arrive at understanding separate substances.

He goes on to prove the same statement by another yet similar way. Thus, he lays down that the idea of a thing, for instance of a horse, in me and in you is multiplied only through the multiplication of the spiritual forms, which are different in you and me. It follows then that an idea which is not clothed with any such form, is the same in you and me. Now, as we have proved, the quiddity of the idea, which our intellect by its innate aptitude abstracts, has no spiritual and individual form: for the quiddity of the idea is not the quiddity of the individual, whether corporeal or spiritual, since the thing understood, as such, is universal. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to understand a quiddity the idea of which is the same in all. Such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Therefore our intellect has a natural aptitude to know separate substances.

Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, these explanations are frivolous. For since the idea as such is universal, the quiddity of an idea must be the quiddity of a universal, namely genus or species. Now the quiddity of the genus or species of these sensible objects, the intellective knowledge whereof we acquire through phantasms, includes both matter and form. Consequently it is quite unlike the quiddity of a separate substance, which is simple and immaterial. Therefore it is impossible to understand the quiddity of a separate substance, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible object.

Again. A form that cannot as to its very being be separated from a particular subject is not of the same kind as a form which, in its being, is separated from a particular subject, although both may be considered apart from that particular subject. For magnitude is not the same kind of thing as a separate substance, unless we suppose there are separated magnitudes midway between the species and the sensible object, as some Platonists have maintained. But the quiddity of a genus or species of sensible things cannot be separated in its very being, from a particular individual matter; unless perhaps, as the Platonists think, we suppose the species of things to exist separately, which Aristotle has refuted. Consequently the aforesaid quiddity is altogether different from separate substances, which are nowise in matter. Therefore it does not follow from the fact that these quiddities are understood, that separate substances can be understood.

Moreover. If we grant that the quiddity of a separate substance is of the same kind as the quiddity of the genus or species of these sensible things, it cannot be said to be of the same specific kind, unless we say that the species of these sensible things are the separate substances themselves, as the Platonists maintained. It follows that they are only of the same kind in the point of quiddity as such; namely in the common ratio of genus and substance. Consequently by means of these quiddities we shall understand nothing about separate substances except their remote genus. Now by knowing the genus, we do not therefore know the species except potentially. Therefore it will not be possible to understand a separate substance through understanding the quiddities of these sensible things.

Besides. A separate substance differs more from sensible things, than one sensible from another. But understanding the quiddity of one sensible does not suffice for understanding the quiddity of another: for a man who is born blind, is quite unable through understanding the quiddity of sound, to understand the quiddity of colour. Much less therefore will anyone, through understanding the quiddity of a sensible substance, be able to understand the quiddity of a separate substance.

Further. If again we grant that the spheres of the separate substance are causes of movement, and that by their movement they cause the forms of sensible substances, this mode of knowing separate substances through sensible things, does not suffice for knowing their quiddity. Because from the effect we know its cause either in the point of likeness between cause and effect, or in this, that the effect indicates the power of the cause. In the point of likeness, we do not gather from the effect what the cause is, unless agent and effect be of one species: and this is not the case with separate substances and sensible things. In the point of power, it is again impossible unless the effect equal the power of the cause: since then the whole power of the cause is known from the effect; and the power of a thing indicates its substance. But this cannot apply to the point in question: because the powers of separate substances surpass all the sensible effects that our intellect understands, even as a universal power surpasses a particular effect. It is therefore impossible through understanding sensible objects to arrive at understanding separate substances.

Moreover. Whatever intelligible things we are able to know by means of inquiry and study, belong to one or other of the speculative sciences. Accordingly if through understanding the natures and quiddities of these sensible objects, we succeed in understanding separate substances, it follows that it would be possible to understand separate substances through one or the other speculative science. Yet we do not find this to be the case: for no speculative science teaches what any separate substance is, but only the fact that it is. It is therefore not possible to succeed in understanding separate substances through understanding the natures of sensible objects. And if it be said that such a speculative science is possible, although it has not yet been discovered, this makes no difference, since it is not possible, from any principles known to us, to arrive at understanding the aforesaid substances. Because all the proper principles of any science whatever, depend on the first indemonstrable self-evident principles, the knowledge of which we acquire from sensible objects, as stated in 2 Poster. xv. And sensible objects do not sufficiently lead to the knowledge of immaterial things, as we have proved in the preceding arguments. Therefore no science is possible whereby one may be able to attain to the understanding of separate substances.

CHAPTER XLII

THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO KNOW SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THE MANNER PROPOSED BY ALEXANDER

ALEXANDER supposed the possible intellect to be subject to generation and corruption, on account of its being a disposition of human nature resulting from the mixture of the elements, as we have seen in the Second Book. Now it is not possible for a power of this kind to arise above the material world. And so he maintained that our possible intellect can never attain to the understanding of separate substances: but he held that, according to our present state of life, we are able to understand separate substances. He endeavoured to prove this as follows. Whenever a thing is completed as regards being generated, and has reached the ultimate perfection of its substance, its proper operation, whether action or passion, will also be completed: for even as operation follows substance, so does perfection of operation follow perfection of substance: wherefore an animal, when quite perfect, is able to walk by itself. Now the habitual intellect, which is nothing else but the intelligible species formed by the active intellect, and residing in the possible intellect, has a twofold operation. One is to make things potentially understood to be actually understood,—and this it has in reference to the active intellect,—while the other is to understand what is actually understood: for man is able to do these two things by an intellectual habit. Accordingly when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, both of these operations will be completed in the intellect. Now whenever the intellect acquires new species it reaches the complement of its generation. And so its generation must necessarily be completed eventually, unless there be an impediment: since no generation tends to the infinite. Therefore eventually both operations will be completed in the habitual intellect, by its making all things potentially understood to be understood actually,—which is the complement of the first operation;—and by understanding all things intelligible, both separate and not separate.

And seeing that the possible intellect is unable to understand separate substances, according to his opinion, as we have stated; he means that we shall understand separate substances by the habitual intellect, in so far as the active intellect, which according to him is a separate substance, will become the form of the habitual intellect and be united to us: so that thereby we shall understand, even as now we understand by the possible intellect; and, since it is in the power of the active intellect to make things actually understood, which are intelligible potentially, and to understand separate substances, in that state we shall understand separate substances, and all non-separate intelligible things.

According to this explanation, by this knowledge which we derive from phantasms, we attain to the knowledge of the separate substance; not as though the phantasms themselves and the things understood from them, were a means for knowing separate substances, as happens in speculative sciences, which was the position of the previous opinion; but because the intelligible species are in us a kind of disposition to this particular form which is the active intellect. This is the first point of difference between these two opinions.

Consequently, when the habitual intellect becomes perfect through these intelligible species produced in us by the active intellect, the active intellect itself becomes a form united to us, as stated. And he calls this the acquired intellect, which, they state, Aristotle held to come from without. And so, although man's ultimate perfection is not seated in the speculative sciences, as the previous opinion maintained; yet by them man is disposed for the attainment of his ultimate perfection. This is the second point of difference between the second and first opinions.

Thirdly they differ in this, that, according to the first opinion, the active intellect's act of understanding is the cause of its union with us. Whereas, in the second opinion, the reverse is the case: since it is because it is united to us as a form, that we understand it and other separate substances.

But there is no reason in these statements. For the habitual intellect, like the possible intellect, is supposed by Alexander to be subject to generation and corruption. Now according to him an eternal thing cannot become the form of that which can be generated and corrupted; for this is why he maintains that the possible intellect, which is united to us as a form, is subject to generation and corruption; and that the active intellect, which is incorruptible, is a separate substance. Since then, according to Alexander, the active intellect is supposed to be an eternal separate substance, it will be impossible for the active intellect to become the form of the habitual intellect.

Again. The form of the intellect, as intellect, is the intelligible, just as the form of the sense is the sensible: for the intellect does not receive a thing, properly speaking, except intelligibly, as neither does the sense, except sensibly. If then the active intellect cannot become an intelligible through the habitual intellect, it cannot possibly be its form.

Besides. There are three ways in which we are said to understand by means of something. First, we understand by means of the intellect, which is the power that elicits this operation: wherefore also the intellect may be said to understand, and the very act of the intellect in understanding becomes our act of understanding.—Secondly, we understand by means of the intelligible species: whereby we are said to understand, not as though the species itself understood, but because the intellective power is actuated by it, just as the power of sight is by the species of colour.—Thirdly, as by a medium through knowing which we arrive at the knowledge of something else.

If, then, man at length understands separate substances through his intellect, it must be in one of these ways. It is not in the third way: because Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands the active intellect.—Nor is it in the second way: because to understand by means of an intelligible species is ascribed to the intellective power that is informed by that species: yet Alexander does not grant that either the possible or the habitual intellect understands separate substances: and consequently we cannot possibly understand separate substances by means of the active intellect in the same way as we understand things by means of an intelligible species.—And if it is as by an intellective power, it follows that the active intellect's act of understanding is the man's act of understanding. Now this cannot be unless the substance of the active intellect and the substance of the man be joined together in unity of being: for it is impossible that there be identity of operation where there is distinction of substances. Hence the active intellect will be one in being with man. But not in respect of accidental being: because the active intellect would then be not a substance but an accident: for instance colour added to a body makes one according to accidental being. It would follow then, that the active intellect together with man makes one in substantial being. Therefore it will be either the human soul or a part thereof, and not a separate substance, as Alexander maintained. Therefore the opinion of Alexander does not explain how man can understand separate substances.

Moreover. If the active intellect at any time become the form of this particular man, so that he be able to understand by means of it, for the same reason it may become the form of some other man who will likewise understand by its means: the result being that at the same time two men will understand by means of the active intellect, as their form. But this implies that the active intellect's act of understanding is the act of understanding of the man who understands by its means, as already stated: and consequently two who understand will have one act of understanding. Which is impossible.

Moreover his reasoning is altogether frivolous. First, because, when the generation of a genus is perfected, its operation must be perfected, yet in keeping with the mode of that, but not of a higher genus: for when the generation of air is perfected, it has generation and complete upward movement, yet not so as to be moved towards the place of fire. Likewise, when the generation of the habitual intellect is complete, its operation, which is to understand, will be complete, according to its mode, but not according to the mode of understanding in separate substances, so as to understand separate substances. Consequently from the generation of the habitual intellect it cannot be concluded that at some time man will understand separate substances.

Secondly, because it belongs to the same power to complete an operation and to perform it. Consequently if the perfection of the habitual intellect's operation be to understand separate substances, it follows that the habitual intellect sometimes understands separate substances. But Alexander does not hold this: for it would follow that to understand separate substances comes to us through the speculative sciences, which are comprised under the habitual intellect. Thirdly, those things that begin to be generated, for the most part are completely generated: since all generations of things are due to definite causes, which produce their effects either always or in the majority of cases. If then, completeness of action follows completeness of generation, it follows that complete operation accrues to things generated, always or most frequently. And yet those who study in order that habitual intellect may be engendered in them do not succeed in understanding separate substances, either in most, or in all, cases: in fact no one has boasted of having attained to this point of perfection. Therefore the perfection of the habitual intellect is not to understand separate substances.

CHAPTER XLIII

THAT WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IN THIS LIFE, IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED BY AVERROES

As the greatest difficulty presented by Alexander’s opinion was that he supposed the habitual intellect to be altogether corruptible, Averroes thought to offer an easier proof that at times we understand separate substances, in that he deemed the possible intellect to be incorruptible and substantially separate from us, just as the active intellect. First, he shows the necessity of admitting that the relation of the active intellect to those principles which we know naturally is either that of agent to instrument or that of form to matter. For the habitual intellect whereby we understand, has not only this action which is to understand, but also this which is to make things actually understood: for we know by experience that both are in our power. Now “to make things actually understood,” indicates more specially the habitual intellect than “to understand”: because it is necessary to make a thing actually understood before one understands it. Now, in us certain things are made actually understood naturally, and not by study or by choice, as the first intelligible principles. And it does not belong to the habitual intellect to make these actually understood, for it belongs to this power to make actually understood those things which we know by study: rather are they a beginning of the habitual intellect, wherefore Aristotle gives the name of understanding to the habit of these principles (6 Ethic, vi.). And they are made actually understood by the active intellect alone: and by them those other things are made actually understood which we know by study. Accordingly to make these things which are by way of consequence understood actually, is an act both of the habitual intellect, as to first principles, and of the active intellect.

Now one action does not proceed from two principles unless one of them be compared to the other as agent to instrument, or as form to matter. Consequently the active intellect must be compared to the first principles of the habitual intellect, either as agent to instrument, or as form to matter.

How this may be possible he explains as follows. Since the possible intellect, according to his opinion, is a separate substance, it understands the active intellect and other separate substances, as well as the first principles of speculative knowledge: and consequently it is the subject of both. Now whenever two things come together in one subject, one of them is as the form of the other: even so, since colour and light are in the diaphanous body as their subject, one of them, namely light, must be the form of the other, namely colour. And this is necessary when one of them is ordained to the other, but not when they are united accidentally in the same subject, as whiteness and music. Now the object of speculative knowledge and the active intellect are mutually ordained to each other: since these understood speculative principles are made actually understood by the active intellect. Therefore the active intellect is related to these understood speculative principles as form to matter. Consequently since these same principles are joined to us by phantasms, which are a kind of subject thereof, it follows that the active intellect also is joined to us, being the form of these principles. When therefore these principles are in us potentially only, the active intellect is only joined to us potentially. When some of these principles are in us actually and some potentially, the active intellect is joined to us actually in part, and potentially in part: and then it is said to be moved towards the above conjunction: because as the more things are made actually understood in us, the more perfectly is the active intellect joined to us. And this progress and movement towards conjunction is effected by study in speculative sciences, whereby we acquire true knowledge, and false opinions are put aside, which are outside the order of this movement, just as monstrosities are outside the operation of nature. Wherefore men help one another towards this progress, just as they help one another in speculative sciences. And so when all potential knowledge has become actual in us, the active intellect will be perfectly joined to us as a form, and we shall understand perfectly by it, just as now we understand perfectly by the habitual intellect. Consequently, since it belongs to the active intellect to understand separate substances, we shall then understand separate substances, just as now we understand speculative knowledge. This will be man's ultimate happiness, wherein man will be a god as it were.

That this explanation is of no account whatever is made clear enough by what we have already said: for it is based on many suppositions that have been already disproved.

First, we have shown above that the possible intellect is not a substance distinct from us in being. Hence it does not follow that it is the subject of separate substances: especially since Aristotle asserts that the possible intellect is the power of becoming all things, so that seemingly it is the subject of such things only as are made to be understood.

Again. It has also been proved above that the active intellect is not a separate substance, but part of the soul, to which Aristotle assigns the operation of making things to be actually understood, which lies in our power. Hence it does not follow that understanding by means of the active intellect is the cause of our being able to understand separate substances: else we would always understand them.

Further. If the active intellect were a separate substance, it would not be joined to us except by means of species made to be actually understood, according to his explanation: as neither would the possible intellect be united to us: although the possible intellect is related to those species as matter to form, while the active intellect, on the contrary, is related to them as form to matter. Now the species which are made to be actually understood are joined to us, according to him, by means of the phantasms, which stand related to the possible intellect as colours to the sight, but to the active intellect as colours to the light, as may be gathered from the statement of Aristotle (3 De Anima v.). Now we cannot ascribe to a stone in which colour is, either the action of seeing, so that it see; nor the action of the sun, so that it give light. Therefore according to this opinion, we cannot ascribe to man either the action of the possible intellect so that he understand, or the action of the active intellect, so that he understand separate substances, or that he make things to be actually understood.

Besides. According to this opinion, the active intellect is not supposed to be joined to us as a form, except through its being the form of the principles of understanding, whereof it is stated to be the form also because the active intellect and these principles have an action in common, namely to make things actually understood. Consequently it cannot be a form to us, except for as much as the principles of knowledge have an action in common with it. But these principles have no share in the action of understanding separate substances, because they are species of sensible things: unless we return to the opinion of Avempace, that the quiddities of separate substances can be known by means of what we know of the sensible world. Therefore nowise can we understand separate substances by this means.

Moreover. The active intellect bears a different relation to principles of knowledge whereof it is the cause; and to separate substances, whereof it is not the cause, but which it only knows, according to his theory. Therefore if it be joined to us through being the cause of principles of knowledge, it does not follow that it is joined to us, in so far as it knows separate substances: and clearly his argument contains a fallacy of accident.

Again. If we know separate substances by means of the active intellect, this is not because the active intellect is the form of this or that principle of understanding, but through becoming a form in us: for it is thus that we are able to understand by its means. Now it becomes a form in us also by means of the first principles of understanding, according to his own statement. Therefore from the very beginning man can understand separate substances by means of the active intellect. If, however, it be said that the active intellect does not become a form in us perfectly by means of some principles of understanding, so that we be able to understand separate substances:—the sole reason for this is because these principles of understanding do not equal the perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances. But not even all these principles of understanding combined together equal this perfection of the active intellect in understanding separate substances: since all of them are not intelligible except in so far as they are made to be actually understood: whereas the latter are intelligible by their very nature. Therefore although we shall know all these intelligible principles, it does not follow that the active intellect will become a form in us so perfectly that we understand separate substances by it. Else, if this be not required, we shall have to admit that by understanding anything intelligible, we also understand separate substances.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT MAN’S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS DOES NOT CONSIST IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATE SUBSTANCES AS PRETENDED BY THE AFORESAID OPINIONS

BUT it is impossible to allow that man’s happiness consists in such a knowledge of separate substances as the above mentioned opinions maintained.

For it is of no purpose to strive for an end by means which cannot secure that end. Since then man’s ultimate end is happiness, to which his natural desire tends, it is impossible to assign man’s happiness to that which he cannot obtain: else it would follow that man was made in vain, and that his natural desire is void, which is impossible. Now it is clear from what we have said that it is impossible for man to understand separate substances, as laid down by the above mentioned opinions. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in such knowledge of separate substances.

Again. In order that the active intellect be united to us as a form so that by it we may understand separate substances, it is required that the generation of the habitual intellect be complete, according to Alexander; or that all the principles of understanding be actualized in us, according to Averroes: both of which amount to the same, because the habitual intellect is engendered in us, by the principles of understanding being actualized in us. Now all the species of sensible things are understood potentially. Wherefore, in order that the active intellect be joined to a man, it is necessary that he actually understand by his speculative intellect all the natures of sensible things, and all their powers, operations and movements. But it is impossible for a man to know all this through the principles of speculative sciences, whereby we are moved to the conjunction with the active intellect, as they say: for it is not possible to acquire knowledge of all these things, from those which come under the perception of our senses, whence the principles of speculative sciences are derived. Therefore it is impossible for any man to arrive at this conjunction in the way assigned by them: and consequently man's happiness cannot consist in such a union.

Besides. Granted that it be possible for man to be united to the active intellect in the manner suggested, it is clear that such a perfection is obtainable by very few; so much so that neither they nor any one else, however much they be advanced and skilled in speculative sciences, have dared to boast of having obtained this perfection. In fact all of them have confessed to ignorance of many things: thus Aristotle, speaking of the quadrature of a circle, and of the reasons for the order in heavenly bodies, himself states (2 De Cœlo v.) that he can only give probable arguments: and he leaves to others to decide what is certain in these things and their movers (11 Metaph. viii.). Now happiness is a common good, to which many can arrive, unless they be prevented, as Aristotle says (1 Ethic, ix.). It is true also of any natural end of a species, that it is obtained by the majority of the members of that species. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot consist in the aforesaid union.

It is clear that Aristotle, whose opinion the philosophers in question endeavoured to follow, did not hold that man's ultimate happiness consists in a union of this kind. For he proves (1 Ethic, xiii.) that man's happiness is an operation of his own according to perfect virtue: wherefore he had to treat specially of the virtues, which he divided into moral and intellectual: and he proves (10 Ethic, vii.) that man's ultimate happiness consists in contemplation. Hence it follows that it is not seated in the act of a moral virtue; nor of prudence or art, and yet these are intellectual virtues. Consequently it must be an operation according to wisdom which is the chief of the three remaining intellectual virtues, namely wisdom, knowledge and understanding, as he proves in 6 Ethic. vii.: for which reason he declares (10 Ethic. viii.) that the wise man is a happy man. Now according to him (6 Ethic. l.c.) wisdom is one of the speculative sciences, and the head of the others: and at the beginning of the Metaphysics, he gives the name of wisdom to the science of which he purposes to treat. Clearly therefore the opinion of Aristotle was that the ultimate happiness which man is able to obtain in this life, is that knowledge of divine things which can be acquired through the speculative sciences. But this last way of knowing divine things, not through speculative sciences, but by a kind of natural process of generation, was invented by some of his commentators.

CHAPTER XLV

THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN THIS LIFE TO UNDERSTAND SEPARATE SUBSTANCES

SINCE then in this life separate substances cannot be known by us in the ways mentioned above, it remains for us to inquire whether we be able to understand separate substances in this life in any way at all.

Themistius seeks to prove that this is possible by an argument a fortiori. For separate substances are more intelligible than material things: since the latter are intelligible in so far as the active intellect causes them to be actually understood; whereas the former are intelligible in themselves. If, therefore, our intellect understands these material things, much more is it adapted to understand separate substances.

This argument must be appraised in the light of the various opinions about the possible intellect. For if the possible intellect is a power independent of matter, and has its being apart from the body, as Averroes maintains, it will follow that it has no necessary relation to things material; so that the more a thing is intelligible in itself, the more will it be intelligible to the possible intellect. But then it would seem to follow, since we understand from the beginning by means of the possible intellect, that we understand separate substances from the beginning: which is clearly false. Averroes seeks to avoid this difficulty, as we have explained above in setting forth his opinion, which we proved to be false.

If, however, the possible intellect is not separate from the body in its very being, from the very fact that it is united in being to such a body, it has a necessary relation to material things, so that only through them can it acquire knowledge of other things. Hence it does not follow, if separate substances be more intelligible in themselves, that they be more intelligible to our intellect. This is proved by the words of Aristotle (2 Metaph. ix.). For he says there that the difficulty of understanding those things is in us and not in them: because our intellect stands in relation to things most evident as the eye of the owl to the sunlight. Consequently, seeing that we cannot arrive at understanding separate substances through understanding material things, as we have proved, it follows that our possible intellect can nowise understand separate substances.

This appears again from the relation of the possible to the active intellect. Because a passive power is in potentiality to those things only which are included in the range of its proper active principle: for every passive power has a corresponding active power in nature: otherwise passive power would be useless, since it cannot be brought to actuality, except by an active principle. Hence we find that the sight is not receptive of other than colours which are enlightened by the light. Now the possible intellect is a power in a certain sense passive, and therefore it has its corresponding agent, namely the active intellect, which stands in relation to the possible intellect as light to the sight. Consequently the possible intellect is in potentiality to those intelligible objects only which have been made so by the active intellect. Wherefore Aristotle (3 De Anima v.) in describing each intellect, says that the possible intellect is the power to become all things, while the active intellect is the medium of making all things: so that the power in either case refers to the same objects, being active in the one and passive in the other. Since then separate substances are not made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and only material things are so made, it follows that the possible intellect extends to these alone: and therefore we cannot understand separate substances thereby.

Wherefore Aristotle employed a fitting example: for the owl’s eye can never see the light of the sun. And yet Averroes tries to depreciate this example, saying that the likeness between our intellect in relation to separate substances, and the owl’s eye in relation to the sun’s light, is one of difficulty, not of impossibility: and he proves this as follows. Because if it were impossible for us to understand things intelligible in themselves, separate substances to wit; they would be intelligible without purpose, as to no purpose would a thing be visible, if it could not be seen by any sight.

Now this argument is clearly of no account at all: for even though these substances be never understood by us, they are understood by themselves: so that not without purpose would they be intelligible: as neither is the sun uselessly visible,—to continue Aristotle’s comparison—because the owl cannot see it, since man and other animals can see it.

Accordingly if we suppose the possible intellect to be united in being to the body, it cannot understand separate substances. It makes a difference, however, what we hold with regard to its substance. For if we suppose it to be a material force subject to generation and corruption, as some have maintained, it would follow that by its very substance it is confined to the understanding of material things: and consequently it would nowise be able to understand separate substances: since it could not possibly itself be separate.—On the other hand, if the possible intellect, although united to the body, be incorruptible and independent of matter in its being, as we have proved above; it follows that its being confined to the understanding of material things is incidental to it through its union with the body. And so, when the soul shall be separated from the body, the possible intellect will be able to understand things that are intelligible in themselves, namely separate substances, by the light of the active intellect, which in the soul is like the intellectual light that is in separate substances. This is what our faith holds about our understanding separate substances after death and not in this life.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT IN THIS LIFE THE SOUL DOES NOT UNDERSTAND ITSELF BY ITSELF

A CERTAIN difficulty would seem to arise against what we have been saying, on account of a passage of Augustine which must be carefully discussed. For he says (9 De Trin. iii.): Just as the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things by means of the senses, so does it acquire knowledge of incorporeal things by itself. Therefore it also knows itself by itself, since itself is incorporeal. For it would seem to follow from these words that the soul understands itself by itself, and that by understanding itself, understands separate substances: and this is contrary to what we have proved. We must, accordingly, inquire how the soul understands itself by itself.

Now it cannot possibly be said that by itself it understands what itself is. Because a cognitive power is made actually cognoscent by something in it whereby it knows. And if this be in it potentially, it knows potentially; if it be in it actually, it knows actually; and if it be in a middle way, it knows habitually. Now the soul is always actually present to itself, and never only potentially or habitually. Wherefore, if the soul knows itself by itself, it will always understand actually what itself is: and this is clearly false.

Again. If the soul, by itself, understands what itself is; and since every man has a soul; every man will know what his soul is: which is evidently untrue.

Moreover. Knowledge that results from something implanted in us by nature, is itself natural: for instance the self-evident principles which are known through the light of the active intellect. Accordingly, if by the soul itself we know what the soul is, we shall know it naturally. But no one can err in things that we know naturally: for no one errs in self-evident principles: so that no one would err about what the soul is, if the soul knew this by itself. But this is clearly false: since many have maintained the soul to be this or that body; some, that it consisted in number or harmony. Therefore the soul does not, by itself, know what itself is.

Besides. In every order that which is per se precedes and causes that which is accidental. Accordingly that which is known per se, is known before all things that are known through something else, and is the principle through which they are known, for instance first principles in comparison with conclusions. Therefore if the soul, by itself, knows what itself is, this will be known per se, and consequently it will be known first, and will be the principle whereby other things are known. But this is clearly false: for science does not postulate what the soul is as being something already known, but proposes it as a point of inquiry from other sources. Therefore the soul does not by itself know what itself is.

But it is clear that neither did Augustine intend this. For he says (10 De Trin. ix.) that when the soul seeks self-knowledge, it does not seek to see itself as though it were absent, but to discern itself as present: not to know itself, as though it knew not; but in order to distinguish itself from what it knows to be distinct. Whereby he gives one to understand that by itself the soul knows itself as present to itself, but not as distinct from other things. Hence he says that some erred in not distinguishing the soul from things that are different from it. Now through knowing what a thing is, one knows it as distinct from others: wherefore a definition which states what a thing is, distinguishes the thing defined from all others. Consequently Augustine did not mean that the soul by itself knows what itself is.

Neither did Aristotle mean this. He says in fact (3 De Anima, iv.) that the possible intellect understands itself even as it understands other things. Because it understands itself by means of an intelligible species, by which it is brought to actual intelligibility. For, considered in itself, it is only potentially an intelligible being: now nothing is known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act. Wherefore separate substances, the substance whereof is as something actual in the genus of things intelligible, understand by their very substance what they are: whereas our possible intellect understands what it is, through the intelligible species by which it is made actually understanding. And so Aristotle (3 De

Anima, iv.) shows the nature of the possible intellect from the act of understanding, namely that it is unmixed with the body and incorruptible, as we explained above.

Accordingly Augustine means to say that our mind knows itself by itself, inasmuch as it knows that it is: because by the very fact that it perceives itself to act, it perceives that it exists; and since it acts by itself, it knows by itself that it exists.

In this way then the soul, by knowing itself, knows of the separate substances that they are; but not what they are, which is to understand their substance. For when either by demonstration or by faith we know about separate substances that they are certain intellectual substances, in neither way could we receive this knowledge, unless our soul derived from itself the knowledge of intellectual being. Consequently we must use the science about the soul's intelligence as a principle on which to establish all our knowledge about separate substances.

But it does not follow, if by the speculative sciences we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, that we are able to arrive at the knowledge of what separate substances are, by means of these sciences: because our intelligence, by which we arrive at the knowledge of what the soul is, is far removed from the intelligence of a separate substance. Nevertheless through knowing what our soul is, we are able to go so far as to know a remote genus of the separate substances: but this is not the same as to understand their substance.

And just as through the soul itself we know that the soul is, inasmuch as we perceive its acts, and seek by a study of its acts and their objects to know what it is, through the principles of speculative sciences: so too, concerning those things that are in our soul, namely its powers and habits, we know indeed that they are, inasmuch as we perceive their acts; but what they are we gather from the nature of these same acts.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT IN THIS LIFE WE ARE UNABLE TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

IF, in this life, we are unable to understand separate substances by reason of our intellect's innate relation to phantasms, much less can we see the divine essence in this life, since it is far above all separate substances. We may take it as a sign of this, that the more our mind is raised to the contemplation of spiritual things, the more is it withdrawn from sensible things. Now the divine substance is the highest term to which contemplation can reach: hence the mind that sees the divine substance must be wholly freed from the senses, either by death or by rapture. Wherefore it is said in God's person (Exod. 33:20): Man shall not see me, and live.

If it is stated in Holy Writ that some have seen God, we must understand this to have been either through an imaginary vision—or even a bodily vision, the presence of the divine power being shown by corporeal species whether appearing externally, or formed internally in the imagination:—or by gathering some intellectual knowledge of God from His spiritual effects.

A difficulty, however, arises through some words of Augustine which would seem to imply that we are able to understand God in this life. For he says (9 De Trin. vii.) that with the eyes of the soul we see the form of our being and of our actions—whether effected in ourselves or truly and rightly on other bodies—in the eternal truth, from which all temporal things proceed. Again (12 Conf. xxv.) he says: If we both see that what you say is true, and that what I say is true: where, I ask, do we see this? Surely, neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the immutable truth itself which transcends our minds. And (De Vera Relig. xxxi.) he says that we judge of all things according to the divine truth: and again (1. Solil. xv.): We must first know the truth by which other things can be known, referring, it would seem, to the divine truth. It would seem then, from his words, that we see God Himself who is His own truth, and that through Him we know other things.

Other words of his would seem to point to the same conclusion, in 12 De Trin. ii., where he says: It is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things, according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas which, unless they were above the human mind, would surely not be unchangeable. Now unchangeable and eternal ideas cannot be elsewhere than in God, since according to the teaching of faith, God alone is eternal. Accordingly it would seem to follow that we can see God in this life, and that through seeing Him and the ideas of things in Him, we judge of other things.

Yet it is not to be believed that Augustine, by these words, meant that we are able in this life to see God in His essence. We must therefore inquire how, in this life, we see that unchangeable truth, or these eternal ideas, and how judge of them according to it.

Augustine allows that truth is in the soul (2 Solil. xix.): wherefore he proves the immortality of the soul from the eternity of truth. Now truth is in the soul not only in the same way as God is said to be in all things by His essence; or as He is in all things by His likeness,—a thing being true so far as it is like to God—for then the soul would not be higher than other things in this respect. It is therefore in the soul in a special way, forasmuch as the soul knows the truth. Accordingly just as the soul and other things are said to be true in their nature, according as they are likened to that supreme nature, which is truth itself, since it is its own being understood by itself; so too, that which is known by the soul, is true so far as it bears a likeness to that divine truth which God knows. Wherefore a gloss on Ps. 11:2, Truths are decayed from among the children of men, says that as a mirror gives many reflections of one face, so are many truths reflected in men’s minds from the first truth. Now although different things are known, and different things believed to be true, by different people, yet some truths there are in which all men agree, such as first principles both of the speculative and of the practical intellect: inasmuch as a kind of image of the divine truth is reflected in the minds of all men.

Consequently when a mind knows with certitude anything at all, and by tracing it back to the principles by which we judge of everything, comes to see it in those principles, it is said to see all such things in the divine truth or in the eternal ideas, and to judge of all things according to them. This explanation is confirmed by Augustine’s words (1 Solil. viii.): The speculations of science are seen in the divine truth, even as these visible things are seen in the light of the sun: for it is evident that these things are not seen in the body of the sun, but by the light, which is a likeness of the solar brilliance reflected in the air, and cast upon such bodies. Therefore, from these words of Augustine, we cannot conclude that God is seen in His essence in this life, but only as in a mirror: and to this the Apostle witnesses as regards the knowledge of this life (1 Cor. 13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner.

And though this mirror, which is the human mind, reflects the likeness of God more faithfully than creatures of lower degree, yet the knowledge of God that pan be gathered from the human mind, does not surpass the knowledge gathered from sensible things: since even the soul knows what itself is through understanding the nature of sensible things, as already stated. Consequently even in this way God is not known in higher fashion than the cause is known from its effect.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT MAN’S ULTIMATE HAPPINESS IS NOT IN THIS LIFE

SEEING then that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowledge of God whereby he is known by all or many in a vague kind of opinion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby he is known in science through demonstration; nor in that knowledge whereby he is known through faith, as we have proved above: and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in His essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God through that which is nearest to Him, so to say, as we have proved; and since we must place our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown; it is impossible for man’s happiness to be in this life.

Again. Man’s last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more: because if he still has a movement towards something, he has not yet reached an end wherein to be at rest. Now, this cannot happen in this life: since the more man understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him,—this being natural to man,—unless perhaps someone there be who understands all things: and in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone that was a mere man,; seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved. Therefore man’s ultimate happiness cannot possibly be in this life.

Besides. Whatever is in motion towards an end, has a natural desire to be established and at rest therein: hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man desires naturally. Therefore it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When therefore a man acquires happiness, he also acquires stability and rest; so that all agree in conceiving stability as a necessary condition of happiness: hence the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. x.): We do not look upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon. Now, in this life there is no sure stability; since, however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in the operation, whatever it be, in which his happiness consists. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being: for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end; hence we see that animals which live but a short time, are perfected in a short time. But, if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue, whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative matters, wherein man's ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved: for hardly is man able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life: and then in the majority of cases, but a short space of life remains to him. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good: else it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil: just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life; not only from evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For no one is there who at times is not disturbed by inordinate passions; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, wherein virtue consists, either in excess or in deficiency; who is not deceived in some thing or another; or at least ignores what he would wish to know, or feels doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore no man is happy in this life.

Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it: not only shunning it now when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this life, cannot obtain not to die. Therefore it is not possible for man to be happy in this life.

Besides. Ultimate happiness consists not in a habit but in an operation: since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously. Therefore man cannot be entirely happy in this life.

Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. Therefore its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death: since it is possible for every man in this life to encounter sickness, whereby he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue; such as madness and the like which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness therefore always has sorrow naturally connected with it: and consequently it will not be perfect happiness.

But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect, namely in separate substances: and that it is imperfect in man, by way of a kind of participation. Because he can arrive at a full understanding of the truth, only by a sort of movement of inquiry; and fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved. Wherefore neither is happiness, in its perfect form, possible to man: yet he has a certain participation thereof, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle’s opinion about happiness. Wherefore (1 Ethic. x.) inquiring whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be most stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfection, are happy as men, as though not attaining to happiness simply, but in a human way.

We must now show that this explanation does not avoid the foregoing arguments. For although man is below the separate substances in the natural order, he is above irrational creatures: wherefore he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further: thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place; and when an animal enjoys sensible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest. Much more therefore when man has obtained his last end, must his natural desire be at rest. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore in this life man does not obtain happiness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore he must obtain it after this life.

Again. The natural desire cannot be void; since nature does nothing in vain. But nature's desire would be void if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore man's natural desire can be fulfilled. But not in this life, as we have shown. Therefore it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore man's ultimate happiness is after this life.

Besides. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are ever in motion and tending towards perfection: because those who follow, make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as stated in 2 Metaph. Therefore in the knowledge of truth man is not situated as though he had arrived at his last end. Since then as Aristotle himself shows (10 Ethic. vii.) man's ultimate happiness in this life consists apparently in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot possibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life.

Moreover. Whatever is in potentiality tends to become actual: so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potentiality to the knowledge of the forms of all things: and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except when it knows all, at least these material things. But man cannot obtain this through speculative sciences, by which in this life we know truth. Therefore man's ultimate happiness cannot be in this life.

For these and like reasons Alexander and Averroes held that man's ultimate happiness does not consist in human knowledge obtained through speculative sciences, but in that which results from conjunction with a separate substance, which conjunction they deemed possible to man in this life. But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through speculative sciences, he maintained that man attains to happiness, not perfect, but proportionate to his capacity.

Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, will avoid these straits if we suppose, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the Second Book.

Therefore man’s ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which he possesses after this life; a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a reward … in heaven (Matt. 5:12) and (Matt. 22:30) states that the saints shall be as the angels: who always see God in heaven (Matt. 18:10).

CHAPTER XLIX

THAT SEPARATE SUBSTANCES DO NOT SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE THROUGH KNOWING HIM BY THEIR OWN ESSENCES

WE must now inquire whether this same knowledge whereby after death separate substances and souls know God by their own essences, be sufficient for their ultimate happiness.

In order to discover the truth in this matter, we must first of all show that to know God in this way, is not to know His essence.

An effect may be known through its cause in several ways. First, when the effect is taken as the means of knowing the existence and qualities of the cause: this happens in sciences which prove the cause from the effect.—Secondly, when the cause is seen in the effect itself, inasmuch as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect: thus a man is seen in a mirror on account of his likeness. This way differs from the first: because in the first there are two knowledges, of effect and of cause, whereof one is the cause of the other; for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of our knowing its cause. Whereas in the second way there is one sight of both: because while seeing the effect we see the cause therein at the same time.—Thirdly, when the very likeness of the cause in the effect is the form by which the cause is known by its effect: for instance if a box had an intellect, and were to know by its own form the art from which that very form had been produced in likeness to that art. But by none of these ways is it possible to know from its effect what the cause is, unless the effect equate the cause, and express the whole power of the cause.

Now separate substances know God by their substances in the same way as a cause is known from its effect; not however in the first way, because then their knowledge would be discursive; but in the second way, inasmuch as one of them sees God in another; and in the third way, inasmuch as each of them sees God in itself. Yet none of them is an effect equalling God's power, as we have shown in the Second Book. Therefore they cannot see the divine essence by this kind of knowledge.

Besides. The intelligible likeness whereby a thing is understood as to its substance, must be of the same species, in fact it must be its species: even as the form of the house, which is in the architect's mind, is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or rather it is its species; for we do not understand what an ass is, or what a horse is, through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not of the same species as the divine nature, indeed not even of the same genus, as we showed in the First Book. Therefore a separate substance cannot possibly understand God through its own nature.

Further. Every created thing is confined to a certain genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself the entire perfection of all being, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through anything created.

Moreover. Every intelligible species through which the quiddity or essence of a thing is understood, comprehends that thing in representing it: wherefore words signifying what a thing is are called terms and definitions. But no created image can possibly represent God thus: since every created image belongs to some fixed genus, whereas God does not, as was proved in the First Book. Therefore it is not possible to understand the divine substance through a created image.

Further. It was proved in the First Book that God's substance is His being. But the being of a separate substance is distinct from its substance, as we proved in the Second Book. Therefore the essence of a separate substance is not a sufficient medium whereby God may be seen in His essence.

And yet the separate substance, through its own substance, knows about God, that He is; that He is the cause of all things; that He is above all and far removed from all, not only from the things that are, but even from those that can be conceived by the created mind. This knowledge about God we also are able somewhat to obtain, because from His effects we know of God that He is, and that He is the cause of other things, surpassing all and remote from all. And this is the limit and the highest point of our knowledge in this life where, as Dionysius says (De Myst. Theol. i., ii.), we are united to God as to something unknown. This happens when we know of Him what He is not, while what He is remains utterly unknown. Hence in order to indicate the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it was said to Moses (Exod. 20:21) that he went to the dark cloud wherein God was.

Since, however, the lower nature in its summit attains only to what is lowest in the higher nature, it follows that this same knowledge is more sublime in separate substances than in us. This can be shown as to each way of attaining to this knowledge. For if the cause be known by its effect, the nearer that effect is, and the clearer its resemblance to its cause, the more evident does it make the existence of that cause. Now separate substances, that know God by themselves, are nearer effects and bear a clearer resemblance to God, than the effects through which we know God. Therefore separate substances know more certainly and more clearly than we that God exists.—Again. Since by negations we come by any way whatever to a proper knowledge of a thing, as stated above, the more things one knows to be removed from God, and the greater their propinquity, the nearer does one approach to a proper knowledge of Him: even so, he who knows that man is neither inanimate nor insensible, approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of man than one who knows only that he is not inanimate, although neither of them knows what man is. Now, separate substances know more than we, and the things that are nearer to God; and consequently by their intelligence remove from God more things and nearer things from God than we do. Therefore they approach nearer to a proper knowledge of God than we: although neither do they, through understanding themselves, see the divine substance.

Again. The higher the persons over whom one knows a man to be placed the better the knowledge one has of his eminence: thus, although a peasant may know that the king is the highest in the land, yet since he knows only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has business, he does not realize the king’s exalted position, as one who knows the dignity of all the great men of the kingdom, over whom he knows the king to be placed: although neither of them comprehends the height of the kingly rank.

Now we know none but the lowest things: and consequently although we know that God is far above all, we do not know the divine supereminence as the separate substances do, to whom the highest orders of things are known, while they know God to be higher than them all.

Again. It is clear that the causality and virtue of a cause are all the better known, according as more and greater effects thereof are known. Wherefore it evidently follows that separate substances know the divine causality and power better than we, although we know him to be the cause of all.

CHAPTER L

THAT THE NATURAL DESIRE OF THE SEPARATE SUBSTANCES IS NOT SET AT REST IN THE NATURAL KNOWLEDGE THEY HAVE OF GOD

NOW it is not possible that the separate substance’s natural desire rest in such a knowledge of God.

For whatever is imperfect in a species, seeks to acquire the perfection of that species: thus whoso has an opinion about a matter, and therefore imperfect knowledge about it, for this very reason is spurred to the desire for certain knowledge about it. Now the aforesaid knowledge which separate substances have about God without knowing his substance, is an imperfect kind of knowledge; for we do not deem ourselves to know a thing if we know not its substance: so that the chief point in knowing a thing is to know what it is. Therefore this knowledge which the separate substances have about God does not set their appetite at rest, but spurs it on to the vision of the divine substance.

Again. The knowledge of effects is an incitement to know the cause: wherefore men began to philosophize because they sought the causes of things. Therefore the desire for knowledge naturally implanted in all intellectual substances does not rest unless, knowing the substance of effects, they know also the substance of their cause. Consequently, since separate substances know that God is the cause of all the things whose substances they see, their natural desire does not rest, unless they see God’s substance also.

Besides. As there is a connexion between knowing the adequate cause (propter quid) of a thing being so and so, and knowing that it is so (quia est), so is there a connexion between knowing about a thing what it is (quid est), and knowing that it exists (an est). Because if we know the adequate cause of a thing being so and so, we can prove that it is so, e.g. that the moon undergoes eclipse: even so, if we know of a thing, what it is, we can prove that it exists. Such is the teaching in 2 Poster i. Now we observe that those who know that a thing is so and so, naturally seek to know the adequate cause of its being so. Therefore those who know that a thing exists, naturally seek to know what it is; and this is to know its essence. Therefore the natural desire for knowledge is not set at rest by the knowledge of God whereby it is known that He exists.

Further. Nothing finite can set the intellect's desire at rest. This is proved from the fact that the intellect, given any finite object, strives to go beyond it: so that given a finite line of any length, it strives to apprehend a longer; and it is the same in numbers: and this is the reason why we can add indefinitely to numbers and mathematical lines. Now the excellence and power of any created substance is finite. Therefore the intellect of a separate substance is not satisfied with knowing separate substances, however excellent they be, but still tends by its natural desire to understand the substance which is of infinite excellence, as we proved in the First Book concerning the divine substance.

Moreover. Just as there is a natural desire for knowledge in all intellectual natures, so is there in them a natural desire to rid themselves of ignorance or nescience. Now separate substances, as stated, know in the manner already mentioned, that God's substance is above them, and above everything that they understand: wherefore they know that the divine substance is unknown to them. Therefore their natural desire tends to understand the divine substance.

Besides. The nearer a thing is to its end, the greater the desire with which it tends to that end: wherefore we may notice that the natural movement of bodies is increased towards the end. Now the intellect of separate substances is nearer to the knowledge of God than ours: and consequently they desire to know God more intensely than we do. And however much we know that God is, and other things mentioned above, we still go on desiring, and seek to know Him in His essence. Much more therefore do separate substances desire this naturally: and consequently their natural desire is not satisfied with the above-mentioned knowledge of God.

Hence we conclude that the ultimate happiness of a separate substance does not consist in the knowledge whereby it knows God by its own substance: since its desire still leads it on to the substance of God.

It also clearly follows from this that ultimate happiness is to be sought nowhere else but in an operation of the intellect: since no desire leads us so high as the desire of knowing the truth. For all our desires, whether of pleasure or of anything else that man wants, can be satisfied with other things: whereas the aforesaid desire rests not until it has reached God, the supreme cause and maker of all. Hence Wisdom rightly says (Ecclus. 24:7): I dwell in the highest places, and my throne is in a pillar of a cloud: and it is said (Prov. 9:3) that Wisdom by her maids inviteth to the tower. They should blush, then, who seek man's happiness in the lowest things, whereas it is placed on such a height.

CHAPTER LI

HOW GOD MAY BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE

SINCE then it is impossible for a natural desire to be void;—and it would be were it impossible to arrive at understanding the divine substance; for all minds desire this naturally:—we must conclude that it is possible for the divine substance to be seen by means of the intellect; both by separate intellectual substances, and by our souls.

It is sufficiently clear from what has been said, what manner of vision this is. For we have proved that the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect in any created species. Wherefore if God's essence be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it in the divine essence itself: so that in that vision the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision.

Since, however, the intellect is unable to understand any particular substance, unless it be actuated by some species informing it, that is the image of the thing understood; someone might deem it impossible for a created intellect to see the very substance of God in the divine essence as an intelligible species, inasmuch as the divine essence is self-subsistent, and we have proved in the First Book that God cannot be the form of anything.

In order to understand this truth, we must note that a self-subsisting substance is either a form alone, or is composed of matter and form. Accordingly, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of something else: because the form therein is already confined to that matter, so that it cannot be the form of another thing. But that which subsists so as nevertheless to be a form alone, can be the form of something else, provided its being be such that some other thing can participate in it, as we have proved concerning the human soul in the Second Book. If, however, its being cannot be participated in by another, it cannot be the form of anything; because by its very being it is determined in itself, as material things are by their matter. Now we must consider this as being the case not only with regard to substantial or natural being, but also as regards intelligible being. For, since truth is the perfection of the intellect, that intelligible which is truth itself, will be a pure form in the genus of intelligible things. This applies solely to God: for, since truth is consequent upon being, that alone is its own truth, which is its own being; and this belongs to God alone, as we proved in the Second Book. Consequently other subsistent intelligibles are not pure forms in the genus of intelligible things, but have a form in a subject: for each of them is a true thing, but not the truth, even as it is a being, but not being itself. It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands: which cannot be said of the essence of any separate substance. And yet it cannot be the form of another thing as to its natural being: for it would follow that being united to this other, it would constitute one nature; which is impossible, since the divine essence is perfect in itself in its own nature. Whereas the intelligible species in its union with the intellect, does not constitute a nature, but perfects the intellect to the effect of understanding: and this is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine essence.

This immediate vision of God is promised to us in Holy Writ (1 Cor. 13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. It would be impious to understand this in a material way, and imagine a material face in the Godhead: since we have proved that God has no body. Nor is it possible for us to see God with a bodily face since the eyes of the body, which are situate in the face, can only see bodily things. Thus then shall we see God face to face, because we shall see Him immediately, even as a man whom we see face to face.

It is according to this vision that we become most like unto God, and participators of His bliss: since God understands His substance by His essence, and this is His bliss. Wherefore it is said (1 Jo. 3:2): When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; because we shall see Him as He is. And (Luke 22:29, 30) our Lord said: I dispose to you, as My Father hath disposed to Me, a banquet, that you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom. Now these words cannot be understood as referring to the food and drink of the body, but to that which is taken from the table of Wisdom, of which Wisdom says (Prov. 9:5): Eat my bread and drink the wine which I have mingled for you. Accordingly, to eat and drink at God’s table is to enjoy the same bliss as that which makes God happy, and to see God as He sees Himself.

CHAPTER LII

THAT NO CREATED SUBSTANCE CAN BY ITS NATURAL POWER ARRIVE AT SEEING GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

HOWEVER it is not possible for any created substance to attain, by its own power, to this way of seeing God.

For that which is proper to the higher nature cannot be acquired by a lower nature, except through the action of the higher nature to whom it properly belongs: thus water cannot become hot except through the action of heat. Now to see God in His essence is proper to the divine nature, since to operate through its own form is proper to the operator. Therefore no intellectual substance can see God in the divine essence, unless God Himself bring this about.

Again. A form proper to A does not become B's except through A's agency: because an agent produces its like by communicating its form to another. Now it is impossible to see the divine substance unless the divine substance itself become the form by which the intellect understands, as we have proved. Therefore no created substance can attain to that vision, except through the divine agency.

Besides. If any two things have to be united together so that one be formal and the other material, their union must be completed by an action on the part of the one that is formal, and not by the action of the one that is material: because the form is the principle of action, whereas matter is the passive principle. Now in order that the created intellect see God's substance, the divine essence itself must be united to the intellect as an intelligible form, as we have proved. Therefore no created intellect can attain to this vision except through the divine agency.

Further. What is so of itself, is the cause of what is so through another. Now the divine intelligence sees of itself the divine substance: for the divine intelligence is the divine essence, in which God's substance is seen, as we proved in the First Book: whereas the created intellect sees the divine substance in the divine essence as in something other than itself. Therefore this vision cannot be acquired by the created intellect, except through the action of God.

Moreover. Whatever exceeds the limits of a nature, cannot be acquired by that nature except through the agency of another: thus water does not flow upwards unless it be moved by something else. Now it is beyond the limits of any created nature to see God's substance: because it is proper to every created intellectual nature to understand according to the mode of its substance: whereas the divine substance cannot be understood thus, as we proved above. Therefore no created intellect can possibly attain to a vision of the divine substance except by the agency of God who surpasses all creatures. Hence it is said (Rom. 6:23): The grace of God is life everlasting. For we have proved that man's happiness consists in seeing God, which is called life everlasting: and we are said to obtain this by God's grace alone, because that vision surpasses the faculty of every creature, and it is impossible to attain thereto except by God's gift; and when such things are obtained by a creature, it is put down to God's grace. Again our Lord says (Jo. 14:21): I will manifest myself to him.

CHAPTER LIII

THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT NEEDS A RAY OF THE DIVINE LIGHT IN ORDER TO SEE GOD IN HIS ESSENCE

TO so sublime a vision the created intellect needs to be raised by some kind of outpouring of the divine goodness. For it is impossible that the proper form of anything become the form of another, unless this other bear some resemblance to the thing to which that form properly belongs: thus light does not actuate a body which has nothing in common with the diaphanous. Now the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intellect, and is proportionate thereto: for these three, understanding, medium of understanding, and object understood, are one in God. Therefore that same essence cannot become the intelligible form of a created intellect, except through the created intellect participating in some divine likeness. Therefore this participation in a divine likeness is necessary in order that the divine substance be seen.

Again. Nothing can receive a higher form unless it be disposed thereto through its capacity being raised: because every act is in its proper power. Now the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. Wherefore in order that the divine essence become the intelligible species to a created intellect, which is requisite in order that the divine substance be seen, the created intellect needs to be raised for that purpose by some sublime disposition.

Besides. If two things from not being united become united, this must be either through both being changed, or one only. Now if we suppose that some created intellect begin to see the divine essence, it follows from what we have said, that the divine essence is united to that intellect as an intelligible species. But it is impossible that the divine essence be changed, as we have proved. Therefore this union must begin through a change in the created intellect. And this change can only consist in the created intellect acquiring some new disposition.—The same conclusion follows if we suppose some created intellect to be endowed from the outset of its creation with such a vision. For if, as we have proved, this vision exceeds the faculty of nature, it is possible to conceive any created intellect as complete in its natural species without its seeing God's substance. Consequently, whether it see God from the beginning, or begin to see Him afterwards, its nature needs something to be added to it.

Further. Nothing can be raised to a higher operation except through its power being strengthened. Now a power may be increased in two ways. First, by a mere intensifying of the power: thus the active power of a hot subject is increased by the intensity of the heat, so that it is capable of a more vehement action in the same species. Secondly, by the addition of a new form: thus the power of a diaphanous body is increased so that it can give light, through its being made actually lightsome by receiving the form of light anew. This increase of power is necessary in order that there result an operation of another species. Now the natural power of the created intellect is not sufficient for the vision of the divine substance, as we have shown. Therefore its power needs to be increased, in order that it attain to that vision. But increase through intensification of the natural power is insufficient: because that vision is not of the same kind as the natural vision of the created intellect: which is clear from the distance of the things seen. Therefore there must be an increase of the intellective power through its receiving a new disposition. Now owing to the fact that we derive our knowledge of intelligible beings from sensible things, we transfer the terms employed in sensual knowledge to our intellectual knowledge; especially those that appertain to the sight, which of all the senses is the highest and most spiritual, and therefore most akin to the intellect: and for this reason intellectual knowledge is called sight. And because bodily sight is not effected without light, those things which serve for the perfection of intellectual vision are called light: wherefore Aristotle (3 De Anima, v.) compares the active intellect to light, because the active intellect makes things actually intelligible, even as light somewhat makes things to be actually visible. Accordingly the disposition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance, is rightly called the light of glory: not that it makes the object actually intelligible, as the light of the active intellect does; but because it makes the intellect able actually to understand.

This is the light of which it is said (Ps. 35:10): In Thy light we shall see light, i.e. the light of the divine substance. Again it is said (Apoc. 22:5): The city, namely of the Blessed, hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon … for the glory of God hath enlightened it. Again it is said (Is. 60:19): Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee: but the Lord shall be unto thee for an everlasting light, and thy God for thy glory.—For this reason too, since in God to be is the same as to understand, and because He is to all the cause of their understanding, He is said to be the light (Jo. 1:9): That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world: and (1 Jo. 1:5): God is light: and (Ps. 103:2): Thou … art clothed with light as with a garment.—For this reason too, both God and the angels are described in Holy Writ in figures of fire, on account of the brilliancy of fire.

CHAPTER LIV

ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT GOD CANNOT BE SEEN IN HIS ESSENCE; AND THE SOLUTION THEREOF

SOMEONE will object against the foregoing:

No additional light can help the sight to see things that surpass the natural faculty of corporeal sight: since the sight can see only coloured objects. Now the divine substance surpasses the whole faculty of a created intellect, more even than intelligence surpasses the senses’ capacity. Therefore no additional light can raise the created intellect to see the divine substance.

Again. This light that is received into the created intellect, is something created. Therefore it also is infinitely distant from God: and consequently such a light cannot help the created intellect to see the divine substance.

Besides. If the aforesaid light can do this for the reason that it is an image of the divine substance; since every intellectual substance, for the very reason that it is intellectual, bears a likeness to God, the nature itself of an intellectual substance will suffice for it to see God.

Further. If this light is created; since there is no reason why that which is created should not be connatural to some creature; there might possibly be a creature that would see the divine substance through its connatural light. But the contrary of this has been proved.

Moreover. The infinite, as such, is unknown. Now we proved in the First Book that God is infinite. Therefore the divine substance cannot be seen through the light in question.

Furthermore. There should be proportion between the understanding and the thing understood. But there is no proportion between the created intellect, even perfected by this light, and the divine substance: for there still remains in infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot be helped by any light to see the divine substance.

By these and like arguments some have been induced to maintain that the divine substance is never seen by a created intellect. This opinion both would destroy the rational creature's true happiness, which can consist in nothing but the vision of the divine substance, as we have proved, and is contrary to the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from what we have said. Wherefore it should be rejected as false and heretical.

It is not difficult, however, to answer the above arguments. For the divine substance is not so outside the range of the created intellect, as to be absolutely beyond its reach, as sound is to the sight, or an immaterial substance to the senses: because the divine substance is the first intelligible, and the principle of all intellectual knowledge: yet it is outside the range of the created intellect, as exceeding its power, just as the highest sensibles are outside the range of the senses. Wherefore the Philosopher (2 Metaph.) says that our intellect stands in relation to the most evident things, as the owl's eye does in relation to the sun. Therefore the created intellect needs to be strengthened by some divine light in order to be able to see the divine substance. This solves the first argument.

Moreover, this light raises the created intellect to the vision of God, not on account of its affinity to the divine substance, but on account of the power which it receives from God to produce such an effect: although in its being it is infinitely distant from God, as the second argument stated. For this fight unites the created intellect to God, not in being but only in understanding.

Since, however, it belongs to God Himself to understand His substance perfectly, the light in question is a likeness of God in this that it perfects the intellect for seeing the divine substance. Now no intellectual substance can be like God in this way. For since no created substance's simplicity is equal to the divine simplicity, it is impossible for the created substance to have its entire perfection in one subject: for this is proper to God, as we proved in the First Book, who is being, understanding and blessed in respect of the same. Consequently in the intellectual substance the created light through which it is raised to the beatific vision of God, differs from any light whereby it is perfected in its specific nature, and understands proportionately to its substance. Hence the reply to the third argument is clear.

The fourth argument is solved thus. The vision of the divine substance surpasses all natural power, as was shown. Consequently the light whereby the created intellect is perfected in order to see the divine substance must needs be supernatural.

Nor can the fact that God is infinite be an obstacle to the vision of the divine substance, as the fifth objection argued. For He is not said to be infinite by way of privation, as quantity: and the infinite of this kind is reasonably unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form which is the principle of knowledge. But He is said to be infinite negatively, as a per se subsistent form that is not limited by being received into matter. Wherefore that which is infinite in this way is in itself most knowable.

There is indeed proportion between the created intellect and understanding God, a proportion not of measure, but of aptitude, such as of matter for form, or cause for effect. In this way there is no reason against there being in the creature a proportion to God, consisting in the aptitude of an intelligent being for an intelligible object, as well as of effect in respect of its cause. Wherefore the solution of the sixth objection is clear.

CHAPTER LV

THAT THE CREATED INTELLECT DOES NOT COMPREHEND THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE

THE mode of any action whatever depends on the efficacity of its active principle,—for that which has the stronger heat imparts greater heat: consequently the mode of knowledge also must depend on the efficiency of the principle of knowledge.

Now the light mentioned above is a principle of knowing God: since thereby the created intellect is raised to the vision of the divine substance. Accordingly, the mode of the divine vision must be commensurate with the power of this same light. But this light is far short in strength of the clarity of the divine intelligence. Wherefore it is impossible that the divine substance be seen in the aforesaid light as perfectly as it is seen by the divine intellect. Now the divine intellect sees this substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible: because the truth of the divine substance, and the clarity of the divine intellect are equal; nay more, they are one. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly by the aforesaid light see the divine substance as perfectly as it is perfectly visible. Now whoever knows a thing so as to comprehend it, knows it as perfectly as it is knowable: thus whoever knows that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, as a matter of opinion based on probable reasons, because wise men say so, does not yet comprehend it; but only he who knows it as a scientific conclusion, through the medium that causes that conclusion. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance.

Again. A finite power cannot in its operation rise to the level of an infinite object. Now the divine substance is something infinite in comparison with every created intellect: since every created intellect is confined to a certain species. Therefore the vision of a created intellect cannot possibly rise to the level of the divine substance in seeing it, namely in seeing the divine substance as perfectly as it is visible. Therefore no created intellect comprehends it.

Further. Every agent acts perfectly so far as it perfectly participates in the form that is the principle of action. Now the intelligible form by which the divine substance is seen, is the divine essence itself: and although it becomes the intelligible form of the created intellect, the created intellect does not grasp it as much as it can be grasped. Therefore it does not see it as perfectly as it can be seen. Therefore it is not comprehended by the created intellect.

Besides. Nothing comprehended goes beyond the limits of the comprehender. Consequently if the created intellect were to comprehend the divine substance, this would not exceed the limits of the created intellect: which is impossible. Therefore the created intellect cannot possibly comprehend the divine substance.

We do not however say that the divine substance is seen, yet not comprehended by a created intellect, as though something thereof were seen and something not seen; since the divine substance is utterly simple: but because it is not seen as perfectly by the created intellect as it is visible, even as one who holds a demonstrated conclusion as an opinion is said to know it but not to comprehend it, because he does not know it perfectly, that is scientifically, although there be no part of it that he knows not.

CHAPTER LVI

THAT NO CREATED INTELLECT, IN SEEING GOD, SEES ALL THAT CAN BE SEEN IN HIM

HENCE it is clear that though the created intellect may see the divine substance, it knows not all that can be seen in the divine substance.

For then alone does it necessarily follow that if one principle be known, all its effects are known in it, when that principle is comprehended by the intellect: because then is a principle known as to its whole power, when all its effects are known from it. Now other things are known from the divine essence, as effects are known from their cause. Consequently since the created intellect cannot know the divine substance so as to comprehend it, it does not follow that because it sees it, it sees also all that can be known in it.

Again. The higher the intellect the more it knows;—either a greater number of things, or at least more about the same things. Now the divine intellect surpasses every created intellect: and consequently it knows more things than any created intellect. Yet it knows not things except through knowing its own essence, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore more things are knowable in the divine essence, than any created intellect can see therein.

Besides. The measure of a power is according to what it can do. Consequently to know all that a power can do is the same as to comprehend that power. But, since the divine power is infinite, no created intellect can comprehend it any more than it can comprehend its essence, as we proved above. Neither, therefore, can a created intellect know all that the divine power can do. Yet all the things that the divine power can do are knowable in the divine essence, because God knows them all, and not otherwise than in His essence. Therefore a created intellect by seeing the divine essence, does not see all that can be seen in the divine substance.

Moreover. No cognitive power knows a thing except under the aspect of its proper object: thus by sight we do not know a thing except as coloured. Now the proper object of the intellect is what a thing is, namely the essence of a thing, as stated in 3 De Anima, iv. Consequently whatever the intellect knows of a thing, it knows it through the knowledge of its essence, so that whenever by demonstration we become acquainted with the proper accidents of a thing, we take as principle, what that thing is, as stated in 1 Poster. i. iv. On the other hand, if the intellect knows the essence from its accidents, according to the statement in 1 De Anima, i. that accidents are a great help in knowing what a thing is; this is accidental, in so far as the knowledge of the intellect arises from the senses, and so by knowing the accidents as perceived by the senses we need to arrive at knowing the substance: for this reason this does not occur in mathematics, but only in physics. Consequently whatever cannot be known in a thing by knowing its substance must be unknown to the intellect. Now by knowing the substance of one who wills, we cannot arrive at knowing what he wills: because the will does not tend altogether naturally to that which it wills; for which reason the will and nature are said to be two active principles. Therefore the intellect cannot know what a person wills, except that it may do so from certain effects: thus if we see a person working willingly, we know what he willed. Or again from a cause; thus God knows what we will, as also other of His effects, in that He is the cause of our willing. Or again by someone insinuating his will to another, as when by speaking he makes known his likes and dislikes. Since then many things depend on God’s simple will, as we have partly shown above, and will show yet more clearly further on; although the created intellect may see the divine essence, it does not know all the things that God sees in His essence.

Someone may object to what has been said, that God’s substance is something greater than all the things He can do, or understand, or will, except Himself: wherefore if the created intellect can see God’s substance, much more can it know all that God either understands, or wills, or can do, except Himself.

But if we consider carefully, to know a thing in itself is not the same as to know it in its cause: since there are things which are easy to know in themselves, but not easy to know in their causes. It is true, then, that to know God in Himself is more than to know anything else besides Him, if this can be known in itself. But it belongs to a more perfect knowledge to know the divine substance and to see its effects therein, than to know the divine substance without seeing its effects in it. And it is possible to see the divine substance without comprehending it. But it is not possible to know all that can be known in that substance, without comprehending it, as we have proved.

CHAPTER LVII

THAT EVERY INTELLECT OF ANY DEGREE CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE DIVINE VISION

SINCE, as we have proved, the created intellect is raised by a kind of supernatural light to the vision of the divine substance, there is no created intellect of so low a degree, as to its nature, that cannot be raised to this vision.

For we have proved that this light cannot be connatural to any creature, but surpasses every created nature in its power. Now that which is done by a supernatural power, is not hindered by any diversity of nature, since the divine power is infinite; so that in the miraculous healing of a sick man, it matters not whether he ail much or little. Consequently the difference of degrees in the intellectual nature does not prevent the lowest in that nature from being raised by the aforesaid light to that vision.

Again. The highest intellect in the order of nature is infinitely distant from God in perfection and goodness: whereas its distance from the lowest intellect is finite: for there cannot be an infinite distance between one finite thing and another. Consequently the distance between the lowest created intellect and the highest, is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the highest created intellect and God. Now that which is as nothing cannot cause an appreciable variation: thus the distance between the centre of the earth and the human eye, is as nothing in comparison with the distance between the human eye and the eighth sphere, compared with which the earth occupies the space of a mere point: for which reason no appreciable variation arises from astronomers considering the human eye as the centre of the earth in their demonstrations. It makes no difference therefore what intellect be raised by the aforesaid light to the vision of God, whether it be of the highest, or of the lowest, or of a middle degree.

Besides. It was proved above that every intellect desires naturally to see the divine substance. Now the natural desire cannot be void. Therefore every created intellect can arrive at the vision of the divine substance, the lowliness of its nature being no obstacle.

Hence it is that (Matt. 22:30) our Lord promises men the glory of the angels: They shall be, he says, speaking of men, like the angels of God in heaven. And (Apoc. 20.) it is stated that the measure of a man is that of an angel. For this reason nearly everywhere in Holy Writ angels are described in the form of men, either wholly, as the angels who appeared to Abraham in the likeness of men (Gen. 18:2), or in part, as may be seen in the animals (Ezech. 1:8) of which it is said that they had the hands of a man under their wings.

Hereby we refute the error of those who said that however much the human soul be raised, it cannot attain to an equality with the higher intellects.

CHAPTER LVIII

THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE TO SEE GOD MORE PERFECTLY THAN ANOTHER

WHEREAS the mode of operation results from the form that is the principle of operation, and the aforesaid light is a principle of the vision whereby the created intellect sees the divine substance, as we have proved; it follows that the mode of the divine vision is in keeping with the mode of this light. Now it is possible that there be various degrees of participation of this light, so that one receives more light than another. Therefore it is possible that of those who see God, one may see Him more perfectly than another; though both see His substance.

Again. In whatever genus there is one thing higher than the others, we shall find degrees according as these others approach more or less to that thing: thus things are more or less cold according as they approach to fire which is supremely hot. Now God sees His own substance most perfectly, inasmuch as he alone comprehends it, as we have proved above. Therefore of those who see Him one sees His substance more perfectly than another, according to their greater or lesser approach to Him.

Besides. The light of glory raises one to the divine vision for the reason that it is a likeness of the divine intellect, as we have stated. Now a thing may be more or less like to God. Therefore it is possible for one to see the divine substance more or less perfectly.

Further. Since there is proportion between the end and things directed to the end, it follows that things directed differently to an end, participate in that end differently. Now vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have shown. And intellectual substances are not all equally prepared for that end: for some are more virtuous, some less, and virtue is the way to happiness. Consequently there must be diversity in the divine vision, in that some see the divine substance more perfectly, some less perfectly. Hence in order to indicate this difference of happiness, our Lord says (Jo. 14:2): In my Father's house there are many mansions.

Hereby too is excluded the error of those who said that all rewards are equal.

Again, just as the mode of vision indicates a diversity of degrees among the blessed, so the object of the vision shows that their glory is the same: for each one's happiness consists in his seeing God's substance, as we have proved. The same thing then makes them all happy, but they do not all derive an equal happiness therefrom. Hence it does not stand in the way of what has been said, that our Lord declares (Matth. 20.) the labourers in the vineyard to have received the same wage, a penny to wit, although they worked not equally: because the same thing is appointed as a reward to be seen and enjoyed, namely God.

Wherein it must also be observed that corporal and spiritual movements are somewhat contrary to each other. For all corporal movements have the identically same first subject, but their ends are diverse: whereas spiritual movements, namely intellectual apprehensions and acts of the will, have various first subjects, but one identical end.

CHAPTER LIX

HOW THOSE WHO SEE THE DIVINE SUBSTANCE SEE ALL THINGS

Now forasmuch as the vision of the divine substance is the last end of every intellectual substance, as we have proved; and since the appetite of everything that has obtained its last end, is at rest: it follows that the natural appetite of the intellectual substance that sees the divine substance must be entirely at rest. Now the natural desire of the intellect is to know all the genera, species and powers of things, and the whole order of the universe: as is evident from the fact that man makes a study of all these things. Therefore everyone that sees the divine substance knows all the things mentioned above.

Again. Intellect and sense differ, as is clear from 3 De Anima iv., in that sense is destroyed or weakened by powerful sensibles, so that afterwards it cannot perceive weaker objects: whereas the intellect, through not being destroyed or weakened by its object, but only perfected thereby, after it has understood a higher intelligible, is not less but more able to understand other intelligibles. Now the highest in the genus of intelligibles is the divine substance. Consequently the intellect which by the divine light is raised to see the substance of God, is a fortiori perfected by the same light so as to see all other intelligibles in the universe.

Besides. Intelligible being is not of less, but may be of greater extent than physical being; for the intellect is naturally adapted to understand all the things in the universe, as well as things that have no physical being, such as negations and privations. Consequently anything required for the perfection of physical being, that and even more is required for the perfection of intelligible being. Now the perfection of intelligible being is when the intellect has reached its last end: even as the perfection of physical being consists in the very making of a thing. Therefore God makes known to the intellect, which sees Him, all the things that He has made for the perfection of the universe.

Moreover. Although of those who see God one sees him more perfectly than another, as we have shown, yet each one sees Him so perfectly that all his natural capacity is filled: indeed the vision itself surpasses all natural capacity, as was proved above. Therefore everyone that sees the divine substance must needs know in the divine substance all the things to which his natural capacity extends. Now the natural capacity of every intellect extends to the knowledge of all general species, and the order of things. Therefore every one that sees God will know these things in the divine substance.

Wherefore the Lord answered Moses' request to see the divine substance (Exod. 33:19): I will show thee all good; and Gregory says (Dial. iv. 33): What know they not who know Him that knows all?

If we consider carefully the foregoing, it is clear that those who see the divine substance, in one sense see all things, and in another sense, do not. For if by all we understand those things that belong to the perfection of the universe, it is evident from what has been said that those who see God see all things, as the arguments just adduced prove. Because, as the intellect is, in a sense, all things, whatever belongs to the perfection of nature, belongs also to the perfection of intelligible being: wherefore according to Augustine (2 Super Gen. ad lit., viii.), all things made by the Word of God that they might subsist in their respective natures, were made likewise in the angelic intelligence so as to be understood by the angels. Now, to the perfection of natural being belong specific natures, their properties and forces: because the intention of nature is directed to the specific natures, since individuals are for the sake of the species. Consequently it belongs to the perfection of an intellectual substance to know the nature, forces and proper accidents of every species: and therefore it will obtain this through the vision of the divine essence.—Moreover through its knowledge of natural species the individuals also, contained in these species, are known by the intellect that sees God, as may be gathered from what has been already said of the divine and angelic knowledge.

On the other hand if by all we understand all that God knows by seeing His essence, no created intellect sees all things in the divine substance, as we have shown.

This may be considered in respect of several things.

First, as to those things which God can make, but neither has made nor ever will make. For all such things cannot be known without comprehending His power, which is impossible for any created intellect, as we have proved. Hence it is said (Job 11:7, seqq.): Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly? He is higher than heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea. For these things are said, not as though God were great in dimensive quantity: but because His power is not limited to all that seems great, so that He be unable to make greater still.

Secondly, as to the reasons of things made: which reasons cannot all be known by an intellect without its comprehending the divine goodness. Because the reason for every thing made is taken from the end which the maker has in view. Now the end of all things made by God is the divine goodness: wherefore the reason for things made is that the divine goodness may be spread abroad in things. So that a man would know all the reasons of created things, if he knew every good that can accrue to things according to the order of divine wisdom: and this would be to comprehend the divine goodness and wisdom, which is impossible to any created intellect. Wherefore it is said (Eccles. 8:17): I understood that man can find no reason of all those works of God.

Thirdly, as to those things which depend on God’s will alone: such as predestination, election and justification, and whatever belongs to the creature’s sanctification. Hence it is said (1 Cor. 2:11): No man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him. So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God.

CHAPTER LX

THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD SEE ALL IN HIM AT ONCE

WHEREAS we have shown that the created intellect which sees the divine substance, sees therein all the species of things; and since whatever is seen in one species, must needs be seen at once and by one vision, because vision must correspond to the principle of vision: it follows that the intellect which sees the divine substance, sees all, not successively but at once.

Again. The supreme and perfect happiness of the intellectual nature consists in seeing God, as proved above. Now happiness results not from a habit but from an act, since it is the ultimate perfection and last end. Consequently whatever we see in the beatific vision of the divine substance is all seen by us actually: and therefore not one thing after another.

Besides. Whenever a thing arrives at its last end, it is at rest: since all movement is to the attainment of an end. Now the last end of the intellect is the vision of the divine substance, as shown above. Therefore the intellect that sees the divine substance does not pass from one intelligible thing to another. Therefore whatsoever it knows in this vision, it considers it all actually.

Moreover. In the divine substance the intellect knows all the species of things, as we have proved. Now of some genera there are an infinite number of species, for instance of numbers, figures and proportions. Therefore the intellect sees an infinite number of things in the divine substance. But it would not see them all unless it saw them at one time: because it is not possible to pass through the infinite.

Consequently all the intellect sees in the divine substance, it sees at once.

Hence Augustine says (15 De Trin. xvi.): Our thoughts will not then be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another: but we shall see all we know by one glance.

CHAPTER LXI

THAT BY SEEING GOD A MAN IS MADE A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE

IT follows hence that by the aforesaid vision the created intellect is made a partaker of eternal life. For eternity differs from time in that the latter has its being in a kind of succession, whereas the former is all simultaneously. Now it has already been proved that there is no succession in the vision in question, and that whatsoever is seen in it, is seen at once and at a glance. Therefore this vision takes place in a kind of participation of eternity. Moreover this vision is a kind of life: because the act of the intellect is life. Therefore by that vision the created intellect becomes a partaker of eternal life.

Again. Actions take their species from their objects. Now the object of the aforesaid vision is the divine substance in its very being, and not in some created image, as we have shown. Now the being of the divine substance is in eternity, or rather is eternity itself. Therefore the aforesaid vision consists in a participation of eternity.

Besides. If an action takes place in time, this is either because the principle of the action is in time:—for instance the actions of natural things are temporal;—or on account of the term of the action; for instance, the actions which spiritual substances, who are above time, exercise on things subject to time. Now the vision in question is not subject to time on the part of the thing seen, since this is an eternal substance; nor on the part of the medium of vision, which is also the eternal substance; nor on the part of the seer, namely the intellect, whose being is independent of time; because it is incorruptible, as we have proved. Therefore this vision is according to a participation of eternity, as altogether transcending time.

Further. The intellective soul is created on the border line between eternity and time as stated in De Causis, and explained above: because it is the last in order among intellects; and yet its substance stands above corporal matter, and is independent thereof. On the other hand its action in respect of which it comes into conjunction with lower and temporal things, is itself temporal. Consequently its action by reason of which it comes into conjunction with higher things that are above time, partakes of eternity. Especially does this apply to the vision in which it sees the divine substance. Therefore by this vision it enters into a participation of eternity: and for the same reason, so too does any other created intellect that sees God.

For this reason our Lord says (Jo. 18:3): This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God.

CHAPTER LXII

THAT THOSE WHO SEE GOD WILL SEE HIM FOR EVER

IT follows from what has been said that those who obtain ultimate happiness from the divine vision, never fall away from it. Because whatever at one time is, and at another time is not, is measured by time, as stated in 4 Phys. xii. Now the vision in question that makes intellectual creatures happy, is not in time but in eternity. Therefore no one can lose it having once become a partaker thereof.

Again. The intellectual creature does not arrive at its last end except when its natural desire is at rest. Now just as it naturally desires happiness, so does it desire perpetuity of happiness: because as it is perpetual in its substance, that which it desires for its own sake and not on account of something else, it desires to have always. Consequently happiness would not be its last end unless it endured for ever.

Besides. Whatever is possessed with love causes sorrow if it be known that at length it will be lost. Now since the vision in question which makes the possessor happy is supremely enjoyable and desirable, it is supremely loved by those who possess it. Therefore they could not but be sorrowful, if they knew that they would lose it some time. But if it were not perpetual, they would know this: for it has been shown that in seeing the divine substance, they know also other things that naturally are; wherefore much more do they know the conditions of that vision, whether it be perpetual or about to cease eventually. Therefore they would not possess that vision without sorrow. Consequently it would not be true happiness, which should insure from all evil, as we have proved.

Moreover. That which is moved towards a thing as the end of its movement, is not moved away from it except by violence; as a heavy body, when it is projected upwards. Now it is clear from what has been said that every intellectual substance tends to that vision with a natural desire. Therefore it cannot fall away from it except by violence. But nothing is taken away by violence unless the might of him who takes it exceed that of him who caused it. Now the cause of the divine vision is God, as we proved. Consequently, as no might exceeds God's, it is impossible for that vision to be taken away by violence. Therefore it will last for ever.

Further. If a man cease to see what he saw hitherto, this will be either because he loses the faculty of sight—as when a man dies or becomes blind, or is hindered in some other way; or because he wishes no longer to see, as when we turn our eyes away from a thing we saw before; or because the object is withdrawn. And this is invariably true, whether we speak of sensitive or of intellective vision. Now the intellectual substance that sees God cannot lose the faculty of seeing God; neither through ceasing to exist, since it is immortal, as we proved above; nor through failure of the light by which it sees God, since that light is received incorruptibly, on the part both of the recipient and of the giver. Nor can it lack the will to enjoy that vision, for it knows its ultimate happiness to consist in that vision: even as it cannot but desire to be happy. Nor will it cease to see through the withdrawal of the object: because that object which is God is unchangeable; nor does He withdraw himself more than we withdraw from Him. Therefore it is impossible for this beatific vision of God ever to cease.

Again. It is impossible for a man to wish to give up a good which he is enjoying, except on account of some evil that he thinks to be attached to the enjoyment of that good, which enjoyment, at least, is an obstacle to a greater good: for just as the appetite desires nothing except under the aspect of a good, so does it shun nothing except as an evil. But in the enjoyment of that vision there cannot be any evil, since it is the greatest good to which the intellectual creature can attain. Nor is it possible that one who enjoys that vision deem any evil to be in it, or anything to be better than it: because the vision of that Supreme Truth excludes any false opinion. Therefore it is impossible that the intellectual substance which sees God ever desire to lose that vision.

Moreover. The reason why we become weary of what we enjoyed hitherto is that it causes some kind of change, by destroying or diminishing one's power. Hence fatigue is incidental to the exercise of the sensitive powers through the action of the sensible objects on the bodily organ;—in fact the power may be altogether destroyed by too powerful an object;—and after a time they are loth to enjoy that which hitherto had been a pleasant sensation. For the same reason we become weary in mind after long or concentrated thought, because powers that employ organs of the body are subject to fatigue, and in this life it is not possible to give the mind to thought without employing those organs. Now the divine substance does not corrupt but, more than anything, perfects the intellect. Nor does any action performed by a corporeal organ concur in the vision of Him. Therefore it is impossible for anyone to be weary of seeing Him, when they have once enjoyed the sight of Him.

Further. Nothing can be wearisome that is wonderful to him that looks on it: because as long as we wonder at it, it still moves our desire. Now the created intellect always looks with wonder on the divine substance, since no created intellect can comprehend it. Therefore the intellectual substance cannot possibly become weary of that vision: and consequently it cannot of its own choice desist from it.

Besides. If two things were united before, and afterwards become separated, this must be the result of a change in one of them: because just as a relationship does not begin except through a change in one of the relatives, so does it not cease except through a fresh change in one of them. Now the created intellect sees God through being, in some way, united to Him, as proved above. Consequently if that vision cease, through the cessation of that union, this must result from a change either in the divine substance, or in the intellect of the one who sees it. But neither of these is possible: since the divine substance is unchangeable, as we proved in the First Book: and the intellectual substance is raised above all changes, when it sees the divine substance. Therefore it is impossible to lapse from the happiness of seeing God.

Furthermore. The nearer a thing is to God who is utterly unchangeable, the less changeable and the more enduring is it: so that certain bodies through being far distant from God, cannot last for ever, as stated in 2 De Gener. x. But no creature can come nearer to God than one who sees His substance. Therefore the intellectual creature that sees the divine substance, becomes, in a very high degree, unchangeable. Therefore it can never fall away from that vision. Hence it is said (Ps. 83:5): Blessed are they that dwell in Thy house, O Lord: they shall praise Thee for ever and ever: and elsewhere (Ps. 124:1): He shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem. Also (Is. 33:21): Thy eyes shall see Jerusalem, a rich habitation, a tabernacle that cannot be removed: neither shall the nails thereof be taken away for ever, neither shall any of the cords thereof be broken: because only there our Lord is magnificent: and (Apoc. 3:12): He that shall overcome, I will make him a pillar in the temple of my God, and he shall go out no more.

Hereby we refute the error of the Platonists who said that souls after being separated from the body, and obtaining ultimate happiness, begin to desire reunion with the body, and that when the happiness of that life is ended, they are plunged once more into this life of unhappiness: and again that of Origen, who maintained that souls and angels can return from bliss to unhappiness.

CHAPTER LXIII

HOW IN THAT ULTIMATE HAPPINESS MAN’S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED

IT is evident from what has been said, that in this happy state which results from the divine vision, man’s every desire is fulfilled, according to Ps. 102:5, Who satisfieth thy desire with good things, and his every end achieved. This is clear to anyone who considers man’s various desires in kind.

There is a desire in man, as an intellectual being, to know the truth: and men pursue this desire by the study of the contemplative life. And this will be most clearly fulfilled in that vision, when the intellect by gazing on the First Truth will know all that it naturally desires to know, as we have proved above.

There is also a desire in man as a rational being capable of regulating things beneath him: and he pursues this desire in the occupations of the active and civic life. The chief object of this desire is that man’s entire life be regulated in accord with reason, to wit, that he may live according to virtue: because the end of every virtuous man in all his actions is the good of his own virtue, that of the brave man, for instance, that he may act bravely. Now this desire will then be wholly fulfilled: because the reason will be right vigorous, being enlightened with the very light of God lest it stray from righteousness.

Consequent to his life as a citizen, there are also certain goods that man needs for his civic actions. Such is a position of honour, through inordinate desire of which, men become proud and ambitious. Now by this vision men are raised to the highest position of honour, because in a way, they are united to God, as we have proved above. Hence, even as God Himself is the

King of ages, so the Blessed united to Him are said to be kings (Apoc. 20:6): They shall reign with Christ.

There is another desirable thing consequent to the civic life, and this is to be well known; through inordinate desire of which men are said to be desirous of vain glory. Now by this vision the Blessed become well known, not in the opinion of men, who can both deceive and be deceived, but in the most true knowledge both of God and of all the Blessed. Hence this happiness is many times described as glory in Holy Writ: thus it is said in the Psalm (149:5): The saints shall rejoice in glory.

There is yet another desirable thing in the civic life, and this is riches; through inordinate desire of which men become illiberal and unjust. Now in that happy state there is a sufficiency of all goods: inasmuch as the Blessed enjoy him who contains the perfection of all goods. Hence it is said (Wis. 7:11): All good things came to me together with her: wherefore it is said again (Ps. 111:3): Glory and wealth shall be in his house.

There is a third desire in man, common to him and other animals, namely the desire for the enjoyment of pleasure: and this men pursue especially by leading a voluptuous life, and through lack of moderation become intemperate and incontinent. Now in that vision there is the most perfect pleasure, all the more perfect than sensuous pleasure, as the intellect is above the senses; as the good in which we shall delight surpasses all sensible good, is more penetrating, and more continuously delightful; and as that pleasure is freer from all alloy of sorrow, or trouble of anxiety: whereof it is said (Ps. 35:9): They shall be inebriated with the plenty of Thy house, and Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure. There is also the natural desire, common to all things, whereby all things seek to be preserved in their being, as far as possible: and through lack of moderation in this desire, men become timorous, and spare themselves overmuch in the matter of labour. This desire will be altogether fulfilled when the Blessed obtain perfect immortality, and security from all evil, according to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. 21:4: They shall no more hunger or thirst, neither shall the sun fall on them, nor any heat. It is therefore evident that intellectual substances by seeing God attain to true beatitude, when their every desire is satisfied, and when there is a sufficiency of all good things, as is required for happiness, as Aristotle says (10 Ethic, vii. 3). Hence

Boethius says (3 De Consol.) that happiness is a state of life made perfect by the accumulation of all goods.

In this life there is nothing so like this ultimate and perfect happiness as the life of those who contemplate the truth, as far as possible here below. Hence the philosophers who were unable to obtain full knowledge of that final beatitude, placed man’s ultimate happiness in that contemplation which is possible during this life. For this reason too, Holy Writ commends the contemplative rather than other forms of life, when our Lord said (Luke 10:42): Mary hath chosen the better part, namely the contemplation of truth, which shall not be taken from her. For contemplation of truth begins in this life, but will be consummated in the life to come: while the active and civic life does not transcend the limits of this life.

CHAPTER LXIV

THAT GOD GOVERNS THINGS BY HIS PROVIDENCE

FROM what has been laid down in the preceding chapters, it has been sufficiently proved that God is the end of all: whence we may further conclude that by His providence He governs or rules all.

For whenever certain things are ordered to a certain end, they are all subject to the disposal of the one to whom chiefly that end belongs. This may be seen in an army: since all the parts of the army, and their actions, are directed to the good of the general, victory to wit, as their ultimate end: for which reason the government of the whole army belongs to the general. In the same way, that art which is concerned with the end dictates and gives laws to the art which is concerned with things directed to the end: as civics controls the military art, and this directs the art of horsemanship; and the art of sailing, the art of ship-building. Since then all things are directed to the divine goodness as their last end, as we have shown above, it follows that God to whom that goodness belongs chiefly as essentially possessed, understood and loved, must be the Governor of all.

Again. Whoever makes a thing for the sake of an end makes use of it for that end. Now it has been shown above that whatsoever has being in any way is an effect of God: and that God makes all things for an end which is Himself. Therefore He uses everything by directing it to its end. But this is to govern. Therefore God, by His providence, is the Governor of all.

Besides. It has been shown that God is the first unmoved mover. Now the first mover moves no less than second movers; more so indeed, because without Him they do not move other things. But all things that are moved, are moved for an end, as was shown above. Therefore God moves each thing to its end. Moreover He moves them by his intellect: for it has been proved above that He moves not by natural necessity, but by intellect and will. Now to rule and govern by providence is nothing else but to move certain things to their end by one's intellect. Therefore God by His providence governs and rules all things that are moved to their end; whether they be moved corporally, or spiritually, as the seeker is said to be moved by the object desired.

Moreover. It was proved that natural bodies are moved and work towards an end, although they have no knowledge of an end, from the fact that always or nearly always that which is best happens to them: nor would they be made otherwise if they were made by art. Now it is impossible that things without knowledge of an end should act for an end, and attain to that end in an orderly manner, unless they be moved to that end by one who has knowledge of the end: as the arrow is directed to the mark by the archer. Therefore the whole operation of nature must be directed by some knowledge. This must be traced back to God mediately or immediately: because every subordinate art and knowledge must take its principles from a higher one, as may be seen in speculative and practical sciences. Therefore God governs the world by His providence.

Further. Things in nature distinct do not converge into one order, unless they be brought together by one controller. Now the universe is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures; and yet they all converge into one order, some things acting on others, some helping or directing others. Therefore there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe.

Moreover. Natural necessity cannot be alleged as the reason for the various phenomena to be observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies: since the movements of some are more numerous than, and wholly different from the movements of others. Therefore the ordering of their movements must come from some providence: and consequently so must the ordering of all those movements and operations here below, that are controlled by the former movements.

Besides. The nearer a thing is to its cause the greater share it has in the effect. Wherefore if we observe that a thing is the more perfectly shared by certain individuals, according as these are nearer to a certain thing, this is a sign that this thing is the cause of that which is shared in various degrees, thus, if certain things are hotter according as they are nearer fire, this shows that fire is the cause of their heat. Now we see that things are all the more perfectly ordered according as they are nearer to God: for in the lower bodies, which are farthest removed from God by unlikeness of nature, we sometimes find defects from the ordinary course of nature, as in monstrosities, and other casual happenings: whereas this never happens in the heavenly bodies, although they are changeable in a certain degree: nor in the separate intellectual substances. Therefore God is the cause of the entire order of things: and consequently He is the governor of the whole universe by His providence.

Further. As we proved above, God brought all things into being, not by natural necessity but by His intellect and will. Now His intellect and will can have no other ultimate end but his goodness, namely the bestowal of His goodness on things, as was shown above. And things partake of the divine goodness by way of likeness, in being good themselves. And the greatest good in things made by Him, is the good consisting in the order of the universe, which is most perfect as the Philosopher says (11 Metaph. x.) and divine Scripture in like manner (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things He had made, and they were very good, whereas of each single work it was said simply that they were good. Consequently that which is chiefly willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the order of things of which He is the cause. But to govern things is nothing else but to impose order on them. Therefore God by His intellect and will governs all things.

Moreover. Whoever has an end in view, cares more for what is nearest to the last end: because the other ends are directed to this. Now the last end of God’s will is His goodness, the nearest thing to which among created things is the good consisting in the order of the universe: because every particular good of this or that thing is ordained thereto as its end, just as the less perfect is ordained to that which is more perfect: even as each part is for the sake of its whole. Consequently that which God cares for most in created things, is the order of the universe: and therefore He governs it.

Again. Every created thing attains its ultimate perfection by its proper operation, because a thing’s ultimate end and perfection must be either an operation or the term or effect of an operation: and the form whereby a thing is, is its first perfection, as stated in 2 De Anima i. Now the order among effects in respect of different natures and the degrees thereof, issues from divine wisdom as we showed in the Second Book. Therefore the order also among the operations, whereby things approach nearer to their ultimate end, does so in like manner. But to direct the actions of things to their end is to govern them. Therefore God by the providence of His wisdom governs and rules things.

Hence Holy Writ acclaims God as Lord and King, according to Psalm 99:2: The Lord, He is God, and Psalm 46:8: God is the King of all the earth: because the king and lord is he whose office it is to rule and govern subjects. Wherefore Holy Writ ascribes the course of events to the divine control (Job 9:7): Who commandeth the sun, and it riseth not, and shutteth up the stars, as it were under a seal: and (Ps. 148:6): He hath made a decree and it shall not pass away. Hereby is refuted the error of some physicists of old, who held that everything happens from natural necessity; whence it followed that all things happen by chance, and not by the ordinance of Providence.

CHAPTER LXV

THAT GOD PRESERVES THINGS IN EXISTENCE

FROM the fact that God governs things by His providence, it follows that He preserves them in existence.

For every thing whereby certain things obtain their end comes under the government of those things: because things are said to be governed or ruled according as they are directed to their end. Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God, the divine goodness to wit, not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist: because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things, as we have proved. Therefore it belongs to divine providence that things be preserved in existence.

Again. The cause of a thing must needs be the same as the cause of its preservation: because preservation is nothing else than continued existence. Now we have shown above that God is the cause of every thing's existence by His intellect and will. Therefore by His intellect and will He preserves things in existence.

Besides. No particular univocal agent can be the cause of its species simply: thus an individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for then he would be the cause of every man, and consequently of himself, which is impossible. But properly speaking the individual is the cause of the individual. Now the individual man exists forasmuch as the human nature is in this particular matter which is the principle of his individuality. Therefore the human individual is not the cause of a man except in the point of his being the cause of the human form being in this particular matter: and this is to be the principle of the generation of this particular man. It is consequently evident that neither the individual man, nor any other natural univocal agent, is a cause except of the generation of an individual. Now there must needs be some per se active cause of the human species; as is evidenced by his composite nature, and the order of his parts, which is always the same, unless it be hindered accidentally: and the same applies to all other species of natural things. This cause is God either mediately or immediately: for it has been shown that He is the first cause of all. Consequently He stands in relation to the species of things as in nature the individual generator to the generation of which He is the cause per se. But generation ceases when the generator's action ceases. Therefore all the species of things would cease, were the divine operation to cease. Therefore by His operation He preserves things in existence.

Moreover. Although movement may accidentally belong to an existing thing, it is something additional to the thing's being. Now nothing corporeal is the cause of any thing except in so far as it is moved; because no body acts except through movement, as Aristotle proves. Therefore no body is the cause of a thing's existence, as such, but it is the cause of a thing's being moved towards existence, that is, of its becoming. Now the existence of a thing is participated existence, since no thing is its own existence, save God, as we proved above. Consequently God who is His own being must be first and per se the cause of all being. Accordingly the divine operation stands in the same relation to the existence of things, as the movement of a corporeal mover to the being made and the being moved of things made or moved. Now it is impossible that a thing continue to be made or to be moved if the movement of the mover cease. Therefore a thing cannot possibly continue to exist except through the divine operation.

Further. As the operation of art presupposes the operation of nature, so the operation of nature presupposes the creative operation of God: because art takes its matter from nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue of the products of nature; a house, for instance, by the solidity of the stones. Therefore all natural things would not continue to exist except by the power of God.

Again. The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect, after the action of the agent has ceased, unless it merge into the nature of the effect. Because the forms of things generated, and their properties, remain in them to the end after generation, because they become natural to them. In like manner the reason why habits are hard to remove is that they merge into the nature: whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not for always, because they are in their subject as preparing a way to nature. On the other hand that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus nowise remains after the action of the agent: thus light does not remain in the diaphanous body after the illuminant has been removed. Now existence is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone, as was proved in the First Book. Therefore nothing could continue to exist, if the divine operation were to cease.

Further. There are two explanations of the origin of things. One is that proposed by faith, that things were first brought into being by God; the other is that of certain philosophers holding that things emanated from God from eternity. According to either explanation it is necessary to say that things are preserved in existence by God. For if things were brought into being by God after not being, their existence as well as their non-existence must result from the divine will: because He permitted things not to be when He so willed, and caused them to be when He so willed. Therefore they exist so long as He wills them to exist. Therefore His will is the preserver of things.—If on the other hand things emanated from God from eternity, we cannot assign a time or an instant when they first emanated from God. Either, therefore, they were never produced by God, or their existence is always emanating from God, as long as they exist. Therefore He preserves things in existence by His operation.

Hence it is said (Heb. 1:3): Upholding all things by the word of His power. Augustine too, says (4 Super Gen. ad lit. xii.): The potency of the Creator, and the power of the Almighty and All-upholder, is the cause of every creature’s subsistence. If this ruling power were withdrawn from His creatures, their form would cease at once, and all nature would collapse. When a man is building a house, and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and has gone: whereas the world would not stand for a single instant, if God withdrew His support. Hereby is refuted the statement of certain authorities quoted in the law of the Moors, who in order to be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held that all forms are accidents, and that no accident lasts for two instants, so that things would always be in the process of formation: as though a thing needed not an active cause except while being made.—Wherefore some of them are stated to have maintained that the indivisible bodies of which, they say, all substances are composed, and which alone, according to them, have any permanency, would be able for a time to remain in existence, if God were to withdraw His government from things.—Some of these say indeed that things would not cease to exist unless God caused in them the accident of ceasing-to-be.—All of which is plainly absurd.

CHAPTER LXVI

THAT NOTHING GIVES EXISTENCE EXCEPT IN SO FAR AS IT ACTS BY GOD’S POWER

IT is evident from what has gone before that all inferior agents do not give existence except in so far as they act by God’s power.

Nothing gives existence except in so far as it is a being in act. Now God preserves things in existence by His providence, as we have proved. Therefore it is by God’s power that a thing causes existence.

Again. When several different agents are subordinate to one agent, the effect that proceeds from them in common, must needs be ascribed to them in so far as they are united together in partaking of the movement and power of that agent: for many things do not make one, except in so far as they are one; thus it is clear that all the men in an army work in order to effect a victory; and this effect they bring about forasmuch as they are subordinate to the general, whose proper effect is the victory. Now it was shown in the First Book that the first agent is God. Since then existence is the effect common to all agents, for every agent makes a thing to be actually: it follows that they produce this effect in so far as they are subordinate to the first agent, and act by its power.

Besides. In all ordered active causes, the last thing in the order of generation and the first in the intention, is the proper effect of the first cause: thus the form of a house which is the proper effect of the builder, comes into being after the cement, stones and timber have prepared the way, which is the work of the inferior workmen who are subject to the builder. Now in every action, actual being is the chief thing intended, and is the last thing in the order of generation: because, when it is obtained, the active principle ceases to act, and the passive principle ceases to be acted upon. Therefore existence is the proper effect of the first agent, namely God: and whatever gives being, does so in so far as it acts by the power of God.

Moreover. Among the things that can be reached by the power of a secondary agent, the limit in goodness and perfection is that which comes within its range through the power of the first agent: because the secondary agent's power receives its complement from the first agent. Now the most perfect of all effects is being: since every nature and form is perfected through being actually, and is compared to actual being as a potentiality to act. Therefore existence is what secondary agents produce by the power of the first agent.

Besides. The order of effects is according to the order of causes. Now the first of all effects is being: for all others are determinations of being. Therefore being is the proper effect of the first agent, and all other agents produce it by the power of the first agent. And secondary agents which, as it were, particularize and determine the action of the first agent, produce the other perfections, as their proper effects, which are particular kinds of being.

Furthermore. That which is such by its essence, is the proper cause of that which is such by participation: thus fire is the cause of all things that are afire. Now God alone is being by His essence, while all others are beings by participation: for in God alone existence is His essence. Therefore the existence of every existing thing is His proper effect, so that whatever brings a thing into existence, does so in so far as it acts by God's power. Wherefore it is said (Wis. 1:14): God created, that all things might be: and in several passages of Holy Writ it is stated that God makes all things.—Again in De Causis it is said that not even does an intelligence give being except in so far as it is something divine, i.e. in so far as it acts by God's power.

CHAPTER LXVII

THAT IN ALL THINGS THAT OPERATE GOD IS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OPERATING

HENCE it is clear that in all things that operate God is the cause of their operating. For everyone that operates is in some way a cause of being, either of essential or of accidental being. But nothing is a cause of being except in so far as it acts by God's power. Therefore everyone that operates acts by God's power.

Again. Every operation consequent to a certain power, is ascribed to the giver of that power as effect to cause: thus the natural movement of heavy and light bodies is consequent to their form, whereby they are heavy or light, wherefore the cause of their movement is said to be that which produced them, and gave them their form. Now all power of any agent whatsoever is from God, as from the first principle of all perfection. Therefore since all operation is consequent to some power, it follows that God is the cause of every operation.

Moreover. It is clear that every action that cannot continue after the influence of a certain agent has ceased, is from that agent: thus the visibility of colours cannot continue after the action of the sun has ceased to enlighten the air; wherefore without doubt it is the cause of the visibility of colours. The same applies to violent motion, which ceases when the violence of the impelling force has ceased. Now, since God not only gave existence to things when they first began to exist, but also causes existence in them as long as they exist, by preserving them in existence, as we have proved,; so not only did He give them active forces when He first made them, but is always causing those forces in them. Consequently if the divine influence were to cease, all operation would come to an end. Therefore every operation of a thing is reducible to Him as its cause.

Besides. Whatever applies an active power to action, is said to be the cause of that action: for the craftsman, when he applies the forces of nature to an action, is said to be the cause of that action; as the cook is the cause of cooking which is done by fire. Now every application of power to action is chiefly and primarily from God. For active forces are applied to their proper operations by some movement of the body or of the soul. Now the first principle of either movement is God. For He is the first mover, wholly immovable, as we have proved above. Likewise every movement of the will whereby certain powers are applied to action, is reducible to God as the first object of appetite, and the first wilier. Therefore every operation should be ascribed to God as its first and principal agent.

Further. In all ordered active causes, the causes that follow must always act by the power of the first: thus in natural things the lower bodies act by the power of the heavenly bodies; and in voluntary things all the inferior craftsmen act in accordance with the direction of the master craftsman. Now, in the order of active causes, God is the first cause, as we proved in the First Book. Consequently all the lower active causes act by His power. Now the cause of an action is the thing by whose power it is done, more even than that which does it: even as the principal agent in comparison with the instrument. Therefore God is more the cause of every action than even secondary active causes.

Further. Every operator is directed through its operation to its ultimate end: since either the operation itself is its last end, or the thing operated, namely the effect of the operation. Now it belongs to God Himself to direct things to their end, as we have proved. Therefore we must conclude that every agent acts by the power of God: and consequently it is He who causes the actions of all things.

Hence it is said (Isa. 26:12): Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us: and (Jo. 15:5): Without Me you can do nothing: and (Philip. 2:13): It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. For this reason Holy Writ often ascribes natural effects to the divine operation: because He it is who works in every agent, natural or voluntary, as it is written in Job 10:10, 11: Hast Thou not milked me as milk, and curdled me like cheese? Thou hast clothed me with skin: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews: and again in Psalm 17:14: The Lord thundered from heaven, and the highest gave His voice: hail and coals of fire.

CHAPTER LXVIII

THAT GOD IS EVERYWHERE

FROM this it is evident that God must be everywhere and in all things.

For the mover and the thing moved must be simultaneous, as the Philosopher proves (7 Phys. ii.). Now God moves all things in their actions, as we have proved. Therefore He is in all things.

Again. Whatever is in a place, or in anything whatsoever, is, after a manner, in contact therewith: for a body is located somewhere by contact of dimensive quantity: while an incorporeal thing is said to be somewhere by contact of its power, since it lacks dimensive quantity. Accordingly an incorporeal thing stands in relation to being somewhere by its power, as a body to being somewhere by dimensive quantity. And if there were a body having infinite dimensive quantity, it would of necessity be everywhere. Consequently if there be an incorporeal thing with infinite power it must needs be everywhere. Now we proved in the First Book that God has infinite power. Therefore He is everywhere.

Besides. As an individual cause is to an individual effect, so is a universal cause to a universal effect. Now the individual cause must needs be present to its proper effect: thus fire by its substance gives out heat, and the soul by its essence gives life to the body. Since, then, God is the universal cause of all being, as we proved in the Second Book, it follows that wherever being is to be found, there also is God present.

Furthermore. If an agent be present to but one of its effects, its action cannot extend to other things except through that one, because agent and patient must be simultaneous: thus the motive power moves the various members of the body not otherwise than through the heart. Consequently if God be present to but one of His effects, such as the first movable, which is moved by Him immediately: it would follow that His action cannot extend to other things except through that first effect. But this is unreasonable. For if the action of an agent cannot extend to other things except through some first effect, the latter must correspond proportionately to the agent as regards the agent's whole power, else the agent could not use its whole power: thus we see that all the movements which the motive power is able to cause, can be performed by the heart. Now there is no creature through which can be done everything that the divine power is capable of doing: for the divine power surpasses infinitely every created thing, as we proved in the First Book. Consequently it is unreasonable to say that the divine action does not extend to other things except through some first thing. Therefore He is present, not in one only, but in all His effects.—For it would amount to the same if someone were to say that He is in some, and not in all: because no matter how many divine effects we take, they will not suffice to carry into effect the execution of the divine power.

Moreover. The active cause must needs be joined together with its proximate and immediate effect. Now in each thing there is a proximate and immediate effect of God. For we proved in the Second Book that God alone can create. Also, in each thing there is something caused by creation: in bodies, there is primary matter; in incorporeal beings there is their simple essence; as is clear from what we have said in the Second Book. Accordingly God must be present in all things at the same time: especially since those things He called into being from non-being, are continually preserved in being by him, as we have proved.

Wherefore it is said (Jer. 23:24): I fill heaven and earth; and (Ps. 138:8): If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there: if I descend into hell, Thou art present.

Hereby we refute the error of some who said that God is in a definite part of the world, for instance in the first heaven, and in the eastern portion, so that he is the principle of the heavenly movement.—Yet this statement of theirs might be upheld if rightly understood; so that the meaning be, not that God is confined to some particular part of the world, but that in the natural order, owing to the divine motion, all corporeal movement begins in one particular part. For this reason Holy Writ specially describes God as being in heaven, according to Isa. 66:1: Heaven is My throne, and Ps. 113:16: The heaven of heavens is the Lord's, etc.—However the fact that God works in the lowest bodies some thing outside the ordinary course of nature, that cannot be wrought by the power of a heavenly body, shows clearly that God is immediately present not only to the heavenly body but also to the lowest things.

But we must not think that God is everywhere as though He were distributed throughout local space, one part of Him here, another there, because He is all everywhere: since God, being utterly simple, has no parts.

Nor is He simple in the same way as a point which is the term of a continuous quantity, and consequently occupies a definite place therein; so that one point cannot be elsewhere than in one indivisible place. But God is indivisible as existing altogether outside the genus of continuous quantity. Consequently He is not necessitated by His essence to a definite place, great or small, as though He needed to be in some place: for He was from eternity before there was any place. Yet by the immensity of His power He reaches all things that are in a place, because He is the universal cause of being, as we have stated. Accordingly, He is wholly wheresoever He is. And yet again we must not think that He is in things as though He were mingled with them: for we proved in the First Book that He is neither the matter nor the form of anything. But He is in all things as active cause.

CHAPTER LXIX

CONCERNING THE OPINION OF THOSE WHO WITHDRAW FROM NATURAL THINGS THEIR PROPER ACTIONS

THIS was an occasion of error to some who thought that no creature has an active part in the production of natural effects: so that, to wit, fire would not heat, but God would cause heat at the presence of fire: and they maintained the like of all natural effects.

They endeavoured to confirm this error with arguments, by showing that no form whether substantial or accidental is brought into being except by the way of creation. Because forms and accidents cannot be made out of matter: since matter is not a part of them. Hence, if they be made, they must be made out of nothing, and this is to be created. And since creation is the act of God alone, as we proved in the Second Book, it would seem to follow that God brings into being forms both substantial and accidental.

The opinion of certain philosophers agreed in part with this position. For, seeing that whatever is not per se must result from that which is per se, it would seem that the forms of things which do not exist by themselves but in matter, result from forms that are by themselves without matter: as though forms existing in matter were participations of forms that are without matter. For this reason Plato supposed that the species of sensible things are certain separate forms, which are causes of being to these objects of sense, in so far as these partake of them.

Avicenna maintained that all substantial forms emanate from the active intelligence. But as to accidental forms he held them to be dispositions of matter, resulting from the action of lower agents disposing the matter: and in this he avoided the absurdity of the previous opinion. A sign of this apparently was that no active power can be found in these bodies except the accidental form, active and passive qualities for instance; and these would not seem capable of causing substantial forms.

Moreover in these lower things we find certain things that are not engendered from their like; animals caused through putrefaction, for instance. Wherefore apparently the forms of these are caused by higher principles. And in like manner other forms, some of which are much more perfect. Some too, find proof of this in the inadequacy of natural bodies for action. Because the form of every natural body is annexed to quantity. Now quantity is an obstacle to action and movement: a sign of which they see in the fact that the more we add to the quantity of a body, the heavier it becomes, and the slower its movement. Whence they conclude that no body is active, but that all bodies are purely passive.

They also attempt to prove this again from the fact that every patient is subject to the agent; and that every agent, save the first which creates, requires a subject inferior to itself. But no substance is inferior to a body. Therefore seemingly no body is active.

They add that the corporeal substance is the furthest removed from the first agent: wherefore they do not see how the active power can reach as far as the corporeal substance: and maintain that, as God is purely active, so the corporeal substance, being the lowest thing of all, is purely passive. For these reasons, then, Avicebron (Fons Vitæ, tract. ii., iii.) held that no body is active: but that the power of a spiritual substance pervading through bodies produces the actions which seem to be performed by bodies.

Moreover certain Moslem theologians are said to have argued that even accidents are not the result of corporeal activity, because an accident does not pass from one subject to another. Hence they deem it impossible for heat to pass from a hot body into another body so as to heat it: but that all like accidents are created by God.

However, many absurdities arise from the foregoing positions. For if no inferior cause, above all a body, is active, and if God works alone in all things; since God is not changed through working in various things, no diversity will follow among the effects through the diversity of the things in which God works. Now this is evidently false to the senses: for from the application of a hot body there follows, not cooling but only heating: and from human seed is generated a man only. Therefore the causing of inferior effects is not to be ascribed to the divine power so as to withdraw the causality of inferior agents.

Again. It is contrary to the notion of wisdom that any thing should be done in vain in the works of a wise man. But if creatures did nothing at all towards the production of effects, and God alone wrought everything immediately, other things would be employed by him in vain for the production of effects. Therefore the above position is incompatible with divine wisdom.

Besides. He who gives a principle, gives whatever results from the principle: thus the cause that gives gravity to an element, gives it downward movement. Now to make a thing actual results from being actual, as we see to be the case in God: for He is pure act, and is also the first cause of being in all things, as we proved above. If therefore He bestowed His likeness on others in respect of being, in so far as He brought things into being, it follows that He also bestowed on them His likeness in the point of acting, so that creatures too should have their proper actions.

Further. Perfection of effect indicates perfection of cause: since greater power produces a more perfect effect. Now God is the most perfect agent. Therefore things created by him must needs receive perfection from him. Consequently to detract from the creature's perfection is to detract from the perfection of the divine power. But if no creature exercises an action for the production of an effect, much is detracted from the perfection of the creature; because it is due to the abundance of its perfection, that a thing is able to communicate to another the perfection that it has. Therefore this opinion detracts from the divine power.

Moreover. Just as it belongs to the good to produce a good, so it belongs to the sovereign good to make a thing best. Now God is the sovereign good, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore it belongs to Him to make all things best. Now it is better that the good bestowed on someone should be common to many, than that it should be proper to one: since the common good is always considered more godlike than the good of one only. But the good of one becomes common to many, if it flows from the one to the other: and this can only be when the one, by its own action, communicates it to the others: and if it has not the power to transmit it to others, that good remains its own property. Accordingly God communicated His goodness to

His creatures in such wise that one thing can communicate to another the good it has received. Therefore it is derogatory to the divine goodness to deny things their proper operations.

Again. To take order away from creatures is to deny them the best thing they have: because each one is good in itself, while altogether they are very good on account of the order of the universe: for the whole is always better than the parts, and is their end. Now if we subtract action from things, the order among things is withdrawn: because, things differing in nature are not bound together in the unity of order, except through the fact that some are active and some passive. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that things have not their proper actions.

Besides. If effects be produced not by the act of creatures but only by the act of God, the power of a created cause cannot possibly be indicated by its effect: since the effect is no indication of the cause’s power, except by reason of the action which proceeds from the power and terminates in the effect. Now the nature of a cause is not known from its effect except in so far as this is an indication of its power which results from its nature. Consequently if creatures exercise no action in producing effects, it will follow that the nature of a creature can never be known from its effect: so that all knowledge of physical science would be denied us, for it is there that arguments from effects are chiefly employed.

Further. By induction it can be proved that like produces like. Now, that which is produced in lower things is not a mere form, but a composite of matter and form: because every generation is movement out of something, namely matter, and to something, namely form. Therefore the producer must be not a mere form, but composed of matter and form. Therefore the cause of forms which exist in matter is not the separate species of things, as the Platonists maintained, nor the active intellect, as Avicenna said, but an individual composed of matter and form.

Again. If action is consequent to being actual, it is unreasonable that the more perfect act be deprived of action. Now the substantial form is a more perfect act than the accidental. Consequently if the accidental forms in corporeal things have their proper actions, much more has the substantial form an operation proper to it. But this action does not consist in disposing matter, because this is effected by alteration, for which accidental forms suffice. Therefore the form of the generator is the principle of the action whereby the substantial form is introduced into the thing generated. The arguments they adduce are easily solved.

For since a thing is made that it may be, just as a form is called a being, not as though itself had being, but because by it the composite is; so neither is the form made, properly speaking, but it begins to be through the composite being brought from potentiality to the act which is the form.

Nor is it necessary that whatever has a form by way of participation, receive it from that which is a form essentially; for it may receive it immediately from something having a like form in a like manner, namely by participation, and acting by virtue of the separate form, if there be any such; and thus like agent produces like effect.

Nor does it follow, because every action of inferior bodies is effected through active or passive qualities, which are accidents, that nothing, save accidents, results from those actions: because even as those accidental forms are caused by the substantial form, which together with matter is the cause of the proper accidents, so do they act by virtue of the substantial form. Now that which acts by virtue of another produces an effect like not only to itself, but also, and more, to that by virtue of which it acts: thus the action of the instrument reproduces in the work done the likeness of the art: so that the action of accidental forms produces substantial forms, inasmuch as they act instrumentally by virtue of substantial forms. As to animals generated from putrefaction, the substantial form is caused in them through the agency of a body, the heavenly body, to wit, that is the first principle of alteration; consequently in this lower sphere whatever acts dispositively to a form, must act by virtue of that body: so that the virtue of the heavenly body suffices without an univocal agent, for the production of certain imperfect forms; whereas for the production of more perfect forms, such as the souls of the higher animals, an univocal agent is required besides the celestial agent: for such animals are not produced otherwise than by seed: hence Aristotle says that man and the sun generate man.

Again, it is untrue that quantity is an obstacle to a form’s activity except accidentally, namely in so far as all continuous quantity is in matter. Thus the form which exists in matter, through being less actual, has less active virtue: so that the body which has less matter and more form, fire, for instance, is more active.

But if we suppose the measure of action of which a form existing in matter is capable, then quantity favours an increase rather than a decrease of action: for the greater the fiery body, supposing the heat to be equally intense, the more heat does it give: and supposing an equally intense gravity, the greater a heavy body is, the more rapid will be its natural movement: and for the same reason the slower will its non-natural movement be. Accordingly the fact that heavy bodies are slower in their non-natural movements, through being of greater quantity, is no proof that quantity is an obstacle to action, but rather that it is a help to its increase.

Again it does not follow that all bodies are without action, because in the order of things, corporeal substance is of the lowest kind: since even among bodies one is higher, more formal and more active than another, as fire in comparison with lower bodies, and yet not even the lowest body is excluded from activity. For it is clear that a body cannot be wholly active, since it is composed of matter, which is potential being, and form which is act. For a thing acts according as it is actual: wherefore every body acts in respect of its form, to which the other body, the patient to wit, is compared as regards its matter, as subject, inasmuch as its matter is in potentiality to the form of the agent. If, on the other hand, the matter of the active body be in potentiality to the form of the passive body, they will be mutually active and passive, as in the case of two elementary bodies: or else, one will be purely active and the other purely passive in relation to it, as the heavenly body compared to the elementary body. Accordingly a body acts on a subject not by reason of its entirety, but by reason of the form by which it works.

Nor is it true that bodies are furthest removed from, God. For as God is pure act, things are more or less distant from Him according as they are more or less in act or potentiality. And that of all things is furthest distant from God, which is pure potentiality, namely primary matter, which is therefore purely passive and nowise active. On the other hand, bodies, being composed of matter and form, approach to a likeness to God, inasmuch as they have a form, which Aristotle (1 Phys. ix.) calls a divine thing: wherefore they act inasmuch as they have a form; and are passive, inasmuch as they have matter.

Again, it is absurd to say that a body is not active because accidents do not pass from one subject to another. For when we say that a hot body gives heat, we do not mean that the identical heat which is in the heater passes into the heated body: but that by virtue of the heat in the heater, another heat, individually distinct, becomes actual in the heated body, having been potentially therein before. Because the natural agent does not transmit its own form into another subject, but reduces the passive subject from potentiality to act. Consequently we do not deny creatures their proper actions, although we ascribe all the effects of creatures to God, as operating in all.

CHAPTER LXX

HOW THE SAME EFFECT IS FROM GOD AND FROM THE NATURAL AGENT

SOME find it difficult to understand how natural effects are ascribed to God and to the activity of nature. For it would seem impossible that one action should proceed from two agents: hence if the action productive of a natural effect proceeds from a natural body, it does not proceed from God.

Again. If a thing can be done sufficiently by means of one, it is superfluous to do it by means of several: for we observe that nature does not employ two instruments where one suffices. Since, then, the divine power suffices to produce natural effects, it is superfluous to employ for the production of the same effects, the powers of nature also: or if the forces of nature suffice, it is superfluous for the divine power to work for the same effect.

Besides. If God produces the whole natural effect, nothing of the effect is left for the natural agent to produce. Therefore, seemingly, it is impossible that God produce the same effects as natural things.

However these arguments offer no difficulty if we mind what has been said already. For two things may be considered in every agent: namely the thing itself that acts, and the power whereby it acts: thus fire by its heat makes a thing hot. Now the power of the lower agent depends on the power of the higher agent, in so far as the higher agent gives the lower agent the power whereby it acts, or preserves that power, or applies it to action: thus the craftsman applies the instrument to its proper effect, although sometimes he does not give the instrument the form whereby it acts, nor preserves that form, but merely puts it into motion. Consequently the action of the lower agent must not only proceed from it through the latter’s proper power, but also through the power of all the higher agents: for it acts by virtue of them all: and just as the lowest agent is found to be immediately active, so the power of the first agent is found to be immediate in the production of the effect: because the power of the lowest agent does not of itself produce this effect, but by the power of the proximate higher agent, and this by the power of a yet higher agent, so that the power of the supreme agent is found to produce the effects of itself, as though it were the immediate cause, as may be seen in the principles of demonstration, the first of which is immediate. Accordingly just as it is not unreasonable that one action be produced by an agent and by the virtue of that agent, so is it not absurd that the same effect be produced by the inferior agent and by God, and by both immediately, though in a different way.

It is also evident that there is nothing superfluous if nature produce its proper effect and God produce it also, since nature does not produce it except by God’s power.

Nor is it superfluous, if God can produce all natural effects by Himself, that they should be produced by certain other causes: because this is not owing to insufficiency of His power, but to the immensity of His goodness, wherefore it was His will to communicate His likeness to things not only in the point of their being but also in the point of their being causes of other things: for it is in these two ways that all creatures in common have the divine likeness bestowed on them, as we proved above.—In this way too the beauty of order is made evident in creatures.

It is, also, clear that the same effect is ascribed to a natural cause and to God, not as though part were effected by God and part by the natural agent: but the whole effect proceeds from each, yet in different ways: just as the whole of the one same effect is ascribed to the instrument, and again the whole is ascribed to the principal agent.

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE EVIL FROM THINGS

FROM the foregoing it is also clear that divine providence, which governs things, does not prevent corruption, defects and evil from being in the world. For the divine government whereby God works among things, does not exclude the operation of second causes, as we have already shown. Now, a fault may occur in an effect through a fault in the secondary active cause, without there being any fault in the first agent: thus there may be a fault in the work of a craftsman who is perfect in his craft, on account of some defect in the instrument: even so, a man with strong motive power may limp, through no fault in the motive power, but because his leg is not straight. Accordingly in the things moved and governed by God, defect and evil may be found on account of defects in the secondary agents, although there is no defect in God.

Moreover. Perfect goodness would not be found in things, unless there were degrees of goodness, so that, to wit, there be some things better than others: else all the possible degrees of goodness would not be fulfilled, nor would any creature be found like to God in the point of being better than others. Moreover this would do away with the chief beauty in things if the order resulting from distinction and disparity were abolished; and what is more, the absence of inequality in goodness would involve the absence of multitude, since it is by reason of things differing from one another that one is better than another: for instance, the animate than the inanimate, and the rational than the irrational. Consequently if there were absolute equality among things there would be but one created good, which is clearly derogatory to the goodness of the creature. Now the higher degree of goodness is that a thing be good and unable to fail from goodness; and the lower degree is of that which can fail from goodness. Wherefore the perfection of the universe requires both degrees of goodness. Now it belongs to the providence of the governor to preserve and not to diminish perfection in the things governed. Therefore it does not belong to the providence of God entirely to exclude from things the possibility of failing from goodness. But evil results from this possibility: because that which can fail, at times does fail; and this very deficiency of the good is evil, as we have proved. Therefore it does not belong to the divine providence to ward off evil entirely from things.

Again. In every government the best thing is that provision be made for the things governed, according to their mode: for in this consists the justice of the régime. Consequently even as it would be contrary to the right notion of human rule, if the governor of a state were to forbid men to act according to their various duties,—except perhaps for the time being, on account of some particular urgency,—so would it be contrary to the notion of God's government, if He did not allow creatures to act in accordance with their respective natures. Now through creatures acting thus, corruption and evil result in things; since by reason of the contrariety and incompatibility that exist in things, one thing is corruptive of another. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from things altogether.

Besides. An agent cannot possibly produce an evil, except by reason of its intending some good, as we proved above. Now it does not belong to the providence of one who is the cause of all good, to exclude from creatures all intention of any particular good: for thus many goods would be banished from the universe: thus if fire were deprived of the intention of producing its like, a consequence of which is this evil, namely the burning of combustible things; the good consisting in fire being generated and preserved in its species would be done away. Therefore it is not part of divine providence to exclude evil altogether from things.

Further. There are in the world many good things which would have no place unless there were evils: thus there would be no patience of the righteous, if there were no ill-will of the persecutors; nor would there be any place for vindictive justice, were there no crimes; even in the physical order there would be no generation of one thing, unless there were corruption of another. Consequently if evil were entirely excluded from the universe by divine providence, it would be necessary to lessen the great number of good things. This ought not to be, since good is more powerful in goodness, than evil is in malice, as was shown above. Therefore evil should not be utterly excluded from things by divine providence.

Again. The good of the whole is of more account than the good of the part. Therefore it belongs to a prudent governor to overlook a lack of goodness in a part, that there may be an increase of goodness in the whole: thus the builder hides the foundation of a house underground, that the whole house may stand firm. Now if evil were taken away from certain parts of the universe, the perfection of the universe would be much diminished; since its beauty results from the ordered unity of good and evil things, seeing that evil arises from the lack of good, and yet certain goods are occasioned from those very evils through the providence of the governor, even as the silent pause gives sweetness to the chant. Therefore evil should not be excluded from things by divine providence.

Further. Other things, especially those of lower degree, are directed to man's good as their end. But if there were no evils in the world, man's good would be lessened considerably, both in his knowledge, and in his desire or love of the good. For his knowledge of the good is increased by comparison with evil, and through suffering evil his desire of doing good is kindled: thus the sick know best what a great good health is; and they, too, are more keen about it than those who have it. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude evil from the world altogether.

Hence it is said (Isa. 45:7): I make peace and create evil: and (Amos 3:6): Shall there be evil in the city, which the Lord hath not done?

Hereby we refute the error of those who through observing the presence of evil in the world, said that there is no God. Thus Boethius (1. de Consol.) introduces a philosopher who asks: If there be a God, whence comes evil? On the contrary, he should have argued: If there is evil, there is a God. For there would be no evil, if the order of good were removed, the privation of which is evil: and there would be no such order, if there were no God.

Moreover by what has been laid down, an occasion of erring is removed from those who denied that divine providence extends to this corruptible world, because they observed that many evils occur in it. They said that incorruptible things alone are subject to God’s providence, because no defects and no evils are to be found in them.

Also we remove an occasion of error from the Manicheans, who posited two first active principles, good and evil, as though evil could have no place in the providence of a good God.

Also the doubt is solved of some, namely whether evil deeds are from God. For since we proved that every agent produces its action in so far as it acts by the power of God, and that therefore God is the cause of all effects and actions: and since again we proved that evil and defect in things ruled by divine providence, result from the condition of the secondary causes, which may be themselves defective, it is evident that evil deeds, considered as defective, are not from God, but from their defective proximate causes: but in so far as they possess activity and entity, they must be from God: even as a limp is from the motive power, in so far as it has movement; but in so far as it has a defect, it is from the crookedness of the leg.

CHAPTER LXXII

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CONTINGENCY FROM THINGS

JUST as divine providence does not altogether banish evil from the world, so neither does it exclude contingency, nor impose necessity on things.

For we have already proved that the operation of providence, whereby God operates in the world, does not exclude secondary causes, but is fulfilled by them inasmuch as they act by God's power. Now certain effects are said to be necessary or contingent, in relation to their proximate, not to their remote cause: thus for a plant to bear fruit is a contingent effect, on account of the proximate cause, which is the power of germination that can be hindered and fail, although a remote cause, namely the sun, is a cause that acts of necessity. Since, then, among proximate causes there are many that can fail, not all the effects subject to divine providence will be necessary, but many of them will be contingent.

Again. It belongs to divine providence that the possible degrees of being be fulfilled, as was made evident above. Now being is divided into contingent and necessary: and this is a per se division of being. Therefore, if divine providence excluded all contingency, not all the degrees of being would be preserved.

Besides. The nearer things are to God the more they partake in a likeness to Him: and the further they are from Him the more they fail in their likeness to Him. Now those things that are nearest to God are altogether immovable; these are separate substances who approach nearest to a likeness to God who is utterly immovable; while those that are nearest to them and are immediately moved by those that are unchangeable, retain a certain degree of immobility in that they are always moved in the same way, for instance the heavenly bodies. Consequently those that come after the foregoing, and are moved by them, are further removed from the divine immobility, so that, to wit, they are not always moved in the same way: and in this the beauty of order is evident. But every necessary thing, as such, never varies. Therefore it would be incompatible with divine providence, to whom it belongs to establish and preserve order among things, if all things happened of necessity.

Moreover. That which is of necessity, is always. Now nothing corruptible is always. Wherefore if divine providence requires all things to be necessary, it would follow that nothing in the world is corruptible, and consequently nothing could be generated. Hence the whole range of things subject to generation and corruption would be withdrawn from the world: and this would be derogatory to the perfection of the universe.

Further. In every movement there is generation and corruption of a kind: since in a thing that is moved, something begins, and another ceases to be. Consequently if all generation and corruption were banished, through the withdrawal of all things contingent, as we have just proved, in consequence all movement and all movable things would be taken away.

Besides. If the power of a substance be weakened, or if it be hindered by a contrary agent, this argues some change in that power. Consequently if divine providence does not banish movement from things, it will prevent neither the weakening of their power nor the impediment arising from the resistance of another agent. Now it is because that power is sometimes weakened and hindered that nature does not work always in the same way, but sometimes fails in that which is competent to a thing according to its nature, so that natural effects do not follow of necessity. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to impose necessity on the things governed.

Moreover. In things that are duly ruled by providence, there should be nothing vain. Since therefore it is evident that some causes are contingent, seeing that they can be hindered from producing their effects, it is clearly inconsistent with providence that all things should occur of necessity. Therefore divine providence does not impose necessity on things, by excluding contingency from them altogether.

CHAPTER LXXIII

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE FREE WILL

WHEREFORE it is clear that providence does not exclude free will.

For the government of any prudent governor is directed to the perfection of the things governed, as regards its attainment, increase or preservation. Therefore whatever pertains to perfection is to be safeguarded by providence rather than what savours of imperfection and defect. Now in inanimate beings, the contingency of causes arises from imperfection and deficiency: because by their nature they are determined to one effect, which they always produce, unless there be an impediment due either to weakness of power, or some extrinsic agency, or indisposition of matter. For this reason natural causes are not indifferent to one or other result, but more often produce their effect in the same way, and seldom fail. On the other hand it is owing to the perfection of the will that it is a contingent cause, because its power is not confined to one effect, and it is in its power to produce this effect or that, so that it is indifferent to either. Therefore it belongs to divine providence to preserve the freedom of the will, more than contingency in natural causes.

Moreover. It belongs to divine providence to use things according to their mode. And the mode of a thing’s action is in keeping with its form which is the principle of action. Now the form through which a voluntary agent acts is not determinate: because the will acts through a form apprehended by the intellect, since the apprehended good moves the will objectively; and the intellect has not one determinate form of the effect, but is of such a nature as to understand a multitude of forms; so that the will is able to produce manifold effects. Therefore it does not belong to divine providence to exclude freedom of the will.

Again. The things governed are brought to a becoming end by the government of providence: wherefore Gregory of Nyssa says of divine providence that it is God’s will from which all existing things receive a fitting end. Now the last end of every creature is to attain to God’s likeness, as we proved above. It would therefore be inconsistent with divine providence if any thing were deprived of that whereby it attains to a likeness to God. But the voluntary agent attains to God’s likeness in that he acts freely: for we have proved that there is free will in God. Therefore providence does not deprive the will of liberty.

Besides. Providence multiplies good things among the subjects of its government. Therefore any thing that would deprive things of many good things does not belong to providence. Now if the will were deprived of freedom, many good things would be done away: for no praise would be given to human virtue; since virtue would be of no account if man acted not freely: there would be no justice in rewarding or punishing, if man were not free in acting well or ill: and there would be no prudence in taking advice, which would be of no use if things occurred of necessity. Therefore it would be inconsistent with providence to deprive the will of liberty.

Hence it is said (Ecclus. 15:14): God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel; and again (ibid., 18): Before man is life and death, good and evil, that which he shall choose shall be given him.

Hereby we refute the opinion of the Stoics who held that all things happen of necessity according to the order of infallible causes, which order the Greeks called εἱμαρμένη.

CHAPTER LXXIV

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE CHANCE OR LUCK

IT is also evident from what has been said that divine providence does not remove from the world chance and luck.

Chance and luck are said of things that happen seldom. If nothing happened seldom, all things would happen of necessity; because those things that happen more frequently than not, differ from necessary things in this alone, that they may possibly fail in a few instances. Now it would be inconsistent with divine providence if all things happened of necessity, as we proved above. Therefore it would also be inconsistent with divine providence if there were no luck or chance in the world.

Again. It would be contrary to the nature of providence if things subject to providence were not to act for an end, since it is the part of providence to direct all things to their end: and again it would be contrary to the perfection of the universe, were there nothing corruptible, nor any defectible power, as we proved above. Now it is owing to the fact that an agent acting for the sake of some end fails to attain that end, that certain things happen by chance. Therefore it would be contrary to the nature of providence, and to the perfection of the world, if nothing happened by chance.

Besides. The number and variety of causes result from the ordering of divine providence and disposition. Now given a diversity of causes, it must happen sometimes that one concurs with another, so that one is either hindered or assisted in producing its effect. Now chance occurrences are due to the concurrence of two or more causes, through some end which was not intended ensuing from the concurrence of some cause: for instance, the finding of his debtor by one who went to market to buy something, resulted from the debtor also going to market. Therefore it is not incompatible with divine providence that there be luck and chance in things.

Moreover. That which is not, cannot be the cause of any thing, wherefore a thing must stand in relation to being a cause, in the same way as to being. Wherefore the diversity of order in causes must be in keeping with diversity of order among things. Now it belongs to the perfection of things that not only there be some that are beings per se, but that there be also some accidental beings. Because things which have not their ultimate perfection in their substance, must needs acquire some perfection by means of accidents, which accidents will be all the more numerous, as the things themselves are more distant from God’s simplicity. Now if a subject has many accidents it follows that it is a being accidentally: since subject and accident, or again two accidents in one subject, are one accidentally, for instance a white man, and a musical white thing. Therefore the perfection of the world requires that there should be also accidental causes. But that which results accidentally from a cause, is said to occur by chance or by luck. Therefore it is not inconsistent with providence that certain things happen by chance or luck.

Further. It belongs to the order of divine providence that there be order and degrees among causes. The higher a cause is above its effect, the greater its power, so that its causality extends to a greater number of things. But the intention of a natural cause never extends further than its power: for such an intention would be in vain. Consequently the intention of an individual cause cannot possibly extend to all possible contingencies. Now it is through things happening beside the intention of the agent that things occur by chance or luck. Therefore the order of divine providence requires the presence of luck and chance in the world.

Hence it is said (Eccles. 9:11): I saw that … the race is not to the swift, etc., but time and chance in all, namely here below.

CHAPTER LXXV

THAT DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CONCERNED WITH SINGULAR CONTINGENCIES

FROM what we have proved it is evident that divine providence reaches to each individual among things subject to generation and corruption.

For apparently the only reason for excluding such things from providence would be their contingent nature, and the fact that many of them are chance or lucky occurrences: since in this alone do they differ from incorruptibles and from the universals of corruptible things, with which it is said that providence is concerned. Now providence is not inconsistent with contingency, chance and luck, as neither is it with voluntary action, as we have proved. There is no reason therefore why providence should not be about such things, even as it is about incorruptibles and universals.

Besides. If God's providence does not extend to these singular things, this is either because He knows them not, or because He is unable or unwilling to care for them. But it cannot be said that God does not know singulars, since we have proved that He has knowledge of them. Nor can it be said that God is unable to care for them, since His power is infinite, as we proved above: nor that these singulars are incapable of being governed; since we see them to be governed by the purposeful activity of reason, as evidenced in man, or by natural instinct, as evidenced in bees and many dumb animals, which are governed by a kind of natural instinct. Nor can it be said that God is unwilling to govern them: since His will is the universal cause of all good: and the good of things governed consists chiefly in the order of government. Therefore it cannot be said that God has no care for these singulars.

Besides. Every secondary cause, by the mere fact of its being a cause, attains to a likeness to God, as was proved above. It is to be universally observed that things which are productive, have the care of the things they produce, thus animals naturally nourish their offspring. Therefore God has care of the things whereof He is the cause. Now He is the cause even of these singulars, as was proved above. Therefore He has care of them.

Further. It was proved above that God acts on created things, not from natural necessity, but by His will and intellect. Now things that are done by will and intellect are subject to providence, which apparently consists in ruling things by the intellect. Consequently the things done by God are subject to His providence. But it has been proved that God works in all second causes, and that all effects of things are to be referred to God as their cause: so that whatever is done in these individuals is His own work. Consequently these individual things, their movements and operations, are subject to divine providence.

Again. A man's providence is foolish if he cares not for those things without which the things he cares for cannot be. Now it is clear that if all individuals ceased to exist, their universals would likewise cease. Wherefore if God cares only for universals, and neglects these individuals altogether, His providence will be foolish and imperfect.—If, however, someone say that God cares for these individuals so far as to preserve them in existence, but no further; this is quite impossible: since whatever else happens in regard to individuals concerns their preservation or corruption. Consequently, if God cares for individuals as to their preservation, he cares also for whatever happens to them.—Yet someone might say that the mere care of universals suffices for the preservation of individuals in existence; since each species is provided with the means of self-preservation for each individual of that species: thus animals were given organs for taking and digesting food, and horns for self-protection: and the use of these organs does not fail except in the minority, since that which is of nature produces its effect either always or more frequently; so that all the individuals could not cease to exist, although some might. But, according to this way of reasoning, whatever happens to individuals will be subject to providence, even as their preservation in being: because nothing can happen to the individual member of a species, that cannot in some way be referred to the principles of that species. Accordingly individuals are not subject to divine providence as to their preservation in existence, more than in other matters.

Moreover. The order of things in relation to the end is such that accidents are for the sake of substances, in order that the latter may be perfected by them. And in substances matter is for the sake of the form; since it is through the form that matter has a participation in the divine goodness, for the sake of which all things were made, as we proved above. Hence it is evident that the individual is for the sake of the universal nature: in sign of which where the universal nature can be preserved in one individual, there are not many individuals of one species, as exemplified in the moon and sun. Now since providence has the ordering of things to their end, it follows that to providence belong both the ends and things directed to the end. Therefore not only universals but also individuals are subject to divine providence.

Again. The difference between speculative and practical knowledge is that speculative knowledge and things connected with it are perfected in the universal, whereas things pertaining to practical knowledge are perfected in the particular: because the end of speculative knowledge is truth which consists first and of its very nature in immaterial and universal things: whereas the end of practical knowledge is operation which is about individual things: hence the physician does not heal a man in general, but this particular man, and the whole of medical science is directed to this. Now it is clear that providence belongs to practical knowledge, since it directs things to their end. Therefore God’s providence would be imperfect, if it extended no further than universals and reached not the individual.

Besides. Speculative knowledge is perfected in the universal rather than in the particular, because universals are known better than individuals: wherefore the knowledge of the most universal principles is common to all. Yet the more perfect in speculative knowledge is he who possesses not only universal but also proper knowledge of things; since he who knows a thing merely in general, knows it only potentially: for which reason the disciple is led from the general knowledge of principles to the proper knowledge of conclusions, by the master who is possessed of both knowledges, just as a thing is brought from potentiality to act by that which is in act. A fortiori therefore the more perfect in practical knowledge is he who directs things to act not only in general but also in particular. Consequently divine providence, being supremely perfect, extends to individuals.

Moreover. Since God is the cause of being as such, as we proved above, it follows that His providence must care for being as such; since He governs things inasmuch as He is their cause. Therefore whatever exists, no matter in what way it exists, is subject to His providence. Now individuals are beings, and more so than universals: because universals do not exist by themselves, but only in individuals. Therefore divine providence is concerned about individuals also.

Further. Creatures are subject to divine providence, as being directed thereby to their end, which is the divine goodness. Therefore participation in the divine goodness by creatures is the work of divine providence. But even contingent singulars participate in the divine goodness. Therefore divine providence must extend to them also.

Hence it is said (Matth. 10:29): Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing: and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father, etc., and (Wis. 8:1): She reacheth … from end to end mightily, that is from the highest creatures to the lowest. Moreover (Ezech. 9:9) the opinion is refuted of some who said: The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not, and (Job 22:14) of those who asserted: He doth not consider our things, and He walketh about the poles of heaven.

Hereby is refuted the opinion of some who maintained that divine providence does not extend to these individual things: an opinion ascribed by some to Aristotle, although it cannot be gathered from his words.

CHAPTER LXXVI

THAT GOD’S PROVIDENCE CARES FOR ALL INDIVIDUALS IMMEDIATELY

NOW some have granted that divine providence reaches these individual things, but through certain intermediary causes. For Plato, according to Gregory of Nyssa, posited a threefold providence. The first is that of the supreme god, who cares first and foremost for his own, i.e. spiritual and intellectual beings, and consequently for the whole world, as regards genera, species, and the universal causes, i.e. the heavenly bodies. The second consists in the care of individual animals and plants and other things subject to generation and corruption, in the matter of their generation, corruption and other changes. This providence Plato ascribed to the gods who wander about heaven; while Aristotle ascribes the causality of such things to the oblique circle. The third providence he places over things concerning human life: and he ascribes it to certain demons who dwell in the neighbourhood of the earth and, according to him, are in charge of human actions. Yet, according to Plato, the second and third providence depend on the first, because the supreme god appointed those of the second and third class as governors.

This opinion accords with the Catholic Faith, in so far as it refers universal providence to God as its first author. But it would seem contrary to the Faith in that it denies that every individual thing is immediately subject to divine providence. This may be proved from what has been already laid down.

For God has immediate knowledge of individuals, as knowing them not merely in their causes, but also in themselves, as we proved in the First Book. Now it would seem unreasonable if, knowing individuals, He did not desire their order, wherein the chief good of things consists, since His will is the source of all goodness. Consequently even as He knows individuals immediately, so does He establish order among them immediately.

Again. The order established by providence in the things governed, is derived from the order conceived in the mind of the governor: even as the art-form that is produced in matter is derived from that which is in the mind of the craftsman. Now where there are several in charge, one subordinate to another, the higher must deliver to the inferior the order he has conceived, just as a subordinate art receives its principles from the higher. Accordingly supposing the governors of the second and third rank to be under the chief governor who is the supreme God, it follows that they must receive from the supreme God the order to be established among things. But this order cannot be more perfect in them than in the supreme God: in fact all perfections proceed from Him into other things in descending order, as we proved above. And the order of things must be in the governors of the second rank, not only in general, but also as to the individual: else they would be unable to establish order in individuals by their providence. Much more therefore is the order of individuals under the control of divine providence.

Besides. In things ruled by human providence it is to be observed that someone is placed at the head, who has charge of general matters of great importance, and by himself devises what arrangements to make with regard to them: while he himself does not trouble about the order of minor affairs, but leaves this to others lower than himself. And this is owing to a defect on his part, inasmuch as he ignores the conditions of particular matters of less importance, or is himself incompetent to decide the order of every thing, on account of the labour and delay required for the purpose. But such defects are far removed from God: for He knows all individual things, nor does He require labour or time in order to understand them; since by understanding Himself, He knows all other things, as we proved above. Therefore He Himself devises the order of all individuals: and His providence is concerned about all individuals immediately.

Moreover. In human affairs the inferior officials by their own skill devise the ordering of the things subjected to their government by the chief governor: which skill they do not receive from the chief, nor its use: for if they received it from the chief, the ordering would be done by the superior, and they would no longer be devisers of this ordering but executors. Now, from what has been said it is clear that all wisdom and understanding is caused in every intellect by the supreme God: nor can any intellect understand except by God’s power, even as neither does any agent act except in so far as it acts by God’s power. Therefore God Himself cares for all things immediately by His providence: and whoever is said to govern under Him, is the executor of His providence.

Further. The higher providence gives rules to the lower providence: even as the politician gives rules and laws to the commander in chief; who gives rules and laws to the captains and generals. Consequently if there be other providences subordinate to the highest providence of the supreme God: it follows that God gives the second and third governors the rules of their office. Either, therefore, He gives general rules and laws or particular.—If He gives them general rules, since general rules are not always applicable to particular cases, especially in matters that are subject to movement and change, it would be necessary for these governors of the second or third rank to go beyond the rules given them in deciding about matters confided to their care. Consequently they would exercise judgement on the rules given to them, as to when to act according to them, and when it would be necessary to disregard them: which is impossible, because such a judgement belongs to the superior, since the interpretation of laws and dispensation from their observance belong to Him who made the law. Accordingly judgement concerning general rules that have been given must be pronounced by the governor in chief: and this would not be possible unless he concerned himself immediately with the ordering of individuals. Therefore, on this supposition, he should be the immediate governor of such things.—If, on the other hand, the governors of the second or third rank receive particular rules and laws from the supreme governor, it is clear that then the ordering of these individual matters comes immediately from divine providence.

Moreover. The higher governor always has the right to judge of the arrangements made by the lower governors, whether they be fitting or not. Consequently if the second or third governors are subordinate to God the chief governor: it follows that God judges of the arrangements made by them: which would be impossible if God considered not the ordering of these individual matters. Therefore He personally cares for individuals by Himself.

Again. If God does not care for these lower individuals immediately by Himself; this is either because He despises them or, as some say, lest His dignity should be besmirched by them. But this is unreasonable. For there is more dignity in providing for and planning the ordering of things, than operating in them. Consequently if God works in all things, as was proved above, and this far from being derogatory to His dignity, on the contrary, belongs to His all pervading and supreme power, it is nowise contemptible in Him, nor does it besmirch His dignity, if His providence extends to these individual things immediately.

Further. Every wise man who uses his power providently, moderates that use in his actions, by directing the purpose and extent of that use: else his power would not be obsequious to his wisdom. Now it is clear from what has been said that divine providence, in its operations, extends to the lowest things. Consequently divine providence directs which and how many effects are to result from its power, and how they are to result therefrom, even in the very lowest of things. Therefore God Himself by His providence, immediately plans the ordering of all things.

Hence it is said (Rom. 13:1): Those that are, are ordained of God, and (Judith 9:4): Thou hast done the things of old, and hast devised one thing after another, and what thou hast designed hath been done.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT THE EXECUTION OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE IS CARRIED OUT BY SECONDARY CAUSES

IT must be observed that two things are required for providence, the order and the execution of the order. The first is the work of the cognitive power, wherefore those that are more perfect in knowledge, are said to order others: for it belongs to the wise man to order. The second is the work of the operative power. Now these two are in inverse proportion to each other. For the ordering is the more perfect according as it extends to the smallest things: whereas the execution of the least things belongs to the lower power proportionate to the effect. In God we find the highest perfection as to both: since in Him is the most perfect wisdom in ordering, and the most perfect power for operation. Consequently, He it is who by His wisdom disposes all things even the very least in their order; and who executes the least or lowest things by means of other inferior powers, through which He operates, as a universal and higher power through an inferior and particular power. It is fitting therefore that there should be inferior active powers to execute divine providence.

Again. It was proved above that the divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes. And whatever is effected by the operations of secondary causes, is subject to divine providence, since God directs all individual things by Himself, as was proved above. Therefore secondary causes execute divine providence.

Besides. The stronger the power of an agent, the further does its operation extend: thus the greater the fire, the more distant things does it heat. But this is not the case with an agent that does not act through an intermediary, because everything on which it acts is close to it. Since then the power of divine providence is supreme, it must bring its operation to bear on the most distant things through certain intermediaries.

Further. It belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and various executors of his rule: because the greater the number of his subordinates of various degrees, the more complete and extensive is his dominion shown to be. But no government can compare with the divine in point of dignity. Therefore it is fitting that the execution of divine providence be committed to agents of various degrees.

Moreover. Suitable order is a proof of perfect providence, for order is the proper effect of providence. Now suitable order implies that nothing be allowed to be out of order. Consequently the perfection of divine providence requires that it should reduce the excess of certain things over others, to a suitable order. And this is done by allowing those who have less to benefit from the superabundance of others. Since then the perfection of the universe requires that some share more abundantly in the divine goodness, as we proved above, the perfection of divine providence demands that the execution of the divine government be fulfilled by those things which have the larger share of divine goodness.

Again. The order of causes excels the order of effects even as the cause excels the effect: consequently it is a greater proof of the perfection of providence. Now if there were no intermediary causes to execute divine providence, there would be no order of causes in the world, but of effects only. Therefore the perfection of divine providence requires intermediary causes for its fulfilment. Hence it is written (Ps. 102:21): Bless the Lord, all ye His hosts: you ministers of His who do His will; and (Ps. 148:8): Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil His word.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THAT BY MEANS OF INTELLECTUAL CREATURES OTHER CREATURES ARE RULED BY GOD

SINCE it belongs to divine providence that order be preserved in the world; and suitable order consists in a proportionate descent from the highest to the lowest, it is meet that divine providence should reach the most distant things according to a certain proportion. This proportion consists in this,—that just as the highest creatures are subject to God and governed by Him, so the lower creatures are subject to and governed by the higher. Now of all creatures the highest is the intellectual, as was proved above. Therefore the very nature of divine providence demands that the remaining creatures be ruled by rational creatures.

Again. Whatever creature executes the order of divine providence, does so in so far as it has a share of the power of the supreme providence: even as the instrument has no movement except in so far as through being moved it has a share in the power of the principal agent. Accordingly those things which have the larger share of the power of divine providence, are the executors of divine providence in regard to those whose share is smaller. Now intellectual creatures have a greater share thereof than others: because, while providence requires disposition of order which is effected by the cognitive faculty, and execution which is the work of the operative power, rational creatures have a share of both powers, whereas other creatures have only the latter. Therefore all other creatures are ruled, under divine providence, by rational creatures.

Moreover. To whomsoever God gives a power: it is given in relation to the effect of that power: for then are all things disposed of in the best way, when each one is directed to all the goods that it has a natural aptitude to produce. Now the intellective power by its very nature is a directive and governing faculty: hence we see that when they are united in the one subject, the operative power follows the ruling of the intellective power: as in man the limb moves at the will’s command. The same may be seen also, if they be in different subjects: since those men who excel in the operative power, need to be directed by those who excel in the intellective faculty. Therefore the nature of divine providence requires that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures.

Again. Particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers, as may be seen both in art and in nature. Now it is evident that the intellective power is more universal than any other operative power: because it contains universal forms, whereas all operative powers proceed only from a form proper to the operator. Therefore all other creatures must needs be moved and ruled by intellectual powers.

Moreover. In all ordered powers, that one is directive of another, which has the better knowledge about the plan to be followed: thus we may observe in the arts, that the art which is concerned with the end, whence is taken the entire scheme of the work to be produced, directs and governs the art that is immediately productive of that work: for instance the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding; and the art which gives the form, governs the art which prepares the material: whereas the instruments, through having no knowledge of the scheme, are governed only. Since then intellectual creatures alone are able to know the scheme of the ordering of creatures, it belongs to them to rule and govern all other creatures.

Further. That which is per se, is the cause of that which is by another. Now intellectual creatures alone operate per se, since they are masters of their own actions through having free will: whereas other creatures operate through natural necessity, as being moved by another, Therefore intellectual creatures by their operations move and rule other creatures.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT THE LOWER INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCES ARE RULED BY THE HIGHER

FORASMUCH as some intellectual creatures are higher than others, as we have shown; the lower intellectual nature must needs be governed by the higher.

Again. The more universal powers move the particular powers, as already stated. And the higher intellectual natures have more universal forms, as we have proved. Therefore they rule the lower intellectual natures.

Besides. The intellective faculty that is nearer to the principle is always found to be the ruler of the intellectual faculty that is more distant from the principle: this is evident both in speculative and in practical science. For the speculative science that receives its principles of demonstration from another, is said to be subalternate to it, and the practical science that is nearer to the end, which is the principle in practical matters, is the master science in comparison with the more distant. Since then some intellectual substances are nearer to the first principle, namely God, as we have shown, they will be the rulers of the others.

Moreover. The higher intellectual substances receive the influence of divine wisdom more perfectly, since each one receives something according to its mode. Now all things are governed by divine wisdom, so that those which have the greater share of divine wisdom, govern those which have the smaller share. Therefore the lower intellectual substances are governed by the higher.

Wherefore the higher spirits are called both angels, inasmuch as they direct the lower spirits, by message as it were, for angels are called messengers; and ministers, forasmuch as by their operation they execute, even in corporeal things, the order of divine providence: because a minister is like an animate instrument according to the Philosopher. This is what is said (Ps. 103:4): Who makest thy angels spirits: and thy ministers a burning fire.

CHAPTER LXXX

OF THE ORDER BETWEEN ONE ANGEL AND ANOTHER

SINCE corporeal things are governed by spiritual, as we have proved, and since there is order of a kind among corporeal things, it follows that the higher bodies are governed by the higher intellectual substances, and the lower bodies by the lower intellectual substances. And seeing that the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power; while the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body; the higher intellectual substances have powers entirely independent of any corporeal power, and consequently they are not united to bodies; whereas the lower intellectual substances have powers confined to certain limits and dependent on certain corporeal organs for their exercise, and consequently they need to be united to bodies. And just as the higher intellectual substances have a more universal power, so too they receive from God more perfectly the divine disposal of things, in that they are acquainted with the scheme of order, even as regards individuals, through receiving it from God. This manifestation of the divine governance, made by God, reaches to the uttermost intellectual substances: thus it is said (Job 25:3): Is there any numbering of his soldiers? and upon whom shall not his light arise? On the other hand the lower intelligences do not receive this manifestation so perfectly, as to be able to know thereby every detail of the order of divine providence left to their execution, but only in a general way: and the lower their position, the less detailed knowledge of the divine government do they receive through this first manifestation received from above; so much so that the human intellect, which is the lowest in point of natural knowledge, has a knowledge of only certain most general things. Accordingly the higher intellectual substances receive immediately from God the perfection of the knowledge in question; which perfection the other lower intellectual substances need to receive through them: just as we have said above that the general knowledge of the disciple is brought to perfection by means of the specific knowledge of the master. Hence it is that Dionysius speaking of the highest intellectual substances which he assigns to the first hierarchy or holy sovereignty, says that they are not sanctified by means of other substances, but that they are placed by God Himself immediately around Him, and as far as possible close to His immaterial and incomprehensible beauty on which they gaze, and in which they contemplate the intelligible concept of His works: and by these, he says, the inferior ranks of heavenly substances are instructed.

Accordingly the higher intelligences receive their perfection from a higher source of knowledge. Now in every disposition of providence, the order of effects is derived from the form of agents: since the effect must needs proceed from its cause in some kind of likeness. Now it is for the sake of an end that the cause communicates the likeness of its form to the effect. Hence the first principle in the dispositions of providence is the end; the second is the form of the agent; the third is the appointment of the order of effects. Consequently in the order of the intellect the highest degree is the consideration of the idea of order, in the end; the second degree is the same consideration, in the form; while the third is the knowledge of the disposition of order in itself and not in a higher principle. Wherefore the art which considers the end governs the art which considers the form, as the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding. And the art which considers the form governs the art which considers only the order of movements which prepare the way for the form, as the art of shipbuilding governs the handiwork of the builders.

Accordingly there is a certain order among the intelligences who take from God Himself immediate and perfect cognizance of the order of divine providence. The first and highest perceive the ordered scheme of providence in the last end itself which is the divine goodness, some of them, however, clearer than others; and these are called Seraphim, i.e. fiery or setting on fire, because fire is used to designate intensity of love or desire, which are about the end. Hence Dionysius says that this name indicates both their fervent and quivering activity towards God, and their leading lower things to God as their end.

The second place belongs to those who acquire perfect knowledge of the scheme of providence in the divine form: and these are called Cherubim which signifies fulness of knowledge: for knowledge is made complete through the form of the thing known. Wherefore Dionysius says that their name indicates that they contemplate the highest operative power of the divine beauty.

The third grade is of those who contemplate the disposition of divine judgements in itself: and they are called Thrones: because the throne is significative of judicial power, according to Ps. 9:5: Thou hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice. Hence Dionysius says that this name signifies that they are God-bearers and adapted for the obedient fulfilment of all divine undertakings.

What has been said must however be understood, not as though the divine goodness, essence, and knowledge of the disposition of things were three distinct things, but in the sense that according to what we have been saying we may look at the matter in question from different points of view.

Again, there must be order among even the lower spirits who receive from the higher spirits perfect knowledge of the divine order to be fulfilled by them. Because the higher ones are also more universal in their power of understanding; so that they acquire their knowledge of the order of providence from more universal principles and causes, but those beneath them, from more particular causes: for a man who could consider the entire physical order in the heavenly bodies, would be of a higher intelligence than one who needed to turn his mind to lower things in order to perfect his knowledge. Accordingly those who are able to know perfectly the order of providence from the universal causes which stand midway between God, the supremely universal cause, and particular causes, are themselves between those who are able to consider the aforesaid order in God Himself, and those who need to consider it in particular causes. Dionysius assigns these to the middle hierarchy which, as it is governed by the highest, so, says he, does it govern the lowest.

Again, among these intellectual substances also there must be some kind of order: since the universal disposition of providence is divided, first, among many executors: which belongs to the order of Dominations:

because to command what others execute belongs to one having dominion. Hence Dionysius says that domination signifies a certain liberty free from servile condition and any subjection. Secondly, it is distributed by the operator and executor in reference to many effects. This is done by the order of Virtues whose name, as Dionysius says in the same passage, designates a certain strength and virility in carrying out the divine operations, without so much as swerving, through weakness, from the divine movement. Hence it is evident that the principle of universal operation belongs to this order: so that apparently the movement of the heavenly bodies belongs to this order also, from which as from universal causes particular effects ensue in nature: wherefore they are called powers of heaven (Lk. 21:26), where it is said: The powers of heaven shall be moved. To the same spirits apparently belongs the execution of those divine works which are done outside the order of nature; for these are the highest of God's ministries: for which reason Gregory says that the Virtues are those spirits through whom miracles are frequently wrought. And if there be anything else of a universal and prominent nature in the fulfilment of the divine ministry, it is fittingly ascribed to this order. Thirdly, the universal order of providence, once established in its effects, is guarded from confusion, by curbing the things which might disturb that order. This belongs to the order of Powers. Wherefore Dionysius says in the same place that the name Powers implies a well-established order, without confusion, in the divine undertakings: and so Gregory says that it belongs to this order to check contrary powers.

The lowest of superior intellectual substances are those who receive the knowledge of the order of divine providence in relation to particular causes: these are placed in immediate authority over human affairs. Of them Dionysius says: This third rank of spirits presides, in consequence, over the human hierarchy. By human affairs we must understand all lower natures and particular causes, that are subordinated to man and serve for his use, as we have already explained. Among these also there is a certain order. For in human affairs there is a common good, namely the good of the city or of the nation, and this apparently belongs to the order of Principalities. Hence Dionysius says in the same chapter that the name Principality indicates leadership in a sacred order. Hence (Dan. 10:12–20) mention is made of Michael the Prince of the Jews, of a Prince of the Persians, and of a Prince of the Greeks. And thus the government of kingdoms and the change of supremacy from one nation to another, must belong to the ministry of this order. It would also seem part of their office to instruct those men who are in positions of authority, in matters pertaining to the administration of their office.

There is also a human good, not common to many, but belonging to an individual by himself, yet useful not to one only, but to many: for instance those things which all and each one must believe and observe, such as the articles of faith, the divine worship, and the like. This belongs to the Archangels of whom Gregory says that they announce the greater things: thus we call Gabriel an Archangel, because he announced the Incarnation of the Word to the Virgin, which is an article of faith for all.

There is also a human good that belongs to each one singly. This pertains to the order of Angels of whom Gregory says that they announce minor matters. Hence they are called guardian angels according to Ps. 90:11: He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. Wherefore Dionysius says that the Archangels are between the Principalities and Angels, because they have something in common with both: with the Principalities inasmuch as they lead the lower angels, and rightly so, because in human affairs matters of restricted interest must be regulated according to those that are of common interest: and with the Angels, because they announce to the Angels, and through the Angels, to us, for it is the duty of the latter to announce to men what concerns each individual. For this reason the lowest order has received as proper, the name common to all: because, to wit, its duty is to announce to us immediately. And so the name Archangel is as it were composed of both, since Archangel means a Principal Angel.

Gregory assigns the ordering of the heavenly spirits differently: for he places the Principalities among the spirits of the second rank, immediately after the Dominations: and the Virtues among the lowest, above the Archangels. But to one who considers the matter carefully, the difference is but small. For, according to Gregory, the Principalities are not placed over nations but over good spirits, as holding the principal place in the execution of the divine ministry: because, says he, to be a principal is to stand in a higher place than others. According to the explanation given above, we said that this belonged to the Virtues.—As to the Virtues, according to Gregory they are assigned to certain particular operations when, in some special case, outside the usual order of things, miracles have to be wrought. In this way they are fittingly numbered among the lowest angels.

Both explanations have the authority of the Apostle. For he says (Eph. 1:20, 21): Setting Him, namely Christ, on his right hand in heavenly places, above all principality, and power, and virtue, and dominion, where it is clear that in the ascending order he places the Powers above the Principalities, and the Virtues above these, and the Dominations above the last named. This is the order adopted by Dionysius. Whereas speaking of Christ to the Colossians (1:16) he says: Whether thrones or dominations or principalities or powers, all things were created by Him and in Him. Here we see that beginning with the Thrones, in the descending order, he places the Dominations under them, beneath these the Principalities, and lower still the Powers. This is the order adopted by Gregory.

Mention is made of the Seraphim, Isa. 6:2, 6; of the Cherubim, Ezech. 1:3; of the Archangels in the canonical epistle of Jude (9): When Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, etc.; and of the Angels in the Psalms as already observed.

In all ordered powers there is this in common, that the lower all work by virtue of the higher. Hence what we have stated as belonging to the order of Seraphim, all the lower angels accomplish by virtue thereof: and the same applies to the other orders.

CHAPTER LXXXI

OF THE ORDERING OF MEN AMONG THEMSELVES AND TO OTHER THINGS

IN comparison with other intellectual substances, the human soul holds the lowest place: because, as we have already stated, when it is first created it receives knowledge of the order of divine providence only in a general way; whereas, in order to acquire perfect knowledge of that order in individual matters, it needs to start from these very things in which the order of divine providence is already established in detail. Consequently the human soul needs bodily organs, so as to be able to receive knowledge from things having bodies. And yet, on account of the weakness of its intellectual light, it is unable to acquire perfect knowledge of things that concern man, without the help of higher spirits, God so disposing that the lower spirits reach perfection through the higher, as we have already proved. Since however man has some share of intellectual light, dumb animals which have none at all are subject to man, according to the order of divine providence. Hence it is said (Gen. 1:26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness, that is to say, inasmuch as he is an intelligent being, and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts of the earth. Dumb animals, though bereft of intellect, yet, since they have some kind of knowledge, are placed by the order of divine providence above plants and other things devoid of knowledge. Hence it is said (Gen. 1:29–30): Behold I have given you every herb bearing seed upon the earth, and all trees that have in themselves seed of their own kind, to be your meat, and to all the beasts of the earth.

Among those that are wholly bereft of knowledge, one thing is placed before another according as one is more capable of action than another. For they have no share in the disposition of providence, but only in the execution.

And since man has both intelligence, and sense, and bodily powers, these things are dependent on one another, according to the disposition of divine providence, in likeness to the order to be observed in the universe. For bodily power is subject to the powers of sense and intellect, as carrying out their commands; and the sensitive power is subject to the intellective, and is controlled by its rule.

In the same way, we find order among men. For those who excel in intelligence, are naturally rulers; whereas those who are less intelligent, but strong in body, seem made by nature for service, as Aristotle says in his Politics. The statement of Solomon (Prov. 11:29) is in agreement with this: The fool shall serve the wise; as also the words of Exodus (18:21, 22): Provide out of all the people wise men such as fear God … who may judge the people at all times.

And just as in the works of one man there is disorder through the intellect being obsequious to the sensual faculty; while the sensual faculty, through indisposition of the body, is drawn to the movement of the body, as instanced in those who limp: so too, in human government disorder results from a man being set in authority, not on account of his excelling in intelligence, but because he has usurped the government by bodily force, or has been appointed to rule through motives of sensual affection. Nor does Solomon omit to mention this disorder, for he says (Eccles. 10:5, 6): There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince; a fool set in high dignity. Now divine providence does not exclude a disorder of this kind: for it results, by God’s permission, from the fault of the inferior agents; even as we have said of other evils. Nor is the natural order wholly perverted by such a disorder: for the government of fools is weak, unless it be strengthened by the counsels of the wise. Hence it is said (Prov. 20:18): Designs are strengthened by counsels: and wars are to be arranged by governments; and (24:5, 6): A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant: because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety when there are many counsels. And since the counsellor rules him who receives his counsel, and, in a sense, governs him, it is said (Prov. 17:2) that a wise servant shall rule over foolish sons.

It is therefore evident that divine providence imposes order on all things, and thus the Apostle says truly (Rom. 13:1) that the things which are of God are well ordered.

CHAPTER LXXXII

THAT THE INFERIOR BODIES ARE RULED BY GOD BY MEANS OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES

JUST as in intellectual substances some are of higher and some of lower degree, so too are there in corporeal substances. Now intellectual substances are governed by higher substances, so that the disposition of divine providence may reach down proportionately to the lowest things, as we have already said. Therefore in like manner bodies of lower degree are ruled by those of a higher.

Again. The higher a body is as regards its place, the more formal it is: hence it is reasonably the place of a lower body, because form contains even as place does; thus water is more formal than earth, air than water, fire than air. Now the heavenly bodies have a higher place than all others. Therefore they are more formal and consequently more active than all other bodies. Therefore they act on lower bodies: and consequently the latter are ruled by them.

Besides. That which in its nature is perfect without contrariety, is of more universal power than that which in its nature is not perfected without contrariety: because contrariety arises from differences which determine and contract the genus: wherefore in the conception of the intellect, forasmuch as it is universal, the species of contraries are not contrary to one another, since they coexist in the intellect. Now the heavenly bodies are perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety: for they are neither light nor heavy, neither hot nor cold: whereas the inferior bodies are not perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety. This is proved by their movements: for there is no contrary to the circular movement of the heavenly bodies, so that there can be nothing violent in them: whereas there are movements contrary to that of the lower bodies; for instance, downward movement is contrary to upward movement. Therefore heavenly bodies have a more universal power than the inferior bodies. Now universal powers move particular powers, as we have proved. Therefore the heavenly bodies move and govern lower bodies.

Moreover. We have shown that all other things are ruled by intellectual substances. Now the heavenly bodies resemble the intellectual substances, more than other bodies do, forasmuch as they are incorruptible. Moreover they are nearer to them, inasmuch as they are moved by them immediately, as we have shown above. Therefore the lower bodies are ruled by them.

Further. The first principle of movement must be something immovable. Consequently things that approach nearest to immobility, must be the movers of others. Now heavenly bodies approach nearer to the immobility of a first principle than do the inferior bodies: because they have but one species of movement, namely local: whereas other bodies have all manner of movements. Therefore the heavenly bodies move and rule the lower bodies.

Again. In each genus the first is the cause of that which comes after. Now the heavenly movement is the first of all movements. First, because local movement precedes all others.—Both in point of time, because it alone can be everlasting, as is proved in 8 Phys. vii.—And naturally: because without it there could be no other: since a thing cannot be increased without a previous alteration, whereby that which was dissimilar is transformed and assimilated: nor can there be alteration without a previous change of place, since in order that there be alteration, the cause of alteration must become nearer to the subject altered than it was before:—And in perfection: because local movement does not cause a thing to vary in respect of something inherent, but only in respect of something extrinsic; and for this reason belongs to a thing already perfect.—Secondly, because even among local movements, circular movement holds the first place.—Both in point of time: because it alone can be everlasting, as proved in 8 Phys. viii.—And naturally: because it excels in simplicity and unity, since it is not divided into beginning, middle and end, but is all middle, as it were.—And in perfection, because it returns to its principle.—Thirdly, because alone the heavenly movement is always regular and uniform; since in the movements of heavy and light bodies the speed increases towards the end if the movement be natural, and decreases if the movement be violent.—Therefore the movement of the heaven must be the cause of all other movements.

Further. As that which is simply immovable is in comparison with movement simply, so is that which is immovable in respect of a particular kind of movement, in comparison with that particular movement. Now that which is simply immovable is the principle of all movement, as we have proved. Therefore that which is immovable in respect of alteration, is the principle of all alteration. Now of all things corporeal the heavenly bodies alone are inalterable: this is proved by their disposition which is always the same. Therefore the heavenly body is the cause of alteration in all things alterable. But in this lower world alteration is the principle of all movement: because alteration leads to increase and generation: and the generator is a per se mover in the local movement of heavy and light bodies. Consequently the heaven must be the cause of all movement in these lower bodies.

Therefore it is evident that the lower bodies are governed by God by means of the heavenly bodies.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

CONCLUSION OF THE FOREGOING

FROM all that has been proved hitherto, we are able to conclude that as regards the design of the order to be imposed on things, God governs all things by Himself. Wherefore Gregory commenting on Job 34:13, What other hath He appointed over the earth? says: He who created the world by Himself governs it by Himself: and Boethius says (De Consol. iii. 12): God rules all things by Himself alone. As to the execution, however, He governs the lower by means of the higher things:—bodily things by means of spiritual things: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv. 6): In this visible world nothing can be ruled except by means of the invisible creature:—the lower spirits by the higher: wherefore Dionysius says that the intelligent heavenly substances first of all shed forth the divine enlightenment on themselves, and bestow on us those manifestations which surpass our capacity:—and the lower bodies by the higher: wherefore Dionysius says that the sun contributes to the generation of visible bodies, as also to life itself, by means of nourishment, growth and perfection, by cleansing and renewing them.

Of all these together Augustine says (3 De Trin. iv:): As the grosser and lower bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power: so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the sinful rational spirit by the righteous rational spirit.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES DO NOT IMPRESS ON OUR INTELLECT

FROM what has been said it is at once clear that the heavenly bodies cannot be the causes of things concerning our intellect. For it has already been shown that the order of divine providence requires the lower things to be ruled and moved by the higher. Now the intellect, in the natural order, surpasses all bodies: as we have proved already. Consequently heavenly bodies cannot act directly on the intellect. Therefore they cannot be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect.

Again. No body acts except through movement, as is proved in 8 Phys. vi. Now things that are immovable are not caused by movement: because nothing is the result of the movement of an agent except through the agent moving the patient, while the latter is moved. Consequently things that are wholly outside movement cannot be caused by the heavenly bodies. But things concerning the intellect are wholly outside movement properly speaking, as the Philosopher states (7 Phys. iii.): in fact the soul becomes prudent and wise through being free from movement, as he says in the same place. It is not possible, therefore, that the heavenly bodies be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect.

Besides. If nothing be caused by a body except in so far as the latter causes movement through being moved, it follows that whatever receives an impression from a body, must be moved. Now nothing is moved except a body, as is proved in 6 Phys. iv. Therefore whatever receives an impression from a body, must be either a body or a power of a body. But it was proved in the Second Book that the intellect is neither a body nor a power of the body. Therefore the heavenly bodies cannot directly make an impression on the intellect.

Further. Whatever is moved by a thing is reduced thereby from potentiality to act. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act. Therefore every agent and mover must be, in some way, in act with regard to those things to which the subject, passive or moved, is in potentiality. But the heavenly bodies are not actually intelligible, because they are singular sensibles. Since then our intellect is not in potentiality except to what is actually intelligible, it is impossible for the heavenly bodies to act directly on the intellect.

Moreover. A thing's proper operation follows its nature, which generated things acquire by generation, together with their proper operation: as may be seen in heavy and light things, which have their proper movement as soon as they are generated, unless there be an obstacle, and for this reason the generator is said to be a mover. Consequently that which, as regards the principle of its nature, is not subject to the action of the heavenly bodies, cannot be subject to them in respect of its operation. Now the intellective faculty is not caused by any bodily principles, but is entirely from an extrinsic source, as we proved above. Therefore the operation of the intellect is not directly subject to the heavenly bodies.

Again. Things caused by the heavenly movements are subject to time, which is the measure of the first heavenly movement. Therefore those that wholly abstract from time, are not subject to heavenly movements. Now the intellect in its operation abstracts from time, as also from place: for it considers the universal which abstracts from here and now. Therefore the operation of the intellect is not subject to heavenly bodies.

Further. Nothing acts outside its species. Now the act of the intellect transcends the species and form of any corporeal agent: since every corporeal form is material and individualized; whereas the act of the intellect is universal and immaterial. Consequently no body can understand by means of its corporeal form. Much less, therefore, can any body whatsoever cause the act of intelligence in another.

Besides. A thing is not subject to that which is beneath it in respect of that by which it is united to things above it. Now our soul, inasmuch as it is intelligent, is united to intellectual substances, which in the order of nature are above heavenly bodies: because our soul cannot understand except in so far as it derives its intellectual light from those substances. Therefore the intellectual operation cannot be directly subject to the heavenly movements.

Moreover. We shall find a confirmation of this if we consider what philosophers have said in the matter. The natural philosophers of old, as Democritus, Empedocles and others, held that intellect differs not from sense, as stated in 4 Metaph. iii., and 3 De Anima iii. Hence it follows that, as sense is a corporeal power resulting from a corporeal transmutation, so is the intellect likewise. Wherefore they said, as transmutation of the lower bodies follows transmutation of the higher bodies, that intellectual operation follows the movements of the heavenly bodies: according to the words of Homer: The mind of gods and men on earth is even as their day which comes from the father of men and gods, the sun to wit, or rather Jove, whom they called the supreme god, by whom they understood the whole heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv. 11; v. 8).

Hence too, followed the opinion of the Stoics who said that the knowledge of the intellect is caused by images of bodies being imprinted on the mind, just as a mirror, or as a page receives the imprinted characters without any action on its part: as Boethius relates (De Consol. v. 4). According to this opinion it followed that our intellectual knowledge was chiefly the result of impressions received from heavenly bodies: and consequently it was chiefly the Stoics who held that man’s life was bound by a kind of fatal necessity.—This opinion however is shown to be false, as Boethius says (ibid.) by the fact that the intellect is capable of synthesis and analysis, and compares the highest with the lowest, and is cognitive of universals and simple forms, none of which is within the capacity of bodies. Consequently it is evident that the intellect does not merely receive the images of bodies, but is possessed of a power that transcends bodies: for the external senses, which receive only images of bodies, do not extend to the things mentioned above. All subsequent philosophers, however, discerned intellect from sense, and assigned, not bodies but immaterial things, as the cause of our knowledge: thus Plato ascribed this to ideas, and Aristotle to the active intellect.

From all this we may gather that to say that the heavenly bodies are the cause of our knowledge, is a sequel to the opinion of those who held that intellect differs not from sense; as Aristotle observes (De Anima, loc. cit.). Now it is evident that this opinion is false. Wherefore also manifestly false is the opinion of those who maintained that the heavenly bodies are the direct cause of our knowledge.

For this reason Holy Writ assigns as the cause of our knowledge, not a body, but God (Job 35:10, 11): Where is God who made me; who hath given songs in the night; who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and instructeth us more than the fowls of the air? and (Ps. 93:10): He that teacheth man knowledge.

Nevertheless we must observe that although heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of our knowledge, they can co-operate indirectly towards it. For though the intellect is not a force of the body, yet in us the operation of the intellect cannot be exercised without the operation of bodily forces, namely the imagination, and the powers of memory and thought, as we have already shown. Hence it is that when the activity of these powers is hampered by some bodily indisposition, the activity of the intellect is hampered also: as may be seen in cases of frenzy, lethargy and the like. For the same reason goodness of disposition in a man's body fits him to understand easily, inasmuch as those forces are strengthened by such a disposition: wherefore it is said in 2 De Anima ix., that it is to be observed that men of soft flesh are of quick intelligence. Now the disposition of the human body is subject to the heavenly movements. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, v. 6) that it is not altogether absurd to ascribe the mere differences between bodies to the influence of the stars: and Damascene says (2 De Fide Orth. vii.) that the various planets produce in us various temperaments, habits and dispositions. Consequently the heavenly bodies co-operate indirectly to the goodness of our intelligence: and thus, even as physicians are able to judge of a man's intelligence from his bodily temperament, as a proximate disposition thereto, so too can an astrologer, from the heavenly movements, as being a remote cause of this disposition. In this sense we can approve of the saying of Ptolemy (Centiloq. xxxviii.): When Mercury is in one of Saturn's houses at the time of a man's birth, he bestows on him a quick intelligence of the inner nature of things.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE HEAVENLY BODIES ARE NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR WILLING AND CHOOSING

IT is also evident from the foregoing that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing.

For the will is in the intellective part of the soul, according to the Philosopher (3 De Anima ix.). Therefore if the heavenly bodies cannot make a direct impression on our intellect, as we have proved, neither will they be able to influence the will directly.

Moreover. Every act of choice or will in us is caused immediately through an intellectual apprehension: for the apprehended good is the object of the will (3 De Anima x.): wherefore there cannot ensue perverseness of choice, unless the judgement of the intellect err in the particular object of choice, as the Philosopher states (7 Ethic. iii.). But the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our intellectual apprehension. Therefore neither can they be the cause of our choice.

Further. Whatever takes place in this lower world through the influence of heavenly bodies happens naturally; since the things here below are naturally subordinate to them. If, therefore, the heavenly bodies have any influence on our choice, this must happen naturally: so that, in fact, man naturally chooses to perform his actions, even as dumb animals perform theirs from natural instinct, and as inanimate bodies are moved naturally. Consequently there will not be two active principles, namely purpose and nature, but only one, namely nature. But Aristotle proves the contrary (2

Phys. v.). Therefore it is untrue that the influence of heavenly bodies is the cause of our choice.

Besides. Things that happen naturally are brought to their end by definite means; wherefore they always happen in the same way: for nature is determined to one method. But man's choice tends to the end in various ways, both in morals and in things made by art. Therefore man's choosing does not come from nature.

Again. Things which are done naturally, for the most part are done rightly: since nature fails but seldom. Consequently if man chose by nature, his choice would be right for the most part; which is clearly false. Therefore man does not choose naturally: yet this would be the case if his choice were subject to the influence of heavenly bodies.

Further. Things of the same species do not differ in those natural operations which result from the specific nature: hence each swallow makes its nest in the same way, and every man equally understands the first principles which are known naturally. Now choosing is an operation that results from the human species. Consequently if man chose naturally, all men would choose in the same way: and this is evidently untrue, both in morals and in things made by art.

Moreover. Virtue and vice are proper principles of choice: because the virtuous and the vicious man differ through choosing contraries. Now civic virtues and vices are not in us by nature but by habituation. The Philosopher proves this (2 Ethic. i.) from the fact that we acquire the habit of those operations to which we are accustomed, especially from childhood. In us therefore choosing does not come from nature: and consequently, it is not caused by the influence of heavenly bodies, in respect of which things happen naturally.

Again. Heavenly bodies make no direct impression except on bodies, as we have shown. Consequently if they are the cause of our choosing, this will be by an impression made either on our bodies, or on external bodies. Yet in neither way can they be a sufficient cause of our choosing. For the objective presentation of some corporeal thing cannot be an adequate cause of our choice: since it is clear that when a man meets with something that pleases him, be it meat or woman, the temperate man is not moved to choose these things, whereas the intemperate is. Again no possible change wrought in our bodies by an impression of the heavenly bodies can suffice to cause us to make a choice: since all that results therefrom are certain passions, more or less impetuous; and passions, however turbulent, are not a sufficient cause of choosing, since the same passions lead the incontinent to follow them by choice, and fail to induce the continent man. Therefore it must not be said that the heavenly bodies cause our choice.

Further. No faculty is bestowed without a purpose. Now man has the faculty of judging and counselling about all matters relative to his own actions, whether in the use of externals, or in giving a loose or a tight rein to our internal passions. But this would be of no use, if our choice were the result of the heavenly bodies and not in our own power. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our choice.

Besides. Man is naturally a civil or social animal. This is evident from the fact that one man does not suffice for himself if he live alone: because the things are few wherein nature makes adequate provision for man, since she gave him his reason by means of which he might provide himself with all necessaries of life, such as food, clothes and so forth, for the production of which one man is not enough. Wherefore man has a natural inclination for social life. Now, the order of providence does not deprive a thing of what is natural to it: rather is each thing provided for according to its nature, as we have said above. Therefore man is not so made by the order of providence that he be deprived of social life. Yet he would be deprived of it, were our choice to proceed from the influence of heavenly bodies, like the natural instinct of other animals.

Moreover laws and precepts of conduct would be useless, were man not the master of his own choice: and useless too would be punishments and rewards for good and wicked, if it were not in our power to choose this or that. And yet, if there were not such things there would be at once an end to social life. Consequently man is not so made according to the order of providence, that his choice should result from the movements of heavenly bodies.

Again. A man’s choice is of good and evil things. Hence, if our choosing is the result of the movements of the stars, it would follow that the stars are the per se cause of wicked deeds. But that which is evil has no natural cause, since evil is incidental to a defective cause, and has no per se cause, as we have proved. Therefore it is impossible that our choice be the direct and per se effect of the heavenly bodies.

Someone, however, might endeavour to meet this argument by saying that every evil choice results from the desire of some particular good, as we have proved above: thus the choice of the lustful man arises from his desire for a good consisting in sexual pleasure: and some star causes movement to this good in general. In fact this is necessary for the generating of animals: and this common good was not to be omitted on account of the particular evil of an individual, who through this instigation chooses an evil.

But this reply is not sufficient if we suppose the heavenly bodies to be the per se cause of our choice, through making direct impressions on our intellect and will. Because the impression made by a univeral cause is received in a thing according to that thing’s mode. Consequently the effect of a star which causes a movement towards pleasure connected in an ordinate manner with generation, will be received into a thing according to the mode proper thereto: thus we see that various animals have various ways and various times of coming together, as becomes their nature, as Aristotle remarks (De Hist. Anim. v. 8). Hence the intellect and will receive the impression of that star according to their mode. Now when a thing is desired according to the mode of the intellect and reason, there is no sin in the choice, which is always evil through not being according to right reason. Therefore if the heavenly bodies were the cause of our choice, we should never make an evil choice.

Further. No active power extends to things above the species and nature of the agent: because every agent acts through its form. Now, to will, as also to understand, transcends every corporeal species: for just as our intellect understands the universal, so also is our will referred to the universal, for instance we dislike every kind of thief, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii. 4). Therefore the act of the will is not caused by a heavenly body.

Besides. Things directed to an end are proportionate to that end. Now, our choice is directed to happiness as our last end. And this does not consist in bodily goods, but in the union of our soul, through the intellect, with divine things: this was proved above to be an article of faith and in accordance with the opinion of philosophers. Therefore heavenly bodies cannot be the cause of our choice. Wherefore it is said (Jerem. 10:2, 3): Be not afraid of the signs of heaven which the heathens fear: for the laws of people are vain.

We hereby refute the opinion of the Stoics, who held that all our actions, even our every choice, are governed by the heavenly bodies.—This is also said to have been the opinion of the Pharisees among the Jews of old.—And the Priscillianists were also guilty of this error, as stated in De Hæresibus.

This was also the opinion of the ancient physicists, who held that intellect differs not from sense. Wherefore Empedocles, as quoted by Aristotle (3 De Anima iii.), said that the will of man, like that of other animals, is strengthened presently (i.e., according to the present moment), by the movement of the heaven which is the cause of time.

We must observe, however, that although heavenly bodies are not the direct cause of our choosing, by making a direct impression on our will, nevertheless indirectly they do occasion our choice, through making an impression on bodies. This happens in two ways. First the impression made by a heavenly body on bodies other than our own may be an occasion of our making a particular choice: thus when through the action of the heavenly bodies the air becomes intensely cold, we choose to warm ourselves by the fire, or to do something similarly befitting the time being.—Secondly, they may make impressions on our own body, and when the body is affected movements of the passions arise; either because such impressions make us liable to certain passions; for instance the bilious are prone to anger; or because they produce in us a bodily disposition that occasions a particular choice, thus when we are ill, we choose to take medicine.—Sometimes too, the heavenly bodies are a cause of human acts, when through an indisposition of the body a person goes out of his mind, and loses the use of reason. Such persons are not capable of choosing properly speaking, but they are moved by a natural instinct, like dumb animals. It is evident, however, and we know by experience, that such occasions whether exterior or interior are not a necessary cause of choice: since man can use his reason to reject or obey them. But those who follow their natural bent are in the majority, and few, the wise alone to wit, are those who avoid the occasions of ill-doing and who follow not the impulse of nature. Hence Ptolemy says (Centiloq. 8, 7, 1) that the soul of the wise man assists the work of the stars; and that the astrologer cannot read the stars unless he knows well the bent of the mind and the natural temperament, and that the astrologer should not express himself in detail but only in general terms: because the majority resist not their bodily disposition, and so the impression of the stars takes effect in them; but not always in this or that individual who, maybe, uses his reason to resist that inclination.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THAT CORPOREAL EFFECTS IN THIS LOWER WORLD DO NOT RESULT OF NECESSITY FROM THE ACTION OF THE HEAVENLY BODIES

NOT only are the heavenly bodies unable to necessitate man's choice, but even corporeal effects do not proceed from them of necessity.

For the impressions of universal causes are received by their effects according to the mode of the recipient. Now the things of this lower world are fluctuating and changeable, both by reason of matter which is in potentiality to several forms, and on account of the contrariety of forms and powers. Therefore the impressions of heavenly bodies are not received of necessity by these lower bodies.

Again. A remote cause does not lead to a necessary result, unless the middle cause be also necessary: in a syllogism, for instance, if the major premiss be a necessary statement, and the minor a contingent statement, the conclusion that follows is not necessary. Now heavenly bodies are remote causes, and the proximate causes of the effects here below are the active and passive forces in the bodies of this lower world; and these are not necessary, but contingent, causes, for they may fail in a few instances. Therefore the heavenly bodies do not produce necessary effects in these lower bodies.

Besides. The heavenly bodies are always moved in the same way. Consequently, if heavenly bodies produced an effect on these lower bodies of necessity, there would be no variety in the things that happen to them.

Now, they are not always the same, but only for the most part. Therefore they do not happen necessarily.

Moreover. Many contingencies do not make one necessary thing: since, just as each one of them by itself may fail in its effect, so too may all of them together. Now, it is evident that in these lower bodies each thing that happens through the influence of the heavenly bodies is a contingency. Therefore the things that happen here below through the influence of heavenly bodies are not necessarily connected, since it is evident that each one of them may be hindered.

Further. The action of the heavenly bodies is in keeping with their nature: so that they require matter on which to act. Consequently their action does not remove what is required by matter. Now the matter on which heavenly bodies act is the bodies of the lower world: and since these are by nature corruptible, they can fail in action just as they can fail in being, so that their nature requires that they should not produce their effects of necessity. Therefore the effects of heavenly bodies on the bodies of the lower world do not result of necessity.

Perhaps someone will say that the effects of heavenly bodies must necessarily follow, and yet potentiality is not therefore removed from this lower world, because each effect is in potentiality before it comes into being, and is then said to be possible; but when it is in act, it passes from potentiality to necessity, the whole of which process is subject to the heavenly movements, and consequently a given effect is not prevented from having been possible at one time, although it is necessary that it result at some time:—in fact Albumasar strives thus to plead the cause of possibility, in the First Book of his Introductorium.

But the case for possibility cannot be defended in this way. For there is one kind of possible which follows from that which is necessary. Because that which must be necessarily, is possible; since what cannot possibly be, is impossible, and that which is impossible, necessarily is not. Consequently what must necessarily be, must necessarily not be: which is impossible. Hence it is impossible that the same thing should be necessarily, and yet that at the same time it should be impossible for it to be. Therefore possible being follows from necessary being.

But it is not this kind of possible that we need defend in contradiction to the statement that effects result of necessity: but the possible which is contrary to necessary, in which sense we say that a thing may possibly be or not be. Now a thing is said to be possible or contingent not merely because it is at one time potential and at another time actual, as the foregoing reply supposes: since thus, even in the heavenly movements there is possibility and contingency. For the sun and moon are not always actually in conjunction or opposition, but sometimes actually and sometimes potentially: and yet these are necessary things, since such matters are subject to demonstration. But the possible or contingent that is contrary to the necessary, is of such a nature that there is no necessity for it to be, when it is not. And the reason for this is that it does not result necessarily from its cause. Thus we say that it is a contingency that Socrates will sit, whereas it is a necessity that he will die, because the latter results from its cause necessarily, and not the former. Consequently if it follows necessarily from the movements of the heavenly bodies that their effects will result at some time, there will be nothing possible or contingent contrary to that which is necessary.

We must observe, however, that Avicenna having a mind to prove that the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity, offers the following argument (Metaph. x.). If an effect of the heavenly bodies be hindered, this must be due to some cause either voluntary or natural. Now every cause, whether voluntary or natural, is reducible to some heavenly principle. Therefore even the impediment to the heavenly bodies’ effect results from some heavenly principles. Consequently, if we take the whole heavenly order at once, it is impossible for its effect ever to fail. Whence he concludes that the heavenly bodies must necessarily produce effects in the lower things both voluntary and natural.

This argument, as Aristotle observes (2 Phys. iv.) was employed by some of the ancients, who denied the existence of chance and luck, for the reason that every effect has its definite cause, and that given the cause the effect follows of necessity; so that, since everything happens necessarily, nothing can be referred to luck or chance.

He solves this argument (6 Metaph.), by denying the two propositions on which it is based. One is that given any cause whatsoever, the effect must follow of necessity. For this is not true of every cause, since even the per se, proper and sufficient cause of a certain effect may be hindered through the clashing of another cause, so that it fails to produce that effect.—The other proposition which he denies is that not everything that exists in any way whatever has a per se cause, but only that which exists per se; and things which exist accidentally, have no cause at all: for instance that a man be musical is to be ascribed to a cause, but that he be musical as well as white, is not due to any cause. Because whatever things concur on account of a cause, are mutually dependent by reason of that cause, whereas accidental things are not mutually dependent. Consequently they are not the result of a per se active cause, but are merely an accidental result: thus it is accidental to the teacher of music that his pupil be a white man, since it is beside his intention, for his intention is to teach one who has an aptitude for music.

Accordingly given any particular effect, we shall say that it had a cause from which it did not necessarily result, because it might have been hindered by the accidental concurrence of another cause. And although we may trace that concurrent cause to some higher cause, we cannot ascribe to any cause the concurrence itself that proved to be a hindrance. Consequently we cannot say that the hindrance to this or that effect is to be traced to some heavenly principle. Therefore we must not allow that the effects of heavenly bodies happen of necessity in this lower world.

Hence Damascene says in the Second Book that heavenly bodies do not cause the generation of things that are made, nor the corruption of things that are destroyed: because, to wit, their effects do not follow of necessity.

Aristotle too, says (2 De Somn. et Vigil.) that many things betokened by corporeal things, even heavenly bodies, by water for instance or wind, do not happen. For if a stronger movement arise than that which presaged the future, the latter fails in its effect: even so we often renounce our first intent, on account of other and better thoughts.

Ptolemy also says (1 Quadrip. ii.): Again, we must not think that the things which occur through the influence of higher beings are inevitable, like those which happen by divine decree and are altogether unavoidable, and such as do actually and necessarily occur. He says again in the Centiloquium: These principles which I have given you, are midway between the necessary and the possible.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THAT THE MOVEMENT OF A HEAVENLY BODY IS NOT THE CAUSE OF OUR CHOOSING BY VIRTUE OF ITS SOUL MOVING US, AS SOME SAY

WE must observe, however, that Avicenna also (Metaph. x.) holds that the movements of the heavenly bodies are the causes of our choice, not merely by being the occasion thereof, but even as a per se cause. For he holds the heavenly bodies to be animate: and, since the heaven's movement proceeds from its soul, and is the movement of a body, it follows that just as forasmuch as it is a body's movement, it must have the power to transform bodies, so, forasmuch as it comes from a soul, it must have the power to make impressions on our soul; wherefore the heavenly movement is the cause of our acts of will and choice. The position of Albumasar would seem to come to the same as expounded in the First Book of his Introductorium.

But this position is unreasonable. Because any effect that is caused by an agent through an instrument, must be proportionate to the instrument as well as to the agent: for we do not employ any instrument for any effect. Consequently it is not possible to produce by means of an instrument an effect which is utterly outside the scope of its action. Now it is altogether beyond the scope of a body's action to impress the intellect or will, as proved above; except perhaps indirectly by making an impression on the body, as we have said. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body's soul, if it have one, to make an impression on the intellect and will by means of the movement of that heavenly body.

Moreover. The particular active cause, while acting, bears a resemblance to the universal active cause, and imitates it. Now if a human soul were to make an impression on another human soul through an action of the body, as when it reveals its mind by means of vocal signs, the bodily action that proceeds from the one soul does not reach the other soul except by means of the body: for the vocal sounds play on the organ of hearing, and thus being perceived by the sense, its meaning reaches the understanding. Consequently if the celestial soul makes an impression on our soul by means of a corporeal movement, its action will not reach our soul except through a change effected in our body. But this does not cause our choice, but only occasions it, as we have shown above. Therefore the heavenly movement is not the cause but only the occasion of our choice.

Again. Since mover and moved must be simultaneous, as is proved in 7 Phys. ii., it follows that movement must come from the first mover to the last thing moved in a certain order, so that, to wit, the mover moves that which is distant through that which is nearest. Now our body is nearer to the heavenly body which is supposed to be moved by the soul united to it, than our soul which is not ordered to the heavenly body except through its own body. This is proved by the fact that separate intellects are not ordered to a heavenly body, except perhaps as a mover to that which it moves. Therefore the impression of a heavenly body that originates in its soul does not reach our soul save through our body. And our soul is not moved in response to the movement of the body except accidentally, nor does choice result from an impression made on the body except as occasioned thereby, as we have said. Therefore the heavenly body’s movement cannot be the cause of our choice through coming from its soul.

Besides. According to the opinion of Avicenna and certain other philosophers, the active intellect is a separate substance which acts on our souls in so far as it makes what is potentially intelligible to be understood actually. Now this is the result of abstraction from all material conditions, as is clear from what we have said in the Second Book. Consequently that which acts directly on the soul, does so not by means of a corporeal movement, but rather by abstraction of everything corporeal. Therefore the soul of heaven, if it have a soul, cannot be through the heavenly movement the cause of our acts of choosing or understanding.

By the same arguments it can be proved that the heavenly movement is not the cause of our choice by the power of a separate substance, if anyone suppose the heaven not to be animate, but to be moved by a separate substance.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

THAT CREATED SUBSTANCES CANNOT BE THE DIRECT CAUSES OF OUR ACTS OF CHOOSING AND WILLING, BUT GOD ALONE

WE must not think, however, that the souls of heavenly bodies, if there be any, or any intellectual separate substances, can directly impel our will or cause our choice.

For the actions of all creatures are subordinate to divine providence; so that they are unable to act beside its laws. Now it is a law of providence that everything is moved immediately by its proximate cause. Consequently, unless this order be observed, the higher created cause can neither move nor act. Again, the proximate moving cause of the will is the good understood, which is its object, and it is moved thereby as sight by colour. Therefore no created substance can move the will except by means of the good understood: in so far, to wit, as it shows it that a particular thing is good to do: and this is to persuade. Therefore no created substance can act on the will, or cause our choice, except by way of persuasion.

Again. A thing is naturally moved by and passive to that agent by whose form it can be reduced to act: since every agent acts by its form. Now the will is made actual by the appetible object, which stills the movement of its desire. And the will’s desire is satisfied by the divine good alone as its last end, as we have proved above. Therefore God alone can move the will as an agent.

Besides. The natural inclination, which we call the natural appetite, of inanimate things for their proper end is like the will or intellectual appetite in intellectual substances. Now a natural inclination cannot be given except by the maker of nature. Therefore the will cannot be inclined to anything except by the cause of the intellectual nature. But this belongs to God alone, as we have proved above. Therefore He alone can incline our will to anything.

Moreover. As stated in 3 Ethic. i., a violent action is one in which the principle is external, and the one who suffers violence contributes nothing. Consequently if the will be moved by an external principle, its movement will be violent:—and I speak of being moved by an external principle that moves as an agent, and not as an end. Now the violent is opposed to the voluntary. Therefore it is impossible that the will be moved by an external principle as an agent, and every movement of the will must come from within. But no created substance is united to the intellectual soul in its inmost being except God alone, who alone is the cause and sustainer of its being. Therefore the movement of the will can be caused by none but God alone.

Further. Violent movement is contrary to natural and voluntary movement; because both of these must be from an internal principle. But an external agent does not cause a natural movement except in so far as it causes an internal principle of movement to be in the movable thing: thus the generator that gives the form of gravity to the generated heavy body, gives it a natural downward movement. And nothing else external can move a natural body without violence, except perhaps indirectly, as that which removes an obstacle, for such a thing makes use of natural movement or action rather than causes it. Therefore that agent alone can cause a movement of the will without violence, which causes the internal principle of that movement, namely the power itself of the will. And this is God, who alone creates the soul, as we proved in the Second Book. Therefore God alone can move the will, as an agent, without violence.

This is expressed in the words of Prov. 21:1: The heart of the King is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it: and Philip 2:13: It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THAT THE MOVEMENT OF THE WILL, AND NOT ONLY THE POWER OF THE WILL, IS CAUSED BY GOD

SOME, nevertheless, unable to understand how God can cause in us the movement of the will without prejudice to liberty, have endeavoured to give a false exposition to the authorities quoted. They say, in fact, that God causes in us to will and to accomplish, by causing in us the power to will, and not by causing us to will this or that. This is the exposition of Origen (3 Peri Arch. i.) who defended free-will in a sense contrary to the aforesaid authorities.

Apparently this was the source of the opinion of some who maintained that providence does not regard things subject to free-will, namely our elections, but only external happenings. For he who chooses to get or do something, for instance to build or get rich, is not always able to succeed; and so the outcome of our actions is not subject to our free-will, but is ordained by providence.

But the authority of Scripture is in manifest opposition to all this: for it is said (Isa. 26:12): O Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us. Hence we receive from God not only the power to will, but also our very operations.

Further. The very words of Solomon, Whithersoever He will He shall turn it, show that the divine causality extends not only to the will, but also to its act.

Again. Not only does God give things their powers, but also nothing can act by its own power, unless it act by His power, as we proved above. Therefore man cannot use the will-power given to him, except forasmuch as he acts by God’s power. Now the thing by whose power the agent acts, is the cause not only of the power but also of the act. This is apparent in the craftsman, by whose power the instrument acts, even though it may not have received its form from the craftsman in question, and is merely applied by him to action. Therefore God is the cause not only of our will but also of our willing.

Further. Order in spiritual things is more perfect than in corporeal things. Now in corporeal things every movement is caused by the first movement. Therefore in spiritual things every movement of the will must be caused by the first will, which is God’s.

Besides. We proved above that God is the cause of every action, and that He works in every agent. Therefore He is the cause of the movements of the will.

Again. Aristotle argues in the same sense (8 Ethic. Eudem.) as follows. There must be some cause of a person understanding, taking counsel, choosing and willing, because everything new must have a cause. And if the cause of these acts was another act of counsel and another act of will, since in such things we cannot proceed to infinity, we must come at length to something first. And this first thing must be something better than the reason. And nothing but God is better than the intellect and the reason. Therefore God is the first principle of our counsels and wills.

CHAPTER XC

THAT HUMAN CHOICE AND WILL ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE

HENCE it follows that human will and choice are subject to divine providence.

For whatsoever God does, He does according to the order of His providence. Wherefore, since He is the cause of our choice and will, these are subject to divine providence.

Moreover. All corporeal things are governed by means of spiritual things, as we have shown above. Now spiritual things act on corporeal things by their will. Consequently if the acts of choice and will in intellectual substances are not the concern of God's providence, it follows that corporeal things also are withdrawn from His providence: so that there will be no providence at all.

Besides. The higher a thing is placed in the universe, the more must it participate in the order in which the good of the universe consists. Hence Aristotle (2 Phys. iv.) reproaches the ancient philosophers for admitting chance and luck in the scheme of the heavenly bodies, but not in the things of the lower world. Now intellectual substances hold a higher place than corporeal substances. Therefore if corporeal substances, as regards their essence and operation, are included in the order of providence, much more so are intellectual substances.

Again. Those things which are nearest to the end are more subject to the order whereby things are directed to the end, since by their means even other things are ordered to the end. Now the actions of intellectual substances are more intimately ordered to God in their end, than the actions of other things, as we have proved above. Therefore the actions of intellectual substances come under the order of providence, whereby God directs all things to Himself, more than the actions of other things.

Further. The government of providence proceeds from God's love for the things created by Him: for love consists chiefly in this, that the lover desires the good of the beloved. Consequently the more God loves a thing, the more it comes under His providence. This is the teaching of Holy Writ, Ps. 144:20 where it is said: The Lord keepeth all them that love Him: and the Philosopher also says (10 Ethic. viii.) that God cares most for those who love the intellect, as being His friends: from which we may conclude that He loves intellectual substances most of all. Therefore their acts of will and choice are the object of His providence.

Moreover. Man's interior goods which depend on his will and action, are more proper to man than external goods, such as acquiring wealth, and the like: wherefore a man is said to be good in respect of the former and not of the latter. Consequently if human choice and the movements of man's will do not come under divine providence, but only external happenings, it will be truer to say that human affairs are not the concern of providence than that they are. But the former saying is put into the mouth of blasphemers (Job 22:14): He doth not consider our things, and he walketh about the poles of heaven, and (Ezech. 9:9): The Lord hath forsaken the earth, and the Lord seeth not, and (Lament. 3:37): Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not?

Some passages in the Holy Doctrine might seem to give utterance to that opinion. Thus it is said (Ecclus. 15:14): God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel, and further on (17, 18): He hath set water and fire before thee: stretch forth thy hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him. Also (Deut. 30:15): Consider that I have set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand death and evil.—But these words indicate that man has a free-will, not that his choice is withdrawn from divine providence.

Likewise the statement of Gregory of Nyssa in his book On Man: Providence regards those things that are not in our power, and not those that are: and the saying of Damascene, who followed him, in the Second Book, that God knows but does not predetermine the things which are in our power, are to be understood as meaning that the things which are in our power are not subject to the divine predetermination in such a way as to be necessitated thereby.

CHAPTER XCI

HOW HUMAN AFFAIRS MAY BE REFERRED TO HIGHER CAUSES

FROM what has been proved we are able to gather how human affairs are to be referred to higher causes, and do not happen by chance.

For acts of choice and will are under the immediate governance of God. Human knowledge pertaining to the intellect is directed by God through angelic intermediaries. While things pertaining to the body, whether internal or external, and adapted to man's use, are governed by God by means of the angels and heavenly bodies. There is one general reason for this. Because every thing that is multiform, changeable and defectible must be referred to a principle that is uniform, unchangeable and indefectible. And every thing connected with us is multiform, changeable and defectible.

For it is clear that our choice is made in many different ways: since different people choose different things in different circumstances. Again our choice is changeable: both through the instability of the mind which is not firmly fixed on the last end; and because things themselves change in the midst of which we live. That man's choice is defectible is proved by his sins. On the other hand the divine will is uniform, since by willing one he wills all things, and is unchangeable and indefectible, as we proved in the First Book. Therefore all movements of will and choice must be traced to the divine will: and not to any other cause, because God alone is the cause of our willing and choosing.

In like manner our intelligence is manifold, since from many sensible objects we gather into one, as it were, the intelligible truth. It is also changeable since by discoursing it passes from one thing to another, from the known to the unknown. Again it is defectible, through admixture of imagination and sense, as the errors of men testify.—On the other hand the cognition of the angels is uniform, because they receive the knowledge of truth from the one fount of verity, namely God. It is also unchangeable, because they see the truth about things, not by discoursing from effects to cause or vice versa, but by simple intuition. It is also indefectible, since they see intuitively the very natures or quiddities of things in themselves, about which the intellect cannot err, as neither can the senses about their proper sensible objects: whereas we gather the nature of a thing from its accidents and effects. Therefore our intellectual knowledge must be ruled by the knowledge of the angels.

Again, as to human bodies and the external things of which men make use, it is evident that they are blended together and contrary to one another in many ways: also that they are not always moved in the same way, because their movements cannot be continual: and that they are defectible by alteration and corruption.—Whereas heavenly bodies are uniform, being simple and devoid of all contrariety. Also, their movements are uniform, continual and unchangeable. Nor can there be corruption or alteration in them. Consequently our bodies and whatever else serves for our use must be ruled by the movements of the heavenly bodies.

CHAPTER XCII

HOW A MAN MAY BE SAID TO BE FORTUNATE, AND HOW HE IS ASSISTED BY HIGHER CAUSES

IT may be seen from what has been said how a man is said to be fortunate.

For a man is said to have good luck when something good happens to him beside his intention: for instance when a man, while digging in a field, finds a treasure which he was not seeking. Now a man, while working, may do something beside his own intention, yet not beside the intention of someone above him: for instance, if a master send a servant to a place whither he had already sent another servant without the knowledge of the former, the finding of the latter is unintentional to the former, but not to the master who sent him: and therefore although in relation to this servant the meeting is fortuitous and casual, it is not so in relation to the master, but is intentional. Since then man, as to his body, is subordinate to the heavenly bodies; as to his intellect, to the angels; and as to his will, to God: it is possible for something to happen beside the intention of man, which is nevertheless according to the order of the heavenly bodies, or the influence of the angels or even of God. And although God's action alone has a direct bearing on man's choice, nevertheless the angel's action has a certain bearing on man's choice by way of persuasion; and the action of a heavenly body by way of disposition, insomuch as the corporeal impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies dispose us to choose in certain ways. Accordingly when, through the influence of higher causes, in the aforesaid manner, a man is led to choose such things as turn to his profit without his being aware of the utility by his own reason; and besides this, his understanding is enlightened from the light of intellectual substances to the effect of doing those same things; and through the divine operation his will is inclined so as to choose that which is profitable to him, without knowing why it is so; he is said to be fortunate; and on the contrary he is said to be unfortunate, when through the influence of higher causes his choice is inclined to contrary things; as it is said of someone (Jer. 22:30): Write this man barren, a man that shall not prosper in his days.

Yet herein we must observe a difference. For the impressions of heavenly bodies on our bodies cause in us natural dispositions of the body. Consequently from the disposition left in our body by a heavenly body, one is said not only to be fortunate or unfortunate, but also to have a good or a bad natural disposition, in which sense the Philosopher says (Magn. Moral., loc. cit.), that to be fortunate is to have, a good natural disposition. For it is inconceivable that the fact of one person choosing what is useful and another what is hurtful, without their knowing it, be due to these people differing in understanding, since the nature of understanding and will is the same in all: because a formal difference would cause a specific difference, and a material difference causes a difference of individuals. Consequently forasmuch as the human intellect is enlightened for the purpose of operation, or the will instigated by God, a man is not said to be well disposed by nature, but to be well guarded or well governed.

Again, another difference is to be observed here. For the operation of an angel and of a heavenly body merely disposes a man to choose, whereas the operation of God gives completion to his choice. And since the disposition arising from a quality affecting the body, or from the persuasion of the intellect, does not necessitate his choice, man does not always choose what his guardian angel intends, nor that to which the heavenly body inclines him: whereas he always chooses in accord with God’s operation in his will. Hence the guardianship of the angels is sometimes frustrated, according to Jer. 51:9: We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: and much more so the influence of heavenly bodies: whereas divine providence never fails.

Yet another difference must be observed. For since a heavenly body does not dispose a man to choose, except forasmuch as it makes an impression on our bodies, so that a man is influenced in his choice, in the same way as he is led by his passions to choose; every disposition towards choosing resulting from the influence of the heavenly bodies, is by way of a passion, as when one is led to make a certain choice, through hate, love, or anger and the like.—On the other hand, a man is disposed by an angel to make a certain choice, by way of intellectual consideration, without passion. And this happens in two ways. Sometimes man's understanding is enlightened by an angel so as to know only that a certain thing is good to do, without being instructed as to the reason for its being good, which reason depends on the end. Consequently sometimes a man thinks it good to do a certain thing, and yet were he asked why, he would answer that he did not know. Hence when he achieves the useful end, to which he had given no thought, it will be fortuitous for him. Sometimes he is instructed by the angel who enlightens him, both as to the goodness of a thing to be done, and as to the reason why it is good, which reason depends on the end. And so, when he achieves the end to which he looked forward, it will not be fortuitous.—It must also be noted that the active force of a spiritual nature surpasses that of a corporeal nature in being wider in its scope even as it is higher in its kind. Consequently the disposition caused by a heavenly body does not extend to all those things that come under the scope of man's choice.

Again. The power of the human soul or even of an angel is restricted in comparison with the divine power, which extends universally to all beings. Hence some good can happen to a man both beside his intention, and beside the influence of heavenly bodies, and beside the angelic enlightenment, but not beside divine providence which is the governor, even as it is the maker of being qua being, wherefore it must hold all things in its power. Consequently some good or evil may happen to a man by chance both in relation to himself, and in relation to heavenly bodies, and in relation to the angels, but not in relation to God. Because in relation to God not only in human affairs but in all things whatsoever, there then can be nothing fortuitous or unforeseen.

And since fortuitous things are those which are unintentional: and moral goods cannot be unintentional, because they are founded on choice, in their respect no man can be described as fortunate or unfortunate, although in their respect one may say that he has by nature a good or evil disposition, when through the natural dispositions of his body he is inclined to the choice of virtue or vice. With regard to external goods, which can accrue to man beside his intention, he may be described both as having a natural disposition for them, and as having good fortune, and as governed by God, and as guarded by the angels.

Man receives yet another assistance from the higher causes, with regard to the performance of his actions. For whereas man has the faculty to choose and to prosecute his choice, in either case he is sometimes helped by higher causes, and sometimes hindered. With regard to his choice, as we have said, in so far as a man is either disposed to choose a certain thing through the influence of heavenly bodies, or enlightened as it were through the guardianship of angels, or led through the operation of God.—With regard to the execution, in so far as man receives from some higher cause strength and efficiency to accomplish his choice. These things may come not only from God and the angels, but even from heavenly bodies, in so far as the aforesaid efficiency may be seated in the body. For it is evident that even inanimate bodies receive certain forces and efficiencies from heavenly bodies, even besides those which result from the active and passive qualities of the elements, which qualities, without any doubt, are subject to the heavenly bodies; thus that the magnet attracts iron is due to the power of a heavenly body, and in the same way certain stones and plants have occult powers. Wherefore there is no reason why one man should not receive through the influence of a heavenly body, a certain efficiency for certain corporeal effects, that is not possessed by another man: for instance, a physician for healing, a farmer for planting, a soldier for fighting. But this efficiency is bestowed on man by God much more perfectly for the purpose of accomplishing His works. Accordingly, as regards the first kind of assistance, which man receives in choosing, God is said to direct him: and as to the second, He is said to strengthen him. These two assistances are indicated in the Psalms, where it is said, in reference to the first: The Lord is my light and my salvation, whom shall I fear? and in reference to the second: The Lord is the protector of my life, of whom shall I be afraid?

There is, however, a twofold difference between these two assistances. The first is that by the first man is assisted both in things subject to his skill, and in others: whereas the second assistance extends only to such things for which man's skill is available. Thus if a man while digging a grave, find a treasure, this does not result from any skill of his: wherefore with a view to such a result a man may be assisted through being instigated to seek where the treasure is, but not by receiving the skill for finding treasures. But that a physician heal, or that a soldier conquer in battle, may result both from assistance received in the choice of means adopted to the end, and from skill received from a higher cause for the success of their actions. Hence the first assistance is more universal.—The other difference is that the second assistance is given for the purpose of accomplishing what one intends to do. Wherefore since the fortuitous is unintentional, a man cannot properly speaking be said to be fortunate through receiving such assistance, as he can through receiving the former kind of assistance, as we have shown above. Now, a man is fortunate or unfortunate sometimes when he acts alone, as when he finds a hidden treasure while he is digging: and sometimes through the concurrent action of another cause, as when a man while going to market intent on buying, meets a debtor whom he did not expect to meet. In the first instance the man was assisted to his good fortune, solely in that he was directed in the choice of something to which a profit was accidentally attached beside his intention. In the second instance both agents need to be directed to choose an action or movement resulting in their mutual encounter.

There is yet another observation to be made about the foregoing. For it has been said that the happening of good or bad fortune to a man, both is from God, and may be from a heavenly body: inasmuch as man is led by God to choose a thing to which some advantage or disadvantage is attached without being considered by the chooser; and in so far as he is disposed by a heavenly body to make such a choice. This advantage or disadvantage, in reference to man’s choice, is fortuitous; in reference to God, it is no longer fortuitous, whereas it is so in reference to the heavenly body. This is proved as follows. An event does not cease to be fortuitous until it is referred to its per se cause. Now, the power of a heavenly body is an active cause, not by way of understanding or choosing, but by way of nature: and it is proper to nature to tend to one thing. Accordingly if a certain effect is not one thing, no natural power can be its per se cause. And when two things are united together accidentally, they are one not really, but only accidentally. Wherefore no natural cause can be the per se cause of such a conjunction. Suppose then that the man in question is led through the impression of a heavenly body, as by a passion, as we said before, to dig a grave. Now the grave and the place of the treasure are not one thing save accidentally, because they have no mutual connection. Consequently the power of the heavenly body cannot cause an inclination per se to this effect considered as a whole, namely that the man in question should dig a grave and a place where a treasure is. Whereas one that acts through the intellect can cause an inclination to this whole, because it belongs to an intelligent being to direct many things to one. It is also plain that a man who knew the treasure to be there, might send another who knew it not, to dig a grave in the same place, so that he might find the treasure unintentionally. Accordingly such fortuitous events when referred to the divine causality, cease to be fortuitous, but not when they are referred to a heavenly cause.

The same argument shows that a man cannot be fortunate in every possible way through the influence of a heavenly body, but only in this or that respect. When I say in every way, I mean that a man is not by nature such that through the influence of a heavenly body, he chooses always or nearly always, those particular things to which some advantage or disadvantage is accidentally connected. For nature is directed to one thing only: and the things in regard to which man is fortunate or unfortunate are not reducible to one, but are indeterminate and infinite in number; as the Philosopher says (2 Phys. v.), and is evident to any one with sense. Therefore it is impossible for anyone to be of such a nature as invariably to choose those things which have some advantage incidental to them. But one may be inclined by a heavenly body to choose something to which an incidental advantage is attached, and by some other inclination, to choose something else, and by yet a third inclination, to choose yet another thing, but not by one inclination to choose them all. Whereas man can be directed to all things by the one divine disposition.

CHAPTER XCIII

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS FATE, AND WHAT IS IT?

WE may gather from the foregoing what we should think about fate. For observing that many things happen in this world accidentally, if particular causes be taken into consideration, some have maintained that such things are not subordinate to any superior causes. According to this opinion there is no such thing as fate. Others, however, endeavoured to refer such things to certain higher causes, asserting that they are directed thereby so as to proceed from them in orderly fashion. These held that there is fate, as though things which appear to happen by chance were effata, that is foretold or preordained by someone.

Some of these pretended to ascribe all contingent occurrences of this world to the causality of heavenly bodies, not excluding human elections, and they held that all such things are subject to the directing force of the stars, which force they called fate. This opinion is impossible and contrary to faith, as we have already shown.

Others, however, wished to assign to the direction of divine providence, all such things as appear to happen by chance in this lower world. Wherefore they maintained that all these things are subject to fate, this being the name given by them to the disposition which divine providence causes to be in things. Hence Boethius says that fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which providence connects each one with its proper order. In this definition disposition stands for order; the words inherent to things are included to differentiate fate from providence, because the order as existing in the divine mind and not yet impressed on things is providence, but as already expressed in things, is called fate;

changeable is added to show that the order of providence does not deprive things of contingency and changeableness, as some maintained.

In this sense to deny fate is to deny divine providence. Since, however, we should not use even names in common with unbelievers, lest use of the same expressions lead us into error: the faithful should not use the word fate, lest they seem to agree with those who having false notions about fate, subject all things to the force of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei, v., 1): If anyone gives the name of fate to God’s will or power, let him keep his opinion, but hold his tongue: and Gregory in the same sense says: Far be it from the minds of the faithful to think that fate is anything real.

CHAPTER XCIV

OF THE CERTAINTY OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE

A DIFFICULTY, however, arises from what has been said. For if all, even the contingent, happenings of this lower world, are subject to divine providence, it would follow seemingly that either providence is uncertain, or all happenings necessary.

For the Philosopher proves (6 Metaph.) that if we suppose every effect to have a per se cause, and again that given any per se cause, we must of necessity grant the effect: it will follow that all future events happen of necessity. For if every effect has a per se cause, every effect will be reducible to some cause either present or past. Thus if it be asked whether a certain man will be killed by robbers, this effect is preceded by a cause which is his being met by the robbers; and this effect is again preceded by another cause, namely that he went out; and this again was preceded by another cause, namely that he went to fetch some water; and this by another cause, namely that he was thirsty; and this was caused by his partaking of salt meat; which he is either eating now or has ate already. Accordingly if given the cause we must necessarily grant the effect: if he eats the salt meat, he is of necessity thirsty; if he thirsts, it is necessary that he wish to seek water; and if he wish to seek water, that he leave his house; and if he go out, that the robbers meet him; and if they meet him, that they kill him. Therefore from first to last, it is necessary that this eater of salt meat be killed by robbers. The Philosopher concludes then that it is untrue that given the cause, the effect must of necessity be granted also, since some of these causes may be ineffective. Nor again is it true that every effect has a per se cause: because that which is accidental, namely that the man who wants water should meet some robbers, has no cause.

This argument proves then that all effects reducible to a per se cause, whether present or past, which being given, the effect follows of necessity, happen themselves of necessity. Either therefore we must say that not all effects are subject to divine providence: and thus providence would not be about all things, contrary to what was proved above: or we must say that granted providence, it is not necessary for its effects to follow: and then providence will not be certain: or that all things must needs happen of necessity: for providence is not only in the present and the past, but from eternity, since nothing can be in God that is not eternal.

Further. If divine providence be certain this conditional proposition must be true: If God foresaw this, it will be. Now the antecedent of this proposition is necessary, for it is eternal. Therefore the consequence is necessary: because whenever the antecedent of a conditional proposition is necessary, the consequence is likewise necessary; so that the consequence is like a conclusion of the antecedent, and whatever follows from a necessity is itself a necessity. Accordingly if divine providence is certain, all things must happen of necessity.

Moreover. Supposing a thing to be foreseen by God, for instance that so and so will reign. Either then it is possible for it to happen that he does not reign, or it is not possible. If it be not possible for him not to reign, then it is impossible: therefore it is necessary that he will reign. On the other hand, if it be possible that he will not reign, then, since given a possibility nothing impossible follows, and whereas it does follow that divine providence is at fault, it remains that it is not impossible for divine providence to fail. Consequently it follows, if all things are foreseen by God, that either divine providence is uncertain, or that all things happen of necessity.

Again. Tully argues thus (2 De Divin., vii.): If all things are foreseen by God, the order of causes is certain. If this be true all things are subject to fate. If all things are subject to fate, nothing is subject to our power, and there is no such thing as free-will. Therefore if divine providence is certain, there is no free-will. And it will also follow that there is no such thing as a contingent cause.

Besides. Divine providence does not exclude intermediary causes, as we have proved. But some causes are contingent and defectible. Therefore the effect of divine providence may fail. Therefore God’s providence is uncertain.

In order to solve these difficulties, we must recall some points already laid down: so as to make it clear that nothing escapes from divine providence; and that the order of divine providence is utterly unchangeable; and that, notwithstanding, it does not follow that whatever results from divine providence, must happen of necessity.

First, we must observe that as God is the cause of all existent things by giving them their very being, the order of His providence must needs include all things: because to those things to which He has given being, He must grant a continuance of being, and perfection by attaining their last end.

Now in everyone that exercises providence there are two points for consideration, namely forethought about the order of things, and establishment of the premeditated order in the things subject to providence, the former pertaining to the cognitive, and the latter to the executive faculty: and there is this difference between them, that in designing the order, providence is so much the more perfect, as its order is more able to reach the most minute things. For it is owing to our defective knowledge which cannot comprise all individual things, that we are unable to arrange beforehand all the particulars; and a man is considered more fit to make provision according as his foresight extends to more particulars: and one whose foresight extends only to general considerations, has but a small share of prudence. The same may be observed in all productive arts. On the other hand, as regards the causing of the premeditated order to be in things, the providence of the governor is the higher in order and perfection, according as it is more universal, and brings about the realization of its forethought through more ministers: in fact the mere organization of these ministers has a large place in the order of providence.—Now God’s providence must be supremely perfect, because He is simply and universally perfect, as we proved in the First Book. Consequently in his providence He orders all things, even the most trivial, by the eternal forethought of His wisdom: and whatsoever things operate, do so as instruments moved by Him, and serve Him obediently, so as to bring forth into the world the order of providence excogitated, as it were, from eternity. —And if all things that are capable of action, must needs act as His ministers, it is impossible that any agent hinder the execution of divine providence, by acting contrary thereto. Nor again is it possible for divine providence to be hindered through a defect in any agent or patient, since every power, active or passive, is caused in things according to God's disposition. Again it is impossible for the execution of divine providence to be prevented through a change in the author of providence, since God is utterly unchangeable, as we have proved. It follows therefore that divine providence cannot possibly fail.

Secondly it must be observed that every agent aims at a good, and at a greater good so far as it is able, as we have proved. Now, the good and the better are not the same as considered in the whole and as considered in the parts. For in the whole the good consists in integrity which results from the order and composition of parts. Consequently for the whole it is better that there be disparity of parts, which is necessary for the order and perfection of the whole, than that all the parts be equal, each one being on a level with the most excellent part; whereas each part of inferior degree would be better, considered in itself, if it were on the same level as a higher part. Take, as an example, the human body: the foot would be a more excellent part if it possessed the beauty and power of the eye: but the whole body would be more imperfect, if it were deprived of the service of the foot. Accordingly the intention of the particular agent differs from that of the universal agent: for the particular agent aims at the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can; whereas the universal agent aims at the good of the whole. Consequently a defect is beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. Thus the generation of a female is clearly beside the intention of a particular nature, namely, of this particular virtue in this particular seed, the tendency of which is to make the embryo as perfect as possible: on the other hand it is the purpose of universal nature, namely of the power of the universal cause of generation in inferior beings, that a female be generated, which is a necessary condition for the generation of many animals. In like manner corruption, diminution, and every defect is in the purpose of universal nature, but not of the particular nature: because each thing shuns deficiency and, for its own part, aims at perfection. It is clear, then, that the particular agent aims at the greatest possible perfection of its effect in its kind; while the universal nature aims at a particular perfection in a particular effect, for instance the perfection of a male in one effect, that of a female in another.—

Among the parts of the whole universe the first distinction to be observed is between the contingent and the necessary: since the higher beings are necessary, incorruptible and unchangeable: and the lower a thing is, the more it falls short of this condition: so that the lowest are corruptible in their very being, are changeable in their disposition, and produce their effects, not of necessity but contingently. Wherefore every agent that is a part of the universe has a tendency to remain firm in its being and natural disposition, and to establish its effect: while God, who governs the universe, intends to establish some of His effects by way of necessity, and others by way of contingency. Accordingly He adapts various causes to those effects, to some necessary, to others contingent causes. Therefore it belongs to the order of divine providence, not only that such and such an effect be produced, but that it be caused necessarily, and that some other effect be produced contingently: and consequently some of the things subject to divine providence are necessary, and some contingent, and not all necessary.—It is therefore evident that although divine providence is the per se cause of a particular future effect; and although it is present and past, yet more truly eternal: it does not follow, as the first argument pretended, that this particular effect necessarily will be; for the divine providence is the per se cause that this particular effect will happen contingently. And this cannot fail.

Wherefore it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: If God foresaw that this would happen, it will be so, as the second argument stated. But it will be as God foresaw that it would be. Now, He foresaw that it would happen contingently. It follows then infallibly that it will be, contingently and not of necessity. It is also clear that if this thing which we suppose to be foreseen by God as future, be of a contingent nature, it will be possible for it not to happen considered in itself: for it is foreseen in such a way as to be contingent, and possible not to be. Yet the order of divine providence cannot fail but that it will happen contingently. Thus the third argument is solved. Consequently we may say that the man in question will not reign if we consider the statement in itself, but not if we consider it as foreseen.

Again the argument advanced by Tully appears of small account in the light of what we have said. For seeing that not only effects but also causes and modes of being are subject to divine providence, as is clear from the foregoing, it does not follow, if all things are ruled by divine providence, that nothing is under our control: for they are foreseen by God so as to be freely done by us.

Nor can the defectibility of second causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, deprive divine providence of certainty, as the fifth objection argued. For God Himself works in all things according to the decree of His will, as we proved above. Consequently it belongs to His providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from failing.

Such arguments as might be used to prove the necessity of things foreseen by God from the certitude of His knowledge, were solved above when we were treating of the divine knowledge.

CHAPTERS XCV AND XCVI

THAT THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE USEFULNESS OF PRAYER

WE must also observe that as the unchangeableness of providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it exclude the usefulness of prayer. For we do not pray that the external disposition of His providence may be changed, since this is impossible, but that He may grant what we desire. For it is fitting that God should assent to the pious yearnings of the rational creature, not that our desires have the effect of changing a God who is unchangeable, but as an effect befitting His goodness in granting our desires. Because since all things naturally desire the good, as we have proved, and since it belongs to the supereminent divine goodness to bestow being and well-being on all things in a certain order, it follows that He fulfils, according to His goodness, the pious desires of which our prayers are the expression.

Again. He who causes a thing to move, should lead that thing to the end: so that by the same nature, a thing is moved to its end, attains to that end and rests therein. Now every desire is a movement to a good: and it cannot be in a thing except it come from God, who is good in His essence, and the source of goodness: for every mover moves to its like. Therefore it belongs to God, according to His goodness, to bring to a fitting issue the reasonable desires which are expressed by means of one’s prayers.

Besides. The nearer things are to their mover, the more effectively do they receive the mover’s impression: thus the things nearer to a fire are more heated thereby. Now intellectual substances are nearer to God than inanimate natural substances. Consequently the impression of the divine motion is more efficacious in intellectual substances than in other natural substances. Now natural bodies participate in the divine motion to this extent that they receive therefrom a natural appetite for the good, as well as the fulfilment of that appetite, which is realized when they attain to their respective ends. Much more therefore do intellectual substances attain to the fulfilment of their desires which are proffered to God in their prayers.

Moreover. It is essential to friendship that the lover wish the desire of the beloved to be fulfilled, inasmuch as he seeks his good and perfection: hence it has been said that friends have but one will. Now we have proved that God loves His creature, and so much the more as it has a greater share of His goodness, which is the first and chief object of His love. Hence He wills the desires of the rational creature to be fulfilled, since of all creatures it participates most perfectly in the divine goodness. Now it is from His will that things derive their being, because He is the cause of things through His will, as was proved above. Therefore it belongs to God's goodness to fulfil the rational creature's desires, as laid before him in our prayers.

Besides. The creature's good flows from the divine goodness, in a kind of likeness thereto. Now it is seemingly a most praiseworthy trait in a man if he grant the prayers of those who ask aright; since for this reason is he said to be liberal, gentle, merciful and kind. Therefore it belongs in a special manner to the divine goodness to grant pious prayers.

Wherefore it is said in the Psalm (144:19): He will do the will of them that fear Him, and He will hear their prayers and save them: and (Matth. 7:8) our Lord says: Every one that asketh receiveth: and he that seeketh, findeth; and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened.

And yet it is not unfitting that sometimes the petitions of those who pray be not granted by God.

For it was proved that God fulfils the desires of the rational creature, inasmuch as the good is the object of the creature's desire. Sometimes, however, it happens that what we seek is good not truly but apparently, and is simply evil. Such a prayer, therefore, cannot be granted by God: hence it is said (James 4:3): You ask and you receive not, because you ask amiss.

Again, it was shown to be fitting that God fulfils our desires, because he moves us to desire. Now the thing moved is not brought to the end of its movement unless the movement continue. Accordingly if the movement of desire be not continued by repeated prayer, it is not unfitting if the prayer be ineffectual. Thus our Lord says (Lk. 18:1) that we ought always to pray and not to faint: and (1 Thess. 5:17) the Apostle says: Pray without ceasing.

Further. We proved that God fittingly fulfils the desire of the rational creature on account of its being near to God. Now a man approaches to God by contemplation, devout affections, and humble but firm resolutions. A prayer, therefore, that lacks these conditions in its approach to God, does not deserve to be granted by Him. Hence it is said in the Psalm (101:18): He hath had regard to the prayer of the humble; and (James 1:6): Let him ask in faith, nothing wavering.

Moreover. We proved that God grants the prayers of the devout on the score of friendship. Consequently if a man rejects God’s friendship, his prayer is unworthy of being granted. Hence it is said (Prov. 28:9): He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination: and (Isa. 1:15): When you multiply prayer, I will not hear, for your hands are full of blood. It is on the same principle that sometimes a friend of God is not heard when he prays for those who are not God’s friends: thus it is said (Jer. 7:16): Therefore do not thou pray for this people, nor take to thee praise and supplication for them: and do not withstand me: for I will not hear thee.

It happens, too, sometimes that through friendship a man refuses his friend’s request, because he knows it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him: even as a physician will sometimes refuse a sick man what he asks, knowing that it is not good for his health. Wherefore, since it has been proved that God, for love of the rational creature, fulfils the desires set forth in his prayers, we must not be surprised if sometimes He fulfil not the prayers of those even who are most dear to Him, that He may accomplish what is best for the welfare of the suppliant. For this He removed not from Paul the thorn in his flesh, though thrice he prayed for this, because he foresaw that this would be good for him by keeping him humble, as related in 2 Cor. 12:8, 9. Hence also (Matth. 20:22) our Lord said to some: You know not what you ask: and (Rom. 8:26) it is said: For we know not what we should pray for as we ought. For this reason Augustine says (Ep. ad Paulin. et Theras.): The Lord is good, for often He grants not what we want, that He may give what we want more.

It is clear then from what has been said, that prayers and pious desires are the cause of some of the things done by God. Now it has been shown that God's providence does not exclude other causes: rather indeed does He dispose of them so that the order appointed by His providence may be established in things. Consequently second causes are not inconsistent with providence, in fact they accomplish the effect of providence. Accordingly prayers are efficacious before God: yet they do not upset the unchangeable order of divine providence: since even the granting of each suppliant's prayer is included in the order of divine providence. To say, therefore, that we must not pray that we may obtain something from God, because the order of His providence is unchangeable, is like saying that we must not walk in order to arrive at a place, nor eat that we may have nourishment, both of which are clearly absurd.

By the foregoing we refute a twofold error about prayer. For some have said that prayer has no fruit. This was asserted both by those who, like the Epicureans, utterly denied divine providence; and by those who like certain Peripatetics withdrew human affairs from the providence of God; and again by those who with the Stoics contended that all things subject to providence happen of necessity. For it results from all these opinions that prayer produces no fruit, and that consequently all worship of the Godhead is in vain. There is an allusion to this error in Malach. 3:14: You have said: He laboureth in vain that serveth God. And what profit is it that we have kept His ordinances, and that we have walked sorrowful before the Lord of hosts? On the other hand some have contended that the divine ordinance can be changed by our prayers: thus the Egyptians said that fate was averted by prayers, certain images, incensings or incantations. Certain passages in Holy Writ would seem at the first glance to admit of being taken in this sense. For it is related (Isa. 38:1–5) that Isaias, at God's command, said to King Ezechias: Thus saith the Lord: Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and shalt not live, and that after Ezechias had prayed, the word of the Lord came to Isaias saying: Go and say to Ezechias … I have heard thy prayer … behold I will add to thy days fifteen years.—Also (Jerem. 18:7, 8) it is said in the name of God: I will suddenly speak against a nation, and against a kingdom, to root out, to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them. And (Joel 2:13, 14): Turn to the

Lord your God; for He is gracious and merciful.… Who knoweth but He will return and forgive?

These passages, if taken in their superficial sense, lead to an impossibility. For, in the first place, it follows that God’s will is changeable. Also, that God acquires something from the course of time. Further, that things happening in time to creatures cause something that is in God. These are all impossible as appears evidently from what has been already laid down.

They are also contrary to Holy Writ which contains the expression of infallible truth. For it is said (Num. 23:19): God is not as a man that He should lie, nor as the son of man that He should be changed. Hath He said then, and will He not do? Hath He spoken, and will He not fulfil? And (1 Kings 15:29): The triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance: for He is not a man that He should repent. And (Malach. 3:6): I am the Lord and I change not.

Now it suffices to consider carefully what we have said above for one to realize that every error occurring in the present matter is due to one’s overlooking the difference between the universal and the particular orders. For, since all effects are ordained one to another, forasmuch as they have one common cause, this order must needs be the more general, as the cause is more universal. Hence the order appointed by the universal cause which is God must of necessity include all things. There is nothing therefore to prevent a particular order being changed through prayer or in some other manner: because there is outside that order something that can change it. Wherefore it is not strange that the Egyptians, who referred the ordering of human affairs to the heavenly bodies, held that fate, having its origin in the stars, can be changed by certain prayers and rites; because outside and above the heavenly bodies there is God, who can hinder the heavenly bodies from producing the effect which was to have taken place in this lower world as a result of their influence.—But outside that order which includes all things, it is not possible to assign a thing whereby the order depending on the universal cause can be subverted. For this reason the Stoics who referred the ordering of all things to God as the universal cause, held that the order appointed by God is utterly unchangeable. But these again failed to consider the universal order, in that they held prayers to be altogether useless, thus implying that man’s volitions and desires, which lead him to pray, are not included in that universal order. For, when they say that whether we pray or not, the result is the same on account of the universal order of things, it is clear that they exclude the suppliant's prayers from that order. For if they were contained in that order, effects would follow through the divine ordinance from these even as they follow through other causes. Accordingly to deny the efficacy of prayer is to deny the efficacy of all other causes. And if the unchangeableness of the divine order does not deprive other causes of their efficacy neither does it destroy the efficacy of prayer. Therefore prayers are useful, not as though they brought about a change in the order appointed from eternity, but as included in that very order. On the other hand, there is no reason why the particular order of an inferior cause should not be changed by God through the efficacy of prayer: for He transcends all causes, so that He is not bound by the order of any cause, but on the contrary all necessity imposed by the order of a lower cause is subject to Him, because it originated from Him. Accordingly when some change is brought about by prayer, in the order of inferior causes, God is said to return or to repent: not that His eternal ordinance is changed, but that some effect of His is changed. Hence Gregory says that God changes not His mind although at times He changes His sentence: not that, mark you, which expresses His eternal decree, but that which expresses the order of lower causes, in keeping with which Ezechias was to die, and a nation was to be exterminated for its sins. Such a change of sentence is described metaphorically as repentance in God, forasmuch as He behaves like a penitent, who shows himself penitent by changing his behaviour. In the same way He is said figuratively to be angry, forasmuch as by punishing He does what an angry man does.

CHAPTER XCVII

HOW THERE IS A REASON FOR DIVINE PROVIDENCE

FROM what has been said, one can see clearly that things are arranged by divine providence for a definite reason.

For we have proved that God, by His providence, directs all things to His goodness as their end: not indeed as though His goodness gained any thing from the things that are made, but in order that the likeness of His goodness may be impressed on things as far as possible. And since every created substance must needs fall short of the perfection of the divine goodness; it was necessary, in order that the divine goodness might the more perfectly be bestowed on things, that there should be diversity among them, so that what could not be perfectly represented by one single thing, might be more perfectly represented in various ways by things of various kinds. Thus when man finds that he cannot adequately express an idea by one word, he uses several words so as to express his idea in several ways. In this too we are able to consider the eminence of the divine perfection, since perfect goodness, which in God exists in a united and simple manner, cannot be in creatures otherwise than in many ways and many subjects. Now things are diversified through having divers forms whence they derive their species. Consequently the reason for diversity in the forms of things is taken from the end.

Again the reason of the order in things is taken from the diversity of forms. Because, as it is from the form that a thing has its being; and as a thing, forasmuch as it has being, approaches to a likeness to God, who is His own simple being: it follows of necessity that the form is nothing else than a participation of the divine similitude in things. Wherefore Aristotle, speaking of the form, rightly says (1 Phys. ix.) that it is something godlike and desirable. Now likeness to one simple thing cannot be diversified except through the resemblance being more or less close, or more or less distant. And the closer a thing approaches to the divine resemblance the more perfect it is. Consequently diversity of forms must be according as one is more perfect than another: for which reason Aristotle (8 Metaph.) likens definitions, whereby the natures and forms of things are indicated, to numbers wherein species are diversified by addition or subtraction of unity, thus giving us to understand that diversity of forms requires divers degrees of perfection. This is evident to anyone who studies the natures of things. For, if he consider carefully, he will find that the diversity of things is made up of degrees; since above inanimate bodies he will find plants, and above these irrational animals, above these intelligent substances; and in each one of these he will find diversity according as some are more perfect than others; so much so, that the highest members of a lower genus appear to be close to the higher genus, and conversely: thus animals that cannot move are like plants. Hence Dionysius says (De Div. Nom. vii.) that divine wisdom has joined together the last things of higher degree to the first things of lower degree. Therefore it is clear that the diversity of things requires that all be not equal; and that there be order and degrees.

From the diversity of forms whence things derive their specific differences, there follows the difference of operations. For since things act according as they are actual, because those that are in potentiality, as such, are devoid of action; and since a thing is actual by its form: a thing’s operation must needs follow its form. Accordingly if there be divers forms, these must have divers operations.

Again, since each thing attains to its proper end by its proper action, it follows that there must be divers proper ends in things: although there is one common end of all.

Moreover, from the diversity of forms there results in matter a diversity of habitude in relation to things. For since forms are diverse according as some are more perfect than others, some of them are perfect to the extent of being subsistent and complete in themselves, having no need of matter as a support. Whereas some are unable to subsist perfectly by themselves, and require matter to uphold them, so that what subsists is not a form only, nor matter only,—which by itself is not an actual being,—but something composed of both.

Now matter and form would be unable to concur in making one thing unless they were mutually proportionate. And if they need to be proportionate, it follows that divers matters correspond to divers forms. Consequently certain forms require simple, while others require complex matter; and to divers forms there must correspond divers composition of parts, in keeping with the species and operation of the form.

From the divers habitudes in relation to matter there results diversity of agents and patients. For since a thing acts by reason of its form, it follows that things which have more perfect and less material forms, act on those that are more material and have more imperfect forms.

Again, from diversity of forms, matters and agents there results diversity of properties and accidents. For since substance is the cause of accident, as the perfect of the imperfect, it follows that divers proper accidents must result from divers substantial principles. Moreover, since divers agents produce divers impressions on patients, it follows that a diversity of agents must result in a diversity of accidents resulting from their activity.

From what has been said then, it is clear that it is not without reason that divine providence has appointed to creatures divers accidents, actions, passions and orders. Wherefore Holy Writ ascribes the formation and government of things to the divine wisdom and prudence. Thus it is said (Prov. 3:19, 20): The Lord by wisdom hath founded the earth: He hath established the heavens by prudence. By His wisdom the depths have broken out, and the clouds grow thick with dew. Again (Wis. 8:1) it is said, that divine wisdom reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly. And (ibid. 11:21): Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight, where by measure we are to understand the quantity, mode, or degree of perfection in each thing: by number, the multitude and diversity of species resulting from the various degress of perfection; and by weight the various inclinations of things to their respective ends and operations, agents and patients, and such accidents as result from diversity of species.

In this same order wherein we find the reason of divine providence, we have stated that the first place must be assigned to the divine goodness, as being the last end, which is the first principle in practical matters; after this comes the multiplicity of things, and this cannot result but from a diversity of grades in forms and matters, agents and patients, actions and accidents. Accordingly as the fundamental reason of divine providence, absolutely speaking, is the divine goodness, so the fundamental reason in creatures is their multiplicity, to the making and preservation of which all other things are apparently subordinate. In this sense Bœthius, it would seem, rightly said (1 Arith. ii.) that number seems to have been the aim of nature in the original formation of things.

We must, however, observe that practical and speculative reason partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that as speculative reason starts from a principle, and employs means to reach the intended conclusion, so the practical reason begins from some first principle and through certain means arrives at the intended operation or product of operation. In speculative matters the principle is the form and what a thing is; whereas in practical matters it is the end, which sometimes is a form, at other times something else. Moreover, the principle in operative matters must always be necessary, whereas in practical things it is sometimes necessary and sometimes not: thus it is necessary that man desire happiness as his end, but it is not necessary that he desire to build a house. Likewise in demonstrations, that which follows is always a necessary sequel to that which precedes, but in practical matters not always, and only when the end cannot be obtained except by the way indicated: thus he who would build a house must needs get some wood, but it depends on his simple will, and not on his will to build a house, that he gets deal.

Accordingly that God love His own goodness is something necessary, but it does not necessarily follow from this that it should be reflected in creatures, since the divine goodness is perfect without this. Consequently although the divine goodness is the reason why creatures were originally brought into being, yet this depends on the simple will of God.—Supposing, however, that God wishes to communicate His goodness to His creatures by way of likeness as far as it is possible, this is the reason why creatures are of divers kinds: although there is no necessity for this diversity being according to this or that degree of perfection, or this or that number of things.—And supposing it to be God’s will to establish a particular number in things, and to bestow on each thing a particular measure of perfection, this is the reason why a particular thing has such and such a form and such and such matter: and so on in like manner. It is therefore clear that the dispensations of providence are according to a certain reason, and yet this reason presupposes the divine will. Accordingly a twofold error is refuted by what we have said. First, there is the error of those who maintained that all things are the result of God's simple will without any reason. This is the error of the Moslem theologians in the law of the Mohammedans, as Rabbi Moses relates, according to whom the sole reason why fire heats rather than chills is because God so wills. Secondly, we refute the error of those who assert that the ordering of causes proceeds from divine providence by way of necessity. Both of which are false, as is clear from what has been said.

There are certain expressions of Scripture that would seem to ascribe all things to God's simple will. But such things are said, not to remove reason from the dispensations of providence, but to show that God's will is the first principle of all things, as we have already shown. Such are the words of the Psalm: Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done, and of Job 9:12: Who can say: Why dost Thou so? and of Rom. 9:19: Who resisteth His will? Augustine likewise says (3 De Trin. iii., iv.): God's will alone is the first cause of health and sickness, reward and punishment, grace and retribution. Accordingly if we be asked the wherefore of a particular natural effect, we can assign the reason to some proximate cause: provided, however, that we refer all things to the divine will as their first cause. Thus if it be asked: Why was the wood heated at the presence of fire? we reply: Because to heat is fire's natural action: and this, because heat is its proper accident: and this results from its proper form: and so on until we come to the divine will. Hence if we reply to the question Why was the wood made hot? by saying: Because God so willed: we shall answer rightly, if we intend to trace the question back to its first cause, but incorrectly if we intend to exclude all other causes.

CHAPTER XCVIII

HOW IT IS POSSIBLE, AND HOW IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, FOR GOD TO DO SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE ORDER OF HIS PROVIDENCE

FROM what has been said we are able to consider a twofold order: the one, dependent on the first cause of all things, so that it comprises all; the other, a particular order, dependent on a created cause, and comprising such things as are subordinate to that cause. The latter order is manifold, in accordance with the diversity of causes to be found among creatures. Yet one such order is subordinate to another, even as one cause is subordinate to another. Consequently all these particular orders are comprised under that universal order, and are subordinate to that order whereby things are dependent on the first cause. We have an example of this in civil affairs. For there is a certain order among all the members of a household according as they are subject to the head of the house: again the head of the house together with all the other heads of houses in the same city have a certain order among themselves, and in relation to the governor of the city; and he again together with all the other governors in the kingdom is subordinate to the king.

This universal order in respect whereof all things are ordered by divine providence, may be considered in two ways: namely, with regard to things subject to that order, and with regard to the reason of the order, which depends on the principle of the order.

Now we proved in the Second Book that the things themselves which are placed in order by God, proceed from him as from an agent that is not necessitated either by nature or by anything else, but from his simple will, especially as regards the original establishment of things. Consequently God can do certain things besides those which are comprised under the order of divine providence: since his power is not bound to the latter.

On the other hand if we consider the aforesaid order with respect to the reason dependent on the principle, then it is not possible for God to do anything outside that order. Because this order, as we have proved, proceeds from the knowledge and will of God who directs all things to his goodness as their end. Now, it is not possible that God do anything that is not willed by him: since creatures proceed from him, not because it is natural that they should, but because he wills them to, as we have proved. Nor is it possible for anything to be done by him that is not included in his knowledge, since nothing can be willed that is not known. Nor again is it possible for him to do anything as regards creatures, that is not directed to his goodness as its end, since his goodness is the proper object of his will. Likewise, since God is utterly unchangeable, he cannot possibly will that which he willed not before, or begin to know something anew, or direct it to his goodness. Therefore God can do nothing but what is comprised in the order of his providence, even as he cannot do but what is subject to his operation. And yet, if we consider his power absolutely, he can do other things besides those that are subject to his providence or operation: but he cannot do what has not been eternally contained in the order of his providence, because he is unchangeable. Through failing to observe this distinction some have fallen into various errors. Some in an endeavour to extend to things themselves the unchangeableness of the divine order, said that all things must of necessity be as they are; so much so, that some declared that God is unable to do except what he does. Against this we have the words of Matth. 26:53: Cannot I ask my Father, and he will give me presently more than twelve legions of angels?

On the other hand, some, thinking in their carnal wisdom that God, like carnal man, is inconstant of will, ascribed the changeableness of things subject to divine providence, to changeableness in divine providence itself. Against this it is said (Num. 23:19): God is not as a man that he should lie; nor as the son of man that He should be changed.

Others again withdrew contingent things from divine providence. Against these it is said (Lament, 3:37): Who is he that hath commanded a thing to be done, when the Lord commandeth it not?

CHAPTER XCIX

THAT GOD CAN WORK OUTSIDE THE ORDER IMPOSED ON THINGS, BY PRODUCING EFFECTS WITHOUT THEIR PROXIMATE CAUSES

IT remains to be proved that he can act outside the order imposed on things by himself.

For the order imposed on things by God is that lower things be moved by higher, as was shown above. Now God can act independently of this order: in other words he can himself produce an effect in inferior things, without a higher agent doing anything towards that effect. For the agent that works by natural necessity differs from the agent that acts by will, in that the effect cannot result from the former except according to the mode of its active power; so that the agent which has very great power cannot produce immediately a small effect, but produces an effect proportionate to its power. In this effect, however, there will be sometimes less power than in its cause, so that at length through many intermediaries a small effect results from the highest cause. But it is not so in the agent that acts by its will. Because the agent that acts by its will can at once without any intermediary produce any effect that does not surpass its power: thus the most perfect craftsman can produce a work such as an imperfect craftsman would produce.

Now God works by his will, and not by necessity of nature, as we proved above. Therefore he can produce minor effects, that are produced by inferior causes, immediately without their proper causes.

Again. The divine power is compared to all active powers as a universal power to particular powers, as is clear from what has been said above. Now an active universal power may be determined to the production of a particular effect, in two ways. First, by a particular intermediary cause: thus the active power of a heavenly body is determined to the effect which is the begetting of a man, by the particular power seated in the semen: and thus again, the power of the general proposition in a syllogism is determined to a particular conclusion, by the application of a particular proposition. Secondly, by an intellect which apprehends a particular form and produces it in the effect. Now the divine intellect knows not only its own essence which is like a universal active power; and not only universal and first causes, but also all particular causes, as we have proved above. Therefore God can produce immediately every effect that is produced by any particular agent.

Further. Since accidents result from the essential principles of a thing, it follows that he who is the immediate cause of the essence, is able to produce in a thing whatever results from its essence: for the generator which gives the form, gives likewise all the resultant properties and movements. Now, we have shown that God, in the original production of things, brought all things into being immediately by creation. Therefore he can cause an effect to result in anything whatsoever independently of middle causes.

Besides. The order of things emanates from God into things according to the forecast of His intelligence: thus in human affairs we see that the head of the state imposes on the citizens the order preconceived by him. Now the divine intellect is not necessarily confined to this particular order, so as to be unable to conceive any other: since even we are able by our intellect to apprehend another order: for it is intelligible to us that God might make a man of earth and not of seed. Therefore God can produce an effect without the inferior causes to which that effect is proper.

Moreover. Although the order imposed on things by divine providence reflects the divine goodness according to its mode, yet it does not reflect it perfectly: since the creature’s goodness does not reach to an equality with the goodness of God. Now, that which is not perfectly represented by one copy, can be represented again in some other way besides. And the representation of the divine goodness in things is the end of their production by God, as above stated. Therefore God's will is not confined to this particular order of causes and effects, as though he could not choose to produce an effect in lower things immediately and independently of other causes.

Further. All creatures are more subject to God, than man's body is to his soul: for the soul is proportionate to the body as its form, whereas God surpasses all proportion to the creature. Now, sometimes when the soul imagines a thing and is strongly drawn towards it, there results a change in the body in the direction of health or sickness, independently of any action on the part of those bodily principles, whose natural function is to cause sickness or health in the body. Much more, therefore, by the divine will can an effect be produced in creatures, independently of the causes which in the course of nature produce that effect naturally.

Further. According to the order of nature, the active forces of the elements are subordinate to the active powers of heavenly bodies. Now, sometimes the power of a heavenly body produces an effect proper to elemental forces without the action of an element: thus the sun heats without the action of fire. Much more therefore can the power of God produce the effects of created causes without any action on their part.

If, however, anyone were to say that since God has implanted this order in things, he cannot produce in them effects apart from their proper causes without a change in himself: he can be answered by referring to the very nature of things. For the order imposed on things by God is in keeping with that which is wont to occur in things for the most part, but it is not everywhere in keeping with what always occurs: because many natural causes produce their effects in the same way usually, but not always; since sometimes, though seldom, it happens otherwise, whether on account of a defect in the power of the agent, or through indisposition of the matter, or by reason of a stronger agency: as when nature produces a sixth finger in a man.

Yet the order of providence does not therefore fail or change: because the very fact that the natural order, established according to what happens for the most part, happens at times to fail, is subject to divine providence. Wherefore if it be possible for the natural order to be changed by a created power from that which is of frequent to that which is of rare occurrence, without any change in divine providence, much more can the divine power at times work apart from the order assigned by God to nature, without prejudice to His providence. In fact He does this sometimes in order to manifest His power. For by no other means can it better be made manifest that all nature is subject to the divine will, than by the fact that sometimes He works independently of the natural order: since this shows that the order of things proceeded from Him, not of natural necessity, but of His free will.

Nor should it be deemed a paltry reason, that God should produce something in nature in order to manifest Himself to the minds of men: since it was shown above that all corporeal creatures are in some way directed to an intellectual nature as their end; while the end of the intellectual creature itself is the knowledge of God, as we have proved. It is not strange, then, if some change be wrought in a corporeal substance, in order to bring the intellectual nature to the knowledge of God.

CHAPTER C

THAT WHAT GOD DOES BESIDE THE ORDER OF NATURE IS NOT CONTRARY TO NATURE

IT would seem, however, necessary to observe that although God sometimes does something beside the order assigned to things, he does nothing contrary to nature.

For since God is pure act, whereas all other things have some admixture of potentiality, it follows that God must be compared to all things as the mover to the thing moved, and as the active to the potential. Now, when that which in the natural order is in potentiality with regard to a certain agent, is acted upon by that agent, this is not contrary to nature simply, although sometimes it is contrary to that particular form which is corrupted by such action: thus when fire is generated, and air is corrupted through the action of the fire, both generation and corruption are natural. Consequently whatever is done by God in created things is not contrary to nature, although it may seem to be contrary to the order proper to a particular nature.

Again. Since God is the first agent, as we have proved, all subsequent agents are likened to His instruments. Now, the purpose of an instrument is to serve the action of the principal agent while it is being moved by it: wherefore the matter and form of an instrument must be such as to be suitable for the action intended by the principal agent. Hence it is not contrary but most becoming to the nature of an instrument to be moved by the principal agent. Neither, therefore, is it contrary to nature, that creatures be moved by God in any way whatsoever: since they were made that they might serve Him.

Further. Even in corporeal agents we observe that the movements resulting in inferior bodies from the influence of higher bodies, are neither violent nor unnatural, although they may seem unbecoming to the natural movement which the inferior body has, as being proper to its form: for we do not say that the ebb and flow of the sea is a violent movement, since it results from the influence of a heavenly body, although the natural movement of water is only in one direction, namely to the centre. Much less, therefore, can whatsoever God does in any creature, be described as violent or unnatural.

Besides. The first measure of every essence and nature is God, as the first being, which is the cause of being in all other things. Since then we judge of everything by its measure, we must regard as natural to a thing, that whereby it is conformed to its measure. Hence whatever is implanted in a thing by God, is natural to that thing. Therefore if something else be implanted by God in that same thing, it will not be unnatural.

Moreover. All creatures are compared to God, as works of art are compared to the artist, as appears from what we have already said. Hence all nature is the work of the divine art. Now it is not inconsistent with a work of art that the artist make some alteration in his work, even after giving it its first form. Neither, therefore is it contrary to nature if God does something in natural things, other than that which occurs in the ordinary course of nature. Wherefore Augustine says: God the creator and author of all natures, does nothing unnatural: because to each thing, that is natural which is caused by Him from whom is all measure, number and order in nature.

CHAPTER CI

OF MIRACLES

THESE works that are sometimes done by God outside the usual order assigned to things are wont to be called miracles: because we are astonished (admiramur) at a thing when we see an effect without knowing the cause. And since at times one and the same cause is known to some and unknown to others, it happens that of several who see an effect, some are astonished and some not: thus an astronomer is not astonished when he sees an eclipse of the sun, for he knows the cause; whereas one who is ignorant of this science must needs wonder, since he knows not the cause. Wherefore it is wonderful to the latter but not to the former. Accordingly a thing is wonderful simply, when its cause is hidden simply: and this is what we mean by a miracle: something, to wit, that is wonderful in itself and not only in respect of this person or that. Now God is the cause which is hidden to every man simply: for we have proved above that in this state of life no man can comprehend Him by his intellect. Therefore properly speaking miracles are works done by God outside the order usually observed in things.

Of these miracles there are various degrees and orders. The highest degree in miracles comprises those works wherein something is done by God, that nature can never do: for instance, that two bodies occupy the same place, that the sun recede or stand still, that the sea be divided and make way to passers by. Among these there is a certain order: for the greater the work done by God, and the further it is removed from the capability of nature, the greater the miracle: thus it is a greater miracle that the sun recede, than that the waters be divided. The second degree in miracles belongs to those whereby God does something that nature can do, but not in the same order: thus it is a work of nature that an animal live, see and walk: but that an animal live after being dead, see after being blind, walk after being lame, this nature cannot do, but God does these things sometimes by a miracle. Among these miracles also, there are degrees, according as the thing done is further removed from the faculty of nature.

The third degree of miracles is when God does what is wont to be done by the operation of nature, but without the operation of the natural principles: for instance when by the power of God a man is cured of a fever that nature is able to cure; or when it rains without the operation of the principles of nature.

CHAPTER CII

THAT GOD ALONE WORKS MIRACLES

FROM what has been said it can be shown that God alone can work miracles.

For whatever is entirely subject to an order cannot do anything above that order. Now, every creature is placed under the order established in things by God. Therefore no creature can do anything above that order: which is to work miracles.

Again. When a finite power produces its proper effect to which it is confined, it is not a miracle: although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand that power: thus to an ignorant person it is wonderful that the magnet attracts iron, or that a small fish should stop a ship. Now every creature's power is limited to one definite effect, or to some. Therefore whatever is done by the power of any creature whatsoever, cannot be properly described as a miracle, although it may be wonderful to one who does not understand the power of the creature in question. But that which is done by the power of God, which, being infinite, is incomprehensible, is truly a miracle.

Moreover. Every creature requires in its action a subject on which to act: for it belongs to God alone to make something out of nothing, as we proved above. Now, that which requires a subject in its action, can do nothing but those things to which that subject is in potentiality: since the agent acts on the subject in order to bring it from potentiality to act. Therefore even as a creature cannot create, so neither can it do in a thing, save what is in the potentiality of that thing. But in many miracles wrought by God, something is done in a thing, that is not in that thing's potentiality: for instance that the dead live again, that the sun recede, that two bodies occupy the same place. Wherefore such miracles cannot be wrought by any created power.

Further. The subject acted upon is ordered both to the agent that brings it from potentiality to act, and to the act to which it is brought. Accordingly just as any particular subject is in potentiality to a particular definite act, and not to any act, so it cannot be brought from potentiality to a definite act, except by some definite agent: for agents must needs differ according as they introduce different acts: thus, whereas air is potentially fire or water, one agent makes it to be actually fire, and another makes it to be actually water. Likewise it is clear that corporeal matter is not brought to a perfect actuality by the sole action of a universal power, and there must needs be some proper agent, whereby the action of the universal power is determined to a definite effect. Nevertheless corporeal matter can be brought to a less perfect actuality by the universal power alone, without a particular agent: thus perfect animals are not formed by the power of a heavenly body alone, but determinate seed is necessary; whereas the power of a heavenly body, without any seed, suffices for the generation of certain imperfect animals. Accordingly, effects produced among these lower things, if they be of a nature to be wrought by universal higher causes, without the action of particular inferior causes, can be produced in this way without any miracle: thus it is not a miracle that animals be formed from putrefaction without seed. But if they be not of a nature to be produced by superior causes alone, then particular inferior causes are required for their perfect formation. Now there is no miracle if an effect be produced by a higher cause, by means of its proper principles. Therefore it is altogether impossible for miracles to be wrought by the power of the higher creatures.

Moreover. Seemingly these amount to the same:—the production of a work out of a subject;—the production of that to which the subject is in potentiality;—and the orderly production of something through definite intermediary stages. Because a subject is not in proximate potentiality to the ultimate effect, until it has arrived at the middle stage: thus food is not in immediate potentiality flesh, but only when it is changed into blood. Now, every creature needs a subject in order to produce something: nor can it produce other than that to which the subject is in potentiality, as we have shown. Therefore it cannot produce anything without bringing the subject to actuality through definite intervening stages. Therefore miracles which consist in something being done without observing the order in which it is naturally feasible, cannot be worked by the power of a creature.

Also. There is a natural order to be observed in the various kinds of movement. The first is local movement; hence it is the cause of other movements, because in every genus that which is first is the cause of all that follows in that genus. Now every effect that is produced in this lower world, must needs result from some generation or alteration: and consequently it must be caused through something that is moved locally, if it be the effect of an incorporeal agent which, properly speaking, is incapable of local movement. Moreover, no effect that is caused by incorporeal substances through corporeal instruments is a miracle; since bodies have no operation that is not natural. Therefore created incorporeal substances cannot work miracles by their own power: and much less corporeal substances whose every action is natural.

Therefore it belongs to God alone to work miracles. For He is above the order which contains all things, as one from whose providence the whole of this order is derived. Moreover His power, being absolutely infinite, is not confined to any special effect, nor to the producing of its effect in any particular way or order.

Wherefore it is said of God in the Psalm: Who alone doth great wonders.

CHAPTER CIII

THAT SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES DO WONDERS WHICH, HOWEVER, ARE NOT MIRACLES PROPERLY SPEAKING

IT was the opinion of Avicenna that matter is more obedient to separate substances in the production of an effect, than to contrary agents in matter. Hence he states that sometimes, at the apprehension of the aforesaid substances, an effect ensues in this lower world, such as rain, or the health of a sick person, without any corporeal agent intervening.

He regards as a sign of this the fact that when our soul is of strong imagination, the body is affected by mere thought: thus a man while walking on a plank at a height, easily falls, because through fear he imagines himself to fall: whereas he would not fall, were the plank placed on the ground, so that he would not fear to fall. It is also clear that the body is heated at a mere apprehension of the soul, for instance in lustful or angry persons; or again, becomes cold, as happens in those who are seized with fear. Sometimes too, through a strong apprehension, it is inclined to some illness, for instance fever or even leprosy. In this way, says he, if the soul be pure and not subject to the passions of the body, and strong of apprehension, not only its own body is obedient to its apprehension, but even external bodies: so much so that a sick man be healed or something similar occur, at its mere apprehension. He holds this to be the cause of fascination: because, to wit, a certain person’s soul being deeply affected with malevolence, exercises a baneful influence on someone, especially on a child, who by reason of the softness of the body is most impressionable. Hence he maintains that much more, without the action of a corporeal agent, do certain effects result in these lower bodies, at the apprehension of separate substances, which, he says, are the souls or movers of the spheres.

This theory is consistent enough with other opinions of his. For he holds that all substantial forms emanate from a separate substance into these lower bodies; and that corporeal agents merely dispose matter to receive the impression of the separate agent. But this is untrue according to the teaching of Aristotle, who proves (7 Metaph.), that the forms which are in matter, do not come from separate forms, but from forms in matter: for thus it is that we find a likeness between the maker and the thing made.

Moreover, the comparison with the soul's impression on the body does not advance his theory very much. For no impression is made on the body as a result of an apprehension, unless united to the apprehension there be some emotion, as of joy, fear, desire, or of some other passion. Now these passions are accompanied by a certain definite movement of the heart, the result being an impression on the entire body, either as to local motion, or as to some alteration. Hence it still remains that the apprehension of a spiritual substance does not make an impression on the body, except by means of local movement.

As to his remark about fascination, this is not due to the apprehension of one affecting immediately the body of another: but it results from that apprehension affecting the conjoined body through the movement of the heart, the influence of which reaches even to the eye, which is able to work evil on an external object, especially if it be easily impressionable: thus the eye of a woman in her menses infects a mirror.

Accordingly, except through the local movement of a body, a created spiritual substance cannot, by its own power, induce any form into corporeal matter, as though matter were in this obedient thereto, so as to become actuated by a certain form. For it is in the power of a created spiritual substance, that a body should be obedient to it in respect of local movement. And by moving a particular body locally, it applies certain natural forces to the production of certain effects: thus the art of the smith applies fire to make the iron malleable. But this is not miraculous, properly speaking. It follows, therefore, that created spiritual substances do not work miracles by their own power. And I say by their own power: because nothing prevents these substances from working miracles, in so far as they work by divine power. This indeed may be seen from the fact that as

Gregory states one order of angels is especially deputed to the working of miracles. He also says that certain saints sometimes work miracles by power, and not merely by intercession.

We must observe, however, that when angels or demons apply natural things in order to produce certain definite effects, they employ them as instruments, just as a physician uses certain herbs as instruments for the purpose of healing. Now, from an instrument there proceeds an effect, not only in proportion to its power, but also in excess thereof, forasmuch as it acts by the power of the principal agent: thus a saw or an axe could not produce a bedstead except through being applied by craftsmanship for that particular effect: nor could natural heat produce flesh, except by the power of the vegetative soul, that employs it as an instrument. It is therefore reasonable that certain higher effects should result from these same natural things, through spiritual substances employing them as instruments.

Accordingly, although such effects cannot be called miracles absolutely, since they result from natural causes, yet are they wonderful to us in two ways. First, because these causes are applied for the production of their proper effects by spiritual substances in a way that is strange to us: even so the works of skilful craftsmen seem wonderful to others who see not how the work is done.—Secondly, because the natural causes employed for the production of certain effects are invested with a certain power through serving as instruments of spiritual substances: and this comes nearer to the nature of a miracle.

CHAPTER CIV

THAT THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS RESULT NOT ONLY FROM THE INFLUENCE OF HEAVENLY BODIES

SOME there were who averred that such works as seem wonderful to us, being wrought by the magic art, are done, not by certain spiritual substances, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. This would seem to be indicated by the fact that those who practise works of this kind, observe the position of the stars: and are assisted by the employment of certain herbs and other corporeal things, for the purpose, as it were, of preparing matter of lower degree to receive the influence of the celestial power.

But this is in contradiction with the apparitions (in the works of magicians). For as it is impossible that an intellect be formed from corporeal principles, as we proved above, it is impossible for effects that are caused exclusively by the intellectual nature, to be produced by the power of a heavenly body. Now in these works of magicians, things appear that are exclusively the work of a rational nature; for instance, answers are given about stolen goods, and the like, and this could not be done except by an intelligence. Therefore it is not true that all such effects are caused by the mere power of a heavenly body.

Further. Speech is an act proper to the rational nature. Now in these works people appear to men and speak to them on various matters. Therefore such things cannot be done by the mere power of heavenly bodies. If, however, someone say that these apparitions are present, not to the sensorial organ, but only to the imagination:—this is, in the first place, apparently untrue. For imaginary forms do not seem real to anyone, unless his external senses be suspended: since it is not possible for a person to look on a likeness as a reality, except the natural judgements of the senses be tied. Now these conversations and apparitions are addressed to those who have free use of their external senses. Therefore these apparitions and speeches cannot be imaginary.

Besides, no imaginary forms can lead a person to intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired faculty of his intellect: this is evident in dreams; since even if they contain some indication of the future, it is not every dreamer that understands the meaning of his dreams. Now, in these apparitions and speeches that occur in the works of magicians, it frequently happens that a person obtains knowledge of things surpassing the faculty of his intelligence, such as the discovery of hidden treasure, the manifestation of the future, and sometimes even true answers are given in matters of science. Either, therefore, these apparitions or speeches are not purely imaginary; or at least it is the work of some higher intelligence, and not only of a heavenly body, that a person obtain the aforesaid knowledge through these imaginings.

Again. That which is done by the power of heavenly bodies, is a natural effect: since they are natural forms that are caused in this lower world by the powers of heavenly bodies. Hence that which cannot be natural to anything, cannot be caused by the power of the heavenly bodies. And yet some such things are stated to be caused by the aforesaid works: for instance, it is averred that at the mere presence of a certain person all doors are unlocked, that a certain man become invisible, and many like occurrences are related. Therefore this cannot be done by the power of heavenly bodies.

Further. The reception, through the power of heavenly bodies, of that which follows, implies the reception of what precedes. Now movement of its very nature, is the result of having a soul: since it is proper to animate things to move themselves. Therefore it is impossible for an inanimate being to be moved by itself, through the power of a heavenly body. Yet it is stated that by the magic art an image is made to move of itself, or to speak. Therefore it is not possible for the effects of the magic art to be caused by a celestial power.

And if it be said that the image in question is endowed with some vital principle by the power of the heavenly bodies; this is impossible. For the principle of life in all living things is the substantial form, because, as the Philosopher says (2 De Anima, iv.) in living things to be is to live. Now, it is impossible for anything to receive anew a substantial form, unless it lose the form which it had previously, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. But in the making of an image no substantial form is discarded, and there is only a change of shape which is an accident: since the form of copper or something of the kind remains. Therefore the image in question cannot possibly be endowed with the vital principle.

Further. If anything is moved by a principle of life it necessarily has sensation, for the principle of movement is sensation or understanding. But understanding is not found without sensation in things that come to be and pass away. Now there cannot be sensation where there is not the sense of touch; nor the sense of touch without an organ of mean temperature. Such a temperature, however, is not found in the stone or wax or metal out of which the statue is made. It is not possible, therefore, that statues of this sort should be moved by a principle of life.

Besides. Perfect living things are generated not only by a celestial power, but also from seed: for man and the sun generate man: and such as are generated by a celestial power alone without seed, are animals formed by putrefaction, and such belong to a lower grade than the others. Accordingly if these images be endowed with the vital principle by a celestial power alone, so as to move themselves, it follows that they belong to the lowest grade of animals. And yet this would be false if they worked by an intrinsic principle of life: since among their operations some are of a high degree, for they give answers about hidden things. Therefore it is not possible that their operations and movements proceed from a principle of life.

Again. We find sometimes a natural effect produced by the power of heavenly bodies without the operation of art: thus, although one may produce frogs, or something of the kind by means of some artifice, frogs do happen to be produced without any artifice. Consequently if these images that are made by necromancy, are endowed with the vital principle by the power of heavenly bodies, it will be possible for them to be formed without the operation of art. But this is not the case. Therefore it is evident that such images have not the principle of life, nor are they moved by the power of heavenly bodies.

Hereby we refute the opinion of Hermes who, according to Augustine (8 De Civ. Dei xxiii.) expressed himself thus: As God is the cause of the heavenly gods, so man fashions the gods that reside in temples, being satisfied to live near men. I refer to those animal images, endowed with sense and spirit, that do great and wonderful things, images gifted with knowledge of the future, and who foretell by dreams and many other things; who afflict men with ailments and heal them, who bring sorrow and joy to them according to their merits.

This opinion is also refuted by divine authority. For it is said in the Psalm (134:15 seqq.): The idols of the Gentiles are silver and gold, the works of men’s hands. They have a mouth but they speak not … neither is there any breath in their mouths.

Yet seemingly we must not absolutely deny the possibility of some kind of efficacy being in these things through the power of the heavenly bodies: but only for such effects as certain lower bodies are able to cause by the power of the heavenly bodies.

CHAPTER CV

WHENCE THE WORKS OF MAGICIANS DERIVE THEIR EFFICACY

IT remains for us to inquire whence the magic arts derive their efficacy: a question that will present no difficulty if we consider their mode of operation.

For in the practice of their art they make use of certain significative words in order to produce certain definite effects. Now, words, in so far as they signify something, have no power except as derived from some intellect; either of the speaker, or of the person to whom they are spoken. From the intellect of the speaker, as when an intellect is of such great power that it can cause things by its mere thought, the voice serving to convey, as it were, this thought to the things that are to be produced. From the intellect of the person to whom the words are addressed, as when the hearer is induced to do some particular thing, through his intellect receiving the signification of those words. Now, it cannot be said that these significative words uttered by magicians derive efficacy from the intellect of the speaker. For since power follows essence, diversity of power indicates diversity of essential principles. Moreover, man’s intellect is invariably of such a disposition that its knowledge is caused by things, rather than that it is able by its mere thought to cause things. Consequently if there be any men that are able of their own power to transform things by words expressive of their thoughts, they will belong to another species, and it would be an equivocation to call them men.

Further. By learning we acquire, not the power to do a thing, but the knowledge of how to do it. Yet some, by learning, are rendered able to perform these magic works. Therefore they must have not only knowledge but also the power to produce these effects.

If someone say that these men, by the influence of the stars, are born with the aforesaid power, while others are excluded from it; so that however much the others, who are born without this power, may be instructed, they cannot succeed in performing these works; we reply, first that, as shown above, heavenly bodies cannot make an impression on the intellect. Therefore a man’s intellect cannot, through the influence of the stars, receive a power whereby the vocal expression of its thoughts is productive of something.

And if it be said that the imagination produces an effect in the utterance of significative words, and that heavenly bodies can work on the imagination, since its operation is performed by a bodily organ:—this does not apply to all the results produced by this art. For we have shown that these effects cannot all be produced by the power of the stars. Neither, therefore, can anyone by the power of the stars, receive the power to produce those effects. Consequently it follows that these effects are accomplished by an intellect to whom the discourse of the person uttering these words is addressed. We have an indication of this in the fact that the significative words employed by the magician are invocations, supplications, adjurations, or even commands as though he were addressing another.

Again. Certain characters and definite figures are employed in the observances of this art. Now a figure cannot be the principle of either action or passion; else, mathematical bodies would be active and passive. Therefore matter cannot, by definite figures, be disposed to receive a certain natural effect. Therefore magicians do not employ figures as dispositions. It remains, then, that they employ them only as signs, for there is no third solution. But we make signs only to other intelligent beings. Therefore the magic arts derive their efficacy from another intelligent being, to whom the magician’s words are addressed.

And if someone say that certain figures are appropriate to certain heavenly bodies; and so the lower bodies are determined by certain figures to receive the impressions of certain heavenly bodies:—seemingly this is an unreasonable statement. For the patient is not directed to receive the impression of the agent, except through being in potentiality. Hence those things alone determine it to receive a particular impression, that cause it to be somehow in potentiality. Now figures do not cause matter to be in potentiality to any particular form, because a figure, as such, abstracts from all matter and sensible forms, since it is something mathematical. Therefore a body is not determined by figures or characters to receive the influence of a heavenly body.

Besides. Certain figures are appropriate to heavenly bodies as the effects thereof; for the figures of the lower bodies are caused by heavenly bodies. Now, the aforesaid arts do not use characters or figures as produced by heavenly bodies, in fact they are produced by man in the practice of the art. Therefore the appropriateness of figures to certain heavenly bodies has nothing to do with the question.

Further. As we have shown, matter is nowise disposed to form by means of figures. Hence the bodies on which these figures are impressed, are as capable of receiving the influence of heavenly bodies, as other bodies of the same species. Now, that a thing act on one rather than another of several equally disposed, by reason of something appropriate to be found in it, is a mark of its operating not by natural necessity, but by choice. Hence it is clear that these arts which employ figures in order to produce certain effects, derive their efficacy, not from something that acts by nature, but from some intellectual substance that acts by intelligence. This is also proved by the very name of character which they apply to these figures: for a character is a sign. Whereby we are given to understand that they employ these figures merely as signs shown to some intellectual nature.

Since, however, in the products of art figures are like specific forms, someone might say that there is no reason why, through the influence of a heavenly body, some power should not shape the figure that gives an image its species, not indeed as a figure, but as specifying the product of art, which acquires this power from the stars. But as to the letters that form an inscription on an image, and other characters, nothing else can be said of them, but that they are signs: wherefore they are directed to an intelligence only.—This is also proved by the sacrifices, prostrations and other similar practices, which can be nothing else than signs of reverence shown to an intellectual nature.

CHAPTER CVI

THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHICH GIVES EFFICACY TO THE PRACTICES OF MAGIC IS NOT GOOD ACCORDING TO VIRTUE

WE must furthermore inquire what is this intellectual nature by whose power these works are done.

And in the first place it is plain that it is not good and praiseworthy: for it is the mark of an ill-disposed mind to countenance things contrary to virtue. Now this is done in these arts: for they are often employed in order to further adultery, theft, murder and like malefices, wherefore those who practise these arts are called malefics. Therefore the intellectual nature on whose assistance these arts depend is not well disposed according to virtue.

Again. It is not the mark of a mind well disposed according to virtue, to befriend and assist men of evil life, rather than every upright man. Now those who practise these arts are often men of evil life. Therefore the intellectual nature from whose assistance these arts derive their efficacy is not well disposed according to virtue.

Further. It is the mark of a well disposed mind to guide men towards those goods that are proper to man, namely the goods of reason. Consequently to lead men away from these, and to draw men to goods of the least worth, shows a mind of evil disposition. Now by these arts men progress, not in the goods of reason, which are science and virtue, but in goods of least account, such as the discovery of stolen goods, the capture of thieves, and so forth. Therefore the intellectual substances whose assistance these arts employ, are not well disposed according to virtue.

Moreover. There is a certain deception and unreasonableness in the works of these arts: for they require a man indifferent to lustful pleasure, whereas they are frequently employed to further lustful intercourse. But there is nothing unreasonable or contradictory in the work of a well-disposed mind. Therefore these arts do not employ the assistance of an intellect that is well disposed as to virtue.

Besides. It is an ill-disposed mind that is incited by the commission of crime to lend his assistance to another. But this is done in these arts: for we read of innocent children being slain by those who practise them. Therefore the persons by whose assistance such things are done have an evil mind.

Again. The proper good of the intellect is truth. Since therefore it belongs to good to lead others to good, it belongs to any well-disposed intellect to lead others to truth. In the works of the magicians, however, many things are done by which men are mocked and deceived. The intellect whose help they use, therefore, is not morally well disposed.

Further. A well-disposed intellect is allured by truth in which it takes delight, but not by lies. The magicians, however, in their invocations make use of various lies, whereby they allure those whose help they employ; for they threaten certain impossible things, as for instance that, unless the one who is called upon gives help, he who invokes him will shatter the heavens or displace the stars, as Porphyry narrates in his Letter to Anebontes. Those intellectual substances, therefore, with whose help the works of the magicians are performed do not seem to be intellectually well disposed.

Moreover. That a superior should be subject as an inferior to one that commands him; or that an inferior should allow himself to be invoked as a superior, would seem to indicate a person of an ill-disposed mind. Now, magicians call upon those whose assistance they employ, as though these were their superiors: and as soon as they appear they command them as inferiors. In no way therefore are they seemingly of a well-disposed mind.

Hereby we refute the error of pagans who ascribed these works to the gods.

CHAPTER CVII

THAT THE INTELLECTUAL SUBSTANCE WHOSE ASSISTANCE IS EMPLOYED IN THE MAGIC ARTS IS NOT EVIL IN ITS NATURE

IT is impossible that there be natural malice in the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed in the practice of the magic arts.

For if a thing tends to something by its nature, it tends thereto not accidentally but per se: as a heavy body tends downwards. Now if these intellectual substances are evil essentially, they tend to evil naturally: and, consequently, not accidentally but per se. But this is impossible: for We have proved that all things tend per se to good, and nothing tends to evil except accidentally. Therefore these intellectual substances are not naturally evil.

Again. Everything that exists must be either cause or caused: otherwise there would be no order between it and other things. Hence the substances in question are either causes only, or are also caused. If they be causes; since evil cannot cause a thing save accidentally, as proved above; and since whatever is accidental must be traced to something per se; it follows that there must be in them something preceding their malice, whereby they are causes. Now in each thing it is the nature and essence that comes first. Therefore these substances are not evil by nature.

The same follows if they be caused. For no agent acts except with a good purpose. Therefore evil cannot be the effect of a cause except accidentally. Now that which is caused only by accident, cannot exist naturally: since every nature has a definite mode of coming into being. Therefore it is impossible for the substances in question to be evil by nature.

Besides. Every being has its proper existence proportionate to its nature. Now existence, as such, is good: a sign of which is that all things desire existence. Consequently if these substances were evil by nature, they would have no existence.

Moreover. We have proved that nothing can exist that has not existence from the first being: and that the first being is the sovereign good. Since then every agent, as such, produces its like, whatever proceeds from the first being must be good. Therefore the aforesaid substances, forasmuch as they exist, and have a certain nature, cannot be evil.

Further. There cannot possibly exist a thing that is altogether deprived of a participation of good: for since the good and the appetible are the same, if a thing were utterly void of good, there would be nothing appetible in it; and its own existence is appetible to everything. Consequently if anything be described as evil in its nature, this must be not because it is simply evil, but because it is evil to some person, or in some respect: thus poison is not evil simply, but to one to whom it is harmful: wherefore one man’s poison is another man’s meat. Now, this happens because the particular good that is proper to one, is contrary to the particular good that is proper to another: thus heat, which is the good of fire, is contrary to cold which is the good of water, and destroys it. Accordingly, that which by its nature is directed, not to this or that good, but to good simply, cannot possibly, even in this way, be called evil by its nature. And such is every intellect: because its good is in its own operation, the object of which is the universal, and things that exist simply. Therefore no intellect can be evil in its nature, either simply or in relation to something else.

Again. In every intellectual subject, the intellect moves the appetite, in the natural order; because the proper object of the will is the good understood. Now the good of the will consists in its following the intellect: thus, in us, good is that which is according to reason, and whatever is beside this is evil. In the natural order, therefore, the intellectual substance wills the good. Consequently it is impossible that the intellectual substances whose assistance is employed by magical arts, be naturally evil.

Besides. Since the will tends naturally to the good understood, as its proper object and end, it is impossible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil, unless its intellect err naturally in its judgement of good. Now, there can be no such intellect: because false judgements in the acts of the intelligence are like monstrosities in natural things, for they are not according to but beside nature: since the good and natural end of the intellect is the knowledge of truth. Therefore there cannot be an intellect that is naturally deceived in its judgement of truth. Neither, consequently, is it possible for an intellectual substance to have a will naturally evil.

Further. No cognitive faculty fails in the knowledge of its object, save on account of being defective or corrupted, since by its very nature it is directed to the knowledge of that object: thus the sight does not fail in the perception of colour, unless the sight itself be injured. Now, every defect and corruption is beside nature: because nature aims at the being and perfection of a thing. Therefore no cognitive faculty can fail in the right judgement of its object. Now, the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore there cannot be an intellect that errs naturally in the knowledge of truth. Neither, therefore, can any will stray naturally from the good.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (1 Tim. 4:4): Every creature of God is good: and (Gen. 1:31): God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.

Hereby also we refute the error of the Manicheans who held that these intellectual substances, whom we are wont to call demons or devils, are naturally evil.

We also exclude the error described by Porphyry in his letter to Anebontes, where he says that some are of opinion that there is a genus of spirits, whose speciality it is to grant the prayers of magicians: spirits naturally deceitful, appearing under all kinds of forms, pretending to be gods, or demons, or souls of the departed. It is they who cause all these effects that seem either good or evil. As to those that are really good, they give no assistance; in fact they know nothing about them. But they counsel evil, and impugn and sometimes hinder those who are intent on leading a virtuous life: they are full of presumption and arrogance; they delight in vanities, and are fascinated by flattery. These words of Porphyry indicate clearly enough the malice of the demons, whose assistance the magic arts employ. In this alone are his words reprehensible that he states this malice to be natural to the demons.

CHAPTER CVIII

ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO PROVE THAT THERE CAN BE NO SIN IN THE DEMONS

SINCE malice in the demons is not natural to them; and since it has been proved that they are evil: it follows of necessity that the evil in them is voluntary. Accordingly, we must inquire how this can be.

Because it would seem altogether impossible. For we proved in the Second Book that no intellectual substance is naturally united to a body, except the human soul: or according to some, the souls of the heavenly bodies,—which it is unreasonable to deem evil, since the movement of heavenly bodies is most orderly, and, in a sense, is the principle of the entire natural order. Now, every other cognitive power, except the intellect, employs animate corporeal organs. Therefore the substances in question cannot have any cognitive power besides the intellect. Therefore whatever they know they understand. Now one does not err in what one understands: since all error results from lack of understanding. Therefore there can be no error in the knowledge of those substances. But there can be no sin in the will without error: because the will always tends to the apprehended good; so that unless there be error in the apprehension of a good, there cannot be sin in the will. Therefore seemingly there can be no sin of the will in those substances.

Again. In us, sin occurs in the will about matters of which we have true knowledge in general; through the judgement of the reason being hindered by a passion that shackles the reason in a particular instance. But there can be no such passions in the demons; because passions belong to the sensitive faculty which exercises no operation without a corporeal organ. Consequently, if these separate substances have right knowledge in general, it is impossible for their will to tend to evil through defective knowledge in a particular matter.

Moreover. No cognitive faculty is deceived about its proper object, but only about one that is outside its purview: thus the sight is not deceived in its judgement about colours; whereas deception may occur if a man judge by sight of taste, or of the species of a thing. Now, the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a thing. Consequently there can be no deception in the knowledge of the intellect, if it were to apprehend the mere quiddities of things, and all deception of the intellect would seem to occur through its apprehending forms mingled with phantasms, as is the case with us. But this mode of knowledge is not in intellectual substances that are not united to bodies; since there can be no phantasms apart from a body. Therefore there can be no error in the knowledge of separate substances, and consequently neither can there be sin in the will.

Besides. In us, falsehood occurs in the intellectual operations of synthesis and analysis, through the intellect not absolutely apprehending the quiddity of a thing, and coupling something with the thing apprehended. Now in the operation whereby the intellect apprehends what a thing is, falsehood does not occur except accidentally, in so far as, in this operation also, there is a certain mixture of the intellectual operation of synthesis and analysis. This happens because our intellect attains to the knowledge of the quiddity of a thing, not at once but in a certain order of inquiry: thus, at first we apprehend animal, then we divide it by opposite differences, and setting one of these aside, add the other to the genus, until we come to the definition of the species. In this process there may be falsehood, if we take as a difference of the genus, one that is not a difference of the genus. Now, to proceed thus to the knowledge of what a thing is, belongs to an intellect that discourses from one thing to another by reasoning: and is not becoming to separate intellectual substances, as we proved above. Seemingly, therefore, there can be no error in the knowledge of suchlike substances: and, consequently, neither can there be sin in their will.

Moreover. Since nothing desires other than its own good, it would seem impossible for that which has but one single good, to err in its appetite. For this reason, although faults happen in natural things through some defect occurring in the execution of the appetite, they never happen in the natural appetite: thus a stone always tends to a lower place, whether it reach it, or be hindered. Now, in us, sin happens in the act of appetite, because, as our nature is composed of spiritual and corporeal elements, there is more than one good in us: for one thing is our good in relation to the intellect, another is our good in relation to the senses, or in relation to the body. And among these various things that are man's goods there is an order, so that what is of less account must be subordinate to that which is of more account. Hence sin of the will occurs in us, when in defiance of this order, we desire that which is good for us in a restricted sense in preference to that which is good simply. But this composition and diversity of goods is not in separate substances: in fact their very good is in relation to the intellect. Therefore, seemingly, no sin of the will is possible in them.

Again. In us, sin of the will results from excess or deficiency, between which virtue stands. Consequently in matters that do not admit of excess and deficiency, but only of the mean, the will cannot sin: thus no man can sin in desiring justice, since justice itself is a kind of mean. Now separate substances cannot desire other than intellectual goods, for it is absurd to say that things by nature incorporeal desire corporeal goods, or that those which have no senses desire sensible goods. But in intellectual goods there can be no excess; for by their very nature they are a mean between excess and deficiency: thus the truth is a mean between two errors, one of which is on the side of excess, the other on that of deficiency; wherefore sensible and corporeal goods are in the mean forasmuch as they are according to reason. Therefore, seemingly, intellectual separate substances cannot sin in the will.

Moreover. An incorporeal substance is, seemingly, more remote from defects than a corporeal substance. Now, no defect can occur in these corporeal substances that are remote from contrariety, namely the heavenly bodies. Much less therefore can any sin occur in separate substances that are remote both from contrariety, and from matter, and from movement, which seem to be the sources of any possible defect.

CHAPTER CIX

THAT SIN IS POSSIBLE IN THE DEMONS, AND HOW

THAT sin of the will is in the demons is clear from the authority of Scripture. For it is said (1 Jo. 3:8) that the devil sinneth from the beginning; and (Jo. 8:44) it is said that the devil is a liar, and the father of lies, and that he was a murderer from the beginning: and (Wis. 2:24) that by the envy of the devil, death came into the world.

If anyone chose to follow the opinions of the Platonists, he would easily explain these authorities. For they assert that demons have a body composed of air: and so, since they have a body united to them, there can be a faculty of sense in them. Hence they ascribe to them passions which in us are a cause of sin, namely anger, hate and the like, wherefore Apuleius says that they are passive in mind.

Moreover, independently of their being united to bodies, as the Platonists aver, perhaps yet another kind of knowledge might be assigned to them besides that of the intellect. For, according to Plato, the sensitive soul also is incorruptible: so that it must have an operation in which the body does not concur. Consequently, nothing prevents the operation of the sensitive soul, and therefore the passions, from being in an intellectual substance, even though it be not united to a body. Hence the same source of sin is seated in them as in us.

But both of these explanations are impossible. For it has been proved above that with the exception of human souls no other intellectual substances are united to bodies.—And that the operations of the sensitive soul are impossible apart from a body, is clear from the fact, that when a sensorial organ is destroyed, the one operation of the sense is destroyed:

thus sight ceases with the loss of an eye. For this reason as soon as the organ of touch is destroyed, the animal must die, for it cannot live without it.

In order to solve the question proposed, then, we must observe that, just as there is order among active causes, so too is there in final causes: so that, to wit, the secondary end depends on the principal end, even as the secondary agent depends on the principal agent. Now, a fault occurs in active causes when the secondary agent strays from the order of the principal agent; just as, when the tibia fails to accomplish the movement commanded by the appetitive power through being crooked, the result is a limping gait. In the same way, therefore, in final causes also, when the secondary end is not subordinate to the principal end, there is sin in the will, the object of which is the good and the end.

Now every will naturally desires that which is the proper good of the wilier, namely perfect being, nor can it will anything contrary to this. Accordingly, no sin of the will can occur in a wilier whose proper good is the ultimate end, which is not subordinate to any other end, and to which all other ends are subordinate. Such a wilier is God, whose being is the sovereign good, which is the ultimate end. Therefore in God there can be no sin of the will.

But in every other wilier, whose proper good must needs be subordinate to another good, sin of the will can occur, if we consider him in his nature. For, though the natural inclination of the will in every wilier be to will and love his own perfection, so that it cannot will anything contrary thereto; yet it is not naturally implanted in him so that he directs his perfection to another end unfailingly: since the higher end is not his proper end, but that of the superior nature. Wherefore it is left to his discretion to direct his own perfection to a higher end. For beings endowed with a will differ from those which are not so endowed, in that the former direct themselves and what is theirs to an end, wherefore they are said to have free-will: whereas the latter do not direct themselves to an end, but are directed by a higher agent, being, as it were, moved to the end by another’s action, and not by their own.

Hence there could be sin in the will of a separate substance, through his not directing his own good and perfection to his last end, and adhering to his own good as his end. And since rules of action must needs be taken from the end, the consequence was that, through making himself his own end, he pretended to submit other things to his rule, and that his will was not subject to another higher than himself. But this belongs to God alone. In this sense then we are to understand that he desired to be equal to God: not that his good might be equal to the divine good; because such a thing could not come into his mind; and because by desiring it he would desire not to be, since the distinction of species is according to the various degrees of things, as is clear from what has been said above.—Now, the will to rule others, and the refusal to submit one's will to the ruling of a superior, is the will to be supreme and, so to say, not to be subject, which is the sin of pride. Hence it is reasonably said that the demon's first sin was pride.—But as from one error about a principle, errors various and manifold result, so from the first disorder in the demon's will, there arose all manner of sins in his will: both of hate towards God as resisting his pride, and most justly punishing his fault; and of envy towards man; and of many such sins.

We must also observe that, as the proper good of a thing is subordinate to several higher goods, the wilier is free to depart from the order of one superior, and not from the order of another that is either higher or lower than the former: thus a soldier who is subordinate both to his king and to his general, can direct his will to the good of the general, and not that of the king, or vice versa. But if the general depart from the order of the king, the will of the soldier will be good, if he depart from the will of his general, and direct his own will to his king; and the will of the soldier who obeys the will of his general against the will of his king will be evil: because the order of the lower principle depends on the order of the higher. Now, separate substances are not only subordinate to God, but one of them is subordinate to another, from the first to the last, as we proved in the Second Book. And since in every wilier under God there can be sin of the will, if he be considered in his nature, it was possible for one of the higher separate substances, or even the highest of all, to sin in his will. And this indeed is not improbable; for he would not have rested in his good as his end unless that good were very perfect. Possibly then, some of the lower separate substances, of their own will, directed their good to him, thus departing from the divine order, and so sinned even as he did: while others adhering, by the movement of their will, to the divine order, rightly departed from the order of the one who sinned, although he was higher than they in the natural order. In the Fourth Book we shall show how in either case that will of theirs continues unchangeable: for this regards the punishments or rewards of the good or wicked.

There is, however, this difference between a man and a separated substance that in any one man there are several appetitive powers which are subordinated one to the other. But this is not the case with separate substances, although one substance is subordinated to another. Now sin occurs in the will whenever the inferior appetite is turned aside. Just as sin, therefore, would be brought about in a separate substance either by its being turned aside from the divine order or because an inferior substance is turned aside from its order to a superior one, which latter remains under the divine order, so in a man sin occurs in two ways. It occurs in one way from the fact that the human will does not direct its proper good to God; and this sin is common both to man and to separate substances. It occurs in another way from the fact that the lower appetite is not regulated with regard to the higher, as for instance when we will the delights of the flesh, towards which the concupiscible appetite tends, not in accordance with reason. But this kind of sin is not found in separate substances.

CHAPTER CX

SOLUTION OF THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS

CONSEQUENTLY it is not difficult to solve the objections that have been raised.

For we are not forced to say that there was error in the intellect of the separate substance by judging a good not to be good; but through not considering the higher good to which his own good should have been referred. His will through being intent on his own good could be the cause of this lack of consideration: for it is free to the will to turn to this or that.

It is also clear that he desired but one good, and that was his own good: but his sin consisted in his disregarding the higher good, to which his own should have been directed. For just as in us there is sin through our desiring inferior goods, those namely of the body, outside the order of reason, so in the devil was there sin through his not referring his own good to the divine.

It is also clear that he strayed from the mean of virtue, inasmuch as he did not submit to the order of his superior, and so to himself gave more than his due, and to God less than was due to Him, as the sovereign rule to whose order all things should be subject. Consequently it is evident that in this sin the mean was not missed through excess of passion, but merely through inequality of justice which is about operations. For in separate substances there can be operations, but passions not at all.

Nor does it follow, that because in the higher bodies there can be no defects, there can be no sin in separate substances. Because bodies and all irrational beings are acted upon, and do not put themselves in action, for they have no dominion over their actions. Wherefore they cannot escape the first rule that puts them in action and moves them; unless they be unable to receive adequately the rectitude of the supreme rule, owing to an indisposition of matter. Wherefore the higher bodies in which there cannot be any indisposition of matter, can never depart from the rectitude of the first rule. But rational or intellectual substances are not only acted upon, but they also move themselves to their own actions. And this applies to them all the more, according as their nature is the more perfect: since the more perfect a thing’s nature, the more perfect is its power for action. Consequently the perfection of their nature does not prevent the possibility of sin in them in the manner explained above; namely, through adhering to themselves, and disregarding the order of the superior agent.

CHAPTER CXI

THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE IN A SPECIAL MANNER

FROM what has been proved up to now, it is evident that divine providence extends to all things. And yet there must be some special kind of providence bestowed on intellectual and rational creatures, in preference to others. For they surpass other creatures both in the perfections of their nature, and in the excellence of their end. In the perfection of their nature,—because alone the rational creature has dominion over its action, since it moves itself freely to act: whereas other creatures are moved to their proper actions rather than act themselves; as was proved above. In the excellence of their end,—because alone the intellectual creature by its operation attains to the last end of the universe, namely by knowing and loving God: whereas other creatures cannot attain to the last end except by a certain participation of His likeness. Now, actions vary in kind according to the diversity of end and of their subject matter: thus in art the operations vary according to the difference of end and matter: for a physician acts differently to expel sickness, and to confirm health; and differently, again in bodies of different temperament. In like manner in the government of a state, a different kind of order must be observed according to the different status of the subjects, and according to the different ends to which they are directed: for there must be a different rule for soldiers to make them ready to fight, and for craftsmen to make them able to work. Accordingly there is one kind of order whereby rational creatures are subject to divine providence; and another whereby other creatures are subject thereto.

CHAPTER CXII

THAT RATIONAL CREATURES ARE GOVERNED FOR THEIR OWN SAKE, AND OTHER CREATURES, AS DIRECTED TO THEM

IN the first place then, the very condition of the rational creature, in that it has dominion over its actions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake: whereas the condition of other things that have not dominion over their actions shows that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. Because that which acts only when moved by another, is like an instrument; whereas that which acts by itself, is like a principal agent. Now an instrument is required, not for its own sake, but that the principal agent may use it. Hence whatever is done for the care of the instruments must be referred to the principal agent as its end: whereas any such action directed to the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is for the sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly intellectual creatures are ruled by God, as though He cared for them for their own sake, while other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures.

Again. That which has dominion over its own act, is free in its action, because he is free who is cause of himself: whereas that which by some kind of necessity is moved by another to act, is subject to slavery. Therefore every other creature is naturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government provision is made for the free for their own sake; but for slaves that they may be useful to the free. Accordingly divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature.

Moreover. Whenever certain things are directed to a certain end, if any of them are unable of themselves to attain to the end, they must needs be directed to those that attain to the end, which are directed to the end for their own sake. Thus the end of the army is victory, which the soldiers obtain by their own action in fighting, and they alone in the army are required for their own sake; whereas all others, to whom other duties are assigned, such as the care of horses, the preparing of arms, are requisite for the sake of the soldiers of the army. Now, it is clear from what has been said, that God is the last end of the universe, whom the intellectual nature alone obtains in Himself, namely by knowing and loving Him, as was proved above. Therefore the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake.

Further. In every whole, the principal parts are requisite on their own account for the completion of the whole, while others are required for the preservation or betterment of the former. Now, of all the parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because they approach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore divine providence provides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake.

Besides. It is clear that all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole: since the whole is not on account of the parts, but the parts on account of the whole. Now, intellectual natures are more akin to the whole than other natures: because, in a sense, the intellectual substance is all things, inasmuch as by its intellect it is able to comprehend all things; whereas every other substance has only a particular participation of being. Consequently God cares for other things for the sake of intellectual substances.

Besides. Whatever happens to a thing in the course of nature happens to it naturally. Now, we see that in the course of nature the intellectual substance uses all others for its own sake; either for the perfection of the intellect, which sees the truth in them as in a mirror; or for the execution of its power and development of its knowledge, in the same way as a craftsman develops the conception of his art in corporeal matter; or again to sustain the body that is united to an intellectual soul, as is the case in man.

It is clear, therefore, that God cares for all things for the sake of intellectual substances.

Moreover. If a man seek something for its own sake, he seeks it always, because what is per se, is always: whereas if he seek a thing on account of something else, he does not of necessity seek it always but only in reference to that for the sake of which he seeks it. Now, as we proved above, things derive their being from the divine will. Therefore whatever is always is willed by God for its own sake; and what is not always is willed by God, not for its own sake, but for another’s. Now, intellectual substances approach nearest to being always, since they are incorruptible. They are, moreover, unchangeable, except in their choice. Therefore intellectual substances are governed for their own sake, as it were; and others for the sake of intellectual substances.

The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion: since all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, in so far as one part serves another. Thus in the human body it is clear that the lungs belong to the body’s perfection, in that they serve the heart: wherefore there is no contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart, and for the sake of the whole animal. In like manner that other natures are on account of the intellectual is not contrary to their being for the perfection of the universe: for without the things required for the perfection of the intellectual substance, the universe would not be complete.

Nor again does the fact that individuals are for the sake of the species militate against what has been said. Because through being directed to their species, they are directed also to the intellectual nature. For a corruptible thing is directed to man, not on account of only one individual man, but on account of the whole human species. Yet a corruptible thing could not serve the whole human species, except as regards its own entire species. Hence the order whereby corruptible things are directed to man, requires that individuals be directed to the species.

When we assert that intellectual substances are directed by divine providence for their own sake, we do not mean that they are not also referred to God and for the perfection of the universe. Accordingly they are said to be provided for on their own account, and others on account of them, because the goods bestowed on them by divine providence are not given them for another’s profit: whereas those bestowed on others are in the divine plan intended for the use of intellectual substances. Hence it is said (Deut. 4:19): Lest thou see the sun and the moon and the other stars, and being deceived by error, thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven: and (Ps. 8:8): Thou hast subjected all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen: moreover, the beasts also of the field: and (Wis. 12:18): Thou, being master of power, judgest with tranquillity, and with great favour disposest of us.

Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for man’s use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever. For this reason the Lord said to Noe (Gen. 9:3): As the green herbs I have delivered all flesh to you.

And if any passages of Holy Writ seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young: this is either to remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings: or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another: or on account of some signification: thus the Apostle expounds the prohibition against muzzling the ox that treadeth the corn.

CHAPTER CXIII

THAT THE RATIONAL CREATURE IS DIRECTED TO ITS ACTION BY GOD NOT ONLY IN ITS RELATION TO THE SPECIES, BUT ALSO IN ITS RELATION TO THE INDIVIDUAL

HENCE it is clear that the rational creature alone is directed to its actions by God, with due regard not only to the species, but also to the individual. For, seemingly, everything is on account of its operation: since operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing. Wherefore each thing is directed to its action by God, according as it stands under divine providence. Now, the rational creature stands under divine providence as being governed and cared for, on its own account, and not, as other corruptible creatures, on account of the species only: because the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species, is not governed for its own sake; whereas the rational creature is governed for its own sake, as we have made clear. Accordingly, rational creatures alone are directed by God to their actions for the sake, not only of the species, but also of the individual.

Besides. Things that are directed in their actions only so far as these refer to the species, have not the power to act or not to act: since whatever results from the species, is common and natural to all the individuals contained in the species; and we have no choice about natural things. Hence if man were directed in his actions in reference only to the demands of the species, he would not have the power to act, or not to act, and he would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as is the case with all irrational creatures. It is therefore clear that rational creatures are directed in their actions, with regard not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Moreover. As we proved above, divine providence extends to every single thing, even the least. Therefore whatever things have actions outside the inclination of nature, must needs in such actions receive from divine providence a direction besides that which regards the species. Now, many actions are apparent in the rational creature, for which the inclination of the species is not sufficient: and a sign of this is that they are not the same in all, but differ in different subjects. Therefore the rational creature must needs be directed to its actions by God, with reference not only to the species, but also to the individual.

Again. God provides for every nature according to its capacity: for He made each creature such that He knew it to be adapted to obtain its end through being governed by Him. Now, the rational creature alone is capable of being directed to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual: because it has intellect and reason, so as to be able to perceive the different ways in which a certain thing is good or evil in relation to various persons, times, and places. Therefore the rational creature alone is directed by God to its actions, in respect not only of the species but also of the individual.

Besides. The rational creature is subject to divine providence in such a way, that not only is it governed thereby, but is able to know something of the nature of providence: so that it is capable of providence and government in respect of others. This is not the case with other creatures, for they only participate in providence by being subject to it. Now, through being capable of providence, a man can direct and govern his own actions also. Therefore the rational creature participates in divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing: for it governs itself in its own actions, and other things too. Now, every lower providence is subject to divine providence as supreme. Therefore the government of a rational creature’s acts, as personal acts, belongs to divine providence.

Again. The personal acts of a rational creature are properly those that proceed from the rational soul. Now, the rational soul is capable of perpetuity, not only in respect of the species, like other creatures, but also in respect of the individual. Therefore the actions of a rational creature are directed by divine providence, not only in the point of their belonging to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal.

Hence it is that, though all things are subject to divine providence, yet Holy Writ ascribes the care of men to it in a special manner; according to Ps. 8:5: What is man that thou art mindful of him? and 1 Cor. 9:9: Doth God take care of oxen? These things are said because God watches over man’s actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts.

CHAPTER CXIV

THAT LAWS ARE GIVEN BY GOD TO MAN

IT is evident from this that it was necessary for man to receive laws from God. For, as we have shown, just as the acts of irrational creatures are directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the species, so are man's actions directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the individual. Now, in so far as they are actions belonging to the species, actions of irrational creatures are directed by God by a certain natural inclination, which is consequent to the specific nature. Therefore in addition to this something must be given to man whereby he is directed in his personal actions. And this is what we call law.

Again. The rational creature, as stated above, is subject to divine providence, in such a way as to participate in a certain likeness of divine providence, inasmuch as it is able to govern itself in its own actions, and other things also. Now, that by which the actions of people are governed is a law. Therefore it was reasonable that a law should be given to man by God.

Besides. Since a law is nothing else than a reason and rule of action, it is reasonable that to those alone a law be given, who know the reason of their action. Now, this applies only to the rational creature. Therefore it was fitting that a law should be given to the rational creature alone.

Further. A law should be given to those in whom is the power to act or not to act. But this belongs to the rational creature alone. Therefore only the rational creature is adapted to receive a law.

Moreover. Since a law is nothing else than a reason of action: and the reason for everyone's action is his end: everyone who is capable of receiving a law must receive the law from the one who guides him to his end: even as the inferior craftsman is guided by the master-craftsman, and the soldier by the commander-in-chief. Now, the rational creature obtains his last end in God and from God, as we have already shown. Therefore it was reasonable that a law should be given to men by God.

Hence it is said (Jerem. 31:33): I will give My law in their hearts, and (Osee 8:12): I shall write to him my manifold laws.

CHAPTER CXV

THAT THE DIVINE LAW DIRECTS MAN CHIEFLY TO GOD

FROM this we may gather what is the principal intention of the divine law.

For it is evident that every lawgiver intends by his law to direct men to his own end: as the commander-in-chief leads to victory, and the governor of a state, to peace. Now the end intended by God, is God Himself. Therefore the chief intention of the divine law is to lead men to God.

Again. Law, as stated above, is a rule which God's governing providence sets before the rational creature. Now the government of God's providence leads each thing to its proper end. Consequently the law given by God directs man chiefly to his end. But the end of the human creature is to adhere to God: since in this does his happiness consist, as we have proved above. Therefore the divine law directs man chiefly to union with God.

Also. The intention of every lawgiver is to make those good for whom he legislates: hence precepts of law should be about acts of virtue. Therefore the divine law aims at those acts that are best. Now, of all human acts the best are those whereby man adheres to God, as being most akin to His end. Therefore the divine law directs man to these acts before all others.

Besides. That which gives a law its force should hold the chief place in the law. But the law given by God derives its force with men from men being subject to God; for no one is bound by the law of a king whose subject he is not. Therefore the union of man's mind with God should be the chief thing in the divine law.

Hence it is written (Deut. 10:12): And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways and love Him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart, and with all thy soul.

CHAPTER CXVI

THAT THE END OF GOD’S LAW IS THE LOVE OF GOD

SINCE the chief intention of God’s law is that man adhere to God; and since man adheres most firmly to God by love: it follows of necessity that the principal purpose of the law is directed to love.

It is evident that man adheres to God principally by love. In man there are two things whereby he can adhere to God, his intellect and his will: for by the inferior faculties of his soul he cannot adhere to God, but to lower beings. But the adhesion of the intellect is completed by the adhesion of the will, because by his will man, as it were, rests in that which the intellect apprehends. Now, the will adheres to a thing either by love or by fear, but not in the same way. For when it adheres to a thing through fear, it adheres on account of something else, namely in order to avoid an evil that threatens unless it adhere to that thing. But when it adheres to a thing through love, it adheres for its own sake. Now, that which is for its own sake is of more account than that which is for another’s sake. Therefore to adhere to God by love is to adhere to Him in the closest way possible: and consequently this is the chief intention of the divine law.

Again. The end of every, and especially the divine, law is to make men good. Now, man is said to be good because he has a good will, whereby he brings into act whatever good is in him. Also, a will is good through willing the good, and above all the greatest good, which is the end. Therefore the more his will wills this good, so much the better is the man. Now a man wills more that which he wills on account of love, than that which he wills on account of fear alone: for when he wills a thing only through fear, he is partly unwilling: as when a man, through fear, wills to cast his cargo overboard. Therefore above all the love of the Sovereign Good, namely God, makes men good, and is intended by the divine law above all else.

Further. Man’s goodness results from virtue: since it is virtue that makes its possessor good. Hence the law intends to make men virtuous; and the precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But a condition of virtue is that the virtuous act with both firmness and pleasure. Now, this is especially the effect of love: because through love we do a thing steadfastly and pleasurably. Therefore love of the good is the ultimate aim of the divine law.

Besides. Lawgivers move those to whom the law is given by the command of the law which they promulgate. Now, in all things moved by a first mover, the more a thing participates in that movement, and the nearer it approaches to a likeness to that first mover, the more perfectly is it moved. Now God, the divine lawgiver, does all things on account of His love. Consequently he who tends to Him in that way, namely by loving Him, tends to Him in the most perfect manner. Now, every agent intends perfection in what he does. Therefore the end of all legislation is that man love God.

Hence it is said (1 Tim. 1:5): The end of the commandment is charity: and (Matth. 22:37, 38) that the greatest and first commandment in the law is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God.

Hence too, the New Law, as being more perfect, is called the law of love, whereas the Old Law, as being less perfect, is called the law of fear.

CHAPTER CXVII

THAT WE ARE DIRECTED BY THE DIVINE LAW TO THE LOVE OF OUR NEIGHBOUR

FROM this it follows that the divine law aims at the love of our neighbour.

For there should be union of affection between those who have one common end. Now, men have one common last end, namely happiness, to which they are directed by God. Therefore men should be united together by mutual love.

Again. Whosoever loves a man, loves those whom he loves, and those who are his kindred. Now, men are loved by God, since He prepared for them a last end consisting in the enjoyment of Himself. Therefore as a man is a lover of God, so must he be a lover of his neighbour.

Moreover. Since man by nature is a social animal, he needs assistance from other men in order to obtain his own end. Now this is most suitably done if men love one another mutually. Hence the law of God, which directs men to their last end, commands us to love one another.

Again. In order to apply himself to divine things, man needs calm and peace. Now mutual love, more than aught else, removes the obstacles to peace. Seeing then that the divine law directs men to apply themselves to divine things, we must conclude that this same law leads men to love one another.

Further. The divine law is offered to man in aid of the natural law. Now it is natural to all men to love one another: a proof of which is that a man, by a kind of natural instinct, comes to the assistance of anyone even unknown that is in need, for instance by warning him, should he have taken the wrong road, by helping him to rise, should he have fallen, and so forth: as though every man were intimate and friendly with his fellow-man. Therefore mutual love is prescribed to man by the divine law. Wherefore it is said (Jo. 15:12): This is My commandment that you love one another: and (1 Jo. 4:21): This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother: and (Matth. 22:39) that the second commandment is, Thou shalt love thy neighbour.

CHAPTER CXVIII

THAT THE DIVINE LAW BINDS MEN TO THE TRUE FAITH

FROM this it is clear that the divine law binds men to the true faith.

For just as the beginning of material love is sight exercised through the material eye, so the beginning of spiritual love is the intellectual vision of a spiritual lovable object. Now, the vision of that spiritual lovable object which is God, is impossible to us in the present life except by faith, because it surpasses natural reason, and especially inasmuch as our happiness consists in the enjoyment thereof. Therefore we need to be brought to the true faith by the divine law.

Again. The divine law directs man to perfect subjection to God. Now, as man is subject to God as to His will by loving Him, so is he subject to Him as to his intellect by believing in Him. Not indeed by believing anything false: since God, who is truth, cannot propose anything false to man; wherefore he that believes something false, believes not in God. Therefore the divine law directs man to the true faith.

Also. He who errs about something essential to a thing, knows not that thing: thus if anyone in apprehending an irrational animal were to think it a man, he would not know man. It would be different were he to err about the accidentals of a thing. In composite things, however, he who errs about any of the essential principles, though he know not the thing simply, yet he knows it in some respect; thus if he thinks a man to be an irrational animal, he knows him in respect of his genus. But this cannot apply to simple things, and any error whatever removes all knowledge of the thing. Now, God is supremely simple. Therefore to err about God, is not to know God: thus he who believes that God is a body, knows not God at all, but apprehends something else instead of God. Now, a thing is loved and desired according as it is known. Therefore he that errs about God, can neither love God, nor desire him as his end. Consequently, since the aim of the divine law is to make men love and desire God, that law must needs bind men to a true faith in God.

Moreover. False opinion in matters of intelligence, is like vice opposed to virtue in moral matters: for the true is the good of the intellect. Now, it belongs to the divine law to prohibit vice. Therefore it belongs to it also to proscribe false opinions about God and things divine. Hence it is said (Heb. 11:6): Without faith it is impossible to please God. Moreover (Exod. 20) before other commandments are given, a right faith in God is prescribed when it is said: Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one.

Hereby is refuted the error of those who maintained that it matters not for man’s salvation with what faith he serves God.

CHAPTER CXIX

THAT OUR MIND IS DIRECTED TO GOD BY CERTAIN SENSIBLE THINGS

SINCE it is connatural to man to acquire knowledge through the senses, and since it is most difficult to arise above sensible things, divine providence has appointed sensible things as a reminder to man of things divine, so that thus man's intention might the more readily be recalled to divine things, not excluding the man whose mind is not equal to the contemplation of divine things in themselves.

For this reason sensible sacrifices were instituted; since man offers these to God, not because God needs them, but that man might be reminded that he must refer both himself and all that is his to God as his end, and as the Creator, Governor and Lord of all.

Again, sensible things are employed for man's sanctification, in the shape of washings, anointings, meat and drink, and the uttering of sensible words, as signifying to man that he receives intelligible gifts from an external source, and from God whose name is expressed by sensible words.

Moreover man performs certain sensible actions, not to arouse God, but to arouse himself to things divine: such as prostrations, genuflexions, raising of the voice and singing. Such things are not done as though God needed them, for He knows all things, and His will is unchangeable, and He looks at the affection of the heart, and not the mere movement of the body: but we do them for our own sake, that by them our intention may be fixed on God, and our hearts inflamed. At the same time we thereby confess that God is the author of our soul and body, since we employ both soul and body in the worship we give Him.

Hence we must not wonder that heretics who deny that God is the author of our body, decry the offering of this bodily worship to God. Wherein it is clear that they forget that they are men, inasmuch as they deem the presentation of sensible objects to be unnecessary for interior knowledge and affection. For experience shows that by acts of the body the soul is aroused to a certain knowledge or affection. Wherefore it is evidently reasonable that we should employ bodies in order to raise our minds to God.

The offering of these bodily things to God is called the worship (cultus) of God. For we speak of cultivating those things to which we give our thought in the shape of deeds. Now, we give our thought to God in our actions, not indeed that we may be of advantage to Him, as when we cultivate other things by our actions: but because by such actions we advance towards God. And since by internal acts we tend to God directly, therefore properly speaking we worship God by internal acts. Nevertheless external acts also belong to the divine worship, forasmuch as by these acts the mind is raised to God, as we have said.

This divine worship is also called religion: because by these acts man tethers (ligat) himself, as it were, lest he stray from God. Also, because by a kind of natural instinct he feels himself obliged in his own way to show reverence to God, from whom flows His being and every good.

Wherefore religion is called piety. Because by piety we give due honour to those who begot us. Hence it would seem reasonably to belong to piety to honour God the Father of all. For this reason those who are averse to the worship of God are said to be impious.

And since not only is God the cause and source of our being, but also our whole being is in His power, and all that we have we owe to Him, and because of this He is truly our master, that which we do to honour Him is called service. Now, God is Lord not accidentally, as man of his fellow-man, but by nature. Hence we owe service to God otherwise than to a fellow-man, to whom we are subject accidentally, and who wields over things a restricted dominion, that he receives from God. Wherefore the service due to God is called by the special name of latria by the Greeks.

CHAPTER CXX

THAT THE WORSHIP OF LATRIA IS DUE TO GOD ALONE

SOME there have been who deemed that the worship of latria should be given not only to the supreme author of all, but to all things, even creatures, that are above man. Hence some, whilst holding God to be the one universal cause of all, considered that we should offer latria, first—after the supreme God—to the heavenly intellectual substances, which they called gods, whether such substances were entirely separate from bodies, or animated the spheres or stars.

Secondly, to other intellectual substances which they believed to be united to aerial bodies, and called demons: nevertheless, deeming them to be above men, even as an aerial body is above an earthly one, they maintained that these substances should be honoured by men with a divine worship, and that in comparison with men they were gods, as being between men and the gods.—And as they believed that the souls of good men, through being separated from their bodies, passed to a higher state than that of the present life, they held that divine worship should be given also to the souls of the dead, whom they called heroes or manes.

Others, believing God to be the soul of the world, held that divine honour should be given to the whole world and each part thereof; not indeed on account of the body, but on account of the soul, which they said was God: even as we honour a wise man, not for his body but for his soul.

Others, again, thought that divine honour should be given even to things which, though beneath man by nature, participate in the power of a higher nature. Wherefore, believing that certain images, made by men, receive a certain supernatural power, either through the influence of a heavenly body, or through the presence of certain spirits, they said that such images should receive divine honour. These images they called gods: for which reason they are called idolaters, because they offered latria to idols, i.e. images.

But it is absurd for those who hold that there is but one separate first cause, to give divine honour to another. For we worship God, as stated above, not because He needs it, but that true notions about God may be confirmed in us by means of sensible things. Now, the notion that there is but one supreme God, cannot be confirmed in us by means of sensible objects, except by our offering Him something distinct, and this we call the divine worship. It is clear, then, that a true notion about the one cause, is weakened if divine worship be given to several.

Further. As we said above, this external worship is necessary for man in order that his soul be roused to give spiritual homage to God. Now, custom is of great weight in moving the human mind to action, for we are more easily inclined to that which is customary. And the custom among men is that the honour given to the head of the state, e.g. the king or the emperor, be given to no other. Therefore the human mind should be urged to realize that there is one supreme cause of all, by rendering to it something that it renders to no other. This is what we call the worship of latria.

Again. If the worship of latria were due to a being as superior and not as supreme: since one man, and one angel, is higher than another, it would follow that a man ought to give the worship of latria to another man, and one angel to another angel. And since he who is superior in one respect, is inferior in another, the result would be that men would worship one another mutually: which is absurd.

Besides. It is customary among men that a special return be due for a special boon. Now, there is a special boon that man receives from the most high God, namely his creation: for we proved in the Second Book that God alone creates. Therefore man must make to God a special return in recognition of this special boon: and this is the worship of latria.

Moreover. Latria means service: and service is due to a master. Properly and truly, a master is one who orders others to work, and receives orders from none: for he who carries out the orders of another is servant rather than master. Now, God the supreme cause of all, orders all things to their respective actions, by His providence, as we proved above: wherefore Holy Writ describes the angels and higher bodies as serving both God, whose orders they carry out, and us for whose good they work. Therefore the worship of latria which is due to the sovereign Lord, should be given to none but the supreme cause of all.

Also. Of all things pertaining to latria, sacrifice would seem to hold a special place: for genuflections, prostrations, and other like signs of honour, may be given even to men, albeit with another intention than when given to God: whereas no one has thought that a sacrifice should be offered except to one whom he looked upon, or pretended to look upon, as God. Now the external sacrifice is a representation of the interior true sacrifice in which the human mind offers itself to God. And our mind offers itself to God, as the principle of its creation, as the author of its operation, as the end wherein lies its happiness. This can only apply to the supreme cause of all: for it was shown above that God is the sole cause of the rational soul; that He alone can incline the will of man whithersoever He will; and that man's final happiness consists in the enjoyment of Him alone. To God alone, therefore, must man offer sacrifice and the worship of latria, and not to any spiritual substances whatsoever.

Although the opinion which holds that the most high God is nothing else but the soul of the world, is false, as we have proved; while that is true which holds God to be a separate being, from whom all other intellectual substances, both separate or embodied, originate; yet the offering of latria to various things is more consistent with the former opinion. Because, by offering the worship of latria to various things, one would seem to offer the same worship to the one most high God, to whom, according to this opinion, the various parts of the world are compared, as the various members of the human body are compared to the soul.—But reason again is in contradiction with this opinion. For they assert that the worship of latria should be given to the world not on account of its body but on account of its soul, which they hold to be God. And though the body of the world is divisible into various parts, the soul is indivisible. Therefore divine honour is not to be given to many things, but to one only.

Again. If we suppose the world to have a soul that animates the whole and every part thereof, this cannot mean the nutritive or sensitive soul: since the operations of these faculties of the soul are not competent to all the parts of the universe. In fact, granted that the world has a sensitive and nutritive soul, the worship of latria would not be due to it on account of a like soul, since neither is it due to animals or plants.—It follows then that in saying that God, to whom latria is due, is the soul of the world, they mean the intellectual soul. But this soul is not a perfection of certain definite parts of the body, but in some way regards the whole. This is clearly the case with our soul which is of lower degree: for the intellect does not employ an organ of the body, as is proved in 3 De Anima, iv. Consequently according to their principle, divine honour would not have to be shown to the various parts of the world, but to the whole, on account of its soul.

Moreover. If, according to their opinion, there is but one soul animating the whole world and all its parts; and if the world is not to be called God save on account of its soul: therefore there will be but one God. Consequently divine honour is due to one only.—And if there be but one soul of the whole, and the various parts again have various souls, they must admit that the souls of the parts are subordinate to the soul of the whole: for the same proportion is between perfections, and the things perfected. Now, where there is order among several intellectual substances, the worship of latria is due only to the one that has the highest place, as we proved against the other opinion. Consequently the worship of latria would have to be given, not to the parts of the world, but to the whole alone.

Again. It is evident that certain parts of the world have no soul of their own: consequently worship would not have to be given to them. Yet these people worshipped all the elements of the world; namely earth, water, fire and other like inanimate bodies.

Besides. It is clear that a superior does not owe the worship of latria to an inferior. Now man, in the order of nature, is superior to all inferior bodies at least, according as he has a more perfect form. Therefore man would not have to give the worship of latria to inferior bodies, if such worship were due to them by reason of their own souls.

The statement that each part of the world has its own soul, and that the whole world has not one common soul, leads to the same inconsistencies. For it would follow that the highest part of the world has the highest kind of soul, to which alone, according to what we have said, the worship of latria would be due.

These opinions are surpassed in unreasonableness by the one which states that the worship of latria is to be given to images. For if these images derive power or excellence from the heavenly bodies, this is no reason for giving them the worship of latria; since it is not given those bodies themselves, except perhaps on account of their souls, as some have asserted. And these images are supposed to receive a certain power from the heavenly bodies in respect of their bodily power.

Besides. It is clear that they do not receive from the heavenly bodies a perfection equal to the human soul. Therefore they are inferior in excellence to any individual man. Consequently man does not owe them any kind of worship.

Again. The cause is more potent than the effect. Now, men are the makers of these images. Therefore man owes them no worship.

And if it be said that these images derive power or excellence through association with some spiritual substance; this again is insufficient, for the worship of latria is due to no spiritual substance except only to the highest of all.

Moreover. The rational soul is associated in a more excellent way with the human body, than a spiritual substance with the aforesaid images. Therefore man still remains in a position of greater excellence than those images.

Again. As these images are sometimes made for producing baneful effects, it is clear that if such effects are brought about by spiritual substances, those spiritual substances are wicked. This is still more clear from the fact that they are deceitful in their answers, and demand of their worshippers things that are contrary to virtue. Hence they are inferior to good men; and consequently the worship of latria is not due to them. It is therefore evident from what has been said that the worship of latria is due to the one most high God alone. Hence it is said (Exod. 12:20): He that sacrificeth to the gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord: and (Deut. 6:13): The Lord thy God shalt thou adore, and Him only shalt thou serve. Again it is said of heathens (Rom. 1:22, 23): Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and they changed the glory of the incorruptible God, into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things: and further on (1:25): Who changed the truth of God into a lie: and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator, who is (above all things God) blessed for ever. Since then it is wrong to give the worship of latria to any other but the first principle of all; and to incite to do wrong belongs only to an ill-disposed rational creature: it is clear that men were urged to the aforesaid unlawful forms of worship, at the instigation of the demons, who coveting divine honour even offered themselves to man’s worship in the place of God. Hence it is said (Ps. 95:5): All the gods of the gentiles are devils: and (1 Cor. 10:20): The things which the heathens sacrifice, they sacrifice to devils, and not to God. Wherefore, since the principal intention of the divine law is that man be subject to God, and give Him a peculiar reverence not only in thought, but also in word and deeds of the body: hence, first of all (Exod. 20.) when God’s law is set forth, the worship of more than one God is forbidden, where it is said: Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me: thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything. Secondly, man is forbidden to utter irreverently the name of God, in order, to wit, to confirm a falsehood: and this is expressed in the words: Thou shalt not take the name of … God in vain. Thirdly, a certain time is prescribed for rest from external works, in order that the mind may have leisure to think of God: hence it is said: Remember that thou keep holy the sabbath-day.

CHAPTER CXXI

THAT THE DIVINE LAW DIRECTS MAN ACCORDING TO REASON AS REGARDS THINGS CORPOREAL AND SENSIBLE

JUST as the human mind can be raised to God by corporeal and sensible things, provided one make right use of them for God’s honour, even so their abuse either wholly withdraws the mind from God, if the will place its end in lower things; or distracts the mind’s intention from God, when we are too attached to those things. Now, the divine law was given chiefly that man might adhere to God. Therefore it belongs to the divine law to direct man in his love and use of corporeal and sensible things.

Again. Just as the mind of man is subordinate to God, so is the body subordinate to the soul, and the lower powers to reason. Now, it belongs to divine providence, which God sets before man under the form of the divine law, that everything should retain its order. Therefore man should be directed by the divine law, in such wise that the lower powers be subject to reason; the body to the soul; and external things be employed for man’s needs.

Further. Every law that is framed aright, is conducive to virtue. Now, virtue is the reason’s rule applied to both interior affections and the use of corporeal things. Therefore this should be prescribed by the divine law.

Moreover. Every lawgiver should legislate for those things that are necessary for the observance of the law. Since, then, the law is proposed to the reason, man would not obey the law, unless all that is in man be subject to reason. Therefore it is for the divine law to command that all that is in man be subject to reason.

Hence it is said (Rom. 12:1): Your reasonable service: and (1 Thess. 4:3): This is the will of God, your sanctification.

Hereby we refute the error of those who assert that there is on sin unless our neighbour be injured or scandalized.

CHAPTER CXXII

HOW, ACCORDING TO THE DIVINE LAW, SIMPLE FORNICATION IS A SIN: AND THAT MATRIMONY IS NATURAL

HENCE it is clear how futile is the reasoning of those who say that simple fornication is no sin. For they say: Take, for instance, a woman who is not bound by the marriage tie, or under any authority, paternal or otherwise. If with her consent, a man have intercourse with her, he does her no wrong: since she pleases herself, and has the disposal of her own body. He does not wrong a third party: because, in the supposition, she is under no one's authority. Therefore there is no sin.

Nor, seemingly, is it enough to reply that he does a wrong to God.—Because we do not wrong God unless we wrong our own good as stated above. But this would not seem to be contrary to man's good. Consequently no wrong, seemingly, is done to God thereby.

Likewise, it would not seem to meet the case if one reply that the man wrongs his neighbour by scandalizing him.—For one may be scandalized at something that is not a sin in itself, so that it becomes a sin accidentally. But the point at issue is whether simple fornication be a sin, not accidentally, but in itself.

Accordingly we must seek the solution from what has been said above. For it has been stated that God cares for everything in respect of what is good for it. Now, it is good for everything that it obtain its end: and its evil is that it turn from its end. This applies to the parts as well as to the whole: so that man's every part, even as his every act, should attain to its due end. Now, though the seed be superfluous for the preservation of the individual, it is necessary for the propagation of the species. Other superfluities such as excretions, urine, sweat and the like are not necessary for anything, and so it is only their discharge that is good for man. Seed, however, has another end in view, since it is emitted for the purpose of generation, which is the object of coition. Moreover generation would be in vain, if due nourishment were not to follow: because the offspring would not survive if deprived of its due nourishment. Hence the emission of seed should be ordered in such wise, that befitting generation, and rearing of the offspring may follow.

It is therefore clearly contrary to man's good that the seed be emitted in such a way that generation cannot ensue: and if this be done deliberately it must needs be a sin.—I mean, if it be done in a way that is directly opposed to generation, such as every emission of seed without the natural union of male and female: hence sins of this kind are said to be against nature. If, however, it be accidental that generation cannot ensue, it is not on this account contrary to nature, or sinful: for instance if the woman be sterile.

In like manner it must be contrary to man's good, if, though seed be emitted so that generation can ensue, the proper upbringing of the offspring is hindered. For it must be observed that in those animals in which the female alone suffices for the rearing of the offspring,—dogs for instance—the male and female do not remain together after coition. On the other hand, in all cases in which the female does not suffice to rear the offspring, the male and female remain together after coition, as long as may be necessary for the rearing and development of the young. We have an instance of this in certain birds, whose young are unable to seek food as soon as they are hatched. For since the bird does not feed its young on milk,—which is ready at hand through being prepared by nature, as in the case of quadrupeds—and needs to go in search of food for them, and besides this fosters them by incubation; the female alone would not suffice for all this. Wherefore divine providence has given the male of such animals the natural instinct to remain with the female for the rearing of the offspring.—Now it is clear that in the human species the female is far from sufficing alone for the rearing of the children, since the needs of human life require many things that one person alone cannot provide. It is therefore in keeping with human nature that the man remain with the woman after coition, and not leave her at once, indulging in promiscuous intercourse, as those do who have the habit of fornication.

Nor is this argument weakened because some woman has sufficient means to rear her offspring by herself. Because natural rectitude in human acts depends, not on what is accidentally in one individual but on that which is proper to the whole species. Again, we must observe that, in the human species, the offspring needs not only nourishment for its body, as with other animals, but also instruction for its soul. For other animals have their natural forethought which enables them to provide for themselves: whereas man lives by reason, which can attain to forethought only after long experience: so that children need to be instructed by their parents who are experienced.

Moreover children are not capable of this instruction as soon as they are born, but only after a long time, and especially when they reach the age of discretion. Besides, this instruction requires a long time. And even then, on account of the assaults of the passions whereby the judgement of prudence is perverted, they need not only instruction but correction. Now a woman is insufficient for these things, in fact there is more need for a man for such things, for his reason is more perfect for instruction, and his arm is stronger for punishment. Consequently a short space of time such as suffices for birds is not sufficient for the education of the offspring in the human species, and a great part of life is required for the purpose. So that, as in all animals it behoves the male to remain with the female as long as the father is needed by the offspring, it is natural in the human race that the man should have not a short-lived but a lasting fellowship with a definite woman: and this fellowship is called matrimony. Therefore matrimony is natural to man: and the intercourse of fornication, which is apart from matrimony, is contrary to man’s good. For this reason it must needs be a sin.

Moreover, the emission of seed without the requisite intention of procreation and education, must not be thought a slight sin, for that it is a small sin, or none at all, to use some part of one’s body for some other purpose than that for which nature intended it: for instance if one walk on one’s hands, or use one’s feet to do what the hands should do. Because by suchlike actions man’s good is not prejudiced very much; whereas the inordinate discharge of semen is perversive of a natural good, which is the preservation of the species. Wherefore, after the sin of murder, whereby human nature is deprived of actual existence, this kind of sin, whereby the generation of human nature is hindered, holds, seemingly, the second place.

The foregoing conclusions are confirmed by divine authority. That the discharge of semen in such wise that no offspring can ensue, is unlawful, is clear from the words of Levit. 18:22, 23: Thou shalt not lie with mankind as with womankind … thou shalt not copulate with any beast; and of 1 Cor. 6:10: Nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind … shall possess the kingdom of God.

Again, that fornication and all intercourse with other than one’s own wife, is unlawful, is evident from the words of Deut. 23:17: There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel: and of Job 4:13: Take heed to keep thyself … from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime: and of 1 Cor. 6:18: Fly fornication.

Hereby we exclude the error of those who denied that there was a greater sin in the emission of seed than in the discharge of other superfluities: and of those who said that fornication is no sin.

CHAPTER CXXIII

THAT MATRIMONY SHOULD BE INDISSOLUBLE

IF one consider the matter rightly, it will be seen that the foregoing arguments not only show that the fellowship of male and female in human nature, which we call matrimony, should be lasting, but also that it should endure throughout life.

For possessions are directed to the preservation of the natural life: and since the natural life which cannot be preserved in the person of an undying father, is preserved, by a kind of succession, in the person of the son, it is naturally befitting that the son succeed in things belonging to the father. Therefore it is natural that the father's care for his son should endure to the end of his life. If, then, the father's care for his son causes, even among birds, the continued fellowship of male and female, the natural order demands that in the human species father and mother should remain together to the end of life.

It would seem also contrary to equity for the aforesaid fellowship to be dissolved. For the female requires the male, not only for procreation, as in other animals, but also for governance: because the male excels both in intelligence and in strength. Now, the woman is taken into partnership with the man for the purpose of procreation. Consequently when the woman ceases to be fruitful and fair, this is an obstacle against her being taken by another man. Hence, if a man after taking a wife in her youth, while she is yet fair and fruitful, can put her away when she has aged, he does her an injury, contrary to natural equity.

Again. It is clearly unfitting that the woman be allowed to put away the man: since she is naturally subject to the man's authority: and one who is subject to another is not free to withdraw himself from his authority. Hence it would be contrary to the natural order if a wife could leave her husband. Consequently, if the husband could leave his wife, there would not be just fellowship between husband and wife, but a kind of slavery on the part of the latter.

Also. There is in man a certain natural anxiety to be assured of his offspring: and this is necessary, because the child needs the father's authority for a long time. Hence whatever prevents him from being assured of having children, is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species. Now, if the husband may put away his wife, or the wife leave her husband, and take another man, thus being copulated first to one, and afterwards to another, the certainty of offspring would be hindered. Therefore it is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species that husband and wife be separated: and in consequence the union of male and female in the human race must be not only long lasting but indissoluble.

Moreover. The greater the friendship the more stable and lasting is it. Now, seemingly between husband and wife there is the greatest friendship: for they are made one not only in the act of carnal intercourse, which even among dumb animals causes an agreeable fellowship, but also as partners in the whole intercourse of daily life: so that, to indicate this, man must leave father and mother (Gen. 2:24) for his wife's sake. Therefore it is right that matrimony should be altogether indissoluble. It must also be observed that among natural acts generation alone is directed to the common good: since eating, and the discharge of other superfluities, regard the individual: whereas procreation regards the preservation of the species. Hence, as the law is made for the common good, whatever regards procreation should be regulated, before other things, by laws both divine and human. Now positive laws should be based on natural instinct, if they be human: even as in demonstrative sciences, all human discoveries must needs be founded on principles naturally known. And if they be divine, not only do they express the instinct of nature, but they also supply the defect of natural instinct: even as the things that God reveals, are beyond the grasp of natural reason. Since, then, the natural instinct of the human species is that the union of male and female be indissoluble, and that one man be united to one woman, it behoved this to be ordered by human law. Moreover, the divine law adds a kind of supernatural reason taken from the representation of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, which is union of one with one. Wherefore inordinateness in the act of generation not only is contrary to the natural instinct, but it also transgresses laws both divine and human. Hence, this kind of disorder is more sinful than that which may occur in taking food, or in similar things.

And since in man all other things should be subordinate to what is best in him, the union of male and female is ordered by law not only in the point of its relation to the procreation of children, as in other animals, but also in its relation to good morals, which right reason regulates, both as regards man in himself, and considered as a member either of a private family, or of the civil community. Now, the indissolubility of the union of male and female belongs to good morals. Because their mutual love will be the more constant if they know that they are indissolubly united. They will also be more carefully provident in the conduct of the household, when they realize that they are always to remain together in possession of the same things. Again, this precludes the origin of quarrels which must needs arise between the husband and his wife's relatives, if he were to put his wife away: and those who are connected through affinity have a greater regard for one another. Moreover it removes the occasions of adultery which would occur, were the husband free to put away his wife, or vice versa: for this would encourage the seeking of further marriage.

Hence it is said (Matth. 5:31; 19:9; 1 Cor. 7:10): But I say to you that the wife depart not from her husband.

Hereby we condemn the custom of putting a wife away. Nevertheless this was permitted to the Jews in the Old Law by reason of the hardness of their heart: because, to wit, they were prone to wife-murder. Hence the lesser evil was allowed, in order to avoid the greater.

CHAPTER CXXIV

THAT MATRIMONY SHOULD BE THE UNION OF ONE MAN WITH ONE WOMAN

IT is also to be observed, seemingly, that all animals that are used to copulate, have a natural instinct to resist another's intercourse with their consort: wherefore, animals fight on account of copulation. And as regards all animals there is one common reason for this, because every animal desires to indulge at will in the pleasure of copulation, even as in the pleasure of eating: and this freedom ceases if many males have access to one female, or vice versa: just as an animal is deprived of the free enjoyment of its food, if another animal despoil it of the food it desires to consume. Hence animals fight both for food and for copulation. But with regard to men there is a special reason: because, as already stated, man naturally desires to be assured of his offspring: and this assurance would be altogether nullified in the case of promiscuous copulation. Therefore the union of one man with one woman comes from a natural instinct.

A difference, however, is to be noted here. For as regards one woman not being united to several men, both the foregoing arguments avail. But as regards one man not being joined to several women, the second argument is of no use: since the certainty of having offspring is not removed if one man be joined to several women. The first argument, however, avails against this: for just as freedom of access to the woman is denied, if she have another man, so too the same freedom is denied the woman, if the man have several women. Hence, as certainty of having offspring is the chief good sought from marriage, no human law or custom has permitted polyandry.

This was considered to be wrong even among the ancient Romans, of whom Maximus Valerius relates that they deemed that not even on account of barrenness should the marriage bond be severed.

Again. In every animal species where the father has a certain care for his offspring, the one male has but one female, as may be seen in birds, where both unite in feeding their young: for one male would not suffice to rear the progeny of several females. On the other hand where the male animal has not the care of the offspring, we find indifferently union of one male with several females, or of one female with several males: such is the case with dogs, hens, and so forth. Since then of all animals the male of the human species is pre-eminent in the care of his offspring, it is clearly natural to man that one man should have one wife and vice versa.

Besides. Equality is a condition of friendship. Hence if a woman may not have several husbands, because this removes the certainty of offspring; were it lawful for a man to have several wives, the friendship of a wife for her husband would not be freely bestowed, but servile as it were. And this argument is confirmed by experience: since where men have several wives, the wives are treated as servants.

Further. In perfect friendship it is impossible to be friends with many, according to the Philosopher (8 Ethic. vi.). Hence if the wife has but one husband, while the husband has several wives, the friendship will not be equal on either side: and consequently it will be not a freely bestowed but a servile friendship as it were.

Moreover. As we have already stated matrimony among men should be so ordered as to be consistent with good morals. Now it is contrary to good morals that one man have several wives, for this leads to discord in the family, as shown by experience. Therefore it is not right for one man to have several wives.

Hence it is said (Gen. 2:24): They shall be two in one flesh.

Hereby polygamy stands condemned, as also the opinion of Plato who said that wives should be possessed in common: which opinion was adopted by Nicolas, one of the seven deacons.

CHAPTER CXXV

THAT MARRIAGE SHOULD NOT BE CONTRACTED BETWEEN RELATIVES

FOR these reasonable motives the laws have decreed that certain persons belonging to a common stock should be debarred from marriage.

Because, as marriage is the union of different persons, those who should consider themselves as one through having a common ancestor, are rightly debarred from marriage, that they may have a greater regard for each other, through realizing that for that reason they are one.

Again. Since in the relations between husband and wife there is a certain natural shame, relations should be forbidden between those who through being united in blood should revere each other. This motive seems to be indicated in the law, where it is said: Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy sister, and so on.

Further. That men be too much given to the pleasure of copulation is corruptive of good morals: because, since, more than any other, this pleasure absorbs the mind, the reason would be hindered in things pertaining to rectitude. Now there would result an abuse of pleasure if man were allowed to be united in copulation with those, in whose society he must needs live, such as sisters and other relatives: for it would be impossible to remove the occasion of intercourse with such persons. It was therefore in keeping with good morals that the laws should forbid such unions.

Moreover. The pleasure of copulation corrupts entirely the judgement of prudence. Therefore frequency of that pleasure is contrary to good morals. Now, this pleasure is increased by the mutual love of those who are thus united. Hence it would be contrary to good morals for relatives to marry:

for then there would be in them the love arising from community of blood and nourishment in addition to the love of desire; and, in consequence, through multiplicity of loves the soul would be all the more a slave to pleasures.

Besides. It is most necessary in human society that friendship be among many. Now friendships among men are multiplied if marriage be contracted between persons of different stock. Therefore it was becoming for the laws to direct that marriage be contracted with those of different stock, and not between relatives.

Also. It is unsuitable that a person be united socially with those to whom he should naturally be subject. Now, it is natural for a man to be subject to his parents. Therefore it is unfitting for one to marry one's parent, since marriage is a social union.

Hence it is said (Levit. 18:6): No man shall approach to her that is near of kin to him.

Hereby stands condemned the custom of those who contract bonds of the flesh with persons of their kindred. We must observe, however, that just as the natural inclination is to what occurs most frequently, so too is the law made to fit the majority of cases. The foregoing arguments are not invalidated by any possible exceptions: for the good of many should not be foregone for the sake of the good of one, since the common good is ever more god-like than the good of one. Lest, however, a defect that may occur in a single instance, be altogether irremediable, lawgivers and the like have the power to dispense in the statutes that are made for the generality, according to the requirements of a particular case. If the law be made by man, those who have the same power can dispense therein. But if the law be of God, dispensation can be granted by divine authority: just as in the old law polygamy, concubinage and divorce were seemingly allowed by dispensation.

CHAPTER CXXVI

THAT NOT ALL CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS SINFUL

JUST as it is contrary to reason to indulge in carnal intercourse so as to frustrate the begetting and rearing of children, so is it in keeping with reason to make use of it in a manner consistent with procreation and upbringing. Now, the divine law forbids only those things that are contrary to reason, as we have shown above. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that all carnal intercourse is sinful.

Again. Since the members of the body are instruments of the soul, the end of each member, as of any other instrument, is its use. Now, the use of certain members of the body is carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is the end of certain members of the body. But that which is the end of any natural thing, cannot be evil in itself: since that which is according to nature, is directed to an end by divine providence, as stated above. Therefore carnal intercourse cannot possibly be evil in itself.

Further. Natural inclinations are implanted in things by God, who moves all things. Therefore the natural inclination of a species cannot be to that which is evil in itself. Now, in all perfect animals there is a natural inclination to carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse cannot be evil in itself.

Moreover. That which is a necessary condition for something good and very good, is not evil in itself. But the preservation of the animal species cannot be enduring except by means of generation by carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse cannot be evil in itself.

Hence it is said (1 Cor. 7:28): A woman sins not if she marries.

Hereby we refute the error of those who say that all carnal intercourse is unlawful: wherefore they utterly condemn matrimony and nuptials. Some of them are led to this assertion because they believe that bodies were made not by a good but by an evil principle.

CHAPTER CXXVII

THAT NO FOOD IS IN ITSELF SINFUL FOR ONE TO TAKE

EVEN as venery, so also food, may be made use of without sin, if the order of reason be observed. And a thing is done according to the order of reason when it is directed in a befitting manner to its due end. Now, the end due to the consumption of food is the preservation of the body by nourishment. Therefore one may partake of any food that is adapted to this purpose. Therefore no food is in itself sinful for one to take.

Again. It is not in itself sinful to use a thing that is not evil in itself. Now, no food is evil by nature: because everything, in its nature, is good, as we have proved above. A certain food may, however, be bad for a certain person, as being harmful to the well-being of his body. Therefore no food, considered as a thing of such and such a nature, is sinful for one to take: but it may be sinful if one use it unreasonably, so as to injure one's health.

Moreover. To put a thing to the use for which it is intended, is not, in itself, a sin. Now, plants are intended for animals; of animals, some are intended for others; and all things are intended for man, as we have already proved. Therefore it is not sinful in itself to make use of either plants or of the flesh of animals, whether for food or for any other purpose useful to man.

Besides. The defect of sin spreads from the soul to the body, and not vice versa: because sin is a disorder of the will. Now food concerns the body immediately, and not the soul. Therefore the consumption of food cannot be sinful in itself, except in so far as it is contrary to rectitude of the will. This happens in one way, through incompatibility with the end for which food is taken: for instance when, for the sake of the pleasure afforded thereby, a man partakes of a food injurious to his health, whether on account of the kind of food, or by reason of the quantity consumed.

In another way, this may happen through the food being inconsistent with the condition either of the consumer or of those among whom he lives: for instance, if a man be so fastidious about his food, as to go beyond his means, or singularize himself by not conforming to the manner of food customary to those around him.—In a third way, this may happen if certain foods are forbidden by law for some special reason: thus, in the old law, certain foods were prohibited on account of their signification: in Egypt it was forbidden of old to eat beef, lest agriculture should be hindered. Or again, because certain regulations forbid the use of certain foods, for the taming of the flesh. Hence our Lord said (Matth. 15:11): Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man. Again it is said (1 Cor. 10:25): Whatsoever is sold in the shambles, eat: asking no questions for conscience' sake. And again (1 Tim. 4:4): Every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving.

Hereby we refute the error of those who say the use of certain foods is illicit in itself; of whom St. Paul says (1 Tim. 4:1–3): In the last times some shall depart from the faith: forbidding to marry, to abstain from meats, which God hath created to be received with thanksgiving.

Since, then, the use of food and venery is not unlawful in itself, and can be unlawful only as evading the order of reason; and whereas external possessions are necessary for the consumption of food, the rearing of children, support of the family, and other bodily needs; it follows that neither is the possession of wealth unlawful in itself, if the order of reason be observed: in such wise, namely, that man possess justly what he has; that he place not therein the end of his will; that he use it aright, for his own and others' good. Hence the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:17, 18) condemns not the rich, but lays down for them a definite rule for the use of riches, when he says: Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded, nor to trust in the uncertainty of riches … to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others. Again it is said (Ecclus. 31:8): Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish: and that hath not gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor in treasures.

Hereby we also refute the error of those who, as Augustine states (De Haeres., xl.), most arrogantly styled themselves Apostolics, because they admitted to their community, neither married men, nor possessors of property, such as are in the Catholic Church as well as monks, and clerks in great number. The reason why these are heretics is because they sever themselves from the Church, and consider that those are without hope, who use these things which they themselves lack.

CHAPTER CXXVIII

HOW BY THE DIVINE LAW MAN IS DIRECTED TO HIS NEIGHBOUR

ACCORDINGLY, from what has been said, it is clear that man is led by the divine law to observe the order of reason in all things that may be of use to him. Now, of all things that may be useful to man, other men hold the first place, since man is by nature a social animal: for he needs many things that cannot be provided by one man alone. Therefore it behoves man to be instructed by divine law so as to behave towards other men according to the order of reason.

Again. The end of the divine law is that man may adhere to God. Now, in this, one man is assisted by another both in his knowledge and in his affections: because one man helps another to know the truth; and one urges another to good, and withdraws him from evil. Hence it is said (Prov. 27:17): Iron sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend; and (Eccles. 4:9–12): It is better … that two should be together, than one: for they have the advantage of their society: if one fall he shall be supported by the other. Woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth, he hath none to lift him up. And if two lie together, they shall warm one another; how shall one alone be warmed? And if a man prevail against one, two shall withstand him. Therefore it behoved the divine law to direct the mutual relations between man and man.

Moreover. The divine law is a rule of divine providence for the governance of men. Now, it belongs to divine providence to keep all things subject to it within the bounds of right order: so that, to wit, each thing be in its place and degree. Accordingly, the divine law directs men to one another in such wise that each one remains in his own order: which is for men to be at peace with one another, for peace among men is nothing else but rightly ordered harmony, as Augustine says.

Besides. Whenever a number of things are subordinate to one, they ought to be harmoniously ordered to one another: else they would hinder one another in the prosecution of the common end: thus, an army is harmoniously ordered to victory which is the end of the commander-in-chief. Now, every man is ordered to God by the divine law. Therefore it behoved the divine law to establish an ordered harmony, which is peace, among men, lest they be a hindrance to one another.

Hence it is said in the psalm: Who hath placed peace in thy borders: and our Lord said (Jo. 16:33): These things I have spoken to you, that in me you may have peace.

Now ordered harmony is observed among men when to every one is given his due: and this belongs to justice. Wherefore it is said (Isa. 32:17): The work of justice shall be peace. Therefore it behoved the divine law to give precepts of justice, that every one might give others their due, and refrain from doing them wrong.

Among men our greatest debt is to our parents. Wherefore the first of the legal precepts (Exod. 20:12–17) that order us to our neighbour is: Honour thy father and thy mother, whereby we are to understand that each one is commanded to give their due both to his parents and to others, according to Rom. 13:7: Render to all men their dues.—The next place is given to the precepts that forbid wrong-doing to one’s neighbour: to harm him by deed either in his own person, for it is said: Thou shalt not kill; or in a person united to him, for it is said: Thou shalt not commit adultery; or in external things, for it is said: Thou shalt not steal. We are also forbidden to wrong our neighbour by word: for it is written: Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour. And since God is judge also of hearts, we are forbidden to injure our neighbour in thought, by coveting his wife or his goods.

Now man is moved in two ways to observe this justice that is prescribed by the divine law: first, from within; secondly, from without. From within, when man is willing to observe the precepts of the divine law. This is the result of man’s love of God and his neighbour: for whoso loves another, gives him his due willingly and with pleasure, and gives even more with liberality. Hence the entire fulfilment of the law depends on love, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 13:10): Love is the fulfilling of the law. Again, our Lord says (Matth. 22:40) that on … two commandments,—i.e., on the love of God and our neighbour, dependeth the whole law. But as some have not the inward disposition to do what the law commands, willingly and of their own accord, they need to be drawn from without to fulfil the justice of the law. This is done when they fulfil the law through fear of punishment, not as freemen but as slaves. Hence it is said (Isa. 26:9): When thou shalt do thy judgements on the earth, namely, by punishing evil-doers, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice.

The former, then, are a law to themselves, for they have charity, which moves them instead of the law, and makes them act as men who are free. Wherefore it was necessary for the external law to be made not on their account, but on account of those who are not inclined to well-doing of their own accord. For this reason it is said (1 Tim. 1:9): The law is not made for the just man, but for the unjust. But this does not mean that the just are not bound to fulfil the law, as some have wrongly understood; but that they are inclined of their own accord to do justice, even without the law.

CHAPTER CXXIX

THAT SOME HUMAN ACTS ARE RIGHT BY NATURE, AND NOT BECAUSE THEY ARE PRESCRIBED BY LAW

FROM what has been said it may be seen that the things prescribed by the divine law are right not only because they are prescribed by law, but also by their very nature.

For the divine law subjects the human mind to God, and all the rest of man, to reason. Now, the natural order demands that the inferior be subject to the superior. Therefore the precepts of the divine law are in themselves right by nature.

Further. Divine providence has endowed man with the natural tribunal of reason, as the principle of his own acts. Now, natural principles are directed to things that are naturally. Hence there are certain actions naturally becoming to man, and in themselves right by nature, and not merely because they are prescribed by law.

Moreover. Whatsoever has a determinate nature must have determinate actions, becoming to that nature: since the proper operation of a thing is consequent to its nature. Now, it is clear that man has a determinate nature. Therefore there must needs be certain actions that are in themselves becoming to man.

Besides. If a thing is natural to a man, that also must be natural to him, without which he cannot have that thing: for nature is not wanting in necessaries. Now, it is natural to man to be a social animal, and this is proved by the fact that one man alone does not suffice to procure all the necessities of human life. Consequently whatever is necessary for the maintenance of human society, is naturally becoming to man: such are to observe the rights of others, and to refrain from doing them any harm. Therefore in human acts some things are naturally right.

Also. It has been shown above that it is natural for man to use things beneath him for the needs of his life. Now, there is a certain measure according to which the use of the aforesaid things is expedient for human life, and if that measure be ignored, a wrong is done to man, as in the inordinate consumption of food. Therefore certain human acts are naturally right, and some naturally wrong.

Again. According to the natural order, the body is on account of the soul, and the lower powers of the soul are on account of the reason: even as in other things, matter is for the form, and instruments for the sake of the principal agent. Now, if a thing be ordered to another, it should be a help to it and not a hindrance. Therefore it is naturally right that man should so care for his body and the lower powers of the soul, that they be not a hindrance but a help to the act of reason and to his own good; if it happen otherwise, it will be evil by nature. Therefore wine-bibbing and feasting; inordinate use of venery which hinders the use of reason; and submission to the passions which thwart the free judgement of reason, are all evil by nature.

Moreover. Those things are natural to every man, whereby he tends to his natural end: while those which are of a contrary nature, are naturally unbecoming to him. Now, we have proved above that man is by nature directed to God as his end. Consequently those things whereby man is brought to the knowledge and love of God, are naturally right: and whatever things have a contrary result, are naturally bad for man.

It is therefore clear that good and evil in human acts result not only from the prescription of the law, but also from the order of nature.

Hence it is said in the Psalm (28:10) that the judgements of the Lord are true, justified in themselves.

Hereby we refute the statement of those who assert that the just and the right are prescribed by law only.

CHAPTER CXXX

OF THE COUNSELS GIVEN IN THE DIVINE LAW

SINCE man’s greatest good is that he adhere with his mind to God and divine things: and whereas it is impossible for him to give undivided attention to things diverse: in order that his mind may more freely turn to God, there are given in the divine law counsels whereby men are withdrawn from the occupations of the present life, as far as this is possible to one whose life is on the earth. Now, this is not so necessary for man’s righteousness, that without it righteousness were impossible: since virtue and righteousness are not destroyed, if man make use of things corporal and earthly according to the order of reason. Wherefore these admonitions of the divine law are called counsels, and not precepts, inasmuch as man is counselled to forego the lesser goods for the sake of the greater. Now man’s cares, as regards the general mode of human life, are occupied with three things: first, about his person, as to what he shall do, where he is to live; secondly, about persons united to him, especially his wife and children: thirdly, about providing himself with those external things which he needs for the support of life. In order to do away with his care for external things, the divine law gives the counsel of poverty: namely, that he should renounce the goods of this world, which are apt to entangle his mind with anxieties. Hence our Lord said (Matth. 19:21): If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all thou hast and give to the poor, and come, follow me. In order to remove the care of wife and children, man is given the counsel of virginity or continence. Hence it is said (1 Cor. 7:25): Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord, but I give counsel. And in order to give the reason for this counsel he adds (verse 32 sq.): He that is without a wife, is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided. In order to remove man's care of himself, the counsel of obedience is given, whereby he surrenders the disposal of his own acts into the hands of his superior. Wherefore it is said (Heb. 13:17): Obey your prelates, and be subject to them. For they watch as being to render an account of your souls.

And whereas the highest perfection of human life is that man's mind be occupied with God, and as these three are apparently the best dispositions to that occupation, it would seem that they rightly belong to the state of perfection; not as though they were themselves perfections, but because they are dispositions to perfection which consists in being busy about God. This is clearly indicated by the words of our Lord in counselling poverty, when he said: If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow me, as though he declared the perfection of life to consist in following him.

They may also be described as the effects and signs of perfection. For when the mind is strongly affected with love and desire of a certain thing, the result is that it thinks less of other things. Wherefore if man's mind be borne with love and desire towards divine things, wherein perfection clearly consists, the result is that he renounces all that may hinder his movement towards God, not only the care of possessions, and love of wife and children, but also love of himself. This is signified by the words of Scripture. For it is said (Cant. 8:7): If a man should give all the substance of his house for love, he shall despise it as nothing: and (Matth. 13:45, 46): The kingdom of heaven is like to a merchant seeking good pearls: who, when he had found one pearl of great price, went his way, and sold all that he had, and bought it: and (Philip. 3:7, 8): The things that were gain to me. … I count … as dung, that I may gain Christ.

Since then these three are dispositions to perfection, and the effects and signs of perfection, it is seemly that those who vow these three things should be said to be in the state of perfection.

Now, the perfection to which the things in question dispose a man, consists in the mind being occupied with God. Wherefore those who make profession of them are called religious, as dedicating themselves and their possessions as a sacrifice to God: their possessions, by poverty; their body, by continence; their will, by obedience. For religion consists in the worship of God, as stated above.

CHAPTER CXXXI

CONCERNING THE ERROR OF THOSE WHO CONDEMN VOLUNTARY POVERTY

SOME, in contradiction of the Gospel teaching, have condemned intentional poverty. The first of these was Vigilantius, who was followed by others, pretending to be teachers of the law, understanding neither the things they say, nor whereof they affirm. They based their contention on the following and similar arguments.

The natural appetite demands that every animal should provide itself with the necessities of life. Hence those animals which are unable to find the necessities of life at all times of the year, by natural instinct, gather such things together at the time they are to be found, and store them, for instance bees and ants. Now, men need many things for the support of life, which cannot be found at all times. Hence it is natural to man to procure and keep the things he needs. Therefore it is contrary to the natural law to scatter by poverty all the things one has gathered.

Again. Everything has a natural liking for those things by which its being is preserved, inasmuch as all things seek to exist. Now man's life is supported with the substance of external things. Wherefore, by the natural law every man is bound to maintain the substance of external things even as life itself. Hence, it is as much against the natural law for a man to deprive himself of the necessities of life by voluntary poverty as it is to lay hands on himself.

Moreover. Man is by nature a social animal, as stated above. Now, society cannot endure among men unless one help another. Consequently it is natural to men for one to help another in his need. But they make it impossible for themselves to afford this help, if they renounce the substance of external things, whereby especially assistance is given to others. Therefore it is contrary to the natural instinct, and to the good of pity and charity that a man, by voluntary poverty, renounce all worldly substance.

Besides. If it be an evil to possess the substance of this world; and if it be good to free one’s neighbour of an evil, and evil to bring evil upon him: it follows that it is evil to give of the substance of this world to one who is in want, and good to take it away from one who has it: which is absurd. Therefore it is good to possess the substance of this world: and to renounce it altogether by voluntary poverty is evil.

Again. Occasions of evil should be avoided. Now, poverty is an occasion of evil, for through it men are led to thieving, flattery and perjury, and the like. Therefore poverty should not be deliberately embraced; rather should we avoid it lest it befall us.

Further. Since virtue follows the mean, it is destroyed by either extreme. Now, liberality is a virtue which gives what should be given, and holds to what should be retained. And illiberality is a vice on the side of deficiency, holding to what should be retained, and to what should not be retained. It is also a vice on the side of excess when all is given: and this is done by those who embrace voluntary poverty. Therefore it is sinful and allied to prodigality.

These arguments would seem to be confirmed by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (Prov. 30:8, 9): Give me neither beggary nor riches: give me only the necessaries of life. Lest perhaps being filled I should be tempted to deny, and say: Who is the Lord? or being compelled by poverty, I should steal, and forswear the name of my God.

CHAPTER CXXXII

OF THE WAYS OF LIFE FOLLOWED BY THOSE WHO EMBRACE VOLUNTARY POVERTY

THIS question would seem to be yet more relevant if one consider the ways in which those must needs live, who embrace voluntary poverty.

One way of living is for the goods of each one to be sold, and for all to live together on the proceeds. This seems to have been done in Jerusalem under the apostles: for it is said (Acts 4:34, 35): As many as were owners of lands. or houses, sold them, and brought the price of the things they sold, and laid it down before the feet of the apostles. And distribution was made to everyone, according as he had need.

Now, in this way it would seem that sufficient provision was not made for man's livelihood. First, because it is not probable that many with great possessions would embrace this kind of life. And the proceeds from the sale of the possessions of a few wealthy men, after being divided among many, would not last very long.

Also, because it is possible and easy for the price received to be lost, through fraud on the part of the dispensers, or through theft or robbery. Consequently those who embrace this kind of poverty will be left without a livelihood.

Besides. Many things happen which compel a man to change his abode. Hence it will be difficult to provide for those who may possibly be scattered about in various places, if the proceeds of the sale be assigned to them all in common.

There is another mode of life observed in many monasteries, where the possessions are held in common, and provision made for each one according to his needs.

But neither does this way of life seem to be expedient. For earthly possessions are attended by anxieties: both in the acquisition of revenue, and in protecting them against fraud and violence: and these anxieties are so much the greater and involve so many more persons, according as greater possessions are needed to suffice for the upkeep of the greater number. In this way, therefore, the motive of voluntary poverty is frustrated: at any rate as regards many who must needs be solicitous in looking after the property.

Again. Possession in common is wont to occasion discord. For apparently people who, like the Spaniards and Persians, have nothing in common, are not given to litigation, but those who hold something together in common: for which reason there are quarrels among brothers. Now, discords are a very great hindrance to the mind being occupied with divine things, as stated above. Therefore this way of living would seem to frustrate the end of voluntary poverty.

There is again a third way of life, where those who embrace voluntary poverty live by manual labour. The apostle Paul followed this manner of living and by his example and institution counselled others to observe it. For it is said (2 Thess. 3:8–10): Neither did we eat any man’s bread for nothing, but in labour and in toil we worked night and day, lest we should be chargeable to any of you: not as if we had not power, but that we might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us. For also when we were with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work, neither let him eat. Yet neither does this manner of life seem expedient. For manual labour is necessary as a means of livelihood, forasmuch as something is acquired thereby. Now it seems futile to renounce what is necessary, and then work to get it back. Consequently, if after embracing voluntary poverty a man has to regain the means of livelihood by working with his hands, it were useless for him to renounce all that he had with which to support his life.

Also. Voluntary poverty is counselled that thereby a man may be disposed to follow Christ with greater promptitude, through being free from worldly cares. Now, it would seem to involve greater solicitude that a man should gain a livelihood by his own toil, than that he should live on what he already had: especially if he were moderately rich, or were possessed of movable goods, with which it were easy for him to gain the necessaries of life. Therefore to live by manual labour would seem inconsistent with the purpose of those who embrace voluntary poverty.

To this we must add that our Lord apparently forbade His disciples manual labour when, using the comparison of the birds and the lilies of the field, He warned them against solicitude for earthly things. For He said (Matth. 6:26): Behold the birds of the air, for they neither sow, nor do they reap, nor gather into barns. And again (verse 28): Consider the lilies of the field how they grow: they labour not, neither do they spin.

But this manner of life is seemingly inadequate. For many desire perfection who have neither the ability nor the skill, so as to be able to spend their life in toil, because they have neither been brought up nor taught to do such things. For thus peasants and labourers would be in a better position for the attainment of the perfection of life, than those who have studied wisdom, and have been brought up in wealth and ease, which they renounce for Christ’s sake.—It also happens that some who embrace voluntary poverty, lose their health, or are hindered in some other way from working. Consequently they would be left deprived of the means of livelihood.

Again. No little time suffices that one may work for the necessities of life; as evidenced in the number of men who pass the whole of their time so doing, and yet are scarcely able to gain an adequate livelihood. But, if those who embrace voluntary poverty have to live by manual labour, the result would be that they would spend the greater part of their life in this kind of work: and, consequently, they would be debarred from actions of greater importance, which also require much time, such as the study of wisdom, teaching and other like spiritual occupations. And so voluntary poverty would be a hindrance rather than a disposition to the perfection of life.

If someone say that manual labour is necessary in order to banish idleness: this is not to the point. For it were better to banish idleness by being busy in the exercise of moral virtues, which riches serve instrumentally, for instance in giving alms, and the like, rather than by manual labour.—Besides: it were useless to counsel poverty merely that men, after becoming poor, might abstain from idleness by occupying their time in manual labour, unless the counsel were given that they might give themselves to higher occupations than those belonging to man’s ordinary life.

And if someone say that manual labour is necessary to tame the desires of the flesh; this is not to the point. For the question at issue is whether it be necessary for those who embrace voluntary poverty to live by manual labour.—Besides: there are many other ways of taming carnal concupiscence: namely, by fasting, watching, and the like.—Moreover, even the rich, who need not work in order to live, might use manual labour for that purpose.

There is yet another way of life, where those who embrace voluntary poverty live by the ministrations of others, who wish to be of service to the perfection of voluntary poverty, by retaining their riches. This way, seemingly, was followed by our Lord and His disciples: for we read (Lk. 8:2, 3) that certain women followed Christ, and ministered unto Him of their substance.

But neither does this way of life seem to be expedient. For apparently it is unreasonable to renounce one’s own goods, in order to live on another’s.

Moreover. It would seem unfitting to receive from another without making him a return: since the equality of justice is observed in giving and taking.—It is, however, allowable to live on the alms of others, for those who tender them some kind of service. Hence it would not seem unreasonable that the ministers of the altar, and preachers, who give the people doctrine and other godly things, should receive their livelihood from them: for the workman is worthy of his meat, as our Lord says (Matth. 10:10). For this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:13–14) that the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel, should live by the Gospel: and that they that serve the altar partake with the altar. Consequently it were unfitting for those who perform no ministerial duty for the people, to receive from the people the necessaries of life.

Further. This mode of living would seem to be harmful to others. For some there are who need to be supported by the bounty of others, through being unable to support themselves by reason of poverty or sickness. And this bounty would needs be lessened, if those who embrace voluntary poverty had to be supported by the offerings of others: since people are both unable and unwilling to support a large number of poor. Hence the Apostle (1 Tim. 4.) commands that if a man have a widow related to him, let him minister to her, that the Church may look after those who are widows indeed. It is therefore unseemly that those who choose voluntary poverty should follow this way of living.

Moreover. A free mind is a most necessary condition for perfect virtue: for without it a man easily becomes a partaker of other men's sins: either by express consent, or by flattering approval, or at least by dissimulation. Now, this freedom is considerably prejudiced by the aforesaid manner of life: for a man cannot but fear to offend one on whose kindness he lives. Consequently this manner of life is a hindrance to perfect virtue, which is the end of voluntary poverty: and so it would seem inexpedient to those who are voluntarily poor.

Besides. We cannot be sure of that which depends on another's will. Now, the giving of his own depends on the will of the giver. Therefore this way of living does not provide sufficiently for the voluntarily poor as regards their being sure of a livelihood.

Further. The poor who have to live on what others give them, have to make their needs known to others, and ask for what they need. Now such begging renders the beggar contemptible, and even burdensome: for people deem themselves better than those who need their support; and many are slow to give. But those who choose the perfect life, should be respected and loved, so that men may imitate them more readily, and embrace the state of virtue: and if the contrary be the case, even virtue itself is despised. Therefore to live by begging is harmful in those who prefer voluntary poverty for the sake of perfect virtue.

Again. Perfect men should avoid not only evil, but even what has the appearance of evil: for the Apostle says (Rom. 12): From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves: and the Philosopher says that a good man should shun not only what is wrong, but also what seems wrong. Now begging has the appearance of evil: since many beg for the sake of gain. Therefore such a mode of life ought not to be embraced by the perfect.

Besides. Voluntary poverty is counselled that a man's mind, being withdrawn from earthly cares, may be more at liberty to give itself to God. But this way of living by begging is full of cares: for seemingly more care is attached to getting others' goods, than to using one's own. Therefore this way of living would seem unbecoming to those who make profession of voluntary poverty.

If, however, someone be desirous of praising beggary on account of humility, his contention would seem altogether unreasonable. For we praise lowliness according as we despise worldly eminence, which consists in riches, honours, renown, and the like: but not through contempt of the eminence of virtue, in respect of which we should be magnanimous. Therefore humility would be blameworthy if for the sake of humility one were to do something derogatory to the eminence of humility. Now, begging is derogatory thereto in this way: both because it is better to give than to receive: and because it has the appearance of wrong. Therefore beggary is not to be praised on account of humility.

There were some, too, who said to those who profess perfection of life that they should have no solicitude, neither by begging, nor by toiling, nor by keeping something back for themselves, and that they should look to God alone for their livelihood: because it is said (Matth. 6:25).: Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat (and drink) nor for your body what you shall put on: and again (verse 34): Be not solicitous for tomorrow.

But this seems utterly unreasonable. For it is foolish to desire the end, and omit the means. Now, eating is the end to which is directed man’s solicitude, whereby he procures his food. Hence those who cannot live without eating, must needs be solicitous about getting their food.—Besides. Solicitude about earthly things is not to be avoided except because it hinders the contemplation of things eternal. But as long as he is clothed in mortal flesh man cannot live without doing many things that hinder contemplation, such as sleeping, eating, and the like. Neither therefore should he omit to be solicitous about the necessaries of life on account of their being a hindrance to contemplation.—Moreover this leads to a strange absurdity. For a man might with equal reason say that he would not walk, or open his mouth to eat, or avoid a falling stone or the thrust of a sword, but that he would wait for God to act: and this is to tempt God. Therefore solicitude about one’s food is not to be avoided altogether.

CHAPTER CXXXIII

HOW POVERTY IS GOOD

IN order to elucidate the truth about what we have been saying, we must form our judgement of poverty, by considering riches. External riches are necessary for the good of virtue: since by them we support the body, and help others. Now, things directed to an end must take their goodness from that end. Consequently external riches must be a good of man; not his chief, but, as it were, his secondary, good: because the end is a good principally; and other things, according as they are directed to the end. For this reason some have thought that virtues are man’s greatest good, and external riches, goods of least account. Now, things directed to an end, must take their measure from the exigency of the end. Wherefore riches are good forasmuch as they serve the use of virtue: and if this measure be exceeded, so that they hinder the practice of virtue, they are no longer to be reckoned as a good but as an evil. Hence it happens that the possession of riches is good for some who use them for virtue: while to others it is an evil, because they are withdrawn thereby from virtue, through being either too anxious about them, or too much attached to them, or self-conceited about them.

Whereas, however, there are virtues of the active and of the contemplative life, both need external riches in different ways. For the contemplative virtues need them only for the support of nature: whereas the active virtues need them both for that purpose, and to support others who share the same life. Hence the contemplative life is the more perfect in that it has fewer needs. To this life indeed it would seem to belong that man occupy himself wholly with divine things: and this perfection Christ’s teaching counsels to man. Consequently those who seek this perfection are content with a minimum of external riches, as much, to wit, as suffices to support nature. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:8): Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.

Accordingly, poverty is commendable so far as it frees man from those vices in which some are enmeshed through wealth. In so far as it removes the anxiety that is occasioned by riches, it is useful to some, those namely who are disposed to occupy themselves with the better things: but it is harmful to some, who being freed from this anxiety, betake themselves to worse occupations. Hence Gregory says (6 Moral. xxxvii): It often happens that people who are busy in doing well while living as men are used to live, are slain by the sword of retirement.—In so far as poverty removes the good resulting from riches, namely the assistance of others, and one’s own support, it is simply an evil: except, forasmuch as the assistance whereby one’s neighbour is relieved in temporal things, may be compensated by a greater good, in that a man, through lacking wealth, can more freely give himself to the affairs of God and his soul. But the good of one’s own support is so far necessary, that it cannot be compensated by any other: for man should not deprive himself of his livelihood for the sake of obtaining any other good.

Such poverty is therefore commendable when a man being freed thereby from worldly solicitude, is enabled more freely to occupy himself with divine and spiritual things; yet so as to retain the possibility of lawfully supporting himself, for which purpose not many things are needful. And according as the manner of living in a state of poverty demands less solicitude, so much the more is poverty to be commended: but not according as the poverty is greater. For poverty is not good in itself: but in so far as it frees a man from that which hinders him from being intent on spiritual things. Hence its measure of goodness depends on how far it frees man from the aforesaid obstacles.—In fact this applies to all external things in common, that they are so far good as they are serviceable to virtue, but not in themselves.

CHAPTER CXXXIV

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST POVERTY

KEEPING these observations before our mind, we shall easily solve the foregoing arguments whereby poverty was impugned. For though man has a natural desire to gather together the necessaries of life, as the first argument stated, this does not imply that each individual must be occupied in so doing. In fact, neither is every bee occupied in the same duty: but some gather honey, some build their dwelling with wax, while the queens do none of these things: and it must needs be so likewise with man. For as many things are needed for man’s livelihood, for which one man is not sufficient by himself, it is necessary for different things to be done by different men: for instance, that some cultivate the land, that some have charge of animals, that some build houses, and so forth. And since man’s life demands not only goods of the body, but also, and still more, goods of the soul, it is necessary for some to be busy about spiritual things for the betterment of others: and such must needs be exempt from the care of temporal things. This division of divers duties among divers persons is made by divine providence, according as some are more inclined to one duty than to others.

It is thus clear that those who renounce temporal goods, do not deprive themselves of a livelihood: as the second argument contended. For they still have the probable hope of maintenance, either from their own work, or from the kindness of others, whether in the shape of common property, or as their daily bread. For even as that which is possible by means of our friends, is possible, in a sense, to ourselves, as the philosopher says, so what our friends have is, in a sense, ours.

Now among men there should be that mutual friendship whereby they assist one another either in spiritual or in earthly duties. Again, it is better to help another in spirituals than in temporals: forasmuch as spirituals are more excellent than temporals, and more necessary for the attainment of that end which is beatitude. Hence the man who by voluntary poverty deprives himself of the possibility of helping others in temporal things, that he may obtain spiritual things, whereby he can be of more useful service to others, does not, as the third argument concluded, counteract the good of human society.

From the foregoing it is clear that riches are a good of man forasmuch as they are directed to the rational good, but not in themselves. Wherefore nothing prevents poverty from being better, if by it a man is directed to a more perfect good. Thus the fourth argument is answered. And since neither wealth nor poverty, nor anything external is in itself man’s good, but only forasmuch as it is directed to reason’s good; nothing prevents them from being a source of sin, when they are not employed by man according to reason’s rule. And yet they are not therefore to be reckoned as simply evil, but only when they are put to an evil use. Hence neither is poverty to be condemned on account of certain vices that are sometimes occasioned thereby: as the fifth argument endeavoured to prove. Wherefore we must also observe that the mean of virtue does not depend on the quantity of external goods employed, but on the rule of reason. So that it happens sometimes that what is an extreme in point of quantity of an external thing, is the mean according to reason’s rule. For neither does anyone tend to greater things than the magnanimous man, nor surpass in amount the magnificent man’s expenditure. Wherefore they follow the mean not by the quantity of expenditure, or the like, but by not exceeding or falling short of the rule of reason. This rule, in fact, measures not only the quantity of the thing used, but also the condition of the person, and his intention, the fitness of place and time, and such things that are required in acts of virtue. Consequently a man through voluntary poverty does not frustrate virtue, even if he renounce all things. Nor is he prodigal in so doing: since he does it for a due end, and observing other due circumstances. For it is more to expose oneself to death,—which nevertheless a man does through the virtue of fortitude, observing the due circumstances,—than to renounce all one’s goods for a due end. Thus the sixth argument is answered.

The words quoted from Solomon are not in contradiction with this. For it is clear that he speaks of compulsory poverty, which is wont to be the occasion of theft.

CHAPTER CXXXV

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST THE VARIOUS WAYS OF LIFE FOLLOWED BY THOSE WHO EMBRACE VOLUNTARY POVERTY

WE must, in sequel to the foregoing, consider the ways in which those who embrace voluntary poverty have to live. The first way, namely that all live in common on the proceeds of the sale of their possessions, suffices indeed, but not for a long time. And so the Apostles instituted this way of living for the faithful in Jerusalem, because they foresaw, through the Holy Ghost, that they were not to remain long together in Jerusalem, both on account of the coming persecutions by the Jews, and on account of the imminent destruction of both city and nation: wherefore there was no need to provide for the faithful, except for a short time. For this reason, when they passed on to the gentiles, among whom the Church was to be firmly established and endure, we do not read of their instituting this way of life.

Nevertheless the fact that the dispensers may be guilty of fraud is no argument against this way of living. For this is common to all ways of life, wherein people live together: yet in this particular way so much the less, as seemingly it is less likely to happen that those who seek the perfection of life should be guilty of fraud.—Besides a remedy may be provided against this by choosing faithful dispensers: wherefore under the apostles Stephen and others were chosen, who were reckoned to be worthy of this office.

The second way of living is also suitable to those who embrace voluntary poverty: that, namely, in which they live on their common property. There is nothing, in this way of living, derogatory to the perfection to which those tend who have become voluntarily poor. Because it is possible for one or a few to have the care of looking after the property, so that the others, being free of care for temporal things, may freely occupy themselves with spiritual things, which is the revenue accruing from voluntary poverty. Nor do those, who take upon themselves this responsibility for the others' sake, forfeit any thing from the perfection of life: since what they seem to lose through being disturbed, is made up to them in their obedience to the call of charity, in which also the perfection of life consists.

Nor does this way of living destroy harmony on account of property being held in common. For those who embrace voluntary poverty ought to hold temporal things in contempt; so that they could not possibly be at variance for the sake of earthly goods; especially as they should not expect from temporalities anything besides the necessaries of life; and since the dispensers should be faithful.—Nor is the fact that some abuse this way of life, a sufficient reason for condemning it: since evil men make evil use even of good things, just as good men make good use of evil things.

The third manner of living is also suitable to those who take poverty upon themselves voluntarily: namely, that in which they live by manual labour. For it is not useless to renounce temporal possessions, in order to regain them by manual labour: as the first objection contended. Because the possession of wealth both required man to be solicitous in administering it or at least in keeping it, and attracted his affections: which is no longer the case when he is occupied in getting his daily bread by manual labour.

Now, it is clear that little time suffices, and no great solicitude is needed, in order that a man get a sufficient livelihood by manual labour. Whereas in order to get rich, or provide oneself with more than a sufficient livelihood, which is the aim of the worldly worker, requires one to spend much time, and to exercise great care. Hence the reply to the second argument is clear.

We must observe that in the Gospel our Lord did not forbid labour, but mental anxiety about the necessaries of life. For he did not say: Do not work, but Be not solicitous. He proves his statement with an argument a fortiori. For if divine providence maintains birds and lilies, which are of a lower condition, and cannot toil as men do in order to gain this sustenance; much more will it provide for man, who is of higher condition, and to whom it has given the means of getting his bread by his own labour; so that he need not be anxiously solicitous about the necessaries of this life. It is clear, then, that this mode of life is not condemned by our Lord’s words quoted in the objection. Again, this mode of life cannot be condemned on the plea that it is insufficient. Because it seldom happens that a man is unable, by manual labour, to get a sufficiency for his livelihood, either on account of sickness, or for some like reason. And an ordinance is not to be censured on account of its failing to apply in a few instances: for this happens in ordinances both of nature and of the will. Nor is there any mode of living that provides for man, without a possibility of being at fault: for riches may be taken away by theft or robbery, just as the man that lives by manual labour may become incapable of work.—And yet there is still a remedy as regards the aforesaid manner of living: namely, that a man who cannot get enough for himself by his labour, should be assisted either by others of the same association, who are able to work more than enough for themselves; or again by those who have means, according to the law of charity and natural friendship, whereby one assists another in his need. Thus the Apostle after saying (2 Thess. 3:10), He that will not work, neither let him eat; on account of those who are unable to get enough for themselves by their own work, adds this admonition to others (verse 13): But you … be not weary in well-doing.

Moreover as few things are necessary for a sufficient livelihood, those who are content with little, need not take much time in getting enough by manual labour. Hence they are not hindered much from doing other spiritual works, for the sake of which they embraced voluntary poverty: all the more since, while working with their hands, they can think of God and praise him, and do other like things, which in private life men are bound to do. Yet, lest they be altogether hindered from attending to spiritual things, they may be assisted by the kindness of other members of the faithful.

Now, though voluntary poverty is not embraced in order by manual labour to banish idleness or chastise the flesh, since even those who have riches can do this: yet there is no doubt that manual labour avails for the things mentioned, even without being done to gain a livelihood. Idleness, however, may be removed by other more useful occupations, and the concupiscence of the flesh may be tamed by means of more effective remedies. Hence those who have a lawful means of livelihood, or are able to get it, are not bound for the above motives to undertake manual labour. For alone, the need of a livelihood, binds a man to work with his hands:

wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): He that will not work, neither let him eat.

Again, the fourth way of living on the offerings of others, is suitable to those who embrace voluntary poverty. For it is not unfitting that he who has renounced his own for the sake of something profitable to others, should be maintained by what others give. Because, were this not so, human society could not last: since, if a man had no care save for his own, no one would be of service to the community. Hence it is expedient for human society, that those who by renouncing the care of property, are of service to the community, should be maintained by those to whom they are of service; seeing that for this reason soldiers live on the contributions of others, and the rulers of the state are paid from the common exchequer. Now, those who embrace voluntary poverty in order to follow Christ, renounce all things precisely that they may be useful to the community, since by their wisdom, learning and example they enlighten the people, and sustain them by their prayers and intercession.

Wherefore it is also clear that it is no disgrace for them to live on what others give, since they pay them back in better kind, by receiving temporal things for their maintenance and profiting others in spiritual things. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:14): Let your abundance, namely in temporal goods, supply their want of the same: that their abundance also, that is, in spiritual goods, may supply your want. For he who helps another, shares in his deeds, both in good and in evil.

And when by their example they encourage others to virtue, the result is that those who profit by their example, become less attached to riches, through seeing that others renounce riches altogether for the sake of the perfection of life. Now, the less a man loves wealth, and the more he is inclined to virtue, so much the more readily does he give of his own wealth for the support of others. Hence those who embrace voluntary poverty, and live on what others give, become more useful to other poor people, encouraging others, by word and example, to works of mercy, than harmful through receiving the gifts of others for their maintenance.

It is also evident that men of perfect virtue, such as they ought to be who profess voluntary poverty through contempt of riches, do not forfeit their liberty just because they receive a few things from others for their maintenance; since man does not cease to be free except on account of things which dominate his affections. Hence he does not lose his liberty on account of the things he despises, if they be given to him.

And though the maintenance of those who live on what others give them, depends on the good-will of those who give, it is not, for that reason, insufficient for the support of Christ's poor. For it depends on the good-will, not of one, but of many. And it is not probable that in the multitude of the faithful there be not many who are ready to supply the needs of those whom they revere for the perfection of their virtue.

Nor is it unfitting that they even make known their needs and beg, whether for others or for themselves. Thus we read that even the apostles did this; for they accepted not only for themselves the necessaries of life from those to whom they preached;—which was an act of authority rather than of begging, since the Lord commanded that they who serve the gospel, should live by the gospel,—but also for the poor in Jerusalem, who renounced their own property, and lived in poverty, but did not preach to the gentiles; yet their spiritual administration could profit those by whom they were maintained. Hence the Apostle counsels that such people be maintained by alms, given, not of necessity, but freely, which counsel is nothing else than begging.—This beggary does not render men contemptible, if it be done in reason, for the sake of need, not of excess, and without importunity: with due consideration both of the person besought, and of place and time: all of which must be observed by those who seek perfection of life.

It is, consequently, clear that there is no appearance of wrong-doing in begging thus: although there would be if it were done with importunity and indiscreetly for the sake of self-indulgence or greed.

Now, it is evident that begging implies a certain abasement. For as to be passive is inferior to being active, so too, is receiving inferior to giving; and subjection and obedience, to governing and commanding: although there may be a set-off in the shape of a concomitant circumstance.

Now, to make a deliberate choice of that which implies abasement, is an act of humility; not indeed simply, but according as there is need for it. For, since humility is a virtue, it does nothing indiscreetly: so that it is a sign, not of humility, but of folly, if a man adopt every kind of abasement. On the other hand if a man does not shrink on account of abasement from doing what virtue requires of him;—for instance, if charity requires him to perform a humiliating service for his neighbour,—through humility he will not shrink from doing it. Accordingly, if, in order to embrace the life of poverty, it be necessary to beg, it is an act of humility to suffer this abasement.—Again, it is an act of virtue sometimes to take upon ourselves things that are degrading, although our duty does not bind us to do so, that by our example we may encourage others who are so bound, that they may more easily suffer them: thus the officer sometimes does the work of a common soldier, so as to encourage others.—Sometimes too the virtuous use of humiliation serves as a remedy. For instance, if a man's mind be inclined to immoderate self-conceit, it is good for him to have recourse, with due moderation, to acts of self-abasement, either of his own choice, or as enjoined by others, in order to repress the elation of his soul: since by so doing he brings himself to the level of the lowest of men, whose duties are of the baser kind.

Those who hold that our Lord forbade all solicitude in seeking one's bread, are guilty of an utterly unreasonable error. Because every act requires solicitude. Hence, if man should have no solicitude about the things of the body, it follows that he must perform no bodily action: which is both impossible and unreasonable. For God has appointed to each thing an action in proportion to its nature. Now, man is formed of a nature both spiritual and corporal. Wherefore, according to the divine ordinance, it is necessary that man both perform actions of the body, and attend to the things of the soul: and he is the more perfect, the more he attends to spiritual things: yet man's perfection does not depend on his performing no actions of the body; because, since the actions of the body are directed to what is needful for the maintenance of life, if a man omit them, he neglects his life, which everyone is bound to maintain. Now a man is a fool and tempts God, if he does nothing himself and looks to God to provide him with those things to which he can help himself by his own action. For it belongs to the divine goodness, to provide for everything, not by doing all things immediately, but by moving each other thing to its proper action, as we have proved above. Therefore man must not expect that God will provide for him, without his doing any action whereby he is able to provide for himself: for this is contrary to the divine ordinance and goodness.

But because, though it is in our power to do, it is not through us that our actions attain to their due end, on account of the obstacles that may occur;

the outcome of everyone’s action is subject to the divine disposition. Accordingly, our Lord commanded us not to be solicitous about what concerns God, namely concerning the outcome of our actions: but He did not forbid us to be solicitous about what concerns us, namely our actions. Therefore a man does not disobey our Lord’s command, if he be solicitous about what he has to do himself: but if he be solicitous about the possible result, even if he does what pertains to him, so that he omits to do what he ought in order to avoid such results, against which we should hope in the providence of God, who gives sustenance even to birds and plants. For to be solicitous in this way, seemingly savours of the error of the heathens, who deny divine providence. Hence, our Lord concludes: Be not solicitous for tomorrow. By these words He does not forbid us to keep till the morrow what is necessary in its proper time, but to be solicitous about future happenings, despairing, as it were, of the divine assistance: or to anticipate to-day the solicitude that we should reserve for the morrow, since each day has its own cares; wherefore it is added: Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.

It is clear, then, that those who embrace voluntary poverty may live in various suitable ways. And among these ways, one is more commendable than the others, according as it exempts man’s mind more from the solicitude of earthly things, and from being occupied with them.

CHAPTERS CXXXVI AND CXXXVII

CONCERNING THE ERROR OF THOSE WHO CONDEMN PERPETUAL CONTINENCE

MEN of distorted judgement have spoken against the good of continency, even as they have impugned the perfection of poverty. Some of these endeavour to proscribe perpetual continency by the following and like arguments.

The union of man and woman is directed to the good of the species. Now, the good of the species is more godlike than the good of the individual. Therefore it is a greater sin to abstain from an act whereby the species is preserved, than to abstain from an act whereby the individual is maintained, such as eating, drinking, and the like.

Again. By divine ordinance man has received members apt for generation; also the faculty of desire that incites thereto, and other like things directed to the same end. Therefore one who refrains altogether from the act of generation would seem to counteract the divine ordinance.

Also. If it be good for one to be continent, it is better for many, and best that all be continent. But this would result in the extinction of the human race. Therefore it is not good for one man to be continent.

Besides. Chastity like the other virtues takes a middle course. Consequently as a man acts contrary to virtue and is intemperate if he yield altogether to his desires; even so he acts against virtue if he refrain from his desires altogether, and falls into the vice of insensibility.

Furthermore. It is impossible for a man to be without all sexual emotions; since they are natural to him. Now it is more disturbing to the soul to resist concupiscences totally, and to fight against them unceasingly, than to enjoy them with moderation. Since then disturbance of the mind is most inconsistent with perfection of virtue, it would seem incompatible with perfection of virtue to observe perpetual continence.

These arguments then would seem to militate against perpetual continence. And to them may be added the command of the Lord which, we read, was given to our first parents (Gen. 1:28, 9:1): Increase and multiply, and fill the earth. This was never revoked, in fact rather was it confirmed by our Lord in the gospel (Matth. 19:6) where it is said in reference to the marriage bond: What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder. Now those who observe perpetual continence disobey this precept. Therefore it would seem unlawful to keep perpetual continence.

However, bearing in mind what we have said above, we shall easily reply to these objections. For we must observe that in matters regarding the needs of the individual we must not reason in the same way as in matters which regard the needs of the community. For when it is a question of the needs of the individual, each one must be provided for. Such things are meat and drink, and other things that concern the maintenance of the individual: wherefore everyone needs to take meat and drink. But when it is a question of what is necessary to the community, it is not necessary, nor indeed is it possible, that such things should be the concern of each member of the community. For it is plain that many things are needful to the human community, such as meat, drink, clothing, dwelling and the like, which cannot be provided by one man. Hence the necessity of various men having various duties: even as in the body various members are appointed for various acts. Since, then, procreation is connected with the needs, not of the individual, but of the entire species, it is not necessary that all men be employed in procreating; but some, refraining from it, are appointed to fulfil other duties, such as military service, or contemplation.

Hence the reply to the second objection is clear. For divine providence has bestowed on man all things necessary for the whole species: and yet it is not necessary that each man use each one of those things. Thus man has been given the art of building, the strength to fight: yet there is no need for every man to be a builder or a soldier. In like manner, though man has received from God the power and means of procreation, there is no need for every man to attend to the act of procreating.

Wherefore the reply to the third argument is also clear. Since though for each individual it be better to abstain from what is needful for the community, and to occupy himself with better things; it is not good that all so abstain. The same applies to the order of the universe: since, although a spiritual substance is better than a body, yet it would be not a better but a less perfect universe, wherein there were none but spiritual substances. And though, in the animal's body, the eye is better than the foot, the animal would not be perfect unless it had both eye and foot. So too, neither would the human community be in a perfect state, unless there be some who attend to the act of procreation, and others who abstain therefrom and give themselves to contemplation.

The fourth objection based on the necessity of virtue taking a middle course, may be solved from what has been said above concerning poverty. Because the mean of virtue does not always depend on the quantity of the thing regulated by reason, but on the rule itself of reason, which compasses the due end, and measures the requisite circumstances. And thus, unreasonable abstinence from all sexual emotions is called the vice of insensibility. But if it be done in reason, it is a virtue surpassing man's usual mode of life: since it gives man a special likeness to the godhead: for which reason virgins are said to be like angels.

To the fifth objection we reply that the solicitude and occupation of married people about wife, children and necessaries of life, is continuous: whereas the disturbance to which a man is subject through resisting concupiscence is transitory. Moreover the less he consents, the less is he disturbed: since the more a man indulges in pleasure, the greater becomes his desire for pleasure. Also, desires are weakened by abstinence, and other bodily exercises suitable for those who propose to be continent.—Again, indulgence in pleasures of the body is more lowering to the mind, and a greater obstacle to the contemplation of spiritual things, than is the disturbance consequent upon the resistance to the desire for these pleasures: because through indulgence in pleasures, especially those of venery, the mind becomes most attached to carnal things: since pleasure causes the appetite to be at rest in the pleasurable object. Consequently for those who would apply themselves to the contemplation of things divine, and of any truth whatsoever, it is most harmful to indulge in venery, and most useful to abstain therefrom.—However, though it may be said in general that for one man it is better to remain continent than enjoy the use of marriage, nothing prevents the latter alternative from being better for a particular individual. Hence, our Lord, speaking of continence, said: All men take not this word. … He that can take it, let him take it.

From what has been said it is clear how to answer the last objection taken from the command given to our first parents. For this precept regards the natural inclination that man has to maintain the species by the act of procreation: which all need not fulfil, but only some, as we have said. And as it is not expedient for everyone to refrain from marriage, so neither is it befitting at all times, when the increase of the species is at stake: either because there are few individuals, as when in the beginning the human race began to multiply; or on account of the small number of the faithful, when it behoved them to increase by carnal generation, as was the case in the Old Testament. Hence the counsel to keep perpetual continence was reserved to the New Testament, when the faithful increase by spiritual generation.

There were also others who, while not condemning perpetual continence, maintained that the married state is equal to it: which is the heresy of Jovinian. The falsity of this error is plain from what we have said: since continence renders man more able to raise his mind to spiritual and divine things; and lifts him, in a sense, above his state, by likening him to the angels.

Nor does it matter that men of most perfect virtue have embraced the married state, for instance Abraham, Isaac and Jacob: because the stronger the mind is rendered by virtue, the less is it liable to fall from its height through any cause whatsoever. And again, because they enjoyed the use of matrimony, it does not follow that they loved less the contemplation of truth and divine things: but according to the needs of the time, they made use of matrimony to increase the number of the faithful. However, the perfection of a particular individual does not prove the perfection of his state: since a man may apply a more perfect mind in the use of a lesser good, than does another in the use of a greater good. Hence, the fact that Abraham or Moses was more perfect than many who are continent, does not argue that the married state is more perfect than, or even equal to the state of continency.

CHAPTER CXXXVIII

AGAINST THOSE WHO CONDEMN VOWS

SOME have thought it foolish to bind oneself by vow to obey a particular person, or to abide by any particular purpose. For, seemingly, any good action whatsoever, the more freely it is done, so much the more virtuous is it. Now the greater the necessity whereby one is bound to do a thing, so much the less freely is it done apparently. Consequently it would seem that virtuous acts are deserving of less praise through being necessitated by obedience or vow.

Now those who argue thus, apparently, know not the meaning of necessity. For necessity is twofold. There is a necessity of compulsion: and this lessens the praise due to virtue, since it is opposed to what is voluntary; for compulsion is contrary to the will.—But there is another necessity resulting from an interior inclination. This does not diminish but increases the praise due to a virtuous act: because it makes the will tend to the act of virtue more tensely. For it is clear that the more perfect is a habit of virtue, the more strongly does it make the will tend to the virtuous good, and the less liable to deflect from it. And when virtue has attained its perfect end, it brings with it a kind of necessity for good action, for instance in the Blessed, who cannot sin, as we shall show further on: and yet the will is not, for that reason, any the less free, or the act less good.

There is yet another kind of necessity arising from an end: as when a ship is said to be necessary for a man, that he may cross the sea. And it is plain that neither does this kind of necessity diminish the freedom of the will, or the goodness of actions. Rather indeed, what a man does as being necessary for an end, for this very reason is commendable, and so much the more, as the end is better.

Now, it is evident that the necessity of abiding by a vow, or of obeying a person to whom one has submitted oneself, is not a necessity of compulsion, nor one that comes from an interior inclination, but arises from direction to an end: because when a man has taken a vow it is necessary for him to do this or that, if the vow is to be kept, or obedience observed. Hence, since these ends are praiseworthy, inasmuch as thereby man submits himself to God, the necessity in question takes nothing from the praise due to virtue. In addition, we must observe that when a man does what he has vowed to do, or fulfils the commands of one to whom he has submitted himself for God's sake, his deed is worthy of yet greater praise and reward. For sometimes one deed belongs to two vices, when the act of one vice is directed to the end of another vice: thus, when theft is committed for the purpose of fornication, the act is, in its species, one of covetousness, but in intention is one of lust. It is the same with virtues: so that the act of one virtue may be directed to another virtue: thus, when a man gives of his own, that he may be bound to another in the friendship of charity, his act, in its species, is one of liberality, but on account of its end, is an act of charity. Now, an act of this kind deserves the greater praise from the greater virtue, namely charity, than from liberality. Hence even if the act were diminished in the point of liberality, still, through being directed to charity, it will call for greater praise and reward, than an act of greater liberality not directed to charity.

Let us, then, suppose a man to do an act of virtue, by fasting, for instance, or by abstaining from venery:—if he do these things apart from a vow, it will be an act of chastity or abstinence; but if he do these things by vow then they are referred to some other virtue, to which it belongs to make vows to God, namely religion, which is a greater virtue than chastity or abstinence, since it makes us behave rightly to God. Consequently an act of abstinence or continency will be more praiseworthy in one who keeps it by vow, even though he does not take such pleasure in abstaining or in being continent, because he takes greater pleasure in a greater virtue which is religion.

Again. The most important thing in a virtue, is the due end: because the character of goodness is derived chiefly from the end. Consequently where the end is higher, even if a man be somewhat remiss in his act, his act will be more virtuous: thus, if one man proposes to go a long way for the sake of a virtuous good, and another, to go a short way, he who proposes to do the greater thing for the sake of virtue will deserve the greater praise; although he may make slower progress on the way. And if a man do something for God, he offers that act to God: but if he does it by vow, he offers God not only his act, but even his very power to act. Hence he clearly purposes to offer God something greater. Therefore his act will be more virtuous by reason of the greater good intended, although another man may appear to be more fervent in the execution.

Besides. The will that precedes the act remains virtually for the whole time that the act is carried on, and makes it praiseworthy, even when a man, while he is performing an action, no longer thinks of the purpose for which he began the action: thus, a man who undertakes a journey for God, need not think actually of God at every stage of his way. Now, it is clear that a man who vowed to do a thing, willed to do so more inflexibly than one who simply proposed to do it: since not only willed he to do it, but he willed so to strengthen himself lest he should fail to do it. Accordingly, this intention of the will renders praiseworthy the execution of the vow by reason of a certain inflexibility, even where the will is not actually directed to the deed, or is directed negligently.

Therefore that which is done by vow is more praiseworthy than what is done without a vow: other things, however, being equal.

CHAPTER CXXXIX

THAT NEITHER MERITS NOR SINS ARE EQUAL

IT is clear from what has been said that neither all good deeds, nor all sins, are equal. For a counsel is only about a greater good. Now, counsels in the divine law, are about poverty, continence and the like, as stated above. Hence these things are better than the use of marriage, and the possession of earthly goods: and yet with these one may live a virtuous life, if one keep within the bounds of reason, as we have proved. Therefore acts of virtue are not all equal.

Again. Acts take their species from their objects. Therefore the better the object, the more virtuous too will the act be in its species. Now, the end is better than the things directed to the end: and of these one is better than another, the nearer it is to the end. Consequently, the best of human acts is that one which is directed to the last end, namely God, immediately. After this, the act will be so much the better in its species, according as its object is nearer to God.

Besides. In human acts the good depends on their being regulated by reason. Now, it happens that some acts are more akin to the reason than others: forasmuch as acts of the reason itself have a greater share in reason’s good, than the acts of the lower powers, which reason commands. Therefore some human acts are better than others.

Also. The precepts of the law are best fulfilled through love, as stated above. Now a man may happen to fulfil an obligation through greater love than another man does. Hence one virtuous act will be better than another.

Further. If a man’s actions are made good by virtue; and since the same virtue is more intense in one than in another: it follows that one human act is better than another.

Moreover. If human acts are made good by virtues, the better act must needs be that which proceeds from the better virtue. Now we see that one virtue is better than another: as magnificence than liberality, and magnanimity than moderation. Thus one human act will be better than another.

Hence it is said (1 Cor. 7:38): He that giveth his virgin in marriage, doth well: and he that giveth her not doth better.

The same reasons show that all sins are not equal: since by one sin a man strays more from his end than by another: and the order of reason is more subverted: and a greater harm done to one's neighbour.

Hence it is said (Ezech. 16:47): Thou hast done … more wicked things than they in all thy ways.

Hereby we refute the error of those who say that all merits and sins are equal.

However there seemed to be some reason for saying that all virtuous acts are equal, because every act is virtuous that tends to the end of the good. Hence, if all good actions have the same good as their end, they must all be equally good.

But, though there is one last end of the good, the acts which derive their goodness from it, receive various degrees of goodness. Because there is a difference of degrees in the goods that are directed to the last end, forasmuch as some are better than others, and approach nearer to the last end. Hence both in the will and in its acts there will be degrees of goodness, according to the diversity of goods that are the term to which the will and its acts are directed, although the last end is the same.

In like manner, there would seem to be reason for asserting that all sins are equal, because in human acts sin results only through someone transgressing the rule of reason. Now, one transgresses the rule of reason by deviating therefrom slightly just as by doing so greatly. Seemingly, then, the sin is equal, whether one sin in small or in great things.

This argument is, apparently, confirmed by the practice in human judgement. For if a person is forbidden to go beyond a certain limit, it makes no difference to the judge whether he goes beyond it little or much: thus it matters not, as soon as the boxer goes outside the ring, whether he go yet further. Therefore from the moment that one transgresses the rule of reason, it matters not whether one transgress little or much.:

Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, wherever perfection and good consist in a certain balance, the greater the deviation from the requisite balance, the greater the evil. Thus, health consists in a proper balance of the humours beauty in due symmetry of members: truth in equation between thought or word and thing. And it is clear that the greater the disproportion in the humours, the greater the disease; and the greater the lack of symmetry in the members, the more unsightly the deformity: and the greater the deviation from the truth, the greater the falsehood: for there is not so much falsity in thinking three to be five, as in thinking it to be a hundred. Now, the virtuous good consists in a certain proportion, for it is the mean, according to the due modification of circumstances, set between contrary vices. Consequently the greater the divergence from this harmony, the greater the malice.

There is no comparison between transgressing a virtue and transgressing the bounds appointed by a judge. Because virtue is a good in itself: wherefore transgression of a virtue is an evil in itself: and consequently a greater deviation from virtue is a greater evil. But to break the particular bounds appointed by a judge, is not an evil in itself, but accidentally because, to wit, it is forbidden. Now when one thing is predicated accidentally of another, it does not follow of necessity, if A be predicated of B simply, that more A should be predicated of more B, but only when the predication is per se: for it does not follow, if a white being is a musical being, that what is more white is more musical: whereas it does follow, if white dazzles the sight, that more white dazzles the sight yet more.

There is, however, this difference to be observed among sins, that some are mortal, and some venial. Mortal sin is that which deprives the soul of spiritual life. What this life consists in may be gathered from two things, by comparing it with natural life. For the body lives naturally through being united to the soul which is the principle of its life: and the body, quickened by the soul, is moved of itself: whereas a dead body either remains without movement, or is moved only by an extrinsic cause. So too, the human will is not only alive when, by its right intention, it is united to its last end,—which union is its object and, as it were, its form,—but also is moved by an intrinsic principle to do what is right—when by love man adheres to God and his neighbour. But without the intention of the last end and without love, the soul is dead, as it were: since it is not moved of itself to do what is right, but either leaves off so doing altogether, or is only instigated to do so by some extrinsic principle, namely the fear of punishment. Therefore all sins that are opposed to the intention of the last end, and to love, are mortal. On the other hand, if a man, without detriment to these, fails in a particular right order of the reason, it will not be a mortal, but a venial sin.

CHAPTER CXL

THAT MAN’S ACTIONS ARE PUNISHED OR REWARDED BY GOD

IT is clear from the foregoing that man’s actions are punished or rewarded by God. Because to punish or reward belongs to him who imposes the law: since legislators induce men to obey the law, by rewards and punishments. Now, as we have shown above, it belongs to divine providence to set a law for men. Therefore it belongs to God to punish or reward men.

Again. Wherever a certain order is requisite to an end, that order must needs lead to that end, and infringement of that order debars from it: since those things that are on account of the end, take their necessity from the end; so that, to wit, they are necessary, if the end has to follow; and, given them, if there be no obstacle, the end will follow. Now, God appointed to man’s actions a certain order in relation to the end of the good, as we have already proved. Consequently, given that this order is rightly followed, those who comply with it attain the end of good, which consists in being rewarded: while those who forsake that order through sin, are debarred from the end of good, which is to be punished.

Also. As natural things are subject to the order of divine providence, so too are human acts, as we have shown. In either case, the due order may happen to be observed or disregarded: but there is this difference, that observance or disregard of the due order, is left in the power of the human will: whereas it is not in the power of natural things to deflect from the right order, or to follow it. Now, between effect and cause there should be a certain fitting correspondence. Wherefore, as when the requisite order of natural principles and actions obtains in natural things, the result is that, of necessity, their nature is sustained, and their good ensured, whereas corruption and evil result in them, when the natural and requisite order is not observed; so too in human affairs it must needs be that, when man voluntarily keeps the order of the law imposed by God, a good accrues to him, not of necessity as it were, but by the appointment of his Lord; and this is to be rewarded: and conversely, that his lot is evil, when the order of the law has been infringed; and this is to be punished.

Besides. It belongs to God's goodness that he leaves nothing out of order: hence we may observe in natural things, that every evil is contained in the order of some good: thus corruption of the air is generation of fire, and the slaying of the sheep is the meal of the wolf. Since, then human acts are subject to divine providence, even as natural things are: it follows that whatever evil occurs in human actions must be included in the order of some good. This is most fittingly done in the punishment of sins. For thus things that exceed in due quantity are included in the order of justice, which reduces them to equality. Now, man exceeds the mark of his right quantity, when he prefers his own will to God's, by gratifying it against the divine ordinance. And this inequality is removed when, against his will, man is compelled to suffer something according to the divine ordinance. Therefore man's sins need to be punished by God: and for the same reason his good deeds should be rewarded.

Further. Divine providence not only appoints the order of things, but also moves all things to the execution of the order by himself appointed, as we have already proved. Now, the will is moved by its object, which is either good or evil. Hence it belongs to divine providence, to set good things before man as his reward, that his will may be moved to proceed aright; and to set evil things before him as his punishment, that he may avoid falling out of order.

Moreover. Divine providence has ordered things in such wise that one is of profit to another. Now, it is most fitting that a man should advance to the end of good, both through the good and through the evil of another man, in that he is urged to do well through seeing that well-doers are rewarded, and is recalled from evil doing, through seeing that evil-doers are punished. Therefore it belongs to divine providence that the wicked be punished, and the good rewarded.

This is what is said (Exod. 20:5, 6): I am … thy God … visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children … and showing mercy … to them that love Me, and keep My commandments. Also in the psalm: Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. Again (Rom. 2:6, 8): Who will render to every man according to his works. To them indeed, who, according to patience in good work … glory and honour: but to them that … obey not the truth, but give credit to iniquity, wrath and indignation.

Hereby we refute the error of some who said that God punishes not. For Marcion and Valentine said that the God who is good is another from the God who is just, and punishes.

CHAPTER CXLI

OF THE DIFFERENCE AND ORDER OF PUNISHMENTS

SINCE, then, as we have shown, a reward is something proposed to the will, as an end whereby it is urged to do well, and on the other hand punishment, as an evil to be avoided, is set before the will, to withdraw it from evil; just as it is essential to a reward that it be a good in harmony with the will, so is it a necessary condition of punishment, that it be an evil, and in opposition to the will. Now, evil is the privation of good. Consequently, the difference and order of punishments must be in keeping with the difference and order of goods.

Now, the sovereign good is man’s beatitude, which is his last end: and the nearer a thing approaches to this end, the higher must it be placed as a good of man. The nearest thing to that end is virtue, and everything else that is of use to man in well-doing, whereby he attains to beatitude. After this comes the right disposition of reason, and of the powers subject thereto. And after this the well-being of the body, which is requisite for facility of action. Lastly come those things that are without, which we employ as helps to virtue.

Accordingly man’s greatest punishment will be his exclusion from beatitude. After this, privation of virtue, and of any perfection of the soul’s natural powers, that conduces to well-doing: then, disorder in the natural powers of the soul: then, injury to the body: lastly, loss of external goods.

But as it is a necessary condition of punishment to be not only the privation of a good, but also opposed to the will: and as not every man’s will appreciates goods at their true value: it happens sometimes that the privation of a greater good is less opposed to the will, and for this reason seems to be less penal. Hence it is that many people who esteem higher and know better sensible and bodily goods than intellectual and spiritual goods, fear corporal punishment more than spiritual. And in the estimation of such men the order of punishments is apparently the reverse to that given above. For to these, injuries to the body and loss of external goods seem the greatest punishment: while they think little or nothing of the disorder of their soul, the decay of virtue, and the loss of the divine fruition, wherein man’s ultimate beatitude consists.

Hence it is that they think that God punishes not the sins of man: because they see that sinners for the most part are sound of body, and outwardly prosperous, while virtuous men sometimes are none of these things.

But this should not be a matter of surprise to anyone who considers the matter aright. For since external goods are directed to internal, and the body to the soul; external and bodily goods are so far good for man, as they are conducive to the good as appointed by reason: while, in so far as they stand in the way of reason’s good, they become, for man, evil. Now God the disposer of things, knows the measure of human power. Wherefore at times he apportions bodily and external goods to a virtuous man as a help to virtue, and in this he bestows a favour on him. But sometimes he withdraws those things from him, because he sees them to be a hindrance to virtue and to his enjoyment of God: since for this reason external goods become evil for man, as we have stated; so that, for the same reason, their loss becomes a good for man. If, then, every punishment is an evil; and if it is not an evil for man to be deprived of external and bodily goods, according as this is expedient for his advance in virtue: it will be no punishment for a virtuous man if he be deprived of external goods, to the profit of virtue. On the other hand, for the wicked it will be a punishment if they be granted external goods whereby they are incited to evil-doing. Hence it is said (Wis. 14:11), that the creatures of God are turned to an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men, and a snare to the feet of the unwise.—Since, however, it belongs to punishment not only to be an evil, but to be opposed to the will; the loss of bodily and external goods, even when it profits man unto virtue, and is not an evil for him, is called a punishment, by a misuse of the term, because it is opposed to the will.

The result of man being out of order is that he does not appreciate things at their true value, and prefers the things of the body to those of the soul.

This disorder is either sinful, or arises from a preceding sin. Hence it is clear that punishment is not in man, even as contrary to the will, without some preceding fault.

Another reason proves this. Because things good in themselves, would not become evil for men by their abuse, unless some disorder already existed in man.

Again, that man needs to be deprived, for the good of virtue, of what the will accepts because it is naturally good, arises from some disorder in man, which is either a sin, or results from sin. For it is evident that the preceding sin produces a certain disorder in man's affective faculty, so that he is afterwards more easily inclined to sin. Therefore, we must suppose some sin in man if he needs to be assisted towards the good of virtue, by means of something, in a sense, penal to him, inasmuch as it is contrary to his will, although sometimes it is voluntary, inasmuch as his reason looks to the end. However, we shall speak further on of this disorder that affects human nature on account of original sin. But for the present be it clearly understood that God punishes men for their sins, and that He punishes not unless there be a fault.

CHAPTER CXLII

THAT PUNISHMENTS AND REWARDS ARE NOT ALL EQUAL

SINCE then divine justice demands that, for the maintenance of equality among things, punishments be dealt for sins, and rewards for good deeds; it follows that if, as we have shown, there are degrees in acts of virtue and in sins, there must also be degrees in rewards and punishments. For, otherwise, equality would not be observed, if he that sins more received not greater punishment, or he that performs better deeds, received not a greater reward: because, in requiting, there is the same reason, apparently, for discriminating between good and bad, as between good and better, or between bad and worse.

Moreover. The equality of distributive justice consists in giving unequal things to those who are unequal among themselves. Consequently the requital by punishments and rewards would not be just, were all rewards and punishments equal.

Again. Rewards and punishments are appointed by the lawgiver, that men may be drawn away from evil to good, as proved above. Now, not only do men need to be drawn to good things, and withdrawn from evil, but also good men need to be enticed to better, and wicked men withdrawn from worse things. But this would not be the case, were rewards and punishments equal. Therefore both punishments and rewards should be unequal.

Further. As a thing is disposed to its form by its natural dispositions, so is a man disposed to punishments and rewards by good and evil deeds. Now, the order which divine providence has established in things is such that things which are more disposed receive a more perfect form. Therefore, there must needs be a difference in punishments and rewards corresponding to the difference of good and evil deeds.

Besides. Excess occurs in good and evil deeds in two ways: first, in point of number, through one man doing more good or evil deeds than another: secondly, in point of the quality of the deed, through one man performing a better or a worse deed than another. Now, there ought to be an excess of rewards or punishments corresponding to the excess in number of deeds: else recompense would not be made in the divine judgement for all a man's deeds, if some evil deeds were left unpunished, and some good deeds unrewarded. Equally, therefore, inequality in rewards and punishments corresponds to excess in regard to inequality of deeds.

Hence it is said (Deut. 25:2): According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be: and (Isa. 27:8): In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off I shall punish it.

Hereby we refute the error of some who say that, in the life to come, all rewards and punishments are equal.

CHAPTER CXLIII

OF THE PUNISHMENT DUE TO MORTAL AND VENIAL SIN IN RELATION TO THE LAST END

IT is clear from what has been said, that sin may happen in two ways. In one way, so that the intention of the mind altogether breaks away from its order to God, who is the last end of the good: and this is mortal sin. In another way, so that, without prejudice to the human mind’s order to its last end, some obstacle is placed, whereby it is hampered in tending freely to its end: and this is called venial sin. If, then, punishments must differ according to the difference of sins, it follows that he who sins mortally, should be punished so as to forfeit man’s end: but that he who sins venially, should be punished not to the extent of forfeiting it, but so as to be hampered, or experience difficulty, in obtaining the end. For thus is the equality of justice maintained: so that in the same way that man by sinning voluntarily turns aside from his end, so by way of punishment, against his will, should he be hindered in the attainment of his end.

Again. The will in man corresponds to the natural inclination in natural things. Now, if a natural thing be deprived of its natural inclination to its end, it is quite unable to reach that end: thus a heavy body, if it lose its weight by corruption, and becomes light, will never reach the centre. Whereas if it be hindered in its movement, while retaining its inclination to the end, it will reach its end, when the obstacle is removed. When a man sins mortally, the intention of his will is altogether turned away from his last end: whereas, when he sins venially, his intention remains turned towards his end, yet somewhat hampered, by reason of his adhering more than he ought, to those things that are directed to the end. Consequently the punishment due to one who sins mortally is that he be altogether debarred from obtaining his end; while the punishment due to one who sins venially, is that he experience difficulty before attaining his end.

Moreover. When a man gets a good thing unintentionally, this is by luck and chance. If, then, a man whose intention is turned away from his last end, obtains that last end, it will be by luck and chance. But this is unreasonable. Because the last end is a good of the intelligence: whereas luck is incompatible with intelligence: since things that happen by chance, occur without the bidding of the intellect. And it is unreasonable that the intellect obtain its end otherwise than in an intelligent way. Therefore a man who, by sinning mortally, has his intention turned away from his last end, will not obtain his last end.

Again. Matter does not receive a form from the agent unless it be disposed to that form. Now the end and the good are the perfection of the will, as form is of matter. Consequently the will does not obtain the last end, unless it be fittingly disposed. But the will is disposed to the end by intending and desiring the end. Therefore a man will not obtain his end if his intentions be averted from the end.

Moreover. In things ordained to an end, we find that if the end is or will be obtained, we must of necessity presuppose the things required for obtaining it: and if those things be not granted, neither will the end be obtained: for if the end can be obtained without the things directed to the end, it is useless to seek the end by such means. Now, all are agreed that man obtains his last end, which is beatitude, by deeds of virtue, the chief of which is the intention of the right end. Therefore, if a man act against virtue, through turning away from the intention of the last end, it is fitting that he be deprived of his last end.

Hence it is said (Matth. 7:23): Depart from Me, all you that work iniquity.

CHAPTER CXLIV

THAT BY MORTAL SIN MAN FORFEITS HIS LAST END FOR ETERNITY

THE punishment whereby a man forfeits his last end must be endless. For one is not deprived of a thing unless it be something one ought to have: thus a kitten newly born is not said to be deprived of sight. Now, in this life, man has not a natural aptitude to obtain his last end, as we have proved above. Therefore privation of this end must be a punishment after this life. But, after this life, man is no longer able to obtain his last end. For the soul needs the body in order to obtain its end: inasmuch as through the body it acquires perfection both in knowledge and in virtue. And the soul, once separated from the body, does not return to this state wherein it attains to perfection through the body, as those maintained who held the transmigration of souls, against whom we have argued above. Therefore the man who is punished by being deprived of his last end, must needs remain punished eternally.

Again. When a thing is deprived of that for which it has a natural aptitude, it cannot be repaired unless it return to pre-existing matter, so as to be generated anew: as when an animal loses its sight or another sense. But it is impossible for a thing that is already generated, to be generated again, unless it first be corrupted: and then from the same matter, it will be possible for another to be generated in its entirety, the same, not identically but in kind. Now, a spiritual being, such as the soul or an angel, cannot return to pre-existing matter, so that another be generated anew, the same as before in kind. Consequently if it be deprived of that for which it has a natural aptitude, it must needs remain eternally thus deprived. Now, in the nature of the soul and of an angel there is the order to the last end, namely

God. Therefore if it be punished by privation of that order, such punishment will remain for ever.

Besides. Natural equity would seem to demand that everyone be deprived of that good against which he has acted: since thereby he renders himself unworthy of that good. Hence it is that according to civil justice, he who sins against the state, is altogether deprived of the society of his fellow citizens, either by being put to death, or by being condemned to exile for life: nor is any account taken of the time taken in sinning, but of that against which he sinned. Now, the same comparison stands between the whole of the present life and the earthly state, as between the whole of eternity and the society of the Blessed who, as we showed above, possess their last end eternally. Therefore he that sins against his last end, and against charity, which is the bond of the society of the Blessed, and of those who are tending to beatitude, ought to be punished eternally, although his sins may have occupied but a short time.

Moreover. In the divine judgement the will counts for the deed, because as man seeketh the things that appear, so the Lord beholdeth the heart. Now, a man, who for the sake of a temporal good, has turned away from his last end, the possession of which is eternal, has preferred the enjoyment of that temporal good to the eternal fruition of his last end: so that evidently much more would he have preferred to enjoy that temporal good eternally. Therefore, in the divine judgement, he should be punished as though he had sinned eternally. Now, there can be no doubt that for an eternal sin an eternal punishment is due. Therefore eternal punishment is due to the man who turns away from his last end.

Further. For the same just reason punishment is rendered for sins, and reward for good deeds. Now, beatitude is the reward of virtue: and beatitude is everlasting, as we have shown. Therefore the punishment also whereby one is deprived of beatitude should be everlasting.

Hence it is said (Matth. 25:46): These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting.

Hereby we refute the error of those who assert that the punishment of the wicked will at length have an end. This statement seems to have originated in the opinion of certain philosophers, who maintained that all punishment is remedial, and therefore terminable at some time.

There seemed to be reasons for this assertion:—both because it is customary among men, that punishments be inflicted by men's laws for the correction of vice, so that they are like medicine:—and for the reason that if the punisher inflicts punishment, not for a further purpose but for its own sake, it follows that he delights in punishing for its own sake, which is inconsistent with the divine goodness. Therefore punishments must be inflicted for a further purpose; and no end seems more fitting than the correction of vice. Consequently it would seem reasonably stated that all punishments are remedial, and therefore terminable at some time: since what can be remedied is accidental to the creature, and is removable without the substance being destroyed.

It must be granted that God inflicts punishments, not for his own sake, as though he took pleasure in them, but for the sake of something else: namely on account of the order that must be imposed on creatures, in which order the good of the universe consists. Now, the order of things demands that all things be dispensed by God proportionally; for which reason it is said (Wis. 11:21) that God does all things in weight, number and measure. And, as rewards correspond proportionally to acts of virtue, so do punishments to sins: and to some sins eternal punishment is proportionate, as we have proved. Therefore for certain sins God inflicts eternal punishment, that in things there may be maintained the right order which shows forth His wisdom.

Even if we were to grant that all punishments are intended for the amendment of morals, and for no further purpose: we would not, for that reason, have to assert that all punishments are remedial and terminable. For even according to human laws, some are punished with death, for the amendment, not of themselves, but of others. Hence it is said (Prov. 19:25): The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser. Again, according to human laws, some are banished from the state into perpetual exile, that by being rid of them the state may be purified. Wherefore it is said (Prov. 22:10): Cast out the scoffer, and contention will go out with him, and quarrels and reproaches shall cease. Consequently, even if punishments be inflicted only for the amendment of morals, nothing forbids certain men being, according to the divine judgement, separated forever from the fellowship of good men, and being punished eternally, so that men, for fear of eternal punishment, may refrain from sin, and the society of the good may be purified through being purged of their presence. Thus it is said (Apoc. 21:27): There shall not enter into it, namely the heavenly Jerusalem, whereby is designated the society of good men, anything defiled, or that worketh abomination, or maketh a lie.

CHAPTER CXLV

THAT SINS ARE PUNISHED ALSO BY THE SINNER BEING SUBJECTED TO SOME KIND OF PAIN

THOSE who sin against God are to be punished not only by forfeiting beatitude for ever, but also by being subjected to some kind of pain. For punishment should be proportionate to fault, as we proved above. Now when a man sins, his mind not only turns away from his last end, but also turns unduly to other things as ends. Therefore the sinner should be punished not only by being debarred from his end, but also by experiencing hurt from other things.

Again. Punishments are inflicted for sins that, through fear of being punished, men may be withdrawn from sin, as stated above. Now no one fears to lose what he desires not to get. Consequently, those whose will is turned away from their last end, fear not to lose it. Hence they would not be recalled from sinning by the mere loss of their last end. Therefore some other punishment, which sinners would fear, should be inflicted on them.

Also. If a man abuses the means to an end, not only is he debarred from the end, but he incurs some other hurt besides: for instance, food taken injudiciously, not only does not strengthen, but even causes sickness. Now the man who places his end in creatures, does not use them as he should, namely by referring them to his last end. Therefore he should be punished, not only by forfeiting beatitude, but also by undergoing some hurt from them.

Besides. As good things are due to well-doers, so evil things are due to evil-doers. Now those who do aright, reap perfection and joy in the end intended by them. Therefore, on the other hand, such a punishment is due to sinners, that they reap pain and hurt from the things wherein they place their end.

Hence it is that Holy Writ threatens sinners not only with exclusion from glory, but also with affliction from other things. For it is said (Matth. 25:41): Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil and his angels: and (Ps. 10:7): He shall rain snares upon sinners; fire, and brimstone, and storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup.

Hereby we refute the opinion of Algazel, who said that the only punishment meted to sinners is their loss of their last end.

CHAPTER CXLVI

THAT IT IS LAWFUL FOR JUDGES TO INFLICT PUNISHMENTS

WHEREAS some belittle the punishments inflicted by God, forasmuch as, being attached to sensible things, they care only for outward appearances: divine providence has ordered that on earth there be men who, by inflicting sensible and present punishments, compel certain people to do right. Now, it is clear that they sin not in punishing the wicked. For no man sins through doing right: and it is right for the wicked to be punished, since by punishment sin is righted, as we have shown above. Therefore judges do not sin by punishing the wicked.

Again. Men who are placed over others on earth, are executors, as it were, of divine providence: because God, by the ordinance of His providence, accomplishes lower things through higher things, as we have proved. Now, no man sins through carrying out the order of divine providence. And divine providence has ordained that the just be rewarded, and the wicked punished, as we have shown. Therefore men who are placed over others do not sin, by rewarding the good and punishing the wicked.

Besides. The good needs not the evil, but conversely. Therefore that which is necessary in order to maintain the good, cannot be evil in itself. Now, it is necessary for punishment to be inflicted on evil-doers, for the maintenance of peace among men. Therefore punishment of evil-doers is not an evil in itself.

Also. The good of the community surpasses a particular good of the individual. Therefore the particular good must give way, that the common good may be maintained. Now, the life of a few pestilential individuals is a hindrance to the common good, which is the harmony of the human community. Therefore such men should be cut off by death from the society of their fellows.

Besides. As the physician in his operation aims at health consisting in the ordered harmony of the humours, so the governor of a state, in his operation, aims at peace, which is the ordered harmony of the citizens. Now, the surgeon rightly and usefully cuts off the unhealthy member, if it threatens the health of the body. Justly, therefore, and rightly the governor of the state slays pestilential subjects, lest the peace of the state be disturbed.

Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:6): Know you not that a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump? And a little further on he adds (verse 13): Put away the evil one from among yourselves. Again speaking of earthly authority he says (Rom. 13:4) that he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Again it is said (1 Pet. 2:13, 14): Be ye subject … to every human creature for God's sake: whether it be to the king as excelling: or to governors as sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of the good. Hereby we refute the error of those who say that capital punishment is unlawful. They base their error on the words of Exod. 20:13, Thou shalt not kill, which are quoted Matth. 5:21.—They also quote the saying of our Lord (Matth. 13:30) in reply to the servants who wished to gather the cockle from the midst of the wheat: Suffer both to grow until the harvest: for the cockle signifies the children of the wicked one, and the harvest is the end of the world, as stated in the same passage. Therefore the wicked should not be cut off from the midst of the good, by being condemned to death.

They also point out that as long as he is on earth man may be converted to better ways. Therefore he should not be put away from the world, but should be kept there that he may repent.

But these arguments are of no account. For the same law that says, Thou shalt not kill, afterwards adds: Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live. Hence we are to understand that the prohibition is against the unjust slaying of a man. This is also evident from our Lord's words in Matth. 5. For after saying, You have heard that it was said to them of old: Thou shalt not kill, He added: But I say to you that whosoever is angry with his brother, etc. Whereby He gives us to understand that it is forbidden to kill through anger, but not through zeal for righteousness.—How we ought to take our Lord's words, Suffer both to grow until the harvest, is clear from what follows: Lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it. Hence, it is forbidden to slay the wicked, when this cannot be done without danger to the good. And this is often the case, when the wicked are not yet discernible from the good by notorious sins; or when it is to be feared lest the wicked draw many good men after them. The fact that the wicked, while alive, are able to amend, does not prevent their being justly slain: because the peril that threatens through their remaining alive, is greater and more certain than the good to be expected from their amendment. Moreover, in the very hour of death they are able to repent and be converted to God. And if they be so obstinate, that even in the hour of death their heart abandons not its wickedness, it may be reckoned with sufficient probability that they will never recover from their evil ways.

CHAPTER CXLVII

THAT MAN NEEDS THE DIVINE ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO OBTAIN BEATITUDE

WHEREAS it is clear from the foregoing, that divine providence governs rational creatures otherwise than other things, inasmuch as they differ from others in natural condition, it remains to be proved that also on account of the excellence of their end, a more exalted mode of government is applied to them by divine providence.

It is evident that in keeping with their nature, they attain to a higher participation of the end. For, since they are of an intellectual nature, they are able by their operation to be in touch with intelligible truth: which is impossible for other things, since they lack intelligence. And, forasmuch as they attain to intelligible truth by their natural operation, it is clear that God provides for them otherwise than for other things: in that to man is given intelligence and reason, that thereby he may be able both to discern and to discover the truth: also to him are given the sensitive powers, both interior and exterior, that by them he may be assisted to discover the truth: also to him is given the use of speech, so that by making use of it, one who has conceived the truth in his mind, may be able to impart it to another: so that men may thus assist one another in the knowledge of truth, even as in other necessaries of life, since man is by nature a social animal.

Furthermore, the knowledge of truth that is appointed as man’s last end is one which surpasses his natural faculty: for it consists in his seeing the First Truth itself in itself, as we have proved above. Now this is not competent to lower creatures, namely that they be able to reach an end surpassing their natural faculty. Consequently, there arises from this end an additional reason why a different manner of government should be accorded to men, and to other creatures of a lower nature. Because the means should be proportionate to the end. So that, if man be directed to an end surpassing his natural faculty, he stands in need of a supernatural assistance from God, to enable him to tend to that end.

Moreover. A thing of inferior nature cannot attain to what is proper to a higher nature except by virtue of that higher nature: thus the moon, that shines not of itself, is made to shine by the power and action of the sun: and water that is not hot of itself, becomes hot by the power and action of fire. Now, to see the First Truth itself in itself, so far surpasses the faculty of human nature, that it belongs to God alone, as we have shown above. Therefore man needs the divine assistance in order to reach that end.

Again. Everything obtains its last end by its own operation. Now, an operation derives its efficacy from the operating principle: wherefore by the action of the seed something is produced in a definite species, through the efficacy pre-existing in the seed. Therefore man cannot, by his own operation, attain to his last end, which surpasses the faculty of his natural powers, unless his operation be enabled by the divine power to bring him thereto.

Besides. No instrument can achieve ultimate perfection by virtue of its own form, but only by virtue of the principal agent: although by virtue of its own form it can cause some disposition to the ultimate perfection. Thus a saw, by reason of its own form, causes the cutting of the wood, but the form of the bench is produced by the art that employs the instrument: likewise in the body of an animal, resolution and consumption is the result of the animal heat, but the formation of flesh, and regulation of increase and other such things, come from the vegetative soul, which uses heat as its instrument. Now, to God the first agent by intellect and will, all intellects and wills are subordinate, as instruments under the principal agent. Consequently their operations have no efficacy in respect of their ultimate perfection, which is the attainment of final beatitude, except by the power of God. Therefore the rational nature needs the divine assistance in order to obtain its last end.

Further. Many obstacles prevent man from reaching his end. For he is hindered by the weakness of his reason, which is easily drawn into error which bars him from the straight road that leads to his end. He is also hindered by the passions of the sensitive faculty, and by the affections whereby he is drawn to sensible and inferior things, since the more he adheres to them, the further is he removed from his last end: for such things are below man, whereas his end is above him. Again he is often hindered by weakness of the body from doing acts of virtue, whereby he tends to beatitude. Therefore he needs the help of God, lest by such obstacles he turn away utterly from his last end.

Hence it is said (Jo. 4:44): No man can come to Me, unless the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him: and (15:4): As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abide in the vine, so neither can you, unless you abide in Me. Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who asserted that man can merit the glory of God by his free-will alone.

CHAPTER CXLVIII

THAT THE ASSISTANCE OF DIVINE GRACE DOES NOT COMPEL MAN TO VIRTUE

POSSIBLY, it might appear to some that the divine assistance compels man to do well, since it is said (Jo. 4:44): No man can come to Me unless the Father, who hath sent Me, draw him: and on account of the saying (Rom. 8:14): Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God: and again (2 Cor. 5:14): The charity of Christ presseth us. And it would seem that compulsion is implied in being drawn, led and pressed.

But it is evident that this is not true. For divine providence provides for all things according to their mode, as we have proved above. Now, it is proper to man and every rational nature, to act voluntarily and to be master of his actions, as we have shown: and compulsion is incompatible with this. Therefore God by assisting man does not compel him to do right.

Again. When we say that the divine assistance is given to man that he may do well, we mean that it does our works in us, even as the first cause does the works of second causes, and the principal agent produces the action of the instrument, wherefore it is said (Isa. 26:12): Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in us. Now, the first cause produces the operation of the second cause, according to the latter’s mode. Therefore God also causes our works in us according to our mode, which is that we act freely and not by compulsion. Therefore the divine assistance does not compel a man to do right.

Besides. Man is directed to his end by his will: because the object of the will is the good and the end. Now, the divine assistance is given to us chiefly that we may obtain the end. Therefore this assistance does not deprive us of the act of the will, but in a special way is the cause of this act in us: hence the Apostle says (Philip. 2:13): It is God who worketh in us both to will and to accomplish, according to His good will. But compulsion excludes from us the act of the will: for we do under compulsion that which is against our will. Therefore God does not, by His assistance, compel us to do right.

Further. Man reaches his last end by acts of virtue: for beatitude is said to be the reward of virtue. Now compulsory actions are not acts of virtue: because virtue's principal condition is choice, which is impossible unless it be voluntary, to which compulsion is opposed. Therefore God does not compel man to do right.

Moreover. The means should be proportionate to the end. Now, the last end which is happiness is not becoming except to those who act voluntarily, and are masters of their own actions: hence neither inanimate beings nor dumb animals are said to be happy, as neither are they said to be lucky or unlucky, save metaphorically. Therefore the assistance which God gives man that he may obtain happiness, does not compel him.

Hence it is said (Deut. 30:15–18): Consider that the Lord hath set before thee this day life and good, and on the other hand, death and evil: that thou mayest love the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways.… But if thy heart be turned away, so that thou wilt not hear … I foretell thee this day that thou shalt perish. Again it is said (Ecclus. 15:18): Before man is life and death, good and evil. That which he shall choose shall be given him.

CHAPTER CXLIX

THAT MAN IS UNABLE TO MERIT THE DIVINE ASSISTANCE

IT can be clearly shown from what has been said, that man is unable to merit God’s assistance. For everything is in the position of matter in regard to what is above it. Now matter does not move itself to its perfection, but needs to be moved by another. Therefore man does not move himself to the effect of obtaining the divine assistance, for this is above him: rather indeed is he moved for this purpose by God. Now the motion of the mover precedes the movement of the thing moved both logically and causally. Consequently the divine assistance is not given to us because by our good deeds we previously move ourselves to obtain it, but rather do we advance by our good deeds, because of God’s prevenient help.

Again. An instrumental agent does not produce a disposition for the introduction of perfection by the principal agent, except in so far as it acts by virtue of the principal agent: thus animal heat does not prepare matter for the form of flesh any more than for another form, save in so far as it acts by virtue of the soul. Now, our soul works under God as the instrumental under the principal agent. Consequently the soul is unable to prepare itself to receive the effect of the divine assistance, save forasmuch as it acts by virtue of God. Therefore it is anticipated by the divine assistance, rather than anticipates it, as though it merited it, or prepared itself for it.

Also. No particular agent can in every case anticipate the action of the first universal agent: because every action of a particular agent originates from a universal agent: thus here below every movement is anticipated by the heavenly movement. Now, the human soul is subordinate to God as the particular to the universal agent. Therefore there cannot be a right movement in the soul that is not anticipated by the divine action. Hence our Lord said (Jo. 15:5): Without me you can do nothing.

Besides. Meed is proportionate to merit: because equality of justice is observed in giving rewards. Now, since the effect of God's assistance surpasses the faculty of nature, it is not proportionate to the acts that man performs by his natural faculty. Therefore man cannot by such acts merit the aforesaid assistance.

Further. Knowledge precedes the movement of the will. Now, knowledge of his supernatural end comes to man from God: because man cannot obtain such knowledge by his natural reason, since it surpasses his natural faculty. Therefore the movement of our will towards our last end needs to be anticipated by the divine assistance.

Hence it is said (Tit. 3:5): Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He hath saved us. And (Rom. 9:16): It is not of him that willeth, namely to will, nor of him that runneth, namely to run, but of God that showeth mercy: because, to wit, in order that he may will and do well, man needs God's prevenient assistance: even as an effect is not usually ascribed to the proximate agent but to the first mover: thus victory is attributed to the general, although it is achieved by the work of the soldiers. Hence these words do not exclude free-will, as some have misunderstood them to do, as though man were not master of his own actions both internal and external: but they indicate the subjection of the free-will to God. Moreover, it is said (Lament. 4.): Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted: whence it is clear that our conversion to God is anticipated by the assistance of God when he converts us.

Yet we read (Zach. 1:3) as said in the person of God: Turn ye to me … and I will turn to you: this does not however deny the anticipating of our conversion by God's operation which we have affirmed, but it means that after our conversion, whereby we turn to him, he maintains it by strengthening it so as to make it effective, and by upholding it, that it may reach its due end.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who said that this assistance is given to us on account of our merits: and that the beginning of our justification is from us, but the consummation from God.

CHAPTER CL

THAT THIS SAME ASSISTANCE IS CALLED GRACE; AND WHAT IS MEANT BY SANCTIFYING GRACE

SEEING that what is given to a man apart from his merits, is said to be given to him gratis: and since the divine assistance given to man anticipates all human merit, as we have said; it follows that this assistance is bestowed on man gratuitously, and therefore is fittingly known by the name of grace. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6): And if by grace, it is not now by works: otherwise grace is no more grace. There is also another reason for which the aforesaid assistance of God has received the name of grace. For one man is said to be pleasing (gratus) to another, because he is beloved by him, wherefore he who is beloved of another, is said to be in his grace. Now it is essential to love that the lover be a well-wisher and a well-doer to the one whom he loves. And indeed the good of every creature is the object of God's will and operation: since the creature's very being and its every perfection come from God willing and operating, as we have proved above: wherefore it is said (Wisd. 11:25): Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made. But a special kind of divine love offers itself to our consideration; it is that which is bestowed on those whom he assists to obtain a good which surpasses the order of their nature, namely the perfect enjoyment, not of any created good, but of his very self. Accordingly this assistance is fittingly named grace: not only because it is given gratis, as we have shown; but also because by this assistance man, by a special favour, is rendered pleasing (gratus) to God. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 1:5, 6): Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children

… according to the purpose of His will: unto the praise of glory in which He hath graced us in His beloved Son.

Now this same grace must needs be something in the man who is graced, something by way of form and perfection. For that which is being directed to an end, must have a continuous order thereto: because the mover causes a continuous change in the thing moved, until the latter by its movement reaches the end. Since then man, as we proved above, is directed to his last end by the assistance of the divine grace, it follows that he must possess this assistance continuously, until he reach his end. But this would not be the case were man to share in this assistance by way of motion or passion, and not by way of a form, abiding and reposing, as it were, within him: for such motion and passion would not be in man except when he is actually turned towards his end, and this is not always so in man, as may be seen especially when he is asleep. Therefore sanctifying grace is a form and perfection abiding in man, even when he is doing nothing.

Again. God’s love causes the good that is in us: even as man’s love is evoked and caused by some good in the beloved. Now, man is incited to love someone especially, on account of some good already existing in the beloved. Consequently where there is special love of God for man, we must suppose some special good bestowed on man by God. Since, then, according to what we have been saying, sanctifying grace denotes God’s special love for man, it must in consequence imply the presence of some special goodness and perfection in man.

Also. Everything is directed to a suitable end in proportion to its form: since different species have different ends. Now, the end whereto man is directed by the assistance of divine grace is above human nature. Therefore man needs, over and above, a supernatural form and perfection, so as to be suitably directed to that same end.

Besides. It behoves man to reach his last end by means of his own actions. Now, everything acts in proportion to its form. Therefore, in order that man may be brought to his last end by means of his own actions, he needs to receive an additional form, whereby his actions may be rendered effective in meriting his last end.

Further. Divine providence provides for each thing according to the mode of its nature, as we have shown above. Now, the mode proper to man is that, for the perfection of his operations, he needs, besides his natural powers, certain perfections and habits, to enable him to do the good well as it were connaturally and with both ease and pleasure. Therefore the assistance of grace which man receives from God that he may obtain his last end, denotes a form and perfection abiding in man.

Hence God's grace is designated in Scripture as being a kind of light; for the Apostle says (Ephes. 5:8): You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. And it is fitting that the perfection whereby man is assisted towards his last end, which consists in seeing God, be named light, which is a principle of vision.

Hereby we refute the opinion of those who say that grace places nothing in man: even as nothing is posited in a man by saying that he has the king's favour (gratiam), but only in the king himself who loves him. It is clear, then, that they were deceived through not observing the difference between divine and human love. For God's love causes the good which He loves in a man: whereas human love does not so always.

CHAPTER CLI

THAT SANCTIFYING GRACE CAUSES IN US THE LOVE OF GOD

FROM what has been said it follows that by the assistance of sanctifying grace man is enabled to love God. For sanctifying grace is an effect in man of the divine love. Now, the proper effect of the divine love in man would seem to be that man loves God. Because the chief thing in the intention of one who loves, is that he be loved in return: since the endeavour of the lover tends especially to draw the beloved to love of him: and unless he accomplishes this, love must cease. Consequently the effect of sanctifying grace in man is that he loves God.

Again. Things that have a common end must be united in so far as they are directed to that end: hence in a state men are joined together in concord that they may ensure the good of the commonwealth; and soldiers, when engaged in battle, must needs be united together, and act in unison in order to achieve the victory which is their common end. Now, the last end to which man is conducted by the assistance of divine grace, is the vision of God in His essence, which vision is proper to God himself: so that this final good is communicated to man by God. Consequently man cannot attain to this end unless he be united to God by conformity of will. And this is the proper effect of love; since it is proper to friends to like and dislike the same things, and to have common joys and griefs. Therefore by sanctifying grace man becomes a lover of God: because by it man is directed to an end communicated to him by God.

Also. Since the end and the good is the proper object of the appetite or affections, it follows that man's affective faculty is perfected chiefly by sanctifying grace which directs man to his last end. Now, the chief perfection of the affective faculty is love. A sign of which is that every affective movement originates in love: for no one desires, or hopes, or rejoices, save on account of a good that he loves; and in like manner no one shuns, or fears, or grieves, or is angry, except on account of something contrary to that which he loves. Therefore the principal effect of sanctifying grace is that man loves God.

Further. The form by virtue of which a thing is directed to its end, likens that thing somewhat to that end: thus a body by virtue of the form of gravity assumes a certain likeness to and conformity with the place to which its movement tends naturally. Now, we have already shown that sanctifying grace is a form residing in man, and directing him to his last end, which is God. Therefore grace makes man like to God. But likeness is the cause of love; because like loves like. Therefore grace makes man a lover of God.

Moreover. Operation, to be perfect, must be constant and prompt. Now, this is the chief effect of love, which makes even hard things seem light. Since then sanctifying grace is needed for the perfection of human actions, as stated above, it follows of necessity that this same grace produces in us the love of God.

Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us. Moreover our Lord promised the vision of Himself to those who love Him, saying (Jo. 14:21): He that loveth me, shall be loved of My Father: and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him.

It is evident, then, that grace which directs us to that end which is to see God, causes in us the love of God.

CHAPTER CLII

THAT GRACE CAUSES FAITH IN US

FORASMUCH as grace causes charity in us, it follows that faith also is caused in us by grace.

Because the movement whereby we are directed by grace to our last end, is voluntary and not compulsory, as we have shown. Now there cannot be voluntary movement towards the unknown. Consequently, for us to be directed voluntarily to our last end, grace must first of all provide us with knowledge of that end. But this knowledge cannot be one of clear vision, in this state of life, as we have already proved. Therefore it must be knowledge by faith.

Moreover. The mode of cognition in every cognitive being follows the mode of that being's nature: hence the mode of cognition differs in the angel, man and dumb animals, according to the diversity of their several natures, as we have shown. Now, that man may attain to his last end, he receives a perfection in addition to and surpassing his nature, namely grace, as we have proved. Consequently, it behoves man to receive over and above his natural knowledge, a knowledge surpassing his natural reason. This is the knowledge of faith, which is of things unseen by natural reason.

Again. Whenever a thing is moved by an agent to that which is proper to that agent, the thing moved must needs at the outset be imperfectly subject to the impressions of the agent, such impressions being as it were foreign and improper thereto, until they become proper to it in the term of the movement: thus wood is at first heated by fire, and such heat is not proper to the wood, but something outside its nature; but in the end, when the wood is incandescent, the heat becomes proper and connatural to it. In like manner, when one is taught by a master, at first he must needs receive the master's ideas, not as understanding them by himself, but as taking them in faith, through their being above his capacity, so to speak: but in the end, when he has been thoroughly taught, he will be able to understand them. Now, as we have shown already, we are directed to our last end by the assistance of divine grace. And our last end is the clear vision of the First Truth in itself, as we have proved. Therefore, before obtaining this end, man's mind, with the assistance of divine grace, must needs be subject to God by believing.

Further. At the beginning of this work we set down the advantages for which it is necessary that man should receive the divine truth by believing therein. Whence we may conclude that it was necessary for faith to be produced in us by divine grace.

Hence the Apostle says (Ephes. 2:8): By grace you are saved through faith: and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians who said that the beginning of faith in us is not from God, but from ourselves.

CHAPTER CLIII

THAT DIVINE GRACE CAUSES HOPE IN US

IN the same way it can be proved that grace must needs cause in us the hope of future bliss.

Because the love which a man has for others, arises from his love for himself, inasmuch as a man looks upon his friend as his other self. Now, a man loves himself, in that he wishes good for himself; even as he loves another, in that he wishes good for him. Consequently, a man through having an affection for his own good, is led to have an affection for another’s good. So that when a man hopes for a good from another he is on the way to love him in himself, of whom he hopes some good: for a man is loved in himself, when the lover wills his good, even though he gain nothing from it. Wherefore, since sanctifying grace causes man to love God for himself, the consequence is that grace also causes man to hope in God.—Friendship whereby one loves another in himself, although it be not for one’s own profit, nevertheless turns to one’s profit in many ways, in so far as one friend helps another as he would help himself. Consequently, when one man loves another and knows that he is beloved of him, the result is that he has hope of him. Now, grace makes man a lover of God, according to the love of charity, so that at the same time he knows by faith that God already loves him, as expressed by the words of 1 Jo. 4:10: In this is love: not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us. The effect, therefore, of the gift of grace is that man hopes in God.—Hence it is evident that, as hope prepares man for true love of God, so conversely by charity man is strengthened in hope.

Moreover. There arises in every lover the desire to be united as far as possible with the beloved: hence nothing gives greater pleasure to friends than living together. Since, then, grace makes man a lover of God, it must also make him desire union with God, as far as this is possible. Now, faith which originates from grace, affirms it to be possible for man to be united to God in perfect enjoyment wherein beatitude consists. Wherefore the desire of this enjoyment arises in man from his love of God. But the desire of a thing troubles the soul of the desirer unless he have the hope of obtaining it. Accordingly, as grace gives rise in man to the love of God and faith, it was fitting that it should also give rise to the hope of obtaining beatitude in the life to come.

Again. If any difficulty offers itself to those who are being directed to an end desired by them, they are comforted by the hope of obtaining it: thus one puts up with the bitter medicine through the hope of being restored to health. Now, many difficulties have to be faced on the way in which we fare towards beatitude, that is the bourn of all our desires: since virtue, which is the road to beatitude, is about difficult things. In order, then, that man might tend to beatitude with a lighter heart and greater readiness, it was necessary to give him the hope of obtaining beatitude.

Further. No man is moved towards an end which he deems impossible to obtain. Hence that a man may proceed towards a certain end, it is necessary for him to think of that end as something possible for him to have: and this thought is afforded by hope. Since, then, man is directed by grace to the last end which is beatitude, it was necessary for the hope of obtaining beatitude to be engraved on man’s thoughts by grace. Hence it is said (1 Pet. 1:3, 4): Who … hath regenerated us unto a lively hope … unto an inheritance incorruptible … reserved in heaven: and (Rom. 8:24): We are saved by hope.

CHAPTER CLIV

OF THE GIFTS OF GRATUITOUS GRACE: WHEREIN IT IS TREATED OF THE DIVINATIONS OF DEMONS

WHEREAS what things man sees not by himself, he cannot know unless he receive them of one who sees them; and as faith is of things unseen by us: it behoves the things that are of faith to be received from one who sees them himself. Now, this one is God, who comprehends Himself perfectly, and sees His own essence naturally: for our faith is of God. Hence the things that we hold by faith must come to us from God. And whereas the things that are of God are enacted in a certain order, as we have shown above, it behoved a certain order to be observed in the revelation of those things that are of faith: so that, to wit, some should receive them immediately from God, and others from these, and thus in orderly fashion down to the very last.

Now, wherever there is any kind of order in a number of things the nearer a thing is to the first principle the greater its efficacy. This is to be observed in the order of divine manifestations. Because the invisible things to see which is beatitude, and to believe is faith, are revealed first of all to the blessed angels, so that they see them clearly, as we have already said.

Afterwards, by the ministry of the angels, they are made known to certain men, not so as to be seen clearly, but so as to be known with a certain assurance arising from the divine revelation.

Now, this revelation is made by a certain interior and intellectual light, which raises the mind to the perception of things that it cannot reach by means of its natural light. For just as by its natural light the intelligence is assured of what it knows in that light, for example first principles; so too of the things it knows in a supernatural light is it assured. And this assurance is necessary in order that things known by divine revelation be proposed to other men: for we have no assurance in proffering to others what we do not hold with certainty. Now, in addition to this same light that enlightens the mind inwardly, there are present sometimes in divine revelation, some outward or inward aids to knowledge; as when the words formed by divine power are heard outwardly by sense, or through God's agency are perceived inwardly by the imagination; or again as when God causes things to be seen outwardly by the eyes, or to be imagined inwardly: from which man, aided by the inward light that is shed on his mind, derives knowledge of divine things. Hence suchlike aids, without the inward light, do not suffice for the knowledge of divine things; whereas the inward light suffices without them. This revelation of the invisible things of God belongs to wisdom, which, properly speaking, is the knowledge of divine things. Wherefore it is said (Wis. 7:27, 28) that divine wisdom through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls: … for God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom: and again (Ecclus. 15:5): The Lord hath filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.

But whereas the invisible things of God are clearly seen … being understood by the things that are made, by divine grace not only are divine things revealed to men, but also some things about creatures; and this apparently belongs to knowledge. Hence it is said (Wis. 7:17): He hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are: to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements. Again the Lord said to Solomon (2 Paralip. 1:12): Wisdom and knowledge are granted to thee. Again, man cannot conveniently communicate his knowledge to others except by speech. Since, then, according to the order established by God, those who receive God's revelation have to instruct others, it was also necessary that they should receive the grace of the word, in so far as it was required for the profit of those to be instructed. Hence it is said (Isa. 50:4): The Lord hath given me a learned tongue, that I should know how to uphold by word him that is weary. And our Lord said to His disciples (Luke 21:15): I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries will not be able to resist and gainsay.—For this same reason, as long as the truth of faith had to be preached in various countries by a few, certain ones were equipped with the gift of speaking in divers tongues, according to Acts 2:4: They were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak. Since, however, the proffered speech needs confirmation that it may be accepted, unless it be manifest in itself; and whereas things that are of faith are not clear to human reason: it was necessary to provide some means of confirming the utterances of those who preached the faith. But they could not be confirmed by being demonstrated from principles of reason, since matters of faith are above reason. Therefore the preachers' words needed to be confirmed by some kind of signs, whereby it was made evident that their words were from God, and that the preacher should do such works as healing the sick, and performing other deeds of power, which God alone can do. Hence our Lord, on the point of sending His disciples to preach, said (Matth. 10:8): Heal the sick, raise the dead, cleanse lepers, cast out devils: and (Mark 16:20) it is said: But they, going forth, preached everywhere: the Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.

There was also another manner of confirmation in that when the heralds of truth were found to speak the truth about such hidden things as could subsequently be made manifest, they were believed because they spoke truthfully of things beyond the ken of man. Hence the necessity of the gift of prophecy, whereby through divine revelation they were able to know and announce to others, the things that were to happen, and such things as are commonly hidden from man's knowledge: so that as they were found to speak the truth in these matters, they were believed in matters of faith. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:24, 25): If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all: (for) the secrets of his heart are made manifest, and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed.

Nevertheless the gift of prophecy were not a sufficient guarantee of faith, unless it be about things which God alone can know: even as miracles are such as God alone can do. The like here below are especially our secret thoughts, which God alone can know, as we proved above: and future contingencies, which also are a matter of God's knowledge only, because he sees them in themselves, since to Him they are present by reason of His eternity, as we proved above.

Some future contingencies, however, can be known by men also: not indeed as future, but as already existing in their causes: for when causes are known, whether in themselves or in certain manifest effects thereof that are called signs, it is possible for men to have foreknowledge of certain future effects. Thus a physician foresees death or health from the state of the forces of nature which he diagnoses from the pulse, urine, and other like signs. Such knowledge of the future is indeed partly certain, and partly uncertain. Because there are some pre-existent causes from which subsequent effects follow of necessity: thus death follows of necessity from the pre-existent composition of contrary elements in the animal. On the other hand, from some pre-existent causes subsequent effects follow, not of necessity, but frequently: thus from the seed of the male being discharged into the matrix, there results a perfect human being in the majority of cases: and yet sometimes monsters are begotten on account of some obstacle hindering the action of the forces of nature. Of the former effects one has certain foreknowledge: but of the latter no knowledge is infallibly certain. On the other hand the foreknowledge of the future, that is acquired from divine revelation by the grace of prophecy, is altogether certain; even as the divine foreknowledge is certain. For God foresees future things not only as in their causes, but infallibly as they are in themselves, as we have already proved. Wherefore in the same way prophetic knowledge of the future is given to man together with perfect certitude.—Nor is this certitude incompatible with the contingent nature of future things, as neither is the certitude of God’s knowledge, as was proved above.

Sometimes, however, future effects are revealed to prophets, not as they are in themselves, but as they are in their causes. And then if the causes are hindered from producing their effects, nothing prevents the prophets’ foretelling from undergoing a change: thus Isaias foretold to the dying Ezechias (Isa. 38:1): Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live, and yet he recovered: and the prophet Jonas foretold (Jonas 3:4) that after forty days Nineveh shall be destroyed, and yet it was not destroyed. Accordingly, Isaias foretold the future death of Ezechias with reference to the relation of his bodily condition and of other inferior causes to that effect; and Jonas foretold the destruction of Nineveh with reference to the exigency of its merits; but in each case the event proved otherwise according to God’s operation of deliverance and healing. Hence prophetic foretelling of the future is a sufficient argument of faith: because, though men know some future things, foreknowledge, such as that of prophecy, of future contingencies has no certitude. For, even if at times a prophet receives a revelation according to the relation of certain causes to a certain effect, nevertheless at the same time, or afterwards, it is revealed to him how the fulfilment of the future effect is to be changed: thus the recovery of Ezechias was revealed to Isaias, and the deliverance of the Ninevites to Jonas.

Now, as we proved above, wicked spirits, in the endeavour to corrupt the true of faith: abuse the working of miracles in order to lead men into error, and to weaken the proofs of the true faith: not however by working real miracles, but by doing things which appear to men miraculous. In the same way they abuse the foretellings of prophecy, not indeed by uttering real prophecies, but by foretelling things in accordance with an order of causes unknown to man, so as to appear to foresee future events in themselves. And though contingent effects arise from natural causes, these same spirits, by the acuteness of their intelligence, are able to know better than men when and how the effects of natural causes can be hindered: and so, in foretelling the future, they seem to be more wonderful and truthful than the wisest of men. Now, among natural causes, the highest and furthest removed from our knowledge are the powers of heavenly bodies: and that these are known to the aforesaid spirits as regards the property of their nature, has been shown above. Since, then, all bodies in this lower world are ruled through the powers and movement of higher bodies, the spirits in question are able, much better than any astrologer, to forecast future winds and storms, changes of weather, and other like events which occur through changes in these lower bodies brought about by the movement of the bodies above. And although heavenly bodies are unable to cause a direct impression on the intellective part of the soul, as we have proved, yet many there are who follow the bent of their passions and their bodily inclinations, which the heavenly bodies are clearly able to influence: for none but the wise, who are few, are able to curb these passions by their reason. Hence also they are able to foretell many things regarding human actions: albeit sometimes even they fail in their forecast, on account of free-will.

Moreover when they foretell what they foresee, they do not enlighten the mind, as God does when He reveals anything: for it is not their intention to perfect the human mind unto the knowledge of truth, but on the contrary to turn it away from the truth.

Their forecasts are sometimes connected with the working of the imagination; either during sleep, as when they draw indications of the future from dreams; or in waking, as when people in a trance or a fit foretell certain future events: sometimes their forecast is taken from external signs, for instance, by observing the flight and chattering of birds, by studying the entrails of animals, or the combination of certain dots, and by like practices, all of which seemingly depend on chance: and sometimes from visible apparitions, and foretelling the future in audible words. And although in the last instance it is evident that wicked spirits must intervene, they strive to account for the other cases by referring them to natural causes. For they contend that since a heavenly body conduces by its movement to certain effects in this lower world; by the same agency, there appear signs of these effects in certain things: because different things receive the celestial influence in different ways. Accordingly, say they, the impression made by a heavenly body on one thing may be taken as a sign of the impression made on another. And so they assert that movements which are independent of the reason’s deliberation, such as things seen by dreamers and lunatics, the flight and twittering of birds, and arrangements of dots when made at haphazard, are consequent to the impressions made by a heavenly body. And consequently they say that such things can be signs of the future events that are caused by the heaven’s movement.

Since, however, there is but little reason in all this, we should judge rather that the forecasts made from such signs have their foundation in some intellectual substance, by whose power the aforesaid indeliberate movements are controlled, so as to be in keeping with the reading of the future. And though such things are sometimes controlled by the divine will through the ministry of good spirits, for God reveals many things by means of dreams, for instance to Pharaoh and Nabuchodonosor; and in the words of Solomon: Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord: yet they do result sometimes from the operation of wicked spirits; for such is the teaching of holy doctors, and the opinion even of the heathens. Thus Valerius Maximus says that the observing of omens and dreams and the like belongs to a religion wherein idols are worshipped. Hence in the old Law, all these were forbidden together with idolatry, for it is said (Deut. 18:9–11): Lest thou have a mind to imitate the abominations of these nations, who, to wit, worshipped idols; neither let be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire; or that consulteth soothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens; neither let there be any wizard, nor charmer; nor any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. Prophecy bears witness also in another way to the preaching of the faith: when, namely, the preacher proclaims as articles of faith, events that take place in the course of time, such as Christ's birth, passion and resurrection, and the like: and lest people think such things to be invented by the preacher, or to have happened by chance, they are proved to have been foretold by the prophets a long time in advance. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 1:1–3): Paul a servant of Jesus Christ, called to be an apostle, separated unto the gospel of God, which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy scriptures, concerning His Son who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh.

Next in rank to those who receive revelation from God immediately, another degree of grace is necessary. For since God vouchsafes revelation to man not only for the present time, but also for the instruction of all in the time to come, it was necessary that the things revealed should be delivered not only by word of mouth to the present generation, but also by the written word for the instruction of the future generation. Hence the need for someone to interpret these writings. And this must be a divine grace, even as revelation itself was made by the grace of God. Wherefore it is said (Gen. 40:8): Doth not interpretation belong to God?

Then comes the last degree; of those, namely, who faithfully believe the things to others revealed, and by others interpreted: and that this is God's gift has been shown above. Nevertheless, whereas the wicked spirits do works like those by which faith is confirmed, both in working signs and in revealing the future, as stated above; lest men be deceived by such things and believe in falsehoods, it is necessary that, by the aid of divine grace, they be instructed in the discerning of suchlike spirits: according to 1 Jo. 4:1: Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God.

These effects of grace intended for the instruction and confirmation of faith are enumerated by the Apostle, 1 Cor. 12:8–10, where he says: To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom: and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit: to another, faith in the same Spirit: to another, the grace of healing in one Spirit: to another, the working of miracles: to another, prophecy: to another, the discerning of spirits: to another, divers kinds of tongues: to another, interpretation of speeches.

Hereby we refute the error of certain Manicheans, who deny that miracles worked on bodies are done by God.—Likewise we refute the error of those who said that the prophets did not speak by the Spirit of God.—We also refute the error of Priscilla and Montanus, who said that the prophets, like men in a trance, understood not what they said. For this is incompatible with divine revelation, whereby the mind chiefly is enlightened.

Now we must observe a certain difference in the aforesaid effects of grace. For though the name of grace befits them all, in that they are bestowed gratis, without any preceding merit: the effect alone of love deserves furthermore the name of grace for this other reason, that it makes man pleasing (gratum) to God: for it is said (Prov. 8:17): I love them that love Me. Consequently faith and hope, and other things directed to faith, can be in sinners who are not pleasing to God: but love alone is the peculiar gift of the righteous, because he that abides in charity, abideth in God, and God in him (1 Jo. 4:16). But there is yet another difference to be noticed in the aforesaid effects of grace. Because some of them are necessary to man during his whole life, seeing that without them he cannot be saved: for instance, faith, hope, charity, and obedience to God's commandments. For such effects man needs to have certain habitual perfections within him, in order that when it is time for him to do so, he may be able to act according to them.—Whereas the other effects are necessary, not during the whole of man's life, but at certain times and places: such as working miracles, foretelling the future, and so forth. For the like habitual perfections are not bestowed, but certain impressions are made by God which cease as soon as the act ceases; and must be repeated when there is need for the act to be repeated: thus the prophet's mind is enlightened with a new light in each revelation; and in each miraculous work there must be a renewal of the activity of the divine power.

CHAPTER CLV

THAT MAN NEEDS THE DIVINE AID IN ORDER TO PERSEVERE IN GOOD

MAN also needs the aid of divine grace in order to persevere in good.

Because everything that is changeable of itself, needs the aid of an immovable mover, in order to stand fast to one thing. Now, man is changeable from evil to good, and from good to evil. Therefore, that he may persevere unchangeably in good, in a word, that he may persevere, he needs the divine assistance.

Again. Man needs the aid of divine grace for that which exceeds the strength of free-will. But the free-will is not sufficiently strong to persevere in good to the end. This is proved as follows. The power of the free-will extends to things which are a matter of choice: and that which is chosen is some particular thing to be done. A thing to be done in particular is something here and now. Therefore the power of the free-will is confined to something to be done now. But perseverance does not denote something to be done now, but a continuous operation that lasts all the time. Consequently this effect, namely to persevere in good, is above the power of the free-will. Therefore man needs the aid of divine grace, to persevere in good.

Besides. Although, by his will and faculty of self-determination, man is master of his actions, he is not master of his natural powers. And, consequently, though he is free to will or not to will a thing, in willing he is unable to make his will so will a thing that it stands fast to what it wills or chooses. Yet this is requisite for perseverance: namely, that the will stand fast in the good. Therefore perseverance is not in the power of the free-will: and consequently man needs the help of divine grace, in order to persevere.

Moreover. If there be several successive agents, one of which, namely, acts after the action of another: the continuation of their activity cannot result from any one of them, since none of them is always in action: nor can it result from them all, because they do not act together. Consequently it must result from some higher agent that is always in action. Thus the Philosopher (8 Phys. vi.) proves that the continuity of generation in animals is caused by some everlasting higher being. Now, let us suppose a man to be persevering in good. It follows that in him there are many movements of the free-will tending to the good, one after the other, until the end. Hence no one of these movements can be the cause of this continuity of good, namely perseverance; because none of them lasts continually. Nor can they all together be the cause of it: since, as they are not together, they cannot together be the cause of anything. Therefore this continuity is caused by some higher being: and consequently man needs the aid of grace from above in order to persevere in good.

Further. If many things be ordered to one end, their whole order, until they reach the end, is from the first agent directing them to the end. Now, in the man who perseveres in good there are many movements and actions tending to one end. Consequently the whole order of these movements and actions must needs be directed by the first director to that end. But it has been shown above that men are directed to the last end by the aid of divine grace. Therefore in him who perseveres in good the whole order and continuation of good works is through the assistance of divine grace.

Hence it is said (Philip. 1:6): He who hath begun a good work in you will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus: and (1 Pet. 5:10): The God of all grace, who hath called us unto His eternal glory … after you have suffered a little, will Himself perfect you, and confirm you, and establish you.

Moreover we find in Holy Writ many prayers by which perseverance is besought of God, for instance in Ps. 16:5, Perfect thou my goings in Thy paths, that my footsteps be not moved; and 2 Thess. 2:15, 16, God our Father … exhort your hearts, and confirm you in every good work and word. The same petition is made in the Lord’s prayer, especially when we say, Thy kingdom come: for God’s kingdom will not come to us, except we persevere in good. Now, it would be absurd to ask of God that whereof He is not the giver. Therefore man’s perseverance is from God.

Hereby we refute the error of the Pelagians, who said that the free-will suffices for man to persevere in good, and that he needs not the assistance of grace in order to do so.

It must be observed, however, that since even one who has grace, asks of God that he may persevere in good; just as the free-will is not sufficient for this effect which is perseverance in good, without the external aid of God, so neither is an infused habit sufficient for the purpose. Because the habits that are infused into us by God, in the present state of life, do not wholly remove from the free-will its proneness to evil: albeit they do give the free-will a certain stability in good. Hence, when we say that man needs the help of grace for final perseverance, we do not mean that, in addition to habitual grace previously infused in order that he may do good works, he needs another grace besides in order to persevere: but we mean that even when he has all the infused gratuitous habits, man still needs the assistance of divine providence governing him externally.

CHAPTER CLVI

THAT HE WHO FALLS AWAY FROM GRACE BY SIN, CAN RECOVER AGAIN BY MEANS OF GRACE

HENCE it may be shown that by the assistance of grace, even when a man has not persevered, and has fallen into sin, he can be restored to good.

For it belongs to the same force to maintain a man’s health, and to mend it when broken: thus health is maintained in the body by the forces of nature, and by the same forces is restored when it is impaired. Now, as we have shown, man perseveres in good by the aid of divine grace. Therefore, if he has fallen through sin, he can be restored by the same assistance of grace.

Again. An agent that requires no disposition in the subject, is able to produce its effect in a subject no matter how disposed: and for this reason God, who in His action requires no disposition in the subject, is able to produce a natural form in a subject, without that subject being thereto disposed: as when He gives sight to the blind, and life to the dead, and so forth. Moreover, as He requires no natural disposition in a corporeal subject, so neither does He require merit in the will, in order to bestow grace, since this is given apart from merit, as we have proved. Therefore God is able to give man sanctifying grace, whereby sins are taken away, even after his fall from grace by sin.

Further. Those things alone is man unable to recover after their loss, which he acquires in birth, such as his natural powers and limbs: because man cannot be born again. Now, the aid of grace is given to man not in birth, but when he is already in existence. Therefore after losing grace through sin, he can regain it so that his sins be wiped out.

Moreover. Grace is an habitual disposition in the soul, as we have shown. But habits acquired by means of acts, if they be lost, can be acquired anew by means of the acts whereby they were acquired. Much more, therefore, if we lose the grace which unites us to God and frees us from sin, can we regain it by the divine operation.

Moreover. In God's works, as in nature's, nothing is without a purpose; for even nature owes this to God. Now it would be useless for a thing to be moved, unless it were able to reach the end of the movement. Hence that which has a natural aptitude for being moved towards a certain end, must needs be able to reach that end. Now, after man has fallen into sin, as long as he remains in this state of life, he retains the aptitude for being moved to good: this is indicated by his desire for good, and his grief for evil, which remain in him after he has sinned. Therefore after he has sinned it is possible for man to return once more to good: and this is the effect of grace in man.

Further. In all nature there is not to be found a passive potentiality that is not reducible to actuality by some natural active power. Much less therefore is there in the human soul a potentiality that cannot be brought to act by the active power of God. Now, even after sin, the human soul retains the potentiality for good: because sin does not deprive the soul of its natural powers whereby it is ordered to its good. Therefore, by God's power it can be restored to good, and consequently, by the aid of grace, man can receive forgiveness of his sins. Hence it is said (Isa. 1:18): If your sins be as scarlet, they shall be made white as snow: and (Prov. 10:12): Charity covereth all sins. This also we daily ask not in vain of the Lord, when we say: Forgive us our trespasses.

Hereby we refute the error of the Novatians who said that a man cannot obtain forgiveness for the sins committed by him after Baptism.

CHAPTER CLVII

THAT MAN CANNOT BE FREED FROM SIN SAVE BY GRACE

FROM the same premisses it can be shown that man cannot arise from mortal sin except by grace.

Because by mortal sin man turns away from his last end: and by grace alone is man directed towards his last end. Therefore by grace alone can he arise from sin.

Again. Offence is not removed save by love. Now, by mortal sin man offends God: for it is written that God hateth sinners, inasmuch as it is His will to deprive them of the last end, which He prepares for those whom He loves. Therefore man cannot arise from sin except by grace, which causes a kind of friendship between God and man.

The same conclusion follows from all the arguments given above to prove the necessity of grace.

Hence it is said (Isa. 43:25): I, even I, am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake: and (Ps. 84:3): Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of Thy people; Thou hast covered all their sins.

Hereby is refuted the error of the Pelagians who said that man can arise from sin by his free-will.

CHAPTER CLVIII

HOW MAN IS FREED FROM SIN

WHEREAS man cannot return to one of two opposites unless he go away from the other; in order by the aid of grace to return to the state of righteousness, he must withdraw from sin whereby he had abandoned the path of rectitude. And since it is chiefly by his will that man is directed to his ultimate end and turned away from it, it is necessary that he not only withdraw from sin in his external actions, by ceasing to sin, but also that he withdraw by his will, in order to rise from sin by grace. Now man withdraws from sin by his will, in repenting of the past sin, and purposing to avoid it for the future. Therefore in order to rise from sin man must both repent of past sins and purpose to avoid future sins. For did he not propose to sin no more, sin would not, in itself, be contrary to his will. And if he were willing to sin no more without repenting of his past sin, the sin itself that he committed would not be contrary to his will.—Now, the movement of recession from a thing is contrary to the movement of approach, as whitening is contrary to blackening. Hence in withdrawing from sin the will must take the contrary road to that which led it into sin. Now, it was led into sin by the desire and pleasure of things beneath it. Therefore it needs to turn away from sin by certain punishments, whereby it suffers for having sinned: for even as the will was drawn by pleasure to consent to sin, so by punishment it is confirmed in the detestation of sin.

Again. Fear of the whip deters even dumb animals from their greatest delights. Now the man who arises from sin must not only detest his past sin, but also avoid future sin. It is, therefore, right that he should be punished for his sin, that he may be the more strengthened in his purpose to avoid sin.

Besides. The things we acquire with toil and pain are dearer to us, and we are more careful about keeping them: thus men who have enriched themselves by their own labours spend less than those who have received their riches from their parents or in any other way without labour. Now for the man who arises from sin it is most necessary that he be most careful to keep in the state of grace, which he carelessly lost by sinning. Therefore it is fitting that he suffer labour and pain for the sins he committed.

Further. The order of justice demands that punishment be awarded for sin. Now, the wisdom of God's government appears in the maintenance of order among things. Therefore it belongs to the manifestation of God's goodness and glory that punishment be the reward of sin. But the sinner by sinning acts against the divinely established order, for he transgresses the laws of God. Therefore it is right that he make compensation by punishing in himself that which had previously sinned: for thus he will be wholly freed of his disorder.

It is clear then that after man has by grace obtained the forgiveness of sin, and been restored to the state of grace, he remains, by virtue of God's justice, bound to suffer punishment for the sin he has committed. And if he, of his own accord, take this punishment on himself, he is said thereby to satisfy God: inasmuch as with labour and pain he follows the divinely established order by punishing himself for his sin, which same order by sinning he of his own accord had abandoned.—On the other hand if he fails to take this punishment on himself, since the things subject to divine providence cannot remain in disorder, this punishment will be inflicted on him by God. Nor will this punishment come under the name of satisfaction, since it will not be of the sufferer's choice: but it will be described as purgatorial, because he will be purged, as it were, by another punishing him, and whatever was disorderly in him will be brought back to the right order.—Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:31, 32): If we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged. But whilst we are judged, we are chastised by the Lord; that we be not condemned with this world.

We must observe, however, that when the mind turns away from sin, it is possible for its detestation of sin to be so strong, and for it to cling so closely to God, that there remains no obligation to punishment. For, as may be gathered from what has been said, the punishment that one suffers after sin has been forgiven, is necessary in order that the mind may adhere to good more firmly, through being chastised by punishment; for punishment is a kind of medicine; and again that the order of justice may be maintained by the sinner being punished. Now, the love of God suffices to strengthen man's mind in good, especially if it be vehement; and when the intense detestation of past sin causes great sorrow. Consequently great love of God, and great hatred of past sin remove the need of punishment whether satisfactory or purgatorial: and even if the vehemence be not so great as to exclude all punishment, yet the greater the vehemence, the less punishment will be required.

Now, what we do by our friends, we do apparently by ourselves: because friendship, especially the love of charity, binds two persons together as one. Wherefore as a man can satisfy God by himself, so can he by another; especially when there is urgent need for it. For a man looks upon the punishment which his friend suffers for his sake, as though he suffered it himself: and so he is not without punishment, seeing that he suffers with his suffering friend, and he suffers all the more, according as he is the cause of his friend's suffering. Again, the love of charity in him who suffers for his friend makes the satisfaction more acceptable to God, than if he suffered for himself: for the former comes of the eagerness of charity, but the latter comes of necessity. Hence we infer that one man may satisfy for another, so long as both remain in charity: wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 6:2): Bear ye one another's burdens, and so ye shall fulfil the law of Christ.

CHAPTER CLIX

THAT, ALTHOUGH MAN CANNOT BE CONVERTED TO GOD WITHOUT GOD’S GRACE, YET IT IS REASONABLY IMPUTED TO HIM, IF HE BE NOT CONVERTED

SINCE, without the aid of divine grace, man cannot be directed to his last end, as we have shown in the preceding chapters; and seeing that without it man can have none of the things required that he may tend to his last end, such as faith, hope, love, and perseverance; someone might think that man is not to be blamed if he lack the things in question: and especially because man cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him: since no one is blamed for what depends on another. But, if this be granted, it is clear that several absurdities follow, For it would follow that a man without faith, or hope, or love of God, or perseverance in good, is not deserving of punishment: whereas it is said expressly (Jo. 3:36): He that believeth not in the Son, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.—And since no man obtains beatitude without these things, it would also follow that there are some who neither obtain beatitude from God, nor suffer punishment from Him. Whereas the contrary is proved from the words of Matth. 25:34–41, where we are told that to all who are present at God’s judgement it will be said, Come … possess the kingdom prepared for you; or Depart … into everlasting fire.

In order to clear away this doubt, we must take note that, though a man is unable, by the movement of his free-will, to merit or acquire the divine grace, nevertheless he can hinder himself from receiving it. For it is said of some (Job 21:14): Who have said to God: Depart from us; we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways: and (ibid. 24:13): They have been rebellious to the light. And since it is in the power of the free-will, to hinder or not to hinder the reception of divine grace, he who places an obstacle in the way of his receiving grace is deservedly to be blamed. Because God, for His own part, is prepared to give grace to all, for He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. 2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace, who place in themselves an obstacle to grace: thus he who shuts his eyes while the sun is shining is to be blamed if an accident occurs, although he is unable to see unless the sun’s light enable him to do so.

CHAPTER CLX

THAT A MAN WHO IS IN SIN CANNOT AVOID SIN WITHOUT GRACE

THE statement that it is in the power of the free-will to offer no obstacle to grace, applies to those in whom the natural power retains its integrity. If however, through some previous disorder, it has turned aside to evil ways, it will not be wholly in its power to place no obstacles to grace. For though man, by his own power, is able to refrain at a certain moment, from a particular sinful act: yet if he be left to himself for long, he will fall into sin, whereby an obstacle to grace is set up. Because when the human mind has turned aside from the path of rectitude, it is clear that it has abandoned the direction to its due end. Consequently that which should stand first in its affections, as its last end, becomes less loved than the thing to which the mind has inordinately turned as though it were its last end. Hence whenever something presents itself that is suitable for an inordinate end, and incompatible with the right end, it will be chosen, unless the mind be brought into right order, so that it places its last end before all: and this is the effect of grace. But as long as a thing is chosen that is incompatible with the last end, an obstacle is opposed to grace which directs us to our end. Wherefore it is evident that, after having sinned, man cannot refrain from all sin, before being restored to the right order by grace.

Again. Once the mind is inclined to something, it is no longer equally disposed towards either of two opposites, but is more disposed to that one to which it is inclined. Now, the mind chooses the thing to which it is more disposed, unless through the reason discussing the matter, it become disinclined thereto from motives of precaution: hence it is chiefly under unforeseen circumstances that a person's conduct is a sign of his interior disposition. Now, it is not possible for a man’s mind to be continually so wide awake as to deliberate about everything that is to be willed or done. Hence it follows that sometimes the mind chooses the object to which it is inclined, because the inclination remains. And so, if it be inclined to sin, it will not stay long without sinning, through placing an obstacle to grace, unless it be restored to the state of rectitude.

To this also the impulse of the bodily passions conduces; also objects of sensible appetite, and occasions of evil-doing: for by these things man is easily incited to sin, unless he be held in check by a firm adherence to his last end, which is the effect of grace.

Hence we can see the absurdity of the opinion of the Pelagians, who held that man, while in a state of sin, is able to avoid sin without grace. The contrary of this may be gathered from the petition of the Psalm (70:9): When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me. Moreover our Lord taught us to pray: And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil.

However, albeit those who are in sin cannot, of their own power, avoid placing an obstacle to grace, as we have proved, unless they be assisted by prevenient grace; nevertheless this is imputed to them as sin, because the defect in question remains in them through their preceding fault: even so a drunken man is not excused from murder committed through his being in a drunken state, which he incurred through his own fault.

Moreover, although a man who is in sin, has it not in his power to avoid sin altogether, yet it is in his power to avoid a particular sin at a given moment, as we have said. Hence, whatever sin he commits, he commits it deliberately. Consequently it is not undeservedly imputed to him as a sin.

CHAPTER CLXI

THAT GOD DELIVERS SOME FROM SIN, AND LEAVES SOME IN SIN

NOW, though he that sins places an obstacle to grace, and so far as the order of things demands, ought not to receive grace: yet, since God can act independently of the order implanted in things, as when He enlightens the blind, or raises the dead, sometimes of the richness of his bounty, He comes to the assistance of those who put an obstacle in the way of grace, turns them from evil, and converts them to good. And even as He enlightens not all the blind, nor heals all the sick, in order that in those whom He restores the work of His power may be evidenced, and in the others, the order of nature be maintained; so too, He comes not to the assistance of all who hinder grace, that they may turn away from evil, and be converted to good; but of some, in whom He wishes His mercy to appear; while in the others the order of justice is made manifest. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 9:22): God willing to show His wrath, and to make His power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction, that he might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory. And if of those who are held in thrall by sins God converts some by His prevenient grace, while others He suffers or allows, in the ordinary way, to continue sinning, we are not to ask why He converts certain ones and not others. For this depends on His simple will: even as it came from His simple will, that whereas all things were made out of nothing, some were made to rank higher than others: and just as it depends on the simple will of the craftsman that of the same matter similarly conditioned, He make some vessels for dignified purposes, and some for common purposes. Hence the apostle says (Rom. 9:21): Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour?

Hereby we refute the error of Origen who said that these are converted to God and not those, on account of certain works done by their souls before they were united to bodies. In the Second Book, we gave more particular attention to the refutation of this opinion.

CHAPTER CLXII

THAT GOD IS NOT THE CAUSE OF ANY MAN SINNING

ALTHOUGH God converts not certain sinners to Himself, but leaves them in their sins, as they deserve to be, yet He does not lead them to sin.

For man sins through wandering away from Him who is his last end, as we have already shown. Now, as every agent acts for an end proper and proportionate to it, it is impossible that God, by His own action, turn anyone away from his last end, which is God. Therefore it is impossible that God make any man sin.

Again. Good cannot be a cause of evil. Now sin is man’s evil: for it is contrary to man’s proper good, which is to live according to reason. Therefore God cannot be the cause of a man sinning.

Further. All human wisdom and goodness flow from the divine wisdom and goodness, and are a kind of likeness thereof. Now it is incompatible with human wisdom and goodness, to make a man sin. Much more therefore is it incompatible with divine wisdom.

Moreover. All sin arises from a fault in the proximate agent, and not from the influence of the first agent: thus the fault of limping is due to a defect in the tibia, and not to the motive power; to which, however, is due whatever there is of the perfection of movement in limping. Now, the proximate agent in human sin is the will. Therefore the defect of sin arises from man’s will and not from God, who is the first agent: although whatever pertains to the perfection of action in the sinful act is due to Him.

Hence it is said (Ecclus. 15:12): Say not: He hath caused me to err: for He hath no need of wicked men: and further on (verse 21): He hath commanded no man to do wickedly, and He hath given to no man license to sin. Also (James 1:13): Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God: for God is not a tempter of evils.

There are, however, a few passages in Scripture which would seem to indicate that, to some, God is the cause of their sinning. For it is said (Exod. 10:1): I have hardened Pharaoh's heart and the heart of his servants: and (Isa. 6:10): Blind the heart of this people, make their ears heavy: lest they see with their eyes … and be converted, and I heal them: and (ibid. 63:17): Thou hast made us to err from Thy ways: … thou hast hardened our heart, that we should not fear Thee. Again it is said (Rom. 1:28): God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient. All these passages are to be understood in the sense that God does not assist some to avoid sin, whereas He does assist others.

This assistance is not only the infusion of grace, but also external protection whereby occasions of sin are warded off by divine providence, and incentives to sin restrained. God also assists man against sin by the natural light of reason and the other natural goods which He bestows on man. Hence when He withdraws these aids from some men, as their actions merit, according to the demands of His justice, He is said to harden their hearts or blind their eyes, or deal with them in some other way as described in the passages above quoted.

CHAPTER CLXIII

OF PREDESTINATION, REPROBATION, AND THE DIVINE ELECTION

WHEREAS we have proved that by the divine operation some are with the assistance of grace directed to their last end, while others fail to reach their last end through being deprived of grace: and since all that God does has been foreseen and ordered from eternity by His wisdom, as we have proved: it follows of necessity that the aforesaid distinction among men has been ordered by God from eternity. Inasmuch as from eternity He has preordained some to be directed to their last end, He is said to have predestined them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Ephes. 1:5): Who hath predestined us unto the adoption of children … according to the purpose of his will.—Those to whom from eternity He has decreed not to give grace, He is said to have reprobated, or to have hated, according to the words of Malachi 2, 3, I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.—By reason of this very distinction, in that He has reprobated some and predestined others, we have the divine election, of which it is said (Ephes. 1:4): He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.

Wherefore it is clear that predestination, election and reprobation form a part of divine providence, in reference to man's direction to his last end by divine providence. Consequently it may be shown that predestination and election do not involve necessity, for the same reasons as were employed to show that divine providence does not deprive things of their contingent nature.

That predestination and election are not founded on any human merits may be made clear, not only from the fact that God's grace, which is an effect of predestination, is not preceded by merits, but itself precedes all human merits, as we have proved: but also from the fact that the will and providence of God are the first cause of whatever is done; and nothing can be the cause of the divine will and providence, although among the effects of providence, as also of predestination, one may be the cause of another. For, as the apostle says, WHO HATH FIRST GIVEN HIM, AND RECOMPENSE SHALL BE MADE HIM? FOR OF HIM, AND IN HIM, AND BY HIM ARE ALL THINGS: TO HIM BE HONOUR AND GLORY FOR EVER. AMEN.

FOURTH BOOK

CHAPTER I

FOREWORD

Lo, these things are said in part, of his ways: and seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of his word, who shall be able to behold the thunder of his greatness? (JOB 26:14).

FOR as much as the human intellect acquires knowledge in a manner conformable with its nature, it cannot by itself arrive at an intuitive knowledge of the divine substance in itself, since the latter infinitely transcends the whole range of things sensible, nay all other beings whatsoever.

Nevertheless, seeing that man's perfect good consists in his knowing God in some way, lest so noble a creature should seem to be utterly void of purpose, through being unable to obtain its own end, man has been given the means of rising to the knowledge of God. For, since all the perfections of things come down from God the summit of all perfection, man begins from the lowest things and rising by degrees advances to the knowledge of God: thus too, in corporeal movements, the way down is the same as the way up, and they differ only as regards their beginning and end.

Now this descent of perfections from God presents a twofold aspect. In the first we look at it from the viewpoint of the origin of things: since divine wisdom, that there might be perfection in things, established a certain order among them, so that the universe might be made up of the highest as well as the lowest things. The second aspect is that of the things considered in themselves; for, since causes rank higher than effects, the things caused first fall short of the first cause, namely God, while they transcend their own effects, and so on until we come to those things that are caused last. And because in God, the summit of all things, there is found the most perfect unity; and since the more a thing is one, the greater its power and worth, it follows that the further we recede from the first principle, the more do we find things to be diversified and varied. Consequently the things that proceed from God must needs derive unity from their principle, and multiplicity from the ends to which they are ordained. Accordingly from the diversity of things we consider the diversity of ways, as beginning from one principle and terminating in different things.

Wherefore our intellect is able to mount by these ways to the knowledge of God; and yet by reason of the weakness of our intellect we are unable to know perfectly the very ways themselves. Because, as our senses, wherein our knowledge begins, are directed to exterior accidents, such as colour, smell, and the like, which are by themselves sensible, the intellect is scarcely able through suchlike externals to arrive at the knowledge of what lies within, even in those things whose accidents it grasps perfectly through the senses. Much less, therefore, will it be able to succeed in comprehending the nature of those things, of whose accidents but few can be grasped by the senses, and still less the nature of those things whose accidents cannot be grasped, although it may be partly gathered from certain effects that fall short of those things. But, even though the very natures of things were known to us, nevertheless their order, in so much as by divine providence they are both referred one to another and directed to their end, could be but little known to us, since we cannot succeed in knowing the purpose of divine providence.

Wherefore, if the ways themselves are known by us but imperfectly, how can they serve us as a means of obtaining perfect knowledge of their principle, which transcends them out of all proportion? Even if we knew those same ways perfectly, not yet should we have perfect knowledge of their principle.

Since then it was but a meagre knowledge of God that man was able to obtain in the above ways by a kind of intellectual insight, God of His overflowing goodness, in order that man's knowledge of Him might have greater stability, revealed to man certain things about Himself which surpass the human intelligence. In this revelation a certain order is observed, in keeping with human nature, so that the imperfect leads to the perfect, as happens in other things subject to movement.

Accordingly, at first, these things are revealed to man, yet so that he understands them not, but merely believes them as things heard by him, because his intellect, in this state of life wherein it is connected with sensibles, is utterly unable to rise so as to behold such things as transcend all proportion to the senses: but, when freed from this connection with the senses, then it will be raised so as to behold the things revealed.

Hence man's knowledge of divine things is threefold. The first is when man, by the natural light of reason, rises through creatures to the knowledge of God. The second is when the divine truth which surpasses the human intelligence comes down to us by revelation, yet not as shown to him that he may see it, but as expressed in words so that he may hear it. The third is when the human mind is raised to the perfect intuition of things revealed.

This threefold knowledge is indicated by the words of Job quoted above.—The words, These things are said in part of his ways refer to the knowledge in which our intellect rises to the knowledge of God by the way of creatures. And because we know these ways but imperfectly, he rightly adds in part: since we know in part, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:9). The words that follow, And seeing we have heard scarce a little drop of his word, refer to the second knowledge, wherein divine things are revealed to our belief by way of speech: because faith, as it is said, is by hearing, and hearing is by the word of Christ, of which it is also said (Jo. 17:17): Sanctify them in truth. Thy word is truth. Wherefore, since the revealed truth in divine things is offered not to our sight but to our belief, he rightly says we have heard. And whereas this imperfect knowledge flows from that perfect knowledge whereby the divine truth is seen in itself, when revealed to us by God by means of the angels who see the face of the Father, the expression drop is appropriate: hence it is said (Joel 3:18): In that day the mountains shall drop down sweetness. But since not all the mysteries which the angels and blessed know through seeing them in the first truth, are revealed to us, but only a certain few, he says pointedly a little. For it is said (Ecclus. 43:35, 36): Who shall magnify him as he is from the beginning? There are many things hidden from us, that are greater than these: for we have seen but a few of his works. Again the Lord said to his disciples (Jo. 16:12): I have yet many things to say to you: but you cannot bear them now. Moreover these few things that are revealed to us are proposed to us figuratively and obscurely, so that only the studious can succeed in understanding them, while others revere them as things occult, and so that unbelievers are unable to deride them. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor.

13:12): We see now through a glass in a dark manner; wherefore Job adds significantly the word scarce, to indicate difficulty.—When he goes on to say, Who shall be able to behold the thunder of his greatness? he is referring to the third knowledge, whereby the first truth shall be known as an object not of belief but of vision, for we shall see him as he is (1 Jo. 3:2), wherefore he says behold. Nor shall a small portion of the divine mysteries be perceived, but the divine majesty itself shall be seen, and the entire perfection of good things: hence the Lord said to Moses (Exod 33:19): I will show thee all good; wherefore he says rightly greatness. Nor will the truth be revealed to man obscurely, but made clearly manifest: wherefore our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. 17:25): The hour cometh when I will no more speak to you in proverbs, but will show you plainly of the Father; hence the word thunder is significant as indicating manifestation.

Now the passage quoted is suitable to our purpose: because hitherto we have spoken of divine things, in as much as natural reason is able to arrive at the knowledge of them through creatures; imperfectly however and as far as its own capacity allows, so that we can say with Job: Lo, these things are said in part, of his ways.

It remains then for us to speak of those things that God has proposed to us to be believed, and which surpass the human intelligence. In what manner we are to proceed in this matter we are taught by the words quoted above. For seeing that we scarce hear the truth in the words of Holy Writ, coming down to us like a little drop, and since, in this state of life, no man is able to behold the thunder of His greatness, we must proceed in such sort that the things delivered to us in the words of Holy Writ shall serve as principles. Thus we shall endeavour in some fashion to grasp what is delivered to us in a hidden manner by the aforesaid words, and to defend them from the attacks of unbelievers; yet so as not to presume that we understand them perfectly. For such things are to be proved by the authority of Holy Writ, and not by natural reason: and yet we must show that they are not opposed to natural reason, so as to defend them from the attacks of unbelievers. This manner of procedure has in fact already been decided on at the outset of this work. And since natural reason rises to the knowledge of God through creatures, while on the other hand the knowledge of God by faith comes down to us by divine revelation, and since the way of ascent is the same as that of descent, we must needs proceed by the same way in those things above reason which are an object of faith, as that which we followed hitherto in those matters concerning God which we investigated by reason.

Accordingly we shall treat in the first place of those things concerning God which are above reason and are proposed to our belief, such as belief in the Trinity (Ch. ii–xxvi).

Secondly we shall treat of those things above reason that have been done by God, such as the work of the Incarnation and things that follow in sequence thereto (Ch. xxvii–lxxviii).

Thirdly we shall treat of those things above reason to which we look forward in man's last end, such as the resurrection and glory of the body, the eternal happiness of souls, and matters connected therewith (Ch. lxxix–xcvii).

CHAPTER II

THAT IN GOD THERE ARE GENERATION, PATERNITY, AND FILIATION

LET us then commence our treatise with the mystery of divine generation, and lay down first of all what we must hold according to the teaching of Holy Writ: after which we shall put forward the arguments set up by unbelievers in opposition to the truth of faith; by answering which we shall ensure the purpose of this treatise.

Accordingly Holy Writ delivers to us the names of paternity and filiation in God, when it declares Jesus Christ to be the Son of God, and this occurs very often in the New Testament. For it is said (Matth. 11:17): No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son. Again Mark begins his gospel with the words: The beginning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, Son of God: and John the Evangelist says this frequently: for it is said (3:35): The Father loveth the Son, and he hath given all things into his hand, and (5:21): As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life; so also the Son giveth life to whom he will. Again the Apostle Paul frequently makes use of similar expressions: thus he says (Rom. 1:1–3): Separated unto the gospel of God, which he had promised before by his prophets in the holy scripture, concerning his Son, and (Heb. 1:1–2): God who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers, last of all in these days hath spoken to us by his Son. This is also expressed, albeit less frequently, in the writings of the Old Testament, for it is written (Prov. 30:4): What is his name, and what is the name of his Son if thou knowest? and we read (Ps. 2:7): The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son, and again (Ps. 88:27): He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father. And though some would twist the last two passages into a different meaning, so that the words The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my son be referred to David himself; and the words He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father be ascribed to Solomon, the context in each passage shows the case to be wholly otherwise. For neither are the succeeding words applicable to David, This day have I begotten thee, nor again the words that follow, I will give thee the Gentiles for thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession, since his kingdom did not extend to the utmost parts of the earth, as attested by the story of the Books of Kings. Nor again can the words He shall cry out to me: Thou art my father be applied to Solomon, since the text goes on (verse 30): I will make his seed to endure for evermore, and his throne as the days of heaven. Hence we are given to understand that since in the passages quoted certain things may apply to David and Solomon, and some things not at all, these words are said of David and Solomon, according to the custom of Scripture, as figures of someone else in whom the whole passage is fulfilled.

And seeing that the names Father and Son are consequent to some sort of generation, Scripture has not failed to mention the name of the divine generation. For in the psalm, as we have remarked, we read: This day have I begotten thee, and it is also written (Prov. 8:24, 35): The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived … before the hills I was brought forth, or, according to another reading, Before the hills, the Lord begot me. It is also said (Isa. 66:9): Shall not I that make others to bring forth children, myself bring forth? saith the Lord. Shall I that give generation to others, be barren? saith the Lord thy God. And though one might say that this should be referred to the multiplication of the children of Israel after their return from captivity into their own land, seeing that it was said before (verse 8): Sion hath been in labour and hath brought forth her children, yet this does not conflict with our purpose. For in whatever sense the text be taken, the argument that is quoted as urged by God remains firm and stable, namely, that if He gives generation to others, He himself should not be barren. Nor would it be becoming that He who makes others to beget in reality, Himself should beget, not really, but figuratively; since a thing should be more excellent in the cause than in the effect, as we have proved above. Moreover it is said (Jo. 1:14): We have seen his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father, and again (verse 18): The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him. Again Paul says (Heb. 1:6): When he bringeth in the first-begotten into the world, he saith: Let all the angels of God adore him.

CHAPTER III

THAT THE SON OF GOD IS GOD

WE must also observe that Holy Writ employs the aforesaid expressions to denote the creation of things: for it is said (Job 38:28, 29): Who is the father of rain? or who begot the drops of dew? Out of whose womb came the ice? and the frost from heaven, who hath gendered it? Lest, therefore, the words paternity, filiation, and generation should convey nothing but the idea of the efficacy of the creation, the authority of Scripture does not omit to declare the Godhead of Him whom it describes as son and begotten, so that the aforesaid generation denotes something more than creation. For it is said (Jo. 1:1): In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. And that the name Word designates the Son is shown from what follows, for he adds: And the Word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us: and we saw his glory, the glory as it were of the only-begotten of the Father. Again Paul says (Tit. 3:4): When the goodness and kindness of God our Saviour appeared. Nor did the Scripture of the Old Testament leave this unsaid, since it calls Christ by the name of God: for it is said (Ps. 44:7, 8): Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever: the sceptre of thy kingdom is a sceptre of uprightness. Thou hast loved justice, and hatedst iniquity: and that these words refer to Christ is clear from what follows: Therefore God, thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows. It is also written (Isa. 9:6): For a child is born to us, and a son is given to us: and the government is upon his shoulder: and his name shall be called, Wonderful, Counsellor, God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of peace. Accordingly we are taught from Holy Writ that the Son of God, begotten of God, is God. And Peter confessed that Jesus Christ is the Son of God when he said (Matth. 16:16): Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. Therefore He is not merely the only-begotten, but is also God.

CHAPTER IV

THE OPINION OF PHOTINUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD: AND ITS REFUTATION

CERTAIN perverse men have presumed to measure the truth of the above doctrine according to their own ideas, and have devised various inept opinions about the aforesaid matter. Some of these observed that Scripture is wont to call sons of God those who are sanctified by grace, according to the words of Jo. 1:12: He gave them the power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in his name, and of Rom. 8:16: The Spirit himself giveth testimony to our spirit, that we are the sons of God, and of 1 Jo. 3:1: Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed on us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God. Moreover Scripture declares the like to be born of God, for it is said (James 1:18): For of his own will hath he begotten us by the word of truth, and (1 Jo. 3:9): Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin: for his seed abideth in him. Again, what is more remarkable still, the divine name is ascribed to them: thus the Lord said to Moses (Exod. 7:1): Behold I have appointed thee the God of Pharao, and (Ps. 81:6): I have said: You are gods, and all of you sons of the most High: and as the Lord said (Jo. 10:35): He called them gods, to whom the words of God were spoken. Thus then, in their opinion, Jesus Christ was a mere man born of the Virgin Mary, and through the merits of His holy life was accorded, above all others, the honour of the Godhead; and they reckoned that, like other men, He was a son of God by the spirit of adoption, and begotten of Him by grace, and that the Scriptures call Him God by reason of His being in some way like to God; not by nature, but by a kind of fellowship in the divine goodness: even as it is said of the saints (2 Pet. 1:4): That … you may be made partakers of the divine nature, flying the corruption of that concupiscence which is in the world.

They strove to strengthen their position by the authority of Holy Writ. For the Lord said (Matth. 28:18): All power is given to me in heaven and on earth: since had He been God before time, He would not have received power in time.

Again, it is said of the Son that He was made to him (i.e., to God) of the seed of David according to the flesh and that He was predestinated the Son of God in power; and that which is predestinated and made is seemingly not eternal.

Again the Apostle says (Philip. 2:8, 9): He became obedient unto death; even to the death of the cross. For which cause God also hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names. Whence it would seem to follow that it was through the merit of His obedience and passion that He was crowned with divine honour and exalted above all things. Again Peter says (Acts 2:36): Therefore let all the house of Israel know most certainly that God hath made both Lord and Christ this same Jesus whom you have crucified. Seemingly, therefore, He was made God in time, and not born so, before time. Moreover, in confirmation of their opinion they quote those passages of Scripture which would seem to imply defects in Christ; for instance that He was borne in a woman’s womb, that He advanced in age, that He suffered from hunger and was overcome with fatigue, and subject to death, that He was ever making progress, that He confessed His ignorance of the day of judgement, and was stricken with the fear of death, and the like, all of which are incompatible in one who is God by nature. Hence they conclude that He was graced with the divine honour through His merits, and that He was not God by nature.

This position was taken up first by certain of the early heretics, Cerinthus and Ebion, was renewed by Paul of Samosata, and later on adopted by Photinus: wherefore those who followed his teaching were called Photinians. Nevertheless it is clear to those who weigh carefully these passages of Holy Writ that they do not admit of the interpretation favoured by the opinion of these men.

For Solomon by saying (Prov. 8:24): The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived clearly shows that this conception took place before the existence of anything corporeal. Hence, it follows that the Son begotten of God did not receive from Mary the beginning of His existence. And though they endeavoured to distort these and other like passages with a false interpretation, by saying that they should be referred to predestination, namely that before the creation of the world it was decreed that the Son of God should be born of the Virgin Mary, but that He was not the Son of God before the creation of the world; yet it is clear from what follows that He was before Mary not only in predestination but also in reality. For after the words of Solomon quoted above it is added (verses 29, 30): When he balanced the foundations of the earth, I was with him forming all things; whereas had He existed merely as predestinated, He could not have been doing anything.

The same is to be gathered from the words of the evangelist John: for after saying, In the beginning was the Word, whereby we are to understand the Son of God, as we have shown; lest anyone should take this in the sense of predestination, he adds (verse 3): All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing: which could not be true had He not existed in reality before the world.

Again, it is said of the Son of God (Jo. 3:13): No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven; and again (Jo. 6:38): I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me. It is, therefore, clear that He existed before He came down from heaven.

Moreover, according to the above opinion, He advanced by merit from manhood to Godhead: whereas the Apostle shows on the contrary that, being already God, He became man. For he says (Philip. 2:6, 7): [Who] Being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God; but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit formed as a man. The above opinion, therefore, is irreconcilable with the words of the Apostle.

Again. Among those who received the grace of God, Moses was copiously endowed: for it is said of him (Exod. 33:11) that the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend. If, then, Jesus Christ is to be called God merely on account of the grace of adoption, like other saints, Moses might be called the son of God for the same reason as Christ, although Christ was endowed with more abundant grace: since even among the other saints one is filled with greater grace than another, and yet all are equally to be called sons of God. But Moses is not called son of God for the same reason as Christ: since the Apostle distinguishes Christ from Moses as son from servant, for he says (Heb. 3:5, 6): Moses indeed was faithful in all his house as a servant, for a testimony of those things which were to be said: but Christ as a Son in his own house. It is, therefore, clear that Christ is not called the Son of God by the grace of adoption, as other saints are. The same may be gathered from several other passages of Scripture which call Christ the Son of God in a special way above others: sometimes indeed by singling Him out from others and calling Him son, as when the voice of the Father was heard from heaven: This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased (Matth. 3:17); sometimes by calling Him the Only Begotten; for instance (Jo. 1:14): We have seen his glory, the glory, as it were, of the Only Begotten of the Father; and again (Jo. 1:18): The Only-Begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him; whereas were He called son in common with the others, He could not be called the Only Begotten: and sometimes by calling Him the First-Born, so as to imply a sonship derived by others from Him, according to Rom. 8:29, Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son; that he might be the first-born amongst many brethren, and (Gal. 4:4, 5), God sent his Son … that we might, receive the adoption of sons. Therefore He is Son in a different way from those who are called sons through a likeness to His sonship.

Moreover. Certain works in Holy Writ are ascribed to God so exclusively that they are inapplicable to another, such as the sanctification of souls and the remission of sins: for it is said (Levit. 20:8): I am the Lord that sanctify you, and (Isa. 43:25): I am he that blot out thy iniquities for my own sake. Now Scripture ascribes both of these to Christ: for it is said (Heb. 2:11): Both he that sanctifieth and they that are sanctified are all of one, and (Heb. 13:12): Jesus, that he might sanctify the people by his own blood, suffered without the gate. Moreover our Lord Himself declared that He had the power to forgive sins, and confirmed His assertion with a miracle (Matth. 9:6): and the angel foretold this of Him, saying (Matth. 1:21): He shall save his people from their sins. Therefore Christ, who both sanctifies us and forgives us our sins, is called God, not as those are called gods who are sanctified and forgiven their sins, but as having both the power and the nature of the Godhead.

Those passages of Scripture whereby they endeavoured to show that Christ is not God by nature are of no avail to prove their contention. For we confess that in Christ the Son of God, after the mystery of the Incarnation, there were two natures, namely the human and the divine: wherefore both those things that are proper to God are said of Him by reason of His divine nature, and those things that would seem to savour of imperfection are said of Him by reason of His human nature, as we shall more fully explain further on. For the present, in the matter of the divine generation, let it suffice that we have shown that, according to the Scriptures, Christ is called the Son of God, and God, not only as a mere man by the grace of adoption, but also on account of His divine nature.

CHAPTER V

THE OPINION OF SABELLIUS CONCERNING THE SON OF GOD: AND ITS REFUTATION

FOR as much as all who have a right conception of God are firmly persuaded that there can be but one who is God by nature, some, gathering from the Scriptures that Christ is truly and naturally God and the Son of God, confessed indeed that Christ the Son of God and God the Father are one God; yet that God is not called Son by nature or from eternity, but assumed the appellation of Son from the moment that He was born of the Virgin Mary in the mystery of the Incarnation: so that whatever Christ underwent in the flesh was ascribed by them to the Father; for instance, that He was the son of a virgin, conceived by and born of her, that He suffered, died, and rose again, and whatever else Scripture relates of Him in the flesh.

They endeavoured to confirm this contention by the authority of Scripture. For it is said (Deut. 6:4): Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord: and (Deut. 32:39): See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me: and (Jo. 14:9–11): He that seeth me seeth the Father also … the Father who abideth in me, he doth the works.… I am in the Father, and the Father in me. From all these texts they imagined that God the Father Himself is called the Son, after being born of the Virgin.

This was the opinion of the Sabellians, who were also styled Patripassionists, because they contended that the Father suffered, and believed that Christ was the Father Himself.

Now, though this opinion differs from the former in the matter of Christ’s Godhead (since the latter confesses that Christ was God in truth and nature, whereas the former denied this), nevertheless as to the question of generation and sonship both opinions agree. Because, just as the former opinion asserts that the sonship and generation, whereby Christ is called Son, did not precede Mary, so also does the latter. Consequently neither opinion refers generation and sonship to the divine nature, but only to the human. The latter opinion has this also peculiar to it that it asserts that when we speak of the Son of God we do not indicate a subsistent person, but a property adventitious to a pre-existing person: since the Father assumed the appellation of Son by reason of His having taken flesh from the Virgin, not as though the Son were a subsistent person distinct from the Father. The falseness of this position can be clearly proved by the authority of Scripture.

For the Scriptures call Christ not only the son of the Virgin, but also the Son of God, as we have shown above. But it is impossible for a person to be his own son: for, since the son is begotten of his father, and the begetter gives being to the begotten, it would follow that the giver of being would be identified with the receiver, and this is quite impossible. Therefore God the Father is not the Son, but the Father and Son are distinct.

Again. The Lord said (Jo. 6:38): I came down, from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me: and (Jo. 17:5): Glorify me thou, O Father, with thyself. From these and like passages it is clear that the Son is other than the Father.

It might be said, however, according to this opinion, that Christ is called the Son of God the Father in respect only of His human nature, because, to wit, God the Father created and sanctified the human nature that Christ assumed. Accordingly as God He is Father of Himself as man: wherefore there is nothing to prevent the same one as man being distinct from Himself as God.

But, in that case, it would follow that Christ is styled the Son of God even as other men, by reason either of creation or of sanctification. But we have shown that Christ is not called the Son of God for the same reason as other holy men. Therefore it cannot be understood in the aforesaid manner that the Father is Christ and His own Son.

Further. Where there is one subsistent supposit plural predication is inadmissible. Yet Christ spoke of Himself and the Father in the plural, when He said (Jo. 10:30): I and the Father are one. Therefore the Son is not the Father.

Again. If the Son is not distinct from the Father, except through the mystery of the Incarnation, before the Incarnation they were not distinct at all. Yet we find from Scripture that the Son was distinct from the Father even before the Incarnation. For it is said (Jo. 1:1): In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. Hence the Word that was with God was in some way distinct from Him: for we are wont to speak of one person as being with another. The Begotten of God says (Prov. 8:30): I was with him forming all things, and this implies some kind of fellowship and distinction. It is also said (Osee 1:7): I will have mercy on the house of Juda, and I will save them by the Lord their God, where God the Father speaks of the people to be saved by God the Son, as by a person distinct from Himself and worthy of the name of God. It is also said (Gen. 1:26): Let us make man to our image and likeness, where the plurality and distinction of man's makers are expressly indicated; and Scripture teaches that man was created by God alone. Consequently God the Father and God the Son were two distinct Persons even before Christ became man. Therefore the Father is not called the Son by reason of the mystery of the Incarnation.

Moreover. True sonship refers to the supposit which is called son: for the hand and foot are not properly called sons, but the man whose parts they are. Now the terms paternity and sonship denote distinction in those of whom they are said, even as begetter and begotten. Hence if one is really a son, he must be a distinct person from his father. Now, Christ is truly the Son of God, for it is said (1 Jo. 5:20): That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ. Consequently Christ must be a supposit distinct from the Father; and therefore the Father is not the Son.

Besides. After the mystery of the Incarnation the Father bore witness to the Son (Matth. 3:17): This is my … Son. Now in pointing Him out thus He referred to the supposit. Therefore Christ is a distinct supposit from the Father.

The arguments whereby Sabellius endeavoured to establish his position do not prove his contention, as we shall show more fully further on. For the fact that God is one, or that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, does not prove that the Father and Son are one supposit: because two things that are distinct supposits may be one in some respect.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING THE OPINION OF ARIUS ABOUT THE SON OF GOD

WHILE it is inadmissible according to sacred doctrine that the Son of God should have had His origin in Mary, as Photinus said, or that He who was God and Father from eternity should begin to be the Son by taking flesh, as Sabellius contended, there were others who accepted the teaching of Scripture, that the Son of God existed before the mystery of the Incarnation, and even before the creation of the world. And since this Son is distinct from God the Father, they deemed Him not to be of the same nature as God the Father: for they were unable to understand, and unwilling to believe, that any two, distinct in personality, should have one essence and nature. And seeing that, according to the teaching of faith, the nature of God the Father is alone believed to be eternal, they thought that the nature of the Son did not exist from eternity, though He was the Son before other creatures. And since whatever is not eternal is made out of nothing and created by God, they taught that the Son of God was made out of nothing, and a creature.

Since, however, they were forced by the authority of Scripture to acknowledge the Son as God, as we have observed above, they said that He was one with God the Father, not indeed by nature, but by a certain unity of mind, and by a participation of the divine likeness surpassing that of other creatures. Wherefore seeing that in the Scriptures the highest creatures, which we call angels, are styled gods and sons of God—for instance (Job 38:4, 7): Where wast thou … when the morning stars praised me together, and all the sons of God made a joyful melody? and (Ps. 81:1): God hath stood in the congregation of gods,—it follows that He must be styled God and Son of God, above the others, as being of higher rank than other creatures; so much so that God the Father created all other creatures through Him. They strove to confirm this opinion by the teaching of Holy Writ. For addressing the Father the Son says (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God. Therefore the Father is the only true God: so that as the Son is not the Father He cannot be true God.

Again. The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:14–16): Keep the commandment without spot, blameless, unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ. Which, in his times, he shall show who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords. Who only hath immortality, and inhabiteth light inaccessible. In these words we find indicated the distinction between God the Father represented as showing and Christ represented as shown. Therefore God the Father alone, represented as showing, is Mighty, King of kings and Lord of lords, He alone hath immortality and inhabiteth light inaccessible. Therefore only the Father is true God and consequently the Son is not.

Further. The Lord said (Jo. 14:28): The Father is greater than I; and the Apostle said that the Son is subject to the Father (1 Cor. 15:28): When all things shall be subdued unto him, then the Son also himself shall be subject unto him, namely the Father, that put all things under him. If however the nature of the Father and the Son were one, there would also be one greatness and one majesty; for the Son would not be less than, nor subject to, the Father. In their opinion then it follows from the Scriptures that the Son is not of the same nature with the Father.

Again. The nature of the Father cannot be subject to want. But want is found in the Son; for Scripture declares that He receives from the Father: and to receive is a sign of want. Thus, it is written (Matth. 11:27): All things are delivered to me by my Father, and (Jo. 3:35): The Father loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into his hand. Therefore seemingly the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Moreover. To be taught and to be helped are signs of need. Now, the Son is taught and helped by the Father. For it is said (Jo. 5:19, 20): The Son cannot do anything of himself, but what he seeth the Father doing, and so the Father loveth the Son, and showeth him all things which himself doth. Again, the Son said to the disciples (Jo. 15:15): All things, whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you. It would seem, therefore, that the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Further. To receive a commandment, to obey, to pray, and to be sent are, apparently, signs of subjection. Now, these things are related of the Son. For the Son says (Jo. 14:31): As the Father hath given me commandment, so do I; and it is said (Philip. 2:8): Being made obedient (to the Father) unto death: and (Jo. 14:16): I will ask the Father, and he shall give you another Paraclete. Again, the Apostle says (Gal. 4:4): When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son. Therefore the Son is less than the Father and subject to Him.

Again. The Son is glorified by the Father, as He Himself declares (Jo. 12:28): Father, glorify my name; and the text goes on: A voice … came from heaven: I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again. Also the Apostle says that God raised Jesus Christ from the dead (Rom. 8:11), and Peter declared that He was exalted by the right hand of God (Acts 2:33). From these texts it would seem to follow that He is less than the Father.

Moreover. There can be no defect in the nature of the Father. But in the Son we find a lack of power; for He says (Matth. 20:23): But to sit at my right or left hand is not mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared by my Father. Also a lack of knowledge: for He says (Mark 13:32): But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father. We also find in Him a lack of mental composure, since Scripture asserts that He was affected by sorrow, anger, and like passions. Therefore seemingly the Son is not of the same nature as the Father.

Again. It is expressly stated in Scripture that the Son of God is a creature: for it is said (Ecclus. 24:12): The Creator of all things … said to me: and he that made me rested in my tabernacle: and again (verse 14): From the beginning and before the world was I created. Therefore the Son is a creature.

Further. The Son is numbered among creatures, for it is said in the person of Wisdom (Ecclus. 24:5): I came out of the mouth of the most High, the first-born before all creatures. Also, the Apostle says that the Son is the First-Born of all creatures (Coloss. 1:15). It would seem then that the Son is of the same order as creatures, being placed in the first rank among them.

Moreover. The Son said, when He prayed to the Father for His disciples (Jo. 17:22): The glory which thou hast given to me I have given to them: that they may be one as we also are one. Hence He wished His disciples to be one, even as the Father and Son are one. Now, He did not wish His disciples to be one in essence. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one in essence: and thus the Son is a creature and subject to the Father.

This is the opinion of Arius and Eunomius; and apparently it arose from the statements of the Platonists, who said that the supreme God is the Father and Creator of all, and that from Him first of all there emanated a Mind containing the forms of all things, and transcending all: and this mind they called the Paternal Intelligence. Below this they placed the World-Soul, and beneath this other creatures. Accordingly, they referred to this Mind whatever is said in the Scriptures concerning God the Son, especially because Holy Writ calls the Son of God by the names of Wisdom and Word of God. The opinion of Avicenna is in agreement with this view; for above the Soul of the first heaven he placed the First Intelligence that moves the first heaven, and higher still above all he placed God. Hence the Arians supposed the Son of God to be a creature transcending all other creatures, and that by His means God created all things. This was especially in keeping with the opinion of certain philosophers who held that things proceeded from the first principle in a certain order, so that by the first creature all other things were created.

CHAPTER VII

REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF ARIUS

ONE has only to study carefully the statements of Holy Writ to perceive that this opinion is clearly in opposition to the divine Scriptures. For Holy Scripture gives the name of son of God to Christ in one sense, and to the angels in another. Wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 1:5): To which of the angels hath he said at any time: Thou art my Son, to-day have I begotten thee? affirming that this was said of Christ. But according to the aforesaid opinion the angels would be called sons of God in the same sense as Christ: since the same appellation of sonship would apply to both in respect of the sublime nature wherein they were created by God. Nor does it matter if Christ were of a more exalted nature than the angels, since even among the angels there are various orders, as we have shown above; and yet the same degree of sonship applies to all. Therefore Christ is not said to be the Son of God in the sense laid down by the aforesaid opinion.

Again. Since, by reason of creation, the appellation of divine sonship applies to many, for it applies to all the angels and saints, it follows that if Christ were called Son for the same reason, He would not be the Only-Begotten, although, on account of the sublimity of His nature, He might be called the First-Born among the others. But Scripture states that He is the Only-Begotten (Jo. 1:14): We have seen his glory, the glory as it were of the Only-Begotten of the Father. Therefore He is not called the Son of God by reason of creation.

Further. The name son is aptly and truly given to one born of living beings, among whom the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter: in other cases, the appellation of sonship is applied not literally, but metaphorically, as when disciples or wards are called sons. Hence, if Christ were called Son merely by reason of creation, since what is created by God does not emanate from His substance, Christ would not truly be called Son. But He is called truly Son (1 Jo. 5:20): That we may be in his true Son, Jesus Christ. Therefore He is called Son of God, not as though He were created by God with however sublime a nature, but as begotten of God’s substance.

Moreover. If Christ be called the Son by reason of creation, He is not true God, because no creature can be called God, save by reason of a certain likeness to God. Now Jesus Christ is true God. For John, after saying (1 Jo. 5:20): That we may be in his true Son, adds: This is the true God and life eternal. Therefore Christ is not called the Son of God by reason of creation.

Further. The Apostle says (Rom. 9:5): Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever, Amen, and (Tit. 2:13): Looking for the blessed hope and coming of the glory of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ. Moreover it is said (Jerem. 23:5, 6): I will raise up to David a just branch, and immediately afterwards: And this is the name they shall call him: The Lord, our just one; where the Hebrew has the tetragrammaton, the name that is certainly applied to God alone. Wherefore it is clear that the Son of God is truly God.

Moreover. If Christ is the true Son, it follows of necessity that He is true God: because he who is born of another cannot truly be called his son, even if begotten of the latter’s substance, unless he issue from him in likeness of species: for the son of a man must needs be a man. Accordingly, if Christ be the true Son of God, He must needs be true God: therefore He is not a creature.

Again. No creature receives the whole fulness of divine goodness, because, as we have already made clear, perfections come from God to creatures by a kind of descent. Now, in Christ is the whole fulness of divine goodness: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 2:9): In him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead. Therefore Christ is not a creature.

Besides. Although an angel’s intelligence has more perfect knowledge than a man’s, it is far below the divine. Now, Christ’s intelligence is not inferior to the divine: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 2:3) that in Christ are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge. Therefore Christ, the Son of God, is not a creature.

Moreover. As we have proved above, whatever God has in Himself is His essence. Now, the Son has whatever the Father has: for the Son said (Jo. 16:15): All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine: and addressing the Father (Jo. 17:10): All my things are thine, and thine are mine. Therefore Father and Son have the same essence and nature: and consequently the Son is not a creature.

Further. The Apostle says (Philip. 2:6, 7) that the Son was in the form of God, before He emptied Himself. Now the form of God can have no other meaning but the nature, of God, even as the form of a servant means the nature of man. Therefore the Son is of divine nature, and consequently He is not a creature.

Again. Nothing created can be equal to God. Now, the Son is equal to the Father, for it is said (Jo. 5:18): The Jews sought to kill him, because he did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was his father, making himself equal to God. Thus the evangelist, whose testimony is true, tells us that Christ said He was the Son of God, and equal to God, and that for this reason the Jews persecuted Him. Nor can any Christian doubt that what Christ said of Himself was true, since also the Apostle declares that it was not robbery that He deemed Himself equal to God (Philip. 2:6). Hence the Son is equal to the Father, and therefore He is not a creature.

Moreover. We read that there is none like to God, not even among the angels, who are called the sons of God: Who, says the Psalmist (Ps. 88:7) among the sons of God shall be like to God? and (Ps. 82:2): O God, who shall be like to thee? Now this must be taken as referring to perfect likeness, as is proved from what has been said in the First Book. But Christ declares His perfect likeness to the Father, even as living, for He said (Jo. 5:26): As the Father hath life in himself, so he hath given to the Son also to have life in himself. Therefore Christ must not be reckoned among the created sons of God.

Further. No created substance resembles God in His essence: for any perfection found in any creature whatsoever is less than what God is: so that it is impossible to know through any creature what God is. Now, the Son resembles the Father: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:15) that He is the image of the invisible God. And lest we should think this to mean an imperfect image, that does not reflect the essence of God, so that it would not be possible to know by it what God is—as when a man is said to be

God’s image (1 Cor. 11:7)—the Apostle shows that He is a perfect image reflecting the very substance of God when he says (Heb. 1:3): Being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance. Therefore the Son of God is not a creature.

Again. Nothing contained in a genus is the universal cause of the things contained in that genus; thus, the universal cause of mankind is not a man, because nothing is its own cause; whereas the sun, which is outside the human genus, is the universal cause of human generation, and still more so is God.

Now, the Son is the universal cause of creatures: for it is said (Jo. 1:8): All things were made by him; and Begotten Wisdom says (Prov. 8:30): I was with him forming all things: and the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:16): In him were created all things in heaven, and on earth. Therefore He is not of the genus of creatures.

Besides. From what has been proved in the Second Book, it is clear that the incorporeal substances called angels cannot be formed otherwise than by creation: and it has also been proved that no substance but God can create. Now Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the cause of the angels, by giving them their being: for the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:16): Whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers. All things were created by him and in him. Therefore the Son is not a creature.

Further. Since the action of a thing is consequent to its nature, the proper action of A cannot be assigned to B, if the nature of A is not proper to B: thus a thing that has not human nature, cannot produce a human action. Now, actions proper to God are also proper to the Son, such as to create, as we have already proved, to uphold and conserve all things in being, and to wash away sins. And these things are proper to God, as we have shown above. Now, it is said of the Son (Coloss. 1:17) that by him all things consist, and (Heb. 1:3): Upholding all things by the word of his power, making purgation of sins. Therefore the Son of God is by nature divine, and not a creature. An Arian indeed might say that the Son does these things, not as the principal agent, but as the latter’s instrument, and that He acts, not by His own power, but only by that of the principal agent; but this view is precluded by the words of our Lord (Jo. 5:19): What things soever he doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. Thus even as the Father works of Himself and by His own power, so too does the Son.

We may further conclude from this that Father and Son have the same might and power. For not only does He say that the Son works in like manner as the Father, but that He does the same things in like manner. Now, if the same work proceed from two agents in like manner, this can happen either when they have dissimilar parts in the action—thus the same work proceeds from the principal agent and the instrument—or when they have similar shares in the action, and then they must combine together in one power: and this power sometimes results from the combined forces of the various agents at work, as when many hands row a boat; for all row alike, and while each one is not strong enough to produce the required result, their combined strength suffices to urge the boat forward. But this cannot be said of the Father and the Son, for the Father's power is not imperfect but infinite, as we have proved. Therefore the power of Father and Son must be identical. And, since power is consequent to nature, it follows that nature and essence must be identical in Father and Son.

This follows also from what we have said above. For if the Son is divine in nature, as we have proved in many ways, since the divine nature cannot be manifold, as we proved above, it follows of necessity that the nature and essence of Father and Son are numerically the same.

Again. Our ultimate happiness is in God alone, who must be the sole object of our hope and worship. Now our happiness is in God the Son: for He said (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life: That they may know thee, namely the Father, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent. It is also said (1 Jo. 5:20) of the Son, that He is true God and life eternal. And it is certain that by eternal life Holy Writ means final beatitude: for Isaias, quoted by the Apostle (Rom. 15:12), says: There shall be a root of Jesse, and he that shall rise up to rule the Gentiles: in him the Gentiles shall hope. Again, it is said (Ps. 71:11): All kings of the earth shall adore him: all nations shall serve him: and (Jo. 5:23): That all men may honour the Son, as they honour the Father; and (Ps. 96:7): Adore him, all you his angels, which words the Apostle applies to the Son (Heb. 1:6). Therefore it is evident that the Son of God is true God.

Moreover this same conclusion follows from the arguments adduced above to prove against Photinus, that Christ is God, not by creation but in very truth.

Accordingly the Catholic Church, taught by the foregoing and like texts of Holy Writ, confesses that Christ is in truth and by nature the Son of God, co-eternal with and equal to the Father, true God having the same essence and nature with the Father, born, neither created nor made. Hence it is clear that the Catholic faith alone confesses true generation in God, since it refers the generation of the Son to the Son's receiving His divine nature from the Father. On the other hand, heretics refer this generation to some extraneous nature; Photinus and Sabellius referring it to the human nature, while Arius refers it not to the human nature, but to a created nature, of higher rank than other creatures. Arius differs also from Sabellius and Photinus, in that he asserts this generation to have been anterior to the world, while the latter deny that it was before the Virgin-Birth. Sabellius differs too from Photinus, in that he confesses Christ to be God in truth and by nature, while this is denied by Photinus and Arius, the former holding Christ to be a mere man, while the latter contends that He was a most excellent creature combining together the divine and human natures in a kind of fusion. These allow a distinction of person between Father and Son, whereas Sabellius denies it. Accordingly the Catholic faith, taking the middle way, confesses with Arius and Photinus, and against Sabellius, that Father and Son are distinct Persons, and that the Son is begotten, but the Father unbegotten: and with Sabellius, but against Photinus and Arius, that Christ is God in truth and by nature, and of the same nature with the Father, yet distinct from Him in person. Even from such things may we gather the Catholic truth: since, as Aristotle says, even error bears witness to truth: and error is at variance, not only with truth, but also with itself.

CHAPTER VIII

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED BY ARIUS IN SUPPORT OF HIS VIEW

SINCE then truth cannot be opposed to truth, it is evident that the texts of the Written Truth which the Arians quote in support of their error cannot be in agreement with their opinion. For, as we have shown from the divine Scriptures, that Father and Son have but one identical divine essence and nature, in respect of which each of them is true God, it follows that Father and Son are not two Gods, but only one God. Because, if they were two Gods, it would follow that the divine essence is shared between them, just as in two men there are two numerically distinct human natures: especially seeing that the divine nature and God are not distinct, as we have proved above: whence it follows of necessity, since there is one divine nature in Father and Son, that Father and Son are one God. Accordingly, though we confess both the Father to be God, and the Son to be God, we do not abandon the position that there is but one God, which we proved in the First Book, by both reason and authority. Therefore, although there is but one God, we confess that this may be predicated of both Father and Son.

When, then, our Lord, addressing the Father, said (Jo. 17:3): That they may know thee, the only true God. we must not gather that the Father alone is true God. as though the Son were not true God—because the authority of Scripture clearly proves that the Son is true God—but that the one only true Godhead belongs to the Father, yet in such a way that it belongs also to the Son. Wherefore our Lord said significantly: That they may know thee, the only true God, not as though (the Father) were the only God; but: That they may know thee, and then added, the only true God, to show that the Father, whose Son He declared Himself to be, is God, because in Him is the only true Godhead. And since the true Son must needs have the same nature with the Father, it follows that the only true Godhead belongs to the Son, rather than that it should be excluded from Him. Hence John, as though expounding these words of our Lord, ascribes to the true Son both of these things which our Lord here ascribes to the Father, namely, that He is true God, and that in Him is eternal life (1 Jo. 5:20): That we may know the true God, and may be in his true Son. This is the true God and eternal life. Even though the Son had confessed that the Father alone was true God, He must not for that reason be understood to exclude Himself from the Godhead: because, as Father and Son are one God, as we have proved, whatever is predicated of the Father, by reason of His Godhead, amounts to the same as though it were said of the Son, and vice versa. For when our Lord said (Matth. 11:27): No one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, we are not to conclude that knowledge of Himself is denied to either the Father or the Son.

Whence it is evident that true Godhead is not excluded from the Son by the words of the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:15): Which in his time he shall shew, who is the Blessed and only Mighty, the King of kings and Lord of lords. For the Father is not named in these words, but only something common to Father and Son. For it is explicitly stated that the Son also is King of kings and Lord of lords (Apoc. 19:13), where it is said: He was clothed with a garment sprinkled with blood, and his name is called The Word of God, and afterwards (verse 16): And he hath on his garment, and on his thigh written: King of kings and Lord of lords. Nor is the Son excluded by the words that follow: Who alone hath immortality (1 Tim. 6:16), since He clothes with immortality them that believe in Him, hence it is said (Jo. 11:26): He that … believeth in me shall not die for ever. It is also certain that the subsequent words also may apply to the Son: Whom no man hath seen, nor can see (1 Tim. 6:16), because our Lord said (Matth. 11:27): No one knoweth the Son but the Father. Nor would it avail to object that He appeared visibly, for this happened in the flesh: since He is invisible as to His Godhead, even as the Father: wherefore the Apostle says in the same epistle (3:16): Evidently great is the mystery of godliness, which was manifested in the flesh. Nor does it affect the issue to say that the above text refers to the Father only, because the text implies a distinction between the one who shows and the one shown, since the Son also shows Himself, for He says (Jo. 14:21): He that loveth me, shall be loved of my Father; and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him: wherefore we say to Him (Ps. 79:20): Show thy face, and we shall be saved. As to our Lord’s words (Jo. 14:28), The Father is greater than I, the Apostle teaches how they should be understood. For seeing that a comparison is made between greater and less, the words must be understood of the Son in respect of His abasement. The Apostle, however, ascribes this abasement to His assuming the form of a servant, yet so that He is equal to the Father in respect of the form of God. For he says (Philip. 2:6, 7): Who being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal to God: but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant. Nor must we wonder that, for this reason, He is called less than the Father, seeing that the Apostle declares Him to have been made lower than the angels: We see, he writes, Jesus who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honour (Heb. 2:9).

Hence too it is evident, that the Son is stated to be subject to the Father in the same sense, namely in respect of His human nature: this is clear from the context. For the Apostle had said before (1 Cor. 15:21): By a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead: and afterwards (verses 23, 24) he had added that everyone shall rise in his own order, first of all Christ, and then they that are of Christ, and then: Afterwards the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father. Then, having declared the nature of this kingdom, namely that all things must be made subject to Him, he goes on to say (verse 28): When all things shall be subdued unto him, then the Son also himself shall be subject unto him that put all things under him. Therefore the context shows that this is to be understood of Christ as man: for as such He died and rose again: because, as God, since He does all that the Father does, as we have shown, He also subdued all things to Himself. Wherefore the Apostle says (Philip. 3:20, 21): We look for the Saviour, our Lord Jesus Christ, who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory, according to the operation whereby also he is able to subdue all things to himself.

The fact that in the Scriptures the Father is said to give to the Son, whence it follows from Scripture that the Son receives from the Father, does not prove that He is in want of anything. In fact this is requisite in order that He be the Son. For He could not be called Son, were He not begotten of the Father, and whatever is begotten receives from the begetter the latter's nature. When therefore, we read that the Son receives from the Father, nothing else is indicated but the Son's generation, whereby the Father gave His nature to the Son. This can be gathered from the thing given, for He says (Jo. 10:29): That which my Father hath given me, is greater than all. Now, that which is greater than all is the divine nature, whereby the Son is equal to the Father. This is proved by our Lord's very words. For He had said that no man would be able to pluck His sheep from His hand: and in proof of this He utters the words quoted, namely that what His father had given Him, is greater than all. And because, as He concludes, no one can wrest from the hand of His Father, it follows that neither can anyone wrest from the hand of the Son: and this would not follow, unless by that which the Father had given Him, He were equal to the Father. Accordingly in order to express this more clearly He says (verse 30): I and the Father are one. In like manner the Apostle says (Philip. 2:9, 10): And (God) hath given him a name which is above all names: that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth. Now, the name that is above all names, and which every creature reveres is none other than the name of the Godhead. Therefore this giving by begetting signifies the begetting itself, whereby the Father gave the Son true Godhead. The same conclusion follows from the statement that all things were given Him by the Father: since all things could not have been given to Him, unless the whole fulness of the Godhead that is in the Father were also in the Son. Accordingly by saying that the Father had given to Him, He declares Himself to be the true Son; and this is against Sabellius: and from the greatness of the thing given, He declares Himself to be equal to the Father; and this is against Arius.

It is clear, then, that this giving is no indication of want in the Son: for the Son was not before He received, since in Him to be begotten and to receive were one and the same: and the fulness of that which was given was incompatible with want in Him who received. Nor can it be objected against what we have said, that Scripture asserts the Son to have received from the Father in course of time. Thus our Lord after His resurrection, said to His disciples (Matth. 28:18): All power is given to me in heaven and in earth:

and the Apostle says (Philip. 2:8, 9) that for this cause God hath exalted him, and hath given him a name which is above all names, because He became obedient unto death: as though He had not this name from eternity. For Scripture is wont to describe things as being or made, when they come to our knowledge. Now, that the Son received from eternity universal power and the divine name, was made known to the world by the preaching of the disciples. This is shown by the words of God Himself, for our Lord said (Jo. 17:5): Glorify thou me, O Father, with thyself, with the glory which I had before the world was: for He asks that His glory, which from eternity, as God, He received from the Father, should be manifested in Him now that He was made man.

Hence it is clear how the Son is taught, whereas He is not ignorant. For it has been shown that in God intelligence and being are one and the same. Wherefore communication of divine nature is also communication of intelligence. Now, communication of intelligence may be called showing, speaking, or teaching. Therefore, since by His birth the Son received the divine nature from the Father, we may speak either of Him as hearing from the Father, or of the Father as showing to Him, or employ other like expressions of Scripture: not as though the Son were previously ignorant or nescient, and was afterwards taught by the Father. For the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 1:24) that Christ is the power of God and the wisdom of God: and it is impossible for wisdom to be ignorant, or power to be weak.

Therefore the words: The Son cannot do anything of himself (Jo. 5:19) do not argue weakness of action in the Son: but, as in God to act is the same as to be, and action is identified with essence, as we have proved above, so the Son is said to be unable to act of Himself, but to act with the Father, even as He cannot be of Himself, but only of the Father. For were He of Himself, He would not be the Son. Accordingly, even as it is impossible for the Son not to be the Son, so is it impossible that He act of Himself. But since the Son receives the same nature as that which the Father has, and consequently the same power, although the Son is not of Himself (a se) nor works of Himself, yet He is by Himself (per se) and works by Himself: because, even as He is by His own nature which He received from the Father, so does He work by His proper nature received from the Father. Wherefore after our Lord had said: The Son cannot do anything of himself, in order to show that although the Son works not of Himself, yet does He work by Himself, He added: What things soever he doth—namely, the Father—these the Son also doth in like manner.

From the foregoing it is also clear in what sense the Father commands the Son, and the Son obeys the Father, or prays to the Father, or is sent by the Father. For all these things are ascribed to the Son as subject to the Father, and this is only in respect of the human nature which He had assumed, as we have shown. Wherefore the Father commands the Son as subject to Him in His human nature. The very words of our Lord declare this. For when He said (Jo. 14:31), That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given me commandment, so do I, what this commandment was is indicated by the words that follow, Arise, let us go hence. For He said this when He was going to His Passion: and it is clear that the command to suffer applied to the Son in respect only of His human nature. Likewise, when He said (Jo. 15:10), If you keep my commandments you shall abide in my love; as I also have kept my Father's commandments, and do abide in his love, it is clear that these commandments regarded the Son, in so far as He was, as man, beloved of His Father; just as He loved His disciples as men. The Apostle shows that the Father's commandments to the Son are to be referred to the human nature assumed by the Son, when he teaches that the Son was obedient to the Father in things appertaining to human nature. For he says (Philip. 2:8) that he became obedient to the Father, unto death. The Apostle also shows that prayer becomes the Son in respect of His human nature, for he says (Heb. 5:7) that in the days of his flesh with a strong cry and tears, offering up prayers and supplications to him, that was able to save him from death, (He) was heard for his reverence. The Apostle shows in what respect He is said to be sent by the Father, when he says (Gal. 4:4): God sent his Son, made of a woman: wherefore He is said to be sent by reason of His being made of a woman: and it is certain that this applies to Him in respect of the flesh which He assumed.

It is therefore clear that none of these texts proves that the Son was subject to the Father, except as regards His human nature.

We must however observe that the Son as God is also said to be sent by the Father invisibly, without prejudice to His equality with the Father. We shall prove this farther on, when we treat of the mission of the Holy Ghost. It is likewise clear that from the Son being glorified, raised up, or exalted by the Father, we cannot argue that the Son is less than the Father, save in respect of His human nature. For the Son needs not to be glorified as receiving glory anew, since He declares that He had it from the beginning of the world: but it was fitting that His glory, which was concealed beneath the weakness of His flesh, should be made manifest, through the glorification of His body and the working of miracles, in the faith of believers. Wherefore it is said of this concealment (Isa. 53:3): His look was, as it were, hidden and despised; whereupon we esteemed him not. In like manner Christ was raised from the dead, in as much as He suffered and died, that is, according to the flesh; for it is said (1 Pet. 4:1): Christ having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought. And it behoved Him to be exalted for as much as He was humbled: for the Apostle says (Philip. 2:8, 9): He humbled himself, being made obedient unto death … for which cause God also hath exalted him.

Accordingly, by the fact that the Father glorifies, raises up, and exalts the Son, the Son is not proved to be less than the Father, except in His human nature: because, in His divine nature whereby He is equal with the Father, there is but one power, and one operation of both Father and Son. Wherefore the Son by His own power not only exalts Himself, according to the words of the Psalmist (Ps. 20:14): Be thou exalted, O Lord, in thy own strength; but also raises Himself from the dead, as slated in His own words (Jo. 10:18): I have power to lay down my life, and I have power to take it up again. Moreover He glorifies not only Himself, but also the Father, for He says (Jo. 17:1): Glorify thy Son, that thy Son may glorify thee; not that the Father is concealed under the veil of assumed flesh, but by the invisibility of His nature. In this way the Son also is concealed in respect of His divine nature: since the words of Isaias (45:15), Verily thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour, apply to Father and Son in common. And the Son glorifies the Father, not by bestowing glory on Him, but by manifesting Him to the world: for He says (Jo. 17:6): I have manifested thy name to men.

We must not believe that there is any lack of power in the Son of God, since He says (Matth. 28:18): All power is given to me in heaven and in earth. Hence His words (Matth. 20:23): To sit on my right hand, is not mine to give you, but to them for whom it is prepared by my Father, do not prove that the Son has not the power of distributing the heavenly seats, since these seats signify the participation in eternal life, the bestowal of which He declares to belong to Him, when He says (Jo. 10:27, 28): My sheep hear my voice: and I know them, and they follow me; and I give them life everlasting. It is also said (Jo. 5:22) that the Father … hath given all judgement to the Son: and it is a part of judgement to bestow eternal life on certain persons for their merits. Wherefore it is said (Matth. 25:33) that the Son of Man shall set the sheep on his right hand, but the goats on his left. Therefore it is in the power of the Son to set a man either on His right or on His left, whether both be referred to different participations of glory, or one to glory and the other to punishment. Accordingly the passage quoted must be interpreted according to the foregoing. For we are told in the first place (Matth. 20:20 seqq.) that the mother of the sons of Zebedee came to Jesus, begging of Him that one of her sons might sit at His right hand, and the other at His left: and she seems to have been urged to make this request through relying on her blood relationship with the man Christ. Accordingly our Lord by His answer denied, not that He had the power to give what was asked, but that it was His to give to them for whom the request was made. For He did not say: “To sit on My right or left hand is not mine to give to any man”; rather does He declare that it was His to give to them for whom it was prepared by His Father. For this belonged to Him, not as the son of the Virgin, but as the Son of God. Consequently, to give to this or that one was not in His power on account of His relationship as son of the Virgin; whereas it was His to give to them for whom it was prepared by His Father in eternal predestination; because He was the Son of God.

Moreover our Lord Himself declares that even this preparation is in the power of the Son of God, when He says (Jo. 14:2): In my Father’s house there are many mansions; if not, I would have told you, that I go to prepare a place for you. Now, these many mansions are the various degrees of participation in heavenly bliss, which God has prepared in His eternal predestination. When then our Lord says: If not—that is, if there were not sufficient mansions prepared for those who were to be taken up into heaven—and adds: I would have told you that I go to prepare a place for you, He shows that this preparation lies in His power.

Nor can it be admitted that the Son knew not the day of His coming, seeing that in him are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, as the Apostle says (Coloss. 2:3), and that He knows perfectly something greater, namely the Father. But this means that the Son, as a man living among men, conducted Himself as an ignorant man, by not revealing the matter to His disciples. For Scripture is wont to describe God as knowing something, when He makes others know it, for instance (Gen. 22:12): Now I know that thou fearest God; that is, “I have caused thee to know”: and thus contrariwise, the Son is said not to know that which He does not make us know.

As to sorrow, fear, and the like, it is clear that such things were in Christ as man: so that they argue no depreciation in the Son’s Godhead.

When wisdom is described as created, in the first place this may refer, not to that Wisdom which is the Son of God, but to the wisdom which God has bestowed on creatures. For it is said (Ecclus. 1:9, 10): He created her—namely, wisdom—in the Holy Ghost … and he poured her out upon all his works. It may also refer to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense would be: From the beginning and before the world, was I created; that is, I was predestined to be united to a creature (ibid. 24:14). Or again wisdom is said to be both created and begotten, so as to insinuate the manner of divine generation. Because, when a thing is begotten, it receives the nature of its begetter, and this savours of perfection: whereas when a thing is generated here below, the begetter itself is changed, and this savours of imperfection: while in creation, the Creator undergoes no change, but the creature does not receive the nature of the Creator. Accordingly, the Son is said to be both created and begotten, so that from creation we gather the unchangeableness of the Father, and from generation the identity of nature in Father and Son. Thus did the Council expound Scripture, as may be gathered from the works of Hilary.

When the Son is said to be the First-Born of creatures, this does not imply that the Son is to be reckoned among creatures, but that the Son proceeds from the Father, and receives from the Father from whom creatures proceed and receive. The Son however receives identity of nature, whereas creatures do not: wherefore the Son is called not only the First-Born, but also the Only Begotten, on account of the singular mode of that reception.

The words of our Lord to His Father in reference to His disciples, That they may be one, as we also are one (Jo. 17:22), prove that Father and Son are one in the same way as it behoves the disciples to be one, namely, by love. But this manner of union does not exclude unity of nature, rather does it prove it. For it is said (Jo. 3:35): The Father loveth the Son: and he hath given all things into his hand: and this shows that the fulness of the Godhead is in the Son, as we have already stated. Hence it is clear that the authority of Scripture invoked by the Arians in support of their view is in no way opposed to the truth as declared by the Catholic Faith.

CHAPTER IX

EXPLANATION OF THE TEXTS QUOTED BY PHOTINUS AND SABELLIUS

IN sequence to the foregoing animadversions it is clear that the texts also of Holy Scripture quoted by Photinus and Sabellius fail to support their errors.

For our Lord’s words after His resurrection, All power is given to me in heaven and in earth (Matth. 28:18), do not imply that He received this power then for the first time, but that the power which the Son of God had received from eternity began to be manifested in Him after He had become man, through His victory over death in His resurrection.

When the Apostle says in reference to the Son (Rom. 1:3), Who was made to him of the seed of David, the sense is clear from the words that follow, according to the flesh. For he did not say that the Son of God was made absolutely, but that He was made of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by taking human nature: even so it is said (Jo. 1:14): The Word was made flesh. Wherefore it is plain that the words that follow (verse 4), Who was predestinated the Son of God, refer to the Son in His human nature. Because it was not of human merits, but of the grace of God predestinating, that human nature was united to the Son of God, so that a man could be called the Son of God.

Likewise when the Apostle (Philip. 2:8) says that God exalted Christ on account of the merits of His Passion, we must refer this to His human nature, in which was the abasement of His Passion. Consequently the subsequent words, He gave him a name, which is above all other names, refer to the fact that the name appropriate to the Son from His eternal birth was to be manifested, in the faith of the multitude, as appropriate to the Son incarnate.

Wherefore again, it is evident that Peter’s statement that God made Jesus both Christ and Lord (Acts 2:36) must be referred to the human nature, wherein Christ began to have in course of time, that which He had from eternity in His divine nature.

Again, the passages invoked by Sabellius in support of the unity of the Godhead (Deut. 6:4), Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord, and, See ye that I alone am, and there is no other God besides me (ibid. 32:39), are not opposed to the view of the Catholic Faith, which declares that Father and Son are not two Gods, but one God, as we have said.

Likewise the words The Father, who abideth in me, he doth the works, and, I am in the Father, and the Father in me (Jo. 14:10), prove not unity of person, as Sabellius pretended, but of essence, which Arius denied. For if Father and Son were one person, it would not be right to say that the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, since, properly speaking, a supposit is not said to be in itself, but only by reason of its parts. Because, as the parts are in the whole, and that which is proper to the parts may be ascribed to the whole, sometimes a whole is spoken of as being in itself. But this manner of speaking does not apply to things appertaining to God, in whom there are no parts, as we have proved. Consequently, since the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, the Father and Son are not one in person: but it follows that they are one in nature. For this being once granted, it is quite evident how the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father. Because, as the Father is His own essence, since in God there is no distinction between the essence and the one who has the essence, as proved above, it follows that whoever has the essence of the Father, is the Father, and in like manner, that whoever has the essence of the Son, is the Son. Hence, as the essence of the Father is in the Son, and the essence of the Son is in the Father, since both have the same essence, as the Catholic Faith teaches, it clearly follows that the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father. Thus the same text refutes the errors of both Sabellius and Arius.

CHAPTER X

ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION AND PROCESSION

NOW that we have considered the whole question carefully, we see clearly that Holy Writ requires us to believe that the Father and Son, though distinct in Person, are nevertheless one God, having one essence or nature. Since however, it is far removed from the nature of creatures, that any two things should be distinct supposits and yet have but one essence, human reason, which takes its principles from the properties of creatures, encounters many difficulties in this mystery of the divine generation.

For, seeing that the generation which comes under our observation, is a kind of change, and that corruption is contrary thereto, seemingly there can scarcely be generation in God who is unchangeable, incorruptible, and eternal, as we have proved above.

Again. If generation is a change, then whatever is generated must be changeable. Now, that which is changed passes from potentiality to act, because movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such. Accordingly, if the Son of God is begotten, seemingly He is not eternal, for He would pass from potentiality to act: neither would He be God, because He would not be pure act, but something with an admixture of potentiality.

Further. That which is begotten receives its nature from the begetter. Therefore, if the Son is begotten of God the Father, it follows that He receives His nature from the Father. But it is impossible that He received from the Father a nature numerically distinct from the Father’s, yet specifically the same, as happens in univocal generations, for instance, when man begets man, or fire generates fire. For it has been shown above that there cannot be several Godheads in number. Seemingly also it is impossible that He received a nature numerically the same as the Father’s, since if He received a part thereof, it would follow that the divine nature is divisible; and if He received the whole, seemingly it would follow, if the divine nature were wholly transfused into the Son, that it would cease to be in the Father, who in begetting would therefore be corrupted. Nor could it be said that the divine nature overflows from the Father into the Son by way of superabundance, as the spring water flows into the stream, and yet the spring does not run dry, because the divine nature not only cannot be divided but also cannot increase. It would seem to follow therefore, that the Son received from the Father a nature neither numerically nor specifically the same as the Father’s, but altogether different in kind: as happens in equivocal generation—for instance, when animals begotten of putrid matter are engendered by the power of the sun, without attaining to the specific nature of the sun. It follows, then, that God’s Son is neither His true Son, since He has not His Father’s nature, nor true God, since He receives not the divine nature.

Besides. If the Son receives His nature from God the Father, we must distinguish in Him the receiver and the nature received: for nothing receives itself. Therefore the Son is not His own essence or nature: and consequently, He is not true God.

Moreover. If the Son of God is not distinct from the divine essence, since the divine essence is subsistent, as we have proved (meanwhile it is clear that the Father is the divine essence), it would seem to follow that Father and Son are identical with the same subsistent thing. Now a person is a subsistent intellectual nature. Therefore, if the Son is the divine nature, it follows that Father and Son are identical in person. On the other hand, if the Son is not the divine essence, He is not true God: for we have proved that God is the divine essence. Seemingly then, either the Son is not true God, as Arius stated, or He is not personally distinct from the Father, as Sabellius asserted.

Again. That which is the principle of individuality in A cannot be in B, if A and B are individually distinct from each other; since what is common to many things cannot be a principle of individuality. Now it is by His own essence that God is individualized: because it is not a form in matter, so that it could be individualized by matter. Consequently there is nothing in God the Father to individualize Him, except His essence. Therefore His essence cannot be in any other supposit. Either then it is not in the Son, and consequently the Son is not true God, as Arius asserts: or the Son is not personally distinct from the Father, and both are the same person, as Sabellius contends.

Further. If Father and Son are two supposits or persons, and nevertheless one in essence, there must be in them, besides the essence, something whereby they are mutually distinct: for the essence is stated to be common to both, and what is common cannot be a principle of distinction. Hence, that whereby Father and Son are distinct must be distinct from the divine essence. Consequently the Person of the Son is composed of two things, and likewise the Person of the Father, namely, the common essence and a principle of distinction. Both, therefore, are composites, and neither of them is true God.

Someone, however, might say that they are distinguished by sole relation, because one is the Father, and the other, the Son; and that relative predication seemingly implies, not some other thing in the subject, but only a relation; and consequently that we cannot conclude that there is composition in the divine persons. But this reply would seem insufficient to solve the above objection.

For there can be no relation without something absolute: because in every relative term there must be an absolute foundation besides the notion of relativity: thus a servant is something absolute besides his relationship to his master. Accordingly, the relation whereby Father and Son are mutually distinct, must be founded on something absolute. Either then this absolute something is one only, or there are two absolute things. If there is but one, it cannot be the foundation of a twofold relation, unless we except the relation of identity, which cannot cause a distinction: thus A is the same as A. If then the relation be such as to require distinction, we must presuppose a distinction of absolutes. Therefore it would seem impossible for the Persons of Father and Son to be distinguished by relations alone.

Moreover it must be admitted that the relation which distinguishes Father from Son is either real or merely logical. If it be real, it is not, seemingly, to be identified with the divine essence, since this is common to Father and Son. Consequently there will be something in the Son, that is not His essence, and so He will not be truly God; because we have proved that there is nothing in God besides His essence. On the other hand, if this relation be merely logical, it cannot effect a personal distinction between Son and Father, since distinction of persons implies a real distinction.

Again. Every relative depends on its correlative. But that which depends on another cannot be true God. Consequently, if the Persons of Father and Son are distinguished by their relations, neither will be true God.

Further. If the Father be God, and if the Son be God, it follows that God is predicated substantially of Father and Son, since the Godhead cannot be an accident. Now, a substantial predicate is truly that about which it is predicated: because, when I say: Man is an animal, the thing that is truly a man is an animal; so, too, when I say: Socrates is a man, that which is really Socrates is a man. Hence it would seem to follow that there cannot be plurality of subjects, since there is unity on the part of the substantial predicate: for Socrates and Plato are not one man, though they are one in point of human nature, nor are man and ass one animal, though they are one in animality. Therefore if Father and Son are two Persons, it is seemingly impossible that they be one God.

Moreover. Opposite predicates indicate plurality of the things about which they are predicated. Now, opposites are predicted of God the Father and God the Son; thus the Father is God unbegotten and begetting, whereas the Son is God begotten. Therefore seemingly, it is not possible that Father and Son be one God.

From these and similar arguments certain men, presuming to measure the mysteries of God by their own reasoning, endeavour to impugn the doctrine of divine generation. Since, however, truth is mighty in itself, and is not weakened by any assault, we must proceed to show that the truth of faith cannot be overthrown by reason.

CHAPTER XI

THE MEANING OF GENERATION IN GOD, AND OF THE SCRIPTURAL REFERENCES TO THE SON OF GOD

TO carry out this purpose we must begin by observing that where things differ in nature, we find different modes of emanation, and further, that from the higher nature things proceed in a more intimate way. Now, of all things the inanimate obtain the lowest place, and from them no emanation is possible except by the action of one on another: thus, fire is engendered from fire when an extraneous body is transformed by fire, and receives the quality and form of fire.

The next place to inanimate bodies belongs to plants, whence emanation proceeds from within, for as much as the plant's intrinsic humour is converted into seed, which being committed to the soil grows into a plant. Accordingly, here we find the first traces of life: since living things are those which move themselves to act, whereas those which can only move extraneous things are wholly lifeless. It is a sign of life in plants that something within them is the cause of a form. Yet the plant's life is imperfect because, although in it emanation proceeds from within, that which emanates comes forth by little and little, and in the end becomes altogether extraneous: thus the humour of a tree gradually comes forth from the tree and eventually becomes a blossom, and then takes the form of fruit distinct from the branch, though united thereto; and when the fruit is perfect it is altogether severed from the tree, and falling to the ground, produces by its seminal force another plant. Indeed if we consider the matter carefully we shall see that the first principle of this emanation is something extraneous: since the intrinsic humour of the tree is drawn through the roots from the soil whence the plant derives its nourishment.

There is yet above that of the plants a higher form of life, which is that of the sensitive soul, the proper emanation whereof, though beginning from without, terminates within. Also, the further the emanation proceeds, the more does it penetrate within: for the sensible object impresses a form on the external senses, whence it proceeds to the imagination and, further still, to the storehouse of the memory. Yet in every process of this kind of emanation, the beginning and the end are in different subjects: for no sensitive power reflects on itself. Wherefore this degree of life transcends that of plants in so much as it is more intimate; and yet it is not a perfect life, since the emanation is always from one thing to another. Wherefore the highest degree of life is that which is according to the intellect: for the intellect reflects on itself, and can understand itself. There are, however, various degrees in the intellectual life: because the human mind, though able to know itself, takes its first steps to knowledge from without: for it cannot understand apart from phantasms, as we have already made clear. Accordingly, intellectual life is more perfect in the angels whose intellect does not proceed from something extrinsic to acquire self-knowledge, but knows itself by itself. Yet their life does not reach the highest degree of perfection because, though the intelligible species is altogether within them, it is not their very substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the same thing, as we have already shown. Therefore, the highest perfection of life belongs to God, whose understanding is not distinct from His being, as we have proved. Wherefore the intelligible species in God must be the divine essence itself. By intelligible species I mean that which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is expressed by external speech. Wherefore the intelligible species is known as the inner word, that is signified by the outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the thing which we understand, is evident from the fact that to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding its intelligible species; and the intellect does this when it reflects on its action: for which reason sciences that treat of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas.

Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as understood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its act. Hence as in God to be is to understand, the intelligible species in Him is His act of understanding; and since in Him the act of understanding is the thing understood (for by understanding Himself He understands all other things, as we have proved), it follows that in God understanding Himself, understanding, the thing understood, and the intelligible species are all one and the same.

With these principles before our eyes, we can to some extent understand the meaning of generation in God. For it is clear that in God generation cannot possibly have the same meaning as in inanimate beings, where the generator impresses its likeness on extraneous matter. Because as our faith declares the Son begotten of God must have true Godhead and be true God: and the Godhead is not a form adhering to matter, nor is God a material being, as we have proved.

Again, generation in God cannot be of the same kind as that which we observe in plants; or again in animals, which in common with plants have the powers of nutrition and generation: because something that was in the plant or animal is severed so as to engender a being of like species and, when finally engendered, is wholly extraneous to the generator. But nothing can be severed from God, since He is indivisible; and the Son begotten of God is not extraneous to the Father who begets Him, but is in Him, as proved by the authorities quoted above. Nor again can the divine generation be taken to signify an emanation such as we find in the sensitive soul: for God does not receive from without the ability to cause an impression on another thing, since otherwise He would not be the first agent. Again, the operations of the sensitive soul are performed by means of bodily instruments; whereas God is manifestly incorporeal. Consequently generation in God must be understood to indicate an intellectual emanation. It behoves us to explain this as follows.

It is evident from what has been already proved that God understands Himself. Now every understood thing, as such, must be in the one who understands: because to understand means the apprehension of the object understood by the intellect: wherefore our intellect in understanding itself, remains within itself, not only as essentially one with itself, but as understanding the object of its apprehension. Therefore God must needs be within Himself as the understood object is in the one who understands. Now the understood object in the one who understands is the intelligible species and word. Accordingly, in God understanding Himself is God’s word, or God understood, even as in the intellect the idea of a stone is a stone understood. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:1): The Word was with God. But since the divine intellect does not pass from potentiality to act, but is always in act, as we proved above, it follows of necessity that God has always understood Himself. Now for the very reason that He understands Himself His Word must be in Him, as we have shown. Therefore God’s Word must have been in Him always: and consequently His Word is co-eternal with Him, and does not come to Him in course of time, as the word that we conceive within ourselves—namely, the intelligible species—comes into our intellect in course of time. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:1): In the beginning was the Word. And since the divine intellect is not only always in act, but is also pure act, as we have proved, it follows that the very substance of the divine intellect is its own understanding, or act of the intellect. Now the being of the word conceived within the mind, otherwise of the intelligible species, consists in its being understood. Therefore the same being is that of the divine Word and of the divine Intellect, and therefore of God Himself, since He is His own act of intelligence. Now God’s being is His essence or nature, which is God Himself, as we proved above. Therefore the Word of God is the divine Being and Essence, and God in very truth.

It is not so with the word of the human intellect. For when our intellect understands itself, the being of the intellect is not identified with its act of understanding; because the substance of the intellect was in potentiality to the act of understanding, ere it understood actually. Consequently the being of the intelligible species is distinct from the act of understanding, since its being consists in its being understood. Therefore in the man who understands himself, the inwardly conceived word is not a real man, having the natural being of a man, but is merely a man understood, that is, the likeness of a true man, apprehended by the intellect. Whereas the Word of God, for the very reason that it is God understood, is true God having by nature the divine being, because the natural being of God is not distinct from His act of understanding, as we have already stated. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:1): The Word was God: which shows, since the statement is absolute, that the Word of God signifies God in very truth. For man's word cannot be called a man simply and absolutely, but only with a qualification, namely a man understood. Hence this statement would be untrue, The word is a man, whereas this may be true, The word is a man understood. Accordingly when it is stated, The Word was God, this shows that the divine Word is not merely an intelligible species as our word is, but that it is indeed a real and subsistent being: because the true God is subsistent, since He is supremely per se being. Nevertheless the Godhead is not in the Word so as to be the same in species and distinct numerically; because the Word has the nature of God, in as much as God's understanding is His being, as we have said. Now understanding is the very being of God. Therefore the Word has the divine essence itself, identical not merely in species, but even in number. Again, a nature that is one specifically is not divided numerically save by reason of matter. But the divine nature is wholly immaterial. Wherefore it is impossible that the divine nature be one in species and be differentiated in number. Consequently the divine Word has the one identical nature in common with God: so that the Word of God, and God whose Word He is are not two Gods, but one God. That with us, two having human nature are two men, is because human nature is divided numerically in two subjects. Now it was shown above that things which in creatures are divided, in God are one simply: thus in creatures essence and existence are distinct; and in some, that which subsists in its essence is distinct from its essence or nature: for an individual man is neither his humanity nor his existence, whereas God is His essence and His existence.

And, though these two in God are one, yet whatever pertains to His subsistence, essence, or existence, is most truly in God: for it befits Him not to be in another, in as much as He is subsistent; to be a particular thing, in as much as He is an essence; and to be in act, by reason of His existence. Consequently as in God intelligent being, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species, which is His Word, are all one and the same thing, whatever pertains to the intelligent subject, or to the act of intelligence, or to the intelligible species or Word must be most truly in God. Now it belongs to the interior word or intelligible species, to proceed from the intelligent being through the latter's act of intelligence, since it is the term of its intellectual operation; for the intellect by understanding conceives and forms the understood species or idea which is the interior word. Therefore

God’s Word must needs proceed from Him by reason of His act of intelligence. Hence God’s Word stands in relation to God understanding, whose Word He is, as to Him from whom He proceeds; for such a relation is implied by the very nature of a word. Since then in God the intelligent subject, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species or word, are essentially one, and since for this reason each one of these must needs be God, it follows that there is only a distinction of relation between them, for as much as the Word is referred to the cause of His conception, as to the source whence He proceeds. Hence John the Evangelist, lest the phrase The Word was God should seem to remove any distinction whatsoever between the Word and God the speaker and conceiver of the Word, added (verse 2): The same was in the beginning with God, as though to say: “This same Word, whom I have stated to be God, is in some way distinct from God the speaker of the Word, and thus may be described as being with God.”

Now the inwardly conceived word is a kind of form and image of the thing understood: for when the likeness of a thing exists in something else, it is either an exemplar, if it is by way of being a principle; or else it is an image, if it be compared to the thing of which it is a likeness, as to its principle. We have an example of both cases in our own intellect: because in the mind of the craftsman there is the image of his handiwork. This image is the principle of the operation that produces the handiwork, and is compared to that handiwork as the exemplar to the exemplate. On the other hand the image which our mind conceives of a natural thing is compared to the thing of which it is an image as to its principle, because our act of intelligence takes its principle from the senses, which are impressed by natural things. Now since God understands both Himself and other things, as we have shown, His act of understanding is the principle of the things understood by Him, because they are caused by Him through His intellect and will: whereas to that intelligible being, which is Himself, He is compared as a thing to its principle: since this intelligible being is identical with the intellect understanding it, and the Word conceived is an emanation thereof. Consequently the Word of God is compared to other things understood by God as their exemplar, and to God Himself whose Word He is, as His image. Hence it is said of the. Word of God that He is the image of the invisible God (Coloss. 1:15).

There is however this difference between intellect and sense, that the latter apprehends the external accidents of things, such as colour, taste, quantity, and the like, whereas the former penetrates within: and since all knowledge is effected by reason of a likeness between knower and known, it follows that there must be in the senses a likeness of the accidents of the sensible object, and in the intellect a likeness of the essence of the object understood. Hence the word conceived in the intellect is the image or exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. And as the Word of God is the image of God, as we have shown, He must needs be God's image in respect of the essence. Wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 1:3) that he is the figure of his substance. Now the image of a thing is twofold. There is the image that has not the same nature as that which it represents; whether it represent it as to its external accidents—thus a bronze statue is the image of a man, yet it is not a man—or whether it represent it as to its substance, for the intellect's idea of a man is not a man, because the Philosopher says (3 De Anima, text. 38): Not a stone, but its image, is in the soul. But an image that has the same nature as the thing it represents, is like the king's son, in whom we see his father's image, and who has the same nature as his father. Now it has been shown that God's Word is the image of the Speaker in His very essence, and that He has the same nature in common with Him. Consequently God's Word is not only His image but also His Son: because it is not possible to be both the image of another and of the same nature as that other without being this other's son, so long as we speak of living beings: because that which proceeds from a living being in likeness of nature is said to be its son. Hence it is said (Ps. 2:7): The Lord hath said to me: Thou art my Son.

Since then the Word of God is called the Son of God, we must also observe, seeing that in every nature the procession of son from father is natural, that the Son of God is begotten of and proceeds from the Father naturally: and this is in keeping with what we have been saying, and may be understood from the operation of our own intellect. For our intellect knows certain things naturally, such as the first principles of matters intelligible, whereof the intelligible concepts, or interior words, exist therein and proceed therefrom naturally. There are also certain intelligible matters which our intellect does not know naturally, but comes to know by reasoning. The concepts of these things are not in our intellect naturally, and it has to make an effort to seek them. Now it is evident that God understands Himself naturally, even as He exists naturally: since His act of intelligence is His being, as we have proved. Hence the Word spoken by God understanding Himself, proceeds from Him naturally; and as the Word of God is of the same nature with God speaking and is His image it follows that the term of this natural procession is the image of that from which it proceeds in identity of nature. Now the essence of true generation in living things is that the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter as its image and with the same nature. Therefore God's Word is truly begotten of God's utterance; and His procession may be called a begetting or birth. Hence it is said (Ps. 2:7): This day have I begotten thee; that is to say, "in eternity," which is ever present, and contains no trace of past or future. It is therefore clear how false was the assertion of the Arians that the Father begot the Son by His will; because that which is done voluntarily is not natural. Since however what God understands of Himself is not less than what is in Him (else He would not understand Himself perfectly, nor would His being be His act of intelligence), the Word of God must needs be essential to God. Now this Word is the Son of God. Therefore the Son of God is essential to the Father.

This is also clear, because since the Son of God is His true Son, He has the species and nature of the Father. Now a certain quantity is due to every nature; wherefore here below a son is brought to equality with his father at the term of generation and growth, unless some defect occur through indisposition of matter and weakness of the active force in generation. That at first the son is born less than his father, is because animal generation passes from potentiality to act, and the animal is brought gradually from imperfection to perfection. Now none of these things can occur in the divine generation, because it is not a generation from matter, nor does it involve a process from potentiality to act, nor can there be a defect in the power of God generating, since His power is infinite. Hence the Son of God must be equal to the Father.

Again. If the Son be not equal to the Father, His greatness must be numerically distinct from the Father's: because the same identical quantity cannot be greater or less than itself. Now God's greatness is not distinct from His essence, as we made clear in the First Book. Consequently the essence of the Son will be numerically distinct from the Father's: and we have proved the contrary to be the case. We must therefore say that the Son is equal to the Father. Hence it is said (Jo. 5:18) that Jesus said God was his Father, making himself equal to God: and (Philip. 2:6) that He thought it not robbery to be equal to God.

We must also take note that the thing begotten, so long as it remains in the begetter, is said to be conceived. Now, God's Word is begotten of God in such wise that He does not depart from God but abides in Him, as stated above. Rightly therefore may God's Word be described as conceived of God. Hence the Wisdom of God says (Prov. 8:24): The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived.

There is however a difference between the conception of God's Word and the material conception which we observe in animals: because the offspring, during the period of conception and gestation, is as yet imperfect, and unable to subsist by itself apart from its begetter: wherefore when an animal's body is begotten, the conception of the offspring is distinct from its birth, when it is severed from its begetter by being brought forth from the womb. On the other hand, God's Word, abiding in God the Speaker, subsists perfectly in Himself, and distinct from God the Speaker: for no distinction of place is needed where, as stated above, there is only a distinction of relationship. Accordingly in the generation of the Word of God conception is the same as birth: wherefore after Wisdom had said: I was already conceived, the text, after a few words, continues (verse 25): Before the hills I was brought forth.

Yet because conception and birth in corporeal beings include movement and consequently some kind of succession—since the term of conception is the existence in the conceiver of that which has been conceived, and the term of birth, the separate existence of the offspring apart from the parent—it follows that in corporeal beings what is being conceived is not as yet, and that the offspring while in the womb is not distinct from the parent. On the other hand, when an intelligible word is conceived and brought forth, there is no movement or succession; hence it exists as soon as it is conceived, and it has a separate existence as soon as it is brought forth: thus the illuminated object is lit up as soon as there is light, since there is no succession in the diffusion of light. And if this is the case with our intelligible word, much more does it apply to the Word of God, not only because His conception and birth are in the intelligible order, but also because both are in eternity, where there can be no yesterday nor morrow. Hence after the words of Wisdom (Prov. 8:25): Before the hills I was brought forth, lest this might seem to imply that he did not exist until he was brought forth, the text continues (verse 27): When he prepared the heavens, I was present. Accordingly whereas in the carnal generation of animals there is first conception, then gestation and association without separate existence, of offspring with parent, in the divine generation all these things are simultaneous: since the Word of God is at once conceived, begotten, and present. And seeing that what is begotten is brought forth from the womb; even as the generation of God’s Word is called birth, in order to indicate His perfect distinction from His begetter, so in like manner it is called generation from the womb, according to Ps. 109:3, From the womb, before the day-star, have I begotten thee. Yet because the distinction between word and speaker is not such as to hinder the word from being in the speaker, as already stated, just as the Word is said to be begotten or brought forth from the womb, so as to indicate distinction, so is He said to be in the bosom of the Father (Jo. 1:18), to show that this distinction does not prevent the Word being in the speaker.

Now we must observe that the carnal generation of animals is effected by an active and a passive function: the father takes an active part, while the mother’s part is passive: so that the begetting of offspring belongs to the father as regards certain conditions, and to the mother as regards others. It belongs to the father to give his offspring its nature and species, while conception and gestation belong to the mother, whose part is passive and receptive. Accordingly since, as we have stated, the procession of the Word lies in the fact that God understands Himself (and God understands Himself, not by a passive power, but by an active power, so to speak, because the divine intellect is not in potentiality but in act only), it follows that in the generation of God’s Word, there is no place for a mother but only for a father. Consequently the parts which belong severally to father and mother in carnal generation, are all ascribed by Scripture to the Father in the generation of the Word: thus the Father is said to give life to the Son, and to conceive and beget Him.

CHAPTER XII

HOW THE SON OF GOD IS CALLED THE WISDOM OF GOD

SEEING that we have applied to the generation of the Word the things that are said of divine Wisdom, it remains to be shown how divine Wisdom, in whose person those things are said, may be taken to be the Word of God. And that we may obtain knowledge of things divine from human things, it behoves us to observe that in man wisdom is a habit perfecting our mind in the knowledge of the highest—namely divine—things. And when, through the habit of wisdom there arises in our intellect an idea of divine things, this very idea or inward word is wont to be called wisdom, by that figure of speech whereby acts and species are denominated from the habits from which they proceed: thus sometimes a just action is called justice, a brave action bravery, and a virtuous action is commonly called virtue: and in this way a man's wise conceptions are called wisdom. Now in God wisdom must be referred to the fact that He knows Himself. But since He knows Himself not by an intelligible species but by His essence—indeed His very act of intelligence is His essence—therefore God's wisdom cannot be a habit, but is the divine essence. Now it is evident from what has been said, that the Son of God is the Word and concept of God understanding Himself. Wherefore the Word of God is rightly called conceived or begotten Wisdom, as being the wise conception of the divine mind: hence the Apostle calls Christ the wisdom of God (1 Cor. 1:24). Now the word of wisdom conceived in the mind is a manifestation of the understander's wisdom, even as all our habits are revealed by their acts. Since then divine Wisdom is called light, because it consists in a pure act of knowledge (for the manifestation of light is its refulgence, which proceeds from it), the

Word of divine Wisdom is fittingly called the splendour of light, according to the words of the Apostle, who says of the Son (Heb. 1:3): Being the brightness of his glory. Hence the Son ascribed to Himself the manifestation of the Father, when He said (Jo. 17:5, 6): O Father … I have manifested thy name to men. Yet though the Son who is God’s Word is rightly called begotten Wisdom, the name Wisdom taken absolutely must needs be common to Father and Son, since the Wisdom that shines through the Word is the essence of the Father, as we have said above, and the Father’s essence is common to Him and the Son.

CHAPTER XIII

THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE SON IN GOD

SINCE God by understanding Himself understands all other things, as we proved in the First Book; and since He understands Himself in one simple glance, for His act of understanding is His being: it follows of necessity that there is only one Word of God. And as in God the generation of the Son is nothing else but the conception of the Word, it follows that there is but one generation in God, and but one Son begotten of the Father. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:14): We saw his glory, the glory, as it were, of the only-begotten of the Father, and again (verse 18): The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him to us.

It would seem however to follow from the foregoing that there is yet another word of the divine Word, and another son proceeding from the Son. For we proved that the Word of God is true God: consequently whatever belongs to God belongs to the Word of God. Now God of necessity understands Himself: therefore the Word of God also understands Himself. If then, because God understands Himself, there is in God the Word begotten of Him, it would seem to follow that we must ascribe to the Word also, yet another word, in as much as He understands Himself: and thus there will be a word of the Word, and a son of the Son. And this other Word, if it be God, will also understand Himself, and will have another Word, so that there will be an infinite process of divine generations.

This objection may be solved from what has already been said. For while we have proved that the Word of God is God, we have also shown that He is not another God distinct from the God whose Word He is, but is wholly one with Him, and distinct only as the Word proceeding from Him. Now as the Word is not another God, so neither is He another intellect, nor consequently has He another act of understanding. And yet it does not follow that the Word has His own word by reason of His understanding Himself: because, as stated above, the Word is distinct from the Speaker solely in that He proceeds from Him. Wherefore all other things must be ascribed in common to God who speaks—that is, the Father—and to the Word who is the Son, because the Word also is God. This alone is to be ascribed to the Father exclusively, that the Word proceeds from Him, and to the Son exclusively, that He proceeds from God speaking. Hence we gather that the Son is not impotent, though unable to beget a son, whereas the Father does beget a Son: because Father and Son have the same power, even as they have the same Godhead. And since in God generation is the intelligible conception of the Word, according as God understands Himself, it follows that in God the power of begetting is identical with His power of understanding Himself. And since in God the act of understanding Himself is one and simple, it follows that also His power of understanding Himself, which is identical with His act, is but one. By the same power therefore, both the Word is conceived, and the Speaker of the Word conceives; and consequently by the same power the Father begets and the Son is begotten. Therefore the Father has no power that the Son has not; yet the Father has the generative power for the purpose of begetting, but the Son for the purpose of being begotten: and these differ but relatively, as already explained.

Seeing however that the Apostle ascribes a word to the Son, whence it would seem to follow that the Son has a son, and that the Word has a word, we must inquire into the meaning of the Apostle when he makes this statement. For he says (Heb. 1:2, 3) that God in these days hath spoken to us by his Son, and afterwards: Who being the brightness of his glory and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power, etc. Now we must gather the meaning of this passage from what we have been saying. For we said that the concept of Wisdom, namely, the Word, is rightly called Wisdom. We may go yet further so as to see that even the external effect, which results from the concept of Wisdom, may itself be called wisdom: in the same way as an effect may assume the name of its cause. Thus we call it wisdom not only when a man thinks wisely, but also when he works wisely: and therefore the manifestation of divine wisdom in creatures is called the Wisdom of God, according to Ecclus. 1:9, 10, He created her—that is, Wisdom—in the Holy Ghost; and afterwards adds: and he poured her out upon all his works. Accordingly the effect of the Word receives the name of word: for even with us the vocal expression of the inward word is called a word, being as it were the word of a word, because it indicates the inward word. Wherefore not only is the concept of the divine intellect called the Word, which is the Son, but also the revelation of the divine concept in visible works is called the Word's word. In this way are we to understand that the Son upholds all things by the word of his power, as also the passage in Ps. 148:8, Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfil his word; because, to wit, the effects of the divine concept are accomplished in the world by created forces.

Now since God in understanding Himself, understands all other things, as stated above, it follows that the Word conceived in God through His understanding Himself, is the only word expressing all things. Yet He is not in the same way the Word of God, as of other things: because He is the Word of God as proceeding from God, whereas He is the word of other things, not as proceeding from them, because God does not acquire knowledge from things, but rather brings things into being by His knowledge, as we have proved above. Consequently the Word of God must needs be the perfect type of all the things that have been made. In what way He can be the proper type of each single thing is plain from our treatise in the First Book, where it was shown that God has proper knowledge of all things. Now whosoever makes a thing with intelligence, works by means of the idea which he has of that thing as made: thus the material house is made by the builder from the idea of a house that is in his mind. And we have shown above that God brings things into being, not by natural necessity, but as an intellectual and voluntary agent. Wherefore God made all things by His Word, who is the type of things made by Him. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:3): All things were made by him: also in accord with this, Moses in his account of the creation uses such expressions of each of the works as: God said: Be light made, and the light was made … and God said: Let there be a firmament (Gen. 1:3, 6), and so on. All this is expressed in the words of the Psalmist (Ps. 148:5): He spoke, and they were made. For to speak is to utter a word. Accordingly the statement that God spoke, and they were made means that He spoke the Word whereby He brought things into being, as by the perfect idea of them.

And since the same cause conserves and brings things into being, as all things were made by the Word, so are they conserved in being by God's Word: wherefore the Psalmist says (Ps. 32:6): By the word of the Lord the heavens were established, and the Apostle says that the Son upholds all things by the word of his power (Heb. 1:3): and we have already stated how this is to be understood.

There is however a difference to be noted between the Word of God and the idea in the mind of the craftsman. The Word of God is God subsistent, whereas the craftsman's idea of his handiwork is not a subsistent thing, but merely an intelligible form. Now a non-subsistent form is not, properly speaking, competent to act (since to act belongs to that which is perfect and subsistent), but is competent to be acted by, since it is a principle of action whereby the agents act. Hence the craftsman's idea of the house does not make the house, but the craftsman makes the house by it. On the other hand since God's word, who is the idea of things made by God, is subsistent, He acts and is not merely something acted by. Wherefore the Wisdom of God says (Prov. 8:30): I was with him forming all things, and our Lord said (Jo. 5:17): My Father worketh until now and I work.

It must also be observed that the thing made with the intelligence pre-exists in the mind even before it exists in itself: thus the house exists in the builder's mind before it is actually built. Now, the Word of God is the type of all things made by God, as we have proved. Therefore all things made by God must have pre-existed in the Word of God, before existing in their own nature. Now, the mode of existence of that which is in another follows the mode of that in which it is, and not its own mode: thus the house in the mind of the builder has an ideal and immaterial existence. Hence things must have pre-existed in the Word of God according to the mode of the Word. And the mode of the Word is that He is one, simple, immaterial; and not merely living, but life itself, since He is His own being. Consequently things made by God, pre-existed in the Word from eternity, in a mode wholly devoid of matter and composition, since in Him they were nothing else but the Word Himself who is life. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:3, 4): That which was made, was life in him, namely, in the Word. Now, as he who works by intelligence and the idea that is in him, brings things into being, so too the teacher, by the knowledge that is in him, produces knowledge in his disciple, for the disciple’s knowledge is drawn from the knowledge of his teacher, as a copy thereof. Now, God by His intelligence is the cause not only of all things that subsist in nature, but also of all intellectual knowledge, as proved above. It follows, therefore, that the Word of God, who is the idea of the divine intellect, must be the cause of all intellectual knowledge: hence it is said (Jo. 1:4): Life was the light of men, because like a light the Word, who is life, and in whom all things are life, reveals the truth to men. Nor is it the fault of the Word that all men attain not to the knowledge of the truth, but that some remain in the dark. This is due to the fault of men who are not converted to the Word, and are unable to comprehend Him fully: wherefore darkness remains in them, more or less, according as they are more or less converted to the Word and comprehend Him. Hence John, in order to remove all deficiency from the Word’s manifestive power, after saying that he is the light of men, adds that he shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it: because darkness is due, not to the light not shining, but to the fact that some do not comprehend the light of the Word: even so, when the material sun is shining throughout the world, there is no darkness, save to one whose eyes are shut or weak.

This, then, is what to some extent we are able to learn from Holy Writ, concerning the divine generation and power of the Only Begotten Son of God.

CHAPTER XIV

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DIVINE GENERATION

SINCE then truth excludes all error and banishes all doubt, it will be easy to solve the objections which seemed to raise difficulties in the matter of the divine generation.

For it is clear from what has been already established that in God we place an intelligible begetting, but not such as obtains in material things, the engendering of which is a kind of change and the antithesis of corruption. Because even the word of our intellect is conceived without change, nor is there a corruption that is antithetical to it: and we have already explained how the begetting of the Son of God is like to the conception of that same word. In like manner the word conceived in our mind does not pass from potentiality to act, except in so far as our intellect passes from potentiality to act; and yet the word is not begotten of our intellect, until the latter is in act, and once it is in act, the conceived word is there. But the divine intellect is never in potentiality, but only in act, as we have proved above. Therefore it begets the Word without passing from potentiality to act; just as one act gives rise to another; as, for example, light to brightness, and the intellect in act to the idea. Wherefore it is clear also that by being begotten the Son of God is none the less true God or eternal; rather in fact must He needs be coeternal with God whose Word He is, since the intellect in act is never without its word.

And because the Son of God is not begotten materially but intelligibly, it is foolish to doubt whether the Father gave Him His nature wholly or in part. For it is evident that if God understands Himself, the whole fulness of Him must be contained in the Word. And yet the substance given to the Son ceases not to be in the Father, for even with us the thing understood does not cease to have its proper nature, although the idea is the intelligible image of the very nature of the object understood. From the fact that the divine begetting is not material, it is clear that there is no need to distinguish in the Son of God the recipient and the nature received. In material generations it must be otherwise, inasmuch as the matter of the being begotten receives the form of the begetter. It is not so, however, with intelligible generations: because the word does not arise from the intellect in such a way that a part thereof be presupposed as receiving, while a part flows out of the intellect: but it originates entirely from the intellect, even as in us one word wholly arises from another, as a conclusion from principles. Now, when a thing in its entirety arises from another, it is impossible to indicate a recipient and a thing received, because all that arises issues from the source whence it arises. In like manner it is plain that the unity of the divine begetting is not destroyed, because there cannot be a distinction of several subsistent beings. For the divine essence, though subsistent, cannot be severed from the relation that we must needs ascribe to God for as much as the conceived Word of the divine mind proceeds from the divine utterance; because both the Word is the divine essence, as we have proved, and God who speaks the Word that proceeds from Him, is also the divine essence, nor are they distinct but identical. Moreover these relations are not accidents in God but subsistent; for nothing can be accidental to God, as we have proved above. Accordingly there are several subsistent beings, if we consider the relations; but one subsistent being if we consider the essence. Hence we say that there is one God, because there is one subsistent essence; and that there are three persons on account of the distinction between the subsistent relations. In human beings the distinction of persons regards not the specific essence, but certain things that are in addition to the specific nature; because in all human persons there is one specific nature, and yet there are many persons, since men are distinguished by things that are in addition to the nature. In God, therefore, we must not say that there is but one person by reason of the unity of the subsistent essence, but that there are several on account of the relations.

Hence it is clear that whatever is the principle of individuality in one is not necessarily in another: since neither is the divine essence in another God, nor paternity in the Son. And although two persons, namely Father and Son, are distinct not in essence but by relation, nevertheless this relation is not really distinct from the essence, seeing that relation in God cannot be an accident. Nor shall we find this impossible if we consider carefully our conclusions in the First Book, where we proved that in God are the perfections of all things, not by a kind of agglomeration, but by the unity of His simple essence. For the various perfections which in the creature are manifold in form, in God are one owing to the simplicity of His essence: thus man, as an animal, is by one form a living being, by another is wise, and by another, just: while all these things belong to God by His essence. Hence as wisdom and justice are accidents in man, whereas in God they are identified with the divine essence, so a relation such as paternity or sonship though an accident in man, in God is the divine essence.

Now we assert that God's wisdom is His essence, while our wisdom is something additional to the essence, not as though the divine wisdom falls short of ours, but because God's essence so transcends ours, that such things as wisdom and justice which in us are not essential to our being, belong to God perfectly by reason of His essence. Consequently whatever belongs to us in respect of our essence and wisdom as mutually distinct, must be ascribed to God in respect of His essence as identical: and the same applies to other matters. Accordingly, since the divine essence is identical with the relations of paternity or sonship, it follows that whatever belongs to paternity must belong to God, although paternity is in the essence. Now it is proper to paternity to be distinguished from sonship: because a father is related to his son as to some other man, and the notion of father is that he is the father of a son. Although then, God the Father is the divine essence, and so too is God the Son, He is distinct from the Son in so much as He is the Father, although He is one with Him, in so much as each is the divine essence. Whence also it is evident that though in God relation is not apart from something absolute, yet in God it is compared to the absolute otherwise than in creatures. Relation in creatures is compared to the absolute as accident to its subject; this is not so in God, in whom they are identical, even as in other things that are predicated of God. Now the same subject cannot have in itself contrary relations; for instance, a man cannot be both father and son in the same respect. The divine essence, however, on account of its absolute perfection, is identical with wisdom, justice, and other like things which in us belong to various species. And so nothing hinders the one essence being identical with both paternity and sonship, and Father and Son being one God, although the Father is not the Son: because it is the same essence that has being naturally, and its own intelligible Word.

From what has been said we may also conclude that relations in God are real and not merely logical. Because every relation which results from a thing's proper operation, power, quantity, or the like, exists in that thing really, otherwise it would be merely a logical relation. Take for example knowledge and the thing known. The relation of knowledge to the thing known results from the action of the knower, and not from any action of the thing known: because the object known is unchanged in itself when it is understood and when it is not understood. Consequently the relation is really in the knower, and only logically in the object known: because that which is understood is said to be known in relation to knowledge, as a consequence of the relation which knowledge bears to it. The same is to be observed in right and left hand: for in animals there are distinct functions from which arise the relations of right to left. Wherefore that relation is really in the animal; so that whichever way the animal turns, the relation always remains the same: for its right side can never be called its left side. On the other hand, inanimate beings which are devoid of such functions, have no such relationship really in them; the relationship of right and left is ascribed to them in reference to some animal; thus the same pillar is said to be now on the right, now on the left, according to the different positions of the animal. Now the relation of the Word to God speaking, whose Word He is, is in God, for as much as God understands Himself; and this operation is in God, or rather is God Himself, as we have proved. It follows, then, that the aforesaid relations are really and truly in God, and not only according to our way of thinking.

Although there is relationship in God, it does not follow that in God there is something having a dependent existence. In us relations have a dependent existence, because their being is distinct from that of substance, wherefore they have their own mode of existence in accordance with their own nature, as other accidents have. For since all accidents are forms superadded to a substance, and caused by the principles of that substance, it follows that their existence is something additional to the existence of the substance and dependent thereon. Moreover each one of them will derive its order of precedence according as, in its proper nature, it is nearer to the substance, or more perfect. Hence a relation that is really adventitious to a substance, in point of existence comes last and is most imperfect. It comes last, because it presupposes not only the existence of the substance, but also that of other accidents, by which the relation is caused: thus oneness in quantity causes equality, and oneness in quality causes likeness. It is also most imperfect, because the proper notion of a relation consists in a habitude to something else: so that its proper being, which it adds to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but also on the being of something extraneous. Now this cannot occur in God, because in Him there is no other being besides His substance: since all that is in God is substance. Accordingly, as in God the being of wisdom is not dependent on the substance, because it is the being of His substance, so the being of relation is dependent neither on His substance nor on something extraneous, because even the being of relation is the being of His substance. Therefore, the fact that there are relations in God does not argue the presence of dependent being in Him, but only of a certain habitude, wherein the essence of relationship consists: thus because we ascribe wisdom to God, it does not follow that this is something accidental in Him, but only that it is a perfection, corresponding to our notion of wisdom.

Hence it is also evident that, although created relations are found to involve imperfection, it does not follow that the divine Persons, who are distinguished by relations, are imperfect, but it follows that this distinction is the least of all.

From what has been said, it is also manifest that, although God is predicated of Father and Son substantially, it does not follow, if Father and Son are two persons, that they are two Gods: for they are two by reason of the distinction of subsistent relations, yet they are one God on account of the unity of the subsistent essence. But among men it is not the case that several are one man, because the essence of human nature is not numerically one in both, nor is the essence of human nature subsistent so that human nature be called man. Since then in God there is unity of essence and distinction of relations, it clearly follows that there is no reason why there should not be opposites in the one God, but only such as result from the distinction of relations: such as Begetter and Begotten, which are mutually opposed relatively; and Begotten and Unbegotten, which are mutually opposed as affirmation and negation. For wherever there is distinction, there must needs be opposition of affirmation and negation: since there is no distinction, where there is no difference of affirmation and negation: because in all respects one must be the same as the other, and thus they are absolutely the same, and in no way distinct.

We have now treated sufficiently of the divine generation.

CHAPTER XV

OF THE HOLY GHOST: THAT HE IS IN GOD

THE authority of Holy Writ not only reveals the existence in God of Father and Son, but also numbers the Holy Ghost with them. Thus our Lord says (Matth. 28:19): Going, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost: and John declares (1 Jo. 5:7): There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. Moreover, Holy Writ witnesses to a kind of procession of this same Holy Spirit: for it says (Jo. 15:26): When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of truth, who proceedeth from the Father, he shall give testimony of me.

CHAPTER XVI

REASONS FOR WHICH CERTAIN MEN HAVE DEEMED THE HOLY GHOST TO BE A CREATURE

SOME have deemed the Holy Ghost to be a creature, higher than other creatures: and they appealed to the authority of Scripture to confirm this assertion. For it is said (Amos 4:13) according to the Septuagint version: Behold he that formeth the mountains and createth the Spirit, and declareth his word to man. Again it is said (Zach. 12:1): Thus saith the Lord, who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man in him. Therefore it would seem that the Holy Spirit is a creature.

Again. Our Lord says, speaking of the Holy Ghost (Jo. 16:13): He shall not speak of himself: but what things soever he shall hear, he shall speak. Whence it would seem to follow that He never speaks on His own authority, but only in obedience to the commands of a master; for to speak what is heard seems to pertain to a minister. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is a creature subject to God.

Further. To be sent would seem to be the mark of an inferior: since authority is implied in one who sends. Now the Holy Ghost is sent by the Father and the Son: for our Lord said (Jo. 14:26): The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things: and (Jo. 15:26): When the Paraclete cometh, whom I will send you from the Father. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is less than both Father and Son.

Also. Where Holy Scripture associates the Son with the Father in things pertaining to the Godhead, it makes no mention of the Holy Ghost; as when our Lord says (Matth. 11:27): No one knoweth the Son, but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son, without mentioning the Holy Ghost. Again it is said (Jo. 17:3): This is eternal life: That they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent: and here again there is no mention of the Holy Ghost. Again, the Apostle says (Rom. 1:7): Grace to you, and peace from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ: and (1 Cor. 8:6): To us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we unto him: and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him: and here again nothing is said of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is not God.

Moreover. Whatsoever is in motion is a creature: for it was proved in the First Book that God is immovable. Now, Holy Scripture ascribes movement to the Holy Spirit: for it is said (Gen. 1:2): The spirit of God moved over the waters, and (Joel 2:28): I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh. Therefore, apparently, the Holy Ghost is a creature.

Further. Whatsoever can be increased or divided is changeable and created. Now this would seem to be ascribed to the Holy Ghost in the sacred writings. Thus the Lord said to Moses (Num. 11:16, 17): Gather unto me seventy men of the ancients of Israel … and I will take of thy spirit, and give to them. It is also stated that Eliseus besought Elias (4 Kings 2:9, 10): I beseech that in me may be thy double spirit, and Elias answered: If thou see me when I am taken from thee, thou shalt have what thou hast asked. Seemingly then, the Holy Ghost is subject to change, and is not God.

Again. There can be no sorrow in God, since it is a passion. But God is impassible. The Holy Ghost, however, is affected by sorrow; wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 4:30): Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God. It is also said (Isa. 63:10): They provoked to wrath and afflicted his Holy Spirit. Therefore, seemingly, the Holy Ghost is not God.

Besides. It is not fitting that God should pray, but rather that prayer should be addressed to him. Now prayer is becoming to the Holy Ghost, for it is said (Rom. 8:26): The Spirit himself asketh for us with unspeakable groanings. Therefore the Holy Ghost is, seemingly, not God.

Moreover. No one gives fittingly that over which he has no dominion. But God the Father gives the Holy Ghost, and so too does the Son: for our

Lord says (Lk. 11:13): Your Father in heaven will give the good Spirit to them that ask him: and Peter says that God gives the Holy Ghost to them that obey him (Acts 5:32). Wherefore it would seem that the Holy Ghost is not God.

Again. If the Holy Ghost be true God, He must needs have the divine nature: and so, since He proceeds from the Father (Jo. 15:26) it follows of necessity that He receives the divine nature from Him. Now, he that receives the nature of the one that produces him, is begotten by him: since it is proper to the one begotten to be brought forth in specific likeness to his principle. Therefore the Holy Ghost would be begotten, and consequently He would be the Son: and this is surely contrary to Faith.

Again. If the Holy Ghost receives the divine nature from the Father, and is not begotten, it follows that the divine nature is bestowed in two ways, namely by way of generation, as the Son proceeds, and by the way in which the Holy Ghost proceeds. Now, seemingly, it is inconsistent with unity of nature to be bestowed in two ways: as can be proved by a review of the various natures. Seeing then that the Holy Ghost does not receive the (divine) nature by way of generation, it must follow, apparently, that He does not receive it at all: and consequently that he is not God.

This was the opinion of Arius, who maintained that the Son and Holy Ghost are creatures: but that the Son is greater than the Holy Ghost, and that the Holy Ghost is subservient to the Son: even as he maintained that the Son is less than the Father. As regards his teaching about the Holy Ghost, he was followed by Macedonius, who rightly held the Father and Son to be of one and the same substance, but refused to believe this about the Holy Ghost, and contended that He is a creature. Hence by some the Macedonians are called Semi-arians, because they partly agree with the Arians, and partly disagree.

CHAPTER XVII

THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS TRUE GOD

IT can be clearly shown by the authority of Holy Writ that the Holy Ghost is God.

No temple is consecrated save to God alone: wherefore it is said (Ps. 10:5): The Lord is in his holy temple. Now, temples are dedicated to the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:19): Know you not that your members are temples of the Holy Ghost? Therefore the Holy Ghost is God. This argument is enhanced by the fact that our members, which the Apostle declares to be the temple of the Holy Ghost, are also the members of Christ. For he had already said (verse 15): Know you not that your bodies are the members of Christ? And it would be unfitting, since Christ is true God, as we have proved above, if Christ's members were the temple of the Holy Ghost, unless the Holy Ghost were God also.

Again. The service of latria is given by the saints to God alone: for it is said (Deut. 6:13): Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and thou shalt serve him only. Now the saints serve the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (Philip. 3:3): We are the circumcision, who serve the divine spirit: and although some codices read: Who serve in the spirit of the Lord, the Greek and older Latin codices have: Who serve the divine Spirit: also, from the Greek, it is plain that the text refers to service of latria, which is due to God alone. Therefore the Holy Ghost is true God, and the worship of latria is due to Him.

Further. The sanctification of man is a work belonging exclusively to God: for it is said (Levit. 22:9): I am the Lord who sanctify them. Now, it is the Holy Ghost who sanctifies: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:11): You are washed … you are sanctified … you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the spirit of our God; and (2 Thess. 2:12): For that God hath chosen you first fruits unto salvation, in sanctification of the Spirit, and faith of the truth. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. As the body derives natural life from the soul, so does the soul derive the righteous life from God: wherefore our Lord says (Jo. 6:58): As the living Father hath sent me, and I live by the Father; so he that eateth me, the same also shall live by me. Now, this latter life comes to us through the Holy Ghost: hence it is added (ibid. 64): It is the Spirit that quickeneth: and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:13): If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live. Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Also. In order to prove His divinity against the Jews, who could not bear that He should make Himself equal to God, our Lord claimed the power of raising the dead to life. Here are His words (Jo. 5:21): As the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom he will. Now the power of raising the dead to life belongs to the Holy Ghost: for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:2): If the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead, dwell in you; he that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Again. Creation is the work of God alone, as we have proved above. Now creation belongs to the Holy Ghost, for it is said (Ps. 103:30): Thou shalt send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created; and (Job 33:4): The Spirit of God made me. Also it is said of God (Ecclus. 1:9) that he created her, namely Wisdom, in the Holy Ghost. Therefore the nature of the Holy Ghost is divine.

Further. The Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10, 11): The Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God. Now, no creature is able to comprehend all the depths of God. This is manifest from the words of our Lord (Matth. 11:27): No one knoweth the Son but the Father: neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son. It is also said in the person of God (Isa. 24:16): My secret to myself. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not a creature.

Also. According to the foregoing comparison of the Apostle, the Holy Ghost is to God as the spirit of man is to man. Now man's spirit is within him, and is not of a different nature from him: but is a part of him. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not of a different nature from God.

Moreover. If we compare the above words of the Apostle with the words of the prophet Isaias, we shall see clearly that the Holy Ghost is God. For it is said (Isa. 64:4): The eye hath not seen, O God, besides thee, what things thou hast prepared for them that wait for thee. Now, the Apostle after quoting these words says, as quoted above, that the Spirit searcheth the deep things of God. Hence it is evident that the Holy Ghost knows those depths of God, which God has prepared for them that wait for Him. Wherefore, if none but God hath seen these things, as Isaias says, it is clear that the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is said (Isa. 6:8, 9): I heard the voice of the Lord, saying: Whom shall I send? and who shall go for us? And I said: Lo, here am I, send me. And he said: Go, and thou shalt say to this people: Hearing hear, and understand not. Now, Paul ascribes these words to the Holy Ghost: wherefore it is related that Paul said to the Jews (Acts 28:25, 26): Well did the Holy Ghost speak to our fathers by Isaias the prophet, saying: Go to this people and say to them: With the ear you shall hear, and you shall not understand. Therefore manifestly the Holy Ghost is God.

Further. It is clear from the Holy Scriptures that God spoke through the prophets: for it is declared by God Himself (Num. 12:6): If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream, i.e. by my Spirit. It is also said (Ps. 84:9): I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me. Now it is quite evident that it was the Holy Ghost who spoke through the prophets: for it is said (Acts 1:16): The scripture must needs be fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost spoke before by the mouth of David. Again our Lord (Matth. 22:43, 44) asked the Scribes why they said that Christ is the Son of David, since the latter said, inspired by the Holy Ghost: The Lord said to my Lord: Sit on my right hand. Again, it is said (2 Pet. 1:21): Prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost. Therefore it is clearly proved from Holy Writ that the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. Scripture declares that the revelation of mysteries is a work peculiar to God: thus it is said (Dan. 2:28): There is a God in heaven that revealeth mysteries. Now the revelation of mysteries is shown to be the work of the Holy Ghost: for it is said (1 Cor. 2:10): To us God hath revealed them by his Spirit; and (ibid. 14:2): The Spirit speaketh mysteries. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Further. To teach inwardly is a work proper to God: for it is said of God (Ps. 93:10): He that teacheth man knowledge: and (Dan. 2:21): He … giveth wisdom to the wise, and knowledge to them that have understanding. Now clearly this is the work of the Holy Ghost: for our Lord said (Jo. 14:26): The Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he will teach you all things. Therefore the Holy Ghost is of divine nature.

Moreover. Those that have the same operation must have the same nature. Now the Son and the Holy Ghost have the same nature. For the Apostle declares (2 Cor. 13:3) that Christ speaks in the saints: Do you seek a Proof of Christ that speaketh in me. And clearly this is also the work of the Holy Ghost: for it is said (Matth. 10:20): It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost have the same nature, and consequently the Father also: seeing that we have shown that the Father and Son have one nature.

Moreover. It is proper to God to dwell in the souls of the saints: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:16): You are the temple of the living God: as God saith: I will dwell in them. And the same Apostle ascribes this to the Holy Ghost: for he says (1 Cor. 3:16): Know you not that you are the temple of God; and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is proper to God to be everywhere: for he says (Jerem. 23:24): Do I not fill heaven and earth? And this also belongs to the Holy Ghost: for it is said (Wis. 1:7): The Spirit of the Lord hath filled the whole world: and (Ps. 138:7): Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I fly from thy face? and (ibid. 8): If I ascend into heaven thou art there, etc. Also, our Lord said to his disciples (Acts 1:8): You shall receive the power of the Holy Ghost coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses to me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is everywhere, since he dwells in men in every part of the world. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Further. The name of God is expressly given to the Holy Ghost in Holy Writ. Thus Peter says (Acts 5:3): Ananias, why hath Satan tempted thy heart, that thou shouldst lie to the Holy Ghost? and afterwards (verse 4): Thou hast not lied to men, but to God. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. It is said (1 Cor. 14:2): He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God: for no man heareth. Yet the Spirit speaketh mysteries. Hence we are given to understand that the Spirit spoke in those who spoke in divers tongues. And further on (verse 21) he says: In the law it is written: In other tongues and other lips I will speak to this people: and neither so will they hear me, saith the Lord. Therefore the Holy Ghost, who speaks mysteries in various lips and tongues, is God.

Again. The above text continues further on (verses 24, 25): If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all. The secrets of his heart are made manifest, and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed. Now, it is clear from what had been said previously, viz., that the Spirit speaketh mysteries, that the revelation of the secrets of the heart is the work of the Holy Ghost. And this is a sign proper to the Godhead: for it is said (Jerem. 17:9, 10): The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable, who can know it? I, the Lord, who search the heart, and Prove the reins. Wherefore, even an unbeliever is led by this sign to conclude that he who speaks these secrets of hearts, is God. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God.

Again. Further on the text continues (verses 32, 33): The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. For God is not the God of dissension, but of peace. Now, the graces of the prophets, indicated by the spirits of the prophets, are from the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost who distributes these graces so that they cause not dissension but peace, is shown to be God, from the words: He is the God, not of dissension, but of peace.

Moreover. It is the work of God alone, to adopt anyone as a son of God: for no spiritual creature is the son of God by nature, but only by the grace of adoption. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 4:4, 5) ascribes this work to the Son of God, who is true God: God sent his Son … that we might receive the adoption of sons. Now, the Holy Ghost is the cause of this adoption: for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:15): You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father). Therefore the Holy Ghost is not a creature, but is God.

Again. If the Holy Ghost be not God, He must be a creature. Now, it is plain that He is neither a corporeal nor a spiritual creature. For no creature is infused into a spiritual creature, since it is impossible to participate in a creature, and rather it is the creature that participates. Now the Holy Ghost is infused into the souls of the saints, so that they participate in Him as it were: for we read that Christ, and also the Apostles, were filled with the Holy Ghost. Therefore the Holy Ghost is God, and not a creature.

If, however, anyone say that the aforesaid works which are proper to God, are ascribed to the Holy Ghost, not as though they were exercised by him authoritatively, as God, but ministerially, as a creature, we reply that this is clearly shown to be untrue, from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:6): There are diversities of operations, but the same God, who worketh all in all: and afterwards having enumerated the various divine gifts, he continues (verse 11): All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will. In these words he clearly indicates that the Holy Ghost is God, both by ascribing to Him works which previously he had ascribed to God, and by stating that the Holy Ghost does those works according as He will. Therefore it is evident that the Holy Ghost is God.

CHAPTER XVIII

THAT THE HOLY GHOST IS A SUBSISTENT PERSON

SOME have denied that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person. Of these some have contended that He is the Godhead of Father and Son; an opinion ascribed to certain followers of Macedonius. Others maintained that He is merely some accidental perfection bestowed by God on our souls; for instance, wisdom, charity, or the like, in which we participate, as in any other created accidents. Against this view we must show that the Holy Ghost is nothing of the kind.

For, properly speaking, accidental forms have no operation; it is their subject that operates, according as he will: thus a wise man uses his wisdom when he chooses. Now, the Holy Ghost works according as He will, as we have shown. Therefore the Holy Ghost must not be reckoned an accidental perfection of the soul.

Again. The Scriptures teach us that the Holy Ghost is the cause of all the perfections of man’s soul. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is given to us: and (1 Cor. 12:8): To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit: and so on. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not to be reasoned a mere accidental perfection of the human soul, since He is Himself the cause of all such perfections.

The teaching of Holy Writ is also opposed to the contention that the name of the Holy Ghost signifies the essence of Father and Son, so that in consequence He would be personally distinct from neither. For it is stated that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jo. 15:6), and that He receives from the Son (Jo. 16:14): neither of which can be referred to the divine essence, seeing that the divine essence does not proceed from the Father, nor does it receive from the Son. Therefore we must infer that the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.

Again. Holy Writ clearly speaks of the Holy Ghost as of a subsistent divine person. Thus it is said (Acts 13:2): As they were ministering to the Lord, and fasting, the Holy Ghost said to them: Separate me Saul and Barnabas for the work whereunto I have taken them: and further on (verse 4): So they, being sent by the Holy Ghost, went. Again (Acts 15:28) the Apostles said: It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost, to lay no further burden upon you, etc. Now, these things would not be said of the Holy Ghost, were He not a subsistent person. Therefore the Holy Ghost is a subsistent person.

Moreover. Seeing that the Father and the Son are subsistent divine persons, the Holy Ghost would not be numbered together with them, unless He also were a subsistent divine person. Now He is clearly numbered together with them, when our Lord says to His disciples (Matth. 28:19): Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Again it is said (2 Cor. 13:13): The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the charity of God, and the communication of the Holy Ghost, be with you all: and (Jo. 5:7): There are three who give testimony in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost. These texts show clearly that He is not only a subsistent person, even as the Father and the Son, but also that He has the one same essence with them.

Someone might endeavour to evade the foregoing arguments by drawing a distinction between the Spirit of God and the Holy Spirit: since some of the above quotations speak of the Spirit of God, and some, of the Holy Ghost.

Nevertheless the identity of the Spirit of God with the Holy Spirit is clearly indicated by the words of the Apostle in his First Epistle to the Corinthians, where after saying: To us God hath revealed them by the Holy Spirit, in confirmation of this he adds: For the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God, and then concludes: So the things also that are of God, no man knoweth but the Spirit of God. Hence it clearly follows that the Holy Ghost and the Spirit of God are one and the same.

Again, this is clear from our Lord’s words (Matth. 10:20): It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh within you: in place of which Mark has (13:11): It is not you that speak, but the Holy Ghost. Hence it is clear that the Holy Ghost and the Spirit of God are one and the same.

Accordingly, since it is evident in many ways from the foregoing passages that the Holy Ghost is not a creature, but is true God, it follows that we must not conclude that when we speak of the Holy Ghost filling the souls of holy persons and dwelling therein, the sense is the same as when we describe the devil as filling and inhabiting certain persons. Thus we read of Judas (Jo. 13:27) that after the morsel, Satan entered into him. Again, Peter, according to some versions, said (Acts 5:3): Ananias, why hath Satan filled thy heart? For, since the devil is a creature, as we have seen above, he cannot fill a man as though a man could participate of the devil; nor can he dwell in a man’s soul participatively or substantially. But he is said to fill some men by the effect of his wickedness: wherefore Paul said to a certain man (Acts 13:10): O full of all guile, and of all deceit, child of the devil! Whereas the Holy Ghost, being God, dwells in the soul by His substance, and makes us good by participation of Him: for He is His own goodness, since He is God: which cannot be true of any creature. This, however, does not hinder Him from filling the souls of holy men by the effect of His power.

CHAPTER XIX

THE MEANING OF STATEMENTS THAT ARE MADE ABOUT THE HOLY GHOST

FOR as much as we are taught by the authority of Holy Scripture, we firmly hold that the Holy Ghost is true God, subsistent and personally distinct from the Father and the Son. We must now consider how this truth is to be understood in both respects, so that we may be able to defend it against the attacks of unbelievers.

For greater clearness, we must begin by observing that in every intellectual nature there is a will: because the intellect is actuated by an intelligible form, in as much as it actually understands: even as a natural thing acquires the actuality of natural being, by its own form. Now, a natural thing, by the form that perfects it in its species, has an inclination to its proper operations, and to the proper end to which it attains by its operation: since, such as a thing is, such is its operation, and such the end to which it tends. Hence from the intelligible form there results in the intelligent being an inclination to its proper operations and end. This inclination of the intellectual nature is the will, and is the principle of those operations that are in our power, and whereby the intellect operates for the sake of an end: because the end and the good are the object of the will. Consequently in every intelligent being there is a will.

Now, since several acts are seen to belong to the will, such as desire, delight, hate, and so forth, we find that the one principle and root of all is love. This may be explained as follows:—The will, as stated above, is in intellectual beings, what the natural inclination is in natural beings: and this inclination is known as the natural appetite. Now the natural inclination arises from the natural thing having through its form (which we have stated to be the principle of its inclination) an association with or aptitude for the thing to which it is moved; for instance, a heavy body in reference to a lower position. Wherefore this too is the source of every inclination of the will, for as much as by the intelligible form something is apprehended as suitable or attractive. Now, to be attracted towards a thing, as such, is to love it. Wherefore every inclination of the will, as well as of the sensitive appetite, has its origin in love. Thus through loving a thing, we desire it if it be absent, we rejoice in it when it is present; we grieve when we are parted from it; whatever parts us from the object loved is to us an object of hate and anger. Consequently that which is loved is not only in the intellect of the lover, but also in his will: yet not in the same way. For it is in his intellect by its specific likeness: whereas it is in his will, as the term of a movement is in its proportionate motive principle, by reason of the proportion and aptitude of the principle to that term. Thus, in a sense, the higher place is in the flame, because fire is volatile, and consequently is proportionate and apt for such a place: and the kindled fire is in the kindling fire by the likeness of its form.

Since, then, we have proved that there is a will in every intellectual nature, and since God is an intelligent being, as we have shown, it follows that there is a will in Him: not that His will is something over and above His essence, as neither is His intellect, as we have proved above: but that His will is His very substance: and seeing that God's intellect also is His very substance, it follows that in God intellect and will are one and the same. It has been sufficiently explained in the First Book how things that elsewhere are many are one in God.

And since we have proved that God's operation is His very essence, and that His will is His essence, it follows that in God will is not power or habit, but act. Now we have shown that every act of the will springs from love. Therefore there is love in God. Also since, as we proved in the First Book, the proper object of the divine will is the goodness of God, it follows that He Himself and His goodness are the first and principal object of His love. Now it has been shown that the beloved object must be, in a sense, in the lover's will. Therefore, since God loves Himself, it follows that God is in His own will as the object loved is in the lover. Now the beloved object is in the lover, in as much as it is loved, and love is an act of the will: and the act of God's will is His being. Therefore God's being by way of love in His will is not accidental being, as in us, but essential being. Consequently God considered as existing in His will is truly and substantially God.

Moreover, the fact that a thing is in the will as a beloved object in a lover, bears a certain relation to the idea conceived by the intellect, and to the thing itself the idea of which is called the word: because a thing would not be loved, were it not known in some way: nor is it the mere idea of the beloved object that is loved, but the object in as much as it is a good in itself. Hence the love, whereby God is in His own will as the beloved in the lover, must proceed both from the Word of God, and from God who utters the Word.

And seeing that we have proved that the object loved is not in the lover as to its specific likeness, as the object understood is in an intelligent being: and, since whatever proceeds from another as begotten, proceeds from its begetter as to its specific likeness: it follows that the procession of a thing to its being in a will as the beloved object in the lover is not by way of generation, while the procession of a thing to its being in an intellect is by way of generation, as we have shown above. Therefore God proceeding by way of love, does not proceed as begotten: and consequently cannot receive the name of Son. Since however the beloved object exists in the lover as inclining and, as it were, inwardly impelling the lover to the thing loved, and since the breath (spiritus) is a living being's impulse from within itself, it is becoming that God, proceeding by way of love, should receive the name of Spirit, because with God to breathe is to love. Hence the Apostle ascribes a certain impulse to spirit and love: thus he says (Rom. 8:14): Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God, and (2 Cor. 5:14): The charity of Christ presseth us. And as every intellectual movement is denominated from its term, and as the aforesaid love is that by which God Himself is loved, it is becoming that God, proceeding by way of love, be called the Holy Spirit: because things consecrated to God are wont to be called holy.

CHAPTER XX

OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED BY SCRIPTURE TO THE HOLY GHOST IN RESPECT OF ALL CREATURES

IN the light of what has already been said, we must now consider the effects ascribed by Scripture to the Holy Ghost.

We have already shown that God’s goodness is the reason for His willing other things to exist, and that by His will He brought things into being. Therefore the love whereby He loves His own goodness is the cause of things being created. Hence, as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics, certain philosophers of old said that the love of the gods was the cause of all things. Dionysius also says that God’s love did not allow him to be fruitless. Now we established in the foregoing chapter that the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love whereby God loves Himself. Hence the Holy Ghost is the cause of the creation: and this is indicated (Ps. 103:30): Send forth thy Spirit and they shall be created. Also, seeing that the Holy Ghost proceeds by way of love, and that love is an impelling and moving force, any movement that God causes in things is rightly appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Now the first change wrought by God in things is that whereby he produced the various species out of formless created matter. Wherefore Holy Scripture ascribes this work to the Holy Ghost: thus it is said (Gen. 1:2): The Spirit of God moved over the waters. For Augustine would have the waters to signify the primary matter over which the Spirit of the Lord is said to move, not as being in motion, but as the principle of movement.

Again. God’s government of the world is understood to be a kind of movement, forasmuch as God directs and moves all things to their respective ends. Accordingly if impulse and movement belong to the Holy Ghost as love, it is fitting that government and increase be ascribed to the Holy Ghost. Hence it is said (Job 33:4): The Spirit of God made me; and (Ps. 142:10): Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land. And, since to govern subjects is the proper function of a lord, it is fitting that lordship be ascribed to the Holy Ghost: thus the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:17): Now the Lord is a Spirit: and we say in the Creed: I believe in the Holy Ghost, Lord.

Again. Life is revealed especially in movement: for we say that a thing lives when it moves itself, and in a general way we ascribe life to all things that move themselves to action. If then impulse and movement are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as love, life also is fittingly ascribed to Him. Thus it is said (Jo. 6:64): It is the Spirit that quickeneth: and (Ezech. 37:6): I will give you Spirit and you shall live. Also, in the Creed we confess our belief in the Holy Ghost, the life-giver. This is in harmony with the name spirit: for an animal’s body lives by the vital spirit which is diffused throughout its members by the principle of life.

CHAPTER XXI

OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, AS REGARDS THE GIFTS BESTOWED BY GOD ON THE RATIONAL CREATURE

WITH regard to the effects wrought by God in the rational nature exclusively, it is to be observed that in whatsoever way we become like to a divine perfection, that particular perfection is said to be given to us. Thus God gives us wisdom, according as in any way we become like the divine wisdom. Hence, since the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love whereby God loves Himself, as we have shown; forasmuch as we become like this love, by loving God, the Holy Ghost is said to be given to us by God. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. It is however to be noted that things which we receive from God, must be referred to God as their efficient and exemplary cause. He is their efficient cause, in as much as an effect is produced in us by His operative power: and He is their exemplary cause, in as much as what we receive from Him, reflects Him in some way. Since then Father, Son, and Holy Ghost have one same power and one same essence, it follows that whatever God works in us, is wrought by Father, Son, and Holy Ghost together as its efficient cause. But the word of wisdom, whereby we know God, and which God implants in us, properly speaking, reflects the Son: and, in like manner, the love whereby we love God, properly reflects the Holy Ghost. Thus although the charity that is in us is the effect of Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost; in a special way it is said to be in us from the Holy Ghost. Now, the divine effects not only have their beginning in the divine operation, but also are upheld in their being thereby, as proved above. Again, nothing can work where it is not, because worker and work must needs be actually together, even as the mover and the thing moved. Hence, wherever we find a divine effect, God must be there as its efficient cause. Therefore, since charity whereby we love God, is in us from the Holy Ghost, it follows that the Holy Ghost is in us, so long as charity remains in us. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:16): Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you? Seeing then that by the Holy Ghost we are made lovers of God, and that every beloved object is in its lover as such, it follows that by the Holy Ghost, the Father and Son also dwell in us. Hence our Lord said (Jo. 14:23): We will come to him, that is to him that loves God, and will make our abode within him: and (1 Jo. 3:24): In this we know that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he hath given us.

Again. It is clear that God must love very much those whom He makes lovers of Himself by giving them the Holy Ghost: for He would not bestow so great a good except through love. Hence it is said in the Lord’s Person: I love them that love me (Prov. 8:17), not as though we had first loved God, but because he hath first loved us (1 Jo. 4:10). Now everything that is loved is in its lover. Consequently the effect of the Holy Ghost is that not only is God in us, but also that we are in God. Hence it is said (1 Jo. 4:16): He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him: and again (ibid. 13): In this we know that we abide in him, and he in us; because he hath given us of his Spirit.

Now, it is proper to friendship that a man reveals his secrets to his friend: because friendship unites their affections, and of two hearts makes one; and consequently when a man reveals something to his friend, he would seem not to have taken it out of his own heart. Hence our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. 15:15): I will not now call you servants … but I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of my Father, I have made known to you. Since then we are made the friends of God by the Holy Ghost, it is fittingly said that the divine mysteries are revealed to men by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9, 10): It is written: That eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love him: but to us God hath revealed them by his Spirit, etc.

Again, man’s speech is based on the things he knows: and therefore it is fitting that man should speak divine mysteries by the Holy Ghost, according to the texts (1 Cor. 14:2): By the Spirit he speaketh mysteries: and (Matth. 10:20): For it is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaketh in you. Also, it is said of the prophets (2 Pet. 1:21) that the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost. Hence the words about the Holy Ghost in the Creed: Who spoke by the prophets.

Now it is part of friendship not only that a man share his secrets with his friend, on account of the union of hearts, but the same union requires that he should share his belongings with him; because, since a man regards his friend as his other self, it follows that he will succour him as he would succour himself, by sharing his goods with him. Hence it is said to be a mark of friendship that a man in both will and deed should seek the good of his friend. Thus it is said (1 Jo. 3:17): He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him? This is especially true of God, whose will is efficacious in the production of its effect: and therefore all God’s gifts are fittingly stated to be given us by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: To one indeed, by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit, and after enumerating many others, the text continues: All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as he will.

Again, it is manifest that in order to reach the place of fire, a body needs to be assimilated to fire and become light so as to acquire the movement of fire: so too, man in order to reach the happy state of divine fruition, which belongs to God by nature, needs first to be assimilated to God by spiritual perfections, and then to perform works in accordance with those perfections, and thus at length to reach the aforesaid state of happiness. Now spiritual gifts are bestowed on us by the Holy Ghost, as we have shown: and thus by the Holy Ghost we are conformed to God; by Him we are enabled to perform good works; and by Him the way is prepared to heaven. These three are insinuated by the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:21, 22): God hath anointed us, and hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts: and (Eph. 1:13, 14): You were sealed with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance. This sealing apparently alludes to the likeness of conformity; the anointing, to man’s being enabled to perform works of perfection; and the pledge, to the hope which spurs us on to our heavenly inheritance, which is perfect bliss.

And, since a man adopts another as his son because he wishes him well, so that the latter becomes his heir, the adoption of the sons of God is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. 8:15: You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).

Now, if a man becomes another’s friend, by this very fact all offence is removed: since friendship is opposed to offence: hence it is said (Prov. 10:12): Charity covereth all sins. Wherefore as we are made the friends of God by the Holy Ghost, it follows that God forgives us our sins through Him: hence our Lord said to His disciples (Jo. 20:22, 23): Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and for this reason those who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost are denied forgiveness of their sins (Matth. 12:31), because they have not that through which man receives forgiveness. Hence too, we are said to be renewed, and cleansed or washed by the Holy Ghost: Send forth thy Spirit, and they shall be created: and thou shalt renew the face of the earth (Ps. 103:30), and: Be renewed in the Spirit of your mind (Eph. 4:23), and: If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Sion, and shall wash away the blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning (Isa. 4:4).

CHAPTER XXII

OF THE EFFECTS ASCRIBED TO THE HOLY GHOST, ACCORDING AS HE MOVES THE CREATURE TO GOD

NOW that we have considered the works of God in us which the Scriptures ascribe to the Holy Ghost, it remains for us to consider how the Holy Ghost moves us to God. In the first place mutual intercourse would seem to belong to friendship in a very special manner. Now, man’s intercourse with God consists in contemplating Him: thus the Apostle says (Philip, 3:20): Our conversation is in heaven. Since, then, the Holy Ghost makes us to be lovers of God, it follows that by Him we are made contemplators of God. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord.

It also belongs to friendship that a man delight in the presence of his friend, and rejoice in his words and deeds: also that he find in him consolation in all his troubles: hence it is especially to our friends that we have recourse for comfort in time of sorrow. Since then the Holy Ghost makes us to be friends of God, and causes Him to live in us, and us in Him, as we have proved, it follows that it is through the Holy Ghost that we rejoice in God, and are comforted in all the hardships and afflictions of the world. Hence it is said (Ps. 50:14): Restore unto me the joy of thy salvation, and strengthen me with thy perfect Spirit, and (Rom. 14:7): The Kingdom of God … is justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost, and (Acts 9:31): The church had peace … and was edified, walking in the fear of the Lord, and was filled with the consolation of the Holy Ghost. For this reason, our

Lord calls the Holy Ghost by the name of Paraclete or Consoler (Jo. 14:26): But the Paraclete, the Holy Ghost, etc.

It also belongs to friendship that a man consent to the things which his friend wills. Now God's will is made known to us in His commandments. Therefore it belongs to our love for God, that we fulfil His commandments, according to Jo. 14:15: If you love me, keep my commandments. Wherefore, as the Holy Ghost makes us lovers of God, it is He also who leads us to fulfil the commandments of God, according to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 8:14): Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

We must observe, however, that the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost, not as though they were slaves, but as being free. For, since to be free is to be cause of one's own actions, we are said to do freely what we do of ourselves. Now this is what we do willingly: and what we do unwillingly, we do, not freely but under compulsion. This compulsion may be absolute, when the cause is wholly extraneous, and the patient contributes nothing to the action, for instance, when a man is compelled to move by force: or it may be partly voluntary, as when a man is willing to do or suffer that which is less opposed to his will, in order to avoid that which is more opposed thereto. Now, the Holy Ghost inclines us to act, in such a way as to make us act willingly, inasmuch as He causes us to be lovers of God. Hence the sons of God are led by the Holy Ghost to act freely and for love, not slavishly and for fear: wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 8:15): You have not received the Spirit of bondage again in fear; but you have received the spirit of adoption of sons.

Now the will is directed to that which is truly good: so that when, either through passion or through an evil habit or disposition, a man turns away from what is truly good, he acts slavishly, in so far as he is led by something extraneous, if we consider the natural direction of the will; but if we consider the act of the will, as inclined towards a seeming good, he acts freely when he follows the passion or evil habit, but he acts slavishly if, while his will remains the same, he refrain from what he desires through fear of the law which forbids the fulfilment of his desire. Accordingly, when the Holy Ghost, by love inclines the will to the true good to which it is naturally directed, He removes both the servitude whereby a man, the slave of passion and sin, acts against the order of the will, and the servitude whereby a man acts against the inclination of his will, and in obedience to the law, as the slave and not the friend of the law. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:17): Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty, and (Gal. 5:18): If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law. For this reason the Holy Ghost is said to mortify the deeds of the flesh, in as much as the sufferings of the flesh do not turn us from the true good, to which the Holy Ghost leads us by love, according to Rom. 8:13: If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.

CHAPTER XXIII

SOLUTION OF THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE, AGAINST THE DIVINITY OF THE HOLY GHOST

IT remains for us to reply to the arguments given above, whereby it was contended that the Holy Ghost is not God, but a creature.

Here we must remark in the first place that the word spirit is apparently derived from the respiration of animals, which is a certain movement of the air by inhalation and exhalation. Hence the name spirit is given to any impulse or movement of an aerial body. Thus the wind is called a spirit (Ps. 148:8): Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy spirits, which fulfil his word. Thus too the subtle vapour diffused throughout the members of the body to facilitate movement is called spirit. Again, since air is invisible, the name spirit is applied also to any kind of motive power or invisible substance. Hence both the sensitive and the rational soul, as well as angels and God Himself, are called spirits: and in a special way God proceeding by way of love, because love implies a certain motive power. Thus when Amos says (4:13): He that createth the spirit, he refers to the wind, as our translation more clearly expresses it: and this is in keeping with the context: He that formeth the mountains. When Zacharias says of God (12:1) that he formeth the spirit of man, he is speaking of the human soul: wherefore we cannot conclude that the Holy Ghost is a creature.

In like manner the words of our Lord in reference to the Holy Ghost (Jo. 14:13), He shall not speak of himself: but what things soever he shall hear, he shall speak, do not prove that the Holy Ghost is a creature. For we have proved that the Holy Ghost is God proceeding from God: whence it follows that He receives His essence from another, even as we have shown in reference to the Son. Wherefore since, in God, knowledge, power and operation are the divine essence, all knowledge, power, and operation of the Son and Holy Ghost are from another; but in the Son they are from the Father alone, whereas in the Holy Ghost, they are from Father and Son. Since, then, one of the operations of the Holy Ghost is to speak in holy men, as we have shown, for this reason He is said not to speak of Himself, because He does not work of Himself. In Him, to hear is to receive knowledge, even as He receives His essence, from Father and Son. Thus we acquire knowledge by hearing: and Scripture is wont to speak of divine things after the manner of human. Nor need we stress the use of the future tense when he says: He shall hear, because, in the Holy Ghost, to receive is eternal: for verbs of any tense can apply to eternity, since eternity embraces all time.

For the same reason it is clear that the mission whereby the Holy Ghost is said to be sent by the Father and the Son, is no proof that He is a creature. For it has been said that the Son of God is said to be sent in as much as He appeared to men by taking visible flesh: so that He began to be in the world after a manner in which He was not there hitherto, that is to say visibly, whereas He was always there invisibly as God. Now, it was owing to the Father that the Son did this: wherefore in this respect He is said to have been sent by the Father. Now, the Holy Ghost also appeared visibly, both in the form of a dove over Christ at the Baptism, and under the form of fiery tongues over the Apostles. And, though He did not become a dove or fire, as the Son became man, nevertheless He appeared under these visible forms as signs of Himself. Hence He also was in the world in a new way, that is to say, visibly: and this was owing to the Father and Son; for which reason He is said to be sent by the Father and the Son: and this does not indicate subjection in Him, but procession.

There is also another way in which both the Son and Holy Ghost are said to be sent, but invisibly. For it is clear from what has been said that the Son proceeds from the Father, as the Father’s knowledge of Himself, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son, as God’s love for Himself. Hence, as we have already said, when by the Holy Ghost a man becomes a lover of God, the Holy Ghost dwells in Him; and thus is in man in a new way, namely by dwelling in him in respect of a new effect. That the Holy

Ghost produces this effect in a man is owing to the Father and the Son: and for this reason He is said to be sent invisibly by them. In like manner the Son is said to be sent invisibly into a man's mind, when through his knowledge of God, a man comes to love God. Wherefore it is clear that neither does this kind of mission in the Son imply subjection on the part of the Holy Ghost, but only procession from another.

Nor does it argue against the divinity of the Holy Ghost, that Father and Son are sometimes associated without mention of the Holy Ghost, as neither is it an argument against the divinity of the Son, that the Father is sometimes spoken of without mention being made of the Son. For thus Scripture insinuates tacitly that when anything pertaining to the Godhead is said of one of the Three, it is to be referred to all of them, because they are one God. Nor indeed can God the Father be understood apart from His Word and Love, nor vice versa; and for this reason, in any one of the Three, all Three are implied, so that sometimes the Son is mentioned alone, in reference to that which is common to the Three, for instance (Matth. 11:27): Neither doth anyone know the Father, but the Son: and yet both Father and Holy Ghost know the Father. In the same way it is said (1 Cor. 2:11) of the Holy Ghost: The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God: and yet it is certain that both Father and Son have this knowledge.

It is also evident that it cannot be proved that the Holy Ghost is a creature, from the fact that Holy Writ ascribes to Him things that savour of movement. Such things are to be taken metaphorically since Holy Writ sometimes ascribes movement to God: for instance (Gen. 3:8): When they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise; and (Gen. 18:21): I will go down and see whether they have done according to the cry. Hence, the words, The Spirit of the Lord moved over the water, must be taken as stated above, as when we say that the will inclines to its object, or that love pursues the beloved. Some however refer these words, not to the Holy Ghost, but to the air, the natural place of which is above the waters: wherefore to indicate the manifold changes of the air, it is said that it moved above the waters.—The words, I will pour out my spirit upon all flesh (Joel 2:28), must be taken as referring to the sending of the Holy Ghost by Father and Son, of which we have spoken above. The expression pour out indicates the abundant effect of the Holy Ghost, in that it will not confine itself to one person, but will reach many, from whom it will flow forth, as it were, on to others, as may be seen when corporeal things are poured forth.

In like manner the words (Num. 11:17), I will take of thy spirit, and will give to them refer, not to the essence or person of the Holy Ghost, since He is indivisible, but to His effects whereby He dwells in us, for they can increase and decrease in man. Yet the sense is not that the identical effect taken from one person is bestowed on another, but that the effect which is increased on the one hand is similar to that which is decreased on the other. Nor does this necessitate subtraction from one person, if another receive an addition, because a spiritual thing can be shared by several at once, without detriment to any one of them. Consequently it does not follow that Moses must have been deprived of any of his spiritual gifts, in order that they might be bestowed on others: this bestowal refers to the act or office, because the Holy Ghost accomplished through several persons, that which previously He had effected through Moses alone. Thus again Eliseus did not ask that the essence or person of the Holy Ghost might be doubled in him, but that he might receive the Holy Ghost’s twofold effect bestowed on Elias, namely prophecy and the working of miracles. Yet it is not unreasonable that one man should have a more abundant share of the Holy Ghost’s gifts than another, whether twice as much or in any other proportion of excess, since every man’s power is measurable and finite: but Eliseus would not have presumed to ask that he might surpass his master in a supernatural effect.

It is also plain that, as is customary in Holy Writ, human passions are ascribed to God metaphorically. Thus it is said (Ps. 105:40): The Lord was exceedingly angry with his people: for God is said to be angry, by reason of a likeness in the effect: because he punishes, and angry people do this: wherefore it is said (ibid. 41): And he delivered them into the hands of the nations. In the same way the Holy Ghost is said to grieve, on account of a likeness in the effect: because He abandons sinners, even as men who are grieved abandon those who grieve them.

It is also a usual mode of expression in Holy Writ, to ascribe to God that which God works in man, according to Gen. 22:12: Now I know that thou fearest God, that is, I have made thee know. In this sense it is said that the Holy Ghost asks, because He makes us ask: since He causes the love of

God in our hearts so that we desire to enjoy Him, and through desire, we ask.

Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love with which God loves Himself; and with the same love God loves Himself and other things for the sake of His own goodness; wherefore it is evident that the love with which God loves us pertains to the Holy Ghost: also the love with which we love God, since it is he who makes us lovers of God, as proved above. As regards both of these, it is fitting that the Holy Ghost be given to us. As to the love with which God loves us, it is in keeping with our usual mode of speaking, when we say that a man gives his love to another when he begins to love him. It is true indeed that God does not begin to love anyone in time, if we consider the divine will with which He loves us: but the effect of His love is caused in us in time, when He draws us to Himself. As to the love with which we love God, it is fitting, because the Holy Ghost causes this love in us. Hence in respect of this love He dwells in us, as we have shown, and thus we possess Him as one in whose wealth we share. And because it is owing to the Father and the Son, that the Holy Ghost dwells in us and is possessed by us, through the love which He causes in us, He is fittingly said to be given to us by the Father and the Son. Nor does this prove Him to be less than the Father and the Son, but that He proceedeth from them. He is also said to give Himself to us, in as much as the love, by which He dwells in us, is caused in us by Him as well as by the Father and the Son.

Now, though the Holy Ghost is true God, and has the true divine nature from Father and Son, it does not follow that He is a Son. For a man is a son because he is begotten; and consequently if one thing receive from another the latter’s nature, otherwise than by being begotten, the conditions of sonship would be lacking. Thus if by a power granted him by God, one man were to fashion another from some part of his body, or from some extraneous matter like a work of art, the result would not be called his son, since he would not be born of him. Now, the procession of the Holy Ghost does not satisfy the conditions of birth, as we have shown. Therefore, although the Holy Ghost derives the divine nature from Father and Son, He cannot be called their Son. And it is reasonable that in God alone can the divine nature be communicated in several ways: because in God alone is operation identified with being. Hence, since in Him, as in every intellectual nature, there is intelligence and will, it follows that what proceeds in Him by way of intelligence, as a word does, and by way of love and will, as love does, must have divine being, and must be God. Consequently both Son and Holy Ghost are true God.

We have said enough about the divinity of the Holy Ghost. Any other difficulties touching His procession must be considered in the light of what we have said about the nativity of the Son.

CHAPTER XXIV

THAT THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS FROM THE SON

NOW some are in error about the procession of the Holy Ghost, and hold that He does not proceed from the Son. Accordingly, we must show that the Holy Ghost does proceed from the Son.

It is evident from Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son: for it is said (Rom. 8:9): If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his. And, lest anyone say that the Spirit proceeding from the Father is distinct from the Spirit of the Son, it is plain from the words of the same Apostle that the same Holy Spirit is the Father's and the Son's. For the words quoted above, If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is not his, are preceded by these: If so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now, the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of Christ, merely because Christ possessed Him as man, according to Lk. 4:1: Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan; since it is said (Gal. 4:6): Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of his Son into your hearts, crying: Abba (Father). Accordingly, the Holy Ghost makes us to be sons of God in as much as He is the Spirit of the Son of God. Now, we become sons of God by adoption, through being conformed to Him who is Son of God by nature, according to Rom. 8:29: Whom he foreknew, he also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of his Son: that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Hence the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ in as much as He is the natural Son of God. But the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Spirit of Christ by reason of any other relationship, save that of origin, since this is the only distinction to be found in God. Therefore we must say that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ, in the sense that He proceeds from Him.

Again. The Holy Ghost is sent by the Son, according to Jo. 15:26: When the Paraclete shall come, whom I will send from the Father. Now, the sender has a certain authority in respect of the person sent. Hence we must say that the Son has a certain authority in respect of the Holy Ghost; not an authority of dominion or greatness, but only in point of origin. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.—But someone might say that the Son also is sent by the Holy Ghost, because our Lord declares that in Himself was fulfilled the saying of Isaias (Lk. 4:18): The Spirit of the Lord is upon me: … to preach the Gospel to the poor he hath sent me. To this we reply that the Son is sent by the Holy Ghost in respect of His human nature. Now, the Holy Ghost did not assume a created nature in such wise that in respect of that nature He could be said to be sent by the Son, or that the Son has authority in relation to Him. It follows therefore that with regard to the eternal Person, the Son has authority over the Holy Ghost.

Moreover. The Son says of the Holy Ghost (Jo. 16:14): He shall glorify me, because he shall receive of mine, and shall show it to you. Now, He cannot be said to receive what is the Son's, unless He receive from the Son—for example, if He be said to receive the divine essence (which is the Son's) from the Father. Hence the text continues: All things whatsoever the Father hath, are mine; therefore I said that he shall receive of mine. For if whatsoever the Father has, is the Son's, it follows that the Father's authority, in as much as He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, must be the Son's also. Consequently as the Holy Ghost receives from the Father of what is the Father's, so from the Son He receives of what is the Son's.

Besides, we can quote the authority of the Doctors of the Church, even of the Greeks. Thus Athanasius says (Symbol. Fid.): The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. Cyril also in his epistle received by the Council of Chalcedon says: He is called the Spirit of Truth, and is the Spirit of Truth: for he proceeds therefrom, as also from God the Father. And Didymus says (De Spir. Sancto): Neither is the Son distinct, save in those things which he receives from the Father, nor is the Holy Ghost of another substance, besides what is conceded, namely that He is from the Son and proceeds from Him. For this word procession, among all those that indicate origin, is the widest in its signification. Thus, in whatever way anything is from anything else, it is said to proceed therefrom: and since divine things are better expressed in general than in special terms, the word procession as denoting the origin of the divine Persons is to be specially noted. Hence, if it be granted that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, or flows from the Son, it follows that He proceeds from Him.

Again. We read in the decree of the Fifth Council: In all things we follow the teaching of the holy Fathers and Doctors of the Church, of Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril, Leo, Probus: and we subscribe to all that they taught concerning the true faith, and the condemnation of heresies. Now, it is clear from many of Augustine’s works, especially the Book on the Trinity and his Commentary on John, that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son. Therefore it must be granted that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

The same may be evidently proved by reason.

Apart from the distinction of matter, which can have no place in the divine Persons, there can be no distinction in things except by way of opposition: since things which are in no way distinct from one another can be together in the same subject, so that they cannot be a cause of distinction: thus white and triangular, albeit diverse, yet, because they are not opposed to each other, can be in the same subject. Now, according to the teaching of the Catholic Faith, we must grant a distinction between the Son and the Holy Ghost: otherwise there would not be three, but two Persons. Consequently, this distinction must result from some kind of opposition. But, it cannot be the opposition of affirmation and negation, since such is the distinction between being and non-being. Nor can it be the opposition of privation and habit, since such is the distinction between perfect and imperfect. Nor can it be the opposition of contrariety, since such is the distinction between things having different forms: for contrariety is difference of form, as the philosophers teach: and such a difference is incompatible in the divine Persons, in as much as they have one form, even as they have one essence: thus the Apostle speaking of the Son, says (Philip, 2:6): Who, being in the form of God, namely of the Father. It follows, therefore, that one divine Person is not distinct from another save by relative opposition: thus the Son is distinct from the Father in respect of the relative opposition between a father and his son. For there can be no other relative opposition in God, save that which is according to origin: since relative opposition is founded either on quantity, as double and half, or on action and passion, as master and servant, mover and moved, father and son.

Again, of those relatives that are founded on quantity, some are based on difference in quantity, as double and half, more and less; some on unity itself—e.g., same, which signifies one in substance, and equal, which signifies one in quantity, and like, which signifies one in quality.

Accordingly, the divine Persons cannot be distinguished by relations based on diversity of quantity, because this would destroy the equality of the three Persons; nor by relations based on unity; because such relations do not cause distinction; in fact they are more akin to conformity, although it may be that one or the other of them presupposes distinction. But in all the relations based on action and passion, one of them is always subject and unequal in power; except only in relations of origin, where no inferiority is indicated, because in their case something produces its like and equal in nature and power. Wherefore it follows that the divine Persons cannot be distinguished save by relative opposition of origin. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, He must proceed from Him: since it cannot be said that the Son proceeds from the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son, and is given by Him.

Again. Both Son and Holy Ghost proceed from the Father. Consequently the Father must be related to both Son and Holy Ghost as the principle is related to that which proceeds from it. Now He is related to the Son by reason of paternity, but not so to the Holy Ghost, since then the Holy Ghost would be His Son: for paternity is a relation to none but a son. Therefore there must be another relation in the Father, whereby He is related to the Holy Ghost; and this is called spiration. In like manner, since there is a relation in the Son, whereby He is related to the Father, and which is called filiation, there must also be in the Holy Ghost another relation whereby He is related to the Father, and which is called procession. Thus there are two relations corresponding to the origin of the Son from the Father, one in the Person who is the origin, and one in the Person originated, namely paternity and filiation; and again two relations corresponding to the origin of the Holy Ghost, namely spiration and procession. Hence paternity and spiration do not constitute two persons, but belong to the one Person of the Father, because they are not opposite to each other. Neither, therefore, would filiation and procession constitute two Persons, but would belong to one Person, unless they were opposed to one another. Now, no other opposition is possible, save that of origin. Therefore there must be opposition of origin between the Son and the Holy Ghost, so that the one proceeds from the other.

Further. Things that have something in common, if they be distinct from each other, must be distinguished by per se differences, and not by differences accidentally belonging to what they have in common. Thus man and horse agree in animal nature, and are differentiated, not by black and white which are accidental to animal, but by rational and irrational which belong to animal per se: because, since animal means that which has a soul (anima), it follows that it must be differentiated in the point of its having this or that kind of soul; for instance, rational or irrational. Now it is manifest that the Son and the Holy Ghost agree in the point of proceeding from another, since each is from the Father: and, accordingly, the Father is fittingly distinguished from both, in that he is innascible. If, then, the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, this must be by distinctions which divide per se the fact of being from another: and such distinctions must needs be of the same kind, that is distinctions of origin, so that one of them proceed from the other. It follows, therefore, that the Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son, in order to be distinct from Him.

Moreover. Someone might say that the Holy Ghost is distinct from the Son, not because He proceeds from Him, but on account of the difference in the origin of each from the Father: but this comes to the same. For if the Holy Ghost is other than the Son, their respective origins or processions must differ. Now, two origins cannot differ save as to term, principle, or subject: thus the origin of a horse differs from the origin of an ox as regards the term, for as much as these two origins terminate in specifically distinct natures. On the part of the principle—thus in the same animal species, there may be some animals engendered by the active force of the sun alone, while others are engendered by the same force co-operating with the active power of seed. On the part of the subject, the engendering of one horse differs from that of another, for as much as the specific nature is received into a different matter. Now, this distinction on the part of the subject cannot be ascribed to the divine Persons, since they are utterly devoid of matter. Again, on the part of the term, if one may use the expression, there can be no difference in the processions, because the Holy Ghost by proceeding, receives one and the same divine nature as the Son receives by being born. Consequently the distinction of their respective origins can only be on the part of the principle. Now, it is plain that the Father alone is the principle of the Son's origin. Therefore, if the Father alone be the principle of the procession of the Holy Ghost, the procession of the Holy Ghost will not be distinct from the generation of the Son, and so the Holy Ghost will not be distinct from the Son. Consequently, if there is a distinction of processions and of Persons proceeding, we must conclude that the Holy Ghost is not from the Father alone, but from the Father and the Son.

Again, someone might say that the processions differ as to the principle, in as much as the Father produces, the Son as the Word proceeding from His intellect; and the Holy Ghost, as the love proceeding from His will: and then we shall have to say that the two processions and the two proceeding Persons are distinct by reason of the difference between will and intellect in God the Father. But will and intellect are not really distinct in God the Father, but only logically, as we have proved. Consequently, there will only be a logical distinction between the two processions, and the two proceeding Persons. Now, things that differ only logically are predicated of one another: for it is true that God's will is His intellect and vice versa. Hence it will be true that the Holy Ghost is the Son, and vice versa: which is the impious statement of Sabellius. Therefore, to account for the distinction between the Holy Ghost and the Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by way of the intelligence, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will, unless we add that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Further. From the very fact that the Holy Ghost is said to proceed by way of the will, and the Son by way of the intellect, it follows that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son: because love proceeds from the word, since we cannot love a thing unless we first conceive it in the word of our hearts.

Again. If we consider the various species of things, we shall observe a certain order in them, in that living beings are above lifeless things, animals above plants, and man above other animals; and that there are various grades in each one of these, in respect of their various species. Hence Plato said that species are like numbers, which differ specifically by the addition or subtraction of unity. Consequently, in substances devoid of matter, there can be no distinction but by reason of order. Now, the divine Persons are immaterial, and in them there can be no order but that of origin. Therefore two Persons cannot proceed from one, unless one of them proceed from the other: and thus, the Holy Ghost must proceed from the Son.

Again. The Father and Son, as regards the unity of essence, do not differ save in that the one is the Father, and the other the Son. Whatsoever, therefore, is in addition to this, is common to Father and Son. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost is in addition to paternity and filiation: since the relation whereby the Father is father is distinct from that whereby He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, as stated above. Therefore it is common to Father and Son, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost.

Moreover. Whatsoever is not against the nature of a thing, can be ascribed to it, unless there be something accidental in the way. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Ghost is not incompatible in the Son, neither as God (since the Father, who is God, is the principle of the Holy Ghost), nor as Son (since the procession of the Holy Ghost differs from that of the Son): and to proceed from a principle by one kind of procession is not incompatible with being the principle of another's procession. Consequently, it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Ghost. Now, what is not impossible is possible: and in God, what is possible is not different from what is. Therefore the Son is the principle of the Holy Ghost.

CHAPTER XXV

ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO WOULD PROVE THAT THE HOLY GHOST PROCEEDS NOT FROM THE SON; AND THEIR SOLUTION

SOME men, in their obstinate opposition to the truth, adduce arguments to the contrary: but they scarcely deserve a reply. They say that when our Lord spoke of the procession of the Holy Ghost, He stated that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, and makes no mention of the Son, as when He says (Jo. 15:26): When the Paraclete shall come, whom I will send you from the Father, the Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father. Therefore, as we must not believe anything about God save what we are taught by the Scriptures, we must not say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Now this is utter nonsense. By reason of the unity of essence, whatsoever the Scripture says about one Person, must be understood to apply to another Person, even though an exclusive term be employed, unless it be incompatible with the latter Person's personal property. For, though it is said (Matth. 11:27): No one knoweth the Son, but the Father, neither the Son Himself, nor the Holy Ghost is excluded from knowledge of the Son. Hence, even were it said in the Gospel that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father alone, this would not imply that He does not proceed from the Son, since this is not incompatible with the Son's property, as we have proved. Nor need we wonder if our Lord said that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, without mentioning Himself, because He is wont to refer all things to the Father, from whom He has whatsoever He has. Thus He says (Jo. 7:16): My doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me; that is, the Father’s: and we find many such utterances of our Lord, stressing the Father’s authority as principle. And yet, in the passage quoted above, He does not wholly omit to say that He is the principle of the Holy Ghost, for He calls Him the Spirit of Truth, and He had previously called Himself the Truth.

They also object that in some Councils it was forbidden, under pain of anathema, to make any addition to the Creed approved by the Councils: and that in this Creed no mention is made of the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son. Wherefore they argue that the Latins who made this addition to the Creed are anathematised.

But this avails nothing: because it is stated in the decree of the Council of Chalcedon, that when the Fathers assembled at Constantinople confirmed the doctrine of the Council of Nicea, they did not imply that the previous Council contained less doctrine, but their object was to explain the mind of the Fathers by quoting the authority of Scripture against those who denied that the Holy Ghost is the Lord. In like manner we must say that the procession of the Holy Ghost is implicitly recognized in the Creed of Constantinople, in as much as it states that He proceeds: because what applies to the Father, applies also to the Son, as we have said above. Moreover the authority of the Roman Pontiff suffices to make this addition: by which authority the early Councils were confirmed.

They also argue that since the Holy Ghost is simple, He cannot proceed from two Persons; and that if He proceed from the Father perfectly, He does not proceed from the Son; and adduce many similar arguments, which can easily be solved even by those who are not far advanced in theology.

For the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, on account of the unity of the divine power, and by one productive act produce the Holy Ghost. Thus too the three Persons are one principle of the creature, and create by one action.

CHAPTER XXVI

THAT THERE ARE NO MORE THAN THREE PERSONS IN GOD, NAMELY, THE FATHER, THE SON, AND THE HOLY GHOST

WE gather from what has been said in the preceding chapters that in the divine nature there subsist three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; and that these three are one God, being distinct in relations alone. The Father is distinct from the Son by the relation of paternity, and by innascibility: the Son from the Father, by the relation of sonship: the Father and the Son from the Holy Ghost by spiration, as it may be called: and the Holy Ghost from Father and Son, by the procession of love, whereby He proceeds from both.

Besides these three Persons there is no fourth in the divine nature.

Since the divine Persons agree in essence, they cannot be distinct save by relations of origin, as we have already made clear. Now these relations of origin do not arise from a procession tending to external things (for thus the thing that proceeds is not of the same essence as its principle), but from a procession that remains within. And it is only in the working of the intellect and will that a thing is found to proceed so as to remain within its principle, as we have explained. Wherefore the divine Persons cannot be multiplied except in so far as this is necessitated by the processions of intellect and will in God. Now in God there can be only one procession according to the intellect, because His act of intelligence is one, simple and perfect; since in understanding Himself, He understands all things else, so that in God there can be but one procession of the Word. In like manner there can be but one procession of love, since the divine volition is one and simple: because in loving Himself, He loves all other things. Consequently in God there can be no more than two proceeding Persons: one by way of intelligence, as word, namely the Son; the other by way of love, namely the Holy Ghost. There is also one Person who does not proceed, namely the Father. Therefore there are but three Persons in the Trinity.

Again. The Persons are distinguished according to procession. Now in respect of procession, there are but three modes possible in a Person: either He proceeds not at all, like the Father; or, as the Son, He proceeds from one that does not proceed; or, like the Holy Ghost, He proceeds from one who proceeds. Therefore there cannot be more than three Persons. And although, in other living beings, relations of origin can be multiplied—thus in human nature there can be many fathers, and many sons—in the divine nature this is quite impossible. For since in one nature filiation is of one species, it cannot be multiplied except in respect of its matter or subject, as in the case of other forms. Hence, as in God there is no matter or subject, and as the very relations are subsistent, as we have proved, there cannot be several filiations in God. The same applies to the other relations: and thus in God there are but three Persons.

Someone may object that since the Son is perfect God, He has perfect intellectual power, and consequently He can produce a Word; and in like manner, as there is infinite goodness in the Holy Ghost, whereby He is the principle of the communication of goodness, He will be able to bestow the divine nature on another.

To this we reply that the Son is God, as begotten, and not as begetting: wherefore the intellectual power is in Him as in one proceeding by way of word, and not as in the one producing the word: and, in like manner, since the Holy Ghost is God as proceeding, infinite goodness is in Him as the recipient, and not as communicating the infinite goodness to another. For they are not distinguished from one another except by the relations alone, as we have shown. Hence the whole fulness of the Godhead is in the Son, identically the same as that which is in the Father; but in the Son it is with the relation of birth; in the Father, with the relation of active generation: so that were the Father’s relation ascribed to the Son, there would no longer be any distinction between them: and the same applies to the Holy Ghost.

We may now consider the likeness to the divine Trinity in the human mind. The mind, by actually understanding itself, produces its word within itself: this word is the intelligible reflection of the mind, and is called the idea, existing in the soul: and when it loves itself, it reproduces itself in the will as loved. Further than this it does not proceed within itself, but completes the circle, when by love it returns to the very substance whence the procession began in the idea: there is however a procession towards external effects, when through love of self one proceeds to action. Thus there are three things in the mind; the mind itself in its natural existence, which is the starting-point of the procession; in the intellect, the conception of the mind; and in the will, the mind loved. Yet these three are not one nature, since the mind's act of intelligence is not its being; and its volition is neither its being nor its act of intelligence. For this reason the mind understood and the mind loved are not persons, since they are not subsistent: nor is the mind, in its natural existence, a person, for it is not the whole subsistence, but only part of the subsistence, that is to say, of man. Accordingly, in our mind there is a likeness to the divine Trinity, as regards the processions which multiply the Persons. For we have sufficiently shown that in the divine nature there is God unbegotten, namely the Father, who is the principle of the whole divine procession: God begotten, as the word is conceived in the intellect, and this is the Son: and God proceeding as love, namely, the Holy Ghost. There are no further processions within the divine nature, but only those that terminate in external effects. This likeness, then, falls short of being a representation of the divine Trinity, in that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are of one nature, and each of them is a perfect Person, since God's very being is intelligence and will, as we have shown. Hence the divine likeness is reproduced in man, as the likeness of Hercules is reproduced in stone, in respect of the form represented, but not by community of nature: wherefore God's image is stated to be in the human mind (Gen. 1:26): Let us make man to our own image and likeness.

In other things also there is a likeness to the Trinity, inasmuch as each thing is one in its substance, informed by a certain species, and has a certain order. Now, as we have already clearly stated, the intellectual concept in intelligible being is like the information of the species in natural being: and love is like the inclination or order of a natural thing. Hence in natural things species represents the Son remotely, and order represents the Holy Ghost. Hence, on account of the likeness in irrational things being remote and obscure, we say that there is in them a trace but not an image of the

Trinity, according to Job 11:7: Peradventure thou wilt understand the steps of God, and wilt find out the Almighty perfectly.

We have now said enough about the Trinity.

CHAPTER XXVII

OF THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD, AS HANDED DOWN IN HOLY SCRIPTURE

IN speaking of the divine generation we observed that certain things are befitting the Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, in respect of His divine nature, and others in respect of His human nature, by taking which in time the eternal Son of God wished to become incarnate. Wherefore we must now proceed to treat of the mystery of the Incarnation. Of all the divine works this surpasses reason more than any: since one cannot imagine God doing anything more wonderful, than that God the Son, true God, should become true man. And because it is the most wonderful of all, it follows that all other wonders are directed to faith in this the greatest of all wonders: since in every genus, what is greatest is the cause of the rest.

Our faith in the Incarnation is based on divine authority. For it is said (Jo. 1:14): And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt amongst us: and speaking of the Son of God, the Apostle says (Philip. 2:6, 7): Who, when he was in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. The same is clearly indicated by the words of our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, since at times He ascribes to Himself lowly and human things that belong to Him in His assumed human nature, for instance, The Father is greater than I (Jo. 14:28), My soul is sorrowful unto death (Matth. 26:38): while sometimes He says of Himself sublime and divine things, such as certainly belong to Him in His divine nature: for instance, I and the Father are one (Jo. 10:30), and, All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine (Jo. 16:15).

The same is shown by the very things He is related to have done. That He feared, grieved, hungered, died, are things pertaining to His human nature: that by His own power He healed the sick, raised the dead, commanded the obedience of the earth's elements, that He cast out devils, forgave sins, raised Himself from the dead when He willed, that at last He ascended into heaven—all these things point to a divine power in Him.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE ERROR OF PHOTINUS ABOUT THE INCARNATION

SOME, through abuse of the words of the Scriptures, have conceived false notions about the divine and human natures of our Lord Jesus Christ.

For instance Ebion and Cerinthus and, after them, Paul of Samosata and Photinus, said that Christ was a mere man: and they ascribed divinity to Him not as though He were God by nature but because by His deeds He had merited to surpass others in His share of divine glory, as we stated above. Now this view, in addition to what we have already said about it, destroys the mystery of the Incarnation.

In this view, God would not have taken flesh, and become man: but fleshly man would have become God: and consequently there would have been no truth in the sentence of John (1:14): The Word was made flesh, but rather should he have said that Flesh was made the Word. In like manner the Son of God would not have come down and emptied Himself, but man would have been raised and glorified, so that the Apostle could not say truly, Who, when he was in the form of God … emptied himself, taking the form of a slave (Philip. 2:6, 7): and it would have been only the man that was raised to divine glory; of which it is said (verse 9): For which cause God also hath exalted him.

Nor would our Lord’s words be true (Jo. 6:38), I came down from heaven, but only His words (Jo. 20:17), I ascend to my Father: and yet Scripture unites these two statements (Jo. 3:13) where our Lord says: No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, who is in heaven: and (Eph. 4:10): He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens. Again, in this case, it could not be said that the Son was sent by the Father, nor that He came out from the Father, in order to come into the world, but only that He went to the Father: and yet He unites both together (Jo. 16:5): I go to him that sent me: and (ibid. 28): I came out from the Father, and came into the world: again I leave the world, and go to the Father; and both of these bear witness to the human and divine natures.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE ERROR OF THE MANICHEANS CONCERNING THE INCARNATION

OTHERS there were who denied the true doctrine of the Incarnation, and invented a fictitious imitation of it. The Manicheans, in fact, said that the Son of God assumed not a real but an imaginary body: so that He could not be a real man, but only seemed to be one. They pretended that whatever He did as man—for instance, that He was born, that He ate, drank, walked, suffered, and was buried—was all unreal, though having some semblance of reality. Consequently they reduced the whole mystery of the Incarnation to a work of fiction. Now in the first place this view entirely sets at nought the authority of Scripture. For since the likeness of flesh is not flesh, and the likeness of walking is not walking, and so on; the Scripture lies when it says, the Word was made flesh, if it were but imaginary flesh: it lies again when it says that Jesus walked, ate, died, and was buried, if these things happened to a mere imaginary apparition. Now, if the authority of Scripture be allowed to suffer in the slightest degree, our faith loses all its stability, for it is based on Holy Writ, according to Jo. 20:31, These things are written that you may believe.

Someone, however, might say that Holy Scripture is not lacking in truth, if it records apparitions as though they were real facts: because the likenesses of things are equivocally and metaphorically called by the names of the things themselves; thus the picture of a man is called a man: and Holy Writ is wont to speak in this way, for instance (1 Cor. 10:4): The Rock was Christ. Thus in Scripture many corporeal terms are applied to God for no other reason but likeness: for instance, He is called a lamb, a lion, and so forth.

Yet, though it be true that the likenesses of things are sometimes called by the names of the things they represent: it is not becoming for Holy Scripture to relate an entire incident with such a double meaning, unless one were able to elucidate the truth from other passages of Scripture: because this would lead men, not to knowledge, but to deception: and yet the Apostle says (Rom. 15:4) that whatsoever things were written, were written for our learning, and (2 Tim. 3:16): All scripture, inspired of God, is profitable to teach … and to instruct. Moreover the whole Gospel story would be a poem and a fable, if imaginary things were portrayed as being real: whereas it is said (2 Pet. 1:16): We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known to you the power … of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Moreover, whenever Scripture relates apparitions and not realities, this is quite clear from the manner of the narrative. Thus it is said (Gen. 18:2): And when he (that is, Abraham) had lifted up his eyes, there appeared to him three men: whereby we are given to understand that they were men in appearance only. Hence he adored God among them, and witnessed to his Godhead, saying (verse 27): I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes; and again (verse 25): Thou who judgest all the earth, wilt not make this judgment. When Isaias, Ezechiel, and other prophets describe their visions, we are not led into error, because such things are set down, not as an historical narrative, but as descriptive of the prophecy; moreover they always use some expression to indicate an apparition: for instance (Isa. 6:1), I saw the Lord sitting upon a high throne, (Ezech. 1:3, 4), The hand of the Lord was there upon him: and I saw, and behold a whirlwind came out of the north, etc., and (ibid. 8:3), The likeness of a hand was put forth, and took me … and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem.

Again, we ought not to be led into error, if Scripture uses metaphors in speaking of divine things. In the first place, these metaphors are taken from things of so little account, that it is clear that the statements are to be taken metaphorically and not literally. Secondly, what is hidden inside metaphors in one part of Scripture, is stated elsewhere in Scripture in proper terms, which express the truth clearly. Now this does not apply to the case in point: because Scripture nowhere affords authority for denying the reality of what it relates of Christ’s human nature.

Yet it might be said that Scripture does this implicitly when the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3): God, sending his own son in the likeness of sinful flesh, or when he says (Philip. 2:7): Being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man. But such an interpretation is forbidden by the context. For he does not say simply: In the likeness of flesh, but of sinful flesh, because Christ had real flesh—not sinful flesh, since there was no sin in Him, but like sinful flesh, since He had passible flesh, and such as man's flesh had become through sin. In like manner, a fictional interpretation of the words, being made in the likeness of men is excluded by the addition of the words, taking the form of a servant: because it is clear that form here means nature and not semblance, since the Apostle had said, Who, being in the form of God; for it is not suggested that Christ was a semblance of God. The fictional sense is also excluded by the subsequent words, Becoming obedient unto death. Therefore likeness here does not indicate the likeness of simulation, but true likeness of species, just as all men are said to be like in species.

Still more emphatically does Holy Scripture exclude any suspicion of a ghostly apparition. For it is related (Matth. 14:26) that the disciples, seeing Jesus walking upon the sea, were troubled, saying: It is an apparition; and they cried out for fear. Our Lord took the right way to undeceive them; for thus the narrative continues: And immediately Jesus spoke to them saying: Be of good heart, it is I, fear not. Yet it hardly seems reasonable to suppose that the disciples would be unaware of it, if He had assumed only an imaginary body, seeing that He had chosen them that they might bear witness to the truth from what they saw and heard; and, if they were aware of it; then the thought that it was an apparition should not have made them afraid.

And still more did our Lord, after His resurrection, remove from the minds of His disciples any doubt of the reality of His body. Thus (Lk. 24:37–39) it is related that the disciples being troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit, when they saw Jesus: and He said to them: Why are you troubled, and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? See my hands and feet, that it is I myself. Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have. For it would have been useless to tell them to feel, if He had but an imaginary body.

Again. The apostles show themselves to be suitable witnesses of Christ. Thus Peter says (Acts 10:40, 41): Him, that is, Jesus, God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with Him after He arose again from the dead: and the Apostle John says at the beginning of his epistle (1 Jo. 1:1, 2): To that which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the word of life … we bear witness. Now it is impossible for a valid witness of the truth to be afforded by things that happen not really but only in appearance. Consequently, if Christ's body was but imaginary, if He did not really eat and drink, if He was not really seen and handled, but only in imagination, it follows that the apostles' witnessing of Christ was unfitting; and thus that their preaching was vain, and vain also our faith, as Paul says (1 Cor. 15:14).

Moreover, if Christ had not a real body, He did not really die. Therefore He did not really rise again. Consequently, the apostles are false witnesses, since they preached to the world that He had risen again: wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:15): We are found false witnesses of God: because we have given testimony against God; that he hath raised up Christ, whom he hath not raised up, if the dead rise not again.

Further. Falsehood is not the right way to the truth, according to Ecclus. 34:4, What truth can come from that which is false? Now Christ came into the world in order to manifest the truth: for He said (Jo. 18:37): For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth. Therefore there was nothing false in Christ. Yet there would have been, if what is related of Him was only imaginary: since that which is not what it seems to be, is false. Therefore all the things related about Christ happened in reality.

Again. It is stated (Rom. 3:24, 25) that we are justified in Christ's blood, and (Apoc. 5:9) it is said: Thou hast redeemed us to God, in thy blood. Consequently, if Christ had not real blood, neither did He really shed it for us, and we are neither truly justified nor truly redeemed. Therefore it is useless for us to be in Christ.

Again. If Christ's coming into the world was nothing but imaginary there was nothing new in His coming: since even in the Old Testament, God appeared to Moses and the prophets, under many figures, as the New

Testament frequently declares. But this would void the entire teaching of the New Testament. Therefore the Son of God assumed a real, and not an imaginary, body.

CHAPTER XXX

THE ERROR OF VALENTINE ABOUT THE INCARNATION

THE opinion of Valentine about the mystery of the Incarnation was somewhat akin to the foregoing. He said that Christ’s body was not earthly but brought by Him from heaven: and that He received nothing from His Virgin Mother, but merely passed through her as water through an aqueduct.

He seems to have been led into this error by certain passages of Holy Scripture. Thus it is said (Jo. 3:13 and 31): No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, the son of man, who is in heaven.… He that cometh from above, is above all. And our Lord said (Jo. 6:38): I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me. And (1 Cor. 15:47): The first man was of the earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly. They take all these texts to mean that we must believe Christ to have come down from heaven even as regards His body.

Now this opinion of Valentine, like that of the Manicheans mentioned above, comes from a false principle: for they believed that all earthly things were created by the devil. Wherefore, since the Son of God appeared that he might destroy the works of the devil (1 Jo. 3:8), it was not fitting that He should take a body formed from a creature of the devil. In fact Paul says (2 Cor. 6:14, 15): What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial? And, since like fruits come from the same root, this view leads to the same false issue as the preceding.

Every species has fixed essential principles, namely its matter and form, which go to constitute the specific nature in things composed of matter and form. Now, just as human flesh and bone and the like are matter proper to a man, so fire, air, water, earth, and like objects of the senses, are the matter of flesh and bone and the parts thereof. Hence, if Christ's body were not earthly, neither had He real flesh and bone, and He was wholly an imaginary being: and consequently He was not a real, but an imaginary man. And yet, as we have observed, He said: A spirit hath not flesh and bone, as you see me to have (Lk. 24:39).

Again. A heavenly body is naturally incorruptible and unchangeable, and cannot be moved from its connatural position. Now it was unbecoming that the Son of God should detract from the dignity of the nature He assumed, nay, rather was it becoming that He should raise it. Therefore He did not bring down from heaven a heavenly or incorruptible body, nay, rather was it an earthly and passible body which He assumed, and rendered incorruptible and heavenly.

Again. The Apostle says (Rom. 1:3) that the Son of God was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh. Now David's body was of the earth. Therefore Christ's body was also.

Moreover. The same Apostle says (Gal. 4:4) that God sent his Son, made of a woman; and it is said (Matth. 1:16) that Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ. But He would not be described as made or born of her, if He only came through her as through a channel, taking nothing from her. Therefore He took His body from her.

Further. Mary could not be called His mother, as the Evangelist declares her to have been, unless He had received something from her.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. 2:11, 12): Both he that sanctifieth, namely Christ, and they who are sanctified, namely Christians, are all of one. For which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying: I will declare thy name to my brethren; and further on (verse 14): Therefore, because the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner hath been partaker of the same. Now, if Christ had but a heavenly body, it is plain that, since we have an earthly body, we are not all of one with Him: and consequently we cannot be called His brethren, nor was He a partaker of flesh and blood. For it is well known that flesh and blood are composed of the lower elements, and are not of a heavenly nature. Clearly, therefore, this opinion is opposed to the statement of the Apostle.

As to the arguments on which that view is based, they are evidently absurd. For Christ came down from heaven, not as to His body and soul, but as God. We may gather this from our Lord’s very words. Thus, after saying (Jo. 3:13): No man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended from heaven, He added, the Son of Man, who is in heaven: thereby showing that He came down from heaven in such wise as not to cease to be there. Now it is proper to God to be on earth and yet fill heaven also, according to the saying of Jeremias (23:24), I fill heaven and earth. Therefore the Son of God did not, as God, come down from heaven by local movement: since that which is moved locally approaches one place in such a way as to leave another place. Consequently, the Son of God is said to come down from heaven, in as much as He united an earthly substance to Himself: even so the Apostle says that He emptied Himself, in as much as He took the form of a servant, although He did not forfeit His Godhead by so doing.

As to the principle on which this view is based, we have already proved it to be erroneous: for it has been shown, that bodies were created not by the devil, but by God.

CHAPTER XXXI

THE ERROR OF APOLLINARIS CONCERNING CHRIST’S BODY

MORE absurd still was the error of Apollinaris concerning the mystery of the Incarnation. He agreed with the above mentioned errors, in that he asserted that Christ’s body was not taken from the Virgin: but his impiety went so far as to contend that Christ’s flesh was formed from some part of the Word. He was led into this error by the text (Jo. 1:14), And the Word was made flesh, which he understood to mean that the Word was transformed into flesh: just as the text (Jo. 2:9), When the chief steward had tasted the water made wine indicates that the water was transformed into wine. It is easy to see how impossible this is, if we take note of what was proved above.

For we proved that God is utterly unchangeable. Now it is evident that whatsoever is transformed is changed. Since, then, the Word of God is true God, as we have proved, it was impossible for the Word of God to be transformed into man.

Again. Since the Word of God is God, He is simple: for it was proved that there is no composition in God. Accordingly, if some part of the Word was changed into flesh, it follows that the whole Word was changed. Now that which is changed into something else, ceases to be what it was before: thus water, changed into wine, is no longer water, but wine. Therefore, according to this view, after the Incarnation, the Word of God would utterly cease to be. But this is impossible, both because the Word of God is eternal, according to Jo. 1:1, In the beginning was the Word; and because, even after the Incarnation, Christ is called the Word, according to Apoc. 19:13, He was clothed with a garment sprinkled with blood: and his name is called, the Word of God.

Further. Things that have not common matter and genus cannot be changed one into the other: you cannot change a line into whiteness, because they differ generically: and a body fashioned from the elements cannot be changed into a heavenly body, or into an incorporeal substance, or vice versa, since they are not of the same matter. Now, since the Word of God is God, He agrees neither in genus nor in matter with anything else: for God is not in a genus, and is void of matter. Therefore it was impossible for the Word of God to be changed into flesh or into anything else.

Again. Flesh, bones, and blood and the parts thereof are essentially composed of some determinate matter. Hence, if according to the above view the Word of God was changed into flesh, it would follow that in Christ there was no real flesh or anything else of the kind; and so He would not be a real, but only an imaginary man. Other equally absurd consequences would follow, all of which we have exposed when refuting Valentine.

Accordingly it is evident that the text of John, And the Word was made flesh, does not mean that the Word was transformed into flesh: but that He took flesh in order to live among men and appear to them visibly. Hence the text continues, And dwelt amongst us, and we saw his glory, etc. Baruch too says of God (3:38) that he was seen upon earth, and conversed with men.

CHAPTER XXXII

THE ERROR OF ARIUS AND APOLLINARIS CONCERNING CHRIST'S SOUL

THERE have been false views not only about Christ's body, but also concerning His soul.

Arius asserted that Christ had no soul, and that He assumed only a body, the Godhead supplying the place of a soul. Apparently he was forced to hold this view, through maintaining that the Son of God is a creature and less than the Father. For, in order to prove this latter statement, he chose those texts of Scripture that stress human weakness in Christ; and lest any one should refute his argument, by saying that these texts refer to Christ not in His divine, but in His human nature, he wickedly denied that Christ had a soul. Thus when things were said of Christ which could not be said of the human body, for instance, that He marvelled, feared, prayed, it was necessary to conclude that the Son of God was an inferior being. In support of his view he quoted the above text of John: The Word was made flesh; which, according to him, proved that the Word took flesh alone, and not a soul. In this particular point Apollinaris followed him.

From what we have already said it is clear that we cannot hold this opinion.

For we have proved that God cannot be the form of a body. Since then the Word of God is God, it is impossible for Him to be the form of a body, so as in a body to take the place of a soul. This argument avails against Apollinaris, who confessed that the Word of God is God: and, though Arius denied this, still the same argument avails against him, since it is impossible not only for God to be the form of a body, but also for any of the supercelestial spirits, supreme among whom Arius placed the Son of God—except according to the opinion of Origen, who held human souls to be of the same species as the supercelestial spirits, an opinion which we have refuted already.

Again, if you subtract what is essential to man, that which remains is not a real man. Now evidently the soul especially is essential to man, since it is his form. Hence, if Christ had no soul, He was no real man. And yet the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:5): There is one mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.

Further. The essence not only of man, but of each of his parts depends on the soul: wherefore, when the soul has departed, the eyes, flesh, and bones of a dead man are so called equivocally, like an eye in a picture or statue. Accordingly, if Christ had no soul, it follows that neither His flesh nor any of His human parts were real. And yet our Lord witnesses to the contrary (Lk. 24:39): A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have.

Further. That which is engendered of a living being cannot be called its son, unless it be produced thereby in the same species: thus a worm is not the son of the animal in which it is engendered. Now, if Christ had no soul, He would not be of the same species as other men: because difference of form causes difference of species. Consequently, we would be unable to say that Christ is the son of the Virgin Mary, or that she is His mother: and yet this is asserted in the Gospels.

Moreover. It is explicitly stated in the Gospel that Christ had a soul: for instance (Matth. 26:38), My soul is sorrowful even unto death, and (Jo. 12:27), Now is my soul troubled. And, should they say that by soul is meant the Son of God, because in their opinion He takes the place of soul and flesh, we refer them to the words of our Lord (Jo. 10:18): I have power to lay it (namely, my soul) down, and I have power to take it up again. From these words we gather that in Christ, besides His soul, there was something that had the power to lay down that soul, and to take it up again. But it was not in the power of His body to be united to the Son of God, or to be separated from God, since this surpasses the power of nature. Therefore we are given to understand that Christ's soul was distinct from the Godhead of the Son of God, to whom rightly that power is ascribed.

Again. Sorrow, anger, and the like are passions of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher asserts. Now these things were in Christ, as the Gospels declare. Therefore in Christ there was a sensitive soul, which evidently differs from the divine nature of the Son of God.

Since, however, it might be said that the Gospels ascribe human things to Christ metaphorically, even as Holy Scripture in many places ascribes such things to God, we must needs refer to something that must be taken in its proper sense. For just as we must understand literally and not metaphorically the other bodily things which the Evangelists relate about Christ, so must we not give it a metaphorical interpretation when we read that He ate, or as a consequence, was hungry. Now hunger is only in one having a sensitive soul, since hunger is the appetite for food. Therefore Christ had a sensitive soul.

CHAPTER XXXIII

THE ERRORS OF APOLLINARIS, WHO SAID THAT CHRIST HAD NOT A RATIONAL SOUL, AND OF ORIGEN, WHO SAID THAT CHRIST'S SOUL WAS CREATED BEFORE THE WORLD

CONVINCED by the authority of Scripture, Apollinaris confessed that there was in Christ a sensitive soul, but one without mind or intellect; so that the Word supplied the absence of mind and intellect in that soul. But neither does this suffice to avoid the absurdities mentioned above.

For man takes his human species from his having a human mind and reason. Accordingly, if Christ had no such thing, He was not really a man, nor of the same species as we are: because a soul devoid of reason belongs to a different species from that to which a rational soul belongs: since, according to the Philosopher, in definitions and species, the addition or subtraction of an essential difference changes the species, as unity in numbers. Now rational is a specific difference. Therefore, if in Christ the soul was sensitive, but not rational, it was of a different species from ours which is possessed of reason. Consequently Christ would not have been of the same species as we are.

Again. There are various species among irrational sensitive souls; as evidenced by irrational animals that differ specifically, each one of which is specified by its own soul. Hence the irrational sensitive soul is a genus containing many species. Now a thing cannot be in a genus without being in one of its species. Consequently, if Christ's soul belonged to the genus of irrational sensitive souls, it must have belonged to one of the species of that genus, such as the soul of a lion, or horse, or some other beast: which is utterly absurd.

Further. The body stands in relation to the soul as matter to form, and as an instrument to the principal agent. Now matter must needs be proportionate to the form, and the instrument to the principal agent. Consequently there must be a diversity of bodies corresponding to the diversity of souls. Our very senses bear witness to the fact that various animals are provided with a variety of members according to the requirements of their respective souls. Hence if Christ had not a soul like ours, His body would not have been provided with the same members as ours.

Moreover. Apollinaris admits that the Word of God is truly God, therefore he must also admit that the Word of God cannot be astonished; since those things astonish us, the cause of which we know not. Now no astonishment could affect a sensitive soul, since it belongs not to a sensitive soul to trouble about knowing the causes of things. Yet Christ was astonished, as can be proved from the Gospels: for it is stated (Matth. 8:10) that Jesus hearing the words of the centurion, marvelled. Therefore in Christ, besides the divinity of the Word and a sensitive soul, there was something else which made it possible for Him to marvel: and this is a human mind. Hence it is clear from all that has been said, that Christ had a real human body, and a real human soul.

Accordingly, the text of John, The Word was made flesh, does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh: nor that the Word assumed flesh alone, or a sensitive and not a rational soul. According to the wonted manner of Scripture, the part is put for the whole: so that The Word was made flesh is the same as The Word was made man. In the same way soul is sometimes used by Scripture to indicate man. Thus (Exod. 1:5) it is said: All the souls that came out of Jacob’s thigh were seventy: and flesh also, thus (Isa. 40:5) it is said: All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken. Accordingly, in the text in question, flesh stands for the whole man, and indicates the assumption by the Word of the weakness of human nature.

Now if, as we have shown, Christ had human flesh and a human soul, it is evident that His soul did not exist before the conception of His body. For it has been proved that human souls do not exist before their respective bodies. Consequently it is clear that the teaching of Origen is false, in asserting that in the beginning and before the creation of the material world, Christ’s soul was created at the same time as all other spiritual creatures, and assumed by the Word: and that at length towards the end of time it was clothed with flesh for the salvation of mankind.

CHAPTER XXXIV

THE ERROR OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA CONCERNING THE UNION OF THE WORD WITH MAN

IT is clear then from what has been said, that neither was the Godhead lacking in Christ, as Ebion, Cerinthus and Photinus contended; nor a true human body, as the Manicheans with Valentine erroneously maintained; nor again a human soul, as Arius and Apollinaris asserted. Accordingly, since these three, viz. Godhead, human soul, and a real human body, were united in Christ, it remains for us to seek from the teaching of the Scriptures, what we are to hold in regard to this union.

Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius his follower explained this union in the following manner. They said that in Christ a human body and a human soul were joined together in a natural union, so that they formed a man of the same species as we are, and that God dwelt in this man as in His temple, that is to say by His grace, as in other men. Hence the words of Christ to the Jews (Jo. 2:19), Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up, which words the Evangelist expounds by saying (verse 21): But he spoke of the temple of his body. Hence too the Apostle says (Coloss. 1:19) that in him, it hath well-pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell. As a result there was between that man and God, a further union of affection, in that the man adhered to God by His good will, and God in His will accepted Him, according to Jo. 8:29: He that sent me is with me; and he hath not left me alone: for I do always the things that please him. Hence we may take the union between that man and God, to be the union of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:17): He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.

And just as, by reason of this union, names which properly belong to God are applied to men, so that in various passages of Scripture they are said to be gods, and sons of God, also lords, Saints, and Christs: so too, divine names may be applied to this man, so that, by reason of God dwelling in Him and being united to Him in a bond of affection, He may be called God, the Son of God, Lord, the Holy One, and Christ. Yet, since there was a greater fulness of grace in this man than in other holy men, He was the temple of God more than the rest of men, and more closely united to God in the bond of affection, and by a special privilege shared in the divine names. For this reason, on account of the excellence of His grace, He received a share of divine honour and dignity, and was adored together with God.

It follows from all this that the Person of the Word of God is distinct from the person of this man who is adored together with God's Word. And if we speak of them as being one person, this is on account of the aforesaid union of affections, so that this man and the Word of God would be called one person, as man and wife are said to be no longer two, but one flesh. Now a union of this kind does not allow of our saying of the one what we say of the other (for not all that is true of the husband is also true of the wife, or vice versa). And so, with regard to the union of the divine Word with this man, they think it necessary to observe that whatsoever is proper to that man, as being part of human nature, cannot be said truly of the divine Word or of God: for instance it is proper to that man to be born of the Virgin, that He suffered, died, and was buried, and so on: all such things, they assert, cannot be said of God or the Word of God.

Since, however, certain names, though belonging chiefly to God, are nevertheless applied to men, such as, Christ, Lord, Holy, and even Son of God, there is no reason why the aforesaid predicates should not be applied to them. Thus, according to them, it is quite correct to say that Christ, the Lord of glory, or the Holy of Holies, or the Son of God, was born of the Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried: wherefore they contend that the Blessed Virgin should be called, not the Mother of God or of the divine Word, but the Mother of Christ.

Careful consideration, however, will show that this view excludes the truth of the Incarnation. According to this view, the Word of God was united to that man merely by the indwelling of grace, resulting in a union of wills. Now the Word of God by dwelling in man does not become incarnate:

for the divine Word, and God Himself, has dwelt in all holy men from the creation of the world, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:16): You are the temple of the living God, as the Lord saith: I will dwell in them. Such an indwelling cannot be styled incarnation, else God would have often become incarnate since the beginning of the world. Nor is the idea of incarnation realized by the divine Word, or God, dwelling in that man with a greater plentitude of grace, since more or less makes no difference in the kind of union. Seeing then that the Christian religion is based on faith in the Incarnation, it is clear that this view destroys the very foundation of the Christian religion.

Moreover. The falseness of this view is evident from the very terminology of Scripture. For Scripture is wont to indicate the indwelling of the divine Word in holy men, in the following manner: The Lord spoke to Moses, or The Lord said to Moses, or The Word of the Lord came to Jeremias, or some other prophet, The Word of the Lord came by the hand of Aggeus the prophet. But never is it said that the Word of God was made either Moses, or Jeremias, or any other. Yet it is in this singular way that the Evangelist describes the union of the divine Word with Christ’s flesh, when he says: The Word was made flesh, as we have observed above. Hence it is manifest that, according to the teaching of Scripture, the Word of God was not in the man Christ merely by dwelling in Him.

Again. That which has been made so-and-so, is whatever it has been made: thus that which has been made a man, is a man; and that which has been made white, is white. Now, the Word of God was made man, as stated above. Therefore the Word of God is man. But when two things are distinct in person, hypostasis, or supposits, one of them cannot be predicated of the other. Thus when I say, Man is an animal, the very same thing that is an animal is a man; and when I say, Man is white, the man himself is declared to be white, albeit whiteness is extraneous to the notion of humanity. Consequently by no means can I say that Socrates is Plato, or any other individual of the same or of another species. Accordingly, if the Word was made flesh, that is to say man, as the Evangelist declares, it is impossible for the divine Word and that man to be two persons, hypostases, or supposits.

Further. Demonstrative pronouns refer to a person, hypostasis, or supposit: for no one would say, I run, meaning that another runs, except metaphorically, if this other runs in his stead. Now this man, Jesus by name, says of Himself (Jo. 8:58): Before Abraham was, I am, and: I and the Father are one (Jo. 10:30), and many similar statements, which clearly refer to the divinity of the Word. Therefore it is manifest that the person and hypostasis of Him who said these things is the Person of the Son of God.

Moreover. It is evident from what has been said that neither did Christ's body come down from heaven, which was the error of Valentine; nor His soul, as Origen erroneously asserted: wherefore it follows that it was the Word who is said to have come down from heaven, not by local movement, but in reference to His union with a lower nature, as we have already stated. Now this man speaking in His own person said that He came down from heaven (Jo. 6:51): I am the living bread, which came down from heaven. Therefore that man's person or hypostasis must be the Person of the Word of God.

Again. It is evident that ascent into heaven applies to the man Christ who, while the Apostles looked on, was raised up (Acts 1:9): while descent from heaven applies to the Word of God. Now, the Apostle says (Eph. 4:10), He that descended is the same also that ascended. Therefore that man's person and hypostasis is the Person and hypostasis of the Word of God.

Again. One whose origin is from the world, and who was not in existence before the world, cannot be said to come into the world. Now, the man Christ, as to His flesh, had His origin from the world, since He had a real human and earthly body, as we have proved: and as to His soul He was not in existence before the world, since He had a real human soul which, by its nature, does not exist before its union with the body. It follows then that it is not by reason of His human nature that this man is said to come into the world. Yet He says that He Himself came into the world (Jo. 16:28): I came forth from the Father, He says, and am come into the world. Thus then it is clear that something pertaining to the Word of God is truly said of this man: since it belongs to the divine Word to come into the world, as John the Evangelist expressly declares (Jo. 1:10, 11): He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. He came unto his own, etc. Therefore the person and hypostasis of the man who said the words quoted above, must be the Person and Hypostasis of the Word of God.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. 10:5): When he cometh into the world, he saith: Sacrifice and oblation thou wouldest not: but a body thou hast fitted to me. Now He that cometh into the world is the Word of God, as we have shown. Therefore it is to the Word of God that a body is fitted, in such wise to wit, that it was His own body. But this could not be said, unless the hypostasis of the Word of God were also the hypostasis of that man. Therefore the Word of God and this man have the one and the same hypostasis.

Moreover. Any change or suffering affecting the body of a man, can be ascribed to the person to whom that body belongs: thus if Peter's body be wounded, scourged, or dies, it can be said that Peter is wounded, scourged, or dies. Now the body of this man was the body of God's Word, as we have shown. Hence whatsoever that body suffered, the Word of God may be said to have suffered. Rightly, therefore, may we say that the Word of God, or God, suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried: whereas those men denied this.

Again. The Apostle says (Heb. 2:10): It became him, for whom are all things, who had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation, by his passion. From this we gather that He for whom are all things, who brings men into glory, and who is the author of man's salvation, suffered and died. Now these four things belong exclusively to God, and are ascribed to no one else. For it is said (Prov. 16:4): The Lord hath made all things for himself: and of God's Word it is said (Jo. 1:3): All things were made by him: and (Ps. 83:12): The Lord will give grace and glory: and elsewhere (Ps. 36:39): But the salvation of the just is from the Lord. Therefore it is evidently right to say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.

Moreover. Though a man may be called a lord, by reason of his sharing in the divine lordship; no man, nor indeed any creature, can be called the Lord of glory: because God alone by nature possesses the glory of the happiness to come; while others possess it by the gift of grace. Hence it is said (Ps. 23:10): The Lord of hosts, he is the king of glory. Now the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:8) that the Lord of glory was crucified: For if they had known it, they never would have crucified the Lord of glory. Therefore it may be truly said that God was crucified.

Further. The Word of God is the Son of God by nature, as we have shown: and man, by reason of God dwelling in him, is called a son of God by the grace of adoption. Hence, according to the opinion aforesaid, we shall find in our Lord Jesus Christ both kinds of sonship: because the indwelling Word is God's Son by nature, and the man in whom He dwells is God's son by the grace of adoption. Consequently that man cannot be called God's own, or only-begotten, Son, but only God's Word, who by reason of the special manner of His birth, was the only offspring of the Father. Now Scripture ascribes passion and death to God's own and only-begotten Son. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:32): God spared not even his own Son but delivered him up for us all. Again it is said (Jo. 3:16): God so loved the world, as to give his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting. That he is speaking of being delivered up to death is clear from his using the same terms in relation to the crucified Son of Man (ibid. 14, 15): As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever believeth in him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting. Again the Apostle declares Christ's death to be a sign of God's love for the world (Rom. 5:8, 9): God commendeth his charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us. Rightly, therefore, may we say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.

Again. A man is said to be his mother's son, because he derives his body from her, although he does not receive his soul from her, but from another source. Now the body of this man was taken from the body of His Virgin Mother: and it has been shown that the body of this man is the body of God's natural Son, that is, of the Word of God. Therefore it is right to call the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God's Word, and even the Mother of God, although the Word's Godhead is not from her: because it is not necessary for a son to receive his entire substance from his mother, but only his body.

Moreover. The Apostle says (Gal. 4:4): God sent his Son, made of a woman. Now from these words we are able to gather the sense in which the Son of God was sent. For we are told that He was sent in as much as He was made of a woman: and this would not be true unless the Son of God had been in existence before He was made of a woman: since what is sent into something must exist before being in that thing. Now, according to Nestorius, this man who is an adopted son, was not in existence before being born of a woman. Hence the words, God sent his Son, cannot refer to an adopted son, but to His Son by nature, namely God, the divine Word. But it is through being made of a woman, that a man is said to be the son of a woman. Therefore God, the divine Word, is the Son of a woman. Perhaps, however, someone might object that the saying of the Apostle means, not that the Son of God was sent to be the son of a woman, but that the Son of God, who was made of a woman and under the Law, was sent to redeem those who were under the Law: in which case the words his Son refer, not to His Son by nature, but to this man who is son by adoption. But this interpretation is excluded by the very words of the Apostle. For no one can absolve from a law, except he be above the law, that is, the author of the law. Now the Law was given by God: and therefore God alone can free anyone from the bondage of the Law. But the Apostle ascribes this to the Son of God, of whom He is speaking. Therefore the Son of God, of whom he is speaking, is God's Son by nature. Therefore it is true to say that God's Son by nature, namely, the divine Word of God, was made of a woman.

Moreover. The same conclusion follows from the fact that the redemption of mankind is ascribed to God Himself (Ps. 30:6): Thou hast redeemed me, Lord, God of truth.

Again. The adoption of the sons of God is the work of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. 8:15, You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons. Now the Holy Ghost is not a gift of man, but of God. Therefore the adoption of sons is effected, not by a man, but by God. Now it is the work of the Son of God, sent by God, made of a woman: as evidenced by the Apostle continuing the text (Gal. 4:5), That we might receive the adoption of sons. Therefore the text of the Apostle (Gal. 4:4) refers to God's Son by nature: and consequently God, the Word of God, was made of a woman, that is to say, of the Virgin Mother.

Further. John says (1:14): And the Word was made flesh. Now He did not take flesh except of a woman. Therefore the Word was made flesh of a woman, that is to say, of the Virgin Mother. Therefore the Virgin is the Mother of the Word of God.

Moreover the Apostle says that Christ is from the fathers according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever. But He is not from the fathers except through the Virgin. God therefore who is over all things is from the Virgin according to the flesh. The Virgin therefore is the Mother of God according to the flesh.

Moreover. The Apostle, speaking of Jesus Christ, says (Philip, 2:6, 7): Who being in the form of God … emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men. From these words it is clear that if, with Nestorius, we distinguish in Christ two persons, namely the man, who is a son by adoption, and the Word of God, who is God's son by nature, these words cannot refer to this man. For if this man were a mere man He was not first in the form of God, and afterwards made in the likeness of men; on the contrary, after being a man, He became a participator in the Godhead; whereby He was not emptied but exalted. Therefore the text means that the Word of God who first was from eternity in the form of God, namely in the nature of God, afterwards emptied himself, being made in the likeness of men. Nor can this kenosis mean simply the indwelling of God's Word in the man Christ Jesus: because from the beginning of the world, God's Word has dwelt in all holy men by grace, and yet He did not empty Himself by so doing. For God in giving a share of His own goodness to creatures suffers no loss, but in a sense is exalted, for as much as the height of His perfection is manifest by the goodness of creatures; and the greater the creature's goodness, the more is God exalted. Hence, if the Word of God dwelt with greater plenitude in the man Christ than in other holy persons, he emptied Himself less in Him than in the others. Consequently it is clear that the union of the Word with human nature, does not merely mean, as Nestorius contended, that God's Word dwelt in that man, but that the Word of God was truly made flesh. For there can be no kenosis, save in the sense that the Word of God emptied, i.e., lowered Himself, not by putting away His own greatness, but by putting on human lowliness: thus if the soul existed before the body, we might say that it becomes a corporeal substance, namely man, not by a change in its own nature, but by being united to a corporeal nature.

Again. It is evident that the Holy Ghost dwelt in the man Christ: since it is said (Lk. 4:1) that Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan. Consequently, if the Incarnation of the Word means nothing more than that the Word of God dwelt with the greatest plenitude in that man, we shall have to say that the Holy Ghost also became incarnate: which is utterly contrary to the teaching of faith.

Further. It is certain that the Word of God dwells in the holy angels; for they are filled with understanding, by participating in the Word. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 2:16): Nowhere doth he take hold of the angels; but of the seed of Abraham he taketh hold. It clearly follows then that the assumption of human nature by the Word does not merely mean His dwelling therein.

Again. If, as Nestorius contended, there are two distinct personalities in Christ, namely the Word of God, and the man, the Word of God cannot possibly be given the name of Christ. This is evident, both from the way of speaking, usual in Scripture, where, before the Incarnation of our Lord, God or His Word is never given the name of Christ, and from the very meaning of that name. For Christ is so called because He is anointed with the oil of gladness, i.e., with the Holy Ghost, as Peter expounds it (Acts 10:38). Now it cannot be said that the Word of God was anointed by the Holy Ghost, since then the Holy Ghost would be greater than the Son, as the sanctifier is greater than the sanctified. Consequently this name Christ can only indicate the man. When therefore the Apostle says (Philip. 2:5): Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus, he is referring to the man. Now he continues: Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God. Therefore we may say with truth that this man is in the form, that is to say, in the nature, of God, and equal with God. And, though men are called gods, or children of God, on account of God dwelling in them, they are never said to be equal with God. Therefore the man Christ is called God, not merely because God dwelt in Him.

Moreover. Though the name of God is applied to holy men, on account of indwelling grace, none of the things that belong to God alone, such as the creation of heaven and earth, and the like, are ever ascribed to any saint by reason of the grace dwelling in him. Yet the creation of all things is ascribed to the man Christ. For it is said (Heb. 3:1, 2): Consider the apostle and high-priest of our confession, Jesus Christ, who is faithful to him that made him, as was also Moses in all his house. Now these words refer to the man, and not to the Word of God, both because as we have shown, the Word of God, according to the view of Nestorius, cannot be called Christ, and because the Word of God was not made, but begotten. And the Apostle continues: This man was counted worthy of greater glory than Moses, by so much as he that hath built the house, hath greater honour than the house. Hence the man

Christ built the house of God: wherefore the Apostle goes on to prove this: For every house is built by some man: but he that created all things is God. Accordingly, the Apostle proves that the man Christ built the house of God, from the fact that God created all things. But this argument would prove nothing unless Christ were God the Creator of all. Thus then the creation of all things, which is the work of God alone, is ascribed to this man. Therefore the man Christ is God in Person, and not merely by God dwelling in Him.

Further. It is quite clear that the man Christ ascribes many divine and supernatural attributes to Himself. For instance (Jo. 6:40), I will raise him up in the last day: and (Jo. 10:28), I give them life everlasting. And it would indicate the highest degree of pride, if the man who spoke thus were not God in Person, and merely had God dwelling in Him. But this accusation cannot be brought against the man Christ, who says (Matth. 11:29): Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart. Therefore this man and God are one and the same Person.

Moreover. Just as the Scriptures state that this man was exalted: Being exalted … by the right hand of God (Acts 2:33), so do they say that God was emptied: He emptied himself (Philip. 2:7). Wherefore, even as sublime things may be ascribed to the man by reason of the union—for instance, that He is God, that He raises the dead to life, and so forth—so may lowly things be attributed to God, for instance that He was born of the Virgin, that He suffered, died, and was buried.

Again. Relative terms, nouns or pronouns, relate to the same supposit. Now the Apostle, speaking of the Son of God, says (Coloss. 1:16): In him were all things created, in heaven, and on earth, visible and invisible, and afterwards he adds: And he is the head of the body, the Church, who is the beginning, the first-born from the dead. Now it is clear that the words, In him were all things created, refer to the Word of God; and the words, the first-born from the dead, to the man Christ. Consequently the Word of God and the man Christ are one suppositum, and, therefore, one Person: and whatsoever is said of that man may be ascribed to the Word of God, and vice versa.

Further. The Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:6): One Lord, Jesus Christ, by whom are all things. Now Jesus Christ, the name of that man, by whom are all things, evidently is the name of the Word of God. Accordingly, the Word of

God and this man, are one Lord, neither two lords nor two sons, as Nestorius maintained: and hence it follows too, that the Word of God and this man are one Person.

Now, if we consider the matter carefully, this opinion of Nestorius, as regards the Incarnation, differs but little from the opinion of Photinus, since both of them asserted that this man was God solely by reason of indwelling grace. Photinus, however, asserted that this man merited to be called God and to be raised to glory, through His Passion and good works: whereas Nestorius admitted that He had this name and glory from the moment of His conception, by reason of the singular fulness of God dwelling in Him. But as regards the eternal generation of the Word, they differed utterly, since Nestorius admitted it, whereas Photinus denied it altogether.

CHAPTER XXXV

AGAINST THE ERROR OF EUTYCHES

WE have proved in many ways that the mystery of the Incarnation is to be understood in such a way that God’s Word, and man, are united in one and the same Person. Nevertheless, there still remains a difficulty in the study of this truth. The divine nature is necessarily accompanied by its personality. And the same would seem to apply to human nature: since that which subsists in an intellectual or rational nature is the definition of a person. Hence seemingly it is impossible that there be one person with two natures, divine and human.

In order to solve this difficulty, various explanations have been offered. Eutyches, in order to safeguard against Nestorius, the unity of Person in Christ, contended that there was also but one nature in Christ, so that, although before the union there were two distinct natures, divine and human, in the very union they coalesced into one. Hence he said that Christ’s Person was of two natures, but not subsisting in two natures. On this account he was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

The falseness of this view may be shown in many ways.

We have proved above that in Jesus Christ there was a body, a rational soul, and the Godhead. It is moreover evident that Christ’s body, even after the union, was not the Godhead of the Word; since that body, even after the union, was passible, visible to the eye, and confined within the lines of its members: all of which is foreign to the divine nature of the Word; as we have sufficiently proved above. Likewise Christ’s soul, after the union, was distinct from the divine nature of the Word, since, even after the union, it was affected by the passions of sorrow, fear, and anger, which in no way can be ascribed to the Godhead of the Word, as we have shown. Now the human soul and body constitute the human nature. Wherefore, even after the union, the human nature in Christ was distinct from the Godhead of the Word, which is the divine nature. Therefore, after the union, there were two natures in Christ.

Again. A thing is said to be natural in reference to nature. Now a thing is said to be natural by reason of its having a form, even as that which is made by art: for we do not call the building a house, until it has the form designed by art; nor is a thing a horse until it has the form pertaining to that nature. Accordingly, the form of a natural thing is its nature. Hence we must say that there were two forms in Christ, even after the union. Thus, speaking of Jesus Christ, the Apostle says (Philip. 2:6, 7) that when he was in the form of God … He took the form of a servant. Now we cannot say that the form of God is the same as the form of a servant. For nothing takes what it has already; so that, if the form of God and the form of a servant are the same, since He already had the form of God, He would not have taken the form of a servant. Nor can it be said that, through the union, the form of God in Christ was destroyed; because then, after the union, Christ would not be God. Nor again can it be said that the form of a servant was destroyed in the union, because then He would not have taken the form of a servant. But neither can it be said that the form of a servant was mixed with the form of God, because when things are made into a mixture, they lose their integrity, and each is partly destroyed; wherefore it could not be said that He took the form of a servant, but a part thereof. Therefore, according to the words of the Apostle, we must say that, after the union, there were two forms in Christ, and consequently two natures.

Further. The word nature was first employed to signify the coming into being of things by nativity, and thence it was transferred to indicate the principle of this kind of generation; and then further still to signify the intrinsic principle of movement in a movable thing: and since this principle is matter or form, nature also stands for the form or matter of a natural thing having within itself the principle of its movement. And, seeing that form and matter constitute the essence of a natural thing, the meaning of the word nature is made to extend to the essence of anything existing in nature; so that the nature of a thing is its essence indicated by its definition. It is in this sense that we are using the term now, and in which we say that there are a divine and a human nature in Christ. Accordingly if, as Eutyches maintained, the human and the divine nature were two before the union, and if through the union they combined together to form one nature, this must have been by one of the ways in which one thing is made out of many. This happens, first of all, by mere co-ordination: thus many houses make a town, and many soldiers make an army. Secondly, by co-ordination and composition: thus a house is made of many conjoined parts co-ordinated and bound together. These two ways, however, do not suffice to form one nature out of several. Accordingly, things that are formed by co-ordination or composition are not natural things; and their unity is not unity of nature. The third way in which one thing is made of several, is by mixture: thus a mixed body is formed from the four elements. Yet neither does this way apply to the case in point. First, because only those things can be mixed together which agree in matter, and which are of such a nature as to be active or passive in relation to one another. Now this does not apply to our case: since it has been proved that God is immaterial and wholly impassible. Secondly, because it is impossible to mix together two things, one of which far exceeds the other: thus if one were to put a drop of wine into a thousand gallons of water, there will be no mixture; but destruction of the wine. Thus again logs placed on a furnace are not said to be mixed with the fire; they are consumed by it, on account of its exceeding power. Now the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, because God's power is infinite, as we have proved. Therefore a mixture of the two natures is quite impossible. Thirdly, because granted that such a mixture were made, neither nature would retain its integrity: because the ingredients do not remain entire in a real mixture. Consequently, after the two natures, namely the divine and human, have been mixed together, neither nature would remain, but a tertium quid: and so Christ would be neither God nor man. Therefore we cannot admit the explanation of Eutyches that, whereas there were two natures before the union, there was but one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ after the union, through the fusion of the two natures into one. Consequently it must be explained by saying that only one of the natures remained after the union. Either then in Christ there was only the nature of God, and what in Him seemed human was purely imaginary, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into the human, as Apollinaris maintained: both of which views we have already refuted. Therefore it is impossible that there were two natures before, and only one after, the union.

Further. Two complete natures never combine together to form one, because each is a whole in itself; whereas when one thing is made out of several, these come under the heading of parts. Hence, since one thing is made out of a soul and a body, neither soul nor body can be called a nature, in the sense in which we are now speaking; because neither has a complete species, but each is a part of a nature. Accordingly, as the human nature is a complete nature, and so likewise is the divine nature, they cannot possibly combine together to form one nature, unless both or one of them be corrupted. But this is impossible, since we have shown that the one Christ is both true God and true man. Therefore it is impossible that there be but one nature in Christ.

Again, one nature may result from two permanent things—either as from bodily parts; for instance an animal is made of various members: and this does not apply to the case in point, since the divine nature is not corporeal:—or as one thing is made from matter and form; for instance, an animal from soul and body: and neither does this apply to the case, since God is neither matter, nor can He be the form of anything, as proved above. Accordingly, if Christ is true God and true man, as we have proved, it is impossible that there be but one nature in Him.

Further. Subtraction or addition of an essential principle diversifies the species of a thing, and therefore changes the nature, which is nothing but the essence as indicated by the definition, as we have stated. For this reason we observe that a specific difference added to or subtracted from a definition causes a difference of species; thus a rational and an irrational animal differ in species: even so, in numbers, the addition or subtraction of unity gives us various species of numbers. Now the form is an essential principle. Hence every additional form makes another species and another nature, in the sense in which we speak of nature now. Therefore if the divine nature of the Word be added to the human nature as a form, another nature will be the result: and consequently Christ's will be not a human nature, but some other: even as an animate body is of another nature from that which is a body only.

Moreover. Things that have not a common nature are not alike in species; as, for instance, man and horse. Now if Christ's nature is composed of the divine and human natures, it is evident that other men will not have the same nature as Christ. Therefore He will not be like us in species: and this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 2:17): It behoved him, in all things, to be like unto his brethren.

Again. Form and matter always make together one species, which can be predicated of many individuals, actually or potentially, as far as the specific ratio is concerned. If then the divine nature be added, like a form, to the human nature, from this combination there must needs result some common species that can be predicated of several individuals. But this is clearly false: since there is but one Jesus Christ, God and man. Therefore the divine and human natures did not constitute one nature in Christ.

Moreover. The statement of Eutyches, that before the union there were two natures in Christ, is also seemingly against faith. For, since human nature is composed of soul and body, it follows that either Christ’s body, or Christ’s soul, or both, existed before His Incarnation: and this is shown to be false, by what we have said above. It is, therefore, against faith to say that there were two natures in Christ before the union, and that after the union, there was one.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE ERROR OF MACARIUS OF ANTIOCH, WHO SAID THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE WILL IN CHRIST

THE opinion of Macarius of Antioch, who said that there were but one operation and will in Christ, seemingly amounts to the same as the foregoing. Each nature has its proper operation: because the form, which gives each nature its particular species, is the principle of operation: wherefore, as various natures have their respective forms, so have they their respective actions. Consequently, if in Christ there be but one action, it follows that He has but one nature: and this is the heresy of Eutyches. Therefore it is false that there is only one operation in Christ.

Again. In Christ the divine nature is perfect, whereby He is consubstantial with the Father; also a perfect human nature, whereby He is of the same species as we are. Now it belongs to the perfection of the divine nature to have a will, as we have proved. Likewise it belongs to the perfection of human nature to have a will, whereby a man is free. Therefore there are two wills in Christ.

Moreover. The will is a power of the soul even as the intellect. Therefore if Christ had no other will besides that of the Word, for the same reason, He had no other intellect besides the Word’s: and so we come back to the error of Apollinaris.

Further. If Christ had but one will, He must have had the divine will alone: because the Word could not lose the divine will which was His from all eternity. Now merit does not pertain to the divine will: since it belongs to one tending to perfection. Accordingly, by His passion, Christ would not have merited, either for Himself or for us: the contrary of which is taught by the Apostle (Philip. 2:8, 9) who says that Christ was made obedient to the Father, unto death … for which cause God hath exalted him.

Again. If there was not a human will in Christ, it follows that there would have been no free-will in Him in respect of the nature assumed: for by His will man is free, so that the man Christ would have acted not in the manner of a man, but in the manner of other animals that are void of free-will. Consequently His actions were neither virtuous nor worthy of praise or imitation. Therefore there was no point in His saying (Matth. 11:29): Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart; and (Jo. 13:15): I have given you an example that, as I have done to you, so you do also.

Again. Even an ordinary man, though he has but one personality, has several appetites and operations corresponding to his various natural principles. Thus in his rational faculty he has a will; in the sensitive faculty he has a concupiscible and an irascible appetite; and besides these he has a natural appetite resulting from the natural forces in him. Again, with his eyes he sees, with his ears he hears, with his mind he understands: and all these are different operations. The reason of this is that operations are differentiated not only according to the various operative subjects, but also according to the various principles of operation in one and the same subject, from which principles these various operations take their species. Now the divine nature is much further removed from human nature than the various principles of human nature are from one another. Therefore the divine and human natures in Christ have each their respective distinct will and operation, although Christ in the two natures is one Person.

Again. It is clearly proved by the authority of Holy Scripture that there were two wills in Christ. Thus He says (Jo. 6:38): I came down from heaven, not to do my own will, but the will of him that sent me; and (Lk. 22:42): Not my will, but thine be done. Hence, it is clear that in Christ there was His own will, besides the will of His Father. Now there certainly was in Him a will common to Him and His Father: since, as Father and Son have the one nature, so have they the one will. Therefore there are two wills in Christ.

It is the same with His operations. Christ had one operation common to Him and the Father: for He says (Jo. 5:19): What things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner. There is also in Him another operation that is not becoming to the Father, as, for instance, sleep, hunger, eating, and so forth, all of which both actions and passions are ascribed by the Evangelist to the man Christ. Therefore there was not only one operation in Christ.

Apparently this opinion originated through its authors being unable to distinguish between simple unity and unity of order. They observed that the human will in Christ was subordinate to the divine will, so that every act of the human will of Christ was in accordance with the disposition of His divine will. In like manner all Christ’s human operations, whether of action or of passion, were in accordance with the disposition of His divine will, as He says Himself (Jo. 8:29): I do always the things that please him. Besides, Christ’s human operation derived a certain divine efficacy through His union with the Godhead, even as the action of the secondary agent acquires efficacy from the principal agent. Consequently His every action or passion was salutary: for which reason Dionysius (De Div. Nom., ii.) calls Christ’s human operations theandric—i.e., God-man-like; as well as because it is the action of God and man. And so, observing that in Christ human will and operation are infallibly subordinate to the divine, they concluded that Christ has but one will and operation; although, in fact, unity of order and simple unity are not the same.

CHAPTER XXXVII

REFUTATION OF THOSE WHO MAINTAINED THAT CHRIST'S BODY AND SOUL WERE NOT UNITED TOGETHER

IN the foregoing chapters we have refuted the opinions of Nestorius and Eutyches, by proving that as laid down by our Faith, there is but one Person in Christ, and two natures. Seeing, however, that this would seem to be in contradiction with natural reason, certain later writers propounded the following view of the union. Man consists of a soul and body united together: and this particular soul together with this particular body constitutes this particular man, which signifies not only a hypostasis or a person, but a hypostasis and a person. Wherefore, lest they should have to admit in Christ a hypostasis or Person of the Word, they maintained that His body and soul were not united, so as to form one substance: and in this way they hoped to avoid the heresy of Nestorius. Again, it would seem impossible for that which was not part of a thing's nature to become part of its substance, without a change taking place in that thing. Now the Word is altogether unchangeable. And so, lest they should be constrained to admit that the assumed body and soul belonged to the nature which the Word had from all eternity, they contended that the Word assumed a human soul and body accidentally, just as a man puts on his clothes. In this way they wished to avoid the error of Eutyches. This view, however, is utterly contrary to faith.

Soul and body, by being united, constitute a man, because the form, when added to the matter, makes the species. Consequently, if soul and body were not united in Christ, He was not a man: whereas the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:5): (One) mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus.

Again. Each one of us is said to be a man, in the sense that a rational soul forms part of our being. Hence, if Christ is said to be a man, not in that sense, but merely because He had a soul and body, without their being united, it would be an equivocation to call Him a man, and He would not belong to the same species as we do: which is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 2:17) that it behoved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren.

Further. Not any kind of body, but only a human body, belongs to human nature. Now a body is not human unless it be quickened by union with the soul: and it is an equivocation to speak of eyes, hands, feet, flesh, and bone when they are no longer united to the soul. Consequently it would not be true to say that the Word assumed human nature, if He assumed a body and soul that were not united together.

Again. The human soul is naturally disposed to be united to the body. Hence a soul that is never united to a body, so as to constitute a being, is not a human soul: because that which is natural must be always. Hence, if Christ's soul is not united to the body, so as to constitute a being, it follows that it is not a human soul, and that human nature was not in Him.

Further. If the Word was accidentally united to the soul and body, as though it were clothed with them, human nature was not the nature of the Word. Consequently, after the union, the Word did not subsist in two natures, as neither does a man, when clothed, subsist in two natures: and Eutyches, for saying this, was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.

Moreover. That which happens to a man's clothes does not happen to him: thus he is not said to be born, when he puts his clothes on, nor to be wounded, if his coat is torn. If then the Word donned a soul and body, as a man puts on his clothes, we cannot say that God was born, or suffered, by reason of the body He assumed.

Again. If the Word took human nature merely as a cloak, so as to be seen by human eyes, it was useless for Him to take a soul, which is naturally invisible.

Moreover. According to this view, the Son would have taken human flesh, in the same way as the Holy Ghost assumed the form of a dove, under which He appeared. Now, this is clearly false: since neither do we say that the Holy Ghost was made a dove, nor that He is less than the Father in respect of the nature assumed.

Again. If we regard the matter carefully, it is evident that this view leads to the absurdities involved in various heresies. For as much as it asserts that the Son of God was accidentally united to soul and flesh, as a man to his clothes, it agrees with the opinion of Nestorius who held this union to signify the indwelling of the Word of God in man: since God could not clothe man by bodily contact, but only by His indwelling grace. For as much as it holds the union of the Word with human soul and flesh to be accidental, it follows that, after the union, the Word was not subsistent in two natures, which was the opinion of Eutyches: since a thing does not subsist in that which is united to it accidentally. For as much as it maintained that soul and flesh were not united so as to constitute a being, this view agrees partly with Arius and Apollinaris, who said that Christ's body was not animated by a rational soul; and partly with the Manicheans, who contended that Christ was not a real man, but only an imaginary one. For if the soul be not united to the body, so as to constitute a being, whatever appeared in Christ to make Him like other men, made of soul and body, was merely imaginary.

This view seems to have been based on the words of the Apostle (Philip. 2:7), In habit found as a man: for they did not realize that this was said metaphorically. Now we must not look for likeness in every detail in metaphorical expressions. Accordingly the assumed human nature bears a certain resemblance to a man's clothes, in so far as the Word was made visible in the flesh, as man is seen in his clothes. But the comparison does not imply that in Christ the union of the Word with human nature was accidental.

CHAPTER XXXVIII

REFUTATION OF THOSE WHO HOLD THAT IN THE PERSON OF CHRIST THERE ARE TWO HYPOSTASES OR SUPPOSITS

IN order to avoid the absurdities involved in the foregoing opinion, some others held that in our Lord Jesus Christ one substance resulted from the union of soul and flesh, a man namely, of the same species as other men. They say that this man is united to the Word of God, not indeed in nature, but in person: so that there would be one person of God's Word and of this man. But, since this man is an individual substance, that is to say a hypostasis and supposit, they draw a distinction between this hypostasis and the Word of God, although they admit that both are but one person. On account of this unity, they admit that we say that this man is the Word of God, or that the Word of God is this man, the sense being: The Word of God is a man—i.e., the person of the Word of God is the person of the man and vice versa. For this reason they state that whatever may be predicated of the Word of God, may be predicated of this man, and vice versa: but with a qualification, so that when it is said: God suffered, the sense is: The man who is God, by reason of the unity of person, suffered: and when it is said: A man created the stars, the sense is: He who is a man, etc.

This opinion, however, must necessarily fall into the error of Nestorius.

If we observe the difference between hypostasis and person, we shall see that they do not differ altogether; in fact, person is a kind of hypostasis, since it is a hypostasis of a particular nature, namely rational. This may be seen from the definition given by Boethius: Person is an individual substance of rational nature. Hence, though not every hypostasis is a person, every hypostasis of rational nature is a person. Accordingly, if from the mere union of soul and body there resulted in Christ a particular substance which is a hypostasis, namely this man, it follows that from this union there resulted a person. Consequently there would be two persons in Christ—the newly constituted person of this man, and the Person of the Eternal Word: and this is the error of Nestorius.

Again. Even though the hypostasis of this man were not a person, still the hypostasis of the Word of God is the same as His Person. Hence, if the hypostasis of the Word of God is not the hypostasis of this man, neither will the Person of the Word be the person of this man; and so it will be false that, as they say, the person of this man is the Person of the Word of God.

Moreover. Granted that there be a distinction between the Person and the hypostasis of the Word of God, or of this man, the only conceivable difference would be that the person adds some property to the hypostasis. For it cannot add anything of the genus of substance, since hypostasis is the chief thing in the genus of substance, being called a first substance. Accordingly if the union be effected in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that it is effected in an accidental quality: and this again is the error of Nestorius.

Further. Cyril says in a letter to Nestorius that was approved in the Council of Ephesus: If anyone does not confess that the Word of God the Father was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with his flesh is one, the same person being both God and man, let him be anathema. In fact nearly all the decrees of the councils declare that this savours of the error of Nestorius, who said that there were two hypostases in Christ.

Again. Damascene says: We acknowledge the union of two perfect natures, united not only in the προσῶπον, i.e. person, as Nestorius the enemy of God maintained, but hypostatically. Whence it is clear that Nestorius maintained that there was one person, but two hypostases.

Further. Hypostasis and supposit must needs be the same: since, according to the Philosopher, all the other things are predicated of the first substance, that is to say hypostasis, namely both universals in the genus of substance, and accidents. Consequently, if there are two hypostases in Christ, there are also two supposits.

Moreover. If the Word and this man have different supposits, neither supposit presupposes the other. Now, if the supposits be distinct, things predicated of them are also distinct: since divine predicates do not apply to the supposit of the man, except by reason of the Word, nor vice versa. Consequently we must make a distinction in the things that Scripture says of Christ, that is to say between divine and human predicates. Now this is against the declaration of Cyril, which was confirmed in the Council: If anyone ascribe to two persons or subsistences, such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by himself of himself, and applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and others (as though they were true of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema.

Again. According to this view, things that are applicable to the Word of God by reason of His nature could not be predicated of the man, save on account of their being associated in one Person. And this they indicated by inserting a qualifying phrase, where they explain the sentence, This man created the stars, thus, The Son of God who is this man, etc. And so on in like manner with other such sentences. So that when we say, This man is God, the sense is, The Word of God, who is this man, is God. Now Cyril condemns these expressions: If anyone dare to say that the assumed humanity is to be co-adored, and co-glorified, and co-named God, together with the Word of God, as one with another (since the prefix “co-” always signifies this) instead of giving one and the same adoration and one and the same glory to the Emmanuel, as the Word made flesh, let him be accursed.

Further. If this man differs in supposit from the Word of God, He can have no association with the Person of the Word, except through the fact of His being assumed by the Word. But this is foreign to the right sense of faith. Thus Felix, Pope and martyr, is quoted in the Council of Ephesus, as saying: We believe that Jesus our God, born of the Virgin Mary, is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there be another besides him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there was another besides him; but while he remained perfect God, he became a perfect man, and took flesh of the Virgin.

Again. Things that differ in supposit are several simply, and they are not one except relatively. If then in Christ there are two supposits, it follows that He is simply two, and not one, except relatively. In that case Jesus would be no more, since a thing exists in so far as it is one: so that whatsoever is not one simply is simply non-existent.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE TEACHING OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ON THE INCARNATION OF CHRIST

FROM the foregoing chapters it is plain that according to the tradition of Catholic faith we must confess that in Christ there is one perfect divine nature, and a perfect human nature composed of a rational soul and human flesh. Also that these two natures are united in Christ, not by mere indwelling, nor accidentally as a man to his clothes, nor by mere personal habitude and property, but in one hypostasis and one supposit. In this way alone can we safeguard the teaching of the Scriptures about the Incarnation.

We have already observed that Holy Scripture, without making any distinction, ascribes divine things to the man; and to God, things pertaining to the man: wherefore in both cases it is the same one to whom reference is made. But, seeing that opposite statements cannot be true about the same subject in the same respect, and whereas the divine and human things that are said about Christ are opposed to one another,—for instance, that He suffered and was impassible, that He died and was immortal, and so on,—it follows that divine and human things must be said of Christ in different respects. Accordingly, as regards the subject of which these things are predicated, we must make no distinction, and hold to unity; but as regards the things in respect of which these predications are made, a distinction is to be observed. Natural properties are attributed to a thing in respect of its nature: thus, a stone falls down in respect of its nature as a heavy body. Accordingly, since divine and human things are attributed to Christ in different respects, it follows that in Christ there are two distinct unmixed natures. Now natural properties are attributed to something that belongs by its own nature to the genus of substance, and this is a hypostasis or supposit of that nature. And, since human and divine things predicated of Christ are attributed to one undivided subject, it follows that Christ is one hypostasis and one supposit subsisting in the human and divine natures. In this way divine things are truly and properly attributed to that man, in as much as that man indicates a supposit of both natures, human and divine: while, vice versa, human things are attributed to the Word, in as much as He is a supposit of human nature. Hence also it is clear that although the Son took flesh, it does not follow that either Father or Holy Ghost became incarnate, since the Incarnation was effected by union, not in the nature common to the three Persons, but in the hypostasis or person, wherein the three Persons are distinct; and thus, even as in the Trinity there are several Persons subsisting in one nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation is there one Person subsisting in two natures.

CHAPTER XL

OBJECTIONS AGAINST FAITH IN THE INCARNATION

THIS view of the Incarnation, as laid down by the Catholic Faith, is beset with a number of difficulties which have led the enemies of the Faith to impugn this mystery. It has been proved that God is neither a body nor a force in a body. But, if He took flesh, it follows that, after the Incarnation, either He was transformed into a body, or that He became a force in a body. Therefore it would seem impossible for God to be incarnate.

Again. Whatsoever acquires a new nature, is subject to substantial change: because when a thing is generated, it acquires a nature. Hence, if the Person of the Son of God became subsistent in human nature, it would seem that He was substantially changed.

Further. No hypostasis extends beyond the nature in which it subsists; rather does nature extend beyond the hypostasis, seeing that it includes many hypostases. And thus, if by the Incarnation the hypostasis of the Son of God became a hypostasis of human nature, it would follow that, after the Incarnation, the Son of God was not everywhere, since human nature is not everywhere.

Moreover. One and the same thing has only one quiddity, for this is its essence, which is one in each one thing. Now the quiddity of a thing is its nature, because its nature is indicated by its definition. Therefore, seemingly, one hypostasis cannot subsist in two natures.

Again. In things devoid of matter, the quiddity is not distinct from the thing, as we proved above: and this is especially true of God, who is not only His own quiddity, but also His own being. Now human nature cannot be the same as a divine hypostasis. Therefore, seemingly, a divine Person cannot subsist in human nature.

Again. Nature is more simple and more formal than the hypostasis that subsists in it: since the common nature is confined to a particular hypostasis by the addition of something material. If then a divine hypostasis subsists in human nature, it would appear to follow that human nature is more simple and more formal than the divine hypostasis: and this is altogether impossible.

Further. It is only in things composed of matter and form that the singular differs from its quiddity, in that the singular is individualized by signate matter, which is not included in the quiddity and specific nature: for this or that matter is included in the designation of Socrates, but not in the definition of human nature. Consequently every hypostasis that subsists in human nature is constituted by signate matter: and this cannot be said of a divine hypostasis. Therefore it would seem impossible for the hypostasis of the Word of God to subsist in human nature.

Moreover. In Christ the soul and body were not less effective than in other men. Now by their union, in other men, they constitute supposit, hypostasis, or person. Hence, in Christ also, a supposit, hypostasis, or person results from the union of soul and body. But this is not the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God, because this is eternal. Therefore in Christ there is, seemingly, another supposit, hypostasis, or person besides the supposit, hypostasis, or person of the Word of God.

Further. As human nature in general consists of a soul and body, so do this soul and this body make this man, or a human hypostasis. Now in Christ there were this soul and this body. Therefore from their union apparently there resulted a hypostasis: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

Again. This man Christ considered as formed merely of soul and body, is a substance. But He is not a substance in general. Therefore He is a particular substance; and consequently a hypostasis.

Moreover. If in Christ there is but one supposit of both human and divine natures, it follows that the divine hypostasis is included in the definition of this man Christ. But it is not included in the definition of other men. Therefore man is predicated equivocally of Christ and of other men: so that He would not be of the same species as we are.

Further. We have proved that in Christ are these three, body, soul, and divinity. Now the soul, being a more noble thing than the body, is not the body’s supposit but its form. Neither, therefore, is something divine a supposit of human nature; but rather ought we to say that it informs human nature.

Further. Whatsoever accrues to a thing that is already complete in being, is accidental thereto. Now, since the Word of God is eternal, it is clear that the flesh assumed by Him, accrued to Him when He was already complete in being. Therefore He came by it accidentally.

CHAPTER XLI

HOW WE ARE TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE SON OF GOD WAS INCARNATE

IN order to reply to these objections, we must begin by going into the question a little more deeply. While Eutyches maintained that the union of God with man was effected in the nature, whereas Nestorius held that it was effected neither in the nature nor in the person, the Catholic Faith teaches that it was effected in the person, and not in the nature. And so it would seem necessary to know first of all what is meant by being united in the nature, and by being united in the person.

The word nature has various meanings. It may mean either the birth of a living being, or the principle of generation and movement, or matter and form. It is also sometimes used to signify a thing’s essential definition, which contains all that belongs to the species of that thing; thus we say that human nature is common to all men, and so on. Accordingly, those things are united in nature which go to form the complete species of a thing; thus, for instance, the soul and body are united together to form the species of an animal; and, generally speaking, whatsoever things are the parts of a species. Now it is impossible for anything extraneous to be united in unity of nature to a species that is already complete, without doing away with the species. For, since species are like numbers, in which either the addition or the subtraction of unity changes the species, if any addition be made to an already complete species, the result must needs be another species. Thus, if you add sensibility to a substance that is only animate, you have another species: because animal and plant are different species. On the other hand something not belonging to the integrity of the species may be found in an individual of another species; for instance white or clothed in Socrates or

Plato, or a sixth finger, and so forth. Consequently nothing hinders things from being united in an individual, that are not united in one complete species: for instance, human nature, whiteness, and music in Socrates, and whatsoever things may be united together in one subject. And, since an individual substance is called a hypostasis, and an individual rational substance is called a person, it is reasonable to say that all these are united together in the hypostasis, or person. Hence it is possible for things not to be united in the nature, and yet united in the hypostasis or person.

Accordingly, taking the union of God and man in Christ as a fact, heretics, disregarding the path of truth, have explained this fact in various ways. Some deemed this union to be like the union of things in one nature. Such were Arius and Apollinaris, who contended that the Word supplied, in Christ's body, the place of the soul or mind. Such also was Eutyches, who held the existence of the two natures of God and man before the Incarnation, but of only one after the Incarnation. But their view involves an utter impossibility. For it is evident that the nature of the Word, from all eternity, was most perfectly complete, and wholly incorruptible and unchangeable. Therefore it is impossible for anything extraneous to the divine nature, such as human nature or a part of it, to be joined to the Word in unity of nature.

Others, realizing the impossibility of this view, adopted the contrary position. For when a thing of a certain nature receives the addition of something that does not belong to the integrity of its nature, this would seem either to be an accident, such as whiteness or music, or to bear an accidental relationship to that thing, such as a ring, clothes, a house, and the like. Seeing then that human nature is joined to the Word of God, and yet does not belong to the integrity of His nature, they concluded that human nature was united to the Word accidentally. And since it is evident that it cannot be an accident in the Word of God, both because in God there cannot be any accidents, as we have proved, and because human nature, through being in the genus of substance, cannot be the accident of anything; it seemed to follow that human nature was joined to the Word, not as an accident, but as bearing an accidental relationship thereto. Wherefore Nestorius maintained that Christ's human nature was, as it were, the temple of the Word, so that the union of the Word with human nature would be reduced to a kind of indwelling. And since a temple is individually distinct from one who dwells in it, and since individuality in human nature is personality, he concluded that human nature and the Word had distinct personalities: so that the Word and the man were two persons.

In order to avoid this difficulty, others imagined that human nature was so assumed that properly speaking, it could have no personality. They said, in effect, that the soul and body, in which the integrity of human nature consists, were assumed by the Word in such a way, that the soul was not united to the body so as to form a substance: and they said this lest they should be forced to admit that the substance thus formed was a person. They maintained that the Word is united to the soul and body, as though these were related to it accidentally, even as clothes are related to the one who is clothed: thus somewhat following in the footsteps of Nestorius.

Since all this has been refuted above, we must hold that the union of the Word with man is such that neither are the two natures fused into one; nor does the Word stand related accidentally to human nature, as a substance—a man for instance—to something extraneous, as, for instance, his house or his clothes. But we hold that the Word subsists in human nature, as made His own nature by the Incarnation, so that the body is truly the body of the Word of God, and the same with the soul: and that the Word of God is truly man. And though man cannot perfectly explain this union, we shall nevertheless endeavour as best we can to say something for the building up of faith, so as to defend the Catholic Faith from the attacks which unbelievers direct at this mystery.

In all created things nothing bears so great a resemblance to this union, as the union of soul and body. Greater still would be the resemblance, as Augustine says (Contra Felician.), were there but one intellect in all men, as some indeed have maintained. If this were true we should have to say that the already existing intellect would become united to the human concept in such a way that the two together would form one person, just as we say that the already existing Word was joined to human nature in one person. Hence, on account of this resemblance between the two unions, Athanasius says in his Creed: As a rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ. Now the body is united to the rational soul, both as the matter and as the instrument of the soul. But the above resemblance does not regard the former mode of union. For thus there would be one nature made of God and man, since matter and form are the proper constituents of the specific nature. The resemblance, therefore, regards the union of soul with the body as its instrument. In fact, the statements of the early Doctors are in agreement with this, who considered the human nature in Christ to be an instrument of the Godhead, even as the body is the instrument of the soul. For the body and its parts are the instruments of the soul otherwise than extraneous instruments: thus a man's spade is not so much his own instrument as his hand is, since many can work with that spade, whereas that hand is employed for the special work of that man's mind. Hence a man's hand is an instrument united and proper to him, whereas the spade is distinct from him and common to many. Now let us apply this to the union of God with man. All men in comparison with God are instruments of His works, for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to accomplish, according to his good will, as the Apostle says (Philip. 2:13). Now other men are employed by God as extraneous and separate instruments, so to speak, since He moves them not only to their own proper operations, but also to those that are common to all rational creatures, such as understanding the truth, loving what is good, doing what is right. But human nature was assumed by Christ, that it might be an instrument in works belonging to God alone, such as cleansing from sins, enlightening our minds by grace, and perfecting us unto eternal life. Accordingly Christ's human nature is compared to God as a proper and united instrument, as the hand is compared to the soul.

Nor is it out of keeping with the usual course of nature, that a thing be naturally the proper instrument of that which is not its form. Thus the tongue, as the instrument of speech, is the proper instrument of the understanding, and yet, as the Philosopher proves (3 De Anima), the understanding is not the form of any part of the body. In like manner, there may be an instrument that does not belong to the specific nature, and yet belongs to the individual on the part of the matter, as, for instance, a sixth finger, or something of the kind. In this way, therefore, nothing prevents our saying that human nature by its union with the Word became, as it were, the Word's instrument, not separate but united: and yet human nature does not belong to the nature of the Word, nor is the Word its form; but it does belong to the Person of the Word.

We must not, however, look for perfect resemblance in the above examples. We must realize that the Word of God was able to unite Himself to human nature in a manner far more sublime and penetrative than that of the union of the soul with any proper instrument whatsoever: especially seeing that He is united to the whole human nature through the intellect. And, although the Word of God by His power penetrates all things, as preserving and upholding them, it is possible for Him to be united in a much more sublime and ineffable manner with intellectual creatures, in as much as they are able properly to enjoy Him and participate in Him.

CHAPTER XLII

THAT IT WAS MOST BECOMING TO THE WORD OF GOD THAT HE SHOULD TAKE HUMAN NATURE

FROM what has been said it is clear that it was most becoming that the Person of the Word should assume human nature.

Since the assumption of human nature was directed to the salvation of mankind, and since the ultimate salvation of man is that man should be perfected in his intellectual faculty by the contemplation of the First Truth, it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word who proceeds from the Father by an intellectual emanation.

Again. There would seem to be a certain affinity between the Word and human nature: since man derives his species from his being rational. Now the Word is akin to reason; hence the Greek λόγος stands for word or reason. Therefore the Word was most fittingly united to the rational nature: since it is also on account of this affinity that Holy Scripture ascribes the expression image both to the Word and to man. Thus the Apostle says that the Word is the image of the invisible God (Coloss. 1:15), and that man … is the image and glory of God (1 Cor. 11:7).

Moreover. The Word bears a certain affinity not only to rational nature, but also to all creatures in general: because the Word contains the types of all things created by God, just as the craftsman has in his mind the types of all his handiwork. Accordingly, all creatures are just the real expression and reproduction of the types contained in the concept of the divine Word: for which reason all things are said to have been made by Him. It was fitting, therefore, that the Word should be united to a creature, namely human nature.

CHAPTER XLIII

THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD DID NOT EXIST BEFORE IT WAS ASSUMED, BUT WAS ASSUMED BY THE WORD AT THE MOMENT OF ITS CONCEPTION

SINCE the Word assumed human nature into unity of Person, as we have proved, it follows that human nature did not exist before it was united to the Word.

For, if it was already in existence, there must have existed, before the union, an individual with that human nature; because a nature cannot exist except in an individual. Now an individual of human nature is a hypostasis and a person. Consequently we shall have to say that the human nature to be assumed by the Word pre-existed in some hypostasis or person. Therefore if this already existing hypostasis or person remained after the nature was assumed, there would have been two hypostases or persons, one of the Word, the other, of a man: so that the union would not have taken place in the hypostasis or person: and this is against faith. On the other hand, if that hypostasis or person did not remain in the nature wherein it existed before being assumed by the Word, it must have been destroyed: for no individual can cease to be what it is, without being corrupted. Hence this man who was in existence before the union, must have been destroyed: and consequently the human nature in Him must have been destroyed also. Therefore it was impossible for the Word to assume an already existing man, in unity of person.

Moreover. It would derogate from the perfection of the Incarnation of the Word of God, if He lacked any of those things that are natural to man. Now it is natural to man to be born in human fashion: and the Word of God would not have been born in human fashion if He had assumed an already existing man. For this man would have been a perfect man from his birth: and consequently his birth could not be ascribed to the Word of God, nor would the Blessed Virgin be called the mother of the Word. Now our faith holds that He was like us in all natural things save sin; and that the Son of God, as the Apostle declares, was made and born of a woman, and that the Virgin is the Mother of God. Therefore it was not fitting that He should assume an already existing man.

Hence it follows that He united human nature to Himself from the first moment of His conception. Just as it behoved the Word of God to have a human birth, in order to be a real natural man, like us in all natural things, so was it fitting that He should have a human conception: since in the order of nature a man is conceived before he is born. Now, if the human nature about to be assumed had existed in any state whatever before being united to the Word, that conception could not be ascribed to the Word of God, so that He might be said to have a human conception. Therefore it behoved the Word of God to be united to human nature from the very beginning of its conception.

Again. In the generation of a human being, the active form aims at completing human nature in a definite individual. But, if the Word of God did not assume human nature at the very beginning of its conception, the active force, before the union, would have been directed to the formation of another human individual, that is a human hypostasis or person; and, after the union, it would have directed the whole process of generation to another hypostasis or person, namely the Word of God, who was being born in human nature. Accordingly, there would not have been one generation, since it would have been directed to two persons; nor would the whole process have been uniform, and this would seem foreign to the order of nature. Therefore it was fitting that the Word of God should assume human nature, not after conception, but at the moment of conception.

Further. The order of human generation would seem to demand that the same one should be born as was conceived, and not another: seeing that conception is directed to birth. Consequently, if the Son of God had a human birth, it was fitting that He should have a human conception, and not assume an already existing man.

CHAPTER XLIV

THAT THE HUMAN NATURE ASSUMED BY THE WORD WAS PERFECT IN BODY AND SOUL AT THE MOMENT OF CONCEPTION

HENCE it follows that the rational soul was united to the body at the very beginning of the conception.

The Word of God assumed the body through the medium of the rational soul: because the human body is not more adapted to be assumed by God than other bodies, except on account of the rational soul. Therefore the Word of God did not assume a body without a rational soul. Since then the Word of God assumed the body at the very moment of its conception, it follows that at that very moment the rational soul was united to the body.

Again. Given that which comes later in the process of generation, we must grant what comes before in that process. Now the last thing in the process of generation is a complete being, and this complete being is the individual thing generated, which in human generation is a hypostasis or person for the completion of which both a soul and body are required. Given, then, the personality of the man that is begotten, both rational soul and body must be in existence. Now the personality of the man Christ is no other than the personality of the Word of God: and the Word of God took to Himself a human body in the very moment of conception. Therefore the personality of that man was there: and consequently the rational soul must have been there also.

It would, moreover, have been unbecoming for the Word, who is the fount and origin of all perfections and forms, to be united to that which lacked form and natural perfection. Now a body in the making is, before animation, without form and natural perfection. Therefore it was unfitting for the Word of God to be united to a body without a soul: and consequently it behoved that soul to be united to the body from the very beginning of conception.

From this we may also conclude that the body assumed, was formed from the very beginning of its conception, since it was not meet for the Word of God to assume anything unformed. Now the soul, like any natural form, requires its proper matter: and the proper matter of the soul is a body with organs, since the soul is the active principle of a physical, organic body that is potentially a living being. Hence if, as already proved, the soul, from the first moment of conception, was united to the body, it follows that this same body had limbs and form from the first moment of conception. Even in the order of generation the body is limbed before the advent of the rational soul: so that if this latter has taken place, the former must have taken place already. Nor is there any reason why the body should not continue to grow until it has reached its appointed stage of development, even after the advent of the soul. Accordingly, with regard to the man assumed, we must hold that at the first moment of His conception, His body was limbed and formed, though it was not yet fully developed.

CHAPTER XLV

THAT IT WAS FITTING THAT CHRIST SHOULD BE BORN OF A VIRGIN

HENCE it follows that it behoved this man to be born of a virgin mother, without natural seed.

The seed of the male is required as the active principle in human generation, on account of the active power it contains. Now, according to what has been said, the active power, in the generation of Christ, could not be natural, since the natural power does not instantly cause the entire formation of the body, but needs time for that purpose: and the body of Christ was formed and limbed from the first moment of its conception, as we have proved. Therefore the human generation of Christ was without natural seed.

Again. In the generation of any animals whatsoever the seed of the male draws to itself the matter provided by the female: as though the power therein contained aimed at its own perfection as the end of the whole process of generation: hence, as soon as this process is complete, the seed itself, developed and complete, is the offspring that is born. Now, in the human generation of Christ, the ultimate term of generation was union with the divine Person, but not the formation of a human person or hypostasis, as proved above. Therefore, in this generation, the active principle could not be the seed of a man, but the power of God alone, so that even as, in the ordinary generation of man, the seed of the male attracts to itself the matter provided by the female, so, in the generation of Christ, the Word of God took the same matter into union with Himself.

In like manner it is clear that even in the human generation of God’s Word, there should be evidence of some property of the spiritual generation of the Word. Now a word, as produced by the utterer, whether by interior concept, or by outward speech, causes no detriment to the utterer, rather indeed does it perfect him. Therefore it was fitting that, in the process of His human generation, the Word of God should be so conceived and born, that the integrity of His Mother should remain intact. Besides it clearly behoved the Word of God, by whom all things were made and preserved in their integrity, to be born in such a manner that His Mother's integrity remained wholly unimpaired. Consequently it was fitting that He should be born of a virgin.

Nor is this manner of generation derogatory to the true and natural human nature of Christ, although He was begotten otherwise than other men. For, seeing that God's power is infinite, as proved above, and that all causes derive from it their power of producing an effect, it is evident that any effect whatsoever that is produced by any cause can, in the same species and nature, be produced by God, without the aid of that cause. Wherefore, just as the natural power in human seed produces a real man, having the human species and nature, so too the divine power which endowed the seed with that power, can produce the effects of that power, without its assistance, by forming a real man, having the human species and nature.

Someone, however, may object that, to be begotten naturally, a man's body must be fashioned naturally from the seed of a man, and from whatever it is that the woman supplies; and therefore Christ's body was not of the same nature as ours, if it was not begotten of a man's seed. But this objection is easily answered according to Aristotle's opinion, who held that the seed of the male does not form a substantial part of the embryo, but is merely the active principle; and that the whole matter of the body is supplied by the mother. Accordingly, as regards its matter, Christ's body differs not from ours: because our bodies also are formed from the material supplied by the mother.

But even if one were not to admit this opinion of Aristotle, the above objection would not stand. For likeness or unlikeness, as regards matter, depends not on the condition of the matter at the beginning of generation, but on its condition when generation is terminated: thus air generated from earth does not differ from air generated from water, because though earth and water differ at the beginning of the process, the action of the generator brings them to a same state of being. Accordingly, the material that is taken from the woman only, can by God’s power be brought to the same state, when the process of generation is terminated, as would result were the material taken from both man and woman. Consequently there will be no unlikeness through difference of material, between Christ’s body which was formed by God’s power, from material taken from His mother only, and our bodies which are formed by Nature’s power, although the material from which they are fashioned is taken from both parents. Thus the slime of the earth from which God formed the first man (who without doubt was a real man, and like us in every way) surely differs more from the material taken from both parents, than does the material taken from the woman only, from which Christ’s body was formed.

Consequently Christ’s birth of a virgin is nowise derogatory either to the reality of His human nature, or to His likeness to us. For, although the forces of nature require definite material for a definite effect to be produced therefrom, the power of God, that can produce all things out of nothing, is not confined, in His action, to definite material. Neither does it derogate from the dignity of Christ’s Mother, that she was a virgin both in conceiving and in giving birth, so as to forbid us to hail her as the true and natural Mother of God’s Son. Through the agency of the divine power she supplied the natural matter for the generation of Christ’s body: and this is all that is required on the mother’s part. Whereas all that conduces to the loss of virginity in other mothers is directed, not to motherhood, but to fatherhood, its purpose being that the seed of the male may reach the place adapted for generation.

CHAPTER XLVI

THAT CHRIST WAS CONCEIVED BY THE HOLY GHOST

ALTHOUGH every divine work that has its effect among creatures is common to all the Trinity, as we have shown above, the fashioning of Christ's body by divine power, although common to the three Persons, is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

This is, seemingly, becoming to the Incarnation of the Word. For, just as our word, which is conceived in our mind, is invisible but becomes perceptible to the senses when it is spoken; so the Word of God is invisible as regards His eternal generation in the bosom of the Father, but became visible to us through the Incarnation. Wherefore the Incarnation of God's Word is like the vocal utterance of our word. Now we give expression to our word by means of the breath (per spiritum) whereby we form words expressive of our thoughts. It is therefore fitting that the flesh of the Son of God should be formed by His Spirit. This is also in keeping with human generation. For the active power of human seed is actuated by the spirit in drawing to itself the material provided by the mother; the same power being derived from the spirit whose purity accounts for the whiteness of the foam-like semen. Accordingly, when the Word of God took to Himself a body from a virgin, it was fitting that this body should be fashioned by the Holy Ghost.

This was also fitting, as indicating the motive of the Incarnation of God's Word. For this motive could be no other but God's love for man whose nature He wished to unite to Himself in unity of person. Now, in God, it is the Holy Ghost who proceeds as love, as proved above. Therefore the work of the Incarnation is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

Moreover, Holy Scripture is wont to ascribe all graces to the Holy Ghost; because that which is freely given would seem to be bestowed through the love of the giver. Now no grace has been bestowed on man greater than his union with the divine Person. Therefore this work is fittingly ascribed to the Holy Ghost.

CHAPTER XLVII

THAT CHRIST WAS NOT THE SON OF THE HOLY GHOST ACCORDING TO THE FLESH

ALTHOUGH we speak of Christ as having been conceived by the Holy Ghost and the Virgin, the Holy Ghost cannot be called His father, in respect of His human generation, as the Virgin is called His Mother.

For the Holy Ghost did not produce the human nature in Christ out of His own substance, but by His power alone was He the active principle in its production. Consequently the Holy Ghost cannot be called Christ's father in respect of His human generation.

Moreover we should be led to a false conclusion if Christ were called the son of the Holy Ghost. For it is clear that the Word of God has a distinct personality in as much as He is the Son of God the Father. Hence, if He were called son of the Holy Ghost, according to his human nature, we might conclude that Christ was two sons: since the Word of God cannot be the son of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, since sonship refers to the person and not to the nature, it would follow that there are two persons in Christ, which is contrary to the Catholic Faith. It would also be unfitting if the Father's authority and name were transferred to another Person: and this would be the case if the Holy Ghost were called the Father of Christ.

CHAPTER XLVIII

THAT WE MUST NOT SAY THAT CHRIST IS A CREATURE

IT is also evident that, although the human nature assumed by the Word is a creature, it cannot be said, without qualification, that Christ is a creature.

To be created is to be made. Now, since being made terminates in being simply, it belongs to that which has substantial being, and this is the complete individual substance, which, if it be of intellectual nature, is called a person or again a hypostasis. On the other hand forms, accidents, even parts are not said to be made, save in reference to something, because they are not self-subsistent, but subsist in something else; hence, when a thing is made white, it is said to be made, not simply, but relatively. Now in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person besides that of the Word of God, who is uncreated, as proved above. Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature; although we can say so, with a qualification; for instance, that He is a creature, as man, or in respect of His human nature. Now, although the statement that an individual substance is made one of its proper attributes—accidents, for instance, or parts—cannot be made simply, but only relatively; nevertheless we can predicate of a subject simply whatever results naturally and appropriately from its accidents or parts: thus seeing is predicated of a man simply, as a consequence of his having eyes: curly haired, by reason of his hair, and visible, because he is coloured. Hence whatsoever results properly from human nature can be predicated simply of Christ; for instance, that He is a man, that He is visible, that He walked, and so on: whereas, whatsoever is proper to the Person cannot be attributed to Christ in reference to His human nature, except with a qualification, expressed or implied.

CHAPTER XLIX

REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST THE INCARNATION

BEARING these things in mind, we can now easily reply to the above objections against faith in the Incarnation.

We have shown that the Incarnation of the Word does not mean that the Word was changed into flesh, or united to the body as its form. Therefore from the fact that the Word became incarnate, it does not follow, as the first objection maintained, that God is really a body, or a bodily power.

Likewise, from the fact that the Word assumed human nature, we cannot conclude that He was substantially changed. No change took place in God’s Word Himself, but only in the human nature assumed by the Word. It was in reference to that nature that the Word was both begotten and born in the course of time, but not in reference to Himself.

The third objection proves nothing. A hypostasis does not extend beyond the nature from which it has its subsistence. Now the Word of God does not derive subsistence from human nature; nay rather He draws human nature to His own subsistence or personality: since He subsists, not through it, but in it. Hence nothing prevents the Word of God from being everywhere, although the human nature assumed by the Word of God is not everywhere.

This helps us to reply to the fourth objection. Every subsistent thing must have but one nature, through which it has being simply: wherefore the Word of God has being simply, through the divine nature alone, and not through human nature. It is owing to the latter that He has a particular kind of being, namely that He is a man.

The fifth objection is solved in the same way. It is impossible that the nature through which the Word subsists, be other than the Person of the

Word. Now He subsists through the divine and not through the human nature: drawing the latter to His own subsistence, so as to subsist therein, as we said before. It does not follow, then, that the human nature is identified with the Person of the Word.

Wherefore the sixth objection also is answered. For the hypostasis is less simple, either in reality or as existing in the mind, than the nature whereby it has being;—in reality, when the hypostasis is not its own nature; in the mind only, in those things where the hypostasis is identical with the nature. Now the hypostasis of the Word is not constituted simply by human nature, so as to exist by it: by it, the Word had this only, that He was a man. Hence it does not follow that the human nature is more simple than the Word, considered as Word, but only in as much as the Word is this man.

Hence follows the reply to the seventh objection. It does not follow that the hypostasis of God's Word is simply constituted by signate matter: but only in as much as He is this man. For it is only in this sense that He is constituted by human nature, as stated above.

That the human soul and body in Christ were drawn into the personality of the Word, without constituting another person besides the Person of the Word proves, not that they were less effective, but that they had greater excellence. For a thing has better being, when united to its betters, than when it is by itself: thus the sensitive soul has better being in man than in other animals: in these it is the principal form, but not in man.

Hence again we gather the reply to the ninth objection. This soul and this body were truly in Christ, and yet they did not give Him another personality from that of the Word of God, since they were assumed into the personality of the divine Word. Even so the body, when it is without the soul, has its own species: but when it is united to the soul, it takes its species from the soul.

Hereby is indicated the reply to the tenth objection. It is clear that this man Christ is a substance, not a universal but a particular, substance: also that He is a hypostasis, and yet not a distinct hypostasis from that of the Word: because human nature was assumed by the hypostasis of the Word, that the Word might subsist in the human as well as in the divine nature. Now that which subsists in human nature is an individual man. Therefore, when we say, This man, the Word is indicated.—If however someone were to apply this same argument to human nature, so as to say that it is a substance, not universal, but particular, and consequently a hypostasis, he would clearly be in the wrong. For human nature, even in Socrates or Plato, is not a hypostasis: it is that which subsists in human nature that is a hypostasis. When it is said that it is a substance, and a particular substance, the sense is not the same as when we say that a hypostasis is a particular substance. According to the Philosopher, substance has a twofold signification. In the first place it may indicate a subject in the genus of substance, namely a hypostasis; secondly, it may mean what a thing is, namely its nature. Nor are the parts of a substance called particular substances as though they subsisted of themselves: but they subsist in the whole. Hence they cannot be called hypostases, seeing that none of them is a complete substance: otherwise there would be as many hypostases in a man as there are parts.

The eleventh objection is answered thus. Equivocation consists in applying the same name to various forms, but not to different supposits. Thus there is no equivocation if man stands at one time for Plato, at another time for Socrates. Accordingly, the term man, whether applied to Christ or to other men, always indicates the same form, namely human nature, and consequently the predication here is univocal. The only way in which it has a different signification is that when it is applied to Christ, it stands for the uncreated hypostasis, whereas when it is applied to other men, it stands for the created hypostasis.

And yet the hypostasis of the Word is not said to be the supposit of the human nature, as though it were the subject, and the latter were its form, as the twelfth objection suggested. This would indeed be necessary, if the hypostasis of the Word were constituted in being simply, by the human nature, which we have shown to be false. The hypostasis of the Word is said to be the supposit of human nature, as drawing it to His own subsistence; even as a thing is drawn to something better, to which it is united.

From the fact that the Word already existed from eternity, it does not follow that human nature is joined to the Word accidentally, as the last objection concluded. The Word assumed human nature in order to be truly man. Now to be a man is to be a kind of substance. Since then the hypostasis of the Word is a man through being united to human nature, this nature is not joined to Him accidentally: for accidents do not give substantial being.

CHAPTER L

THAT ORIGINAL SIN IS TRANSMITTED BY OUR FIRST PARENT TO HIS POSTERITY

IN the preceding chapters we have shown there is nothing impossible in what the Catholic Faith affirms concerning the Incarnation of the Son of God: and consequently we must now show that it was fitting for the Son of God to take to Himself human nature. Seemingly, the Apostle assigns as a reason of this fittingness, original sin which was contracted by all men. Thus he says (Rom. 5:19): As by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners; so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just. Since, however, the Pelagian heretics denied original sin, we must prove that men are born in original sin. In the first place we must quote the words of Gen. 2:15, 17: The Lord God took man, and put him into paradise … And he commanded him saying: Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat: but of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat. For in what day soever thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt die the death. Seeing, however, that Adam did not actually die on the very day on which he ate, the words, Thou shalt die the death must be understood to mean, Thou shalt be under the ban of death. Now there would be no purpose in saying this if man were created with the necessity of dying. Consequently we must say that death and the necessity of dying is a punishment inflicted on man for sin. Now a punishment is not inflicted justly except on those who are guilty. Therefore in all who are thus punished there must be some guilt. Now all men are punished thus, even from the moment of their birth: for as soon as he is born man is under the ban of death, so that some die as soon as they are born, and are taken from the womb to the grave. Therefore some kind of sin is in them. But this is not actual sin, for infants have not the use of free-will, without which no sin is imputed to a man, as appears from what we have stated above. We must conclude, then, that they have contracted original sin.

This is expressly indicated in the words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): As by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death, and so death passed upon all men, in whom all have sinned. Now it cannot be said that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, because in that case sin would only enter into those who, by sinning, imitate the first man; and since through sin death entered into the world, only those would die who sin in imitation of the first man. But the Apostle excludes this interpretation when he goes on to say (verse 14): Death reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them who have not sinned, after the similitude of the transgression of Adam. Hence the Apostle did not mean that by one man sin entered into the world by way of imitation, but by way of origin. Moreover, if the Apostle were speaking of the entrance of sin into the world by mere imitation, he would have said that sin had entered into the world by the devil rather than by one man. Thus it is said explicitly (Wis. 2:24, 25): By the envy of the devil, death came into the world: and they follow him that are of his side.

Again. David says (Ps. 50:7): Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me. Now this cannot refer to actual sin, seeing that David was conceived and born of lawful wedlock. Therefore his words must refer to original sin.

Moreover. It is said (Job 14:4): Who can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only art? Whence it is clearly to be gathered that man contracts uncleanness through being conceived of seed. And this must refer to the uncleanness of sin, for which alone is man brought into judgement: because the preceding verse reads: And dost thou think it meet to open thy eyes upon such an one, and to bring him into judgement with thee? Therefore man from his very origin contracts a guilt that is called original sin.

Again. Baptism and the other sacraments of the Church are remedies for sin, as we shall prove further on. Now it is the universal custom of the Church to give baptism to children soon after birth. Consequently there would be no purpose in doing so unless they were stained with some sin. But this is not actual sin, because they have no free-will without which no one is accounted guilty of sin. Therefore, since God and the Church do nothing without a purpose, we must conclude that they have contracted original sin. Someone, however, may say that infants are baptized, not that they may be cleansed from sin, but that they may enter the kingdom of heaven. For they cannot enter the kingdom of heaven, unless they are baptized: since our Lord said (Jo. 3:5): Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven. But this objection is futile. No one is excluded from the kingdom of God, save on account of sin. For the end of every rational creature is to obtain beatitude, which is nowhere but in God's kingdom. And this kingdom is the orderly society of those who enjoy the vision of God, wherein true beatitude consists, as proved above. Now nothing fails to obtain its end except through some sin. Therefore, if children before being baptized, cannot enter into the kingdom of God, we must admit that there is some sin in them: and consequently, according to the teaching of Catholic faith, we must hold that men are born with original sin.

CHAPTER LI

ARGUMENTS AGAINST ORIGINAL SIN

THERE are, however, some points that would seem to be in contradiction with the truth. One man’s sin is not imputed to others: wherefore it is said (Ezech. 18:19): The son beareth not the iniquity of his father. The reason for this is that we are neither praised nor blamed for that which is not in our power. Now those things are in our power, that we do freely. Therefore the sin of the first man is not imputed to all mankind.

Someone, however, might reply that through one man sinning, all men sinned in him, as the Apostle seems to say (Rom. 5:19): and thus it is not a case of one man’s sin being imputed to another. Yet, seemingly, this reply is not conclusive; because when Adam sinned, those who were born of him were not yet in existence; they only existed virtually as in their first origin. Now only one who is actually in existence can sin, since to sin is to act. Therefore we did not all sin in Adam. And if it be said that we sinned in Adam, in the sense that he transmitted his sin to us together with our nature; this again is apparently impossible. An accident does not pass from one subject to another, and therefore it cannot be transmitted, unless its subject be transmitted. Now the subject of sin is the rational soul, which is not transmitted to us from our first parent, but is created by God for each one separately, as we have proved. Therefore sin cannot be transmitted to us from Adam through our origin.

Again. If other men contract sin from their first parent, because they trace their origin to him, it would seem that Christ must have been subject to original sin, seeing that He also traces His origin to him: and this is contrary to faith.

Moreover. That which a thing receives through its natural origin, is natural to it: and that which is natural to a thing is not its fault: thus it is not a mole’s fault that it is blind. Therefore sin could not be contracted from the first man by other men. If someone reply that sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity through their origin, considered not as natural but as vitiated; this reply will not stand. A fault does not occur in nature’s work, except through a fault in a natural principle: thus a defect in the seed of animals leads to the birth of monstrosities. Now we cannot assign any defect of a natural principle in human seed. Consequently a vitiated origin cannot account for the transmission of original sin from our first parent to his posterity.

Again. Faults in the works of nature, due to a defective principle, do not occur always or even frequently, but in the minority of cases. Therefore, if sin is transmitted by the first parent to his posterity through a vitiated origin, it will be contracted, not by all, but by a few.

Further. If a vitiated generation occasions the transmission of a defect to the offspring, this defect must be of the same kind as the fault in the origin, because like effects have like causes. Now the origin or generation of man is an act of the generating power, which has no part in the reason; and consequently it cannot be the subject of a fault of a sinful kind, since virtue and vice can only be in acts that are to some extent subject to reason: thus a man is not blamed if, on account of a vitiated generation, he is born a leper or blind. Therefore it is quite impossible for a culpable fault to be transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, through a vitiated generation.

Again. Sin does not destroy the good of nature: wherefore natural good remains even in the demons, according to Dionysius (De Div. Nom. iv.). Now generation is an act of nature. Therefore human generation could not be vitiated by the first man’s sin, in such a way that his sin would be transmitted to his posterity.

Moreover. Man begets his like in species. Hence a son is not necessarily like his parents in things that are not connected with the nature of the species. Now sin has no connection with the specific nature, since it is not according to nature; in fact, it is a corruption of the natural order. Therefore it does not follow that, because the first man sinned, other sinners should be born of him.

Again. Children take after their proximate rather than their remote progenitors. Now it may happen that the immediate progenitors are sinless, and commit no sin in the act of procreation. Therefore all men are not born sinners on account of the sin of their first parent.

Besides, if sin was transmitted by the first man to his posterity, since good is more effective in its action than evil, as we have proved, much more were Adam’s repentance and righteousness transmitted by him to others.

Moreover. If the sin of the first man is transmitted to his posterity by generation, for the same reason the sins of other parents are transmitted to their children. Thus the burden of sin would be greater in the later descendants than in the first. And this would be the case all the more if sin were transmitted from parent to child, whereas repentance cannot be transmitted.

CHAPTER LII

REPLY TO THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS

WE must, in the first place, observe that there are certain probable signs of original sin in the human race. For since God watches over men’s actions, so as to assign rewards to good deeds, and punishments to evil deeds, as we have already shown, we can conclude that where there is punishment, there has been sin. Now the whole human race suffers various punishments, both bodily and spiritual. Of bodily punishments the chief is death, to which all others are conducive and subordinate, such as hunger, thirst, and so on. Of spiritual punishments, the principal is weakness of reason, the result being that man encounters difficulty in acquiring knowledge of the truth, and easily falls into error; also that he is unable wholly to overcome his animal propensities, which sometimes even obscure his mental vision. Someone however might reply that these defects, whether of body or of soul, are not penalties but natural defects, and a necessary consequence of the conditions of matter. For the human body, being composed of contrary elements, must needs be corruptible; and the sensitive appetite must needs incline to things in which the senses delight, and which at times are contrary to reason. Again, the possible intellect is in potentiality to all things intelligible, and has none of them actually, but has by its very nature to acquire them through the senses, and therefore with difficulty acquires the knowledge of truth, and is easily led astray by the imagination.

Nevertheless, if we look at the matter rightly, it will appear sufficiently probable that, divine providence having fitted each perfection to that which is to be perfected, God has united a higher to a lower nature in order that the former might dominate the latter, and, should any obstacle to this dominion arise through a defect of nature, God by a special and supernatural act of kindness would remove it. Wherefore, since the rational soul is of a higher nature than the body, we believe that it was united to the body under such conditions, that there can be nothing in the body to oppose the soul whereby the body lives: and in like manner, if reason in man is united to his sensual appetite and his other sensitive powers, that reason is not hindered by the sensitive powers, but, on the contrary, dominates them. Hence, according to the teaching of faith, we affirm that man was, from the beginning, so fashioned that as long as his reason was subject to God, not only would his lower powers serve him without hindrance; but there would be nothing in his body to lessen its subjection; since whatever was lacking in nature to bring this about God by His grace would supply. Whereas no sooner did his reason turn away from God than his lower powers rebelled against his reason, and his body became subject to sufferings that counteract the life it receives from the soul. Accordingly, although these defects seem natural to man absolutely, if we consider his nature from its lower side, nevertheless, if we consider divine providence, and the dignity of the higher part of man’s nature, it can be proved with sufficient probability that these defects are penal, and consequently that the human race was originally infected with sin. Having made these remarks, let us now turn our attention to the objections.

It is not unreasonable, as the first objection affirmed, to say that because one man sinned all men have contracted sin through their origin, although each one is praised or blamed for his own actions. For we must not speak in the same way of things that regard the individual, as of things that regard the nature of the whole species: because, as Porphyry says, by sharing the same species, many men are like one man. Accordingly, a sin belonging to one individual or person, is not imputed to the fault of any other but the sinner, because they are different persons. But if there be a sin that pertains to the whole specific nature, it is not unreasonable that it be transmitted from one man to another, even as the specific nature is. Now sin is an evil of the rational nature, and evil is the privation of good, and, consequently, if we are to judge whether a certain sin pertains to the common nature or to a particular person, we must see what good it deprives one of. Accordingly, actual sins which are committed by mankind in general, deprive the person of the sinner of a good, such as grace and the right order among the parts of the soul: consequently they are personal sins, and when one man sins, another is not blamed. On the other hand, the first sin of the first man deprived the sinner not only of his own personal good—namely, grace and due order in the soul, but also of the good belonging to the common nature. For, as we said above, human nature was so fashioned when it was first brought into being that the lower powers were perfectly subject to the soul, the reason to God, and the body to the soul, God supplying by grace that which nature lacked for the purpose. Now this boon, which some call original justice, was bestowed on the first man in such wise that he was to transmit it together with human nature to his posterity. But when the first man sinned, his reason rebelled against God, and the consequence was that his lower powers ceased to be perfectly subject to reason, and his body to his soul. And this, not only in the first man that sinned, but also in his posterity, who were to have inherited the aforesaid original justice. Hence the sin of the first man, from whom all others are descended, according to the teaching of faith, was not only a personal sin, in so far as it deprived the first man himself of his own good, but also a sin of nature, in as much as the result of that sin was that both he and his posterity were deprived of a gift bestowed on the entire nature. Wherefore this defect transmitted by our first parent to others, is culpable also in those others, in as much as all men are reckoned as one man, through sharing in one common nature. And this sin proves to be voluntary in reference to the will of our first parent, just as the hand’s deed may be sinful, on account of the will of the first mover—namely, the reason: so that in reference to the sin of nature we look upon the members of the human race as being parts of the common nature, just as in the case of a personal sin there are various parts in one man.

Accordingly, it is true to say with the Apostle (Rom. 5:19) that, because one man sinned, all others sinned in him, as the second argument stated: not that other men were actually in him, but virtually, as in their first origin. Nor are they said to have sinned in him by their own deed, but as sharing in his nature which was corrupted by sin.

The third objection argued thus: If sin is transmitted by our first parent to his posterity, seeing that the rational soul is the subject of sin, it follows that the rational soul is transmitted together with the semen. But this does not follow. This sin of nature, which we call original sin, is transmitted in the same way as the specific nature, and although the rational soul completes that nature, it is not transmitted with the semen: the body alone is thus transmitted, being naturally adapted to receive such a soul, as proved above.

Although, according to the flesh, Christ was descended from our first parent, he did not contract the stain of original sin, as the fourth objection argued: because from our first parent he received only the matter of a human body, and the power which fashioned his body was not derived from our first parent, but from the Holy Ghost, as we have proved. Consequently he received human nature from Adam, not as from its efficient cause, but as from its material principle.

We must also note that the reason why these defects are transmitted to us through our natural origin, is that our nature is deprived of the assistance of grace, bestowed on it in our first parent, and destined, together with nature, to be transmitted to his posterity: and since this privation was the consequence of his deliberate sin, the defects resulting therefrom took the form of sin. Accordingly, these defects are both culpable in reference to their first principle, which was Adam's sin, and natural, in reference to nature already destitute: wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 2:3): We were by nature children of wrath. Thus the fifth objection is answered.

Thus it is clear that the vicious origin which is the Cause of original sin, is due to the lack of a principle—namely the gratuitous gift bestowed on human nature in its creation. In a sense this gift was natural, not because it resulted from the principles of nature, but because it was bestowed on man in such a way that it was to be transmitted by him together with his nature: the sixth objection took natural as signifying that which results from natural principles.

In the same sense the seventh objection speaks of the defect of a natural principle as belonging to the specific nature: and it is true that whatever results from this defect occurs in the minority of cases. But the defect of original sin results from our being deprived of a principle that is additional to the principles of the species, as stated above.

We must also observe that the act of the generative power cannot be an actual sin, for this depends on the will of the individual, whereas the act of the generative power is not obedient to reason or the will, as the eighth objection argued. But original sin pertains to nature; so that there is nothing to prevent its being in the act of the generative power, seeing that such acts are said to be natural.

The ninth objection can easily be solved from what has been said. By sin man is not deprived of the natural good which belongs to his specific nature: but he could, by the sin of his first parent, be deprived of the gratuitous good bestowed on his nature, as already stated.

Again, from what we have been saying, we can easily reply to the tenth objection. Since being deprived and being in want are correlatives, it follows that children resemble their parents as regards original sin, in as much as the gift bestowed on nature in the beginning would have been transmitted by parents to their posterity. Although this gift was not included in the species, nevertheless, it was given by God gratuitously to the first man, that he might transmit it to the entire species. In the same way the sin which caused man to lose that good is transmitted to the whole species. We must also observe that although a man is cleansed from original sin by the sacraments of grace, so that it ceases to be imputed to him as a sin, this cleansing regards him personally; nor is he entirely healed: whereas original sin is transmitted to posterity by an act of nature. Accordingly, even though there be no original sin in the one who generates, considered as an individual, and though there may be no sin in the act of generation, as the eleventh objection suggested, nevertheless, original sin, through infecting the nature, infects both the generator, who is nature’s principle of generation, and the act whereby he generates.

Again we must note that the actual sin of the first man affected the whole nature, because on account of the gift bestowed on it this nature was still perfect: but when this nature, through his sin, was deprived of that gift, his act became simply natural. Hence by his act he could neither satisfy for the whole nature, nor restore the gift of nature: but he could only make satisfaction, to a certain extent, for himself. This suffices as a reply to the twelfth objection.

In like manner the thirteenth objection is solved. When subsequent parents sin, nature is already deprived of the gift originally bestowed on it: and consequently their sin does not cause a defect to be transmitted to their posterity, but only one that affects them personally.

Accordingly, it is neither unfitting nor unreasonable that men should have contracted original sin, as the Pelagian heresy which denied original sin declared.

CHAPTER LIII

ARGUMENTS THAT WOULD SEEM TO SHOW THAT IT WAS NOT FITTING THAT GOD SHOULD BE INCARNATE

SINCE unbelievers look upon the doctrine of the Incarnation as folly, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:21), It pleased God by the foolishness of our preaching to save them that believe, and whereas it is foolish to preach not only what is impossible, but also what is unfitting, they attack the Incarnation not only on the ground that Catholic faith teaches what is impossible, but also because it is unreasonable and unbecoming the divine goodness. It becomes the divine goodness that all things should retain their order. Now the order of things requires that God should be exalted above all, and that man's place should be among the lower creatures. Therefore it becomes not the divine majesty to be united to human nature.

Again. If it were fitting that God should become man, this must have been on account of some consequent benefit. But whatever this benefit was, God, since He is almighty, could have brought it about by His mere will. Seeing then that whatever is done fittingly, should be done as quickly as possible, it was not fitting that God should unite human nature to Himself, for the sake of that benefit.

Further. Since God is the universal cause of all, it behoves Him especially to seek the good of the universe. But the assumption of human nature pertains only to the good of man. Therefore, if it behoved God to take some other nature, it was not fitting that He should take human nature only.

Moreover. The more things are like to each other, the more fittingly are they united together. Now the angelic nature is more like and akin to God than human nature is. Therefore it was not fitting that God should pass over the angelic nature and be united to human nature.

Again. If God took human nature, this would seem to provide an obstacle to man's understanding of the truth, which in him is a principle of knowledge. For he would be liable to fall into the error of those who deny that God is exalted above all bodies. Therefore it was of no profit to human nature that it should be assumed by God.

Moreover. We know by experience that many errors have arisen concerning the Incarnation. Therefore it would seem that it was not good for man's salvation that God should become incarnate.

Again. Of all God's works the Incarnation is apparently the greatest. Now one would expect that the greatest work would be productive of the greatest benefit. Hence if the Incarnation of God was directed to the salvation of all, it would seem fitting that He should have saved the whole human race: in fact, the salvation of all men would seem a fitting result to expect from so great a work.

Further. If God took human nature in order to save mankind, it would seem proper that His divine nature should have been made clear to men by adequate signs. Now this apparently was not the case, since other men, by God's power alone, and without God being united to their nature, worked miracles like those that Christ worked, and even greater. Therefore God's Incarnation seemingly did not provide sufficiently for man's salvation.

Again. If it was necessary for man's salvation, that God should take flesh; seemingly He ought to have taken human nature at the very beginning of the world, and not towards the end of time, seeing that there have been men since the world's beginning: for it would seem that the salvation of all previous men was neglected.

Further. For the same reason He ought to have continued to dwell with men until the end of the world, so as to teach and guide men by His presence.

Moreover. It is most profitable to man that His hope of future bliss should have a strong foundation. Now God incarnate would have inspired man with this hope much more, had He taken an immortal, impassible, and glorious flesh, and shown it to all men. Therefore, seemingly, it was unfitting that He took a body subject to death and infirmities.

Moreover. It would seem proper that He should have enjoyed an abundance of worldly possessions, and have lived in the midst of wealth and the highest honours in order to show that all the things in the world come from God. Nevertheless we are told that the contrary was the case, that He lived the life of a poor and humble man, and suffered a shameful death. Therefore, the teaching of faith concerning God incarnate would seem to be unbecoming.

Further. By suffering humiliations He hid His divinity very considerably, and yet it was most necessary that men should acknowledge His Godhead, if He was God incarnate. Therefore the teaching of faith is, seemingly, out of keeping with the salvation of mankind.

Someone might reply that the Son of God suffered death out of obedience to His Father; but this does not seem reasonable.

Obedience consists in conforming oneself to the will of one who commands. Now the will of God the Father cannot be unreasonable. Consequently, if it was not becoming for God made man to die, since death is seemingly incompatible with the divinity that is life itself, His death is not sufficiently explained by saying that He died out of obedience to the Father.

Again. God’s will is not inclined to the death of men, even of sinners, but rather that they should live, according to Ezech. 33:11, I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way, and live. Much less, therefore, could it be God’s will that the most perfect man should die.

Moreover. It seems wicked and cruel to command an innocent man to be put to death, and especially to be put to death for sinners, who deserve themselves to die. Now the man Christ Jesus was innocent. Therefore it would have been wicked, if he had suffered death at the command of God the Father.

Someone might say that this was necessary in order to show forth His humility: thus the Apostle says (Philip. 2:8): He humbled himself being become obedient unto death. But neither is this reply to the point. In the first place, humility is commended in one who has a superior to whom he can be subject, and this cannot be said of God. Therefore it was unfitting for the Word of God to be humbled unto death. Secondly, men could be sufficiently taught humility by divine words, which they are bound to believe, and by human examples. Therefore it was not necessary, as an example of humility, that the Word of God should either take flesh or submit to die.

And if it be replied again that it was necessary for Christ to suffer death and other ignominies, according to the Apostle, who says that He was delivered up for our sins (Rom. 4:25), and that He was offered … to exhaust the sins of many: neither is this to the point.

First, because only God’s grace cleanses man from sin.

Secondly, if any atonement was required, it was proper for the one who had sinned to atone: since, according to God’s just judgement, every one shall bear his own burden.

Again, if it was fitting that someone more than a mere man should atone for mankind, it were enough, seemingly, if an angel had taken flesh and offered satisfaction: since an angel has a higher nature than man.

Further. Sin is not expiated by sin; on the contrary, it is aggravated thereby. Hence, if Christ was to atone by His death, His death should have been one in which sin had no part: in other words, He should have died, not a violent, but a natural death.

Again. If it behoved Christ to die for the sins of men, He should have died more than once, since men sin often.

Someone, however, might reply that it was especially on account of original sin that it behoved Christ to be born and to suffer: since that was the sin which had infected the whole of the human race, on account of the first man’s sin. But this does not seem possible. For if other men do not suffice to atone for original sin, neither, apparently, was Christ’s death sufficient to atone for the sins of mankind, since He died in His human, and not in His divine, nature.

Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, it were surely unjust that men should still suffer punishments which Scripture declares to have been inflicted for sin.

Again. If Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, there would be no need to seek further forgiveness of one’s sins. And yet all who have their salvation at heart seek forgiveness. Therefore Christ did not take away the sins of mankind sufficiently. These and like arguments might appeal to some as indicating that the doctrine of the Catholic Faith about the Incarnation is inconsistent with the majesty and wisdom of God.

CHAPTER LIV

THAT IT WAS FITTING FOR GOD TO BE INCARNATE

NEVERTHELESS, if we consider the mystery of the Incarnation carefully and reverently, we shall discover such a depth of divine wisdom, as will surpass all human knowledge; according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:25), The foolishness of God is wiser than men. Hence it is that those who study this mystery with reverence discover more and more its marvellous secrets.

In the first place we must note that the Incarnation of God was a most effective assistance to man in his road to heaven. For we have proved that man's perfect happiness consists in seeing God face to face. Now, on account of the immeasurable distance between his nature and God's, a man might deem it impossible for him to reach a state, wherein the human intellect is immediately united to the divine essence, as the intellect is united to its idea. Consequently he would be discouraged in his search after happiness, and would hold back in despair. But when he knows that God consented to personal union with human nature, he is convinced that he can be united to God by his intellect, so as to see Him face to face. Therefore it was most fitting for God to assume human nature, in order to raise in man the hope of finding happiness; and hence it is that after Christ's Incarnation men began to have greater hopes of obtaining the happiness of heaven, according to His own words (Jo. 10:10), I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly. At the same time man is freed of the obstacles that hinder him from gaining happiness. For, since his perfect beatitude consists solely in the enjoyment of God, as we have proved, it follows that whosoever seeks his end in things beneath God, places an obstacle to his obtaining a share in true beatitude. Now, if man remained in ignorance of his own worth, he would easily be led to place his end in things beneath God. For it is through considering themselves in their corporeal and sensitive nature, which they have in common with other animals, that some seek a kind of animal happiness in things pertaining to the body and carnal pleasures. Others, considering the superiority in some respects of certain creatures over man, made such things the object of their religion, by worshipping either the world and its parts, on account of their great size and duration; or spiritual substances, angels and demons, by reason of their surpassing man, both in immortality and intellectual acumen: and so man deemed that his happiness is to be found in such things, for as much as they are above him. Now, though in certain respects man is indeed below some creatures, and in some ways like the very lowest, nevertheless, in the order of the end, nothing is above man, save only God, in whom alone man's perfect happiness consists. Accordingly, man's worth in that he is destined to be blessed with the immediate vision of God, is most fittingly indicated by God, by His taking human nature immediately to Himself. Hence we find that, as a result of the Incarnation of God, a great number of people gave up the worship of angels, demons, and all manner of creatures, renounced even the pleasures of the flesh and all bodily goods, and gave themselves to the worship of God alone. To Him alone they look for perfect happiness, in accordance with the Apostolic exhortation (Coloss. 3:1, 2), Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God: mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth.

Again. Whereas man's perfect happiness consists in a knowledge of God, surpassing the faculty of every created intellect, as proved above, it was necessary that man should have a foretaste of this knowledge, so that he might be directed towards that same knowledge in its fulness: and we have shown that this is provided by faith. Now the knowledge whereby man is directed to his last end ought to be most certain, since it is the principle on which all things are directed to the last end: so, too, those principles that we know naturally are most certain. Now we cannot have absolutely certain knowledge about a thing, unless it is either evident in itself, like the first principles of demonstration, or is resolved into self-evident premisses, like the conclusion of a demonstration. Since then faith teaches us to believe concerning God things which cannot be self-evident to us, because they surpass the faculty of the human intellect, it was necessary for these things to be revealed to man by one to whom they are self-evident. And though they are to a certain extent self-evident to all those who see the divine essence, nevertheless, in order that man's knowledge might be absolutely certain, it was necessary that it should be derived from its first principle—namely, God—to whom it is naturally self-evident, and by whom it is manifested to all. Even so, scientific certainty is not attained without recourse to the first indemonstrable principles. Therefore, that man might obtain perfect certitude about the truth of faith, it was fitting that he should be instructed by God made man, so as to receive divine instruction in a human way. Hence it is said (Jo. 1:18): No man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him: and our Lord Himself says (Jo. 18:37): For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth. And for this reason we find that, after Christ's Incarnation, men had greater evidence and more certain knowledge of divine things, according to Isa. 11:9, The earth is filled with the knowledge of the Lord.

Again. Since man's perfect happiness consists in the enjoyment of God, it was necessary for man's affections to be disposed to desire it, since he has a natural desire for happiness. Now the desire for the enjoyment of a thing is caused by love of it. Hence it was necessary for man, who seeks perfect happiness, to be urged to the love of God. But nothing is a greater incentive to love someone than the experience of his love for us. And God's love for man could not be proved more effectively than by His consenting to personal union with man: since it is peculiar to love that it unites lover and beloved, as far as this is possible. Therefore, since man seeks perfect happiness, it was necessary for God to become man.

Moreover. Friendship is based on a certain equality, and consequently it would seem that those who are very unequal cannot be united in friendship. And so, that friendship between man and God might be more intimate, it was well for man that God should become man—since friendship between man and man is natural—in order that by knowing a God made visible to us, we might be drawn to the love of things invisible.

It is also evident that heaven is the reward of virtue. Consequently those who are on their way to heaven should be disposed by virtue. Now we are incited to virtue by word and example; and a man's example and word incite us to virtue so much the more efficaciously, as we are firmly convinced of his goodness. But it was not possible to be infallibly certain of a mere man's goodness, since even the most holy men have at times been found wanting. Wherefore, that man might be strengthened in virtue, it was necessary for him to be taught virtue by the word and example of God incarnate. For which reason our Lord said (Jo. 13:15): I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do also.

Again. Just as virtue prepares man for heaven, so sin debars him therefrom. Now sin, which is opposed to virtue, debars man from heaven, not only because it brings disorder into the soul, by leading it away from its due end, but also because it offends God, to whom, as the director of human actions, man looks for this heavenly reward. Moreover, sin is contrary to divine charity, as we have fully proved. Again, when a man is conscious of sin, he loses hope, which he needs in order to go to heaven. Therefore, as sin abounds in the human race, man needs a remedy for it. But none can provide this remedy, save God alone, who is able not only to move man's will to good, so as to bring him back to the right order, but also to condone the offence committed against Himself; since an offence is not forgiven, save by the person offended. In order that man's conscience may be eased of his past sin, he must be certified of God's forgiveness. But he cannot be certified of this except by God Himself. Therefore it was fitting to the human race, and expedient for the obtainment of heavenly bliss, that God should become man, so that man would both receive from God forgiveness of his sins, and be certified of that forgiveness by God made man. Hence our Lord said (Matth. 9:6): That you may know that the Son of man hath power on earth to forgive sins: and the Apostle says (Heb. 9:14) that the blood of Christ … shall cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God.

Again. We are taught by the tradition of the Church that the whole human race is infected with sin. Now it has been proved that the order of divine justice requires that without atonement sin be not forgiven by God. But no mere man was able to atone for the sin of the whole human race, because any single mere man is something less than the whole assembly of the human race. Therefore, in order that the human race might be delivered from the common sin, it was necessary for atonement to be made by one who was both man, from whom atonement was due, and something more than man, so that his merit would suffice to atone for the sin of the whole human race. Now in the order of heavenly bliss nothing is greater than man, save God alone: because the angels, although they are above man, as regards their natural condition, are not above him in the order of the end, since their heaven is the same as his. Consequently, for man to obtain heaven, it was necessary that God should become man, in order to take away the sin of the human race. This is expressed in the words of John the Baptist concerning Christ (Jo. 1:29): Behold the Lamb of God, behold him who taketh away the sin of the world. And, again, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:18): Therefore, as by the offence of one, unto all men unto condemnation, so also by the justice of one, unto justification of life.

From these and like arguments we may conclude that far from being inconsistent with the divine goodness, it was most expedient for man's salvation that God should become man.

CHAPTER LV

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS GIVEN ABOVE AGAINST THE FITTINGNESS OF THE INCARNATION

THERE should be no difficulty in solving the objections given above.

It is not contrary to the order of the universe, as the first objection maintained, that God should become man. Although the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, nevertheless, according to the order of his nature, man has God for his end, and is adapted for union with God by his intellect. The personal union of God with man exemplifies and endorses that union, although each nature retains its own property, so that neither did the divine nature lose anything of its excellence, nor was the human nature raised above the limits of its species. We must also note that, by reason of the perfection and unchangeableness of the divine goodness, God suffers no loss of dignity through the approach, however near, of any creature, although this is a gain to the creature: even so, He communicates His goodness to creatures, without any detriment to Himself. Likewise, though God's will suffices to make all things, His wisdom requires that each individual thing, according as it is expedient for it, should be the object of His providence: thus to each thing He has fittingly appointed its appropriate cause. Consequently, although God was able by His will alone to bring about all the benefits that we ascribe to the Incarnation, as the second objection stated, it was nevertheless expedient for human nature that they should be brought about by God made man, as we may gather somewhat from the arguments given above.

The third objection is easily answered. Man is composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, standing as it were on the boundaries of both, so that whatsoever is done for man’s good would seem to affect all creatures. Thus the lower material creatures are employed by man and, to a certain extent, are subject to him: while the higher spiritual creature—namely, the angel—has the same last end to obtain as man, as we have already shown. Accordingly, it would seem fitting that the universal cause of all should assume, in unity of person, the creature in whom, more than in any other, He unites Himself to all creatures.

We must also observe that the rational creature alone acts of itself: for irrational creatures are driven by their own bias, rather than act of themselves: so that they are to be regarded as instruments rather than principal agents. Now it was fitting that God should assume a creature capable of acting of itself, as principal agent: because an instrumental agent acts through being moved to action, whereas the principal agent acts itself and of itself. Accordingly, if God were to do anything by means of an irrational creature, all that is required in accordance with that creature’s natural condition is that it be moved by God, and there is no need for it to be assumed into personal union, so as to act itself, since this would be inconsistent with its natural condition, and is consistent with the rational nature alone. Hence it was fitting that God should assume not an irrational, but a rational creature—that is to say, either an angel or a man. And though the angelic nature, as regards its natural properties, is more excellent than human nature, as the fourth objection argued, it was nevertheless more expedient for the human nature to be assumed.—First, because in man sin is reparable, in as much as his choice is not set upon a thing unchangeably, but may turn from good to evil, and return from evil to good; and man’s reason, gathering the truth from sensible objects and signs, can be led in opposite directions. On the other hand, just as an angel’s apprehension is unchangeable, since he has unchangeable knowledge by simple intuition, so too is his choice unchangeable. Consequently he is either not moved at all to evil, or if he is so moved, he is moved unchangeably: and therefore his sin is irreparable. Since then, as we learn from Scripture, the expiation of sins was apparently the chief motive of the Incarnation, it was more fitting that God should assume the human than the angelic nature.—Secondly, because God assumed the creature in unity of person, not of nature, as we have already proved. Hence it was more fitting that He should assume the human than the angelic nature; because, in man, nature and person are distinct, in as much as he is composed of matter and form; whereas, in the angel, they are not distinct because he is immaterial.—Thirdly, because an angel, by a property of his nature, is nearer to knowing God than man, whose knowledge arises from the senses. Hence, for an angel, it was enough that, through his intelligence, he learned divine things from God: whereas man's natural condition required that through his senses he should learn about himself from God: and this was done by the Incarnation. Moreover, the very distance between man and God seemed to make it more difficult for him to arrive at the enjoyment of God; wherefore he needed, more than the angel, to be assumed by God, so that he might conceive the hope of going to heaven. Again, since man was the terminus of creation, as though postulating all other creatures in the natural order of generation, he was fittingly united to the first principle of things, so as to complete the circle of creation.

The assumption of human nature by God does not prove an occasion of error, as the fifth argument suggested. The assumption of human nature, as we have stated, was made in unity of person, and not in unity of nature. Consequently there is no occasion for us to agree with those who held that God is not above all, and said that He is the soul of the world, or something of the kind. It is true, as the sixth objection states, that many errors arose concerning God's Incarnation; yet, surely, many more came to an end after the Incarnation. Even as, in keeping with the defectible nature of the creature, some evils resulted from the creation of things, although it proceeded from the divine goodness; so neither is it a matter for astonishment, if after the manifestation of the divine truth, some errors arose through the defectible nature of the human mind. And yet these errors sharpened the wits of the faithful for a more diligent search of the truth in divine things: even so does God direct to some good the evils that occur among creatures.

Although all created good is small in comparison with the divine goodness, nevertheless nothing among created things can be greater than the salvation of the rational creature, consisting, as it does, in the enjoyment of that same divine goodness. Now the salvation of mankind was the result of God's Incarnation. Therefore, as the seventh objection argued, the world derived no little benefit from the Incarnation. But it does not follow that all men should be saved through God's Incarnation, but only those who would adhere to the Incarnation by faith and the sacraments of faith. The efficacy of the Incarnation is indeed sufficient to save all men: that not all are saved is due to their evil disposition, in that they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the Incarnation, by adhering to God incarnate by faith and love. For man was not to be deprived of his free-will, whereby he can adhere to God incarnate or not adhere to Him: else man's good would be compulsory, and would be rendered unmeritorious and undeserving of praise.

The Incarnation of God was made known to man by adequate signs. The Godhead cannot be better evidenced than by those things that are proper to God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the laws of nature, by performing a work that is above nature, whose author He is. Hence it is a most appropriate proof of divinity, if works are done that transcend the laws of nature, such as giving sight to the blind, cleansing lepers, raising the dead to life. Now, Christ performed such works as these: hence, when He was asked (Lk. 7:20), Art thou he that art to come, or look me for another? He proved His divinity by these works, replying, The blind see, the lame walk, the lepers are made clean, the deaf hear, the dead rise again, etc. And there was no need to create another world, for this was neither in the plan of divine wisdom, nor in the nature of things. If, however, it be contended that like miracles are related to have been done by others, as the eighth argument suggested, we must observe that Christ's way of doing them was very different, and more God-like. Others did these things by praying; Christ, by commanding, as acting by His own power. Moreover, not only did He do these things Himself, but gave the power to do these and greater things still, to others who worked miracles by merely calling on His name. Again, Christ worked miracles not only on men's bodies, but also on their souls: which latter works are much greater. Thus, for instance, through Him and the invocation of His name, the Holy Ghost was given, by Whom men's hearts were kindled with the fire of divine love, their minds suddenly filled with the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of simple men made eloquent in declaring God's truth to the people. Such works are an evident proof of Christ's divinity, for no mere man could have done them. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:3, 4) that the salvation of mankind having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard him:

God also bearing them witness by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost.

Although God’s Incarnation was necessary for the salvation of all mankind, there was no need, as the ninth objection states, for God to become incarnate from the very beginning of the world.—In the first place, a God incarnate was necessary that man might have a remedy for sin, as stated above. Now it is not expedient to offer a man a remedy for sin, unless he first acknowledge his fault, so that no longer trusting in himself, he puts his trust in God, who alone can heal him of his sin, as stated above. Now man could presume on himself, in point of knowledge, and in point of strength. Hence it was expedient that he should be left to himself for a time, that he might learn by experience his inability to save his soul. His natural knowledge was insufficient, since, before the time of the written law, he disobeyed the law of nature: and his own strength was inadequate, since even when, by the law, he knew what was sinful, he sinned through weakness. Thus, when at length man no longer presumed either on his knowledge or on his own strength, it was expedient that he should be given an efficacious assistance against sin by Christ’s Incarnation: the grace of Christ, to wit, supplying his lack of knowledge, by removing his doubts, and strengthening him against the assaults of temptation, lest he fail through weakness. Hence it is that the human race has experienced three states, before the law, under the law, and under grace.—Secondly, perfect law and doctrine were to be given to man by God incarnate. Now such is the condition of human nature, that it does not reach perfection at once, but is led through a stage of imperfection before it reaches that of perfection. We have an example of this in the education of children: we instruct them at first in very little things, because they cannot grasp the great things from the very beginning. In like manner, if a man were to tell his audience things they have never heard before, or that are above their intelligence, they would not grasp them at once; he must prepare their minds beforehand with things that are less out of the ordinary. Accordingly, it was expedient that in things concerning his salvation, man should receive at first a slight and elementary instruction, through the patriarchs, the law, and the prophets; and that at length in the fulness of time, the perfect teaching of Christ should be published on earth. Hence, the Apostle says (Galat. 4:4): When the fulness of the time was come, God sent his Son into the world: and (ibid. 3:24, 25): The law was our pedagogue in Christ … but … we are no longer under a pedagogue.—It must also be noted that just as the coming of a great king should be preceded by heralds, that his subjects may be ready to receive him with due respect; so was it proper that the coming of God on earth should be heralded by many things, in order that men might be ready to receive God incarnate. This was done by promises and admonitions preceding him, whereby man's mind was prepared to believe the more easily in one who was already announced, and to receive Him the more earnestly on account of the promises made of old.

Although the coming of God incarnate into the world was so necessary for man's salvation, there was no need for Him to live among men until the end of the world, as the tenth objection contended. This would have been detrimental to the reverence which men owe to the incarnate God, since, seeing Him in the flesh and like the rest of men, they would have esteemed Him no better than others. On the other hand, when He withdrew His presence from among men, after doing wonders on earth, they began to revere Him all the more. For this very reason He did not give His disciples the fulness of the Holy Ghost, while as yet He lived among them, because His absence would make their souls more ready to receive the gifts of the spirit. Hence He said to them (Jo. 16:7): If I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you: but, if I go, I will send him to you.

It was not expedient for God to take impassible and immortal flesh, as the eleventh objection stated, but rather that He should assume a flesh that was subject to suffering and death.—In the first place, it was necessary for man to know of the blessing bestowed on him through the Incarnation, in order that he might be inflamed with divine love. Now, that the truth of the Incarnation might be evident to man, it was necessary that God should take flesh like that of other men—namely, passible and mortal. For, had He taken impassible and immortal flesh, men who were unacquainted with flesh of that kind would have deemed it to be imaginary and not real.—Secondly, it was necessary for God to take flesh, in order to atone for the sin of mankind. Now, as we have shown, one man can atone for another; on the condition, however, that he take upon himself willingly the punishment due to another and not due to himself. And the punishment resulting from the sin of the human race is death as well as other sufferings of the present life, as indicated above. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12) that by one man sin came into the world, and by sin death. Hence it was expedient that God should take suffering and mortal flesh without sin, so that by suffering and dying for us He would make atonement and take sin away. This is expressed in the words of the Apostle (Rom. 8:3), God sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh—that is to say, “having flesh like to that of sinners, passible and mortal”: and he adds, that of sin he might condemn sin in the flesh—that is to say, “that by the pain He bore in His flesh for our sins He might take our sins away.”—Thirdly, since His flesh was subject to suffering and death, He was the more able to give us an example of virtue, by His fortitude in overcoming the sufferings in the flesh, and by the godly use He made of them.—Fourthly, we are the more raised to the hope of immortality, seeing that He was transformed from the state of suffering and mortal flesh, to that of a flesh that knows neither suffering nor death: and so we also hope that it will be the same with us, who are now clothed in flesh, passible and mortal. Whereas had He taken impassible and immortal flesh from the very first, we who know ourselves to be mortal and corruptible would have had no reason to hope for immortality.—Moreover, the office of Mediator required that He should be a partner with us in suffering and mortal flesh, and with God in power and glory, so that He might take away from us that which He shared with us—namely, suffering and death; and lead us to that which He shared with God: since for this was He Mediator, that He might unite us to God.

In like manner it was not expedient that God incarnate should, in this world, lead a life replete with wealth and the highest honour or dignity, as the twelfth objection argued.—In the first place, seeing that man’s mind was given to earthly things, He came to withdraw it from them, and to raise it to heavenly things. Hence it behoved Him, by His example, to draw men to the contempt of riches and of other things on which worldly men set their heart, and that He should lead a poor and hidden life in this world.—Secondly, if He had abounded in riches, and occupied a high position, the works He did as God would have been put down to His worldly power rather than to His Godly might. Hence it was a very strong proof of His divinity that, without the help of the secular arm, He converted the whole world to better things.

Hence, it is plain how the thirteenth objection is to be answered. It is, indeed, far from being untrue that, according to the Apostle’s teaching, the incarnate Son of God suffered death in obedience to His Father’s command. God’s commands to men concern acts of virtue; and according as a man’s virtuous acts are more perfect, the more is he obedient to God. Now the greatest of the virtues is charity, to which all the others are referred. Hence Christ, whose act of charity was most perfect, was most obedient to God: for no act of charity is more perfect than that a man die for love of another, as our Lord Himself declared (Jo. 15:13), Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Therefore Christ, by dying for the salvation of man, and for the glory of God the Father, performed an act of perfect charity, and was most obedient to God.

Nor was this incompatible with His Godhead, as the fourteenth objection averred. For the union was so made in the Person that both natures retained their respective properties, divine, namely, and human, as we have stated above: hence, though Christ suffered even death, besides those things which belonged to His human nature, His Godhead remained impassible, although on account of the unity of person, we say that God suffered and died. This is exemplified in ourselves, since although the body dies, the soul remains immortal.

It must also be observed that although God wills not the death of man, as the fifteenth objection stated, nevertheless He wills the virtue whereby man suffers death with fortitude and braves the danger of death through charity. Thus did God will Christ’s death, in as much as Christ accepted death through charity, and bore it with fortitude.

Hence it is clear that it was not wicked and cruel for God the Father to have willed Christ’s death, as the sixteenth objection argued. For He did not compel Him against His will, but it pleased Him that Christ should accept death through charity: indeed He wrought this charity in Christ’s soul.

Likewise there is nothing unseemly in saying that Christ was willing to suffer death on the cross, in order to give an example of humility. It is true, as the seventeenth objection asserted, that humility is not in God: since the virtue of humility consists in this, that a man keeps to his own place, and does not reach out to things above him, but is subject to his superior. Hence it is evident that humility is not becoming to God, who has no superior, but is above all. If however someone out of humility, subject himself at times either to an equal or to an inferior, this is because he looks upon as superior to himself in some respect, one who is simply his equal or inferior.

Accordingly, though the virtue of humility is not becoming to Christ in His divine nature, it is becoming to Him in His humanity. And His humility is rendered the more praiseworthy by reason of His divine nature: because personal worth adds to the praise of humility, as for instance when a great man has through necessity to suffer an indignity. Now no man is of greater worth than one who is God: and consequently most praiseworthy was the humility of the Man-God, who suffered the infamies which it behoved Him to suffer for man's salvation. For pride had made men lovers of worldly glory. Wherefore, that He might transform man's mind from the love of worldly glory to the love of divine glory, He was willing to suffer death, not any kind, but the most humiliating death. There are those who, though they fear not death, abhor an ignominious death, and it was that men might despise even this that our Lord heartened men by the example of His death.

Again, although men might have been taught humility by divine discourses, as the eighteenth objection urged, nevertheless deeds incite more to action than words, and all the more effectively, as the goodness of the doer is known with greater certainty. So that however many other men might be examples of humility, it was still most expedient that we should be incited by the example of a Man-God, who certainly could not err, and whose humility is all the more wonderful as His majesty is the more sublime.

It is also clear from what has been said that it behoved Christ to suffer death, not only that He might give an example of the contempt of death for love of the truth, but also that He might wash away the sins of others. This was done when He who was sinless was willing to suffer the death due to sin, in order that He might take upon Himself the punishment due to others by atoning for them. And, though God's grace alone suffices for the remission of sins, as the nineteenth objection argued, nevertheless when sin is remitted something is required of him whose sin is forgiven—namely, that he offer satisfaction to the one he offended. And seeing that other men were unable to do this for themselves, Christ did so for all, by suffering a voluntary death through charity.

And although in the punishment of sins the sinner himself should be punished, as the twentieth objection urged, nevertheless in the atonement for sin, one man can bear the punishment of another. The reason is that when a punishment is inflicted for sin, we consider the wickedness of the person to be punished: whereas when it is a question of atonement, when a person, in order to placate one whom he has offended, accepts punishment willingly, we look at the charity and good-will of him who atones; and especially when one man atones for another. Consequently one man's atonement for another man is acceptable to God, as we have shown.

No mere man can make satisfaction for all mankind, as proved above: nor could an angel suffice for the purpose, as the twenty-first objection suggested. An angel, though superior to man in certain natural properties of his, in the participation of heavenly bliss, to which man was to be restored by means of atonement, is man's equal. Moreover, man's dignity would not be fully repaired if he were beholden to an angel for his atonement.

It must be borne in mind, however, that Christ's death derived its power of atonement from His charity whereby He accepted death voluntarily, and not from the wickedness of His executioners, who sinned by slaying Him: for, as the twenty-second objection states, sin is not blotted out by sin.

Although Christ's death atoned for sin, there was no need for Him to die as often as men sin, as the twenty-third objection maintained. Christ's death sufficed to expiate the sins of all men; both by reason of the sublime charity whereby He suffered death, and on account of the dignity of the person who made satisfaction, since He was both God and man. And it is clear that even in human affairs, the higher a person is placed, of so much greater account is the punishment suffered by him, whether in reference to the humility and charity of the sufferer, or to the guilt of the offender.

Christ's death sufficed to atone for the sins of all mankind: because, although He died only in His human nature, as the twenty-fourth objection argued, yet His death was rendered precious by the dignity of the person who suffered, the Person, namely, of God the Son. For, just as it is a greater crime to injure a person of greater dignity, so is it a mark of greater virtue and of greater charity, that a person of higher rank suffer willingly for others.

Yet although by His death Christ made sufficient satisfaction for original sin, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-fifth objection argued, that the penalties resulting from original sin still remain in all, even in those who have become participators in Christ's redemption. It was fitting and profitable that the punishment should remain after the guilt had been removed. In the first place, that the faithful might be conformed to Christ, as members to their head. Wherefore, just as Christ bore many sufferings before entering into everlasting glory, so was it fitting that His faithful should suffer before attaining to immortality. Thus they bear in themselves the emblems of Christ’s suffering, that they may obtain the likeness of His glory; according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 8:17), Heirs indeed of God, and joint-heirs with Christ: yet so if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him.—Secondly, if man were to become immune from death and suffering, as soon as he comes to Christ, many would come to Him for the sake of these advantages of the body rather than for the sake of the good of the soul: and this is against Christ’s purpose, since He came into the world to draw men away from the love of bodily goods to spiritual things.—Thirdly, if men became impassible and immortal as soon as they came to Christ, they would be compelled, in a sense, to believe in Christ: and this would diminish the merit of faith.

Although Christ, by His death, atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind, as the twenty-sixth objection argued, each one must seek the means of his own salvation. Christ’s death is by way of being a universal cause of salvation, just as the sin of the first man was like a universal cause of damnation. Now a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual, that the latter may have its share in the effect of the universal cause. Accordingly, the effect of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through carnal origin: and the effect of Christ’s death reaches each individual through spiritual regeneration, whereby man is united to and incorporated with Christ. Therefore each one must seek to be regenerated by Christ, and to receive the other things in which the power of Christ’s death is effective.

Hence it follows that the outflow of salvation from Christ to mankind is not through the channel of natural procreation, but through the endeavour of the good-will whereby a man adheres to Christ; consequently that which each one receives from Christ is his own personal good; so that it is not transmitted by him to his children, as the sin of our first parent is, through having its source in natural procreation. Hence it is that although parents be cleansed of original sin by Christ, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-seventh objection argued, that their children be born in original sin, and need the sacraments of salvation.

In some measure then we have shown that the teaching of the Catholic faith concerning the mystery of the Incarnation is neither impossible nor unreasonable.

CHAPTER LVI

OF THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENTS

WE have already observed that Christ’s death is a kind of universal cause of man’s salvation, and that a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual effect. Consequently it was necessary for man to be supplied with certain remedies, so that thereby the benefit of Christ’s death might be brought to him. These remedies are called the sacraments of the Church: and it was expedient that they should be supplied to man under the guise of visible signs.

First, because God provides for man, as for other things, according to the condition of his nature. Now it is a condition of man’s nature that he be naturally led to things spiritual and intelligible by objects of sense. Therefore it was expedient for man to receive spiritual remedies under the guise of sensible signs.

Secondly, Instruments should be proportionate to the first cause. Now the first and universal cause of man’s salvation is the incarnate Word, as we have already stated. Wherefore it was fitting that the remedies whereby the power of the universal cause reaches mankind should bear some likeness to that cause—namely, that in them the divine power should work invisibly under visible signs.

Thirdly, man had fallen into sin by adhering to visible things unduly. Lest therefore it might be thought that visible things are evil by nature, and that for this reason it was sinful to adhere to them; it was expedient that by means of visible things man should receive salutary remedies. For thus it was made evident that visible things are by their nature good, as being created by God; and that they become hurtful to man, through his adhering to them inordinately; whereas they are beneficial to him, as long as he makes proper use of them.

Hereby we refute the error of certain heretics, who would remove all such visible elements from the sacraments of the Church. And naturally so, since they deem all visible things to be evil by nature, and to be produced by an evil author. We have refuted this in the Second Book.

Nor is it unreasonable that spiritual well-being be dispensed by means of visible and corporeal things; since these visible elements are, as it were, instruments of God’s Incarnation and Passion. Now an instrument is effective not by virtue of its nature, but by virtue of the principal agent, by whom it is applied to act. So too these visible elements effect spiritual well-being, not by any property of their nature, but by Christ’s institution, from which they derive their instrumental efficacy.

CHAPTER LVII

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE SACRAMENTS OF THE OLD AND OF THE NEW LAW

THE next point to consider is that since these visible sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion, and in a certain way represent it, they ought to be of such a nature as to be in keeping with the salvation wrought by Christ. Now this salvation, before Christ’s Incarnation and death, was indeed promised, but not actually realized: the Word by His Incarnation and Passion wrought this salvation. Accordingly, the sacraments which preceded Christ’s Incarnation needed to be such as to signify, and, so to speak, promise salvation: whereas the sacraments that followed Christ’s Passion needed to be such as to give salvation to man, and not merely signify it.

Thus we avoid the opinion of the Jews, who believe that the sacraments of the law, as being instituted by God, ought to be observed for ever, since God repents not, neither does He change. But it does not argue change or repentance in a man, if he makes various arrangements to fit various times. Wherefore, even as a father gives certain commands to his son when a child, and others when he is grown up, so too God delivered one kind of sacraments and precepts before the Incarnation, to signify the future, and another kind after the Incarnation, to show forth the present and commemorate the past.

Still more absurd is the error of the Nazarenes and Helonites, who held that the sacraments of the law are to be observed together with (those of) the Gospel: since such an error implies a contradiction. By observing the sacraments of the Gospel they admit that the Incarnation and other mysteries of Christ are things of the past: whereas, by observing the sacraments of the law, they hold that those things are yet to come.

CHAPTER LVIII

THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW

SINCE, as stated above, the remedies of spiritual welfare have been given to man under sensible signs, it follows that the remedies which give life to the soul differ from one another in a manner that corresponds with the life of the body.

In the life of the body there is a twofold order. There are those who propagate and direct this life in others, and there are those who are propagated and directed, with this life in view. Three things are essentially necessary to the life of the body, and a fourth is required accidentally. In the first place, a thing needs to receive life by generation or nativity; secondly, it needs growth so as to attain to its proper size and strength; thirdly, it needs nourishment, for the preservation of the life thus generated and developed. These are essentially necessary to natural life, since without them the body cannot live: hence to the vegetative soul which is the principle of life, are assigned the three natural forces of generation, growth, and nutrition. Since, however, the life of the body meets with obstacles, which cause the body to ail, a fourth thing is necessary accidentally, and this is that the living being be healed of its ailments.

Accordingly, there are also in the spiritual life—first, spiritual regeneration by Baptism; secondly, spiritual growth bringing the soul to perfect strength by Confirmation; thirdly, spiritual nourishment by the sacrament of the Eucharist; and fourthly, spiritual healing, which is given either to the soul only, by the sacrament of Penance, or, when it is expedient, to the body through the soul, by the sacrament of Extreme Unction. These concern those who are propagated and safeguarded in the life of the soul. The propagators and directors of the life of the body are required from two points of view—namely, in respect of natural origin, which concerns the parents, and in respect of state control, whereby man is assured a peaceful life, and this regards kings and governors. Thus is it also in the life of the soul. There are those who propagate and safeguard the spiritual life, by a purely spiritual administration; to these corresponds the Sacrament of Orders; and these are those who propagate and safeguard the spiritual life by ministering to both body and soul: this is the object of the sacrament of Matrimony in which husband and wife are joined together, in order to beget children, and bring them up in the fear of God.

CHAPTER LIX

BAPTISM

IN accordance with what we have been saying, we shall be able to gather what are the peculiar effects and the appropriate matter of each sacrament. And first, with regard to spiritual regeneration, which is the result of Baptism.

The generation of a living thing is the change of a lifeless into a living being. Now man is deprived of spiritual life in his origin, by original sin, as we have already stated, and whatsoever sins a man commits in addition to this, deprive him of life. Hence it was necessary that Baptism, which is spiritual birth, should have the power to remove original sin and all the actual sins a man has committed. Now the sensible sign in a sacrament should be adapted to signify the spiritual effect of that sacrament: and water is the easiest and handiest means of removing dirt from the body. Therefore Baptism is fittingly conferred with water, hallowed by the Word of God. Moreover, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and since that which is generated loses its previous form and the properties resulting therefrom, it follows that Baptism, which is spiritual generation, removes not only sins which are contrary to spiritual life, but also all guilt of sin: so that it not only washes sin away, but removes all debt of punishment. Hence no satisfaction for sin is demanded in the sacrament of Baptism.

Again. By generation a thing acquires its form; hence it acquires, at the same time, the operation that results from that form, and the place that is becoming to it: thus, as soon as it is kindled, fire tends upwards as towards its proper place. Wherefore, since Baptism is spiritual generation, as soon as a man is baptized he is fit for spiritual action, such as the reception of other sacraments and so forth; and a place befitting the spiritual life—

namely, eternal happiness—is due to him. For this reason, if a man die immediately after being baptized, he is forthwith admitted into heaven; wherefore Baptism is said to open the gates of heaven.

Again we must observe that a thing can be born but once: so that, since Baptism is spiritual generation, a man is but once baptized. It is also evident that the disorder which, through Adam, came into the world, infects man but once: wherefore Baptism, which is chiefly a remedy for that disorder, may not be repeated. It is also a general rule that, when a thing is once consecrated, so long as it remains intact it must not be reconsecrated, lest the consecration seem to have been invalid. Consequently, since Baptism is a kind of consecration of the person baptized, it must not be repeated: and thus the error of the Donatists or Rebaptizers is refuted.

CHAPTER LX

CONFIRMATION

THE perfection of spiritual strength is attained, properly speaking, when a man dares to confess his faith in Christ in the presence of anyone, whosoever it be; and is not held back by confusion or fear: since fortitude dispels inordinate fear. Accordingly, the sacrament whereby spiritual strength is conferred on one who is regenerate, makes him a soldier of Christ's faith. And, as soldiers carry the banner of the prince under whom they fight, those who receive the sacrament of Confirmation receive the banner of Christ—namely, the sign of the cross—by which he fought and conquered. They receive this sign on their brow, to indicate that they are not ashamed to make public profession of their faith in Christ. Moreover, the cross is signed on them with a mixture of oil and balsam, called chrism: the reason of which is as follows. Oil signifies the power of the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ, as the word implies, was anointed: so that Christians take their name from Christ, as fighting under Him. Balsam, on account of its fragrance, signifies a good name, which those should have, who live among worldly people, that marching forth on to the field of battle from the hidden stronghold of the Church, they may make public profession of their faith in Christ. Moreover, this sacrament is fittingly conferred by bishops only. For they are the commanding officers of the Christian army: and in worldly warfare it belongs to the commander-in-chief to choose those whom he appoints to military service. Hence those who receive this sacrament are chosen for service in the spiritual combat: for which reason the bishop lays his hand upon them, to signify that they receive strength from Christ.

CHAPTER LXI

THE EUCHARIST

JUST as the life of the body needs material nourishment, not only that the body may grow, but also for its natural upkeep, lest it wear away through continual dissolution, and lose all its strength: so too was spiritual nourishment needed for the spiritual life, so that those who have been born again may both be sustained and grow in virtue. And since spiritual effects are bestowed under visible symbols, as stated above, it was fitting that this spiritual element should be given to us under the forms of those things which man uses most commonly for the nourishment of the body. Such are bread and wine: wherefore this sacrament is conferred under the appearances of bread and wine.

We must take note however that in corporeal things there is a difference between the union of begetter with begotten, and that of nourishment with the subject nourished. The begetter and the begotten need not be united in substance, but only in likeness and power: whereas nourishment needs to be united to the body nourished in its very substance. Consequently, that the material symbols may correspond to their spiritual effects, in Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, the mystery of the Incarnate Word is united to us in one way; and in another way in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual nourishment. The Word Incarnate is present in the sacrament of Baptism by His power only: whereas we believe Him to be present in the sacrament of the Eucharist, in His very substance. And because our salvation was consummated by Christ’s passion and death, wherein His blood was separated from His body, the sacrament of His body is delivered to us separately under the form of bread, and His blood under the form of wine: so that this sacrament is a memorial and representation of our Lord’s Passion. Thus were fulfilled our Lord’s words (Jo. 6:56), My flesh is meat indeed, and my blood is drink indeed.

CHAPTER LXII

THE ERROR OF UNBELIEVERS CONCERNING THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

EVEN as, when Christ spoke the above words, some of the disciples were troubled and exclaimed (Jo. 6:61): This saying is hard; and who can hear it? so again heretics have arisen and denied the truth of the Church’s teaching. They say that this sacrament contains the body and blood of Christ, not in reality, but only in signification. Thus, when Christ said, This is my body, His meaning would be, “This signifies or represents My body,” in the same way as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:4), And the rock was Christ—i.e., represented Christ. To support this interpretation they quote all the similar expressions of Scripture.

As a plea for holding this opinion, they allege the words of our Lord who, wishing to allay the scandal occasioned to His disciples by His speaking of His body and blood as meat and drink, explained Himself by saying (Jo. 6:64): The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life, as though His previous statement were to be taken, not literally, but in a spiritual sense.

Moreover, they are led to hold this view by the many difficulties which would seem to follow from the teaching of the Church in this matter, and on account of which this saying of Christ and of the Church seems hard to them.

In the first place, it is hard to see how the true body of Christ begins to be present on the altar. A thing begins in two ways, to be where it was not before: either by local movement, or by something else being changed into it: thus fire begins to be in a place, either by being kindled there, or by being brought there. Now it is clear that the true body of Christ was not always present on this or that altar: since the Church declares that Christ ascended bodily into heaven. And it is seemingly impossible for anything here below to be changed anew into Christ's body. For surely nothing is changed into that which is already in existence, since that into which a thing is changed, acquires existence by that change. And it is evident that Christ's body was already in existence, through having been conceived in the Virgin's womb. Consequently it is seemingly impossible that He begin to be present on the altar through something else being changed into Him.—But neither could He begin to be there by local movement; since whatsoever is moved thus begins to be in another place in such a way as not to be where it was before. And so, since Christ begins to be present on this altar where this sacrament is being enacted, we shall have to say that He is no longer in heaven whither He had ascended. Moreover no local movement terminates in two places at the same time. Now it is clear that this sacrament is celebrated on several altars simultaneously. Therefore it is impossible that Christ begin to be present there by local movement.

A second difficulty is one of place. As long as a thing remains entire, its parts are not scattered about in various places. Now, in this sacrament, it is plain that the bread and wine exist apart in separate places. If then Christ's flesh be under the appearance of bread, and His blood under the appearance of wine, it would seem to follow that Christ does not remain entire, but that whenever this sacrament is enacted His blood is separated from His body.—Moreover it seems impossible for a greater body to be enclosed in the space of a smaller body. And yet it is evident that Christ's body is greater in quantity than the bread that is offered on the altar. Therefore seemingly it is not possible for the whole body of Christ to be where there seems to be bread. And if His whole body is not there then, but only part of it, we come back to the first difficulty, namely, that whenever this sacrament is enacted, the parts of Christ's body are separated.—Further, one body cannot be in several places. Yet it is clear that this sacrament is celebrated in several places. Therefore, seemingly, it is impossible for Christ's body to be truly present in this sacrament: unless one were to say that one part of Him is here, and another part there. And thus again it follows that the celebration of this sacrament involves the division of Christ's body into parts: whereas it would seem that the size of Christ’s body is insufficient to be divided into as many parts as there are places in which this sacrament is enacted.

A third difficulty arises from what our senses perceive in this sacrament. Even after the consecration, we clearly perceive all the accidents of bread and wine, namely, colour, taste, smell, shape, quantity, and weight: and about these things we cannot be deceived, because the senses are not deceived about their proper sensible objects. Now these accidents cannot be subjected in Christ’s body: nor can they be in the air immediately surrounding it: since several of them are natural accidents, and require a subject of a certain particular nature differing from that of the human body or the air. Nor can they exist by themselves, seeing that the very essence of an accident is to be in something: and accidents, since they are forms, cannot be individualized, save by a subject: so that, apart from a subject, they are universal forms. It follows then that these accidents are in their respective determinate subjects, namely, the substances of bread and wine. Therefore the substance of bread and wine is present, and not the substance of Christ’s body: since two bodies, seemingly, cannot be in the same place.

A fourth difficulty arises from the fact that the bread and wine have the same action, and undergo the same changes, after the consecration, as before. Thus the wine, if it were taken in great quantity, would heat and inebriate: the bread would strengthen and nourish. Moreover, if they be kept for a long time and carelessly, they are liable to putrefy, and to be consumed by mice. Again, they can be burnt and turned into ashes and steam. All these things are incompatible with Christ’s body, which according to faith is impassible. Therefore it would seem that the substance of Christ’s body cannot be present in this sacrament.

A fifth difficulty regards especially the breaking of the bread: since this breaking is apparent to the senses; and is impossible without a subject. And it is absurd to say that the subject of that breaking is Christ’s body. Therefore, seemingly, Christ’s body is not there, but the substance of bread and wine.

For these and like reasons the teaching of Christ and the Church appears to be hard.

CHAPTER LXIII

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING DIFFICULTIES: AND FIRST WITH REGARD TO THE CHANGING OF THE BREAD INTO CHRIST'S BODY

ALTHOUGH the operation of the divine power in this sacrament is too sublime and hidden for human research, lest unbelievers should deem the teaching of the Church on this question to be impossible, we must endeavour to show that it involves no impossibility whatsoever.

The first point to consider, then, is how Christ's body begins to be present under this sacrament. It is, in fact, impossible for this to take place by local movement of Christ's body: both because it would follow that it ceases to be in heaven, whenever this sacrament is enacted; and because then this sacrament could only be celebrated in one place at a time, since the same local movement cannot terminate in more than one place; and because local movement cannot be instantaneous but needs time, whereas the consecration is effective in the last instant of the pronouncement of the words. It remains, therefore, to be said that the true body of Christ begins to be present in this sacrament, through the substance of the bread being changed into the substance of His body, and the substance of the wine into the substance of his blood.

Hence we see how false are the opinions of those who say that in this sacrament the substance of the bread exists together with the substance of Christ's body, as well as the opinion of those who say that the substance of the bread is annihilated, or that it is reduced to primal matter. In either case it follows that, in this sacrament, Christ’s body begins to be present by local movement: and we have proved this to be impossible.

Moreover, if the substance of the bread is present in this sacrament together with Christ’s body, He should have said, Here is my body, rather than, This is my body: because Here points to the substance seen, which would be the substance of bread, if it remains in this sacrament together with Christ’s body.

Likewise it is seemingly impossible that the substance of the bread be wholly annihilated. It would follow that a considerable portion of matter originally created has returned into nothingness, on account of the frequent celebration of this mystery. Nor is it becoming that the divine power should annihilate anything in the sacrament of salvation.

It is impossible for the substance of the bread to be reduced to primal matter, since primal matter cannot exist without a form. Unless indeed primal matter be taken to signify the elementary bodies: but then, if the substance of the bread is resolved into these, this would, of necessity, be perceptible to the senses; seeing that the corporeal elements are objects of sense. Moreover this would involve local change and the corporeal alteration of contraries, which cannot occur instantaneously.

It must however be observed that this changing of the bread into Christ’s body is brought about in a manner different from all natural changes. In all natural changes, the subject remains, in which various forms succeed one another: and these forms may be either accidental—as when white is changed into black—or substantial—as when air is changed into fire: hence these are called formal changes. But in the aforesaid change, one subject passes into another, and the accidents remain: wherefore this is called a substantial change. How and why these accidents remain, we shall discuss later on. At present we have to inquire how one subject is changed into another: since nature cannot do this. For every work of nature presupposes matter, whereby subjects are individualized: so that nature cannot make this substance to be that substance; for instance, that this finger be that finger. But matter is subject to the divine power; since by it was it brought into being: wherefore it is possible, by the divine power, for this or that individual substance to be changed into this or that already existing substance. For just as, by the power of a natural agent, whose operation does not go beyond the changing of a form in an already existing subject, the whole of one thing is changed into the whole of another by a change of species or form (for instance this air into this already kindled fire), so by the power of God, which presupposes no matter, but produces it, this matter is changed into that matter and, consequently, this individual into that; for matter is the principle of individuality, just as form is the principle of the species. Now it is clear that in the aforesaid change of the bread into Christ's body there is no common subject remaining after the change, seeing that a change is wrought of the primal subject which is the principle of individuality. And yet something must remain, in order that it should be true to say, This is my body: which words both signify and effect this change. And since, as we have proved, neither the substance of the bread, nor any prior matter remains, it follows that there remains that which is besides the substance of the bread: namely, that which is accidental to it. Therefore the accidents of the bread remain even after the aforesaid change.

Among these accidents a certain order is to be noted. Of all accidents, dimensive quantity adheres most closely to substance: afterwards, with quantity as a medium, the substance is affected with qualities: for instance with colour by means of the surface. Hence the division of the other accidents is incidental to the division of quantity. Further, qualities are the principles of actions and passions, as well as of certain relationships, for instance of father and son, master and servant, and so on; while some relationships are founded immediately on quantity, for instance greater and lesser, double and half, and the like. Accordingly, after the aforesaid change, the accidents of the bread must be said to remain in such wise, that dimensive quantity alone remains without a subject, while the qualities are founded thereon as their subject, and consequently actions, passions, and relations also. Wherefore, in this change, the contrary happens to that which is the rule in natural transmutations, where the substance remains as the subject of change, while the accidents are changed: whereas here, on the contrary, accident remains and subject passes away. This change cannot, properly speaking, be described as a movement in the physical sense, that requires a subject: it is a kind of sequence of substances, just as in creation existence follows non-existence, as stated above.

This then is one reason why the accident of the bread must needs remain, so that something may be found to remain in the aforesaid change. But there is yet another cogent reason. If the substance of the bread be changed into Christ’s body, and the accidents of the bread pass away, the result of such a change would be that Christ’s body, in its substance, is not where the bread was before; since Christ’s body would bear no relation to that place. On the other hand, after the change, the dimensive quantity, whereby the bread occupied that place, remains; while the substance of the bread is changed into Christ’s body, which thus comes to be under the dimensive quantity of the bread, and consequently occupies the place of the bread; by means however of the bread’s dimensions.

Other reasons might be assigned, both from the point of view of faith which is of things invisible, and from the point of view of merit, which is so much greater as this sacrament is more invisibly enacted: for Christ’s body is hidden under the accidents of bread, with a view to a more handy and more fitting use of this sacrament. It would indeed be revolting to the partakers, and repulsive to the beholders, if the faithful received Christ’s body under its own form. Wherefore Christ’s body is offered as meat, and His blood as drink, under the appearance of bread and wine, which are man’s most common form of meat and drink.

CHAPTER LXIV

SOLUTION OF THE DIFFICULTIES AS REGARDS PLACE

NOW that we have made these observations regarding the mode of the change, the way is, to a certain extent, prepared for the solution of the other difficulties. We have already stated that when this sacrament is enacted Christ's body occupies a place in reference to the dimensions of the bread, which remain after the substance of the bread has been changed into Christ's body. Hence whatever belongs to Christ must needs be in that place, according to the exigencies of the aforesaid change.

We must observe, then, that in this sacrament something is present by virtue of the change, and something by natural concomitance. By virtue of the change there is, in this sacrament, that which is the natural term of the change. Thus under the appearance of bread is Christ's body, into which the substance of the bread is changed, as indicated by the words of consecration, This is my body. Likewise, under the appearance of wine is Christ's blood, as signified by the words, This is the chalice of my blood, etc. By natural concomitance all other things are there, which are not the term of the change but are really united to that term. For it is plain that Christ's Godhead or His soul are not the term of the change; and yet both Christ's soul and His divinity are present under the appearance of bread, because both are united to His body.—If however this sacrament had been celebrated during the three days succeeding Christ's death, Christ's soul would not have been present under the appearance of bread, since it was not then really united to His body. Neither would His blood have been present under the appearance of bread, nor His body under the appearance of wine, since they were both separated in death. Now, however, since Christ's body, in His natural form, is not without His blood, both His body and His blood are present under either species: but, under the appearance of bread, His body is present by virtue of the change, and His blood, by natural concomitance: and conversely under the species of wine.

Thus it is plain how to solve the difficulty about the inequality between Christ’s body and the place occupied by the bread. The substance of the bread is directly changed into the substance of Christ’s body. But the dimensions of Christ’s body are in the Sacrament, by natural concomitance, and not by virtue of the change, since the dimensions of the bread remain. Hence Christ’s body is related to that place, not through its own dimensions, so that it need to be equal to the place, but through the dimensions of the bread which remain, and to which the place is equal.

Hence also it is clear how to reply to the objection about plurality of places. Christ’s body, as regards its own dimensions, is in but one place, but through the dimensions of the bread which has been changed into His body, it is present in as many places as this change is celebrated in: not indeed by being divided into parts, but remaining entire in each place: since each consecrated host is changed into the whole body of Christ.

CHAPTER LXV

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS ON THE PART OF THE ACCIDENTS

HAVING solved the difficulty about place, we have now to reply to the objection that arises out of the remaining accidents. For there is no denying that the accidents of bread and wine remain, seeing that one's senses are an infallible witness thereto. And yet Christ's body and blood are not affected by them, since this could not happen without their being altered: nor are they susceptible of such accidents; as neither is the substance of air. It follows then that they are without a subject, but as explained above; namely, that only dimensive quantity subsists without a subject, and affords a support to the other accidents. Nor is it impossible that an accident be without a subject, by the divine power. We must judge of the upholding of things, as of their production into being. Now the divine power can produce the effects of any second causes whatsoever, without these second causes, even as it could fashion man without seed, and cure a fever without the operation of nature. This is because God's power is infinite, and because He bestows on every second cause its active energy; so that He can uphold the existence of the effects of second causes, without the second causes themselves. Thus then, in this sacrament, He upholds the accident in its being, although the subject that upheld it is no longer there. This is especially applicable to dimensive quantities (which the Platonists held to subsist even of themselves), since we can think of them as separate. Now it is evident that God can do more in His works, than the mind can in its thoughts. And it is peculiar to dimensive quantity, as compared with other accidents, that it is individualized by itself: the reason being that position, i.e., the order of the parts in the whole, is included in the very notion thereof; since it is defined as quantity having position. Now, wherever it is possible to understand various parts of the same species, we must needs understand individual distinction: since many things of the same species must needs be many individuals. For this reason we cannot apprehend several whitenesses, except in as much as they are in various subjects: but we can apprehend several lines, even as considered in themselves, because, since position is contained in the notion of a line, difference of position suffices for distinction of lines. And, since dimensive quantity alone is by its very nature sufficient to occasion a multiplicity of individuals in the same species, it would seem to be the foundation of this multiplicity: thus in the genus of substance multiplicity is according to material dimensions; in fact, it is inconceivable in matter apart from dimensions; seeing that without quantity, all substance is indivisible, as the Philosopher states. Now it is evident that as regards other accidents, the number of individuals in the same species depends on the number of subjects. Consequently, since in this sacrament we postulate per se subsistent dimensions, which are the foundation of the other accidents, it does not follow that these accidents are not individualized: because they retain the dimensions which are the foundation of individuality.

CHAPTER LXVI

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS ON THE PART OF ACTION AND PASSION

HAVING made these observations, we come to deal with the fourth objection. In some ways it presents no difficulty: in one respect however the solution is not quite so easy.

From what we have already said, it is surely fitting that, in this sacrament, we should observe the same action (of the elements) after (the consecration), as was to be noticed before in the substance of bread and wine, for instance it affects the senses in the same way, or the surrounding air or anything else, by its odour, or colour. We said, in fact, that the accidents of bread and wine remain in this sacrament: and among those accidents are the sensible qualities, which are the principles of these actions. Again, as regards certain passions, i.e., alterations in these accidents, there is no great difficulty, so long as we bear in mind what has already been said. We stated that the dimensions are the subject of the other accidents, and consequently these other accidents must be considered to be subject to alteration, in the same way as though the substance (of bread and wine) were actually present: thus, for instance, the wine would be subject to heating, or cooling, or a change of taste, and so on.

A greater difficulty, however, is presented by the generation and corruption which are observed to happen in this sacrament. Thus, were a man to partake of the sacramental food in any quantity, he could be nourished, and he could even be made drunk with the wine, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:21), One indeed is hungry, and another is drunk. Now these things would be impossible, unless flesh and blood were produced by this sacrament: since nourishment is changed into the substance of the body nourished. It is true that some reply that this sacrament cannot nourish a man, but can only strengthen and refresh him, as the smell of wine stimulates him. But refreshment only lasts for a time, and does not suffice to nourish him, if he remain for a long time without food: and it is easy to prove by experiment that it is possible for a man to be nourished with this sacramental food for a considerable time. Moreover it is astonishing that they should deny that a man can be nourished with the sacramental elements through refusing to admit that they can be changed into flesh and blood: for it is apparent to the senses, that by putrefaction or burning they are changed into another substance, namely ashes and dust: and yet this would seem difficult, since apparently it is impossible for accidents to be transformed into substance, and it is unbelievable that Christ's body, which is impassible, be changed into another substance.

Perhaps someone will say that, as the bread is changed miraculously into Christ's body, so are the accidents miraculously changed into a substance. But, in the first place, it would seem inconsistent with the miraculous, that this sacrament should putrefy, or be destroyed by burning. Secondly, the putrefaction and burning that happen to this sacrament observe the ordinary course of nature, which is out of keeping with the course of miraculous effects. Accordingly, to solve this difficulty a well-known explanation has been devised, which finds favour with many. They say that when this sacrament is changed into flesh or blood by the process of nutrition, or into ashes by burning or putrefaction, neither the accidents nor the substance of Christ's body are changed into another substance, but, by a divine miracle, the substance of the bread that was there before, returns, and therefrom are generated the things into which this sacrament is observed to be changed. But this is utterly impossible.

We have already proved that the substance of the bread is changed into the substance of Christ's body. Now that which has been changed into something else cannot return unless this other thing be changed back again into it. Hence, if the substance of bread returns, it follows that the substance of Christ's body is changed into bread: and this is absurd.

Again. If the substance of bread returns, it follows that it returns either while the appearances of bread are still there, or after they have disappeared. But as long as the appearances of bread are there, the substance of bread cannot return, since as long as they remain, the substance of Christ’s body remains present under them: so that it would follow that the substance of bread and the substance of Christ’s body are both there at the same time. Yet neither can the substance of bread return after the appearances of bread have disappeared: both because the substance of bread must have its proper appearances; and because, after the appearances of bread have disappeared, there is already another substance generated there, the generation of which was supposed to involve the return of the bread’s substance.

It would seem, therefore, better to say that in the consecration, just as the substance of the bread is miraculously changed into Christ’s body, so by a miracle the accidents are made to subsist, which is proper to a substance. Consequently they produce all the effects and undergo all the changes, which the substance would produce or undergo, if it were present: and therefore without any further miracle they can inebriate, nourish, be reduced to ashes or dust, in the same way and order, as though the substance of bread and wine were present.

CHAPTER LXVII

SOLUTION OF THE OBJECTIONS IN REGARD TO BREAKING OF THE HOST

THE fifth objection now remains to be considered. From what has been said it is clear that as subject of the breaking we can postulate the dimensions that subsist of themselves. Nor does the breaking of these dimensions involve the breaking of the substance of Christ’s body, because Christ’s body remains entire in each portion. This may seem difficult, yet it may be explained in accordance with what has been already said. It has been stated that in this sacrament Christ’s body is present in its substance, by virtue of the sacrament; and that the dimensions of Christ’s body are present by natural concomitance with His substance, and in a manner contrary to that in which a body is in a place naturally. For a body is in a place naturally, through its dimensions whereby it is commensurate with the place. For the relation of a substantial thing to its container differs from that of a quantitative thing to that in which it is. A quantitative whole is contained by a whole, in such a way that it is not wholly in any single part, but each part is in itself, and the whole in the whole: hence a natural body is wholly in the whole place, and yet is not wholly in each part of the place, but each part of the body fits into its own part of the place; because a body is in a place through its dimensions. On the other hand, if a substantial totality is wholly in the whole of something, it is also wholly in each part of that thing. Thus the whole nature and species of water is in each part of the water, and the whole soul is in each part of the body. Since then Christ’s body is in the Sacrament by reason of its substance, into which the substance of the bread has been changed, while the bread’s dimensions remain; just as the whole species of bread was present in each part of the dimensions, so the whole body of Christ is present in each part of those same dimensions. Consequently the subject of this breaking or dividing is not Christ’s body, but the dimensions of bread and wine: which dimensions remain and, as already stated, are the subject of the other accidents that remain after the consecration.

CHAPTER LXVIII

EXPLANATION OF THE PASSAGE QUOTED ABOVE

HAVING solved these difficulties, we see clearly that the tradition of the Church concerning the Sacrament of the Altar contains nothing impossible to God who can do all things. Nor is this tradition incompatible with the words of our Lord spoken to those disciples who appeared to be shocked at this doctrine, The words that I have spoken to you, are spirit and life (Jo. 6:64). By these words He did not intend to say that His real flesh is not given to be eaten by the faithful, but that it is not given to be eaten carnally; namely, that it is to be consumed, not piece-meal under its proper species, like other flesh-foods; but spiritually, and not as we are used to partake of other flesh-meats.

CHAPTER LXIX

WHAT KIND OF BREAD AND WINE SHOULD BE USED IN THIS SACRAMENT

WE have already said that this sacrament is celebrated with bread and wine: hence, the valid celebration of this sacrament requires that the bread and wine used for the purpose satisfy the essential conditions of bread and wine. Now wine is no other liquor but that which is pressed from grapes, and bread, properly speaking, must be made from grains of wheat. True, the name of bread is given to other kinds that supply the lack of wheaten bread; and other liquors are given the name of wine. But this sacrament cannot be celebrated with any other kind of bread or wine; nor with any bread or wine that is so mixed with other materials that the species of bread or wine is destroyed. On the other hand, if the bread or wine be affected by accidents that do not affect the species of bread or wine, it is clear that, notwithstanding such accidents, the sacrament may be validly performed. Thus, since it is not essential to bread that it be leavened or unleavened, and whichever it happens to be, the essential conditions of bread remain, the Sacrament may be validly celebrated with either. For this reason different Churches have different uses in this respect. Indeed either use is in keeping with the signification of the Sacrament. As Gregory says in his Register: The Roman Church offers unleavened bread, because our Lord took flesh without union of sexes: but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh, as leaven is mixed with the flour: and is true God and true man.

However, the use of unleavened bread is more becoming to the purity of the mystic Body, i.e., the Church; in as much as this purity is represented in this sacrament, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:7, 8), Christ, our pasch, is sacrificed: therefore let us feast … with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.

This excludes the error of certain heretics who say that this sacrament cannot be celebrated with unleavened bread: moreover, such a view is altogether opposed to the authority of the Gospels. For we are told (Matth. 26., Mark 14., Luke 22.) that our Lord, on the first day of the Azymes, partook of the pasch with His disciples, and afterwards instituted this sacrament. Now it was unlawful for the Jews to have leavened bread in their houses on the first day of the Azymes (Exod. 12:15): and as long as He was in the world our Lord kept the law. It is, therefore, evident that He changed unleavened bread into His body, and gave it to His disciples to eat. Consequently it is foolish to condemn, in the use of the Latin Church, that which our Lord observed in the institution of this sacrament.

It must be noted however that some say that He anticipated the first day of the Azymes on account of His imminent Passion, and that he therefore used leavened bread. In their attempt to prove this they offer two reasons. In the first place, we are told that our Lord, before the festival day of the pasch (Jo. 13:1), kept with His disciples the supper at which He consecrated His body, as the Apostle relates (1 Cor. 11:28). Hence it would seem that Christ kept the supper before the day of the Azymes, and consequently used leavened bread in consecrating His body. They think to confirm this by the fact that on the Friday, on which Christ was crucified, the Jews went not into the hall of Pilate, that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the pasch. Now pasch here means the Azymes. Therefore they conclude that the supper was celebrated before the Azymes.

To this we reply that according to the Lord’s commandment (Exod. 12:15), the feast of the Azymes was observed during seven days. The first of these, which was the fifteenth day of the month, was more holy and solemn than the others: but since the Jews commenced their festivals the evening before, they began to eat unleavened bread the evening of the fourteenth day, and continued to eat it during the seven following days. Hence we read (ibid. 18, 19): The first month, the fourteenth day of the month in the evening, you shall eat unleavened bread, until the one and twentieth day of the same month in the evening. Seven days there shall not be found any leaven in your houses. In the evening of that same fourteenth day the paschal lamb was slain. Accordingly, the fourteenth day of the month is called by the Evangelists, Matthew, Mark and Luke, the first day of the Azymes, because in the evening the Jews ate unleavened bread, and the pasch, namely the paschal lamb, was slain. This is what John means by saying: Before the festival day of the pasch, that is to say, before the fifteenth day of the month, which day was the most solemn of all. On this day the Jews desired to eat the pasch, that is the paschal unleavened bread, but not the paschal lamb. Consequently there is no disagreement among the Evangelists, and it is clear that Christ at the supper consecrated His body from unleavened bread. Therefore the Latin Church has good reason to use unleavened bread in this sacrament.

CHAPTER LXX

THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE: AND FIRST, THAT IT IS POSSIBLE FOR A MAN TO SIN AFTER RECEIVING SACRAMENTAL GRACE

ALTHOUGH the aforesaid sacraments confer grace on man, the grace bestowed on him does not make him impeccable.

Gratuitous gifts are received into the soul like habitual dispositions: for man does not always act in accordance with them. Now nothing prevents the man who has a habit, from acting either in accordance with it, or against it: thus a grammarian may speak either grammatically or ungrammatically. It is the same with the habits of moral virtue: thus a man who has the habit of justice may perform just actions, and may act unjustly. The reason is because the use of habits is subject to our will: and the will may be borne to either of two opposite alternatives. It is therefore clear that the man who has received gratuitous gifts, can sin by acting against grace.

Again. There can be no impeccability in man without unchangeableness of will. Now man's will cannot be unchangeable, except through his obtaining his last end: because the will is rendered unchangeable by being so wholly fulfilled, that there is nothing to turn it away from the object on which it is fixed. But such a fulfilment of his will is not becoming to man, unless he has obtained his last end: since, as long as something remains to be desired, the will is not fulfilled. Accordingly, man cannot be impeccable until he has reached his last end: and this is not granted to man by sacramental grace, because the sacraments are intended to assist man on his way to that end. Therefore sacramental grace does not make man impeccable.

Further. Every sin is the result of ignorance: wherefore the Philosopher says (3 Ethic. i) that every bad man is ignorant: and it is said (Prov. 14:22): They err that work evil. Consequently then only is man safe from sin, as regards his will, when he is safe from ignorance and error in his intellect. Now it is evident that sacramental grace does not deliver man from all ignorance and error: since this is the privilege of those whose intellectual gaze is fixed on that truth which is the supreme criterion of all truth; of those, namely, who have obtained their last end, as shown above. Therefore man is not made impeccable by the grace of the sacraments.

Moreover. Man's changeableness in vice and virtue depends not a little on his changeableness in the soul's passions: because, when those passions are curbed by his reason, man becomes and remains virtuous; whereas he becomes wicked when his reason obeys the impulse of his passions. Therefore, as long as man is subject to change in his passions, he is also changeable in vice and virtue. Now the changeableness which results from the soul's passions is not removed by sacramental grace, but remains in man as long as his soul is united to a passible body. It is therefore evident that man is not made impeccable by sacramental grace.

Further. It would seem unnecessary to warn against sin those who cannot sin. Nevertheless the faithful who, through the sacraments, have already received the grace of the Holy Ghost, are admonished by the teaching both of the Gospels and of the Apostle. Thus it is said (Heb. 12:15): Looking diligently lest any man be wanting to the grace of God; lest any root of bitterness springing up do hinder: and (Eph. 4:30): Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby you are sealed: and (1 Cor. 10:12): He that thinketh himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall. Again the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 9:27): I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection: lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway. Therefore men are not rendered impeccable by the grace they receive in the sacrament.

This puts out of court the error of those heretics who say that a man cannot sin after receiving the grace of the Holy Ghost: and that if a man sins, he never had that grace.

They base their error on 1 Cor. 13:8, Charity never falleth away: and on 1 Jo. 3:6, Whosoever abideth in him sinneth not; and whosoever sinneth, hath not seen him, nor known him: and on ibid. 3:9, which is still more explicit, Whosoever is born of God committeth no sin: for his seed abideth in him and he cannot sin, because he is born of God. These texts however do not avail to support their contention. Charity is said never to fall away, not as though a man who has charity cannot lose it, since it is said (Apoc. 2:4): I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity; but because the other gifts of the Holy Ghost imply some kind of imperfection,—as, for instance, the spirit of prophecy and the like,—and therefore are made void, when that which is perfect is come, whereas charity will remain in that state of perfection.—The sense of the texts quoted from the epistle of John is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost, by which man is adopted or is born again as a son of God, as far as they are concerned, have such great power that they can keep man from sin: and man cannot sin as long as he lives in accordance with them; but he can act against them, and sin by abandoning them. Thus it is said that whosoever is born of God cannot sin in the same sense as one might say that what is hot cannot make a thing cool (yet it can become cool, and then it will cool something else); or that a just man does not perform unjust actions; that is, as long as he acts as a just man.

CHAPTER LXXI

THAT A MAN WHO HAS SINNED AFTER RECEIVING THE GRACE OF THE SACRAMENT CAN RETURN TO GRACE

IT follows from what has been said in the preceding chapter that a man who falls into sin after receiving sacramental grace can be restored to grace.

As already stated, as long as we live here below, the will is changeable as to vice and virtue. Consequently, just as man can sin after receiving grace, so too, seemingly, he can return to virtue. Again. It is evident that good is more powerful than evil: since evil acts not, save by virtue of a good, as we proved above. Hence, if a man's will is turned away from the state of grace by sin, much more can he be recalled from sin, by grace.

Further. As long as he is a wayfarer, man's will is not unchangeable. Now, as long as he is here below, a man is on the way to his last end. Therefore his will is not so unchangeably turned to evil, as to be unable by divine grace to return to that which is good.

Moreover. It is evident that sacramental grace delivers a man from the sins committed by him before he received the grace of the sacraments. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:9–11): Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers … shall possess the kingdom of God.… And such some of you were; but you are washed; but you are sanctified, but you are justified in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the Spirit of our God. It is also clear that the grace bestowed in the sacraments does not lessen, but increases the good of nature. Now it is part of the good of nature that a man can be restored from the state of sin to the state of righteousness; since the possibility for good is a good in itself. Therefore if a man happen to sin after receiving grace, he can still return to the state of righteousness.

Again. If those who sin after baptism cannot return to grace, they lose all hope of salvation. Now despair is the road to greater liberty in sinning: for it is said of some (Ephes. 4:19) that despairing they have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness, unto covetousness. Therefore the above is a most dangerous opinion, since it leads man into a very sewer of sin.

Further. We have proved that the grace which man receives in the sacraments does not render him impeccable. Consequently, if after receiving sacramental grace the sinner were unable to return to the state of righteousness, it would be dangerous to receive the sacraments: and this is clearly unreasonable. Therefore a return to justice is not denied those who sin after receiving the sacraments.

This is confirmed by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (1 Jo. 2:1, 2): My little children, these things I write to you, that you may not sin. But if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just. And he is the propitiation for our sins: and it is evident that these words were addressed to the faithful who were already baptized. Paul also writes, in reference to the Corinthian who had been guilty of fornication (2 Cor. 2:6, 7): To him that is such a one, this rebuke is sufficient, that is given by many: so that contrariwise you should rather Pardon and comfort him. Again he says further on (7:9): Now I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance. It is also said (Jerem. 3:1): Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers: nevertheless, return to me, saith the Lord: and (Lam. 5:21): Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shall be converted: renew our days, as from the beginning. From all these texts it is evident that, if the faithful fall after receiving grace, the way back to salvation is still open to them.

Hereby we exclude the error of the Novatians, who refused forgiveness to those who sinned after receiving Baptism. In support of their error they quoted Heb. 6:4–6: It is impossible for those who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, have moreover tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come, and are fallen away, to be renewed again unto penance. But it is clear from the context, in what sense the Apostle says this, for he continues: Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God, and making him a mockery. Hence the reason why those, who fall away after receiving grace, cannot be renewed again unto penance, is that the Son of God is not to be crucified again. Consequently that renewal unto penance is denied, whereby man is crucified with Christ, namely, by Baptism, according to Rom. 6:3, All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in his death. Therefore, just as Christ is not to be crucified again, so he that sins after Baptism is not to be baptized again; yet he can be restored to grace by penance. Hence the Apostle did not say that it is impossible for those who have once fallen to be recalled or restored to penance, but to be renewed, which expression is generally applied to Baptism: According to his mercy, he saved us, by the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost (Tit. 3:5).

CHAPTER LXXII

THE NECESSITY OF PENANCE AND OF ITS PARTS

ACCORDINGLY, if a man sin after being baptized, his sin cannot be mended by Baptism: and, since the abundance of divine mercy, and the efficacy of Christ’s grace, do not allow man to remain without a remedy, another sacramental antidote has been provided for the cleansing of sins. This is the sacrament of Penance, which is a kind of spiritual healing. When those who have acquired natural life through generation contract a disease that is contrary to the perfection of life, they can be cured, not by being born again, but by being healed, which is a process of alteration. So too when a man sins after Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, his sin is remedied, not by a repetition of Baptism, but by Penance, which is a kind of spiritual alteration.

We must observe, however, that the body’s healing proceeds sometimes entirely from within, as when a man is cured by his own natural forces; and sometimes both from within and without, as when nature’s efforts are assisted by external help of medicine. But a body is never healed entirely from without; for it still retains the principles of life, which are the cause of its having health. On the other hand, spiritual healing cannot proceed entirely from within. For we have proved that a man cannot be delivered from sin without the assistance of grace. Yet neither can spiritual healing proceed entirely from without: since the mind would not be restored to health, unless the will be moved in the right direction. Therefore, in the sacrament of Penance, spiritual health must come from within and from without. This happens as follows. In order that a man be perfectly cured of a bodily sickness, he needs to be delivered from all the mischief he incurs through the disease. So too the spiritual healing of Penance would not be perfect, unless man were relieved of all the mischief he has incurred through sin. The first mischief that afflicts man through sin, is disorder in his mind, in as much as it is turned away from the unchangeable good, namely, God, and is turned towards sin. The second mischief is that he incurs a debt of punishment; because, as proved above, it is due to each sin that God, the most just ruler, should punish it. The third mischief is a certain weakness in man's natural good, in as much as by sinning he becomes more prone to sin, and less inclined to good works.

Accordingly, the first thing required in Penance is to restore order in the mind; namely, that the mind be turned to God, and turned away from sin, that it grieve for the sin committed, and resolve not to commit it again: this is what is meant by contrition. Now this restoration of the mind to order cannot be brought about without grace: because our minds cannot be turned to God aright without charity, and there is no charity without grace, as we have already proved. Accordingly contrition removes God's anger, and man is freed from the debt of eternal punishment: which is incompatible with grace or charity, since eternal punishment consists in separation from God, to whom man is united by grace and charity. For this restoration of the mind to order by contrition proceeds from within, that is, from the free will assisted by grace. Since however it has been proved that the merit of Christ's sufferings for the human race is sufficient to expiate all sins, it is necessary for man's deliverance from sin, that he adhere with his mind not only to God, but also to the Mediator of God and man, Jesus Christ, in whom is given the remission of all sins. For spiritual health consists in the mind turning to God: and we cannot obtain this health except through the physician of our souls, Jesus Christ, who saved His people from their sins, and whose merit suffices to take away wholly all sins: for He it is who taketh away the sin of the world (Jo. 1:29). Nevertheless all do not receive the effect of perfect remission; each one receives a share in proportion to his union with Christ suffering. Since then our union with Christ in Baptism is effected, not by any internal operation on our part (since nothing brings itself into being), but by Christ, who regenerates us into a living hope: it follows that the forgiveness of sins in Baptism is the effect of Christ's power, who unites us to Himself perfectly and wholly, so that not only is the stain of sin washed away, but all debt of punishment is also remitted: except accidentally in those who are deprived of the effect of the sacrament, through receiving the sacrament insincerely. By this spiritual healing we are united to Christ by means of our own action informed with divine grace; and consequently we do not always entirely, nor do we all equally, receive the remission which is the effect of this union. For the mind may turn to God, and turn away from sin with such strength that man receives complete forgiveness of sin, so that not only is he cleansed from the stain, but is released from the whole punishment. But this does not always happen. Sometimes contrition removes the stain and remits the debt of eternal punishment, as we have said, yet there still remains an obligation to some temporal punishment, that God's justice may be secured, in as much as sin is brought to order by punishment.

Now, infliction of punishment for a fault requires some kind of judgment, wherefore the penitent who comes to Christ to be healed must look to Christ for the assessment of the punishment: and Christ prescribes the remedy through His minister, as He does in the other sacraments. No one, however, can judge of sins of which he is not informed. Consequently, it was necessary to institute confession as the second part of this sacrament, that Christ's minister may be informed of the penitent's sin. Therefore the minister, to whom confession is made, needs to have judiciary power, as occupying the place of Christ, who is appointed judge of the living and the dead. Now two things are requisite for judiciary power, namely the authority to take cognizance of a fault, and the power to absolve or condemn. These two are called the keys of the Church, discerning knowledge, and the power to bind and loose, which our Lord committed to Peter when He said (Matth. 16:19): To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. But we must not suppose that He entrusted the keys to Peter, that Peter alone might have them, but that others might have them through him: otherwise sufficient provision would not have been made for the spiritual welfare of the faithful. Now these keys derive their efficacy from Christ's Passion, whereby He opened to us the gate of the heavenly kingdom. Consequently, just as there is no salvation for man without Baptism, in which Christ's Passion is efficacious, received either in reality or in desire (namely, when necessity and not contempt excludes the sacrament), so is there no salvation for those who sin after Baptism, unless they submit themselves to the keys of the Church, either by actual confession and acceptance of the judgement of the Church’s ministers, or at least by purposing to do so when the opportunity offers. For thus Peter declares (Acts 4:12): There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved, except the name of our Lord Jesus Christ. Hereby we exclude the error of those who say that man can obtain forgiveness of his sins without confession, or the purpose to confess, or that the authorities of the Church can dispense a man from the obligation of going to confession. Ecclesiastical superiors cannot override the Church’s power of the keys wherein all their powers consist, nor make it possible for a man to obtain forgiveness of his sins without the sacrament that derives its efficacy from Christ’s Passion: this Christ alone can do: who is the institutor and author of the sacraments. Wherefore, just as the Ecclesiastical superiors cannot dispense a man so that he be saved without Baptism, so neither can they dispense a man so that he obtain forgiveness of sin without confession and absolution.

It must be observed, however, that Baptism has a certain efficacy for the remission of a man’s sins, even before he actually receives it, and while he has the purpose to receive it; and afterwards, indeed, when actually received, it bestows an effect more plentiful in grace and forgiveness: whereas sometimes grace is bestowed and sin is remitted, in the actual reception of Baptism by one whose sin has not yet been remitted. In the same way, the keys of the Church produce their effect in a man even before he actually submits himself to them; provided he has the intention of so doing. But he receives grace and forgiveness more plentifully when he actually submits himself to them, by confessing his sins, and receiving absolution. And sometimes, by the power of the keys a man after confessing his sins may obtain grace even at the moment of the absolution whereby his sins are remitted. Since then at the time of confession and absolution grace and forgiveness are more plentifully bestowed on a man who has already obtained both on account of his good intention, it is clear that, by the power of the keys, the minister of the Church, by absolving him, remits some of the temporal punishment which was still due to the penitent after his contrition. As to what remains of that punishment, he binds the penitent thereto by enjoining a penance, the fulfilment of which is called satisfaction, which is the third part of Penance. Hereby man is wholly freed from the debt of punishment, since he has paid the penalty which he deserved. More than this, the weakness of his natural good is repaired: for then he refrains from evil things, and habituates himself to good things by humbling his spirit to God in prayer, training his flesh by fasting that it should be subject to the spirit, and using his external possessions to give alms to his neighbour, to whom he thus unites himself, whereas he had been separated from him by sin. Hence it follows that the minister of the Church exercises a kind of judgement by using the keys. Now no man is appointed judge except over those who are subject to him. Consequently, it is not true, as some falsely assert, that a priest can absolve anyone from his sins; but only those over whom he exercises that power.

CHAPTER LXXIII

THE SACRAMENT OF EXTREME UNCTION

THE body is the instrument of the soul. Now an instrument is intended for the use of the principal agent; wherefore the instrument needs to be disposed so as to be suitable to the principal agent. Consequently the body is disposed so as to be suitable to the soul. By dispensation of the divine judgement it happens sometimes that the disease of the soul, which is sin, spreads to the body; and this bodily ailment is sometimes profitable to the soul's health, in so far as a man bears his bodily infirmity with humility and patience; since this is credited to him as punishment as it were in satisfaction for his sins. Moreover bodily infirmity is sometimes a hindrance to the health of the soul, in so far as it is an obstacle to virtue. It was, therefore, fitting that a spiritual remedy should be applied against sin, in so far as sin is an occasion of bodily infirmity: and sometimes this remedy heals the bodily ailment; that is to say, when it is good for the soul's health. For this purpose the sacrament of Extreme Unction was instituted; of which it is said (James 5:14, 15): Is any man sick among you? Let him bring in the priests of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith shall heal the sick man. Nor is the efficacy of the sacrament prejudiced if sometimes the sick who have received this sacrament are not completely cured of their bodily ailment, because the healing of the body is not always good for the soul, even for those who have received this sacrament worthily. Nor do they receive it in vain, although they do not recover the health of the body. For while this sacrament is directed against bodily sickness as a result of sin, it is evidently directed also against other consequences of sin, namely proneness to evil, and difficulty in respect of good; and all the more so, as these latter infirmities of the soul are more akin to sin than sickness of the body. It is true that these infirmities should be repaired by penance, in as much as the penitent is withdrawn from evil and inclined to good, by deeds of virtue, which he does in satisfaction for sin. But, seeing that man does not completely repair these defects in himself, either through negligence or the manifold business of this life, or the shortness of time, and so forth; he is fortunately provided with a sacrament which completes his cure and delivers him from the debt of temporal punishment. Thus when his soul departs from his body, there is no longer anything in him to prevent his entering into glory; wherefore James adds: And the Lord shall raise him up. It also happens that a man is not cognizant or mindful of all the sins he has committed, so as to be cleansed of them all in Penance: moreover, these are his daily sins, from which this life cannot be free. From all these man needs to be cleansed by this sacrament in the hour of death, so that nothing remain in him to prevent his entrance into glory: and therefore James adds: If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him. It is evident, therefore, that this sacrament is the conclusion and consummation of the whole spiritual healing, since it prepares man for a participation in glory: and for this reason it is called Extreme Unction.

Wherefore it is plain that this sacrament is not to be given to any sick person, but only to those who, through sickness, are likely to be near death. And if they get well again, they can receive this sacrament a second time, if they return to the same state of danger. The reason is that the anointing in this sacrament is not one of consecration, as the anointing of Confirmation, the washing of Baptism, and certain other anointings. These latter are never repeated, because consecration remains for always, so long as the consecrated thing remains, on account of the efficacy of the divine power which consecrates. Whereas the anointing of this sacrament is directed to healing: and a healing remedy should be repeated as often as the sickness recurs.

Now there are some who, without being sick, are near death (as for instance a man condemned to die) and who need the spiritual effects of this sacrament; yet to none may it be given, save to those who are in sickness, for it is given under the form of a bodily remedy: which is unsuitable except for one who is sick of body: and the signification of the sacraments must be observed. Consequently, just as a bodily washing is required in Baptism, so in this sacrament is there required the application of a remedy for bodily infirmity. Hence oil is the special matter of this sacrament, because by easing pain it is useful for healing the body, even as water, that washes the body, is the matter of the sacrament in which the soul is cleansed.

Hence again we may see that as bodily remedies are applied to the source of the disease, so is this unction applied to those parts of the body that are the source of the disease which is sin. Such are the organs of sense, the hands, and feet, with which sins are committed: also, as is the custom in some places, the thighs which are the seat of lust.

Again seeing that sins are remitted in this sacrament, and that sin is not remitted without grace, it is evident that grace is bestowed in this sacrament.

Now those things which bestow illuminating grace may be given by none but a priest, whose order is light-giving, according to Dionysius (Eccles. Hier. vi.). A bishop is not necessary, since this sacrament does not confer excellence of state, as is the case in those things of which a bishop is the minister. Since however this sacrament has the effect of producing a complete cure, and requires an abundance of grace, it becomes the sacrament that many priests be present, and that the prayers of the whole Church combine to secure the effect of this sacrament: hence James says (5:14, 15): Let him bring in the priests of the Church … and the prayers of faith shall save the sick man. Yet, if there be only one priest present, he is understood to confer this sacrament as proxy of the whole Church, whose minister he is, and who speaks through him.—As in the other sacraments, the effect of this sacrament is hindered by insincerity on the part of the recipient.

CHAPTER LXXIV

THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER

FROM what has been said, it is clear that, in all the sacraments of which we have spoken hitherto, spiritual grace is bestowed under the sacred sign of visible things. Now every action should be proportionate to the agent. Hence these same sacraments should be dispensed by visible men having spiritual powers. For angels are not competent to dispense sacraments: but men clothed in visible flesh, according to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 5:1), Every high priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God.

This may be proved in yet another way. Sacraments derive their institution and efficacy from Christ; of whom the Apostle says (Eph. 5:25, 26): Christ loved the Church, and delivered himself for it, that he might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life. It is also clear that at the Supper He gave the Sacrament of His body and blood, and instituted it for our frequent use: and this is the greatest of all sacraments. Seeing then that He was about to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, it was necessary that He should institute others as His ministers, who would dispense the sacraments to the faithful, according to the Apostle's words (1 Cor. 4:1): Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God. For this reason He entrusted His disciples with the consecration of His body and blood, saying (Luke 22:19): Do this for a commemoration of me: to them He gave the power to forgive sins (Jo. 20:23): Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: and on them He conferred the office of teaching and baptizing, saying (Matth. 28:19): Going, teach ye all nations, baptizing them. Now the minister is compared to his master as an instrument to the principal agent: for, just as the instrument is moved by the agent in order to produce an effect, so a minister is moved by his master to execute his will. Again, the instrument should be proportionate to the agent. Therefore Christ's ministers should be conformed to Him. Now Christ wrought our salvation, as master, by His own authority and power, in as much as He is God and man: in that, as man, He suffered for our redemption, and, as God, His sufferings were made efficacious for our salvation. Consequently Christ's ministers needed to be men, and to share in His Godhead by a kind of spiritual power: since the instrument shares in the power of the principal agent. Of this power the Apostle says (2 Cor. 13:10) that the Lord gave him power unto edification, and not unto destruction.

Now it cannot be said that this power was given to Christ's disciples, yet so that it would not be derived from them by others: for it was given to them unto the edification of the Church, according to the Apostle's words. Therefore this power must last as long as the Church needs to be edified: that is to say from after the death of Christ's disciples until the end of the world. Consequently spiritual power was given to Christ's disciples in such wise that others were to receive it from them. Hence our Lord spoke to His disciples as representatives of the rest of the faithful, as we may see from His words (Mark 13:37), What I say to you, I say to all. Again He said to His disciples (Matth. 28:20): Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.

Accordingly, this spiritual power flows from Christ to the ministers of the Church, and the spiritual effects accruing to us from Christ are conferred under certain sensible signs, as explained above; and consequently it was proper that this spiritual power also should be conferred on men by means of sensible symbols. These are certain forms of words, certain actions, as for instance laying on of hands, anointing, delivery of book or chalice or something of the kind pertaining to the execution of a spiritual power. Now, whenever something spiritual is bestowed under a bodily symbol, this is called a sacrament. It is clear, therefore, that in the bestowal of spiritual power, a sacrament is enacted: and this is known as the Sacrament of Order. Now it is a part of the divine liberality that whosoever receives power to perform a certain work, receives also whatsoever is required for the suitable execution of that work. Since then the sacraments that are the purpose of this spiritual power, cannot be becomingly administered without the assistance of divine grace: it follows that grace is conferred in this sacrament, even as in the others.

Whereas the power of Order is directed to the dispensing of the sacraments, and since of all the sacraments the Eucharist is the most sublime and perfect, as was indicated above, it follows that we must consider the power of Order chiefly in its relation to that sacrament: for a thing takes its name from its end. Now seemingly the same power bestows a perfection, and prepares the matter to receive that perfection: thus fire has the power to communicate its form to a thing, and to prepare the material for the reception of its form. Since then the power of Order extends to the production of Christ’s body and the distribution thereof to the faithful, it follows that the same power should extend to the preparation of the faithful, that they be made apt and worthy to receive this sacrament. Now the faithful are made apt and worthy to receive this sacrament, by being freed from sin: otherwise spiritual union with Christ is impossible, in one who is united to Him sacramentally by receiving this sacrament. Consequently the power of Order must extend to the forgiveness of sins, by the dispensation of those sacraments that are directed to the remission of sin: such as Baptism and Penance, as is evident from what we have said above. Wherefore, as we have already stated, our Lord, having entrusted to His disciples the consecration of His body, gave them also the power to forgive sins, which power is indicated by the keys, of which He said to Peter (Matth. 16:19): To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven. For heaven is closed and opened to a man according as he is shackled with, or freed from sin; and for this reason the use of these keys is expressed as binding and loosing, namely from sins. Of the keys themselves we have already spoken.

CHAPTER LXXV

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF ORDER

A POWER directed to a principal effect naturally has lesser powers administering to it. This may be clearly seen in the arts: the arts which dispose the material are subservient to the art which introduces the art-form: and the art that introduces the art-form is subservient to the art which is concerned with the end of the art-product: and again the art that is concerned with an anterior end is subservient to the art that is concerned with the ultimate end. Thus the art of wood-cutting serves the ship-building art; and the latter serves the art of sailing; and this latter serves the art of commerce or war or the like, in so far as sailing may be directed to various ends. Since then the power of Order is directed chiefly to the consecration of Christ's body, and to its distribution to the faithful, and likewise to the cleansing of the faithful from their sins, there is need for a principal order, whose power extends chiefly to these things, and this is the Priesthood; and for other orders that serve it by preparing the matter in one way or another; these are the Orders of the lower ministers.

Accordingly, since the priestly power, as we have stated, extends to two things, namely the consecration of Christ's body and the preparation of the faithful, by absolving them from their sins, that they may be worthy to receive the Eucharist, it follows that the lower orders should minister to the priestly order, either in both, or in one of these things. And it is clear that among the lower orders, the higher is the one that serves the priestly order in more ways, or in a higher way. The lowest orders then serve the priestly order, only in the preparation of the people: the Door-keeper by excluding unbelievers from the assembly of the faithful; the Readers by instructing catechumens in the rudiments of the faith; wherefore the Old Testament Scriptures are committed to them to read: the Exorcists by cleansing those who are already instructed, if in any way they be hindered by the devil from receiving the sacraments. The higher orders serve the priestly order, both in the preparation of the people and in the celebration of the Sacrament. Acolytes exercise their ministry over the non-sacred vessels, in which the matter of the Sacrament is prepared, wherefore the cruets are delivered to them at their ordination: Subdeacons exercise their ministry over the sacred vessels, and the preparation of the matter before consecration: Deacons exercise a ministry over the already consecrated matter, in as much as they distribute Christ's blood to the faithful. Wherefore these three, the priesthood, diaconate, and sub-diaconate, are called Sacred Orders, because they confer a ministry over sacred things. These higher orders serve also in the preparation of the people: hence deacons are entrusted with the proclamation of the Gospel teaching; subdeacons, with the teaching of the Apostles; while the acolytes serve by conducing to the solemnity of that teaching, by bearing lighted candles, and in other like ministrations.

CHAPTER LXXVI

OF THE EPISCOPAL DIGNITY: AND THAT ONE BISHOP IS OVER ALL

IT has been stated that all these orders are conferred by a certain sacrament, and that the sacraments of the Church have to be dispensed by certain ministers: consequently, there must be in the Church a still higher power of some higher ministry, to confer the sacrament of Order. This is the episcopal power, which, while it does not surpass the priestly power in the consecration of Christ’s body, nevertheless does surpass it in things concerning the faithful: for the priest himself derives his power from the bishop: while all difficult matters regarding the faithful are reserved to bishops, by whose authority even the priests are able to do what they are appointed to do. Thus in his priestly actions, the priest uses things consecrated by a bishop; for instance in the celebration of the Eucharist, he uses chalice, altar and pall. Hence it is evident that the supreme power in the direction of the faithful belongs to the episcopal dignity. Now although the people are distributed among various dioceses and cities, nevertheless there is but one Church, and therefore only one Christian people. Consequently, just as a bishop is appointed as the head of a certain people and a particular Church, so must the whole Christian people be subject to one who is the head of the whole Church.

Again. The unity of the Church requires that all the faithful be of one faith. Now questions are wont to arise about matters of faith: and the Church would be divided by differences of opinion, unless its unity were safeguarded by the pronouncement of one. Therefore, in order to safeguard the unity of the Church, it is necessary that there be one who presides over the whole Church. Now Christ loved the Church and shed His blood for her, wherefore He did not fail her in her needs, seeing that it is said even of the Synagogue (Isa. 5:4): What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to it? There can be no doubt, therefore, that Christ provided His Church with a head.

Further. We cannot doubt that the government of the Church was perfectly provided for, since it was devised by one through whom kings reign and lawgivers decree just things (Prov. 8:15). Now the best form of government is when a people is governed by one: because the end of government is peace; since peace and unity of the subjects is the end of the governing authority: and unity is more fittingly ensured by one than by many. Therefore the government of the Church is so arranged that one presides over the whole.

Moreover. The Church militant originates from the Church triumphant by its likeness to it: hence in the Apocalypse, John saw Jerusalem coming down out of heaven; and Moses was bidden to make all things according to the pattern that was shown him in the mountain. Now there is one who presides over the Church triumphant, namely God, Who also presides over the whole universe; for it is said (Apoc. 21:3): They shall be his people: and God himself with them shall be their God. Therefore, in the Church militant, there is one who presides over all. Hence it is said (Osee 1:11): The children of Juda and the children of Israel shall be gathered together, and they shall appoint themselves one head: and our Lord said (Jo. 10:16): There shall be one fold, and one shepherd.

Someone, however, may say that the one head and the one shepherd is Christ, who is the one bridegroom of the one Church: but this reply is not sufficient. It is evident that Christ Himself accomplishes all the Church’s sacraments: He it is who baptizes; He it is who forgives sins; He is the true priest, who offered Himself on the altar of the cross, and by whose power His own body is consecrated daily on the altar. And yet, because He was not to remain bodily present to all the faithful, He chose ministers, that through them He might give that same body to the faithful, as we have shown above. For this very reason then, that He was about to withdraw His bodily presence from the Church, He needed to appoint one to take His place in governing the whole Church. Wherefore, before His Ascension, He said to Peter (Jo. 21:17): Feed my sheep; and before His Passion (Luke 22:32): Thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren; and to him alone

He made the promise (Matth. 16:19): To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven, in order to show that the power of the keys was to be received from him by others, so as to safeguard the unity of the Church. It cannot be said that, although He conferred this dignity on Peter, it does not pass from him to others. For it is evident that Christ so instituted His Church, that it would endure to the end of the world according to Isa. 9:11, He shall sit upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom; to establish it, and strengthen it with judgement and with justice, from henceforth and for ever. Hence it is evident that those He appointed to the ministry then and there, were, for the good of the Church, to communicate their powers to their successors, until the end of time: especially, since He says (Matth. 28:20): Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.

This suffices to refute the presumptuous error of those who dare to withdraw from obedience and submission to Peter, by refusing to acknowledge his successor, the Roman Pontiff, as the shepherd of the universal Church.

CHAPTER LXXVII

THAT THE SACRAMENTS CAN BE DISPENSED BY WICKED MINISTERS

WE have said enough to show that the ministers of the Church, at their ordination, receive from above power to dispense the sacraments to the faithful. Now that which a thing acquires by being consecrated, remains in it for ever: wherefore that which is consecrated once, is not consecrated again. Therefore the ministers of the Church retain for ever the power of their Orders: and, consequently it is not taken away from them by sin. Therefore the sacraments of the Church can be administered by sinners and wicked men, provided they be in Orders.

Again. Nothing can produce an effect exceeding its faculty, unless it receive the power from elsewhere. This is evident both in nature and in civil matters: water cannot give heat, unless it receive from fire the power to do so: nor can a magistrate imprison a citizen without having received power from the sovereign. Now the sacramental effects surpass the powers of man, as stated above. Therefore no man, however good, can administer the sacraments unless he has received the power to do so. Now wickedness and sin are opposite to goodness. Therefore neither does sin prevent a man, who has received the power, from being able to administer the sacraments.

Again. A man is good or bad in reference to virtue and vice, which are habits. Now habit differs from power in that power makes it possible for us to do a certain thing, whereas habit does not make it possible for us to do a thing, but confers a certain ability or inability for doing well or ill that which it is possible for us to do. Consequently habit neither gives nor removes the possibility of doing, but gives the facility of doing a certain thing well or ill. Therefore the fact that a man is good or bad does not make it possible or impossible for him to administer the sacraments, but it makes him fit or unfit to administer them well.

Moreover. That which acts by the power of another agent does not assimilate the material to itself, but to the principal agent: thus a house is not made in likeness to the instruments used by the builder, but is likened to his art. Now the ministers of the Church in dispensing the sacraments, act not by their own, but by Christ’s power, of whom it is said (Jo. 1:33): He it is that baptizeth. Wherefore the minister acts as a kind of instrument: for he is an animated instrument, as it were. Therefore the wickedness of a minister does not prevent the faithful from being saved by Christ through the sacraments.

Further. It is not for man to judge of another man’s goodness or wickedness: this belongs to God alone, who searches the secrets of the heart. Consequently, if the wickedness of a minister could prevent a sacrament from taking effect, man would be unable to be confident of his soul’s welfare, nor would his conscience be relieved of sin. Therefore it would be unseemly, were he to base his hope of salvation on the goodness of a mere man: for it is said (Jerem. 17:5): Cursed be the man that trusteth in man. And if a man had no hope of obtaining salvation through the sacraments, unless they were dispensed by a good minister, he would seem somewhat to trust in man for his salvation. Wherefore, in order that we may place our hope of salvation in Christ, who is both God and man, we must acknowledge that the sacraments are salutary through Christ’s power, whether they be dispensed by good or by wicked ministers.

This is also made evident by the fact that our Lord bade us obey even wicked superiors, although we must not imitate their works (Matth. 23:2, 3): The Scribes and Pharisees have sitten on the chair of Moses. All things therefore whatsoever they shall say to you, observe and do: but according to their works, do ye not. And much more ought we to obey men by reason of their having been appointed ministers by Christ, than by reason of their sitting in the chair of Moses. Therefore even wicked ministers should be obeyed: and this would not be the case unless they retained the power of Orders, which is the reason why they should be obeyed. Therefore even the wicked have the power to dispense the sacraments. This disposes of the error of those who said that all good men, but no wicked men, can administer the sacraments.

CHAPTER LXXVIII

THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY

ALTHOUGH the sacraments restore grace to man, they do not at once give him back immortality: the reasons for which we have already given. Now whatsoever things are corruptible cannot be perpetuated save by generation. Since then believers were to be perpetuated till the end of the world, this had to be done by means of generation, whereby also the human race is carried on.

We must observe that when a thing is directed to several ends, it needs several directors to those ends: because the end is proportionate to the agent. Now human generation is directed to several ends, namely, the continuation of the species, or the securing of some good of the state, such as the preservation of the people in some particular country: again it is directed to the perpetuity of the Church which is the assembly of the faithful. Wherefore the generation in question needs to receive its direction from various sources. In so far as it is directed to the good of nature, namely the perpetuation of the species, it is directed by nature which inclines to this end, and thus it is called an office of nature. In so far as it is directed to the good of the state, it is subject to the control of the civil authority. But in so far as it is directed to the good of the Church, it must be subject to ecclesiastical power. Now those things which are dispensed by the ministers of the Church are called sacraments. Therefore matrimony, as consisting in the union of a man and woman who intend to beget and educate children for the glory of God, is a sacrament of the Church: and hence it is that the bridal pair receive a blessing from the ministers of the Church. And just as in the other sacraments, something spiritual is symbolized by external actions, so in this sacrament the union of husband and wife signifies the union of Christ with the Church, according to the saying of the Apostle

(Eph. 5:32): This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church. And seeing that the sacraments cause what they signify, we must believe that the sacrament of matrimony confers on those who are joined in wedlock, the grace to take part in the union of Christ with His Church: since it is most necessary that they should so seek carnal and earthly things, as not to be separated from Christ and His Church.

Since then the union of husband and wife signifies the union of Christ and the Church, the figure must needs correspond to the thing signified. Now the union of Christ with the Church is the unending union of one with one, for the Church is one according to Cant. 6:8, One is my dove, my perfect one. Nor will Christ ever be separated from His Church, for He said (Matth. 28:20): Behold I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world: and again it is said (1 Thess. 4:16): So shall we be always with the Lord. Therefore Matrimony, as a sacrament of the Church, must needs be the indissoluble union of one man with one woman: and this pertains to the mutual troth which binds husband and wife together.

Accordingly there are three blessings attaching to Matrimony as a sacrament of the Church: namely, children, to be begotten and brought up to worship God; faithfulness, in as much as one husband is bound to one wife; and the sacrament, in as much as it is an indissoluble union, symbolising the union of Christ with the Church. Other matters connected with matrimony have been treated above.

CHAPTER LXXIX

THAT OUR BODIES WILL RISE AGAIN THROUGH CHRIST

IT has been proved that Christ has delivered us from those things we have incurred through the sin of the first man; from whom we have contracted not only sin, but also death, the punishment of sin, according to the Apostle (Rom. 5:12), By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death. Consequently Christ delivered us from both, namely, sin and death: wherefore the Apostle says (Ibid., 17): For if by one man's offence death reigned through one: much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one Jesus Christ. And in order to afford us a proof of both in Himself, He chose both to die and to rise again. He chose to die, in order to free us from sin, wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 9:27, 28): As it is appointed unto men once to die … so also Christ was offered once to exhaust the sins of many. He chose to rise again, in order to free us from death; wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:20, 21): Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep: for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of life. Accordingly, we obtain the effect of Christ's Passion, as to the forgiveness of sin: for it has been already stated that the sacraments produce their effect through the efficacy of Christ's Passion. But we shall obtain the effect of Christ's Resurrection, by being delivered from death, at the end of the world, when by the power of Christ, we shall all rise again. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:12–14): If Christ be preached, that he arose again from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection from the dead? But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen again. And if Christ be not risen again, then our preaching is vain, and your faith is also vain. Therefore it is of faith to believe in the future resurrection of the dead. There are some, however, who disbelieve in the future resurrection of the body: such is the perversity of their mind that when, in the Scriptures, they read about the resurrection, they refer such statements to the spiritual resurrection of those who, through grace, arise from sin.

This error is condemned by the Apostle (2 Tim. 2:16–18): Shun profane and vain babblings: for they grow much towards ungodliness. And their speech spreadeth like a canker: of whom are Hymenœus and Philetus; who have erred from the truth, saying that the resurrection is past already: which could only refer to a spiritual resurrection. Therefore it is against faith to substitute a spiritual for a bodily resurrection.

Moreover. It is evident from other passages in the Epistle to the Corinthians that, in this particular one quoted above, the Apostle is speaking of the resurrection of the body. Thus, after a few words he goes on to say (verse 44): It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body: thus clearly indicating the body's resurrection, and then he adds (verse 53): This corruptible must put on in-corruption: and this mortal must put on immortality. Now this corruptible and this mortal refer to the body. Therefore it is the body that will arise again.

Further. Our Lord foretold both resurrections. He said (Jo. 5:25): Amen, amen I say unto you, that the hour cometh and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. These words, seemingly, refer to the spiritual resurrection of souls, which was already beginning when people believed in Christ. But afterwards He referred to the resurrection of the body, when He said (Ibid., 28): The hour cometh wherein all that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God: since it is clear that they who are in the graves are not souls but bodies. Therefore the resurrection of bodies is foretold here.

It is also expressly foretold by Job (Job 19:25, 26): I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth: and I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God.

Reason also supplies an evident proof of the resurrection: provided we bear in mind what has already been proved. Thus we have shown that the human soul is immortal: so that it survives the body after its separation from it. It is also manifest from what has been stated, that the soul is united to the body naturally: since it is by its essence the form of the body: wherefore it is unnatural for the soul to be without the body. Now nothing unnatural can last for ever: and consequently the soul will not remain for ever without the body. Therefore, since the soul is immortal, it must needs be reunited to the body: and this is to rise again. Hence the immortality of the soul would seem to demand the future resurrection of the body.

Again. It has been proved that man's natural desire tends to happiness. Now ultimate happiness is the perfection of the happy one. Consequently whosoever lacks something for perfection, is not yet perfectly happy, since his desire is not yet wholly at rest: and all imperfect things naturally seek to attain to perfection. Now the soul when separated from the body is, in a way, imperfect: even as any part is when severed from its whole: and the soul is naturally part of human nature. Therefore man cannot obtain ultimate happiness, unless his soul be reunited to his body: and this is all the more true, seeing that as we have shown man cannot reach ultimate happiness in this life.

Again. It was proved above that divine providence punishes evil-doers and rewards those who do well. Now, in this life man, who is composed of soul and body, either sins or lives aright. Therefore reward or punishment is due to man in respect of his body and of his soul. But it is plain that in this life man cannot obtain the reward of ultimate felicity, as we have shown above. Moreover, in many cases sins are not punished in this life: nay more, for it is said (Job 21:7): Why then do the wicked live, are they advanced, and strengthened with riches? Therefore we must postulate a reunion of soul and body, in order that both in soul and body man may be rewarded or punished.

CHAPTER LXXX

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE RESURRECTION

BELIEF in the resurrection encounters a certain number of objections.

In nature, that which is destroyed, does not return to existence, identically the same as before: just as the habit that one acquires after losing it, is not identically the same habit as before: and for this reason the purpose of nature is, by means of generation, to preserve the species of that which is destroyed. Accordingly, since death deprives man of life, and the human body is resolved into the primary elements, it would seem impossible for the same identical man to come back to life.

Again. A thing cannot be identically the same, if any of its essential principles be not identically the same: since the change of an essential principle always induces a change in a thing’s essence, whereby a thing is, and is one. Now, when a thing is utterly annihilated it cannot resume existence as identically the same thing: a new thing, indeed, will be created; but the same thing will not be restored. And seemingly death annihilates several of man’s essential principles.

In the first place, his corporeity and the form of the mixture of elements, since the body is evidently dissolved; secondly, the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul, which cannot exist without the organs of the body; in fact, there would seem to be nothing left of humanity, which is the form of all that remains after the soul has left the body. Therefore it would seem impossible for the same man to rise again.

Moreover. It would seem that continuity is an essential condition of identity, not only in quantities and movements, but also in qualities and forms: thus when a healthy person falls sick and is restored to health, the health which he recovers is not identically the same as his previous health. Now death clearly deprives man of being, since corruption is the change of being into non-being. Therefore it is impossible for man to recover the same identical being as he had before. Consequently he will not be the same man: because things that are identical have the same being.

Moreover. If the same human body returns to life, it follows that whatsoever was in the body must be restored to it. But this leads to most unseemly consequences; as regards not only the hair on the head, and distributed about the body, and the nails, all of which clearly are frequently cut away: but also other parts of the body which are dissolved by the hidden action of natural heat: and if all these things were to be restored to man when he rises again, the result would be most unseemly. Therefore, apparently, man will not rise again after death.

Further. There are to be found men who eat human flesh and nothing else; and men thus nourished have children. Consequently the same flesh will be in several men. But it cannot possibly rise again in several men: and yet the resurrection would surely not be universal and entire, if each one did not regain what he had before. Therefore it would seem impossible that men will rise again.

Again. That which is common to all the individuals of one species would seem to be natural to that species. But the resurrection is not natural to man; because no natural agent is of sufficient power to cause the resurrection of all mankind. Therefore all mankind will not rise again.

Further. If we are delivered by Christ from sin, and from death the result of sin, seemingly those alone are to be delivered from death by rising again, who have partaken of the mysteries of Christ, whereby they are delivered from sin. But this does not apply to all men. Therefore it would seem that not all men will rise again.

CHAPTER LXXXI

SOLUTION OF THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS

IN order to solve these difficulties, we must observe that, in fashioning human nature, God, as we have already stated, bestowed on the human body something in addition to that which was due to it by virtue of its natural principles. This was a kind of incorruptibility, the result of the body being so proportioned to its form, that as the soul's life is everlasting, so was it possible for the body, through the soul, to live for ever. This incorruptibility, although it was not natural in relation to a natural principle, was nevertheless natural, so to say, in relation to the end; in as much as the matter was proportioned to its natural form, which is the end of matter. Accordingly, when the soul, against the order of its nature, turned away from God, the body was deprived of that God-given disposition which made it proportionate to the soul, and death was the result. If then we consider the state in which human nature was created, death is incidental to man through sin. But this accident was removed by Christ, who through the merits of His Passion destroyed death by dying. We conclude then that the body is restored from death to life, by the same divine power that created the body incorruptible.

Accordingly, we reply to the first objection thus. The power of nature falls short of the divine power, even as the power of the instrument falls short of that of the principal agent. Hence, although nature is unable to restore a dead body to life, this can be done by the power of God. The reason why nature cannot do this is that nature always works through a form: and that which has a form already exists. Wherefore a thing cannot generate itself; but it generates something else that is its like in species. And when it has been destroyed, it has lost its form, by which it could be a principle of action. Consequently that which has been destroyed cannot be restored to its identity by the operation of nature. But the divine power, which brought things into being, so works through nature that, without it, it can produce an effect of nature, as we have proved above. Therefore, since the divine power changes not though things themselves be destroyed, it can restore integrity to things which have been corrupted.

The second objection does not prove that the same man cannot rise again. None of man's essential principles is utterly annihilated by death: because the rational soul, which is man's form, remains after death, as we have shown. The matter also which was subject to that form remains under the same dimensions that individualized it. Accordingly, the same man will be restored as a result of the union of the same identical matter with the same identical form.—As to corporeity, it can be taken in two ways. In one way it signifies the substantial form of the body, considered as a substance: and thus the corporeity of any body whatever is its substantial form, whereby that thing belongs to such and such a genus and species, and owing to which a body has the three dimensions. For there are not, in one and the same thing, several substantial forms, by one of which it belongs to a supreme genus, substance for example, and by another, to its proximate genus, such as bodies or animals, and by yet another, to its species, such as man or horse. For, if the first form makes it a substance, the subsequent forms would be additions to that which is already an actual individual, subsisting in nature, so that they would not be constituents of that individual, but like accidental forms would be in the subject which is that individual. Consequently corporeity taken as meaning the substantial form in man, is nothing else but the rational soul, which requires the three dimensions in its matter: since it is the actuating principle of a body.—In another sense, corporeity signifies an accidental form in regard to which a body is said to be in the genus of quantity: so that corporeity is identified with the three dimensions that enter into the definition of a body. Wherefore, although this corporeity returns to nothingness, when the body is corrupted, this cannot prevent a man from being identically the same when he rises again, since corporeity, taken in the first sense, does not return into nothing, but remains the same.

The form of a mixture can also be taken in two ways.—In one way, it signifies the substantial form of a mixed body: and thus, since in man there is no other substantial form besides the rational soul, as we have proved, neither can it be said that the form of the mixture, considered as his substantial form, is annihilated when a man dies.—In another way, when a number of simple qualities are mixed and attempered so as to form a composite quality, this latter may be called the form of the mixture, and stands in the same relation to the substantial form of the mixed body, as a simple quality does to the substantial form of a simple body. Wherefore, if the form of the mixture, thus understood, comes to nothing, this is no proof against the identity of the body that rises again.—This same applies to the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul. If by these we mean the sensitive and nutritive powers, which are natural properties of the soul or rather of the composite, they cease to be when the body ceases to be: and this does not interfere with the body's identity in the resurrection. If, however, by these parts we mean the very substance of the sensitive and nutritive soul, each of these is identical with the rational soul: for man has not three souls, but one only, as we have proved.—As to the humanity, we must not imagine this to be a form resulting from the union of the form with the matter, and distinct from both: because, since the form makes the matter to be something actually (2 De Anima, text. viii.), this additional form would not be substantial, but accidental. There are some who say that the form of the part is also the form of the whole; but that it is said to be the form of the part, in as much as it actuates the matter; and the form of the whole, in as much as it completes the species. Thus humanity is really nothing else but the rational soul; so that clearly it is not annihilated when the body is destroyed. But, seeing that humanity is the essence of man, and that the essence of a thing is indicated by the definition, and that the definition of a natural thing indicates not the form only, but the form and the matter, it follows that humanity signifies something composed of matter and form, just as man does, but not in the same way. Humanity signifies the essential principles of the species, both formal and material, with abstraction of the individualizing principles: for humanity is that by which someone is a man; whereas it is not by the principles of individuality, but only by the essential principles of the species, that someone is a man. Wherefore humanity signifies nothing else besides the essential principles of the species; so that its signification is only partial. On the other hand man signifies the essential principles of the species, without excluding the principles of individuality from its signification: since man signifies one having humanity, and this does not exclude his having other things: wherefore its signification is complete, because it signifies the essential principles of the species actually, and the individualizing principles potentially. But Socrates signifies both actually, even as the genus includes the difference potentially, whereas the species includes it actually. From this it follows that both the very same man and the very same humanity rise again, by reason of the survival of the rational soul, and the unity of matter.

The third objection in stating that identity of being depends on continuity, is based on a false premiss. For it is evident that matter and form have one being, since matter has not actual being except through a form. In this respect, however, the rational soul differs from other forms: because the being of other forms is nothing else but their adherence to matter: for they do not transcend matter, either in being or in operation: whereas it is clear that the rational soul transcends matter in operation, since by its operation of understanding it is independent of any bodily organ: and consequently its being is not merely adherence to matter. Therefore the soul’s being, which was that of the composite, remains after the dissolution of the body; and when the body is restored at the resurrection, it receives again the same being, which has remained in the soul.

The fourth objection proves nothing against the identity of those who rise again. That which is not an obstacle to man’s identity in this life, is clearly no obstacle to his identity when he rises again. Now, while a man lives, the parts of his body do not always remain the same as to matter, but only as to species: in fact, as regards matter, the parts come and go. Yet this does not prevent a man from retaining his identity from the beginning of his life to the end. Take fire for an example; as long as it continues to burn, we say that it is the same fire, because its species remains: and yet the logs have been consumed, and fresh ones have been put on. It is the same with the human body: since each single part retains its form and species during the whole of a lifetime: whereas their matter is both dissolved by the action of natural heat, and renewed by means of nourishment. Now a man remains the very same man, as to his various parts and stages of life, although the matter of his body changes from one stage to another. Accordingly, for a man to rise again identically the same as before, there is no need that he should have restored to him all the matter that was in him during his whole lifetime: but only as much as would suffice for the quantity due to him: and especially such matter as is closely connected with form and species. If there be anything lacking to a man's proper quantity, whether because he died before reaching maturity, or because he has lost a limb, the divine power will supply the deficiency. Nor will this prevent the identity of the rising body; seeing that nature too, makes additions to a child's body from extraneous sources, so that the body attains to maturity; and such an addition does not change its identity: since the child and the adult are the same man.

Hence we gather that even if some people partake of human flesh, this is no proof against identity in the resurrection; as the fifth objection argued. In fact, as we have already proved, there is no need that whatever was in man materially should rise again in him; and that if anything be lacking, it can be supplied by God's power. Accordingly, the flesh consumed will rise again in the man in whom it was first perfected by a rational soul; the second man—if he partook of other food besides human flesh—will rise again with only such matter as he acquired from this other food, and in such quantity as is required for the proper size of his body. But if he partake of no other food, he will rise again with what he received from his parents, and the deficiency will be supplied by the omnipotence of his Creator. And if his parents also partook of none but human meat, so that this seed would also be engendered therefrom, their children will rise again with that seed, and he whose flesh was consumed will be supplied from another source. In the resurrection it will be the rule that if any matter belong to several in common, it will rise again in him to whose perfection it most intimately belonged: so that if it were in one as the radical seed from which he was generated, and in another as the result of nourishment, it will rise again in the man who was generated from it as from seed. But if it were in one as belonging to the perfection of the individual, and in another as directed to the perfection of the species, it will rise again in him to whom it belonged as a perfection of the individual. Hence the seed will rise again in the begotten and not in the begetter: and Adam's rib will rise again in Eve, and not in Adam, in whom it was as in the principle of nature. And if it be in both on the same count, it will rise again in the one to whom it first belonged.

The reply to the sixth objection is clear from what we have already said. Resurrection is natural, if we look at its final cause, in as much as it is natural for the soul to be united to the body: but its efficient cause is not natural, since it is caused by the power of God alone.

Nor should we deny that all will rise again, although all men do not believe in Christ, nor are partakers in His mysteries. The Son of God took human nature that He might restore it. Accordingly, the natural defect that is shared by all will be repaired, and the dead will rise again. But this defect will not be repaired perfectly, save in those who adhere to Christ, either by their own action in believing in Him, or at least by the sacrament of faith.

CHAPTER LXXXII

THAT MAN WILL RISE AGAIN IMMORTAL

IT follows that man will so rise as not to die again.

The necessity of dying is a defect that nature has contracted from sin. Now Christ by the merits of His Passion, repaired the defects which nature contracted from sin: for as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15), not as the offence, so also the gift: for if by the offence of one many died: much more the grace of God, and the gift, by the grace of one man Jesus Christ, have abounded unto many. From this we gather that Christ's merit is more efficacious in destroying death, than Adam's sin in causing it. Therefore those who rise again, being delivered from death by the merits of Christ, will not die again.

Further. That which is to endure for ever has not been destroyed. Wherefore, if after rising from the dead men are to die again, so that death will go on for ever, death was in no sense destroyed by the death of Christ. Yet it has been destroyed now indeed in its cause, as the Lord foretold by the prophet Osee (13:14), O death, I will be thy death: and at last it will be actually destroyed, according to 1 Cor. 15:26, And the enemy death shall be destroyed last. It is therefore part of the Church's faith that those who arise will not die again.

Moreover. The effect is likened to its cause. Now Christ's resurrection is the cause of the resurrection to come, as stated above. But Christ so rose from the dead that He will not die again, according to Rom. 6:9, Christ rising from the dead, dieth now no more. Therefore men will so rise, that they will die no more.

Again. If after rising from the dead men are to die again: either they will rise again from this latter death, or they will not. If not, their souls will remain for ever separated from their bodies; and we have proved this to be unfitting, and for this reason it is granted that they will rise again: otherwise if they were not to rise again after dying a second time, there would be no reason for their rising after dying the first time. On the other hand, if they rise again after this second death, either this second resurrection will be followed by yet another death, or not. If not, the same argument applies, as to their first resurrection. And if they are to die again, there will be an indefinite alternation of death and life in the subject. But this is unseemly, because God must have some definite end in raising the dead to life: while alternate death and life is a kind of succession and change which cannot be an end: for movement of its very nature cannot be an end, since all movement tends towards something else.

Further. The purpose of nature's action in this lower world tends to perpetuity; because that action is directed to generation, which aims at the perpetuation of the species: hence nature does not intend this or that individual as its last end, but the preservation of the species in the individual. It is thus with nature, because nature acts by the power of God, the fount of perpetuity: wherefore the Philosopher (2 De Gen. et Corr.) says that the purpose of generation is that the participation of the divine being may be perpetuated in the things generated. Much more therefore does the action of God himself tend to something perpetual. Now resurrection is not directed to the perpetuity of the species: since this might have been secured by generation. Therefore it is directed to the perpetuation of the individual. But not in respect of the soul only: for the soul has this without the resurrection. Therefore in respect of the composite; and consequently man will live for ever after the resurrection.

Again. If we compare the soul and body from the point of view of a man's first generation on the one hand and of his resurrection on the other, we shall find a different order between them. In man's first generation, the creation of the soul follows the generation of the body: for at first the matter is prepared, by the power of the disconnected seed, and then God creates and infuses the soul: whereas in the resurrection the body will be united to the pre-existing soul. Now the first life, which man obtains by generation, follows the condition of the mortal body, in that death puts an end to it. Therefore the life which he obtains by the resurrection will be everlasting, in accordance with the condition of the immortal soul.

Again. If there be an indefinite succession of life and death in the same man, this alternating life and death will form a kind of circle. Now, in things subject to generation and corruption, every circle originates from the first circle of incorruptible bodies: for the first circle is composed of local movement, and this is communicated thence by way of imitation to other kinds of movement. Consequently the alternation of death and life would be caused by a heavenly body: but this is impossible, since the restoration of life to a dead body is beyond the scope of nature's action. Hence we cannot admit this alternation of death and life, nor consequently that bodies will die after rising from the dead.

Further. Whatsoever things succeed one another in the same subject, last for a certain time: and all such things are subject to the heavens' movement, of which time is a result. But the separated soul is not subject to the movement of the heavens, because it is above all corporeal nature. Consequently its alternate separation from and union with the body is not subject to the heavens' movement. Therefore there is no such rotation of alternate death and life, as would result if those who rise from death were to die again. Therefore they will rise to die no more. Hence it is said (Isa. 25:8): The Lord shall cast death down headlong for ever; and (Apoc. 21:4): Death shall be no more.

Hereby we reject the error of certain heathens of old, who held that the history of times and temporal things repeats itself. For instance, just as once upon a time the philosopher Plato taught at Athens in the school known as the Academy, so during a space of countless previous centuries, at long but certain intervals, we shall find again and again the same Plato, and the same city, and the same disciples, and we shall go on finding them during ages without number: so Augustine relates (12 De Civ. Dei). To this, says he (ibid.) some would refer the words of Ecclesiastes 1:9, 10, What is it that hath been? The same thing that shall be. What is it that hath been done? The same that shall be done. Nothing under the sun is new: neither is any man able to say: Behold this is new: for it had already gone before it in the ages that were before us. This however does not mean that the same identical things occur over again, but the same kind of thing, as Augustine explains (ibid.). Aristotle also (De Generat.) taught this in opposition to the foregoing view.

CHAPTER LXXXIII

THAT AFTER THE RESURRECTION THERE WILL BE NO USE OF FOOD OR VENERY

FROM what has been said it follows that men after rising again will have no use of venery or food. When corruptible life is no more there will be an end of those things that minister to it. Now it is evident that the use of food ministers to the corruptible life: since the reason why we partake of food is to avoid the corruption that might result from the consumption of the natural humidity. Moreover in the present life food is necessary for growth; whereas after the resurrection men will not grow, since they will rise again of the size that is due to them, as we have already stated. Likewise the alliance of male with female administers to the corruptible life; for its purpose is generation, whereby that which cannot last for ever in the individual may be preserved in the species. Now we have shown that the life of those who rise again will be everlasting. Therefore after the resurrection there will be no use for food or venery.

Again. The life of those who will have risen again will not be less orderly than the present life: in fact, it will be more so, since they will obtain that life through the agency of God alone, whereas the present life is acquired through the co-operation of nature. Now in this life food is consumed for a certain purpose, namely that it may be transformed into the body by the process of digestion. Wherefore, if then there will be a use for food, it will be that it may be transformed into the body. Since then the body will suffer no dissolution, because it will be incorruptible, we shall have to admit that whatever a man will derive from nourishment will add to his size: and seeing that, as we have shown above, he will rise again in the size due to him, it follows that he will become of immoderate size: for that which is more than due is immoderate.

Further. Man after rising again will live for ever. Either then he will continue always to take food, or only for a certain time. If he continue always to take food, his growth will be according to a certain measure, since his food will have been transformed into his body, in which nothing will be dissolved: and consequently his body will grow indefinitely. But this is impossible, because growth is a natural movement: and a natural motive force never aims at the indefinite, but always at something definite. The reason is that as Aristotle says (2 De Anima, text. xli.). there is a limit to the size and increase of all things in nature. On the other hand if man who is to live for ever is not always to partake of food after the resurrection, there will be a time during which he will not partake of it: and so should he have done from the beginning. Therefore there will be no use for food after the resurrection.

And if he will have no use for food, neither will he have any use for venery, which requires emission of seed. Now after the resurrection there can be no emission of seed: neither from the substance of a man’s body, since this is incompatible with the nature of seed: for it would involve corruption and a subtraction from man’s nature, so that it could not be a principle of nature, as the Philosopher says (1 De Gener. Anim., xviii.). Another reason is because no resolution will be possible in the incorruptible bodies of those who rise again. Nor will it be possible for the seed to be the product of the surplus nourishment, since after the resurrection man will not partake of food, as we have shown. Therefore man will have no use for venery after the resurrection.

Again. The use of venery aims at generation. Consequently, if it be used after the resurrection, and to some purpose, it follows that men will be begotten then, even as now. Hence, there will be many, after the resurrection, who were not in existence before. And thus there will be no use in deferring the resurrection of the dead, that all who have the same nature may receive life together.

Moreover. If, after the resurrection, men will be begotten, either they too will die, or they will be incorruptible and immortal.—If they are to be incorruptible and immortal, many difficulties will result. In the first place, we shall have to say that those men will be born without original sin, seeing that the necessity of dying is the punishment resulting from original sin. And this is against the statement of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12) that by one man, sin entered into this world, and by sin death; and so death passed upon all men. Secondly, it follows that not all men need to be redeemed by Christ, if some are to be born without original sin and the necessity of dying. Thus Christ would not be the head of all; and this is contrary to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:22) that as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive. There is also yet another incongruity, in that men having like generation should have different terms of generation: since men begotten of seed now acquire a corruptible life, whereas then they will acquire an immortal life.—On the other hand if the men to be born then, are to be corruptible and die:—either they will not rise again, and, in consequence, their souls will remain for ever separated from their bodies: and this is unreasonable, seeing that they are of the same species as the souls of those who rise again:—or they will rise again, and then the others should wait for them, so that all who share in the same nature may, at the same time, receive the benefit of resurrection, which belongs to the reparation of nature, as stated above. Moreover there would, seemingly, be no reason for some to wait until they rise together, if all do not wait alike.

Moreover. If after the resurrection men are to have sexual intercourse and beget, this will either be for always, or only for a time. If it is to go on for ever, men will increase in numbers indefinitely. Now after the resurrection the intention of nature in the begetter can be for no other end but the increase in numbers: for it cannot be for the preservation of the species by means of generation, seeing that man’s life will be incorruptible. Consequently the intention of nature in the begetter will be for something indefinite: and this is impossible. On the other hand if they are not to go on for ever begetting, but only for a certain time; then after that time they will no longer beget: and so we ought to say that neither will they from the beginning have sexual intercourse and beget.

Someone, however, might say that there will be use for food and sexual intercourse, not for the preservation and increase of the body, nor for the preservation of the species and the increase of mankind, but merely for the pleasure accompanying those acts, lest in the final reward something should be lacking to man’s enjoyment.

But there are many ways of showing that such a statement is devoid of reason:—First, because, as we have already observed, life after the resurrection will be better ordered than the present life, as stated above. Now, in this life it is inordinate and sinful to make use of food or venery for mere pleasure, and not for the purpose of supporting the body, and begetting children. And there is reason in this: since the pleasure attaching to these actions is not their end; but contrariwise, nature has made them pleasant, lest man should not take the trouble to perform acts that are necessary to nature; and that might happen unless the pleasure urged him. Consequently to do these things with the sole object of pleasure is altogether out of order and unbecoming. Therefore this cannot be said of those who will rise again, whose life will be most orderly.

Again. The life of those who rise again will have perfect beatitude for its object: and man's perfect happiness does not consist in pleasures of the body, such as those that are derived from food and sexual intercourse, as we proved. Therefore we must not ascribe such pleasures to life after the resurrection.

Moreover. Acts of virtue are directed to happiness as their end. Therefore, if the state of future bliss includes the pleasures of the table and sexual intercourse, as pertaining to happiness, it would follow that those who act virtuously, must in some way include those pleasures in their intention. But this would exclude temperance, since it is inconsistent with that virtue to abstain from pleasures now, in order the more to enjoy them hereafter: every chaste man would be a rake, and every abstainer a glutton. If however the said pleasures are to be present in the state of bliss, but not as belonging thereto, so that those who act virtuously would not have to intend them; this is impossible, because whatsoever is at all, is either for the sake of something else, or for its own sake. Now the said pleasures will not be for the sake of something else, since they will not be for the sake of actions directed to nature's end, as we have already shown. Consequently they will be for their own sake. But all such things are either happiness itself, or part of it. Hence, if those pleasures are to be present in the life of those who rise again, they will form part of their happiness: and we have proved this to be impossible. Therefore in no sense will those pleasures have any place in the life to come.

Further. It seems ridiculous to seek pleasures of the body, that are common to us and dumb animals, in a place where the highest pleasures are to be found consisting in the vision of God, which we shall have in common with the angels, as stated above; unless someone were to say that the angels' happiness is imperfect, because they lack the pleasures of the beasts: which is equally absurd.

Hence, our Lord said (Matth. 22:30) that in the resurrection they shall neither marry, nor be married, but shall be as the angels of God in heaven.

Hereby we refute the error of the Jews and Mohammedans who say that after the resurrection men will use food and sexual intercourse, even as now. They were followed by some Christian heretics, who said that Christ would reign over an earthly kingdom, that would last for a thousand years: and that for that space of time those who have risen again will give themselves to the most immoderate pleasures in eating and drinking, to such an extent as to exceed not only all moderation, but even the bounds of credibility: but such things can enter the minds of those only who are carnally inclined. Those who are spiritual call those who believe these things χιλιασται, a Greek word which, as Augustine observes, may be rendered Millenarians. There are, however, a few things that would seem to support this opinion. In the first place, Adam, before he sinned, was immortal; and yet he could use food and sexual intercourse in that state, since it was before he sinned that it was said to him (Gen. 1:28): Increase and multiply: and again (ibid. 2:16): Of every tree of paradise thou shalt eat.

Again, after His resurrection, Christ is said to have eaten and drunk: for it is said (Luke 24:43) that, when he had eaten before them, taking the remains he gave to them. Also, Peter said (Acts 10:40, 41): Him, that is Jesus, God raised up the third day, and gave him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses pre-ordained by God, even to us, who did eat and drink with him after he arose again from the dead.

There are, moreover, some texts which would seem to promise the use of food to men in that state. It is said (Isa. 25:6): The Lord of hosts shall make unto all people in this mountain, a feast of fat things, a feast of wine, of fat things full of marrow, of wine purified from the lees. And that this refers to the state of life after the resurrection, is clear from what follows (verse 8): He shall cast death down headlong for ever: and the Lord God shall wipe away tears from every face. Again, it is said (ibid. 65:13): Behold my servants shall eat, and you shall be hungry: behold my servants shall drink, and you shall be thirsty: and this is shown to refer to the state of the future life, by the words that follow (verse 17): Behold I create new heavens and a new earth.—Again, our Lord said (Matth. 26:29): I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I shall drink it with you new in the kingdom of my Father: and (Luke 22:29, 30): I dispose to you, as my Father hath disposed to me, a kingdom: that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom.—Again it is said (Apoc. 22:2) that on both sides of the river, which shall be in the city of the blessed, there shall be the tree of life, bearing twelve fruits: and again (ibid. 20:4, 5): I saw … the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus … and they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years. All these texts might seem to confirm the opinion of the above-mentioned heretics: but the answer is not very difficult to find.

The objection which refers to Adam avails nothing. Adam had a certain personal perfection: but human nature was not as yet wholly perfect in point of numbers. Accordingly, Adam was created with the perfection becoming to the principle of the whole human race: wherefore it behoved him to beget, in order that mankind might increase in numbers; and consequently it was necessary also that he should partake of food. On the other hand the perfection of man, after the resurrection, will consist in human nature attaining to its full perfection, so that the number of the elect may be complete: wherefore there will be no room for begetting or partaking of nourishment. Hence the immortality and incorruption of those who rise again will differ from the immortality and incorruption of Adam. They will be immortal and incorruptible in such a way as to be unable to die, and as to preclude any dissolution whatsoever in their bodies: whereas Adam was immortal in such a way that it was possible for him not to die, if he sinned not, and possible for him to die, if he sinned. And his immortality could be preserved in such a way, not that there would be no dissolution in his body, but that the dissolution of the natural humidity would be remedied by the use of food, lest his body should be actually corrupted.

With regard to Christ it must be said that, after His resurrection, He ate, not because He needed to, but to show the reality of His resurrection. Consequently that food was not changed into His flesh, but dissolved into prejacent matter. But there will be no such reason for eating after the general resurrection.

The texts that seem to promise the use of food after the resurrection should be understood in a spiritual sense. Holy Scripture sets before us intelligible truths under the guise of sensible objects; in order that our mind, from the things that come under its ken, may learn to love the things which are beyond its ken. Thus then the delight afforded by the contemplation of wisdom, and the acquisition of intelligible truth by our understanding, is wont to be indicated in Holy Scripture by the use of food: according to what is said of Wisdom (Prov. 9:2, 5), She hath mingled her wine, and set forth her table … and to the unwise she said: Come, eat my bread, and drink the wine which I have mingled for you: and again (Ecclus. 15:3), The Lord shall feed him with the bread of life and understanding, and give him the water of wholesome wisdom to drink. Again it is said of Wisdom (Prov. 3:18): She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her: and he that shall retain her is blessed. Therefore these texts do not prove that those who rise again will partake of food.

The words of our Lord, quoted from Matth. 26, can be understood in another sense to the one suggested, so as to refer to His eating and drinking with His disciples, after the resurrection, a new wine indeed, that is in a new way, namely not because He needed it, but in order to prove His resurrection: and the words, in the kingdom of my Father signify that in the resurrection of Christ the kingdom of immortality began to be demonstrated. The reference in the Apocalypse to the thousand years and the first resurrection of the martyrs, signifies that the first resurrection is that of souls, in rising from sins, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:14), Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee. The thousand years signify the whole time of the Church, when the martyrs and other saints reign with Christ, both in the Church of the present, which is called the kingdom of God, and in the heavenly kingdom, as to their souls. For a thousand is the number that signifies perfection, because it is a cube, i.e., a solid figure, and its root is ten, which also is wont to signify perfection. Accordingly, it is evident that those who rise again will have no use for meat, drink and venery.

Lastly, we may conclude that all the occupations of the active life will cease, since they appear to be directed to the use of food and sexual intercourse, and other necessities of a corruptible life. Consequently only the occupation of the contemplative life will remain in those who rise again: for which reason it was said of Mary when contemplating (Luke 10:42) that she hath chosen the better part, which shall not be taken away from her. Hence also it is said (Job 7:9, 10): He that shall go down to hell shall not come up: nor shall he return any more into his house, neither shall his place know him any more. In these words Job denies the resurrection such as some held, saying that after the resurrection man will return to occupations like those he has now, as for instance, the building of houses and similar avocations.

CHAPTER LXXXIV

THAT THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN WILL HAVE THE SAME NATURE AS BEFORE

THE preceding matter gave some an occasion for erring about the condition of those who rise again. Seeing that a body composed of contrary elements is seemingly of necessity subject to corruption, some have maintained that the bodies of those who rise again will not be composed of contrary elements. Of these, some held that our bodies will not rise again with a corporeal nature, but will be transformed into spirits: and they were induced to hold this view by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:44), It is sown a natural body, it shall rise a spiritual body. Others, moved by the same text, asserted that our bodies, in the resurrection, will be rarefied, like air and wind: for the air is called spiritus, so that the spiritual body would mean an air-like body. Others again said that in the resurrection our souls will resume, not earthly, but heavenly bodies: and they were brought to hold this view, by the words of the Apostle speaking of the resurrection (1 Cor. 15:40), And there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial. And all these would seem to find a support in the words of the Apostle (ibid. 50), Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God: so that, seemingly, the bodies of those who rise again will not contain flesh and blood, nor consequently any other humours. These views, however, are manifestly erroneous.

For our resurrection will be in conformity with Christ's, according to the Apostle (Philip, 3:21), Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of his glory. Now, after His resurrection, Christ had a palpable body, consisting of flesh and bone: since as it is related, He said to His disciples after the Resurrection (Luke 24:39): Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have. Therefore other men, also, when they rise again, will have palpable bodies, consisting of flesh and bone.

Again. The soul is united to the body as form to matter. Now every form has its definite matter, since act must be proportionate to potentiality. Since then the soul will be of the same species, seemingly it will have the same specific matter. Therefore the body will be the same specifically after the resurrection as before: so that it will consist of flesh and bone and other like parts.

Further. Since the definition of natural things, which signifies the specific essence, includes matter, it would seem to follow that a specific change of matter must involve a specific change of the natural thing. Now man is a natural thing. Accordingly if, after the resurrection, he will not have, as now, a body consisting of flesh and bone and like parts, those that rise again will not be of the same species as now, and they will be called men but equivocally.

Again. The soul of one man is more distant from a body of another species, than from the body of another man. Now the soul cannot be united to the body of another man, as we have proved. Much less then can it be united, in the resurrection, to a body of another species.

Further. For a man to be the selfsame when he rises again, his essential parts must be the selfsame. If then, his body will not consist of flesh and bone when he rises from the dead, he will not be the very same man.

Job most clearly rejects all these false opinions when he says (19:26, 27): I shall be clothed again with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see my God, whom I myself shall see … and not another.

Moreover, each of the above opinions is objectionable in its own way.

It is quite impossible for a body to be transformed into a spirit. For things which are transformable into each other must have common matter: and there can be no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things, since the former are utterly immaterial, as we have proved. Therefore the human body cannot be changed into a spiritual substance.

Again. If the human body be changed into a spiritual substance, it will either be transformed into the spiritual substance of the soul, or into some other. If it be changed into the former, then after the resurrection there will be nothing in man besides his soul, even as before the resurrection: and consequently his condition will not be altered in the resurrection. And if it be transformed into another spiritual substance, it would follow that two spiritual substances would combine to form one thing in nature: and this is altogether impossible, since every spiritual substance is self-subsistent.

It is likewise impossible for the body of the man who rises again to be akin to air or wind. For the body of a man, or of any animal, must have definite configuration, both in the whole and in its parts. And a body with a definite figure must be terminable: since a figure is that which is comprised within its term or terms: whereas air is not of itself terminable, but is confined by the terms of something else. Therefore the body of a man, in the resurrection, cannot be akin to air or wind.

Further. The body of the man who rises again must have the sense of touch: since no animal is without it; and when he rises again he must needs be an animal, if he is to be a man. Now, an air-like body cannot have the sense of touch, nor indeed can any simple body, since a body that is perceptive of contact needs to be in the mean of tangible qualities, so as to be in potentiality to them, as the Philosopher states (2 De Anima, text. ci.). Therefore the body of a man who rises again cannot be akin to air or wind.

Hence neither can it be a celestial body. For the body of a man or of any animal, must be susceptible to tangible qualities, as we have just stated. Now this is incompatible with a celestial body, which is neither hot, nor cold, nor damp, nor dry, nor anything else of the kind, either actually or potentially, as is proved in 1 De Cœlo. Therefore man’s body, in the resurrection, will not be a celestial body.

Again. The celestial bodies are incorruptible, and consequently cannot be changed from their natural disposition: and they are naturally spherical in figure (1 De Cœlo et Mundo). Therefore they cannot be given the figure which is naturally due to the human body. Consequently the bodies of those who rise again cannot possibly have the nature of celestial bodies.

CHAPTER LXXXV

THAT THE BODIES OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN WILL HAVE A DIFFERENT DISPOSITION FROM THAT WHICH THEY HAD BEFORE

ALTHOUGH the bodies of those who rise again will be of the same species as our bodies are now, they will be of a different disposition. In the first place in the resurrection the bodies of all men, both good and wicked, will be incorruptible. There are three reasons for this.

The first is taken from the end of the resurrection. Both good and bad will rise again, in order that they may, in their own bodies, receive the reward or punishment due to the works they performed while yet they lived in the body. Now the reward of the good, namely beatitude, will be everlasting: likewise eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Both these points have been proved. Therefore, in both cases, must they receive an incorruptible body.

Another reason may be found in the formal cause of those who rise again, namely the soul. We have already said that the soul will resume its body at the resurrection, lest it should remain for ever separated from it. Since then the body is restored to the soul for the sake of the soul's perfection, it is becoming that the body should be disposed in a manner suitable to the soul. Hence, seeing that the soul is incorruptible, an incorruptible body will be restored to it.

The third reason may be taken from the active cause of the resurrection. God will restore to life bodies already corrupt, wherefore a fortiori will he be able to preserve for ever the life which he will restore to those bodies.

Thus, when he so willed, he guarded from corruption even corruptible bodies, for example the bodies of the three children in the fiery furnace.

Accordingly, the incorruptibility of the life to come is to be understood in the sense that the body which is now corruptible will, by divine power, be made incorruptible, in that the soul in giving life to the body will exercise perfect dominion over it, nor will anything be able to hinder the soul in this life-giving effect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:53): This corruptible must put on incorruption: and this mortal must put on immortality. Consequently man will rise immortal, not through resuming another and an incorruptible body, as the aforesaid opinions maintained, but because that which is corruptible now will be rendered incorruptible. Wherefore we are to understand the saying of the Apostle (ibid. 50), Flesh and blood cannot possess the Kingdom of God, in the sense that in the life after the resurrection there will be no corruption of flesh and blood, but that these things will remain in substance: wherefore he adds, Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.

CHAPTER LXXXVI

THE QUALITY OF GLORIFIED BODIES

ALTHOUGH, by the merits of Christ, the defect of nature will be taken away from all, both good and bad, in the resurrection, there will still be a difference between good and bad, as regards things that belong to them personally. Now it pertains to nature that the human soul is the body’s form, quickening and preserving it in being: but it is by personal deeds that the soul merits to be raised to the glory of the beatific vision, or to be excluded from this glory on account of sin. Accordingly, the bodies of all without exception will be disposed in a manner becoming the soul, so that the incorruptible form will impart its incorruptible being to the body, notwithstanding the latter’s formation from contrary elements; because by the divine power the matter of the human body will be altogether subject to the soul in that respect: besides which, on account of the glory and power of the soul, when raised to the vision of God, the body united to it will acquire something more. For the divine power will have the effect of making the body wholly subject to the soul, not only in its being, but also in its actions, and passions, and movements, and bodily qualities.

Accordingly, just as the soul that enjoys the sight of God will be filled with spiritual brightness, so by a kind of overflow from the soul to the body, the latter will be, in its own way, clothed with the brightness of glory. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:18): It is sown, namely the body, in dishonour, it shall rise in glory: because now this body of ours is impervious to light, whereas then it will be full of light, according to Matth. 13:43, Then shall the just shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father.

Again, the soul which, united to its last end, will enjoy the sight of God, will find its every desire fulfilled: and since the body moves in obedience to the soul’s desire, the result will be that the body’s movements will be in perfect obedience to the spirit. Hence the bodies of the blessed, after the resurrection, will be agile: and this is indicated by the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:43): It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power. For we feel the body’s weakness, when we find it unable to satisfy the soul’s desire, in the movements and actions commanded by the soul. This weakness will then be wholly removed, because the body will receive an overflow of power from the soul united to God: wherefore again is it said of the just (Wis. 3:7) that they shall run to and fro, like sparks among the reeds. Their movements, however, will not be occasioned by need, since those who possess God need nothing, but they will be exhibitions of power.

Moreover, just as the soul that enjoys God will have its desire fulfilled, through having obtained possession of all good, so also will its desire be fulfilled as to the removal of all evil, since there can be no evil where the sovereign good is. Accordingly, the body that is perfected by that soul will, in conformity with it, be free from all evil, both in act and in potentiality. In act, since in it there will be neither corruption, nor deformity, nor defect of any kind: in potentiality, because nothing will be able to do it any harm; so that it will be impassible. This impassibility, however, does not imply insensibility: for they will use their senses for such pleasures as are not incompatible with a state of incorruption. The Apostle indicates this state of impassibility, when he says (1 Cor. 15:42): It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption.

Again. The soul that enjoys God will adhere to Him most completely, and will participate in His goodness in the highest degree possible that is consistent with its mode of being. Wherefore both the body will be perfectly subject to the soul, and it will share in the soul’s properties, as far as possible, in acuteness of sense, in the orderliness of the bodily appetite, and in the superlative perfection of its nature. For a thing is so much the more perfect in nature, as its matter is more completely subject to its form. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:44): It is sown a natural (animal) body; it shall rise a spiritual body. In the resurrection, the body will be spiritual, not that it will be a spirit, as some wrongly understood (whether spirit mean a spiritual substance, or air or wind), but because it will be completely subject to the spirit. Even so, we speak of the animal body, not that it is an animal, but because it is subject to animal passions, and needs food.

From the foregoing it follows that just as man’s soul will be raised to the glory of the heavenly spirits, by seeing God in His essence, as above stated, so will his body be uplifted to the properties of the heavenly bodies, in brightness, impassibility, easy and unwearying movement, and in being perfected by its most perfect form. This is what the Apostle meant when he said that man will rise again with a celestial body, celestial indeed not in nature, but in glory. Hence, after saying that there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial, he adds that one is the glory of the celestial, and another the glory of the terrestrial (1 Cor. 15:40). And just as the glory to which the human soul is uplifted surpasses the natural power of the heavenly spirits, as we have proved, so does the glory of risen bodies surpass the natural perfection of heavenly bodies in greater brightness, more changeless impassibility, and more perfect agility and dignity of nature.

CHAPTER LXXXVII

THE PLACE OF THE GLORIFIED BODIES

SINCE a place should be proportionate to that which is in it, it follows that, as the bodies of those who rise again acquire the properties of heavenly bodies, they have a place in heaven also, or rather above all the heavens, in order that they may be together with Christ, by whose power they will be brought to that glory; and of whom the Apostle says (Eph. 4:10) that he ascended above all the heavens, that he might fill all things.

It seems stupid to argue against this divine promise, from the natural position of the elements, as though it were impossible for the human body to be raised above the lighter elements, in that it is made of earth, and by nature should occupy the lowest place. For it is evident that, owing to the soul's power, the body, perfected by the soul, does not follow the inclinations of the elements. Even in this life the soul, by its power, holds the body together, lest it be dissolved through being composed of contrary elements: and again by the motive power of the soul, the body is moved upwards, and so much the more as the motive power is stronger. Now it is evident that the soul's power will be perfect, when it is united by vision to God. Therefore it should not seem difficult for the body, by the power of the soul, to be preserved from all corruption, and to be raised above all other bodies. Nor is this divine promise proved to be impossible by the fact that the heavenly bodies are unbreakable, and prevent the glorified bodies from being raised above them; because the divine power will enable the glorified body to be in the same place as a heavenly body. We have already an indication of this in Christ's body which came in to the disciples, the doors being closed.

CHAPTER LXXXVIII

THE SEX AND AGE OF THOSE WHO WILL RISE AGAIN

WE must not deem, however, as some have done, that the female sex will be lacking in the bodies of those who rise again. Since defects of nature are to be repaired in the resurrection, the bodies of those who will rise from the dead will lack none of the things that belong to the perfection of nature. Now, just as other members of the body belong to the integrity of the human body, so do those that serve the purpose of generation, both in man and in woman. Therefore bodies will rise again with these members.

Nor is this obviated by the fact that there will be no use for these members, as we have proved: for if that were a sufficient reason for dispensing with those members, the members that are used for taking nourishment would equally be absent in those who will rise again, since neither will there be any use for food after the resurrection: and thus a considerable number of members would be lacking in the bodies of those who will rise from the dead.

Wherefore none of those members will be lacking, although they will not have their use; yet not without purpose, since they will serve to restore the integrity of the human body. Nor does the weakness of the female sex prejudice the perfection of those who will rise again, because that is not a weakness in default of nature, but intended by nature. Moreover this very distinction in nature by extending to all things, will serve as a proof of nature’s perfection, and as an indication of divine wisdom disposing all things in order.

Nor need we be moved to think otherwise, by the words of the Apostle (Eph. 4:13), Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of age of the fulness of Christ. This does not mean that at this meeting, when those who will rise from the dead shall go into the air, to meet Christ, each one will belong to the male sex; but is intended to indicate the perfection and power of the Church. The whole Church will be like a perfect man going forth to meet Christ, as is clear from what we have been saying, and from what we have yet to say.

All will rise again at the age of Christ, which is the age of youth, because it is only at that age that nature is perfect: for the child has not yet grown so as to have reached the perfection of nature, and old age has overpassed it through decay.

CHAPTER LXXXIX

THE QUALITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION AS REGARDS THE DAMNED

WE have now sufficient to go on, to realize what will be in the resurrection the condition of the bodies of the damned. For those bodies will needs be proportionate to the souls of those about to be condemned. Now the souls of the wicked have a good nature, since it was created by God; but their will is disordered, and turned away from its proper end. Wherefore their bodies, in whatever belongs to their nature, will be restored to integrity, since they will rise again of a perfect age, without any diminution of members, and without any defect or corruption, occasioned by the erring or weakness of nature. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:52): The dead shall rise again incorruptible, which evidently refers to all, both good and wicked, as the context shows. Since however their souls will be, as to the will, turned away from God and deprived of their proper end, their bodies will not be spiritual, and altogether subject to the spirit, but will be carnal in their affections. Nor will their bodies be agile, as obeying the soul without difficulty, but will be heavy and unwieldy: and, in a way, they will be insupportable to their souls, even as their souls will be averted from God by disobedience. They will also remain passible as now, or even more so; and yet while being afflicted by sensible things, they will not be corrupted, even as their souls will be tormented by the utterly frustrated desire for happiness. Moreover their bodies will be impervious to light, and darksome; even as their souls will be strangers to the light of divine knowledge. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:51): We shall all indeed rise again; but we shall not all be changed: because the good alone will be changed unto glory; whereas the bodies of the wicked will rise again without glory.

Someone might deem it impossible for the bodies of the wicked to be passible without being also corruptible: since excess of passion causes loss of substance: thus if a body remain long in the fire, it is at length consumed; and if pain be too intense, the soul quits the body.

But all this postulates the changeableness of matter from one form to another: whereas, after the resurrection, the human body both of good and wicked will not be changeable from one form to another, since in both cases it will be completely perfected in its natural being by the soul. Wherefore it will no longer be possible for this form to be removed from this body, and for another form to take its place, because the divine power will completely subject the body to the soul. Hence the potentiality of primal matter to all forms will remain in the human body, restrained, as it were, by the power of the soul from the possibility of being actuated by another form. Since however the bodies of the damned in respect of certain conditions, will not be wholly subject to their souls, they will suffer pain from the antagonism of sensible objects: for they will suffer from the material fire, in as much as the quality of fire, by reason of its predominance, counteracts the equilibrium of the humours and the mutual adjustment that are connatural to the senses, although it cannot destroy them altogether. And yet this pain will be unable to separate the soul from the body, because the body is under the necessity of remaining for ever under the same form.

Moreover, just as the bodies of the blessed, through being renewed unto glory, will be raised above the heavenly bodies, so in due proportion, the bodies of the damned will be consigned to the nether regions, a place of darkness and torment. Hence it is said (Ps. 54:16): Let death come upon them, and let them go down alive into hell: and (Apoc. 20:9, 10): The devil who seduced them, was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beast and the false prophet shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.

CHAPTER XC

HOW INCORPOREAL SUBSTANCES CAN SUFFER FROM A MATERIAL FIRE

A doubt may arise as to how the devil, who is incorporeal, and, before the resurrection, the souls of the damned, can suffer from the material fire, which, according to our Lord’s words (Matth. 25:41), will torment the souls of the damned in hell. For He said: Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.

We must not think that incorporeal substances can be affected by a material fire, so that their nature be corrupted or altered, or in any way changed by the fire, in the same way as our corruptible bodies are affected by fire. For incorporeal substances have not a material nature, so as to be able to be changed by material substances. Nor are they receptive of the forms of sensible objects, except by understanding them: and such a reception is not penal, but perfecting and pleasure-giving. Nor can it be said that they suffer from the material fire, by reason of a certain antagonism, as bodies will after the resurrection: since incorporeal substances have no organs of sense, and have no use for sensitive powers. Accordingly, incorporeal substances suffer from the material fire by being coupled with it in some way. For a spirit can be coupled with a body either as its form;—thus the soul is coupled with the body to give it life:—or without being its form; thus necromancers, by the power of the demons, couple spirits with apparitions and the like. A fortiori, therefore, can the divine power bind the souls of the damned to a material fire: and thus it is painful to them to know themselves to be united to the lowest things as a punishment.

Moreover it is reasonable that the souls of the damned be punished with material pain.

Every sin of the rational creature results from disobedience to God. Now the punishment should correspond with the fault, so that the will may receive a punishment in contrast with that for love of which it sinned. Therefore it is reasonable that the rational nature should be punished for its sin, by being in a way bound to things beneath it, and thus made subject to them.

Again. Sin that is committed against God, deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense, as we have proved. For the pain of sense corresponds to sin with respect to the inordinate conversion to a mutable good, even as the pain of loss corresponds to sin, as regards the aversion from the immutable good. Now the rational creature, and especially the human soul, sins by turning inordinately to material things. Therefore it is fitting for it to be punished by means of material things.

Further. If sin deserves the painful punishment which is called the pain of sense, as proved above, this punishment must come from something that can cause pain. Now nothing causes pain except in so far as it is contrary to the will. And it is not contrary to the natural will of the rational creature, to be united to a spiritual substance; on the contrary it gives it pleasure and conduces to its perfection. For it is the union of like to like, and of the intelligible object to the intelligence: since every spiritual substance is, in itself, intelligible. On the other hand it is contrary to the natural will of a spiritual substance, that it be subject to a body, from which, according to the order of its nature, it should be free. Therefore it is fitting that a spiritual substance should be punished by means of material things.

Hence it follows that, although the material things spoken of by Scripture to describe the rewards of the blessed, are to be understood in a spiritual sense, as we have stated in regard to the promise of meat and drink, nevertheless some of the corporal punishments with which Scripture threatens the sinner are to be understood in the material and strict sense. For it is not fitting for the higher nature to be rewarded by using a lower nature, but by being united to a yet higher nature: whereas it is fitting for it to be punished by being consigned to the society of things beneath it. However this does not forbid our giving a spiritual and metaphorical interpretation to certain material expressions of Scripture in reference to the punishments of the damned. For instance, it is said (Isa. 66:24): Their worm shall not die: since by the worm we may understand the remorse of conscience, with which also the wicked will be tortured: for a material worm can eat neither into a spiritual substance, nor into the bodies of the damned, which will be incorruptible. Again, weeping and gnashing of teeth cannot be ascribed, save metaphorically, to spiritual substances; although they can be applied in the material sense to the bodies of the damned after the resurrection. By weeping however we must not understand the shedding of tears, since nothing will be resolved from those bodies; but this signifies the constriction of the heart, the convulsion of the eyes and brow, which are associated with weeping.

CHAPTER XCI

THAT THE SOUL WILL RECEIVE ITS PUNISHMENT OR REWARD, AS SOON AS IT DEPARTS FROM THE BODY

FROM what we have said, it may be gathered that immediately after death, the souls of men are punished or rewarded according to their merits.

The separated soul is susceptible to pain both spiritual and bodily, as we have proved. It is also clear from what was said in the Third Book that it is capable of being glorified: because as soon as the soul departs from the body, it is capable of seeing God, which it could not do, so long as it was united to a corruptible body: and man's ultimate happiness, which is the reward of virtue, consists in seeing God. Now there is no reason for deferring a punishment or reward, after the moment in which the soul is capable of receiving them. Therefore, as soon as the soul departs from the body, it receives its punishment or reward, for those things which it did while yet in the body.

Again. This life is the time for merit or demerit: wherefore it is compared to military or domestic service: thus it is said (Job 7:1): The life of man upon earth is a warfare, and his days are like the days of a hireling. Now reward or punishment is due to those who have served well or ill, as soon as their service is ended: wherefore it is said (Levit. 19:13): The wages of him that hath been hired by thee, shall not abide with thee until the morning: and the Lord said (Joel 3:4): I will very soon return you a recompense upon your own head. Therefore the soul will receive its reward or punishment immediately after death.

Again. The order in punishment and reward should correspond to the order in fault and merit. Now merit and fault are not ascribed to the body except through the soul: since nothing is deserving of praise or blame, except in so far as it is voluntary. Consequently both reward and punishment are awarded to the body through the soul: and not to the soul on account of the body. Hence there is no reason why the punishment or reward of the soul should await its reunion with the body: indeed it would seem more fitting that the soul which was the first to be the subject of sin or merit, should be the first to be punished or rewarded.

Moreover. By the same divine providence rewards and punishments are due to the rational creature, as natural things are provided with the perfections due to them. Now natural things receive at once each one the perfection of which it is capable, unless there be an obstacle, either on the part of the recipient, or on the part of the agent. Since then the soul as soon as it departs from the body, is capable of receiving either glory or punishment: it follows that the reward of the good, and the punishment of the wicked, are not delayed until the reunion of soul and body.

We must observe, however, with regard to the good, that there may be something to prevent their souls from receiving, as soon as they are separated from the body, their ultimate reward, consisting in the vision of God. The rational creature cannot be raised to that vision, unless it be wholly purified, since that vision surpasses the entire natural faculty of the creature. Hence it is said (Wis. 7:25) of wisdom, that no defiled thing cometh into her, and (Isa. 35:8): The unclean shall not pass over it. Now the soul is defiled by sin, whereby it adheres inordinately to things beneath it: and in this life it is cleansed from this defilement by Penance and the other sacraments, as stated above. Sometimes, however, it happens that this cleansing is not entirely completed in this life, but the soul still owes a debt of punishment, through either neglect, or occupations, or because it has been surprised by death. Nevertheless, it does not for this reason deserve to be wholly deprived of its reward, since these things may happen without mortal sin, which alone takes away charity, to which the reward of eternal life is due, as we have stated in the Third Book. Consequently, after this life, that soul will need to be cleansed before it can receive its final reward. Now this cleansing is effected by means of punishment, even as in this life the soul might have been cleansed by satisfactory punishment: otherwise the negligent would be better off than the prudent, if in the next life they were not to suffer for their sins the punishment they failed to undergo in this life. Therefore the souls of the just, who have something that could have been cleansed in this world, are debarred from receiving their reward, until they have suffered a purgatorial punishment: and this is why we hold that there is a Purgatory.

We are justified in this statement by the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:15), If any man's work burn he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire. This is confirmed by the universal custom of the Church in praying for the dead: since such prayers would be useless if there were no Purgatory after death. For the Church prays not for those who are already in the final term of a good or evil life, but for those who have not yet reached it.

That the soul receives its pain or punishment immediately after death, provided there be no obstacle, is confirmed by the authority of Scripture. Of the wicked it is said (Job 21:13): They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment they go down to hell: and (Luke 16:22): The rich man also died; and he was buried in hell: for hell is the place where souls are punished. The same is clear with regard to the just: thus according to Luke 23:43, our Lord, while hanging on the cross, said to the thief: This day shalt thou be with me in paradise: and by paradise is meant the reward that is promised to the just, according to Apoc. 2:7, To him that overcometh, I will give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the paradise of my God.

Some say however that paradise does not mean the final reward that will be in heaven, according to Matth. 5:12, Be glad and rejoice for your reward is very great in heaven, but an earthly reward, because paradise would seem to indicate a place on earth, on account of its being said (Gen. 2:8) that the Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning: wherein he placed man whom he had formed.

Nevertheless, if we consider the words of Holy Scripture, we shall find that the final reward which is promised in heaven to the saints, is bestowed immediately after this life. For the Apostle after speaking of the final glory says (2 Cor. 4:17, 18): That which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly, an eternal weight of glory. While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal: but the things which are not seen are eternal: where he evidently is speaking of the final glory which is in heaven. Then, in order to show when and how this glory is to be bestowed, he adds (ibid. 5:1): For we know, if our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in heaven. This evidently means that, the body being delivered to corruption, the soul is taken into the eternal and heavenly mansion, which is no less than the enjoyment of the Godhead, together with the angels in heaven.

And if someone choose to contradict this by maintaining that the Apostle did not say that, as soon as the body is given over to dissolution, we are to have an eternal dwelling in heaven in reality, but only in hope, and that at length we are to have it in reality, it is clear that this is contrary to the meaning of the Apostle. For even while we live here below, we are to have a heavenly habitation, according to divine predestination, so that we have it already in hope, according to Rom. 8:24, For we are saved by hope. Consequenty, there would be no purpose in his adding, If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, since it would have sufficed him to say, We know that we have a building of God, etc. This is made clearer still by what he says further on (8:6–8), Knowing that while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. (For we walk by faith and not by sight.) But we are confident, and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord. Now there would be no use in our desiring to be absent, that is separated, from the body, unless we were to be at once present with the Lord. But we are not present, unless He is present to our sight: since as long as we walk by faith and not by sight, we are absent from the Lord (ibid.). Therefore as soon as the soul of the just man is separated from the body, it sees God; and this is final beatitude, as we have proved in the Third Book. The same conclusion is proved by the words of the same Apostle (Philip. 1:23), Having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ. Now Christ is in heaven; and therefore the Apostle desired to go to heaven as soon as his body was dissolved.

This disposes of the error of certain Greeks who deny Purgatory and say that souls, before the resurrection of the bodies, neither ascend into heaven nor are cast into hell.

CHAPTER XCII

THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEATH THE SOULS OF THE JUST HAVE THEIR WILL FIXED UNCHANGEABLY ON THE GOOD

IT follows from what we have said that the soul, as soon as it is separated from the body, becomes unchangeable in its will, so that it can no more be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good.

As long as the soul can be changed from good to evil, or from evil to good, it is in a state of conflict and warfare: since it needs either to be watchful in resisting evil lest it be overcome by it, or to strive to be delivered from it. As soon, however, as it is separated from the body, it will no longer be in a state of warfare or conflict, but of receiving the reward or punishment according as it has striven rightly or wrongly: for it has been proved that it will receive its reward or punishment at once. Therefore the soul will no longer have a changeable will as regards good and evil.

Again. It has been proved that happiness, consisting in the vision of God, is everlasting. It has also been proved that eternal punishment is due to mortal sin. Now the soul cannot be happy, if its will be not right; for it ceases to be right through being turned away from its end, and it is right by enjoying its end: and it cannot be turned away from it and enjoy it at the same time. Therefore the rectitude of the will in the beatified soul must needs be everlasting, and cannot turn away from good to evil.

Further. The rational creature naturally desires to be happy. Hence it cannot desire not to be happy: and yet it can, by its will, turn from that in which true happiness consists, and then its will is perverse. The reason for this is because instead of apprehending that in which true happiness consists, as being happiness, it takes for happiness something else, to which the disordered will turns as though that thing were its end. Thus, for instance, the man who places his end in bodily pleasures, takes them to be the best thing: and this is what is meant by happiness. On the other hand the blessed apprehend that in which true beatitude consists, as being their happiness and last end: otherwise their appetite would not rest therein, and they would not be truly happy. Therefore whosoever is in the state of heavenly bliss cannot turn his will away from that in which is true happiness. Consequently his will cannot be perverse.

Again. Whosoever has sufficient for himself seeks for nothing else. Now that in which true happiness consists is enough for each of the blessed: otherwise his desire would not be fulfilled. Therefore every one of the blessed seeks nothing that does not pertain to that in which true happiness consists. But no one has a perverse will, unless he desire something incompatible with that in which true happiness consists. Therefore the will of the blessed cannot be changed to evil.

Further. There is no sin in the will without ignorance in the intellect: for we will nothing but what is either really good or seemingly good: wherefore it is said (Prov. 14:22): They err, that work evil; and the Philosopher declares (3 Ethic. iii.) that every wicked man is ignorant. But the truly beatified soul cannot be ignorant: since, in God, it sees whatever pertains to its own perfection: and consequently by no means can it have an evil will, especially seeing that the beatific vision is always actual, as we proved in the Third Book.

Moreover. Our intellect can err about conclusions, before tracing them back to first principles: but when this has been done its knowledge of the conclusion is scientific, and in such knowledge error is impossible. Now, as the principle of demonstration is in speculative matters, so is the end in matters relating to the appetite. Wherefore, as long as our will has not obtained its last end, it can be perverse, but not after it has attained to the enjoyment of the last end, which is desirable for itself, even as the first principles of demonstration are evident in themselves.

Again. The good, as such, is lovable: wherefore that which is apprehended as supremely good is most lovable. Now the beatified rational substance, in seeing God, apprehends him as supremely good: therefore it loves God above all things. Moreover, it is a part of love that those who love each other should be of one will. Therefore the will of the blessed is perfectly conformed to God, since the divine will is the supreme rule of all wills: and consequently the will of those who see God cannot be perverse.

Further. As long as a thing can acquire something else it has not reached its final end. Wherefore, if a beatified soul can be changed from good to evil, it has not reached its ultimate end: and this is inconsistent with beatitude. Consequently the soul that is beatified immediately after death, becomes unchangeable in its will.

CHAPTER XCIII

THAT THE SOULS OF THE WICKED AFTER DEATH HAVE THEIR WILL FIXED UNCHANGEABLY ON EVIL

IN like manner the souls which, immediately after death, are punished by being deprived of happiness, become unchangeable in their will.

It has been proved that, for mortal sin, the soul is condemned to eternal punishment. But this punishment of the soul would not be everlasting if its will could be changed for the better: since it would be unjust if its punishment continued after its will is good. Therefore the will of a lost soul cannot turn towards the good.

Further. The very disorder of the will is a punishment, and is most painful: since when a man has a disordered will, good deeds are displeasing to him: and the damned will be distressed to see in all things the fulfilment of God’s will, which by sinning they had resisted. Therefore they will never lose their disordered will.

Again. The will does not turn from sin to goodness except by God’s grace, as we have proved. Now, whereas the souls of the just are admitted to perfect participation in the divine goodness, the souls of the damned are utterly excluded from grace. Therefore the lost souls are unable to change their will for the better.

Again. Whereas the just, whilst in the flesh, look to God as the end of all their deeds and desires, the wicked look to an unlawful end which turns them away from God. Now the separated souls of the just will adhere unchangeably to God as the end to which they looked in this life. Therefore the souls of the wicked will adhere unchangeably to the end which they have chosen for themselves. Hence, as the will of the just will be unchangeable to evil, so the will of the wicked will be unchangeable to the good.

CHAPTER XCIV

THE UNCHANGEABLENESS OF WILL OF THE SOULS IN PURGATORY

HOWEVER, some souls do not attain beatitude as soon as they depart, and yet are not damned. Such are those who depart with something that needs to be cleansed, as stated above. We must prove then that neither do these souls admit of a change in their will, after they have been separated from the body.

We have shown that both blessed and damned have an unchangeable will, as regards the end to which they adhered. Now the souls that finally depart with something that needs to be cleansed, differ not from the souls of the blessed, in that they depart in charity, whereby we adhere to God as our end. Therefore they also have an unchangeable will.

CHAPTER XCV

THE COMMON CAUSE OF THIS UNCHANGEABLENESS IN ALL SOULS AFTER THEIR DEPARTURE FROM THE BODY

THIS unchangeableness of the will in all souls after their departure from the body is to be traced to the end as its cause.

This may be proved as follows. As already stated the end is, in matters of appetite, what the first principles of demonstration are in speculative matters. These principles are known naturally, and any error that may occur about such principles must be traced to some corruption in nature. Hence a man who understands these principles aright cannot come to understand them wrongly, or vice versa, unless his nature be changed. For one who errs about those principles cannot be set right by more certain principles as would be possible if he erred about some conclusion. Nor is it possible for one who grasps these principles aright, to be led astray by anything more certain. The same applies to the end: since everyone naturally desires the ultimate end; and in consequence the rational nature desires happiness in general. But that it desire this or that thing as happiness and its last end, depends on some special condition of nature; hence the Philosopher says (1 Ethic. viii.) that such as a man is, such does he deem his end to be. Accordingly if this disposition which makes a man desire a certain thing as his last end, cannot be removed from him, his will cannot be changed from its desire for that end. Now these dispositions can be removed from us so long as the soul is united to the body. The desire for something as our last end, is occasioned sometimes through our being disposed thereto by a passion, which is of short duration: wherefore our desire for that end is easily removed: and this is especially evident in contingent matters. And sometimes we are disposed to desire something as an end, good or evil, by a habit. But this disposition is not easily removed: and consequently such a desire for an end has a firmer hold on us: and of this we have an example in the temperate. Nevertheless an habitual disposition can be removed in this life.

It is evident then that as long as the disposition remains that causes the desire for a certain thing as the ultimate end, the desire for that end cannot be removed; because the ultimate end is desired above all; so that one cannot be turned back from the desire for the ultimate end, by something more desirable. Now, so long as the soul is united to the body, it is in a changeable state; but not after its separation from the body. For a disposition of the soul is accidentally subject to change in accordance with some change in the body: because, since the body serves the soul in the soul’s proper operations, it is natural that while the soul is in the body, it should be perfected by being moved to perfection. Hence, when it departs from the body, it will no longer be in a state of mobility towards the end, but of quiescence in the end. Consequently the will, as regards the desire for the ultimate end, will be immovable. Now the goodness or badness of the will depends entirely on the ultimate end, since whatsoever goods a man desires in relation to a good end, he desires well, and whatsoever he desires in relation to a bad end, he desires ill. Therefore the will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from the desire for one thing to the desire for another, provided the order to the ultimate end be observed.

Hence it is evident that this immobility of the will is not inconsistent with free-will, the act of which is to choose: since we choose things that are directed to the end, but not the ultimate end itself. Therefore, just as it is not inconsistent with free-will that we desire happiness and shun unhappiness, in general, with an unchangeable will, so will it not be incompatible with free-will that the will be fixed immovably on a particular object as its last end. For, just as now our common nature adheres to us unchangeably, whereby we desire happiness in general, so too that special disposition whereby we desire this or that as our last end, will remain in us unchangeably. Now the separate substances, that is the angels, as regards the nature wherein they were created, are nearer to ultimate perfection than souls: because they do not need to gain knowledge through senses, nor to reach conclusions by arguing from principles as souls do; but reach the contemplation of truth at once through the ideas implanted in them. Consequently, as soon as they adhere to an end, due or undue, they abide therein immovably.

It must not be imagined that the soul ceases to have an immovable will, after being reunited to the body. On the contrary, it will remain thus, because as we have already said, at the resurrection, the body will be disposed according to the exigencies of the soul, and the soul will not be influenced by the body, but will remain unchangeable.

CHAPTER XCVI

THE LAST JUDGEMENT

WE gather from what has been said that a twofold award is assigned to men’s deeds in this life: one with respect to the soul is received as soon as the soul departs from the body: the other will be when the soul returns to the body, and some will return to an impassible and glorious body, some to a passible and base body.

The first award is made to each one separately, in as much as each one dies separately; but the second award will be made to all at the same time, in as much as all will rise together. Now there must needs be a judgement whenever different awards are made according to difference of merits. Consequently there must be a twofold judgement: one in which each soul receives separately its reward or punishment; while the other is a general judgement, when all at the same time will receive as to soul and body, the award due to their merits. And since Christ in His human nature, by His Passion and Resurrection, merited for us resurrection and eternal life, it is fitting that He should preside at this general judgement, in which those who have risen from the dead will be rewarded or punished: hence it is said of Him (Jo. 5:27): He hath given him power to do the judgement, because he is the Son of man. Now the judgement should be in keeping with the things that are judged. And, seeing that the last judgement will refer to the rewards and punishments due to visible bodies, it is fitting for that judgement to be carried out visibly. Wherefore Christ will judge in His human form, which all will be able to see, both good and wicked: whereas the sight of His divinity is beatific, as we have proved: so that thus He can be seen by the good alone. On the other hand, the judgement of souls, since it is about things invisible, will be enacted invisibly.

Moreover although Christ, at the last judgement, will exercise the authority of judge, others nevertheless will judge with Him as assessors: and these will be those who were most closely united to Him, namely the Apostles, to whom it was said (Matth. 19:28): You, who have followed me … shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel: which promise extends to those who follow in the footsteps of the Apostles.

CHAPTER XCVII

THE STATE OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGEMENT

AFTER the last judgement has taken place, human nature will have reached its term. But, since all corporeal things were made for man, as we have shown, it will be fitting that the state of all corporeal creatures should be changed, so as to be in conformity with the state of men, as they will be then. And, seeing that men will then be incorruptible, all corporeal creatures will cease to be in the state of generation and corruption. This is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. 8:21): The creature itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God. Now since generation and corruption in the lower bodies is caused by the movement of the heavens, it follows that the heavens' movement must also cease, if generation and corruption in the lower bodies is to come to an end: whence it is said (Apoc. 10:6): Time shall be no longer. Nor ought it to be deemed impossible for the heavens' movement to cease. This movement, in fact, is natural, not as proceeding from an interior active principle, like the movement of heavy and light bodies; but because the heavens have, by nature, an aptitude for such a movement: while the principle of that movement is our intellect, as we have proved. Hence the heavens are moved like things moved by the will: and the will moves for the sake of an end. Now the end of the heavens' movement is not that they be moved: for, since movement always tends to something else, it cannot be a last end. Nor can it be said that the end of the heavens' movement is that it be moved from potentiality to actuality in point of its whereabouts: because such a potentiality can never wholly be reduced to actuality, since while a heavenly body is in one place, it is potentially in another: and the same applies to the potentiality of primal matter in respect of forms. Consequently, just as the end of nature in generation is not to reduce matter from potentiality to actuality, but something that results from this, namely the perpetuation of things, whereby they approach to the divine likeness, so the end of the heavens' movement is not that the heavens may be reduced from potentiality to actuality, but something resulting therefrom, namely, to be like God in causality. Now all the things subject to generation and corruption, that are caused by the heavens' movement, are, in a sense, directed to man as their end, as we have proved. Therefore the movement of the heavens is chiefly for the sake of the generation of mankind: for it is especially in this that it approaches to a divine likeness in point of causality, since the form of man, namely the rational soul, is immediately created by God, as proved above. Now the indefinite increase in the number of souls cannot be an end, since the indefinite is incompatible with the nature of an end. Therefore there is nothing unreasonable in saying that the movement of the heavens will cease when the number of men is complete.

Nevertheless, when the heavens cease to move, and the elements cease to generate and corrupt, their substance will remain, because God's goodness is unchangeable. For He created things that they might be: wherefore things that have an aptitude for perpetuity will remain for ever. The heavenly bodies have this aptitude both in whole and in part: whereas the elements have it in whole but not in part, since, in part, they are corruptible: and men have it in part, but not in whole; since the rational soul is incorruptible, whereas the composite is corruptible. Accordingly, those things will remain, in their substance, in that last state of the world, which in any way whatever have an aptitude for perpetuity: for God, by His power, will supply what is lacking to them through their own infirmity. Other things, animals, plants and mixed bodies, which are entirely corruptible, both in whole and in part, will nowise remain in the state of incorruption. Thus then are we to understand the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:31), The fashion of this world passeth away, because the present outward appearance of the world will pass away, while its substance will remain. In the same sense we are to understand the saying of Job (14:12), Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not awake till the heavens be broken, that is, until the present disposition of the heavens ceases, whereby the heavens move and cause movement in other things.

Moreover, since of all the elements fire is the most active, and the most destructive of corruptible things, the destruction of those things which will not remain in the future state, will be fittingly brought about by fire. Wherefore it is of faith that the world will be finally cleansed by fire, not only from corruptible bodies, but even from the contamination which this world has contracted through being the abode of sinners. Thus it is said (2 Pet. 3:7): The heavens and the earth, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgement: where by the heavens, we are to understand, not the firmament wherein are the stars, whether fixed or planets, but the atmosphere contiguous to the earth.

Since then the corporeal creature is disposed of finally in a manner that is in keeping with man's state, and man himself will not only be delivered from corruption, but also clothed in glory, as we have stated; it follows that even the corporeal creature will acquire a certain glory of brightness befitting its capacity. Wherefore it is said (Apoc. 21:1): I saw a new heaven and a new earth: and (Isa. 65:17, 18): I create new heavens, and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in remembrance, and they shall not come upon the heart. But you shall be glad and rejoice for ever. AMEN.

THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

COMPLETE EDTITION

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

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- Whether truth resides only in the intellect?
- Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?
- Whether the true and being are convertible terms?
- Whether good is logically prior to the true?
- Whether God is truth?
- Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?
- Whether created truth is eternal?
- Whether truth is immutable?

CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether falsity exists in things?

- Whether there is falsity in the senses?
- Whether falsity is in the intellect?
- Whether true and false are contraries?

THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether to live belongs to all natural things?
- Whether life is an operation?
- Whether life is properly attributed to God?
- Whether all things are life in God?

THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)

- Whether there is will in God?
- Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
- Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
- Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
- Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
- Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
- Whether the will of God is changeable?
- Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
- Whether God wills evils?
- Whether God has free-will?
- Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
- Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?

GOD’S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether love exists in God?
- Whether God loves all things?
- Whether God loves all things equally?
- Whether God always loves more the better things?

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether there is justice in God?

Whether the justice of God is truth?

Whether mercy can be attributed to God?

Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?

Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?

Whether God has immediate providence over everything?

Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?

OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether men are predestined by God?

Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?

Whether God reprobates any man?

Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*”Eligantur.”]

Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?

Whether predestination is certain?

Whether the number of the predestined is certain?

Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?

THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?

Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?

Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?

THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether there is power in God?

Whether the power of God is infinite?

Whether God is omnipotent?

Whether God can make the past not to have been?

Whether God can do what He does not?

Whether God can do better than what He does?

OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether beatitude belongs to God?

Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?

Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?

Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?

TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether there is procession in God?

Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?

Whether the procession of love in God is generation?

Whether there are more than two processions in God?

THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether there are real relations in God?

Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?

Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?

Whether in God there are only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession?

THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether “person” is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?

Whether the word “person” should be said of God?

Whether this word “person” signifies relation?

THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether there are several persons in God?

Whether there are more than three persons in God?

Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?

Whether this term “person” can be common to the three persons?

OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

  - Whether there is trinity in God?
  - Whether the Son is other than the Father?
  - Whether the exclusive word “alone” should be added to the essential term in God?
  - Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?
- THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
  - Whether there are notions in God?
  - Whether there are five notions?
  - Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?
- OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?
  - Whether this name “Father” is properly the name of a divine person?
  - Whether this name “Father” is applied to God, firstly as a personal name?
  - Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?
- OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether Word in God is a personal name?
  - Whether “Word” is the Son’s proper name?
  - Whether the name “Word” imports relation to creatures?
- OF THE IMAGE (TWO ARTICLES)
  - Whether image in God is said personally?
  - Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?
- OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether this name “Holy Ghost” is the proper name of one divine person?
  - Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?
  - Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?
  - Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?
- OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST—LOVE (TWO ARTICLES)
  - Whether “Love” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether “Gift” is a personal name?

Whether “Gift” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?

Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?

Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?

Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?

Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?

Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?

Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?

Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?

OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether relation is the same as person?

Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?

Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons?

Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?

OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

Whether the notional acts are voluntary?

Whether the notional acts proceed from something?

Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?

Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?

Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?

OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)

        Whether there is equality in God?

        Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father?

        Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?

        Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?

        Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?

        Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?

    THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

        Whether a divine person can be properly sent?

        Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?

        Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace?

        Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?

        Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?

        Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?

        Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?

        Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?

TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44–46)

    THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)

        Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?

        Whether primary matter is created by God?

        Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?

        Whether God is the final cause of all things?

    THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

        Whether to create is to make something from nothing?

        Whether God can create anything?

        Whether creation is anything in the creature?

        Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?

    - Whether it belongs to God alone to create?
    - Whether to create is proper to any person?
    - Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?
    - Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?
  - OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)
    - Whether the universe of creatures always existed?
    - Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?
    - Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?
- TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (Q[47])
  - OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (THREE ARTICLES)
    - Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?
    - Whether the inequality of things is from God?
    - Whether there is only one world?
- TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF GOOD AND EVIL (QQ[48]-49)
  - THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (SIX ARTICLES)
    - Whether evil is a nature?
    - Whether evil is found in things?
    - Whether evil is in good as in its subject?
    - Whether evil corrupts the whole good?
    - Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?
    - Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?
  - THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)
    - Whether good can be the cause of evil?
    - Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?
    - Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?
- TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)
  - OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?
- Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?
- Whether the angels exist in any great number?
- Whether the angels differ in species?
- Whether the angels are incorruptible?

OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?
- Whether angels assume bodies?
- Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether an angel is in a place?
- Whether an angel can be in several places at once?
- Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?

OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether an angel can be moved locally?
- Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?
- Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether an angel’s act of understanding is his substance?
- Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?
- Whether an angel’s power of intelligence is his essence?
- Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?
- Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?

OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the angels know all things by their substance?
- Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?
- Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels?

OF THE ANGEL’S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether an angel knows himself?
- Whether one angel knows another?
- Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?

OF THE ANGEL’S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether the angels know material things?
- Whether an angel knows singulars?
- Whether angels know the future?
- Whether angels know secret thoughts?
- Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?

OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (SEVEN ARTICLES)

- Whether the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in act?
- Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?
- Whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive?
- Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?
- Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?
- Whether there is a “morning” and an “evening” knowledge in the angels?
- Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?

THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether there is will in the angels?
- Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect?
- Whether there is free-will in the angels?
- Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?

OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?
- Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
- Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?
- Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?
- Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?

- OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?
  - Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?
  - Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?
  - Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?
- OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE ARTICLES)
  - Whether the angels were created in beatitude?
  - Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?
  - Whether the angels were created in grace?
  - Whether an angel merits his beatitude?
  - Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?
  - Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts?
  - Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?
  - Whether a beatified angel can sin?
  - Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?
- THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (NINE ARTICLES)
  - Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?
  - Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?
  - Whether the devil desired to be as God?
  - Whether any demons are naturally wicked?
  - Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation?
  - Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel?
  - Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?
  - Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?
  - Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?
- THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the demons’ intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth?

Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?

Whether there is sorrow in the demons?

Whether our atmosphere is the demons’ place of punishment?

TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)

THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

Whether corporeal things were made on account of God’s goodness?

Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels?

Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?

ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?

Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?

Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?

Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?

ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the word “light” is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?

Whether light is a body?

Whether light is a quality?

Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?

ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the firmament was made on the second day?

Whether there are waters above the firmament?

Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?

Whether there is only one heaven?

ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day?

- Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day?
- OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?
  - Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?
  - Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?
- ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
- ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)
- ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?
  - Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?
  - Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?
- ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?
  - Whether all these days are one day?
  - Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?
- TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)
  - OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES)
    - Whether the soul is a body?
    - Whether the human soul is something subsistent?
    - Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?
    - Whether the soul is man?
    - Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
    - Whether the human soul is incorruptible?
    - Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?
  - OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
    - Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?

Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?

Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another?

Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?

Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?

Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?

Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?

Whether the soul is in each part of the body?

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether the essence of the soul is its power?

Whether there are several powers of the soul?

Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects?

Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?

Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?

Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?

Whether one power of the soul arises from another?

Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?

OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?

Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?

Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?

Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?

OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?

Whether the intellect is a passive power?

Whether there is an active intellect?

- Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?
- Whether the active intellect is one in all?
- Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?
- Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?
- Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?
- Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?
- Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?
- Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?
- Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?
- Whether conscience be a power?

OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?
- Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether sensuality is only appetitive?
- Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?
- Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?

OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether the will desires something of necessity?
- Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?
- Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?
- Whether the will moves the intellect?
- Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?

OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether man has free-will?
- Whether free-will is a power?
- Whether free-will is an appetitive power?

Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?

Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?

Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?

Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?

Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?

Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?

Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms?

Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?

Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?

Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?

Whether we can understand many things at the same time?

Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?

Whether the intellect can be false?

Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can?

Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether our intellect knows singulars?

Whether our intellect can know the infinite?

Whether our intellect can know contingent things?

Whether our intellect can know the future?

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?
- Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?
- Whether our intellect knows its own act?
- Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?

HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?
- Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things?
- Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the separated soul can understand anything?
- Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?
- Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?
- Whether the separated soul knows singulars?
- Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?
- Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?
- Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?
- Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?

OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the soul was made or was of God’s substance?
- Whether the soul was produced by creation?
- Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?
- Whether the human soul was produced before the body?

THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN’S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?
- Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?

- Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?
- Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?
- Whether woman should have been made from man?
- Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?
- Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)

- Whether the image of God is in man?
- Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?
- Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?
- Whether the image of God is found in every man?
- Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?
- Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?
- Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?
- Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?
- Whether “likeness” is properly distinguished from “image”?

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?
- Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence?
- Whether the first man knew all things?
- Whether man in his first state could be deceived?

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN’S WILL—NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the first man was created in grace?
- Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?
- Whether Adam had all the virtues?

Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?

OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?

Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?

Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?

Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?

Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?

Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth?

Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?

Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?

Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?

OF MAN’S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether paradise is a corporeal place?

Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?

Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?

Whether man was created in paradise?

TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether the world is governed by anyone?

Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?

Whether the world is governed by one?

Whether the effect of government is one or many?

Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?

Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?

Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?

THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?

Whether God preserves every creature immediately?

Whether God can annihilate anything?

Whether anything is annihilated?

OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?

Whether God can move a body immediately?

Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?

Whether God can move the created will?

Whether God works in every agent?

Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?

Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?

- Whether one miracle is greater than another?

HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether one angel enlightens another?
- Whether one angel moves another angel’s will?
- Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?
- Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?

THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether one angel speaks to another?
- Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?
- Whether an angel speaks to God?
- Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?
- Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?

OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?
- Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?
- Whether there are many angels in one order?
- Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?
- Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?
- Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?
- Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?
- Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?

THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether there are orders among the demons?
- Whether among the demons there is precedence?
- Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?
- Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?

HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?

Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?

Whether angels can work miracles?

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether an angel can enlighten man?

Whether the angels can change the will of man?

Whether an angel can change man’s imagination?

Whether an angel can change the human senses?

THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?

Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?

Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?

Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether men are guarded by the angels?

Whether each man is guarded by an angel?

Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?

Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?

Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?

Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?

Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?

Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?

OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether men are assailed by the demons?

Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?

Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?

- Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?
- OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)
  - Whether a body can be active?
  - Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?
  - Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?
  - Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?
  - Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?
  - Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?
- ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether there be such a thing as fate?
  - Whether fate is in created things?
  - Whether fate is unchangeable?
  - Whether all things are subject to fate?
- OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether one man can teach another?
  - Whether man can teach the angels?
  - Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?
  - Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?
- OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?
  - Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?
  - Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?
- OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)
  - Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?
  - Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?
- FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (FS) (QQ[1]-114)
  - TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)

PROLOGUE

OF MAN’S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?

Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

Whether human acts are specified by their end?

Whether there is one last end of human life?

Whether one man can have several last ends?

Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?

Whether all men have the same last end?

Whether other creatures concur in that last end?

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN’S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether man’s happiness consists in wealth?

Whether man’s happiness consists in honors?

Whether man’s happiness consists in fame or glory?

Whether man’s happiness consists in power?

Whether man’s happiness consists in any bodily good?

Whether man’s happiness consists in pleasure?

Whether some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness?

Whether any created good constitutes man’s happiness?

WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether happiness is something uncreated?

Whether happiness is an operation?

Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?

Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?

Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?

Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?

- Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether delight is required for happiness?
- Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?
- Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?
- Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?
- Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?
- Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?
- Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?
- Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?

OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether man can attain happiness?
- Whether one man can be happier than another?
- Whether one can be happy in this life?
- Whether happiness once had can be lost?
- Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?
- Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?
- Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?
- Whether every man desires happiness?

TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)

OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?
- Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?
- Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?
- Whether violence can be done to the will?
- Whether violence causes involuntariness?
- Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?
- Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?

Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?

Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?

Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics?

Whether the most important circumstances are “why” and “in what the act consists”?

OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether the will is of good only?

Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?

Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?

OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the will is moved by the intellect?

Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?

Whether the will moves itself?

Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?

Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?

Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?

Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?

Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?

Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?

OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?

Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?

Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?

Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?

OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?

Whether intention is only of the last end?

Whether one can intend two things at the same time?

Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?

Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?

OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?

Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?

Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?

Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?

Whether choice is only of possible things?

Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?

OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether counsel is an inquiry?

Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?

Whether counsel is only of things that we do?

Whether counsel is about all things that we do?

Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?

Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?

OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?

Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?

Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?

Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?

OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether use is an act of the will?

Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?

Whether use regards also the last end?

Whether use precedes choice?

OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)

Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?

Whether command belongs to irrational animals?

Whether use precedes command?

Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?

Whether the act of the will is commanded?

Whether the act of the reason is commanded?

Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?

Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?

Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?

OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)

Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?

Whether the good or evil of a man’s action is derived from its object?

Whether man’s action is good or evil from a circumstance?

Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?

Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?

Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?

Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?

Whether any action is indifferent in its species?

Whether an individual action can be indifferent?

Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?

Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil?

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?

Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?

Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?

Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?

Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end?

Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?

Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will?

Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?

OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action?

Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?

Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?

Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?

Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?

Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?

Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?

Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?

Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil?

TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)

OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL’S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether any passion is in the soul?
- Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?
- Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?

HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?
- Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?
- Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?
- Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?

OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?
- Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?
- Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?
- Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?

OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?
- Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
- Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?
- Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?

OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether love is in the concupiscible power?
- Whether love is a passion?
- Whether love is the same as dilection?
- Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?

OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether good is the only cause of love?
- Whether knowledge is a cause of love?
- Whether likeness is a cause of love?
- Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?

OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether union is an effect of love?
- Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?
- Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?
- Whether zeal is an effect of love?
- Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?
- Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?

OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?
- Whether love is a cause of hatred?
- Whether hatred is stronger than love?
- Whether a man can hate himself?
- Whether a man can hate the truth?
- Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?

OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?
- Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?
- Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?
- Whether concupiscence is infinite?

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether delight is a passion?
- Whether delight is in time?
- Whether delight differs from joy?
- Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?

Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?

Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?

Whether any pleasure is not natural?

Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?

Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?

Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?

Whether sadness causes pleasure?

Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?

Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?

Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?

Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?

OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?

Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?

Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?

Whether pleasure perfects operation?

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether every pleasure is evil?

- Whether every pleasure is good?
- Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?
- Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether pain is a passion of the soul?
- Whether sorrow is the same as pain?
- Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?
- Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?
- Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?
- Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?
- Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?
- Whether there are only four species of sorrow?

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?
- Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?
- Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?
- Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?

OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?
- Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?
- Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?
- Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul?

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?
- Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?
- Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
- Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?
- Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether all sorrow is evil?
- Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?
- Whether sorrow can be a useful good?
- Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?

OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?
- Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?
- Whether hope is in dumb animals?
- Whether despair is contrary to hope?
- Whether experience is a cause of hope?
- Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?
- Whether hope is a cause of love?
- Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?

OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether fear is a passion of the soul?
- Whether fear is a special passion?
- Whether there is a natural fear?
- Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether the object of fear is good or evil?
- Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?
- Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
- Whether fear itself can be feared?
- Whether sudden things are especially feared?
- Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?

OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether love is the cause of fear?
- Whether defect is the cause of fear?

OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether fear causes contraction?
- Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?
- Whether fear makes one tremble?
- Whether fear hinders action?

OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether daring is contrary to fear?
- Whether daring ensues from hope?
- Whether some defect is a cause of daring?
- Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether anger is a special passion?
- Whether the object of anger is good or evil?
- Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?
- Whether anger requires an act of reason?
- Whether anger is more natural than desire?
- Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?
- Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?
- Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?

OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?
- Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?
- Whether a man’s excellence is the cause of his being angry?
- Whether a person’s defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?

OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether anger causes pleasure?

Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?

Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?

Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?

TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)

OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether habit is a quality?

Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?

Whether habit implies order to an act?

Whether habits are necessary?

OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether there is a habit in the body?

Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?

Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?

Whether there is any habit in the intellect?

Whether any habit is in the will?

Whether there are habits in the angels?

OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether any habit is from nature?

Whether any habit is caused by acts?

Whether a habit can be caused by one act?

Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether habits increase?

Whether habits increases by addition?

Whether every act increases its habit?

HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether a habit can be corrupted?

Whether a habit can diminish?

Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?

OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether many habits can be in one power?

Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?

Whether habits are divided into good and bad?

Whether one habit is made up of many habits?

TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)

OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether human virtue is a habit?

Whether human virtue is an operative habit?

Whether human virtue is a good habit?

Whether virtue is suitably defined?

OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?

Whether one virtue can be in several powers?

Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?

Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?

Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?

Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?

OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?

Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?

Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?

Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?

Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?

Whether “eubulia, synesis, and gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?

Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether moral virtue is a passion?

Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?

Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?

Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?

Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether there is only one moral virtue?

Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?

Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?

Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?

Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?

Whether there are four cardinal virtues?

Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?

Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?

Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether there are any theological virtues?
- Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?
- Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?
- Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?

OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether virtue is in us by nature?
- Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?
- Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?
- Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?

OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether moral virtues observe the mean?
- Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?
- Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?
- Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?

OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?
- Whether moral virtues can be without charity?
- Whether charity can be without moral virtue?
- Whether faith and hope can be without charity?
- Whether charity can be without faith and hope?

OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?
- Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?
- Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?
- Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?
- Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?
- Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?

OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?
- Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?
- Whether faith remains after this life?
- Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?
- Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?
- Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?

OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?
- Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?
- Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?
- Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?
- Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?
- Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?
- Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?
- Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?

OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?
- Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?
- Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
- Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?

OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5) are acts?
- Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?
- Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?
- Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?

EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)

OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether vice is contrary to virtue?

Whether vice is contrary to nature?

Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?

Whether sin is compatible with virtue?

Whether every sin includes an action?

Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?

OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)

Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?

Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?

Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?

Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one’s neighbor?

Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?

Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?

Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?

Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?

Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?

OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether all sins are connected with one another?

Whether all sins are equal?

Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?

Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?

Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?

Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?

Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?

Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?

Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?

Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?

OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)

- Whether the will is a subject of sin?
- Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?
- Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?
- Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?
- Whether sin can be in the reason?
- Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?
- Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?
- Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?
- Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?
- Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?

OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether sin has a cause?
- Whether sin has an internal cause?
- Whether sin has an external cause?
- Whether one sin is a cause of another?

OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?
- Whether ignorance is a sin?
- Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?
- Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?
- Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?
- Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?
- Whether self-love is the source of every sin?

Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?

Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?

Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?

Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?

OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether anyone sins through certain malice?

Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?

Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?

Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?

OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether God is a cause of sin?

Whether the act of sin is from God?

Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the devil is directly the cause of man’s sinning?

Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?

Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?

Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil’s suggestion?

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?

Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?

Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?

Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?

Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?

OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

  - Whether original sin is a habit?
  - Whether there are several original sins in one man?
  - Whether original sin is concupiscence?
  - Whether original sin is equally in all?

OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

  - Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?
  - Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?
  - Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?
  - Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

  - Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?
  - Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?
  - Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?
  - Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?

OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

  - Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?
  - Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?
  - Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?
  - Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?
  - Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?
  - Whether death and other defects are natural to man?

OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

  - Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?
  - Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?

OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?
- Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?
- Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
- Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?
- Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?
- Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?
- Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?
- Whether anyone is punished for another’s sin?

OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?
- Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?
- Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?
- Whether a venial sin can become mortal?
- Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?
- Whether a mortal sin can become venial?

OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?
- Whether venial sins are suitably designated as “wood, hay, and stubble”?
- Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?
- Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?
- Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?
- Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?

TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90–108)

OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether law is something pertaining to reason?
- Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?
- Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?
- Whether promulgation is essential to a law?

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether there is an eternal law?
- Whether there is in us a natural law?
- Whether there is a human law?
- Whether there was any need for a Divine law?
- Whether there is but one Divine law?
- Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether an effect of law is to make men good?
- Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?

OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?
- Whether the eternal law is known to all?
- Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?
- Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?
- Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?
- Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?

OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether the natural law is a habit?
- Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?
- Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?
- Whether the natural law is the same in all men?
- Whether the natural law can be changed?
- Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?

OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?
- Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?
- Whether Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?

Whether Isidore’s division of human laws is appropriate?

OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individual?

Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?

Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?

Whether human law binds a man in conscience?

Whether all are subject to the law?

Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?

OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether human law should be changed in any way?

Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better occurs?

Whether custom can obtain force of law?

Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?

OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the Old Law was good?

Whether the Old Law was from God?

Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?

Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?

Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?

Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?

OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?

Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?

Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?

Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts?

Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts?

Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?

OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?

Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?

Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one another?

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?

Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?

Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?

Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?

Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue?

Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?

OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining to the worship of God?

Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?

Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?

Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?

OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?

Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative cause?

Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained to sacrifices?

Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to holy things?

Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?

- Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?

OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?
- Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?
- Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?
- Whether since Christ’s Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin?

OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neighbor?
- Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?
- Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?
- Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?

OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?
- Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of one man with another?
- Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable manner?
- Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the household?

OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the New Law is a written law?
- Whether the New Law justifies?
- Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world?
- Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?

OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?
- Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?
- Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?

- Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?
- Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?
- Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?
- Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?

TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ[109]-114)

OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)

- Whether without grace man can know any truth?
- Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?
- Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all things?
- Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the commandments of the Law?
- Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?
- Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare himself for grace?
- Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?
- Whether man without grace can avoid sin?
- Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin?
- Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to persevere?

OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether grace implies anything in the soul?
- Whether grace is a quality of the soul?
- Whether grace is the same as virtue?
- Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of the powers?

OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace?
- Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?

Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?

Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?

Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?

OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether God alone is the cause of grace?

Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man’s part?

Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to whoever does what he can?

Whether grace is greater in one than in another?

Whether man can know that he has grace?

OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins?

Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, i.e. for the justification of the ungodly?

Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of the free-will?

Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly?

Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards sin?

Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification?

Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or successively?

Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required for the justification of the ungodly?

Whether the justification of the ungodly is God’s greatest work?

Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?

OF MERIT (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether a man may merit anything from God?

Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?

Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?

Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues?

Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?

Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?

Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?

Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?

Whether a man may merit perseverance?

Whether temporal goods fall under merit?

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART (SS) (QQ[1]-189)

TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)

OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?

Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?

Whether anything false can come under faith?

Whether the object of faith can be something seen?

Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration]?

Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles?

Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?

Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?

Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?

Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?

OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether to believe is to think with assent?

Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God and believing in God?

Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason?

Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason?

Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?

Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?

- Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ?
- Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity?
- Whether to believe is meritorious?
- Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?

OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether confession is an act of faith?
- Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?

OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?”
- Whether faith resides in the intellect?
- Whether charity is the form of faith?
- Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?
- Whether faith is a virtue?
- Whether faith is one virtue?
- Whether faith is the first of the virtues?
- Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues?

OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?
- Whether in the demons there is faith?
- Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles?
- Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?

OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether faith is infused into man by God?
- Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?

OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether fear is an effect of faith?

- Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?

OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?
- Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?
- Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?
- Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?
- Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace?
- Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?
- Whether the sixth beatitude, “Blessed are the clean of heart,” etc., responds to the gift of understanding?
- Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?

OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether knowledge is a gift?
- Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?
- Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?
- Whether the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” etc. corresponds to the gift of knowledge?

OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)

- Whether unbelief is a sin?
- Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?
- Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?
- Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?
- Whether there are several species of unbelief?
- Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?
- Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?
- Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?
- Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?
- Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?

- Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?
- Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will?

OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?
- Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?
- Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?
- Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?

OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?
- Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?

OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?
- Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?
- Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?
- Whether the damned blaspheme?

OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice?
- Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost?
- Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?
- Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether blindness of mind is a sin?
- Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?
- Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh?

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?

Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly set down in the Old Law?

OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether hope is a virtue?

Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?

Whether one man may hope for another’s eternal happiness?

Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?

Whether hope is a theological virtue?

Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?

Whether hope precedes faith?

Whether charity precedes hope?

OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether hope is in the will as its subject?

Whether in the blessed there is hope?

Whether hope is in the damned?

Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?

OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether God can be feared?

Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear?

Whether worldly fear is always evil?

Whether servile fear is good?

Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

Whether servile fear remains with charity?

Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?

Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

Whether fear decreases when charity increases?

- Whether fear remains in heaven?
- Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear?

OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether despair is a sin?
- Whether there can be despair without unbelief?
- Whether despair is the greatest of sins?
- Whether despair arises from sloth?

OF PRESUMPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?
- Whether presumption is a sin?
- Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?
- Whether presumption arises from vainglory?

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether there should be a precept of hope?
- Whether there should have been given a precept of fear?

OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether charity is friendship?
- Whether charity is something created in the soul?
- Whether charity is a virtue?
- Whether charity is a special virtue?
- Whether charity is one virtue?
- Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues?
- Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?
- Whether charity is the form of the virtues?

OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

- Whether the will is the subject of charity?
- Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?
- Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?

Whether charity can increase?

Whether charity increases by addition?

Whether charity increases through every act of charity?

Whether charity increases indefinitely?

Whether charity can be perfect in this life?

Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning, progress, and perfection?

Whether charity can decrease?

Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?

Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?

OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?

Whether we should love charity out of charity?

Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?

Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?

Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?

Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?

Whether sinners love themselves?

Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?

Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and effects of love?

Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?

Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?

Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz. God, our neighbor, our body and ourselves?

OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

Whether there is order in charity?

Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?

Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself?

- Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor?
- Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?
- Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another?
- Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more closely united us?
- Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood?
- Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father?
- Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?
- Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?
- Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?
- Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?

OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?
- Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?
- Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?
- Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?
- Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]
- Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?
- Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?
- Whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God?

OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether joy is effected in us by charity?
- Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an admixture of sorrow?
- Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?
- Whether joy is a virtue?

OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether peace is the same as concord?
- Whether all things desire peace?

Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?

Whether peace is a virtue?

OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?

Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?

Whether mercy is a virtue?

Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues?

OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

Whether we ought to do good to all?

Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?

Whether beneficence is a special virtue?

OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?

Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?

Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?

Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?

Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?

Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?

Whether one who is under another’s power can give alms?

Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us?

Whether alms should be given in abundance?

OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?

Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?

Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?

Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?

- Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?
- Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become worse?
- Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private admonition should precede denunciation?
- Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward?

OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?
- Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?
- Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin?
- Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor?
- Whether hatred is a capital sin?
- Whether hatred arises from envy?

OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether sloth is a sin?
- Whether sloth is a special vice?
- Whether sloth is a mortal sin?
- Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?

OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?
- Whether envy is a sin?
- Whether envy is a mortal sin?
- Whether envy is a capital vice?

OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether discord is a sin?
- Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory?

OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether contention is a mortal sin?
- Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?

OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether schism is a special sin?
- Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?
- Whether schismatics have any power?
- Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with excommunication?

OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it is always sinful to wage war?
- Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?
- Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
- Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether strife is always a sin?
- Whether strife is a daughter of anger?

OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?
- Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?

OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall?
- Whether scandal is a sin?
- Whether scandal is a special sin?
- Whether scandal is a mortal sin?
- Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?
- Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?
- Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?
- Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?

OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether any precept should be given about charity?

- Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?
- Whether two precepts of charity suffice?
- Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart?
- Whether to the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” it was fitting to add “and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength”?
- Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of God?
- Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?
- Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?

OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?
- Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?
- Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?
- Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?
- Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?
- Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?

OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?
- Whether folly is a sin?
- Whether folly is a daughter of lust?

TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ[47]-170)

OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)

- Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?
- Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative reason?
- Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?
- Whether prudence is a virtue?
- Whether prudence is a special virtue?
- Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?
- Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?

Whether command is the chief act of prudence?

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Whether prudence about one’s own good is specifically the same as that which extends to the common good?

Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

Whether prudence can be in sinners?

Whether prudence is in all who have grace?

Whether prudence is in us by nature?

Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?

OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)

Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?

OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether memory is a part of prudence?

Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle’s word is {nous}]

Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?

Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?

Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? [*”Providentia,” which may be translated either “providence” or “foresight.”]

Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?

Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?

OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether a species of prudence is regnative?

Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?

Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?

Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?

OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?

Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?

Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue?

OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?

Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel?

OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether imprudence is a sin?

Whether imprudence is a special sin?

Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?

Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?

Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?

Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?

OF NEGLIGENCE (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether negligence is a special sin?

Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?

Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?

OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?

Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?

Whether craftiness is a special sin?

Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?

Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?

Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?

Whether we should be solicitous about the future?

Whether these vices arise from covetousness?

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence?

Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are fittingly propounded in the Old Law?

OF RIGHT (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether right is the object of justice?

Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?

Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?

Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as special species?

OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?

Whether justice is always towards one another?

Whether justice is a virtue?

Whether justice is in the will as its subject?

Whether justice is a general virtue?

Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?

Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?

Whether particular justice has a special matter?

Whether justice is about the passions?

Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?

Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?

OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether injustice is a special virtue?

Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?

Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?

Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?

OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether judgment is an act of justice?

Whether it is lawful to judge?

Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?

Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

Whether we should always judge according to the written law?

Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?

OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distributive?

Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative justice?

Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?

Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?

OF RESTITUTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?

Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation?

Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?

Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?

Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken?

Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?

Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?

Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?

VICES OPPOSED TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Q[63])

OF RESPECT OF PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether respect of persons is a sin?

Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual goods?

Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect?

Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences?

OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?

Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?

Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?

Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?

Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?

Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?

OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?

Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves?

Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?

Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others?

OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)

- Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?
- Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?
- Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another’s thing secretly?
- Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?
- Whether theft is always a sin?
- Whether theft is a mortal sin?
- Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?
- Whether robbery may be committed without sin?
- Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?

OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?
- Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?
- Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?
- Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?

OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether a man is bound to accuse?
- Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing?
- Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion?
- Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the punishment of retaliation?

OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one’s condemnation?
- Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies?
- Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing?
- Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can?

OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether a man is bound to give evidence?
- Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices?
- Whether a man’s evidence can be rejected without any fault of his?
- Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence?

OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?
- Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the office of advocate?
- Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?
- Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?

OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether reviling consists in words?
- Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?
- Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?
- Whether reviling arises from anger?

OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another’s character by secret words?
- Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?
- Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor?
- Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?

OF TALE-BEARING [*’Susurratio,’ i.e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?
- Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?

OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?
- Whether derision can be a mortal sin?

- OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?
  - Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?
  - Whether cursing is a mortal sin?
  - Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?
- BY SINS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (Q[77])
  - OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (FOUR ARTICLES)
    - Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?
    - Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?
    - Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?
    - Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than what was paid for it?
- BY SINS COMMITTED IN LOANS (Q[78])
  - OF THE SIN OF USURY (FOUR ARTICLES)
    - Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?
    - Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money lent?
    - Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury?
    - Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?
  - OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)
    - Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?
    - Whether transgression is a special sin?
    - Whether omission is a special sin?
    - Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression?
  - OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (ONE ARTICLE)
    - Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?
  - OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)
    - Whether religion directs man to God alone?

- Whether religion is a virtue?
- Whether religion is one virtue?
- Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?
- Whether religion is a theological virtue?
- Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?
- Whether religion has an external act?
- Whether religion is the same as sanctity?

OF DEVOTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether devotion is a special act?
- Whether devotion is an act of religion?
- Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion?
- Whether joy is an effect of devotion?

OF PRAYER (SEVENTEEN ARTICLES)

- Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?
- Whether it is becoming to pray?
- Whether prayer is an act of religion?
- Whether we ought to pray to God alone?
- Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?
- Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays?
- Whether we ought to pray for others?
- Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?
- Whether the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer are fittingly assigned?
- Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?
- Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?
- Whether prayer should be vocal?
- Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?
- Whether prayer should last a long time?
- Whether prayer is meritorious?

Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?

Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings?

OF ADORATION (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion?

Whether adoration denotes an action of the body?

Whether adoration requires a definite place?

OF SACRIFICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?

Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?

Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue?

Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices?

OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations?

Whether oblations are due to priests alone?

Whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses?

Whether men are bound to pay first-fruits?

OF TITHES (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept?

Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?

Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?

Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?

SERVICE BY PROMISE (Q[88])

OF VOWS (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?

Whether a vow should always be about a better good?

Whether all vows are binding?

Whether it is expedient to take vows?

Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?

Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfilment of a vow, than without a vow?

Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the profession of a certain rule?

Whether those who are subject to another’s power are hindered from taking vows?

Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?

Whether vows admit of dispensation?

Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?

Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the dispensation of a vow?

OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether to swear is to call God to witness?

Whether it is lawful to swear?

Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned, namely, justice, judgment, and truth?

Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?

Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good?

Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures?

Whether an oath has a binding force?

Whether an oath is more binding than a vow?

Whether anyone can dispense from an oath?

Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time?

OF THE TAKING OF GOD’S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?

OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAISE (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether God should be praised with the lips?

Whether God should be praised with song?

OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?

Whether there are various species of superstition?

OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?

Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?

OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?

Whether idolatry is a sin?

Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?

Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?

OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether divination is a sin?

Whether divination is a species of superstition?

Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?

Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?

Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?

Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful?

Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?

OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?

Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?

Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful?

Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?

OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone?
- Whether it is a sin to tempt God?
- Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?
- Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?

OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false?
- Whether all perjury is sinful?
- Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?
- Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?

OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?
- Whether sacrilege is a special sin?
- Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things?
- Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?

ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing?
- Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?
- Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?
- Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things?
- Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?
- Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony?

OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?
- Whether piety provides support for our parents?

- Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?
- Whether the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion?

OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
- Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity?
- Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?

OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether honor denotes something corporal?
- Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?
- Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?
- Whether dulia has various species?

OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether one man is bound to obey another?
- Whether obedience is a special virtue?
- Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?
- Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?
- Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?
- Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?

OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?
- Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?

OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?
- Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?
- Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?
- Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?

- Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor’s disposition or at the deed?
- Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?

OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether ingratitude is always a sin?
- Whether ingratitude is a special sin?
- Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?
- Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?

OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether vengeance is lawful?
- Whether vengeance is a special virtue?
- Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among men?
- Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?

OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether truth is a virtue?
- Whether truth is a special virtue?
- Whether truth is a part of justice?
- Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
- Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?
- Whether every lie is a sin?
- Whether every lie is a mortal sin?

OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether all dissimulation is a sin?
- Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?
- Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?
- Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?

OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?
- Whether boasting is a mortal sin?

IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether irony is a sin?
- Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?

OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether friendliness is a special virtue?
- Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?

OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether flattery is a sin?
- Whether flattery is a mortal sin?

OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?
- Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?

OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether liberality is a virtue?
- Whether liberality is about money?
- Whether using money is the act of liberality?
- Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?
- Whether liberality is a part of justice?
- Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether covetousness is a sin?
- Whether covetousness is a special sin?
- Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?
- Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?
- Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?

Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?

Whether covetousness is a capital vice?

Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?

OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

Whether prodigality is a sin?

Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?

OF “EPIKEIA” OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether “epikeia” [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue?

Whether “epikeia” is a part of justice?

OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether piety is a gift?

Whether the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” corresponds to the gift of piety?

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?

Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?

Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?

Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is fittingly expressed?

Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?

TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)

OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether fortitude is a virtue?

Whether fortitude is a special virtue?

Whether fortitude is about fear and dying?

Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death?

Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?

Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?

Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit?

Whether the brave man delights in his act?

Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?

Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action?

Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?

Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?

OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?

Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?

Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?

Whether death is essential to martyrdom?

Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?

OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether fear is a sin?

Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?

Whether fear is a mortal sin?

Whether fear excuses from sin?

OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether fearlessness is a sin?

Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?

OF DARING [*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether daring is a sin?

Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?

OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)

Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?

OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether magnanimity is about honors?
- Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?
- Whether magnanimity is a virtue?
- Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?
- Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?
- Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?
- Whether security belongs to magnanimity?
- Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?

OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether presumption is a sin?
- Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether ambition is a sin?
- Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether the desire of glory is a sin?
- Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?
- Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?
- Whether vainglory is a capital vice?
- Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of novelties?

OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether pusillanimity is a sin?
- Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?

OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether magnificence is a virtue?
- Whether magnificence is a special virtue?
- Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?

Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?

OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether meanness is a vice?

Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?

OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether patience is a virtue?

Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?

Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?

Whether patience is a part of fortitude?

Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.]

OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether perseverance is a virtue?

Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?

Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?

Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally ‘softness’]

Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?

OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether fortitude is a gift?

Whether the fourth beatitude: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” corresponds to the gift of fortitude?

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?

Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?

OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether temperance is a virtue?

- Whether temperance is a special virtue?
- Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?
- Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?
- Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?
- Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?
- Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?
- Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether insensibility is a vice?
- Whether intemperance is a childish sin?
- Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]
- Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?

OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)

- Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?

OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?
- Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?
- Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?
- Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?

OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether honesty is the same as virtue?
- Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?
- Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?
- Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?

OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether abstinence is a virtue?
- Whether abstinence is a special virtue?

OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether fasting is an act of virtue?
- Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?
- Whether fasting is a matter of precept?
- Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?
- Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?
- Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?
- Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster’s meal?
- Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?

OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether gluttony is a sin?
- Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?
- Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?
- Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?
- Whether gluttony is a capital vice?
- Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?

OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?
- Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?
- Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?
- Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?

OF DRUNKENNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether drunkenness is a sin?
- Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?
- Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?
- Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?

OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether chastity is a virtue?

- Whether chastity is a general virtue?
- Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?
- Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?

OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?
- Whether virginity is unlawful?
- Whether virginity is a virtue?
- Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?
- Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?

OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?
- Whether no venereal act can be without sin?
- Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?
- Whether lust is a capital vice?
- Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?

OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

- Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?
- Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?
- Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?
- Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?
- Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?
- Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?
- Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?
- Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?
- Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?
- Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?
- Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?
- Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?

OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether continence is a virtue?

Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?

Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?

Whether continence is better than temperance?

OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

Whether incontinence is a sin?

Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?

Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?

OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?

Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?

Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?

Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?

OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether it is lawful to be angry?

Whether anger is a sin?

Whether all anger is a mortal sin?

Whether anger is the most grievous sin?

Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?

Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?

Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?

Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?

OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?

OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether modesty is a part of temperance?
- Whether modesty is only about outward actions?

OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether humility is a virtue?
- Whether humility has to do with the appetite?
- Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?
- Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?
- Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?
- Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict?

OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether pride is a sin?
- Whether pride is a special sin?
- Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?
- Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?
- Whether pride is a mortal sin?
- Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?
- Whether pride is the first sin of all?
- Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?

OF THE FIRST MAN’S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether pride was the first man’s first sin?
- Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness?
- Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?
- Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s?

OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN’S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether death is the punishment of our first parents’ sin?
- Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture?

OF OUR FIRST PARENTS’ TEMPTATION (TWO ARTICLES)

        - Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?
        - Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?
    - OF STUDIOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)
        - Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?
        - Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?
    - OF CURIOSITY (TWO ARTICLES)
        - Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?
        - Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?
    - OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)
        - Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?
        - Whether there can be a virtue about games?
        - Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?
        - Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?
    - OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)
        - Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?
        - Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?
    - OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)
        - Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?
        - Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?
- TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ[171]-182)
    - OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)
        - Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?
        - Whether prophecy is a habit?
        - Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?
        - Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically?
        - Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit?

Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?

OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether prophecy can be natural?

Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?

Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?

Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?

Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?

Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?

Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s mind, or merely a new light?

Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?

Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy?

OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation?

Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone?

Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary vision?

Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?

Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed?

Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?

OF RAPTURE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?

Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power?

Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God?

Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses?

- Whether, while in this state, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body?

OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language?
- Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?

OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?
- Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?

OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?
- Whether the wicked can work miracles?

OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?
- Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?

OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect?
- Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?
- Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?
- Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or also in the consideration of any truth whatever?
- Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence?
- Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement, circular, straight and oblique?
- Whether there is delight in contemplation?
- Whether the contemplative life is continuous?

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?
- Whether prudence pertains to the active life?

Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?

Whether the active life remains after this life?

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?

Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?

Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?

Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?

TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ[183]-189)

OF MAN'S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude?

Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church?

Whether duties differ according to their actions?

Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect?

OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity?

Whether any one can be perfect in this life?

Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the commandments or of the counsels?

Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?

Whether religious and prelates are in the state of perfection?

Whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection?

Whether the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates?

Whether parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious?

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?

Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate?

Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others?

- Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter religion?
- Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to abandon the flock committed to his care?
- Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own?
- Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them?
- Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious observances?

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS (TEN ARTICLES)

- Whether religion implies a state of perfection?
- Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels?
- Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?
- Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection?
- Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection?
- Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence, and obedience should come under a vow?
- Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows?
- Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?
- Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his rule?
- Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin?

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like?
- Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business?
- Whether religious are bound to manual labor?
- Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms?
- Whether it is lawful for religious to beg?
- Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others?

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether there is only one religious order?

Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active life?

Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?

Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing confessions?

Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study?

Whether a religious order that is devoted to the contemplative life is more excellent than on that is given to the active life?

Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common?

Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life?

OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should enter religion?

Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion?

Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation of entering religion?

Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in perpetuity?

Whether children should be received in religion?

Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s parents?

Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion?

Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another?

Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?

Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time?

THIRD PART (TP) OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (QQ[1]-90)

PROLOGUE

TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ[1]-59)

OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?

Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate?

Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?

Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than to take away original sin?

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race?

Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world?

OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?

Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?

Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?

Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is composite?

Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?

Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally?

Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created?

Whether union is the same as assumption?

Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all unions?

Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace?

Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation?

Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume?

Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume?

Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?

Whether one Person without another can assume a created nature?

Whether each of the Divine Persons could have assumed human nature?

Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual nature?

Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?

Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any other Divine Person should assume human nature?

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other nature?

Whether the Son of God assumed a person?

Whether the Divine Person assumed a man?

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals?

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals?

Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam?

OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body?

Whether the Son of God assumed a soul?

Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect?

OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul?

Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind?

Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God?

Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul?

Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts?

Whether the human nature was assumed through the medium of grace?

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

Whether in the Soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?

Whether in Christ there were virtues?

Whether in Christ there was faith?

Whether in Christ there was hope?

Whether in Christ there were the gifts?

Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?

Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ?

Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy?

Whether in Christ there was the fulness of grace?

Whether the fulness of grace is proper to Christ?

Whether the grace of Christ is infinite?

Whether the grace of Christ could increase?

Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union?

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?

Whether Christ is the Head of men as to their bodies or only as to their souls?

Whether Christ is the Head of all men?

Whether Christ is the Head of the angels?

Whether the grace of Christ, as Head of the Church, is the same as His habitual grace, inasmuch as He is Man?

Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?

Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?

Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked?

OF CHRIST’S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?

Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?

Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge?

Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?

OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?

Whether the Son of God knew all things in the Word?

Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?

Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more clearly than does any other creature?

OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether by this imprinted or infused knowledge Christ knew all things?

Whether Christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?

Whether this knowledge is collative?

Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than the knowledge of the angels?

Whether this knowledge was habitual?

Whether this knowledge was distinguished by divers habits?

OF THE ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether Christ knew all things by this acquired or empiric knowledge?

Whether Christ advanced in acquired or empiric knowledge?

Whether Christ learned anything from man?

Whether Christ received knowledge from the angels?

OF THE POWER OF CHRIST’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence?

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures?

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to His own body?

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of His will?

OF THE DEFECTS OF BODY ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the Son of God in human nature ought to have assumed defects of body?

Whether Christ was of necessity subject to these defects?

Whether Christ contracted these defects?

Whether Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men?

OF THE DEFECTS OF SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether there was sin in Christ?

Whether there was the “fomes” of sin in Christ?

Whether in Christ there was ignorance?

Whether Christ’s soul was passible?

Whether there was sensible pain in Christ?

Whether there was sorrow in Christ?

Whether there was fear in Christ?

Whether there was wonder in Christ?

Whether there was anger in Christ?

Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor?

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND BECOMING (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether this is true: “God is man”?

Whether this is true: “Man is God”?

Whether Christ can be called a lordly man?

Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God?

Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine Nature?

Whether this is true: “God was made man”?

Whether this is true: “Man was made God”?

Whether this is true: “Christ is a creature”?

Whether this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be?

Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is a creature”?

Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is God”?

Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person”?

OF CHRIST’S UNITY OF BEING (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether Christ is one or two?

Whether there is only one being in Christ?

OF CHRIST’S UNITY OF WILL (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether there are two wills in Christ?

Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason?

Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason?

Whether there was free-will in Christ?

Whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed?

Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ?

OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST’S OPERATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and Manhood?

Whether in Christ there are several human operations?

Whether the human action of Christ could be meritorious to Him?

Whether Christ could merit for others?

OF CHRIST’S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether we may say that Christ is subject to the Father?

Whether Christ is subject to Himself?

OF CHRIST’S PRAYER (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether it is becoming of Christ to pray?

Whether it pertains to Christ to pray according to His sensuality?

Whether it was fitting that Christ should pray for Himself?

Whether Christ’s prayer was always heard?

OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest?

Whether Christ was Himself both priest and victim?

Whether the effect of Christ’s priesthood is the expiation of sins?

Whether the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also to Himself?

Whether the priesthood of Christ endures for ever?

Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech?

OF ADOPTION AS BEFITTING TO CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?

Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt?

Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted?

Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?

OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated?

Whether this proposition is false: “Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of God”?

Whether Christ’s predestination is the exemplar of ours?

Whether Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours?

OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether Christ’s humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same adoration?

Whether Christ’s humanity should be adored with the adoration of “latria”?

Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of “latria”?

Whether Christ’s cross should be worshipped with the adoration of “latria”?

Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of “latria”?

Whether any kind of worship is due to the relics of the saints?

OF CHRIST AS CALLED THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MAN (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man?

Whether Christ, is the Mediator of God and men?

ST. THOMAS AND THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION

EDITORIAL NOTE

OF THE SANCTIFICATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb?

Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation?

Whether the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from the infection of the fomes?

Whether by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was preserved from all actual sin?

Whether, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin received the fulness of grace?

- Whether after Christ, it was proper to the Blessed Virgin to be sanctified in the womb?

OF THE VIRGINITY OF THE MOTHER OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the Mother of God was a virgin in conceiving Christ?
- Whether Christ's Mother was a virgin in His birth?
- Whether Christ's Mother remained a virgin after His birth?
- Whether the Mother of God took a vow of virginity?

OF THE ESPOUSALS OF THE MOTHER OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin?
- Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph?

OF THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it was necessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her?
- Whether the annunciation should have been made by an angel to the Blessed Virgin?
- Whether the angel of annunciation should have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision?
- Whether the Annunciation took place in becoming order?

OF THE MATTER FROM WHICH THE SAVIOUR'S BODY WAS CONCEIVED (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam?
- Whether Christ took flesh of the seed of David?
- Whether Christ's genealogy is suitably traced by the evangelists?
- Whether the matter of Christ's body should have been taken from a woman?
- Whether the flesh of Christ was conceived of the Virgin's purest blood?
- Whether Christ's body was in Adam and the other patriarchs, as to something signate?
- Whether Christ's flesh in the patriarchs was infected by sin?
- Whether Christ paid tithes in Abraham's loins?

OF THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN CHRIST'S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether the accomplishment of Christ's conception should be attributed to the Holy Ghost?
- Whether it should be said that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost?

- Whether the Holy Ghost should be called Christ’s father in respect of His humanity?
- Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ’s body?

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF CHRIST’S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first instant of its conception?
- Whether Christ’s body was animated in the first instant of its conception?
- Whether Christ’s flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed?
- Whether Christ’s conception was natural?

OF THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of His conception?
- Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception?
- Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of His conception?
- Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His conception?

OF CHRIST’S NATIVITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person?
- Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ?
- Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ’s Mother in respect of His temporal nativity?
- Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God?
- Whether there are two filiations in Christ?
- Whether Christ was born without His Mother suffering?
- Whether Christ should have been born in Bethlehem?
- Whether Christ was born at a fitting time?

OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE NEWLY BORN CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to all?
- Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to some?
- Whether those to whom Christ’s birth was made known were suitably chosen?
- Whether Christ Himself should have made His birth know?
- Whether Christ’s birth should have been manifested by means of the angels and the star?

Whether Christ's birth was made known in a becoming order?

Whether the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system?

Whether it was becoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay homage to Him?

OF CHRIST'S CIRCUMCISION, AND OF THE OTHER LEGAL OBSERVANCES ACCOMPLISHED IN REGARD TO THE CHILD CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether Christ should have been circumcised?

Whether His name was suitably given to Christ?

Whether Christ was becomingly presented in the temple?

Whether it was fitting that the Mother of God should go to the temple to be purified?

OF THE BAPTISM OF JOHN (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?

Whether the baptism of John was from God?

Whether grace was given in the baptism of John?

Whether Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John?

Whether John's baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized?

Whether those who had been baptized with John's baptism had to be baptized with the baptism of Christ?

OF THE BAPTIZING OF CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Whether it was fitting that Christ should be baptized?

Whether it was fitting for Christ to be baptized with John's baptism?

Whether Christ was baptized at a fitting time?

Whether Christ should have been baptized in the Jordan?

Whether the heavens should have been opened unto Christ at His baptism?

Whether it is fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Ghost came down on Him in the form of a dove?

Whether the dove in which the Holy Ghost appeared was real?

Whether it was becoming, when Christ was baptized that the Father's voice should be heard, bearing witness to the Son?

OF CHRIST'S MANNER OF LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a solitary life?

Whether it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this world?

- Whether Christ should have led a life of poverty in this world?
- Whether Christ conformed His conduct to the Law?

OF CHRIST’S TEMPTATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted?
- Whether Christ should have been tempted in the desert?
- Whether Christ’s temptation should have taken place after His fast?
- Whether the mode and order of the temptation were becoming?

OF CHRIST’S DOCTRINE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles?
- Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them?
- Whether Christ should have taught all things openly?
- Whether Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing?

OF THE MIRACLES WORKED BY CHRIST, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ should have worked miracles?
- Whether Christ worked miracles by Divine power?
- Whether Christ began to work miracles when He changed water into wine at the marriage feast?
- Whether the miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of His Godhead?

OF (CHRIST’S) MIRACLES CONSIDERED SPECIFICALLY (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether those miracles were fitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances?
- Whether it was fitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies?
- Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on men?
- Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on irrational creatures?

OF CHRIST’S TRANSFIGURATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured?
- Whether this clarity was the clarity of glory?
- Whether the witnesses of the transfiguration were fittingly chosen?

Whether the testimony of the Father’s voice, saying, “This is My beloved Son,” was fittingly added?

THE PASSION OF CHRIST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race?

Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the Passion of Christ?

Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than by Christ’s Passion?

Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross?

Whether Christ endured all suffering?

Whether the pain of Christ’s Passion was greater than all other pains?

Whether Christ suffered in His whole soul?

Whether Christ’s entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion?

Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time?

Whether Christ suffered in a suitable place?

Whether it was fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves?

Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead?

OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF CHRIST’S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether Christ was slain by another or by Himself?

Whether Christ died out of obedience?

Whether God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion?

Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer at the hands of the Gentiles?

Whether Christ’s persecutors knew who He was?

Whether the sin of those who crucified Christ was most grievous?

OF THE EFFICIENCY OF CHRIST’S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit?

Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of atonement?

Whether Christ’s Passion operated by way of sacrifice?

Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of redemption?

- Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer?
- Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation efficiently?

OF THE EFFECTS OF CHRIST’S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)
- Whether we were delivered from sin through Christ’s Passion?
- Whether we were delivered from the devil’s power through Christ’s Passion?
- Whether men were freed from the punishment of sin through Christ’s Passion?
- Whether we were reconciled to God through Christ’s Passion?
- Whether Christ opened the gate of heaven to us by His Passion?
- Whether by His Passion Christ merited to be exalted?

OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)
- Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?
- Whether the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died?
- Whether in Christ’s death there was a severance between His Godhead and His soul?
- Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death?
- Whether Christ’s was identically the same body living and dead?
- Whether Christ’s death conduced in any way to our salvation?

OF CHRIST’S BURIAL (FOUR ARTICLES)
- Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried?
- Whether Christ was buried in a becoming manner?
- Whether Christ’s body was reduced to dust in the tomb?
- Whether Christ was in the tomb only one day and two nights?

OF CHRIST’S DESCENT INTO HELL (EIGHT ARTICLES)
- Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell?
- Whether Christ went down into the hell of the lost?
- Whether the whole Christ was in hell?
- Whether Christ made any stay in hell?
- Whether Christ descending into hell delivered the holy Fathers from thence?
- Whether Christ delivered any of the lost from hell?

- Whether the children who died in original sin were delivered by Christ?
- Whether Christ by His descent into hell delivered souls from purgatory?

OF CHRIST’S RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it was necessary for Christ to rise again?
- Whether it was fitting for Christ to rise again on the third day?
- Whether Christ was the first to rise from the dead?
- Whether Christ was the cause of His own Resurrection?

OF THE QUALITY OF CHRIST RISING AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ had a true body after His Resurrection?
- Whether Christ’s body rose glorified?
- Whether Christ’s body rose again entire?
- Whether Christ’s body ought to have risen with its scars?

OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE RESURRECTION (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all?
- Whether it was fitting that the disciples should see Him rise again?
- Whether Christ ought to have lived constantly with His disciples after the Resurrection?
- Whether Christ should have appeared to the disciples “in another shape”?
- Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by proofs?
- Whether the proofs which Christ made use of manifested sufficiently the truth of His Resurrection?

OF THE CAUSALITY OF CHRIST’S RESURRECTION (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of our bodies?
- Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls?

OF THE ASCENSION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether it was fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven?
- Whether Christ’s Ascension into heaven belonged to Him according to His Divine Nature?
- Whether Christ ascended by His own power?
- Whether Christ ascended above all the heavens?

- Whether Christ’s body ascended above every spiritual creature?
- Whether Christ’s Ascension is the cause of our salvation?

OF CHRIST’S SITTING AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether it is fitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the Father?
- Whether it belongs to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father?
- Whether it belongs to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father?
- Whether it is proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father?

OF CHRIST’S JUDICIARY POWER (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether judiciary power is to be specially attributed to Christ?
- Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ as man?
- Whether Christ acquired His judiciary power by His merits?
- Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs?
- Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there remains yet another General Judgment?
- Whether Christ’s judiciary power extends to the angels?

TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS (QQ[60]-90)

WHAT IS A SACRAMENT? (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?
- Whether every sign of a holy thing is a sacrament?
- Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only?
- Whether a sacrament is always something sensible?
- Whether determinate things are required for a sacrament?
- Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments?
- Whether determinate words are required in the sacraments?
- Whether it is lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists?

OF THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether sacraments are necessary for man’s salvation?
- Whether before sin sacraments were necessary to man?

Whether there should have been sacraments after sin, before Christ?

Whether there was need for any sacraments after Christ came?

OF THE SACRAMENTS’ PRINCIPAL EFFECT, WHICH IS GRACE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the sacraments are the cause of grace?

Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts?

Whether the sacraments of the New Law contain grace?

Whether there be in the sacraments a power of causing grace?

Whether the sacraments of the New Law derive their power from Christ’s Passion?

Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace?

OF THE OTHER EFFECT OF THE SACRAMENTS, WHICH IS A CHARACTER (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether a sacrament imprints a character on the soul?

Whether a character is a spiritual power?

Whether the sacramental character is the character of Christ?

Whether the character be subjected in the powers of the soul?

Whether a character can be blotted out from the soul?

Whether a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law?

OF THE CAUSES OF THE SACRAMENTS (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether God alone, or the minister also, works inwardly unto the sacramental effect?

Whether the sacraments are instituted by God alone?

Whether Christ as man had the power of producing the inward sacramental effect?

Whether Christ could communicate to ministers the power which He had in the sacraments?

Whether the sacraments can be conferred by evil ministers?

Whether wicked men sin in administering the sacraments?

Whether angels can administer sacraments?

Whether the minister’s intention is required for the validity of a sacrament?

Whether faith is required of necessity in the minister of a sacrament?

Whether the validity of a sacrament requires a good intention in the minister?

OF THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether there should be seven sacraments?
- Whether the order of the sacraments, as given above, is becoming?
- Whether the Eucharist is the greatest of the sacraments?
- Whether all the sacraments are necessary for salvation?

OF THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM (TWELVE ARTICLES)

- Whether Baptism is the mere washing?
- Whether Baptism was instituted after Christ’s Passion?
- Whether water is the proper matter of Baptism?
- Whether plain water is necessary for Baptism?
- Whether this be a suitable form of Baptism: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”?
- Whether Baptism can be conferred in the name of Christ?
- Whether immersion in water is necessary for Baptism?
- Whether trine immersion is essential to Baptism?
- Whether Baptism may be reiterated?
- Whether the Church observes a suitable rite in baptizing?
- Whether three kinds of Baptism are fittingly described—viz. Baptism of Water, of Blood, and of the Spirit?
- Whether the Baptism of Blood is the most excellent of these?

OF THE MINISTERS BY WHOM THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM IS CONFERRED (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether it is part of a deacon’s duty to baptize?
- Whether to baptize is part of the priestly office, or proper to that of bishops?
- Whether a layman can baptize?
- Whether a woman can baptize?
- Whether one that is not baptized can confer the sacrament of Baptism?
- Whether several can baptize at the same time?

Whether in Baptism it is necessary for someone to raise the baptized from the sacred font?

Whether he who raises anyone from the sacred font is bound to instruct him?

OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE BAPTISM (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether all are bound to receive Baptism?

Whether a man can be saved without Baptism?

Whether Baptism should be deferred?

Whether sinners should be baptized?

Whether works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized?

Whether sinners who are going to be baptized are bound to confess their sins?

Whether the intention of receiving the sacrament of Baptism is required on the part of the one baptized?

Whether faith is required on the part of the one baptized?

Whether children should be baptized?

Whether children of Jews or other unbelievers be baptized against the will of their parents?

Whether a child can be baptized while yet in its mother's womb?

Whether madmen and imbeciles should be baptized?

OF THE EFFECTS OF BAPTISM (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether all sins are taken away by Baptism?

Whether man is freed by Baptism from all debt of punishment due to sin?

Whether Baptism should take away the penalties of sin that belong to this life?

Whether grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism?

Whether certain acts of the virtues are fittingly set down as effects of Baptism, to wit—incorporation in Christ, enlightenment, and fruitfulness?

Whether children receive grace and virtue in Baptism?

Whether the effect of Baptism is to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom?

Whether Baptism has an equal effect in all?

Whether insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism?

Whether Baptism produces its effect when the insincerity ceases?

OF CIRCUMCISION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism?

Whether circumcision was instituted in a fitting manner?

Whether the rite of circumcision was fitting?

Whether circumcision bestowed sanctifying grace?

OF THE PREPARATIONS THAT ACCOMPANY BAPTISM (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether catechism should precede Baptism?

Whether exorcism should precede Baptism?

Whether what is done in the exorcism effects anything, or is a mere sign?

Whether it belongs to a priest to catechize and exorcize the person to be baptized?

CONFIRMATION (Q[72])

OF THE SACRAMENT OF CONFIRMATION (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Whether confirmation is a sacrament?

Whether chrism is a fitting matter for this sacrament?

Whether it is essential to this sacrament that the chrism which is its matter be previously consecrated by a bishop?

Whether the proper form of this sacrament is: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross,” etc.?

Whether the sacrament of Confirmation imprints a character?

Whether the character of Confirmation presupposes of necessity, the baptismal character?

Whether sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament?

Whether this sacrament should be given to all?

Whether this sacrament should be given to man on the forehead?

Whether he who is confirmed needs one to stand* for him? [*Literally, “to hold him”]

Whether only a bishop can confer this sacrament?

Whether the rite of this sacrament is appropriate?

OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament?

Whether the Eucharist is one sacrament or several?

- Whether the Eucharist is necessary for salvation?
- Whether this sacrament is suitably called by various names?
- Whether the institution of this sacrament was appropriate?
- Whether the Paschal Lamb was the chief figure of this sacrament?

OF THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the matter of this sacrament is bread and wine?
- Whether a determinate quantity of bread and wine is required for the matter of this sacrament?
- Whether wheaten bread is required for the matter of this sacrament?
- Whether this sacrament ought to be made of unleavened bread?
- Whether wine of the grape is the proper matter of this sacrament?
- Whether water should be mixed with the wine?
- Whether the mixing with water is essential to this sacrament?
- Whether water should be added in great quantity?

OF THE CHANGE OF BREAD AND WINE INTO THE BODY AND BLOOD OF CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the body of Christ be in this sacrament in very truth, or merely as in a figure or sign?
- Whether in this sacrament the substance of the bread and wine remains after the consecration?
- Whether the substance of the bread or wine is annihilated after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into their original matter?
- Whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ?
- Whether the accidents of the bread and wine remain in this sacrament after the change?
- Whether the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration?
- Whether this change is wrought instantaneously?
- Whether this proposition is false: “The body of Christ is made out of bread”?

OF THE WAY IN WHICH CHRIST IS IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the whole Christ is contained under this sacrament?
- Whether the whole Christ is contained under each species of this sacrament?

- Whether Christ is entire under every part of the species of the bread and wine?
- Whether the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is in this sacrament?
- Whether Christ’s body is in this sacrament as in a place?
- Whether Christ’s body is in this sacrament movably?
- Whether the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by any eye, at least by a glorified one?
- Whether Christ’s body is truly there when flesh or a child appears miraculously in this sacrament?

OF THE ACCIDENTS WHICH REMAIN IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject?
- Whether in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is the subject of the other accidents?
- Whether the species remaining in this sacrament can change external objects?
- Whether the sacramental species can be corrupted?
- Whether anything can be generated from the sacramental species?
- Whether the sacramental species can nourish?
- Whether the sacramental species are broken in this sacrament?
- Whether any liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine?

OF THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether this is the form of this sacrament: “This is My body,” and “This is the chalice of My blood”?
- Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the bread: “This is My body”?
- Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the wine: “This is the chalice of My blood,” etc.?
- Whether in the aforesaid words of the forms there be any created power which causes the consecration?
- Whether the aforesaid expressions are true?
- Whether the form of the consecration of the bread accomplishes its effect before the form of the consecration of the wine be completed?

OF THE EFFECTS OF THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

- Whether grace is bestowed through this sacrament?
- Whether the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament?
- Whether the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this sacrament?
- Whether venial sins are forgiven through this sacrament?
- Whether the entire punishment due to sin is forgiven through this sacrament?
- Whether man is preserved by this sacrament from future sins?
- Whether this sacrament benefit others besides the recipients?
- Whether the effect of this sacrament is hindered by venial sin?

OF THE USE OR RECEIVING OF THIS SACRAMENT IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)

- Whether there are two ways to be distinguished of eating Christ’s body?
- Whether it belongs to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually?
- Whether the just man alone may eat Christ sacramentally?
- Whether the sinner sins in receiving Christ’s body sacramentally?
- Whether to approach this sacrament with consciousness of sin is the gravest of all sins?
- Whether the priest ought to deny the body of Christ to the sinner seeking it?
- Whether the seminal loss that occurs during sleep hinders anyone from receiving this sacrament?
- Whether food or drink taken beforehand hinders the receiving of this sacrament?
- Whether those who have not the use of reason ought to receive this sacrament?
- Whether it is lawful to receive this sacrament daily?
- Whether it is lawful to abstain altogether from communion?
- Whether it is lawful to receive the body of Christ without the blood?

OF THE USE WHICH CHRIST MADE OF THIS SACRAMENT AT ITS INSTITUTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ received His own body and blood?
- Whether Christ gave His body to Judas?
- Whether Christ received and gave to the disciples His impassible body?

Whether, if this sacrament had been reserved in a pyx, or consecrated at the moment of Christ’s death by one of the apostles, Christ Himself would have died there?

OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether the consecration of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone?

Whether several priests can consecrate one and the same host?

Whether dispensing of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone?

Whether the priest who consecrates is bound to receive this sacrament?

Whether a wicked priest can consecrate the Eucharist?

Whether the mass of a sinful priest is of less worth than the mass of a good priest?

Whether heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated persons can consecrate?

Whether a degraded priest can consecrate this sacrament?

Whether it is permissible to receive communion from heretical, excommunicate, or sinful priests, and to hear mass said by them?

Whether it is lawful for a priest to refrain entirely from consecrating the Eucharist?

OF THE RITE OF THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether Christ is sacrificed in this sacrament?

Whether the time for celebrating this mystery has been properly determined?

Whether this sacrament ought to be celebrated in a house and with sacred vessels?

Whether the words spoken in this sacrament are properly framed?

Whether the actions performed in celebrating this sacrament are becoming?

Whether the defects occurring during the celebration of this sacrament can be sufficiently met by observing the Church’s statutes?

OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether Penance is a sacrament?

Whether sins are the proper matter of this sacrament?

Whether the form of this sacrament is: “I absolve thee”?

Whether the imposition of the priest’s hands is necessary for this sacrament?

Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation?

Whether Penance is a second plank after shipwreck?

- Whether this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law?
- Whether Penance should last till the end of life?
- Whether Penance can be continuous?
- Whether the sacrament of Penance may be repeated?

OF PENANCE AS A VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether Penance is a virtue?
- Whether Penance is a special virtue?
- Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice?
- Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?
- Whether penance originates from fear?
- Whether penance is the first of the virtues?

OF THE EFFECT OF PENANCE, AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether all sins are taken away by Penance?
- Whether sin can be pardoned without Penance?
- Whether by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another?
- Whether the debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance?
- Whether the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven?
- Whether the forgiveness of guilt is an effect of Penance?

OF THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?
- Whether infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins?
- Whether venial sins are removed by the sprinkling of holy water and the like?
- Whether venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin?

OF THE RETURN OF SINS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin?
- Whether sins that have been forgiven, return through ingratitude which is shown especially in four kinds of sin?

Whether the debt of punishment that arises through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned?

Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of previous sins, is a special sin?

OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the virtues are restored through Penance?

Whether, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue?

Whether, by Penance, man is restored to his former dignity?

Whether virtuous deeds done in charity can be deadened?

Whether deeds deadened by sin, are revived by Penance?

Whether the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works?

OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether Penance should be assigned any parts?

Whether contrition, confession, and satisfaction are fittingly assigned as parts of Penance?

Whether these three are integral parts of Penance?

Whether Penance is fittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal sins, and penance for venial sins?

SUPPLEMENT

SUPPLEMENT (XP): TO THE THIRD PART OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS GATHERED FROM HIS COMMENTARY ON BOOK IV OF THE SENTENCES (QQ[1] -99)

EDITOR’S NOTE:

OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them?

Whether contrition is an act of virtue?

Whether attrition can become contrition?

OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin?

- Whether contrition should be on account of original sin?
- Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin?
- Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins?
- Whether a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin?
- Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?

OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?
- Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?
- Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?

OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?
- Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?
- Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?

OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?
- Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?
- Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?

OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)

- Whether confession is necessary for salvation?
- Whether confession is according to the natural law?
- Whether all are bound to confession?
- Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?
- Whether one is bound to confess at once?
- Whether one can be dispensed from confession?

OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?
- Whether confession is an act of virtue?
- Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?

OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)

- Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?
- Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?
- Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear the confession of venial sins?
- Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one’s own priest?
- Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or a command given by a superior?
- Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest?
- Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the fault?

OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether confession can be lacking in form?
- Whether confession should be entire?
- Whether one may confess through another, or by writing?
- Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned are necessary for confession?

OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?
- Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way?
- Whether confession opens paradise?
- Whether confession gives hope of salvation?
- Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins?

OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession?
- Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?
- Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?
- Whether by the penitent’s permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession?

- Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through some other source besides?

OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?
- Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?
- Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether man can make satisfaction to God?
- Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?

OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?
- Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for which he was previously contrite?
- Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to charity?
- Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?
- Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?
- Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?
- Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?

OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether penance can be in the innocent?
- Whether the saints in glory have penance?
- Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?

OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether there should be keys in the Church?
- Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?
- Whether there are two keys or only one?

OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?

Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?

Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?

Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?

OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?

Whether Christ had the key?

Whether priests alone have the keys?

Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?

Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?

Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys?

OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?

Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?

Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?

OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of the Church, etc?

Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?

Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?

Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?

OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether every priest can excommunicate?

Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate?

Whether a man who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another?

- Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior?
- Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men?
- Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of excommunication?

OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person?
- Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated?
- Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed?

OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?
- Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?
- Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all?

OF INDULGENCES (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?
- Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?
- Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?

OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?
- Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?
- Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?
- Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?
- Whether indulgences avail religious?

Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the conditions required?

Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?

OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?

Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?

Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether any priest can impose it?

EXTREME UNCTION (QQ[29]-33)

OF EXTREME UNCTION, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE AND INSTITUTION (NINE ARTICLES)

Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?

Whether Extreme Unction is one sacrament?

Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?

Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?

Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?

Whether the matter of this sacrament need be consecrated by a bishop?

Whether this sacrament has a form?

Whether the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion or of petition?

Whether the foregoing prayer is a suitable form for this sacrament?

OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?

Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?

Whether this sacrament imprints a character?

OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?

Whether deacons can confer this sacrament?

Whether none but a bishop can confer this sacrament?

ON WHOM SHOULD THIS SACRAMENT BE CONFERRED AND ON WHAT PART OF THE BODY? (SEVEN ARTICLES)

- Whether this sacrament ought to be conferred on those who are in good health?
- Whether this sacrament ought to be given in any kind of sickness?
- Whether this sacrament ought to be given to madmen and imbeciles?
- Whether this sacrament should be given to children?
- Whether the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament?
- Whether the parts to be anointed are suitably assigned?
- Whether those who are deformed in those parts should be anointed?

OF THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)

- Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?
- Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated during the same sickness?

HOLY ORDERS (QQ[34]-40)

OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER AS TO ITS ESSENCE AND ITS PARTS (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether there should be Order in the Church?
- Whether Order is properly defined?
- Whether Order is a sacrament?
- Whether the form of this sacrament is suitably expressed?
- Whether this sacrament has any matter?

OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?
- Whether in the sacrament of Order a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?
- Whether the character of Order presupposes the baptismal character?
- Whether the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation?
- Whether the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order?

OF THE QUALITIES REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive Orders?

Whether knowledge of all Holy Writ is required?

Whether a man obtains the degrees of Order by the merit of one’s life?

Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders commits a sin?

Whether a man who is in sin can without sin exercise the Order he has received? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], A[6]]

OF THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS, OF THEIR ACTS, AND THE IMPRINTING OF THE CHARACTER (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether we ought to distinguish several Orders?

Whether there are seven Orders?

Whether the Order should be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?

Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?

Whether the character is imprinted on a priest when the chalice is handed to him?

OF THOSE WHO CONFER THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether a bishop alone confers the sacrament of Order?

Whether heretics and those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], AA[5],9]

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders?

Whether boys and those who lack the use of reason can receive Orders?

Whether the state of slavery is an impediment to receiving Orders?

Whether a man should be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide?

Whether those of illegitimate birth should be debarred from receiving Orders?

Whether lack of members should be an impediment?

OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER (SEVEN ARTICLES)

Whether those who are ordained ought to wear the tonsure?

Whether the tonsure is an Order?

Whether by receiving the tonsure a man renounces temporal goods?

Whether above the priestly Order there ought to be an episcopal power?

- Whether the episcopate is an Order?
- Whether in the Church there can be anyone above the bishops?
- Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted in the Church?

MATRIMONY (QQ[41]-67)

OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether matrimony is of natural law?
- Whether matrimony still comes under a precept?
- Whether the marriage act is always sinful?
- Whether the marriage act is meritorious?

OF MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)

- Whether matrimony is a sacrament?
- Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?
- Whether matrimony confers grace?
- Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament?

OF MATRIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE BETROTHAL (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage?
- Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal?
- Whether a betrothal can be dissolved?

OF THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?
- Whether matrimony is fittingly named?
- Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text?

OF THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?
- Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?
- Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?

  Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent given in words of the present?

  Whether consent given secretly in words of the present makes a marriage?

OF THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED (TWO ARTICLES)

  Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?

  Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage?

OF COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT (SIX ARTICLES)

  Whether a compulsory consent is possible?

  Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?

  Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?

  Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses compulsion?

  Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?

  Whether one can be compelled by one’s father’s command to marry?

OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT (TWO ARTICLES)

  Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?

  Whether marriage can result from one person’s consent to take another for a base motive?

OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS* (SIX ARTICLES)

  Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?

  Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?

  Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?

  Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?

  Whether the marriage act can be excused without the marriage goods?

  Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure?

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)

  Whether it is fitting that impediments should be assigned to marriage?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage?

Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?

Whether a slave can marry without his master’s consent?

Whether slavery can supervene to marriage?

Whether children should follow the condition of their father?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOWS AND ORDERS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether marriage already contracted should be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow?

Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted?

Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?

Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF CONSANGUINITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether consanguinity is rightly defined?

Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?

Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural law?

Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could be fixed by the Church?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY (ELEVEN ARTICLES)

Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation?

Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?

Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?

Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?

Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?

Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?

Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?

Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity?

Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or consanguinity should always be annulled?

Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of a marriage contracted by persons related to each other by affinity or consanguinity?

Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in the same way as in other suits?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?

Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?

Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from the sacred font?

Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?

Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather’s carnal children?

OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether adoption is rightly defined?

Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through adoption?

Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child?

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?

Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?

Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?

Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife’s sister?

Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?

OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?

Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?

Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife is she be unwilling to be converted?

Whether a believer can, after his conversion, put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator?

Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife can take another wife?

Whether other sins dissolve marriage?

OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery?

Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?

Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent?

Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?

OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication?

Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is guilty of fornication?

Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication?

Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with each other?

Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?

Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?

OF SECOND MARRIAGES (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether a second marriage is lawful?

Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?

OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE MARRIAGE DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)

Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt?

Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it?

- Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt? [*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]
- Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to her husband if he ask for it? [*This and the previous article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]
- Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?
- Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent?
- Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?
- Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?
- Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?
- Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? [*This article is omitted in the Leonine edition.]

OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?
- Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?
- Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?
- Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?
- Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?

OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?
- Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives, one in law, the other in fact?
- Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?
- Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?
- Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?

OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)

- Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?
- Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?
- Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?

    - Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband?
    - Whether a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced?
    - Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife?
    - Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill?
  - OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (THREE ARTICLES)
    - Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate?
    - Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?
    - Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized?
- TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION (QQ[69]-86)
  - OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE AFTER DEATH (SEVEN ARTICLES)
    - Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death?
    - Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death?
    - Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence?
    - Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham’s bosom?
    - Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?
    - Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers?
    - Whether so many abodes should be distinguished?
  - OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE (THREE ARTICLES)
    - Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? [*Cf. FP, Q[77], A[8]]
    - Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?
    - Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?
  - OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)
    - Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?
    - Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?
    - Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?
    - Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer them?

- Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?
- Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?
- Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo?
- Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven?
- Whether the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms profit the departed?
- Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?
- Whether the burial service profits the dead?
- Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for whom they are offered more than others?
- Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular?
- Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages?

OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?
- Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us?
- Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are always granted?

OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether any signs will precede the Lord’s coming to judgment?
- Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth?
- Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved when our Lord shall come?

OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION (NINE ARTICLES)

- Whether the world is to be cleansed?
- Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire?
- Whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed will be of the same species with elemental fire?
- Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?
- Whether that fire will consume the other elements?
- Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire?

Whether the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment?

Whether that fire will have such an effect on men as is described?

Whether that fire will engulf the wicked?

OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?

Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?

Whether the resurrection is natural?

OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?

Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection?

Whether the angels will do anything towards the resurrection?

OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the world?

Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?

Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?

Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?

OF THE TERM “WHEREFROM” OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether death will be the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in all cases?

Whether all will rise again from ashes?

Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?

OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical body?

Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?

Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return to the same parts of the body that were dissolved into them?

OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?

Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?

Whether the humors will rise again in the body?

Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in it?

Whether whatever was materially in a man’s members will all rise again?

OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether all will rise again of the same age?

Whether all will rise again of the same stature?

Whether all will rise again of the male sex?

Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions of nutrition and generation?

OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?

Whether all will be equally impassible?

Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?

Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in act?

OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?

Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified?

Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same place?

Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body?

Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place?

Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable?

OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (THREE ARTICLES)

Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?

Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement?

Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?

- OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?
  - Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified eye?
  - Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?
- OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?
  - Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?
  - Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?

TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS (QQ[86]-99)

- OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS (THREE ARTICLES)
  - Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has committed?
  - Whether every one will be able to read all that is in another’s conscience?
  - Whether all merits and demerits, one’s own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance?
- OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE (FOUR ARTICLES)
  - Whether there will be a general judgment?
  - Whether the judgment will take place by word of mouth?
  - Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown?
  - Whether the judgment will take place in the valley of Josaphat?
- OF THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND OF THOSE WHO WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL JUDGMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)
  - Whether any men will judge together with Christ?
  - Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?
  - Whether the angels will judge?
  - Whether the demons will carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned?
  - Whether all men will be present at the judgment?
  - Whether the good will be judged at the judgment?

- Whether the wicked will be judged?
- Whether at the coming judgment the angels will be judged?

OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity?
- Whether at the judgment Christ will appear in His glorified humanity?
- Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy?

OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether the world will be renewed?
- Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?
- Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this renewal?
- Whether the elements will be renewed by an addition of brightness?
- Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal?

OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED* (THREE ARTICLES) [*Cf. FP, Q[12]]

- Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?
- Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[3]]
- Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], AA[7],8]

OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND THEIR MANSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than before?
- Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions?
- Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various degrees of charity?

OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED (THREE ARTICLES)

- Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned?
- Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?
- Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?

OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED (FIVE ARTICLES)

- Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?

Whether the dowry is the same as beatitude*? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[7], ad 1; FS, Q[4], A[3]]

Whether it is fitting that Christ should receive a dowry?

Whether the angels receive the dowries?

Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned?

OF THE AUREOLES (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the aurea?

Whether the aureole differs from the fruit?

Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone?

Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence?

Whether an aureole is due on account of virginity?

Whether an aureole is due to martyrs?

Whether an aureole is due to doctors?

Whether an aureole is due to Christ?

Whether an aureole is due to the angels?

Whether an aureole is also due to the body?

Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned, those of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors?

Whether the virgin’s aureole is the greatest of all?

Whether one person has an aureole more excellently than another person?

OF THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED (SEVEN ARTICLES)

Whether in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire?

Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal?

Whether the weeping of the damned will be corporeal?

Whether the damned are in material darkness?

Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal?

Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?

Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth?

OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED (NINE ARTICLES)

Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?

Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?

Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?

Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not damned?

Whether the damned hate God?

Whether the damned demerit?

Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world? [*Cf. FP, Q[89]]

Whether the damned will ever think of God?

Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed?

OF GOD’S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED (FIVE ARTICLES)

Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? [*Cf. FS, Q[87], AA[3],4]

Whether by God’s mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end?

Whether God’s mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally?

Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God?

Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?

APPENDIX 1

OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO ARTICLES)

Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire, and are punished by fire?

Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state in which they are?

OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY (SIX ARTICLES)

Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass all the temporal pains of this life?

Whether this punishment is voluntary?

Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons?

Whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt?

    - Whether the fire of Purgatory delivers from the debt of punishment?
    - Whether one person is delivered from this punishment sooner than another?
- APPENDIX 2
  - TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY
    - Whether there is a Purgatory after this life?
    - Whether it is the same place where souls are cleansed, and the damned punished?

THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA: COMPLETE EDITION

AETERNI PATRIS

ENCYCLICAL OF POPE LEO XIII

ON THE RESTORATION OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

TO THE PATRIARCHS, PRIMATES, ARCHBISHOPS, AND
BISHOPS OF THE CATHOLIC WORLD IN GRACE AND
COMMUNION WITH THE APOSTOLIC SEE.

The only-begotten Son of the Eternal Father, who came on earth to bring salvation and the light of divine wisdom to men, conferred a great and wonderful blessing on the world when, about to ascend again into heaven, He commanded the Apostles to go and teach all nations, and left the Church which He had founded to be the common and supreme teacher of the peoples. For men whom the truth had set free were to be preserved by the truth; nor would the fruits of heavenly doctrines by which salvation comes to men have long remained had not the Lord Christ appointed an unfailing teaching authority to train the minds to faith. And the Church built upon the promises of its own divine Author, whose charity it imitated, so faithfully followed out His commands that its constant aim and chief wish was this: to teach religion and contend forever against errors. To this end assuredly have tended the incessant labors of individual bishops; to this end also the published laws and decrees of councils, and especially the constant watchfulness of the Roman Pontiffs, to whom, as successors of the blessed Peter in the primacy of the Apostles, belongs the right and office of teaching and confirming their brethren in the faith. Since, then, according to the warning of the apostle, the minds of Christ’s faithful are apt to be deceived and the integrity of the faith to be corrupted among men by philosophy and vain deceit, the supreme pastors of the Church have always thought it their duty to advance, by every means in their power, science truly so called, and at the same time to provide with special care that all studies should accord with the Catholic faith, especially philosophy, on which a right interpretation of the other sciences in great part depends. Indeed, venerable brethren, on this very subject among others, We briefly admonished you in Our first encyclical letter; but now, both by reason of the gravity of the subject and the condition of the time, we are again compelled to speak to you on the mode of taking up the study of philosophy which shall respond most fitly to the excellence of faith, and at the same time be consonant with the dignity of human science.

2. Whoso turns his attention to the bitter strifes of these days and seeks a reason for the troubles that vex public and private life must come to the conclusion that a fruitful cause of the evils which now afflict, as well as those which threaten, us lies in this: that false conclusions concerning divine and human things, which originated in the schools of philosophy, have now crept into all the orders of the State, and have been accepted by the common consent of the masses. For, since it is in the very nature of man to follow the guide of reason in his actions, if his intellect sins at all his will soon follows; and thus it happens that false opinions, whose seat is in the understanding, influence human actions and pervert them. Whereas, on the other hand, if men be of sound mind and take their stand on true and solid principles, there will result a vast amount of benefits for the public and private good. We do not, indeed, attribute such force and authority to philosophy as to esteem it equal to the task of combating and rooting out all errors; for, when the Christian religion was first constituted, it came upon earth to restore it to its primeval dignity by the admirable light of faith, diffused “not by persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the manifestation of spirit and of power,” so also at the present time we look above all things to the powerful help of Almighty God to bring back to a right understanding the minds of man and dispel the darkness of error. But the natural helps with which the grace of the divine wisdom, strongly and sweetly disposing all things, has supplied the human race are neither to be despised nor neglected, chief among which is evidently the right use of philosophy. For, not in vain did God set the light of reason in the human mind; and so far is the super-added light of faith from extinguishing or

lessening the power of the intelligence that it completes it rather, and by adding to its strength renders it capable of greater things.

3. Therefore, Divine Providence itself requires that, in calling back the people to the paths of faith and salvation, advantage should be taken of human science also-an approved and wise practice which history testifies was observed by the most illustrious Fathers of the Church. They, indeed, were wont neither to belittle nor undervalue the part that reason had to play, as is summed up by the great Augustine when he attributes to this science “that by which the most wholesome faith is begotten . . . is nourished, defended, and made strong.”

4. In the first place, philosophy, if rightly made use of by the wise, in a certain way tends to smooth and fortify the road to true faith, and to prepare the souls of its disciples for the fit reception of revelation; for which reason it is well called by ancient writers sometimes a steppingstone to the Christian faith, sometimes the prelude and help of Christianity, sometimes the Gospel teacher. And, assuredly, the God of all goodness, in all that pertains to divine things, has not only manifested by the light of faith those truths which human intelligence could not attain of itself, but others, also, not altogether unattainable by reason, that by the help of divine authority they may be made known to all at once and without any admixture of error. Hence it is that certain truths which were either divinely proposed for belief, or were bound by the closest chains to the doctrine of faith, were discovered by pagan sages with nothing but their natural reason to guide them, were demonstrated and proved by becoming arguments. For, as the Apostle says, the invisible things of Him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: His eternal power also and divinity; and the Gentiles who have not the Law show, nevertheless, the work of the Law written in their hearts. But it is most fitting to turn these truths, which have been discovered by the pagan sages even, to the use and purposes of revealed doctrine, in order to show that both human wisdom and the very testimony of our adversaries serve to support the Christian faith-a method which is not of recent introduction, but of established use, and has often been adopted by the holy Fathers of the Church. What is more, those venerable men, the witnesses and guardians of religious traditions, recognize a certain form and figure of this in the action of the Hebrews, who, when about to depart out of Egypt, were commanded

to take with them the gold and silver vessels and precious robes of the Egyptians, that by a change of use the things might be dedicated to the service of the true God which had formerly been the instruments of ignoble and superstitious rites. Gregory of NeoCaesarea praises Origen expressly because, with singular dexterity, as one snatches weapons from the enemy, he turned to the defense of Christian wisdom and to the destruction of superstition many arguments drawn from the writings of the pagans. And both Gregory of Nazianzen and Gregory of Nyssapraise and commend a like mode of disputation in Basil the Great; while Jerome especially commends it in Quadratus, a disciple of the Apostles, in Aristides, Justin, Irenaeus, and very many others. Augustine says: “Do we not see Cyprian, that mildest of doctors and most blessed of martyrs, going out of Egypt laden with gold and silver and vestments? And Lactantius, also and Victorinus, Optatus and Hilary? And, not to speak of the living, how many Greeks have done likewise?” But if natural reason first sowed this rich field of doctrine before it was rendered fruitful by the power of Christ, it must assuredly become more prolific after the grace of the Saviour has renewed and added to the native faculties of the human mind. And who does not see that a plain and easy road is opened up to faith by such a method of philosophic study?

5. But the advantage to be derived from such a school of philosophy is not to be confined within these limits. The foolishness of those men who “by these good things that are seen could not understand Him, that is, neither by attending to the works could have acknowledged who was the workman,” is gravely reproved in the words of Divine Wisdom. In the first place, then, this great and noble fruit is gathered from human reason, that it demonstrates that God is; for the greatness of the beauty and of the creature the Creator of them may be seen so as to be known thereby. Again, it shows God to excel in the height of all perfections, especially in infinite wisdom before which nothing lies hidden, and in absolute justice which no depraved affection could possibly shake; and that God, therefore, is not only true but truth itself, which can neither deceive nor be deceived. Whence it clearly follows that human reason finds the fullest faith and authority united in the word of God. In like manner, reason declares that the doctrine of the Gospel has even from its very beginning been made manifest by certain wonderful signs, the established proofs, as it were, of unshaken truth; and that all,

therefore, who set faith in the Gospel do not believe rashly as though following cunningly devised fables, but, by a most reasonable consent, subject their intelligence and judgment to an authority which is divine. And of no less importance is it that reason most clearly sets forth that the Church instituted by Christ (as laid down in the Vatican Council), on account of its wonderful spread, its marvellous sanctity, and its inexhaustible fecundity in all places, as well as of its Catholic unity and unshaken stability, is in itself a great and perpetual motive of belief and an irrefragable testimony of its own divine mission.

6. Its solid foundations having been thus laid, a perpetual and varied service is further required of philosophy, in order that sacred theology may receive and assume the nature, form, and genius of a true science. For in this, the most noble of studies, it is of the greatest necessity to bind together, as it were, in one body the many and various parts of the heavenly doctrines, that, each being allotted to its own proper place and derived from its own proper principles, the whole may join together in a complete union; in order, in fine, that all and each part may be strengthened by its own and the others' invincible arguments. Nor is that more accurate or fuller knowledge of the things that are believed, and somewhat more lucid understanding, as far as it can go, of the very mysteries of faith which Augustine and the other fathers commended and strove to reach, and which the Vatican Council itself declared to be most fruitful, to be passed over in silence or belittled. Those will certainly more fully and more easily attain that knowledge and understanding who to integrity of life and love of faith join a mind rounded and finished by philosophic studies, as the same Vatican Council teaches that the knowledge of such sacred dogmas ought to be sought as well from analogy of the things that are naturally known as from the connection of those mysteries one with another and with the final end of man.

7. Lastly, the duty of religiously defending the truths divinely delivered, and of resisting those who dare oppose them, pertains to philosophic pursuits. Wherefore, it is the glory of philosophy to be esteemed as the bulwark of faith and the strong defense of religion. As Clement of Alexandria testifies, the doctrine of the Saviour is indeed perfect in itself and wanteth naught, since it is the power and wisdom of God. And the assistance of the Greek philosophy maketh not the truth more powerful; but,

inasmuch as it weakens the contrary arguments of the sophists and repels the veiled attacks against the truth, it has been fitly called the hedge and fence of the vine. For, as the enemies of the Catholic name, when about to attack religion, are in the habit of borrowing their weapons from the arguments of philosophers, so the defenders of sacred science draw many arguments from the store of philosophy which may serve to uphold revealed dogmas. Nor is the triumph of the Christian faith a small one in using human reason to repel powerfully and speedily the attacks of its adversaries by the hostile arms which human reason itself supplied. This species of religious strife St. Jerome, writing to Magnus, notices as having been adopted by the Apostle of the Gentiles himself; Paul, the leader of the Christian army and the invincible orator, battling for the cause of Christ, skillfully turns even a chance inscription into an argument for the faith; for he had learned from the true David to wrest the sword from the hands of the enemy and to cut off the head of the boastful Goliath with his own weapon. Moreover, the Church herself not only urges, but even commands, Christian teachers to seek help from philosophy. For, the fifth Lateran Council, after it had decided that "every assertion contrary to the truth of revealed faith is altogether false, for the reason that it contradicts, however slightly, the truth," advises teachers of philosophy to pay close attention to the exposition of fallacious arguments; since, as Augustine testifies, "if reason is turned against the authority of sacred Scripture, no matter how specious it may seem, it errs in the likeness of truth; for true it cannot be."

8. But in order that philosophy may be bound equal to the gathering of those precious fruits which we have indicated, it behooves it above all things never to turn aside from that path which the Fathers have entered upon from a venerable antiquity, and which the Vatican Council solemnly and authoritatively approved. As it is evident that very many truths of the supernatural order which are far beyond the reach of the keenest intellect must be accepted, human reason, conscious of its own infirmity, dare not affect to itself too great powers, nor deny those truths, nor measure them by its own standard, nor interpret them at will; but receive them, rather, with a full and humble faith, and esteem it the highest honor to be allowed to wait upon heavenly doctrines like a handmaid and attendant, and by God's goodness attain to them in any way whatsoever. But in the case of such doctrines as the human intelligence may perceive, it is equally just that

philosophy should make use of its own method, principles, and arguments-not, indeed, in such fashion as to seem rashly to withdraw from the divine authority. But, since it is established that those things which become known by revelation have the force of certain truth, and that those things which war against faith war equally against right reason, the Catholic philosopher will know that he violates at once faith and the laws of reason if he accepts any conclusion which he understands to be opposed to revealed doctrine.

9. We know that there are some who, in their overestimate of the human faculties, maintain that as soon as man's intellect becomes subject to divine authority it falls from its native dignity, and hampered by the yoke of this species of slavery, is much retarded and hindered in its progress toward the supreme truth and excellence. Such an idea is most false and deceptive, and its sole tendency is to induce foolish and ungrateful men wilfully to repudiate the most sublime truths, and reject the divine gift of faith, from which the fountains of all good things flow out upon civil society. For the human mind, being confined within certain limits, and those narrow enough, is exposed to many errors and is ignorant of many things; whereas the Christian faith, reposing on the authority of God, is the unfailing mistress of truth, whom whoso followeth he will be neither enmeshed in the snares of error nor tossed hither and thither on the waves of fluctuating opinion. Those, therefore, who to the study of philosophy unite obedience to the Christian faith, are philosophizing in the best possible way; for the splendor of the divine truths, received into the mind, helps the understanding, and not only detracts in nowise from its dignity, but adds greatly to its nobility, keenness, and stability. For surely that is a worthy and most useful exercise of reason when men give their minds to disproving those things which are repugnant to faith and proving the things which conform to faith. In the first case they cut the ground from under the feet of error and expose the viciousness of the arguments on which error rests; while in the second case they make themselves masters of weighty reasons for the sound demonstration of truth and the satisfactory instruction of any reasonable person. Whoever denies that such study and practice tend to add to the resources and expand the faculties of the mind must necessarily and absurdly hold that the mind gains nothing from discriminating between the true and the false. Justly, therefore, does the Vatican Council commemorate in these words the great benefits which faith has conferred upon reason:

Faith frees and saves reason from error, and endows it withmanifold knowledge. A wise man, therefore, would not accuse faith and look upon it as opposed to reason and natural truths, but would rather offer heartfelt thanks to God, and sincerely rejoice that, in the density of ignorance and in the flood-tide of error, holy faith, like a friendly star, shines down upon his path and points out to him the fair gate of truth beyond all danger of wandering.

10. If, venerable brethren, you open the history of philosophy, you will find all We have just said proved by experience. The philosophers of old who lacked the gift of faith, yet were esteemed so wise, fell into many appalling errors. You know how often among some truths they taught false and incongruous things; what vague and doubtful opinions they held concerning the nature of the Divinity, the first origin of things, the government of the world, the divine knowledge of the future, the cause and principle of evil, the ultimate end of man, the eternal beatitude, concerning virtue and vice, and other matters, a true and certain knowledge of which is most necessary to the human race; while, on the other hand, the early Fathers and Doctors of the Church, who well understood that, according to the divine plan, the restorer of human science is Christ, who is the power and the wisdom of God, and in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, took up and investigated the books of the ancient philosophers, and compared their teachings with the doctrines of revelation, and, carefully sifting them, they cherished what was true and wise in them and amended or rejected all else. For, as the all-seeing God against the cruelty of tyrants raised up mighty martyrs to the defense of the Church, men prodigal of their great lives, in like manner to false philosophers and heretics He opposed men of great wisdom, to defend, even by the aid of human reason, the treasure of revealed truths. Thus, from the very first ages of the Church, the Catholic doctrine has encountered a multitude of most bitter adversaries, who, deriding the Christian dogmas and institutions, maintained that there were many gods, that the material world never had a beginning or cause, and that the course of events was one of blind and fatal necessity, not regulated by the will of Divine Providence.

11. But the learned men whom We call apologists speedily encountered these teachers of foolish doctrine and, under the guidance of faith, found arguments in human wisdom also to prove that one God, who stands pre-

eminent in every kind of perfection, is to be worshiped; that all things were created from nothing by His omnipotent power; that by His wisdom they flourish and serve each their own special purposes. Among these St. Justin Martyr claims the chief place.

After having tried the most celebrated academies of the Greeks, he saw clearly, as he himself confesses, that he could only draw truths in their fullness from the doctrine of revelation. These he embraced with all the ardor of his soul, purged of calumny, courageously and fully defended before the Roman emperors, and reconciled with them not a few of the sayings of the Greek philosophers.

12. Quadratus, also, and Aristides, Hermias, and Athenagoras stood nobly forth in that time. Nor did Irenaeus, the invincible martyr and Bishop of Lyons, win less glory in the same cause when, forcibly refuting the perverse opinions of the Orientals, the work of the Gnostics, scattered broadcast over the territories of the Roman Empire, he explained (according to Jerome) the origin of each heresy and in what philosophic source it took its rise. But who knows not the disputations of Clement of Alexandria, which the same Jerome thus honorably commemorates: “What is there in them that is not learned, and what that is not of the very heart of philosophy?” He himself, indeed, with marvellous versatility treated of many things of the greatest utility for preparing a history of philosophy, for the exercise of the dialectic art, and for showing the agreement between reason and faith. After him came Origen, who graced the chair of the school of Alexandria, and was most learned in the teachings of the Greeks and Orientals. He published many volumes, involving great labor, which were wonderfully adapted to explain the divine writings and illustrate the sacred dogmas; which, though, as they now stand, not altogether free from error, contain nevertheless a wealth of knowledge tending to the growth and advance of natural truths. Tertullian opposes heretics with the authority of the sacred writings; with the philosophers he changes his fence and disputes philosophically; but so learnedly and accurately did he confute them that he made bold to say: “Neither in science nor in schooling are we equals, as you imagine.” Arnobius, also, in his works against the pagans, and Lactantius in the divine Institutions especially, with equal eloquence and strength strenuously strive to move men to accept the dogmas and precepts of Catholic wisdom, not by philosophic juggling, after the fashion of the

Academicians, but vanquishing them partly by their own arms, and partly by arguments drawn from the mutual contentions of the philosophers. But the writings on the human soul, the divine attributes, and other questions of mighty moment which the great Athanasius and Chrysostom, the prince of orators, have left behind them are, by common consent, so supremely excellent that it seems scarcely anything could be added to their subtlety and fulness. And, not to cover too wide a range, we add to the number of the great men of whom mention has been made the names of Basil the Great and of the two Gregories, who, on going forth from Athens, that home of all learning, thoroughly equipped with all the harness of philosophy, turned the wealth of knowledge which each had gathered up in a course of zealous study to the work of refuting heretics and preparing Christians.

13. But Augustine would seem to have wrested the palm from all. Of a most powerful genius and thoroughly saturated with sacred and profane learning, with the loftiest faith and with equal knowledge, he combated most vigorously all the errors of his age. What topic of philosophy did he not investigate? What region of it did he not diligently explore, either in expounding the loftiest mysteries of the faith to the faithful, or defending them against the full onslaught of adversaries, or again when, in demolishing the fables of the Academicians or the Manichaeans, he laid the safe foundations and sure structure of human science, or followed up the reason, origin, and causes of the evils that afflict man? How subtly he reasoned on the angels, the soul, the human mind, the will and free choice, on religion and the life of the blessed, on time and eternity, and even on the very nature of changeable bodies. Afterwards, in the East, John Damascene, treading in the footsteps of Basil and of Gregory of Nazianzen, and in the West, Boethius and Anselm following the doctrines of Augustine, added largely to the patrimony of philosophy.

14. Later on, the doctors of the middle ages, who are called Scholastics, addressed themselves to a great work-that of diligently collecting, and sifting, and storing up, as it were, in one place, for the use and convenience of posterity the rich and fertile harvests of Christian learning scattered abroad in the voluminous works of the holy Fathers. And with regard, venerable brethren, to the origin, drift, and excellence of this scholastic learning, it may be well here to speak more fully in the words of one of the

wisest of Our predecessors, Sixtus V: “By the divine favor of Him who alone gives the spirit of science wisdom, and understanding, and who thou ages, as there may be need, enriches His Church with new blessings and strengthens it with safeguards, there was founded by Our fathers, men of eminent wisdom, the scholastic theology, which two glorious doctors in particular angelic St. Thomas and the seraphic St. Bonaventure, illustrious teachers of this faculty, . . . with surpassing genius, by unwearied diligence, and at the cost of long labors and vigils, set in order and beautified, and when skilfuly arranged and clearly explained in a variety of ways, handed down to posterity.

15. “And, indeed, the knowledge and use of so salutary a science, which flows from the fertilizing founts of the sacred writings, the sovereign Pontiffs, the holy Fathers and the councils, must always be of the greatest assistance to the Church, whether with the view of really and soundly understanding and interpreting the Scriptures, or more safely and to better purpose reading and explaining the Fathers, or for exposing and refuting the various errors and heresies; and in these late days, when those dangerous times described by the Apostle are already upon us, when the blasphemers, the proud, and the seducers go from bad to worse, erring themselves and causing others to err, there is surely a very great need of confirming the dogmas of Catholic faith and confuting heresies.”

16. Although these words seem to bear reference solely to Scholastic theology, nevertheless they may plainly be accepted as equally true of philosophy and its praises. For, the noble endowments which make the Scholastic theology so formidable to the enemies of truth-to wit, as the same Pontiff adds, “that ready and close coherence of cause and effect, that order and array as of a disciplined army in battle, those clear definitions and distinctions, that strength of argument and those keen discussions, by which light is distinguished from darkness, the true from the false, expose and strip naked, as it were, the falsehoods of heretics wrapped around by a cloud of subterfuges and fallacies”—those noble and admirable endowments, We say, are only to be found in a right use of that philosophy which the Scholastic teachers have been accustomed carefully and prudently to make use of even in theological disputations. Moreover, since it is the proper and special office of the Scholastic theologians to bind together by the fastest chain human and divine science, surely the theology

in which they excelled would not have gained such honor and commendation among men if they had made use of a lame and imperfect or vain philosophy.

17. Among the Scholastic Doctors, the chief and master of all towers Thomas Aquinas, who, as Cajetan observes, because “he most venerated the ancient doctors of the Church, in a certain way seems to have inherited the intellect of all.” The doctrines of those illustrious men, like the scattered members of a body, Thomas collected together and cemented, distributed in wonderful order, and so increased with important additions that he is rightly and deservedly esteemed the special bulwark and glory of the Catholic faith. With his spirit at once humble and swift, his memory ready and tenacious, his life spotless throughout, a lover of truth for its own sake, richly endowed with human and divine science, like the sun he heated the world with the warmth of his virtues and filled it with the splendor of his teaching. Philosophy has no part which he did not touch finely at once and thoroughly; on the laws of reasoning, on God and incorporeal substances, on man and other sensible things, on human actions and their principles, he reasoned in such a manner that in him there is wanting neither a full array of questions, nor an apt disposal of the various parts, nor the best method of proceeding, nor soundness of principles or strength of argument, nor clearness and elegance of style, nor a facility for explaining what is abstruse.

18. Moreover, the Angelic Doctor pushed his philosophic inquiry into the reasons and principles of things, which because they are most comprehensive and contain in their bosom, so to say, the seeds of almost infinite truths, were to be unfolded in good time by later masters and with a goodly yield. And as he also used this philosophic method in the refutation of error, he won this title to distinction for himself: that, single-handed, he victoriously combated the errors of former times, and supplied invincible arms to put those to rout which might in after-times spring up. Again, clearly distinguishing, as is fitting, reason from faith, while happily associating the one with the other, he both preserved the rights and had regard for the dignity of each; so much so, indeed, that reason, borne on the wings of Thomas to its human height, can scarcely rise higher, while faith could scarcely expect more or stronger aids from reason than those which she has already obtained through Thomas.

19. For these reasons most learned men, in former ages especially, of the highest repute in theology and philosophy, after mastering with infinite pains the immortal works of Thomas, gave themselves up not so much to be instructed in his angelic wisdom as to be nourished upon it. It is known that nearly all the founders and lawgivers of the religious orders commanded their members to study and religiously adhere to the teachings of St. Thomas, fearful least any of them should swerve even in the slightest degree from the footsteps of so great a man. To say nothing of the family of St. Dominic, which rightly claims this great teacher for its own glory, the statutes of the Benedictines, the Carmelites, the Augustinians, the Society of Jesus, and many others all testify that they are bound by this law.

20. And, here, how pleasantly one's thoughts fly back to those celebrated schools and universities which flourished of old in Europe—to Paris, Salamanca, Alcalá, to Douay, Toulouse, and Louvain, to Padua and Bologna, to Naples and Coimbra, and to many another! All know how the fame of these seats of learning grew with their years, and that their judgment, often asked in matters of grave moment, held great weight everywhere. And we know how in those great homes of human wisdom, as in his own kingdom, Thomas reigned supreme; and that the minds of all, of teachers as well as of taught, rested in wonderful harmony under the shield and authority of the Angelic Doctor.

Z 1. But, furthermore, Our predecessors in the Roman pontificate have celebrated the wisdom of Thomas Aquinas by exceptional tributes of praise and the most ample testimonials. Clement VI in the bull In Ordine; Nicholas V in his brief to the friars of the Order of Preachers, 1451; Benedict XIII in the bull Pretiosus, and others bear witness that the universal Church borrows lustre from his admirable teaching; while St. Pius V declares in the bull Mirabilis that heresies, confounded and convicted by the same teaching, were dissipated, and the whole world daily freed from fatal errors; others, such as Clement XII in the bull Verbo Dei, affirm that most fruitful blessings have spread abroad from his writings over the whole Church, and that he is worthy of the honor which is bestowed on the greatest Doctors of the Church, on Gregory and Ambrose, Augustine and Jerome; while others have not hesitated to propose St. Thomas for the exemplar and master of the universities and great centers of learning whom they may follow with unfaltering feet. On which point the words of Blessed

Urban V to the University of Toulouse are worthy of recall: “It is our will, which We hereby enjoin upon you, that ye follow the teaching of Blessed Thomas as the true and Catholic doctrine and that ye labor with all your force to profit by the same.” Innocent XII, followed the example of Urban in the case of the University of Louvain, in the letter in the form of a brief addressed to that university on February 6, 1694, and Benedict XIV in the letter in the form of a brief addressed on August 26, 1752, to the Dionysian College in Granada; while to these judgments of great Pontiffs on Thomas Aquinas comes the crowning testimony of Innocent VI: “His teaching above that of others, the canonical writings alone excepted, enjoys such a precision of language, an order of matters, a truth of conclusions, that those who hold to it are never found swerving from the path of truth, and he who dare assail it will always be suspected of error.”

22. The ecumenical councils, also, where blossoms the flower of all earthly wisdom, have always been careful to hold Thomas Aquinas in singular honor. In the Councils of Lyons, Vienna, Florence, and the Vatican one might almost say that Thomas took part and presided over the deliberations and decrees of the Fathers, contending against the errors of the Greeks, of heretics and rationalists, with invincible force and with the happiest results. But the chief and special glory of Thomas, one which he has shared with none of the Catholic Doctors, is that the Fathers of Trent made it part of the order of conclave to lay upon the altar, together with sacred Scripture and the decrees of the supreme Pontiffs, the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, whence to seek counsel, reason, and inspiration.

23. A last triumph was reserved for this incomparable man-namely, to compel the homage, praise, and admiration of even the very enemies of the Catholic name. For it has come to light that there were not lacking among the leaders of heretical sects some who openly declared that, if the teaching of Thomas Aquinas were only taken away, they could easily battle with all Catholic teachers, gain the victory, and abolish the Church. A vain hope, indeed, but no vain testimony.

24. Therefore, venerable brethren, as often as We contemplate the good, the force, and the singular advantages to be derived from his philosophic discipline which Our Fathers so dearly loved. We think it hazardous that its special honor should not always and everywhere remain, especially when it is established that daily experience, and the judgment of the greatest men,

and, to crown all, the voice of the Church, have favored the Scholastic philosophy. Moreover, to the old teaching a novel system of philosophy has succeeded here and there, in which We fail to perceive those desirable and wholesome fruits which the Church and civil society itself would prefer. For it pleased the struggling innovators of the sixteenth century to philosophize without any respect for faith, the power of inventing in accordance with his own pleasure and bent being asked and given in turn by each one. Hence, it was natural that systems of philosophy multiplied beyond measure, and conclusions differing and clashing one with another arose about those matters even which are the most important in human knowledge. From a mass of conclusions men often come to wavering and doubt; and who knows not how easily the mind slips from doubt to error? But, as men are apt to follow the lead given them, this new pursuit seems to have caught the souls of certain Catholic philosophers, who, throwing aside the patrimony of ancient wisdom, chose rather to build up a new edifice than to strengthen and complete the old by aid of the new-ill-advisedly, in sooth, and not without detriment to the sciences. For, a multiform system of this kind, which depends on the authority and choice of any professor, has a foundation open to change, and consequently gives us a philosophy not firm, and stable, and robust like that of old, but tottering and feeble. And if, perchance, it sometimes finds itself scarcely equal to sustain the shock of its foes, it should recognize that the cause and the blame lie in itself. In saying this We have no intention of discountenancing the learned and able men who bring their industry and erudition, and, what is more, the wealth of new discoveries, to the service of philosophy; for, of course, We understand that this tends to the development of learning. But one should be very careful lest all or his chief labor be exhausted in these pursuits and in mere erudition. And the same thing is true of sacred theology, which, indeed, may be assisted and illustrated by all kinds of erudition, though it is absolutely necessary to approach it in the grave manner of the Scholastics, in order that, the forces of revelation and reason being united in it, it may continue to be “the invincible bulwark of the faith.”

25. With wise forethought, therefore, not a few of the advocates of philosophic studies, when turning their minds recently to the practical reform of philosophy, aimed and aim at restoring the renowned teaching of Thomas Aquinas and winning it back to its ancient beauty.

26. We have learned with great joy that many members of your order, venerable brethren, have taken this plan to heart; and while We earnestly commend their efforts, We exhort them to hold fast to their purpose, and remind each and all of you that Our first and most cherished idea is that you should all furnish to studious youth a generous and copious supply of those purest streams of wisdom flowing inexhaustibly from the precious fountainhead of the Angelic Doctor.

27. Many are the reasons why We are so desirous of this. In the first place, then, since in the tempest that is on us the Christian faith is being constantly assailed by the machinations and craft of a certain false wisdom, all youths, but especially those who are the growing hope of the Church, should be nourished on the strong and robust food of doctrine, that so, mighty in strength and armed at all points, they may become habituated to advance the cause of religion with force and judgment, "being ready always, according to the apostolic counsel, to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that hope which is in you," and that they may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers." Many of those who, with minds alienated from the faith, hate Catholic institutions, claim reason as their sole mistress and guide. Now, We think that, apart from the supernatural help of God, nothing is better calculated to heal those minds and to bring them into favor with the Catholic faith than the solid doctrine of the Fathers and the Scholastics, who so clearly and forcibly demonstrate the firm foundations of the faith, its divine origin, its certain truth, the arguments that sustain it, the benefits it has conferred on the human race, and its perfect accord with reason, in a manner to satisfy completely minds open to persuasion, however unwilling and repugnant.

28. Domestic and civil society even, which, as all see, is exposed to great danger from this plague of perverse opinions, would certainly enjoy a far more peaceful and secure existence if a more wholesome doctrine were taught in the universities and high schools-one more in conformity with the teaching of the Church, such as is contained in the works of Thomas Aquinas.

29. For, the teachings of Thomas on the true meaning of liberty, which at this time is running into license, on the divine origin of all authority, on laws and their force, on the paternal and just rule of princes, on obedience to the higher powers, on mutual charity one toward another-on all of these

and kindred subjects-have very great and invincible force to overturn those principles of the new order which are well known to be dangerous to the peaceful order of things and to public safety. In short, all studies ought to find hope of advancement and promise of assistance in this restoration of philosophic discipline which We have proposed. The arts were wont to draw from philosophy, as from a wise mistress, sound judgment and right method, and from it, also, their spirit, as from the common fount of life. When philosophy stood stainless in honor and wise in judgment, then, as facts and constant experience showed, the liberal arts flourished as never before or since; but, neglected and almost blotted out, they lay prone, since philosophy began to lean to error and join hands with folly. Nor will the physical sciences themselves, which are now in such great repute, and by the renown of so many inventions draw such universal admiration to themselves, suffer detriment, but find very great assistance in the restoration of the ancient philosophy. For, the investigation of facts and the contemplation of nature is not alone sufficient for their profitable exercise and advance; but, when facts have been established, it is necessary to rise and apply ourselves to the study of the nature of corporeal things, to inquire into the laws which govern them and the principles whence their order and varied unity and mutual attraction in diversity arise. To such investigations it is wonderful what force and light and aid the Scholastic philosophy, if judiciously taught, would bring.

30. And here it is well to note that our philosophy can only by the grossest injustice be accused of being opposed to the advance and development of natural science. For, when the Scholastics, following the opinion of the holy Fathers, always held in anthropology that the human intelligence is only led to the knowledge of things without body and matter by things sensible, they well understood that nothing was of greater use to the philosopher than diligently to search into the mysteries of nature and to be earnest and constant in the study of physical things. And this they confirmed by their own example; for St. Thomas, Blessed Albertus Magnus, and other leaders of the Scholastics were never so wholly rapt in the study of philosophy as not to give large attention to the knowledge of natural things; and, indeed, the number of their sayings and writings on these subjects, which recent professors approve of and admit to harmonize with truth, is by no means small. Moreover, in this very age many

illustrious professors of the physical sciences openly testify that between certain and accepted conclusions of modern physics and the philosophic principles of the schools there is no conflict worthy of the name.

31. While, therefore, We hold that every word of wisdom, every useful thing by whomsoever discovered or planned, ought to be received with a willing and grateful mind, We exhort you, venerable brethren, in all earnestness to restore the golden wisdom of St. Thomas, and to spread it far and wide for the defense and beauty of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, and for the advantage of all the sciences. The wisdom of St. Thomas, We say; for if anything is taken up with too great subtlety by the Scholastic doctors, or too carelessly stated-if there be anything that ill agrees with the discoveries of a later age, or, in a word, improbable in whatever way-it does not enter Our mind to propose that for imitation to Our age. Let carefully selected teachers endeavor to implant the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas in the minds of students, and set forth clearly his solidity and excellence over others. Let the universities already founded or to be founded by you illustrate and defend this doctrine, and use it for the refutation of prevailing errors. But, lest the false for the true or the corrupt for the pure be drunk in, be ye watchful that the doctrine of Thomas be drawn from his own fountains, or at least from those rivulets which, derived from the very fount, have thus far flowed, according to the established agreement of learned men, pure and clear; be careful to guard the minds of youth from those which are said to flow thence, but in reality are gathered from strange and unwholesome streams.

32. But well do We know that vain will be Our efforts unless, venerable brethren, He helps Our common cause who, in the words of divine Scripture, is called the God of all knowledge; by which we are also admonished that “every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights,” and again: “If any of you want wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not: and it shall be given him.”

33. Therefore in this also let us follow the example of the Angelic Doctor, who never gave himself to reading or writing without first begging the blessing of God, who modestly confessed that whatever he knew he had acquired not so much by his own study and labor as by the divine gift; and therefore let us all, in humble and united prayer, beseech God to send forth

the spirit of knowledge and of understanding to the children of the Church and open their senses for the understanding of wisdom. And that we may receive fuller fruits of the divine goodness, offer up to God the most efficacious patronage of the Blessed Virgin Mary, who is called the seat of wisdom; having at the same time as advocates St. Joseph, the most chaste spouse of the Virgin, and Peter and Paul, the chiefs of the Apostles, whose truth renewed the earth which had fallen under the impure blight of error, filling it with the light of heavenly wisdom.

34. In fine, relying on the divine assistance and confiding in your pastoral zeal, most lovingly We bestow on all of you, venerable brethren, on all the clergy and the flocks committed to your charge, the apostolic benediction as a pledge of heavenly gifts and a token of Our special esteem.

Given at St. Peter’s, in Rome, the fourth day of August, 1879, the second year of our pontificate.

LEO XIII

THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA

FIRST PART (FP: QQ 1–119)

TREATISE ON SACRED DOCTRINE [1] (Q[1])

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE (TEN ARTICLES)

To place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to investigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning this there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is necessary?

(2) Whether it is a science?

(3) Whether it is one or many?

(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?

(5) How it is compared with other sciences?

(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?

(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?

(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?

(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?

(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded in different senses?

Whether, besides philosophy, any further doctrine is required?

Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is above reason: “Seek not the things that are too high for thee” (Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of in philosophical science.

Therefore any other knowledge besides philosophical science is superfluous.

Objection 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for nothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But everything that is, is treated of in philosophical science—even God Himself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the divine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore, besides philosophical science, there is no need of any further knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): “All Scripture, inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in justice.” Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical science, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is useful that besides philosophical science, there should be other knowledge, i.e. inspired of God.

I answer that, It was necessary for man’s salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: “The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee” (Is. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.

Reply to Objection 1: Although those things which are beyond man’s knowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason, nevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by faith. Hence the sacred text continues, “For many things are shown to thee above the understanding of man” (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the sacred science consists.

Reply to Objection 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the various means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer and the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth, for instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e. abstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself. Hence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from philosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason, may not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall within revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs in kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.

Whether sacred doctrine is a science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every science proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine proceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since their truth is not admitted by all: “For all men have not faith” (2 Thess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

Objection 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this sacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) “to this science alone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished, protected and strengthened.” But this can be said of no science except sacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that there are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a principle known by the natural light of intelligence, such as arithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed from principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the science of perspective proceeds from principles established by geometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it is that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science, namely, the science of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on authority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred science is established on principles revealed by God.

Reply to Objection 1: The principles of any science are either in themselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher science; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred doctrine.

Reply to Objection 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred doctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they are introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as in moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those men through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture or doctrine is based, has come down to us.

Whether sacred doctrine is one science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for according to the Philosopher (Poster. i) “that science is one which treats only of one class of subjects.” But the creator and the creature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be grouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred doctrine is not one science.

Objection 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal creatures and human morality. But these belong to separate philosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one science.

On the contrary, Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: “Wisdom gave him the knowledge (scientiam) of holy things” (Wis. 10:10).

I answer that, Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty or habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material aspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an object. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise formality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight. Therefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under the formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely revealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this science; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one science.

Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and creatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far as they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the unity of this science is not impaired.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits from being differentiated by something which falls under a higher faculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards the object in its more universal formality, as the object of the "common sense" is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore, whatever is visible or audible. Hence the "common sense," although one faculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly, objects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical sciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under one aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So that in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.

Whether sacred doctrine is a practical science?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for a practical science is that which ends in action according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only" (James 1:22). Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

Objection 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the New Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science. Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.

On the contrary, Every practical science is concerned with human operations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and architecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned with God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a practical but a speculative science.

I answer that, Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which belong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in each the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known through divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical sciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred doctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows both Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than practical because it is more concerned with divine things than with human acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man is ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists eternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.

Whether sacred doctrine is nobler than other sciences?

Objection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other sciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it establishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be doubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its principles—namely, articles of faith—can be doubted. Therefore other sciences seem to be nobler.

Objection 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon a higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in a sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in his Epistle to Magnus, that “the ancient doctors so enriched their books with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou knowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or their scriptural learning.” Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to other sciences.

On the contrary, Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this one: “Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower” (Prov. 9:3).

I answer that, Since this science is partly speculative and partly practical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one speculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by reason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of its subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses other speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because other sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human reason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the higher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly of those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while other sciences consider only those things which are within reason’s grasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained to a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military science; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the State. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical, is eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every practical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every standpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.

Reply to Objection 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the more certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the weakness of our intelligence, “which is dazzled by the clearest objects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun” (Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about articles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths, but to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest knowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable than the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said in de Animalibus xi.

Reply to Objection 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the philosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but only in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its principles not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by revelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon the higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as handmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that supply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus uses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the defect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known through natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that which is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.

Whether this doctrine is the same as wisdom?

Objection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom. For no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of wisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph. i). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science is not wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles of other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is clear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of other sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas wisdom is acquired by God’s inspiration; so that it is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (Is. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): “This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.”

I answer that, This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not merely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a wise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be judged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in any one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus in the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called wise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim the wood and make ready the stones: “As a wise architect, I have laid the foundation” (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life, the prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a fitting end: “Wisdom is prudence to a man” (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore he who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe, namely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the knowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But sacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest cause—not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as philosophers knew Him—“That which is known of God is manifest in them” (Rom. 1:19)—but also as far as He is known to Himself alone and revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called wisdom.

Reply to Objection 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from any human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as through the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.

Reply to Objection 2: The principles of other sciences either are evident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through some other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes through revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no concern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge of them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth of this science must be condemned as false: “Destroying counsels and every height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God” (2 Cor. 10:4,5).

Reply to Objection 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold manner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one way by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards it. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and rule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man learned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous acts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the Holy Ghost: “The spiritual man judgeth all things” (1 Cor. 2:15). And Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “Hierotheus is taught not by mere learning, but by experience of divine things.” The second manner of judging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though its principles are obtained by revelation.

Whether God is the object of this science?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For in every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this science cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, iv): “It is impossible to define the essence of God.” Therefore God is not the object of this science.

Objection 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science must be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ we reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many other things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is not the object of this science.

On the contrary, The object of the science is that of which it principally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about God; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is the object of this science.

I answer that, God is the object of this science. The relation between a science and its object is the same as that between a habit or faculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty or habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are referred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to the faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things are the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are treated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God Himself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence it follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This is clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the articles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the principles and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole science is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however, looking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect under which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to be something other than God—that is, either things and signs; or the works of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of all these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as they have reference to God.

Reply to Objection 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the essence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His effects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in regard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even as in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a cause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition of the cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this sacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or accidents but as in some way related to Him.

Whether sacred doctrine is a matter of argument?

Objection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For Ambrose says (De Fide 1): “Put arguments aside where faith is sought.” But in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: “But these things are written that you may believe” (Jn. 20:31). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

Objection 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is either from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it seems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the weakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting its end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), “faith has no merit in those things of which human reason brings its own experience.” Therefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.

On the contrary, The Scripture says that a bishop should “embrace that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers” (Titus 1:9).

I answer that, As other sciences do not argue in proof of their principles, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other truths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of its principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes on to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of Christ argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15). However, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher science; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute with one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make some concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute with him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture, since it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies its principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths obtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics from texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of faith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of divine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the articles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his objections—if he has any—against faith. Since faith rests upon infallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.

Reply to Objection 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot avail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this doctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.

Reply to Objection 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments from authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation: thus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the revelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of this doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human reason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine revelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of human reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of faith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are put forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the natural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the

Apostle says: “Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ” (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the authority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able to know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of Aratus: “As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His offspring” (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of these authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly uses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible proof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may properly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the revelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical books, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to other doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): “Only those books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to hold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any way in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem everything in their works to be true, merely on account of their having so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness and learning.”

Whether Holy Scripture should use metaphors?

Objection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors. For that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this science, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the aid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least of all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science should make use of such similitudes.

Objection 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth clear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: “They that explain me shall have life everlasting” (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such similitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths by likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.

Objection 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they approach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to represent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the higher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in Scriptures.

On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): “I have multiplied visions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets.” But to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use metaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.

I answer that, It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and spiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God provides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now it is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): “We cannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within the covering of many sacred veils.” It is also befitting Holy Writ, which is proposed to all without distinction of persons—“To the wise and to the unwise I am a debtor” (Rom. 1:14)—that spiritual truths be expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order that thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp intellectual things may be able to understand it.

Reply to Objection 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a representation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with representations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both necessary and useful.

Reply to Objection 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished by the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow the minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in the metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through those to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive instruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught metaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught more openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the exercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of the impious, according to the words “Give not that which is holy to dogs” (Mat. 7:6).

Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more fitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of less noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly, because thereby men’s minds are the better preserved from error. For then it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of divine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been expressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who could think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is more befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For what He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes drawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer estimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him. Thirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the unworthy.

Whether in Holy Scripture a word may have several senses?

Objection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several senses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and anagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion and deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument, but only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of propositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth without any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to a word.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that “the Old Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy and allegory.” Now these four seem altogether different from the four divisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem fitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four different senses mentioned above.

Objection 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical, which is not one of these four.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): “Holy Writ by the manner of its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same sentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery.”

I answer that, The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to signify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also by things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are signified by words, this science has the property, that the things signified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore that first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the first sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby things signified by words have themselves also a signification is called the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and presupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For as the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New Law, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) “the New Law itself is a figure of future glory.” Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has done is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the allegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as the things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do, there is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to eternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense is that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is God, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not unfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the literal sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.

Reply to Objection 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not produce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that these senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several things, but because the things signified by the words can be themselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion results, for all the senses are founded on one—the literal—from which alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in allegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy Scripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to faith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere put forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.

Reply to Objection 2: These three—history, etiology, analogy—are grouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as Augustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it is called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave the reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives—namely, on account of the hardness of men’s hearts; it is called analogy whenever the truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the truth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three spiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.) includes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three senses only—the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.

Reply to Objection 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the literal, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively. Nor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal sense. When Scripture speaks of God’s arm, the literal sense is not that God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member, namely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever underlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.

TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)

Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.

In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.

Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations—namely, His knowledge, will, power.

Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?

(2) Whether it is demonstrable?

(3) Whether God exists?

Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

Objection 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word “God” is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word “God” is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition “God exists” is self-evident.

Objection 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition “Truth does not exist” is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (Jn. 14:6) Therefore “God exists” is self-evident.

On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition “God is” can be mentally admitted: “The fool said in his heart, There is no God” (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as “Man is an animal,” for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: “Whether all that is, is good”), “that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space.” Therefore I say that this proposition, “God exists,” of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ([2]Q[3], A[4]). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by effects.

Reply to Objection 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man’s beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man’s perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

Reply to Objection 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word “God” understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word “God” is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

Reply to Objection 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?

Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

Objection 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.

Objection 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.

I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

Reply to Objection 1: The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Reply to Objection 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word “God.”

Reply to Objection 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.

Whether God exists?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word “God” means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God’s existence.

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: “I am Who am.” (Ex. 3:14)

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): “Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless

His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil.” This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

Reply to Objection 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)

When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but rather how He is not.

Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.

Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.

Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is a body?

(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?

(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?

(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?

(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?

(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?

(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?

(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?

Whether God is a body?

Objection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions to God, for it is written: “He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea” (Job 11:8,9). Therefore God is a body.

Objection 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it is written: “Let us make man to our image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: “Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure,” i.e. the image, “of His substance” (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.

Objection 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. “Hast thou an arm like God?” (Job 40:4); and “The eyes of the Lord are upon the just” (Ps. 33:16); and “The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength” (Ps. 117:16). Therefore God is a body.

Objection 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: “I saw the Lord sitting” (Is. 6:1), and “He standeth up to judge” (Is. 3:13). Therefore God is a body.

Objection 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term “wherefrom” or “whereto.” But in the Scriptures God is spoken of as a local term “whereto,” according to the words, “Come ye to Him and be enlightened” (Ps. 33:6), and as a term “wherefrom”: “All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth” (Jer. 17:13). Therefore God is a body.

On the contrary, It is written in the Gospel of St. John (Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit.”

I answer that, It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ([3]Q[2], A[3]), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body.

Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([4]Q[1], A[9]), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, when it is said, “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” it is added, “And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea” (Gn. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; and so on with the other parts.

Reply to Objection 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him.

Reply to Objection 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the metaphor of local motion.

Whether God is composed of matter and form?

Objection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: “But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul.” Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Objection 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: “The Lord was exceeding angry with His people” (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is composed of matter and form.

Objection 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. Therefore He is composed of matter and form.

On the contrary, Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form.

I answer that, It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ([5]Q[2], A[3]) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the first good and the best—viz. God—is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.

Reply to Objection 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul.

Reply to Objection 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act of an angry man, God’s punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger.

Reply to Objection 3: Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in God.

Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of God—i.e. the Godhead—is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature.

Objection 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the “suppositum” is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.

On the contrary, It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: “I am the way, the truth, and the life” (Jn. 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His very Godhead.

I answer that, God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the nature or essence must differ from the “suppositum,” because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter—that is to say, to “this” matter—the very forms being individualized of themselves—it is necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting “supposita.” Therefore “suppositum” and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.

Reply to Objection 1: We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that

Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.

Reply to Objection 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature.

Whether essence and existence are the same in God?

Objection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood" (Wis. 14:21). Therefore God's existence is not His essence.

Objection 2: Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above ([6]Q[2], A[2]); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence—that is, as His quiddity or nature.

On the contrary, Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in God is His existence.

I answer that, God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species—as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man—and is caused by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent—as heat is caused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above [7](A[1]), it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above [8](A[3]) if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not therefore be the first being—which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the second sense.

Reply to Objection 2: “To be” can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking “to be” in the first sense, we cannot understand God’s existence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say “God is,” is true; and this we know from His effects ([9]Q[2], A[2]).

Whether God is contained in a genus?

Objection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.

Objection 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

On the contrary, In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is not in any genus.

I answer that, A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being," because, since genus is predicated as an essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and quiddity—i.e.

essence—must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.

Reply to Objection 1: The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself—for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way—namely, of existing of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according as it resembles Him.

Whether in God there are any accidents?

Objection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God there are accidents.

Objection 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many “genera” of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God—which is absurd.

On the contrary, Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for “no simple form can be a subject,” as Boethius says (De Trin.).

Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.

I answer that, From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as was shown ([10]Q[2], A[3]). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God as there are in us.

Reply to Objection 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all being, outside of every genus.

Whether God is altogether simple?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God altogether simple.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God is altogether simple.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): “God is truly and absolutely simple.”

I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His “suppositum”; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above ([11]Q[2], A[3]). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ([12]Q[2], A[3]), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): “God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim.”

Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ([13]Q[4], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 2: With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ([14]Q[4], A[1] and [15]Q[6], A[2]).

Whether God enters into the composition of other things?

Objection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): “The being of all things is that which is above being—the Godhead.” But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters into the composition of other things.

Objection 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, “the word of God, which is God, is an uncreated form.” But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound.

Objection 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor—whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “There can be no touching Him,” i.e. God, “nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part.”

Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).

I answer that, On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings—not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing ([16]Q[3], A[1]): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being ([17]Q[2], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.

Reply to Objection 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.

Reply to Objection 3: Simple things do not differ by added differences—for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), “things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something.” Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.

THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)

Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God’s perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.

Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is perfect?

(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?

(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?

Whether God is perfect?

Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.

Objection 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.

Objection 3: Further, as shown above ([18]Q[3], A[4]), God’s essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is imperfect.

On the contrary, It is written: “Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect” (Mat. 5:48).

I answer that, As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate “best” and “most perfect” of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): “Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God.” For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word “perfect” signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.

Reply to Objection 2: The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual.

Reply to Objection 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.

Whether the perfections of all things are in God?

Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above ([19]Q[3], A[7]); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.

Objection 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the differences by which “genera” are divided, and “species” constituted, are opposed to each other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not in God.

Objection 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that “God in His one existence prepossesses all things.”

I answer that, All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent—as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent—thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun’s power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): “It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all.” Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ([20]Q[3], A[4]). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, “God exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;” and afterwards he adds that, “He is the very existence to subsisting things.”

Reply to Objection 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; “a fortiori” should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of existence; nevertheless God’s existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.

Whether any creature can be like God?

Objection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written (Ps. 85:8): “There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord.” But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God.

Objection 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different “genus.” Therefore neither can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same “genus” as God: since God is no “genus,” as shown above ([21]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore no creature is like God.

Objection 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God.

Objection 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: “To whom have you likened God?” (Is. 40:18).

On the contrary, It is written: “Let us make man to our image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26), and: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him” (1 Jn. 3:2).

I answer that, Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated by the sun’s heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any “genus,” its effect will still more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent’s form according to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness to Him. For, “the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause,” not merely in intensity and remission, as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.

Reply to Objection 2: God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the principle of all "genera."

Reply to Objection 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.

Reply to Objection 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.

OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)

We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?

(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?

(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?

(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?

(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?

(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?

Whether goodness differs really from being?

Objection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing: that they are is another.” Therefore goodness and being really differ.

Objection 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. “But that is called good which has the form of being,” according to the commentary on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

Objection 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, “inasmuch as we exist we are good.”

I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): “Goodness is what all desire.” Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing ([22]Q[3], A[4]; [23]Q[4], A[1]). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.

Reply to Objection 1: Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing’s substantial being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply—in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.

Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality.

Reply to Objection 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or virtue.

Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?

Objection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

Objection 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being.

Objection 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, if that man had not been born" (Mat. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.

Objection 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.

On the contrary, It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that “the first of created things is being.”

I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that “goodness extends to non-existence” (Div. Nom. v).

Reply to Objection 2: The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them—if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual.

Reply to Objection 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively—i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as relatively good.

Reply to Objection 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being.

Whether every being is good?

Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.

Objection 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (Is. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.

Objection 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.

On the contrary, Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.

I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.

Reply to Objection 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.

Reply to Objection 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.

Reply to Objection 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to desire.

Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding article.

Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?

Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “Goodness is praised as beauty.” But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.

Objection 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that “we exist because God is good.” But we owe our existence to God as the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that “that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which something is.” Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.

I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind—because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.

Reply to Objection 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, “we exist because God is good” has reference to the final cause.

Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): “Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability.” Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

Objection 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.

Objection 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

Objection 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

Objection 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): “It is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and measure.” Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): “These three—mode, species and order—as common good things, are in everything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.

I answer that, Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above [24]AA[1],3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.

Reply to Objection 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.

Reply to Objection 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.

Reply to Objection 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on;

according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.

Reply to Objection 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), “Every mode, as mode, is good” (and the same can be said of species and order). “But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous.”

Reply to Objection 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.

Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*”Bonum honestum” is the virtuous good considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])]

Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.

Objection 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.

Objection 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.

On the contrary, Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)

I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.

Reply to Objection 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its proper formality.

Reply to Objection 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.

THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?

(2) Whether God is the supreme good?

(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?

(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?

Whether God is good?

Objection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.

Objection 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 3:25): “The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him.”

I answer that, To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good “as by Whom all things subsist.”

Reply to Objection 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.

Reply to Objection 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said above ([25]Q[4] , A[3]). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.

Whether God is the supreme good?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is supremely simple; as was shown above ([26]Q[3], A[7]). Therefore God is not the supreme good.

Objection 2: Further, “Good is what all desire,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said (Lk. 18:19): “None is good but God alone.” But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good.

Objection 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above ([27]Q[3], A[5]; [28]Q[4], A[3]) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is “the supreme good, discerned by purified minds.”

I answer that, God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above ([29]Q[4], A[2]); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.

Reply to Objection 1: The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in comparison with it.

Reply to Objection 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, “None is good but God alone,” this is to be understood of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.

Reply to Objection 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.

Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as “one” is convertible with “being,” so is “good”; as we said above ([30]Q[5], A[1]). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.

Objection 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially.

Objection 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that “all things but God are good by participation.” Therefore they are not good essentially.

I answer that, God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above ([31]Q[3], A[6]); and He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.

Reply to Objection 1: “One” does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does not follow that a creature is good essentially.

Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else:

hence for this reason is it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself has some other goodness whereby it is good.

Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), “This and that are good; take away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good.” But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God.

Objection 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness.

On the contrary, All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness.

I answer that, As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated “placed” from “place,” and “measured” from “measure.” But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ([32]Q[84], A[4]) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of “being” and of “one,” and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation of these, everything was called “being” or “one”; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by way of participation.

Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves—as Aristotle argues in many ways—still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above ([33]Q[2], A[3]), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears from the above ([34]Q[4], A[3]).

Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.

This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.

THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God’s existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.

Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is infinite?

(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?

(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?

(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?

Whether God is infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for He is not a body, as was shown above ([35]Q[3], A[1]). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.

Objection 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that “God is infinite and eternal, and boundless.”

I answer that, All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things.

We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown above ([36]Q[4], A[1], OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was shown above ([37]Q[3], A[4]), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.

From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to God; as was said above, in this article.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him.

Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing in a subject.

Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the extent of a power is known by its effect.

Objection 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is infinite.

Objection 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above ([38]Q[3], A[8]). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.

On the contrary, The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.

I answer that, Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite.

Reply to Objection 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite.

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.

Reply to Objection 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.

Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?

Objection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since “there is no lie in things abstract,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in his demonstrations says, “Let this line be infinite.” Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.

Objection 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude to be infinite.

Objection 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.

Objection 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite.

On the contrary, Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.

I answer that, It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.

We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.

Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other.

The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.

Reply to Objection 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude is infinite.

Reply to Objection 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality.

Whether an infinite multitude can exist?

Objection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist.

Objection 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore an infinite number of actual figures is possible.

Objection 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.

On the contrary, It is written, “Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight” (Wis. 11:21).

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium.

A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.

This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition of multitude.

Reply to Objection 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity.

Reply to Objection 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is in all things?

(2) Whether God is everywhere?

(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?

(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?

Whether God is in all things?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to the Psalm (Ps. 112:4), “The Lord is high above all nations,” etc. Therefore God is not in all things.

Objection 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that “in Him things are, rather than He is in any place.”

Objection 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things.

Objection 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.

On the contrary, A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to Is. 26:12, “Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’] us.” Therefore God is in all things.

I answer that, God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above ([39]Q[7], A[1]). Hence it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.

Reply to Objection 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things; as was shown above in this article.

Reply to Objection 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.

Reply to Objection 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature.

Reply to Objection 4: In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, “inasmuch as they are beings.” But in things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is.

Whether God is everywhere?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for “incorporeal things,” as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), “are not in a place.” Therefore God is not everywhere.

Objection 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.

Objection 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere.

On the contrary, It is written, “I fill heaven and earth.” (Jer. 23:24).

I answer that, Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things—i.e. as one thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place.

Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.

Reply to Objection 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places, and in a small or large place.

Reply to Objection 3: A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.

Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?

Objection 1: It seems that the mode of God’s existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power.

Objection 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power.

Objection 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power.

Objection 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special mode of God’s existence in things.

On the contrary, A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, “God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance;

still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace” [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].

I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later [40] (Q[12]). He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.

But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.

But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, “He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: ‘He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,’ etc.]” (Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence.

Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God’s providence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things by His essence.

Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence.

Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to another.

Reply to Objection 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God’s existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God’s existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP).

Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from what is said above [41](Q[3]). Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Objection 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom (Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere.

Objection 3: Further, the universe is a kind of “whole perfect body” (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Objection 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.

Objection 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Objection 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?"

I answer that, To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of Him, but as to His very self.

Reply to Objection 1: The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.

Reply to Objection 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.

Reply to Objection 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would not be in them.

Reply to Objection 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts.

Reply to Objection 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.

Reply to Objection 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that it is everywhere.

THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?

(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?

Whether God is altogether immutable?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable.

Objection 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that “it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.’mobilior’]” (Wis. 7:24). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable.

Objection 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, “Draw nigh to God and He will draw nigh to you” (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.

On the contrary, It is written, “I am the Lord, and I change not” (Malachi 3:6).

I answer that, From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has been shown above ([42]Q[3], A[7]) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first principle was immovable.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.

Reply to Objection 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light.

Reply to Objection 3: These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, or decline from Him.

Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?

Objection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that “matter is in everything which is moved.” But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be immutable does not belong to God alone.

Objection 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.

Objection 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that “form is essence consisting of the simple and invariable.” Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), “God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable.”

I answer that, God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of another—namely, of God—they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence.

If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places—which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above ([43]Q[8], A[2]).

Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement.

Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.

Reply to Objection 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being.

THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:
(1) What is eternity?

(2) Whether God is eternal?

(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?

(4) Whether eternity differs from time?

(5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?

(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?

Whether this is a good definition of eternity, “The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life”?

Objection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: “Eternity is the simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.” For the word “interminable” is a negative one. But negation only belongs to what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word “interminable” ought not to be found.

Objection 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word “life” ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word “existence.”

Objection 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be “whole.”

Objection 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it is said, “His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity” (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, “According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity” (Rom. 16:25). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.

Objection 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is “whole,” it is superfluously described as “perfect.”

Objection 6: Further, duration does not imply “possession.” But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.

I answer that, As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by “before” and “after.” For since succession occurs in every movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.

Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.

Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable—that is, has no beginning nor end (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.

Reply to Objection 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as “a point is that which has no parts.” Yet this is not to be taken as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.

Reply to Objection 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.

Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing.

Reply to Objection 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously whole, is called by names implying time and succession.

Reply to Objection 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" of time.

Reply to Objection 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we use the word "possession."

Whether God is eternal?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal.

Objection 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and ever']" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.

Objection 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.

Objection 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.

On the contrary, Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal."

I answer that, The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity.

Reply to Objection 1: The “now” that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the “now,” so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the “now” standing still. When Augustine says that “God is the author of eternity,” this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates His immutability.

Reply to Objection 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that “intelligence is equal to eternity.” In the words of Exodus, “The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond,” eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously whole.

Reply to Objection 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone.

Reply to Objection 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered through present, past and future.

Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that “those who instruct many to justice,” shall be “as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: ‘for all eternity’]” (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.

Objection 2: Further, it is written “Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: ‘everlasting’] fire” (Mat. 25:41). Therefore God is not the only eternal.

Objection 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that “God is the only one who has no beginning.” Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.

I answer that, Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above ([44]Q[9], A[1]). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, “it standeth for ever” (Eccles. 1:4). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the hills are called “eternal” and we read “of the fruits of the eternal hills.” (Dt. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because “as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,” etc. (Jn. 17:3).

Reply to Objection 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.

Reply to Objection 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according to the words “To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters” (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm “Their time will be for ever” (Ps. 80:16).

Reply to Objection 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal.

Whether eternity differs from time?

Objection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the “now” of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the “now” of time. But the “now” of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different from time.

Objection 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being—that is, of the divine being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either eternity or is a part of eternity.

On the contrary, Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a “before” and an “after.” Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing.

I answer that, It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time.

Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.

Reply to Objection 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity.

Reply to Objection 2: The “now” of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as time corresponds to movement, its “now” corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the “now” as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the “now” of time.

Reply to Objection 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion.

The difference of aeviternity and time

Objection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that “God moves the spiritual through time.” But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.

Objection 2: Further, it is essential to time to have “before” and “after”; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal “Wisdom is before age.” Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has “before” and “after”; and thus it is the same as time.

Objection 3: Further, if there is no “before” and “after” in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing.

Objection 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) “Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity.”

I answer that, Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity, and from time.

Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no “before” and “after”; but that time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has “before” and “after” without innovation and veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For since “before” and “after” of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has “before” and “after,” it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows “before” and “after” in the measure, as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain “before” and “after.” We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has “before” and “after”; aeviternity in itself has no “before” and “after,” which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has neither “before” nor “after,” nor is it compatible with such at all.

Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity.

Reply to Objection 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because “before” and “after” are compatible with it.

Reply to Objection 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been.

Reply to Objection 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature.

Whether there is only one aeviternity?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: “Majesty and power of ages are with Thee, O Lord.”

Objection 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

Objection 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

Objection 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity.

On the contrary, Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity one only.

I answer that, A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge of spiritual things.

Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured.

This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ([45]Q[47], A[2]); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.

Reply to Objection 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing’s duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we mean ages.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.

Reply to Objection 3: All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.

Reply to Objection 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple than the rest.

THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?

(2) Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other?

(3) Whether God is one?

(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?

Whether “one” adds anything to “being”?

Objection 1: It seems that “one” adds something to “being.” For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates all “genera.” But “one” is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore “one” adds something to “being.”

Objection 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But “being” is divided by “one” and by “many.” Therefore “one” is an addition to “being.”

Objection 3: Further, if “one” is not an addition to “being,” “one” and “being” must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to call “being” by the name of “being”; therefore it would be equally so to call being “one.” Now this is false. Therefore “one” is an addition to “being.”

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): “Nothing which exists is not in some way one,” which would be false if “one” were an addition to “being,” in the sense of limiting it. Therefore “one” is not an addition to “being.”

I answer that, “One” does not add any reality to “being”; but is only a negation of division; for “one” means undivided “being.” This is the very reason why “one” is the same as “being.” Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being.

Reply to Objection 1: Some, thinking that the “one” convertible with “being” is the same as the “one” which is the principle of number, were divided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the “one” convertible with “being” did not add any reality to “being,” but signified the substance of “being” as undivided, thought that the same applied to the “one” which is the principle of number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that “one” which is the principle of number, added a reality to the substance of “being” (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought that the “one” convertible with “being” added a reality to the substance of beings; as “white” to “man.” This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is “one” by its substance. For if a thing were “one” by anything else but by its substance, since this again would be “one,” supposing it were again “one” by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the “one” which is convertible with “being,” does not add a reality to being; but that the “one” which is the principle of number, does add a reality to “being,” belonging to the genus of quantity.

Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way “one,” and in another way “many.” Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is “one” in the whole, and is “many” in parts; in such a case a thing will be “one” absolutely and “many” accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be “many” absolutely and “one” accidentally; as what are “many” in number and “one” in species or “one” in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by “one” and by “many”; as it were by “one” absolutely and by “many” accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under “being,” unless it were in some way contained under “one.” Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that “there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle.”

Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say “being” is “one”; forasmuch as “one” adds an idea to “being.”

Whether “one” and “many” are opposed to each other?

Objection 1: It seems that “one” and “many” are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every “multitude” is in a certain way “one,” as appears from the preceding article. Therefore “one” is not opposed to “multitude.”

Objection 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But “multitude” is constituted by “one.” Therefore it is not opposed to “multitude.”

Objection 3: Further, “one” is opposed to “one.” But the idea of “few” is opposed to “many.” Therefore “one” is not opposed to “many.”

Objection 4: Further, if “one” is opposed to “multitude,” it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that “one” comes after “multitude,” and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, “multitude” is defined by “one.” Hence there would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore “one” and “many” are not opposed.

On the contrary, Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of “one” consists in indivisibility; and the idea of “multitude” contains division. Therefore “one” and “many” are opposed to each other.

I answer that, “One” is opposed to “many,” but in various ways. The “one” which is the principle of number is opposed to “multitude” which is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For “one” implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is “multitude” measured by “one,” as is clear from Metaph. x. But the “one” which convertible with “being” is opposed to “multitude” by way of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided.

Reply to Objection 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means “negation in the subject,” according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely “one” is relatively “many,” and vice versa.

Reply to Objection 2: A “whole” is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not houses.

Reply to Objection 3: “Many” is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to “one”; in another way as importing some kind of excess, in which sense it is opposed to “few”; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense.

Reply to Objection 4: “One” is opposed to “many” privatively, inasmuch as the idea of “many” involves division. Hence division must be prior to unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and hence we define a point to be, “what has no part,” or “the beginning of a line.” “Multitude” also, in idea, follows on “one”; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence “one” is placed in the definition of “multitude”; but “multitude” is not placed in the definition of “one.” But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude.

Whether God is one?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written “For there be many gods and many lords” (1 Cor. 8:5).

Objection 2: Further, “One,” as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, neither can “one” which is convertible with “being” be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.

On the contrary, It is written “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord” (Dt. 6:4).

I answer that, It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why any singular thing is “this particular thing” is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above ([46]Q[3], A[3]). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.

Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above ([47]Q[4], A[2]) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.

Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the “per se” cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, and is so “per se” and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this one is God.

Reply to Objection 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: “Our God is one,” etc.

Reply to Objection 2: “One” which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For “one” the principle of number belongs to the “genus” of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But “one” which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one.

Whether God is supremely one?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not supremely “one.” For “one” is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater or less. Therefore God is not more “one” than other things which are called “one.”

Objection 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. But a thing is said to be more “one” according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more “one” than unity is “one” and a point is “one.”

Objection 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially “one” is supremely “one.” But every being is essentially “one,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely “one”; and therefore God is not “one” more than any other being is “one.”

On the contrary, Bernard says (De Consid. v): “Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place.”

I answer that, Since “one” is an undivided being, if anything is supremely “one” it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple, as was shown above ([48]Q[3], A[7]). Hence it is manifest that God is “one” in the supreme degree.

Reply to Objection 1: Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, “one.”

Reply to Objection 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. Hence neither of them can be supremely “one.” For as a subject cannot be supremely “one,” because of the difference within it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.

Reply to Objection 3: Although every being is “one” by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance of some things is compound and of others simple.

HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?

(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?

(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?

(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?

(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?

(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?

(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?

(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?

(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?

(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?

(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?

(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?

(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?

Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on Jn. 1:18, “No man hath seen God at any time,” says: “Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what is increatable?” Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: “Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him.”

Objection 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ([49]Q[7], A[1]). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.

Objection 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.

Objection 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God.

On the contrary, It is written: “We shall see Him as He is” (1 Jn. 2:2).

I answer that, Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light.

Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void.

Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.

Reply to Objection 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, “He is universally to all incomprehensible,” etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: “He says this of the most certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son.”

Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first way: as appears from what was said above ([50]Q[7], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which means that He is not comprehended.

Reply to Objection 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.

Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is” (1 Jn. 3:2).

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): “When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us.”

Objection 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, “We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: ‘in a dark manner’],” “by the terms ‘glass’ and ‘enigma’ certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God.” But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude.

I answer that, Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision—viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing.

Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above ([51]Q[3], A[4]), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.

Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the Ps. 35:10, "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the divine essence itself as it really is.

Reply to Objection 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.

Reply to Objection 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself.

Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): “In my flesh I shall see . . . God,” and (Job 42:5), “With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.”

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): “Those eyes” (namely the glorified) “will therefore have a greater power of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things.” Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.

Objection 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: “I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne,” etc. (Is. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen by a vision of sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): “No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision.”

I answer that, It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later [52](Q[78]). Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above ([53]Q[3], A[1]). Hence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: The words, “In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour,” do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, “Now my eye seeth Thee,” are to be understood of the mind’s eye, as the Apostle says: “May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart” may be “enlightened” (Eph. 1:17,18).

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: “Therefore they will have an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;” and afterwards he explains this, saying: “It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it.” Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal things, happens from two causes—viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused into the body after its renovation.

Reply to Objection 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things.

Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?

Objection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he understands the Divine essence.

Objection 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he understand God.

Objection 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above [54](A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.

On the contrary, It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" (Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. (Jn. 17:3). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.

Reply to Objection 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel—namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above [55](A[2]). Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.

Reply to Objection 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it does not possess the excellence which is in God.

Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.

Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light.

Objection 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.

Objection 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.

On the contrary, It is written: “In Thy light we shall see light” (Ps. 35:10).

I answer that, Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the Apocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): “The glory of God hath enlightened it”—viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made “deiform”—i.e. like to God, according to the saying: “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is” (1 Jn. 3:2).

Reply to Objection 1: The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible of color.

Reply to Objection 2: This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God.

Reply to Objection 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made deiform, as is said in this article.

Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?

Objection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “We shall see Him as He is.” But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): “One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than another.” But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was shown above (A[3]). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another.

Objection 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude.

On the contrary, Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God,” etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: “Star differs from star in glory” (1 Cor. 15:41).

I answer that, Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of “deiformity,” as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article.

Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified.

Reply to Objection 1: In the words,”We shall see Him as He is,” the conjunction “as” determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God’s existence.

Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the understanding of another.

Reply to Objection 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all—viz. the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty.

Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: ‘apprehend’].” But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): “I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty.” Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: “So run that you may comprehend.”

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): “That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.” But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.

Objection 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a “whole,” but not “wholly,” it may be contrarily urged that “wholly” refers either to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him.

On the contrary, It is written: “O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible in thought” (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.

I answer that, It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet “for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great beatitude,” as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii).

In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears—Everything is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above [56](Q[7]) is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.

Reply to Objection 1: “Comprehension” is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense “comprehension” is taken more largely as opposed to “non-attainment”; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, “I held him, and I will not let him go" (Cant 3:4); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment of desire.

Reply to Objection 2: God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.

Reply to Objection 3: The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated.

Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, who see Him

Who sees all things?” But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things.

Objection 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.

Objection 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do.

Objection 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees God knows all things.

On the contrary, The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), “the inferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels.” Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things.

I answer that, The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above [57](A[7]). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the more perfectly it sees God.

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Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror itself.

Reply to Objection 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly.

Reply to Objection 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): “Unhappy the man who knoweth all these” (i.e. all creatures) “and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee alone.”

Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?

Objection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes.

Objection 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he said: “I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter” (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.

On the contrary, A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or ideas.

I answer that, Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen.

Reply to Objection 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.

Reply to Objection 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.

Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?

Objection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii): “It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood.” But what is seen in God, is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), “God moves the spiritual creature according to time”—i.e. by intelligence and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected successively; for time means succession.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): “Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall see all we know at one glance.”

I answer that, What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not successively.

Reply to Objection 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof.

Reply to Objection 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all at the same time.

Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" (Gn. 32:30). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to face" (1 Cor. 13:12).

Objection 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life.

Objection 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable.” Therefore even in this life we see God Himself.

Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.

On the contrary, It is written, “Man shall not see Me, and live” (Ex. 32:20), and a gloss upon this says, “In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own nature.”

I answer that, God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, as was said above [58](A[4]), the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ([59]AA[2],9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily senses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, “I have seen God face to face,” this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary vision; as will later be explained (SS, Q[174]) in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary state.

Reply to Objection 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of rapture (SS, Q[175]).

Reply to Objection 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun’s light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), “The lessons of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun,” namely God. As therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.

Reply to Objection 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power.

Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?

Objection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that “reason does not grasp simple form.” But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ([60]Q[3], A[7]). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.

Objection 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): “The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:19), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them."

I answer that, Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.

Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is."

Reply to Objection 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects.

Reply to Objection 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason.

Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?

Objection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to us by grace than by natural reason.

Objection 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.

Objection 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent knowledge of God by grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" (1 Cor. 2:10), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.

I answer that, We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions.

Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" (Mat. 3:17).

Reply to Objection 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and One.

Reply to Objection 2: From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light.

Reply to Objection 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles.

THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)

After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.

Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:

(1) Whether God can be named by us?

(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?

(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?

(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?

(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?

(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?

(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?

(8) Whether this name “God” is a name of nature, or of the operation?

(9) Whether this name “God” is a communicable name?

(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?

(11) Whether this name, “Who is,” is the supremely appropriate name of God?

(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

Whether a name can be given to God?

Objection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, “Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be found of Him;” and it is written: “What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?” (Prov. 30:4).

Objection 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.

Objection 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore God cannot in any way be named by us.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 15:3): “The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name.”

I answer that, Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ([61]Q[12], AA[11],12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name “man” expresses the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed by the name is the definition.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand about God, and signify in word.

Reply to Objection 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this life as He is.

Reply to Objection 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the “suppositum” with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative pronouns.

Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?

Objection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): “Everything said of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His nature or operation.”

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God.” Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi): “The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that simplicity whereby His substance is signified.” Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance.

I answer that, Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to Himself.

But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as “good,” “wise,” and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, “God is good,” we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other names.

Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things; therefore if the words “God is good,” signified no more than, “God is the cause of good things,” it might in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.

Therefore we must hold a different doctrine—viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above ([62]Q[4], A[2]) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ([63]Q[4], A[3]), in treating of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, “God is good,” the meaning is not, “God is the cause of goodness,” or “God is not evil”; but the meaning is, “Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God,” and in a more excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes goodness in things because He is good;

according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), “Because He is good, we are.”

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly.

Reply to Objection 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, as for instance, this name “stone” [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word “lapis” which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say “God lives,” the sense were, “life proceeds from Him”; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.

Reply to Objection 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only.

Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?

Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained above [64](A[1]). But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

Objection 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such names as “good,” “wise,” and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense.

Objection 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii), “Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude.” Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.

I answer that, According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God—viz. the perfections which they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as “stone” signifies a material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their signification as the words “being,” “good,” “living,” and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God.

Reply to Objection 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and all life.

Reply to Objection 3: These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing signified.

Whether names applied to God are synonymous?

Objection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous.

Objection 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these ideas are vain notions.

Objection 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous.

On the contrary, All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, “vesture clothing.” Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say “good God” or the like, and yet it is written, “O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy name” (Jer. 32:18).

I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above [65](A[2]), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not synonymous.

Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.

Reply to Objection 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him.

Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?

Objection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as many are reduced to one; for if the name “dog” be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some univocally—viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense.

Therefore it seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is predicated univocally.

Objection 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to the word of Genesis (Gn. 1:26), “Let us make man to our image and likeness,” it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally.

Objection 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures.

On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.

Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.

I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term “wise” applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man’s essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term “wise” applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term “wise” is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.

Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example “healthy” predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus “healthy” is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures [66](A[1]). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus “healthy” applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

Reply to Objection 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ([67]Q[4], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the same genus.

The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally.

Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?

Objection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it, since “names,” as the Philosopher says, “are signs of ideas.” But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “We name God from creatures.” But names transferred from creatures to God, are said primarily of creatures rather than of God, as “lion,” “stone,” and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God.

Objection 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for “healthy” is primarily predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather than of God.

On the contrary, It is written, “I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named” (Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures.

I answer that, In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. Thus, for instance, “healthy” applied to animals comes into the definition of “healthy” applied to medicine, which is called healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of “healthy” which is applied to urine, which is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal’s health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For as “smiling” applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of “lion” applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, “God is good,” it would then only mean “God is the cause of the creature’s goodness”; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature’s goodness. Hence “good” would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above [68](A[2]), these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, “God is good,” or “wise,” signify not only that He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above [69](A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.

Reply to Objection 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as “healthy” is applied to medicine.

Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?

Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name “Lord” is the name of power, which is the divine substance; and “Creator” signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but eternally.

Objection 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally.

Objection 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: “I have loved thee with an everlasting love” (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as “Lord” and “Creator,” are applied to God from eternity.

Objection 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called “Lord” from the opposite relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally.

Objection 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.

Objection 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus these names “Lord” and “Creator” are predicated of God from eternity, and not temporally.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation “Lord” is applied to God temporally.

I answer that, The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity.

To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension of reason; as when we say a thing “the same as itself.” For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between “being” and “non-being” formed by reason, apprehending “non-being” as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.

Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.

Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, “on the right” is not applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal.

Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.

Reply to Objection 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as “master” and “servant,” “father,” and “son,” and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as “Lord,” and these do not signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, either directly or indirectly.

Reply to Objection 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, “to become” or “to be made” are applied to God only in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, “Lord, Thou art become [Douay: ‘hast been’] our refuge” (Ps. 89:1).

Reply to Objection 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as “Saviour,” “Creator,” and the like.

Reply to Objection 4: Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it.

Reply to Objection 5: Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the manner in which the creature is subject to Him.

Reply to Objection 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself.

Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?

Objection 1: It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not signify the divine nature.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature.

I answer that, Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the name and its source are the same.

Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name “God” is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), “The Deity watches over all with perfect providence and goodness.” But taken from this operation, this name “God” is imposed to signify the divine nature.

Reply to Objection 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name “God.”

Reply to Objection 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can know what stone is in itself from its property, this name “stone” signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above ([70]Q[12], A[12]). Thus the name “God” signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.

Whether this name “God” is communicable?

Objection 1: It seems that this name “God” is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. But this name “God” signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, “He hath given us great [Vulg.: ‘most great’] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: ‘ye’] may be made partakers of the divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4). Therefore this name “God” can be communicated to others.

Objection 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name “God” is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, “I have said, You are gods” (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name “God” is communicable.

Objection 3: Further, this name “God” comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects are communicable; as “good,” “wise,” and the like. Therefore this name “God” is communicable.

On the contrary, It is written: “They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones” (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name “God” is incommunicable.

I answer that, A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. For instance this name “lion” is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as “lion”; by similitude it is communicable to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called “Achilles” metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any “suppositum,” but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.

Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above [71](A[8]), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ([72]Q[11], A[3]), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: "You served them who by nature are not gods," (Gal. 4:8), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" (Ps. 81:6).

But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.

Reply to Objection 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude.

Reply to Objection 2: This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the name "sun."

Reply to Objection 3: These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable to many. But this name “God” is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine nature.

Whether this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?

Objection 1: It seems that this name “God” is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But a Catholic who says: “An idol is not God,” contradicts a pagan who says: “An idol is God.” Therefore GOD in both senses is spoken of univocally.

Objection 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, and not in truth. But this name “beatitude” is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also this name “God” is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion.

Objection 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: “There is one God,” he understands by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: “An idol is God.” Therefore this name “God” is applied univocally to both.

On the contrary, The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word “animal” applied to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name “God” applied to the true God and to God in opinion is applied equivocally.

Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore this name “God” is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to opinion.

I answer that, This name “God” in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance, “being” which is applied to “substance” is placed in the definition of being as applied to “accident”; and “healthy” applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health.

The same applies to the question at issue. For this name “God,” as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically.

Reply to Objection 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name “man,” of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name “man” we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name “man” what man really is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, “All the gods of the Gentiles are demons” (Ps. 95:5).

The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not from its various significations.

Reply to Objection 4: The term “animal” applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of different predicaments.

Reply to Objection 5: Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or remotion ([73]Q[12], A[12]). So a pagan can take this name “God” in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use names the meaning of which we know not.

Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?

Objection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name “God” is an incommunicable name. But this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that “the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God.” But it especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name “good” is supremely proper to God, and not this name HE WHO IS.

Objection 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.

On the contrary, It is written that when Moses asked, “If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?” The Lord answered him, “Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you” (Ex. 3:13,14). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God.

I answer that, This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:

First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ([74]Q[3], A[4]), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.

Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, “HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance.” Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the “infinite ocean of substance.”

Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).

Reply to Objection 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name “God,” as regards its source, namely, existence; and as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name “God” is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, singular.

Reply to Objection 2: This name “good” is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely comes before the idea of cause.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.

Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?

Objection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that “negations about God are true; but affirmations are vague.”

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that “a simple form cannot be a subject.” But God is the most absolutely simple form, as shown (Q[3]): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.

Objection 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition as shown above ([75]Q[3], A[7]). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.

On the contrary, What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God.

I answer that, True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that “man” and “white” are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, “man is an animal”; since the same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same “suppositum” there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as to “suppositum,” but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the “suppositum” what it places in the subject; and what it places in the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the “suppositum”; according to the saying that “predicates are to be taken formally, and subjects materially.” To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself.

God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, “incongruous,” inasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification.

Reply to Objection 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form as a subject, and attributes something else to it.

Reply to Objection 3: This proposition, “The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false,” can be taken in two senses, accordingly as this adverb “otherwise” determines the word “understanding” on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God.

OF GOD’S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)

Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God’s operation. And since one kind of operation is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the treatment of ideas.

Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:

(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?

(2) Whether God understands Himself?

(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?

(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?

(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?

(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?

(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?

(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?

(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?

(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?

(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?

(12) Whether He knows the infinite?

(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?

(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?

(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?

(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?

Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?

Objection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God.

Objection 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God.

Objection 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular ([76]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.

On the contrary, The Apostle says, “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God” (Rom. 11:33).

I answer that, In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that “the soul is in a sense all things.” Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above ([77]Q[7], A[1]) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality as stated above ([78]Q[7], A[1]), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.

Reply to Objection 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself ([79]Q[4], A[2]), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly ([80]Q[13], A[4]). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has “intelligence” as regards the knowledge of principles; he has “science” as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has “wisdom,” according as he knows the highest cause; he has “counsel” or “prudence,” according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown [81](A[7]). Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, “With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding” (Job 12:13).

Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.

Whether God understands Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), “Every knower who knows his own essence, returns completely to his own essence.” But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.

Objection 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made perfect by itself, “nor,” as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), “is a thing its own likeness.” Therefore God does not understand Himself.

Objection 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things.

On the contrary, It is written: “The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:11).

I answer that, God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that “the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act.” For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality.

Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God understands Himself through Himself.

Reply to Objection 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, “whoever knows his essence returns to it.” Now it supremely belongs to God to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and its own intelligible object.

Reply to Objection 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself.

Whether God comprehends Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that “whatever comprehends itself is finite as regards itself.” But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself.

Objection 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is against what was laid down above ([82]Q[7], A[1]). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that “Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself.” But God understands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.

I answer that, God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above ([83]AA[1],2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.

Reply to Objection 1: The strict meaning of “comprehension” signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), “The whole is comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer.”

Reply to Objection 2: When it is said, “God is finite to Himself,” this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite.

Whether the act of God’s intellect is His substance?

Objection 1: It seems that the act of God’s intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His substance.

Objection 2: Further, to understand one’s act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand our act of understanding: and thus God’s act of understanding will not be something great.

Objection 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God’s intellect is not His substance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii), “In God to be is the same as to be wise.” But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God’s existence is His substance, as shown above ([84]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore the act of God’s intellect is His substance.

I answer that, It must be said that the act of God’s intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how this is. As was laid down above [85](A[2]), to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above [86](Q[3]). Hence as His essence itself is also His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.

Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His substance.

Reply to Objection 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him.

Reply to Objection 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.

Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.

Whether God knows things other than Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.

Objection 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible.

Objection 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself.

On the contrary, It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" (Heb. 4:13).

I answer that, God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid ([87]Q[2], A[3]), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence of the first effective cause—viz. God—is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.

Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another.

So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God “sees nothing outside Himself” is not to be taken in such a way, as if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For “a stone is not in the soul, but its image.” Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the divine intellect other than the divine essence.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself.

Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown [88](A[5]), God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge of it.

Objection 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.

On the contrary, To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible in His sight" (Heb. 4:12,13).

I answer that, Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.

But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said above ([89]Q[4], A[1]). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know all colors.

Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above ([90]Q[4], A[2]) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is common to creatures—viz. being—belongs to their perfection, but also what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge.

As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each other.

Reply to Objection 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb “so” imports the mode of knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb ‘so’ be understood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of knowledge.

We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him.

Reply to Objection 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse.

Reply to Objection 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate in, and imitate it.

Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): “The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing at a time.” Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another.

Objection 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.

Objection 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately here and there; but He sees all things together at once.”

I answer that, In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.

Reply to Objection 1: Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), as shown above.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.

Reply to Objection 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His knowledge is not discursive.

Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, “Whom He called, them He also justified,” etc.: “A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists.”

Objection 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.

Objection 3: Further, “The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows them, therefore they are.”

I answer that, The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually called the “knowledge of approbation.”

Reply to Objection 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined to it, as is said above.

But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them.

Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.

Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not.

Objection 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God.

Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" (Rom. 4:17).

I answer that, God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not.

Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.

Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by God.

Reply to Objection 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not that they be, but that they be possible.

Whether God knows evil things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2]), it seems that God does not know evil things.

Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things.

Objection 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His essence, as is clear from the foregoing [91](A[5]). Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.

Objection 4: Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 15:11), “Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: ‘the Lord’].”

I answer that, Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): “God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness except through light.”

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

Reply to Objection 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils.

Reply to Objection 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor known except by good.

Whether God knows singular things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), “reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things.” Therefore God does not know singular things.

Objection 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things.

Objection 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:2), “All the ways of a man are open to His eyes.”

I answer that, God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the foregoing ([92]Q[4], A[2]). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. iii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.

Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know

singular things in their singularity.

On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.

Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above [93](A[8]), His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ([94]Q[44], A[2]), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.

Reply to Objection 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also singular things.

Reply to Objection 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things.

Reply to Objection 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.

Whether God can know infinite things?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, “to those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that “whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower.” Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of God.

Objection 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God’s knowledge, against this it may be urged that the essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in God’s knowledge, which is infinite.

Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), “Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose knowledge has no bounds.”

I answer that, Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above [95](A[9]), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for ever.

The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other.

Reply to Objection 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above [96](A[7]). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.

Reply to Objection 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as if it were traversable.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the knowledge of God.

Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above [97](A[8]). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

Objection 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, “If God knew that this thing will be, it will be,” for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.

Objection 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent future thing is known by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 32:15), “He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works,” i.e. of men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things.

I answer that, Since as was shown above [98](A[9]), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said above ([99]Q[10], A[2]). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their own causes.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary.

Reply to Objection 2: Some say that this antecedent, “God knew this contingent to be future,” is not necessary, but contingent; because, although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as this saying is contingent, “Socrates is a white man.” But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, “God knew this contingent to be future,” contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, “if the sun moves, the grass will grow.”

Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, “What the soul understands is immaterial,” this is to be understood that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, “If God knew anything, it will be,” the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: “For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be,” as the Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i.

Reply to Objection 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary."

Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.

Whether God knows enunciable things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

Objection 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things.

On the contrary, It is written: “The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men” (Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things.

I answer that, Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that of creatures, as said above [100](A[9]), it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.

Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine intellect, which is God’s essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things.

Reply to Objection 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.

Whether the knowledge of God is variable?

Objection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of God is variable according to the variation of creatures.

Objection 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.

Objection 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.

On the contrary, It is said, that in God “there is no change nor shadow of alteration” (James 1:17).

I answer that, Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing [101](A[4]), just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ([102]Q[9], A[1]), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.

Reply to Objection 1: “Lord,” “Creator” and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that “Lord,” “Creator” and the like, import the relations consequent upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But “knowledge” and “love,” and the like, import relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable manner.

Reply to Objection 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew.

Reply to Objection 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say “Christ is born” and “will be born” and “was born”; because the same thing is signified by these three—viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, “Socrates sits,” is true when he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, “Whatever God knew He knows,” if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of which can be in God.

Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above [103] (A[8]). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

Objection 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.

On the contrary, Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.

I answer that, Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing—as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.

In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly.

Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art.

Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make, and which nevertheless are never made.

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally in so far as it is human.

In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.

OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)

After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are ideas?

(2) Whether they are many, or one only?

(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?

Whether there are ideas?

Objection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas.

Objection 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said ([104]Q[14], A[5]). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.

Objection 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),”Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are understood.”

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin “forma.” Hence by ideas are understood the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason:

In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear later ([105]Q[46], A[1]), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.

Reply to Objection 1: God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.

Reply to Objection 3: God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.

Whether ideas are many?

Objection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only one idea.

Objection 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.

Objection 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of the eternal.

Objection 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so.”

I answer that, It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), “that each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it,” from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas.

Reply to Objection 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence.

Reply to Objection 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.

Reply to Objection 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing its own essence with these things.

Reply to Objection 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God.

Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?

Objection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.

Objection 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above (A[9]). But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): “Acts of the divine will are the determining and effective types of things.” Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.

Objection 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.

Objection 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of these, according to Plato’s teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him.

On the contrary, Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him.

I answer that, As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an “exemplar,” and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a “type,” and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in a speculative manner.

Reply to Objection 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither in so far as an idea is an “exemplar” nor as a “type.”

Reply to Objection 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an “exemplar” but only in so far as it denotes a “type.”

Reply to Objection 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known.

Reply to Objection 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an “exemplar”; for genus cannot exist except in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later ([106]Q[22], A[3]).

OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?

(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

(3) On the comparison of the true to being.

(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.

(5) Whether God is truth?

(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?

(7) On the eternity of truth.

(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.

Whether truth resides only in the intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns this definition of truth, “That is true which is seen”; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, “That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and able to know,” for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: “That is true which is.” It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and not in the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time.

Objection 3: Further, “that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so,” as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), “ The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect.”

I answer that, As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite—and hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.

Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form in the architect’s mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;” and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that “Truth makes being clear and evident” and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine’s definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), “Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to a principle”: also Anselm’s definition (De Verit. xii), “Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone”; for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna’s definition (Metaph. viii, 6), “The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it.” The definition that “Truth is the equation of thought and thing” is applicable to it under either aspect.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for what is accidental is excluded from every definition.

Reply to Objection 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation to the divine intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true."

Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?

Objection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.

Objection 2: Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the intellect nor in things."

I answer that, As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is."

And thus the Objections given are solved.

Whether the true and being are convertible terms?

Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated [107](A[1]); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.

Objection 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible.

Objection 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth.

I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that “the soul is in some manner all things,” through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before [108](A[1]). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already [109](A[1]). It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.

Reply to Objection 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.

Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being.

Whether good is logically prior to the true?

Objection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true.

Objection 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above [110](A[2]). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.

Objection 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true.

On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.

I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good.

Reply to Objection 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things.

Reply to Objection 3: The virtue which is called “truth” is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to “life” is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things [111](A[1]). Whereas the truth of “justice” is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.

Whether God is truth?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.

Objection 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a “likeness to the principle.” But in God there is no likeness to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.

On the contrary, Our Lord says, “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life” (Jn. 14:6).

I answer that, As said above [112](A[1]), truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of every other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.

Reply to Objection 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: “the Father is of Himself, because He is not from another.” Similarly, the divine truth can be called a “likeness to the principle,” inasmuch as His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement—“that a person commits fornication is true”—is entirely from God. But to argue, “Therefore that this person fornicates is from God,” is a fallacy of Accident.

Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?

Objection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), “nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God.” Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God.

Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, “as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things.” But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.

On the contrary, it is written (Ps. 11:2), “Truths are decayed from among the children of men.”

I answer that, In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said [113] (A[1]) that truth resides primarily in the intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on Ps. 11:2, “Truths are decayed from among the children of men,” says: “As from one man’s face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth.” But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true.

Reply to Objection 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.

Whether created truth is eternal?

Objection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) “Nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle, and that two added to three make five.” But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.

Objection 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore is truth, which is the most universal.

Objection 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.

Objection 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is eternal.

On the contrary, God alone is eternal, as laid down before ([114]Q[10], A[3]).

I answer that, The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already [115](A[5]).

Reply to Objection 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God.

Reply to Objection 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.

Reply to Objection 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.

Reply to Objection 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.

Whether truth is immutable?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."

Objection 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable.

Objection 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits," receives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.

Objection 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three propositions, “Socrates sits, will sit, sat.” Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 11:2),”Truths are decayed from among the children of men.”

I answer that, Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before [116](A[1]); but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said before ([117]Q[14], A[15]). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.

Reply to Objection 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before.

Reply to Objection 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this proposition, “Socrates sits,” is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth remains, but the second is changed.

Reply to Objection 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, “Socrates sits,” has not the same meaning when Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same truth remains invariable.

CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether falsity exists in things?

(2) Whether it exists in the sense?

(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?

(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.

Whether falsity exists in things?

Objection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), “If the true is that which is, it will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary.”

Objection 2: Further, false is derived from “fallere” [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things.

Objection 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above [118](Q[16]). But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): “Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity.” But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists.

I answer that, Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it “per se,” but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared “per se” but may be called false relatively as directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper operation of his art.

In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, “Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?” (Ps. 4:3): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the “truth of life” as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, “He that doth truth, cometh to the light” (Jn. 3:21).

But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): “The true tragedian is a false Hector”: even as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be called false, by way of cause —and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): “We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:” and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): “Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not.” In this way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. Hence, “The true tragedian is a false Hector,” as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.

Reply to Objection 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear to things which they actually are not.

Reply to Objection 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.

To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in the majority of instances.

Whether there is falsity in the senses?

Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): “If all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them.” Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that falsity is not in them.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.

Objection 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), “It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes.”

I answer that, Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above ([119]Q[16], A[2]), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really are.

The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man.

Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being directed to other things.

Reply to Objection 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about the object, but not about the fact of sensation.

Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation it is said more plainly, “Sense, about its proper object, is never false.” Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things that are not present in substance.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false.

Whether falsity is in the intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), “Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived.” But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore falsity does not exist in the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the intellect.

On the contrary, It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that “where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood.” But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect.

I answer that, Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said [120](A[2]) that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth ([121]Q[16], A[2]), that falsity can exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above [122](A[2]).

But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as “ a reasonable four-footed animal” would be of this kind, and the intellect false in making it; for such a statement as “some reasonable animals are four-footed” is false in itself. For this reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.

Reply to Objection 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense Augustine’s words must be understood, “that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;” and not in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject.

Whether true and false are contraries?

Objection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for “truth,” as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), “is that which is.” But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things.

Objection 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), “A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian.” Therefore true and false are not contraries.

Objection 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for “nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, “They have laid hold on lying” (Jer. 8:5), that is to say, “an idol,” as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one.

I answer that, True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it is “negation in a subject,” as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries.

Reply to Objection 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good."

Reply to Objection 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some truth.

Reply to Objection 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity.

THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise:

(1) To whom does it belong to live?

(2) What is life?

(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?

(4) Whether all things in God are life?

Whether to live belongs to all natural things?

Objection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that “Movement is like a kind of life possessed by all things existing in nature.” But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake of life.

Objection 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.

Objection 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of “living waters.” Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that “The last echo of life is heard in the plants,” whereby it is inferred that their life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.

I answer that, We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies.

Reply to Objection 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.

Whether life is an operation?

Objection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation.

Objection 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.

Objection 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of Jn. 18:3, “Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God.” Therefore life is an operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), “In living things, to live is to be.”

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ([123]Q[17], A[3]), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said ([124]Q[13], A[1]), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word “body” is used to denote a genus of substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word “running” denotes “to run” in the abstract.

Hence “living” is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher here takes “to live” to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand—in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.

Reply to Objection 2: By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.

Whether life is properly attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously stated [125](A[2]). But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.

Objection 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4) that “the soul is the cause and principle of the living body.” But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.

Objection 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 83:3): “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”

I answer that, Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay.

Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship.

But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.

Reply to Objection 2: As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle of life.

Reply to Objection 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold good with incorruptible natures.

Whether all things are life in God?

Objection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said (Acts 17:28), “In Him we live, and move, and be.” But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.

Objection 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially.

Objection 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible.

On the contrary, (Jn. 1:3,4), it is said, “What was made, in Him was life.” But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.

I answer that, In God to live is to understand, as before stated [126] (A[3]). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, “In Him we live, move, and be”; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, but life.

Reply to Objection 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, as having a divine existence in that mind.

Reply to Objection 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the “separate” man was the true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect’s mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential.

Reply to Objection 4: Although bad things are in God’s knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far as life implies a principle of operation.

THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)

After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is will in God?

(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?

(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?

(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?

(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?

(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?

(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?

(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?

(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?

(10) Whether God has free will?

(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?

(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?

Whether there is will in God?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is not will in God.

Objection 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): “That you may prove what is the will of God.”

I answer that, There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His will.

Reply to Objection 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above ([127]Q[6], A[3]): for the end has the aspect of good.

Reply to Objection 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence.

Reply to Objection 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will is

His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.

Whether God wills things apart from Himself?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.

Objection 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible.

Objection 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself.

Objection 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): “This is the will of God, your sanctification.”

I answer that, God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above [128] (A[1]). For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other things should be partakers therein.

Reply to Objection 1: The divine will is God’s own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said ([129]Q[13], A[4]). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things.

Reply to Objection 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness.

Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?

Objection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Objection 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.

Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as above shown ([130]Q[2], A[3]). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.

Objection 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.

Objection 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.

Objection 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever God wills, He wills necessarily.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change.

Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by supposition.

Reply to Objection 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can exist without other things.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.

Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun’s power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such defect accompanies all created good.

Reply to Objection 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation.

Reply to Objection 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.

Whether the will of God is the cause of things?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): “As our sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists.” But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things.

Objection 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.

Objection 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being “such” a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), “Because God is good, we exist.” Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.

Objection 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before ([131]Q[14], A[8]). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:26), “How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?”

I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.

This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He must act by intellect and will.

This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown ([132]Q[7], A[2]). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.

Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.

Reply to Objection 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and will.

Reply to Objection 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these things are one.

Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?

Objection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.

Objection 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown [133](A[4]). If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.

Objection 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): “Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected.” But nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.

I answer that, In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.

Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.

Reply to Objection 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.

Reply to Objection 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): “Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God.”

Reply to Objection 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other causes.

Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): “God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” But this does not happen. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.

Objection 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.

Objection 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 113:11): “God hath done all things, whatsoever He would.”

I answer that, The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle, “God will have all men to be saved,” etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), “God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will.” Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.

To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.

Reply to Objection 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists.

Reply to Objection 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as said above.

Whether the will of God is changeable?

Objection 1: It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (Gn. 6:7): “It repenteth Me that I have made man.” But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.

Objection 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: “I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them” (Jer. 18:7,8) Therefore God has a changeable will.

Objection 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.

Objection 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before [134](A[3]). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.

On the contrary, It is said: “God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed” (Num. 23:19).

I answer that, The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable ([135]Q[9], A[1]; [136]Q[14], A[15]). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom He had made.

Reply to Objection 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: “Lazarus will not rise again,” but looking at the divine first cause might have said: “Lazarus will rise again.” And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: “Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live” (Is. 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): “The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel”—that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, “I also will repent,” His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.

Reply to Objection 3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.

Reply to Objection 4: Although God’s willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above [137](A[3]).

Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): “No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be.”

Objection 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) “Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it.” But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (Rom. 9:19): “Who resisteth His will?” Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is necessary absolutely.

On the contrary, All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.

I answer that, The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.

This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun’s power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God’s will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.

Reply to Objection 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.

Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.

Reply to Objection 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.

Whether God wills evils?

Objection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): “Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things.” Therefore God wills evil things.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): “Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything,” i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): “Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil.” But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.

Objection 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God’s will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): “No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it.” Therefore it is not by God’s will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.

I answer that, Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before ([138]Q[5], A[1]), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.

Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words “that evil should be or be done.” This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.

Reply to Objection 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that “evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe,” draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.

Reply to Objection 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.

Whether God has free-will?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; “God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side.”

Objection 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said [139](A[9]). Therefore there is not free-will in God.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): “The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity.”

I answer that, We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above [140](A[3]), He has free will with respect to what He does not necessarily will.

Reply to Objection 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.

Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?

Objection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.

Objection 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.

On the contrary, The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of Ps. 110:2: “Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills.” Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.

I answer that, Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before ([141]Q[13], A[3]). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: “Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven” (Mat. 6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called will.

Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.

Reply to Objection 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.

Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?

Objection 1: It seems that five expressions of will—namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission—are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.

Objection 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of expression.

Objection 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.

Objection 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of evil—namely, prohibition—and two—namely, counsel and precept—in the case of good.

I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of Mat. 6:10: “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.” That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: “Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it.”

Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.

Reply to Objection 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.

Reply to Objection 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.

Reply to Objection 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the avoiding of lesser evils.

GOD’S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether love exists in God?

(2) Whether He loves all things?

(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?

(4) Whether He loves more the better things?

Whether love exists in God?

Objection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.

Objection 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “Love is a uniting and binding force.” But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.

On the contrary, It is written: “God is love” (Jn. 4:16).

I answer that, We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate:

because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God ([142]Q[19], A[1]), and hence we must attribute love to Him.

Reply to Objection 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): “God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple,” and for the same reason He loves without passion.

Reply to Objection 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element—namely, the bodily change—and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show ([143]Q[3], A[2] , ad 2; [144]Q[19], A[11]). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before ([145]Q[19], A[11]).

Reply to Objection 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as above shown ([146]Q[6], AA[1],3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.

Whether God loves all things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.

Objection 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.

Objection 3: Further, love is twofold—the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): “Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity.” Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 11:25): “Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.”

I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above ([147]Q[19], A[4]) that God’s will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.

Reply to Objection 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): “On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.

Reply to Objection 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.

Whether God loves all things equally?

Objection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: “He hath equally care of all” (Wis. 6:8). But God’s providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.

Objection 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God’s essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.

Objection 3: Further, as God’s love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): “God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself.”

I answer that, Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God’s love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said [148](A[2]), no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.

Reply to Objection 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God’s love.

Whether God always loves more the better things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: “He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all” (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: “Thou hast made him a little less than the angels” (Ps. 8:6). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: “Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold” (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Objection 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: “Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?” Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, “Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?”: “By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest.” Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Objection 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), “a second plank after shipwreck.” But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: “I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance” (Lk. 15:7). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

Objection 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.

On the contrary, Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (Ecclus. 13:19): “Every beast loveth its like.” Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.

I answer that, It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown ([149]AA[2],3), that God’s loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God’s will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.

Reply to Objection 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe:

because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him “a name that is above all names,” in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: “The government was placed upon His shoulder,” according to Is. 9:6.

Reply to Objection 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.

Reply to Objection 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.

Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (Prov. 16:2).

Reply to Objection 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."

Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.

Reply to Objection 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.

THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is justice in God?

(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?

(3) Whether there is mercy in God?

(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: neither therefore does justice.

Objection 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: “God worketh all things according to the counsel of His will” (Eph. 1:11). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.

Objection 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man’s debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “Good regards the essence; justice the act.” Therefore justice does not belong to God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 10:8): “The Lord is just, and hath loved justice.”

I answer that, There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: “Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?” (Rom. 11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii, 4): “We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it.”

Reply to Objection 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above ([150]Q[20], A[1]), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says

(Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power, God is a law unto Himself.

Reply to Objection 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10):

“When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness.”

Reply to Objection 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the general to the special.

Whether the justice of God is truth?

Objection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore justice does not appertain to truth.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain to the idea of justice.

On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 84:11): “Mercy and truth have met each other”: where truth stands for justice.

I answer that, Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above ([151]Q[16], A[1]). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his art.

Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God’s justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed according to the law, it resides in the will.

Reply to Objection 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.

Whether mercy can be attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.

Objection 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13): “If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself.” But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.

On the contrary, it is said (Ps. 110:4): “He is a merciful and gracious Lord.”

I answer that, Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above ([152]Q[6] , A[4]). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality, and mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown above ([153]Q[6], AA[1],4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already said [154](A[1]); in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel defects, it belongs to mercy.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion.

Reply to Objection 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: “Forgive one another, as Christ has forgiven you” (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: “Mercy exalteth itself above judgement” (James 2:13).

Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?

Objection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy” (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Objection 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.

Objection 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 24:10): “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.”

I answer that, Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine will—which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved.

In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: “Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much” (Lk. 7:47).

Reply to Objection 2: God’s justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.

Reply to Objection 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): “The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God.”

Reply to Objection 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence.

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. Concerning God’s providence there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?

(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?

(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?

(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?

Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?

Objection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God.

Objection 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Wis. 14:3): “But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But ‘Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.’].”

I answer that, It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was shown above ([155]Q[6], A[4]). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness ([156]Q[21], A[4]). This good of order existing in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before ([157]Q[19], A[4]), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other parts are directed—namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself—as for instance, a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life—or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said (Mat. 24:45), “a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family.” In this way prudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that “Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things”: which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), “Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that ‘ebulia’ has rightly counselled and ‘synesis’ rightly judged” [*Cf. [158]FS, Q[57], A[6]]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God, according to Ps. 148:6: “He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away.” In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: “Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will” (Eph. 1:11).

Reply to Objection 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence—namely, the “reason of order,” which is called providence and disposition; and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal.

Reply to Objection 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one and the same thing, as we have said above [159](Q[19]).

Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?

Objection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.

Objection 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.

Objection 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9, 10,11): “Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice.” Since, then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence.

Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God in accordance with the words: “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel” (Ecclus. 15:14). And particularly in reference to the wicked: “I let them go according to the desires of their heart” (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine providence.

Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): “God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. ‘Doth God take care for oxen?’]”: and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence.

On the contrary, It is said of Divine Wisdom: “She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1).

I answer that, Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job 22:14): “The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven.” Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others.

We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual selves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: “Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.’Those powers that are, are ordained of God’: ‘Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.’ St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: ‘Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.’]” (Rom. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine providence. It has also been shown ([160]Q[14], AA[6],11) that God knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the ordering of that art.

Reply to Objection 1: There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other.

Reply to Objection 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): “Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil.” It would appear that it was on account of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things—e.g. casual and evil things—as removed from the care of divine providence.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and others of the ancients.

Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: “In the hand of his own counsel.” But since the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For “to them that love God, all things work together unto good” (Rom. 8:28). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the reason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.

Reply to Objection 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above ([161]Q[19], A[10]), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.

Whether God has immediate providence over everything?

Objection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, “It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile things”: and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things.

On the contrary, It is said (Job 34:13): “What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?” On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): “Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made.”

I answer that, Two things belong to providence—namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato’s opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).

Reply to Objection 1: It pertains to a king’s dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned.

Reply to Objection 2: God’s immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His order, as was said above ([162]Q[19], AA[5],8).

Reply to Objection 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.

Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?

Objection 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a “per se” cause, either present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.

Objection 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns the stability of necessity to things provided.

Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): “Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes by the indissoluble connection of causes.” It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) “to corrupt nature is not the work of providence.” But it is in the nature of some things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.

I answer that, Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes.

Reply to Objection 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency.

Reply to Objection 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.

Reply to Objection 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember that properly speaking ‘necessary’ and “contingent” are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things.

OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?

(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?

(3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?

(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?

(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?

(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?

(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?

(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?

Whether men are predestined by God?

Objection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): “It must be borne in mind that God foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.” But human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man’s predestination is done away.

Objection 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above ([163]Q[22], AA[1],2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.

Objection 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the “purpose to take pity [miserendi]” [*See [164]Q[22], A[3]]. Therefore men are not predestined.

Objection 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 2:12): “Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given us from God.” Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:30): “Whom He predestined, them He also called.”

I answer that, It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above ([165]Q[22], A[2]). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said ([166]Q[22], AA[1],2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above ([167]Q[12], A[4]). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards one end. This is clear from his adding: “He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue.” Whence predestination is not excluded by Him.

Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.

Reply to Objection 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take its species from the term “wherefrom” but from the term “whereto.” Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown previously ([168]Q[21], AA[3],4).

Reply to Objection 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.

Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined.

Objection 2: Further, Origen says on the text, “He who was predestined,” etc. (Rom. 1:4): “Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is.” And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): “What is predestination but the destination of one who is?” Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something in the predestined.

Objection 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God’s benefits, as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined.

Objection 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that “predestination is the foreknowledge of God’s benefits.” But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, and not in the predestined.

I answer that, Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, as was proved above ([169]Q[22], A[1]). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30): “Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. ‘justified’].”

Reply to Objection 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion—for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above ([170]Q[14], A[2]; [171]Q[18], A[3], ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes out to external things, has an effect in them.

Reply to Objection 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar “determined not to do any unlawful things for the love of life” (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted.

Reply to Objection 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.

Reply to Objection 4: Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination is anything temporal.

Whether God reprobates any man?

Objection 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis. 11:25): “Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made.” Therefore God reprobates no man.

Objection 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said (Osee 13:9): “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me.” God does not, then, reprobate any man.

Objection 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is said (Eccles. 7:14): “Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised.” Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone.

On the contrary, It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): “I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.”

I answer that, God does reprobate some. For it was said above [172] (A[1]) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which are subject to providence, as was said above ([173]Q[22], A[2]). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from that end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was said above ([174]Q[22], A[1]). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.

Reply to Objection 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobated them.

Reply to Objection 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory—and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true—namely, "Destruction is thy own, O Israel."

Reply to Objection 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as was said above ([175]Q[19], A[3]), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.

Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]

Objection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to predestination.

Objection 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, some are predestined without election.

Objection 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God “wills all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.

On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 1:4): “He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world.”

I answer that, Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, as stated above [176](A[1]), is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved above ([177]Q[22], A[2]). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:—love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above ([178]Q[20], AA[2],3):—election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above [179](A[3]). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election and love.

Reply to Objection 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above ([180]Q[6], A[4]). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory election is implied.

Reply to Objection 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above ([181]Q[20], A[2]). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): “Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice.”

Reply to Objection 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent will, which is to will simply.

Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?

Objection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): “Whom He foreknew, He also predestined.” Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: “I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy” says: “I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart.” Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

Objection 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is “the purpose to have mercy,” as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination.

Objection 3: Further, “There is no injustice in God” (Rom. 9:14). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): “Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us.” But as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination.

I answer that, Since predestination includes will, as was said above [182](A[4]), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above ([183]Q[19], A[5]), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.

Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): “For when they were not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the younger.”

Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that “we are not sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves.” Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination.

And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, as was above shown ([184]Q[22], A[3]). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in a twofold light—in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): “convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.” Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle.

Reply to Objection 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary that God’s goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was said above ([185]Q[22], A[2]). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (Rom. 9:22,23): “What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory” and (2 Tim. 2:20): “But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor, but some unto dishonor.” Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): “Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.” Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: “Take what is thine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?” (Mat. 20:14,15).

Whether predestination is certain?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words “Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown,” (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): “Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it.” Hence the crown which is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain.

Objection 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined—e.g. Peter—may sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.

Objection 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 8:29: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated,” says: “Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed.”

I answer that, Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect should take place from necessity. For it was said above [186](A[1]), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above ([187]Q[22], A[4]). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will ([188]Q[14], A[13]; [189]Q[19], A[4]) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are most certain and infallible.

Reply to Objection 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God’s predestination, and thus no one loses his crown:

secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall, without raising others; according to Job 34:24: "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by himself or by others.

Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.

Reply to Objection 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above [190](A[4]): and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.

Whether the number of the predestined is certain?

Objection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written (Dt. 1:11): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain.

Objection 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain.

Objection 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Mat. 7:13,14: “For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!” Therefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not certain.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): “The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished.”

I answer that, The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above [191](A[6]). Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite ([192]Q[7], AA[2],3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number “per se”; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and what number would befit the essential parts of that universe—that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal pre-ordination.

It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" (Rom. 8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God alone is known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']"

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe.

Reply to Objection 3: The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall short.

Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?

Objection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Objection 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: “Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: ‘Who hath known the mind of the Lord?’] Or who hath been His counsellor?” (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

Objection 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it cannot be furthered by anything.

On the contrary, It is said that “Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive” (Gn. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints.

I answer that, Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.

Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: “But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved to repentance” (1 Kings 15:29); and that “the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance” (Rom. 11:29).

Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered—namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one’s own prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason it is said: “Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election” (2 Pet. 1:10).

Reply to Objection 1: This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.

Reply to Objection 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, “Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?” In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: “We are God’s co-adjutors.” Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.

Reply to Objection 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above ([193]Q[19], A[6]), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.

THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)

We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:

(1) What is the book of life?

(2) Of what life is it the book?

(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?

Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?

Objection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. For it is said, “All things are the book of life” (Ecclus. 4:32)—i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is not predestination.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that “the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory.” But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.

Objection 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a book of death, as there is a book of life.

On the contrary, It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, “Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew.”

I answer that, The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly were called “conscript” fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding ([194]Q[23], A[4]) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory, according to Prov. 3:3: “Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments,” and further on, “Write them in the tables of thy heart.” For things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: “The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His.”

Reply to Objection 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.

Hence the solution of the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.

Reply to Objection 4: Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.

Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?

Objection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.

Objection 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called.

Objection 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: “Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?” (Jn. 6:71). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.

On the contrary, The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above [195](A[1]). But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.

I answer that, The book of life, as stated above [196](A[1]), implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as said above ([197]Q[23], A[1]). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.

Reply to Objection 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are consequent on nature.

From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace.

Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?

Objection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): “God’s foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, is the book of life.” But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.

Objection 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither therefore can he be blotted out.

On the contrary, It is said, “Let them be blotted out from the book of the living” (Ps. 68:29).

I answer that, Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: “Let them be blotted out of the book of the living.” But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the text, “He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life” (Apoc. 3:5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace.

Reply to Objection 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God’s foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.

Reply to Objection 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of the book of life refers.

Reply to Objection 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included in the knowledge of God, although not anew.

THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)

After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God. About this are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is power in God?

(2) Whether His power is infinite?

(3) Whether He is almighty?

(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?

(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?

(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?

Whether there is power in God?

Objection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent—namely, God—is devoid of power.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as was shown above ([198]Q[3] , A[3]). Therefore, there is no power in God.

Objection 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God’s essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God.

Objection 4: Further, it was shown above ([199]Q[14], A[8]; [200]Q[19], A[4]) that God’s knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.

On the contrary, It is said: “Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee” (Ps. 88:9).

I answer that, Power is twofold—namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above ([201]Q[3], A[2]; [202]Q[4], AA[1], 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the highest degree.

Reply to Objection 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active power.

Reply to Objection 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God’s action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in God nobler than His power.

Reply to Objection 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of “suppositum” possessing nature, and under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect.

Reply to Objection 4: Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically;

inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.

Whether the power of God is infinite?

Objection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite.

Objection 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that “God’s power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one.” Now everything that is immeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.

I answer that, As stated above [203](A[1]), active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine essence ([204]Q[7], A[1]). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above ([205]Q[7], A[1]) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above ([206]Q[7], A[1]); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.

Reply to Objection 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above ([207]Q[3], A[5]; [208]Q[4], A[3]). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will.

Whether God is omnipotent?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, for He is immovable, as was said above ([209]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Objection 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is not omnipotent.

Objection 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

Objection 4: Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God,' etc.] by showing those things to be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent.

On the contrary, It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" (Lk. 1:37).

I answer that, All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is able to do.

It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.

It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: “No word shall be impossible with God.” For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing.

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above [210](A[1]). Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.

Reply to Objection 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is impossible—as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent are impossible: as if one were to say: “If man is a donkey, he has four feet.” Or he may be understood to mean that God can do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury.

Reply to Objection 3: God’s omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ([211]Q[21], A[4]), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.

Reply to Objection 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it belongs to God alone to do immediately—as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like—are said to be possible in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above ([212]Q[14], A[1], ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and necessity.

Whether God can make the past not to have been?

Objection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been.

Objection 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run.

Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): “Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted.” Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been.

I answer that, As was said above ([213]Q[7], A[2]), there does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): “Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): “Of this one thing alone is God deprived—namely, to make undone the things that have been done.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.

Reply to Objection 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done.

Reply to Objection 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.

Whether God can do what He does not?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Objection 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.

Objection 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does.

On the contrary, It is said: “Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?” (Mat. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not.

I answer that, In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place—as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above ([214]Q[19], A[3]) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above ([215]Q[21], A[2]), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.

Reply to Objection 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above ([216]Q[19], A[3]), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above [217](A[3]). What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.

Reply to Objection 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words “befitting” and “just” may be understood in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb “is”; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the verb “can” (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with “is,” the present will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: “God cannot do anything except that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just.”

Reply to Objection 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order.

Whether God can do better than what He does?

Objection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): “If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have been envious.” For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better than He does.

Objection 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine says (Enchiridion 10), “each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe.” Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God.

Objection 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made them.

On the contrary, It is said (Eph. 3:20): “God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand.”

I answer that, The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it—thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if “better” is taken substantively, this proposition is true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, “better” is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the substance.

Reply to Objection 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be another and a better universe.

Reply to Objection 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.

OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?

(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?

(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?

(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?

Whether beatitude belongs to God?

Objection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) “is a state made perfect by the aggregation of all good things.” But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude does not belong to God.

Objection 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.

On the contrary, The Apostle says: “Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of Lords.” (1 Tim. 6:15).

I answer that, Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.

Reply to Objection 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ([218]Q[4], A[2]; [219]Q[13], A[4]), in simplicity and unity.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit.

Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?

Objection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect.

Objection 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): “He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise.” To be in glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because “vision is the whole of the reward,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect.

I answer that, Beatitude, as stated above [220](A[1]), is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation to His beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect.

Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?

Objection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above ([221]Q[6], AA[2],4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above ([222]Q[11], A[3]). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God Himself.

Objection 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.

On the contrary, The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: “Star differeth from star in glory.” But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God.

I answer that, The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): “Blessed is he who knoweth Thee, though he know nought else.” But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.

Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate.

Reply to Objection 2: End is twofold, namely, “objective” and “subjective,” as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the “thing itself” and “its use.” Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing.

Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?

Objection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.

Objection 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.

On the contrary, Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above ([223]Q[4], A[2]). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.

I answer that, Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.

We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.

TREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ[27]-43)

THE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

Having considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it remains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God. And because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other according to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads us to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession; secondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.

Concerning procession there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is procession in God?

(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides generation.

(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?

(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?

Whether there is procession in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God. For procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing mobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession in God.

Objection 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence it proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme simplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.

Objection 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the nature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as shown above

([224]Q[2], A[3]). Therefore in God there is no procession.

On the contrary, Our Lord says, “From God I proceeded” (Jn. 8:42).

I answer that, Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which signify procession. This procession has been differently understood. Some have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its cause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father as His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the Son nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what is said of the Son, “That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is true God” (1 Jn. 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, “Know you not that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?” (1 Cor. 6:19). Now, to have a temple is God’s prerogative. Others take this procession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it, or impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood by Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming flesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost in sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words of the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, “The Son cannot of Himself do anything” (Jn. 5:19); while many other passages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the Son. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take procession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms procession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession always supposes action, and as there is an outward procession corresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be an inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the agent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of which remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by the very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us, which is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that object. This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is called the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.

As God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God, not according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but from the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual substances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short in the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not to be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local movement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect, as, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot. Rather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for example, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet remains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands procession as existing in God.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession in the sense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or to an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in God, as we have explained.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is necessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas, whatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not necessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the more closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is clear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the intellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent; since the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with the object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very supreme perfection of God ([225]Q[14], A[2]), the divine Word is of necessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without any kind of diversity.

Reply to Objection 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be something outside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the idea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession by way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first principle. For when we call the builder the principle of the house, in the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and it would be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder the first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of all things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to things designed.

Whether any procession in God can be called generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called generation. For generation is change from non-existence to existence, and is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both. Nothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist in God.

Objection 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained [226](A[1]). But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called in God.

Objection 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from its generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But no derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the divine existence is self-subsisting ([227]Q[3], A[4]), it follows that no generated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is no generation in God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 2:7): “This day have I begotten Thee.”

I answer that, The procession of the Word in God is called generation. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a twofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and corruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from non-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs to living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living being from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called birth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but, strictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a hair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has which proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice; for a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of generation and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for this kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by way of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from a man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed from potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation includes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being whose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if found in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of generation; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs to living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God is generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which is a vital operation:—from a conjoined principle (as above described):—by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the intellect is a likeness of the object conceived:—and exists in the same nature, because in God the act of understanding and His existence are the same, as shown above ([228]Q[14], A[4]). Hence the procession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word Himself proceeding is called the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation in the first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to act; in which sense it is not found in God.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the substance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds within us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the source whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be properly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence is the very substance itself of the one who understands ([229]Q[14], A[4]). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same nature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture employs terms which denote generation of living things in order to signify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and birth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, "The depths were not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was brought forth." (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the word "conception" in order to signify that in the word of our intellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although there be no identity of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything derived from another has existence in another subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance of created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could receive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God receives its existence from the generator, not as though that existence were received into matter or into a subject (which would conflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His existence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine existence from another; not, however, as if He were other from the divine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence are contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle of the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection ([230]Q[4], A[2]).

Whether any other procession exists in God besides that of the Word?

Objection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God besides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we admit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and so on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the first, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.

Objection 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of self-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity from their terms. But procession in God is only by way of communication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one divine nature ([231]Q[11], A[4]), it follows that only one procession exists in God.

Objection 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect ([232]Q[19], A[1]). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word.

On the contrary, The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (Jn. 15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, “I will ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete” (Jn. 14:16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the procession of the Word.

I answer that, There are two processions in God; the procession of the Word, and another.

In evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God, only according to an action which does not tend to anything external, but remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual nature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of the Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the will within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love, whereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the word, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent. Hence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him another procession called the procession of love.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine processions; for the procession which is accomplished within the agent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the will.

Reply to Objection 2: All that exists in God, is God ([233]Q[3], AA[3],4); whereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine nature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and this does not apply to other natures.

Reply to Objection 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.

Whether the procession of love in God is generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is generation. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among living things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in God by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it would be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external procession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds as generated and born.

Objection 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does it belong to love. Hence it is said, that “every beast loves its like” (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by way of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of generation.

Objection 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So if there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some special name besides this common name of procession. But no other name is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love in God is generation.

On the contrary, Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost Who proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the statement of Athanasius: “The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding.”

I answer that, The procession of love in God ought not to be called generation. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect and the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual by the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the intellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of the object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination to the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of similitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets its own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of similitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an object.

So what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten, or as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a certain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described as moved or impelled by love to perform an action.

Reply to Objection 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature. Hence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one procession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of this unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be taken from the order of one procession to another; which order is derived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each procession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and intellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really is; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the divine nature, but is not said to be born.

Reply to Objection 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to love. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object understood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator; but it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness, but because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not follow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the principle of love.

Reply to Objection 3: We can name God only from creatures ([234]Q[13], A[1]). As in creatures generation is the only principle of communication of nature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that of generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has remained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as it is the procession of the Spirit.

Whether there are more than two processions in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions in God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power. Therefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will, it seems that there must also be a third procession of power.

Objection 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of procession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there must be a procession of goodness in God.

Objection 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than in us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but there are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also from one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more than two processions.

On the contrary, In God there are not more than two who proceed—the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him but two processions.

I answer that, The divine processions can be derived only from the actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is intellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the acts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also appears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the intellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from the sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected by the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word, and of Love.

Reply to Objection 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on another. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the divine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but is indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to the essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the object of the will.

Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love, according as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([235]Q[14], A[5]; [236]Q[19], A[5]), God understands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He wills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of Word from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one perfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His perfect fecundity.

THE DIVINE RELATIONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

The divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are real relations in God?

(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are extrinsic to it?

(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from each other?

(4) The number of these relations.

Whether there are real relations in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God. For Boethius says (De Trin. iv), “All possible predicaments used as regards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be predicated relatively.” But whatever really exists in God can be predicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, “Relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is the relation of the same to the same.” But a relation of this kind is only a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in reality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real relations, but are formed only by the mind.

Objection 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a principle. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not import any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity in God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same reason to the other relations in God.

Objection 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an intelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of the intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and filiation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical relations.

On the contrary, The Father is denominated only from paternity; and the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or filiation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really Father or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is the Sabellian heresy.

I answer that, relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we may consider that in relations alone is found something which is only in the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any other genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in their strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a subject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what refers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the nature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature are ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such relations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found an inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the heavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same applies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another, signified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation only; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the species to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of the same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of procession, agree in the same order; and then they have real relations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in the identity of the same nature, as above explained ([237]Q[27], AA[2],4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are necessarily real relations.

Reply to Objection 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not wish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation signified by the term “the same” is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.

Reply to Objection 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of nature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any relation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not produce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will, as is above explained ([238]Q[14], AA[3],4; [239]Q[19], A[8]). Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.

Reply to Objection 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone in the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as reason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the mind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the intellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding and the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only, but are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are real things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them intelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds from it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations in God.

Whether relation in God is the same as His essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as the divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that “not all that is said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things relatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not refer to the substance.” Therefore the relation is not the divine essence.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, “every relative expression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is a man, and slave is a man." Therefore, if relations exist in God, there must be something else besides relation in God. This can only be His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.

Objection 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to another, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the divine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially itself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the perfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and self-subsisting ([240]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore relation is not the divine essence.

On the contrary, Everything which is not the divine essence is a creature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the divine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of latria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: "Let us adore the distinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty."

I answer that, It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on this point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims. For he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally affixed.

To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.

Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in

God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.

Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God’s supreme simplicity.

Reply to Objection 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not only a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same applies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the creature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of relation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God there is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is not perfectly expressed by the word “relation,” as if it were comprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above explained ([241]Q[13], A[2]), in treating of the divine names, that more is contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be signified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in God anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various names imposed by us.

Reply to Objection 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is signified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect, being thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing more were contained in it than what is signified by the word “wisdom,” it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the perfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in any name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name applied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence is in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within itself the perfection of every genus ([242]Q[4], A[2]).

Whether the relations in God are really distinguished from each other?

Objection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really distinguished from each other. For things which are identified with the same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God is really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

Objection 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished from the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this kind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine goodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real distinction of paternity and filiation.

Objection 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of origin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another. Therefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God “the substance contains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity.” Therefore, if the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there would be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is the error of Sabellius.

I answer that, The attributing of anything to another involves the attribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when “man” is attributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him. The idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to another, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in God there is a real relation [243](A[1]), there must also be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not, indeed, according to that which is absolute—namely, essence, wherein there is supreme unity and simplicity—but according to that which is relative.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument holds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are identified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as, for instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ logically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is the same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow that action and passion are the same; because action implies reference as of something "from which" there is motion in the thing moved; whereas passion implies reference as of something "which is from" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is really the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in their own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence they are distinguished from each other.

Reply to Objection 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in their respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.

Reply to Objection 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or proceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed according to the procession of one from another.

Whether in God there are only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real relations—paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it must be observed that in God there exist the relations of the intelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to the object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those above specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in God.

Objection 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming from the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible relations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore in God there exists an infinite series of real relations.

Objection 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal ([244]Q[15], A[1]); and are only distinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as above stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.

Objection 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations: and they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations are eternal in God than the above named.

Objection 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are fewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the Philosopher

(Phys. iii text 24), “It is the same way from Athens to Thebes, as from Thebes to Athens.” By the same way of reasoning there is the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity, and from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are not four relations in God.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every relation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on action and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son, the master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity in God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to creatures are not real in Him ([245]Q[13], A[7]). Hence, it follows that real relations in God can be understood only in regard to those actions according to which there are internal, and not external, processions in God. These processions are two only, as above explained ([246]Q[27], A[5]), one derived from the action of the intellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action of the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these processions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the relation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is the relation of the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is called generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is applied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of generation in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the relation of the one proceeding from the principle is called filiation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own ([247]Q[27], A[4]); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper name of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession is called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is called procession: although these two names belong to the processions or origins themselves, and not to the relations.

Reply to Objection 1: In those things in which there is a difference between the intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can be a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer to the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its object are one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God understands all other things; and the same applies to His will and the object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of relations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to itself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation; because the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible action; and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a stone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood, is called the word.

Reply to Objection 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely multiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by another act understands that he understands the stone, and again by another, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of understanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the relations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He understands all things by one act alone.

Reply to Objection 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it does not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in God; but that God knows these many relations.

Reply to Objection 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations; but are only logical relations ([248]Q[42], A[3], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the same; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we cannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the same as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of something absolute, if there were such between them.

THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

Having premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the processions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the persons.

First, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then comparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons absolutely first in common; and then singly.

The general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four points: (1) The signification of this word “person”; (2) the number of the persons; (3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto; as diversity, and similitude, and the like; and (4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.

Four subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:(1) The definition of “person.”
(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.

(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?

(4) What does it signify in Him?

The definition of “person”

Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient—that is, “a person is an individual substance of a rational nature.” For nothing singular can be subject to definition. But “person” signifies something singular. Therefore person is improperly defined.

Objection 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of person, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the former, the word “individual” is superfluous, because first substance is individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word “individual” is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since second substances are the “genera” or “species.” Therefore this definition is incorrect.

Objection 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the definition of a thing. For to define a man as “a species of animal” would not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing, and “species” is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is the name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational nature), the word “individual” which is an intentional name comes improperly into the definition.

Objection 4: Further, “Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in those things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally,” as Aristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as in God, and in the angels. Therefore the word “nature” ought not to enter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be “essence.”

Objection 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of the rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not properly defined as above.

I answer that, Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself; whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called “this,” because it exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the individuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their own; for they are called “hypostases,” or first substances.

Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is “person.”

Thus the term “individual substance” is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term “rational nature” is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.

Reply to Objection 1: Although this or that singular may not be definable, yet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined; and so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a definition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines person.

Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, the term “substance” in the definition of person stands for first substance, which is the hypostasis; nor is the term “individual” superfluously added, forasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of universality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in general is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a part. But where “individual” is added, the idea of assumptibility is excluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it is assumed by a greater—that is, by the Word of God. It is, however, better to say that substance is here taken in a general sense, as divided into first and second, and when “individual” is added, it is restricted to first substance.

Reply to Objection 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at least unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental differences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say that fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise, terms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if used to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term “individual” is placed in the definition of person to signify the mode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word “nature” was first used to signify the generation of living things, which is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes from an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the intrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines “nature” (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either formal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature. And as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the essence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called nature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that, “nature is the specific difference giving its form to each thing,” for the specific difference completes the definition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in the definition of “person,” which means the singular in a determined “genus,” it is more correct to use the term “nature” than “essence,” because the latter is taken from being, which is most common.

Reply to Objection 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so, although it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains its nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance, which is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand nor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name of person belongs to it.

Whether “person” is the same as hypostasis, subsistence, and essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that “person” is the same as “hypostasis,” “subsistence,” and “essence.” For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that “the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by the name hypostasis.” But this with us signifies “person.” Therefore “person” is altogether the same as “hypostasis.”

Objection 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say there are three subsistences in God; which implies that “person” and “subsistence” have the same meaning. Therefore “person” and “subsistence” mean the same.

Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek {ousia}, which means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form. Now that which is composed of matter and form is the individual substance called “hypostasis” and “person.” Therefore all the aforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.

Objection 4: On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera and species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only subsistent, but also substand. But subsistences are so called from subsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding. Therefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons, these are not the same as subsistences.

Objection 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called hypostasis, and form is called {ousiosis}—that is, subsistence. But neither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person differs from the others.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance is twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the Greeks {ousia}, what we may call “essence.” In another sense substance means a subject or “suppositum,” which subsists in the genus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be applied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called “suppositum.” It is also called by three names signifying a reality—that is, “a thing of nature,” “subsistence,” and “hypostasis,” according to a threefold consideration of the substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is called “subsistence”; as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common nature, it is called “a thing of nature”; as, for instance, this particular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the accidents, it is called “hypostasis,” or “substance.” What these three names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this name “person” signifies in the genus of rational substances.

Reply to Objection 1: Among the Greeks the term “hypostasis,” taken in the strict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the genus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the individual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of that nature.

Reply to Objection 2: As we say “three persons” plurally in God, and “three subsistences,” so the Greeks say “three hypostases.” But because the word “substance,” which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to “hypostasis,” is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it sometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to avoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use “subsistence” for hypostasis, rather than “substance.”

Reply to Objection 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only the matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as the principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter and this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul, flesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this flesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore hypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of essence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed of matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine simplicity ([249]Q[3], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch as it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact that they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament of substance, but not because the species and genera themselves subsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the species of things subsisted separately from singular things. To substand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation to the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.

Reply to Objection 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in relation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius says (De Trin.): “A simple form cannot be a subject.” Its self-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does not supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account, therefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and {ousiosis}, or subsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of substanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.

Whether the word “person” should be said of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name “person” should not be said of God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): “No one should ever dare to say or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity, beyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles.” But the name “person” is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament. Therefore “person” is not to be applied to God.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): “The word person seems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies and tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando], since a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the mask. These “persons” or masks the Greeks called {prosopa}, as they were placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes.” This, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense. Therefore the word “person” is only applied to God metaphorically.

Objection 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word “hypostasis” does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not exist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, “in this word hypostasis, poison lurks in honey.” Therefore the word “person” should not be said of God.

Objection 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing defined is also denied of it. But the definition of “person,” as given above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a discursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above ([250]Q[14], A[12]); and thus God cannot be said to have “a rational nature.” And also because God cannot be called an individual substance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God is immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called a substance. Therefore the word “person” ought not to be attributed to God.

On the contrary, In the Creed of Athanasius we say: “One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.”

I answer that, “Person” signifies what is most perfect in all nature—that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence, since everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch as His essence contains every perfection, this name “person” is fittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures, but in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving them to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when treating of the names of God ([251]Q[13], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: Although the word “person” is not found applied to God in Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what the word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the most perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in the very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one could speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or New Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to find new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a kind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for it does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle warns us to avoid “profane novelties of words” (1 Tim. 6:20).

Reply to Objection 2: Although this name “person” may not belong to God as regards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs to God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name “person” was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called “persons.” Thence by some the definition of person is given as “hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity.” And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of the rational nature is called a “person.” Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other dignity; and thus the name “person” pre-eminently belongs to God.

Reply to Objection 3: The word “hypostasis” does not apply to God as regards its source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it applies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify the subsistence. Jerome said that “poison lurks in this word,” forasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the heretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess many essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the word “substance,” which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is commonly taken amongst us to mean essence.

Reply to Objection 4: It may be said that God has a rational “nature,” if reason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general sense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an “individual” in the sense that

His individuality comes from matter; but only in the sense which implies incommunicability. “Substance” can be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence. There are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius, quoted above [252](A[1]), is not a definition of person in the sense we use when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor amends this definition by adding that “Person” in God is “the incommunicable existence of the divine nature.”

Whether this word “person” signifies relation?

Objection 1: It would seem that this word “person,” as applied to God, does not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6): “When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to Himself, and not in regard to the Son.”

Objection 2: Further, the interrogation “What?” refers to essence. But, as Augustine says: “When we say there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked, Three what? the answer is, Three persons.” Therefore person signifies essence.

Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a word is its definition. But the definition of “person” is this: “The individual substance of the rational nature,” as above stated. Therefore “person” signifies substance.

Objection 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation, but something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation, it would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.) that “every word that refers to the persons signifies relation.” But no word belongs to person more strictly than the very word “person” itself. Therefore this word “person” signifies relation.

I answer that, A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this word “person” in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally of the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the essence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words which express relation.

Hence some have thought that this word “person” of itself expresses absolutely the divine essence; as this name “God” and this word “Wise”;

but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by conciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and especially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing adjective; as when we say, “Three persons,” or, “one is the person of the Father, another of the Son,” etc. Used, however, in the singular, it may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation; for, if this word “person,” by force of its own signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that forasmuch as we speak of “three persons,” so far from the heretics being silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this, others maintained that this word “person” in God signifies both the essence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies directly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as “person” means as it were “by itself one” [per se una]; and unity belongs to the essence. And what is “by itself” implies relation indirectly; for the Father is understood to exist “by Himself,” as relatively distinct from the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it signifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in the definition of “person” the term nature is mentioned indirectly; and these come nearer to the truth.

To determine the question, we must consider that something may be included in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included in the more common term; as “rational” is included in the meaning of “man,” and not in the meaning of “animal.” So that it is one thing to ask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning when the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the meaning of this word “person” in general; and another to ask the meaning of “person” as applied to God. For “person” in general signifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The individual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others. Therefore “person” in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which, though not belonging to “person” in general, nevertheless do belong to the meaning of a particular human person.

Now distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above ([253]Q[28], AA[2],3), while relation in God is not as an accident in a subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent, for the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so the divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person. Therefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that which subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus it is true to say that the name “person” signifies relation directly, and the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as expressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly the essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is the same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed as distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into the notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this signification of the word “person” was not clearly perceived before it was attacked by heretics. Hence, this word “person” was used just as any other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express relation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word “person” means relation not only by use and custom, according to the first opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.

Reply to Objection 1: This word “person” is said in respect to itself, not to another; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way of a substance—which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says that it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same as the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are the same.

Reply to Objection 2: The term “what” refers sometimes to the nature expressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we answer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the “suppositum,” as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.

Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual—i.e. distinct and incommunicable substance—includes the idea of relation, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term does not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a human person, the word “person” is used in an equivocal sense. Though neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally of God and creatures ([254]Q[13], A[5]).

THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are several persons in God?

(2) How many are they?

(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?

(4) The community of the term “person.”

Whether there are several persons in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God. For person is “the individual substance of a rational nature.” If then there are several persons in God, there must be several substances; which appears to be heretical.

Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God there is no plurality but of relations ([255]Q[28], A[3]). Therefore there cannot be several persons in God.

Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that “this is truly one which has no number.” But plurality implies number. Therefore there are not several persons in God.

Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.

On the contrary, Athanasius says: “One is the person of the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.

I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several persons in God. For it was shown above ([256]Q[29], A[4]) that this word “person” signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine nature. It was also established ([257]Q[28], A[1]) that there are several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that there are several persons in God.

Reply to Objection 1: The definition of “person” includes “substance,” not as meaning the essence, but the “suppositum” which is made clear by the addition of the term “individual.” To signify the substance thus understood, the Greeks use the name “hypostasis.” So, as we say, “Three persons,” they say “Three hypostases.” We are not, however, accustomed to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.

Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist, nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities—that is, several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other ([258]Q[28], A[3]). Hence the plurality of persons in God.

Reply to Objection 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations. Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations do not import composition in that of which they are predicated, as Boethius teaches in the same book.

Reply to Objection 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered, in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the whole Trinity, as we shall show further on ([259]Q[42], AA[1], 4).

Whether there are more than three persons in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of the relative properties as stated above [260](A[1]). But there are four relations in God as stated above ([261]Q[28], A[4]), paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in God.

Objection 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three persons in God.

Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from the intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are an infinite number of persons in God.

Objection 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and so to infinity.

Objection 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured, for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we say in the Creed of Athanasius: “The Father is immense, the Son is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense.” Therefore the persons are not contained within the number three.

On the contrary, It is said: “There are three who bear witness in heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost” (1 Jn. 5:7). To those who ask, “Three what?” we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4), “Three persons.” Therefore there are but three persons in God.

I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only three persons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and the other to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person generating and the person generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what was laid down above ([262]Q[27] , AA[3],4). We must frequently admit that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs to the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as above explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not called a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor is it a personal relation—i.e. constituting a person. The three relations—paternity, filiation, and procession—are called personal properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.

Reply to Objection 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way of nature; thus, as above explained ([263]Q[27], A[3]), the procession of the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and therefore the procession of love is not called generation in God.

Reply to Objection 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real operation—that is, His essence. How there are in Him two processions was above explained ([264]Q[27], AA[1],4).

Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from the other persons who are in God.

Reply to Objection 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is the same ([265]Q[42], AA[1],4), and the same is not measured by the same.

Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in God.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.

Objection 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality; it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “If we admit companionship”—that is, plurality—“we exclude the idea of oneness and of solitude;” and Ambrose says (De Fide i): “When we say one God, unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God.” Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove something; and not to denote anything positive.

I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.

In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.

Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God, asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.

But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to the many of which it is predicated, as “one” convertible with “being” is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the divine unity ([266]Q[11], A[1]); for “one” signifies undivided being. So, of whatever we say “one,” we imply its undivided reality: thus, for instance, “one” applied to man signifies the undivided nature or substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things, multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each undivided in itself.

But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident added to being; as also does “one” which is the principle of that number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term “one” signifies the essence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the very nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.

Reply to Objection 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude; hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a negation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God: unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to God.

Reply to Objection 3: “One” does not exclude multitude, but division, which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity, but division from each of the individuals which compose the multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity ([267]Q[11], A[2]).

It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.

Whether this term “person” can be common to the three persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that this term “person” cannot be common to the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the essence. But this term “person” does not signify the essence directly. Therefore it is not common to all three.

Objection 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable. But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor ([268]Q[29], A[3], ad 4). Therefore this term “person” is not common to all the three persons.

Objection 3: Further, if the name “person” is common to the three, it is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really; otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we proved above ([269]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore this term ‘person’ is not common to the three.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask, “Three what?” we say, “Three persons,” because what a person is, is common to them.

I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term “person” is common to the three when we say “three persons”; for when we say “three men” we show that “man” is common to the three. Now it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of the three, as also one essence.

What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of “person” contains the word “incommunicable.” Others thought it to be a community of intention, as the definition of person contains the word “individual”; as we say that to be a “species” is common to horse and ox. Both of these explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that “person” is not a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name “person” is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms “genus” or “species.” The vague individual thing, as “some man,” signifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular things—that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference—that the term “some man” signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name “person” is not given to signify the individual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name “person” is common in idea to the three divine persons.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is founded on a real community.

Reply to Objection 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many.

Reply to Objection 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the community of person the same as community of genus or species; and because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being.

OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which gives rise to four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the word “Trinity”;

(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?

(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be joined to an essential name in God?

(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?

Whether there is trinity in God?

Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name in God signifies substance or relation. But this name “Trinity” does not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a name that refers to another. Therefore the word “Trinity” is not to be applied to God.

Objection 2: Further, this word “trinity” is a collective term, since it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word “trinity” does not apply to God.

Objection 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither is there trinity in God.

Objection 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.

Objection 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the word trinity is not to be applied to God.

On the contrary, Athanasius says: “Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in Unity is to be revered.”

I answer that, The name “Trinity” in God signifies the determinate number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate manner.

Reply to Objection 1: In its etymological sense, this word “Trinity” seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality of the “supposita,” and a unity of some kind of order. For “people” is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the first sense, this word “trinity” is like other collective words; but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is unity of essence.

Reply to Objection 3: “Trinity” is taken in an absolute sense; for it signifies the threefold number of persons. “Triplicity” signifies a proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion, according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not triplicity, but Trinity.

Reply to Objection 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number and the persons numbered. So when we say, “Trinity in Unity,” we do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as the “supposita” of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the other hand, we say “Unity in Trinity”; meaning that the nature is in its “supposita.”

Reply to Objection 5: When we say, “Trinity is trine,” by reason of the number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself; since the word trine imports a distinction in the “supposita” of which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be three “supposita” of the Trinity; as when we say, “God is trine,” it follows that there are three “supposita” of the Godhead.

Whether the Son is other than the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father. For “other” is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If, then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that when we speak of three persons, “we do not mean to imply diversity.”

Objection 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that “the Father and the Son are one in Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any diversity.”

Objection 3: Further, the term alien is taken from “alius” [other]. But the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that “in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien, nothing separable." Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.

Objection 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing apart from the Father.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says: "There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost another."

I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful." Now, in treating of the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed cautiously between them—namely, the error of Arius, who placed a Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.

Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or "difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of "diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction." But lest the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid the terms "alien" and "discrepant." For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead": and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing alien, nothing separable."

To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity," lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father and the Son are separate in Godhead.” We must avoid the adjective “only” [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary says in the same book: “We exclude from God the idea of singularity or uniqueness.” Nevertheless, we say “the only Son,” for in God there is no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say “the only God,” for the Deity is common to several. We avoid the word “confused,” lest we take away from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide i): “What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where there is no difference.” The word “solitary” is also to be avoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says (De Trin. iv), “We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God.”

This word “other” [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only a distinction of “suppositum”; and hence we can properly say that “the Son is other than the Father,” because He is another “suppositum” of the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.

Reply to Objection 1: “Other,” being like the name of a particular thing, refers to the “suppositum”; and so, there is sufficient reason for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from the Father, although He is another.

Reply to Objection 2: “Difference” implies distinction of form. There is one form in God, as appears from the text, “Who, when He was in the form of God” (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term “difference” does not properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term “difference” in the divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But “difference” is taken for “distinction,” as above stated.

Reply to Objection 3: The term “alien” means what is extraneous and dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term “other” [alius]; and therefore we say that the Son is “other” than the Father, but not that He is anything “alien.”

Reply to Objection 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the “suppositum”; whereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person.

Whether the exclusive word “alone” should be added to the essential term in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word “alone” [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), “He is alone who is not with another.” But God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot say that God is alone.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can be predicated of every person “per se,” and of all the persons together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): “We must consider the opinion that the Father is not true God alone.” Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.

Objection 3: Further if this expression “alone” is joined to an essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is false to say, “God alone is Father,” since man also is a father; nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying were true, “God alone creates,” it would follow that the “Father alone creates,” as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father; and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this expression “alone” cannot be joined to an essential term in God.

On the contrary, It is said, “To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God” (1 Tim. 1:17).

I answer that, This term “alone” can be taken as a categorematical term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given “suppositum”; as, for instance, “white” to man, as when we say a “white man.” If the term “alone” is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is above stated [270](A[2]). A syncategorematical term imports the order of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other "suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said "God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary, though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.

Reply to Objection 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the "suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"—that is, no one else—"runs: and Socrates runs only"—that is, he does nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who alone is God." In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the predicate, and not to the "suppositum." So, when Augustine says that the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to the Trinity alone.

Reply to Objection 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow, "therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore Socrates alone is such."

Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?

Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true God" (Jn. 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.

Objection 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father" (Mat. 11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Objection 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white," or that "man is not white." But one person is in the concept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.

Objection 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus Christ."

On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes two assertions—namely, that the Father is God, and that no other besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.

I answer that, When we say, “The Father alone is God,” such a proposition can be taken in several senses. If “alone” means solitude in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways. For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is true, the sense being “the Father alone is God”—that is, “He who with no other is the Father, is God.” In this way Augustine expounds when he says (De Trin. vi, 6): “We say the Father alone, not because He is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not the Father together with Him.” This, however, is not the usual way of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said “He who alone is called the Father is God.” But in the strict sense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But because this diction “alone,” properly speaking, refers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.

Reply to Objection 1: When we say, “Thee the only true God,” we do not understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word “only” excludes another thing, as above explained.

The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the term “no one” [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man] is not the same as “no man,” which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not differ in “suppositum,” as part and universal. But the Son differs in “suppositum” from the Father; and so there is no parity.

Reply to Objection 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most High; but that He alone is Most High “with the Holy Ghost, in the glory of God the Father.”

THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons; and this involves four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?

(3) The number of the notions?

(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these notions?

Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo et Mundo i, 2): “Through this number”—namely, three—“we bring ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all things created.” And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): “I have read in their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,” and so on; in which passage the distinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign—that is, as regards knowledge of a third person—i.e. of the Holy Ghost—and thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise Trismegistus says: “The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself its own heat.” By which words the generation of the Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.

Objection 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): “I believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found for any explanation of the truth.” So even to prove the Trinity some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine persons; while some are moved by the consideration that “no good thing can be joyfully possessed without partnership.” Augustine proceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in this ([271]Q[27] , AA[1],3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), “Let no man think to reach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind.” And Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 5), “It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The mind fails, the voice is silent.” But the trinity of the divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and procession ([272]Q[30], A[2]). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.

I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained ([273]Q[12], AA[4],12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating of God as above ([274]Q[12], A[12]). Now, the creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason, derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that “faith is of things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle says also, “We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden” (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such grounds.

Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible. Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): “Whoever wholly resists the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the truth of the word”—i.e. “the sacred word, we too follow this rule.”

Reply to Objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle’s words, “We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the world”—i.e. the philosophers—“knew” (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless, they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, “By this number,” etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, “In the beginning was the word,” not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third sign—that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that knowing God “they did not glorify Him as God” (Rom. 1); or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called “mind” or the “paternal intellect,” containing the idea of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, “Monad begot monad,” etc., this does not refer to the generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but to the production of the world. For one God produced one world by reason of His love for Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a point: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of some principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be brought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform velocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a sufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already established principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in astrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were sufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the first way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second way, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when assumed to be true, such reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident when we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is manifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an act of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His infinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should proceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it should receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that joyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the case of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some other’s good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness. Nor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God, forasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally. Hence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we arrive at knowledge, and not conversely.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two reason why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of creation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced things by necessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we show that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of His own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” subjoined, “God said, Let there be light,” to manifest the divine Word; and then said, “God saw the light that it was good,” to show proof of the divine love. The same is also found in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly, that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race, accomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.

Whether there are notions in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “We must not dare to say anything of God but what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture.” But Holy Scripture does not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in God.

Objection 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the essence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern the unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither can what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for instance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can what belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not say that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore there do not exist notions in God.

Objection 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): “We recognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three properties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional.” Therefore we must admit properties and notions in God.

I answer that, Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the persons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and wherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the concrete. For as we are accustomed to say, “I beseech your kindness”—i.e. you who are kind—so when we speak of paternity in God, we mean God the Father.

But, as shown above ([275]Q[3], A[3], ad 1), the use of concrete and abstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine simplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it. Now, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the divine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human intellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own mode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence its knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to signify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete terms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by abstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their subsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.

But not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in the concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but the same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity and Father.

Two chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the obstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask: “Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?” as we answer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be some abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are distinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an abstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine essence is signified as “What”; and the person as “Who”; and the property as “Whereby.”

The second motive is because one person in God is related to two persons—namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son and the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one relation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy Ghost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation. Thus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow that the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it be said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to creatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the Father is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost; whereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations. For, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to another, it must be said that two relations are not specifically different if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the relation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of filiation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His creatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are not related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence there is no parity.

Further, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the creature ([276]Q[28], A[1],3); while there is no reason against our admitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there must be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, corresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, whereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two relations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is necessary that the relations should be separately signified in the abstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy Scripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of notions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.

Reply to Objection 2: In God the notions have their significance not after the manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the persons are known; although in God these notions or relations are real, as stated above ([277]Q[28], A[1]). Therefore whatever has order to any essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions; forasmuch as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we cannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is intelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any act, but simply remove created conditions from God, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense, or such like. So also on account of the real identity, substantive terms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the notions; for we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is the Father.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the persons are simple, still without prejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be abstractedly signified, as above explained.

Whether there are five notions?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the notions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are distinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four ([278]Q[28], A[4]). Therefore the notions are only four in number.

Objection 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called one God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the Trine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be called quinary; which cannot be allowed.

Objection 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in God, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the person of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common spiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they really differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed of several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that one of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as the divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the common reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be admitted. Therefore there are not five notions.

Objection 4: On the contrary, It seems that there are more; because as the Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of innascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And in this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.

Objection 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of the Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the Father and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine Person. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their origin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another comes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes a person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be known by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact that He is from no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called “innascibility.” As the source of another, He can be known in two ways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known by the notion of “paternity”; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known by the notion of “common spiration.” The Son can be known as begotten by another, and thus He is known by “filiation”; and also by another person proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in the same way as the Father is known, by “common spiration.” The Holy Ghost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from others; thus He is known by “procession”; but not by the fact that another is from Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him.

Therefore, there are Five notions in God: “innascibility,” “paternity,” “filiation,” “common spiration,” and “procession.” Of these only four are relations, for “innascibility” is not a relation, except by reduction, as will appear later ([279]Q[33], A[4], ad 3). Four only are properties. For “common spiration” is not a property; because it belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions—i.e. constituting persons, “paternity,” “filiation,” and “procession.” “Common spiration” and “innascibility” are called notions of Persons, but not personal notions, as we shall explain further on ([280]Q[40], A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must be admitted, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and likewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions are signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God is one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons, nevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only on relative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they are not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor again are they predicated of each other, because they are different ideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is the attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is power.

Reply to Objection 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above ([281]Q[19], A[3]) we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact that no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity, as it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.

Reply to Objection 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special mode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son agree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the principle on which a notion is based must be something special; thus no parity of reasoning exists.

Whether it is lawful to have various contrary opinions of notions?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various contrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3): “No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity”: to which mystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in some way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary opinions of the notions.

Objection 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no contrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore neither can there be about the notions.

On the contrary, The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore different opinions of the notions are permissible.

I answer that, Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any truth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and unity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning these truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if it be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial of it involves as a consequence something against faith; as for instance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it follows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such things anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy, before the matter has been considered or settled as involving consequences against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown; whereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided that consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free from heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as heretical which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences are now more manifest.

So we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about the notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with faith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the notions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would follow, he would lapse into heresy.

By what has been said all the objections may be solved.

OF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the Father, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?

(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this name “Father”?

(3) Whether “Father” in God is said personally before it is said essentially?

(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?

Whether it belongs to the Father to be the principle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the principle of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause are the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say that He is the principle of the Son.

Objection 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing principled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which appears false.

Objection 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in God there is no “before” and “after,” as Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), “The Father is the Principle of the whole Deity.”

I answer that, The word “principle” signifies only that whence another proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way we call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one whence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.

Reply to Objection 1: The Greeks use the words “cause” and “principle” indifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not use the word “cause,” but only “principle.” The reason is because “principle” is a wider term than “cause”; as “cause” is more common than “element.” For the first term of a thing, as also the first part, is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a term is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God ([282]Q[13], A[11]), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the mode adapted to the creature. Hence this term “cause” seems to mean diversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is not implied in the word “principle.” For in all kinds of causes there is always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of perfection or of power: whereas we use the term “principle” even in things which have no such difference, but have only a certain order to each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a line; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the principle of a line.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son and the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom with our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father something of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we do not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way, Hilary says (De Trin. ix): “By authority of the Giver, the Father is the greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of nature is give.”

Reply to Objection 3: Although this word principle, as regards its derivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not signify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the reason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above ([283]Q[13], A[8]).

Whether this name “Father” is properly the name of a divine person?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name “Father” is not properly the name of a divine person. For the name “Father” signifies relation. Moreover “person” is an individual substance. Therefore this name “Father” is not properly a name signifying a Person.

Objection 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every father begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is more properly applied to God, as stated above ([284]Q[13], A[11]). Therefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and genitor than Father.

Objection 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of anyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or offspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is metaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in God is not properly called Father.

Objection 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of God first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to creatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the one who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not only by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name “Father” taken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any divine person.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 88:27): “He shall cry out to me: Thou art my Father.”

I answer that, The proper name of any person signifies that whereby the person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and soul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular man belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these is this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is paternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other persons. Hence this name “Father,” whereby paternity is signified, is the proper name of the person of the Father.

Reply to Objection 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this name “father” among us does not signify a person, but the relation of a person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for in God the relation signified by the name “Father” is a subsisting person. Hence, as above explained ([285]Q[29], A[4]), this name “person” in God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a thing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now generation signifies something in process of being made, whereas paternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the name “Father” is more expressive as regards the divine person than genitor or begettor.

Reply to Objection 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and hence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is something subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly and not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.

Reply to Objection 4: The terms “generation” and “paternity” like the other terms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as regards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of signification. Hence also the Apostle says, “I bend my knee to the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named” (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus. It is manifest that generation receives its species from the term which is the form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of the generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as univocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs to the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in form. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of the Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in creatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same, shows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God before creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction exists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only, belongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity.

Whether this name “Father” is applied to God, firstly as a personal name?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name “Father” is not applied to God, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common precedes the particular. But this name “Father” as a personal name, belongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense it is common to the whole Trinity; for we say “Our Father” to the whole Trinity. Therefore “Father” comes first as an essential name before its personal sense.

Objection 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is no priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of the same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son, and the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature’s; since, according to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the creature and to the Son. Therefore “Father” in God is not taken as an essential name before it is taken personally.

Objection 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not a common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason of filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: “Who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature.” Therefore paternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same concept as, paternity taken essentially.

On the contrary, The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is the Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the creature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal sense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the creature.

I answer that, A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly contained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which only partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of a kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the signification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from perfect things. Hence this name "lion" is applied first to the animal containing the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so called, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's nature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said by way of similitude.

Now it is manifest from the foregoing ([286]Q[27], A[2]; [287]Q[28], A[4]), that the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in God the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and glory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is found in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator and the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain likeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the true idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some creatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational creatures, according to Job 38:28: "Who is the father of the rain? or who begot the drops of dew?" Of some, namely, the rational creature (He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according to Dt. 32:6: "Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and created thee?" And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace, and these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage of eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received, according to Rom. 8:16,17: "The Spirit Himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also." Lastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch as they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according to Rom. 5:2: "We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore it is plain that "paternity" is applied to God first, as importing regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports the regard of God to creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our intelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in the understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the concept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not conversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature come after proper terms which import personal relations; because the person proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is first understood to proceed from the artist before the thing designed, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the artist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the creature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it participates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words of Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son."

Reply to Objection 2: To "receive" is said to be common to the creature and to the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote similitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence the authority quoted subjoins: "That He may be the First Born among many brethren," after saying that some were conformed to the image of the Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of singularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as Basil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only begotten (Jn. 1:18): "The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared unto us."

From this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.

Whether it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it is the property. But "unbegotten" supposes nothing in the Father; it only removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of the Father.

Objection 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in a negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not begotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten; neither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also to the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be taken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection in the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the Person of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.

Objection 3: Further, in God, "unbegotten" does not signify relation, for it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance; therefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son, Who is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance. Therefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.

Objection 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since, then, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there is nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another. Therefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.

Objection 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person begotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his opposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be unbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be unproceeding.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “One is from one—that is, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten—namely, by the property in each one respectively of innascibility and origin.”

I answer that, As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary principle, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before or after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the Father; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.

Now in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one way as the first “principle,” by reason of its having a relation to what proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a “first” principle by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the Father is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards the persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a principle He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and this belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word “begotten.”

Reply to Objection 1: Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by the word “unbegotten,” as a property of the Father, is not a negative term only, but either that it means both these things together—namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the principle of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also His plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem true, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is included in the common. For source and authority signify in God nothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with Augustine (De Trin. v, 7) that “unbegotten” imports the negation of passive generation. For he says that “unbegotten” has the same meaning as “not a son.” Nor does it follow that “unbegotten” is not the proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are notified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what has no part.

Reply to Objection 2: “Unbegotten” is taken sometimes in a negative sense only, and in that sense Jerome says that “the Holy Ghost is unbegotten,” that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise “unbegotten” may be taken in a kind of privation sense, but not as implying any imperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way when a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even though it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a stone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally belongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so called when something has not what naturally belongs to some members of its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third sense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in which sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense, “unbegotten” is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it may be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain person of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the same nature is begotten. In this sense the term “unbegotten” can be applied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper to the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name “unbegotten” belongs to a divine person as the principle of another person; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of principle taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the term “unbegotten” that He is not in any way derived from another; and not only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In this sense the term “unbegotten” does not belong at all to the Holy Ghost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor does it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it is in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another—namely, from the Father.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9), “unbegotten” in one sense signifies the same as “uncreated”; and thus it applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance differ from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not begotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation is reduced to the genus of affirmation, as “not man” is reduced to the genus of substance, and “not white” to the genus of quality. Hence, since “begotten” implies relation in

God, “unbegotten” belongs also to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten is substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by relation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.

Reply to Objection 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the divine nature there must be some one principle which is not from another, and which we call “unbegotten.” To admit two innascibles is to suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence Hilary says (De Synod.): “As there is one God, so there cannot be two innascibles.” And this especially because, did two innascibles exist, one would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished by relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from each other by diversity of nature.

Reply to Objection 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not from another, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of the Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost; both because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as stated above ([288]Q[27], A[4], ad 3), and because also in the order of nature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being denied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the principle of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does not proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy Ghost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the person begotten.

OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (THREE ARTICLES)

We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son—namely, “Son,” “Word,” and “Image.” The idea of Son is gathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider Word and Image.

Concerning Word there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?

(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?

(3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?

Whether Word in God is a personal name?

Objection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name. For personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and Son. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on (Jn. 1:1), “In the beginning was the Word.” Therefore Word is not a personal name in God.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), “The Word is knowledge with love;” and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), “To speak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought.” But knowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God. Therefore Word is not a personal term in God.

Objection 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according to Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is intelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks, the Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of them is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term in God, and not in a personal sense.

Objection 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is something made. For it is said, “Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms which do His Word” (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal name in God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): “As the Son is related to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is.” But the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore so also is Word.

I answer that, The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense, is a personal name, and in no way an essential name.

To see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is taken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense is when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as stated in De Anima ii, text 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called a word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of words (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that "word" is called "the natural movement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and thinks, as light and splendor;" which is the first kind. "Again," he says, "the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is uttered in the heart;" which is the third kind. "Again," also, "the word is the angel"—that is, the messenger "of intelligence;" which is the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for that which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to say, "this is the word I have said," or "which the king has commanded," alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way of assertion or of command.

Now word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the intellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): "Whoever can understand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before thought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some likeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the Word." The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to proceed from something other than itself—namely, from the knowledge of the one conceiving. Hence "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which belongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine persons are distinguished by origin ([289]Q[27], AA[3],4,5). Hence the term "Word," according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be taken as said not essentially, but personally.

Reply to Objection 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the Son differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to maintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to be understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding should compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same substance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a manner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But supposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit Word in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word metaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation; either it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by a word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it is manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly manifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except in as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which anyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word may be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must also admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to God personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that which emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its conception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is made actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely; likewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect what existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding does not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an act remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is knowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing intellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the intellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1) that the Word is "begotten wisdom;" for it is nothing but the concept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called "begotten knowledge." Thus can also be explained how "to speak" is in God "to see by thought," forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the gaze of the divine thought. Still the term "thought" does not properly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16): "Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the Thought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something unstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form and remaining latent and as it were formless." For thought consists properly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God. But when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not think, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx) takes "thought" in an improper sense for "contemplation."

Reply to Objection 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally, and not essentially, so likewise is to "speak." Hence, as the Word is not common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): "He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is understood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word, without which, forsooth, He would not be speaking." On the other hand, "to be spoken" belongs to each

Person, for not only is the word spoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word. Therefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to be spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way whereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs to each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding Himself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised in this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity is "spoken" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the intellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of understanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term "speak" improperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ from each other; for "to understand" means only the habitude of the intelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace of origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our intellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of the thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity, because in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether the same, as was proved above ([290]Q[14], AA[4],5). Whereas to "speak" means chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for "to speak" is nothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a habitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is manifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who utters the Word is "speaker" in God, although each Person understands and is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.

Reply to Objection 4: The term "word" is there taken figuratively, as the thing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus creatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect, whereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine wisdom; as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the work to which he is appointed by the king's word.

Whether "Word" is the Son's proper name?

Objection 1: It would seem that "Word" is not the proper name of the Son. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not signify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word cannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.

Objection 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered. Therefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the Father, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine; as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).

Objection 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some property of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper name, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be several more properties in God than those above mentioned.

Objection 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of understanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs to the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.

Objection 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): "Bearing all things by the word of His power;" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom. v, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is not proper to the Son.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): "By Word we understand the Son alone."

I answer that, "Word," said of God in its proper sense, is used personally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it signifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds in God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and this procession is called generation, as we have shown above ([291]Q[27], A[2]). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in God.

Reply to Objection 1: "To be" and "to understand" are not the same in us. Hence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our nature. But in God "to be" and "to understand" are one and the same: hence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His; but belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be something subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists; and so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that "the Word of God is substantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own] are activities if the soul."

Reply to Objection 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians pretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being uttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the different mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).

Reply to Objection 3: In the term “Word” the same property is comprised as in the name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): “Word and Son express the same.” For the Son’s nativity, which is His personal property, is signified by different names, which are attributed to the Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is of the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that He is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is altogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten immaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be expressed by only one name.

Reply to Objection 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way as it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God essentially, as stated above ([292]Q[14], AA[2],4). Now the Son is God begotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as producing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the Word proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but is distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.

Reply to Objection 5: When it is said of the Son, “Bearing all things by the word of His power”; “word” is taken figuratively for the effect of the Word. Hence a gloss says that “word” is here taken to mean command; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things are kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word things are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively in applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that everything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so in that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son’s Word, because He manifests the Son.

Whether the name “Word” imports relation to creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name ‘Word’ does not import relation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in creatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said essentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation to creatures.

Objection 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of God in time; as “Lord” and “Creator.” But Word is said of God from eternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.

Objection 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it proceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it follows that the Word proceeds from the creature.

Objection 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various relations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to creatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but many.

Objection 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can only be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know beings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are implied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that “the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power.”

I answer that, Word implies relation to creatures. For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures.

And as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas as regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word of God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both expressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps. 32:9): “He spake, and they were made;” because in the Word is implied the operative idea of what God makes.

Reply to Objection 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of the person; for person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the personal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is implied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to prevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is included in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the Creator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names import the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on the action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to create and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But others import a relation which follows from an action which does not pass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent—as to know and to will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of relation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it true that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are applied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time which import relation following on the action of God passing into exterior effect.

Reply to Objection 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived from the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is not necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although the Word is expressive of creatures.

Reply to Objection 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation to creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God; and it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed chiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to creatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands every creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a personal one.

Reply to Objection 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about non-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less than does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14). Nevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is expressive and manifestive of non-beings.

OF THE IMAGE (TWO ARTICLES)

We next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Image in God is said personally?

(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?

Whether image in God is said personally?

Objection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God. For Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, "The Godhead of the

Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one.” Therefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.

Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): “An image is a like species of that which it represents.” But species or form is said of God essentially. Therefore so also is Image.

Objection 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies “before” and “after.” But in the divine persons there is no “before” and “after.” Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): “What is more absurd than to say that an image is referred to itself?” Therefore the Image in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.

I answer that, Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not any kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only similitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal things the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see that the species of different animals are of different figures; but not of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on a wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise depicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is enough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): “One egg is not the image of another, because it is not derived from it.” Therefore for a true image it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in species, or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession or origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name “Image” is a personal name.

Reply to Objection 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth in likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything proceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly called the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name of Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the Holy Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.

Reply to Objection 2: “Species,” as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of image, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this sense image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is assimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like form.

Reply to Objection 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but only assimilation.

Whether the name of Image is proper to the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the Son; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), “The Holy Ghost is the Image of the Son.” Therefore Image does not belong to the Son alone.

Objection 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an image, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude. Therefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not belong to the Son alone.

Objection 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to 1 Cor. 11:7, “The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image and the glory of God.” Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): “The Son alone is the Image of the Father.”

I answer that, The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost is the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors attribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the canonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words, “Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures” (Col. 1:15) and again: “Who being the brightness of His glory, and the figure of His substance.” (Heb. 1:3).

Some explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not in nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy Ghost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion. This, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by reason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality in God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason thereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image. Hence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the Son, because there cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father, because again the image must be immediately related to that which it is the image; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the Son; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then there would be one image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows that the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we shall explain further on ([293]Q[36], A[4]). Hence there is nothing to prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son, inasmuch as they are one; since even man is one image of the whole Trinity.

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the Holy Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the Father, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be “born”; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is not called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is essential to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds; whereas this does not essentially belong to love, although it may belong to that love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the divine love.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ the term image as meaning a perfect similitude.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the Son, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in two ways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific nature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way it is found in something of a different nature, as the king’s image on the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father; in the second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in order to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man, man is not simply called the image, but “to the image,” whereby is expressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot be said that the Son of God is “to the image,” because He is the perfect Image of the Father.

OF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost, Who is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of God. Concerning the name “Holy Ghost” there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this name, “Holy Ghost,” is the proper name of one divine Person?

(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds from the Father and the Son?

(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?

(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?

Whether this name “Holy Ghost” is the proper name of one divine person?

Objection 1: It would seem that this name, “Holy Ghost,” is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the three persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of ‘Holy Ghost’ [*It should be borne in mind that the word “ghost” is the old English equivalent for the Latin “spiritus,” whether in the sense of “breath” or “blast,” or in the sense of “spirit,” as an immaterial substance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7), “The Gost of Storms” [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter “Trubled gost is sacrifice of God” (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and “Oure wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the ayre” (More, “Comfort against Tribulation”); and in our modern expression of “giving up the ghost.” As applied to God, and not specially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder, “Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good.” (See Oxford Dictionary).] is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin. viii) shows that the “Spirit of God” sometimes means the Father, as in the words of Is. 61:1: “The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;” and sometimes the Son, as when the Son says: “In the Spirit of God I cast out devils” (Mat. 12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own natural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the words of Joel 2:28: “I will pour out of My Spirit over all flesh.” Therefore this name ‘Holy Ghost’ is not the proper name of a divine person.

Objection 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms, as Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name “Holy Ghost” is not a relative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine Person.

Objection 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He cannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken of as of this or that man, as appears in the words, “The Lord said to Moses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them” (Num. 11:17) and also “The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus” (4 Kings 2:15). Therefore “Holy Ghost” does not seem to be the proper name of a divine Person.

On the contrary, It is said (1 Jn. 5:7): “There are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost.” As Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): “When we ask, Three what? we say, Three persons.” Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine person.

I answer that, While there are two processions in God, one of these, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as stated above ([294]Q[27] , A[4], ad 3). Hence the relations also which follow from this procession are without a name ([295]Q[28], A[4]): for which reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper name. But as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of speaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names of procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly signify the notional acts than the relations; so to signify the divine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name “Holy Ghost” is by the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The appropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from the fact that the person who is called “Holy Ghost” has something in common with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17; v, 11), “Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is called that properly which both are called in common. For the Father also is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy, and the Son is holy.” Secondly, from the proper signification of the name. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify impulse and motion; for we call the breath and the wind by the term spirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of the lover towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed to whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person proceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most properly named “The Holy Ghost.”

Reply to Objection 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is applicable to the whole Trinity: because by ‘spirit’ the immateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal spirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this term to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the word “holy” we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy Spirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the usage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three persons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: Although this name “Holy Ghost” does not indicate a relation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it is accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by relation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a relation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed [spiratus].

Reply to Objection 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only which is of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in the name “Father” we understand the relation of principle; and likewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power. But to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a divine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say “our Father,” and “our Spirit”; but we cannot say “our Son.”

Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): “We must not dare to say anything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been divinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles.” But in the Sacred Scripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; but only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from Jn. 15:26: “The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can. vii) we read: “We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver, who proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be adored and glorified.” Therefore it should not be added in our Creed that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a thing appear to be worthy of anathema.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): “We say that the Holy Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the Father; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we name Him the Spirit of the Son.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the Holy Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St. Andrew: “Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the Father, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one Holy Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son.” Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath [spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word. Therefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.

Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father. Therefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.

Objection 7: Further “the actual and the possible do not differ in things perpetual” (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it is possible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if He did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir. Sancti, ii): “The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the Father; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by Procession, so that they are thus distinct from one another.” And further on he says: “For even if for no other reason were the Son and the Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice.” Therefore the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.

On the contrary, Athanasius says: “The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.”

I answer that, It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son. For if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally distinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above ([296]Q[28], A[3]; [297]Q[30], A[2]). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons are distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would follow that there would not be one essence of the three persons: since everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs to the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine persons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now the relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they are opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father has two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by the other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations, and therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the one person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost there were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to the Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as neither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to them. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that the person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two relations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is heretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite relations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each other, except relations of origin, as proved above (Q[28], A[44]). And opposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a “principle,” and of what is “from the principle.” Therefore we must conclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the Holy Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, as we confess.

Furthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this conclusion. For it was said above ([298]Q[27], AA[2],4; [299]Q[28], A[4]), that the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the Holy Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a word. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental conception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

We derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature itself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one without order except in those which differ only by their matter; as for instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other materially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which there is not only a material distinction we always find that some order exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of creatures produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So if from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and the Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any other be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is from the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy Ghost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them proceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material distinction; which is impossible.

Hence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the Holy Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy Ghost is the Spirit “of the Son”; and that He is from the Father “through the Son.” Some of them are said also to concede that “He is from the Son”; or that “He flows from the Son,” but not that He proceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just consideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word procession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin of any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as when we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a stream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted that the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can conclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although we do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of Scripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost, “He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine” (Jn. 16:14). It is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the Father, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive term; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations, whereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For when the Lord says, “No one knoweth the Son, but the Father,” the idea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be added that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not thereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of the Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other, but only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is the Son.

Reply to Objection 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has been drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council at that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as making a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in the first symbol was explained by some addition directed against rising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it is declared that those who were congregated together in the council of Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not implying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their predecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what those fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the time of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not necessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas, later on, when certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of Rome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was explicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose authority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed. Nevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.

Reply to Objection 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error that the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a Nestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was embraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him, among whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is not to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that while Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son, neither do those words of his express a denial thereof.

Reply to Objection 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the Son, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son also is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the Father. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of the lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature of Christ, by reason of what is written: “On whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes” (Jn. 1:33).

Reply to Objection 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of the vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it would then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the mental word, whence proceeds love.

Reply to Objection 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds from the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one power belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from the Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property of filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from the Father.

Reply to Objection 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other; but the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son is only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father and the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished from each other, as explained above, and in [300]Q[27].

Whether the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through another, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed immediately; which seems to be unfitting.

Objection 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the Father. But “whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so.” Therefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.

Objection 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that the Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds; and thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is heretical.

Objection 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be said conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the bailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through the king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost through the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. xii): “Keep me, I pray, in this expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the Father—namely Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee: and that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only Begotten.”

I answer that, Whenever one is said to act through another, this preposition “through” points out, in what is covered by it, some cause or principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent and the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition “through” is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent; and in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be a final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It is a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works through love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works through his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works through the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is covered by this preposition “through” is the cause of the action regarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we say, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that the mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause why the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even this effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that this preposition “through” sometimes denotes direct authority, as when we say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect authority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king.

Therefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy Ghost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the Holy Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through the Son, which has the same meaning.

Reply to Objection 1: In every action two things are to be considered, the "suppositum" acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance, fire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son the power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for this is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons themselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the Father and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father immediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He is said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel proceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and mediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although, indeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the immaterial procession of the divine persons.

Reply to Objection 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically distinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow that He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the Holy Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son; whereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the Father and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally from both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or properly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the Father.

Reply to Objection 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost proceeded; but each of the operations is eternal.

Reply to Objection 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the converse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the mallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the bailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to act, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's place to act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only as an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the king, although this preposition “through” denotes a medium, for the more a “suppositum” is prior in action, so much the more is its power immediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first cause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first principles are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences. Therefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order of the subject’s acting, the king is said to work through the bailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to act through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the bailiff’s action its effect. Now there is no order of power between Father and Son, but only order of ‘supposita’; and hence we say that the Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely.

Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature, for the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is one in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any one property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two subjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, in this proposition “the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,” we do not designate personal unity, because in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor again do we designate the unity of property, because if one property were the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the Holy Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father would be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which cannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle as regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father and the Son.

Objection 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father. But we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is the Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is not the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father. Therefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems to be false; for this word "principle" stands either for the person of the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it is false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father and the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that they are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we cannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one Creator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the Father and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert; and this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "the Holy Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as authors." Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and the Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever there is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since there is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the Holy Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.

Some, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: "The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost," because, they declare, since the word "principle" in the singular number does not signify "person," but "property," it must be taken as an adjective; and forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective, it cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that the meaning should be: They are one principle—that is, in one and the same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the Father is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost—namely, in two ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word "principle" signifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as do the words “father” and “son” even in things created. Hence it takes its number from the form it signifies, like other substantives. Therefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the unity of the form that is signified by this word “God”; so they are one principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property that is signified in this word “principle.”

Reply to Objection 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative power, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property, as we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one property being in two “supposita” that possess one common nature. But if we consider the “supposita” of the spiration, then we may say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for He proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.

Reply to Objection 2: In the proposition “the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,” one property is designated which is the form signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason of the several properties the Father can be called several principles, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that we speak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the essence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is to the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father than is the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 4: These two propositions, “The Father and the Son are one principle which is the Father,” or, “one principle which is not the Father,” are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not necessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father and the Son are one principle, this word “principle” has not determinate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two persons together. Hence there is a fallacy of “figure of speech” as the argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.

Reply to Objection 5: This proposition is also true:—The one principle of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word “principle” does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for the two persons as above explained.

Reply to Objection 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father and the Son are the same principle, because the word “principle” stands confusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.

Reply to Objection 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of the distinction of “supposita,” as also there are two spirating, because acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the name “Creator”; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the creature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but as united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because spirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the plurality of the “supposita” but not two spirators by reason of the one spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the “supposita” but substantives from themselves, according to the form signified. As to what Hilary says, that “the Holy ghost is from the Father and the Son as His authors,” this is to be explained in the sense that the substantive here stands for the adjective.

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST—LOVE (TWO ARTICLES)

We now inquire concerning the name “Love,” on which arise two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?

Whether “Love” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that “Love” is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): “As the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one; I know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called Charity, and all together one Charity.” But no name which is predicated in the singular of each person and of all together, is a proper name of a person. Therefore this name, “Love,” is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is not used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing from the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “Love is a unitive force.” But a bond is a medium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from them. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as was shown above ([301]Q[36], A[2]), it seems that He is not the Love or bond of the Father and the Son.

Objection 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a lover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must be love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): “The Holy Ghost Himself is Love.”

I answer that, The name Love in God can be taken essentially and personally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.

To see this we must know that since as shown above ([302]Q[27], AA[2],3,4,5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect, which is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will, which is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more known to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to express our various considerations as regards that procession, but not as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to employ circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the relations following from this procession which are called “procession” and “spiration,” as stated above ([303]Q[27], A[4], ad 3), and yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of each procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone, there results in the one who understands a conception of the object understood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an object, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved in the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is said to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one who understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he is in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object understood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in the lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found to describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object understood, as appears in the word "to understand"; and other words are used to express the procession of the intellectual conception—namely, "to speak," and "word." Hence in God, "to understand" is applied only to the essence; because it does not import relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas "Word" is said personally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term "to speak" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle of the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of the will, with the exception of the words "dilection" and "love," which express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there are no other terms in use, which express the relation of the impression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by fact that he loves—to the principle of that impression, or "vice versa." And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary, we express these relations by the words "love" and "dilection": just as if we were to call the Word "intelligence conceived," or "wisdom begotten."

It follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to the object loved, "love" and "to love" are said of the essence, as "understanding" and "to understand"; but, on the other hand, so far as these words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what proceeds by way of love, and "vice versa," so that by "love" is understood the "love proceeding," and by "to love" is understood "the spiration of the love proceeding," in that sense "love" is the name of the person and "to love" is a notional term, as "to speak" and "to beget."

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the divine essence, as was said above (here and [304]Q[24], A[2], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 2: Although to understand, and to will, and to love signify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are actions that remain in the agents, as stated above ([305]Q[14], A[4]), yet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain relation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something that abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something abiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by word, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there is more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent. Therefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father for the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that passes into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as also in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing expressed by the Word.

Reply to Objection 3: The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and Son, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself and the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the Holy Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and conversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact that the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily follows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As regards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the third person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid relation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from both.

Reply to Objection 4: As it does not belong to the Son, though He understands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand as the word proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost loves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to Him to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term; because He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one whence love proceeds.

Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love each other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves that the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is Wisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as explained above ([306]Q[27], A[3]). Therefore the Father and the Son do not love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, the proposition, “The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost,” this word “love” is to be taken either essentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken essentially, because in the same way we might say that “the Father understands by the Son”; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for then, in like manner, it might be said that “the Father and the Son spirate by the Holy Ghost,” or that “the Father generates by the

Son.” Therefore in no way is this proposition true: “‘The Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost.”

Objection 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the “Father begets Himself,” or that “He spirates Himself.” Therefore, neither can it be said that “He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost,” if “to love” is taken in a notional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy Ghost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs to the essence. Therefore this also is false: “The Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost.”

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): “The Holy Ghost is He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves His Begetter.”

I answer that, A difficulty about this question is objected to the effect that when we say, “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,” since the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean that the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the Son; which cannot be admitted.

In view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that “the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost”; and they add that it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to the effect that “the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten.” Others say that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as that “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost”—that is, “by His essential Love,” which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others further say that this ablative should be construed as importing a sign, so that it means, “the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father loves the Son”; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as Love. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as importing the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the love whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others, again, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a formal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth.

To make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is commonly denominated from its forms, as “white” from whiteness, and “man” from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in this particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form. So when I say, "this man is clothed with a garment," the ablative is to be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the garment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be denominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is from its action, but also as from the term itself of the action—that is, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the action. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not the heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding from the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower, although the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect proceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that since in God "to love" is taken in two ways, essentially and notionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and the Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): "Who dares to say that the Father loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except by the Holy Ghost?" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this sense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means nothing else than "to spirate love"; just as to speak is to produce a word, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a tree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word or the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and the Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love proceeding.

Reply to Objection 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in God; therefore we cannot say that "the Father is wise or intelligent by the Son." But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a notional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined effect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the action, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree flowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea of an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case, the principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect, but only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces the flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So when we say, "spirates" or "begets," this imports only a notional act. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost, or begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the Word, as by the Person proceeding, “and speaks by the speaking,” as by a notional act; forasmuch as “to speak” imports a determinate person proceeding; since “to speak” means to produce a word. Likewise to love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it can be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by the person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act.

Reply to Objection 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and us, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in a notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person, but also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to the object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every creature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word “begotten” adequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves Himself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father loves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to the creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love, as it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and goodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures.

OF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT (TWO ARTICLES)

There now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether “Gift” can be a personal name?

(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Whether “Gift” is a personal name?

Objection 1: It would seem that “Gift” is not a personal name. For every personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of “Gift” does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): that “the Holy Ghost is so given as God’s Gift, that He also gives Himself as God.” Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name.

Objection 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But the divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as Hilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore “Gift” is not a personal name.

Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there is no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies a subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards him by whom it is given. Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.

Objection 4: Further, "Gift" imports relation to the creature, and it thus seems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God from eternity; as "Father," and "Son." Therefore "Gift" is not a personal name.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): "As the body of flesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing but the Holy Ghost." But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also therefore is "Gift."

I answer that, The word "gift" imports an aptitude for being given. And what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to that to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless it was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine person is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son belongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to possess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way a divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature united to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not, however, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and to use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain thereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the Love proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God rightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine person. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner, its own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above; for that is said to be given to us which we have from another source. Thus a divine person can "be given," and can be a "gift."

Reply to Objection 1: The name "Gift" imports a personal distinction , in so far as gift imports something belonging to another through its origin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is His own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man belongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix): "What is more yours than yourself?" Or we might say, and more fittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the phrase, "this is this one's," can be understood in several senses. In one way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix); and in that sense "gift" is the same as "the giver," but not the same as the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that sense. In another sense, a thing is another’s as a possession, or as a slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the giver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third sense “this is this one’s” through its origin only; and in this sense the Son is the Father’s; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both. Therefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the giver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a personal name.

Reply to Objection 2: The divine essence is the Father’s gift in the first sense, as being the Father’s by way of identity.

Reply to Objection 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply subjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the one to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but from its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift from eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that it is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature; but that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the essence is included in the idea of person, as stated above ([307]Q[34], A[3]).

Whether “Gift” is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Is. 9:16 says: “A Son is give to us.” Therefore to be Gift belongs to the Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property. But this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost. Therefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man, whereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but “God’s Gift” only. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): “As ‘to be born’ is, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, ‘to be the Gift of God’ is to proceed from Father and Son.” But the Holy Ghost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from Father and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.

In proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)—i.e. a thing which is not given with the intention of a return—and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above ([308]Q[27], A[4]; [309]Q[37], A[1]), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): “By the gift, which is the Holy Ghost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of Christ.”

Reply to Objection 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He proceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of its principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so also, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is properly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the Son is given is from the Father’s love, according to the words, “God so loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son” (Jn. 3:16).

Reply to Objection 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the Giver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the origin of the Holy Ghost—that is, His procession.

Reply to Objection 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver; but when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore, because “Gift” does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called a gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been given, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.

OF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Those things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely, we next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence, to the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of these with each other.

As regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?

(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?

(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular?

(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?

(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in the abstract?

(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete essential names?

(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?

(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?

Whether in God the essence is the same as the person?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as person. For whenever essence is the same as person or "suppositum," there can be only one "suppositum" of one nature, as is clear in the case of all separate substances. For in those things which are really one and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But in God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what is above expounded ([310]Q[28], A[3]; [311]Q[30], A[2]). Therefore essence is not the same as person.

Objection 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same things in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and negation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct, whereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.

Objection 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is subject to essence; whence it is called "suppositum" or "hypostasis."

Therefore person is not the same as essence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): “When we say the person of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the Father.”

I answer that, The truth of this question is quite clear if we consider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above ([312]Q[3], A[3]) that the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same as “suppositum,” which in intellectual substances is nothing else than person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while the divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains its unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), “relation multiplies the Trinity of persons,” some have thought that in God essence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be “adjacent”; considering only in the relations the idea of “reference to another,” and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown above ([313]Q[28], A[2]) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in God they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God essence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons are really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated ([314]Q[29], A[4]), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature. But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.

Reply to Objection 1: There cannot be a distinction of “suppositum” in creatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles; because in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God relations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between them they distinguish the “supposita”; and yet the essence is not distinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished from each other so far as they are identified with the essence.

Reply to Objection 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way of thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and affirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need not suppose the other.

Reply to Objection 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of created things, as above explained ([315]Q[13], AA[1],3). And since created natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of the specific nature, it follows that individuals are called “subjects,” “supposita,” or “hypostases.” So the divine persons are named “supposita” or “hypostases,” but not as if there really existed any real “supposition” or “subjection.”

Whether it must be said that the three persons are of one essence?

Objection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are of one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost “are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony.” But the substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are not of one essence.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be confirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.

Objection 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence. It suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.

Objection 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the essence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it does not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one essence.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say that the three persons are “from one essence [ex una essentia],” lest we should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the persons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the oblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three persons are “of one essence [unius essentiae].”

Objection 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion of error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or substance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De Synod.): “One substance predicated of the Father and the Son signifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one substance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior substance taken and assumed by the other two.” Therefore it must not be said that the three persons are of one substance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word {homoousion}, which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians, means that the three persons are of one essence.

I answer that, As above explained ([316]Q[13], AA[1],2), divine things are named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for in that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things created. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect derives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by the matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is the "suppositum" of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as the form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification. Now in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is the form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we do not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form, unless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: "That woman is of a handsome figure," or: "This man is of perfect virtue." In like manner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not multiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three persons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be understood as designating the form.

Reply to Objection 1: Substance is here taken for the "hypostasis," and not for the essence.

Reply to Objection 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so many words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we find it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, "I and the Father are one (Jn. 10:30)," and "I am in the Father, and the Father in Me (Jn. 10:38)"; and there are many other texts of the same import.

Reply to Objection 3: Because "nature" designates the principle of action while "essence" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be of one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give heat; but only those things can be said to be of "one essence" which have one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying that the three persons are "of one essence," than by saying they are "of one nature."

Reply to Objection 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated as belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say "the virtue of Peter." On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be designated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or designate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one signifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of the form, as, for instance, when we say, "Peter is of great virtue [magnae virtutis]," or else one genitive must have the force of two, as, for instance, “he is a man of blood”—that is, he is a man who sheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence signifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that the essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless we add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the Father is a person of the “divine essence”; or, the three persons are “of one essence.”

Reply to Objection 5: The preposition “from” or “out of” does not designate the habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an efficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases distinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For nothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a thing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So, when we say, “three persons of one essence,” taking essence as having the habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from person, which we should mean if we said, “three persons from the same essence.”

Reply to Objection 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): “It would be prejudicial to holy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not think them holy. So if some misunderstand {homoousion}, what is that to me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does not result from division, or from union or from community of possession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.”

Whether essential names should be predicated in the singular of the three persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name “God,” should not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in the plural. For as “man” signifies “one that has humanity,” so God signifies “one that has Godhead.” But the three persons are three who have Godhead. Therefore the three persons are “three Gods.”

Objection 2: Further, Gn. 1:1, where it is said, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” the Hebrew original has “Elohim,” which may be rendered “Gods” or “Judges”: and this word is used on account of the plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are “several Gods,” and not “one” God.

Objection 3: Further, this word “thing” when it is said absolutely, seems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three persons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): “The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father, Son and Holy Ghost.” Therefore other essential names can be predicated in the plural of the three persons.

Objection 4: Further, as this word “God” signifies “a being who has Deity,” so also this word “person” signifies a being subsisting in an intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for the same reason we can say there are “three Gods.”

On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 6:4): “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God.”

I answer that, Some essential names signify the essence after the manner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of adjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of the three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those which signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three persons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives signify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify something by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as substance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or multitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive name depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents have their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality from their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of adjectives depends upon their “supposita.” In creatures, one form does not exist in several “supposita” except by unity of order, as the form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a form are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular, but otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a college, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are collegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a form, as above explained [317](A[2]), which, indeed, is simple and supremely one, as shown above ([318]Q[3], A[7]; [319]Q[11], A[4]). So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are “three men”; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are “three Gods,” but “one God”; forasmuch as in the three “supposita” of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of “supposita.” For we say there are three “existent” or three “wise” beings, or three “eternal,” “uncreated,” and “immense” beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say “one uncreated, immense, eternal being,” as Athanasius declares.

Reply to Objection 1: Though the name “God” signifies a being having Godhead, nevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name “God” is used substantively; whereas “having Godhead” is used adjectively. Consequently, although there are “three having Godhead,” it does not follow that there are three Gods.

Reply to Objection 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So as by reason of the plurality of “supposita” the Greeks said “three hypostases,” so also in Hebrew “Elohim” is in the plural. We, however, do not apply the plural either to “God” or to “substance,” lest plurality be referred to the substance.

Reply to Objection 3: This word “thing” is one of the transcendentals. Whence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God in the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it is predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage quoted, that “the same Trinity is a thing supreme.”

Reply to Objection 4: The form signified by the word “person” is not essence or nature, but personality. So, as there are three personalities—that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost—it is predicated of the three, not in the singular, but in the plural.

Whether the concrete essential names can stand for the person?

Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say “God begot God.” For, as the logicians say, “a singular term signifies what it stands for.” But this name “God” seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be predicated in the plural, as above explained [320](A[3]). Therefore, since it signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.

Objection 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in the predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense signified in the predicate. But when I say, "God creates," this name "God" stands for the essence. So when we say "God begot," this term "God" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.

Objection 3: Further, if this be true, "God begot," because the Father generates; for the same reason this is true, "God does not beget," because the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets, and there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there are two Gods.

Objection 4: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God, that is Himself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), "nothing begets itself." Neither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore it is false to say, "God begot God."

Objection 5: Further, if "God begot God," He begot either God who is the Father, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then God the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there is a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it cannot be said that "God begot God."

On the contrary, In the Creed it is said, "God of God."

I answer that, Some have said that this name "God" and the like, properly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by reason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This opinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which requires that in God, He "who possesses" and "what is possessed" be the same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name God, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of expressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no less than the thing signified. Hence as this word "God" signifies the divine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name "man" signifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this word "God," from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense, stand for person, as does the word "man." So this word "God" sometimes stands for the essence, as when we say "God creates"; because this predicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form signified—that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person, either for only one, as when we say, "God begets," or for two, as when we say, “God spirates”; or for three, as when it is said: “To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God,” etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).

Reply to Objection 1: Although this name “God” agrees with singular terms as regards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it agrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be found in several “supposita.” So it need not always stand for the essence it signifies.

Reply to Objection 2: This holds good against those who say that the word “God” does not naturally stand for person.

Reply to Objection 3: The word “God” stands for the person in a different way from that in which this word “man” does; for since the form signified by this word “man”—that is, humanity—is really divided among its different subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there is no adjunct determining it to the person—that is, to a distinct subject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not a reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this term “man” does not stand for the common nature, unless this is required by some adjunct, as when we say, “man is a species”; whereas the form signified by the name “God”—that is, the divine essence—is really one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature, but by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the person. So, when we say, “God generates,” by reason of the notional act this name “God” stands for the person of the Father. But when we say, “God does not generate,” there is no adjunct to determine this name to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that generation is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something be added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for instance, “God begotten does not beget,” is true. Consequently, it does not follow that there exists a “God generator,” and a “God not generator”; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as, for instance, if we were to say, “the Father is God the generator” and the “Son is God the non-generator” and so it does not follow that there are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was said above [321](A[3]).

Reply to Objection 4: This is false, “the Father begot God, that is Himself,” because the word “Himself,” as a reciprocal term, refers to the same “suppositum.” Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi ad Maxim.) that “God the Father begot another self [alterum se],” forasmuch as the word “se” is either in the ablative case, and then it means

“He begot another from Himself,” or it indicates a single relation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however, either a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would really mean, “He begot another most like to Himself.” Likewise also it is false to say, “He begot another God,” because although the Son is another than the Father, as above explained ([322]Q[31], A[2]), nevertheless it cannot be said that He is “another God”; forasmuch as this adjective “another” would be understood to apply to the substantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a distinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition “He begot another God” is tolerated by some, provided that “another” be taken as a substantive, and the word “God” be construed in apposition with it. This, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for fear of giving occasion to error.

Reply to Objection 5: To say, “God begot God Who is God the Father,” is wrong, because since the word “Father” is construed in apposition to “God,” the word “God” is restricted to the person of the Father; so that it would mean, “He begot God, Who is Himself the Father”; and then the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false. Wherefore the negative of the proposition is true, “He begot God Who is not God the Father.” If however, we understand these words not to be in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the contrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is false; so that the meaning would be, “He begot God Who is God Who is the Father.” Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that it is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false, and the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the negative and affirmative are false, because this relative “Who” in the affirmative proposition can be referred to the “suppositum”; whereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the “suppositum.” Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that “to be God the Father” is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the negative sense is that “to be God the Father,” is to be removed from the Son’s divinity as well as from His personality. This, however, appears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.

Whether abstract essential names can stand for the person?

Objection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand for the person, so that this proposition is true, “Essence begets essence.” For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): “The Father and the Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken singly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence.”

Objection 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies generation or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is generated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it seems that the divine essence is generated.

Objection 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear from what is above explained ([323]Q[3], A[3]). But, as was shown, it is true to say that “God begets God.” Therefore this is also true: “Essence begets essence.”

Objection 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is predicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence can stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.

Objection 5: Further, the essence is “a thing begetting,” because the essence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is not begetting, the essence will be “a thing begetting,” and “not begetting”: which cannot be.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): “The Father is the principle of the whole Godhead.” But He is principle only by begetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the Godhead.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): “Nothing begets itself.” But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only, since nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence. Therefore the essence does not beget essence.

I answer that, Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in asserting that as we can say “God begot God,” so we can say “Essence begot essence”: considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity God is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong, because if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into account not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of its signification as above stated [324](A[4]). Now although “God” is really the same as “Godhead,” nevertheless the mode of signification is not in each case the same. For since this word “God” signifies the divine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of signification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the things which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of this word, “God,” as, for instance, we can say “God is begotten” or is “Begetter,” as above explained [325](A[4]). The word “essence,” however, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person, because it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently, what properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished from each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would imply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there exists distinction in the “supposita.”

Reply to Objection 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy Doctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis than the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of enlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus, for instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names, or even by personal names; as when we find “essence from essence”; or “wisdom from wisdom”; we should take the sense to be, “the Son” who is essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom. Nevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should be observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly allied to the persons because actions belong to “supposita.” So “nature from nature,” and “wisdom from wisdom” are less inexact than “essence from essence.”

Reply to Objection 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature numerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically distinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and ceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted accidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as the begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either directly or accidentally.

Reply to Objection 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the same, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of signification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.

Reply to Objection 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode of identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not follow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification being different. This objection would hold good as regards things which are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.

Reply to Objection 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names consist in this, that the former carry their subject with them, whereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the substantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is considered in the light of “suppositum,” whereas the adjective indicates something added to the “suppositum.” Therefore substantive personal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are really the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a distinct essence; but it belongs to the “suppositum” implied in the substantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot say that the “essence is begetting”; yet we can say that the “essence is a thing begetting,” or that it is “God begetting,” if “thing” and God stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently there exists no contradiction in saying that “essence is a thing begetting,” and “a thing not begetting”; because in the first case “thing” stands for person, and in the second it stands for the essence.

Reply to Objection 6: So far as Godhead is one in several “supposita,” it agrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So when we say, “the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead,” the term Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as it is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow that He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the ruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say that He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or spirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.

Whether the persons can be predicated of the essential terms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of the concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, “God is three persons”; or “God is the Trinity.” For it is false to say, “man is every man,” because it cannot be verified as regards any particular subject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every man. In the same way this proposition, “God is the Trinity,” cannot be verified of any one of the “supposita” of the divine nature. For the Father is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So to say, “God is the Trinity,” is false.

Objection 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except by accidental predication; as when I say, “animal is man”; for it is accidental to animal to be man. But this name “God” as regards the three persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of the persons cannot be predicated of this name “God,” except in an accidental sense.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii, in coena Domini], “We believe that one God is one divinely named Trinity.”

I answer that, As above explained [326](A[5]), although adjectival terms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the essence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to the real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not only really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the three persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be predicated of the essence as if we were to say, “The essence is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost.” And because this word “God” can of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (A[4], ad 3), hence, as it is true to say, “The essence is the three persons”; so likewise it is true to say, “God is the three persons.”

Reply to Objection 1: As above explained this term “man” can of itself stand for person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the universal human nature. So it is false to say, “Man is every man”; because it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the contrary, this word “God” can of itself be taken for the divine essence. So, although to say of any of the “supposita” of the divine nature, “God is the Trinity,” is untrue, nevertheless it is true of the divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not take note of this distinction.

Reply to Objection 2: When we say, “God,” or “the divine essence is the Father,” the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in regard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and singular. Hence, as this proposition, “The Father is God” is of itself true, so this proposition “God is the Father” is true of itself, and by no means accidentally.

Whether the essential names should be appropriated to the persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be appropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in faith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as Jerome says, “careless words involve risk of heresy” [*In substance Ep. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are common to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may be supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they are appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than to the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be appropriated to the persons.

Objection 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when expressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.

Objection 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property is included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential attributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as what is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential attributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.

On the contrary, the Apostle says: “Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24).

I answer that, For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting that the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons. For although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by demonstration, as was above expounded ([327]Q[32], A[1]), nevertheless it is fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us. Now the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the standpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can derive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures which are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain regarding the personal properties, as was above explained ([328]Q[32], A[1]). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image found in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so also in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes. And such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the essential attributes is called “appropriation.”

The divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the essential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things which belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who proceeds by way of intellect, as

Word. In another way by dissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine says, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble; lest anything of the kind be imagined of God.

Reply to Objection 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the persons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make the persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above explained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation of the truth.

Reply to Objection 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the persons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would follow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which Augustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the Father is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son were Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be called wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is called the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father Who is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both together are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper concept prior to person, according to our way of understanding; nevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to prevent the personal property from being prior to that which is appropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body, but is naturally prior to “white body,” considered as white.

Whether the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons in a fitting manner by the holy doctors?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are appropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii): “Eternity is in the Father, the species in the Image; and use is in the Gift.” In which words he designates three names proper to the persons: the name of the “Father,” the name “Image” proper to the Son ([329]Q[35], A[2]), and the name “Bounty” or “Gift,” which is proper to the Holy Ghost ([330]Q[38], A[2]). He also designates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates “eternity” to the Father, “species” to the Son, and “use” to the

Holy Ghost. This he does apparently without reason. For “eternity” imports duration of existence; “species,” the principle of existence; and ‘use’ belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not found to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are not fittingly appropriated to the persons.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): “Unity is in the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the concord of equality and unity.” This does not, however, seem fitting; because one person does not receive formal denomination from what is appropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom begotten, as above explained ([331]Q[37], A[2], ad 1). But, as he subjoins, “All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by the Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost.” The above, therefore, are not fittingly appropriated to the Persons.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed “power,” to the Son “wisdom,” to the Holy Ghost “goodness.” Nor does this seem fitting; for “strength” is part of power, whereas strength is found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text, “Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God” (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is likewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words, “strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all” (Lk. 6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.

Objection 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): “What the Apostle says, “From Him, and by Him, and in Him,” is not to be taken in a confused sense.” And (Contra Maxim. ii) “‘from Him’ refers to the Father, ‘by Him’ to the Son, ‘in Him’ to the Holy Ghost.’” This, however, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words “in Him” seem to imply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes. Therefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the Father, Who is “the principle from no principle.”

Objection 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to Jn. 14:6, “I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life”; and likewise “the book of life,” according to Ps. 39:9, “In the beginning of the book it is written of Me,” where a gloss observes, “that is, with the Father Who is My head,” also this word “Who is”; because on the text of Is. 65:1, “Behold I go to the Gentiles,” a gloss adds, “The Son speaks Who said to Moses, I am Who am.” These appear to belong to the Son, and are not appropriated. For "truth," according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 36), "is the supreme similitude of the principle without any dissimilitude." So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son, Who has a principle. Also the "book of life" seems proper to the Son, as signifying "a thing from another"; for every book is written by someone. This also, "Who is," appears to be proper to the Son; because if when it was said to Moses, "I am Who am," the Trinity spoke, then Moses could have said, "He Who is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," so also he could have said further, "He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you," pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false; because no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot be common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.

I answer that, Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God from creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from creatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves to us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is considered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its intrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth point of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence this fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.

According to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider God absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary applies, according to which "eternity" is appropriated to the Father, "species" to the Son, "use" to the Holy Ghost. For "eternity" as meaning a "being" without a principle, has a likeness to the property of the Father, Who is "a principle without a principle." Species or beauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes three conditions, "integrity" or "perfection," since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due "proportion" or "harmony"; and lastly, "brightness" or "clarity," whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.

The first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch as He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the Father. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin. vi, 10): "Where—that is, in the Son—there is supreme and primal life," etc.

The second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the express Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is indicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), “Where there exists wondrous proportion and primal equality,” etc.

The third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): “As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to speak, the art of the omnipotent God,” etc.

“Use” has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the “use” be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of “to enjoy”; according as “to use” is to employ something at the beck of the will, and “to enjoy” means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11). So “use,” whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each other, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is what Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): “That love, that delectation, that felicity or beatitude, is called use by him” (Hilary). But the “use” by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy Ghost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin. vi, 10): “In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the Begettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His immense bounty and wealth.” Thus it is clear how “eternity,” “species,” and “use” are attributed or appropriated to the persons, but not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing in their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.

The second consideration of God regards Him as “one.” In that view Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates “unity” to the Father, “equality” to the Son, “concord” or “union” to the Holy Ghost. It is manifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For “unity” is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else; and for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any other person is not presupposed since He is the “principle without principle.” “Equality” implies unity as regards another; for that is equal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is appropriated to the Son, Who is the “principle from a principle.” “Union” implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can understand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) that “The Three are one, by reason of the Father;

They are equal by reason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost.” For it is clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first: just as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul, because therein we find the first trace of life. Now “unity” is perceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an impossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other persons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons be removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as soon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son, not as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but that, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be called equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to the Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from the Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be excluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the Father and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost; because given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son are said to be united.

According to the third consideration, which brings before us the adequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be a third kind of appropriation, of “power,” “wisdom,” and “goodness.” This kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as regards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of dissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For “power” has the nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly Father, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly father it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. “Wisdom” has likeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but the concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by reason of lack of years. “Goodness,” as the nature and object of love, has likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly spirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to Is. 25:4: “The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the wall.” “Strength” is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, not as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to express that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the strong work done by an agent is its strength.

According to the fourth consideration, i.e. God’s relation to His effects, there arise appropriation of the expression “from Whom, by Whom, and in Whom.” For this preposition “from” [ex] sometimes implies a certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God; and sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which can be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is appropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition "by" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say that a smith works "by" a hammer. Hence the word "by" is not always appropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly, according to the text, "All things were made by Him" (Jn. 1:3); not that the Son is an instrument, but as "the principle from a principle." Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form "by" which an agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence, as wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the expression "by Whom." The preposition "in" strictly denotes the habitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in one way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as existing in His knowledge. In this sense the expression "in Him" should be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are contained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and governs them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the expression "in Him" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is "goodness." Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first of causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is "the principle without a principle": because the divine persons, of Whom the Father is the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since each of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural procession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural power.

Regarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since "truth" belongs to the intellect, as stated above ([332]Q[16], A[1]), it is appropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His. For truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing itself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are referred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be said of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth as appropriated to the Son. The "book of life" directly means knowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained ([333]Q[24], A[1]), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to possess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son; although life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain kind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of the Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence of a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work produced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an appropriation to a person. The expression “Who is” is appropriated to the person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an adjunct, inasmuch as, in God’s word to Moses, was prefigured the delivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as the word “Who” is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate to the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken personally; as, for instance, were we to say, “The Son is the begotten ‘Who is,’” inasmuch as “God begotten is personal.” But taken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun “this” [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person, nevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically treated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person; as we may say, “this stone,” and “this ass.” So, speaking in a grammatical sense, so far as the word “God” signifies and stands for the divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun “this,” according to Ex. 15:2: “This is my God, and I will glorify Him.”

OF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or properties; and there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether relation is the same as person?

(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?

(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons leaves the hypostases distinct?

(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding, presuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?

Whether relation is the same as person?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as person. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others are multiplied.

But in one person there are several relations; as in the person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration. Again, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the Father and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24), nothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor can it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for otherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation, or property, is not the same as person in God.

Objection 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is predicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is predicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say that the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting. Therefore property is not the same as person in God.

On the contrary, in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, according to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by paternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the persons.

I answer that, Different opinions have been held on this point. Some have said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons; and these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the relations, which do not indeed signify existence "in" something, but rather existence "towards" something. Whence, they styled the relations "assistant," as above explained ([334]Q[28], A[2]). But since relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine essence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from what was said above ([335]Q[39], A[1]), relation must necessarily be the same as person.

Others, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said, there are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as stated above ([336]Q[32], A[2]). We must, however, say that there are properties in God; as we have shown ([337]Q[32], A[2]). These are designated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons. So, since the nature of a form requires it to be "in" that of which it is the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and yet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God, and yet is God.

Reply to Objection 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied, the other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as "Godhead" and "God." And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the non-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the other reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is His own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of the Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one self-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two persons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above explained ([338]Q[30], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by mode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity, not merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the form exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and distinguish the persons, but not the essence.

Reply to Objection 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional acts: and acts belong to a "suppositum." Now, properties are not designated as "supposita," but as forms of "supposita." And so their mode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being predicated of the properties.

Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations?

Objection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by the relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the persons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by themselves, and not by the relation.

Objection 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its genus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But “hypostasis” signifies an individual in the genus of substance. Therefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.

Objection 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But the distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction. Therefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.

Objection 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first principle of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which comes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is towards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God cannot be relation.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin.): “Relation alone multiplies the Trinity of the divine persons.”

I answer that, In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are “origin” and “relation.” Although these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for “origin” is signified by way of act, as “generation”; and “relation” by way of the form, as “paternity.”

Some, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that the divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say that the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former begets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the properties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons as resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest the distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the material principles.

This opinion, however, cannot stand—for two reasons. Firstly, because, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their distinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic to both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their form. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but means the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies the way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator. Hence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator should be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and in the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be distinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to presuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the persons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons are distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because the distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if what is common to them all is divided, because the common essence remains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must constitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the properties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons, inasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity is the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract and the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an active sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it presupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as "nativity," signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet constituting the person.

It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations; whence this name "Father" signifies not only a property, but also the hypostasis; whereas this term "Begetter" or "Begetting" signifies property only; forasmuch as this name "Father" signifies the relation which is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term "Begetter" or "Begotten" signifies the origin which is not distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis.

Reply to Objection 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves. Hence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them to be distinguished by the relations.

Reply to Objection 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards being, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as regards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their distinction.

Reply to Objection 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it approaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible distinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which distinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.

Reply to Objection 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects, when it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does not presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said that relation is by nature to be towards another, the word "another" signifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the order of nature.

Whether the hypostases remain if the relations are mentally abstracted from the persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the properties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For that to which something is added, may be understood when the addition is taken away; as man is something added to animal which can be understood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to hypostasis; for person is "a hypostasis distinguished by a property of dignity." Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a person, the hypostasis remains.

Objection 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone, are not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity, supposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son, in Whom there is not paternity, would not be "someone." So when paternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains "someone"—that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed from person, the hypostasis remains.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): "Unbegotten is not the same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son, nothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten." But if He had not begotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if paternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the Father as unbegotten.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The Son has nothing else than birth." But He is Son by "birth." Therefore, if filiation be removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds as regards the other persons.

I answer that, Abstraction by the intellect is twofold—when the universal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from man; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a circle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The difference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in the abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which the abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of rationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the intellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the form from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the intellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from brass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding both of a circle, and of brass. Now, although there is no universal nor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless, as regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of these things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that “substance is common and hypostasis is particular.” So, if we speak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, the common universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties are removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it were, a particular.

But as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the non-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases and persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father’s being unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father, the Father’s hypostasis or person remains.

If, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of the hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not to be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added to a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own “supposita,” inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus paternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something distinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So, as relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above explained [339](A[2]), it follows that if the personal relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however, think, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not distinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father is a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as from another by generation. And that the consequent relations which are to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of a person, and are thus called “personal properties.” Hence, if these relations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the persons, remain.

But this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations distinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above [340](A[2]); secondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person, as appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that, “person is the individual substance of a rational nature.” Hence, to have hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the rationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.

Reply to Objection 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing property absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all of which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing property is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as subsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing property be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer remains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature removed; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances. Consequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially to both.

Reply to Objection 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a person, and is “someone,” or a hypostasis. It does not follow, however, that the Son is not “someone” or a hypostasis; just as it does not follow that He is not a person.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of the Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed, as if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of the Father; for this would be impossible, since “being unbegotten” says nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But he speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being is the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other persons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the Jews understand it.

Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are understood before the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i, D, xxvii) that “the

Father always is, because He is ever begetting the Son." So it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of intelligence.

Objection 2: Further, in the order of intelligence every relation presupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes quantity. But paternity is a relation founded on the action of generation. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.

Objection 3: Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is to filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so called because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes generation.

On the contrary, Generation is the operation of the person of the Father. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore in the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.

I answer that, According to the opinion that the properties do not distinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest them as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that "because He begets, He is the Father." A distinction, however, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive signification—active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person acting.

Reply to Objection 1: When the Master says that "because He begets, He is Father," the term "Father" is taken as meaning relation only, but not as signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary to say conversely that because He is Father He begets.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but not as constituting a person.

Reply to Objection 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so, in the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as constituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a proceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes the personal property of the Father.

OF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS (SIX ARTICLES)

We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?

(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or from something?

(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?

(5) What this power means?

(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?

Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): “Whatever is predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation.” But action is one of the ten “genera.” Therefore any action attributed to God belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, “everything which is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or relation.” But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties. Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.

Objection 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion. But we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in God.

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: “It is a property of the Father to beget the Son.” Therefore notional acts are to be placed in God.

I answer that, In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts. Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons.

Reply to Objection 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above explained ([341]Q[32], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the Master says that “generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation” (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called “passion,” so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called “action.” Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations which result from action and passion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of signification.

Reply to Objection 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not attributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."

Whether the notional acts are voluntary?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son."

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will. Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.

Objection 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.

Objection 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii).

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."

I answer that, When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will—that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by will, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book De Synod, it is said: “If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema.” The reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to one; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will’s action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent’s will and understanding. So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must assert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature. Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): “The will of God gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created are such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists in the perfect likeness of God.”

Reply to Objection 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father’s will in the generation of the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity—as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read: “Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son.”

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if love were the principle of the Son’s generation.

Reply to Objection 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man’s will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise God naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained ([342]Q[19], A[3]). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Word is natural.

Reply to Objection 5: A thing is said to be necessary “of itself,” and “by reason of another.” Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary “of itself” which cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.

Whether the notional acts proceed from something?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, “In them nothing diverse or different exists.” If the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say, “The man is white,” since the man remains, when not from white he is made white—it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.

Objection 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, which was disproved above ([343]Q[39], A[5]).

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the Father’s essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father’s essence.

Objection 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,”I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures”: and further on (Ecclus. 24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, “From the beginning, and before the world was I created.” Therefore the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1): “Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him”; and (Amos 4:13) according to another version [*The Septuagint]: “I Who form the earth, and create the spirit.”

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says: “God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself.”

I answer that, The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father’s substance. For it was explained above ([344]Q[27], A[2]; [345]Q[33], AA[2] ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in God. Now, this is the difference between true “generation,” whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and “making,” that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out of nothing, as will be shown later on ([346]Q[45], A[1]), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1 Jn. 5:20): “That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ.” Therefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten.

That certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of God is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of God, He is called the “only begotten,” according to Jn. 1:18, “The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him”; and so as others are entitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the “first begotten,” according to Rom. 8:29: “Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many brethren.” Therefore the Son of God is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation passes into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above ([347]Q[40], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition “of” designates a consubstantial generating principle, but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.

Reply to Objection 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, “the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father”—that is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): “When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father.”

This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition “of” [de] always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is “of” [de] the builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that something is “of” another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be “of” the father, or a material principle, as a knife is “of” iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is “of” an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten ‘of’ the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.

Reply to Objection 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that the three persons are ‘of’ the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument.

Reply to Objection 4: When we say “Wisdom was created,” this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created wisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, “He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all His works” (Ecclus. 1:9,10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in one text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for wisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom. The saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the Son, so that the sense be, “From the beginning and before the world was I made”—that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or the mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into our minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what is generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains to perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but the creature does not receive the Creator’s nature. Thus the Son is called both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of creation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from generation the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way Hilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The other passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the created spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the breath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible substance.

Whether in God there is a power in respect of the notional acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or passive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God nothing which we call passive power, as above explained ([348]Q[25], A[1]); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another, since the divine persons were not made, as stated above [349](A[3]). Therefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.

Objection 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the divine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary. Therefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons proceed, there cannot be power in God.

Objection 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs to the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as regards intellect and will, as stated above ([350]Q[25], A[1]). Therefore, in God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): “If God the Father could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of God the Father?” Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional acts.

I answer that, As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be also a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the principle of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of generation; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of spiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father, and the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power of generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every generator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we must suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power of spirating.

Reply to Objection 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not proceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts has no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the person as proceeding.

Reply to Objection 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a consequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence, in God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only in the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in this latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to be, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.

Reply to Objection 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies distinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must observe a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real distinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real distinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of which He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct from the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God the distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise action would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to those actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are distinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe power to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to God the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting and of spirating. But “to understand” and “to will” are not such actions as to designate the procession of something distinct from God, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to these actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but only after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we designate by different terms the intellect and the act of understanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His very essence which has no principle.

Whether the power of begetting signifies a relation, and not the essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of spirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power signifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active power is the principle of action, as we find in Metaph. v, text 17. But in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally. Therefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.

Objection 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and ‘to act’ are not distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore, the same applies to the power of begetting.

Objection 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to the three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the three persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not signify the essence.

On the contrary, As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He wills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence. Therefore, also, the power to beget.

I answer that, Some have said that the power to beget signifies relation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is properly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that produces something by its action, produces something like itself, as to the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his begetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the power to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power of begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.

Now the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine nature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power of begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): “The birth of God cannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot subsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God.”

We must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies principally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii), and not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as identified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For although paternity is signified as the form of the Father, nevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person of the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature. Now the individual form in things created constitutes the person begetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise Socrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood as that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of the Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by which the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like to Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that generation is the “work of nature,” not of nature generating, but of nature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore the power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the relation indirectly.

Reply to Objection 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a principle, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it signifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in which we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that by which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it makes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by which the generator generates is common to generated and generator, and so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since, therefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the Begetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of identity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore, from the fact that we say that the divine essence “is the principle by which the Begetter begets,” it does not follow that the divine essence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we were to say that the divine essence begets.

Reply to Objection 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the act of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the act of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: When I speak of the “power of begetting,” power is signified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say, the “essence of the Father.” Wherefore in respect of the essence, which is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three persons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper to the person of the Father.

Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to several Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or spirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But the Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He cannot beget Himself:

therefore He can beget another son. Therefore there can be several Sons in God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): “The Son did not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved Him not.”

Objection 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than has a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God can also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished after begetting the Son.

On the contrary, In God “that which is possible,” and “that which is” do not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be several Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be more than three Persons in God; which is heretical.

I answer that, As Athanasius says, in God there is only “one Father, one Son, one Holy Ghost.” For this four reasons may be given.

The first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are the Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations themselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or several Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or more than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible except owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species are not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God. Wherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as there could be but one subsistent whiteness.

The second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God understands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there can be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which person is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of love, which person is the Holy Ghost.

The third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons proceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said [351](A[2]), and nature is determined to one.

The fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons. For this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation is contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is similar in regard to the other persons.

Reply to Objection 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the same power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the power “generandi” [of begetting] thus taking “generandi” as the gerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son has the “power to beget.” Just as, although Father and Son have the same being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason of the notional term added. But if the word “generandi” [of being begotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power “generandi” is in the Son—that is, the power of being begotten. The same is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal verb, so that the sense be “the power of generation”—that is, a power by which it is generated by some person.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the Son could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He could not, as we shall see later on ([352]Q[42], A[6], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in God require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have explained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to any lack of begetting power in the Father.

OF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS (SIX ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the persons as compared to one another: firstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard to mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.

(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?

(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He proceeds in eternity?

(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?

(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?

(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?

(6) Whether they are equal in power?

Whether there is equality in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the divine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one in quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the divine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic quantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity, which we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of discrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.

Objection 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have said ([353]Q[39], A[2]). Now essence is signified by way of form. But agreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal. Therefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not of equality.

Objection 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are equal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine persons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): “If an image answers perfectly to that whereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that which it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image.” But the Son is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the Son. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.

Objection 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to the three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the relations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.

On the contrary, Athanasius says that “the three persons are co-eternal and co-equal to one another.”

I answer that, We must needs admit equality among the divine persons. For, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15,16, 17), equality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot admit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius says (De Trin. i): “They must needs admit a difference [namely, of Godhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do, who sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus involving a plurality.” Now the reason of this is that unequal things cannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else than His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any inequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same essence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is impossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.

Reply to Objection 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of “bulk” or dimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things, and has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of “virtue,” which is measured according to the perfection of some nature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of something as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or less, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly by its source—that is, by the perfection of that form or nature: such is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great heat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 18) that “in things which are great, but not in bulk, to be greater is to be better,” for the more perfect a thing is the better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the effects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for everything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is operation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently virtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to action: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as things of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: “We understand equality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one of them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or surpasses in power.”

Reply to Objection 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity, equality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes excess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be alike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as the air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said to be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than another. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and Son, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not only that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the error of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude the error of Arius.

Reply to Objection 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two ways—namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns, equality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the Son is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because the divine essence is not more the Father’s than the Son’s. Wherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is therefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the Son, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to creatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “Equality and likeness are not mutual.” For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch as they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the form is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.

But verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not in God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son receives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the Father, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is equalled to the Father, but not conversely.

Reply to Objection 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to consider but the essence which they have in common and the relations in which they are distinct. Now equality implies both—namely, distinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to itself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons equal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and essence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is not a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another by a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to filiation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity and filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied indefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons is not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in its concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the persons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says (Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these “it is only the terms that are relative.”

Whether the person proceeding is co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not co-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius gives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of a line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The second is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent equality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a seal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The fourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also consubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an accident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The sixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives the species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of spiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by knowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is transformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is material. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have effect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but this mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the Son as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an idea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind. The twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which implies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that equality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one thing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say that He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.

Objection 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle. But nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not eternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence everything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is existence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He begins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.

Objection 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is always being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is begotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process of generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive things, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion, it follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be admitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of the Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.

On the contrary, Athanasius declares that “all the three persons are co-eternal with each other.”

I answer that, We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the Father. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which proceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due to two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the part of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently as regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account of the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it gives to the effect, as stated above ([354]Q[41], A[2]), so it can choose the time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however, the same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural power from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as, for instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first. Considered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle cannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is successive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to act thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the instant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to what has been said ([355]Q[41], A[2]), that the Father does not beget the Son by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was perfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father produces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be successively generated, and this generation would be material, and accompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we conclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus the Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with both.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode of the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine generation. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of these modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied from another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: "Let Splendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the Father; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the name Son insinuate His consubstantiality." Yet, above them all the procession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly; the intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an intellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not the principle of origin.

Reply to Objection 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts begins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however, is not changed, as stated above ([356]Q[27], A[2]). Hence the Son is ever being begotten, and the Father is always begetting.

Reply to Objection 4: In time there is something indivisible—namely, the instant; and there is something else which endures—namely, time. But in eternity the indivisible "now" stands ever still, as we have said above ([357]Q[10], A[2] ad 1, A[4] ad 2). But the generation of the Son is not in the "now" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to express the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that "He is ever being born," as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as Gregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is better to say "ever born," so that "ever" may denote the permanence of eternity, and "born" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus, therefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor "was there a time when He was not," as Arius said.

Whether in the divine persons there exists an order of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does not exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the essence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not signify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore there is no order of nature in God.

Objection 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes before another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in the divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as declared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no order of nature.

Objection 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists. But there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is not subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.

Objection 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But there is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there of nature.

On the contrary, Where plurality exists without order, confusion exists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius says. Therefore in God order exists.

I answer that, Order always has reference to some principle. Wherefore since there are many kinds of principle—namely, according to site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of demonstration; and according to each individual cause—so are there many kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without priority, exists in God as we have stated ([358]Q[33], A[1]): so there must likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and this is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine (Contra Maxim. iv): "Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby one is from another."

Reply to Objection 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in general, not a special kind of origin.

Reply to Objection 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a principle is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle still comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally considered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of cause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding therefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in the order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the definition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the persons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the nature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to another, not even in the order of nature and reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature itself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to natural origin.

Reply to Objection 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a principle, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more correctly called the order of nature than the order of essence.

Whether the Son is equal to the Father in greatness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in greatness. For He Himself said (Jn. 14:28): "The Father is greater than I"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): "The Son Himself shall be subject to Him that put all things under Him."

Objection 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But paternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not possess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness to the Father.

Objection 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions are included. Therefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the Son there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.

On the contrary, It is said (Phil. 2:6): “He thought it not robbery to be equal with God.”

I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in greatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of His nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and filiation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession of the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same way as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a certain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to act, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who begets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a defect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise. From what precedes ([359]Q[27], A[2]; [360]Q[33], AA[2] ,3), it is evident that in God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say that the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that the Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by change. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the Father in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): “Remove bodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and all human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural nativity, is the father’s equal, because he has a like nature.”

Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood of Christ’s human nature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but in His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by Athanasius, “Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father in humanity”: and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): “By the fact of giving, the Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is given”; and (De Synod.): “The Son subjects Himself by His inborn piety”—that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas “creatures are subject by their created weakness.”

Reply to Objection 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness signifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A[1], ad 1), and belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have reference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or dissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), “The question of origin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what kind, or how great, is he?” Therefore, paternity is the Father’s dignity, as also the Father’s essence: since dignity is something absolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same essence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation, so the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever dignity the Father has; but we cannot argue—“the Father has paternity, therefore the Son has paternity,” for there is a transition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son have the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the relation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver.

Reply to Objection 3: In God relation is not a universal whole, although it is predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are one in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of universal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Persons likewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above ([361]Q[30], A[4]). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only one; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because the whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person.

Whether the Son is in the Father, and conversely?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each other. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of one thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son in the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each mode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.

Objection 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within. But the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Mic. 5:2: “His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity.” Therefore the Son is not in the Father.

Objection 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the Son and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in the other.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 14:10): “I am in the Father, and the Father is in Me.”

I answer that, There are three points of consideration as regards the Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and according to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The Father is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His own essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change on His part. Hence it follows that as the Father’s essence is in the Son, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His own essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is His essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), “The unchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an unchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to subsist in Him, for He is God in God.” It is also manifest that as regards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the concept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the procession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect, inasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is uttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently represent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes enumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each other. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be found in that whereby something exists in its originating principle, except that the unity of essence between the principle and that which proceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.

Reply to Objection 2: The Son’s going forth from the Father is by mode of the interior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and remains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the distinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.

Reply to Objection 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not essentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in the other.

Whether the Son is equal to the Father in power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in power. For it is said (Jn. 5:19): “The Son cannot do anything of Himself but what He seeth the Father doing.” But the Father can act of Himself. Therefore the Father’s power is greater than the Son’s.

Objection 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches than of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son according to Jn. 14:31: “As the Father gave Me commandment so do I.” The Father also teaches the Son: “The Father loveth the Son, and showeth Him all things that Himself doth” (Jn. 5:20). Also, the Son hears: “As I hear, so I judge” (Jn. 5:30). Therefore the Father has greater power than the Son.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the Father’s omnipotence to be able to beget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 7), “Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the omnipotence of God the Father?” But the Son cannot beget a Son, as proved above ([362]Q[41], A[6]). Therefore the Son cannot do all that belongs to the Father’s omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him power.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:19): “Whatsoever things the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.”

I answer that, The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power. Power of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In creatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the greater power is there for action. Now it was shown above [363](A[4]) that the very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that the Son should be the Father’s equal in greatness—that is, in perfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the Father in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation to both.

Reply to Objection 1: The words, “the Son cannot of Himself do anything,” do not withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it is immediately added, “Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son doth in like manner”; but their meaning is to show that the Son derives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature. Hence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), “The unity of the divine nature implies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not act by Himself [a se].”

Reply to Objection 2: The Father’s “showing” and the Son’s “hearing” are to be taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the Son, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be explained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge and will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be referred to Christ in His human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and filiation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the Son is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the Father can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to argue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for generation signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same omnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father possessing power as “giving” signified when we say that He is able to beget; while the Son possesses the power of “receiving,” signified by saying that He can be begotten.

THE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?

(2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?

(3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?

(4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?

(5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?

(6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?

(7) Of the visible mission

(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?

Whether a divine person can be properly sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly sent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine person is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by another.

Objection 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence Jerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: “What is joined and tied in one body cannot be sent.” But in the divine persons there is nothing that is separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one person is not sent by another.

Objection 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes anew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is everywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be sent.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 8:16): “I am not alone, but I and the Father that sent Me.”

I answer that, the notion of mission includes two things: the habitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to the end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind of procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to command, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as an adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to origin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term to which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to be present there: either because in no way was he present before in the place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in some way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a divine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the procession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of existing in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father into the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by taking our nature; whereas “He was” previously “in the world” (Jn. 1:1).

Reply to Objection 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which is according to equality, as explained above ([364]Q[42], AA[4],6).

Reply to Objection 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously it did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is necessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no place in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent neither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases to exist where He was.

Hence such a mission takes place without a separation, having only distinction of origin.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission according to local motion, which is not in God.

Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?

Objection 1: It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), “The Son is sent as He is begotten.” But the Son’s generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something temporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the mission of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal.

Objection 3: Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of the divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.

On the contrary, It is said (Gal. 4:4): “When the fullness of the time was come, God sent His Son.”

I answer that, A certain difference is to be observed in all the words that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express only relation to the principle, as “procession” and “going forth.” Others express the term of procession together with the relation to the principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as “generation” and “spiration”; for generation is the procession of the divine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the procession of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term with the relation to the principle, as “mission” and “giving.” For a thing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it may be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed by any creature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal.

Hence “mission” and “giving” have only a temporal significance in God; but “generation” and “spiration” are exclusively eternal; whereas “procession” and “giving,” in God, have both an eternal and a temporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but temporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or likewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son, not from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean that He could be sent because eternally begotten.

Reply to Objection 2: That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be possessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine person, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called Lord temporally by change of the creature.

Reply to Objection 3: Mission signifies not only procession from the principle, but also determines the temporal term of the procession. Hence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the eternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the relation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence the procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal, not that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double term, temporal and eternal.

Whether the invisible mission of the divine person is only according to the gift of sanctifying grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine person is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the sending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine person is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the divine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this is the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but that His gifts are given.

Objection 2: Further, this preposition, “according to,” denotes the habitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the gift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according to Rom. 5:5, “the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.” Therefore it is improperly said that the divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that “the Son, when temporally perceived by the mind, is sent.” But the Son is known not only by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith and knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

Objection 4: Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the apostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of sanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine person is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that “the Holy Ghost proceeds temporally for the creature’s sanctification.” But mission is a temporal procession. Since then the creature’s sanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission of the divine person is only by sanctifying grace.

I answer that, The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that He exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone; and neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.

For God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according to His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which participate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode, however, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature wherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the knower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So no other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is in the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace. Hence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only according to sanctifying grace.

Again, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy: and to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be according to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed by man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying grace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.

Reply to Objection 1: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature is perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift itself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the invisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.

Reply to Objection 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy Ghost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift itself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words, “the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost.”

Reply to Objection 3: Although the Son can be known by us according to other effects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us according to those effects.

Reply to Objection 4: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as also does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence gratuitous grace is called the “manifestation of the Spirit” (1 Cor. 12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the working of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with the outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to them without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the Holy Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we read of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or of miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying or of working miracles.

Whether the Father can be fittingly sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father should be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given. But the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His giving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends Himself.

Objection 2: Further, the divine person is sent according to the indwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us according to Jn. 14:23: “We will come to him and make Our abode with him.” Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent.

Objection 3: Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all, except the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any person; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as stated above ([365]Q[32], A[3]). Therefore every divine person can be sent.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), “The Father alone is never described as being sent.”

I answer that, The very idea of mission means procession from another, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above expounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it fitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and to the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.

Reply to Objection 1: In the sense of "giving" as a free bestowal of something, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to be enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the giver as regards what is given, "to be given" only applies in God to the Person Who is from another; and the same as regards "being sent."

Reply to Objection 2: Although the effect of grace is also from the Father, Who dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still He is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that "The Father, when known by anyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He is, or from whom He proceeds."

Reply to Objection 3: Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes the signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in general; thus "to be from another" is common to two of the notions.

Whether it is fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be sent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is according to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:11: "One and the same Spirit worketh all things." Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.

Objection 2: Further, the mission of the divine person is according to sanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the intellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held without the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: "If I should have prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and if I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent invisibly.

Objection 3: Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as expounded above ([366]AA[1],4). But the procession of the Son and of the Holy Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct missions if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous, since one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.

On the contrary, It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. 9:10): “Send her from heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness.”

I answer that, The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying grace, according to Jn. 14:23: “We will come to him, and will make Our abode with him.” But that a divine person be sent to anyone by invisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way within him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by grace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to be invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace, still it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently He is not sent.

Reply to Objection 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above ([367]Q[38], A[1]), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are appropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong to the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of the Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that “The Son is sent to anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone.”

Reply to Objection 2: The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a divine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a likening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift of grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to the Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy Ghost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the Word, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix 10): “The Word we speak of is knowledge with love.” Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual illumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is said (Jn. 6:45): “Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath learned, cometh to Me,” and (Ps. 38:4): “In my meditation a fire shall flame forth.” Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20): “The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone.” Now perception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is properly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge [sapida scientia], according to Ecclus. 6:23: “The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name.”

Reply to Objection 3: Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is sent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained [368](A[1]), if we speak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission is distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is distinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the effect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the root which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace, which consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling of the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be without the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying grace, nor is one person separated from the other.

Whether the invisible mission is to all who participate grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all who participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their share of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is said (Jn. 7:39): "The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." Therefore the invisible mission is not to all partakers in grace.

Objection 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the invisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because progress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or decreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all who share in grace.

Objection 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace. But mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas Christ, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.

Objection 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and it is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore the invisible mission is not to all that have grace.

On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27), the invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every creature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission is to every such creature.

I answer that, As above stated ([369]AA[3],4,5), mission in its very meaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he was not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he was before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to the divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is sent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain renewal by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom are to be found these two conditions.

Reply to Objection 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament Fathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that the invisible mission of the Son “is in man and with men. This was done in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets.” Thus the words, “the Spirit was not yet given,” are to be applied to that giving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day of Pentecost.

Reply to Objection 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards progress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that “the Son is sent to each one when He is known and perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived according to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards God, or united perfectly to Him.” Such invisible mission, however, chiefly occurs as regards anyone’s proficiency in the performance of a new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for example, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of prophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself to the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his possessions, or to undertake any arduous work.

Reply to Objection 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the very beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to them subsequently, not by “intensity” of grace, but by the further revelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such an increase is by the “extension” of grace, because it extends to a greater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent at the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from the beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and grace.

Reply to Objection 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the New Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments of the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent to the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to its term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the sacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.

Whether it is fitting for the Holy Ghost to be sent visibly?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said to be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be less than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent in a visible manner.

Objection 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to a visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But the Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it cannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in others, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the sacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost is either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes place in all these things.

Objection 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth the whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason of those visible creatures more than any other person.

Objection 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest kind of creature—namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy Ghost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational creatures.

Objection 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the ministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So visible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the angels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.

Objection 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner is only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as invisible things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the invisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible mission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in the New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise to be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent visibly.

On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 3:16) that, when our Lord was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.

I answer that, God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as explained above ([370]Q[12], A[12]). Wherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the invisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest by some visible creatures.

This mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as Love, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of the Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Ghost as the sign of sanctification.

Reply to Objection 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He appeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said of that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of the nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared, into the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be predicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by reason of any visible creature.

Reply to Objection 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to the imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 6): “The prophetic vision is not displayed to corporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the spiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire, saw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same relation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is said, “The rock was Christ” (1 Cor. 10:4). For that rock was already created, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it typified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify only what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame of the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people followed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing forth when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the bodily appearances of those things was that they might signify, and then pass away.” Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by prophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the body, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament, wherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify something. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as He showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made for that purpose.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still they are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that person. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by diverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different things; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.

Reply to Objection 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the author of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible mission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational nature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of sanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action, but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required to last beyond what its use required.

Reply to Objection 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of the angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the Person of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those visible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.

Reply to Objection 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission should always be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is said (1 Cor. 12:7)—“the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit”—that is, of the Church. This utility consists in the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible signs. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles, according to Heb. 2:3, “which having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard.”

Thus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to Christ, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the Church was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the visible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission made to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of His conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time of His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show forth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual regeneration; hence the Father’s voice spoke, “This is My beloved Son” (Mat. 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the only Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance of a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it was said, “Hear ye Him” (Mat. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was directed in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their ministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said, “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven” (Jn. 20:23): and again under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of teaching; whence it is said that, “they began to speak with divers tongues” (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was fittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the visible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the Holy Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son manifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were, however, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed, cannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De Trin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the divine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.

Whether a divine person is sent only by the person whence He proceeds eternally?

Objection 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), “The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one.” Therefore if a divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other.

Objection 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But there can be no authority as regards a divine person except from origin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one sending.

Objection 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does not proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He proceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds.

On the contrary, The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Is. 48:16, “Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit.” But the Son is not from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from Whom He does not proceed.

I answer that, There are different opinions on this point. Some say that the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds eternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the Holy Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by reason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine, however, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by the Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son; so that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to the person proceeding from

another, whereas to send belongs to each person.

There is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person is described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another is designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the mission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the principle of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but that person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and thus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the Father and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as the principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the whole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a man can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect of grace.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.

TREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ 44–46)

THE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)

After treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must consider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration will be threefold: (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government. Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause; (3) the principle of the duration of things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?

(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent coordinate principle with Him?

(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there are other exemplar causes?

(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?

Whether it is necessary that every being be created by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being be created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being without that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be found without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its cause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can be understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and therefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by God.

Objection 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to exist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an efficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because whatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are many necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are from God.

Objection 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated by that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the efficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text 3); therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient cause.

On the contrary, It is said (Rom. 11:36): “Of Him, and by Him, and in Him are all things.”

I answer that, It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must be caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron becomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above ([371]Q[3], A[4]) when treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially self-subsisting Being; and also it was shown ([372]Q[11], AA[3],4) that subsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting, it would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients. Therefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which are diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses being most perfectly.

Hence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude; and Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in being and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every truth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all heat.

Reply to Objection 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without having the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not enter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for us to find a being uncaused.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection has led some to say that what is necessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly false in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are the causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says (Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have a cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is required is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but because the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this conditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and consequent be possible or impossible.

Reply to Objection 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though it were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in reality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient cause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of mathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause is not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the mathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from its efficient cause.

Whether primary matter is created by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God. For whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else (Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore primary matter cannot have been made by God.

Objection 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a division. But as the first active principle is God, so the first passive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two principles divided against each other, neither of which is from the other.

Objection 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since every agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that everything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only in potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is against the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two “things hast Thou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself”—viz. angels—“the other nigh unto nothing”—viz. primary matter.

I answer that, The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were step by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of grosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except sensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not consider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in relation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation. And supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was uncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes, as for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that kind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a distinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter they imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation to take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such transmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as the oblique circle [*The zodiac], according to Aristotle (De Gener. ii), or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into consideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate species, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is contracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being; for instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore, considered "being" under some particular aspect, either as "this" or as "such"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to things. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of "being," as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as "these," or as "such," but as "beings."

Therefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must be the cause of things, not only according as they are "such" by accidental forms, nor according as they are "these" by substantial forms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in any way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is created by the universal cause of things.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of "becoming" in particular—that is, from form to form, either accidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things according to their emanation from the universal principle of being; from which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is excluded from the former mode of being made.

Reply to Objection 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable that the first passive principle should be the effect of the first active principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one perfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 40).

Reply to Objection 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not created, but that it is not created without form; for though everything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is necessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all that belongs to its being is created.

Whether the exemplar cause is anything besides God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something besides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures are far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar cause.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something self-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above [373] (A[1]). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by participation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all sensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but also individuating principles added to the principles of the species. Therefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for instance, a “per se” man, and a “per se” horse, and the like, which are called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.

Objection 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species themselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there is no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are some beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular things, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div. Nom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life, and before self-subsisting wisdom.

On the contrary, The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are “the master forms, which are contained in the divine intelligence.” Therefore the exemplars of things are not outside God.

I answer that, God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In proof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive a determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the exemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in the mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive determinate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the order of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things. And therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of all things, which types we have called ideas—i.e. exemplar forms existing in the divine mind ([374]Q[15], A[1]). And these ideas, though multiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart from the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence can be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore God Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things created one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of its likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some kind of imitation.

Reply to Objection 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness to God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him, forasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is like to the house in the architect's mind.

Reply to Objection 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man without matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man is a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to anything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior species, such as separate substances. The same applies to other sensible things.

Reply to Objection 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only with beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the same mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding. For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.

Reply to Objection 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by "self-existing life and self-existing wisdom" he sometimes denotes God Himself, sometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any self-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.

Whether God is the final cause of all things?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all things. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God needs nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.

Objection 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing generated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70), because the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But God is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the final cause of all things.

Objection 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not desire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the end of all things.

Objection 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If, therefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it follows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord has made all things for Himself.”

I answer that, Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would not follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it were by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered as such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the impression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient intends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are both agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents, and to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition of something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent only, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to communicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every creature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness of the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness is the end of all things.

Reply to Objection 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent, which by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not belong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal giver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His own goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of generation, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the generator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise the form of the thing generated would be more noble than the generator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end.

Reply to Objection 3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire some good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or natural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and desirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.

Reply to Objection 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this does not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him, some of which come into our mind before others.

THE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

The next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from the First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight points of inquiry:

(1) What is creation?

(2) Whether God can create anything?

(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?

(4) To what things it belongs to be created?

(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?

(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any one Person?

(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?

(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature and of the will?

Whether to create is to make something from nothing?

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything from nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): “To make concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make something by bringing forth something from what was already.”

Objection 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered from their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and from being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation appears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions. Therefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being to being.

Objection 3: Further, the preposition “from” [ex] imports relation of some cause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a statue is made from brass. But “nothing” cannot be the matter of being, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make something from nothing.

On the contrary, On the text of Gn. 1, “In the beginning God created,” etc., the gloss has, “To create is to make something from nothing.”

I answer that, As said above ([375]Q[44], A[2]), we must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from “not-man,” and white from “not-white.” Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore as the generation of a man is from the “not-being” which is “not-man,” so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the “not-being” which is “nothing.”

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense, according as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when we say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of creation in that way here, but as it is described above.

Reply to Objection 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term “wherefrom,” but from the term “whereto.” Therefore a change is more perfect and excellent when the term “whereto” of the change is more noble and excellent, although the term “wherefrom,” corresponding to the term “whereto,” may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply nobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial form is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the substantial form, which is the term "wherefrom" in generation, is more imperfect than the contrary, which is the term "wherefrom" in alteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than generation and alteration, because the term "whereto" is the whole substance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term "wherefrom" is simply not-being.

Reply to Objection 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this preposition "from" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only order; as when we say, "from morning comes midday"—i.e. after morning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition "from" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word "nothing," or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense, then we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now and its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the preposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, "It is made from nothing—i.e. it is not made from anything"—as if we were to say, "He speaks of nothing," because he does not speak of anything. And this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is made from nothing. But in the first way this preposition "from" [ex] implies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense, it imports the material cause, which is denied.

Whether God can create anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient philosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that "nothing is made from nothing." But the power of God does not extend to the contraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make the whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation are both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything from nothing, or create.

Objection 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to be created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore creation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as appears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of what is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to be made out of nothing by God.

Objection 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been becoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same time, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what is becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it would follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time. Therefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having been made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which the becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything should be made from nothing.

Objection 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite distance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not happen that something is made from nothing.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

I answer that, Not only is it not impossible that anything should be created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were created by God, as appears from what has been said ([376]Q[44], A[1]). For when anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from which he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by his action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or brass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action of nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards their form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act from something presupposed, it would follow that the thing presupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above ([377]Q[44], AA[1],2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is the universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that God brings things into being from nothing.

Reply to Objection 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above ([378]Q[44], A[2]), considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action; whence came their common opinion that “nothing is made from nothing.” But this has no place in the first emanation from the universal principle of things.

Reply to Objection 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of understanding. For change means that the same something should be different now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the same actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in motion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is the same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the subject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the substance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations (Phys. iii, text 20,21), it must follow that when motion is withdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the creature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of understanding as was said above ([379]Q[13], A[1]), creation is signified by mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is to make something from nothing. And yet "to make" and "to be made" are more suitable expressions here than "to change" and "to be changed," because "to make" and "to be made" import a relation of cause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change only as a consequence.

Reply to Objection 3: In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of movement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the same time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak of its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not previously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is being created and is already created at the same time.

Reply to Objection 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if there were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is plainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken to signify a change existing between two forms.

Whether creation is anything in the creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the creature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to the creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to the Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the Creator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be something temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything in the creature.

Objection 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the creature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both: since it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the creature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same reason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to infinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.

Objection 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created substance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident is in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of creation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term of creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the accident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the action and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action and passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.

On the contrary, It is greater for a thing to be made according to its entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or accidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby anything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form, is something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation, whereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something in the thing created.

I answer that, Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above (A[2], ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of motion.

Reply to Objection 1: Creation signified actively means the divine action, which is God’s essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God relation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real relation, as was said above ([380]Q[13], A[7]) in treating of the divine names.

Reply to Objection 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was said above (A[2], ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover and the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium between the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation is in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further creation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature being referred to something, are not referred by any other relations, but by themselves; as was also shown above ([381]Q[42], A[1], ad 4), in treating of the equality of the Persons.

Reply to Objection 3: The creature is the term of creation as signifying a change, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and is prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident. Nevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of the object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the creature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it should be created; because creation imports a relation of the creature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.

Whether to be created belongs to composite and subsisting things?

Objection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to composite and subsisting things. For in the book, De Causis (prop. iv) it is said, “The first of creatures is being.” But the being of a thing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking does not belong to subsisting and composite things.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite things are not from nothing, but are the result of their own component parts. Therefore composite things are not created.

Objection 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is properly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the natural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the thing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter, and not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” But heaven and earth are subsisting composite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.

I answer that, To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was shown above ([382]Q[44], A[2], ad 2,3). Now, to be made is directed to the being of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong to whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being—that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be "of a being" than "a being." Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting things are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought to be called rather "concreated" than "created" things; whereas, properly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.

Reply to Objection 1: In the proposition "the first of created things is being," the word "being" does not refer to the subject of creation, but to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created thing is called created because it is a being, not because it is "this" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the Universal Being, as was said above [383] (A[1]). We use a similar way of speaking when we say that "the first visible thing is color," although, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.

Reply to Objection 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a composite thing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the "composite" is created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all its principles.

Reply to Objection 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is created, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for creation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.

Whether it belongs to God alone to create?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to create, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34), what is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures are more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make their own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man. Therefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself. But immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no matter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the thing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But a “contrary” resists more than “nothing.” Therefore it requires more power to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a creature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more therefore can a creature do this.

Objection 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to the measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we proved above when treating of the infinity of God ([384]Q[7], AA[2],3,4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by creation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of a creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good nor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other creatures.

I answer that, It sufficiently appears at the first glance, according to what precedes [385](A[1]), that to create can be the action of God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the more universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most universal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is said (De Causis prop., iii) that “neither intelligence nor the soul gives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation.” Now to produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to creation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God alone.

It happens, however, that something participates the proper action of another, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts by the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of fire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper act of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the power of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that the first separate substance created by God created another after itself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the substance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in the same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can communicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter can create ministerially, not by its own power.

But such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause does not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch as by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect of the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to what is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be any need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that a saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form, produces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the principal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is presupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence nothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect, since creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed by the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible for any creature to create, either by its own power or instrumentally—that is, ministerially.

And above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no body acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its action some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which is contrary to the very idea of creation.

Reply to Objection 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a likeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by applying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause of himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man begotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter whereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man participates human nature, so every created being participates, so to speak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own being, as we have said above ([386]Q[7], AA[1],2). Therefore no created being can produce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes “being” in “this”: and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is this thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But in an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything whereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form, whereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an immaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like to itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added perfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an inferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). In this way even in heaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:15): “From whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.” From which evidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless something is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i, text 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And so the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the potentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire intends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but is impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the potentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act; and the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is required in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much greater power is required in the agent when no potentiality pre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much greater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the substance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being made; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore although to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power, yet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which appears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is required in the agent in proportion to the distance of the potentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which produces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite, because there is no proportion between “no potentiality” and the potentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is no proportion between “not being” and “being.” And because no creature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an infinite being, as was proved above ([387]Q[7], A[2]), it follows that no creature can create.

Whether to create is proper to any person?

Objection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person. For what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is perfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the divine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more perfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of its principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude. Therefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the processions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.

Objection 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each other only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever difference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them according to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the causation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons; for in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that “He is the Creator of all things visible and invisible”; to the Son is attributed that by Him “all things were made”; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that He is “Lord and Life-giver.” Therefore the causation of creatures belongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.

Objection 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature flows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person, this does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect is caused by every essential attribute—viz. by power, goodness and wisdom—and thus does not belong to one more than to another. Therefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed to one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in creating according to relations and processions.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things caused are the common work of the whole Godhead.

I answer that, To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce the being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the principle of action can be considered from the effect of the action; for it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create belongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is common to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one Person, but is common to the whole Trinity.

Nevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For as was said above ([388]Q[14], A[8]; [389]Q[19], A[4]), when treating of the knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His intellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in his mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which is His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so the processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will.

Reply to Objection 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to the three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son receives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to be the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not receive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said (Jn. 1:3), “Through Him all things were made,” inasmuch as He has the same power, but from another; for this preposition “through” usually denotes a mediate cause, or “a principle from a principle.” But to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is attributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created by the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular appropriation may be taken from the common notion of the appropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated ([390]Q[39], A[8], ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly shown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the Creator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the intellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: “Through Whom all things were made.” And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to which belong both government, which brings things to their proper end, and the giving of life—for life consists in a certain interior movement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each attribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is naturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to “wisdom,” and the justification of the sinner to “mercy” and “goodness” poured out superabundantly. But creation, which is the production of the very substance of a thing, is reduced to “power.”

Whether in creatures is necessarily found a trace of the Trinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily found a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its traces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the creatures, as was above stated ([391]Q[32], A[1]). Therefore there is no trace of the Trinity in creatures.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if the trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of their properties, and if everything created has a trace of the Trinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each of these (properties): and so on to infinitude.

Objection 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the causality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the relations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered. Therefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity but of the unity of essence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that “the trace of the Trinity appears in creatures.”

I answer that, Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a “trace”: for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as regards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire generating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of “image.” Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was said above [392](Q[27]). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in rational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is found in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.

But in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch as in every creature are found some things which are necessarily reduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature subsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to a species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a created substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in that manner it shows the

Person of the Father, Who is the “principle from no principle.” According as it has a form and species, it represents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the conception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it represents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order of the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And therefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the Trinity is found in every creature, according “as it is one individual,” and according “as it is formed by a species,” and according as it “has a certain relation of order.” And to these also are reduced those three, “number,” “weight,” and “measure,” mentioned in the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For “measure” refers to the substance of the thing limited by its principles, “number” refers to the species, “weight” refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the other three mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), “mode,” “species,” and “order,” and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): “that which exists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees.” For a thing exists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and agrees by its order. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.

Reply to Objection 1: The representation of the trace is to be referred to the appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a knowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we have said ([393]Q[32], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: A creature properly speaking is a thing self-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to be found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found in all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is the trace ascribed in regard to those three things.

Reply to Objection 3: The processions of the persons are also in some way the cause and type of creation; as appears from the above [394](A[6]).

Whether creation is mingled with works of nature and art?

Objection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of nature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is produced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no part in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every operation of nature and art there is creation.

Objection 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But in natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an active or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not produced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be produced by creation.

Objection 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are found generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in animals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these is not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to other things.

Objection 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore in nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that nature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.

On the contrary, Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes the work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of creation.

I answer that, The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which, some said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but previously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent. This arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how to distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms pre-exist in matter, "in potentiality," they asserted that they pre-exist "simply." Others, however, said that the forms were given or caused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that to each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose from ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the form of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a thing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong properly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above [395](A[4]), it does not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be "concreated." What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is the "composite," which is made from matter.

Hence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is presupposed to the work of nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are made, not as though they were made "directly," but only "indirectly."

Reply to Objection 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of substantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces its like according to quality, but according to species.

Reply to Objection 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal agent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to which they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind of analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created by a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals the universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required, in the shape of a univocal generator.

Reply to Objection 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the presupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature are called creatures.

OF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES (THREE ARTICLES)

Next must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures, about which there are three points for treatment:

(1) Whether creatures always existed?

(2) Whether that they began to exist in an article of Faith?

(3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the beginning?

Whether the universe of creatures always existed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the world, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything which begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise it would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began to exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But possible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence, which results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from privation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must have existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form: while the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore the world existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.

Objection 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is and sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends so long is exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be always; for its power does not extend to any determinate time. Therefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not: but everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some time is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But there are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial bodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not begin to exist.

Objection 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and also (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten. Therefore the universe did not begin to exist.

Objection 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there might be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body where the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there, otherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world there was a vacuum; which is impossible.

Objection 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through either the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was before. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved. Therefore before every new movement there was a previous movement. Therefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved always was, because movement is only in a movable thing.

Objection 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But neither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For nature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change precede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing, there cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not there before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off doing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined change, at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a house tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be tomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass, and for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because time is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before every new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in its end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in its end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is in its beginning and end, because there is no time except “now” which is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore time cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the measure of what is time.

Objection 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order of nature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only, therefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if God is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in duration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the world, which is impossible.

Objection 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of His goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the efficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above ([396]Q[44], AA[2],3,4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also eternal.

Objection 10: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But the action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the world is eternal.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 17:5), “Glorify Me, O Father, with Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was”; and (Prov. 8:22), “The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning.”

I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above ([397]Q[19], A[4]) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above ([398]Q[19], A[3]), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration.

Nor are Aristotle’s reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively, demonstrative—viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite impossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both in Phys. viii and in De Coelo i, text 101, he premises some opinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings forward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks of this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is not the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is probable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that there are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say from reason, as, “whether the world is eternal.”

Reply to Objection 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the world to be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but according to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing is called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from the sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other; in which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of having that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but before it received that power, it did not exist.

Hence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120) does not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist; but that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things generated and corruptible begin.

Reply to Objection 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to derive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves that heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from which to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows either way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by generation, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that matter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears above ([399]Q[44], A[1], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only “in which is nothing,” but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in which there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text 60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the world was.

Reply to Objection 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but the first movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas hitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by creation, which is not change, as said above ([400]Q[45], A[2], as 2). Hence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys. viii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal movable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the moment that movable things began to exist movement also existed.

Reply to Objection 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He had the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce an eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be presupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take into consideration the difference between a particular agent, that presupposes something and produces something else, and the universal agent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the form, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it introduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it is correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and not into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But it is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter together: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces matter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent presupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly described as acting in time "after" and not in time "before," according to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the universal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not correctly described as acting now, and not before, according to an imaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were presupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time to His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what was fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more evidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was not always, than if it had always been; since everything which was not always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest of what always was.

Reply to Objection 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), "before" and "after" belong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning and end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now, granted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given moment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need not be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the “now” of time. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant “now,” as being always the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of time and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys. viii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but denied the eternity of movement.

Reply to Objection 8: God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word “prior” signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing, the word “above” signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.

Reply to Objection 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by nature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows from the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and determined by the agent, as appears from what was said above ([401]Q[19], A[4]; [402]Q[41], A[2]). Therefore, although God was from eternity the sufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was produced by Him, except as preordained by His will—that is, that it should have being after not being, in order more manifestly to declare its author.

Reply to Objection 10: Given the action, the effect follows according to the requirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in agents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be taken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from the eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such an effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not being.

Whether it is an article of faith that the world began?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.

Objection 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by God, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something.

But it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world would have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of Aristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated. Therefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and thus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.

Objection 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some principle, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by intellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore, which is His effect, did not always exist.

Objection 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have developed, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some fixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been always. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.

Objection 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.

Objection 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.

Objection 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).

Objection 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man’s soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.

On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things “that appear not” (Heb. 11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, “I believe in one God,” etc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”: in which words the newness of the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.

I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity ([403]Q[32], A[1]). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; whence it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above ([404]Q[19], A[3]). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of faith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to consider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of philosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For some said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is an intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are cogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made by God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time, but of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was always made. "And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei x, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity, there would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by him who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker always existed." To understand this we must consider that the efficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its effect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action, and every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is instantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker to be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of illumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if God is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the world in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change, as was said above ([405]Q[45], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would say that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made after nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation, but that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do not reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix, text 4).

Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys. viii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion, except as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out what should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human intellect, but not the divine intellect ([406]Q[14], AA[7],12).

Reply to Objection 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that some region was changed an infinite number of times, from being uninhabitable to being inhabitable and “vice versa,” and likewise they hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and accidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay. Hence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such particular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole world.

Reply to Objection 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.

Reply to Objection 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.

Reply to Objection 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity “per se”—thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are “per se” required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Reply to Objection 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this reason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to be an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of Algazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But this was disproved above ([407]Q[7], A[4]). Some say that the soul is corrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will remain. But others, as Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4,5; De Haeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a circuit of souls—viz. that souls separated from their bodies return again thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which matters will be given later ([408]Q[75], A[2]; Q[118], A[6]). But be it noted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one might say that the world was eternal, or least some creature, as an angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in general, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.

Whether the creation of things was in the beginning of time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the beginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of time. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation the substance of things was brought into being; and time does not measure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things. Therefore creation was not in the beginning of time.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that everything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies a “before” and “after.” But in the beginning of time, since it is indivisible, there is no “before” and “after.” Therefore, since to be created is a kind of “being made,” it appears that things were not created in the beginning of time.

Objection 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”

I answer that, The words of Genesis, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” are expounded in a threefold sense in order to exclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and that time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words “In the beginning” are expounded—viz. “of time.” And some said that there are two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of evil things, against which “In the beginning” is expounded—“in the Son.” For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by reason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son by reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), “Thou hast made all things in wisdom,” it may be understood that God made all things in the beginning—that is, in the Son; according to the word of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), “In Him”—viz. the Son—“were created all things.” But others said that corporeal things were created by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to exclude this it is expounded thus: “In the beginning”—i.e. before all things—“God created heaven and earth.” For four things are stated to be created together—viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal matter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time, not as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but because together with time heaven and earth were created.

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood “of being made” by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because, since in every movement there is “before” and “after,” before any one point in a given movement—that is, whilst anything is in the process of being moved and made, there is a “before” and also an “after,” because what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not in “being moved.” But creation is neither movement nor the term of movement, as was said above

([409]Q[45], AA[2],3). Hence a thing is created in such a way that it was not being created before.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists of time except “now.” Hence time cannot be made except according to some “now”; not because in the first “now” is time, but because from it time begins.

TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (Q[47])

OF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL (THREE ARTICLES)

After considering the production of creatures, we come to the consideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be threefold—first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly, of the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creature.

Under the first head, there are three points of inquiry:

(1) The multitude or distinction of things.

(2) Their inequality.

(3) The unity of the world.

Whether the multitude and distinction of things come from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of things does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one. But God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes ([410]Q[11], A[4]). Therefore He produces but one effect.

Objection 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar. But God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above ([411]Q[44], A[3]). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not diverse.

Objection 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end of the creation is one—viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above ([412]Q[44] , A[4]). Therefore the effect of God is but one.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:4, 7) that God “divided the light from the darkness,” and “divided waters from waters.” Therefore the distinction and multitude of things is from God.

I answer that, The distinction of things has been ascribed to many causes. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by itself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the ancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter, attributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction of things comes from chance according to the movement of matter. Anaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of things to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the intellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in matter.

But this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown above ([413]Q[44], A[2]), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we must reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause. Secondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the form for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their proper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account of the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is formless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.

Others have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents, as did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced the first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own being, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as will appear later ([414]Q[50], A[3]). And so the first intelligence, inasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second intelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality it produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as it understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the heavens.

But this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it was shown above ([415]Q[45], A[5]) that to create belongs to God alone, and hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God alone—viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and corruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the universality of things would not proceed from the intention of the first agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such an effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore, the perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of things, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.

Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.

And because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word of God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read in Gn. 1:3,4: “God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the light from the darkness.”

Reply to Objection 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes it what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its effect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was shown above ([416]Q[19], A[4]), acts by an intellectual form. Since, therefore, it is not against God’s unity and simplicity to understand many things, as was shown above ([417]Q[15], A[2]), it follows that, although He is one, He can make many things.

Reply to Objection 2: This reason would apply to the representation which reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by reason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is only one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly, which is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by many things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the plurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of things.

Reply to Objection 3: In speculative things the medium of demonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one only; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when operation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the end, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to its end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is necessary.

Whether the inequality of things is from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from God. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things that are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs to God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.

Objection 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text 20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.

Objection 3: Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal things. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no inequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives being to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.

On the contrary, It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): “Why does one day excel another, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun another sun? [Vulg.: ‘when all come of the sun’]. By the knowledge of the Lord they were distinguished.”

I answer that, When Origen wished to refute those who said that the distinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and evil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by God. For he asserted that God first created only the rational creatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from free-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others turned more and others less away from God. And so those rational creatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the order of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who were turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the diversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation and diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would follow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the effect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it would be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to what is said: “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good” (Gn. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3): “What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect provided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its beauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened through the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned, there would be a hundred suns in the world?”

Therefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of the distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their inequality.

This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction is found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things differing specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards things differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account of the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal distinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only one individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is sufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and corruptible there are many individuals of one species for the preservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction is of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction always requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the universe, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not be perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.

Reply to Objection 1: It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which is best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every part of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the whole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be taken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus, therefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole, according to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each single creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we find it said of each creature, “God saw the light that it was good” (Gn. 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all together it is said, “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good” (Gn. 1:31).

Reply to Objection 2: The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes multiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son proceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the creature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless even creatures share in a certain equality—namely, of proportion.

Reply to Objection 3: This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it holds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of which is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things there is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality, either of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality comes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works done by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not because it is made of other material; but in order that the house may be made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different material; indeed, he would make such material if he could.

Whether there is only one world?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not only one world, but many. Because, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say that God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason He created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited to the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown above ([418]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore God has produced many worlds.

Objection 2: Further, nature does what is best and much more does God. But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by God.

Objection 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because multiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form in matter. Thus as when I say “man” I mean the form, and when I say “this man,” I mean the form in matter; so when we say “world,” the form is signified, and when we say “this world,” the form in the matter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the existence of many worlds.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 1:10): “The world was made by Him,” where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.

I answer that, The very order of things created by God shows the unity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of order, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things come from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God Himself, as shown above ([419]Q[11], A[3]; [420]Q[21], A[1]). Hence it must be that all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can assert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining wisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that this world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made from a casual concourse of atoms.

Reply to Objection 1: This reason proves that the world is one because all things must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from the unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52) the unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of the exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.

Reply to Objection 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end forasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself tends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end. Now when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has reference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the intention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it might be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if He had made three; and so on to infinite.

Reply to Objection 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For it is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since every earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever it was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the world.

TREATISE ON THE DISTINCTION OF GOOD AND EVIL (QQ[48]-49)

THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and firstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of the spiritual and corporeal creatures.

Concerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.

Concerning evil, six points are to be considered:

(1) Whether evil is a nature?

(2) Whether evil is found in things?

(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?

(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?

(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.

(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?

Whether evil is a nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is a nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x) that “good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other things.” Therefore evil is a nature.

Objection 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a nature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality; for a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality from illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

Objection 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil and good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries, as the

Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good and evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to good. Therefore evil signifies a nature.

Objection 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it corrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.

Objection 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe except what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the perfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir. 10,11) that the "admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all things. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its place, is the eminent commendation of what is good." Therefore evil is a nature.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Evil is neither a being nor a good."

I answer that, One opposite is known through the other, as darkness is known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the nature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its own perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying that "evil is neither a being nor a good." For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.

Reply to Objection 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of Pythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and therefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil. For Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward examples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some philosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 6), "the first kind of contrariety is habit and privation," as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary is always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to white, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil are said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries; because, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as such, has the nature of evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences except in morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the object of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has the nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific differences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence of the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself constitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end; just as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in natural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore, the evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain good joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by the intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but the delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a constitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is annexed.

Reply to Objection 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks there of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between good and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something rightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but also as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, i) that a “prodigal man is foolish, but not evil.” And from this evil in morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of evil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although blindness is an evil.

Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one way, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that sense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good, forasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In another sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter makes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final cause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause. But in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that is, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For every action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as an end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside the scope of our will and intention.”

Reply to Objection 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are ordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and according as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was said above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good. Hence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor does it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that is, by reason of some good joined to it.

Whether evil is found in things?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For whatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of something, that is a "not-being." But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from non-existence." Therefore evil is not at all found in things.

Objection 2: Further, "being" and "thing" are convertible. If therefore evil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is contrary to what has been said [421](A[1]).

Objection 3: Further, "the white unmixed with black is the most white," as the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed with evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best, much more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is no evil.

On the contrary, On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and penalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.

I answer that, As was said above ([422]Q[47], AA[1],2), the perfection of the universe requires that there should be inequality in things, so that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of goodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of goodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this grade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are which cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while some there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.

As, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there should be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings; so the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some which can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they do fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact that a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found in things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple "not-being," because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a privation.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten “predicaments”; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word “is”; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, “Does it exist?” and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.

Reply to Objection 3: God and nature and any other agent make what is best in the whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order to the whole, as was said above ([423]Q[47], A[2]). And the whole itself, which is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more perfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes fail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because “it belongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may fail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says (Enchir. 11), “God is so powerful that He can even make good out of evil.” Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no evil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not corrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass were killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a sufferer be praised if there were no injustice.

Whether evil is in good as in its subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject. For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that “evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists.” Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.

Objection 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But “non-being” does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither does evil require good as its subject.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its subject.

Objection 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore also the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as in its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said (Is. 5:20): “Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!”

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that “evil exists only in good.”

I answer that, As was said above [424](A[1]), evil imports the absence of good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good, taken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil, through not having the good belonging to something else; for instance, a man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.

Now, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same—viz. being in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality, as primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and of privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative potentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent body, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however, manifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and a good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every potential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For as it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality. Therefore, the subject of evil is good.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as a part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.

Reply to Objection 2: “Not-being,” understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such “not-being” is an evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its subject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not “sight,” but “animal.” Yet, it appears, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is laid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be taken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference to any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and bitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in a special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus; whereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with the privation of another good.

Reply to Objection 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as such is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is clear from the explanation given.

Whether evil corrupts the whole good?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For one contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that “evil hurts inasmuch as it takes away good.” But good is all of a piece and uniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.

Objection 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away good. But that from which something is always being removed, is at some time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of any created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that “evil cannot wholly consume good.”

I answer that, Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must consider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed by evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly destroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is neither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good which is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air is not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished by evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude of a subject to some actuality.

The diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered by way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of remission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission likewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity. For this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions whereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are multiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its perfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission by contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the matter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the potentiality remitted as regards the actuality.

Therefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and intensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the aforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in the active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and humidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is diminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the contrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid aptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless, it is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is the substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed to infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to light would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be wholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is transparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude, whereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened; and these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and God, according to Is. 59:2: “Our sins have divided between us and God.” Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away, for it belongs to its very nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away; but other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.

Reply to Objection 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and act. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where it touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although good is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different things, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.

Reply to Objection 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of good is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the continuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an ever same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a third), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not avail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we continue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than half of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the above mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance either equally or more.

Therefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite thing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not “per se,” but accidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also increased infinitely, as explained above.

Whether evil is adequately divided into pain* and fault?

[*Pain here means “penalty”: such was its original signification, being derived from “poena.” In this sense we say “Pain of death, Pain of loss, Pain of sense.”—Ed.]

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into pain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all creatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own existence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore evil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.

Objection 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor pain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are evils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.

Objection 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for “temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion for the exercise of virtue,” as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not is it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain follows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into pain and fault.

Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that this division is superfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil “because it hurts.” But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil comes under pain.

I answer that, Evil, as was said above [425](A[3]) is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil also is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its due mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which comes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has the nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown above ([426]Q[22], A[2]); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be against the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of the due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for this is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.

Reply to Objection 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere negation, as was said above [427](A[3]), therefore not every defect of good is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So, likewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in existence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one and the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as regards a creature.

Reply to Objection 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely considered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.

Reply to Objection 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always an evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not, properly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change is wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the agent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the tempter he falls into fault.

Reply to Objection 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said that the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent in himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to the agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as including the idea of injury.

Whether pain has the nature of evil more than fault has?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For fault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good than merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault has.

Objection 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the greater good. But pain, as was said above [428](A[5]), is opposed to the good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the action. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it seems that pain is worse than fault.

Objection 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in forfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation of the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.

On the contrary, A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to prevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole body. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore fault is a greater evil than pain.

I answer that, Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not only more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal goods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any kind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to include privation of grace or glory.

There is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil by the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to be made worthy of punishment.” And this because, since good absolutely considered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate act is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that the absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use of something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will. Hence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is called good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a bad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his own will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself consists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in the privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in it than pain has.

The second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of the evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because the evil of pain takes away the creature’s good, which may be either something created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something uncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature forfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed to uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine will, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself, and not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that fault has more evil in it than pain has.

Reply to Objection 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.

Reply to Objection 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the more perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection, than the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order to the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way, both by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed from the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as this privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due end.

THE CAUSE OF EVIL (THREE ARTICLES)

We next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are three points of inquire:

(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?

(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of all evils?

Whether good can be the cause of evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For it is said (Mat. 7:18): “A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit.”

Objection 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But evil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of evil.

Objection 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient cause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has one, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the cause of evil can only be evil.

Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no cause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): “There is no possible source of evil except good.”

I answer that, It must be said that every evil in some way has a cause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due disposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper disposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some impelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some impediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a cause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is good.

And if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the agent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which belongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to good, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by way of the material cause was shown above ([429]Q[48], A[3]). For it was shown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause, rather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final cause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since not only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which is ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent, not directly, but accidentally.

In proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action otherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason of the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or the instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal may happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the case of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the instrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a thing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the power of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the agent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or perfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form intended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance, when on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of air or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in strength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so also the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil and corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the fire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the privation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own form, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other. But if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire—as, for instance, that it fails to heat—this comes either by defect of the action, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above, or by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the action of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a deficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to act. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental cause; and thus is good the cause of evil.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): “The Lord calls an evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree.” Now, a good will does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good will itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the movement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature, which is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to itself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes evil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act morally evil. And, as explained above ([430]Q[19], A[9]), this is by accident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes another by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold heats (the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.

Reply to Objection 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.

Reply to Objection 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause, as was said above.

Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil. For it is said (Is. 45:5, 7): “I am the Lord, and there is no other God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and creating evil.” And Amos 3:6, “Shall there be evil in a city, which the Lord hath not done?”

Objection 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the first cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above [431](A[1]). Therefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above ([432]Q[2] , A[3]; [433]Q[6], AA[1],4), it follows that also every evil is from God.

Objection 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30), the cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God is the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause of all perdition and of all evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, “God is not the author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to not-being.”

I answer that, As appears from what was said [434](A[1]), the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection, as was shown above ([435]Q[4], A[1]). Hence, the evil which consists in defect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not reduced to God as to its cause.

But the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is reduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural things and voluntary things. For it was said [436](A[1]) that some agent inasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows corruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and defect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in things created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the order of the universe requires, as was said above ([437]Q[22], A[2], ad 2; [438]Q[48], A[2]), that there should be some things that can, and do sometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the order of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident, causes the corruptions of things, according to 1 2:6: “The Lord killeth and maketh alive.” But when we read that “God hath not made death” (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its own sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of the universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but not of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.

Reply to Objection 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to the evil of fault.

Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.

Reply to Objection 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as the cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of the ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary for the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.

Whether there be one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is the cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes. But contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: “Good is set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner against a just man.” Therefore there are many contrary principles, one of good, the other of evil.

Objection 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But the supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was shown above ([439]Q[2], A[3]; [440]Q[6], AA[2],4). Therefore, also, there is a supreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.

Objection 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil and worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what is best.

Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to some supreme evil.

Objection 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is essential. But things which are evil among us are evil not essentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for some supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.

Objection 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is “per se.” But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we must suppose some supreme evil which is the “per se” cause of evils. Nor can it be said that evil has no “per se” cause, but only an accidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist in the many, but only in the few.

Objection 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the cause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause, as was said above ([441]AA[1],2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in this matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause of every evil.

On the contrary, The supreme good is the cause of every being, as was shown above ([442]Q[2], A[3]; [443]Q[6], A[4]). Therefore there cannot be any principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.

I answer that, It appears from what precedes that there is no one first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.

First, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially good, as was shown above ([444]Q[6], AA[3],4). But nothing can be essentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such, is good ([445]Q[5], A[3]); and that evil can exist only in good as in its subject ([446]Q[48], A[3]).

Secondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and perfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above ([447]Q[6], A[2]). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was shown above ([448]Q[48], A[4]), although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “if the wholly evil could be, it would destroy itself”; because all good being destroyed (which it need be for something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away, since its subject is good.

Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above

[449](A[1]), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental cause is subsequent to the direct cause.

Those, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the other evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also arose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they failed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered only the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account, if they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own nature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as, for instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil because it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of the goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any particular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its order to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly ordered place, as was said above ([450]Q[47], A[2], ad 1).

Likewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two contrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these contrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and therefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first principles. But since all contraries agree in something common, it is necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own contrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the elements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things that exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being, as was shown above ([451]Q[2], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree in the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary particular cause, nevertheless we must come at last to one first common cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same subject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as was said above ([452]Q[48], A[3]). Hence, since evil is privation of good, as appears from what was said above ([453]Q[48], AA[1], 2,3), it is opposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the supreme good, who is pure act.

Reply to Objection 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature of a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a perfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by approach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from that term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason of access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be good and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.

Reply to Objection 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by privation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it to any essential evil.

Reply to Objection 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown above [454](A[1]). Hence reduction to any ‘per se’ cause of evil is impossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply false. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone can there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole universe. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the smaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater number; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good of man as man—that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good in regard to the senses than good according to reason.

Reply to Objection 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity, but reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows accidentally.

TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)

OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE ARTICLES)

Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.

Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.

Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things.

Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?

(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form?

(3) We ask concerning their number.

(4) Of their difference from each other.

(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.

Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal.”

Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance.” Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.

Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): “Every creature is limited within its own nature.” But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God’s creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: “Praise ye” the Lord, “all His angels”; and, farther on (verse 4), “For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created.” Therefore angels are corporeal.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): “Who makes His angels spirits.”

I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and will ([455]Q[14], A[8]; [456]Q[19], A[4]). Hence the perfection of the universe requires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to “here” and “now.” Hence the perfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8).

But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect alone.

Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.

Reply to Objection 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.

Reply to Objection 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that “although some things are not contained in corporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance.”

Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.

Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand; whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that “a simple form cannot be a subject”: and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an angel is composed of matter and form.

Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.

Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the form of an angel is in matter.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “The first creatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal.”

I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the

Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of corporeal things.

But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same matter.

It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.

But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God [457](Q[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now everything is constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because "the species of things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things there is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the matter; and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the former the "difference." Whereas in immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them "genus" and "difference" are not derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of their "genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their "difference."

Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.

Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, “whereby he is,” and “what is,” or “existence,” and “what is,” as Boethius says. For “what is,” is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs. But in God “existence” and “what is” are not different as was explained above ([458]Q[3], A[4]). Hence God alone is pure act.

Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its “being” is finite as determined to some one special nature.

Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that “intelligence is finite from above,” as receiving its being from above itself, and is “infinite from below,” as not received in any matter.

Whether the angels exist in any great number?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are incorporeal, as was shown above [459](A[1]). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great number.

Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the angelic nature.

Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements of the heavenly bodies.

Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “all intelligible and intellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine goodness.” But a ray is only multiplied according to the different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above [460] (A[2]). Therefore it seems that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the first bodies—that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before.

On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood before Him.”

I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate substances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and according to this view it would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31) because matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of the first movements.

But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God’s almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be designated as angels.

Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv): “There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers.” The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is something very small in comparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude.

Reply to Objection 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above ([461]Q[30], A[3]; [462]Q[11]).

Reply to Objection 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few subjects.

Reply to Objection 3: This is Aristotle’s argument (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted above ([463]Q[47], A[1]). Accordingly, the multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances.

Whether the angels differ in species?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the “difference” is nobler than the ‘genus,’ all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them—that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one species.

Objection 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only from one another according to more and less—namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.

Objection 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels.

Objection 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of one species.

On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as “first” and “second” [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels are not of the same species.

I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.

But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said above [464](A[2]), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus.

Reply to Objection 1: “Difference” is nobler than “genus,” as the determined is more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that there should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature.

Reply to Objection 2: More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified according to more or less.

Reply to Objection 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in the one species.

Reply to Objection 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above ([465]Q[47], A[3]). Hence the perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of individuals in one species.

Whether the angels are incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is “an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and not by nature.”

Objection 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: “O gods of gods, whose maker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it.” But gods such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by their nature

Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), “all things would tend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them.” But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of their own nature.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual substances “have unfailing life, being free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation.”

I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above [466](A[2]), it is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, as was said above [467](A[2]), it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel’s immateriality is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature.

A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete immutability; since “every change is a kind of death,” as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later [468](Q[62]).

Reply to Objection 2: By the expression ‘gods’ Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in existence by the Divine will.

Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([469]Q[44], A[1]) there is a kind of necessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.

OF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)

We next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things; and in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly, of the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of their comparison with local movement.

Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?

(2) Whether they assume bodies?

(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): “It is God’s attribute alone—that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and without any companionship of corporeal addition.” Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.): “Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance.” Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. iii): “The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies.” But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.

Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the angels are understood to be incorporeal.”

I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings, because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later ([470]Q[75], A[2]), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on ([471]Q[84], A[6]; [472]Q[89], A[1]). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and these we call angels.

Reply to Objection 1: As was said above ([473]Q[50], A[1]) it was the opinion of some that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points, by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for some purpose, as will be explained [474](A[2]). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they termed demons.

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.

Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one which is united to a body.

Whether angels assume bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body.

Objection 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated [475](A[1]); while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

Objection 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision—that is, according to imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder’s imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said [476](A[1]; [477]Q[50], A[1]), it follows that they sometimes assume bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared in the flesh.

Reply to Objection 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.

Reply to Objection 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for forming the assumed body.

Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.

Objection 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life.

Objection 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said (Gn. 18:16) that “Abraham walked with” the angels, who had appeared to him, “bringing them on the way”; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob. 5:7,8): “Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of Medes?” he answered: “I know it; and I have often walked through all the ways thereof.” Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

Objection 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bodies they exercise functions of life.

Objection 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having resumed life (Lk. 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed bodies they ate, and

Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored them as God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.

Objection 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related: “After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown” (Gn. 6:4). Consequently the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies.

On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far as it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects; because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), “that which has the faculty has the action.” Hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential principle of such action.

Reply to Objection 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really not. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to angels.

Reply to Objection 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power of the angel’s knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other members, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).

Reply to Objection 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of the world’s substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but according to a fixed quarter; because “the moving energy is always in the east,” as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.

Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.

Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat, because eating involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater.

Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ’s body, but resolved into pre-existing matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias: “When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink” (Tob. 12:19).

Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).

Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): “Many persons affirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God’s holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge.” Still if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.

OF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE (THREE ARTICLES)

We now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are three subjects of inquiry:
(1) Is the angel in a place?

(2) Can he be in several places at once?

(3) Can several angels be in the same place?

Whether an angel is in a place?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “The common opinion of the learned is that things incorporeal are not in a place.” And again, Aristotle observes (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that “it is not everything existing which is in a place, but only a movable body.” But an angel is not a body, as was shown above [478] (Q[50]). Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Objection 2: Further, place is a “quantity having position.” But everything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a position cannot benefit an angel, since his substance is devoid of quantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position. Therefore an angel is not in a place.

Objection 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be contained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained by a place, because the container is more formal than the contained; as air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an angel is not in a place.

On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline, Dominican Breviary]: “Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us in peace.”

I answer that, It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel and a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A body is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such place according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no such quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to any place.

Accordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed commensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the continuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with dimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this account for the angel to be contained by a place; because an incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body as containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is said to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained, but as somehow containing it.

And hereby we have the answers to the objections.

Whether an angel can be in several places at once?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at once. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But the soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every part of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel can be in several places at once.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since the body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is in every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are various places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “where the angel operates, there he is.” But occasionally he operates in several places at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom (Gn. 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one time.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “while the angels are in heaven, they are not on earth.”

I answer that, An angel’s power and nature are finite, whereas the Divine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things, is infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things, and is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since the angel’s power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to one determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be compared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all being is compared as one thing to God’s universal power, so is one particular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since the angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place, it follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in only one place.

Some, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were unable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the indivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently they thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point. But they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something indivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is indivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation. Consequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one indivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible or indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own free-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the entire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one place to him.

Neither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to be everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to what is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in which there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east: hence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of the heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly, because philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves all the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.

So, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite differently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a place in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place. An angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he is not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a place in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither circumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.

From this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because the entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied, is reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.

Whether several angels can be at the same time in the same place?

Objection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same time in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time in the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not fill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not empty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58). Therefore several angels can be in the one place.

Objection 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a body than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at the one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not filled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58. Much more, then, can two angels be in the same place.

Objection 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess souls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon are at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same reason all other spiritual substances.

On the contrary, There are not two souls in the same body. Therefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same place.

I answer that, There are not two angels in the same place. The reason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to be the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident in every class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one thing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be several remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several individuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover, because no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat; while all together are as one mover, in so far as their united strengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the angel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches the place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said [479](A[1]), there can be but one angel in one place.

Reply to Objection 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the same place because of their filling the place; but for another reason, as has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way; hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body according to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its form, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.

OF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.

(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through intervening space?

(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?

Whether an angel can be moved locally?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32,86) "nothing which is devoid of parts is moved"; because, while it is in the term "wherefrom," it is not moved; nor while it is in the term "whereto," for it is then already moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved, while it is being moved, is partly in the term "wherefrom" and partly in the term "whereto." But an angel is without parts. Therefore an angel cannot be moved locally.

Objection 2: Further, movement is “the act of an imperfect being,” as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is not imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.

Objection 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy angels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.

On the contrary, It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ’s soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified angel is moved locally.

I answer that, A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however, to be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so likewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as it is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place. Hence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate with the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the continuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude; and according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place as commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it is not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be commensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the exigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is a non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by virtual contact, as was said above ([480]Q[52], A[1]), it follows necessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else than the various contacts of various places successively, and not at once; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as was said above ([481]Q[52], A[2]). Nor is it necessary for these contacts to be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be found in such contacts. Because, as was said above ([482]Q[52], A[1]), there is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an angel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is assigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body successively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was before, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so likewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which he was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all at once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself to the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be continuous.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold reason. First of all, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals with what is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place necessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, because Aristotle’s demonstration deals with movement which is continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be said that a thing is moved where it is in the term “wherefrom,” and while it is in the term “whereto”: because the very succession of “wheres,” regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence, in whichever of those “wheres” the thing might be, it could be said to be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because nothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the line is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing moved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being moved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore, according as the angel’s movement is not continuous, Aristotle’s demonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel’s movement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while an angel is in movement, he is partly in the term “wherefrom,” and partly in the term “whereto” (yet so that such partiality be not referred to the angel’s substance, but to the place); because at the outset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible place from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in movement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part of the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can occupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that he can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does by application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which is movable according to place, that it is divisible according to magnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to something which is divisible.

Reply to Objection 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application of energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the act of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any need of its own, but for another’s need. In this way, because of our need, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: “They are all [*Vulg.: ‘Are they not all . . . ?’] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation.”

Whether an angel passes through intermediate space?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through intermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space first travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing through a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is indivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes through middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement: which is not possible.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul. But our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: for I can think of France and afterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands between them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle.

On the contrary, If the angel be moved from one place to another, then, when he is in the term “whither,” he is no longer in motion, but is changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change: consequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he was not moved so long as he was in the term “whence.” Therefore, he was moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him to pass through intervening space.

I answer that, As was observed above in the preceding article, the local motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it be continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another without passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), “The middle is that into which a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the last into which it is moved”; because the order of first and last in continuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last in magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).

But if an angel’s movement be not continuous, it is possible for him to pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle: which is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are infinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible or as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which are indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite intermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a middle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of necessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the continuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to place except in time. But in the whole time which measures the movement of a body, there are not two “nows” in which the body moved is not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same place in two “nows,” it would follow that it would be at rest there; since to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now and previously. Therefore since there are infinite “nows” between the first and the last “now” of the time which measures the movement, there must be infinite places between the first from which the movement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is made evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm’s length, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it travels; it is evident that the first place from which the movement starts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement ends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to move, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second. According, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are the intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in the magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a distinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the same. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the points in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it follows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate places.

Now a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate places by the continuity of its movement; because, as the intermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must there be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous. Consequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts of the movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable body be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either that it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else that it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible. Accordingly, then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does not pass through all intermediate places.

Now, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going through the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature; but not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and contained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of place in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to place as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence it is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills, either through or without the intervening place.

Reply to Objection 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him according to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the angel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet even the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said above: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is evident from the foregoing.

Reply to Objection 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied to various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the things thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part of the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede change. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in movement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is a part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even without the mid-space, constitutes such movement.

Whether the movement of an angel is instantaneous?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous. For the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist the mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel moving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a body. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the lessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other length of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in time, an angel is moved in an instant.

Objection 2: Further, the angel’s movement is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as illumination; both because the subject is not illuminated successively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not reach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is the angel’s movement instantaneous.

Objection 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it is manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term “whereto”: but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in the place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term “wherefrom”; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the other, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible. Therefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term “wherefrom.” Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be in the same place now and previously, as was said [483](A[2]). Therefore it follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.

On the contrary, In every change there is a before and after. Now the before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently every movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before and after in it.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the local movement of an angel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from place to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term “wherefrom”; but in the last instant of such time he is in the term “whereto.” Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms, just as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But there is a mid-time between two “nows” of time: hence they say that a last “now” cannot be assigned in which it was in the term “wherefrom,” just as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire, there is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or in which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a last time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time there is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so illumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous movements.

But this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown thus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not otherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every “now” of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the same “where” in the first, in the middle, and in the last “now.” On the other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject moved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every “now” of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in various dispositions; hence in the last “now” it must have a different form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest during the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in whiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is not possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the preceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be in the other term. But this is possible in movement: because to be moved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in every instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of the kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is the term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of the local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement of an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is of itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is impossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and that in the last “now” he is in another place: but some “now” must be assigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there are many “nows” succeeding one another, there is necessarily time; since time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in movement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time. It is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in non-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was said [484](A[1]), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity of time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99).

But that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as the time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all corporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from the movement of the heavens; because the angel’s movement does not depend upon the movement of the heavens.

Reply to Objection 1: If the time of the angel’s movement be not continuous, but a kind of succession of ‘nows,’ it will have no proportion to the time which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is continuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be continuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the proportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the proportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides, the swiftness of the angel’s movement is not measured by the quantity of his power, but according to the determination of his will.

Reply to Objection 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an alteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood to be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote. But the angel’s movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term of movement; hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But the same time of an angel’s movement can be non-continuous. So an angel can be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next instant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel’s movement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places throughout the whole time which precedes the last ‘now’; as was already shown [485](A[2]). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the continuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance is susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part of the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above [486](A[2]).

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

After considering what belongs to the angel’s substance, we now proceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In the first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge: secondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects known: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.

Under the first heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Is the angel’s understanding his substance?

(2) Is his being his understanding?

(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?

(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?

(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the intellect?

Whether an angel’s act of understanding is his substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel’s act of understanding is his substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect is its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and from his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126–1198]. Therefore much more is the angel’s substance his action—that is, his act of understanding.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that “the action of the intellect is life.” But “since in living things to live is to be,” as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life is essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of an angel who understands.

Objection 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence. Therefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect and the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who understands.

On the contrary, The action of anything differs more from its substance than does its existence. But no creature’s existence is its substance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was said above ([487]Q[3], A[4]). Therefore neither the action of an angel, nor of any other creature, is its substance.

I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His existence and His action.

Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists. Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in itself, nor from the substance of another angel.

Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.

Reply to Objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if "to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence." Although life is sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of the intellect is life."

Reply to Objection 3: The action which is transient, passing to some extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an effect which differs from both.

Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 37).

But to “understand is in a sense to live” (De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

Objection 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

On the contrary, The angel’s act of understanding is his movement, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.

I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text. 16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent. It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be the agent’s very existence: because the agent’s existence is signified as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple infinity, we have the act “to understand,” of which the object is “the true”; and the act “to will,” of which the object is “the good”; each of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will, of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to one in genus and species; God’s being alone is simply infinite, comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its own act of will.

Reply to Objection 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the various functions of life.

Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding, since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely, truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand.'

Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and "intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds." Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.

Objection 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been previously said ([488]Q[50], A[2]).

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of intelligence.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are divided into substance, power, and operation." Therefore substance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.

I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been already said ([489]Q[44], A[1]). Now the act to which the operative power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its power of operation.

Reply to Objection 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind," because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.

Reply to Objection 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for such accident belongs to the form—whereas an accident which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species, results from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.

Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17) that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make all things." But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.

Objection 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.

On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in the angel.

I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power, which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for admitting an active intellect is due to this—that the natures of the material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the active intellect.

But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear later ([490]Q[84], A[7]; [491]Q[85], A[1]). Therefore there cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.

Reply to Objection 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher understands those two things to be in every nature in which there chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the function of the active intellect to enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.

Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in the angels there is "life which understands and feels." Therefore there is a sensitive faculty in them as well.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have likewise a power of memory.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of the same nature.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that "man senses in common with the brutes, and understands with the angels."

I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to them, as is manifest from what has been said already ([492]Q[51], A[1]). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.

The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul. For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was said above (A[3], ad 1).

A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that “such an inquiry does not call for much labor.” Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we “sense it.” And hence it is that we use the word “sentence.” Experience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show ([493]Q[57], A[2]), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul. In like fashion ‘a perverted phantasy’ is attributed to demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.

OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (THREE ARTICLES)

Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some species?

(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as they have derived from things?

(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower angels?

Whether the angels know all things by their substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that “the angels, according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are happening upon earth." But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore the angel knows things by his essence.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51; De Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same as the object understood." But the object understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very substance of the one understanding it.

Objection 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i.e. all in all. Therefore the angel knows all things in his substance.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are enlightened by the forms of things." Therefore they know by the forms of things, and not by their own substance.

I answer that, The medium through which the intellect understands, is compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the angel of his own nature.

Reply to Objection 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter, the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a thing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.

Reply to Objection 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality—because the angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality from other things—but according to some common formality. Yet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from which proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel has not, but only a common knowledge.

Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from things.

Objection 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect abstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands through species drawn from things.

Objection 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no purpose.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible."

I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower intellectual substances—that is to say, human souls—have a power of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things. But in the higher spiritual substances—that is, the angels—the power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can know naturally.

The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances. The lower spiritual substances—that is, souls—have a nature akin to a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the higher substances—that is, the angels—are utterly free from bodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): “The other things which are lower than the angels are so created that they first receive existence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature.”

Reply to Objection 1: There are images of creatures in the angel’s mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, “As the type, according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very fashioning of the creature.”

Reply to Objection 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination, which form is without matter but not without material conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no imagination, as was said above ([494]Q[54], A[5]). Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he would not do so; because he would not need them, for he has connatural intelligible species.

Reply to Objection 3: The angel’s knowledge is quite indifferent as to what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.

Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the lower angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal, seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less universal.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known than what is known generically; because to know anything generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the lower; which is not befitting.

Objection 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things. Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which seems unbecoming.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.

I answer that, For this reason are some things of a more exalted nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect is lower.

Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.

Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God;

or at least in the order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.

Reply to Objection 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one universal medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.

Reply to Objection 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to its proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known through it with a proper knowledge.

OF THE ANGEL’S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS (THREE ARTICLES)

We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Does an angel know himself?

(2) Does one angel know another?

(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?

Whether an angel knows himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius says that “the angels do not know their own powers” (Coel. Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known. Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a kind of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that “the angel knew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth.”

I answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said ([495]Q[14], A[2]; [496]Q[54], A[2]), the object is on a different footing in an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the object or matter into which the action passes is something separate from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just as the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the form which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat is the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of the thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.

It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then there is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the action, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the less if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something else. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be any subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since an angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he is actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by his form, which is his substance.

Reply to Objection 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is amended in the new one, and runs thus: “furthermore they,” that is to say the angels, “knew their own powers”: instead of which the old translation read—“and furthermore they do not know their own powers.” Although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power perfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.

Reply to Objection 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as if is in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of the same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into some other matter.

Whether one angel knows another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored with some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the human intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is the angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since the angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature from the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot understand other natures.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in De Causis that “every intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause.” But one angel is not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.

Objection 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way of a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what has been said before ([497]Q[50], A[4]; [498]Q[55], A[1], ad 3). Hence, it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known; because that whereby the intellect understands is something within the intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because that species would not differ from the angel understood, since each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can understand another.

Objection 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way does it seem that one angel knows another.

On the contrary, We read in De Causis that “every intelligence knows the things which are not corrupted.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things as pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him in two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word of God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished from one another in a certain order, as was already observed ([499]Q[50], A[4], ad 1,2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to their various degrees of perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.

Reply to Objection 3: One angel knows another by the species of such angel existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the intellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only an intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a natural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only intentional existence.

Reply to Objection 4: God made every creature proportionate to the universe which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe, means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.

Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God “by His incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds.” Afterwards he adds that, “since He is above all substances, He is remote from all knowledge.”

Objection 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.” From this it appears that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already shown ([500]Q[12], A[4]), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.

On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men can know God through their natural principles; according to Rom. 1:19: “what is known of God is manifest in them.” Therefore much more so can the angels.

I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an angel knows himself—secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the eye—thirdly, when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.

To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above ([501]Q[12], A[4]). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures, according to Rom. 1:20: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his natural principles the angel knows

God, stands midway between these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is impressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God's essence; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the Divine image.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not known by any created intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has of Him.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more to one of them, as was said above.

OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?

(2) Whether they know single things?

(3) Whether they know the future?

(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?

(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?

Whether the angels know material things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.

Objection 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2 Cor. 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know material things.

Objection 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.

On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the mind of an angel.

I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God.

Now whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the manner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of their own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelligible species.

Reply to Objection 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in his intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the intellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but only their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the imagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The intellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said (De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense regarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of material things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing understood is in him who understands, and not according to their real natures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according to both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision.

Reply to Objection 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material things from the material things themselves, he would require to make them actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does not derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves; he has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species of things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect has, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.

Whether an angel knows singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the Philosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): “The sense has for its object singulars, but the intellect, universals.” Now, in the angels there is no power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident from what was said above ([502]Q[54], A[5]). Consequently they do not know singulars.

Objection 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of the knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any assimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so far as it is singular; because, as was observed above ([503]Q[50], A[2]), an angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity. Therefore the angel cannot know singulars.

Objection 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by singular or by universal species. It is not by singular species; because in this way he would require to have an infinite number of species. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not the sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because singular things are not known in the universal except potentially. Therefore the angel does not know singulars.

On the contrary, No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: “He hath given His angels charge over Thee.” Consequently the angels know singulars.

I answer that, Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of singulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith, which asserts that these lower things are administered by angels, according to Heb. 1:14: “They are all ministering spirits.” Now, if they had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision over what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals: and this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: “Say not before the angel: There is no providence.” Secondly, it is also contrary to the teachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to be the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to their knowledge and will.

Consequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of singulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular effects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming eclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This opinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know a singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as singular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing from computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to happen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking place now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and movement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.

Therefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various powers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending universals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things singular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his one mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that the higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and far-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in other cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of nature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his powers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge, namely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it ridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be unknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; Metaph. text. 15).

The manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered from this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may subsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that they may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes forth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature, but likewise all that goes to make up their principles of individuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the thing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He causes, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as was shown above ([504]Q[14], A[8]). Therefore as by His essence, by which He causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows all things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to their singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the angels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but likewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the manifold representations of that one simple essence.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which apprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction from material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal. Such a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of the angels, as was said above ([505]Q[55], A[2], A[3] ad 1), and consequently there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels are likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by agreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears resemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way there is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and form, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever is to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the angel’s intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence, are the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to their matter.

Reply to Objection 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which nevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and as to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by the same species, has been already stated above ([506]Q[55], A[3], ad 3).

Whether angels know the future?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For angels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many future events. Therefore much more do the angels.

Objection 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time. But the angel’s intellect is above time; because, as is said in De Causis, “an intelligence keeps pace with eternity,” that is, aeviternity. Therefore, to the angel’s mind, past and future are not different, but he knows each indifferently.

Objection 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived from things, but by innate universal species. But universal species refer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears that the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.

Objection 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of time, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are distant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things distant according to future time.

On the contrary, Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, does not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the exclusive sign of the Divinity, according to Is. 41:23: “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.” Therefore the angels do not know future events.

I answer that, The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be known in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily from their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will rise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the majority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus the doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of knowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more than it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more universally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply into the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the future issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in the minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance events.

In another way future events are known in themselves. To know the future in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those events which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but even casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His eternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces all time. And therefore God's one glance is cast over all things which happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all things as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing with God's knowledge ([507]Q[14], A[13]). But the mind of an angel, and every created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the future as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Men cannot know future things except in their causes, or by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way, but much more distinctly.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time according to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a time in his mind according to the succession of intelligible concepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that "God moves the spiritual creature according to time." And thus, since there is succession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen through all time, are present to the angelic mind.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in so far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless the present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the species. Present things have a nature according to which they resemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be known thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature whereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot be known by those species.

Reply to Objection 4: Things distant according to place are already existing in nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel; whereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated. Consequently there is no comparison.

Whether angels know secret thoughts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For Gregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: “Gold or crystal cannot equal it,” says that “then,” namely in the bliss of those rising from the dead, “one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and when once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same time be penetrated.” But those who rise shall be like the angels, as is stated (Mat. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in another’s conscience.

Objection 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the intellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape is seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the intelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one angel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the thoughts of both.

Objection 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more than do the images in our imagination; because the former are actually understood, while the latter are understood only potentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an angel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a corporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the thoughts of the intellect.

On the contrary, What is proper to God does not belong to the angels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts, according to Jer. 17:9: “The heart is perverse above all things, and unsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart.” Therefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts.

I answer that, A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in its effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also by man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect is the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by outward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell some passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can angels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult bodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that demons "sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions, not only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought, when the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body"; although (Retract. ii, 30) he says "it cannot be asserted how this is done."

In another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and affections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the thoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is, because the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone can work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be developed later ([508]Q[63], A[1]; [509]Q[105], A[5]). Consequently all that is in the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known to God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will for anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a habit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): "For what man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?"

Reply to Objection 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets. The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not exist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in the angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show forth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of glory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.

Reply to Objection 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species of another, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of these substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it does not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by actual consideration.

Reply to Objection 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but follows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause. Since, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their dispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite or in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of man, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following some bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in brutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the sensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far as these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower part of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as is said in Ethics iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the angel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or imagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the intellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the imagination, but can make various uses of them.

Whether the angels know the mysteries of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace. For, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all mysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): "This mystery was hidden in God through the ages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly places." And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): "That great mystery of godliness appeared unto angels*." [*Vulg.: 'Great is the mystery of godliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels know the mysteries of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained in the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is His essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.

Objection 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is clear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew mysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): "For the Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets." Therefore angels know the mysteries of grace.

On the contrary, No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the highest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated (Coel. Hier. vii) that "Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly essences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of His Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly": as is evident in Is. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, "Who is he who cometh up from Edom?" Jesus answered, "It is I, Who speak justice." Therefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.

I answer that, There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first is his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by his essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels cannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the pure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of another angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less can he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle reasons in this fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): "No one knoweth the things of a man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'], but the spirit of a man that is in him." So, "the things also that are of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God."

There is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it is the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By such vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor do they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by revelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): "But to us God hath revealed them through His Spirit"; yet so that the higher angels beholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper mysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to the lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they knew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught afterwards, as befits their ministrations.

Reply to Objection 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the Incarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was revealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason of this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all their duties are ordered. For "all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (Heb. 1:14)"; and this is brought by the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of them to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning.

We can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to its special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on all points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these afterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom, yet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to know everything hidden in it.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the mysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the angels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He was one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still the apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets did not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4,5): “As you reading, may understand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other generations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles.” Among the prophets also, the later ones knew what the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: “I have had understanding above ancients,” and Gregory says: “The knowledge of Divine things increased as time went on” (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).

OF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (SEVEN ARTICLES)

After the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic knowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the angel’s intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and sometimes in act?

(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?

(3) Whether the angel’s knowledge is discursive?

(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?

(5) Whether there can be error in the angel’s intellect?

(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?

(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do they differ?

Whether the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in act?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is in potentiality, as stated in Phys. iii, 6. But the angels’ minds are moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.

Objection 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but possible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality thereto. But it is said (1 Pet. 1:12): “On Whom the angels desire to look.” Therefore the angel’s intellect is sometimes in potentiality.

Objection 3: Further, in the book De Causis it is stated that “an intelligence understands according to the mode of its substance.” But the angel’s intelligence has some admixture of potentiality. Therefore it sometimes understands potentially.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): “Since the angels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy and devout contemplation.” Now a contemplating intellect is not in potentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not in potentiality.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8; Phys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first, “as before learning or discovering,” that is, before it has the habit of knowledge; secondly, as “when it possesses the habit of knowledge, but does not actually consider.” In the first way an angel’s intellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which his natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the heavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not fully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels, have no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by connatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely revealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in potentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in potentiality to being enlightened by the sun.

In the second way an angel’s intellect can be in potentiality with regard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always actually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge. But as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds in the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is always actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the Word. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and beatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8).

Reply to Objection 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something imperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the act of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this way understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.

Reply to Objection 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude the object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire the vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they receive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.

Reply to Objection 3: In the angel's substance there is no potentiality divested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so in potentiality as to be without act.

Whether an angel can understand many things at the same time?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things at the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that “it may happen that we know many things, but understand only one.”

Objection 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be informed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by shape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore neither can one intellect simultaneously understand various intelligible things.

Objection 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement terminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be understood altogether.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): “The spiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at the same time all things that it wills.”

I answer that, As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered severally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by intellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they are grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one operation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as is stated in De Anima iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect understands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition; and also two things compared together, according as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is evident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be understood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one intelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything is actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect. All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects.

Consequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through the Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which is the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know all things at once: just as in heaven “our thoughts will not be fleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall survey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels know things by innate species, they can at one time know all things which can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under various species.

Reply to Objection 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to speak, to understand one thing.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible species which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many intelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape be likened to many bodies.

To the third objection the answer is the same as the first.

Whether an angel’s knowledge is discursive?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is discursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one thing being known through another. But the angels know one thing through another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore the intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.

Objection 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do. But the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects; all of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the angel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater reason do this.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that “demons learn more things by experience.” But experimental knowledge is discursive: for, “one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from many experiences,” as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; Metaph. vii). Therefore an angel’s knowledge is discursive.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the “angels do not acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they led to something particular from something common.”

I answer that, As has often been stated [510](A[1]; [511]Q[55], A[1]), the angels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly bodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them “heavenly minds” [512](A[1]; [513]Q[55], A[1]). Now, the difference between heavenly and earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last perfection by chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have their last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise, the lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from one known thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known principle they were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at all. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which they know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that can be known in them.

Therefore they are called “intellectual beings”: because even with ourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said to be understood [intelligi]; hence “intellect” is defined as the habit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of truth by the discursive method are called “rational”; and this comes of the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed the fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first aspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range, by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.

Reply to Objection 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all movement is from something before to something after. Hence discursive knowledge comes about according as from something previously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards known, and which was previously unknown. But if in the thing perceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and its image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive knowledge. And in this way the angels know things in the Word.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a syllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet they do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by syllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.

Reply to Objection 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by way of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are present, yet without any discursion withal.

Whether the angels understand by composing and dividing?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and dividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there is composition of the same, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 21. But there is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because angels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at one time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's mind.

Objection 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than any two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is that of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant natures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what was said [514](A[2]). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by diverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and dividing.

Objection 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking to men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are signs of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest from many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the angel understands by composing and dividing.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the intellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear simplicity of divine concepts.” But a simple intelligence is without composition and division. Therefore the angel understands without composition or division.

I answer that, As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion is compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and dividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our intellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the principle, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In like manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the subject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed to, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by composing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it is evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by discursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first apprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp all that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the weakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said [515](A[3]). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the angel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by reasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.

Nevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of enunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for he understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable immovably, and material things immaterially.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes composition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of them is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends the nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can be either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a nature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by composing and dividing.

Reply to Objection 2: The various natures of things differ less as to their mode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way in which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more in common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the falsehood of the opposite negation is known also.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms of speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet not that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply the nature of a thing.

Whether there can be falsehood in the intellect of an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's intellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), there is "a perverted fancy" in the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of the angels.

Objection 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the angels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.

Objection 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom, and which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its intellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons. Therefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that "the intelligence is always true." Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83, qu. 32) that "nothing but what is true can be the object of intelligence" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood in the angel's knowledge.

I answer that, The truth of this question depends partly upon what has gone before. For it has been said [516](A[4]) that an angel understands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what a thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing is, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in De Anima iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep in, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of composition, and this happens either when we take the definition of one thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang together, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature, "a four-footed flying beast," for there is no such animal. And this comes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn from diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But there is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is stated in Metaph. ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at all, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known precisely as they exist.

So therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in the mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very differently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the quiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by division and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition. Such is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of the) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said regarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can be a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such thing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's supernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will, from their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form no judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save under the Divine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them. But since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine wisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according to the natural conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as to the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with regard to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man, they may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ, they may judge Him not to be God.

From all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the question are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their not being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the angels as regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally. It is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing is, is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an undue manner, referred to some composition or division.

Whether there is a "morning" and an "evening" knowledge in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a morning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an admixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of an angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the angelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes; while noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if there be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the same reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference of the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 38), “The sciences are divided just as things are.” But there is a threefold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own natures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be admitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the Word, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a third class of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in the angelic mind.

On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,31; De Civ. Dei xii, 7,20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and evening knowledge.

I answer that, The expression “morning” and “evening” knowledge was devised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all things, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the sun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day of angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the ordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day, so, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the being of things flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial principle; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in themselves.

Reply to Objection 1: Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge are not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as compared to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine puts it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us from calling something light in comparison with one thing, and darkness with respect to another. In the same way the life of the faithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked, according to Eph. 5:8: “You were heretofore darkness; but now, light in the Lord”: yet this very life of the faithful, when set in contrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to 2 Pet. 1:19: “You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.” So the angel’s knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is day in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in comparison with the vision of the Word.

Reply to Objection 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn to darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of God, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things. Consequently after “evening” there is no night, but “morning”; so that morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of the following, in so far as the angels refer to God’s praise their knowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name of day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can be referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither beginning nor end.

Reply to Objection 3: The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly the existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under evening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own nature.

Whether the morning and evening knowledge are one?

Objection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge are one. For it is said (Gn. 1:5): “There was evening and morning, one day.” But by the expression “day” the knowledge of the angels is to be understood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the morning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.

Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two operations at the same time. But the angels are always using their morning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in God, according to Mat. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were different from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): “When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.” But, if the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is compared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the evening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): “There is a vast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God, and as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day, and the latter to the evening.”

I answer that, As was observed [517](A[6]), the evening knowledge is that by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This cannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper nature of things, so that the preposition “in” denotes the form of a principle; because, as has been already stated ([518]Q[55], A[2]), the angels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that when we say “in their proper nature” we refer to the aspect of the thing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say, that the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the being of things which those things have in their own nature.

Now they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas, or by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the Word, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the Word, but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by contemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own nature. It, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as when the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have in their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are essentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known. If it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas they know the being which things have in their own natures, then the morning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to understand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.

Reply to Objection 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken as the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day’s unit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which, nevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.

Reply to Objection 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty at the one time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when the will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and the intellect at the same instant perceives principles and conclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired knowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening knowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence there is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the angels.

Reply to Objection 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite imperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that are not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection of the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the morning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not opposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any inconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is more perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a demonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion. In like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the uncreated Word, and through an innate idea.

THE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

In the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of the angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself; secondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is will in the angels?

(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?

(3) Is there free-will in the angels?

(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?

Whether there is will in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), “The will is in the reason.” But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher than reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something higher than the will.

Objection 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the appetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of something not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no imperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it seems that there is no will in them.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that the will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible object understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are incorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the image of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory, understanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the soul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable of knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.

I answer that, We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In evidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow from the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called "a natural appetite." Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they apprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called "a sensitive appetite." Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards good in general. Such inclination is termed "will." Accordingly, since the angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness, it is manifest that there is a will in them.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in which intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to the diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular objects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be one appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite belongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular good, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason differ as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by simple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from one thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to know what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal. Consequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the part of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in the angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher than the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived from seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part reaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things; thus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot [laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the same way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira]; though at the same time there are several other passions in it, as hope, daring, and the rest.

Reply to Objection 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as to will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there is nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the angels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 28.

Whether in the angels the will differs from the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ from the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple than a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form towards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the angel. Now the angel’s form is either the nature in which he subsists, or else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel inclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an intelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to the will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his nature or his intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the object of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ, not really but only logically [*Cf. [519]Q[16], A[4]]. Therefore will and intellect are not really different.

Objection 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not differentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives color and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually related as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to wit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good, does not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.

On the contrary, The will in the angels regards good things only, while their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know both. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their intellect.

I answer that, In the angels the will is a special faculty or power, which is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not their nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to anything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies that the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something like itself comes from the active qualities.

Now the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there alone are essence and will identified where all good is contained within the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills nothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot be said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to the nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the angel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.

In like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect of angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object known is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself to what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside it is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will goes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination it tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one faculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect and will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is not so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the universal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.

Reply to Objection 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its substantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by something additional, as has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material difference of their objects, but according to their formal distinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such. Consequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true suffices for the difference of intellect from will.

Reply to Objection 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible, it follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something true; while the true is desired by the will as something good. Nevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for diversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).

Whether there is free-will in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is “the desire of something after taking counsel,” while counsel is “a kind of inquiry,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels’ knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.

Objection 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference; because, as was observed already ([520]Q[58], A[5]), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.

Objection 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.

On the contrary, Free-will is part of man’s dignity. But the angels’ dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.

I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.

Reply to Objection 2: As was observed already [521](A[2]), knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, with he to be indeterminate to what is above him.

Reply to Objection 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some qualification.

Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the demons there is “unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence.” But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.

Objection 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.

Objection 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels.

I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black.

Now it is quite evident from what has been said [522](A[1]; [523]Q[16], A[1]), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the will.

Reply to Objection 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;—on account of the resemblance in the effect.

Reply to Objection 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).

Reply to Objection 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible appetite.

OF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

The next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which is love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty comes of love.

Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?

(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?

(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love of choice?

(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?

(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?

Whether there is natural love or dilection in an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection in the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from intellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an angel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.

Objection 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted upon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own nature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves; because they possess free-will, as was shown above ([524]Q[59], A[3]). Consequently there is no natural love in them.

Objection 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now ordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to wickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is above nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is no natural love in the angels.

On the contrary, Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved except it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But there is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also natural love.

I answer that, We must necessarily place natural love in the angels. In evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is always sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before intellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence. Consequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in such subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to have some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This inclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in each according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature there is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in the sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a nature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the nature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual nature, there must be a natural love in his will.

Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that natural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a nature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something else except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in no way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the same. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in so far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author of his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act himself, because he has free-will.

Reply to Objection 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love well regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the inclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural inclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of nature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the rectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects the other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and the truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.

Whether there is love of choice in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.

Objection 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated [525](A[1]; [526]Q[16], A[1]). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them.

On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them.

I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.

This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.

There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will. Because, as was stated already ([527]Q[59], A[2]), the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on account of something else. Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice.

In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on [528](Q[62]).

Reply to Objection 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above ([529]Q[59], A[3], ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.

The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.

Whether the angel loves himself with both natural love, and love of choice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both with natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said [530](A[2]), natural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the means to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot be both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the love of choice cannot have the same object.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): “Love is a uniting and a binding power.” But uniting and binding imply various things brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.

Objection 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement tends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot love himself with either natural or elective love.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): “Love for others comes of love for oneself.”

I answer that, Since the object of love is good, and good is to be found both in substance and in accident, as is clear from Ethic. i, 6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting good; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved as a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But that which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or inherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to it but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by the name “concupiscence” while the first is called “friendship.”

Now it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything naturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to mount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their own good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man naturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires what is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the love of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something which will benefit himself.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not under the same but under quite different aspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with elective love, as was observed above.

Reply to Objection 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so there is more oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which unites one to others. Dionysius used the terms “uniting” and “binding” in order to show the derivation of love from self to things outside self; as uniting is derived from unity.

Reply to Objection 3: As love is an action which remains within the agent, so also is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of necessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back upon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is reflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.

Whether an angel loves another with natural love as he loves himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an angel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows himself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as was said above ([531]Q[56], AA[1],2). Therefore it seems that one angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.

Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the principle than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of love for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one angel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.

Objection 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is unremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love can be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no love for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another with natural love as he loves himself.

On the contrary, That seems to be a natural property which is found in all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, “every beast loves its like,” as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves another as he loves himself.

I answer that, As was observed [532](A[3]), both angel and man naturally love self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself: consequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this be one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but if it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with non-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social love, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.

Now it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with another, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves another which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in so far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things devoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate its form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing’s good; as it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne upwards.

So then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural affection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an angel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from him in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.

Reply to Objection 1: The expression ‘as himself’ can in one way qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and thus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other to be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression can qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and lover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because he knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other’s essence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself, because he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love another by the other’s will.

Reply to Objection 2: The expression “as” does not denote equality, but likeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the angel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he loves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one only generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a like love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he loves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing well to him.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that end to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one wills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to oneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked angels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the good angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But they hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to righteousness and unrighteousness.

Whether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by natural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated [533](A[4]), natural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far above the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the angel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.

Objection 2: Further, “That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so.” But every one loves another with natural love for his own sake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than self with natural love.

Objection 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we behold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But nature’s operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards anything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does not love God more than himself from natural love.

Objection 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self. But to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for “it is poured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to them,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels do not love God more than themselves by natural love.

Objection 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the love of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who sins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), “Two loves have made two cities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the earthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made the heavenly city.” Therefore it is not natural to love God more than self.

On the contrary, All the moral precepts of the law come of the law of nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral precept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature. Consequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.

I answer that, There have been some who maintained that an angel loves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of concupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather than his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in so far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself; because he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he wills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the natural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he naturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.

The falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider whither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because the natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of the natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual nature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally belongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that other to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural tendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature: because “according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn aptitude to be thus moved,” as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we observe that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard the whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed to the blow for the whole body’s safety. And since reason copies nature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it behooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death for the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of the city, then such inclination would be natural to him.

Consequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good both man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every creature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it follows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before themselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them loved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be perverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided whereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the other; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it does the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is with the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and goodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self; because, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more than itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the species more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the good of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence everything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.

Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel “in so far” as He is good to the angel, if the expression “in so far” denotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God for his own good, but for God’s sake. If it denotes the nature of love on the lover’s part, then it is true; for it would not be in the nature of anyone to love God, except from this—that everything is dependent on that good which is God.

Reply to Objection 3: Nature’s operation is self-centered not merely as to certain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for everything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but likewise its species. And much more has everything a natural inclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.

Reply to Objection 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom every natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love. So far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with supernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.

Reply to Objection 5: Since God’s substance and universal goodness are one and the same, all who behold God’s essence are by the same movement of love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other things, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is naturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is impossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him. But such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular effects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way they are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the universal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than itself.

OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (FOUR ARTICLES)

After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a general way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the first place we must see how they were brought into natural existence; secondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly, how some of them became wicked.

Under the first heading there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?

(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?

(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?

(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?

Whether the angels have a cause of their existence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their existence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created by God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were not created by God.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that if any substance be a form without matter, “straightway it has being and unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity.” But the angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above ([534]Q[50], A[2]). Therefore they have no cause of their being.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very fact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the angels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent. Therefore the angels have no active cause.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:2): “Praise ye Him, all His angels”; and further on, verse 5: “For He spoke and they were made.”

I answer that, It must be affirmed that angels and everything existing, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own existence; while in everything else the essence differs from the existence, as was shown above ([535]Q[3], A[4]). From this it is clear that God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have their existence by participation. Now whatever exists by participation is caused by what exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused by fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels were not passed over in that account of the first creation of things, but are designated by the name “heavens” or of “light.” And they were either passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal things, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet incapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had been divulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature, it would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they were inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard them.

Reply to Objection 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no ‘formal’ cause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces its effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to actuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire substance.

From this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.

Whether the angel was produced by God from eternity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from eternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does not act through something besides His essence. But His being is eternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.

Objection 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at another, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid down in the book De Causis. Therefore the angel is not at one time existing and at another non-existing, but exists always.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul’s incorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as truth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual nature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but likewise eternal.

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten Wisdom: “The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He made anything from the beginning.” But, as was shown above [536](A[1]), the angels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.

I answer that, God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from eternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to the contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced creatures that He made them “from nothing”; that is, after they had not been.

Reply to Objection 1: God’s being is His will. So the fact that God produced the angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that He made them also by His will. But, as was shown above ([537]Q[19], A[3]; [538]Q[46], A[1]), God’s will does not act by necessity in producing creatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He willed.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure of the movement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a corporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the measure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence, and which is also the measure of the succession which is in his operations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that “God moves the spiritual creature according to time.”

Reply to Objection 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the very fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth. But they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed upon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow that the angels existed from eternity.

Whether the angels were created before the corporeal world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the corporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): “Six thousand years of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the time, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God?” Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii): “Some say that the angels were begotten before all creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all devised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the making thereof.”

Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine and the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity; while corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was produced ere time was made, and after eternity.

Objection 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal nature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal nature was made before another; hence the six days of the production of things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more, therefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Now, this would not be true if anything had been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created before corporeal nature.

I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found in the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the angels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the angels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of themselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting one universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of creature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures makes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate from the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose “works are perfect,” as it is said Dt. 32:4, should have created the angelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the contrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the opinion of Gregory Nazianzen, “whose authority in Christian doctrine is of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his teaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius,” as Jerome says.

Reply to Objection 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the Greek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have taken place previously to that of the corporeal world.

Reply to Objection 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole universe, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the universe in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the universe. Hence the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the angels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation of the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the creation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not involve creation of the universe.

If the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gn. 1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," the words, "In the beginning," must be interpreted, "In the Son," or "In the beginning of time": but not, "In the beginning, before which there was nothing," unless we say "Before which there was nothing of the nature of corporeal creatures."

Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the empyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a substance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its existence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation. Therefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the angels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the empyrean heaven.

Objection 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest heaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven, it would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And this is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of the sinning angel: "I will ascend into heaven" (Is. 14:13).

On the contrary, Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but from its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was made.”

I answer that, As was observed [539](A[3]), the universe is made up of corporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures were so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal creature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was fitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place, as presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the empyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that the highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage of Dt. 10:14: “Behold heaven is the Lord’s thy God, and the heaven of heaven.”

Reply to Objection 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as if depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their being made; because God could have created them before all corporeal creation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal place in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and that they are by their power in touch with bodies.

Reply to Objection 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means the highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of affinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not speaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the opinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an exalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created in the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other angels, as having more restricted powers, were created among the inferior bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven, but of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning angel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner to God, as will appear later on ([540]Q[63], A[3]).

OF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY (NINE ARTICLES)

In due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the order of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?

(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?

(3) Were they created in grace?

(4) Did they merit their beatitude?

(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?

(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural capacities?

(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge remain?

(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?

(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?

Whether the angels were created in beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude. For it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that "the angels who continue in the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature possess the excellence they have." Therefore the angels were created in beatitude.

Objection 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal creature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation was made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take precedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 15). Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature imperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection are derived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was created in beatitude.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5), the things which we read of as being made in the works of the six days, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must have existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according to his exposition, in those six days, "the morning" was the angelic knowledge, according to which they knew the Word and things in the Word. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the Word, and things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing the Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from the very beginning of their creation.

On the contrary, To be established or confirmed in good is of the nature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as soon as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this. Therefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.

I answer that, By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that it is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its ultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of rational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can procure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called beatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's ultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby in this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is God. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look forward to in the future, whereby "we shall see God as He is." This is beyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above ([541]Q[12], A[4]).

So, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first beatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was created already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such beatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, as was observed above ([542]Q[58], AA[3] ,4), is straightway in possession thereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have from the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is beyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of their nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it immediately from the beginning.

Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection which the angel had in the state of innocence.

Reply to Objection 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of its creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by its operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v, 4,23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take place at once among the first works, in which only the germinating power of the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the angelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection of its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to come by its operation.

Reply to Objection 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one which is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural knowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof shining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he knows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the angel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge, and perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first knowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the outset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the angels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly termed their morning knowledge.

Whether an angel needs grace in order to turn to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can accomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because he loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said ([543]Q[60], A[5]). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now it was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because there was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had no need of grace in order to turn to God.

Objection 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for grace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): “Turn ye to Me, and I will turn to you.” But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare ourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore the angel did not need grace to turn to God.

On the contrary, It was by turning to God that the angel reached to beatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God, it would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess everlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 6:23): “The grace of God is life everlasting.”

I answer that, The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn to God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above ([544]Q[60], A[2]) the natural movement of the will is the principle of all things that we will. But the will’s natural inclination is directed towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if there is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined towards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus it is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and to generate fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural power of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in so far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.

Now it was shown above ([545]Q[12], AA[4],5), when we were treating of God's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate beatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of every created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have the movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be moved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help of grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own will be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the author of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to God, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing is "difficult" which is beyond a power; and this happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the natural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some help, it is said to be "difficult"; but if it can in no way be attained, then it is "impossible"; thus it is impossible for a man to fly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to the natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening hindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order of the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in itself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing by the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to mount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult for man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a hindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But it is difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.

Reply to Objection 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a conversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The first is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature enjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate grace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits beatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is the principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man disposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual grace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul towards Himself, according to Lam 5:21: “Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.” Hence it is clear that there is no need to go on to infinity.

Whether the angels were created in grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was first made without form, and was called “heaven”: but afterwards it received its form, and was then called “light.” But such formation comes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.

Objection 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If, therefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever have turned away from God.

Objection 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the angels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that they were not created in grace; but that they were first created in nature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were beatified.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), “Who wrought the good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His will, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the same time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?”

I answer that, Although there are conflicting opinions on this point, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural state, while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it seems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy men, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all things which, in the process of time, being created by the work of Divine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were created in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike forms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees, animals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears the same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to the natural effect; hence (1 Jn. 3:9) grace is called the “seed” of God. As, then, in

Augustine’s opinion it is contended that the seedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature when corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the angels were created in grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be understood either by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the absence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else it can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so it did not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as Augustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things (Gen. ad lit. i, 15).

Reply to Objection 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject’s nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace can fail to make use of it, and can sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes midway between nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in created nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory is the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace stands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but as the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for grace to be given straightway with nature.

Whether an angel merits his beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude. For merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the angel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous action was not meritorious for him.

Objection 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it was quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not thereby merit beatitude.

Objection 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did so either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not before; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before whereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he would be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that case a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher, and the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is not admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.

On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the “measure of the angel” in that heavenly Jerusalem is “the measure of a man.” Therefore the same is the case with the angel.

I answer that, Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because existence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude, however, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now everything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation leading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is not beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing art is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when such end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it; wherefore it is looked for from another’s bestowing. Now it is evident from what has gone before ([546]AA[1],2; [547]Q[12], AA[4],5), ultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It remains, then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.

And if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no merit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited beatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way before he had glory.

But if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then have to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have grace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which conveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as some others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their present ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary, again, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means to an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking, be moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he already enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same act of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is meritorious; and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of beatitude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not the sufficient cause of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be meritorious as coming from free-will, except in so far as it is informed by grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by imperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect grace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not appear to be possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the same time to merit it.

Consequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was admitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not come from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but from the fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement towards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace.

The answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.

Whether the angel obtained beatitude immediately after one act of merit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude instantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man to do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after one act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.

Objection 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from the very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to be moved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a body could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it would have movement in the first instant of its generation. Consequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will, he merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their beatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the first instant.

Objection 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which are far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far remote from their natural condition: while merit comes midway between. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages of merit in order to reach beatitude.

On the contrary, Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for beatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the saints. Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit deserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be some obstacle. Therefore so does an angel.

Now an angel instantly, in his first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since there was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by only one meritorious act.

I answer that, The angel was beatified instantly after the first act of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is because grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature; as every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection, according to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to receive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to another; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above [548](A[1]; [549]Q[58], AA[3],4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to natural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence instantly after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of beatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because man merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it remains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection at once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than to the angel for securing beatitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence the various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except as reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which merited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of beatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect grace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains for different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel merited beatitude, and in another was beatified.

Reply to Objection 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain the perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one meritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an interval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.

Whether the angels receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and glory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is bestowed of

God’s absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace depends on God’s will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.

Objection 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with grace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace. But grace does not come “of works,” as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore much less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their natural gifts.

Objection 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or grace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of his natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.

On the contrary, Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences (Sent. ii, D, 3) that “those angels who were created with more subtle natures and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed with greater gifts of grace.”

I answer that, It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and perfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the degree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from two sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of His wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as the angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude, so likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for the various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the builder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he prepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is clear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the house. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of grace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.

Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is not a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the one thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man, in whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or thwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is nothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy. So it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher nature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same thing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed according to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it appears that the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the more grace and glory.

Reply to Objection 1: As grace comes of God’s will alone, so likewise does the nature of the angel: and as God’s will ordained nature for grace, so did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees of grace.

Reply to Objection 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the creature itself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems rather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than according to works.

Reply to Objection 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels, who are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way in men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on account of the end; while numerical difference is because of the matter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or impede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the angels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both.

Whether natural knowledge and love remain in the beatified angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not remain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): “When that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.” But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison with beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural knowledge and love cease.

Objection 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the knowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels. Therefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and love to remain.

Objection 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as the same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points. But the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified knowledge and love; for, as is said Ethic. i, 8, happiness consists not in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural knowledge and love in the angels.

On the contrary, So long as a nature endures, its operation remains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its perfection. Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and love.

I answer that, Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For as principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations themselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to second; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must ever be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved in beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved in the act of beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite imperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the perfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the power underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken away by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In the same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from knowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at the one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative one. In like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this appertains to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know God by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beatitude.

Reply to Objection 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at the one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural knowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory. Accordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love from existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.

Whether a beatified angel can sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as was said above [550](A[7]), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it is of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore a beatified angel can sin.

Objection 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the angel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is inclined towards good and evil.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be able to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened in the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that “there is in the holy angels that nature which cannot sin.” Therefore the holy angels cannot sin.

I answer that, The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for this is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence. Now, God’s essence is the very essence of goodness. Consequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the same way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of goodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do anything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn away from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can neither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills or acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel cannot sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail. But from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the union of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason already alleged.

Reply to Objection 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in the things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the things whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred to opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known principles; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good, formally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to its proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to opposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have no tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to be the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards God, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.

Reply to Objection 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is disposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident that it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to different conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to proceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the principles, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the perfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose between opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it comes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning away from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is greater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is in ourselves, who can sin.

Whether the beatified angels advance in beatitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in beatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is perfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can merit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases. Therefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that “God makes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same thing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual ministrations”; since “they are all [*Vulg.: ‘Are they not all . . . ?’] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation” (Heb. 1:14). This would not be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to advance to beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels can merit, and can advance in beatitude.

Objection 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying the foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not in the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend higher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in them; which is not admissible.

On the contrary, Merit and progress belong to this present condition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards beatitude, they are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently the beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.

I answer that, In every movement the mover’s intention is centered upon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable subject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite progress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature cannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in the vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before ([551]Q[12], A[4]), that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore there must be some one determined thing to which every rational creature is directed as to its last end.

Now this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist precisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all the blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of vision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of Him Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the rational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it should be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which is comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from what was said above ([552]Q[12], A[7]; [553]Q[14], A[3]). But since infinite efficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's efficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is in infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that the rational creature understands God more or less clearly according to infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the degree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.

Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.

Reply to Objection 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely passively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the power of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure the end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be beyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action will be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate term is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently, to merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas perfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as in acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive of the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both perfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has no quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the reward.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all, as being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is useful.

Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall for a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the beatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for to pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what is perfect, considered as perfect.

Reply to Objection 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the highest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the highest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the joy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of such as are saved by their ministrations, according to Lk. 15:10: “There is [Vulg.’shall be’] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance.” Such joy belongs to their accidental reward, which can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that they can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say that the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For the Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude, rather than merit it.

THE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN (NINE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of all with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil of punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for consideration:
(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?

(2) What kind of sins can be in them?

(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?

(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing, are any of them naturally evil?

(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil in the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?

(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his creation and fall?

(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among the angels?

(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others sinning?

(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?

Whether the evil of fault can be in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the angels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in potentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19), because the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the angels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting forms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.

Objection 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But philosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies. Therefore neither can there by in the angels.

Objection 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it is natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards God. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving God they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.

Objection 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good. Now for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true good; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at least not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it truly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good. Consequently the angel does not sin by desire.

On the contrary, It is said (Job 4:18): “In His angels He found wickedness.”

I answer that, An angel or any other rational creature considered in his own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to sin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the condition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing else than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have; whether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the rule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of rectitude. Were the craftsman’s hand the rule itself engraving, he could not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the rightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving may be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God’s act, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created will has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to the Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every desire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his superior; for instance, the soldier’s will, according to the will of his commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no sin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature; considering the condition of its nature.

Reply to Objection 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.

Reply to Objection 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation. Therefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so neither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But besides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the angels, by reason of which evil may be in them.

Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the movement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural being. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural beatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away by sinning.

Reply to Objection 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will. First, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing adultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance or error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The adulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an inordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the inclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in his universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect. In this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no passions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest from what has been said above ([554]Q[59], A[4]); nor, again, could any habit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin comes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not according to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces sin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly regulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to pray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of the things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel sinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will, insubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.

Whether only the sin of pride and envy can exist in an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels besides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any kind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even in the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.

Objection 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth, avarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit, just as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there be pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.

Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices spring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is granted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and envy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other vices in them.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil “is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort; yet he is proud and envious.”

I answer that, Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all by actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are in the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of all sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons which can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot be affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by such as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is affected except with regard to something which is in some way suited to its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good of the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the superior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride—not to be subject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first sin of the angel can be none other than pride.

Yet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them, since for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on its part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines over the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his neighbor’s good to be a hindrance to his own. But another’s good could not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked angel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which would cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other. So, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the sinning angel, whereby he grieved over man’s good, and also over the Divine excellence, according as against the devil’s will God makes use of man for the Divine glory.

Reply to Objection 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the sins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal pleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all sorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man’s good.

Reply to Objection 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the immoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human life, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons are not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures. Consequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if every immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed avarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in the demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence; consequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth is a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual exercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the demons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual sins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be taken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.

Reply to Objection 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are comprised all other sins derived from them.

Whether the devil desired to be as God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as God. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under desire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite, whether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only in such desire. But for any creature to be God’s equal does not fall under apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the finite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite. Therefore an angel could not desire to be as God.

Objection 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin. But to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature naturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not by equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby sin.

Objection 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom than man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the equal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only things which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation. Therefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.

On the contrary, It is said, in the person of the devil (Is. 14:13,14), “I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most High.” And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being “inflated with pride, he wished to be called God.”

I answer that, Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as God. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first way; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible: and there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any passion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was impossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in ourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against the natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural desire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved were it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature of a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as an ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised, it would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us false; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy a higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the destruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of nature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it is quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in accidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another. Consequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire equality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God.

To desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper order, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin were he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his own, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like unto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were to desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which desire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired to be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own 'not-being'; since no creature can exist except by holding its existence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this respect—by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which he could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite away from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's grace. Or, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is bestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own nature; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering. This harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli, iv.] that "he sought that to which he would have come had he stood fast." These two views in a manner coincide; because according to both, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas this is proper to God alone.

Since, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of another, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have dominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like unto God.

From this we have the answer to all the objections.

Whether any demons are naturally wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For Porphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): "There is a class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and the souls of the dead." But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore some demons are naturally wicked.

Objection 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men. But some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10): “Their malice is natural.” Therefore some angels may be naturally wicked.

Objection 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions by nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally rapacious; yet they are God’s creatures. Therefore, although the demons are God’s creatures, they may be naturally wicked.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the demons are not naturally wicked.”

I answer that, Everything which exists, so far as it exists and has a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it comes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to its principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil connected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it consumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be connected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined towards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil; not as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if anything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its own nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that every intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which it can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since the demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a natural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they cannot be naturally evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons are naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not naturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held that they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons are animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is inclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be connected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to evil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.

Reply to Objection 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either because of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the natural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some inordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful or lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their sensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain evils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural inclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit. Wherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to him; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes (De Div. Nom. iv).

Whether the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of his own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): “He was a murderer from the beginning.”

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the lack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order of time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8), the “heaven,” which is said to have been created in the beginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed: and when it is said that God said: “Be light made: and light was made,” we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning to the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and light was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light was made, it was made distinct from “darkness,” whereby the angels who sinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation some of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned.

Objection 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual nature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of Christ, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could sin in the first instant of their creation.

Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the corporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation in the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards in the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also have his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this operation was either ordinate or inordinate. It ordinate, then, since he had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the reward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above ([555]Q[62], A[5]). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:31): “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” But among them were also the demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the demons were wicked straightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their nature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was made, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree with those Manichean heretics who say that the devil’s nature is evil of itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the authority of Scripture—for it is said of the devil under the figure of the prince of Babylon (Is. 14:12): “How art thou fallen . . . O Lucifer, who didst rise in the morning!” and it is said to the devil in the person of the King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): “Thou wast in the pleasures of the paradise of God,”—consequently, this opinion was reasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.

Hence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their creation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is repudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the other, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one instant. Now it is clear that the angel’s sin was an act subsequent to his creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel’s very being, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems, then, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first instant of his existence.

This argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in such movements as are measured by time, and take place successively; thus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the local movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the changes are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant there can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the same instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere is lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is instantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels; for, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison or discursive reasoning ([556]Q[58], A[3]). Consequently, there is nothing to hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the same instant.

We must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for the angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of free-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant of its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the existence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as upward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if there be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause, which can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first instant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg, which is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of generation, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the angels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin. Consequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the first instant of his creation.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is stated that “the devil sins from the beginning,” “he is not to be thought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but from the beginning of sin”: that is to say, because he never went back from his sin.

Reply to Objection 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the sins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken as according to God’s foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), that “He alone could discern light and darkness, Who also could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall.”

Reply to Objection 3: All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an angel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same reason does not hold good of sin; as has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before the turning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were created in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of them at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby destroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were deprived of the beatitude which they had merited.

Whether there was any interval between the creation and the fall of the angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the angel’s creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): “Thou didst walk perfect [*Vulg.: ‘Thou hast walked in the midst of the stones of fire; thou wast perfect . . . ‘] in thy ways from the day of thy creation until iniquity was found in thee.” But since walking is continuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some interval between the devil’s creation and his fall.

Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that “the serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly”; which refers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the first instant of his creation.

Objection 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and angel. But there was some delay between man’s formation and his sin. Therefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the devil’s formation and his sin.

Objection 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was distinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a middle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an interval between his creation and his fall.

On the contrary, It is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44): “He stood not in the truth”: and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), “we must understand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not remain in it.”

I answer that, There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the more probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings of the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first instant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that he elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation, and that he was created in grace; as we have said ([557]Q[62], A[3]). For since the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said above ([558]Q[62], A[5]), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that first instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.

If, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace, or that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant, then there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed between his creation and fall.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous movements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured by time. In this way by “walking” we are to understand the movement of free-will tending towards good.

Reply to Objection 2: Origen says, “The serpent of old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly,” because of the first instant in which he was not wicked.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once choosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a natural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to beatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with man; and therefore the argument does not hold good.

Reply to Objection 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time between every two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved Phys. vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the heavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time, time is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of their affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to respond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects itself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is mentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From such operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word by their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves, became night, “swelling up with pride,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in their second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them good in the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart from the wicked.

Whether the highest angel among those who sinned was the highest of all?

Objection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who sinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14): “Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in the holy mountain of God.” Now the order of the Cherubim is under the order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii). Therefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was not the highest of all.

Objection 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it might attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels sinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the noblest creature which is unfitting.

Objection 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so much the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is, so much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the less can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the angel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower angels.

On the contrary, Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief angel who sinned, “being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed them in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among them.”

I answer that, Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the proneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels we consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels were less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set over the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view of the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6,7; x, 9,10,11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some of the demons were good, and some bad; naming as ‘gods’ the intellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling by the name of “demons” the intellectual substances which are beneath it, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion to be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal creation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from saying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding over the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the highest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels; yet in that order some of them remained good.

But if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed in the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said [559](A[2]), the demons’ sin was pride; and the motive of pride is excellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory says that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be the more probable view: because the angels’ sin did not come of any proneness, but of free choice alone.

Consequently that argument seems to have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet this must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be some motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower angels.

Reply to Objection 1: Cherubim is interpreted “fulness of knowledge,” while “Seraphim” means “those who are on fire,” or “who set on fire.” Consequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible with mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity, which is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who sinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.

Reply to Objection 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those who sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end of both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His goodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual creature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this unfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature was so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its end.

Reply to Objection 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the highest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently it was in his power not to follow it.

Whether the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect. But, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at one time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others’ sinning.

Objection 2: Further, an angel’s first sin can only be pride, as was shown above [560](A[2]). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more contrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than to a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by desiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the sin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if he had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear that the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.

Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to another against God, than to wish to be over another against God; because there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of the foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he induced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would have sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a gloss on Ps. 103:26: “This dragon which Thou hast formed—He who was the more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in malice.” Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of the others sinning.

On the contrary, It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon “drew” with him “the third part of the stars of heaven.”

I answer that, The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind of exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons are subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord’s words: “Go [Vulg. ‘Depart from Me’], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels” (Mat. 25:41). For the order of Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another’s evil suggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to (2 Pet. 2:19): “By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet the sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For an angel needs no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man, who requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal speech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it is evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he takes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches his meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with regard to primary concepts, “which everyone accepts directly they are heard” [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].

Taking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is required in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel expressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for the others to consent thereto.

Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be subject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to be subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an advantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior. Consequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to serve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have him as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their ultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in the order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.

Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([561]Q[62], A[6]), an angel has nothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower angels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he became the greater in malice.

Whether those who sinned were as many as those who remained firm?

Objection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): "Evil is in many, but good is in few."

Objection 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way in men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than good; according to Eccles. 1:15: "The number of fools is infinite." Therefore for the same reason it is so with the angels.

Objection 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to persons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it would appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.

On the contrary, It is said (4 Kings 6:16): "There are more with us than with them": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us to aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.

I answer that, More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is contrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the natural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its effects either always, or more often than not.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom evil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are known to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason, which good is known to the few. In the angels there is only an intellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold.

And from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.

Reply to Objection 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil belonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly affairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but only those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that the chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some fell of every order; just as men are taken up into every order to supply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is more established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to evil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as of Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are derived from the ardor of love and from God’s indwelling, which are not consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers, and Principalities are attributed to them; because these names are derived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both good and bad.

THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

It now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons; under which heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of their darkness of intellect;

(2) Of their obstinacy of will;

(3) Of their grief;

(4) Of their place of punishment.

Whether the demons’ intellect is darkened by privation of the knowledge of all truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons’ intellect is darkened by being deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For it they knew any truth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to know separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their unhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as that some writers have assigned as man’s last happiness the knowledge of the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all knowledge of truth.

Objection 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be specially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same is not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of our intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes from the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of the sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of Himself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they are not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore neither can they know other things.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the proper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and evening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do not see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge, because this evening knowledge refers the things known to the Creator's praise (hence, after "evening" comes "morning" [Gn. 1]). Therefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.

Objection 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the kingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei xi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: "for if they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory," as is said 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of all other knowledge of truth.

Objection 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either naturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from someone else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the things we learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth by their own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33), the good angels are separated from them as light is from darkness; and every manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13. In like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from the good angels: because "there is no fellowship of light with darkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath . . . ?']" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor can they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the senses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, "certain gifts were bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at all, but remain entire and most brilliant." Now, the knowledge of truth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some knowledge of truth in them.

I answer that, The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes of nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of grace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when Divine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective, and produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the gift of wisdom.

Of these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor lessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the angel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on account of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn from his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural powers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or of something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the natural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural knowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however, which comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been utterly taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine secrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is done either by means of the angels, or "through some temporal workings of Divine power," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in the same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are revealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third knowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness consists in self-application to something higher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature; hence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated substances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the first substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one separate substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know sensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in knowing sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness consist in knowing separated substances.

Reply to Objection 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us by its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because our intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine substance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect, but even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his own nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of his intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God than man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons. Although they do not possess the purity which comes with grace, nevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the knowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the excellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature’s knowledge in its own nature is called “evening” knowledge. For the evening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when the light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of things in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the Creator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine light, and can be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred to God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but “nocturnal” knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gn. 1:5 that the darkness, which God separated from the light, “He called night.”

Reply to Objection 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very beginning respecting the mystery of God’s kingdom, which found its completion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were beatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never had. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence the demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation, when Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 21), “It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels, who enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known by some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them.” For had they fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the effect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion of the Lord of glory.

Reply to Objection 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by the subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by privation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the light of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the holy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will, they do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual nature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by others: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it from the senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible species is completed in individual things, they know some things as present, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we said when dealing with the knowledge of the angels ([562]Q[57], A[3], ad 3).

Whether the will of the demons is obstinate in evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not obstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an intellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said above [563](A[1]). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained to good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so obstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.

Objection 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than the demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the malice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy. Therefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice to the state of justice.

Objection 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then their will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they fell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the motive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore the demon is not obstinate in malice.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated by another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed already ([564]Q[63], A[8]), the lower demons fell through the highest one. Therefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they are not obstinate in malice.

Objection 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any good work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses the truth, saying to Christ: "I know Who Thou art, the holy one of God" (Mk. 1:24). "The demons" also "believe and tremble" (Jam. 2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that "they desire what is good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand." Therefore they are not obstinate in malice.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 73:23): "The pride of them that hate Thee, ascendeth continually"; and this is understood of the demons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.

I answer that, It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that every will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to good and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of the union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of true beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature of true beatitude; hence it is termed “life everlasting.” It is also contrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that demons and wicked men shall be sent “into everlasting punishment,” and the good brought “into everlasting life.” Consequently such an opinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic Faith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels is confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate in evil.

We must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of the sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), “death is to men, what the fall is to the angels.” Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave or less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they are without remission and endure for ever.

To find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind that the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the apprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For the sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks the universal good, as was said above ([565]Q[59], A[1]); as also the sense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers universals. Now the angel’s apprehension differs from man’s in this respect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we apprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit of “intelligence”; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably, passing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by which he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man’s will adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it and of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel’s will adheres fixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its adhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite (namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he has once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that man’s free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after choice; but the angel’s free-will is flexible either opposite before the choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to justice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are obstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who are damned (SP, [566]Q[98], AA[1], 2).

Reply to Objection 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: God’s mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and are not delivered by the Divine mercy.

Reply to Objection 3: The devil’s first sin still remains in him according to desire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he desired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder, and wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him; nevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would he had done it, or still would do it if he could.

Reply to Objection 4: The fact that man sinned from another’s suggestion, is not the whole cause of man’s sin being pardonable. Consequently the argument does not hold good.

Reply to Objection 5: A demon’s act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will; and this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon’s part is always wicked; because, although at times he does something good, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order to deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly, but compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is natural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the goodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.

Whether there is sorrow in the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For since sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the same subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing against the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: “The devil has power over them who despise God’s commandments, and he rejoices over this sinister power.” Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things cause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are present. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24, “Who was made to fear no one.” Therefore there is no grief in the demons.

Objection 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the demons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least for the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.

On the contrary, The demon’s sin is greater than man’s sin. But man is punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin, according to Apoc. 18:7, “As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.” Consequently much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow, because he especially glorified himself.

I answer that, Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are passions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the sensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According, however, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the demons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because sorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the resistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is evident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are, and others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish others to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said to exist in them: and especially because it is of the very notion of punishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are deprived of happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked will is curbed in many respects.

Reply to Objection 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but not about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man from being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so far as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not merely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there can be something that we will, and something that we will not.

Reply to Objection 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so also there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, “He was made to fear no one,” this is to be understood of the fear of God which restrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that “the devils believe and tremble” (James 2:19).

Reply to Objection 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin bears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin is opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, for the evil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the goodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that “sorrow for good lost by punishment, is the witness to a good nature.” Consequently, since the demon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil of sin.

Whether our atmosphere is the demons’ place of punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons’ place of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a spiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no place of punishment for demons.

Objection 2: Further, man’s sin is not graver than the demons.’ But man’s place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the demons’ place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome atmosphere.

Objection 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire. But there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the darksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that “the darksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment day.”

I answer that, The angels in their own nature stand midway between God and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it procures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But man’s welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of all, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil; and this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way, indirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against opposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man’s welfare to be brought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be of service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of punishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this is hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the darksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.

Now the procuring of men’s salvation is prolonged even to the judgment day: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with demons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to us here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial: although some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they have led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy souls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men and angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.

Reply to Objection 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting the nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it: because the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not agreeable to its will.

Reply to Objection 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of nature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature; consequently there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons and souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude of the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this is erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:1): "If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have a house in heaven." Others, again, while not admitting the same of souls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same judgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on good souls and good angels.

Consequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs to the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their coming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the same way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is not actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said, that although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of hell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their punishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement is their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: "They carry fire of hell with them wherever they go." Nor is this contrary to what is said (Lk. 8:31), "They besought the Lord not to cast them into the abyss"; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for them to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it is stated, "They [Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel them [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country" (Mk. 5:10).

TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)

THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)

From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; the work of distinction as given in the words, “He divided the light from the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament”; and the work of adornment, expressed thus, “Let there be lights in the firmament.”

First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

(2) Whether they were created on account of God’s goodness?

(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?

(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God.

Whether corporeal creatures are from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said (Eccles. 3:14): “I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever.” But visible bodies do not continue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): “The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.” Therefore God did not make visible bodies.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): "God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

Objection 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): "While we look not at the things which are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 145:6): "Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them."

I answer that, Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof of their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense, "Whose god is their belly" (Phil. 3:19).

Reply to Objection 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true even as regards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): “It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory.”

Reply to Objection 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful.

Reply to Objection 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for “the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): “Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise.” And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some good that they have from Him.

Whether corporeal things were made on account of God’s goodness?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God’s goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God “created all things that they might be.” Therefore all things were created for their own being’s sake, and not on account of God’s goodness.

Objection 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God’s goodness.

Objection 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on account of God’s goodness.

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord hath made all things for Himself.”

I answer that, Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God’s original purpose, but in punishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal creatures, subjoins, “God saw that it was good” (Gn. 1), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen’s opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun’s body was made what it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts.

Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, that less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.

Reply to Objection 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God's goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.

Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps. 103:24 “Thou hast made all things in wisdom.” But “it belongs to wisdom to ordain,” as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the higher.

Objection 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).

Objection 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:1): “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.

I answer that, Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.

In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

Reply to Objection 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as has been shown above ([567]Q[15], A[2]); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.

Reply to Objection 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature.

Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances.

Objection 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual substances.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from spiritual substances.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): “We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather that it obeys God thus.” But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, then, are not from the angels, but from God.

I answer that, It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, “participation” (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or “per se” life, as they term it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist “per se” in matter, but in the intellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called “intelligences” by them, but “angels” by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species.

But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the "composite." Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses prefaces each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is "all form and fitness and concord of parts."

Reply to Objection 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made." But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.

Reply to Objection 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought by movement into act.

Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation.

ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?

(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?

(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter?

(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?

Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?

Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gn. 1:2): “The earth was void and empty,” or “invisible and shapeless,” according to another version [*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form.

Objection 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working.

Objection 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without form.

On the contrary, An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him (Dt. 32:4): “The works of God are perfect.” Therefore the work of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal creation.

I answer that, On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form, and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to its formation or to its distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but ‘this’ actual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be shown later ([568]Q[69], A[1]; [569]Q[74], A[2]).

As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that "darkness was upon the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty in two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or "invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading [*Septuagint], "shapeless"—that is, unadorned. Thus after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty."

Reply to Objection 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be "void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said [570](A[1]) how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form.

Reply to Objection 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power.

Reply to Objection 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for accident to be without subject.

In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection.

In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later [571](A[3]; [572]Q[68], A[1]). This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words, "Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered that by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above; because by the words "Spirit of God" Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters," not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words: “Darkness was upon the face of the deep.” The remaining distinctions will appear from what follows [573](Q[71]).

Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?

Objection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless,” and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): “Things that are one in genus are one in matter.” But all corporeal things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same.

Objection 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.

Objection 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.

On the contrary, Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.

I answer that, On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: “By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together." But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms—that is to say, it would be corruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form.

Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in potentiality to a perfect form, and "vice versa." Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should possess the same matter.

Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines, that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven—beings in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside, then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form—that is, something composed of a form and the subject of that form—it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle [*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter is one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity.

Reply to Objection 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form.

Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so, its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not created contemporaneously with formless matter.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that “the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order.” If, therefore, the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.

Objection 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): “In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world”; from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of contemplation.

Objection 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.

On the contrary, Strabus says that in the passage, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” heaven denotes not the visible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.

I answer that, The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil [*Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of rest." But they differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven, because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by modern writers.

Reply to Objection 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.

Reply to Objection 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does not influence inferior bodies of another order—those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra, [574]Q[112], A[3]], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity.

Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: “The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual dwelling in light and joy.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): “It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. “But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural brightness.

Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): “I find two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. “Therefore time was not created with formless matter.

Objection 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when “God divided the light from the darkness. “Therefore in the beginning time was not.

Objection 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament’s movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. Therefore in the beginning time was not.

Objection 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time.

Objection 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned among the things first created.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): “Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time.”

I answer that, It is commonly said that the first things created were these four—the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies only two things as first created—the angelic nature and corporeal matter—making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there would be no such measure.

Reply to Objection 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.

Reply to Objection 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night.

Reply to Objection 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than "the measure of priority and succession in movement."

Reply to Objection 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable subject.

Reply to Objection 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now."

ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly the work of the third day.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?

(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?

(3) Whether light is a quality?

(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?

Whether the word “light” is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?

Objection 1: It would seem that “light” is used in its proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that “in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically.”

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): “All that is made manifest is light.” But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that “Splendor” is among those things which are said of God metaphorically.

I answer that, Any word may be used in two ways—that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This is clearly shown in the word “sight,” originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, “Seeing how it tastes,” or “smells,” or “burns. “Further, sight is applied to knowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God” (Mat. 5:8). And thus it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to spiritual things.

The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said.

Whether light is a body?

Objection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that “light takes the first place among bodies.”Therefore light is a body.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that “light is a species of fire.” But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.

Objection 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they are bodies. Therefore light is a body.

On the contrary, Two bodies cannot occupy the same place simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore light is not a body.

I answer that, Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons. First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires distinction of place.

The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to another must pass through the intervening space before reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate movement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body.

The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but approaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than it burned before.

Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act—in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.

Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is “flame,” or in earthly matter is “burning coal.” Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers.

Reply to Objection 3: All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. 13.

Whether light is a quality?

Objection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the source of light is withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality.

Objection 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensible quality.

Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of earthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality, but rather a substantial or spiritual form.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a species of quality.

I answer that, Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly, because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have said that light is the sun’s substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun.

We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its active cause.

Reply to Objection 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.

Reply to Objection 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.

Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above [575](A[3]), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.

Objection 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been on the first day.

Objection 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day.

Objection 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown ([576]Q[63], A[5]). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day.

On the contrary, That without which there could not be day, must have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light. Therefore light must have been made on the first day.

I answer that, There are two opinions as to the production of light. Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when we read, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word “heaven,” and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the word “earth.” And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.

Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i in Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.

Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine worship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and stars, which was forbidden them (Dt. 4).

But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the corporeal creature. One is where we read that “the earth was void and empty,” and another where it is said that “darkness was upon the face of the deep.” Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light. In the first place because light is a quality of the first body, as was stated [577] (A[3]), and thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second reason is because light is a common quality.

For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man, as is shown in De Gener. Anim. ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common quality.

Basil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on the first day.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light holds the first place.

Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this returned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time afterwards ceased to exist.

Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be indistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is superfluous, whereas none of God’s works have been made in vain. On this account it is held by some that the sun’s body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and naturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on another form.

I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the sun’s light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards added the special and determinative power required to produce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple distinction was made between light and darkness. First, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there was light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere; and this is signified by the words, “He called the light day, and the darkness night.”

Reply to Objection 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for whose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is actually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the movement of the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common to the entire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in proportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is the cause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night alone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the common movement of the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth day, in the words, “let them be for seasons, and for days, and years” is due to proper movements.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must understand the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in which they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which they possessed from their creation as said above ([578]Q[62], A[3]). Thus the division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form. But if all created things received their form at the same time, the darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw would exist.

ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?

(2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?

(3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?

(4) Whether there is more than one heaven?

Whether the firmament was made on the second day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the second day. For it is said (Gn. 1:8): “God called the firmament heaven.” But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

Objection 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

Objection 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “God said: let there be a firmament,” and further on (verse 8); “And the evening and morning were the second day.”

I answer that, In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first is, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.

We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32).

According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist.

But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation, since the first form received by matter is the elemental.

Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time.

Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.

If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.

Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the air. “For a body is called firm,” that is dense and solid, “thereby differing from a mathematical body” as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: “I consider this view of the question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and then proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as one might say: “This house was constructed by that builder,” and then add: “First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and thirdly, put on the roof.” In accepting this explanation we are, therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth,” and when we read that the firmament was made on the second day.

We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the formless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal movement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that "God called the firmament heaven"; just as in a preceding verse it said that "God called the light day" (since the word "day" is also used to denote a space of twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed out by Rabbi Moses.

The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has been already said.

Whether there are waters above the firmament?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.

Objection 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a sphere, there cannot be water above it.

Objection 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which imperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that water would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:7): "(God) divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament."

I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there." As to the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in Gen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are "spiritual substances." Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4): "Let the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord," and (Dan. 3:60): "Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the

Lord.”To this Basil answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these waters are rational creatures, but that “the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator.” Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to these.

We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature will be differently defined according as opinions on the firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four elements then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.

If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), that waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain point only.

Reply to Objection 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in its place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says “It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way of miracle.” We leave this view, then, and answer that according to the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven.

Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified.

Reply to Objection 2: The solution is clear from what has been said, according to the last two opinions. But according to the first opinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the third opinion given, the waters above the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and their various influences. But according to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament.

Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?

Objection 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): “All water is the same species.” Water therefore cannot be distinct from water by place.

Objection 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it is not the firmament that distinguishes them.

Objection 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:6): “Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from the waters.”

I answer that, The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, “Darkness was upon the face of the deep,” the word “deep” might be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not all corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those within—that is to say, from all bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of them all.

As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum.

Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in the words: “Darkness was upon the face of the deep,” the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air.

Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name.

Reply to Objection 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But if by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of their begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.

Reply to Objection 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their destruction, but only as the boundary of each.

Reply to Objection 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, and thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.

Whether there is only one heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.”But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven.

Objection 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then, they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which each is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven.

On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 148:4): “Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens.”

I answer that, On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words ‘heavens of heavens’ are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven [*Ps. 8:9]. But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one.

In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets.

In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon’s orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was “rapt to the third heaven.”

But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he calls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus.

Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, “I will ascend into heaven”; whereby the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual blessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words, “Your reward is very great in heaven” (Mat. 5:12).

Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to which Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul’s rapture “to the third heaven.”

Reply to Objection 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have many circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heavens.

Reply to Objection 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it is one.

Reply to Objection 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.

ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY (TWO ARTICLES)

We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) About the gathering together of the waters;

(2) About the production of plants.

Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been "made" in the words, "God said: Be light made," and "Let there be a firmament made."But the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day should have been described as a making not as a gathering together.

Objection 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [*[579]Q[66], A[1], OBJ[1]]. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together.

Objection 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, and therefore all were not gathered together into one place.

Objection 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea. In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary.

Objection 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity.

On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.

I answer that, It is necessary to reply differently to this question according to the different interpretations given by Augustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated by the words “earth” and “water.” Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, “Let there be made a firmament,” by which is to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. But in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore the words, “Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land appear,” mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.

According, however, to other holy writers [*[580]Q[66], A[1]] an order of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since heaven, earth, and water already existed, since these three are named as already clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty, and in respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long as “darkness” filled it, because it was the source of light. The formlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the “deep,” because, as Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the formless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to be “void” or “invisible,” because it was covered by the waters. Thus, then, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day. And since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is the numerical measure of the movement of the highest body, from this formation, resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night and day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed, receiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order (so that water be understood as including certain other things, as explained above ([581]Q[68], A[3])). On the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted the distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence Scripture, having clearly expresses the manner in which it received its form by the equally suitable words, “Let the dry land appear.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8; iii, 20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For “water,” to use Augustine’s words, “glides and flows away, the earth abides” (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to place, and that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of it as made.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is easily solved, according to Augustine’s opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not suppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers there are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater height at the place where they were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the water that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The third suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable.

Reply to Objection 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, “one place” is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, “Let the waters be gathered together in one place,” that is, apart from the dry land. That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by the words that follow, “The gathering together of the waters He called Seas.”

Reply to Objection 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement and by these natural movements they are said to “fulfill His word.” Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that plants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers attribute this uncovering of the earth’s surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture, however, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of Genesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the Lord it is said, “I set My bounds around the sea,” and Jer. 5:22, where it is written: “Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea?”

Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here in respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it is written: “He called the dry land, Earth.” It may also be said with Rabbi Moses, that the expression, “He called,” denotes throughout an equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that “He called the light Day”: for the reason that later on a period of twenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that “there was evening and morning, one day.” In like manner it is said that “the firmament,” that is, the air, “He called heaven”: for that which was first created was also called “heaven.” And here, again, it is said that “the dry land,” that is, the part from which the waters had withdrawn, “He called, Earth,” as distinct from the sea; although the name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or not. So by the expression “He called” we are to understand throughout that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He gave.

Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants, as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of distinction.

Objection 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But the words of Gn. 3:17, “Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee,” show that by the production of certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, which is concerned with the work of formation.

Objection 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third day.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 1:12): “The earth brought forth the green herb,” after which there follows, “The evening and the morning were the third day.”

I answer that, On the third day, as said [582](A[1]), the formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was “invisible” or “void,” being covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was “shapeless” or “empty,” that is, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this formless state ends on the third day: first, when “the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared”; secondly, when “the earth brought forth the green herb.” But concerning the production of plants, Augustine’s opinion differs from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that . . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew.” Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth’s surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, “He worketh until now.”Now the production of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only. However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, “before it sprung up in the earth,” and “before it grew,” that is, before like was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly (Gn. 1:11): “Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed,” as indicating the production of perfection of perfect species, from which the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where the seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument.

Reply to Objection 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth’s formation.

Reply to Objection 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is said: “Shall it bring forth TO THEE.”

Reply to Objection 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said ([583]Q[67], A[4]; [584]Q[68], A[3]). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them.

OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.

In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day, secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) As to the production of the lights;

(2) As to the end of their production;

(3) Whether they are living beings?

Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation, before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, then, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.

Objection 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.

Objection 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: “He set them in the firmament.” But plants are described as produced when the earth, to which they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore, should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the second day.

Objection 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day.

Objection 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly described as the “two great lights.”

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says (Gn. 2:1): “So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture of them,” thereby indicating that the work was threefold. In the first work, that of “creation,” the heaven and the earth were produced, but as yet without form. In the second, or work of “distinction,” the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. To these two works is added the work of adornment, which is distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated above ([585]Q[69], A[1]), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received their form from the three days’ work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in the work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that Augustine’s opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: “Let the firmament produce lights,” though it says: “Let the earth bring forth the green herb.”

Reply to Objection 1: In Augustine’s opinion there is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this by the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning.

Reply to Objection 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to have been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that on the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have one effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that the sun's light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.) that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He fixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in reality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the spheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have already said ([586]Q[67], A[4]; [587]Q[68], A[3]). The objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of which

Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in the higher firmament.

Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry, since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom remarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the work of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates by his labor.

Reply to Objection 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater.

Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): “Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear.” Therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs.

Objection 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore they are not signs.

Objection 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were not made “for seasons, and days, and years,” that is, in order to distinguish them.

Objection 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself, “since the end is better than the means” (Topic. iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made “to enlighten it.”

Objection 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said “to rule the night.” But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made “to rule the night.”

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, As we have said above ([588]Q[65], A[2]), a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:19): "Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations." Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth." Secondly, as regards the changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and provide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he says: "Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years." Thirdly, as regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable to various occupations. And in this respect he says: "Let them be for signs."

Reply to Objection 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend upon the free-will.

Reply to Objection 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says "signs," rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry.

Reply to Objection 3: The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year than another, are due to certain particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their beginning on the fourth day.

Reply to Objection 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of the universe.

Reply to Objection 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it was probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.

Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.

Objection 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: “Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has not life.” The lights of heaven, therefore, are living beings.

Objection 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the heavenly bodies a living soul.

Objection 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36). Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.

Objection 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living move themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), “Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have neither life nor sense.”

I answer that, Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), “was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being.” On the other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the Church. It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words (Eccles. 1:6), “The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about.” But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the angelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).

In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the form. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas the nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).

From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly luminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a living substance.

Reply to Objection 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent.

Reply to Objection 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power.

Reply to Objection 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).

ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)

We must next consider the work of the fifth day.

Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are generated from seed. Therefore the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the earth,” do not fittingly describe this work.

Objection 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes and birds are produced from water.

Objection 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced from the air, and not from the waters.

Objection 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life.”

Objection 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, As said above, ([589]Q[70], A[1]), the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction. Hence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially.

Reply to Objection 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, and consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars.

Reply to Objection 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their generation is described.

Reply to Objection 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water, because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly “beneath the firmament,” even if the firmament be taken to mean the region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water.

Reply to Objection 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between the animals of the air and those of the water, having something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to that class to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have special characters like to theirs, the words, “Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life,” are followed by these: “God created great whales,” etc.

Reply to Objection 5: The order in which the production of these animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the less perfect.

ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the work of the sixth day.

Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, “Let the earth bring forth the living creature,” should rather have been, “Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures.”

Objection 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.

Objection 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is said “according to its genus” and “in its species.”

Objection 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well.

Objection 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time.

Objection 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had sinned.

On the contrary, Suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy writers that it was actual.

Reply to Objection 1: The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.). The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on ([590]Q[78], A[2]). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes “living creatures,” but “creeping creatures having life”; whereas it does call land animals “living creatures” on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.

Reply to Objection 2: By “cattle,” domestic animals are signified, which in any way are of service to man: but by “beasts,” wild animals such as bears and lions are designated. By “creeping things” those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word “quadrupeds” is added. Or perhaps the word “quadruped” is used first as being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.

Reply to Objection 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God.”

Reply to Objection 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there was any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.

Reply to Objection 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not have been produced then otherwise than potentially.

Reply to Objection 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): “If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection of the universe." And, since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have injured him.

ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) About the completion of the works;

(2) About the resting of God;

(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.

Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?

Objection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world (Mat. 13:39,40). Moreover, the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it is called "the time of fulness [*Vulg.: 'the fulness of time']" (Gal. 4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, "It is consummated" (Jn. 19:30). Hence the completion of the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day.

Objection 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were made after the seventh day, as the production of many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work of the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22): “The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth.” Miracles also are new works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): “Renew thy signs, and work new miracles.” Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: “And He that sat on the throne said: Behold I make all things new.” Therefore the completion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the seventh day.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “On the seventh day God ended His work which He had made.”

I answer that, The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The ‘first’ perfection is that according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole having its parts complete. But the ‘second’ perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day.

Reply to Objection 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second, as above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ” (Jn. 1:17). So, then, on the seventh day was the consummation of nature, in Christ’s Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the consummation of glory.

Reply to Objection 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the “second” perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version, however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be added that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on that day to have consummated His work.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed beforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read (Phil. 2:7), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of men." And again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), "Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us."

Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?

Objection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. For it is said (Jn. 5:17), "My Father worketh until now, and I work." God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all His work.

Objection 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work.

Objection 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words “God created” or “made” this thing or the other cannot be explained to mean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God cannot be explained as His making man to rest.

On the contrary, It is said (Gn. 2:2): “God rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done.”

I answer that, Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although movement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire. Now, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day. First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for, as said above (A[1], ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He is not said to have rested “in” His works, as though needing them for His own happiness, but to have rested “from” them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And even though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God’s resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).

Reply to Objection 1: God indeed “worketh until now” by preserving and providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new ones.

Reply to Objection 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an external object.

Reply to Objection 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the first and principal explanation.

Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?

Objection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the seventh day.

Objection 2: Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from "bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days, therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather than the day on which He ceased producing them.

Objection 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as upon each work it was said, "God saw that it was good." Therefore it was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day should be blessed.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:3), "God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work."

I answer that, As said above [591](A[2]), God's rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures He has made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day, since, as we explained (Q[72], ad 4), the blessing referred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this increase is effected through

God’s Providence over His creatures, securing the generation of like from like. And according to the second meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified.

Reply to Objection 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because something is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God.

Reply to Objection 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition.

Reply to Objection 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the seventh day, to its propagation.

ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)

We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three points of inquiry:
(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;

(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?

(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days.

Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another. But separate days are assigned to distinction and to adornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.

Objection 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and another to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air.

Objection 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the beast of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the production of birds and another to that of man.

Objection 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different days.

Objection 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day ought not to be enumerated with the others.

I answer that, The reason of the distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above ([592]Q[70], A[1]), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place "in a day," but creation "in the beginning" which denotes something indivisible.

Reply to Objection 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the world, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which the higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 13).

Reply to Objection 3: The production of animals is recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days of their production are separated or united according as the animals adorn the same parts of the world, or different parts.

Reply to Objection 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, as said above ([593]Q[70], A[1] ad 2).

Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something distinct is attributed to the seventh—namely, that on it God rested in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said, with the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessation from work.

Whether all these days are one day?

Objection 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is written (Gn. 2:4,5): “These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . . made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up in the earth.” Therefore the day in which God made “the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field,” is one and the same day. But He made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the first and third days are but one day, and for a like reason all the rest.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): “He that liveth for ever, created all things together.” But this would not be the case if the days of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many but one only.

Objection 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works. If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make that day; which is not admissible.

Objection 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in an instant, for with each work are the words (God) “said. . . . and it was . . . done.” If, then, He had kept back His next work to another day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would have ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be superfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with the day of the work that follows.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1), “The evening and the morning were the second day . . . the third day,” and so on. But where there is a second and third there are more than one. There was not, therefore, only one day.

I answer that, On this question Augustine differs from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely different. For Augustine understands by the word “day,” the knowledge in the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in the things produced.

If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown ([594]Q[67], A[1]; [595]Q[69], A[1]), between Augustine and other writers is taken into account. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as first created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making of the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter. But other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown ([596]Q[67], AA[1],4; [597]Q[69], A[1]). Secondly, some writers hold that plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference; which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side.

Reply to Objection 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, but “before it sprung up in the earth,” that is, potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other writers to the first instituting of the world.

Reply to Objection 2: God created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment. Hence the word “creation” is significant.

Reply to Objection 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.

Reply to Objection 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not from a want of power on God’s part, as requiring time in which to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection.

Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days.

Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?

Objection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, and other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the earth. For “all things were made by Him” (Jn. 1:3). Therefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention should have been made of the Word of God.

Objection 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently described.

Objection 3: Further, it is said (Gn. 1:31): “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” It ought, then, to have been said of each work, “God saw that it was good.” The omission, therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is not fitting.

Objection 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, “The Spirit of God moved over the waters,” are unbecoming.

Objection 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again. Therefore to the words, “God said: Let the firmament be made . . . and it was so,” it is superfluous to add, “God made the firmament.” And the like is to be said of other works.

Objection 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, “The evening and morning were the second day” or, “the third day,” are not suitable.

Objection 7: Further, “first,” not “one,” corresponds to “second” and “third.” It should therefore have been said that, “The evening and the morning were the first day,” rather than “one day.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place. For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning, by the words, “In the beginning God created,” since by creation is understood the production of formless matter. But according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their proper forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, “God said,” signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced that could obey it.

Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening things being left to be understood, since all these move heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the word, “earth,” Scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, “Praise the Lord from the earth,” is added, “fire, hail, snow, and ice.”

Reply to Objection 3: In the account of the creation there is found something to correspond to the words, “God saw that it was good,” used in the work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, “there are two things,” says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God’s love of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That they might then exist, and exist permanently, “the Spirit of God,” it is said, “moved over the waters”—that is to say, over that formless matter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over the materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And the words, “God saw that it was good,” signify that the things that He had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, than before He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, “God saw that it was good,” are not said of the work of the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected on the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that Scripture does not use these words of approval of the second days’ work, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not evident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi Moses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection of unity.

Reply to Objection 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the “Spirit of the Lord,” the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these things are throughout attributed to God. But according to the holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said to “move over the water”—that is to say, over what Augustine holds to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water, “fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods over her chickens.” For water has especially a life-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by the water of baptism, according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”

Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being in the Word, denoted by the command “Let . . . be made”; secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, “It was . . . done”; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, “He made.” And because the formation of the angels is recorded on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, “He made.” It may also be said, following other writers, that the words, “He said,” and “Let . . . be made,” denote God’s command, and the words, “It was done,” the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the sake of those especially who have asserted that all visible things were made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in order to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in each work, after the words, “It was done,” some act of God is expressed by some such words as, “He made,” or, “He divided,” or, “He called.”

Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the “evening” and the “morning” are understood the evening and the morning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained ([598]Q[58], A[6],7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part, the day. And instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, “The days of my pilgrimage," where night is not mentioned at all. But the evening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins with morning and ends with evening, or because evening denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction of creatures is described, divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the light, the termination of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning (Hom. v in Gen.).

Reply to Objection 7: The words "one day" are used when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours. Hence, by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed. Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. And yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven days, the first day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three reasons assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).

TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)

OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES)

Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances—essence, power, and operation—we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.

Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul is a body?

(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?

(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?

(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?

(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?

(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?

Whether the soul is a body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body.

Objection 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things.

Objection 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul “is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk.”

I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things “animate,” [*i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, “inanimate.” Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.

It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the “first” principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such;

since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as “such” a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.

Reply to Objection 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially—namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of contact; of “quantity,” and of “power.” By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

Whether the human soul is something subsistent?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be “this particular thing.” Now “this particular thing” is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent.

Objection 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), “to say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds.” Therefore the soul is not subsistent.

Objection 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): “Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature—i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things.” Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent.

I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man’s tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies;

as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.

Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation “per se” apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation “per se.” For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

Reply to Objection 1: “This particular thing” can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called “this particular thing” in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called “this particular thing,” in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be “this particular thing.”

Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate “per se” belongs to what exists “per se.” But for a thing to exist “per se,” it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist “per se,” which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist “per se”; nor can it for that reason be said to operate “per se.” Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same ‘genus’ as other animals; and, as we have just shown [599](A[2]), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent.

Objection 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.

Objection 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body.

On the contrary, Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: “Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent.”

I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has been said [600](A[1]). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no “per se” operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no “per se” operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being.

Reply to Objection 1: Although man is of the same “genus” as other animals, he is of a different “species.” Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of “genus.”

Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.

Reply to Objection 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body.

Whether the soul is man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2 Cor. 4:16): “Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day.” But that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is the inward man.

Objection 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore it is a “hypostasis” or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding “that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body.”

I answer that, The assertion “the soul is man,” can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong to the substance of the species.

It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above [601](A[3]) that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the “inward” man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the “outward” man.

Reply to Objection 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.

Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself.

Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul—namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.

Objection 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.

Objection 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter.

On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the “primary animate.”

Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.

Reply to Objection 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually “precontaining all things,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.

Reply to Objection 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.

Reply to Objection 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam."]

Reply to Objection 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

Whether the human soul is incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast," as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, "the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written (Wis. 2:2), “We are born of nothing”; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage, “After this we shall be as if we had not been,” even as to our soul.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are “intellectual,” and that they have “an incorruptible substantial life.”

I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways—“per se,” and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence “per se” cannot be generated or corrupted except ‘per se’; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above ([602]AA[2],3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted “per se.” This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.

Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of “here” and “now,” whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Reply to Objection 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: “Let the earth bring forth the living soul” (Gn. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gn. 2:7) that “He breathed into his face the breath of life.” And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: “(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it.” Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): “All things breathe alike,” and (Wis. 2:2), “The breath in our nostrils is smoke.” But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say: “Man has nothing more than beasts.” Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence.

Reply to Objection 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on ([603]Q[89], A[1]).

Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel—namely, eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species.

Objection 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species.

On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), “Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things.” Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species.

I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above ([604]Q[47], A[2]). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a "genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the "principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," as is written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter—that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later ([605]Q[76], A[2], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.

Reply to Objection 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.

Reply to Objection 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the “composite,” is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.

OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?

(2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for all men?

(3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul?

(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?

(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?

(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?

(7) Whether by means of an accident?

(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?

Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?

Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect is “separate,” and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said

([606]Q[75], A[2]); which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears from above ([607]Q[75], A[2]). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of a body.

Objection 5: Further, whatever has “per se” existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual principle has “per se” existence and is subsistent, as was said above ([608]Q[75], A[2]). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

Objection 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above ([609]Q[75], A[6]), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes man is “rational,” which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man.

I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2).

But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above ([610]Q[75], A[4]), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates.

The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood.

Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one.

There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle—namely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.

The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man.

But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.

It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the "primary animate," as was said above ([611]Q[75], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from matter." It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.

From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body.

Reply to Objection 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.

Reply to Objection 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms.

Reply to Objection 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.

Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above ([612]Q[75], A[5]). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men.

Objection 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments.

Objection 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.

Objection 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men.

Objection 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: “If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself.” But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals.

I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence.

Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sense—for instance, if two men had one eye—there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object.

However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasms—that is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you—if the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species.

Reply to Objection 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being.

Reply to Objection 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material—that is, not abstracted from material conditions—its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species.

Reply to Objection 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for “the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is,” as is said, De Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter.

Reply to Objection 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on ([613]Q[117], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species.

Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above ([614]Q[75], A[6]). Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.

Objection 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same "genus." Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore, “animal” will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But “rational,” which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called “animal” by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject.

On the contrary, It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: “Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning.”

I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul’s operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be “only logically” distinct from the other parts of the soul, “or also locally.”

The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three different reasons.

In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, “a white man.” If, therefore, man were ‘living’ by one form, the vegetative soul, and ‘animal’ by another form, the sensitive soul, and “man” by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima i, 5), “what contains them?”—that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse.

Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another—or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because “animal” is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.

Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another—since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal—so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man.

Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.

Reply to Objection 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and the other animals.

Reply to Objection 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on ([615]Q[118], A[2], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the “genus”; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; thence it gathers the “difference” of man.

Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that “the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially.” Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul.

Objection 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.

Objection 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for “before” and “after” apply by comparison to some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.

Objection 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.

On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.

I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above [616](A[1]), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.

In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being—for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort—maintained that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false.

Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.

Reply to Objection 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but “the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially”; and that this potentiality “does not reject the soul.” Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the “act of a body,” etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality “does not reject”—that is, does not exclude—the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved.

Reply to Objection 3: We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.

Reply to Objection 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.

Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms, and so can be “more” or “less”; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive “more” or “less.” Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.

Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.

Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body.

Objection 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body.

Objection 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species.

Objection 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that “the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially.”

I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above ([617]Q[55], A[2]) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.

Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe “those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind,” as stated in De Anima ii, 9.

Reply to Objection 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil.

Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace.

Reply to Objection 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.

Reply to Objection 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants.

Reply to Objection 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are “the organs of organs” (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.

Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form.

Objection 2: Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species.

Objection 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident.

On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial form.

I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.

If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above [618](A[1]), it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above [619](A[4]). Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: As appears from what has been already said [620](A[4]), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect.

Reply to Objection 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.

Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?

Objection 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.

Objection 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body.

Objection 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): “We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one.” But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.

I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer.

If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said [621](A[1]), it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6).

From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word “administration.” It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).

Reply to Objection 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.

Whether the soul is in each part of the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x): “It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own.”

Objection 2: Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal.

Objection 4: Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd.

Objection 5: Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that “in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire.”

I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof.

That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of operation.

Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.

Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible.

Reply to Objection 3: An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul’s primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal.

Reply to Objection 4: Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.

Reply to Objection 5: One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner.

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?

(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?

(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?

(4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;

(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?

(6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?

(7) Whether one power rises from another?

(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?

Whether the essence of the soul is its power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence."

Objection 2: Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own power.

Objection 3: Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.

Objection 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the soul is its own power.

Objection 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see OBJ 1) "are not in the soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other things" (De Trin. ix, 4).

Objection 6: Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we have said above ([622]Q[75], A[5]). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject.

Objection 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.

On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.

I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when speaking of the angels ([623]Q[54], A[3]). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul, that it is “the act of a body having life potentially”; which potentiality, however, “does not exclude the soul.” Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are “one life, one mind, one essence.” Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will are the one essence of the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence.

Reply to Objection 3: Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul.

Reply to Objection 4: That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we understand and sense."

Reply to Objection 5: If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul.

Reply to Objection 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above ([624]Q[75], A[5], ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i).

Reply to Objection 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences.

Whether there are several powers of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul.

Objection 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or power.

Objection 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above ([625]Q[76], AA[3],4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.

On the contrary, The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3).

I answer that, Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.

There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers—because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things.

Reply to Objection 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers.

Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects?

Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.

Objection 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.

Objection 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the appetitive.

Objection 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects.

On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that “acts and operations precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites,” that is their objects. Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects.

I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects.

Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence "rational" and "irrational" are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers of the soul are not distinct.

Reply to Objection 1: Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end.

Reply to Objection 2: If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul.

Reply to Objection 4: The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, however, are subject to one higher power.

Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is no order among them.

Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.

I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to the order of generation and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.

In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.

Reply to Objection 1: The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus.

Reply to Objection 2: This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have said above.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another.

Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), “The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily.” But the natural principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar reason, of all the other powers.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that “sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite.” Therefore the sensitive power is in “the composite” as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers.

I answer that, The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the “subject of power” is of necessity “the subject of operation,” as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above ([626]Q[75], AA[2],3; [627]Q[76], A[1], ad 1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.

Reply to Objection 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations.

Reply to Objection 2: All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.

Reply to Objection 3: Plato’s opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words “with the body or without the body” may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something.

Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence.

Objection 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

Objection 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself.

On the contrary, The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause.

I answer that, The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and “per se” accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.

Now it is clear, from what has been said [628](A[5]), that either the subject of the soul’s powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A[1], ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.

Reply to Objection 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Reply to Objection 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.

Whether one power of the soul arises from another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another.

Objection 2: Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another.

Objection 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another.

On the contrary, Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another.

I answer that, In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above [629](A[4]) that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man.

Reply to Objection 1: As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.

Reply to Objection 2: An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.

Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that “the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility.”

Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death.

Objection 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), “If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man.” But weakness is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.

Objection 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: “Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime” (Lk.

16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.

Objection 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.

On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain.

I answer that, As we have said already ([630]AA[5],6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root.

So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

Reply to Objection 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually.

Reply to Objection 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite.

Reply to Objection 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers.

Reply to Objection 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.

Reply to Objection 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.

Reply to Objection 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said there (Retrac. ii, 24).

OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The powers of the soul considered generally;

(2) The various species of the vegetative part;

(3) The exterior senses;

(4) The interior senses.

Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul—namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned—namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the soul, and not five.

Objection 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): “In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment.” Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive is excluded.

Objection 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): “The eye desireth favor and beauty, but more than these green sown fields.” In the same way every other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.

Objection 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), “The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and the intellectual.”

I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the “rational soul.” Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the “sensitive soul”; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul; since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4).

Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object to which it extends, as we have said above ([631]Q[77], A[3], ad 4). But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called "vegetative" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal object—namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object—namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers—namely, the "sensitive" in regard to the less common object—the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to the most common object—universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one—the "appetitive"—in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other—the "locomotive" power—in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions.

The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power—namely, men. But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii, 3).

Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.

Reply to Objection 3: The “natural appetite” is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the “animal appetite” results from the form apprehended; this sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul—mere apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act only—namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them; there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.

Reply to Objection 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them; for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience to the appetite.

Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described—namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called “natural” forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.

Objection 4: Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being “a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it.” Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are “generation, the use of food,” and (cf. De Anima iii, 9) “growth.”

I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said [632](A[1]), has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the “generative” power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the “augmentative” power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the “nutritive” power.

We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to “produce another like unto itself.” And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive.

Reply to Objection 1: Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions.

Reply to Objection 2: Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter.

Reply to Objection 4: As we have said above [633](A[1]), the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.

Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?

Objection 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.

Objection 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called “common sensibles,” are “not sensibles by accident,” but are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or sound.

Objection 3: Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.

Objection 4: Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense of touch.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): “There is no other besides the five senses.”

I answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect.

The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and "per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.

Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.

But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight" while in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling"; for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place in "touch" and "taste"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly.

Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because "the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2.

Reply to Objection 2: Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper sensibles," which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided according to its proper subject.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed.

Reply to Objection 4: The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.

Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?

Objection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.

Objection 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior power, called the common sense.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the “first sensitive.” But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.

Objection 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that “those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge.” Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the “estimative” power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive.

Objection 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination.

On the contrary, Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, “common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.”

I answer that, As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul’s operation.

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.

Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions.

Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the “proper sense” and the “common sense” are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the “phantasy” or “imagination” is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the “estimative” power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the “memorative” power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part—namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.

Reply to Objection 1: The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.

Reply to Objection 2: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.

Reply to Objection 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above ([634]Q[77], A[7]), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the “first sensitive.”

Reply to Objection 4: Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.

Reply to Objection 5: The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.

Reply to Objection 6: Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to all interior apprehensions.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?

(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?

(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?

(4) Whether it is something in the soul?

(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?

(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?

(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?

(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?

(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?

(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?

(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers?

(12) Whether “synderesis” is a power of the intellectual part?

(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?

Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): “Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence.” Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, different genera of the soul’s powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul’s powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.

Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), “man understands with the angels.” But angels are called “minds” and “intellects.” Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.

Objection 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).

I answer that, In accordance with what has been already shown ([635]Q[54], A[3]; [636]Q[77], A[1]) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is power.

Reply to Objection 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).

Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9).

Reply to Objection 3: In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.

Whether the intellect is a passive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.

Objection 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above ([637]Q[79], A[6]). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.

Objection 3: Further, the “agent is nobler than the patient,” as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that “to understand is in a way to be passive.”

I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above ([638]Q[78], A[1]), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly bodies ([639]Q[58], A[1]). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.

Reply to Objection 2: "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.

Reply to Objection 3: The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one.

Whether there is an active intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive.

Objection 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.

Objection 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), “As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things.” Therefore we must admit an active intellect.

I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on [640](A[4]). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms “species or ideas”; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle’s comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason.

Reply to Objection 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to Jn. 1:9, “He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world.” Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, “that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand.” But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

Objection 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a “substance in actual being.” But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.

Objection 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that “it is necessary for these differences,” namely, the passive and active intellect, “to be in the soul.”

I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.

Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect ([641]Q[76], A[1]). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul’s Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on ([642]Q[90], A[3]; FS, [643]Q[3], A[7]). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, “The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.”

Reply to Objection 1: That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said:

"Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.

Reply to Objection 3: If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.

Reply to Objection 4: The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.

Reply to Objection 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.

Whether the active intellect is one in all?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says (De

Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men.

Objection 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.

Objection 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men.

I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said [644](A[4]). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above ([645]Q[76], A[2]). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), “the agent is more noble than the patient.” Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called “separate”; but not as a separate substance.

Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.

Reply to Objection 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.

Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.

Objection 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind."

I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part.

But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding—namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.

The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.

Reply to Objection 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that “the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect.”

Reply to Objection 2: The condition of past may be referred to two things—namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul’s act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect ([646]Q[76], A[1]); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something “here” and “now.”

Reply to Objection 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality.

Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.

Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said ([647]Q[78], A[4]). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.

On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect.

I answer that, As has been said above ([648]Q[77], A[3]), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above ([649]Q[59], A[4]) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that “in which all are in potentiality.” Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Reply to Objection 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.

Reply to Objection 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.

Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.

Objection 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that “that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it.” Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.

I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood—namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.

Reply to Objection 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority.

Reply to Objection 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.

Reply to Objection 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.

Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.

Objection 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that “the scientific part” of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and another part from the “opinionative” and “reasoning” part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are “generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained.” Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the “scientific” part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) “is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal”; and that what the Philosopher calls the “reasoning” or “opinionative” part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, “is intent on the disposal of temporal things.” Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower.

Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence” men’s (mind) “is derived from” metiendo [measuring]. “And therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision.” Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that “the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions.” Therefore they are not two powers.

I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that “the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal”: forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which “is intent on the disposal of temporal things.” Now these two—namely, eternal and temporal—are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made”: while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.

But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science—for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.

Reply to Objection 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers.

Reply to Objection 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The “scientific” part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the “opinionative” and “ratiocinative” part is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect—namely, under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul—namely, the “scientific” and the “ratiocinative,” not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.

Reply to Objection 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For “opinion” signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to “judge” or “measure” [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word “mens” [mind]. Lastly, to “understand” is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.

Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that “when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence.” But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that “sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another.” But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.

Objection 3: Further, “actions came before powers,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue.” Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that “intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false.” But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.

I answer that, This word “intelligence” properly signifies the intellect’s very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called “intelligences,” and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called “intellects” or “minds.” Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects—namely, the “active” and “passive” intellects, the intellect “in habit,” and the “actual” intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power.

Reply to Objection 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.

Reply to Objection 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power—namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence." Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above ([650]Q[78], A[4]).

Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers.

Objection 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.

Objection 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above ([651]Q[78], A[4]). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.

On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers.

I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above ([652]Q[77], A[3]), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10); that “the speculative differs from the practical in its end.” Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical—i.e. operative.

Reply to Objection 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.

Reply to Objection 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.

Reply to Objection 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (A[7] , ad 2; [653]Q[77], A[3], ad 4).

Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?

Objection 1: It would seem that “synderesis” is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. 1:6, “synderesis” is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore “synderesis” is a power.

Objection 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But “synderesis” and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because “synderesis” always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that ‘synderesis’ is a power just as sensuality is.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain “rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable.” And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that “synderesis” is the same as reason: and thus it is a power.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), “rational powers regard opposite things.” But “synderesis” does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore “synderesis” is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.

I answer that, “Synderesis” is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above [654](A[8]), man’s act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle—and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called “the understanding of principles,” as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call “synderesis.” Whence “synderesis” is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that “synderesis” is not a power, but a natural habit.

Reply to Objection 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power.

Reply to Objection 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to “synderesis” is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus.

Reply to Objection 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to “synderesis” as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by “synderesis.”

Whether conscience be a power?

Objection 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says [*Commentary on Rom. 2:15] that “conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good.” But in the soul, spirit designates a power—either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. 4:13), “Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind”—or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that “their mind and conscience are defiled” (Titus 1:15). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power.

Objection 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.

On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.

I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.

The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" (Eccles. 7:23), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit—namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it is the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another.

Reply to Objection 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind.

Reply to Objection 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is defiled.

Reply to Objection 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called “synderesis.” And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.

OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)

Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul?

(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?

Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since “all desire good,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.

Objection 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing—namely its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.

I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being—that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, “in Whom all things pre-exist,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power.

Reply to Objection 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Reply to Objection 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.

Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen above ([655]Q[77], A[3]). But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

Objection 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things. But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive.

Objection 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower.

I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred can regard a universal, as when “we hate every kind of thief.” In the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)

Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?

(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?

(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

Whether sensuality is only appetitive?

Objection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that “the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts.” But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

Objection 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.

Objection 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body."

I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.

Reply to Objection 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Reply to Objection 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent.

Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.

Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible.

Objection 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on Mat. 13:33: “We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power.” But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.

I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite—the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible—namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.].

Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

Reply to Objection 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above ([656]Q[78], A[2]); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power.

Reply to Objection 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite.

Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Objection 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): “I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.” Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Objection 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey reason.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that “the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger.”

I answer that, In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above ([657]Q[78], A[4]), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some ‘the particular reason,’ because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), that “the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower.” In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): “We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power.” For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul’s command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.

Reply to Objection 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.

OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)

We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?

(2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?

(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?

(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?

(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?

Whether the will desires something of necessity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), “the will is in the reason.” Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that “all desire happiness with one will.” Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity.

I answer that, The word “necessity” is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle—either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible—or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is “natural” and “absolute necessity.” In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called “necessity of end,” and sometimes also “utility.” On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called “necessity of coercion.”

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary.

But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity “does not take away the liberty of the will,” as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).

Reply to Objection 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply to Objection 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but “the means to the end,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.

Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil is outside the scope of the will.” Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Objection 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will’s object moves it of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that “animals are moved by things seen.” Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that “it is the will by which we sin and live well,” and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.

I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already [658](A[1]). Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply to Objection 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Reply to Objection 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite—that is, the will—may be moved; but not of necessity from one thing.

Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power.

Objection 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): “If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing.” Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the will.

I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: “absolutely” and “relatively.” Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above ([659]Q[16], A[1]; [660]Q[27], A[4]), the action of the intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that “good and evil,” which are objects of the will, “are in things,” but “truth and error,” which are objects of the intellect, “are in the mind.” When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.

Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

Reply to Objection 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

Reply to Objection 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God.

Whether the will moves the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and “the agent is nobler than the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above [661](A[3]). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will.

Objection 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): “It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list.” But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.

I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above [662](A[3]), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect—namely, God—as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called from “concupiscere” [to desire], and the irascible part from “irasci” [to be angry]. But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): “The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom.” There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Mat. 13:33 warns us “to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part.” Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.

Objection 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible power to the intellectual part.

Objection 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that “the soul has these powers”—namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational—“before it is united to the body.” But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above (Q[78], AA[5],8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says “that the irrational” part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) “that the will is in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger,” or “desire and animus.”

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said above ([663]Q[59], A[4]; [664]Q[79], A[7]), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the senses.

Reply to Objection 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions—arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is called the will.

Reply to Objection 2: The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope—that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection is clear.

OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man has free-will?

(2) What is free-will—a power, an act, or a habit?

(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?

(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?

Whether man has free-will?

Objection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom. 7:19): “For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do.” Therefore man has not free-will.

Objection 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man’s power: for it is written (Rom. 9:16): “It is not of him that willeth”—namely, to will—“nor of him that runneth”—namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will.

Objection 3: Further, what is “free is cause of itself,” as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1): “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it” and (Phil. 2:13): “It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.” Therefore man has not free-will.

Objection 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer. 10:23): “The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk.” Therefore man has not free-will.

Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): “According as each one is, such does the end seem to him.” But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel”; and the gloss adds:

“That is of his free-will.”

I answer that, Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([665]Q[81], A[3], ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes—namely, “not to desire against reason,” as Augustine says.

Reply to Objection 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.

Reply to Objection 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

Reply to Objection 4: “Man’s way” is said “not to be his” in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.

Reply to Objection 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above ([666]Q[82], AA[1],2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said ([667]Q[81], A[3]). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.

Whether free-will is a power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.

Objection 2: Further, free-will is defined as “the faculty of the will and reason.” But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et

Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is “the soul’s habit of disposing of itself.” Therefore it is not a power.

Objection 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that “man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself.” Therefore free-will is not a power.

On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.

I answer that, Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium—i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits—for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness ([668]Q[82], AA[1],2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that “by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions” (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Reply to Objection 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (FS, Q[85], seqq.; [669]Q[109]).

Whether free-will is an appetitive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that “free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature.” But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

Objection 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

Objection 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is “the desire of those things which are in us.” But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.

I answer that, The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power.

On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power.

Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.

Reply to Objection 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.

Reply to Objection 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.

Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} is one thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Objection 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because “the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Objection 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers—the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will.

I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above ([670]Q[64], A[2]). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of “understanding” implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to “reason,” properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to “will” implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to “choose” is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above ([671]Q[79], A[8]) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

Reply to Objection 1: {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

Reply to Objection 2: Choice and will—that is, the act of willing—are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now.

In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.

The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.

In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them?

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?

(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species?

(3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?

(4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?

(5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?

(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?

(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?

(8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?

Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that “bodies cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses.” He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.

On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies.

I answer that, It should be said in order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that “it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent,” as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5).

After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called “species” or “ideas,” by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof.

Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration through moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things.

Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent’s form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.

But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power.

Reply to Objection 3: Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things.

Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul “collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance.” But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms them.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that “the soul, after a fashion, is everything.” Since, therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.

Objection 3: Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that “the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses.” But the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself.

I answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that “like is known by like.” But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence of our four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul’s knowledge is material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense.

But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.

We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above ([672]Q[78], A[3]): while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause.

God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we say that a body is made into something colored because of its being informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"—namely, not informed with such image—"which is able freely to judge of the species of these images": and that this is the "mind" or "intellect." And he says that the part which is informed with these images—namely, the imagination—is "common to us and beasts."

Reply to Objection 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all—through the senses, to all things sensible—through the intellect, to all things intelligible.

Reply to Objection 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the universal principle of all.

Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with the angels." But angels understand all things through innate species: wherefore in the book De Causis it is said that "every intelligence is full of forms." Therefore the soul also has innate species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things.

Objection 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.

Objection 3: Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.

On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like “a tablet on which nothing is written.”

I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act—through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation—by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species.

But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man’s intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof:

for no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above ([673]Q[76] , A[1]): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species.

Reply to Objection 1: Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above ([674]Q[66], A[2]). In the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.

Reply to Objection 2: Primary matter has substantial being through its form, consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded.

Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by some separate forms.

Objection 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances.

On the contrary, If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.

I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said [675](A[1]), held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called “per se” man, and the form or idea of a horse which is called “per se” horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said above [676](A[1]), he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas.

But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which he called the “active intelligence,” from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the “active intelligence.” They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas remain immovably in the soul.

But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, for the latter’s proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body.

But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought.

And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the "active intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms.

Reply to Objection 1: The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible—namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii).

Reply to Objection 2: Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul, as we have said ([677]Q[79], A[4]); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause.

Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is “united to God as to the unknown,” as Dionysius says (Myst. Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal types.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 1:20) that “the invisible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made.” But among the invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.

Objection 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that “ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind.” If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): “If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds.” Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): “If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens.” Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above [678](A[4]), that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect, by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, asserting that "per se" life or "per se" wisdom are creative substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the human soul.

When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly, on thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7), "Many say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us.

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?"

But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their “eternal types” or in the “unchangeable truth,” as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46)—viz. that “not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision,” namely, of the eternal types, “but only those that are holy and pure,” such as the souls of the blessed.

From what has been said the objections are easily solved.

Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?

Objection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that “we cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body.” This he proves in two ways. First, because “whatever the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived.” Secondly, because, “whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit.” And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): “We must not thing that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body’s action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts on.” Whence he concludes that “the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself.” Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

Objection 3: Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.

I answer that, On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that “all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls,” as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a “discharge of images.” And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.

Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we have said above ([679]AA[4] ,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the “body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without.” Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding.

Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the “composite.” And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the “composite,” Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above ([680]Q[79], AA[3],4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.

Reply to Objection 1: Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness.

Reply to Objection 2: In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination, is an action of the "composite," there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to the pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since “fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation” (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augustine’s words may be taken in this sense.

Reply to Objection 3: Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.

Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms.

Objection 2: Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.

Objection 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the angels.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that “the soul understands nothing without a phantasm.”

I answer that, In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands.

Reply to Objection 1: The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have said above ([681]Q[79], A[6]). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals.

Reply to Objection 2: Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does.

Reply to Objection 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.

Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses.

Objection 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil. i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses.

On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.

I answer that, As we have said above [682](A[7]), our intellect’s proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing’s nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that “as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses”; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms?

(2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?

(3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?

(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?

(5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division?

(6) Whether the intellect can err?

(7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?

(8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?

Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul—the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms.

Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that “the intellect understands the species in the phantasm”; and not, therefore, by abstraction.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that “things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter.” Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms.

I answer that, As stated above ([683]Q[84], A[7]), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above ([684]Q[76], A[1]). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above ([685]Q[84] , A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider color and its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore color can be understood independently of the apple.

Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word “otherwise” refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word “otherwise” be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and “signate” or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from “this flesh and these bones,” which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form “flesh and bones.”

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," "act," and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.

Reply to Objection 3: Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.

Reply to Objection 4: Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect.

Reply to Objection 5: Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ([686]Q[84], A[7]).

Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood.

Objection 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that “words are signs of the passions in the soul.” But words signify the things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul—viz. the intelligible species, are what is actually understood.

On the contrary, The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.

I answer that, Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood.

This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [*[687]Q[84], A[1]]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" [*Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says “that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone”; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species.

Reply to Objection 1: The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: In these words “the thing actually understood” there is a double implication—the thing which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like manner the words “abstract universal” imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect’s division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because “that is first which does not involve the existence of its correlative” (Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as “animal” is part of the definition of “man.” Therefore the universals are secondarily known by us.

Objection 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known by us.

On the contrary, “We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual” (Phys. i, 1)

I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that “what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements.” Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less common, as to “animal” indistinctly is to know it as “animal”; whereas to know “animal” distinctly is know it as “rational” or “irrational animal,” that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows “animal” before it knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.

Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore “children at first call men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others” (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows “genus” is in a state of potentiality as regards “difference.” Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act.

We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common.

Reply to Objection 1: The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality—viz. the relation of one and the same to many—is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas.

Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself—for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for "the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.

Reply to Objection 2: The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained not only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more; as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore "animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man" comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea.

Reply to Objection 3: A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all.

But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature.

Reply to Objection 4: The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.

Whether we can understand many things at the same time?

Objection 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same time.

Objection 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the same time.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect understands many things at the same time.

Objection 4: Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it knows many things at the same time.

On the contrary, It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that “understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many.”

I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by “one” but not by “many” intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22), that “God moves the spiritual creature through time.”

Reply to Objection 2: Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes.

Reply to Objection 3: Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; and so they are not understood at the same time.

Reply to Objection 4: If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole.

Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.

Objection 2: Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division.

On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.

I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.

Reply to Objection 1: Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we have said [688](A[1]; [689]Q[84], A[7]). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time.

Reply to Objection 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white." Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white," means that "the man is something having whiteness": and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another.

Whether the intellect can be false?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood are in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown above ([690]Q[79], A[1]). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.

Objection 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves falsehood: for "those err that work evil" (Prov. 14:22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived." And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the intellect is always true."

I answer that, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper object, as sight in regard to color; has accidentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ—for example, the taste of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is “per se” directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect is the “quiddity” of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions.

The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible; as, for instance, to describe anything as “a rational winged animal.” Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 10.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.

Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can?

Objection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), “Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than another can.”

Objection 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes.

I answer that, A thing being understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word “more” be taken as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another, because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense the word “more” can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand the same thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to matter’s capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that “it is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt mind.” Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to understand.

The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is.

Reply to Objection 3: The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter.

Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1) that “we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements.” But principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible.

Objection 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition “proceeds from the first and more known,” as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid says, “a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points”; also unity comes into the definition of number, for “number is multitude measured by one,” as is said Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible.

Objection 3: Further, “Like is known by like.” But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because “the intellect is simple” (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible.

On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that “the indivisible is expressed as a privation.” But privation is known secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible.

I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as above stated ([691]Q[84], A[7]). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said De Anima iii, 6. First, the continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above [692](A[3]). Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect.

But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated by things.

Reply to Objection 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes."

Reply to Objection 2: A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely.

Reply to Objection 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power’s aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather than color.

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it knows singulars?

(2) Whether it knows the infinite?

(3) Whether it knows contingent things?

(4) Whether it knows future things?

Whether our intellect knows singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our intellect knows this composition; “Socrates is a man”: for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this singular, Socrates.

Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows the singular.

Objection 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.

Objection 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that “the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense.”

I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said above ([693]Q[85], A[1]), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above ([694]Q[85], A[7]), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition “Socrates is a man.” Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima iii, 11.

Reply to Objection 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be intelligible.

Reply to Objection 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.

Whether our intellect can know the infinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have said above ([695]Q[12], A[1]). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things.

Objection 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and "species." But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.

Objection 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things.

Objection 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said ([696]Q[76], A[1]), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.

On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered as such, is unknown."

I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more.

On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible.

For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above.

Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([697]Q[7], A[1]), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term 'infinite' is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him.

Reply to Objection 2: The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles; and this is to know them potentially and confusedly.

Reply to Objection 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect.

Reply to Objection 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals.

Whether our intellect can know contingent things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things.

Objection 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, “what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time.” Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.

On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.

I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above [698](A[1]) that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above [699](A[1]). Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.

From which the replies to the objections are clear.

Whether our intellect can know the future?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future.

Objection 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future.

Objection 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 8:6,7), "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger."

I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above [700](A[3]) to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflection only, as stated above [701](A[1]). But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.

Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge ([702]Q[14], A[13]). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, according to the order of the effects to the cause.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii. 13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future.

But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above ([703]Q[57], A[3]). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii.], “impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen.”

Reply to Objection 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals’ movements some future things, such as rain and the like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that “some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it.”

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?

(2) Whether it knows its own habits?

(3) How does the intellect know its own act?

(4) How does it know the act of the will?

Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that “the mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal.”

Objection 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.

Objection 3: Further, “in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same” (De Anima iii, 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above ([704]Q[76], A[1]). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence.

On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that “the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things.” But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence.

I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.

Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as “act,” but not as a “pure act,” nor as a “complete act,” and hence the angel’s act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called “possible” [*Possibilis—elsewhere in this translation rendered “passive”—Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above ([705]Q[84], A[7]), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated ([706]Q[84], A[5]). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): “We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man’s mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types.” There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul’s nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: “Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present”—i.e. to know how it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident.

Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things—as is the passive intellect—or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms—as is the active intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same." For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things are immaterial—as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2).

Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): “Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence”; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves.

Objection 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the soul’s habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence.

Objection 3: Further, “whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so.” But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves.

On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), “acts and operations are logically prior to powers.” Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.

I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said [707](A[1]) that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind [708](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes.

Reply to Objection 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect’s object is the nature of a material thing as stated above ([709]Q[84], A[7]), but as that by which it understands.

Reply to Objection 3: The axiom, “whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so,” is true of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove.

Whether our intellect knows its own act?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), “I understand that I understand.”

I answer that, As stated above ([710]AA[1],2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above ([711]Q[79], A[1]), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).

Reply to Objection 1: The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, “being” and “the true,” in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but “being” and “true,” as considered in material things, as we have said above ([712]Q[84], A[7]), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.

Reply to Objection 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being thus potentially infinite, as explained above ([713]Q[86], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison.

Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Objection 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will."

I answer that, As stated above ([714]Q[59], A[1]), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)—that “the will is in the reason.” Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The “good” and the “true” which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above ([715]Q[82], A[4], ad 1; [716]Q[16], A[4], ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will.

Reply to Objection 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul’s affections are in the memory by certain notions.

HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?

(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?

(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?

Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine (De Trin. ix, 3) says: “As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things.” But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances.

Objection 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above ([717]Q[76], A[1]). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things.

Objection 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De Anima iii, 4. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things.

Objection 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that “nature would be frustrated in its end” were we unable to understand abstract substances, “because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at all.” But in nature nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.

Objection 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior and immaterial.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 9:16): “The things that are in heaven, who shall search out?” But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to Mat. 18:10, “Their angels in heaven,” etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation.

I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called “Ideas,” are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus first and “per se” understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things.

But in Aristotle’s opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ([718]Q[84], A[7]). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and “per se” be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.

Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which he calls the “active intellect,” and which, being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and the active intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate substances (because according to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by means of the active intellect.

This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its actuality, as was said of the passive intellect ([719]Q[70], A[1]). Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances.

Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a "kind of common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the species.

Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness is “an operation according to perfect virtue”; and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined.

Sixthly, as was shown above ([720]Q[79], A[4]), the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is “all things potentially,” and the active intellect is “all things in act.” Therefore both intellects, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true—that the soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances.

Reply to Objection 3: There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another.

Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all.

Reply to Objection 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial.

Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things?

Objection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature.” Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial substances.

Objection 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.

Objection 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can be understood by us, through their material effects.

Objection 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal."

I answer that, Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and as the process of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance.

Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material substances.

Reply to Objection 1: From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).

Reply to Objection 2: Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material things.

Reply to Objection 3: The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any other material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former.

Reply to Objection 4: Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above ([721]Q[3], A[5]). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.

Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii, 25]). Therefore God is the first object known to us.

Objection 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is “the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world” (Jn. 1:9). Therefore God is our first and most known object.

Objection 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind.

On the contrary, “No man hath seen God at any time” (Jn. 1:18).

I answer that, Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances [722](A[1]), much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), “the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made”: while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the “quiddity of a material thing,” which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages ([723]Q[84], A[7]; [724]Q[85], A[8]; [725]Q[87], A[2], ad 2)

Reply to Objection 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above ([726]Q[12], A[2]). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much less can it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The axiom, “Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so,” must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, as explained above ([727]Q[81], A[2], ad 3). Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?

(2) Whether it understands separate substances?

(3) Whether it understands all natural things?

(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?

(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?

(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?

(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul’s knowledge?

(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?

Whether the separated soul can understand anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that “the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle.” But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.

Objection 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained above ([728]Q[84], AA[7],8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have shown above ([729]Q[77], A[8]). Therefore after death the soul understands nothing.

Objection 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of innate species, because it has none such; being at first “like a tablet on which nothing is written”: nor does it understand by species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child’s soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), “If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body.” But the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation and above all, that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.

I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul’s very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.

To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose.

In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples.

It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher’s words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.

Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above ([730]Q[88], A[1]). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances.

Objection 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be reasonably be said.

On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Lk. 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels.

I answer that, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), “our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself”—i.e. by knowing itself ([731]Q[88], A[1], ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above [732](A[1]), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above ([733]Q[87], A[1]). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance “understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance” (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.

Reply to Objection 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.

Reply to Objection 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.

Reply to Objection 3: Man’s ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness—not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article.

Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things.

Objection 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility.

On the contrary, The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.

I answer that, As stated above [734](A[1]), the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.

Reply to Objection 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above ([735]Q[87], A[1]). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.

Reply to Objection 2: As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article.

Reply to Objection 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things.

Reply to Objection 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is useless.

Whether the separated soul knows singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above ([736]Q[77], A[8]). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown ([737]Q[86], A[1]). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.

Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars.

Objection 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none.

On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: “I have five brethren” (Lk. 16:28).

I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above ([738]Q[86], A[1]). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles ([739]Q[14], A[2]), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.

Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle says: “Knowledge shall be destroyed” (1 Cor. 13:8).

Objection 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; which seems unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which cannot be.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that “a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like.” But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), “Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven.”

I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed.

But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is “the abode of species,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For “habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired” (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.

Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated ([740]Q[79], A[2], ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible “intentions,” above all as regards simple intelligence of “what a thing is.” But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, “forgetfulness” on the part of the memorative power, and “deception” on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, “Now, I know in part.”

Reply to Objection 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man.

Reply to Objection 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility.

Reply to Objection 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.

Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, “the soul neither remembers nor loves.” But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired.

Objection 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above ([741]Q[84], A[7]). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that “habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired.” But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life.

On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Lk. 16:25): “Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.”

I answer that, Action offers two things for our consideration—its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object’s similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due to the eye’s visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above [742] (A[5]), and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above ([743]Q[79], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.

Reply to Objection 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).

Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul’s knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that “the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon's.

Objection 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 16:23), that Dives, "lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.

I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local distance.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if impeded by local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain [744](A[8]).

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10.

Reply to Objection 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place.

Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?

Objection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said (Lk. 16:27,28), “I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments.” Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.

Objection 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Kings 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.

Objection 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false [745](A[7]).

On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:21): “He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor.”

I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid down [746](A[4]), since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: “The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge” (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same

(De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, “the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living.”

Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the passage above quoted: “The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them.” But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: “The dead, even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children,” as a gloss quotes on the text, “Abraham hath not known us” (Is. 63:16). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people’s afflictions (4 Kings 22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, “Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say.” Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, “We cannot believe.” His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one—that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.

Reply to Objection 1: The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by “the revelation of the Holy Ghost,” as Augustine says in the same book.

Reply to Objection 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living—and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, “he slept, and told the king the end of his life.” Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.

Reply to Objection 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.

OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man’s soul; (2) the production of man’s body; (3) the production of the woman.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man’s soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance?

(2) Whether, if made, it was created?

(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?

(4) Whether it was made before the body?

Whether the soul was made or was of God’s substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God’s substance. For it is written (Gn. 2:7): “God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul.” But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance.

Objection 2: Further, as above explained ([747]Q[75], A[5]), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God’s substance.

Objection 3: Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls “exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith,” among which the first is the opinion that “God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself.”

I answer that, To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said ([748]Q[77] , A[2]; [749]Q[79], A[2]; [750]Q[84], A[6]), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence—acquires its knowledge somehow from things—and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act—receives nothing from any other—and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved ([751]Q[3], AA[1],7; [752]Q[9], A[1]).

This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body.

Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, “God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason,” as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man’s soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.

But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ([753]Q[3], AA[1],8; and [754]Q[75], A[1]), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.

Reply to Objection 1: The term “breathe” is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the same as to “make a spirit.” Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained ([755]Q[75], A[5], ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.

Reply to Objection 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.

Whether the soul was produced by creation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created.

Objection 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.

Objection 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:27): “God created man to His own image.” But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created.

I answer that, The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained ([756]Q[75], A[2]). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter—whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being—or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.

Reply to Objection 1: The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.

Reply to Objection 2: The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen ([757]Q[75], A[2]), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms.

Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.

Objection 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But “inferior things are forwarded by the higher,” as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels.

Objection 3: Further, “perfect is that which can produce its like,” as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7) that God Himself “breathed into the face of man the breath of life.”

I answer that, Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained ([758]Q[75], A[3]): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God.

Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior—all these things are effected through a certain transmutation.

Whether the human soul was produced before the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above ([759]Q[66], A[1]; [760]Q[70], A[1]). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.

Objection 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.

Objection 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body.

On the contrary, The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body.

I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them—namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies—are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken ([761]Q[47], A[2]); and so we need say nothing about it here.

Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some “causal virtues”; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): “We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created.”

Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.

Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days ([762]Q[74], A[2]), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days.

Reply to Objection 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body.

Reply to Objection 2: The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.

Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created.

THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN’S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the production of the first man’s body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The matter from which it was produced;

(2) The author by whom it was produced;

(3) The disposition it received in its production;

(4) The mode and order of its production.

Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing.

Objection 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.

Objection 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth.

Objection 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): "God made man of the slime of the earth."

I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" (Dt. 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called ‘a little world,’ because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him.

Reply to Objection 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man’s body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false—that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power.

Reply to Objection 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole “genus” of such contraries—thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense—or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes.

Reply to Objection 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed.

Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that “corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels.” But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above [763](A[1]). Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Objection 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man’s body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): “God created man out of the earth.”

I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained ([764]Q[65], A[4]); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels’ power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.

Reply to Objection 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), “man and the sun beget man from matter.” For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.

Reply to Objection 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their causal virtues.

Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.

Objection 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.

Objection 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right."

I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): “And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one’s substance.”

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.

Reply to Objection 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ([765]Q[78], A[4]). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above ([766]Q[84], A[7]); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.

Reply to Objection 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), “the organ of organs.” Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.

Reply to Objection 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man’s stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man’s stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason’s proper operation.

Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man’s superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.

Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, “God said; Let it be made, and it was made.” Therefore the same should have been said of man.

Objection 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above [767](A[2]). Therefore it was not fittingly said, “Let us make man.”

Objection 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, “God made man of the slime of the earth,” he should not have added: “And He breathed into him the breath of life.”

Objection 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly said: “He breathed into his face the breath of life.”

Objection 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: “To His image He made them,” he should not have added, “male and female He created them.”

On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps. 101:26), “The work of Thy hands is the heaven,” and elsewhere (Ps. 94:5), “His hands laid down the dry land”; but in this, that man is made to God’s image. Yet in describing man’s production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man’s sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind.

Reply to Objection 2: We must not imagine that when God said “Let us make man,” He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have thought that man’s body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.

To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, “God made man,” must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and that the subsequent words, “and He breathed into his face the breath of life,” should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, “Receive ye the Holy Ghost” (Jn. 20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, “And man was made a living soul”; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, “He breathed into his face the breath of life,” are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body.

Reply to Objection 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man’s face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man’s face.

Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him man’s soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made.

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things?

(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?

(3) Whether of man's rib?

(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?

Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production.

Objection 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Gn. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin.

Objection 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:18): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself."

I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: “And they shall be two in one flesh” (Gn. 2:24).

Reply to Objection 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature’s intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female.

Reply to Objection 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove ([768]Q[96], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.

Whether woman should have been made from man?

Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man.

Objection 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man.

Objection 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from man.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): “He created of him,” that is, out of man, “a helpmate like to himself,” that is, woman.

I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that “God made the whole human race from one” (Acts 17:26). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23,24): “She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife.” This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church."

Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.

Reply to Objection 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man.

Reply to Objection 3: A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this argument does not prove.

Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only—either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)—or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's—at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.

Objection 2: Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.

Objection 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:22): “God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman.”

I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should neither “use authority over man,” and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man’s contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed—namely, blood and water—on which the Church was established.

Reply to Objection 1: Some say that the woman’s body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories—viz. the definition with the absence of the thing defined.

Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that “Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn”—that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.

Reply to Objection 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man’s rib.

From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.

Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman’s body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Objection 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not immediately by God. But the woman’s body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: “God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the man’s rib.”

I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man’s rib.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): “The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made.” Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator.

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)

We now treat of the end or term of man’s production, inasmuch as he is said to be made “to the image and likeness of God.” There are under this head nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the image of God is in man?

(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?

(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?

(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?

(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?

(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?

(7) Whether the image of God is in man’s power or in his habits and acts?

(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?

(9) Of the difference between “image” and “likeness.”

Whether the image of God is in man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Is. 40:18): “To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?”

Objection 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): “Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature.” Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.

Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.]) that “an image is of the same species as that which it represents”; and he also says that “an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another.” But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): “Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image.” Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness—namely, that it is copied from something else. For an “image” is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): “Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality,” as we see in a person’s image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made “to” God’s likeness; for the preposition “to” signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.

Reply to Objection 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: “What image will you make for Him?” But

God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.

Reply to Objection 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).

Reply to Objection 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect image.

Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.

Objection 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God.

Objection 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" (Gn. 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man.

Objection 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): “Man’s excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field.” Therefore things without intellect are not made to God’s image.

I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man’s image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man’s image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that “an image is of the same species.”

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) “approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him.” It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God’s image.

Reply to Objection 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are “contingent images of their causes”; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.

Reply to Objection 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded.

Reply to Objection 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.

Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

Objection 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" [Ezech. 28:12] because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression."

I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said ([769]Q[58], A[3]; [770]Q[79], A[8]). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels.

Reply to Objection 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.

Reply to Objection 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree.

Whether the image of God is found in every man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is the image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): “Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son.” But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image.

Objection 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained [771](A[1]). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:7): “Surely man passeth as an image.”

I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, “The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us” (Ps. 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of “creation,” of “re-creation,” and of “likeness.” The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.

Reply to Objection 1: The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, “To the image of God He created him,” it is added, “Male and female He created them” (Gn. 1:27). Moreover it is said “them” in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that “man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man,” he adds his reason for saying this: “For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man.”

Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.

Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide ad Petrum i): “One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made.” And Hilary (De Trin. v) says: “Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity.” Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as “an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement.” Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that “man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness.” Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence.

Objection 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above ([772]Q[32], A[1]).

Objection 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2) that “the Son alone is the image of the Father.” Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): “The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God.”

I answer that, as we have seen ([773]Q[40], A[2]), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.

Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: “We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity.”

Reply to Objection 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, “Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness”; but “to Thy image.” When, therefore, it is written, “He made him to the image of God,” the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God “made man to His image,” this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition “to” points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, “Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him.” Secondly, this preposition ‘to’ may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, “This book is made (like) to that one.” Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another.

Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in man’s mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that “the man is the image . . . of God.” But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gn. 1:27): “God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them.” But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.

Objection 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man’s body also, and not in his mind.

Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, “corporeal,” “spiritual,” or imaginary, and “intellectual.” Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man.” Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): “Putting on the new” man; “him who is renewed unto knowledge” of God, “according to the image of Him that created him,” where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.

I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of “image” as we have explained above ([774]AA[1],2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a “trace.” Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a “trace,” as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a “trace,” and the way in which an “image,” represents anything. An “image” represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a “trace” represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called “traces”: so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained [775](A[2]); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen ([776]Q[28], A[3]); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker’s love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an “image” in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a “trace.”

Reply to Objection 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that “the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew").

Reply to Objection 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.

Reply to Objection 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.

Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things—mind, knowledge, and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Objection 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision.

I answer that, As above explained [777](A[2]), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Reply to Objection 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself—namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves—De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. [778]Q[79], A[7], ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation’s tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent.” From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.

Reply to Objection 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine’s statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that “the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself”; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that “it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things.” Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): “If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence.”

Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above [779](A[7]), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that “when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal.” Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.

Objection 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.

Objection 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 Cor. 3:18): “We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory.” But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): “The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made.” Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.

I answer that, As above explained ([780]AA[2],7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated ([781]AA[6],7), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De

Trin. xiv, 8), the “the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God.” But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).

Reply to Objection 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God.

Reply to Objection 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, “any third thing should be required to make up the trinity,” as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, “although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there,” as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.

Reply to Objection 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above ([782]Q[12], A[12]; [783]Q[56], A[3]; [784]Q[60], A[5]). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; “whether this image of God be so obsolete,” as it were clouded, “as almost to amount to nothing,” as in those who have not the use of reason; “or obscured and disfigured,” as in sinners; or “clear and beautiful,” as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6).

Reply to Objection 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that “in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable”; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.

Whether “likeness” is properly distinguished from “image”?

Objection 1: It would seem that “likeness” is not properly distinguished from “image.” For “genus” is not properly distinguished from “species.” Now, “likeness” is to “image” as genus to species: because, “where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore “likeness” is not properly to be distinguished from “image.”

Objection 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the “likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things” (Sent. ii, D, xvi).

Objection 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold—the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained [785](A[4]). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) “that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness.”

Objection 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that “the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue.”

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): “Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely “image” and “likeness,” since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed.”

I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, since “one” is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between “likeness” and “image.” For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above [786](A[1]): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that “the spirit” (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. “But the other parts of man,” belonging to the soul’s inferior faculties, or even to the body, “are in the opinion of some made to God’s likeness.” In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of God is found in the soul’s incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies “an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man.” In the same sense “likeness” is said to belong to “the love of virtue”: for there is no virtue without love of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: “Likeness” is not distinct from “image” in the general notion of “likeness” (for thus it is included in “image”); but so far as any “likeness” falls short of “image,” or again, as it perfects the idea of “image.”

Reply to Objection 2: The soul’s essence belongs to the “image,” as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.

Reply to Objection 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural “likeness” exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term “image” from one point of view and from another the term “likeness.”

Reply to Objection 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of “image”; but love of virtue belongs to “likeness,” as virtue itself belongs to likeness.

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?

(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?

(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?

(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?

Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man’s happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, “while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): “If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!” Therefore the first man in paradise saw God through His Essence.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that “the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain.” But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.

Objection 3: Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence “saw

God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God through His Essence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence.

I answer that, The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam" (Gn. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence.

Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right." And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, “perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence.” Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.

Reply to Objection 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with “a life of happiness in a certain measure,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.

Reply to Objection 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma.

Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): “In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels.”

Objection 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which “is a load upon the soul,” as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained ([787]Q[89], A[2]). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to see separate substances.

Objection 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.

On the contrary, The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither could Adam’s soul.

I answer that, The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man’s soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a “living soul”; that is, a soul giving life to the body—namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above [788](A[1]). Now it is clear from what has been already said ([789]Q[84], A[7]; [790]Q[85], A[1]; [791]Q[89], A[1]) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first is by the soul “passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself”; the second is by the soul ascending “so as to be associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to God.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above ([792]Q[87], A[3]): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above ([793]Q[55], A[2]); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits."

This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply to Objection 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure.

Whether the first man knew all things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is “like a clean tablet on which nothing is written.” And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves.

Objection 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things when he was first created.

Objection 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.

On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gn. 2:20). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals’ natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things.

I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like.

Reply to Objection 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature.

Reply to Objection 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained.

Reply to Objection 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.

Whether man in his first state could be deceived?

Objection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that “the woman being seduced was in the transgression.”

Objection 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, “the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God.” But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.

Objection 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities.

Objection 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men’s thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above [794] (A[3]). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): “To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment of man condemned.”

I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but without the assent of belief—or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed.

Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life “sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist.” Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.

This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded ([795]Q[85], A[6]), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that “the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit.”

Reply to Objection 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point.

Reply to Objection 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth.

Reply to Objection 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man’s proper action.

Reply to Objection 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion.

It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend.

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN’S WILL—NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?

(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?

(3) Whether he had all virtues?

(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?

Whether the first man was created in grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. 15:45): “The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit.” But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that “Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost.” But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that “God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness.” God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them.

Objection 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): “When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance.” But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace.

Objection 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.

Objection 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.

On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): “God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace.” Therefore man also was created in grace.

I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.

But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, “God made man right.” For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, “as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited

Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.

Reply to Objection 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.

Reply to Objection 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Reply to Objection 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence.

Reply to Objection 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.

Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.

Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of the soul.

I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply to Objection 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on ([796]Q[97], A[2]); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.

Whether Adam had all the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.

Objection 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above [797](A[2]). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.

Objection 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.

Objection 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.

Objection 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): “The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness.”

I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above [798](A[1]) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (FS, [799]Q[63], A[2]). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue.

It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9).

Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions.

Reply to Objection 2: Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear.

Reply to Objection 3: appears from what has been said above.

Reply to Objection 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.

Reply to Objection 5: appears from what has been said above.

Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?

Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.

Objection 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): “He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): “The object of virtue is the difficult and the good.” But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.

Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that “man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists.” Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state.

On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning.

I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good.

We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.

Reply to Objection 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.

Reply to Objection 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace.

OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?

(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?

(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?

(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?

Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals.

Objection 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St. Jerome’s works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gn. 1:26]: “God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man.” Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership.

Objection 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth” [Vulg.”and the whole earth”].

I answer that, As above stated ([800]Q[95], A[1]) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural.

Reply to Objection 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.

Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man’s sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede’s gloss on Gn. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon.

Reply to Objection 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals—neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence—nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise—nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures.

Reply to Objection 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him.

Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), “corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels.” Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence.

Objection 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants.

Objection 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): “That he may have dominion over . . . every creature.”

I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his “reason,” which makes him like to the angels’; his “sensitive powers,” whereby he is like the animals; his “natural forces,” which liken him to the plants; and “the body itself,” wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read “all creatures,” we must understand the creatures which are not made to God’s image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man’s mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.

Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): “Where there is no sin, there is no inequality.” But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal.

Objection 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Ecclus. 13:19, “Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself.” Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.

Objection 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:1): “The things which are of God, are well ordered” [Vulg.”Those that are, are ordained of God”]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): “Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place.” Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.

I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile.

Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.

There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.

So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body.

Reply to Objection 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.

Reply to Objection 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.

Reply to Objection 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): “God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle.”

Objection 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gn. 3:16): “Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power.” Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.

Objection 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, “where nothing was wanting that man’s good-will could desire,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of “Dominations.” Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another.

I answer that, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own—namely the master’s use. And since every man’s proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one’s own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.

But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10, “As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another.” Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): “Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel”: and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): “The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man.”

From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?

(2) Whether he was impassible?

(3) Whether he stood in need of food?

(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term “mortal” belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Objection 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.

Objection 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wis. 10:2: “He brought him out of his sins.” Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

Objection 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apoc. 21:4: “Death shall be no more.” But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:12): “By sin death came into the world.” Therefore man was immortal before sin.

I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter—that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): “God made man’s soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption.” Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): “God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death.” For man’s body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained ([801]Q[76], A[1]), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply OBJ 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply to Objection 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (TP, [802]Q[14] , A[4], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For “sensation is a kind of passion.” But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible.

Objection 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gn. 2:21, “God cast a deep sleep upon Adam.” Therefore he would have been passible.

Objection 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that “He took a rib out of Adam.” Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body.

Objection 4: Further, man’s body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.

On the contrary, Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): “Excessive suffering wastes the very substance.”

I answer that, “Passion” may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, “passion” can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.

Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare.

Reply to Objection 3: As already explained ([803]Q[92], A[3], ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib.

Reply to Objection 4: Man’s body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.

Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But Adam’s body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food.

Objection 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man’s body was impassible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him.

Objection 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food.

Objection 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:16): “Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. ‘thou shalt’] eat.”

I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls—that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gn. 2:7): “Man was made into a living soul”; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power.

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called “animal” [*From ‘anima,’ a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called “spiritual.” So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): “How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink.” For we have explained [804](A[1]) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.

Reply to Objection 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man’s body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature.

Reply to Objection 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.

Reply to Objection 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state.

Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.

Objection 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality.

Objection 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 3:22): “Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever.” Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): “A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life.”

I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul’s instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): “Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age”; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]) “The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption.”

Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul’s intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man’s life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.

From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above given.

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)

We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?

(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?

Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?

Objection 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, “corruption is contrary to generation.” But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation.

Objection 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation.

Objection 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:28): “Increase and multiply, and fill the earth.” But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.

I answer that, In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise man’s sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature’s purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature’s purpose would become void.

Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature.

Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence.

Reply to Objection 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual.

Reply to Objection 3: In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one’s need, those things of which they were masters—a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.

Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?

Objection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was “like an angel.” But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like the angels, “they shall neither marry nor be married,” as is written Mat. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition.

Objection 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture (Gn. 4:1).

Objection 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to Ps. 48:13: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them.” Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman.

Objection 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin (Gn. 1, 2). But nothing is void in God’s works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man (Gn. 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence.

I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained ([805]Q[97], A[3]), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin.

Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): “We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body.”

Reply to Objection 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time.

Reply to Objection 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By “immoderately” I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state “intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action.”

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the condition of the offspring—first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?

(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?

Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately after birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 38): “This weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind.” But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants.

Objection 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength.

Objection 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs.

Objection 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy.

On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power.

I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth.

Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that “God made man right” (Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man’s well-ordered will, so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will’s commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that “even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle.”

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a small amount of strength suffices them.

Reply OBJ 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and only what was befitting to their state of life.

Reply to Objection 4: In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption.

Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that woman is a “misbegotten male,” as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born.

Objection 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man’s active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always have been born.

Objection 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born.

On the contrary, Nature’s process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gn. 1, 2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born.

I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.

Reply to Objection 1: Woman is said to be a “misbegotten male,” as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained ([806]Q[92], A[1], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): “The northern wind favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females”: sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.

Reply to Objection 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number.

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?

(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i): “Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father’s righteousness.”

Objection 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous.

Objection 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents, to the children.

On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): “As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul.”

I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained ([807]Q[95], A[1]), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace ([808]Q[95], A[1]). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.

From this the reply to the third objection is clear.

Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: “For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten “children of hell”; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer.” Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): “If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more.” Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Objection 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness.

Objection 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): “Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they—that is our first parents—had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been condemned.” From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.

I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to

Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Reply to Objection 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: "It seems that if they had lived, etc."

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed.

Reply to Objection 4: There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels ([809]Q[64], A[2]).

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)

We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?

(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?

Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge ([810]Q[94], A[3]). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. FS, [811]Q[85], A[3]). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born.

Objection 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge.

On the contrary, The human soul is naturally “like a blank tablet on which nothing is written,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth.

I answer that, As above stated ([812]Q[99], A[1]), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained ([813]Q[55], A[2]; [814]Q[84], A[6]); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning.

Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.

Reply to Objection 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).

Reply to Objection 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.

Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, “The corruptible body is a load upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.

Objection 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth.

On the contrary, In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.

I answer that, As above stated ([815]Q[84], A[7]), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs ([816]Q[99], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.

Reply to Objection 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above ([817]Q[99], A[1]).

OF MAN’S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider man’s abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?

(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?

(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?

(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?

Whether paradise is a corporeal place?

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gn. 2:8] says that “paradise reaches to the lunar circle.” But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Objection 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gn. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Objection 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place.

Objection 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom that “She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her” (Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place.

Objection 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): “Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): “Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred.” For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), “is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden.” It was fitting that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east.

Reply to Objection 1: Bede’s assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is “a continually even temperature”; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements.

Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon—that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): “It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?”

Reply to Objection 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it.

Reply to Objection 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated ([818]Q[97] , A[4]). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say.

Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: “The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning” (Gn. 2:8).

Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed—that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man’s habitation should have been there also.

Objection 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man’s abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.

Objection 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose.

Objection 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator—a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): “Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God’s image.”

I answer that, As above stated ([819]Q[97], A[1]), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained ([820]Q[97], A[4]), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): “Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants.” Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality.

Reply to Objection 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), “God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures.” Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man’s nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude.

Reply to Objection 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul—that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): “No irrational animal inhabited paradise”; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil.

Reply to Objection 3: Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God’s kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.

Reply to Objection 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere.

Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?

Objection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gn. 3:17). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.

Objection 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise.

Objection 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2: 15): “The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man’s practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man’s good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man’s benefit, and not conversely.

Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.

Whether man was created in paradise?

Objection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place—namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise.

Objection 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created ([821]Q[97], A[4]). Therefore he was created in paradise.

Objection 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:15): “God took man and placed him in paradise.”

I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was man’s, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.

Reply to Objection 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.

In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.

TREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ[103]-119)

OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?

(2) What is the end of this government?

(3) Whether the world is governed by one?

(4) Of the effects of this government?

(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?

(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?

(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?

Whether the world is governed by anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone. For it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for an end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world do not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their end. Therefore the world is not governed.

Objection 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards an object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has stability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.

Objection 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature to one particular thing, does not require any external principle of government. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain necessity determined to something particular in their actions and movements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:3): “But Thou, O Father, governest all things by Thy Providence.” And Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal.”

I answer that, Certain ancient philosophers denied the government of the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an opinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by observation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature things happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not be the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards good as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we observe in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if we enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of him that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii), quoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a consideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above ([822]Q[44], A[4]; [823]Q[65], A[2]), was the cause of the production of things in existence. For as “it belongs to the best to produce the best,” it is not fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things without giving them their perfection. Now a thing’s ultimate perfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it belongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence, so to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two ways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational creatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the means to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an end, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow directed to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the arrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end shows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the unvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows clearly that the world is governed by some reason.

Reply to Objection 2: In all created things there is a stable element, at least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under movement we include operation. And things need governing as to both: because even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing, would return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand, as will be explained later ([824]Q[104], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings which are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression from God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an arrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression from the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference, inasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature, while that which natural things receive from man in addition to their nature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the movement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural necessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.

Whether the end of the government of the world is something outside the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the world is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the government of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in him. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not outside, but within the things themselves.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): “Some ends are an operation; some are a work”—i.e. produced by an operation. But nothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and operation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the end of the government of things.

Objection 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order, and peace which is the “tranquillity of order,” as Augustine says (De Civ.

Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of things. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the peaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the government of the world is not an extrinsic good.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 16:4): “The Lord hath made all things for Himself.” But God is outside the entire order of the universe. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to them.

I answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning, it is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know their beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is something outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what has been expounded above ([825]Q[44], AA[1],2), that we must conclude that the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved by reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end; wherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular good; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good; Which is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by participation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe there is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore that good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good outside the universe.

Reply to Objection 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form existing in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something done by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house; thirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer of a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore nothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to which it is directed.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various arts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as the end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other arts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not the act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that something extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as possessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say that Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him. Therefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the end of the government of the universe, as something possessed and represented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to an assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.

Reply to Objection 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of the universe, is an end thereof; this. however, is not its ultimate end, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the order in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10.

Whether the world is governed by one?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For we judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the universe that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but some contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Objection 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against each other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler; which cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and act against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries. Therefore the world is not governed by one.

Objection 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it "is better that two should be together than one" (Eccles. 4:9). Therefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.

On the contrary, We confess our belief in one God and one Lord, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): "To us there is but one God, the Father . . . and one Lord": and both of these pertain to government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the name of God is taken from Providence as stated above ([826]Q[13], A[8]). Therefore the world is governed by one.

I answer that, We must of necessity say that the world is governed by one. For since the end of the government of the world is that which is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government of the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best government is the government by one. The reason of this is that government is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the end; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of goodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as all things desire good, so do they desire unity;

without which they would cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence we observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the intention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the proper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be the cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united. Furthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause of unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better governed by one than by several. From this it follows that the government of the world, being the best form of government, must be by one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10): “Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of authorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler.”

Reply to Objection 1: Movement is “the act of a thing moved, caused by the mover.” Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity of things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of the universe ([827]Q[47], AA[1],2; [828]Q[48], A[2]), and not by a diversity of governors.

Reply to Objection 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other in their proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so far as they are included in the one order of the universe.

Reply to Objection 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are better than one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is possible.

Whether the effect of government is one or many?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the government of the world and not many. For the effect of government is that which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the good which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an army. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.

Objection 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the world is governed by one as we have proved [829](A[3]). Therefore also the effect of this government is but one.

Objection 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of the unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many things governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore we cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): “God contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness.” But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government.

I answer that, The effect of any action may be judged from its end; because it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected. Now the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to the participation and similarity of which all things tend. Consequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken in three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way there is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good. Secondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered on the part of those things by means of which the creature is made like to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the government. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two effects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness, and the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the individual the effects of the government of the world; and in this way they are without number.

Reply to Objection 1: The order of the universe includes both the preservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards these two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better than another; and one is moved by another.

From what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other two objections.

Whether all things are subject to the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the Divine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): “I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor to the skillful, but time and chance in all.” But things subject to the Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things which are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): “God hath no care for oxen.” But he that governs has care for the things he governs. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

Objection 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by another. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is master of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by another, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): “Not only heaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the lowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant, the leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of their nature.” Therefore all things are subject to His government.

I answer that, For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He is their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection; and this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only of some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being, as proved above ([830]Q[44], AA[1],2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing which is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not subject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of the end of government. For a man’s government extends over all those things which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the Divine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown [831](A[2]). Wherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine goodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above ([832]Q[44], A[4]; [833]Q[65], A[2]), so it is impossible for anything to escape from the Divine government.

Foolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the corruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human affairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are represented as saying, “God hath abandoned the earth” (Ezech. 9:9).

Reply to Objection 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are generated and corrupted according to the sun’s movement. In all such things we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in such things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And the very fact that an element of chance is found in those things proves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless corruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend to nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of knowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes the nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance and yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say absolutely that he observes chance in all things, but “time and chance,” that is to say, that defects may be found in these things according to some order of time.

Reply to Objection 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the governor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a movable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down Phys. iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is an act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously, even as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one art of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed according to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of themselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are governed by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God Himself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they are induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and prohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which do not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence, when the Apostle says that “God hath no care for oxen,” he does not wholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards the way in which rational creatures are governed.

Reply to Objection 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect and will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the Divine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby the rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it requires to be governed by God.

Whether all things are immediately governed by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God immediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves the opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The first he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly things and all universals; the second providence he attributes to the secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over generation and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to certain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions. Therefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.

Objection 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But God can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause. Therefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.

Objection 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it seems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus an earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything himself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time, requires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all things immediately.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): “As the lower and grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the good and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself.”

I answer that, In government there are two things to be considered; the design of government, which is providence itself; and the execution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs all things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some things by means of others.

The reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness, so everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of goodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order, design or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists in knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not the one who can only give his attention to general principles, but who can consider the least details; and so on in other things. Therefore we must say that God has the design of the government of all things, even of the very least.

But since things which are governed should be brought to perfection by government, this government will be so much the better in the degree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a greater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself. Therefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts knowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching others.

Reply to Objection 1: Plato’s opinion is to be rejected, because he held that God did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of government; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence, which is the design of government, into three parts.

Reply to Objection 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the perfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would not be accomplished by one.

Reply to Objection 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute his laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his dignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is brought into greater evidence.

Whether anything can happen outside the order of the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside the order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that “God disposes all for good.” Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no evil exists.

Objection 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the preordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing occurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that there is nothing fortuitous and casual.

Objection 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and unchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design. Therefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and nothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for something to occur outside the order of the Divine government.

On the contrary, It is written (Esther 13:9): “O Lord, Lord, almighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that can resist Thy will.”

I answer that, It is possible for an effect to result outside the order of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the universal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside the order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding cause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first universal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the nutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the food, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on till we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the first universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in general, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of the Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of view something seems to evade the order of Divine providence considered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily come back to that order as regards some other cause.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is ever founded on good, as shown above ([834]Q[48], A[3]). Therefore something is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of some particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the Divine government, it would wholly cease to exist.

Reply to Objection 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some particular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the order of Divine providence, “nothing in the world happens by chance,” as Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

Reply to Objection 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared to their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not as though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine government. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of some proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to the Divine government.

Whether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?

Objection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made to the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Is. 3:8): “Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord.”

Objection 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel against his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God’s commands, no one would be justly punished by God.

Objection 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine government. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things rebel against the order of the Divine government.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly,” as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.

I answer that, We may consider the order of Divine providence in two ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing cause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some particular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.

Considered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the Divine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the fact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to good, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good only, “for no one acts intending evil,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A[1], ad 3; A[5], ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or voluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover; as the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but an impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether natural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of its own accord. For this reason God is said “to order all things sweetly.”

Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against God: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government; for even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but because they resist some particular good, which belongs to their nature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.

Reply OBJ 2 is clear from the above.

Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular cause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all things.

THE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular; concerning which four points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?

(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?

(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?

(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?

Whether creatures need to be kept in being by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in being by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in being; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept from departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot not-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God. The middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the nature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and cannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself, because everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But some creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels ([835]Q[50], AA[2],5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same reasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality to one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies ([836]Q[66], A[2]). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be necessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to not-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter existing under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in potentiality to any other form.

Objection 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a created agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be preserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the builder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time after the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God cause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create it.

Objection 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some active cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and violent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be. Therefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some active cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature that nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to not-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.

Objection 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by some action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be efficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the preserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But this is not so; because this action does not give being to the creature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does it add anything new to the creature; because either God would not keep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually adding something new to the creature; either of which is unreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:3): “Upholding all things by the word of His power.”

I answer that, Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures are kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a thing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and accidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing the cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a child, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God preserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such a nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary to keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another ‘per se’ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being of every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it subsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by the operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).

This is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so far as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the cause of the “becoming” of its effect, but not directly of its “being.” This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings: for the builder causes the house in its “becoming,” but he is not the direct cause of its “being.” For it is clear that the “being” of the house is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together and arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural qualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying the natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by making use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put together in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the “being” of a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its “becoming” depends on the action of the builder. The same principle applies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form as such, neither will it be directly the cause of “being” which results from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in its “becoming” only.

Now it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot directly cause the other’s form as such, since it would then be the cause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of the other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is in matter—in other words, it may be the cause that “this matter” receives “this form.” And this is to be the cause of “becoming,” as when man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural effect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active cause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause, then the “becoming” of the effect, but not its “being,” depends on the agent.

Sometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the impression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent: as may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect of the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the generation of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such an agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as existing in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of “becoming” but also the cause of “being.”

Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action of the agent ceases which causes the “becoming” of the effect: so neither can the “being” of a thing continue after that action of the agent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in “becoming” but also in “being.” This is why hot water retains heat after the cessation of the fire’s action; while, on the contrary, the air does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun ceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the fire’s heat in the same way as it exists in the fire.

Wherefore if it were to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that form always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and inchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the imperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand, air is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it exists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since it has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the sun.

Now every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun which enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and as the air is enlightened by sharing the sun’s nature; so God alone is Being in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His existence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that its essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12): “If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse.” In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: “As the air becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by the presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.”

Reply to Objection 1: “Being” naturally results from the form of a creature, given the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from the diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun. Wherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and heavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His influence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being after the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make it not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect depends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison with an agent that is not the cause of ‘being’ but only of “becoming.”

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation which consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not need to be preserved thus, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of that action whereby He gives existence, which action is without either motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air is by the continual influence of the sun.

Whether God preserves every creature immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature immediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action, as above stated (A[1], ad 4). But God created all things immediately. Therefore He preserves all things immediately.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it cannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore can it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God preserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.

Objection 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of its “becoming,” but also of its being. But all created causes do not seem to cause their effects except in their “becoming,” for they cause only by moving, as above stated ([837]Q[45], A[3]). Therefore they do not cause so as to keep their effects in being.

On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that which gives it being. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes. Therefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.

I answer that, As stated above [838](A[1]), a thing keeps another in being in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or hindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and “per se,” by the fact that that on it depends the other’s being, as the being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a created thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in corporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of corrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just as salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many other things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as to its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one another, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first and principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal cause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the middle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle cause is higher and nearer to the first cause.

For this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and continuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the diurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated; whereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of diversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner astrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those things which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps certain things in being, by means of certain causes.

Reply to Objection 1: God created all things immediately, but in the creation itself He established an order among things, so that some depend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He remains the principal cause of their preservation.

Reply to Objection 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause on which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can only produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the power of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving another.

Reply to Objection 3: No created nature can be the cause of another, as regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by virtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something presupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect, without any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form or disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow some change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light is without any further change in the air due to the presence of the source of light.

Whether God can annihilate anything?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that “God is not the cause of anything tending to non-existence.” But He would be such a cause if He were to annihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.

Objection 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): “Because God is good, we exist.” But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to annihilate anything.

Objection 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by His action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is existence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term in something generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:24): “Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.”

I answer that, Some have held that God, in giving existence to creatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could not annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we have said above ([839]Q[19], A[4]), such an opinion is entirely false, and absolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God created things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to make them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to annihilate them.

Reply to Objection 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a cause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as such is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency of itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can be the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing His action therefrom.

Reply to Objection 2: God’s goodness is the cause of things, not as though by natural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on creatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to His goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so, without prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in existence.

Reply to Objection 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not imply an action on God’s part; but a mere cessation of His action.

Whether anything is annihilated?

Objection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing but God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall be nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.

Objection 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite power extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that, “a finite power cannot move in infinite time.” Therefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at some time it will be reduced to nothing.

Objection 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of themselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are reduced to nothing.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:14): “I have learned that all the works that God hath made continue for ever.”

I answer that, Some of those things which God does in creatures occur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen miraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will be explained ([840]Q[105], A[6]). Now whatever God wills to do according to the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but those things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the manifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, “To each one is given the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit” (1 Cor. 12:7); and subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.

Now the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated. For, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality to non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to exist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the subject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of things does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather the power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of things in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely that anything at all will be annihilated.

Reply to Objection 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of non-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that they should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation, since the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all things in existence, according to the Apostle: “Upholding all things by the word of His power” (Heb. 1:3).

Reply to Objection 2: A creature’s potentiality to existence is merely receptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom existence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a consequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things, however, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time, so far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving the influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot resist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which have no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to exist for ever.

Reply to Objection 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist: but each one of them is something “of a being”; for it is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their mode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to nothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain in the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.

OF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the change of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God; secondly, the change of one creature by another.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?

(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?

(3) Whether He can move the intellect?

(4) Whether He can move the will?

(5) Whether God works in every worker?

(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?

(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?

(8) Of the diversity of miracles.

Whether God can move the matter immediately to the form?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately to receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except that form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is not a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.

Objection 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce none of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some other cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a general assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some particular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause of all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form, except by means of a particular agent.

Objection 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so determinate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we have seen above ([841]Q[104], A[2]). But the determinate being of a particular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things are produced by God, only by means of particular causes.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:7): “God formed man of the slime of the earth.”

I answer that, God can move matter immediately to form; because whatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the active power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since the Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be reduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by matter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the act of matter.

Reply to Objection 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two ways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by man, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the cause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause: thus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are like the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way the effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which the power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both matter and form; as we have said above ([842]Q[14], A[2]; [843]Q[44], A[2]); wherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by way of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite generator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite generator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing like itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in matter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance extends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible matter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of corporeal seeds.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural necessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows the particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it follows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to determinate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other causes to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by Himself without any other cause.

Whether God can move a body immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately. For as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some contact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact between God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): “There is no contact with God.” Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Objection 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the desirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object of desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the intellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an infinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body to be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between opposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the same subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved immediately by an infinite power. But God’s power is infinite, as we have explained ([844]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.

On the contrary, God produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gn. 1:9 “Let the waters be gathered together into one place.” Therefore God alone can move a body immediately.

I answer that, It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created cause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created causes, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any bodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated [845](A[1]). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a form, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form which they have from their generating cause, for which reason the generator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating tends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to imprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement which results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but it also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint form immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body whatever in respect of any movement whatever.

Reply to Objection 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when two bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of sadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first kind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is touched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by moving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no creature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the words, “There is no contact with God”; that is, so that God Himself be touched.

Reply to Objection 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but it does not follow that He always moves as being desired and apprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by Himself; for He does all things for His own goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to prove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first mover “of bulk,” by the following argument. The power of the first mover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover can move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power “of bulk,” would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the infinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not measured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved without time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason is that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by the necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of all proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the mover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a finite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite power does not move in any time; for between one time and any other time there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not in bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its effects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it cannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not follow that it moves without time.

Whether God moves the created intellect immediately?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the created intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its own subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated in Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by another does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover. Therefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently God cannot move the created intellect.

Objection 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle of movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the intellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say that to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which is natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding. Therefore it is not moved by another.

Objection 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the intellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible to us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God cannot move our intellect.

On the contrary, The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught. But it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God “teaches man knowledge.” Therefore God moves the human intellect.

I answer that, As in corporeal movement that is called the mover which gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is said to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is the principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of the intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual operation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual power itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in potentiality; while the other is the principle of actual understanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the one who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect, whether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding; or impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.

Now God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First immaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality, it follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in each order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must conclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like manner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in Him as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly in Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible types of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from Him by other intellects in order that these may actually understand; so also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore God so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the intellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on the created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and preserves both power and species in existence.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the intellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds from God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand is given to the one who understands.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of the thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but it is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.

Reply to Objection 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so far as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of which the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses which God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to enable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence, as we have seen above ([846]Q[12], A[2]; [847]Q[56], A[3]). Hence He moves the created intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we have explained ([848]Q[12], A[4]).

Whether God can move the created will?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For whatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be forced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot be moved by God.

Objection 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at the same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be voluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another. Therefore God cannot move the will.

Objection 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to the one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but to the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that voluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But this is false. Therefore God does not move the will.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): “It is God who worketh in us [Vulgate—‘you’] both to will and to accomplish.”

I answer that, As the intellect is moved by the object and by the Giver of the power of intelligence, as stated above [849](A[3]), so is the will moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the power of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object, but by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move a movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover surpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for its object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal being. But every created good is some particular good; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the capacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In like manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will is nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which is universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs to the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just as in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs the directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both ways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second way by an interior inclination of the will.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its natural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the proper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is made to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not forced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it, because He gives the will its own natural inclination.

Reply to Objection 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within, that is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be caused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is not repugnant to being moved by another.

Reply to Objection 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be moved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed for reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not prevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2), it does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.

Whether God works in every agent?

Objection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For we must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works in every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be superfluous for the created agent to work at all.

Objection 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from two sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two movable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God operating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from the creature; and so no creature works at all.

Objection 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing made, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is the cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be inasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the beginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not operate any further in the operating creature.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:12): “Lord, Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: ‘for’] us.”

I answer that, Some have understood God to work in every agent in such a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that God alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance, that it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so forth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and effect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply lack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the cause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because the active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be bestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through them. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be purposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the matter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and thus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore understand that God works in things in such a manner that things have their proper operation.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few kinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the subject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the end, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a certain order. For the first principle of action is the end which moves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of that which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts through its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art. For the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the axe which cuts through its being sharp.

Thus then does God work in every worker, according to these three things. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake of some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or apparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the Supreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause of every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where there are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue of the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus all agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the cause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not only moves things to operated, as it were applying their forms and powers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who nevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also gives created agents their forms and preserves them in being. Therefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the forms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause of the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves the light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer to the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God Himself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost in all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: “Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.”

Reply to Objection 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it does not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is superfluous.

Reply to Objection 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same order. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a primary and a secondary agent.

Reply to Objection 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also preserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover the end of every action, as above explained.

Whether God can do anything outside the established order of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3) says: “God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature.” But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order.

Objection 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order of nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice; for then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do anything outside the order of nature.

Objection 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it God does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He is changeable; which cannot be said.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): “God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature.”

I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not subject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have created another order of things. Wherefore God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): “God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself.”

Reply to Objection 1: In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): “That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature.”

Reply to Objection 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First Cause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do nothing against such order.

Reply to Objection 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that at the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do otherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this order, He does not change.

Whether whatever God does outside the natural order is miraculous?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle.

Objection 2: Further, a miracle is “something difficult, which seldom occurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our hopes as to compel our astonishment” [*St. Augustine, De utilitate credendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not arduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and healing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they happen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be healed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the faculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they beyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead, which nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore not all things are outside the course of natur are miraculous.

Objection 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now admiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes things happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to the senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without studying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs outside the order of nature is miraculous.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): “Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle.”

I answer that, The word miracle is derived from admiration, which arises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others: as an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

Reply to Objection 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order.

Reply to Objection 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of the excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it surpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the usual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of the thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which it is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope “of nature,” not above the hope “of grace,” which hope comes from faith, whereby we believe in the future resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in itself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown to be wonderful.

Whether one miracle is greater than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than another. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): “In miraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the doer.” But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

Objection 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite exceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more reason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another. Therefore one miracle is not greater than another.

On the contrary, The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (Jn. 14:12): “The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do.”

I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Is. 40:15: “Behold the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance.” But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature’s power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.

From this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do from the Divine power.

HOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration will be threefold: (1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures; (2) How bodies move; (3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature.

Concerning the first point, there are three things to be considered: (1) How an angel acts on an angel; (2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature; (3) How an angel acts on man.

The first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and speech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the good and of the bad angels.

Concerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?

(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?

(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that he knows himself?

Whether one angel enlightens another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another. For the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain. But one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34: “They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother.” Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.

Objection 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of grace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of nature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in the light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God. Therefore one angel does not enlighten another.

Objection 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational mind is "informed by God alone, without created intervention," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not enlighten the mind of another.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy."

I answer that, One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a manifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: "All that is made manifest is light." Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to communicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according to the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): "To me the least of all the saints is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God." Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by manifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): "Theologians plainly show that the orders of the heavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds."

Now since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we have said ([850]Q[105], A[3]), namely, the intellectual power, and the likeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can notify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his intellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is strengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body—for instance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is hotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened by the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal things. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives the knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive which the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for it is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner. Therefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which he conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior angel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us that the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into many points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This is thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): “Every intellectual substance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform knowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its inferiors upwards by analogy.”

Reply to Objection 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the Essence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach another. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he adds: “They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: ‘Know the Lord’: for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the greatest.” But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in God as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends Himself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types, the more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more about the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and concerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels “are enlightened by the types of existing things.”

Reply to Objection 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the light of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural light, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of nature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either as the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image of God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for the created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it adhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment that proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to this ultimate form.

Whether one angel moves another angel’s will?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel’s will. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above [851](A[1]), as one angel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But cleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former seems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to be perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will. Therefore an angel can move another angel’s will.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): “The names of the angels designate their properties.” Now the Seraphim are so called because they “kindle” or “give heat”: and this is by love which belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel’s will.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior angel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the superior angel can change the will of another angel.

On the contrary, To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it belongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness of the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel cannot change another angel’s will.

I answer that, As was said above ([852]Q[105], A[4]), the will is changed in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of the power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is the object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the appetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one who proves something to be good. But as we have said above ([853]Q[105], A[4]), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing sufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God. And this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed, Who, when Moses asked: “Show me Thy glory,” answered: “I will show thee all good” (Ex. 33:18,19). Therefore an angel does not move the will sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But he inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some created good ordered to God’s goodness. And thus he can incline the will to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.

But on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by God. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the willer to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination, Who bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent alone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to which follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the creature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the intellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel’s will.

Reply to Objection 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according to the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing the intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect and will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But the enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as explained above [854](A[1]); therefore an angel is to be understood as cleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as perfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the knowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that “in the heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an enlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect knowledge.” For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is cleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of light; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the colored object.

Reply to Objection 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite which can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it belongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior appetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to the angels.

Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and represents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is called “our mother” (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are enlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:31): “You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all may be exhorted.” Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the superiors can be enlightened by inferiors.

Objection 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the will of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as was said above ([855]Q[105], A[6]), God sometimes acts outside the order of corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the order of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise than through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors enlightened by God can enlighten superiors.

Objection 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as was above explained [856](A[1]). But since this turning to another is voluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the others. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the latter can enlighten his superiors.

On the contrary, Dionysius says that “this is the Divine unalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior” (Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).

I answer that, The inferior angels never enlighten the superior, but are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above explained ([857]Q[105], A[6]), one order is under another, as cause is under cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to order. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is done outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the superior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is passed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God works miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men may be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the order that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the ordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made known to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order which belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so that the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not conversely.

Reply to Objection 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in some degree, but by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly hierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its nearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more sublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account the superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God in sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for science; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail in another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.

Reply to Objection 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what God does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual nature. Hence the argument does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel, but the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made the order in the angels.

Whether the superior angel enlightens the inferior as regards all he himself knows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten the inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual knowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than under a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior angels know, is known by the inferior, through these being enlightened by the former.

Objection 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that the superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation, whereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was accomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as it were, in ignorance: "Who is this King of glory?" other angels, who knew, answered: "The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory," as Dionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the superior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know themselves. Therefore they do not do so.

Objection 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about all they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown to the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could communicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to objection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in all things.

On the contrary, Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf. Gregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: "In that heavenly country, though there are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually." And Dionysius says: "Each heavenly essence communicates to the inferior the gift derived from the superior" (Coel. Hier. xv), as quoted above [858](A[1]).

I answer that, Every creature participates in the Divine goodness, so as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the nature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal agents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more an agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much the more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far as possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace share in the Divine goodness; saying: “As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the manifold grace of God” (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy angels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine goodness, impart the same to those below them.

Nevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior as by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in a higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master understands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.

Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more universal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: The Master’s words are not to be understood as if the inferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the Incarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior angels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards when the Mystery was accomplished.

Reply to Objection 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being revealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the world, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is always something for the superior angels to make known to the inferior.

THE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?

(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?

(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?

(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?

(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?

Whether one angel speaks to another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection “each one’s body will not hide his mind from his fellows.” Much less, therefore, is one angel’s mind hidden from another. But speech manifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not necessary that one angel should speak to another.

Objection 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to oneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior speech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or some bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot apply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

Objection 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he says. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to listen; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels.”

I answer that, The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory says (Moral. ii): “It is fitting that our mind, rising above the properties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and unknown methods of interior speech.”

To understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that, as we explained above ([859]Q[82], A[4]), when treating of the actions and powers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation. Now an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways; first, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6,7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as related to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible object passes from the first to the second stage by the command of the will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur, “which anyone uses when he wills.” So likewise the intelligible object passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by the will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as, for instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made known to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual consideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to himself; for the concept of the mind is called “the interior word.” And by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be made known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept of one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel speaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known the mental concept to another.

Reply to Objection 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The first is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or can direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of another, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: “What man knoweth the things of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?” The other obstacle whereby the mental concept is excluded from another one’s knowledge, comes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will directs the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at once make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used. Gregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): “To other eyes we seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and when we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the door of the tongue to show what we really are.” But an angel is under no such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at once.

Reply to Objection 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for us on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an angel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not only the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being ordered to another’s knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel is called metaphorically the angel’s power, whereby he manifests his mental concept.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good angels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as one ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself. But because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and even now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the intellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is affected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by the sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to attention by some intelligible power.

Whether the inferior angel speaks to the superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to the superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), “If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels,” a gloss remarks that the speech of the angels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the inferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was above explained ([860]Q[106], A[3]). Therefore neither do the inferior speak to the superior.

Objection 2: Further, as was said above ([861]Q[106], A[1]), to enlighten means merely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is to speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the same conclusion follows.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): “God speaks to the angels by the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and invisible things.” But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever God speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an enlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a superior angel.

On the contrary, According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: “Who is this King of Glory?”

I answer that, The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To make this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is an angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an enlightening; because, as we have said [862](A[1]), for one angel to speak to another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he directs his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to the other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold principle; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will of the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything. But because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is the rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the mind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and enlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: “Heaven was created by God”; or, “Man is an animal.” The manifestation, however, of what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be called an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one says to another: “I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that.” The reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of truth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes from the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know what you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the perfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.

Now it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by comparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment, which depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the superior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the principle, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the manifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by the one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to the inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.

From this clearly appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply to Objection 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening; because since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the perfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what God wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as was explained above.

Whether an angel speaks to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For speech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make known anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does not speak to God.

Objection 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference to another, as was shown above [863](A[1]). But an angel ever orders his mental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks to God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel sometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel never speaks to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 1:12): “The angel of the Lord answered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy on Jerusalem.” Therefore an angel speaks to God.

I answer that, As was said above ([864]AA[1],2), the angel speaks by ordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is ordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of giving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is ordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to the learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God either of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the created will; because God is the principle and source of all truth and of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to receive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the agent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this way an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of what ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he can never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that “the angels speak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they rise to emotions of admiration.”

Reply to Objection 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making something known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the purpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the disciples ask instruction from the master.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of praising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by consulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to perform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.

Whether local distance influences the angelic speech?

Objection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic speech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): “An angel works where he is.” But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an angel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel’s speech is limited by the bounds of that place.

Objection 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of the hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that “they cried one to another” (Is. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance has some effect.

On the contrary, It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to Abraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Lk. 16:24). Much less therefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to another.

I answer that, The angelic speech consists in an intellectual operation, as explained above ([865]AA[1],2,3). And the intellectual operation of an angel abstracts from the “here and now.” For even our own intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the “here and now,” except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do not exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted from “here and now,” neither difference of time nor local distance has any influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is no impediment.

Reply to Objection 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A[1], ad 2), is interior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it exists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is who speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing another, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is ordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his speech.

Reply to Objection 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by reason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude of what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what Gregory says (Moral. ii): “The less one desires, the less one cries out.”

Whether all the angels know what one speaks to another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks to another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do not know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech local distance has no effect, as above explained [866](A[4]). Therefore all the angels know what one speaks to another.

Objection 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in common. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known by one, it is for the same reason known by all.

Objection 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the enlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels, because, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): “Each one of the heavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others.” Therefore the speech of one angel to another extends to all.

On the contrary, One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels.

I answer that, As above explained ([867]AA[1],2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not by another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one angel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of local distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained above.

From this appear the replies to the first and second objections.

Reply to Objection 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the first rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels; and in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may be of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which is proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that these speeches should be common to all.

OF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and orders; for it was said above ([868]Q[106], A[3]), that the superior angels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.

Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?

(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?

(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?

(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?

(5) Of the names and properties of each order.

(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.

(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?

(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?

Whether all the angels are of one hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one hierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is evident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of a multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the Philosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4). Therefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it seems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that “hierarchy is order, knowledge, and action.” But all the angels agree in one order towards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are ruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.

Objection 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be found among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy. Therefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.

On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three hierarchies of angels.

I answer that, Hierarchy means a “sacred” principality, as above explained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself and the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there is one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and all creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels, but also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of sacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): “There are two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and men, the other of the wicked.” But if we consider the principality on the part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality is said to be “one” accordingly as the multitude can be subject in “one” way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be governed in the same way by a prince belong to different principalities: thus, under one king there are different cities, which are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is evident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same way as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their intelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a distinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same manner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown above ([869]Q[55], A[3]), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the superior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the inferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the angels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are enlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as preceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of knowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with God, and, “as it were, placed in the vestibule of God,” as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on the universal created causes which in some way are already multiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly, forasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as depending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest hierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of the orders [870] (A[6]). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on the part of the multitude of subjects.

Hence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of Dionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it the “supercelestial” hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there exists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order, for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): “The hierarchical order is so directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and that others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect”; which far be it from us to apply to the Divine Persons.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers principality on the part of the ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as the Philosopher asserts in those passages.

Reply to Objection 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one way—that is, in His essence—there is no hierarchical distinction among the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the types of created things, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural mode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and hence the same argument does not apply to both.

Whether there are several orders in one hierarchy?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not several orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one hierarchy only, but many.

Objection 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades among spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among the angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for “nothing is possessed individually” (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not different orders of angels.

Objection 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are distinguished according to the actions of “cleansing,” “enlightening,” and “perfecting.” For the order of deacons is “cleansing,” the order of priests, is “enlightening,” and of bishops “perfecting,” as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the angels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no distinction of orders among the angels.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that “God has set the Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and dominion”: which are the various orders of the angels, and some of them belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained [871](A[6]).

I answer that, As explained above, one hierarchy is one principality—that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the rule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but confused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of a hierarchy requires diversity of orders.

This diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and actions, as appears in one city where there are different orders according to the different actions; for there is one order of those who judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who labor in the fields, and so forth.

But although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be reduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a beginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order of men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others are the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between these, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we find in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to their actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to three—namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in every hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).

Reply to Objection 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order comprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy is called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and in that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.

Reply to Objection 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic society, some things, however, being held more excellently by some than by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who can communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the hot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is unable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a gift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect grade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this similitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the angels, according to their different offices and actions.

Reply to Objection 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of our hierarchy, according to the words, “He that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven, is greater than he”—namely, John the Baptist, than whom “there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of women” (Mat. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly hierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and in a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the heavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by reason of other different acts.

Whether there are many angels in one order?

Objection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order. For it was shown above ([872]Q[50], A[4]), that all the angels are unequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many angels in one order.

Objection 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one angelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more sufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the sun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If, therefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated above [873](A[2]), several angels in one order would be superfluous.

Objection 3: Further, it was said above (OBJ 1) that all the angels are unequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four), are of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more akin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of his own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with the latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels of one order.

On the contrary, It is written: “The Seraphim cried to one another” (Is. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the Seraphim.

I answer that, Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points. Thus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their orders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order, inanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals in another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to distinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and in each of the other orders.

Now our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and orders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But if we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we should know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own order among things, and much more so than any star, though this be hidden from us.

Reply to Objection 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a common similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but absolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who are first, middle, and last.

Reply to Objection 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein each angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.

Reply to Objection 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black, the two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as regards their position than any other two white parts, but are less akin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders are more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to the others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for similar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.

Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders comes from the angelic nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of orders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is “a sacred principality,” and Dionysius places in its definition that it “approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be” (Coel. Hier. iii). But sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not by nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the angels is by grace, and not by nature.

Objection 2: Further, the Seraphim are called “burning” or “kindling,” as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes not from nature but from grace; for “it is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5): “which is said not only of holy men, but also of the holy angels,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but from grace.

Objection 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the heavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the gift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop, and another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the angels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.

On the contrary, The Master says (ii, D. 9) that “an angelic order is a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by some gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of natural gifts.” Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels is not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.

I answer that, The order of government, which is the order of a multitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of the angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the faculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural knowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the orders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly, the end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above their natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which end they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the orders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of grace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels are given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural gifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained ([874]Q[62], A[6]). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the gratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.

From the above the replies to the objections are evident.

Whether the orders of the angels are properly named?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not properly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and heavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to individuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are ineptly named.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the words, “Know ye that the Lord He is God” (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one order of the heavenly spirits is not properly called “Dominations.”

Objection 3: Further, the name “Domination” seems to imply government and likewise the names “Principalities” and “Powers.” Therefore these three names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.

Objection 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore this name ought not to be given to any other order than to the “Principalities.”

Objection 5: Further, the name “Seraphim” is derived from ardor, which pertains to charity; and the name “Cherubim” from knowledge. But charity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore they ought not to be names of any particular orders.

Objection 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows and loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it. Therefore there ought not to be any order of “Thrones” besides the “Cherubim” and “Seraphim.” Therefore it appears that the orders of angels are not properly styled.

On the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are so named. For the name “Seraphim” is found in Is. 6:2; the name “Cherubim” in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); “Thrones” in Col. 1:16; “Dominations,” “Virtues,” “Powers,” and “Principalities” are mentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name “Archangels” in the canonical epistle of St. Jude (9), and the name “Angels” is found in many places of Scripture.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of the angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of each order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of each order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something may be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of excess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another by way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its nature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is attributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have stated ([875]Q[13], A[2]) concerning all the names which are attributed to God: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something not fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by participation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name designating its property, it ought not to be named from what it participates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess, but from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we wish properly to name a man, we should call him a "rational substance," but not an "intellectual substance," which latter is the proper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an angel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him a "sensible substance," which is the proper name of a brute; because sense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a more excellent way than to other animals.

So we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual perfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more excellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as in these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs to the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the inferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection belongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by way of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the superior perfection.

So in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the orders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they signify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for he says that "angels are so called as announcing the least things; and the archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought; by the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities preside over the good spirits themselves."

Reply to Objection 1: Angel means “messenger.” So all the heavenly spirits, so far as they make known Divine things, are called “angels.” But the superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this manifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The lowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common manifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation only; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the lowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that the lowest order can be specially called the order of “angels,” forasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.

“Virtue” can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the medium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all the heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also “heavenly essences.” Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and thus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the “name ‘virtues’ signifies a certain virile and immovable strength”; first, in regard of those Divine operations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine gifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine behests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.

Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): “Dominion is attributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the Divine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of Lord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the Divine gifts.” Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name “Domination” means first “a certain liberty, free from servile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians, and from tyrannical oppression,” endured sometimes even by the great. Secondly, it signifies “a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy which does not bend to any servile act, or to the act, of those who are subject to or oppressed by tyrants.” Thirdly, it signifies “the desire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God.” Likewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what belongs to God; as the name “Virtues” signifies the participation of the Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest.

Reply to Objection 3: The names “Domination,” “Power,” and “Principality” belong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only to prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in

Evang.), that “some companies of the angels, because others are subject to obedience to them, are called dominations.” The name “Power” points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle says, “He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God” (Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name “Power” signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception of Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by superiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above. Therefore, to the order of “Powers” it belongs to regulate what is to be done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is “to be first among others,” as being first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of “Principalities” signifies “one who leads in a sacred order.” For those who lead others, being first among them, are properly called “princes,” according to the words, “Princes went before joined with singers” (Ps. 67:26).

Reply to Objection 4: The “Archangels,” according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ix), are between the “Principalities” and the “Angels.” A medium compared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the nature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and hot compared to cold. So the “Archangels” are called the “angel princes”; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the “Angels,” and angels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) they are called “Archangels,” because they preside over the one order of the “Angels”; as it were, announcing greater things: and the “Principalities” are so called as presiding over all the heavenly “Virtues” who fulfil the Divine commands.

Reply to Objection 5: The name “Seraphim” does not come from charity only, but from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire. Hence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name “Seraphim” according to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat. Now in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which is upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne inflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is “heat,” which is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain sharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to the smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor; whereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully upon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor, and cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider in fire the quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these angels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they also perfectly enlighten others.

In the same way the name “Cherubim” comes from a certain excess of knowledge; hence it is interpreted “fulness of knowledge,” which Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the perfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their contemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard to the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth copiously upon others.

Reply to Objection 6: The order of the “Thrones” excels the inferior orders as having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works; whereas the “Cherubim” have the excellence of knowledge and the “Seraphim” the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent attributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the “Thrones” does not include the other two; and so the order of the “Thrones” is distinguished from the orders of the “Cherubim” and the “Seraphim.” For it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the inferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name “Thrones” by its relation to material seats, in which we may consider four things. First, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to the angels who are called “Thrones” are raised up to the immediate knowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in material seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits firmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels themselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives him who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the angels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to the inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is open on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels promptly open to receive God and to serve Him.

Whether the grades of the orders are properly assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not properly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the names of

“Dominations,” “Principalities,” and “Powers” of themselves imply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.

Objection 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But the order of “Thrones” is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the “Thrones” is the highest.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher than will. Therefore the order of “Cherubim” seems to be higher than the “Seraphim.”

Objection 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the “Principalities” above the “Powers.” These therefore are not placed immediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).

On the contrary, Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest hierarchy the “Seraphim” as the first, the “Cherubim” as the middle, the “Thrones” as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the “Dominations,” as the first, the “Virtues” in the middle, the “Powers” last; in the lowest hierarchy the “Principalities” first, then the “Archangels,” and lastly the “Angels.”

I answer that, The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree as regards all except the “Principalities” and “Virtues.” For Dionysius places the “Virtues” beneath the “Dominations,” and above the “Powers”; the “Principalities” beneath the “Powers” and above the “Archangels.” Gregory, however, places the “Principalities” between the “Dominations” and the “Powers”; and the “Virtues” between the “Powers” and the “Archangels.” Each of these placings may claim authority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21) enumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that “God set Him,” i.e. Christ, “on His right hand in the heavenly places above all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion.” Here he places “Virtues” between “Powers” and “Dominations,” according to the placing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16), numbering the same orders from the highest, he says: “Whether Thrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things were created by Him and in Him.” Here he places the “Principalities” between “Dominations” and “Powers,” as does also Gregory.

Let us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius, in which we see, that, as said above [876](A[1]), the highest hierarchy contemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the universal causes; and third in their application to particular effects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic ministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first hierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal disposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the application of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying out of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in every kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of the orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy those orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God, the "Seraphim," "Cherubim," and "Thrones"; and he places in the middle hierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common government or disposition—the "Dominations," "Virtues," and "Powers"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names denote the execution of the work, the "Principalities," "Angels," and "Archangels."

As regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we consider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end; thirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an addition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because God is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar order may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the dignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader; others in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others above these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this similitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the first hierarchy; for the "Thrones" are raised up so as to be the familiar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing immediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the whole of the first hierarchy. The "Cherubim" know the Divine secrets supereminently; and the "Seraphim" excel in what is the supreme excellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in such a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the "Thrones"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits together, they are all called "Angels."

As regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first of which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this belongs to the "Dominations"; the second is to give the power of carrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the “Virtues”; the third is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done can be carried out by others, which belongs to the “Powers.”

The execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing Divine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners and leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and officers; this belongs to the “Principalities.” There are others who simply execute what is to be done; and these are the “Angels.” Others hold a middle place; and these are the “Archangels,” as above explained.

This explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the highest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the higher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the first order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the Holy Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the first hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of love. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the “Thrones,” who in their own order are akin to the “Dominations”; for the “Thrones,” according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called “because through them God accomplishes His judgments,” since they are enlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening of the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the Divine ministrations. The order of the “Powers” is akin to the order of the “Principalities”; for as it belongs to the “Powers” to impose order on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once in the name of “Principalities,” who, as presiding over the government of peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place in the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof; “for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man” (Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, “The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me” (Dan. 10:13).

The disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also reasonable. For since the “Dominations” appoint and order what belongs to the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged according to the disposition of those things in which the Divine ministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), “bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior; and all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the good spirit.” So the first order after the

“Dominations” is called that of “Principalities,” who rule even over good spirits; then the “Powers,” who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced by earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come the “Virtues,” which have power over corporeal nature in the working of miracles; after these are the “Angels” and the “Archangels,” who announce to men either great things above reason, or small things within the purview of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel’s subjection to God is greater than their presiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the former. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are not the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name from their nearness and relation to God.

Reply to Objection 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the “Thrones,” belongs also to the “Cherubim” and “Seraphim,” and in a more excellent way, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 3: As above explained ([877]Q[27], A[3]), knowledge takes place accordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the lover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a nobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things are in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves. Therefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to love the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.

Reply to Objection 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no difference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders according to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name “Principalities” from their “presiding over good spirits,” which also agrees with the “Virtues” accordingly as this name expressed a certain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the execution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory, the “Virtues” seem to be the same as “Principalities” of Dionysius. For to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine ministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the announcements of the “Archangels” and the “Angels.”

Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast the Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ will “bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father,” and this will be in the final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will be abolished in that state.

Objection 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to cleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one angel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they will not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders would remain for no purpose.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that “they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation”; whence it appears that the angelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to salvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the Day of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not outlast the Day of Judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (Judges 5:20): “Stars remaining in their order and courses,” which is applied to the angels. Therefore the angels will ever remain in their orders.

I answer that, In the angelic orders we may consider two things; the distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The distinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the difference of grace and nature, as above explained [878](A[4]); and these differences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of natures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be corrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them according to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution of the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the Day of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease accordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to their end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the attainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have different duties to perform in battle and in triumph.

Reply to Objection 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in that final consummation as regards their office of leading others to their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer necessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of the Apostle, “When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God and the Father,” i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the enjoyment of God Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be considered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions. In ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered according to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually arrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest that the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding middle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is that when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can have opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he is ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels know the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior angels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels not only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards the preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the Judgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of some things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by the superior angels.

Reply to Objection 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led any more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who are already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.

Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders of the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest heavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the middle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are never transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are men transferred to the angelic orders.

Objection 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels, as to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like; which do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore they are not transferred to the angelic orders.

Objection 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons to what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men are changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in Matt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will be transferred to the orders of angels.

On the contrary, The Lord says of the saints that, “they will be as the angels of God” (Mat. 22:30). I answer that, As above explained ([879]AA[4],7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to the conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace. Considered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be assumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will always remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men can in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this is erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying that the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in heaven (Lk. 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material part of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which depends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature. Therefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree as to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this implies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some, however, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic orders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will constitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole society of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), that “there will not be two societies of men and angels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to God alone.”

Reply to Objection 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their natural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above explained [880](A[4]; [881]Q[62], A[6]). So, as the inferior angels cannot be transferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be transferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to the grade of grace, but not of nature.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between us and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human affairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But holy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves; and hence according to the common law they do not administer human affairs, “nor do they interfere in the things of the living,” as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain special dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to exercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons, or by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro mortuis xvi).

Reply to Objection 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to the penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons are nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom rejects.

THE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?

(2) Whether among them there is precedence?

(3) Whether one enlightens another?

(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?

Whether there are orders among the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons. For order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine says (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to evil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore in the bad angels there are no orders.

Objection 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy. But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy principality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.

Objection 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic orders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said to belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem necessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we never find that they are called “Seraphim,” or “Thrones,” or “Dominations.” Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed in any other order.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): “Our wrestling . . . is against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness.”

I answer that, As explained above ([882]Q[108], AA[4],7,8), order in the angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and according to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the imperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of consummate glory.

If therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the perfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders, and never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect grace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of angels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above ([883]Q[62], A[3]), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we consider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in those orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Reply to Objection 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist without good ([884]Q[49], A[3]); so there is order in the demons, as possessing a good nature.

Reply to Objection 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part of God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for Himself; but on the part of the demons’ will it is not a sacred thing, because they abuse their nature for evil.

Reply to Objection 3: The name “Seraphim” is given from the ardor of charity; and the name “Thrones” from the Divine indwelling; and the name “Dominations” imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to sin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.

Whether among the demons there is precedence?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the demons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice. But the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no precedence among them.

Objection 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and subjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which is not to be found among the demons, according to the text, “Among the proud there are always contentions" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

Objection 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according to nature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not according to their nature, for subjection and service do not come from nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin or punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have sinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior. Therefore there is no precedence among the demons.

On the contrary, On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: "While the world lasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over demons."

I answer that, Since action follows the nature of a thing, where natures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each other. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by natural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and movements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly bodies. Now it is plain from what we have said [885](A[1]), that the demons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions are subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we mean by precedence—that the action of the subject should be under the action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the demons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees too with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which "reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1).

Reply to Objection 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on their justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.

Reply to Objection 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey others, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common wickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For it belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom they see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.

Reply to Objection 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among them there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with men, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the superior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their detriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to unhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.

Whether there is enlightenment in the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For enlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can manifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural knowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

Objection 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body deficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior demons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it seems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.

On the contrary, Enlightenment is not without cleansing and perfecting, as stated above ([886]Q[106], A[1]). But to cleanse does not befit the demons, according to the words: “What can be made clean by the unclean?” (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.

I answer that, There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among the demons. For, as above explained ([887]Q[107], A[2]), enlightenment properly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to God, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of the truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to another. Now the demon’s perversity does not lead one to order another to God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one demon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental concept to another by way of speech.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is enlightenment, but only that which is above described.

Reply to Objection 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there is no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or in the demons, because, as above explained ([888]Q[55], A[2]; [889]Q[58], A[2]; [890]Q[79], A[2]), they know from the first all that belongs to their natural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the superior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.

Whether the good angels have precedence over the bad angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence over the bad angels. For the angels’ precedence is especially connected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are not enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not rule over the bad.

Objection 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence for the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil. Therefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that negligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be admitted.

Objection 3: Further, the angels’ precedence follows upon the order of nature, as above explained [891](A[2]). But if the demons fell from every order, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many good angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no precedence over all the bad angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that “the treacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life”; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that “the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile powers.”

I answer that, The whole order of precedence is first and originally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they are the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect and nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest perfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the creatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the demons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence over the bad, and these are ruled by them.

Reply to Objection 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known by the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice requires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or for the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge’s assessors make known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if compared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment, forasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on the part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the fulfilment of their own wickedness.

Reply to Objection 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom. Hence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels or men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good angels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides over demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the power of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger than the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, “the spiritual man judgeth all things” (1 Cor. 2:15), and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that “the virtuous man is the rule and measure of all human acts.”

HOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?

(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies locally?

(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?

Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal things have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed upon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.

Objection 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But some corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior. Therefore they need not be governed by the angels.

Objection 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished by different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the angels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species of things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there are species of things; which is against what is laid down above ([892]Q[108], A[2]). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by angels.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that “all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life”; and Gregory says (Dial. iv, 6), that “in this visible world nothing takes place without the agency of the invisible creature."

I answer that, It is generally found both in human affairs and in natural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by the universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed by the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above ([893]Q[55], A[3] ; [894]Q[108], A[1]), the superior angels who preside over the inferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that the power of any individual body is more particular than the power of any spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form individualized by matter, and determined to the "here and now"; whereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as the inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by the superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This is not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all philosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.

Reply to Objection 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they exercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it belongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature must be moved by a spiritual creature.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of Aristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to assign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly bodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances with immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human souls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations were exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for which the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we assert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the natural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly bodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert that the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the heavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about immaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances were types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more universal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances preside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over different bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are not the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more universal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate presiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the heavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed with Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside immediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as Plato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are derived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato because he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all inferior bodies, which he called the “active intelligence.”

The holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual substances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): “Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power placed over it”; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): “The devil was one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial order”; and Origen says on the text, “When the ass saw the angel” (Num. 22:23), that “the world has need of angels who preside over beasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and over the increase of all other things” (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason of this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature to preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even the least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of corporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine wisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does it follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as above expounded ([895]Q[108], A[2]), the orders are distinguished by their general offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose proper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of the “powers”; so to the order of the “virtues” do those angels seem to belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their ministration miracles are sometimes performed.

Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.

Objection 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.

Objection 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above [896](A[1]), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner’s] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.

On the contrary, Augustine says “It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone.”

I answer that, The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the “intellect”; and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made “per se,” so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the “composite”: for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence.

Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole “composite” as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.

Reply to Objection 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul’s concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.

Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel’s will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.

Whether bodies obey the angels as regards local motion?

Objection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local motion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms. But the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated above [897] (A[2]). Therefore neither can they cause in them local motion.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local motion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause other movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither can they cause local motion.

Objection 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul as regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of life. In natural bodies, however, there is not vital principle. Therefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels use corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do this without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in local motion.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): “Divine wisdom has joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second.” Hence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in conjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the spiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect is local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The reason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in potentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something extrinsic—that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as regards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme bodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see that the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.

Reply to Objection 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those which result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the sea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from the influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result from the power of spiritual substances.

Reply to Objection 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first motion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing corporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire to soften iron.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power of the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the body united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move other things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence it can move locally bodies not joined to it.

Whether angels can work miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): "Those spirits are called virtues by whom signs and miracles are usually done."

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that "magicians work miracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad Christians by the signs of public justice." But magicians work miracles because they are "heard by the demons," as he says elsewhere in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work miracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine] that "it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen may be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our atmosphere." But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside the order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for instance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of nature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.

Objection 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an inferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel. Therefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents; which is to work miracles.

On the contrary, It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): "Who alone doth great wonders."

I answer that, A miracle properly so called is when something is done outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle if something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for otherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards, as such a thing is outside the order of the stone’s nature. So for a miracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created nature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any other creature does by its own power, is according to the order of created nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can work miracles.

Reply to Objection 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because God works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are said to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in the miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the general resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.

Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those things which are done outside the order of the whole created nature. But as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows that when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a power unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So when the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things are called “miracles” not in an absolute sense, but in reference to ourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the demons; and these are said to be done by “private contracts,” forasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be compared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a magician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it were by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in the whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good Christians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said to work miracles by “public justice”: but bad Christians by the “signs of public justice,” as by invoking the name of Christ, or by making use of other sacred signs.

Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside the whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above explained.

THE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire: (1) How far they can change them by their own natural power; (2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men; (3) How they guard and protect men.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?

(2) Whether he can change man's will?

(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?

(4) Whether he can change man's senses?

Whether an angel can enlighten man?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For man is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii) attributes enlightenment to baptism, as "the sacrament of faith." But faith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the gift of God." Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but immediately by God.

Objection 2: Further, on the words, "God hath manifested it to them" (Rom. 1:19), the gloss observes that "not only natural reason availed for the manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them by His work," that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from God—that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God enlightens man immediately.

Objection 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being enlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels. Therefore he is not enlightened by them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the revelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the angels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated ([898]Q[106], A[1]; [899]Q[107], A[2]). Therefore men are enlightened by the angels.

I answer that, Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that lower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above ([900]Q[109], A[2]); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the superior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by them.

The modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way alike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above ([901]Q[106], A[1]), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has two functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is strengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according as the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are proposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes place in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal concept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel, as explained above ([902]Q[106], A[1]).

The human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself unveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, as above explained ([903]Q[84], A[7]). So the angels propose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of sensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), that, “It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise than shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils.” On the other hand, the human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of the angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an angel.

Reply to Objection 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first, the habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will tending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of faith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will; hence Augustine says, “No one believes except willingly.” In this respect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that what is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is accomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, “Faith cometh by hearing”; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things are revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the enlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels not only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what is to be done.

Reply to Objection 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be strengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the human intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth can be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is assisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more perfect knowledge of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be understood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood; thus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands or is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to him. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not follow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is, which is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner not everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is enlightened by him.

Whether the angels can change the will of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of man. For, upon the text, “Who maketh His angels spirits and His ministers a flame of fire” (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that “they are fire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices.” This could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore the angels can change the will.

Objection 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, “the devil does not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them.” Damascene, however, says that he also sends them; for he remarks that “every malicious act and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men” (De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce and kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the will. Therefore the will is changed by them.

Objection 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human intellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which serves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive appetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a corporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can he change the will.

On the contrary, To change the will belongs to God alone, according to Prov. 21:1: “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord, whithersoever He will He shall turn it.”

I answer that, The will can be changed in two ways. First, from within; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but the inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus change the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to the intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God alone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from God alone, Who causes the will.

Secondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this can be only in one way—by the good apprehended by the intellect. Hence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended as an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also God alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move the will by way of persuasion, as above explained ([904]Q[106], A[2]).

In addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in another way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive appetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will something. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these passions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will ever remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who act as God’s ministers, either men or angels, are said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of persuasion.

Reply to Objection 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing them from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject to the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of thoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the things thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions. Damascene calls this kindling “a putting in” because such a work is accomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher principle, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry of the angels.

Reply to Objection 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand only by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will something following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of the sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.

Whether an angel can change man’s imagination?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man’s imagination. For the phantasy, as is said De Anima iii, is “a motion caused by the sense in act.” But if this motion were caused by an angel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the imaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.

Objection 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual, they are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an angel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter ([905]Q[110], A[2]). Therefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he cannot change it.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): “One spirit by intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the other spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands it himself, or accepts it as understood by the other.” But it does not seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor that the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore it seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.

Objection 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the similitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this there is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of deception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by changing the imagination.

On the contrary, Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by imaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as appears from Mat. 1:20;[2]:13,[19] in regard to the angel who appeared to Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.

I answer that, Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above ([906]Q[110], A[3]), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be caused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural power of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions are sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits and humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis iii.], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that “when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and movements descend with it,” that is, the impressions left from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, “and move the sensitive principle”; so that a certain appearance ensues, as if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external objects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors may be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are awake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by a natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will of man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so also the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel, sometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without such alienation.

Reply to Objection 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the sense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by the senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot imagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in such a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the impressions preserved within.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the impression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from the senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but by local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human imagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect which he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that he shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.

Reply to Objection 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes enlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what these images signify; and then there is not deception. But sometimes by the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the imagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but by the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus neither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to the people in parables, which He did not explain to them.

Whether an angel can change the human senses?

Objection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses. For the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an operation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the sensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.

Objection 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the nutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other natural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.

Objection 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible objects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature ([907]Q[110], A[4]). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are changed always by the sensible object.

On the contrary, The angels who overturned Sodom, “struck the people of Sodom with blindness or {aorasia}, so that they could not find the door” (Gn. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the only two passages in the Greek version where the word {aorasia} appears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of Sodom—namely, dazzling (French version, “eblouissement”), which the Latin “caecitas” (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is recorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings 6:18).

I answer that, The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from without, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within, for we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors are disturbed; as for example, a sick man’s tongue, charged with choleric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the other senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change in the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible object from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as when he assumes a body, as we have said above ([908]Q[51], A[2]). Likewise he can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked, whereby the senses are changed in various ways.

Reply to Objection 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be without the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this interior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior principle, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an angel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive power, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any other power using a corporeal organ.

Reply to Objection 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of creatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since he is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel can work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.

THE MISSION OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?

(2) Whether all are sent?

(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?

(4) From what orders they are sent.

Whether the angels are sent on works of ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of ministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But intellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect abstracts from the "here" and "now." Since therefore the angelic actions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to perform their own actions.

Objection 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the angelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it seems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is unseemly.

Objection 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of wisdom; hence it is said: "He that is less in action, shall receive wisdom" (Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external ministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation. But the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of God. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which is unfitting.

Objection 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is written (Lk. 22:27): "Which is the greater, he that sitteth at table, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?" But the angels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent to administer to us.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:20): "Behold I will send My angels who shall go before thee."

I answer that, From what has been said above ([909]Q[108], A[6]), it may be shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we have already stated ([910]Q[43], A[1]), in treating of the mission of the Divine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from another so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another way, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to be sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in a new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by the presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present everywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power reaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things ([911]Q[8], A[1]). An angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to the whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to reach another; and so he is "here" in such a manner as not to be "there." But it is clear from what was above stated ([912]Q[110], A[1]), that the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence, whenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal creature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power; and in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place by Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.

Yet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God as from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the angels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is what is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent instrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action is ordered to another. Hence angels' actions are called 'ministries'; and for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.

Reply to Objection 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one way, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an operation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "Even we ourselves as mentally tasting something eternal, are not in this world." In another sense an action is said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by some intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently have sometimes a determinate place.

Reply to Objection 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by way of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body should be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above bodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean heaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of his dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when not actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.

Reply to Objection 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by exterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the sensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the action of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary, regulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence it follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his contemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule and the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that “the angels do not go abroad in such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation.”

Reply to Objection 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister to God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them, absolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by cleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior to every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): “Esteeming others better than themselves.”

Whether all the angels are sent in ministry?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry. For the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): “All are ministering spirits, sent to minister” [Vulg. ‘Are they not all . . . ?’].

Objection 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the Seraphim, as stated above ([913]Q[108], A[6]). But a Seraph was sent to purify the lips of the prophet (Is. 6:6,7). Therefore much more are the inferior orders sent.

Objection 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic orders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even the highest angels sent.

Objection 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external ministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the Divine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the angels are unequal, as stated above ([914]Q[50], A[4]), each angel has an angel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the last angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words, “Thousands of thousands ministered to Him” (Dan. 7:10).

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the statement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that “the higher ranks fulfil no exterior service.”

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([915]Q[106], A[3]; [916]Q[110], A[1]), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not only among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior things are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation, however, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal things, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is suitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was enlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished immediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies. Moreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these bodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of the clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can anyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without the help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior. From this standpoint some have said that according to the general law the superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that sometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.

It may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is greater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law; in order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old law. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides those who were sent to give the law.

Reply to Objection 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet’s lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a “Seraph,” that is, “kindling “ in an equivocal sense, because he came to “kindle” the lips of the prophet. It may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own proper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of the inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as purifying by fire the prophet’s lips, not as if he did so immediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as the Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means of someone else.

Reply to Objection 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are said to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been said

([917]Q[43], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence there is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent immediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior are sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior ministries.

Whether all the angels who are sent, assist?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist. For Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): “So the angels are sent, and assist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme Spirit, God, is not limited.”

Objection 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he said, “I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the Lord” (Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.

Objection 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet Satan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: “When the sons of God came to stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them.” Therefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.

Objection 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is because they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but through the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine enlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all. Therefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to the text of Dan. 7:10: “Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood before Him.” Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.

On the contrary, Gregory says, on Job 25:3: “Is there any numbering of His soldiers?” (Moral. xvii): “Those powers assist, who do not go forth as messengers to men.” Therefore those who are sent in ministry do not assist.

I answer that, The angels are spoken of as “assisting” and “administering,” after the likeness of those who attend upon a king; some of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately; while others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by those who are in attendance—for instance, those who are placed at the head of the administration of various cities; these are said to administer, not to assist.

We must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine Essence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister, are said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that “those who are sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist and see the face of the Father.” Yet not all the angels can perceive the secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the Divine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the inferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to the highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative it is to be enlightened immediately by God.

From this may be deduced the reply to the first and second objections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.

Reply to Objection 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as present among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii), “though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to the angels.”

Reply to Objection 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in the glory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the prerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately enlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is seen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among those who assist the king, one knows more of the king’s secrets than another.

Whether all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister, according to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do not assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first hierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that “there are more who minister than who assist.” This would not be the case if the angels of the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the angels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the “Dominations are above all subjection.” But to be sent implies subjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.

I answer that, As above stated [918](A[1]), to be sent to external ministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine command in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the execution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are manifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and therefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry whose names signify some kind of administration. But the name “dominations” does not signify any such administration, but only disposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the names of the inferior orders imply administration, for the “Angels” and “Archangels” are so called from “announcing”; the “Virtues” and “Powers” are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that the “Prince,” according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), “be first among the workers.” Hence it belongs to these five orders to be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.

Reply to Objection 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering angels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to be done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the production of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are to do.

Reply to Objection 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number of the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those who minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he takes the words (Dan. 7:10) “thousands of thousands ministered to Him,” not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean “thousands out of thousands”; thus the number of those who minister is indefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is finite as in the words added, “and ten thousand times a hundred thousand assisted Him.” This explanation rests on the opinion of the Platonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first principle, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is to unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified as regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.

Dionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of angels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the superior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable degree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal natures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and more multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the ministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way, the words “thousands of thousands” are taken by way of multiplication, to signify “a thousand times a thousand.” And because ten times a hundred is a thousand, if it were said “ten times a hundred thousand” it would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but since it is written “ten thousand times a hundred thousand,” we are given to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than the ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise number of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it exceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the multiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a hundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and their warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight points of inquiry arise:
(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?

(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?

(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of angels?

(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?

(5) When does an angel’s guardianship of a man begin?

(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?

(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?

(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their guardianship?

Whether men are guarded by the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels. For guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how, or are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But man is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his natural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an angel.

Objection 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But men are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: “He shall neither slumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel.” Therefore man does not need to be guarded by an angel.

Objection 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence of the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: “Keep this man; and if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life” (3 Kings 20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the angels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some such-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are given to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore the angels are not the guardians of men.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 90:11): “He hath given His angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways.”

I answer that, According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find that in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated by the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable spiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which are invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as regards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the principles which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover manifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and affection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was necessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men, in order to regulate them and move them to good.

Reply to Objection 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree, but not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in affection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the soul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by nature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but not in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the universal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be deficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.” Thus man needs to be guarded by the angels.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that the affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the habit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the proper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the Philosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first, God guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as regards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose precepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated ([919]Q[111], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is not to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice of men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the ordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as likewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.

Whether each man is guarded by an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel. For an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard many men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.

Objection 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the medium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But as all the angels are unequal ([920]Q[50], A[4]), there is only one angel between whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one angel who immediately keeps men.

Objection 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater offices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than another; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all the angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different angels.

On the contrary, On the text, “Their angels in heaven,” etc. (Mat. 8:10), Jerome says: “Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to have an angel deputed to guard it from its birth.”

I answer that, Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him. This rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to the execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God’s providence acts differently as regards men and as regards other corruptible creatures, for they are related differently to incorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common species, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are the rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible things. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly exercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things which pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their existence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of God is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of things corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), the different orders are deputed to the different "genera" of things, for instance, the "Powers" to coerce the demons, the "Virtues" to work miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the different species are presided over by different angels of the same order. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels are appointed to the guardianship of different men.

Reply to Objection 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons: first, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one guardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one. Secondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man is appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to provide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community, such as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to others. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards invisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in his own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard individual men.

Reply to Objection 2: As above stated ([921]Q[112], A[3], ad 4), all the angels of the first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God directly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly enlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the same also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is enlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other respects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that some one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels beneath him whom he enlightens.

Reply to Objection 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality exists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the greater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,12: "With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified their ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of them hath He cursed and brought low.” Thus it is a greater office to guard one man than another.

Whether to guard men belongs only to the lowest order of angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not belong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says that the text (Mat. 18:10), “Their angels in heaven,” etc. is to be understood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the superior angels guard men.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels “are sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation” (Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is directed to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in external ministry ([922]Q[112], A[4]). Therefore all the angels of the five orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.

Objection 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially necessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the Powers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work miracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are also deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest order.

On the contrary, In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is attributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).

I answer that, As above stated [923](A[2]), man is guarded in two ways; in one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an angel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the lowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory, to announce the “lesser things”; for it seems to be the least of the angelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one man. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied according to the different orders. For the more universal an agent is, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs to the order of “Principalities,” or perhaps to the “Archangels,” whom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an archangel, is also styled “one of the princes” (Dan. 10:13). Moreover all corporeal creatures are guarded by the “Virtues”; and likewise the demons by the “Powers,” and the good spirits by the “Principalities,” according to Gregory’s opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the lowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in each order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however, probable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by God for the higher degree of glory.

Reply to Objection 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of individual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship, greater or less, as above explained.

Reply to Objection 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the superior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the superiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order can coerce the demons, and work miracles.

Whether angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that "He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man." If therefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ also would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for Christ is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Objection 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not fitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state of innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore angels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.

Objection 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men, that they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life, encourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults of the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain to eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good works, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention: for "faith directs the intention" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 31). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be "according to the working of Satan," as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels are not deputed to the guardianship of all men.

On the contrary, is the authority of Jerome quoted above [924](A[2]), for he says that “each soul has an angel appointed to guard it.”

I answer that, Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on a road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is threatened by many dangers both from within and from without, according to Ps. 159:4: “In this way wherein I walked, they have hidden a snare for me.” And therefore as guardians are appointed for men who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is assigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he arrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in the kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon to punish him.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of God: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards His soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible body, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He should have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a ministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Mat. 4:11) that “angels came and ministered to Him.”

Reply to Objection 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened by any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as we have said above ([925]Q[95], AA[1],3). But peril threatened from without on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the event. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even Antichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason; so neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to the whole human race—namely the guardianship of the angels. And although the help which they receive therefrom does not result in their deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless conduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt both themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the good angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner Antichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.

Whether an angel is appointed to guard a man from his birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard a man from his birth. For angels are “sent to minister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation,” as the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation, when they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a man from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.

Objection 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels enlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of instruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of reason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as soon as they are born.

Objection 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before birth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is appointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then admitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.

On the contrary, Jerome says (vide A, 4) that “each soul has an angel appointed to guard it from its birth.”

I answer that, as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there are two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel guardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is appointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves (vide A, 4), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred by God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as receiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred by God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth, for then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter benefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said above ([926]AA[1],4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man has an angel guardian appointed to him.

Reply to Objection 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously indeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if we consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the realizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic ministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so efficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless, they are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.

Reply to Objection 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by instruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it has many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to ward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.

Reply to Objection 3: As long as the child is in the mother’s womb it is not entirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still part of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of the tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of probability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child while in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from the mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above quoted, says.

Whether the angel guardian ever forsakes a man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in the person of the angels: “We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her.” And (Is. 5:5) it is written: “I will take away the hedge”—that is, “the guardianship of the angels” [gloss]—“and it shall be wasted.”

Objection 2: Further, God’s guardianship excels that of the angels. But God forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: “O God, my God, look upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?” Much rather therefore does an angel guardian forsake man.

Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), “When the angels are here with us, they are not in heaven.” But sometimes they are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.

On the contrary, The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1 Pet. 5:8: “Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour.” Much more therefore do the good angels ever guard us.

I answer that, As appears above [927](A[2]), the guardianship of the angels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is evident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn from the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all being. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering of His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some defect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that the angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he leaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him from being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin, according to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon and the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels, because their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject to tribulation.

From this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.

Reply to Objection 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally, he does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his guardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is happening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he can be with man in an instant.

Whether angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard?

Objection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard. For it is written (Is. 33:7): “The angels of peace shall weep bitterly.” But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow. Therefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), “sorrow is for those things that happen against our will.” But the loss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel’s will. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.

Objection 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary to sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are told, Lk. 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls into sin.

Objection 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: “Whatsoever first-fruits they offer,” etc. the gloss of Origen says: “The angels are brought to judgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or through their own fault.” But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve for the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels grieve for men’s sins.

On the contrary, Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not perfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): “Death shall be no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow.” But the angels are perfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.

I answer that, Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the pains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our will. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the angels and the other blessed, because they will cleaves entirely to the ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world save what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore simply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the blessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called simply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a particular time, having considered all the circumstances; although universally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the sailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea, considered universally and absolutely, but on account of the threatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is voluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage. Therefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will sin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the fulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in respect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall into sin.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels, i.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of Rabsaces, as related Is. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal sense. According to the allegorical sense the “angels of peace” are the apostles and preachers who weep for men’s sins. If according to the anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels, then the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally speaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense we attribute passions to God and the angels.

The reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: Both in man’s repentance and in man’s sin there is one reason for the angel’s joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of the Divine Providence.

Reply to Objection 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of men, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.

Whether there can be strife or discord among the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be strife or discord among the angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): “Who maketh peace in His high places.”

But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high angels there is no strife.

Objection 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just authority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the angels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.

Objection 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they guard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the opposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in the wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder of wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good angels.

On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 10:13): “The prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days.” But this prince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of the kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the others; and thus there is strife among them.

I answer that, The raising of this question is occasioned by this passage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the kingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of the people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being offered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been caused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in Persia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the prayer which Daniel put up for that same people.

But according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of Persia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom. To see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must note that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and various men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the angels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in various kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits, so that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what is the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot know it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult Divine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the Divine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are said to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition, since they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine decree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in opposition.

From this the answers to the objections are clear.

OF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?

(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or temptations of the demons?

(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading men astray?

(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from making further assaults?

Whether men are assailed by the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons. For angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by God: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is the salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail man.

Objection 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set against the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are weak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not therefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men should be assailed by demons.

Objection 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are enough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed that they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be assailed by the demons.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): "Our wrestling is not against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the high places."

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the assault of the demons—the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault itself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor to hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of Divine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the angels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation. But the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make orderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in regard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering thereof are to be referred to God as their first author.

Reply to Objection 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by instigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail us, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just judgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and thus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish Achab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment is referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who are sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which they are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are sent by God on account of His justice.

Reply to Objection 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the guardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to his servant: "Fear not, for there are more with us than with them."

Reply to Objection 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice for the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the demon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men. But by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.

Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil. For God is said to tempt, according to Gn. 22:1, "God tempted Abraham." Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again, man is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not proper to the devil to tempt.

Objection 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know what happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.

Objection 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the will. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears from what has been said above ([928]Q[111], A[2]), it seems that it is not in their province to tempt.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): "Lest perhaps he that tempteth should have tempted you": to which the gloss adds, "that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt."

I answer that, To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of something. Now we make trial of something in order to know something about it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But sometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired through that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires to know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or virtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge is sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.

From this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in various ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for the sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to tempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an experiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help, sometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in order to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be his proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he does this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may know, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to know. Hence it is written (Dt. 13:3): "The Lord your God trieth you, that it may appear whether you love him."

The flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or matter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man someone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the flesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity: of which things the devil also makes use in tempting.

Thus the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but the inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the “weigher of spirits” (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more prone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order to explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him to that vice to which he is most prone.

Reply to Objection 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated above ([929]Q[111], A[3]), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a certain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it can nevertheless be inclined.

Whether all sins are due to the temptation of the devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of the devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the multitude of demons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others.” And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that “all malice and all uncleanness have been devised by the devil.”

Objection 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of the Jews (Jn. 8:44): “You are of your father the devil.” But this was in as far as they sinned through the devil’s instigation. Therefore every sin is due to the devil’s instigation.

Objection 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are deputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the suggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne to us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the instigation of the devil.

On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): “Not all our evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they arise from the movement of our free-will.”

I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another in two ways; directly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of a disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional and indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he who dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we must admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it was who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there resulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this sense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.

But a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its action tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the cause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's instigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of the flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were no devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like pleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those desires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the corruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to curb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need for all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins which are due thereto man perpetrates "through being deceived by the same blandishments as were our first parents," as Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii).

Thus the answer to the first objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated by the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby, in so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot advance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man by the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part in all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the demons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is not sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.

Whether demons can lead men astray by means of real miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by means of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show itself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9), his "coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders." Much more therefore at other times do the demons perform lying wonders.

Objection 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change. But demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): "I cannot believe that the human body can receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power." Therefore the demons cannot work real miracles.

Objection 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If therefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of what is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the faith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): “The Lord working withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.”

On the contrary, Augustine says [930](Q[83]; [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): “Often by means of the magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by the servants of God.”

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said above ([931]Q[110], A[4]), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot work miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the strict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the entire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is contained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for whatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can work miracles, that is, things which rouse man’s astonishment, by reason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of knowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and knowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so that in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.

It is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which appear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes nevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the demons’ power produced real serpents and frogs. And “when fire came down from heaven and at one blow consumed Job’s servants and sheep; when the storm struck down his house and with it his children—these were the work of Satan, not phantoms”; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 19).

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of Antichrist may be called lying wonders, “either because he will deceive men’s senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really do what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies, they will lead those into falsehood who believe in him.”

Reply to Objection 2: As we have said above ([932]Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter does not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons be able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another; but they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the world, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation of corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers, to which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be produced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these seeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or frogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those transformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature, cannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for instance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or that the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something of this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is not real but a mere semblance of reality.

Now this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a demon can work on man’s imagination and even on his corporeal senses, so that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above ([933]Q[111], AA[3],4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by the power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he can from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so as to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any corporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein. This is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): “Man’s imagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of an innumerable number of things, appears to other men’s senses, as it were embodied in the semblance of some animal.” This not to be understood as though the imagination itself or the images formed therein were identified with that which appears embodied to the senses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a man’s imagination, can offer the same picture to another man’s senses.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): “When magicians do what holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different right. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the glory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by the evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is subject.”

Whether a demon who is overcome by man, is for this reason hindered from making further assaults?

Objection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is not for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ overcame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon assailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is not true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.

Objection 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted in a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not befitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not prevented from further assaults.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:11): "Then the devil left Him," i.e. Christ Who overcame.

I answer that, Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he can no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any other sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same man. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so for a certain definite time: wherefore (Lk. 4:13) it is written: "All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time." There are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency; for as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus Imperfectum, among his supposititious works], "the devil does not tempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God allows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He orders him off on account of our weakness." The other reason is taken from the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13: "The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from frequent defeat." That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return to the assault, is apparent from Mat. 12:44: "I will return into my house from whence I came out."

From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.

OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal actions there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a body can be active?

(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?

(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here by the inferior bodies?

(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?

(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?

(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things which are subject to their influence?

Whether a body can be active?

Objection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 9): “There are things that are acted upon, but do not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted upon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon; these are the spiritual substances.”

Objection 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its work a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance below the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the latter’s action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings. Therefore corporeal substance is not active.

Objection 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity. But quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it surrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from receiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in quantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore no corporeal substance is active.

Objection 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to its propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most composite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most simple. Therefore no bodies are active.

Objection 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is either a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a substantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any principle of action, save an active quality, which is an accident; and an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the cause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is it an accidental form, for “an accident does not extend beyond its subject,” as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are active.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other qualities of corporeal fire, “it shows its greatness in its action and power on that of which it lays hold.”

I answer that, It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are active. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three errors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of Avicebron in his book on The Fount of Life, where, by the arguments mentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that all the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the actions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that, according to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power which penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be derived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in corporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited thereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were universal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes of forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which is in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by quantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and imprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to be unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the spiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by quantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.

But this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is participated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is proper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is the participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else than to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act as such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the fact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and universal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it owes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form of fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a fashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is in this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes from this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the contact of two bodies.

But this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For Plato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred accidents to the material principles which are “the great” and “the small,” which he considered to be the first contraries, by others considered to the “the rare” and “the dense.” Consequently both Plato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that corporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing matter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection attained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the action of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of the creation ([934]Q[45], A[8]).

The third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while passion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the passive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole, and the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its action; which things are manifestly untrue.

We must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on a body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.

Reply to Objection 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the whole corporeal nature considered as a whole, while thus has no nature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature acts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created. Nevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to that which the other has in act.

From this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must be observed, when Avicebron argues thus, “There is a mover who is not moved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand, there exists something moved which is purely passive,” that this is to be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure potentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of potentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.

Reply to Objection 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form from action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent, forasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject to quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the purpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight; as is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that weight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto. Thirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as Democritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to act.

Reply to Objection 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for it participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being, forasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is primary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure potentiality.

Reply to Objection 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form and a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat, although itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the substantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can terminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument of the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh. But by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the nature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to surpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an accident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient; thus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.

Whether there are any seminal virtues in corporeal matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter. For virtue [ratio] implies something of a spiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually, but only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which it is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8,9) says that demons produce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain seeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues, can be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Objection 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active principles in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter is not competent to act (A[1], ad 2,4). Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

Objection 4: Further, there are said to be certain "causal virtues" (Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the production of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for miracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal virtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "Of all the things which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion, certain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world."

I answer that, It is customary to name things after what is more perfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole corporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the word "nature" has been transferred from living things to all natural things. For the word itself, "nature," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation of living things, which is called "nativity": and because living things are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a tree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united, consequently the word "nature" has been applied to every principle of movement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the active and passive principles of the generation of living things are the seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine fittingly gave the name of "seminal virtues" [seminales rationes] to all those active and passive virtues which are the principles of natural generation and movement.

These active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders. For in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they are principally and originally in the Word of God, as "typal ideas." Secondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were produced altogether at the beginning, as in "universal causes." Thirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time, are produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in that animal, as in "particular causes." Fourthly, they are in the "seeds" produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared to further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to the first effects produced.

Reply to Objection 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things, thought not called "virtues" [rationes] by reason of their being in corporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their origin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes ideales].

Reply to Objection 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts of corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement for the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as employing seeds.

Reply to Objection 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the generation of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the female contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word "seed" covers both active and passive principles.

Reply to Objection 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these seminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal virtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii, 9) that, "as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is the world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things." Nevertheless, the "typal ideas" can be called "causal virtues," but not, strictly speaking, "seminal virtues," because seed is not a separate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the scope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought outside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the creature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God commands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of the natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are ordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we say that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.

Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of what is produced in bodies here below?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7): "We say that they"—namely, the heavenly bodies—"are not the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of storms and atmospheric changes."

Objection 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there are contrary agents—heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no need to ascribe causality to the heavenly bodies.

Objection 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be observed that everything which is produced here below is produced through the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other such qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): “Nothing is more corporeal than sex.” But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a sign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one may be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not the cause of things produced in bodies here below.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): “Bodies of a grosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of a more subtle and powerful nature.” And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that “the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible bodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and perfection.”

I answer that, Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since what is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is moved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the whole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore the more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of those things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of all bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally. Therefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and multiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies, as to their cause.

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as denying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation and corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held that the heavenly bodies are gods.

Reply to Objection 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the active qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like. If therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not diversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles of which the early natural philosophers held to be the "rare" and the "dense"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these inferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act. But to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those accidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the substantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself sufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some active principle above these material dispositions.

This is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate species, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their substantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate species, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have the same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly false.

Therefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10), to suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or absence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior bodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates here below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument of a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that "man and the sun generate man."

Reply to Objection 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the bodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of their universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is contained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like God.

Reply to Objection 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received in inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter. Now it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is not wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes into a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an argument against divination by stars: because the effects of the stars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various dispositions of matter.

Whether the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances, as stated above ([935]Q[110], A[3]), they act by virtue thereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are superior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause impressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.

Objection 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle. But human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that they are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to their principles.

Objection 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the outcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and will are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the heavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions. Therefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that “the heavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions.”

I answer that, The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves act on bodies, as stated above [936](A[3]). They can act directly indeed on those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs, but accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be hindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot see well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to corporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not differ from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly bodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow that man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other animals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed to corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the action of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore follow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate actions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false, and contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that indirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can reach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and will receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to corporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently situated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior apprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or memorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of necessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of necessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for although the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a certain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains the power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the impressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior powers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the proximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.

To maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ from sense. Wherefore some of these said that “such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on” (Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect and will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that heavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.

Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly bodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly bodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by enlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will, as stated above ([937]Q[111], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is reducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause: so the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the will is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect and will.

Reply to Objection 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are movements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the heavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist these passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the truth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not in particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions by his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to say that “the wise man is stronger than the stars” [*Ptolemy, Centiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.

Whether heavenly bodies can act on the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons. For the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass men, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Mat. 4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the heavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.

Objection 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order to invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the heavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are subject to them.

Objection 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior bodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies, namely, "herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words, forms and figures," as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

On the contrary, The demons are superior in the order of nature, to the heavenly bodies. But the "agent is superior to the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies.

I answer that, There have been three opinions about the demons. In the first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and held that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the necromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies. This is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been held by Porphyry, namely, that "on earth men fabricate certain powers useful in producing certain effects of the stars." But this opinion is manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are done by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no way suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should speak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no previous knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move, and other like things.

For this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are "animals with an aerial body and a passive soul," as Apuleius says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of the opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said that demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have said man is subject thereto [938](A[4]). But this opinion is proved to be false from what we have said above ([939]Q[51], A[1]): for we hold that demons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is clear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither essentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.

Reply to Objection 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases of the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to “defame God’s creature,” namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv, 24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as they are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural forces, as stated above ([940]Q[114], A[4], ad 2) they take into account the aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest that “the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body,” as Aristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De Somn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action of the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it is precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man’s imagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.

Reply to Objection 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations, come for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error of believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly, because they consider that under certain constellations corporeal matter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the “demons are enticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by signs”; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them in token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.

Whether heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action?

Objection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on things subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the effect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient cause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their movements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their effects follow of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, an agent’s effect results of necessity in matter, when the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to itself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject to the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than theirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity received in corporeal matter.

Objection 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow of necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal cause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must of necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the heavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below. Therefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it follows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered. Consequently it would follow that all that takes place here below happens of necessity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divin. per Somn. ii]): “It is not incongruous that many of the signs observed in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and wind, should not be fulfilled.” Therefore not all the effects of heavenly bodies take place of necessity.

I answer that, This question is partly solved by what was said above [941](A[4]); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown that although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain inclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of necessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of the will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which human action extends.

But in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with freedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by heavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least, everything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some of the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause; and that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded that all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by Aristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.

For in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever, the effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered to their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the majority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But that such cases do fail in the minority of cases is due to some hindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems not to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of necessity.

Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being “per se,” has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one. For (that a thing is) “white” has a cause, likewise (that a man is) “musical” has not a cause, but (that a being is) “white-musical” has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it is manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so ordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases, clashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of these two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause. Consequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be reduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of necessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the higher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some heavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some combustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that the burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is not caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not all the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.

Reply to Objection 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take place here below, through the means of particular inferior causes, which can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.

Reply to Objection 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore it requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local distance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect. Therefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body (for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in Ethiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or other such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another cause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless the clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the causality of a heavenly body, as stated above.

ON FATE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Is there such a thing as fate?

(2) Where is it?

(3) Is it unchangeable?

(4) Are all things subject to fate?

Whether there be such a thing as fate?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a homily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): “Far be it from the hearts of the faithful to think that fate is anything real.”

Objection 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), “fate is understood to be derived from the verb ‘fari’ which means to speak”; as though things were said to happen by fate, which are “fore-spoken” by one who decrees them to happen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If therefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance in the world.

On the contrary, What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius (De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: “Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its proper order.”

I answer that, In this world some things seem to happen by luck or chance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or chance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some higher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are sent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two servants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the master, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.

So there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events which by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the existence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De Civ. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about Providence ([942]Q[22], A[2]).

On the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes place here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or in human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the heavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than “a disposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born” [*Cf. St. Augustine De Civ. Dei v, 1,8,9]. But this will not hold. First, as to human affairs: because we have proved above ([943]Q[115], A[4]) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly bodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate, since it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of necessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place. Secondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been said ([944]Q[115], A[6]) that what is accidental, is properly speaking neither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is accidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No natural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man intending to dig a grace finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a heavenly body acts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects in this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active power of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident here below, whether by luck or by chance.

We must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in natural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining cause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which happens by accident being considered as one by an intellect: otherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: “The digger of a grave found a treasure.” And just as an intellect can apprehend this so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place where a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of this, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what happens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some ordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine intellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above ([945]Q[105], A[4]). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of which is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.

So therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to Divine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were “fore-spoken,” we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy doctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted its application to a certain force in the position of the stars. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): “If anyone ascribes human affairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him keep to his opinion, but hold his tongue.” For this reason Gregory denies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection’s solution is manifest.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by chance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to Divine Providence, whereby “nothing happens at random in the world,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).

Whether fate is in created things?

Objection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the “Divine will or power is called fate.” But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but in God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.

Objection 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as their cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal cause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below, is God alone, as stated above [946](A[1]). Therefore fate is in God, and not in creatures.

Objection 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or an accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to the number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things.”

I answer that, As is clear from what has been stated above ([947]Q[22], A[3]; [948]Q[103], A[6]), Divine Providence produces effects through mediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects in two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering of the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering as being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of certain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “Fate is worked out when Divine Providence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by all nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements of the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of the demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is forged.” Of each of these things we have spoken above [949](A[1]; [950]Q[104], A[2]; [951]Q[110], A[1]; [952]Q[113]; [953]Q[114]). It is therefore manifest that fate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the production of their effects.

Reply to Objection 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine (De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the “series of causes,” has not the nature of fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or will can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially fate is the very disposition or “series,” i.e. order, of second causes.

Reply to Objection 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the second causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.

Reply to Objection 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition which is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies order, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be considered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is one. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the mediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote: “Thy fate draws thee.”

Whether fate is unchangeable?

Objection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is to that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so is the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of Providence.”

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): “If we be moved, what is in us is moved.” But fate is a “disposition inherent to changeable things,” as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore fate is changeable.

Objection 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate happens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate seem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no contingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an unchangeable disposition.

I answer that, The disposition of second causes which we call fate, can be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second causes, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to the first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some, therefore, have held that the series itself or dispositions of causes is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of necessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a cause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as proved above ([954]Q[115], A[6]).

Others, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as dependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that fate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says (Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the reason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.

We must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second causes, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it derives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of conditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is true and necessary: “If God foreknew that this would happen, it will happen.” Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is fickle, shortly afterwards adds—“which, since it is derived from an unchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable.”

From this the answers to the objections are clear.

Whether all things are subject to fate?

Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): “The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born into the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of offspring and seed.” Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from the domain of fate.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is something real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the Divine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.

Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate "is a disposition inherent to changeable things." But all creatures are changeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above ([955]Q[9], A[2]). Therefore fate is in all things.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that "some things subject to Providence are above the ordering of fate."

I answer that, As stated above [956](A[2]), fate is the ordering of second causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is subject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is done immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes, neither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification of spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says (De Consol. iv): viz. that "those things which are nigh to God have a state of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate." Hence it is clear that "the further a thing is from the First Mind, the more it is involved in the chain of fate"; since so much the more it is bound up with second causes.

Reply to Objection 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by God by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in the order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as to its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as already stated.

Reply to Objection 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet some of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And these, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of man, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In the first place we shall consider that action (in general) and secondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the first, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his knowledge?

(2) Whether man can teach an angel?

(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?

(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local movement?

Whether one man can teach another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the Lord says (Mat. 22:8): “Be not you called Rabbi”: on which the gloss of Jerome says, “Lest you give to men the honor due to God.” Therefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it belongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is proper to God.

Objection 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as he acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the other. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his like, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an active quality just as heat is.

Objection 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the species of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of these in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause knowledge in another man.

Objection 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple save to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by words or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to cause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are signs either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know. If of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is already in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from the master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can learn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to a man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore in no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): “Whereunto I am appointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth.”

I answer that, On this question there have been various opinions. For Averroes, commenting on De Anima iii, maintains that all men have one passive intellect in common, as stated above ([957]Q[76], A[2]). From this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all men. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have a knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he communicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving him to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be rightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true so far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we consider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective truth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all men have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible species, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is false, as stated above ([958]Q[76], A[2]).

Besides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that our souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through the participation of separate forms, as stated above ([959]Q[84], AA[3],4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body, from the free consideration of those things which it knows. According to this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his master, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to learn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they held that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms, which matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But against this we have proved above ([960]Q[79], A[2]; [961]Q[84], A[3]) that the passive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to intelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).

We must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the teacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from potentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In order to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding from an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle alone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone: whereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle, sometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick man, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art, sometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the force of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed. First, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals a man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused the sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior principle, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with instruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use in producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and employs food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended end.

Now knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as is clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from an exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by instruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of knowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which certain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally understood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone applies these universal principles to certain particular things, the memory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by his own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains knowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches, leads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge of things previously unknown to him; according to what the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 1): “All teaching and all learning proceed from previous knowledge.”

Now the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of the unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him certain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use for the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him certain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the disciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose to him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of opposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the learner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown. Secondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed, by some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above ([962]Q[106], A[1]; [963]Q[111], A[1]) of the angelic enlightenment, because all human intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch as he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to conclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power to be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that “a demonstration is a syllogism that causes knowledge.” In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer to know.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help as the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the principal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the intellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are from God. Therefore as of God is it written: “Who healeth all thy diseases” (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: “He that teacheth man knowledge” (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as “the light of His countenance is signed upon us” (Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown to us.

Reply to Objection 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause knowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause. Wherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the principle by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the principle by which one is directed in working.

Reply to Objection 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the disciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he moves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of his intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are proposed to him from without.

Reply to Objection 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of things known in a general and confused manner; but not known in detail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by himself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own master because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is required in a master.

Whether man can teach the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says (Eph. 3:10): “That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church.” But the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things are made known to angels through men.

Objection 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately concerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as stated above ([964]Q[116], A[1]; [965]Q[112], A[3]). But some men are instructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of

God; as appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1,2: “Last of all, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son.” Therefore some men have been able to teach the angels.

Objection 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior. But some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up to the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be instructed by men concerning Divine things.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine enlightenment to the superior angels, by making their thoughts known to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never enlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same way as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men are subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord’s words (Mat. 11:11): “There hath not risen among them that are born of woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.” Therefore angels are never enlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of speech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it belongs to God alone to know the heart’s secrets.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this passage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: “To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the multiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and powers in the heavenly places—that is, through the Church.” As though he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from the Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and powers who knew it “from all ages, but not before all ages: because the Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this Church composed of men will be gathered together.”

It can also be explained otherwise that “what is hidden, is known by the angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place and is made public,” as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v, 19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled by the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became apparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this way we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad Eph.)—that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned certain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the apostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus by the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which mystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of God, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His human nature. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than certain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have such great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude than that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say that the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree, though actually it is much smaller.

Whether man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): “Saints work miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus Peter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof delivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira.” But in the working of miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men, by the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.

Objection 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): “Who hath bewitched you, that you should not obey the truth?” the gloss says that “some have blazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially children.” But this would not be unless the power of the soul could change corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by the power of his soul.

Objection 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies. But by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed to heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed this change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death. Much more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal matter.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): “Corporeal matter obeys God alone at will.”

I answer that, As stated above ([966]Q[110], A[2]), corporeal matter is not changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent composed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter and form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both. Wherefore of the angels also we have stated ([967]Q[110], A[2]) that they cannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by employing corporeal agents for the production of certain effects. Much less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change corporeal matter, except by means of bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of grace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the same place: "Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says—what wonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?"

Reply to Objection 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact that corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual substance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the soul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This he says is the cause of the "evil eye."

But it has been shown above ([968]Q[110], A[2]) that corporeal matter does not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone. Therefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the (corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed, which change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to which the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air which is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way as a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a "menstruata," as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [*De Insomniis ii]).

Hence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs mostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the countenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who have a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that by God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons co-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the sensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as stated above ([969]Q[81], A[3]), it is the act of a corporeal organ. Therefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive appetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal operation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice to work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in the body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).

Whether the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally?

Objection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at least locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to local motion, as stated above (Q[110], A[5]). But the separate soul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies by its command.

Objection 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the narrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained power over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through this soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been without some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the separate soul has the power to move bodies locally.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul cannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.

I answer that, The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a body. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the body, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that if one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as to local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by the separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power the separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by the power of God, it can exceed those limits.

Reply to Objection 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are not determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are naturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey them as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance is naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will not be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower degree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven cannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its nature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it cannot by its natural power move any other body.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the dead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is therefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who pretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.

OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL (THREE ARTICLES)

We next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the soul; secondly, as to the body.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?

(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?

(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?

Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted with the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not composed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence not by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save from matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise it could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is not composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by generation but by creation.

Objection 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the generating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the vegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be caused by the animal’s generating power.

Objection 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of the generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But neither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in the semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in some part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a particle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body which is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore the sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.

Objection 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of the sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is begotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it would be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal; which is impossible, for thus there would be identity between begetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct therefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above ([970]Q[76], A[4]) that in one animal there is but one formal principle, which is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does not remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent would act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.

On the contrary, The power in the semen is to the animal seminally generated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals produced from these elements—for instance by putrefaction. But in the latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power, according to Gn. 1:20: "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creatures having life." Therefore also the souls of animals seminally generated are produced by the seminal power.

I answer that, Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals are created by God ([971]Q[65], A[4]). This opinion would hold if the sensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself. For thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would needs be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul would arrive at existence by creation.

But this principle is false—namely, that being and operation are proper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above ([972]Q[75], A[3]): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since, therefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is that of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as proper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the subsistent composites exist through them.

Wherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator is like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the sensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into existence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from potentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are possessed.

Now the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for instance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its heat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the lowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some medium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But living bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their like, both without and with a medium. Without a medium—in the work of nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium—in the act of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives a certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the instrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent. And as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the instrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter whether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul of the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.

Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent substance. We have said enough ([973]Q[25], A[3]) on this point, nor need we repeat it here.

Reply to Objection 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue but by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the generating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal begets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more perfect effect is its generating power ordained.

Reply to Objection 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is derived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain movement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the soul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the axe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is no need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is based on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is attested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a certain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the species as stated above ([974]Q[115], A[3], ad 2). And since in this (vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of a heavenly body, it has been said that “man and the sun generate man.” Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the soul’s power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii, 4).

Reply to Objection 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the force itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for thus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical; moreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than generation, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by the power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in one of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that the sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the perfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the active power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the semen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is there anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the principal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an instrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.

Whether the intellectual soul is produced from the semen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the semen. For it is written (Gn. 46:26): “All the souls that came out of [Jacob’s] thigh, sixty-six.” But nothing is produced from the thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Objection 2: Further, as shown above ([975]Q[76], A[3]), the intellectual, sensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man. But the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in other animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but first of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore also the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.

Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is directed to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and the form there would not result something simply one. But the intellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced by the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is produced by the power of the semen.

Objection 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human species is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational soul is from the begetter.

Objection 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if the rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the sin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit intercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.

On the contrary, It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that “the rational soul is not engendered by coition.”

I answer that, It is impossible for an active power existing in matter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial effect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man transcends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no part whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to produce the intellectual principle.

Again, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter according as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making use of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever to do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the intellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen. Hence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): “It follows that the intellect alone comes from without.”

Again, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of the body, it is subsistent, as proved above ([976]Q[75], A[2]): therefore to be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an immaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only through creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul is caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to be non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is therefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted with the semen.

Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the whole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.

Reply to Objection 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the embryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or from the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are false; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth cannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said that the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the beginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.

Therefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which existed first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in addition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus there would be in man three souls of which one would be in potentiality to another. This has been disproved above ([977]Q[76], A[3]).

Therefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely vegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power, becomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes intellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by the power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from without. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect comes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no substantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not possible for the same identical form to belong to different species. Secondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal would be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the imperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because it would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not generation simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in act. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter of offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection; this will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of the preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of generation properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is caused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must needs be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was non-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those who held the existence of several souls in the body—or else it is not subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from this it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with the body, which cannot be admitted.

There is again another explanation, according to those who held that all men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved above ([978]Q[76], A[2]).

We must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and in other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous form is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the perfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in this way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at the ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This indeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from putrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is created by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at the same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being corrupted.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not ordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to one another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from reaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior agents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the generation of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but the power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what has been said above ([979]Q[105], A[5]; [980]Q[110], A[1]) that the whole of corporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power, especially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the body from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul is from God alone.

Reply to Objection 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power the matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.

Reply to Objection 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is good; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is evil; in this God does not concur.

Whether human souls were created together at the beginning of the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at the beginning of the world. For it is written (Gn. 2:2): “God rested Him from all His work which He had done.” This would not be true if He created new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the same time.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the perfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the bodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to the perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the universe would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gn. 2:2, where it is said that “God ended” all “His work.”

Objection 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But the intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it began to exist before the body.

On the contrary, It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that “the soul is created together with the body.”

I answer that, Some have maintained that it is accidental to the intellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul is of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not united to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were created together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement is false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if it were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would follow that man who results from this union is a being by accident; or that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above ([981]Q[75], A[4]). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the angels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown above ([982]Q[55], A[2]; [983]Q[85], A[1]): for man understands through receiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above ([984]Q[84], AA[6],7; [985]Q[85], A[1]). For this reason the soul needs to be united to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the sensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.

Secondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural to it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is deprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God should begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did not make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a man. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.

But if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to the body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the reason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other reason. If because the soul willed it—this seems incongruous. First, because it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to the body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would be natural for it to be united to it, since "nature does not fail in what is necessary." Secondly, because there would be no reason why, having been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should, after such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a spiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly revolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united to this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills would have to concur—to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of the begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural on the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent cause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting nature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that souls were embodies in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these opinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not created before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are infused into them.

Reply to Objection 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from all work, since we read (Jn. 5:17): "My Father worketh until now"; but from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not have already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls which are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the species, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's soul.

Reply to Objection 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of the universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the number of species.

Reply to Objection 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the corruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it was not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from the beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): "God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them."

OF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)

We now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning this there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?

(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation, is produced from the surplus food?

Whether some part of the food is changed into true human nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true human nature. For it is written (Mat. 15:17): “Whatsoever entereth into the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy.” But what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature. Therefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh belonging to the “species” from flesh belonging to “matter”; and says that the latter “comes and goes.” Now what is formed from food comes and goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to matter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature belongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

Objection 3: Further, the “radical humor” seems to belong to the reality of human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according to physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed into the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.

Objection 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature, whatever is lost in man could be restored. But man’s death is due only to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking food to insure himself against death in perpetuity.

Objection 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there is nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is generated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If therefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end nothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the beginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man throughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same, identity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore the food is not changed into true human nature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): “The bodily food when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into the texture of the members.” But the texture of the members belongs to true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality of human nature.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), “The relation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being.” Therefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters into the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in two ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as in the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong to a thing’s true nature considered in general; individual signate matter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true nature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body belong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human nature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.

Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which, they said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man. So that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by posterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human nature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.

But, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject of the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the multitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man. According to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we take food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action of natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the “radical humor”; just as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed by fire.

But this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to the same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it can cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can be generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that the human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which is its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible. Consequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that something else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because in all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual there is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case with the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one individual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of matter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of quantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter increases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the matter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it cannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result from division. Therefore some other substance must be added to matter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into it. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by rarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some other things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or lastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of matter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the body of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of a child. Nor does it occur by creation of flesh matter: for, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): “All things were created together as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific form.” Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be the result of the food being changed into the true human nature. Fourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants in regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of animals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment into the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication. Which multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot naturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does anything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change of something else into it. Consequently the whole process of generation and nourishment, which are called “natural forces,” would be miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.

Wherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to exist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in general: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the individual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter, on which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual, so that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of the individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the true human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the requisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the change of food into the substance of the individual partaking thereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required. And this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human nature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the individual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further is produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature, properly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because this opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in which, although there be a power of generating their like in species, there is not the power of generating their like in the individual; which power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing, therefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power, if their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly, because the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from the soul of the begetter, as stated above ([986]Q[118], A[1]). Hence it cannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is derived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly assumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the nutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food which is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for growth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer; but also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat. But there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food, took the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was there previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that which is formed from the food.

Therefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is really changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming the specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): “Food nourishes inasmuch as it is potentially flesh.”

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord does not say that the “whole” of what enters into the mouth, but “all”—because something from every kind of food is cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is generated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast aside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.

Reply to Objection 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood that which first receives the human species, which is derived from the begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does. By flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated from food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it comes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For he says there, that "just as in things which have their species in matter"—for instance, wood or stone—"so in flesh, there is something belonging to the species, and something belonging to matter." Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in inanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished. Again, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing with, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the Philosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and that to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they are already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no reason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the other remains.

It must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is not of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered from different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according to the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein, thus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains together with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh according to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually destroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of fire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter is substituted in its place.

Reply to Objection 3: The "radical humor" is said to comprise whatever the virtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot be renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the "nutritive humor" is that which has not yet received perfectly the specific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and the like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species remains in its root, which is not destroyed.

Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by continuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore the transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to transform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also for growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of what is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this; and then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether, the animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water added to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to become at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example (De Gener. i, 5).

Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a certain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said to be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire already existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the entire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter transformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if, while one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on until the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire will remain all the time: because that which is added passes into what pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by means of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural heat.

Whether the semen is produced from surplus food?

Objection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the surplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that “generation is a work of nature, producing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is begotten.” But that which is generated is produced from the semen. Therefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.

Objection 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which he receives from him. But if the semen from which something is generated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive nothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never existed. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or ancestors, than to any other men.

Objection 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of cows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from surplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to the cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in Adam “not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of the body.” But this would not be, if the semen were produced from surplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener. Animal. i, 18) that “the semen is surplus food.”

I answer that, This question depends in some way on what has been stated above [987](A[1]; [988]Q[118], A[1]). For if human nature has a virtue for the communication of its form to alien matter not only in another, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which at first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form communicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing should be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things generated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is afterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the proper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see that in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first, then the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a certain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which virtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.

Now it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what is already transformed into the substance of the members. For this solution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken from, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would be due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have the power of transforming something else into the likeness of that nature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from, then, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not have the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature, but only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the solution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains the nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in act; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as mud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after being cut in two: which is inadmissible.

It remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something separated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the whole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of the begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above [989](A[1]; [990]Q[108], A[1]). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that which is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the substance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In this sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power: because what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as semen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the Philosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food, have little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and generated seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in animals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the form of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the substance.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on account not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that generates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his grandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter should have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a virtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father. In like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in relation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.

Reply to Objection 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as though the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from which this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that both were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter, which is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal substance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active seminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue (in the production) of this man.

But Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the "corporeal substance," not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter from which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin Mother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not derived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal virtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For "such a birth was becoming to Him," [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary, O. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.

FIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (FS)
(QQ[1]-114)

TREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ[1]-5)

PROLOGUE

Since, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be made in God’s image, in so far as the image implies “an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement”: now that we have treated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came forth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains for us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the principle of his actions, as having free-will and control of his actions.

OF MAN’S LAST END (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life; and secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards this end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever is ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is stated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general; (2) happiness.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?

(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?

(3) Whether a man’s actions are specified by their end?

(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?

(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?

(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?

(7) Whether all men have the same last end?

(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?

Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name, implies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But that for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this preposition "for" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it does not belong to man to act for an end.

Objection 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end. But in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

Objection 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts deliberately. But man does many things without deliberation, sometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when one moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent on something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.

On the contrary, All things contained in a genus are derived from the principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human operations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it belongs to man to do everything for an end.

I answer that, Of actions done by man those alone are properly called "human," which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from irrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions. Wherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man is master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and will; whence, too, the free-will is defined as "the faculty and will of reason." Therefore those actions are properly called human which proceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in man, they can be called actions "of a man," but not properly "human" actions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear that whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power in accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for an end.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet it is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way that it is a cause.

Reply to Objection 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be voluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action is voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by the will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited by the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is impossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end. For the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is color: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of seeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object; so the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of willing. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last end, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some action of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore whatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even when he does that action in which the last end consists.

Reply to Objection 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.

Whether it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature to act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end, never acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many things that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are altogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because they do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational animals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for an end.

Objection 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one’s action to an end. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to things that lack reason.

Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But “the will is in the reason” (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for an end belongs to none but a rational nature.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that “not only mind but also nature acts for an end.”

I answer that, Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if, in a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed, the others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all causes is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were not determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: consequently in order that it produce a determinate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some certain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this determination is effected, in the rational nature, by the "rational appetite," which is called the will; so, in other things, it is caused by their natural inclination, which is called the "natural appetite."

Nevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its action or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as an arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer who directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are possessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have dominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the "faculty of will and reason." But those things that lack reason tend to an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not by themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such, and consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be ordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature is in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as stated above ([991]FP, Q[22], A[2], ad 4; [992]FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Consequently it is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing [agens] and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the irrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another, whether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not apprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether void of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the end: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when he acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's compulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it is thus with irrational creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs itself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that which is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an irrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.

Whether human acts are specified by their end?

Objection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their end. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified by an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by their end.

Objection 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist before it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a human act does not derive its species from the end.

Objection 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But one and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends. Therefore the end does not give the species to human acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13): “According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds worthy of blame or praise.”

I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For human acts can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself. Now it has been stated above [993](A[1]) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts.

Reply to Objection 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because it is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just this that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something, considered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as passion.

Reply to Objection 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention, pertains to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). And it is thus that it gives the species to the human or moral act.

Reply to Objection 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds once from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which it has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of which one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an act which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to several ends of the will: thus this act "to kill a man," which is but one act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an end, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger: the result being that there would be several acts in different species of morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in another, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species from that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which is its "per se" terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to morality. Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same considered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered in their moral species, and conversely.

Whether there is one last end of human life?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life, but that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds from good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other good: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has the nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.

Objection 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to infinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same reason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number, the reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is consequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that there is also an infinite series of ends.

Objection 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But the will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can will something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely. Therefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and there is no last end of the human will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that “to suppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good.” But the good is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary to the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is necessary to fix one last end.

I answer that, Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed indefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in whatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of necessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement, because then there would be no first mover, without which neither can the others move, since they move only through being moved by the first mover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends—the order of intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders there must be something first. For that which is first in the order of intention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite; consequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to move the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is that wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be taken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the intention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the first of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on neither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no last end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its term, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would begin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would continue indefinitely.

On the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that are ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for accidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that there is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the end.

Reply to Objection 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from it, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good has the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this argument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the end, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards those things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if we considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite. But, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect, to which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a certain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the flow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods share the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods does not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God disposes all things “in number, weight and measure.”

Reply to Objection 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from principles that are known naturally, and advances to some term. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no infinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process of things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one another. But in those things which are accidentally connected, nothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is accidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or unity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders the reason from an indefinite process.

Reply to Objection 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on itself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the fact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on itself indifferently once or several times.

Whether one man can have several last ends?

Objection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four things, viz. "in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue." But these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place the last end of his will in many things.

Objection 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not exclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in opposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing is the last end of the will does not exclude others.

Objection 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one thing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its last end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something else, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in pleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches. Therefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to several things, as last ends.

On the contrary, That in which a man rests as in his last end, is master of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of life. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): "Whose god is their belly": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures of the belly. Now according to Mat. 6:24, "No man can serve two masters," such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore it is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained to one another.

I answer that, It is impossible for one man's will to be directed at the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may be assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its own perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he desires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): "In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete." It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill man's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire. Which is not possible, if something else be required for his perfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to tend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.

The second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning, the principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of the rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that which is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature tends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the rational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will tends, as to its last end, is one.

The third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their species from the end, as stated above [994](A[3]), they must needs receive their genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common form. Since, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as such, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more because in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end has the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last end of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last end of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of all men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual man must be fixed on one last end.

Reply to Objection 1: All these several objects were considered as one perfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the last end.

Reply to Objection 2: Although it is possible to find several things which are not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will does not extend to making opposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to tend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above (ad 2).

Whether man will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end?

Objection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he wills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said to be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to serious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to the last end.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his Metaphysics 1,[2] that speculative science is sought for its own sake. Now it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end. Therefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end.

Objection 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of that end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that he desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for the last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): “That is the end of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas we love it for its own sake.”

I answer that, Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First, because whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good. And if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of art. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete perfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because the last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as the first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary moving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first mover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the appetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite, which is the last end.

Reply to Objection 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external end; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford him pleasure or relaxation. But man’s consummate good is his last end.

Reply to Objection 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is desired as the scientist’s good, included in complete and perfect good, which is the ultimate end.

Reply to Objection 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end, whenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first intention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every desire directed to any object whatever, even though one’s thoughts be not actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the road one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.

Whether all men have the same last end?

Objection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end. For before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of man. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning. Therefore all men have not the same last end.

Objection 2: Further, man’s entire life is ruled according to his last end. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not have various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.

Objection 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of individuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet they differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men have not the same last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men agree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.

I answer that, We can speak of the last end in two ways: first, considering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the thing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to the aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this fulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above [995](A[5]). But as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not agreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to every taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine is most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something similar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant things, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In like manner that good is most complete which the man with well disposed affections desires for his last end.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.

Reply to Objection 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason of the various things in which men seek to find their last end.

Reply to Objection 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first principle of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above [996] (A[5]).

Whether other creatures concur in that last end?

Objection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man’s last end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man’s beginning—i.e. God—is also the beginning of all else. Therefore all other things concur in man’s last end.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “God turns all things to Himself as to their last end.” But He is also man’s last end; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last end.

Objection 3: Further, man’s last end is the object of the will. But the object of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all. Therefore other things, too, concur in man’s last end.

On the contrary, man’s last end is happiness; which all men desire, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3,4). But “happiness is not possible for animals bereft of reason,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man’s last end.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold—the end “for which” and the end “by which”; viz. the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is either a lower place as “thing,” or to be in a lower place, as “use”; and the end of the miser is money as “thing,” or possession of money as “use.”

If, therefore, we speak of man’s last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man’s last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man’s last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, or live, or even know.

Hence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness means the acquisition of the last end.

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN’S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?

(2) Whether in honor?

(3) Whether in fame or glory?

(4) Whether in power?

(5) Whether in any good of the body?

(6) Whether in pleasure?

(7) Whether in any good of the soul?

(8) Whether in any created good?

Whether man’s happiness consists in wealth?

Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in wealth. For since happiness is man’s last end, it must consist in that which has the greatest hold on man’s affections. Now this is wealth: for it is written (Eccles. 10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore man’s happiness consists in wealth.

Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is “a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” Now money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be a sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires. Therefore happiness consists in wealth.

Objection 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails, it seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than anything else; since “a covetous man shall not be satisfied with riches” (Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.

On the contrary, Man’s good consists in retaining happiness rather than in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), “wealth shines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful, whereas the generous man is applauded.” Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in wealth.

I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in wealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3), viz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man as a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing, cars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which is not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art of man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things salable.

Now it is evident that man’s happiness cannot consist in natural wealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something else, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be man’s last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore in the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for him, according to Ps. 8:8: “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.”

And as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of natural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its means, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently much less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore it is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to consist in wealth.

Reply to Objection 1: All material things obey money, so far as the multitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material goods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our estimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just as it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.

Reply to Objection 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so spiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov. 17:16): “What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot buy wisdom.”

Reply to Objection 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite: because they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire for artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered concupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear (Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than the desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the sovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things despised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:29): “They that eat me shall yet hunger.” Whereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods, the contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise them, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord’s words (Jn. 4:13): “Whosoever drinketh of this water,” by which temporal goods are signified, “shall thirst again.” The reason of this is that we realize more their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact shows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist therein.

Whether man’s happiness consists in honors?

Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in honors. For happiness or bliss is “the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that by which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore happiness consists especially in honor.

Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great excellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect good. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Moreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): “To . . . the only God be honor and glory.” Therefore happiness consists in honor.

Objection 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But nothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers loss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor. Therefore happiness consists in honor.

On the contrary, Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the honored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to the person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore happiness does not consist in honor.

I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor. For honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and consequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is in the person honored. Now a man’s excellence is in proportion, especially to his happiness, which is man’s perfect good; and to its parts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness. And therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot principally consist therein.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not that reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive honor from men by way of reward, “as from those who have nothing greater to offer.” But virtue’s true reward is happiness itself, for which the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would no longer be a virtue, but ambition.

Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence as a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that honor makes them excellent.

Reply to Objection 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his natural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated above. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on whose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.

Whether man’s happiness consists in fame or glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in glory. For happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints for the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory: for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): “The sufferings of this time are not worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.” Therefore happiness consists in glory.

Objection 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But man’s good is spread abroad in the knowledge of others by glory more than by anything else: since, according to Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists “in being well known and praised.” Therefore man’s happiness consists in glory.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems to be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a fashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): “You seem to beget unto yourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time.” Therefore man’s happiness consists in fame or glory.

On the contrary, Happiness is man’s true good. But it happens that fame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), “many owe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can anything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must needs blush at their own praise.” Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in fame or glory.

I answer that, Man’s happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists “in being well known and praised,” as Ambrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God’s knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another’s happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man’s happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man’s good depends on God’s knowledge as its cause. And therefore man’s beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to Ps. 90:15,16: “I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.”

Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor. 10:18): “He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk. 8:38): “The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels” [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38 with Lk. 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the fact that he was quoting from memory].

Reply to Objection 2: A man’s good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy.

Reply to Objection 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever.

Whether man’s happiness consists in power?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called “gods” (Ex. 22:28), “Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods.” Therefore happiness consists in power.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.

Objection 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power.

On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), “the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety”: and further on: “Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more?”

I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness is man’s proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself.

Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness is man’s supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to “satisfy of itself,” as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Thirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written (Eccles. 5:12) that "riches" are sometimes "kept to the hurt of the owner"; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing.

Reply to Objection 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme good consists in power.

Whether man's happiness consists in any bodily good?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): "There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body." But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that "to be" is better than "to live," and "to live" is better than all that follows. But for man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.

Objection 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man’s happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body.

On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in goods of the body.

I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. 15:14: “God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man’s reason and will cannot be the preservation of man’s being.

Secondly, because, granted that the end of man’s will and reason be the preservation of man’s being, it could not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. For man’s being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above ([997]FP, Q[75], A[2]); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man’s last end, cannot consist in goods of the body.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by “riches,” just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods.

Reply to Objection 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living things.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few.

Whether man’s happiness consists in pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: “for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased” (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.

Objection 2: Further, “the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause” (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man’s last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."

I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.

But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wis. 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.

Reply to Objection 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

Reply to Objection 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.

Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above ([998]AA[4],5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above [999](A[5]). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.

On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), “that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake.” But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God’s sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul.

I answer that, As stated above ([1000]Q[1], A[8]), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man’s last end, it is impossible for man’s last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man’s appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man’s last end.

But if we speak of man’s last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.

Whether any created good constitutes man’s happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man’s happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom “unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,” from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man’s highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in [1001]FP, Q[111], A[1], it seems that man’s happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.

Objection 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man’s happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.

Objection 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man’s natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since then man’s capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man’s happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): “As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man’s life of happiness: of Whom it is written: ‘Happy is that people whose God is the Lord’ (Ps. 143:15).”

I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps. 102:5: “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.

Reply to Objection 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.

Reply to Objection 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.

WHAT IS HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?

(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?

(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part?

(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will?

(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?

(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances viz. angels?

(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence?

Whether happiness is something uncreated?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): “We must needs confess that God is happiness itself.”

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man’s will tends naturally. But man’s will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.

On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man’s happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): “Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy.” Therefore happiness is not something uncreated.

I answer that, As stated above ([1002]Q[1], A[8];[1003] Q[2], A[7]), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will. But in the second way, man's last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created.

Reply to Objection 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called "gods," by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created.

Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end.

Whether happiness is an operation?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting." But life is not an operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things." But state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Objection 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Objection 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Objection 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

Objection 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue."

I answer that, In so far as man's happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it "second act" (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be "for its operation" (De Coel ii, 3). Therefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.

Reply to Objection 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown ([1004]Q[2] , A[5]) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true that His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God."

Reply to Objection 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he signified this by saying that happiness is "a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things," thus implying that the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be "the perfect good" (Ethic. i, 7).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as "to burn" and "to cut."

And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an operation can be happiness.

Reply to Objection 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: "We call men happy, but only as men." But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be "as the angels . . . in heaven" (Mat. 22:30).

Consequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails: because in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God by one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life, which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged in this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and since he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself otherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were, continuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are evident.

Whether happiness is an operation of the sensitive part, or of the intellective part only?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of the senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than that of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the intellective operation depends on the sensitive: since “we cannot understand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the senses also.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” But some goods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses. Therefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for happiness.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in Ethic. i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby in all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by sensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for happiness.

On the contrary, Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in common with us: but they have not happiness in common with us. Therefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.

I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1) essentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of sense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man’s happiness consists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which is his last end, as shown above [1005](A[1]): to Which man cannot be united by an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as shown above (Q[2], A[5]), man’s happiness does not consist in goods of the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the operation of the senses.

Nevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness, both antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the operation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense; consequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven; because at the resurrection, “from the very happiness of the soul,” as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) “the body and the bodily senses will receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their operations”; a point which will be explained further on when we treat of the resurrection (SS, QQ[82] -85). But then the operation whereby man’s mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses is required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life.

Reply to Objection 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes the aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal source of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in this imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that suffice for the most perfect operation of this life.

Reply to Objection 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in the imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance from the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher part.

Whether, if happiness is in the intellective part, it is an operation of the intellect or of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10,11), that man’s happiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3): “Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: ‘borders’].” But peace pertains to the will. Therefore man’s happiness is in the will.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the object of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of the will.

Objection 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus the last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the general, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to operations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we shall state further on ([1006]Q[9], AA[1],3). Therefore happiness regards the will.

Objection 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man’s most excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the will, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an operation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13). Therefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.” And a little further on (6) he adds: “He is most happy who desires well, whatever he desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man already possesses some good—i.e. a good will.” Therefore happiness consists in an act of the will.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 17:3): “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God.” Now eternal life is the last end, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Therefore man’s happiness consists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[2], A[6]) two things are needed for happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other, that is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected with it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident from what has been said ([1007]AA[1],2; Q[2], A[7]) that happiness is the attainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not consist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the end, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is delighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire itself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement towards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being present; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact that the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to him who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the will.

This is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the acquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous man would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at the moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in his hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money got. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to attain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made present to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will rests in the end when attained.

So, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the intellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to the will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is “joy in truth,” because, to wit, joy itself is the consummation of happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: Peace pertains to man’s last end, not as though it were the very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and consequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are removed which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end: consequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains at peace, his desire being at rest.

Reply to Objection 2: The will’s first object is not its act: just as neither is the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as the will’s first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as its act.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does: yet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the will belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the end, viz. delight or enjoyment.

Reply to Objection 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining: for “naught is loved save what is known,” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an intelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain a sensible end by an act of sense.

Reply to Objection 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he has what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the act of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness, as a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among the good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an inclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus of its terminus, for instance, “alteration” to the genus “quality.”

Whether happiness is an operation of the speculative, or of the practical intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the practical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in becoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect, which is the cause of things understood, rather than by his speculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is man’s perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys.”

I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. First because if man’s happiness is an operation, it must needs be man’s highest operation. Now man’s highest operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that “seems to be each man’s self, which is best in him,” according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him.

Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect.

Thirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly.

Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7,8.

Reply to Objection 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and "information"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz. the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect.

Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue." And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative virtues—"knowledge," "wisdom" and "understanding," which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.

Objection 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, "all men naturally desire to know"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.

Objection 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences, man’s final happiness consists.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:23): “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom”: and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man’s final happiness does not consist in the consideration of these.

I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 4), man’s happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence.

Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man’s final happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man’s final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown ([1008]FP, Q[88], A[2]), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man’s happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences.

However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A[2], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act.

Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi in Evang.): “It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels”; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man’s final happiness consists in contemplating the angels.

Objection 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels.

Objection 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 9:24): “Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.” Therefore man’s final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.

I answer that, As stated above [1009](A[6]), man’s perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown in the [1010]FP, Q[44], A[1]. It follows that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science.

Reply to Objection 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in [1011]FP, Q[90], A[3]. Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the [1012]FP, Q[111], A[2], ad 2. Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.

Reply to Objection 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is attained by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.

Whether man's happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence.

Objection 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: ‘because’] we shall see Him as He is.”

I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” i.e. the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to know of the cause “what it is”; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, “what it is.” And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.

If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than “that He is”; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists, as stated above ([1013]AA[1],7; Q[2], A[8]).

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1014]Q[1], A[8]), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above ([1015]Q[1], A[8]). Secondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?

(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?

(3) Whether comprehension is required?

(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?

(5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?

(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?

(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?

(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?

Whether delight is required for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “vision is the entire reward of faith.” But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is “the most self-sufficient of all goods,” as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above ([1016]Q[3], A[8]); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.

Objection 3: Further, the “operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered” (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is “joy in truth.”

I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight.

Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward.

Reply to Objection 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight.

Reply to Objection 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect.

Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight?

Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For "delight is the perfection of operation" (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.

Objection 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision.

Objection 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision.

On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.

I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above ([1017]Q[1], A[1], ad 2;[1018] Q[3], A[4]): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) "delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth," because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.

Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity does not seem the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity.

Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf. Serm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): “To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible.” Therefore happiness is without comprehension.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect and will, as stated in the FP, QQ[79] and following. But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

Objection 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): “So run that you may comprehend [Douay: ‘obtain’].” But happiness is the goal of the spiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7,8): “I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the rest there is laid up for me a crown of justice.” Therefore comprehension is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end, those things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from the way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an intelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his will: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect knowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will, first by love which is the will's first movement towards anything; secondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which relation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present to the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is not present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is not sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is raised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have it forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that which he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the end. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness itself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect knowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope; but delight in the end now present results from love, as already stated (A[2], ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with Happiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the intelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end; and delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the object beloved.

Reply to Objection 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the comprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended by the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus comprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means nothing but the holding of something already present and possessed: thus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [*In English we should say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense comprehension is necessary for Happiness.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it is the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while not possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will, since it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.

Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision; but a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even vision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the object of comprehension.

Whether rectitude of the will is necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an operation of the intellect, as stated above ([1019]Q[3], A[4]). But rectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of heart, is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect: for Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) "I do not approve of what I said in a prayer: O God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to know the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of heart, know many truths." Therefore rectitude of the will is not necessary for Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But the operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will. Therefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect, does not depend on rectitude of the will.

Objection 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not necessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance, after arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of virtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness once obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God": and (Heb. 12:14): "Follow peace with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God."

I answer that, Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end in comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to matter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be duly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly ordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without rectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above ([1020]Q[3], A[8]), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, Which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of him who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in subordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's Essence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common notion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the will right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without a right will.

Reply to Objection 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of the intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect which is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is required antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a right course in order to strike the target.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to the end is necessary.

Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness. For the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of nature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the soul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is naturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while separated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above ([1021]Q[3], AA[2],5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since nothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since, therefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from the body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole; it seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul, without the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the soul separated from the body.

Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) “the operation of bliss,” in which operation happiness consists, is “not hindered.” But the operation of the separate soul is hindered; because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul “has a natural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is held back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the heavenward journey,” i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.

Objection 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire. But this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to be united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.

Objection 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the soul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 14:13): “Happy [Douay: ‘blessed’] are the dead who die in the Lord.”

I answer that, Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had in this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God. Now it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this life. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the intellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the intellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in a bodily organ, as was shown in the [1022]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7. Consequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in a way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the vision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the soul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints, when separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness until the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back again. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason. By authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): “While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord”; and he points out the reason of this absence, saying: “For we walk by faith and not by sight.” Now from this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by sight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present to the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, are in God’s presence; wherefore the text continues: “But we are confident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and to be present with the Lord.” Whence it is evident that the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies, “walk by sight,” seeing the Essence of God, wherein is true Happiness.

Again this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the body, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it looks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the [1023]FP, Q[84], A[7]. Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by means of phantasms, as stated in the [1024]FP, Q[12], A[3]. Wherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently, without the body the soul can be happy.

We must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's perfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof; thus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as necessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of perfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does not belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet it does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more perfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness consists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) "whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the dead separated from their bodies," answers "that they cannot see the Unchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some other more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to rule the body."

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of the intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of the body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the body. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect of which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that natural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as that of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any individual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be, when the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the animal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual being, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the whole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite after the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the form is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the composite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the [1025]FP, Q[75], A[2]. It follows, therefore, that after being separated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it can have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect specific nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect: and, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.

Thus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be white, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.

Reply to Objection 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by way of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a hindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of some kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not all that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a hindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but prevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that separation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending with all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul desires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may overflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as it enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at rest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish the body to attain to its share.

Reply to Objection 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest, as regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which suffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the desirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it would wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been resumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.

Reply to Objection 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect that “the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do,” is not to be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even now some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the angels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it refers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the lowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have, whereas the separated souls of the saints have not.

Whether perfection of the body is necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not necessary for man’s perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is a bodily good. But it has been shown above ([1026]Q[2]) that Happiness does not consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the body is necessary for man’s Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, man’s Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence, as shown above (Q[3], A[8]). But the body has not part in this operation, as shown above [1027](A[5]). Therefore no disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body, the more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most perfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be abstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a disposition of the body necessary for Happiness.

On the contrary, Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is written (Jn. 13:17): “You shall be blessed, if you do them.” But the reward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and enjoy God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it is written (Is. 66:14): “You shall see and your heart shall rejoice, and your bones shall flourish like a herb.” Therefore good disposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire in this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity required for it. For this happiness consists, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in “an operation according to perfect virtue”; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition of the body, from every operation of virtue.

But speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no disposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is necessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said that “for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything corporeal.” But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the soul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection of the soul to exclude its natural perfection.

Consequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is necessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness which is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), “if body be such, that the governance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which is corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from that vision of the highest heaven.” Whence he concludes that, “when this body will no longer be ‘natural,’ but ‘spiritual,’ then will it be equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which erstwhile was its burden.” Consequently, because from the Happiness of the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this too will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) that “God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature.”

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its object: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to Happiness.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the body has not part in that operation of the intellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a hindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary, lest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.

Reply to Objection 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed that the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which weighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the Third Part of this work (SS, Q[82], seqq.).

Whether any external goods are necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for Happiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs to Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for instance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Lk. 22:30): “That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom”: and (Mat. 6:20): “Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven”: and (Mat. 25:34): “Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom.” Therefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is “a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” But some of man’s goods are external, although they be of least account, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are necessary for Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:12): “Your reward is very great in heaven.” But to be in heaven implies being in a place. Therefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 72:25): “For what have I in heaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?” As though to say: “I desire nothing but this,”—“It is good for me to adhere to my God.” Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence of happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which consists in an operation of virtue, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. For man needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the operation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active virtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of which to perform its operations.

On the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for perfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is that all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support of the animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human life, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that perfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the soul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then no longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are nowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the animal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation, as being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the likeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need of these goods of the body as stated in Ethic. x, 8.

Reply to Objection 1: All those material promises contained in Holy Scripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture is wont to express spiritual things under the form of things corporeal, in order “that from things we know, we may rise to the desire of things unknown,” as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus food and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the sufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to union of God.

Reply to Objection 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are incompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness consists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate of all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we shall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of the saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods. Nevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be appointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of a certain fitness and adornment.

Whether the fellowship of friend is necessary for happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.

Objection 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.

But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship."

Reply to Objection 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.

Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.

Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.

OF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man can attain Happiness?

(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?

(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?

(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?

(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?

(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature?

(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God?

(8) Whether every man desires Happiness?

Whether man can attain happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material things: wherefore "he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:12): "Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord."

I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain Happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in [1028]FP, Q[12], A[1]: in which vision, as we stated above (Q[3], A[8]) man's perfect Happiness consists.

Reply to Objection 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the [1029]FP, Q[58], A[3]; [1030]FP, Q[79], A[8]. Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain Happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.

Reply to Objection 2: To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the [1031]FP, Q[84], A[7] ; [1032]FP, Q[89], A[1].

Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he will be perfectly happy.

Whether one man can be happier than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For Happiness is “the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (Mat. 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard “received every man a penny”; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), “each was equally rewarded with eternal life.” Therefore one man cannot be happier than another.

Objection 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man’s Happiness cannot be surpassed by another’s.

Objection 3: Further, since Happiness is “the perfect and sufficient good” (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man’s desire. But his desire is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other Happiness can be greater.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): “In My Father’s house there are many mansions”; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify “the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal life.” But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of Happiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.

I answer that, As stated above ([1033]Q[1], A[8];[1034] Q[2], A[7]), Happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one Happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another.

Reply to Objection 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the divers degrees of enjoyment.

Reply to Objection 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.

Reply to Objection 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is “the good of all good,” as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): “He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing Thee alone.”

Whether one can be happy in this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (Ps. 118:1): “Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord.” But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.

Objection 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man can be happy in this life.

Objection 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in this life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: “They have called the people happy that hath these things,” to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:1): “Man born of a woman, living for a short time, is filled with many miseries.” But Happiness excludes misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.

I answer that, A certain participation of Happiness can be had in this life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life. This may be seen from a twofold consideration.

First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a “perfect and sufficient good,” it excludes every evil, and fulfils every desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance on the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as Augustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally desire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally shrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness in this life.

Secondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness, viz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in this life, as was shown in the [1035]FP, Q[12], A[11]. Hence it is evident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.

Reply to Objection 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on account of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come, according to Rom. 8:24: “We are saved by hope”; or on account of a certain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment of the Sovereign Good.

Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to one of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness, which is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the nature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the part of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness, in itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the way in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy the true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an operation, as stated above

([1036]Q[3], A[2]), the true nature of Happiness is taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the subject.

Reply to Objection 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be had in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness. And thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.

Whether happiness once had can be lost?

Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness is a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected according to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his nature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in a changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and the intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation whereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.

Objection 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's Happiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore it seems that it has an end.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the righteous that "they shall god . . . into life everlasting," which, as above stated [1037](A[2]), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases not. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.

I answer that, If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of contemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for instance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by certain occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from contemplation.

This is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be changed so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that happiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain unimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness, in so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it away altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby man bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the happiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be contrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher state (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply, but “as men,” whose nature is subject to change.

But if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this life, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following the error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy after the final Happiness.

This, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is the “perfect and sufficient good,” it must needs set man’s desire at rest and exclude every evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he has, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity be troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing that he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness that man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he possesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will lose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he should have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the intellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Consequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.

Secondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of Happiness. For it has been shown above ([1038]Q[3], A[8]) that man’s perfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now it is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to see It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be without, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being desired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it, by reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine Essence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to the source of all goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): “I shall be satisfied when Thy glory shall appear”; and (Wis. 7:11): “All good things came to me together with her,” i.e. with the contemplation of wisdom. In like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to it; because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness.” It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake Happiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness, through God taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of Happiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just Judge, except for some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a fault, since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that vision as was shown above ([1039]Q[4], A[4]). Nor again can it be withdrawn by any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised above all other things: and consequently no other agent can sever the mind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time goes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa; because such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as are subject to time and movement.

Reply to Objection 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes every defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change.

Reply to Objection 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things which are ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to the last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to wish to be happy.

Reply to Objection 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the participator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the good, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning of happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.

Whether man can attain happiness by his natural powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his natural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But nothing is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last end. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man can attain Happiness by his natural powers.

Objection 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures, it seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational creatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more therefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness is a “perfect operation,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs to the same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the imperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations, is subject to man’s natural power, whereby he is master of his own actions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e. Happiness, by his natural powers.

On the contrary, Man is naturally the principle of his action, by his intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints, surpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:9) “Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him.” Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.

I answer that, Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak further on (Q[63]). But man’s perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q[3], A[8]), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the vision of God’s Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but also of every creature, as was shown in the [1040]FP, Q[12], A[4]. For the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the mode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De Causis; Prop. viii) that “it knows things that are above it, and things that are below it, according to the mode of its substance.” But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which infinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man, nor any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries, although it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it provided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with which he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it fail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal to attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him free-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy. “For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by ourselves” (Ethic. iii, 3).

Reply to Objection 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although it needs help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble condition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains some imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order to attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is better disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by means of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health, without the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature, which can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine assistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational creature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains some imperfect good by its natural powers.

Reply to Objection 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same species, they can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of necessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that can cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final perfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's natural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation which is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its object. Consequently the argument does not prove.

Whether man attains happiness through the action of some higher creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the action of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a twofold order in things—one, of the parts of the universe to one another, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside the universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end (Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the order of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the parts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the lower, as stated in the [1041]FP, Q[109], A[2]: while happiness consists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe, i.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz. an angel, acting on him.

Objection 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced to act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially hot, is made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is potentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an angel who is actually happy.

Objection 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect as stated above (Q[3], A[4]). But an angel can enlighten man's intellect as shown in the [1042]FP, Q[111], A[1]. Therefore an angel can make a man happy.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): “The Lord will give grace and glory.”

I answer that, Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited: that which surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of any creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above nature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to life, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been shown above [1043](A[5]) that Happiness is a good surpassing created nature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we speak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect happiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose act it consists.

Reply to Objection 1: It often happens in the case of active powers ordained to one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the last end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that last end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of sailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a ship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of the universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of his last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto: whereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which is God.

Reply to Objection 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in something, it can be the principle of action on something else: for instance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in something imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle whereby it is communicated to something else: thus the “intention” of color which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something else; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to infinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God perfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly and by likeness or participation. Consequently no creature can communicate its Happiness to another.

Reply to Objection 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the [1044]FP, Q[106], A[1]: since in order to see this, all are immediately enlightened by God.

Whether any good works are necessary that man may receive happiness from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he may obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite power, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of matter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works, since they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause thereof, as stated above [1045](A[6]), can be required only as dispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions before acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.

Objection 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so is He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established nature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or action on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect forthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows Happiness on man without any previous works.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of the man "to whom God reputeth justice without works." Therefore no works of man are necessary for attaining Happiness.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:17): "If you know these things, you shall be blessed if you do them." Therefore Happiness is obtained through works.

I answer that, Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]), is necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right order of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for obtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order to receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man need precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right tendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as sometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the form. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be thus; for as is stated in De Coel. ii, 12, "of those things that have a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without movement, some by one movement, some by several.” Now to possess the perfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it naturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone. Therefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness by any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every created nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness, without the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the angel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according to the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work, as was explained in the [1046]FP, Q[62], A[5]; whereas man obtains it by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward of works of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness; not on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows Happiness, but that the order in things be observed.

Reply to Objection 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are perfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of the creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the various species, that through them nature might be propagated to their progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed on others through Christ, who is God and Man, “Who,” according to Heb. 2:10, “had brought many children into glory”; therefore, from the very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any previous meritorious operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for Christ’s merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness, though they have no merits of their own; because by Baptism they are made members of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which is bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account of previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness is; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards Happiness.

Whether every man desires happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man can desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object of the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness is. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4), “some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the body; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things.” Therefore not all desire Happiness.

Objection 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine Essence, as stated above ([1047]Q[3], A[8]). But some consider it impossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire it not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that “happy is he who has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss.” But all do not desire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish to desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): “If that actor had said: ‘You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,’ he would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge in his will.” Therefore everyone desires to be happy.

I answer that, Happiness can be considered in two ways. First according to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity, every man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good, as stated above ([1048]AA[3],4). But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one’s will be satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which it consists. And thus all do not know Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general notion of happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not all desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the intellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real distinction, there may be a distinction according to the consideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same thing is desired in one way, and not desired in another. So that happiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is the general notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of necessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered under other special aspects, either on the part of the operation itself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the object; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.

Reply to Objection 3: This definition of Happiness given by some—"Happy is the man that has all he desires," or, "whose every wish is fulfilled" is a good and adequate definition; but an inadequate definition if understood in another. For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural appetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is happy: since nothing satisfies man's natural desire, except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason, thus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things that man desires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the possession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires naturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things that are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through taking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to include perfect Happiness—that he "desires nothing amiss": although the first part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, that "happy is he who has all he desires."

TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)

OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general principles; and secondly matters of detail.

In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2) their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals. And since Happiness is man’s proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?

And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.

First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.

And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?

(2) Whether in irrational animals?

(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?

(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?

(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?

(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?

(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?

(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?

Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary “which has its principle within itself.” as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man’s appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is outside him, and is as a “mover unmoved” (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.

Objection 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (Jn. 15:5): “Without Me you can do nothing.” Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that “the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation.” Now such are human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.

I answer that, There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end, as stated above ([1049]Q[1], A[2]); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word “voluntary” implies that their movements and acts are from their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having “a principle within” the agent, but also as implying “knowledge.” Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be found.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.

Reply to Objection 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite. Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.

Reply to Objection 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.

Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For a thing is called “voluntary” from “voluntas” [will]. Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything voluntary in them.

Objection 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters of their actions; for “they act not; rather are they acted upon,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that “voluntary acts lead to praise and blame.” But neither praise nor blame is due to the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that “both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary.” The same is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].

I answer that, As stated above [1050](A[1]), it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power.

Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.

Reply to Objection 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word “voluntary” is derived from “voluntas” [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in irrational animals.

Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?

Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.

Objection 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above ([1051]AA[1],2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.

On the contrary, The word “voluntary” is applied to that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.

I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm.

Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.

Reply to Objection 1: We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.

Reply to Objection 2: "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish." Consequently just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to wish not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness. Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.

Whether violence can be done to the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.

Objection 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force: for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is compelled.

Objection 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature; as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the will can be compelled.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act.

I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.

As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.

The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be dragged of his own will.

Reply to Objection 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration and generation of simply bodies would be unnatural and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.

Reply to Objection 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit.

Whether violence causes involuntariness?

Objection 1: It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown above [1052](A[4]). Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.

Objection 2: Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.

Objection 3: Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that “things done under compulsion are involuntary.”

I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be “unnatural”; and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be “involuntary.” Therefore violence causes involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said [1053](A[4]) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above [1054](A[4]): wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 2: As that is said to be natural, which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an active principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such movement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action is brought to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject, there is not violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man himself.

Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes involuntariness simply.

Objection 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it remains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the addition of fear, it is involuntary.

Objection 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition, is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary absolutely, is necessary simply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through fear are “voluntary rather than involuntary.”

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such things are done through fear “are of a mixed character,” being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.

But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that which is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary, because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.

Reply to Objection 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a violent action is defined as not only one, “the principal whereof is from without,” but with the addition, “in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all”; because the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.

Reply to Objection 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves rather the opposite.

Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too.

Objection 2: Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “delight,” or the lust of pleasure, “destroys the judgment of prudence.” Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): “The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret.” But neither of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.

I answer that, Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 2: He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence; for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.

Reply to Objection 3: If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary, because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example "not to act" or "not to will," and in like manner "not to consider"; for the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on ([1055]Q[10], A[3];[1056] Q[77], A[7]).

Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?

Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.

Objection 2: Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to Prov. 14: 22: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary: which is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary" (De Vera Relig. xiv).

Objection 3: Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out of ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that “what is done through ignorance is involuntary.”

I answer that, If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness, as was declared above [1057](A[1]). But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of the will: in one way, “concomitantly”; in another, “consequently”; in a third way, “antecedently.” “Concomitantly,” when there is ignorance of what is done; but, so that even if it were known, it would be done. For then, ignorance does not induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus in the example given (OBJ 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of anything that is repugnant to the will: but it causes “non-voluntariness,” since that which is unknown cannot be actually willed. Ignorance is “consequent” to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary [1058](A[3]). First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin, or that he may not be withheld from sin; according to Job 21:14: “We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.” And this is called “affected ignorance.” Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it regards that which one can and ought to know: for in this sense “not to act” and “not to will” are said to be voluntary, as stated above [1059](A[3]). And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider; this is called “ignorance of evil choice,” and arises from some passion or habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignorance is “antecedent” to the act of the will, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man’s willing what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result being that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.

From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know. The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will.

OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is a circumstance?

(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts?

(3) How many circumstances are there?

(4) Which are the most important of them?

Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance is that from “which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument.” But oratorical arguments are derived principally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is not an accident of a human act.

Objection 2: Further, “to be in” is proper to an accident. But that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of human acts.

Objection 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents of acts.

On the contrary, The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [*{ta kath’ ekasta}], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.

I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), “words are the signs of what we understand,” it must needs be that in naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, “the notion of distance has been transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition”: and in like manner words that signify local movement are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that the word “circumstance” has passed from located things to human acts.

Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly, whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is outside a thing’s substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should be called their accidents.

Reply to Objection 1: The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the circumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently, or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that the orator “adds strength to his argument,” as though this were something secondary.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. And in this sense circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as when the subject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the surface.

Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner in which the act is done.

Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts.

Objection 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that “no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry.” Therefore the theologian has not to consider circumstances.

Objection 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not a theologian's business to consider circumstances.

On the contrary, Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.

I answer that, Circumstances come under the consideration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on ([1060]Q[18], AA[10],11;[1061] Q[73], A[7]). Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary, according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above ([1062]Q[6], A[8]). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.

Reply to Objection 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly, since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.

Reply to Objection 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above [1063](A[1]), they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the consideration of art.

Reply to Objection 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they are deserving of reward or punishment.

Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics?

Objection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit, “when” and “where.”

Objection 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore all the circumstances are included under one, which is the “mode of acting.”

Objection 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance. Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, neither “who,” nor “why,” nor “about what,” are circumstances: since “who” refers to the efficient cause, “why” to the final cause, and “about what” to the material cause.

On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.

I answer that, Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:

“Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando—
Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when.”

For in acts we must take note of “who” did it, “by what aids” or “instruments” he did it, “what” he did, “where” he did it, “why” he did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which Tully includes in the circumstance "what."

The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as "time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting." It touches the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why"; as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance "who"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids."

Reply to Objection 1: Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.

Reply to Objection 2: This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a quality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act "valiantly for the sake of" the good of the virtue or fortitude, is not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a man by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.

Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act consists"?

Objection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important circumstances, namely, “why” and those “in which the act is, [*hen ois e praxis]” as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are not the most important circumstances.

Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance.

Objection 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the greatest importance.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] says that “the most important circumstances” are “why it is done” and “what is done.”

I answer that, As stated above ([1064]Q[1], A[1]), acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance “why”: and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance “what he did.” As to the other circumstances, they are more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.

Reply to Objection 1: By those things “in which the act is” the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the Philosopher, instead of the latter’s term—“in which the act is”—said, “what is done.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.

Reply to Objection 3: The person that does the act is the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act. As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.

OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.

Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end; viz. “volition,” “enjoyment,” and “intention”; we must consider: (1) volition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By what is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will is of good only?

(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?

(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means, by the same movement?

Whether the will is of good only?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil.

Objection 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will is a rational power, since it is “in the reason,” as is stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.

Objection 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we wish “not to walk,” or “not to speak”; and again at times we wish for future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not of good only.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “evil is outside the scope of the will,” and that “all things desire good.”

I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that “the good is that which all desire.”

But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that “the end is a good, or an apparent good.”

Reply to Objection 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called “volition” [*In Latin, ‘voluntas.’ To avoid confusion with “voluntas” (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may appear superfluous], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is in this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as “nolition”: wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.

Reply to Objection 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object; for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to be “beings of reason.” In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “to lack evil is considered as a good.”

Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?

Objection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that “volition is of the end, while choice is of the means.”

Objection 2: Further, “For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul” (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end and the means are in different genera of good: because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus “quality,” or “action,” or “passion”; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus “relation” (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

Objection 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the) helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.

On the contrary, In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is also of the means.

I answer that, The word “voluntas” sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]]. Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.

If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus “to understand” designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in morals the end is what principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the will.

Reply to Objection 2: There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are different genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but are as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now such like objects are always referred to the same power; for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by which color is seen.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong properly to that art.

Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 2) “where one thing is on account of another there is only one.” But the will does not will the means save on account of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.

Objection 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby it wills the end and the means.

Objection 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed to the end and to the means.

On the contrary, Acts are diversified according to their objects. But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.

I answer that, Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can be moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved to the end. Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the same movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the will is moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the principles.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.

Reply to Objection 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not the conversely.

Reply to Objection 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural movement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the end. But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the conclusions through the principles which are called "means." Hence it is that sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means.

The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else: wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not conversely.

OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?

(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?

(3) Whether the will moves itself?

(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?

(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?

(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?

Whether the will is moved by the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: “My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not.” But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

Objection 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.

Objection 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that “the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved.”

I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.

The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above ([1065]Q[1], A[2]), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the “art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding” (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good—i.e. the order of the whole army—by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.

On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).

Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.

Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

Objection 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

On the contrary, It is written (James 1:14): “Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured.” But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.

I answer that, As stated above [1066](A[1]), that which is apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): “According as a man is, such does the end seem to him.”

Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.

Reply to Objection 2: Men’s acts and choices are in reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, “by a despotic sovereignty,” as a slave is moved by his master, but by a “royal and politic sovereignty,” as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.

Whether the will moves itself?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality; since “movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such” [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.

Objection 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.

Objection 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above [1067](A[1]). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.

On the contrary, The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.

I answer that, As stated above [1068](A[1]), it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will’s object. Now, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.

Reply to Objection 2: The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.

Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.

Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of the will is not from anything exterior.

Objection 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above ([1069]Q[6], A[4]). But the violent act is one “the principle of which is outside the agent” [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the will cannot be moved by anything exterior.

Objection 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently. Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.

On the contrary, The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1]). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.

I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.

For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above [1070](A[3]), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).

Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves nature.

Reply to Objection 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add “without the concurrence of him that suffers violence.” This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same thing.

Reply to Objection 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.

Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) “the lower bodies are moved by the higher.” But the movements of the human body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.

Objection 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man’s will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that “the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts.” But they would be, if the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly bodies.

I answer that, It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.

But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the “will,” as stated in De Anima iii, 9, “is in the reason.” Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that “such is the will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on” [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.

But since it has been stated [1071](A[2]) that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (Cf. [1072]FP, Q[84], AA[6],7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v), “the wise man governs the stars”; which is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.

Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): “We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits.”

Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man’s will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle.

Objection 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man’s intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by an angel.

Objection 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things, according to Gn. 1:31: “God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good.” If, therefore man’s will were moved by God alone, it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby “we sin and whereby we do right,” as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:13): “It is God Who worketh in us” [Vulg.’you’] “both to will and to accomplish.”

I answer that, The movement of the will is from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing’s nature, can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone’s nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.

Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in the [1073]FP, Q[90], A[2]. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.

Reply to Objection 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.

Reply to Objection 2: Man’s intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man’s knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above [1074](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 3: God moves man’s will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on ([1075]Q[109], A[2]).

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?

(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?

(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?

(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?

Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.

Objection 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as “being hot” is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore no movement is natural to the will.

Objection 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.

On the contrary, The movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.

I answer that, As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word “nature” is used in a manifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense, that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense, it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements must be something naturally willed.

Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.

Reply to Objection 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are done voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.

Reply to Objection 2: In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is “the act of that which is in potentiality” (Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1). Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The Aristotelian theory was that fire’s proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God’s will, which is pure act, is always in the act of volition.

Reply to Objection 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a genus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as species there corresponds something one specifically; and to the individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or “what a thing is.”

And under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.

Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?

Objection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be moved of necessity by its object.

Objection 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.

Objection 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily: because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.

On the contrary, The rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational power, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.

I answer that, The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man’s power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one’s eyes away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.

Reply to Objection 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power. If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that which may be either true or false—viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said of the good.

Reply to Objection 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end, and without which the end cannot be attained, such as “to be” and “to live,” and the like. But other things without which the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the principles can still be true.

Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do”: and this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.

Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, “according as a man is, such does the end seem to him.” But it is not in man’s power to cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man’s power not to will that to which the passion inclines him.

Objection 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 4:7): “Thy lust [Vulg. ‘The lust thereof’] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore man’s will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.

I answer that, As stated above ([1076]Q[9], A[2]), the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.

Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will’s movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: “The evil which I will not, that I do—i.e. I desire”; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.

Reply to Objection 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.

Reply to Objection 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.

Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (Rom. 9:19): “Who resisteth His will?” Therefore God moves the will of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But “whatever God does in a thing is natural to it,” as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves it.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God’s operation would be ineffectual. Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore He does not of necessity move man’s will.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) “it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things.” Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.

Reply to Objection 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing—that it be subject to the Divine power.

Reply to Objection 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.

OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?

(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?

(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?

(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?

Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above ([1077]Q[3], A[4]), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but of the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the hearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to the appetite.

Objection 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive power.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin. x, 10,11): “To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake.” But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.

I answer that, “Fruitio” [enjoyment] and “fructus” [fruit] seem to refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which, matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that the word “fruition” is derived from sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and enjoying the end attained.

Reply to Objection 2: The perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained in the common, as stated above ([1078]Q[9], A[1]). Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the other powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.

Reply to Objection 3: In delight there are two things: perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.

Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that “it is given to us men to enjoy and to use.” Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.

Objection 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to enjoy.

Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): “It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure.”

I answer that, As was stated above [1079](A[1]) to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge.

Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at all.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.

Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his last end.

Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that “it is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy,” that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they “use.”

Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?

Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the Apostle says (Philem. 20): “Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord.” But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.

Objection 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says (Gal. 5:22): “The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace,” and other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.

Objection 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will: since “it is the will with which we enjoy,” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): “A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else.” But the last end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.

I answer that, As stated above [1080](A[1]) the notion of fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively, if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end, is properly called fruit; and this it is that one is properly said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only as referred to something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something delightful about it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10) that “we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein.” But its rest is not absolute save in the possession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), “if he had said, ‘May I enjoy thee,’ without adding ‘in the Lord,’ he would seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him”: as if we were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a means.

Reply to Objection 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight. Accordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore they are called “fruits of the spirit”: but not as though we are to enjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because “we should desire them for their own sake”: not indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find pleasure in them.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1081]Q[1], A[8];[1082] Q[2], A[7]), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created happiness which consists in enjoyment.

Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?

Objection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that “to enjoy is to use joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession.” But so long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1083](A[3]), enjoyment is not properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.

Objection 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.

On the contrary, “to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not possessed.

I answer that, To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end. Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in intention.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.

Reply to Objection 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent. Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it is possessed.

Reply to Objection 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.

OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?

(2) Whether it is only of the last end?

(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?

(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means?

(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?

Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (Mat. 6:22): “If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome”: where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention. But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Mat. 6:23): “If the light that is in thee be darkness,” etc. But light pertains to knowledge. Therefore intention does too.

Objection 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to the will but to the reason.

Objection 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that “the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul’s inner thought.” Therefore intention is an act of the will.

I answer that, Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, “to tend to something.” Now both the action of the mover and the movement of thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover. Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown above ([1084]Q[9], A[1]). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.

Reply to Objection 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes knowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our bodies.

Reply to Objection 2: Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).

Reply to Objection 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention" indicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something to the end.

Reply to Objection 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely; and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.

Whether intention is only of the last end?

Objection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end.

Objection 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore intention always regards the last end.

Objection 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention is too.

On the contrary, There is but one last end of human wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above ([1085]Q[1], A[7]). If, therefore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: which is evidently false.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both. Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be always of the last end.

Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.

Reply to Objection 2: A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.

Reply to Objection 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end, not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.

Whether one can intend two things at the same time?

Objection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17) that man’s intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to any other two things.

Objection 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same time.

Objection 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect. But “it is not possible to understand several things at the same time,” according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same time.

On the contrary, Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus “the tongue is for the purpose of taste and speech” (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that one can intend several ends at the same time.

I answer that, The expression “two things” may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things at the same time. For intention is not only of the last end, as stated above [1086](A[2]), but also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine and the giving of health.

But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus also a man can intend several things at the same time. This is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another, because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available: so that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last ends: since, as stated above ([1087]Q[1], A[5]), one man cannot have several last ends.

Reply to Objection 2: There can be several termini ordained to one another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. Now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended. For instance, the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1088]FP, Q[12], A[10]; [1089]FP, Q[58], A[2]; [1090]FP, Q[85], A[4] it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one.

Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that “the will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from the will to see, through the window, the passersby.” But that I should will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention; whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the means. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.

Objection 2: Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.

Objection 3: Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.

On the contrary, The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is the same movement as the willing of the means.

I answer that, The movement of the will to the end and to the means can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are really two movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: “I wish to take medicine for the sake of health,” I signify no more than one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the reason for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above ([1091]Q[8], A[3], ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct act; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is moved to either absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same object.

Reply to Objection 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end, as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means, it is called "intention." A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having determined the means which are the object of choice.

Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved in Phys. ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the end.

Objection 2: Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above ([1092]Q[11], A[2]). Therefore intention is too.

Objection 3: Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something. But irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore irrational animals intend an end.

On the contrary, Intention of an end implies ordaining something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals are void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.

I answer that, As stated above [1093](A[1]), to intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something by natural instinct. The other way of intending an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated above [1094](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end.

Reply to Objection 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.

Reply to Objection 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this belongs to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another, like other things that are moved naturally.

OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means. There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice: secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use.

Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?

(2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?

(3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?

(4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?

(5) Whether choice is only of possible things?

(6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?

Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason.

Objection 2: Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism, and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the reason that forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3, it seems that it is an act of reason.

Objection 3: Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an “ignorance of choice,” as is stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is “the desire of things in our power.” But desire is an act of will. Therefore choice is too.

I answer that, The word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either “intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect.” Now whenever two things concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that choice “is neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body, nor a mere soul, but both; so is it with choice.”

Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives a form or species from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is ordained by a superior: for if a man were to perform an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends to its object, according to the order of reason, since the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite. Accordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice is substantially not an act of the reason but of the will: for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.

Reply to Objection 1: Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself.

Reply to Objection 2: It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called “a decision” or “judgment,” to be followed by “choice.” And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which results from it.

Reply to Objection 3: In speaking “of ignorance of choice,” we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen.

Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose. For choice “is the desire of certain things on account of an end,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3. But irrational animals desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.

Objection 2: Further, the very word “electio” [choice] seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, “it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means.” But prudence is found in irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that “those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are prudent by instinct.” We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that “children and irrational animals act willingly but not from choice.” Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.

I answer that, Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above ([1095]Q[1], A[2], ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to several things.

Reply to Objection 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing. Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any choice.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Phys. iii, 3 “movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover.” Wherefore the power of the mover appears in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share in one nature, invariably act in the same way.

Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?

Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that “virtue makes us choose aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those things which are to be done for its sake.” But that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.

Objection 2: Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that “volition is of the end, but choice of the means.”

I answer that, As already stated (A[1], ad 2), choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is not a matter of choice.

But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science, from being the conclusion of another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science; so too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a matter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.

Reply to Objection 1: The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1096]Q[1], A[5]), there is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.

Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?

Objection 1: It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but also the organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with human acts.

Objection 2: Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.

Objection 3: Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man chooses save what he can do himself."

I answer that, Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when the end is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the physician produces health (wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the possession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means must needs be either an action; or a thing, with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always in regard to human acts.

Reply to Objection 1: The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of the end.

Reply to Objection 2: In contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that is put in contradistinction to contemplation.

Reply to Objection 3: When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post. Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser.

Whether choice is only of possible things?

Objection 1: It would seem that choice in not only of possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above [1097](A[1]). Now there is “a willing of impossibilities” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities.

Objection 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above [1098](A[4]). Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.

Objection 3: Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of the impossible.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that “there is no choice of impossibilities.”

I answer that, As stated above [1099](A[4]), our choice is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible things.

Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this is that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is impossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the business.

Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle. Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible. Therefore the impossible is not the object of choice.

Reply to Objection 1: The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends something under the universal notion of good: but the term or perfection of the will’s act is to be observed in its relation to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by some is called “velleity,” because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason for this is that the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible; but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.

Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?

Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But conclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).

Objection 2: Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is made necessarily.

On the contrary, Choice is an act of a rational power; which according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.

I answer that, Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will, act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. “to will” or “to act,” but also this, viz. “not to will” or “not to act.” Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil: and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of the means, as stated above [1100](A[3]); it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.

Reply to Objection 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered in that light.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason’s decision or judgment of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such matters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally; as, for instance, “If he runs, he is in motion.”

Reply to Objection 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other.

OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?

(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?

(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?

(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?

(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?

(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?

Whether counsel is an inquiry?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is “an act of the appetite.” But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

Objection 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive, as we have shown in the [1101]FP, Q[14], A[7]. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written (Eph. 1:11) that “He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” Therefore counsel is not inquiry.

Objection 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25): “Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel.” Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: “Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel.”

I answer that, Choice, as stated above ([1102]Q[13], A[1], ad 2; A[3]), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the “desire of what has been already counselled.”

Reply to Objection 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power: consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason’s direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the will—both as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do)—and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect influenced by appetite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.

Reply to Objection 2: The things that we say of God must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us science is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."

Reply to Objection 3: It may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.

Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.

Objection 2: Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel can be of the end.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that “counsel is not of the end, but of the means.”

I answer that, The end is the principle in practical matters: because the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of the end, but only of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something else; just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of another: and consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be looked upon as the means in another; and thus it will become an object of counsel.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel not about the end, but about the means.

Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will not, as such, be the matter of counsel.

Whether counsel is only of things that we do?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.

Objection 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.

Objection 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.

Objection 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: “We take counsel of things that are within our competency and that we are able to do.”

I answer that, Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.

Reply to Objection 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.

Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.

Reply to Objection 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection—thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument, for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about what he would do through his servant.

Whether counsel is about all things that we do?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the “desire of what is counselled” as stated above [1103](A[1]). But choice is about all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too.

Objection 2: Further, counsel implies the reason’s inquiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the reason’s inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that “if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this.” But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that we do.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that “counsel has no place in things that are done according to science or art.”

I answer that, Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above [1104](A[1]). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, “is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt” [*Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].

Reply to Objection 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.

Reply to Objection 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in all that is done by reason.

Reply to Objection 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is no need of counsel.

Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?

Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always proceed by way of analysis.

Objection 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one of analysis.

Objection 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that “he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze.”

I answer that, In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.

Reply to Objection 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about actions is contrary to the order of actions.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason begins with that which is first according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.

Reply to Objection 3: We should not want to know whether something to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be possible.

Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.

Objection 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason. Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.

Objection 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are self-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and uncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.

On the contrary, “No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly reach” (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the infinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.

I answer that, The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle, as stated above [1105](A[2]). The other principle is taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now these principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses—for instance, that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science; for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.

Reply to Objection 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.

Reply to Objection 2: Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take counsel about removing the obstacle.

Reply to Objection 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.

OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?

(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?

(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?

(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only?

Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.

Objection 2: Further, consent is “co-sense.” But sense is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.

Objection 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no sentence,” i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent does also.

I answer that, Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence it is written (Wis. 1:1): “Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness.” And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 9, “the will is in the reason.” Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes reason as including the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: “Assentire” [to assent] is, to speak, “ad aliud sentire” [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain distance from that to which assent is given. But “consentire” [to consent] is “to feel with,” and this implies a certain union to the object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the [1106]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [1107]FP, Q[27], A[4]; [1108]FP, Q[59], A[2], is more properly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other

[*In Latin rather than in English.]. We may also say that the intellect assents, in so far as it is moved by the will.

Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.

Objection 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is clearly false.

Objection 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “after judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and this is called the sentence,” i.e. consent. But counsel is not in irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.

I answer that, Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of the appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick. But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.

Reply to Objection 1: In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.

Reply to Objection 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.

Reply to Objection 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent to the end.

Objection 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.

Objection 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above ([1109]Q[13], A[1]). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “after the approval” which he calls “the sentence,” “comes the choice.” Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the “sentence,” i.e. the consent, takes place “when a man approves and embraces the judgment of his counsel.” But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the same applies to consent.

I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application. Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel’s decision is consent, properly speaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.

Reply to Objection 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents to that act.

Reply to Objection 3: Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet with our approval.

Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason. For “delight follows action, and perfects it, just as beauty perfects youth” [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}—as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4). But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only to the higher reason.

Objection 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.

Objection 3: Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its slave."

I answer that, The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs to the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the function of the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles, no judgment of the reason can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason includes the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it is ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art.

Reply to Objection 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.

Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.

OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether use is an act of the will?

(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?

(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?

(4) Of the relation of use to choice.

Whether use is an act of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that “to use is to refer that which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else.” But “to refer” something to another is an act of the reason to which it belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of the will.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man “goes forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then he makes use (of the powers) and this is called use.” But operation belongs to the executive power; and the act of the will does not follow the act of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. Therefore use is not an act of the will.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): “All things that were made were made for man’s use, because reason with which man is endowed uses all things by its judgment of them.” But judgment of things created by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems to be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of human acts. Therefore use is not an act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): “To use is to apply to something to purpose of the will.”

I answer that, The use of a thing implies the application of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the interior principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to see; but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident that we do not apply external things to an operation save through the interior principles which are either the powers of the soul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown above ([1110]Q[9], A[1]) that it is the will which moves the soul’s powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation. Hence it is evident that first and principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments are compared to the principal agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else. And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.

Reply to Objection 2: Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers.

Reply to Objection 3: Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers.

Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals, as stated above ([1111]Q[11], A[2]). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to use.

Objection 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance, their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to use.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational animal can make use of a thing."

I answer that, as stated above [1112](A[1]), to use is to apply an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q[15], AA[1],2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but a rational animal consents and uses.

Reply to Objection 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.

Reply to Objection 2: Animals by means of their members do something from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their members to action, nor do they use them.

Whether use regards also the last end?

Objection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): “Whoever enjoys, uses.” But man enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.

Objection 2: Further, “to use is to apply something to the purpose of the will” (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else, is the object of the will’s application. Therefore it can be the object of use.

Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that “Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image,” i.e. in the Son, “Use in the Gift,” i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore the last end can be the object of use.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): “No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him.” But God alone is the last end. Therefore we cannot use the last end.

I answer that, Use, as stated above [1113](A[1]), implies the application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is regarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said to be “useful”; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use.

It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For since the end, as stated above ([1114]Q[1], A[8];[1115] Q[2], A[7]), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the miser’s end is either money or the possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said to use it.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks in that end.

Reply to Objection 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will’s purpose, not only in being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.

Reply to Objection 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that “this love, delight, felicity, or happiness, is called use by him.”

Whether use precedes choice?

Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.

Objection 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.

Objection 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above ([1116]Q[9], A[3]). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent. But consent precedes choice as stated above ([1117]Q[15], A[3], ad 3). Therefore use does also.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses (the powers).” Therefore use follows choice.

I answer that, The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing subject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed. Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.

Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the last act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by use we mean the will’s use of the executive power in moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.

Reply to Objection 1: The motion of the will to the execution of the work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.

Reply to Objection 2: What is essentially relative is after the absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come after. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation.

Reply to Objection 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.

OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?

(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?

(3) Of the order between command and use

(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?

(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?

(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?

(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?

(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?

(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?

Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna says that there are four ways of moving, “by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling.” But it belongs to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above ([1118]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore command is an act of the will.

Objection 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.

Objection 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that “the appetite obeys reason.” Therefore command is an act of the reason.

I answer that, Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing, and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the will.

Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person says to another: “This is what you should do.” Sometimes, however, the reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is said to someone: “Do this.” Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated above ([1119]Q[9], A[1]). Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that the reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act.

Reply to Objection 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will as being “a free judgment arising from reason,” implying that reason is the root of liberty.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.

Whether command belongs to irrational animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, “the power that commands movement is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves.” But both powers are in irrational animals. Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.

Objection 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are composed of soul and body.

Objection 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as

Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.

On the contrary, Command is an act of reason, as stated above [1120] (A[1]). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.

I answer that, To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.

Reply to Objection 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.

Reply to Objection 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the directing reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid. Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.

Whether use precedes command?

Objection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above [1121] (A[1]). But, as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.

Objection 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end. Therefore it seems that use precedes command.

Objection 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16], A[1]). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above [1122](A[1]). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command. Therefore command precedes use.

I answer that, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as stated above ([1123]Q[16], A[4]). Wherefore still more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident that command precedes use.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when one commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes, rather than that it follows use.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.

Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?

Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.

Objection 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a distinct act from the act commanded.

Objection 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that “where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one.” But there is no commanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.

I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now “one” is predicated in the same way as “being.” And substance is being simply, whereas accident or being “of reason” is a being only in a certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole is being and substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species are many simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration of the reason.

Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many.

Reply to Objection 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since “the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act” (Phys. iii, 3).

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts. Because the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form one whole.

Reply to Objection 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the soul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.

Whether the act of the will is commanded?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): “The mind commands the mind to will, and yet it does not.” But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

Objection 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command; for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

Objection 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above [1124](A[1]); for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.

On the contrary, Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.

I answer that, As stated above [1125](A[1]), command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command perfectly.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.

Reply to Objection 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above ([1126]Q[9], A[4]). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.

Whether the act of the reason is commanded?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But it is the reason that commands, as stated above [1127](A[1]). Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.

Objection 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not commanded.

Objection 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.

On the contrary, That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “by his free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves.” Therefore the acts of the reason can be commanded.

I answer that, Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently its act can be commanded.

But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus, the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one’s reason. Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject to our command.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above ([1128]Q[9], A[3]), that is to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.

Reply to Objection 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the knowledge of the conclusions.

The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.

Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): “For I do not that good which I will”: and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.

Objection 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the [1129]FP, Q[65], A[4]; [1130]FP, Q[91], A[2]; [1131]FP, Q[110], A[2]. But the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man’s command.

Objection 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says: “That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the irascible,” which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.

I answer that, An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in our power, as stated above [1132](A[5]). Consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body.

Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the command of reason.

Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not by a “despotic supremacy,” which is that of a master over his slave; but by a “politic and royal supremacy,” whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.

Reply to Objection 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.” This may also happen through a sudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart, which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers, is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power, due to some organic indisposition.

Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are the powers of the vegetal soul.

Objection 2: Further, man is called a “little world” [*Aristotle, Phys. viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world. But God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.

Objection 3: Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their contrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] sats that “the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason has no control.”

I answer that, Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual appetite. But the reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those acts that proceed from the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says “that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers.” Consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the command of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest.

Reply to Objection 2: The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the world is wholly subject to His command.

Reply to Objection 3: Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e. digestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation and nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use thereof.

Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?

Objection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as stated above [1133] (A[8]). Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.

Objection 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason: for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that “the pulse is not controlled by reason.” Therefore the movement of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that “the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold.” Therefore the movements of the members are not obedient to reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): “The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely can one discern obedience from command.”

I answer that, The members of the body are organs of the soul’s powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members, that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.

Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is called “vital.” For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin is transmitted to posterity.

But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of this particular member's insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," and that the reason of this is as follows. These members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply OBJ 2).

OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the good or evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.

Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general; the second, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of external acts.

Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?

(2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its object?

(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?

(4) Whether it is derived from the end?

(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?

(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?

(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?

(8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?

(9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?

(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?

(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places the moral action in the species of good or evil?

Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not, save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action is evil.

Objection 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph. ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.

Objection 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 3:20): “Every one that doth evil, hateth the light.” Therefore some actions of man are evil.

I answer that, We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that it produces.

Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the [1134]FP, Q[5], AA[1],3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness, and is said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being is of the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being, it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a certain respect, as was stated in the [1135]FP, Q[5], A[1], ad 1. We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.

Reply to Objection 1: Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.

Reply to Objection 3: An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.

Whether the good or evil of a man’s action is derived from its object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But “evil is not in things, but in the sinner’s use of them,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or evil of a human action is not derived from their object.

Objection 2: Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object.

Objection 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not depend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from their object.

On the contrary, It is written (Osee 9:10): “They became abominable as those things which they loved.” Now man becomes abominable to God on account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his action is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to the goodness of his action.

I answer that, as stated above [1136](A[1]) the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an action “good in its genus”; for instance, “to make use of what is one’s own.” And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead of a man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance, “to take what belongs to another.”

And this action is said to be “evil in its genus,” genus here standing for species, just as we apply the term “mankind” to the whole human species.

Reply to Objection 1: Although external things are good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that action. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the quality of goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: The object is not the matter “of which” (a thing is made), but the matter “about which” (something is done); and stands in relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species.

Reply to Objection 3: The object of the human action is not always the object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive; in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of the active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since movement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness.

Whether man’s action is good or evil from a circumstance?

Objection 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action, as being outside it, as stated above ([1137]Q[7], A[1]). But “good and evil are in things themselves,” as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an action does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance.

Objection 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art: because “no art takes notice of what is accidental” (Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.

Objection 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an action can be good or evil in its genus as stated above [1138](A[2]). Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.

I answer that, In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.

Reply to Objection 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.

Reply to Objection 3: Since good and being are convertible; according as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and in moral actions.

Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?

Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “nothing acts with a view to evil.” If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.

Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not said to be good or bad according to its end.

Objection 3: Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action is not good or evil from its end.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that “if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also is evil.”

I answer that, The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.

Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above [1139](A[1]). Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.

Reply to Objection 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good. And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to the action.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since “evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete cause,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?

Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated above [1140](A[1]). But good and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.

Objection 2: Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action is not constituted in a species through being evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.

Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species produce different effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.

Objection 4: Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a circumstance, as stated above [1141](A[3]). But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or malice.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) “like habits produce like actions.” But a good and a bad habit differ in species, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad actions differ in species.

I answer that, Every action derives its species from its object, as stated above [1142](A[2]). Hence it follows that a difference of object causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed that a difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions, according as the latter are referred to one active principle, which does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to another active principle. Because nothing accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object may be essential in reference to one active principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ essentially in reference to sense, but not in reference to the intellect.

Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “the good of man is to be in accordance with reason,” and evil is “to be against reason.” For that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that the difference of good and evil considered in reference to the object is an essential difference in relation to reason; that is to say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral, inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human actions; since essential differences cause a difference of species.

Reply to Objection 1: Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.

Reply to Objection 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, not because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another’s property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.

Reply to Objection 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect.

Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.

Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?

Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of an action.

Objection 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the species, as stated above [1143](A[5]). But it is accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.

Objection 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.

On the contrary, It has been shown above ([1144]Q[1], A[3]) that human actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species of actions.

I answer that, Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above ([1145]Q[1], A[1]). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the external action: and each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own proper object.

Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that “he who steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief.”

Reply to Objection 1: The end also has the character of an object, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form to matter.

Reply to Objection 3: When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.

Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its species from its object, as stated above ([1146]AA[2],6). But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this species be not contained under the proper species of that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from the object.

Objection 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is something last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is contained under the species derived from the object, as its most specific species.

Objection 3: Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above [1147](A[6]). Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as the most specific species is contained under the subaltern genus.

On the contrary, Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus.

I answer that, The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute the species of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: “Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals without wings”; for “winged” and “wingless” are not essential determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would be correct: “Some animals have feet, some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many”: because the latter division is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other.

It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.

Reply to Objection 1: One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species, as stated above ([1148]Q[1], A[3], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species.

Reply to Objection 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more universal.

Whether any action is indifferent in its species?

Objection 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good and evil.

Objection 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their end or object, as stated above [1149](A[6]; Q[1], A[3]). But every end and every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or evil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [1150](A[1]), an action is said to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it lacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is indifferent.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that “there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment.” Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species.

I answer that, As stated above ([1151]AA[2],5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms to a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their species.

Reply to Objection 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation “as a result” [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation “in process” [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health; not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary of the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be something between good and evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or malice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this that we are here treating.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.

Whether an individual action can be indifferent?

Objection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an individual. But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated above [1152](A[8]). Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.

Objection 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.

Objection 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.

On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): “An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive of just necessity or pious utility.” But an idle word is an evil, because “men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of judgment” (Mat. 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good.

Therefore every word is either good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.

I answer that, It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above [1153](A[3]), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.

If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.

Reply to Objection 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species demands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly, specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition of his species that he should not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his species.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because he hurts none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or bad, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice. Thus, if a man’s action is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other actions.

Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.

Objection 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above ([1154]Q[7], A[1]). But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.

Objection 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a moral action in a species of good or evil.

On the contrary, Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.

I answer that, Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above [1155] (A[5]). But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further.

And consequently that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate another's property is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species of theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.

Reply to Objection 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance implies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said above (A[7], ad 1;[1156] Q[1], A[3], ad 3).

Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it differ in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a species.

Objection 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new species of good or evil.

Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “evil is caused by each single defect.” Now every circumstance that increases malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since the good consists in “number, weight, and measure” ([1157]FP, Q[5], A[5]).

On the contrary, More and less do not change a species. But more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good or evil.

I answer that, As stated above [1158](A[10]), a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.

Reply to Objection 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by differing in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.

Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself, but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.

Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil.

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?

(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?

(3) Whether it depends on reason?

(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?

(5) Whether erring reason binds?

(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?

(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end?

(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?

(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine Will?

(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than to what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.

Objection 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the end, but goodness of making is never the end": because the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.

Objection 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the object.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly, virtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.

I answer that, Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as much as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above

([1159]Q[18], A[5]). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects.

Reply to Objection 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be man’s last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated above ([1160]Q[1], A[1], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated above ([1161]Q[18], A[5]).

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as we have shown above ([1162]Q[18] , A[4]). Therefore the act also of the will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.

Objection 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above ([1163]Q[18], A[3]). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on the circumstances.

Objection 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, as stated above ([1164]Q[6], A[8]). But it would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and not only on the object.

On the contrary, An action does not take its species from the circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good and evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated above [1165] (A[1]). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.

I answer that, In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.

Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto: because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are accidents, as it were, of the act.

Reply to Objection 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.

Reply to Objection 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed on something good: since to will to do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time. And then evil results, not from his willing that particular good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the other circumstances.

Reply to Objection 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.

Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above ([1166]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is “a truth that is in conformity with right desire.” But right desire is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will, rather than conversely.

Objection 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers, as stated above ([1167]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. x): “It is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason.” But the goodness of the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.

I answer that, As stated above ([1168]AA[1],2), the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will’s object is proposed to it by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive appetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends on the object.

Reply to Objection 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a good that is not previously apprehended by reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension of the end.

Reply to Objection 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above ([1169]Q[9], A[1]).

Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, “a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured” (Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human will depends.

Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the goodness of our will depends.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that “sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law.” But malice of the will is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.

I answer that, Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause: since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness. Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6,7): “Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance." It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.

Reply to Objection 1: To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.

Reply to Objection 2: A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is not.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.

Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated above [1170](A[4]). But erring reason is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with erring reason.

Objection 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.

On the contrary, As stated in the [1171]FP, Q[79], A[13], conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is written (Rom. 14:23): “All that is not of faith”—i.e. all that is against conscience—“is sin.” Therefore the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.

I answer that, Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the FP, Q[19], A[13]), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire “whether an erring conscience binds.” On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil. On the other hand if a man’s reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man’s reason or conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or conscience is not evil.

But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above [1172](A[3]), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 9) that “properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not follow false reason.” We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or erring, is always evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason was dictating something contrary to God’s commandment, he would not be bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being something contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species of malice.

Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason, tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.

Objection 2: Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by erring reason.

Objection 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.

On the contrary, The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to Jn. 16:2: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God." Therefore the will can be evil, when it abides by erring reason.

I answer that, Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance. For it was said (Q[6], A[8]) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above [1173](A[2]); it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but not, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q[6], A[8]) that when ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance "directly" voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, which is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]).

If then reason or conscience err with an error that is involuntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience, from being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another man's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound to know. But if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently in order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.

Reply to Objection 2: The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can. Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right, nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose a man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary.

Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above [1174](A[2]) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end.

Objection 2: Further, to wish to keep God’s commandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end.

Objection 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end. Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.

I answer that, The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine edn.: ‘accompanying’] it. The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast for God’s sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from the very fact that it is done for God’s sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above ([1175]AA[1],2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the end.

On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention.

Reply to Objection 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the object, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but that which is repeated.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause." Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil, it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good.

Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Mat. 12:35, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good as he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated above [1176](A[7]). Therefore the goodness of a man's will is according to the goodness of his intention.

Objection 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will. Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.

Objection 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good intended.

On the contrary, The intention can be good, while the will is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will less good.

I answer that, In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.

If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.

But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above ([1177]Q[12], A[4];[1178] Q[18], A[6]). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon the intense volition of medicine.

We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on ([1179]Q[20] , A[4];[1180] Q[114], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another gloss says on the same passage that “the treasure of the heart is the intention, according to which God judges our works.” For the goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be meritorious in God’s sight.

Reply to Objection 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).

Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible for man’s will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of Isa. 55:9: “As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts.” If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would follow that it is impossible for man’s will to be good. Which is inadmissible.

Objection 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will to be conformed to the Divine will.

Objection 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be conformed to His.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 26:39): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright and to tend to God," as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr. in Ps. 32, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will.

I answer that, As stated above [1181](A[7]), the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.

Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.

Reply to Objection 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.

From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third Objections.

Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.

Objection 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.

Objection 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes be contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against filial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed.

On the contrary, (1) On Ps. 32:1, “Praise becometh the upright,” a gloss says: “That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills.” But everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what God wills.

(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.

(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has an evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.

I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above ([1182]AA[3],5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of view. And therefore if a man’s will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of another—e.g. the thief’s wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.

Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the more universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the example given above: because the judge has care of the common good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief’s death, which has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate; whereas the thief’s wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.

But a man’s will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.

At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a man's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God wishes him to will.

There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause, consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper object of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good. Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed. But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not will the damnation of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as death, because, “He wills all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of God's justice and of the natural order.

Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.

To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed; because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.

To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the object considered materially.

To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under the same aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is no question of this here.

OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?

(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?

(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?

(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?

(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?

(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?

Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action?

Objection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness from its object, as stated above ([1183]Q[19], AA[1],2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.

Objection 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above ([1184]Q[1], A[1], ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act of the will.

Objection 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above ([1185]Q[18], A[6]). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that “it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright.” Therefore moral good and evil are first in the will.

I answer that, External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the will’s proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason’s ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.

Reply to Objection 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.

Reply to Objection 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.

Reply to Objection 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.

Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written (Mat. 7:18): “A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” But, according to the gloss, the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.

Objection 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that “there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good.”

I answer that, As stated above [1186](A[1]), we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.

Now it must be observed, as was noted above ([1187]Q[19], A[6], ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external action is evil.

Reply to Objection 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed and from the end intended.

Reply to Objection 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.

Reply to Objection 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.

Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external action. For the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the principles of action are different, the actions themselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the same as that of the external action.

Objection 2: Further, “A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and renders its action good also” (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the goodness of the external action, which belongs to the power commanded.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated above ([1188]AA[1],2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.

On the contrary, It was shown above ([1189]Q[18], A[6]) that the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that which results from the material and formal element is one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external action, and sometimes not. For as we have already said ([1190]AA[1],2), these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things that are subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is subordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.

We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end, and of the external action, which regards the end through the medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct from the goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above ([1191]AA[1],2).

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the internal and external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated above ([1192]Q[17], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: thus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically. But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the healthiness of the animal’s body; nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other.

Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?

Objection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Mat.): “It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished for doing evil.” Now works are the witnesses of the will. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may understand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according to God’s judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that of the interior act.

Objection 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external acts are one and the same, as stated above [1193](A[3]). But increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external action does not add to the goodness or malice of the interior act.

Objection 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom. But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as stated above ([1194]AA[1],2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or malice of the other.

On the contrary, Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be added, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.

I answer that, If we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action adds nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in good things, or worse in evil things. This, seemingly, may happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil end in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it, the act of his will is doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly, in point of extension: when, for instance, a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in point of intensity: for these are certain external actions, which, in so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to make the will more intense or more remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.

On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands in relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term. Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible, as long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action, is simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple involuntariness fail to do good or evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man’s will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the impossibility of achievement.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But the goodness which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; but it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause, as stated above ([1195]AA[1],2).

From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.

Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually in its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue “makes that which has it to be good” (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.

Objection 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these redound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1: “My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown.” Therefore the consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice.

Objection 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (Dt. 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” But the punishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is written (Ex. 21:29): “But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.” But he would not have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an action.

Objection 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.

On the contrary, The consequences do not make an action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and, in like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an action doe not increase its goodness or malice.

I answer that, The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.

But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.

Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.

Reply to Objection 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from the preacher’s words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. Hence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such is his intention.

Reply to Objection 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.

Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can be both good and evil. For “movement, if continuous, is one and the same” (Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and bad: for instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the same action can be both good and bad.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3), action and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ’s was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one and the same act can be both good and evil.

Objection 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of his master, the servant’s action is his master’s, just as the action of a tool is the workman’s action. But it may happen that the servant’s action result from his master’s good will, and is therefore good: and from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the same action can be both good and evil.

On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be both good and evil.

On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be both good and evil.

I answer that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus of color, if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural order; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and vice versa, as we have stated above (A[3], ad 1;[1196] Q[18], A[7], ad 1). For continuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order: but it may resolve itself into many actions, considered in the moral order, if a change take place in the walker’s will, for the will is the principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil. Whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it can be both good and evil.

Reply to Objection 1: This continual movement which proceeds from various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in the point of moral unity.

Reply to Objection 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order, in so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are voluntary in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.

Reply to Objection 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but only in so far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect.

OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?

(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?

(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?

(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?

Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?

Objection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature" (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil.

Objection 2: Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that the malice of an action does not make it sinful.

Objection 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false: since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.

On the contrary, As shown above ([1197]Q[19], A[4]), the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently its malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that “sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law.” Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.

I answer that, Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an action strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.

Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is evident from what has been said ([1198]Q[19], AA[3],4) that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from a sin in nature’s action.

Reply to Objection 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of the last end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever; since when nature works it forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended, because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be right or sinful.

Reply to Objection 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end, consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the [1199]FP, Q[48], A[5], ad 4; A[6], ad 3.

Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For “sin happens even in things done by nature” (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, consequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being good.

Objection 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii, 8 “it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine.” But the artist is not blamed for making something bad: because the artist’s work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it is evil.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is “weak and incapable.” But weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that “virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve censure and blame.” But good actions are virtuous; because “virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good” (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good or evil.

I answer that, Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made clear above ([1200]Q[1], AA[1],2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.

Reply to Objection 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, although there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since therefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated above [1201](A[1]), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art. First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or produce something good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then he will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of reason to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues,” which prudence directs, “he is the reverse.”

Reply to Objection 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man’s power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.

Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are not all related to another person, for some are related to the person of the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is meritorious or demeritorious.

Objection 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or evil purpose.

Objection 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil. Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 3:10,11): “Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.”

I answer that, We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another’s advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society: although retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be just to himself.

It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards another.

Reply to Objection 1: A man’s good or evil actions, although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his, in respect of which he is bound to serve the community.

Reply to Objection 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.

Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that man’s actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated above [1202](A[3]), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man’s action, good or evil, does no good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6,7): “If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?” Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.

Objection 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his action; hence it is written (Is. 10:15): “Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?” where man while acting is evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God’s sight, by good or evil deeds.

Objection 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in God’s sight.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 12:14): “All things that are done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil.” Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit in God’s sight.

I answer that, A human action, as stated above [1203](A[3]), acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man’s last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Q[19], A[10]). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the [1204]FP, Q[103], A[5]: and especially of rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions are no business of God’s.

Reply to Objection 1: God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above

([1205]Q[9], A[6], ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit in God’s sight.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is concerned.

TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)

OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL’S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and goodness.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?

(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?

(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?

Whether any passion is in the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of matter and form, as stated in the [1206]FP, Q[75], A[5]. Therefore there is no passion in the soul.

Objection 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore passion is not in the soul.

Objection 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since “every passion, when increased, alters the substance,” as is stated in Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): “When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members.” Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as being “of sins,” are in the soul.

I answer that, The word “passive” is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to be passive. Secondly, the word “passive” is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal’s body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of “feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion” (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the “composite” is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4.

Reply to Objection 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in De Anima i, 3.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not found in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.

Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?

Objection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. ii, 1. Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.

Objection 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part.

Objection 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that “the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them passions.” From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part.

I answer that, As we have already stated [1207](A[1]) the word “passion” implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that “good and evil,” i.e. the objects of the appetitive power, “are in things themselves.” On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason of an “intention” of the thing, which “intention” it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that “the true and the false,” which pertain to knowledge, “are not in things, but in the mind.” Consequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.

Reply to Objection 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers.

Reply to Objection 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1208]FP, Q[78], A[3] the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an “intention” of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and natural change, which affects their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the organ; for instance, “anger is” said to be “a kindling of the blood about the heart.” Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a corporeal organ.

Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii) Hierotheus “to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering [patiens] them.” But the sensitive appetite cannot “suffer” Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive appetite.

Objection 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite.

Objection 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: “Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil.”

I answer that, As stated above [1209](A[1]) passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above.

Reply to Objection 1: By “suffering” Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place without any alteration in the body.

Reply to Objection 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive.

Reply to Objection 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): “The holy angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours.”

HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?

(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?

(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?

(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?

Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?

Objection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.

Objection 2: Further, on the words of Mat. 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties.

Objection 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the [1210]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part.

I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers have different objects, as stated in the [1211]FP, Q[77], A[3], the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.

In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these powers. For we have stated in the [1212]FP, Q[81], A[2], that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [1213]FP, Q[81], A[2], the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.

Reply to Objection 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.

Reply to Objection 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.

Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the irascible passions.

Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil.

Objection 3: Further, “every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal,” as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as “good is what all desire” (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.

On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.

I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.

Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above [1214](A[1]), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.

On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called “daring.” Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear).

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.

Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?

Objection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above [1215](A[1]). But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary.

Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a contrary.

Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above [1216](A[2]). But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.

On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore not every passion has a contrary.

I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of “sadness,” which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of “anger.” But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.

In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.

Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.

Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.

Objection 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.

Objection 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as stated above [1217](A[2]): whereas the third difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.

On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another.

I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion.

Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of “love”: the corresponding contrary of which is “hatred” in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of “desire” or “concupiscence”: and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of “aversion” or “dislike.” Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of “delight” or “joy”; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is “sorrow” or “sadness.”

On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have “hope” and “despair.” In respect of evil not yet present we have “fear” and “daring.” But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above [1218](A[3]). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of “anger.”

Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.

Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.

From this the replies to the objections are evident.

OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?

(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?

(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?

(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?

Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since “morals are properly predicated of man,” as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil.

Objection 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in “being in accord, or in disaccord with reason,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1219]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions.” But we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: “They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good.”

I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above ([1220]Q[18] , A[5]). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

Reply to Objection 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man.

Reply to Objection 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as “they partake of reason in some sort” (Ethic. i, 13).

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: “For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason.”

Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that “some call the soul’s passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore these passions are morally evil.

Objection 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions of sins" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works."

I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of the soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound."

On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that “every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound.” For passions are not called “diseases” or “disturbances” of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason.

Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to deviate always from the order of natural reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.

Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?

Objection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): “All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship and pity.” Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.

Objection 2: Further, the more a man’s action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): “Be ye followers of God, as most dear children.” But “God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the unhappy,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without passion, than he who does with passion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven.” But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.

I answer that, As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man’s good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man’s good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above ([1221]Q[17], A[7]), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason.

Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite; according to Ps. 83:3: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God”: where by “heart” we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by “flesh” the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an action.

Reply to Objection 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.

Reply to Objection 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous.

Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?

Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, nothing accidental belongs to a thing’s species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species.

Objection 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.

Objection 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “pity is a kind of virtue.” Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species.

I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts ([1222]Q[18], AA[5],6;[1223] Q[20], A[1])—viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite, but essentially.

Reply to Objection 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to evil, are themselves evil.

Reply to Objection 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard to the soul's passions.

OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;

(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;

(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;

(4) The four principal passions.

Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.

Objection 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; [1224]FP, Q[81], A[2]). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions.

Objection 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.

On the contrary, The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the irascible.

I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we find something relating to movement—e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.

Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.

But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.

Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.

Reply to Objection 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object leads to the same conclusion.

Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.

Objection 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.

Objection 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.

I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil—that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.

Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above ([1225]Q[11], A[3], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for “words are signs of thoughts,” as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love.” Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.

Reply to Objection 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.

Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.

Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. Since, therefore, “things are names from their chief characteristic” (cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and surpasses hope.

Objection 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And consequently it seems that hope does not precede them.

Objection 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.

On the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty.

I answer that, As stated above [1226](A[1]) all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], AA[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.

Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this—that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.

And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.

Reply to Objection 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining the end.

Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.

Objection 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four principal passions.

Objection 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another.

On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says:

“Banish joys: banish fears:
Away with hope: away with tears.”

I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.

As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite’s common tendency to desire or shun something.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.

Reply to Objection 2: These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply OBJ 3).

Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.

OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the irascible faculty.

The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness.

Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?

(2) Whether love is a passion?

(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?

(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?

Whether love is in the concupiscible power?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that “love is in the concupiscible power.”

I answer that, Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in some other: and this is called the “natural appetite.” Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author of their nature, as stated in the [1227]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2; [1228]FP, Q[103], A[1], ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the “sensitive appetite,” which, however, in man, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the “will.”

Now in each of these appetites, the name “love” is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called “natural love”: thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called “natural love.” In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called “sensitive love,” or “intellectual” or “rational love.” So that sensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.

Reply to Objection 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul’s powers, and also in all the parts of the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.

iv), “Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things”; since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it.

Whether love is a passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a passion.

Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that “love is a passion.”

I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called “natural love.” In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For “the appetitive movement is circular,” as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called “love,” and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is “desire”; and lastly, there is rest which is “joy.” Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.

Reply to Objection 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that “love is a unitive force” (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.

Reply to Objection 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein.

Whether love is the same as dilection?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, “as four is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines.” But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection denote the same thing.

Objection 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. Therefore these are the same.

Objection 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that “dilection refers to good things, love to evil things, as some have maintained,” according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that “it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection.”

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does.”

I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, in this, that “friendship,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), “is like a habit,” whereas “love” and “dilection” are expressed by way of act or passion; and “charity” can be taken either way.

Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the Latin “carus” (dear)].

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same as dilection.

Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that “a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love.” However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference spoken of.

Reply to Objection 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word “love” signifies something more Godlike than “dilection,” was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.

Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For “love is a passion, while friendship is a habit,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as “animal.” But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a division of love.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on “usefulness,” that which is founded on “pleasure,” and that which is founded on “goodness.” But useful and pleasant friendship are not without concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship.

On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus “a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness which he desires”; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), “to love is to wish good to someone.” Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.

Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another’s good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another’s good, is relative love.

Reply to Objection 1: Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.

OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?

(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?

(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?

(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?

Whether good is the only cause of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul”: else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of love.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “we love those who acknowledge their evils.” Therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not “the good” only but also “the beautiful is beloved by all.”

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): “Assuredly the good alone is beloved.” Therefore good alone is the cause of love.

I answer that, As stated above ([1229]Q[26], A[1]), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated above ([1230]Q[26], AA[1],2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.

Reply to Objection 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or such like.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy.

Reply to Objection 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.

Whether knowledge is a cause of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

Objection 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

Objection 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that “none can love what he does not know.”

I answer that, As stated above [1231](A[1]), good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.

Reply to Objection 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.

Reply to Objection 2: Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.

This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; cf. [1232]FP, Q[6], A[1], ad 2).

Whether likeness is a cause of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that “among the proud there are always contentions”; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that “potters quarrel with one another.” Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that “a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an actor, but would not himself be an actor.” But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

Objection 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain their friendship for the dead.” But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): “Every beast loveth its like.”

I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.

Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.

Now it has been stated above ([1233]Q[26], A[4]), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other’s likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why “potters quarrel among themselves,” because they hinder one another’s gain: and why “there are contentions among the proud,” because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.

Reply to Objection 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with his own natural reason.

Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.

Objection 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): “When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all, even if we see how beautiful it is.” Therefore hope too is a cause of love.

On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).

I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another.

Reply to Objection 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.

Reply to Objection 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing’s being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is loved.

OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether union is an effect of love?

(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?

(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?

(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?

(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?

(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?

Whether union is an effect of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): “Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always” (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), “and not only when I am present with you.” Therefore union is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above ([1234]Q[27], A[3]). Therefore union is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a “unitive love.”

I answer that, The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man’s “other self” (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), “Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul.”

The first of these unions is caused “effectively” by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused “formally” by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that “love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved.” For in describing it as “uniting” he refers to the union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that “it seeks to unite,” he refers to real union.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.

Reply to Objection 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above ([1235]Q[27], A[3]). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), “Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one,” but since “this would result in either one or both being destroyed,” they seek a suitable and becoming union—to live together, speak together, and be united together in other like things.

Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused by knowledge.

Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa.

Objection 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above [1236](A[1]). Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:16): “He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him.” Now charity is the love of God.

Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.

I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Phil. 1:7, “For that I have you in my heart”: while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God’s Love, that He “searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God” (1 Cor. 2:10).

As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover’s heart. For this reason we speak of love as being “intimate”; and “of the bowels of charity.” On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend’s will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends “to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend’s sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover.

In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.

Reply to Objection 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.

Reply to Objection 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.

Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.

Objection 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.

Objection 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above [1237](A[1]). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the Divine love produces ecstasy,” and that “God Himself suffered ecstasy through love.” Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love causes ecstasy.

I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.

The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above [1238](A[2]), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man’s affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.

Reply to Objection 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself.

Whether zeal is an effect of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3): “Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: ‘envying’] and contention,” etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.

Objection 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.

Objection 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): “I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked.” Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things.”

I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is “a movement towards the object loved,” as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it.

But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Ps. 36:1): “Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity.”

On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend’s good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend’s good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend’s good. In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God’s behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 3 Kings 19:14: “With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts.” Again on the words of Jn. 2:17: “The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up,” a gloss says that “a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.

Reply to Objection 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.

Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?

Objection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: for it is written (Cant 2:5): “Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples; because I languish with love.” Therefore love is a wounding passion.

Objection 2: Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written (Cant 5:6): “My soul melted when my beloved spoke.” Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion.

Objection 3: Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim’s love, includes “hot” and “piercing” and “most fervent.” Moreover it is said of love (Cant 8:6) that “its lamps are fire and flames.” Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “everything loves itself with a love that holds it together,” i.e. that preserves it. Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects.

I answer that, As stated above ([1239]Q[26], AA[1],2;[1240] Q[27], A[1]), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to Osee 9:10: “They became abominable, as those things which they loved.”

And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.

In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor, and fervor. Of these the first is “melting,” which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above [1241](A[2]). Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence, which is denoted by “languor” (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term “ailment” chiefly to sadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by “fervor.” And these are the effects of love considered formally, according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate to the above, in respect of a change in the organ.

Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?

Objection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above ([1242]Q[26], A[2]). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.

Objection 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all things are not done from love.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good."

I answer that, Every agent acts for an end, as stated above ([1243]Q[1], A[2]). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every action from love of some kind.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [1244](A[5]; Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on ([1245]Q[29], A[2]).

OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?

(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?

(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?

(4) Whether a man can hate himself?

(5) Whether a man can hate the truth?

(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?

Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.

Objection 2: Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence (2 Macc 3:1) some are praised for that “the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls [Douay: ‘his soul’] had no evil.” If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.

On the contrary, Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above ([1246]Q[26], A[1];[1247] Q[27], A[1]). Therefore the object of hatred is evil.

I answer that, Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above ([1248]Q[26], A[1]). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil is the object of hatred.

Reply to Objection 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good.

Reply to Objection 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.

Whether love is a cause of hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For “the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous” (Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.

Objection 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.

Objection 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by love.

I answer that, As stated above [1249](A[1]), love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.

Reply to Objection 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.

Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one’s hating its contrary.

Reply to Objection 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement.

Whether hatred is stronger than love?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): “There is no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires pleasure.” But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

Objection 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love.

On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because “evil does nothing except in virtue of good,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred.

I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above stated [1250] (A[2]). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely.

But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul’s movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil.

Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x,

12) that “love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love.” And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love.

Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure.

Whether a man can hate himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written (Ps. 10:6): “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul.” But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.

Objection 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.

Objection 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that “avarice makes a man hateful”; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that “no man ever hated his own flesh.”

I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for “evil is outside the scope of the will,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above ([1251]Q[26], A[4]). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking.

But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself.

Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain.

Reply to Objection 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.

Whether a man can hate the truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, therefore, can he hate the truth.

Objection 2: Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man can hate the truth.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though it were an assertion: “I am become,” etc.]

I answer that, Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is “what all things seek.” Wherefore good, as such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.

Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true. Secondly, according as truth is in man’s knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is said (Job 21:14): “We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.” Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men “love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it reproves.” This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one’s desire.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered in itself, is a desirable thing.

Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred.

Objection 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred.

Objection 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But “evil is in things, and not in the mind” (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter.”

I answer that, There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter, on which every sensitive power is based.

Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal—for instance, a wolf in regard to a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in general.”

But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the universal in both ways.

Reply to Objection 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is given by abstraction.

Reply to Objection 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance with others, so as to be hateful to them.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension or appetite.

OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?

(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?

(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?

Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according to Wis. 6:21: “The concupiscence [Douay: ‘desire’] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom.” But the sensitive appetite can have no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.

Objection 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): “There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.” But desire for God’s commandments is an act of concupiscence, according to Ps. 118:20: “My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy justifications.” Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite.

Objection 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, and not only in the sensitive appetite.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that “the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive.” Therefore concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), “concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant.” Now pleasure is twofold, as we shall state later on ([1252]Q[31], AA[3],4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word “concupiscentia.” Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it.

Reply to Objection 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. 83:3: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.”

Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension. But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.

Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the concupiscible faculty.

Objection 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above ([1253]Q[23], A[4]). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend makes us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad": from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.

On the contrary, Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. Hence it is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion.

I answer that, As stated above [1254](A[1]; Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the nature of the active object, causes a material difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which the passions differ specifically.

Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs according as it is really present, or absent: because, according as it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence is a passion differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ "in number."

Reply to Objection 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered as past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particular things.

Reply to Objection 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect of good to come: so that it includes both love and hope.

Reply to Objection 3: The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and evil as arduous.

Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no concupiscence is natural.

Objection 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and those that are not.

Objection 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not natural.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural.

I answer that, As stated above [1255](A[1]), concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to be called “cupidity.”

Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them “common” and “necessary.” But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are “irrational,” but the latter, “rational.” And because different men reason differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) “peculiar and acquired,” i.e. in addition to those that are natural.

Reply to Objection 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, 11).

Reply to Objection 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the [1256]FP, Q[78], A[4]; [1257]FP, Q[81], A[3]: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular imagination.

Whether concupiscence is infinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.

Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.

Objection 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things."

I answer that, As stated above [1258](A[3]), concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (Jn. 4:13): “Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again.”

But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above [1259](A[3]), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible.

Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any other things.

Reply to Objection 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that “from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken” (Phys. iii, 6).

Reply to Objection 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars.

Reply to Objection 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization of each object of his concupiscence.

OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether delight is a passion?

(2) Whether delight is subject to time?

(3) Whether it differs from joy?

(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?

(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower;

(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;

(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?

(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?

Whether delight is a passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says that “operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature.” But delight is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion.

Objection 2: Further, “To be passive is to be moved,” as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion.

Objection 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it “perfects operation,” as stated in Ethic. x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.

I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above ([1260]Q[22], A[3]). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) “delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing.”

In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly by saying that delight is “a movement of the soul,” we designate its genus. By saying that it is “an establishing in keeping with the thing’s nature,” i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is “all at once,” we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a “becoming” as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a “complete fact,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is “sensible,” we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above ([1261]Q[23], AA[1],4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.

Whether delight is in time?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For “delight is a kind of movement,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.

Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “no one takes pleasure according to time.”

I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.

Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.

Reply to Objection 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.

Reply to Objection 3: Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.

Whether delight differs from joy?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.

Objection 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same.

Objection 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not differ from delight.

On the contrary, We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight.

I answer that, Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above ([1262]Q[30], A[3]), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight.

Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy.

Reply to Objection 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences ([1263]Q[30], A[3], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to the difference of movement.

Reply to Objection 3: These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from the “dilation” of the heart, as if one were to say “latitia”; “exultation” is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and “cheerfulness” is so called from certain special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings.

Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that “delight is a sensible movement.” But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.

Objection 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive appetite.

Objection 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we have in common with irrational animals.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): “Delight in the Lord.” But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.

I answer that, As stated above [1264](A[3]), a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.

However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that “desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish.”

Reply to Objection 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word “sensible” in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he says (Ethic. x, 4) that “delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation.” Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that “God rejoices by one simple act”: and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that “the angels are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness of incorruption.”

Reply to Objection 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De Coel. Hier.) that “holy men often take part in the angelic delights.” Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.

Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

Objection 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since “they alter the state of the body, and in some they cause madness” (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

Objection 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:103): “How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!” And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that “the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom.”

I answer that, As stated above [1265](A[1]), pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for “movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved” (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.

If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).

If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is “what a thing is.” More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.

On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on ([1266]Q[35], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.

Reply to Objection 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate.

Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?

Objection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the words of Tob. 5:12: “What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?”

Therefore the pleasure afforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.

Objection 2: Further, “every one finds treasure in what he loves,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But “of all the senses the sight is loved most” [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.

Objection 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.

I answer that, As stated above ([1267]Q[25], A[2], ad 1;[1268] Q[27], A[4], ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to all animals.

If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal’s nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like. Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: “for dogs do not take delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it” (Ethic. iii, 10).

Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible.

Reply to Objection 1: Joy, as stated above [1269](A[3]), denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the touch.

Reply to Objection 2: The sight is loved most, “on account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things,” as is stated in the same passage (Metaph. i, 1).

Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him to love it and to seek its delight.

Whether any pleasure is not natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is non-natural.

Objection 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But “whatever is violent causes grief” (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is unnatural can give pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, the fact of being established in one’s own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the Philosopher’s definition quoted above [1270](A[1]). But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant “not from nature but from disease.”

I answer that, We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man’s nature, since in respect thereof he has his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find some that are “not natural” speaking absolutely, and yet “connatural” in some respect. For it happens in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat. Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this corruption may be either on the part of the body—from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and vice versa—or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in accord with human nature.

This suffices for the answers to the objections.

Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but "good is contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another.

Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not contrary to pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety between one pleasure and another.

On the contrary, Things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another.

I answer that, Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above ([1271]Q[23], A[4]). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to another.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one thing—i.e. the reason.

Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness.

Reply to Objection 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts and passions, as stated above ([1272]Q[23], AA[1],4;[1273] Q[30], A[2]).

OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?

(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?

(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?

(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?

(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?

(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?

(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?

(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?

Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), “pleasure consists in a perception of the senses,” since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above ([1274]Q[31], A[1]). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that “pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation.”

I answer that, As stated above ([1275]Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.

Reply to Objection 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good—riches, honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) “we take great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves.” Now to have such like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.

Reply to Objection 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is finite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results from labor.

Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above ([1276]Q[31], A[1]), the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that which is being moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to cause pleasure.

I answer that, Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one’s natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11): “Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively.”

If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once—to such a one change will afford no delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or ceases to be, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing the obstacles to our natural aptitude.

Reply to Objection 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become pleasant.

Objection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore memory and hope do not cause pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: “Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.” Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 12:12): “Rejoicing in hope”; and (Ps. 76:4): “I remembered God, and was delighted.”

I answer that, Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present to us in two ways. First, in knowledge—i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in reality—i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of apprehension.

Reply to Objection 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present, i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.

Reply to Objection 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away.

Whether sadness causes pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore it does not cause it.

Objection 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as stated above ([1277]Q[29], A[2]). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 41:4): “My tears have been my bread day and night”: where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give pleasure.

I answer that, Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that “oftentimes in joy we call to mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness”: and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that “the more peril there was in the battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph.”

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary: thus “that which is cold sometimes causes heat,” as stated in Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of something pleasant.

Reply to Objection 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.

Reply to Objection 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one and the same thing.

Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?

Objection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.

Objection 2: Further, the action is the agent’s own good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue.

Objection 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that “we must reckon the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us.” But the actions of others do not proceed from habits existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the agents themselves.

On the contrary, It is written in the second canonical epistle of John (verse 4): “I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking in truth.”

I answer that, As stated above [1278](A[1]; Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one’s proper good, and the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: since it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth."

Reply to Objection 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; or by affection, as in the third way.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the first two.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love.

Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's proper good, as stated above ([1279]AA[1],5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one’s proper good. Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality.” Now it is a mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that “it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers.”

I answer that, Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of the end; as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either from God or from man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and in their own works, as being things on which they bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man’s habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle is the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure.

Reply to Objection 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one’s good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of sadness; for instance when it is excessive.

Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.

Reply to Objection 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another’s ill, but as pertaining to one’s own good, which man loves more than he hates another’s ill. For it is naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one’s own good.

Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But “it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding,” as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with food.

Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated ([1280]Q[27], A[3]): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure.

I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, as stated above ([1281]Q[27], A[3]). And if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes disgust or sadness, not as being like and one with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.

Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one’s own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or profits, which he seeks as his own good.

Reply to Objection 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a man’s own good: because they belong to men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is pleasant.

Reply to Objection 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state later on ([1282]Q[35], A[5]). And this explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man.

Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises from an operation which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure.

I answer that, It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above ([1283]Q[23], A[4]): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is loved, since it was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why “it is more delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something wonderful,” as stated in Rhetor. i, 11.

Reply to Objection 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to another reading:—that he is other than he thought himself to be.]

Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the first time.

Reply to Objection 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that “the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are new,” as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation causes more perfect pleasure.

OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?

(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?

(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?

(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?

Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:11): “Our heart is enlarged.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:96) concerning the precept of charity: “Thy commandment is exceeding broad.” But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not pertain to pleasure.

On the contrary, In order to express joy, it is written (Is. 60:5): “Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged.” Moreover pleasure is called by the name of “laetitia” as being derived from “dilatatio” [expansion], as stated above ([1284]Q[31], A[3], ad 3).

I answer that, Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man’s mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man’s affection is expanded by pleasure, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure.

Reply to Objection 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample in itself so as to become more capacious.

Reply to Objection 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire.

Reply to Objection 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that he may enjoy it perfectly.

Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?

Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above ([1285]Q[23], A[4];[1286] Q[25], A[2]). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire.

Objection 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire for itself.

Objection 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:13): “Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again”: where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the body.

I answer that, Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst, or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, as excluding distaste.

Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; in which sense we may understand the words of Ecclus. 24:29: “They that drink me shall yet thirst.”

On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29: “They that drink me shall yet thirst”: for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they “desire to look at Him.”

Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.

Reply to Objection 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether.

Reply to Objection 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.

Reply to Objection 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above.

Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that “while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence”; and it is written (Wis. 8:16): “When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her,” i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it helps rather than hinders the use of reason.

Objection 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.

Objection 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that “pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence.”

I answer that, As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, “appropriate pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources are impediments to activity.” Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity.

On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind’s attention on itself; or else it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that “bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but not the speculative estimate,” to which they are not opposed, “for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles.” In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered.

Reply to Objection 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part.

Reply to Objection 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers.

Whether pleasure perfects operation?

Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure hinders the use of reason, as stated above [1287](A[3]). Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.

Objection 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.

Objection 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above ([1288]Q[4], A[2]): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation."

I answer that, Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that “pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are not appropriate.”

Reply to Objection 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?

(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?

(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?

(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?

Whether every pleasure is evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil in itself: since man’s good is to be “in accord with reason,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore “in sexual pleasures,” which are the greatest of all, “it is impossible to understand anything,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that “at the time of conjugal intercourse, the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty.” Therefore pleasure is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil.

Objection 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 “the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions”; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided.

Objection 3: Further, “virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. Therefore pleasure is not something good.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 36:4): “Delight in the Lord.” Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil.

I answer that, As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. Because, since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight, example moves more than words.

We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as stated above ([1289]Q[18], A[5]): just as in the order of nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant from reason and the law of God.

The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions evil.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above (Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as stated in the [1290]FP, Q[98], A[2] the case was different in the state of innocence.

Reply to Objection 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.

Reply to Objection 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on ([1291]Q[57], A[3]). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an art of making pleasure, namely, “the art of cookery and the art of making arguments,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 12.

Whether every pleasure is good?

Objection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the [1292]FP, Q[5], A[6] there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good.

Objection 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is good.

Objection 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is “what all things seek,” as stated in Ethic. i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently all pleasure is good.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 2:14): “Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.”

I answer that, While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man’s appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good.

Reply to Objection 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with regard to pleasure.

Reply to Objection 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.

Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?

Objection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being established in its own nature, as stated above ([1293]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good.

Objection 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.

Objection 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above [1294](A[2]). Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good.

On the contrary, Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man’s life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written (Ps. 15:11): “Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end.”

I answer that, Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good. But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in a certain movement and “becoming,” as is evident in satiety from eating and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some “becoming” and movement: and from this, since “becoming” and movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the “becoming” of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above ([1295]Q[32], A[8], ad 2); but also in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired.

Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above ([1296]Q[1], A[8];[1297] Q[2], A[7]) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; thus the miser’s end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man’s last end may be said to be either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every pleasure arises from a “becoming”; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8.

Reply to Objection 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science is supremely good, but not every science is.

Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.

Objection 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.

Objection 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.

On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 "The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [*St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive—{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), "is the architect of the end.”], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good.”

I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above ([1298]Q[20], A[1]); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.

On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.

Reply to Objection 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above ([1299]Q[33], A[4]); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?

(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?

(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?

(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?

(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?

(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?

(8) Of the species of sorrow.

Whether pain is a passion of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that “bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption.” Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that “bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body.” Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): “Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in being punished by the loss of good.” Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): “hence wild desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears.” [Translation: Conington.]

I answer that, Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite.

Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension of another, as stated in the [1300]FP, Q[103], AA[1],3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the intellective or sensitive appetite.

Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above ([1301]Q[22], AA[1],3): and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, [8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment.

Reply to Objection 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the movement of pain is always in the soul; since “the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it,” as Augustine says (Super Psalm 87:4).

Reply to Objection 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.

Reply to Objection 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive appetite.

Whether sorrow is the same as pain?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that “pain is used to express bodily suffering.” But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain.

Objection 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain.

Objection 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is not pain, and extends to more objects.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): “I have great sorrow [Douay: ‘sadness’] and continual pain [Douay: ‘sorrow’] in my heart,” thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.

I answer that, Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is called joy, as stated above ([1302]Q[31], A[3]): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because “pain” is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.

Reply to Objection 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can only regard something present.

Reply to Objection 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch.

Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.

Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Mat. 5:5): “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Therefore they are not contrary to one another.

Objection 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that “weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases us.” Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): “The penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow.” The Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, “the evil man feels pain at having been pleased.” Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary to one another.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that “joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the volition of dissent from the things we do not wish.” But consent and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to one another.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way, in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain it.

Reply to Objection 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented.

Reply to Objection 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil.

Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.

Objection 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and “weep with them that weep” (Rom. 12:15). Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.

I answer that, As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and injustice.

Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction, which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. “white” and “non-white”; while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the other, as, if I were to say “black” and “not white.”

Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary to one another: since one is a kind of “pursuit,” the other a kind of “avoidance,” which “are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial are to the intellect” (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to sorrow for evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do: wherefore the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort.

Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10): “The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.” Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that “it is unfitting to think of certain things.” Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

Objection 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.

Objection 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it is written (Eccles. 12:12) “much study is an affliction of the flesh.” Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:16): “Her,” i.e. wisdom’s, “conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness.” Now the conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

I answer that, The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the pleasure of contemplation.

In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], “no sorrow is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation”: and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated above ([1303]Q[31], A[1]).

Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ, secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above ([1304]Q[33], A[2]), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above that intellectual contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled with contemplation.

Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony with it, as is evident from what has been said above [1305](A[4]): while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save accidentally.

Reply to Objection 1: The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one and the same science considers contraries.

Reply to Objection 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached.

Reply to Objection 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above.

Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): “There is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure.” Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought.

Objection 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for “hot water freezes quicker and harder,” as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought.

Objection 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more virtuous: since “virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “the brave and the just are chiefly praised.” Therefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure.

On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the shunning of sorrow.

I answer that, The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object of pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.

But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), “love is felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love.” Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned, according as love is the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine that “sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought” is true accidentally but not simply. And this is clear from what he says after: “Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain,” which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object. Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.

Reply to Objection 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. iii, 11.

Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been said above [1306](A[6]), outward pain is greater than interior sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow.

On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): “The sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: ‘plague’], and the wickedness of a woman is all evil.” Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses every outward wound.

I answer that, Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above [1307](A[1]). But they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason.

If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the heart is every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart.

Reply to Objection 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain is compared to the appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward apprehension.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as stated above ([1308]Q[22], A[3];[1309] Q[31], A[5]), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than from inward pain.

Whether there are only four species of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls "anxiety,"—"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are "indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient.

Objection 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is correct.

On the contrary, stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene.

I answer that, It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.

In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For the proper object of sorrow is “one’s own evil.” Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through one’s being sorry for an evil that is not one’s own; and thus we have “pity” which is sorrow for another’s evil, considered, however, as one’s own: or through one’s being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one’s own, but another’s good, considered, however, as one’s own evil: and thus we have “envy.” The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain “flight of the appetite.” Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by excluding flight: and thus we have “anxiety” which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also called “perplexity.” If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which belongs to “torpor,” then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated in Polit. i, 1.

Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; for the latter is caused by evil, which “happens in many ways,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Reply to Objection 2: Repentance is for one’s own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later ([1310]SS, Q[36], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of sorrow is applied, as stated above.

OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?

(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?

(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?

(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?

Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss of some good.

Objection 2: Further, it was said above ([1311]Q[35], A[4]) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above ([1312]Q[23], A[4]; [1313] Q[31], A[1];[1314] Q[35], A[3]). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that “the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow.”

I answer that, If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. For, as stated in the [1315]FP, Q[14], A[10] and [1316]FP, Q[48], A[3], evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect of a being, wherefore it is called “a being of reason.” And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a “contrary.” Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present evil or the good which is lost.

Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place, and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is the reason for its downward tendency.

Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or pain, than the good which is lost.

Reply to Objection 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.

Reply to Objection 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing under a contrary aspect.

Reply to Objection 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.

Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above [1317](A[1]): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.

Objection 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.

Objection 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of sorrow.

I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above [1318](A[1]), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.

Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above [1319](A[1]) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.

Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that regard evil.

Reply to Objection 2: That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.

Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that “this opinion,” which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, ‘want’; St. Thomas, in the Latin version, read ‘incisionem’; should he have read ‘indigentiam’?], the cause of sorrow, “seems to have originated in pains and pleasures connected with food.” But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the cause of multitude.

Objection 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous.

Objection 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that “from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?”

I answer that, Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that “one” is a principle, just as “good” is. Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the perfection of nature consists.

Reply to Objection 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing’s perfection, or because it has some union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.

Reply to Objection 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is.

Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): “Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body.”

I answer that, As stated above [1320](A[1]), a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing’s inclination does not happen to it save by the action of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow.

But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.

Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will “resisting a stronger power”: for were it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.

Reply to Objection 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.

OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?

(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?

(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?

(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?

Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn. For it is written (Is. 26:9): “When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice”: and further on (verse 16): “In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them.” But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow in men’s hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 28:9): “Whom shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts,” i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and (Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that “the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great delights.” Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the faculty of learning.

Objection 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above ([1321]Q[35], A[7]). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): “Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it required undivided attention.”

I answer that, Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul, being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is incompatible therewith.

Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul’s attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in Prov. 2:4,5: “If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou understand learning” [Vulg: ‘the fear of the Lord’]. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning or for considering: because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.

Reply to Objection 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, “in the tribulation of murmuring,” men are more apt to be taught by God.

Reply to Objection 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul’s intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that “in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything.” Nevertheless pain attracts the soul’s intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.

Reply to Objection 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).

Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): “Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation,” etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7): “Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of sorrow.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of “depressing sorrow.”

I answer that, The effects of the soul’s passions are sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his own movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said above ([1322]Q[23], A[4];[1323] Q[25], A[4];[1324] Q[36], A[1]) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied.

Reply to Objection 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.

Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken literally, appear to exclude one another.

Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): “Carefully study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed.” Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one to work well.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore sorrow does too.

Objection 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “pleasure perfects action,” whereas on the other hand, “sorrow hinders it” (Ethic. x, 5).

I answer that, As stated above [1325](A[2]), sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and cause: and such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result from that sorrow.

From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.

Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body.

Objection 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above ([1326]Q[22], AA[1],3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that “anger and desire drive some to madness”: which seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 17:22): “A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones”: and (Prov. 25:20): “As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart”: and (Ecclus. 38:19): “Of sadness cometh death.”

I answer that, Of all the soul’s passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man’s life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul. For man’s life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man’s life in respect of the measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species.

Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness.

OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?

(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?

(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?

(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?

(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?

Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far as it is contrary to it: for “remedies work by contraries” (Ethic. ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated above ([1327]Q[35], A[4]). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, “the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased.” Therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now dead: “for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him.” Hence we may gather that those things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that “sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, provided it be intense.”

I answer that, As is evident from what has been said above ([1328]Q[23], A[4]), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite. Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.

Reply to Objection 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above ([1329]Q[35], A[4]). And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure.

Reply to Objection 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.

Reply to Objection 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the thought of the friend’s death or absence, inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his “sorrow gave way to his former pleasures.”

Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?

Objection 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, “in groans and in tears alone did he find some little refreshment.”

I answer that, Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul’s intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above [1330](A[1]), every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans.

Reply to Objection 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man. For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid contrariety.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it.

Reply to Objection 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure. For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 27).

Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), “when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by the other.” Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.

Objection 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase.

Objection 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since “a friend is one’s other self” (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympathizes.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.

I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason is because when a man’s friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above [1331](A[1]), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend.

Reply to Objection 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: The friend’s sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to pleasure.

And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.

Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): “He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow” [Vulg.: ‘labor’]. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But “the speculative intellect is not a principle of movement”; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect. Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): “It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure assuages pain as stated above [1332](A[1]): hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according to James 1:2: “My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations”: and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily tortures this joy is found; as the “martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ.” [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]

Reply to Objection 1: “He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow,” either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure.

Reply to Objection 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation itself, which is man’s good and naturally pleasant to him.

Reply to Objection 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.

Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?

Objection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above [1333](A[4]). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like.

Objection 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): “I had heard that the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from the fact of its driving sadness from the mind.” And further on, he says: “I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not a little assuaged”: and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that “Sleep restores the tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow.”

I answer that, As stated above ([1334]Q[37], A[4]), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above ([1335]Q[31], A[1]). Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.

Reply to Objection 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1336]Q[31], A[8]), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which hinder one another.

Reply to Objection 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi.

OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all sorrow is evil?

(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?

(3) Whether it can be a useful good?

(4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?

Whether all sorrow is evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: “All sorrow is evil, from its very nature.” Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil.

Objection 2: Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic. vii, 11, “though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow.” Therefore sorrow is evil.

Objection 3: Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul.

On the contrary, Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, it is written (Prov. 2:14), that “they were glad when they had done evil.” Therefore sorrow for evil is good.

I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the mere fact of a man’s appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): “It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of good.” Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually—for actions are concerned about individuals—that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and likewise above ([1337]Q[6], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of nature.

This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.

Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), “Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners.” Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.

Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): “Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity.” Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), “sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will.” But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above ([1338]Q[19], A[9]), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous.

On the contrary, Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Mat. 5:5: “Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good.

I answer that, In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above [1339](A[1]) that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good.

Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.

Reply to Objection 3: Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen—such as sins. Consequently a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, even by God’s will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above ([1340]Q[19], A[10]).

Whether sorrow can be a useful good?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:25): “Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.”

Objection 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, “a thing without sorrow is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow” (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

Objection 3: Further, “Everything is for the sake of its own operation,” as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But “sorrow hinders operation,” as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.

On the contrary, The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to Eccles. 7:5, “the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth.” Therefore sorrow is useful.

I answer that, A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): “I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance.” Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one’s being attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one’s being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: “It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of all.”

Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.

Reply to Objection 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above ([1341]Q[37], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful.

Reply to Objection 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.

Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil.

Objection 2: Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above ([1342]Q[3], A[4], OBJ[5];[1343] Q[5], A[8], OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain is man's greatest evil.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain."

On the contrary, Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the [1344]FP, Q[48], A[6]. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil.

I answer that, It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated ([1345]Q[34], A[3]): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil.

Reply to Objection 2: The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; because it has an admixture of good.

Reply to Objection 3: That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius Celsus].

OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?

(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?

(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?

(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?

(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?

(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?

(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;

(8) Whether love conduces to action?

Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.

Objection 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz. the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.

Objection 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity.

On the contrary, To different powers belong different species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity.

I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one’s power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1346]Q[25], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.

Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the [1347]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from despair according to the difference of possible and impossible.

Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:25): “If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience.” But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by “looking out.” Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.

Objection 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.

Objection 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power.

On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above [1348](A[1]). Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power.

I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise from the apprehension of something present and of something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something considered as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.

Reply to Objection 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another’s. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get by another’s help as though to await [exspectare] implied keeping one’s eyes on another [ex alio spectare], in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to Ecclus. 51:10, “I looked for the succor of men.” Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding inspection of the cognitive power.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.

Reply to Objection 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.

Whether hope is in dumb animals?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.

Objection 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no mind.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that “animals are moved by the things that they see.” But hope is of things unseen: “for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” (Rom. 8:24). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.

On the contrary, Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.

I answer that, The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it: whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it. Because as stated above ([1349]Q[1], A[2];[1350] Q[26], A[1];[1351] Q[35], A[1]), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a difference, in that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.

Reply to Objection 1: Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future.

Reply to Objection 2: The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the possible given in Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the thing which is future does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future.

Whether despair is contrary to hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope.

Objection 2: Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards the good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair.

Objection 3: Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards the hoped-for good.

On the contrary, The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes].

I answer that, As stated above ([1352]Q[23], A[2]), there is a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above ([1353]Q[23], A[2]). Now the object of hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, it has the character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, “when men come to an impossibility they disperse.” And this is how despair stands in regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety of approach and withdrawal.

Reply to Objection 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good.

Reply to Objection 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire.

Whether experience is a cause of hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher says

(Ethic. ii, 1) that “intellectual virtue needs experience and time.” But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the appetite, as stated above [1354](A[2]). Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that “the old are slow to hope, on account of their experience”; whence it seems to follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that “to have something to say about everything, without leaving anything out, is sometimes a proof of folly.” But to attempt everything seems to point to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) “some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents”: which seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope.

I answer that, As stated above [1355](A[1]), the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is caused by everything that increases a man’s power; e.g. riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): “No one fears to do that which he is sure of having learned well.”

In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope.

Reply to Objection 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.

Reply to Objection 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that “many evils have befallen them.”

Reply to Objection 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of hope.

Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?

Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1356](A[5]), the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one’s power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.

Objection 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above [1357](A[5]). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “drunken men are hopeful”: and (Rhet. ii, 12) that “the young are full of hope.”

I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope—namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above [1358](A[1]). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink—viz. heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of hope.

Reply to Objection 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.

In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings.

Reply to Objection 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3).

Whether hope is a cause of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.

Objection 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above ([1359]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause.

Objection 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above ([1360]Q[32], A[3]). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope.

On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mat. 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope.

I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but through others;

hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us.

In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him.

Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.

Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above ([1361]Q[37], A[3]). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (Prov. 13:12): “Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.” Therefore hope hinders action.

Objection 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above [1362] (A[4]). But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written (2 Kings 2:26), that “it is dangerous to drive people to despair.” Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that “he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit”: and the same applies to all other actions.

I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above

([1363]Q[32], A[3]), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above ([1364]Q[33], A[4]). Therefore hope is conducive to action.

Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above ([1365]Q[32], A[3], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to the foe.

OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?

(2) Whether fear is a special passion?

(3) Whether there is a natural fear?

(4) Of the species of fear.

Whether fear is a passion of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that “fear is a power, by way of {systole}”—i.e. of contraction—“desirous of vindicating nature.” But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion.

Objection 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future, as

Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion.

Objection 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul.

I answer that, Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above (Q[22]), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power—i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation—i.e. contraction—as Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.

Whether fear is a special passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"—i.e. sorrow—"nor tossed about in transports of empty joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general passion.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special passion.

Objection 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1366]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different powers.

On the contrary, Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15).

I answer that, The passions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be something common, yet fear is a special passion.

Reply to Objection 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above ([1367]Q[25], A[1]); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what has been said above ([1368]Q[25], A[2];[1369] Q[29], A[2];[1370] Q[36], A[2]).

Whether there is a natural fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through the soul refusing to be severed from the body."

Objection 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is also a natural fear.

Objection 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above ([1371]Q[40], A[4], ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rom. 4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.

On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no natural fear.

I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated above ([1372]Q[10], A[1]), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.

And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we have stated above ([1373]Q[26], A[1];[1374] Q[30], A[3];[1375] Q[31], A[7]) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural.

But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have said[1376], Q[31], AA[1],3;[1377] Q[35], A[1], that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.

Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.

Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, “laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety.” Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear regards a saddening evil.” Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above ([1378]Q[35], A[8]). Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them.

Objection 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated above [1379](A[2]). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.

Objection 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above ([1380]AA[1], 2). But “shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,” as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a species of fear.

Objection 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear.

Objection 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.

On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).

I answer that, As stated above [1381](A[2]), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man’s evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises “laziness,” as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is “shamefacedness”; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is “shame.”

On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man’s faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is “amazement.” Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is “stupor,” which is caused by the representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called “anxiety.”

Reply to Objection 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself.

Reply to Objection 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear.

Reply to Objection 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear.

Reply to Objection 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to external work.

Reply to Objection 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto.

OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?

(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?

(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?

(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?

(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?

(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?

Whether the object of fear is good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that “we fear nothing save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for.” But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “power and to be above another is a thing to be feared.” But this is a good thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.

Objection 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: “Fear the Lord, all ye saints.” Therefore even the good is an object of fear.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.

I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object.

It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good.

Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.

In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above ([1382]Q[40], A[7]), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm.

In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of fear.

Objection 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of fear, man would needs be always in fear.

Objection 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear.

But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."

Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.

Reply to Objection 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it.

Reply to Objection 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always feared.

Reply to Objection 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear when threatening in the future.

Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to Is. 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear.

Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.

Objection 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.

Objection 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ([1383]Q[41], A[4]). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."

I answer that, As stated above ([1384]Q[40], A[1];[1385] Q[41], A[2]), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.

But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this light it is not an object of fear to him.

Reply to Objection 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([1386]Q[41], A[4], ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause.

Whether fear itself can be feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd.

Objection 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.

Objection 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.

On the contrary, A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.

I answer that, As stated above [1387](A[3]), nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the fear which he has not.

Reply to Objection 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.

Reply to Objection 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object.

Whether sudden things are especially feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be feared.

Objection 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes forethought for their safety."

I answer that, As stated about [1388](A[3]; Q[41], A[2]), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise.

Reply to Objection 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about.

Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?

Objection 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated above [1389](A[2]). But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all.

Objection 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared most, for which there is no remedy.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that “a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting”: and the same applies to evil. But things that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy.”

I answer that, The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above ([1390]Q[18], A[3]). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire the greatest fear.

Reply to Objection 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now.

Reply to Objection 2: Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above [1391] (A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature.

OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether love is the cause of fear?

(2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?

Whether love is the cause of fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But “fear leads to the love of charity” as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil.” But the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love.

Objection 3: Further, it has been stated above ([1392]Q[42], A[3]) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): “There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for.” Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently love is the cause of fear.

I answer that, The objects of the soul’s passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.

Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an evil.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([1393]Q[42], A[1]), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God’s punishments, man keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above ([1394]Q[40], A[7]).

Reply to Objection 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material disposition, as stated above.

Whether defect is the cause of fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.

Objection 2: Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii, 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.

Objection 3: Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But “those who contend fear those who contend with them” (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.

On the contrary, Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But “wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away” (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.

I answer that, As stated above [1395](A[1]), fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order to cause fear, this defect must be according to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary is feared, were entirely absent.

But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by him.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure of fear.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory.

OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear causes contraction?

(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?

(3) Whether it makes one tremble?

(4) Whether it hinders action?

Whether fear causes contraction?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.

Objection 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause contraction.

Objection 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ([1396]Q[41], A[4]). But “those who are ashamed blush,” as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that “fear is a power according to {systole},” i.e. contraction.

I answer that, As stated above ([1397]Q[28], A[5]), in the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain contraction: the reason of which is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above ([1398]Q[41], A[2]). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above ([1399]Q[43], A[2]): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place in regard to the body.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.

Reply to Objection 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated together within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward direction through the mouth: the result being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7).

Reply to Objection 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Consequently there results a contraction in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the result being that those who are ashamed blush.

Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason. Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.

Objection 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but hinders it.

Objection 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope is.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel."

I answer that, A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ([1400]Q[42], A[2]). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid.

Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above.

Whether fear makes one tremble?

Objection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause trembling.

Objection 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling.

Objection 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.

On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that “fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth.”

I answer that, As stated above [1401](A[1]), in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as stated in De Anima ii, 4.

Reply to Objection 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11).

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the knees tremble in those who are afraid, according to Is. 35:3: “Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: ‘weak’] knees.”

Whether fear hinders action?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. But fear disturbs reason, as stated above [1402](A[2]). Therefore fear hinders action.

Objection 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders action.

Objection 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): “With fear and trembling work out your salvation”: and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action.

I answer that, Man’s exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination.

Reply to Objection 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears.

OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?

(2) How is daring related to hope?

(3) Of the cause of daring;

(4) Of its effect.

Whether daring is contrary to fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that “daring is a vice.” Now vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.

Objection 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that “fear takes forethought for safety.” Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear."

I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear.

Reply to Objection 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense.

Reply to Objection 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above ([1403]Q[23], A[2];[1404] Q[40], A[4]) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so daring implies safety.

Whether daring ensues from hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ([1405]Q[40], A[1]). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope.

Objection 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope.

Objection 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “those are hopeful are full of daring.” Therefore it seems that daring ensues from hope.

I answer that, As we have often stated ([1406]Q[22], A[2];[1407] Q[35], A[1];[1408] Q[41], A[1]), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good.

Reply to Objection 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is strong.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.

Whether some defect is a cause of daring?

Objection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that “lovers of wine are strong and daring.” But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “those who have no experience of danger are bold.” But want of experience is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

Objection 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; “like the beasts when beaten,” as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring “is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off.” But anything pertaining to defect implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a cause of daring.

I answer that, As stated above ([1409]AA[1],2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation.

On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others.

On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large house as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood, are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been said above ([1410]Q[40], A[6]) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation and enlargement of the heart.

Reply to Objection 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think greatly of himself.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the cause of fear gives rise to daring.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) “those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the assistance of those who suffer unjustly.”

Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another.

Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?

Objection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above [1411](A[1]; Q[44], A[3]). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger.

Objection 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest.

Objection 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “anger makes man bold.” Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.

On the contrary, It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that “the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of dangers they stand aloof.”

I answer that, Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way.

On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above [1412](A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it withdraws to the inferior parts.

Reply to Objection 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring considered to be.

Reply to Objection 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ([1413]Q[46], A[1]). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring.

OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether anger is a special passion?

(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?

(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?

(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?

(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?

(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?

(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?

(8) Of the species of anger.

Whether anger is a special passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special passion.

Objection 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion is contrary to anger, as stated above ([1414]Q[23], A[3]). Therefore anger is not a special passion.

Objection 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).

I answer that, A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus “animal” is general in respect of all animals. Secondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are, in a fashion, actually existing therein.

Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above ([1415]Q[23], A[4]). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above ([1416]Q[27], A[4]). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv, 6).

Reply to Objection 1: The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent.

Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made.

Reply to Objection 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of cause and effect.

Whether the object of anger is good or evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.

Objection 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its object, as stated above ([1417]Q[29], A[1]). Therefore anger does also.

Objection 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that “anger acts with sorrow.” But evil is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that “anger craves for revenge.” But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good.

Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger.

I answer that, The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil.

We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion.

On the contrary, The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible would not take its name from it.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated [1418](A[2]) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty.

Reply to Objection 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties.

Reply to Objection 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred.

Reply to Objection 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and it has been said above ([1419]Q[25], A[2]) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions.

Whether anger requires an act of reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Objection 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

Objection 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger listens to reason somewhat.”

I answer that, As stated above [1420](A[2]), anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated.” Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that “anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above ([1421]Q[40], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.

Whether anger is more natural than desire?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man.

Objection 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.

Objection 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is more natural than anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire."

I answer that, By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion, as stated above ([1422]Q[36], A[2]), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.

If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “revenge” which pertains to anger “is more natural to man than meekness”: for it is natural to everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies result from a man’s individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to desire.

Reply to Objection 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man “does not listen perfectly to the command of reason,” as stated above (A[4], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows that it is, in a manner, natural to man.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object.

Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is written (Prov. 27:4) that “anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth.” But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous than hatred.

Objection 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred.

Objection 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above [1423](A[1]): whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred.

On the contrary, Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to “a beam,” but anger to “a mote.”

I answer that, The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry. But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above [1424](A[2]) that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger.

Reply to Objection 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 12:16): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never appeased."

As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?"

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another’s evil as such. It is not true, however, that an evil is worse through giving pain: because “injustice and imprudence, although evil,” yet, being voluntary, “do not grieve those in whom they are,” as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).

Reply to Objection 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “hatred is more incurable than anger.”

Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.

Objection 2: Further, “there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there justice towards one’s own” (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): “Be ye angry and sin not.” Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice.

Objection 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice.

The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).

I answer that, As stated above [1425](A[6]), anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those to whom one is just or unjust.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), “it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead”: both because they feel no pain, which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since they can do us no harm.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), “metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and himself,” in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is never angry with himself.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that “hatred may be felt towards a class, as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual.” The reason is that hatred arises from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual.

When the whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf.[1426] Q[29], A[6]].

Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger—“wrath,” “ill-will” and “rancor.” For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because “the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor {kotos} is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance.” Therefore these are not different species of anger.

Objection 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that “excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently”; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, “anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and anger with perfection of speech,” corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his brother” [thus implying “anger without utterance”], and then, “whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca’” [implying “anger with utterance yet without full expression”], and lastly, “whosoever shall say ‘Thou fool’” [where we have “perfection of speech”]. Therefore Damascene’s division is imperfect, since it takes no account of utterance.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].

I answer that, The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to {menis} [ill-will] which is derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: “Let all bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you.”]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons {akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} [bitter], because they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf. [1427]SS, Q[158], A[5]].

Reply to Objection 1: All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin “furor,” should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged.

Reply to Objection 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the very movement of anger.

OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)

[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except in A[4].]

We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?

(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?

(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;

(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.

Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?

Objection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, can do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): “If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?” And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according to Ps. 105:40: “The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people.” Therefore it is not always on account of something done against him, that a man is angry.

Objection 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always angry on account of something done against us.

Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those “who despise what he takes a great interest in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy,” and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry.

Objection 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done against him.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that “anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such.”

I answer that, As stated above ([1428]Q[46], A[6]), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man’s anger is always something done against him.

Reply to Objection 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God’s providence and protection.

Reply to Objection 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.

Reply to Objection 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.

Reply to Objection 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight is an action.

Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?

Objection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry “when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury.” But one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger.

Objection 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet “they are roused to anger, when wounded,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, “being forgotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like.” Therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is “a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly.”

I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. “contempt,” “despiteful treatment,” i.e. hindering one from doing one’s will, and “insolence”: and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another’s hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “men are not angry—if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just.” Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because they do not seem to have acted slightingly.”

The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man’s excellence: because “men think little of things that are not worth much ado” (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.

Reply to Objection 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger.

Reply to Objection 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything derogatory thereto.

Reply to Objection 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.

Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being angry.

Objection 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger.

I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above [1429](A[2]). Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth.

Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other like cause.

Reply to Objection 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.

Whether a person’s defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?

Objection 1: It would seem that a person’s defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down.” But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with him.

Objection 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not provoke anger against him.

Objection 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): “If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it.” Therefore a person’s defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that “the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject.”

I answer that, As stated above ([1430]AA[2],3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just as the higher a man’s position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant.

If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Prov. 15:1: “A mild answer breaketh wrath”: because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation.

Reply to Objection 3: To be despised by one’s friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us.

OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?

(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?

(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?

(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?

Whether anger causes pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, “everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain.” Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain”: whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is “Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste” (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trl. Pope]).

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said ([1431]Q[47], AA[1],3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ([1432]Q[46], A[1]); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger.

Reply to Objection 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.

Reply to Objection 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.

Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above ([1433]Q[28], A[5];[1434] Q[37], A[2]), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more powerful than its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor.

Objection 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that “time puts an end to anger.” Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger.

Objection 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But “the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger,” as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that “anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of the bile.”

I answer that, As stated above ([1435]Q[44], A[1]), the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now it is evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. Since then the appetitive movement of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) "the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says."

Reply to Objection 1: "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to be felt more.

Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that "love springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}."

Reply to Objection 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done.

Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that “if a friend’s absence lasts long, it seems to make men forget their friendship.” But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually multiplied.

Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away.

Reply to Objection 3: Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem to be of little or no account.

Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem to hinder the use of reason. But “anger listens to reason,” as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.

Objection 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “an angry man is not cunning but is open.” Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).

Objection 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that “men are more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored”:

and so forth. Therefore the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does not hinder the judgment of reason.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger “withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind.”

I answer that, Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated [1436](A[2]) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to Ps. 30:10: “My eye is troubled with wrath.”

Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of reason.

Reply to Objection 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv, 3) that “he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly.” Desire, on the other hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased also.

Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord (Mat. 5:22): where He says: “Whosoever is angry with his brother”; and “ . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Raca’”; and “ . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, ‘Thou fool.’” Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity.

Objection 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28): “As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking.” But anger, above all, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above [1437](A[3]). Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 12:34): “Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.” But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as stated above [1438](A[2]). Therefore above all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that “when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely.”

I answer that, As stated above [1439](A[3]; Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): “Sometimes when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if in judgment, commands silence.” On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated above [1440](A[2]), the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above [1441](A[2]), “the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce.” Consequently anger may cause such a disturbance, that the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result.

Reply to Objection 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to paralyze the tongue and other outward members.

And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then “out of the abundance of the heart” thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak.

TREATISE ON HABITS (QQ[49]-54)

OF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

After treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the consideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of intrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic principle is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the FP, Q[77], seqq., it remains for us to consider them in general: in the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like habits, which are the principles of human acts.

Concerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First, the substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of their generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are distinguished from one another.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether habit is a quality?

(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?

(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?

(4) Of the necessity of habit.

Whether habit is a quality?

Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): “this word ‘habit’ is derived from the verb ‘to have.’” But “to have” belongs not only to quality, but also to the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as “having” quantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Objection 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may be clearly seen in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). But one predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is not a quality.

Objection 3: Further, “every habit is a disposition,” as is stated in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now disposition is “the order of that which has parts,” as stated in Metaph. v, text. 24. But this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not a quality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) that “habit is a quality which is difficult to change.”

I answer that, This word “habitus” [habit] is derived from “habere” [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to “have” something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.

Concerning the first, we must observe that “to have,” as said in regard to anything that is “had,” is common to the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts “to have” among the “post-predicaments,” so called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the “haver” and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that “a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had”; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the predicament of “habit”: of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that “there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed.”

But if “to have” be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that “habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit.” And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes “to have” in the general sense: for thus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which we understand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is had: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, “either as to place, or as to power, or as to species.” “In saying this,” as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, “he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says ‘as to place,’” and this belongs to the predicament “Position,” which is the order of parts in a place: “when he says ‘as to power,’ he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness,” such as inchoate science and virtue: “and when he says, ‘as to species,’ he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits,” such as perfected science and virtue.

Whether habit is a distinct species of quality?

Objection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of quality. Because, as we have said [1442](A[1]), habit, in so far as it is a quality, is “a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill.” But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in like manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such things. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or habits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition is not distinct from the other species of quality.

Objection 3: Further, “difficult to change” is not a difference belonging to the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion. Now, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of another genus; but “differences should be proper to a genus,” as the Philosopher says in

Metaph. vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit is “a quality difficult to change,” it seems not to be a distinct species of quality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of the Predicaments (Categor. vi) that “one species of quality is habit and disposition.”

I answer that, The Philosopher in the Book of Predicaments (Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of quality. Now Simplicius, in his Commentary on the Predicaments, explains the difference of these species as follows. He says “that some qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its nature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused from without, and these can be lost. Now the latter,” i.e. those which are adventitious, “are habits and dispositions, differing in the point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural qualities, some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state of potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality: while others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply rooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the third species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth species of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an animated being.” But this distinction of the species of quality seems unsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities, which are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many dispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health, beauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the species, since that which is the more natural is always first.

Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), “is that which a measure determines”: wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).

Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory.

But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.

On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.

Reply to Objection 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some quality except in relation to something else. And if we add "well or ill," which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must consider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So in regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or ill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a thing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently even shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as they are considered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing, belong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according to their suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat and cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing, concern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the Philosopher, in the first species of quality.

Wherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some give another solution, as Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments.

Reply to Objection 3: This difference, “difficult to change,” does not distinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from disposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as the genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of habit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is divided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be divided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect within the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining the name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily lost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not to be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a boy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse species of the one subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions, those qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very nature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g. sickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by reason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they have unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this sense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation seems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for in order to confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking, according to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature, easily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly changeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in regard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly changeable: for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as to be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that he has the science. From this it is clear that the word “habit” implies a certain lastingness: while the word “disposition” does not.

Nor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are specific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion and movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences, though apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate differences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same way, in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of substantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential principles are designated.

Whether habit implies order to an act?

Objection 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act. For everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text 8), that “when one is become knowing by habit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than before learning.” Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a principle to an act.

Objection 2: Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing, belongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in the definition of power, as we read in Metaph. v, text. 17. Therefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially. Now that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore, habit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to power. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of quality.

Objection 3: Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and beauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is not essential to habit to be a principle of act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that “habit is that whereby something is done when necessary.” And the Commentator says (De Anima iii) that “habit is that whereby we act when we will.”

I answer that, To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both in regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in which the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to every habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit to imply some relation to a thing’s nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing’s nature, which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the end. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition of habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is well or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end.

But there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in which they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act. For, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a relation to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it follows that the habit principally implies relation to an act. Now it is clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be a principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power, implies principally relation to an act.

Reply to Objection 1: Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in this respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a state of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is called first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in De Anima ii, text. 5.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not the essence of habit to be related to power, but to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which power is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of quality.

Reply to Objection 3: Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual disposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as nature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to act. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that man, or one of his members, is called healthy, "when he can perform the operation of a healthy man." And the same applies to other habits.

Whether habits are necessary?

Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by habits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated above. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in respect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore there is no necessity for habits.

Objection 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies sufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without any habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity for habits.

Objection 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is habit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit. Given, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.

On the contrary, Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But perfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be habits.

I answer that, As we have said above ([1443]AA[2],3), habit implies a disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or end, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed thereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else, three conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and so, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act. Whence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of potentiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, which itself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and disposition, as is clearly the case in God.

The second condition is, that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination in several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a state of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to that only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such a subject from its own nature has the due relation to such an act. Wherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since that matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we said in the [1444]FP, Q[56], A[2], there is no need for disposition or habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation, since the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of potentiality to more than one fixed movement.

The third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those things to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur, capable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the subject well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the simple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the elements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or habits, but "simple qualities": but we call dispositions or habits, such things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the adjustment of several things which may vary in their relative adjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 24,25) that “habit is a disposition”: and disposition is “the order of that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or as to species,” as we have said above (A[1], ad 3). Wherefore, since there are many things for whose natures and operations several things must concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it follows that habit is necessary.

Reply to Objection 1: By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the subject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some disposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation, which is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is limited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the form itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such that it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be disposed to its operations by means of habits.

Reply to Objection 2: Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then it needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a relation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as we have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their operations by means of habits: because they are of themselves determined to one mode of operation.

Reply to Objection 3: The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as will be made clear further on ([1445]Q[54], A[3]): whereas the same power has a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary that the powers be determined to good.

OF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS (SIX ARTICLES)

We consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is a habit in the body?

(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?

(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?

(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?

(5) Whether there is a habit in the will?

(6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?

Whether there is a habit in the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body. For, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), “a habit is that whereby we act when we will.” But bodily actions are not subject to the will, since they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.

Objection 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit.

Objection 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided against habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments (De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are called habits.

I answer that, As we have said above ([1446]Q[49], AA[2] seqq.), habit is a disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either to form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies disposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its subject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a natural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body. Consequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature, the body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are determined to one mode of operation; and we have already said ([1447]Q[49], A[4]) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things that a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations which proceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to the soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion to their operations: whence “by like acts like habits are formed” (Ethic. ii, 1,2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations are principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body: to wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with promptitude to help in the operations of the soul.

If, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus a habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the soul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty and such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the nature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature, are easily changeable.

On the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, Alexander denied absolutely that habits or dispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the first species of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that Aristotle mentions health and sickness in the Book on the Predicaments not as though they belonged to the first species of quality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as health and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are all the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and dispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of Aristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and sickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in Phys. vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among habits.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a disposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are from nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from the soul, and the principle of which is the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change on account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may be difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to wit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or because they are difficult to change, by comparison to other dispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to change, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And therefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is a habit simply: but that it is “as a habit,” as we read in the Greek [*{isos hexin} (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of the soul are called habits simply.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of quality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third species, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in some “becoming” and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called passions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to perfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed into the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his Commentary disapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third species, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle puts heat in the third.

Wherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that passion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in bodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able to give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or passion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought to the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a disposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to become difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that disposition would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like quality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius disapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply diversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the diverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be no diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say otherwise that, as was explained above ([1448]Q[49], A[2], ad 1), the adjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to their suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and so, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities, which are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change as to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to like habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves.

Whether the soul is the subject of habit in respect of its essence or in respect of its power?

Objection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of its essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of dispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above ([1449]Q[49], A[2]). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the powers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the nature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in the soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers.

Objection 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit is an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of accident, as we have said in the [1450]FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 5. Therefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.

Objection 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the subject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it is prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore habit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits in the various powers of the soul.

I answer that, As we have said above ([1451]Q[49], AA[2],3), habit implies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation. If therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot be in the soul—that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul itself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in this way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by reason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its relation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which man may become a partaker, according to 2 Pet. 1, “that we may be partakers of the Divine Nature”: thus nothing hinders some habit, namely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as we shall state later on ([1452]Q[110], A[4]).

On the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it is chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the soul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many, which is a condition for a habit, as we have said above ([1453]Q[49], A[4]). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its powers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in respect of its powers.

Reply to Objection 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as a subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a form and nature to which someone is disposed.

Reply to Objection 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But since among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the subject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the subject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident is the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in which sense power is the subject of habit.

Reply to Objection 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according as it implies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a relation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the principle of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does not imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is posterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of power, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act takes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to potentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and time, as stated in Metaph. vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.

Whether there can be any habits in the powers of the sensitive parts?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the powers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an irrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no habits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to put any habit in the powers of the sensitive part.

Objection 2: Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes. But there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will, which is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above ([1454]Q[49], A[3]). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.

Objection 3: Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and just as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue related to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there are no sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive powers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of virtue in the sensitive part.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that “some virtues,” namely, temperance and fortitude, “belong to the irrational part.”

I answer that, The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways: first, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly, according as they act at the command of reason. According as they act from natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be ordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by which they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.

Reply to Objection 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no habits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to obey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for in so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be rational, as stated in Ethic. i, 13.

Reply to Objection 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the command of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals act from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits ordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain dispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas by man’s reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things in this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can admit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): “We find the most untamed beasts, deterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest pleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they are tame and gentle.” But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of the will, for they have not that power of using or of refraining, which seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly speaking, there can be no habits in them.

Reply to Objection 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be moved by the rational appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude to receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more suitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite than in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of sensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act at the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of sensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man has a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that “custom conduces much to a good memory”: the reason of which is that these powers also are moved to act at the command of the reason.

On the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing and the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just as the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but rather in the powers which command their movements.

Whether there is any habit in the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect. For habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above [1455](A[1]). But the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in De Anima i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect is not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the intellect is not the subject of a habit.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the mode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter, is act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has potentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same time potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only in that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is form without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the same time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be in the intellect; but only in the "conjunction," which is composed of soul and body.

Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill disposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25). But that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the intellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it is stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that "we observe men with soft flesh to be quick witted." Therefore the habits of knowledge are not in the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the act of some part of the body.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3,10) puts science, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first principles, in the intellective part of the soul.

I answer that, concerning intellective habits there have been various opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one "possible" [*[1456]FP, Q[79], A[2], ad 2] intellect for all men, were bound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect itself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that men differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of knowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to all men. Wherefore if there were but one single "possible" intellect of all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one another, could not be in the "possible" intellect as their subject, but would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in various men.

Now, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational, not by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now the Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence. Wherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect itself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8,18) that when the “possible” intellect “is thus identified with each thing,” that is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the intelligible species, “then it is said to be in act, as the knower is said to be in act; and this happens when the intellect can act of itself,” i.e. by considering: “and even then it is in potentiality in a sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discovering.” Therefore the “possible” intellect itself is the subject of the habit of science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually considering, is able to consider. In the second place, this supposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom belongs the operation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit. But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect. Therefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the intellect itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the “conjunctum,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the soul only, but in the “conjunctum.” And from this it follows that no habit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the argument, given above. But the argument is no cogent. For habit is not a disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of the power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power which is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to the power as its object.

Now the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and body, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in De Anima, text. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to the passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3,39). Whence it follows that the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect itself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul and body. And therefore we must say that the “possible” intellect is the subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this belongs, above all, to the “possible” intellect. Wherefore the “possible” intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.

Reply to Objection 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to corporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the “possible” intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the “possible” intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and perfect act.

Reply to Objection 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare their proper objects for the “possible intellect,” therefore it is by the good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of the body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in a secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But principally it is in the “possible” intellect.

Whether any habit is in the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For the habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by means of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does not act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of habit.

Objection 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as there is to the “possible” intellect, because the former is an active power. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves all the powers to their acts, as stated above ([1457]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore there is no habit in the will.

Objection 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by reason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the will, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which reason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.

On the contrary, Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will; for it is “a habit whereby men will and do that which is just” (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.

I answer that, Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the will is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And therefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of habit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will; inasmuch as habit “is that which one uses when one wills,” as stated above [1458](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which is the likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive power there must be something by which the power is inclined to its object; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain inclination, as we have said above ([1459]Q[6], A[4];[1460] Q[22], A[2]). And therefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined sufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no quality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of human life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed, to which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a relation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that, in the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain qualities to incline them, and these are called habits.

Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no way passive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and moved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between them does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that which is somehow in potentiality.

Reply to Objection 3: The will from the very nature of the power inclined to the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many ways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some fixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more promptly.

Whether there are habits in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels. For Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: “It is not proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual) powers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the manner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in a subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them.” But every habit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): “The holy dispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other things, in God’s goodness.” But that which is of itself [per se] is prior to and more power than that which is by another [per aliud]. Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves unto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And this seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same passage adds: “For if this were the case, surely their essence would not remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible deified of itself.”

Objection 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But disposition, as is said in the same book, is “the order of that which has parts.” Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems that there are no dispositions and habits in them.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels are of the first hierarchy are called: “Fire-bearers and Thrones and Outpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of their habits.”

I answer that, Some have thought that there are no habits in the angels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially. Whence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: “Their dispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential, through the absence of matter in them.” And Simplicius says the same in his Commentary on the Predicaments: “Wisdom which is in the soul is its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance. For everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself.”

Now this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is manifest from what we have said ([1461]Q[49], A[4]) that only a being in potentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned commentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and that there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account, excluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though there is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some potentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone), therefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may habits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and the potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind. Whence, Simplicius says in his Commentary on the Predicaments that: “The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits here below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images which it contains in itself.”

However, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with regard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in the intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all intelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all sensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it needs some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure potentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not indeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an admixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less potentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the [1462]FP, Q[55], A[1], so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of habitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its proper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence it can understand some things, at least itself, and other things according to the mode of its substance, as stated in De Causis: and the more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.

But since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are infinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to God Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits, being as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are “godlike,” that is to say, that by them they are made like to God.

But those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not in angels, since they are immaterial.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material habits and accidents.

Reply to Objection 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence, they do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of themselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness, therefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without, so far do they need to have habits.

Reply to Objection 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but there are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected by several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to several things.

OF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their formation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their diminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any habit is from nature?

(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?

(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?

(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

Whether any habit is from nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use of those things which are from nature does not depend on the will. But habit "is that which we use when we will," as the Commentator says on De Anima iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.

Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient. But the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits of the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.

Objection 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are necessary in order to act well, as we have stated above ([1463]Q[49], A[4]). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature would not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly false. Therefore habits are not from nature.

On the contrary, In Ethic. vi, 6, among other habits, place is given to understanding of first principles, which habit is from nature: wherefore also first principles are said to be known naturally.

I answer that, One thing can be natural to another in two ways. First in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing is natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward tendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is natural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to health, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in respect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways: first, because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it is partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For instance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely from nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health is partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.

Thus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in relation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the foregoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded by the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this disposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since such a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different grades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect of the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely from nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.

But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the specific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the part of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way does it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be entirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since they have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which cannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the [1464]FP, Q[55], A[2]; [1465]FP, Q[84], A[3].

There are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their existence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle: in one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in the appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a natural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific nature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with regard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus the understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For it is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man, having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part: and in like manner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and what is a part—this he cannot know except through the intelligible species which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason, the Philosopher at the end of the Posterior Analytics shows that knowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.

But in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is natural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the disposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to understand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation of the intellect.

In the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its beginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the habit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance, the principles of common law are called the “nurseries of virtue.” The reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects, which seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the habit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.

But on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature, there are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For some are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or meekness or such like.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection takes nature as divided against reason and will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.

Reply to Objection 2: Something may be added even naturally to the nature of a power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance, with regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power itself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be the act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by which something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew all things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things. Wherefore there must needs be added to the angels’ intellective power, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things understood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not by their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those things which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything belonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.

Reply to Objection 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various kinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as we have said above. And so it does not follow that because some habits are natural, therefore all are natural.

Whether any habit is caused by acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit is a quality, as we have said above ([1466]Q[49], A[1]). Now every quality is caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since then the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather gives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by its own acts.

Objection 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to that quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or cooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality, moves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore habits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that the same would be mover and moved, active and passive: which is impossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8.

Objection 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But habit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is clear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts. Therefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1,2) teaches that habits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.

I answer that, In the agent there is sometimes only the active principle of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active principle of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused by its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become accustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a certain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and the passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according as it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and further, the intellective power, according as it reasons about conclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident proposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their agents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but with regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover moved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is disposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be multiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive and moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of moral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they are moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in the intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.

Reply to Objection 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But in so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives something from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.

Reply to Objection 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be mover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text. 28,29.

Reply to Objection 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as it comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent principle than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a more excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in the appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of first principles is a more excellent principle than the science of conclusions.

Whether a habit can be caused by one act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For demonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of one conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can be caused by one act.

Objection 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do they happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by multiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it can be the generating cause of a habit.

Objection 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that a man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can cause a habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): “As neither does one swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a short time make a man blessed and happy.” But “happiness is an operation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue” (Ethic. i, 7,10,13). Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other habits, is not caused by one act.

I answer that, As we have said already [1467](A[2]), habit is caused by act, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in order that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active principle must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that because fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not enkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so that by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it. Now it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot entirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the appetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the reason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to various aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is not thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs to the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but only by many.

But in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two passive principles: one is the “possible” [*See [1468]FP, Q[79], A[2] ad 2] intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle (De Anima iii, text. 20) calls “passive,” and is the “particular reason,” that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination. With regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for a certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the power of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition convinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the conclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a habit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even on the part of the “possible” intellect: whereas a habit of science can be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the “possible” intellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive powers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to be firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. 1) that “meditation strengthens memory.” Bodily habits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is of great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine restores health at once.

Hence the solutions to the objections are clear.

Whether any habits are infused in man by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God. For God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some, He would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.

Objection 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode which is suitable to their nature: for “it belongs to Divine providence to preserve nature,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are naturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above [1469](A[2]). Therefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.

Objection 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by that habit perform many acts. But “from those acts a like habit is caused” (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Consequently there will be two habits of the same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused. Now this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into man by God.

On the contrary, it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): “God filled him with the spirit of wisdom and understanding.” Now wisdom and understanding are habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.

I answer that, Some habits are infused by God into man, for two reasons.

The first reason is because there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above ([1470]Q[5], A[5]). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.

The other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second causes, without these second causes, as we have said in the [1471]FP, Q[105], A[6]. Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show His power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which nature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of His power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused by a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the Scriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by custom, but not so perfectly.

Reply to Objection 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but in respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives certain things to some, which He does not give to others.

Reply to Objection 2: That God works in all according to their mode, does not hinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from this that He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a habit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the remedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not cause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had before.

OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS (THREE ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether habits increase?

(2) Whether they increase by addition?

(3) Whether each act increases the habit?

Whether habits increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the genus quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be no increase of habits.

Objection 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.

Objection 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15,17. Therefore habits cannot increase.

On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (Lk. 17:5): “Lord, increase our faith.” Therefore habits increase.

I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore “in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better,” as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).

Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation of the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be “little” or “great”: for instance great or little health or science. But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be “more” or “less”: for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.

In this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers concerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius relates in his Commentary on the Predicaments. For Plotinus and the other Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were susceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material and so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity of matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of themselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things affected by them [qualia] are said to be more or less, in respect of the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is not more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this opinion in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). The third opinion was that of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For they held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and less, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues. The fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and immaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that material forms are.

In order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must be something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for whatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and whatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species, more or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition or subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or anything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself, or in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that, considered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can be neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like qualities which are not denominated from a relation to something else: and much more so, substance, which is “per se” being. But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We may observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the nature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an animal’s nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which disposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal the nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 2,3): “Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the same in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to a certain point it may decrease and still remain health.”

Now these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of excess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the most perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater or less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may increase or decrease of itself, and how it cannot.

But if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation by the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are susceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the cause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot be susceptible of more or less, because it is “per se” being. And therefore every form which is participated substantially by its subject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the genus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because quantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity, therefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that when a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered, but to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from quantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are susceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by the subject.

Now it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this diversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its species must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something indivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot be participated more or less. First because the participator has its species in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial form is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, “as a number cannot be more or less, so neither can that which is in the species of substance,” that is, in respect of its participation of the specific form: “but in so far as substance may be with matter,” i.e. in respect of material dispositions, “more or less are found in substance.”

Secondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially indivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must needs participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this reason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect of more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an indivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of continuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as two-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as double and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and tetragon.

This same explanation is given by Aristotle in the Predicaments (Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of more or less, he says: “Things which are given the nature of a triangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles”: to wit, because indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore whatever participates their nature must participate it in its indivisibility.

It is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in respect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two ways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and dispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for instance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less science, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect of participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health is participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse aptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and disposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they essentially imply indivisibility.

We shall say further on ([1472]Q[66], A[1]) how it is with the virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: As the word “great” is taken from corporeal quantities and applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the word “growth,” the term of which is something great.

Reply to Objection 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection which is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the subject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit include the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore there is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.

Reply to Objection 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the third species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the first species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there follows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like manner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive appetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration follows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).

Whether habits increases by addition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of addition. For the word “increase,” as we have said, is transferred to forms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there is no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it is said that “increase is an addition to a magnitude already existing.” Therefore in habits also there is no increase without addition.

Objection 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some agent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for instance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated. Therefore there is no increase without addition.

Objection 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be white: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more white. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the addition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not made more white, except by an added whiteness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): “That which is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something hot, that was not hot, when the thing was less hot.” Therefore, in like manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they increase.

I answer that, The solution of this question depends on what we have said above [1473](A[1]). For we said that increase and decrease in forms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one way not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through the diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such increase of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of form to form; but by the subject participating more or less perfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is in act, something is made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to participate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is proved in Metaph. vii, text. 32, so, by an intense action of the agent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form more perfectly, not as though something were added to the form.

For if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of addition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the subject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been stated [1474](A[1]) that such an addition or subtraction would change the species; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be understood as applying to the subject, this could only be either because one part of the subject receives a form which it had not previously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being cold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because some other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in either of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot thing, but a greater white or hot thing.

Since, however, as stated above [1475](A[1]), certain accidents are of themselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find increase by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to the time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species remains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement increases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. in so far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or readily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man’s science increases, as to the subject’s participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions.

As to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive increase by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply healthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it be brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change in the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save in intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.

How this question affects virtues we shall state further on ([1476]Q[66], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by addition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living things. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all; such is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in Phys. iv, text. 63.

Reply to Objection 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects something in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the subject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes the form to extend further.

Reply to Objection 3: What is not already white, is potentially white, as not yet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new form in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in potentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but it is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it receives through the agent’s action.

Whether every act increases its habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For when the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are causes of habits, as stated above ([1477]Q[51], A[2]). Therefore a habit increases when its acts are multiplied.

Objection 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But all the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike (Ethic. ii, 1,2).

Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should increase it.

Objection 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the habit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.

On the contrary, Opposite effects do not result from the same cause. But according to Ethic. ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit whence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly. Therefore it is not every act that increases a habit.

I answer that, “Like acts cause like habits” (Ethic. ii, 1,2). Now things are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities being the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a different mode of participation. For it is not only black that is unlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there is movement from less white to more white, even as from one opposite to another, as stated in Phys. v, text. 52.

But since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above ([1478]Q[50], A[5]); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act contrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an act that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit. Accordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to the intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either increases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may speak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an animal. For not every morsel of food actually increases the animal’s size as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but the multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the body. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof.

From this it is clear how to solve the objections.

HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?

(2) Whether it can be diminished?

(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?

Whether a habit can be corrupted?

Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For habit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is pleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as its subject remains.

Objection 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to corruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases through corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health. Now science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of its subject: since "the intellect," which is its subject, "is a substance that is incorruptible" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like manner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary: since intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph. vii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.

Objection 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the habit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a direct movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved directly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of the body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the intelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect independently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for which reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old age or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the same reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they also are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 10), "virtue is more lasting than learning."

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that "forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science." Moreover, by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again, virtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).

I answer that, A form is said to be corrupted directly by its contrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When therefore a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a contrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with bodily habits—for instance, health and sickness. But those habits that have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly. There are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an incorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a corruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly indeed in the “possible” intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive powers of apprehension, as stated above ([1479]Q[50], A[3], ad 3). Consequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on the part of the “possible” intellect, but only on the part of the lower sensitive powers.

We must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be corrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary, either on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be corrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted directly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in the “possible” intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active intellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary. Wherefore if in the “possible” intellect there be a habit caused immediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible both directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first principles, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted by any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher says about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that “it cannot be lost by being forgotten.” There is, however, in the “possible” intellect a habit caused by the reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is called science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in two ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the starting point of the reason: for the assertion “Good is not good” is contrary to the assertion “Good is good” (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly, on the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical syllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism. Wherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a true opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated above, says that “deception is the corruption of science.” As to virtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as stated in Ethic. vi, 1: and to these applies what we have said of science and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in the appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the contrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused therein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason. Therefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or virtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. vii, 10, a habit is like a second nature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the nature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a habit is removed, though with difficulty.

Reply to Objection 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible species, yet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of reason, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if we consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an obstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its act, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal transmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can corrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the habit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted. Nevertheless when it is said that “virtue is more lasting than learning,” this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or cause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through the whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.

Whether a habit can diminish?

Objection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a habit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost it cannot diminish.

Objection 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by reason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not become more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow that a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less. And if it can become less intense as to its participation by its subject, it would follow that something is accidental to a habit, proper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now whenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that form can be separate, as stated in De Anima i, text. 13. Hence it follows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible.

Objection 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any accident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is defined with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not become more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its inherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less intense.

On the contrary, It is natural for contraries to be applicable to the same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since therefore a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.

I answer that, Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways, as we have already explained ([1480]Q[52], A[1]). And since they increase through the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they diminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the diminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption, even as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a foundation of its increase.

Reply to Objection 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is not thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the different ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due to the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through its being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to a greater or a smaller number of things.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a habit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that a certain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the habit, but in its subject.

Reply to Objection 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very notion implies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we take an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject, which relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject: for "whiteness is that whereby a thing is white." Accordingly in defining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as though it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but we give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we say that "simitas" is "a curvature of the nose." But if we take accidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and terminates at the accident: for "a white thing" is "something that has whiteness." Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we place the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a definition; for we say that a "simum" is a "snub-nose." Accordingly whatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is not of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that accident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase and decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white is not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies to habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other qualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of addition, as we have already clearly explained ([1481]Q[52], A[2]).

Whether a habit is corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act?

Objection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or diminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more lasting than passion-like qualities, as we have explained above ([1482]Q[49], A[2], ad 3;[1483] Q[50], A[1]). But passion-like qualities are neither corrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not lessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to make something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.

Objection 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing is changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation from act does not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be diminished or corrupted through cessation from act.

Objection 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the intellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are above time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time. Neither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through length of time, if one fails for long to exercise them.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only “deception,” but also “forgetfulness, is the corruption of science.” Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that “want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship.” In like manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.

I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it has been stated [1484](A[1]) that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.

Reply to Objection 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give heat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat were to increase.

Reply to Objection 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of corruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles, thereto, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in itself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and therefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of the sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.

OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?

(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?

(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?

(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?

Whether many habits can be in one power?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one power. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the same thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now habits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing, viz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like manner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power.

Objection 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject there cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the cause of its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can proceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power.

Objection 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a power informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the same time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be informed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits cannot be at the same time in one power.

On the contrary, The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless, are the habits of various sciences.

I answer that, As stated above ([1485]Q[49], A[4]), habits are dispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either to nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those habits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can be in one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in various ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts there are various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts of the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human nature, we have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take like parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of these in respect of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we take the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of these in proportion to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several habits or dispositions in the same subject.

If, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to operation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may be several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the subject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above ([1486]Q[51], A[2]): for it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit, as was clearly shown above ([1487]Q[51], A[2]). Now a passive power is compared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form: because, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so, too, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object to an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can move one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of several acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are qualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to acts of a determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as several specifically different acts, can belong to one power.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species is according to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter, as stated in Metaph. v, text. 33 (since things that differ in matter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of objects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher says in Ethic. vi, 1, that “those objects that differ generically belong to different departments of the soul”); while specific difference of objects entails a specific difference of acts, and consequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ in species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of different powers differ in species: but it does not follow that different habits are in different powers, for several can be in one power. And even as several genera may be included in one genus, and several species be contained in one species; so does it happen that there are several species of habits and powers.

Reply to Objection 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is multiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically different acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many superficially different habits from being in one power.

Reply to Objection 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own terminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a power, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate term. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same time, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another; just as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one shape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure. For the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time "actually"; and yet it can know several things at the same time "habitually."

Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?

Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their objects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of science regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the unhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects specifically distinct.

Objection 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the same scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the physicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by their objects.

Objection 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the same. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if it be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it be done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in order to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same object can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of habits does not follow diversity of objects.

On the contrary, Acts differ in species according to the diversity of their objects, as stated above ([1488]Q[18], A[5]). But habits are dispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished according to the diversity of objects.

I answer that, A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition implying a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation consequent to nature.

Accordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three things. First, in respect of the active principles of such dispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of specifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.

Reply to Objection 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must consider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect, which may differ in species or even in genus. And though the distinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet they are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the other. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of cognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.

Reply to Objection 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one means, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means of mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the sort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the movement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the whole force of a demonstration, which is “a syllogism producing science,” as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And consequently various means are as so many active principles, in respect of which the habits of science are distinguished.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic. vii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a diversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does. Moreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above all, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said ([1489]Q[18], A[6];[1490] Q[19], A[2], ad 1;[1491] Q[34], A[4]).

Whether habits are divided into good and bad?

Objection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and bad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards contraries, as was stated above (A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore habits are not divided into good and bad.

Objection 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is common to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the Philosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a privation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore habits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.

Objection 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same object; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of concupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits; for instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not divided into good and bad.

On the contrary, A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue to vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad habits.

I answer that, As stated above [1492](A[2]), habits are specifically distinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles, but also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways. First, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature. In this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit: since a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the agent’s nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act unsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human nature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are discordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it is clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference of good and bad.

Secondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the fact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower nature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher nature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting human nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which disposes to an act befitting some higher nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far as contraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen that contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits follows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into good and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad; but not by reason of one habit being something good, and another about something bad.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not the good which is common to every being, that is a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some determinate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz. the human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a difference of habits is not a pure privation, but something determinate repugnant to a determinate nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing are distinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as stated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are distinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in keeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are contrary to one virtue.

Whether one habit is made up of many habits?

Objection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits. For whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems to be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at once, but little by little out of several acts, as stated above ([1493]Q[51], A[3]). Therefore one habit is made up of several.

Objection 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are assigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude, temperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.

Objection 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a habit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one science, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one habit is made up of many.

On the contrary, A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form. But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up of many.

I answer that, A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects. Hence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in so far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective aspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are related to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or to one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above ([1494]AA[2],3).

If then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall find a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is directed to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it is that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits, even though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to many things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.

Reply to Objection 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is due, not to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that the subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly changeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being imperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same applies to other qualities.

Reply to Objection 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue, are not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective or potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q[57], A[6], ad 4; [1495]SS, Q[48]).

Reply to Objection 3: In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration, scientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet imperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific knowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in him: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected, forasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and demonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from another.

TREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ[55]-89) GOOD HABITS, i.e. VIRTUES (QQ[55]-70)

OF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since habits, as we have said ([1496]Q[54], A[3]), are divided into good and bad, we must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues, and of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of vices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues: (1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of virtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?

(2) Whether it is an operative habit?

(3) Whether it is a good habit?

(4) Of the definition of virtue.

Whether human virtue is a habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For virtue is “the limit of power” (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit of anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the limit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue is reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf. De Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that “virtue is good use of free-will.” But use of free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.

Objection 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions: otherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do merit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that “virtue is the order of love,” and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that “the ordering which is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy, and using what we ought to use.” Now order, or ordering, denominates either an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an action or a relation.

Objection 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there natural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers. Neither therefore are human virtues habits.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science and virtue are habits.

I answer that, Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now a thing’s perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But the end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect, according as it is determinate to its act.

Now there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to their acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore these natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the rational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one particular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they are determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we have said above ([1497]Q[49], A[4]). Therefore human virtues are habits.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which the virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act: for instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to the act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When therefore we say that “virtue is the limit of power,” virtue is taken for the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can reach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a hundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say ‘strength,’ which is the original signification of the Latin ‘virtus’: thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to indicate its ‘strength’] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty. But the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of power.

Reply to Objection 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the same sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to which virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue is nothing else than the good use of free-will.

Reply to Objection 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways. First, as by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.

Reply to Objection 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of love, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us love is set in order by virtue.

Reply to Objection 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one act: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we have said.

Whether human virtue is an operative habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue to be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health and beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But health and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is virtue.

Objection 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in reference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from the Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always, while some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time. Now as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in rational beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to act, but also to being.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that virtue "is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best." Now the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God Himself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3, 6, 14) to Whom the soul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that virtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as it were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not, therefore, an operative habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that “virtue of a thing is that which makes its work good.”

I answer that, Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies some perfection of power, as we have said above [1498](A[1]). Wherefore, since power [*The one Latin word ‘potentia’ is rendered ‘potentiality’ in the first case, and ‘power’ in the second] is of two kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in reference to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue. But power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is potential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of the form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts in so far as it is in act.

Now man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter, the soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other animals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to the soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the soul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And therefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul. Wherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather to act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an operative habit.

Reply to Objection 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent: for such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue is the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs pre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding disposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue itself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit, the powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to that which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable disposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are suitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue from being a principle of operation.

Reply to Objection 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man; but only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are proper to man.

Reply to Objection 3: As God’s substance is His act, the highest likeness of man to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have said above ([1499]Q[3], A[2]), happiness or bliss by which man is made most perfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life, consists in an operation.

Whether human virtue is a good habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it should be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But there is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: “The virtue [Douay: ‘strength’] of sin is the Law.” Therefore virtue is not always a good habit.

Objection 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Is. 5: “Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness.” Therefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): “Virtue [Douay: ‘power’] is made perfect in infirmity.” But infirmity is an evil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): “No one can doubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): “Virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.”

I answer that, As we have said above [1500](A[1]), virtue implies a perfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the limit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must needs be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the virtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore human virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive of good works.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be perfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief or robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to evil things: so that the “virtue” of sin is said to be law, in so far as occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to the limit of its possibility.

Reply to Objection 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists in a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that, together with this falling away from reason, some lower power is perfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in direct opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But the perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling away from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect, according as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the weakness of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human virtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be "made perfect in infirmity," not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the lower powers.

Whether virtue is suitably defined?

Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: "Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us." For virtue is man's goodness, since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a "good quality."

Objection 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore "good" should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): "When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertaining to the mind." But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality "of the mind."

Objection 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put "righteous" in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that "by which we live righteously."

Objection 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that "pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them." It is untrue, therefore, "that no one can make bad use of virtue."

Objection 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on Jn. 15:11: “He shall do greater things than these,” says [*Tract. xxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: “He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.” It is therefore unsuitable to say that “God works virtue in us, without us.”

On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19.

I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as “a good quality”: for “quality” is the genus of virtue, and the difference, “good.” But the definition would be more suitable if for “quality” we substitute “habit,” which is the proximate genus.

Now virtue has no matter “out of which” it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter “about which” it is concerned, and matter “in which” it exits, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality “of the mind.”

The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words “by which we live righteously”: and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, “of which no one makes bad use.”

Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words “which God works in us without us.” If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good.

Reply to Objection 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) “that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason.”

Reply to Objection 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q[60], A[2]; [1501]SS, Q[58], A[8]). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (Q[19], A[4]), is common to all virtues.

Reply to Objection 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it, or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.

Reply to Objection 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, “which God works in us without us.” As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.

OF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?

(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?

(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?

(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue?

(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue?

(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?

Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “virtue is that by which we live righteously.” But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, but in the essence of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.” But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above ([1502]Q[55], A[4]): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.

On the contrary, “Virtue is the limit of power” (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul.

I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects.

Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above ([1503]Q[55], A[2]): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing's power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: "To live" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes "to live" is taken for the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.

Reply to Objection 2: Good is either the end, or something referred to the end. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the work, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred to the work, and consequently, to the power.

Reply to Objection 3: One accident is said to be the subject of another, not as though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident inheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by means of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of color. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue.

Whether one virtue can be in several powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers. For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various way from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as directing, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as executing. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three things are required for virtue, namely: "to know, to will, and to work steadfastly." But "to know" belongs to the intellect, and "to will" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is "the right reason of things to be done" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the will: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi, 12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.

On the contrary, The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue cannot be in several powers of the soul.

I answer that, It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected in two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity of powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while diversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so wherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits; but not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two or more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus one virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one chiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way of a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one power receives from another.

Reply to Objection 1: One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in the same degree; but only from different points of view, and in various degrees.

Reply to Objection 2: “To know” is a condition required for moral virtue, inasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral virtue is essentially in the appetite.

Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it presupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall see further on [1504](A[3]; Q[57], A[4]).

Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of virtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is love. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the appetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what has been said above ([1505]Q[55], A[3]). Now good is not the object of the intellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of virtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power.

Objection 3: Further, virtue is that “which makes its possessor good,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects the intellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said to be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the intellect is not the subject of virtue.

On the contrary, The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the subject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above given, of virtue ([1506]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore the intellect is the subject of virtue.

I answer that, As we have said above ([1507]Q[55], A[3]), a virtue is a habit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good act in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an aptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has the aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man always speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism or make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and arts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also the right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives man the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.

And since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing simply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is actually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is said simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is just, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues. And since virtue is that “which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise,” these latter habits are called virtuous simply: because they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good simply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply: because they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain aptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through being gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply, but relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And for this reason science and art are often divided against virtue; while at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).

Hence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative sense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect, but also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and understanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the subject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the will, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the reason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other powers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q[9], A[1]; Q[17], AA[1],5; [1508]FP, Q[82], A[4]): and therefore if man do well actually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue which makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the aptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some power as moved by the will.

Now it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are the other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he wills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is subordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so called. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is the subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of the will to assent to what is of faith: for "no man believeth, unless he will" [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical intellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right reason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be rightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things to be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly disposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of speculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the active intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is the right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect in its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence is the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue simply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it depends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will, whose first movement consists in love, as we have said above (Q[25], AA[1],2,3; Q[27], A[4]; [1509]FP, Q[20], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as truth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act of the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in regard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical, is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers virtue simply so called.

Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers are the subject of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible powers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common to us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper to man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is therefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we have said in the [1510]FP, Q[81], A[2].

Objection 2: Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of a corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man’s body: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7): “I know that good does not dwell in my flesh.” Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is ruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a man make good use of his body: “For instance, if my coachman, through obedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving; this is all due to me.” But just as the soul rules the body, so also does the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the irascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due to the rational powers. Now “virtue is that by which we live rightly,” as we have said above ([1511]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the rational powers.

Objection 4: Further, “the principal act of moral virtue is choice” (Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and concupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said above ([1512]Q[13], A[2]). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but in the reason.

On the contrary, Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and temperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 10) says that “these virtues belong to the irrational part of the soul.”

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible powers can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are parts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not competent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be considered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they have a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or concupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so far as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human act. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.

For it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power according as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the operations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the irascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in themselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and dumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation, and are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this way they can be the subject of human virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of virtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as being moved by reason, we “yield our members to serve justice”; so also, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed, have not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the “fomes”: whereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of reason is begotten in them.

Reply to Objection 3: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and concupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the body obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those things in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul: whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the “soul rules the body with a despotic command” as the master rules his slave: wherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul. For this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the irascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on the contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at times, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the “reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a political command” such as that by which free men are ruled, who have in some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must there be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by which these powers are well disposed to act.

Reply to Objection 4: In choice there are two things, namely, the intention of the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the preferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 2,5). But that the irascible and concupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to the passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these powers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with the passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but prudence is in the reason.

Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension are the subject of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive appetite can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason. But the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for the powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. [1513]FP, Q[78], A[4]] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers there can be virtue.

Objection 2: Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be hindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also can the intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned above. As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of appetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of apprehension.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent. Rhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power of memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other interior sensitive powers of apprehension.

On the contrary, All virtues are either intellectual or moral (Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while the intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear from Ethic. vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior sensitive powers of apprehension.

I answer that, In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension there are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that “in remembering one thing after another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature.” Now a habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is like unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his Rhetoric that “it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.” Yet, in man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other sensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called, but something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as we have said above ([1514]Q[50], A[4], ad 3).

Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is not consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such powers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore in these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know truth: these are rather in the intellect or reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is the rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the act of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite: and for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue. Whereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the intellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms are related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima iii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in the intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in the intellect itself, or the reason.

And thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a genus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of the conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a fashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.

Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of virtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a power by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the reason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good, according to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since everything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as Tully says in his Rhetoric, is a "habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic. i, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect and reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in the irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by participation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.

Objection 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are voluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of some human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in respect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue in any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same act, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the subject of virtue.

On the contrary, Greater perfection is required in the mover than in the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible powers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than in the irascible and concupiscible powers.

I answer that, Since the habit perfects the power in reference to act, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well, which habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not suffice for the purpose.

Now the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its object. Since, therefore, as we have said above ([1515]Q[19], A[3]), the object of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will, in respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But if man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity, whether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good, which transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the individual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will need virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as charity, justice, and such like.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection is true of those virtues which are ordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude, which are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is clear from what we have said ([1516]Q[35], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are rational by participation but "the appetitive power altogether," i.e. in its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the appetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must be a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on ([1517]Q[62], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated passion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these cases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the power suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists only in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the intellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological virtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?

(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?

(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?

(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?

(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?

(6) Whether "eubulia," "synesis" and "gnome" are virtues annexed to prudence?

Whether the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above

([1518]Q[55], A[2]). But speculative habits are not operative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e. operative matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are not virtues.

Objection 2: Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made happy or blessed: for “happiness is the reward of virtue” (Ethic. i, 9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human goods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining to nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called virtues.

Objection 3: Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and virtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not subalternate, as the Philosopher proves in Topic. iv. Therefore speculative habits are not virtues.

On the contrary, The speculative habits alone consider necessary things which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of the soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise than they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are virtues.

I answer that, Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as stated above ([1519]Q[55], A[3]), a habit, as we have already observed ([1520]Q[56], A[3]), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it confers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it confers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated ([1521]Q[55], A[3]), belongs to those habits alone which affect the appetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul’s appetitive power that puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.

Since, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect the appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the intellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as they confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth (since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not called virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right use of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in the acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus Gregory says (Moral. vi) that the “contemplative life has greater merit than the active life.”

Reply to Objection 1: Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior. Accordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with the speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which the speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the interior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in this way it is an operative habit.

Reply to Objection 2: Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the first place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative virtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except perhaps, in so far as the word “whereby” indicates the efficient cause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme object of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its acts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those things whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these virtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a kind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the contemplation of truth, as we have already stated ([1522]Q[3], A[7]).

Reply to Objection 3: Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second sense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.

Whether there are only three habits of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of the speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding. Because a species is a kind of science, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Therefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in respect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of these objects, as we have already explained ([1523]FP, Q[77], A[3]). Therefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material objects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the principle of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the conclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should not be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of conclusions.

Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the essentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs the dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs the demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the result of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual virtue, so also should opinion be.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three alone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.

I answer that, As already stated [1524](A[1]), the virtues of the speculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative intellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work. Now a truth is subject to a twofold consideration—as known in itself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as a “principle,” and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore the habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such truth is called “understanding,” which is the habit of principles.

On the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is understood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the reason’s inquiry, and is as a “term.” This may happen in two ways: first, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so that it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since “things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable first and chiefly in their nature” (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that which is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is knowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is “wisdom,” which considers the highest causes, as stated in Metaph. i, 1,2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in order, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is not based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in this or that genus of knowable matter, it is “science” which perfects the intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable matter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas there is but one wisdom.

Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to their conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore it is a more perfect virtue than science.

Reply to Objection 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a power or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or power in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object: thus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and light, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is seen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles of a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion being considered at all. Again they can be considered together with the conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them. Accordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs to science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider the principles in themselves belongs to understanding.

Consequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues are distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a certain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes, wherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the rational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the sensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on understanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1525]Q[55], AA[3],4), a virtuous habit has a fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the good of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore those habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell the truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can be about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in Ethic. vi, 3, they are not intellectual virtues.

Whether the intellectual habit, art, is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that “no one makes bad use of virtue.” But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can work badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But “there is a virtue of art,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore art is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would have to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,4) says that art is a virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative virtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of the soul.

I answer that, Art is nothing else but “the right reason about certain works to be made.” And yet the good of these things depends, not on man’s appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way, but on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is commendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the quality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an operative habit. And yet it has something in common with the speculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the latter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human appetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the geometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his appetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry: even as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed. And so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the speculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative habit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the property of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards the aptness to work well.

Reply to Objection 1: When anyone endowed with an art produces bad workmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary to the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his words are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto. Wherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that it is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect virtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for which purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot be a good use without the art.

Reply to Objection 2: In order that man may make good use of the art he has, he needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for this reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art; namely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a moral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by justice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in speculative matters there is something by way of work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but "liberal" arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free [liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not arts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notion of art is more applicable to them.

Whether prudence is a distinct virtue from art?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue from art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But diversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since there are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore prudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too should be reckoned a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the speculative habits have; for they are both "about contingent matters that may be otherwise than they are" (Ethic. vi, 4,5). Now some speculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should prudence be called an art.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, "to be of good counsel" (Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of seamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from art.

On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art (Ethic. vi, 5).

I answer that, Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a different kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above [1526](A[1]; Q[56], A[3]) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely conferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues, not only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through conferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work; since it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not only aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the appetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.

The reason for this difference is that art is the “right reason of things to be made”; whereas prudence is the “right reason of things to be done.” Now “making” and “doing” differ, as stated in Metaph. ix, text. 16, in that “making” is an action passing into outward matter, e.g. “to build,” “to saw,” and so forth; whereas “doing” is an action abiding in the agent, e.g. “to see,” “to will,” and the like. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like human actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art does to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the things with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which reason argues; just as we have said above (A[2], ad 2) that science depends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in speculative matters, as stated in Ethic. vii, 8. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the other hand the good things made by art is not the good of man’s appetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does not presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that more praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than to one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to sin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is essential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is evident that prudence is a virtue distinct from art.

Reply to Objection 1: The various kinds of things made by art are all external to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue. But prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is a distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative habit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both in the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be otherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art has more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there is counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts. Hence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.

Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to lead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it is the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in respect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right reason about these things, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. Now art is not necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be made, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is prudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has become virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become virtuous.

Objection 2: Further, "It is by prudence that we are of good counsel," as stated in Ethic. vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but also from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need prudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he follow the counsels of prudent men.

Objection 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always tells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be the case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking counsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about things that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned an intellectual virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for human life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: “She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.”

I answer that, Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life. For a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good deeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it; to wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the end, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end, and something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably directed to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the appetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to that which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be rightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and choice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the reason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason, to perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things ordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently prudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.

Reply to Objection 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the craftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason about things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into external matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the thing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art is concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good of prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its perfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as stated above [1527](A[4]). Consequently art does not require of the craftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good. Rather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g. that a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it were proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on, because they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the craftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may produce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas prudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not merely that he may be a good man.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel, but moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as regards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him. Wherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet this is required in order that he may lead a good life.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. vi, 2, truth is not the same for the practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of the speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect and the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in conformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary matters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an intellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On the other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on conformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in necessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only in contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be matters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence it is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is assigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to be made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.

Whether “eubulia, synesis, and gnome” are virtues annexed to prudence? [*{euboulia, synesis, gnome}]

Objection 1: It would seem that “{euboulia, synesis}, and {gnome}” are unfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For “{euboulia}” is “a habit whereby we take good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it “belongs to prudence to take good counsel,” as stated (Ethic. vi, 9). Therefore “{euboulia}” is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is prudence itself.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The highest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is judgment. Now “{synesis}” enables us to judge well. Therefore “{synesis}” is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue.

Objection 3: Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment on, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel. But there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel. Therefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no need, besides “{synesis}” of the virtue of “{gnome}.”

Objection 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. “memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future.” Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. “caution, docility,” and the like. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues annexed to prudence.

On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to prudence.

I answer that, Wherever several powers are subordinate to one another, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest act. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done by man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the third, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the speculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is a kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical intellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason does not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is evident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command, to which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue which perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest place, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. “{eustochia},” which perfects counsel; and “{synesis}” and “{gnome},” which are parts of prudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall speak further on (ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its immediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it perfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz. “{euboulia}.”

Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to something further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a man’s judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter does not attain to its final complement until the reason has commanded aright in the point of what has to be done.

Reply to Objection 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing’s proper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper principles: because, if we were in possession of these, we should need no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence only one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there are two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on common but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative matters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all matters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment, differ according to their different objects. “{Synesis}” and “{gnome}” differ in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based: for “{synesis}” judges of actions according to the common law; while “{gnome}” bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where the common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on ([1528]SS, Q[51], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution and docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence: but are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are all requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective parts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy, and the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential parts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary virtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later (SS, Q[48], seqq.).

OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the difference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their distinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter; (3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and the others.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual virtue?

(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue. Because moral virtue is so called from the Latin “mos,” i.e. custom. Now, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues. Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral virtue is "a habit of choosing the rational mean." But every virtue is a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done from choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the rational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on ([1529]Q[64], AA[1],2,3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit like a second nature, in accord with reason." But since every human virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with reason: since man's good "consists in that which agrees with his reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13): "When we speak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or intelligent, but that he is gentle or sober." Accordingly, then, wisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are virtues, as stated above ([1530]Q[57], A[2]). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue.

I answer that, In order to answer this question clearly, we must consider the meaning of the Latin word "mos"; for thus we shall be able to discover what a "moral" virtue is. Now "mos" has a twofold meaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts 15:1): "Except you be circumcised after the manner (morem) of Moses, you cannot be saved." Sometimes it means a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which sense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2) that "rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more, i.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them": and the word is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: "Who maketh men of one manner [moris] to dwell in a house." For both these significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek there is a distinct word for each, for the word "ethos" is written sometimes with a long, and sometimes a short "e."

Now "moral" virtue is so called from "mos" in the sense of a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the other meaning of "mos," i.e. "custom," is akin to this: because custom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar to a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action belongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to move all the powers to their acts, as explained above ([1531]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are in the appetitive faculty.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes “mos” in the sense of “custom.”

Reply to Objection 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no virtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive part of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act of the appetitive faculty ([1532]Q[13], A[1]). Wherefore a habit of choosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is that habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the acts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.

Reply to Objection 3: “Nature is the principle of movement” (Phys. ii, text. 3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the appetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by consenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the appetitive faculty.

Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) “that virtue is the art of right conduct.” But art is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.

Objection 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of virtues: thus some define perseverance as a “science or habit regarding those things to which we should hold or not hold”; and holiness as “a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his duty to God.” Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral virtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that “virtue is the rectitude and perfection of reason.” But this belongs to the intellectual virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

Objection 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included in its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the definition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it.” Now this right reason that fixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ from intellectual.

On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. i, 13 that “there are two kinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral.”

I answer that, Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and whatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey reason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly and without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the body, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason commands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that “the soul rules the body like a despot,” i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel. Accordingly some held that all the active principles in man are subordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act well it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions, it would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be none but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who said “every virtue is a kind of prudence,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of knowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so through ignorance.

Now this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of opposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that “reason commands the appetitive faculty by a politic power,” whereby a man rules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of opposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that “sometimes we understand [what is right] while desire is slow, or follows not at all,” in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And in this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so long as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin: provided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of reason in this individual act of choice.

Accordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only that his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual virtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a habit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue, even as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the appetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of reason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as they are in conformity with reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine usually applies the term “art” to any form of right reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right reason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about things to be made. Accordingly, when he says that “virtue is the art of right conduct,” this applies to prudence essentially; but to other virtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by prudence.

Reply to Objection 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based on the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we have said about art (ad 1).

The same applies to the Third Objection.

Reply to Objection 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of prudence.

Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual?

Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into moral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral and intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual virtues (Ethic. vi, 3,5); and again is placed by all among the four cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further on ([1533]Q[61], A[1]). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.

Objection 2: Further, contingency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

Objection 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are not intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz. science, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above ([1534]Q[57], AA[2] ,3,5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are not about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue. Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and moral.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “virtue is twofold, intellectual and moral.”

I answer that, Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of human actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for these are the two principles of movement in man as stated in De Anima iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a perfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects man’s speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may be good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects his appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that every human virtue is either intellectual or moral.

Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But considered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with the moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as stated above ([1535]Q[57], A[4]). It is in this sense that it is reckoned with the moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: Contingency and perseverance are not perfections of the sensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound in the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if his sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it conformable to reason. Contingency and perseverance are, however, perfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest reason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since intellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in respect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so that it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the ends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the continent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding from two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by the habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be the principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an imperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence if the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is not perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the resulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of that action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, contingency, desisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are not virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher maintains (Ethic. vii, 1,9).

Reply to Objection 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for they are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.

Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is “a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.” Now though nature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it, there is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same subject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature, inclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being perfected by an intellectual virtue.

Objection 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect use of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason. Therefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.

Objection 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But some, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural inclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without intellectual virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that “the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues.” But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above ([1536]Q[57], A[5]). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.

I answer that, Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding and prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is a habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a choice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those things which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above ([1537]Q[57], AA[5],6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence: and consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it is by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident principles both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently just as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds from naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of those principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason about things to be done.

Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice: and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mat. 10:16: “Be ye therefore prudent [Douay: ‘wise’] as serpents, and simple as doves.”

Reply to Objection 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right reason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it “according to right reason,” in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to right reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.]; but also it needs to be “joined with right reason,” as Aristotle declares (Ethic. vi, 13).

Whether there can be intellectual without moral virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without moral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on the perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the sensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a perfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a perfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.

Objection 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things makeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper matter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without the moral virtue, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems most akin to the moral virtues.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is “a virtue whereby we are of good counsel” (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having the moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.

On the contrary, To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral virtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without moral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence “to sin willingly” (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.

I answer that, Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot, be without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the right reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in general, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now right reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue. And when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only universal but also particular principles. As to universal principles of action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of principles, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or again by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that man may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens sometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of understanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a passion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by the habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be rightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so, in order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular principles of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the virtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because "such a man is, such does the end seem to him" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the right reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to have moral virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite for the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing about the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even so, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the foundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.

Reply to Objection 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite whether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does, when we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in the former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does not require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.

Reply to Objection 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but also to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the impediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of prudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.

OF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another. And since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ accordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the relation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral virtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?

(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?

(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?

(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?

(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?

Whether moral virtue is a passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because the mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a mean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.

Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are in the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such as envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.

Objection 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's ills, as stated above ([1538]Q[35], A[8]). Now "Cicero the renowned orator did not hesitate to call pity a virtue," as Augustine states in De Civ. Dei ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.

On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. ii, 5 that "passions are neither virtues nor vices."

I answer that, Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for three reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above ([1539]Q[22], A[3]): whereas moral virtue is not a movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite, being a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in reference to reason: wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they may accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be a virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above ([1540]Q[55], A[3]). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in some way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the movement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in the reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On the other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins in the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is moved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6) states that it is "a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason as a prudent man would appoint it."

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its essence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it establishes the mean between passions.

Reply to Objection 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in so far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in so far as “that movement of the soul is obedient to reason”; viz. “when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that he bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from being a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.

Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion. For the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that “a gentle man is one who is not passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does not give way.” The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore all moral virtues are without passion.

Objection 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health is to the body, as stated Phys. vii, text. 17: wherefore “virtue is a kind of health of the soul,” as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But the soul’s passions are “the soul’s diseases,” as he says in the same book. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is passion compatible with virtue.

Objection 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in particular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “pleasures destroy the judgment of prudence”: and Sallust says (Catilin.) that “when they,” i.e. the soul’s passions, “interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the truth.” Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): “If the will is perverse, these movements,” viz. the passions, “are perverse also: but if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.” But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.

I answer that, The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that the soul’s passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the Peripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with moral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.

This difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one of words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not discriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the passions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of their being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other emotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason. These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius [*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), “it is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by fear, or depressed with sorrow,” in so far as “these passions forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or consenting thereto.”

Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately; as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says (Ethic. ii, 3) that “some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the assertion should be qualified”: they should have said virtue is freedom from those passions “that are not as they should be as to manner and time.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand this of inordinate passion.

Reply to Objection 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings forward in De Tusc. Quaest. iv take the passions in the execution of reason's command.

Reply to Objection 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's command.

Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue. Because the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7: "She," i.e. Divine wisdom, "teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude." Now the "conversation" of wisdom "hath no bitterness," as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue also.

Objection 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is incompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc. Quaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue, which is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to virtue and is incompatible with it.

On the contrary, Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said (Mat. 26:38): "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics held that in the mind of the wise man there are three {eupatheiai}, i.e. "three good passions," in place of the three disturbances: viz. instead of covetousness, "desire"; instead of mirth, "joy"; instead of fear, "caution." But they denied that anything corresponding to sorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.

First, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now they held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought that, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some good to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." A third reason is because a virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been so in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: "The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Fourthly, because he may praiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is compatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions are when moderated by reason.

Their second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about evil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is about a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the enjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one possesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the mind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary to reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is unreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the virtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by reason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection by sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason dictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be conformed to reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Wherefore moderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a mark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6,7). Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.

Accordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue is incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the other hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no matter how.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made sorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom. Consequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom there can be no hindrance to wisdom.

Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it helps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but moderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to the present state of life.

Whether all the moral virtues are about the passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that “moral virtue is about objects of pleasure and sorrow.” But pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ([1541]Q[23], A[4];[1542] Q[31], A[1];[1543] Q[35], AA[1], 2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.

Objection 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which is rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above ([1544]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.

Objection 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue: and so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are about the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.

On the contrary, Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the passions; as stated in Ethic. v, 1, seqq.

I answer that, Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as defined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason. Consequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are subject to reason’s direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not only the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations of the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject of a passion, as stated above ([1545]Q[22], A[3]). Therefore not all the moral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some about operations.

Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and sorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something resulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in acts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher, after the words quoted, adds, “if virtues are about actions and passions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,” viz. as about something that results from virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of the passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where there are no passions, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but some virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.

Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion.

Objection 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. 7:5) they are called “passions of sins.” Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion.

Objection 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion.

On the contrary, “No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds,” as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.

I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements.

Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above ([1546]Q[17], A[7];[1547] Q[24], A[3]). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion.

Reply to Objection 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body's help.

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?

(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions?

(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?

(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?

(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

Whether there is only one moral virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.

Objection 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.

Objection 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above ([1548]Q[1], A[3]). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.

On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q[56], A[2]). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the [1549]FP, Q[80], A[2]; [1550]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([1551]Q[58], AA[1],2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above ([1552]Q[54], A[2]). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.

Reply to Objection 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.

Reply to Objection 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.

Whether moral virtues about operations are different from those that are about passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is “an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow.” Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above ([1553]Q[31], A[1];[1554] Q[35], A[1]). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit.

Objection 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations.

Objection 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).

I answer that, Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are passions, as stated above ([1555]Q[59], A[4], ad 1).

Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.

It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate passion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about passions, for the reason given above.

Whether there is only one moral virtue about operations?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.

Objection 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man’s actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.

Objection 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in Ethic. v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.

On the contrary, Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.

I answer that, All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is established, as we have stated [1556](A[2]), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: e.g. “Religion” whereby we pay our debt to God; “Piety,” whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; “Gratitude,” whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on ([1557]SS, Q[61], A[1]).

Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different passions. For there is but one habit about things that concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the case of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz. love; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as we stated above ([1558]Q[25], AA[1],2,4; [1559] Q[27], A[4]). Therefore there is but one moral virtue about all the passions.

Objection 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about different passions, it would follow that there are as many moral virtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is one moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about fear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore there is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.

Objection 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different species, as stated above ([1560]Q[23], A[4]). Now there is but one virtue about all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not different moral virtues about different passions.

On the contrary, Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance about desire; meekness about anger; as stated in Ethic. iii, 6,10; iv, 5.

I answer that, It cannot be said that there is only one moral virtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the same power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible, others to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ([1561]Q[23], A[1]).

On the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions necessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because some passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy and sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are thus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same virtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the mean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as in the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g. between black and white. Secondly, because there are different passions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling to that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that which is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of the concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues, because their movements follow one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire, and from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the opposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this leads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not all of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues about such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible passions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope and despair; meekness, about anger.

Reply to Objection 1: All the passions concur in one common principle and end; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not suffice for the unity of moral virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle causes movement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in the intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too between contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like a second nature, consents to reason’s dictates.

Reply to Objection 3: Those three passions are directed to the same object in a certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same virtue.

Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ according to the objects of the passions. For just as there are objects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those moral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to the objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of a house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice. Therefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions differ according to the objects of those passions.

Objection 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions.

Objection 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable.

Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions.

Objection 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But there are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and “eutrapelia” [*{eutrapelia}] about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils.

On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and “eutrapelia” about pleasures in games.

I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions: while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above [1562](A[4]); and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure.

And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above [1563](A[4]); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues—for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason rules man’s lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause a difference of virtues. Consequently man’s good which is the object of love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same good may be directed to man’s good in himself, either in his body or in his soul, or to man’s good in relation to other men. And every such difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates virtues.

Accordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the sense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life either in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of “temperance.” As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are not intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason: hence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, “like art, is about difficult things” (Ethic. ii, 3).

On the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner power, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the former, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the body, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind. These goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way they concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to obtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which distinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch; since such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far as he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in reference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of desire, pleasure, or love, there is “liberality”: but if we consider this good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope, there is “magnificence” [*{megaloprepeia}]. With regard to that good which we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have a virtue called “philotimia” [*{philotimia}], i.e. “love of honor”: while if we consider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have “magnanimity.” Wherefore liberality and “philotimia” seem to be in the concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the irascible.

As regards man’s good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard to obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the concupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his behavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions, to wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful actions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand in the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves towards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being pleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this belongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls “friendship” [*{philia}], and may be rendered “affability.” Secondly, one man behaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds: this belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls “truthfulness” [*{aletheia}]. For frankness is more akin to the reason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is another virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher “eutrapelia” [*{eutrapelia}] (Ethic. iv, 8).

It is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten moral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, “philotimia,” gentleness, friendship, truthfulness, and “eutrapelia,” all of which differ in respect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we add “justice,” which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.

Reply to Objection 1: All objects of the same specific operation have the same relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific passion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.

Reply to Objection 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as virtues are, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: More and less do not cause a difference of species, unless they bear different relations to reason.

Reply to Objection 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil does not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason, so as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being, seemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence there is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and, again, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the other hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if it be not a great good in that particular kind of passion. Consequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated above.

OF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?

(2) Of their number;

(3) Which are they?

(4) Whether they differ from one another?

(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called cardinal or principal virtues. For “the opposite members of a division are by nature simultaneous” (Categor. x), so that one is not principal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite members of the division of the genus “virtue.” Therefore none of them should be called principal.

Objection 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But the theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues are about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than the moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.

Objection 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in comparison with that which is so by participation. But the intellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational: whereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by participation, as stated above ([1564]Q[58] , A[3]). Therefore the intellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.

On the contrary, Ambrose in explaining the words, “Blessed are the poor in spirit” (Lk. 6:20) says: “We know that there are four cardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude.” But these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal virtues.

I answer that, When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to speak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above ([1565]Q[56], A[3]), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires rectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the faculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the other hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers imperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of the appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well without causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the perfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those virtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal virtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the intellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as was clearly shown above ([1566]Q[57], A[4]). Consequently, those virtues which are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue into various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things.

Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above ([1567]Q[58], A[3], ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but “super-human” or godlike virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence, rank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do not rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good, which is the object of the appetite.

Whether there are four cardinal virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues. For prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues, as is clear from what has been said above ([1568]Q[58], A[4]). But that which directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence alone is a principal virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues. Now we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and by a right appetite, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2. Therefore there are only two cardinal virtues.

Objection 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than another. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to rank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that there are many more principal virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii): “The entire structure of good works is built on four virtues.”

I answer that, Things may be numbered either in respect of their formal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are: and either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.

For the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good as defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as existing in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal virtue, called “Prudence.” Secondly, according as the reason puts its order into something else; either into operations, and then we have “Justice”; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the need of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their thwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions inciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a curb, which we call “Temperance.” Secondly, by the passions withdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through fear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for that which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there is “Fortitude.”

In like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects of virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now: viz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is perfected by “Prudence”; and that which is rational by participation, and is threefold, the will, subject of “Justice,” the concupiscible faculty, subject of “Temperance,” and the irascible faculty, subject of “Fortitude.”

Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply. The others are principal, each in its own genus.

Reply to Objection 2: That part of the soul which is rational by participation is threefold, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before another, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and as to the formal principle.

Whether any other virtues should be called principal rather than these?

Objection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called principal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the principal in any genus. Now “magnanimity has a great influence on all the virtues” (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than any be called a principal virtue.

Objection 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should above all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for Gregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that “he who gathers the other virtues without humility is as one who carries straw against the wind.” Therefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.

Objection 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal. But this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal virtue.

On the contrary, Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De Invent. Rhet. ii).

I answer that, As stated above [1569](A[2]), these four are reckoned as cardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue as we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in certain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of reason, is found chiefly in reason’s command, but not in its counsel or its judgment, as stated above (Q[57], A[6]). Again, good as defined by reason and put into our operations as something right and due, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of another person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the passions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult to curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in holding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of passion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most difficult to withstand.

Accordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways. First, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they are called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with all the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good in reason’s act of consideration, may be called prudence; every virtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called justice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be called temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors, as also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in this way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all the objections fail.

Secondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated, each one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and thus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they are called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account of the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue which commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions between equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for the pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens against dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because the other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are called principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.

Whether the four cardinal virtues differ from one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not diverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1): “There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and brave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no sound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance.” But this would not be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since the different species of one genus do not qualify one another. Therefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.

Objection 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the function of one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance is attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi): “Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is not weakened and bent by any enticement.” And of temperance he says (De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it “safeguards the manner and order in all things that we decide to do and say." Therefore it seems that these virtues are not distinct from one another.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the necessary conditions of virtue are first of all "that a man should have knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a particular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act with firmness and steadfastness." But the first of these seems to belong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done; the second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man, holding his passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from choice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end, implies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice; while the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs to fortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison to other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one another.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that "there are four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love," and he applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the same four virtues are distinct from one another.

I answer that, As stated above [1570](A[3]), these four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a "habit," should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a "virtue," it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a "moral virtue" partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we ascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the other three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason; whereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a kind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According to the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the other three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one another; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both habit, and virtue, and moral virtue.

Others, however, with better reason, take these four virtues, according as they have their special determinate matter; each of its own matter, in which special commendation is given to that general condition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above [1571](A[3]). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct habits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first sense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues qualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of prudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are directed by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the rest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what is less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much easier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. Again, temperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing into temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened by fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very great difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught of pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), "it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by cupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing himself to be unconquered by toil."

From this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance observes the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent by the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues are taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the sense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the Philosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may, however, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.

Whether the cardinal virtues are fittingly divided into social virtues, perfecting, perfect, and exemplar virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly divided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues, and social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the "exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God." Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "it is absurd to ascribe justice, fortitude, temperance, and prudence to God." Therefore these virtues cannot be exemplar.

Objection 2: Further, the "perfect" virtues are those which are without any passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "in a soul that is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it has forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the passions; it does not have to conquer them." Now it was stated above ([1572]Q[59], A[5]) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions. Therefore there is no such thing as "perfect" virtue.

Objection 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "perfecting" virtues are those of the man "who flies from human affairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God." But it seems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): "I reckon that it is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that he despises what most men admire, viz. power and office." Therefore there are no "perfecting" virtues.

Objection 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the "social" virtues are those "whereby good men work for the good of their country and for the safety of the city." But it is only legal justice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called "social."

On the contrary, Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): "Plotinus, together with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The four kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are social* virtues;

secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes purgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there are perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean soul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'" [*Cf. Chrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: "The gentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his good deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and peaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives for the common weal."]

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), "the soul needs to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright." Consequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly virtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we speak of "exemplar" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself may be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze on Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to reason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the observance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).

Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social" virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have been speaking of these virtues until now.

But since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to Divine things, as even the Philosopher declares in Ethic. x, 7, and as Scripture often admonishes us—for instance: "Be ye . . . perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Mat. 5:48), we must needs place some virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar virtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a difference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who are on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these are called "perfecting" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the things of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs all the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as nature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the virtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude: these are called the "perfect virtues." Thus prudence sees nought else but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires; fortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the Divine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as the virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who are at the summit of perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according as they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying and selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in this sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.

Reply to Objection 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living together in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of those who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence Plotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that "the social virtues check the passions," i.e. they bring them to the relative mean; "the second kind," viz. the perfecting virtues, "uproot them"; "the third kind," viz. the perfect virtues, "forget them; while it is impious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth kind," viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is speaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.

Reply to Objection 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is wicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier: "Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their exceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to those who have retired from public life on account of failing health, or for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to others the power and renown of authority." This agrees with what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): "The love of truth demands a hallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays this burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and contemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be taken up under the pressure of charity."

Reply to Objection 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly: but by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the service of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we understand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but also towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household, or even towards one individual.

OF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?

(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?

(3) How many, and which are they?

(4) Of their order.

Whether there are any theological virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological virtues. For according to Phys. vii, text. 17, "virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect, I mean that which is disposed according to nature." But that which is Divine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of a man.

Objection 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But the Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above ([1573]Q[61], A[5]), which are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are not virtues of man.

Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they direct us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all things. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is directed to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no need for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and will to God.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope, and charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): "Ye that fear the Lord believe Him," and again, "hope in Him," and again, "love Him." Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to God. Therefore they are theological virtues.

I answer that, Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above ([1574]Q[5], A[7]). Now man’s happiness is twofold, as was also stated above ([1575]Q[5], A[5]). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit, which man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made “partakers of the Divine nature.” And because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, man’s natural principles which enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not suffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to his connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not without Divine assistance. Such like principles are called “theological virtues”: first, because their object is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused in us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known to us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.

Reply to Objection 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in two ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues surpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled wood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man becomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that these virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of which he is made a partaker.

Reply to Objection 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were virtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us virtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but exemplate virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to God, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in proportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their nature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the object of supernatural happiness.

Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual and moral virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological virtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as to the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues which perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the virtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral. Therefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to God. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs us to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it considers the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are not distinct from the intellectual virtues.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four cardinal virtues are the “order of love.” Now love is charity, which is a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct from the theological.

On the contrary, That which is above man’s nature is distinct from that which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues are above man’s nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are in proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above ([1576]Q[58], A[3]). Therefore they are distinct from one another.

I answer that, As stated above ([1577]Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are specifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal difference of their objects. Now the object of the theological virtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the knowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the intellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human reason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct from the moral and intellectual virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man’s intellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the theological virtues, supernaturally.

Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3,7) reckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as they are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on the other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass human reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity. When, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this can be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love of charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then each virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each cardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and cause of every emotion, as stated above (Q[27], A[4]; Q[28], A[6], ad 2; Q[41], A[2], ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of charity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity essentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some way, as we shall show further on (Q[65], AA[2],5; [1578]SS, Q[23], A[7]).

Whether faith, hope, and charity are fittingly reckoned as theological virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not fittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological virtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural inclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the virtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural virtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should be but one theological virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the intellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the intellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion. Much less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.

Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man’s soul to God. Now man’s soul cannot be directed to God, save through the intellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore there should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the intellect, the other, the will.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.”

I answer that, As stated above [1579](A[1]), the theological virtues direct man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the natural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the latter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the reason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal principles which are known to us by the natural light of the intellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative and in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will which tends naturally to good as defined by reason.

But these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him." Consequently in respect of both the above things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural to direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect, man receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means of a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is faith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that end as something attainable—and this pertains to hope—and as to a certain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak, transformed into that end—and this belongs to charity. For the appetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end naturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the thing with its end.

Reply to Objection 1: The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to understand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition to the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be directed naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end and as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is insufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed to things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for an additional supernatural habit in both respects.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since faith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence faith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short of the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above the capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion to man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: "The weakness of God is stronger than men."

Reply to Objection 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to the end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity.

Whether faith precedes hope, and hope charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: “Being rooted and founded in charity.” Therefore charity precedes the others.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): “A man cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves, by doing good works he ends in hoping.” Therefore it seems that faith precedes charity, and charity hope.

Objection 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a passion, as stated above ([1580]Q[25], A[2]). Therefore charity, which is love, precedes hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity.”

I answer that, Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of perfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter precedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same subject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts: because habits are all infused together. For the movement of the appetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless that thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is by faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love. Hence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In like manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good. Now from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some good through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good of his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he proceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope precedes charity as regards their respective acts.

But in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope: because both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive from charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all, as we shall state further on ([1581]SS, Q[23], A[8]).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes to obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs to hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a man before having charity, to hope through merits not already possessed, but which he hopes to possess.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1582]Q[40], A[7]), in treating of the passions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz. the good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope: for good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also regards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some good. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though afterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a man thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to love him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the more in him.

OF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?

(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?

(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?

(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species as infused virtue?

Whether virtue is in us by nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): “Virtues are natural to us and are equally in all of us.” And Antony says in his sermon to the monks: “If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow nature it is virtuous.” Moreover, a gloss on Mat. 4:23, “Jesus went about,” etc., says: “He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity, justice, humility, which man possesses naturally.”

Objection 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as was clearly shown above ([1583]Q[55], A[4], ad 2). But that which accords with reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man’s nature. Therefore virtue is in man by nature.

Objection 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural to us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written (Job 31:18): “From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from my mother’s womb.” Therefore virtue is in man by nature.

On the contrary, Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men, and is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts remain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all men; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.

I answer that, With regard to corporeal forms, it has been maintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for instance, who upheld the theory of “latent forms” [*Anaxagoras; Cf. [1584]FP, Q[45], A[8]; Q[65], A[4]]. Others held that forms are entirely from without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms originated from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that they are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially in matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought into act by the agent.

In like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that they are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would pre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science and virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body, are removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by being polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said that they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the active intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences and virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to them, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.

To make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature. And, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its individuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his rational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him in respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his specific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the particular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of his individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of his body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a way, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to this particular soul.

In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in respect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a disposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to certain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts of certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of which these powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts, and, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid sensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude for science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in these ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a natural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is determined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not depend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue's action, and according to various circumstances.

It is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from without.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two argue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature, inasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken in the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body has from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living temperately, another for some other virtue.

Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?

Objection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by habituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] commenting on Rom. 14:23, "All that is not of faith is sin," says: "The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is no good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is lacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people." Now faith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by God, according to Eph. 2:8: "By grace you are saved through faith." Therefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.

Objection 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God, according to Wis. 8:21: "I knew that I could not otherwise be continent, except God gave it." Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.

Objection 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the perfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its cause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more efficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts. Much more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.

I answer that, We have spoken above ([1585]Q[51], AA[2],3) in a general way about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a special way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note that, as stated above ([1586]Q[55], AA[3],4), man’s virtue perfects him in relation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in “mode, species, and order,” as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in “number, weight, and measure,” as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man’s good must needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is twofold, as stated above ([1587]Q[19], AA[3],4), viz. human reason and Divine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to more things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by the Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.

It follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined according to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts: inasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule the aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence Augustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the words, “which God works in us without us” (Super Ps. 118, Serm. xxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds good.

Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated above ([1588]Q[49], A[3]): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason. There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however, will be more fully explained later ([1589]Q[109], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [1590](A[1]; Q[51], A[1]), certain seeds or principles of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These principles are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them: thus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent than the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the reason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which results through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification belongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they proceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues.

Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?

Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), “it is God’s rule to bring about extremes through the mean.” Now intellectual and moral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above [1591](A[2]). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us by infusion.

Objection 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in God’s works than in the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct us to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural virtues needing to be caused in us by God.

Objection 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices: much less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls, according to a gloss on Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15,16]. Therefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by means of infusion.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 8:7): “She teacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude.”

I answer that, Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us, as above stated [1592](A[1]; Q[51], A[1]): instead of which natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues, whereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q[62], A[1]). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our supernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But the soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard to other things, yet in relation to God.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does not extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in addition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his supernatural end.

Whether virtue by habituation belongs to the same species as infused virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in species from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues, according to what has been said [1593](A[3]), do not differ seemingly, save in relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified, not by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused moral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.

Objection 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of infused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires of touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.

Objection 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is wrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature. But the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten naturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one produced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired and infused virtue belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Any change introduced into the difference expressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the definition of infused virtue contains the words, “which God works in us without us,” as stated above ([1594]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore acquired virtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species as infused virtue.

I answer that, There is a twofold specific difference among habits. The first, as stated above ([1595]Q[54], A[2];[1596] Q[56], A[2];[1597] Q[60], A[1]), is taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now the object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue’s proper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of the pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal aspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these concupiscences: while the material element is something on the part of the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is appointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human reason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed according to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the health of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to “chastise his body, and bring it into subjection” (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired temperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other virtues.

The other specific differences among habits is taken from the things to which they are directed: for a man’s health and a horse’s are not of the same species, on account of the difference between the natures to which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse virtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of government. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues, whereby men behave well in respect of their being “fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household [Douay: ‘domestics’] of God” (Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves well in respect of human affairs.

Reply to Objection 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires for pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated: wherefore their respective acts are not identical.

Reply to Objection 3: God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as the act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it was of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a man miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts. But the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.

OF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of virtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues, (4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?

(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational mean?

(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

(4) Whether the theological virtues do?

Whether moral virtues observe the mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it is stated in De Coelo i that “virtue is the limit of power.” Therefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.

Objection 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues tend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors, and magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2,3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.

Objection 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the mean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the contrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some moral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus virginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the extreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the poor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean.”

I answer that, As already explained ([1598]Q[55], A[3]), the nature of virtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is properly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to some determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive movement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good of that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with its rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the rule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in discordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by their exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is clearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident that the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of reason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean is equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue observes the mean.

Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which is has of reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity; while excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state,” in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: “but it is an extreme in reference to the ‘best’ and the ‘excellent,’” viz. as to its conformity with reason.

Reply to Objection 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes depend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from being extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while the same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through being in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity and magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the respective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and a maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other circumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these virtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason, i.e. “where” it is right, “when” it is right, and for an “end” that is right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum “when” it is not right, or “where” it is not right, or for an undue “end”; and there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto “where” one ought, and “when” one aught. This agrees with the saying of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the “magnanimous man observes the extreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action.”

Reply to Objection 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of magnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and poverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e. according to God’s word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if this be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition, or again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done when it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by deficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity or poverty.

Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, or the rational mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue consists in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in Metaph. ii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is a real mean.

Objection 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral virtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a mean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

Objection 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or geometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral virtue is not the rational, but the real mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “moral virtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason.”

I answer that, The rational mean can be understood in two ways. First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the rational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that which the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense every mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated [1599](A[1]), moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity with right reason.

But it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real mean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for instance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean is not the real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such is the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is that justice is about operations, which deal with external things, wherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as stated above ([1600]Q[60], A[2]): wherefore the rational mean in justice is the same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each one his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal with interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the same way, since men are variously situated in relation to their passions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the passions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the passions.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two arguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason, while the third argues from the mean of justice.

Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by conforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in reason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not observe the mean.

Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual virtue: for it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6, that “virtue observes the mean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it.” If therefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean will have to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would be an indefinite series of virtues.

Objection 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as the Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22,23). But there seems to be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves, as they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another, but are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick. Therefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.

On the contrary, Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a mean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue observes the mean.

I answer that, The good of anything consists in its observing the mean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may happen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above [1601](A[1]). Now intellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as stated above (Q[56], A[3]). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue consists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a measure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case of contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi, 2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity with a right appetite.

Now truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely, is measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the good of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean, by way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the intellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what they are not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists. There will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though something were, which in reality it is not: and there will be deficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be, whereas in reality it is.

The truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in relation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both in practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean consists in conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation to the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure. Consequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and also the mean of prudence—of prudence as ruling and measuring, of moral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the difference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both cases.

Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as stated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that measure.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues: because the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another kind of virtue, but things themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: The things themselves that are contrary have no contrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the other: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of affirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end of Peri Hermenias. For though "to be" and "not to be" are not in contrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as we consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one hand we have "being" and on the other we have simply "non-being"; yet if we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something positive in both cases. Hence "to be" and "not to be" are contradictory: but the opinion stating that "good is good" is contrary to the opinion stating that "good is not good": and between two such contraries intellectual virtue observes the mean.

Whether the theological virtues observe the mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean. For the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean. Now the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore much more does theological virtue observe the mean.

Objection 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite being ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists in the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue perfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above ([1602]Q[62], A[3]). Therefore theological virtue also observes the mean.

Objection 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean between despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii): thus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe the mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the existence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches, who held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue observes the mean.

On the contrary, Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it is written (Ecclus. 43:33): “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can: for He is above all praise.” Therefore theological virtue does not observe the mean.

I answer that, As stated above [1603](A[1]), the mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue’s rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological virtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue, and thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself: because our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human power: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore can there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of such virtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we approach to the summit.

The other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with us: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought, yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.

Reply to Objection 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in a mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded: whereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered in itself, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect and appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the theological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and measure. Wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and despair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be presumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of his condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which according to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In like manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not by comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe too much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle position between contrary opinions, as was explained above.

OF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?

(3) Whether charity can be without them?

(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?

(5) Whether charity can be without them?

Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected with one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the exercise of acts, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 1,2. But man can exercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising himself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to have one moral virtue without another.

Objection 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now a man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or magnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2,3) that “a poor man cannot be magnificent,” and yet he may have other virtues; and (Ethic. iv) that “he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts his worth, is modest, but not magnanimous.” Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with one another.

Objection 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of the soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective part. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since we may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore, are the moral virtues connected with one another.

Objection 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this can only be because they are united together in prudence. But this does not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For, seemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to one virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another virtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things, without the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right reason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not necessarily connected with one another.

On the contrary, Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20: “The virtues are connected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to have several”: and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that “the virtues that reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one another”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that “one virtue without the other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect”: and Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): “If you confess to not having one particular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all.”

I answer that, Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or as imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or fortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of good deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by habituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not connected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being accustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not prompt in doing deeds of chastity.

But the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good deed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that they are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this two reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of assigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated above ([1604]Q[61], AA[3],4), some distinguish them according to certain general properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that discretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to temperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we consider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the connection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as virtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and so forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that “a virtue cannot be perfect” as a virtue, “if isolated from the others: for there can be no true prudence without temperance, justice and fortitude”: and he continues to speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. [1605] Q[61], A[4], OBJ[1]). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).

Others, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their matters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for their connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above ([1606]Q[58], A[4]), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct choice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is “right reason about things to be done,” and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science unless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we have prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows clearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.

Reply to Objection 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he exercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire the habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by good deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for instance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of concupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining his anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the absence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In the same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete character of virtue, if prudence be lacking.

But there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to some eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since it does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of such virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral virtues, without actually having the habits of these virtues—provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when once a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in proximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired liberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for a large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with but little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study, acquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never been presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing when we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): "That which is scarcely lacking is not lacking at all."

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers matters having no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the various sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the connection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are about passions and operations, that are clearly related to one another. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial passions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz. pleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the matter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the passions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one rule of prudence.

Nevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first principles. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on the understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the moral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do not depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other intellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence, because the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason the appetite, as stated above ([1607]Q[9], A[1];[1608] Q[58], A[5], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 4: Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as the principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the principles, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though reason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another, yet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in any principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle, “A whole is greater than its part,” he cannot acquire the science of geometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his conclusion. Moreover, things “done” are related to one another, but not things “made,” as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of prudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a deficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not occur in things to be made.

Whether moral virtues can be without charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity. For it is stated in the Liber Sentent. Prosperi vii, that “every virtue save charity may be common to the good and bad.” But “charity can be in none except the good,” as stated in the same book. Therefore the other virtues can be had without charity.

Objection 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human acts, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, whereas charity cannot be had otherwise than by infusion, according to Rom. 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us.” Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without charity.

Objection 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through depending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence; indeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. 3:19: “The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.” Therefore the moral virtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 3:14): “He that loveth not, abideth in death.” Now the spiritual life is perfected by the virtues, since it is “by them” that “we lead a good life,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17,19). Therefore they cannot be without the love of charity.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), it is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like moral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above [1609](A[1]; Q[58], AA[4],5) that the other moral virtues cannot be without prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends, which are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for prudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be well disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of charity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends, which is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters right reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle, that “contradictories cannot both be true at the same time.” It is therefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without charity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they cannot be without prudence.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused virtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since they direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues, those, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the words, “All that is not of faith is sin” (Rom. 14:23), says: “He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, even if his conduct be good.”

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue. Else if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, “it makes its possessor good,” and consequently cannot be in the wicked.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of acquired virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet prudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all the infused moral virtues.

Whether charity can be without moral virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral virtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is superfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the fulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4, seqq.: “Charity is patient, is kind,” etc. Therefore it seems that if one has charity, other virtues are superfluous.

Objection 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the works of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their own sake: hence “pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet they find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works pleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of charity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there are some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on Lk. 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not having certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have. Therefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that he has all the moral virtues.

On the contrary, The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it is written (Rom. 13:8): “He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled the Law.” Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without having all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about all acts of virtue, as stated in Ethic. v, 1,2. Therefore he that has charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a letter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that charity contains all the cardinal virtues.

I answer that, All the moral virtues are infused together with charity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly in works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of nature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain works, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus animals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that their souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity, inasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all the good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the moral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work.

It is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and, again, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all the infused moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not only must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower power: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed. Consequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving principle in respect of those things that are referred to the end. Therefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with charity.

Reply to Objection 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary dispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not occur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts by which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in so far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues, for the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the virtues.

Whether faith and hope can be without charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without charity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be more excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused moral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith and hope be without charity.

Objection 2: Further, “no man believes unwillingly” as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection thereof, as stated above ([1610]Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith cannot be without charity.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that “there can be no hope without love.” But love is charity: for it is of this love that he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.

On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 1:2 says that “faith begets hope, and hope, charity.” Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can be without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without charity.

I answer that, Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be considered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as complete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good works, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a perfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is good, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but not well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will the habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect character of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence.

Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since to believe is to assent to someone of one’s own free will: to will not as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one ought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every right movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope consists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if it is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without charity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not yet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be an imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently, faith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are not virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires that by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we should do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).

Reply to Objection 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused prudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this involves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the ultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not depend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without charity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look to gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this is not without charity.

Whether charity can be without faith and hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

Objection 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on ([1611]TP, Q[7], AA[3],4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): “Without faith it is impossible to please God”; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Prov. 8:17: “I love them that love me.” Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above ([1612]Q[62], A[4]). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope.

I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him,” and from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: “God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.” Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above ([1613]Q[62], A[4]), and so charity is impossible without them.

Reply to Objection 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above[1614], Q[4], A[3]]: so that in Him was perfect charity.

OF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?

(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal?

(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;

(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;

(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;

(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.

Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues.

Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another.

Objection 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is “the limit of power,” as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose.” Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another.

Objection 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another.

On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written (Mat. 5:20): “Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven”: and (Prov. 15:5): “In abundant justice there is the greatest strength [virtus].” Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another.

I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said ([1615]Q[18], A[5];[1616] Q[61], A[2]) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, in so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6.

The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was said above ([1617]Q[52], A[1]), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; secondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g. temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.

If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one "according to the measure of the giving of Christ," as stated in Eph. 4:9. And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target.

Reply to Objection 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on [1618](A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: This "limit" which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something "more" or "less" good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.

Reply to Objection 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: "To every one of you [Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ."

Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not all equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7): “Everyone hath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another after that.” Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a man, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

Objection 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and the same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one virtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not the case: since various saints are specially praised for different virtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (Rom. 4), Moses for his meekness (Num. 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This is why of each Confessor the Church sings: “There was not found his like in keeping the law of the most High,” [*See Lesson in the Mass Statuit (Dominican Missal)], since each one was remarkable for some virtue or other. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

Objection 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one’s pleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that a man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of another. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that “those who are equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance,” and so on. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were equal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.

I answer that, As explained above [1619](A[1]), the comparative greatness of virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to their specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a man one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than faith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree of participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes intense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in one man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their growth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but equal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.

Now the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as the connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their connection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above ([1620]Q[65], A[1]) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is according to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues to be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found together with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be said to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties equal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4) when he says: “If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that one is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of the latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in fortitude, since the former’s fortitude is more prudent. You will find that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all in the same way.”

The other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of those who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective matters ([1621]Q[65] , AA[1],2). In this way the connection among moral virtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from charity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the subject, as stated above ([1622]Q[65], A[1]). Accordingly the nature of the equality among virtues can also be considered on the part of prudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues: for in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same degree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined according to right reason in each matter of virtue.

But in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz. the inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform the act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this either from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the gifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all of them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it refers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one man has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on account of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in which all the infused virtues are connected.

Reply to Objection 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another saint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness for the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

Whether the moral virtues are better than the intellectual virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the intellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting, is better. Now the moral virtues are “more lasting even than the sciences” (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover, they are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable to the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: Further, virtue is defined as “that which makes its possessor good.” Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art in respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of prudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But according to Ethic. vi, 12, “moral virtue gives right intention of the end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means.” Therefore moral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the intellectual virtue that regards moral matters.

On the contrary, Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is rational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the essentially rational part, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Now rational by essence is more excellent than rational by participation. Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.

I answer that, A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. “learning than riches,” and yet not better relatively, i.e. “for one who is in want” [*Aristotle, Topic. iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in its proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species from its object, as explained above ([1623]Q[54], A[2]; [1624] Q[60], A[1]). Hence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the more excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the reason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the reason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends to things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular. Consequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which perfect the appetite.

But if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue, which perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other powers to act, as stated above ([1625]Q[9], A[1]), is more excellent. And since virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for it is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of virtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though the intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.

Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the intellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters pertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the objects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more lasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain particular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more necessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not simply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues, from the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a useful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason for this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that happiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above ([1626]Q[3], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in respect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue, is because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as stated above ([1627]Q[56], A[3]). Wherefore this argument, too, proves merely that moral virtue is better relatively.

Reply to Objection 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the choice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of each moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that virtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of prudence, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6; vi, 13.

Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral virtues. For it is better to give of one’s own than to pay what is due. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice. Therefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.

Objection 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in which it is most perfect. Now, according to Jam. 1:4, “Patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore it would seem that patience is greater than justice.

Objection 3: Further, “Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice. Therefore it is greater than justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “justice is the most excellent of the virtues.”

I answer that, A virtue considered in its species may be greater or less, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater simply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above [1628](A[1]). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral virtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by considering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is the will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (Q[8], A[1]; Q[26], A[1]): its object or matter, because it is about operations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also in regard to another. Hence “justice is the most excellent of virtues” (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the appetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the rational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the chief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently fortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters of life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues that are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. 1) that “those virtues must needs be greatest which receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good. Hence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others; because the former,” i.e. fortitude, “is useful in war, and the latter,” i.e. justice, “both in war and in peace.” After fortitude comes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters directly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one species, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three virtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in excellence also.

A virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping or adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent simply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is more excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in some accidental mode of being.

Reply to Objection 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of justice, for "a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his own" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from justice, which discerns between "meum" and "tuum": whereas justice can be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than liberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation: while liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an addition to justice.

Reply to Objection 2: Patience is said to have "a perfect work," by enduring evils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also excluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by charity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also inordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it is more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this matter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues simply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being disturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is brave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a part of fortitude.

Reply to Objection 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their ornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but not simply.

Whether wisdom is the greatest of the intellectual virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the intellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one commanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in Ethic. i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence (Ethic. vi, 8), "orders that sciences should be cultivated in states, and to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to what extent." Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems that prudence is greater than wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to happiness: because virtue is "the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best," as stated in Phys. vii, text. 17. Now prudence is "right reason about things to be done," whereby man is brought to happiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man attains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems to be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which are the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the object of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according to Job 26:26: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." Therefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.

Objection 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than knowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from indemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of understanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is a greater virtue than wisdom.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is "the head" among "the intellectual virtues."

I answer that, As stated above [1629](A[3]), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom surpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom considers the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. And since it is by the cause that we judge of an effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower effects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the other intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of them all.

Reply to Objection 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about the Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater virtue than wisdom, "unless," as stated in Ethic. vi, 7, "man were the greatest thing in the world." Wherefore we must say, as stated in the same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but vice versa: because "the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he himself is judged by no man" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no business with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its command covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain wisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way, the servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for her, as the doorkeeper for the king.

Reply to Objection 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness, but wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme Intelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect in respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act of wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in respect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the act of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so that wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), “one knowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a higher object, or because it is more certain.” Hence if the objects be equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which possesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain about a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more certain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that “it is a great thing to be able to know something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and probable reasoning”; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that “it is better to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean things.” Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains, is beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his possession: for this “belongs to God alone” (Metaph. i, 2): and yet this little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is preferable to all other knowledge.

Reply to Objection 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles depends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a whole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is greater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the proper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes use of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.

Whether charity is the greatest of the theological virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the theological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while hope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is compared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now intellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident above ([1630]Q[62], A[3]). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.

Objection 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is greater than either one. Now hope results from something added to charity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the beloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.

Objection 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and hope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Mat. 1:3 says that “faith begets hope, and hope charity.” Therefore faith and hope are greater than charity.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): “Now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.”

I answer that, As stated above [1631](A[3]), the greatness of a virtue, as to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three theological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be said that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its having a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches nearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is greater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature, imply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is not seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of charity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is, in a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire to union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 Jn. 4:16): “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.”

Reply to Objection 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same way as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because the theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul: whereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man. Now in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than to know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in the knower:

whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the beloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than in man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the container. But it is the other way about in things beneath man. Secondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements pertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the appetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the theological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive movement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19: “The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.”

Reply to Objection 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to obtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who desires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other hand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by hope, as stated above ([1632]Q[62], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but not a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more noble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in this way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to wit, that one is a disposition to the other.

OF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?

(2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?

(3) Whether faith remains?

(4) Whether hope remains?

(5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?

(6) Whether charity remains?

Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues doe not remain after this life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels, according to Mat. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in the angels [*”Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy of the gods” (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in Ethic. x, 8. Therefore neither in man will there be moral virtues after this life.

Objection 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But the active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says (Moral. iv, 18): “The works of the active life pass away from the body.” Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life.

Objection 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues, are in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted, when the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this life.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:15) that “justice is perpetual and immortal.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held that the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), “in the other life men are made happy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is better or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all others.” Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in the future life, but after a different manner.

In order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues there is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material element in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive part to the passions and operations according to a certain mode: and since this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely this order of reason.

Accordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the future life, as regards their material element. For in the future life there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food and sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor distributions and commutations of things employed in this present life. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most perfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one’s reason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things concerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive power will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in things pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9) that “prudence will be there without any danger of error; fortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance, without the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither prefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most steadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no imperfection.” As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its act in that life, viz. “to be subject to God”: because even in this life subjection to a superior is part of justice.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral virtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as regards “commutations and distributions”; of fortitude, as to “matters of terror and danger”; of temperance, in respect of “lewd desires.”

The same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that concern the active life, belong to the material element of the virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold state after this life; one before the resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the body; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be reunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the irrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are. Hence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and temperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be perfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the resurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually, but only radically in its essence, as stated in the [1633]FP, Q[77], A[8]. Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only in their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain nurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q[63], A[1]). Justice, however, will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice it is specially said that it is “perpetual and immortal”; both by reason of its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its act will not change, as stated.

Whether the intellectual virtues remain after this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8,9) that “knowledge shall be destroyed,” and he states the reason to be because “we know in part.” Now just as the knowledge of science is in part, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other intellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the intellectual virtues will cease after this life.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since science is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is not easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness. But no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science and the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.

Objection 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so that it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act of the intellect after this life, since "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life, the phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of the body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this life.

On the contrary, The knowledge of what is universal and necessary is more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now the knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this life; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered, according to Lk. 16:25: "Son, remember that thou didst receive good things in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things." Much more, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things remain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.

I answer that, As stated in the [1634]FP, Q[79], A[6] some have held that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive intellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as actual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the powers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the body is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion, neither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after this life when once the body is corrupted.

But this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De Anima iii, text. 8) that "the possible intellect is in act when it is identified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is in potentiality to consider it actually." It is also contrary to reason, because intelligible species are contained by the "possible" intellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence the "possible" intellect is called "the abode of the species" (De Anima iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.

And yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this life, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the [1635]FP, Q[84], A[7]; [1636]FP, Q[85], A[1], ad 5, cease as soon as the body is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned, which are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues, these latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect, the intellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal element of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after this life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated concerning the moral virtues [1637](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as referring to the material element in science, and to the mode of understanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when the body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the phantasms.

Reply to Objection 2: Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its material element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible species, which are in the "possible" intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [1638]FP, Q[89], A[1] the separated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to the phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same mode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues [1639](A[1]).

Whether faith remains after this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life. Because faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains after this life, as stated above [1640](A[2]). Therefore faith remains also.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11): "Other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus," i.e. faith in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which is built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not after this life, no other virtue remains.

Objection 3: Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory differ as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is compatible with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be “evening” and “morning” knowledge [*Cf. [1641]FP, Q[58], A[6]]; and a man can have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with opinion through a probable syllogism, about one same conclusion. Therefore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowledge of glory.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7): “While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not by sight.” But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord, but present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain in the life of glory.

I answer that, Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one thing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two things are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation and negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of contrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we find opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: wherefore in alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as when a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text. 19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it is impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same thing at the same time.

Now we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a thing’s very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack of reason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And since a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, cannot pass from one species to another, it follows that if such an imperfection be removed, the species of that thing is changed: even as it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational. Sometimes, however, the imperfection does not belong to the specific nature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something else; even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man, because he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like reason; and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed, the thing remains substantially.

Now it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: for it is included in its definition; faith being defined as “the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb. 11:1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.): “Where is faith? Believing without seeing.” But it is an imperfect knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen. Consequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith: therefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect and remain identically the same.

But we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect knowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect knowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we must observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on the part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium; thirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the “morning” and “evening” knowledge of the angels: for the “morning” knowledge is about things according to the being which they have in the Word, while the “evening” knowledge is about things according as they have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in comparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a conclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable medium. On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and imperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is essential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions with fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science it is essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for science possesses certitude which results from the understanding of principles: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses opinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science in so far as it lacks vision.

Now it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the same respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect can be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing. Accordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is quite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object; but they are compatible with one another in respect of the same medium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at one and the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and imperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other imperfect, e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like manner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is incompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same medium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in the same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a probable and through a demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge that is perfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect knowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very nature, contains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the believer sees not what he believes: whereas bliss, of its very nature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the Blessed see that which makes them happy, as stated above ([1642]Q[3], A[8]). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one and the same subject.

Reply to Objection 1: Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of the object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a more perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible with vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of faith is incompatible.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

Whether hope remains after death, in the state of glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the state of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more excellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain after this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much more then does hope remain.

Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this life: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever—in the lost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can remain.

Objection 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in the Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of the body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul, according to Ecclus. 24:29: “They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and they that drink me, shall yet thirst,” and 1 Pet. 1:12: “On Whom the angels desire to look.” Therefore it seems that there can be hope in the Blessed after this life is past.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” But the Blessed see that which is the object of hope, viz.

God. Therefore they do not hope.

I answer that, As stated above [1643](A[3]), that which, in its very nature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the opposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement of its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is “the act of that which is in potentiality as such” (Phys. iii): so that as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement ceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it is made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not possessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion of hope (Q[40], AA[1],2). Therefore when we possess that which we hope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to have hope.

Reply to Objection 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object, which is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible with the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except perhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not remain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect of what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is in our actual possession.

Reply to Objection 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state further on ([1644]SS, Q[19], A[2]). Servile fear regards punishment, and will be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer be possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an act of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the other is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards this act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the nature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to Prov. 1:33: “He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils.” Now fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated above (Q[23], A[2]; Q[40], A[1]), and therefore the fear which will remain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear of punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in the lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the notion of something future remains there, which is the object of fear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its being a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither past nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking, neither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q[42], A[2]), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no such hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except speaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future evil is called fear.

Reply to Objection 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in the Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the reason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in them because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said to be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can be desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly speaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is God, and not a created good; nor in its general signification. Because the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above ([1645]Q[40], A[1]): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess, is not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money is not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once. In like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly speaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire it.

Whether anything of faith or hope remains in glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that something of faith and hope remains in glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there remains what is common; thus it is stated in De Causis that “if you take away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living, there remains being.” Now in faith there is something that it has in common with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper to it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner. Therefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith still remains.

Objection 2: Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to Eph. 1:17,18: “The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the knowledge of God”; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the light of glory, of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall see light.” Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light supervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun’s rays appear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains with the light of glory.

Objection 3: Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the withdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of liberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the act. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore when this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still remain.

On the contrary, Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is either withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith does not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above [1646](A[3]), it seems that it is withdrawn entirely.

I answer that, Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but that faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and remains in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if this be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically but generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same genus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand, hope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is compared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the term of movement.

But if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith remains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because when you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus does not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the difference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not remain identically the same, as though the identical color were at one time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that genus is not related to difference as matter to form, so that the substance of the genus remains identically the same, when the difference is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically the same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are not the parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the species. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. the compound of matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and likewise the genus; the genus denotes the whole by signifying that which is material; the difference, by signifying that which is formal; the species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive nature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is predicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of that which has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So that the one same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the same aspect.

It is therefore evident that, since the signification of the difference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the substance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal nature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute the animal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was previously obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident that, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or specifically the same, but only generically.

Reply to Objection 1: If “rational” be withdrawn, the remaining “living” thing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the perfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject: whereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are opposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they are incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the air.

Reply to Objection 3: He that loses his money does not therefore lose the possibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the habit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is the object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even its possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss: and so such a habit would remain to no purpose.

Whether charity remains after this life, in glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this life, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part,” i.e. that which is imperfect, “shall be done away.” Now the charity of the wayfarer is imperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of glory is attained.

Objection 2: Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects. But the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore the apprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the life to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases.

Objection 3: Further, things of the same kind can advance from imperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of the wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven, however much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of the wayfarer does not remain in heaven.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8): “Charity never falleth away.”

I answer that, As stated above [1647](A[3]), when the imperfection of a thing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to hinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection, even as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now charity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection, since it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed, either seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the perfection of glory, but remains identically the same.

Reply to Objection 1: The imperfection of charity is accidental to it; because imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now although that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the substance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away, charity itself is not done away.

Reply to Objection 2: The object of charity is not knowledge itself; if it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the charity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the same, viz. God Himself.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot attain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on the part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in Ethic. ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly we love Him.

OF THE GIFTS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?

(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?

(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?

(4) Which, and how many are they?

(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?

(6) Whether they remain in heaven?

(7) Of their comparison with one another;

(8) Of their comparison with the virtues.

Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, “There were born to him seven sons,” says (Moral. i, 12): “Seven sons were born to us, when through the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost take birth in us”: and he quotes the words of Is. 11:2,3: “And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him,” etc. where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine commenting on Mat. 12:45, “Then he goeth and taketh with him seven other spirits,” etc., says (De Quaest. Evang. i, qu. 8): “The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues of the Holy Ghost,” i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts do not differ from the virtues commonly so called.

Objection 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are themselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the gifts; for each gift is “a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead a good life,” etc. [*Cf.[1648] Q[55], A[4]]. Likewise the definition of a gift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is “an unreturnable giving,” according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the virtues and gifts do not differ from one another.

Objection 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues: for, as stated above ([1649]Q[57], A[2]), wisdom, understanding, and knowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence, piety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue. Therefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts, which he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the three theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job’s three daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven gifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by the four corners of the house.

I answer that, If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the notion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition between them. Because the word "virtue" conveys the notion that it perfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word "gift" refers to the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that which proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in well-doing: especially as we have already stated ([1650]Q[63], A[3]) that some virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we cannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held that the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But there remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must explain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among the gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned virtues.

Hence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as being distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a suitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would apply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice versa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the reason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three to the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the gifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the reason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since they observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith and prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the affections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have to be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.

Others observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the gift of the Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens it against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift," said that the virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts, that we may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction sufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which lead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything naturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard to charity, of which it is written (Cant 8:7): “Many waters cannot quench charity.”

Others again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as having been in Christ, according to Is. 11:2,3, said that the virtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in order to conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor. Yet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction. Because Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in humility and meekness, according to Mat. 11:29: “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart,” and in charity, according to Jn. 15:12: “Love one another, as I have loved you.” Moreover, these virtues were especially resplendent in Christ’s Passion.

Accordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we must be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we find there that the term employed is “spirit” rather than “gift.” For thus it is written (Is. 11:2,3): “The spirit . . . of wisdom and of understanding . . . shall rest upon him,” etc.: from which words we are clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down as being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion from without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold principle of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other extrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above ([1651]Q[9], AA[4],6): moreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).

Now it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its mover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a disposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover. Hence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the disposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover: thus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order to receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that human virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be moved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions. Consequently man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed to be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only because they are infused by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according to Is. 50:5: “The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I have not gone back.”

Even the Philosopher says in the chapter On Good Fortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by Divine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some say, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than acts of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad sense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above the virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of "heroic" or "divine virtue [*{arete heroike kai theia}]," in respect of which some men are called "divine."

Reply to Objection 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they are opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed to the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct. For the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light flows from God.

Reply to Objection 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its general sense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as distinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, "whereby we lead a good life" as referring to the rectitude of life which is measured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from infused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation to His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the promptings of God.

Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it proceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift, according as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same applies to the other virtues.

Whether the gifts are necessary to man for salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection surpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary for man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing the ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not under the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

Objection 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave well in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's behavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues; and his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that "the Holy Ghost gives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel against rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against ignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against pride." But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found in the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for salvation.

On the contrary, Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest, and fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation: since of wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be justified." Therefore the other gifts that are placed between these are also necessary for salvation.

I answer that, As stated above [1652](A[1]), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of God. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not sufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost, there is, in consequence, need for a gift.

Now man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its natural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly, with a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as stated above ([1653]Q[62], A[1]). And, though this latter perfection is greater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more perfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his full possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since we love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything that has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work according to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who works inwardly in every nature and in every will. On the other hand, that which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of itself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which possesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon which has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed light. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can work by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed, cannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him.

Accordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to man’s connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his reason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the shape of special promptings from God, this will be out of God’s superabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not every one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or divine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to which man’s reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and imperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of reason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting or motion of the Holy Ghost, according toRom. 8:14, 17: “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons, heirs also”: and Ps. 142:10: “Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the right land,” because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of that land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is necessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the virtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass the commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect of man being moved by a higher principle.

Reply to Objection 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so perfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual need of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost, for the reason already given.

Reply to Objection 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its natural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it does not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is unable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the objection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are subject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects.

Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as "a quality difficult to remove," as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy Ghost rest in Him, as stated in Is. 11:2,3: "He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii, 27): "The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular way, He dwells always in the Mediator." Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.

Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as he is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above ([1654]AA[1],2). But in so far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an instrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is befitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.

Objection 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine inspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit: for "the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets," as Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His disciples (Jn. 14:17): "He shall abide with you, and shall be in you." Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore His gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or passions but abiding habits.

I answer that, As stated above [1655](A[1]), the gifts are perfections of man, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost. Now it is evident from what has been already said (Q[56], A[4]; Q[58], A[2]), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power according as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit, as it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason. Accordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy Ghost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in comparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now the moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are disposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying that “by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy Ghost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts.” Now the seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above [1656](A[2]). Therefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy men.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which has no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is not an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy Ghost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will. Therefore he needs a habit.

Reply to Objection 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the manifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation: hence the comparison fails.

Whether the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence; whereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth intellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to justice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz. the gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to temperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.

Objection 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude is assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore justice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.

Objection 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to God. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by God, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological virtues, should have been included.

Objection 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love, of hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided with fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the other three.

Objection 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding; counsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore, some gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear. Therefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Holy Writ (Is. 11:2,3).

I answer that, As stated above [1657](A[3]), the gifts are habits perfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the appetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is natural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God, as by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the principles of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even as they are virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite.

Now the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the apprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and judgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of truth, the speculative reason is perfected by “understanding”; the practical reason, by “counsel.” In order to judge aright, the speculative reason is perfected by “wisdom”; the practical reason by “knowledge.” The appetitive power, in matters touching a man’s relations to another, is perfected by “piety”; in matters touching himself, it is perfected by “fortitude” against the fear of dangers; and against inordinate lust for pleasures, by “fear,” according to Prov. 15:27: “By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,” and Ps. 118:120: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid of Thy judgments.” Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend.

Reply to Objection 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters concerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters, but to external things that can be made, since art is the right reason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made (Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of the gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the principal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when He moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to temperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking, to restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good appointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason, and so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name of piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety.

Reply to Objection 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless in some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved by the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union between them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope and charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the gifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to these three virtues, as being derived therefrom.

Reply to Objection 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God is the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are transferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the other hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to God: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from certain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its name to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from evil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.

Reply to Objection 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their directing principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of understanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear. Because the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a consideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.

Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): “To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the word of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit.” Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “many of the faithful have not knowledge, though they have faith.” But some of the gifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems that the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the same man.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom “is of small account if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless if it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the strength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very weak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if it hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has these virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good action”: from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift without another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not connected.

On the contrary, Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with the following remark: “It is worthy of note in this feast of Job’s sons, that by turns they fed one another.” Now the sons of Job, of whom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening one another.

I answer that, The true answer to this question is easily gathered from what has been already set down. For it has been stated [1658](A[3]) that as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues as regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul are disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us,” even as our reason is perfected by prudence. Wherefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence, so the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so that whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of which can one possess without charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as gratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the knowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to instruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and knowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the “word” of wisdom and the “word” of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts of the Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but perfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and human. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are possessed of charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while expounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (OBJ 1): hence he is referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a gratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: “For it is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain the blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another, to know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against the ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the proper name of knowledge.”

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues is proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected by another, as stated above ([1659]Q[65], A[1]); so Gregory wishes to prove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that one cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed that “each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless one virtue lend its support to another.” We are therefore not to understand that one gift can be without another; but that if understanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as temperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.

Whether the gifts of the Holy Ghost remain in heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not remain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of His sevenfold gift the “Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all temptations.” Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according to Is. 11:9: “They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My holy mountain.” Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in heaven.

Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated above [1660](A[3]). But habits are of no use, where their acts are impossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven; for Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that “understanding . . . penetrates the truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . . . fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy,” all of which are incompatible with the heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the state of glory.

Objection 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative life, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life, e.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as Gregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy Ghost will be in the state of glory.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): “The city of God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an earthly river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but taste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more abundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of sevenfold heavenly virtue.”

I answer that, We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to their essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may be gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for this is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially realized in heaven, where God will be “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28), and man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered as regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in the present life they have an operation about a matter, in respect of which they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered in this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues ([1661]Q[67], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as they are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they afford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of glory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good by the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that passes away with the present state, and something that remains in the future state. For he says that “wisdom strengthens the mind with the hope and certainty of eternal things”; of which two, hope passes, and certainty remains. Of understanding, he says “that it penetrates the truths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,” of which, hearing passes away, since “they shall teach no more every man . . . his brother” (Jer. 31:3,4); but the enlightening of the mind remains. Of counsel he says that it “prevents us from being impetuous,” which is necessary in the present life; and also that “it makes the mind full of reason,” which is necessary even in the future state. Of fortitude he says that it “fears not adversity,” which is necessary in the present life; and further, that it “sets before us the viands of confidence,” which remains also in the future life. With regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that “she overcomes the void of ignorance,” which refers to the present state. When, however, he adds “in the womb of the mind,” this may refer figuratively to the fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future state. Of piety he says that “it satisfies the inmost heart with deeds of mercy.” These words taken literally refer only to the present state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by “the inmost heart,” belongs also to the future state, when piety will achieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he say that “it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things,” which refers to the present state, and that “it strengthens it with the meat of hope for the future,” which also belongs to the present state, as regards hope, but may also refer to the future state, as regards being “strengthened” for things we hope are here, and obtain there.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their matter. For the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life; but all the gifts will have their respective acts about things pertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly bliss.

Whether the gifts are set down by Isaias in their order of dignity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias in their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that which, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of man fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Dt. 10:12): “And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?” and (Malachi 1:6): “If . . . I be a master, where is My fear?” Therefore it seems that fear, which is mentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.

Objection 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): “Piety [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things.” Now a common good is preferable to particular goods. Therefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be the most excellent gift.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge perfects man’s judgment, while counsel pertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it is set down as being below it.

Objection 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while science belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than the appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than fortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the gifts are not set down in their order of dignity.

On the contrary, Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: “It seems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which Isaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these [of which we read in Mat. 5:3]: but there is a difference of order, for there [viz. in Isaias] the enumeration begins with the more excellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts.”

I answer that, The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two ways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as proceeding from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by comparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the gifts simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their comparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all the acts of the soul’s powers, even as the virtues do, as stated above [1662](A[4]). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence of the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the contemplative are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom, understanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom stands before understanding, and understanding before science, and prudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts, wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than piety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels fortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude, and fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude and counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and counsel are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and knowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the gifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so far as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the others, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as counsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and piety, it is considered with regard to their matter.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the order of generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov. 16:16), before doing good works, and which result from the other gifts.

Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not compared with all God's gifts, but only with "bodily exercise," of which he had said it "is profitable to little."

Reply to Objection 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of its judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter: for counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii, 3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.

Reply to Objection 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are more excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in relation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because reason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled. But on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the directive power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to piety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of difficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary matters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason of their matter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety.

Whether the virtues are more excellent than the gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than the gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: “No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy Ghost, but, without charity, they avail nothing.” But charity is a virtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more excellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that “the gift of the Holy Ghost in the mind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude, temperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven virtues” [viz. the gifts], so “as against folly to bestow wisdom; against dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against fear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of heart, piety; against piety, fear.” Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “the virtues cannot be used to evil purpose.” But it is possible to make evil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): “We offer up the sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or understanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or counsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that fortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest knowledge, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest piety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted; and lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit of despair.” Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and to remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (OBJ 2), so that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot. Therefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.

I answer that, As was shown above ([1663]Q[58], A[3];[1664] Q[62], A[1]), there are three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some intellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those whereby man’s mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are those whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are those which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the reason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the powers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.

Accordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues, by which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way as the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which perfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues. Wherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more excellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence Gregory says (Moral. i, 12) that “the seven sons,” i.e. the seven gifts, “never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all they do be done in faith, hope, and charity.”

But if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and moral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the gifts perfect the soul’s powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their Mover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the other powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more exalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the thing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more perfect than the virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to be more perfect than the gifts.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes another. One is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes love of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the intellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues. The other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of one’s neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this way moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man, through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the Holy Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which “dealeth not perversely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and understanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far as they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the perfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory means to say.

OF THE BEATITUDES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?

(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?

(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;

(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.

Whether the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) assigns the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts of the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq., ascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

Objection 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([1665]Q[19], A[3];[1666] Q[21], A[1]). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the gifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost, as is clear from what has been said ([1667]Q[68], AA[1],3, seqq.). Therefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude of the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from them.

Objection 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice, and mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and gifts.

On the contrary, Certain things are included among the beatitudes, that are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and peace. Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.

I answer that, As stated above ([1668]Q[2], A[7];[1669] Q[3], A[1]), happiness is the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end already, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that “children are said to be happy because they are full of hope”; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): “We are saved by hope.” Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved towards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action. And a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of virtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of eternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we need to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His gifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts, not as habit, but as act from habit.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the gifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are more excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above ([1670]Q[68], A[8]). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the throng, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who is explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the mountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that no other habits, besides the virtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.

Reply to Objection 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of meekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these might seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts, because the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him, as stated above ([1671]Q[68], A[2]).

Whether the rewards assigned to the beatitudes refer to this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the beatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be happy because they hope for a reward, as stated above [1672](A[1]). Now the object of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to the life to come.

Objection 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to the beatitudes, Lk. 6:25, where we read: “Woe to you that are filled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you shall mourn and weep.” Now these punishments do not refer to this life, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according to Job 21:13: “They spend their days in wealth.” Therefore neither do the rewards of the beatitudes refer to this life.

Objection 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the reward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De Civ.

Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant fullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps. 16:15: “I shall be filled [Douay: ‘satisfied’] when Thy glory shall appear.” Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God, and that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: “We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.” Therefore these rewards refer to the future life.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): “These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to have been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that complete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised to us after this life.”

I answer that, Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking of these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that all these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life; and Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to the future, and some to the present life.

In order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of future happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of our having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness; and this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect inchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it is one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves begin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the fruit.

Accordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the beatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned as rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the future life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in those who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the present life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts of the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at perfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly kingdom.

Reply to Objection 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that end, according to Ps. 27:7: “In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal punishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence Augustine says (Confess. i): “Thou hast decreed, and it is so, Lord—that the disordered mind should be its own punishment.” The Philosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that “their soul is divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another that”; and afterwards he concludes, saying: “If wickedness makes a man so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice.” In like manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not receive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual rewards, even in this life, according to Mat. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30: “Ye shall receive a hundred times as much” even “in this time.”

Reply to Objection 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life to come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this life. Because the “kingdom of heaven,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv; *Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte, i, 1), can denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as “the spirit” begins to reign in men. The “possession” of the land denotes the well-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by “the land.” They are “comforted” in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who is called the “Paraclete,” i.e. the Comforter. They “have their fill,” even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said (Jn. 4:34): “My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me.” Again, in this life, men “obtain” God’s “Mercy.” Again, the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, “see God.” Likewise, in this life, those who are the “peacemakers” of their own movements, approach to likeness to God, and are called “the children of God.” Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in heaven.

Whether the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and understanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is assigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters connected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently indicated.

Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ. Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): “Blessed is the man whom God correcteth”; and (Ps. i, 1): “Blessed is the man who hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly”; and (Prov. 3:13): “Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom.” Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are indicated.

Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5 are too many.

I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is a beginning thereof.

And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods, whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn—by a virtue so that he uses them in moderation—and by a gift, in a more excellent way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is: “Blessed are the poor in spirit,” which may refer either to the contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of one’s passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the irascible passions man is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that they are kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason—and by a gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God’s will, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is: “Blessed are the meek.” From following the concupiscible passions, man is withdrawn—by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in moderation—and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice of sorrow [*Cf.[1673] Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is: “Blessed are they that mourn.”

Active life consists chiefly in man’s relations with his neighbor, either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former we are disposed—by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice—and by a gift, so that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice.” With regard to spontaneous favors we are perfected—by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality—and by a gift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): “When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren,” etc . . .”but . . . call the poor, the maimed,” etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: “Blessed are the merciful.”

Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in himself, is the cleansing of man’s heart, so that it is not defiled by the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is:

“Blessed are the clean of heart.” But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace, according to Is. 32:17: “The work of justice shall be peace”: hence the seventh beatitude is “Blessed are the peacemakers.”

Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason given above. Because to “see God” corresponds to the gift of understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive “children of God,” corresponds to the gift of wisdom.

Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts have the direction, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and mercy in respect of counsel.

Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: “It is the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,” fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of the world.

Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18: “He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor].” The principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God’s counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor.” It is thus that Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).

Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, “Blessed is the man whom the Lord correcteth,” we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we read, “Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly,” we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read, “Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom,” this must be referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that can be adduced.

Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.

Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord’s sermon as addressed to the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by saying: “Blessed are ye poor.” The second is that man be well off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying in the second place: “Blessed are ye that hunger.” The third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts aside by saying: “Blessed are ye that weep now.” The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: “Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you.” And as Ambrose says on Lk. 6:20, “poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men’s hatred belongs to fortitude.”

Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.

Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward, both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same ground it should have been assigned to all.

Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven." Therefore these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these rewards.

I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of happiness indicated above [1674](A[3]). For the first three beatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.

Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery.

The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.

Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the merits to which those rewards are assigned.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes. Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the body.

Reply to Objection 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God, even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace belongs to the king's son.

OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?

(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?

(3) Of their number?

(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.

Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5) are acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis. 3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (Jn. 4:36): "He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting." Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy [*'Fruimur,' from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing in them." But our will should not rest in our actions for their own sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.

Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity. Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ([1675]Q[55], A[1]). Therefore the fruits are not actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.

I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word “fruit” in two ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man’s fruit is what he gathers.

Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense man’s fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.

If, however, by man’s fruit we understand a product of man, then human actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man’s operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man’s operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): “Whosoever is born of God, committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him.”

Reply to Objection 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): “My flowers are the fruits of honor and riches.”

Reply to Objection 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the expression “for the sake of” be taken to designate the final cause; and in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because “they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight.”

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): “Faith is to believe what thou seest not”; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): “Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor.” It is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.

Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated above ([1676]Q[69], A[1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are fruits of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.

Objection 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above ([1677]Q[3], A[1];[1678] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.

On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.

I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit. Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the virtues, as already stated ([1679]Q[69], A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.

Reply to Objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.

Reply to Objection 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as stated.

Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. 6:22: “You have your fruit unto sanctification.” Moreover it is written (Is. 27:9): “This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away.” Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.

Objection 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated (A[1]). But Our Lord mentions (Mat. 13:23) a threefold fruit as growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. “hundredfold, sixtyfold,” and “thirtyfold.” Therefore one should not reckon twelve fruits.

Objection 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are enumerated.

Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated [1680](A[2]) that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are insufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): “On both sides of the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits.” Since, however, a fruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in regard to things that are below it.

Accordingly man’s mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as stated above ([1681]Q[27], A[4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, we reckon “charity,” wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:5): “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.” The necessary result of the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in God Whom it loves, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him”: wherefore the sequel of charity is “joy.” Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man’s heart is perfectly set at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165): “Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no stumbling-block,” because, to wit, external things do not disturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and joy, “peace” is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to “patience”; secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed; which belongs to “long suffering,” since “to lack good is a kind of evil” (Ethic. v, 3).

Man’s mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs “goodness.” Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this belongs “benignity,” for the benign are those in whom the salutary flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs “meekness,” which curbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To this pertains “faith,” if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect and, consequently, all that is his, to God.

Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards external action, by “modesty,” whereby we observe the “mode” in all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by “contingency” and “chastity”: whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them.

Reply to Objection 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.

Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and its end.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: “Faith, which is certainly about the unseen.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22,23, “the Apostle had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or fruits of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be avoided, and the latter sought after.” Hence either more or fewer fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.

Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5:19, seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to them.

Objection 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to one another.

Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the works of the flesh.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that “the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.”

I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.

Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this they are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad 4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine, commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works, each to each. Thus “to fornication, which is the love of satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency.”

Reply to Objection 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the tree’s nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called fruits, but not so works of vice.

Reply to Objection 2: “Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

EVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)

OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)

We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect of sin.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?

(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?

(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?

(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?

(5) Whether every sin includes action?

(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii): “Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.”

Whether vice is contrary to virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of any things whatever.

Objection 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that “virtue is the soul’s health.” Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that “vice is a quality in respect of which the soul is evil.” But “virtue is a quality which makes its subject good,” as was shown above ([1682]Q[55], AA[3],4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue—the essence of virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider something consequently. Virtue implies “directly” a disposition whereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that “virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its nature.” That which virtue implies “consequently” is that it is a kind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above ([1683]Q[56], A[3]).

Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of these is “sin,” which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is “malice”: while in respect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is “vice”: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): “Whatever is lacking for a thing’s natural perfection may be called a vice.”

Reply to Objection 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.

Reply to Objection 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), “disease and sickness are vicious qualities,” for in speaking of the body “he calls it” disease “when the whole body is infected,” for instance, with fever or the like; he calls it sickness “when the disease is attended with weakness”; and vice “when the parts of the body are not well compacted together.” And although at times there may be disease in the body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; “yet, in the soul,” as he says, “these two things are indistinguishable, except in thought.” For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since “a tree is known by its fruit,” i.e. man by his works, according to Mat. 12:33. But “vice of the soul,” as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), “is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with itself through life”: and this is to be found even without disease and sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or disease.

Whether vice is contrary to nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above [1684](A[1]). Now virtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above (Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which is contrary to nature: thus “a stone never becomes habituated to upward movement” (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13): “Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat.” Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.

Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated above [1685](A[1]). Now sin is defined as “a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the Law of God,” as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): “Every vice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature.”

I answer that, As stated above [1686](A[1]), vice is contrary to virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above [1687](A[1]). Hence the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing “vituperated,” which word is derived from “vice” according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14).

But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the nature of man, as man. Now “man’s good is to be in accord with reason, and his evil is to be against reason,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good, is in accord with man’s nature, for as much as it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man’s nature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which accords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that “virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a second nature”: and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to nature.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being against nature, in so far as “being against nature” is contrary to “being from nature”: and not in so far as “being against nature” is contrary to “being in accord with nature,” in which latter sense virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they incline us to that which is suitable to nature.

Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive nature against the order of his reason.

Reply to Objection 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such, is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the Divine art whereby it was made."

Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?

Objection 1: It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than a sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

Objection 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.

Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in goodness and in badness.

On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious action is worse than a vicious habit.

I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since “the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so.”

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.

Reply to Objection 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain respect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.

Reply to Objection 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit both in goodness and in badness.

Whether sin is compatible with virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above [1688](A[1]). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.

Objection 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither, therefore, can sin.

Objection 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that “virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes.” Now one virtuous act does not cause a virtue, as stated above ([1689]Q[51], A[3]): and, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they can be together in the same subject.

I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit. Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed by one act as stated above ([1690]Q[63], A[2], ad 2). But if we compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled “as virtues.” And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.

Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with virtues, whether infused or acquired.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the act, but not with the habit, of virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts of virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of necessity; hence the comparison fails.

Whether every sin includes an action?

Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there be sin without action.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that, unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all." Now nothing can be voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies an act.

Objection 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.

On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Now "not to do" does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.

I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or exterior—interior, as when a man wills "not to go to church," when he is bound to go—exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.

Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act, as when a man wills "not to go to church": while sometimes it will be without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or not going to church.

If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church—or, precede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.

Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.

Reply to Objection 1: More things are required for good than for evil, since “good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results from each single defect,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act, whereas there can be sin without act.

Reply to Objection 2: The term “voluntary” is applied not only to that on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in his power to will, and not to will.

Reply to Objection 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept binds him to act.

Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying: “Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law.” Because “Word,” “deed,” and “desire” imply an act; whereas not every sin implies an act, as stated above [1691](A[5]). Therefore this definition does not include every sin.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): “Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids.” Now will is comprised under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite. Therefore it was enough to say: “Sin is a desire contrary to the eternal law,” nor was there need to add “word” or “deed.”

Objection 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the end as explained above ([1692]Q[1], A[3];[1693] Q[18], AA[4],6;[1694] Q[20], AA[2],3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference to the end, by saying that “sin is nothing else than to neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things”: and again he says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that “all human wickedness consists in using what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use.” Now the definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.

Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.

Objection 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained above [1695](A[1]). Now man’s evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the eternal law.

On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust. xxii, 27).

I answer that, As was shown above [1696](A[1]), sin is nothing else than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being voluntary, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary, as being elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being commanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law, which is God’s reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says “word,” “deed,” or “desire”; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, “contrary to the eternal law.”

Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus: e.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the genus “relation,” as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so “word” and “deed” denote equally what is said and what is not said, what is done and what is not done.

Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in defining sin to include something referring to external action.

Reply to Objection 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, “contrary to the eternal law,” he includes aversion from the end and all other forms of inordinateness.

Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely because it is inordinate.

Reply to Objection 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being “contrary to the eternal law,” more fittingly than with reference to its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs us in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.

OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?

(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;

(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?

(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?

(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?

(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?

(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?

(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?

(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?

Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species, according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above ([1697]Q[1], A[3];[1698] Q[18], AA[4],6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as stated above ([1699]Q[71], A[1]), it seems that sins should differ specifically according to their ends rather than according to their objects.

Objection 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according to their opposites rather than according to their objects.

Objection 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not differ in species according to their objects.

On the contrary, “Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God’s law.” Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above ([1700]Q[18], A[2]). Therefore sins, also differ in species according to their objects.

I answer that, As stated above ([1701]Q[71], A[6]), two things concur in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness, which consists in departing from God’s law. Of these two, one is referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for “no one acts intending evil,” as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species according to their objects, as was proved above ([1702]Q[18], A[2]). Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by their objects.

Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.

Reply to Objection 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according to their objects, as stated above ([1703]Q[60], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 3: In various things, differing in species or genus, nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things adapted to human use.

Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts,” etc. from which it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.

Objection 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as stated in Rom. 8:13: “If you live according to the flesh, you shall die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.” Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be distinguished from spiritual sins.

Objection 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind,” where spirit stands for reason, according to a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on ([1704]Q[74], A[7]). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one another.

Objection 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this, seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), “every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth fornication, sinneth against his own body.” Therefore fornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that “of the seven capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal.”

I answer that, As stated above [1705](A[1]), sins take their species from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure, e.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and this can also be called carnal pleasure.

Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): “Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit.”

Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are named, is carnal pleasure.

Reply to Objection 4: As the gloss says, “in the sin of fornication the soul is the body’s slave in a special sense, because at the moment of sinning it can think of nothing else”: whereas the pleasure of gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the unjust appropriation of another’s wife. Again, it may be said that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.

Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes. Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ specifically in reference to their causes.

Objection 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference to their other causes.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that “every sin is due either to fear inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor.” For it is written (1 Jn. 2:16) that “all that is in the world, is the concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: ‘and’] the concupiscence of the eyes, or [Vulg.: ‘and’] the pride of life.” Now a thing is said to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the diversity of their causes.

On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus. 10:15) that “pride is the beginning of all sin,” and (1 Tim. 6:10) that “the desire of money is the root of all evils.” Now it is evident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to their different causes.

I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are attributed to various things in various ways. Because the “formal” and the “material” cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form, both in species and in genus. The “agent” and the “end” regard directly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however, because the natural active principles are always determined to the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above ([1706]Q[1], A[3];[1707] Q[18], AA[4],6) that human acts take their species from the end.

Reply to Objection 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.

Reply to Objection 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the character of end.

Reply to Objection 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.

Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and against one's neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as stated above ([1708]Q[66], A[6]). Therefore sin against God should not be reckoned a part of the division of sin.

Objection 2: Further, every division should consist of things in opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into these three.

Objection 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is unfittingly divided according to these three.

On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and against his neighbor."

I answer that, As stated above ([1709]Q[71], AA[1],6), sin is an inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed, differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from what has been said ([1710]Q[62], AA[1],2,3) that by the theological virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to himself; and by justice to his neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers three and four.

Reply to Objection 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are related to it as to its object.

Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species?

Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is divided into "mortal" and "venial." For things which are infinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be." Therefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong to the same species.

Objection 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species [*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ specifically.

Objection 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according to the debt of punishment.

On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according to the debt of punishment.

I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be found save in different species, e.g. "rational" and "irrational," "animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the one species of man.

We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment, cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent’s intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments according to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference derived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the specific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.

Now the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the diversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin. For inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of order, and another which, without destroying the principle of order, implies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle: thus, in an animal’s body, the frame may be so out of order that the vital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death; while, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be disorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the principle of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in the same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable principle does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore when the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last end, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin; but when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is venial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which results from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable according to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired by reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters concerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is impossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one who errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the truth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he who, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the nature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin mortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins without turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his disorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not destroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he does not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.

Reply to Objection 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards what they “turn away from,” not as regards what they “turn to,” viz. the object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same species from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the species “adultery” the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle word, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its species, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that this difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not that it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even in things of the same species, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts virtually; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner, but, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether sins of commission and omission differ specifically?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission differ specifically. For “offense” and “sin” are condivided with one another (Eph. 2:1), where it is written: “When you were dead in your offenses and sins,” which words a gloss explains, saying: “‘Offenses,’ by omitting to do what was commanded, and ‘sins,’ by doing what was forbidden.” Whence it is evident that “offenses” here denotes sins of omission; while “sin” denotes sins of commission. Therefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with one another as different species.

Objection 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against God’s law, for this is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said ([1711]Q[71], A[6]). Now in God’s law, the affirmative precepts, against which is the sin of omission, are different from the negative precepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of omission and commission differ specifically.

Objection 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and negation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species, since negation has no species; for "there is neither species nor difference of non-being," as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text. 67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same species.

On the contrary, Omission and commission are found in the same species of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to others, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to whom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission and commission do not differ specifically.

I answer that, There is a twofold difference in sins; a material difference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be observed in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal difference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which is also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing from one another in the material specific difference, which are nevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are directed to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing come under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves differ specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if we refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission, they differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far as negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the formal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ specifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed from the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money, both robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the glutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the prescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things, negation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its cause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that fire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.

Reply to Objection 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is not according to different formal species, but only according to material species, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and negative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue, first by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative precepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by the affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative precepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees of virtue; and consequently they are not of necessity, opposed to sins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from which it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or privation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act. Consequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various precepts of the Law.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the material diversity of sins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking, negation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by reduction to the affirmation on which it is based.

Whether sins are fittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into sins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) describes three stages of sin, of which the first is “when the carnal sense offers a bait,” which is the sin of thought; the second stage is reached “when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought”; and the third stage, “when consent is given to the deed.” Now these three belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to reckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin; the first of which is “a fault hidden in the heart”; the second, “when it is done openly”; the third, “when it is formed into a habit”; and the fourth, “when man goes so far as to presume on God’s mercy or to give himself up to despair”: where no distinction is made between sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin are added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.

Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there precede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ specifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one another.

On the contrary, Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23: “The human race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is either by thought, or word, or deed.”

I answer that, Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when each has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ specifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from diversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is the complete generation of a house, while the laying of the foundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to the generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these three, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various complete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed, wherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first beginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of thought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is ready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third degree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these three differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless it is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of sin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man, through desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then he breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful deeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.

Reply to Objection 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in respect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided into three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.

Reply to Objection 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for this reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head: whereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between them, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation which is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the consummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and the outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are stages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and youth follow the complete generation of a man.

Reply to Objection 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from the sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each is found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct from the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only when there is a break in the movement.

Whether excess and deficiency diversify the species of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in respect of more and less. Now “more” and “less” do not diversify a species. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

Objection 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than the reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by straying more or less from the rectitude of reason.

Objection 3: Further, “one species cannot be made out of two,” as Porphyry declares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. Metaph. i]. Now excess and deficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and wasteful—illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by excess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species of sins.

On the contrary, Contraries differ specifically, for “contrariety is a difference of form,” as stated in Metaph. x, text. 13,14. Now vices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to one another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ specifically.

I answer that, While there are two things in sin, viz. the act itself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from the order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is gathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner’s intention, as stated above [1712](A[1]), but one the contrary, from the act itself as terminating in the object to which the sinner’s intention is directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive inclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of sin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by excess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of deficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the motive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while the motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same. Therefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary to one another.

Reply to Objection 1: Although “more” and “less” do not cause diversity of species, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in so far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say that fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that “those who held that there are no different species of friendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by insufficient proof.” In this way to exceed reason or to fall short thereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they result from different motives.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not the sinner’s intention to depart from reason; and so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind through departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other hand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth, wherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or less. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the intention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes to tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds of falsehood, as is evident of the “boaster,” who exceeds in telling untruths for the sake of fame, and the “cheat,” who tells less than the truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also explains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.

Reply to Objection 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to different objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. [1713]SS, Q[119], A[1], ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders contraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.

Whether sins differ specifically in respect of different circumstances?

Objection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of different circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “evil results from each single defect.” Now individual defects are corruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the corruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species of sin.

Objection 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take their species from circumstances, as stated above ([1714]Q[18], A[10]). Therefore sins differ specifically according as different circumstances are corrupted.

Objection 3: Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according to the words contained in the following verse:

‘Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.’ Now these pertain to various circumstances, for “hastily” means sooner than is right; “too much,” more than is right, and so on with the others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to the various circumstances.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that “every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought not”; and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the species of sins are not diversified in this respect.

I answer that, As stated above [1715](A[8]), wherever there is a special motive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the motive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens sometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there is but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes when he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so on with the circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate desire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but belongs to one and the same species.

Sometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises from different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be due to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on account of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he desire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion; that he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in taking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different circumstances entails different species of sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different species in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even as other privations. But sin does not take its species from the privation or aversion, as stated above [1716](A[1]), but from turning to the object of the act.

Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance never transfers an act from one species to another, save when there is another motive.

Reply to Objection 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various motives, as stated.

OF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?

(2) Whether all are equal?

(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?

(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is opposed?

(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?

(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?

(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?

(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?

(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?

(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning?

Whether all sins are connected with one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is written (James 2:10): “Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.” Now to be guilty of transgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all sins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), “sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments.” Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.

Objection 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever lacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above ([1717]Q[65], A[1]). Therefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues. Therefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.

Objection 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a principle in common, as stated above ([1718]Q[65], AA[1],2). Now as the virtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love of God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of all the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is the root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has one, has them all.

On the contrary, Some vices are contrary to one another, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together in the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and vices to be connected with one another.

I answer that, The intention of the man who acts according to virtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of the sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of every man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason, wherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same end, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right reason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above ([1719]Q[65], A[1]). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point of straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to some appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods, to which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from reason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact they are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices and sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is evident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species, sins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in passing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which are connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.

Reply to Objection 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to which it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated above ([1720]Q[72] , A[1]), but as regards that from which sin turns away, in as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law. Now all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he also says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised in every sin; and in this sense he says that whoever "offends in one point, is become guilty of all," for as much as, by committing one sin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God, which is the origin of all sins.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1721]Q[71], A[4]), the opposite virtue is not banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy virtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the destruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man acts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without which no moral virtue is possible, as stated above ([1722]Q[58], A[4];[1723] Q[65], A[1]). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous acts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless it does not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of sins—first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that a virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being present; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as regards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above ([1724]Q[71], A[1]). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot be said that man has the opposite vices or sins.

Reply to Objection 3: The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws man's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which flow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love disunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man loves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are various and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from self-love, are not connected together.

Whether all sins are equal?

Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and the same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason, which is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things. Therefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over a line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way from it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or less. Therefore all sins are equal.

Objection 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are equal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.

On the contrary, Our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): “He that hath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,” and yet it is evident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is greater than another.

I answer that, The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in the book on Paradoxes (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal: from which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only hold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of hell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero the Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the side of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure from reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of more or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider the matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of privation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists, so to speak, in “being” corrupted; thus death is privation of life, and darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit of more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence a man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the third or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already dissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be covered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single shade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another privation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite habit; it consists in “becoming” corrupted rather than in “being” corrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due commensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that commensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same applies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or less on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it matters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or less from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same applies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due commensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of reason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the agent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of reason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one departs more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we must say that sins are not all equal.

Reply to Objection 1: To commit sin is lawful on account of some inordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater inordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure privation.

Reply to Objection 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same subject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to its species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the same species of virtue, as stated above ([1725]Q[66], AA[1],2). Moreover, even if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal, since virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.

Whether the gravity of sins varies according to their objects?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to its mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.

Objection 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice. Now sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it turns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which it turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their various objects.

Objection 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different kinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one another, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one sin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects.

On the contrary, Sins take their species from their objects, as was shown above ([1726]Q[72], A[1]). But some sins are graver than others in respect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore the gravity of sins varies according to their objects.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ([1727]Q[71], A[5]), the gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver than another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain commensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal’s nature, so the good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human act in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the higher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the humors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on the human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or from some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must needs be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle which is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the reason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher the end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now the object of an act is its end, as stated above ([1728]Q[72], A[3], ad 2); and consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their objects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as their end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore a sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is graver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and graver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief, blasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin will be graver than another according as it is about a higher or lower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their objects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects is first and foremost, as resulting from the species.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the object is the matter about which an act is concerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the intention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above ([1729]Q[72], A[3], ad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown above ([1730]Q[72], A[6];[1731] Q[18], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some mutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good, which aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various degrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those things to which man turns.

Reply to Objection 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one another, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far as they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all sins from being compared with one another.

Whether the gravity of sins depends on the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary according to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed, so that, to wit, the graver the sin is opposed to the greater virtue. For, according to Prov. 15:5, “In abundant justice there is the greatest strength.” Now, as Our Lord says (Mat. 5:20, seqq.) abundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than murder, which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that “virtue is about the difficult and the good”: whence it seems to follow that the greater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less grievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less difficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.

Objection 3: Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1 Cor. 13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less grievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and hope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the “worst is opposed to the best.” Now in morals the best is the greatest virtue; and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most grievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.

I answer that, A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first, principally and directly; that sin, to with, which is about the same object: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the more grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue: because, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the object, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and virtue take their species from the object, as shown above ([1732]Q[60], A[5];[1733] Q[72], A[1]). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly opposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in the same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be considered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in checking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man from the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that sin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that the greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less grievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more does it ward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the opposition which consists in restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor sins.

Reply to Objection 2: The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good is opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil. For in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is shown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome by the difficulty.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God: hence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the hatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins.

Whether carnal sins are of less guilt than spiritual sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt than spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than theft: for it is written (Prov. 6:30, 32): "The fault is not so great when a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the folly of his heart shall destroy his own soul." Now theft belongs to covetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to lust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater guilt than spiritual sins.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The quotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that "the devil rejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry." But he rejoices more in the greater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the carnal sins are of most guilt.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that "it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger." But anger is a spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust pertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than spiritual sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins are of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.

I answer that, Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal sins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater guilt than each carnal sin;

but that, considering the sole difference between spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than carnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual sins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and to turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the carnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs to turn to goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a "turning to" something, and for that reason, implies a closer cleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a "turning from" something, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it involves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of the person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as such, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less, in the order of charity, than God and his neighbor, against whom he commits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since the stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we shall state further on [1734](A[6]). Now carnal sins have a stronger impulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore spiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.

Reply to Objection 1: Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also to the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the head of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. "No fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person," etc.; so that adultery is so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more than his chattels.

Reply to Objection 2: The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of lust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with difficulty be withdrawn from it. "For the desire of pleasure is insatiable," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the reason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger, is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "sins of intemperance are most worthy of reproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to us and irrational minds": hence, by these sins man is, so to speak, brutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that they are more shameful.

Whether the gravity of a sin depends on its cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend on its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it moves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is lessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes weakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin that is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does not derive its gravity from its cause.

Objection 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 7:7, "For I had not known concupiscence," says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils." Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome, the less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is diminished by the greatness of its cause.

Objection 3: Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a virtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin. Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of its cause.

On the contrary, If the cause be increased, the effect is increased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous the sin.

I answer that, In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two causes may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of sin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as a tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Mat. 7:18, "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit": and the greater this cause is, the more grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the more grievously does man sin.

The other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being those whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must make a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord with the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the proper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more grievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced to sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the will to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural inclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the judgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment of reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the will, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the gravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much so, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause, which diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause diminishes the sin, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the movement of the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a greater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which is a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater concupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement of the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being stimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous temptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if concupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason, and the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the graver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is redoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the cause which renders the act involuntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as stated.

Whether a circumstance aggravates a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a sin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a circumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof. Therefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.

Objection 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil, it causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it cannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates a sin.

Objection 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away (from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to which it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin’s malice.

On the contrary, Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he who sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven (Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance aggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of virtue (Ethic. ii, 1,2), “it is natural for a thing to be increased by that which causes it.” Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a defect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from the order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances in his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin to be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in three ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one kind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with one who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance that the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another kind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another’s property; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than fornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by drawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of sin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom he ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways than if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that very reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the graver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says (Paradox. iii) that “in taking his father’s life a man commits many sins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated him, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the republic.” Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the deformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus, taking another’s property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to this be added the circumstance that much is taken of another’s property, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take more or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.

Reply to Objection 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated above ([1735]Q[18], A[10]). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give the species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a thing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in reference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not only according to the species of that act, but also according to a circumstance.

Reply to Objection 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if it is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin’s species; because it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as stated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in relation to the malice of another circumstance.

Reply to Objection 3: Reason should direct the action not only as regards the object, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may turn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single circumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or where one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason suffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of reason results from man’s turning away from God, to Whom man ought to be united by right reason.

Whether sin is aggravated by reason of its causing more harm?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of its causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent to the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its goodness or malice, as stated above ([1736]Q[20], A[5]). Therefore a sin is not aggravated on account of its causing more harm.

Objection 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor. Because no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God, according to Job 35:6, 8: “If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that is like thee.” If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing more harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more grievous than sins against God or oneself.

Objection 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him of the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because the life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man ought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace. Now, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit fornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into mortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely speaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently untrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its causing a greater harm.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): “Since vice is contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it diminishes the integrity of nature.” Now the diminution of the integrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as it does more harm.

I answer that, Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because sometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as when a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a murderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the sin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin. Sometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when a man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he knowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to do this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the quantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in so far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to sin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to another, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however, the harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is connected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin directly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that might ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his action if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow directly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor intended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is directly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very species of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious fornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although such was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet it aggravates his sin directly.

But this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner himself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the sinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate a sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for instance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If, on the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful act, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then greater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a graver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an unbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would suffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of theft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither intending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a believer, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that he despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to sin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As we have already stated ([1737]Q[20], A[5]), in treating of the goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action if foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not follow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is inordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm itself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the act more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be inflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are the most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found against which man commits against God, and in some which he commits against himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do God any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things concerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things, which are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and freely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though this be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery from some anxiety.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first, because the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors; whereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not to harm but pleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause of bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient cause of another’s spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually except by sinning of his own will.

Whether a sin is aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of the condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this were the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed against a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin: because a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less harmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being scandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the person against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin.

Objection 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin, this would be still more the case if the person be near of kin, because, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): “The man who kills his slave sins once: he that takes his father’s life sins many times.” But the kinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a sin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less grievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one’s own, than another’s horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

Objection 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a sin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to Wis. 6:7: “The mighty shall be mightily tormented,” and Lk. 12:47: “The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.” Therefore, in like manner, on the part of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by reason of his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a more grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person than on a poor man, since “there is no respect of persons with God” (Col. 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is measured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does not aggravate the sin.

On the contrary, Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are committed against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kings 19:14): “They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets with the sword.” Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed by a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6: “the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against her mother.” Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are expressly condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): “Who saith to the king: ‘Thou art an apostate’; who calleth rulers ungodly.” Therefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the sin.

I answer that, The person sinned against is, in a manner, the object of the sin. Now it has been stated above [1738](A[3]) that the primary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is deemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more principal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man himself, and his neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of one of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to the other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in respect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part of these three.

First, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as he is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury inflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to Zech. 2:8: “He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye.” Wherefore a sin is the more grievous, according as it is committed against a person more closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or official station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he sins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he sins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or kindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against himself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all the more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5: “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” On the part of his neighbor, a man sins the more grievously, according as his sin affects more persons: so that a sin committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign prince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous than a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly prohibited (Ex. 22:28): “The prince of thy people thou shalt not curse.” In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person of prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and the disturbance it would cause among many people.

Reply to Objection 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far as he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that the latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which does not extenuate the sin of the injurer.

Reply to Objection 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those things which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance his possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another, because he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not subject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual goods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is more grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, however, things belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of our will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of injuries done to such like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard, unless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his approval.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes more severely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is done because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.

Whether the excellence of the person sinning aggravates the sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning does not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving to God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: “How great is he that findeth wisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the Lord.” Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed to him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18,19): “The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified.” Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.

Objection 2: Further, “there is no respect of persons with God” (Rom. 2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for one and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the excellence of the person sinning.

Objection 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning.

On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): “A sin is deemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more excellent person.”

I answer that, Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us unawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like sins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is less negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human weakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other sins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the more imputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be assigned for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one who excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence Our Lord said (Lk. 12:47) that the "servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes." Secondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a man excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins: and in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods, aggravates a sin, according to Wis. 6:7: "The mighty shall be mightily tormented." Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being specially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for instance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up as the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator, whereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the example or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): "Sin becomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his position": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men are wont to bear them with more indignation.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which are done negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the great more severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of their sin, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3: The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not from the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof.

OF THE SUBJECT OF SIN (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?

(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?

(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?

(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?

(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?

(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected in the higher reason?

(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the higher reason?

(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?

(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?

(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed to its proper object?

Whether the will is a subject of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the will and the intention." But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin cannot be in the will.

Objection 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what seems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not sin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points to a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will. Therefore sin is nowise in the will.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient cause of sin: because "the efficient and the material cause do not coincide" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of sin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine states (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11). Therefore it is not the subject of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and live righteously."

I answer that, Sin is an act, as stated above ([1739]Q[71], AA[1],6). Now some acts pass into external matter, e.g. "to cut" and "to burn": and such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which the action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover.” On the other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external matter, but remain in the agent, e.g. “to desire” and “to know”: and such are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the proper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle of the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are voluntary, as stated above ([1740]Q[1], A[1] ;[1741] Q[18], A[6]), it follows that the will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good acts, and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore it follows that sin is in the will as its subject.

Reply to Objection 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will does not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is an apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this sense is in the will.

Reply to Objection 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise subject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in the apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is invincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the apprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect also is deemed a sin.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes whose actions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves, but move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the will; hence the argument does not prove.

Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin. For Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that “no one sins except by the will.” Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

Objection 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil pertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], “so true is it that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.” Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary, except in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this suffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the external members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a subject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is the subject of sin.

On the contrary, Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are about one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the will, are the subject of virtues, as stated above ([1742]Q[56]). Therefore the will is not the only subject of sin.

I answer that, As was shown above [1743](A[1]), whatever is the a principle of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts are not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those which are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q[6], A[4]) in treating of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a subject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their acts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same powers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act and habit belong to the same subject.

Reply to Objection 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we sin by the other powers as moved by the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper objects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and evils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice, and sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The members of the body are not principles but merely organs of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves them, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand, the internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents, because they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in Polit. i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions that pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is inflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.

Whether there can be sin in the sensuality?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the sensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his actions. Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals. Therefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.

Objection 2: Further, “no man sins in what he cannot avoid,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of the sensuality from being inordinate, since “the sensuality ever remains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore it is signified by the serpent,” as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii, 12,13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to him as a sin. Now “that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do with the deliberation of reason,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the deliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 7:19): “The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do”: which words Augustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a movement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the sensuality.

I answer that, As stated above ([1744]AA[2],3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will. Wherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.

Reply to Objection 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are common to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a certain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we surpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have the powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the [1745]FP, Q[78], A[4]. In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses that of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in its natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can be the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the subject of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be understood as referring to the “fomes,” which is never completely destroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin passes, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the “fomes” does not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual inordinate movements, if he be presentient to them, for instance by turning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his thoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about this also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of concupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the considerations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of vainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such movements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough, for the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each single one.

Reply to Objection 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without the deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does nothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and consequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is something imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the sensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is something imperfect in the genus of sin.

Whether mortal sin can be in the sensuality?

Objection 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality. Because an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to commit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about carnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal sin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.

Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be in the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the irrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10). Therefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same subject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now disposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial sin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), mortal sin can be there also.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): “The inordinate movement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can even be in those who are in a state of grace,” in whom, however, mortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a mortal sin.

I answer that, Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of the body’s life causes the body’s death, so too a disorder which destroys the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes spiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above ([1746]Q[72], A[5]). Now it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to order anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can only belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the end. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in the reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal sin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being an act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom the ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed, not to the sensuality, but to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an act of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act of reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of moral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act of moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always accompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power; and the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to that to which it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the same subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect science: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same thing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it is neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those things which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can arrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is a disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the venial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal sin, which is in the reason.

Whether sin can be in the reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the sin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is not a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from sin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.

Objection 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated above [1747](A[1]). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.

Objection 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are under our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among those things which are under our control: since by nature some are mentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in the reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in the lower and in the higher reason.

I answer that, The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we have clearly shown ([1748]AA[1],2,3). Now reason has a twofold act: one is its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the act of knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing the other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the reason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper act of the reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the case when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is unable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and excuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen. If, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is able and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and the defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only to the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason as a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its proper act.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1749]Q[17], A[1]), when we were treating of the acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the reason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in another: so that both the movement of the will can be called rational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is found in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the reason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said (ad 1).

Whether the sin of morose delectation is in the reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above ([1750]Q[31], A[1]). But the appetitive power is distinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore morose delectation is not in the reason.

Objection 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs, since it is through the act that the power is directed to its object. Now a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not about the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose delectation is not in the reason.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin 'mora'—delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is no reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore morose delectation does not belong to the reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "if the consent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere thought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman alone had partaken of the forbidden fruit." Now "the woman" denotes the lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.

I answer that, As stated [1751](A[5]), sin may be in the reason, not only in respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its directing human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not only external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the reason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in the reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now it fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it commands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately provokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when it fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance, when a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of passion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell [immoratur] upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense the sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its proximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in accordance with what has been stated above [1752](A[1]), viz. that actions which do not pass into external matter are subjected in their principles.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper object; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those lower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly delectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of time, but because the reason in deliberating dwells [immoratur] thereon, and fails to drive it away, “deliberately holding and turning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched the mind,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).

Whether the sin of consent to the act is in the higher reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above ([1753]Q[15], A[1]): whereas the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher reason.

Objection 2: Further, “the higher reason is intent on contemplating and consulting the eternal law,” as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7). [*’Rationes aeternae,’ cf. [1754]FP, Q[15], AA[2],[3] where as in similar passages ‘ratio’ has been rendered by the English ‘type,’ because St. Thomas was speaking of the Divine ‘idea’ as the archetype of the creature.

Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is identified with the eternal law, (cf. A[8], OBJ[1]; A[9])]. But sometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal law: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he consents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not always in the higher reason.

Objection 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions according to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal pleasures or other passions. But "consent to a pleasure without deciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason," as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful act should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.

Objection 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does the reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act through the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any deliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves his hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may consent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "If the consent to the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses, so far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its consummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered the forbidden fruit to her husband."

I answer that, Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which consent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and delivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical reason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we must observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final sentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in speculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is delivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as there remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be submitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the final sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that human acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule is derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and further still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above ([1755]Q[19], A[4]). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the higher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the judgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is intent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced on several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes last; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the delectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble thereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the higher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the delectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a lower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the delectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower court, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not conversely.

Reply to Objection 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above ([1756]Q[15], A[3]). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will tends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment. Hence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the very fact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine law, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of God’s law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it by a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always proceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12), “the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a sin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of moving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it become the servant or slave of the evil deed.”

Reply to Objection 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can direct or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or restrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of the higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating the matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of this delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to the lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man persists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to the higher reason.

Reply to Objection 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden and indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or lower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower reason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher reason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it does not check the sinful act, this will deservedly by imputed to it.

Whether consent to delectation is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason, which does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and consequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin consists in turning away from Augustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above ([1757]Q[71], A[6]). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to which consent is given be evil. Now "the cause of anything being such is yet more so," or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to which a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But delectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin. Therefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice, according to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 3,5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the outward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation consequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and malice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward thought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a like difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is not a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore neither is the consent to the delectation.

Objection 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a mortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found also in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the act itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for this reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he seems not to sin mortally.

Objection 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple fornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a mortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought of fornication.

Objection 6: Further, the Lord’s prayer is recited every day for the remission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii). Now Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away by means of the Lord’s Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that “this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by deed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we should strike our breasts and say: ‘Forgive us our trespasses.’” Therefore consent to delectation is a venial sin.

On the contrary, Augustine adds after a few words: “Man will be altogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be forgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since without the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them.” But no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to delectation is a mortal sin.

I answer that, There have been various opinions on this point, for some have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and this opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note that since every delectation results from some action, as stated in Ethic. x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be compared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results, and to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens that an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because the action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which the person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself, which results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far as the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in anything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for instance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as his thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent to an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another action, as being the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from the inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to the action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of fornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in the thought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the delectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the appetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a mortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man thinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at all, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he may wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection or delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a mortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and sometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to consent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.

But that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act thought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act. Wherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts to nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to fornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in conformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man deliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in itself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a mortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.

Reply to Objection 1: Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower reason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above [1758](A[7]). Nevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types, for, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to them, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on them, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them in this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of the lower powers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as the direction of the higher reason fails in directing them according to the eternal types.

Reply to Objection 2: Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself a venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to take pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial sin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its genus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent is given, is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the act: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been given, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the delectation which has the thought for its object.

Reply to Objection 4: The delectation which has an external act for its object, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such, even though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the prohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is inordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.

Reply to Objection 5: The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency in an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the consent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of murder.

Reply to Objection 6: The Lord’s Prayer is to be said in order that we may be preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.

Whether there can be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the higher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a sinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the “higher reason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law.” But mortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore it seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher reason.

Objection 2: Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual life, as the heart is of the body’s life. But the diseases of the heart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal.

Objection 3: Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial sin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the higher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of the eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on account of the contempt of the Divine law.

On the contrary, Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher reason, as stated above [1759](A[7]). But consent to an act of venial sin is itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher reason.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher reason “is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law”; it contemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging and directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the fact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to an act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness of the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law, in the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion from the last end, but is beside that law, as an act of venial sin is.

Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial sin, it does not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins, not mortally, but venially.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the very substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and such a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart consisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts surrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In like manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the order itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the eternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this untouched, the sin is not mortal but venial.

Reply to Objection 3: Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to contempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the Divine law.

Whether venial sin can be in the higher reason as such?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher reason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a power is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed with regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the eternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without mortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

Objection 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can be no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate movement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.

Objection 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us unawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin, through the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher good, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when the reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act, considers that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more grievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is contrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse to any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement that takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the subsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.

On the contrary, A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But it belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a venial sin in the higher reason as such.

I answer that, The higher reason regards its own object otherwise than the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher reason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers, except in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it does not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate consent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin; and consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts of the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.

With regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple “intuition,” and “deliberation,” in respect of which it again consults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of simple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine things, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And although unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin unless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one of the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly under some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God, is consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance, when a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as impossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus apprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider that this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine law. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this deliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the higher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even if it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving a deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers, it always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their genus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.

Reply to Objection 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be mortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the incompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the principles from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason, as well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it belongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions: consequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.

Reply to Objection 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of different considerations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the existence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by the human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which is a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the higher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is reducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that which in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal sin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of a higher consideration, as was explained above.

OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sin has a cause?

(2) Whether it has an internal cause?

(3) Whether it has an external cause?

(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?

Whether sin has a cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the nature of evil, as stated above ([1760]Q[71], A[6]). But evil has no cause, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.

Objection 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of necessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for every sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.

Objection 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or evil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). Likewise neither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment is a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin. Therefore sin has no cause.

On the contrary, Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to Job 5:6, "nothing upon earth is done without a cause." But sin is something done; since it a "word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God." Therefore sin has a cause.

I answer that, A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be assigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of affirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of the negation in itself; since the result of the removing the cause is the removal of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of darkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which a negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting negation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal tendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these suffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of sin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of that which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness must needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which naturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on account of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say that evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient cause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause is reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its inordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of the act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness of sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine law, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly, and the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the intention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which privation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the subject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this evil has a cause, has been explained.

Reply to Objection 2: If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it must be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not impeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of something else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on account of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all things happen of necessity, as is proved in Metaph. vi, text. 5. Accordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is a necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of not applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in itself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before it is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the cause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.

Whether sin has an internal cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that which is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an internal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause, the effect follows.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal movements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or voluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3; iv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is already a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the first sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10,11; Retract. i, 9) that “the will is the cause of sin.”

I answer that, As stated above [1761](A[1]), the direct cause of sin must be considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a twofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other proximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the reason and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the remote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the sensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason, that the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is due to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is inclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the will and reason, as we shall explain further on (Q[77], A[1]). Accordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one proximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the other remote, on the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.

But since we have said above (A[1], ad 3) that the cause of sin is some apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the rule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent good, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the appetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason, whose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the voluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the will, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is within a thing as its natural power, is always in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the appetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power of the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the preceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place, and afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed as appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined, that the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the will produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that precede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually sinning.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the substance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the will; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.

Reply to Objection 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is natural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which sin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins through appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from the very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with his nature, ought to observe.

Whether sin has an external cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is a voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are within us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no external cause.

Objection 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will. Now in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal cause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption of some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can arise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no external cause.

Objection 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external inducements to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed to him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Num. 21:16): "Are not these they, that deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and made you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?" Therefore something external can be a cause of sin.

I answer that, As stated above [1762](A[2]), the internal cause of sin is both the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as lacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin. Accordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways, either by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the reason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q[9], A[6]; Q[10], A[4]), none can move the will inwardly save God alone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q[79], A[1]). Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of sin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to sin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external sensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the reason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed externally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps it be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive appetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore something external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be a sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient completive cause of sin being accomplished.

Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that the external motive causes of sin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that it remains in our power to sin or not to sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not prevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause of sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied, the sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful act in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the character of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being voluntary and in our power.

Whether one sin is a cause of another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of another. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in with one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of good; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil. In like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since “evil is not an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless,” as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have no place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and form. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.

Objection 2: Further, “to produce its like belongs to a perfect thing,” as stated in Meteor. iv, 2 [*Cf. De Anima ii.]. But sin is essentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause of another.

Objection 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the same way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the cause of another.

On the contrary, Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): “A sin is not quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of sin.”

I answer that, Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the act of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in the same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it happens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the four kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or moving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which removes an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for when man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or anything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into another sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the second.

Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to commit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions and habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the manner of a material cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its matter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is often about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the manner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man commits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a man is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for the purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral matters, as stated above ([1763]Q[1], A[3];[1764] Q[18], AA[4],6), it follows that one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act of fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is material while the latter is formal.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character of evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least apparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being inordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another sin. A sin has matter, not "of which" but "about which" it is: and it has its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of another, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is no need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is not caused by another sin.

OF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The internal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which are the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above [1765](A[2]), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first place we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the part of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause of sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice, which is the cause of sin on the part of the will.

Under the first head, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?

(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?

(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?

(4) Whether it diminishes sin?

Whether ignorance can be a cause of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin: because a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a non-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance is not a cause of sin.

Objection 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin being a "turning to" something, as was stated above ([1766]Q[75], A[1]). Now ignorance seems to savor of "turning away" from something. Therefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does not turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good apprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) "that some sin through ignorance."

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a moving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one that moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of heavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes an impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in this way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it is a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the act of sin, in so far as it directs human acts.

Now we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one’s father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that not every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone which removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act. Consequently if a man’s will be so disposed that he would not be restrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his father, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his committing the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a man sins, not “through ignorance” but “in ignorance,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1).

Reply to Objection 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but it can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.

Reply to Objection 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards sin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect of a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.

Reply to Objection 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely unknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in another, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause of sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a man, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a certain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.

Whether ignorance is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is “a word, deed or desire contrary to God’s law,” as stated above ([1767]Q[71], A[5]). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or external. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to knowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment resulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of knowledge is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as it is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary, it seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will, rather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a sin, but rather a result of sin.

Objection 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any sin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act. Now ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all its guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a sin, unless perchance it be original sin.

Objection 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning, as long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the one who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be continually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be a most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance deserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: “If any man know not, he shall not be known.” Therefore ignorance is a sin.

I answer that, Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience denotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge about anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense Dionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the other hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of knowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know. Some of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit, without the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act rightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of faith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is bound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there are other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet he is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and contingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is evident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or do, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence, ignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not imputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to know. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called “invincible,” because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason such like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our power to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no invincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance is a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it be about things one is not bound to know.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([1768]Q[71], A[6], ad 1), when we say that sin is a "word, deed or desire," we include the opposite negations, by reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so that negligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the above definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one ought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order to acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.

Reply to Objection 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet by reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have the character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there is a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas grace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not only in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is commanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of the will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some way voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of consideration is a sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through repentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of knowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of which the ignorance is said to be a sin.

Reply to Objection 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually only at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is it with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually indeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the knowledge that he ought to have.

Whether ignorance excuses from sin altogether?

Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin altogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is voluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ([1769]Q[6], A[8]). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Objection 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done accidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.

Therefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human acts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore nothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be deemed sinful or virtuous.

Objection 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he is partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which perfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that “some things done through ignorance are rightly reproved.” Now those things alone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done through ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin.

I answer that, Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which it causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated ([1770]AA[1],2) that ignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would have prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be contrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary. If, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not have prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will thereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling, but not willing, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1: and such like ignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already stated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not excuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not cause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.

On the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it makes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin, because voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse altogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of the thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin, in so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen that a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of which circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong to the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge is sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for instance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which suffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it is his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species of sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend himself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would not have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the act). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is not altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge of the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance itself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either directly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of certain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as when a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to acquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such like negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful, provided it be about matters one is bound and able to know. Consequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If, however, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either through being invincible, or through being of matters one is not bound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above ([1771]Q[6], A[8]). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.

Reply to Objection 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his sin is not accidental.

Reply to Objection 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of reason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with madmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that causes the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.

Whether ignorance diminishes a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin. For that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now ignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that “every evil man is ignorant.” Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Objection 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But ignorance is itself a sin, as stated above [1772](A[2]). Therefore it does not diminish a sin.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish sin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Rom. 2:4, “Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to penance?” says: “Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not.” Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

Objection 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this would seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which removes the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does not diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that the “punishment is doubled for a drunken man.” Therefore ignorance does not diminish sin.

On the contrary, Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven, diminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13: “I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly.” Therefore ignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.

I answer that, Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not render it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is evident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through making it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does away with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not the cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it, neither diminishes nor increases the sin.

Therefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such as is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse from the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like ignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is purposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this kind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful, since it is through the will’s intention to sin that he is willing to bear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning. Sometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being committed, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally, as when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result being that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much wine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this ignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the sin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be said to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally; wherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The ignorance whereby “every evil man is ignorant,” is not the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from that cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.

Reply to Objection 2: One sin is added to another makes more sins, but it does not always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not coincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes the second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of them alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if committed by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk, although in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness diminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own gravity implies.

Reply to Objection 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to simply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of the sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even ignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an allusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the foundation of the spiritual edifice.

Reply to Objection 4: The drunken man deserves a “double punishment” for the two sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which results from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the ignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and more, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated above (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an ordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to be more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye, not to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to expediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline the will?

(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter’s knowledge?

(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?

(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?

(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 Jn. 2:16: “Concupiscence of the eyes, Concupiscence of the flesh,” and “Pride of life.”

(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?

(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?

(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?

Whether the will is moved by a passion of the senstive appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its object. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as it is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive power in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object of the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good defined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive appetite does not move the will.

Objection 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that “the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.” Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.

Objection 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective appetite.

On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 13:56): “Lust hath perverted thy heart.”

I answer that, A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether impeded.

Secondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the will, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.

The Third Objection is solved in like manner.

Whether the reason can be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion, which is weak and soon passes away.

Objection 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason. Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter—on the contrary, if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g. “Every man,” and “Not every man.” Now if two opinions contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.

Objection 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that “no fornication is lawful,” knows this general proposition to contain, for example, the particular proposition, “This is an act of fornication.” Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the particular.

Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), “words express the thoughts of the mind.” Now it often happens that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular.

Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin.” Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Prov. 14:22): “They err that work evil.”

Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the words of Lk. 12:47: “The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes,” and of James 4:17: “To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.” Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above (Q[76], A[1]). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above [1773](A[1]). Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation, the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general.

Reply to Objection 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.

Reply to Objection 2: The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason.

Reply to Objection 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act.

Reply to Objection 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.

Reply to Objection 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3.

Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above [1774](A[1]). Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of weakness.

Objection 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps. 77:39): “He remembered that they are flesh.” Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due to a passion.

Objection 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man’s will, whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to Gn. 4:7: “Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.: ‘The lust thereof shall be under thee.’], and thou shalt have dominion over it.” Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness.

On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness.

I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man’s body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action, through some disorder of the body’s parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above [1775](A[1]). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.

Reply to Objection 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained [1776](A[1]).

Whether self-love is the source of every sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev. 19:18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): “Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence”; on which words a gloss says that “the law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils,” the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above ([1777]Q[3], A[2];[1778] Q[23], A[4]). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, “Things set on fire and dug down,” says that “every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility.” Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.

Objection 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that “self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon.” Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([1779]Q[75], A[1]), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil things.

Reply to Objection 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love.

Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:10), "covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.

Objection 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh.

Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above ([1780]Q[30], A[2]). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned.

Objection 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:16): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin.

I answer that, As stated above [1781](A[4]), inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (Q[23], A[1]). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (Q[30], A[3]). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of perception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others.

The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall state further on (Q[84], A[2]; [1782]SS, Q[162], A[1]).

It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.

Reply to Objection 1: "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on ([1783]Q[84], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.

Reply to Objection 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii).

Reply to Objection 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above ([1784]Q[25], A[2];[1785] Q[39], A[2]); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.

Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated [1786](A[5]). Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it.

Objection 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin.

Objection 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin.

On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12).

I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above ([1787]AA[1],2; Q[10], A[3]); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite.

Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness.

On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else—accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause.

Reply to Objection 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.

Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?

Objection 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: “The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would.” Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.

Objection 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above [1788](A[2]; Q[76], A[3]). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.

Objection 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul.

On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of the passions as “passions of sins,” for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether.

I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either “in itself,” as when the will tends towards it directly; or “in its cause,” when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary “directly” or “indirectly”; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not.

Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above ([1789]Q[17], A[9]): wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether.

Reply to Objection 1: The words, “So that you do not the things that you would” are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: “The evil which I will not, that I do.” Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.

Reply to Objection 2: The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.

Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.

Objection 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above ([1790]Q[74], A[4]). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.

Objection 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above ([1791]AA[1],2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that “the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulg.: ‘did work’] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.” Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be mortal.

I answer that, Mortal sin, as stated above ([1792]Q[72], A[5]), consists in turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion pertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to direct towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last end can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating reason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden movements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or to a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the deliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive the passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as stated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a mortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and adulteries are committed through passion.

Reply to Objection 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards the first kind.

Reply to Objection 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A[6], ad 1): hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial.

OF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz. malice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice, i.e. purposely?

(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?

(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through habit?

(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than through passion?

Whether anyone sins through certain malice?

Objection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through certain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain malice. Now "every evil man is ignorant," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): "They err that work evil." Therefore no one sins through certain malice.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "no one works intending evil." Now to sin through malice seems to denote the intention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of "malitia" (malice) from "malum" (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not denominated from that which is unintentional and accidental. Therefore no one sins through malice.

Objection 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a cause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 34:27): "[Who] as it were on purpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not understand all His ways." Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore some sin purposely or through certain malice.

I answer that, Man like any other being has naturally an appetite for the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is due to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man: for it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now the principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite, both rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin occurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as when anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too does it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will. Now the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good. Again, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to suffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one loves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a limb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when an inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure, more than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or some such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of some spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some temporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so a man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply, whereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a temporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or on purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.

Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that a particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through ignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular action is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through passion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular evil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular good, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus that a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.

Reply to Objection 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but it can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or obtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone would choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without suffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to enjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before him to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God’s anger, to being deprived of the pleasure.

Reply to Objection 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to denote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit is called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through malice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also denote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of evil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he sins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean some previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when anyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this imply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the cause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not indefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous sin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above ([1793]Q[75], A[4], ad 3).

Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain malice?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit, sins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain malice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a man commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle word. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed through certain malice.

Objection 2: Further, "Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by which those habits were formed" (Ethic. ii, 1,2). But the acts which precede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice. Therefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.

Objection 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he is glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things": and this, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do those actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But those who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin: because "bad men," i.e. those who have a vicious habit, "are full of remorse" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not committed through certain malice.

On the contrary, A sin committed through certain malice is one that is done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to which we are inclined by habit, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2 with regard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is committed through certain malice.

I answer that, There is a difference between a sin committed by one who has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not necessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the person who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being "something we use when we will," as stated above ([1794]Q[50], A[1]). And thus, even as it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth into a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason altogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being that a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it may happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from that habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through ignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin through certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever is befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of something lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to him, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very thing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something that excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a spiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in respect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice. Wherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through certain malice.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting in the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply, but in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not a simple but a relative evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the acts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them as perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin committed through certain malice and sin committed through passion.

Reply to Objection 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for what he does through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is able not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means of his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that while not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through the habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his sin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account of his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.

Whether one who sins through certain malice, sins through habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice, sins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that “an unjust action is not done as an unjust man does it,” i.e. through choice, “unless it be done through habit.” Now to sin through certain malice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above [1795](A[1]). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the habit of sin.

Objection 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that “a man is not suddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little.” But the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through certain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice, not from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a habit.

Objection 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will must needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the nature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good. Therefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something supervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through passion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as stated ([1796]Q[77], A[3]). Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain malice, he sins through habit.

On the contrary, The good habit stands in the same relation to the choice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something evil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit of a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue. Therefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice, may choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.

I answer that, The will is related differently to good and to evil. Because from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the rational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to be contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice, to some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes, in fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as when anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through the impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain malice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when his will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two ways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him to evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it were, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of its suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because everything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it. Moreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by custom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case of a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some natural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord, may tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for instance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being in itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or fear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption, he will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the bridle, as it were.

It is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice, always presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not always a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man sins through certain malice, that he sins through habit.

Reply to Objection 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only to do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with pleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason, and this occurs only in one who has a habit.

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin from certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this something is not always a habit, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a habit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there is no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because evil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be perfect without the evil of fault.

Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin through certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance excuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is greater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins through passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers from the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false estimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action. Therefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain malice, than for one who sins through passion.

Objection 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous his sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into sin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain malice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than that of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than to sin through passion.

Objection 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through choosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil. Therefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain malice.

On the contrary, A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very reason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: “He hath struck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on purpose, have revolted from Him.” Now punishment is not increased except for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through being done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.

I answer that, A sin committed through malice is more grievous than a sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because, as sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other things being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the movement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is committed through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the will, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin is committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by something extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the very fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much the more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being committed through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is stronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to sin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon returns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a man sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice, abides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a sick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the incontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers intermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice is ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle in matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the case of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a good end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the passion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect of principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through malice is more grievous than one committed through passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers, neither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above ([1797]Q[76], A[4]). Therefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to be less grave.

Reply to Objection 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a defect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is inclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to sin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while choosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for him the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the passion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the passion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice, chooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained ([1798]AA[2],3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the principle of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin “through” choosing.

OF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part of God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?

(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?

(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded or hardened?

Whether God is a cause of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the Apostle says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): “God delivered them up to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay: ‘convenient’],” and a gloss comments on this by saying that “God works in men’s hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills, whether to good or to evil.” Now sin consists in doing what is not right, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man a cause of sin.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): “The creatures of God are turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men.” But a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since therefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the [1799]FP, Q[44], A[1], it seems that God is a cause of sin, by provoking man to sin.

Objection 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect. Now God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of sin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.

Objection 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not contrary to God’s goodness that He should cause the evil of punishment; since of this evil it is written (Is. 45:7) that God creates evil, and (Amos 3:6): “Shall there be evil in the city which God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’] hath not done?” Therefore it is not incompatible with God’s goodness that He should cause the evil of fault.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:25): “Thou . . . hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.” Now God hates sin, according to Wis. 14:9: “To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful.” Therefore God is not a cause of sin.

I answer that, Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of another’s sin. First, directly, namely be inclining his or another’s will to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely be not preventing someone from sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: “If thou say not to the wicked: ‘Thou shalt surely die’ [*Vulg.: “If, when I say to the wicked, ‘Thou shalt surely die,’ thou declare it not to him.”] . . . I will require his blood at thy hand.” Now God cannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another, since every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the end: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their last end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible that He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of departing from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be directly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin indirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the assistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to give, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order of His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so that if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the cause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking of the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer while able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is nowise a cause of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear from the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it follows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was not right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate sense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that reprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if we do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that “God inclines men’s wills to good and evil,” is to be understood as meaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in so far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this is due as being deserved through a previous sin.

Reply to Objection 2: When it is said the “creatures of God are turned ‘to’ an abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men,” the preposition “to” does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made clear by the Douay Version: the Latin “factae sunt in abominationem” admits of the translation “were made to be an abomination,” which might imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they might be an evil to man; this was the result of man’s folly, wherefore the text goes on to say, “and a snare to the feet of the unwise,” who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose other than that for which they were made.

Reply to Objection 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause, according as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that first cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it goes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that first cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master’s orders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause thereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the commandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.

Reply to Objection 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person punished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is opposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly opposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison between fault and punishment.

Whether the act of sin is from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that “the act of sin is not a thing.” Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin is not from God.

Objection 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except because he is the cause of the sinful act: for “no one works, intending evil,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a cause of sin, as stated above [1800](A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.

Objection 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species, as was shown above (Q[18], AA[2],8). Now whatever is the cause of a thing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If therefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin, which is false, as was proved above [1801](A[1]). Therefore God is not the cause of the act of sin.

On the contrary, The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now “the will of God is the cause of every movement,” as Augustine declares (De Trin. iii, 4,9). Therefore God’s will is the cause of the act of sin.

I answer that, The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in both respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode of its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something existing in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as it is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act, viz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God is the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin denotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from the created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order of the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced to God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of limping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the motive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement in the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and yet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to have a defect.

Reply to Objection 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name of “thing,” that which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the act of sin is not a thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to man as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to Whom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally. Wherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the act, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect accompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1802]Q[72], A[1]), acts and habits do not take their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the nature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is united: and so this defect which consists in not being from God, belongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific difference.

Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man is made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Objection 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): “God does not punish what He causes.” Now God punishes the hardened heart, according to Ecclus. 3:27: “A hard heart shall fear evil at the last.” Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.

Objection 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes. But the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man, according to Wis. 2:21: “For their own malice blinded them,” and again, according to 2 Cor. 4:4: “The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers”: which causes seem to be opposed to God. Therefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 6:10): “Blind the heart of this people, and make their ears heavy,” and Rom. 9:18: “He hath mercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.”

I answer that, Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two things. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil, and turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as He is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of grace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God to see aright, and man’s heart is not softened to live aright; and as regards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.

Now we must consider that God is the universal cause of the enlightening of souls, according to Jn. 1:9: “That was the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,” even as the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies, though not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of nature, whereas God works freely, through the order of His wisdom. Now although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all bodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves it in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are closed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being darkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light up the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who closed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord, withholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that the cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an obstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His grace. In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness of ear, and hardness of heart.

These differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace, which both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses excel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing, of which the former assists "discovery," and the latter, "teaching," hence it is that spiritual "blindness" corresponds to sight, "heaviness of the ears" to hearing, and "hardness of heart" to the affections.

Reply to Objection 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the withholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this respect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened by sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it is a sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as sin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is said to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.

Whether blindness and hardness of heart are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are always directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that "as God is supremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He could draw some good from every evil." Much more, therefore, does He direct to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now God is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above [1803](A[3]). Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and hardened.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that "God hath no pleasure in the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death, neither hath

He pleasure in the destruction of the living.’].” Now He would seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn their blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to take pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal the invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore God turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.

Objection 3: Further, “God is not a respecter of persons” (Acts 10:34). Now He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the case of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in Christ, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were seized with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De Quaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded.

Objection 4: On the other hand, according to Rom. 3:8, evil should not be done, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God does not blind some for the sake of their welfare.

I answer that, Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has a twofold relation—to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner’s damnation—to another, by reason of God’s mercy or providence, viz. that the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall into sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and converted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore blindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those who are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of reprobation. But, through God’s mercy, temporary blindness is directed medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are blinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are blinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom “all things work together unto good” (Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness is directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their damnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii).

Reply to Objection 1: Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is directed to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom the evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole universe: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the martyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as regards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good that ensues from the loss.

Reply to Objection 3: That God directs the blindness of some to their spiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of others is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He vouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a respecter of persons, as explained in the [1804]FP, Q[23], A[5], ad 3.

Reply to Objection 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue; but evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?

(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?

(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?

(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil’s suggestion?

Whether the devil is directly the cause of man’s sinning?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of man’s sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite. Now Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that “the devil inspires his friends with evil desires”; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says that the devil “draws the mind to evil desires”; and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil “fills men’s hearts with secret lusts.” Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that “as God is the perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil.” But God is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is directly the cause of our sins.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the Eudemein Ethics (vii, 18): “There must needs be some extrinsic principle of human counsel.” Now human counsel is not only about good things but also about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good counsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take evil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.

On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that “nothing else than his own will makes man’s mind the slave of his desire.” Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except through sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but man’s own will alone.

I answer that, Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly the cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of an action; and this can only happen by moving that action’s proper principle to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the will, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be directly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.

Now the will, as stated above ([1805]Q[9], AA[3],4,6), can be moved by two things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended appetible is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which moves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will itself, or God, as was shown above ([1806]Q[9], AA[3],4,6). Now God cannot be the cause of sin, as stated above ([1807]Q[79], A[1]). Therefore it follows that in this respect, a man’s will alone is directly the cause of his sin.

As regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will in three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the will: thus we say that food arouses man’s desire to eat. Secondly, he that proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the will that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also, in a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or apparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible things, which approach from without, move a man’s will to sin. In the second and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin, either by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by persuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything be the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity, moved by any object except the last end, as stated above ([1808]Q[10], AA[1],2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he that proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of sin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither directly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with them, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to affection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him objects of appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is somewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the cause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of causation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will inwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.

Reply to Objection 3: God is the universal principle of all inward movements of man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is directly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or offering the object of appetite.

Whether the devil can induce man to sin, by internal instigations?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin, by internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul are vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except by an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which are the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot instigate man to evil through his internal movements.

Objection 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the external senses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone to do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the [1809]FP, Q[110], A[4]. Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in man's internal movements, except in respect of things which are perceived by the external senses.

Objection 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and to imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of these, because, as stated in the [1810]FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2, the devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it seem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary forms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are in sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to produce, as is clear from what we have said in the

[1811]FP, Q[110], A[2]; [1812]FP, Q[111], AA[2],3, ad 2. Therefore the devil cannot through man’s internal movements induce him to sin.

On the contrary, In that case, the devil would never tempt man, unless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.

I answer that, The interior part of the soul is intellective and sensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the will. As regards the will, we have already stated [1813](A[1]; [1814]FP, Q[111], A[1]) what is the devil’s relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its very nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of truth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man’s regard; rather does he darken man’s reason so that it may consent to sin, which darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite. Consequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the imagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can induce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain forms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive appetite to some passion or other.

The reason of this is, that as stated in the [1815]FP, Q[110], A[3], the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally by the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those effects which can result from the local movement of bodies here below, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the representation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to local movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De Insomn. iii, iv.] that “when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with it, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects, which impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and continue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just as though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the time.” Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can be procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it happens that man’s imagination is brought into play.

In like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions according to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital spirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through certain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result is that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image which is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive principle, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.: De Insomn. iii, iv), “lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to an apprehension of the beloved.” It also happens, through the rousing of a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as being something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a passion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this way the devil induces man inwardly to sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic principle, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as external heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that food may be more easily digested.

Reply to Objection 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether outside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but according to local movement, as explained above.

Consequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these forms are received originally from the senses.

Whether the devil can induce man to sin of necessity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of necessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said of the devil (Job 41:24) that “there is no power on earth that can compare with him.” Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he dwells on the earth.

Objection 2: Further, man’s reason cannot be moved except in respect of things that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented to the imagination: because “all our knowledge arises from the senses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm” (De Anima iii, text. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man’s imagination, as stated above [1816](A[2]); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 12) that “this evil,” of which, to wit, the devil is the cause, “extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses, it adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds, seasons every flavor.” Therefore it can incline man’s reason to sin of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that “there is some sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit.” Now the devil can cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the way explained above [1817](A[2]). Therefore he can induce man to sin of necessity.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): “Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.” Now it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man were under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he cannot induce man to sin of necessity.

Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): “Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you,” which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not compel to sin.

I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above ([1818]Q[77], A[7]). It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can move man’s will; God alone can do this, as stated above ([1819]Q[9], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the devil’s power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.

Whether all the sins of men are due to the devil’s suggestion?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the "crowd of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others."

Objection 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to Jn. 8:34: "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay: 'servant'] of sin." Now "by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave" (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly false. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's suggestion.

On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): "Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will."

I answer that, the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of all our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason of whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to sin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who dried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not, however, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were the result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2) from the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still have the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire might be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter that is subject to the free-will.

Reply to Objection 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as regards their original cause, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being overcome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously: it is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of the devil.

Reply to Objection 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he sinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not already prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be said of no sin of man.

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while man, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward suggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of origin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration of which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its essence; (3) of its subject.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his descendants?

(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other parents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin?

(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten of Adam by way of seminal generation?

(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from some part of the human body?

(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and not the man, had sinned?

Whether the first sin of our first parent is contracted by his descendants, by way of origin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is not contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father." But he would bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no one contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.

Objection 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin, unless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass from one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the subject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in the [1820]FP, Q[118], A[2]. Therefore neither can any sin be transmitted by way of origin.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is caused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks the rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin. Therefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.

Objection 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more powerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united to it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long as it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen infect the soul.

Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): “No one finds fault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so through want of exercise and through carelessness.” Now those are said to be “naturally ugly,” who are so from their origin. Therefore nothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.” Nor can this be understood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written (Wis. 2:24): “By the envy of the devil, death came into this world.” It follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin entered into the world.

I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold that the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his descendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to be baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be washed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian heresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For instance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra Julian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.]

In endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be transmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have gone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject of sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is transmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem to produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous, endeavored to show how the guilt of the parent’s soul can be transmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted, from the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to child—thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the father of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption, although this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body is proportionate to the soul, and since the soul’s defects redound into the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable defect of the soul is passed on to the child, through the transmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject of the guilt.

But all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that some bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to child, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted in consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the case of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a defect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt, which is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the rational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on the child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty stain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5), "no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather takes pity on him."

Therefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men born of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one common nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as in civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as one body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says (Praedic., De Specie) that "by sharing the same species, many men are one man." Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so many members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body, of the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand, but by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members. Wherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a sin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is imputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first moving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this man born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of his first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who originate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to their actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first parent to his descendants is called "original," just as the sin which flows from the soul into the bodily members is called "actual." And just as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is not the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part of the man, for which reason it is called a "human sin"; so original sin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person receives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is called the "sin of nature," according to Eph. 2:3: "We . . . were by nature children of wrath."

Reply to Objection 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father, because he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in his guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is transmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual sin is transmitted through being imitated.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power in the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the motion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the rational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human nature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which infects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent in his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him by a kind of movement which is that of generation.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet human nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.

Reply to Objection 4: The semen is the principle of generation, which is an act proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the soul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is already perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.

Reply to Objection 5: A man is not blamed for that which he has from his origin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider him as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it: thus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account of a crime committed by one of his forbears.

Whether also other sins of the first parent or of nearer ancestors are transmitted to their descendants?

Objection 1: It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first parent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants. For punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished by the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents, according to Ex. 20:5: "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." Furthermore, according to human law, the children of those who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the guilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants.

Objection 2: Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he has of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus fire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his children, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much more therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of himself.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our first parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our nature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer ancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it be corrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. 22:11: “He that is filthy, let him be filthier still.” Therefore children contract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer ancestors, even as they contract the sin of their first parent.

On the contrary, Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the merits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their descendants. Much less therefore are their sins.

I answer that, Augustine puts this question in the Enchiridion xlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter carefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the nearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first parent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man begets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently those things that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal actions and matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to their children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the knowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the other hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are transmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of nature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature fails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the individual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the children, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so forth; but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above.

Now just as something may belong to the person as such, and also something through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the nature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature, and something too through the gift of grace. In this way original justice, as stated in the [1821]FP, Q[100], A[1], was a gift of grace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This gift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original justice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his posterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however, whether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature as nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of the proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad Auxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment on account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either in their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is God’s immediate property, as stated in Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however, by Divine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their parents’ account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of its father.

Reply to Objection 2: A man can more easily transmit that which he has of himself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our nearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely personal, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The first sin infects nature with a human corruption pertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption pertaining only to the person.

Whether the sin of the first parent is transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not transmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a punishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are born of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still living at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may be gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: “We who are alive . . . unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept.” Therefore they do not contract original sin.

Objection 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a man who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not transmit it to his children.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ is not transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “Death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned.”

I answer that, According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly believe that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam contract original sin from him; else all would not need redemption [*Cf. Translator’s note inserted before TP, Q[27]] which is through Christ; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered from what has been stated [1822] (A[1]), viz. that original sin, in virtue of the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just as, from the soul’s will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of the body, through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident that actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an inborn aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is transmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of generation.

Reply to Objection 1: It is held with greater probability and more commonly that all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die, and rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the TP ([1823]XP, Q[78], A[1], OBJ[1]). If, however, it be true, as others hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome mentions among others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of the Body—Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the objection, that although they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in them, and that the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since He can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt, in so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind. Nevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the “fomes,” which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of the body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man exercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are baptized transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being renewed in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness of the first sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as Adam’s sin is transmitted to all who are born of Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that are begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not only unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto the removal of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.

Whether original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a person formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gn. 4:1 says that “Adam’s entire posterity was corrupted in his loins, because they were not severed from him in the place of life, before he sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned.” But if a man were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be severed in the place of exile. Therefore it would contract original sin.

Objection 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being infected through the flesh. But man’s flesh is entirely corrupted. Therefore a man’s soul would contract the infection of original sin, from whatever part of the flesh it was formed.

Objection 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent, in so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might be formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they would contract original sin.

On the contrary, They would not have been in Adam “according to seminal virtue,” which alone is the cause of the transmission of original sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).

I answer that, As stated above ([1824]AA[1],3), original sin is transmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they are moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by the soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except by the active power of generation: so that those alone contract original sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of generation originally derived from Adam, i.e. who are descended from him through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than the active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by God out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not be derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original sin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were moved, not by the man’s will, but by some external power.

Reply to Objection 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin. Consequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on account of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom his active generation extends.

Reply to Objection 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far as it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.

Reply to Objection 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would have been in Adam, “by way of bodily substance” [*The expression is St. Augustine’s (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica [1825]TP, Q[31], A[6], Reply to OBJ[1]], but not according to seminal virtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.

Whether if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have contracted original sin. Because we contract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in them, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): “In whom all have sinned.” Now a man pre-exist in his mother as well as in his father. Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his mother’s sin as well as from his father’s.

Objection 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is “the mother” that “provides the matter in generation” as the Philosopher states (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1,4), when death and liability to suffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to suffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin. Therefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would contract original sin.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that “the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin,” (of whom Christ was to be born without original sin) “purifying her.” But this purification would not have been necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted from the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is contracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children would have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “By one man sin entered into this world.” Now if the woman would have transmitted original sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by two, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman, since she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the children, not by the mother, but by the father.

I answer that, The solution of this question is made clear by what has been said. For it has been stated [1826](A[1]) that original sin is transmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the begetting of his children: wherefore it has been said [1827](A[4]) that if anyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not contract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of philosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father, while the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin, is contracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that, accordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would not contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned, they would contract it.

Reply to Objection 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its active principle, and in its mother, as in its material and passive principle. Consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to the necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a necessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not as punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems unreasonable. Because, as stated in the [1828]FP, Q[97], AA[1], 2, ad 4, immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a result, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice, whereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul remained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is original sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original sin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's sin; it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of original justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to suffer and subject to the necessity of dying.

Reply to Objection 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was not needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it behooved the Mother of God "to shine with the greatest purity" [*Cf. Anselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy to receive God unless it be pure, according to Ps. 92:5: "Holiness becometh Thy House, O Lord."

OF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether original sin is a habit?

(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?

(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?

(4) Whether original sin is equally in all?

Whether original sin is a habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For original sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation. But privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a habit.

Objection 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than original sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of actual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a man while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit has the nature of a fault.

Objection 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because evil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not preceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of infants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of original sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence though they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of habit. Therefore original sin is a habit.

I answer that, As stated above ([1829]Q[49], A[4];[1830] Q[50], A[1]), habit is twofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act: thus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin is not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a complex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to something, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second nature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original sin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice, even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to health.

Hence it is that original sin is called the “languor of nature” [*Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].

Reply to Objection 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as it denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly something positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately disposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original justice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of the soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt habit.

Reply to Objection 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas original sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition of nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted from our first parent, as stated above ([1831]Q[81], A[1]). Now this inordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the inordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason original sin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines a power to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit. Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to says that original sin is a habit “infused,” or a habit “acquired” (except by the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a habit “inborn” due to our corrupt origin.

Whether there are several original sins in one man?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one man. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): “Behold I was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me.” But the sin in which a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several original sins in man.

Objection 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject to contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of nature which tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines to various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one habit; but several.

Objection 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the different parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown above ([1832]Q[74]). Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it seems that original sin is not one but several.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): “Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world”: and the reason for the employment of the singular is that the “sin of the world” is original sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.

I answer that, In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons may be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of original sin. For it has been stated ([1833]Q[81], A[2]), that the first sin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity. Wherefore in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men, it is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The second reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin. Because in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on the cause, while the unity of number is derived from the subject. For example, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed from different causes, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a lesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man will be one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that is called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original justice, removing the subjection of man’s mind to God. Consequently original sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in number; while, in different men, it is one in species and in proportion, but is numerically many.

Reply to Objection 1: The employment of the plural—“in sins”—may be explained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use of the plural for the singular, e.g. “They are dead that sought the life of the child”; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually pre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually many; or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of our first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth; or by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit cannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why it should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal of an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed, the elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the harmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the soul have various opposite tendencies.

Reply to Objection 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the soul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original justice held all the soul’s parts together in one. Consequently there is but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man, although the various parts of the body are affected.

Whether original sin is concupiscence?

Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence. For every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature, since it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a natural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.

Objection 2: Further, through original sin “the passions of sins” are in us, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other passions besides concupiscence, as stated above ([1834]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another passion.

Objection 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are disordered, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[3]). But the intellect is the highest of the soul’s parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7). Therefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): “Concupiscence is the guilt of original sin.”

I answer that, Everything takes its species from its form: and it has been stated [1835](A[2]) that the species of original sin is taken from its cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be considered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries have contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be considered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is opposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice consists in man’s will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to the end, as stated above (Q[9], A[1]), so that the will being turned away from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is concupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice, formally.

Reply to Objection 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally governed by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to man, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary to reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([1836]Q[25], A[1]), all the irascible passions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the principle place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous in moving, and is felt most, as stated above ([1837]Q[25], A[2], ad 1). Therefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the chief passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.

Reply to Objection 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as stated above ([1838]Q[77], AA[1],2;[1839] Q[80], A[2]). Hence original sin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance is comprised among the material defects of original sin.

Whether original sin is equally in all?

Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all. Because original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above [1840](A[3]). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence. Therefore original sin is not equally in all.

Objection 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the soul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But sickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to degrees.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that "lust transmits original sin to the child." But the act of generation may be more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be greater in one than in another.

On the contrary, Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above ([1841]Q[81], A[1]). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin is too.

I answer that, There are two things in original sin: one is the privation of original justice; the other is the relation of this privation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted to man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has no degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away entirely; and privations that remove something entirely, such as death and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above ([1842]Q[73], A[2]). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second: since all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt origin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt; for relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that original sin cannot be more in one than in another.

Reply to Objection 1: Through the bond of original justice being broken, which held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order, each power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more impetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the soul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of the different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more prone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to original sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken in all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to themselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the powers, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same species, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be caused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or less, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause of original sin is equal to all, so that there is not comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin: for, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust in the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we must understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive appetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original justice. This lust is equally in all.

OF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the soul?

(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or through its powers?

(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of original sin?

(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?

Whether original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh than in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind arises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this rebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind.” Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect: thus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the soul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal semen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.

Objection 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in so far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls were not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul, but in the flesh.

Objection 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the body. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would follow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God would be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul’s creation and fusion.

Objection 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel, knowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational soul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by being united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of original sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul into such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by the flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.

On the contrary, The same is the subject of a virtue and of the vice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the subject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): “I know that there dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.” Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but only the soul.

I answer that, One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as in its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its subject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed, as in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): “In whom all have sinned”: whereas it is in the bodily semen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power of the semen that original sin together with human nature is transmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh as its subject, but only in the soul.

The reason for this is that, as stated above ([1843]Q[81], A[1]), original sin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this posterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as actual sin is transmitted from any man’s will to his other parts. Now in this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from the motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can in any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its instrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting to gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible faculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth, which, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the instruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the nutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural aptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of guilt.

Accordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the flesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to the soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of guilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of guilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject of original sin, and not the flesh.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already redeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to punishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell “in the flesh.” Consequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt, but of punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental cause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the instrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal cause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since in him it had the nature of actual sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect of his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but as in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is transmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational soul, but disposes the matter for it.

Reply to Objection 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God, but by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation. And so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone, it cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created. On the other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to the flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God infusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being infused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused.

Reply to Objection 5: The common good takes precedence of private good. Wherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general order of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a body), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more that the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to its infusion into the body, as stated in the [1844]FP, Q[90], A[4]; [1845]FP, Q[118], A[3]. And it is better for the soul to be thus, according to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it can avoid damnation, by means of grace.

Whether original sin is in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of the soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to be the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved by the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence but only as to the powers.

Therefore original sin is in the soul, not according to its essence, but only according to the powers.

Objection 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now original justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the subject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the soul, rather than in its essence.

Objection 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as from the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But original sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is more in the powers than in the essence of the soul.

Objection 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated ([1846]Q[82], A[3]). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul. Therefore original sin is also.

On the contrary, Original sin is called the sin of nature, as stated above (Q[81], A[1]). Now the soul is the form and nature of the body, in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers, as stated in the [1847]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul is the subject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.

I answer that, The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the soul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus if the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the concupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that the concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is evident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently that part of the soul which is first reached by man’s origin, is the primary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as the term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and this belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in the [1848]FP, Q[76], A[6]. Therefore the soul, in respect of its essence, is the primary subject of original sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to the soul’s powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will of the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches first of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the essence of the soul, because it was God’s gift to human nature, to which the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the powers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the principles of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of actual sins, which are the sins of the person.

Reply to Objection 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to form, which though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless comes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of the soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper accidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation and in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the position of matter and effect, as stated above ([1849]Q[82], A[3]).

Whether original sin infects the will before the other powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will before the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power by whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of the generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative power more than to the others.

Objection 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal semen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh than the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive powers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them more than in the will.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of the will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin infects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of all infect the intellect, as preceding the others.

On the contrary, Original justice has a prior relation to the will, because it is “rectitude of the will,” as Anselm states (De Concep. Virg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has a prior relation to the will.

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the infection of original sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this respect it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above [1850](A[2]). In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and in this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore regard first of all that power in which is seated the first inclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above (Q[74], AA[1],2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the will.

Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative power of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power. Consequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is the subject of original sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the soul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former follows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of perfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers, are more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher power, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of original sin reaches it first.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by proposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the intellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to sin.

Whether the aforesaid powers are more infected than the others?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more infected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to pertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject of sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will. Therefore that power is most infected by original sin.

Objection 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in so far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey reason, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the generative power is not the most infected by original sin.

Objection 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual and the nearest to reason, in so far "as it shows us how a number of things differ" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of all in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24) that the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements of the members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now those members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes, wherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful incentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin regards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the concupiscible faculty and the sense of touch.

I answer that, Those corruptions especially are said to be infectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one subject to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and murrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption of original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated above ([1851]Q[81], A[1]). Therefore the powers which concur in this act, are chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative power, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes delectation of the touch, which is the most powerful object of the concupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul are said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are said specially to be corrupted and infected.

Reply to Objection 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins, belongs chiefly to the will, as stated above [1852](A[3]). But in so far as it is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid powers proximately, and to the will, remotely.

Reply to Objection 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers which are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of original sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but through his natural origin, which is effected by the generative power. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation except in respect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species is seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the touch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch rather than to the sight.

OF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?

(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?

(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?

(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?

Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all sins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is opposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root of all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.

Objection 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for the end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are not desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins, but proceeds from some deeper root.

Objection 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name for covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires money through ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is not the root of all sins.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): “The desire of money is the root of all evil.”

I answer that, According to some, covetousness may be understood in different ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for any temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins, because every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good, as stated above ([1853]Q[72], A[2]). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of a corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they say that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins, comparing it to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from earth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.

Now, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of the Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins. For in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they “will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils.” Hence it is evident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the inordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that covetousness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all sins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to the whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of committing any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin whatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal goods, according to Eccles. 10:19: “All things obey money”: so that in this desire for riches is the root of all sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For sin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the desire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is called the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for the immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of God, is called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.”

Reply to Objection 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not as though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last end; but because they are much sought after as useful for any temporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a particular good, they move the appetite more than any individual goods, which along with many others can be procured by means of money.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what always happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that the nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to act in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what happens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the reason that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that covetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other evil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise therefrom, for the reason given.

Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every sin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of a sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is the root of every sin, as stated above [1854](A[1]). Therefore it is also the beginning of every sin, and not pride.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): “The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: ‘to fall off’] from God.” But apostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of pride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.

Objection 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that which causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), “builds up the city of Babylon.” Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning of every sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.”

I answer that, Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic sin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to the corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the beginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness, because covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good by which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason covetousness is called the “root”; whereas pride regards sin as turning away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be subject, for which reason it is called the “beginning,” because the beginning of evil consists in turning away from God.

Now though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the mind of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.” For it is evident that he is speaking of pride as denoting inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows (verse 17): “God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes”; indeed this is the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must therefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the beginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary actions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, and of execution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have stated many times before (Q[1], A[1], ad 1; Q[18], A[7], ad 2; Q[15], A[1], ad 2; Q[25], A[2]). Now man’s end in acquiring all temporal goods is that, through their means, he may have some perfection and excellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the desire to excel, is said to be the “beginning” of every sin. On the other hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of sin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, from this point of view, covetousness is said to be the “root” of all evils, as stated above [1855](A[1]).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of pride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from the fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he desires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things. Wherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote the special sin, but rather that general condition of every sin, consisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that apostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is the first species of pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be unwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the result being that a man is unduly lifted up, in respect of the other species of pride.

Reply to Objection 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love oneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently it amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the beginning of every evil.

Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?

Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because “the head seems to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant,” as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the “root of all evils,” it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.

Objection 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital.

I answer that, The word capital is derived from “caput” [a head]. Now the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal’s body, which is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence, metaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even men who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a capital vice is so called, in the first place, from “head” taken in the proper sense, and thus the name “capital” is given to a sin for which capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that we are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in which the term “capital” is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a principle or director of others. In this way a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause, which origin is formal, as stated above ([1856]Q[72], A[6]). Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the “leaders of an army.”

Reply to Objection 1: The term “capital” is taken from “caput” and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the “root,” and pride which is called the beginning, but also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins.

Reply to Objection 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is “the privation of mode, species and order.” But in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.

Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above ([1857]Q[61], A[2]). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices.

Objection 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above ([1858]Q[77]). But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.

Objection 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices.

Objection 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above [1859](A[2]). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices.

Objection 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g. steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).

I answer that, As stated above [1860](A[3]), the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man’s particular dispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art.

Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. Secondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil.

Again, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately by "vainglory." Secondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by "gluttony," or the preservation of the species, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by "lust." Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which "covetousness" is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.

Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by "pride" or "vainglory." Secondly, it implies satiety, which "covetousness" seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, 6,7,[8] and this "gluttony" and "lust" pursue.

On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own good, and thus we have "sloth," which is sadness about one's spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it happens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to "envy," which is sadness about another's good as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is "anger." Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above ([1861]Q[25], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against another's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right to vengeance.

Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above [1862](A[2]): and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the "queen of them all," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above ([1863]AA[1],2).

Reply to Objection 5: These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above ([1864]Q[76], A[2]). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done that good may come of it.

OF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of the good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of punishment.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?

(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?

(3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is stricken in consequence of sin.

(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?

(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

(6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?

Whether sin diminishes the good of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of nature. For man’s sin is no worse than the devil’s. But natural good remains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human nature.

Objection 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which precedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its accidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action. Therefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature is not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be diminished.

Objection 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now no agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is possible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards another. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the good of his nature.

Objection 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which is patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an accident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But sin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore sin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.

On the contrary, “A certain man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho (Lk. 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of his gifts, and wounded in his nature,” as Bede [*The quotation is from the Glossa Ordinaria of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore sin diminishes the good of nature.

I answer that, The good of human nature is threefold. First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth. Secondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as stated above ([1865]Q[60], A[1]; [1866] Q[63], A[1]), this inclination to virtue is a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred on the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be called a good of nature.

Accordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely destroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of nature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin. Because human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated above ([1867]Q[50], A[1]). Now from the very fact that thing becomes inclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other contrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to virtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a diminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of nature, which consists in “being, living and understanding,” as anyone may see who reads the context.

Reply to Objection 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has an inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not changed in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is the inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its term.

Reply to Objection 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active and passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something is caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when treating of the production of habits ([1868]Q[51], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject, but it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that whiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder sin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is itself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an inordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the agent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the fact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive element: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and the sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above ([1869]Q[77], AA[1], 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as though an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the object acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it out of order.

Whether the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can be destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since human nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken away, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of nature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end it can be entirely taken away.

Objection 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts are uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all bodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform. Since therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems that the whole can also be taken away by sin.

Objection 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is aptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some on account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any more than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the good of nature entirely.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that “evil does not exist except in some good.” But the evil of sin cannot be in the good of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it. Therefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does not destroy it entirely.

I answer that, As stated above [1870](A[1]), the good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely.

Since, however, this same good of nature may be continually diminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use of the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely, without being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, text. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be made in the same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for instance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length of a span. If, however, the subtraction be made each time in the same proportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely, as, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished by half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided that what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted before. But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a subsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a previous sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin.

We must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the aforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between two others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root, and tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently its diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of its rood, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is not diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as stated above [1871](A[1]). But it is diminished in the second way, in so far as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if it were diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely destroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed. Since, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is place against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be diminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed indefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to sin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of this inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a transparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the very fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is diminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always remains rooted in the nature of the body.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by subtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles, and this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform: nevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its term, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on the one hand, and not on the other.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue remains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is not reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by Divine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains in the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally endowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the lack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ requisite for sight.

Whether weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and concupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature consequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause of the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as appears from what has been said above ([1872]Q[76], A[1];[1873] Q[77], AA[3],5; [1874] Q[78], A[1]). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin.

Objection 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should have no place among the effects of sin.

Objection 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an act of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not be reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be reckoned a wound of nature.

Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ([1875]Q[77], A[3]) that to sin from weakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a passion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons “two things to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz. ignorance and difficulty,” from which arise “error and vexation,” which four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it seems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.

On the contrary, The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not known].

I answer that, As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already stated ([1876]Q[81], A[2]); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.

Again, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of virtue, as stated above ([1877]Q[61], A[2]), viz. the reason, where prudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the subject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of temperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

Accordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human nature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the inclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on account of actual sin, as was explained above ([1878]AA[1], 2), these four wounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin, the reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and concupiscence more impetuous.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not be the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is more easily inclined to sin again.

Reply to Objection 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a certain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gn. 8:21: "Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth" [*Vulgate: 'The imagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his youth.'].

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([1879]Q[82], A[3], ad 1), concupiscence is natural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so far as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.

Reply to Objection 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called a weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the reason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary to fortitude which pertains to the irascible.

Reply to Objection 5: The "difficulty" which is mentioned in this book of Augustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers, viz. "malice," "weakness" and "concupiscence," for it is owing to these three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good. "Error" and "vexation" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed through being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.

Whether privation of mode, species and order is the effect of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii) that “where these three abound, the good is great; where they are less, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at all.” But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does not destroy mode, species and order.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the “privation of mode, species and order,” as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of sin.

Objection 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now since mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding privations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the result of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and order is not the effect of each sin.

On the contrary, Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body, according to Ps. 6:3, “Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak.” Now weakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.

I answer that, As stated in the [1880]FP, Q[5], A[5], mode, species and order are consequent upon every created good, as such, and also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such depends on its form from which it derives its “species.” Again, any kind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything whatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in Metaph. viii, that “the forms of things are like numbers,” so that a form has a certain “mode” corresponding to its measure. Lastly owing to its form, each thing has a relation of “order” to something else.

Accordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order, corresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good belonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode, species and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin. There is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has its mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated above ([1881]AA[1] ,2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the good of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order, and is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting in the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and order, the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear both how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it destroys or diminishes mode, species and order.

This suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.

Reply to Objection 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as explained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.

Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now these defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in others, whereas original sin, from which especially these defects seem to result, is equal in all, as stated above ([1882]Q[82], A[4]). Therefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin.

Objection 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But these defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or Penance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.

Objection 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than original sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the body by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does original sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the result of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), “By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.”

I answer that, One thing causes another in two ways: first, by reason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one thing is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of the power of its nature or form, the result being that the effect is directly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like defects are beside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that sin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one thing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an obstacle: thus it is stated in Phys. viii, text. 32, that “by displacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting thereon.” In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause of death and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the sin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not only were the lower powers of the soul held together under the control of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole body was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect, as stated in the [1883]FP, Q[97], A[1]. Wherefore, original justice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as human nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the powers, as stated above [1884](A[3]; Q[82], A[3]), so also it became subject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.

Now the withdrawal of original justice has the character of punishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death and all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin. And although the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless they are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as punishments.

Reply to Objection 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if equal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or diminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes of an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For supposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it does not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will be equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the greater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it is left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly, when original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments, some men’s bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all.

Reply to Objection 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the same cause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:11): “He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you”: but each is done according to the order of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that we should first of all be conformed to Christ’s sufferings, before attaining to the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was begun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our bodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that we may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the substance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the substance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some sicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it deprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the acts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body, as original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those defects, as original sin does.

Whether death and other defects are natural to man?

Objection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are natural to man. For "the corruptible and the incorruptible differ generically" (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as other animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is naturally corruptible.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally corruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But such is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.

Objection 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human life is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the vital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like defects are natural to man.

On the contrary, (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him. Now "God made not death" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural to man.

(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a punishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable to it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original sin, as stated above [1885](A[5]). Therefore they are not natural to man.

(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its end. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[5] , AA[3],4): and the form of the human body is the rational soul, as was proved in the [1886]FP, Q[75], A[6]. Therefore the human body is naturally incorruptible.

I answer that, We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways; first, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its particular nature.

A thing’s particular nature is its own power of action and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every corruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in De Coelo ii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation of the thing to which it belongs.

On the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some universal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or again belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is said by some to be “the Nature Who makes nature.” This force intends the good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate generation and corruption in things are requisite: and in this respect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as regards the inclination of the form which is the principle of being and perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is allotted proportionately to its particular form according to the discretion of the universal agent. And although every form intends perpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being can achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the reason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other forms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its own, as stated in the [1887]FP, Q[75], A[2]. Consequently as regards his form, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible things. But since that very form has a matter composed of contraries, from the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in the whole. In this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards the nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the nature of his form.

The first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the other three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to solve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the rational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its end, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is corruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way, adapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note a twofold condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and another which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition of matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter both hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for cutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted for a knife: but that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results from the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose this in the iron, indeed he would do without it if he could: wherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman’s intention, nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human body is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a mixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ of touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the fact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is not chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible matter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in forming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of original justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was stated in the [1888]FP, Q[97], A[1]. It is in this sense that it is said that “God made not death,” and that death is the punishment of sin.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF THE STAIN OF SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?

(2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?

Whether sin causes a stain on the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For a higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature: hence the sun’s ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of a much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by sinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning.

Objection 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above ([1889]Q[74], AA[1],2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by considering anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby. Therefore neither is the will stained by sin.

Objection 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive, it can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that nothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition nor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal of a disposition or habit; for instance, in a man who after committing a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into a sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation. Because all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of grace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by all sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.

On the contrary, It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): “Thou hast stained thy glory”: and it is written (Eph. 5:27): “That He might present it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle”: and in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a stain is the effect of sin.

I answer that, A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things, when a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another body, e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a stain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man’s soul has a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural light of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other, from the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace, whereby man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and fitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as shown above ([1890]Q[71], A[6]). Wherefore the loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their own power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the soul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them inordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law.

Reply to Objection 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by the intelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of the intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected, by them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a movement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to the thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves inordinately, according to Osee 9:10: “They . . . became abominable as those things were which they loved.”

Reply to Objection 3: The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the soul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which varies according to the diversity of the interposed bodies.

Whether the stain remains in the soul after the act of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the soul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or disposition, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul after the act of sin.

Objection 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the body, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the shadow does not remain when the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in the soul when the act of sin is past.

Objection 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of the stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no longer there, neither is the stain in the soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Jos. 22:17): "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime remaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?"

I answer that, The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated above (A[1]), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on account of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine law. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the stain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he returns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is removed. For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew from the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once return to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement. Thus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of movement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases, but he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of sin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something private, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.

Reply to Objection 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the transparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards the illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the sin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God: and so there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes the defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local parting. Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is not removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain removed.

OF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1) the debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect of the punishment due to them.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?

(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?

(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in quantity?

(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite punishment?

(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?

(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?

(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another’s sin?

Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing, does not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is accidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the sinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.

Objection 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is good, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an effect of sin, which is evil.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that “every inordinate affection is its own punishment.” But punishment does not incur a further debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely. Therefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 2:9): “Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil.” But to work evil is to sin. Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the words “tribulation and anguish.”

I answer that, It has passed from natural things to human affairs that whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some detriment therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one contrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which reason “hot water freezes more rapidly,” as stated in Meteor. i, 12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to repress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all things contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to the principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.

Accordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment corresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject. In the first place a man’s nature is subjected to the order of his own reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who governs him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member either of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to the universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these orders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason, and against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold punishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience; another, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.

Reply to Objection 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by reason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental to the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt of punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by God or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin, not directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of punishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is." Consequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the effect of sin.

Reply to Objection 3: This punishment of the "inordinate affection" is due to sin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a further punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or human law.

Whether sin can be the punishment of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin. For the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of virtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not bring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite direction. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.

Objection 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice. Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

Objection 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against the will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above ([1891]Q[74], AA[1] ,2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.

On the contrary, Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins are punishments of others.

I answer that, We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its essence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto. Sin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin considered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for it is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas punishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in the [1892]FP, Q[48], A[5]. Consequently it is evident that sin regarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.

On the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in three ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing an impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and the like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine grace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the withdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above ([1893]Q[79], A[3]), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is also a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle speaks (Rom. 1:24) when he says: “Wherefore God gave them up to the desires of their heart,” i.e. to their passions; because, to wit, when men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome by their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the punishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance of the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior act, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act, as is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in order to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: “We wearied ourselves in the way of iniquity.” Thirdly, on the part of the effect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its effect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in respect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall into sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it is for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise from sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the amendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are the more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is evident that the punishment is intended for the sinner’s amendment, since the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of a nature to withdraw man from sin.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and the same answer applies to the Third Objection.

Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since justice is equality:

wherefore it is written (Is. 27:8): “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.” Now sin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Objection 2: Further, “punishments are a kind of medicine” (Ethic. ii, 3). But no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end, and “what is directed to an end, is not infinite,” as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.

Objection 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it for its own sake. But “God hath not pleasure in the destruction of men” [Vulg.: ‘of the living’]. Therefore He will not inflict eternal punishment on man.

Objection 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is accidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished. Therefore it cannot be of infinite duration.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): “These shall go into everlasting punishment”; and (Mk. 3:29): “He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be guilty of an everlasting sin.”

I answer that, As stated above [1894](A[1]), sin incurs a debt of punishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so long as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of the order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now disturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes irreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is irreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be repaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle of sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine power; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there arise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied by nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby one takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the principle of the order whereby man’s will is subject to God, the disorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable, although it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the principle of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by charity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to destroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of severity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment, however, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for punishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that adultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a momentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by imprisonment or banishment for life—sometimes even by death; wherein account is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of the expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the living, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the eternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory (Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his own eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to have sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual sinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very fact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin, everlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the "wicked would wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins for ever."

Reply to Objection 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according to human laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is punished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged, this is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that at least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the punishment, according to Prov. 19:25: "The wicked man being scourged, the fool shall be wiser." Accordingly the eternal punishments inflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for those who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments, according to Ps. 59:6: "Thou hast given a warning to them that fear Thee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be delivered."

Reply to Objection 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.

Reply to Objection 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to nature, nevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the order, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance lasts, the punishment endures.

Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment infinite in quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): “Correct me, O Lord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to nothing.” Now God’s anger or fury signifies metaphorically the vengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an infinite punishment, even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes infinite power. Therefore according to God’s vengeance, sin is awarded a punishment infinite in quantity.

Objection 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of fault, according to Dt. 25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Now a sin which is committed against God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin increases according to the greatness of the person sinned against (thus it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a private individual), and God’s greatness is infinite. Therefore an infinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God.

Objection 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration, and in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration. Therefore it is infinite in quantity also.

On the contrary, If this were the case, the punishments of all mortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than another.

I answer that, Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin comprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the immutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is infinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good. In this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself is finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite, since the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so far as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding punishment is the “pain of loss,” which also is infinite, because it is the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin turns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the “pain of sense,” which is also finite.

Reply to Objection 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the sinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be incompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice requires, as stated above [1895](A[3]). The expression “to be brought to nothing” is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: “If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing.”

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from something, for it is thus that man sins against God.

Reply to Objection 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of fault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain, for as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But punishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault which is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever; wherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite as regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does not incur punishment of infinite quantity.

Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment. Because punishment, as stated above [1896](A[4]), is proportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely from temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs infinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot be infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting punishment, as stated above [1897](A[4]), it seems that no sin incurs a debt of mere temporal punishment.

Objection 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that “the lightest punishment is incurred by those who are punished for original sin alone.” But original sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have died in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the kingdom of God, as shown by our Lord’s words (Jn. 3:3): “ Unless a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.” Much more, therefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting.

Objection 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through being united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its punishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment if it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there is no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves eternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter sins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not punished eternally.

I answer that, As stated above [1898](A[3]), a sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in the order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very principle of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in some sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve contrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things referable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little intent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for instance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would not offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments. Consequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in respect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the substance of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect of their turning away from something. Because some sins consist in turning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting things referable to the end: and the last end differs infinitely from the things that are referred to it.

Reply to Objection 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on account of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the subject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is no remission of sin.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin. Because eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of the sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above [1899](A[3]).

Whether the debt of punishment remains after sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment after sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin is the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is removed, the debt of punishment ceases also.

Objection 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a virtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when sin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.

Objection 3: Further, “Punishments are a kind of medicine” (Ethic. ii, 3). But a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease. Therefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Kings xii. 13,14): “David said to Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David: The Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die. Nevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the Lord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die.” Therefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven: and so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins, when the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of sin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses the order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay some sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality of justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who has been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God’s commandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something contrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of justice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done to one’s fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful or injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of punishment.

But if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the soul being united to God, since it was through being separated from Him that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain consists, as stated above ([1900]Q[86], A[1]). Now man is united to God by his will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man, unless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say, unless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment of his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts on him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained when speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary ([1901]Q[6], A[6]). We must, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed, there may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment simply, but of satisfactory punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain remains, as stated above ([1902]Q[86], A[2]), so the debt of punishment also can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of punishment does not remain in the same way, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply, but he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue demands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God or man.

Reply to Objection 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that the other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered by the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied by the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is requisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove the scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at the sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the example of David quoted above.

Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for a sin. For it is written (Jn. 9:3, 2) about the man born blind: “Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should be born blind.” In like manner we see that many children, those also who have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for instance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no sin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are baptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who do not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

Objection 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent should be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of these is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written about the wicked (Ps. 72:5): “They are not in the labor of men: neither shall they be scourged like other men”; and (Job 21:7): “[Why then do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with riches” (?)[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate]; and (Hab. 1:13): “Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.: ‘them that do unjust things’], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked man oppresseth [Vulg.: ‘devoureth’], the man that is more just than himself?” Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.

Objection 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. 2:22) that “He did no sin, nor was guile found in His mouth.” And yet it is said (1 Pet. 2:21) that “He suffered for us.” Therefore punishment is not always inflicted by God for sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): “Who ever perished innocent? Or when were the just destroyed? On the contrary, I have seen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God”; and Augustine writes (Retract. i) that “all punishment is just, and is inflicted for a sin.”

I answer that, As already stated [1903](A[6]), punishment can be considered in two ways—simply, and as being satisfactory. A satisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who differ as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union of love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the punishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take the debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of punishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has always a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a relation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a sin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and this, either principally or consequently—principally, the punishment of original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived of original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result from this defect in human nature.

Nevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and yet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as stated in the [1904]FP, Q[48], A[5]. Now evil is privation of good. And since man’s good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good of the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man suffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater good, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health, or loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul’s health and the glory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply but relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of punishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man prescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them to health.

And since such like are not punishments properly speaking, they are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted sense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of penal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself the punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state of innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in virtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is reduced to original sin as its cause.

Reply to Objection 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or which children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of original sin, as stated above ([1905]Q[85], A[5]); and they remain even after baptism, for the cause stated above ([1906]Q[85], A[5], ad 2): and that they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature, which is left to itself, as stated above ([1907]Q[85], A[5], ad 1). Nevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the salvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are admonished by their means—and also to the glory of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but they are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief goods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual goods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or evils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii), "Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the virtuous man, by material gifts." The very fact that others receive temporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the psalm quoted concludes (verse 6): "Therefore pride hath held them fast."

Reply to Objection 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but for our sins.

Whether anyone is punished for another's sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's sin. For it is written (Ex. 20:5): "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate Me"; and (Mat. 23:35): "That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon the earth."

Objection 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now, according to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their parents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to Divine justice, one is punished for another's sin.

Objection 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for the father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his father's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather than of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose crimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished, not for their own sins, but for those of their parents.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:20): "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father."

I answer that, If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which one takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's punishment, in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above [1908](A[7]). If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of sin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own sin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we speak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does happen that one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated [1909](A[7]) that ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are medicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore there is no reason why one should not have such like punishments inflicted on one for another's sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on children for their parents, or on servants for their masters, inasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way, however, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin, this penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the one punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take part in the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the one for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who is punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he consent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his soul, if he bears it patiently.

With regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal, because the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good. Consequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without some fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep. ad

Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one for another’s sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the father’s property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by saying (Ezech. 18:4): “All souls are Mine.”

Reply to Objection 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred to temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the property of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else, if they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood in reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words are added, “Of them that hate Me,” and in the chapter quoted from Matthew (verse 32) we read: “Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers.” The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their children, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being brought up amid their parents’ crimes, both by becoming accustomed to them, and by imitating their parents’ example, conforming to their authority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if, seeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways. The text adds, “to the third and fourth generation,” because men are wont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so that both the children can witness their parents’ sins so as to imitate them, and the parents can see their children’s punishments so as to grieve for them.

Reply to Objection 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for another’s sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or medicines against future sins, in order that either they who are punished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished, rather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the punishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as stated above, in so far as the child is the father’s property, and because the examples and the punishments that occur in one’s own household are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid the sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he is not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more obstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.

OF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)

In the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of the debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall consider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall consider venial sin in itself.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?

(2) Whether they differ generically?

(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?

(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?

(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an aggravating circumstance?

(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?

Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): “Sin is a word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law.” But the fact of being against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently every sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): “Whether you eat or drink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God.” Now whoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for God’s glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.

Objection 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either as enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable good as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which gives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3,4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys a mutable good. Now “to enjoy what we should use is human perverseness,” as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30). Therefore, since “perverseness” [*The Latin ‘pervertere’ means to overthrow, to destroy, hence ‘perversion’ of God’s law is a mortal sin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.

Objection 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact turns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable good, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that he sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with mortal sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that “a crime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does not.” But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.

I answer that, Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed, if taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken metaphorically: thus “to smile” is not opposed to “being dry”; but if we speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and fresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if mortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it does not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus. But if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is opposed to that which is venial.

For sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above ([1910]Q[71], A[1], ad 3;[1911] Q[72], A[5];[1912] Q[74], A[9], ad 2), is said to be mortal by comparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through causing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a principle, as stated above ([1913]Q[72], A[5]). Now the principle of the spiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order to the last end, as stated above ([1914]Q[72], A[5];[1915] Q[87], A[3]): and if this order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic principle, but by the power of God alone, as stated above ([1916]Q[87], A[3]), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired through the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired through the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the last end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher principle, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such sins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins which imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to the end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called venial: because a sin receives its acquittal [veniam] when the debt of punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as explained above ([1917]Q[87], A[6]).

Accordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and irreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic principle, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all diseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a division of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the generic nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its parts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other afterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine gives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called a sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to mortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is not "against" the law, since he who sins venially neither does what the law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he acts "beside" the law, through not observing the mode of reason, which the law intends.

Reply to Objection 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it does not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not actually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not therefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid mortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to God's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to God habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the human act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does not exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it does not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally.

Reply to Objection 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as enjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it, by referring it to God, not actually but habitually.

Reply to Objection 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in contraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed therein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of finality.

Whether mortal and venial sin differ generically?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ generically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some generically venial. Because human acts are considered to be generically good or evil according to their matter or object, as stated above ([1918]Q[18], A[2]). Now either mortal or venial sin may be committed in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any mutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or more than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [1919](A[1]; Q[72], A[5]; Q[87], A[3]), a sin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be repaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice, which, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability belongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are remissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed through malice differs from sin committed through weakness or ignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in cause, as stated above (Q[77], A[8], ad 1). Therefore venial and mortal sin do not differ generically.

Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([1920]Q[74], A[3], ad 3; A[10]) that sudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial sins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no sins are generically venial.

On the contrary, Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain generic mortal sins.

I answer that, Venial sin is so called from “venia” [pardon]. Consequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has been pardoned: thus Ambrose says that “penance makes every sin venial”: and this is called venial “from the result.” Secondly, a sin is called venial because it does not contain anything either partially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as when a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin committed through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial “from the cause”: totally, through not destroying the order to the last end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting punishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now.

For as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no determinate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can have a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically, and another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of an act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to a thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is directed to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object. Consequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary to the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against the love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like: wherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes, however, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a certain inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God and one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so forth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.

Nevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and malice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition of the agent, as stated above ([1921]Q[18], AA[4],6), it happens sometimes that a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object, becomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his last end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a mortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle word to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on the part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal becomes venial, by reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason, which is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above in reference to sudden movements of unbelief.

Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is contrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of God, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence it belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves contrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that they are mortal by reason of their genus.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial from their cause.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by reason of the imperfection of the act.

Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial and mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated above [1922](A[1]). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species, wherefore it is stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2, that “from like acts like dispositions and habits are engendered.” But mortal and venial sin differ in genus or species, as stated above [1923](A[2]). Therefore venial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to mortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a venial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that “pride lies in wait for good works that it may destroy them.” Therefore even good works would be venial sins, which is absurd.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): “He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little.” Now he that sins venially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and little he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.

I answer that, A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there is a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of disposition. For there is a cause which moves directly to the production of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause which moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces a pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly an act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and thus it disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin generically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to a sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless, in this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to a sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the disposition or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial sin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end in that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, as such, is to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that, by sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin. Secondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle thereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin generically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial, turns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end, by choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety to one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance. Wherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so can a venial sin dispose to mortal.

Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is in genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit in different ways, as stated ([1924]AA[1],2).

Reply to Objection 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal sin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally; whereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as stated.

Whether a venial sin can become mortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin. For Augustine in explaining the words of Jn. 3:36: “He that believeth not the Son, shall not see life,” says (Tract. xii in Joan.): “The slightest,” i.e. venial, “sins kill if we make little of them.” Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death of the soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

Objection 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of reason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as stated above ([1925]Q[74], A[8], ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

Objection 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and incurable disease, as stated above [1926](A[1]). But a curable disease may become incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.

Objection 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated [1927](A[3]). Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.

I answer that, The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may be understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be at first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because a sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so that an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the act be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed, it is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.

Secondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial, becomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end in that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated above [1928](A[2]).

Thirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins constituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many venial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because all the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment equal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the duration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as stated above ([1929]Q[87], AA[3],5). It is also evident as regards the pain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as regards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although as to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be improportionate to one another.

If, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one mortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above [1930](A[3]) with regard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial sin disposes to mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins making one mortal sin dispositively.

Reply to Objection 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the consent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of the reason in consenting is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding disposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may undergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act, which cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an imperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being perfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a disposition to something differing generically, even as an accident which disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.

Whether a circumstance can make a venial sin to be mortal?

Objection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin mortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis, serm. xli) that “if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness be frequent, they become mortal sins.” But anger and drunkenness are not mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be mortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Objection 2: Further, the Master says (Sentent. ii, D, 24) that delectation, if morose [*See[1931] Q[74], A[6]], is a mortal sin, but that if it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a circumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.

Objection 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal sin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a good act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much more, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.

On the contrary, Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity cannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act’s genus, because the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act be venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason of an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the quantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said ([1932]Q[72], A[5], ad 1;[1933] Q[87], A[5], ad 1).

I answer that, As stated above (Q[7], A[1]; Q[18], A[5], ad 4; AA[10] ,11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as such, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may happen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and then it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species of the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the deformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another woman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity; but if this other be another man’s wife, there is an additional deformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs to another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new species of sin known as adultery.

It is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin become mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For it has been stated above [1934](A[1]) that the deformity of a venial sin consists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end, whereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about the last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot make a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance, but only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes, as it were, the specific difference of the moral act.

Reply to Objection 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin to another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by something accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a new species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance something supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its species, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.

We must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger is a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one’s neighbor, if the angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically, such as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin generically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the imperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the sensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its generic nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other hand, the hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically venial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish to say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the anger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps accidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal or something of the kind.

With regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason of its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the mere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he is directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly contrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of ignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of the wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of getting drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him as a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk frequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his will seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to refrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its specific nature.

Reply to Objection 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those matters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the delectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection of the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because anger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account of the approval of the deliberating reason.

Reply to Objection 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil, unless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above ([1935]Q[18], A[5] , ad 4).

Whether a mortal sin can become venial?

Objection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial. Because venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is from venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above [1936](A[5]). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.

Objection 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this, that he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he who sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen that a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a creature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that simple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God, commits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love of God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he was acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial sin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above (A[5], OBJ[3]), good is more distant from evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in itself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice, as when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a mortal sin become venial.

On the contrary, An eternal thing can never become temporal. But mortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves temporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.

I answer that, Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in the genus of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the imperfect can become perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial sin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining to the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the purpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become imperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by the addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin, for the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to utter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional deformity.

Nevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by reason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not completely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a deliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said above [1937](A[2]). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of deliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from deliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the species of the act is destroyed.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from perfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man and not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin altogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that commits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin either mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then the ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of the love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things whereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), “those things which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good end.” Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise be well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4,5), the judge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the enemy of the common weal, are not murderers.

OF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?

(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by "wood," "hay," "stubble" (1 Cor. 3:12);

(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?

(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?

(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?

(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?

Whether venial sin causes a stain on the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the soul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that if venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so as to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the stain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty. Therefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul.

Objection 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of the inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in venial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the affections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.

Objection 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a temporal thing, through love thereof as stated above ([1938]Q[86], A[1]). But, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing through inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the soul.

On the contrary, it is written, (Eph. 5:27): "That He might present it to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle," on which the gloss says: "i.e., some grievous sin." Therefore it seems proper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.

I answer that as stated above (Q[86], A[1]), a stain denotes a loss of comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in corporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the soul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a twofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence supervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one habitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an outward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual comeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither destroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, as we shall show further on ([1939]SS, Q[24], A[10]; Q[133], A[1], ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain denotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems in the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness. Therefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in the soul. If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce a stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the comeliness that results from acts of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial sins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would not sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.

Reply to Objection 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys the habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.

Reply to Objection 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a temporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of grace, which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their last end, is entirely cut off. On the contrary, in venial sin, man does not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no comparison.

Whether venial sins are suitably designated as “wood, hay, and stubble”?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated as “wood,” “hay,” and “stubble.” Because wood hay and stubble are said (1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins are something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions are outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not suitably designated as wood, hay and stubble.

Objection 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay and stubble, “shall be saved yet so as by fire” (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who commits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a man dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore, venial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who build "gold, silver, precious stones," i.e. love of God and our neighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay, and stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do good works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore venial sins are not suitably designated by these three.

Objection 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and degrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under these three.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who builds up wood, hay and stubble, "shall be saved yet so as by fire," so that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt of temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated above ([1940]Q[87], A[5]). Therefore these three signify venial sins.

I answer that, Some have understood the "foundation" to be dead faith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver, and precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according to them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine disapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as the Apostle says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh, "shall not obtain the kingdom of God," which signifies to be saved; whereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble "shall be saved yet so as by fire." Consequently wood, hay, stubble cannot be understood to denote mortal sins.

Others say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are indeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial sins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a good thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his possessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so that, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to do anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be reasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the love of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by "gold," "silver," and "precious stones," and consequently not by "wood," "hay," and "stubble."

We must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate themselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are designated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in a house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be burnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied in a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man suffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory after this life, and yet he is saved for ever.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual foundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because they are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps. 136:1): “Upon the waters of Babylon,” i.e. “beside the waters”: because venial sins do not destroy the edifice.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and stubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build “upon” the “foundation.” And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have esteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Accordingly, he that dies in mortal sin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not built upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be saved so as by fire.

Reply to Objection 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of temporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight venial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of charity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do not remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy about earthly remain longer, because they are unable to have such frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove them.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), “all things are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the end.” Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three, viz. to “wood,” which remains longer in the fire; “stubble,” which is burnt up at once; and “hay,” which is between these two: because venial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man is more or less attached to them.

Whether man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence?

Objection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, “Adam was not seduced,” a gloss says: “Having had no experience of God’s severity, it was possible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done was a venial sin.” But he would not have thought this unless he could have committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin without sinning mortally.

Objection 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): “We must not suppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all there had arisen in man’s soul a movement of vainglory which should have been checked.” Now the vainglory which preceded man’s defeat, which was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be nothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5) that “man was allured by a certain desire of making the experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had taken the forbidden fruit.” Again there seems to have been a certain movement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had said, as appears from her saying (Gn. 3:3): “Lest perhaps we die.” Now these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a venial sin before he committed a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the original state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally notwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he could also sin venially.

On the contrary, Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing penal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could commit a sin that would not deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not change man’s state. Therefore he could not sin venially.

I answer that, It is generally admitted that man could not commit a venial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be understood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the sin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had committed it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that aggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species, unless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or vow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point. Consequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into mortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must therefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially, because it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in itself, before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning mortally.

The reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either through the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden movements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in respect of things referred to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of order, by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher. Because the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is due to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the sudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the fact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the act of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as stated above (Q[74], A[10]); and that the human mind be out of order as regards things directed to the end, the due order of the end being safeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end are not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest place, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the appetite, as stated above (Q[10], AA[1],2, ad 3; Q[72], A[5]). Now, in the state of innocence, as stated in the [1941]FP, Q[95], A[1], there was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers were always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be no inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man were not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it is evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a venial sin, before committing a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same sense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is easily forgiven.

Reply to Objection 2: This vainglory which preceded man’s downfall, was his first mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into the outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by the desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for she gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention the precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.

Reply to Objection 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the original state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial sin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is incompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the first man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.

Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?

Objection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially. Because man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul which is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix in Evang.) that “man understands in common with the angels.” But man can commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an angel can commit a venial sin also.

Objection 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could love a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally. Therefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately, by sinning venially.

Objection 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial sins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like frivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a mortal sin to be venial as stated above [1942](A[3]), unless there is a special prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an angel can sin venially.

On the contrary, The perfection of an angel is greater than that of man in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the primitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.

I answer that, An angel’s intellect, as stated above in the [1943]FP, Q[58], A[3]; [1944]FP, Q[79], A[8], is not discursive, i.e. it does not proceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both separately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect considers a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its principles. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q[8], A[2]; Q[10], A[1]; Q[72], A[5]), ends are like principles, while the means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel’s mind is not directed to the means, except as they stand under the order to the end. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no inordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they have an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal sin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in subordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts are acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the other hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in subordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they sin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does not apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we have stated to be in them ([1945]FP, Q[63], A[4]; Q[64], A[2], ad 5).

Reply to Objection 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or intellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God, without, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last end, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem venial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to mortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on account of the end they have in view.

Whether the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality in unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that “there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who walk not according to the flesh”: and he is speaking there of the concupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom. 7). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of condemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by consenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But unbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is a matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins.

Objection 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): “Those who are not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the road of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh.” But damnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels the sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence, it seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are mortal sins.

Objection 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): “Man was so made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence.” Now this liability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which the unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an unbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he acts against his duty.

On the contrary, It is stated in Acts 10:34 that “God is not a respecter of persons.” Therefore he does not impute to one unto condemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not impute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither therefore does He impute them to unbelievers.

I answer that, It is unreasonable to say that the first movements of unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them. This is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself could not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above ([1946]Q[79], A[4]). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in believers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the sensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins. Secondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the person of the person never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as stated above ([1947]Q[73], A[10]). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in a believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of an unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their ignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: “I obtained the mercy of God, because I did it ignorantly in my unbelief”: whereas the sins of believers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace, according to Heb. 10:29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?”

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to original sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus Christ, although the “fomes” of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the fact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a sign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.

In this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a result of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such liability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.

Whether venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin, as stated above ([1948]Q[88], A[3]). Therefore in an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin exists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial together with original sin, and without mortal sins.

Objection 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection with mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an unbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin without committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin without committing a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is first able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that time, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal sin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible for the child to sin venially during that space of time, however short it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original sin alone and without mortal sin.

On the contrary, Man is punished for original sin in the children's limbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on (SS, Q[69], A[6]): whereas men are punished in hell for no other than mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be punished for venial sin with no other than original sin.

I answer that, It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with original sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is because before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of years hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin, wherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does anything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the use of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or mortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about then, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself to the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of original sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due end, and as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he will sin mortally, for through not doing that which is in his power to do.

Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him without mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to him through grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a necessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes disposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.

Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin alone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on account of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason can refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free from the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as possible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has discretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to himself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the intention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's affirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zech. 1:3): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you."

TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90–108)

OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose temptations we have spoken in the [1949]FP, Q[114]. But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.

Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

(2) Concerning the end of law;

(3) Its cause;

(4) The promulgation of law.

Whether law is something pertaining to reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I see another law in my members,” etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.

Objection 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above ([1950]Q[57]). Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.

Objection 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is evident from what has been said above ([1951]Q[9], A[1]). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law."

On the contrary, It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above ([1952]Q[17], A[1]). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.

I answer that, Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above ([1953]Q[1], A[1], ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules: and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."

Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above ([1954]Q[13], A[3];[1955] Q[76], A[1]) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.

Reply to Objection 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above ([1956]Q[17], A[1]): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.

Whether the law is always something directed to the common good?

Objection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.

Objection 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is directed to some particular good.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."

I answer that, As stated above [1957](A[1]), the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]). Consequently the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1.

Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.

Reply to Objection 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters.

Reply to Objection 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.

Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that “when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are a law to themselves.” Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.

Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), “the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue.” But every man can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.

Objection 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): “A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together with the Commonalty.”

I answer that, A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him. Hence the same text goes on: “Who show the work of the law written in their hearts.”

Reply to Objection 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3; [1958]SS, Q[64], A[3]). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.

Reply to Objection 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according to Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have properly the force of law.

Whether promulgation is essential to a law?

Objection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.

Objection 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since “laws are binding in matters of the future,” as the jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not essential to a law.

On the contrary, It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that “laws are established when they are promulgated.”

I answer that, As stated above [1959](A[1]), a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force.

Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.

Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man’s mind so as to be known by him naturally.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.

Reply to Objection 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that “lex [law] is derived from legere [to read] because it is written.”

OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is an eternal law?

(2) Whether there is a natural law?

(3) Whether there is a human law?

(4) Whether there is a Divine law?

(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?

(6) Whether there is a law of sin?

Whether there is an eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.

Objection 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.

Objection 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): “That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; [1960]AA[3],4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the [1961]FP, Q[22], AA[1],2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason’s conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.

Reply to Objection 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Rom. 4:17: “Who calls those things that are not, as those that are.” Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.

Reply to Objection 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

Reply to Objection 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively—that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end—except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.

Whether there is in us a natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that “the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly.” But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Objection 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above ([1962]Q[90], A[2]). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Objection 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 2:14: “When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law,” comments as follows: “Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above [1963](A[1]); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Ps. 4:6): “Offer up the sacrifice of justice,” as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: “Many say, Who showeth us good things?” in answer to which question he says: “The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above ([1964]Q[10], A[1]): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ([1965]Q[90], A[1]). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.

Whether there is a human law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above [1966](A[2]). Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.

Objection 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above ([1967]Q[90], A[1]). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

Objection 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: “The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.” Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

I answer that, As stated above ([1968]Q[90], A[1], ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above ([1969]Q[90], AA[2],3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law.”

Reply to Objection 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.

Reply to Objection 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.

Whether there was any need for a Divine law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above [1970](A[2]), the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above [1971](A[1]). Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above [1972](A[3]). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law.

Objection 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural law.

On the contrary, David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (Ps. 118:33): “Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord.”

I answer that, Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate to man’s natural faculty, as stated above ([1973]Q[5], A[5]), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God.

Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.

Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.

Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

And these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is said: “The law of the Lord is unspotted,” i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; “converting souls,” because it directs not only exterior, but also interior acts; “the testimony of the Lord is faithful,” because of the certainty of what is true and right; “giving wisdom to little ones,” by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

Reply to Objection 1: By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.

Reply to Objection 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently the comparison fails.

Whether there is but one Divine law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps. 46:8: “God is the King of all the earth.” Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Objection 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: “He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.” Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Objection 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): “The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law.” But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.

I answer that, As stated in the [1974]FP, Q[30], A[3], distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child “under a pedagogue”; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is “no longer under a pedagogue.”

Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated above ([1975]Q[90], A[2]). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (Ex. 3:8, 17). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Mat. 4:17): “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that “promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament.”

Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness [1976](A[4]): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Mat. 5:20: “Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Hence the saying that “the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind” (Sentent. iii, D, xl).

Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that “there is little difference [*The ‘little difference’ refers to the Latin words ‘timor’ and ‘amor’—‘fear’ and ‘love.’] between the Law and the Gospel—fear and love.”

Reply to Objection 1: As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.

Reply to Objection 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: “There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved.” Consequently the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of

Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.

Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no law of the “fomes” of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the “law is based on reason.” But the “fomes” of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the “fomes” has not the nature of a law.

Objection 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor, from not following the instigations of the “fomes”; but rather from his following them. Therefore the “fomes” has not the nature of a law.

Objection 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ([1977]Q[90], A[2]). But the “fomes” inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore the “fomes” has not the nature of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): “I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind.”

I answer that, As stated above [1978](A[2]; Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law, is called a law by participation, as stated above [1979](A[2]; Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly; thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.

Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them.”

So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the “fomes,” in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the “fomes” in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law become transgressors. But the “fomes” is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the “fomes” as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called “fomes” in so far as it strays from the order of reason.

OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?

Whether an effect of law is to make men good?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6 is “that which makes its subject good.” But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who “works it in us without us,” as we stated above ([1980]Q[55], A[4]) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good.

Objection 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good. Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good.

Objection 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ([1981]Q[90], A[2]). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is not the business of the law to make men good.

Objection 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the “intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens.”

I answer that, as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; AA[3],4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every subject consists in his being well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect to that particular government. In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above ([1982]Q[63], A[2]), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating them to good works."

Reply to Objection 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above ([1983]Q[63], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that “the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same as that of a good man.”

Reply to Objection 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens’ being good. For all it has in the nature of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular government.

Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in “command,” “prohibition,” “permission” and “punishment.” For “every law is a general precept,” as the jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other three are superfluous.

Objection 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good, as stated above [1984](A[1]). But counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command.

Objection 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so also is to reward.

Objection 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above [1985](A[1]). But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good: because “although a good deed may be done through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well,” as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore punishment is not a proper effect of law.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): “Every law either permits something, as: ‘A brave man may demand his reward’”: or forbids something, as: “No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage”: or punishes, as: “Let him that commits a murder be put to death.”

I answer that, Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law.

Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as stated above ([1986]Q[90], AA[1],2;[1987] Q[91], A[4]). Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above ([1988]Q[18], A[8]), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command, for “the law commands all acts of virtue” (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect of law.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.

Reply to Objection 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor. 7:12) says: “I speak, not the Lord.” Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law.

Reply to Objection 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish.

Reply to Objection 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so likewise, with delight and of one’s own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.

OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the “fomes,” suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.

Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:

(1) What is the eternal law?

(2) Whether it is known to all?

(3) Whether every law is derived from it?

(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?

(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?

(6) Whether all human things are subject to it?

Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God “made each thing according to its type.” Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.

Objection 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name in God, as stated in the [1989]FP, Q[34], A[1]: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): “We see a law above our minds, which is called truth.” But the law which is above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that “the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform.”

I answer that, Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the [1990]FP, Q[14], A[8]. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the [1991]FP, Q[103], A[5]. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the [1992]FP, Q[15], A[2]. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And things, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type of this order.

Reply to Objection 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father’s knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word.

Reply to Objection 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with things, since “an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality.” But the Divine intellect is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine intellect, as was stated in the [1993]FP, Q[16], A[1]. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.

Whether the eternal law is known to all?

Objection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), “the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.” But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) “the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly.” But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that “the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man.” But according to Ethic. i, “any man can judge well of what he knows.” Therefore the eternal law is not known to us.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that “knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us.”

I answer that, A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law:

and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according to Rom. 1:20: “The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly.

Reply to Objection 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to Job 12:11: “Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?” It is to this kind of judgment that the Philosopher alludes when he says that “anyone can judge well of what he knows,” by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true. In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.

Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the “fomes,” as stated above ([1994]Q[91], A[6]), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the “prudence of the flesh,” of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that “it cannot be subject to the law of God.” Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), “the eternal law is that, according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly.” But some laws are unjust, according to Is. 10:1: “Woe to them that make wicked laws.” Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that “the law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things which are punished by Divine providence.” But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above [1995](A[1]). Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.

On the contrary, Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): “By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above [1996](A[1]). Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law.

I answer that, As stated above ([1997]Q[90], AA[1],2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government is derived by secondary governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king’s command to his inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that “in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what man has drawn from the eternal law.”

Reply to Objection 1: The “fomes” has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above ([1998]Q[91], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the Lord God, according to Rom. 13:1.

Reply to Objection 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect equality with it.

Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the Divine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28,24, "shall be subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son, Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.

On the contrary, Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order to restrain them from evil, as explained above ([1999]Q[92], A[2]). Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.

I answer that, As stated above [2000](A[1]), the eternal law is the type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, which can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.

Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God’s will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since God’s will is His very Essence, it is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of God’s will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God’s will is said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type [ratio].

Reply to Objection 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.

The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to.

Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated above ([2001]Q[90], A[4]). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not.

Objection 2: Further, “Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason,” as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme type, as stated above [2002](A[1]). Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they are not subject to the eternal law.

Objection 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the eternal law.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 8:29): “When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits.”

I answer that, We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above ([2003]Q[1], A[2]). Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle of action.

Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him, so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature, according to Ps. 148:6: “He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away.” And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment.

Reply to Objection 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason does. And as the members of the human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account, being rational.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the [2004]FP, Q[22], A[2]. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above [2005](A[1]), hence the defects of natural things are subject to the eternal law.

Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): “If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law.” But the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to Rom. 8:14: “Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God.” Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): “The prudence [Vulg.: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God.” But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of God.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that “the eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of blessedness.” But those who are already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not under the eternal law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): “Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace of the universe is administered.”

I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above [2006](A[5]): first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal law, as stated above [2007](A[5]). But since the rational nature, together with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law, as stated above [2008](A[2]), it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law; for “we are naturally adapted to the recipients of virtue” (Ethic. ii, 1).

Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added motive of grace and virtue.

Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): “I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech. Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most suitable laws.”

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says that “he is under the law, who refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue.” In this way the spiritual man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Cor. 3:17): “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.”

Reply to Objection 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above ([2009]Q[85], A[2]) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the eternal law.

OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) What is the natural law?

(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?

(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?

(5) Whether it is changeable?

(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?

Whether the natural law is a habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), “there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and passion.” But the natural law is not one of the soul’s powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Objection 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the conscience or “synderesis is the law of our mind”; which can only apply to the natural law. But the “synderesis” is a habit, as was shown in the [2010]FP, Q[79], A[12]. Therefore the natural law is a habit.

Objection 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on [2011](A[6]). But man’s reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an act, but a habit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that “a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary.” But such is not the natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.

I answer that, A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For it has been stated above ([2012]Q[90], A[1], ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.

Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit of which we possess.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action, he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the like.

Reply to Objection 2: "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are the first principles of human actions.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is granted.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him habitually.

Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above ([2013]Q[92], A[2]). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.

Objection 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above ([2014]Q[90], A[1]). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law.

On the contrary, The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.

I answer that, As stated above ([2015]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, “Man is a rational being,” is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says “man,” says “a rational being”: and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, “Every whole is greater than its part,” and, “Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another.” But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension, is “being,” the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that “the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,” which is based on the notion of “being” and “not-being”: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9. Now as “being” is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so “good” is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that “good is that which all things seek after.” Hence this is the first precept of law, that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.” All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, “which nature has taught to all animals” [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

Reply to Objection 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.

Reply to Objection 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation.

Reply to Objection 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained under the law of reason.

Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above ([2016]Q[90], A[2]) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins.

Objection 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that “virtues are natural.” Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural law.

I answer that, We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the natural law. For it has been stated [2017] (A[2]) that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one’s reason naturally dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living.

Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.

Reply to Objection 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man—and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural crime.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.

Whether the natural law is the same in all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 2: Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in all men.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2018]AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for all.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."

I answer that, As stated above ([2019]AA[2],3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one’s country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).

Reply to Objection 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law, since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them. Wherefore Gratian, after saying that “the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel,” adds at once, by way of example, “by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done by.”

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.

Reply to Objection 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed according to reason.

Whether the natural law can be changed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on Ecclus. 17:9, “He gave them instructions, and the law of life,” the gloss says: “He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order to correct the law of nature.” But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Objection 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22:2); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself “a wife of fornications” (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be changed.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that “the possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law.” But these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): “The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary according to time, but remains unchangeable.”

I answer that, A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both by the Divine law and by human laws.

Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary principles, which, as we have said [2020](A[4]), are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of such precepts, as stated above [2021](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.

Reply to Objection 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on account of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: “The Lord killeth and maketh alive.” Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another’s wife; who is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the taking of another’s property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as stated in the [2022]FP, Q[105], A[6], ad 1.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all things in common and universal freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.

Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out.

Objection 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.

Objection 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out.

I answer that, As stated above ([2023]AA[4],5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men’s hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts of the natural law, in the way stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments which are unjust.

OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Its utility.

(2) Its origin.

(3) Its quality.

(4) Its division.

Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good thereby, as stated above ([2024]Q[92], A[1]). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame laws.

Objection 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), “men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice.” But animate justice is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.

Objection 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above ([2025]Q[90], AA[1],2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): “Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm.” But these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made.

I answer that, As stated above ([2026]Q[63], A[1];[2027] Q[94], A[3]), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment, is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.

Reply to Objection 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is perverted.

Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary, whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like.

Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference.” But those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.

Objection 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above ([2028]Q[94], A[4]). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the natural just is that which is equally valid everywhere.” If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for all: which is clearly false.

Objection 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But “it is not possible to give the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers,” as the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii): “Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the laws.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) “that which is not just seems to be no law at all”: wherefore the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above ([2029]Q[91], A[2], ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g. that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man": while some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.

Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.

Reply to Objection 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.

Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they see at once what is the best thing to decide.

Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations."

Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?

Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore’s description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): “Law shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common good.” Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions, saying that “law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common weal.” Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.

Objection 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying “honest” it was superfluous to add “just.”

Objection 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the definition of law that it is “according to the custom of the country.”

Objection 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both “necessary” and “useful.”

On the contrary, stands the authority of Isidore.

I answer that, Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above [2030](A[2]; Q[93], A[3]). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that it “foster religion,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be “helpful to discipline,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the nature law;

and that it “further the common weal,” inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.

All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he goes on to say that it should be “just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to place and time,” he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying “just”: secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, “adapted to place and time.” The remaining words, “necessary, useful,” etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that “necessity” refers to the removal of evils; “usefulness” to the attainment of good; “clearness of expression,” to the need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above ([2031]Q[90], A[2]), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether Isidore’s division of human laws is appropriate?

Objection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes the “law of nations,” so called, because, as he says, “nearly all nations use it.” But as he says, “natural law is that which is common to all nations.” Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural law.

Objection 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But “statutes, decrees of the commonalty, senatorial decrees,” and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws is not appropriate.

Objection 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems that, as this division includes “military law,” and “public law,” referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state.

Objection 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the “Cornelian” law, another the “Falcidian” law, etc.

On the contrary, The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices.

I answer that, A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from the law of nature, as explained above [2032](A[2]). In this respect positive law is divided into the “law of nations” and “civil law,” according to the two ways in which something may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above [2033](A[2]). Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according as each state decides on what is best for itself.

Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect human law may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are adapted to these men.

Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state, as shown above ([2034]Q[90], A[3]). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is “monarchy,” i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we have “Royal Ordinances.” Another form is “aristocracy,” i.e. government by the best men or men of highest rank; and then we have the “Authoritative legal opinions” [Responsa Prudentum] and “Decrees of the Senate” [Senatus consulta]. Another form is “oligarchy,” i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have “Praetorian,” also called “Honorary,” law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called “democracy,” and there we have “Decrees of the commonalty” [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the “Lords and Commons,” as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.).

Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the “Lex Julia” about adultery, the “Lex Cornelia” concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer.

Reply to Objection 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals.

The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.

OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?

(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?

(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?

(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?

(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?

(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law?

Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individual?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject of decrees,” which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for the community, but also for the individual.

Objection 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above ([2035]Q[90], AA[1],2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather for the individual.

Objection 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above ([2036]Q[90], AA[1],2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for individual cases.

On the contrary, The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that “laws should be made to suit the majority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case.”

I answer that, Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that “law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens.” Hence human laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that “the legal is that which originally was a matter of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer”: as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called “privileges,” i.e. “private laws,” as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters; and in regard to these, he adds, “and further, all particular acts of legislation.” Other matters are legal, not through being laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he adds “all matters subject to decrees.”

Reply to Objection 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above ([2037]Q[92], A[2], OBJ[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: “We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things” (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though at times and less frequently it fail.

Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?

Objection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that “laws were made in order that, in fear thereof, man’s audacity might be held in check.” But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils.

Objection 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices.

Objection 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above ([2038]Q[95], A[2]). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices.

On the contrary, We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: “It seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits these things, and that Divine providence punishes them.” But Divine providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them.

I answer that, As stated above ([2039]Q[90], AA[1],2), law is framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be “possible both according to nature, and according to the customs of the country.” Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are permitted to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are permissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man.

Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.

Reply to Objection 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one’s neighbor is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): “He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood”; and (Mat. 9:17) that if “new wine,” i.e. precepts of a perfect life, “is put into old bottles,” i.e. into imperfect men, “the bottles break, and the wine runneth out,” i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): “The law which is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it does.” Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything that is forbidden by the natural law.

Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above [2040](A[2]). Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above ([2041]Q[90], A[2]). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law "prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the acts of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the former, forbidding the latter."

I answer that, The species of virtues are distinguished by their objects, as explained above ([2042]Q[54], A[2];[2043] Q[60], A[1];[2044] Q[62], A[2]). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above ([2045]Q[90], A[2]) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common good—either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good—or mediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.

Reply to Objection 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue. Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end at which every lawgiver aims.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.

Whether human law binds a man in conscience?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience.

Objection 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the commandments of God. But sometimes God’s commandments are made void by human laws, according to Mat. 15:6: “You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition.” Therefore human law does not bind a man in conscience.

Objection 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on man, according to Is. 10:1 et seqq.: “Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of My people.” But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore human laws do not bind man in conscience.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 2:19): “This is thankworthy, if for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully.”

I answer that, Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal law whence they are derived, according to Prov. 8:15: “By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.” Now laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good—and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver—and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding in conscience, and are legal laws.

On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned above—either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory—or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to him—or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like are acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to Mat. 5:40,41: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will force thee one mile, go with him other two."

Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, "we ought to obey God rather than man."

Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1,2), all human power is from God . . ."therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters that are within its scope, "resisteth the ordinance of God"; so that he becomes guilty according to his conscience.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more grievous hurt.

Whether all are subject to the law?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just are not subject to the law.

Objection 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by the public law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom it is said (Rom. 8:14):

“Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.” Therefore not all men are subject to human law.

Objection 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.] that “the sovereign is exempt from the laws.” But he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are subject to the law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers.” But subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men should be subject to human law.

I answer that, As stated above ([2046]Q[90], AA[1],2; A[3], ad 2), the notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive power. Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator: and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is not subject to a power. In one way, by being altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign of another city or kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher law; thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the subject receives his orders from the emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed by that of a higher. In this way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a subject thereto in certain matters, in respect of which he is ruled by a higher law.

Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are not subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to the will: but the will of the good is in harmony with the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Wherefore in this sense the good are not subject to the law, but only the wicked.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion: for, in this way, “the law is not made for the just men”: because “they are a law to themselves,” since they “show the work of the law written in their hearts,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14,15). Consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked.

Reply to Objection 2: The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost. Nevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pet. 2:13: “Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God’s sake.”

Reply to Objection 3: The sovereign is said to be “exempt from the law,” as to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced by himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6: “To Thee only have I sinned,” a gloss says that “there is no man who can judge the deeds of a king.” But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own will, according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that “whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] says: ‘Obey the law that thou makest thyself.’” Moreover the Lord reproaches those who “say and do not”; and who “bind heavy burdens and lay them on men’s shoulders, but with a finger of their own they will not move them” (Mat. 23:3,4). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is expedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it according to time and place.

Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?

Objection 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31): “Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they must pass judgment not on them, but according to them.” But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver.

Objection 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter of the law.

Objection 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: for Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words.

I answer that, As stated above [2047](A[4]), every law is directed to the common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly. Hence the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now it happens often that the observance of some point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by directing his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common weal, which the lawgiver had in view.

Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law.

Reply to Objection 1: He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed.

Reply to Objection 2: He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according to the letter of the law, or consult those in power.

Reply to Objection 3: No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but should frame the law according to that which is of most common occurrence.

OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether human law is changeable?

(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?

(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law?

(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority?

Whether human law should be changed in any way?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above ([2048]Q[95], A[2]). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change.

Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human acts, as stated above ([2049]Q[90], AA[1],2). Therefore it should remain without change.

Objection 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as stated above ([2050]Q[95], A[2]). But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): “A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2051]Q[91], A[3]), human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.

On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): “If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the choice devolves to a few good men."

Reply to Objection 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above ([2052]Q[91], A[2]), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain particular precepts, according to various emergencies.

Reply to Objection 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.

Reply to Objection 3: In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.

Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better occurs?

Objection 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the same should apply to human laws.

Objection 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted.

Objection 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something better to occur for legislation.

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): “It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old.”

I answer that, As stated above [2053](A[1]), human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from some very great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.] that “in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered just.”

Reply to Objection 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto should be changed. But “laws derive very great force from custom,” as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently they should not be quickly changed.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or in a case of great urgency, as stated above. This answer applies also to the Third Objection.

Whether custom can obtain force of law?

Objection 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law and from the Divine law, as stated above ([2054]Q[93], A[3];[2055] Q[95], A[2]). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law.

Objection 2: Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so that the mere custom should obtain force of law.

Objection 3: Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to abolish the law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): “The customs of God’s people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God.”

I answer that, All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution. But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually declared; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.

Reply to Objection 1: The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): “Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason.”

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2056]Q[96], A[6]), human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however, the same reason remains, for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be that it is not "possible according to the custom of the country" [*[2057]Q[95], A[3]], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people.

Reply to Objection 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws, the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people: because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom.

Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the "common weal," as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man." Therefore it seems that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general law.

Objection 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows (Dt. 1:17): "You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the Divine law.

Objection 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not “foster religion,” nor be “helpful to discipline,” which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): “A dispensation is committed to me.”

I answer that, Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as explained above ([2058]Q[96], A[6]). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above ([2059]Q[96], A[6]). Consequently he who is placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If however he grant this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says (Lk. 12:42): “Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?”

Reply to Objection 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention of benefiting, the common good.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object of special favor.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts, however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private person to the public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose.

OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Old Law was good?

(2) Whether it was from God?

(3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?

(4) Whether it was given to all?

(5) Whether it was binding on all?

(6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?

Whether the Old Law was good?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written (Ezech. 20:25): “I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live.” But a law is not said to be good except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8, seqq.): “Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived; and I died.” Again he says (Rom. 5:20): “Law entered in that sin might abound.” Therefore the Old Law was not good.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts 15:10): “Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 7:12): “Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good.”

I answer that, Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods” (Ex. 20:17). Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way (Rom. 7): “I am delighted,” says he (verse 22), “with the law of God, according to the inward man”: and again (verse 16): “I consent to the law, that is good.”

But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that the end of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection of human law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which fulfilleth the law . . ."is spread abroad in our hearts" (Rom. 5:5): since "the grace of God is life everlasting" (Rom. 6:23). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (Jn. 1:17), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: "The law brought nothing to perfection."

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and judgments in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered all that opened the womb, for their offenses."

Reply to Objection 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 5:11): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the same sense when it is said that "the law entered in that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not final: in so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden.

Reply to Objection 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (Rom. 9:16): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, “but of God that showeth mercy.” Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): “I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart,” i.e. by giving me grace and charity.

Whether the Old Law was from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written (Dt. 32:4): “The works of God are perfect.” But the Law was imperfect, as stated above [2060](A[1]). Therefore the Old Law was not from God.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): “I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever.” But the Old Law does not continue for ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18): “There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.” Therefore the Old Law was not from God.

Objection 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, to Whom “none is like among the lawgivers” (Job 36:22).

Objection 4: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that God “will have all men to be saved.” But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated above [2061](A[1]). Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 15:6) while speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: “You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition.” And shortly before (verse 4) He had said: “Honor thy father and mother,” which is contained expressly in the Old Law (Ex. 20:12; Dt. 5:16). Therefore the Old Law was from God.

I answer that, The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says (Lk. 24:44): “All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning Me”: and (Jn. 5:46): “If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me.” Secondly, as a kind of disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by Whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 3:23): “Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that faith which was to be revealed.” Now it is evident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say “the same,” I mean that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to Christ, Who was to cast him out, according to Mat. 12:26: “If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is divided” [Vulg.: ‘he is divided against himself’]. Therefore the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, not simply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison with the condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence the Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): “The law was our pedagogue in Christ.”

Reply to Objection 2: Those works of God endure for ever which God so made that they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, “the law brought nothing to perfection”: hence he says (Gal. 3:25): “After the faith is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2062]Q[79], A[4]), God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give such a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. faith in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him insufficient aids to salvation.

Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?

Objection 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a “messenger”; so that the word “angel” denotes ministry, not lordship, according to Ps. 102:20,21: “Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His.” But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord: for it is written (Ex. 20:1): “And the Lord spoke . . . these words,” and further on: “I am the Lord Thy God.” Moreover the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God immediately.

Objection 2: Further, according to Jn. 1:17, “the Law was given by Moses.” But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written (Ex. 33:11): “The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend.” Therefore the Old Law was given by God immediately.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as stated above ([2063]Q[90], A[3]). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls: while the angels are the “ministering spirits,” as stated in Heb. 1:14. Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls.

On the contrary, The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the Law was “given [Vulg.: ‘ordained’] by angels in the hand of a Mediator.” And Stephen said (Acts 7:53): “(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of angels.”

I answer that, The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that “the gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels,” there is a special reason why the Old Law should have been given through them. For it has been stated ([2064]AA[1],2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which was to come through Christ. Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself exercises the principal and perfect acts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen who assist him under his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be given by the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old; because in the New Testament “God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son,” whereas in the Old Testament “the word was spoken by angels” (Heb. 2:2).

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef. chap. i), “the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who supported the effectual power of speaking.” Hence also it is that the angel spoke as personating the Lord.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated in Exodus that “the Lord spoke to Moses face to face”; and shortly afterwards we read, “Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not.” Hence he did not see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that “He spoke to him face to face,” this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision “face to face” means some kind of sublime and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence.

Reply to Objection 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it through others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the angels.

Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2065]AA[2],3). But that salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according to Is. 49:6: “It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of

Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth.” Therefore the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to one people only.

Objection 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34,35, “God is not a respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to Him.” Therefore the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another.

Objection 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated above [2066](A[3]). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written (Ecclus. 17:14): “Over every nation He set a ruler.” Also on all nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God than spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to all peoples.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:1,2): “What advantage then hath the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God were committed to them”: and (Ps. 147:9): “He hath not done in like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto them.”

I answer that, It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.

But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous, as is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25,26: “Did you offer victims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves.” Moreover it is stated expressly (Dt. 9:6): “Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art a very stiff-necked people”: but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: “That the Lord might accomplish His word, which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.”

What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16) that “to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, ‘And to his seeds,’ as of many: but as of one, ‘And to thy seed,’ which is Christ.” And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to that people, on account of the promised made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of whom Christ was to be born, should be signalized by a special sanctification, according to the words of Lev. 19:2: “Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy.” Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, viz. that Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written (Is. 41:2): “Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called him to follow him?”

It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung from them received the law; according to Dt. 4:36, 37: “Ye did [Vulg.: ‘Thou didst’] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them.” And if again it asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof; a fitting answer is given by Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): “Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not to err.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peoples; according to Rom. 9:4: “To whom,” namely the Jews, “belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the testament, and the giving of the Law . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh.”

Reply to Objection 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them according to personal merits, he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on the human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. viii): “All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not": for this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first parent.

Reply to Objection 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7: "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord."

Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the earth" (Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe the Law.

Objection 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law: for it is written (Dt. 27:26): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If therefore other men could be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men.

Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land." But it would have been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing the Law.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that the Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved without observing the Law.

I answer that, The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the Old

Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on save the Jewish people alone.

The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above [2067](A[4]), was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus clerics who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise religious are bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like manner this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:13): “Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God”: and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession, as appears from Dt. 26:3: “I profess this day before the Lord thy God,” etc.

Reply to Objection 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things to be observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto.

Reply to Objection 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is written (Dt. 4:8): “What other nation is there so renowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?” In like manner, from this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the laity, and the state of religious than that of folk living in the world.

Reply to Objection 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this.

Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation which was to come through Christ, as stated above ([2068]AA[2],3). But man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the "seed, which is Christ" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as related in Gn. 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham.

Objection 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a Mediator": ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains. Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given in this order of time.

I answer that, It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written law: and man was able to learn from experience that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices.

Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as a remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of sin" (Rom. 3:20). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom. 8:3,4), "what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us."

With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by habitual sinning.

Reply to Objection 2: A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a general precept, as stated above ([2069]Q[90], AA[2],3); wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that they should be given a law; for "slaves are not that part of the people or state to which it is fitting for the law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5).

Reply to Objection 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed, according to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?

(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?

(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?

(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?

(5) Whether it contains any others besides these?

(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.

Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above ([2070]Q[90], AA[2],3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): “If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” But this is only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): “All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets.” But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one commandment.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): “Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees”: where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises many commandments.

I answer that, Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and yet they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end.

Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordained thereto.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), “the end of the commandment is charity”; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or between man and God. Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of one’s neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor for God’s sake. Hence the Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one’s neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, “friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself,” in so far as man looks on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, “All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them,” this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”: so that it is an explanation of this commandment.

Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated above ([2071]Q[91], AA[4],5;[2072] Q[98], A[5]). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law.

Objection 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man’s assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things that are of faith, which are above reason. But man’s reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.

Objection 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be “the letter that killeth” (2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to Ps. 118:93: “Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life.” Therefore the moral precepts do not belong to the Old Law.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): “Moreover, He gave them discipline [Douay: ‘instructions’] and the law of life for an inheritance.” Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on Heb. 12:11: “Now all chastisement [disciplina],” etc., says: “Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties.” Therefore the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts.

I answer that, The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident fromEx. 20:13, 15: “Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal.” This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like”; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it is written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): “You shall be holy, for I am holy.” But the goodness of man is virtue, which “makes its possessor good” (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts of the Law.

Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto. For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man’s assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient, but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.

Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as stated above ([2073]Q[1], A[3]). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts.

Objection 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a virtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) “offers worship and ceremony to the Godhead.” Since, then, the moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as stated above [2074](A[2]), it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.

Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3,4), “of all signs employed by men words hold the first place.” Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13,14): “Ten words . . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall do.” But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral precepts there are others which are ceremonial.

I answer that, As stated above [2075](A[2]), the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love, but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is these works that are said to belong to the Divine worship. This worship is called “ceremony” [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word “ceremony” was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived from a town near Rome called “Caere”: since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially called ceremonial.

Reply to Objection 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters also.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2076]Q[91], A[3]), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts.

Reply to Objection 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes. Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to the ceremonial precepts.

Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, "I have not declined from Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts.

Objection 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to Ps. 93:15: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts.

I answer that, As stated above ([2077]AA[2],3), it belongs to the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly just as the determination of the universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts.

We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural law; "ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and “judicial” precepts, which are determinations of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12) after saying that the “Law is holy,” adds that “the commandment is just, and holy, and good”: “just,” in respect of the judicial precepts; “holy,” with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word “sanctus”—“holy”—is applied to that which is consecrated to God); and “good,” i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.

Reply to Objection 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the life we have to lead.

Reply to Objection 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This explains why sometimes “judgments” comprise both judicial and moral precepts, as in Dt. 5:1: “Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments”; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in Lev. 18:4: “You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts,” where “precepts” denotes moral precepts, while “judgments” refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs to the judicial precepts.

Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated above

([2078]Q[60], A[5]). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 11:1): “Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments.” Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above [2079](A[4]). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called “commandments.” [*The “commandments” (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.]

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Dt. 6:17): “Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: ‘He hath’] commanded thee.” Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises “testimonies.”

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): “Thy justifications (i.e. “Thy Law,” according to a gloss) I will never forget.” Therefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called “justifications.”

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): “These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you.” And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them.

I answer that, Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts. Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g. Dt. 6:4: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord”; and Gn. 1:1: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”: and these are called “testimonies.” Again it was necessary that in the Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Dt. 28: “If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly.

The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just—moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).

Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed by way of inducement and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in Ex. 22:26: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases. Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.

Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled "justifications," as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called "precepts" which God Himself prescribed; and those things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the very word seems to denote.

From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De

Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.

The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.

Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written (Dt. 10:12): “And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?” But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that “covetousness is the bane of charity.” Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6).

Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.

Objection 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked. But as stated in Eccles. 9:2, “all” temporal “things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices.” Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 1:19,20): “If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you.”

I answer that, As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now it has been said above ([2080]Q[98], AA[1],2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle (Phil. 3:13, 15): "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . . Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection.

Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: "He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him."

Reply to Objection 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means.

Reply to Objection 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But certain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with misfortunes—either because they had already become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried)—or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to Is. 29:13 (Mat. 15:8): “This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me.”

OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?

(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues?

(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?

(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?

(5) Their number;

(6) Their order;

(7) The manner in which they were given;

(8) Whether they are dispensable?

(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law?

(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?

(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;

(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?

Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): “Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law.

Objection 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals.

Objection 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which must be understood of things pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.

I answer that, The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above ([2081]Q[94], AA[2],4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith.

It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals; and since good morals are those which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must needs by derived in some way from natural reason; it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but not all in the same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things, to judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the Old Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: "I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.

Objection 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice.

Objection 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that “a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven.” But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts of virtue.

I answer that, Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common good, as stated above ([2082]Q[90], A[2]), the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).

But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God’s image. Wherefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other matters, which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.

Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to man should be subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.

Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first and principal precepts of the Law are, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” and “Thou shalt love thy neighbor,” as stated in Mat. 22:37,39. But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue.

Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day.” Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue.

Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.

On the contrary, The gloss on Mat. 5:11: “Blessed are ye when they shall revile you,” etc. says that “Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in detail.” Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be gathered at once from the first general principles: and those also which become known to man immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as principles in their proximate conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their principles.

Reply to Objection 1: Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.

Reply to Objection 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things of God, according to Ps. 45:11: “Be still and see that I am God.” In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept.

Reply to Objection 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law.

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me,” belongs to faith: and that which is added, “Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing,” etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.

Objection 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. “Honor thy father and thy mother,” and, “Thou shalt not kill.” But this, “I am the Lord thy God,” is affirmative: and that which follows, “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me,” is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): “I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say: ‘Thou shalt not covet.’” Hence it seems that this precept, “Thou shalt not covet,” is one precept; and, therefore, should not be divided into two.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev. 26:26, “Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven,” says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first being, “I am the Lord thy God”; the second, “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me,” (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on Osee 10:10, “On thy” [Vulg.: “their”] “two iniquities”); the third precept according to him is, “Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing”; and the fourth, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.” He states that there are six precepts pertaining to our neighbor; the first, “Honor thy father and thy mother”; the second, “Thou shalt not kill”; the third, “Thou shalt not commit adultery”; the fourth, “Thou shalt not steal”; the fifth, “Thou shalt not bear false witness”; the sixth, “Thou shalt not covet.”

But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written (Mat. 6:24), “No man can serve two masters,” the two statements, “I am the

Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth, "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.

Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their being worshipped as gods—for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related in Ex. 25:18—Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.

Reply to Objection 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that cometh to God, must believe that He is" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of faith.

Reply to Objection 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor his parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one precept saying that “Thou shalt not steal,” and another binding one to keep another’s property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different precepts about believing in God, and about not believing in strange gods.

Reply to Objection 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it were one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 5).

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso viii), is “a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven.” But sins are distinguished according as man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.

Objection 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.” Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine.

Objection 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: “The end of the commandment is charity.”

Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should there have been some precepts referring to children and other neighbors.

Objection 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, “Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal,” is distinct from the prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods,” and, “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife.” Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the sins of homicide and false witness.

Objection 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, “Thou shalt not covet.” Therefore the decalogue should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:13): “He shewed you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tablets of stone.”

I answer that, As stated above [2083](A[2]), just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave well to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who are his neighbors and live with him under God.

Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the first commandment, in the words “Thou shalt not have strange gods.” Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the second commandment, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.” Service is due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third commandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of all things.

To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one’s parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one’s neighbor—sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not kill”: sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, “Thou shalt not commit adultery”: sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, “Thou shalt not steal.” Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor”: harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, “Thou shalt not covet.”

The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to deeds; wherefore it is said, “Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing”: the second, to words; wherefore it is said, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain”: the third, to thoughts; because the sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In Ps. 32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of God and of one’s neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.

Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are those which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is written (Dt. 10:4): “He wrote in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you.” Hence the precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself and not another, man has, of necessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that everyone is free in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters; and, consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.

Reply to Objection 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this precept is given in Ex. 20:11: “In six days the Lord made heaven and earth,” etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (Is. 58:13): “If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the Lord glorious.” Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), “men swear by one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy.” Hence, since oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however, the words, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain,” are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds them thus: “Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature.”

Reply to Objection 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son’s debt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by denying it: since the father is the principle of generation and being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone except to one’s parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and “parents love their children as being a part of themselves,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue contains no ordinance as to man’s behavior towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving one’s children.

Reply to Objection 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good, are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire. But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed.

Reply to Objection 6: As stated above ([2084]Q[25], A[1]), all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but only of the concupiscible passions.

Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of one’s neighbor is seemingly previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according to 1 Jn. 4:20: “He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” But the first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.

Objection 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts. But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.

Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men’s actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “The things that are of God, are well ordered” [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God’]. But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above [2085](A[3]). Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.

I answer that, As stated above ([2086]AA[3],5, ad 1), the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers.

Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service to him.

As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which regards his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed, murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child; and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.

Reply to Objection 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on ([2087]SS, Q[25], A[1]; [2088]SS, Q[26], A[2]). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the others.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are sown, according to Ps. 33:15: “Turn away from evil, and do good,” and Is. 1:16,17: “Cease to do perversely; learn to do well”; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because “the crooked line is known by the straight” (De Anima i): and “by the law is the knowledge of sin” (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, since its transgression implies a less grievous sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of reason.

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third.

Objection 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth.

Objection 4: Further, the Old Law is called “the law of fear,” in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in each, and not only in the first and second.

Objection 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): “Write them in the tables of thy heart.” Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 11:21) that "God made all things, in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in formulating His Law.

I answer that, The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written (Dt. 4:6): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.

Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if it is not black, it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another, which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.

Reply to Objection 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination, "Thou shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason in each case.

Reply to Objection 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added to the precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by entering into a compact with the demons.

Reply to Objection 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts.

Reply to Objection 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law, wherefore this precept needed a special admonition.

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above ([2089]Q[96], A[6];[2090] Q[97], A[4]). Therefore a dispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue.

Objection 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our superiors are God’s viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:10): “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.” Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.

Objection 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.

Objection 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this precept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): “And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him.” Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.

On the contrary, are the words of Is. 24:5, where some are reproved for that “they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant”; which, seemingly, apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation.

I answer that, As stated above ([2091]Q[96], A[6];[2092] Q[97], A[4]), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted, such as this—that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account of some greater utility.

Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle that “justice should be preserved.” But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to apply in certain cases.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), “God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself.” But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another.

Reply to Objection 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man’s property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.

Consequently when the children of Israel, by God’s command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of marriage.

Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to any determination by application to individual actions—for instance, that this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not—in this point they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects.

Reply to Objection 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Mat. 12:3, seqq.).

Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it is commanded (Dt. 26:20) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.

Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.

Objection 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept of the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): "Serve ye the Lord with gladness"; and (2 Cor. 9:7): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is done in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law.

On the contrary, No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8). Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of virtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept.

I answer that, As stated above ([2093]Q[90], A[3], ad 2), a precept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently situated as to the appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that appear," according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, according to Ps. 7:10: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God."

Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii. The first is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what a man does in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable.

The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from choice, choosing that particular action for its own sake"; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have spoken above (QQ[8], 12): and concerning these two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine law does, according to Mat. 5:22: "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment."

The third point is that he should “act from a firm and immovable principle”: which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety.

Reply to Objection 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not that they be done from the habit of justice.

Reply to Objection 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to the end.

Reply to Objection 3: That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one’s neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as pleasure ensues from a habit; for “pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For an act may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming habit.

Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law. For it is written (Mat. 19:17): “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments”: whence it seems to follow that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.

Objection 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): “Do all to the glory of God.” Therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept.

Objection 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.

On the contrary, Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it follows that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.

I answer that, Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept; and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind: because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept.

Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it, viz. “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” and “Thou shalt love thy neighbor.” In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not impossible to observe this precept which regards the act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues, i.e. inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is “the end of the commandment,” as stated in 1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above ([2094]Q[12], A[4]) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true in saying that the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, “Honor thy father,” does not mean that a man must honor his father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not break this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not say, “If thou wilt enter into life, keep one commandment”; but “keep” all “the commandments”: among which is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue of the precept, “Honor thy father and mother,” but in virtue of the precept, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.” And since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the law without grace.

Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord declared (Mat. 22:40), “on these two commandments” of charity “dependeth the whole law and the prophets.” But these two commandments are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral precepts.

Objection 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But the determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained in the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above [2095](A[3]). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue.

Objection 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues, as stated above [2096](A[2]). Therefore, as the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides those of the decalogue.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:8): “The law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls.” But man is preserved from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral precepts.

I answer that, As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99], AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of these there are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident as to need no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as stated above [2097](A[3]), which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron.

But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among you anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead.” The second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine (Dt. 13). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: “Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man”; and likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to Lev. 19:16: “Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor”: likewise the prohibition against hating one’s brother (Lev. 19:17): “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.” To the sixth commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about whoredom, according to Dt. 23:17: “There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel”; and the prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,23: “Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast.” To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, according to Dt. 23:19: “Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury”; and the prohibition against fraud, according to Dt. 25:13: “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag”; and universally all prohibitions relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against false judgment, according to Ex. 23:2: “Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against lying (Ex. 23:7): "Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction, according to Lev. 19:16: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a whisperer among the people." To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds of evil desires.

Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently.

Reply to Objection 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral precepts.

Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as stated above ([2098]Q[90], A[2]). And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear from Dt. 20:3, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said (Dt. 21:20) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings."

Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man. Because the Apostle says (Rom. 2:13): “For not the hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified.” But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): “Keep My laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them.” But the spiritual life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.

Objection 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): “The letter killeth”: which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did not cause justice.

I answer that, Just as “healthy” is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were, it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), “even the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ.”

But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense justification is nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated ([2099]Q[63], A[4]). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2: “If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God.” Hence this justice could not be caused by moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice.

If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in various ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at offering worship to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in itself, but by being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either in general or also in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained that which is just in itself according to that “general justice” which is “every virtue” according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts belonged to “special justice,” which is about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man and another.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution of justice.

Reply to Objection 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this passage (Gal. 3:12).

Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about that justice which is before God.

OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;

(2) Whether they are figurative?

(3) Whether there should have been many of them?

(4) Of their various kinds.

Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining to the worship of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because, in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food (Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts”; and again (Num. 15:38): “To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments.” But these are not moral precepts; since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine worship.

Objection 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the “cerei” [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other things besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to the Divine worship.

Objection 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the same as the Latin “salve.” But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only those that pertain to the worship of God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial.

Objection 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason. But there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the Passover and of the

Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 18:19,20): “Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the ceremonies and the manner of worshipping.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2100]Q[99], A[4]), the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The reason for their being so called was given above ([2101]Q[99], A[3]), when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts.

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and food of God’s worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a king make use of certain special observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.

Reply to Objection 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick were furnished with “oil of olives,” as stated in Lev. 24:2. Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so that all ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of solemnities.

Reply to Objection 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the point, since the word “ceremony” is not Greek but Latin. We may say, however, that, since man’s salvation is from God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which direct man to God:

and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts.

Reply to Objection 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial precisely because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine worship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on [2102](A[2]), the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.

Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the framing of a law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of something, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signified.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above [2103](A[1]). Therefore they should not be figurative.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that “God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity.” But the precepts of faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative.

Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” But a figure is not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not be figurative.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): “Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come.”

I answer that, As stated above [2104](A[1]; Q[99], AA[3],4), the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God; the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” And as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship. Now interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are applied in various ways to the Divine worship.

For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Is. 51:3: “Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise.”

But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8). Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law this way is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds as something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1): “The Law has [Vulg.: ‘having’] a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things”: for a shadow is less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the Old.

Reply to Objection 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need of signs by means of sensible figures.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above.

The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of God.

Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?

Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above ([2105]AA[1],2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now “there is but one God, of Whom are all things . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things” (1 Cor. 8:6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.

Objection 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts 15:10): “Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?” Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man’s salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man’s salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number.

Objection 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above [2106](A[2]). But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to worship God “in spirit and in truth,” as stated in Jn. 4:23. Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.

On the contrary, (Osee 8:12): “I shall write to them [Vulg.: ‘him’] My manifold laws”; and (Job 11:6): “That He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2107]Q[96], A[1]), every law is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated above ([2108]Q[95], A[1]); some, inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and improved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand to devise many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order that being burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the service of idols. As to those who were inclined to good, it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified by various ceremonies.

Reply to Objection 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, when one is not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of

Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18,19): "There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number.

Reply to Objection 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial precepts.

Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person. Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii). Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols.

Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies.

Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and "sacraments."

Objection 3: Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above [2109](A[1]). Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies.

Objection 4: Further, “observances” are so called from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it is written (Dt. 8:11): “Observe [Douay: ‘Take heed’] and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and judgments and ceremonies.” Therefore the “observances” should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies.

Objection 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16,17): and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem to be inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is unsuitable.

On the contrary, In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24): “They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require.” Of the sacrament of Order it is written (Lev. 7:35): “This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies.” Of sacred things also it is written (Ex. 38:21): “These are the instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies of the Levites.” And again of the observances it is written (3 Kings 9:6): “If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not observe [Douay: ‘keep’] My . . . ceremonies which I have set before you.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2110]AA[1],2), the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship consists specially in “sacrifices,” which are offered up in honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the “sacred things,” such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard to the worshippers two points may be considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the ministers; and to this the “sacraments” refer. The second point is their particular mode of life, whereby they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the “observances,” for instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He sanctified “the people by His own blood” (Heb. 13:12). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united.

Reply to Objection 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to the Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things.

Reply to Objection 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of observances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.

Reply to Objection 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn festivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): “Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices.”

OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?

(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative?

(3) The causes of the sacrifices;

(4) The causes of the sacrifices;

(5) The causes of the sacred things;

(6) The causes of the observances.

Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, “Making void the law of the commandments,” the gloss says, (i.e.) “making void the Old Law as to the carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, which are based on reason.” But if the observances of the Old Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.

Objection 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save that man’s obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 6,13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man’s obedience, having no reason in themselves.

Objection 3: Further, man’s works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts: for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:9): “The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes.” But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause.

I answer that, Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a “wise man to do everything in order,” those things which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the

Apostle states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, which is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since those things that happen by chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9. Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written (Dt. 4:6): “This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.” Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered.

Reply to Objection 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are reasonable from the very nature of the act.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil: and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as much as it signified something. And so also the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation to something else.

Reply to Objection 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, “Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal.” But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above.

Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts, the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because each was given as a sign. For it is written (Gn. 17:11): “You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you”: and of the celebration of the Passover it is written (Ex. 13:9): “It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes.” Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts have none but a figurative reason.

Objection 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above ([2111]Q[101], A[2]). Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause.

Objection 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be offered, and other such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the precepts of the Old Law.

On the contrary, Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1 Cor. 10:11) that “all (these things) happened to them in figure.” Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative, there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes.

I answer that, As stated above [2112](A[1]), the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical:

whether they be taken from Christ Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical sense.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in order to convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits, on account of which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order of literal causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebration of the Passover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with Abraham, we assign the literal cause.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the purpose of worshipping God then and there.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws ([2113]Q[96], AA[1] ,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment of those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause.

Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained to sacrifices?

Objection 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs no such sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered to God.

Objection 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more noble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not only of these three should sacrifices have been offered to Him.

Objection 3: Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes. Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices.

Objection 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded to be offered, so also should the young of the turtledove.

Objection 5: Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from Gn. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us (Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies “a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God.”

Objection 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.).

Objection 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God, it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal.

Objection 8: Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): “Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?” It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder.

Objection 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds should not be offered up in peace-offerings.

Objection 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other peace-offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq.

Objection 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should have been offered up for all sins.

Objection 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes of flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron.

Objection 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that besides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to God.

Objection 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27): “My spirit is sweet above honey.” Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 1:13): “The priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor to the Lord.” Now according to Wis. 7:28, “God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom”: whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes.

I answer that, As stated above [2114](A[2]), the ceremonies of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended for Divine worship; and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause.

For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that whatever he has is from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his having received them from God, according to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): “All things are Thine: and we have given Thee what we received of Thy hand.” Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that God is the first principle of the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to be directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end in any other; for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God, according to Ex. 22:20: “He that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord.” Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf: as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): “I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and sacrifices.”

Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; wherefore it is written (Jn. 3:16): “God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ Himself “delivered Himself . . . to God for an odor of sweetness” (Eph. 5:2). And for this reason all the other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice—the imperfect forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the Old Law “often” offered “the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but” Christ offered “one sacrifice for sins, for ever.” And since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore the reasons of the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him on account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He stood in need of them: wherefore it is written (Is. 1:11): “I desire not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs and buckgoats.” But, as stated above, He wished them to be offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the right ordering of man’s mind to God; and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made use of them in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling) considered it abominable to slay these animals, wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their gods. Hence it is written (Ex. 8:26): “We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God.” For they worshipped the sheep; they reverenced the ram (because demons appeared under the form thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by them as something sacred.

Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man’s mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is chiefly by means of these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals are either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially were offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise. Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals represented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev. 1, “We offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity.” And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and simplicity of heart.

Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, “Christ is offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to foreshadow His headship; and in the goat, to signify the likeness of ‘sinful flesh’ [*An allusion to Col. 2:11 (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the two natures”; or else the turtledove signified chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity. “The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water of Baptism.”

Reply to Objection 3: Fish through living in water are further removed from man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the temple like other animals.

Reply to Objection 4: Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God but what is best.

Reply to Objection 5: The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, forasmuch as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made fit for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death on account of his sins; as though those animals were slain in man’s stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of Christ.

Reply to Objection 6: The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), “the Law chose that manner of slaying which was least painful to the slain animal.” This excluded cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals slain.

Reply to Objection 7: It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice to God: and for this reason too they were forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer “the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God.” For the same reason they did not offer animals before the seventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on account of its exceeding softness.

Reply to Objection 8: There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called “a holocaust, i.e. all burnt.” For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God specially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole was burnt up: so that as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so it might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of God, and should be offered to Him.

Another sacrifice was the “sin-offering,” which was offered to God on account of man’s need for the forgiveness of sin: and this typifies the state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part was burnt; while the other was granted to the use of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was offered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction for sin: for if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same as if it had not been offered.

The third kind of sacrifice was called the “peace-offering,” which was offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be received: and this typifies the state of those who are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into three parts: for one part was burnt in honor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests; and the third part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify that man’s salvation is from God, by the direction of God’s ministers, and through the cooperation of those who are saved.

But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar (Lev. 9:9,10). The reason for this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat of the victims, according to Dt. 32:38: “Of whose victims they eat the fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings.” Secondly, in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:4,5): “Flesh with blood you shall not eat: for I will require the blood of your lives”: and they were forbidden to eat the fat, in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is written (Ezech. 34:3): “You have killed that which was fat.” Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most necessary for life, for which reason “life” is said to be “in the blood” (Lev. 17:11, 14): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding of Christ’s blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He offered Himself to God for us.

In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent a certain kind of divination which is known as “spatulamantia,” so called because it was customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade [spatula], and the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things were taken away from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest’s need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people—this was signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty—and this was signified by the right shoulder.

Reply to Objection 9: Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against his will, hence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty flight, while befitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is doleful.

Reply to Objection 10: The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the sacrifice (Lev. 7:6, 15). The third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the "ex-voto" peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is bound to God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins he has committed; thirdly, because of the benefits he has already received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from Him.

Reply to Objection 11: Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sinner, as stated above ([2115]Q[73], A[10]): wherefore different victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of some other private individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very base animal, was offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince."

Reply to Objection 12: In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a four-footed animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.

The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the "living bread" (Jn. 6:41, 51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron.

Reply to Objection 13: The products of the soil are useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine was offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells sweetly and binds easily together.

Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace of Christ; salt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer.

Reply to Objection 14: Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols.

Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh.

Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of a good name: for incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice “of jealousy” did not proceed from devotion, but rather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein (Num. 5:15).

Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to holy things?

Objection 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For Paul said (Acts 17:24): “God Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands.” It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God.

Objection 2: Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law. Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple.

Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship requires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many.

Objection 4: Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by means of veils.

Objection 5: Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should have been built so as to point to the east rather than the west.

Objection 6: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4) that they should “not make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything.” It was therefore unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the candlestick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there without reasonable cause.

Objection 7: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:24): “You shall make an altar of earth unto Me”: and again (Ex. 20:26): “Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar.” It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps. For it is written (Ex. 27:1,2): “Thou shalt make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and thou shalt cover it with brass”: and (Ex. 30:1, 3): “Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold.”

Objection 8: Further, in God’s works nothing should be superfluous; for not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found. But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz. curtains, curtains of goats’ hair, rams’ skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins (Ex. 26).

Objection 9: Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate things.

Objection 10: Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): “I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth.” But the solemn festivals were instituted for the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to holy things.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that those who “offer gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was answered to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the pattern which was shown thee on the mount.” But that is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies relating to holy things had a reasonable cause.

I answer that, The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that man may give worship to God. Now man’s tendency is to reverence less those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced by their subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess vaster and more beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special ministers to be appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God.

In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above [2116](A[2]; Q[100] , A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows something should be determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, certain special points had to be observed in matters pertaining to the worship of God.

Reply to Objection 1: The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who is worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped, is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men, who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together with the thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that certain things relating to the excellence of

Christ’s Divine or human nature might be signified by the arrangement of various details in such temple or tabernacle.

To this Solomon refers (3 Kings 8:27) when he says: “If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I have built” for Thee? And further on (3 Kings 8:29, 20) he adds: “That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou mayest hearken to the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel.” From this it is evident that the house of the sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might be made known there by means of things done and said there; and that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more devoutly, so as to be heard more readily.

Reply to Objection 2: Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was effected in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition of the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the people were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged in various wars with the neighboring nations; and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one of great peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the place which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is written (Gn. 22:2) that the Lord commanded Abraham to “offer” his son “for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show thee”: and it is related further on (Gn. 22:14) that “he calleth the name of that place, The Lord seeth,” as though, according to the Divine prevision, that place were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is written (Dt. 12:5,6): “You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and victims.”

Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not built until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the literal reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple.

The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, signifies the state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, signifies the state of future life which is altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future state. Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the New Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the exclusion of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief in the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one place only. Another reason was in order to show that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained from offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained, is of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and temples is permitted in the New Law.

As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there were, even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed for the people to gather together for the praise of God; just as now there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather together for the divine worship. Thus our church takes the place of both temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby is signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant.

Reply to Objection 4: Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are subject to God, and from which we arise to the worship of God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called the “Holy of Holies,” and was placed to the west; the other was called the “Holy Place” [*Or ‘Sanctuary.’ The Douay version uses both expressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are two reasons for this distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of God. Because the different parts of the world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was called the Holy of Holies signified the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances: while that part which is called the Holy Place signified the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four different colors (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying water, because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it has the color of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed of the four elements is a veil between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, i.e. the Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught that man’s final perfection consists in his entering into that (higher) world: whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered every day: whereas the people were only admitted to the court; because the people were able to perceived material things, the inner nature of which only wise men by dint of study are able to discover.

But regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the Old Law, as the Apostle says (Heb. 9:6, seqq.): because into that tabernacle “the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices.” But the inner tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this was signified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened the concealing of the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. that of linen, to designate purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signifying the twofold love of God and our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With regard to the state of the Old Law the people and the priests were situated differently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices which were offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided from the court by a veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the people, while they were known to the priests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New Testament (cf. Eph. 3:5).

Reply to Objection 5: Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to the exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to the sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written (Ezech. 8:16) that certain men "had their backs towards the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the rising of the sun." Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that they might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first tabernacle was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to Ps. 67:5: "Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name."

Reply to Objection 6: Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in connection with the divine worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signified the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three things, viz. "the ark of the testament in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had blossomed, and the tables" (Heb. 9:4) on which were written the ten commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between two "cherubim" that looked one towards the other: and over the ark was a table, called the "propitiatory," raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it were held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this reason it was called the "propitiatory," as though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers of the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three things denote three things in that higher world: namely, God Who is above all, and incomprehensible to any creature.

Hence no likeness of Him was set up; to denote His invisibility. But there was something to represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath God, as the seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that higher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are at peace with one another, according to Job 25:2: “Who maketh peace in . . . high places.” For this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken the multitude of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to worship but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever takes place in this world, just as in every cause are enclosed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the types of the works of his craft. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means of the three things it contained, the three things of greatest import in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the testament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or else these three things signified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna—both by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through the goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was preserved as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three things were represented in Isaias’ vision. For he “saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated”; and the seraphim standing by; and that the house was filled with the glory of the Lord; wherefrom the seraphim cried out: “All the earth is full of His glory” (Is. 6:1, 3). And so the images of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first commandment; but as a sign of their function, as stated above.

The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained three things, viz. the “altar of incense,” which was directly opposite the ark; the “table of proposition,” with the twelve loaves of proposition on it, which stood on the northern side; and the “candlestick,” which was placed towards the south. These three things seem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in the ark; and they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly: because, in order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary to express them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The altar of incense signified the office of the priest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was signified also by the rod: because on that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to God: for it is written (Apoc. 8:3) that the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the "justifications of the saints" (cf. Apoc. 19:8). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator between God and the people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His government, i.e. the holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the manna did: but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was placed to the north: because the south is the right-hand side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on the left, according to Prov. 3:16: "In her left hand (are) riches and glory." And the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual wisdom; because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed.

Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness of the Law, wherefore it is written (Ex. 24:12): "I will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that thou mayest teach them" to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood of Aaron; wherefore it is written (Num. 17:10): "Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious children of Israel." The manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the children of Israel in the desert; wherefore it is written (Ex. 16:32): "Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith I fed you in the wilderness." The candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being well lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven planets, wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the south; because for us the course of the planets is from that quarter. The altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a sweet-smelling smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. The table was place there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their food in the temple: wherefore, as stated in Mat. 12:4, it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on the table in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory, in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of the moon, wherefore it is written (Jer. 7:18): “The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven.”

In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed were offered to God: and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present in the court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. And this altar was put up outside the tabernacle and in the court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed altars inside the temples to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols.

The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed therein. Now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various figures were instituted in the temple to betoken Christ. For He was foreshadowed by the “propitiatory,” since He is “a propitiation for our sins” (1 Jn. 2:2). This propitiatory was fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written (Heb. 1:6): “Let all the angels of God adore Him.” He is also signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made of setim-wood, so was Christ’s body composed of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna, i.e. “all the fulness of the Godhead” (Col. 2:9). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: for “He was made a . . . priest for ever” (Heb. 6:20). And therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified by the candlestick, for He said Himself (Jn. 8:12): “I am the Light of the world”; while the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in the table, because He is our spiritual food, according toJn. 6:41, 51: “I am the living bread”: and the twelve loaves signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify the Church’s teaching, and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense. Because all works of virtue must be offered to us to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the body, which are offered, as it were, on the altar of holocausts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ, by the spiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to Heb. 13:15: “By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God.”

Reply to Objection 7: The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was at the beginning of the Law (Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the Lord commanded them to make “an altar of earth,” or at least “not of hewn stones”; and again, not to make the altar high, so as to make it necessary to “go up” to it “by steps.” This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles made their altars ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord commanded (Dt. 16:21): “Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God”: since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was also a figurative reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature of flesh, as regards His humanity—and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we must confess His equality with the Father—and this is “not to go up” to the altar by steps.

Moreover we should not couple the doctrine of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness.

But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be conspicuous to all the people; and the altar of incense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so precious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry.

Since, however, the reason for the precept, “Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar” (Ex. 20:26) is stated to have been “lest thy nakedness be discovered,” it should be observed that this too was instituted with the purpose of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake of decency: so that without any danger the altar could be placed so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but movable.

Reply to Objection 8: The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors, viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle; and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins; and over this there was another covering of rams’ skins dyed red; and over this there was a third curtain made of goats’ hair, which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle on the outside. The literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle, that it might be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned with various stars; the curtain (of goats’ skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity.

The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of Christ, who compose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colors: because the faithful are inwardly adorned with the four virtues: for “the twisted linen,” as the gloss observes, “signifies the flesh refulgent with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions; the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of God and our neighbor." The coverings of the building designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of life, signified by the violet colored skins: and who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of goats' hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the gloss observes.

Reply to Objection 9: The literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence, being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification signified the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed.

Reply to Objection 10: Under the Old Law there were seven temporal solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from Num. 28, 29. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast of an abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every week. This was the solemnity of the "Sabbath," celebrated in memory of the work of the creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the "New Moon," was repeated every month, and was observed in memory of the work of the Divine government. For the things of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the moon; wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human race; and hence they were repeated more frequently.

The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially on that people. For there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month to commemorate the blessing of being delivered out of Egypt. The feast of "Pentecost" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving of the Law. The other three feasts were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month was the feast of “Trumpets,” in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of invitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast of “Expiation,” in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave the people’s sin of worshipping the calf. After this was the feast of “Scenopegia” or of “Tents,” which was kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of being protected and led by God through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this feast they had to take “the fruits of the fairest tree,” i.e. the citron, “and the trees of dense foliage” [*Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: ‘Boughs of thick trees’], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant, “and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook,” which retain their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that God had brought them through the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On the eighth day another feast was observed, of “Assembly and Congregation,” on which the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and the peace granted to them in the Land of promise.

The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, Who is the “Lamb of God,” according to Heb. 13:8: “Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the same for ever.” The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by Christ, as stated in Heb. 4. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by Christ’s preaching and miracles. The feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching of the apostles. The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins: and the feast of Tabernacles signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly or Congregation foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as “most holy” (Lev. 23:36). These three feasts followed immediately on one another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue, until they come to see God, as stated in Ps. 83:8.

Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since it is written (Dt. 12:31): “Thou shalt not do in like manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all the abominations which the Lord abhorreth.” Now worshippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding of blood: for it is related (3 Kings 18:28) that they “cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood.” For this reason the Lord commanded (Dt. 14:1): “You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead.” Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed by the Law (Lev. 12:3).

Objection 2: Further, those things which are done for the worship of God should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to Ps. 34:18: “I will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: ‘strong’] people.” But it seems to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was unfittingly commanded (Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the Paschal lamb “in haste.” Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were prescribed, which seem altogether unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the sacrament of the Eucharist, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed.” Therefore there should also have been some sacraments of the Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so forth.

Objection 4: Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily thing is reputed impure, because all bodies are God’s creatures; and “every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving” (1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection.

Objection 5: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 34:4): “What can be made clean by the unclean?” But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. Heb. 9:13] which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: for it is stated (Num. 19:7, seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean “until the evening”; likewise he that burnt her; and he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders.

Objection 6: Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin by means of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of the people that the priest should confess the sins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might carry them away into the wilderness: while they were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of purification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies with water (Lev. 16).

Objection 7: Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in Lev. 14.

Objection 8: Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Lord ordered (Ex. 30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the temple; and that He commanded (Num. 8:7) the Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of their flesh.

Objection 9: Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the higher and lower priests, as stated in Lev. 8 [*Cf. Ex. 29], and the Levites, according to Num. 8, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations.

Objection 10: Further, as stated in 1 Kings 16:7, “Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.” But those things that appear outwardly in man are the dispositions of his body and his clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to the higher and lower priests, as related in Ex. 28 [*Cf. Lev. 8:7, seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone should be debarred from the priesthood on account of defects in the body, as stated in Lev. 21:17, seqq.: “Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God . . . if he be blind, if he be lame,” etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were unreasonable.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 20:8): “I am the Lord that sanctify you.” But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is written (Ps. 103:24): “Thou hast made all things in wisdom.” Therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification of man.

I answer that, As stated above ([2117]Q[101], A[4]), the sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some way, to depute them to the worship of God. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole people; but in a special way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these sacraments of the Old Law, certain things concerned the whole people in general; while others belonged to the ministers.

In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be established in the state of worshipping God: and this institution was brought about—for all in general, by circumcision, without which no one was admitted to any of the legal observances—and for the priests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those things that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no uncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from Ex. 12:43, seqq.: and, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition and of other things that were allotted to the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship, viz. of uncleannesses. And then, as to the people, certain purifications were instituted for the removal of certain external uncleannesses; and also expiations from sins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted.

And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God for the time being, and figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we shall see by taking them one by one.

Reply to Objection 1: The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham was the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rom. 4:9, seqq.) thus: “He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith which he had, being uncircumcised”; because, to wit, we are told that “unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice,” for the reason that “against hope he believed in hope,” i.e. against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, “that he might be made the father of many nations,” when he was an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this declaration, and imitation of Abraham’s faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh such a sign as they could not forget, wherefore it is written (Gn. 17:13): “My covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant.” This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child is very tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore neither are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign of circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest the parents, whose love for their children increases as they become used to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their children from circumcision. A second reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in that member. A third motive may have been to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the body. The Lord’s prohibition extended only to the cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not the circumcision of which we have been speaking.

The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be brought about by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the dead. And since all corruption of guilt and punishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our first parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the generative member. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): “You are circumcised” in Christ “with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of” Our Lord Jesus “Christ.”

Reply to Objection 2: The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by celebrating this banquet they declared that they belonged to that people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring that they were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the ram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger of extermination which threatened the Egyptians.

Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed them to go forth speedily, as related in Ex. 12:33; and there was danger that anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians. Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it could not be leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to depart"; and to eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone thereof, because in their haste there was no time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written: "You shall gird your reins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste": which clearly designates men at the point of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the command: "In one house shall it be eaten, neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house": because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could not send any gifts of it.

The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to 1 Cor. 5:7: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, which ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on the transoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion we are delivered from sin and death, according to 1 Pet. 1:18: "You were . . . redeemed . . . with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." The partaking of its flesh signified the eating of Christ's body in the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify Christ's Passion or charity. And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's body, according to 1 Cor. 5:8: "Let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins, which is required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet are the examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was commanded that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles of heretics.

Reply to Objection 3: Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written (Col. 2:11,12): “You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of” Our Lord Jesus “Christ: buried with Him in Baptism.” In the New Law the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds to all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no corresponding sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of fulness had not yet come, since “the Law brought no man [Vulg.: ‘nothing’] to perfection” (Heb. 7:19). The same applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate preparation for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been paid. Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ with the Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 4: As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship: which worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations, and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereby men were said to be polluted, for instance, by idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were purified by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in general, or also for the sins of individuals; not that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they signified that expiation of sins which was to be effected by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the Redeemer, while taking part in the figurative sacrifices.

The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as existing in man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes, dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean things. Anything proceeding from man was reputed unclean that was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and consequently since death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption of the humors, which break out externally and infect other persons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, again, women suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly course or at the time of conception); and, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to nocturnal pollution, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves some unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever.

Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence due to those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: and in order that by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them. For since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with greater reverence and humility. Moreover, in some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping God through fear of coming in contact with lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed. All these bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which were more grievous, by some sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question.

The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of heretical doctrine: both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false as not to have some truth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the healthy parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the uncleanness of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies the uncleanness of empty words, for “the seed is the word of God.” The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies the uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in another’s sin, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: “Go out from among them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the unclean thing.”

Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any way by an unclean man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was contracted not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her periods. The mystical sense of this was that “to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike” (Wis. 14:9).

There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; so, too, through some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy, whereby a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean: both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because the Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses, where this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in order to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written

(Num. 19:15): “The vessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean.” The cause of this uncleanness was that anything unclean might easily drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command aimed at the prevention of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered vessels in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call “Janae.”

The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment denoted the wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has neither cover nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline.

Reply to Objection 5: As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness in the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body; and this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was more easily expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin, and signifies sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling of a certain water, of which water we read in Num. 19. For there God commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, according to Osee 4:16: “Israel hath gone astray like a wanton heifer”: and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom of Egypt, according to Osee 10:5: “(They) have worshipped the kine of Bethaven.” And in detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show that this sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, “the priest” dipped “his finger in her blood,” and sprinkled “it over against the door of the tabernacle seven times”; for the number seven signified universality. Further, the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out, but was collected together, and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either because God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all that was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow was burnt "with her skin and her flesh, her blood and dung being delivered to the flames." To this burning were added "cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed," to signify that just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color, and hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, and for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: "That they may be reserved for the multitude of the children of Israel." Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the four elements are indicated here: for "cedar-wood" was added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its earthiness; "hyssop," to signify the air, on account of its smell; "scarlet twice dyed," to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are taken out of the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both "he that burned her," and "he that gathered up the ashes," and "he that sprinkled the water" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that whatever was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From this uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of uncleanness, because otherwise the process would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely.

The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified Christ in respect his assumed weakness, denoted by the female sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the "red cow was of full age," because all Christ's works are perfect, "in which there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had "not carried the yoke," because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Him for transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered "to Eleazar the priest," because Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated "without the camp," because Christ "suffered outside the gate" (Heb. 13:12). And the priest dipped "his finger in her blood," because the mystery of Christ's Passion should be considered and imitated.

It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in token either of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of Christ should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should be understood spiritually; for the "skin" and "flesh" signified Christ's outward works; the "blood" denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His external deeds; the "dung" betokened His weariness, His thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness. Three things were added, viz. "cedar-wood," which denotes the height of hope or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of humility or faith; "scarlet twice dyed," which denotes twofold charity; for it is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning were gathered by "a man that is clean," because the relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were not guilty of Christ's death. The ashes were put into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's Passion the power of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes, were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel will be converted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end of this life.

Reply to Objection 6: As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings. Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating such sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28), “the Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity,” it behooved the priest first of all to offer a calf for his own sins, in memory of Aaron’s sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust, which signified that the priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he offered two he-goats for the people: one of which was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated, its blood was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled with it; to signify that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of sins. They were not, however, burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was prescribed that they should be burnt without the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped in desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to them; but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Israel: as though that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment of the people’s sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the forgiveness of the people’s sins was signified by its being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened.

The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power; and by the ram, because He is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of “the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people: since both those of high and those of low degree are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into the Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion. Their bodies were burnt without the camp, because "Christ suffered without the gate," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 13:12). The scape-goat may denote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going to another place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which we ought to cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue.

With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned (ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer.

Reply to Objection 7: The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words of Lev. 14:3, seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that is to be purified": consequently, the leper was already healed: but he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest restored him to the society of men and to the worship of God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the priest erred in his judgment.

Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first purification the leper who sought to be cleansed offered for himself "two living sparrows . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop," in such wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped into the blood of the other sparrow which was "immolated . . . over living waters." These things he offered as an antidote to the four defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a living sparrow was offered up against numbness; and scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let loose to fly away into the plain, because the leper was restored to his former liberty.

On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored to the society of men; but only after having shaved all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives them an evil smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, “and on the thumb of his right hand, and the great toe of his right foot”; because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of the disease; and living waters, to wash away the filth.

The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in likeness of His human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ’s Passion. The other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living, because the Godhead cannot die: hence it flew away, for the Godhead could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow, together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e. faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the man to be cleansed is moistened with some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words; and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters pertaining to this purification, or to that also of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to other sacrifices, whether for sins or for trespasses.

Reply OBJ 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers by some special purification or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be separated from other men, as being specially deputed, rather than others, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in their consecration or institution, was with a view to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity. Hence three things were done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned [*'Ornabantur.' Some editions have 'ordinabantur'—'were ordained': the former reading is a reference to Lev. 8:7–9] and consecrated; thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to be purified by washing in water, and by certain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as stated in Lev. 8 (cf. Num. 8).

With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was performed as follows. First, when they had been washed, they were clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed on the head with the oil of unction: to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him on to others, just as oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of the body; according to Ps. 132:2: "Like the precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron." But the Levites received no other consecration besides being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for them. The lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial animal, to denote that they should be obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their right ear); and that they should be careful and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening of the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, in memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their consecration the following sacrifices were offered: a calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; a ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram of consecration, which was a peace-offering, in memory of the delivery form Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people.

In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were placed on their hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to the Lord: while the Levites were initiated to the ministry by being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary.

The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should be first of all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ's Passion, which is a sacrifice both of expiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body, i.e. all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with the sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry.

Reply to Objection 10: As already stated [2118](A[4]), the purpose of the Law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in two ways; first, by excluding from the worship of God whatever might be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all that seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the animals to be sacrificed, much more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect: since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same reason it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast manner from any family, but according to their descent from one particular stock, thus giving them distinction and nobility.

In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. This indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight vestments. First, he had a linen tunic. Secondly, he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed "little bells" and "pomegranates of violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed." Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and on his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, made of the same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven the names of the children of Israel, in token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and that it was his duty ever to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord commanded the "Doctrine and Truth" to be put in the rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth were written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color according to the various things which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they call the "Truth and Doctrine." Fifthly, he wore a belt or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen. Seventhly, there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name. Eighthly, there were "the linen breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness," when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the lesser priests had four, viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara.

According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; as though the high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it is written (Wis. 18:24): "In the robe" of Aaron "was the whole world" described. For the linen breeches signified the earth out of which the flax grows. The surrounding belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet tunic denoted the air by its color: its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its many colors, signified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have been placed on the rational because in heaven, are the types [rationes] of earthly things, according to Job 38:33: "Dost thou know the order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified the empyrean: the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the universe.

The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various vices and sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: he must not be lame, i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have “a little, or a great, or a crooked nose,” i.e. that he should not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even exercise some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should have “a broken foot” or “hand,” i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have a swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: ‘if he be crook-backed’]: by which is signified too much love of earthly things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by carnal affections: for running of the eyes is caused by a flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had “a pearl in his eye,” i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation that he is clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected “if he have a continued scab,” i.e. lustfulness of the flesh: also, if he have “a dry scurf,” which covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeliness of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is rejected “if he have a rupture” or hernia; through baseness rending his heart, though it appear not in his deeds.

The vestments denote the virtues of God’s ministers. Now there are four things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests needed four other things in addition to these. First, a continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was signified by the golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the shortcomings of the people: this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: because his doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace.

Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:4), “every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving.” It was therefore unfitting that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according to Lev. 11 [*Cf. Dt. 14].

Objection 2: Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also are herbs: wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): “As the green herbs have I delivered all” flesh “to you.” But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being unclean, although some are most harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither should any animals have been prohibited as being unclean.

Objection 3: Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is engendered from blood.

Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28; cf. Lk. 12:4), that those should not be feared “that kill the body,” since after death they “have no more that they can do”: which would not be true if after death harm might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less therefore does it matter to an animal already dead how its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said, Ex. 23:19: “Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam.”

Objection 5: Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord (Ex. 13). Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in Lev. 19:23: “when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision [*’Praeputia,’ which Douay version renders ‘first fruits’] of them,” i.e. the first crops, and they “shall be unclean to you, neither shall you eat of them.”

Objection 6: Further, clothing is something extraneous to man’s body. Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden to the Jews: for instance (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts”: and (Dt. 22:5): “A woman shall not be clothed with man’s apparel, neither shall a man use woman’s apparel”: and further on (Dt. 22:11): “Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of woolen and linen together.”

Objection 7: Further, to be mindful of God’s commandments concerns not the body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed (Dt. 6:8, seqq.) that they should “bind” the commandments of God “as a sign” on their hands; and that they should “write them in the entry”; and (Num. 15:38, seqq.) that they should “make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . . . they may remember . . . the commandments of the Lord.”

Objection 8: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9) that God does not “take care for oxen,” and, therefore, neither of other irrational animals. Therefore without reason is it commanded (Dt. 22:6): “If thou find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird’s nest in a tree . . . thou shalt not take the dam with her young”; and (Dt. 25:4): “Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn”; and (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind.”

Objection 9: Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been made about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed (Lev. 19:19): “Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds”; and (Dt. 22:9, seqq.): “Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds”; and: “Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together.”

Objection 10: Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to debar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed in the commandment of the Law (Dt. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set forth in Dt. 23:13, that they should “dig round about and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased of.”

Objection 11: Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one’s friends: wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing (Tob. 1:20, seqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests (Lev. 21).

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:14): “But thou art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God”: from which words we may gather that these observances were instituted by God to be a special prerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause.

I answer that, The Jewish people, as stated above [2119](A[5]), were specially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests themselves were specially set apart for that purpose. And just as other things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some particular way so that they be worthy of the worship of God; so too in that people’s, and especially the priests,’ mode of life, there needed to be certain special things befitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: “All these things happened to them in figures.” Consequently the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways, first according to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, according as they foreshadow something touching the Christian mode of life.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[5], ad 4,5), the Law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the soul was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of the first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read (Mat. 15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man”: which words are explained (Mat. 15:17) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against obedience or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some refrain from wine and flesh-meat.

If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, either because like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their life is among unclean surroundings: thus certain animals, like moles and mice and such like, live underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell; or because their flesh, through being too moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence they were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and in like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet, because such are very fierce and their flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the same reason they were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity. In like manner certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the like. They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals the humors are well absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they too earthly, which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, of which the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another reason was detestation of idolatry: because the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols, or employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A[3], ad 2). The third reason was to prevent excessive care about food: wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily and promptly.

With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those of any animals whatever without exception. Blood was forbidden, both in order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood, as stated above (A[3], ad 8); and in order to shun idolatrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather together around it for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded the blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth (Lev. 17:13). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood of these animals would not be separated from the body: or because this form of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord wished to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through being used to be kind to beasts. They were forbidden to eat the fat: both because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used to be burnt in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex. iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in Gn. 32:32, where it is stated that “the children of Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of” Jacob’s “thing and it shrank.”

The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals signified certain sins, in token of which those animals were prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): “If the swine and lamb be called in question, both are clean by nature, because all God’s creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain signification. Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean considered in the nature of the sound, letters and syllables of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is clean, the other unclean.” The animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of the two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins signify the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual cleanness. Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden: in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small birds, signifies those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture, which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight among themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or those who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which, though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight God's cause, and at the same time are taken up with worldly business. The owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, denotes those who are clever in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which flies both in the air and swims in the water, signifies those who are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong to prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under water, denotes the glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as the stork: it signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of others, as with snakes. The swan is bright in color, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water: it may denote those who seek earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak, and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it is a figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life. The coot [*Douay: 'porphyrion.' St. Thomas' description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another.] has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it swims like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only when it bites, since it dips all its food in water: it is a figure of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the water of his own will. The heron [*Vulg.: 'herodionem'], commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed blood" (Ps. 13:3). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed from the Vulgate: 'charadrion'; 'charadrius' is the generic name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those who are unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge, seek none but earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have been introduced after the deluge; for it is written (Gn. 9:3): “Even as the green herbs have I delivered . . . all” flesh “to you.” The reason for this was that the eating of the products of the soil savors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and over-careful living. For the soil gives birth to the herb of its own accord; and such like products of the earth may be had in great quantities with very little effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful to bring His people back to a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those things that are produced by the soil. Another reason may be that animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil were not.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 4: Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of heartlessness if the dam’s milk, which was intended for the nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. It might also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence (Ex. 23) after the solemnities to be celebrated under the Law had been foretold, it is added: “Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam.” The figurative reason for this prohibition is this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of “the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3), was not to be seethed, i.e. slain, by the Jews, “in the milk of its dam,” i.e. during His infancy. Or else it signifies that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by flattery.

Reply to Objection 5: The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose of secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean: for in that country nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from seed, or from a graft, or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and the Law considered what happened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered to God: and from the fifth year onward they were eaten.

The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting from Abraham to David, the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), the Fruit of the Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on account of their imperfection.

Reply to Objection 6: It is said of a man in Ecclus. 19:27, that "the attire of the body . . ." shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished from other nations, not only by the sign of the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain difference of attire. Wherefore they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel, or vice versa, for two reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover in the worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in the worship of Venus men donned women's attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust: because the employment of various materials in the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform other duties of men: or that man should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman.

Reply to Objection 7: As Jerome says on Mat. 23:6, “the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments, so that the Israelites might be distinguished from other nations.” Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the very sight of this sign reminded them of their law.

When we read: “Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: ‘they shall be and shall move between thy eyes’], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes”: whereas the intention of the Lord in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that they should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify the godly intention which should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be said that, because they were a carnal-minded and stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law.

Reply to Objection 8: Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man’s affection be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man’s power, according to Ps. 8:8: “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet”: and it is in this sense that the Apostle says that “God has no care for oxen”; because God does not ask of man what he does with oxen or other animals.

But if man’s affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity is caused by the afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is possible for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it is written (Prov. 11:10): “The just regardeth the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are cruel.” Consequently the Lord, in order to inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals, and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He prohibited them to “boil a kid in the milk of its dam”; and to “muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn”; and to slay “the dam with her young.” It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up children: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young.

As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to show detestation for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets, which produce various effects, and on various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. The second reason was in condemnation of unnatural sins. The third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because animals of different species do not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things. Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed as stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes from such sights.

The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth the corn, i.e. from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states (1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young: because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses, i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the Law. It is also forbidden that beast of burden, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any connection, with animals of another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews.

Reply to Objection 9: All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in worshipping the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals and garments, in order to represent the various connections of the stars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice.

They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: “Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds,” is to be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. Likewise “the field,” i.e. the Church, must not be sown “with different seeds,” i.e. with Catholic and heretical doctrines. Neither is it allowed to plough “with an ox and an ass together”; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man in preaching, for one would hinder the other.

Reply to Objection 10: [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden (Dt. 7) not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which idols were made, were anathematized as hateful in God’s sight. This is clear from the same chapter, where we read further on (Dt. 7:26): “Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou become an anathema like it.” Another reason was lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were inclined. The other precept (Dt. 23) about covering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air wholesome; and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after expressing the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: “For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy [i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear therein.” The figurative reason for this precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the fetid excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to Ps. 31:1: “Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered.” Or else according to a gloss, that we should recognize the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of self-examination.

Reply to Objection 11: Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the temple, should not “incur an uncleanness at the death” of anyone except of those who were closely related to them, viz. their father or mother, and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however nearly related to him. They were also forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has been put away," or any other than a virgin: both on account of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage: and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be avoided when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not to make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head and beard, wherefore it is written (Bar 6:30): "Priests sit in their temples having their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven." Moreover, in worshipping their idols "they cut themselves with knives and lancets" (3 Kings 18:28). For this reason the priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the contrary.

The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should not shave their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom; nor rend their garments or cut their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism.

OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?

(2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?

(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ?

Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated above ([2120]Q[101], A[4]). But sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written (Gn. 4:3,4) that "Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord," and that "Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of their fat." Noe also "offered holocausts" to the Lord (Gn. 18:20), and Abraham did in like manner (Gn. 22:13). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law.

Objection 2: Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the Law. For we read (Gn. 13:18) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an altar to the Lord"; and (Gn. 28:18) that "Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.

Objection 3: Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears from Gn. 17. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn. 14:18) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God." Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law.

Objection 4: Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q[100], 2, A[6], ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written (Gn. 7:2,3): "Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:1): "These are the precepts and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach you." But they would not have needed to be taught about these things, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said ([2121]Q[101], A[2]; [2122] Q[102] , A[2]), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the divine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our relations with our neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial precepts, as stated above ([2123]Q[99], A[4]). Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority, but ordained by human reason; so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according to the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed also by other things that they did, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." Therefore there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal ceremonies, because they were not as yet established by legislation.

Reply to Objection 1: The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from Him, and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all.

Reply to Objection 2: They also established certain sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship.

Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 7:20) that circumcision was "not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence before the Law by human appointment, for the Law allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn.

Reply to Objection 4: The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written (Gn. 9:3): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it was considered illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by any law, but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake of them in others.

Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation from sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written (Ex. 39:21) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (Lev. 16:16) that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated “the sanctuary from the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and . . . their sins.” Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification.

Objection 2: Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justification, according to Ps. 10:8: “The Lord is just and hath loved justice.” But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to Lev. 10:19: “How could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?” Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification.

Objection 3: Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to Ps. 18:8: “The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls.” But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated in Lev. 14. Much more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2) [*The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: ‘If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.’]: “If there had been a law given which could justify [Vulg.: ‘give life’], Christ died in vain,” i.e. without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not confer justice.

I answer that, As stated above ([2124]Q[102], A[5], ad 4), a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power to cleanse: because they were ordered by the Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:13) that "the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing of the flesh." And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than the soul, so also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before (Heb. 9:10) justices of the flesh: "justices of the flesh," says he, "being laid on them until the time of correction."

On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, "Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world" (Jn. 1:29). And since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently they could not cleanse from sin: thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:4) that "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away"; and for this reason he calls them (Gal. 4:9) "weak and needy elements": weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy, i.e. from the fact that they do not contain grace within themselves.

However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written (Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin "the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him,” as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must be observed, however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure of that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ.

It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification.

Reply to Objection 1: That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, “to the cleansing of the flesh,” as the Apostle states (Heb. 9:13) in token of that sanctification whereby “Jesus” sanctified “the people by His own blood” (Heb. 13:12). Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated.

Reply to Objection 2: The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed; not by reason of the things considered in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed: hence it is written (Lev. 14:3,4) that the priest, “going out of the camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be purified to offer,” etc.; whence it is evident that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment, the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water “on which” the priest had “heaped curses,” as stated in Num. 5:19–27.

Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written (Bar 4:1): “This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever.” But the legal ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to last for ever.

Objection 2: Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has been cleansed, to make this offering (Mat. 8:4). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ’s coming.

Objection 3: Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes, inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased.

Objection 4: Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham’s faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as state above ([2125]Q[102], A[4], ad 10; A[5], ad 1). But Abraham’s faith is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other Divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:16,17): “Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come”: and (Heb. 8:13): “In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end.”

I answer that, All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above ([2126]Q[101], AA[1],2). Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them—in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed.

In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving and voice of praise" (Is. 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed (Apoc. 21:22): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately, therefore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present.

Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed.

Reply to Objection 2: The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is consummated" (Jn. 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ "the veil of the temple was rent" (Mat. 27:51). Hence, before Christ's Passion, while Christ was preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but was not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies.

Reply to Objection 3: The literal reasons already given ([2127]Q[102]) for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come, both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto.

Reply to Objection 4: The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed in God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham’s faith by means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the saying of the Apostle (Col. 2:11, 12): “You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.”

As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the “Lord’s Day,” which recalls the beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of Christ’s Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to the feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast of All Hallows.

Whether since Christ’s Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that since Christ’s Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were “endued with power from on high” (Lk. 24:49). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (Acts 16:3) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at the advice of James, “took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving notice of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of them.” Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church complied with this observance; for it is stated (Gal. 2:12) that, “when” certain men “had come” to Antioch, Peter “withdrew and separated himself” from the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ’s Passion without committing mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts 15:28,29): “It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication.” Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ’s Passion without committing mortal sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): “If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ’s fruit. Therefore since Christ’s Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies.

I answer that, All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now, though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them was it said: “Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son,” where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she “conceived and bore.” In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 16), who says: “It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in which Christians share, are the actual representation."

Reply to Objection 1: On this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii, 11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time previous to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them. But immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only by a kind of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however, is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed them without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health's sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumcision.

But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz. from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them.

Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality.

The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that there is a difference between these rites. For heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God as a figure of Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews, of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: because in the canonical Scripture (viz. Gal. 2:11), wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." Consequently it is true that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the Gentiles.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a mystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech. 44:31 ("The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts."

But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have been forbidden more than the others.

We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that “not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man” (Mat. 15:11); and that “nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving” (1 Tim. 4:4). With regard to fornication a special prohibition was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful.

OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?

(2) Whether they are figurative?

(3) Their duration;

(4) Their division.

Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial precepts take their name from “judgment.” But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor.

Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above ([2128]Q[99], A[4]). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.

Objection 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one’s neighbor, as stated above ([2129]Q[99], A[4];[2130] Q[101], A[1]). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel, of which we have already spoken ([2131]Q[102], A[6], ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.

On the contrary, It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of a good and just man, that “he hath executed true judgment between man and man.” But judicial precepts are so called from “judgment.” Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between man and man.

I answer that, As is evident from what we have stated above ([2132]Q[95], A[2] ;[2133] Q[99], A[4]), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called “moral” precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man’s subordination to God, they are called “ceremonial” precepts: but when they refer to man’s relations to other men, they are called “judicial” precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man’s relations to other men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.

Reply to Objection 1: Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding force from the mere dictate of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law.

Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the judicial and ceremonial precepts.

Objection 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.

Objection 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are above our reason, as stated above ([2134]Q[101], A[2], ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should not have been figurative.

On the contrary, The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21).

I answer that, A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: “All . . . things happened to them in figure.”

Reply to Objection 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.

Reply to Objection 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative.

Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever.

Objection 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) that "there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Now this is true of the ceremonial precept, which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:9,10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that "the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer in force.

I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force:

but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.

The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above [2135](A[2]). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come.

Reply to Objection 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind.

Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also.

Reply to Objection 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also.

Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.

Objection 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial precepts.

Objection 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have no distinct division.

On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.

I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is directed.

Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.

Reply to Objection 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above ([2136]Q[100], A[3]): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them.

Reply to Objection 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law.

OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers;

(2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;

(3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;

(4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.

Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), “the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler.” But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: firstly (Ex. 18:21): “Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc.; again (Num. 11:16): “Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel”; and again (Dt. 1:13): “Let Me have from among you wise and understanding men,” etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people.

Objection 2: Further, “The best gives of the best,” as Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God rules the world from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed (Dt. 17:14,15): “When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him,” etc.

Objection 3: Further, according to Mat. 12:25: “Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate”: a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this have been introduced even by Divine authority; as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite (3 Kings 11:29, seqq.).

Objection 4: Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb. 5:1; so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore in like manner certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in Ex. 23:8: “You shall not [Vulg.: ‘Neither shalt thou’] take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just.”

Objection 5: Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He established a tyrannical law; for it is written (1 Kings 8:11): “This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons,” etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision with regard to the institution of rulers.

On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order (Num. 24:5): “How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents.” But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers.

I answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the “kingdom,” where the power of government is vested in one; and “aristocracy,” which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers.

Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for it is written

(Dt. 1:15): “I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and appointed them rulers”: so that there was an element of aristocracy. But it was a democratical government in so far as the rulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written (Ex. 18:21): “Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people; wherefore it is written (Dt. 1:13): “Let me have from among you wise [Vulg.: ‘able’] men,” etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the Law.

Reply to Objection 1: This people was governed under the special care of God: wherefore it is written (Dt. 7:6): “The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people”: and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray (Num. 27:16): “May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude.” Thus by God’s orders Josue was set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God “raised . . . up a saviour” for the people, and that “the spirit of the Lord was” in them (Judges 3:9, 10, 15). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from Dt. 17:15: “Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose.”

Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel (1 Kings 8:7): “They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them.”

Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the manner of election from the very beginning (Dt. 17:14, seqq.): and then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord’s decision; and that they should not make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they are set over, and consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, He prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually read and ponder on God's Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their subjects: namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not depart from the paths of justice.

Reply to Objection 3: The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions, specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written (Osee 13:11): "I will give thee a king in My wrath"; and (Osee 8:4): "They have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not."

Reply to Objection 4: The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine worship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again, as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On the other hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole people; wherefore they had their own possessions, from which to derive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make too much show of magnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising from such things, and because, if the rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it would not tempt the ambition of the common people; and would not become an occasion of sedition.

Reply to Objection 5: That right was not given to the king by Divine institution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right, by framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. This is clear from the context that follows: "And you shall be his slaves [Douay: ‘servants’]”: which is significative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as though they were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them from asking for a king; since the narrative continues: “But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel.” It may happen, however, that even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may take many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal.

Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of one man with another?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. Because men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law: since it is written (Dt. 23:24): “Going into thy neighbor’s vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest.” Therefore the Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man’s peace.

Objection 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written (Num. 27:8): “When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter.” Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision for the welfare of the people.

Objection 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying and selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28). Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command.

Objection 4: Further, man’s needs require that men should be ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the pledges: hence it is written (Ecclus. 29:10): “Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause.” And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed (Dt. 15:2): “He to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord”; and (Ex.

22:15) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written (Dt. 24:10): “When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge”; and again (Dt. 24:12,13): “The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him presently.” Therefore the Law made insufficient provision in the matter of loans.

Objection 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed in such matters: hence it is stated in 2 Mac. 3:15 that “the priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things given to be kept, that He would preserve them safe, for them that had deposited them.” But the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard to deposits: since it is prescribed (Ex. 22:10,11) that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in this matter.

Objection 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard prescription (Lev. 19:13) that “the wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning.”

Objection 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting that the Law (Dt. 17:8,9) should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters.

Objection 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated (Dt. 19:15) that “in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand.”

Objection 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written (Dt. 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain faults: for it is written (Ex. 22:1) that the thief “shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.” Moreover, certain slight offenses are severely punished: thus (Num. 15:32, seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and (Dt.

21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions, viz. because “he gave himself to revelling . . . and banquetings.” Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner.

Objection 10: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), “Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, indemnity, prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery.” Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. “Indemnity,” as when a thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. “Prison,” as when (Num. 15:34) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned. “Stripes”; thus (Dt. 25:2), “if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before them.” “Public disgrace” was brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she took “off his shoe from his foot, and” did “spit in his face” (Dt. 25:9). It prescribed the “death” penalty, as is clear from (Lev. 20:9): “He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die.” The Law also recognized the “lex talionis,” by prescribing (Ex. 21:24): “Eye for eye, tooth for tooth.” Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments, viz. “exile” and “slavery.”

Objection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable in punishing them (Ex. 21:29): “If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a woman,” it “shall be stoned”: and (Lev. 20:16): “The woman that shall lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same.” Therefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one man with another were unsuitably regulated by the Law.

Objection 12: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is unfittingly prescribed (Dt. 21:1, 4) that “when there shall be found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the murder . . . the ancients” of the nearest city “shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground, and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off the head of the heifer.”

On the contrary, It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps. 147:20) that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them."

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected under the guidance of those in authority: others are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever is subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between one man and another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand, the power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess: and consequently their dealings with one another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For it established judges, as is clearly indicated in Dt. 16:18: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates . . . that they may judge the people with just judgment." It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to Dt. 1:16,17: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger: there shall be no difference of persons." It also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Dt. 16:19). It prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state farther on (ad 10).

But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly granted to others by the will of the possessors. These three points were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions themselves were divided among individuals: for it is written (Num. 33:53,54): "I have given you" the land "for a possession: and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the regularity of possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is written (Num. 33:54): “To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser.” A second remedy was that possessions could not be alienated for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be succeeded by their next of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father’s brother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. 36:6.

Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care of them; for it was prescribed (Dt. 22:1–4): “Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy brother’s ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother,” and in like manner as to other things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a friend’s vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and fruit, should be left behind for them (Lev. 19:9; Dt. 24:19). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in Ex. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4.

Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Dt. 14:28,29): “The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled.” And there was a transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual relations of one man with another.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8), “he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law”: because, to wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in 1 Jn. 3:17: “He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?” Hence the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others readily: thus the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich “to give easily and to communicate to others.” Now a man does not give easily to others if he will not suffer another man to take some little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it should be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor’s vineyard, to eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one another.

Reply to Objection 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father’s estate except in default of male issue: failing which it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due caution in the matter, by providing that those women who succeeded to their father’s estate, should marry within their own tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in Num. 36:7,8.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or nation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states, “that anyone should sell his possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss.” For if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that while provision was made for men’s needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the same time the said danger was removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The reason for this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes.

But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other hand, houses situated not in a town, but "in a village that hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription in regard to both (Lev. 25).

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another's assistance: because this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more frequent and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in Dt. 15:7, seqq. Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they should be restored at once. For it is written (Dt. 23:19): "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and (Dt. 24:6): "Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath pledged his life to thee": and (Ex. 22:26): "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding them to be importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:25): "If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too, it is enacted (Dt. 24:10,11): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath": both because a man's house is his surest refuge, wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law does not allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least. Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it was probable that those who could conveniently pay their debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender without cause. But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was for renewing the loan on account of their need.

As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they were hired for a consideration: because they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender would have gained something by the loan which would no longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a consideration: because then the owner received a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated.

Reply to Objection 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held in deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what was left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to take an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an animal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for less negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of theft.

Reply to Objection 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded wisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich: nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed (Dt. 16:18) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a matter may be doubtful even among experts: and therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen by God, where there would be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine worship; and the chief judge of the people, who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as even now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written (Dt. 17:8,9): "If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and thou see that the words of the judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this account.

Reply to Objection 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it, or are not otherwise suspect.

Moreover, in order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that they should be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful should be severely punished, as stated in Dt. 19:16, seqq.

There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on Jn. 8:17: “In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true.”

Reply to Objection 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing them.

Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is written (Dt. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not guilty of death, because “she cried, and there was no man to help her.” But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin is diminished: and the punishment, according to true judgment, should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in order to deter others from committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a man sins through ignorance: and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written (Lev. 4:2): “The soul that sinneth through ignorance,” etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e. through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. Dt. 25:2]. The fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of the commandment of the Law [*Cf. Num. 15:30,31].

Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft, the Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently (Ex. 22:1–9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the case of other thefts: for there was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": and therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep was useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank: but on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated above. As to the man who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to testify the belief in the newness of the world, as stated above ([2137]Q[100], A[5]): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever.

Reply to Objection 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents, adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness.

In other faults of less degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.

The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining a slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.

The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into idolatry. For this reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David said to Saul: “They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheritance of the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods.” There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written in Dt. 19:4 [*Cf. Num. 35:25] that “he that striketh [Vulg.: ‘killeth’] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall flee to one of the cities” of refuge and “abide there until the death of the high-priest.” For then it became lawful for him to return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so eager to kill the slayer.

Reply to Objection 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone “yesterday or the day before” (in which case steps might have been taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight thereof.

Reply to Objection 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was frequently from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily make known the murderer, if they knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or again, this was done in order to frighten people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder, however useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off of its head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place.

Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer.

Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable manner?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts 10:34,35): “In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice is acceptable to Him.” But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:3) that “the Ammonite and the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord for ever”: whereas, on the other hand, it is prescribed (Dt. 23:7) to be observed with regard to certain other nations: “Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land.”

Objection 2: Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things which are not in our power. But it is not in man’s power to be an eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:1,2) that “an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the church of the Lord.”

Objection 3: Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the land of Egypt”: and (Ex. 23:9): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt.” But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law unsuitably permitted them (Dt. 23:19,20) to lend money to the stranger for usury.

Objection 4: Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we should show greater care and love for these things that are nearest to us, according to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like: so also every man him that is nearest to himself.” Therefore the Lord unsuitably commanded (Dt. 20:13–19) that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down.

Objection 5: Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in a war which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (Dt. 20:5–7) that certain men should be sent home, for instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a vineyard, or who had married a wife.

Objection 6: Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a man’s fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Dt. 20:8).

On the contrary, Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. 8:8): “All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them.”

I answer that, Man’s relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners passed through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these respects the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger [advenam]”; and again (Ex. 22:9): “Thou shalt not molest a stranger [peregrino].” Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship and mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizenship: just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation; whereas others (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship; while the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes in perpetuity: for it is written (Ex. 17:16): "The war of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation to generation."

In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, it commanded that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded (Dt. 20:10) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they might be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, who might be in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage of victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country.

Reply to Objection 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in the land.” But in temporal matters concerning the public life of the people, admission was not granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some, i.e. the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation; while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e. the peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing this may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain from similar crimes.

Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus it is related (Judith 14:6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, “was joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred.” The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was “a virtuous woman” (Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be citizens absolutely speaking.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the state, even common people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the “ecclesia,” i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was continued through carnal generation: for even among the heathens, those who had many children were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as neither were strangers, as already stated: for it is written (Isa. 56:3): “Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree.”

Reply to Objection 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on account of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a profit.

Reply to Objection 4: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those which had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had fought against God's people; whereas the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on account of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the Israelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is written (Dt. 9:5) "because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in." The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, for the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected.

Reply to Objection 5: The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two reasons. First, because man is wont to give all his affection to those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having, and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of this affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented from obtaining something good when it is within his grasp." And so lest the surviving relations should be the more grieved at the death of these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them; and also lest the people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from the danger of death by being removed from the battle.

Reply to Objection 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away.

Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the household?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every respect his master’s property,” as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a man’s property should be his always. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that slaves should “go out free” in the seventh year.

Objection 2: Further, a slave is his master’s property, just as an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Dt. 22:1–3) with regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt. 23:15): “Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee.”

Objection 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20,21) that “he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if the party remain alive a day . . . he shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his money.”

Objection 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7).

Objection 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 21:18, seqq.) that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment.

Objection 6: Further, the Lord forbade them (Dt. 7:3, seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such as had been contracted (1 Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations (Dt. 21:10, seqq.).

Objection 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev. 18. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Dt. 25:5) that if any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife.

Objection 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to allow (Dt. 24:1–4) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her again to wife.

Objection 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the Law did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant to his master, or by a son to his father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order to investigate a wife's adultery (Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it seems that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): "The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves."

I answer that, The mutual relations of the members of a household regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life, considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need of servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose man needs a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations of the members of a household admit of a threefold combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and wife, and those of father and son: and in respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded them to be treated with moderation—both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor, wherefore the Lord commanded (Dt. 5:14) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"—and also as to the infliction of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants, to set them free (Ex. 21:26,27). Similar provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq.). Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the people, the Law prescribed that they should go out free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded (Dt. 15:13) that they should be given provision for the journey.

With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that they should marry a wife from their own tribe (Num. 36:6): and this lest confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry the wife of his deceased brother when the latter died without issue, as prescribed in Dt. 25:5,6: and this in order that he who could not have successors according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear of their losing their faith; and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what way wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime (Dt. 22:13, seqq.). Also that a man’s hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son (Dt. 21:15, seqq.). Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away (Dt. 24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset, it was prescribed that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife.

With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it is written (Ex. 12:26, seqq.): “When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim of the passage of the Lord.” Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct: wherefore it is written (Dt. 21:20) that the parents had to say: “He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery.”

Reply to Objection 1: As the children of Israel had been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of God, He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written (Lev. 25:39, seqq.): “If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt: let them not be sold as bondmen”: and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of time they were set free.

Reply to Objection 2: This commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing some sin.

Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not: since if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his master. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once after being struck, but after some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free man, yet so that he did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his staff," he that struck him was quit of murder, even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim of his assault. But this was not the case if a man killed his own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person, was the property of his master. Hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because it is his money."

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the very words of the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go out." Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, but even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to Lev. 25:39,40: "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner."

Reply to Objection 5: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion, whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished by the rulers of the city.

Reply to Objection 6: The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry. And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom Booz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth 1:16): “Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God.” Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she first shaved her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father and mother, in token that she renounced idolatry for ever.

Reply to Objection 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), “because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with a view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be born to the dead man through his brother: thus affording a certain mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should marry the wife of the deceased, because” the offspring of this union “would not be looked upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the obligation to support the household of the deceased, as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of his relationship.” Hence it is evident that in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother’s place.

Reply to Objection 8: The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews’ hardness of heart, as Our Lord declared (Mat. 19:8). Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony (SP, Q[67]).

Reply to Objection 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since “the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness” (Job 24:15). But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master: because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of an adulterous woman.

OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)

In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart?

(2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?

(3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world?

(4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place?

Whether the New Law is a written law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth in writing, according to Jn. 20:31: “But these are written that you may believe.” Therefore the New Law is a written law.

Objection 2: Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural law, according to Rom. 2:14,15: “(The Gentiles) do by nature those things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: ‘show’] the work of the law written in their hearts.” If therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of nature.

Objection 3: Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled in the heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testament: for it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine Wisdom “through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets.” Therefore the New Law is not instilled in our hearts.

On the contrary, The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle, quoting the authority ofJeremiah 31:31, 33: “Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the house of Judah, a new testament,” says, explaining what this statement is (Heb. 8:8, 10): “For this is the testament which I will make to the house of Israel . . . by giving [Vulg.: ‘I will give’] My laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write them.” Therefore the New Law is instilled in our hearts.

I answer that, “Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is preponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (Rom. 3:27): “Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith”: for he calls the grace itself of faith “a law.” And still more clearly it is written (Rom. 8:2): “The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death.” Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that “as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the hearts of the faithful”: and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): “What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts, but the very presence of His Holy Spirit?”

Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to the use of that grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed concerning them, both by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Consequently we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that secondarily it is a written law.

Reply to Objection 1: The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or by directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation of Christ’s Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: and with regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for “the world,” i.e. worldly men, "cannot receive" the Holy Ghost (Jn. 14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort men in divers ways.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping him to accomplish it.

Reply to Objection 3: No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament.

Whether the New Law justifies?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no man is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to Heb. 5:9: "He," i.e. Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." But the Gospel does not always cause men to believe in it: for it is written (Rom. 10:16): "All do not obey the Gospel." Therefore the New Law does not justify.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased at its advent: for it is stated (Rom. 4:15): "The Law worketh wrath: for where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But much more did the New Law increase transgression: since he who sins after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to Heb. 10:28,29: "A man making void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of God," etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify.

Objection 3: Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according to Rom. 8:33: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more than the Old Law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 1:16): “I am not ashamed of the Gospel: for it is in the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth.” But there is no salvation but to those who are justified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies.

I answer that, As stated above [2138](A[1]), there is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): “There,” i.e. in the Old Testament, “the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid”; “here,” i.e. in the New Testament, “it is given in an inward manner, that they may be justified.” The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6) “The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth”: and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter denotes any writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing grace of faith.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin: for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help given to him. And this is why the New Law is not said to “work wrath”: because as far as it is concerned it gives man sufficient help to avoid sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone: whereas He gave the New Law written “in the fleshly tables of the heart,” as the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), “the Apostle calls this letter which is written outside man, a ministration of death and a ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls the other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to transgression.”

Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world. “For there is no respect of persons with God” (Rom. 2:11). But “all” men “have sinned and do need the glory of God” (Rom. 3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor to all.

Objection 2: Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in various times. But God, “Who will have all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the beginning of the world.

Objection 3: Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But God provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting to his power whatever was created for the sake of man (Gn. 1:26–29). Therefore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, should have been given to man from the beginning of the world.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): “That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural.” But the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore it was not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world.

I answer that, Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The first is because the New Law, as stated above [2139](A[1]), consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been cast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:39): “As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.” This reason the Apostle states clearly (Rom. 8:2, seqq.) where, after speaking of “the Law of the Spirit of life,” he adds: “God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.” [*St. Thomas, quoting perhaps from memory, omits the “et” (and), after “sinful flesh.” The text quoted should read thus: “in the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ({peri hamartias}), hath,” etc.]

A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset, but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal. 3:24,25): “The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer under a pedagogue.”

The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left to himself under the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This reason is set down by the Apostle (Rom. 5:20): “The Law entered in, that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound.”

Reply to Objection 1: Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so “from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given,” as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf. Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not follow that there is respect of persons with God, from the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the world, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The state of mankind does not vary according to diversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New Law avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: Things pertaining to the health of the body are of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: whereas things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison will not hold.

Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law will not last until the end of the world. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10), “when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.” But the New Law is “in part,” since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:9): “We know in part and we prophesy in part.” Therefore the New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect state.

Objection 2: Further, Our Lord (Jn. 16:13) promised His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come. But the Church knows not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the Father and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent on begetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of the Son: viz. the state of the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the Son) hold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men will hold the first place.

Objection 4: Further, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:14): “This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the consummation come.” But the Gospel of Christ is already preached throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto another Law.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:34): “I say to you that this generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done”: which passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) explains as referring to “the generation of those that believe in Christ.” Therefore the state of those who believe in Christ will last until the consummation of the world.

I answer that, The state of the world may change in two ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will succeed this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the New Law: since nothing can approach nearer to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being brought to the last end. But the New Law does this: wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 10:19–22): “Having therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw near.” Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that of the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more perfect it is.

In another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly. And thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws were very well kept, and at other times were altogether unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to various places, times, and persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless we are not to look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed it hitherto, especially the apostles who “received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than others,” as a gloss expounds on Rom. 8:23.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect in comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away as expressed in that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face.”

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord’s promise to give the Holy Ghost was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised them a second time (Acts 1:5): “You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence": which we read as having been fulfilled in Acts 2. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement (Jn. 7:39) that "as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was given as soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover, this puts out of court the senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time.

Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events: for this did not regard them according to Acts 1:7: "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power."

Reply to Objection 3: The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 5:46): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New Law corresponds not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost; according to Rom. 8:2: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," etc. Hence we are not to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 4: Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching of the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" (Mat. 4:17), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be understood in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel was preached throughout the world even at the time of the apostles, as Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this sense the words that follow—"and then shall the consummation come," refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be understood as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every nation. And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but, when it is, the consummation of the world will come.

OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?

(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?

(3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?

(4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?

Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God: since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to Heb. 11:6. But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss says on Mat. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same also.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel" [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor']—"fear and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot be differentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law comprised precepts of charity: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor" (Lev. 19:18), and: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God" (Dt. 6:5). In like manner neither can they differ according to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2), viz. that "the Old Testament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal promises": since even the New Testament contains temporal promises, according to Mk. 10:30: He shall receive "a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and brethren," etc.: while in the Old Testament they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to Heb. 11:16: "But now they desire a better, that is to say, a heavenly country," which is said of the patriarchs. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not distinct from the Old.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of faith" (Rom. 3:27). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to Heb. 11:39: "All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] approved by the testimony of faith,” which he says of the fathers of the Old Testament. In like manner the New Law is a law of works: since it is written (Mat. 5:44): “Do good to them that hate you”; and (Lk. 22:19): “Do this for a commemoration of Me.” Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old.

On the contrary, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): “The priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law.” But the priesthood of the New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also distinct.

I answer that, As stated above ([2140]Q[90], A[2];[2141] Q[91], A[4]), every law ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways, considered from the point of view of the end. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this difference will be specific, especially if such ends are proximate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the end. Thus it is clear that movements differ in species through being directed to different terms: while according as one part of a movement is nearer to the term than another part, the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is assessed.

Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government, would differ specifically from a law ordained to government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one another, through one of them being more closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus in one and the same state there is one law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common good; and another law regulating the education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on.

We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have the same end, namely, man’s subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to Rom. 3:30: “It is one God that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith.” According to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the Apostle says (Gal. 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (Col. 3:14) that it is “the bond of perfection.”

Reply to Objection 1: The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been stated above ([2142]Q[62], A[2]) that the object of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith had a different state in the Old and in the New Law: since what they believed as future, we believe as fact.

Reply to Objection 2: All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed in another way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits, are directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the “law of fear,” inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal promises. On the other hand, those who are possessed of virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts, is called the “Law of love”: and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of the virtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to something foreign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as “restraining the hand, not the will” [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness: and hence the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will.

Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to the New Law. In like manner in the New Testament there are some carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and these it was necessary, even under the New Testament, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises.

But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity . . . is spread abroad in our hearts" (Rom. 5:5).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2143]Q[106], AA[1],2), the New Law is called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace which is given inwardly to believers, and for this reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain deeds, moral and sacramental: but the New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law. As to those under the Old Testament who through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they were not justified except through faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says (Heb. 11:26) that he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians."

Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids or excludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.

Objection 2: Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary to precepts of the Old Law. For we read (Mat. 5:27–32): You have heard that it was said to them of old: . . ."Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery." Furthermore, the same evidently applies to the prohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods

(Mat. 15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man.” Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.

Objection 3: Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched the leper (Mat. 8:3), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of Him (Jn. 9:16): “This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath.” Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law given by Christ is not a fulfilment of the Old.

Objection 4: Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above ([2144]Q[99], A[4]). But Our Lord (Mat. 5) fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not a complete fulfilment of the Old.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 5:17): “I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil”: and went on to say (Mat. 5:18): “One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled.”

I answer that, As stated above [2145](A[1]), the New Law is compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law.

Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as was stated above ([2146]Q[92], A[1]): and consequently the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old by justifying men through the power of Christ’s Passion. This is what the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3,4): “What the Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.” And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law promised, according to 2 Cor. 1:20: “Whatever are the promises of God, in Him,” i.e. in Christ, “they are ‘Yea.’” [*The Douay version reads thus: “All the promises of God are in Him, ‘It is.’”] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written (Col. 2:17) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were “a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ”; in other words, the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure.

Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing to be circumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were binding for the time being; according to Gal. 4:4: “Made under the Law.” In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided, by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in Mat. 19:21, where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: “One thing is wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast,” etc. [*St. Thomas combines Mat. 19:21 with Mk. 10:21].

Reply to Objection 1: The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above ([2147]Q[103], AA[3],4). Now the latter were figurative of something to come. Wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled when those things were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for it they were to be observed, this would mean that something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law. For what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. “For the Law did not say: ‘Let him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would be not to put her away. On the contrary, the Law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornication." The same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibition of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the hatred of one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his sin. As to discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed: but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something else, as stated above ([2148]Q[102], A[6], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as also by touching the dead, as stated above ([2149]Q[102], A[5], ad 4). But Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By those things which He did on the sabbath, He did not break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active among things; and because He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active among things; and because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being of animals even on the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He excused His disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the intention of the Law.

Reply to Objection 4: The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in Mat. 5 is because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the New Law.

Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is called the "law of faith" (Rom. 3:27). But many points of faith are set forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is not contained in the Old.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss says on Mat. 5:19, "He that shall break one of these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the greater commandments, those contained in the Gospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the New Law is not contained in the Old.

Objection 3: Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that whoever had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law is not contained in the Old.

On the contrary, As expressed in Ezech. 1:16, there was "a wheel in the midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," according to Gregory's exposition.

I answer that, One thing may be contained in another in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually; as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed contains the whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old: for it has been stated [2150] (A[1]) that the New Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence Chrysostom, expounding Mk. 4:28, "The earth of itself bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear," expresses himself as follows: "He brought forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly, the full corn, i.e. the

Law of the Gospel.” Hence then the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear.

Reply to Objection 1: Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament as a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law is contained in the Old.

Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth explicitly. But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 23,28) that “nearly all Our Lord’s admonitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: ‘But I say unto you,’ are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder.” And it is in the point of declarations of this kind that the precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being contained in the lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed.

Reply to Objection 3: What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also had to be given.

Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of an unknown author]) say: “The commandments given to Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: but the commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust.” Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.

Objection 2: Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance of the Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from Dt. 28:1–14;

whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the New Law, as stated in 2 Cor. 6:4–10: “Let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses,” etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.

Objection 3: The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New Law is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury, while the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, while the New Law forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in Mat. 5:31, seqq., according to Augustine’s expounding. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 11:28): “Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened”: which words are expounded by Hilary thus: “He calls to Himself all those that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world.” And further on He says of the yoke of the Gospel: “For My yoke is sweet and My burden light.” Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the Old.

I answer that, A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier burden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the queries of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, “whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave’s burden; so much so that the state of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable.”

The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through virtue it becomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old; because the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition. Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is not righteous. Accordingly we read also (1 Jn. 5:3) that “His commandments are not heavy”: which words Augustine expounds by saying that “they are not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that loveth not.”

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements.

Reply to Objection 2: The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne, on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), “love makes light and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power.”

Reply to Objection 3: The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26]. Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome, but rather that it is a lighter burden.

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works?

(2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts?

(3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?

(4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?

Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom, according to Mat. 24:14: “This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world.” But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Lk. 17:21: “The kingdom of God is within you”; and Rom. 14:17: “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.” Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any external acts.

Objection 2: Further, the New Law is “the law of the Spirit” (Rom. 8:2). But “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or forbid any external acts.

Objection 3: Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the “Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the will” [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands about exterior deeds, but only about interior acts.

On the contrary, Through the New Law, men are made “children of light”: wherefore it is written (Jn. 12:36): “Believe in the light that you may be the children of light.” Now it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to Eph. 5:8: “You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light.” Therefore the New Law had to forbid certain external acts and prescribe others.

I answer that, As stated above ([2151]Q[106], AA[1],2), the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love. Now men become receivers of this grace through God’s Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14): “The Word was made flesh,” and afterwards: “full of grace and truth”; and further on: “Of His fulness we all have received, and grace for grace.” Hence it is added that “grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Consequently it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue.

Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like.

In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written (Mat. 10:32,33) “(Every one) that shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him before My Father.” On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith that worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution; but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the “law of liberty” [*Cf. Reply OBJ[2]]: since the Old Law decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose.

Reply to Objection 1: The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink.”

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is "free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but according to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it.

Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect liberty" (James 1:25).

Reply to Objection 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which ensue from inward movements.

Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through charity seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to Gal. 5:6: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law.

Objection 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above ([2152]Q[101], A[4];[2153] Q[102], A[4]). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast.

Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external matters.

Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances pertaining to God’s ministers, so also were there certain observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law ([2154]Q[101], A[4];[2155] Q[102], A[6]). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from Mat. 10:9: “Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses,” nor other things which are mentioned here and Lk. 9, 10. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law.

Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external works.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 7:24): “Every one . . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a rock.” But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ’s words contain all things necessary for man’s salvation.

I answer that, as stated above [2156](A[1]), the New Law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception or right use of grace. And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His institution the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil (Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments of the New Law.

The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add as regards external action. The determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above ([2157]Q[99], A[4]). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law consists, they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man; some relating to inferiors—as when a precept is given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the common good.

Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and those moral precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above ([2158]Q[19], A[3];[2159] Q[63], A[2]). Wherefore in such matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed from the dictate of reason.

Reply to Objection 2: In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like, or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the institution of such things to the discretion of the faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary connection with inward grace.

Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be understood in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted them to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on to say: “For the laborer is worthy of his hire.” Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without accepting supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did (1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.).

Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little children under Christ's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects receive from their superiors: and especially so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He established certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by their means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said (Lk. 22:35,36) "When I sent you without purse and scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A[3], ad 2).

Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely, the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man insufficiently.

Objection 2: Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above ([2160]Q[104], A[4];[2161] Q[105]). Therefore, in this respect, He directed human life insufficiently.

Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination. Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently.

Objection 4: Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer. Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods ought we to shun the glory of human favor.

Objection 5: Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other animals share with man: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:6, 8): “Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.” But every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command, forasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment.

Objection 6: Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to Ps. 18:15: “Until justice be turned into judgment.” Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently that the New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said: “‘He that heareth these My words,’ He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a Christian’s life is formed.”

I answer that, As is evident from Augustine’s words just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian. Therein man’s interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the authority of the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He orders man’s interior movements, first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard to his neighbor.

This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to man’s two interior movements in respect of any prospective action, viz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first place, He directs man’s will in respect of the various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works that are evil in themselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the second place He directs man’s intention, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth.

Afterwards He directs man’s interior movement in respect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy.

Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares that we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to hear His words.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: and this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false witness. They held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have recourse to them.

Reply to Objection 2: The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters contained in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife (Mat. 5:32); and to receive usury (Lk. 6:35), when He said: “Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.”

In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice’s sake, should be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one’s enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concerning punishment by retaliation: whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge. Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary. They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution of what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as stated above ([2162]Q[105], A[2], ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Wherefore Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more if necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying of one’s enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above ([2163]Q[105], A[3], ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be taken as binding “the mind to be prepared to fulfil them,” as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19).

Reply to Objection 3: The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to virtue: whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. On the other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally abolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship: as is evident from Jn. 4:21,23, where He says: “The hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . . the true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.”

Reply to Objection 4: All worldly goods may be reduced to three—honors, riches, and pleasures; according to 1 Jn. 2:16: “All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh,” which refers to pleasures of the flesh, “and the concupiscence of the eyes,” which refers to riches, “and the pride of life,” which refers to ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the former (Dt. 28:1): “If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations”; and in reference to the latter, we read a little further on (Dt. 28:11): “He will make thee abound with all goods.” But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that we ought to serve God, with these things as the end in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human glory. And He mentions three works, to which all others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires, comes under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as they hold the principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that we must not place our end in riches, when He said: “Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth” (Mat. 6:19).

Reply to Objection 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore He says: “Lay not up for yourselves,” etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God’s help: wherefore Our Lord says (Mat. 6:32): “Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things.” Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without God’s help: such solicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his stature (Mat. 6:27). We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but of a future time: wherefore He says (Mat. 6:34): “Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow.”

Reply to Objection 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above.

Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel ([2164]Q[14] , A[2]). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all.

Objection 2: Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels should not be given.

Objection 3: Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel.

Objection 4: Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, for instance, “Love your enemies” (Mat. 5:44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles (Mat. 10). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because they are not distinguished from the commandments.

On the contrary, The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, according to Prov. (27:9): “Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul.” But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely useful and becoming.

I answer that, The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the New Law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss, to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end more assured and expeditious.

Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose.

Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining to the “concupiscence of the eyes”; carnal pleasures pertaining to the “concupiscence of the flesh”; and honors, which pertain to the “pride of life,” according to 1 Jn. 2:16: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form of the religious life that professes the state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience.

Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed which he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels.

Reply to Objection 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual poverty (Mat. 19:21), He begins with the words: "If thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying (Mat. 19:12): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take, let him take it." And again, the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:35), after giving the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you."

Reply to Objection 2: The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to Jn. 10:27: "My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow Me."

Reply to Objection 4: Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings (Mat. 5; Lk. 6), may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters which are set down in Mat. 10 and Lk. 9 and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Hence they are not set down among the counsels.

TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ[109]-114)

OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects.

The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its essence; (3) its division.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether without grace man can know anything?

(2) Whether without God’s grace man can do or wish any good?

(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?

(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law?

(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life?

(6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?

(7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin?

(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin?

(9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further Divine help?

(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?

Whether without grace man can know any truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For, on 1 Cor. 12:3: “No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost,” a gloss says: “Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost.”

Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth without grace.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that “the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God Himself is He Whom sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul.” Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object, without the sun’s light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and this pertains to the aid of grace.

Objection 3: Further, the human mind can only understand truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God.” Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): “I do not approve having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths.” Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according to Ps. 50:12: “Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels.” Therefore without grace man of himself can know truth.

I answer that, To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13): “All that is made manifest is light.” Now every use implies movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see that for movement there is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action, but there is also required the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heavenly body. Hence no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.

Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible things, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things of the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy which is called the "light of grace," inasmuch as it is added to nature.

Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.

Reply to Objection 1: Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the Apostle speaks.

Reply to Objection 2: The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand anything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7).

Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace. For that is in man’s power, whereof he is master. Now man is master of his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above ([2165]Q[1], A[1];[2166] Q[13], A[6]). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the help of grace.

Objection 2: Further, man has more power over what is according to his nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of virtue are according to his nature, as stated above ([2167]Q[71], A[1]). Therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.

Objection 3: Further, the understanding’s good is truth, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know truth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of itself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish good.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): “It is not of him that willeth,” namely, to will, “nor of him that runneth,” namely to run, “but of God that showeth mercy.” And Augustine says (De Corrept. et Gratia ii) that “without grace men do nothing good when they either think or wish or love or act.”

I answer that, Man’s nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or wish any good whatsoever, as stated above [2168](A[1]). But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of medicine he be cured.

And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well.

Reply to Objection 1: Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is above the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the chapter "On Good Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not need to be moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the nature.

Reply to Objection 2: To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.

Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as stated above [2169](A[1]). And yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth.

Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all things?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity, since the “charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us,” as is said Rom. 5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all things.

Objection 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love God above itself.

Objection 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things.

On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natural endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things.

I answer that, As was said above ([2170]FP, Q[60], A[5]), where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since “all things act according as they are naturally fit” as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “God leads everything to love of Himself.” Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God’s grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above.

Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the commandments of the Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law." Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man.” Now what a man cannot fulfil by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of himself.

Objection 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart” (Mat. 27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by loving God above all things, as stated above [2171](A[3]). Therefore man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that “they believe that without grace man can fulfil all the Divine commandments.”

I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that “without grace men can do no good whatever,” adds: “Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know.” Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God’s motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above ([2172]AA[2],3).

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), “do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made.”

Reply to Objection 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): “What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves.” Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes that "our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still require God's help."

Reply to Objection 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above [2173](A[3]).

Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without grace. For Our Lord says (Mat. 19:17): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments"; from which it would seem that to enter into everlasting life rests with man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life of himself.

Objection 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God on men, according to Mat. 5:12: "Your reward is very great in heaven." But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, according to Ps. 61:12: "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life.

Objection 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments, without grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God is life everlasting." And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life."

I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above ([2174]Q[5], A[5]). Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as “to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends,” and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians [*Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine].

Reply to Objection 1: Man, by his will, does works meritorious of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.

Reply to Objection 2: As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23, “The grace of God is life everlasting,” says, “It is certain that everlasting life is meter to good works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God’s grace.” And it has been said [2175](A[4]), that to fulfil the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires grace.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12).

Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare himself for grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A[4], ad 1). But it is written (Zech. 1:3): “Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you.” Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace.

Objection 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny him grace, for it is written (Mat. 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit “to them that ask Him.” But what is in our power is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace.

Objection 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that “it is the part of man to prepare the soul.” Now an action is said to be part of a man, when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:44): “No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him.” But if man could prepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace.

I answer that, The preparation of the human will for good is twofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious works, as stated above [2176](A[5]). There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as stated above ([2177]AA[2],3). Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct is effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army—and towards following the standard of a regiment by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover, simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “God turns all to Himself.” But He directs righteous men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling, according to Ps. 72:28, “it is good for Me to adhere to my God.” And that they are “turned” to God can only spring from God’s having “turned” them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from the light of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun’s light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to God, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: "Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and Lam. 5:21: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted."

Reply to Objection 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to Jn. 15:5: "Without Me, you can do nothing." Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according as he is moved by God.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God is the First Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity.

Reply to Objection 4: It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the help of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.

Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without grace. But to rise to sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written (Eph. 5:14): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee." Therefore man can rise from sin without grace.

Objection 2: Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as stated above ([2178]Q[71], A[1], ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life, from which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the help of external grace.

Objection 3: Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of justice.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. Gal. 3:21): “For if there had been a law given which could give life—then Christ died in vain,” i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a nature, whereby he can he justified, “Christ died in vain,” i.e. to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice.

I answer that, Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding in its guilt, as stated above ([2179]Q[87], A[6]), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above ([2180]Q[85], A[1];[2181] Q[86], A[1];[2182] Q[87], A[1]), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man’s nature is disordered by man’s will not being subject to God’s; and this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man deserves everlasting damnation.

Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. man’s will can only be subject to God when God draws man’s will to Himself, as stated above [2183](A[6]). So, too, the guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who is man’s Judge. And thus in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God.

Reply to Objection 1: To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise from sin. Hence when it is said, “Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee,” we are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying grace.

Reply to Objection 2: The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. This principle is grace which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by himself; but he requires the light of grace to be poured upon him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: When nature is perfect, it can be restored by itself to its befitting and proportionate condition; but without exterior help it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And thus human nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect, but corrupted, as stated above ([2184]Q[85]); nor can it be restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the supernatural good of justice.

Whether man without grace can avoid sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin. Because "no one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does not sin, which is impossible.

Objection 2: Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem to be given to no purpose; which is absurd.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): "Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him." But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' (and they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all."

I answer that, We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in the state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature—and in the state of perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not have done it without God’s help to uphold him in good, since if this had been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into nothingness.

But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present life this healing is wrought in the mind—the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of one who is restored: “I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of sin.” And in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as stated above ([2185]Q[74], A[5]); but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above ([2186]Q[74], A[3], ad 2).

So, too, before man’s reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that “ a sin not at once taken away by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins”: and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man’s reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when man’s heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally: especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with premeditation of his reason a man may do something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly brought back to the due order.

Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid each but every act of sin, except by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own shortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Correction is useful “in order that out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden inspirations is inwardly causing to will,” as Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact that man’s will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is not sufficient without God’s help. Hence it is written (Eccles. 7:14): “Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of man in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God’s assistance.

Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, can by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either useless or imperfect.

Objection 2: Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to 1 Cor. 3:16: “Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?” Now since the Spirit of God is omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two things without any further assistance of grace.

Objection 3: Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with equal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to infinity; which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free from sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as the eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped by the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he is most righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the eternal light of justice." But justification is by grace, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace." Hence even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in order to live righteously.

I answer that, As stated above [2187](A[5]), in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God—first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act.

Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason—the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves "the law of sin," Rom. 7:25. In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Rom. 8:26): "We know not what we should pray for as we ought"; since on account of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: "For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain." Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: “Lead us not into temptation,” and “Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven,” and whatever else is contained in the Lord’s Prayer pertaining to this.

Reply to Objection 1: The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature needs to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after having received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son, moves and protects us.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no further habitual grace.

Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to persevere?

Objection 1: It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help to persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of grace in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the help of grace to have perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together with grace, perseverance is given to the other infused virtues.

Objection 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) more was restored to man by Christ’s gift, than he had lost by Adam’s sin. But Adam received what enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need grace in order to persevere.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. ii): “Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power without His giving it?” Now perseverance is besought by even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say “Hallowed be Thy name,” which Augustine confirms by the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God.

I answer that, Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance may be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of persevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused together with grace, even as continence and the other virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding in good to the end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the Divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom perseverance in grace is not given.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the second.

Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii) [*Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii]: “in the original state man received a gift whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering,” and thus Christ’s gift is greater than Adam’s fault. Nevertheless it was easier for man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, than it is now. For the restoration by Christ’s grace, although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere but will be unable to sin.

OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?

(2) Whether grace is a quality?

(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?

(4) Of the subject of grace.

Whether grace implies anything in the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of man. Hence it is written (Gn. 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph "grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison." Now when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance is implied in him whose favor he has. Hence when we say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine acceptance.

Objection 2: Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken the soul; hence it is written (Dt. 30:20): "He is thy life." Now the soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as a medium between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in the soul.

Objection 3: Further, on Rom. 1:7, "Grace to you and peace," the gloss says: "Grace, i.e. the remission of sins." Now the remission of sin implies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the sin, according to Ps. 31:2: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.

On the contrary, Light implies something in what is enlightened. But grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law, and those who have been thus deserted become blind." Therefore grace implies something in the soul.

I answer that, According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are accustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given “gratis,” inasmuch as we are said to be “grateful” for benefits. Of these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another “gratis” from the love wherewith he receives him into his good “graces.” And from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed “gratis” arises “gratitude.”

Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly, the acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace of man; for since the creature’s good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature flows from God’s love, whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good pre-existing in things; and hence man’s love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but presupposes it either in part or wholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal with the eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common, whereby He loves “all things that are” (Wis. 11:25), and thereby gives things their natural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature.

Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is signified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of God sometimes signifies God’s eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits predestines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): “He hath predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of the glory of His grace.”

Reply to Objection 1: Even when a man is said to be in another’s good graces, it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the other; even as anyone is said to have God’s grace—with this difference, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the Divine love, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: God is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the manner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and matter, since the form, of itself, “informs” the matter or subject; whereas the agent “informs” the subject, not by its substance, but by the form, which it causes in the matter.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): “When I said that grace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our reconciliation with God, you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to general peace, but that the special name of grace signifies the remission of sins.” Not only grace, therefore, but many other of God’s gifts pertain to grace. And hence the remission of sins does not take place without some effect divinely caused in us, as will appear later ([2188]Q[113], A[2]).

Whether grace is a quality of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is not without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality.

Objection 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by grace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above ([2189]Q[109], AA[1],2,3). Therefore grace is not a quality.

Objection 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus it would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is called a “new creature”(Gal. 6:15).

On the contrary, on Ps. 103:15: “That he may make the face cheerful with oil”; the gloss says: “Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which wins the Divine love.” But beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality.

I answer that, As stated above [2190](A[1]), there is understood to be an effect of God’s gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God’s grace. Now it was stated (Q[109], A[1]) that man is aided by God’s gratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man’s soul is moved by God to know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for “motion is the act of the mover in the moved.” Secondly, man is helped by God’s gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for this reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by God become natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1: “she . . . ordereth all things sweetly.” Much more therefore does He infuse into such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a quality.

Reply to Objection 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just.

Reply to Objection 2: Every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as matter and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being.

Reply to Objection 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist] says, the “being of an accident is to inhere.” Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, “created in Jesus Christ in good works.”

Whether grace is the same as virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that “operating grace is faith that worketh by charity.” But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since “it makes its subject good, and his work good,” and “it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously,” etc. Therefore grace is virtue.

Objection 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the “fourth” species of quality; viz. “form” which is the “abiding figure of things,” since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the “third,” since it is not a “passion nor a passion-like quality,” which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the “second” species, which is “natural power” or “impotence”; since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the “first” species which is “habit” or “disposition.” Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above ([2191]Q[57], AA[1],2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue.

On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since “grace foreruns charity,” as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is not virtue.

I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in essence, and differed only logically—in the sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously—and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).

But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), “virtue is disposition of what is perfect—and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature.” Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke above (Q[55], seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.” And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.

And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): “For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as children of the light.” For as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine calls “faith that worketh by charity” grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested.

Reply to Objection 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root.

Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of the powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that grace is related to the will or to the free will "as a rider to his horse." Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above ([2192]FP, Q[83], A[2]). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject.

Objection 2: Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace.

Objection 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or power of the soul—viz. neither the will, nor the intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.

On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.

I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated above ([2193]Q[56], A[1]). But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above ([2194]Q[55], A[1];[2195] Q[56], A[1]). Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.

Reply to Objection 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse—but not as an accident to a subject.

And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the powers.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species.

Reply to Objection 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers naturally flow.

OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace?

(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;

(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;

(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;

(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.

Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, as is clear from what has been already stated ([2196]Q[110], A[1]). But man is not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by God, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying grace.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided with grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of grace.

Objection 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us gratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: “Being justified freely [gratis] by His grace.” Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says (Eph. 1:6): “He hath graced us in His beloved son.” And with regard to the second (Rom. 2:6): “And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace is no more grace.” Therefore grace can be distinguished by its having one only or both.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), “those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘those that are, are ordained by God].” Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led to God by other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God by others.

And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to God, and this is called “sanctifying grace”; the other is that whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called “gratuitous grace,” since it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:7): “And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility,” i.e. of others.

Reply to Objection 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but formally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy to be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: “He hath made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light.”

Reply to Objection 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as arising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: “Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.” The second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second. Hence they especially merit the name of grace.

Reply to Objection 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace.

Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated above

([2197]Q[110], A[2]). Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating.

Objection 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine says, on Jn. 14:12, "the works that I do he also shall do," says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating.

Objection 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than free-will, according to Rom. 9:16: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Therefore no grace ought to be called cooperating.

Objection 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings by operating that they may will." But the operations of God whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating.

I answer that, As stated above ([2198]Q[110], A[2]) grace may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.

Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we speak of "operating grace." But in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of "cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, as was shown above ([2199]Q[17], A[9]) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: “He operates that we may will; and when we will, He cooperates that we may perfect.” And thus if grace is taken for God’s gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.

But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of which is “being,” and the second, “operation”; thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is called cooperating grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness makes a surface white.

Reply to Objection 2: God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to God’s justification [justitiae] by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation pertains to grace.

Reply to Objection 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being already intended, grace cooperates with us.

Reply to Objection 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what has been said.

Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love. But God’s love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to 1 Jn. 4:10: “Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us.” Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient and subsequent.

Objection 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: “My grace is sufficient for thee.” But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

Objection 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an infinite number of effects—one preceding another. Hence it with regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. Now no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

On the contrary, God’s grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are said in Ps. 58:11: “His mercy shall prevent me,” and again, Ps. 22:6: “Thy mercy will follow me.” Therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.

I answer that, As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, with regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach glory. And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is called prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first effect. And as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so may grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of the same effect viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxxi): “It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified.”

Reply to Objection 1: God’s love signifies something eternal; and hence can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a temporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both prevenient and subsequent.

Reply to Objection 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was already said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct from prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same be said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies imperfection.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all reduced to some of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in this—that one precedes another.

Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?

Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may be called a gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the soul and the good of the body—and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain division.

Objection 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are justified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: “Being justified therefore by faith.” Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces, especially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope and charity.

Objection 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains either to wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: “And to these children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom.” Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the interpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge.

Objection 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear, as stated above ([2200]Q[68], A[4]). Therefore these also ought to be placed amongst the gratuitous gifts.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8, 9, 10): “To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another interpretation of speeches.”

I answer that, As was said above [2201](A[1]), gratuitous grace is ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God. Now no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct another in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three things are required: first, a man must possess the fullness of knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others. Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, otherwise his words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of fittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows.

Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science must first be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to this there is “faith,” which is certitude of invisible things, the principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science, and hence we have the word of “wisdom,” which is the knowledge of Divine things. Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have the word of “knowledge,” which is the knowledge of human things, since “the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20).

Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what is proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the teacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous deeds, whether with respect to bodily health—and thus there is the “grace of healing,” or merely for the purpose of manifesting the Divine power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or that the sea should be divided—and thus there is the “working of miracles.” Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone can know, and these are either future contingents—and thus there is “prophecy,” or also the secrets of hearts—and thus there is the “discerning of spirits.”

But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a person can be understood, and thus there is “kinds of tongues”; or it can regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the “interpretation of speeches.”

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [2202](A[1]), not all the benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but only those that surpass the power of nature—e.g. that a fisherman should be replete with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such as these are here set down as gratuitous graces.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a super-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith. With regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power, according as man is ordained thereby to God.

Reply to Objection 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the general working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith. So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as special gratuitous graces.

Reply to Objection 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man’s mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge; for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above ([2203]Q[68], AA[1],4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and wisdom that a man may not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is significant that it is the “word” of wisdom and the “word” of knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous graces, since, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), “It is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting life, and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may be defended against the ungodly."

Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the individual good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated above ([2204]AA[1],4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is the brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most excellent of the virtues," since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others. But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas by gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.

Objection 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is nobler than to feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the proper gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way"; and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which pertains to sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than gratuitous grace.

I answer that, The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is preparatory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52), a multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the multitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader—and this is better good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.

Reply to Objection 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the nobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent, even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species whereby it produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its substantial form.

Reply to Objection 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is proper is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no comparison.

OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?

(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free-will?

(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?

(4) Whether grace is equal in all?

(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?

Whether God alone is the cause of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written (Jn. 1:17): “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace.

Objection 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.

Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii), “Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and men.” Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:12): “The Lord will give grace and glory.”

I answer that, Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is impossible that anything save fire should enkindle.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s humanity is an “organ of His Godhead,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not bring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ’s humanity does not cause grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ’s humanity are saving actions.

Reply to Objection 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so likewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”

Reply to Objection 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that “this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine knowledge.”

Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man’s part?

Objection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man’s part, since, as the Apostle says (Rom. 4:4), “To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt.” Now a man’s preparation by free-will can only be through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace.

Objection 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was “breathing our threatenings and slaughter against the disciples of the Lord” (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man’s part.

Objection 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in creation, to which grace is compared, which is called “a new creature” (Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated above (A[1]). Hence no preparation is required on man’s part to obtain grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Amos 4:12): “Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel,” and (1 Kings 7:3): “Prepare your hearts unto the Lord.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2205]Q[111], A[2]), grace is taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man’s part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to Prov. 16:1: “It is the part of man to prepare the soul”; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that man’s will is prepared by God, and that man’s steps are guided by God.

Reply to Objection 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not indeed of grace, which is already possessed—but of glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God’s motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be seen further on ([2206]Q[114], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written (Ecclus. 11:23): “It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich.” Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.” And thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace suddenly.

Reply to Objection 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else; and yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring about.

Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to whoever does what he can?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, on Rom. 5:1, “Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace,” etc. the gloss says: “God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there would be injustice with Him.” But it is impossible for injustice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace.

On the contrary, Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according to Jer. 18:6: “As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand.” But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.

I answer that, As stated above [2207](A[2]), man’s preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus it has a necessity—not indeed of coercion, but of infallibility—as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God’s intention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that “by God’s good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly liberated.” Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.”

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free-will, already “informed” with grace; for if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of free-will before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man’s flight to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.

Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God’s according to Osee 13:9: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.”

Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent that causes the disposition.

Whether grace is greater in one than in another?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above ([2208]Q[110], A[1]). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): “He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all.” Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in another.

Objection 3: Further, grace is the soul’s life, as stated above ([2209]Q[110], A[1], ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:7): “But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.” Now what is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace.

I answer that, As stated above ([2210]Q[52], AA[1],2;[2211] Q[56], AA[1],2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.

Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest Good, which is

God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause of this diversity is to be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection of the Church may result from these various degree; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said (Eph. 4:7): “To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ,” having enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12): “For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, “secondly,” it may be considered in those things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of the same good. For there may be diversity of intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects’ participation.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural life pertains to man’s substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less.

Whether man can know that he has grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace.

Objection 2: Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge, according to Wis. 7:17: The Lord “hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are.” Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from God, knows that he has grace.

Objection 3: Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), “all that is made manifest is light,” Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known.

Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): “Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are given us from God.” Now grace is God’s first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.

Objection 5: Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Gn. 22:12): “Now I know that thou fearest God,” i.e. “I have made thee know.” Now He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace. Hence a man may know that he has grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 9:1): “Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred.” Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God’s love. Therefore no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace.

I answer that, There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul (2 Cor. 12:9): “My grace is sufficient for thee.”

Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who by reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job 36:26: “Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge.” And hence His presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, according to Job 9:11: “If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand.” And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace, according to 1 Cor. 4:3,4: “But neither do I judge my own self . . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord.”

Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): “To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it,” because whoever receives it knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): “I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified,” since, according to Ps. 18:13: “Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant.”

Reply to Objection 1: Those things which are in the soul by their physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as through acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when we wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the functions of life, we observe that there is life in us.

Reply to Objection 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the appetitive faculty.

Reply to Objection 3: Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on account of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: “Who . . . inhabiteth light inaccessible.”

Reply to Objection 4: The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly by faith, although we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (1 Cor. 2:10): “But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.”

Reply to Objection 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation.

OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) What is the justification of the ungodly?

(2) Whether grace is required for it?

(3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required?

(4) Whether a movement of faith is required?

(5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required?

(6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing?

(7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden?

(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification;

(9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God’s greatest work?

(10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous?

Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice, but to all the other virtues, as stated above ([2212]Q[71], A[1]). Now justification signifies a certain movement towards justice. Therefore not even remission of sin is justification, since movement is from one contrary to the other.

Objection 2: Further, everything ought to be named from what is predominant in it, according to De Anima ii, text. 49. Now the remission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according to Acts 15:9: “Purifying their hearts by faith”; and by charity, according to Prov. 10:12: “Charity covereth all sins.” Therefore the remission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than justice.

Objection 3: Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as being called, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off from God by sin. But one is called before being justified according to Rom. 8:30: “And whom He called, them He also justified.” Therefore justification is not the remission of sins.

On the contrary, On Rom. 8:30, “Whom He called, them He also justified,” the gloss says i.e. “by the remission of sins.” Therefore the remission of sins is justification.

I answer that, Justification taken passively implies a movement towards heat. But since justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude of order, it may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right order in man’s act, and thus justice is placed amongst the virtues—either as particular justice, which directs a man’s acts by regulating them in relation to his fellowman—or as legal justice, which directs a man’s acts by regulating them in their relation to the common good of society, as appears from Ethic. v, 1.

Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls “justice metaphorically speaking” (Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by simple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus justification may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they receive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received original justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man by a movement from one contrary to the other, and thus justification implies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of the justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle (Rom. 4:5): “But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly,” etc. And because movement is named after its term “whereto” rather than from its term “whence,” the transmutation whereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodliness to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term “whereto,” and is called “justification of the ungodly.”

Reply to Objection 1: Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary to the aforesaid justice, according to 1 Jn. 3:4: “Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity.” And thus the removal of any sin is called the justification of the ungodly.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith and charity imply a special directing of the human mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice implies a general rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named after justice rather than after charity or faith.

Reply to Objection 3: Being called refers to God’s help moving and exciting our mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the remission of sins, but its cause.

Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, i.e. for the justification of the ungodly?

Objection 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. For anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin.” Now the infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated above ([2213]Q[110], A[1]). Hence the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt.

Objection 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is remitted without grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 3:24): “Justified freely by His grace.”

I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated above ([2214]Q[71], A[5]). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God’s love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God’s goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace.

Reply to Objection 2: As God’s love consists not merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated above ([2215]Q[110], A[1]), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough if Scripture warned us thus: “‘My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?’

Now this is not enough, but it is added: ‘But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.’” For the act of sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above ([2216]Q[87], A[6]). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning from God, wherein sin has its guilt.

Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of the free-will?

Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess. iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, “he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was regenerated”; which is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without the sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will.

Objection 2: Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and without it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 Kings 3 and 2 Paral 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the movement of his free-will.

Objection 3: Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that “so ought man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him.” Now grace is preserved in man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:45): “Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.” Now to learn cannot be without a movement of the free-will, since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a movement of the free-will.

I answer that, The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice. For He it is “that justifieth the ungodly” according to Rom. 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it is man’s proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God’s motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus.

Reply to Objection 1: Infants are not capable of the movement of their free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, does not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation, so also is grace given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration. And the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sickness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can only be by the use of his free-will. And it was in this way that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and afterwards he assented to the Baptism.

Reply to Objection 2: Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in his person (Wis. 7:7): “I wished, and understanding was given unto me.”

Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep of prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” In such cases the use of free-will remains.

And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift of justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the object of the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect which precedes the will; hence without any complete movement of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of wisdom, even as we see that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to Job 33:15,16: “When deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching, instructeth them in what they are to learn.”

Reply to Objection 3: In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of the human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own manner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of the Divine influx.

Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly?

Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, so also by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written (Ecclus. 1:27): “The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified”; and again by charity, according to Lk. 7:47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much”; and again by humility, according to James 4:6: “God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble”; and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: “By mercy and faith sins are purged away.” Hence the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues.

Objection 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other ways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.

Objection 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:1): “Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God.”

I answer that, As stated above [2217](A[3]) a movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man’s mind is moved by God. Now God moves man’s soul by turning it to Himself according to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): “Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to life.” Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: “He that cometh to God must believe that He is.” Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.

Reply to Objection 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs from different virtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or concur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above ([2218]Q[68], A[4], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Rom. 4:5), “to him that . . . believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God.” Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of Christ.

Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity alone suffices to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: “Charity covereth all sins.” Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will towards sin is required.

Objection 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back, according to Phil. 3:13,14: “Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation.” But whoever is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will.

Objection 3: Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not remitted without another, for “it is irreverent to expect half a pardon from God” [*Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence, in the justification of the ungodly, if man’s free-will must move against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly, both because a great space of time would be required for such thought, and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will is required.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 31:5): “I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin.”

I answer that, As stated above [2219](A[1]), the justification of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement. Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the term “whence” and nears the term “whereto.” Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to justice.

Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the words “the hireling fleeth,” etc. (Jn. 10:12): “Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy is the soul’s outpouring; fear is the soul’s flight; your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you are afraid.” Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts of the free-will—one, whereby it tends to God’s justice; the other whereby it hates sin.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God.

Reply to Objection 2: A man ought not to return to those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest them; for this is to fly from them.

Reply to Objection 3: Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; and this movement cooperates in his justification.

Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification?

Objection 1: It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated above [2220](A[1]). Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

Objection 2: Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the infusion of grace.

Objection 3: Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, from the free-will’s movement towards God and sin; since it is by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required for the justification of the ungodly.

On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Is. 27:9): “This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken away.” Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification.

I answer that, There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for this is that, as stated above [2221](A[1]), the justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required: first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two movements—of departure from the term “whence,” and of approach to the term “whereto”; but the consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed.

Reply to Objection 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach the term, as stated above [2222](A[5]).

Reply to Objection 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one thing is the corruption of another.

Reply to Objection 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is division of the things required for the completion of anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some follow.

Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or successively?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already stated [2223] (A[3]), for the justification of the ungodly, there is required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above (Q[13], A[1]). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly would seem to be successive.

Objection 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually and at once, as stated above ([2224]FP, Q[85], A[4]). Hence, since for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards sin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an instant.

Objection 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may be greater or less, as stated above ([2225]Q[112], A[4]). Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.

Objection 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace, without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on ([2226]Q[114], A[2]). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once.

Objection 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between which there must be time, as the

Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1). Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once, but successively.

On the contrary, The justification of the ungodly is caused by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: "And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that "the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.

I answer that, The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it was stated ([2227]Q[112], A[2]) that God, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and successively, as stated above ([2228]Q[112], A[2], ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature instantaneous. Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an instant.

Reply to Objection 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local movement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2229]FP, Q[85], A[5]), there is nothing to prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together, inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in the same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement towards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God, since a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will—the movements of the free-will—are not successive, but instantaneous. Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive.

Reply to Objection 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that in time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant. Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it has the form which is the term of the movement.

But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as in the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous, as stated above ([2230]FP, Q[53], AA[2],3). In these, therefore, there is a last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which the subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is no continuity of time, which this would necessitate.

Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species, as stated above ([2231]FP, Q[85], AA[1],2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin inhered.

Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required for the justification of the ungodly?

Objection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps. 33:15: “Turn away from evil, and do good.” Now the remission of sins regards the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it disposes. Now the free-will’s movement is a disposition for the reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace.

Objection 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God. Now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will’s movement towards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace.

On the contrary, The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above [2232](A[7]). Therefore it is naturally prior to it.

I answer that, The aforesaid four things required for the justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification of the ungodly is not successive, as stated above [2233](A[7]); but in the order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the free-will's movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement towards sin; the fourth, the remission of sin.

The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover is the infusion of grace, as stated above [2234](A[6]); the movement or disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the term or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above [2235](A[6]). Hence in their natural order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is the free-will's movement towards God; the third is the free-will's movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards God naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin, to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above ([2236]AA[1],6).

Reply to Objection 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to another may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved, and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God Who justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term “whence” of justification is sin; and the term “whereto” is justice; and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of justice.

Reply to Objection 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will’s movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature, and follows the infusion of grace.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the practical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as the free-will’s movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of nature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing the impediment of sin.

Whether the justification of the ungodly is God’s greatest work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not God’s greatest work. For it is by the justification of the ungodly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.

Objection 2: Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to the particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater than the good of one man, as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly.

Objection 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is nought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something with the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes something from something, i.e. a just man from a sinner, and there is a cooperation on man’s part, since there is a movement of the free-will, as stated above [2237](A[3]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is not God’s greatest work.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 144:9): “His tender mercies are over all His works,” and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost] we say: “O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by pardoning and having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words, "greater than these shall he do" (Jn. 14:12) says that "for a just man to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth."

I answer that, A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that "for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall endure."

Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways: first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quantity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: "Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to create the angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy."

And thus the reply to the first is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in which way creation is God's greatest work.

Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?

Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous.

Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine [2238](A[9]). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work.

Objection 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is miraculous.

Objection 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by God.

On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that “to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man’s nature; but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful.” Therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.

I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above ([2239]FP, Q[105], A[7]). And thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is miraculous.

Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as Augustine says, in the above quotation.

Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become perfect; because “charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits perfection,” as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this respect.

Reply to Objection 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God’s. Hence there is no parity.

OF MERIT (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?

(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?

(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?

(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit?

(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?

(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?

(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?

(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?

(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?

(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?

Whether a man may merit anything from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is written (Lk. 17:10): “When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do.” Therefore a man can merit nothing from God.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is written (Job 35:7): “If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He receive of thy hand.” Hence a man can merit nothing from God.

Objection 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor; for a man’s wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one’s debtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): “Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?” Hence no one can merit anything from God.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 31:16): “There is a reward for thy work.” Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God.

I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child merits something from his father and the slave from his lord.

Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious.

Reply to Objection 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e. the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.

Reply to Objection 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out.

Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?

Objection 1: It would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained to, as stated above [2240](A[1]). Now man by his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude which is eternal life.

Objection 2: Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it is. Now, less due is that work which is done by one who has received fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has received fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as well as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious with God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some extent, much more may he who has no grace.

Objection 3: Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even though he has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): "The grace of God, life everlasting."

I answer that, Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as was said above ([2241]Q[109], A[2]): the first, a state of perfect nature, in which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt nature, in which we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural endowments, viz. because man's merit depends on the Divine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are the principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that nothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man." And hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, a second reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For since sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is clear from what has been said above ([2242]Q[71], A[6];[2243]

Q[113], A[2]), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, which is brought about by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, but death, according to Rom. 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.”

Reply to Objection 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this way its act can be meritorious of eternal life.

Reply to Objection 2: Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed the operations equal in both cases.

Reply to Objection 3: With regard to the first reason adduced, the case is different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of well-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing from God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying (Rom. 11:35): “Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?” But man may merit from man, before he has received anything from him, by what he has received from God.

But as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from another whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and is reconciled.

Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): “The sufferings of this time are not worthy [condignae] to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us.” But of all meritorious works, the sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly.

Objection 2: Further, on Rom. 6:23, “The grace of God, life everlasting,” a gloss says: “He might have truly said: ‘The wages of justice, life everlasting’; but He preferred to say ‘The grace of God, life everlasting,’ that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting of His own mercy and not by our merits.” Now when anyone merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit. Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life everlasting condignly.

Objection 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life, which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature. Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.

On the contrary, What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, in accordance with the judgment of justice, according to 2 Tim. 4:8: “As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day.” Therefore man merits everlasting life condignly.

I answer that, Man’s meritorious work may be considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will, there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should reward him according to the excellence of his power.

If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: “Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting.” And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these sufferings.

Reply to Objection 2: This saying is to be understood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God’s mercy. But our merit is a subsequent cause.

Reply to Objection 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause of life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the “pledge” of our inheritance.

Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to work, according to Mat. 20:8: “Call the laborers and pay them their hire.” Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative habit, as stated above ([2244]Q[55], A[2]). Hence every virtue is equally a principle of merit.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): “Every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor.” Now charity lessens rather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm. lxx), “love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing.” Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than any other virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and bravely even till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than charity.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 14:21): “He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him.” Now everlasting life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, according to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true” and living “God.” Hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly with charity.

I answer that, As we may gather from what has been stated above [2245](A[1]), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind’s movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end pertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was said above ([2246]Q[9], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways: first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the work pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil—rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils, “for it does great things, if it exists,” as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless “faith . . . worketh by charity” (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: “If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.”

Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), “faith merits justification.” Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first grace.

Objection 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly. Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly.

Objection 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use of it in his master’s service. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the first grace already received from God.

On the contrary, The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works, according to Rom. 4:4: “Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt.” Now a man merits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace.

I answer that, The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom. 11:6), “if by grace, it is not now by works.” Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our good works, as stated above ([2247]Q[109]). But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes, whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above ([2248]Q[113], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, Who alone “can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed” (Job 14:4).

Reply to Objection 3: Man’s every good work proceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men.

Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for another. Because on Mat. 9:2: “Jesus seeing their faith,” etc. a gloss says: “How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a price on another’s faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!” Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man can merit the first grace for another.

Objection 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but efficacious, according to James 5:16: “The continued prayer of a just man availeth much.” Now he had previously said: “Pray one for another, that you may be saved.” Hence, since man’s salvation can only be brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his first grace.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 16:9): “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting dwellings.” Now it is through grace alone that anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does anyone merit everlasting life as stated above [2249](A[2]; Q[109], A[5]). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 15:1): “If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people”—yet they had great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the first grace for another.

I answer that, As shown above ([2250]AA[1],3,4), our works are meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift of grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ’s soul is moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: “Who hath brought many children into glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation.”

But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a man in grace fulfils God’s will, and it is congruous and in harmony with friendship that God should fulfil man’s desire for the salvation of another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense that the passage from Jeremias speaks.

Reply to Objection 1: A man’s faith avails for another’s salvation by congruous and not by condign merit.

Reply to Objection 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things from the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according to Dan. 9:18: “For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies.”

Reply to Objection 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works, or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting dwellings.

Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?

Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super Ps. lxx.], according to Ps. 70:9: “When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me.” Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall.

Objection 2: Further, a man’s works benefit himself more than another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself restoration after a fall.

Objection 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above [2251](A[2]; Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself restoration.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): “If the just man turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered.” Therefore his previous merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for himself restoration after a fall.

I answer that, No one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent sin; hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit—the motion of the preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall.

Reply to Objection 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.

Reply to Objection 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him who merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit of grace.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that no one “absolutely” merits life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only “conditionally,” i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less meritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening impediment.

Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no other reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Mat. 6:2): “They have received their reward.” Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace has been increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting.

Objection 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above ([2252]AA[2], 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity than he has.

Objection 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a man would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he infallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for it is written (2 Tim. 1:12): “I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him.” Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by every meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times meritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come under merit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that “charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected.” Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.

I answer that, As stated above ([2253]AA[6],7), whatever the motion of grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the whole progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of charity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: “But the path of the just as a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day," which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under condign merit.

Reply to Objection 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is both beginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward.

Reply to Objection 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its quantity.

Reply to Objection 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life. But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time, viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.

Whether a man may merit perseverance?

Objection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that is in grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of the Lord's Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance may come under the merit of whoever has grace.

Objection 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin. But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal life, of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may we merit not to sin, i.e. to persevere.

Objection 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of grace, as was stated above [2254](A[8]). Much more, therefore, may he merit perseverance in the grace he has already.

On the contrary, What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain perseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.

I answer that, Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance in good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of the Divine motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above ([2255]AA[6],7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's movement directed to God the mover, falls under human merit; and not what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is clear that the perseverance of glory which is the term of the aforesaid movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not fall under merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good of perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it.

Reply to Objection 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins, which they do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in Joan.] on Jn. 11:31, "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners," otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God, be merciful to me a sinner," Lk. 18:13. So too may we impetrate of God in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for others, although it does not fall under merit.

Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the wayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.

In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the increase of grace, as was explained above.

Whether temporal goods fall under merit?

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit. Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of justice, as appears from Dt. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods fall under merit.

Objection 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows temporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written (Ex. 1:21): “And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses”; on which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that “life everlasting might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on account of their sin of falsehood they received an earthly reward.” And it is written (Ezech. 29:18): “The King of Babylon hath made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no reward given him,” and further on: “And it shall be wages for his army . . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored for me.” Therefore temporal goods fall under merit.

Objection 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gn. 19. Hence temporal goods fall under merit.

Objection 4: On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike; according to Eccles. 9:2: “All things equally happen to the just and the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth sacrifices.” Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.

I answer that, What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a kind of good. Now man’s good is twofold: the first, simply; the second, relatively. Now man’s good simply is his last end (according to Ps. 72:27: “But it is good for men to adhere to my God”) and consequently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply under merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and this does not fall under merit simply, but relatively.

Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the first grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): “For there is no want to them that fear Him,” and again, Ps. 36:25: “I have not seen the just forsaken,” etc.

But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not man’s good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall under merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do temporal works, in which with God’s help they reach their purpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above ([2256]AA[3],6), so have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the nature of reward, with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men’s wills are moved to undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men have not a right intention in them.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), “in these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For the carnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life; and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic.”

Reply to Objection 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to the malice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon, since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather in order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not right, inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.

Reply to Objection 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life everlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not punishments but medicines as stated above ([2257]Q[87], A[8]).

Reply to Objection 4: All things happen equally to the good and the wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as regards the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by them.

And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.

SECOND PART OF THE SECOND PART
(SS) (QQ[1]-189)

TREATISE ON THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES (QQ[1]-46)

OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)

Having to treat now of the theological virtues, we shall begin with Faith, secondly we shall speak of Hope, and thirdly, of Charity.

The treatise on Faith will be fourfold: (1) Of faith itself; (2) Of the corresponding gifts, knowledge and understanding; (3) Of the opposite vices; (4) Of the precepts pertaining to this virtue.

About faith itself we shall consider: (1) its object; (2) its act; (3) the habit of faith.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?

(2) Whether the object of faith is something complex or incomplex, i.e. whether it is a thing or a proposition?

(3) Whether anything false can come under faith?

(4) Whether the object of faith can be anything seen?

(5) Whether it can be anything known?

(6) Whether the things to be believed should be divided into a certain number of articles?

(7) Whether the same articles are of faith for all times?

(8) Of the number of articles;

(9) Of the manner of embodying the articles in a symbol;

(10) Who has the right to propose a symbol of faith?

Whether the object of faith is the First Truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not the First Truth. For it seems that the object of faith is that which is proposed to us to be believed. Now not only things pertaining to the Godhead, i.e. the First Truth, are proposed to us to be believed, but also things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, and the condition of creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth.

Objection 2: Further, faith and unbelief have the same object since they are opposed to one another. Now unbelief can be about all things contained in Holy Writ, for whichever one of them a man denies, he is considered an unbeliever. Therefore faith also is about all things contained in Holy Writ. But there are many things therein, concerning man and other creatures. Therefore the object of faith is not only the First Truth, but also created truth.

Objection 3: Further, faith is condivided with charity, as stated above ([2258]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now by charity we love not only God, who is the sovereign Good, but also our neighbor. Therefore the object of Faith is not only the First Truth.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is about the simple and everlasting truth." Now this is the First Truth. Therefore the object of faith is the First Truth.

I answer that, The object of every cognitive habit includes two things: first, that which is known materially, and is the material object, so to speak, and, secondly, that whereby it is known, which is the formal aspect of the object. Thus in the science of geometry, the conclusions are what is known materially, while the formal aspect of the science is the mean of demonstration, through which the conclusions are known.

Accordingly if we consider, in faith, the formal aspect of the object, it is nothing else than the First Truth. For the faith of which we are speaking, does not assent to anything, except because it is revealed by God. Hence the mean on which faith is based is the Divine Truth. If, however, we consider materially the things to which faith assents, they include not only God, but also many other things, which, nevertheless, do not come under the assent of faith, except as bearing some relation to God, in as much as, to wit, through certain effects of the Divine operation, man is helped on his journey towards the enjoyment of God. Consequently from this point of view also the object of faith is, in a way, the First Truth, in as much as nothing comes under faith except in relation to God, even as the object of the medical art is health, for it considers nothing save in relation to health.

Reply to Objection 1: Things concerning Christ's human nature, and the sacraments of the Church, or any creatures whatever, come under faith, in so far as by them we are directed to God, and in as much as we assent to them on account of the Divine Truth.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection, as regards all things contained in Holy Writ.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity also loves our neighbor on account of God, so that its object, properly speaking, is God, as we shall show further on ([2259]Q[25] , A[1]).

Whether the object of faith is something complex, by way of a proposition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is not something complex by way of a proposition. For the object of faith is the First Truth, as stated above [2260](A[1]). Now the First Truth is something simple. Therefore the object of faith is not something complex.

Objection 2: Further, the exposition of faith is contained in the symbol. Now the symbol does not contain propositions, but things: for it is not stated therein that God is almighty, but: "I believe in God . . . almighty." Therefore the object of faith is not a proposition but a thing.

Objection 3: Further, faith is succeeded by vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. Now I know in part; but then I shall know even as I am known." But the object of the heavenly vision is something simple, for it is the Divine Essence. Therefore the faith of the wayfarer is also.

On the contrary, Faith is a mean between science and opinion. Now the mean is in the same genus as the extremes. Since, then, science and opinion are about propositions, it seems that faith is likewise about propositions; so that its object is something complex.

I answer that, The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Now the mode proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by synthesis and analysis, as stated in the [2261]FP, Q[85], A[5].

Hence things that are simple in themselves, are known by the intellect with a certain amount of complexity, just as on the other hand, the Divine intellect knows, without any complexity, things that are complex in themselves.

Accordingly the object of faith may be considered in two ways. First, as regards the thing itself which is believed, and thus the object of faith is something simple, namely the thing itself about which we have faith. Secondly, on the part of the believer, and in this respect the object of faith is something complex by way of a proposition.

Hence in the past both opinions have been held with a certain amount of truth.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the object of faith on the part of the thing believed.

Reply to Objection 2: The symbol mentions the things about which faith is, in so far as the act of the believer is terminated in them, as is evident from the manner of speaking about them. Now the act of the believer does not terminate in a proposition, but in a thing. For as in science we do not form propositions, except in order to have knowledge about things through their means, so is it in faith.

Reply to Objection 3: The object of the heavenly vision will be the First Truth seen in itself, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: “We know that when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him: because we shall see Him as He is”: hence that vision will not be by way of a proposition but by way of a simple understanding. On the other hand, by faith, we do not apprehend the First Truth as it is in itself. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether anything false can come under faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that something false can come under faith. For faith is condivided with hope and charity. Now something false can come under hope, since many hope to have eternal life, who will not obtain it. The same may be said of charity, for many are loved as being good, who, nevertheless, are not good. Therefore something false can be the object of faith.

Objection 2: Further, Abraham believed that Christ would be born, according to Jn. 8:56: “Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see My day: he saw it, and was glad.” But after the time of Abraham, God might not have taken flesh, for it was merely because He willed that He did, so that what Abraham believed about Christ would have been false. Therefore the object of faith can be something false.

Objection 3: Further, the ancients believed in the future birth of Christ, and many continued so to believe, until they heard the preaching of the Gospel. Now, when once Christ was born, even before He began to preach, it was false that Christ was yet to be born. Therefore something false can come under faith.

Objection 4: Further, it is a matter of faith, that one should believe that the true Body of Christ is contained in the Sacrament of the altar. But it might happen that the bread was not rightly consecrated, and that there was not Christ’s true Body there, but only bread. Therefore something false can come under faith.

On the contrary, No virtue that perfects the intellect is related to the false, considered as the evil of the intellect, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 2). Now faith is a virtue that perfects the intellect, as we shall show further on ([2262]Q[4], AA[2],5). Therefore nothing false can come under it.

I answer that, Nothing comes under any power, habit or act, except by means of the formal aspect of the object: thus color cannot be seen except by means of light, and a conclusion cannot be known save through the mean of demonstration. Now it has been stated [2263](A[1]) that the formal aspect of the object of faith is the First Truth; so that nothing can come under faith, save in so far as it stands under the First Truth, under which nothing false can stand, as neither can non-being stand under being, nor evil under goodness. It follows therefore that nothing false can come under faith.

Reply to Objection 1: Since the true is the good of the intellect, but not of the appetitive power, it follows that all virtues which perfect the intellect, exclude the false altogether, because it belongs to the nature of a virtue to bear relation to the good alone. On the other hand those virtues which perfect the appetitive faculty, do not entirely exclude the false, for it is possible to act in accordance with justice or temperance, while having a false opinion about what one is doing. Therefore, as faith perfects the intellect, whereas hope and charity perfect the appetitive part, the comparison between them fails.

Nevertheless neither can anything false come under hope, for a man hopes to obtain eternal life, not by his own power (since this would be an act of presumption), but with the help of grace; and if he perseveres therein he will obtain eternal life surely and infallibly.

In like manner it belongs to charity to love God, wherever He may be; so that it matters not to charity, whether God be in the individual whom we love for God’s sake.

Reply to Objection 2: That “God would not take flesh,” considered in itself was possible even after Abraham’s time, but in so far as it stands in God’s foreknowledge, it has a certain necessity of infallibility, as explained in the [2264]FP, Q[14], AA[13],15: and it is thus that it comes under faith. Hence in so far as it comes under faith, it cannot be false.

Reply to Objection 3: After Christ’s birth, to believe in Him, was to believe in Christ’s birth at some time or other. The fixing of the time, wherein some were deceived was not due to their faith, but to a human conjecture. For it is possible for a believer to have a false opinion through a human conjecture, but it is quite impossible for a false opinion to be the outcome of faith.

Reply to Objection 4: The faith of the believer is not directed to such and such accidents of bread, but to the fact that the true body of Christ is under the appearances of sensible bread, when it is rightly consecrated. Hence if it be not rightly consecrated, it does not follow that anything false comes under faith.

Whether the object of faith can be something seen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the object of faith is something seen. For Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:29): “Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed.” Therefore vision and faith regard the same object.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, while speaking of the knowledge of faith, says (1 Cor. 13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” Therefore what is believed is seen.

Objection 3: Further, faith is a spiritual light. Now something is seen under every light. Therefore faith is of things seen.

Objection 4: Further, “Every sense is a kind of sight,” as Augustine states (De Verb. Domini, Serm. xxxiii). But faith is of things heard, according to

Rom. 10:17: “Faith . . . cometh by hearing.” Therefore faith is of things seen.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that “faith is the evidence of things that appear not.”

I answer that, Faith implies assent of the intellect to that which is believed. Now the intellect assents to a thing in two ways. First, through being moved to assent by its very object, which is known either by itself (as in the case of first principles, which are held by the habit of understanding), or through something else already known (as in the case of conclusions which are held by the habit of science). Secondly the intellect assents to something, not through being sufficiently moved to this assent by its proper object, but through an act of choice, whereby it turns voluntarily to one side rather than to the other: and if this be accompanied by doubt or fear of the opposite side, there will be opinion, while, if there be certainty and no fear of the other side, there will be faith.

Now those things are said to be seen which, of themselves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them. Wherefore it is evident that neither faith nor opinion can be of things seen either by the senses or by the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Thomas “saw one thing, and believed another” [*St. Gregory: Hom. xxvi in Evang.]: he saw the Man, and believing Him to be God, he made profession of his faith, saying: “My Lord and my God.”

Reply to Objection 2: Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed.

Reply to Objection 3: The light of faith makes us see what we believe. For just as, by the habits of the other virtues, man sees what is becoming to him in respect of that habit, so, by the habit of faith, the human mind is directed to assent to such things as are becoming to a right faith, and not to assent to others.

Reply to Objection 4: Hearing is of words signifying what is of faith, but not of the things themselves that are believed; hence it does not follow that these things are seen.

Whether those things that are of faith can be an object of science [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration]?

Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be an object of science. For where science is lacking there is ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: “I did it ignorantly in unbelief.” Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

Objection 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such things can be an object of science.

Objection 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of science, since a “demonstration is a syllogism that produces science.” Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth. Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.

Objection 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster. i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that “when a thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of perception.” Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an object of science.

I answer that, All science is derived from self-evident and therefore “seen” principles; wherefore all objects of science must needs be, in a fashion, seen.

Now as stated above [2265](A[4]), it is impossible that one and the same thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however, that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face”: which vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see. In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer, is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it by demonstration.

Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not about the same things.

Reply to Objection 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A[4], ad 2,3).

Reply to Objection 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work ([2266]FP, Q[1], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by demonstration must know them first of all by faith.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), “science and opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men,” as we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and, by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man, about the same object, and in the same respect, science is incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons. Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise. Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.

Whether those things that are of faith should be divided into certain articles?

Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith should not be divided into certain articles. For all things contained in Holy Writ are matters of faith. But these, by reason of their multitude, cannot be reduced to a certain number. Therefore it seems superfluous to distinguish certain articles of faith.

Objection 2: Further, material differences can be multiplied indefinitely, and therefore art should take no notice of them. Now the formal aspect of the object of faith is one and indivisible, as stated above [2267](A[1]), viz. the First Truth, so that matters of faith cannot be distinguished in respect of their formal object. Therefore no notice should be taken of a material division of matters of faith into articles.

Objection 3: Further, it has been said by some [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] that “an article is an indivisible truth concerning God, exacting [arctans] our belief.” Now belief is a voluntary act, since, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), “no man believes against his will.” Therefore it seems that matters of faith should not be divided into articles.

On the contrary, Isidore says: “An article is a glimpse of Divine truth, tending thereto.” Now we can only get a glimpse of Divine truth by way of analysis, since things which in God are one, are manifold in our intellect. Therefore matters of faith should be divided into articles.

I answer that, the word “article” is apparently derived from the Greek; for the Greek {arthron} [*Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa Aurea] which the Latin renders “articulus,” signifies a fitting together of distinct parts:

wherefore the small parts of the body which fit together are called the articulations of the limbs. Likewise, in the Greek grammar, articles are parts of speech which are affixed to words to show their gender, number or case. Again in rhetoric, articles are parts that fit together in a sentence, for Tully says (Rhet. iv) that an article is composed of words each pronounced singly and separately, thus: “Your passion, your voice, your look, have struck terror into your foes.”

Hence matters of Christian faith are said to contain distinct articles, in so far as they are divided into parts, and fit together. Now the object of faith is something unseen in connection with God, as stated above [2268](A[4]). Consequently any matter that, for a special reason, is unseen, is a special article; whereas when several matters are known or not known, under the same aspect, we are not to distinguish various articles. Thus one encounters one difficulty in seeing that God suffered, and another in seeing that He rose again from the dead, wherefore the article of the Resurrection is distinct from the article of the Passion. But that He suffered, died and was buried, present the same difficulty, so that if one be accepted, it is not difficult to accept the others; wherefore all these belong to one article.

Reply to Objection 1: Some things are proposed to our belief are in themselves of faith, while others are of faith, not in themselves but only in relation to others: even as in sciences certain propositions are put forward on their own account, while others are put forward in order to manifest others. Now, since the chief object of faith consists in those things which we hope to see, according to Heb. 11:2: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for,” it follows that those things are in themselves of faith, which order us directly to eternal life. Such are the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God [*The Leonine Edition reads: The Three Persons, the omnipotence of God, etc.], the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation, and the like: and these are distinct articles of faith. On the other hand certain things in Holy Writ are proposed to our belief, not chiefly on their own account, but for the manifestation of those mentioned above: for instance, that Abraham had two sons, that a dead man rose again at the touch of Eliseus’ bones, and the like, which are related in Holy Writ for the purpose of manifesting the Divine mystery or the Incarnation of Christ: and such things should not form distinct articles.

Reply to Objection 2: The formal aspect of the object of faith can be taken in two ways: first, on the part of the thing believed, and thus there is one formal aspect of all matters of faith, viz. the First Truth: and from this point of view there is no distinction of articles. Secondly, the formal aspect of matters of faith, can be considered from our point of view; and thus the formal aspect of a matter of faith is that it is something unseen; and from this point of view there are various distinct articles of faith, as we saw above.

Reply to Objection 3: This definition of an article is taken from an etymology of the word as derived from the Latin, rather than in accordance with its real meaning, as derived from the Greek: hence it does not carry much weight. Yet even then it could be said that although faith is exacted of no man by a necessity of coercion, since belief is a voluntary act, yet it is exacted of him by a necessity of end, since “he that cometh to God must believe that He is,” and “without faith it is impossible to please God,” as the Apostle declares (Heb. 11:6).

Whether the articles of faith have increased in course of time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith have not increased in course of time. Because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1), “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Now the same things are to be hoped for at all times. Therefore, at all times, the same things are to be believed.

Objection 2: Further, development has taken place, in sciences devised by man, on account of the lack of knowledge in those who discovered them, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ii). Now the doctrine of faith was not devised by man, but was delivered to us by God, as stated in Eph. 2:8: “It is the gift of God.” Since then there can be no lack of knowledge in God, it seems that knowledge of matters of faith was perfect from the beginning and did not increase as time went on.

Objection 3: Further, the operation of grace proceeds in orderly fashion no less than the operation of nature. Now nature always makes a beginning with perfect things, as Boethius states (De Consol. iii). Therefore it seems that the operation of grace also began with perfect things, so that those who were the first to deliver the faith, knew it most perfectly.

Objection 4: Further, just as the faith of Christ was delivered to us through the apostles, so too, in the Old Testament, the knowledge of faith was delivered by the early fathers to those who came later, according to Dt. 32:7: “Ask thy father, and he will declare to thee.” Now the apostles were most fully instructed about the mysteries, for “they received them more fully than others, even as they received them earlier,” as a gloss says on Rom. 8:23: “Ourselves also who have the first fruits of the Spirit.” Therefore it seems that knowledge of matters of faith has not increased as time went on.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Ezech.) that “the knowledge of the holy fathers increased as time went on . . . and the nearer they were to Our Savior’s coming, the more fully did they received the mysteries of salvation.”

I answer that, The articles of faith stand in the same relation to the doctrine of faith, as self-evident principles to a teaching based on natural reason. Among these principles there is a certain order, so that some are contained implicitly in others; thus all principles are reduced, as to their first principle, to this one: “The same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,” as the Philosopher states (Metaph. iv, text. 9). In like manner all the articles are contained implicitly in certain primary matters of faith, such as God’s existence, and His providence over the salvation of man, according to Heb. 11: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” For the existence of God includes all that we believe to exist in God eternally, and in these our happiness consists; while belief in His providence includes all those things which God dispenses in time, for man’s salvation, and which are the way to that happiness: and in this way, again, some of those articles which follow from these are contained in others: thus faith in the Redemption of mankind includes belief in the Incarnation of Christ, His Passion and so forth.

Accordingly we must conclude that, as regards the substance of the articles of faith, they have not received any increase as time went on: since whatever those who lived later have believed, was contained, albeit implicitly, in the faith of those Fathers who preceded them. But there was an increase in the number of articles believed explicitly, since to those who lived in later times some were known explicitly which were not known explicitly by those who lived before them. Hence the Lord said to Moses

(Ex. 6:2,3): “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob [*Vulg.: ‘I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob’] . . . and My name Adonai I did not show them”: David also said (Ps. 118:100): “I have had understanding above ancients”: and the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5) that the mystery of Christ, “in other generations was not known, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets.”

Reply to Objection 1: Among men the same things were always to be hoped for from Christ. But as they did not acquire this hope save through Christ, the further they were removed from Christ in point of time, the further they were from obtaining what they hoped for. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 11:13): “All these died according to faith, not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off.” Now the further off a thing is the less distinctly is it seen; wherefore those who were nigh to Christ’s advent had a more distinct knowledge of the good things to be hoped for.

Reply to Objection 2: Progress in knowledge occurs in two ways. First, on the part of the teacher, be he one or many, who makes progress in knowledge as time goes on: and this is the kind of progress that takes place in sciences devised by man. Secondly, on the part of the learner; thus the master, who has perfect knowledge of the art, does not deliver it all at once to his disciple from the very outset, for he would not be able to take it all in, but he condescends to the disciple’s capacity and instructs him little by little. It is in this way that men made progress in the knowledge of faith as time went on. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24) compares the state of the Old Testament to childhood.

Reply to Objection 3: Two causes are requisite before actual generation can take place, an agent, namely, and matter. In the order of the active cause, the more perfect is naturally first; and in this way nature makes a beginning with perfect things, since the imperfect is not brought to perfection, except by something perfect already in existence. On the other hand, in the order of the material cause, the imperfect comes first, and in this way nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Now in the manifestation of faith, God is the active cause, having perfect knowledge from all eternity; while man is likened to matter in receiving the influx of God’s action. Hence, among men, the knowledge of faith had to proceed from imperfection to perfection; and, although some men have been after the manner of active causes, through being doctors of faith, nevertheless the manifestation of the Spirit is given to such men for the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7; so that the knowledge of faith was imparted to the Fathers who were instructors in the faith, so far as was necessary at the time for the instruction of the people, either openly or in figures.

Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate consummation of grace was effected by Christ, wherefore the time of His coming is called the “time of fulness [*Vulg.: ‘fulness of time’]” (Gal. 4:4). Hence those who were nearest to Christ, wherefore before, like John the Baptist, or after, like the apostles, had a fuller knowledge of the mysteries of faith; for even with regard to man’s state we find that the perfection of manhood comes in youth, and that a man’s state is all the more perfect, whether before or after, the nearer it is to the time of his youth.

Whether the articles of faith are suitably formulated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the articles of faith are unsuitably formulated. For those things, which can be known by demonstration, do not belong to faith as to an object of belief for all, as stated above (A[5]). Now it can be known by demonstration that there is one God; hence the Philosopher proves this (Metaph. xii, text. 52) and many other philosophers demonstrated the same truth. Therefore that “there is one God” should not be set down as an article of faith.

Objection 2: Further, just as it is necessary to faith that we should believe God to be almighty, so is it too that we should believe Him to be “all-knowing” and “provident for all,” about both of which points some have erred. Therefore, among the articles of faith, mention should have been made of God’s wisdom and providence, even as of His omnipotence.

Objection 3: Further, to know the Father is the same things as to know the Son, according to Jn. 14:9: “He that seeth Me, seeth the Father also.” Therefore there ought to be but one article about the Father and Son, and, for the same reason, about the Holy Ghost.

Objection 4: Further, the Person of the Father is no less than the Person of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Now there are several articles about the Person of the Holy Ghost, and likewise about the Person of the Son. Therefore there should be several articles about the Person of the Father.

Objection 5: Further, just as certain things are said by appropriation, of the Person of the Father and of the Person of the Holy Ghost, so too is something appropriated to the Person of the Son, in respect of His Godhead. Now, among the articles of faith, a place is given to a work appropriated to the Father, viz. the creation, and likewise, a work appropriated to the Holy Ghost, viz. that "He spoke by the prophets." Therefore the articles of faith should contain some work appropriated to the Son in respect of His Godhead.

Objection 6: Further, the sacrament of the Eucharist presents a special difficulty over and above the other articles. Therefore it should have been mentioned in a special article: and consequently it seems that there is not a sufficient number of articles.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Church who formulates the articles thus.

I answer that, As stated above ([2269]AA[4],6), to faith those things in themselves belong, the sight of which we shall enjoy in eternal life, and by which we are brought to eternal life. Now two things are proposed to us to be seen in eternal life: viz. the secret of the Godhead, to see which is to possess happiness; and the mystery of Christ's Incarnation, "by Whom we have access" to the glory of the sons of God, according to Rom. 5:2. Hence it is written (Jn. 17:3): "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." Wherefore the first distinction in matters of faith is that some concern the majesty of the Godhead, while others pertain to the mystery of Christ's human nature, which is the "mystery of godliness" (1 Tim. 3:16).

Now with regard to the majesty of the Godhead, three things are proposed to our belief: first, the unity of the Godhead, to which the first article refers; secondly, the trinity of the Persons, to which three articles refer, corresponding to the three Persons; and thirdly, the works proper to the Godhead, the first of which refers to the order of nature, in relation to which the article about the creation is proposed to us; the second refers to the order of grace, in relation to which all matters concerning the sanctification of man are included in one article; while the third refers to the order of glory, and in relation to this another article is proposed to us concerning the resurrection of the dead and life everlasting. Thus there are seven articles referring to the Godhead.

In like manner, with regard to Christ’s human nature, there are seven articles, the first of which refers to Christ’s incarnation or conception; the second, to His virginal birth; the third, to His Passion, death and burial; the fourth, to His descent into hell; the fifth, to His resurrection; the sixth, to His ascension; the seventh, to His coming for the judgment, so that in all there are fourteen articles.

Some, however, distinguish twelve articles, six pertaining to the Godhead, and six to the humanity. For they include in one article the three about the three Persons; because we have one knowledge of the three Persons: while they divide the article referring to the work of glorification into two, viz. the resurrection of the body, and the glory of the soul. Likewise they unite the conception and nativity into one article.

Reply to Objection 1: By faith we hold many truths about God, which the philosophers were unable to discover by natural reason, for instance His providence and omnipotence, and that He alone is to be worshiped, all of which are contained in the one article of the unity of God.

Reply to Objection 2: The very name of the Godhead implies a kind of watching over things, as stated in the [2270]FP, Q[13], A[8]. Now in beings having an intellect, power does not work save by the will and knowledge. Hence God’s omnipotence includes, in a way, universal knowledge and providence. For He would not be able to do all He wills in things here below, unless He knew them, and exercised His providence over them.

Reply to Objection 3: We have but one knowledge of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, as to the unity of the Essence, to which the first article refers: but, as to the distinction of the Persons, which is by the relations of origin, knowledge of the Father does indeed, in a way, include knowledge of the Son, for He would not be Father, had He not a Son; the bond whereof being the Holy Ghost. From this point of view, there was a sufficient motive for those who referred one article to the three Persons. Since, however, with regard to each Person, certain points have to be observed, about which some happen to fall into error, looking at it in this way, we may distinguish three articles about the three Persons. For Arius believed in the omnipotence and eternity of the Father, but did not believe the Son to be co-equal and consubstantial with the Father; hence the need for an article about the Person of the Son in order to settle this point. In like manner it was necessary to appoint a third article about the Person of the Holy Ghost, against Macedonius. In the same way Christ’s conception and birth, just as the resurrection and life everlasting, can from one point of view be united together in one article, in so far as they are ordained to one end; while, from another point of view, they can be distinct articles, in as much as each one separately presents a special difficulty.

Reply to Objection 4: It belongs to the Son and Holy Ghost to be sent to sanctify the creature; and about this several things have to be believed. Hence it is that there are more articles about the Persons of the Son and Holy Ghost than about the Person of the Father, Who is never sent, as we stated in the [2271]FP, Q[43], A[4].

Reply to Objection 5: The sanctification of a creature by grace, and its consummation by glory, is also effected by the gift of charity, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, and by the gift of wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son: so that each work belongs by appropriation, but under different aspects, both to the Son and to the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 6: Two things may be considered in the sacrament of the Eucharist. One is the fact that it is a sacrament, and in this respect it is like the other effects of sanctifying grace. The other is that Christ’s body is miraculously contained therein and thus it is included under God’s omnipotence, like all other miracles which are ascribed to God’s almighty power.

Whether it is suitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unsuitable for the articles of faith to be embodied in a symbol. Because Holy Writ is the rule of faith, to which no addition or subtraction can lawfully be made, since it is written (Dt. 4:2): “You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it.” Therefore it was unlawful to make a symbol as a rule of faith, after the Holy Writ had once been published.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Eph. 4:5) there is but “one faith.” Now the symbol is a profession of faith. Therefore it is not fitting that there should be more than one symbol.

Objection 3: Further, the confession of faith, which is contained in the symbol, concerns all the faithful. Now the faithful are not all competent to believe in God, but only those who have living faith. Therefore it is unfitting for the symbol of faith to be expressed in the words: “I believe in one God.”

Objection 4: Further, the descent into hell is one of the articles of faith, as stated above [2272](A[8]). But the descent into hell is not mentioned in the symbol of the Fathers. Therefore the latter is expressed inadequately.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxix in Joan.) expounding the passage, “You believe in God, believe also in Me” (Jn. 14:1) says: “We believe Peter or Paul, but we speak only of believing ‘in’ God.” Since then the Catholic Church is merely a created being, it seems unfitting to say: “In the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church.”

Objection 6: Further, a symbol is drawn up that it may be a rule of faith. Now a rule of faith ought to be proposed to all, and that publicly. Therefore every symbol, besides the symbol of the Fathers, should be sung at Mass. Therefore it seems unfitting to publish the articles of faith in a symbol.

On the contrary, The universal Church cannot err, since she is governed by the Holy Ghost, Who is the Spirit of truth: for such was Our Lord’s promise to His disciples (Jn. 16:13): “When He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will teach you all truth.” Now the symbol is published by the authority of the universal Church. Therefore it contains nothing defective.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6), “he that cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Now a man cannot believe, unless the truth be proposed to him that he may believe it. Hence the need for the truth of faith to be collected together, so that it might the more easily be proposed to all, lest anyone might stray from the truth through ignorance of the faith. It is from its being a collection of maxims of faith that the symbol [*The Greek {symballein}] takes its name.

Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is contained in Holy Writ, diffusely, under various modes of expression, and sometimes obscurely, so that, in order to gather the truth of faith from Holy Writ, one needs long study and practice, which are unattainable by all those who require to know the truth of faith, many of whom have no time for study, being busy with other affairs. And so it was necessary to gather together a clear summary from the sayings of Holy Writ, to be proposed to the belief of all. This indeed was no addition to Holy Writ, but something taken from it.

Reply to Objection 2: The same doctrine of faith is taught in all the symbols. Nevertheless, the people need more careful instruction about the truth of faith, when errors arise, lest the faith of simple-minded persons be corrupted by heretics. It was this that gave rise to the necessity of formulating several symbols, which nowise differ from one another, save that on account of the obstinacy of heretics, one contains more explicitly what another contains implicitly.

Reply to Objection 3: The confession of faith is drawn up in a symbol in the person, as it were, of the whole Church, which is united together by faith. Now the faith of the Church is living faith; since such is the faith to be found in all those who are of the Church not only outwardly but also by merit. Hence the confession of faith is expressed in a symbol, in a manner that is in keeping with living faith, so that even if some of the faithful lack living faith, they should endeavor to acquire it.

Reply to Objection 4: No error about the descent into hell had arisen among heretics, so that there was no need to be more explicit on that point. For this reason it is not repeated in the symbol of the Fathers, but is supposed as already settled in the symbol of the Apostles. For a subsequent symbol does not cancel a preceding one; rather does it expound it, as stated above (ad 2).

Reply to Objection 5: If we say: "'In' the holy Catholic Church," this must be taken as verified in so far as our faith is directed to the Holy Ghost, Who sanctifies the Church; so that the sense is: "I believe in the Holy Ghost sanctifying the Church." But it is better and more in keeping with the common use, to omit the 'in,' and say simply, "the holy Catholic Church," as Pope Leo [*Rufinus, Comm. in Sym. Apost.] observes.

Reply to Objection 6: Since the symbol of the Fathers is an explanation of the symbol of the Apostles, and was drawn up after the faith was already spread abroad, and when the Church was already at peace, it is sung publicly in the Mass. On the other hand the symbol of the Apostles, which was drawn up at the time of persecution, before the faith was made public, is said secretly at Prime and Compline, as though it were against the darkness of past and future errors.

Whether it belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol of faith. For a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to explain the articles of faith, as stated above [2273](A[9]). Now, in the Old Testament, the articles of faith were more and more explained as time went on, by reason of the truth of faith becoming clearer through greater nearness to Christ, as stated above [2274](A[7]). Since then this reason ceased with the advent of the New Law, there is no need for the articles of faith to be more and more explicit. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a new edition of the symbol.

Objection 2: Further, no man has the power to do what is forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church. Now it was forbidden under pain of anathema by the universal Church, to make a new edition of the symbol. For it is stated in the acts of the first* council of Ephesus (P. ii, Act. 6) that "after the symbol of the Nicene council had been read through, the holy synod decreed that it was unlawful to utter, write or draw up any other creed, than that which was defined by the Fathers assembled at Nicaea together with the Holy Ghost," and this under pain of anathema. [*St. Thomas wrote 'first' (expunged by Nicolai) to distinguish it from the other council, A.D. 451, known as the "Latrocinium" and condemned by the Pope.] The same was repeated in the acts of the council of Chalcedon (P. ii, Act. 5). Therefore it seems that the Sovereign Pontiff has no authority to publish a new edition of the symbol.

Objection 3: Further, Athanasius was not the Sovereign Pontiff, but patriarch of Alexandria, and yet he published a symbol which is sung in the Church. Therefore it does not seem to belong to the Sovereign Pontiff any more than to other bishops, to publish a new edition of the symbol.

On the contrary, The symbol was drawn us by a general council. Now such a council cannot be convoked otherwise than by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 4,5]. Therefore it belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to draw up a symbol.

I answer that, As stated above (OBJ 1), a new edition of the symbol becomes necessary in order to set aside the errors that may arise. Consequently to publish a new edition of the symbol belongs to that authority which is empowered to decide matters of faith finally, so that they may be held by all with unshaken faith. Now this belongs to the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, "to whom the more important and more difficult questions that arise in the Church are referred,” as stated in the Decretals [*Dist. xvii, Can. 5]. Hence our Lord said to Peter whom he made Sovereign Pontiff (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter, “that thy faith fail not, and thou, being once converted, confirm thy brethren.” The reason of this is that there should be but one faith of the whole Church, according to 1 Cor. 1:10: “That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you”: and this could not be secured unless any question of faith that may arise be decided by him who presides over the whole Church, so that the whole Church may hold firmly to his decision. Consequently it belongs to the sole authority of the Sovereign Pontiff to publish a new edition of the symbol, as do all other matters which concern the whole Church, such as to convoke a general council and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: The truth of faith is sufficiently explicit in the teaching of Christ and the apostles. But since, according to 2 Pet. 3:16, some men are so evil-minded as to pervert the apostolic teaching and other doctrines and Scriptures to their own destruction, it was necessary as time went on to express the faith more explicitly against the errors which arose.

Reply to Objection 2: This prohibition and sentence of the council was intended for private individuals, who have no business to decide matters of faith: for this decision of the general council did not take away from a subsequent council the power of drawing up a new edition of the symbol, containing not indeed a new faith, but the same faith with greater explicitness. For every council has taken into account that a subsequent council would expound matters more fully than the preceding council, if this became necessary through some heresy arising. Consequently this belongs to the Sovereign Pontiff, by whose authority the council is convoked, and its decision confirmed.

Reply to Objection 3: Athanasius drew up a declaration of faith, not under the form of a symbol, but rather by way of an exposition of doctrine, as appears from his way of speaking. But since it contained briefly the whole truth of faith, it was accepted by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff, so as to be considered as a rule of faith.

OF THE ACT OF FAITH (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the act of faith, and (1) the internal act; (2) the external act.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) What is “to believe,” which is the internal act of faith?

(2) In how many ways is it expressed?

(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in anything above natural reason?

(4) Whether it is necessary to believe those things that are attainable by natural reason?

(5) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe certain things explicitly?

(6) Whether all are equally bound to explicit faith?

(7) Whether explicit faith in Christ is always necessary for salvation?

(8) Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity explicitly?

(9) Whether the act of faith is meritorious?

(10) Whether human reason diminishes the merit of faith?

Whether to believe is to think with assent?

Objection 1: It would seem that to believe is not to think with assent. Because the Latin word “cogitatio” [thought] implies a research, for “cogitare” [to think] seems to be equivalent to “coagitare,” i.e. “to discuss together.” Now Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that faith is “an assent without research.” Therefore thinking has no place in the act of faith.

Objection 2: Further, faith resides in the reason, as we shall show further on (Q[4], A[2]). Now to think is an act of the cogitative power, which belongs to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the [2275]FP, Q[78], A[4]. Therefore thought has nothing to do with faith.

Objection 3: Further, to believe is an act of the intellect, since its object is truth. But assent seems to be an act not of the intellect, but of the will, even as consent is, as stated above ([2276]FS, Q[15], A[1], ad 3). Therefore to believe is not to think with assent.

On the contrary, This is how “to believe” is defined by Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. ii).

I answer that, “To think” can be taken in three ways. First, in a general way for any kind of actual consideration of the intellect, as Augustine observes (De Trin. xiv, 7): “By understanding I mean now the faculty whereby we understand when thinking.” Secondly, “to think” is more strictly taken for that consideration of the intellect, which is accompanied by some kind of inquiry, and which precedes the intellect’s arrival at the stage of perfection that comes with the certitude of sight. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16) that “the Son of God is not called the Thought, but the Word of God. When our thought realizes what we know and takes form therefrom, it becomes our word. Hence the Word of God must be understood without any thinking on the part of God, for there is nothing there that can take form, or be unformed.” In this way thought is, properly speaking, the movement of the mind while yet deliberating, and not yet perfected by the clear sight of truth. Since, however, such a movement of the mind may be one of deliberation either about universal notions, which belongs to the intellectual faculty, or about particular matters, which belongs to the sensitive part, hence it is that “to think” is taken secondly for an act of the deliberating intellect, and thirdly for an act of the cogitative power.

Accordingly, if “to think” be understood broadly according to the first sense, then “to think with assent,” does not express completely what is meant by “to believe”: since, in this way, a man thinks with assent even when he considers what he knows by science [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.], or understands. If, on the other hand, “to think” be understood in the second way, then this expresses completely the nature of the act of believing. For among the acts belonging to the intellect, some have a firm assent without any such kind of thinking, as when a man considers the things that he knows by science, or understands, for this consideration is already formed. But some acts of the intellect have unformed thought devoid of a firm assent, whether they incline to neither side, as in one who “doubts”; or incline to one side rather than the other, but on account of some slight motive, as in one who “suspects”; or incline to one side yet with fear of the other, as in one who “opines.” But this act “to believe,” cleaves firmly to one side, in which respect belief has something in common with science and understanding; yet its knowledge does not attain the perfection of clear sight, wherein it agrees with doubt, suspicion and opinion. Hence it is proper to the believer to think with assent: so that the act of believing is distinguished from all the other acts of the intellect, which are about the true or the false.

Reply to Objection 1: Faith has not that research of natural reason which demonstrates what is believed, but a research into those things whereby a man is induced to believe, for instance that such things have been uttered by God and confirmed by miracles.

Reply to Objection 2: “To think” is not taken here for the act of the cogitative power, but for an act of the intellect, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellect of the believer is determined to one object, not by the reason, but by the will, wherefore assent is taken here for an act of the intellect as determined to one object by the will.

Whether the act of faith is suitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God and believing in God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of faith is unsuitably distinguished as believing God, believing in a God, and believing in God. For one habit has but one act. Now faith is one habit since it is one virtue. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are three acts of faith.

Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all acts of faith should not be reckoned as a particular kind of act of faith. Now “to believe God” is common to all acts of faith, since faith is founded on the First Truth. Therefore it seems unreasonable to distinguish it from certain other acts of faith.

Objection 3: Further, that which can be said of unbelievers, cannot be called an act of faith. Now unbelievers can be said to believe in a God. Therefore it should not be reckoned an act of faith.

Objection 4: Further, movement towards the end belongs to the will, whose object is the good and the end. Now to believe is an act, not of the will, but of the intellect. Therefore “to believe in God,” which implies movement towards an end, should not be reckoned as a species of that act.

On the contrary is the authority of Augustine who makes this distinction (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxi—Tract. xxix in Joan.).

I answer that, The act of any power or habit depends on the relation of that power or habit to its object. Now the object of faith can be considered in three ways. For, since “to believe” is an act of the intellect, in so far as the will moves it to assent, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), the object of faith can be considered either on the part of the intellect, or on the part of the will that moves the intellect.

If it be considered on the part of the intellect, then two things can be observed in the object of faith, as stated above ([2277]Q[1], A[1]). One of these is the material object of faith, and in this way an act of faith is “to believe in a God”; because, as stated above ([2278]Q[1], A[1]) nothing is proposed to our belief, except in as much as it is referred to God. The other is the formal aspect of the object, for it is the medium on account of which we assent to such and such a point of faith; and thus an act of faith is “to believe God,” since, as stated above ([2279]Q[1], A[1]) the formal object of faith is the First Truth, to Which man gives his adhesion, so as to assent to Its sake to whatever he believes.

Thirdly, if the object of faith be considered in so far as the intellect is moved by the will, an act of faith is “to believe in God.” For the First Truth is referred to the will, through having the aspect of an end.

Reply to Objection 1: These three do not denote different acts of faith, but one and the same act having different relations to the object of faith.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Unbelievers cannot be said “to believe in a God” as we understand it in relation to the act of faith. For they do not believe that God exists under the conditions that faith determines; hence they do not truly believe in a God, since, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. ix, text. 22) “to know simple things defectively is not to know them at all.”

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above ([2280]FS, Q[9], A[1]) the will moves the intellect and the other powers of the soul to the end: and in this respect an act of faith is “to believe in God.”

Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for salvation to believe anything above the natural reason. For the salvation and perfection of a thing seem to be sufficiently insured by its natural endowments. Now matters of faith, surpass man's natural reason, since they are things unseen as stated above ([2281]Q[1], A[4]). Therefore to believe seems unnecessary for salvation.

Objection 2: Further, it is dangerous for man to assent to matters, wherein he cannot judge whether that which is proposed to him be true or false, according to Job 12:11: "Doth not the ear discern words?" Now a man cannot form a judgment of this kind in matters of faith, since he cannot trace them back to first principles, by which all our judgments are guided. Therefore it is dangerous to believe in such matters. Therefore to believe is not necessary for salvation.

Objection 3: Further, man's salvation rests on God, according to Ps. 36:39: "But the salvation of the just is from the Lord." Now "the invisible things" of God "are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made; His eternal power also and Divinity," according to Rom. 1:20: and those things which are clearly seen by the understanding are not an object of belief. Therefore it is not necessary for man's salvation, that he should believe certain things.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is impossible to please God."

I answer that, Wherever one nature is subordinate to another, we find that two things concur towards the perfection of the lower nature, one of which is in respect of that nature's proper movement, while the other is in respect of the movement of the higher nature. Thus water by its proper movement moves towards the centre (of the earth), while according to the movement of the moon, it moves round the centre by ebb and flow. In like manner the planets have their proper movements from west to east, while in accordance with the movement of the first heaven, they have a movement from east to west. Now the created rational nature alone is immediately subordinate to God, since other creatures do not attain to the universal, but only to something particular, while they partake of the Divine goodness either in "being" only, as inanimate things, or also in "living," and in "knowing singulars," as plants and animals; whereas the rational nature, in as much as it apprehends the universal notion of good and being, is immediately related to the universal principle of being.

Consequently the perfection of the rational creature consists not only in what belongs to it in respect of its nature, but also in that which it acquires through a supernatural participation of Divine goodness. Hence it was said above ([2282]FS, Q[3], A[8]) that man’s ultimate happiness consists in a supernatural vision of God: to which vision man cannot attain unless he be taught by God, according to Jn. 6:45: “Every one that hath heard of the Father and hath learned cometh to Me.” Now man acquires a share of this learning, not indeed all at once, but by little and little, according to the mode of his nature: and every one who learns thus must needs believe, in order that he may acquire science in a perfect degree; thus also the Philosopher remarks (De Soph. Elench. i, 2) that “it behooves a learner to believe.”

Hence in order that a man arrive at the perfect vision of heavenly happiness, he must first of all believe God, as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him.

Reply to Objection 1: Since man’s nature is dependent on a higher nature, natural knowledge does not suffice for its perfection, and some supernatural knowledge is necessary, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as man assents to first principles, by the natural light of his intellect, so does a virtuous man, by the habit of virtue, judge aright of things concerning that virtue; and in this way, by the light of faith which God bestows on him, a man assents to matters of faith and not to those which are against faith. Consequently “there is no” danger or “condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus,” and whom He has enlightened by faith.

Reply to Objection 3: In many respects faith perceives the invisible things of God in a higher way than natural reason does in proceeding to God from His creatures. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 3:25): “Many things are shown to thee above the understandings of man.”

Whether it is necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason. For nothing is superfluous in God’s works, much less even than in the works of nature. Now it is superfluous to employ other means, where one already suffices. Therefore it would be superfluous to receive by faith, things that can be known by natural reason.

Objection 2: Further, those things must be believed, which are the object of faith. Now science and faith are not about the same object, as stated above ([2283]Q[1], AA[4],5). Since therefore all things that can be known by natural reason are an object of science, it seems that there is no need to believe what can be proved by natural reason.

Objection 3: Further, all things knowable scientifically [*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration] would seem to come under one head: so that if some of them are proposed to man as objects of faith, in like manner the others should also be believed. But this is not true. Therefore it is not necessary to believe those things which can be proved by natural reason.

On the contrary, It is necessary to believe that God is one and incorporeal: which things philosophers prove by natural reason.

I answer that, It is necessary for man to accept by faith not only things which are above reason, but also those which can be known by reason: and this for three motives. First, in order that man may arrive more quickly at the knowledge of Divine truth. Because the science to whose province it belongs to prove the existence of God, is the last of all to offer itself to human research, since it presupposes many other sciences: so that it would not by until late in life that man would arrive at the knowledge of God. The second reason is, in order that the knowledge of God may be more general. For many are unable to make progress in the study of science, either through dullness of mind, or through having a number of occupations, and temporal needs, or even through laziness in learning, all of whom would be altogether deprived of

the knowledge of God, unless Divine things were brought to their knowledge under the guise of faith. The third reason is for the sake of certitude. For human reason is very deficient in things concerning God. A sign of this is that philosophers in their researches, by natural investigation, into human affairs, have fallen into many errors, and have disagreed among themselves. And consequently, in order that men might have knowledge of God, free of doubt and uncertainty, it was necessary for Divine matters to be delivered to them by way of faith, being told to them, as it were, by God Himself Who cannot lie.

Reply to Objection 1: The researches of natural reason do not suffice mankind for the knowledge of Divine matters, even of those that can be proved by reason: and so it is not superfluous if these others be believed.

Reply to Objection 2: Science and faith cannot be in the same subject and about the same object: but what is an object of science for one, can be an object of faith for another, as stated above ([2284]Q[1], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 3: Although all things that can be known by science are of one common scientific aspect, they do not all alike lead man to beatitude: hence they are not all equally proposed to our belief.

Whether man is bound to believe anything explicitly?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound to believe anything explicitly. For no man is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is not in man’s power to believe a thing explicitly, for it is written (Rom. 10:14,15): “How shall they believe Him, of whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall they preach unless they be sent?” Therefore man is not bound to believe anything explicitly.

Objection 2: Further, just as we are directed to God by faith, so are we by charity. Now man is not bound to keep the precepts of charity, and it is enough if he be ready to fulfil them: as is evidenced by the precept of Our Lord (Mat. 5:39): “If one strike thee on one [Vulg.: ‘thy right’] cheek, turn to him also the other”; and by others of the same kind, according to Augustine’s exposition (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xix). Therefore neither is man bound to believe anything explicitly, and it is enough if he be ready to believe whatever God proposes to be believed.

Objection 3: Further, the good of faith consists in obedience, according to Rom. 1:5: “For obedience to the faith in all nations.” Now the virtue of obedience does not require man to keep certain fixed precepts, but it is enough that his mind be ready to obey, according to Ps. 118:60: “I am ready and am not troubled; that I may keep Thy commandments.” Therefore it seems enough for faith, too, that man should be ready to believe whatever God may propose, without his believing anything explicitly.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.”

I answer that, The precepts of the Law, which man is bound to fulfil, concern acts of virtue which are the means of attaining salvation. Now an act of virtue, as stated above ([2285]FS, Q[60], A[5]) depends on the relation of the habit to its object. Again two things may be considered in the object of any virtue; namely, that which is the proper and direct object of that virtue, and that which is accidental and consequent to the object properly so called. Thus it belongs properly and directly to the object of fortitude, to face the dangers of death, and to charge at the foe with danger to oneself, for the sake of the common good: yet that, in a just war, a man be armed, or strike another with his sword, and so forth, is reduced to the object of fortitude, but indirectly.

Accordingly, just as a virtuous act is required for the fulfilment of a precept, so is it necessary that the virtuous act should terminate in its proper and direct object: but, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the precept does not require that a virtuous act should terminate in those things which have an accidental or secondary relation to the proper and direct object of that virtue, except in certain places and at certain times. We must, therefore, say that the direct object of faith is that whereby man is made one of the Blessed, as stated above ([2286]Q[1], A[8]): while the indirect and secondary object comprises all things delivered by God to us in Holy Writ, for instance that Abraham had two sons, that David was the son of Jesse, and so forth.

Therefore, as regards the primary points or articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to be ready to believe them, in so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.

Reply to Objection 1: If we understand those things alone to be in a man’s power, which we can do without the help of grace, then we are bound to do many things which we cannot do without the aid of healing grace, such as to love God and our neighbor, and likewise to believe the articles of faith. But with the help of grace we can do this, for this help “to whomsoever it is given from above it is mercifully given; and from whom it is withheld it is justly withheld, as a punishment of a previous, or at least of original, sin,” as Augustine states (De Corr. et Grat. v, vi [*Cf. Ep. cxc; De Praed. Sanct. viii.]).

Reply to Objection 2: Man is bound to love definitely those lovable things which are properly and directly the objects of charity, namely, God and our neighbor. The objection refers to those precepts of charity which belong, as a consequence, to the objects of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The virtue of obedience is seated, properly speaking, in the will; hence promptness of the will subject to authority, suffices for the act of obedience, because it is the proper and direct object of obedience. But this or that precept is accidental or consequent to that proper and direct object.

Whether all are equally bound to have explicit faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are equally bound to have explicit faith. For all are bound to those things which are necessary for salvation, as is evidenced by the precepts of charity. Now it is necessary for salvation that certain things should be believed explicitly. Therefore all are equally bound to have explicit faith.

Objection 2: Further, no one should be put to test in matters that he is not bound to believe. But simple reasons are sometimes tested in reference to the slightest articles of faith. Therefore all are bound to believe everything explicitly.

Objection 3: Further, if the simple are bound to have, not explicit but only implicit faith, their faith must needs be implied in the faith of the learned. But this seems unsafe, since it is possible for the learned to err. Therefore it seems that the simple should also have explicit faith; so that all are, therefore, equally bound to have explicit faith.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 1:14): “The oxen were ploughing, and the asses feeding beside them,” because, as Gregory expounds this passage (Moral. ii, 17), the simple, who are signified by the asses, ought, in matters of faith, to stay by the learned, who are denoted by the oxen.

I answer that, The unfolding of matters of faith is the result of Divine revelation: for matters of faith surpass natural reason. Now Divine revelation reaches those of lower degree through those who are over them, in a certain order; to men, for instance, through the angels, and to the lower angels through the higher, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. iv, vii). In like manner therefore the unfolding of faith must needs reach men of lower degree through those of higher degree. Consequently, just as the higher angels, who enlighten those who are below them, have a fuller knowledge of Divine things than the lower angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xii), so too, men of higher degree, whose business it is to teach others, are under obligation to have fuller knowledge of matters of faith, and to believe them more explicitly.

Reply to Objection 1: The unfolding of the articles of faith is not equally necessary for the salvation of all, since those of higher degree, whose duty it is to teach others, are bound to believe explicitly more things than others are.

Reply to Objection 2: Simple persons should not be put to the test about subtle questions of faith, unless they be suspected of having been corrupted by heretics, who are wont to corrupt the faith of simple people in such questions. If, however, it is found that they are free from obstinacy in their heterodox sentiments, and that it is due to their simplicity, it is no fault of theirs.

Reply to Objection 3: The simple have no faith implied in that of the learned, except in so far as the latter adhere to the Divine teaching. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” Hence it is not human knowledge, but the Divine truth that is the rule of faith: and if any of the learned stray from this rule, he does not harm the faith of the simple ones, who think that the learned believe aright; unless the simple hold obstinately to their individual errors, against the faith of the universal Church, which cannot err, since Our Lord said (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee,” Peter, “that thy faith fail not.”

Whether it is necessary for the salvation of all, that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for the salvation of all that they should believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ. For man is not bound to believe explicitly what the angels are ignorant about: since the unfolding of faith is the result of Divine revelation, which reaches man by means of the angels, as stated above [2287](A[6]; [2288]FP, Q[111], A[1]).

Now even the angels were in ignorance of the mystery of the Incarnation: hence, according to the commentary of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), it is they who ask (Ps. 23:8): “Who is this king of glory?” and (Is. 63:1): “Who is this that cometh from Edom?” Therefore men were not bound to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation.

Objection 2: Further, it is evident that John the Baptist was one of the teachers, and most nigh to Christ, Who said of him (Mat. 11:11) that “there hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater than” he. Now John the Baptist does not appear to have known the mystery of Christ explicitly, since he asked Christ (Mat. 11:3): “Art Thou He that art to come, or look we for another?” Therefore even the teachers were not bound to explicit faith in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, many gentiles obtained salvation through the ministry of the angels, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. ix). Now it would seem that the gentiles had neither explicit nor implicit faith in Christ, since they received no revelation. Therefore it seems that it was not necessary for the salvation of all to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vii; Ep. cxc): “Our faith is sound if we believe that no man, old or young is delivered from the contagion of death and the bonds of sin, except by the one Mediator of God and men, Jesus Christ.”

I answer that, As stated above [2289](A[5]; Q[1], A[8]), the object of faith includes, properly and directly, that thing through which man obtains beatitude. Now the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation and Passion is the way by which men obtain beatitude; for it is written (Acts 4:12): “There is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.” Therefore belief of some kind in the mystery of Christ’s Incarnation was necessary at all times and for all persons, but this belief differed according to differences of times and persons. The reason of this is that before the state of sin, man believed, explicitly in Christ’s Incarnation, in so far as it was intended for the consummation of glory, but not as it was intended to deliver man from sin by the Passion and Resurrection, since man had no foreknowledge of his future sin. He does, however, seem to have had foreknowledge of the Incarnation of Christ, from the fact that he said (Gn. 2:24): “Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife,” of which the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32) that “this is a great sacrament . . . in Christ and the Church,” and it is incredible that the first man was ignorant about this sacrament.

But after sin, man believed explicitly in Christ, not only as to the Incarnation, but also as to the Passion and Resurrection, whereby the human race is delivered from sin and death: for they would not, else, have foreshadowed Christ’s Passion by certain sacrifices both before and after the Law, the meaning of which sacrifices was known by the learned explicitly, while the simple folk, under the veil of those sacrifices, believed them to be ordained by God in reference to Christ’s coming, and thus their knowledge was covered with a veil, so to speak. And, as stated above ([2290]Q[1], A[7]), the nearer they were to Christ, the more distinct was their knowledge of Christ’s mysteries.

After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation, of which we have spoken above ([2291]Q[1], A[8]). As to other minute points in reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have been bound to believe them more or less explicitly according to each one’s state and office.

Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Kingdom of God was not entirely hidden from the angels, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. v, 19), yet certain aspects thereof were better known to them when Christ revealed them to them.

Reply to Objection 2: It was not through ignorance that John the Baptist inquired of Christ’s advent in the flesh, since he had clearly professed his belief therein, saying: “I saw, and I gave testimony, that this is the Son of God” (Jn. 1:34). Hence he did not say: “Art Thou He that hast come?” but “Art Thou He that art to come?” thus saying about the future, not about the past. Likewise it is not to be believed that he was ignorant of Christ’s future Passion, for he had already said (Jn. 1:39): “Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world,” thus foretelling His future immolation; and since other prophets had foretold it, as may be seen especially in Isaias 53. We may therefore say with Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that he asked this question, being in ignorance as to whether Christ would descend into hell in His own Person. But he did not ignore the fact that the power of Christ’s Passion would be extended to those who were detained in Limbo, according to Zech. 9:11: “Thou also, by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein there is no water”; nor was he bound to believe explicitly, before its fulfilment, that Christ was to descend thither Himself.

It may also be replied that, as Ambrose observes in his commentary on Lk. 7:19, he made this inquiry, not from doubt or ignorance but from devotion: or again, with Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvi in Matth.), that he inquired, not as though ignorant himself, but because he wished his disciples to be satisfied on that point, through Christ: hence the latter framed His answer so as to instruct the disciples, by pointing to the signs of His works.

Reply to Objection 3: Many of the gentiles received revelations of Christ, as is clear from their predictions. Thus we read (Job 19:25): “I know that my Redeemer liveth.” The Sibyl too foretold certain things about Christ, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xiii, 15). Moreover, we read in the history of the Romans, that at the time of Constantine Augustus and his mother Irene a tomb was discovered, wherein lay a man on whose breast was a golden plate with the inscription: “Christ shall be born of a virgin, and in Him, I believe. O sun, during the lifetime of Irene and Constantine, thou shalt see me again” [*Cf. Baron, Annal., A.D. 780]. If, however, some were saved without receiving any revelation, they were not saved without faith in a Mediator, for, though they did not believe in Him explicitly, they did, nevertheless, have implicit faith through believing in Divine providence, since they believed that God would deliver mankind in whatever way was pleasing to Him, and according to the revelation of the Spirit to those who knew the truth, as stated in Job 35:11: “Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth.”

Whether it is necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for salvation to believe explicitly in the Trinity. For the Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): “He that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” Now one can believe this without believing in the Trinity. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.

Objection 2: Further our Lord said (Jn. 17:5,6): “Father, I have manifested Thy name to men,” which words Augustine expounds (Tract. cvi) as follows: “Not the name by which Thou art called God, but the name whereby Thou art called My Father,” and further on he adds: “In that He made this world, God is known to all nations; in that He is not to be worshipped together with false gods, ‘God is known in Judea’; but, in that He is the Father of this Christ, through Whom He takes away the sin of the world, He now makes known to men this name of His, which hitherto they knew not.” Therefore before the coming of Christ it was not known that Paternity and Filiation were in the Godhead: and so the Trinity was not believed explicitly.

Objection 3: Further, that which we are bound to believe explicitly of God is the object of heavenly happiness. Now the object of heavenly happiness is the sovereign good, which can be understood to be in God, without any distinction of Persons. Therefore it was not necessary to believe explicitly in the Trinity.

On the contrary, In the Old Testament the Trinity of Persons is expressed in many ways; thus at the very outset of Genesis it is written in manifestation of the Trinity: “Let us make man to Our image and likeness” (Gn. 1:26). Therefore from the very beginning it was necessary for salvation to believe in the Trinity.

I answer that, It is impossible to believe explicitly in the mystery of Christ, without faith in the Trinity, since the mystery of Christ includes that the Son of God took flesh; that He renewed the world through the grace of the Holy Ghost; and again, that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost. Wherefore just as, before Christ, the mystery of Christ was believed explicitly by the learned, but implicitly and under a veil, so to speak, by the simple, so too was it with the mystery of the Trinity. And consequently, when once grace had been revealed, all were bound to explicit faith in the mystery of the Trinity: and all who are born again in Christ, have this bestowed on them by the invocation of the Trinity, according to Mat. 28:19: “Going therefore teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.”

Reply to Objection 1: Explicit faith in those two things was necessary at all times and for all people: but it was not sufficient at all times and for all people.

Reply to Objection 2: Before Christ’s coming, faith in the Trinity lay hidden in the faith of the learned, but through Christ and the apostles it was shown to the world.

Reply to Objection 3: God’s sovereign goodness as we understand it now through its effects, can be understood without the Trinity of Persons: but as understood in itself, and as seen by the Blessed, it cannot be understood without the Trinity of Persons. Moreover the mission of the Divine Persons brings us to heavenly happiness.

Whether to believe is meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that to believe in not meritorious. For the principle of all merit is charity, as stated above ([2292]FS, Q[114], A[4]). Now faith, like nature, is a preamble to charity. Therefore, just as an act of nature is not meritorious, since we do not merit by our natural gifts, so neither is an act of faith.

Objection 2: Further, belief is a mean between opinion and scientific knowledge or the consideration of things scientifically known [*Science is a certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through its demonstration.]. Now the considerations of science are not meritorious, nor on the other hand is opinion. Therefore belief is not meritorious.

Objection 3: Further, he who assents to a point of faith, either has a sufficient motive for believing, or he has not. If he has a sufficient motive for his belief, this does not seem to imply any merit on his part, since he is no longer free to believe or not to believe: whereas if he has not a sufficient motive for believing, this is a mark of levity, according to Ecclus. 19:4: “He that is hasty to give credit, is light of heart,” so that, seemingly, he gains no merit thereby. Therefore to believe is by no means meritorious.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:33) that the saints “by faith . . . obtained promises,” which would not be the case if they did not merit by believing. Therefore to believe is meritorious.

I answer that, As stated above ([2293]FS, Q[114], AA[3],4), our actions are meritorious in so far as they proceed from the free-will moved with grace by God. Therefore every human act proceeding from the free-will, if it be referred to God, can be meritorious. Now the act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God, so that it is subject to the free-will in relation to God; and consequently the act of faith can be meritorious.

Reply to Objection 1: Nature is compared to charity which is the principle of merit, as matter to form: whereas faith is compared to charity as the disposition which precedes the ultimate form. Now it is evident that the subject or the matter cannot act save by virtue of the form, nor can a preceding disposition, before the advent of the form: but after the advent of the form, both the subject and the preceding disposition act by virtue of the form, which is the chief principle of action, even as the heat of fire acts by virtue of the substantial form of fire. Accordingly neither nature nor faith can, without charity, produce a meritorious act; but, when accompanied by charity, the act of faith is made meritorious thereby, even as an act of nature, and a natural act of the free-will.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in science: namely the scientist’s assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free-will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his free-will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider. Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our neighbor. On the other hand, in the case of faith, both these things are subject to the free-will so that in both respects the act of faith can be meritorious: whereas in the case of opinion, there is no firm assent, since it is weak and infirm, as the Philosopher observes (Poster. i, 33), so that it does not seem to proceed from a perfect act of the will: and for this reason, as regards the assent, it does not appear to be very meritorious, though it can be as regards the actual consideration.

Reply to Objection 3: The believer has sufficient motive for believing, for he is moved by the authority of Divine teaching confirmed by miracles, and, what is more, by the inward instinct of the Divine invitation: hence he does not believe lightly. He has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit.

Whether reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that reasons in support of what we believe lessen the merit of faith. For Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that “there is no merit in believing what is shown by reason.” If, therefore, human reason provides sufficient proof, the merit of faith is altogether taken away. Therefore it seems that any kind of human reasoning in support of matters of faith, diminishes the merit of believing.

Objection 2: Further, whatever lessens the measure of virtue, lessens the amount of merit, since “happiness is the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 9). Now human reasoning seems to diminish the measure of the virtue of faith, since it is essential to faith to be about the unseen, as stated above ([2294]Q[1], AA[4],5). Now the more a thing is supported by reasons the less is it unseen. Therefore human reasons in support of matters of faith diminish the merit of faith.

Objection 3: Further, contrary things have contrary causes. Now an inducement in opposition to faith increases the merit of faith whether it consist in persecution inflicted by one who endeavors to force a man to renounce his faith, or in an argument persuading him to do so. Therefore reasons in support of faith diminish the merit of faith.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 3:15): “Being ready always to satisfy every one that asketh you a reason of that faith [*Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you.’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede.] and hope which is in you.” Now the Apostle would not give this advice, if it would imply a diminution in the merit of faith. Therefore reason does not diminish the merit of faith.

I answer that, As stated above [2295](A[9]), the act of faith can be meritorious, in so far as it is subject to the will, not only as to the use, but also as to the assent. Now human reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be moved by human reasons: and in this way human reason diminishes the merit of faith. In this sense it has been said above ([2296]FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1; Q[77], A[6], ad 2) that, in moral virtues, a passion which precedes choice makes the virtuous act less praiseworthy. For just as a man ought to perform acts of moral virtue, on account of the judgment of his reason, and not on account of a passion, so ought he to believe matters of faith, not on account of human reason, but on account of the Divine authority. Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when a man’s will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit. Thus again, in moral virtues a consequent passion is the sign of a more prompt will, as stated above ([2297]FS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1). We have an indication of this in the words of the Samaritans to the woman, who is a type of human reason: “We now believe, not for thy saying” (Jn. 4:42).

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is referring to the case of a man who has no will to believe what is of faith, unless he be induced by reasons. But when a man has the will to believe what is of faith on the authority of God alone, although he may have reasons in demonstration of some of them, e.g. of the existence of God, the merit of his faith is not, for that reason, lost or diminished.

Reply to Objection 2: The reasons which are brought forward in support of the authority of faith, are not demonstrations which can bring intellectual vision to the human intellect, wherefore they do not cease to be unseen. But they remove obstacles to faith, by showing that what faith proposes is not impossible; wherefore such reasons do not diminish the merit or the measure of faith. On the other hand, though demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith [*The Leonine Edition reads: ‘in support of matters of faith which are however, preambles to the articles of faith, diminish,’ etc.], but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if they were unseen; and so the measure of merit is not diminished.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is in opposition to faith, whether it consist in a man’s thoughts, or in outward persecution, increases the merit of faith, in so far as the will is shown to be more prompt and firm in believing. Hence the martyrs had more merit of faith, through not renouncing faith on account of persecution; and even the wise have greater merit of faith, through not renouncing their faith on account of the reasons brought forward by philosophers or heretics in opposition to faith. On the other hand things that are favorable to faith, do not always diminish the promptness of the will to believe, and therefore they do not always diminish the merit of faith.

OF THE OUTWARD ACT OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the outward act, viz. the confession of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether confession is an act of faith?

(2) Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?

Whether confession is an act of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of faith. For the same act does not belong to different virtues. Now confession belongs to penance of which it is a part. Therefore it is not an act of faith.

Objection 2: Further, man is sometimes deterred by fear or some kind of confusion, from confessing his faith: wherefore the Apostle (Eph. 6:19) asks for prayers that it may be granted him “with confidence, to make known the mystery of the gospel.” Now it belongs to fortitude, which moderates daring and fear, not to be deterred from doing good on account of confusion or fear. Therefore it seems that confession is not an act of faith, but rather of fortitude or constancy.

Objection 3: Further, just as the ardor of faith makes one confess one’s faith outwardly, so does it make one do other external good works, for it is written (Gal. 5:6) that “faith . . . worketh by charity.” But other external works are not reckoned acts of faith. Therefore neither is confession an act of faith.

On the contrary, A gloss explains the words of 2 Thess. 1:11, “and the work of faith in power” as referring to “confession which is a work proper to faith.”

I answer that, Outward actions belong properly to the virtue to whose end they are specifically referred: thus fasting is referred specifically to the end of abstinence, which is to tame the flesh, and consequently it is an act of abstinence.

Now confession of those things that are of faith is referred specifically as to its end, to that which concerns faith, according to 2 Cor. 4:13: “Having the same spirit of faith . . . we believe, and therefore we speak also." For the outward utterance is intended to signify the inward thought. Wherefore, just as the inward thought of matters of faith is properly an act of faith, so too is the outward confession of them.

Reply to Objection 1: A threefold confession is commended by the Scriptures. One is the confession of matters of faith, and this is a proper act of faith, since it is referred to the end of faith as stated above. Another is the confession of thanksgiving or praise, and this is an act of "latria," for its purpose is to give outward honor to God, which is the end of "latria." The third is the confession of sins, which is ordained to the blotting out of sins, which is the end of penance, to which virtue it therefore belongs.

Reply to Objection 2: That which removes an obstacle is not a direct, but an indirect, cause, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 4). Hence fortitude which removes an obstacle to the confession of faith, viz. fear or shame, is not the proper and direct cause of confession, but an indirect cause so to speak.

Reply to Objection 3: Inward faith, with the aid of charity, causes all outward acts of virtue, by means of the other virtues, commanding, but not eliciting them; whereas it produces the act of confession as its proper act, without the help of any other virtue.

Whether confession of faith is necessary for salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession of faith is not necessary for salvation. For, seemingly, a thing is sufficient for salvation, if it is a means of attaining the end of virtue. Now the proper end of faith is the union of the human mind with Divine truth, and this can be realized without any outward confession. Therefore confession of faith is not necessary for salvation.

Objection 2: Further, by outward confession of faith, a man reveals his faith to another man. But this is unnecessary save for those who have to instruct others in the faith. Therefore it seems that the simple folk are not bound to confess the faith.

Objection 3: Further, whatever may tend to scandalize and disturb others, is not necessary for salvation, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:32): "Be without offense to the Jews and to the gentiles and to the Church of God."

Now confession of faith sometimes causes a disturbance among unbelievers. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 10:10): “With the heart we believe unto justice; but with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation.”

I answer that, Things that are necessary for salvation come under the precepts of the Divine law. Now since confession of faith is something affirmative, it can only fall under an affirmative precept. Hence its necessity for salvation depends on how it falls under an affirmative precept of the Divine law. Now affirmative precepts as stated above ([2298]FS, Q[71], A[5], ad 3; [2299]FS, Q[88], A[1], ad 2) do not bind for always, although they are always binding; but they bind as to place and time according to other due circumstances, in respect of which human acts have to be regulated in order to be acts of virtue.

Thus then it is not necessary for salvation to confess one’s faith at all times and in all places, but in certain places and at certain times, when, namely, by omitting to do so, we would deprive God of due honor, or our neighbor of a service that we ought to render him: for instance, if a man, on being asked about his faith, were to remain silent, so as to make people believe either that he is without faith, or that the faith is false, or so as to turn others away from the faith; for in such cases as these, confession of faith is necessary for salvation.

Reply to Objection 1: The end of faith, even as of the other virtues, must be referred to the end of charity, which is the love of God and our neighbor. Consequently when God’s honor and our neighbor’s good demand, man should not be contented with being united by faith to God’s truth, but ought to confess his faith outwardly.

Reply to Objection 2: In cases of necessity where faith is in danger, every one is bound to proclaim his faith to others, either to give good example and encouragement to the rest of the faithful, or to check the attacks of unbelievers: but at other times it is not the duty of all the faithful to instruct others in the faith.

Reply to Objection 3: There is nothing commendable in making a public confession of one’s faith, if it causes a disturbance among unbelievers, without any profit either to the faith or to the faithful. Hence Our Lord said (Mat. 7:6): “Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine . . . lest turning upon you, they tear you." Yet, if there is hope of profit to the faith, or if there be urgency, a man should disregard the disturbance of unbelievers, and confess his faith in public. Hence it is written (Mat. 15:12) that when the disciples had said to Our Lord that "the Pharisee, when they heard this word, were scandalized," He answered: "Let them alone, they are blind, and leaders of the blind."

OF THE VIRTUE ITSELF OF FAITH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the virtue itself of faith, and, in the first place, faith itself; secondly, those who have faith; thirdly, the cause of faith; fourthly, its effects.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is faith?

(2) In what power of the soul does it reside?

(3) Whether its form is charity?

(4) Whether living [formata] faith and lifeless [informis] faith are one identically?

(5) Whether faith is a virtue?

(6) Whether it is one virtue?

(7) Of its relation to the other virtues;

(8) Of its certitude as compared with the certitude of the intellectual virtues.

Whether this is a fitting definition of faith: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not?"

Objection 1: It would seem that the Apostle gives an unfitting definition of faith (Heb. 11:1) when he says: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." For no quality is a substance: whereas faith is a quality, since it is a theological virtue, as stated above ([2300]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore it is not a substance.

Objection 2: Further, different virtues have different objects. Now things to be hoped for are the object of hope. Therefore they should not be included in a definition of faith, as though they were its object.

Objection 3: Further, faith is perfected by charity rather than by hope, since charity is the form of faith, as we shall state further on [2301](A[3]). Therefore the definition of faith should have included the thing to be loved rather than the thing to be hoped for.

Objection 4: Further, the same thing should not be placed in different genera. Now “substance” and “evidence” are different genera, and neither is subalternate to the other. Therefore it is unfitting to state that faith is both “substance” and “evidence.”

Objection 5: Further, evidence manifests the truth of the matter for which it is adduced. Now a thing is said to be apparent when its truth is already manifest. Therefore it seems to imply a contradiction to speak of “evidence of things that appear not”: and so faith is unfittingly defined.

On the contrary, The authority of the Apostle suffices.

I answer that, Though some say that the above words of the Apostle are not a definition of faith, yet if we consider the matter aright, this definition overlooks none of the points in reference to which faith can be defined, albeit the words themselves are not arranged in the form of a definition, just as the philosophers touch on the principles of the syllogism, without employing the syllogistic form.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that since habits are known by their acts, and acts by their objects, faith, being a habit, should be defined by its proper act in relation to its proper object. Now the act of faith is to believe, as stated above (Q[2], AA[2],3), which is an act of the intellect determinate to one object of the will’s command. Hence an act of faith is related both to the object of the will, i.e. to the good and the end, and to the object of the intellect, i.e. to the true. And since faith, through being a theological virtues, as stated above ([2302]FS, Q[62], A[2]), has one same thing for object and end, its object and end must, of necessity, be in proportion to one another. Now it has been already stated (Q[1], AA[1],4) that the object of faith is the First Truth, as unseen, and whatever we hold on account thereof: so that it must needs be under the aspect of something unseen that the First Truth is the end of the act of faith, which aspect is that of a thing hoped for, according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:25): “We hope for that which we see not”: because to see the truth is to possess it. Now one hopes not for what one has already, but for what one has not, as stated above ([2303]FS, Q[67], A[4]). Accordingly the relation of the act of faith to its end which is the object of the will, is indicated by the words: “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” For we are wont to call by the name of substance, the first beginning of a thing, especially when the whole subsequent thing is virtually contained in the first beginning; for instance, we might say that the first self-evident principles are the substance of science, because, to wit, these principles are in us the first beginnings of science, the whole of which is itself contained in them virtually. In this way then faith is said to be the “substance of things to be hoped for,” for the reason that in us the first beginning of things to be hoped for is brought about by the assent of faith, which contains virtually all things to be hoped for. Because we hope to be made happy through seeing the unveiled truth to which our faith cleaves, as was made evident when we were speaking of happiness ([2304]FS, Q[3], A[8]; [2305]FS, Q[4], A[3]).

The relationship of the act of faith to the object of the intellect, considered as the object of faith, is indicated by the words, “evidence of things that appear not,” where “evidence” is taken for the result of evidence. For evidence induces the intellect to adhere to a truth, wherefore the firm adhesion of the intellect to the non-apparent truth of faith is called “evidence” here. Hence another reading has “conviction,” because to wit, the intellect of the believer is convinced by Divine authority, so as to assent to what it sees not. Accordingly if anyone would reduce the foregoing words to the form of a definition, he may say that “faith is a habit of the mind, whereby eternal life is begun in us, making the intellect assent to what is non-apparent.”

In this way faith is distinguished from all other things pertaining to the intellect. For when we describe it as “evidence,” we distinguish it from opinion, suspicion, and doubt, which do not make the intellect adhere to anything firmly; when we go on to say, “of things that appear not,” we distinguish it from science and understanding, the object of which is something apparent; and when we say that it is “the substance of things to be hoped for,” we distinguish the virtue of faith from faith commonly so called, which has no reference to the beatitude we hope for.

Whatever other definitions are given of faith, are explanations of this one given by the Apostle. For when Augustine says (Tract. xl in Joan.: QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39) that “faith is a virtue whereby we believe what we do not see," and when Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11) that "faith is an assent without research," and when others say that "faith is that certainty of the mind about absent things which surpasses opinion but falls short of science," these all amount to the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not"; and when Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "faith is the solid foundation of the believer, establishing him in the truth, and showing forth the truth in him," comes to the same as "substance of things to be hoped for."

Reply to Objection 1: "Substance" here does not stand for the supreme genus condivided with the other genera, but for that likeness to substance which is found in each genus, inasmuch as the first thing in a genus contains the others virtually and is said to be the substance thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Since faith pertains to the intellect as commanded by the will, it must needs be directed, as to its end, to the objects of those virtues which perfect the will, among which is hope, as we shall prove further on ([2306]Q[18], A[1]). For this reason the definition of faith includes the object of hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Love may be of the seen and of the unseen, of the present and of the absent. Consequently a thing to be loved is not so adapted to faith, as a thing to be hoped for, since hope is always of the absent and the unseen.

Reply to Objection 4: "Substance" and "evidence" as included in the definition of faith, do not denote various genera of faith, nor different acts, but different relationships of one act to different objects, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 5: Evidence taken from the proper principles of a thing, make it apparent, whereas evidence taken from Divine authority does not make a thing apparent in itself, and such is the evidence referred to in the definition of faith.

Whether faith resides in the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not reside in the intellect. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that "faith resides in the believer's will." Now the will is a power distinct from the intellect. Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the assent of faith to believe anything, proceeds from the will obeying God. Therefore it seems that faith owes all its praise to obedience. Now obedience is in the will. Therefore faith is in the will, and not in the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect is either speculative or practical. Now faith is not in the speculative intellect, since this is not concerned with things to be sought or avoided, as stated in De Anima iii, 9, so that it is not a principle of operation, whereas "faith . . . worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Likewise, neither is it in the practical intellect, the object of which is some true, contingent thing, that can be made or done. For the object of faith is the Eternal Truth, as was shown above ([2307]Q[1], A[1]). Therefore faith does not reside in the intellect.

On the contrary, Faith is succeeded by the heavenly vision, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face." Now vision is in the intellect. Therefore faith is likewise.

I answer that, Since faith is a virtue, its act must needs be perfect. Now, for the perfection of an act proceeding from two active principles, each of these principles must be perfect: for it is not possible for a thing to be sawn well, unless the sawyer possess the art, and the saw be well fitted for sawing. Now, in a power of the soul, which is related to opposite objects, a disposition to act well is a habit, as stated above ([2308]FS, Q[49], A[4], ad 1,2,3). Wherefore an act that proceeds from two such powers must be perfected by a habit residing in each of them. Again, it has been stated above (Q[2], AA[1],2) that to believe is an act of the intellect inasmuch as the will moves it to assent. And this act proceeds from the will and the intellect, both of which have a natural aptitude to be perfected in this way. Consequently, if the act of faith is to be perfect, there needs to be a habit in the will as well as in the intellect: even as there needs to be the habit of prudence in the reason, besides the habit of temperance in the concupiscible faculty, in order that the act of that faculty be perfect. Now, to believe is immediately an act of the intellect, because the object of that act is "the true," which pertains properly to the intellect. Consequently faith, which is the proper principle of that act, must needs reside in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine takes faith for the act of faith, which is described as depending on the believer's will, in so far as his intellect assents to matters of faith at the command of the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Not only does the will need to be ready to obey but also the intellect needs to be well disposed to follow the command of the will, even as the concupiscible faculty needs to be well disposed in order to follow the command of reason; hence there needs to be a habit of virtue not only in the commanding will but also in the assenting intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: Faith resides in the speculative intellect, as evidenced by its object. But since this object, which is the First Truth, is the end of all our desires and actions, as Augustine proves (De Trin. i, 8), it follows that faith worketh by charity just as "the speculative intellect becomes practical by extension" (De Anima iii, 10).

Whether charity is the form of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the form of faith. For each thing derives its species from its form. When therefore two things are opposite members of a division, one cannot be the form of the other. Now faith and charity are stated to be opposite members of a division, as different species of virtue (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore charity is not the form of faith.

Objection 2: Further, a form and the thing of which it is the form are in one subject, since together they form one simply. Now faith is in the intellect, while charity is in the will. Therefore charity is not the form of faith.

Objection 3: Further, the form of a thing is a principle thereof. Now obedience, rather than charity, seems to be the principle of believing, on the part of the will, according to Rom. 1:5: "For obedience to the faith in all nations." Therefore obedience rather than charity, is the form of faith.

On the contrary, Each thing works through its form. Now faith works through charity. Therefore the love of charity is the form of faith.

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([2309]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2310]FS, Q[18], A[6]), voluntary acts take their species from their end which is the will's object. Now that which gives a thing its species, is after the manner of a form in natural things. Wherefore the form of any voluntary act is, in a manner, the end to which that act is directed, both because it takes its species therefrom, and because the mode of an action should correspond proportionately to the end. Now it is evident from what has been said [2311](A[1]), that the act of faith is directed to the object of the will, i.e. the good, as to its end: and this good which is the end of faith, viz. the Divine Good, is the proper object of charity. Therefore charity is called the form of faith in so far as the act of faith is perfected and formed by charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of faith because it quickens the act of faith. Now nothing hinders one act from being quickened by different habits, so as to be reduced to various species in a certain order, as stated above ([2312]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; [2313]FS, Q[61], A[2]) when we were treating of human acts in general.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of an intrinsic form. But it is not thus that charity is the form of faith, but in the sense that it quickens the act of faith, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: Even obedience, and hope likewise, and whatever other virtue might precede the act of faith, is quickened by charity, as we shall show further on ([2314]Q[23], A[8]), and consequently charity is spoken of as the form of faith.

Whether lifeless faith can become living, or living faith, lifeless?

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith does not become living, or living faith lifeless. For, according to 1 Cor. 13:10, “when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.” Now lifeless faith is imperfect in comparison with living faith. Therefore when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, so that they are not one identical habit.

Objection 2: Further, a dead thing does not become a living thing. Now lifeless faith is dead, according to James 2:20: “Faith without works is dead.” Therefore lifeless faith cannot become living.

Objection 3: Further, God’s grace, by its advent, has no less effect in a believer than in an unbeliever. Now by coming to an unbeliever it causes the habit of faith. Therefore when it comes to a believer, who hitherto had the habit of lifeless faith, it causes another habit of faith in him.

Objection 4: Further, as Boethius says (In Categ. Arist. i), “accidents cannot be altered.” Now faith is an accident. Therefore the same faith cannot be at one time living, and at another, lifeless.

On the contrary, A gloss on the words, “Faith without works is dead” (James 2:20) adds, “by which it lives once more.” Therefore faith which was lifeless and without form hitherto, becomes formed and living.

I answer that, There have been various opinions on this question. For some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 15] have said that living and lifeless faith are distinct habits, but that when living faith comes, lifeless faith is done away, and that, in like manner, when a man sins mortally after having living faith, a new habit of lifeless faith is infused into him by God. But it seems unfitting that grace should deprive man of a gift of God by coming to him, and that a gift of God should be infused into man, on account of a mortal sin.

Consequently others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. iii, 64] have said that living and lifeless faith are indeed distinct habits, but that, all the same, when living faith comes the habit of lifeless faith is not taken away, and that it remains together with the habit of living faith in the same subject. Yet again it seems unreasonable that the habit of lifeless faith should remain inactive in a person having living faith.

We must therefore hold differently that living and lifeless faith are one and the same habit. The reason is that a habit is differentiated by that which directly pertains to that habit. Now since faith is a perfection of the intellect, that pertains directly to faith, which pertains to the intellect. Again, what pertains to the will, does not pertain directly to faith, so as to be able to differentiate the habit of faith. But the distinction of living from lifeless faith is in respect of something pertaining to the will, i.e. charity, and not in respect of something pertaining to the intellect. Therefore living and lifeless faith are not distinct habits.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Apostle refers to those imperfect things from which imperfection is inseparable, for then, when the perfect comes the imperfect must needs be done away. Thus with the advent of clear vision, faith is done away, because it is essentially “of the things that appear not.” When, however, imperfection is not inseparable from the imperfect thing, the same identical thing which was imperfect becomes perfect. Thus childhood is not essential to man and consequently the same identical subject who was a child, becomes a man. Now lifelessness is not essential to faith, but is accidental thereto as stated above. Therefore lifeless faith itself becomes living.

Reply to Objection 2: That which makes an animal live is inseparable from an animal, because it is its substantial form, viz. the soul: consequently a dead thing cannot become a living thing, and a living and a dead thing differ specifically. On the other hand that which gives faith its form, or makes it live, is not essential to faith. Hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: Grace causes faith not only when faith begins anew to be in a man, but also as long as faith lasts. For it has been said above ([2315]FP, Q[104], A[1]; [2316]FS, Q[109], A[9]) that God is always working man's justification, even as the sun is always lighting up the air. Hence grace is not less effective when it comes to a believer than when it comes to an unbeliever: since it causes faith in both, in the former by confirming and perfecting it, in the latter by creating it anew.

We might also reply that it is accidental, namely on account of the disposition of the subject, that grace does not cause faith in one who has it already: just as, on the other hand, a second mortal sin does not take away grace from one who has already lost it through a previous mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 4: When living faith becomes lifeless, faith is not changed, but its subject, the soul, which at one time has faith without charity, and at another time, with charity.

Whether faith is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not a virtue. For virtue is directed to the good, since "it is virtue that makes its subject good," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 6). But faith is directed to the true. Therefore faith is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, infused virtue is more perfect than acquired virtue. Now faith, on account of its imperfection, is not placed among the acquired intellectual virtues, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3). Much less, therefore, can it be considered an infused virtue.

Objection 3: Further, living and lifeless faith are the same species, as stated above [2317](A[4]). Now lifeless faith is not a virtue, since it is not connected with the other virtues. Therefore neither is living faith a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, the gratuitous graces and the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But faith is numbered among the gratuitous graces (1 Cor. 12:9) and likewise among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore faith is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Man is justified by the virtues, since “justice is all virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 1). Now man is justified by faith according to Rom. 5:1: “Being justified therefore by faith let us have peace,” etc. Therefore faith is a virtue.

I answer that, As shown above, it is by human virtue that human acts are rendered good; hence, any habit that is always the principle of a good act, may be called a human virtue. Such a habit is living faith. For since to believe is an act of the intellect assenting to the truth at the command of the will, two things are required that this act may be perfect: one of which is that the intellect should infallibly tend to its object, which is the true; while the other is that the will should be infallibly directed to the last end, on account of which it assents to the true: and both of these are to be found in the act of living faith. For it belongs to the very essence of faith that the intellect should ever tend to the true, since nothing false can be the object of faith, as proved above ([2318]Q[1], A[3]): while the effect of charity, which is the form of faith, is that the soul ever has its will directed to a good end. Therefore living faith is a virtue.

On the other hand, lifeless faith is not a virtue, because, though the act of lifeless faith is duly perfect on the part of the intellect, it has not its due perfection as regards the will: just as if temperance be in the concupiscible, without prudence being in the rational part, temperance is not a virtue, as stated above ([2319]FS, Q[65], A[1]), because the act of temperance requires both an act of reason, and an act of the concupiscible faculty, even as the act of faith requires an act of the will, and an act of the intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: The truth is itself the good of the intellect, since it is its perfection: and consequently faith has a relation to some good in so far as it directs the intellect to the true. Furthermore, it has a relation to the good considered as the object of the will, inasmuch as it is formed by charity.

Reply to Objection 2: The faith of which the Philosopher speaks is based on human reasoning in a conclusion which does not follow, of necessity, from its premisses; and which is subject to be false: hence such like faith is not a virtue. On the other hand, the faith of which we are speaking is based on the Divine Truth, which is infallible, and consequently its object cannot be anything false; so that faith of this kind can be a virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species. Hence lifeless faith, being imperfect, does not satisfy the conditions of a perfect virtue, for “virtue is a kind of perfection” (Phys. vii, text. 18).

Reply to Objection 4: Some say that faith which is numbered among the gratuitous graces is lifeless faith. But this is said without reason, since the gratuitous graces, which are mentioned in that passage, are not common to all the members of the Church: wherefore the Apostle says: “There are diversities of graces,” and again, “To one is given” this grace and “to another” that. Now lifeless faith is common to all members of the Church, because its lifelessness is not part of its substance, if we consider it as a gratuitous gift. We must, therefore, say that in that passage, faith denotes a certain excellency of faith, for instance, “constancy in faith,” according to a gloss, or the “word of faith.”

Faith is numbered among the fruits, in so far as it gives a certain pleasure in its act by reason of its certainty, wherefore the gloss on the fifth chapter to the Galatians, where the fruits are enumerated, explains faith as being “certainty about the unseen.”

Whether faith is one virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not one. For just as faith is a gift of God according to Eph. 2:8, so also wisdom and knowledge are numbered among God’s gifts according to Is. 11:2. Now wisdom and knowledge differ in this, that wisdom is about eternal things, and knowledge about temporal things, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 14,15). Since, then, faith is about eternal things, and also about some temporal things, it seems that faith is not one virtue, but divided into several parts.

Objection 2: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above ([2320]Q[3], A[1]). Now confession of faith is not one and the same for all: since what we confess as past, the fathers of old confessed as yet to come, as appears from Is. 7:14: “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Therefore faith is not one.

Objection 3: Further, faith is common to all believers in Christ. But one accident cannot be in many subjects. Therefore all cannot have one faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): “One Lord, one faith.”

I answer that, If we take faith as a habit, we can consider it in two ways. First on the part of the object, and thus there is one faith. Because the formal object of faith is the First Truth, by adhering to which we believe whatever is contained in the faith. Secondly, on the part of the subject, and thus faith is differentiated according as it is in various subjects. Now it is evident that faith, just as any other habit, takes its species from the formal aspect of its object, but is individualized by its subject. Hence if we take faith for the habit whereby we believe, it is one specifically, but differs numerically according to its various subjects.

If, on the other hand, we take faith for that which is believed, then, again, there is one faith, since what is believed by all is one same thing: for though the things believed, which all agree in believing, be diverse from one another, yet they are all reduced to one.

Reply to Objection 1: Temporal matters which are proposed to be believed, do not belong to the object of faith, except in relation to something eternal, viz. the First Truth, as stated above ([2321]Q[1], A[1]). Hence there is one faith of things both temporal and eternal. It is different with wisdom and knowledge, which consider temporal and eternal matters under their respective aspects.

Reply to Objection 2: This difference of past and future arises, not from any difference in the thing believed, but from the different relationships of believers to the one thing believed, as also we have mentioned above ([2322]FS, Q[103], A[4]; [2323]FS, Q[107], A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers numerical diversity of faith.

Whether faith is the first of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not the first of the virtues. For a gloss on Lk. 12:4, “I say to you My friends,” says that fortitude is the foundation of faith. Now the foundation precedes that which is founded thereon. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 36, “Be not emulous,” says that hope “leads on to faith.” Now hope is a virtue, as we shall state further on ([2324]Q[17], A[1]). Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, it was stated above [2325](A[2]) that the intellect of the believer is moved, out of obedience to God, to assent to matters of faith. Now obedience also is a virtue. Therefore faith is not the first virtue.

Objection 4: Further, not lifeless but living faith is the foundation, as a gloss remarks on 1 Cor. 3:11 [*Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi.]. Now faith is formed by charity, as stated above [2326](A[3]). Therefore it is owing to charity that faith is the foundation: so that charity is the foundation yet more than faith is (for the foundation is the first part of a building) and consequently it seems to precede faith.

Objection 5: Further, the order of habits is taken from the order of acts. Now, in the act of faith, the act of the will which is perfected by charity, precedes the act of the intellect, which is perfected by faith, as the cause which precedes its effect. Therefore charity precedes faith. Therefore faith is not the first of the virtues.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:1) that “faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Now the substance of a thing is that which comes first. Therefore faith is first among the virtues.

I answer that, One thing can precede another in two ways: first, by its very nature; secondly, by accident. Faith, by its very nature, precedes all other virtues. For since the end is the principle in matters of action, as stated above ([2327]FS, Q[13], A[3]; [2328]FS, Q[34], A[4], ad 1), the theological virtues, the object of which is the last end, must needs precede all the others. Again, the last end must of necessity be present to the intellect before it is present to the will, since the will has no inclination for anything except in so far as it is apprehended by the intellect. Hence, as the last end is present in the will by hope and charity, and in the intellect, by faith, the first of all the virtues must, of necessity, be faith, because natural knowledge cannot reach God as the object of heavenly bliss, which is the aspect under which hope and charity tend towards Him.

On the other hand, some virtues can precede faith accidentally. For an accidental cause precedes its effect accidentally. Now that which removes an obstacle is a kind of accidental cause, according to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 4): and in this sense certain virtues may be said to precede faith accidentally, in so far as they remove obstacles to belief. Thus fortitude removes the inordinate fear that hinders faith; humility removes pride, whereby a man refuses to submit himself to the truth of faith. The same may be said of some other virtues, although there are no real virtues, unless faith be presupposed, as Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope cannot lead to faith absolutely. For one cannot hope to obtain eternal happiness, unless one believes this possible, since hope does not tend to the impossible, as stated above ([2329]FS, Q[40], A[1]). It is, however, possible for one to be led by hope to persevere in faith, or to hold firmly to faith; and it is in this sense that hope is said to lead to faith.

Reply to Objection 3: Obedience is twofold: for sometimes it denotes the inclination of the will to fulfil God's commandments. In this way it is not a special virtue, but is a general condition of every virtue; since all acts of virtue come under the precepts of the Divine law, as stated above ([2330]FS, Q[100], A[2]); and thus it is requisite for faith. In another way, obedience denotes an inclination to fulfil the commandments considered as a duty. In this way it is a special virtue, and a part of justice: for a man does his duty by his superior when he obeys him: and thus obedience follows faith, whereby man knows that God is his superior, Whom he must obey.

Reply to Objection 4: To be a foundation a thing requires not only to come first, but also to be connected with the other parts of the building: since the building would not be founded on it unless the other parts adhered to it. Now the connecting bond of the spiritual edifice is charity, according to Col. 3:14: "Above all . . . things have charity which is the bond of perfection." Consequently faith without charity cannot be the foundation: and yet it does not follow that charity precedes faith.

Reply to Objection 5: Some act of the will is required before faith, but not an act of the will quickened by charity. This latter act presupposes faith, because the will cannot tend to God with perfect love, unless the intellect possesses right faith about Him.

Whether faith is more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not more certain than science and the other intellectual virtues. For doubt is opposed to certitude, wherefore a thing would seem to be the more certain, through being less doubtful, just as a thing is the whiter, the less it has of an admixture of black. Now understanding, science and also wisdom are free of any doubt about their objects; whereas the believer may sometimes suffer a movement of doubt, and doubt about matters of faith. Therefore faith is no more certain than the intellectual virtues.

Objection 2: Further, sight is more certain than hearing. But “faith is through hearing” according to Rom. 10:17; whereas understanding, science and wisdom imply some kind of intellectual sight. Therefore science and understanding are more certain than faith.

Further, in matters concerning the intellect, the more perfect is the more certain. Now understanding is more perfect than faith, since faith is the way to understanding, according to another version [*The Septuagint] of Is. 7:9: “If you will not believe, you shall not understand [Vulg.: ‘continue’]”: and Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “faith is strengthened by science.” Therefore it seems that science or understanding is more certain than faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:15): “When you had received of us the word of the hearing,” i.e. by faith . . .”you received it not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God.” Now nothing is more certain than the word of God. Therefore science is not more certain than faith; nor is anything else.

I answer that, As stated above ([2331]FS, Q[57], A[4], ad 2) two of the intellectual virtues are about contingent matter, viz. prudence and art; to which faith is preferable in point of certitude, by reason of its matter, since it is about eternal things, which never change, whereas the other three intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science [*In English the corresponding ‘gift’ is called knowledge] and understanding, are about necessary things, as stated above ([2332]FS, Q[57], A[5], ad 3). But it must be observed that wisdom, science and understanding may be taken in two ways: first, as intellectual virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2,3); secondly, for the gifts of the Holy Ghost. If we consider them in the first way, we must note that certitude can be looked at in two ways. First, on the part of its cause, and thus a thing which has a more certain cause, is itself more certain. In this way faith is more certain than those three virtues, because it is founded on the Divine truth, whereas the aforesaid three virtues are based on human reason. Secondly, certitude may be considered on the part of the subject, and thus the more a man’s intellect lays hold of a thing, the more certain it is. In this way, faith is less certain, because matters of faith are above the human intellect, whereas the objects of the aforesaid three virtues are not. Since, however, a thing is judged simply with regard to its cause, but relatively, with respect to a disposition on the part of the subject, it follows that faith is more certain simply, while the others are more certain relatively, i.e. for us. Likewise if these three be taken as gifts received in this present life, they are related to faith as to their principle which they presuppose: so that again, in this way, faith is more certain.

Reply to Objection 1: This doubt is not on the side of the cause of faith, but on our side, in so far as we do not fully grasp matters of faith with our intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Other things being equal sight is more certain than hearing; but if (the authority of) the person from whom we hear greatly surpasses that of the seer's sight, hearing is more certain than sight: thus a man of little science is more certain about what he hears on the authority of an expert in science, than about what is apparent to him according to his own reason: and much more is a man certain about what he hears from God, Who cannot be deceived, than about what he sees with his own reason, which can be mistaken.

Reply to Objection 3: The gifts of understanding and knowledge are more perfect than the knowledge of faith in the point of their greater clearness, but not in regard to more certain adhesion: because the whole certitude of the gifts of understanding and knowledge, arises from the certitude of faith, even as the certitude of the knowledge of conclusions arises from the certitude of premisses. But in so far as science, wisdom and understanding are intellectual virtues, they are based upon the natural light of reason, which falls short of the certitude of God's word, on which faith is founded.

OF THOSE WHO HAVE FAITH (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who have faith: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?

(2) Whether the demons have faith?

(3) Whether those heretics who err in one article, have faith in others?

(4) Whether among those who have faith, one has it more than another?

Whether there was faith in the angels, or in man, in their original state?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no faith, either in the angels, or in man, in their original state. For Hugh St. Victor says in his Sentences (De Sacram. i, 10) that “man cannot see God or things that are in God, because he closes his eyes to contemplation.” Now the angels, in their original state, before they were either confirmed in grace, or had fallen from it, had their eyes opened to contemplation, since “they saw things in the Word,” according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Likewise the first man, while in the state of innocence, seemingly had his eyes open to contemplation; for Hugh St. Victor says (De Sacram. i, 6) that “in his original state man knew his Creator, not by the mere outward perception of hearing, but by inward inspiration, not as now believers seek an absent God by faith, but by seeing Him clearly present to their contemplation.” Therefore there was no faith in the angels and man in their original state.

Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of faith is dark and obscure, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: “We see now through a glass in a dark manner.” Now in their original state there was not obscurity either in the angels or in man, because it is a punishment of sin. Therefore there could be no faith in the angels or in man, in their original state.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 10:17) that “faith . . . cometh by hearing.” Now this could not apply to angels and man in their original state; for then they could not hear anything from another. Therefore, in that state, there was no faith either in man or in the angels.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:6): “He that cometh to God, must believe.” Now the original state of angels and man was one of approach to God. Therefore they had need of faith.

I answer that, Some say that there was no faith in the angels before they were confirmed in grace or fell from it, and in man before he sinned, by reason of the manifest contemplation that they had of Divine things. Since, however, “faith is the evidence of things that appear not,” according to the Apostle (Heb. 11:2), and since “by faith we believe what we see not,” according to Augustine (Tract. xl in Joan.; QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 39), that manifestation alone excludes faith, which renders apparent or seen the principal object of faith. Now the principal object of faith is the First Truth, the sight of which gives the happiness of heaven and takes the place of faith. Consequently, as the angels before their confirmation in grace, and man before sin, did not possess the happiness whereby God is seen in His Essence, it is evident that the knowledge they possessed was not such as to exclude faith.

It follows then, that the absence of faith in them could only be explained by their being altogether ignorant of the object of faith. And if man and the angels were created in a purely natural state, as some [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. ii, D, 29] hold, perhaps one might hold that there was no faith in the angels before their confirmation in grace, or in man before sin, because the knowledge of faith surpasses not only a man’s but even an angel’s natural knowledge about God.

Since, however, we stated in the [2333]FP, Q[62], A[3]; [2334]FP, Q[95], A[1] that man and the angels were created with the gift of grace, we must needs say that there was in them a certain beginning of hoped-for happiness, by reason of grace received but not yet consummated, which happiness was begun in their will by hope and charity, and in the intellect by faith, as stated above (Q[4], A[7]). Consequently we must hold that the angels had faith before they were confirmed, and man, before he sinned. Nevertheless we must observe that in the object of faith, there is something formal, as it were, namely the First Truth surpassing all the natural knowledge of a creature, and something material, namely, the thing to which we assent while adhering to the First Truth. With regard to the former, before obtaining the happiness to come, faith is common to all who have knowledge of God, by adhering to the First Truth: whereas with regard to the things which are proposed as the material object of faith, some are believed by one, and known manifestly by another, even in the present state, as we have shown above (Q[1], A[5]; Q[2], A[4], ad 2). In this respect, too, it may be said that the angels before being confirmed, and man, before sin, possessed manifest knowledge about certain points in the Divine mysteries, which now we cannot know except by believing them.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the words of Hugh of St. Victor are those of a master, and have the force of an authority, yet it may be said that the contemplation which removes the need of faith is heavenly contemplation, whereby the supernatural truth is seen in its essence. Now the angels did not possess this contemplation before they were confirmed, nor did man before he sinned: yet their contemplation was of a higher order than ours, for by its means they approached nearer to God, and had manifest knowledge of more of the Divine effects and mysteries than we can have knowledge of. Hence faith was not in them so that they sought an absent God as we seek Him: since by the light of wisdom He was more present to them than He is to us, although He was not so present to them as He is to the Blessed by the light of glory.

Reply to Objection 2: There was no darkness of sin or punishment in the original state of man and the angels, but there was a certain natural obscurity in the human and angelic intellect, in so far as every creature is darkness in comparison with the immensity of the Divine light: and this obscurity suffices for faith.

Reply to Objection 3: In the original state there was no hearing anything from man speaking outwardly, but there was from God inspiring inwardly: thus the prophets heard, as expressed by the Ps. 84:9: “I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me.”

Whether in the demons there is faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons have no faith. For Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that “faith depends on the believer’s will”: and this is a good will, since by it man wishes to believe in God. Since then no deliberate will of the demons is good, as stated above ([2335]FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5), it seems that in the demons there is no faith.

Objection 2: Further, faith is a gift of Divine grace, according to Eph. 2:8: “By grace you are saved through faith . . . for it is the gift of God.” Now, according to a gloss on Osee 3:1, “They look to strange gods, and love the husks of the grapes,” the demons lost their gifts of grace by sinning. Therefore faith did not remain in the demons after they sinned.

Objection 3: Further, unbelief would seem to be graver than other sins, as Augustine observes (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) on Jn. 15:22, “If I had not come and spoken to them, they would not have sin: but now they have no excuse for their sin.” Now the sin of unbelief is in some men. Consequently, if the demons have faith, some men would be guilty of a sin graver than that of the demons, which seems unreasonable. Therefore in the demons there is no faith.

On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): “The devils . . . believe and tremble.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2336]Q[1], A[4];[2337] Q[2], A[1]), the believer’s intellect assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first self-evident principles, but because his will commands his intellect to assent. Now, that the will moves the intellect to assent, may be due to two causes. First, through the will being directed to the good, and in this way, to believe is a praiseworthy action. Secondly, because the intellect is convinced that it ought to believe what is said, though that conviction is not based on objective evidence. Thus if a prophet, while preaching the word of God, were to foretell something, and were to give a sign, by raising a dead person to life, the intellect of a witness would be convinced so as to recognize clearly that God, Who lieth not, was speaking, although the thing itself foretold would not be evident in itself, and consequently the essence of faith would not be removed.

Accordingly we must say that faith is commended in the first sense in the faithful of Christ: and in this way faith is not in the demons, but only in the second way, for they see many evident signs, whereby they recognize that the teaching of the Church is from God, although they do not see the things themselves that the Church teaches, for instance that there are three Persons in God, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: The demons are, in a way, compelled to believe, by the evidence of signs, and so their will deserves no praise for their belief.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good, even when that faith is lifeless. Consequently the faith which the demons have, is not a gift of grace. Rather are they compelled to believe through their natural intellectual acumen.

Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the signs of faith are so evident, that the demons are compelled to believe, is displeasing to them, so that their malice is by no means diminished by their believe.

Whether a man who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles?

Objection 1: It would seem that a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith, can have lifeless faith in the other articles. For the natural intellect of a heretic is not more able than that of a catholic. Now a catholic's intellect needs the aid of the gift of faith in order to believe any article whatever of faith. Therefore it seems that heretics cannot believe any articles of faith without the gift of lifeless faith.

Objection 2: Further, just as faith contains many articles, so does one science, viz. geometry, contain many conclusions. Now a man may possess the science of geometry as to some geometrical conclusions, and yet be ignorant of other conclusions. Therefore a man can believe some articles of faith without believing the others.

Objection 3: Further, just as man obeys God in believing the articles of faith, so does he also in keeping the commandments of the Law. Now a man can obey some commandments, and disobey others. Therefore he can believe some articles, and disbelieve others.

On the contrary, Just as mortal sin is contrary to charity, so is disbelief in one article of faith contrary to faith. Now charity does not remain in a man after one mortal sin. Therefore neither does faith, after a man disbelieves one article.

I answer that, Neither living nor lifeless faith remains in a heretic who disbelieves one article of faith.

The reason of this is that the species of every habit depends on the formal aspect of the object, without which the species of the habit cannot remain. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, as manifested in Holy Writ and the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth. Consequently whoever does not adhere, as to an infallible and Divine rule, to the teaching of the Church, which proceeds from the First Truth manifested in Holy Writ, has not the habit of faith, but holds that which is of faith otherwise than by faith. Even so, it is evident that a man whose mind holds a conclusion without knowing how it is proved, has not scientific knowledge, but merely an opinion about it. Now it is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Hence it is evident that a heretic who obstinately disbelieves one article of faith, is not prepared to follow the teaching of the Church in all things; but if he is not obstinate, he is no longer in heresy but only in error. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will.

Reply to Objection 1: A heretic does not hold the other articles of faith, about which he does not err, in the same way as one of the faithful does, namely by adhering simply to the Divine Truth, because in order to do so, a man needs the help of the habit of faith; but he holds the things that are of faith, by his own will and judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: The various conclusions of a science have their respective means of demonstration, one of which may be known without another, so that we may know some conclusions of a science without knowing the others. On the other hand faith adheres to all the articles of faith by reason of one mean, viz. on account of the First Truth proposed to us in Scriptures, according to the teaching of the Church who has the right understanding of them. Hence whoever abandons this mean is altogether lacking in faith.

Reply to Objection 3: The various precepts of the Law may be referred either to their respective proximate motives, and thus one can be kept without another; or to their primary motive, which is perfect obedience to God, in which a man fails whenever he breaks one commandment, according to James 2:10: “Whosoever shall . . . offend in one point is become guilty of all.”

Whether faith can be greater in one man than in another?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith cannot be greater in one man than in another. For the quantity of a habit is taken from its object. Now whoever has faith believes everything that is of faith, since by failing in one point, a man loses his faith altogether, as stated above [2338](A[3]). Therefore it seems that faith cannot be greater in one than in another.

Objection 2: Further, those things which consist in something supreme cannot be “more” or “less.” Now faith consists in something supreme, because it requires that man should adhere to the First Truth above all things. Therefore faith cannot be “more” or “less.”

Objection 3: Further, faith is to knowledge by grace, as the understanding of principles is to natural knowledge, since the articles of faith are the first principles of knowledge by grace, as was shown above ([2339]Q[1], A[7]). Now the understanding of principles is possessed in equal degree by all men. Therefore faith is possessed in equal degree by all the faithful.

On the contrary, Wherever we find great and little, there we find more or less. Now in the matter of faith we find great and little, for Our Lord said to Peter (Mat. 14:31): “O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?” And to the woman he said (Mat. 15: 28): “O woman, great is thy faith!” Therefore faith can be greater in one than in another.

I answer that, As stated above ([2340]FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; [2341]FS, Q[112], A[4]), the quantity of a habit may be considered from two points of view: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of its participation by the subject.

Now the object of faith may be considered in two ways: first, in respect of its formal aspect; secondly, in respect of the material object which is proposed to be believed. Now the formal object of faith is one and simple, namely the First Truth, as stated above ([2342]Q[1], A[1]). Hence in this respect there is no diversity of faith among believers, but it is specifically one in all, as stated above ([2343]Q[4], A[6]). But the things which are proposed as the matter of our belief are many and can be received more or less explicitly; and in this respect one man can believe explicitly more things than another, so that faith can be greater in one man on account of its being more explicit.

If, on the other hand, we consider faith from the point of view of its participation by the subject, this happens in two ways, since the act of faith proceeds both from the intellect and from the will, as stated above ([2344]Q[2], AA[1],2;[2345] Q[4], A[2]). Consequently a man’s faith may be described as being greater, in one way, on the part of his intellect, on account of its greater certitude and firmness, and, in another way, on the part of his will, on account of his greater promptitude, devotion, or confidence.

Reply to Objection 1: A man who obstinately disbelieves a thing that is of faith, has not the habit of faith, and yet he who does not explicitly believe all, while he is prepared to believe all, has that habit. In this respect, one man has greater faith than another, on the part of the object, in so far as he believes more things, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: It is essential to faith that one should give the first place to the First Truth. But among those who do this, some submit to it with greater certitude and devotion than others; and in this way faith is greater in one than in another.

Reply to Objection 3: The understanding of principles results from man's very nature, which is equally shared by all: whereas faith results from the gift of grace, which is not equally in all, as explained above ([2346]FS, Q[112], A[4]). Hence the comparison fails.

Nevertheless the truth of principles is more known to one than to another, according to the greater capacity of intellect.

OF THE CAUSE OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of faith, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether faith is infused into man by God?

(2) Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?

Whether faith is infused into man by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith is not infused into man by God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv) that "science begets faith in us, and nourishes, defends and strengthens it." Now those things which science begets in us seem to be acquired rather than infused. Therefore faith does not seem to be in us by Divine infusion.

Objection 2: Further, that to which man attains by hearing and seeing, seems to be acquired by him. Now man attains to belief, both by seeing miracles, and by hearing the teachings of faith: for it is written (Jn. 4:53): "The father . . . knew that it was at the same hour, that Jesus said to him, Thy son liveth; and himself believed, and his whole house"; and (Rom.

10:17) it is said that “faith is through hearing.” Therefore man attains to faith by acquiring it.

Objection 3: Further, that which depends on a man’s will can be acquired by him. But “faith depends on the believer’s will,” according to Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. v). Therefore faith can be acquired by man.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 2:8,9): “By grace you are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves . . . that no man may glory . . . for it is the gift of God.”

I answer that, Two things are requisite for faith. First, that the things which are of faith should be proposed to man: this is necessary in order that man believe anything explicitly. The second thing requisite for faith is the assent of the believer to the things which are proposed to him. Accordingly, as regards the first of these, faith must needs be from God. Because those things which are of faith surpass human reason, hence they do not come to man’s knowledge, unless God reveal them. To some, indeed, they are revealed by God immediately, as those things which were revealed to the apostles and prophets, while to some they are proposed by God in sending preachers of the faith, according to Rom. 10:15: “How shall they preach, unless they be sent?”

As regards the second, viz. man’s assent to the things which are of faith, we may observe a twofold cause, one of external inducement, such as seeing a miracle, or being persuaded by someone to embrace the faith: neither of which is a sufficient cause, since of those who see the same miracle, or who hear the same sermon, some believe, and some do not. Hence we must assert another internal cause, which moves man inwardly to assent to matters of faith.

The Pelagians held that this cause was nothing else than man’s free-will: and consequently they said that the beginning of faith is from ourselves, inasmuch as, to wit, it is in our power to be ready to assent to things which are of faith, but that the consummation of faith is from God, Who proposes to us the things we have to believe. But this is false, for, since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God. Therefore faith, as regards the assent which is the chief act of faith, is from God moving man inwardly by grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Science begets and nourishes faith, by way of external persuasion afforded by science; but the chief and proper cause of faith is that which moves man inwardly to assent.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument again refers to the cause that proposes outwardly the things that are of faith, or persuades man to believe by words or deeds.

Reply to Objection 3: To believe does indeed depend on the will of the believer: but man's will needs to be prepared by God with grace, in order that he may be raised to things which are above his nature, as stated above ([2347]Q[2] , A[3]).

Whether lifeless faith is a gift of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that lifeless faith is not a gift of God. For it is written (Dt. 32:4) that "the works of God are perfect." Now lifeless faith is something imperfect. Therefore it is not the work of God.

Objection 2: Further, just as an act is said to be deformed through lacking its due form, so too is faith called lifeless [informis] when it lacks the form due to it. Now the deformed act of sin is not from God, as stated above ([2348]FS, Q[79], A[2], ad 2). Therefore neither is lifeless faith from God.

Objection 3: Further, whomsoever God heals, He heals wholly: for it is written (Jn. 7:23): "If a man receive circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the law of Moses may not be broken; are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day?" Now faith heals man from unbelief. Therefore whoever receives from God the gift of faith, is at the same time healed from all his sins. But this is not done except by living faith. Therefore living faith alone is a gift of God: and consequently lifeless faith is not from God.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 13:2 says that "the faith which lacks charity is a gift of God." Now this is lifeless faith. Therefore lifeless faith is a gift of God.

I answer that, Lifelessness is a privation. Now it must be noted that privation is sometimes essential to the species, whereas sometimes it is not, but supervenes in a thing already possessed of its proper species: thus privation of the due equilibrium of the humors is essential to the species of sickness, while darkness is not essential to a diaphanous body, but supervenes in it. Since, therefore, when we assign the cause of a thing, we intend to assign the cause of that thing as existing in its proper species, it follows that what is not the cause of privation, cannot be assigned as the cause of the thing to which that privation belongs as being essential to its species. For we cannot assign as the cause of a sickness, something which is not the cause of a disturbance in the humors: though we can assign as cause of a diaphanous body, something which is not the cause of the darkness, which is not essential to the diaphanous body.

Now the lifelessness of faith is not essential to the species of faith, since faith is said to be lifeless through lack of an extrinsic form, as stated above (Q[4], A[4]). Consequently the cause of lifeless faith is that which is the cause of faith strictly so called: and this is God, as stated above [2349] (A[1]). It follows, therefore, that lifeless faith is a gift of God.

Reply to Objection 1: Lifeless faith, though it is not simply perfect with the perfection of a virtue, is, nevertheless, perfect with a perfection that suffices for the essential notion of faith.

Reply to Objection 2: The deformity of an act is essential to the act's species, considered as a moral act, as stated above ([2350]FP, Q[48], A[1], ad 2; [2351]FS, Q[18], A[5]): for an act is said to be deformed through being deprived of an intrinsic form, viz. the due commensuration of the act's circumstances. Hence we cannot say that God is the cause of a deformed act, for He is not the cause of its deformity, though He is the cause of the act as such.

We may also reply that deformity denotes not only privation of a due form, but also a contrary disposition, wherefore deformity is compared to the act, as falsehood is to faith. Hence, just as the deformed act is not from God, so neither is a false faith; and as lifeless faith is from God, so too, acts that are good generically, though not quickened by charity, as is frequently the case in sinners, are from God.

Reply to Objection 3: He who receives faith from God without charity, is healed from unbelief, not entirely (because the sin of his previous unbelief is not removed) but in part, namely, in the point of ceasing from committing such and such a sin. Thus it happens frequently that a man desists from one act of sin, through God causing him thus to desist, without desisting from another act of sin, through the instigation of his own malice. And in this way sometimes it is granted by God to a man to believe, and yet he is not granted the gift of charity: even so the gift of prophecy, or the like, is given to some without charity.

OF THE EFFECTS OF FAITH (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of faith: under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether fear is an effect of faith?

(2) Whether the heart is purified by faith?

Whether fear is an effect of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not an effect of faith. For an effect does not precede its cause. Now fear precedes faith: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye that fear the Lord, believe in Him.” Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. Now fear and hope are contraries, as stated above ([2352]FS, Q[23], A[2]): and faith begets hope, as a gloss observes on Mat. 1:2. Therefore fear is not an effect of faith.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary does not cause another. Now the object of faith is a good, which is the First Truth, while the object of fear is an evil, as stated above ([2353]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Again, acts take their species from the object, according to what was stated above ([2354]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Therefore faith is not a cause of fear.

On the contrary, It is written (James 2:19): “The devils . . . believe and tremble.”

I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power, as stated above ([2355]FS, Q[41], A[1]). Now the principle of all appetitive movements is the good or evil apprehended: and consequently the principle of fear and of every appetitive movement must be an apprehension. Again, through faith there arises in us an apprehension of certain penal evils, which are inflicted in accordance with the Divine judgment. In this way, then, faith is a cause of the fear whereby one dreads to be punished by God; and this is servile fear.

It is also the cause of filial fear, whereby one dreads to be separated from God, or whereby one shrinks from equalling oneself to Him, and holds Him in reverence, inasmuch as faith makes us appreciate God as an unfathomable and supreme good, separation from which is the greatest evil, and to which it is wicked to wish to be equalled. Of the first fear, viz. servile fear, lifeless faith is the cause, while living faith is the cause of the second, viz. filial fear, because it makes man adhere to God and to be subject to Him by charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear of God cannot altogether precede faith, because if we knew nothing at all about Him, with regard to rewards and punishments, concerning which faith teaches us, we should nowise fear Him. If, however, faith be presupposed in reference to certain articles of faith, for example the Divine excellence, then reverential fear follows, the result of which is that man submits his intellect to God, so as to believe in all the Divine promises. Hence the text quoted continues: “And your reward shall not be made void.”

Reply to Objection 2: The same thing in respect of contraries can be the cause of contraries, but not under the same aspect. Now faith begets hope, in so far as it enables us to appreciate the prize which God awards to the just, while it is the cause of fear, in so far as it makes us appreciate the punishments which He intends to inflict on sinners.

Reply to Objection 3: The primary and formal object of faith is the good which is the First Truth; but the material object of faith includes also certain evils; for instance, that it is an evil either not to submit to God, or to be separated from Him, and that sinners will suffer penal evils from God: in this way faith can be the cause of fear.

Whether faith has the effect of purifying the heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that faith does not purify the heart. For purity of the heart pertains chiefly to the affections, whereas faith is in the intellect. Therefore faith has not the effect of purifying the heart.

Objection 2: Further, that which purifies the heart is incompatible with impurity. But faith is compatible with the impurity of sin, as may be seen in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore faith does not purify the heart.

Objection 3: Further, if faith were to purify the human heart in any way, it would chiefly purify the intellect of man. Now it does not purify the intellect from obscurity, since it is a veiled knowledge. Therefore faith nowise purifies the heart.

On the contrary, Peter said (Acts 15:9): “Purifying their hearts by faith.”

I answer that, A thing is impure through being mixed with baser things: for silver is not called impure, when mixed with gold, which betters it, but when mixed with lead or tin. Now it is evident that the rational creature is more excellent than all transient and corporeal creatures; so that it becomes impure through subjecting itself to transient things by loving them. From this impurity the rational creature is purified by means of a contrary movement, namely, by tending to that which is above it, viz. God. The first beginning of this movement is faith: since “he that cometh to God must believe that He is,” according to Heb. 11:6. Hence the first beginning of the heart’s purifying is faith; and if this be perfected through being quickened by charity, the heart will be perfectly purified thereby.

Reply to Objection 1: Things that are in the intellect are the principles of those which are in the appetite, in so far as the apprehended good moves the appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Even lifeless faith excludes a certain impurity which is contrary to it, viz. that of error, and which consists in the human intellect, adhering inordinately to things below itself, through wishing to measure Divine things by the rule of sensible objects. But when it is quickened by charity, then it is incompatible with any kind of impurity, because “charity covereth all sins” (Prov. 10:12).

Reply to Objection 3: The obscurity of faith does not pertain to the impurity of sin, but rather to the natural defect of the human intellect, according to the present state of life.

OF THE GIFT OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gifts of understand and knowledge, which respond to the virtue of faith. With regard to the gift of understanding there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether it can be together with faith in the same person?

(3) Whether the understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is only speculative, or practical also?

(4) Whether all who are in a state of grace have the gift of understanding?

(5) Whether this gift is to be found in those who are without grace?

(6) Of the relationship of the gift of understanding to the other gifts;

(7) Which of the beatitudes corresponds to this gift?

(8) Which of the fruits?

Whether understanding is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts of grace are distinct from the gifts of nature, since they are given in addition to the latter. Now understanding is a natural habit of the soul, whereby self-evident principles are known, as stated in Ethic. vi, 6. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, the Divine gifts are shared by creatures according to their capacity and mode, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now the mode of human nature is to know the truth, not simply (which is a sign of understanding), but discursively (which is a sign of reason), as Dionysius explains (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the Divine knowledge which is bestowed on man, should be called a gift of reason rather than a gift of understanding.

Objection 3: Further, in the powers of the soul the understanding is condivided with the will (De Anima iii, 9,10). Now no gift of the Holy Ghost is called after the will. Therefore no gift of the Holy Ghost should receive the name of understanding.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the Spirit of wisdom of understanding.”

I answer that, Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for “intelligere” [to understand] is the same as “intus legere” [to read inwardly]. This is clear to anyone who considers the difference between intellect and sense, because sensitive knowledge is concerned with external sensible qualities, whereas intellective knowledge penetrates into the very essence of a thing, because the object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” as stated in De Anima iii, 6.

Now there are many kinds of things that are hidden within, to find which human knowledge has to penetrate within so to speak. Thus, under the accidents lies hidden the nature of the substantial reality, under words lies hidden their meaning; under likenesses and figures the truth they denote lies hidden (because the intelligible world is enclosed within as compared with the sensible world, which is perceived externally), and effects lie hidden in their causes, and vice versa. Hence we may speak of understanding with regard to all these things.

Since, however, human knowledge begins with the outside of things as it were, it is evident that the stronger the light of the understanding, the further can it penetrate into the heart of things. Now the natural light of our understanding is of finite power; wherefore it can reach to a certain fixed point. Consequently man needs a supernatural light in order to penetrate further still so as to know what it cannot know by its natural light: and this supernatural light which is bestowed on man is called the gift of understanding.

Reply to Objection 1: The natural light instilled within us, manifests only certain general principles, which are known naturally. But since man is ordained to supernatural happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[3]; [2356]FS, Q[3] , A[8]), man needs to reach to certain higher truths, for which he requires the gift of understanding.

Reply to Objection 2: The discourse of reason always begins from an understanding and ends at an understanding; because we reason by proceeding from certain understood principles, and the discourse of reason is perfected when we come to understand what hitherto we ignored. Hence the act of reasoning proceeds from something previously understood. Now a gift of grace does not proceed from the light of nature, but is added thereto as perfecting it. Wherefore this addition is not called “reason” but “understanding,” since the additional light is in comparison with what we know supernaturally, what the natural light is in regard to those things which we known from the first.

Reply to Objection 3: “Will” denotes simply a movement of the appetite without indicating any excellence; whereas “understanding” denotes a certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things.

Hence the supernatural gift is called after the understanding rather than after the will.

Whether the gift of understanding is compatible with faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is incompatible with faith. For Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 15) that “the thing which is understood is bounded by the comprehension of him who understands it.” But the thing which is believed is not comprehended, according to the word of the Apostle to the Philippians 3:12: “Not as though I had already comprehended [Douay: ‘attained’], or were already perfect.” Therefore it seems that faith and understanding are incompatible in the same subject.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is understood is seen by the understanding. But faith is of things that appear not, as stated above ([2357]Q[1], A[4];[2358] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore faith is incompatible with understanding in the same subject.

Objection 3: Further, understanding is more certain than science. But science and faith are incompatible in the same subject, as stated above ([2359]Q[1], AA[4],5). Much less, therefore, can understanding and faith be in the same subject.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that “understanding enlightens the mind concerning the things it has heard.” Now one who has faith can be enlightened in his mind concerning what he has heard; thus it is written (Lk. 24:27, 32) that Our Lord opened the scriptures to His disciples, that they might understand them. Therefore understanding is compatible with faith.

I answer that, We need to make a twofold distinction here: one on the side of faith, the other on the part of understanding.

On the side of faith the distinction to be made is that certain things, of themselves, come directly under faith, such as the mystery to three Persons in one God, and the incarnation of God the Son; whereas other things come under faith, through being subordinate, in one way or another, to those just mentioned, for instance, all that is contained in the Divine Scriptures.

On the part of understanding the distinction to be observed is that there are two ways in which we may be said to understand. In one way, we understand a thing perfectly, when we arrive at knowing the essence of the thing we understand, and the very truth considered in itself of the proposition understood. In this way, so long as the state of faith lasts, we cannot understand those things which are the direct object of faith: although certain other things that are subordinate to faith can be understood even in this way.

In another way we understand a thing imperfectly, when the essence of a thing or the truth of a proposition is not known as to its quiddity or mode of being, and yet we know that whatever be the outward appearances, they do not contradict the truth, in so far as we understand that we ought not to depart from matters of faith, for the sake of things that appear externally. In this way, even during the state of faith, nothing hinders us from understanding even those things which are the direct object of faith.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first three argue in reference to perfect understanding, while the last refers to the understanding of matters subordinate to faith.

Whether the gift of understanding is merely speculative or also practical?

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding, considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost, is not practical, but only speculative. For, according to Gregory (Moral. i, 32), “understanding penetrates certain more exalted things.” But the practical intellect is occupied, not with exalted, but with inferior things, viz. singulars, about which actions are concerned. Therefore understanding, considered as a gift, is not practical.

Objection 2: Further, the gift of understanding is something more excellent than the intellectual virtue of understanding. But the intellectual virtue of understanding is concerned with none but necessary things, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 6). Much more, therefore, is the gift of understanding concerned with none but necessary matters. Now the practical intellect is not about necessary things, but about things which may be otherwise than they are, and which may result from man’s activity. Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding enlightens the mind in matters which surpass natural reason. Now human activities, with which the practical intellect is concerned, do not surpass natural reason, which is the directing principle in matters of action, as was made clear above ([2360]FS, Q[58], A[2]; [2361]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Therefore the gift of understanding is not practical.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 110:10): “A good understanding to all that do it.”

I answer that, As stated above [2362](A[2]), the gift of understanding is not only about those things which come under faith first and principally, but also about all things subordinate to faith. Now good actions have a certain relationship to faith: since “faith worketh through charity,” according to the Apostle (Gal. 5:6). Hence the gift of understanding extends also to certain actions, not as though these were its principal object, but in so far as the rule of our actions is the eternal law, to which the higher reason, which is perfected by the gift of understanding, adheres by contemplating and consulting it, as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).

Reply to Objection 1: The things with which human actions are concerned are not surpassingly exalted considered in themselves, but, as referred to the rule of the eternal law, and to the end of Divine happiness, they are exalted so that they can be the matter of understanding.

Reply to Objection 2: The excellence of the gift of understanding consists precisely in its considering eternal or necessary matters, not only as they are rules of human actions, because a cognitive virtue is the more excellent, according to the greater extent of its object.

Reply to Objection 3: The rule of human actions is the human reason and the eternal law, as stated above ([2363]FS, Q[71], A[6]). Now the eternal law surpasses human reason: so that the knowledge of human actions, as ruled by the eternal law, surpasses the natural reason, and requires the supernatural light of a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Whether the gift of understanding is in all who are in a state of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “the gift of understanding is given as a remedy against dulness of mind.” Now many who are in a state of grace suffer from dulness of mind. Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.

Objection 2: Further, of all the things that are connected with knowledge, faith alone seems to be necessary for salvation, since by faith Christ dwells in our hearts, according to Eph. 3:17. Now the gift of understanding is not in everyone that has faith; indeed, those who have faith ought to pray that they may understand, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 27). Therefore the gift of understanding is not necessary for salvation: and, consequently, is not in all who are in a state of grace.

Objection 3: Further, those things which are common to all who are in a state of grace, are never withdrawn from them. Now the grace of understanding and of the other gifts sometimes withdraws itself profitably, for, at times, “when the mind is puffed up with understanding sublime things, it becomes sluggish and dull in base and vile things,” as Gregory observes (Moral. ii, 49). Therefore the gift of understanding is not in all who are in a state of grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 81:5): “They have not known or understood, they walk on in darkness.” But no one who is in a state of grace walks in darkness, according to Jn. 8:12: “He that followeth Me, walketh not in darkness.” Therefore no one who is in a state of grace is without the gift of understanding.

I answer that, In all who are in a state of grace, there must needs be rectitude of the will, since grace prepares man’s will for good, according to Augustine (Contra Julian. Pelag. iv, 3). Now the will cannot be rightly directed to good, unless there be already some knowledge of the truth, since the object of the will is good understood, as stated in De Anima iii, 7. Again, just as the Holy Ghost directs man’s will by the gift of charity, so as to move it directly to some supernatural good; so also, by the gift of understanding, He enlightens the human mind, so that it knows some supernatural truth, to which the right will needs to tend.

Therefore, just as the gift of charity is in all of those who have sanctifying grace, so also is the gift of understanding.

Reply to Objection 1: Some who have sanctifying grace may suffer dulness of mind with regard to things that are not necessary for salvation; but with regard to those that are necessary for salvation, they are sufficiently instructed by the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Jn. 2:27: “His unction teacheth you of all things.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although not all who have faith understand fully the things that are proposed to be believed, yet they understand that they ought to believe them, and that they ought nowise to deviate from them.

Reply to Objection 3: With regard to things necessary for salvation, the gift of understanding never withdraws from holy persons: but, in order that they may have no incentive to pride, it does withdraw sometimes with regard to other things, so that their mind is unable to penetrate all things clearly.

Whether the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is found also in those who have not sanctifying grace. For Augustine, in expounding the words of Ps. 118:20: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications," says: "Understanding flies ahead, and man's will is weak and slow to follow." But in all who have sanctifying grace, the will is prompt on account of charity. Therefore the gift of understanding can be in those who have not sanctifying grace.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 10:1) that "there is need of understanding in a" prophetic "vision," so that, seemingly, there is no prophecy without the gift of understanding. But there can be prophecy without sanctifying grace, as evidenced by Mat. 7:22, where those who say: "We have prophesied in Thy name [*Vulg.: 'Have we not prophesied in Thy name?']," are answered with the words: "I never knew you." Therefore the gift of understanding can be without sanctifying grace.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, according to Is. 7:9, following another reading [*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand." Now faith can be without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding can be without it.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:45): "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now it is by the intellect, as Gregory observes (Moral. i, 32), that we learn or understand what we hear. Therefore whoever has the gift of understanding, cometh to Christ, which is impossible without sanctifying grace. Therefore the gift of understanding cannot be without sanctifying grace.

I answer that, As stated above ([2364]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect the soul, according as it is amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Accordingly then, the intellectual light of grace is called the gift of understanding, in so far as man's understanding is easily moved by the Holy Ghost, the consideration of which movement depends on a true apprehension of the end. Wherefore unless the human intellect be moved by the Holy Ghost so far as to have a right estimate of the end, it has not yet obtained the gift of understanding, however much the Holy Ghost may have enlightened it in regard to other truths that are preambles to the faith.

Now to have a right estimate about the last end one must not be in error about the end, and must adhere to it firmly as to the greatest good: and no one can do this without sanctifying grace; even as in moral matters a man has a right estimate about the end through a habit of virtue. Therefore no one has the gift of understanding without sanctifying grace.

Reply to Objection 1: By understanding Augustine means any kind of intellectual light, that, however, does not fulfil all the conditions of a gift, unless the mind of man be so far perfected as to have a right estimate about the end.

Reply to Objection 2: The understanding that is requisite for prophecy, is a kind of enlightenment of the mind with regard to the things revealed to the prophet: but it is not an enlightenment of the mind with regard to a right estimate about the last end, which belongs to the gift of understanding.

Reply to Objection 3: Faith implies merely assent to what is proposed but understanding implies a certain perception of the truth, which perception, except in one who has sanctifying grace, cannot regard the end, as stated above. Hence the comparison fails between understanding and faith.

Whether the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of understanding is not distinct from the other gifts. For there is no distinction between things whose opposites are not distinct. Now “wisdom is contrary to folly, understanding is contrary to dulness, counsel is contrary to rashness, knowledge is contrary to ignorance,” as Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49). But there would seem to be no difference between folly, dulness, ignorance and rashness. Therefore neither does understanding differ from the other gifts.

Objection 2: Further, the intellectual virtue of understanding differs from the other intellectual virtues in that it is proper to it to be about self-evident principles. But the gift of understanding is not about any self-evident principles, since the natural habit of first principles suffices in respect of those matters which are naturally self-evident: while faith is sufficient in respect of such things as are supernatural, since the articles of faith are like first principles in supernatural knowledge, as stated above ([2365]Q[1], A[7]). Therefore the gift of understanding does not differ from the other intellectual gifts.

Objection 3: Further, all intellectual knowledge is either speculative or practical. Now the gift of understanding is related to both, as stated above [2366](A[3]). Therefore it is not distinct from the other intellectual gifts, but comprises them all.

On the contrary, When several things are enumerated together they must be, in some way, distinct from one another, because distinction is the origin of number. Now the gift of understanding is enumerated together with the other gifts, as appears from Is. 11:2. Therefore the gift of understanding is distinct from the other gifts.

I answer that, The difference between the gift of understanding and three of the others, viz. piety, fortitude, and fear, is evident, since the gift of understanding belongs to the cognitive power, while the three belong to the appetitive power.

But the difference between this gift of understanding and the remaining three, viz. wisdom, knowledge, and counsel, which also belong to the cognitive power, is not so evident. To some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, iii, 8], it seems that the gift of understanding differs from the gifts of knowledge and counsel, in that these two belong to practical knowledge, while the gift of understanding belongs to speculative knowledge; and that it differs from the gift of wisdom, which also belongs to speculative knowledge, in that wisdom is concerned with judgment, while understanding renders the mind apt to grasp the things that are proposed, and to penetrate into their very heart. And in this sense we have assigned the number of the gifts, above ([2367]FS, Q[68], A[4]).

But if we consider the matter carefully, the gift of understanding is concerned not only with speculative, but also with practical matters, as stated above [2368](A[3]), and likewise, the gift of knowledge regards both matters, as we shall show further on (Q[9], A[3]), and consequently, we must take their distinction in some other way. For all these four gifts are ordained to supernatural knowledge, which, in us, takes its foundation from faith. Now “faith is through hearing” (Rom. 10:17). Hence some things must be proposed to be believed by man, not as seen, but as heard, to which he assents by faith. But faith, first and principally, is about the First Truth, secondarily, about certain considerations concerning creatures, and furthermore extends to the direction of human actions, in so far as it works through charity, as appears from what has been said above (Q[4], A[2], ad 3).

Accordingly on the part of the things proposed to faith for belief, two things are requisite on our part: first that they be penetrated or grasped by the intellect, and this belongs to the gift of understanding. Secondly, it is necessary that man should judge these things aright, that he should esteem that he ought to adhere to these things, and to withdraw from their opposites: and this judgment, with regard to Divine things belong to the gift of wisdom, but with regard to created things, belongs to the gift of knowledge, and as to its application to individual actions, belongs to the gift of counsel.

Reply to Objection 1: The foregoing difference between those four gifts is clearly in agreement with the distinction of those things which Gregory assigns as their opposites. For dulness is contrary to sharpness, since an intellect is said, by comparison, to be sharp, when it is able to penetrate into the heart of the things that are proposed to it. Hence it is dulness of mind that renders the mind unable to pierce into the heart of a thing. A man is said to be a fool if he judges wrongly about the common end of life, wherefore folly is properly opposed to wisdom, which makes us judge aright about the universal cause. Ignorance implies a defect in the mind, even about any particular things whatever, so that it is contrary to knowledge, which gives man a right judgment about particular causes, viz. about creatures. Rashness is clearly opposed to counsel, whereby man does not proceed to action before deliberating with his reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The gift of understanding is about the first principles of that knowledge which is conferred by grace; but otherwise than faith, because it belongs to faith to assent to them, while it belongs to the gift of understanding to pierce with the mind the things that are said.

Reply to Objection 3: The gift of understanding is related to both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical, not as to the judgment, but as to apprehension, by grasping what is said.

Whether the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart," etc., responds to the gift of understanding?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sixth beatitude, "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God," does not respond to the gift of understanding. Because cleanness of heart seems to belong chiefly to the appetite. But the gift of understanding belongs, not to the appetite, but rather to the intellectual power. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not respond to the gift of understanding.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Acts 15:9): "Purifying their hearts by faith." Now cleanness of heart is acquired by the heart being purified. Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is related to the virtue of faith rather than to the gift of understanding.

Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in the present state of life. But the sight of God does not belong to the present life, since it is that which gives happiness to the Blessed, as stated above ([2369]FS, Q[3], A[8]). Therefore the sixth beatitude which comprises the sight of God, does not respond to the gift of understanding.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The sixth work of the Holy Ghost which is understanding, is applicable to the clean of heart, whose eye being purified, they can see what eye hath not seen."

I answer that, Two things are contained in the sixth beatitude, as also in the others, one by way of merit, viz. cleanness of heart; the other by way of reward, viz. the sight of God, as stated above ([2370]FS, Q[69], AA[2] ,4), and each of these, in some way, responds to the gift of understanding.

For cleanness is twofold. One is a preamble and a disposition to seeing God, and consists in the heart being cleansed of inordinate affections: and this cleanness of heart is effected by the virtues and gifts belonging to the appetitive power. The other cleanness of heart is a kind of complement to the sight of God; such is the cleanness of the mind that is purged of phantasms and errors, so as to receive the truths which are proposed to it about God, no longer by way of corporeal phantasms, nor infected with heretical misrepresentations: and this cleanness is the result of the gift of understanding.

Again, the sight of God is twofold. One is perfect, whereby God's Essence is seen: the other is imperfect, whereby, though we see not what God is, yet we see what He is not; and whereby, the more perfectly do we know God in this life, the more we understand that He surpasses all that the mind comprehends. Each of these visions of God belongs to the gift of understanding; the first, to the gift of understanding in its state of perfection, as possessed in heaven; the second, to the gift of understanding in its state of inchoation, as possessed by wayfarers.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first two arguments refer to the first kind of cleanness; while the third refers to the perfect vision of God. Moreover the gifts both perfect us in this life by way of inchoation, and will be fulfilled, as stated above ([2371]FS, Q[69], A[2]).

Whether faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding?

Objection 1: It would seem that, among the fruits, faith does not respond to the gift of understanding. For understanding is the fruit of faith, since it is written (Is. 7:9) according to another reading [*The Septuagint]: "If you will not believe you shall not understand," where our version has: "If you will not believe, you shall not continue." Therefore fruit is not the fruit of understanding.

Objection 2: Further, that which precedes is not the fruit of what follows. But faith seems to precede understanding, since it is the foundation of the entire spiritual edifice, as stated above ([2372]Q[4], AA[1],7). Therefore faith is not the fruit of understanding.

Objection 3: Further, more gifts pertain to the intellect than to the appetite. Now, among the fruits, only one pertains to the intellect; namely, faith, while all the others pertain to the appetite. Therefore faith, seemingly, does not pertain to understanding more than to wisdom, knowledge or counsel.

On the contrary, The end of a thing is its fruit. Now the gift of understanding seems to be ordained chiefly to the certitude of faith, which certitude is reckoned a fruit. For a gloss on Gal. 5:22 says that the "faith which is a fruit, is certitude about the unseen." Therefore faith, among the fruits, responds to the gift of understanding.

I answer that, The fruits of the Spirit, as stated above ([2373]FS, Q[70], A[1]), when we were discussing them, are so called because they are something ultimate and delightful, produced in us by the power of the Holy Ghost. Now the ultimate and delightful has the nature of an end, which is the proper object of the will: and consequently that which is ultimate and delightful with regard to the will, must be, after a fashion, the fruit of all the other things that pertain to the other powers.

Accordingly, therefore, to this kind of gift of virtue that perfects a power, we may distinguish a double fruit: one, belonging to the same power; the other, the last of all as it were, belonging to the will. In this way we must conclude that the fruit which properly responds to the gift of understanding is faith, i.e. the certitude of faith; while the fruit that responds to it last of all is joy, which belongs to the will.

Reply to Objection 1: Understanding is the fruit of faith, taken as a virtue. But we are not taking faith in this sense here, but for a kind of certitude of faith, to which man attains by the gift of understanding.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith cannot altogether precede understanding, for it would be impossible to assent by believing what is proposed to be believed, without understanding it in some way. However, the perfection of understanding follows the virtue of faith: which perfection of understanding is itself followed by a kind of certainty of faith.

Reply to Objection 3: The fruit of practical knowledge cannot consist in that very knowledge, since knowledge of that kind is known not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else. On the other hand, speculative knowledge has its fruit in its very self, which fruit is the certitude about the thing known. Hence the gift of counsel, which belongs only to practical knowledge, has no corresponding fruit of its own: while the gifts of wisdom, understanding and knowledge, which can belongs also to speculative knowledge, have but one corresponding fruit, which is certainly denoted by the name of faith. The reason why there are several fruits pertaining to the appetitive faculty, is because, as already stated, the character of end, which the word fruit implies, pertains to the appetitive rather than to the intellective part.

OF THE GIFT OF KNOWLEDGE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift of knowledge, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether knowledge is a gift?

(2) Whether it is about Divine things?

(3) Whether it is speculative or practical?

(4) Which beatitude responds to it?

Whether knowledge is a gift?

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a gift. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost surpass the natural faculty. But knowledge implies an effect of natural reason: for the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that a “demonstration is a syllogism which produces knowledge.” Therefore knowledge is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are common to all holy persons, as stated above (Q[8], A[4]; [2374]FS, Q[68], A[5]). Now Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “many of the faithful lack knowledge though they have faith.” Therefore knowledge is not a gift.

Objection 3: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above ([2375]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Therefore one gift suffices for the perfection of one virtue. Now the gift of understanding responds to the virtue of faith, as stated above (Q[8], A[2]). Therefore the gift of knowledge does not respond to that virtue, nor does it appear to which other virtue it can respond. Since, then, the gifts are perfections of virtues, as stated above ([2376]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2), it seems that knowledge is not a gift.

On the contrary, Knowledge is reckoned among the seven gifts (Is. 11:2).

I answer that, Grace is more perfect than nature, and, therefore, does not fail in those things wherein man can be perfected by nature. Now, when a man, by his natural reason, assents by his intellect to some truth, he is perfected in two ways in respect of that truth: first, because he grasps it; secondly, because he forms a sure judgment on it.

Accordingly, two things are requisite in order that the human intellect may perfectly assent to the truth of the faith: one of these is that he should have a sound grasp of the things that are proposed to be believed, and this pertains to the gift of understanding, as stated above ([2377]Q[8], A[6]): while the other is that he should have a sure and right judgment on them, so as to discern what is to be believed, from what is not to be believed, and for this the gift of knowledge is required.

Reply to Objection 1: Certitude of knowledge varies in various natures, according to the various conditions of each nature. Because man forms a sure judgment about a truth by the discursive process of his reason: and so human knowledge is acquired by means of demonstrative reasoning. On the other hand, in God, there is a sure judgment of truth, without any discursive process, by simple intuition, as was stated in the [2378]FP, Q[14], A[7]; wherefore God’s knowledge is not discursive, or argumentative, but absolute and simple, to which that knowledge is likened which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, since it is a participated likeness thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: A twofold knowledge may be had about matters of belief. One is the knowledge of what one ought to believe by discerning things to be believed from things not to be believe: in this way knowledge is a gift and is common to all holy persons. The other is a knowledge about matters of belief, whereby one knows not only what one ought to believe, but also how to make the faith known, how to induce others to believe, and confute those who deny the faith. This knowledge is numbered among the gratuitous graces, which are not given to all, but to some. Hence Augustine, after the words quoted, adds: “It is one thing for a man merely to know what he ought to believe, and another to know how to dispense what he believes to the godly, and to defend it against the ungodly.”

Reply to Objection 3: The gifts are more perfect than the moral and intellectual virtues; but they are not more perfect than the theological virtues; rather are all the gifts ordained to the perfection of the theological virtues, as to their end. Hence it is not unreasonable if several gifts are ordained to one theological virtue.

Whether the gift of knowledge is about Divine things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of knowledge is about Divine things. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “knowledge begets, nourishes and strengthens faith.” Now faith is about Divine things, because its object is the First Truth, as stated above ([2379]Q[1], A[1]). Therefore the gift of knowledge also is about Divine things.

Objection 2: Further, the gift of knowledge is more excellent than acquired knowledge. But there is an acquired knowledge about Divine things, for instance, the science of metaphysics. Much more therefore is the gift of knowledge about Divine things.

Objection 3: Further, according to Rom. 1:20, “the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” If therefore there is knowledge about created things, it seems that there is also knowledge of Divine things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1): “The knowledge of Divine things may be properly called wisdom, and the knowledge of human affairs may properly receive the name of knowledge.”

I answer that, A sure judgment about a thing formed chiefly from its cause, and so the order of judgments should be according to the order of causes. For just as the first cause is the cause of the second, so ought the judgment about the second cause to be formed through the first cause: nor is it possible to judge of the first cause through any other cause; wherefore the judgment which is formed through the first cause, is the first and most perfect judgment.

Now in those things where we find something most perfect, the common name of the genus is appropriated for those things which fall short of the most perfect, and some special name is adapted to the most perfect thing, as is the case in Logic. For in the genus of convertible terms, that which signifies “what a thing is,” is given the special name of “definition,” but the convertible terms which fall short of this, retain the common name, and are called “proper” terms.

Accordingly, since the word knowledge implies certitude of judgment as stated above [2380](A[1]), if this certitude of the judgment is derived from the highest cause, the knowledge has a special name, which is wisdom: for a wise man in any branch of knowledge is one who knows the highest cause of that kind of knowledge, and is able to judge of all matters by that cause: and a wise man “absolutely,” is one who knows the cause which is absolutely highest, namely God. Hence the knowledge of Divine things is called “wisdom,” while the knowledge of human things is called “knowledge,” this being the common name denoting certitude of judgment, and appropriated to the judgment which is formed through second causes. Accordingly, if we take knowledge in this way, it is a distinct gift from the gift of wisdom, so that the gift of knowledge is only about human or created things.

Reply to Objection 1: Although matters of faith are Divine and eternal, yet faith itself is something temporal in the mind of the believer. Hence to know what one ought to believe, belongs to the gift of knowledge, but to know in themselves the very things we believe, by a kind of union with them, belongs to the gift of wisdom. Therefore the gift of wisdom corresponds more to charity which unites man's mind to God.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes knowledge in the generic acceptation of the term: it is not thus that knowledge is a special gift, but according as it is restricted to judgments formed through created things.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2381]Q[1], A[1]), every cognitive habit regards formally the mean through which things are known, and materially, the things that are known through the mean. And since that which is formal, is of most account, it follows that those sciences which draw conclusions about physical matter from mathematical principles, are reckoned rather among the mathematical sciences, though, as to their matter they have more in common with physical sciences: and for this reason it is stated in Phys. ii, 2 that they are more akin to physics. Accordingly, since man knows God through His creatures, this seems to pertain to "knowledge," to which it belongs formally, rather than to "wisdom," to which it belongs materially: and, conversely, when we judge of creatures according to Divine things, this pertains to "wisdom" rather than to "knowledge."

Whether the gift of knowledge is practical knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge, which is numbered among the gifts, is practical knowledge. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14) that "knowledge is concerned with the actions in which we make use of external things." But the knowledge which is concerned about actions is practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is practical.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): "Knowledge is nought if it hath not its use for piety . . . and piety is very useless if it lacks the discernment of knowledge.” Now it follows from this authority that knowledge directs piety. But this cannot apply to a speculative science. Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.

Objection 3: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are only in the righteous, as stated above (Q[9], A[5]). But speculative knowledge can be also in the unrighteous, according to James 4:17: “To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.” Therefore the gift of knowledge is not speculative but practical.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 32): “Knowledge on her own day prepares a feast, because she overcomes the fast of ignorance in the mind.” Now ignorance is not entirely removed, save by both kinds of knowledge, viz. speculative and practical. Therefore the gift of knowledge is both speculative and practical.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[9], A[8]), the gift of knowledge, like the gift of understanding, is ordained to the certitude of faith. Now faith consists primarily and principally in speculation, in as much as it is founded on the First Truth. But since the First Truth is also the last end for the sake of which our works are done, hence it is that faith extends to works, according to Gal. 5:6: “Faith . . . worketh by charity.”

The consequence is that the gift of knowledge also, primarily and principally indeed, regards speculation, in so far as man knows what he ought to hold by faith; yet, secondarily, it extends to works, since we are directed in our actions by the knowledge of matters of faith, and of conclusions drawn therefrom.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of the gift of knowledge, in so far as it extends to works; for action is ascribed to knowledge, yet not action solely, nor primarily: and in this way it directs piety.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have already stated ([2382]Q[8], A[5]) about the gift of understanding, not everyone who understands, has the gift of understanding, but only he that understands through a habit of grace: and so we must take note, with regard to the gift of knowledge, that they alone have the gift of knowledge, who judge aright about matters of faith and action, through the grace bestowed on them, so as never to wander from the straight path of justice. This is the knowledge of holy things, according to

Wis. 10:10: “She conducted the just . . . through the right ways . . . and gave him the knowledge of holy things.”

Whether the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” etc. corresponds to the gift of knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” does not correspond to the gift of knowledge. For, even as evil is the cause of sorrow and grief, so is good the cause of joy. Now knowledge brings good to light rather than evil, since the latter is known through evil: for “the straight line rules both itself and the crooked line” (De Anima i, 5). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond to the gift of knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, consideration of truth is an act of knowledge. Now there is no sorrow in the consideration of truth; rather is there joy, since it is written (Wis. 8:16): “Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness.” Therefore the aforesaid beatitude does not suitably correspond with the gift of knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of knowledge consists in speculation, before operation. Now, in so far as it consists in speculation, sorrow does not correspond to it, since “the speculative intellect is not concerned about things to be sought or avoided” (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore the aforesaid beatitude is not suitably reckoned to correspond with the gift of knowledge.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte iv): “Knowledge befits the mourner, who has discovered that he has been mastered by the evil which he coveted as though it were good.”

I answer that, Right judgment about creatures belongs properly to knowledge. Now it is through creatures that man’s aversion from God is occasioned, according to Wis. 14:11: “Creatures . . . are turned to an abomination . . . and a snare to the feet of the unwise,” of those, namely, who do not judge aright about creatures, since they deem the perfect good to consist in them. Hence they sin by placing their last end in them, and lose the true good. It is by forming a right judgment of creatures that man becomes aware of the loss (of which they may be the occasion), which judgment he exercises through the gift of knowledge.

Hence the beatitude of sorrow is said to correspond to the gift of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 1: Created goods do not cause spiritual joy, except in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy. Hence spiritual peace and the resulting joy correspond directly to the gift of wisdom: but to the gift of knowledge there corresponds, in the first place, sorrow for past errors, and, in consequence, consolation, since, by his right judgment, man directs creatures to the Divine good. For this reason sorrow is set forth in this beatitude, as the merit, and the resulting consolation, as the reward; which is begun in this life, and is perfected in the life to come.

Reply to Objection 2: Man rejoices in the very consideration of truth; yet he may sometimes grieve for the thing, the truth of which he considers: it is thus that sorrow is ascribed to knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: No beatitude corresponds to knowledge, in so far as it consists in speculation, because man's beatitude consists, not in considering creatures, but in contemplating God. But man's beatitude does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well-ordered love of them: and this I say with regard to the beatitude of a wayfarer. Hence beatitude relating to contemplation is not ascribed to knowledge, but to understanding and wisdom, which are about Divine things.

OF UNBELIEF IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the contrary vices: first, unbelief, which is contrary to faith; secondly, blasphemy, which is opposed to confession of faith; thirdly, ignorance and dulness of mind, which are contrary to knowledge and understanding.

As to the first, we must consider (1) unbelief in general; (2) heresy; (3) apostasy from the faith.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether unbelief is a sin?

(2) What is its subject?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether every action of unbelievers is a sin?

(5) Of the species of unbelief;

(6) Of their comparison, one with another;

(7) Whether we ought to dispute about faith with unbelievers?

(8) Whether they ought to be compelled to the faith?

(9) Whether we ought to have communications with them?

(10) Whether unbelievers can have authority over Christians?

(11) Whether the rites of unbelievers should be tolerated?

(12) Whether the children of unbelievers are to be baptized against their parents' will?

Whether unbelief is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not a sin. For every sin is contrary to nature, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). Now unbelief seems not to be contrary to nature; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. v) that “to be capable to having faith, just as to be capable of having charity, is natural to all men; whereas to have faith, even as to have charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” Therefore not to have faith, which is to be an unbeliever, is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, no one sins that which he cannot avoid, since every sin is voluntary. Now it is not in a man's power to avoid unbelief, for he cannot avoid it unless he have faith, because the Apostle says (Rom. 10:14): “How shall they believe in Him, of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?” Therefore unbelief does not seem to be a sin.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([2383]FS, Q[84], A[4]), there are seven capital sins, to which all sins are reduced. But unbelief does not seem to be comprised under any of them. Therefore unbelief is not a sin.

On the contrary, Vice is opposed to virtue. Now faith is a virtue, and unbelief is opposed to it. Therefore unbelief is a sin.

I answer that, Unbelief may be taken in two ways: first, by way of pure negation, so that a man be called an unbeliever, merely because he has not the faith. Secondly, unbelief may be taken by way of opposition to the faith; in which sense a man refuses to hear the faith, or despises it, according to Is. 53:1: “Who hath believed our report?” It is this that completes the notion of unbelief, and it is in this sense that unbelief is a sin.

If, however, we take it by way of pure negation, as we find it in those who have heard nothing about the faith, it bears the character, not of sin, but of punishment, because such like ignorance of Divine things is a result of the sin of our first parent. If such like unbelievers are damned, it is on account of other sins, which cannot be taken away without faith, but not on account of their sin of unbelief. Hence Our Lord said (Jn. 15:22) “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin”; which Augustine expounds (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.) as “referring to the sin whereby they believed not in Christ.”

Reply to Objection 1: To have the faith is not part of human nature, but it is part of human nature that man’s mind should not thwart his inner instinct, and the outward preaching of the truth. Hence, in this way, unbelief is contrary to nature.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes unbelief as denoting a pure negation.

Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief, in so far as it is a sin, arises from pride, through which man is unwilling to subject his intellect to the rules of faith, and to the sound interpretation of the Fathers. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “presumptuous innovations arise from vainglory.”

It might also be replied that just as the theological virtues are not reduced to the cardinal virtues, but precede them, so too, the vices opposed to the theological virtues are not reduced to the capital vices.

Whether unbelief is in the intellect as its subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not in the intellect as its subject. For every sin is in the will, according to Augustine (De Duabus Anim. x, xi). Now unbelief is a sin, as stated above [2384](A[1]). Therefore unbelief resides in the will and not in the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, unbelief is sinful through contempt of the preaching of the faith. But contempt pertains to the will. Therefore unbelief is in the will.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx.] on 2 Cor. 11:14 “Satan . . . transformeth himself into an angel of light,” says that if “a wicked angel pretend to be a good angel, and be taken for a good angel, it is not a dangerous or an unhealthy error, if he does or says what is becoming to a good angel.” This seems to be because of the rectitude of the will of the man who adheres to the angel, since his intention is to adhere to a good angel. Therefore the sin of unbelief seems to consist entirely in a perverse will: and, consequently, it does not reside in the intellect.

On the contrary, Things which are contrary to one another are in the same subject. Now faith, to which unbelief is opposed, resides in the intellect. Therefore unbelief also is in the intellect.

I answer that, As stated above ([2385]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2), sin is said to be in the power which is the principle of the sinful act. Now a sinful act may have two principles: one is its first and universal principle, which commands all acts of sin; and this is the will, because every sin is voluntary. The other principle of the sinful act is the proper and proximate principle which elicits the sinful act: thus the concupiscible is the principle of gluttony and lust, wherefore these sins are said to be in the concupiscible. Now dissent, which is the act proper to unbelief, is an act of the intellect, moved, however, by the will, just as assent is.

Therefore unbelief, like faith, is in the intellect as its proximate subject. But it is in the will as its first moving principle, in which way every sin is said to be in the will.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The will’s contempt causes the intellect’s dissent, which completes the notion of unbelief. Hence the cause of unbelief is in the will, while unbelief itself is in the intellect.

Reply to Objection 3: He that believes a wicked angel to be a good one, does not dissent from a matter of faith, because “his bodily senses are deceived, while his mind does not depart from a true and right judgment” as the gloss observes [*Augustine, Enchiridion lx]. But, according to the same authority, to adhere to Satan when he begins to invite one to his abode, i.e. wickedness and error, is not without sin.

Whether unbelief is the greatest of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelief is not the greatest of sins. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. iv, 20): “I should hesitate to decide whether a very wicked Catholic ought to be preferred to a heretic, in whose life one finds nothing reprehensible beyond the fact that he is a heretic.” But a heretic is an unbeliever. Therefore we ought not to say absolutely that unbelief is the greatest of sins.

Objection 2: Further, that which diminishes or excuses a sin is not, seemingly, the greatest of sins. Now unbelief excuses or diminishes sin: for the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): “I . . . before was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and contumelious; but I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.” Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the greater sin deserves the greater punishment, according to Dt. 25:2: “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Now a greater punishment is due to believers than to unbelievers, according to Heb. 10:29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden under foot the Son of God, and hath esteemed the blood of the testament unclean, by which he was sanctified?” Therefore unbelief is not the greatest of sins.

On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Jn. 15:22, “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin,” says (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.): “Under the general name, He refers to a singularly great sin. For this,” viz. infidelity, “is the sin to which all others may be traced.” Therefore unbelief is the greatest of sins.

I answer that, Every sin consists formally in aversion from God, as stated above ([2386]FS, Q[71], A[6]; [2387]FS, Q[73], A[3]). Hence the more a sin severs man from God, the graver it is. Now man is more than ever separated from God by unbelief, because he has not even true knowledge of God: and by false knowledge of God, man does not approach Him, but is severed from Him.

Nor is it possible for one who has a false opinion of God, to know Him in any way at all, because the object of his opinion is not God. Therefore it is clear that the sin of unbelief is greater than any sin that occurs in the perversion of morals. This does not apply to the sins that are opposed to the theological virtues, as we shall stated further on ([2388]Q[20], A[3];[2389] Q[34], A[2], ad 2;[2390] Q[39], A[2], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders a sin that is more grave in its genus from being less grave in respect of some circumstances. Hence Augustine hesitated to decide between a bad Catholic, and a heretic not sinning otherwise, because although the heretic's sin is more grave generically, it can be lessened by a circumstance, and conversely the sin of the Catholic can, by some circumstance, be aggravated.

Reply to Objection 2: Unbelief includes both ignorance, as an accessory thereto, and resistance to matters of faith, and in the latter respect it is a most grave sin. In respect, however, of this ignorance, it has a certain reason for excuse, especially when a man sins not from malice, as was the case with the Apostle.

Reply to Objection 3: An unbeliever is more severely punished for his sin of unbelief than another sinner is for any sin whatever, if we consider the kind of sin. But in the case of another sin, e.g. adultery, committed by a believer, and by an unbeliever, the believer, other things being equal, sins more gravely than the unbeliever, both on account of his knowledge of the truth through faith, and on account of the sacraments of faith with which he has been satiated, and which he insults by committing sin.

Whether every act of an unbeliever is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that each act of an unbeliever is a sin. Because a gloss on Rom. 14:23, “All that is not of faith is sin,” says: “The whole life of unbelievers is a sin.” Now the life of unbelievers consists of their actions. Therefore every action of an unbeliever is a sin.

Objection 2: Further, faith directs the intention. Now there can be no good save what comes from a right intention. Therefore, among unbelievers, no action can be good.

Objection 3: Further, when that which precedes is corrupted, that which follows is corrupted also. Now an act of faith precedes the acts of all the virtues. Therefore, since there is no act of faith in unbelievers, they can do no good work, but sin in every action of theirs.

On the contrary, It is said of Cornelius, while yet an unbeliever (Acts 10:4, 31), that his alms were acceptable to God. Therefore not every action of an unbeliever is a sin, but some of his actions are good.

I answer that, As stated above ([2391]FS, Q[85], AA[2],4) mortal sin takes away sanctifying grace, but does not wholly corrupt the good of nature. Since therefore, unbelief is a mortal sin, unbelievers are without grace indeed, yet some good of nature remains in them. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, viz. meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices.

Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do; but whenever they do anything out of their unbelief, then they sin. For even as one who has the faith, can commit an actual sin, venial or even mortal, which he does not refer to the end of faith, so too, an unbeliever can do a good deed in a matter which he does not refer to the end of his unbelief.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be taken to mean either that the life of unbelievers cannot be sinless, since without faith no sin is taken away, or that whatever they do out of unbelief, is a sin. Hence the same authority adds: “Because every one that lives or acts according to his unbelief, sins grievously.”

Reply to Objection 2: Faith directs the intention with regard to the supernatural last end: but even the light of natural reason can direct the intention in respect of a connatural good.

Reply to Objection 3: Unbelief does not so wholly destroy natural reason in unbelievers, but that some knowledge of the truth remains in them, whereby they are able to do deeds that are generically good. With regard, however, to Cornelius, it is to be observed that he was not an unbeliever, else his works would not have been acceptable to God, whom none can please without faith. Now he had implicit faith, as the truth of the Gospel was not yet made manifest: hence Peter was sent to him to give him fuller instruction in the faith.

Whether there are several species of unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several species of unbelief. For, since faith and unbelief are contrary to one another, they must be about the same thing. Now the formal object of faith is the First Truth, whence it derives its unity, although its matter contains many points of belief.

Therefore the object of unbelief also is the First Truth; while the things which an unbeliever disbelieves are the matter of his unbelief. Now the specific difference depends not on material but on formal principles. Therefore there are not several species of unbelief, according to the various points which the unbeliever disbelieves.

Objection 2: Further, it is possible to stray from the truth of faith in an infinite number of ways. If therefore the various species of unbelief correspond to the number of various errors, it would seem to follow that there is an infinite number of species of unbelief, and consequently, that we ought not to make these species the object of our consideration.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing does not belong to different species. Now a man may be an unbeliever through erring about different points of truth. Therefore diversity of errors does not make a diversity of species of unbelief: and so there are not several species of unbelief.

On the contrary, Several species of vice are opposed to each virtue, because "good happens in one way, but evil in many ways," according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now faith is a virtue. Therefore several species of vice are opposed to it.

I answer that, As stated above ([2392]FS, Q[55], A[4]; [2393]FS, Q[64], A[1]), every virtue consists in following some rule of human knowledge or operation. Now conformity to a rule happens one way in one matter, whereas a breach of the rule happens in many ways, so that many vices are opposed to one virtue. The diversity of the vices that are opposed to each virtue may be considered in two ways, first, with regard to their different relations to the virtue: and in this way there are determinate species of vices contrary to a virtue: thus to a moral virtue one vice is opposed by exceeding the virtue, and another, by falling short of the virtue. Secondly, the diversity of vices opposed to one virtue may be considered in respect of the corruption of the various conditions required for that virtue. In this way an infinite number of vices are opposed to one virtue, e.g. temperance or fortitude, according to the infinite number of ways in which the various circumstances of a virtue may be corrupted, so that the rectitude of virtue is forsaken. For this reason the Pythagoreans held evil to be infinite.

Accordingly we must say that if unbelief be considered in comparison to faith, there are several species of unbelief, determinate in number. For, since the sin of unbelief consists in resisting the faith, this may happen in two ways: either the faith is resisted before it has been accepted, and such is the unbelief of pagans or heathens; or the Christian faith is resisted after it has been accepted, and this either in the figure, and such is the unbelief of the Jews, or in the very manifestation of truth, and such is the unbelief of heretics. Hence we may, in a general way, reckon these three as species of unbelief.

If, however, the species of unbelief be distinguished according to the various errors that occur in matters of faith, there are not determinate species of unbelief: for errors can be multiplied indefinitely, as Augustine observes (De Haeresibus).

Reply to Objection 1: The formal aspect of a sin can be considered in two ways. First, according to the intention of the sinner, in which case the thing to which the sinner turns is the formal object of his sin, and determines the various species of that sin. Secondly, it may be considered as an evil, and in this case the good which is forsaken is the formal object of the sin; which however does not derive its species from this point of view, in fact it is a privation. We must therefore reply that the object of unbelief is the First Truth considered as that which unbelief forsakes, but its formal aspect, considered as that to which unbelief turns, is the false opinion that it follows: and it is from this point of view that unbelief derives its various species. Hence, even as charity is one, because it adheres to the Sovereign Good, while there are various species of vice opposed to charity, which turn away from the Sovereign Good by turning to various temporal goods, and also in respect of various inordinate relations to God, so too, faith is one virtue through adhering to the one First Truth, yet there are many species of unbelief, because unbelievers follow many false opinions.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the various species of unbelief according to various points in which errors occur.

Reply to Objection 3: Since faith is one because it believes in many things in relation to one, so may unbelief, although it errs in many things, be one in so far as all those things are related to one. Yet nothing hinders one man from erring in various species of unbelief, even as one man may be subject to various vices, and to various bodily diseases.

Whether the unbelief of pagans or heathens is graver than other kinds?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unbelief of heathens or pagans is graver than other kinds. For just as bodily disease is graver according as it endangers the health of a more important member of the body, so does sin appear to be graver, according as it is opposed to that which holds a more important place in virtue. Now that which is most important in faith, is belief in the unity of God, from which the heathens deviate by believing in many gods. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest of all.

Objection 2: Further, among heresies, the more detestable are those which contradict the truth of faith in more numerous and more important points: thus, the heresy of Arius, who severed the Godhead, was more detestable than that of Nestorius who severed the humanity of Christ from the Person of God the Son. Now the heathens deny the faith in more numerous and more important points than Jews and heretics; since they do not accept the faith at all. Therefore their unbelief is the gravest.

Objection 3: Further, every good diminishes evil. Now there is some good in the Jews, since they believe in the Old Testament as being from God, and there is some good in heretics, since they venerate the New Testament. Therefore they sin less grievously than heathens, who receive neither Testament.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 2:21): “It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back.” Now the heathens have not known the way of justice, whereas heretics and Jews have abandoned it after knowing it in some way. Therefore theirs is the graver sin.

I answer that, As stated above [2394](A[5]), two things may be considered in unbelief. One of these is its relation to faith: and from this point of view, he who resists the faith after accepting it, sins more grievously against faith, than he who resists it without having accepted it, even as he who fails to fulfil what he has promised, sins more grievously than if he had never promised it. In this way the unbelief of heretics, who confess their belief in the Gospel, and resist that faith by corrupting it, is a more grievous sin than that of the Jews, who have never accepted the Gospel faith. Since, however, they accepted the figure of that faith in the Old Law, which they corrupt by their false interpretations, their unbelief is a more grievous sin than that of the heathens, because the latter have not accepted the Gospel faith in any way at all.

The second thing to be considered in unbelief is the corruption of matters of faith. In this respect, since heathens err on more points than Jews, and these in more points than heretics, the unbelief of heathens is more grievous than the unbelief of the Jews, and that of the Jews than that of the heretics, except in such cases as that of the Manichees, who, in matters of faith, err even more than heathens do.

Of these two gravities the first surpasses the second from the point of view of guilt; since, as stated above [2395](A[1]) unbelief has the character of guilt, from its resisting faith rather than from the mere absence of faith, for the latter as was stated [2396](A[1]) seems rather to bear the character of punishment. Hence, speaking absolutely, the unbelief of heretics is the worst.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether one ought to dispute with unbelievers in public?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to dispute with unbelievers in public. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:14): “Contend not in words, for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers.” But it is impossible to dispute with unbelievers publicly without contending in words. Therefore one ought not to dispute publicly with unbelievers.

Objection 2: Further, the law of Martianus Augustus confirmed by the canons [*De Sum. Trin. Cod. lib. i, leg. Nemo] expresses itself thus: “It is an insult to the judgment of the most religious synod, if anyone ventures to debate or dispute in public about matters which have once been judged and disposed of.” Now all matters of faith have been decided by the holy councils. Therefore it is an insult to the councils, and consequently a grave sin to presume to dispute in public about matters of faith.

Objection 3: Further, disputations are conducted by means of arguments. But an argument is a reason in settlement of a dubious matter: whereas things that are of faith, being most certain, ought not to be a matter of doubt. Therefore one ought not to dispute in public about matters of faith.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 9:22, 29) that “Saul increased much more in strength, and confounded the Jews,” and that “he spoke . . . to the gentiles and disputed with the Greeks.”

I answer that, In disputing about the faith, two things must be observed: one on the part of the disputant; the other on the part of his hearers. On the part of the disputant, we must consider his intention. For if he were to dispute as though he had doubts about the faith, and did not hold the truth of faith for certain, and as though he intended to probe it with arguments, without doubt he would sin, as being doubtful of the faith and an unbeliever. On the other hand, it is praiseworthy to dispute about the faith in order to confute errors, or for practice.

On the part of the hearers we must consider whether those who hear the disputation are instructed and firm in the faith, or simple and wavering. As to those who are well instructed and firm in the faith, there can be no danger in disputing about the faith in their presence. But as to simple-minded people, we must make a distinction; because either they are provoked and molested by unbelievers, for instance, Jews or heretics, or pagans who strive to corrupt the faith in them, or else they are not subject to provocation in this matter, as in those countries where there are not unbelievers. In the first case it is necessary to dispute in public about the faith, provided there be those who are equal and adapted to the task of confuting errors; since in this way simple people are strengthened in the faith, and unbelievers are deprived of the opportunity to deceive, while if those who ought to withstand the perverters of the truth of faith were silent, this would tend to strengthen error. Hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 4): “Even as a thoughtless speech gives rise to error, so does an indiscreet silence leave those in error who might have been instructed.” On the other hand, in the second case it is dangerous to dispute in public about the faith, in the presence of simple people, whose faith for this very reason is more firm, that they have never heard anything differing from what they believe. Hence it is not expedient for them to hear what unbelievers have to say against the faith.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not entirely forbid disputations, but such as are inordinate, and consist of contentious words rather than of sound speeches.

Reply to Objection 2: That law forbade those public disputations about the faith, which arise from doubting the faith, but not those which are for the safeguarding thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: One ought to dispute about matters of faith, not as though one doubted about them, but in order to make the truth known, and to confute errors. For, in order to confirm the faith, it is necessary sometimes to dispute with unbelievers, sometimes by defending the faith, according to 1 Pet. 3:15: “Being ready always to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that hope and faith which is in you [*Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you’ St. Thomas’ reading is apparently taken from Bede].” Sometimes again, it is necessary, in order to convince those who are in error, according to Titus 1:9: “That he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers.”

Whether unbelievers ought to be compelled to the faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers ought by no means to be compelled to the faith. For it is written (Mat. 13:28) that the servants of the householder, in whose field cockle had been sown, asked him: “Wilt thou that we go and gather it up?” and that he answered: “No, lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root up the wheat also together with it”: on which passage Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Matth.): “Our Lord says this so as to forbid the slaying of men. For it is not right to slay heretics, because if you do you will necessarily slay many innocent persons.” Therefore it seems that for the same reason unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Objection 2: Further, we read in the Decretals (Dist. xlv can., De Judaeis): “The holy synod prescribes, with regard to the Jews, that for the future, none are to be compelled to believe.” Therefore, in like manner, neither should unbelievers be compelled to the faith.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) that “it is possible for a man to do other things against his will, but he cannot believe unless he is willing.” Therefore it seems that unbelievers ought not to be compelled to the faith.

Objection 4: It is said in God’s person (Ezech. 18:32 [*Ezech. 33:11]): “I desire not the death of the sinner [Vulg.: ‘of him that dieth’].” Now we ought to conform our will to the Divine will, as stated above ([2397]FS, Q[19], AA[9],10). Therefore we should not even wish unbelievers to be put to death.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 14:23): “Go out into the highways and hedges; and compel them to come in.” Now men enter into the house of God, i.e. into Holy Church, by faith. Therefore some ought to be compelled to the faith.

I answer that, Among unbelievers there are some who have never received the faith, such as the heathens and the Jews: and these are by no means to be compelled to the faith, in order that they may believe, because to believe depends on the will: nevertheless they should be compelled by the faithful, if it be possible to do so, so that they do not hinder the faith, by their blasphemies, or by their evil persuasions, or even by their open persecutions. It is for this reason that Christ’s faithful often wage war with unbelievers, not indeed for the purpose of forcing them to believe, because even if they were to conquer them, and take them prisoners, they should still leave them free to believe, if they will, but in order to prevent them from hindering the faith of Christ.

On the other hand, there are unbelievers who at some time have accepted the faith, and professed it, such as heretics and all apostates: such should be submitted even to bodily compulsion, that they may fulfil what they have promised, and hold what they, at one time, received.

Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the authority quoted to forbid, not the excommunication but the slaying of heretics, as appears from the words of Chrysostom. Augustine too, says (Ep. ad Vincent. xciii) of himself: “It was once my opinion that none should be compelled to union with Christ, that we should deal in words, and fight with arguments. However this opinion of mine is undone, not by words of contradiction, but by convincing examples. Because fear of the law was so profitable, that many say: Thanks be to the Lord Who has broken our chains asunder.” Accordingly the meaning of Our Lord’s words, “Suffer both to grow until the harvest,” must be gathered from those which precede, “lest perhaps gathering up the cockle, you root the wheat also together with it.” For, Augustine says (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) “these words show that when this is not to be feared, that is to say, when a man’s crime is so publicly known, and so hateful to all, that he has no defenders, or none such as might cause a schism, the severity of discipline should not slacken.”

Reply to Objection 2: Those Jews who have in no way received the faith, ought not by no means to be compelled to the faith: if, however, they have received it, they ought to be compelled to keep it, as is stated in the same chapter.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as taking a vow is a matter of will, and keeping a vow, a matter of obligation, so acceptance of the faith is a matter of the will, whereas keeping the faith, when once one has received it, is a matter of obligation. Wherefore heretics should be compelled to keep the faith. Thus Augustine says to the Count Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): “What do these people mean by crying out continually: ‘We may believe or not believe just as we choose. Whom did Christ compel?’ They should remember that Christ at first compelled Paul and afterwards taught Him.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says in the same letter, “none of us wishes any heretic to perish. But the house of David did not deserve to have peace, unless his son Absalom had been killed in the war which he had raised against his father. Thus if the Catholic Church gathers together some of the perdition of others, she heals the sorrow of her maternal heart by the delivery of so many nations.”

Whether it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:27): “If any of them that believe not, invite you, and you be willing to go, eat of anything that is set before you.” And Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv super Epist. ad Heb.): “If you wish to go to dine with pagans, we permit it without any reservation.” Now to sit at table with anyone is to communicate with him. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with unbelievers.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” Now unbelievers are without. When, therefore, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with certain people, it seems that they ought not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers.

Objection 3: Further, a master cannot employ his servant, unless he communicate with him, at least by word, since the master moves his servant by command. Now Christians can have unbelievers, either Jews, or pagans, or Saracens, for servants. Therefore they can lawfully communicate with them.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 7:2,3): “Thou shalt make no league with them, nor show mercy to them; neither shalt thou make marriages with them”: and a gloss on Lev. 15:19, “The woman who at the return of the month,” etc. says: “It is so necessary to shun idolatry, that we should not come in touch with idolaters or their disciples, nor have any dealings with them.”

I answer that, Communication with a particular person is forbidden to the faithful, in two ways: first, as a punishment of the person with whom they are forbidden to communicate; secondly, for the safety of those who are forbidden to communicate with others. Both motives can be gathered from the Apostle’s words (1 Cor. 5:6). For after he had pronounced sentence of excommunication, he adds as his reason: “Know you not that a little leaven corrupts the whole lump?” and afterwards he adds the reason on the part of the punishment inflicted by the sentence of the Church when he says (1 Cor. 5:12): “Do not you judge them that are within?”

Accordingly, in the first way the Church does not forbid the faithful to communicate with unbelievers, who have not in any way received the Christian faith, viz. with pagans and Jews, because she has not the right to exercise spiritual judgment over them, but only temporal judgment, in the case when, while dwelling among Christians they are guilty of some misdemeanor, and are condemned by the faithful to some temporal punishment. On the other hand, in this way, i.e. as a punishment, the Church forbids the faithful to communicate with those unbelievers who have forsaken the faith they once received, either by corrupting the faith, as heretics, or by entirely renouncing the faith, as apostates, because the Church pronounces sentence of excommunication on both.

With regard to the second way, it seems that one ought to distinguish according to the various conditions of persons, circumstances and time. For some are firm in the faith; and so it is to be hoped that their communicating with unbelievers will lead to the conversion of the latter rather than to the aversion of the faithful from the faith. These are not to be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers who have not received the faith, such as pagans or Jews, especially if there be some urgent necessity for so doing. But in the case of simple people and those who are weak in the faith, whose perversion is to be feared as a probable result, they should be forbidden to communicate with unbelievers, and especially to be on very familiar terms with them, or to communicate with them without necessity.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The Church does not exercise judgment against unbelievers in the point of inflicting spiritual punishment on them: but she does exercise judgment over some of them in the matter of temporal punishment. It is under this head that sometimes the Church, for certain special sins, withdraws the faithful from communication with certain unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3: There is more probability that a servant who is ruled by his master's commands, will be converted to the faith of his master who is a believer, than if the case were the reverse: and so the faithful are not forbidden to have unbelieving servants. If, however, the master were in danger, through communicating with such a servant, he should send him away, according to Our Lord's command (Mat. 18:8): "If . . . thy foot scandalize thee, cut it off, and cast it from thee."

With regard to the argument in the contrary [*The Leonine Edition gives this solution before the Reply OBJ 2] sense the reply is that the Lord gave this command in reference to those nations into whose territory the Jews were about to enter. For the latter were inclined to idolatry, so that it was to be feared lest, through frequent dealings with those nations, they should be estranged from the faith: hence the text goes on (Dt. 7:4): "For she will turn away thy son from following Me."

Whether unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful?

Objection 1: It would seem that unbelievers may have authority or dominion over the faithful. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:1): "Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor": and it is clear that he is speaking of unbelievers, since he adds (1 Tim. 6:2): "But they that have believing masters, let them not despise them." Moreover it is written (1 Pet. 2:18): "Servants be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward." Now this command would not be contained in the apostolic teaching unless unbelievers could have authority over the faithful. Therefore it seems that unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

Objection 2: Further, all the members of a prince’s household are his subjects. Now some of the faithful were members of unbelieving princes’ households, for we read in the Epistle to the Philippians (4:22): “All the saints salute you, especially they that are of Caesar’s household,” referring to Nero, who was an unbeliever. Therefore unbelievers can have authority over the faithful.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2) a slave is his master’s instrument in matters concerning everyday life, even as a craftsman’s laborer is his instrument in matters concerning the working of his art. Now, in such matters, a believer can be subject to an unbeliever, for he may work on an unbeliever’s farm. Therefore unbelievers may have authority over the faithful even as to dominion.

On the contrary, Those who are in authority can pronounce judgment on those over whom they are placed. But unbelievers cannot pronounce judgment on the faithful, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:1): “Dare any of you, having a matter against another, go to be judged before the unjust,” i.e. unbelievers, “and not before the saints?” Therefore it seems that unbelievers cannot have authority over the faithful.

I answer that, That this question may be considered in two ways. First, we may speak of dominion or authority of unbelievers over the faithful as of a thing to be established for the first time. This ought by no means to be allowed, since it would provoke scandal and endanger the faith, for subjects are easily influenced by their superiors to comply with their commands, unless the subjects are of great virtue: moreover unbelievers hold the faith in contempt, if they see the faithful fall away. Hence the Apostle forbade the faithful to go to law before an unbelieving judge. And so the Church altogether forbids unbelievers to acquire dominion over believers, or to have authority over them in any capacity whatever.

Secondly, we may speak of dominion or authority, as already in force: and here we must observe that dominion and authority are institutions of human law, while the distinction between faithful and unbelievers arises from the Divine law. Now the Divine law which is the law of grace, does not do away with human law which is the law of natural reason. Wherefore the distinction between faithful and unbelievers, considered in itself, does not do away with dominion and authority of unbelievers over the faithful.

Nevertheless this right of dominion or authority can be justly done away with by the sentence or ordination of the Church who has the authority of God: since unbelievers in virtue of their unbelief deserve to forfeit their power over the faithful who are converted into children of God.

This the Church does sometimes, and sometimes not. For among those unbelievers who are subject, even in temporal matters, to the Church and her members, the Church made the law that if the slave of a Jew became a Christian, he should forthwith receive his freedom, without paying any price, if he should be a “vernaculus,” i.e. born in slavery; and likewise if, when yet an unbeliever, he had been bought for his service: if, however, he had been bought for sale, then he should be offered for sale within three months. Nor does the Church harm them in this, because since those Jews themselves are subject to the Church, she can dispose of their possessions, even as secular princes have enacted many laws to be observed by their subjects, in favor of liberty. On the other hand, the Church has not applied the above law to those unbelievers who are not subject to her or her members, in temporal matters, although she has the right to do so: and this, in order to avoid scandal, for as Our Lord showed (Mat. 17:25,26) that He could be excused from paying the tribute, because “the children are free,” yet He ordered the tribute to be paid in order to avoid giving scandal. Thus Paul too, after saying that servants should honor their masters, adds, “lest the name of the Lord and His doctrine be blasphemed.”

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The authority of Caesar preceded the distinction of faithful from unbelievers. Hence it was not cancelled by the conversion of some to the faith. Moreover it was a good thing that there should be a few of the faithful in the emperor’s household, that they might defend the rest of the faithful. Thus the Blessed Sebastian encouraged those whom he saw faltering under torture, and, the while, remained hidden under the military cloak in the palace of Diocletian.

Reply to Objection 3: Slaves are subject to their masters for their whole lifetime, and are subject to their overseers in everything: whereas the craftsman’s laborer is subject to him for certain special works. Hence it would be more dangerous for unbelievers to have dominion or authority over the faithful, than that they should be allowed to employ them in some craft. Wherefore the Church permits Christians to work on the land of Jews, because this does not entail their living together with them. Thus Solomon besought the King of Tyre to send master workmen to hew the trees, as related in 3 Kings 5:6. Yet, if there be reason to fear that the faithful will be perverted by such communications and dealings, they should be absolutely forbidden.

Whether the rites of unbelievers ought to be tolerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that rites of unbelievers ought not to be tolerated. For it is evident that unbelievers sin in observing their rites: and not to prevent a sin, when one can, seems to imply consent therein, as a gloss observes on Rom. 1:32: “Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.” Therefore it is a sin to tolerate their rites.

Objection 2: Further, the rites of the Jews are compared to idolatry, because a gloss on Gal. 5:1, “Be not held again under the yoke of bondage,” says: “The bondage of that law was not lighter than that of idolatry.” But it would not be allowable for anyone to observe the rites of idolatry, in fact Christian princes at first caused the temples of idols to be closed, and afterwards, to be destroyed, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xviii, 54). Therefore it follows that even the rites of Jews ought not to be tolerated.

Objection 3: Further, unbelief is the greatest of sins, as stated above (A[3]). Now other sins such as adultery, theft and the like, are not tolerated, but are punishable by law. Therefore neither ought the rites of unbelievers to be tolerated.

On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, Ep. 15: cf. Decret., dist. xlv, can., Qui sincera] says, speaking of the Jews: “They should be allowed to observe all their feasts, just as hitherto they and their fathers have for ages observed them.”

I answer that, Human government is derived from the Divine government, and should imitate it. Now although God is all-powerful and supremely good, nevertheless He allows certain evils to take place in the universe, which He might prevent, lest, without them, greater goods might be forfeited, or greater evils ensue. Accordingly in human government also, those who are in authority, rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be lost, or certain greater evils be incurred: thus Augustine says (De Ordine ii, 4): “If you do away with harlots, the world will be convulsed with lust.” Hence, though unbelievers sin in their rites, they may be tolerated, either on account of some good that ensues therefrom, or because of some evil avoided. Thus from the fact that the Jews observe their rites, which, of old, foreshadowed the truth of the faith which we hold, there follows this good—that our very enemies bear witness to our faith, and that our faith is represented in a figure, so to speak. For this reason they are tolerated in the observance of their rites.

On the other hand, the rites of other unbelievers, which are neither truthful nor profitable are by no means to be tolerated, except perchance in order to avoid an evil, e.g. the scandal or disturbance that might ensue, or some hindrance to the salvation of those who if they were unmolested might gradually be converted to the faith. For this reason the Church, at times, has tolerated the rites even of heretics and pagans, when unbelievers were very numerous.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the children of Jews and other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the children of Jews and of other unbelievers ought to be baptized against their parents’ will. For the bond of marriage is stronger than the right of parental authority over children, since the right of parental authority can be made to cease, when a son is set at liberty; whereas the marriage bond cannot be severed by man, according to Mat. 19:6: “What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” And yet the marriage bond is broken on account of unbelief: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:15): “If the unbeliever depart, let him depart. For a brother or sister is not under servitude in such cases”: and a canon [*Can. Uxor legitima, and Idololatria, qu. i] says that “if the unbelieving partner is unwilling to abide with the other, without insult to their Creator, then the other partner is not bound to cohabitation.” Much more, therefore, does unbelief abrogate the right of unbelieving parents’ authority over their children: and consequently their children may be baptized against their parents’ will.

Objection 2: Further, one is more bound to succor a man who is in danger of everlasting death, than one who is in danger of temporal death. Now it would be a sin, if one saw a man in danger of temporal death and failed to go to his aid. Since, then, the children of Jews and other unbelievers are in danger of everlasting death, should they be left to their parents who would imbue them with their unbelief, it seems that they ought to be taken away from them and baptized, and instructed in the faith.

Objection 3: Further, the children of a bondsman are themselves bondsmen, and under the power of his master. Now the Jews are bondsmen of kings and princes: therefore their children are also. Consequently kings and princes have the power to do what they will with Jewish children. Therefore no injustice is committed if they baptize them against their parents’ wishes.

Objection 4: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if Jewish children be taken away from their parents, and consecrated to God in Baptism.

Objection 5: Further, Baptism avails for salvation more than preaching does, since Baptism removes forthwith the stain of sin and the debt of punishment, and opens the gate of heaven. Now if danger ensue through not preaching, it is imputed to him who omitted to preach, according to the words of Ezech. 33:6 about the man who “sees the sword coming and sounds not the trumpet.” Much more therefore, if Jewish children are lost through not being baptized are they accounted guilty of sin, who could have baptized them and did not.

On the contrary, Injustice should be done to no man. Now it would be an injustice to Jews if their children were to be baptized against their will, since they would lose the rights of parental authority over their children as soon as these were Christians. Therefore these should not be baptized against their parents’ will.

I answer that, The custom of the Church has very great authority and ought to be jealously observed in all things, since the very doctrine of catholic doctors derives its authority from the Church. Hence we ought to abide by the authority of the Church rather than by that of an Augustine or a Jerome or of any doctor whatever. Now it was never the custom of the Church to baptize the children of the Jews against the will of their parents, although at times past there have been many very powerful catholic princes like Constantine and Theodosius, with whom most holy bishops have been on most friendly terms, as Sylvester with Constantine, and Ambrose with Theodosius, who would certainly not have failed to obtain this favor from them if it had been at all reasonable. It seems therefore hazardous to repeat this assertion, that the children of Jews should be baptized against their parents' wishes, in contradiction to the Church's custom observed hitherto.

There are two reasons for this custom. One is on account of the danger to the faith. For children baptized before coming to the use of reason, afterwards when they come to perfect age, might easily be persuaded by their parents to renounce what they had unknowingly embraced; and this would be detrimental to the faith.

The other reason is that it is against natural justice. For a child is by nature part of its father: thus, at first, it is not distinct from its parents as to its body, so long as it is enfolded within its mother's womb; and later on after birth, and before it has the use of its free-will, it is enfolded in the care of its parents, which is like a spiritual womb, for so long as man has not the use of reason, he differs not from an irrational animal; so that even as an ox or a horse belongs to someone who, according to the civil law, can use them when he likes, as his own instrument, so, according to the natural law, a son, before coming to the use of reason, is under his father's care. Hence it would be contrary to natural justice, if a child, before coming to the use of reason, were to be taken away from its parents' custody, or anything done to it against its parents' wish. As soon, however, as it begins to have the use of its free-will, it begins to belong to itself, and is able to look after itself, in matters concerning the Divine or the natural law, and then it should be induced, not by compulsion but by persuasion, to embrace the faith: it can then consent to the faith, and be baptized, even against its parents' wish; but not before it comes to the use of reason. Hence it is said of the children of the fathers of old that they were saved in the faith of their parents; whereby we are given to understand that it is the parents' duty to look after the salvation of their children, especially before they come to the use of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: In the marriage bond, both husband and wife have the use of the free-will, and each can assent to the faith without the other's consent. But this does not apply to a child before it comes to the use of reason: yet the comparison holds good after the child has come to the use of reason, if it is willing to be converted.

Reply to Objection 2: No one should be snatched from natural death against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man were condemned by the judge to temporal death, nobody ought to rescue him by violence: hence no one ought to break the order of the natural law, whereby a child is in the custody of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of everlasting death.

Reply to Objection 3: Jews are bondsmen of princes by civil bondage, which does not exclude the order of natural or Divine law.

Reply to Objection 4: Man is directed to God by his reason, whereby he can know Him. Hence a child before coming to the use of reason, in the natural order of things, is directed to God by its parents' reason, under whose care it lies by nature: and it is for them to dispose of the child in all matters relating to God.

Reply to Objection 5: The peril that ensues from the omission of preaching, threatens only those who are entrusted with the duty of preaching. Hence it had already been said (Ezech. 3:17): "I have made thee a watchman to the children [Vulg.: 'house'] of Israel." On the other hand, to provide the sacraments of salvation for the children of unbelievers is the duty of their parents. Hence it is they whom the danger threatens, if through being deprived of the sacraments their children fail to obtain salvation.

OF HERESY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider heresy: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether heresy is a kind of unbelief?

(2) Of the matter about which it is;

(3) Whether heretics should be tolerated?

(4) Whether converts should be received?

Whether heresy is a species of unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not a species of unbelief. For unbelief is in the understanding, as stated above (Q[10], A[2]). Now heresy would seem not to pertain to the understanding, but rather to the appetitive power; for Jerome says on Gal. 5:19: [*Cf. Decretals xxiv, qu. iii, cap. 27] “The works of the flesh are manifest: Heresy is derived from a Greek word meaning choice, whereby a man makes choice of that school which he deems best.” But choice is an act of the appetitive power, as stated above ([2398]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

Objection 2: Further, vice takes its species chiefly from its end; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that “he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer.” Now the end of heresy is temporal profit, especially lordship and glory, which belong to the vice of pride or covetousness: for Augustine says (De Util. Credendi i) that “a heretic is one who either devises or follows false and new opinions, for the sake of some temporal profit, especially that he may lord and be honored above others.” Therefore heresy is a species of pride rather than of unbelief.

Objection 3: Further, since unbelief is in the understanding, it would seem not to pertain to the flesh. Now heresy belongs to the works of the flesh, for the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness,” and among the others, he adds, “dissensions, sects,” which are the same as heresies. Therefore heresy is not a species of unbelief.

On the contrary, Falsehood is contrary to truth. Now a heretic is one who devises or follows false or new opinions. Therefore heresy is opposed to the truth, on which faith is founded; and consequently it is a species of unbelief.

I answer that, The word heresy as stated in the first objection denotes a choosing. Now choice as stated above ([2399]FS, Q[13], A[3]) is about things directed to the end, the end being presupposed. Now, in matters of faith, the will assents to some truth, as to its proper good, as was shown above (Q[4], A[3]): wherefore that which is the chief truth, has the character of last end, while those which are secondary truths, have the character of being directed to the end.

Now, whoever believes, assents to someone’s words; so that, in every form of unbelief, the person to whose words assent is given seems to hold the chief place and to be the end as it were; while the things by holding which one assents to that person hold a secondary place. Consequently he that holds the Christian faith aright, assents, by his will, to Christ, in those things which truly belong to His doctrine.

Accordingly there are two ways in which a man may deviate from the rectitude of the Christian faith. First, because he is unwilling to assent to Christ: and such a man has an evil will, so to say, in respect of the very end. This belongs to the species of unbelief in pagans and Jews. Secondly, because, though he intends to assent to Christ, yet he fails in his choice of those things wherein he assents to Christ, because he chooses not what Christ really taught, but the suggestions of his own mind.

Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, belonging to those who profess the Christian faith, but corrupt its dogmas.

Reply to Objection 1: Choice regards unbelief in the same way as the will regards faith, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Vices take their species from their proximate end, while, from their remote end, they take their genus and cause. Thus in the case of adultery committed for the sake of theft, there is the species of adultery taken from its proper end and object; but the ultimate end shows that the act of adultery is both the result of the theft, and is included under it, as an effect under its cause, or a species under its genus, as appears from what we have said about acts in general ([2400]FS, Q[18], A[7]). Wherefore, as to the case in point also, the proximate end of heresy is adherence to one’s own false opinion, and from this it derives its species, while its remote end reveals its cause, viz. that it arises from pride or covetousness.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as heresy is so called from its being a choosing [*From the Greek {airein} [hairein], to cut off], so does sect derive its name from its being a cutting off [secando], as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 3). Wherefore heresy and sect are the same thing, and each belongs to the works of the flesh, not indeed by reason of the act itself of unbelief in respect of its proximate object, but by reason of its cause, which is either the desire of an undue end in which way it arises from pride or covetousness, as stated in the second objection, or some illusion of the imagination (which gives rise to error, as the Philosopher states in Metaph. iv; Ed. Did. iii, 5), for this faculty has a certain connection with the flesh, in as much as its act is independent on a bodily organ.

Whether heresy is properly about matters of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that heresy is not properly about matters of faith. For just as there are heresies and sects among Christians, so were there among the Jews, and Pharisees, as Isidore observes (Etym. viii, 3,4,5). Now their dissensions were not about matters of faith. Therefore heresy is not about matters of faith, as though they were its proper matter.

Objection 2: Further, the matter of faith is the thing believed. Now heresy is not only about things, but also about works, and about interpretations of Holy Writ. For Jerome says on Gal. 5:20 that “whoever expounds the Scriptures in any sense but that of the Holy Ghost by Whom they were written, may be called a heretic, though he may not have left the Church”: and elsewhere he says that “heresies spring up from words spoken amiss.” [*St. Thomas quotes this saying elsewhere, in Sent. iv, D, 13, and [2401]TP, Q[16], A[8], but it is not to be found in St. Jerome’s works.] Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.

Objection 3: Further, we find the holy doctors differing even about matters pertaining to the faith, for example Augustine and Jerome, on the question about the cessation of the legal observances: and yet this was without any heresy on their part. Therefore heresy is not properly about the matter of faith.

On the contrary, Augustine says against the Manichees [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xviii, 51]: “In Christ’s Church, those are heretics, who hold mischievous and erroneous opinions, and when rebuked that they may think soundly and rightly, offer a stubborn resistance, and, refusing to mend their pernicious and deadly doctrines, persist in defending them.” Now pernicious and deadly doctrines are none but those which are contrary to the dogmas of faith, whereby “the just man liveth” (Rom. 1:17). Therefore heresy is about matters of faith, as about its proper matter.

I answer that, We are speaking of heresy now as denoting a corruption of the Christian faith. Now it does not imply a corruption of the Christian faith, if a man has a false opinion in matters that are not of faith, for instance, in questions of geometry and so forth, which cannot belong to the faith by any means; but only when a person has a false opinion about things belonging to the faith.

Now a thing may be of the faith in two ways, as stated above ([2402]FP, Q[32], A[4]; [2403]FS, Q[1], A[6], ad 1; [2404]FS, Q[2], A[5]), in one way, directly and principally, e.g. the articles of faith; in another way, indirectly and secondarily, e.g. those matters, the denial of which leads to the corruption of some article of faith; and there may be heresy in either way, even as there can be faith.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the heresies of the Jews and Pharisees were about opinions relating to Judaism or Pharisaism, so also heresies among Christians are about matter touching the Christian faith.

Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to expound Holy Writ in another sense than that required by the Holy Ghost, when he so distorts the meaning of Holy Writ, that it is contrary to what the Holy Ghost has revealed. Hence it is written (Ezech. 13:6) about the false prophets: “They have persisted to confirm what they have said,” viz. by false interpretations of Scripture. Moreover a man professes his faith by the words that he utters, since confession is an act of faith, as stated above ([2405]Q[3], A[1]). Wherefore inordinate words about matters of faith may lead to corruption of the faith; and hence it is that Pope Leo says in a letter to Proterius, Bishop of Alexandria: “The enemies of Christ’s cross lie in wait for our every deed and word, so that, if we but give them the slightest pretext, they may accuse us mendaciously of agreeing with Nestorius.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Ep. xliii) and we find it stated in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. 3, can. Dixit Apostolus): “By no means should we accuse of heresy those who, however false and perverse their opinion may be, defend it without obstinate fervor, and seek the truth with careful anxiety, ready to mend their opinion, when they have found the truth,” because, to wit, they do not make a choice in contradiction to the doctrine of the Church. Accordingly, certain doctors seem to have differed either in matters the holding of which in this or that way is of no consequence, so far as faith is concerned, or even in matters of faith, which were not as yet defined by the Church; although if anyone were obstinately to deny them after they had been defined by the authority of the universal Church, he would be deemed a heretic. This authority resides chiefly in the Sovereign Pontiff. For we read [*Decret. xxiv, qu. 1, can. Quoties]: “Whenever a question of faith is in dispute, I think, that all our brethren and fellow bishops ought to refer the matter to none other than Peter, as being the source of their name and honor, against whose authority neither Jerome nor Augustine nor any of the holy doctors defended their opinion.” Hence Jerome says (Exposit. Symbol [*Among the supposititious works of St.

Jerome]): “This, most blessed Pope, is the faith that we have been taught in the Catholic Church. If anything therein has been incorrectly or carelessly expressed, we beg that it may be set aright by you who hold the faith and see of Peter. If however this, our profession, be approved by the judgment of your apostleship, whoever may blame me, will prove that he himself is ignorant, or malicious, or even not a catholic but a heretic.”

Whether heretics ought to be tolerated?

Objection 1: It seems that heretics ought to be tolerated. For the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:24,25): “The servant of the Lord must not wrangle . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth, if peradventure God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil.” Now if heretics are not tolerated but put to death, they lose the opportunity of repentance. Therefore it seems contrary to the Apostle’s command.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is necessary in the Church should be tolerated. Now heresies are necessary in the Church, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:19): “There must be . . . heresies, that they . . . who are reproved, may be manifest among you.” Therefore it seems that heretics should be tolerated.

Objection 3: Further, the Master commanded his servants (Mat. 13:30) to suffer the cockle “to grow until the harvest,” i.e. the end of the world, as a gloss explains it. Now holy men explain that the cockle denotes heretics. Therefore heretics should be tolerated.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:10,11): “A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition, avoid: knowing that he, that is such an one, is subverted.”

I answer that, With regard to heretics two points must be observed: one, on their own side; the other, on the side of the Church. On their own side there is the sin, whereby they deserve not only to be separated from the Church by excommunication, but also to be severed from the world by death. For it is a much graver matter to corrupt the faith which quickens the soul, than to forge money, which supports temporal life. Wherefore if forgers of money and other evil-doers are forthwith condemned to death by the secular authority, much more reason is there for heretics, as soon as they are convicted of heresy, to be not only excommunicated but even put to death.

On the part of the Church, however, there is mercy which looks to the conversion of the wanderer, wherefore she condemns not at once, but “after the first and second admonition,” as the Apostle directs: after that, if he is yet stubborn, the Church no longer hoping for his conversion, looks to the salvation of others, by excommunicating him and separating him from the Church, and furthermore delivers him to the secular tribunal to be exterminated thereby from the world by death. For Jerome commenting on Gal. 5:9, “A little leaven,” says: “Cut off the decayed flesh, expel the mangy sheep from the fold, lest the whole house, the whole paste, the whole body, the whole flock, burn, perish, rot, die. Arius was but one spark in Alexandria, but as that spark was not at once put out, the whole earth was laid waste by its flame.”

Reply to Objection 1: This very modesty demands that the heretic should be admonished a first and second time: and if he be unwilling to retract, he must be reckoned as already “subverted,” as we may gather from the words of the Apostle quoted above.

Reply to Objection 2: The profit that ensues from heresy is beside the intention of heretics, for it consists in the constancy of the faithful being put to the test, and “makes us shake off our sluggishness, and search the Scriptures more carefully,” as Augustine states (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 1). What they really intend is the corruption of the faith, which is to inflict very great harm indeed. Consequently we should consider what they directly intend, and expel them, rather than what is beside their intention, and so, tolerate them.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Decret. (xxiv, qu. iii, can. Notandum), “to be excommunicated is not to be uprooted.” A man is excommunicated, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:5) that his “spirit may be saved in the day of Our Lord.” Yet if heretics be altogether uprooted by death, this is not contrary to Our Lord’s command, which is to be understood as referring to the case when the cockle cannot be plucked up without plucking up the wheat, as we explained above ([2406]Q[10], A[8], ad 1), when treating of unbelievers in general.

Whether the Church should receive those who return from heresy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought in all cases to receive those who return from heresy. For it is written (Jer. 3:1) in the person of the Lord: “Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me saith the Lord.” Now the sentence of the Church is God’s sentence, according to Dt. 1:17: “You shall hear the little as well as the great: neither shall you respect any man’s person, because it is the judgment of God.” Therefore even those who are guilty of the prostitution of unbelief which is spiritual prostitution, should be received all the same.

Objection 2: Further, Our Lord commanded Peter (Mat. 18:22) to forgive his offending brother “not” only “till seven times, but till seventy times seven times,” which Jerome expounds as meaning that “a man should be forgiven, as often as he has sinned.” Therefore he ought to be received by the Church as often as he has sinned by falling back into heresy.

Objection 3: Further, heresy is a kind of unbelief. Now other unbelievers who wish to be converted are received by the Church. Therefore heretics also should be received.

On the contrary, The Decretal Ad abolendam (De Haereticis, cap. ix) says that “those who are found to have relapsed into the error which they had already abjured, must be left to the secular tribunal.” Therefore they should not be received by the Church.

I answer that, In obedience to Our Lord’s institution, the Church extends her charity to all, not only to friends, but also to foes who persecute her, according to Mat. 5:44: “Love your enemies; do good to them that hate you.” Now it is part of charity that we should both wish and work our neighbor’s good. Again, good is twofold: one is spiritual, namely the health of the soul, which good is chiefly the object of charity, since it is this chiefly that we should wish for one another. Consequently, from this point of view, heretics who return after falling no matter how often, are admitted by the Church to Penance whereby the way of salvation is opened to them.

The other good is that which charity considers secondarily, viz. temporal good, such as life of the body, worldly possessions, good repute, ecclesiastical or secular dignity, for we are not bound by charity to wish others this good, except in relation to the eternal salvation of them and of others. Hence if the presence of one of these goods in one individual might be an obstacle to eternal salvation in many, we are not bound out of charity to wish such a good to that person, rather should we desire him to be without it, both because eternal salvation takes precedence of temporal good, and because the good of the many is to be preferred to the good of one. Now if heretics were always received on their return, in order to save their lives and other temporal goods, this might be prejudicial to the salvation of others, both because they would infect others if they relapsed again, and because, if they escaped without punishment, others would feel more assured in lapsing into heresy. For it is written (Eccles. 8:11): “For because sentence is not speedily pronounced against the evil, the children of men commit evils without any fear.”

For this reason the Church not only admits to Penance those who return from heresy for the first time, but also safeguards their lives, and sometimes by dispensation, restores them to the ecclesiastical dignities which they may have had before, should their conversion appear to be sincere: we read of this as having frequently been done for the good of peace. But when they fall again, after having been received, this seems to prove them to be inconstant in faith, wherefore when they return again, they are admitted to Penance, but are not delivered from the pain of death.

Reply to Objection 1: In God’s tribunal, those who return are always received, because God is a searcher of hearts, and knows those who return in sincerity. But the Church cannot imitate God in this, for she presumes that those who relapse after being once received, are not sincere in their return; hence she does not debar them from the way of salvation, but neither does she protect them from the sentence of death.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord was speaking to Peter of sins committed against oneself, for one should always forgive such offenses and spare our brother when he repents. These words are not to be applied to sins committed against one’s neighbor or against God, for it is not left to our discretion to forgive such offenses, as Jerome says on Mat. 18:15, “If thy brother shall offend against thee.” Yet even in this matter the law prescribes limits according as God’s honor or our neighbor’s good demands.

Reply to Objection 3: When other unbelievers, who have never received the faith are converted, they do not as yet show signs of inconstancy in faith, as relapsed heretics do; hence the comparison fails.

OF APOSTASY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider apostasy: about which there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?

(2) Whether, on account of apostasy from the faith, subjects are absolved from allegiance to an apostate prince?

Whether apostasy pertains to unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that apostasy does not pertain to unbelief. For that which is the origin of all sins, does not, seemingly, pertain to unbelief, since many sins there are without unbelief. Now apostasy seems to be the origin of every sin, for it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): “The beginning of the pride of man is apostasy [Douay: ‘to fall off’] from God,” and further on, (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.” Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

Objection 2: Further, unbelief is an act of the understanding: whereas apostasy seems rather to consist in some outward deed or utterance, or even in some inward act of the will, for it is written (Prov. 6:12–14): “A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man walketh with a perverse mouth. He winketh with the eyes, presseth with the foot, speaketh with the finger. With a wicked heart he deviseth evil, and at all times he soweth discord.” Moreover if anyone were to have himself circumcised, or to worship at the tomb of Mahomet, he would be deemed an apostate. Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

Objection 3: Further, heresy, since it pertains to unbelief, is a determinate species of unbelief. If then, apostasy pertained to unbelief, it would follow that it is a determinate species of unbelief, which does not seem to agree with what has been said ([2407]Q[10], A[5]). Therefore apostasy does not pertain to unbelief.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:67): “Many of his disciples went back,” i.e. apostatized, of whom Our Lord had said previously (Jn. 6:65): “There are some of you that believe not.” Therefore apostasy pertains to unbelief.

I answer that, Apostasy denotes a backsliding from God. This may happen in various ways according to the different kinds of union between man and God. For, in the first place, man is united to God by faith; secondly, by having his will duly submissive in obeying His commandments; thirdly, by certain special things pertaining to supererogation such as the religious life, the clerical state, or Holy Orders. Now if that which follows be removed, that which precedes, remains, but the converse does not hold. Accordingly a man may apostatize from God, by withdrawing from the religious life to which he was bound by profession, or from the Holy Order which he had received: and this is called "apostasy from religious life" or "Orders." A man may also apostatize from God, by rebelling in his mind against the Divine commandments: and though man may apostatize in both the above ways, he may still remain united to God by faith.

But if he give up the faith, then he seems to turn away from God altogether: and consequently, apostasy simply and absolutely is that whereby a man withdraws from the faith, and is called "apostasy of perfidy." In this way apostasy, simply so called, pertains to unbelief.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection refers to the second kind of apostasy, which denotes an act of the will in rebellion against God's commandments, an act that is to be found in every mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to faith not only that the heart should believe, but also that external words and deeds should bear witness to the inward faith, for confession is an act of faith. In this way too, certain external words or deeds pertain to unbelief, in so far as they are signs of unbelief, even as a sign of health is said itself to be healthy. Now although the authority quoted may be understood as referring to every kind of apostate, yet it applies most truly to an apostate from the faith. For since faith is the first foundation of things to be hoped for, and since, without faith it is "impossible to please God"; when once faith is removed, man retains nothing that may be useful for the obtaining of eternal salvation, for which reason it is written (Prov. 6:12): "A man that is an apostate, an unprofitable man": because faith is the life of the soul, according to Rom. 1:17: "The just man liveth by faith." Therefore, just as when the life of the body is taken away, man's every member and part loses its due disposition, so when the life of justice, which is by faith, is done away, disorder appears in all his members. First, in his mouth, whereby chiefly his mind stands revealed; secondly, in his eyes; thirdly, in the instrument of movement; fourthly, in his will, which tends to evil. The result is that "he sows discord," endeavoring to sever others from the faith even as he severed himself.

Reply to Objection 3: The species of a quality or form are not diversified by the fact of its being the term "wherefrom" or "whereto" of movement: on the contrary, it is the movement that takes its species from the terms. Now apostasy regards unbelief as the term "whereto" of the movement of withdrawal from the faith; wherefore apostasy does not imply a special kind of unbelief, but an aggravating circumstance thereof, according to 2 Pet. 2:21: “It had been better for them not to know the truth [Vulg.: ‘the way of justice’], than after they had known it, to turn back.”

Whether a prince forfeits his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, so that they no longer owe him allegiance?

Objection 1: It would seem that a prince does not so forfeit his dominion over his subjects, on account of apostasy from the faith, that they no longer owe him allegiance. For Ambrose [*St. Augustine, Super Ps. 124:3] says that the Emperor Julian, though an apostate, nevertheless had under him Christian soldiers, who when he said to them, “Fall into line for the defense of the republic,” were bound to obey. Therefore subjects are not absolved from their allegiance to their prince on account of his apostasy.

Objection 2: Further, an apostate from the faith is an unbeliever. Now we find that certain holy men served unbelieving masters; thus Joseph served Pharaoh, Daniel served Nabuchodonosor, and Mardochai served Assuerus. Therefore apostasy from the faith does not release subjects from allegiance to their sovereign.

Objection 3: Further, just as by apostasy from the faith, a man turns away from God, so does every sin. Consequently if, on account of apostasy from the faith, princes were to lose their right to command those of their subjects who are believers, they would equally lose it on account of other sins: which is evidently not the case. Therefore we ought not to refuse allegiance to a sovereign on account of his apostatizing from the faith.

On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Council, Roman V): “Holding to the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority, absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred bond of an oath owe allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their allegiance to such persons, until these shall have made amends.” Now apostates from the faith, like heretics, are excommunicated, according to the Decretal [*Extra, De Haereticis, cap. Ad abolendam]. Therefore princes should not be obeyed when they have apostatized from the faith.

I answer that, As stated above ([2408]Q[10], A[10]), unbelief, in itself, is not inconsistent with dominion, since dominion is a device of the law of nations which is a human law: whereas the distinction between believers and unbelievers is of Divine right, which does not annul human right. Nevertheless a man who sins by unbelief may be sentenced to the loss of his right of dominion, as also, sometimes, on account of other sins.

Now it is not within the competency of the Church to punish unbelief in those who have never received the faith, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:12): “What have I to do to judge them that are without?” She can, however, pass sentence of punishment on the unbelief of those who have received the faith: and it is fitting that they should be punished by being deprived of the allegiance of their subjects: for this same allegiance might conduce to great corruption of the faith, since, as was stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]), “a man that is an apostate . . . with a wicked heart deviseth evil, and . . . soweth discord,” in order to sever others from the faith. Consequently, as soon as sentence of excommunication is passed on a man on account of apostasy from the faith, his subjects are “ipso facto” absolved from his authority and from the oath of allegiance whereby they were bound to him.

Reply to Objection 1: At that time the Church was but recently instituted, and had not, as yet, the power of curbing earthly princes; and so she allowed the faithful to obey Julian the apostate, in matters that were not contrary to the faith, in order to avoid incurring a yet greater danger.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the article, it is not a question of those unbelievers who have never received the faith.

Reply to Objection 3: Apostasy from the faith severs man from God altogether, as stated above [2409](A[1]), which is not the case in any other sin.

OF THE SIN OF BLASPHEMY, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sin of blasphemy, which is opposed to the confession of faith; and (1) blasphemy in general, (2) that blasphemy which is called the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?

(2) Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?

(3) Whether blasphemy is the most grievous sin?

(4) Whether blasphemy is in the damned?

Whether blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith. Because to blaspheme is to utter an affront or insult against the Creator. Now this pertains to ill-will against God rather than to unbelief. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to the confession of faith.

Objection 2: Further, on Eph. 4:31, “Let blasphemy . . . be put away from you,” a gloss says, “that which is committed against God or the saints.” But confession of faith, seemingly, is not about other things than those pertaining to God, Who is the object of faith. Therefore blasphemy is not always opposed to the confession of faith.

Objection 3: Further, according to some, there are three kinds of blasphemy. The first of these is when something unfitting is affirmed of God; the second is when something fitting is denied of Him; and the third, when something proper to God is ascribed to a creature, so that, seemingly, blasphemy is not only about God, but also about His creatures. Now the object of faith is God. Therefore blasphemy is not opposed to confession of faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:12,13): “I . . . before was a blasphemer and a persecutor,” and afterwards, “I did it ignorantly in” my “unbelief.” Hence it seems that blasphemy pertains to unbelief.

I answer that, The word blasphemy seems to denote the disparagement of some surpassing goodness, especially that of God. Now God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), is the very essence of true goodness. Hence whatever befits God, pertains to His goodness, and whatever does not befit Him, is far removed from the perfection of goodness which is His Essence. Consequently whoever either denies anything befitting God, or affirms anything unbefitting Him, disparages the Divine goodness.

Now this may happen in two ways. In the first way it may happen merely in respect of the opinion in the intellect; in the second way this opinion is united to a certain detestation in the affections, even as, on the other hand, faith in God is perfected by love of Him. Accordingly this disparagement of the Divine goodness is either in the intellect alone, or in the affections also. If it is in thought only, it is blasphemy of the heart, whereas if it betrays itself outwardly in speech it is blasphemy is opposed to confession of faith.

Reply to Objection 1: He that speaks against God, with the intention of reviling Him, disparages the Divine goodness, not only in respect of the falsehood in his intellect, but also by reason of the wickedness of his will, whereby he detests and strives to hinder the honor due to God, and this is perfect blasphemy.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as God is praised in His saints, in so far as praise is given to the works which God does in His saints, so does blasphemy against the saints, redound, as a consequence, against God.

Reply to Objection 3: Properly speaking, the sin of blasphemy is not in this way divided into three species: since to affirm unfitting things, or to deny fitting things of God, differ merely as affirmation and negation. For this diversity does not cause distinct species of habits, since the falsehood of affirmations and negations is made known by the same knowledge, and it is the same ignorance which errs in either way, since negatives are proved by affirmatives, according to Poster. i, 25. Again to ascribe to creatures things that are proper to God, seems to amount to the same as affirming something unfitting of Him, since whatever is proper to God is God Himself: and to ascribe to a creature, that which is proper to God, is to assert that God is the same as a creature.

Whether blasphemy is always a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that blasphemy is not always a mortal sin. Because a gloss on the words, “Now lay you also all away,” etc. (Col. 3:8) says: “After prohibiting greater crimes he forbids lesser sins”: and yet among the latter he includes blasphemy. Therefore blasphemy is comprised among the lesser, i.e. venial, sins.

Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to one of the precepts of the decalogue. But, seemingly, blasphemy is not contrary to any of them. Therefore blasphemy is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, sins committed without deliberation, are not mortal: hence first movements are not mortal sins, because they precede the deliberation of the reason, as was shown above ([2410]FS, Q[74], AA[3],10). Now blasphemy sometimes occurs without deliberation of the reason. Therefore it is not always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 24:16): “He that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, dying let him die.” Now the death punishment is not inflicted except for a mortal sin. Therefore blasphemy is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([2411]FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal sin is one whereby a man is severed from the first principle of spiritual life, which principle is the charity of God. Therefore whatever things are contrary to charity, are mortal sins in respect of their genus. Now blasphemy, as to its genus, is opposed to Divine charity, because, as stated above [2412](A[1]), it disparages the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity. Consequently blasphemy is a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all the sins which follow, are mortal, but that whereas all those mentioned previously are more grievous sins, some of those mentioned afterwards are less grievous; and yet among the latter some more grievous sins are included.

Reply to Objection 2: Since, as stated above [2413](A[1]), blasphemy is contrary to the confession of faith, its prohibition is comprised under the prohibition of unbelief, expressed by the words: “I am the Lord thy God,” etc. (Ex. 20:1). Or else, it is forbidden by the words: “Thou shalt not take the name of . . . God in vain” (Ex. 20:7). Because he who asserts something false about God, takes His name in vain even more than he who uses the name of God in confirmation of a falsehood.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two ways in which blasphemy may occur unawares and without deliberation. In the first way, by a man failing to advert to the blasphemous nature of his words, and this may happen through his being moved suddenly by passion so as to break out into words suggested by his imagination, without heeding to the meaning of those words: this is a venial sin, and is not a blasphemy properly so called. In the second way, by adverting to the meaning of his words, and to their blasphemous nature: in which case he is not excused from mortal sin, even as neither is he who, in a sudden movement of anger, kills one who is sitting beside him.

Whether the sin of blasphemy is the greatest sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of blasphemy is not the greatest sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), a thing is said to be evil because it does harm. Now the sin of murder, since it destroys a man’s life, does more harm than the sin of blasphemy, which can do no harm to God. Therefore the sin of murder is more grievous than that of blasphemy.

Objection 2: Further, a perjurer calls upon God to witness to a falsehood, and thus seems to assert that God is false. But not every blasphemer goes so far as to say that God is false. Therefore perjury is a more grievous sin than blasphemy.

Objection 3: Further, on Ps. 74:6, “Lift not up your horn on high,” a gloss says: “To excuse oneself for sin is the greatest sin of all.” Therefore blasphemy is not the greatest sin.

On the contrary, On Is. 18:2, “To a terrible people,” etc. a gloss says: “In comparison with blasphemy, every sin is slight.”

I answer that, As stated above [2414](A[1]), blasphemy is opposed to the confession of faith, so that it contains the gravity of unbelief: while the sin is aggravated if the will’s detestation is added thereto, and yet more, if it breaks out into words, even as love and confession add to the praise of faith.

Therefore, since, as stated above ([2415]Q[10], A[3]), unbelief is the greatest of sins in respect of its genus, it follows that blasphemy also is a very great sin, through belonging to the same genus as unbelief and being an aggravated form of that sin.

Reply to Objection 1: If we compare murder and blasphemy as regards the objects of those sins, it is clear that blasphemy, which is a sin committed directly against God, is more grave than murder, which is a sin against one’s neighbor. On the other hand, if we compare them in respect of the harm wrought by them, murder is the graver sin, for murder does more harm to one’s neighbor, than blasphemy does to God. Since, however, the gravity of a sin depends on the intention of the evil will, rather than on the effect of the deed, as was shown above ([2416]FS, Q[73], A[8]), it follows that, as the blasphemer intends to do harm to God’s honor, absolutely speaking, he sins more grievously that the murderer. Nevertheless murder takes precedence, as to punishment, among sins committed against our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 2: A gloss on the words, "Let . . . blasphemy be put away from you" (Eph. 4:31) says: "Blasphemy is worse than perjury." The reason is that the perjurer does not say or think something false about God, as the blasphemer does: but he calls God to witness to a falsehood, not that he deems God a false witness, but in the hope, as it were, that God will not testify to the matter by some evident sign.

Reply to Objection 3: To excuse oneself for sin is a circumstance that aggravates every sin, even blasphemy itself: and it is called the most grievous sin, for as much as it makes every sin more grievous.

Whether the damned blaspheme?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not blaspheme. Because some wicked men are deterred from blaspheming now, on account of the fear of future punishment. But the damned are undergoing these punishments, so that they abhor them yet more. Therefore, much more are they restrained from blaspheming.

Objection 2: Further, since blasphemy is a most grievous sin, it is most demeritorious. Now in the life to come there is no state of meriting or demeriting. Therefore there will be no place for blasphemy.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Eccles. 11:3) that "the tree . . . in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be": whence it clearly follows that, after this life, man acquires neither merit nor sin, which he did not already possess in this life. Now many will be damned who were not blasphemous in this life. Neither, therefore, will they blaspheme in the life to come.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 16:9): "The men were scorched with great heat, and they blasphemed the name of God, Who hath power over these plagues," and a gloss on these words says that "those who are in hell, though aware that they are deservedly punished, will nevertheless complain that God is so powerful as to torture them thus." Now this would be blasphemy in their present state: and consequently it will also be in their future state.

I answer that, As stated above ([2417]AA[1],3), detestation of the Divine goodness is a necessary condition of blasphemy. Now those who are in hell retain their wicked will which is turned away from God's justice, since they love the things for which they are punished, would wish to use them if they could, and hate the punishments inflicted on them for those same sins. They regret indeed the sins which they have committed, not because they hate them, but because they are punished for them. Accordingly this detestation of the Divine justice is, in them, the interior blasphemy of the heart: and it is credible that after the resurrection they will blaspheme God with the tongue, even as the saints will praise Him with their voices.

Reply to Objection 1: In the present life men are deterred from blasphemy through fear of punishment which they think they can escape: whereas, in hell, the damned have no hope of escape, so that, in despair, they are borne towards whatever their wicked will suggests to them.

Reply to Objection 2: Merit and demerit belong to the state of a wayfarer, wherefore good is meritorious in them, while evil is demeritorious. In the blessed, on the other hand, good is not meritorious, but is part of their blissful reward, and, in like manner, in the damned, evil is not demeritorious, but is part of the punishment of damnation.

Reply to Objection 3: Whoever dies in mortal sin, bears with him a will that detests the Divine justice with regard to a certain thing, and in this respect there can be blasphemy in him.

OF BLASPHEMY AGAINST THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider in particular blasphemy against the Holy Ghost: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice?

(2) Of the species of this sin;

(3) Whether it can be forgiven?

(4) Whether it is possible to begin by sinning against the Holy Ghost before committing other sins?

Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost is the same as the sin committed through certain malice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice. Because the sin against the Holy Ghost is the sin of blasphemy, according to Mat. 12:32. But not every sin committed through certain malice is a sin of blasphemy: since many other kinds of sin may be committed through certain malice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice.

Objection 2: Further, the sin committed through certain malice is condivided with sin committed through ignorance, and sin committed through weakness: whereas the sin against the Holy Ghost is condivided with the sin against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32). Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice, since things whose opposites differ, are themselves different.

Objection 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is itself a generic sin, having its own determinate species: whereas sin committed through certain malice is not a special kind of sin, but a condition or general circumstance of sin, which can affect any kind of sin at all. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is not the same as the sin committed through certain malice.

On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. ii, D, 43) that “to sin against the Holy Ghost is to take pleasure in the malice of sin for its own sake.” Now this is to sin through certain malice. Therefore it seems that the sin committed through certain malice is the same as the sin against the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, Three meanings have been given to the sin against the Holy Ghost. For the earlier doctors, viz. Athanasius (Super Matth. xii, 32), Hilary (Can. xii in Matth.), Ambrose (Super Luc. xii, 10), Jerome (Super Matth. xii), and Chrysostom (Hom. xli in Matth.), say that the sin against the Holy Ghost is literally to utter a blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, whether by Holy Spirit we understand the essential name applicable to the whole Trinity, each Person of which is a Spirit and is holy, or the personal name of one of the Persons of the Trinity, in which sense blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is distinct from the blasphemy against the Son of Man (Mat. 12:32), for Christ did certain things in respect of His human nature, by eating, drinking, and such like actions, while He did others in respect of His Godhead, by casting out devils, raising the dead, and the like: which things He did both by the power of His own Godhead and by the operation of the Holy Ghost, of Whom He was full, according to his human nature. Now the Jews began by speaking blasphemy against the Son of Man, when they said (Mat. 11:19) that He was “a glutton . . . a wine drinker,” and a “friend of publicans”: but afterwards they blasphemed against the Holy Ghost, when they ascribed to the prince of devils those works which Christ did by the power of His own Divine Nature and by the operation of the Holy Ghost.

Augustine, however (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi), says that blasphemy or the sin against the Holy Ghost, is final impenitence when, namely, a man perseveres in mortal sin until death, and that it is not confined to utterance by word of mouth, but extends to words in thought and deed, not to one word only, but to many. Now this word, in this sense, is said to be uttered against the Holy Ghost, because it is contrary to the remission of sins, which is the work of the Holy Ghost, Who is the charity both of the Father and of the Son. Nor did Our Lord say this to the Jews, as though they had sinned against the Holy Ghost, since they were not yet guilty of final impenitence, but He warned them, lest by similar utterances they should come to sin against the Holy Ghost: and it is in this sense that we are to understand Mark 3:29,30, where after Our Lord had said: “But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost,” etc. the Evangelist adds, “because they said: He hath an unclean spirit.”

But others understand it differently, and say that the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, is a sin committed against that good which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost: because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, just a power is appropriated to the Father, and wisdom to the Son. Hence they say that when a man sins through weakness, it is a sin “against the Father”; that when he sins through ignorance, it is a sin “against the Son”; and that when he sins through certain malice, i.e. through the very choosing of evil, as explained above ([2418]FS, Q[78], AA[1] ,3), it is a sin “against the Holy Ghost.”

Now this may happen in two ways. First by reason of the very inclination of a vicious habit which we call malice, and, in this way, to sin through malice is not the same as to sin against the Holy Ghost. In another way it happens that by reason of contempt, that which might have prevented the choosing of evil, is rejected or removed; thus hope is removed by despair, and fear by presumption, and so on, as we shall explain further on (QQ[20],21). Now all these things which prevent the choosing of sin are effects of the Holy Ghost in us; so that, in this sense, to sin through malice is to sin against the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the confession of faith consists in a protestation not only of words but also of deeds, so blasphemy against the Holy Ghost can be uttered in word, thought and deed.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the third interpretation, blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is condivided with blasphemy against the Son of Man, forasmuch as He is also the Son of God, i.e. the "power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Cor. 1:24). Wherefore, in this sense, the sin against the Son of Man will be that which is committed through ignorance, or through weakness.

Reply to Objection 3: Sin committed through certain malice, in so far as it results from the inclination of a habit, is not a special sin, but a general condition of sin: whereas, in so far as it results from a special contempt of an effect of the Holy Ghost in us, it has the character of a special sin. According to this interpretation the sin against the Holy Ghost is a special kind of sin, as also according to the first interpretation: whereas according to the second, it is not a species of sin, because final impenitence may be a circumstance of any kind of sin.

Whether it is fitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish six kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, viz. despair, presumption, impenitence, obstinacy, resisting the known truth, envy of our brother's spiritual good, which are assigned by the Master (Sent. ii, D, 43). For to deny God's justice or mercy belongs to unbelief. Now, by despair, a man rejects God's mercy, and by presumption, His justice. Therefore each of these is a kind of unbelief rather than of the sin against the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, impenitence, seemingly, regards past sins, while obstinacy regards future sins. Now past and future time do not diversify the species of virtues or vices, since it is the same faith whereby we believe that Christ was born, and those of old believed that He would be born. Therefore obstinacy and impenitence should not be reckoned as two species of sin against the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" (Jn. 1:17). Therefore it seem that resistance of the known truth, and envy of a brother's spiritual good, belong to blasphemy against the Son rather than against the Holy Ghost.

Objection 4: Further, Bernard says (De Dispens. et Praecept. xi) that “to refuse to obey is to resist the Holy Ghost.” Moreover a gloss on Lev. 10:16, says that “a feigned repentance is a blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.” Again, schism is, seemingly, directly opposed to the Holy Ghost by Whom the Church is united together. Therefore it seems that the species of sins against the Holy Ghost are insufficiently enumerated.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] (De Fide ad Petrum iii) says that “those who despair of pardon for their sins, or who without merits presume on God’s mercy, sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (Enchiridion lxxxiii) that “he who dies in a state of obstinacy is guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that “impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost,” and (De Serm. Dom. in Monte xxii), that “to resist fraternal goodness with the brands of envy is to sin against the Holy Ghost,” and in his book De unico Baptismo (De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 35) he says that “a man who spurns the truth, is either envious of his brethren to whom the truth is revealed, or ungrateful to God, by Whose inspiration the Church is taught,” and therefore, seemingly, sins against the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, The above species are fittingly assigned to the sin against the Holy Ghost taken in the third sense, because they are distinguished in respect of the removal of contempt of those things whereby a man can be prevented from sinning through choice. These things are either on the part of God’s judgment, or on the part of His gifts, or on the part of sin. For, by consideration of the Divine judgment, wherein justice is accompanied with mercy, man is hindered from sinning through choice, both by hope, arising from the consideration of the mercy that pardons sins and rewards good deeds, which hope is removed by “despair”; and by fear, arising from the consideration of the Divine justice that punishes sins, which fear is removed by “presumption,” when, namely, a man presumes that he can obtain glory without merits, or pardon without repentance.

God’s gifts whereby we are withdrawn from sin, are two: one is the acknowledgment of the truth, against which there is the “resistance of the known truth,” when, namely, a man resists the truth which he has acknowledged, in order to sin more freely: while the other is the assistance of inward grace, against which there is “envy of a brother’s spiritual good,” when, namely, a man is envious not only of his brother’s person, but also of the increase of Divine grace in the world.

On the part of sin, there are two things which may withdraw man therefrom: one is the inordinateness and shamefulness of the act, the consideration of which is wont to arouse man to repentance for the sin he has committed, and against this there is “impenitence,” not as denoting permanence in sin until death, in which sense it was taken above (for thus it would not be a special sin, but a circumstance of sin), but as denoting the purpose of not repenting. The other thing is the smallness or brevity of the good which is sought in sin, according to Rom. 6:21: “What fruit had you therefore then in those things, of which you are now ashamed?” The consideration of this is wont to prevent man’s will from being hardened in sin, and this is removed by “obstinacy,” whereby man hardens his purpose by clinging to sin. Of these two it is written (Jer. 8:6): “There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?” as regards the first; and, “They are all turned to their own course, as a horse rushing to the battle,” as regards the second.

Reply to Objection 1: The sins of despair and presumption consist, not in disbelieving in God’s justice and mercy, but in contemning them.

Reply to Objection 2: Obstinacy and impenitence differ not only in respect of past and future time, but also in respect of certain formal aspects by reason of the diverse consideration of those things which may be considered in sin, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: Grace and truth were the work of Christ through the gifts of the Holy Ghost which He gave to men.

Reply to Objection 4: To refuse to obey belongs to obstinacy, while a feigned repentance belongs to impenitence, and schism to the envy of a brother’s spiritual good, whereby the members of the Church are united together.

Whether the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi): “We should despair of no man, so long as Our Lord’s patience brings him back to repentance.” But if any sin cannot be forgiven, it would be possible to despair of some sinners. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

Objection 2: Further, no sin is forgiven, except through the soul being healed by God. But “no disease is incurable to an all-powerful physician,” as a gloss says on Ps. 102:3, “Who healeth all thy diseases.” Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

Objection 3: Further, the free-will is indifferent to either good or evil. Now, so long as man is a wayfarer, he can fall away from any virtue, since even an angel fell from heaven, wherefore it is written (Job 4:18,19): “In His angels He found wickedness: how much more shall they that dwell in houses of clay?” Therefore, in like manner, a man can return from any sin to the state of justice. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost can be forgiven.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:32): “He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come”: and Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22) that “so great is the downfall of this sin that it cannot submit to the humiliation of asking for pardon.”

I answer that, According to the various interpretations of the sin against the Holy Ghost, there are various ways in which it may be said that it cannot be forgiven. For if by the sin against the Holy Ghost we understand final impenitence, it is said to be unpardonable, since in no way is it pardoned: because the mortal sin wherein a man perseveres until death will not be forgiven in the life to come, since it was not remitted by repentance in this life.

According to the other two interpretations, it is said to be unpardonable, not as though it is nowise forgiven, but because, considered in itself, it deserves not to be pardoned: and this in two ways. First, as regards the punishment, since he that sins through ignorance or weakness, deserves less punishment, whereas he that sins through certain malice, can offer no excuse in alleviation of his punishment. Likewise those who blasphemed against the Son of Man before His Godhead was revealed, could have some excuse, on account of the weakness of the flesh which they perceived in Him, and hence, they deserved less punishment; whereas those who blasphemed against His very Godhead, by ascribing to the devil the works of the Holy Ghost, had no excuse in diminution of their punishment.

Wherefore, according to Chrysostom’s commentary (Hom. xlii in Matth.), the Jews are said not to be forgiven this sin, neither in this world nor in the world to come, because they were punished for it, both in the present life, through the Romans, and in the life to come, in the pains of hell. Thus also Athanasius adduces the example of their forefathers who, first of all, wrangled with Moses on account of the shortage of water and bread; and this the Lord bore with patience, because they were to be excused on account of the weakness of the flesh: but afterwards they sinned more grievously when, by ascribing to an idol the favors bestowed by God Who had brought them out of Egypt, they blasphemed, so to speak, against the Holy Ghost, saying (Ex. 32:4): “These are thy gods, O Israel, that have brought thee out of the land of Egypt.” Therefore the Lord both inflicted temporal punishment on them, since “there were slain on that day about three and twenty thousand men” (Ex. 32:28), and threatened them with punishment in the life to come, saying, (Ex. 32:34): “I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin . . . of theirs.”

Secondly, this may be understood to refer to the guilt: thus a disease is said to be incurable in respect of the nature of the disease, which removes whatever might be a means of cure, as when it takes away the power of nature, or causes loathing for food and medicine, although God is able to cure such a disease. So too, the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be unpardonable, by reason of its nature, in so far as it removes those things which are a means towards the pardon of sins. This does not, however, close the way of forgiveness and healing to an all-powerful and merciful God, Who, sometimes, by a miracle, so to speak, restores spiritual health to such men.

Reply to Objection 1: We should despair of no man in this life, considering God’s omnipotence and mercy. But if we consider the circumstances of sin, some are called (Eph. 2:2) “children of despair” [*’Filios diffidentiae,’ which the Douay version renders ‘children of unbelief.’].

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the question on the part of God’s omnipotence, not on that of the circumstances of sin.

Reply to Objection 3: In this life the free-will does indeed ever remain subject to change: yet sometimes it rejects that whereby, so far as it is concerned, it can be turned to good. Hence considered in itself this sin is unpardonable, although God can pardon it.

Whether a man can sin first of all against the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot sin first of all against the Holy Ghost, without having previously committed other sins. For the natural order requires that one should be moved to perfection from imperfection. This is evident as regards good things, according to Prov. 4:18: “The path of the just, as a shining light, goeth forwards and increases even to perfect day.” Now, in evil things, the perfect is the greatest evil, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. v, text. 21). Since then the sin against the Holy Ghost is the most grievous sin, it seems that man comes to commit this sin through committing lesser sins.

Objection 2: Further, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice, or through choice. Now man cannot do this until he has sinned many times; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6,9) that “although a man is able to do unjust deeds, yet he cannot all at once do them as an unjust man does,” viz. from choice. Therefore it seems that the sin against the Holy Ghost cannot be committed except after other sins.

Objection 3: Further, repentance and impenitence are about the same object. But there is no repentance, except about past sins. Therefore the same applies to impenitence which is a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the sin against the Holy Ghost presupposes other sins.

On the contrary, “It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make a poor man rich” (Ecclus. 11:23). Therefore, conversely, it is possible for a man, according to the malice of the devil who tempts him, to be led to commit the most grievous of sins which is that against the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, As stated above [2419](A[1]), in one way, to sin against the Holy Ghost is to sin through certain malice. Now one may sin through certain malice in two ways, as stated in the same place: first, through the inclination of a habit; but this is not, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, nor does a man come to commit this sin all at once, in as much as sinful acts must precede so as to cause the habit that induces to sin. Secondly, one may sin through certain malice, by contemptuously rejecting the things whereby a man is withdrawn from sin. This is, properly speaking, to sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above [2420](A[1]); and this also, for the most part, presupposes other sins, for it is written (Prov. 18:3) that “the wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth.”

Nevertheless it is possible for a man, in his first sinful act, to sin against the Holy Ghost by contempt, both on account of his free-will, and on account of the many previous dispositions, or again, through being vehemently moved to evil, while but feebly attached to good. Hence never or scarcely ever does it happen that the perfect sin all at once against the Holy Ghost: wherefore Origen says (Peri Archon. i, 3): “I do not think that anyone who stands on the highest step of perfection, can fail or fall suddenly; this can only happen by degrees and bit by bit.”

The same applies, if the sin against the Holy Ghost be taken literally for blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. For such blasphemy as Our Lord speaks of, always proceeds from contemptuous malice.

If, however, with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) we understand the sin against the Holy Ghost to denote final impenitence, it does not regard the question in point, because this sin against the Holy Ghost requires persistence in sin until the end of life.

Reply to Objection 1: Movement both in good and in evil is made, for the most part, from imperfect to perfect, according as man progresses in good or evil: and yet in both cases, one man can begin from a greater (good or evil) than another man does. Consequently, that from which a man begins can be perfect in good or evil according to its genus, although it may be imperfect as regards the series of good or evil actions whereby a man progresses in good or evil.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the sin which is committed through certain malice, when it proceeds from the inclination of a habit.

Reply to Objection 3: If by impenitence we understand with Augustine (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) persistence in sin until the end, it is clear that it presupposes sin, just as repentance does. If, however, we take it for habitual impenitence, in which sense it is a sin against the Holy Ghost, it is evident that it can precede sin: for it is possible for a man who has never sinned to have the purpose either of repenting or of not repenting, if he should happen to sin.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to knowledge and understanding. Since, however, we have treated of ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, when we were discussing the causes of sins ([2421]FS, Q[76]), we must now inquire about blindness of mind and dulness of sense, which are opposed to the gift of understanding; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether blindness of mind is a sin?

(2) Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?

(3) Whether these vices arise from sins of the flesh?

Whether blindness of mind is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind is not a sin. Because, seemingly, that which excuses from sin is not itself a sin. Now blindness of mind excuses from sin; for it is written (Jn. 9:41): “If you were blind, you should not have sin.” Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, punishment differs from guilt. But blindness of mind is a punishment as appears from Is. 6:10, “Blind the heart of this people,” for, since it is an evil, it could not be from God, were it not a punishment. Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). Now blindness of mind is not voluntary, since, as Augustine says (Confess. x), “all love to know the resplendent truth,” and as we read in Eccles. 11:7, “the light is sweet and it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun.” Therefore blindness of mind is not a sin.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons blindness of mind among the vices arising from lust.

I answer that, Just as bodily blindness is the privation of the principle of bodily sight, so blindness of mind is the privation of the principle of mental or intellectual sight. Now this has a threefold principle. One is the light of natural reason, which light, since it pertains to the species of the rational soul, is never forfeit from the soul, and yet, at times, it is prevented from exercising its proper act, through being hindered by the lower powers which the human intellect needs in order to understand, for instance in the case of imbeciles and madmen, as stated in the [2422]FP, Q[84], AA[7],8.

Another principle of intellectual sight is a certain habitual light superadded to the natural light of reason, which light is sometimes forfeit from the soul. This privation is blindness, and is a punishment, in so far as the privation of the light of grace is a punishment. Hence it is written concerning some (Wis. 2:21): “Their own malice blinded them.”

A third principle of intellectual sight is an intelligible principle, through which a man understands other things; to which principle a man may attend or not attend. That he does not attend thereto happens in two ways. Sometimes it is due to the fact that a man’s will is deliberately turned away from the consideration of that principle, according to Ps. 35:4, “He would not understand, that he might do well”: whereas sometimes it is due to the mind being more busy about things which it loves more, so as to be hindered thereby from considering this principle, according to Ps. 57:9, “Fire,” i.e. of concupiscence, “hath fallen on them and they shall not see the sun.” In either of these ways blindness of mind is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The blindness that excuses from sin is that which arises from the natural defect of one who cannot see.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the second kind of blindness which is a punishment.

Reply to Objection 3: To understand the truth is, in itself, beloved by all; and yet, accidentally it may be hateful to someone, in so far as a man is hindered thereby from having what he loves yet more.

Whether dulness of sense is a sin distinct from blindness of mind?

Objection 1: It seems that dulness of sense is not a distinct sin from blindness of mind. Because one thing has one contrary. Now dulness is opposed to the gift of understanding, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49); and so is blindness of mind, since understanding denotes a principle of sight. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) in speaking of dulness describes it as “dullness of sense in respect of understanding.” Now dulness of sense in respect of understanding seems to be the same as a defect in understanding, which pertains to blindness of mind. Therefore dulness of sense is the same as blindness of mind.

Objection 3: Further, if they differ at all, it seems to be chiefly in the fact that blindness of mind is voluntary, as stated above [2423](A[1]), while dulness of sense is a natural defect. But a natural defect is not a sin: so that, accordingly, dulness of sense would not be a sin, which is contrary to what Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), where he reckons it among the sins arising from gluttony.

On the contrary, Different causes produce different effects. Now Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony, and that blindness of mind arises from lust. Now these others are different vices. Therefore those are different vices also.

I answer that, Dull is opposed to sharp: and a thing is said to be sharp because it can pierce; so that a thing is called dull through being obtuse and unable to pierce. Now a bodily sense, by a kind of metaphor, is said to pierce the medium, in so far as it perceives its object from a distance or is able by penetration as it were to perceive the smallest details or the inmost parts of a thing. Hence in corporeal things the senses are said to be acute when they can perceive a sensible object from afar, by sight, hearing, or scent, while on the other hand they are said to be dull, through being unable to perceive, except sensible objects that are near at hand, or of great power.

Now, by way of similitude to bodily sense, we speak of sense in connection with the intellect; and this latter sense is in respect of certain primals and extremes, as stated in Ethic. vi, even as the senses are cognizant of sensible objects as of certain principles of knowledge. Now this sense which is connected with understanding, does not perceive its object through a medium of corporeal distance, but through certain other media, as, for instance, when it perceives a thing’s essence through a property thereof, and the cause through its effect. Consequently a man is said to have an acute sense in connection with his understanding, if, as soon as he apprehends a property or effect of a thing, he understands the nature or the thing itself, and if he can succeed in perceiving its slightest details: whereas a man is said to have a dull sense in connection with his understanding, if he cannot arrive at knowing the truth about a thing, without many explanations; in which case, moreover, he is unable to obtain a perfect perception of everything pertaining to the nature of that thing.

Accordingly dulness of sense in connection with understanding denotes a certain weakness of the mind as to the consideration of spiritual goods; while blindness of mind implies the complete privation of the knowledge of such things. Both are opposed to the gift of understanding, whereby a man knows spiritual goods by apprehending them, and has a subtle penetration of their inmost nature. This dulness has the character of sin, just as blindness of mind has, that is, in so far as it is voluntary, as evidenced in one who, owing to his affection for carnal things, dislikes or neglects the careful consideration of spiritual things.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether blindness of mind and dulness of sense arise from sins of the flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that blindness of mind and dulness of sense do not arise from sins of the flesh. For Augustine (Retract. i, 4) retracts what he had said in his Soliloquies i, 1, “God Who didst wish none but the clean to know the truth,” and says that one might reply that “many, even those who are unclean, know many truths.” Now men become unclean chiefly by sins of the flesh. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are not caused by sins of the flesh.

Objection 2: Further, blindness of mind and dulness of sense are defects in connection with the intellective part of the soul: whereas carnal sins pertain to the corruption of the flesh. But the flesh does not act on the soul, but rather the reverse. Therefore the sins of the flesh do not cause blindness of mind and dulness of sense.

Objection 3: Further, all things are more passive to what is near them than to what is remote. Now spiritual vices are nearer the mind than carnal vices are. Therefore blindness of mind and dulness of sense are caused by spiritual rather than by carnal vices.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that dulness of sense arises from gluttony and blindness of mind from lust.

I answer that, The perfect intellectual operation in man consists in an abstraction from sensible phantasms, wherefore the more a man’s intellect is freed from those phantasms, the more thoroughly will it be able to consider things intelligible, and to set in order all things sensible. Thus Anaxagoras stated that the intellect requires to be “detached” in order to command, and that the agent must have power over matter, in order to be able to move it. Now it is evident that pleasure fixes a man’s attention on that which he takes pleasure in: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4,5) that we all do best that which we take pleasure in doing, while as to other things, we do them either not at all, or in a faint-hearted fashion.

Now carnal vices, namely gluttony and lust, are concerned with pleasures of touch in matters of food and sex; and these are the most impetuous of all pleasures of the body. For this reason these vices cause man’s attention to be very firmly fixed on corporeal things, so that in consequence man’s operation in regard to intelligible things is weakened, more, however, by lust than by gluttony, forasmuch as sexual pleasures are more vehement than those of the table. Wherefore lust gives rise to blindness of mind, which excludes almost entirely the knowledge of spiritual things, while dulness of sense arises from gluttony, which makes a man weak in regard to the same intelligible things. On the other hand, the contrary virtues, viz. abstinence and chastity, dispose man very much to the perfection of intellectual operation. Hence it is written (Dan. 1:17) that “to these children” on account of their abstinence and continency, “God gave knowledge and understanding in every book, and wisdom.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although some who are the slaves of carnal vices are at times capable of subtle considerations about intelligible things, on account of the perfection of their natural genius, or of some habit superadded thereto, nevertheless, on account of the pleasures of the body, it must needs happen that their attention is frequently withdrawn from this subtle contemplation: wherefore the unclean can know some truths, but their uncleanness is a clog on their knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: The flesh acts on the intellective faculties, not by altering them, but by impeding their operation in the aforesaid manner.

Reply to Objection 3: It is owing to the fact that the carnal vices are further removed from the mind, that they distract the mind’s attention to more remote things, so that they hinder the mind’s contemplation all the more.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FAITH, KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts pertaining to the aforesaid, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) The precepts concerning faith;

(2) The precepts concerning the gifts of knowledge and understanding.

Whether in the Old Law there should have been given precepts of faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Old Law, there should have been given precepts of faith. Because a precept is about something due and necessary. Now it is most necessary for man that he should believe, according to Heb. 11:6, “Without faith it is impossible to please God.” Therefore there was very great need for precepts of faith to be given.

Objection 2: Further, the New Testament is contained in the Old, as the reality in the figure, as stated above ([2424]FS, Q[107], A[3]). Now the New Testament contains explicit precepts of faith, for instance Jn. 14:1: “You believe in God; believe also in Me.” Therefore it seems that some precepts of faith ought to have been given in the Old Law also.

Objection 3: Further, to prescribe the act of a virtue comes to the same as to forbid the opposite vices. Now the Old Law contained many precepts forbidding unbelief: thus (Ex. 20:3): “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me,” and (Dt. 13:1–3) they were forbidden to hear the words of the prophet or dreamer who might wish to turn them away from their faith in God. Therefore precepts of faith should have been given in the Old Law also.

Objection 4: Further, confession is an act of faith, as stated above ([2425]Q[3], A[1]). Now the Old Law contained precepts about the confession and the promulgation of faith: for they were commanded (Ex. 12:27) that, when their children should ask them, they should tell them the meaning of the paschal observance, and (Dt. 13:9) they were commanded to slay anyone who disseminated doctrine contrary to faith. Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.

Objection 5: Further, all the books of the Old Testament are contained in the Old Law; wherefore Our Lord said (Jn. 15:25) that it was written in the Law: “They have hated Me without cause,” although this is found written in Ps. 34 and 68. Now it is written (Ecclus. 2:8): “Ye that fear the Lord, believe Him.” Therefore the Old Law should have contained precepts of faith.

On the contrary, The Apostle (Rom. 3:27) calls the Old Law the “law of works” which he contrasts with the “law of faith.” Therefore the Old Law ought not to have contained precepts of faith.

I answer that, A master does not impose laws on others than his subjects; wherefore the precepts of a law presuppose that everyone who receives the law is subject to the giver of the law. Now the primary subjection of man to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is.” Hence faith is presupposed to the precepts of the Law: for which reason (Ex. 20:2) that which is of faith, is set down before the legal precepts, in the words, “I am the Lord thy God, Who brought thee out of the land of Egypt,” and, likewise (Dt. 6:4), the words, “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy [Vulg.: ‘our’] God is one,” precede the recording of the precepts.

Since, however, faith contains many things subordinate to the faith whereby we believe that God is, which is the first and chief of all articles of faith, as stated above ([2426]Q[1], AA[1],7), it follows that, if we presuppose faith in God, whereby man’s mind is subjected to Him, it is possible for precepts to be given about other articles of faith. Thus Augustine expounding the words: “This is My commandment” (Jn. 15:12) says (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.) that we have received many precepts of faith. In the Old Law, however, the secret things of faith were not to be set before the people, wherefore, presupposing their faith in one God, no other precepts of faith were given in the Old Law.

Reply to Objection 1: Faith is necessary as being the principle of spiritual life, wherefore it is presupposed before the receiving of the Law.

Reply to Objection 2: Even then Our Lord both presupposed something of faith, namely belief in one God, when He said: “You believe in God,” and commanded something, namely, belief in the Incarnation whereby one Person is God and man. This explanation of faith belongs to the faith of the New Testament, wherefore He added: “Believe also in Me.”

Reply to Objection 3: The prohibitive precepts regard sins, which corrupt virtue. Now virtue is corrupted by any particular defect, as stated above ([2427]FS, Q[18], A[4], ad 3; [2428]FS, Q[19], A[6], ad 1, A[7], ad 3). Therefore faith in one God being presupposed, prohibitive precepts had to be given in the Old Law, so that men might be warned off those particular defects whereby their faith might be corrupted.

Reply to Objection 4: Confession of faith and the teaching thereof also presuppose man's submission to God by faith: so that the Old Law could contain precepts relating to the confession and teaching of faith, rather than to faith itself.

Reply to Objection 5: In this passage again that faith is presupposed whereby we believe that God is; hence it begins, "Ye that fear the Lord," which is not possible without faith. The words which follow—"believe Him"—must be referred to certain special articles of faith, chiefly to those things which God promises to them that obey Him, wherefore the passage concludes—"and your reward shall not be made void."

Whether the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were fittingly set down in the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding were unfittingly set down in the Old Law. For knowledge and understanding pertain to cognition. Now cognition precedes and directs action. Therefore the precepts referring to knowledge and understanding should precede the precepts of the Law referring to action. Since, then, the first precepts of the Law are those of the decalogue, it seems that precepts of knowledge and understanding should have been given a place among the precepts of the decalogue.

Objection 2: Further, learning precedes teaching, for a man must learn from another before he teaches another. Now the Old Law contains precepts about teaching—both affirmative precepts as, for example, (Dt. 4:9), "Thou shalt teach them to thy sons"—and prohibitive precepts, as, for instance, (Dt. 4:2), "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it." Therefore it seems that man ought to have been given also some precepts directing him to learn.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge and understanding seem more necessary to a priest than to a king, wherefore it is written (Malachi 2:7): "The lips of the priest shall keep knowledge, and they shall seek the law at his mouth," and (Osee 4:6): "Because thou hast rejected knowledge, I will reject thee, that thou shalt not do the office of priesthood to Me." Now the king is commanded to learn knowledge of the Law (Dt. 17:18,19). Much more therefore should the Law have commanded the priests to learn the Law.

Objection 4: Further, it is not possible while asleep to meditate on things pertaining to knowledge and understanding: moreover it is hindered by extraneous occupations. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (Dt. 6:7): “Thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising.” Therefore the precepts relating to knowledge and understanding are unfittingly set down in the Law.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 4:6): “That, hearing all these precepts, they may say, Behold a wise and understanding people.”

I answer that, Three things may be considered in relation to knowledge and understanding: first, the reception thereof; secondly, the use; and thirdly, their preservation. Now the reception of knowledge or understanding, is by means of teaching and learning, and both are prescribed in the Law. For it is written (Dt. 6:6): “These words which I command thee . . . shall be in thy heart.” This refers to learning, since it is the duty of a disciple to apply his mind to what is said, while the words that follow—“and thou shalt tell them to thy children”—refer to teaching.

The use of knowledge and understanding is the meditation on those things which one knows or understands. In reference to this, the text goes on: “thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house,” etc.

Their preservation is effected by the memory, and, as regards this, the text continues—“and thou shalt bind them as a sign on thy hand, and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write them in the entry, and on the doors of thy house.” Thus the continual remembrance of God’s commandments is signified, since it is impossible for us to forget those things which are continually attracting the notice of our senses, whether by touch, as those things we hold in our hands, or by sight, as those things which are ever before our eyes, or to which we are continually returning, for instance, to the house door. Moreover it is clearly stated (Dt. 4:9): “Forget not the words that thy eyes have seen and let them not go out of thy heart all the days of thy life.”

We read of these things also being commanded more notably in the New Testament, both in the teaching of the Gospel and in that of the apostles.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Dt. 4:6, “this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of the nations.” By this we are given to understand that the wisdom and understanding of those who believe in God consist in the precepts of the Law. Wherefore the precepts of the Law had to be given first, and afterwards men had to be led to know and understand them, and so it was not fitting that the aforesaid precepts should be placed among the precepts of the decalogue which take the first place.

Reply to Objection 2: There are also in the Law precepts relating to learning, as stated above. Nevertheless teaching was commanded more expressly than learning, because it concerned the learned, who were not under any other authority, but were immediately under the law, and to them the precepts of the Law were given. On the other hand learning concerned the people of lower degree, and these the precepts of the Law have to reach through the learned.

Reply to Objection 3: Knowledge of the Law is so closely bound up with the priestly office that being charged with the office implies being charged to know the Law: hence there was no need for special precepts to be given about the training of the priests. On the other hand, the doctrine of God's law is not so bound up with the kingly office, because a king is placed over his people in temporal matters: hence it is especially commanded that the king should be instructed by the priests about things pertaining to the law of God.

Reply to Objection 4: That precept of the Law does not mean that man should meditate on God's law of sleeping, but during sleep, i.e. that he should meditate on the law of God when he is preparing to sleep, because this leads to his having better phantasms while asleep, in so far as our movements pass from the state of vigil to the state of sleep, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. i, 13). In like manner we are commanded to meditate on the Law in every action of ours, not that we are bound to be always actually thinking about the Law, but that we should regulate all our actions according to it.

OF HOPE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

After treating of faith, we must consider hope and (1) hope itself; (2) the gift of fear; (3) the contrary vices; (4) the corresponding precepts. The first of these points gives rise to a twofold consideration: (1) hope, considered in itself; (2) its subject.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether hope is a virtue?

(2) Whether its object is eternal happiness?

(3) Whether, by the virtue of hope, one man may hope for another’s happiness?

(4) Whether a man may lawfully hope in man?

(5) Whether hope is a theological virtue?

(6) Of its distinction from the other theological virtues?

(7) Of its relation to faith;

(8) Of its relation to charity.

Whether hope is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a virtue. For “no man makes ill use of a virtue,” as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18). But one may make ill use of hope, since the passion of hope, like the other passions, is subject to a mean and extremes. Therefore hope is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, no virtue results from merits, since “God works virtue in us without us,” as Augustine states (De Grat. et Lib. Arb. xvii). But hope is caused by grace and merits, according to the Master (Sent. iii, D, 26). Therefore hope is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing” (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). But hope is the disposition of an imperfect thing, of one, namely, that lacks what it hopes to have. Therefore hope is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. i, 33) that the three daughters of Job signify these three virtues, faith, hope and charity. Therefore hope is a virtue.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) “the virtue of a thing is that which makes its subject good, and its work good likewise.” Consequently wherever we find a good human act, it must correspond to some human virtue. Now in all things measured and ruled, the good is that which attains its proper rule: thus we say that a coat is good if it neither exceeds nor falls short of its proper measurement. But, as we stated above (Q[8], A[3], ad 3) human acts have a twofold measure; one is proximate and homogeneous, viz. the reason, while the other is remote and excelling, viz. God: wherefore every human act is good, which attains reason or God Himself. Now the act of hope, whereof we speak now, attains God. For, as we have already stated ([2429]FS, Q[40], A[1]), when we were treating of the passion of hope, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Now a thing is possible to us in two ways: first, by ourselves; secondly, by means of others, as stated in Ethic. iii. Wherefore, in so far as we hope for anything as being possible to us by means of the Divine assistance, our hope attains God Himself, on Whose help it leans. It is therefore evident that hope is a virtue, since it causes a human act to be good and to attain its due rule.

Reply to Objection 1: In the passions, the mean of virtue depends on right reason being attained, wherein also consists the essence of virtue. Wherefore in hope too, the good of virtue depends on a man’s attaining, by hoping, the due rule, viz. God. Consequently man cannot make ill use of hope which attains God, as neither can he make ill use of moral virtue which attains the reason, because to attain thus is to make good use of virtue. Nevertheless, the hope of which we speak now, is not a passion but a habit of the mind, as we shall show further on [2430](A[5]; Q[18], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: Hope is said to arise from merits, as regards the thing hoped for, in so far as we hope to obtain happiness by means of grace and merits; or as regards the act of living hope. The habit itself of hope, whereby we hope to obtain happiness, does not flow from our merits, but from grace alone.

Reply to Objection 3: He who hopes is indeed imperfect in relation to that which he hopes to obtain, but has not as yet; yet he is perfect, in so far as he already attains his proper rule, viz. God, on Whose help he leans.

Whether eternal happiness is the proper object of hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope. For a man does not hope for that which surpasses every movement of the soul, since hope itself is a movement of the soul. Now eternal happiness surpasses every movement of the human soul, for the Apostle says (1 Cor.

2:9) that it hath not “entered into the heart of man.” Therefore happiness is not the proper object of hope.

Objection 2: Further, prayer is an expression of hope, for it is written (Ps. 36:5): “Commit thy way to the Lord, and trust in Him, and He will do it.” Now it is lawful for man to pray God not only for eternal happiness, but also for the goods, both temporal and spiritual, of the present life, and, as evidenced by the Lord’s Prayer, to be delivered from evils which will no longer be in eternal happiness. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.

Objection 3: Further, the object of hope is something difficult. Now many things besides eternal happiness are difficult to man. Therefore eternal happiness is not the proper object of hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 6:19) that we have hope “which entereth in,” i.e. maketh us to enter . . .”within the veil,” i.e. into the happiness of heaven, according to the interpretation of a gloss on these words. Therefore the object of hope is eternal happiness.

I answer that, As stated above [2431](A[1]), the hope of which we speak now, attains God by leaning on His help in order to obtain the hoped for good. Now an effect must be proportionate to its cause. Wherefore the good which we ought to hope for from God properly and chiefly is the infinite good, which is proportionate to the power of our divine helper, since it belongs to an infinite power to lead anyone to an infinite good. Such a good is eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God Himself. For we should hope from Him for nothing less than Himself, since His goodness, whereby He imparts good things to His creature, is no less than His Essence. Therefore the proper and principal object of hope is eternal happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: Eternal happiness does not enter into the heart of man perfectly, i.e. so that it be possible for a wayfarer to know its nature and quality; yet, under the general notion of the perfect good, it is possible for it to be apprehended by a man, and it is in this way that the movement of hope towards it arises. Hence the Apostle says pointedly (Heb. 6:19) that hope “enters in, even within the veil,” because that which we hope for is as yet veiled, so to speak.

Reply to Objection 2: We ought not to pray God for any other goods, except in reference to eternal happiness. Hence hope regards eternal happiness chiefly, and other things, for which we pray God, it regards secondarily and as referred to eternal happiness: just as faith regards God principally, and, secondarily, those things which are referred to God, as stated above ([2432]Q[1], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: To him that longs for something great, all lesser things seem small; wherefore to him that hopes for eternal happiness, nothing else appears arduous, as compared with that hope; although, as compared with the capability of the man who hopes, other things besides may be arduous to him, so that he may have hope for such things in reference to its principal object.

Whether one man may hope for another’s eternal happiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may hope for another’s eternal happiness. For the Apostle says (Phil. 1:6): “Being confident of this very thing, that He Who hath begun a good work in you, will perfect it unto the day of Jesus Christ.” Now the perfection of that day will be eternal happiness. Therefore one man may hope for another’s eternal happiness.

Objection 2: Further, whatever we ask of God, we hope to obtain from Him. But we ask God to bring others to eternal happiness, according to James 5:16: “Pray for one another that you may be saved.” Therefore we can hope for another’s eternal happiness.

Objection 3: Further, hope and despair are about the same object. Now it is possible to despair of another’s eternal happiness, else Augustine would have no reason for saying (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxxi) that we should not despair of anyone so long as he lives. Therefore one can also hope for another’s eternal salvation.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that “hope is only of such things as belong to him who is supposed to hope for them.”

I answer that, We can hope for something in two ways: first, absolutely, and thus the object of hope is always something arduous and pertaining to the person who hopes. Secondly, we can hope for something, through something else being presupposed, and in this way its object can be something pertaining to someone else. In order to explain this we must observe that love and hope differ in this, that love denotes union between lover and beloved, while hope denotes a movement or a stretching forth of the appetite towards an arduous good. Now union is of things that are distinct, wherefore love can directly regard the other whom a man unites to himself by love, looking upon him as his other self: whereas movement is always towards its own term which is proportionate to the subject moved. Therefore hope regards directly one’s own good, and not that which pertains to another. Yet if we presuppose the union of love with another, a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and, accordingly, he can hope for another eternal’s life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself, and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether a man can lawfully hope in man?

Objection 1: It wold seem that one may lawfully hope in man. For the object of hope is eternal happiness. Now we are helped to obtain eternal happiness by the patronage of the saints, for Gregory says (Dial. i, 8) that “predestination is furthered by the saints’ prayers.” Therefore one may hope in man.

Objection 2: Further, if a man may not hope in another man, it ought not to be reckoned a sin in a man, that one should not be able to hope in him. Yet this is reckoned a vice in some, as appears from Jer. 9:4: “Let every man take heed of his neighbor, and let him not trust in any brother of his.” Therefore it is lawful to trust in a man.

Objection 3: Further, prayer is the expression of hope, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]). But it is lawful to pray to a man for something. Therefore it is lawful to trust in him.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 17:5): “Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.”

I answer that, Hope, as stated above [2433](A[1]; [2434]FS, Q[40], A[7]), regards two things, viz. the good which it intends to obtain, and the help by which that good is obtained. Now the good which a man hopes to obtain, has the aspect of a final cause, while the help by which one hopes to obtain that good, has the character of an efficient cause. Now in each of these kinds of cause we find a principal and a secondary cause. For the principal end is the last end, while the secondary end is that which is referred to an end. In like manner the principal efficient cause is the first agent, while the secondary efficient cause is the secondary and instrumental agent. Now hope regards eternal happiness as its last end, and the Divine assistance as the first cause leading to happiness.

Accordingly, just as it is not lawful to hope for any good save happiness, as one’s last end, but only as something referred to final happiness, so too, it is unlawful to hope in any man, or any creature, as though it were the first cause of movement towards happiness. It is, however, lawful to hope in a man or a creature as being the secondary and instrumental agent through whom one is helped to obtain any goods that are ordained to happiness. It is in this way that we turn to the saints, and that we ask men also for certain things; and for this reason some are blamed in that they cannot be trusted to give help.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether hope is a theological virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a theological virtue. For a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now hope has for its object not only God but also other goods which we hope to obtain from God. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.

Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is not a mean between two vices, as stated above ([2435]FS, Q[64], A[4]). But hope is a mean between presumption and despair. Therefore hope is not a theological virtue.

Objection 3: Further, expectation belongs to longanimity which is a species of fortitude. Since, then, hope is a kind of expectation, it seems that hope is not a theological, but a moral virtue.

Objection 4: Further, the object of hope is something arduous. But it belongs to magnanimity, which is a moral virtue, to tend to the arduous. Therefore hope is a moral, and not a theological virtue.

On the contrary, Hope is enumerated (1 Cor. 13) together with faith and charity, which are theological virtues.

I answer that, Since specific differences, by their very nature, divide a genus, in order to decide under what division we must place hope, we must observe whence it derives its character of virtue.

Now it has been stated above [2436](A[1]) that hope has the character of virtue from the fact that it attains the supreme rule of human actions: and this it attains both as its first efficient cause, in as much as it leans on its assistance, and as its last final cause, in as much as it expects happiness in the enjoyment thereof. Hence it is evident that God is the principal object of hope, considered as a virtue. Since, then, the very idea of a theological virtue is one that has God for its object, as stated above ([2437]FS, Q[62], A[1]), it is evident that hope is a theological virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Whatever else hope expects to obtain, it hopes for it in reference to God as the last end, or as the first efficient cause, as stated above [2438](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 2: In things measured and ruled the mean consists in the measure or rule being attained; if we go beyond the rule, there is excess, if we fall short of the rule, there is deficiency. But in the rule or measure itself there is no such thing as a mean or extremes. Now a moral virtue is concerned with things ruled by reason, and these things are its proper object; wherefore it is proper to it to follow the mean as regards its proper object. On the other hand, a theological virtue is concerned with the First Rule not ruled by another rule, and that Rule is its proper object. Wherefore it is not proper for a theological virtue, with regard to its proper object, to follow the mean, although this may happen to it accidentally with regard to something that is referred to its principal object. Thus faith can have no mean or extremes in the point of trusting to the First Truth, in which it is impossible to trust too much; whereas on the part of the things believed, it may have a mean and extremes; for instance one truth is a mean between two falsehoods. So too, hope has no mean or extremes, as regards its principal object, since it is impossible to trust too much in the Divine assistance; yet it may have a mean and extremes, as regards those things a man trusts to obtain, in so far as he either presumes above his capability, or despairs of things of which he is capable.

Reply to Objection 3: The expectation which is mentioned in the definition of hope does not imply delay, as does the expectation which belongs to longanimity. It implies a reference to the Divine assistance, whether that which we hope for be delayed or not.

Reply to Objection 4: Magnanimity tends to something arduous in the hope of obtaining something that is within one’s power, wherefore its proper object is the doing of great things. On the other hand hope, as a theological virtue, regards something arduous, to be obtained by another’s help, as stated above [2439](A[1]).

Whether hope is distinct from the other theological virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues. For habits are distinguished by their objects, as stated above ([2440]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the object of hope is the same as of the other theological virtues. Therefore hope is not distinct from the other theological virtues.

Objection 2: Further, in the symbol of faith, whereby we make profession of faith, we say: “I expect the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.” Now expectation of future happiness belongs to hope, as stated above [2441](A[5]). Therefore hope is not distinct from faith.

Objection 3: Further, by hope man tends to God. But this belongs properly to charity. Therefore hope is not distinct from charity.

On the contrary, There cannot be number without distinction. Now hope is numbered with the other theological virtues: for Gregory says (Moral. i, 16) that the three virtues are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore hope is distinct from the theological virtues.

I answer that, A virtue is said to be theological from having God for the object to which it adheres. Now one may adhere to a thing in two ways: first, for its own sake; secondly, because something else is attained thereby. Accordingly charity makes us adhere to God for His own sake, uniting our minds to God by the emotion of love.

On the other hand, hope and faith make man adhere to God as to a principle wherefrom certain things accrue to us. Now we derive from God both knowledge of truth and the attainment of perfect goodness. Accordingly faith makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive the knowledge of truth, since we believe that what God tells us is true: while hope makes us adhere to God, as the source whence we derive perfect goodness, i.e. in so far as, by hope, we trust to the Divine assistance for obtaining happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: God is the object of these virtues under different aspects, as stated above: and a different aspect of the object suffices for the distinction of habits, as stated above ([2442]FS, Q[54], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Expectation is mentioned in the symbol of faith, not as though it were the proper act of faith, but because the act of hope presupposes the act of faith, as we shall state further on [2443](A[7]). Hence an act of faith is expressed in the act of hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope makes us tend to God, as to a good to be obtained finally, and as to a helper strong to assist: whereas charity, properly speaking, makes us tend to God, by uniting our affections to Him, so that we live, not for ourselves, but for God.

Whether hope precedes faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope precedes faith. Because a gloss on Ps. 36:3, “Trust in the Lord, and do good,” says: “Hope is the entrance to faith and the beginning of salvation.” But salvation is by faith whereby we are justified. Therefore hope precedes faith.

Objection 2: Further, that which is included in a definition should precede the thing defined and be more known. But hope is included in the definition of faith (Heb. 11:1): “Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for.” Therefore hope precedes faith.

Objection 3: Further, hope precedes a meritorious act, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:10): “He that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit.” But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore hope precedes faith.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:2): “Abraham begot Isaac,” i.e. “Faith begot hope,” according to a gloss.

I answer that, Absolutely speaking, faith precedes hope. For the object of hope is a future good, arduous but possible to obtain. In order, therefore, that we may hope, it is necessary for the object of hope to be proposed to us as possible. Now the object of hope is, in one way, eternal happiness, and in another way, the Divine assistance, as explained above [2444](A[2]; A[6], ad 3): and both of these are proposed to us by faith, whereby we come to know that we are able to obtain eternal life, and that for this purpose the Divine assistance is ready for us, according to Heb. 11:6: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him.” Therefore it is evident that faith precedes hope.

Reply to Objection 1: As the same gloss observes further on, “hope” is called “the entrance” to faith, i.e. of the thing believed, because by hope we enter in to see what we believe. Or we may reply that it is called the “entrance to faith,” because thereby man begins to be established and perfected in faith.

Reply to Objection 2: The thing to be hoped for is included in the definition of faith, because the proper object of faith, is something not apparent in itself. Hence it was necessary to express it in a circumlocution by something resulting from faith.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope does not precede every meritorious act; but it suffices for it to accompany or follow it.

Whether charity precedes hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity precedes hope. For Ambrose says on Lk. 27:6, “If you had faith like to a grain of mustard seed,” etc.: “Charity flows from faith, and hope from charity.” But faith precedes charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that “good emotions and affections proceed from love and holy charity.” Now to hope, considered as an act of hope, is a good emotion of the soul. Therefore it flows from charity.

Objection 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. iii, D, 26) that hope proceeds from merits, which precede not only the thing hoped for, but also hope itself, which, in the order of nature, is preceded by charity. Therefore charity precedes hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience,” i.e. “from hope,” according to a gloss. Therefore hope precedes charity.

I answer that, Order is twofold. One is the order of generation and of matter, in respect of which the imperfect precedes the perfect: the other is the order of perfection and form, in respect of which the perfect naturally precedes the imperfect. In respect of the first order hope precedes charity: and this is clear from the fact that hope and all movements of the appetite flow from love, as stated above ([2445]FS, Q[27], A[4]; [2446]FS, Q[28], A[6], ad 2; [2447]FS, Q[40], A[7]) in the treatise on the passions.

Now there is a perfect, and an imperfect love. Perfect love is that whereby a man is loved in himself, as when someone wishes a person some good for his own sake; thus a man loves his friend. Imperfect love is that whereby a man love something, not for its own sake, but that he may obtain that good for himself; thus a man loves what he desires. The first love of God pertains to charity, which adheres to God for His own sake; while hope pertains to the second love, since he that hopes, intends to obtain possession of something for himself.

Hence in the order of generation, hope precedes charity. For just as a man is led to love God, through fear of being punished by Him for his sins, as Augustine states (In primam canon. Joan. Tract. ix), so too, hope leads to charity, in as much as a man through hoping to be rewarded by God, is encouraged to love God and obey His commandments. On the other hand, in the order of perfection charity naturally precedes hope, wherefore, with the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends. It is in this sense that Ambrose states (OBJ[1]) that charity flows from hope: so that this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope and every movement of the appetite proceed from some kind of love, whereby the expected good is loved. But not every kind of hope proceeds from charity, but only the movement of living hope, viz. that whereby man hopes to obtain good from God, as from a friend.

Reply to Objection 3: The Master is speaking of living hope, which is naturally preceded by charity and the merits caused by charity.

OF THE SUBJECT OF HOPE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subject of hope, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the virtue of hope is in the will as its subject?

(2) Whether it is in the blessed?

(3) Whether it is in the damned?

(4) Whether there is certainty in the hope of the wayfarer?

Whether hope is in the will as its subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not in the will as its subject. For the object of hope is an arduous good, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]; [2448]FS, Q[40], A[1]). Now the arduous is the object, not of the will, but of the irascible. Therefore hope is not in the will but in the irascible.

Objection 2: Further, where one suffices it is superfluous to add another. Now charity suffices for the perfecting of the will, which is the most perfect of the virtues. Therefore hope is not in the will.

Objection 3: Further, the one same power cannot exercise two acts at the same time; thus the intellect cannot understand many things simultaneously. Now the act of hope can be at the same time as an act of charity. Since, then, the act of charity evidently belongs to the will, it follows that the act of hope does not belong to that power: so that, therefore, hope is not in the will.

On the contrary, The soul is not apprehensive of God save as regards the mind in which is memory, intellect and will, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Now hope is a theological virtue having God for its object. Since therefore it is neither in the memory, nor in the intellect, which belong to the cognitive faculty, it follows that it is in the will as its subject.

I answer that, As shown above ([2449]FP, Q[87], A[2]), habits are known by their acts. Now the act of hope is a movement of the appetitive faculty, since its object is a good. And, since there is a twofold appetite in man, namely, the sensitive which is divided into irascible and concupiscible, and the intellective appetite, called the will, as stated in the [2450]FP, Q[82], A[5], those movements which occur in the lower appetite, are with passion, while those in the higher appetite are without passion, as shown above ([2451]FP, Q[87], A[2], ad 1; [2452]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Now the act of the virtue of hope cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, since the good which is the principal object of this virtue, is not a sensible but a Divine good. Therefore hope resides in the higher appetite called the will, and not in the lower appetite, of which the irascible is a part.

Reply to Objection 1: The object of the irascible is an arduous sensible: whereas the object of the virtue of hope is an arduous intelligible, or rather superintelligible.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity perfects the will sufficiently with regard to one act, which is the act of loving: but another virtue is required in order to perfect it with regard to its other act, which is that of hoping.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of hope and the movement of charity are mutually related, as was shown above (Q[17], A[8]). Hence there is no reason why both movements should not belong at the same time to the same power: even as the intellect can understand many things at the same time if they be related to one another, as stated in the [2453]FP, Q[85], A[4].

Whether in the blessed there is hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the blessed there is hope. For Christ was a perfect comprehensor from the first moment of His conception. Now He had hope, since, according to a gloss, the words of Ps. 30:2, “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped,” are said in His person. Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

Objection 2: Further, even as the obtaining of happiness is an arduous good, so is its continuation. Now, before they obtain happiness, men hope to obtain it. Therefore, after they have obtained it, they can hope to continue in its possession.

Objection 3: Further, by the virtue of hope, a man can hope for happiness, not only for himself, but also for others, as stated above ([2454]Q[17], A[3]). But the blessed who are in heaven hope for the happiness of others, else they would not pray for them. Therefore there can be hope in them.

Objection 4: Further, the happiness of the saints implies not only glory of the soul but also glory of the body. Now the souls of the saints in heaven, look yet for the glory of their bodies (Apoc. 6:10; Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore in the blessed there can be hope.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” Now the blessed enjoy the sight of God. Therefore hope has no place in them.

I answer that, If what gives a thing its species be removed, the species is destroyed, and that thing cannot remain the same; just as when a natural body loses its form, it does not remain the same specifically. Now hope takes its species from its principal object, even as the other virtues do, as was shown above (Q[17], AA[5],6; [2455]FS, Q[54], A[2]): and its principal object is eternal happiness as being possible to obtain by the assistance of God, as stated above (Q[17], A[2]).

Since then the arduous possible good cannot be an object of hope except in so far as it is something future, it follows that when happiness is no longer future, but present, it is incompatible with the virtue of hope. Consequently hope, like faith, is voided in heaven, and neither of them can be in the blessed.

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a comprehensor and therefore blessed as to the enjoyment of God, nevertheless He was, at the same time, a wayfarer, as regards the passibility of nature, to which He was still subject. Hence it was possible for Him to hope for the glory of impassibility and immortality, yet not so as to the virtue of hope, the principal object of which is not the glory of the body but the enjoyment of God.

Reply to Objection 2: The happiness of the saints is called eternal life, because through enjoying God they become partakers, as it were, of God’s eternity which surpasses all time: so that the continuation of happiness does not differ in respect of present, past and future. Hence the blessed do not hope for the continuation of their happiness (for as regards this there is no future), but are in actual possession thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: So long as the virtue of hope lasts, it is by the same hope that one hopes for one’s own happiness, and for that of others. But when hope is voided in the blessed, whereby they hoped for their own happiness, they hope for the happiness of others indeed, yet not by the virtue of hope, but rather by the love of charity. Even so, he that has Divine charity, by that same charity loves his neighbor, without having the virtue of charity, but by some other love.

Reply to Objection 4: Since hope is a theological virtue having God for its object, its principal object is the glory of the soul, which consists in the enjoyment of God, and not the glory of the body. Moreover, although the glory of the body is something arduous in comparison with human nature, yet it is not so for one who has the glory of the soul; both because the glory of the body is a very small thing as compared with the glory of the soul, and because one who has the glory of the soul has already the sufficient cause of the glory of the body.

Whether hope is in the damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is hope in the damned. For the devil is damned and prince of the damned, according to Mat. 25:41: “Depart . . . you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels.” But the devil has hope, according to Job 40:28, “Behold his hope shall fail him.” Therefore it seems that the damned have hope.

Objection 2: Further, just as faith is either living or dead, so is hope. But lifeless faith can be in the devils and the damned, according to James 2:19: “The devils . . . believe and tremble.” Therefore it seems that lifeless hope also can be in the damned.

Objection 3: Further, after death there accrues to man no merit or demerit that he had not before, according to Eccles. 11:3, “If the tree fall to the south, or to the north, in what place soever it shall fall, there shall it be.” Now many who are damned, in this life hoped and never despaired. Therefore they will hope in the future life also.

On the contrary, Hope causes joy, according to Rom. 12:12, “Rejoicing in hope.” Now the damned have no joy, but sorrow and grief, according to Is. 65:14, “My servants shall praise for joyfulness of heart, and you shall cry for sorrow of heart, and shall howl for grief of spirit.” Therefore no hope is in the damned.

I answer that, Just as it is a condition of happiness that the will should find rest therein, so is it a condition of punishment, that what is inflicted in punishment, should go against the will. Now that which is not known can neither be restful nor repugnant to the will: wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 17) that the angels could not be perfectly happy in their first state before their confirmation, or unhappy before their fall, since they had no foreknowledge of what would happen to them. For perfect and true happiness requires that one should be certain of being happy for ever, else the will would not rest.

In like manner, since the everlastingness of damnation is a necessary condition of the punishment of the damned, it would not be truly penal unless it went against the will; and this would be impossible if they were ignorant of the everlastingness of their damnation. Hence it belongs to the unhappy state of the damned, that they should know that they cannot by any means escape from damnation and obtain happiness. Wherefore it is written (Job 15:22): “He believeth not that he may return from darkness to light.” It is, therefore, evident that they cannot apprehend happiness as a possible good, as neither can the blessed apprehend it as a future good. Consequently there is no hope either in the blessed or in the damned. On the other hand, hope can be in wayfarers, whether of this life or in purgatory, because in either case they apprehend happiness as a future possible thing.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 20) this is said of the devil as regards his members, whose hope will fail utterly: or, if it be understood of the devil himself, it may refer to the hope whereby he expects to vanquish the saints, in which sense we read just before (Job 40:18): “He trusteth that the Jordan may run into his mouth”: this is not, however, the hope of which we are speaking.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Enchiridion viii), “faith is about things, bad or good, past, present, or future, one’s own or another’s; whereas hope is only about good things, future and concerning oneself.” Hence it is possible for lifeless faith to be in the damned, but not hope, since the Divine goods are not for them future possible things, but far removed from them.

Reply to Objection 3: Lack of hope in the damned does not change their demerit, as neither does the voiding of hope in the blessed increase their merit: but both these things are due to the change in their respective states.

Whether there is certainty in the hope of a wayfarer?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer. For hope resides in the will. But certainty pertains not to the will but to the intellect. Therefore there is no certainty in hope.

Objection 2: Further, hope is based on grace and merits, as stated above (Q[17], A[1]). Now it is impossible in this life to know for certain that we are in a state of grace, as stated above ([2456]FS, Q[112], A[5]). Therefore there is no certainty in the hope of a wayfarer.

Objection 3: Further, there can be no certainty about that which may fail. Now many a hopeful wayfarer fails to obtain happiness. Therefore wayfarer’s hope has no certainty.

On the contrary, “Hope is the certain expectation of future happiness,” as the Master states (Sent. iii, D, 26): and this may be gathered from 2 Tim. 1:12, “I know Whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed to Him.”

I answer that, Certainty is found in a thing in two ways, essentially and by participation. It is found essentially in the cognitive power; by participation in whatever is moved infallibly to its end by the cognitive power. In this way we say that nature works with certainty, since it is moved by the Divine intellect which moves everything with certainty to its end. In this way too, the moral virtues are said to work with greater certainty than art, in as much as, like a second nature, they are moved to their acts by the reason: and thus too, hope tends to its end with certainty, as though sharing in the certainty of faith which is in the cognitive faculty.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope does not trust chiefly in grace already received, but on God's omnipotence and mercy, whereby even he that has not grace, can obtain it, so as to come to eternal life. Now whoever has faith is certain of God's omnipotence and mercy.

Reply to Objection 3: That some who have hope fail to obtain happiness, is due to a fault of the free will in placing the obstacle of sin, but not to any deficiency in God's power or mercy, in which hope places its trust. Hence this does not prejudice the certainty of hope.

OF THE GIFT OF FEAR (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift of fear, about which there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God is to be feared?

(2) Of the division of fear into filial, initial, servile and worldly;

(3) Whether worldly fear is always evil?

(4) Whether servile fear is good?

(5) Whether it is substantially the same as filial fear?

(6) Whether servile fear departs when charity comes?

(7) Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

(8) Whether initial fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

(9) Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(10) Whether it grows when charity grows?

(11) Whether it remains in heaven?

(12) Which of the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?

Whether God can be feared?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be feared. For the object of fear is a future evil, as stated above ([2457]FS, Q[41], AA[2],3). But God is free of all evil, since He is goodness itself. Therefore God cannot be feared.

Objection 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. Now we hope in God. Therefore we cannot fear Him at the same time.

Objection 3: Further, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 5), “we fear those things whence evil comes to us.” But evil comes to us, not from God, but from ourselves, according to Osee 13:9: “Destruction is thy own, O Israel: thy help is . . . in Me.” Therefore God is not to be feared.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 10:7): “Who shall not fear Thee, O King of nations?” and (Malachi 1:6): “If I be a master, where is My fear?”

I answer that, Just as hope has two objects, one of which is the future good itself, that one expects to obtain, while the other is someone’s help, through whom one expects to obtain what one hopes for, so, too, fear may have two objects, one of which is the very evil which a man shrinks from, while the other is that from which the evil may come. Accordingly, in the first way God, Who is goodness itself, cannot be an object of fear; but He can be an object of fear in the second way, in so far as there may come to us some evil either from Him or in relation to Him.

From Him there comes the evil of punishment, but this is evil not absolutely but relatively, and, absolutely speaking, is a good. Because, since a thing is said to be good through being ordered to an end, while evil implies lack of this order, that which excludes the order to the last end is altogether evil, and such is the evil of fault. On the other hand the evil of punishment is indeed an evil, in so far as it is the privation of some particular good, yet absolutely speaking, it is a good, in so far as it is ordained to the last end.

In relation to God the evil of fault can come to us, if we be separated from Him: and in this way God can and ought to be feared.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the object of fear as being the evil which a man shuns.

Reply to Objection 2: In God, we may consider both His justice, in respect of which He punishes those who sin, and His mercy, in respect of which He sets us free: in us the consideration of His justice gives rise to fear, but the consideration of His mercy gives rise to hope, so that, accordingly, God is the object of both hope and fear, but under different aspects.

Reply to Objection 3: The evil of fault is not from God as its author but from us, in for far as we forsake God: while the evil of punishment is from God as its author, in so far as it has character of a good, since it is something just, through being inflicted on us justly; although originally this is due to the demerit of sin: thus it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): “God made not death . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to them.”

Whether fear is fittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. “laziness, shamefacedness,” etc. of which we have treated above ([2458]FS, Q[41], A[4]), and which are not mentioned in the division in question. Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.

Objection 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good, since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, “The devils . . . believe and tremble,” nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to Mk. 14:33, Jesus “began to fear and be heavy.” Therefore the aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.

Objection 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father, is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be distinguished from all these other fears.

Objection 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between them.

Objection 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear about some evil. Now “concupiscence of the eyes,” which is the desire for things of this world, is distinct from “concupiscence of the flesh,” which is the desire for one’s own pleasure. Therefore “worldly fear,” whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct from “human fear,” whereby one fears harm to one’s own person.

On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).

I answer that, We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him. This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of fault.

Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both, it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has been treated above ([2459]FS, Q[42], A[3]) when we were considering the passion of fear.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul: whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not numbered among these kinds of fear.

Reply to Objection 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes our Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]"; and by this same charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these, since it does not include charity in its definition.

Reply to Objection 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten: whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it secondarily.

Reply to Objection 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins, all of which alike however lead man away from God.

Whether worldly fear is always evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that worldly fear is not always evil. Because regard for men seems to be a kind of human fear. Now some are blamed for having no regard for man, for instance, the unjust judge of whom we read (Lk. 18:2) that he "feared not God, nor regarded man." Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

Objection 2: Further, worldly fear seems to have reference to the punishments inflicted by the secular power. Now such like punishments incite us to good actions, according to Rom. 13:3, "Wilt thou not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same." Therefore worldly fear is not always evil.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that what is in us naturally, is not evil, since our natural gifts are from God. Now it is natural to man to fear detriment to his body, and loss of his worldly goods, whereby the present life is supported. Therefore it seems that worldly fear is not always evil.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear ye not them that kill the body," thus forbidding worldly fear. Now nothing but what is evil is forbidden by God. Therefore worldly fear is evil.

I answer that, As shown above ([2460]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2461]FS, Q[18], A[1]; [2462]FS, Q[54], A[2]) moral acts and habits take their name and species from their objects. Now the proper object of the appetite's movement is the final good: so that, in consequence, every appetitive movement is both specified and named from its proper end. For if anyone were to describe covetousness as love of work because men work on account of covetousness, this description would be incorrect, since the covetous man seeks work not as end but as a means: the end that he seeks is wealth, wherefore covetousness is rightly described as the desire or the love of wealth, and this is evil. Accordingly worldly love is, properly speaking, the love whereby a man trusts in the world as his end, so that worldly love is always evil. Now fear is born of love, since man fears the loss of what he loves, as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Now worldly fear is that which arises from worldly love as from an evil root, for which reason worldly fear is always evil.

Reply to Objection 1: One may have regard for men in two ways. First in so far as there is in them something divine, for instance, the good of grace or of virtue, or at least of the natural image of God: and in this way those are blamed who have no regard for man. Secondly, one may have regard for men as being in opposition to God, and thus it is praiseworthy to have no regard for men, according as we read of Elias or Eliseus (Ecclus. 48:13): “In his days he feared not the prince.”

Reply to Objection 2: When the secular power inflicts punishment in order to withdraw men from sin, it is acting as God’s minister, according to Rom. 13:4, “For he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.” To fear the secular power in this way is part, not of worldly fear, but of servile or initial fear.

Reply to Objection 3: It is natural for man to shrink from detriment to his own body and loss of worldly goods, but to forsake justice on that account is contrary to natural reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that there are certain things, viz. sinful deeds, which no fear should drive us to do, since to do such things is worse than to suffer any punishment whatever.

Whether servile fear is good?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is not good. For if the use of a thing is evil, the thing itself is evil. Now the use of servile fear is evil, for according to a gloss on Rom. 8:15, “if a man do anything through fear, although the deed be good, it is not well done.” Therefore servile fear is not good.

Objection 2: Further, no good grows from a sinful root. Now servile fear grows from a sinful root, because when commenting on Job 3:11, “Why did I not die in the womb?” Gregory says (Moral. iv, 25): “When a man dreads the punishment which confronts him for his sin and no longer loves the friendship of God which he has lost, his fear is born of pride, not of humility.” Therefore servile fear is evil.

Objection 3: Further, just as mercenary love is opposed to the love of charity, so is servile fear, apparently, opposed to chaste fear. But mercenary love is always evil. Therefore servile fear is also.

On the contrary, Nothing evil is from the Holy Ghost. But servile fear is from the Holy Ghost, since a gloss on Rom. 8:15, “You have not received the spirit of bondage,” etc. says: “It is the one same spirit that bestows two fears, viz. servile and chaste fear.” Therefore servile fear is not evil.

I answer that, It is owing to its servility that servile fear may be evil. For servitude is opposed to freedom. Since, then, “what is free is cause of itself” (Metaph. i, 2), a slave is one who does not act as cause of his own action, but as though moved from without. Now whoever does a thing through love, does it of himself so to speak, because it is by his own inclination that he is moved to act: so that it is contrary to the very notion of servility that one should act from love. Consequently servile fear as such is contrary to charity: so that if servility were essential to fear, servile fear would be evil simply, even as adultery is evil simply, because that which makes it contrary to charity belongs to its very species.

This servility, however, does not belong to the species of servile fear, even as neither does lifelessness to the species of lifeless faith. For the species of a moral habit or act is taken from the object. Now the object of servile fear is punishment, and it is by accident that, either the good to which the punishment is contrary, is loved as the last end, and that consequently the punishment is feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who is devoid of charity, or that the punishment is directed to God as its end, and that, consequently, it is not feared as the greatest evil, which is the case with one who has charity. For the species of a habit is not destroyed through its object or end being directed to a further end. Consequently servile fear is substantially good, but is servility is evil.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be applied to a man who does something through servile fear as such, so that he loves not justice, and fears nothing but the punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear as to its substance is not born of pride, but its servility is, inasmuch as man is unwilling, by love, to subject his affections to the yoke of justice.

Reply to Objection 3: Mercenary love is that whereby God is loved for the sake of worldly goods, and this is, of itself, contrary to charity, so that mercenary love is always evil. But servile fear, as to its substance, implies merely fear of punishment, whether or not this be feared as the principal evil.

Whether servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear is substantially the same as filial fear. For filial fear is to servile fear the same apparently as living faith is to lifeless faith, since the one is accompanied by mortal sin and the other not. Now living faith and lifeless faith are substantially the same. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.

Objection 2: Further, habits are diversified by their objects. Now the same thing is the object of servile and of filial fear, since they both fear God. Therefore servile and filial fear are substantially the same.

Objection 3: Further, just as man hopes to enjoy God and to obtain favors from Him, so does he fear to be separated from God and to be punished by Him. Now it is the same hope whereby we hope to enjoy God, and to receive other favors from Him, as stated above ([2463]Q[17], A[2], ad 2). Therefore filial fear, whereby we fear separation from God, is the same as servile fear whereby we fear His punishments.

On the contrary, Augustine (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) says that there are two fears, one servile, another filial or chaste fear.

I answer that, The proper object of fear is evil. And since acts and habits are diversified by their objects, as shown above ([2464]FS, Q[54], A[2]), it follows of necessity that different kinds of fear correspond to different kinds of evil.

Now the evil of punishment, from which servile fear shrinks, differs specifically from evil of fault, which filial fear shuns, as shown above [2465](A[2]). Hence it is evident that servile and filial fear are not the same substantially but differ specifically.

Reply to Objection 1: Living and lifeless faith differ, not as regards the object, since each of them believes God and believes in a God, but in respect of something extrinsic, viz. the presence or absence of charity, and so they do not differ substantially. On the other hand, servile and filial fear differ as to their objects: and hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear and filial fear do not regard God in the same light. For servile fear looks upon God as the cause of the infliction of punishment, whereas filial fear looks upon Him, not as the active cause of guilt, but rather as the term wherefrom it shrinks to be separated by guilt. Consequently the identity of object, viz. God, does not prove a specific identity of fear, since also natural movements differ specifically according to their different relationships to some one term, for movement from whiteness is not specifically the same as movement towards whiteness.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope looks upon God as the principle not only of the enjoyment of God, but also of any other favor whatever. This cannot be said of fear; and so there is no comparison.

Whether servile fear remains with charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that servile fear does not remain with charity. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix) that “when charity takes up its abode, it drives away fear which had prepared a place for it.”

Objection 2: Further, “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us” (Rom. 5:5). Now “where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17). Since then freedom excludes servitude, it seems that servile fear is driven away when charity comes.

Objection 3: Further, servile fear is caused by self-love, in so far as punishment diminishes one’s own good. Now love of God drives away self-love, for it makes us despise ourselves: thus Augustine testifies (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that “the love of God unto the contempt of self builds up the city of God.” Therefore it seems that servile fear is driven out when charity comes.

On the contrary, Servile fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above [2466](A[4]). Now the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not forfeited through the advent of charity, whereby the Holy Ghost dwells in us. Therefore servile fear is not driven out when charity comes.

I answer that, Servile fear proceeds from self-love, because it is fear of punishment which is detrimental to one’s own good. Hence the fear of punishment is consistent with charity, in the same way as self-love is: because it comes to the same that a man love his own good and that he fear to be deprived of it.

Now self-love may stand in a threefold relationship to charity. In one way it is contrary to charity, when a man places his end in the love of his own good. In another way it is included in charity, when a man loves himself for the sake of God and in God. In a third way, it is indeed distinct from charity, but is not contrary thereto, as when a man loves himself from the point of view of his own good, yet not so as to place his end in this his own good: even as one may have another special love for one’s neighbor, besides the love of charity which is founded on God, when we love him by reason of usefulness, consanguinity, or some other human consideration, which, however, is referable to charity.

Accordingly fear of punishment is, in one way, included in charity, because separation from God is a punishment, which charity shuns exceedingly; so that this belongs to chaste fear. In another way, it is contrary to charity, when a man shrinks from the punishment that is opposed to his natural good, as being the principal evil in opposition to the good which he loves as an end; and in this way fear of punishment is not consistent with charity. In another way fear of punishment is indeed substantially distinct from chaste fear, when, to wit, a man fears a penal evil, not because it separates him from God, but because it is hurtful to his own good, and yet he does not place his end in this good, so that neither does he dread this evil as being the principal evil. Such fear of punishment is consistent with charity; but it is not called servile, except when punishment is dreaded as a principal evil, as explained above ([2467]AA[2],4). Hence fear considered as servile, does not remain with charity, but the substance of servile fear can remain with charity, even as self-love can remain with charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of fear considered as servile: and such is the sense of the two other objections.

Whether fear is the beginning of wisdom?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not the beginning of wisdom. For the beginning of a thing is a part thereof. But fear is not a part of wisdom, since fear is seated in the appetitive faculty, while wisdom is in the intellect. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is the beginning of itself. “Now fear of the Lord, that is wisdom,” according to Job 28:28. Therefore it seems that fear of God is not the beginning of wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is prior to the beginning. But something is prior to fear, since faith precedes fear. Therefore it seems that fear is not the beginning of wisdom.

On the contrary, It is written in the Ps. 110:10: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.”

I answer that, A thing may be called the beginning of wisdom in two ways: in one way because it is the beginning of wisdom itself as to its essence; in another way, as to its effect. Thus the beginning of an art as to its essence consists in the principles from which that art proceeds, while the beginning of an art as to its effect is that wherefrom it begins to operate: for instance we might say that the beginning of the art of building is the foundation because that is where the builder begins his work.

Now, since wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things, as we shall state further on ([2468]Q[45], A[1]), it is considered by us in one way, and in another way by philosophers. For, seeing that our life is ordained to the enjoyment of God, and is directed thereto according to a participation of the Divine Nature, conferred on us through grace, wisdom, as we look at it, is considered not only as being cognizant of God, as it is with the philosophers, but also as directing human conduct; since this is directed not only by the human law, but also by the Divine law, as Augustine shows (De Trin. xii, 14). Accordingly the beginning of wisdom as to its essence consists in the first principles of wisdom, i.e. the articles of faith, and in this sense faith is said to be the beginning of wisdom. But as regards the effect, the beginning of wisdom is the point where wisdom begins to work, and in this way fear is the beginning of wisdom, yet servile fear in one way, and filial fear, in another. For servile fear is like a principle disposing a man to wisdom from without, in so far as he refrains from sin through fear of punishment, and is thus fashioned for the effect of wisdom, according to Ecclus. 1:27, “The fear of the Lord driveth out sin.” On the other hand, chaste or filial fear is the beginning of wisdom, as being the first effect of wisdom. For since the regulation of human conduct by the Divine law belongs to wisdom, in order to make a beginning, man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him: for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that fear is not the beginning of wisdom as to the essence of wisdom.

Reply to Objection 2: The fear of God is compared to a man’s whole life that is ruled by God’s wisdom, as the root to the tree: hence it is written (Ecclus. 1:25): “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, for [Vulg.: ‘and’] the branches thereof are longlived.” Consequently, as the root is said to be virtually the tree, so the fear of God is said to be wisdom.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, faith is the beginning of wisdom in one way, and fear, in another. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 25:16): “The fear of God is the beginning of love: and the beginning of faith is to be fast joined to it.”

Whether initial fear differs substantially from filial fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that initial fear differs substantially from filial fear. For filial fear is caused by love. Now initial fear is the beginning of love, according to Ecclus. 25:16, “The fear of God is the beginning of love.” Therefore initial fear is distinct from filial fear.

Objection 2: Further, initial fear dreads punishment, which is the object of servile fear, so that initial and servile fear would seem to be the same. But servile fear is distinct from filial fear. Therefore initial fear also is substantially distinct from initial fear.

Objection 3: Further, a mean differs in the same ratio from both the extremes. Now initial fear is the mean between servile and filial fear. Therefore it differs from both filial and servile fear.

On the contrary, Perfect and imperfect do not diversify the substance of a thing. Now initial and filial fear differ in respect of perfection and imperfection of charity, as Augustine states (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Therefore initial fear does not differ substantially from filial fear.

I answer that, Initial fear is so called because it is a beginning [initium]. Since, however, both servile and filial fear are, in some way, the beginning of wisdom, each may be called in some way, initial.

It is not in this sense, however, that we are to understand initial fear in so far as it is distinct from servile and filial fear, but in the sense according to which it belongs to the state of beginners, in whom there is a beginning of filial fear resulting from a beginning of charity, although they do not possess the perfection of filial fear, because they have not yet attained to the perfection of charity. Consequently initial fear stands in the same relation to filial fear as imperfect to perfect charity. Now perfect and imperfect charity differ, not as to essence but as to state. Therefore we must conclude that initial fear, as we understand it here, does not differ essentially from filial fear.

Reply to Objection 1: The fear which is a beginning of love is servile fear, which is the herald of charity, just as the bristle introduces the thread, as Augustine states (Tract. ix in Ep. i Joan.). Or else, if it be referred to initial fear, this is said to be the beginning of love, not absolutely, but relatively to the state of perfect charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Initial fear does not dread punishment as its proper object, but as having something of servile fear connected with it: for this servile fear, as to its substance, remains indeed, with charity, its servility being cast aside; whereas its act remains with imperfect charity in the man who is moved to perform good actions not only through love of justice, but also through fear of punishment, though this same act ceases in the man who has perfect charity, which "casteth out fear," according to 1 Jn. 4:18.

Reply to Objection 3: Initial fear is a mean between servile and filial fear, not as between two things of the same genus, but as the imperfect is a mean between a perfect being and a non-being, as stated in Metaph. ii, for it is the same substantially as the perfect being, while it differs altogether from non-being.

Whether fear is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost. For no gift of the Holy Ghost is opposed to a virtue, which is also from the Holy Ghost; else the Holy Ghost would be in opposition to Himself. Now fear is opposed to hope, which is a virtue. Therefore fear is not a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, it is proper to a theological virtue to have God for its object. But fear has God for its object, in so far as God is feared. Therefore fear is not a gift, but a theological virtue.

Objection 3: Further, fear arises from love. But love is reckoned a theological virtue. Therefore fear also is a theological virtue, being connected with the same matter, as it were.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that "fear is bestowed as a remedy against pride." But the virtue of humility is opposed to pride. Therefore again, fear is a kind of virtue.

Objection 5: Further, the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, since they are bestowed in support of the virtues as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, while fear regards evil. Since, then, hope is a virtue, it should not be said that fear is a gift.

On the contrary, The fear of the Lord is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:3).

I answer that, Fear is of several kinds, as stated above [2469](A[2]). Now it is not "human fear," according to Augustine (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. xviii), "that is a gift of God"—for it was by this fear that Peter denied Christ—but that fear of which it was said (Mat. 10:28): "Fear Him that can destroy both soul and body into hell."

Again servile fear is not to be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, though it is from Him, because according to Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lvii) it is compatible with the will to sin: whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are incompatible with the will to sin, as they are inseparable from charity, as stated above ([2470]FS, Q[68], A[5]).

It follows, therefore, that the fear of God, which is numbered among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, is filial or chaste fear. For it was stated above ([2471]FS, Q[68], AA[1],3) that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are certain habitual perfections of the soul's powers, whereby these are rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost, just as, by the moral virtues, the appetitive powers are rendered amenable to the motion of reason. Now for a thing to be amenable to the motion of a certain mover, the first condition required is that it be a non-resistant subject of that mover, because resistance of the movable subject to the mover hinders the movement. This is what filial or chaste fear does, since thereby we revere God and avoid separating ourselves from Him. Hence, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) filial fear holds the first place, as it were, among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the ascending order, and the last place, in the descending order.

Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is not opposed to the virtue of hope: since thereby we fear, not that we may fail of what we hope to obtain by God's help, but lest we withdraw ourselves from this help. Wherefore filial fear and hope cling together, and perfect one another.

Reply to Objection 2: The proper and principal object of fear is the evil shunned, and in this way, as stated above [2472](A[1]), God cannot be an object of fear. Yet He is, in this way, the object of hope and the other theological virtues, since, by the virtue of hope, we trust in God’s help, not only to obtain any other goods, but, chiefly, to obtain God Himself, as the principal good. The same evidently applies to the other theological virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: From the fact that love is the origin of fear, it does not follow that the fear of God is not a distinct habit from charity which is the love of God, since love is the origin of all the emotions, and yet we are perfected by different habits in respect of different emotions. Yet love is more of a virtue than fear is, because love regards good, to which virtue is principally directed by reason of its own nature, as was shown above ([2473]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4); for which reason hope is also reckoned as a virtue; whereas fear principally regards evil, the avoidance of which it denotes, wherefore it is something less than a theological virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Ecclus. 10:14, “the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God,” that is to refuse submission to God, and this is opposed to filial fear, which reveres God. Thus fear cuts off the source of pride for which reason it is bestowed as a remedy against pride. Yet it does not follow that it is the same as the virtue of humility, but that it is its origin. For the gifts of the Holy Ghost are the origin of the intellectual and moral virtues, as stated above ([2474]FS, Q[68], A[4]), while the theological virtues are the origin of the gifts, as stated above ([2475]FS, Q[69], A[4], ad 3).

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.

Whether fear decreases when charity increases?

Objection 1: It seems that fear decreases when charity increases. For Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix): “The more charity increases, the more fear decreases.”

Objection 2: Further, fear decreases when hope increases. But charity increases when hope increases, as stated above ([2476]Q[17], A[8]). Therefore fear decreases when charity increases.

Objection 3: Further, love implies union, whereas fear implies separation. Now separation decreases when union increases. Therefore fear decreases when the love of charity increases.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that “the fear of God not only begins but also perfects wisdom, whereby we love God above all things, and our neighbor as ourselves.”

I answer that, Fear is twofold, as stated above ([2477]AA[2],4); one is filial fear, whereby a son fears to offend his father or to be separated from him; the other is servile fear, whereby one fears punishment.

Now filial fear must needs increase when charity increases, even as an effect increases with the increase of its cause. For the more one loves a man, the more one fears to offend him and to be separated from him.

On the other hand servile fear, as regards its servility, is entirely cast out when charity comes, although the fear of punishment remains as to its substance, as stated above [2478](A[6]). This fear decreases as charity increases, chiefly as regards its act, since the more a man loves God, the less he fears punishment; first, because he thinks less of his own good, to which punishment is opposed; secondly, because, the faster he clings, the more confident he is of the reward, and, consequently the less fearful of punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there of the fear of punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: It is fear of punishment that decreases when hope increases; but with the increase of the latter filial fear increases, because the more certainly a man expects to obtain a good by another’s help, the more he fears to offend him or to be separated from him.

Reply to Objection 3: Filial fear does not imply separation from God, but submission to Him, and shuns separation from that submission. Yet, in a way, it implies separation, in the point of not presuming to equal oneself to Him, and of submitting to Him, which separation is to be observed even in charity, in so far as a man loves God more than himself and more than aught else. Hence the increase of the love of charity implies not a decrease but an increase in the reverence of fear.

Whether fear remains in heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear does not remain in heaven. For it is written (Prov. 1:33): “He . . . shall enjoy abundance, without fear of evils,” which is to be understood as referring to those who already enjoy wisdom in everlasting happiness. Now every fear is about some evil, since evil is the object of fear, as stated above ([2479]AA[2],5; [2480]FS, Q[42], A[1]). Therefore there will be no fear in heaven.

Objection 2: Further, in heaven men will be conformed to God, according to 1 Jn. 3:2, “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him.” But God fears nothing. Therefore, in heaven, men will have no fear.

Objection 3: Further, hope is more perfect than fear, since hope regards good, and fear, evil. Now hope will not be in heaven. Therefore neither will there be fear in heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 18:10): “The fear of the Lord is holy, enduring for ever and ever.”

I answer that, Servile fear, or fear of punishment, will by no means be in heaven, since such a fear is excluded by the security which is essential to everlasting happiness, as stated above ([2481]FS, Q[5], A[4]).

But regard to filial fear, as it increases with the increase of charity, so is it perfected when charity is made perfect; hence, in heaven, it will not have quite the same act as it has now.

In order to make this clear, we must observe that the proper object of fear is a possible evil, just as the proper object of hope is a possible good: and since the movement of fear is like one of avoidance, fear implies avoidance of a possible arduous evil, for little evils inspire no fear. Now as a thing’s good consists in its staying in its own order, so a thing’s evil consists in forsaking its order. Again, the order of a rational creature is that it should be under God and above other creatures. Hence, just as it is an evil for a rational creature to submit, by love, to a lower creature, so too is it an evil for it, if it submit not to God, by presumptuously revolt against Him or contemn Him. Now this evil is possible to a rational creature considered as to its nature on account of the natural flexibility of the free-will; whereas in the blessed, it becomes impossible, by reason of the perfection of glory. Therefore the avoidance of this evil that consists in non-subjection to God, and is possible to nature, but impossible in the state of bliss, will be in heaven; while in this life there is avoidance of this evil as of something altogether possible. Hence Gregory, expounding the words of Job (26:11), “The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck,” says (Moral. xvii, 29): “The heavenly powers that gaze on Him without ceasing, tremble while contemplating: but their awe, lest it should be of a penal nature, is one not of fear but of wonder,” because, to wit, they wonder at God’s supereminence and incomprehensibility. Augustine also (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) in this sense, admits fear in heaven, although he leaves the question doubtful. “If,” he says, “this chaste fear that endureth for ever and ever is to be in the future life, it will not be a fear that is afraid of an evil which might possibly occur, but a fear that holds fast to a good which we cannot lose. For when we love the good which we have acquired, with an unchangeable love, without doubt, if it is allowable to say so, our fear is sure of avoiding evil. Because chaste fear denotes a will that cannot consent to sin, and whereby we avoid sin without trembling lest, in our weakness, we fall, and possess ourselves in the tranquillity born of charity. Else, if no kind of fear is possible there, perhaps fear is said to endure for ever and ever, because that which fear will lead us to, will be everlasting.”

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted excludes from the blessed, the fear that denotes solicitude, and anxiety about evil, but not the fear which is accompanied by security.

Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix) “the same things are both like and unlike God. They are like by reason of a variable imitation of the Inimitable”—that is, because, so far as they can, they imitate God Who cannot be imitated perfectly—“they are unlike because they are the effects of a Cause of Whom they fall short infinitely and immeasurably.” Hence, if there be no fear in God (since there is none above Him to whom He may be subject) it does not follow that there is none in the blessed, whose happiness consists in perfect subjection to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope implies a certain defect, namely the futurity of happiness, which ceases when happiness is present: whereas fear implies a natural defect in a creature, in so far as it is infinitely distant from God, and this defect will remain even in heaven. Hence fear will not be cast out altogether.

Whether poverty of spirit is the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty of spirit is not the beatitude corresponding to the gift of fear. For fear is the beginning of the spiritual life, as explained above [2482](A[7]): whereas poverty belongs to the perfection of the spiritual life, according to Mat. 19:21, “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor." Therefore poverty of spirit does not correspond to the gift of fear.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:120): "Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear," whence it seems to follow that it belongs to fear to restrain the flesh. But the curbing of the flesh seems to belong rather to the beatitude of mourning. Therefore the beatitude of mourning corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than the beatitude of poverty.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of fear corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above (A[9], ad 1). Now the last beatitude which is, "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God," seems above all to correspond to hope, because according to Rom. 5:2, "we . . . glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God." Therefore that beatitude corresponds to the gift of fear, rather than poverty of spirit.

Objection 4: Further, it was stated above ([2483]FS, Q[70], A[2]) that the fruits correspond to the beatitudes. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of fear. Neither, therefore, does any of the beatitudes.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): "The fear of the Lord is befitting the humble of whom it is said: Blessed are the poor in spirit."

I answer that, Poverty of spirit properly corresponds to fear. Because, since it belongs to filial fear to show reverence and submission to God, whatever results from this submission belongs to the gift of fear. Now from the very fact that a man submits to God, it follows that he ceases to seek greatness either in himself or in another but seeks it only in God. For that would be inconsistent with perfect subjection to God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 19:8): "Some trust in chariots and some in horses; but we will call upon the name of . . . our God." It follows that if a man fear God perfectly, he does not, by pride, seek greatness either in himself or in external goods, viz. honors and riches. In either case, this proceeds from poverty of spirit, in so far as the latter denotes either the voiding of a puffed up and proud spirit, according to Augustine's interpretation (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4), or the renunciation of worldly goods which is done in spirit, i.e. by one's own will, through the instigation of the Holy Spirit, according to the expounding of Ambrose on Lk. 6:20 and Jerome on Mat. 5:3.

Reply to Objection 1: Since a beatitude is an act of perfect virtue, all the beatitudes belong to the perfection of spiritual life. And this perfection seems to require that whoever would strive to obtain a perfect share of spiritual goods, needs to begin by despising earthly goods, wherefore fear holds the first place among the gifts. Perfection, however, does not consist in the renunciation itself of temporal goods; since this is the way to perfection: whereas filial fear, to which the beatitude of poverty corresponds, is consistent with the perfection of wisdom, as stated above ([2484]AA[7],10).

Reply to Objection 2: The undue exaltation of man either in himself or in another is more directly opposed to that submission to God which is the result of filial fear, than is external pleasure. Yet this is, in consequence, opposed to fear, since whoever fears God and is subject to Him, takes no delight in things other than God. Nevertheless, pleasure is not concerned, as exaltation is, with the arduous character of a thing which fear regards: and so the beatitude of poverty corresponds to fear directly, and the beatitude of mourning, consequently.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope denotes a movement by way of a relation of tendency to a term, whereas fear implies movement by way of a relation of withdrawal from a term: wherefore the last beatitude which is the term of spiritual perfection, fittingly corresponds to hope, by way of ultimate object; while the first beatitude, which implies withdrawal from external things which hinder submission to God, fittingly corresponds to fear.

Reply to Objection 4: As regards the fruits, it seems that those things correspond to the gift of fear, which pertain to the moderate use of temporal things or to abstinence therefrom; such are modesty, continency and chastity.

OF DESPAIR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the contrary vices; (1) despair; (2) presumption. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether despair is a sin?

(2) Whether it can be without unbelief?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether it arises from sloth?

Whether despair is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not a sin. For every sin includes conversion to a mutable good, together with aversion from the immutable good, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). But despair includes no conversion to a mutable good. Therefore it is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which grows from a good root, seems to be no sin, because “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit” (Mat. 7:18). Now despair seems to grow from a good root, viz. fear of God, or from horror at the greatness of one’s own sins. Therefore despair is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, if despair were a sin, it would be a sin also for the damned to despair. But this is not imputed to them as their fault but as part of their damnation. Therefore neither is it imputed to wayfarers as their fault, so that it is not a sin.

On the contrary, That which leads men to sin, seems not only to be a sin itself, but a source of sins. Now such is despair, for the Apostle says of certain men (Eph. 4:19): “Who, despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness, unto the working of all uncleanness and [Vulg.: ‘unto’] covetousness.” Therefore despair is not only a sin but also the origin of other sins.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2) affirmation and negation in the intellect correspond to search and avoidance in the appetite; while truth and falsehood in the intellect correspond to good and evil in the appetite. Consequently every appetitive movement which is conformed to a true intellect, is good in itself, while every appetitive movement which is conformed to a false intellect is evil in itself and sinful. Now the true opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners, according to Ezech. 18:23, “I desire not the death of the sinner, but that he should be converted, and live” [*Vulg.: ‘Is it My will that a sinner should die . . . and not that he should be converted and live?’ Cf. Ezech. 33:11]: while it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so the contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: In every mortal sin there is, in some way, aversion from the immutable good, and conversion to a mutable good, but not always in the same way. Because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are contrary to them, such as hatred of God, despair and unbelief, consist principally in aversion from the immutable good; but, consequently, they imply conversion to a mutable good, in so far as the soul that is a deserter from God, must necessarily turn to other things. Other sins, however, consist principally in conversion to a mutable good, and, consequently, in aversion from the immutable good: because the fornicator intends, not to depart from God, but to enjoy carnal pleasure, the result of which is that he departs from God.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing may grow from a virtuous root in two ways: first, directly and on the part of the virtue itself; even as an act proceeds from a habit: and in this way no sin can grow from a virtuous root, for in this sense Augustine declared (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) that "no man makes evil use of virtue." Secondly, a thing proceeds from a virtue indirectly, or is occasioned by a virtue, and in this way nothing hinders a sin proceeding from a virtue: thus sometimes men pride themselves of their virtues, according to Augustine (Ep. ccxi): "Pride lies in wait for good works that they may die." In this way fear of God or horror of one's own sins may lead to despair, in so far as man makes evil use of those good things, by allowing them to be an occasion of despair.

Reply to Objection 3: The damned are outside the pale of hope on account of the impossibility of returning to happiness: hence it is not imputed to them that they hope not, but it is a part of their damnation. Even so, it would be no sin for a wayfarer to despair of obtaining that which he had no natural capacity for obtaining, or which was not due to be obtained by him; for instance, if a physician were to despair of healing some sick man, or if anyone were to despair of ever becoming rich.

Whether there can be despair without unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no despair without unbelief. For the certainty of hope is derived from faith; and so long as the cause remains the effect is not done away. Therefore a man cannot lose the certainty of hope, by despairing, unless his faith be removed.

Objection 2: Further, to prefer one’s own guilt to God’s mercy and goodness, is to deny the infinity of God’s goodness and mercy, and so savors of unbelief. But whoever despairs, prefers his own guilt to the Divine mercy and goodness, according to Gn. 4:13: “My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.” Therefore whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.

Objection 3: Further, whoever falls into a condemned heresy, is an unbeliever. But he that despairs seems to fall into a condemned heresy, viz. that of the Novatians, who say that there is no pardon for sins after Baptism. Therefore it seems that whoever despairs, is an unbeliever.

On the contrary, If we remove that which follows, that which precedes remains. But hope follows faith, as stated above ([2485]Q[17], A[7]). Therefore when hope is removed, faith can remain; so that, not everyone who despairs, is an unbeliever.

I answer that, Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to have a particular estimate (De Anima iii, 2), just as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter, although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith, viz. that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man while retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, viz. that there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of despair, to wit, that for him, being in such a state, there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there can be other mortal sins, without belief.

Reply to Objection 1: The effect is done away, not only when the first cause is removed, but also when the secondary cause is removed. Hence the movement of hope can be done away, not only by the removal of the universal estimate of faith, which is, so to say, the first cause of the certainty of hope, but also by the removal of the particular estimate, which is the secondary cause, as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: If anyone were to judge, in universal, that God’s mercy is not infinite, he would be an unbeliever. But he who despairs judges not thus, but that, for him in that state, on account of some particular disposition, there is no hope of the Divine mercy.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection, since the Novatians denied, in universal, that there is remission of sins in the Church.

Whether despair is the greatest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair is not the greatest of sins. For there can be despair without unbelief, as stated above [2486](A[2]). But unbelief is the greatest of sins because it overthrows the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Therefore despair is not the greatest of sins.

Objection 2: Further, a greater evil is opposed to a greater good, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 10). But charity is greater than hope, according to 1 Cor. 13:13. Therefore hatred of God is a greater sin than despair.

Objection 3: Further, in the sin of despair there is nothing but inordinate aversion from God: whereas in other sins there is not only inordinate aversion from God, but also an inordinate conversion. Therefore the sin of despair is not more but less grave than other sins.

On the contrary, An incurable sin seems to be most grievous, according to Jer. 30:12: “Thy bruise is incurable, thy wound is very grievous.” Now the sin of despair is incurable, according to Jer. 15:18: “My wound is desperate so as to refuse to be healed.” [*Vulg.: ‘Why is my wound,’ etc.] Therefore despair is a most grievous sin.

I answer that, Those sins which are contrary to the theological virtues are in themselves more grievous than others: because, since the theological virtues have God for their object, the sins which are opposed to them imply aversion from God directly and principally. Now every mortal sin takes its principal malice and gravity from the fact of its turning away from God, for if it were possible to turn to a mutable good, even inordinately, without turning away from God, it would not be a mortal sin. Consequently a sin which, first and of its very nature, includes aversion from God, is most grievous among mortal sins.

Now unbelief, despair and hatred of God are opposed to the theological virtues: and among them, if we compare hatred of God and unbelief to despair, we shall find that, in themselves, that is, in respect of their proper species, they are more grievous. For unbelief is due to a man not believing God's own truth; while the hatred of God arises from man's will being opposed to God's goodness itself; whereas despair consists in a man ceasing to hope for a share of God's goodness. Hence it is clear that unbelief and hatred of God are against God as He is in Himself, while despair is against Him, according as His good is partaken of by us. Wherefore strictly speaking it is more grievous sin to disbelieve God's truth, or to hate God, than not to hope to receive glory from Him.

If, however, despair be compared to the other two sins from our point of view, then despair is more dangerous, since hope withdraws us from evils and induces us to seek for good things, so that when hope is given up, men rush headlong into sin, and are drawn away from good works. Wherefore a gloss on Prov. 24:10, "If thou lose hope being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished," says: "Nothing is more hateful than despair, for the man that has it loses his constancy both in the every day toils of this life, and, what is worse, in the battle of faith." And Isidore says (De Sum. Bono ii, 14): "To commit a crime is to kill the soul, but to despair is to fall into hell."

Whether despair arises from sloth?

Objection 1: It would seem that despair does not arise from sloth. Because different causes do not give rise to one same effect. Now despair of the future life arises from lust, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore it does not arise from sloth.

Objection 2: Further, just as despair is contrary to hope, so is sloth contrary to spiritual joy. But spiritual joy arises from hope, according to

Rom. 12:12, “rejoicing in hope.” Therefore sloth arises from despair, and not vice versa.

Objection 3: Further, contrary effects have contrary causes. Now hope, the contrary of which is despair, seems to proceed from the consideration of Divine favors, especially the Incarnation, for Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10): “Nothing was so necessary to raise our hope, than that we should be shown how much God loves us. Now what greater proof could we have of this than that God’s Son should deign to unite Himself to our nature?” Therefore despair arises rather from the neglect of the above consideration than from sloth.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons despair among the effects of sloth.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[1]; [2487]FS, Q[40], A[1]), the object of hope is a good, difficult but possible to obtain by oneself or by another. Consequently the hope of obtaining happiness may be lacking in a person in two ways: first, through his not deeming it an arduous good; secondly, through his deeming it impossible to obtain either by himself, or by another. Now, the fact that spiritual goods taste good to us no more, or seem to be goods of no great account, is chiefly due to our affections being infected with the love of bodily pleasures, among which, sexual pleasures hold the first place: for the love of those pleasures leads man to have a distaste for spiritual things, and not to hope for them as arduous goods. In this way despair is caused by lust.

On the other hand, the fact that a man deems an arduous good impossible to obtain, either by himself or by another, is due to his being over downcast, because when this state of mind dominates his affections, it seems to him that he will never be able to rise to any good. And since sloth is a sadness that casts down the spirit, in this way despair is born of sloth.

Now this is the proper object of hope—that the thing is possible, because the good and the arduous regard other passions also. Hence despair is born of sloth in a more special way: though it may arise from lust, for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11), just as hope gives rise to joy, so, when a man is joyful he has greater hope: and, accordingly, those who are sorrowful fall the more easily into despair, according to 2 Cor. 2:7: “Lest . . . such an one be swallowed up by overmuch sorrow.” Yet, since the object of hope is good, to which the appetite tends naturally, and which it shuns, not naturally but only on account of some supervening obstacle, it follows that, more directly, hope gives birth to joy, while on the contrary despair is born of sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: This very neglect to consider the Divine favors arises from sloth. For when a man is influenced by a certain passion he considers chiefly the things which pertain to that passion: so that a man who is full of sorrow does not easily think of great and joyful things, but only of sad things, unless by a great effort he turn his thoughts away from sadness.

OF PRESUMPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider presumption, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is the object in which presumption trusts?

(2) Whether presumption is a sin?

(3) To what is it opposed?

(4) From what vice does it arise?

Whether presumption trusts in God or in our own power?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption, which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts, not in God, but in our own power. For the lesser the power, the more grievously does he sin who trusts in it too much. But man’s power is less than God’s. Therefore it is a more grievous sin to presume on human power than to presume on the power of God. Now the sin against the Holy Ghost is most grievous. Therefore presumption, which is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost, trusts to human rather than to Divine power.

Objection 2: Further, other sins arise from the sin against the Holy Ghost, for this sin is called malice which is a source from which sins arise. Now other sins seem to arise from the presumption whereby man presumes on himself rather than from the presumption whereby he presumes on God, since self-love is the origin of sin, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it seems that presumption which is a sin against the Holy Ghost, relies chiefly on human power.

Objection 3: Further, sin arises from the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. Now presumption is a sin. Therefore it arises from turning to human power, which is a mutable good, rather than from turning to the power of God, which is an immutable good.

On the contrary, Just as, through despair, a man despises the Divine mercy, on which hope relies, so, through presumption, he despises the Divine justice, which punishes the sinner. Now justice is in God even as mercy is. Therefore, just as despair consists in aversion from God, so presumption consists in inordinate conversion to Him.

I answer that, Presumption seems to imply immoderate hope. Now the object of hope is an arduous possible good: and a thing is possible to a man in two ways: first by his own power; secondly, by the power of God alone. With regard to either hope there may be presumption owing to lack of moderation. As to the hope whereby a man relies on his own power, there is presumption if he tends to a good as though it were possible to him, whereas it surpasses his powers, according to Judith 6:15: “Thou humblest them that presume of themselves.” This presumption is contrary to the virtue of magnanimity which holds to the mean in this kind of hope.

But as to the hope whereby a man relies on the power of God, there may be presumption through immoderation, in the fact that a man tends to some good as though it were possible by the power and mercy of God, whereas it is not possible, for instance, if a man hope to obtain pardon without repenting, or glory without merits. This presumption is, properly, the sin against the Holy Ghost, because, to wit, by presuming thus a man removes or despises the assistance of the Holy Spirit, whereby he is withdrawn from sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[20], A[3]; [2488]FS, Q[73], A[3]) a sin which is against God is, in its genus, graver than other sins. Hence presumption whereby a man relies on God inordinately, is a more grievous sin than the presumption of trusting in one’s own power, since to rely on the Divine power for obtaining what is unbecoming to God, is to depreciate the Divine power, and it is evident that it is a graver sin to detract from the Divine power than to exaggerate one’s own.

Reply to Objection 2: The presumption whereby a man presumes inordinately on God, includes self-love, whereby he loves his own good inordinately. For when we desire a thing very much, we think we can easily procure it through others, even though we cannot.

Reply to Objection 3: Presumption on God’s mercy implies both conversion to a mutable good, in so far as it arises from an inordinate desire of one’s own good, and aversion from the immutable good, in as much as it ascribes to the Divine power that which is unbecoming to it, for thus man turns away from God’s power.

Whether presumption is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is not a sin. For no sin is a reason why man should be heard by God. Yet, through presumption some are heard by God, for it is written (Judith 9:17): “Hear me a poor wretch making supplication to Thee, and presuming of Thy mercy.” Therefore presumption on God’s mercy is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, presumption denotes excessive hope. But there cannot be excess of that hope which is in God, since His power and mercy are infinite. Therefore it seems that presumption is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, that which is a sin does not excuse from sin: for the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 22) that “Adam sinned less, because he sinned in the hope of pardon,” which seems to indicate presumption. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is reckoned a species of sin against the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, As stated above ([2489]Q[20], A[1]) with regard to despair, every appetitive movement that is conformed to a false intellect, is evil in itself and sinful. Now presumption is an appetitive movement, since it denotes an inordinate hope. Moreover it is conformed to a false intellect, just as despair is: for just as it is false that God does not pardon the repentant, or that He does not turn sinners to repentance, so is it false that He grants forgiveness to those who persevere in their sins, and that He gives glory to those who cease from good works: and it is to this estimate that the movement of presumption is conformed.

Consequently presumption is a sin, but less grave than despair, since, on account of His infinite goodness, it is more proper to God to have mercy and to spare, than to punish: for the former becomes God in Himself, the latter becomes Him by reason of our sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Presumption sometimes stands for hope, because even the right hope which we have in God seems to be presumption, if it be measured according to man’s estate: yet it is not, if we look at the immensity of the goodness of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Presumption does not denote excessive hope, as though man hoped too much in God; but through man hoping to obtain from God something unbecoming to Him; which is the same as to hope too little in Him, since it implies a depreciation of His power; as stated above (A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: To sin with the intention of persevering in sin and through the hope of being pardoned, is presumptuous, and this does not diminish, but increases sin. To sin, however, with the hope of obtaining pardon some time, and with the intention of refraining from sin and of repenting of it, is not presumptuous, but diminishes sin, because this seems to indicate a will less hardened in sin.

Whether presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption is more opposed to fear than to hope. Because inordinate fear is opposed to right fear. Now presumption seems to pertain to inordinate fear, for it is written (Wis. 17:10): “A troubled conscience always presumes [Douay: ‘forecasteth’] grievous things,” and (Wis. 17:11) that “fear is a help to presumption [*Vulg.: ‘Fear is nothing else but a yielding up of the succours from thought.’].” Therefore presumption is opposed to fear rather than to hope.

Objection 2: Further, contraries are most distant from one another. Now presumption is more distant from fear than from hope, because presumption implies movement to something, just as hope does, whereas fear denotes movement from a thing. Therefore presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

Objection 3: Further, presumption excludes fear altogether, whereas it does not exclude hope altogether, but only the rectitude of hope. Since therefore contraries destroy one another, it seems that presumption is contrary to fear rather than to hope.

On the contrary, When two vices are opposed to one another they are contrary to the same virtue, as timidity and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Now the sin of presumption is contrary to the sin of despair, which is directly opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that presumption also is more directly opposed to hope.

I answer that, As Augustine states (Contra Julian. iv, 3), “every virtue not only has a contrary vice manifestly distinct from it, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also a sort of kindred vice, alike, not in truth but only in its deceitful appearance, as cunning is opposed to prudence.” This agrees with the Philosopher who says (Ethic. ii, 8) that a virtue seems to have more in common with one of the contrary vices than with the other, as temperance with insensibility, and fortitude with audacity.

Accordingly presumption appears to be manifestly opposed to fear, especially servile fear, which looks at the punishment arising from God’s justice, the remission of which presumption hopes for; yet by a kind of false likeness it is more opposed to hope, since it denotes an inordinate hope in God. And since things are more directly opposed when they belong to the same genus, than when they belong to different genera, it follows that presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear. For they both regard and rely on the same object, hope inordinately, presumption inordinately.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as hope is misused in speaking of evils, and properly applied in speaking of good, so is presumption: it is in this way that inordinate fear is called presumption.

Reply to Objection 2: Contraries are things that are most distant from one another within the same genus. Now presumption and hope denote a movement of the same genus, which can be either ordinate or inordinate. Hence presumption is more directly opposed to hope than to fear, since it is opposed to hope in respect of its specific difference, as an inordinate thing to an ordinate one, whereas it is opposed to fear, in respect of its generic difference, which is the movement of hope.

Reply to Objection 3: Presumption is opposed to fear by a generic contrariety, and to the virtue of hope by a specific contrariety. Hence presumption excludes fear altogether even generically, whereas it does not exclude hope except by reason of its difference, by excluding its ordinateness.

Whether presumption arises from vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that presumption does not arise from vainglory. For presumption seems to rely most of all on the Divine mercy. Now mercy [misericordia] regards unhappiness [miseriam] which is contrary to glory. Therefore presumption does not arise from vainglory.

Objection 2: Further, presumption is opposed to despair. Now despair arises from sorrow, as stated above ([2490]Q[20], A[4], ad 2). Since therefore opposites have opposite causes, presumption would seem to arise from pleasure, and consequently from sins of the flesh, which give the most absorbing pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, the vice of presumption consists in tending to some impossible good, as though it were possible. Now it is owing to ignorance that one deems an impossible thing to be possible. Therefore presumption arises from ignorance rather than from vainglory.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.”

I answer that, As stated above [2491](A[1]), presumption is twofold; one whereby a man relies on his own power, when he attempts something beyond his power, as though it were possible to him. Such like presumption clearly arises from vainglory; for it is owing to a great desire for glory, that a man attempts things beyond his power, and especially novelties which call for greater admiration. Hence Gregory states explicitly that presumption of novelties is a daughter of vainglory.

The other presumption is an inordinate trust in the Divine mercy or power, consisting in the hope of obtaining glory without merits, or pardon without repentance. Such like presumption seems to arise directly from pride, as though man thought so much of himself as to esteem that God would not punish him or exclude him from glory, however much he might be a sinner.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO HOPE AND FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts relating to hope and fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) The precepts relating to hope;

(2) The precepts relating to fear.

Whether there should be a precept of hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given relating to the virtue of hope. For when an effect is sufficiently procured by one cause, there is no need to induce it by another. Now man is sufficiently induced by his natural inclination to hope for good. Therefore there is no need of a precept of the Law to induce him to do this.

Objection 2: Further, since precepts are given about acts of virtue, the chief precepts are about the acts of the chief virtues. Now the chief of all the virtues are the three theological virtues, viz. hope, faith and charity. Consequently, as the chief precepts of the Law are those of the decalogue, to which all others may be reduced, as stated above ([2492]FS, Q[100], A[3]), it seems that if any precept of hope were given, it should be found among the precepts of the decalogue. But it is not to be found there. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.

Objection 3: Further, to prescribe an act of virtue is equivalent to a prohibition of the act of the opposite vice. Now no precept is to be found forbidding despair which is contrary to hope. Therefore it seems that the Law should contain no precept of hope.

On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 15:12, “This is My commandment, that you love one another” (Tract. lxxxiii in Joan.): “How many things are commanded us about faith! How many relating to hope!” Therefore it is fitting that some precepts should be given about hope.

I answer that, Among the precepts contained in Holy Writ, some belong to the substance of the Law, others are preambles to the Law. The preambles to the Law are those without which no law is possible: such are the precepts relating to the act of faith and the act of hope, because the act of faith inclines man’s mind so that he believes the Author of the Law to be One to Whom he owes submission, while, by the hope of a reward, he is induced to observe the precepts. The precepts that belong to the substance of the Law are those which relate to right conduct and are imposed on man already subject and ready to obey: wherefore when the Law was given these precepts were set forth from the very outset under form of a command.

Yet the precepts of hope and faith were not to be given under the form of a command, since, unless man already believed and hoped, it would be useless to give him the Law: but, just as the precept of faith had to be given under the form of an announcement or reminder, as stated above ([2493]Q[16], A[1]), so too, the precept of hope, in the first promulgation of the Law, had to be given under the form of a promise. For he who promises rewards to them that obey him, by that very fact, urges them to hope: hence all the promises contained in the Law are incitements to hope.

Since, however, when once the Law has been given, it is for a wise man to induce men not only to observe the precepts, but also, and much more, to safeguard the foundation of the Law, therefore, after the first promulgation of the Law, Holy Writ holds out to man many inducements to hope, even by way of warning or command, and not merely by way of promise, as in the Law; for instance, in the Ps. 61:9: “Hope [Douay: ‘Trust’] in Him all ye congregation of the people,” and in many other passages of the Scriptures.

Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines us to hope for the good which is proportionate to human nature; but for man to hope for a supernatural good he had to be induced by the authority of the Divine law, partly by promises, partly by admonitions and commands. Nevertheless there was need for precepts of the Divine law to be given even for those things to which natural reason inclines us, such as the acts of the moral virtues, for sake of insuring a greater stability, especially since the natural reason of man was clouded by the lusts of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the law of the decalogue belong to the first promulgation of the Law: hence there was no need for a precept of hope among the precepts of the decalogue, and it was enough to induce men to hope by the inclusion of certain promises, as in the case of the first and fourth commandments.

Reply to Objection 3: In those observances to which man is bound as under a duty, it is enough that he receive an affirmative precept as to what he has to do, wherein is implied the prohibition of what he must avoid doing: thus he is given a precept concerning the honor due to parents, but not a prohibition against dishonoring them, except by the law inflicting punishment on those who dishonor their parents. And since in order to be saved it is man’s duty to hope in God, he had to be induced to do so by one of the above ways, affirmatively, so to speak, wherein is implied the prohibition of the opposite.

Whether there should have been given a precept of fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in the Law, there should not have been given a precept of fear. For the fear of God is about things which are a preamble to the Law, since it is the “beginning of wisdom.” Now things which are a preamble to the Law do not come under a precept of the Law. Therefore no precept of fear should be given in the Law.

Objection 2: Further, given the cause, the effect is also given. Now love is the cause of fear, since “every fear proceeds from some kind of love,” as Augustine states (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 33). Therefore given the precept of love, it would have been superfluous to command fear.

Objection 3: Further, presumption, in a way, is opposed to fear. But the Law contains no prohibition against presumption. Therefore it seems that neither should any precept of fear have been given.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 10:12): “And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God?” But He requires of us that which He commands us to do. Therefore it is a matter of precept that man should fear God.

I answer that, Fear is twofold, servile and filial. Now just as man is induced, by the hope of rewards, to observe precepts of law, so too is he induced thereto by the fear of punishment, which fear is servile.

And just as according to what has been said [2494](A[1]), in the promulgation of the Law there was no need for a precept of the act of hope, and men were to be induced thereto by promises, so neither was there need for a precept, under form of command, of fear which regards punishment, and men were to be induced thereto by the threat of punishment: and this was realized both in the precepts of the decalogue, and afterwards, in due sequence, in the secondary precepts of the Law.

Yet, just as wise men and the prophets who, consequently, strove to strengthen man in the observance of the Law, delivered their teaching about hope under the form of admonition or command, so too did they in the matter of fear.

On the other hand filial fear which shows reverence to God, is a sort of genus in respect of the love of God, and a kind of principle of all observances connected with reverence for God. Hence precepts of filial fear are given in the Law, even as precepts of love, because each is a preamble to the external acts prescribed by the Law and to which the precepts of the decalogue refer. Hence in the passage quoted in the argument, “On the contrary,” man is required “to have fear, to walk in God’s ways,” by worshipping Him, and “to love Him.”

Reply to Objection 1: Filial fear is a preamble to the Law, not as though it were extrinsic thereto, but as being the beginning of the Law, just as love is. Hence precepts are given of both, since they are like general principles of the whole Law.

Reply to Objection 2: From love proceeds filial fear as also other good works that are done from charity. Hence, just as after the precept of charity, precepts are given of the other acts of virtue, so at the same time precepts are given of fear and of the love of charity, just as, in demonstrative sciences, it is not enough to lay down the first principles, unless the conclusions also are given which follow from them proximately or remotely.

Reply to Objection 3: Inducement to fear suffices to exclude presumption, even as inducement to hope suffices to exclude despair, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).

OF CHARITY, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In proper sequence, we must consider charity; and (1) charity itself; (2) the corresponding gift of wisdom. The first consideration will be fivefold: (1) Charity itself; (2) The object of charity; (3) Its acts; (4) The opposite vices; (5) The precepts relating thereto.

The first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Charity, considered as regards itself; (2) Charity, considered in its relation to its subject. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether charity is friendship?

(2) Whether it is something created in the soul?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is a special virtue?

(5) Whether it is one virtue?

(6) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?

(7) Whether any true virtue is possible without it?

(8) Whether it is the form of the virtues?

Whether charity is friendship?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Dan. 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.

Objection 2: Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Mat. 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is it friendship for the virtuous, since by charity we love even sinners, whereas friendship based on the virtuous is only for virtuous men (Ethic. viii). Therefore charity is not friendship.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 15:15): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.

Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9): “God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.” The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.

Reply to Objection 1: Man’s life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man’s spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Phil. 3:20): “Our conversation is in heaven.” But this “conversation” will be perfected in heaven, when “His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face” (Apoc. 22:3,4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.

Reply to Objection 2: Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one’s friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Indeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.

Reply to Objection 3: The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God’s sake.

Whether charity is something created in the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not something created in the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7): “He that loveth his neighbor, consequently, loveth love itself.” Now God is love. Therefore it follows that he loves God in the first place. Again he says (De Trin. xv, 17): “It was said: God is Charity, even as it was said: God is a Spirit.” Therefore charity is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.

Objection 2: Further, God is the life of the soul spiritually just as the soul is the life of the body, according to Dt. 30:20: “He is thy life.” Now the soul by itself quickens the body. Therefore God quickens the soul by Himself. But He quickens it by charity, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: “We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren.” Therefore God is charity itself.

Objection 3: Further, no created thing is of infinite power; on the contrary every creature is vanity. But charity is not vanity, indeed it is opposed to vanity; and it is of infinite power, since it brings the human soul to the infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.

On the charity, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): “By charity I mean the movement of the soul towards the enjoyment of God for His own sake.” But a movement of the soul is something created in the soul. Therefore charity is something created in the soul.

I answer that, The Master looks thoroughly into this question in Q[17]

of the First Book, and concludes that charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.

But if we consider the matter aright, this would be, on the contrary, detrimental to charity. For when the Holy Ghost moves the human mind the movement of charity does not proceed from this motion in such a way that the human mind be merely moved, without being the principle of this movement, as when a body is moved by some extrinsic motive power. For this is contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself, as stated above ([2495]FS, Q[6], A[1]): so that it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.

Likewise, neither can it be said that the Holy Ghost moves the will in such a way to the act of loving, as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious, whereas it has been stated above ([2496]FS, Q[114], A[4]) that the love of charity is the root of merit: and, given that the will is moved by the Holy Ghost to the act of love, it is necessary that the will also should be the efficient cause of that act.

Now no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of that action. Wherefore God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him; and in this way He "ordereth all things sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. And this is evidently untrue, since no virtue has such a strong inclination to its act as charity has, nor does any virtue perform its act with so great pleasure. Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine Essence Itself is charity, even as It is wisdom and goodness. Wherefore just as we are said to be good with the goodness which is God, and wise with the wisdom which is God (since the goodness whereby we are formally good is a participation of Divine goodness, and the wisdom whereby we are formally wise, is a share of Divine wisdom), so too, the charity whereby formally we love our neighbor is a participation of Divine charity. For this manner of speaking is common among the Platonists, with whose doctrines Augustine was imbued; and the lack of adverting to this has been to some an occasion of error.

Reply to Objection 2: God is effectively the life both of the soul by charity, and of the body by the soul: but formally charity is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body. Consequently we may conclude from this that just as the soul is immediately united to the body, so is charity to the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity works formally. Now the efficacy of a form depends on the power of the agent, who instills the form, wherefore it is evident that charity is not vanity. But because it produces an infinite effect, since, by justifying the soul, it unites it to God, this proves the infinity of the Divine power, which is the author of charity.

Whether charity is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a virtue. For charity is a kind of friendship. Now philosophers do not reckon friendship a virtue, as may be gathered from Ethic. viii, 1; nor is it numbered among the virtues whether moral or intellectual. Neither, therefore, is charity a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, “virtue is the ultimate limit of power” (De Coelo et Mundo i, 11). But charity is not something ultimate, this applies rather to joy and peace. Therefore it seems that charity is not a virtue, and that this should be said rather of joy and peace.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is an accidental habit. But charity is not an accidental habit, since it is a more excellent thing than the soul itself: whereas no accident is more excellent than its subject. Therefore charity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi): “Charity is a virtue which, when our affections are perfectly ordered, unites us to God, for by it we love Him.”

I answer that, Human acts are good according as they are regulated by their due rule and measure. Wherefore human virtue which is the principle of all man’s good acts consists in following the rule of human acts, which is twofold, as stated above ([2497]Q[17], A[1]), viz. human reason and God.

Consequently just as moral virtue is defined as being “in accord with right reason,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6, so too, the nature of virtue consists in attaining God, as also stated above with regard to faith, ([2498]Q[4], A[5]) and hope ([2499]Q[17], A[1]). Wherefore, it follows that charity is a virtue, for, since charity attains God, it unites us to God, as evidenced by the authority of Augustine quoted above.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. viii) does not deny that friendship is a virtue, but affirms that it is “either a virtue or with a virtue.” For we might say that it is a moral virtue about works done in respect of another person, but under a different aspect from justice. For justice is about works done in respect of another person, under the aspect of the legal due, whereas friendship considers the aspect of a friendly and moral duty, or rather that of a gratuitous favor, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 13). Nevertheless it may be admitted that it is not a virtue distinct of itself from the other virtues. For its praiseworthiness and virtuousness are derived merely from its object, in so far, to wit, as it is based on the moral goodness of the virtues. This is evident from the fact that not every friendship is praiseworthy and virtuous, as in the case of friendship based on pleasure or utility. Wherefore friendship for the virtuous is something consequent to virtue rather than a virtue. Moreover there is no comparison with charity since it is not founded principally on the virtue of a man, but on the goodness of God.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the same virtue to love a man and to rejoice about him, since joy results from love, as stated above ([2500]FS, Q[25], A[2]) in the treatise on the passions: wherefore love is reckoned a virtue, rather than joy, which is an effect of love. And when virtue is described as being something ultimate, we mean that it is last, not in the order of effect, but in the order of excess, just as one hundred pounds exceed sixty.

Reply to Objection 3: Every accident is inferior to substance if we consider its being, since substance has being in itself, while an accident has its being in another: but considered as to its species, an accident which results from the principles of its subject is inferior to its subject, even as an effect is inferior to its cause; whereas an accident that results from a participation of some higher nature is superior to its subject, in so far as it is a likeness of that higher nature, even as light is superior to the diaphanous body. In this way charity is superior to the soul, in as much as it is a participation of the Holy Ghost.

Whether charity is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not a special virtue. For Jerome says: “Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity whereby we love God” [*The reference should be to Augustine, Ep. clxvii]: and Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) [*De Civ. Dei xv, 22] that “virtue is the order of love.” Now no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, that which extends to all works of virtue, cannot be a special virtue. But charity extends to all works of virtue, according to 1 Cor. 13:4: “Charity is patient, is kind,” etc.; indeed it extends to all human actions, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: “Let all your things be done in charity.” Therefore charity is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law refer to acts of virtue. Now Augustine says (De Perfect. Human. Justit. v) that, “Thou shalt love” is “a general commandment,” and “Thou shalt not covet,” “a general prohibition.” Therefore charity is a general virtue.

On the contrary, Nothing general is enumerated together with what is special. But charity is enumerated together with special virtues, viz. hope and faith, according to 1 Cor. 13:13: “And now there remain faith, hope, charity, these three.” Therefore charity is a special virtue.

I answer that, Acts and habits are specified by their objects, as shown above ([2501]FS, Q[18], A[2]; [2502]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of love is the good, as stated above ([2503]FS, Q[27], A[1]), so that wherever there is a special aspect of good, there is a special kind of love. But the Divine good, inasmuch as it is the object of happiness, has a special aspect of good, wherefore the love of charity, which is the love of that good, is a special kind of love. Therefore charity is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is included in the definition of every virtue, not as being essentially every virtue, but because every virtue depends on it in a way, as we shall state further on ([2504]AA[7],8). In this way prudence is included in the definition of the moral virtues, as explained in Ethic. ii, vi, from the fact that they depend on prudence.

Reply to Objection 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has for its object the last end of human life, viz. everlasting happiness, it follows that it extends to the acts of a man’s whole life, by commanding them, not by eliciting immediately all acts of virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: The precept of love is said to be a general command, because all other precepts are reduced thereto as to their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: “The end of the commandment is charity.”

Whether charity is one virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not one virtue. For habits are distinct according to their objects. Now there are two objects of charity—God and our neighbor—which are infinitely distant from one another. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

Objection 2: Further, different aspects of the object diversify a habit, even though that object be one in reality, as shown above (Q[17], A[6]; [2505]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Now there are many aspects under which God is an object of love, because we are debtors to His love by reason of each one of His favors. Therefore charity is not one virtue.

Objection 3: Further, charity comprises friendship for our neighbor. But the Philosopher reckons several species of friendship (Ethic. viii, 3,11,12). Therefore charity is not one virtue, but is divided into a number of various species.

On the contrary, Just as God is the object of faith, so is He the object of charity. Now faith is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine truth, according to Eph. 4:5: “One faith.” Therefore charity also is one virtue by reason of the unity of the Divine goodness.

I answer that, Charity, as stated above [2506](A[1]) is a kind of friendship of man for God. Now the different species of friendship are differentiated, first of all, in respect of a diversity of end, and in this way there are three species of friendship, namely friendship for the useful, for the delightful, and for the virtuous; secondly, in respect of the different kinds of communion on which friendships are based; thus there is one species of friendship between kinsmen, and another between fellow citizens or fellow travellers, the former being based on natural communion, the latter on civil communion or on the comradeship of the road, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. viii, 12).

Now charity cannot be differentiated in either of these ways: for its end is one, namely, the goodness of God; and the fellowship of everlasting happiness, on which this friendship is based, is also one. Hence it follows that charity is simply one virtue, and not divided into several species.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would hold, if God and our neighbor were equally objects of charity. But this is not true: for God is the principal object of charity, while our neighbor is loved out of charity for God's sake.

Reply to Objection 2: God is loved by charity for His own sake: wherefore charity regards principally but one aspect of lovableness, namely God's goodness, which is His substance, according to Ps. 105:1: "Give glory to the Lord for He is good." Other reasons that inspire us with love for Him, or which make it our duty to love Him, are secondary and result from the first.

Reply to Objection 3: Human friendship of which the Philosopher treats has various ends and various forms of fellowship. This does not apply to charity, as stated above: wherefore the comparison fails.

Whether charity is the most excellent of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the higher power has the higher virtue even as it has a higher operation. Now the intellect is higher than the will, since it directs the will. Therefore, faith, which is in the intellect, is more excellent than charity which is in the will.

Objection 2: Further, the thing by which another works seems the less excellent of the two, even as a servant, by whom his master works, is beneath his master. Now "faith . . . worketh by charity," according to Gal. 5:6. Therefore faith is more excellent than charity.

Objection 3: Further, that which is by way of addition to another seems to be the more perfect of the two. Now hope seems to be something additional to charity: for the object of charity is good, whereas the object of hope is an arduous good. Therefore hope is more excellent than charity.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:13): “The greater of these is charity.”

I answer that, Since good, in human acts, depends on their being regulated by the due rule, it must needs be that human virtue, which is a principle of good acts, consists in attaining the rule of human acts. Now the rule of human acts is twofold, as stated above [2507](A[3]), namely, human reason and God: yet God is the first rule, whereby, even human reason must be regulated. Consequently the theological virtues, which consist in attaining this first rule, since their object is God, are more excellent than the moral, or the intellectual virtues, which consist in attaining human reason: and it follows that among the theological virtues themselves, the first place belongs to that which attains God most.

Now that which is of itself always ranks before that which is by another. But faith and hope attain God indeed in so far as we derive from Him the knowledge of truth or the acquisition of good, whereas charity attains God Himself that it may rest in Him, but not that something may accrue to us from Him. Hence charity is more excellent than faith or hope, and, consequently, than all the other virtues, just as prudence, which by itself attains reason, is more excellent than the other moral virtues, which attain reason in so far as it appoints the mean in human operations or passions.

Reply to Objection 1: The operation of the intellect is completed by the thing understood being in the intellectual subject, so that the excellence of the intellectual operation is assessed according to the measure of the intellect. On the other hand, the operation of the will and of every appetitive power is completed in the tendency of the appetite towards a thing as its term, wherefore the excellence of the appetitive operation is gauged according to the thing which is the object of the operation. Now those things which are beneath the soul are more excellent in the soul than they are in themselves, because a thing is contained according to the mode of the container (De Causis xii). On the other hand, things that are above the soul, are more excellent in themselves than they are in the soul. Consequently it is better to know than to love the things that are beneath us; for which reason the Philosopher gave the preference to the intellectual virtues over the moral virtues (Ethic. x, 7,8): whereas the love of the things that are above us, especially of God, ranks before the knowledge of such things. Therefore charity is more excellent than faith.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith works by love, not instrumentally, as a master by his servant, but as by its proper form: hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: The same good is the object of charity and of hope: but charity implies union with that good, whereas hope implies distance therefrom. Hence charity does not regard that good as being arduous, as hope does, since what is already united has not the character of arduous: and this shows that charity is more perfect than hope.

Whether any true virtue is possible without charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be true virtue without charity. For it is proper to virtue to produce a good act. Now those who have not charity, do some good actions, as when they clothe the naked, or feed the hungry and so forth. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.

Objection 2: Further, charity is not possible without faith, since it comes of "an unfeigned faith," as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5). Now, in unbelievers, there can be true chastity, if they curb their concupiscences, and true justice, if they judge rightly. Therefore true virtue is possible without charity.

Objection 3: Further, science and art are virtues, according to Ethic. vi. But they are to be found in sinners who lack charity. Therefore true virtue can be without charity.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute all my goods to the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." And yet true virtue is very profitable, according to Wis. 8:7: "She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life." Therefore no true virtue is possible without charity.

I answer that, Virtue is ordered to the good, as stated above ([2508]FS, Q[55] , A[4]). Now the good is chiefly an end, for things directed to the end are not said to be good except in relation to the end. Accordingly, just as the end is twofold, the last end, and the proximate end, so also, is good twofold, one, the ultimate and universal good, the other proximate and particular.

The ultimate and principal good of man is the enjoyment of God, according to Ps. 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to God,” and to this good man is ordered by charity. Man’s secondary and, as it were, particular good may be twofold: one is truly good, because, considered in itself, it can be directed to the principal good, which is the last end; while the other is good apparently and not truly, because it leads us away from the final good. Accordingly it is evident that simply true virtue is that which is directed to man’s principal good; thus also the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that “virtue is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best”: and in this way no true virtue is possible without charity.

If, however, we take virtue as being ordered to some particular end, then we speak of virtue being where there is no charity, in so far as it is directed to some particular good. But if this particular good is not a true, but an apparent good, it is not a true virtue that is ordered to such a good, but a counterfeit virtue. Even so, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), “the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser’s justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser’s temperance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the miser’s fortitude, whereby as Horace, says, ‘he braves the sea, he crosses mountains, he goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty’” (Epis. lib, 1; Ep. i, 45). If, on the other hand, this particular good be a true good, for instance the welfare of the state, or the like, it will indeed be a true virtue, imperfect, however, unless it be referred to the final and perfect good. Accordingly no strictly true virtue is possible without charity.

Reply to Objection 1: The act of one lacking charity may be of two kinds; one is in accordance with his lack of charity, as when he does something that is referred to that whereby he lacks charity. Such an act is always evil: thus Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3) that the actions which an unbeliever performs as an unbeliever, are always sinful, even when he clothes the naked, or does any like thing, and directs it to his unbelief as end.

There is, however, another act of one lacking charity, not in accordance with his lack of charity, but in accordance with his possession of some other gift of God, whether faith, or hope, or even his natural good, which is not completely taken away by sin, as stated above (Q[10], A[4]; [2509]FS, Q[85], A[2]). In this way it is possible for an act, without charity, to be generically good, but not perfectly good, because it lacks its due order to the last end.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the end is in practical matters, what the principle is in speculative matters, just as there can be no strictly true science, if a right estimate of the first indemonstrable principle be lacking, so, there can be no strictly true justice, or chastity, without that due ordering to the end, which is effected by charity, however rightly a man may be affected about other matters.

Reply to Objection 3: Science and art of their very nature imply a relation to some particular good, and not to the ultimate good of human life, as do the moral virtues, which make man good simply, as stated above ([2510]FS, Q[56] , A[3]). Hence the comparison fails.

Whether charity is the form of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not the true form of the virtues. Because the form of a thing is either exemplar or essential. Now charity is not the exemplar form of the other virtues, since it would follow that the other virtues are of the same species as charity: nor is it the essential form of the other virtues, since then it would not be distinct from them. Therefore it is in no way the form of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, charity is compared to the other virtues as their root and foundation, according to Eph. 3:17: “Rooted and founded in charity.” Now a root or foundation is not the form, but rather the matter of a thing, since it is the first part in the making. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, formal, final, and efficient causes do not coincide with one another (Phys. ii, 7). Now charity is called the end and the mother of the virtues. Therefore it should not be called their form.

On the contrary, Ambrose [*Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 23] says that charity is the form of the virtues.

I answer that, In morals the form of an act is taken chiefly from the end. The reason of this is that the principal of moral acts is the will, whose object and form, so to speak, are the end. Now the form of an act always follows from a form of the agent. Consequently, in morals, that which gives an act its order to the end, must needs give the act its form. Now it is evident, in accordance with what has been said [2511](A[7]), that it is charity which directs the acts of all other virtues to the last end, and which, consequently, also gives the form to all other acts of virtue: and it is precisely in this sense that charity is called the form of the virtues, for these are called virtues in relation to “informed” acts.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is called the form of the other virtues not as being their exemplar or their essential form, but rather by way of efficient cause, in so far as it sets the form on all, in the aforesaid manner.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity is compared to the foundation or root in so far as all other virtues draw their sustenance and nourishment therefrom, and not in the sense that the foundation and root have the character of a material cause.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity is said to be the end of other virtues, because it directs all other virtues to its own end. And since a mother is one who conceives within herself and by another, charity is called the mother of the other virtues, because, by commanding them, it conceives the acts of the other virtues, by the desire of the last end.

OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?

(2) Whether charity is caused in man by preceding acts or by a Divine infusion?

(3) Whether it is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?

(4) Whether it increases in the person who has it?

(5) Whether it increases by addition?

(6) Whether it increases by every act?

(7) Whether it increases indefinitely?

(8) Whether the charity of a wayfarer can be perfect?

(9) Of the various degrees of charity;

(10) Whether charity can diminish?

(11) Whether charity can be lost after it has been possessed?

(12) Whether it is lost through one mortal sin?

Whether the will is the subject of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of charity. For charity is a kind of love. Now, according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 3) love is in the concupiscible part. Therefore charity is also in the concupiscible and not in the will.

Objection 2: Further, charity is the foremost of the virtues, as stated above ([2512]Q[23], A[6]). But the reason is the subject of virtue. Therefore it seems that charity is in the reason and not in the will.

Objection 3: Further, charity extends to all human acts, according to 1 Cor. 16:14: “Let all your things be done in charity.” Now the principle of human acts is the free-will. Therefore it seems that charity is chiefly in the free-will as its subject and not in the will.

On the contrary, The object of charity is the good, which is also the object of the will. Therefore charity is in the will as its subject.

I answer that, Since, as stated in the [2513]FP, Q[80], A[2], the appetite is twofold, namely the sensitive, and the intellective which is called the will, the object of each is the good, but in different ways: for the object of the sensitive appetite is a good apprehended by sense, whereas the object of the intellective appetite or will is good under the universal aspect of good, according as it can be apprehended by the intellect. Now the object of charity is not a sensible good, but the Divine good which is known by the intellect alone. Therefore the subject of charity is not the sensitive, but the intellective appetite, i.e. the will.

Reply to Objection 1: The concupiscible is a part of the sensitive, not of the intellective appetite, as proved in the [2514]FP, Q[81], A[2]: wherefore the love which is in the concupiscible, is the love of sensible good: nor can the concupiscible reach to the Divine good which is an intelligible good; the will alone can. Consequently the concupiscible cannot be the subject of charity.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9), the will also is in the reason: wherefore charity is not excluded from the reason through being in the will. Yet charity is regulated, not by the reason, as human virtues are, but by God's wisdom, and transcends the rule of human reason, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Hence it is not in the reason, either as its subject, like prudence is, or as its rule, like justice and temperance are, but only by a certain kinship of the will to the reason.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the [2515]FP, Q[83], A[4], the free-will is not a distinct power from the will. Yet charity is not in the will considered as free-will, the act of which is to choose. For choice is of things directed to the end, whereas the will is of the end itself (Ethic. iii, 2). Hence charity, whose object is the last end, should be described as residing in the will rather than in the free-will.

Whether charity is caused in us by infusion?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not caused in us by infusion. For that which is common to all creatures, is in man naturally. Now, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), the "Divine good," which is the object of charity, "is for all an object of dilection and love." Therefore charity is in us naturally, and not by infusion.

Objection 2: Further, the more lovable a thing is the easier it is to love it. Now God is supremely lovable, since He is supremely good. Therefore it is easier to love Him than other things. But we need no infused habit in order to love other things. Neither, therefore, do we need one in order to love God.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): "The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith." Now these three have reference to human acts. Therefore charity is caused in us from preceding acts, and not from infusion.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us."

I answer that, As stated above ([2516]Q[23], A[1]), charity is a friendship of man for God, founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness. Now this fellowship is in respect, not of natural, but of gratuitous gifts, for, according to Rom. 6:23, “the grace of God is life everlasting”: wherefore charity itself surpasses our natural facilities. Now that which surpasses the faculty of nature, cannot be natural or acquired by the natural powers, since a natural effect does not transcend its cause.

Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by the natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity, as stated above ([2517]Q[23], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the love of God, which is founded on the fellowship of natural goods, wherefore it is in all naturally. On the other hand, charity is founded on a supernatural fellowship, so the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as God is supremely knowable in Himself yet not to us, on account of a defect in our knowledge which depends on sensible things, so too, God is supremely lovable in Himself, in as much as He is the object of happiness. But He is not supremely lovable to us in this way, on account of the inclination of our appetite towards visible goods. Hence it is evident that for us to love God above all things in this way, it is necessary that charity be infused into our hearts.

Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that in us charity proceeds from “a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith,” this must be referred to the act of charity which is aroused by these things. Or again, this is said because the aforesaid acts dispose man to receive the infusion of charity. The same remark applies to the saying of Augustine (Tract. ix in prim. canon. Joan.): “Fear leads to charity,” and of a gloss on Mat. 1:2: “Faith begets hope, and hope charity.”

Whether charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is infused according to the capacity of our natural gifts. For it is written (Mat. 25:15) that “He gave to every one according to his own virtue [Douay: ‘proper ability’].” Now, in man, none but natural virtue precedes charity, since there is no virtue without charity, as stated above ([2518]Q[23], A[7]). Therefore God infuses charity into man according to the measure of his natural virtue.

Objection 2: Further, among things ordained towards one another, the second is proportionate to the first: thus we find in natural things that the form is proportionate to the matter, and in gratuitous gifts, that glory is proportionate to grace. Now, since charity is a perfection of nature, it is compared to the capacity of nature as second to first. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according to the capacity of nature.

Objection 3: Further, men and angels partake of happiness according to the same measure, since happiness is alike in both, according to Mat. 22:30 and Lk. 20:36. Now charity and other gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the angels, according to their natural capacity, as the Master teaches (Sent. ii, D, 3). Therefore the same apparently applies to man.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:8): “The Spirit breatheth where He will,” and (1 Cor. 12:11): “All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will.” Therefore charity is given, not according to our natural capacity, but according as the Spirit wills to distribute His gifts.

I answer that, The quantity of a thing depends on the proper cause of that thing, since the more universal cause produces a greater effect. Now, since charity surpasses the proportion of human nature, as stated above [2519] (A[2]) it depends, not on any natural virtue, but on the sole grace of the Holy Ghost Who infuses charity. Wherefore the quantity of charity depends neither on the condition of nature nor on the capacity of natural virtue, but only on the will of the Holy Ghost Who “divides” His gifts “according as He will.” Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:7): “To every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.”

Reply to Objection 1: The virtue in accordance with which God gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposition or effort, by moving man’s mind either more or less, according as He will. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:12): “Who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light.”

Reply to Objection 2: The form does not surpass the proportion of the matter. In like manner grace and glory are referred to the same genus, for grace is nothing else than a beginning of glory in us. But charity and nature do not belong to the same genus, so that the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: The angel’s is an intellectual nature, and it is consistent with his condition that he should be borne wholly whithersoever he is borne, as stated in the FP, Q[61], A[6]. Hence there was a greater effort in the higher angels, both for good in those who persevered, and for evil in those who fell, and consequently those of the higher angels who remained steadfast became better than the others, and those who fell became worse. But man’s is a rational nature, with which it is consistent to be sometimes in potentiality and sometimes in act: so that it is not necessarily borne wholly whithersoever it is borne, and where there are greater natural gifts there may be less effort, and vice versa. Thus the comparison fails.

Whether charity can increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot increase. For nothing increases save what has quantity. Now quantity is twofold, namely dimensive and virtual. The former does not befit charity which is a spiritual perfection, while virtual quantity regards the objects in respect of which charity does not increase, since the slightest charity loves all that is to be loved out of charity. Therefore charity does not increase.

Objection 2: Further, that which consists in something extreme receives no increase. But charity consists in something extreme, being the greatest of the virtues, and the supreme love of the greatest good. Therefore charity cannot increase.

Objection 3: Further, increase is a kind of movement. Therefore wherever there is increase there is movement, and if there be increase of essence there is movement of essence. Now there is no movement of essence save either by corruption or generation. Therefore charity cannot increase essentially, unless it happen to be generated anew or corrupted, which is unreasonable.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxiv in Joan.) [*Cf. Ep. clxxxv.] that “charity merits increase that by increase it may merit perfection.”

I answer that, The charity of a wayfarer can increase. For we are called wayfarers by reason of our being on the way to God, Who is the last end of our happiness. In this way we advance as we get nigh to God, Who is approached, “not by steps of the body but by the affections of the soul” [*St. Augustine, Tract. in Joan. xxxii]: and this approach is the result of charity, since it unites man’s mind to God. Consequently it is essential to the charity of a wayfarer that it can increase, for if it could not, all further advance along the way would cease. Hence the Apostle calls charity the way, when he says (1 Cor. 12:31): “I show unto you yet a more excellent way.”

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is not subject to dimensive, but only to virtual quantity: and the latter depends not only on the number of objects, namely whether they be in greater number or of greater excellence, but also on the intensity of the act, namely whether a thing is loved more, or less; it is in this way that the virtual quantity of charity increases.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity consists in an extreme with regard to its object, in so far as its object is the Supreme Good, and from this it follows that charity is the most excellent of the virtues. Yet not every charity consists in an extreme, as regards the intensity of the act.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that charity does not increase in its essence, but only as to its radication in its subject, or according to its fervor.

But these people did not know what they were talking about. For since charity is an accident, its being is to be in something. So that an essential increase of charity means nothing else but that it is yet more in its subject, which implies a greater radication in its subject. Furthermore, charity is essentially a virtue ordained to act, so that an essential increase of charity implies ability to produce an act of more fervent love. Hence charity increases essentially, not by beginning anew, or ceasing to be in its subject, as the objection imagines, but by beginning to be more and more in its subject.

Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases by addition. For just as increase may be in respect of bodily quantity, so may it be according to virtual quantity. Now increase in bodily quantity results from addition; for the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5) that “increase is addition to pre-existing magnitude.” Therefore the increase of charity which is according to virtual quantity is by addition.

Objection 2: Further, charity is a kind of spiritual light in the soul, according to 1 Jn. 2:10: “He that loveth his brother abideth in the light.” Now light increases in the air by addition; thus the light in a house increases when another candle is lit. Therefore charity also increases in the soul by addition.

Objection 3: Further, the increase of charity is God’s work, even as the causing of it, according to 2 Cor. 9:10: “He will increase the growth of the fruits of your justice.” Now when God first infuses charity, He puts something in the soul that was not there before. Therefore also, when He increases charity, He puts something there which was not there before. Therefore charity increases by addition.

On the contrary, Charity is a simple form. Now nothing greater results from the addition of one simple thing to another, as proved in Phys. iii, text. 59, and Metaph. ii, 4. Therefore charity does not increase by addition.

I answer that, Every addition is of something to something else: so that in every addition we must at least presuppose that the things added together are distinct before the addition. Consequently if charity be added to charity, the added charity must be presupposed as distinct from charity to which it is added, not necessarily by a distinction of reality, but at least by a distinction of thought. For God is able to increase a bodily quantity by adding a magnitude which did not exist before, but was created at that very moment; which magnitude, though not pre-existent in reality, is nevertheless capable of being distinguished from the quantity to which it is added. Wherefore if charity be added to charity we must presuppose the distinction, at least logical, of the one charity from the other.

Now distinction among forms is twofold: specific and numeric. Specific distinction of habits follows diversity of objects, while numeric distinction follows distinction of subjects. Consequently a habit may receive increase through extending to objects to which it did not extend before: thus the science of geometry increases in one who acquires knowledge of geometrical matters which he ignored hitherto. But this cannot be said of charity, for even the slightest charity extends to all that we have to love by charity. Hence the addition which causes an increase of charity cannot be understood, as though the added charity were presupposed to be distinct specifically from that to which it is added.

It follows therefore that if charity be added to charity, we must presuppose a numerical distinction between them, which follows a distinction of subjects: thus whiteness receives an increase when one white thing is added to another, although such an increase does not make a thing whiter. This, however, does not apply to the case in point, since the subject of charity is none other than the rational mind, so that such like an increase of charity could only take place by one rational mind being added to another; which is impossible. Moreover, even if it were possible, the result would be a greater lover, but not a more loving one. It follows, therefore, that charity can by no means increase by addition of charity to charity, as some have held to be the case.

Accordingly charity increases only by its subject partaking of charity more and more subject thereto. For this is the proper mode of increase in a form that is intensified, since the being of such a form consists wholly in its adhering to its subject. Consequently, since the magnitude of a thing follows on its being, to say that a form is greater is the same as to say that it is more in its subject, and not that another form is added to it: for this would be the case if the form, of itself, had any quantity, and not in comparison with its subject. Therefore charity increases by being intensified in its subject, and this is for charity to increase in its essence; and not by charity being added to charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Bodily quantity has something as quantity, and something else, in so far as it is an accidental form. As quantity, it is distinguishable in respect of position or number, and in this way we have the increase of magnitude by addition, as may be seen in animals. But in so far as it is an accidental form, it is distinguishable only in respect of its subject, and in this way it has its proper increase, like other accidental forms, by way of intensity in its subject, for instance in things subject to rarefaction, as is proved in Phys. iv, 9. In like manner science, as a habit, has its quantity from its objects, and accordingly it increases by addition, when a man knows more things; and again, as an accidental form, it has a certain quantity through being in its subject, and in this way it increase in a man who knows the same scientific truths with greater certainty now than before. In the same way charity has a twofold quantity; but with regard to that which it has from its object, it does not increase, as stated above: hence it follows that it increases solely by being intensified.

Reply to Objection 2: The addition of light to light can be understood through the light being intensified in the air on account of there being several luminaries giving light: but this distinction does not apply to the case in point, since there is but one luminary shedding forth the light of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The infusion of charity denotes a change to the state of "having" charity from the state of "not having it," so that something must needs come which was not there before. On the other hand, the increase of charity denotes a change to "more having" from "less having," so that there is need, not for anything to be there that was not there before, but for something to be more there that previously was less there. This is what God does when He increases charity, that is He makes it to have a greater hold on the soul, and the likeness of the Holy Ghost to be more perfectly participated by the soul.

Whether charity increases through every act of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity increases through every act of charity. For that which can do what is more, can do what is less. But every act of charity can merit everlasting life; and this is more than a simple addition of charity, since it includes the perfection of charity. Much more, therefore, does every act of charity increase charity.

Objection 2: Further, just as the habits of acquired virtue are engendered by acts, so too an increase of charity is caused by an act of charity. Now each virtuous act conduces to the engendering of virtue. Therefore also each virtuous act of charity conduces to the increase of charity.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory [*St. Bernard, Serm. ii in Festo Purif.] says that "to stand still in the way to God is to go back." Now no man goes back when he is moved by an act of charity. Therefore whoever is moved by an act of charity goes forward in the way to God. Therefore charity increases through every act of charity.

On the contrary, The effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But an act of charity is sometimes done with tepidity or slackness. Therefore it does not conduce to a more excellent charity, rather does it dispose one to a lower degree.

I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity is somewhat like the increase of a body. Now bodily increase in animals and plants is not a continuous movement, so that, to wit, if a thing increase so much in so much time, it need to increase proportionally in each part of that time, as happens in local movement; but for a certain space of time nature works by disposing for the increase, without causing any actual increase, and afterwards brings into effect that to which it had disposed, by giving the animal or plant an actual increase. In like manner charity does not actually increase through every act of charity, but each act of charity disposes to an increase of charity, in so far as one act of charity makes man more ready to act again according to charity, and this readiness increasing, man breaks out into an act of more fervent love, and strives to advance in charity, and then his charity increases actually.

Reply to Objection 1: Every act of charity merits everlasting life, which, however, is not to be bestowed then and there, but at its proper time. In like manner every act of charity merits an increase of charity; yet this increase does not take place at once, but when we strive for that increase.

Reply to Objection 2: Even when an acquired virtue is being engendered, each act does not complete the formation of the virtue, but conduces towards that effect by disposing to it, while the last act, which is the most perfect, and acts in virtue of all those that preceded it, reduces the virtue into act, just as when many drops hollow out a stone.

Reply to Objection 3: Man advances in the way to God, not merely by actual increase of charity, but also by being disposed to that increase.

Whether charity increases indefinitely?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not increase indefinitely. For every movement is towards some end and term, as stated in Metaph. ii, text.

8,9. But the increase of charity is a movement. Therefore it tends to an end and term. Therefore charity does not increase indefinitely.

Objection 2: Further, no form surpasses the capacity of its subject. But the capacity of the rational creature who is the subject of charity is finite. Therefore charity cannot increase indefinitely.

Objection 3: Further, every finite thing can, by continual increase, attain to the quantity of another finite thing however much greater, unless the amount of its increase be ever less and less. Thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, 6) that if we divide a line into an indefinite number of parts, and take these parts away and add them indefinitely to another line, we shall never arrive at any definite quantity resulting from those two lines, viz. the one from which we subtracted and the one to which we added what was subtracted. But this does not occur in the case in point: because there is no need for the second increase of charity to be less than the first, since rather is it probable that it would be equal or greater. As, therefore, the charity of the blessed is something finite, if the charity of the wayfarer can increase indefinitely, it would follow that the charity of the way can equal the charity of heaven; which is absurd. Therefore the wayfarer's charity cannot increase indefinitely.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may, by any means apprehend," on which words a gloss says: "Even if he has made great progress, let none of the faithful say: 'Enough.' For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more.

I answer that, A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the form itself having a fixed measure, and when this has been reached it is no longer possible to go any further in that form, but if any further advance is made, another form is attained. And example of this is paleness, the bounds of which may, by continual alteration, be passed, either so that whiteness ensues, or so that blackness results. Secondly, on the part of the agent, whose power does not extend to a further increase of the form in its subject. Thirdly, on the part of the subject, which is not capable of ulterior perfection.

Now, in none of these ways, is a limit imposed to the increase of man's charity, while he is in the state of the wayfarer. For charity itself considered as such has no limit to its increase, since it is a participation of the infinite charity which is the Holy Ghost. In like manner the cause of the increase of charity, viz. God, is possessed of infinite power. Furthermore, on the part of its subject, no limit to this increase can be determined, because whenever charity increases, there is a corresponding increased ability to receive a further increase. It is therefore evident that it is not possible to fix any limits to the increase of charity in this life.

Reply to Objection 1: The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life.

Reply to Objection 2: The capacity of the rational creature is increased by charity, because the heart is enlarged thereby, according to 2 Cor. 6:11: "Our heart is enlarged"; so that it still remains capable of receiving a further increase.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in those things which have the same kind of quantity, but not in those which have different kinds: thus however much a line may increase it does not reach the quantity of a superficies. Now the quantity of a wayfarer's charity which follows the knowledge of faith is not of the same kind as the quantity of the charity of the blessed, which follows open vision. Hence the argument does not prove.

Whether charity can be perfect in this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity cannot be perfect in this life. For this would have been the case with the apostles before all others. Yet it was not so, since the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): "Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect." Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "whatever kindles charity quenches cupidity, but where charity is perfect, cupidity is done away altogether." But this cannot be in this world, wherein it is impossible to live without sin, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now all sin arises from some inordinate cupidity. Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

Objection 3: Further, what is already perfect cannot be perfected any more. But in this life charity can always increase, as stated above [2520] (A[7]). Therefore charity cannot be perfect in this life.

On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) “Charity is perfected by being strengthened; and when it has been brought to perfection, it exclaims, ‘I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.’” Now this is possible in this life, as in the case of Paul. Therefore charity can be perfect in this life.

I answer that, The perfection of charity may be understood in two ways: first with regard to the object loved, secondly with regard to the person who loves. With regard to the object loved, charity is perfect, if the object be loved as much as it is lovable. Now God is as lovable as He is good, and His goodness is infinite, wherefore He is infinitely lovable. But no creature can love Him infinitely since all created power is finite. Consequently no creature’s charity can be perfect in this way; the charity of God alone can, whereby He loves Himself.

On the part of the person who loves, charity is perfect, when he loves as much as he can. This happens in three ways. First, so that a man’s whole heart is always actually borne towards God: this is the perfection of the charity of heaven, and is not possible in this life, wherein, by reason of the weakness of human life, it is impossible to think always actually of God, and to be moved by love towards Him. Secondly, so that man makes an earnest endeavor to give his time to God and Divine things, while scorning other things except in so far as the needs of the present life demand. This is the perfection of charity that is possible to a wayfarer; but is not common to all who have charity. Thirdly, so that a man gives his whole heart to God habitually, viz. by neither thinking nor desiring anything contrary to the love of God; and this perfection is common to all who have charity.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle denies that he has the perfection of heaven, wherefore a gloss on the same passage says that “he was a perfect wayfarer, but had not yet achieved the perfection to which the way leads.”

Reply to Objection 2: This is said on account of venial sins, which are contrary, not to the habit, but to the act of charity: hence they are incompatible, not with the perfection of the way, but with that of heaven.

Reply to Objection 3: The perfection of the way is not perfection simply, wherefore it can always increase.

Whether charity is rightly distinguished into three degrees, beginning, progress, and perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three degrees of charity, beginning, progress, and perfection. For there are many degrees between the beginning of charity and its ultimate perfection. Therefore it is not right to put only one.

Objection 2: Further, charity begins to progress as soon as it begins to be. Therefore we ought not to distinguish between charity as progressing and as beginning.

Objection 3: Further, in this world, however perfect a man's charity may be, it can increase, as stated above [2521](A[7]). Now for charity to increase is to progress. Therefore perfect charity ought not to be distinguished from progressing charity: and so the aforesaid degrees are unsuitably assigned to charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. v) "As soon as charity is born it takes food," which refers to beginners, "after taking food, it waxes strong," which refers to those who are progressing, "and when it has become strong it is perfected," which refers to the perfect. Therefore there are three degrees of charity.

I answer that, The spiritual increase of charity may be considered in respect of a certain likeness to the growth of the human body. For although this latter growth may be divided into many parts, yet it has certain fixed divisions according to those particular actions or pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth. Thus we speak of a man being an infant until he has the use of reason, after which we distinguish another state of man wherein he begins to speak and to use his reason, while there is again a third state, that of puberty when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfection.

In like manner the divers degrees of charity are distinguished according to the different pursuits to which man is brought by the increase of charity. For at first it is incumbent on man to occupy himself chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting his concupiscences, which move him in opposition to charity: this concerns beginners, in whom charity has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed: in the second place man's chief pursuit is to aim at progress in good, and this is the pursuit of the proficient, whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it: while man's third pursuit is to aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God: this belongs to the perfect who "desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ."

In like manner we observe in local motion that at first there is withdrawal from one term, then approach to the other term, and thirdly, rest in this term.

Reply to Objection 1: All these distinct degrees which can be discerned in the increase of charity, are comprised in the aforesaid three, even as every division of continuous things is included in these three—the beginning, the middle, and the end, as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, 1).

Reply to Objection 2: Although those who are beginners in charity may progress, yet the chief care that besets them is to resist the sins which disturb them by their onslaught. Afterwards, however, when they come to feel this onslaught less, they begin to tend to perfection with greater security; yet with one hand doing the work, and with the other holding the sword as related in 2 Esdr 4:17 about those who built up Jerusalem.

Reply to Objection 3: Even the perfect make progress in charity: yet this is not their chief care, but their aim is principally directed towards union with God. And though both the beginner and the proficient seek this, yet their solicitude is chiefly about other things, with the beginner, about avoiding sin, with the proficient, about progressing in virtue.

Whether charity can decrease?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity can decrease. For contraries by their nature affect the same subject. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since then charity increases, as stated above [2522](A[4]), it seems that it can also decrease.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine, speaking to God, says (Confess. x) “He loves Thee less, who loves aught besides Thee”: and (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) he says that “what kindles charity quenches cupidity.” For this it seems to follow that, on the contrary, what arouses cupidity quenches charity. But cupidity, whereby a man loves something besides God, can increase in man. Therefore charity can decrease.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) “God makes the just man, by justifying him, but in such a way, that if the man turns away from God, he no longer retains the effect of the Divine operation.” From this we may gather that when God preserves charity in man, He works in the same way as when He first infuses charity into him. Now at the first infusion of charity God infuses less charity into him that prepares himself less. Therefore also in preserving charity, He preserves less charity in him that prepares himself less. Therefore charity can decrease.

On the contrary, In Scripture, charity is compared to fire, according to Cant 8:6: “The lamps thereof,” i.e. of charity, “are fire and flames.” Now fire ever mounts upward so long as it lasts. Therefore as long as charity endures, it can ascend, but cannot descend, i.e. decrease.

I answer that, The quantity which charity has in comparison with its proper object, cannot decrease, even as neither can it increase, as stated above (A[4], ad 2).

Since, however, it increases in that quantity which it has in comparison with its subject, here is the place to consider whether it can decrease in this way. Now, if it decrease, this must needs be either through an act, or by the mere cessation from act. It is true that virtues acquired through acts decrease and sometimes cease altogether through cessation from act, as stated above ([2523]FS, Q[53], A[3]). Wherefore the Philosopher says, in reference to friendship (Ethic. viii, 5) “that want of intercourse,” i.e. the neglect to call upon or speak with one’s friends, “has destroyed many a friendship.” Now this is because the safe-keeping of a thing depends on its cause, and the cause of human virtue is a human act, so that when human acts cease, the virtue acquired thereby decreases and at last ceases altogether. Yet this does not occur to charity, because it is not the result of human acts, but is caused by God alone, as stated above [2524](A[2]). Hence it follows that even when its act ceases, it does not for this reason decrease, or cease altogether, unless the cessation involves a sin.

The consequence is that a decrease of charity cannot be caused except either by God or by some sinful act. Now no defect is caused in us by God, except by way of punishment, in so far as He withdraws His grace in punishment of sin. Hence He does not diminish charity except by way of punishment: and this punishment is due on account of sin.

It follows, therefore, that if charity decrease, the cause of this decrease must be sin either effectively or by way of merit. But mortal sin does not diminish charity, in either of these ways, but destroys it entirely, both effectively, because every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as we shall state further on [2525](A[12]), and by way of merit, since when, by sinning mortally, a man acts against charity, he deserves that God should withdraw charity from him.

In like manner, neither can venial sin diminish charity either effectively or by way of merit. Not effectively, because it does not touch charity, since charity is about the last end, whereas venial sin is a disorder about things directed to the end: and a man's love for the end is none the less through his committing an inordinate act as regards the things directed to the end. Thus sick people sometimes, though they love health much, are irregular in keeping to their diet: and thus again, in speculative sciences, the false opinions that are derived from the principles, do not diminish the certitude of the principles. So too, venial sin does not merit diminution of charity; for when a man offends in a small matter he does not deserve to be mulcted in a great matter. For God does not turn away from man, more than man turns away from Him: wherefore he that is out of order in respect of things directed to the end, does not deserve to be mulcted in charity whereby he is ordered to the last end.

The consequence is that charity can by no means be diminished, if we speak of direct causality, yet whatever disposes to its corruption may be said to conduce indirectly to its diminution, and such are venial sins, or even the cessation from the practice of works of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Contraries affect the same subject when that subject stands in equal relation to both. But charity does not stand in equal relation to increase and decrease. For it can have a cause of increase, but not of decrease, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Cupidity is twofold, one whereby man places his end in creatures, and this kills charity altogether, since it is its poison, as Augustine states (Confess. x). This makes us love God less (i.e. less than we ought to love Him by charity), not indeed by diminishing charity but by destroying it altogether. It is thus that we must understand the saying: “He loves Thee less, who loves aught beside Thee,” for he adds these words, “which he loveth not for Thee.” This does not apply to venial sin, but only to mortal sin: since that which we love in venial sin, is loved for God's sake habitually though not actually. There is another cupidity, that of venial sin, which is always diminished by charity: and yet this cupidity cannot diminish charity, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 3: A movement of the free-will is requisite in the infusion of charity, as stated above ([2526]FS, Q[113], A[3]). Wherefore that which diminishes the intensity of the free-will conduces dispositively to a diminution in the charity to be infused. On the other hand, no movement of the free-will is required for the safe-keeping of charity, else it would not remain inn us while we sleep. Hence charity does not decrease on account of an obstacle on the part of the intensity of the free-will's movement.

Whether we can lose charity when once we have it?

Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who has charity cannot sin, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God, committeth not sin; for His seed abideth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God." But none save the children of God have charity, for it is this which distinguishes "the children of God from the children of perdition," as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17). Therefore he that has charity cannot lose it.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 7) that "if love be not true, it should not be called love." Now, as he says again in a letter to Count Julian, "charity which can fail was never true." [*The quotation is from De Salutaribus Documentis ad quemdam comitem, vii., among the works of Paul of Friuli, more commonly known as Paul the Deacon, a monk of Monte Cassino.] Therefore it was no charity at all. Therefore, when once we have charity, we cannot lose it.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx) that "God's love works great things where it is; if it ceases to work it is not charity." Now no man loses charity by doing great things. Therefore if charity be there, it cannot be lost.

Objection 4: Further, the free-will is not inclined to sin unless by some motive for sinning. Now charity excludes all motives for sinning, both self-love and cupidity, and all such things. Therefore charity cannot be lost.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 2:4): "I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first charity."

I answer that, The Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, as shown above [2527](A[2]; QQ[23],24). We can, accordingly, consider charity in three ways: first on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who moves the soul to love God, and in this respect charity is incompatible with sin through the power of the Holy Ghost, Who does unfailingly whatever He wills to do. Hence it is impossible for these two things to be true at the same time—that the Holy Ghost should will to move a certain man to an act of charity, and that this man, by sinning, should lose charity. For the gift of perseverance is reckoned among the blessings of God whereby "whoever is delivered, is most certainly delivered," as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the saints (De Dono Persev. xiv).

Secondly, charity may be considered as such, and thus it is incapable of anything that is against its nature. Wherefore charity cannot sin at all, even as neither can heat cool, nor unrighteousness do good, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24).

Thirdly, charity can be considered on the part of its subject, which is changeable on account of the free-will. Moreover charity may be compared with this subject, both from the general point of view of form in comparison with matter, and from the specific point of view of habit as compared with power. Now it is natural for a form to be in its subject in such a way that it can be lost, when it does not entirely fill the potentiality of matter: this is evident in the forms of things generated and corrupted, because the matter of such things receives one form in such a way, that it retains the potentiality to another form, as though its potentiality were not completely satisfied with the one form. Hence the one form may be lost by the other being received. On the other hand the form of a celestial body which entirely fills the potentiality of its matter, so that the latter does not retain the potentiality to another form, is in its subject inseparably. Accordingly the charity of the blessed, because it entirely fills the potentiality of the rational mind, since every actual movement of that mind is directed to God, is possessed by its subject inseparably: whereas the charity of the wayfarer does not so fill the potentiality of its subject, because the latter is not always actually directed to God: so that when it is not actually directed to God, something may occur whereby charity is lost.

It is proper to a habit to incline a power to act, and this belongs to a habit, in so far as it makes whatever is suitable to it, to seem good, and whatever is unsuitable, to seem evil. For as the taste judges of savors according to its disposition, even so does the human mind judge of things to be done, according to its habitual disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that “such as a man is, so does the end appear to him.” Accordingly charity is inseparable from its possessor, where that which pertains to charity cannot appear otherwise than good, and that is in heaven, where God is seen in His Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. Therefore the charity of heaven cannot be lost, whereas the charity of the way can, because in this state God is not seen in His Essence, which is the essence of goodness.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks from the point of view of the power of the Holy Ghost, by Whose safeguarding, those whom He wills to move are rendered immune from sin, as much as He wills.

Reply to Objection 2: The charity which can fail by reason of itself is no true charity; for this would be the case, were its love given only for a time, and afterwards were to cease, which would be inconsistent with true love. If, however, charity be lost through the changeableness of the subject, and against the purpose of charity included in its act, this is not contrary to true charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The love of God ever works great things in its purpose, which is essential to charity; but it does not always work great things in its act, on account of the condition of its subject.

Reply to Objection 4: Charity by reason of its act excludes every motive for sinning. But it happens sometimes that charity is not acting actually, and then it is possible for a motive to intervene for sinning, and if we consent to this motive, we lose charity.

Whether charity is lost through one mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not lost through one mortal sin. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): “When a man who has mounted to the stage of perfection, is satiated, I do not think that he will become empty or fall away suddenly; but he must needs do so gradually and by little and little.” But man falls away by losing charity. Therefore charity is not lost through only one mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo in a sermon on the Passion (60) addresses Peter thus: “Our Lord saw in thee not a conquered faith, not an averted love, but constancy shaken. Tears abounded where love never failed, and the words uttered in trepidation were washed away by the fount of charity.” From this Bernard [*William of St. Thierry, De Nat. et Dig. Amoris. vi.] drew his assertion that “charity in Peter was not quenched, but cooled.” But Peter sinned mortally in denying Christ. Therefore charity is not lost through one mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, charity is stronger than an acquired virtue. Now a habit of acquired virtue is not destroyed by one contrary sinful act. Much less, therefore, is charity destroyed by one contrary mortal sin.

Objection 4: Further, charity denotes love of God and our neighbor. Now, seemingly, one may commit a mortal sin, and yet retain the love of God and one’s neighbor; because an inordinate affection for things directed to the end, does not remove the love for the end, as stated above (A[10]). Therefore charity towards God can endure, though there be a mortal sin through an inordinate affection for some temporal good.

Objection 5: Further, the object of a theological virtue is the last end. Now the other theological virtues, namely faith and hope, are not done away by one mortal sin, in fact they remain though lifeless. Therefore charity can remain without a form, even when a mortal sin has been committed.

On the contrary, By mortal sin man becomes deserving of eternal death, according to Rom. 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.” On the other hand whoever has charity is deserving of eternal life, for it is written (Jn. 14:21): “He that loveth Me, shall be loved by My Father: and I will love Him, and will manifest Myself to him,” in which manifestation everlasting life consists, according to Jn. 17:3: “This is eternal life; that they may know Thee the . . . true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent.” Now no man can be worthy, at the same time, of eternal life and of eternal death. Therefore it is impossible for a man to have charity with a mortal sin. Therefore charity is destroyed by one mortal sin.

I answer that, That one contrary is removed by the other contrary supervening. Now every mortal sin is contrary to charity by its very nature, which consists in man’s loving God above all things, and subjecting himself to Him entirely, by referring all that is his to God. It is therefore essential to charity that man should so love God as to wish to submit to Him in all things, and always to follow the rule of His commandments; since whatever is contrary to His commandments is manifestly contrary to charity, and therefore by its very nature is capable of destroying charity.

If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. Now the endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes the acquired habit is not at once done away. But charity, being an infused habit, depends on the action of God Who infuses it, Who stands in relation to the infusion and safekeeping of charity, as the sun does to the diffusion of light in the air, as stated above (A[10], OBJ 3). Consequently, just as the light would cease at once in the air, were an obstacle placed to its being lit up by the sun, even so charity ceases at once to be in the soul through the placing of an obstacle to the outpouring of charity by God into the soul.

Now it is evident that through every mortal sin which is contrary to God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity, since from the very fact that a man chooses to prefer sin to God's friendship, which requires that we should obey His will, it follows that the habit of charity is lost at once through one mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "man is enlightened by God's presence, but he is darkened at once by God's absence, because distance from Him is effected not by change of place but by aversion of the will."

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Origen may be understood, in one way, that a man who is in the state of perfection, does not suddenly go so far as to commit a mortal sin, but is disposed thereto by some previous negligence, for which reason venial sins are said to be dispositions to mortal sin, as stated above ([2528]FS, Q[88], A[3]). Nevertheless he falls, and loses charity through the one mortal sin if he commits it.

Since, however, he adds: "If some slight slip should occur, and he recover himself quickly he does not appear to fall altogether," we may reply in another way, that when he speaks of a man being emptied and falling away altogether, he means one who falls so as to sin through malice; and this does not occur in a perfect man all at once.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity may be lost in two ways; first, directly, by actual contempt, and, in this way, Peter did not lose charity. Secondly, indirectly, when a sin is committed against charity, through some passion of desire or fear; it was by sinning against charity in this way, that Peter lost charity; yet he soon recovered it.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: Not every inordinate affection for things directed to the end, i.e., for created goods, constitutes a mortal sin, but only such as is directly contrary to the Divine will; and then the inordinate affection is contrary to charity, as stated.

Reply to Objection 5: Charity denotes union with God, whereas faith and hope do not. Now every mortal sin consists in aversion from God, as stated above (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12). Consequently every moral sin is contrary to charity, but not to faith and hope, but only certain determinate sins, which destroy the habit of faith or of hope, even as charity is destroyed by every moral sin. Hence it is evident that charity cannot remain lifeless, since it is itself the ultimate form regarding God under the aspect of last end as stated above ([2529]Q[23], A[8]).

OF THE OBJECT OF CHARITY (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of charity; which consideration will be twofold: (1) The things we ought to love out of charity: (2) The order in which they ought to be loved. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether we should love God alone, out of charity, or should we love our neighbor also?

(2) Whether charity should be loved out of charity?

(3) Whether irrational creatures ought to be loved out of charity?

(4) Whether one may love oneself out of charity?

(5) Whether one’s own body?

(6) Whether sinners should be loved out of charity?

(7) Whether sinners love themselves?

(8) Whether we should love our enemies out of charity?

(9) Whether we are bound to show them tokens of friendship?

(10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?

(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?

(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity.

Whether the love of charity stops at God, or extends to our neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that the love of charity stops at God and does not extend to our neighbor. For as we owe God love, so do we owe Him fear, according Dt. 10:12: “And now Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear . . . and love Him?” Now the fear with which we fear man, and which is called human fear, is distinct from the fear with which we fear God, and which is either servile or filial, as is evident from what has been stated above ([2530]Q[10], A[2]). Therefore also the love with which we love God, is distinct from the love with which we love our neighbor.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that “to be loved is to be honored.” Now the honor due to God, which is known as “latria,” is distinct from the honor due to a creature, and known as “dulia.” Therefore again the love wherewith we love God, is distinct from that with which we love our neighbor.

Objection 3: Further, hope begets charity, as a gloss states on Mat. 1:2. Now hope is so due to God that it is reprehensible to hope in man, according to Jer. 17:5: “Cursed be the man that trusteth in man.” Therefore charity is so due to God, as not to extend to our neighbor.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): “This commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[17], A[6]; Q[19], A[3]; [2531]FS, Q[54], A[3]) habits are not differentiated except their acts be of different species. For every act of the one species belongs to the same habit. Now since the species of an act is derived from its object, considered under its formal aspect, it follows of necessity that it is specifically the same act that tends to an aspect of the object, and that tends to the object under that aspect: thus it is specifically the same visual act whereby we see the light, and whereby we see the color under the aspect of light.

Now the aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved, is God, since what we ought to love in our neighbor is that he may be in God. Hence it is clear that it is specifically the same act whereby we love God, and whereby we love our neighbor. Consequently the habit of charity extends not only to the love of God, but also to the love of our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: We may fear our neighbor, even as we may love him, in two ways: first, on account of something that is proper to him, as when a man fears a tyrant on account of his cruelty, or loves him by reason of his own desire to get something from him. Such like human fear is distinct from the fear of God, and the same applies to love. Secondly, we fear a man, or love him on account of what he has of God; as when we fear the secular power by reason of its exercising the ministry of God for the punishment of evildoers, and love it for its justice: such like fear of man is not distinct from fear of God, as neither is such like love.

Reply to Objection 2: Love regards good in general, whereas honor regards the honored person’s own good, for it is given to a person in recognition of his own virtue. Hence love is not differentiated specifically on account of the various degrees of goodness in various persons, so long as it is referred to one good common to all, whereas honor is distinguished according to the good belonging to individuals. Consequently we love all our neighbors with the same love of charity, in so far as they are referred to one good common to them all, which is God; whereas we give various honors to various people, according to each one’s own virtue, and likewise to God we give the singular honor of latria on account of His singular virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to hope in man as though he were the principal author of salvation, but not, to hope in man as helping us ministerially under God. In like manner it would be wrong if a man loved his neighbor as though he were his last end, but not, if he loved him for God’s sake; and this is what charity does.

Whether we should love charity out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity need not be loved out of charity. For the things to be loved out of charity are contained in the two precepts of charity (Mat. 22:37–39): and neither of them includes charity, since charity is neither God nor our neighbor. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, charity is founded on the fellowship of happiness, as stated above ([2532]Q[23], A[1]). But charity cannot participate in happiness. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

Objection 3: Further, charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ([2533]Q[23], A[1]). But no man can have friendship for charity or for an accident, since such things cannot return love for love, which is essential to friendship, as stated in Ethic. viii. Therefore charity need not be loved out of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 8): “He that loves his neighbor, must, in consequence, love love itself.” But we love our neighbor out of charity. Therefore it follows that charity also is loved out of charity.

I answer that, Charity is love. Now love, by reason of the nature of the power whose act it is, is capable of reflecting on itself; for since the object of the will is the universal good, whatever has the aspect of good, can be the object of an act of the will: and since to will is itself a good, man can will himself to will. Even so the intellect, whose object is the true, understands that it understands, because this again is something true. Love, however, even by reason of its own species, is capable of reflecting on itself, because it is a spontaneous movement of the lover towards the beloved, wherefore from the moment a man loves, he loves himself to love.

Yet charity is not love simply, but has the nature of friendship, as stated above ([2534]Q[23], A[1]). Now by friendship a thing is loved in two ways: first, as the friend for whom we have friendship, and to whom we wish good things: secondly, as the good which we wish to a friend. It is in the latter and not in the former way that charity is loved out of charity, because charity is the good which we desire for all those whom we love out of charity. The same applies to happiness, and to the other virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: God and our neighbor are those with whom we are friends, but love of them includes the loving of charity, since we love both God and our neighbor, in so far as we love ourselves and our neighbor to love God, and this is to love charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity is itself the fellowship of the spiritual life, whereby we arrive at happiness: hence it is loved as the good which we desire for all whom we love out of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers friendship as referred to those with whom we are friends.

Whether irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that irrational creatures also ought to be loved out of charity. For it is chiefly by charity that we are conformed to God. Now God loves irrational creatures out of charity, for He loves "all things that are" (Wis. 11:25), and whatever He loves, He loves by Himself Who is charity. Therefore we also should love irrational creatures out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, charity is referred to God principally, and extends to other things as referable to God. Now just as the rational creature is referable to God, in as much as it bears the resemblance of image, so too, are the irrational creatures, in as much as they bear the resemblance of a trace [*Cf. [2535]FP, Q[45], A[7]]. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.

Objection 3: Further, just as the object of charity is God. so is the object of faith. Now faith extends to irrational creatures, since we believe that heaven and earth were created by God, that the fishes and birds were brought forth out of the waters, and animals that walk, and plants, out of the earth. Therefore charity extends also to irrational creatures.

On the contrary, The love of charity extends to none but God and our neighbor. But the word neighbor cannot be extended to irrational creatures, since they have no fellowship with man in the rational life. Therefore charity does not extend to irrational creatures.

I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([2536]Q[13], A[1]) charity is a kind of friendship. Now the love of friendship is twofold: first, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be loved out of charity; and for three reasons. Two of these reasons refer in a general way to friendship, which cannot have an irrational creature for its object: first because friendship is towards one to whom we wish good things, while, properly speaking, we cannot wish good things to an irrational creature, because it is not competent, properly speaking, to possess good, this being proper to the rational creature which, through its free-will, is the master of its disposal of the good it possesses. Hence the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 6) that we do not speak of good or evil befalling such like things, except metaphorically. Secondly, because all friendship is based on some fellowship in life; since "nothing is so proper to friendship as to live together," as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. viii, 5). Now irrational creatures can have no fellowship in human life which is regulated by reason. Hence friendship with irrational creatures is impossible, except metaphorically speaking. The third reason is proper to charity, for charity is based on the fellowship of everlasting happiness, to which the irrational creature cannot attain. Therefore we cannot have the friendship of charity towards an irrational creature.

Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use; thus too does God love them out of charity.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness by way of trace does not confer the capacity for everlasting life, whereas the likeness of image does: and so the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Faith can extend to all that is in any way true, whereas the friendship of charity extends only to such things as have a natural capacity for everlasting life; wherefore the comparison fails.

Whether a man ought to love himself out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to love himself out of charity. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xvii) that there "can be no charity between less than two." Therefore no man has charity towards himself.

Objection 2: Further, friendship, by its very nature, implies mutual love and equality (Ethic. viii, 2,7), which cannot be of one man towards himself. But charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ([2537]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore a man cannot have charity towards himself.

Objection 3: Further, anything relating to charity cannot be blameworthy, since charity "dealeth not perversely" (1 Cor. 23:4). Now a man deserves to be blamed for loving himself, since it is written (2 Tim. 3:1,2): "In the last days shall come dangerous times, men shall be lovers of themselves." Therefore a man cannot love himself out of charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18): "Thou shalt love thy friend as thyself." Now we love our friends out of charity. Therefore we should love ourselves too out of charity.

I answer that, Since charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ([2538]Q[23], A[1]), we may consider charity from two standpoints: first, under the general notion of friendship, and in this way we must hold that, properly speaking, a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "love is a unitive force," whereas a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in Ethic. ix, 4,8, that "the origin of friendly relations with others lies in our relations to ourselves." Thus too with regard to principles we have something greater than science, namely understanding.

Secondly, we may speak of charity in respect of its specific nature, namely as denoting man's friendship with God in the first place, and, consequently, with the things of God, among which things is man himself who has charity. Hence, among these other things which he loves out of charity because they pertain to God, he loves also himself out of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory speaks there of charity under the general notion of friendship: and the Second Objection is to be taken in the same sense.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who love themselves are to be blamed, in so far as they love themselves as regards their sensitive nature, which they humor. This is not to love oneself truly according to one's rational nature, so as to desire for oneself the good things which pertain to the perfection of reason: and in this way chiefly it is through charity that a man loves himself.

Whether a man ought to love his body out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to love his body out of charity. For we do not love one with whom we are unwilling to associate. But those who have charity shun the society of the body, according to Rom. 7:24: "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" and Phil. 1:23: "Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ." Therefore our bodies are not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, the friendship of charity is based on fellowship in the enjoyment of God. But the body can have no share in that enjoyment. Therefore the body is not to be loved out of charity.

Objection 3: Further, since charity is a kind of friendship it is towards those who are capable of loving in return. But our body cannot love us out of charity. Therefore it should not be loved out of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23,26) that there are four things that we should love out of charity, and among them he reckons our own body.

I answer that, Our bodies can be considered in two ways: first, in respect of their nature, secondly, in respect of the corruption of sin and its punishment.

Now the nature of our body was created, not by an evil principle, as the Manicheans pretend, but by God. Hence we can use it for God's service, according to Rom. 6:13: "Present . . . your members as instruments of justice unto God." Consequently, out of the love of charity with which we love God, we ought to love our bodies also, but we ought not to love the evil effects of sin and the corruption of punishment; we ought rather, by the desire of charity, to long for the removal of such things.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle did not shrink from the society of his body, as regards the nature of the body, in fact in this respect he was loth to be deprived thereof, according to 2 Cor. 5:4: "We would not be unclothed, but clothed over." He did, however, wish to escape from the taint of concupiscence, which remains in the body, and from the corruption of the body which weighs down the soul, so as to hinder it from seeing God. Hence he says expressly: "From the body of this death."

Reply to Objection 2: Although our bodies are unable to enjoy God by knowing and loving Him, yet by the works which we do through the body, we are able to attain to the perfect knowledge of God. Hence from the enjoyment in the soul there overflows a certain happiness into the body, viz., “the flush of health and incorruption,” as Augustine states (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii). Hence, since the body has, in a fashion, a share of happiness, it can be loved with the love of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: Mutual love is found in the friendship which is for another, but not in that which a man has for himself, either in respect of his soul, or in respect of his body.

Whether we ought to love sinners out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love sinners out of charity. For it is written (Ps. 118:113): “I have hated the unjust.” But David had perfect charity. Therefore sinners should be hated rather than loved, out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, “love is proved by deeds” as Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx). But good men do no works of the unjust: on the contrary, they do such as would appear to be works of hate, according to Ps. 100:8: “In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land”: and God commanded (Ex. 22:18): “Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live.” Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.

Objection 3: Further, it is part of friendship that one should desire and wish good things for one’s friends. Now the saints, out of charity, desire evil things for the wicked, according to Ps. 9:18: “May the wicked be turned into hell [*Douay and A. V.: ‘The wicked shall be,’ etc. See Reply to this Objection.].” Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.

Objection 4: Further, it is proper to friends to rejoice in, and will the same things. Now charity does not make us will what sinners will, nor to rejoice in what gives them joy, but rather the contrary. Therefore sinners should not be loved out of charity.

Objection 5: Further, it is proper to friends to associate together, according to Ethic. viii. But we ought not to associate with sinners, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: “Go ye out from among them.” Therefore we should not love sinners out of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30) that “when it is said: ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor,’ it is evident that we ought to look upon every man as our neighbor.” Now sinners do not cease to be men, for sin does not destroy nature. Therefore we ought to love sinners out of charity.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the sinner: his nature and his guilt. According to his nature, which he has from God, he has a capacity for happiness, on the fellowship of which charity is based, as stated above [2539](A[3]; Q[23], AA[1],5), wherefore we ought to love sinners, out of charity, in respect of their nature.

On the other hand their guilt is opposed to God, and is an obstacle to happiness. Wherefore, in respect of their guilt whereby they are opposed to God, all sinners are to be hated, even one’s father or mother or kindred, according to Lk. 12:26. For it is our duty to hate, in the sinner, his being a sinner, and to love in him, his being a man capable of bliss; and this is to love him truly, out of charity, for God’s sake.

Reply to Objection 1: The prophet hated the unjust, as such, and the object of his hate was their injustice, which was their evil. Such hatred is perfect, of which he himself says (Ps. 138:22): “I have hated them with a perfect hatred.” Now hatred of a person’s evil is equivalent to love of his good. Hence also this perfect hatred belongs to charity.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ix, 3), when our friends fall into sin, we ought not to deny them the amenities of friendship, so long as there is hope of their mending their ways, and we ought to help them more readily to regain virtue than to recover money, had they lost it, for as much as virtue is more akin than money to friendship. When, however, they fall into very great wickedness, and become incurable, we ought no longer to show them friendliness. It is for this reason that both Divine and human laws command such like sinners to be put to death, because there is greater likelihood of their harming others than of their mending their ways. Nevertheless the judge puts this into effect, not out of hatred for the sinners, but out of the love of charity, by reason of which he prefers the public good to the life of the individual. Moreover the death inflicted by the judge profits the sinner, if he be converted, unto the expiation of his crime; and, if he be not converted, it profits so as to put an end to the sin, because the sinner is thus deprived of the power to sin any more.

Reply to Objection 3: Such like imprecations which we come across in Holy Writ, may be understood in three ways: first, by way of prediction, not by way of wish, so that the sense is: “May the wicked be,” that is, “The wicked shall be, turned into hell.” Secondly, by way of wish, yet so that the desire of the wisher is not referred to the man’s punishment, but to the justice of the punisher, according to Ps. 57:11: “The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,” since, according to Wis. 1:13, not even God “hath pleasure in the destruction of the wicked [Vulg.: ‘living’]” when He punishes them, but He rejoices in His justice, according to Ps. 10:8: “The Lord is just and hath loved justice.” Thirdly, so that this desire is referred to the removal of the sin, and not to the punishment itself, to the effect, namely, that the sin be destroyed, but that the man may live.

Reply to Objection 4: We love sinners out of charity, not so as to will what they will, or to rejoice in what gives them joy, but so as to make them will what we will, and rejoice in what rejoices us. Hence it is written (Jer. 15:19): “They shall be turned to thee, and thou shalt not to be turned to them.”

Reply to Objection 5: The weak should avoid associating with sinners, on account of the danger in which they stand of being perverted by them. But it is commendable for the perfect, of whose perversion there is no fear, to associate with sinners that they may convert them. For thus did Our Lord eat and drink with sinners as related by Mat. 9:11–13. Yet all should avoid the society of sinners, as regards fellowship in sin; in this sense it is written (2 Cor. 6:17): “Go out from among them . . . and touch not the unclean thing,” i.e. by consenting to sin.

Whether sinners love themselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that sinners love themselves. For that which is the principle of sin, is most of all in the sinner. Now love of self is the principle of sin, since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that it “builds up the city of Babylon.” Therefore sinners most of all love themselves.

Objection 2: Further, sin does not destroy nature. Now it is in keeping with nature that every man should love himself: wherefore even irrational creatures naturally desire their own good, for instance, the preservation of their being, and so forth. Therefore sinners love themselves.

Objection 3: Further, good is beloved by all, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now many sinners reckon themselves to be good. Therefore many sinners love themselves.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:6): “He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul.”

I answer that, Love of self is common to all, in one way; in another way it is proper to the good; in a third way, it is proper to the wicked. For it is common to all for each one to love what he thinks himself to be. Now a man is said to be a thing, in two ways: first, in respect of his substance and nature, and, this way all think themselves to be what they are, that is, composed of a soul and body. In this way too, all men, both good and wicked, love themselves, in so far as they love their own preservation.

Secondly, a man is said to be something in respect of some predominance, as the sovereign of a state is spoken of as being the state, and so, what the sovereign does, the state is said to do. In this way, all do not think themselves to be what they are. For the reasoning mind is the predominant part of man, while the sensitive and corporeal nature takes the second place, the former of which the Apostle calls the “inward man,” and the latter, the “outward man” (2 Cor. 4:16). Now the good look upon their rational nature or the inward man as being the chief thing in them, wherefore in this way they think themselves to be what they are. On the other hand, the wicked reckon their sensitive and corporeal nature, or the outward man, to hold the first place. Wherefore, since they know not themselves aright, they do not love themselves aright, but love what they think themselves to be. But the good know themselves truly, and therefore truly love themselves.

The Philosopher proves this from five things that are proper to friendship. For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good, all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing.

On the other hand, the wicked have no wish to be preserved in the integrity of the inward man, nor do they desire spiritual goods for him, nor do they work for that end, nor do they take pleasure in their own company by entering into their own hearts, because whatever they find there, present, past and future, is evil and horrible; nor do they agree with themselves, on account of the gnawings of conscience, according to Ps. 49:21: “I will reprove thee and set before thy face.”

In the same manner it may be shown that the wicked love themselves, as regards the corruption of the outward man, whereas the good do not love themselves thus.

Reply to Objection 1: The love of self which is the principle of sin is that which is proper to the wicked, and reaches “to the contempt of God,” as stated in the passage quoted, because the wicked so desire external goods as to despise spiritual goods.

Reply to Objection 2: Although natural love is not altogether forfeited by wicked men, yet it is perverted in them, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The wicked have some share of self-love, in so far as they think themselves good. Yet such love of self is not true but apparent: and even this is not possible in those who are very wicked.

Whether charity requires that we should love our enemies?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that “this great good,” namely, the love of our enemies, is “not so universal in its application, as the object of our petition when we say: Forgive us our trespasses.” Now no one is forgiven sin without he have charity, because, according to Prov. 10:12, “charity covereth all sins.” Therefore charity does not require that we should love our enemies.

Objection 2: Further, charity does not do away with nature. Now everything, even an irrational being, naturally hates its contrary, as a lamb hates a wolf, and water fire. Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.

Objection 3: Further, charity “doth nothing perversely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Now it seems perverse to love one’s enemies, as it would be to hate one’s friends: hence Joab upbraided David by saying (2 Kings 19:6): “Thou lovest them that hate thee, and thou hatest them that love thee.” Therefore charity does not make us love our enemies.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 4:44): “Love your enemies.”

I answer that, Love of one’s enemies may be understood in three ways. First, as though we were to love our enemies as such: this is perverse, and contrary to charity, since it implies love of that which is evil in another.

Secondly love of one’s enemies may mean that we love them as to their nature, but in general: and in this sense charity requires that we should love our enemies, namely, that in loving God and our neighbor, we should not exclude our enemies from the love given to our neighbor in general.

Thirdly, love of one’s enemies may be considered as specially directed to them, namely, that we should have a special movement of love towards our enemies. Charity does not require this absolutely, because it does not require that we should have a special movement of love to every individual man, since this would be impossible. Nevertheless charity does require this, in respect of our being prepared in mind, namely, that we should be ready to love our enemies individually, if the necessity were to occur. That man should actually do so, and love his enemy for God’s sake, without it being necessary for him to do so, belongs to the perfection of charity. For since man loves his neighbor, out of charity, for God’s sake, the more he loves God, the more does he put enmities aside and show love towards his neighbor: thus if we loved a certain man very much, we would love his children though they were unfriendly towards us. This is the sense in which Augustine speaks in the passage quoted in the First Objection, the Reply to which is therefore evident.

Reply to Objection 2: Everything naturally hates its contrary as such. Now our enemies are contrary to us, as enemies, wherefore this itself should be hateful to us, for their enmity should displease us. They are not, however, contrary to us, as men and capable of happiness: and it is as such that we are bound to love them.

Reply to Objection 3: It is wrong to love one’s enemies as such: charity does not do this, as stated above.

Whether it is necessary for salvation that we should show our enemies the signs and effects of love?

Objection 1: It would seem that charity demands of a man to show his enemy the signs or effects of love. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:18): “Let us not love in word nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth.” Now a man loves in deed by showing the one he loves signs and effects of love. Therefore charity requires that a man show his enemies such signs and effects of love.

Objection 2: Further, Our Lord said in the same breath (Mat. 5:44): “Love your enemies,” and, “Do good to them that hate you.” Now charity demands that we love our enemies. Therefore it demands also that we should “do good to them.”

Objection 3: Further, not only God but also our neighbor is the object of charity. Now Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (In Evang. xxx), that “love of God cannot be idle for wherever it is it does great things, and if it ceases to work, it is no longer love.” Hence charity towards our neighbor cannot be without producing works. But charity requires us to love our neighbor without exception, though he be an enemy. Therefore charity requires us to show the signs and effects of love towards our enemies.

On the contrary, A gloss on Mat. 5:44, “Do good to them that hate you,” says: “To do good to one’s enemies is the height of perfection” [*Augustine, Enchiridion lxxiii]. Now charity does not require us to do that which belongs to its perfection. Therefore charity does not require us to show the signs and effects of love to our enemies.

I answer that, The effects and signs of charity are the result of inward love, and are in proportion with it. Now it is absolutely necessary, for the fulfilment of the precept, that we should inwardly love our enemies in general, but not individually, except as regards the mind being prepared to do so, as explained above [2540](A[8]).

We must accordingly apply this to the showing of the effects and signs of love. For some of the signs and favors of love are shown to our neighbors in general, as when we pray for all the faithful, or for a whole people, or when anyone bestows a favor on a whole community: and the fulfilment of the precept requires that we should show such like favors or signs of love towards our enemies. For if we did not so, it would be a proof of vengeful spite, and contrary to what is written (Lev. 19:18): “Seek not revenge, nor be mindful of the injury of thy citizens.” But there are other favors or signs of love, which one shows to certain persons in particular: and it is not necessary for salvation that we show our enemies such like favors and signs of love, except as regards being ready in our minds, for instance to come to their assistance in a case of urgency, according to Prov. 25:21: “If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he thirst, give him . . . drink.” Outside cases of urgency, to show such like favors to an enemy belongs to the perfection of charity, whereby we not only beware, as in duty bound, of being overcome by evil, but also wish to overcome evil by good [*Rom. 12:21], which belongs to perfection: for then we not only beware of being drawn into hatred on account of the hurt done to us, but purpose to induce our enemy to love us on account of our kindliness.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to love the angels out of charity. For, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i), charity is a twofold love: the love of God and of our neighbor. Now love of the angels is not contained in the love of God, since they are created substances; nor is it, seemingly, contained in the love of our neighbor, since they do not belong with us to a common species. Therefore we are not bound to love them out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, dumb animals have more in common with us than the angels have, since they belong to the same proximate genus as we do. But we have not charity towards dumb animals, as stated above [2541] (A[3]). Neither, therefore, have we towards the angels.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is so proper to friends as companionship with one another (Ethic. viii, 5). But the angels are not our companions; we cannot even see them. Therefore we are unable to give them the friendship of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 30): “If the name of neighbor is given either to those whom we pity, or to those who pity us, it is evident that the precept binding us to love our neighbor includes also the holy angels from whom we receive many merciful favors.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2542]Q[23], A[1]), the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of everlasting happiness, in which men share in common with the angels. For it is written (Mat. 22:30) that “in the resurrection . . . men shall be as the angels of God in heaven.” It is therefore evident that the friendship of charity extends also to the angels.

Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor is not only one who is united to us in a common species, but also one who is united to us by sharing in the blessings pertaining to everlasting life, and it is on the latter fellowship that the friendship of charity is founded.

Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals are united to us in the proximate genus, by reason of their sensitive nature; whereas we are partakers of everlasting happiness, by reason not of our sensitive nature but of our rational mind wherein we associate with the angels.

Reply to Objection 3: The companionship of the angels does not consist in outward fellowship, which we have in respect of our sensitive nature; it consists in a fellowship of the mind, imperfect indeed in this life, but perfect in heaven, as stated above ([2543]Q[23], A[1], ad 1).

Whether we are bound to love the demons out of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love the demons out of charity. For the angels are our neighbors by reason of their fellowship with us in a rational mind. But the demons also share in our fellowship thus, since natural gifts, such as life and understanding, remain in them unimpaired, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.

Objection 2: Further, the demons differ from the blessed angels in the matter of sin, even as sinners from just men. Now the just man loves the sinner out of charity. Therefore he ought to love the demons also out of charity.

Objection 3: Further, we ought, out of charity, to love, as being our neighbors, those from whom we receive favors, as appears from the passage of Augustine quoted above [2544](A[9]). Now the demons are useful to us in many things, for “by tempting us they work crowns for us,” as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 17). Therefore we ought to love the demons out of charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 28:18): “Your league with death shall be abolished, and your covenant with hell shall not stand.” Now the perfection of a peace and covenant is through charity. Therefore we ought not to have charity for the demons who live in hell and compass death.

I answer that, As stated above [2545](A[6]), in the sinner, we are bound, out of charity, to love his nature, but to hate his sin. But the name of demon is given to designate a nature deformed by sin, wherefore demons should not be loved out of charity. Without however laying stress on the word, the question as to whether the spirits called demons ought to be loved out of charity, must be answered in accordance with the statement made above ([2546]AA[2],3), that a thing may be loved out of charity in two ways. First, a thing may be loved as the person who is the object of friendship, and thus we cannot have the friendship of charity towards the demons. For it is an essential part of friendship that one should be a well-wisher towards one's friend; and it is impossible for us, out of charity, to desire the good of everlasting life, to which charity is referred, for those spirits whom God has condemned eternally, since this would be in opposition to our charity towards God whereby we approve of His justice.

Secondly, we love a thing as being that which we desire to be enduring as another's good. In this way we love irrational creatures out of charity, in as much as we wish them to endure, to give glory to God and be useful to man, as stated above [2547](A[3]): and in this way too we can love the nature of the demons even out of charity, in as much as we desire those spirits to endure, as to their natural gifts, unto God's glory.

Reply to Objection 1: The possession of everlasting happiness is not impossible for the angelic mind as it is for the mind of a demon; consequently the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of everlasting life, rather than on the fellowship of nature, is possible towards the angels, but not towards the demons.

Reply to Objection 2: In this life, men who are in sin retain the possibility of obtaining everlasting happiness: not so those who are lost in hell, who, in this respect, are in the same case as the demons.

Reply to Objection 3: That the demons are useful to us is due not to their intention but to the ordering of Divine providence; hence this leads us to be friends, not with them, but with God, Who turns their perverse intention to our profit.

Whether four things are rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, viz. God, our neighbor, our body and ourselves?

Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: God, our neighbor, our body, and ourselves. For, as Augustine states (Tract. super Joan. lxxxiii), “he that loveth not God, loveth not himself.” Hence love of oneself is included in the love of God. Therefore love of oneself is not distinct from the love of God.

Objection 2: Further, a part ought not to be condivided with the whole. But our body is part of ourselves. Therefore it ought not to be condivided with ourselves as a distinct object of love.

Objection 3: Further, just as a man has a body, so has his neighbor. Since then the love with which a man loves his neighbor, is distinct from the love with which a man loves himself, so the love with which a man loves his neighbor’s body, ought to be distinct from the love with which he loves his own body. Therefore these four things are not rightly distinguished as objects to be loved out of charity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23): “There are four things to be loved; one which is above us,” namely God, “another, which is ourselves, a third which is nigh to us,” namely our neighbor, “and a fourth which is beneath us,” namely our own body.

I answer that, As stated above ([2548]Q[23], AA[1],5), the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness. Now, in this fellowship, one thing is considered as the principle from which happiness flows, namely God; a second is that which directly partakes of happiness, namely men and angels; a third is a thing to which happiness comes by a kind of overflow, namely the human body.

Now the source from which happiness flows is lovable by reason of its being the cause of happiness: that which is a partaker of happiness, can be an object of love for two reasons, either through being identified with ourselves, or through being associated with us in partaking of happiness, and in this respect, there are two things to be loved out of charity, in as much as man loves both himself and his neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: The different relations between a lover and the various things loved make a different kind of lovableness. Accordingly, since the relation between the human lover and God is different from his relation to himself, these two are reckoned as distinct objects of love, for the love of the one is the cause of the love of the other, so that the former love being removed the latter is taken away.

Reply to Objection 2: The subject of charity is the rational mind that can be capable of obtaining happiness, to which the body does not reach directly, but only by a kind of overflow. Hence, by his reasonable mind which holds the first place in him, man, out of charity, loves himself in one way, and his own body in another.

Reply to Objection 3: Man loves his neighbor, both as to his soul and as to his body, by reason of a certain fellowship in happiness. Wherefore, on the part of his neighbor, there is only one reason for loving him; and our neighbor's body is not reckoned as a special object of love.

OF THE ORDER OF CHARITY (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the order of charity, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is an order in charity?

(2) Whether man ought to love God more than his neighbor?

(3) Whether more than himself?

(4) Whether he ought to love himself more than his neighbor?

(5) Whether man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?

(6) Whether he ought to love one neighbor more than another?

(7) Whether he ought to love more, a neighbor who is better, or one who is more closely united to him?

(8) Whether he ought to love more, one who is akin to him by blood, or one who is united to him by other ties?

(9) Whether, out of charity, a man ought to love his son more than his father ?

(10) Whether he ought to love his mother more than his father?

(11) Whether he ought to love his wife more than his father or mother?

(12) Whether we ought to love those who are kind to us more than those whom we are kind to?

(13) Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?

Whether there is order in charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no order in charity. For charity is a virtue. But no order is assigned to the other virtues. Neither, therefore, should any order be assigned to charity.

Objection 2: Further, just as the object of faith is the First Truth, so is the object of charity the Sovereign Good. Now no order is appointed for faith, but all things are believed equally. Neither, therefore, ought there to be any order in charity.

Objection 3: Further, charity is in the will: whereas ordering belongs, not to the will, but to the reason. Therefore no order should be ascribed to charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Cant 2:4): “He brought me into the cellar of wine, he set in order charity in me.”

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 16), the terms “before” and “after” are used in reference to some principle. Now order implies that certain things are, in some way, before or after. Hence wherever there is a principle, there must needs be also order of some kind. But it has been said above ([2549]Q[23], A[1];[2550] Q[25], A[12]) that the love of charity tends to God as to the principle of happiness, on the fellowship of which the friendship of charity is based. Consequently there must needs be some order in things loved out of charity, which order is in reference to the first principle of that love, which is God.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity tends towards the last end considered as last end: and this does not apply to any other virtue, as stated above ([2551]Q[23], A[6]). Now the end has the character of principle in matters of appetite and action, as was shown above ([2552]Q[23], A[7], ad 2; FS, A[1], ad 1). Wherefore charity, above all, implies relation to the First Principle, and consequently, in charity above all, we find an order in reference to the First Principle.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith pertains to the cognitive power, whose operation depends on the thing known being in the knower. On the other hand, charity is in an appetitive power, whose operation consists in the soul tending to things themselves. Now order is to be found in things themselves, and flows from them into our knowledge. Hence order is more appropriate to charity than to faith.

And yet there is a certain order in faith, in so far as it is chiefly about God, and secondarily about things referred to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Order belongs to reason as the faculty that orders, and to the appetitive power as to the faculty which is ordered. It is in this way that order is stated to be in charity.

Whether God ought to be loved more than our neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that God ought not to be loved more than our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 4:20): “He that loveth not his brother whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?” Whence it seems to follow that the more a thing is visible the more lovable it is, since loving begins with seeing, according to Ethic. ix, 5,12. Now God is less visible than our neighbor. Therefore He is less lovable, out of charity, than our neighbor.

Objection 2: Further, likeness causes love, according to Ecclus. 13:19: “Every beast loveth its like.” Now man bears more likeness to his neighbor than to God. Therefore man loves his neighbor, out of charity, more than he loves God.

Objection 3: Further, what charity loves in a neighbor, is God, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27). Now God is not greater in Himself than He is in our neighbor. Therefore He is not more to be loved in Himself than in our neighbor. Therefore we ought not to love God more than our neighbor.

On the contrary, A thing ought to be loved more, if others ought to be hated on its account. Now we ought to hate our neighbor for God’s sake, if, to wit, he leads us astray from God, according to Lk. 14:26: “If any man come to Me and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, end children, and brethren, and sisters . . . he cannot be My disciple.” Therefore we ought to love God, out of charity, more than our neighbor.

I answer that, Each kind of friendship regards chiefly the subject in which we chiefly find the good on the fellowship of which that friendship is based: thus civil friendship regards chiefly the ruler of the state, on whom the entire common good of the state depends; hence to him before all, the citizens owe fidelity and obedience. Now the friendship of charity is based on the fellowship of happiness, which consists essentially in God, as the First Principle, whence it flows to all who are capable of happiness.

Therefore God ought to be loved chiefly and before all out of charity: for He is loved as the cause of happiness, whereas our neighbor is loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from Him.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire love. It is in this way that seeing is the cause of loving, not as though a thing were lovable according as it is visible, but because by seeing a thing we are led to love it. Hence it does not follow that what is more visible is more lovable, but that as an object of love we meet with it before others: and that is the sense of the Apostle’s argument. For, since our neighbor is more visible to us, he is the first lovable object we meet with, because “the soul learns, from those things it knows, to love what it knows not,” as Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi). Hence it can be argued that, if any man loves not his neighbor, neither does he love God, not because his neighbor is more lovable, but because he is the first thing to demand our love: and God is more lovable by reason of His greater goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness we have to God precedes and causes the likeness we have to our neighbor: because from the very fact that we share along with our neighbor in something received from God, we become like to our neighbor. Hence by reason of this likeness we ought to love God more than we love our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 3: Considered in His substance, God is equally in all, in whomsoever He may be, for He is not lessened by being in anything. And yet our neighbor does not possess God’s goodness equally with God, for God has it essentially, and our neighbor by participation.

Whether out of charity, man is bound to love God more than himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8) that “a man’s friendly relations with others arise from his friendly relations with himself.” Now the cause is stronger than its effect. Therefore man’s friendship towards himself is greater than his friendship for anyone else. Therefore he ought to love himself more than God.

Objection 2: Further, one loves a thing in so far as it is one’s own good. Now the reason for loving a thing is more loved than the thing itself which is loved for that reason, even as the principles which are the reason for knowing a thing are more known. Therefore man loves himself more than any other good loved by him. Therefore he does not love God more than himself.

Objection 3: Further, a man loves God as much as he loves to enjoy God. But a man loves himself as much as he loves to enjoy God; since this is the highest good a man can wish for himself. Therefore man is not bound, out of charity, to love God more than himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22): “If thou oughtest to love thyself, not for thy own sake, but for the sake of Him in Whom is the rightest end of thy love, let no other man take offense if him also thou lovest for God’s sake.” Now “the cause of a thing being such is yet more so.” Therefore man ought to love God more than himself.

I answer that, The good we receive from God is twofold, the good of nature, and the good of grace. Now the fellowship of natural goods bestowed on us by God is the foundation of natural love, in virtue of which not only man, so long as his nature remains unimpaired, loves God above all things and more than himself, but also every single creature, each in its own way, i.e. either by an intellectual, or by a rational, or by an animal, or at least by a natural love, as stones do, for instance, and other things bereft of knowledge, because each part naturally loves the common good of the whole more than its own particular good. This is evidenced by its operation, since the principal inclination of each part is towards common action conducive to the good of the whole. It may also be seen in civic virtues whereby sometimes the citizens suffer damage even to their own property and persons for the sake of the common good. Wherefore much more is this realized with regard to the friendship of charity which is based on the fellowship of the gifts of grace.

Therefore man ought, out of charity, to love God, Who is the common good of all, more than himself: since happiness is in God as in the universal and fountain principle of all who are able to have a share of that happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of friendly relations towards another person in whom the good, which is the object of friendship, resides in some restricted way; and not of friendly relations with another in whom the aforesaid good resides in totality.

Reply to Objection 2: The part does indeed love the good of the whole, as becomes a part, not however so as to refer the good of the whole to itself, but rather itself to the good of the whole.

Reply to Objection 3: That a man wishes to enjoy God pertains to that love of God which is love of concupiscence. Now we love God with the love of friendship more than with the love of concupiscence, because the Divine good is greater in itself, than our share of good in enjoying Him. Hence, out of charity, man simply loves God more than himself.

Whether our of charity, man ought to love himself more than his neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not, out of charity, to love himself more than his neighbor. For the principal object of charity is God, as stated above [2553](A[2]; Q[25], AA[1],12). Now sometimes our neighbor is more closely united to God than we are ourselves. Therefore we ought to love such a one more than ourselves.

Objection 2: Further, the more we love a person, the more we avoid injuring him. Now a man, out of charity, submits to injury for his neighbor’s sake, according to Prov. 12:26: “He that neglecteth a loss for the sake of a friend, is just.” Therefore a man ought, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than himself.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:5) “charity seeketh not its own.” Now the thing we love most is the one whose good we seek most. Therefore a man does not, out of charity, love himself more than his neighbor.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 19:18, Mat. 22:39): “Thou shalt love thy neighbor (Lev. 19:18: ‘friend’) as thyself.” Whence it seems to follow that man’s love for himself is the model of his love for another. But the model exceeds the copy. Therefore, out of charity, a man ought to love himself more than his neighbor.

I answer that, There are two things in man, his spiritual nature and his corporeal nature. And a man is said to love himself by reason of his loving himself with regard to his spiritual nature, as stated above ([2554]Q[25], A[7]): so that accordingly, a man ought, out of charity, to love himself more than he loves any other person.

This is evident from the very reason for loving: since, as stated above ([2555]Q[25], AA[1],12), God is loved as the principle of good, on which the love of charity is founded; while man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good. Now fellowship is a reason for love according to a certain union in relation to God. Wherefore just as unity surpasses union, the fact that man himself has a share of the Divine good, is a more potent reason for loving than that another should be a partner with him in that share. Therefore man, out of charity, ought to love himself more than his neighbor: in sign whereof, a man ought not to give way to any evil of sin, which counteracts his share of happiness, not even that he may free his neighbor from sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The love of charity takes its quantity not only from its object which is God, but also from the lover, who is the man that has charity, even as the quantity of any action depends in some way on the subject. Wherefore, though a better neighbor is nearer to God, yet because he is not as near to the man who has charity, as this man is to himself, it does not follow that a man is bound to love his neighbor more than himself.

Reply to Objection 2: A man ought to bear bodily injury for his friend’s sake, and precisely in so doing he loves himself more as regards his spiritual mind, because it pertains to the perfection of virtue, which is a good of the mind. In spiritual matters, however, man ought not to suffer injury by sinning, in order to free his neighbor from sin, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), the saying, “‘charity seeks not her own,’ means that it prefers the common to the private good.” Now the common good is always more lovable to the individual than his private good, even as the good of the whole is more lovable to the part, than the latter’s own partial good, as stated above [2556] (A[3]).

Whether a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to love his neighbor more than his own body. For his neighbor includes his neighbor’s body. If therefore a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body, it follows that he ought to love his neighbor’s body more than his own.

Objection 2: Further, a man ought to love his own soul more than his neighbor’s, as stated above [2557](A[4]). Now a man’s own body is nearer to his soul than his neighbor. Therefore we ought to love our body more than our neighbor.

Objection 3: Further, a man imperils that which he loves less for the sake of what he loves more. Now every man is not bound to imperil his own body for his neighbor’s safety: this belongs to the perfect, according to Jn. 15:13: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Therefore a man is not bound, out of charity, to love his neighbor more than his own body.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that “we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.”

I answer that, Out of charity we ought to love more that which has more fully the reason for being loved out of charity, as stated above [2558](A[2]; Q[25], A[12]). Now fellowship in the full participation of happiness which is the reason for loving one’s neighbor, is a greater reason for loving, than the participation of happiness by way of overflow, which is the reason for loving one’s own body. Therefore, as regards the welfare of the soul we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) a thing seems to be that which is predominant in it: so that when we say that we ought to love our neighbor more than our own body, this refers to his soul, which is his predominant part.

Reply to Objection 2: Our body is nearer to our soul than our neighbor, as regards the constitution of our own nature: but as regards the participation of happiness, our neighbor’s soul is more closely associated with our own soul, than even our own body is.

Reply to Objection 3: Every man is immediately concerned with the care of his own body, but not with his neighbor’s welfare, except perhaps in cases of urgency: wherefore charity does not necessarily require a man to imperil his own body for his neighbor’s welfare, except in a case where he is under obligation to do so and if a man of his own accord offer himself for that purpose, this belongs to the perfection of charity.

Whether we ought to love one neighbor more than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love one neighbor more than another. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): “One ought to love all men equally. Since, however, one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance, are more closely united to us.” Therefore one neighbor ought not to be loved more than another.

Objection 2: Further, where there is one and the same reason for loving several, there should be no inequality of love. Now there is one and the same reason for loving all one’s neighbors, which reason is God, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27). Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

Objection 3: Further, to love a man is to wish him good things, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4). Now to all our neighbors we wish an equal good, viz. everlasting life. Therefore we ought to love all our neighbors equally.

On the contrary, One’s obligation to love a person is proportionate to the gravity of the sin one commits in acting against that love. Now it is a more grievous sin to act against the love of certain neighbors, than against the love of others. Hence the commandment (Lev. 10:9), “He that curseth his father or mother, dying let him die,” which does not apply to those who cursed others than the above. Therefore we ought to love some neighbors more than others.

I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question: for some have said that we ought, out of charity, to love all our neighbors equally, as regards our affection, but not as regards the outward effect. They held that the order of love is to be understood as applying to outward favors, which we ought to confer on those who are connected with us in preference to those who are unconnected, and not to the inward affection, which ought to be given equally to all including our enemies.

But this is unreasonable. For the affection of charity, which is the inclination of grace, is not less orderly than the natural appetite, which is the inclination of nature, for both inclinations flow from Divine wisdom. Now we observe in the physical order that the natural inclination in each thing is proportionate to the act or movement that is becoming to the nature of that thing: thus in earth the inclination of gravity is greater than in water, because it is becoming to earth to be beneath water. Consequently the inclination also of grace which is the effect of charity, must needs be proportionate to those actions which have to be performed outwardly, so that, to wit, the affection of our charity be more intense towards those to whom we ought to behave with greater kindness.

We must, therefore, say that, even as regards the affection we ought to love one neighbor more than another. The reason is that, since the principle of love is God, and the person who loves, it must needs be that the affection of love increases in proportion to the nearness to one or the other of those principles. For as we stated above [2559](A[1]), wherever we find a principle, order depends on relation to that principle.

Reply to Objection 1: Love can be unequal in two ways: first on the part of the good we wish our friend. In this respect we love all men equally out of charity: because we wish them all one same generic good, namely everlasting happiness. Secondly love is said to be greater through its action being more intense: and in this way we ought not to love all equally.

Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence, love ought not to be thus unequal. The other inequality arises from our loving some more than others: and Augustine does not mean to exclude the latter inequality, but the former, as is evident from what he says of beneficence.

Reply to Objection 2: Our neighbors are not all equally related to God; some are nearer to Him, by reason of their greater goodness, and those we ought, out of charity, to love more than those who are not so near to Him.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the quantity of love on the part of the good which we wish our friends.

Whether we ought to love those who are better more those who are more closely united us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely united to us. For that which is in no way hateful seems more lovable than that which is hateful for some reason: just as a thing is all the whiter for having less black mixed with it. Now those who are connected with us are hateful for some reason, according to Lk. 14:26: “If any man come to Me, and hate not his father,” etc. On the other hand good men are not hateful for any reason. Therefore it seems that we ought to love those who are better more than those who are more closely connected with us.

Objection 2: Further, by charity above all, man is likened to God. But God loves more the better man. Therefore man also, out of charity, ought to love the better man more than one who is more closely united to him.

Objection 3: Further, in every friendship that ought to be loved most which has most to do with the foundation of that friendship: for, by natural friendship we love most those who are connected with us by nature, our parents for instance, or our children. Now the friendship of charity is founded upon the fellowship of happiness, which has more to do with better men than with those who are more closely united to us. Therefore, out of charity, we ought to love better men more than those who are more closely connected with us.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 5:8): “If any man have not care of his own and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” Now the inward affection of charity ought to correspond to the outward effect. Therefore charity regards those who are nearer to us before those who are better.

I answer that, Every act should be proportionate both to its object and to the agent. But from its object it takes its species, while, from the power of the agent it takes the mode of its intensity: thus movement has its species from the term to which it tends, while the intensity of its speed arises from the disposition of the thing moved and the power of the mover. Accordingly love takes its species from its object, but its intensity is due to the lover.

Now the object of charity’s love is God, and man is the lover. Therefore the specific diversity of the love which is in accordance with charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, depends on his relation to God, so that, out of charity, we should wish a greater good to one who is nearer to God; for though the good which charity wishes to all, viz. everlasting happiness, is one in itself, yet it has various degrees according to various shares of happiness, and it belongs to charity to wish God’s justice to be maintained, in accordance with which better men have a fuller share of happiness. And this regards the species of love; for there are different species of love according to the different goods that we wish for those whom we love.

On the other hand, the intensity of love is measured with regard to the man who loves, and accordingly man loves those who are more closely united to him, with more intense affection as to the good he wishes for them, than he loves those who are better as to the greater good he wishes for them.

Again a further difference must be observed here: for some neighbors are connected with us by their natural origin, a connection which cannot be severed, since that origin makes them to be what they are. But the goodness of virtue, wherein some are close to God, can come and go, increase and decrease, as was shown above ([2560]Q[24], AA[4],10,11). Hence it is possible for one, out of charity, to wish this man who is more closely united to one, to be better than another, and so reach a higher degree of happiness.

Moreover there is yet another reason for which, out of charity, we love more those who are more nearly connected with us, since we love them in more ways. For, towards those who are not connected with us we have no other friendship than charity, whereas for those who are connected with us, we have certain other friendships, according to the way in which they are connected. Now since the good on which every other friendship of the virtuous is based, is directed, as to its end, to the good on which charity is based, it follows that charity commands each act of another friendship, even as the art which is about the end commands the art which is about the means. Consequently this very act of loving someone because he is akin or connected with us, or because he is a fellow-countryman or for any like reason that is referable to the end of charity, can be commanded by charity, so that, out of charity both eliciting and commanding, we love in more ways those who are more nearly connected with us.

Reply to Objection 1: We are commanded to hate, in our kindred, not their kinship, but only the fact of their being an obstacle between us and God. In this respect they are not akin but hostile to us, according to Micah 7:6: “A men’s enemies are they of his own household.”

Reply to Objection 2: Charity conforms man to God proportionately, by making man comport himself towards what is his, as God does towards what is His. For we may, out of charity, will certain things as becoming to us which God does not will, because it becomes Him not to will them, as stated above ([2561]FS, Q[19], A[10]), when we were treating of the goodness of the will.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity elicits the act of love not only as regards the object, but also as regards the lover, as stated above. The result is that the man who is more nearly united to us is more loved.

Whether we ought to love more those who are connected with us by ties of blood?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to love more those who are more closely united to us by ties of blood. For it is written (Prov. 18:24): “A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother.” Again, Valerius Maximus says (Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv 7): “The ties of friendship are most strong and in no way yield to the ties of blood.” Moreover it is quite certain and undeniable, that as to the latter, the lot of birth is fortuitous, whereas we contract the former by an untrammelled will, and a solid pledge. Therefore we ought not to love more than others those who are united to us by ties of blood.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 7): “I love not less you whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had begotten you in wedlock, for nature is no more eager to love than grace.” Surely we ought to love those whom we expect to be with us for ever more than those who will be with us only in this world. Therefore we should not love our kindred more than those who are otherwise connected with us.

Objection 3: Further, “Love is proved by deeds,” as Gregory states (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Now we are bound to do acts of love to others than our kindred: thus in the army a man must obey his officer rather than his father. Therefore we are not bound to love our kindred most of all.

On the contrary, The commandments of the decalogue contain a special precept about the honor due to our parents (Ex. 20:12). Therefore we ought to love more specially those who are united to us by ties of blood.

I answer that, As stated above [2562](A[7]), we ought out of charity to love those who are more closely united to us more, both because our love for them is more intense, and because there are more reasons for loving them. Now intensity of love arises from the union of lover and beloved: and therefore we should measure the love of different persons according to the different kinds of union, so that a man is more loved in matters touching that particular union in respect of which he is loved. And, again, in comparing love to love we should compare one union with another. Accordingly we must say that friendship among blood relations is based upon their connection by natural origin, the friendship of fellow-citizens on their civic fellowship, and the friendship of those who are fighting side by side on the comradeship of battle. Wherefore in matters pertaining to nature we should love our kindred most, in matters concerning relations between citizens, we should prefer our fellow-citizens, and on the battlefield our fellow-soldiers. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 2) that "it is our duty to render to each class of people such respect as is natural and appropriate. This is in fact the principle upon which we seem to act, for we invite our relations to a wedding . . . It would seem to be a special duty to afford our parents the means of living . . . and to honor them."

The same applies to other kinds of friendship.

If however we compare union with union, it is evident that the union arising from natural origin is prior to, and more stable than, all others, because it is something affecting the very substance, whereas other unions supervene and may cease altogether. Therefore the friendship of kindred is more stable, while other friendships may be stronger in respect of that which is proper to each of them.

Reply to Objection 1: In as much as the friendship of comrades originates through their own choice, love of this kind takes precedence of the love of kindred in matters where we are free to do as we choose, for instance in matters of action. Yet the friendship of kindred is more stable, since it is more natural, and preponderates over others in matters touching nature: consequently we are more beholden to them in the providing of necessaries.

Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose is speaking of love with regard to favors respecting the fellowship of grace, namely, moral instruction. For in this matter, a man ought to provide for his spiritual children whom he has begotten spiritually, more than for the sons of his body, whom he is bound to support in bodily sustenance.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that in the battle a man obeys his officer rather than his father proves, that he loves his father less, not simply relatively, i.e. as regards the love which is based on fellowship in battle.

Whether a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father?

Objection 1: It seems that a man ought, out of charity, to love his children more than his father. For we ought to love those more to whom we are more bound to do good. Now we are more bound to do good to our children than to our parents, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:14): “Neither ought the children to lay up for the parents, but the parents for the children.” Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.

Objection 2: Further, grace perfects nature. But parents naturally love their children more than these love them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Therefore a man ought to love his children more than his parents.

Objection 3: Further, man’s affections are conformed to God by charity. But God loves His children more than they love Him. Therefore we also ought to love our children more than our parents.

On the contrary, Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: “We ought to love God first, then our parents, then our children, and lastly those of our household.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1; A[7]), the degrees of love may be measured from two standpoints. First, from that of the object. In this respect the better a thing is, and the more like to God, the more is it to be loved: and in this way a man ought to love his father more than his children, because, to wit, he loves his father as his principle, in which respect he is a more exalted good and more like God.

Secondly, the degrees of love may be measured from the standpoint of the lover, and in this respect a man loves more that which is more closely connected with him, in which way a man’s children are more lovable to him than his father, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii). First, because parents love their children as being part of themselves, whereas the father is not part of his son, so that the love of a father for his children, is more like a man’s love for himself. Secondly, because parents know better that so and so is their child than vice versa. Thirdly, because children are nearer to their parents, as being part of them, than their parents are to them to whom they stand in the relation of a principle. Fourthly, because parents have loved longer, for the father begins to love his child at once, whereas the child begins to love his father after a lapse of time; and the longer love lasts, the stronger it is, according to Ecclus. 9:14: “Forsake not an old friend, for the new will not be like to him.”

Reply to Objection 1: The debt due to a principle is submission of respect and honor, whereas that due to the effect is one of influence and care. Hence the duty of children to their parents consists chiefly in honor: while that of parents to their children is especially one of care.

Reply to Objection 2: It is natural for a man as father to love his children more, if we consider them as closely connected with him: but if we consider which is the more exalted good, the son naturally loves his father more.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), God loves us for our good and for His honor. Wherefore since our father is related to us as principle, even as God is, it belongs properly to the father to receive honor from his children, and to the children to be provided by their parents with what is good for them. Nevertheless in cases of necessity the child is bound out of the favors received to provide for his parents before all.

Whether a man ought to love his mother more than his father?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his mother more than his father. For, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), “the female produces the body in generation.” Now man receives his soul, not from his father, but from God by creation, as stated in the [2563]FP, Q[90], A[2]; Q[118]. Therefore a man receives more from his mother than from his father: and consequently he ought to love her more than him.

Objection 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due. Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that “mothers have greater love for their children. For the mother labors more in child-bearing, and she knows more surely than the father who are her children.”

Objection 3: Further, love should be more fond towards those who have labored for us more, according to Rom. 16:6: “Salute Mary, who hath labored much among you.” Now the mother labors more than the father in giving birth and education to her child; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 7:29): “Forget not the groanings of thy mother.” Therefore a man ought to love his mother more than his father.

On the contrary, Jerome says on Ezech. 44:25 that “man ought to love God the Father of all, and then his own father,” and mentions the mother afterwards.

I answer that, In making such comparisons as this, we must take the answer in the strict sense, so that the present question is whether the father as father, ought to be loved more than the mother as mother. The reason is that virtue and vice may make such a difference in such like matters, that friendship may be diminished or destroyed, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. viii, 7). Hence Ambrose [*Origen, Hom. ii in Cant.] says: “Good servants should be preferred to wicked children.”

Strictly speaking, however, the father should be loved more than the mother. For father and mother are loved as principles of our natural origin. Now the father is principle in a more excellent way than the mother, because he is the active principle, while the mother is a passive and material principle. Consequently, strictly speaking, the father is to be loved more.

Reply to Objection 1: In the begetting of man, the mother supplies the formless matter of the body; and the latter receives its form through the formative power that is in the semen of the father. And though this power cannot create the rational soul, yet it disposes the matter of the body to receive that form.

Reply to Objection 2: This applies to another kind of love. For the friendship between lover and lover differs specifically from the friendship between child and parent: while the friendship we are speaking of here, is that which a man owes his father and mother through being begotten of them.

The Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

Whether a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother. For no man leaves a thing for another unless he love the latter more. Now it is written (Gn. 2:24) that “a man shell leave father and mother” on account of his wife. Therefore a man ought to love his wife more than his father and mother.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:33) that a husband should “love his wife as himself.” Now a man ought to love himself more than his parents. Therefore he ought to love his wife also more than his parents.

Objection 2: Further, love should be greater where there are more reasons for loving. Now there are more reasons for love in the friendship of a man towards his wife. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12) that “in this friendship there are the motives of utility, pleasure, and also of virtue, if husband and wife are virtuous.” Therefore a man’s love for his wife ought to be greater than his love for his parents.

On the contrary, According to Eph. 5:28, “men ought to love their wives as their own bodies.” Now a man ought to love his body less than his neighbor, as stated above [2564](A[5]): and among his neighbors he should love his parents most. Therefore he ought to love his parents more than his wife.

I answer that, As stated above [2565](A[9]), the degrees of love may be taken from the good (which is loved), or from the union between those who love. On the part of the good which is the object loved, a man should love his parents more than his wife, because he loves them as his principles and considered as a more exalted good.

But on the part of the union, the wife ought to be loved more, because she is united with her husband, as one flesh, according to Mat. 19:6: “Therefore now they are not two, but one flesh.” Consequently a man loves his wife more intensely, but his parents with greater reverence.

Reply to Objection 1: A man does not in all respects leave his father and mother for the sake of his wife: for in certain cases a man ought to succor his parents rather than his wife. He does however leave all his kinsfolk, and cleaves to his wife as regards the union of carnal connection and co-habitation.

Reply to Objection 2: The words of the Apostle do not mean that a man ought to love his wife equally with himself, but that a man’s love for himself is the reason for his love of his wife, since she is one with him.

Reply to Objection 3: There are also several reasons for a man’s love for his father; and these, in a certain respect, namely, as regards good, are more weighty than those for which a man loves his wife; although the latter outweigh the former as regards the closeness of the union.

As to the argument in the contrary sense, it must be observed that in the words quoted, the particle "as" denotes not equality of love but the motive of love. For the principal reason why a man loves his wife is her being united to him in the flesh.

Whether a man ought to love more his benefactor than one he has benefited?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to love his benefactor more than one he has benefited. For Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv): "Nothing will incite another more to love you than that you love him first: for he must have a hard heart indeed, who not only refuses to love, but declines to return love already given." Now a man's benefactor forestalls him in the kindly deeds of charity. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors above all.

Objection 2: Further, the more grievously we sin by ceasing to love a man or by working against him, the more ought we to love him. Now it is a more grievous sin to cease loving a benefactor or to work against him, than to cease loving one to whom one has hitherto done kindly actions. Therefore we ought to love our benefactors more than those to whom we are kind.

Objection 3: Further, of all things lovable, God is to be loved most, and then one's father, as Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezechiel xliv, 25]. Now these are our greatest benefactors. Therefore a benefactor should be loved above all others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7), that "benefactors seem to love recipients of their benefactions, rather than vice versa."

I answer that, As stated above ([2566]AA[9],11), a thing is loved more in two ways: first because it has the character of a more excellent good, secondly by reason of a closer connection. In the first way we ought to love our benefactor most, because, since he is a principle of good to the man he has benefited, he has the character of a more excellent good, as stated above with regard to one's father [2567](A[9]).

In the second way, however, we love those more who have received benefactions from us, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. ix, 7) by four arguments. First because the recipient of benefactions is the handiwork of the benefactor, so that we are wont to say of a man: “He was made by so and so.” Now it is natural to a man to love his own work (thus it is to be observed that poets love their own poems): and the reason is that we love “to be” and “to live,” and these are made manifest in our “action.” Secondly, because we all naturally love that in which we see our own good. Now it is true that the benefactor has some good of his in the recipient of his benefaction, and the recipient some good in the benefactor; but the benefactor sees his virtuous good in the recipient, while the recipient sees his useful good in the benefactor. Now it gives more pleasure to see one’s virtuous good than one’s useful good, both because it is more enduring for usefulness quickly flits by, and the pleasure of calling a thing to mind is not like the pleasure of having it present and because it is more pleasant to recall virtuous goods than the profit we have derived from others. Thirdly, because is it the lover’s part to act, since he wills and works the good of the beloved, while the beloved takes a passive part in receiving good, so that to love surpasses being loved, for which reason the greater love is on the part of the benefactor. Fourthly because it is more difficult to give than to receive favors: and we are most fond of things which have cost us most trouble, while we almost despise what comes easy to us.

Reply to Objection 1: It is some thing in the benefactor that incites the recipient to love him: whereas the benefactor loves the recipient, not through being incited by him, but through being moved thereto of his own accord: and what we do of our own accord surpasses what we do through another.

Reply to Objection 2: The love of the beneficiary for the benefactor is more of a duty, wherefore the contrary is the greater sin. On the other hand, the love of the benefactor for the beneficiary is more spontaneous, wherefore it is quicker to act.

Reply to Objection 3: God also loves us more than we love Him, and parents love their children more than these love them. Yet it does not follow that we love all who have received good from us, more than any of our benefactors. For we prefer such benefactors as God and our parents, from whom we have received the greatest favors, to those on whom we have bestowed lesser benefits.

Whether the order of charity endures in heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity does not endure in heaven. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xlviii): “Perfect charity consists in loving greater goods more, and lesser goods less.” Now charity will be perfect in heaven. Therefore a man will love those who are better more than either himself or those who are connected with him.

Objection 2: Further, we love more him to whom we wish a greater good. Now each one in heaven wishes a greater good for those who have more good, else his will would not be conformed in all things to God’s will: and there to be better is to have more good. Therefore in heaven each one loves more those who are better, and consequently he loves others more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.

Objection 3: Further, in heaven love will be entirely for God’s sake, for then will be fulfilled the words of 1 Cor. 15:28: “That God may be all in all.” Therefore he who is nearer God will be loved more, so that a man will love a better man more than himself, and one who is not connected with him, more than one who is.

On the contrary, Nature is not done away, but perfected, by glory. Now the order of charity given above ([2568]AA[2],3,4) is derived from nature: since all things naturally love themselves more than others. Therefore this order of charity will endure in heaven.

I answer that, The order of charity must needs remain in heaven, as regards the love of God above all things. For this will be realized simply when man shall enjoy God perfectly. But, as regards the order between man himself and other men, a distinction would seem to be necessary, because, as we stated above ([2569]AA[7],9), the degrees of love may be distinguished either in respect of the good which a man desires for another, or according to the intensity of love itself. In the first way a man will love better men more than himself, and those who are less good, less than himself: because, by reason of the perfect conformity of the human to the Divine will, each of the blessed will desire everyone to have what is due to him according to Divine justice. Nor will that be a time for advancing by means of merit to a yet greater reward, as happens now while it is possible for a man to desire both the virtue and the reward of a better man, whereas then the will of each one will rest within the limits determined by God. But in the second way a man will love himself more than even his better neighbors, because the intensity of the act of love arises on the part of the person who loves, as stated above ([2570]AA[7],9). Moreover it is for this that the gift of charity is bestowed by God on each one, namely, that he may first of all direct his mind to God, and this pertains to a man's love for himself, and that, in the second place, he may wish other things to be directed to God, and even work for that end according to his capacity.

As to the order to be observed among our neighbors, a man will simply love those who are better, according to the love of charity. Because the entire life of the blessed consists in directing their minds to God, wherefore the entire ordering of their love will be ruled with respect to God, so that each one will love more and reckon to be nearer to himself those who are nearer to God. For then one man will no longer succor another, as he needs to in the present life, wherein each man has to succor those who are closely connected with him rather than those who are not, no matter what be the nature of their distress: hence it is that in this life, a man, by the inclination of charity, loves more those who are more closely united to him, for he is under a greater obligation to bestow on them the effect of charity. It will however be possible in heaven for a man to love in several ways one who is connected with him, since the causes of virtuous love will not be banished from the mind of the blessed. Yet all these reasons are incomparably surpassed by that which is taken from nighness to God.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument should be granted as to those who are connected together; but as regards man himself, he ought to love himself so much the more than others, as his charity is more perfect, since perfect entire reason of his love, for God is man's charity directs man to God perfectly, and this belongs to love of oneself, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the order of charity in respect of the degree of good one wills the person one loves.

Reply to Objection 3: God will be to each one the entire reason of his love, for God is man's entire good. For if we make the impossible supposition that God were not man's good, He would not be man's reason for loving. Hence it is that in the order of love man should love himself more than all else after God.

OF THE PRINCIPLE ACT OF CHARITY, WHICH IS TO LOVE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the act of charity, and (1) the principal act of charity, which is to love, (2) the other acts or effects which follow from that act.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?

(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?

(3) Whether God should be loved for His own sake?

(4) Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?

(5) Whether God can be loved wholly?

(6) Whether the love of God is according to measure?

(7) Which is the better, to love one’s friend, or one’s enemy? (8) Which is the better, to love God, or one’s neighbor?

Whether to be loved is more proper to charity than to love?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more proper to charity to be loved than to love. For the better charity is to be found in those who are themselves better. But those who are better should be more loved. Therefore to be loved is more proper to charity.

Objection 2: Further, that which is to be found in more subjects seems to be more in keeping with nature, and, for that reason, better. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), “many would rather be loved than love, and lovers of flattery always abound.” Therefore it is better to be loved than to love, and consequently it is more in keeping with charity.

Objection 3: Further, “the cause of anything being such is yet more so.” Now men love because they are loved, for Augustine says (De Catech. Rud. iv) that “nothing incites another more to love you than that you love him first.” Therefore charity consists in being loved rather than in loving.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8) that friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of friendship. Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.

I answer that, To love belongs to charity as charity. For, since charity is a virtue, by its very essence it has an inclination to its proper act. Now to be loved is not the act of the charity of the person loved; for this act is to love:

and to be loved is competent to him as coming under the common notion of good, in so far as another tends towards his good by an act of charity. Hence it is clear that to love is more proper to charity than to be loved: for that which befits a thing by reason of itself and its essence is more competent to it than that which is befitting to it by reason of something else. This can be exemplified in two ways. First, in the fact that friends are more commended for loving than for being loved, indeed, if they be loved and yet love not, they are blamed. Secondly, because a mother, whose love is the greatest, seeks rather to love than to be loved: for "some women," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. viii, 8) "entrust their children to a nurse; they do love them indeed, yet seek not to be loved in return, if they happen not to be loved."

Reply to Objection 1: A better man, through being better, is more lovable; but through having more perfect charity, loves more. He loves more, however, in proportion to the person he loves. For a better man does not love that which is beneath him less than it ought to be loved: whereas he who is less good fails to love one who is better, as much as he ought to be loved.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 8), "men wish to be loved in as much as they wish to be honored." For just as honor is bestowed on a man in order to bear witness to the good which is in him, so by being loved a man is shown to have some good, since good alone is lovable. Accordingly men seek to be loved and to be honored, for the sake of something else, viz. to make known the good which is in the person loved. On the other hand, those who have charity seek to love for the sake of loving, as though this were itself the good of charity, even as the act of any virtue is that virtue's good. Hence it is more proper to charity to wish to love than to wish to be loved.

Reply to Objection 3: Some love on account of being loved, not so that to be loved is the end of their loving, but because it is a kind of way leading a man to love.

Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?

Objection 1: It would seem that to love, considered as an act of charity, is nothing else than goodwill. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "to love is to wish a person well"; and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing but goodwill.

Objection 2: Further, the act belongs to the same subject as the habit. Now the habit of charity is in the power of the will, as stated above ([2571]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore the act of charity is also an act of the will. But it tends to good only, and this is goodwill. Therefore the act of charity is nothing else than goodwill.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher reckons five things pertaining to friendship (Ethic. ix, 4), the first of which is that a man should wish his friend well; the second, that he should wish him to be and to live; the third, that he should take pleasure in his company; the fourth, that he should make choice of the same things; the fifth, that he should grieve and rejoice with him. Now the first two pertain to goodwill. Therefore goodwill is the first act of charity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that "goodwill is neither friendship nor love, but the beginning of friendship." Now charity is friendship, as stated above ([2572]Q[23], A[1]). Therefore goodwill is not the same as to love considered as an act of charity.

I answer that, Goodwill properly speaking is that act of the will whereby we wish well to another. Now this act of the will differs from actual love, considered not only as being in the sensitive appetite but also as being in the intellective appetite or will. For the love which is in the sensitive appetite is a passion. Now every passion seeks its object with a certain eagerness. And the passion of love is not aroused suddenly, but is born of an earnest consideration of the object loved; wherefore the Philosopher, showing the difference between goodwill and the love which is a passion, says (Ethic. ix, 5) that goodwill does not imply impetuosity or desire, that is to say, has not an eager inclination, because it is by the sole judgment of his reason that one man wishes another well. Again such like love arises from previous acquaintance, whereas goodwill sometimes arises suddenly, as happens to us if we look on at a boxing-match, and we wish one of the boxers to win. But the love, which is in the intellective appetite, also differs from goodwill, because it denotes a certain union of affections between the lover and the beloved, in as much as the lover deems the beloved as somewhat united to him, or belonging to him, and so tends towards him. On the other hand, goodwill is a simple act of the will, whereby we wish a person well, even without presupposing the aforesaid union of the affections with him. Accordingly, to love, considered as an act of charity, includes goodwill, but such dilection or love adds union of affections, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 5) that “goodwill is a beginning of friendship.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher, by thus defining “to love,” does not describe it fully, but mentions only that part of its definition in which the act of love is chiefly manifested.

Reply to Objection 2: To love is indeed an act of the will tending to the good, but it adds a certain union with the beloved, which union is not denoted by goodwill.

Reply to Objection 3: These things mentioned by the Philosopher belong to friendship because they arise from a man’s love for himself, as he says in the same passage, in so far as a man does all these things in respect of his friend, even as he does them to himself: and this belongs to the aforesaid union of the affections.

Whether out of charity God ought to be loved for Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that God is loved out of charity, not for Himself but for the sake of something else. For Gregory says in a homily (In Evang. xi): “The soul learns from the things it knows, to love those it knows not,” where by things unknown he means the intelligible and the Divine, and by things known he indicates the objects of the senses. Therefore God is to be loved for the sake of something else.

Objection 2: Further, love follows knowledge. But God is known through something else, according to Rom. 1:20: “The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” Therefore He is also loved on account of something else and not for Himself.

Objection 3: Further, “hope begets charity” as a gloss says on Mat. 1:1, and “fear leads to charity,” according to Augustine in his commentary on the First Canonical Epistle of John (In prim. canon. Joan. Tract. ix). Now hope looks forward to obtain something from God, while fear shuns something which can be inflicted by God. Therefore it seems that God is to be loved on account of some good we hope for, or some evil to be feared. Therefore He is not to be loved for Himself.

On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i), to enjoy is to cleave to something for its own sake. Now “God is to be enjoyed” as he says in the same book. Therefore God is to be loved for Himself.

I answer that, The preposition “for” denotes a relation of causality. Now there are four kinds of cause, viz., final, formal, efficient, and material, to which a material disposition also is to be reduced, though it is not a cause simply but relatively. According to these four different causes one thing is said to be loved for another. In respect of the final cause, we love medicine, for instance, for health; in respect of the formal cause, we love a man for his virtue, because, to wit, by his virtue he is formally good and therefore lovable; in respect of the efficient cause, we love certain men because, for instance, they are the sons of such and such a father; and in respect of the disposition which is reducible to the genus of a material cause, we speak of loving something for that which disposed us to love it, e.g. we love a man for the favors received from him, although after we have begun to love our friend, we no longer love him for his favors, but for his virtue. Accordingly, as regards the first three ways, we love God, not for anything else, but for Himself. For He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things; nor does He require to receive any form in order to be good, for His very substance is His goodness, which is itself the exemplar of all other good things; nor again does goodness accrue to Him from aught else, but from Him to all other things. In the fourth way, however, He can be loved for something else, because we are disposed by certain things to advance in His love, for instance, by favors bestowed by Him, by the rewards we hope to receive from Him, or even by the punishments which we are minded to avoid through Him.

Reply to Objection 1: From the things it knows the soul learns to love what it knows not, not as though the things it knows were the reason for its loving things it knows not, through being the formal, final, or efficient cause of this love, but because this knowledge disposes man to love the unknown.

Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of God is indeed acquired through other things, but after He is known, He is no longer known through them, but through Himself, according to Jn. 4:42: “We now believe, not for thy saying: for we ourselves have heard Him, and know that this is indeed the Saviour of the world.”

Reply to Objection 3: Hope and fear lead to charity by way of a certain disposition, as was shown above ([2573]Q[17], A[8];[2574] Q[19], AA[4],7,10).

Whether God can be loved immediately in this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved immediately in this life. For the “unknown cannot be loved” as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Now we do not know God immediately in this life, since “we see now through a glass, in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Neither, therefore, do we love Him immediately.

Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less, cannot do what is more. Now it is more to love God than to know Him, since “he who is joined” to God by love, is “one spirit with Him” (1 Cor. 6:17). But man cannot know God immediately. Therefore much less can he love Him immediately.

Objection 3: Further, man is severed from God by sin, according to Is. 59:2: “Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love God immediately than to know Him immediately.

On the contrary, Knowledge of God, through being mediate, is said to be “enigmatic,” and “falls away” in heaven, as stated in 1 Cor. 13:12. But charity “does not fall away” as stated in the same passage (1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the charity of the way adheres to God immediately.

I answer that, As stated above ([2575]FP, Q[82], A[3]; Q[84], A[7]), the act of a cognitive power is completed by the thing known being in the knower, whereas the act of an appetitive power consists in the appetite being inclined towards the thing in itself. Hence it follows that the movement of the appetitive power is towards things in respect of their own condition, whereas the act of a cognitive power follows the mode of the knower.

Now in itself the very order of things is such, that God is knowable and lovable for Himself, since He is essentially truth and goodness itself, whereby other things are known and loved: but with regard to us, since our knowledge is derived through the senses, those things are knowable first which are nearer to our senses, and the last term of knowledge is that which is most remote from our senses.

Accordingly, we must assert that to love which is an act of the appetitive power, even in this state of life, tends to God first, and flows on from Him to other things, and in this sense charity loves God immediately, and other things through God. On the other hand, with regard to knowledge, it is the reverse, since we know God through other things, either as a cause through its effects, or by way of pre-eminence or negation as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i; cf. [2576]FP, Q[12], A[12]).

Reply to Objection 1: Although the unknown cannot be loved, it does not follow that the order of knowledge is the same as the order of love, since love is the term of knowledge, and consequently, love can begin at once where knowledge ends, namely in the thing itself which is known through another thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Since to love God is something greater than to know Him, especially in this state of life, it follows that love of God presupposes knowledge of God. And because this knowledge does not rest in creatures, but, through them, tends to something else, love begins there, and thence goes on to other things by a circular movement so to speak; for knowledge begins from creatures, tends to God, and love begins with God as the last end, and passes on to creatures.

Reply to Objection 3: Aversion from God, which is brought about by sin, is removed by charity, but not by knowledge alone: hence charity, by loving God, unites the soul immediately to Him with a chain of spiritual union.

Whether God can be loved wholly? [*Cf. Q[184], A[2]]

Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot be loved wholly. For love follows knowledge. Now God cannot be wholly known by us, since this would imply comprehension of Him. Therefore He cannot be wholly loved by us.

Objection 2: Further, love is a kind of union, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. iv). But the heart of man cannot be wholly united to God, because "God is greater than our heart" (1 Jn. 3:20). Therefore God cannot be loved wholly.

Objection 3: Further, God loves Himself wholly. If therefore He be loved wholly by another, this one will love Him as much as God loves Himself. But this is unreasonable. Therefore God cannot be wholly loved by a creature.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."

I answer that, Since love may be considered as something between lover and beloved, when we ask whether God can be wholly loved, the question may be understood in three ways, first so that the qualification "wholly" be referred to the thing loved, and thus God is to be loved wholly, since man should love all that pertains to God.

Secondly, it may be understood as though "wholly" qualified the lover: and thus again God ought to be loved wholly, since man ought to love God with all his might, and to refer all he has to the love of God, according to Dt. 6:5: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart."

Thirdly, it may be understood by way of comparison of the lover to the thing loved, so that the mode of the lover equal the mode of the thing loved. This is impossible: for, since a thing is lovable in proportion to its goodness, God is infinitely lovable, since His goodness is infinite. Now no creature can love God infinitely, because all power of creatures, whether it be natural or infused, is finite.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the first three objections consider the question in this third sense, while the last takes it in the second sense.

Whether in loving God we ought to observe any mode?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to observe some mode in loving God. For the notion of good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni iii, iv). Now the love of God is the best thing in man, according to Col. 3:14: “Above all . . . things, have charity.” Therefore there ought to be a mode of the love of God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. viii): “Prithee, tell me which is the mode of love. For I fear lest I burn with the desire and love of my Lord, more or less than I ought.” But it would be useless to seek the mode of the Divine love, unless there were one. Therefore there is a mode of the love of God.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), “the measure which nature appoints to a thing, is its mode.” Now the measure of the human will, as also of external action, is the reason. Therefore just as it is necessary for the reason to appoint a mode to the exterior effect of charity, according to Rom. 12:1: “Your reasonable service,” so also the interior love of God requires a mode.

On the contrary, Bernard says (De Dilig. Deum 1) that “God is the cause of our loving God; the measure is to love Him without measure.”

I answer that, As appears from the words of Augustine quoted above (OBJ 3) mode signifies a determination of measure; which determination is to be found both in the measure and in the thing measured, but not in the same way. For it is found in the measure essentially, because a measure is of itself the determining and modifying rule of other things; whereas in the things measured, it is found relatively, that is in so far as they attain to the measure. Hence there can be nothing unmodified in the measure whereas the thing measured is unmodified if it fails to attain to the measure, whether by deficiency or by excess.

Now in all matters of appetite and action the measure is the end, because the proper reason for all that we desire or do should be taken from the end, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore the end has a mode by itself, while the means take their mode from being proportionate to the end. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), “in every art, the desire for the end is endless and unlimited,” whereas there is a limit to the means: thus the physician does not put limits to health, but makes it as perfect as he possibly can; but he puts a limit to medicine, for he does not give as much medicine as he can, but according as health demands so that if he give too much or too little, the medicine would be immoderate.

Again, the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God, whereby principally we attain to our last end, as stated above ([2577]Q[23], A[6]), wherefore the mode in the love of God, must not be taken as in a thing measured where we find too much or too little, but as in the measure itself, where there cannot be excess, and where the more the rule is attained the better it is, so that the more we love God the better our love is.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is so by its essence takes precedence of that which is so through another, wherefore the goodness of the measure which has the mode essentially, takes precedence of the goodness of the thing measured, which has its mode through something else; and so too, charity, which has a mode as a measure has, stands before the other virtues, which have a mode through being measured .

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine adds in the same passage, “the measure of our love for God is to love Him with our whole heart,” that is to love Him as much as He can be loved, and this belongs to the mode which is proper to the measure.

Reply to Objection 3: An affection, whose object is subject to reason’s judgment, should be measured by reason. But the object of the Divine love which is God surpasses the judgment of reason, wherefore it is not measured by reason but transcends it. Nor is there parity between the interior act and external acts of charity. For the interior act of charity has the character of an end, since man’s ultimate good consists in his soul cleaving to God, according to Ps. 72:28: “It is good for me to adhere to my God”; whereas the exterior acts are as means to the end, and so have to be measured both according to charity and according to reason.

Whether it is more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend?

Objection 1: It would seem more meritorious to love an enemy than to love a friend. For it is written (Mat. 5:46): “If you love them that love you, what reward shall you have?” Therefore it is not deserving of reward to love one’s friend: whereas, as the same passage proves, to love one’s enemy is deserving of a reward. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.

Objection 2: Further, an act is the more meritorious through proceeding from a greater charity. But it belongs to the perfect children of God to love their enemies, whereas those also who have imperfect charity love their friends. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.

Objection 3: Further, where there is more effort for good, there seems to be more merit, since “every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor” (1 Cor. 3:8). Now a man has to make a greater effort to love his enemy than to love his friend, because it is more difficult. Therefore it seems more meritorious to love one’s enemy than to love one’s friend.

On the contrary, The better an action is, the more meritorious it is. Now it is better to love one’s friend, since it is better to love a better man, and the friend who loves you is better than the enemy who hates you. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s friend than to love one’s enemy.

I answer that, God is the reason for our loving our neighbor out of charity, as stated above ([2578]Q[25], A[1]). When therefore it is asked which is better or more meritorious, to love one’s friend or one’s enemy, these two loves may be compared in two ways, first, on the part of our neighbor whom we love, secondly, on the part of the reason for which we love him.

In the first way, love of one’s friend surpasses love of one’s enemy, because a friend is both better and more closely united to us, so that he is a more suitable matter of love and consequently the act of love that passes over this matter, is better, and therefore its opposite is worse, for it is worse to hate a friend than an enemy.

In the second way, however, it is better to love one’s enemy than one’s friend, and this for two reasons. First, because it is possible to love one’s friend for another reason than God, whereas God is the only reason for loving one’s enemy. Secondly, because if we suppose that both are loved for God, our love for God is proved to be all the stronger through carrying a man’s affections to things which are furthest from him, namely, to the love of his enemies, even as the power of a furnace is proved to be the stronger, according as it throws its heat to more distant objects. Hence our love for God is proved to be so much the stronger, as the more difficult are the things we accomplish for its sake, just as the power of fire is so much the stronger, as it is able to set fire to a less inflammable matter.

Yet just as the same fire acts with greater force on what is near than on what is distant, so too, charity loves with greater fervor those who are united to us than those who are far removed; and in this respect the love of friends, considered in itself, is more ardent and better than the love of one’s enemy.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Our Lord must be taken in their strict sense: because the love of one’s friends is not meritorious in God’s sight when we love them merely because they are our friends: and this would seem to be the case when we love our friends in such a way that we love not our enemies. On the other hand the love of our friends is meritorious, if we love them for God’s sake, and not merely because they are our friends.

The Reply to the other Objections is evident from what has been said in the article, because the two arguments that follow consider the reason for loving, while the last considers the question on the part of those who are loved.

Whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God. For the more meritorious thing would seem to be what the Apostle preferred. Now the Apostle preferred the love of our neighbor to the love of God, according to Rom. 9:3: “I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ for my brethren.” Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God.

Objection 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to love one’s friend, as stated above [2579](A[7]). Now God is our chief friend, since “He hath first loved us” (1 Jn. 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious to love God.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is more difficult seems to be more virtuous and meritorious since “virtue is about that which is difficult and good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is easier to love God than to love one’s neighbor, both because all things love God naturally, and because there is nothing unlovable in God, and this cannot be said of one’s neighbor. Therefore it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor than to love God.

On the contrary, That on account of which a thing is such, is yet more so. Now the love of one’s neighbor is not meritorious, except by reason of his being loved for God’s sake. Therefore the love of God is more meritorious than the love of our neighbor.

I answer that, This comparison may be taken in two ways. First, by considering both loves separately: and then, without doubt, the love of God is the more meritorious, because a reward is due to it for its own sake, since the ultimate reward is the enjoyment of God, to Whom the movement of the Divine love tends: hence a reward is promised to him that loves God (Jn. 14:21): “He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will . . . manifest Myself to him.” Secondly, the comparison may be understood to be between the love of God alone on the one side, and the love of one’s neighbor for God’s sake, on the other. In this way love of our neighbor includes love of God, while love of God does not include love of our neighbor. Hence the comparison will be between perfect love of God, extending also to our neighbor, and inadequate and imperfect love of God, for “this commandment we have from God, that he, who loveth God, love also his brother” (1 Jn. 4:21).

Reply to Objection 1: According to one gloss, the Apostle did not desire this, viz. to be severed from Christ for his brethren, when he was in a state of grace, but had formerly desired it when he was in a state of unbelief, so that we should not imitate him in this respect.

We may also reply, with Chrysostom (De Compunct. i, 8) [*Hom. xvi in Ep. ad Rom.] that this does not prove the Apostle to have loved his neighbor more than God, but that he loved God more than himself. For he wished to be deprived for a time of the Divine fruition which pertains to love of one self, in order that God might be honored in his neighbor, which pertains to the love of God.

Reply to Objection 2: A man’s love for his friends is sometimes less meritorious in so far as he loves them for their sake, so as to fall short of the true reason for the friendship of charity, which is God. Hence that God be loved for His own sake does not diminish the merit, but is the entire reason for merit.

Reply to Objection 3: The "good" has, more than the "difficult," to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better.

OF JOY (FOUR ARTICLES)

WE must now consider the effects which result from the principal act of charity which is love, and (1) the interior effects, (2) the exterior effects. As to the first, three things have to be considered: (1) Joy, (2) Peace, (3) Mercy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether joy is an effect of charity?

(2) Whether this kind of joy is compatible with sorrow?

(3) Whether this joy can be full?

(4) Whether it is a virtue?

Whether joy is effected in us by charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not effected in us by charity. For the absence of what we love causes sorrow rather than joy. But God, Whom we love by charity, is absent from us, so long as we are in this state of life, since "while we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Therefore charity causes sorrow in us rather than joy.

Objection 2: Further, it is chiefly through charity that we merit happiness. Now mourning, which pertains to sorrow, is reckoned among those things whereby we merit happiness, according to Mat. 5:5: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow, rather than joy, is an effect of charity.

Objection 3: Further, charity is a virtue distinct from hope, as shown above ([2580]Q[17], A[6]). Now joy is the effect of hope, according to Rom. 12:12: "Rejoicing in hope." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:5): “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.” But joy is caused in us by the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 14:17: “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.” Therefore charity is a cause of joy.

I answer that, As stated above ([2581]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2,3), when we were treating of the passions, joy and sorrow proceed from love, but in contrary ways. For joy is caused by love, either through the presence of the thing loved, or because the proper good of the thing loved exists and endures in it; and the latter is the case chiefly in the love of benevolence, whereby a man rejoices in the well-being of his friend, though he be absent. On the other hand sorrow arises from love, either through the absence of the thing loved, or because the loved object to which we wish well, is deprived of its good or afflicted with some evil. Now charity is love of God, Whose good is unchangeable, since He is His goodness, and from the very fact that He is loved, He is in those who love Him by His most excellent effect, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.” Therefore spiritual joy, which is about God, is caused by charity.

Reply to Objection 1: So long as we are in the body, we are said to be “absent from the Lord,” in comparison with that presence whereby He is present to some by the vision of “sight”; wherefore the Apostle goes on to say (2 Cor. 5:6): “For we walk by faith and not by sight.” Nevertheless, even in this life, He is present to those who love Him, by the indwelling of His grace.

Reply to Objection 2: The mourning that merits happiness, is about those things that are contrary to happiness. Wherefore it amounts to the same that charity causes this mourning, and this spiritual joy about God, since to rejoice in a certain good amounts to the same as to grieve for things that are contrary to it.

Reply to Objection 3: There can be spiritual joy about God in two ways. First, when we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself; secondly, when we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. The former joy is the better, and proceeds from charity chiefly: while the latter joy proceeds from hope also, whereby we look forward to enjoy the Divine good, although this enjoyment itself, whether perfect or imperfect, is obtained according to the measure of one’s charity.

Whether the spiritual joy, which results from charity, is compatible with an admixture of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy that results from charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow. For it belongs to charity to rejoice in our neighbor’s good, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, 6: “Charity . . . rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.” But this joy is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, according to Rom. 12:15: “Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep.” Therefore the spiritual joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv), “penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we have deplored.” But there is no true penance without charity. Therefore the joy of charity has an admixture of sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, it is through charity that man desires to be with Christ according to Phil. 1:23: “Having a desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” Now this desire gives rise, in man, to a certain sadness, according to Ps. 119:5: “Woe is me that my sojourning is prolonged!” Therefore the joy of charity admits of a seasoning of sorrow.

On the contrary, The joy of charity is joy about the Divine wisdom. Now such like joy has no admixture of sorrow, according to Wis. 8:16: “Her conversation hath no bitterness.” Therefore the joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), a twofold joy in God arises from charity. One, the more excellent, is proper to charity; and with this joy we rejoice in the Divine good considered in itself. This joy of charity is incompatible with an admixture of sorrow, even as the good which is its object is incompatible with any admixture of evil: hence the Apostle says (Phil. 4:4): “Rejoice in the Lord always.”

The other is the joy of charity whereby we rejoice in the Divine good as participated by us. This participation can be hindered by anything contrary to it, wherefore, in this respect, the joy of charity is compatible with an admixture of sorrow, in so far as a man grieves for that which hinders the participation of the Divine good, either in us or in our neighbor, whom we love as ourselves.

Reply to Objection 1: Our neighbor does not weep save on account of some evil. Now every evil implies lack of participation in the sovereign good: hence charity makes us weep with our neighbor in so far as he is hindered from participating in the Divine good.

Reply to Objection 2: Our sins divide between us and God, according to Is. 59:2; wherefore this is the reason why we grieve for our past sins, or for those of others, in so far as they hinder us from participating in the Divine good.

Reply to Objection 3: Although in this unhappy abode we participate, after a fashion, in the Divine good, by knowledge and love, yet the unhappiness of this life is an obstacle to a perfect participation in the Divine good: hence this very sorrow, whereby a man grieves for the delay of glory, is connected with the hindrance to a participation of the Divine good.

Whether the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity, can be filled?

Objection 1: It would seem that the spiritual joy which proceeds from charity cannot be filled. For the more we rejoice in God, the more is our joy in Him filled. But we can never rejoice in Him as much as it is meet that we should rejoice in God, since His goodness which is infinite, surpasses the creature's joy which is finite. Therefore joy in God can never be filled.

Objection 2: Further, that which is filled cannot be increased. But the joy, even of the blessed, can be increased, since one's joy is greater than another's. Therefore joy in God cannot be filled in a creature.

Objection 3: Further, comprehension seems to be nothing else than the fulness of knowledge. Now, just as the cognitive power of a creature is finite, so is its appetitive power. Since therefore God cannot be comprehended by any creature, it seems that no creature's joy in God can be filled.

On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:11): "That My joy may be in you, and your joy may be filled."

I answer that, Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus God's joy alone in Himself is filled, because it is infinite; and this is condignly due to the infinite goodness of God: but the joy of any creature must needs be finite. Secondly, fulness of joy may be understood on the part of the one who rejoices. Now joy is compared to desire, as rest to movement, as stated above ([2582]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), when we were treating of the passions: and rest is full when there is no more movement. Hence joy is full, when there remains nothing to be desired. But as long as we are in this world, the movement of desire does not cease in us, because it still remains possible for us to approach nearer to God by grace, as was shown above (Q[24], AA[4],7). When once, however, perfect happiness has been attained, nothing will remain to be desired, because then there will be full enjoyment of God, wherein man will obtain whatever he had desired, even with regard to other goods, according to Ps. 102:5: “Who satisfieth thy desire with good things.” Hence desire will be at rest, not only our desire for God, but all our desires: so that the joy of the blessed is full to perfection—indeed over-full, since they will obtain more than they were capable of desiring: for “neither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love Him” (1 Cor. 2:9). This is what is meant by the words of Lk. 6:38: “Good measure and pressed down, and shaken together, and running over shall they give into your bosom.” Yet, since no creature is capable of the joy condignly due to God, it follows that this perfectly full joy is not taken into man, but, on the contrary, man enters into it, according to Mat. 25:21: “Enter into the joy of thy Lord.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the fulness of joy in reference to the thing in which we rejoice.

Reply to Objection 2: When each one attains to happiness he will reach the term appointed to him by Divine predestination, and nothing further will remain to which he may tend, although by reaching that term, some will approach nearer to God than others. Hence each one’s joy will be full with regard to himself, because his desire will be fully set at rest; yet one’s joy will be greater than another’s, on account of a fuller participation of the Divine happiness.

Reply to Objection 3: Comprehension denotes fulness of knowledge in respect of the thing known, so that it is known as much as it can be. There is however a fulness of knowledge in respect of the knower, just as we have said of joy. Wherefore the Apostle says (Col. 1:9): “That you may be filled with the knowledge of His will, in all wisdom and spiritual understanding.”

Whether joy is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is a virtue. For vice is contrary to virtue. Now sorrow is set down as a vice, as in the case of sloth and envy. Therefore joy also should be accounted a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, as love and hope are passions, the object of which is “good,” so also is joy. Now love and hope are reckoned to be virtues. Therefore joy also should be reckoned a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. But we are commanded to rejoice in the Lord, according to Phil. 4:4: “Rejoice in the Lord always.” Therefore joy is a virtue.

On the contrary, It is not numbered among the theological virtues, nor among the moral, nor among the intellectual virtues, as is evident from what has been said above (FS, QQ[57],60,62).

I answer that, As stated above ([2583]FS, Q[55], AA[2],4), virtue is an operative habit, wherefore by its very nature it has an inclination to a certain act. Now it may happen that from the same habit there proceed several ordinate and homogeneous acts, each of which follows from another. And since the subsequent acts do not proceed from the virtuous habit except through the preceding act, hence it is that the virtue is defined and named in reference to that preceding act, although those other acts also proceed from the virtue. Now it is evident from what we have said about the passions ([2584]FS, Q[25], AA[2],4) that love is the first affection of the appetitive power, and that desire and joy follow from it. Hence the same virtuous habit inclines us to love and desire the beloved good, and to rejoice in it. But in as much as love is the first of these acts, that virtue takes its name, not from joy, nor from desire, but from love, and is called charity. Hence joy is not a virtue distinct from charity, but an act, or effect, of charity: for which reason it is numbered among the Fruits (Gal. 5:22).

Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow which is a vice is caused by inordinate self-love, and this is not a special vice, but a general source of the vices, as stated above ([2585]FS, Q[77], A[4]); so that it was necessary to account certain particular sorrows as special vices, because they do not arise from a special, but from a general vice. On the other hand love of God is accounted a special virtue, namely charity, to which joy must be referred, as its proper act, as stated above (here and A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Hope proceeds from love even as joy does, but hope adds, on the part of the object, a special character, viz. “difficult,” and “possible to obtain”; for which reason it is accounted a special virtue. On the other hand joy does not add to love any special aspect, that might cause a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: The Law prescribes joy, as being an act of charity, albeit not its first act.

OF PEACE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider Peace, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether peace is the same as concord?

(2) Whether all things desire peace?

(3) Whether peace is an effect of charity?

(4) Whether peace is a virtue?

Whether peace is the same as concord?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is the same as concord. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): “Peace among men is well ordered concord.” Now we are speaking here of no other peace than that of men. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Objection 2: Further, concord is union of wills. Now the nature of peace consists in such like union, for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xi) that peace unites all, and makes them of one mind. Therefore peace is the same as concord.

Objection 3: Further, things whose opposites are identical are themselves identical. Now the one same thing is opposed to concord and peace, viz. dissension; hence it is written (1 Cor. 16:33): “God is not the God of dissension but of peace.” Therefore peace is the same as concord.

On the contrary, There can be concord in evil between wicked men. But "there is no peace to the wicked" (Is. 48:22). Therefore peace is not the same as concord.

I answer that, Peace includes concord and adds something thereto. Hence wherever peace is, there is concord, but there is not peace, wherever there is concord, if we give peace its proper meaning.

For concord, properly speaking, is between one man and another, in so far as the wills of various hearts agree together in consenting to the same thing. Now the heart of one man may happen to tend to diverse things, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the diverse appetitive powers: thus the sensitive appetite tends sometimes to that which is opposed to the rational appetite, according to Gal. 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit." Secondly, in so far as one and the same appetitive power tends to diverse objects of appetite, which it cannot obtain all at the same time: so that there must needs be a clashing of the movements of the appetite. Now the union of such movements is essential to peace, because man's heart is not at peace, so long as he has not what he wants, or if, having what he wants, there still remains something for him to want, and which he cannot have at the same time. On the other hand this union is not essential to concord: wherefore concord denotes union of appetites among various persons, while peace denotes, in addition to this union, the union of the appetites even in one man.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there of that peace which is between one man and another, and he says that this peace is concord, not indeed any kind of concord, but that which is well ordered, through one man agreeing with another in respect of something befitting to both of them . For if one man concord with another, not of his own accord, but through being forced, as it were, by the fear of some evil that besets him, such concord is not really peace, because the order of each concordant is not observed, but is disturbed by some fear-inspiring cause. For this reason he premises that "peace is tranquillity of order," which tranquillity consists in all the appetitive movements in one man being set at rest together.

Reply to Objection 2: If one man consent to the same thing together with another man, his consent is nevertheless not perfectly united to himself, unless at the same time all his appetitive movements be in agreement.

Reply to Objection 3: A twofold dissension is opposed to peace, namely dissension between a man and himself, and dissension between one man and another. The latter alone is opposed to concord.

Whether all things desire peace?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all things desire peace. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. xi), peace "unites consent." But there cannot be unity of consent in things which are devoid of knowledge. Therefore such things cannot desire peace.

Objection 2: Further, the appetite does not tend to opposite things at the same time. Now many desire war and dissension. Therefore all men do not desire peace.

Objection 3: Further, good alone is an object of appetite. But a certain peace is, seemingly, evil, else Our Lord would not have said (Mat. 10:34): "I came not to send peace." Therefore all things do not desire peace.

Objection 4: Further, that which all desire is, seemingly, the sovereign good which is the last end. But this is not true of peace, since it is attainable even by a wayfarer; else Our Lord would vainly command (Mk. 9:49): "Have peace among you." Therefore all things do not desire peace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12,14) that "all things desire peace": and Dionysius says the same (Div. Nom. xi).

I answer that, From the very fact that a man desires a certain thing it follows that he desires to obtain what he desires, and, in consequence, to remove whatever may be an obstacle to his obtaining it. Now a man may be hindered from obtaining the good he desires, by a contrary desire either of his own or of some other, and both are removed by peace, as stated above. Hence it follows of necessity that whoever desires anything desires peace, in so far as he who desires anything, desires to attain, with tranquillity and without hindrance, to that which he desires: and this is what is meant by peace which Augustine defines (De Civ. Dei xix, 13) "the tranquillity of order."

Reply to Objection 1: Peace denotes union not only of the intellective or rational appetite, or of the animal appetite, in both of which consent may be found, but also of the natural appetite. Hence Dionysius says that "peace is the cause of consent and of connaturalness," where "consent" denotes the union of appetites proceeding from knowledge, and “connaturalness,” the union of natural appetites.

Reply to Objection 2: Even those who seek war and dissension, desire nothing but peace, which they deem themselves not to have. For as we stated above, there is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he would prefer. Consequently men seek by means of war to break this concord, because it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to their will. Hence all wars are waged that men may find a more perfect peace than that which they had heretofore.

Reply to Objection 3: Peace gives calm and unity to the appetite. Now just as the appetite may tend to what is good simply, or to what is good apparently, so too, peace may be either true or apparent. There can be no true peace except where the appetite is directed to what is truly good, since every evil, though it may appear good in a way, so as to calm the appetite in some respect, has, nevertheless many defects, which cause the appetite to remain restless and disturbed. Hence true peace is only in good men and about good things. The peace of the wicked is not a true peace but a semblance thereof, wherefore it is written (Wis. 14:22): “Whereas they lived in a great war of ignorance, they call so many and so great evils peace.”

Reply to Objection 4: Since true peace is only about good things, as the true good is possessed in two ways, perfectly and imperfectly, so there is a twofold true peace. One is perfect peace. It consists in the perfect enjoyment of the sovereign good, and unites all one’s desires by giving them rest in one object. This is the last end of the rational creature, according to Ps. 147:3: “Who hath placed peace in thy borders.” The other is imperfect peace, which may be had in this world, for though the chief movement of the soul finds rest in God, yet there are certain things within and without which disturb the peace.

Whether peace is the proper effect of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not sanctifying grace, thus heathens sometimes have peace. Therefore peace is not the effect of charity.

Objection 2: Further, if a certain thing is caused by charity, its contrary is not compatible with charity. But dissension, which is contrary to peace, is compatible with charity, for we find that even holy doctors, such as Jerome and Augustine, dissented in some of their opinions. We also read that Paul and Barnabas dissented from one another (Acts 15). Therefore it seems that peace is not the effect of charity.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing is not the proper effect of different things. Now peace is the effect of justice, according to Is. 32:17: "And the work of justice shall be peace." Therefore it is not the effect of charity.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:165): "Much peace have they that love Thy Law."

I answer that, Peace implies a twofold union, as stated above [2586] (A[1]). The first is the result of one's own appetites being directed to one object; while the other results from one's own appetite being united with the appetite of another: and each of these unions is effected by charity—the first, in so far as man loves God with his whole heart, by referring all things to Him, so that all his desires tend to one object—the second, in so far as we love our neighbor as ourselves, the result being that we wish to fulfil our neighbor's will as though it were ours: hence it is reckoned a sign of friendship if people "make choice of the same things" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Tully says (De Amicitia) that friends "like and dislike the same things" (Sallust, Catilin.)

Reply to Objection 1: Without sin no one falls from a state of sanctifying grace, for it turns man away from his due end by making him place his end in something undue: so that his appetite does not cleave chiefly to the true final good, but to some apparent good. Hence, without sanctifying grace, peace is not real but merely apparent.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 6) friends need not agree in opinion, but only upon such goods as conduce to life, and especially upon such as are important; because dissension in small matters is scarcely accounted dissension. Hence nothing hinders those who have charity from holding different opinions. Nor is this an obstacle to peace, because opinions concern the intellect, which precedes the appetite that is united by peace. In like manner if there be concord as to goods of importance, dissension with regard to some that are of little account is not contrary to charity: for such a dissension proceeds from a difference of opinion, because one man thinks that the particular good, which is the object of dissension, belongs to the good about which they agree, while the other thinks that it does not. Accordingly such like dissension about very slight matters and about opinions is inconsistent with a state of perfect peace, wherein the truth will be known fully, and every desire fulfilled; but it is not inconsistent with the imperfect peace of the wayfarer.

Reply to Objection 3: Peace is the “work of justice” indirectly, in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace: but it is the work of charity directly, since charity, according to its very nature, causes peace. For love is “a unitive force” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): and peace is the union of the appetite’s inclinations.

Whether peace is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that peace is a virtue. For nothing is a matter of precept, unless it be an act of virtue. But there are precepts about keeping peace, for example: “Have peace among you” (Mk. 9:49). Therefore peace is a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. Now it is meritorious to keep peace, according to Mat. 5:9: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.” Therefore peace is a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. But dissensions, which are contrary to peace, are numbered among the vices (Gal. 5:20). Therefore peace is a virtue.

On the contrary, Virtue is not the last end, but the way thereto. But peace is the last end, in a sense, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 11). Therefore peace is not a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([2587]Q[28], A[4]), when a number of acts all proceeding uniformly from an agent, follow one from the other, they all arise from the same virtue, nor do they each have a virtue from which they proceed, as may be seen in corporeal things. For, though fire by heating, both liquefies and rarefies, there are not two powers in fire, one of liquefaction, the other of rarefaction: and fire produces all such actions by its own power of calefaction.

Since then charity causes peace precisely because it is love of God and of our neighbor, as shown above [2588](A[3]), there is no other virtue except charity whose proper act is peace, as we have also said in reference to joy (Q[28], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: We are commanded to keep peace because it is an act of charity; and for this reason too it is a meritorious act. Hence it is placed among the beatitudes, which are acts of perfect virtue, as stated above ([2589]FS, Q[69], AA[1],3). It is also numbered among the fruits, in so far as it is a final good, having spiritual sweetness.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Several vices are opposed to one virtue in respect of its various acts: so that not only is hatred opposed to charity, in respect of its act which is love, but also sloth and envy, in respect of joy, and dissension in respect of peace.

OF MERCY (FOUR ARTICLES)

[*The one Latin word “misericordia” signifies either pity or mercy. The distinction between these two is that pity may stand either for the act or for the virtue, whereas mercy stands only for the virtue.]

We must now go on to consider Mercy, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether evil is the cause of mercy on the part of the person pitied?

(2) To whom does it belong to pity?

(3) Whether mercy is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of virtues?

Whether evil is properly the motive of mercy?

Objection 1: It would seem that, properly speaking, evil is not the motive of mercy. For, as shown above (Q[19], A[1]; [2590]FS, Q[79], A[1], ad 4; [2591]FP, Q[48] , A[6]), fault is an evil rather than punishment. Now fault provokes indignation rather than mercy. Therefore evil does not excite mercy.

Objection 2: Further, cruelty and harshness seem to excel other evils. Now the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “harshness does not call for pity but drives it away.” Therefore evil, as such, is not the motive of mercy.

Objection 3: Further, signs of evils are not true evils. But signs of evils excite one to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 8). Therefore evil, properly speaking, is not an incentive to mercy.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 2) that mercy is a kind of sorrow. Now evil is the motive of sorrow. Therefore it is the motive of mercy.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5), mercy is heartfelt sympathy for another’s distress, impelling us to succor him if we can. For mercy takes its name “misericordia” from denoting a man’s compassionate heart [miserum cor] for another’s unhappiness. Now unhappiness is opposed to happiness: and it is essential to beatitude or happiness that one should obtain what one wishes; for, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiii, 5), “happy is he who has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.” Hence, on the other hand, it belongs to unhappiness that a man should suffer what he wishes not.

Now a man wishes a thing in three ways: first, by his natural appetite; thus all men naturally wish to be and to live: secondly, a man wishes a thing from deliberate choice: thirdly, a man wishes a thing, not in itself, but in its cause, thus, if a man wishes to eat what is bad for him, we say that, in a way, he wishes to be ill.

Accordingly the motive of “mercy,” being something pertaining to “misery,” is, in the first way, anything contrary to the will’s natural appetite, namely corruptive or distressing evils, the contrary of which man desires naturally, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “pity is sorrow for a visible evil, whether corruptive or distressing.” Secondly, such like evils are yet more provocative of pity if they are contrary to deliberate choice, wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that evil excites our pity “when it is the result of an accident, as when something turns out ill, whereas we hoped well of it.” Thirdly, they cause yet greater pity, if they are entirely contrary to the will, as when evil befalls a man who has always striven to do well: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “we pity most the distress of one who suffers undeservedly.”

Reply to Objection 1: It is essential to fault that it be voluntary; and in this respect it deserves punishment rather than mercy. Since, however, fault may be, in a way, a punishment, through having something connected with it that is against the sinner’s will, it may, in this respect, call for mercy. It is in this sense that we pity and commiserate sinners. Thus Gregory says in a homily (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that “true godliness is not disdainful but compassionate,” and again it is written (Mat. 9:36) that Jesus “seeing the multitudes, had compassion on them: because they were distressed, and lying like sheep that have no shepherd.”

Reply to Objection 2: Since pity is sympathy for another’s distress, it is directed, properly speaking, towards another, and not to oneself, except figuratively, like justice, according as a man is considered to have various parts (Ethic. v, 11). Thus it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God” [*Cf.[2592] Q[106], A[3], ad 1].

Accordingly just as, properly speaking, a man does not pity himself, but suffers in himself, as when we suffer cruel treatment in ourselves, so too, in the case of those who are so closely united to us, as to be part of ourselves, such as our children or our parents, we do not pity their distress, but suffer as for our own sores; in which sense the Philosopher says that “harshness drives pity away.”

Reply to Objection 3: Just as pleasure results from hope and memory of good things, so does sorrow arise from the prospect or the recollection of evil things; though not so keenly as when they are present to the senses. Hence the signs of evil move us to pity, in so far as they represent as present, the evil that excites our pity.

Whether the reason for taking pity is a defect in the person who pities?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who takes pity. For it is proper to God to be merciful, wherefore it is written (Ps. 144:9): “His tender mercies are over all His works.” But there is no defect in God. Therefore a defect cannot be the reason for taking pity.

Objection 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “those who are in a desperate state are pitiless.” Therefore it seems that the reason for taking pity is not a defect in the person who pities.

Objection 3: Further, to be treated with contempt is to be defective. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that “those who are disposed to contumely are pitiless.” Therefore the reason for taking pity, is not a defect in the person who pities.

On the contrary, Pity is a kind of sorrow. But a defect is the reason of sorrow, wherefore those who are in bad health give way to sorrow more easily, as we shall say further on ([2593]Q[35], A[1], ad 2). Therefore the reason why one takes pity is a defect in oneself.

I answer that, Since pity is grief for another’s distress, as stated above [2594](A[1]), from the very fact that a person takes pity on anyone, it follows that another’s distress grieves him. And since sorrow or grief is about one’s own ills, one grieves or sorrows for another’s distress, in so far as one looks upon another’s distress as one’s own.

Now this happens in two ways: first, through union of the affections, which is the effect of love. For, since he who loves another looks upon his friend as another self, he counts his friend’s hurt as his own, so that he grieves for his friend’s hurt as though he were hurt himself. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 4) reckons “grieving with one’s friend” as being one of the signs of friendship, and the Apostle says (Rom. 12:15): “Rejoice with them that rejoice, weep with them that weep.”

Secondly, it happens through real union, for instance when another’s evil comes near to us, so as to pass to us from him. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that men pity such as are akin to them, and the like, because it makes them realize that the same may happen to themselves. This also explains why the old and the wise who consider that they may fall upon evil times, as also feeble and timorous persons, are more inclined to pity: whereas those who deem themselves happy, and so far powerful as to think themselves in no danger of suffering any hurt, are not so inclined to pity.

Accordingly a defect is always the reason for taking pity, either because one looks upon another’s defect as one’s own, through being united to him by love, or on account of the possibility of suffering in the same way.

Reply to Objection 1: God takes pity on us through love alone, in as much as He loves us as belonging to Him.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are already in infinite distress, do not fear to suffer more, wherefore they are without pity. In like manner this applies to those also who are in great fear, for they are so intent on their own passion, that they pay no attention to the suffering of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are disposed to contumely, whether through having been contemned, or because they wish to contemn others, are incited to anger and daring, which are manly passions and arouse the human spirit to attempt difficult things. Hence they make a man think that he is going to suffer something in the future, so that while they are disposed in that way they are pitiless, according to Prov. 27:4: “Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth.” For the same reason the proud are without pity, because they despise others, and think them wicked, so that they account them as suffering deservedly whatever they suffer. Hence Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) that “false godliness,” i.e. of the proud, “is not compassionate but disdainful.”

Whether mercy is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is not a virtue. For the chief part of virtue is choice as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5). Now choice is “the desire of what has been already counselled” (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore whatever hinders counsel cannot be called a virtue. But mercy hinders counsel, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.): “All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from . . . anger . . . and mercy, because the mind does not easily see aright, when these things stand in the way.” Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, nothing contrary to virtue is praiseworthy. But nemesis is contrary to mercy, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9), and yet it is a praiseworthy passion (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, joy and peace are not special virtues, because they result from charity, as stated above ([2595]Q[28], A[4];[2596] Q[29], A[4]). Now mercy, also, results from charity; for it is out of charity that we weep with them that weep, as we rejoice with them that rejoice. Therefore mercy is not a special virtue.

Objection 4: Further, since mercy belongs to the appetitive power, it is not an intellectual virtue, and, since it has not God for its object, neither is it a theological virtue. Moreover it is not a moral virtue, because neither is it about operations, for this belongs to justice; nor is it about passions, since it is not reduced to one of the twelve means mentioned by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore mercy is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): “Cicero in praising Caesar expresses himself much better and in a fashion at once more humane and more in accordance with religious feeling, when he says: ‘Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous or more graceful than thy mercy.’” Therefore mercy is a virtue.

I answer that, Mercy signifies grief for another’s distress. Now this grief may denote, in one way, a movement of the sensitive appetite, in which case mercy is not a virtue but a passion; whereas, in another way, it may denote a movement of the intellective appetite, in as much as one person’s evil is displeasing to another. This movement may be ruled in accordance with reason, and in accordance with this movement regulated by reason, the movement of the lower appetite may be regulated. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that “this movement of the mind” (viz. mercy) “obeys the reason, when mercy is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, whether we give to the needy or forgive the repentant.” And since it is essential to human virtue that the movements of the soul should be regulated by reason, as was shown above ([2597]FS, Q[59], AA[4],5), it follows that mercy is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Sallust are to be understood as applying to the mercy which is a passion unregulated by reason: for thus it impedes the counselling of reason, by making it wander from justice.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of pity and nemesis, considered, both of them, as passions. They are contrary to one another on the part of their respective estimation of another’s evils, for which pity grieves, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer undeservedly, whereas nemesis rejoices, in so far as it esteems someone to suffer deservedly, and grieves, if things go well with the undeserving: “both of these are praiseworthy and come from the same disposition of character” (Rhet. ii, 9). Properly speaking, however, it is envy which is opposed to pity, as we shall state further on ([2598]Q[36], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: Joy and peace add nothing to the aspect of good which is the object of charity, wherefore they do not require any other virtue besides charity. But mercy regards a certain special aspect, namely the misery of the person pitied.

Reply to Objection 4: Mercy, considered as a virtue, is a moral virtue having relation to the passions, and it is reduced to the mean called nemesis, because “they both proceed from the same character” (Rhet. ii, 9). Now the Philosopher proposes these means not as virtues, but as passions, because, even as passions, they are praiseworthy. Yet nothing prevents them from proceeding from some elective habit, in which case they assume the character of a virtue.

Whether mercy is the greatest of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For the worship of God seems a most virtuous act. But mercy is preferred before the worship of God, according to Osee 6:6 and Mat. 12:7: “I have desired mercy and not sacrifice.” Therefore mercy is the greatest virtue.

Objection 2: Further, on the words of 1 Tim. 4:8: “Godliness is profitable to all things,” a gloss says: “The sum total of a Christian’s rule of life consists in mercy and godliness.” Now the Christian rule of life embraces every virtue. Therefore the sum total of all virtues is contained in mercy.

Objection 3: Further, “Virtue is that which makes its subject good,” according to the Philosopher. Therefore the more a virtue makes a man like God, the better is that virtue: since man is the better for being more like God. Now this is chiefly the result of mercy, since of God is it said (Ps. 144:9) that “His tender mercies are over all His works,” and (Lk. 6:36) Our Lord said: “Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” Therefore mercy is the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, The Apostle after saying (Col. 3:12): “Put ye on . . . as the elect of God . . . the bowels of mercy,” etc., adds (Col. 3:14): “Above all things have charity.” Therefore mercy is not the greatest of virtues.

I answer that, A virtue may take precedence of others in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in comparison with its subject. In itself, mercy takes precedence of other virtues, for it belongs to mercy to be bountiful to others, and, what is more, to succor others in their wants, which pertains chiefly to one who stands above. Hence mercy is accounted as being proper to God: and therein His omnipotence is declared to be chiefly manifested [*Collect, Tenth Sunday after Pentecost].

On the other hand, with regard to its subject, mercy is not the greatest virtue, unless that subject be greater than all others, surpassed by none and excelling all: since for him that has anyone above him it is better to be united to that which is above than to supply the defect of that which is beneath. [*"The quality of mercy is not strained./' Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes/The throned monarch better than his crown." Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Scene i.]. Hence, as regards man, who has God above him, charity which unites him to God, is greater than mercy, whereby he supplies the defects of his neighbor. But of all the virtues which relate to our neighbor, mercy is the greatest, even as its act surpasses all others, since it belongs to one who is higher and better to supply the defect of another, in so far as the latter is deficient.

Reply to Objection 1: We worship God by external sacrifices and gifts, not for His own profit, but for that of ourselves and our neighbor. For He needs not our sacrifices, but wishes them to be offered to Him, in order to arouse our devotion and to profit our neighbor. Hence mercy, whereby we supply others' defects is a sacrifice more acceptable to Him, as conducing more directly to our neighbor's well-being, according to Heb. 13:16: "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained."

Reply to Objection 2: The sum total of the Christian religion consists in mercy, as regards external works: but the inward love of charity, whereby we are united to God preponderates over both love and mercy for our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity likens us to God by uniting us to Him in the bond of love: wherefore it surpasses mercy, which likens us to God as regards similarity of works.

OF BENEFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the outward acts or effects of charity, (1) Beneficence, (2) Almsdeeds, which are a part of beneficence, (3) Fraternal correction, which is a kind of alms.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether beneficence is an act of charity ?

(2) Whether we ought to be beneficent to all?

(3) Whether we ought to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us?

(4) Whether beneficence is a special virtue?

Whether beneficence is an act of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity. For charity is chiefly directed to God. Now we cannot benefit God, according to Job 35:7: “What shalt thou give Him? or what shall He receive of thy hand?” Therefore beneficence is not an act of charity.

Objection 2: Further, beneficence consists chiefly in making gifts. But this belongs to liberality. Therefore beneficence is an act of liberality and not of charity.

Objection 3: Further, what a man gives, he gives either as being due, or as not due. But a benefit conferred as being due belongs to justice while a benefit conferred as not due, is gratuitous, and in this respect is an act of mercy. Therefore every benefit conferred is either an act of justice, or an act of mercy. Therefore it is not an act of charity.

On the contrary, Charity is a kind of friendship, as stated above ([2599]Q[23] , A[1]). Now the Philosopher reckons among the acts of friendship (Ethic. ix, 1) “doing good,” i.e. being beneficent, “to one’s friends.” Therefore it is an act of charity to do good to others.

I answer that, Beneficence simply means doing good to someone. This good may be considered in two ways, first under the general aspect of good, and this belongs to beneficence in general, and is an act of friendship, and, consequently, of charity: because the act of love includes goodwill whereby a man wishes his friend well, as stated above ([2600]Q[23], A[1];[2601] Q[27] , A[2]). Now the will carries into effect if possible, the things it wills, so that, consequently, the result of an act of love is that a man is beneficent to his friend. Therefore beneficence in its general acceptation is an act of friendship or charity.

But if the good which one man does another, be considered under some special aspect of good, then beneficence will assume a special character and will belong to some special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “love moves those, whom it unites, to a mutual relationship: it turns the inferior to the superior to be perfected thereby; it moves the superior to watch over the inferior:” and in this respect beneficence is an effect of love. Hence it is not for us to benefit God, but to honor Him by obeying Him, while it is for Him, out of His love, to bestow good things on us.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things must be observed in the bestowal of gifts. One is the thing given outwardly, while the other is the inward passion that a man has in the delight of riches. It belongs to liberality to moderate this inward passion so as to avoid excessive desire and love for riches; for this makes a man more ready to part with his wealth. Hence, if a man makes some great gift, while yet desiring to keep it for himself, his is not a liberal giving. On the other hand, as regards the outward gift, the act of beneficence belongs in general to friendship or charity. Hence it does not detract from a man’s friendship, if, through love, he give his friend something he would like to I keep for himself; rather does this prove the perfection of his friendship.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as friendship or charity sees, in the benefit bestowed, the general aspect of good, so does justice see therein the aspect of debt, while pity considers the relieving of distress or defect.

Whether we ought to do good to all?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are not bound to do good to all. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28) that we “are unable to do good to everyone.” Now virtue does not incline one to the impossible. Therefore it is not necessary to do good to all.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 12:5) “Give to the good, and receive not a sinner.” But many men are sinners. Therefore we need not do good to all.

Objection 3: Further, “Charity dealeth not perversely” (1 Cor. 13:4). Now to do good to some is to deal perversely: for instance if one were to do good to an excommunicated person, since, by doing so, he would be holding communion with him. Therefore, since beneficence is an act of charity, we ought not to do good to all.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 6:10): “Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1), beneficence is an effect of love in so far as love moves the superior to watch over the inferior. Now degrees among men are not unchangeable as among angels, because men are subject to many failings, so that he who is superior in one respect, is or may be inferior in another. Therefore, since the love of charity extends to all, beneficence also should extend to all, but according as time and place require: because all acts of virtue must be modified with a view to their due circumstances.

Reply to Objection 1: Absolutely speaking it is impossible to do good to every single one: yet it is true of each individual that one may be bound to do good to him in some particular case. Hence charity binds us, though not actually doing good to someone, to be prepared in mind to do good to anyone if we have time to spare. There is however a good that we can do to all, if not to each individual, at least to all in general, as when we pray for all, for unbelievers as well as for the faithful.

Reply to Objection 2: In a sinner there are two things, his guilt and his nature. Accordingly we are bound to succor the sinner as to the maintenance of his nature, but not so as to abet his sin, for this would be to do evil rather than good.

Reply to Objection 3: The excommunicated and the enemies of the common weal are deprived of all beneficence, in so far as this prevents them from doing evil deeds. Yet if their nature be in urgent need of succor lest it fail, we are bound to help them: for instance, if they be in danger of death through hunger or thirst, or suffer some like distress, unless this be according to the order of justice.

Whether we ought to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we are nor bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Lk. 14:12): “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren, nor thy kinsmen.” Now these are the most closely united to us. Therefore we are not bound to do good to those rather who are more closely united to us, but preferably to strangers and to those who are in want: hence the text goes on: “But, when thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed,” etc.

Objection 2: Further, to help another in the battle is an act of very great goodness. But a soldier on the battlefield is bound to help a fellow-soldier who is a stranger rather than a kinsman who is a foe. Therefore in doing acts of kindness we are not bound to give the preference to those who are most closely united to us.

Objection 3: Further, we should pay what is due before conferring gratuitous favors. But it is a man’s duty to be good to those who have been good to him. Therefore we ought to do good to our benefactors rather than to those who are closely united to us.

Objection 4: Further, a man ought to love his parents more than his children, as stated above ([2602]Q[26], A[9]). Yet a man ought to be more beneficent to his children, since “neither ought the children to lay up for the parents,” according to 2 Cor. 12:14. Therefore we are not bound to be more beneficent to those who are more closely united to us.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28): “Since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us.”

I answer that, Grace and virtue imitate the order of nature, which is established by Divine wisdom. Now the order of nature is such that every natural agent pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest to it: thus fire heats most what is next to it. In like manner God pours forth the gifts of His goodness first and most plentifully on the substances which are nearest to Him, as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). But the bestowal of benefits is an act of charity towards others. Therefore we ought to be most beneficent towards those who are most closely connected with us.

Now one man’s connection with another may be measured in reference to the various matters in which men are engaged together; (thus the intercourse of kinsmen is in natural matters, that of fellow-citizens is in civic matters, that of the faithful is in spiritual matters, and so forth): and various benefits should be conferred in various ways according to these various connections, because we ought in preference to bestow on each one such benefits as pertain to the matter in which, speaking simply, he is most closely connected with us. And yet this may vary according to the various requirements of time, place, or matter in hand: because in certain cases one ought, for instance, to succor a stranger, in extreme necessity, rather than one's own father, if he is not in such urgent need.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not absolutely forbid us to invite our friends and kinsmen to eat with us, but to invite them so that they may invite us in return, since that would be an act not of charity but of cupidity. The case may occur, however, that one ought rather to invite strangers, on account of their greater want. For it must be understood that, other things being equal, one ought to succor those rather who are most closely connected with us. And if of two, one be more closely connected, and the other in greater want, it is not possible to decide, by any general rule, which of them we ought to help rather than the other, since there are various degrees of want as well as of connection: and the matter requires the judgment of a prudent man.

Reply to Objection 2: The common good of many is more Godlike than the good of an individual. Wherefore it is a virtuous action for a man to endanger even his own life, either for the spiritual or for the temporal common good of his country. Since therefore men engage together in warlike acts in order to safeguard the common weal, the soldier who with this in view succors his comrade, succors him not as a private individual, but with a view to the welfare of his country as a whole: wherefore it is not a matter for wonder if a stranger be preferred to one who is a blood relation.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be due in two ways. There is one which should be reckoned, not among the goods of the debtor, but rather as belonging to the person to whom it is due: for instance, a man may have another's goods, whether in money or in kind, either because he has stolen them, or because he has received them on loan or in deposit or in some other way. In this case a man ought to pay what he owes, rather than benefit his connections out of it, unless perchance the case be so urgent that it would be lawful for him to take another's property in order to relieve the one who is in need. Yet, again, this would not apply if the creditor were in equal distress: in which case, however, the claims on either side would have to be weighed with regard to such other conditions as a prudent man would take into consideration, because, on account of the different particular cases, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 2), it is impossible to lay down a general rule.

The other kind of due is one which is reckoned among the goods of the debtor and not of the creditor; for instance, a thing may be due, not because justice requires it, but on account of a certain moral equity, as in the case of benefits received gratis. Now no benefactor confers a benefit equal to that which a man receives from his parents: wherefore in paying back benefits received, we should give the first place to our parents before all others, unless, on the other side, there be such weightier motives, as need or some other circumstance, for instance the common good of the Church or state. In other cases we must take to account the connection and the benefit received; and here again no general rule can laid down.

Reply to Objection 4: Parents are like superiors, and so a parent's love tends to conferring benefits, while the children's love tends to honor their parents. Nevertheless in a case of extreme urgency it would be lawful to abandon one's children rather than one's parents, to abandon whom it is by no means lawful, on account of the obligation we lie under towards them for the benefits we have received from them, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 14).

Whether beneficence is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is a special virtue. For precepts are directed to virtue, since lawgivers purpose to make men virtuous (Ethic. i 9,13; ii, 1). Now beneficence and love are prescribed as distinct from one another, for it is written (Mat. 4:44): “Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.” Therefore beneficence is a virtue distinct from charity.

Objection 2: Further, vices are opposed to virtues. Now there are opposed to beneficence certain vices whereby a hurt is inflicted on our neighbor, for instance, rapine, theft and so forth. Therefore beneficence is a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, charity is not divided into several species: whereas there would seem to be several kinds of beneficence, according to the various kinds of benefits. Therefore beneficence is a distinct virtue from charity.

On the contrary, The internal and the external act do not require different virtues. Now beneficence and goodwill differ only as external and internal act, since beneficence is the execution of goodwill. Therefore as goodwill is not a distinct virtue from charity, so neither is beneficence.

I answer that, Virtues differ according to the different aspects of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the object of charity and of beneficence is the same, since both virtues regard the common aspect of good, as explained above [2603](A[1]). Wherefore beneficence is not a distinct virtue from charity, but denotes an act of charity.

Reply to Objection 1: Precepts are given, not about habits but about acts of virtue: wherefore distinction of precept denotes distinction, not of habits, but of acts.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as all benefits conferred on our neighbor, if we consider them under the common aspect of good, are to be traced to love, so all hurts considered under the common aspect of evil, are to be traced to hatred. But if we consider these same things under certain special aspects of good or of evil, they are to be traced to certain special virtues or vices, and in this way also there are various kinds of benefits.

Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

OF ALMSDEEDS (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

(2) Of the different kinds of alms;

(3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual or corporal?

(4) Whether corporal alms have a spiritual effect?

(5) Whether the giving of alms is a matter of precept?

(6) Whether corporal alms should be given out of the things we need?

(7) Whether corporal alms should be given out of ill-gotten goods?

(8) Who can give alms?

(9) To whom should we give alms?

(10) How should alms be given ?

Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not an act of charity. For without charity one cannot do acts of charity. Now it is possible to give alms without having charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:3: “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.

Objection 2: Further, almsdeeds are reckoned among works of satisfaction, according to Dan. 4:24: “Redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Now satisfaction is an act of justice. Therefore almsgiving is an act of justice and not of charity.

Objection 3: Further, the offering of sacrifices to God is an act of religion. But almsgiving is offering a sacrifice to God, according to Heb. 13:16: “Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained.” Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity, but of religion.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,1) that to give for a good purpose is an act of liberality. Now this is especially true of almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not an act of charity.

On the contrary, It is written 2 Jn. 3:17: “He that hath the substance of this world, and shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?”

I answer that, External acts belong to that virtue which regards the motive for doing those acts. Now the motive for giving alms is to relieve one who is in need. Wherefore some have defined alms as being “a deed whereby something is given to the needy, out of compassion and for God’s sake,” which motive belongs to mercy, as stated above ([2604]Q[30], AA[1],2). Hence it is clear that almsgiving is, properly speaking, an act of mercy. This appears in its very name, for in Greek {eleemosyne} it is derived from having mercy {eleein} even as the Latin “miseratio” is. And since mercy is an effect of charity, as shown above ([2605]Q[30], A[2], A[3], OBJ[3]), it follows that almsgiving is an act of charity through the medium of mercy.

Reply to Objection 1: An act of virtue may be taken in two ways: first materially, thus an act of justice is to do what is just; and such an act of virtue can be without the virtue, since many, without having the habit of justice, do what is just, led by the natural light of reason, or through fear, or in the hope of gain. Secondly, we speak of a thing being an act of justice formally, and thus an act of justice is to do what is just, in the same way as a just man, i.e. with readiness and delight, and such an act of virtue cannot be without the virtue.

Accordingly almsgiving can be materially without charity, but to give alms formally, i.e. for God's sake, with delight and readiness, and altogether as one ought, is not possible without charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the proper elicited act of one virtue being commanded by another virtue as commanding it and directing it to this other virtue's end. It is in this way that almsgiving is reckoned among works of satisfaction in so far as pity for the one in distress is directed to the satisfaction for his sin; and in so far as it is directed to placate God, it has the character of a sacrifice, and thus it is commanded by religion.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 4: Almsgiving belongs to liberality, in so far as liberality removes an obstacle to that act, which might arise from excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to them more than one ought.

Whether the different kinds of almsdeeds are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the different kinds of almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For we reckon seven corporal almsdeeds, namely, to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to harbor the harborless, to visit the sick, to ransom the captive, to bury the dead; all of which are expressed in the following verse: "To visit, to quench, to feed, to ransom, clothe, harbor or bury."

Again we reckon seven spiritual alms, namely, to instruct the ignorant, to counsel the doubtful, to comfort the sorrowful, to reprove the sinner, to forgive injuries, to bear with those who trouble and annoy us, and to pray for all, which are all contained in the following verse: "To counsel, reprove, console, to pardon, forbear, and to pray," yet so that counsel includes both advice and instruction.

And it seems that these various almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated. For the purpose of almsdeeds is to succor our neighbor. But a dead man profits nothing by being buried, else Our Lord would not have spoken truly when He said (Mat. 10:28): "Be not afraid of them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do." [*The quotation is from Lk. 12:4.] This explains why Our Lord, in enumerating the works of mercy, made no mention of the burial of the dead (Mat. 25:35,36). Therefore it seems that these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [2606](A[1]), the purpose of giving alms is to relieve our neighbor's need. Now there are many needs of human life other than those mentioned above, for instance, a blind man needs a leader, a lame man needs someone to lean on, a poor man needs riches. Therefore these almsdeeds are unsuitably enumerated.

Objection 3: Further, almsgiving is a work of mercy. But the reproof of the wrong-doer savors, apparently, of severity rather than of mercy. Therefore it ought not to be reckoned among the spiritual almsdeeds.

Objection 4: Further, almsgiving is intended for the supply of a defect. But no man is without the defect of ignorance in some matter or other. Therefore, apparently, each one ought to instruct anyone who is ignorant of what he knows himself.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Nom. in Evang. ix): "Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath abundance of wealth, watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who is a servant to art be most solicitous to share his skill and profit with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy, fear lest he be condemned for retaining his talent, if when he has the chance he plead not with him the cause of the poor." Therefore the aforesaid almsdeeds are suitably enumerated in respect of those things whereof men have abundance or insufficiency.

I answer that, The aforesaid distinction of almsdeeds is suitably taken from the various needs of our neighbor: some of which affect the soul, and are relieved by spiritual almsdeeds, while others affect the body, and are relieved by corporal almsdeeds. For corporal need occurs either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or it is a special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first case, the need is either internal or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have “to feed the hungry”; while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, and in respect of this we have “to give drink to the thirsty.” The common need with regard to external help is twofold; one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have “to clothe the naked”: while the other is in respect of a dwelling place, and as to this we have “to harbor the harborless.” Again if the need be special, it is either the result of an internal cause, like sickness, and then we have “to visit the sick,” or it results from an external cause, and then we have “to ransom the captive.” After this life we give “burial to the dead.”

In like manner spiritual needs are relieved by spiritual acts in two ways, first by asking for help from God, and in this respect we have “prayer,” whereby one man prays for others; secondly, by giving human assistance, and this in three ways. First, in order to relieve a deficiency on the part of the intellect, and if this deficiency be in the speculative intellect, the remedy is applied by “instructing,” and if in the practical intellect, the remedy is applied by “counselling.” Secondly, there may be a deficiency on the part of the appetitive power, especially by way of sorrow, which is remedied by “comforting.” Thirdly, the deficiency may be due to an inordinate act; and this may be the subject of a threefold consideration. First, in respect of the sinner, inasmuch as the sin proceeds from his inordinate will, and thus the remedy takes the form of “reproof.” Secondly, in respect of the person sinned against; and if the sin be committed against ourselves, we apply the remedy by “pardoning the injury,” while, if it be committed against God or our neighbor, it is not in our power to pardon, as Jerome observes (Super Matth. xviii, 15). Thirdly, in respect of the result of the inordinate act, on account of which the sinner is an annoyance to those who live with him, even beside his intention; in which case the remedy is applied by “bearing with him,” especially with regard to those who sin out of weakness, according to Rom. 15:1: “We that are stronger, ought to bear the infirmities of the weak,” and not only as regards their being infirm and consequently troublesome on account of their unruly actions, but also by bearing any other burdens of theirs with them, according to Gal. 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s burdens.”

Reply to Objection 1: Burial does not profit a dead man as though his body could be capable of perception after death. In this sense Our Lord said that those who kill the body “have no more that they can do”; and for this reason He did not mention the burial of the dead with the other works of mercy, but those only which are more clearly necessary. Nevertheless it does concern the deceased what is done with his body: both that he may live in the memory of man whose respect he forfeits if he remain without burial, and as regards a man’s fondness for his own body while he was yet living, a fondness which kindly persons should imitate after his death. It is thus that some are praised for burying the dead, as Tobias, and those who buried Our Lord; as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii).

Reply to Objection 2: All other needs are reduced to these, for blindness and lameness are kinds of sickness, so that to lead the blind, and to support the lame, come to the same as visiting the sick. In like manner to assist a man against any distress that is due to an extrinsic cause comes to the same as the ransom of captives. And the wealth with which we relieve the poor is sought merely for the purpose of relieving the aforesaid needs: hence there was no reason for special mention of this particular need.

Reply to Objection 3: The reproof of the sinner, as to the exercise of the act of reproving, seems to imply the severity of justice, but, as to the intention of the reprover, who wishes to free a man from the evil of sin, it is an act of mercy and lovingkindness, according to Prov. 27:6: “Better are the wounds of a friend, than the deceitful kisses of an enemy.”

Reply to Objection 4: Nescience is not always a defect, but only when it is about what one ought to know, and it is a part of almsgiving to supply this defect by instruction. In doing this however we should observe the due circumstances of persons, place and time, even as in other virtuous acts.

Whether corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal alms are of more account than spiritual alms. For it is more praiseworthy to give an alms to one who is in greater want, since an almsdeed is to be praised because it relieves one who is in need. Now the body which is relieved by corporal alms, is by nature more needy than the spirit which is relieved by spiritual alms. Therefore corporal alms are of more account.

Objection 2: Further, an alms is less praiseworthy and meritorious if the kindness is compensated, wherefore Our Lord says (Lk. 14:12): “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy neighbors who are rich, lest perhaps they also invite thee again. Now there is always compensation in spiritual almsdeeds, since he who prays for another, profits thereby, according to Ps. 34:13: “My prayer shall be turned into my bosom: and he who teaches another, makes progress in knowledge, which cannot be said of corporal almsdeeds. Therefore corporal almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.

Objection 3: Further, an alms is to be commended if the needy one is comforted by it: wherefore it is written (Job 31:20): “If his sides have not blessed me,” and the Apostle says to Philemon (verse 7): “The bowels of the saints have been refreshed by thee, brother.” Now a corporal alms is sometimes more welcome to a needy man than a spiritual alms. Therefore bodily almsdeeds are of more account than spiritual almsdeeds.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the words, “Give to him that asketh of thee” (Mat. 5:42): “You should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what another asks you must not lose sight of the claims of justice, and send him away empty; at times indeed you will give what is better than what is asked for, if you reprove him that asks unjustly.” Now reproof is a spiritual alms. Therefore spiritual almsdeeds are preferable to corporal almsdeeds.

I answer that, There are two ways of comparing these almsdeeds. First, simply; and in this respect, spiritual almsdeeds hold the first place, for three reasons. First, because the offering is more excellent, since it is a spiritual gift, which surpasses a corporal gift, according to Prov. 4:2: “I will give you a good gift, forsake not My Law.” Secondly, on account of the object succored, because the spirit is more excellent than the body, wherefore, even as a man in looking after himself, ought to look to his soul more than to his body, so ought he in looking after his neighbor, whom he ought to love as himself. Thirdly, as regards the acts themselves by which our neighbor is succored, because spiritual acts are more excellent than corporal acts, which are, in a fashion, servile.

Secondly, we may compare them with regard to some particular case, when some corporal alms excels some spiritual alms: for instance, a man in hunger is to be fed rather than instructed, and as the Philosopher observes

(Topic. iii, 2), for a needy man “money is better than philosophy,” although the latter is better simply.

Reply to Objection 1: It is better to give to one who is in greater want, other things being equal, but if he who is less needy is better, and is in want of better things, it is better to give to him: and it is thus in the case in point.

Reply to Objection 2: Compensation does not detract from merit and praise if it be not intended, even as human glory, if not intended, does not detract from virtue. Thus Sallust says of Cato (Catilin.), that “the less he sought fame, the more he became famous”: and thus it is with spiritual almsdeeds.

Nevertheless the intention of gaining spiritual goods does not detract from merit, as the intention of gaining corporal goods.

Reply to Objection 3: The merit of an almsgiver depends on that in which the will of the recipient rests reasonably, and not on that in which it rests when it is inordinate.

Whether corporal almsdeeds have a spiritual effect?

Objection 1: It would seem that corporal almsdeeds have not a spiritual effect. For no effect exceeds its cause. But spiritual goods exceed corporal goods. Therefore corporal almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

Objection 2: Further, the sin of simony consists in giving the corporal for the spiritual, and it is to be utterly avoided. Therefore one ought not to give alms in order to receive a spiritual effect.

Objection 3: Further, to multiply the cause is to multiply the effect. If therefore corporal almsdeeds cause a spiritual effect, the greater the alms, the greater the spiritual profit, which is contrary to what we read (Lk. 21:3) of the widow who cast two brass mites into the treasury, and in Our Lord’s own words “cast in more than . . . all.” Therefore bodily almsdeeds have no spiritual effect.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:18): “The alms of a man . . . shall preserve the grace of a man as the apple of the eye.”

I answer that, Corporal almsdeeds may be considered in three ways. First, with regard to their substance, and in this way they have merely a corporal effect, inasmuch as they supply our neighbor’s corporal needs. Secondly, they may be considered with regard to their cause, in so far as a man gives a corporal alms out of love for God and his neighbor, and in this respect they bring forth a spiritual fruit, according to Ecclus. 29:13, 14: “Lose thy money for thy brother . . . place thy treasure in the commandments of the Most High, and it shall bring thee more profit than gold.”

Thirdly, with regard to the effect, and in this way again, they have a spiritual fruit, inasmuch as our neighbor, who is succored by a corporal alms, is moved to pray for his benefactor; wherefore the above text goes on (Ecclus. 29:15): “Shut up alms in the heart of the poor, and it shall obtain help for thee from all evil.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers corporal almsdeeds as to their substance.

Reply to Objection 2: He who gives an alms does rot intend to buy a spiritual thing with a corporal thing, for he knows that spiritual things infinitely surpass corporal things, but he intends to merit a spiritual fruit through the love of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The widow who gave less in quantity, gave more in proportion; and thus we gather that the fervor of her charity, whence corporal almsdeeds derive their spiritual efficacy, was greater.

Whether almsgiving is a matter of precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that almsgiving is not a matter of precept. For the counsels are distinct from the precepts. Now almsgiving is a matter of counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: “Let my counsel be acceptable to the King; [Vulg.: ‘to thee, and’] redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for everyone to use and to keep what is his own. Yet by keeping it he will not give alms. Therefore it is lawful not to give alms: and consequently almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is a matter of precept binds the transgressor at some time or other under pain of mortal sin, because positive precepts are binding for some fixed time. Therefore, if almsgiving were a matter of precept, it would be possible to point to some fixed time when a man would commit a mortal sin unless he gave an alms. But it does not appear how this can be so, because it can always be deemed probable that the person in need can be relieved in some other way, and that what we would spend in almsgiving might be needful to ourselves either now or in some future time. Therefore it seems that almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

Objection 4: Further, every commandment is reducible to the precepts of the Decalogue. But these precepts contain no reference to almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is not a matter of precept.

On the contrary, No man is punished eternally for omitting to do what is not a matter of precept. But some are punished eternally for omitting to give alms, as is clear from Mat. 25:41–43. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.

I answer that, As love of our neighbor is a matter of precept, whatever is a necessary condition to the love of our neighbor is a matter of precept also. Now the love of our neighbor requires that not only should we be our neighbor’s well-wishers, but also his well-doers, according to 1 Jn. 3:18: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed, and in truth.” And in order to be a person’s well-wisher and well-doer, we ought to succor his needs: this is done by almsgiving. Therefore almsgiving is a matter of precept.

Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver, it must be noted that he should give of his surplus, according to Lk. 11:41: “That which remaineth, give alms.” This surplus is to be taken in reference not only to himself, so as to denote what is unnecessary to the individual, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression “necessary to the person” [*The official necessities of a person in position] taking the word “person” as expressive of dignity). Because each one must first of all look after himself and then after those over whom he has charge, and afterwards with what remains relieve the needs of others. Thus nature first, by its nutritive power, takes what it requires for the upkeep of one’s own body, and afterwards yields the residue for the formation of another by the power of generation.

On the part of the recipient it is requisite that he should be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms: yet since it is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be succored if we not did succor them. For in such cases the words of Ambrose apply, “Feed him that dies of hunger: if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him” [*Cf. Canon Pasce, dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken]. Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme: otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.

Reply to Objection 1: Daniel spoke to a king who was not subject to God’s Law, wherefore such things as were prescribed by the Law which he did not profess, had to be counselled to him. Or he may have been speaking in reference to a case in which almsgiving was not a matter of precept.

Reply to Objection 2: The temporal goods which God grants us, are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them, they belong not to us alone but also to such others as we are able to succor out of what we have over and above our needs. Hence Basil says [*Hom. super Luc. xii, 18]: “If you acknowledge them,” viz. your temporal goods, “as coming from God, is He unjust because He apportions them unequally? Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience? It is the hungry man’s bread that you withhold, the naked man’s cloak that you have stored away, the shoe of the barefoot that you have left to rot, the money of the needy that you have buried underground: and so you injure as many as you might help.” Ambrose expresses himself in the same way.

Reply to Objection 3: There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give alms; on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succored otherwise—on the part of the giver, when he has superfluous goods, which he does not need for the time being, as far as he can judge with probability. Nor need he consider every case that may possibly occur in the future, for this would be to think about the morrow, which Our Lord forbade us to do (Mat. 6:34), but he should judge what is superfluous and what necessary, according as things probably and generally occur.

Reply to Objection 4: All succor given to our neighbor is reduced to the precept about honoring our parents. For thus does the Apostle interpret it (1 Tim. 4:8) where he says: “Dutifulness* [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come,” and he says this because the precept about honoring our parents contains the promise, “that thou mayest be longlived upon the land” (Ex. 20:12): and dutifulness comprises all kinds of almsgiving. [*”Pietas,” whence our English word “Piety.” Cf. also inf.[2607] Q[101], A[2].]

Whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms out of what one needs. For the order of charity should be observed not only as regards the effect of our benefactions but also as regards our interior affections. Now it is a sin to contravene the order of charity, because this order is a matter of precept. Since, then, the order of charity requires that a man should love himself more than his neighbor, it seems that he would sin if he deprived himself of what he needed, in order to succor his neighbor.

Objection 2: Further, whoever gives away what he needs himself, squanders his own substance, and that is to be a prodigal, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). But no sinful deed should be done. Therefore we should not give alms out of what we need.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.” Now if a man gives of what he needs for himself or for his charge, he seems to detract from the care he should have for himself or his charge. Therefore it seems that whoever gives alms from what he needs, sins gravely.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell what thou hast, and give to the poor.” Now he that gives all he has to the poor, gives not only what he needs not, but also what he needs. Therefore a man may give alms out of what he needs.

I answer that, A thing is necessary in two ways: first, because without it something is impossible, and it is altogether wrong to give alms out of what is necessary to us in this sense; for instance, if a man found himself in the presence of a case of urgency, and had merely sufficient to support himself and his children, or others under his charge, he would be throwing away his life and that of others if he were to give away in alms, what was then necessary to him. Yet I say this without prejudice to such a case as might happen, supposing that by depriving himself of necessaries a man might help a great personage, and a support of the Church or State, since it would be a praiseworthy act to endanger one’s life and the lives of those who are under our charge for the delivery of such a person, since the common good is to be preferred to one’s own.

Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if a man cannot without it live in keeping with his social station, as regards either himself or those of whom he has charge. The “necessary” considered thus is not an invariable quantity, for one might add much more to a man’s property, and yet not go beyond what he needs in this way, or one might take much from him, and he would still have sufficient for the decencies of life in keeping with his own position. Accordingly it is good to give alms of this kind of “necessary”; and it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. Yet it would be inordinate to deprive oneself of one’s own, in order to give to others to such an extent that the residue would be insufficient for one to live in keeping with one’s station and the ordinary occurrences of life: for no man ought to live unbecomingly. There are, however, three exceptions to the above rule. The first is when a man changes his state of life, for instance, by entering religion, for then he gives away all his possessions for Christ’s sake, and does the deed of perfection by transferring himself to another state. Secondly, when that which he deprives himself of, though it be required for the decencies of life, can nevertheless easily be recovered, so that he does not suffer extreme inconvenience. Thirdly, when he is in presence of extreme indigence in an individual, or great need on the part of the common weal. For in such cases it would seem praiseworthy to forego the requirements of one’s station, in order to provide for a greater need.

The objections may be easily solved from what has been said.

Whether one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods. For it is written (Lk. 16:9): “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” Now mammon signifies riches. Therefore it is lawful to make unto oneself spiritual friends by giving alms out of ill-gotten riches.

Objection 2: Further, all filthy lucre seems to be ill-gotten. But the profits from whoredom are filthy lucre; wherefore it was forbidden (Dt. 23:18) to offer therefrom sacrifices or oblations to God: “Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of . . . thy God.” In like manner gains from games of chance are ill-gotten, for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), “we take such like gains from our friends to whom we ought rather to give.” And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.

Objection 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided more than lesser evils. Now it is less sinful to keep back another’s property than to commit murder, of which a man is guilty if he fails to succor one who is in extreme need, as appears from the words of Ambrose who says (Cf. Canon Pasce dist. lxxxvi, whence the words, as quoted, are taken): “Feed him that dies of hunger, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.” Therefore, in certain cases, it is lawful to give alms of ill-gotten goods.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2): “Give alms from your just labors. For you will not bribe Christ your judge, not to hear you with the poor whom you rob . . . Give not alms from interest and usury: I speak to the faithful to whom we dispense the Body of Christ.”

I answer that, A thing may be ill-gotten in three ways. In the first place a thing is ill-gotten if it be due to the person from whom it is gotten, and may not be kept by the person who has obtained possession of it; as in the case of rapine, theft and usury, and of such things a man may not give alms since he is bound to restore them.

Secondly, a thing is ill-gotten, when he that has it may not keep it, and yet he may not return it to the person from whom he received it, because he received it unjustly, while the latter gave it unjustly. This happens in simony, wherein both giver and receiver contravene the justice of the Divine Law, so that restitution is to be made not to the giver, but by giving alms. The same applies to all similar cases of illegal giving and receiving.

Thirdly, a thing is ill-gotten, not because the taking was unlawful, but because it is the outcome of something unlawful, as in the case of a woman’s profits from whoredom. This is filthy lucre properly so called, because the practice of whoredom is filthy and against the Law of God, yet the woman does not act unjustly or unlawfully in taking the money. Consequently it is lawful to keep and to give in alms what is thus acquired by an unlawful action.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. 2), “Some have misunderstood this saying of Our Lord, so as to take another’s property and give thereof to the poor, thinking that they are fulfilling the commandment by so doing. This interpretation must be amended. Yet all riches are called riches of iniquity, as stated in De Quaest. Ev. ii, 34, because “riches are not unjust save for those who are themselves unjust, and put all their trust in them. Or, according to Ambrose in his commentary on Lk. 16:9, “Make unto yourselves friends,” etc., “He calls mammon unjust, because it draws our affections by the various allurements of wealth.” Or, because “among the many ancestors whose property you inherit, there is one who took the property of others unjustly, although you know nothing about it,” as Basil says in a homily (Hom. super Luc. A, 5). Or, all riches are styled riches “of iniquity,” i.e., of “inequality,” because they are not distributed equally among all, one being in need, and another in affluence.

Reply to Objection 2: We have already explained how alms may be given out of the profits of whoredom. Yet sacrifices and oblations were not made therefrom at the altar, both on account of the scandal, and through reverence for sacred things. It is also lawful to give alms out of the profits of simony, because they are not due to him who paid, indeed he deserves to lose them. But as to the profits from games of chance, there would seem to be something unlawful as being contrary to the Divine Law, when a man wins from one who cannot alienate his property, such as minors, lunatics and so forth, or when a man, with the desire of making money out of another man, entices him to play, and wins from him by cheating. In these cases he is bound to restitution, and consequently cannot give away his gains in alms. Then again there would seem to be something unlawful as being against the positive civil law, which altogether forbids any such profits. Since, however, a civil law does not bind all, but only those who are subject to that law, and moreover may be abrogated through desuetude, it follows that all such as are bound by these laws are bound to make restitution of such gains, unless perchance the contrary custom prevail, or unless a man win from one who enticed him to play, in which case he is not bound to restitution, because the loser does not deserve to be paid back: and yet he cannot lawfully keep what he has won, so long as that positive law is in force, wherefore in this case he ought to give it away in alms.

Reply to Objection 3: All things are common property in a case of extreme necessity. Hence one who is in such dire straits may take another's goods in order to succor himself, if he can find no one who is willing to give him something. For the same reason a man may retain what belongs to another, and give alms thereof; or even take something if there be no other way of succoring the one who is in need. If however this be possible without danger, he must ask the owner's consent, and then succor the poor man who is in extreme necessity.

Whether one who is under another's power can give alms?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is under another's power can give alms. For religious are under the power of their prelates to whom they have vowed obedience. Now if it were unlawful for them to give alms, they would lose by entering the state of religion, for as Ambrose [*The quotation is from the works of Ambrosiaster. Cf. Index to ecclesiastical authorities quoted by St. Thomas] says on 1 Tim. 4:8: "'Dutifulness [Douay: 'godliness'] is profitable to all things': The sum total of the Christian religion consists in doing one's duty by all," and the most creditable way of doing this is to give alms. Therefore those who are in another's power can give alms.

Objection 2: Further, a wife is under her husband's power (Gn. 3:16). But a wife can give alms since she is her husband's partner; hence it is related of the Blessed Lucy that she gave alms without the knowledge of her betrothed [*"Sponsus" The matrimonial institutions of the Romans were so entirely different from ours that "sponsus" is no longer accurately rendered either "husband" or "betrothed."] Therefore a person is not prevented from giving alms, by being under another's power.

Objection 3: Further, the subjection of children to their parents is founded on nature, wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 6:1): "Children, obey your parents in the Lord." But, apparently, children may give alms out of their parents' property. For it is their own, since they are the heirs; wherefore, since they can employ it for some bodily use, it seems that much more can they use it in giving alms so as to profit their souls. Therefore those who are under another's power can give alms.

Objection 4: Further, servants are under their master’s power, according to Titus 2:9: “Exhort servants to be obedient to their masters.” Now they may lawfully do anything that will profit their masters: and this would be especially the case if they gave alms for them. Therefore those who are under another’s power can give alms.

On the contrary, Alms should not be given out of another’s property; and each one should give alms out of the just profit of his own labor as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 2). Now if those who are subject to anyone were to give alms, this would be out of another’s property. Therefore those who are under another’s power cannot give alms.

I answer that, Anyone who is under another’s power must, as such, be ruled in accordance with the power of his superior: for the natural order demands that the inferior should be ruled according to its superior. Therefore in those matters in which the inferior is subject to his superior, his ministrations must be subject to the superior’s permission.

Accordingly he that is under another’s power must not give alms of anything in respect of which he is subject to that other, except in so far as he has been commissioned by his superior. But if he has something in respect of which he is not under the power of his superior, he is no longer subject to another in its regard, being independent in respect of that particular thing, and he can give alms therefrom.

Reply to Objection 1: If a monk be dispensed through being commissioned by his superior, he can give alms from the property of his monaster, in accordance with the terms of his commission; but if he has no such dispensation, since he has nothing of his own, he cannot give alms without his abbot’s permission either express or presumed for some probable reason: except in a case of extreme necessity, when it would be lawful for him to commit a theft in order to give an alms. Nor does it follow that he is worse off than before, because, as stated in De Eccles. Dogm. lxxi, “it is a good thing to give one’s property to the poor little by little, but it is better still to give all at once in order to follow Christ, and being freed from care, to be needy with Christ.”

Reply to Objection 2: A wife, who has other property besides her dowry which is for the support of the burdens of marriage, whether that property be gained by her own industry or by any other lawful means, can give alms, out of that property, without asking her husband’s permission: yet such alms should be moderate, lest through giving too much she impoverish her husband. Otherwise she ought not to give alms without the express or presumed consent of her husband, except in cases of necessity as stated, in the case of a monk, in the preceding Reply. For though the wife be her husband's equal in the marriage act, yet in matters of housekeeping, the head of the woman is the man, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:3). As regards Blessed Lucy, she had a betrothed, not a husband, wherefore she could give alms with her mother's consent.

Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the children belongs also to the father: wherefore the child cannot give alms, except in such small quantity that one may presume the father to be willing: unless, perchance, the father authorize his child to dispose of any particular property. The same applies to servants. Hence the Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear.

Whether one ought to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to give alms to those rather who are more closely united to us. For it is written (Ecclus. 12:4, 6): "Give to the merciful and uphold not the sinner . . . Do good to the humble and give not to the ungodly." Now it happens sometimes that those who are closely united to us are sinful and ungodly. Therefore we ought not to give alms to them in preference to others.

Objection 2: Further, alms should be given that we may receive an eternal reward in return, according to Mat. 6:18: "And thy Father Who seeth in secret, will repay thee." Now the eternal reward is gained chiefly by the alms which are given to the saints, according to Lk. 16:9: "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail, they may receive you into everlasting dwellings, which passage Augustine expounds (De Verb. Dom. xxxv, 1): "Who shall have everlasting dwellings unless the saints of God? And who are they that shall be received by them into their dwellings, if not those who succor them in their needs? Therefore alms should be given to the more holy persons rather than to those who are more closely united to us.

Objection 3: Further, man is more closely united to himself. But a man cannot give himself an alms. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to give alms to those who are most closely united to us.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:8): “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), “it falls to us by lot, as it were, to have to look to the welfare of those who are more closely united to us.” Nevertheless in this matter we must employ discretion, according to the various degrees of connection, holiness and utility. For we ought to give alms to one who is much holier and in greater want, and to one who is more useful to the common weal, rather than to one who is more closely united to us, especially if the latter be not very closely united, and has no special claim on our care then and there, and who is not in very urgent need.

Reply to Objection 1: We ought not to help a sinner as such, that is by encouraging him to sin, but as man, that is by supporting his nature.

Reply to Objection 2: Almsdeeds deserve on two counts to receive an eternal reward. First because they are rooted in charity, and in this respect an almsdeed is meritorious in so far as it observes the order of charity, which requires that, other things being equal, we should, in preference, help those who are more closely connected with us. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “It is with commendable liberality that you forget not your kindred, if you know them to be in need, for it is better that you should yourself help your own family, who would be ashamed to beg help from others.” Secondly, almsdeeds deserve to be rewarded eternally, through the merit of the recipient, who prays for the giver, and it is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

Reply to Objection 3: Since almsdeeds are works of mercy, just as a man does not, properly speaking, pity himself, but only by a kind of comparison, as stated above ([2608]Q[30], AA[1],2), so too, properly speaking, no man gives himself an alms, unless he act in another’s person; thus when a man is appointed to distribute alms, he can take something for himself, if he be in want, on the same ground as when he gives to others.

Whether alms should be given in abundance?

Objection 1: It would seem that alms should not be given in abundance. For we ought to give alms to those chiefly who are most closely connected with us. But we ought not to give to them in such a way that they are likely to become richer thereby, as Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30). Therefore neither should we give abundantly to others.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “We should not lavish our wealth on others all at once, we should dole it out by degrees.” But to give abundantly is to give lavishly. Therefore alms should not be given in abundance.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 8:13): “Not that others should be eased,” i.e. should live on you without working themselves, “and you burthened,” i.e. impoverished. But this would be the result if alms were given in abundance. Therefore we ought not to give alms abundantly.

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:93): “If thou have much, give abundantly.”

I answer that, Alms may be considered abundant in relation either to the giver, or to the recipient: in relation to the giver, when that which a man gives is great as compared with his means. To give thus is praiseworthy, wherefore Our Lord (Lk. 21:3,4) commended the widow because “of her want, she cast in all the living that she had.” Nevertheless those conditions must be observed which were laid down when we spoke of giving alms out of one’s necessary goods [2609](A[9]).

On the part of the recipient, an alms may be abundant in two ways; first, by relieving his need sufficiently, and in this sense it is praiseworthy to give alms: secondly, by relieving his need more than sufficiently; this is not praiseworthy, and it would be better to give to several that are in need, wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): “If I should distribute . . . to feed the poor,” on which words a gloss comments: “Thus we are warned to be careful in giving alms, and to give, not to one only, but to many, that we may profit many.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers abundance of alms as exceeding the needs of the recipient.

Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted considers abundance of alms on the part of the giver; but the sense is that God does not wish a man to lavish all his wealth at once, except when he changes his state of life, wherefore he goes on to say: “Except we imitate Eliseus who slew his oxen and fed the poor with what he had, so that no household cares might keep him back” (3 Kings 19:21).

Reply to Objection 3: In the passage quoted the words, “not that others should be eased or refreshed,” refer to that abundance of alms which surpasses the need of the recipient, to whom one should give alms not that he may have an easy life, but that he may have relief. Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): “When you give an alms to a man, you should take into consideration his age and his weakness; and sometimes the shame which proclaims his good birth; and again that perhaps he has fallen from riches to indigence through no fault of his own.”

With regard to the words that follow, “and you burdened,” they refer to abundance on the part of the giver. Yet, as a gloss says on the same passage, “he says this, not because it would be better to give in abundance, but because he fears for the weak, and he admonishes them so to give that they lack not for themselves.”

OF FRATERNAL CORRECTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider Fraternal Correction, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?

(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?

(3) Whether this precept binds all, or only superiors?

(4) Whether this precept binds the subject to correct his superior?

(5) Whether a sinner may correct anyone?

(6) Whether one ought to correct a person who becomes worse through being corrected?

(7) Whether secret correction should precede denouncement?

(8) Whether witnesses should be called before denouncement?

Whether fraternal correction is an act of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not an act of charity. For a gloss on Mat. 18:15, “If thy brother shall offend against thee,” says that “a man should reprove his brother out of zeal for justice.” But justice is a distinct virtue from charity. Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of justice.

Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is given by secret admonition. Now admonition is a kind of counsel, which is an act of prudence, for a prudent man is one who is of good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore fraternal correction is an act, not of charity, but of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, contrary acts do not belong to the same virtue. Now it is an act of charity to bear with a sinner, according to Gal. 6:2: “Bear ye one another’s burdens, and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” which is the law of charity. Therefore it seems that the correction of a sinning brother, which is contrary to bearing with him, is not an act of charity.

On the contrary, To correct the wrongdoer is a spiritual almsdeed. But almsdeeds are works of charity, as stated above ([2610]Q[32], A[1]). Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity.

I answer that, The correction of the wrongdoer is a remedy which should be employed against a man’s sin. Now a man’s sin may be considered in two ways, first as being harmful to the sinner, secondly as conducing to the harm of others, by hurting or scandalizing them, or by being detrimental to the common good, the justice of which is disturbed by that man’s sin.

Consequently the correction of a wrongdoer is twofold, one which applies a remedy to the sin considered as an evil of the sinner himself. This is fraternal correction properly so called, which is directed to the amendment of the sinner. Now to do away with anyone’s evil is the same as to procure his good: and to procure a person’s good is an act of charity, whereby we wish and do our friend well. Consequently fraternal correction also is an act of charity, because thereby we drive out our brother’s evil, viz. sin, the removal of which pertains to charity rather than the removal of an external loss, or of a bodily injury, in so much as the contrary good of virtue is more akin to charity than the good of the body or of external things. Therefore fraternal correction is an act of charity rather than the healing of a bodily infirmity, or the relieving of an external bodily need. There is another correction which applies a remedy to the sin of the wrongdoer, considered as hurtful to others, and especially to the common good. This correction is an act of justice, whose concern it is to safeguard the rectitude of justice between one man and another.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of the second correction which is an act of justice. Or if it speaks of the first correction, then it takes justice as denoting a general virtue, as we shall state further on ([2611]Q[58] , A[5]), in which sense again all "sin is iniquity" (1 Jn. 3:4), through being contrary to justice.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), prudence regulates whatever is directed to the end, about which things counsel and choice are concerned. Nevertheless when, guided by prudence, we perform some action aright which is directed to the end of some virtue, such as temperance or fortitude, that action belongs chiefly to the virtue to whose end it is directed. Since, then, the admonition which is given in fraternal correction is directed to the removal of a brother's sin, which removal pertains to charity, it is evident that this admonition is chiefly an act of charity, which virtue commands it, so to speak, but secondarily an act of prudence, which executes and directs the action.

Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction is not opposed to forbearance with the weak, on the contrary it results from it. For a man bears with a sinner, in so far as he is not disturbed against him, and retains his goodwill towards him: the result being that he strives to make him do better.

Whether fraternal correction is a matter of precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction is not a matter of precept. For nothing impossible is a matter of precept, according to the saying of Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Symb. ad Damas]: "Accursed be he who says that God has commanded any. thing impossible." Now it is written (Eccles. 7:14): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.

Objection 2: Further, all the precepts of the Divine Law are reduced to the precepts of the Decalogue. But fraternal correction does not come under any precept of the Decalogue. Therefore it is not a matter of precept.

Objection 3: Further, the omission of a Divine precept is a mortal sin, which has no place in a holy man. Yet holy and spiritual men are found to omit fraternal correction: since Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “Not only those of low degree, but also those of high position, refrain from reproving others, moved by a guilty cupidity, not by the claims of charity.” Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is something due. If, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, it is due to our brethren that we correct them when they sin. Now when a man owes anyone a material due, such as the payment of a sum of money, he must not be content that his creditor come to him, but he should seek him out, that he may pay him his due. Hence we should have to go seeking for those who need correction, in order that we might correct them; which appears to be inconvenient, both on account of the great number of sinners, for whose correction one man could not suffice, and because religious would have to leave the cloister in order to reprove men, which would be unbecoming. Therefore fraternal correction is not a matter of precept.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4): “You become worse than the sinner if you fail to correct him.” But this would not be so unless, by this neglect, one omitted to observe some precept. Therefore fraternal correction is a matter of precept.

I answer that, Fraternal correction is a matter of precept. We must observe, however, that while the negative precepts of the Law forbid sinful acts, the positive precepts inculcate acts of virtue. Now sinful acts are evil in themselves, and cannot become good, no matter how, or when, or where, they are done, because of their very nature they are connected with an evil end, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore negative precepts bind always and for all times. On the other hand, acts of virtue must not be done anyhow, but by observing the due circumstances, which are requisite in order that an act be virtuous; namely, that it be done where, when, and how it ought to be done. And since the disposition of whatever is directed to the end depends on the formal aspect of the end, the chief of these circumstances of a virtuous act is this aspect of the end, which in this case is the good of virtue. If therefore such a circumstance be omitted from a virtuous act, as entirely takes away the good of virtue, such an act is contrary to a precept. If, however, the circumstance omitted from a virtuous act be such as not to destroy the virtue altogether, though it does not perfectly attain the good of virtue, it is not against a precept. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 9) says that if we depart but little from the mean, it is not contrary to the virtue, whereas if we depart much from the mean virtue is destroyed in its act. Now fraternal correction is directed to a brother's amendment: so that it is a matter of precept, in so far as it is necessary for that end, but not so as we have to correct our erring brother at all places and times.

Reply to Objection 1: In all good deeds man's action is not efficacious without the Divine assistance: and yet man must do what is in his power. Hence Augustine says (De Correp. et Gratia xv): "Since we ignore who is predestined and who is not, charity should so guide our feelings, that we wish all to be saved." Consequently we ought to do our brethren the kindness of correcting them, with the hope of God's help.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2612]Q[32], A[5], ad 4), all the precepts about rendering service to our neighbor are reduced to the precept about the honor due to parents.

Reply to Objection 3: Fraternal correction may be omitted in three ways.

First, meritoriously, when out of charity one omits to correct someone. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): "If a man refrains from chiding and reproving wrongdoers, because he awaits a suitable time for so doing, or because he fears lest, if he does so, they may become worse, or hinder, oppress, or turn away from the faith, others who are weak and need to be instructed in a life of goodness and virtue, this does not seem to result from covetousness, but to be counselled by charity."

Secondly, fraternal correction may be omitted in such a way that one commits a mortal sin, namely, "when" (as he says in the same passage) "one fears what people may think, or lest one may suffer grievous pain or death; provided, however, that the mind is so dominated by such things, that it gives them the preference to fraternal charity." This would seem to be the case when a man reckons that he might probably withdraw some wrongdoer from sin, and yet omits to do so, through fear or covetousness.

Thirdly, such an omission is a venial sin, when through fear or covetousness, a man is loth to correct his brother's faults, and yet not to such a degree, that if he saw clearly that he could withdraw him from sin, he would still forbear from so doing, through fear or covetousness, because in his own mind he prefers fraternal charity to these things. It is in this way that holy men sometimes omit to correct wrongdoers.

Reply to Objection 4: We are bound to pay that which is due to some fixed and certain person, whether it be a material or a spiritual good, without waiting for him to come to us, but by taking proper steps to find him. Wherefore just as he that owes money to a creditor should seek him, when the time comes, so as to pay him what he owes, so he that has spiritual charge of some person is bound to seek him out, in order to reprove him for a sin. On the other hand, we are not bound to seek someone on whom to bestow such favors as are due, not to any certain person, but to all our neighbors in general, whether those favors be material or spiritual goods, but it suffices that we bestow them when the opportunity occurs; because, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), we must look upon this as a matter of chance. For this reason he says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 1) that "Our Lord warns us not to be listless in regard of one another's sins: not indeed by being on the lookout for something to denounce, but by correcting what we see": else we should become spies on the lives of others, which is against the saying of Prov. 24:19: "Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest." It is evident from this that there is no need for religious to leave their cloister in order to rebuke evil-doers.

Whether fraternal correction belongs only to prelates?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone. For Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vii in Joan.] says: "Let priests endeavor to fulfil this saying of the Gospel: 'If thy brother sin against thee,'" etc. Now prelates having charge of others were usually designated under the name of priests. Therefore it seems that fraternal correction belongs to prelates alone.

Objection 2: Further, fraternal correction is a spiritual alms. Now corporal almsgiving belongs to those who are placed above others in temporal matters, i.e. to the rich. Therefore fraternal correction belongs to those who are placed above others in spiritual matters, i.e. to prelates.

Objection 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelates alone to correct inferiors.

On the contrary, It is written (Dist. xxiv, qu. 3, Can. Tam Sacerdotes): “Both priests and all the rest of the faithful should be most solicitous for those who perish, so that their reproof may either correct their sinful ways. or, if they be incorrigible, cut them off from the Church.”

I answer that, As stated above [2613](A[1]), correction is twofold. One is an act of charity, which seeks in a special way the recovery of an erring brother by means of a simple warning: such like correction belongs to anyone who has charity, be he subject or prelate.

But there is another correction which is an act of justice purposing the common good, which is procured not only by warning one’s brother, but also, sometimes, by punishing him, that others may, through fear, desist from sin. Such a correction belongs only to prelates, whose business it is not only to admonish, but also to correct by means of punishments.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as regards that fraternal correction which is common to all, prelates have a grave responsibility, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9): “for just as a man ought to bestow temporal favors on those especially of whom he has temporal care, so too ought he to confer spiritual favors, such as correction, teaching and the like, on those who are entrusted to his spiritual care.” Therefore Jerome does not mean that the precept of fraternal correction concerns priests only, but that it concerns them chiefly.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as he who has the means wherewith to give corporal assistance is rich in this respect, so he whose reason is gifted with a sane judgment, so as to be able to correct another’s wrong-doing, is, in this respect, to be looked on as a superior.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in the physical order certain things act mutually on one another, through being in some respect higher than one another, in so far as each is somewhat in act, and somewhat in potentiality with regard to another. In like manner one man can correct another in so far as he has a sane judgment in a matter wherein the other sins, though he is not his superior simply.

Whether a mann is bound to correct his prelate?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man is bound to correct his prelate. For it is written (Ex. 19:12): “The beast that shall touch the mount shall be stoned,” [*Vulg.: ‘Everyone that shall touch the mount, dying he shall die.’] and (2 Kings 6:7) it is related that the Lord struck Oza for touching the ark. Now the mount and the ark signify our prelates. Therefore prelates should not be corrected by their subjects.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Gal. 2:11, “I withstood him to the face,” adds: “as an equal.” Therefore, since a subject is not equal to his prelate, he ought not to correct him.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 8) that “one ought not to presume to reprove the conduct of holy men, unless one thinks better of oneself.” But one ought not to think better of oneself than of one’s prelate. Therefore one ought not to correct one’s prelate.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his Rule: “Show mercy not only to yourselves, but also to him who, being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater danger.” But fraternal correction is a work of mercy. Therefore even prelates ought to be corrected.

I answer that, A subject is not competent to administer to his prelate the correction which is an act of justice through the coercive nature of punishment: but the fraternal correction which is an act of charity is within the competency of everyone in respect of any person towards whom he is bound by charity, provided there be something in that person which requires correction.

Now an act which proceeds from a habit or power extends to whatever is contained under the object of that power or habit: thus vision extends to all things comprised in the object of sight. Since, however, a virtuous act needs to be moderated by due circumstances, it follows that when a subject corrects his prelate, he ought to do so in a becoming manner, not with impudence and harshness, but with gentleness and respect. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): “An ancient man rebuke not, but entreat him as a father.” Wherefore Dionysius finds fault with the monk Demophilus (Ep. viii), for rebuking a priest with insolence, by striking and turning him out of the church.

Reply to Objection 1: It would seem that a subject touches his prelate inordinately when he upbraids him with insolence, as also when he speaks ill of him: and this is signified by God’s condemnation of those who touched the mount and the ark.

Reply to Objection 2: To withstand anyone in public exceeds the mode of fraternal correction, and so Paul would not have withstood Peter then, unless he were in some way his equal as regards the defense of the faith. But one who is not an equal can reprove privately and respectfully. Hence the Apostle in writing to the Colossians (4:17) tells them to admonish their prelate: “Say to Archippus: Fulfil thy ministry [*Vulg.: ‘Take heed to the ministry which thou hast received in the Lord, that thou fulfil it.’ Cf. 2 Tim. 4:5].” It must be observed, however, that if the faith were endangered, a subject ought to rebuke his prelate even publicly. Hence Paul, who was Peter’s subject, rebuked him in public, on account of the imminent danger of scandal concerning faith, and, as the gloss of Augustine says on Gal. 2:11, “Peter gave an example to superiors, that if at any time they should happen to stray from the straight path, they should not disdain to be reproved by their subjects.”

Reply to Objection 3: To presume oneself to be simply better than one’s prelate, would seem to savor of presumptuous pride; but there is no presumption in thinking oneself better in some respect, because, in this life, no man is without some fault. We must also remember that when a man reproves his prelate charitably, it does not follow that he thinks himself any better, but merely that he offers his help to one who, “being in the higher position among you, is therefore in greater danger,” as Augustine observes in his Rule quoted above.

Whether a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sinner ought to reprove a wrongdoer. For no man is excused from obeying a precept by having committed a sin. But fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above [2614](A[2]). Therefore it seems that a man ought not to forbear from such like correction for the reason that he has committed a sin.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual almsdeeds are of more account than corporal almsdeeds. Now one who is in sin ought not to abstain from administering corporal alms. Much less therefore ought he, on account of a previous sin, to refrain from correcting wrongdoers.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 1:8): “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Therefore if, on account of a sin, a man is hindered from reproving his brother, there will be none to reprove the wrongdoer. But the latter proposition is unreasonable: therefore the former is also.

On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 32): “He that is subject to vice should not correct the vices of others.” Again it is written (Rom. 2:1): “Wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself. For thou dost the same things which thou judgest.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), to correct a wrongdoer belongs to a man, in so far as his reason is gifted with right judgment. Now sin, as stated above ([2615]FS, Q[85], AA[1],2), does not destroy the good of nature so as to deprive the sinner’s reason of all right judgment, and in this respect he may be competent to find fault with others for committing sin. Nevertheless a previous sin proves somewhat of a hindrance to this correction, for three reasons. First because this previous sin renders a man unworthy to rebuke another; and especially is he unworthy to correct another for a lesser sin, if he himself has committed a greater. Hence Jerome says on the words, “Why seest thou the mote?” etc. (Mat. 7:3): “He is speaking of those who, while they are themselves guilty of mortal sin, have no patience with the lesser sins of their brethren.”

Secondly, such like correction becomes unseemly, on account of the scandal which ensues therefrom, if the corrector’s sin be well known, because it would seem that he corrects, not out of charity, but more for the sake of ostentation. Hence the words of Mat. 7:4, “How sayest thou to thy brother?” etc. are expounded by Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] thus: “That is—‘With what object?’ Out of charity, think you, that you may save your neighbor?” No, “because you would look after your own salvation first. What you want is, not to save others, but to hide your evil deeds with good teaching, and to seek to be praised by men for your knowledge.”

Thirdly, on account of the rebuker’s pride; when, for instance, a man thinks lightly of his own sins, and, in his own heart, sets himself above his neighbor, judging the latter’s sins with harsh severity, as though he himself were just man. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): “To reprove the faults of others is the duty of good and kindly men: when a wicked man rebukes anyone, his rebuke is the latter’s acquittal.” And so, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): “When we have to find fault with anyone, we should think whether we were never guilty of his sin; and then we must remember that we are men, and might have been guilty of it; or that we once had it on our conscience, but have it no longer: and then we should bethink ourselves that we are all weak, in order that our reproof may be the outcome, not of hatred, but of pity. But if we find that we are guilty of the same sin, we must not rebuke him, but groan with him, and invite him to repent with us.” It follows from this that, if a sinner reprove a wrongdoer with humility, he does not sin, nor does he bring a further condemnation on himself, although thereby he proves himself deserving of condemnation, either in his brother’s or in his own conscience, on account of his previous sin.

Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.

Whether one ought to forbear from correcting someone, through fear lest he become worse?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to forbear from correcting someone through fear lest he become worse. For sin is weakness of the soul, according to Ps. 6:3: “Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak.” Now he that has charge of a sick person, must not cease to take care of him, even if he be fractious or contemptuous, because then the danger is greater, as in the case of madmen. Much more, therefore should one correct a sinner, no matter how badly he takes it.

Objection 2: Further, according to Jerome vital truths are not to be foregone on account of scandal. Now God’s commandments are vital truths. Since, therefore, fraternal correction is a matter of precept, as stated above [2616](A[2]), it seems that it should not be foregone for fear of scandalizing the person to be corrected.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 3:8) we should not do evil that good may come of it. Therefore, in like manner, good should not be omitted lest evil befall. Now fraternal correction is a good thing. Therefore it should not be omitted for fear lest the person corrected become worse.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 9:8): “Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee,” where a gloss remarks: “You must not fear lest the scorner insult you when you rebuke him: rather should you bear in mind that by making him hate you, you may make him worse.” Therefore one ought to forego fraternal correction, when we fear lest we may make a man worse.

I answer that, As stated above [2617](A[3]) the correction of the wrongdoer is twofold. One, which belongs to prelates, and is directed to the common good, has coercive force. Such correction should not be omitted lest the person corrected be disturbed, both because if he is unwilling to amend his ways of his own accord, he should be made to cease sinning by being punished, and because, if he be incorrigible, the common good is safeguarded in this way, since the order of justice is observed, and others are deterred by one being made an example of. Hence a judge does not desist from pronouncing sentence of condemnation against a sinner, for fear of disturbing him or his friends.

The other fraternal correction is directed to the amendment of the wrongdoer, whom it does not coerce, but merely admonishes. Consequently when it is deemed probable that the sinner will not take the warning, and will become worse, such fraternal correction should be foregone, because the means should be regulated according to the requirements of the end.

Reply to Objection 1: The doctor uses force towards a madman, who is unwilling to submit to his treatment; and this may be compared with the correction administered by prelates, which has coercive power, but not with simple fraternal correction.

Reply to Objection 2: Fraternal correction is a matter of precept, in so far as it is an act of virtue, and it will be a virtuous act in so far as it is proportionate to the end. Consequently whenever it is a hindrance to the end, for instance when a man becomes worse through it, it is longer a vital truth, nor is it a matter precept.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is directed to end, becomes good through being directed to the end. Hence whenever fraternal correction hinders the end, namely the amendment of our brother, it is no longer good, so that when such a correction is omitted, good is not omitted lest evil should befall.

Whether the precept of fraternal correction demands that a private admonition should precede denunciation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of fraternal correction does not demand that a private admonition should precede denunciation. For, in works of charity, we should above all follow the example of God, according to Eph. 5:1,2: “Be ye followers of God, as most dear children, and walk in love.” Now God sometimes punishes a man for a sin, without previously warning him in secret. Therefore it seems that there is no need for a private admonition to precede denunciation.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Mendacio xv), we learn from the deeds of holy men how we ought to understand the commandments of Holy Writ. Now among the deeds of holy men we find that a hidden sin is publicly denounced, without any previous admonition in private. Thus we read (Gn. 37:2) that “Joseph accused his brethren to his father of a most wicked crime”: and (Acts 5:4, 9) that Peter publicly denounced Ananias and Saphira who had secretly “by fraud kept back the price of the land,” without beforehand admonishing them in private: nor do we read that Our Lord admonished Judas in secret before denouncing him. Therefore the precept does not require that secret admonition should precede public denunciation.

Objection 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce. Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without previously admonishing him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that “nothing else need precede accusation except inscription.” [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore it seems that the precept does not require that a secret admonition should precede public denunciation.

Objection 4: Further, it does not seem probable that the customs observed by religious in general are contrary to the precepts of Christ. Now it is customary among religious orders to proclaim this or that one for a fault, without any previous secret admonition. Therefore it seems that this admonition is not required by the precept.

Objection 5: Further, religious are bound to obey their prelates. Now a prelate sometimes commands either all in general, or someone in particular, to tell him if they know of anything that requires correction. Therefore it would seem that they are bound to tell them this, even before any secret admonition. Therefore the precept does not require secret admonition before public denunciation.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 4) on the words, “Rebuke him between thee and him alone” (Mat. 18:15): “Aiming at his amendment, while avoiding his disgrace: since perhaps from shame he might begin to defend his sin; and him whom you thought to make a better man, you make worse.” Now we are bound by the precept of charity to beware lest our brother become worse. Therefore the order of fraternal correction comes under the precept.

I answer that, With regard to the public denunciation of sins it is necessary to make a distinction: because sins may be either public or secret. In the case of public sins, a remedy is required not only for the sinner, that he may become better, but also for others, who know of his sin, lest they be scandalized. Wherefore such like sins should be denounced in public, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:20): “Them that sin reprove before all, that the rest also may have fear,” which is to be understood as referring to public sins, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7).

On the other hand, in the case of secret sins, the words of Our Lord seem to apply (Mat. 18:15): “If thy brother shall offend against thee,” etc. For if he offend thee publicly in the presence of others, he no longer sins against thee alone, but also against others whom he ‘disturbs. Since, however, a man’s neighbor may take offense even at his secret sins, it seems that we must make yet a further distinction. For certain secret sins are hurtful to our neighbor either in his body or in his soul, as, for instance, when a man plots secretly to betray his country to its enemies, or when a heretic secretly turns other men away from the faith. And since he that sins thus in secret, sins not only against you in particular, but also against others, it is necessary to take steps to denounce him at once, in order to prevent him doing such harm, unless by chance you were firmly persuaded that this evil result would be prevented by admonishing him secretly. On the other hand there are other sins which injure none but the sinner, and the person sinned against, either because he alone is hurt by the sinner, or at least because he alone knows about his sin, and then our one purpose should be to succor our sinning brother: and just as the physician of the body restores the sick man to health, if possible, without cutting off a limb, but, if this be unavoidable, cuts off a limb which is least indispensable, in order to preserve the life of the whole body, so too he who desires his brother's amendment should, if possible, so amend him as regards his conscience, that he keep his good name.

For a good name is useful, first of all to the sinner himself, not only in temporal matters wherein a man suffers many losses, if he lose his good name, but also in spiritual matters, because many are restrained from sinning, through fear of dishonor, so that when a man finds his honor lost, he puts no curb on his sinning. Hence Jerome says on Mat. 18:15: "If he sin against thee, thou shouldst rebuke him in private, lest he persist in his sin if he should once become shameless or unabashed." Secondly, we ought to safeguard our sinning brother's good name, both because the dishonor of one leads to the dishonor of others, according to the saying of Augustine (Ep. ad pleb. Hipponens. lxxviii): "When a few of those who bear a name for holiness are reported falsely or proved in truth to have done anything wrong, people will seek by busily repeating it to make it believed of all": and also because when one man's sin is made public others are incited to sin likewise.

Since, however, one's conscience should be preferred to a good name, Our Lord wished that we should publicly denounce our brother and so deliver his conscience from sin, even though he should forfeit his good name. Therefore it is evident that the precept requires a secret admonition to precede public denunciation.

Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is hidden, is known to God, wherefore hidden sins are to the judgment of God, just what public sins are to the judgment of man. Nevertheless God does rebuke sinners sometimes by secretly admonishing them, so to speak, with an inward inspiration, either while they wake or while they sleep, according to Job 33:15–17: "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men . . . then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn, that He may withdraw a man from the things he is doing."

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord as God knew the sin of Judas as though it were public, wherefore He could have made it known at once. Yet He did not, but warned Judas of his sin in words that were obscure. The sin of Ananias and Saphira was denounced by Peter acting as God's executor, by

Whose revelation he knew of their sin. With regard to Joseph it is probable that he warned his brethren, though Scripture does not say so. Or we may say that the sin was public with regard to his brethren, wherefore it is stated in the plural that he accused "his brethren."

Reply to Objection 3: When there is danger to a great number of people, those words of Our Lord do not apply, because then thy brother does not sin against thee alone.

Reply to Objection 4: Proclamations made in the chapter of religious are about little faults which do not affect a man's good name, wherefore they are reminders of forgotten faults rather than accusations or denunciations. If, however, they should be of such a nature as to injure our brother's good name, it would be contrary to Our Lord's precept, to denounce a brother's fault in this manner.

Reply to Objection 5: A prelate is not to be obeyed contrary to a Divine precept, according to Acts 5:29: "We ought to obey God rather then men." Therefore when a prelate commands anyone to tell him anything that he knows to need correction, the command rightly understood supports the safeguarding of the order of fraternal correction, whether the command be addressed to all in general, or to some particular individual. If, on the other hand, a prelate were to issue a command in express opposition to this order instituted by Our Lord, both would sin, the one commanding, and the one obeying him, as disobeying Our Lord's command. Consequently he ought not to be obeyed, because a prelate is not the judge of secret things, but God alone is, wherefore he has no power to command anything in respect of hidden matters, except in so far as they are made known through certain signs, as by ill-repute or suspicion; in which cases a prelate can command just as a judge, whether secular or ecclesiastical, can bind a man under oath to tell the truth.

Whether before the public denunciation witnesses ought to be brought forward?

Objection 1: It would seem that before the public denunciation witnesses ought not to be brought forward. For secret sins ought not to be made known to others, because by so doing "a man would betray his brother's sins instead of correcting them," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xvi, 7). Now by bringing forward witnesses one makes known a brother's sin to others. Therefore in the case of secret sins one ought not to bring witnesses forward before the public denunciation.

Objection 2: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now no man brings in witnesses to prove his own secret sin. Neither therefore ought one to bring forward witnesses to prove the secret sin of our brother.

Objection 3: Further, witnesses are brought forward to prove something. But witnesses afford no proof in secret matters. Therefore it is useless to bring witnesses forward in such cases.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says in his Rule that “before bringing it to the notice of witnesses . . . it should be put before the superior.” Now to bring a matter before a superior or a prelate is to tell the Church. Therefore witnesses should not be brought forward before the public denunciation.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 18:16): “Take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two,” etc.

I answer that, The right way to go from one extreme to another is to pass through the middle space. Now Our Lord wished the beginning of fraternal correction to be hidden, when one brother corrects another between this one and himself alone, while He wished the end to be public, when such a one would be denounced to the Church. Consequently it is befitting that a citation of witnesses should be placed between the two extremes, so that at first the brother’s sin be indicated to a few, who will be of use without being a hindrance, and thus his sin be amended without dishonoring him before the public.

Reply to Objection 1: Some have understood the order of fraternal correction to demand that we should first of all rebuke our brother secretly, and that if he listens, it is well; but if he listen not, and his sin be altogether hidden, they say that we should go no further in the matter, whereas if it has already begun to reach the ears of several by various signs, we ought to prosecute the matter, according to Our Lord’s command. But this is contrary to what Augustine says in his Rule that “we are bound to reveal” a brother’s sin, if it “will cause a worse corruption in the heart.” Wherefore we must say otherwise that when the secret admonition has been given once or several times, as long as there is probable hope of his amendment, we must continue to admonish him in private, but as soon as we are able to judge with any probability that the secret admonition is of no avail, we must take further steps, however secret the sin may be, and call witnesses, unless perhaps it were thought probable that this would not conduce to our brother’s amendment, and that he would become worse: because on that account one ought to abstain altogether from correcting him, as stated above [2618](A[6]).

Reply to Objection 2: A man needs no witnesses that he may amend his own sin: yet they may be necessary that we may amend a brother’s sin. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: There may be three reasons for citing witnesses. First, to show that the deed in question is a sin, as Jerome says: secondly, to prove that the deed was done, if repeated, as Augustine says (in his Rule): thirdly, “to prove that the man who rebuked his brother, has done what he could,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. in Matth. lx).

Reply to Objection 4: Augustine means that the matter ought to be made known to the prelate before it is stated to the witnesses, in so far as the prelate is a private individual who is able to be of more use than others, but not that it is to be told him as to the Church, i.e. as holding the position of judge.

OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)

We must how consider the vices opposed to charity: (1) hatred, which is opposed to love; (2) sloth and envy, which are opposed to the joy of charity; (3) discord and schism, which are contrary to peace; (4) offense and scandal, which are contrary to beneficence and fraternal correction.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is possible to hate God?

(2) Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?

(3) Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin?

(4) Whether it is the greatest of all sins against our neighbor?

(5) Whether it is a capital sin?

(6) From what capital sin does it arise?

Whether it is possible for anyone to hate God?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man can hate God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the first good and beautiful is an object of love and dilection to all.” But God is goodness and beauty itself. Therefore He is hated by none.

Objection 2: Further, in the Apocryphal books of 3 Esdras 4:36, 39 it is written that “all things call upon truth . . . and (all men) do well like of her works.” Now God is the very truth according to Jn. 14:6. Therefore all love God, and none can hate Him.

Objection 3: Further, hatred is a kind of aversion. But according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) God draws all things to Himself. Therefore none can hate Him.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually,” and (Jn. 15:24): “But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father.”

I answer that, As shown above ([2619]FS, Q[29], A[1]), hatred is a movement of the appetitive power, which power is not set in motion save by something apprehended. Now God can be apprehended by man in two ways; first, in Himself, as when He is seen in His Essence; secondly, in His effects, when, to wit, “the invisible things” of God . . .”are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made” (Rom. 1:20). Now God in His Essence is goodness itself, which no man can hate—for it is natural to good to be loved. Hence it is impossible for one who sees God in His Essence, to hate Him.

Moreover some of His effects are such that they can nowise be contrary to the human will, since “to be, to live, to understand,” which are effects of God, are desirable and lovable to all. Wherefore again God cannot be an object of hatred if we consider Him as the Author of such like effects. Some of God’s effects, however, are contrary to an inordinate will, such as the infliction of punishment, and the prohibition of sin by the Divine Law. Such like effects are repugnant to a will debased by sin, and as regards the consideration of them, God may be an object of hatred to some, in so far as they look upon Him as forbidding sin, and inflicting punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is true of those who see God’s Essence, which is the very essence of goodness.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is true in so far as God is apprehended as the cause of such effects as are naturally beloved of all, among which are the works of Truth who reveals herself to men.

Reply to Objection 3: God draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be like God, Who is Being itself.

Whether hatred of God is the greatest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of God is not the greatest of sins. For the most grievous sin is the sin against the Holy Ghost, since it cannot be forgiven, according to Mat. 12:32. Now hatred of God is not reckoned among the various kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, as may be seen from what has been said above ([2620]Q[14], A[2]). Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

Objection 2: Further, sin consists in withdrawing oneself from God. Now an unbeliever who has not even knowledge of God seems to be further away from Him than a believer, who though he hate God, nevertheless knows Him. Therefore it seems that the sin of unbelief is graver than the sin of hatred against God.

Objection 3: Further, God is an object of hatred, only by reason of those of His effects that are contrary to the will: the chief of which is punishment. But hatred of punishment is not the most grievous sin. Therefore hatred of God is not the most grievous sin.

On the contrary, The best is opposite to the worst, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). But hatred of God is contrary to the love of God, wherein man’s best consists. Therefore hatred of God is man’s worst sin.

I answer that, The defect in sin consists in its aversion from God, as stated above ([2621]Q[10], A[3]): and this aversion would not have the character of guilt, were it not voluntary. Hence the nature of guilt consists in a voluntary aversion from God.

Now this voluntary aversion from God is directly implied in the hatred of God, but in other sins, by participation and indirectly. For just as the will cleaves directly to what it loves, so does it directly shun what it hates. Hence when a man hates God, his will is directly averted from God, whereas in other sins, fornication for instance, a man turns away from God, not directly, but indirectly, in so far, namely, as he desires an inordinate pleasure, to which aversion from God is connected. Now that which is so by itself, always takes precedence of that which is so by another. Wherefore hatred of God is more grievous than other sins.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Gregory (Moral. xxv, 11), “it is one thing not to do good things, end another to hate the giver of good things, even as it is one thing to sin indeliberately, and another to sin deliberately.” This implies that to hate God, the giver of all good things, is to sin deliberately, and this is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Hence it is evident that hatred of God is chiefly a sin against the Holy Ghost, in so far as the sin against the Holy Ghost denotes a special kind of sin: and yet it is not reckoned among the kinds of sin against the Holy Ghost, because it is universally found in every kind of that sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Even unbelief is not sinful unless it be voluntary: wherefore the more voluntary it is, the more it is sinful. Now it becomes voluntary by the fact that a man hates the truth that is proposed to him. Wherefore it is evident that unbelief derives its sinfulness from hatred of God, Whose truth is the object of faith; and hence just as a cause is greater than its effect, so hatred of God is a greater sin than unbelief.

Reply to Objection 3: Not everyone who hates his punishment, hates God the author of punishments. For many hate the punishments inflicted on them, and yet they bear them patiently out of reverence for the Divine justice. Wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x) that God commands us to bear with penal evils, not to love them. On the other hand, to break out into hatred of God when He inflicts those punishments, is to hate God’s very justice, and that is a most grievous sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxv, 11): “Even as sometimes it is more grievous to love sin than to do it, so is it more wicked to hate justice than, not to have done it.”

Whether hatred of one’s neighbor is always a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of one’s neighbor is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded or counselled by God, according to Prov. 8:8: “All My words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them.” Now, it is written (Lk. 14:26): “If any man come to Me, and hate not his father and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple.” Therefore hatred of one’s neighbor is not always a sin.

Objection 2: Further, nothing wherein we imitate God can be a sin. But it is in imitation of God that we hate certain people: for it is written (Rom. 1:30): “Detractors, hateful to God.” Therefore it is possible to hate certain people without committing a sin.

Objection 3: Further, nothing that is natural is a sin, for sin is a “wandering away from what is according to nature,” according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30; iv, 20). Now it is natural to a thing to hate whatever is contrary to it, and to aim at its undoing. Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to hate one’s I enemy.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 2:9): “He that . . . hateth his brother, is in darkness.” Now spiritual darkness is sin. Therefore there cannot be hatred of one’s neighbor without sin.

I answer that, Hatred is opposed to love, as stated above ([2622]FS, Q[29], A[2]); so that hatred of a thing is evil according as the love of that thing is good. Now love is due to our neighbor in respect of what he holds from God, i.e. in respect of nature and grace, but not in respect of what he has of himself and from the devil, i.e. in respect of sin and lack of justice.

Consequently it is lawful to hate the sin in one’s brother, and whatever pertains to the defect of Divine justice, but we cannot hate our brother’s nature and grace without sin. Now it is part of our love for our brother that we hate the fault and the lack of good in him, since desire for another’s good is equivalent to hatred of his evil. Consequently the hatred of one’s brother, if we consider it simply, is always sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: By the commandment of God (Ex. 20:12) we must honor our parents—as united to us in nature and kinship. But we must hate them in so far as they prove an obstacle to our attaining the perfection of Divine justice.

Reply to Objection 2: God hates the sin which is in the detractor, not his nature: so that we can hate detractors without committing a sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Men are not opposed to us in respect of the goods which they have received from God: wherefore, in this respect, we should love them. But they are opposed to us, in so far as they show hostility towards us, and this is sinful in them. In this respect we should hate them, for we should hate in them the fact that they are hostile to us.

Whether hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred of our neighbor is the most grievous sin against our neighbor. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:15): “Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer.” Now murder is the most grievous of sins against our neighbor. Therefore hatred is also.

Objection 2: Further, worst is opposed to best. Now the best thing we give our neighbor is love, since all other things are referable to love. Therefore hatred is the worst.

On the contrary, A thing is said to be evil, because it hurts, as Augustine observes (Enchiridion xii). Now there are sins by which a man hurts his neighbor more than by hatred, e.g. theft, murder and adultery. Therefore hatred is not the most grievous sin.

Moreover, Chrysostom [*Hom. x in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commenting on Mat. 5:19, “He that shall break one of these least commandments,” says: “The commandments of Moses, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, count for little in their reward, but they count for much if they be disobeyed. On the other hand the commandments of Christ such as, Thou shalt not be angry, Thou shalt not desire, are reckoned great in their reward, but little in the transgression.” Now hatred is an internal movement like anger and desire. Therefore hatred of one’s brother is a less grievous sin than murder.

I answer that, Sins committed against our neighbor are evil on two counts; first by reason of the disorder in the person who sins, secondly by reason of the hurt inflicted on the person sinned against. On the first count, hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man’s will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin, so that if a man’s outward actions were to be inordinate, without any disorder in his will, they would not be sinful, for instance, if he were to kill a man, through ignorance or out of zeal for justice: and if there be anything sinful in a man’s outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his inward hatred.

On the other hand, as regards the hurt inflicted on his neighbor, a man’s outward sins are worse than his inward hatred. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether hatred is a capital sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is a capital sin. For hatred is directly opposed to charity. Now charity is the foremost among the virtues, and the mother of all others. Therefore hatred is the chief of the capital sins, and the origin of all others.

Objection 2: Further, sins arise in us on account of the inclinations of our passions, according to Rom. 7:5: “The passions of sins . . . did work in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.” Now all other passions of the soul seem to arise from love and hatred, as was shown above ([2623]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Therefore hatred should be reckoned one of the capital sins.

Objection 3: Further, vice is a moral evil. Now hatred regards evil more than any other passion does. Therefore it seems that hatred should be reckoned a capital sin.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) does not reckon hatred among the seven capital sins.

I answer that, As stated above ([2624]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently. Now vice is contrary to man’s nature, in as much as he is a rational animal: and when a thing acts contrary to its nature, that which is natural to it is corrupted little by little. Consequently it must first of all fail in that which is less in accordance with its nature, and last of all in that which is most in accordance with its nature, since what is first in construction is last in destruction. Now that which, first and foremost, is most natural to man, is the love of what is good, and especially love of the Divine good, and of his neighbor’s good. Wherefore hatred, which is opposed to this love, is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice: and therefore it is not a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Phys. vii, text. 18, “the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in accordance with its nature.” Hence what is first and foremost in the virtues must be first and foremost in the natural order. Hence charity is reckoned the foremost of the virtues, and for the same reason hatred cannot be first among the vices, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Hatred of the evil that is contrary to one’s natural good, is the first of the soul’s passions, even as love of one’s natural good is. But hatred of one’s connatural good cannot be first, but is something last, because such like hatred is a proof of an already corrupted nature, even as love of an extraneous good.

Reply to Objection 3: Evil is twofold. One is a true evil, for the reason that it is incompatible with one’s natural good, and the hatred of such an evil may have priority over the other passions. There is, however, another which is not a true, but an apparent evil, which, namely, is a true and connatural good, and yet is reckoned evil on account of the corruption of nature: and the hatred of such an evil must needs come last. This hatred is vicious, but the former is not.

Whether hatred arises from envy?

Objection 1: It seems that hatred does not arise from envy. For envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now hatred does not arise from sorrow, for, on the contrary, we grieve for the presence of the evil we hate. Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

Objection 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of God, as stated above ([2625]Q[25], A[1];[2626] Q[26], A[2]). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of God. But hatred of God does not arise from envy, for we do not envy those who are very far removed from us, but rather those who seem to be near us, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

Objection 3: Further, to one effect there is one cause. Now hatred is caused by anger, for Augustine says in his Rule that “anger grows into hatred.” Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “out of envy cometh hatred.”

I answer that, As stated above [2627](A[5]), hatred of his neighbor is a man’s last step in the path of sin, because it is opposed to the love which he naturally has for his neighbor. Now if a man declines from that which is natural, it is because he intends to avoid that which is naturally an object to be shunned. Now every animal naturally avoids sorrow, just as it desires pleasure, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, x). Accordingly just as love arises from pleasure, so does hatred arise from sorrow. For just as we are moved to love whatever gives us pleasure, in as much as for that very reason it assumes the aspect of good; so we are moved to hate whatever displeases us, in so far as for this very reason it assumes the aspect of evil.

Wherefore, since envy is sorrow for our neighbor’s good, it follows that our neighbor’s good becomes hateful to us, so that “out of envy cometh hatred.”

Reply to Objection 1: Since the appetitive power, like the apprehensive power, reflects on its own acts, it follows that there is a kind of circular movement in the actions of the appetitive power. And so according to the first forward course of the appetitive movement, love gives rise to desire, whence follows pleasure when one has obtained what one desired. And since the very fact of taking pleasure in the good one loves is a kind of good, it follows that pleasure causes love. And in the same way sorrow causes hatred.

Reply to Objection 2: Love and hatred are essentially different, for the object of love is good, which flows from God to creatures, wherefore love is due to God in the first place, and to our neighbor afterwards. On the other hand, hatred is of evil, which has no place in God Himself, but only in His effects, for which reason it has been stated above [2628](A[1]), that God is not an object of hatred, except in so far as He is considered in relation to His effects, and consequently hatred is directed to our neighbor before being directed to God. Therefore, since envy of our neighbor is the mother of hatred of our neighbor, it becomes, in consequence, the cause of hatred towards God.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a thing arising from various causes in various respects, and accordingly hatred may arise both from anger and from envy. However it arises more directly from envy, which looks upon the very good of our neighbor as displeasing and therefore hateful, whereas hatred arises from anger by way of increase. For at first, through anger, we desire our neighbor’s evil according to a certain measure, that is in so far as that evil has the aspect of vengeance: but afterwards, through the continuance of anger, man goes so far as absolutely to desire his neighbor’s evil, which desire is part of hatred. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is caused by envy formally as regards the aspect of the object, but dispositively by anger.

OF SLOTH (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the joy of charity. This joy is either about the Divine good, and then its contrary is sloth, or about our neighbor’s good, and then its contrary is envy. Wherefore we must consider (1) Sloth and (2) Envy.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sloth is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special vice?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital sin?

Whether sloth is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a sin. For we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now sloth is a passion, since it is a kind of sorrow, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14), and as we stated above ([2629]FS, Q[35], A[8]). Therefore sloth is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, no bodily failing that occurs at fixed times is a sin. But sloth is like this, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x, [*De Institutione Caeobiorum]): “The monk is troubled with sloth chiefly about the sixth hour: it is like an intermittent fever, and inflicts the soul of the one it lays low with burning fires at regular and fixed intervals.” Therefore sloth is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, that which proceeds from a good root is, seemingly, no sin. Now sloth proceeds from a good root, for Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x) that “sloth arises from the fact that we sigh at being deprived of spiritual fruit, and think that other monasteries and those which are a long way off are much better than the one we dwell in”: all of which seems to point to humility. Therefore sloth is not a sin.

Objection 4: Further, all sin is to be avoided, according to Ecclus. 21:2: “Flee from sins as from the face of a serpent.” Now Cassian says (De Instit. Monast. x): “Experience shows that the onslaught of sloth is not to be evaded by flight but to be conquered by resistance.” Therefore sloth is not a sin.

On the contrary, Whatever is forbidden in Holy Writ is a sin. Now such is sloth [acedia]: for it is written (Ecclus. 6:26): “Bow down thy shoulder, and bear her," namely spiritual wisdom, "and be not grieved [acedieris] with her bands." Therefore sloth is a sin.

I answer that, Sloth, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) is an oppressive sorrow, which, to wit, so weighs upon man's mind, that he wants to do nothing; thus acid things are also cold. Hence sloth implies a certain weariness of work, as appears from a gloss on Ps. 106:18, "Their soul abhorred all manner of meat," and from the definition of some who say that sloth is a "sluggishness of the mind which neglects to begin good."

Now this sorrow is always evil, sometimes in itself, sometimes in its effect. For sorrow is evil in itself when it is about that which is apparently evil but good in reality, even as, on the other hand, pleasure is evil if it is about that which seems to be good but is, in truth, evil. Since, then, spiritual good is a good in very truth, sorrow about spiritual good is evil in itself. And yet that sorrow also which is about a real evil, is evil in its effect, if it so oppresses man as to draw him away entirely from good deeds. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7) did not wish those who repented to be "swallowed up with overmuch sorrow."

Accordingly, since sloth, as we understand it here, denotes sorrow for spiritual good, it is evil on two counts, both in itself and in point of its effect. Consequently it is a sin, for by sin we mean an evil movement of the appetite, as appears from what has been said above (Q[10], A[2]; [2630]FS, Q[74], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: Passions are not sinful in themselves; but they are blameworthy in so far as they are applied to something evil, just as they deserve praise in so far as they are applied to something good. Wherefore sorrow, in itself, calls neither for praise nor for blame: whereas moderate sorrow for evil calls for praise, while sorrow for good, and again immoderate sorrow for evil, call for blame. It is in this sense that sloth is said to be a sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The passions of the sensitive appetite may either be venial sins in themselves, or incline the soul to mortal sin. And since the sensitive appetite has a bodily organ, it follows that on account of some bodily transmutation a man becomes apt to commit some particular sin. Hence it may happen that certain sins may become more insistent, through certain bodily transmutations occurring at certain fixed times. Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be parched by the sun’s heat.

Reply to Objection 3: It is a sign of humility if a man does not think too much of himself, through observing his own faults; but if a man contemns the good things he has received from God, this, far from being a proof of humility, shows him to be ungrateful: and from such like contempt results sloth, because we sorrow for things that we reckon evil and worthless. Accordingly we ought to think much of the goods of others, in such a way as not to disparage those we have received ourselves, because if we did they would give us sorrow.

Reply to Objection 4: Sin is ever to be shunned, but the assaults of sin should be overcome, sometimes by flight, sometimes by resistance; by flight when a continued thought increases the incentive to sin, as in lust; for which reason it is written (1 Cor. 6:18): “Fly fornication”; by resistance, when perseverance in the thought diminishes the incentive to sin, which incentive arises from some trivial consideration. This is the case with sloth, because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away.

Whether sloth is a special vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a special vice. For that which is common to all vices does not constitute a special kind of vice. But every vice makes a man sorrowful about the opposite spiritual good: for the lustful man is sorrowful about the good of continence, and the glutton about the good of abstinence. Since then sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, as stated above [2631](A[1]), it seems that sloth is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, sloth, through being a kind of sorrow, is opposed to joy. Now joy is not accounted one special virtue. Therefore sloth should not be reckoned a special vice.

Objection 3: Further, since spiritual good is a general kind of object, which virtue seeks, and vice shuns, it does not constitute a special virtue or vice, unless it be determined by some addition. Now nothing, seemingly, except toil, can determine it to sloth, if this be a special vice; because the reason why a man shuns spiritual goods, is that they are toilsome, wherefore sloth is a kind of weariness: while dislike of toil, and love of bodily repose seem to be due to the same cause, viz. idleness. Hence sloth would be nothing but laziness, which seems untrue, for idleness is opposed to carefulness, whereas sloth is opposed to joy. Therefore sloth is not a special vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) distinguishes sloth from the other vices. Therefore it is a special vice.

I answer that, Since sloth is sorrow for spiritual good, if we take spiritual good in a general way, sloth will not be a special vice, because, as stated above ([2632]FS, Q[71], A[1]), every vice shuns the spiritual good of its opposite virtue. Again it cannot be said that sloth is a special vice, in so far as it shuns spiritual good, as toilsome, or troublesome to the body, or as a hindrance to the body's pleasure, for this again would not sever sloth from carnal vices, whereby a man seeks bodily comfort and pleasure.

Wherefore we must say that a certain order exists among spiritual goods, since all the spiritual goods that are in the acts of each virtue are directed to one spiritual good, which is the Divine good, about which there is a special virtue, viz. charity. Hence it is proper to each virtue to rejoice in its own spiritual good, which consists in its own act, while it belongs specially to charity to have that spiritual joy whereby one rejoices in the Divine good. In like manner the sorrow whereby one is displeased at the spiritual good which is in each act of virtue, belongs, not to any special vice, but to every vice, but sorrow in the Divine good about which charity rejoices, belongs to a special vice, which is called sloth. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether sloth is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Divine Law. But sloth seems contrary to no precept, as one may see by going through the precepts of the Decalogue. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, in the same genus, a sin of deed is no less grievous than a sin of thought. Now it is not a mortal sin to refrain in deed from some spiritual good which leads to God, else it would be a mortal sin not to observe the counsels. Therefore it is not a mortal sin to refrain in thought from such like spiritual works. Therefore sloth is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin is to be found in a perfect man. But sloth is to be found in a perfect man: for Cassian says (De Instit. Caenob. x,1) that “sloth is well known to the solitary, and is a most vexatious and persistent foe to the hermit.” Therefore sloth is not always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 7:20): “The sorrow of the world worketh death.” But such is sloth; for it is not sorrow “according to God,” which is contrasted with sorrow of the world. Therefore it is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([2633]FS, Q[88], AA[1],2), mortal sin is so called because it destroys the spiritual life which is the effect of charity, whereby God dwells in us. Wherefore any sin which by its very nature is contrary to charity is a mortal sin by reason of its genus. And such is sloth, because the proper effect of charity is joy in God, as stated above (Q[28], A[1]), while sloth is sorrow about spiritual good in as much as it is a Divine good. Therefore sloth is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. But it must be observed with regard to all sins that are mortal in respect of their genus, that they are not mortal, save when they attain to their perfection. Because the consummation of sin is in the consent of reason: for we are speaking now of human sins consisting in human acts, the principle of which is the reason. Wherefore if the sin be a mere beginning of sin in the sensuality alone, without attaining to the consent of reason, it is a venial sin on account of the imperfection of the act. Thus in the genus of adultery, the concupiscence that goes no further than the sensuality is a venial sin, whereas if it reach to the consent of reason, it is a mortal sin. So too, the movement of sloth is sometimes in the sensuality alone, by reason of the opposition of the flesh to the spirit, and then it is a venial sin; whereas sometimes it reaches to the reason, which consents in the dislike, horror and detestation of the Divine good, on account of the flesh utterly prevailing over the spirit. In this case it is evident that sloth is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Sloth is opposed to the precept about hallowing the Sabbath day. For this precept, in so far as it is a moral precept, implicitly commands the mind to rest in God: and sorrow of the mind about the Divine good is contrary thereto.

Reply to Objection 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is not a sin of sloth; but when he is sorry to have to do something for God’s sake.

Reply to Objection 3: Imperfect movements of sloth are to be found in holy men, but they do not reach to the consent of reason.

Whether sloth should be accounted a capital vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that sloth ought not to be accounted a capital vice. For a capital vice is one that moves a man to sinful acts, as stated above ([2634]Q[34], A[5]). Now sloth does not move one to action, but on the contrary withdraws one from it. Therefore it should not be accounted a capital sin.

Objection 2: Further, a capital sin is one to which daughters are assigned. Now Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns six daughters to sloth, viz. “malice, spite, faint-heartedness, despair, sluggishness in regard to the commandments, wandering of the mind after unlawful things.” Now these do not seem in reality to arise from sloth. For “spite” is, seemingly the same as hatred, which arises from envy, as stated above ([2635]Q[34], A[6]); “malice” is a genus which contains all vices, and, in like manner, a “wandering” of the mind after unlawful things is to be found in every vice; “sluggishness” about the commandments seems to be the same as sloth, while “faint-heartedness” and “despair” may arise from any sin. Therefore sloth is not rightly accounted a capital sin.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore distinguishes the vice of sloth from the vice of sorrow, saying (De Summo Bono ii, 37) that in so far as a man shirks his duty because it is distasteful and burdensome, it is sorrow, and in so far as he is inclined to undue repose, it is sloth: and of sorrow he says that it gives rise to “spite, faint-heartedness, bitterness, despair,” whereas he states that from sloth seven things arise, viz. “idleness, drowsiness, uneasiness of the mind, restlessness of the body, instability, loquacity, curiosity.” Therefore it seems that either Gregory or Isidore has wrongly assigned sloth as a capital sin together with its daughters.

On the contrary, The same Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that sloth is a capital sin, and has the daughters aforesaid.

I answer that, As stated above ([2636]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital vice is one which easily gives rise to others as being their final cause. Now just as we do many things on account of pleasure, both in order to obtain it, and through being moved to do something under the impulse of pleasure, so again we do many things on account of sorrow, either that we may avoid it, or through being exasperated into doing something under pressure thereof. Wherefore, since sloth is a kind of sorrow, as stated above [2637](A[2]; FS, Q[85], A[8]), it is fittingly reckoned a capital sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Sloth by weighing on the mind, hinders us from doing things that cause sorrow: nevertheless it induces the mind to do certain things, either because they are in harmony with sorrow, such as weeping, or because they are a means of avoiding sorrow.

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory fittingly assigns the daughters of sloth. For since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5,6) “no man can be a long time in company with what is painful and unpleasant,” it follows that something arises from sorrow in two ways: first, that man shuns whatever causes sorrow; secondly, that he passes to other things that give him pleasure: thus those who find no joy in spiritual pleasures, have recourse to pleasures of the body, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 6). Now in the avoidance of sorrow the order observed is that man at first flies from unpleasant objects, and secondly he even struggles against such things as cause sorrow. Now spiritual goods which are the object of the sorrow of sloth, are both end and means. Avoidance of the end is the result of “despair,” while avoidance of those goods which are the means to the end, in matters of difficulty which come under the counsels, is the effect of “faint-heartedness,” and in matters of common righteousness, is the effect of “sluggishness about the commandments.” The struggle against spiritual goods that cause sorrow is sometimes with men who lead others to spiritual goods, and this is called “spite”; and sometimes it extends to the spiritual goods themselves, when a man goes so far as to detest them, and this is properly called “malice.” In so far as a man has recourse to eternal objects of pleasure, the daughter of sloth is called “wandering after unlawful things.” From this it is clear how to reply to the objections against each of the daughters: for “malice” does not denote here that which is generic to all vices, but must be understood as explained. Nor is “spite” taken as synonymous with hatred, but for a kind of indignation, as stated above: and the same applies to the others.

Reply to Objection 3: This distinction between sorrow and sloth is also given by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. x, 1). But Gregory more fittingly (Moral. xxxi, 45) calls sloth a kind of sorrow, because, as stated above [2638](A[2]), sorrow is not a distinct vice, in so far as a man shirks a distasteful and burdensome work, or sorrows on account of any other cause whatever, but only in so far as he is sorry on account of the Divine good, which sorrow belongs essentially to sloth; since sloth seeks undue rest in so far as it spurns the Divine good. Moreover the things which Isidore reckons to arise from sloth and sorrow, are reduced to those mentioned by Gregory: for "bitterness" which Isidore states to be the result of sorrow, is an effect of "spite." "Idleness" and "drowsiness" are reduced to "sluggishness about the precepts": for some are idle and omit them altogether, while others are drowsy and fulfil them with negligence. All the other five which he reckons as effects of sloth, belong to the "wandering of the mind after unlawful things." This tendency to wander, if it reside in the mind itself that is desirous of rushing after various things without rhyme or reason, is called "uneasiness of the mind," but if it pertains to the imaginative power, it is called "curiosity"; if it affect the speech it is called "loquacity"; and in so far as it affects a body that changes place, it is called "restlessness of the body," when, to wit, a man shows the unsteadiness of his mind, by the inordinate movements of members of his body; while if it causes the body to move from one place to another, it is called "instability"; or "instability" may denote changeableness of purpose.

OF ENVY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider envy, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is envy?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital sin, and which are its daughters?

Whether envy is a kind of sorrow?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a kind of sorrow. For the object of envy is a good, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) of the envious man that “self-inflicted pain wounds the pining spirit, which is racked by the prosperity of another.” Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, likeness is a cause, not of sorrow but rather of pleasure. But likeness is a cause of envy: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10): “Men are envious of such as are like them in genus, in knowledge, in stature, in habit, or in reputation.” Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, sorrow is caused by a defect, wherefore those who are in great defect are inclined to sorrow, as stated above ([2639]FS, Q[47], A[3]) when we were treating of the passions. Now those who lack little, and who love honors, and who are considered wise, are envious, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 10). Therefore envy is not a kind of sorrow.

Objection 4: Further, sorrow is opposed to pleasure. Now opposite effects have not one and the same cause. Therefore, since the recollection of goods once possessed is a cause of pleasure, as stated above ([2640]FS, Q[32], A[3]) it will not be a cause of sorrow. But it is a cause of envy; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “we envy those who have or have had things that befitted ourselves, or which we possessed at some time.” Therefore sloth is not a kind of sorrow.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) calls envy a species of sorrow, and says that “envy is sorrow for another’s good.”

I answer that, The object of a man’s sorrow is his own evil. Now it may happen that another’s good is apprehended as one’s own evil, and in this way sorrow can be about another’s good. But this happens in two ways: first, when a man is sorry about another’s good, in so far as it threatens to be an occasion of harm to himself, as when a man grieves for his enemy’s prosperity, for fear lest he may do him some harm: such like sorrow is not envy, but rather an effect of fear, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9).

Secondly, another’s good may be reckoned as being one’s own evil, in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one’s own good name or excellence. It is in this way that envy grieves for another’s good: and consequently men are envious of those goods in which a good name consists, and about which men like to be honored and esteemed, as the Philosopher remarks (Rhet. ii, 10).

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders what is good for one from being reckoned as evil for another: and in this way it is possible for sorrow to be about good, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Since envy is about another's good name in so far as it diminishes the good name a man desires to have, it follows that a man is envious of those only whom he wishes to rival or surpass in reputation. But this does not apply to people who are far removed from one another: for no man, unless he be out of his mind, endeavors to rival or surpass in reputation those who are far above him. Thus a commoner does not envy the king, nor does the king envy a commoner whom he is far above. Wherefore a man envies not those who are far removed from him, whether in place, time, or station, but those who are near him, and whom he strives to rival or surpass. For it is against our will that these should be in better repute than we are, and that gives rise to sorrow. On the other hand, likeness causes pleasure in so far as it is in agreement with the will.

Reply to Objection 3: A man does not strive for mastery in matters where he is very deficient; so that he does not envy one who surpasses him in such matters, unless he surpass him by little, for then it seems to him that this is not beyond him, and so he makes an effort; wherefore, if his effort fails through the other's reputation surpassing his, he grieves. Hence it is that those who love to be honored are more envious; and in like manner the faint-hearted are envious, because all things are great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in something great. Hence it is written (Job 5:2): "Envy slayeth the little one," and Gregory says (Moral. v, 46) that "we can envy those only whom we think better in some respect than ourselves."

Reply to Objection 4: Recollection of past goods in so far as we have had them, causes pleasure; in so far as we have lost them, causes sorrow; and in so far as others have them, causes envy, because that, above all, seems to belittle our reputation. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii) that the old envy the young, and those who have spent much in order to get something, envy those who have got it by spending little, because they grieve that they have lost their goods, and that others have acquired goods.

Whether envy is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a sin. For Jerome says to Laeta about the education of her daughter (Ep. cvii): “Let her have companions, so that she may learn together with them, envy them, and be nettled when they are praised.” But no one should be advised to commit a sin. Therefore envy is not a sin

Objection 1: Further, “Envy is sorrow for another’s good,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). But this is sometimes praiseworthy: for it is written (Prov. 29:2): “When the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn.” Therefore envy is not always a sin.

Objection 3: Further, envy denotes a kind of zeal. But there is a good zeal, according to Ps. 68:10: “The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up.” Therefore envy is not always a sin.

Objection 4: Further, punishment is condivided with fault. But envy is a kind of punishment: for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): “When the foul sore of envy corrupts the vanquished heart, the very exterior itself shows how forcibly the mind is urged by madness. For paleness seizes the complexion, the eyes are weighed down, the spirit is inflamed, while the limbs are chilled, there is frenzy in the heart, there is gnashing with the teeth.” Therefore envy is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 5:26): “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another.”

I answer that, As stated above [2641](A[1]), envy is sorrow for another’s good. Now this sorrow may come about in four ways. First, when a man grieves for another’s good, through fear that it may cause harm either to himself, or to some other goods. This sorrow is not envy, as stated above [2642](A[1]), and may be void of sin. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 11): “It very often happens that without charity being lost, both the destruction of an enemy rejoices us, and again his glory, without any sin of envy, saddens us, since, when he falls, we believe that some are deservedly set up, and when he prospers, we dread lest many suffer unjustly.”

Secondly, we may grieve over another’s good, not because he has it, but because the good which he has, we have not: and this, properly speaking, is zeal, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9). And if this zeal be about virtuous goods, it is praiseworthy, according to 1 Cor. 14:1: “Be zealous for spiritual gifts”: while, if it be about temporal goods, it may be either sinful or sinless. Thirdly, one may grieve over another’s good, because he who happens to have that good is unworthy of it. Such sorrow as this cannot be occasioned by virtuous goods, which make a man righteous, but, as the Philosopher states, is about riches, and those things which can accrue to the worthy and the unworthy; and he calls this sorrow {nemesis} [*The nearest equivalent is “indignation.” The use of the word “nemesis” to signify “revenge” does not represent the original Greek.], saying that it belongs to good morals. But he says this because he considered temporal goods in themselves, in so far as they may seem great to those who look not to eternal goods: whereas, according to the teaching of faith, temporal goods that accrue to those who are unworthy, are so disposed according to God’s just ordinance, either for the correction of those men, or for their condemnation, and such goods are as nothing in comparison with the goods to come, which are prepared for good men. Wherefore sorrow of this kind is forbidden in Holy Writ, according to Ps. 36:1: “Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy them that work iniquity,” and elsewhere (Ps. 72:2,3): “My steps had well nigh slipped, for I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners [*Douay: ‘because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’].” Fourthly, we grieve over a man’s good, in so far as his good surpasses ours; this is envy properly speaking, and is always sinful, as also the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 10), because to do so is to grieve over what should make us rejoice, viz. over our neighbor’s good.

Reply to Objection 1: Envy there denotes the zeal with which we ought to strive to progress with those who are better than we are.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sorrow for another’s good in the first sense given above.

Reply to Objection 3: Envy differs from zeal, as stated above. Hence a certain zeal may be good, whereas envy is always evil.

Reply to Objection 4: Nothing hinders a sin from being penal accidentally, as stated above ([2643]FS, Q[87], A[2]) when we were treating of sins.

Whether envy is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but only in the reason, as Augustine declares

(De Trin. xii, 12) [*Cf. [2644]FS, Q[74], A[4]]. Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, there cannot be mortal sin in infants. But envy can be in them, for Augustine says (Confess. i): “I myself have seen and known even a baby envious, it could not speak, yet it turned pale and looked bitterly on its foster-brother.” Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to some virtue. But envy is contrary, not to a virtue but to {nemesis}, which is a passion, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9). Therefore envy is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:2): “Envy slayeth the little one.” Now nothing slays spiritually, except mortal sin. Therefore envy is a mortal sin.

I answer that, Envy is a mortal sin, in respect of its genus. For the genus of a sin is taken from its object; and envy according to the aspect of its object is contrary to charity, whence the soul derives its spiritual life, according to 1 Jn. 3:14: “We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren.” Now the object both of charity and of envy is our neighbor’s good, but by contrary movements, since charity rejoices in our neighbor’s good, while envy grieves over it, as stated above [2645] (A[1]). Therefore it is evident that envy is a mortal sin in respect of its genus.

Nevertheless, as stated above (Q[35], A[4]; [2646]FS, Q[72], A[5], ad 1), in every kind of mortal sin we find certain imperfect movements in the sensuality, which are venial sins: such are the first movement of concupiscence, in the genus of adultery, and the first movement of anger, in the genus of murder, and so in the genus of envy we find sometimes even in perfect men certain first movements, which are venial sins.

Reply to Objection 1: The movement of envy in so far as it is a passion of the sensuality, is an imperfect thing in the genus of human acts, the principle of which is the reason, so that envy of that kind is not a mortal sin. The same applies to the envy of little children who have not the use of reason: wherefore the Reply to the Second Objection is manifest.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 9), envy is contrary both to {nemesis} and to pity, but for different reasons. For it is directly contrary to pity, their principal objects being contrary to one another, since the envious man grieves over his neighbor’s good, whereas the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor’s evil, so that the envious have no pity, as he states in the same passage, nor is the pitiful man envious. On the other hand, envy is contrary to {nemesis} on the part of the man whose good grieves the envious man, for {nemesis} is sorrow for the good of the undeserving according to Ps. 72:3: “I was envious of the wicked, when I saw the prosperity of sinners” [*Douay: ‘because I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners’], whereas the envious grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it. Hence it is clear that the former contrariety is more direct than the latter. Now pity is a virtue, and an effect proper to charity: so that envy is contrary to pity and charity.

Whether envy is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a capital vice. For the capital vices are distinct from their daughters. Now envy is the daughter of vainglory; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 10) that “those who love honor and glory are more envious.” Therefore envy is not a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, the capital vices seem to be less grave than the other vices which arise from them. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45): “The leading vices seem to worm their way into the deceived mind under some kind of pretext, but those which follow them provoke the soul to all kinds of outrage, and confuse the mind with their wild outcry.” Now envy is seemingly a most grave sin, for Gregory says (Moral. v, 46): “Though in every evil thing that is done, the venom of our old enemy is infused into the heart of man, yet in this wickedness the serpent stirs his whole bowels and discharges the bane of spite fitted to enter deep into the mind.” Therefore envy is not a capital sin.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that its daughters are unfittingly assigned by Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45), who says that from envy arise “hatred, tale-bearing, detraction, joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes, and grief for his prosperity.” For joy at our neighbor’s misfortunes and grief for his prosperity seem to be the same as envy, as appears from what has been said above [2647](A[3]). Therefore these should not be assigned as daughters of envy.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) who states that envy is a capital sin and assigns the aforesaid daughters thereto.

I answer that, Just as sloth is grief for a Divine spiritual good, so envy is grief for our neighbor’s good. Now it has been stated above ([2648]Q[35], A[4]) that sloth is a capital vice for the reason that it incites man to do certain things, with the purpose either of avoiding sorrow or of satisfying its demands. Wherefore envy is accounted a capital vice for the same reason.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45), “the capital vices are so closely akin to one another that one springs from the other. For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which by corrupting the mind it occupies begets envy, since while it craves for the power of an empty name, it repines for fear lest another should acquire that power.” Consequently the notion of a capital vice does not exclude its originating from another vice, but it demands that it should have some principal reason for being itself the origin of several kinds of sin. However it is perhaps because envy manifestly arises from vainglory, that it is not reckoned a capital sin, either by Isidore (De Summo Bono) or by Cassian (De Instit. Caenob. v, 1).

Reply to Objection 2: It does not follow from the passage quoted that envy is the greatest of sins, but that when the devil tempts us to envy, he is enticing us to that which has its chief place in his heart, for as quoted further on in the same passage, “by the envy of the devil, death came into the world” (Wis. 2:24).

There is, however, a kind of envy which is accounted among the most grievous sins, viz. envy of another’s spiritual good, which envy is a sorrow for the increase of God’s grace, and not merely for our neighbor’s good. Hence it is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, because thereby a man envies, as it were, the Holy Ghost Himself, Who is glorified in His works.

Reply to Objection 3: The number of envy’s daughters may be understood for the reason that in the struggle aroused by envy there is something by way of beginning, something by way of middle, and something by way of term. The beginning is that a man strives to lower another’s reputation, and this either secretly, and then we have “tale-bearing,” or openly, and then we have “detraction.” The middle consists in the fact that when a man aims at defaming another, he is either able to do so, and then we have “joy at another’s misfortune,” or he is unable, and then we have “grief at another’s prosperity.” The term is hatred itself, because just as good which delights causes love, so does sorrow cause hatred, as stated above ([2649]Q[34], A[6]). Grief at another’s prosperity is in one way the very same as envy, when, to Wit, a man grieves over another’s prosperity, in so far as it gives the latter a good name, but in another way it is a daughter of envy, in so far as the envious man sees his neighbor prosper notwithstanding his efforts to prevent it. On the other hand, “joy at another’s misfortune” is not directly the same as envy, but is a result thereof, because grief over our neighbor’s good which is envy, gives rise to joy in his evil.

OF DISCORD, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO PEACE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sins contrary to peace, and first we shall consider discord which is in the heart, secondly contention, which is on the lips, thirdly, those things which consist in deeds, viz. schism, quarrelling, war, and sedition. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether discord is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?

Whether discord is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a sin. For to disaccord with man is to sever oneself from another’s will. But this does not seem to be a sin, because God’s will alone, and not our neighbor’s, is the rule of our own will. Therefore discord is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, whoever induces another to sin, sins also himself. But it appears not to be a sin to incite others to discord, for it is written (Acts 23:6) that Paul, knowing that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, cried out in the council: “Men brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of Pharisees, concerning the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question. And when he had so said, there arose a dissension between the Pharisees and the Sadducees.” Therefore discord is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, sin, especially mortal sin, is not to be found in a holy man. But discord is to be found even among holy men, for it is written (Acts 15:39): “There arose a dissension” between Paul and Barnabas, “so that they departed one from another.” Therefore discord is not a sin. and least of all a mortal sin.

On the contrary, “Dissensions,” that is, discords, are reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), of which it is said afterwards (Gal. 5:21) that “they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Now nothing, save mortal sin, excludes man from the kingdom of God. Therefore discord is a mortal sin.

I answer that, Discord is opposed to concord. Now, as stated above ([2650]Q[29], AA[1],3) concord results from charity, in as much as charity directs many hearts together to one thing, which is chiefly the Divine good, secondarily, the good of our neighbor. Wherefore discord is a sin, in so far as it is opposed to this concord.

But it must be observed that this concord is destroyed by discord in two ways: first, directly; secondly, accidentally. Now, human acts and movements are said to be direct when they are according to one’s intention. Wherefore a man directly disaccords with his neighbor, when he knowingly and intentionally dissents from the Divine good and his neighbor’s good, to which he ought to consent. This is a mortal sin in respect of its genus, because it is contrary to charity, although the first movements of such discord are venial sins by reason of their being imperfect acts.

The accidental in human acts is that which occurs beside the intention. Hence when several intend a good pertaining to God’s honor, or our neighbor’s profit, while one deems a certain thing good, and another thinks contrariwise, the discord is in this case accidentally contrary to the Divine good or that of our neighbor. Such like discord is neither sinful nor against charity, unless it be accompanied by an error about things necessary to salvation, or by undue obstinacy, since it has also been stated above ([2651]Q[29], AA[1],3, ad 2) that the concord which is an effect of charity, is union of wills not of opinions. It follows from this that discord is sometimes the sin of one party only, for instance, when one wills a good which the other knowingly resists; while sometimes it implies sin in both parties, as when each dissents from the other’s good, and loves his own.

Reply to Objection 1: One man’s will considered in itself is not the rule of another man’s will; but in so far as our neighbor’s will adheres to God’s will, it becomes in consequence, a rule regulated according to its proper measure. Wherefore it is a sin to disaccord with such a will, because by that very fact one disaccords with the Divine rule.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as a man’s will that adheres to God is a right rule, to disaccord with which is a sin, so too a man’s will that is opposed to God is a perverse rule, to disaccord with which is good. Hence to cause a discord, whereby a good concord resulting from charity is destroyed, is a grave sin: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:16): “Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,” which seventh is stated (Prov. 6:19) to be “him that soweth discord among brethren.” On the other hand, to arouse a discord whereby an evil concord (i.e. concord in an evil will) is destroyed, is praiseworthy. In this way Paul was to be commended for sowing discord among those who concorded together in evil, because Our Lord also said of Himself (Mat. 10:34): “I came not to send peace, but the sword.”

Reply to Objection 3: The discord between Paul and Barnabas was accidental and not direct: because each intended some good, yet the one thought one thing good, while the other thought something else, which was owing to human deficiency: for that controversy was not about things necessary to salvation. Moreover all this was ordained by Divine providence, on account of the good which would ensue.

Whether discord is a daughter of vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that discord is not a daughter of vainglory. For anger is a vice distinct from vainglory. Now discord is apparently the daughter of anger, according to Prov. 15:18: “A passionate man stirreth up strifes.” Therefore it is not a daughter of vainglory.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine expounding the words of Jn. 7:39, “As yet the Spirit was not given,” says (Tract. xxxii) “Malice severs, charity unites.” Now discord is merely a separation of wills. Therefore discord arises from malice, i.e. envy, rather than from vainglory.

Objection 3: Further, whatever gives rise to many evils, would seem to be a capital vice. Now such is discord, because Jerome in commenting on Mat. 12:25, “Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate,” says: “Just as concord makes small things thrive, so discord brings the greatest things to ruin.” Therefore discord should itself be reckoned a capital vice, rather than a daughter of vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

I answer that, Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, to wit, as one man’s will holds fast to one thing, while the other man’s will holds fast to something else. Now if a man’s will holds fast to its own ground, this is due to the act that he prefers what is his own to that which belongs to others, and if he do this inordinately, it is due to pride and vainglory. Therefore discord, whereby a man holds to his own way of thinking, and departs from that of others, is reckoned to be a daughter of vainglory.

Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not the same as discord, for strife consists in external deeds, wherefore it is becoming that it should arise from anger, which incites the mind to hurt one’s neighbor; whereas discord consists in a divergence in the movements of wills, which arises from pride or vainglory, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 2: In discord we may consider that which is the term “wherefrom,” i.e. another’s will from which we recede, and in this respect it arises from envy; and again we may consider that which is the term “whither,” i.e. something of our own to which we cling, and in this respect it is caused by vainglory. And since in every moment the term “whither” is more important than the term “wherefrom” (because the end is of more account than the beginning), discord is accounted a daughter of vainglory rather than of envy, though it may arise from both for different reasons, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why concord makes small things thrive, while discord brings the greatest to ruin, is because “the more united a force is, the stronger it is, while the more disunited it is the weaker it becomes” (De Causis xvii). Hence it is evident that this is part of the proper effect of discord which is a disunion of wills, and in no way indicates that other vices arise from discord, as though it were a capital vice.

OF CONTENTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider contention, in respect of which there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether contention is a mortal sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of vainglory?

Whether contention is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a mortal sin. For there is no mortal sin in spiritual men: and yet contention is to be found in them, according to Lk. 22:24: “And there was also a strife amongst” the disciples of Jesus, “which of them should . . . be the greatest.” Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, no well disposed man should be pleased that his neighbor commit a mortal sin. But the Apostle says (Phil. 1:17): “Some out of contention preach Christ,” and afterwards he says (Phil. 1:18): “In this also I rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.” Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, it happens that people contend either in the courts or in disputations, without any spiteful purpose, and with a good intention, as, for example, those who contend by disputing with heretics. Hence a gloss on 1 Kings 14:1, “It came to pass one day,” etc. says: “Catholics do not raise contentions with heretics, unless they are first challenged to dispute.” Therefore contention is not a mortal sin.

Objection 4: Further, Job seems to have contended with God, according to Job 39:32: “Shall he that contendeth with God be so easily silenced?” And yet Job was not guilty of mortal sin, since the Lord said of him (Job 42:7): “You have not spoken the thing that is right before me, as my servant Job hath.” Therefore contention is not always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is against the precept of the Apostle who says (2 Tim. 2:14): “Contend not in words.” Moreover (Gal. 5:20) contention is included among the works of the flesh, and as stated there (Gal. 5:21) “they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Now whatever excludes a man from the kingdom of God and is against a precept, is a mortal sin. Therefore contention is a mortal sin.

I answer that, To contend is to tend against some one. Wherefore just as discord denotes a contrariety of wills, so contention signifies contrariety of speech. For this reason when a man contrasts various contrary things in a speech, this is called “contentio,” which Tully calls one of the rhetorical colors (De Rhet. ad Heren. iv), where he says that “it consists in developing a speech from contrary things,” for instance: “Adulation has a pleasant beginning, and a most bitter end.”

Now contrariety of speech may be looked at in two ways: first with regard to the intention of the contentious party, secondly, with regard to the manner of contending. As to the intention, we must consider whether he contends against the truth, and then he is to be blamed, or against falsehood, and then he should be praised. As to the manner, we must consider whether his manner of contending is in keeping with the persons and the matter in dispute, for then it would be praiseworthy, hence Tully says (De Rhet. ad Heren. iii) that "contention is a sharp speech suitable for proof and refutation"—or whether it exceeds the demands of the persons and matter in dispute, in which case it is blameworthy.

Accordingly if we take contention as denoting a disclaimer of the truth and an inordinate manner, it is a mortal sin. Thus Ambrose [*Cf. Gloss. Ord. in Rom. i, 29] defines contention: "Contention is a disclaimer of the truth with clamorous confidence." If, however, contention denote a disavowal of what is false, with the proper measure of acrimony, it is praiseworthy: whereas, if it denote a disavowal of falsehood, together with an inordinate manner, it can be a venial sin, unless the contention be conducted so inordinately, as to give scandal to others. Hence the Apostle after saying (2 Tim. 2:14): "Contend not in words," adds, "for it is to no profit, but to the subverting of the hearers."

Reply to Objection 1: The disciples of Christ contended together, not with the intention of disclaiming the truth, since each one stood up for what he thought was true. Yet there was inordinateness in their contention, because they contended about a matter which they ought not to have contended about, viz. the primacy of honor; for they were not spiritual men as yet, as a gloss says on the same passage; and for this reason Our Lord checked them.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who preached Christ "out of contention," were to be blamed, because, although they did not gainsay the truth of faith, but preached it, yet they did gainsay the truth, by the fact that they thought they would "raise affliction" to the Apostle who was preaching the truth of faith. Hence the Apostle rejoiced not in their contention, but in the fruit that would result therefrom, namely that Christ would be made known—since evil is sometimes the occasion of good results.

Reply to Objection 3: Contention is complete and is a mortal sin when, in contending before a judge, a man gainsays the truth of justice, or in a disputation, intends to impugn the true doctrine. In this sense Catholics do not contend against heretics, but the reverse. But when, whether in court or in a disputation, it is incomplete, i.e. in respect of the acrimony of speech, it is not always a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Contention here denotes an ordinary dispute. For Job had said (13:3): “I will speak to the Almighty, and I desire to reason with God”: yet he intended not to impugn the truth, but to defend it, and in seeking the truth thus, he had no wish to be inordinate in mind or in speech.

Whether contention is a daughter of vainglory?

Objection 1: It would seem that contention is not a daughter of vainglory. For contention is akin to zeal, wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 3:3): “Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: ‘envying’] and contention, are you not carnal, and walk according to men?” Now zeal pertains to envy. Therefore contention arises rather from envy.

Objection 2: Further, contention is accompanied by raising of the voice. But the voice is raised on account of anger, as Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 14). Therefore contention too arises from anger.

Objection 3: Further, among other things knowledge seems to be the matter of pride and vainglory, according to 1 Cor. 8:1: “Knowledge puffeth up.” Now contention is often due to lack of knowledge, and by knowledge we do not impugn the truth, we know it. Therefore contention is not a daughter of vainglory.

On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 14).

I answer that, As stated above ([2652]Q[37], A[2]), discord is a daughter of vainglory, because each of the disaccording parties clings to his own opinion, rather than acquiesce with the other. Now it is proper to pride and vainglory to seek one’s own glory. And just as people are discordant when they hold to their own opinion in their hearts, so are they contentious when each defends his own opinion by words. Consequently contention is reckoned a daughter of vainglory for the same reason as discord.

Reply to Objection 1: Contention, like discord, is akin to envy in so far as a man severs himself from the one with whom he is discordant, or with whom he contends, but in so far as a contentious man holds to something, it is akin to pride and vainglory, because, to wit, he clings to his own opinion, as stated above ([2653]Q[37], A[2], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 2: The contention of which we are speaking puts on a loud voice, for the purpose of impugning the truth, so that it is not the chief part of contention. Hence it does not follow that contention arises from the same source as the raising of the voice.

Reply to Objection 3: Pride and vainglory are occasioned chiefly by goods even those that are contrary to them, for instance, when a man is proud of his humility: for when a thing arises in this way, it does so not directly but accidentally, in which way nothing hinders one contrary from arising out of another. Hence there is no reason why the "per se" and direct effects of pride or vainglory, should not result from the contraries of those things which are the occasion of pride.

OF SCHISM (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices contrary to peace, which belong to deeds: such are schism, strife, sedition, and war. In the first place, then, about schism, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether schism is a special sin?

(2) Whether it is graver than unbelief?

(3) Of the power exercised by schismatics;

(4) Of the punishment inflicted on them.

Whether schism is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that schism is not a special sin. For "schism," as Pope Pelagius I says (Epist. ad Victor. et Pancrat.), "denotes a division." But every sin causes a division, according to Is. 59:: "Your sins have divided between you and your God." Therefore schism is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is disobedience against the heavenly commandments." Therefore every sin is a schism.

Objection 3: Further, heresy also divides a man from the unity of faith. If, therefore, the word schism denotes a division, it would seem not to differ, as a special sin, from the sin of unbelief.

On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Faust. xx, 3; Contra Crescon. ii, 4) distinguishes between schism and heresy, for he says that a “schismatic is one who holds the same faith, and practises the same worship, as others, and takes pleasure in the mere disunion of the community, whereas a heretic is one who holds another faith from that of the Catholic Church.” Therefore schism is not a generic sin.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. viii, 3), schism takes its name “from being a scission of minds,” and scission is opposed to unity. Wherefore the sin of schism is one that is directly and essentially opposed to unity. For in the moral, as in the physical order, the species is not constituted by that which is accidental. Now, in the moral order, the essential is that which is intended, and that which results beside the intention, is, as it were, accidental. Hence the sin of schism is, properly speaking, a special sin, for the reason that the schismatic intends to sever himself from that unity which is the effect of charity: because charity unites not only one person to another with the bond of spiritual love, but also the whole Church in unity of spirit.

Accordingly schismatics properly so called are those who, wilfully and intentionally separate themselves from the unity of the Church; for this is the chief unity, and the particular unity of several individuals among themselves is subordinate to the unity of the Church, even as the mutual adaptation of each member of a natural body is subordinate to the unity of the whole body. Now the unity of the Church consists in two things; namely, in the mutual connection or communion of the members of the Church, and again in the subordination of all the members of the Church to the one head, according to Col. 2:18,19: “Puffed up by the sense of his flesh, and not holding the Head, from which the whole body, by joints and bands, being supplied with nourishment and compacted, groweth unto the increase of God.” Now this Head is Christ Himself, Whose viceregent in the Church is the Sovereign Pontiff. Wherefore schismatics are those who refuse to submit to the Sovereign Pontiff, and to hold communion with those members of the Church who acknowledge his supremacy.

Reply to Objection 1: The division between man and God that results from sin is not intended by the sinner: it happens beside his intention as a result of his turning inordinately to a mutable good, and so it is not schism properly so called.

Reply to Objection 2: The essence of schism consists in rebelliously disobeying the commandments: and I say "rebelliously," since a schismatic both obstinately scorns the commandments of the Church, and refuses to submit to her judgment. But every sinner does not do this, wherefore not every sin is a schism.

Reply to Objection 3: Heresy and schism are distinguished in respect of those things to which each is opposed essentially and directly. For heresy is essentially opposed to faith, while schism is essentially opposed to the unity of ecclesiastical charity. Wherefore just as faith and charity are different virtues, although whoever lacks faith lacks charity, so too schism and heresy are different vices, although whoever is a heretic is also a schismatic, but not conversely. This is what Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians [*In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10]: "I consider the difference between schism and heresy to be that heresy holds false doctrine while schism severs a man from the Church." Nevertheless, just as the loss of charity is the road to the loss of faith, according to 1 Tim. 1:6: "From which things," i.e. charity and the like, "some going astray, are turned aside into vain babbling," so too, schism is the road to heresy. Wherefore Jerome adds (In Ep. ad Tit. iii, 10) that "at the outset it is possible, in a certain respect, to find a difference between schism and heresy: yet there is no schism that does not devise some heresy for itself, that it may appear to have had a reason for separating from the Church."

Whether schism is a graver sin than unbelief?

Objection 1: It would seem that schism is a graver sin than unbelief. For the graver sin meets with a graver punishment, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." Now we find the sin of schism punished more severely than even the sin of unbelief or idolatry: for we read (Ex. 32:28) that some were slain by the swords of their fellow men on account of idolatry: whereas of the sin of schism we read (Num. 16:30): "If the Lord do a new thing, and the earth opening her mouth swallow them down, and all things that belong to them, and they go down alive into hell, you shall know that they have blasphemed the Lord God.” Moreover the ten tribes who were guilty of schism in revolting from the rule of David were most severely punished (4 Kings 17). Therefore the sin of schism is graver than the sin of unbelief.

Objection 2: Further, “The good of the multitude is greater and more godlike than the good of the individual,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 2). Now schism is opposed to the good of the multitude, namely, ecclesiastical unity, whereas unbelief is contrary to the particular good of one man, namely the faith of an individual. Therefore it seems that schism is a graver sin than unbelief.

Objection 3: Further, a greater good is opposed to a greater evil, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10). Now schism is opposed to charity, which is a greater virtue than faith to which unbelief is opposed, as shown above ([2654]Q[10], A[2];[2655] Q[23], A[6]). Therefore schism is a graver sin than unbelief.

On the contrary, That which results from an addition to something else surpasses that thing either in good or in evil. Now heresy results from something being added to schism, for it adds corrupt doctrine, as Jerome declares in the passage quoted above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore schism is a less grievous sin than unbelief.

I answer that, The gravity of a sin can be considered in two ways: first, according to the species of that sin, secondly, according to its circumstances. And since particular circumstances are infinite in number, so too they can be varied in an infinite number of ways: wherefore if one were to ask in general which of two sins is the graver, the question must be understood to refer to the gravity derived from the sin’s genus. Now the genus or species of a sin is taken from its object, as shown above ([2656]FS, Q[72], A[1]; [2657]FS, Q[73], A[3]). Wherefore the sin which is opposed to the greater good is, in respect of its genus, more grievous, for instance a sin committed against God is graver than a sin committed against one’s neighbor.

Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself. Wherefore it is manifest that the sin of unbelief is generically more grievous than the sin of schism, although it may happen that a particular schismatic sins more grievously than a particular unbeliever, either because his contempt is greater, or because his sin is a source of greater danger, or for some similar reason.

Reply to Objection 1: It had already been declared to that people by the law which they had received that there was one God, and that no other God was to be worshipped by them; and the same had been confirmed among them by many kinds of signs. Consequently there was no need for those who sinned against this faith by falling into idolatry, to be punished in an unwonted manner: it was enough that they should be punished in the usual way. On the other hand, it was not so well known among them that Moses was always to be their ruler, and so it behooved those who rebelled against his authority to be punished in a miraculous and unwonted manner.

We may also reply by saying that the sin of schism was sometimes more severely punished in that people, because they were inclined to seditions and schisms. For it is written (1 Esdra 4:15): “This city since days gone by has rebelled against its kings: and seditions and wars were raised therein [*Vulg.: ‘This city is a rebellious city, and hurtful to the kings and provinces, and . . . wars were raised therein of old’].” Now sometimes a more severe punishment is inflicted for an habitual sin (as stated above, [2658]FS, Q[105], A[2], ad 9), because punishments are medicines intended to keep man away from sin: so that where there is greater proneness to sin, a more severe punishment ought to be inflicted. As regards the ten tribes, they were punished not only for the sin of schism, but also for that of idolatry as stated in the passage quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the good of the multitude is greater than the good of a unit in that multitude, so is it less than the extrinsic good to which that multitude is directed, even as the good of a rank in the army is less than the good of the commander-in-chief. In like manner the good of ecclesiastical unity, to which schism is opposed, is less than the good of Divine truth, to which unbelief is opposed.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity has two objects; one is its principal object and is the Divine goodness, the other is its secondary object and is our neighbor’s good. Now schism and other sins against our neighbor, are opposed to charity in respect of its secondary good, which is less than the object of faith, for this is God Himself; and so these sins are less grievous than unbelief. On the other hand, hatred of God, which is opposed to charity in respect of its principal object, is not less grievous than unbelief.

Nevertheless of all sins committed by man against his neighbor, the sin of schism would seem to be the greatest, because it is opposed to the spiritual good of the multitude.

Whether schismatics have any power?

Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics have some power. For Augustine says (Contra Donat. i, 1): “Just as those who come back to the Church after being baptized, are not baptized again, so those who return after being ordained, are not ordained again.” Now Order is a kind of power. Therefore schismatics have some power since they retain their Orders.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Unico Bapt. [*De Bap. contra Donat. vi, 5]): “One who is separated can confer a sacrament even as he can have it.” But the power of conferring a sacrament is a very great power. Therefore schismatics who are separated from the Church, have a spiritual power.

Objection 3: Further, Pope Urban II [*Council of Piacenza, cap. x; cf. Can. Ordinationes, ix, qu. 1] says: “We command that persons consecrated by bishops who were themselves consecrated according to the Catholic rite, but have separated themselves by schism from the Roman Church, should be received mercifully and that their Orders should be acknowledged, when they return to the unity of the Church, provided they be of commendable life and knowledge.” But this would not be so, unless spiritual power were retained by schismatics. Therefore schismatics have spiritual power.

On the contrary, Cyprian says in a letter (Ep. lii, quoted vii, qu. 1, can. Novatianus): “He who observes neither unity of spirit nor the concord of peace, and severs himself from the bonds of the Church, and from the fellowship of her priests, cannot have episcopal power or honor.”

I answer that, Spiritual power is twofold, the one sacramental, the other a power of jurisdiction. The sacramental power is one that is conferred by some kind of consecration. Now all the consecrations of the Church are immovable so long as the consecrated thing remains: as appears even in inanimate things, since an altar, once consecrated, is not consecrated again unless it has been broken up. Consequently such a power as this remains, as to its essence, in the man who has received it by consecration, as long as he lives, even if he fall into schism or heresy: and this is proved from the fact that if he come back to the Church, he is not consecrated anew. Since, however, the lower power ought not to exercise its act, except in so far as it is moved by the higher power, as may be seen also in the physical order, it follows that such persons lose the use of their power, so that it is not lawful for them to use it. Yet if they use it, this power has its effect in sacramental acts, because therein man acts only as God's instrument, so that sacramental effects are not precluded on account of any fault whatever in the person who confers the sacrament.

On the other hand, the power of jurisdiction is that which is conferred by a mere human appointment. Such a power as this does not adhere to the recipient immovably: so that it does not remain in heretics and schismatics; and consequently they neither absolve nor excommunicate, nor grant indulgence, nor do anything of the kind, and if they do, it is invalid.

Accordingly when it is said that such like persons have no spiritual power, it is to be understood as referring either to the second power, or if it be referred to the first power, not as referring to the essence of the power, but to its lawful use.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether it is right that schismatics should be punished with excommunication?

Objection 1: It would seem that schismatics are not rightly punished with excommunication. For excommunication deprives a man chiefly of a share in the sacraments. But Augustine says (Contra Donat. vi, 5) that "Baptism can be received from a schismatic." Therefore it seems that excommunication is not a fitting punishment for schismatics.

Objection 2: Further, it is the duty of Christ's faithful to lead back those who have gone astray, wherefore it is written against certain persons (Ezech. 34:4): "That which was driven away you have not brought again, neither have you sought that which was lost." Now schismatics are more easily brought back by such as may hold communion with them. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be excommunicated.

Objection 3: Further, a double punishment is not inflicted for one and the same sin, according to Nahum 1:9: "God will not judge the same twice" [*Septuagint version]. Now some receive a temporal punishment for the sin of schism, according to[2659] Q[23], A[5], where it is stated: “Both divine and earthly laws have laid down that those who are severed from the unity of the Church, and disturb her peace, must be punished by the secular power.” Therefore they ought not to be punished with excommunication.

On the contrary, It is written (Num. 16:26): “Depart from the tents of these wicked men,” those, to wit, who had caused the schism, “and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sins.”

I answer that, According to Wis. 11:11, “By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he should be punished” [Vulg.: ‘he is tormented’]. Now a schismatic, as shown above [2660](A[1]), commits a twofold sin: first by separating himself from communion with the members of the Church, and in this respect the fitting punishment for schismatics is that they be excommunicated. Secondly, they refuse submission to the head of the Church, wherefore, since they are unwilling to be controlled by the Church’s spiritual power, it is just that they should be compelled by the secular power.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not lawful to receive Baptism from a schismatic, save in a case of necessity, since it is better for a man to quit this life, marked with the sign of Christ, no matter from whom he may receive it, whether from a Jew or a pagan, than deprived of that mark, which is bestowed in Baptism.

Reply to Objection 2: Excommunication does not forbid the intercourse whereby a person by salutary admonitions leads back to the unity of the Church those who are separated from her. Indeed this very separation brings them back somewhat, because through confusion at their separation, they are sometimes led to do penance

Reply to Objection 3: The punishments of the present life are medicinal, and therefore when one punishment does not suffice to compel a man, another is added: just as physicians employ several body medicines when one has no effect. In like manner the Church, when excommunication does not sufficiently restrain certain men, employs the compulsion of the secular arm. If, however, one punishment suffices, another should not be employed.

OF WAR (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?

(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?

(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?

(4) Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

Whether it is always sinful to wage war?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is always sinful to wage war. Because punishment is not inflicted except for sin. Now those who wage war are threatened by Our Lord with punishment, according to Mat. 26:52: “All that take the sword shall perish with the sword.” Therefore all wars are unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is contrary to a Divine precept is a sin. But war is contrary to a Divine precept, for it is written (Mat. 5:39): “But I say to you not to resist evil”; and (Rom. 12:19): “Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath.” Therefore war is always sinful.

Objection 3: Further, nothing, except sin, is contrary to an act of virtue. But war is contrary to peace. Therefore war is always a sin.

Objection 4: Further, the exercise of a lawful thing is itself lawful, as is evident in scientific exercises. But warlike exercises which take place in tournaments are forbidden by the Church, since those who are slain in these trials are deprived of ecclesiastical burial. Therefore it seems that war is a sin in itself.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the son of the centurion [*Ep. ad Marcel. cxxxviii]: “If the Christian Religion forbade war altogether, those who sought salutary advice in the Gospel would rather have been counselled to cast aside their arms, and to give up soldiering altogether. On the contrary, they were told: ‘Do violence to no man . . . and be content with your pay’ [*Lk. 3:14]. If he commanded them to be content with their pay, he did not forbid soldiering.”

I answer that, In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Moreover it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. And as the care of the common weal is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the common weal of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. And just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that common weal against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 13:4): “He beareth not the sword in vain: for he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil”; so too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the common weal against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority (Ps. 81:4): “Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner”; and for this reason Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 75): “The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority.”

Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. Wherefore Augustine says (QQ. in Hept., qu. x, super Jos.): “A just war is wont to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly.”

Thirdly, it is necessary that the belligerents should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. [*The words quoted are to be found not in St. Augustine’s works, but Can. Apud. Caus. xxiii, qu. 1]): “True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good.” For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 74): “The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, an unpacific and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 70): "To take the sword is to arm oneself in order to take the life of anyone, without the command or permission of superior or lawful authority." On the other hand, to have recourse to the sword (as a private person) by the authority of the sovereign or judge, or (as a public person) through zeal for justice, and by the authority, so to speak, of God, is not to "take the sword," but to use it as commissioned by another, wherefore it does not deserve punishment. And yet even those who make sinful use of the sword are not always slain with the sword, yet they always perish with their own sword, because, unless they repent, they are punished eternally for their sinful use of the sword.

Reply to Objection 2: Such like precepts, as Augustine observes (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19), should always be borne in readiness of mind, so that we be ready to obey them, and, if necessary, to refrain from resistance or self-defense. Nevertheless it is necessary sometimes for a man to act otherwise for the common good, or for the good of those with whom he is fighting. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Marcellin. cxxxviii): "Those whom we have to punish with a kindly severity, it is necessary to handle in many ways against their will. For when we are stripping a man of the lawlessness of sin, it is good for him to be vanquished, since nothing is more hopeless than the happiness of sinners, whence arises a guilty impunity, and an evil will, like an internal enemy."

Reply to Objection 3: Those who wage war justly aim at peace, and so they are not opposed to peace, except to the evil peace, which Our Lord "came not to send upon earth" (Mat. 10:34). Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix): "We do not seek peace in order to be at war, but we go to war that we may have peace. Be peaceful, therefore, in warring, so that you may vanquish those whom you war against, and bring them to the prosperity of peace."

Reply to Objection 4: Manly exercises in warlike feats of arms are not all forbidden, but those which are inordinate and perilous, and end in slaying or plundering. In olden times warlike exercises presented no such danger, and hence they were called “exercises of arms” or “bloodless wars,” as Jerome states in an epistle [*Reference incorrect: cf. Veget., De Re Milit. i].

Whether it is lawful for clerics and bishops to fight?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics and bishops to fight. For, as stated above [2661](A[1]), wars are lawful and just in so far as they protect the poor and the entire common weal from suffering at the hands of the foe. Now this seems to be above all the duty of prelates, for Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xiv): “The wolf comes upon the sheep, when any unjust and rapacious man oppresses those who are faithful and humble. But he who was thought to be the shepherd, and was not, leaveth the sheep, end flieth, for he fears lest the wolf hurt him, and dares not stand up against his injustice.” Therefore it is lawful for prelates and clerics to fight.

Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo IV writes (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Igitur): “As untoward tidings had frequently come from the Saracen side, some said that the Saracens would come to the port of Rome secretly and covertly; for which reason we commanded our people to gather together, and ordered them to go down to the seashore.” Therefore it is lawful for bishops to fight.

Objection 3: Further, apparently, it comes to the same whether a man does a thing himself, or consents to its being done by another, according to Rom. 1:32: “They who do such things, are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.” Now those, above all, seem to consent to a thing, who induce others to do it. But it is lawful for bishops and clerics to induce others to fight: for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Hortatu) that Charles went to war with the Lombards at the instance and entreaty of Adrian, bishop of Rome. Therefore they also are allowed to fight.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is right and meritorious in itself, is lawful for prelates and clerics. Now it is sometimes right and meritorious to make war, for it is written (xxiii, qu. 8, can. Omni timore) that if “a man die for the true faith, or to save his country, or in defense of Christians, God will give him a heavenly reward.” Therefore it is lawful for bishops and clerics to fight.

On the contrary, It was said to Peter as representing bishops and clerics (Mat. 16:52): “Put up again thy sword into the scabbard [Vulg.: ‘its place’] [*”Scabbard” is the reading in Jn. 18:11].” Therefore it is not lawful for them to fight.

I answer that, Several things are requisite for the good of a human society: and a number of things are done better and quicker by a number of persons than by one, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 1), while certain occupations are so inconsistent with one another, that they cannot be fittingly exercised at the same time; wherefore those who are deputed to important duties are forbidden to occupy themselves with things of small importance. Thus according to human laws, soldiers who are deputed to warlike pursuits are forbidden to engage in commerce [*Cod. xii, 35, De Re Milit.].

Now warlike pursuits are altogether incompatible with the duties of a bishop and a cleric, for two reasons. The first reason is a general one, because, to wit, warlike pursuits are full of unrest, so that they hinder the mind very much from the contemplation of Divine things, the praise of God, and prayers for the people, which belong to the duties of a cleric. Wherefore just as commercial enterprises are forbidden to clerics, because they unsettle the mind too much, so too are warlike pursuits, according to 2 Tim. 2:4: “No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business.” The second reason is a special one, because, to wit, all the clerical Orders are directed to the ministry of the altar, on which the Passion of Christ is represented sacramentally, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: “As often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come.” Wherefore it is unbecoming for them to slay or shed blood, and it is more fitting that they should be ready to shed their own blood for Christ, so as to imitate in deed what they portray in their ministry. For this reason it has been decreed that those who shed blood, even without sin, become irregular. Now no man who has a certain duty to perform, can lawfully do that which renders him unfit for that duty. Wherefore it is altogether unlawful for clerics to fight, because war is directed to the shedding of blood.

Reply to Objection 1: Prelates ought to withstand not only the wolf who brings spiritual death upon the flock, but also the pillager and the oppressor who work bodily harm; not, however, by having recourse themselves to material arms, but by means of spiritual weapons, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:4): “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God.” Such are salutary warnings, devout prayers, and, for those who are obstinate, the sentence of excommunication.

Reply to Objection 2: Prelates and clerics may, by the authority of their superiors, take part in wars, not indeed by taking up arms themselves, but by affording spiritual help to those who fight justly, by exhorting and absolving them, and by other like spiritual helps. Thus in the Old Testament (Joshua 6:4) the priests were commanded to sound the sacred trumpets in the battle. It was for this purpose that bishops or clerics were first allowed to go to the front: and it is an abuse of this permission, if any of them take up arms themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2662]Q[23], A[4], ad 2) every power, art or virtue that regards the end, has to dispose that which is directed to the end. Now, among the faithful, carnal wars should be considered as having for their end the Divine spiritual good to which clerics are deputed. Wherefore it is the duty of clerics to dispose and counsel other men to engage in just wars. For they are forbidden to take up arms, not as though it were a sin, but because such an occupation is unbecoming their personality.

Reply to Objection 4: Although it is meritorious to wage a just war, nevertheless it is rendered unlawful for clerics, by reason of their being deputed to works more meritorious still. Thus the marriage act may be meritorious; and yet it becomes reprehensible in those who have vowed virginity, because they are bound to a yet greater good.

Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written (Dt. 16:20): “Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just.” But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.

Objection 2: Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one’s enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one’s enemies.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:12): “Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them”: and we ought to observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): “Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes”: and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).

I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another’s word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain “rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies,” as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).

Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in the Sacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Mat. 7:6: “Give not that which is holy, to dogs.” Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy’s knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy [*Stratagematum i, 1] by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.

Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether it is lawful to fight on holy days?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to fight on holy days. For holy days are instituted that we may give our time to the things of God. Hence they are included in the keeping of the Sabbath prescribed Ex. 20:8: for “sabbath” is interpreted “rest.” But wars are full of unrest. Therefore by no means is it lawful to fight on holy days.

Objection 2: Further, certain persons are reproached (Is. 58:3) because on fast-days they exacted what was owing to them, were guilty of strife, and of smiting with the fist. Much more, therefore, is it unlawful to fight on holy days.

Objection 3: Further, no ill deed should be done to avoid temporal harm. But fighting on a holy day seems in itself to be an ill deed. Therefore no one should fight on a holy day even through the need of avoiding temporal harm.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Mac. 2:41): The Jews rightly determined . . . saying: “Whosoever shall come up against us to fight on the Sabbath-day, we will fight against him.”

I answer that, The observance of holy days is no hindrance to those things which are ordained to man’s safety, even that of his body. Hence Our Lord argued with the Jews, saying (Jn. 7:23): “Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath-day?” Hence physicians may lawfully attend to their patients on holy days. Now there is much more reason for safeguarding the common weal (whereby many are saved from being slain, and innumerable evils both temporal and spiritual prevented), than the bodily safety of an individual. Therefore, for the purpose of safeguarding the common weal of the faithful, it is lawful to carry on a war on holy days, provided there be need for doing so: because it would be to tempt God, if notwithstanding such a need, one were to choose to refrain from fighting.

However, as soon as the need ceases, it is no longer lawful to fight on a holy day, for the reasons given: wherefore this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF STRIFE (TWO ARTICLES)

[*Strife here denotes fighting between individuals]

We must now consider strife, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether strife is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a daughter of anger?

Whether strife is always a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not always a sin. For strife seems a kind of contention: hence Isidore says (Etym. x) that the word “rixosus [quarrelsome] is derived from the snarling [rictu] of a dog, because the quarrelsome man is ever ready to contradict; he delights in brawling, and provokes contention.” Now contention is not always a sin. Neither, therefore, is strife.

Objection 2: Further, it is related (Gn. 26:21) that the servants of Isaac “digged” another well, “and for that they quarrelled likewise.” Now it is not credible that the household of Isaac quarrelled publicly, without being reproved by him, supposing it were a sin. Therefore strife is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, strife seems to be a war between individuals. But war is not always sinful. Therefore strife is not always a sin.

On the contrary, Strifes [*The Douay version has ‘quarrels’] are reckoned among the works of the flesh (Gal. 5:20), and “they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Therefore strifes are not only sinful, but they are even mortal sins.

I answer that, While contention implies a contradiction of words, strife denotes a certain contradiction of deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Gal. 5:20 says that “strifes are when persons strike one another through anger.” Hence strife is a kind of private war, because it takes place between private persons, being declared not by public authority, but rather by an inordinate will. Therefore strife is always sinful. In fact it is a mortal sin in the man who attacks another unjustly, for it is not without mortal sin that one inflicts harm on another even if the deed be done by the hands. But in him who defends himself, it may be without sin, or it may sometimes involve a venial sin, or sometimes a mortal sin; and this depends on his intention and on his manner of defending himself. For if his sole intention be to withstand the injury done to him, and he defend himself with due moderation, it is no sin, and one cannot say properly that there is strife on his part. But if, on the other hand, his self-defense be inspired by vengeance and hatred, it is always a sin. It is a venial sin, if a slight movement of hatred or vengeance obtrude itself, or if he does not much exceed moderation in defending himself: but it is a mortal sin if he makes for his assailant with the fixed intention of killing him, or inflicting grievous harm on him.

Reply to Objection 1: Strife is not just the same as contention: and there are three things in the passage quoted from Isidore, which express the inordinate nature of strife. First, the quarrelsome man is always ready to fight, and this is conveyed by the words, “ever ready to contradict,” that is to say, whether the other man says or does well or ill. Secondly, he delights in quarrelling itself, and so the passage proceeds, “and delights in brawling.” Thirdly, “he” provokes others to quarrel, wherefore it goes on, “and provokes contention.”

Reply to Objection 1: The sense of the text is not that the servants of Isaac quarrelled, but that the inhabitants of that country quarrelled with them: wherefore these sinned, and not the servants of Isaac, who bore the calumny [*Cf. Gn. 26:20].

Reply to Objection 3: In order for a war to be just it must be declared by authority of the governing power, as stated above ([2663]Q[40], A[1]); whereas strife proceeds from a private feeling of anger or hatred. For if the servants of a sovereign or judge, in virtue of their public authority, attack certain men and these defend themselves, it is not the former who are said to be guilty of strife, but those who resist the public authority. Hence it is not the assailants in this case who are guilty of strife and commit sin, but those who defend themselves inordinately.

Whether strife is a daughter of anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that strife is not a daughter of anger. For it is written (James 4:1): “Whence are wars and contentions? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences, which war in your members?” But anger is not in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore strife is a daughter, not of anger, but of concupiscence.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:25): “He that boasteth and puffeth up himself, stirreth up quarrels.” Now strife is apparently the same as quarrel. Therefore it seems that strife is a daughter of pride or vainglory which makes a man boast and puff himself up.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 18:6): “The lips of a fool intermeddle with strife.” Now folly differs from anger, for it is opposed, not to meekness, but to wisdom or prudence. Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): “Hatred stirreth up strifes.” But hatred arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Therefore strife is not a daughter of anger, but of envy.

Objection 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 17:19): “He that studieth discords, soweth [Vulg.: ‘loveth’] quarrels.” But discord is a daughter of vainglory, as stated above ([2664]Q[37], A[2]). Therefore strife is also.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that “anger gives rise to strife”; and it is written (Prov. 15:18; 29:22): “A passionate man stirreth up strifes.”

I answer that, As stated above [2665](A[1]), strife denotes an antagonism extending to deeds, when one man designs to harm another. Now there are two ways in which one man may intend to harm another. In one way it is as though he intended absolutely the other’s hurt, which in this case is the outcome of hatred, for the intention of hatred is directed to the hurt of one’s enemy either openly or secretly. In another way a man intends to hurt another who knows and withstands his intention. This is what we mean by strife, and belongs properly to anger which is the desire of vengeance: for the angry man is not content to hurt secretly the object of his anger, he even wishes him to feel the hurt and know that what he suffers is in revenge for what he has done, as may be seen from what has been said above about the passion of anger ([2666]FS, Q[46], A[6], ad 2). Therefore, properly speaking, strife arises from anger.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2667]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2), all the irascible passions arise from those of the concupiscible faculty, so that whatever is the immediate outcome of anger, arises also from concupiscence as from its first root.

Reply to Objection 2: Boasting and puffing up of self which are the result of anger or vainglory, are not the direct but the occasional cause of quarrels or strife, because, when a man resents another being preferred to him, his anger is aroused, and then his anger results in quarrel and strife.

Reply to Objection 3: Anger, as stated above ([2668]FS, Q[48], A[3]) hinders the judgment of the reason, so that it bears a likeness to folly. Hence they have a common effect, since it is due to a defect in the reason that a man designs to hurt another inordinately.

Reply to Objection 4: Although strife sometimes arises from hatred, it is not the proper effect thereof, because when one man hates another it is beside his intention to hurt him in a quarrelsome and open manner, since sometimes he seeks to hurt him secretly. When, however, he sees himself prevailing, he endeavors to harm him with strife and quarrel. But to hurt a man in a quarrel is the proper effect of anger, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 5: Strifes give rise to hatred and discord in the hearts of those who are guilty of strife, and so he that "studies," i.e., intends to sow discord among others, causes them to quarrel among themselves. Even so any sin may command the act of another sin, by directing it to its own end. This does not, however, prove that strife is the daughter of vainglory properly and directly.

OF SEDITION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a special sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

Whether sedition is a special sin distinct from other sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not a special sin distinct from other sins. For, according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a seditious man is one who sows dissent among minds, and begets discord." Now, by provoking the commission of a sin, a man sins by no other kind of sin than that which he provoked. Therefore it seems that sedition is not a special sin distinct from discord.

Objection 2: Further, sedition denotes a kind of division. Now schism takes its name from scission, as stated above ([2669]Q[39], A[1]). Therefore, seemingly, the sin of sedition is not distinct from that of schism.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin that is distinct from other sins, is either a capital vice, or arises from some capital vice. Now sedition is reckoned neither among the capital vices, nor among those vices which arise from them, as appears from Moral. xxxi, 45, where both kinds of vice are enumerated. Therefore sedition is not a special sin, distinct from other sins.

On the contrary, Seditions are mentioned as distinct from other sins (2 Cor. 12:20).

I answer that, Sedition is a special sin, having something in common with war and strife, and differing somewhat from them. It has something in common with them, in so far as it implies a certain antagonism, and it differs from them in two points. First, because war and strife denote actual aggression on either side, whereas sedition may be said to denote either actual aggression, or the preparation for such aggression. Hence a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:20 says that "seditions are tumults tending to fight," when, to wit, a number of people make preparations with the intention of fighting. Secondly, they differ in that war is, properly speaking, carried on against external foes, being as it were between one people and another, whereas strife is between one individual and another, or between few people on one side and few on the other side, while sedition, in its proper sense, is between mutually dissentient parts of one people, as when one part of the state rises in tumult against another part. Wherefore, since sedition is opposed to a special kind of good, namely the unity and peace of a people, it is a special kind of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: A seditious man is one who incites others to sedition, and since sedition denotes a kind of discord, it follows that a seditious man is one who creates discord, not of any kind, but between the parts of a multitude. And the sin of sedition is not only in him who sows discord, but also in those who dissent from one another inordinately.

Reply to Objection 2: Sedition differs from schism in two respects. First, because schism is opposed to the spiritual unity of the multitude, viz. ecclesiastical unity, whereas sedition is contrary to the temporal or secular unity of the multitude, for instance of a city or kingdom. Secondly, schism does not imply any preparation for a material fight as sedition does, but only for a spiritual dissent.

Reply to Objection 3: Sedition, like schism, is contained under discord, since each is a kind of discord, not between individuals, but between the parts of a multitude.

Whether sedition is always a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sedition is not always a mortal sin. For sedition denotes "a tumult tending to fight," according to the gloss quoted above [2670](A[1]). But fighting is not always a mortal sin, indeed it is sometimes just and lawful, as stated above (Q[40], A[1]). Much more, therefore, can sedition be without a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, sedition is a kind of discord, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Now discord can be without mortal sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Therefore sedition can be also.

Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to deliver a multitude from a tyrannical rule. Yet this cannot easily be done without some dissension in the multitude, if one part of the multitude seeks to retain the tyrant, while the rest strive to dethrone him. Therefore there can be sedition without mortal sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle forbids seditions together with other things that are mortal sins (2 Cor. 12:20).

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), sedition is contrary to the unity of the multitude, viz. the people of a city or kingdom. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21) that “wise men understand the word people to designate not any crowd of persons, but the assembly of those who are united together in fellowship recognized by law and for the common good.” Wherefore it is evident that the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and common good: whence it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and the common good. Therefore by reason of its genus it is a mortal sin, and its gravity will be all the greater according as the common good which it assails surpasses the private good which is assailed by strife.

Accordingly the sin of sedition is first and chiefly in its authors, who sin most grievously; and secondly it is in those who are led by them to disturb the common good. Those, however, who defend the common good, and withstand the seditious party, are not themselves seditious, even as neither is a man to be called quarrelsome because he defends himself, as stated above ([2671]Q[41], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: It is lawful to fight, provided it be for the common good, as stated above ([2672]Q[40], A[1]). But sedition runs counter to the common good of the multitude, so that it is always a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Discord from what is not evidently good, may be without sin, but discord from what is evidently good, cannot be without sin: and sedition is discord of this kind, for it is contrary to the unity of the multitude, which is a manifest good.

Reply to Objection 3: A tyrannical government is not just, because it is directed, not to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5; Ethic. viii, 10). Consequently there is no sedition in disturbing a government of this kind, unless indeed the tyrant's rule be disturbed so inordinately, that his subjects suffer greater harm from the consequent disturbance than from the tyrant's government. Indeed it is the tyrant rather that is guilty of sedition, since he encourages discord and sedition among his subjects, that he may lord over them more securely; for this is tyranny, being conducive to the private good of the ruler, and to the injury of the multitude.

OF SCANDAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

It remains for us to consider the vices which are opposed to beneficence, among which some come under the head of injustice, those, to wit, whereby one harms one's neighbor unjustly. But scandal seems to be specially opposed to charity. Accordingly we must here consider scandal, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) What is scandal?

(2) Whether scandal is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a special sin?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(5) Whether the perfect can be scandalized?

(6) Whether they can give scandal?

(7) Whether spiritual goods are to be foregone on account of scandal?

(8) Whether temporal things are to be foregone on account of scandal?

Whether scandal is fittingly defined as being something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is unfittingly defined as "something less rightly said or done that occasions spiritual downfall." For scandal is a sin as we shall state further on [2673](A[2]). Now, according to Augustine

(Contra Faust. xxii, 27), a sin is a “word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God.” Therefore the definition given above is insufficient, since it omits “thought” or “desire.”

Objection 2: Further, since among virtuous or right acts one is more virtuous or more right than another, that one alone which has perfect rectitude would not seem to be a “less” right one. If, therefore, scandal is something “less” rightly said or done, it follows that every virtuous act except the best of all, is a scandal.

Objection 3: Further, an occasion is an accidental cause. But nothing accidental should enter a definition, because it does not specify the thing defined. Therefore it is unfitting, in defining scandal, to say that it is an “occasion.”

Objection 4: Further, whatever a man does may be the occasion of another’s spiritual downfall, because accidental causes are indeterminate. Consequently, if scandal is something that occasions another’s spiritual downfall, any deed or word can be a scandal: and this seems unreasonable.

Objection 5: Further, a man occasions his neighbor’s spiritual downfall when he offends or weakens him. Now scandal is condivided with offense and weakness, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): “It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or weakened.” Therefore the aforesaid definition of scandal is unfitting.

On the contrary, Jerome in expounding Mat. 15:12, “Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word,” etc. says: “When we read ‘Whosoever shall scandalize,’ the sense is ‘Whosoever shall, by deed or word, occasion another’s spiritual downfall.’”

I answer that, As Jerome observes the Greek {skandalon} may be rendered offense, downfall, or a stumbling against something. For when a body, while moving along a path, meets with an obstacle, it may happen to stumble against it, and be disposed to fall down: such an obstacle is a {skandalon}.

In like manner, while going along the spiritual way, a man may be disposed to a spiritual downfall by another’s word or deed, in so far, to wit, as one man by his injunction, inducement or example, moves another to sin; and this is scandal properly so called.

Now nothing by its very nature disposes a man to spiritual downfall, except that which has some lack of rectitude, since what is perfectly right, secures man against a fall, instead of conducing to his downfall. Scandal is, therefore, fittingly defined as “something less rightly done or said, that occasions another’s spiritual downfall.”

Reply to Objection 1: The thought or desire of evil lies hidden in the heart, wherefore it does not suggest itself to another man as an obstacle conducing to his spiritual downfall: hence it cannot come under the head of scandal.

Reply to Objection 2: A thing is said to be less right, not because something else surpasses it in rectitude, but because it has some lack of rectitude, either through being evil in itself, such as sin, or through having an appearance of evil. Thus, for instance, if a man were to “sit at meat in the idol’s temple” (1 Cor. 8:10), though this is not sinful in itself, provided it be done with no evil intention, yet, since it has a certain appearance of evil, and a semblance of worshipping the idol, it might occasion another man’s spiritual downfall. Hence the Apostle says (1 Thess. 5:22): “From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.” Scandal is therefore fittingly described as something done “less rightly,” so as to comprise both whatever is sinful in itself, and all that has an appearance of evil.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2674]FS, Q[75], AA[2],3; [2675]FS, Q[80], A[1]), nothing can be a sufficient cause of a man’s spiritual downfall, which is sin, save his own will. Wherefore another man’s words or deeds can only be an imperfect cause, conducing somewhat to that downfall. For this reason scandal is said to afford not a cause, but an occasion, which is an imperfect, and not always an accidental cause. Nor is there any reason why certain definitions should not make mention of things that are accidental, since what is accidental to one, may be proper to something else: thus the accidental cause is mentioned in the definition of chance (Phys. ii, 5).

Reply to Objection 4: Another’s words or deed may be the cause of another’s sin in two ways, directly and accidentally. Directly, when a man either intends, by his evil word or deed, to lead another man into sin, or, if he does not so intend, when his deed is of such a nature as to lead another into sin: for instance, when a man publicly commits a sin or does something that has an appearance of sin. In this case he that does such an act does, properly speaking, afford an occasion of another's spiritual downfall, wherefore his act is called "active scandal." One man's word or deed is the accidental cause of another's sin, when he neither intends to lead him into sin, nor does what is of a nature to lead him into sin, and yet this other one, through being ill-disposed, is led into sin, for instance, into envy of another's good, and then he who does this righteous act, does not, so far as he is concerned, afford an occasion of the other's downfall, but it is this other one who takes the occasion according to Rom. 7:8: "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence." Wherefore this is "passive," without "active scandal," since he that acts rightly does not, for his own part, afford the occasion of the other's downfall. Sometimes therefore it happens that there is active scandal in the one together with passive scandal in the other, as when one commits a sin being induced thereto by another; sometimes there is active without passive scandal, for instance when one, by word or deed, provokes another to sin, and the latter does not consent; and sometimes there is passive without active scandal, as we have already said.

Reply to Objection 5: "Weakness" denotes proneness to scandal; while "offense" signifies resentment against the person who commits a sin, which resentment may be sometimes without spiritual downfall; and "scandal" is the stumbling that results in downfall.

Whether scandal is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a sin. For sins do not occur from necessity, since all sin is voluntary, as stated above ([2676]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2). Now it is written (Mat. 18:7): "It must needs be that scandals come." Therefore scandal is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, no sin arises from a sense of dutifulness, because "a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit" (Mat. 7:18). But scandal may come from a sense of dutifulness, for Our Lord said to Peter (Mat. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal unto Me," in reference to which words Jerome says that "the Apostle's error was due to his sense of dutifulness, and such is never inspired by the devil." Therefore scandal is not always a sin.

Objection 3: Further, scandal denotes a stumbling. But he that stumbles does not always fall. Therefore scandal, which is a spiritual fall, can be without sin.

On the contrary, Scandal is “something less rightly said or done.” Now anything that lacks rectitude is a sin. Therefore scandal is always with sin.

I answer that, As already said (A[1], ad 4), scandal is of two kinds, passive scandal in the person scandalized, and active scandal in the person who gives scandal, and so occasions a spiritual downfall. Accordingly passive scandal is always a sin in the person scandalized; for he is not scandalized except in so far as he succumbs to a spiritual downfall, and that is a sin.

Yet there can be passive scandal, without sin on the part of the person whose action has occasioned the scandal, as for instance, when a person is scandalized at another’s good deed. In like manner active scandal is always a sin in the person who gives scandal, since either what he does is a sin, or if it only have the appearance of sin, it should always be left undone out of that love for our neighbor which binds each one to be solicitous for his neighbor’s spiritual welfare; so that if he persist in doing it he acts against charity.

Yet there can be active scandal without sin on the part of the person scandalized, as stated above (A[1], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 1: These words, “It must needs be that scandals come,” are to be understood to convey, not the absolute, but the conditional necessity of scandal; in which sense it is necessary that whatever God foresees or foretells must happen, provided it be taken conjointly with such foreknowledge, as explained in the [2677]FP, Q[14], A[13], ad 3; [2678]FP, Q[23], A[6], ad 2.

Or we may say that the necessity of scandals occurring is a necessity of end, because they are useful in order that “they . . . who are reproved may be made manifest” (1 Cor. 11:19).

Or scandals must needs occur, seeing the condition of man who fails to shield himself from sin. Thus a physician on seeing a man partaking of unsuitable food might say that such a man must needs injure his health, which is to be understood on the condition that he does not change his diet. In like manner it must needs be that scandals come, so long as men fail to change their evil mode of living.

Reply to Objection 2: In that passage scandal denotes any kind of hindrance: for Peter wished to hinder Our Lord’s Passion out of a sense of dutifulness towards Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: No man stumbles spiritually, without being kept back somewhat from advancing in God’s way, and that is at least a venial sin.

Whether scandal is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is not a special sin. For scandal is “something said or done less rightly.” But this applies to every kind of sin. Therefore every sin is a scandal, and consequently, scandal is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, every special kind of sin, or every special kind of injustice, may be found separately from other kinds, as stated in Ethic. v, 3,5. But scandal is not to be found separately from other sins. Therefore it is not a special kind of sin.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin is constituted by something which specifies the moral act. But the notion of scandal consists in its being something done in the presence of others: and the fact of a sin being committed openly, though it is an aggravating circumstance, does not seem to constitute the species of a sin. Therefore scandal is not a special sin.

On the contrary, A special virtue has a special sin opposed to it. But scandal is opposed to a special virtue, viz. charity. For it is written (Rom. 14:15): “If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity.” Therefore scandal is a special sin.

I answer that, As stated above [2679](A[2]), scandal is twofold, active and passive. Passive scandal cannot be a special sin, because through another’s word or deed a man may fall into any kind of sin: and the fact that a man takes occasion to sin from another’s word or deed, does not constitute a special kind of sin, because it does not imply a special deformity in opposition to a special virtue.

On the other hand, active scandal may be understood in two ways, directly and accidently. The scandal is accidental when it is beside the agent’s intention, as when a man does not intend, by his inordinate deed or word, to occasion another’s spiritual downfall, but merely to satisfy his own will. In such a case even active scandal is not a special sin, because a species is not constituted by that which is accidental.

Active scandal is direct when a man intends, by his inordinate word or deed, to draw another into sin, and then it becomes a special kind of sin on account of the intention of a special kind of end, because moral actions take their species from their end, as stated above ([2680]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2681]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Hence, just as theft and murder are special kinds of sin, on account of their denoting the intention of doing a special injury to one’s neighbor: so too, scandal is a special kind of sin, because thereby a man intends a special harm to his neighbor, and it is directly opposed to fraternal correction, whereby a man intends the removal of a special kind of harm.

Reply to Objection 1: Any sin may be the matter of active scandal, but it may derive the formal aspect of a special sin from the end intended, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Active scandal can be found separate from other sins, as when a man scandalizes his neighbor by a deed which is not a sin in itself, but has an appearance of evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Scandal does not derive the species of a special sin from the circumstance in question, but from the intention of the end, as stated above.

Whether scandal is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that scandal is a mortal sin. For every sin that is contrary to charity is a mortal sin, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]; Q[35] , A[3]). But scandal is contrary to charity, as stated above ([2682]AA[2],3). Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, no sin, save mortal sin, deserves the punishment of eternal damnation. But scandal deserves the punishment of eternal damnation, according to Mat. 18:6: “He that shall scandalize one of these little ones, that believe in Me, it were better for him that a mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea.” For, as Jerome says on this passage, “it is much better to receive a brief punishment for a fault, than to await everlasting torments.” Therefore scandal is a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin committed against God is a mortal sin, because mortal sin alone turns man away from God. Now scandal is a sin against God, for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:12): “When you wound the weak conscience of the brethren [*Vulg.: ‘When you sin thus against the brethren and wound their weak conscience’], you sin against Christ.” Therefore scandal is always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It may be a venial sin to lead a person into venial sin: and yet this would be to give scandal. Therefore scandal may be a venial sin.

I answer that, As stated above [2683](A[1]), scandal denotes a stumbling whereby a person is disposed to a spiritual downfall. Consequently passive scandal may sometimes be a venial sin, when it consists in a stumbling and nothing more; for instance, when a person is disturbed by a movement of venial sin occasioned by another’s inordinate word or deed: while sometimes it is a mortal sin, when the stumbling results in a downfall, for instance, when a person goes so far as to commit a mortal sin through another’s inordinate word or deed.

Active scandal, if it be accidental, may sometimes be a venial sin; for instance, when, through a slight indiscretion, a person either commits a venial sin, or does something that is not a sin in itself, but has some appearance of evil. On the other hand, it is sometimes a mortal sin, either because a person commits a mortal sin, or because he has such contempt for his neighbor’s spiritual welfare that he declines, for the sake of procuring it, to forego doing what he wishes to do. But in the case of active direct scandal, as when a person intends to lead another into sin, if he intends to lead him into mortal sin, his own sin will be mortal; and in like manner if he intends by committing a mortal sin himself, to lead another into venial sin; whereas if he intends, by committing a venial sin, to lead another into venial sin, there will be a venial sin of scandal.

And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether passive scandal may happen even to the perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that passive scandal may happen even to the perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to Peter (Mat. 16:23): “Thou art a scandal to Me.” Much more therefore can other perfect men suffer scandal.

Objection 2: Further, scandal denotes an obstacle which is put in a person’s spiritual way. Now even perfect men can be hindered in their progress along the spiritual way, according to 1 Thess. 2:18: “We would have come to you, I Paul indeed, once and again; but Satan hath hindered us.” Therefore even perfect men can suffer scandal.

Objection 3: Further, even perfect men are liable to venial sins, according to 1 Jn. 1:8: “If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.” Now passive scandal is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial, as stated above [2684](A[4]). Therefore passive scandal may be found in perfect men.

On the contrary, Jerome, in commenting on Mat. 18:6, “He that shall scandalize one of these little ones,” says: “Observe that it is the little one that is scandalized, for the elders do not take scandal.”

I answer that, Passive scandal implies that the mind of the person who takes scandal is unsettled in its adherence to good. Now no man can be unsettled, who adheres firmly to something immovable. The elders, i.e. the perfect, adhere to God alone, Whose goodness is unchangeable, for though they adhere to their superiors, they do so only in so far as these adhere to Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16: “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” Wherefore, however much others may appear to them to conduct themselves ill in word or deed, they themselves do not stray from their righteousness, according to Ps. 124:1: “They that trust in the Lord shall be as Mount Sion: he shall not be moved for ever that dwelleth in Jerusalem.” Therefore scandal is not found in those who adhere to God perfectly by love, according to Ps. 118:165: “Much peace have they that love Thy law, and to them there is no stumbling-block [scandalum].”

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 2), in this passage, scandal is used in a broad sense, to denote any kind of hindrance. Hence Our Lord said to Peter: “Thou art a scandal to Me,” because he was endeavoring to weaken Our Lord’s purpose of undergoing His Passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Perfect men may be hindered in the performance of external actions. But they are not hindered by the words or deeds of others, from tending to God in the internal acts of the will, according to Rom. 8:38,39: “Neither death, nor life . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God.”

Reply to Objection 3: Perfect men sometimes fall into venial sins through the weakness of the flesh; but they are not scandalized (taking scandal in its true sense), by the words or deeds of others, although there can be an approach to scandal in them, according to Ps. 72:2: “My feet were almost moved.”

Whether active scandal can be found in the perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that active scandal can be found in the perfect. For passion is the effect of action. Now some are scandalized passively by the words or deeds of the perfect, according to Mat. 15:12: “Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized?” Therefore active scandal can be found in the perfect.

Objection 2: Further, Peter, after receiving the Holy Ghost, was in the state of the perfect. Yet afterwards he scandalized the gentiles: for it is written (Gal. 2:14): “When I saw that they walked not uprightly unto the truth of the Gospel, I said to Cephas,” i.e. Peter, “before them all: If thou being a Jew, livest after the manner of the gentiles, and not as the Jews do, how dost thou compel the gentiles to live as do the Jews?” Therefore active scandal can be in the perfect.

Objection 3: Further, active scandal is sometimes a venial sin. But venial sins may be in perfect men. Therefore active scandal may be in perfect men.

On the contrary, Active scandal is more opposed to perfection, than passive scandal. But passive scandal cannot be in the perfect. Much less, therefore, can active scandal be in them.

I answer that, Active scandal, properly so called, occurs when a man says or does a thing which in itself is of a nature to occasion another’s spiritual downfall, and that is only when what he says or does is inordinate. Now it belongs to the perfect to direct all their actions according to the rule of reason, as stated in 1 Cor. 14:40: “Let all things be done decently and according to order”; and they are careful to do this in those matters chiefly wherein not only would they do wrong, but would also be to others an occasion of wrongdoing. And if indeed they fail in this moderation in such words or deeds as come to the knowledge of others, this has its origin in human weakness wherein they fall short of perfection. Yet they do not fall short so far as to stray far from the order of reason, but only a little and in some slight matter: and this is not so grave that anyone can reasonably take therefrom an occasion for committing sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Passive scandal is always due to some active scandal; yet this active scandal is not always in another, but in the very person who is scandalized, because, to wit, he scandalizes himself.

Reply to Objection 2: In the opinion of Augustine (Ep. xxviii, xl, lxxxii) and of Paul also, Peter sinned and was to be blamed, in withdrawing from the gentiles in order to avoid the scandal of the Jews, because he did this somewhat imprudently, so that the gentiles who had been converted to the faith were scandalized. Nevertheless Peter’s action was not so grave a sin as to give others sufficient ground for scandal. Hence they were guilty of passive scandal, while there was no active scandal in Peter.

Reply to Objection 3: The venial sins of the perfect consist chiefly in sudden movements, which being hidden cannot give scandal. If, however, they commit any venial sins even in their external words or deeds, these are so slight as to be insufficient in themselves to give scandal.

Whether spiritual goods should be foregone on account of scandal?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual goods ought to be foregone on account of scandal. For Augustine (Contra Ep. Parmen. iii, 2) teaches that “punishment for sin should cease, when the peril of schism is feared.” But punishment of sins is a spiritual good, since it is an act of justice. Therefore a spiritual good is to be foregone on account of scandal.

Objection 2: Further, the Sacred Doctrine is a most spiritual thing. Yet one ought to desist therefrom on account of scandal, according to Mat. 7:6: “Give not that which is holy to dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine lest . . . turning upon you, they tear you.” Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.

Objection 3: Further, since fraternal correction is an act of charity, it is a spiritual good. Yet sometimes it is omitted out of charity, in order to avoid giving scandal to others, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Therefore a spiritual good should be foregone on account of scandal.

Objection 4: Further, Jerome [*Hugh de S. Cher., In Matth. xviii; in Luc. xvii, 2] says that in order to avoid scandal we should forego whatever it is possible to omit without prejudice to the threefold truth, i.e. “the truth of life, of justice and of doctrine.” Now the observance of the counsels, and the bestowal of alms may often be omitted without prejudice to the aforesaid threefold truth, else whoever omitted them would always be guilty of sin, and yet such things are the greatest of spiritual works. Therefore spiritual works should be omitted on account of scandal.

Objection 5: Further, the avoidance of any sin is a spiritual good, since any sin brings spiritual harm to the sinner. Now it seems that one ought sometimes to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandalizing one’s neighbor, for instance, when by sinning venially, one would prevent someone else from committing a mortal sin: because one is bound to hinder the damnation of one’s neighbor as much as one can without prejudice to one’s own salvation, which is not precluded by a venial sin. Therefore one ought to forego a spiritual good in order to avoid scandal.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. Super Ezech. vii): “If people are scandalized at the truth, it is better to allow the birth of scandal, than to abandon the truth.” Now spiritual goods belong, above all others, to the truth. Therefore spiritual goods are not to be foregone on account of scandal.

I answer that, Whereas scandal is twofold, active and passive, the present question does not apply to active scandal, for since active scandal is “something said or done less rightly,” nothing ought to be done that implies active scandal. The question does, however, apply to passive scandal, and accordingly we have to see what ought to be foregone in order to avoid scandal. Now a distinction must be made in spiritual goods. For some of them are necessary for salvation, and cannot be foregone without mortal sin: and it is evident that no man ought to commit a mortal sin, in order to prevent another from sinning, because according to the order of charity, a man ought to love his own spiritual welfare more than another’s. Therefore one ought not to forego that which is necessary for salvation, in order to avoid giving scandal.

Again a distinction seems necessary among spiritual things which are not necessary for salvation: because the scandal which arises from such things sometimes proceeds from malice, for instance when a man wishes to hinder those spiritual goods by stirring up scandal. This is the “scandal of the Pharisees,” who were scandalized at Our Lord’s teaching: and Our Lord teaches (Mat. 15:14) that we ought to treat such like scandal with contempt.

Sometimes scandal proceeds from weakness or ignorance, and such is the “scandal of little ones.” In order to avoid this kind of scandal, spiritual goods ought to be either concealed, or sometimes even deferred (if this can be done without incurring immediate danger), until the matter being explained the scandal cease. If, however, the scandal continue after the matter has been explained, it would seem to be due to malice, and then it would no longer be right to forego that spiritual good in order to avoid such like scandal.

Reply to Objection 1: In the infliction of punishment it is not the punishment itself that is the end in view, but its medicinal properties in checking sin; wherefore punishment partakes of the nature of justice, in so far as it checks sin. But if it is evident that the infliction of punishment will result in more numerous and more grievous sins being committed, the infliction of punishment will no longer be a part of justice. It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking, when, to wit, the excommunication of a few threatens to bring about the danger of a schism, for in that case it would be contrary to the truth of justice to pronounce excommunication.

Reply to Objection 2: With regard to a man’s doctrine two points must be considered, namely, the truth which is taught, and the act of teaching. The first of these is necessary for salvation, to wit, that he whose duty it is to teach should no’ teach what is contrary to the truth, and that he should teach the truth according to the requirements of times and persons: wherefore on no account ought he to suppress the truth and teach error in order to avoid any scandal that might ensue. But the act itself of teaching is one of the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above ([2685]Q[32], A[2]), and so the same is to be said of it as of the other works of mercy, of which we shall speak further on (ad 4).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2686]Q[33], A[1]), fraternal correction aims at the correction of a brother, wherefore it is to be reckoned among spiritual goods in so far as this end can be obtained, which is not the case if the brother be scandalized through being corrected. And so, if the correction be omitted in order to avoid scandal, no spiritual good is foregone.

Reply to Objection 4: The truth of life, of doctrine, and of justice comprises not only whatever is necessary for salvation, but also whatever is a means of obtaining salvation more perfectly, according to 1 Cor. 12:31:

“Be zealous for the better gifts.” Wherefore neither the counsels nor even the works of mercy are to be altogether omitted in order to avoid scandal; but sometimes they should be concealed or deferred, on account of the scandal of the little ones, as stated above. Sometimes, however, the observance of the counsels and the fulfilment of the works of mercy are necessary for salvation. This may be seen in the case of those who have vowed to keep the counsels, and of those whose duty it is to relieve the wants of others, either in temporal matters (as by feeding the hungry), or in spiritual matters (as by instructing the ignorant), whether such duties arise from their being enjoined as in the case of prelates, or from the need on the part of the person in want; and then the same applies to these things as to others that are necessary for salvation.

Reply to Objection 5: Some have said that one ought to commit a venial sin in order to avoid scandal. But this implies a contradiction, since if it ought to be done, it is no longer evil or sinful, for a sin cannot be a matter of choice. It may happen however that, on account of some circumstance, something is not a venial sin, though it would be were it not for that circumstance: thus an idle word is a venial sin, when it is uttered uselessly; yet if it be uttered for a reasonable cause, it is neither idle nor sinful. And though venial sin does not deprive a man of grace which is his means of salvation, yet, in so far as it disposes him to mortal sin, it tends to the loss of salvation.

Whether temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal?

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal goods should be foregone on account of scandal. For we ought to love our neighbor’s spiritual welfare which is hindered by scandal, more than any temporal goods whatever. But we forego what we love less for the sake of what we love more. Therefore we should forego temporal goods in order to avoid scandalizing our neighbor.

Objection 2: Further, according to Jerome’s rule [*Cf. A[7], OBJ[4]], whatever can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth, should be omitted in order to avoid scandal. Now temporal goods can be foregone without prejudice to the threefold truth. Therefore they should be foregone in order to avoid scandal.

Objection 3: Further, no temporal good is more necessary than food. But we ought to forego taking food on account of scandal, according to Rom. 14:15: “Destroy not him with thy meat for whom Christ died.” Much more therefore should all other temporal goods be foregone on account of scandal.

Objection 4: Further, the most fitting way of safeguarding and recovering temporal goods is the court of justice. But it is unlawful to have recourse to justice, especially if scandal ensues: for it is written (Mat. 5:40): “If a man will contend with thee in judgment, and take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him”; and (1 Cor. 6:7): “Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?” Therefore it seems that we ought to forego temporal goods on account of scandal.

Objection 5: Further, we ought, seemingly, to forego least of all those temporal goods which are connected with spiritual goods: and yet we ought to forego them on account of scandal. For the Apostle while sowing spiritual things did not accept a temporal stipend lest he “should give any hindrance to the Gospel of Christ” as we read 1 Cor. 9:12. For a like reason the Church does not demand tithes in certain countries, in order to avoid scandal. Much more, therefore, ought we to forego other temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.

On the contrary, Blessed Thomas of Canterbury demanded the restitution of Church property, notwithstanding that the king took scandal from his doing so.

I answer that, A distinction must be made in temporal goods: for either they are ours, or they are consigned to us to take care of them for someone else; thus the goods of the Church are consigned to prelates, and the goods of the community are entrusted to all such persons as have authority over the common weal. In this latter case the care of such things (as of things held in deposit) devolves of necessity on those persons to whom they are entrusted, wherefore, even as other things that are necessary for salvation, they are not to be foregone on account of scandal. On the other hand, as regards those temporalities of which we have the dominion, sometimes, on account of scandal, we are bound to forego them, and sometimes we are not so bound, whether we forego them by giving them up, if we have them in our possession, or by omitting to claim them, if they are in the possession of others. For if the scandal arise therefrom through the ignorance or weakness of others (in which case, as stated above, A[7], it is scandal of the little ones) we must either forego such temporalities altogether, or the scandal must be abated by some other means, namely, by some kind of admonition. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20): “Thou shouldst give so as to injure neither thyself nor another, as much as thou canst lend, and if thou refusest what is asked, thou must yet be just to him, indeed thou wilt give him something better than he asks, if thou reprove him that asks unjustly.” Sometimes, however, scandal arises from malice. This is scandal of the Pharisees: and we ought not to forego temporal goods for the sake of those who stir up scandals of this kind, for this would both be harmful to the common good, since it would give wicked men an opportunity of plunder, and would be injurious to the plunderers themselves, who would remain in sin as long as they were in possession of another’s property. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 13): “Sometimes we ought to suffer those who rob us of our temporalities, while sometimes we should resist them, as far as equity allows, in the hope not only that we may safeguard our property, but also lest those who take what is not theirs may lose themselves.”

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: If it were permissible for wicked men to rob other people of their property, this would tend to the detriment of the truth of life and justice. Therefore we are not always bound to forego our temporal goods in order to avoid scandal.

Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle had no intention of counselling total abstinence from food on account of scandal, because our welfare requires that we should take food: but he intended to counsel abstinence from a particular kind of food, in order to avoid scandal, according to 1 Cor. 8:13: “I will never eat flesh, lest I should scandalize my brother.”

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) this precept of Our Lord is to be understood of the preparedness of the mind, namely, that man should be prepared, if it be expedient, to suffer being harmed or defrauded, rather than go to law. But sometimes it is not expedient, as stated above (ad 2). The same applies to the saying of the Apostle.

Reply to Objection 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. For a like reason the Church refrains from demanding tithes in those countries where it is not customary to pay them.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF CHARITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the Precepts of Charity, under which there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether precepts should be given about charity?

(2) Whether there should be one or two?

(3) Whether two suffice?

(4) Whether it is fittingly prescribed that we should love God, "with thy whole heart"?

(5) Whether it is fittingly added: "With thy whole mind," etc.?

(6) Whether it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life?

(7) Of the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself";

(8) Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?

Whether any precept should be given about charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that no precept should be given about charity. For charity imposes the mode on all acts of virtue, since it is the form of the virtues as stated above ([2687]Q[23], A[8]), while the precepts are about the virtues themselves. Now, according to the common saying, the mode is not included in the precept. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.

Objection 2: Further, charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost" (Rom. 5:5), makes us free, since "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (2 Cor. 3:17). Now the obligation that arises from a precept is opposed to liberty, since it imposes a necessity. Therefore no precept should be given about charity.

Objection 3: Further, charity is the foremost among all the virtues, to which the precepts are directed, as shown above ([2688]FS, Q[90], A[2]; [2689]FS, Q[100], A[9]). If, therefore, any precepts were given about charity, they should have a place among the chief precepts which are those of the decalogue. But they have no place there. Therefore no precepts should be given about charity.

On the contrary, Whatever God requires of us is included in a precept. Now God requires that man should love Him, according to Dt. 10:12. Therefore it behooved precepts to be given about the love of charity, which is the love of God.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [2690]FS, Q[99], A[1]), a precept implies the notion of something due. Hence a thing is a matter of precept, in so far as it is something due. Now a thing is due in two ways, for its own sake, and for the sake of something else. In every affair, it is the end that is due for its own sake, because it has the character of a good for its own sake: while that which is directed to the end is due for the sake of something else: thus for a physician, it is due for its own sake, that he should heal, while it is due for the sake of something else that he should give a medicine in order to heal. Now the end of the spiritual life is that man be united to God, and this union is effected by charity, while all things pertaining to the spiritual life are ordained to this union, as to their end. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5): “The end of the commandment is charity from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith.” For all the virtues, about whose acts the precepts are given, are directed either to the freeing of the heart from the whirl of the passions—such are the virtues that regulate the passions—or at least to the possession of a good conscience—such are the virtues that regulate operations—or to the having of a right faith—such are those which pertain to the worship of God: and these three things are required of man that he may love God. For an impure heart is withdrawn from loving God, on account of the passion that inclines it to earthly things; an evil conscience gives man a horror for God’s justice, through fear of His punishments; and an untrue faith draws man’s affections to an untrue representation of God, and separates him from the truth of God. Now in every genus that which is for its own sake takes precedence of that which is for the sake of another, wherefore the greatest precept is that of charity, as stated in Mat. 22:39.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2691]FS, Q[100], A[10]) when we were treating of the commandments, the mode of love does not come under those precepts which are about the other acts of virtue: for instance, this precept, "Honor thy father and thy mother," does not prescribe that this should be done out of charity. The act of love does, however, fall under special precepts.

Reply to Objection 2: The obligation of a precept is not opposed to liberty, except in one whose mind is averted from that which is prescribed, as may be seen in those who keep the precepts through fear alone. But the precept of love cannot be fulfilled save of one's own will, wherefore it is not opposed to charity.

Reply to Objection 3: All the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor: and therefore the precepts of charity had not to be enumerated among the precepts of the decalogue, since they are included in all of them.

Whether there should have been given two precepts of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that there should not have been given two precepts of charity. For the precepts of the Law are directed to virtue, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]). Now charity is one virtue, as shown above ([2692]Q[33], A[5]). Therefore only one precept of charity should have been given.

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22,27), charity loves none but God in our neighbor. Now we are sufficiently directed to love God by the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." Therefore there was no need to add the precept about loving our neighbor.

Objection 3: Further, different sins are opposed to different precepts. But it is not a sin to put aside the love of our neighbor, provided we put not aside the love of God; indeed, it is written (Lk. 15:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother . . . he cannot be My disciple." Therefore the precept of the love of God is not distinct from the precept of the love of our neighbor.

Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8): “He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law.” But a law is not fulfilled unless all its precepts be observed. Therefore all the precepts are included in the love of our neighbor: and consequently the one precept of the love of our neighbor suffices. Therefore there should not be two precepts of charity.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Jn. 4:21): “This commandment we have from God, that he who loveth God, love also his brother.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2693]FS, Q[91], A[3]; [2694]FS, Q[94], A[2]) when we were treating of the commandments, the precepts are to the Law what propositions are to speculative sciences, for in these latter, the conclusions are virtually contained in the first principles. Hence whoever knows the principles as to their entire virtual extent has no need to have the conclusions put separately before him. Since, however, some who know the principles are unable to consider all that is virtually contained therein, it is necessary, for their sake, that scientific conclusions should be traced to their principles. Now in practical matters wherein the precepts of the Law direct us, the end has the character of principle, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; Q[26], A[1], ad 1): and the love of God is the end to which the love of our neighbor is directed. Therefore it behooved us to receive precepts not only of the love of God but also of the love of our neighbor, on account of those who are less intelligent, who do not easily understand that one of these precepts is included in the other.

Reply to Objection 1: Although charity is one virtue, yet it has two acts, one of which is directed to the other as to its end. Now precepts are given about acts of virtue, and so there had to be several precepts of charity.

Reply to Objection 2: God is loved in our neighbor, as the end is loved in that which is directed to the end; and yet there was need for an explicit precept about both, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 3: The means derive their goodness from their relation to the end, and accordingly aversion from the means derives its malice from the same source and from no other

Reply to Objection 4: Love of our neighbor includes love of God, as the end is included in the means, and vice versa: and yet it behooved each precept to be given explicitly, for the reason given above.

Objection 1: It would seem that two precepts of charity do not suffice. For precepts are given about acts of virtue. Now acts are distinguished by their objects. Since, then, man is bound to love four things out of charity, namely, God, himself, his neighbor and his own body, as shown above ([2695]Q[25], A[12];[2696] Q[26]), it seems that there ought to be four precepts of charity, so that two are not sufficient.

Objection 2: Further, love is not the only act of charity, but also joy, peace and beneficence. But precepts should be given about the acts of the virtues. Therefore two precepts of charity do not suffice.

Objection 3: Further, virtue consists not only in doing good but also in avoiding evil. Now we are led by the positive precepts to do good, and by the negative precepts to avoid evil. Therefore there ought to have been not only positive, but also negative precepts about charity; and so two precepts of charity are not sufficient.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets.”

I answer that, Charity, as stated above ([2697]Q[23], A[1]), is a kind of friendship. Now friendship is between one person and another, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. in Ev. xvii): “Charity is not possible between less than two”: and it has been explained how one may love oneself out of charity ([2698]Q[25], A[4]). Now since good is the object of dilection and love, and since good is either an end or a means, it is fitting that there should be two precepts of charity, one whereby we are induced to love God as our end, and another whereby we are led to love our neighbor for God’s sake, as for the sake of our end

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 23), “though four things are to be loved out of charity, there was no need of a precept as regards the second and fourth,” i.e. love of oneself and of one’s own body. “For however much a man may stray from the truth, the love of himself and of his own body always remains in him.” And yet the mode of this love had to be prescribed to man, namely, that he should love himself and his own body in an ordinate manner, and this is done by his loving God and his neighbor.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2699]Q[28], A[4];[2700] Q[29], A[3]), the other acts of charity result from the act of love as effects from their cause. Hence the precepts of love virtually include the precepts about the other acts. And yet we find that, for the sake of the laggards, special precepts were given about each act—about joy (Phil. 4:4): “Rejoice in the Lord always”—about peace (Heb. 12:14): “Follow peace with all men”—about beneficence (Gal. 6:10): “Whilst we have time, let us work good to all men”—and Holy Writ contains precepts about each of the parts of beneficence, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter carefully.

Reply to Objection 3: To do good is more than to avoid evil, and therefore the positive precepts virtually include the negative precepts. Nevertheless we find explicit precepts against the vices contrary to charity: for, against hatred it is written (Lev. 12:17): “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart”; against sloth (Ecclus. 6:26): “Be not grieved with her bands”; against envy (Gal. 5:26): “Let us not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one another”; against discord (1 Cor. 1:10): “That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you”; and against scandal (Rom. 14:13): “That you put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way.”

Whether it is fittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart. For the mode of a virtuous act is not a matter of precept, as shown above (A[1], ad 1; [2701]FS, Q[100], A[9]). Now the words “with thy whole heart” signify the mode of the love of God. Therefore it is unfittingly commanded that man should love God with his whole heart.

Objection 2: Further, “A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that God be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love of God, acts counter to the precept, and consequently sins mortally. Now a venial sin does not pertain to the love of God. Therefore a venial sin is a mortal sin, which is absurd.

Objection 3: Further, to love God with one’s whole heart belongs to perfection, since according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, text. 64), “to be whole is to be perfect.” But that which belongs to perfection is not a matter of precept, but a matter of counsel. Therefore we ought not to be commanded to love God with our whole heart.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart.”

I answer that, Since precepts are given about acts of virtue, an act is a matter of precept according as it is an act of virtue. Now it is requisite for an act of virtue that not only should it fall on its own matter, but also that it should be endued with its due circumstances, whereby it is adapted to that matter. But God is to be loved as the last end, to which all things are to be referred. Therefore some kind of totality was to be indicated in connection with the precept of the love of God.

Reply to Objection 1: The commandment that prescribes an act of virtue does not prescribe the mode which that virtue derives from another and higher virtue, but it does prescribe the mode which belongs to its own proper virtue, and this mode is signified in the words “with thy whole heart.”

Reply to Objection 2: To love God with one’s whole heart has a twofold signification. First, actually, so that a man’s whole heart be always actually directed to God: this is the perfection of heaven. Secondly, in the sense that a man’s whole heart be habitually directed to God, so that it consent to nothing contrary to the love of God, and this is the perfection of the way. Venial sin is not contrary to this latter perfection, because it does not destroy the habit of charity, since it does not tend to a contrary object, but merely hinders the use of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: That perfection of charity to which the counsels are directed, is between the two perfections mentioned in the preceding reply: and it consists in man renouncing, as much as possible, temporal things, even such as are lawful, because they occupy the mind and hinder the actual movement of the heart towards God.

Whether to the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” it was fitting to add “and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength”?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting to the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, with thy whole heart,” to add, “and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength” (Dt. 6:5). For heart does not mean here a part of the body, since to love God is not a bodily action: and therefore heart is to be taken here in a spiritual sense. Now the heart understood spiritually is either the soul itself or part of the soul. Therefore it is superfluous to mention both heart and soul.

Objection 2: Further, a man’s strength whether spiritual or corporal depends on the heart. Therefore after the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” it was unnecessary to add, “with all thy strength.”

Objection 3: Further, in Mat. 22:37 we read: “With all thy mind,” which words do not occur here. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly worded in Dt. 6.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, This precept is differently worded in various places: for, as we said in the first objection, in Dt. 6 three points are mentioned: “with thy whole heart,” and “with thy whole soul,” and “with thy whole strength.” In Mat. 22 we find two of these mentioned, viz. “with thy whole heart” and “with thy whole soul,” while “with thy whole strength” is omitted, but “with thy whole mind” is added. Yet in Mark 12 we find all four, viz. “with thy whole heart,” and “with thy whole soul,” and “with thy whole mind,” and “with thy whole force” which is the same as “strength.” Moreover, these four are indicated in Luke 10, where in place of “strength” or “force” we read “with all thy might.” [*St. Thomas is explaining the Latin text which reads “ex tota fortitudine tua” (Dt.), “ex tota virtue tua” (Mk.), and “ex omnibus tuis” (Lk.), although the Greek in all three cases has {ex holes tes ischyos}, which the Douay renders “with thy whole strength.”]

Accordingly these four have to be explained, since the fact that one of them is omitted here or there is due to one implying another. We must therefore observe that love is an act of the will which is here denoted by the “heart,” because just as the bodily heart is the principle of all the movements of the body, so too the will, especially as regards the intention of the last end which is the object of charity, is the principle of all the movements of the soul. Now there are three principles of action that are moved by the will, namely, the intellect which is signified by “the mind,” the lower appetitive power, signified by “the soul”; and the exterior executive power signified by “strength,” “force” or “might.” Accordingly we are commanded to direct our whole intention to God, and this is signified by the words “with thy whole heart”; to submit our intellect to God, and this is expressed in the words “with thy whole mind”; to regulate our appetite according to God, in the words “with thy whole soul”; and to obey God in our external actions, and this is to love God with our whole “strength,” “force” or “might.”

Chrysostom [*The quotation is from an anonymous author’s unfinished work (Opus imperf. Hom. xlii, in Matth.) which is included in Chrysostom’s works], on the other hand, takes “heart” and “soul” in the contrary sense; and Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) refers “heart” to the thought, “soul” to the manner of life, and “mind” to the intellect. Again some explain “with thy whole heart” as denoting the intellect, “with thy whole soul” as signifying the will, “with thy mind” as pointing to the memory. And again, according to Gregory of Nyssa (De Hom. Opif. viii), “heart” signifies the vegetative soul, “soul” the sensitive, and “mind” the intellective soul, because our nourishment, sensation, and understanding ought all to be referred by us to God.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether it is possible in this life to fulfil this precept of the love of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that in this life it is possible to fulfil this precept of the love of God. For according to Jerome [*Pelagius, Exposit. Cath. Fid.] “accursed is he who says that Cod has commanded anything impossible.” But God gave this commandment, as is clear from Dt. 6:5. Therefore it is possible to fulfil this precept in this life.

Objection 2: Further, whoever does not fulfil a precept sins mortally, since according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) sin is nothing else than “a transgression of the Divine Law, and disobedience of the heavenly commandments.” If therefore this precept cannot be fulfilled by wayfarers, it follows that in this life no man can be without mortal sin, and this is against the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 1:8): “(Who also) will confirm you unto the end without crime,” and (1 Tim. 3:10): “Let them minister, having no crime.”

Objection 3: Further, precepts are given in order to direct man in the way of salvation, according to Ps. 18:9: “The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes.” Now it is useless to direct anyone to what is impossible. Therefore it is not impossible to fulfill this precept in this life.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii): “In the fulness of heavenly charity this precept will be fulfilled: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,” etc. For as long as any carnal concupiscence remains, that can be restrained by continence, man cannot love God with all his heart.

I answer that, A precept can be fulfilled in two ways; perfectly, and imperfectly. A precept is fulfilled perfectly, when the end intended by the author of the precept is reached; yet it is fulfilled, imperfectly however, when although the end intended by its author is not reached, nevertheless the order to that end is not departed from. Thus if the commander of an army order his soldiers to fight, his command will be perfectly obeyed by those who fight and conquer the foe, which is the commander’s intention; yet it is fulfilled, albeit imperfectly, by those who fight without gaining the victory, provided they do nothing contrary to military discipline. Now God intends by this precept that man should be entirely united to Him, and this will be realized in heaven, when God will be “all in all,” according to 1 Cor. 15:28. Hence this precept will be observed fully and perfectly in heaven; yet it is fulfilled, though imperfectly, on the way. Nevertheless on the way one man will fulfil it more perfectly than another, and so much the more, as he approaches by some kind of likeness to the perfection of heaven.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that the precept can be fulfilled after a fashion on the way, but not perfectly.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as the soldier who fights legitimately without conquering is not blamed nor deserves to be punished for this, so too he that does not fulfil this precept on the way, but does nothing against the love of God, does not sin mortally.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. viii), “why should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man attains it in this life? For one cannot run straight unless one knows whither to run. And how would one know this if no precept pointed it out.”

Whether the precept of love of our neighbor is fittingly expressed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precept of the love of our neighbor is unfittingly expressed. For the love of charity extends to all men, even to our enemies, as may be seen in Mat. 5:44. But the word “neighbor” denotes a kind of “nighness” which does not seem to exist towards all men. Therefore it seems that this precept is unfittingly expressed.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8) “the origin of our friendly relations with others lies in our relation to ourselves,” whence it seems to follow that love of self is the origin of one’s love for one’s neighbor. Now the principle is greater than that which results from it. Therefore man ought not to love his neighbor as himself.

Objection 3: Further, man loves himself, but not his neighbor, naturally. Therefore it is unfitting that he should be commanded to love his neighbor as himself.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:39): “The second” commandment “is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.”

I answer that, This precept is fittingly expressed, for it indicates both the reason for loving and the mode of love. The reason for loving is indicated in the word “neighbor,” because the reason why we ought to love others out of charity is because they are nigh to us, both as to the natural image of God, and as to the capacity for glory. Nor does it matter whether we say “neighbor,” or “brother” according to 1 Jn. 4:21, or “friend,” according to Lev. 19:18, because all these words express the same affinity.

The mode of love is indicated in the words “as thyself.” This does not mean that a man must love his neighbor equally as himself, but in like manner as himself, and this in three ways. First, as regards the end, namely, that he should love his neighbor for God’s sake, even as he loves himself for God’s sake, so that his love for his neighbor is a “holy” love. Secondly, as regards the rule of love, namely, that a man should not give way to his neighbor in evil, but only in good things, even as he ought to gratify his will in good things alone, so that his love for his neighbor may be a “righteous” love. Thirdly, as regards the reason for loving, namely, that a man should love his neighbor, not for his own profit, or pleasure, but in the sense of wishing his neighbor well, even as he wishes himself well, so that his love for his neighbor may be a “true” love: since when a man loves his neighbor for his own profit or pleasure, he does not love his neighbor truly, but loves himself.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the order of charity is included in the precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that the order of charity is not included in the precept. For whoever transgresses a precept does a wrong. But if man loves some one as much as he ought, and loves any other man more, he wrongs no man. Therefore he does not transgress the precept. Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is a matter of precept is sufficiently delivered to us in Holy Writ. Now the order of charity which was given above ([2702]Q[26]) is nowhere indicated in Holy Writ. Therefore it is not included in the precept.

Objection 3: Further, order implies some kind of distinction. But the love of our neighbor is prescribed without any distinction, in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Therefore the order of charity is not included in the precept.

On the contrary, Whatever God works in us by His grace, He teaches us first of all by His Law, according to Jer. 31:33: "I will give My Law in their heart [*Vulg.: 'in their bowels, and I will write it in their heart']." Now God causes in us the order of charity, according to Cant 2:4: "He set in order charity in me." Therefore the order of charity comes under the precept of the Law.

I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), the mode which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to the thing beloved, as shown above ([2703]Q[25], A[12];[2704] Q[26], AA[1],2). It is therefore evident that the order of charity must come under the precept.

Reply to Objection 1: A man gratifies more the person he loves more, so that if he loved less one whom he ought to love more, he would wish to gratify more one whom he ought to gratify less, and so he would do an injustice to the one he ought to love more.

Reply to Objection 2: The order of those four things we have to love out of charity is expressed in Holy Writ. For when we are commanded to love God with our "whole heart," we are given to understand that we must love Him above all things. When we are commanded to love our neighbor "as ourselves," the love of self is set before love of our neighbor. In like manner where we are commanded (1 Jn. 3:16) "to lay down our souls," i.e. the life of our bodies, "for the brethren," we are given to understand that a man ought to love his neighbor more than his own body; and again when we are commanded (Gal. 6:10) to “work good . . . especially to those who are of the household of the faith,” and when a man is blamed (1 Tim. 5:8) if he “have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house,” it means that we ought to love most those of our neighbors who are more virtuous or more closely united to us.

Reply to Objection 3: It follows from the very words, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor” that those who are nearer to us are to be loved more.

OF THE GIFT OF WISDOM (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift of wisdom which corresponds to charity; and firstly, wisdom itself, secondly, the opposite vice. Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

(2) What is its subject?

(3) Whether wisdom is only speculative or also practical?

(4) Whether the wisdom that is a gift is compatible with mortal sin?

(5) Whether it is in all those who have sanctifying grace?

(6) Which beatitude corresponds to it?

Whether wisdom should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom ought not to be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. For the gifts are more perfect than the virtues, as stated above ([2705]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now virtue is directed to the good alone, wherefore Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that “no man makes bad use of the virtues.” Much more therefore are the gifts of the Holy Ghost directed to the good alone. But wisdom is directed to evil also, for it is written (James 3:15) that a certain wisdom is “earthly, sensual, devilish.” Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 14) “wisdom is the knowledge of Divine things.” Now that knowledge of Divine things which man can acquire by his natural endowments, belongs to the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue, while the supernatural knowledge of Divine things belongs to faith which is a theological virtue, as explained above (Q[4], A[5]; [2706]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Therefore wisdom should be called a virtue rather than a gift.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 28:28): “Behold the fear of the Lord, that is wisdom, and to depart from evil, that is understanding.” And in this passage according to the rendering of the Septuagint which Augustine follows (De Trin. xii, 14; xiv, 1) we read: “Behold piety, that is wisdom.” Now both fear and piety are gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore wisdom should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as though it were distinct from the others.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him; the spirit of wisdom and of understanding.”

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i: 2), it belongs to wisdom to consider the highest cause. By means of that cause we are able to form a most certain judgment about other causes, and according thereto all things should be set in order. Now the highest cause may be understood in two ways, either simply or in some particular genus. Accordingly he that knows the highest cause in any particular genus, and by its means is able to judge and set in order all the things that belong to that genus, is said to be wise in that genus, for instance in medicine or architecture, according to 1 Cor. 3:10: “As a wise architect, I have laid a foundation.” On the other hand, he who knows the cause that is simply the highest, which is God, is said to be wise simply, because he is able to judge and set in order all things according to Divine rules.

Now man obtains this judgment through the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 2:15: “The spiritual man judgeth all things,” because as stated in the same chapter (1 Cor. 2:10), “the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God.” Wherefore it is evident that wisdom is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be good in two senses: first in the sense that it is truly good and simply perfect, secondly, by a kind of likeness, being perfect in wickedness; thus we speak of a good or a perfect thief, as the Philosopher observes (Metaph. v, text. 21). And just as with regard to those things which are truly good, we find a highest cause, namely the sovereign good which is the last end, by knowing which, man is said to be truly wise, so too in evil things something is to be found to which all others are to be referred as to a last end, by knowing which, man is said to be wise unto evil doing, according to Jer. 4:22: “They are wise to do evils, but to do good they have no knowledge.” Now whoever turns away from his due end, must needs fix on some undue end, since every agent acts for an end. Wherefore, if he fixes his end in external earthly things, his “wisdom” is called “earthly,” if in the goods of the body, it is called “sensual wisdom,” if in some excellence, it is called “devilish wisdom” because it imitates the devil’s pride, of which it is written (Job 41:25): “He is king over all the children of pride.”

Reply to Objection 2: The wisdom which is called a gift of the Holy Ghost, differs from that which is an acquired intellectual virtue, for the latter is attained by human effort, whereas the latter is “descending from above” (James 3:15). In like manner it differs from faith, since faith assents to the Divine truth in itself, whereas it belongs to the gift of wisdom to judge according to the Divine truth. Hence the gift of wisdom presupposes faith, because “a man judges well what he knows” (Ethic. i, 3).

Reply to Objection 3: Just as piety which pertains to the worship of God is a manifestation of faith, in so far as we make profession of faith by worshipping God, so too, piety manifests wisdom. For this reason piety is stated to be wisdom, and so is fear, for the same reason, because if a man fear and worship God, this shows that he has a right judgment about Divine things.

Whether wisdom is in the intellect as its subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject. For Augustine says (Ep. cxx) that “wisdom is the charity of God.” Now charity is in the will as its subject, and not in the intellect, as stated above ([2707]Q[24], A[1]). Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect as its subject.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 6:23): “The wisdom of doctrine is according to her name,” for wisdom [sapientia] may be described as “sweet-tasting science [sapida scientia],” and this would seem to regard the appetite, to which it belongs to taste spiritual pleasure or sweetness. Therefore wisdom is in the appetite rather than in the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, the intellective power is sufficiently perfected by the gift of understanding. Now it is superfluous to require two things where one suffices for the purpose. Therefore wisdom is not in the intellect.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “wisdom is contrary to folly.” But folly is in the intellect. Therefore wisdom is also.

I answer that, As stated above [2708](A[1]), wisdom denotes a certain rectitude of judgment according to the Eternal Law. Now rectitude of judgment is twofold: first, on account of perfect use of reason, secondly, on account of a certain connaturality with the matter about which one has to judge. Thus, about matters of chastity, a man after inquiring with his reason forms a right judgment, if he has learnt the science of morals, while he who has the habit of chastity judges of such matters by a kind of connaturality.

Accordingly it belongs to the wisdom that is an intellectual virtue to pronounce right judgment about Divine things after reason has made its inquiry, but it belongs to wisdom as a gift of the Holy Ghost to judge aright about them on account of connaturality with them: thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that “Hierotheus is perfect in Divine things, for he not only learns, but is patient of, Divine things.”

Now this sympathy or connaturality for Divine things is the result of charity, which unites us to God, according to 1 Cor. 6:17: “He who is joined to the Lord, is one spirit.” Consequently wisdom which is a gift, has its cause in the will, which cause is charity, but it has its essence in the intellect, whose act is to judge aright, as stated above ([2709]FS, Q[14], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of wisdom as to its cause, whence also wisdom [sapientia] takes its name, in so far as it denotes a certain sweetness [saporem]. Hence the Reply to the Second Objection is evident, that is if this be the true meaning of the text quoted. For, apparently this is not the case, because such an exposition of the text would only fit the Latin word for wisdom, whereas it does not apply to the Greek and perhaps not in other languages. Hence it would seem that in the text quoted wisdom stands for the renown of doctrine, for which it is praised by all.

Reply to Objection 3: The intellect exercises a twofold act, perception and judgment. The gift of understanding regards the former; the gift of wisdom regards the latter according to the Divine ideas, the gift of knowledge, according to human ideas.

Whether wisdom is merely speculative, or practical also?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not practical but merely speculative. For the gift of wisdom is more excellent than the wisdom which is an intellectual virtue. But wisdom, as an intellectual virtue, is merely speculative. Much more therefore is wisdom, as a gift, speculative and not practical.

Objection 2: Further, the practical intellect is about matters of operation which are contingent. But wisdom is about Divine things which are eternal and necessary. Therefore wisdom cannot be practical.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that “in contemplation we seek the Beginning which is God, but in action we labor under a mighty bundle of wants.” Now wisdom regards the vision of Divine things, in which there is no toiling under a load, since according to Wis. 8:16, “her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness.” Therefore wisdom is merely contemplative, and not practical or active.

On the contrary, It is written (Col. 4:5): “Walk with wisdom towards them that are without.” Now this pertains to action. Therefore wisdom is not merely speculative, but also practical.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14), the higher part of the reason is the province of wisdom, while the lower part is the domain of knowledge. Now the higher reason according to the same authority (De Trin. xii, 7) “is intent on the consideration and consultation of the heavenly,” i.e. Divine, “types” [*Cf. [2710]FP, Q[79], A[9]; [2711]FS, Q[74], A[7]]; it considers them, in so far as it contemplates Divine things in themselves, and it consults them, in so far as it judges of human acts by Divine things, and directs human acts according to Divine rules.

Accordingly wisdom as a gift, is not merely speculative but also practical.

Reply to Objection 1: The higher a virtue is, the greater the number of things to which it extends, as stated in De Causis, prop. x, xvii. Wherefore from the very fact that wisdom as a gift is more excellent than wisdom as an intellectual virtue, since it attains to God more intimately by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it is able to direct us not only in contemplation but also in action.

Reply to Objection 2: Divine things are indeed necessary and eternal in themselves, yet they are the rules of the contingent things which are the subject-matter of human actions.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of human acts according to the Divine rules. Nor from the direction of wisdom does there result any bitterness or toil in human acts; on the contrary the result of wisdom is to make the bitter sweet, and labor a rest.

Whether wisdom can be without grace, and with mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin. For saints glory chiefly in such things as are incompatible with mortal sin, according to 2 Cor. 1:12: “Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience.” Now one ought not to glory in one’s wisdom, according to Jer. 9:23: “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom.” Therefore wisdom can be without grace and with mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, wisdom denotes knowledge of Divine things, as stated above [2712](A[1]). Now one in mortal sin may have knowledge of the Divine truth, according to Rom. 1:18: “(Those men that) detain the truth of God in injustice.” Therefore wisdom is compatible with mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of charity: “Nothing surpasses this gift of God, it is this alone that divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition.” But wisdom is distinct from charity. Therefore it does not divide the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition. Therefore it is compatible with mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:4): “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.”

I answer that, The wisdom which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, as stated above [2713](A[1]), enables us to judge aright of Divine things, or of other things according to Divine rules, by reason of a certain connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity, as stated above [2714](A[2]; Q[23], A[5]). Hence the wisdom of which we are speaking presupposes charity. Now charity is incompatible with mortal sin, as shown above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore it follows that the wisdom of which we are speaking cannot be together with mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: These words are to be understood as referring to worldly wisdom, or to wisdom in Divine things acquired through human reasons. In such wisdom the saints do not glory, according to Prov. 30:2: "The wisdom of men is not with Me": But they do glory in Divine wisdom according to 1 Cor. 1:30: "(Who) of God is made unto us wisdom."

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers, not the wisdom of which we speak but that which is acquired by the study and research of reason, and is compatible with mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Although wisdom is distinct from charity, it presupposes it, and for that very reason divides the children of perdition from the children of the kingdom.

Whether wisdom is in all who have grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not in all who have grace. For it is more to have wisdom than to hear wisdom. Now it is only for the perfect to hear wisdom, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: "We speak wisdom among the perfect." Since then not all who have grace are perfect, it seems that much less all who have grace have wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, "The wise man sets things in order," as the Philosopher states (Metaph. i, 2): and it is written (James 3:17) that the wise man "judges without dissimulation [*Vulg.: 'The wisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation']." Now it is not for all that have grace, to judge, or put others in order, but only for those in authority. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace.

Objection 3: Further, "Wisdom is a remedy against folly," as Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49). Now many that have grace are naturally foolish, for instance madmen who are baptized or those who without being guilty of mortal sin have become insane. Therefore wisdom is not in all that have grace.

On the contrary, Whoever is without mortal sin, is beloved of God; since he has charity, whereby he loves God, and God loves them that love Him (Prov. 8:17). Now it is written (Wis. 7:28) that “God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom.” Therefore wisdom is in all those who have charity and are without mortal sin.

I answer that, The wisdom of which we are speaking, as stated above [2715](A[4]), denotes a certain rectitude of judgment in the contemplation and consultation of Divine things, and as to both of these men obtain various degrees of wisdom through union with Divine things. For the measure of right judgment attained by some, whether in the contemplation of Divine things or in directing human affairs according to Divine rules, is no more than suffices for their salvation. This measure is wanting to none who is without mortal sin through having sanctifying grace, since if nature does not fail in necessaries, much less does grace fail: wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 2:27): “(His) unction teacheth you of all things.”

Some, however, receive a higher degree of the gift of wisdom, both as to the contemplation of Divine things (by both knowing more exalted mysteries and being able to impart this knowledge to others) and as to the direction of human affairs according to Divine rules (by being able to direct not only themselves but also others according to those rules). This degree of wisdom is not common to all that have sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the gratuitous graces, which the Holy Ghost dispenses as He will, according to 1 Cor. 12:8: “To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom,” etc.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks there of wisdom, as extending to the hidden mysteries of Divine things, as indeed he says himself (2 Cor. 1:7): “We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, a wisdom which is hidden.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although it belongs to those alone who are in authority to direct and judge other men, yet every man is competent to direct and judge his own actions, as Dionysius declares (Ep. ad Demophil.).

Reply to Objection 3: Baptized idiots, like little children, have the habit of wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, but they have not the act, on account of the bodily impediment which hinders the use of reason in them.

Whether the seventh beatitude corresponds to the gift of wisdom?

Objection 1: It seems that the seventh beatitude does not correspond to the gift of wisdom. For the seventh beatitude is: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.” Now both these things belong to charity: since of peace it is written (Ps. 118:165): “Much peace have they that love Thy law,” and, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:5), “the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us,” and Who is “the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba [Father]” (Rom. 8:15). Therefore the seventh beatitude ought to be ascribed to charity rather than to wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is declared by its proximate effect rather than by its remote effect. Now the proximate effect of wisdom seems to be charity, according to Wis. 7:27: “Through nations she conveyeth herself into holy souls; she maketh the friends of God and prophets”: whereas peace and the adoption of sons seem to be remote effects, since they result from charity, as stated above ([2716]Q[29], A[3]). Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should be determined in respect of the love of charity rather than in respect of peace.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 3:17): “The wisdom, that is from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, easy to be persuaded, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: ‘without judging, without dissimulation’].” Therefore the beatitude corresponding to wisdom should not refer to peace rather than to the other effects of heavenly wisdom.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) that “wisdom is becoming to peacemakers, in whom there is no movement of rebellion, but only obedience to reason.”

I answer that, The seventh beatitude is fittingly ascribed to the gift of wisdom, both as to the merit and as to the reward. The merit is denoted in the words, “Blessed are the peacemakers.” Now a peacemaker is one who makes peace, either in himself, or in others: and in both cases this is the result of setting in due order those things in which peace is established, for “peace is the tranquillity of order,” according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 13). Now it belongs to wisdom to set things in order, as the Philosopher declares (Metaph. i, 2), wherefore peaceableness is fittingly ascribed to wisdom. The reward is expressed in the words, “they shall be called the children of God.” Now men are called the children of God in so far as they participate in the likeness of the only-begotten and natural Son of God, according to Rom. 8:29, “Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son,” Who is Wisdom Begotten. Hence by participating in the gift of wisdom, man attains to the sonship of God.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to charity to be at peace, but it belongs to wisdom to make peace by setting things in order. Likewise the Holy Ghost is called the “Spirit of adoption” in so far as we receive from Him the likeness of the natural Son, Who is the Begotten Wisdom.

Reply to Objection 2: These words refer to the Uncreated Wisdom, which in the first place unites itself to us by the gift of charity, and consequently reveals to us the mysteries the knowledge of which is infused wisdom. Hence, the infused wisdom which is a gift, is not the cause but the effect of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [2717](A[3]) it belongs to wisdom, as a gift, not only to contemplate Divine things, but also to regulate human acts. Now the first thing, to be effected in this direction of human acts is the removal of evils opposed to wisdom: wherefore fear is said to be “the beginning of wisdom,” because it makes us shun evil, while the last thing is like an end, whereby all things are reduced to their right order; and it is this that constitutes peace. Hence James said with reason that “the wisdom that is from above” (and this is the gift of the Holy Ghost) “first indeed is chaste,” because it avoids the corruption of sin, and “then peaceable,” wherein lies the ultimate effect of wisdom, for which reason peace is numbered among the beatitudes. As to the things that follow, they declare in becoming order the means whereby wisdom leads to peace. For when a man, by chastity, avoids the corruption of sin, the first thing he has to do is, as far as he can, to be moderate in all things, and in this respect wisdom is said to be modest. Secondly, in those matters in which he is not sufficient by himself, he should be guided by the advice of others, and as to this we are told further that wisdom is “easy to be persuaded.” These two are conditions required that man may be at peace with himself. But in order that man may be at peace with others it is furthermore required, first that he should not be opposed to their good; this is what is meant by “consenting to the good.” Secondly, that he should bring to his neighbor’s deficiencies, sympathy in his heart, and succor in his actions, and this is denoted by the words “full of mercy and good fruits.” Thirdly, he should strive in all charity to correct the sins of others, and this is indicated by the words “judging without dissimulation [*Vulg.: ‘The wisdom that is from above . . . is . . . without judging, without dissimulation’],” lest he should purpose to sate his hatred under cover of correction.

OF FOLLY WHICH IS OPPOSED TO WISDOM (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider folly which is opposed to wisdom; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?

(2) Whether folly is a sin?

(3) To which capital sin is it reducible?

Whether folly is contrary to wisdom?

Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not contrary to wisdom. For seemingly unwisdom is directly opposed to wisdom. But folly does not seem to be the same as unwisdom, for the latter is apparently about Divine things alone, whereas folly is about both Divine and human things. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.

Objection 2: Further, one contrary is not the way to arrive at the other. But folly is the way to arrive at wisdom, for it is written (1 Cor. 3:18): “If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise.” Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary is not the cause of the other. But wisdom is the cause of folly; for it is written (Jer. 10:14): “Every man is become a fool for knowledge,” and wisdom is a kind of knowledge. Moreover, it is written (Is. 47:10): “Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, this hath deceived thee.” Now it belongs to folly to be deceived. Therefore folly is not contrary to wisdom.

Objection 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that “a fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when he is injured.” But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefore folly is not opposed to wisdom.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that “the gift of wisdom is given as a remedy against folly.”

I answer that, Stultitia [Folly] seems to take its name from “stupor”; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter of S): “A fool is one who through dullness [stuporem] remains unmoved.” And folly differs from fatuity, according to the same authority (Etym. x), in that folly implies apathy in the heart and dullness in the senses, while fatuity denotes entire privation of the spiritual sense. Therefore folly is fittingly opposed to wisdom.

For “sapiens” [wise] as Isidore says (Etym. x) “is so named from sapor [savor], because just as the taste is quick to distinguish between savors of meats, so is a wise man in discerning things and causes.” Wherefore it is manifest that “folly” is opposed to “wisdom” as its contrary, while “fatuity” is opposed to it as a pure negation: since the fatuous man lacks the sense of judgment, while the fool has the sense, though dulled, whereas the wise man has the sense acute and penetrating.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Isidore (Etym. x), “unwisdom is contrary to wisdom because it lacks the savor of discretion and sense”; so that unwisdom is seemingly the same as folly. Yet a man would appear to be a fool chiefly through some deficiency in the verdict of that judgment, which is according to the highest cause, for if a man fails in judgment about some trivial matter, he is not for that reason called a fool.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as there is an evil wisdom, as stated above ([2718]Q[45], A[1], ad 1), called “worldly wisdom,” because it takes for the highest cause and last end some worldly good, so too there is a good folly opposed to this evil wisdom, whereby man despises worldly things: and it is of this folly that the Apostle speaks.

Reply to Objection 3: It is the wisdom of the world that deceives and makes us foolish in God’s sight, as is evident from the Apostle’s words (1 Cor. 3:19).

Reply to Objection 4: To be unconcerned when one is injured is sometimes due to the fact that one has no taste for worldly things, but only for heavenly things. Hence this belongs not to worldly but to Divine wisdom, as Gregory declares (Moral. x, 49). Sometimes however it is the result of a man’s being simply stupid about everything, as may be seen in idiots, who do not discern what is injurious to them, and this belongs to folly simply.

Whether folly is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a sin. For no sin arises in us from nature. But some are fools naturally. Therefore folly is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, “Every sin is voluntary,” according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv). But folly is not voluntary. Therefore it is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin is contrary to a Divine precept. But folly is not contrary to any precept. Therefore folly is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 1:32): “The prosperity of fools shall destroy them.” But no man is destroyed save for sin. Therefore folly is a sin.

I answer that, Folly, as stated above [2719](A[1]), denotes dullness of sense in judging, and chiefly as regards the highest cause, which is the last end and the sovereign good. Now a man may in this respect contract dullness in judgment in two ways. First, from a natural indisposition, as in the case of idiots, and such like folly is no sin. Secondly, by plunging his sense into earthly things, whereby his sense is rendered incapable of perceiving Divine things, according to 1 Cor. 2:14, “The sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of the Spirit of God,” even as sweet things have no savor for a man whose taste is infected with an evil humor: and such like folly is a sin.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Though no man wishes to be a fool, yet he wishes those things of which folly is a consequence, viz. to withdraw his sense from spiritual things and to plunge it into earthly things. The same thing happens in regard to other sins; for the lustful man desires pleasure, without which there is no sin, although he does not desire sin simply, for he would wish to enjoy the pleasure without sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Folly is opposed to the precepts about the contemplation of truth, of which we have spoken above ([2720]Q[16]) when we were treating of knowledge and understanding.

Whether folly is a daughter of lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that folly is not a daughter of lust. For Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) enumerates the daughters of lust, among which however he makes no mention of folly. Therefore folly does not proceed from lust.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:19): “The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.” Now, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 29) “the wisdom of this world consists in covering the heart with crafty devices;” and this savors of duplicity. Therefore folly is a daughter of duplicity rather than of lust.

Objection 3: Further, anger especially is the cause of fury and madness in some persons; and this pertains to folly. Therefore folly arises from anger rather than from lust.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 7:22): “Immediately he followeth her,” i.e. the harlot . . .”not knowing that he is drawn like a fool to bonds.”

I answer that, As already stated [2721](A[2]), folly, in so far as it is a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man’s sense is plunged into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.

Reply to Objection 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust, pertaining to folly, namely, “hatred of God” and “despair of the life to come”; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.

Reply to Objection 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above ([2722]FS, Q[48] , AA[2],3,4), produces a great change in the nature of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.

TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ[47]-170)

OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)

After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning prudence.

Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?

(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also in the speculative reason?

(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?

(4) Whether it is virtue?

(5) Whether it is a special virtue?

(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?

(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?

(8) Whether its proper act is command?

(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?

(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?

(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same in species as that which regards the common good?

(12) Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

(13) Whether prudence is in the wicked?

(14) Whether prudence is in all good men?

(15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?

(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness ?

Whether prudence is in the cognitive or in the appetitive faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv): “Prudence is love choosing wisely between the things that help and those that hinder.” Now love is not in the cognitive, but in the appetitive faculty. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive faculty.

Objection 2: Further, as appears from the foregoing definition it belongs to prudence “to choose wisely.” But choice is an act of the appetitive faculty, as stated above ([2723]FS, Q[13], A[1]). Therefore prudence is not in the cognitive but in the appetitive faculty.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “in art it is better to err voluntarily than involuntarily, whereas in the case of prudence, as of the virtues, it is worse.” Now the moral virtues, of which he is treating there, are in the appetitive faculty, whereas art is in the reason. Therefore prudence is in the appetitive rather than in the rational faculty.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61): “Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid.”

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x): “A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen, and he foresees the event of uncertainties.” Now sight belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive faculty. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence belongs directly to the cognitive, and not to the sensitive faculty, because by the latter we know nothing but what is within reach and offers itself to the senses: while to obtain knowledge of the future from knowledge of the present or past, which pertains to prudence, belongs properly to the reason, because this is done by a process of comparison. It follows therefore that prudence, properly speaking, is in the reason.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2724]FP, Q[82], A[4]) the will moves all the faculties to their acts. Now the first act of the appetitive faculty is love, as stated above ([2725]FS, Q[25], AA[1],2). Accordingly prudence is said to be love, not indeed essentially, but in so far as love moves to the act of prudence. Wherefore Augustine goes on to say that “prudence is love discerning aright that which helps from that which hinders us in tending to God.” Now love is said to discern because it moves the reason to discern.

Reply to Objection 2: The prudent man considers things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or a hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time. Hence it is clear that those things which prudence considers stand in relation to this other, as in relation to the end. Now of those things that are directed to the end there is counsel in the reason, and choice in the appetite, of which two, counsel belongs more properly to prudence, since the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5,7,9) that a prudent man “takes good counsel.” But as choice presupposes counsel, since it is “the desire for what has been already counselled” (Ethic. iii, 2), it follows that choice can also be ascribed to prudence indirectly, in so far, to wit, as prudence directs the choice by means of counsel.

Reply to Objection 3: The worth of prudence consists not in thought merely, but in its application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. Wherefore if any defect occur in this, it is most contrary to prudence, since, the end being of most import in everything, it follows that a defect which touches the end is the worst of all. Hence the Philosopher goes on to say (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is “something more than a merely rational habit,” such as art is, since, as stated above ([2726]FS, Q[57] , A[4]) it includes application to action, which application is an act of the will.

Whether prudence belongs to the practical reason alone or also to the speculative reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence belongs not only to the practical, but also to the speculative reason. For it is written (Prov. 10:23): “Wisdom is prudence to a man.” Now wisdom consists chiefly in contemplation. Therefore prudence does also.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): “Prudence is concerned with the quest of truth, and fills us with the desire of fuller knowledge.” Now this belongs to the speculative reason. Therefore prudence resides also in the speculative reason.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher assigns art and prudence to the same part of the soul (Ethic. vi, 1). Now art may be not only practical but also speculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore prudence also is both practical and speculative.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) “a prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel.” Now counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end: and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in the practical reason.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2727]Q[45], AA[1],3), wisdom considers the absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare, so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good, and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated significantly that “prudence is wisdom for man,” but not wisdom absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards its specification in relation to its object which is the “necessary true,” it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.

Reply to Objection 3: Every application of right reason in the work of production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason makes things such as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative prudence.

Whether prudence takes cognizance of singulars?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above ([2728]AA[1],2). But “reason deals with universals,” according to Phys. i, 5. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.

Objection 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence which is right reason, is not about singulars.

Objection 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of singulars.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that “prudence does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of singulars also.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), to prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the singulars about which actions are concerned.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals, and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases: hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to matter, as stated in De Anima iii.

Reply to Objection 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain" (Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule, and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does not reside in the external senses whereby we know sensible objects, but in the interior sense, which is perfected by memory and experience so as to judge promptly of particular cases. This does not mean however that prudence is in the interior sense as in its principle subject, for it is chiefly in the reason, yet by a kind of application it extends to this sense.

Whether prudence is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 13) that "prudence is the science of what to desire and what to avoid." Now science is condivided with virtue, as appears in the Predicaments (vi). Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue: but "there is a virtue of art," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5): wherefore art is not a virtue. Now there is prudence in art, for it is written (2 Paralip. ii, 14) concerning Hiram, that he knew "to grave all sort of graving, and to devise ingeniously [prudenter] all that there may be need of in the work." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, no virtue can be immoderate. But prudence is immoderate, else it would be useless to say (Prov. 23:4): "Set bounds to thy prudence." Therefore prudence is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory states (Moral. ii, 49) that prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice are four virtues.

I answer that, As stated above ([2729]FS, Q[55], A[3]; [2730]FS, Q[56], A[1]) when we were treating of virtues in general, "virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.” Now good may be understood in a twofold sense: first, materially, for the thing that is good, secondly, formally, under the aspect of good. Good, under the aspect of good, is the object of the appetitive power. Hence if any habits rectify the consideration of reason, without regarding the rectitude of the appetite, they have less of the nature of a virtue since they direct man to good materially, that is to say, to the thing which is good, but without considering it under the aspect of good. On the other hand those virtues which regard the rectitude of the appetite, have more of the nature of virtue, because they consider the good not only materially, but also formally, in other words, they consider that which is good under the aspect of good.

Now it belongs to prudence, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]) to apply right reason to action, and this is not done without a right appetite. Hence prudence has the nature of virtue not only as the other intellectual virtues have it, but also as the moral virtues have it, among which virtues it is enumerated.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine there takes science in the broad sense for any kind of right reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art, because art does not require rectitude of the appetite; wherefore in order that a man may make right use of his art, he needs to have a virtue which will rectify his appetite. Prudence however has nothing to do with the matter of art, because art is both directed to a particular end, and has fixed means of obtaining that end. And yet, by a kind of comparison, a man may be said to act prudently in matters of art. Moreover in certain arts, on account of the uncertainty of the means for obtaining the end, there is need for counsel, as for instance in the arts of medicine and navigation, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the wise man does not mean that prudence itself should be moderate, but that moderation must be imposed on other things according to prudence.

Whether prudence is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) “an elective habit that follows a mean appointed by reason in relation to ourselves, even as a wise man decides.” Now right reason is reason in accordance with prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 13) that “the effect of moral virtue is right action as regards the end, and that of prudence, right action as regards the means.” Now in every virtue certain things have to be done as means to the end. Therefore prudence is in every virtue, and consequently is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, a special virtue has a special object. But prudence has not a special object, for it is right reason “applied to action” (Ethic. vi, 5); and all works of virtue are actions. Therefore prudence is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is distinct from and numbered among the other virtues, for it is written (Wis. 8:7): “She teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude.”

I answer that, Since acts and habits take their species from their objects, as shown above ([2731]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2732]FS, Q[18], A[2]; [2733]FS, Q[54], A[2]), any habit that has a corresponding special object, distinct from other objects, must needs be a special habit, and if it be a good habit, it must be a special virtue. Now an object is called special, not merely according to the consideration of its matter, but rather according to its formal aspect, as explained above ([2734]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1). Because one and the same thing is the subject matter of the acts of different habits, and also of different powers, according to its different formal aspects. Now a yet greater difference of object is requisite for a difference of powers than for a difference of habits, since several habits are found in the same power, as stated above ([2735]FS, Q[54], A[1]). Consequently any difference in the aspect of an object, that requires a difference of powers, will “a fortiori” require a difference of habits.

Accordingly we must say that since prudence is in the reason, as stated above [2736](A[2]), it is differentiated from the other intellectual virtues by a material difference of objects. “Wisdom,” “knowledge” and “understanding” are about necessary things, whereas “art” and “prudence” are about contingent things, art being concerned with “things made,” that is, with things produced in external matter, such as a house, a knife and so forth; and prudence, being concerned with “things done,” that is, with things that have their being in the doer himself, as stated above ([2737]FS, Q[57], A[4]). On the other hand prudence is differentiated from the moral virtues according to a formal aspect distinctive of powers, i.e. the intellective power, wherein is prudence, and the appetitive power, wherein is moral virtue. Hence it is evident that prudence is a special virtue, distinct from all other virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: This is not a definition of virtue in general, but of moral virtue, the definition of which fittingly includes an intellectual virtue, viz., prudence, which has the same matter in common with moral virtue; because, just as the subject of moral virtue is something that partakes of reason, so moral virtue has the aspect of virtue, in so far as it partakes of intellectual virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that prudence helps all the virtues, and works in all of them; but this does not suffice to prove that it is not a special virtue; for nothing prevents a certain genus from containing a species which is operative in every other species of that same genus, even as the sun has an influence over all bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Things done are indeed the matter of prudence, in so far as they are the object of reason, that is, considered as true: but they are the matter of the moral virtues, in so far as they are the object of the appetitive power, that is, considered as good.

Whether prudence appoints the end to moral virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence appoints the end to moral virtues. Since prudence is in the reason, while moral virtue is in the appetite, it seems that prudence stands in relation to moral virtue, as reason to the appetite. Now reason appoints the end to the appetitive power. Therefore prudence appoints the end to the moral virtues.

Objection 2: Further, man surpasses irrational beings by his reason, but he has other things in common with them. Accordingly the other parts of man are in relation to his reason, what man is in relation to irrational creatures. Now man is the end of irrational creatures, according to Polit. i, 3. Therefore all the other parts of man are directed to reason as to their end. But prudence is “right reason applied to action,” as stated above [2738]

(A[2]). Therefore all actions are directed to prudence as their end. Therefore prudence appoints the end to all moral virtues.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the virtue, art, or power that is concerned about the end, to command the virtues or arts that are concerned about the means. Now prudence disposes of the other moral virtues, and commands them. Therefore it appoints their end to them.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that “moral virtue ensures the rectitude of the intention of the end, while prudence ensures the rectitude of the means.” Therefore it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

I answer that, The end of moral virtues is human good. Now the good of the human soul is to be in accord with reason, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Wherefore the ends of moral virtue must of necessity pre-exist in the reason.

Now, just as, in the speculative reason, there are certain things naturally known, about which is “understanding,” and certain things of which we obtain knowledge through them, viz. conclusions, about which is “science,” so in the practical reason, certain things pre-exist, as naturally known principles, and such are the ends of the moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in speculative matters, as stated above (Q[23], A[7], ad 2; [2739]FS, Q[13], A[3]); while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions, and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these is prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical matters. Consequently it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues, but only to regulate the means.

Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason known by the name of “synderesis” appoints the end to moral virtues, as stated above ([2740]FP, Q[79], A[12]): but prudence does not do this for the reason given above.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The end concerns the moral virtues, not as though they appointed the end, but because they tend to the end which is appointed by natural reason. In this they are helped by prudence, which prepares the way for them, by disposing the means. Hence it follows that prudence is more excellent than the moral virtues, and moves them: yet “synderesis” moves prudence, just as the understanding of principles moves science.

Whether it belongs to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to prudence to find the mean in moral virtues. For the achievement of the mean is the end of moral virtues. But prudence does not appoint the end to moral virtues, as shown above [2741](A[6]). Therefore it does not find the mean in them.

Objection 2: Further, that which of itself has being, would seem to have no cause, but its very being is its cause, since a thing is said to have being by reason of its cause. Now "to follow the mean" belongs to moral virtue by reason of itself, as part of its definition, as shown above (A[5], OBJ[1]). Therefore prudence does not cause the mean in moral virtues.

Objection 3: Further, prudence works after the manner of reason. But moral virtue tends to the mean after the manner of nature, because, as Tully states (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53), "virtue is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason." Therefore prudence does not appoint the mean to moral virtues.

On the contrary, In the foregoing definition of moral virtue (A[5], OBJ[1]) it is stated that it "follows a mean appointed by reason . . . even as a wise man decides."

I answer that, The proper end of each moral virtue consists precisely in conformity with right reason. For temperance intends that man should not stray from reason for the sake of his concupiscences; fortitude, that he should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or daring. Moreover this end is appointed to man according to natural reason, since natural reason dictates to each one that he should act according to reason.

But it belongs to the ruling of prudence to decide in what manner and by what means man shall obtain the mean of reason in his deeds. For though the attainment of the mean is the end of a moral virtue, yet this mean is found by the right disposition of these things that are directed to the end.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as a natural agent makes form to be in matter, yet does not make that which is essential to the form to belong to it, so too, prudence appoints the mean in passions and operations, and yet does not make the searching of the mean to belong to virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Moral virtue after the manner of nature intends to attain the mean. Since, however, the mean as such is not found in all matters after the same manner, it follows that the inclination of nature which ever works in the same manner, does not suffice for this purpose, and so the ruling of prudence is required.

Whether command is the chief act of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that command is not the chief act of prudence. For command regards the good to be ensued. Now Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) states that it is an act of prudence "to avoid ambushes." Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that "the prudent man takes good counsel." Now "to take counsel" and "to command" seem to be different acts, as appears from what has been said above ([2742]FS, Q[57], A[6]). Therefore command is not the chief act of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the will to command and to rule, since the will has the end for its object, and moves the other powers of the soul. Now prudence is not in the will, but in the reason. Therefore command is not an act of prudence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 10) that "prudence commands."

I answer that, Prudence is "right reason applied to action," as stated above [2743](A[2]). Hence that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action must needs be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is "to take counsel," which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry, as stated above ([2744]FS, Q[14], A[1]). The second act is "to judge of what one has discovered," and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is "to command," which act consists in applying to action the things counselled and judged. And since this act approaches nearer to the end of the practical reason, it follows that it is the chief act of the practical reason, and consequently of prudence.

In confirmation of this we find that the perfection of art consists in judging and not in commanding: wherefore he who sins voluntarily against his craft is reputed a better craftsman than he who does so involuntarily, because the former seems to do so from right judgment, and the latter from a defective judgment. On the other hand it is the reverse in prudence, as stated in Ethic. vi, 5, for it is more imprudent to sin voluntarily, since this is to be lacking in the chief act of prudence, viz. command, than to sin involuntarily.

Reply to Objection 1: The act of command extends both to the ensuing of good and to the avoidance of evil. Nevertheless Augustine ascribes “the avoidance of ambushes” to prudence, not as its chief act, but as an act of prudence that does not continue in heaven.

Reply to Objection 2: Good counsel is required in order that the good things discovered may be applied to action: wherefore command belongs to prudence which takes good counsel.

Reply to Objection 3: Simply to move belongs to the will: but command denotes motion together with a kind of ordering, wherefore it is an act of the reason, as stated above ([2745]FS, Q[17], A[1]).

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence. For solicitude implies disquiet, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a solicitous man is a restless man.” Now motion belongs chiefly to the appetitive power: wherefore solicitude does also. But prudence is not in the appetitive power, but in the reason, as stated above [2746](A[1]). Therefore solicitude does not belong to prudence.

Objection 2: Further, the certainty of truth seems opposed to solicitude, wherefore it is related (1 Kings 9:20) that Samuel said to Saul: “As for the asses which were lost three days ago, be not solicitous, because they are found.” Now the certainty of truth belongs to prudence, since it is an intellectual virtue. Therefore solicitude is in opposition to prudence rather than belonging to it.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the “magnanimous man is slow and leisurely.” Now slowness is contrary to solicitude. Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for “good is not opposed to good,” as stated in the Predicaments (viii) it would seem that solicitude does not belong to prudence.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 4:7): “Be prudent . . . and watch in prayers.” But watchfulness is the same as solicitude. Therefore solicitude belongs to prudence.

I answer that, According to Isidore (Etym. x), a man is said to be solicitous through being shrewd [solers] and alert [citus], in so far as a man through a certain shrewdness of mind is on the alert to do whatever has to be done. Now this belongs to prudence, whose chief act is a command about what has been already counselled and judged in matters of action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 9) that “one should be quick in carrying out the counsel taken, but slow in taking counsel.” Hence it is that solicitude belongs properly to prudence, and for this reason Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxiv) that “prudence keeps most careful watch and ward, lest by degrees we be deceived unawares by evil counsel.”

Reply to Objection 1: Movement belongs to the appetitive power as to the principle of movement, in accordance however, with the direction and command of reason, wherein solicitude consists.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), “equal certainty should not be sought in all things, but in each matter according to its proper mode.” And since the matter of prudence is the contingent singulars about which are human actions, the certainty of prudence cannot be so great as to be devoid of all solicitude.

Reply to Objection 3: The magnanimous man is said to be “slow and leisurely” not because he is solicitous about nothing, but because he is not over-solicitous about many things, and is trustful in matters where he ought to have trust, and is not over-solicitous about them: for over-much fear and distrust are the cause of over-solicitude, since fear makes us take counsel, as stated above ([2747]FS, Q[44], A[2]) when we were treating of the passion of fear.

Whether solicitude belongs to prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not extend to the governing of many, but only to the government of oneself. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that virtue directed to the common good is justice. But prudence differs from justice. Therefore prudence is not directed to the common good.

Objection 2: Further, he seems to be prudent, who seeks and does good for himself. Now those who seek the common good often neglect their own. Therefore they are not prudent.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from temperance and fortitude. But temperance and fortitude seem to be related only to a man’s own good. Therefore the same applies to prudence.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 24:45): “Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and prudent [Douay: ‘wise’] servant whom his lord hath appointed over his family?”

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) some have held that prudence does not extend to the common good, but only to the good of the individual, and this because they thought that man is not bound to seek other than his own good. But this opinion is opposed to charity, which “seeketh not her own” (1 Cor. 13:5): wherefore the Apostle says of himself (1 Cor. 10:33): “Not seeking that which is profitable to myself, but to many, that they may be saved.” Moreover it is contrary to right reason, which judges the common good to be better than the good of the individual.

Accordingly, since it belongs to prudence rightly to counsel, judge, and command concerning the means of obtaining a due end, it is evident that prudence regards not only the private good of the individual, but also the common good of the multitude.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of moral virtue. Now just as every moral virtue that is directed to the common good is called “legal” justice, so the prudence that is directed to the common good is called “political” prudence, for the latter stands in the same relation to legal justice, as prudence simply so called to moral virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: He that seeks the good of the many, seeks in consequence his own good, for two reasons. First, because the individual good is impossible without the common good of the family, state, or kingdom. Hence Valerius Maximus says [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. iv, 6] of the ancient Romans that “they would rather be poor in a rich empire than rich in a poor empire.” Secondly, because, since man is a part of the home and state, he must needs consider what is good for him by being prudent about the good of the many. For the good disposition of parts depends on their relation to the whole; thus Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8) that “any part which does not harmonize with its whole, is offensive.”

Reply to Objection 3: Even temperance and fortitude can be directed to the common good, hence there are precepts of law concerning them as stated in Ethic. v, 1: more so, however, prudence and justice, since these belong to the rational faculty which directly regards the universal, just as the sensitive part regards singulars.

Whether prudence about one’s own good is specifically the same as that which extends to the common good?

Objection 1: It seems that prudence about one’s own good is the same specifically as that which extends to the common good. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that “political prudence, and prudence are the same habit, yet their essence is not the same.”

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that “virtue is the same in a good man and in a good ruler.” Now political prudence is chiefly in the ruler, in whom it is architectonic, as it were. Since then prudence is a virtue of a good man, it seems that prudence and political prudence are the same habit.

Objection 3: Further, a habit is not diversified in species or essence by things which are subordinate to one another. But the particular good, which belongs to prudence simply so called, is subordinate to the common good, which belongs to political prudence. Therefore prudence and political prudence differ neither specifically nor essentially.

On the contrary, “Political prudence,” which is directed to the common good of the state, “domestic economy” which is of such things as relate to the common good of the household or family, and “monastic economy” which is concerned with things affecting the good of one person, are all distinct sciences. Therefore in like manner there are different kinds of prudence, corresponding to the above differences of matter.

I answer that, As stated above [2748](A[5]; Q[54], A[2], ad 1), the species of habits differ according to the difference of object considered in its formal aspect. Now the formal aspect of all things directed to the end, is taken from the end itself, as shown above (FS, Prolog.; [2749]FS, Q[102], A[1]), wherefore the species of habits differ by their relation to different ends. Again the individual good, the good of the family, and the good of the city and kingdom are different ends. Wherefore there must needs be different species of prudence corresponding to these different ends, so that one is “prudence” simply so called, which is directed to one’s own good; another, “domestic prudence” which is directed to the common good of the home; and a third, “political prudence,” which is directed to the common good of the state or kingdom.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher means, not that political prudence is substantially the same habit as any kind of prudence, but that it is the same as the prudence which is directed to the common good. This is called “prudence” in respect of the common notion of prudence, i.e. as being right reason applied to action, while it is called “political,” as being directed to the common good.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher declares (Polit. iii, 2), “it belongs to a good man to be able to rule well and to obey well,” wherefore the virtue of a good man includes also that of a good ruler. Yet the virtue of the ruler and of the subject differs specifically, even as the virtue of a man and of a woman, as stated by the same authority (Polit. iii, 2).

Reply to Objection 3: Even different ends, one of which is subordinate to the other, diversify the species of a habit, thus for instance, habits directed to riding, soldiering, and civic life, differ specifically although their ends are subordinate to one another. In like manner, though the good of the individual is subordinate to the good of the many, that does not prevent this difference from making the habits differ specifically; but it follows that the habit which is directed to the last end is above the other habits and commands them.

Whether prudence is in subjects, or only in their rulers?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in subjects but only in their rulers. For the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2) that “prudence alone is the virtue proper to a ruler, while other virtues are common to subjects and rulers, and the prudence of the subject is not a virtue but a true opinion.”

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in Polit. i, 5 that “a slave is not competent to take counsel.” But prudence makes a man take good counsel (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence is not befitting slaves or subjects.

Objection 3: Further, prudence exercises command, as stated above [2750](A[8]). But command is not in the competency of slaves or subjects but only of rulers. Therefore prudence is not in subjects but only in rulers.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are two kinds of political prudence, one of which is “legislative” and belongs to rulers, while the other “retains the common name political,” and is about “individual actions.” Now it belongs also to subjects to perform these individual actions. Therefore prudence is not only in rulers but also in subjects.

I answer that, Prudence is in the reason. Now ruling and governing belong properly to the reason; and therefore it is proper to a man to reason and be prudent in so far as he has a share in ruling and governing. But it is evident that the subject as subject, and the slave as slave, are not competent to rule and govern, but rather to be ruled and governed. Therefore prudence is not the virtue of a slave as slave, nor of a subject as subject.

Since, however, every man, for as much as he is rational, has a share in ruling according to the judgment of reason, he is proportionately competent to have prudence. Wherefore it is manifest that prudence is in the ruler “after the manner of a mastercraft” (Ethic. vi, 8), but in the subjects, “after the manner of a handicraft.”

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood strictly, namely, that prudence is not the virtue of a subject as such.

Reply to Objection 2: A slave is not capable of taking counsel, in so far as he is a slave (for thus he is the instrument of his master), but he does take counsel in so far as he is a rational animal.

Reply to Objection 3: By prudence a man commands not only others, but also himself, in so far as the reason is said to command the lower powers.

Whether prudence can be in sinners?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be prudence in sinners. For our Lord said (Lk. 16:8): “The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: ‘wiser’] in their generation than the children of light.” Now the children of this world are sinners. Therefore there be prudence in sinners.

Objection 2: Further, faith is a more excellent virtue than prudence. But there can be faith in sinners. Therefore there can be prudence also.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vi, 7, “we say that to be of good counsel is the work of prudent man especially.” Now many sinners can take good counsel. Therefore sinners can have prudence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 12) that “it is impossible for a man be prudent unless he be good.” Now no inner is a good man. Therefore no sinner is prudent.

I answer that, Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such things as are fitting for an evil end, has false prudence, in far as that which he takes for an end, is good, not in truth but in appearance. Thus man is called “a good robber,” and in this way may speak of “a prudent robber,” by way of similarity, because he devises fitting ways of committing robbery. This is the prudence of which the Apostle says (Rom. 8:6): “The prudence [Douay: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is death,” because, to wit, it places its ultimate end in the pleasures of the flesh.

The second prudence is indeed true prudence, because it devises fitting ways of obtaining a good end; and yet it is imperfect, from a twofold source. First, because the good which it takes for an end, is not the common end of all human life, but of some particular affair; thus when a man devises fitting ways of conducting business or of sailing a ship, he is called a prudent businessman, or a prudent sailor; secondly, because he fails in the chief act of prudence, as when a man takes counsel aright, and forms a good judgment, even about things concerning life as a whole, but fails to make an effective command.

The third prudence is both true and perfect, for it takes counsel, judges and commands aright in respect of the good end of man’s whole life: and this alone is prudence simply so-called, and cannot be in sinners, whereas the first prudence is in sinners alone, while imperfect prudence is common to good and wicked men, especially that which is imperfect through being directed to a particular end, since that which is imperfect on account of a failing in the chief act, is only in the wicked.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of our Lord is to be understood of the first prudence, wherefore it is not said that they are prudent absolutely, but that they are prudent in “their generation.”

Reply to Objection 2: The nature of faith consists not in conformity with the appetite for certain right actions, but in knowledge alone. On the other hand prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without the moral virtues there is no prudence, as shown above

([2751]FS, Q[58], A[5]); secondly because prudence commands right actions, which does not happen unless the appetite be right. Wherefore though faith on account of its object is more excellent than prudence, yet prudence, by its very nature, is more opposed to sin, which arises from a disorder of the appetite.

Reply to Objection 3: Sinners can take good counsel for an evil end, or for some particular good, but they do not perfectly take good counsel for the end of their whole life, since they do not carry that counsel into effect. Hence they lack prudence which is directed to the good only; and yet in them, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12) there is "cleverness," [*{deinotike}] i.e. natural diligence which may be directed to both good and evil; or "cunning," [*{panourgia}] which is directed only to evil, and which we have stated above, to be "false prudence" or "prudence of the flesh."

Whether prudence is in all who have grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not in all who have grace. Prudence requires diligence, that one may foresee aright what has to be done. But many who have grace have not this diligence. Therefore not all who have grace have prudence.

Objection 2: Further, a prudent man is one who takes good counsel, as stated above (A[8], OBJ[2]; A[13], OBJ[3]). Yet many have grace who do not take good counsel, and need to be guided by the counsel of others. Therefore not all who have grace, have prudence

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "young people are not obviously prudent." Yet many young people have grace. Therefore prudence is not to be found in all who have grace.

On the contrary, No man has grace unless he be virtuous. Now no man can be virtuous without prudence, for Gregory says (Moral. ii, 46) that "the other virtues cannot be virtues at all unless they effect prudently what they desire to accomplish." Therefore all who have grace have prudence.

I answer that, The virtues must needs be connected together, so that whoever has one has all, as stated above ([2752]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Now whoever has grace has charity, so that he must needs have all the other virtues, and hence, since prudence is a virtue, as shown above [2753](A[4]), he must, of necessity, have prudence also.

Reply to Objection 1: Diligence is twofold: one is merely sufficient with regard to things necessary for salvation; and such diligence is given to all who have grace, whom “His unction teacheth of all things” (1 Jn. 2:27). There is also another diligence which is more than sufficient, whereby a man is able to make provision both for himself and for others, not only in matters necessary for salvation, but also in all things relating to human life; and such diligence as this is not in all who have grace.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who require to be guided by the counsel of others, are able, if they have grace, to take counsel for themselves in this point at least, that they require the counsel of others and can discern good from evil counsel.

Reply to Objection 3: Acquired prudence is caused by the exercise of acts, wherefore “its acquisition demands experience and time” (Ethic. ii, 1), hence it cannot be in the young, neither in habit nor in act. On the other hand gratuitous prudence is caused by divine infusion. Wherefore, in children who have been baptized but have not come to the use of reason, there is prudence as to habit but not as to act, even as in idiots; whereas in those who have come to the use of reason, it is also as to act, with regard to things necessary for salvation. This by practice merits increase, until it becomes perfect, even as the other virtues. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that “strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil.”

Whether prudence is in us by nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is in us by nature. The Philosopher says that things connected with prudence “seem to be natural,” namely “synesis, gnome” [*{synesis} and {gnome}, Cf. [2754]FS, Q[57], A[6]] and the like, but not those which are connected with speculative wisdom. Now things belonging to the same genus have the same kind of origin. Therefore prudence also is in us from nature.

Objection 2: Further, the changes of age are according to nature. Now prudence results from age, according to Job 12:12: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length of days prudence.” Therefore prudence is natural.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is more consistent with human nature than with that of dumb animals. Now there are instances of a certain natural prudence in dumb animals, according to the Philosopher (De Hist. Anim. viii, 1). Therefore prudence is natural.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “intellectual virtue is both originated and fostered by teaching; it therefore demands experience and time.” Now prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above [2755](A[4]). Therefore prudence is in us, not by nature, but by teaching and experience.

I answer that, As shown above [2756](A[3]), prudence includes knowledge both of universals, and of the singular matters of action to which prudence applies the universal principles. Accordingly, as regards the knowledge of universals, the same is to be said of prudence as of speculative science, because the primary universal principles of either are known naturally, as shown above [2757](A[6]): except that the common principles of prudence are more connatural to man; for as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 7) “the life which is according to the speculative reason is better than that which is according to man”: whereas the secondary universal principles, whether of the speculative or of the practical reason, are not inherited from nature, but are acquired by discovery through experience, or through teaching.

On the other hand, as regards the knowledge of particulars which are the matter of action, we must make a further distinction, because this matter of action is either an end or the means to an end. Now the right ends of human life are fixed; wherefore there can be a natural inclination in respect of these ends; thus it has been stated above ([2758]FS, Q[51], A[1]; [2759]FS, Q[63], A[1]) that some, from a natural inclination, have certain virtues whereby they are inclined to right ends; and consequently they also have naturally a right judgment about such like ends.

But the means to the end, in human concerns, far from being fixed, are of manifold variety according to the variety of persons and affairs. Wherefore since the inclination of nature is ever to something fixed, the knowledge of those means cannot be in man naturally, although, by reason of his natural disposition, one man has a greater aptitude than another in discerning them, just as it happens with regard to the conclusions of speculative sciences. Since then prudence is not about the ends, but about the means, as stated above [2760](A[6]; [2761]FS, Q[57], A[5]), it follows that prudence is not from nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of things relating to prudence, in so far as they are directed to ends. Wherefore he had said before (Ethic. vi, 5,11) that “they are the principles of the {ou heneka}” [*Literally, ‘for the sake of which’ (are the means)], namely, the end; and so he does not mention {euboulia} among them, because it takes counsel about the means.

Reply to Objection 2: Prudence is rather in the old, not only because their natural disposition calms the movement of the sensitive passions, but also because of their long experience.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in dumb animals there are fixed ways of obtaining an end, wherefore we observe that all the animals of a same species act in like manner. But this is impossible in man, on account of his reason, which takes cognizance of universals, and consequently extends to an infinity of singulars.

Whether prudence can be lost through forgetfulness?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness. For since science is about necessary things, it is more certain than prudence which is about contingent matters of action. But science is lost by forgetfulness. Much more therefore is prudence.

Objection 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) “the same things, but by a contrary process, engender and corrupt virtue.” Now the engendering of prudence requires experience which is made up “of many memories,” as he states at the beginning of his Metaphysics (i, 1). Therefore since forgetfulness is contrary to memory, it seems that prudence can be lost through forgetfulness.

Objection 3: Further, there is no prudence without knowledge of universals. But knowledge of universals can be lost through forgetfulness. Therefore prudence can also.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “forgetfulness is possible to art but not to prudence.”

I answer that, Forgetfulness regards knowledge only, wherefore one can forget art and science, so as to lose them altogether, because they belong to the reason. But prudence consists not in knowledge alone, but also in an act of the appetite, because as stated above [2762](A[8]), its principal act is one of command, whereby a man applies the knowledge he has, to the purpose of appetition and operation. Hence prudence is not taken away directly by forgetfulness, but rather is corrupted by the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “pleasure and sorrow pervert the estimate of prudence”: wherefore it is written (Dan. 13:56): “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath subverted thy heart,” and (Ex. 23:8): “Neither shalt thou take bribes which blind even the prudent [Douay: ‘wise’].”

Nevertheless forgetfulness may hinder prudence, in so far as the latter’s command depends on knowledge which may be forgotten.

Reply to Objection 1: Science is in the reason only: hence the comparison fails, as stated above [*Cf. [2763]FS, Q[53], A[1]].

Reply to Objection 2: The experience required by prudence results not from memory alone, but also from the practice of commanding aright.

Reply to Objection 3: Prudence consists chiefly, not in the knowledge of universals, but in applying them to action, as stated above [2764](A[3]). Wherefore forgetting the knowledge of universals does not destroy the principal part of prudence, but hinders it somewhat, as stated above.

OF THE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the parts of prudence, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Which are the parts of prudence?

(2) Of its integral parts;

(3) Of its subjective parts;

(4) Of its potential parts.

Whether three parts of prudence are fittingly assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prudence are assigned unfittingly. Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) assigns three parts of prudence, namely, “memory,” “understanding” and “foresight.” Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) following the opinion of Plotinus ascribes to prudence six parts, namely, “reasoning,” “understanding,” “circumspection,” “foresight,” “docility” and “caution.” Aristotle says (Ethic. vi, 9,10,11) that “good counsel,” “synesis” and “gnome” belong to prudence. Again under the head of prudence he mentions “conjecture,” “shrewdness,” “sense” and “understanding.” And another Greek philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q[80], OBJ[4]] says that ten things are connected with prudence, namely, “good counsel,” “shrewdness,” “foresight,” “regnative [*Regnativa],” “military,” “political” and “domestic prudence,” “dialectics,” “rhetoric” and “physics.” Therefore it seems that one or the other enumeration is either excessive or deficient.

Objection 2: Further, prudence is specifically distinct from science. But politics, economics, logic, rhetoric, physics are sciences. Therefore they are not parts of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, the parts do not exceed the whole. Now the intellective memory or intelligence, reason, sense and docility, belong not only to prudence but also to all the cognitive habits. Therefore they should not be set down as parts of prudence.

Objection 4: Further, just as counselling, judging and commanding are acts of the practical reason, so also is using, as stated above ([2765]FS, Q[16], A[1]). Therefore, just as “eubulia” which refers to counsel, is connected with prudence, and “synesis” and “gnome” which refer to judgment, so also ought something to have been assigned corresponding to use.

Objection 5: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence, as stated above ([2766]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore solicitude also should have been mentioned among the parts of prudence.

I answer that, Parts are of three kinds, namely, “integral,” as wall, roof, and foundations are parts of a house; “subjective,” as ox and lion are parts of animal; and “potential,” as the nutritive and sensitive powers are parts of the soul. Accordingly, parts can be assigned to a virtue in three ways. First, in likeness to integral parts, so that the things which need to concur for the perfect act of a virtue, are called the parts of that virtue. In this way, out of all the things mentioned above, eight may be taken as parts of prudence, namely, the six assigned by Macrobius; with the addition of a seventh, viz. “memory” mentioned by Tully; and {eustochia} or “shrewdness” mentioned by Aristotle. For the “sense” of prudence is also called “understanding”: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): “Of such things one needs to have the sense, and this is understanding.” Of these eight, five belong to prudence as a cognitive virtue, namely, “memory,” “reasoning,” “understanding,” “docility” and “shrewdness”: while the three others belong thereto, as commanding and applying knowledge to action, namely, “foresight,” “circumspection” and “caution.” The reason of their difference is seen from the fact that three things may be observed in reference to knowledge. In the first place, knowledge itself, which, if it be of the past, is called “memory,” if of the present, whether contingent or necessary, is called “understanding” or “intelligence.” Secondly, the acquiring of knowledge, which is caused either by teaching, to which pertains “docility,” or by “discovery,” and to this belongs to {eustochia}, i.e. “a happy conjecture,” of which “shrewdness” is a part, which is a “quick conjecture of the middle term,” as stated in Poster. i, 9. Thirdly, the use of knowledge, in as much as we proceed from things known to knowledge or judgment of other things, and this belongs to “reasoning.” And the reason, in order to command aright, requires to have three conditions. First, to order that which is befitting the end, and this belongs to “foresight”; secondly, to attend to the circumstances of the matter in hand, and this belongs to “circumspection”; thirdly, to avoid obstacles, and this belongs to “caution.”

The subjective parts of a virtue are its various species. In this way the parts of prudence, if we take them properly, are the prudence whereby a man rules himself, and the prudence whereby a man governs a multitude, which differ specifically as stated above ([2767]Q[47], A[11]). Again, the prudence whereby a multitude is governed, is divided into various species according to the various kinds of multitude. There is the multitude which is united together for some particular purpose; thus an army is gathered together to fight, and the prudence that governs this is called “military.” There is also the multitude that is united together for the whole of life; such is the multitude of a home or family, and this is ruled by “domestic prudence”: and such again is the multitude of a city or kingdom, the ruling principle of which is “regnative prudence” in the ruler, and “political prudence,” simply so called, in the subjects.

If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also speculative knowledge, as stated above ([2768]Q[47], A[2], ad 2) then its parts include “dialectics,” “rhetoric” and “physics,” according to three methods of prudence in the sciences. The first of these is the attaining of science by demonstration, which belongs to “physics” (if physics be understood to comprise all demonstrative sciences). The second method is to arrive at an opinion through probable premises, and this belongs to “dialectics.” The third method is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to “rhetoric.” It may be said, however, that these three belong also to prudence properly so called, since it argues sometimes from necessary premises, sometimes from probabilities, and sometimes from conjectures.

The potential parts of a virtue are the virtues connected with it, which are directed to certain secondary acts or matters, not having, as it were, the whole power of the principal virtue. In this way the parts of prudence are “good counsel,” which concerns counsel, “synesis,” which concerns judgment in matters of ordinary occurrence, and “gnome,” which concerns judgment in matters of exception to the law: while “prudence” is about the chief act, viz. that of commanding.

Reply to Objection 1: The various enumerations differ, either because different kinds of parts are assigned, or because that which is mentioned in one enumeration includes several mentioned in another enumeration. Thus Tully includes “caution” and “circumspection” under “foresight,” and “reasoning,” “docility” and “shrewdness” under “understanding.”

Reply to Objection 2: Here domestic and civic prudence are not to be taken as sciences, but as kinds of prudence. As to the other three, the reply may be gathered from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: All these things are reckoned parts of prudence, not by taking them altogether, but in so far as they are connected with things pertaining to prudence.

Reply to Objection 4: Right command and right use always go together, because the reason’s command is followed by obedience on the part of the lower powers, which pertain to use.

Reply to Objection 5: Solicitude is included under foresight.

OF EACH QUASI-INTEGRAL PART OF PRUDENCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider each quasi-integral part of prudence, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Memory;

(2) Understanding or Intelligence;

(3) Docility;

(4) Shrewdness;

(5) Reason;

(6) Foresight;

(7) Circumspection;

(8) Caution.

Whether memory is a part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not a part of prudence. For memory, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i), is in the sensitive part of the soul: whereas prudence is in the rational part (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, prudence is acquired and perfected by experience, whereas memory is in us from nature. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, memory regards the past, whereas prudence regards future matters of action, about which counsel is concerned, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2,7. Therefore memory is not a part of prudence.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) places memory among the parts of prudence.

I answer that, Prudence regards contingent matters of action, as stated above ([2769]Q[47], A[5]). Now in such like matters a man can be directed, not by those things that are simply and necessarily true, but by those which occur in the majority of cases: because principles must be proportionate to their conclusions, and “like must be concluded from like” (Ethic. vi [*Anal. Post. i. 32]). But we need experience to discover what is true in the majority of cases: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that “intellectual virtue is engendered and fostered by experience and time.” Now experience is the result of many memories as stated in Metaph. i, 1, and therefore prudence requires the memory of many things. Hence memory is fittingly accounted a part of prudence.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2770]Q[47], AA[3],6), prudence applies universal knowledge to particulars which are objects of sense: hence many things belonging to the sensitive faculties are requisite for prudence, and memory is one of them.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as aptitude for prudence is in our nature, while its perfection comes through practice or grace, so too, as Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii, 16,24], memory not only arises from nature, but is also aided by art and diligence.

There are four things whereby a man perfects his memory. First, when a man wishes to remember a thing, he should take some suitable yet somewhat unwonted illustration of it, since the unwonted strikes us more, and so makes a greater and stronger impression on the mind; the mind; and this explains why we remember better what we saw when we were children. Now the reason for the necessity of finding these illustrations or images, is that simple and spiritual impressions easily slip from the mind, unless they be tied as it were to some corporeal image, because human knowledge has a greater hold on sensible objects. For this reason memory is assigned to the sensitive part of the soul. Secondly, whatever a man wishes to retain in his memory he must carefully consider and set in order, so that he may pass easily from one memory to another. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii): “Sometimes a place brings memories back to us: the reason being that we pass quickly from the one to the other.” Thirdly, we must be anxious and earnest about the things we wish to remember, because the more a thing is impressed on the mind, the less it is liable to slip out of it. Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric [*Ad Herenn. de Arte Rhet. iii.] that “anxiety preserves the figures of images entire.” Fourthly, we should often reflect on the things we wish to remember. Hence the Philosopher says (De Memoria i) that “reflection preserves memories,” because as he remarks (De Memoria ii) “custom is a second nature”: wherefore when we reflect on a thing frequently, we quickly call it to mind, through passing from one thing to another by a kind of natural order.

Reply to Objection 3: It behooves us to argue, as it were, about the future from the past; wherefore memory of the past is necessary in order to take good counsel for the future.

Whether understanding* is a part of prudence? [*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle’s word is {nous}]

Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But intellectual virtue is divided into understanding and prudence, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Therefore understanding should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, understanding is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and corresponds to faith, as stated above (Q[8], AA[1],8). But prudence is a virtue other than faith, as is clear from what has been said above (Q[4], A[8]; [2771]FS, Q[62], A[2]). Therefore understanding does not pertain to prudence.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is about singular matters of action (Ethic. vi, 7): whereas understanding takes cognizance of universal and immaterial objects (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore understanding is not a part of prudence.

On the contrary, Tully [*De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53] accounts “intelligence” a part of prudence, and Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] mentions “understanding,” which comes to the same.

I answer that, Understanding denotes here, not the intellectual power, but the right estimate about some final principle, which is taken as self-evident: thus we are said to understand the first principles of demonstrations. Now every deduction of reason proceeds from certain statements which are taken as primary: wherefore every process of reasoning must needs proceed from some understanding. Therefore since prudence is right reason applied to action, the whole process of prudence must needs have its source in understanding. Hence it is that understanding is reckoned a part of prudence.

Reply to Objection 1: The reasoning of prudence terminates, as in a conclusion, in the particular matter of action, to which, as stated above ([2772]Q[47], AA[3],6), it applies the knowledge of some universal principle. Now a singular conclusion is argued from a universal and a singular proposition. Wherefore the reasoning of prudence must proceed from a twofold understanding. The one is cognizant of universals, and this belongs to the understanding which is an intellectual virtue, whereby we know naturally not only speculative principles, but also practical universal principles, such as “One should do evil to no man,” as shown above ([2773]Q[47], A[6]). The other understanding, as stated in Ethic. vi, 11, is cognizant of an extreme, i.e. of some primary singular and contingent practical matter, viz. the minor premiss, which must needs be singular in the syllogism of prudence, as stated above ([2774]Q[47], AA[3],6). Now this primary singular is some singular end, as stated in the same place. Wherefore the understanding which is a part of prudence is a right estimate of some particular end.

Reply to Objection 2: The understanding which is a gift of the Holy Ghost, is a quick insight into divine things, as shown above ([2775]Q[8], AA[1],2). It is in another sense that it is accounted a part of prudence, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The right estimate about a particular end is called both "understanding," in so far as its object is a principle, and "sense," in so far as its object is a particular. This is what the Philosopher means when he says (Ethic. v, 11): "Of such things we need to have the sense, and this is understanding." But this is to be understood as referring, not to the particular sense whereby we know proper sensibles, but to the interior sense, whereby we judge of a particular.

Whether docility should be accounted a part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that docility should not be accounted a part of prudence. For that which is a necessary condition of every intellectual virtue, should not be appropriated to one of them. But docility is requisite for every intellectual virtue. Therefore it should not be accounted a part of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to a human virtue is in our power, since it is for things that are in our power that we are praised or blamed. Now it is not in our power to be docile, for this is befitting to some through their natural disposition. Therefore it is not a part of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, docility is in the disciple: whereas prudence, since it makes precepts, seems rather to belong to teachers, who are also called "preceptors." Therefore docility is not a part of prudence.

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] following the opinion of Plotinus places docility among the parts of prudence.

I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1;[2776] Q[47], A[3]) prudence is concerned with particular matters of action, and since such matters are of infinite variety, no one man can consider them all sufficiently; nor can this be done quickly, for it requires length of time. Hence in matters of prudence man stands in very great need of being taught by others, especially by old folk who have acquired a sane understanding of the ends in practical matters. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11): “It is right to pay no less attention to the undemonstrated assertions and opinions of such persons as are experienced, older than we are, and prudent, than to their demonstrations, for their experience gives them an insight into principles.” Thus it is written (Prov. 3:5): “Lean not on thy own prudence,” and (Ecclus. 6:35): “Stand in the multitude of the ancients” (i.e. the old men), “that are wise, and join thyself from thy heart to their wisdom.” Now it is a mark of docility to be ready to be taught: and consequently docility is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence

Reply to Objection 1: Although docility is useful for every intellectual virtue, yet it belongs to prudence chiefly, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 2: Man has a natural aptitude for docility even as for other things connected with prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully, frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness, nor despising them through pride.

Reply to Objection 3: By prudence man makes precepts not only for others, but also for himself, as stated above ([2777]Q[47], A[12], ad 3). Hence as stated (Ethic. vi, 11), even in subjects, there is place for prudence; to which docility pertains. And yet even the learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of prudence, as stated above.

Whether shrewdness is part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that shrewdness is not a part of prudence. For shrewdness consists in easily finding the middle term for demonstrations, as stated in Poster. i, 34. Now the reasoning of prudence is not a demonstration since it deals with contingencies. Therefore shrewdness does not pertain to prudence.

Objection 2: Further, good counsel pertains to prudence according to Ethic. vi, 5,7,9. Now there is no place in good counsel for shrewdness [*Ethic. vi, 9; Poster. i, 34] which is a kind of {eustochia}, i.e. “a happy conjecture": for the latter is "unreasoning and rapid," whereas counsel needs to be slow, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore shrewdness should not be accounted a part of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, shrewdness as stated above ([2778]Q[48]) is a "happy conjecture." Now it belongs to rhetoricians to make use of conjectures. Therefore shrewdness belongs to rhetoric rather than to prudence.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "A solicitous man is one who is shrewd and alert [solers citus]." But solicitude belongs to prudence, as stated above ([2779]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore shrewdness does also.

I answer that, Prudence consists in a right estimate about matters of action. Now a right estimate or opinion is acquired in two ways, both in practical and in speculative matters, first by discovering it oneself, secondly by learning it from others. Now just as docility consists in a man being well disposed to acquire a right opinion from another man, so shrewdness is an apt disposition to acquire a right estimate by oneself, yet so that shrewdness be taken for {eustochia}, of which it is a part. For {eustochia} is a happy conjecture about any matter, while shrewdness is "an easy and rapid conjecture in finding the middle term" (Poster. i, 34). Nevertheless the philosopher [*Andronicus; Cf. Q[48], OBJ[1]] who calls shrewdness a part of prudence, takes it for {eustochia}, in general, hence he says: "Shrewdness is a habit whereby congruities are discovered rapidly."

Reply to Objection 1: Shrewdness is concerned with the discovery of the middle term not only in demonstrative, but also in practical syllogisms, as, for instance, when two men are seen to be friends they are reckoned to be enemies of a third one, as the Philosopher says (Poster. i, 34). In this way shrewdness belongs to prudence.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher adduces the true reason (Ethic. vi, 9) to prove that {euboulia}, i.e. good counsel, is not {eustochia}, which is commended for grasping quickly what should be done. Now a man may take good counsel, though he be long and slow in so doing, and yet this does not discount the utility of a happy conjecture in taking good counsel: indeed it is sometimes a necessity, when, for instance, something has to be done without warning. It is for this reason that shrewdness is fittingly reckoned a part of prudence.

Reply to Objection 3: Rhetoric also reasons about practical matters, wherefore nothing hinders the same thing belonging both to rhetoric and prudence. Nevertheless, conjecture is taken here not only in the sense in which it is employed by rhetoricians, but also as applicable to all matters whatsoever wherein man is said to conjecture the truth.

Whether reason should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For the subject of an accident is not a part thereof. But prudence is in the reason as its subject (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, that which is common to many, should not be reckoned a part of any one of them; or if it be so reckoned, it should be reckoned a part of that one to which it chiefly belongs. Now reason is necessary in all the intellectual virtues, and chiefly in wisdom and science, which employ a demonstrative reason. Therefore reason should not be reckoned a part of prudence

Objection 3: Further, reason as a power does not differ essentially from the intelligence, as stated above ([2780]FP, Q[79], A[8]). If therefore intelligence be reckoned a part of prudence, it is superfluous to add reason.

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i], following the opinion of Plotinus, numbers reason among the parts of prudence.

I answer that, The work of prudence is to take good counsel, as stated in Ethic. vi, 7. Now counsel is a research proceeding from certain things to others. But this is the work of reason. Wherefore it is requisite for prudence that man should be an apt reasoner. And since the things required for the perfection of prudence are called requisite or quasi-integral parts of prudence, it follows that reason should be numbered among these parts.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason denotes here, not the power of reason, but its good use.

Reply to Objection 2: The certitude of reason comes from the intellect. Yet the need of reason is from a defect in the intellect, since those things in which the intellective power is in full vigor, have no need for reason, for they comprehend the truth by their simple insight, as do God and the angels. On the other hand particular matters of action, wherein prudence guides, are very far from the condition of things intelligible, and so much the farther, as they are less certain and fixed. Thus matters of art, though they are singular, are nevertheless more fixed and certain, wherefore in many of them there is no room for counsel on account of their certitude, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Hence, although in certain other intellectual virtues reason is more certain than in prudence, yet prudence above all requires that man be an apt reasoner, so that he may rightly apply universals to particulars, which latter are various and uncertain.

Reply to Objection 3: Although intelligence and reason are not different powers, yet they are named after different acts. For intelligence takes its name from being an intimate penetration of the truth [*Cf. [2781]SS, Q[8], A[1]], while reason is so called from being inquisitive and discursive. Hence each is accounted a part of reason as explained above [2782](A[2]; Q[47], A[2] ,3).

Whether foresight* should be accounted a part of prudence? [*"Providentia," which may be translated either "providence" or "foresight."]

Objection 1: It would seem that foresight should not be accounted a part of prudence. For nothing is part of itself. Now foresight seems to be the same as prudence, because according to Isidore (Etym. x), "a prudent man is one who sees from afar [porro videns]": and this is also the derivation of "providentia [foresight]," according to Boethius (De Consol. v). Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because "seeing," whence we have the word "to foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, the chief act of prudence is to command, while its secondary act is to judge and to take counsel. But none of these seems to be properly implied by foresight. Therefore foresight is not part of prudence.

On the contrary stands the authority of Tully and Macrobius, who number foresight among the parts of prudence, as stated above ([2783]Q[48]).

I answer that, As stated above ([2784]Q[47], A[1], ad 2, AA[6],13), prudence is properly about the means to an end, and its proper work is to set them in due order to the end. And although certain things are necessary for an end, which are subject to divine providence, yet nothing is subject to human providence except the contingent matters of actions which can be done by man for an end. Now the past has become a kind of necessity, since what has been done cannot be undone. In like manner, the present as such, has a kind of necessity, since it is necessary that Socrates sit, so long as he sits.

Consequently, future contingents, in so far as they can be directed by man to the end of human life, are the matter of prudence: and each of these things is implied in the word foresight, for it implies the notion of something distant, to which that which occurs in the present has to be directed. Therefore foresight is part of prudence.

Reply to Objection 1: Whenever many things are requisite for a unity, one of them must needs be the principal to which all the others are subordinate. Hence in every whole one part must be formal and predominant, whence the whole has unity. Accordingly foresight is the principal of all the parts of prudence, since whatever else is required for prudence, is necessary precisely that some particular thing may be rightly directed to its end. Hence it is that the very name of prudence is taken from foresight [providentia] as from its principal part.

Reply to Objection 2: Speculation is about universal and necessary things, which, in themselves, are not distant, since they are everywhere and always, though they are distant from us, in so far as we fail to know them. Hence foresight does not apply properly to speculative, but only to practical matters.

Reply to Objection 3: Right order to an end which is included in the notion of foresight, contains rectitude of counsel, judgment and command, without which no right order to the end is possible.

Whether circumspection can be a part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that circumspection cannot be a part of prudence. For circumspection seems to signify looking at one’s surroundings. But these are of infinite number, and cannot be considered by the reason wherein is prudence. Therefore circumspection should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, circumstances seem to be the concern of moral virtues rather than of prudence. But circumspection seems to denote nothing but attention to circumstances. Therefore circumspection apparently belongs to the moral virtues rather than to prudence.

Objection 3: Further, whoever can see things afar off can much more see things that are near. Now foresight enables a man to look on distant things. Therefore there is no need to account circumspection a part of prudence in addition to foresight.

On the contrary stands the authority of Macrobius, quoted above ([2785]Q[48]).

I answer that, As stated above [2786](A[6]), it belongs to prudence chiefly to direct something aright to an end; and this is not done aright unless both the end be good, and the means good and suitable.

Since, however, prudence, as stated above ([2787]Q[47], A[3]) is about singular matters of action, which contain many combinations of circumstances, it happens that a thing is good in itself and suitable to the end, and nevertheless becomes evil or unsuitable to the end, by reason of some combination of circumstances. Thus to show signs of love to someone seems, considered in itself, to be a fitting way to arouse love in his heart, yet if pride or suspicion of flattery arise in his heart, it will no longer be a means suitable to the end. Hence the need of circumspection in prudence, viz. of comparing the means with the circumstances.

Reply to Objection 1: Though the number of possible circumstances be infinite, the number of actual circumstances is not; and the judgment of reason in matters of action is influenced by things which are few in number

Reply to Objection 2: Circumstances are the concern of prudence, because prudence has to fix them; on the other hand they are the concern of moral virtues, in so far as moral virtues are perfected by the fixing of circumstances.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as it belongs to foresight to look on that which is by its nature suitable to an end, so it belongs to circumspection to consider whether it be suitable to the end in view of the circumstances. Now each of these presents a difficulty of its own, and therefore each is reckoned a distinct part of prudence.

Whether caution should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that caution should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For when no evil is possible, no caution is required. Now no man makes evil use of virtue, as Augustine declares (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore caution does not belong to prudence which directs the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, to foresee good and to avoid evil belong to the same faculty, just as the same art gives health and cures ill-health. Now it belongs to foresight to foresee good, and consequently, also to avoid evil. Therefore caution should not be accounted a part of prudence, distinct from foresight.

Objection 3: Further, no prudent man strives for the impossible. But no man can take precautions against all possible evils. Therefore caution does not belong to prudence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:15): “See how you walk cautiously [Douay: ‘circumspectly’].”

I answer that, The things with which prudence is concerned, are contingent matters of action, wherein, even as false is found with true, so is evil mingled with good, on account of the great variety of these matters of action, wherein good is often hindered by evil, and evil has the appearance of good. Wherefore prudence needs caution, so that we may have such a grasp of good as to avoid evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Caution is required in moral acts, that we may be on our guard, not against acts of virtue, but against the hindrance of acts of virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the same in idea, to ensue good and to avoid the opposite evil, but the avoidance of outward hindrances is different in idea. Hence caution differs from foresight, although they both belong to the one virtue of prudence.

Reply to Objection 3: Of the evils which man has to avoid, some are of frequent occurrence; the like can be grasped by reason, and against them caution is directed, either that they may be avoided altogether, or that they may do less harm. Others there are that occur rarely and by chance, and these, since they are infinite in number, cannot be grasped by reason, nor is man able to take precautions against them, although by exercising prudence he is able to prepare against all the surprises of chance, so as to suffer less harm thereby.

OF THE SUBJECTIVE PARTS OF PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must, in due sequence, consider the subjective parts of prudence. And since we have already spoken of the prudence with which a man rules himself (Q[47], seqq.), it remains for us to discuss the species of prudence whereby a multitude is governed. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a species of prudence is regnative?

(2) Whether political and (3) domestic economy are species of prudence?

(4) Whether military prudence is?

Whether a species of prudence is regnative?

Objection 1: It would seem that regnative should not be reckoned a species of prudence. For regnative prudence is directed to the preservation of justice, since according to Ethic. v, 6 the prince is the guardian of justice. Therefore regnative prudence belongs to justice rather than to prudence.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Polit. iii, 5) a kingdom [regnum] is one of six species of government. But no species of prudence is ascribed to the other five forms of government, which are “aristocracy,” “polity,” also called “timocracy” [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 10], “tyranny,” “oligarchy” and “democracy.” Therefore neither should a regnative species be ascribed to a kingdom.

Objection 3: Further, lawgiving belongs not only to kings, but also to certain others placed in authority, and even to the people, according to Isidore (Etym. v). Now the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 8) reckons a part of prudence to be “legislative.” Therefore it is not becoming to substitute regnative prudence in its place.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 11) that “prudence is a virtue which is proper to the prince.” Therefore a special kind of prudence is regnative.

I answer that, As stated above ([2788]Q[47], AA[8],10), it belongs to prudence to govern and command, so that wherever in human acts we find a special kind of governance and command, there must be a special kind of prudence. Now it is evident that there is a special and perfect kind of governance in one who has to govern not only himself but also the perfect community of a city or kingdom; because a government is the more perfect according as it is more universal, extends to more matters, and attains a higher end. Hence prudence in its special and most perfect sense, belongs to a king who is charged with the government of a city or kingdom: for which reason a species of prudence is reckoned to be regnative.

Reply to Objection 1: All matters connected with moral virtue belong to prudence as their guide, wherefore "right reason in accord with prudence" is included in the definition of moral virtue, as stated above (Q[47], A[5], ad 1; [2789]FS, Q[58], A[2], ad 4). For this reason also the execution of justice in so far as it is directed to the common good, which is part of the kingly office, needs the guidance of prudence. Hence these two virtues—prudence and justice—belong most properly to a king, according to Jer. 23:5: "A king shall reign and shall be wise, and shall execute justice and judgment in the earth." Since, however, direction belongs rather to the king, and execution to his subjects, regnative prudence is reckoned a species of prudence which is directive, rather than to justice which is executive.

Reply to Objection 2: A kingdom is the best of all governments, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10: wherefore the species of prudence should be denominated rather from a kingdom, yet so as to comprehend under regnative all other rightful forms of government, but not perverse forms which are opposed to virtue, and which, accordingly, do not pertain to prudence.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher names regnative prudence after the principal act of a king which is to make laws, and although this applies to the other forms of government, this is only in so far as they have a share of kingly government.

Whether political prudence is fittingly accounted a part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as stated above [2790](A[1]). But a part should not be reckoned a species with the whole. Therefore political prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, the species of habits are distinguished by their various objects. Now what the ruler has to command is the same as what the subject has to execute. Therefore political prudence as regards the subjects, should not be reckoned a species of prudence distinct from regnative prudence.

Objection 3: Further, each subject is an individual person. Now each individual person can direct himself sufficiently by prudence commonly so called. Therefore there is no need of a special kind of prudence called political.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8) that “of the prudence which is concerned with the state one kind is a master-prudence and is called legislative; another kind bears the common name political, and deals with individuals.”

I answer that, A slave is moved by his master, and a subject by his ruler, by command, but otherwise than as irrational and inanimate beings are set in motion by their movers. For irrational and inanimate beings are moved only by others and do not put themselves in motion, since they have no free-will whereby to be masters of their own actions, wherefore the rectitude of their government is not in their power but in the power of their movers. On the other hand, men who are slaves or subjects in any sense, are moved by the commands of others in such a way that they move themselves by their free-will; wherefore some kind of rectitude of government is required in them, so that they may direct themselves in obeying their superiors; and to this belongs that species of prudence which is called political.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, regnative is the most perfect species of prudence, wherefore the prudence of subjects, which falls short of regnative prudence, retains the common name of political prudence, even as in logic a convertible term which does not denote the essence of a thing retains the name of “proper.”

Reply to Objection 2: A different aspect of the object diversifies the species of a habit, as stated above ([2791]Q[47], A[5]). Now the same actions are considered by the king, but under a more general aspect, as by his subjects who obey: since many obey one king in various departments. Hence regnative prudence is compared to this political prudence of which we are speaking, as mastercraft to handicraft.

Reply to Objection 3: Man directs himself by prudence commonly so called, in relation to his own good, but by political prudence, of which we speak, he directs himself in relation to the common good.

Whether a part of prudence should be reckoned to be domestic?

Objection 1: It would seem that domestic should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) “prudence is directed to a good life in general”: whereas domestic prudence is directed to a particular end, viz. wealth, according to Ethic. i, 1. Therefore a species of prudence is not domestic.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([2792]Q[47], A[13]) prudence is only in good people. But domestic prudence may be also in wicked people, since many sinners are provident in governing their household. Therefore domestic prudence should not be reckoned a species of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, just as in a kingdom there is a ruler and subject, so also is there in a household. If therefore domestic like political is a species of prudence, there should be a paternal corresponding to regnative prudence. Now there is no such prudence. Therefore neither should domestic prudence be accounted a species of prudence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 8) that there are various kinds of prudence in the government of a multitude, “one of which is domestic, another legislative, and another political.”

I answer that, Different aspects of an object, in respect of universality and particularity, or of totality and partiality, diversify arts and virtues; and in respect of such diversity one act of virtue is principal as compared with another. Now it is evident that a household is a mean between the individual and the city or kingdom, since just as the individual is part of the household, so is the household part of the city or kingdom. And therefore, just as prudence commonly so called which governs the individual, is distinct from political prudence, so must domestic prudence be distinct from both.

Reply to Objection 1: Riches are compared to domestic prudence, not as its last end, but as its instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 3. On the other hand, the end of political prudence is “a good life in general” as regards the conduct of the household. In Ethic. i, 1 the Philosopher speaks of riches as the end of political prudence, by way of example and in accordance with the opinion of many.

Reply to Objection 2: Some sinners may be provident in certain matters of detail concerning the disposition of their household, but not in regard to “a good life in general” as regards the conduct of the household, for which above all a virtuous life is required.

Reply to Objection 3: The father has in his household an authority like that of a king, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10, but he has not the full power of a king, wherefore paternal government is not reckoned a distinct species of prudence, like regnative prudence.

Whether military prudence should be reckoned a part of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that military prudence should not be reckoned a part of prudence. For prudence is distinct from art, according to Ethic. vi, 3. Now military prudence seems to be the art of warfare, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8). Therefore military prudence should not be accounted a species of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, just as military business is contained under political affairs, so too are many other matters, such as those of tradesmen, craftsmen, and so forth. But there are no species of prudence corresponding to other affairs in the state. Neither therefore should any be assigned to military business.

Objection 3: Further, the soldiers’ bravery counts for a great deal in warfare. Therefore military prudence pertains to fortitude rather than to prudence.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 24:6): “War is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where there are many counsels.” Now it belongs to prudence to take counsel. Therefore there is great need in warfare for that species of prudence which is called “military.”

I answer that, Whatever things are done according to art or reason, should be made to conform to those which are in accordance with nature, and are established by the Divine Reason. Now nature has a twofold tendency: first, to govern each thing in itself, secondly, to withstand outward assailants and corruptives: and for this reason she has provided animals not only with the concupiscible faculty, whereby they are moved to that which is conducive to their well-being, but also with the irascible power, whereby the animal withstands an assailant. Therefore in those things also which are in accordance with reason, there should be not only “political” prudence, which disposes in a suitable manner such things as belong to the common good, but also a “military” prudence, whereby hostile attacks are repelled.

Reply to Objection 1: Military prudence may be an art, in so far as it has certain rules for the right use of certain external things, such as arms and horses, but in so far as it is directed to the common good, it belongs rather to prudence.

Reply to Objection 2: Other matters in the state are directed to the profit of individuals, whereas the business of soldiering is directed to the service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, protection of the entire common good.

Reply to Objection 3: The execution of military service belongs to fortitude, but the direction, especially in so far as it concerns the commander-in-chief, belongs to prudence.

OF THE VIRTUES WHICH ARE CONNECTED WITH PRUDENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

In due sequence, we must consider the virtues that are connected with prudence, and which are its quasi-potential parts. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether {euboulia}, is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

(3) Whether {synesis} is a special virtue?

(4) Whether {gnome} is a special virtue?

[*These three Greek words may be rendered as the faculties of deliberating well {euboulia}, of judging well according to common law {synesis}, and of judging well according to general law {gnome}, respectively.]

Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue. For, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19) “no man makes evil use of virtue.” Now some make evil use of {euboulia} (deliberating well) or good counsel, either through devising crafty counsels in order to achieve evil ends, or through committing sin in order that they may achieve good ends, as those who rob that they may give alms. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, virtue is a perfection, according to Phys. vii. But {euboulia} (deliberating well) is concerned with counsel, which implies doubt and research, and these are marks of imperfection. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above ([2793]FS, Q[65]). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not connected with the other virtues, since many sinners take good-counsel, and many godly men are slow in taking counsel. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a virtue.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9) {euboulia} (deliberating well) "is a right counselling." Now the perfection of virtue consists in right reason. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([2794]Q[47], A[4]) the nature of a human virtue consists in making a human act good. Now among the acts of man, it is proper to him to take counsel, since this denotes a research of the reason about the actions he has to perform and whereof human life consists, for the speculative life is above man, as stated in Ethic. x. But {euboulia} (deliberating well) signifies goodness of counsel, for it is derived from the {eu}, good, and {boule}, counsel, being "a good counsel" or rather "a disposition to take good counsel." Hence it is evident that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a human virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no good counsel either in deliberating for an evil end, or in discovering evil means for attaining a good end, even as in speculative matters, there is no good reasoning either in coming to a false conclusion, or in coming to a true conclusion from false premisses through employing an unsuitable middle term. Hence both the aforesaid processes are contrary to {euboulia} (deliberating well), as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9).

Reply to Objection 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which counsel is one, but also as regards the passions of the sensitive appetite, which are still more imperfect.

It may also be replied that human virtue is a perfection according to the mode of man, who is unable by simple insight to comprehend with certainty the truth of things, especially in matters of action which are contingent.

Reply to Objection 3: In no sinner as such is {euboulia} (deliberating well) to be found: since all sin is contrary to taking good counsel. For good counsel requires not only the discovery or devising of fit means for the end, but also other circumstances. Such are suitable time, so that one be neither too slow nor too quick in taking counsel, and the mode of taking counsel, so that one be firm in the counsel taken, and other like due circumstances, which sinners fail to observe when they sin. On the other hand, every virtuous man takes good counsel in those things which are directed to the end of virtue, although perhaps he does not take good counsel in other particular matters, for instance in matters of trade, or warfare, or the like.

Whether {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a special virtue, distinct from prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), the “prudent man is, seemingly, one who takes good counsel.” Now this belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well) as stated above. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not distinct from prudence.

Objection 2: Further, human acts to which human virtues are directed, are specified chiefly by their end, as stated above ([2795]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [2796]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6). Now {euboulia} (deliberating well) and prudence are directed to the same end, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9, not indeed to some particular end, but to the common end of all life. Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

Objection 3: Further, in speculative sciences, research and decision belong to the same science. Therefore in like manner these belong to the same virtue in practical matters. Now research belongs to {euboulia} (deliberating well), while decision belongs to prudence. There {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence.

On the contrary, Prudence is preceptive, according to Ethic. vi, 10. But this does not apply to {euboulia} (deliberating well). Therefore {euboulia} (deliberating well) is a distinct virtue from prudence.

I answer that, As stated above [2797](A[1]), virtue is properly directed to an act which it renders good; and consequently virtues must differ according to different acts, especially when there is a different kind of goodness in the acts. For, if various acts contained the same kind of goodness, they would belong to the same virtue: thus the goodness of love, desire and joy depends on the same, wherefore all these belong to the same virtue of charity.

Now acts of the reason that are ordained to action are diverse, nor have they the same kind of goodness: since it is owing to different causes that a man acquires good counsel, good judgment, or good command, inasmuch as these are sometimes separated from one another. Consequently {euboulia} (deliberating well) which makes man take good counsel must needs be a distinct virtue from prudence, which makes man command well. And since counsel is directed to command as to that which is principal, so {euboulia} (deliberating well) is directed to prudence as to a principal virtue, without which it would be no virtue at all, even as neither are the moral virtues without prudence, nor the other virtues without charity.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to prudence to take good counsel by commanding it, to {euboulia} (deliberating well) by eliciting it.

Reply to Objection 2: Different acts are directed in different degrees to the one end which is “a good life in general” [*Ethic. vi, 5]: for counsel comes first, judgment follows, and command comes last. The last named has an immediate relation to the last end: whereas the other two acts are related thereto remotely. Nevertheless these have certain proximate ends of their own, the end of counsel being the discovery of what has to be done, and the end of judgment, certainty. Hence this proves not that {euboulia} (deliberating well) is not a distinct virtue from prudence, but that it is subordinate thereto, as a secondary to a principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Even in speculative matters the rational science of dialectics, which is directed to research and discovery, is distinct from demonstrative science, which decides the truth.

Whether {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that {synesis} is not a virtue. Virtues are not in us by nature, according to Ethic. ii, 1. But {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is natural to some, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 11). Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, as stated in the same book (10), {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is nothing but “a faculty of judging.” But judgment without command can be even in the wicked. Since then virtue is only in the good, it seems that {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, there is never a defective command, unless there be a defective judgment, at least in a particular matter of action; for it is in this that every wicked man errs. If therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) be reckoned a virtue directed to good judgment, it seems that there is no need for any other virtue directed to good command: and consequently prudence would be superfluous, which is not reasonable. Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Judgment is more perfect than counsel. But {euboulia}, or good counsel, is a virtue. Much more, therefore, is {synesis} (judging well according to common law) a virtue, as being good judgment.

I answer that, {synesis} (judging well according to common law) signifies a right judgment, not indeed about speculative matters, but about particular practical matters, about which also is prudence. Hence in Greek some, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to common law) are said to be {synetoi}, i.e. “persons of sense,” or {eusynetoi}, i.e. “men of good sense,” just as on the other hand, those who lack this virtue are called {asynetoi}, i.e. “senseless.”

Now, different acts which cannot be ascribed to the same cause, must correspond to different virtues. And it is evident that goodness of counsel and goodness of judgment are not reducible to the same cause, for many can take good counsel, without having good sense so as to judge well. Even so, in speculative matters some are good at research, through their reason being quick at arguing from one thing to another (which seems to be due to a disposition of their power of imagination, which has a facility in forming phantasms), and yet such persons sometimes lack good judgment (and this is due to a defect in the intellect arising chiefly from a defective disposition of the common sense which fails to judge aright). Hence there is need, besides {euboulia} (deliberating well), for another virtue, which judges well, and this is called {synesis} (judging well according to common law).

Reply to Objection 1: Right judgment consists in the cognitive power apprehending a thing just as it is in reality, and this is due to the right disposition of the apprehensive power. Thus if a mirror be well disposed the forms of bodies are reflected in it just as they are, whereas if it be ill disposed, the images therein appear distorted and misshapen. Now that the cognitive power be well disposed to receive things just as they are in reality, is radically due to nature, but, as to its consummation, is due to practice or to a gift of grace, and this in two ways. First directly, on the part of the cognitive power itself, for instance, because it is imbued, not with distorted, but with true and correct ideas: this belongs to {synesis} (judging well according to common law) which in this respect is a special virtue. Secondly indirectly, through the good disposition of the appetitive power, the result being that one judges well of the objects of appetite: and thus a good judgment of virtue results from the habits of moral virtue; but this judgment is about the ends, whereas {synesis} (judging well according to common law) is rather about the means.

Reply to Objection 2: In wicked men there may be right judgment of a universal principle, but their judgment is always corrupt in the particular matter of action, as stated above ([2798]Q[47], A[13]).

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes after judging aright we delay to execute or execute negligently or inordinately. Hence after the virtue which judges aright there is a further need of a final and principal virtue, which commands aright, and this is prudence.

Whether {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is not a special virtue distinct from {synesis} (judging well according to common law). For a man is said, in respect of {synesis} (judging well according to common law), to have good judgment. Now no man can be said to have good judgment, unless he judge aright in all things. Therefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) extends to all matters of judgment, and consequently there is no other virtue of good judgment called {gnome} (judging well according to general law).

Objection 2: Further, judgment is midway between counsel and precept. Now there is only one virtue of good counsel, viz. {euboulia} (deliberating well) and only one virtue of good command, viz. prudence. Therefore there is only one virtue of good judgment, viz. {synesis} (judging well according to common law).

Objection 3: Further, rare occurrences wherein there is need to depart from the common law, seem for the most part to happen by chance, and with such things reason is not concerned, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. Now all the intellectual virtues depend on right reason. Therefore there is no intellectual virtue about such matters.

On the contrary, The Philosopher concludes (Ethic. vi, 11) that {gnome} (judging well according to general law) is a special virtue.

I answer that cognitive habits differ according to higher and lower principles: thus in speculative matters wisdom considers higher principles than science does, and consequently is distinguished from it; and so must it be also in practical matters. Now it is evident that what is beside the order of a lower principle or cause, is sometimes reducible to the order of a higher principle; thus monstrous births of animals are beside the order of the active seminal force, and yet they come under the order of a higher principle, namely, of a heavenly body, or higher still, of Divine Providence. Hence by considering the active seminal force one could not pronounce a sure judgment on such monstrosities, and yet this is possible if we consider Divine Providence.

Now it happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the enemy of one’s country, when it would be wrong to give him back his deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such matters according to higher principles than the common laws, according to which {synesis} (judging according to common law) judges: and corresponding to such higher principles it is necessary to have a higher virtue of judgment, which is called {gnome} (judging according to general law), and which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

Reply to Objection 1: {Synesis} (judging well according to common law) judges rightly about all actions that are covered by the common rules: but certain things have to be judged beside these common rules, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Judgment about a thing should be formed from the proper principles thereof, whereas research is made by employing also common principles. Wherefore also in speculative matters, dialectics which aims at research proceeds from common principles; while demonstration which tends to judgment, proceeds from proper principles. Hence {euboulia} (deliberating well) to which the research of counsel belongs is one for all, but not so {synesis} (judging well according to common law) whose act is judicial. Command considers in all matters the one aspect of good, wherefore prudence also is only one.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to Divine Providence alone to consider all things that may happen beside the common course. On the other hand, among men, he who is most discerning can judge a greater number of such things by his reason: this belongs to {gnome} (judging well according to general law), which denotes a certain discrimination in judgment.

OF THE GIFT OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift of counsel which corresponds to prudence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether counsel should be reckoned among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence?

(3) Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

(4) Whether the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful,” etc. corresponds to the gift of counsel?

Whether counsel should be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Moral. ii, 49). Now for the purpose of taking counsel, man is sufficiently perfected by the virtue of prudence, or even of {euboulia} (deliberating well), as is evident from what has been said ([2799]Q[47], A[1], ad 2;[2800] Q[51], AA[1],2). Therefore counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, the difference between the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost and the gratuitous graces seems to be that the latter are not given to all, but are divided among various people, whereas the gifts of the Holy Ghost are given to all who have the Holy Ghost. But counsel seems to be one of those things which are given by the Holy Ghost specially to certain persons, according to 1 Macc. 2:65: “Behold . . . your brother Simon is a man of counsel.” Therefore counsel should be numbered among the gratuitous graces rather than among the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:14): “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.” But counselling is not consistent with being led by another. Since then the gifts of the Holy Ghost are most befitting the children of God, who “have received the spirit of adoption of sons,” it would seem that counsel should not be numbered among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “(The Spirit of the Lord) shall rest upon him . . . the spirit of counsel, and of fortitude.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2801]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are dispositions whereby the soul is rendered amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now God moves everything according to the mode of the thing moved: thus He moves the corporeal creature through time and place, and the spiritual creature through time, but not through place, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22). Again, it is proper to the rational creature to be moved through the research of reason to perform any particular action, and this research is called counsel. Hence the Holy Ghost is said to move the rational creature by way of counsel, wherefore counsel is reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well), whether acquired or infused, directs man in the research of counsel according to principles that the reason can grasp; hence prudence or {euboulia} (deliberating well) makes man take good counsel either for himself or for another. Since, however, human reason is unable to grasp the singular and contingent things which may occur, the result is that “the thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain” (Wis. 9:14). Hence in the research of counsel, man requires to be directed by God who comprehends all things: and this is done through the gift of counsel, whereby man is directed as though counseled by God, just as, in human affairs, those who are unable to take counsel for themselves, seek counsel from those who are wiser.

Reply to Objection 2: That a man be of such good counsel as to counsel others, may be due to a gratuitous grace; but that a man be counselled by God as to what he ought to do in matters necessary for salvation is common to all holy persons.

Reply to Objection 3: The children of God are moved by the Holy Ghost according to their mode, without prejudice to their free-will which is the "faculty of will and reason" [*Sent. iii, D, 24]. Accordingly the gift of counsel is befitting the children of God in so far as the reason is instructed by the Holy Ghost about what we have to do.

Whether the gift of counsel corresponds to the virtue of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not fittingly correspond to the virtue of prudence. For "the highest point of that which is underneath touches that which is above," as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii), even as a man comes into contact with the angel in respect of his intellect. Now cardinal virtues are inferior to the gifts, as stated above ([2802]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Since, then, counsel is the first and lowest act of prudence, while command is its highest act, and judgment comes between, it seems that the gift corresponding to prudence is not counsel, but rather a gift of judgment or command.

Objection 2: Further, one gift suffices to help one virtue, since the higher a thing is the more one it is, as proved in De Causis. Now prudence is helped by the gift of knowledge, which is not only speculative but also practical, as shown above ([2803]Q[9], A[3]). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs properly to prudence to direct, as stated above (Q[47], A[8]). But it belongs to the gift of counsel that man should be directed by God, as stated above [2804](A[1]). Therefore the gift of counsel does not correspond to the virtue of prudence.

On the contrary, The gift of counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of the end. Now prudence is about the same matter. Therefore they correspond to one another.

I answer that, A lower principle of movement is helped chiefly, and is perfected through being moved by a higher principle of movement, as a body through being moved by a spirit. Now it is evident that the rectitude of human reason is compared to the Divine Reason, as a lower motive principle to a higher: for the Eternal Reason is the supreme rule of all human rectitude. Consequently prudence, which denotes rectitude of reason, is chiefly perfected and helped through being ruled and moved by the Holy Ghost, and this belongs to the gift of counsel, as stated above [2805](A[1]). Therefore the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence, as helping and perfecting it.

Reply to Objection 1: To judge and command belongs not to the thing moved, but to the mover. Wherefore, since in the gifts of the Holy Ghost, the position of the human mind is of one moved rather than of a mover, as stated above [2806](A[1]; [2807]FS, Q[68], A[1]), it follows that it would be unfitting to call the gift corresponding to prudence by the name of command or judgment rather than of counsel whereby it is possible to signify that the counselled mind is moved by another counselling it.

Reply to Objection 2: The gift of knowledge does not directly correspond to prudence, since it deals with speculative matters: yet by a kind of extension it helps it. On the other hand the gift of counsel corresponds to prudence directly, because it is concerned about the same things.

Reply to Objection 3: The mover that is moved, moves through being moved. Hence the human mind, from the very fact that it is directed by the Holy Ghost, is enabled to direct itself and others.

Whether the gift of counsel remains in heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of counsel does not remain in heaven. For counsel is about what has to be done for the sake of an end. But in heaven nothing will have to be done for the sake of an end, since there man possesses the last end. Therefore the gift of counsel is not in heaven.

Objection 2: Further, counsel implies doubt, for it is absurd to take counsel in matters that are evident, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 3). Now all doubt will cease in heaven. Therefore there is no counsel in heaven.

Objection 3: Further, the saints in heaven are most conformed to God, according to 1 Jn. 3:2, “When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him.” But counsel is not becoming to God, according to Rom. 11:34, “Who hath been His counsellor?” Therefore neither to the saints in heaven is the gift of counsel becoming.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xvii, 12): “When either the guilt or the righteousness of each nation is brought into the debate of the heavenly Court, the guardian of that nation is said to have won in the conflict, or not to have won.”

I answer that, As stated above [2808](A[2]; [2809]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected with the motion of the rational creature by God. Now we must observe two points concerning the motion of the human mind by God. First, that the disposition of that which is moved, differs while it is being moved from its disposition when it is in the term of movement. Indeed if the mover is the principle of the movement alone, when the movement ceases, the action of the mover ceases as regards the thing moved, since it has already reached the term of movement, even as a house, after it is built, ceases being built by the builder. On the other hand, when the mover is cause not only of the movement, but also of the form to which the movement tends, then the action of the mover does not cease even after the form has been attained: thus the sun lightens the air even after it is lightened. In this way, then, God causes in us virtue and knowledge, not only when we first acquire them, but also as long as we persevere in them: and it is thus that God causes in the blessed a knowledge of what is to be done, not as though they were ignorant, but by continuing that knowledge in them.

Nevertheless there are things which the blessed, whether angels or men, do not know: such things are not essential to blessedness, but concern the government of things according to Divine Providence. As regards these, we must make a further observation, namely, that God moves the mind of the blessed in one way, and the mind of the wayfarer, in another. For God moves the mind of the wayfarer in matters of action, by soothing the pre-existing anxiety of doubt; whereas there is simple nescience in the mind of the blessed as regards the things they do not know. From this nescience the angel’s mind is cleansed, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), nor does there precede in them any research of doubt, for they simply turn to God;

and this is to take counsel of God, for as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) “the angels take counsel of God about things beneath them”: wherefore the instruction which they receive from God in such matters is called “counsel.”

Accordingly the gift of counsel is in the blessed, in so far as God preserves in them the knowledge that they have, and enlightens them in their nescience of what has to be done.

Reply to Objection 1: Even in the blessed there are acts directed to an end, or resulting, as it were, from their attainment of the end, such as the acts of praising God, or of helping on others to the end which they themselves have attained, for example the ministrations of the angels, and the prayers of the saints. In this respect the gift of counsel finds a place in them.

Reply to Objection 2: Doubt belongs to counsel according to the present state of life, but not to that counsel which takes place in heaven. Even so neither have the theological virtues quite the same acts in heaven as on the way thither.

Reply to Objection 3: Counsel is in God, not as receiving but as giving it: and the saints in heaven are conformed to God, as receivers to the source whence they receive.

Whether the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, corresponds to the gift of counsel?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fifth beatitude, which is that of mercy, does not correspond to the gift of counsel. For all the beatitudes are acts of virtue, as stated above ([2810]FS, Q[69], A[1]). Now we are directed by counsel in all acts of virtue. Therefore the fifth beatitude does not correspond more than any other to counsel.

Objection 2: Further, precepts are given about matters necessary for salvation, while counsel is given about matters which are not necessary for salvation. Now mercy is necessary for salvation, according to James 2:13, “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy.” On the other hand poverty is not necessary for salvation, but belongs to the life of perfection, according to Mat. 19:21. Therefore the beatitude of poverty corresponds to the gift of counsel, rather than to the beatitude of mercy.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits result from the beatitudes, for they denote a certain spiritual delight resulting from perfect acts of virtue. Now none of the fruits correspond to the gift of counsel, as appears from Gal. 5:22, 23. Therefore neither does the beatitude of mercy correspond to the gift of counsel.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. iv): “Counsel is befitting the merciful, because the one remedy is to be delivered from evils so great, to pardon, and to give.”

I answer that, Counsel is properly about things useful for an end. Hence such things as are of most use for an end, should above all correspond to the gift of counsel. Now such is mercy, according to 1 Tim. 4:8, “Godliness [*’Pietas,’ which our English word ‘pity,’ which is the same as mercy; see note on [2811]SS, Q[30], A[1]] is profitable to all things.” Therefore the beatitude of mercy specially corresponds to the gift of counsel, not as eliciting but as directing mercy.

Reply to Objection 1: Although counsel directs in all the acts of virtue, it does so in a special way in works of mercy, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 2: Counsel considered as a gift of the Holy Ghost guides us in all matters that are directed to the end of eternal life whether they be necessary for salvation or not, and yet not every work of mercy is necessary for salvation.

Reply to Objection 3: Fruit denotes something ultimate. Now the ultimate in practical matters consists not in knowledge but in an action which is the end. Hence nothing pertaining to practical knowledge is numbered among the fruits, but only such things as pertain to action, in which practical knowledge is the guide. Among these we find “goodness” and “benignity” which correspond to mercy.

OF IMPRUDENCE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to prudence. For Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3): “There are vices opposed to every virtue, not only vices that are in manifest opposition to virtue, as temerity is opposed to prudence, but also vices which have a kind of kinship and not a true but a spurious likeness to virtue; thus in opposition to prudence we have craftiness.”

Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false resemblance to prudence, those namely which are due to abuse of the things required for prudence. And since solicitude pertains to prudence, the first of these considerations will be twofold: (1) Of imprudence; (2) Of negligence which is opposed to solicitude.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Concerning imprudence, whether it is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) Of precipitation or temerity;

(4) Of thoughtlessness;

(5) Of inconstancy;

(6) Concerning the origin of these vices.

Whether imprudence is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a sin. For every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine [*De Vera Relig. xiv]; whereas imprudence is not voluntary, since no man wishes to be imprudent. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, none but original sin comes to man with his birth. But imprudence comes to man with his birth, wherefore the young are imprudent; and yet it is not original sin which is opposed to original justice. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance. But imprudence is not taken away by repentance. Therefore imprudence is not a sin.

On the contrary, The spiritual treasure of grace is not taken away save by sin. But it is taken away by imprudence, according to Prov. 21:20, “There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just, and the imprudent [Douay: ‘foolish’] man shall spend it.” Therefore imprudence is a sin.

I answer that, Imprudence may be taken in two ways, first, as a privation, secondly, as a contrary. Properly speaking it is not taken as a negation, so as merely to signify the absence of prudence, for this can be without any sin. Taken as a privation, imprudence denotes lack of that prudence which a man can and ought to have, and in this sense imprudence is a sin by reason of a man’s negligence in striving to have prudence.

Imprudence is taken as a contrary, in so far as the movement or act of reason is in opposition to prudence: for instance, whereas the right reason of prudence acts by taking counsel, the imprudent man despises counsel, and the same applies to the other conditions which require consideration in the act of prudence. In this way imprudence is a sin in respect of prudence considered under its proper aspect, since it is not possible for a man to act against prudence, except by infringing the rules on which the right reason of prudence depends. Wherefore, if this should happen through aversion from the Divine Law, it will be a mortal sin, as when a man acts precipitately through contempt and rejection of the Divine teaching: whereas if he act beside the Law and without contempt, and without detriment to things necessary for salvation, it will be a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: No man desires the deformity of imprudence, but the rash man wills the act of imprudence, because he wishes to act precipitately. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that “he who sins willingly against prudence is less to be commended.”

Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes imprudence in the negative sense. It must be observed however that lack of prudence or of any other virtue is included in the lack of original justice which perfected the entire soul. Accordingly all such lack of virtue may be ascribed to original sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Repentance restores infused prudence, and thus the lack of this prudence ceases; but acquired prudence is not restored as to the habit, although the contrary act is taken away, wherein properly speaking the sin of imprudence consists.

Whether imprudence is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that imprudence is not a special sin. For whoever sins, acts against right reason, i.e. against prudence. But imprudence consists in acting against prudence, as stated above [2812](A[1]). Therefore imprudence is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, prudence is more akin to moral action than knowledge is. But ignorance which is opposed to knowledge, is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. Much more therefore should imprudence be reckoned among those causes.

Objection 3: Further, sin consists in the corruption of the circumstances of virtue, wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil results from each single defect." Now many things are requisite for prudence; for instance, reason, intelligence docility, and so on, as stated above (QQ[48],49). Therefore there are many species of imprudence, so that it is not a special sin.

On the contrary, Imprudence is opposed to prudence, as stated above [2813](A[1]). Now prudence is a special virtue. Therefore imprudence too is one special vice.

I answer that, A vice or sin may be styled general in two ways; first, absolutely, because, to wit, it is general in respect of all sins; secondly, because it is general in respect of certain vices, which are its species. In the first way, a vice may be said to be general on two counts: first, essentially, because it is predicated of all sins: and in this way imprudence is not a general sin, as neither is prudence a general virtue: since it is concerned with special acts, namely the very acts of reason: secondly, by participation; and in this way imprudence is a general sin: for, just as all the virtues have a share of prudence, in so far as it directs them, so have all vices and sins a share of imprudence, because no sin can occur, without some defect in an act of the directing reason, which defect belongs to imprudence.

If, on the other hand, a sin be called general, not simply but in some particular genus, that is, as containing several species of sin, then imprudence is a general sin. For it contains various species in three ways. First, by opposition to the various subjective parts of prudence, for just as we distinguish the prudence that guides the individual, from other kinds that govern communities, as stated above ([2814]Q[48]; Q[50], A[7]), so also we distinguish various kinds of imprudence. Secondly, in respect of the quasi-potential parts of prudence, which are virtues connected with it, and correspond to the several acts of reason. Thus, by defect of “counsel” to which {euboulia} (deliberating well) corresponds, “precipitation” or “temerity” is a species of imprudence; by defect of “judgment,” to which {synesis} (judging well according to common law) and {gnome} (judging well according to general law) refer, there is “thoughtlessness”; while “inconstancy” and “negligence” correspond to the “command” which is the proper act of prudence. Thirdly, this may be taken by opposition to those things which are requisite for prudence, which are the quasi-integral parts of prudence. Since however all these things are intended for the direction of the aforesaid three acts of reason, it follows that all the opposite defects are reducible to the four parts mentioned above. Thus incautiousness and incircumspection are included in “thoughtlessness”; lack of docility, memory, or reason is referable to “precipitation”; improvidence, lack of intelligence and of shrewdness, belong to “negligence” and “inconstancy.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers generality by participation.

Reply to Objection 2: Since knowledge is further removed from morality than prudence is, according to their respective proper natures, it follows that ignorance has the nature of mortal sin, not of itself, but on account either of a preceding negligence, or of the consequent result, and for this reason it is reckoned one of the general causes of sin. On the other hand imprudence, by its very nature, denotes a moral vice; and for this reason it can be called a special sin.

Reply to Objection 3: When various circumstances are corrupted for the same motive, the species of sin is not multiplied: thus it is the same species of sin to take what is not one’s own, where one ought not, and when one ought not. If, however, there be various motives, there are various species: for instance, if one man were to take another’s property from where he ought not, so as to wrong a sacred place, this would constitute the species called sacrilege, while if another were to take another’s property when he ought not, merely through the lust of possession, this would be a case of simple avarice. Hence the lack of those things which are requisite for prudence, does not constitute a diversity of species, except in so far as they are directed to different acts of reason, as stated above.

Whether precipitation is a sin included in imprudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that precipitation is not a sin included in imprudence. Imprudence is opposed to the virtue of prudence; whereas precipitation is opposed to the gift of counsel, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. ii, 49) that the gift of "counsel is given as a remedy to precipitation." Therefore precipitation is not a sin contained under imprudence.

Objection 2: Further, precipitation seemingly pertains to rashness. Now rashness implies presumption, which pertains to pride. Therefore precipitation is not a vice contained under imprudence.

Objection 3: Further, precipitation seems to denote inordinate haste. Now sin happens in counselling not only through being over hasty but also through being over slow, so that the opportunity for action passes by, and through corruption of other circumstances, as stated in Ethic. vi, 9. Therefore there is no reason for reckoning precipitation as a sin contained under imprudence, rather than slowness, or something else of the kind pertaining to inordinate counsel.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:19): "The way of the wicked is darksome, they know not where they fall." Now the darksome ways of ungodliness belong to imprudence. Therefore imprudence leads a man to fall or to be precipitate.

I answer that, Precipitation is ascribed metaphorically to acts of the soul, by way of similitude to bodily movement. Now a thing is said to be precipitated as regards bodily movement, when it is brought down from above by the impulse either of its own movement or of another's, and not in orderly fashion by degrees. Now the summit of the soul is the reason, and the base is reached in the action performed by the body; while the steps that intervene by which one ought to descend in orderly fashion are "memory" of the past, "intelligence" of the present, "shrewdness" in considering the future outcome, "reasoning" which compares one thing with another, "docility" in accepting the opinions of others. He that takes counsel descends by these steps in due order, whereas if a man is rushed into action by the impulse of his will or of a passion, without taking these steps, it will be a case of precipitation. Since then inordinate counsel pertains to imprudence, it is evident that the vice of precipitation is contained under imprudence.

Reply to Objection 1: Rectitude of counsel belongs to the gift of counsel and to the virtue of prudence; albeit in different ways, as stated above ([2815]Q[52], A[2]), and consequently precipitation is opposed to both.

Reply to Objection 2: Things are said to be done rashly when they are not directed by reason: and this may happen in two ways; first through the impulse of the will or of a passion, secondly through contempt of the directing rule; and this is what is meant by rashness properly speaking, wherefore it appears to proceed from that root of pride, which refuses to submit to another's ruling. But precipitation refers to both, so that rashness is contained under precipitation, although precipitation refers rather to the first.

Reply to Objection 3: Many things have to be considered in the research of reason; hence the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vi, 9) that "one should be slow in taking counsel." Hence precipitation is more directly opposed to rectitude of counsel than over slowness is, for the latter bears a certain likeness to right counsel.

Whether thoughtlessness is a special sin included in prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that thoughtlessness is not a special sin included in imprudence. For the Divine law does not incite us to any sin, according to Ps. 18:8, "The law of the Lord is unspotted"; and yet it incites us to be thoughtless, according to Mat. 10:19, "Take no thought how or what to speak." Therefore thoughtlessness is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, whoever takes counsel must needs give thought to many things. Now precipitation is due to a defect of counsel and therefore to a defect of thought. Therefore precipitation is contained under thoughtlessness: and consequently thoughtlessness is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. "counsel," "judgment" about what has been counselled, and "command" [*Cf.[2816] Q[47], A[8]]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. Therefore thoughtlessness is not a special sin contained under imprudence.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 4:25): "Let thy eyes look straight on, and let thine eye-lids go before thy steps." Now this pertains to prudence, while the contrary pertains to thoughtlessness. Therefore thoughtlessness is a special sin contained under imprudence.

I answer that, Thought signifies the act of the intellect in considering the truth about. something. Now just as research belongs to the reason, so judgment belongs to the intellect. Wherefore in speculative matters a demonstrative science is said to exercise judgment, in so far as it judges the truth of the results of research by tracing those results back to the first indemonstrable principles. Hence thought pertains chiefly to judgment; and consequently the lack of right judgment belongs to the vice of thoughtlessness, in so far, to wit, as one fails to judge rightly through contempt or neglect of those things on which a right judgment depends. It is therefore evident that thoughtlessness is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did not forbid us to take thought, when we have the opportunity, about what we ought to do or say, but, in the words quoted, He encourages His disciples, so that when they had no opportunity of taking thought, either through lack of knowledge or through a sudden call, they should trust in the guidance of God alone, because “as we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to God,” according to 2 Paral 20:12: else if man, instead of doing what he can, were to be content with awaiting God’s assistance, he would seem to tempt God.

Reply to Objection 2: All thought about those things of which counsel takes cognizance, is directed to the formation of a right judgment, wherefore this thought is perfected in judgment. Consequently thoughtlessness is above all opposed to the rectitude of judgment.

Reply to Objection 3: Thoughtlessness is to be taken here in relation to a determinate matter, namely, that of human action, wherein more things have to be thought about for the purpose of right judgment, than in speculative matters, because actions are about singulars.

Whether inconstancy is a vice contained under prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that inconstancy is not a vice contained under imprudence. For inconstancy consists seemingly in a lack of perseverance in matters of difficulty. But perseverance in difficult matters belongs to fortitude. Therefore inconstancy is opposed to fortitude rather than to prudence.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (James 3:16): “Where jealousy [Douay: ‘envy’] and contention are, there are inconstancy and every evil work.” But jealousy pertains to envy. Therefore inconstancy pertains not to imprudence but to envy.

Objection 3: Further, a man would seem to be inconstant who fails to persevere in what he has proposed to do. Now this is a mark of “incontinency” in pleasurable matters, and of “effeminacy” or “squeamishness” in unpleasant matters, according to Ethic. vii, 1. Therefore inconstancy does not pertain to imprudence.

On the contrary, It belongs to prudence to prefer the greater good to the lesser. Therefore to forsake the greater good belongs to imprudence. Now this is inconstancy. Therefore inconstancy belongs to imprudence.

I answer that, Inconstancy denotes withdrawal from a definite good purpose. Now the origin of this withdrawal is in the appetite, for a man does not withdraw from a previous good purpose, except on account of something being inordinately pleasing to him: nor is this withdrawal completed except through a defect of reason, which is deceived in rejecting what before it had rightly accepted. And since it can resist the impulse of the passions, if it fail to do this, it is due to its own weakness in not standing to the good purpose it has conceived; hence inconstancy, as to its completion, is due to a defect in the reason. Now just as all rectitude of the practical reason belongs in some degree to prudence, so all lack of that rectitude belongs to imprudence. Consequently inconstancy, as to its completion, belongs to imprudence. And just as precipitation is due to a defect in the act of counsel, and thoughtlessness to a defect in the act of judgment, so inconstancy arises from a defect in the act of command. For a man is stated to be inconstant because his reason fails in commanding what has been counselled and judged.

Reply to Objection 1: The good of prudence is shared by all the moral virtues, and accordingly perseverance in good belongs to all moral virtues, chiefly, however, to fortitude, which suffers a greater impulse to the contrary.

Reply to Objection 2: Envy and anger, which are the source of contention, cause inconstancy on the part of the appetite, to which power the origin of inconstancy is due, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Continency and perseverance seem to be not in the appetitive power, but in the reason. For the continent man suffers evil concupiscences, and the persevering man suffers grievous sorrows (which points to a defect in the appetitive power); but reason stands firm, in the continent man, against concupiscence, and in the persevering man, against sorrow. Hence continency and perseverance seem to be species of constancy which pertains to reason; and to this power inconstancy pertains also.

Whether the aforesaid vices arise from lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust. For inconstancy arises from envy, as stated above (A[5], ad 2). But envy is a distinct vice from lust.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (James 1:8): “A double-minded man is inconstant in all his ways.” Now duplicity does not seem to pertain to lust, but rather to deceitfulness, which is a daughter of covetousness, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore the aforesaid vices do not arise from lust.

Objection 3: Further, the aforesaid vices are connected with some defect of reason. Now spiritual vices are more akin to the reason than carnal vices. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise from spiritual vices rather than from carnal vices.

On the contrary, Gregory declares (Moral. xxxi, 45) that the aforesaid vices arise from lust.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 5) “pleasure above all corrupts the estimate of prudence,” and chiefly sexual pleasure which absorbs the mind, and draws it to sensible delight. Now the perfection of prudence and of every intellectual virtue consists in abstraction from sensible objects. Wherefore, since the aforesaid vices involve a defect of prudence and of the practical reason, as stated above ([2817]AA[2],5), it follows that they arise chiefly from lust.

Reply to Objection 1: Envy and anger cause inconstancy by drawing away the reason to something else; whereas lust causes inconstancy by destroying the judgment of reason entirely. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the man who is incontinent through anger listens to reason, yet not perfectly, whereas he who is incontinent through lust does not listen to it at all.”

Reply to Objection 2: Duplicity also is something resulting from lust, just as inconstancy is, if by duplicity we understand fluctuation of the mind from one thing to another. Hence Terence says (Eunuch. act 1, sc. 1) that “love leads to war, and likewise to peace and truce.”

Reply to Objection 3: Carnal vices destroy the judgment of reason so much the more as they lead us away from reason.

OF NEGLIGENCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether negligence is a special sin?

(2) To which virtue is it opposed?

(3) Whether negligence is a mortal sin?

Whether negligence is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special vice.

On the contrary, Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished from those which are committed through contempt.

I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above ([2818]Q[47], A[9]), it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in all sins.

Reply to Objection 3: Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.

Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated above ([2819]Q[35], A[3]). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.

Objection 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.

Objection 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is “precipitation,” nor a defect of judgment, since that is “thoughtlessness,” nor a defect of command, because that is “inconstancy.” Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Eccles. 7:19): “He that feareth God, neglecteth nothing.” But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to prudence.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 20:7): “A babbler and a fool [imprudens] will regard no time.” Now this is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.

I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) “a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]”: and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence.

Reply to Objection 1: Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is “an oppressive sorrow,” i.e. hindering, the mind from action [*Cf. Q[35], A[1]; [2820]FS, Q[35], A[8]].

Reply to Objection 2: Omission regards the external act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.

Reply to Objection 4: The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because according to Prov. 15:27, “by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil.” Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above ([2821]FS, Q[44], A[2]) when we were treating of the passions, that “fear makes us take counsel.”

Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory [*Moral. ix. 34] on Job 9:28, “I feared all my works,” etc. says that “too little love of God aggravates the former,” viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ecclus. 7:34, “For thy negligences purify thyself with a few,” says: “Though the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many sins.” Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:16): “He that neglecteth his own life [Vulg.: ‘way’] shall die.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), negligence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt.

But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.

Reply to Objection 1: Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not only from venial but also from mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: When negligence consists in the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public.

OF VICES OPPOSED TO PRUDENCE BY WAY OF RESEMBLANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider those vices opposed to prudence, which have a resemblance thereto. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether craftiness is a special sin?

(4) Of guile;

(5) Of fraud;

(6) Of solicitude about temporal things;

(7) Of solicitude about the future;

(8) Of the origin of these vices.

Whether prudence of the flesh is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is not a sin. For prudence is more excellent than the other moral virtues, since it governs them all. But no justice or temperance is sinful. Neither therefore is any prudence a sin.

Objection 2: Further, it is not a sin to act prudently for an end which it is lawful to love. But it is lawful to love the flesh, “for no man ever hated his own flesh” (Eph. 5:29). Therefore prudence of the flesh is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, just as man is tempted by the flesh, so too is he tempted by the world and the devil. But no prudence of the world, or of the devil is accounted a sin. Therefore neither should any prudence of the flesh be accounted among sins.

On the contrary, No man is an enemy to God save for wickedness according to Wis. 14:9, “To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike.” Now it is written (Rom. 8:7): “The prudence [Vulg.: ‘wisdom’] of the flesh is an enemy to God.” Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[13]), prudence regards things which are directed to the end of life as a whole. Hence prudence of the flesh signifies properly the prudence of a man who looks upon carnal goods as the last end of his life. Now it is evident that this is a sin, because it involves a disorder in man with respect to his last end, which does not consist in the goods of the body, as stated above ([2822]FS, Q[2], A[5]). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice and temperance include in their very nature that which ranks them among the virtues, viz. equality and the curbing of concupiscence; hence they are never taken in a bad sense. On the other hand prudence is so called from foreseeing [providendo], as stated above ([2823]Q[47], A[1];[2824] Q[49], A[6]), which can extend to evil things also. Therefore, although prudence is taken simply in a good sense, yet, if something be added, it may be taken in a bad sense: and it is thus that prudence of the flesh is said to be a sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The flesh is on account of the soul, as matter is on account of the form, and the instrument on account of the principal agent. Hence the flesh is loved lawfully, if it be directed to the good of the soul as its end. If, however, a man place his last end in a good of the flesh, his love will be inordinate and unlawful, and it is thus that the prudence of the flesh is directed to the love of the flesh.

Reply to Objection 3: The devil tempts us, not through the good of the appetible object, but by way of suggestion. Wherefore, since prudence implies direction to some appetible end, we do not speak of "prudence of the devil," as of a prudence directed to some evil end, which is the aspect under which the world and the flesh tempt us, in so far as worldly or carnal goods are proposed to our appetite. Hence we speak of "carnal" and again of "worldly" prudence, according to Lk. 16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation," etc. The Apostle includes all in the "prudence of the flesh," because we covet the external things of the world on account of the flesh.

We may also reply that since prudence is in a certain sense called "wisdom," as stated above ([2825]Q[47], A[2], ad 1), we may distinguish a threefold prudence corresponding to the three kinds of temptation. Hence it is written (James 3:15) that there is a wisdom which is "earthly, sensual and devilish," as explained above ([2826]Q[45], A[1], ad 1), when we were treating of wisdom.

Whether prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin. For it is a mortal sin to rebel against the Divine law, since this implies contempt of God. Now "the prudence [Douay: 'wisdom'] of the flesh . . . is not subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7). Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin. Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it cannot be subject to the law of God" (Rom. 8:7), and so it seems to be an unpardonable sin, which is proper to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, the greatest evil is opposed to the greatest good, as stated in Ethic. viii, 10. Now prudence of the flesh is opposed to that prudence which is the chief of the moral virtues. Therefore prudence of the flesh is chief among mortal sins, so that it is itself a mortal sin.

On the contrary, That which diminishes a sin has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin. Now the thoughtful quest of things pertaining to the care of the flesh, which seems to pertain to carnal prudence, diminishes sin [*Cf. Prov. 6:30]. Therefore prudence of the flesh has not of itself the nature of a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[47], A[2], ad 1; A[13]), a man is said to be prudent in two ways. First, simply, i.e. in relation to the end of life as a whole. Secondly, relatively, i.e. in relation to some particular end; thus a man is said to be prudent in business or something else of the kind. Accordingly if prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to prudence in its absolute signification, so that a man place the last end of his whole life in the care of the flesh, it is a mortal sin, because he turns away from God by so doing, since he cannot have several last ends, as stated above ([2827]FS, Q[1], A[5]).

If, on the other hand, prudence of the flesh be taken as corresponding to particular prudence, it is a venial sin. For it happens sometimes that a man has an inordinate affection for some pleasure of the flesh, without turning away from God by a mortal sin; in which case he does not place the end of his whole life in carnal pleasure. To apply oneself to obtain this pleasure is a venial sin and pertains to prudence of the flesh. But if a man actually refers the care of the flesh to a good end, as when one is careful about one's food in order to sustain one's body, this is no longer prudence of the flesh, because then one uses the care of the flesh as a means to an end.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of that carnal prudence whereby a man places the end of his whole life in the goods of the flesh, and this is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Prudence of the flesh does not imply a sin against the Holy Ghost. For when it is stated that "it cannot be subject to the law of God," this does not mean that he who has prudence of the flesh, cannot be converted and submit to the law of God, but that carnal prudence itself cannot be subject to God's law, even as neither can injustice be just, nor heat cold, although that which is hot may become cold.

Reply to Objection 3: Every sin is opposed to prudence, just as prudence is shared by every virtue. But it does not follow that every sin opposed to prudence is most grave, but only when it is opposed to prudence in some very grave matter.

Whether craftiness is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that craftiness is not a special sin. For the words of Holy Writ do not induce anyone to sin; and yet they induce us to be crafty, according to Prov. 1:4, "To give craftiness [Douay: 'subtlety'] to little ones." Therefore craftiness is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 13:16): "The crafty [Douay: 'prudent'] man doth all things with counsel." Therefore, he does so either for a good or for an evil end. If for a good end, there is no sin seemingly, and if for an evil end, it would seem to pertain to carnal or worldly prudence. Therefore craftiness is not a special sin distinct from prudence of the flesh.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory expounding the words of Job 12, "The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn," says (Moral. x, 29): "The wisdom of this world is to hide one's thoughts by artifice, to conceal one's meaning by words, to represent error as truth, to make out the truth to be false," and further on he adds: "This prudence is acquired by the young, it is learnt at a price by children." Now the above things seem to belong to craftiness. Therefore craftiness is not distinct from carnal or worldly prudence, and consequently it seems not to be a special sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 4:2): “We renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness, nor adulterating the word of God.” Therefore craftiness is a sin.

I answer that, Prudence is “right reason applied to action,” just as science is “right reason applied to knowledge.” In speculative matters one may sin against rectitude of knowledge in two ways: in one way when the reason is led to a false conclusion that appears to be true; in another way when the reason proceeds from false premises, that appear to be true, either to a true or to a false conclusion. Even so a sin may be against prudence, through having some resemblance thereto, in two ways. First, when the purpose of the reason is directed to an end which is good not in truth but in appearance, and this pertains to prudence of the flesh; secondly, when, in order to obtain a certain end, whether good or evil, a man uses means that are not true but fictitious and counterfeit, and this belongs to the sin of craftiness. This is consequently a sin opposed to prudence, and distinct from prudence of the flesh.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine observes (Contra Julian. iv, 3) just as prudence is sometimes improperly taken in a bad sense, so is craftiness sometimes taken in a good sense, and this on account of their mutual resemblance. Properly speaking, however, craftiness is taken in a bad sense, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. vi, 12.

Reply to Objection 2: Craftiness can take counsel both for a good end and for an evil end: nor should a good end be pursued by means that are false and counterfeit but by such as are true. Hence craftiness is a sin if it be directed to a good end.

Reply to Objection 3: Under “worldly prudence” Gregory included everything that can pertain to false prudence, so that it comprises craftiness also.

Whether guile is a sin pertaining to craftiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that guile is not a sin pertaining to craftiness. For sin, especially mortal, has no place in perfect men. Yet a certain guile is to be found in them, according to 2 Cor. 12:16, “Being crafty I caught you by guile.” Therefore guile is not always a sin.

Objection 2: Further, guile seems to pertain chiefly to the tongue, according to Ps. 5:11, “They dealt deceitfully with their tongues.” Now craftiness like prudence is in the very act of reason. Therefore guile does not pertain to craftiness.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:20): “Guile [Douay: ‘Deceit’] is in the heart of them that think evil things.” But the thought of evil things does not always pertain to craftiness. Therefore guile does not seem to belong to craftiness.

On the contrary, Craftiness aims at lying in wait, according to Eph. 4:14, “By cunning craftiness by which they lie in wait to deceive”: and guile aims at this also. Therefore guile pertains to craftiness.

I answer that, As stated above [2828](A[3]), it belongs to craftiness to adopt ways that are not true but counterfeit and apparently true, in order to attain some end either good or evil. Now the adopting of such ways may be subjected to a twofold consideration; first, as regards the process of thinking them out, and this belongs properly to craftiness, even as thinking out right ways to a due end belongs to prudence. Secondly the adopting of such like ways may be considered with regard to their actual execution, and in this way it belongs to guile. Hence guile denotes a certain execution of craftiness, and accordingly belongs thereto.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as craftiness is taken properly in a bad sense, and improperly in a good sense, so too is guile which is the execution of craftiness.

Reply to Objection 2: The execution of craftiness with the purpose of deceiving, is effected first and foremost by words, which hold the chief place among those signs whereby a man signifies something to another man, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), hence guile is ascribed chiefly to speech. Yet guile may happen also in deeds, according to Ps. 104:25, “And to deal deceitfully with his servants.” Guile is also in the heart, according to Ecclus. 19:23, “His interior is full of deceit,” but this is to devise deceits, according to Ps. 37:13: “They studied deceits all the day long.”

Reply to Objection 3: Whoever purposes to do some evil deed, must needs devise certain ways of attaining his purpose, and for the most part he devises deceitful ways, whereby the more easily to obtain his end. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that evil is done openly and by violence without craftiness and guile; but as this is more difficult, it is of less frequent occurrence.

Whether fraud pertains to craftiness?

Objection 1: It would seem that fraud does not pertain to craftiness. For a man does not deserve praise if he allows himself to be deceived, which is the object of craftiness; and yet a man deserves praise for allowing himself to be defrauded, according to 1 Cor. 6:1, “Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?” Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.

Objection 2: Further, fraud seems to consist in unlawfully taking or receiving external things, for it is written (Acts 5:1) that “a certain man named Ananias with Saphira his wife, sold a piece of land, and by fraud kept back part of the price of the land.” Now it pertains to injustice or illiberality to take possession of or retain external things unjustly. Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness which is opposed to prudence.

Objection 3: Further, no man employs craftiness against himself. But the frauds of some are against themselves, for it is written (Prov. 1:18) concerning some “that they practice frauds [Douay: ‘deceits’] against their own souls.” Therefore fraud does not belong to craftiness.

On the contrary, The object of fraud is to deceive, according to Job 13:9, “Shall he be deceived as a man, with your fraudulent [Douay: ‘deceitful’] dealings?” Now craftiness is directed to the same object. Therefore fraud pertains to craftiness.

I answer that, Just as “guile” consists in the execution of craftiness, so also does “fraud.” But they seem to differ in the fact that “guile” belongs in general to the execution of craftiness, whether this be effected by words, or by deeds, whereas “fraud” belongs more properly to the execution of craftiness by deeds.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle does not counsel the faithful to be deceived in their knowledge, but to bear patiently the effect of being deceived, and to endure wrongs inflicted on them by fraud.

Reply to Objection 2: The execution of craftiness may be carried out by another vice, just as the execution of prudence by the virtues: and accordingly nothing hinders fraud from pertaining to covetousness or illiberality.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who commit frauds, do not design anything against themselves or their own souls; it is through God's just judgment that what they plot against others, recoils on themselves, according to Ps. 7:16, "He is fallen into the hole he made."

Whether it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful to be solicitous about temporal matters. Because a superior should be solicitous for his subjects, according to Rom. 12:8, "He that ruleth, with solicitude." Now according to the Divine ordering, man is placed over temporal things, according to Ps. 8:8, "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet," etc. Therefore man should be solicitous about temporal things.

Objection 2: Further, everyone is solicitous about the end for which he works. Now it is lawful for a man to work for the temporal things whereby he sustains life, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 3:10): "If any man will not work, neither let him eat." Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about temporal things.

Objection 3: Further, solicitude about works of mercy is praiseworthy, according to 2 Tim. 1:17, "When he was come to Rome, he carefully sought me." Now solicitude about temporal things is sometimes connected with works of mercy; for instance, when a man is solicitous to watch over the interests of orphans and poor persons. Therefore solicitude about temporal things is not unlawful.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:31): "Be not solicitous . . . saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary.

I answer that, Solicitude denotes an earnest endeavor to obtain something. Now it is evident that the endeavor is more earnest when there is fear of failure, so that there is less solicitude when success is assured. Accordingly solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful in three ways. First on the part of the object of solicitude; that is, if we seek temporal things as an end. Hence Augustine says (De Operibus Monach. xxvi): "When Our Lord said: 'Be not solicitous,' etc. . . . He intended to forbid them either to make such things their end, or for the sake of these things to do whatever they were commanded to do in preaching the Gospel." Secondly, solicitude about temporal things may be unlawful, through too much earnestness in endeavoring to obtain temporal things, the result being that a man is drawn away from spiritual things which ought to be the chief object of his search, wherefore it is written (Mat. 13:22) that "the care of this world . . . chokes up the word." Thirdly, through over much fear, when, to wit, a man fears to lack necessary things if he do what he ought to do. Now our Lord gives three motives for laying aside this fear. First, on account of the yet greater favors bestowed by God on man, independently of his solicitude, viz. his body and soul (Mat. 6:26); secondly, on account of the care with which God watches over animals and plants without the assistance of man, according to the requirements of their nature; thirdly, because of Divine providence, through ignorance of which the gentiles are solicitous in seeking temporal goods before all others. Consequently He concludes that we should be solicitous most of all about spiritual goods, hoping that temporal goods also may be granted us according to our needs, if we do what we ought to do.

Reply to Objection 1: Temporal goods are subjected to man that he may use them according to his needs, not that he may place his end in them and be over solicitous about them.

Reply to Objection 2: The solicitude of a man who gains his bread by bodily labor is not superfluous but proportionate; hence Jerome says on Mat. 6:31, "Be not solicitous," that "labor is necessary, but solicitude must be banished," namely superfluous solicitude which unsettles the mind.

Reply to Objection 3: In the works of mercy solicitude about temporal things is directed to charity as its end, wherefore it is not unlawful, unless it be superfluous.

Whether we should be solicitous about the future?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should be solicitous about the future. For it is written (Prov. 6:6–8): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways and learn wisdom; which, although she hath no guide, nor master . . . provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest." Now this is to be solicitous about the future. Therefore solicitude about the future is praiseworthy.

Objection 2: Further, solicitude pertains to prudence. But prudence is chiefly about the future, since its principal part is "foresight of future things," as stated above ([2829]Q[49], A[6], ad 1). Therefore it is virtuous to be solicitous about the future.

Objection 3: Further, whoever puts something by that he may keep it for the morrow, is solicitous about the future. Now we read (Jn. 12:6) that Christ had a bag for keeping things in, which Judas carried, and (Acts 4:34–37) that the Apostles kept the price of the land, which had been laid at their feet. Therefore it is lawful to be solicitous about the future.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 6:34): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow"; where "tomorrow" stands for the future, as Jerome says in his commentary on this passage.

I answer that, No work can be virtuous, unless it be vested with its due circumstances, and among these is the due time, according to Eccles. 8:6, "There is a time and opportunity for every business"; which applies not only to external deeds but also to internal solicitude. For every time has its own fitting proper solicitude; thus solicitude about the crops belongs to the summer time, and solicitude about the vintage to the time of autumn. Accordingly if a man were solicitous about the vintage during the summer, he would be needlessly forestalling the solicitude belonging to a future time. Hence Our Lord forbids such like excessive solicitude, saying: "Be . . . not solicitous for tomorrow," wherefore He adds, "for the morrow will be solicitous for itself," that is to say, the morrow will have its own solicitude, which will be burden enough for the soul. This is what He means by adding: "Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof," namely, the burden of solicitude.

Reply to Objection 1: The ant is solicitous at a befitting time, and it is this that is proposed for our example.

Reply to Objection 2: Due foresight of the future belongs to prudence. But it would be an inordinate foresight or solicitude about the future, if a man were to seek temporal things, to which the terms "past" and "future" apply, as ends, or if he were to seek them in excess of the needs of the present life, or if he were to forestall the time for solicitude.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17), “when we see a servant of God taking thought lest he lack these needful things, we must not judge him to be solicitous for the morrow, since even Our Lord deigned for our example to have a purse, and we read in the Acts of the Apostles that they procured the necessary means of livelihood in view of the future on account of a threatened famine. Hence Our Lord does not condemn those who according to human custom, provide themselves with such things, but those who oppose themselves to God for the sake of these things.”

Whether these vices arise from covetousness?

Objection 1: It would seem that these vices do not arise from covetousness. As stated above ([2830]Q[43], A[6]) lust is the chief cause of lack of rectitude in the reason. Now these vices are opposed to right reason, i.e. to prudence. Therefore they arise chiefly from lust; especially since the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “Venus is full of guile and her girdle is many colored” and that “he who is incontinent in desire acts with cunning.”

Objection 2: Further, these vices bear a certain resemblance to prudence, as stated above ([2831]Q[47], A[13]). Now, since prudence is in the reason, the more spiritual vices seem to be more akin thereto, such as pride and vainglory. Therefore the aforesaid vices seem to arise from pride rather than from covetousness.

Objection 3: Further, men make use of stratagems not only in laying hold of other people’s goods, but also in plotting murders, the former of which pertains to covetousness, and the latter to anger. Now the use of stratagems pertains to craftiness, guile, and fraud. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise not only from covetousness, but also from anger.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) states that fraud is a daughter of covetousness.

I answer that, As stated above [2832](A[3]; Q[47], A[13]), carnal prudence and craftiness, as well as guile and fraud, bear a certain resemblance to prudence in some kind of use of the reason. Now among all the moral virtues it is justice wherein the use of right reason appears chiefly, for justice is in the rational appetite. Hence the undue use of reason appears chiefly in the vices opposed to justice, the chief of which is covetousness. Therefore the aforesaid vices arise chiefly from covetousness.

Reply to Objection 1: On account of the vehemence of pleasure and of concupiscence, lust entirely suppresses the reason from exercising its act: whereas in the aforesaid vices there is some use of reason, albeit inordinate. Hence these vices do not arise directly from lust. When the Philosopher says that “Venus is full of guile,” he is referring to a certain resemblance, in so far as she carries man away suddenly, just as he is moved in deceitful actions, yet not by means of craftiness but rather by the vehemence of concupiscence and pleasure; wherefore he adds that “Venus doth cozen the wits of the wisest man” [*Cf. Iliad xiv, 214–217].

Reply to Objection 2: To do anything by stratagem seems to be due to pusillanimity: because a magnanimous man wishes to act openly, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Wherefore, as pride resembles or apes magnanimity, it follows that the aforesaid vices which make use of fraud and guile, do not arise directly from pride, but rather from covetousness, which seeks its own profit and sets little by excellence.

Reply to Objection 3: Anger’s movement is sudden, hence it acts with precipitation, and without counsel, contrary to the use of the aforesaid vices, though these use counsel inordinately. That men use stratagems in plotting murders, arises not from anger but rather from hatred, because the angry man desires to harm manifestly, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2,3) [*Cf. Ethic. vii, 6].

OF THE PRECEPTS RELATING TO PRUDENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts relating to prudence, under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) The precepts of prudence;

(2) The precepts relating to the opposite vices.

Whether the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence. For the chief precepts should include a precept of the chief virtue. Now the chief precepts are those of the decalogue. Since then prudence is the chief of the moral virtues, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.

Objection 2: Further, the teaching of the Gospel contains the Law especially with regard to the precepts of the decalogue. Now the teaching of the Gospel contains a precept of prudence (Mat. 10:16): "Be ye . . . prudent [Douay: 'wise'] as serpents." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included a precept of prudence.

Objection 3: Further, the other lessons of the Old Testament are directed to the precepts of the decalogue: wherefore it is written (Malach. 4:4): "Remember the law of Moses My servant, which I commanded him in Horeb." Now the other lessons of the Old Testament include precepts of prudence; for instance (Prov. 3:5): "Lean not upon thy own prudence"; and further on (Prov. 4:25): "Let thine eyelids go before thy steps." Therefore the Law also should have contained a precept of prudence, especially among the precepts of the decalogue.

The contrary however appears to anyone who goes through the precepts of the decalogue.

I answer that, As stated above ([2833]FS, Q[100], A[3]; A[5], ad 1) when we were treating of precepts, the commandments of the decalogue being given to the whole people, are a matter of common knowledge to all, as coming under the purview of natural reason. Now foremost among the things dictated by natural reason are the ends of human life, which are to the practical order what naturally known principles are to the speculative order, as shown above (Q[47], A[6]). Now prudence is not about the end, but about the means, as stated above (Q[47], A[6]). Hence it was not fitting that the precepts of the decalogue should include a precept relating directly to prudence. And yet all the precepts of the decalogue are related to prudence, in so far as it directs all virtuous acts.

Reply to Objection 1: Although prudence is simply foremost among all the moral virtues, yet justice, more than any other virtue, regards its object under the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, as stated above (Q[44], A[1]; [2834]FS, Q[99], AA[1],5). Hence it behooved the chief precepts of the Law, which are those of the decalogue, to refer to justice rather than to prudence.

Reply to Objection 2: The teaching of the Gospel is the doctrine of perfection. Therefore it needed to instruct man perfectly in all matters relating to right conduct, whether ends or means: wherefore it behooved the Gospel teaching to contain precepts also of prudence.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the rest of the teaching of the Old Testament is directed to the precepts of the decalogue as its end, so it behooved man to be instructed by the subsequent lessons of the Old Testament about the act of prudence which is directed to the means.

Whether the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are fittingly propounded in the Old Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prohibitive precepts relating to the vices opposed to prudence are unfittingly propounded in the Old Law. For such vices as imprudence and its parts which are directly opposed to prudence are not less opposed thereto, than those which bear a certain resemblance to prudence, such as craftiness and vices connected with it. Now the latter vices are forbidden in the Law: for it is written (Lev. 19:13): “Thou shalt not calumniate thy neighbor,” and (Dt. 25:13): “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less.” Therefore there should have also been prohibitive precepts about the vices directly opposed to prudence.

Objection 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud solely in buying and selling.

Objection 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of virtue as for prohibiting the act of a contrary vice. But acts of prudence are not prescribed in the Law. Therefore neither should any contrary vices have been forbidden in the Law.

The contrary, however, appears from the precepts of the Law which are quoted in the first objection.

I answer that, As stated above [2835](A[1]), justice, above all, regards the aspect of something due, which is a necessary condition for a precept, because justice tends to render that which is due to another, as we shall state further on (Q[58], A[2]). Now craftiness, as to its execution, is committed chiefly in matters of justice, as stated above (Q[55], A[8]): and so it was fitting that the Law should contain precepts forbidding the execution of craftiness, in so far as this pertains to injustice, as when a man uses guile and fraud in calumniating another or in stealing his goods.

Reply to Objection 1: Those vices that are manifestly opposed to prudence, do not pertain to injustice in the same way as the execution of craftiness, and so they are not forbidden in the Law, as fraud and guile are, which latter pertain to injustice

Reply to Objection 2: All guile and fraud committed in matters of injustice, can be understood to be forbidden in the prohibition of calumny (Lev. 19:13). Yet fraud and guile are wont to be practiced chiefly in buying and selling, according to Ecclus. 26:28, “A huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips”: and it is for this reason that the Law contained a special precept forbidding fraudulent buying and selling.

Reply to Objection 3: All the precepts of the Law that relate to acts of justice pertain to the execution of prudence, even as the precepts prohibitive of stealing, calumny and fraudulent selling pertain to the execution of craftiness.

OF RIGHT (FOUR ARTICLES)

After considering prudence we must in due sequence consider justice, the consideration of which will be fourfold:

(1) Of justice;

(2) Of its parts;

(3) Of the corresponding gift;

(4) Of the precepts relating to justice.

Four points will have to be considered about justice: (1) Right; (2) Justice itself; (3) Injustice; (4) Judgment.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether right is the object of justice?

(2) Whether right is fittingly divided into natural and positive right?

(3) Whether the right of nations is the same as natural right?

(4) Whether right of dominion and paternal right are distinct species?

Whether right is the object of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that right is not the object of justice. For the jurist Celsus says [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 1] that “right is the art of goodness and equality.” Now art is not the object of justice, but is by itself an intellectual virtue. Therefore right is not the object of justice.

Objection 2: Further, “Law,” according to Isidore (Etym. v, 3), “is a kind of right.” Now law is the object not of justice but of prudence, wherefore the Philosopher [*Ethic. vi, 8] reckons “legislative” as one of the parts of prudence. Therefore right is not the object of justice.

Objection 3: Further, justice, before all, subjects man to God: for Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that “justice is love serving God alone, and consequently governing aright all things subject to man.” Now right [jus] does not pertain to Divine things, but only to human affairs, for Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “‘fas’ is the Divine law, and ‘jus,’ the human law.” Therefore right is not the object of justice.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 2) that “‘jus’ [right] is so called because it is just.” Now the “just” is the object of justice, for the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that “all are agreed in giving the name of justice to the habit which makes men capable of doing just actions.”

I answer that, It is proper to justice, as compared with the other virtues, to direct man in his relations with others: because it denotes a kind of equality, as its very name implies; indeed we are wont to say that things are adjusted when they are made equal, for equality is in reference of one thing to some other. On the other hand the other virtues perfect man in those matters only which befit him in relation to himself. Accordingly that which is right in the works of the other virtues, and to which the intention of the virtue tends as to its proper object, depends on its relation to the agent only, whereas the right in a work of justice, besides its relation to the agent, is set up by its relation to others. Because a man’s work is said to be just when it is related to some other by way of some kind of equality, for instance the payment of the wage due for a service rendered. And so a thing is said to be just, as having the rectitude of justice, when it is the term of an act of justice, without taking into account the way in which it is done by the agent: whereas in the other virtues nothing is declared to be right unless it is done in a certain way by the agent. For this reason justice has its own special proper object over and above the other virtues, and this object is called the just, which is the same as “right.” Hence it is evident that right is the object of justice.

Reply to Objection 1: It is usual for words to be distorted from their original signification so as to mean something else: thus the word “medicine” was first employed to signify a remedy used for curing a sick person, and then it was drawn to signify the art by which this is done. In like manner the word “jus” [right] was first of all used to denote the just thing itself, but afterwards it was transferred to designate the art whereby it is known what is just, and further to denote the place where justice is administered, thus a man is said to appear “in jure” [*In English we speak of a court of law, a barrister at law, etc.], and yet further, we say even that a man, who has the office of exercising justice, administers the jus even if his sentence be unjust.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as there pre-exists in the mind of the craftsman an expression of the things to be made externally by his craft, which expression is called the rule of his craft, so too there pre-exists in the mind an expression of the particular just work which the reason determines, and which is a kind of rule of prudence. If this rule be expressed in writing it is called a “law,” which according to Isidore (Etym. v, 1) is “a written decree”: and so law is not the same as right, but an expression of right.

Reply to Objection 3: Since justice implies equality, and since we cannot offer God an equal return, it follows that we cannot make Him a perfectly just repayment. For this reason the Divine law is not properly called “jus” but “fas,” because, to wit, God is satisfied if we accomplish what we can. Nevertheless justice tends to make man repay God as much as he can, by subjecting his mind to Him entirely.

Whether right is fittingly divided into natural right and positive right?

Objection 1: It would seem that right is not fittingly divided into natural right and positive right. For that which is natural is unchangeable, and is the same for all. Now nothing of the kind is to be found in human affairs, since all the rules of human right fail in certain cases, nor do they obtain force everywhere. Therefore there is no such thing as natural right.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is called “positive” when it proceeds from the human will. But a thing is not just, simply because it proceeds from the human will, else a man’s will could not be unjust. Since then the “just” and the “right” are the same, it seems that there is no positive right.

Objection 3: Further, Divine right is not natural right, since it transcends human nature. In like manner, neither is it positive right, since it is based not on human, but on Divine authority. Therefore right is unfittingly divided into natural and positive.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “political justice is partly natural and partly legal,” i.e. established by law.

I answer that, As stated above [2836](A[1]) the “right” or the “just” is a work that is adjusted to another person according to some kind of equality. Now a thing can be adjusted to a man in two ways: first by its very nature, as when a man gives so much that he may receive equal value in return, and this is called “natural right.” In another way a thing is adjusted or commensurated to another person, by agreement, or by common consent, when, to wit, a man deems himself satisfied, if he receive so much. This can be done in two ways: first by private agreement, as that which is confirmed by an agreement between private individuals; secondly, by public agreement, as when the whole community agrees that something should be deemed as though it were adjusted and commensurated to another person, or when this is decreed by the prince who is placed over the people, and acts in its stead, and this is called “positive right.”

Reply to Objection 1: That which is natural to one whose nature is unchangeable, must needs be such always and everywhere. But man’s nature is changeable, wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes fail. Thus the restitution of a deposit to the depositor is in accordance with natural equality, and if human nature were always right, this would always have to be observed; but since it happens sometimes that man’s will is unrighteous there are cases in which a deposit should not be restored, lest a man of unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited: as when a madman or an enemy of the common weal demands the return of his weapons.

Reply to Objection 2: The human will can, by common agreement, make a thing to be just provided it be not, of itself, contrary to natural justice, and it is in such matters that positive right has its place. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that “in the case of the legal just, it does not matter in the first instance whether it takes one form or another, it only matters when once it is laid down.” If, however, a thing is, of itself, contrary to natural right, the human will cannot make it just, for instance by decreeing that it is lawful to steal or to commit adultery. Hence it is written (Is. 10:1): “Woe to them that make wicked laws.”

Reply to Objection 3: The Divine right is that which is promulgated by God. Such things are partly those that are naturally just, yet their justice is hidden to man, and partly are made just by God’s decree. Hence also Divine right may be divided in respect of these two things, even as human right is. For the Divine law commands certain things because they are good, and forbids others, because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden.

Whether the right of nations is the same as the natural right?

Objection 1: It would seem that the right of nations is the same as the natural right. For all men do not agree save in that which is natural to them. Now all men agree in the right of nations; since the jurist [*Ulpian: Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] “the right of nations is that which is in use among all nations.” Therefore the right of nations is the natural right.

Objection 2: Further, slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally slaves according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2). Now “slavery belongs to the right of nations,” as Isidore states (Etym. v, 4). Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.

Objection 3: Further, right as stated above [2837](A[2]) is divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v, 4) that “right is either natural, or civil, or right of nations,” and consequently the right of nations is distinct from natural right.

I answer that, As stated above [2838](A[2]), the natural right or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as it is considered absolutely: thus a male by its very nature is commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly a thing is naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it, for instance the possession of property. For if a particular piece of land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. ii, 2).

Now it belongs not only to man but also to other animals to apprehend a thing absolutely: wherefore the right which we call natural, is common to us and other animals according to the first kind of commensuration. But the right of nations falls short of natural right in this sense, as the jurist [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i] says because “the latter is common to all animals, while the former is common to men only.” On the other hand to consider a thing by comparing it with what results from it, is proper to reason, wherefore this same is natural to man in respect of natural reason which dictates it. Hence the jurist Gaius says (Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure i, 9): “whatever natural reason decrees among all men, is observed by all equally, and is called the right of nations.” This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wiser man, and to the latter to be helped by the former, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). Wherefore slavery which belongs to the right of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the first.

Reply to Objection 3: Since natural reason dictates matters which are according to the right of nations, as implying a proximate equality, it follows that they need no special institution, for they are instituted by natural reason itself, as stated by the authority quoted above

Whether paternal right and right of dominion should be distinguished as special species?

Objection 1: It would seem that “paternal right” and “right of dominion” should not be distinguished as special species. For it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, as Ambrose states (De Offic. i, 24). Now right is the object of justice, as stated above [2839](A[1]). Therefore right belongs to each one equally; and we ought not to distinguish the rights of fathers and masters as distinct species.

Objection 2: Further, the law is an expression of what is just, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now a law looks to the common good of a city or kingdom, as stated above ([2840]FS, Q[90], A[2]), but not to the private good of an individual or even of one household. Therefore there is no need for a special right of dominion or paternal right, since the master and the father pertain to a household, as stated in Polit. i, 2.

Objection 3: Further, there are many other differences of degrees among men, for instance some are soldiers, some are priests, some are princes. Therefore some special kind of right should be allotted to them.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) distinguishes right of dominion, paternal right and so on as species distinct from civil right.

I answer that, Right or just depends on commensuration with another person. Now "another" has a twofold signification. First, it may denote something that is other simply, as that which is altogether distinct; as, for example, two men neither of whom is subject to the other, and both of whom are subjects of the ruler of the state; and between these according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is the "just" simply. Secondly a thing is said to be other from something else, not simply, but as belonging in some way to that something else: and in this way, as regards human affairs, a son belongs to his father, since he is part of him somewhat, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12, and a slave belongs to his master, because he is his instrument, as stated in Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]. Hence a father is not compared to his son as to another simply, and so between them there is not the just simply, but a kind of just, called "paternal." In like manner neither is there the just simply, between master and servant, but that which is called "dominative." A wife, though she is something belonging to the husband, since she stands related to him as to her own body, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 5:28), is nevertheless more distinct from her husband, than a son from his father, or a slave from his master: for she is received into a kind of social life, that of matrimony, wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) there is more scope for justice between husband and wife than between father and son, or master and slave, because, as husband and wife have an immediate relation to the community of the household, as stated in Polit. i, 2,5, it follows that between them there is “domestic justice” rather than “civic.”

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to justice to render to each one his right, the distinction between individuals being presupposed: for if a man gives himself his due, this is not strictly called “just.” And since what belongs to the son is his father’s, and what belongs to the slave is his master’s, it follows that properly speaking there is not justice of father to son, or of master to slave.

Reply to Objection 2: A son, as such, belongs to his father, and a slave, as such, belongs to his master; yet each, considered as a man, is something having separate existence and distinct from others. Hence in so far as each of them is a man, there is justice towards them in a way: and for this reason too there are certain laws regulating the relations of father to his son, and of a master to his slave; but in so far as each is something belonging to another, the perfect idea of “right” or “just” is wanting to them.

Reply to Objection 3: All other differences between one person and another in a state, have an immediate relation to the community of the state and to its ruler, wherefore there is just towards them in the perfect sense of justice. This “just” however is distinguished according to various offices, hence when we speak of “military,” or “magisterial,” or “priestly” right, it is not as though such rights fell short of the simply right, as when we speak of “paternal” right, or right of “dominion,” but for the reason that something proper is due to each class of person in respect of his particular office.

OF JUSTICE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider justice. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) What is justice?

(2) Whether justice is always towards another?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is in the will as its subject?

(5) Whether it is a general virtue?

(6) Whether, as a general virtue, it is essentially the same as every virtue?

(7) Whether there is a particular justice?

(8) Whether particular justice has a matter of its own?

(9) Whether it is about passions, or about operations only?

(10) Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

(11) Whether the act of justice is to render to everyone his own?

(12) Whether justice is the chief of the moral virtues?

Whether justice is fittingly defined as being the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right?

Objection 1: It would seem that lawyers have unfittingly defined justice as being "the perpetual and constant will to render to each one his right" [*Digest. i, 1; De Just. et Jure 10]. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1), justice is a habit which makes a man "capable of doing what is just, and of being just in action and in intention." Now "will" denotes a power, or also an act. Therefore justice is unfittingly defined as being a will.

Objection 2: Further, rectitude of the will is not the will; else if the will were its own rectitude, it would follow that no will is unrighteous. Yet, according to Anselm (De Veritate xii), justice is rectitude. Therefore justice is not the will.

Objection 3: Further, no will is perpetual save God's. If therefore justice is a perpetual will, in God alone will there be justice.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is perpetual is constant, since it is unchangeable. Therefore it is needless in defining justice, to say that it is both "perpetual" and "constant."

Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the sovereign to give each one his right. Therefore, if justice gives each one his right, it follows that it is in none but the sovereign: which is absurd.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that "justice is love serving God alone." Therefore it does not render to each one his right.

I answer that, The aforesaid definition of justice is fitting if understood aright. For since every virtue is a habit that is the principle of a good act, a virtue must needs be defined by means of the good act bearing on the matter proper to that virtue. Now the proper matter of justice consists of those things that belong to our intercourse with other men, as shall be shown further on [2841](A[2]). Hence the act of justice in relation to its proper matter and object is indicated in the words, “Rendering to each one his right,” since, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “a man is said to be just because he respects the rights [jus] of others.”

Now in order that an act bearing upon any matter whatever be virtuous, it requires to be voluntary, stable, and firm, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that in order for an act to be virtuous it needs first of all to be done “knowingly,” secondly to be done “by choice,” and “for a due end,” thirdly to be done “immovably.” Now the first of these is included in the second, since “what is done through ignorance is involuntary” (Ethic. iii, 1). Hence the definition of justice mentions first the “will,” in order to show that the act of justice must be voluntary; and mention is made afterwards of its “constancy” and “perpetuity” in order to indicate the firmness of the act.

Accordingly, this is a complete definition of justice; save that the act is mentioned instead of the habit, which takes its species from that act, because habit implies relation to act. And if anyone would reduce it to the proper form of a definition, he might say that “justice is a habit whereby a man renders to each one his due by a constant and perpetual will”: and this is about the same definition as that given by the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5) who says that “justice is a habit whereby a man is said to be capable of doing just actions in accordance with his choice.”

Reply to Objection 1: Will here denotes the act, not the power: and it is customary among writers to define habits by their acts: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. xl) that “faith is to believe what one sees not.”

Reply to Objection 2: Justice is the same as rectitude, not essentially but causally; for it is a habit which rectifies the deed and the will.

Reply to Objection 3: The will may be called perpetual in two ways. First on the part of the will’s act which endures for ever, and thus God’s will alone is perpetual. Secondly on the part of the subject, because, to wit, a man wills to do a certain thing always. and this is a necessary condition of justice. For it does not satisfy the conditions of justice that one wish to observe justice in some particular matter for the time being, because one could scarcely find a man willing to act unjustly in every case; and it is requisite that one should have the will to observe justice at all times and in all cases.

Reply to Objection 4: Since "perpetual" does not imply perpetuity of the act of the will, it is not superfluous to add "constant": for while the "perpetual will" denotes the purpose of observing justice always, "constant" signifies a firm perseverance in this purpose.

Reply to Objection 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects render to each one what belongs to him, by way of execution.

Reply to Objection 6: Just as love of God includes love of our neighbor, as stated above ([2842]Q[25], A[1]), so too the service of God includes rendering to each one his due.

Whether justice is always towards one another?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not always towards another. For the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22) that "the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ." Now faith does not concern the dealings of one man with another. Neither therefore does justice.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), "it belongs to justice that man should direct to the service of God his authority over the things that are subject to him." Now the sensitive appetite is subject to man, according to Gn. 4:7, where it is written: "The lust thereof," viz. of sin, "shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore it belongs to justice to have dominion over one's own appetite: so that justice is towards oneself.

Objection 3: Further, the justice of God is eternal. But nothing else is co-eternal with God. Therefore justice is not essentially towards another.

Objection 4: Further, man's dealings with himself need to be rectified no less than his dealings with another. Now man's dealings are rectified by justice, according to Prov. 11:5, "The justice of the upright shall make his way prosperous." Therefore justice is about our dealings not only with others, but also with ourselves.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Officiis i, 7) that "the object of justice is to keep men together in society and mutual intercourse." Now this implies relationship of one man to another. Therefore justice is concerned only about our dealings with others.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[57], A[1]) since justice by its name implies equality, it denotes essentially relation to another, for a thing is equal, not to itself, but to another. And forasmuch as it belongs to justice to rectify human acts, as stated above (Q[57], A[1]; [2843]FS, Q[113], A[1]) this otherness which justice demands must needs be between beings capable of action. Now actions belong to supposits [*Cf. [2844]FP, Q[29], A[2]] and wholes and, properly speaking, not to parts and forms or powers, for we do not say properly that the hand strikes, but a man with his hand, nor that heat makes a thing hot, but fire by heat, although such expressions may be employed metaphorically. Hence, justice properly speaking demands a distinction of supposits, and consequently is only in one man towards another. Nevertheless in one and the same man we may speak metaphorically of his various principles of action such as the reason, the irascible, and the concupiscible, as though they were so many agents: so that metaphorically in one and the same man there is said to be justice in so far as the reason commands the irascible and concupiscible, and these obey reason; and in general in so far as to each part of man is ascribed what is becoming to it. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11) calls this "metaphorical justice."

Reply to Objection 1: The justice which faith works in us, is that whereby the ungodly is justified it consists in the due coordination of the parts of the soul, as stated above ([2845]FS, Q[113], A[1]) where we were treating of the justification of the ungodly. Now this belongs to metaphorical justice, which may be found even in a man who lives all by himself.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: God's justice is from eternity in respect of the eternal will and purpose (and it is chiefly in this that justice consists); although it is not eternal as regards its effect, since nothing is co-eternal with God.

Reply to Objection 4: Man’s dealings with himself are sufficiently rectified by the rectification of the passions by the other moral virtues. But his dealings with others need a special rectification, not only in relation to the agent, but also in relation to the person to whom they are directed. Hence about such dealings there is a special virtue, and this is justice.

Whether justice is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a virtue. For it is written (Lk. 17:10): “When you shall have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do.” Now it is not unprofitable to do a virtuous deed: for Ambrose says (De Officiis ii, 6): “We look to a profit that is estimated not by pecuniary gain but by the acquisition of godliness.” Therefore to do what one ought to do, is not a virtuous deed. And yet it is an act of justice. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, that which is done of necessity, is not meritorious. But to render to a man what belongs to him, as justice requires, is of necessity. Therefore it is not meritorious. Yet it is by virtuous actions that we gain merit. Therefore justice is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is about matters of action. Now those things which are wrought externally are not things concerning behavior but concerning handicraft, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix) [*Didot ed., viii, 8]. Therefore since it belongs to justice to produce externally a deed that is just in itself, it seems that justice is not a moral virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 49) that “the entire structure of good works is built on four virtues,” viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice

I answer that, A human virtue is one “which renders a human act and man himself good” [*Ethic. ii, 6], and this can be applied to justice. For a man’s act is made good through attaining the rule of reason, which is the rule whereby human acts are regulated. Hence, since justice regulates human operations, it is evident that it renders man’s operations good, and, as Tully declares (De Officiis i, 7), good men are so called chiefly from their justice, wherefore, as he says again (De Officiis i, 7) “the luster of virtue appears above all in justice.”

Reply to Objection 1: When a man does what he ought, he brings no gain to the person to whom he does what he ought, but only abstains from doing him a harm. He does however profit himself, in so far as he does what he ought, spontaneously and readily, and this is to act virtuously. Hence it is written (Wis. 8:7) that Divine wisdom “teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men (i.e. virtuous men) can have nothing more profitable in life.”

Reply to Objection 2: Necessity is twofold. One arises from “constraint,” and this removes merit, since it runs counter to the will. The other arises from the obligation of a “command,” or from the necessity of obtaining an end, when, to wit, a man is unable to achieve the end of virtue without doing some particular thing. The latter necessity does not remove merit, when a man does voluntarily that which is necessary in this way. It does however exclude the credit of supererogation, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me, for a necessity lieth upon me.”

Reply to Objection 3: Justice is concerned about external things, not by making them, which pertains to art, but by using them in our dealings with other men.

Whether justice is in the will as its subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not in the will as its subject. For justice is sometimes called truth. But truth is not in the will, but in the intellect. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject.

Objection 2: Further, justice is about our dealings with others. Now it belongs to the reason to direct one thing in relation to another. Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject but in the reason.

Objection 3: Further, justice is not an intellectual virtue, since it is not directed to knowledge; wherefore it follows that it is a moral virtue. Now the subject of moral virtue is the faculty which is “rational by participation,” viz. the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Therefore justice is not in the will as its subject, but in the irascible and concupiscible.

On the contrary, Anselm says (De Verit. xii) that “justice is rectitude of the will observed for its own sake.”

I answer that, The subject of a virtue is the power whose act that virtue aims at rectifying. Now justice does not aim at directing an act of the cognitive power, for we are not said to be just through knowing something aright. Hence the subject of justice is not the intellect or reason which is a cognitive power. But since we are said to be just through doing something aright, and because the proximate principle of action is the appetitive power, justice must needs be in some appetitive power as its subject.

Now the appetite is twofold; namely, the will which is in the reason and the sensitive appetite which follows on sensitive apprehension, and is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible, as stated in the [2846]FP, Q[81], A[2]. Again the act of rendering his due to each man cannot proceed from the sensitive appetite, because sensitive apprehension does not go so far as to be able to consider the relation of one thing to another; but this is proper to the reason. Therefore justice cannot be in the irascible or concupiscible as its subject, but only in the will: hence the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1) defines justice by an act of the will, as may be seen above [2847](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Since the will is the rational appetite, when the rectitude of the reason which is called truth is imprinted on the will on account of its nighness to the reason, this imprint retains the name of truth; and hence it is that justice sometimes goes by the name of truth.

Reply to Objection 2: The will is borne towards its object consequently on the apprehension of reason: wherefore, since the reason directs one thing in relation to another, the will can will one thing in relation to another, and this belongs to justice.

Reply to Objection 3: Not only the irascible and concupiscible parts are “rational by participation,” but the entire “appetitive” faculty, as stated in Ethic. i, 13, because all appetite is subject to reason. Now the will is contained in the appetitive faculty, wherefore it can be the subject of moral virtue.

Whether justice is a general virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is not a general virtue. For justice is specified with the other virtues, according to Wis. 8:7, “She teacheth temperance and prudence, and justice, and fortitude.” Now the “general” is not specified or reckoned together with the species contained under the same “general.” Therefore justice is not a general virtue.

Objection 2: Further, as justice is accounted a cardinal virtue, so are temperance and fortitude. Now neither temperance nor fortitude is reckoned to be a general virtue. Therefore neither should justice in any way be reckoned a general virtue.

Objection 3: Further, justice is always towards others, as stated above (A[2]). But a sin committed against one’s neighbor cannot be a general sin, because it is condivided with sin committed against oneself. Therefore neither is justice a general virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “justice is every virtue.”

I answer that, Justice, as stated above [2848](A[2]) directs man in his relations with other men. Now this may happen in two ways: first as regards his relation with individuals, secondly as regards his relations with others in general, in so far as a man who serves a community, serves all those who are included in that community. Accordingly justice in its proper acceptation can be directed to another in both these senses. Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in relation to certain other individual persons, is referable to the common good, to which justice directs: so that all acts of virtue can pertain to justice, in so far as it directs man to the common good. It is in this sense that justice is called a general virtue. And since it belongs to the law to direct to the common good, as stated above ([2849]FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows that the justice which is in this way styled general, is called “legal justice,” because thereby man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on ([2850]AA[7],12).

Reply to Objection 2: Temperance and fortitude are in the sensitive appetite, viz. in the concupiscible and irascible. Now these powers are appetitive of certain particular goods, even as the senses are cognitive of particulars. On the other hand justice is in the intellective appetite as its subject, which can have the universal good as its object, knowledge whereof belongs to the intellect. Hence justice can be a general virtue rather than temperance or fortitude.

Reply to Objection 3: Things referable to oneself are referable to another, especially in regard to the common good. Wherefore legal justice, in so far as it directs to the common good, may be called a general virtue: and in like manner injustice may be called a general sin; hence it is written (1 Jn. 3:4) that all "sin is iniquity."

Whether justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice, as a general virtue, is essentially the same as all virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "virtue and legal justice are the same as all virtue, but differ in their mode of being." Now things that differ merely in their mode of being or logically do not differ essentially. Therefore justice is essentially the same as every virtue.

Objection 2: Further, every virtue that is not essentially the same as all virtue is a part of virtue. Now the aforesaid justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v. 1) "is not a part but the whole of virtue." Therefore the aforesaid justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the essence of a virtue does not change through that virtue directing its act to some higher end even as the habit of temperance remains essentially the same even though its act be directed to a Divine good. Now it belongs to legal justice that the acts of all the virtues are directed to a higher end, namely the common good of the multitude, which transcends the good of one single individual. Therefore it seems that legal justice is essentially all virtue.

Objection 4: Further, every good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole, so that if it be not thus directed it would seem without use or purpose. But that which is in accordance with virtue cannot be so. Therefore it seems that there can be no act of any virtue, that does not belong to general justice, which directs to the common good; and so it seems that general justice is essentially the same as all virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that “many are able to be virtuous in matters affecting themselves, but are unable to be virtuous in matters relating to others,” and (Polit. iii, 2) that “the virtue of the good man is not strictly the same as the virtue of the good citizen.” Now the virtue of a good citizen is general justice, whereby a man Is directed to the common good. Therefore general justice is not the same as virtue in general, and it is possible to have one without the other.

I answer that, A thing is said to be “general” in two ways. First, by “predication”: thus “animal” is general in relation to man and horse and the like: and in this sense that which is general must needs be essentially the same as the things in relation to which it is general, for the reason that the genus belongs to the essence of the species, and forms part of its definition. Secondly a thing is said to be general “virtually”; thus a universal cause is general in relation to all its effects, the sun, for instance, in relation to all bodies that are illumined, or transmuted by its power; and in this sense there is no need for that which is “general” to be essentially the same as those things in relation to which it is general, since cause and effect are not essentially the same. Now it is in the latter sense that, according to what has been said [2851](A[5]), legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in as much, to wit, as it directs the acts of the other virtues to its own end, and this is to move all the other virtues by its command; for just as charity may be called a general virtue in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, so too is legal justice, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good. Accordingly, just as charity which regards the Divine good as its proper object, is a special virtue in respect of its essence, so too legal justice is a special virtue in respect of its essence, in so far as it regards the common good as its proper object. And thus it is in the sovereign principally and by way of a mastercraft, while it is secondarily and administratively in his subjects.

However the name of legal justice can be given to every virtue, in so far as every virtue is directed to the common good by the aforesaid legal justice, which though special essentially is nevertheless virtually general. Speaking in this way, legal justice is essentially the same as all virtue, but differs therefrom logically: and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks.

Wherefore the Replies to the First and Second Objections are manifest.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument again takes legal justice for the virtue commanded by legal justice.

Reply to Objection 4: Every virtue strictly speaking directs its act to that virtue's proper end: that it should happen to be directed to a further end either always or sometimes, does not belong to that virtue considered strictly, for it needs some higher virtue to direct it to that end. Consequently there must be one supreme virtue essentially distinct from every other virtue, which directs all the virtues to the common good; and this virtue is legal justice.

Whether there is a particular besides a general justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a particular besides a general justice. For there is nothing superfluous in the virtues, as neither is there in nature. Now general justice directs man sufficiently in all his relations with other men. Therefore there is no need for a particular justice.

Objection 2: Further, the species of a virtue does not vary according to "one" and "many." But legal justice directs one man to another in matters relating to the multitude, as shown above ([2852]AA[5],6). Therefore there is not another species of justice directing one man to another in matters relating to the individual.

Objection 3: Further, between the individual and the general public stands the household community. Consequently, if in addition to general justice there is a particular justice corresponding to the individual, for the same reason there should be a domestic justice directing man to the common good of a household: and yet this is not the case. Therefore neither should there be a particular besides a legal justice.

On the contrary, Chrysostom in his commentary on Mat. 5:6, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," says (Hom. xv in Matth.): "By justice He signifies either the general virtue, or the particular virtue which is opposed to covetousness."

I answer that, As stated above [2853](A[6]), legal justice is not essentially the same as every virtue, and besides legal justice which directs man immediately to the common good, there is a need for other virtues to direct him immediately in matters relating to particular goods: and these virtues may be relative to himself or to another individual person. Accordingly, just as in addition to legal justice there is a need for particular virtues to direct man in relation to himself, such as temperance and fortitude, so too besides legal justice there is need for particular justice to direct man in his relations to other individuals.

Reply to Objection 1: Legal justice does indeed direct man sufficiently in his relations towards others. As regards the common good it does so immediately, but as to the good of the individual, it does so mediately. Wherefore there is need for particular justice to direct a man immediately to the good of another individual.

Reply to Objection 2: The common good of the realm and the particular good of the individual differ not only in respect of the "many" and the "few," but also under a formal aspect. For the aspect of the "common" good differs from the aspect of the "individual" good, even as the aspect of "whole" differs from that of "part." Wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "they are wrong who maintain that the State and the home and the like differ only as many and few and not specifically."

Reply to Objection 3: The household community, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 2), differs in respect of a threefold fellowship; namely "of husband and wife, father and son, master and slave," in each of which one person is, as it were, part of the other. Wherefore between such persons there is not justice simply, but a species of justice, viz. "domestic" justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 6.

Whether particular justice has a special matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that particular justice has no special matter. Because a gloss on Gn. 2:14, "The fourth river is Euphrates," says: "Euphrates signifies 'fruitful'; nor is it stated through what country it flows, because justice pertains to all the parts of the soul." Now this would not be the case, if justice had a special matter, since every special matter belongs to a special power. Therefore particular justice has no special matter.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 61) that "the soul has four virtues whereby, in this life, it lives spiritually, viz. temperance, prudence, fortitude and justice;” and he says that “the fourth is justice, which pervades all the virtues.” Therefore particular justice, which is one of the four cardinal virtues, has no special matter.

Objection 3: Further, justice directs man sufficiently in matters relating to others. Now a man can be directed to others in all matters relating to this life. Therefore the matter of justice is general and not special.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons (Ethic. v, 2) particular justice to be specially about those things which belong to social life.

I answer that, Whatever can be rectified by reason is the matter of moral virtue, for this is defined in reference to right reason, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now the reason can rectify not only the internal passions of the soul, but also external actions, and also those external things of which man can make use. And yet it is in respect of external actions and external things by means of which men can communicate with one another, that the relation of one man to another is to be considered; whereas it is in respect of internal passions that we consider man’s rectitude in himself. Consequently, since justice is directed to others, it is not about the entire matter of moral virtue, but only about external actions and things, under a certain special aspect of the object, in so far as one man is related to another through them.

Reply to Objection 1: It is true that justice belongs essentially to one part of the soul, where it resides as in its subject; and this is the will which moves by its command all the other parts of the soul; and accordingly justice belongs to all the parts of the soul, not directly but by a kind of diffusion.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([2854]FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the cardinal virtues may be taken in two ways: first as special virtues, each having a determinate matter; secondly, as certain general modes of virtue. In this latter sense Augustine speaks in the passage quoted: for he says that “prudence is knowledge of what we should seek and avoid, temperance is the curb on the lust for fleeting pleasures, fortitude is strength of mind in bearing with passing trials, justice is the love of God and our neighbor which pervades the other virtues, that is to say, is the common principle of the entire order between one man and another.”

Reply to Objection 3: A man’s internal passions which are a part of moral matter, are not in themselves directed to another man, which belongs to the specific nature of justice; yet their effects, i.e. external actions, are capable of being directed to another man. Consequently it does not follow that the matter of justice is general.

Whether justice is about the passions?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice is about the passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that “moral virtue is about pleasure and pain.” Now pleasure or delight, and pain are passions, as stated above [*[2855]FS, Q[23], A[4]; [2856]FS, Q[31], A[1]; [2857]FS, Q[35], A[1]] when we were treating of the passions. Therefore justice, being a moral virtue, is about the passions.

Objection 2: Further, justice is the means of rectifying a man’s operations in relation to another man. Now such like operations cannot be rectified unless the passions be rectified, because it is owing to disorder of the passions that there is disorder in the aforesaid operations: thus sexual lust leads to adultery, and overmuch love of money leads to theft. Therefore justice must needs be about the passions.

Objection 3: Further, even as particular justice is towards another person so is legal justice. Now legal justice is about the passions, else it would not extend to all the virtues, some of which are evidently about the passions. Therefore justice is about the passions.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is about operations.

I answer that, The true answer to this question may be gathered from a twofold source. First from the subject of justice, i.e. from the will, whose movements or acts are not passions, as stated above ([2858]FS, Q[22], A[3]; [2859]FS, Q[59], A[4]), for it is only the sensitive appetite whose movements are called passions. Hence justice is not about the passions, as are temperance and fortitude, which are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. Secondly, on he part of the matter, because justice is about man’s relations with another, and we are not directed immediately to another by the internal passions. Therefore justice is not about the passions.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every moral virtue is about pleasure and pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring: but every moral virtue is directed to pleasure and pain, as to ends to be acquired, for, as the

Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11), “pleasure and pain are the principal end in respect of which we say that this is an evil, and that a good”: and in this way too they belong to justice, since “a man is not just unless he rejoice in just actions” (Ethic. i, 8).

Reply to Objection 2: External operations are as it were between external things, which are their matter, and internal passions, which are their origin. Now it happens sometimes that there is a defect in one of these, without there being a defect in the other. Thus a man may steal another’s property, not through the desire to have the thing, but through the will to hurt the man; or vice versa, a man may covet another’s property without wishing to steal it. Accordingly the directing of operations in so far as they tend towards external things, belongs to justice, but in so far as they arise from the passions, it belongs to the other moral virtues which are about the passions. Hence justice hinders theft of another’s property, in so far as stealing is contrary to the, equality that should be maintained in external things, while liberality hinders it as resulting from an immoderate desire for wealth. Since, however, external operations take their species, not from the internal passions but from external things as being their objects, it follows that, external operations are essentially the matter of justice rather than of the other moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is directed to the common good, is more capable of extending to the internal passions whereby man is disposed in some way or other in himself, than particular justice which is directed to the good of another individual: although legal justice extends chiefly to other virtues in the point of their external operations, in so far, to wit, as “the law commands us to perform the actions of a courageous person . . . the actions of a temperate person . . . and the actions of a gentle person” (Ethic. v, 5).

Whether the mean of justice is the real mean?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean of justice is not the real mean. For the generic nature remains entire in each species. Now moral virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) to be “an elective habit which observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason.” Therefore justice observes the rational and not the real mean.

Objection 2: Further, in things that are good simply, there is neither excess nor defect, and consequently neither is there a mean; as is clearly the case with the virtues, according to Ethic. ii, 6. Now justice is about things that are good simply, as stated in Ethic. v. Therefore justice does not observe the real mean.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why the other virtues are said to observe the rational and not the real mean, is because in their case the mean varies according to different persons, since what is too much for one is too little for another (Ethic. ii, 6). Now this is also the case in justice: for one who strikes a prince does not receive the same punishment as one who strikes a private individual. Therefore justice also observes, not the real, but the rational mean.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6; v, 4) that the mean of justice is to be taken according to “arithmetical” proportion, so that it is the real mean.

I answer that, As stated above [2860](A[9]; [2861]FS, Q[59], A[4]), the other moral virtues are chiefly concerned with the passions, the regulation of which is gauged entirely by a comparison with the very man who is the subject of those passions, in so far as his anger and desire are vested with their various due circumstances. Hence the mean in such like virtues is measured not by the proportion of one thing to another, but merely by comparison with the virtuous man himself, so that with them the mean is only that which is fixed by reason in our regard.

On the other hand, the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person. Now equality is the real mean between greater and less, as stated in Metaph. x [*Didot ed., ix, 5; Cf. Ethic. v, 4]: wherefore justice observes the real mean.

Reply to Objection 1: This real mean is also the rational mean, wherefore justice satisfies the conditions of a moral virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: We may speak of a thing being good simply in two ways. First a thing may be good in every way: thus the virtues are good; and there is neither mean nor extremes in things that are good simply in this sense. Secondly a thing is said to be good simply through being good absolutely i.e. in its nature, although it may become evil through being abused. Such are riches and honors; and in the like it is possible to find excess, deficiency and mean, as regards men who can use them well or ill: and it is in this sense that justice is about things that are good simply.

Reply to Objection 3: The injury inflicted bears a different proportion to a prince from that which it bears to a private person: wherefore each injury requires to be equalized by vengeance in a different way: and this implies a real and not merely a rational diversity.

Whether the act of justice is to render to each one his own?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of justice is not to render to each one his own. For Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9) ascribes to justice the act of succoring the needy. Now in succoring the needy we give them what is not theirs but ours. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7) that “beneficence which we may call kindness or liberality, belongs to justice.” Now it pertains to liberality to give to another of one’s own, not of what is his. Therefore the act of justice does not consist in rendering to each one his own.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to justice not only to distribute things duly, but also to repress injurious actions, such as murder, adultery and so forth. But the rendering to each one of what is his seems to belong solely to the distribution of things. Therefore the act of justice is not sufficiently described by saying that it consists in rendering to each one his own.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 24): “It is justice that renders to each one what is his, and claims not another’s property; it disregards its own profit in order to preserve the common equity.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2862]AA[8],10), the matter of justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing we use by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we are related by justice. Now each man’s own is that which is due to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is nothing else than to render to each one his own.

Reply to Objection 1: Since justice is a cardinal virtue, other secondary virtues, such as mercy, liberality and the like are connected with it, as we shall state further on ([2863]Q[80], A[1]). Wherefore to succor the needy, which belongs to mercy or pity, and to be liberally beneficent, which pertains to liberality, are by a kind of reduction ascribed to justice as to their principal virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 4), in matters of justice, the name of "profit" is extended to whatever is excessive, and whatever is deficient is called "loss." The reason for this is that justice is first of all and more commonly exercised in voluntary interchanges of things, such as buying and selling, wherein those expressions are properly employed; and yet they are transferred to all other matters of justice. The same applies to the rendering to each one of what is his own.

Whether justice stands foremost among all moral virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice does not stand foremost among all the moral virtues. Because it belongs to justice to render to each one what is his, whereas it belongs to liberality to give of one's own, and this is more virtuous. Therefore liberality is a greater virtue than justice.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is adorned by a less excellent thing than itself. Now magnanimity is the ornament both of justice and of all the virtues, according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is more excellent than justice.

Objection 3: Further, virtue is about that which is "difficult" and "good," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. But fortitude is about more difficult things than justice is, since it is about dangers of death, according to Ethic. iii, 6. Therefore fortitude is more excellent than justice.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i, 7): "Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues, and gives its name to a good man."

I answer that, If we speak of legal justice, it is evident that it stands foremost among all the moral virtues, for as much as the common good transcends the individual good of one person. In this sense the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 1) that “the most excellent of the virtues would seem to be justice, and more glorious than either the evening or the morning star.” But, even if we speak of particular justice, it excels the other moral virtues for two reasons. The first reason may be taken from the subject, because justice is in the more excellent part of the soul, viz. the rational appetite or will, whereas the other moral virtues are in the sensitive appetite, whereunto appertain the passions which are the matter of the other moral virtues. The second reason is taken from the object, because the other virtues are commendable in respect of the sole good of the virtuous person himself, whereas justice is praiseworthy in respect of the virtuous person being well disposed towards another, so that justice is somewhat the good of another person, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9): “The greatest virtues must needs be those which are most profitable to other persons, because virtue is a faculty of doing good to others. For this reason the greatest honors are accorded the brave and the just, since bravery is useful to others in warfare, and justice is useful to others both in warfare and in time of peace.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although the liberal man gives of his own, yet he does so in so far as he takes into consideration the good of his own virtue, while the just man gives to another what is his, through consideration of the common good. Moreover justice is observed towards all, whereas liberality cannot extend to all. Again liberality which gives of a man’s own is based on justice, whereby one renders to each man what is his.

Reply to Objection 2: When magnanimity is added to justice it increases the latter’s goodness; and yet without justice it would not even be a virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Although fortitude is about the most difficult things, it is not about the best, for it is only useful in warfare, whereas justice is useful both in war and in peace, as stated above.

OF INJUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider injustice, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether injustice is a special vice?

(2) Whether it is proper to the unjust man to do unjust deeds?

(3) Whether one can suffer injustice willingly?

(4) Whether injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus?

Whether injustice is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that injustice is not a special vice. For it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): “All sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: ‘Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity’].” Now iniquity would seem to be the same as injustice, because justice is a kind of equality, so that injustice is apparently the same as inequality or iniquity. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contrary to all the virtues. But injustice is contrary to all the virtues: for as regards adultery it is opposed to chastity, as regards murder it is opposed to meekness, and in like manner as regards the other sins. Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, injustice is opposed to justice which is in the will. But every sin is in the will, as Augustine declares (De Duabus Anim. x). Therefore injustice is not a special sin.

On the contrary, Injustice is contrary to justice. But justice is a special virtue. Therefore injustice is a special vice.

I answer that, Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general vice, as regards the intention, since contempt of the common good may lead to all kinds of sin. Thus too all vices, as being repugnant to the common good, have the character of injustice, as though they arose from injustice, in accord with what has been said above about justice ([2864]Q[58], AA[5],6). Secondly we speak of injustice in reference to an inequality between one person and another, when one man wishes to have more goods, riches for example, or honors, and less evils, such as toil and losses, and thus injustice has a special matter and is a particular vice opposed to particular justice.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as legal justice is referred to human common good, so Divine justice is referred to the Divine good, to which all sin is repugnant, and in this sense all sin is said to be iniquity.

Reply to Objection 2: Even particular justice is indirectly opposed to all the virtues; in so far, to wit, as even external acts pertain both to justice and to the other moral virtues, although in different ways as stated above ([2865]Q[58], A[9], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: The will, like the reason, extends to all moral matters, i.e. passions and those external operations that relate to another person. On the other hand justice perfects the will solely in the point of its extending to operations that relate to another: and the same applies to injustice.

Whether a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is called unjust through doing an unjust thing. For habits are specified by their objects, as stated above ([2866]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Now the proper object of justice is the just, and the proper object of injustice is the unjust. Therefore a man should be called just through doing a just thing, and unjust through doing an unjust thing.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9) that they hold a false opinion who maintain that it is in a man's power to do suddenly an unjust thing, and that a just man is no less capable of doing what is unjust than an unjust man. But this opinion would not be false unless it were proper to the unjust man to do what is unjust. Therefore a man is to be deemed unjust from the fact that he does an unjust thing.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue bears the same relation to its proper act, and the same applies to the contrary vices. But whoever does what is intemperate, is said to be intemperate. Therefore whoever does an unjust thing, is said to be unjust.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 6) that "a man may do an unjust thing without being unjust."

I answer that, Even as the object of justice is something equal in external things, so too the object of injustice is something unequal, through more or less being assigned to some person than is due to him. To this object the habit of injustice is compared by means of its proper act which is called an injustice. Accordingly it may happen in two ways that a man who does an unjust thing, is not unjust: first, on account of a lack of correspondence between the operation and its proper object. For the operation takes its species and name from its direct and not from its indirect object: and in things directed to an end the direct is that which is intended, and the indirect is what is beside the intention. Hence if a man do that which is unjust, without intending to do an unjust thing, for instance if he do it through ignorance, being unaware that it is unjust, properly speaking he does an unjust thing, not directly, but only indirectly, and, as it were, doing materially that which is unjust: hence such an operation is not called an injustice. Secondly, this may happen on account of a lack of proportion between the operation and the habit. For an injustice may sometimes arise from a passion, for instance, anger or desire, and sometimes from choice, for instance when the injustice itself is the direct object of one’s complacency. In the latter case properly speaking it arises from a habit, because whenever a man has a habit, whatever befits that habit is, of itself, pleasant to him. Accordingly, to do what is unjust intentionally and by choice is proper to the unjust man, in which sense the unjust man is one who has the habit of injustice: but a man may do what is unjust, unintentionally or through passion, without having the habit of injustice.

Reply to Objection 1: A habit is specified by its object in its direct and formal acceptation, not in its material and indirect acceptation.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not easy for any man to do an unjust thing from choice, as though it were pleasing for its own sake and not for the sake of something else: this is proper to one who has the habit, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 9).

Reply to Objection 3: The object of temperance is not something established externally, as is the object of justice: the object of temperance, i.e. the temperate thing, depends entirely on proportion to the man himself. Consequently what is accidental and unintentional cannot be said to be temperate either materially or formally. In like manner neither can it be called intemperate: and in this respect there is dissimilarity between justice and the other moral virtues; but as regards the proportion between operation and habit, there is similarity in all respects.

Whether we can suffer injustice willingly?

Objection 1: It would seem that one can suffer injustice willingly. For injustice is inequality, as stated above [2867](A[2]). Now a man by injuring himself, departs from equality, even as by injuring another. Therefore a man can do an injustice to himself, even as to another. But whoever does himself an injustice, does so involuntarily. Therefore a man can voluntarily suffer injustice especially if it be inflicted by himself.

Objection 2: Further, no man is punished by the civil law, except for having committed some injustice. Now suicides were formerly punished according to the law of the state by being deprived of an honorable burial, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Therefore a man can do himself an injustice, and consequently it may happen that a man suffers injustice voluntarily.

Objection 3: Further, no man does an injustice save to one who suffers that injustice. But it may happen that a man does an injustice to one who wishes it, for instance if he sell him a thing for more than it is worth. Therefore a man may happen to suffer an injustice voluntarily.

On the contrary, To suffer an injustice and to do an injustice are contraries. Now no man does an injustice against his will. Therefore on the other hand no man suffers an injustice except against his will.

I answer that, Action by its very nature proceeds from an agent, whereas passion as such is from another: wherefore the same thing in the same respect cannot be both agent and patient, as stated in Phys. iii, 1; viii, 5. Now the proper principle of action in man is the will, wherefore man does properly and essentially what he does voluntarily, and on the other hand a man suffers properly what he suffers against his will, since in so far as he is willing, he is a principle in himself, and so, considered thus, he is active rather than passive. Accordingly we must conclude that properly and strictly speaking no man can do an injustice except voluntarily, nor suffer an injustice save involuntarily; but that accidentally and materially so to speak, it is possible for that which is unjust in itself either to be done involuntarily (as when a man does anything unintentionally), or to be suffered voluntarily (as when a man voluntarily gives to another more than he owes him).

Reply to Objection 1: When one man gives voluntarily to another that which he does not owe him, he causes neither injustice nor inequality. For a man’s ownership depends on his will, so there is no disproportion if he forfeit something of his own free-will, either by his own or by another’s action.

Reply to Objection 2: An individual person may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to himself; and thus, if he inflict an injury on himself, it may come under the head of some other kind of sin, intemperance for instance or imprudence, but not injustice; because injustice no less than justice, is always referred to another person. Secondly, this or that man may be considered as belonging to the State as part thereof, or as belonging to God, as His creature and image; and thus a man who kills himself, does an injury not indeed to himself, but to the State and to God. Wherefore he is punished in accordance with both Divine and human law, even as the Apostle declares in respect of the fornicator (1 Cor. 3:17): "If any man violate the temple of God, him shall God destroy."

Reply to Objection 3: Suffering is the effect of external action. Now in the point of doing and suffering injustice, the material element is that which is done externally, considered in itself, as stated above [2868](A[2]), and the formal and essential element is on the part of the will of agent and patient, as stated above [2869](A[2]). Accordingly we must reply that injustice suffered by one man and injustice done by another man always accompany one another, in the material sense. But if we speak in the formal sense a man can do an injustice with the intention of doing an injustice, and yet the other man does not suffer an injustice, because he suffers voluntarily; and on the other hand a man can suffer an injustice if he suffer an injustice against his will, while the man who does the injury unknowingly, does an injustice, not formally but only materially.

Whether whoever does an injustice sins mortally?

Objection 1: It would seem that not everyone who does an injustice sins mortally. For venial sin is opposed to mortal sin. Now it is sometimes a venial sin to do an injury: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 8) in reference to those who act unjustly: "Whatever they do not merely in ignorance but through ignorance is a venial matter." Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Objection 2: Further, he who does an injustice in a small matter, departs but slightly from the mean. Now this seems to be insignificant and should be accounted among the least of evils, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ii, 9). Therefore not everyone that does an injustice sins mortally.

Objection 3: Further, charity is the “mother of all the virtues” [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D. 23], and it is through being contrary thereto that a sin is called mortal. But not all the sins contrary to the other virtues are mortal. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to do an injustice.

On the contrary, Whatever is contrary to the law of God is a mortal sin. Now whoever does an injustice does that which is contrary to the law of God, since it amounts either to theft, or to adultery, or to murder, or to something of the kind, as will be shown further on (Q[64], seqq.). Therefore whoever does an injustice sins mortally.

I answer that, As stated above ([2870]FS, Q[12], A[5]), when we were treating of the distinction of sins, a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which gives life to the soul. Now every injury inflicted on another person is of itself contrary to charity, which moves us to will the good of another. And so since injustice always consists in an injury inflicted on another person, it is evident that to do an injustice is a mortal sin according to its genus.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood as referring to ignorance of fact, which he calls “ignorance of particular circumstances” [*Ethic. iii, 1], and which deserves pardon, and not to ignorance of the law which does not excuse: and he who does an injustice through ignorance, does no injustice except accidentally, as stated above [2871](A[2])

Reply to Objection 2: He who does an injustice in small matters falls short of the perfection on an unjust deed, in so far as what he does may be deemed not altogether contrary to the will of the person who suffers therefrom: for instance, if a man take an apple or some such thing from another man, in which case it is probable that the latter is not hurt or displeased.

Reply to Objection 3: The sins which are contrary to the other virtues are not always hurtful to another person, but imply a disorder affecting human passions; hence there is no comparison.

OF JUDGMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider judgment, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether judgment is an act of justice?

(2) Whether it is lawful to judge?

(3) Whether judgment should be based on suspicions?

(4) Whether doubts should be interpreted favorably?

(5) Whether judgment should always be given according to the written law?

(6) Whether judgment is perverted by being usurped?

Whether judgment is an act of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice. The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he knows," so that judgment would seem to belong to the cognitive faculty. Now the cognitive faculty is perfected by prudence. Therefore judgment belongs to prudence rather than to justice, which is in the will, as stated above ([2872]Q[58], A[4]).

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." Now man is made spiritual chiefly by the virtue of charity, which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Therefore judgment belongs to charity rather than to justice.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to every virtue to judge aright of its proper matter, because "the virtuous man is the rule and measure in everything," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4). Therefore judgment does not belong to justice any more than to the other moral virtues.

Objection 4: Further, judgment would seem to belong only to judges. But the act of justice is to be found in every just man. Since then judges are not the only just men, it seems that judgment is not the proper act of justice.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 93:15): "Until justice be turned into judgment."

I answer that, Judgment properly denotes the act of a judge as such. Now a judge [judex] is so called because he asserts the right [jus dicens] and right is the object of justice, as stated above ([2873]Q[57], A[1]). Consequently the original meaning of the word "judgment" is a statement or decision of the just or right. Now to decide rightly about virtuous deeds proceeds, properly speaking, from the virtuous habit; thus a chaste person decides rightly about matters relating to chastity. Therefore judgment, which denotes a right decision about what is just, belongs properly to justice. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4) that “men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice.”

Reply to Objection 1: The word “judgment,” from its original meaning of a right decision about what is just, has been extended to signify a right decision in any matter whether speculative or practical. Now a right judgment in any matter requires two things. The first is the virtue itself that pronounces judgment: and in this way, judgment is an act of reason, because it belongs to the reason to pronounce or define. The other is the disposition of the one who judges, on which depends his aptness for judging aright. In this way, in matters of justice, judgment proceeds from justice, even as in matters of fortitude, it proceeds from fortitude. Accordingly judgment is an act of justice in so far as justice inclines one to judge aright, and of prudence in so far as prudence pronounces judgment: wherefore {synesis} (judging well according to common law) which belongs to prudence is said to “judge rightly,” as stated above ([2874]Q[51], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 2: The spiritual man, by reason of the habit of charity, has an inclination to judge aright of all things according to the Divine rules; and it is in conformity with these that he pronounces judgment through the gift of wisdom: even as the just man pronounces judgment through the virtue of prudence conformably with the ruling of the law.

Reply to Objection 3: The other virtues regulate man in himself, whereas justice regulates man in his dealings with others, as shown above ([2875]Q[58], A[2]). Now man is master in things concerning himself, but not in matters relating to others. Consequently where the other virtues are in question, there is no need for judgment other than that of a virtuous man, taking judgment in its broader sense, as explained above (ad 1). But in matters of justice, there is further need for the judgment of a superior, who is “able to reprove both, and to put his hand between both” [*Job 9:33]. Hence judgment belongs more specifically to justice than to any other virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: Justice is in the sovereign as a master-virtue [*Cf. [2876] Q[58], A[6]], commanding and prescribing what is just; while it is in the subjects as an executive and administrative virtue. Hence judgment, which denotes a decision of what is just, belongs to justice, considered as existing chiefly in one who has authority.

Whether it is lawful to judge?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to judge. For nothing is punished except what is unlawful. Now those who judge are threatened with punishment, which those who judge not will escape, according to Mat. 7:1, "Judge not, and ye shall not be judged." Therefore it is unlawful to judge.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant. To his own lord he standeth or falleth." Now God is the Lord of all. Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

Objection 3: Further, no man is sinless, according to 1 Jn. 1:8, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Now it is unlawful for a sinner to judge, according to Rom. 2:1, "Thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art, that judgest; for wherein thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou judgest." Therefore to no man is it lawful to judge.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 16:18): "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all thy gates . . . that they may judge the people with just judgment."

I answer that, Judgment is lawful in so far as it is an act of justice. Now it follows from what has been stated above (A[1], ad 1,3) that three conditions are requisite for a judgment to be an act of justice: first, that it proceed from the inclination of justice; secondly, that it come from one who is in authority; thirdly, that it be pronounced according to the right ruling of prudence. If any one of these be lacking, the judgment will be faulty and unlawful. First, when it is contrary to the rectitude of justice, and then it is called "perverted" or "unjust": secondly, when a man judges about matters wherein he has no authority, and this is called judgment "by usurpation": thirdly, when the reason lacks certainty, as when a man, without any solid motive, forms a judgment on some doubtful or hidden matter, and then it is called judgment by "suspicion" or "rash" judgment.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words our Lord forbids rash judgment which is about the inward intention, or other uncertain things, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18). Or else He forbids judgment about Divine things, which we ought not to judge, but simply believe, since they are above us, as Hilary declares in his commentary on Mat. 5. Or again according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross], He forbids the judgment which proceeds not from benevolence but from bitterness of heart.

Reply to Objection 2: A judge is appointed as God’s servant; wherefore it is written (Dt. 1:16): “Judge that which is just,” and further on (Dt. 1:17), “because it is the judgment of God.”

Reply to Objection 3: Those who stand guilty of grievous sins should not judge those who are guilty of the same or lesser sins, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xxiv] says on the words of Mat. 7:1, “Judge not.” Above all does this hold when such sins are public, because there would be an occasion of scandal arising in the hearts of others. If however they are not public but hidden, and there be an urgent necessity for the judge to pronounce judgment, because it is his duty, he can reprove or judge with humility and fear. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19): “If we find that we are guilty of the same sin as another man, we should groan together with him, and invite him to strive against it together with us.” And yet it is not through acting thus that a man condemns himself so as to deserve to be condemned once again, but when, in condemning another, he shows himself to be equally deserving of condemnation on account of another or a like sin.

Whether it is unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to form a judgment from suspicions. For suspicion is seemingly an uncertain opinion about an evil, wherefore the Philosopher states (Ethic. vi, 3) that suspicion is about both the true and the false. Now it is impossible to have any but an uncertain opinion about contingent singulars. Since then human judgment is about human acts, which are about singular and contingent matters, it seems that no judgment would be lawful, if it were not lawful to judge from suspicions.

Objection 2: Further, a man does his neighbor an injury by judging him unlawfully. But an evil suspicion consists in nothing more than a man’s opinion, and consequently does not seem to pertain to the injury of another man. Therefore judgment based on suspicion is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, if it is unlawful, it must needs be reducible to an injustice, since judgment is an act of justice, as stated above [2877](A[1]). Now an injustice is always a mortal sin according to its genus, as stated above (Q[59], A[4]). Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would always be a mortal sin, if it were unlawful. But this is false, because “we cannot avoid suspicions,” according to a gloss of Augustine (Tract. xc in Joan.) on 1 Cor. 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” Therefore a judgment based on suspicion would seem not to be unlawful.

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xvii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John of the Cross] in comment on the words of Mat. 7:1, “Judge not,” etc., says: “By this commandment our Lord does not forbid Christians to reprove others from kindly motives, but that Christian should despise Christian by boasting his own righteousness, by hating and condemning others for the most part on mere suspicion.”

I answer that, As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), suspicion denotes evil thinking based on slight indications, and this is due to three causes. First, from a man being evil in himself, and from this very fact, as though conscious of his own wickedness, he is prone to think evil of others, according to Eccles. 10:3, “The fool when he walketh in the way, whereas he himself is a fool, esteemeth all men fools.” Secondly, this is due to a man being ill-disposed towards another: for when a man hates or despises another, or is angry with or envious of him, he is led by slight indications to think evil of him, because everyone easily believes what he desires. Thirdly, this is due to long experience: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that “old people are very suspicious, for they have often experienced the faults of others.” The first two causes of suspicion evidently connote perversity of the affections, while the third diminishes the nature of suspicion, in as much as experience leads to certainty which is contrary to the nature of suspicion. Consequently suspicion denotes a certain amount of vice, and the further it goes, the more vicious it is.

Now there are three degrees of suspicion. The first degree is when a man begins to doubt of another’s goodness from slight indications. This is a venial and a light sin; for “it belongs to human temptation without which no man can go through this life,” according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, “Judge not before the time.” The second degree is when a man, from slight indications, esteems another man’s wickedness as certain. This is a mortal sin, if it be about a grave matter, since it cannot be without contempt of one’s neighbor. Hence the same gloss goes on to say: “If then we cannot avoid suspicions, because we are human, we must nevertheless restrain our judgment, and refrain from forming a definite and fixed opinion.” The third degree is when a judge goes so far as to condemn a man on suspicion: this pertains directly to injustice, and consequently is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Some kind of certainty is found in human acts, not indeed the certainty of a demonstration, but such as is befitting the matter in point, for instance when a thing is proved by suitable witnesses.

Reply to Objection 2: From the very fact that a man thinks evil of another without sufficient cause, he despises him unduly, and therefore does him an injury.

Reply to Objection 3: Since justice and injustice are about external operations, as stated above ([2878]Q[58], AA[8],10,11;[2879] Q[59], A[1], ad 3), the judgment of suspicion pertains directly to injustice when it is betrayed by external action, and then it is a mortal sin, as stated above. The internal judgment pertains to justice, in so far as it is related to the external judgment, even as the internal to the external act, for instance as desire is related to fornication, or anger to murder.

Whether doubts should be interpreted for the best?

Objection 1: It would seem that doubts should not be interpreted for the best. Because we should judge from what happens for the most part. But it happens for the most part that evil is done, since “the number of fools is infinite” (Eccles. 1:15), “for the imagination and thought of man’s heart are prone to evil from his youth” (Gn. 8:21). Therefore doubts should be interpreted for the worst rather than for the best.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 27) that “he leads a godly and just life who is sound in his estimate of things, and turns neither to this side nor to that.” Now he who interprets a doubtful point for the best, turns to one side. Therefore this should not be done.

Objection 3: Further, man should love his neighbor as himself. Now with regard to himself, a man should interpret doubtful matters for the worst, according to Job 9:28, “I feared all my works.” Therefore it seems that doubtful matters affecting one’s neighbor should be interpreted for the worst.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 14:3, “He that eateth not, let him not judge him that eateth,” says: “Doubts should be interpreted in the best sense.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 2), things from the very fact that a man thinks ill of another without sufficient cause, he injures and despises him. Now no man ought to despise or in any way injure another man without urgent cause: and, consequently, unless we have evident indications of a person’s wickedness, we ought to deem him good, by interpreting for the best whatever is doubtful about him.

Reply to Objection 1: He who interprets doubtful matters for the best, may happen to be deceived more often than not; yet it is better to err frequently through thinking well of a wicked man, than to err less frequently through having an evil opinion of a good man, because in the latter case an injury is inflicted, but not in the former.

Reply to Objection 2: It is one thing to judge of things and another to judge of men. For when we judge of things, there is no question of the good or evil of the thing about which we are judging, since it will take no harm no matter what kind of judgment we form about it; but there is question of the good of the person who judges, if he judge truly, and of his evil if he judge falsely because “the true is the good of the intellect, and the false is its evil,” as stated in Ethic. vi, 2, wherefore everyone should strive to make his judgment accord with things as they are. On the other hand when we judge of men, the good and evil in our judgment is considered chiefly on the part of the person about whom judgment is being formed; for he is deemed worthy of honor from the very fact that he is judged to be good, and deserving of contempt if he is judged to be evil. For this reason we ought, in this kind of judgment, to aim at judging a man good, unless there is evident proof of the contrary. And though we may judge falsely, our judgment in thinking well of another pertains to our good feeling and not to the evil of the intellect, even as neither does it pertain to the intellect’s perfection to know the truth of contingent singulars in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: One may interpret something for the worst or for the best in two ways. First, by a kind of supposition; and thus, when we have to apply a remedy to some evil, whether our own or another's, in order for the remedy to be applied with greater certainty of a cure, it is expedient to take the worst for granted, since if a remedy be efficacious against a worse evil, much more is it efficacious against a lesser evil. Secondly we may interpret something for the best or for the worst, by deciding or determining, and in this case when judging of things we should try to interpret each thing according as it is, and when judging of persons, to interpret things for the best as stated above.

Whether we should always judge according to the written law?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But written laws sometimes contain injustice, according to Is. 10:1, "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice." Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

Objection 2: Further, judgment has to be formed about individual happenings. But no written law can cover each and every individual happening, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 10). Therefore it seems that we are not always bound to judge according to the written law.

Objection 3: Further, a law is written in order that the lawgiver's intention may be made clear. But it happens sometimes that even if the lawgiver himself were present he would judge otherwise. Therefore we ought not always to judge according to the written law.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): "In these earthly laws, though men judge about them when they are making them, when once they are established and passed, the judges may judge no longer of them, but according to them."

I answer that, As stated above [2880](A[1]), judgment is nothing else but a decision or determination of what is just. Now a thing becomes just in two ways: first by the very nature of the case, and this is called "natural right," secondly by some agreement between men, and this is called "positive right," as stated above (Q[57], A[2]). Now laws are written for the purpose of manifesting both these rights, but in different ways. For the written law does indeed contain natural right, but it does not establish it, for the latter derives its force, not from the law but from nature: whereas the written law both contains positive right, and establishes it by giving it force of authority.

Hence it is necessary to judge according to the written law, else judgment would fall short either of the natural or of the positive right.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the written law does not give force to the natural right, so neither can it diminish or annul its force, because neither can man's will change nature. Hence if the written law contains anything contrary to the natural right, it is unjust and has no binding force. For positive right has no place except where "it matters not," according to the natural right, "whether a thing be done in one way or in another"; as stated above (Q[57], A[2], ad 2). Wherefore such documents are to be called, not laws, but rather corruptions of law, as stated above ([2881]FS, Q[95], A[2]): and consequently judgment should not be delivered according to them.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as unjust laws by their very nature are, either always or for the most part, contrary to the natural right, so too laws that are rightly established, fail in some cases, when if they were observed they would be contrary to the natural right. Wherefore in such cases judgment should be delivered, not according to the letter of the law, but according to equity which the lawgiver has in view. Hence the jurist says [*Digest. i, 3; De leg. senatusque consult. 25]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." In such cases even the lawgiver himself would decide otherwise; and if he had foreseen the case, he might have provided for it by law.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

Whether judgment is rendered perverse by being usurped?

Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not rendered perverse by being usurped. For justice is rectitude in matters of action. Now truth is not impaired, no matter who tells it, but it may suffer from the person who ought to accept it. Therefore again justice loses nothing, no matter who declares what is just, and this is what is meant by judgment.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judgment to punish sins. Now it is related to the praise of some that they punished sins without having authority over those whom they punished; such as Moses in slaying the

Egyptian (Ex. 2:12), and Phinees the son of Eleazar in slaying Zambri the son of Salu (Num. 25:7–14), and “it was reputed to him unto justice” (Ps. 105:31). Therefore usurpation of judgment pertains not to injustice.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual power is distinct from temporal. Now prelates having spiritual power sometimes interfere in matters concerning the secular power. Therefore usurped judgment is not unlawful.

Objection 4: Further, even as the judge requires authority in order to judge aright, so also does he need justice and knowledge, as shown above (A[1], ad 1,3; A[2]). But a judgment is not described as unjust, if he who judges lacks the habit of justice or the knowledge of the law. Neither therefore is it always unjust to judge by usurpation, i.e. without authority.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 14:4): “Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant?”

I answer that, Since judgment should be pronounced according to the written law, as stated above [2882](A[5]), he that pronounces judgment, interprets, in a way, the letter of the law, by applying it to some particular case. Now since it belongs to the same authority to interpret and to make a law, just as a law cannot be made save by public authority, so neither can a judgment be pronounced except by public authority, which extends over those who are subject to the community. Wherefore even as it would be unjust for one man to force another to observe a law that was not approved by public authority, so too it is unjust, if a man compels another to submit to a judgment that is pronounced by other than the public authority.

Reply to Objection 1: When the truth is declared there is no obligation to accept it, and each one is free to receive it or not, as he wishes. On the other hand judgment implies an obligation, wherefore it is unjust for anyone to be judged by one who has no public authority.

Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have slain the Egyptian by authority received as it were, by divine inspiration; this seems to follow from Acts 7:24, 25, where it is said that “striking the Egyptian . . . he thought that his brethren understood that God by his hand would save Israel [Vulg.: ‘them’].” Or it may be replied that Moses slew the Egyptian in order to defend the man who was unjustly attacked, without himself exceeding the limits of a blameless defence. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 36) that “whoever does not ward off a blow from a fellow man when he can, is as much in fault as the striker”; and he quotes the example of Moses. Again we may reply with Augustine (QQ. Exod. qu. 2) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 70] that just as "the soil gives proof of its fertility by producing useless herbs before the useful seeds have grown, so this deed of Moses was sinful although it gave a sign of great fertility," in so far, to wit, as it was a sign of the power whereby he was to deliver his people.

With regard to Phinees the reply is that he did this out of zeal for God by Divine inspiration; or because though not as yet high-priest, he was nevertheless the high-priest's son, and this judgment was his concern as of the other judges, to whom this was commanded [*Ex. 22:20; Lev. 20; Dt. 13, 17].

Reply to Objection 3: The secular power is subject to the spiritual, even as the body is subject to the soul. Consequently the judgment is not usurped if the spiritual authority interferes in those temporal matters that are subject to the spiritual authority or which have been committed to the spiritual by the temporal authority.

Reply to Objection 4: The habits of knowledge and justice are perfections of the individual, and consequently their absence does not make a judgment to be usurped, as in the absence of public authority which gives a judgment its coercive force.

OF THE PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of justice; (1) the subjective parts, which are the species of justice, i.e. distributive and commutative justice; (2) the quasi-integral parts; (3) the quasi-potential parts, i.e. the virtues connected with justice. The first consideration will be twofold: (1) The parts of justice; (2) their opposite vices. And since restitution would seem to be an act of commutative justice, we must consider (1) the distinction between commutative and distributive justice; (2) restitution.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are two species of justice, viz. distributive and commutative?

(2) Whether in either case the mean is take in the same way?

(3) Whether their matter is uniform or manifold?

(4) Whether in any of these species the just is the same as counter-passion?

Whether two species of justice are suitably assigned, viz. commutative and distributive?

Objection 1: It would seem that the two species of justice are unsuitably assigned, viz. distributive and commutative. That which is hurtful to the many cannot be a species of justice, since justice is directed to the common good. Now it is hurtful to the common good of the many, if the goods of the community are distributed among many, both because the goods of the community would be exhausted, and because the morals of men would be corrupted. For Tully says (De Offic. ii, 15): “He who receives becomes worse, and the more ready to expect that he will receive again.” Therefore distribution does not belong to any species of justice.

Objection 2: Further, the act of justice is to render to each one what is his own, as stated above ([2883]Q[58], A[2]). But when things are distributed, a man does not receive what was his, but becomes possessed of something which belonged to the community. Therefore this does not pertain to justice.

Objection 3: Further, justice is not only in the sovereign, but also in the subject, as stated above ([2884]Q[58], A[6]). But it belongs exclusively to the sovereign to distribute. Therefore distribution does not always belong to justice.

Objection 4: Further, “Distributive justice regards common goods” (Ethic. v, 4). Now matters regarding the community pertain to legal justice. Therefore distributive justice is a part, not of particular, but of legal justice.

Objection 5: Further, unity or multitude do not change the species of a virtue. Now commutative justice consists in rendering something to one person, while distributive justice consists in giving something to many. Therefore they are not different species of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher assigns two parts to justice and says (Ethic. v, 2) that “one directs distributions, the other, commutations.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2885]Q[58], AA[7],8), particular justice is directed to the private individual, who is compared to the community as a part to the whole. Now a twofold order may be considered in relation to a part. In the first place there is the order of one part to another, to which corresponds the order of one private individual to another. This order is directed by commutative justice, which is concerned about the mutual dealings between two persons. In the second place there is the order of the whole towards the parts, to which corresponds the order of that which belongs to the community in relation to each single person. This order is directed by distributive justice, which distributes common goods proportionately. Hence there are two species of justice, distributive and commutative.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as a private individual is praised for moderation in his bounty, and blamed for excess therein, so too ought moderation to be observed in the distribution of common goods, wherein distributive justice directs.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as part and whole are somewhat the same, so too that which pertains to the whole, pertains somewhat to the part also: so that when the goods of the community are distributed among a number of individuals each one receives that which, in a way, is his own.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of distributing the goods of the community, belongs to none but those who exercise authority over those goods; and yet distributive justice is also in the subjects to whom those goods are distributed in so far as they are contented by a just distribution. Moreover distribution of common goods is sometimes made not to the state but to the members of a family, and such distribution can be made by authority of a private individual.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement takes its species from the term "whereunto." Hence it belongs to legal justice to direct to the common good those matters which concern private individuals: whereas on the contrary it belongs to particular justice to direct the common good to particular individuals by way of distribution.

Reply to Objection 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and multitude, but also in respect of different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.

Whether the mean is to be observed in the same way in distributive as in commutative justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mean in distributive justice is to be observed in the same way as in commutative justice. For each of these is a kind of particular justice, as stated above [2886](A[1]). Now the mean is taken in the same way in all the parts of temperance or fortitude. Therefore the mean should also be observed in the same way in both distributive and commutative justice.

Objection 2: Further, the form of a moral virtue consists in observing the mean which is determined in accordance with reason. Since, then, one virtue has one form, it seems that the mean for both should be the same.

Objection 3: Further, in order to observe the mean in distributive justice we have to consider the various deserts of persons. Now a person’s deserts are considered also in commutative justice, for instance, in punishments; thus a man who strikes a prince is punished more than one who strikes a private individual. Therefore the mean is observed in the same way in both kinds of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in distributive justice is observed according to “geometrical proportion,” whereas in commutative justice it follows “arithmetical proportion.”

I answer that, As stated above [2887](A[1]), in distributive justice something is given to a private individual, in so far as what belongs to the whole is due to the part, and in a quantity that is proportionate to the importance of the position of that part in respect of the whole. Consequently in distributive justice a person receives all the more of the common goods, according as he holds a more prominent position in the community. This prominence in an aristocratic community is gauged according to virtue, in an oligarchy according to wealth, in a democracy according to liberty, and in various ways according to various forms of community. Hence in distributive justice the mean is observed, not according to equality between thing and thing, but according to proportion between things and persons: in such a way that even as one person surpasses another, so that which is given to one person surpasses that which is allotted to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 3,4) that the mean in the latter case follows “geometrical proportion,” wherein equality depends not on quantity but on proportion. For example we say that 6 is to 4 as 3 is to 2, because in either case the proportion equals 1–1/2; since the greater number is the sum of the lesser plus its half: whereas the equality of excess is not one of quantity, because 6 exceeds 4 by 2, while 3 exceeds 2 by 1.

On the other hand in commutations something is paid to an individual on account of something of his that has been received, as may be seen chiefly in selling and buying, where the notion of commutation is found primarily. Hence it is necessary to equalize thing with thing, so that the one person should pay back to the other just so much as he has become richer out of that which belonged to the other. The result of this will be equality according to the "arithmetical mean" which is gauged according to equal excess in quantity. Thus 5 is the mean between 6 and 4, since it exceeds the latter and is exceeded by the former, by 1. Accordingly if, at the start, both persons have 5, and one of them receives 1 out of the other's belongings, the one that is the receiver, will have 6, and the other will be left with 4: and so there will be justice if both be brought back to the mean, 1 being taken from him that has 6, and given to him that has 4, for then both will have 5 which is the mean.

Reply to Objection 1: In the other moral virtues the rational, not the real mean, is to be followed: but justice follows the real mean; wherefore the mean, in justice, depends on the diversity of things.

Reply to Objection 2: Equality is the general form of justice, wherein distributive and commutative justice agree: but in one we find equality of geometrical proportion, whereas in the other we find equality of arithmetical proportion.

Reply to Objection 3: In actions and passions a person's station affects the quantity of a thing: for it is a greater injury to strike a prince than a private person. Hence in distributive justice a person's station is considered in itself, whereas in commutative justice it is considered in so far as it causes a diversity of things.

Whether there is a different matter for both kinds of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a different matter for both kinds of justice. Diversity of matter causes diversity of virtue, as in the case of fortitude and temperance. Therefore, if distributive and commutative justice have different matters, it would seem that they are not comprised under the same virtue, viz. justice.

Objection 2: Further, the distribution that has to do with distributive justice is one of "wealth or of honors, or of whatever can be distributed among the members of the community" (Ethic. v, 2), which very things are the subject matter of commutations between one person and another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Therefore the matters of distributive and commutative justice are not distinct.

Objection 3: Further, if the matter of distributive justice differs from that of commutative justice, for the reason that they differ specifically, where there is no specific difference, there ought to be no diversity of matter. Now the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) reckons commutative justice as one species, and yet this has many kinds of matter. Therefore the matter of these species of justice is, seemingly, not of many kinds.

On the contrary, It is stated in Ethic. v, 2 that “one kind of justice directs distributions, and another commutations.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[51], AA[8],10), justice is about certain external operations, namely distribution and commutation. These consist in the use of certain externals, whether things, persons or even works: of things, as when one man takes from or restores to another that which is his; of persons, as when a man does an injury to the very person of another, for instance by striking or insulting him, or even by showing respect for him; and of works, as when a man justly exacts a work of another, or does a work for him. Accordingly, if we take for the matter of each kind of justice the things themselves of which the operations are the use, the matter of distributive and commutative justice is the same, since things can be distributed out of the common property to individuals, and be the subject of commutation between one person and another; and again there is a certain distribution and payment of laborious works.

If, however, we take for the matter of both kinds of justice the principal actions themselves, whereby we make use of persons, things, and works, there is then a difference of matter between them. For distributive justice directs distributions, while commutative justice directs commutations that can take place between two persons. Of these some are involuntary, some voluntary. They are involuntary when anyone uses another man’s chattel, person, or work against his will, and this may be done secretly by fraud, or openly by violence. In either case the offence may be committed against the other man’s chattel or person, or against a person connected with him. If the offence is against his chattel and this be taken secretly, it is called “theft,” if openly, it is called “robbery.” If it be against another man’s person, it may affect either the very substance of his person, or his dignity. If it be against the substance of his person, a man is injured secretly if he is treacherously slain, struck or poisoned, and openly, if he is publicly slain, imprisoned, struck or maimed. If it be against his personal dignity, a man is injured secretly by false witness, detractions and so forth, whereby he is deprived of his good name, and openly, by being accused in a court of law, or by public insult. If it be against a personal connection, a man is injured in the person of his wife, secretly (for the most part) by adultery, in the person of his slave, if the latter be induced to leave his master: which things can also be done openly. The same applies to other personal connections, and whatever injury may be committed against the principal, may be committed against them also. Adultery, however, and inducing a slave to leave his master are properly injuries against the person; yet the latter, since a slave is his master's chattel, is referred to theft. Voluntary commutations are when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he transfer it simply so that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is an act, not of justice but of liberality. A voluntary transfer belongs to justice in so far as it includes the notion of debt, and this may occur in many ways. First when one man simply transfers his thing to another in exchange for another thing, as happens in selling and buying. Secondly when a man transfers his thing to another, that the latter may have the use of it with the obligation of returning it to its owner. If he grant the use of a thing gratuitously, it is called "usufruct" in things that bear fruit; and simply "borrowing" on "loan" in things that bear no fruit, such as money, pottery, etc.; but if not even the use is granted gratis, it is called "letting" or "hiring." Thirdly, a man transfers his thing with the intention of recovering it, not for the purpose of its use, but that it may be kept safe, as in a "deposit," or under some obligation, as when a man pledges his property, or when one man stands security for another. In all these actions, whether voluntary or involuntary, the mean is taken in the same way according to the equality of repayment. Hence all these actions belong to the one same species of justice, namely commutative justice. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the just is absolutely the same as retaliation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation. For the judgment of God is absolutely just. Now the judgment of God is such that a man has to suffer in proportion with his deeds, according to Mat. 7:2: “With what measure you judge, you shall be judged: and with what measure you mete, it shall be measured to you again.” Therefore the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

Objection 2: Further, in either kind of justice something is given to someone according to a kind of equality. In distributive justice this equality regards personal dignity, which would seem to depend chiefly on what a person has done for the good of the community; while in commutative justice it regards the thing in which a person has suffered loss. Now in respect of either equality there is retaliation in respect of the deed committed. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

Objection 3: Further, the chief argument against retaliation is based on the difference between the voluntary and the involuntary; for he who does an injury involuntarily is less severely punished. Now voluntary and involuntary taken in relation to ourselves, do not diversify the mean of justice since this is the real mean and does not depend on us. Therefore it would seem that the just is absolutely the same as retaliation.

On the contrary, The Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 5) that the just is not always the same as retaliation.

I answer that, Retaliation [contrapassum] denotes equal passion repaid for previous action; and the expression applies most properly to injurious passions and actions, whereby a man harms the person of his neighbor; for instance if a man strike, that he be struck back. This kind of just is laid down in the Law (Ex. 21:23,24): “He shall render life for life, eye for eye,” etc. And since also to take away what belongs to another is to do an unjust thing, it follows that secondly retaliation consists in this also, that whosoever causes loss to another, should suffer loss in his belongings. This just loss is also found in the Law (Ex. 22:1): “If any man steal an ox or a sheep, and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox and four sheep for one sheep.” Thirdly retaliation is transferred to voluntary commutations, where action and passion are on both sides, although voluntariness detracts from the nature of passion, as stated above ([2888]Q[59], A[3]).

In all these cases, however, repayment must be made on a basis of equality according to the requirements of commutative justice, namely that the meed of passion be equal to the action. Now there would not always be equality if passion were in the same species as the action. Because, in the first place, when a person injures the person of one who is greater, the action surpasses any passion of the same species that he might undergo, wherefore he that strikes a prince, is not only struck back, but is much more severely punished. In like manner when a man despoils another of his property against the latter's will, the action surpasses the passion if he be merely deprived of that thing, because the man who caused another's loss, himself would lose nothing, and so he is punished by making restitution several times over, because not only did he injure a private individual, but also the common weal, the security of whose protection he has infringed. Nor again would there be equality of passion in voluntary commutations, were one always to exchange one's chattel for another man's, because it might happen that the other man's chattel is much greater than our own: so that it becomes necessary to equalize passion and action in commutations according to a certain proportionate commensuration, for which purpose money was invented. Hence retaliation is in accordance with commutative justice: but there is no place for it in distributive justice, because in distributive justice we do not consider the equality between thing and thing or between passion and action (whence the expression 'contrapassum'), but according to proportion between things and persons, as stated above [2889] (A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: This form of the Divine judgment is in accordance with the conditions of commutative justice, in so far as rewards are apportioned to merits, and punishments to sins.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man who has served the community is paid for his services, this is to be referred to commutative, not distributive, justice. Because distributive justice considers the equality, not between the thing received and the thing done, but between the thing received by one person and the thing received by another according to the respective conditions of those persons.

Reply to Objection 3: When the injurious action is voluntary, the injury is aggravated and consequently is considered as a greater thing. Hence it requires a greater punishment in repayment, by reason of a difference, not on part, but on the part of the thing.

OF RESTITUTION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider restitution, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) of what is it an act?

(2) Whether it is always of necessity for salvation to restore what one has taken away?

(3) Whether it is necessary to restore more than has been taken away?

(4) Whether it is necessary to restore what one has not taken away?

(5) Whether it is necessary to make restitution to the person from whom something has been taken?

(6) Whether the person who has taken something away is bound to restore it?

(7) Whether any other person is bound to restitution?

(8) Whether one is bound to restore at once?

Whether restitution is an act of commutative justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due. Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due. Therefore restitution is not the act of any part of justice.

Objection 2: Further, that which has passed away and is no more cannot be restored. Now justice and injustice are about certain actions and passions, which are unenduring and transitory. Therefore restitution would not seem to be the act of a part of justice.

Objection 3: Further, restitution is repayment of something taken away. Now something may be taken away from a man not only in commutation, but also in distribution, as when, in distributing, one gives a man less than his due. Therefore restitution is not more an act of commutative than of distributive justice.

On the contrary, Restitution is opposed to taking away. Now it is an act of commutative injustice to take away what belongs to another. Therefore to restore it is an act of that justice which directs commutations.

I answer that, To restore is seemingly the same as to reinstate a person in the possession or dominion of his thing, so that in restitution we consider the equality of justice attending the payment of one thing for another, and this belongs to commutative justice. Hence restitution is an act of commutative justice, occasioned by one person having what belongs to another, either with his consent, for instance on loan or deposit, or against his will, as in robbery or theft.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is not due to another is not his properly speaking, although it may have been his at some time: wherefore it is a mere gift rather than a restitution, when anyone renders to another what is not due to him. It is however somewhat like a restitution, since the thing itself is materially the same; yet it is not the same in respect of the formal aspect of justice, which considers that thing as belonging to this particular man: and so it is not restitution properly so called.

Reply to Objection 2: In so far as the word restitution denotes something done over again, it implies identity of object. Hence it would seem originally to have applied chiefly to external things, which can pass from one person to another, since they remain the same both substantially and in respect of the right of dominion. But, even as the term “commutation” has passed from such like things to those actions and passions which confer reverence or injury, harm or profit on another person, so too the term “restitution” is applied, to things which though they be transitory in reality, yet remain in their effect; whether this touch his body, as when the body is hurt by being struck, or his reputation, as when a man remains defamed or dishonored by injurious words.

Reply to Objection 3: Compensation is made by the distributor to the man to whom less was given than his due, by comparison of thing with thing, when the latter receives so much the more according as he received less than his due: and consequently it pertains to commutative justice.

Whether restitution of what has been taken away is necessary for salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to restore what has been taken away. For that which is impossible is not necessary for salvation. But sometimes it is impossible to restore what has been taken, as when a man has taken limb or life. Therefore it does not seem necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.

Objection 2: Further, the commission of a sin is not necessary for salvation, for then a man would be in a dilemma. But sometimes it is impossible, without sin, to restore what has been taken, as when one has taken away another's good name by telling the truth. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken from another.

Objection 3: Further, what is done cannot be undone. Now sometimes a man loses his personal honor by being unjustly insulted. Therefore that which has been taken from him cannot be restored to him: so that it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

Objection 4: Further, to prevent a person from obtaining a good thing is seemingly the same as to take it away from him, since "to lack little is almost the same as to lack nothing at all," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5). Now when anyone prevents a man from obtaining a benefice or the like, seemingly he is not bound to restore the benefice, since this would be sometimes impossible. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to restore what one has taken.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Maced. cxliii): "Unless a man restore what he has purloined, his sin is not forgiven."

I answer that, Restitution as stated above [2890](A[1]) is an act of commutative justice, and this demands a certain equality. Wherefore restitution denotes the return of the thing unjustly taken; since it is by giving it back that equality is reestablished. If, however, it be taken away justly, there will be equality, and so there will be no need for restitution, for justice consists in equality. Since therefore the safeguarding of justice is necessary for salvation, it follows that it is necessary for salvation to restore what has been taken unjustly.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is impossible to repay the equivalent, it suffices to repay what one can, as in the case of honor due to God and our parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Wherefore when that which has been taken cannot be restored in equivalent, compensation should be made as far as possible: for instance if one man has deprived another of a limb, he must make compensation either in money or in honor, the condition of either party being duly considered according to the judgment of a good man.

Reply to Objection 2: There are three ways in which one may take away another’s good name. First, by saying what is true, and this justly, as when a man reveals another’s sin, while observing the right order of so doing, and then he is not bound to restitution. Secondly, by saying what is untrue and unjustly, and then he is bound to restore that man’s good name, by confessing that he told an untruth. Thirdly, by saying what is true, but unjustly, as when a man reveals another’s sin contrarily to the right order of so doing, and then he is bound to restore his good name as far as he can, and yet without telling an untruth; for instance by saying that he spoke ill, or that he defamed him unjustly; or if he be unable to restore his good name, he must compensate him otherwise, the same as in other cases, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: The action of the man who has defamed another cannot be undone, but it is possible, by showing him deference, to undo its effect, viz. the lowering of the other man’s personal dignity in the opinion of other men.

Reply to Objection 4: There are several ways of preventing a man from obtaining a benefice. First, justly: for instance, if having in view the honor of God or the good of the Church, one procures its being conferred on a more worthy subject, and then there is no obligation whatever to make restitution or compensation. Secondly, unjustly, if the intention is to injure the person whom one hinders, through hatred, revenge or the like. In this case, if before the benefice has been definitely assigned to anyone, one prevents its being conferred on a worthy subject by counseling that it be not conferred on him, one is bound to make some compensation, after taking account of the circumstances of persons and things according to the judgment of a prudent person: but one is not bound in equivalent, because that man had not obtained the benefice and might have been prevented in many ways from obtaining it. If, on the other hand, the benefice had already been assigned to a certain person, and someone, for some undue cause procures its revocation, it is the same as though he had deprived a man of what he already possessed, and consequently he would be bound to compensation in equivalent, in proportion, however, to his means.

Whether it suffices to restore the exact amount taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount taken. For it is written (Ex. 22:1): “If a man shall steal an ox or a sheep and kill or sell it, he shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.” Now everyone is bound to keep the commandments of the Divine law. Therefore a thief is bound to restore four- or fivefold.

Objection 2: Further, “What things soever were written, were written for our learning” (Rom. 15:4). Now Zachaeus said (Lk. 19:8) to our Lord: “If I have wronged any man of any thing, I restore him fourfold.” Therefore a man is bound to restore several times over the amount he has taken unjustly.

Objection 3: Further, no one can be unjustly deprived of what he is not bound to give. Now a judge justly deprives a thief of more than the amount of his theft, under the head of damages. Therefore a man is bound to pay it, and consequently it is not sufficient to restore the exact amount.

On the contrary, Restitution re-establishes equality where an unjust taking has caused inequality. Now equality is restored by repaying the exact amount taken. Therefore there is no obligation to restore more than the exact amount taken.

I answer that, When a man takes another’s thing unjustly, two things must be considered. One is the inequality on the part of the thing, which inequality is sometimes void of injustice, as is the case in loans. The other is the sin of injustice, which is consistent with equality on the part of the thing, as when a person intends to use violence but fails.

As regards the first, the remedy is applied by making restitution, since thereby equality is re-established; and for this it is enough that a man restore just so much as he has belonging to another. But as regards the sin, the remedy is applied by punishment, the infliction of which belongs to the judge: and so, until a man is condemned by the judge, he is not bound to restore more than he took, but when once he is condemned, he is bound to pay the penalty.

Hence it is clear how to answer the First Objection: because this law fixes the punishment to be inflicted by the judge. Nor is this commandment to be kept now, because since the coming of Christ no man is bound to keep the judicial precepts, as stated above ([2891]FS, Q[104], A[3]). Nevertheless the same might be determined by human law, and then the same answer would apply.

Reply to Objection 2: Zachaeus said this being willing to do more than he was bound to do; hence he had said already: “Behold . . . the half of my goods I give to the poor.”

Reply to Objection 3: By condemning the man justly, the judge can exact more by way of damages; and yet this was not due before the sentence.

Whether a man is bound to restore what he has not taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore what he has not taken. For he that has inflicted a loss on a man is bound to remove that loss. Now it happens sometimes that the loss sustained is greater than the thing taken: for instance, if you dig up a man’s seeds, you inflict on the sower a loss equal to the coming harvest, and thus you would seem to be bound to make restitution accordingly. Therefore a man is bound to restore what he has not taken.

Objection 2: Further, he who retains his creditor’s money beyond the stated time, would seem to occasion his loss of all his possible profits from that money, and yet he does not really take them. Therefore it seems that a man is bound to restore what he did not take.

Objection 3: Further, human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now a man is bound to restore to God more than he has received from Him, according to Mat. 25:26, “Thou knewest that I reap where I sow not, and gather where I have not strewed.” Therefore it is just that one should restore to a man also, something that one has not taken.

On the contrary, Restitution belongs to justice, because it re-establishes equality. But if one were to restore what one did not take, there would not be equality. Therefore it is not just to make such a restitution.

I answer that, Whoever brings a loss upon another person, seemingly, takes from him the amount of the loss, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) loss is so called from a man having “less”* than his due. [*The derivation is more apparent in English than in Latin, where ‘damnum’ stands for ‘loss,’ and ‘minus’ for ‘less.’ Aristotle merely says that to have more than your own is called ‘gain,’ and to have less than you started with is called ‘loss.’] Therefore a man is bound to make restitution according to the loss he has brought upon another.

Now a man suffers a loss in two ways. First, by being deprived of what he actually has; and a loss of this kind is always to be made good by repayment in equivalent: for instance if a man damnifies another by destroying his house he is bound to pay him the value of the house. Secondly, a man may damnify another by preventing him from obtaining what he was on the way to obtain. A loss of this kind need not be made good in equivalent; because to have a thing virtually is less than to have it actually, and to be on the way to obtain a thing is to have it merely virtually or potentially, and so were he to be indemnified by receiving the thing actually, he would be paid, not the exact value taken from him, but more, and this is not necessary for salvation, as stated above. However he is bound to make some compensation, according to the condition of persons and things.

From this we see how to answer the First and Second Objections: because the sower of the seed in the field, has the harvest, not actually but only virtually. In like manner he that has money has the profit not yet actually but only virtually: and both may be hindered in many ways.

Reply to Objection 3: God requires nothing from us but what He Himself has sown in us. Hence this saying is to be understood as expressing either the shameful thought of the lazy servant, who deemed that he had received nothing from the other, or the fact that God expects from us the fruit of His gifts, which fruit is from Him and from us, although the gifts themselves are from God without us.

Whether restitution must always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it would sometimes be injurious to the man himself, or to others, were one to restore to him what has been taken from him; if, for instance, one were to return a madman his sword. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

Objection 2: Further, if a man has given a thing unlawfully, he does not deserve to recover it. Now sometimes a man gives unlawfully that which another accepts unlawfully, as in the case of the giver and receiver who are guilty of simony. Therefore it is not always necessary to make restitution to the person from whom one has taken something.

Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. Now it is sometimes impossible to make restitution to the person from whom a thing has been taken, either because he is dead, or because he is too far away, or because he is unknown to us. Therefore restitution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

Objection 4: Further, we owe more compensation to one from whom we have received a greater favor. Now we have received greater favors from others (our parents for instance) than from a lender or depositor. Therefore sometimes we ought to succor some other person rather than make restitution to one from whom we have taken something.

Objection 5: Further, it is useless to restore a thing which reverts to the restorer by being restored. Now if a prelate has unjustly taken something from the Church and makes restitution to the Church, it reverts into his hands, since he is the guardian of the Church's property. Therefore he ought not to restore to the Church from whom he has taken: and so restitution should not always be made to the person from whom something has been taken away

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 13:7): "Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom."

I answer that, Restitution re-establishes the equality of commutative justice, which equality consists in the equalizing of thing to thing, as stated above [2892](A[2]; Q[58], A[10]). Now this equalizing of things is impossible, unless he that has less than his due receive what is lacking to him: and for this to be done, restitution must be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken.

Reply to Objection 1: When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is directed to the good of the person to whom it is made, since all possessions come under the head of the useful. Yet he who retains another's property must not appropriate it, but must either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or hand it over to another to keep it more securely.

Reply to Objection 2: A person may give a thing unlawfully in two ways. First through the giving itself being illicit and against the law, as is the case when a man gives a thing simoniacally. Such a man deserves to lose what he gave, wherefore restitution should not be made to him: and, since the receiver acted against the law in receiving, he must not retain the price, but must use it for some pious object. Secondly a man gives unlawfully, through giving for an unlawful purpose, albeit the giving itself is not unlawful, as when a woman receives payment for fornication: wherefore she may keep what she has received. If, however, she has extorted overmuch by fraud or deceit, she would be bound to restitution.

Reply to Objection 3: If the person to whom restitution is due is unknown altogether, restitution must be made as far as possible, for instance by giving an alms for his spiritual welfare (whether he be dead or living): but not without previously making a careful inquiry about his person. If the person to whom restitution is due be dead, restitution should be made to his heir, who is looked upon as one with him. If he be very far away, what is due to him should be sent to him, especially if it be of great value and can easily be sent: else it should be deposited in a safe place to be kept for him, and the owner should be advised of the fact.

Reply to Objection 4: A man is bound, out of his own property, to succor his parents, or those from whom he has received greater benefits; but he ought not to compensate a benefactor out of what belongs to others; and he would be doing this if he were to compensate one with what is due to another. Exception must be made in cases of extreme need, for then he could and should even take what belongs to another in order to succor a parent.

Reply to Objection 5: There are three ways in which a prelate can rob the Church of her property. First by laying hands on Church property which is committed, not to him but to another; for instance, if a bishop appropriates the property of the chapter. In such a case it is clear that he is bound to restitution, by handing it over to those who are its lawful owners. Secondly by transferring to another person (for instance a relative or a friend) Church property committed to himself: in which case he must make restitution to the Church, and have it under his own care, so as to hand it over to his successor. Thirdly, a prelate may lay hands on Church property, merely in intention, when, to wit, he begins to have a mind to hold it as his own and not in the name of the Church: in which case he must make restitution by renouncing his intention.

Whether he that has taken a thing is always bound to restitution?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who has taken a thing is not always bound to restore it. Restitution re-establishes the equality of justice, by taking away from him that has more and giving to him that has less. Now it happens sometimes that he who has taken that which belongs to another, no longer has it, through its having passed into another’s hands. Therefore it should be restored, not by the person that took it, but by the one that has it.

Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to reveal his own crime. But by making restitution a man would sometimes reveal his crime, as in the case of theft. Therefore he that has taken a thing is not always bound to restitution.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing should not be restored several times. Now sometimes several persons take a thing at the same time, and one of them restores it in its entirety. Therefore he that takes a thing is not always bound to restitution.

On the contrary, He that has sinned is bound to satisfaction. Now restitution belongs to satisfaction. Therefore he that has taken a thing is bound to restore it.

I answer that, With regard to a man who has taken another’s property, two points must be considered: the thing taken, and the taking. By reason of the thing taken, he is bound to restore it as long as he has it in his possession, since the thing that he has in addition to what is his, should be taken away from him, and given to him who lacks it according to the form of commutative justice. On the other hand, the taking of the thing that is another’s property, may be threefold. For sometimes it is injurious, i.e. against the will of the owner, as in theft and robbery: in which case the thief is bound to restitution not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the injurious action, even though the thing is no longer in his possession. For just as a man who strikes another, though he gain nothing thereby, is bound to compensate the injured person, so too he that is guilty of theft or robbery, is bound to make compensation for the loss incurred, although he be no better off; and in addition he must be punished for the injustice committed. Secondly, a man takes another’s property for his own profit but without committing an injury, i.e. with the consent of the owner, as in the case of a loan: and then, the taker is bound to restitution, not only by reason of the thing, but also by reason of the taking, even if he has lost the thing: for he is bound to compensate the person who has done him a favor, and he would not be doing so if the latter were to lose thereby. Thirdly, a man takes another’s property without injury to the latter or profit to himself, as in the case of a deposit; wherefore he that takes a thing thus, incurs no obligation on account of the taking, in fact by taking he grants a favor; but he is bound to restitution on account of the thing taken. Consequently if this thing be taken from him without any fault on his part, he is not bound to restitution, although he would be, if he were to lose the thing through a grievous fault on his part.

Reply to Objection 1: The chief end of restitution is, not that he who has more than his due may cease to have it, but that he who has less than his due may be compensated. Wherefore there is no place for restitution in those things which one man may receive from another without loss to the latter, as when a person takes a light from another’s candle. Consequently although he that has taken something from another, may have ceased to have what he took, through having transferred it to another, yet since that other is deprived of what is his, both are bound to restitution, he that took the thing, on account of the injurious taking, and he that has it, on account of the thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Although a man is not bound to reveal his crime to other men, yet is he bound to reveal it to God in confession; and so he may make restitution of another’s property through the priest to whom he confesses.

Reply to Objection 3: Since restitution is chiefly directed to the compensation for the loss incurred by the person from whom a thing has been taken unjustly, it stands to reason that when he has received sufficient compensation from one, the others are not bound to any further restitution in his regard: rather ought they to refund the person who has made restitution, who, nevertheless, may excuse them from so doing.

Whether restitution is binding on those who have not taken?

Objection 1: It would seem that restitution is not binding on those who have not taken. For restitution is a punishment of the taker. Now none should be punished except the one who sinned. Therefore none are bound to restitution save the one who has taken.

Objection 2: Further, justice does not bind one to increase another’s property. Now if restitution were binding not only on the man who takes a thing but also on all those who cooperate with him in any way whatever, the person from whom the thing was taken would be the gainer, both because he would receive restitution many times over, and because sometimes a person cooperates towards a thing being taken away from someone, without its being taken away in effect. Therefore the others are not bound to restitution.

Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to expose himself to danger, in order to safeguard another’s property. Now sometimes a man would expose himself to the danger of death, were he to betray a thief, or withstand him. Therefore one is not bound to restitution, through not betraying or withstanding a thief.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:32): “They who do such things are worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but also they that consent to them that do them.” Therefore in like manner they that consent are bound to restitution.

I answer that, As stated above [2893](A[6]), a person is bound to restitution not only on account of someone else’s property which he has taken, but also on account of the injurious taking. Hence whoever is cause of an unjust taking is bound to restitution. This happens in two ways, directly and indirectly. Directly, when a man induces another to take, and this in three ways. First, on the part of the taking, by moving a man to take, either by express command, counsel, or consent, or by praising a man for his courage in thieving. Secondly, on the part of the taker, by giving him shelter or any other kind of assistance. Thirdly, on the part of the thing taken, by taking part in the theft or robbery, as a fellow evil-doer. Indirectly, when a man does not prevent another from evil-doing (provided he be able and bound to prevent him), either by omitting the command or counsel which would hinder him from thieving or robbing, or by omitting to do what would have hindered him, or by sheltering him after the deed. All these are expressed as follows:

“By command, by counsel, by consent, by flattery, by receiving, by participation, by silence, by not preventing, by not denouncing.”

It must be observed, however, that in five of these cases the cooperator is always bound to restitution. First, in the case of command: because he that commands is the chief mover, wherefore he is bound to restitution principally. Secondly, in the case of consent; namely of one without whose consent the robbery cannot take place. Thirdly, in the case of receiving; when, to wit, a man is a receiver of thieves, and gives them assistance. Fourthly, in the case of participation; when a man takes part in the theft and in the booty. Fifthly, he who does not prevent the theft, whereas he is bound to do so; for instance, persons in authority who are bound to safeguard justice on earth, are bound to restitution, if by their neglect thieves prosper, because their salary is given to them in payment of their preserving justice here below.

In the other cases mentioned above, a man is not always bound to restitution: because counsel and flattery are not always the efficacious cause of robbery. Hence the counsellor or flatterer is bound to restitution, only when it may be judged with probability that the unjust taking resulted from such causes.

Reply to Objection 1: Not only is he bound to restitution who commits the sin, but also he who is in any way cause of the sin, whether by counselling, or by commanding, or in any other way whatever.

Reply to Objection 2: He is bound chiefly to restitution, who is the principal in the deed; first of all, the “commander”; secondly, the “executor,” and in due sequence, the others: yet so that, if one of them make restitution, another is not bound to make restitution to the same person. Yet those who are principals in the deed, and who took possession of the thing, are bound to compensate those who have already made restitution. When a man commands an unjust taking that does not follow, no restitution has to be made, since its end is chiefly to restore the property of the person who has been unjustly injured.

Reply to Objection 3: He that fails to denounce a thief or does not withstand or reprehend him is not always bound to restitution, but only when he is obliged, in virtue of his office, to do so: as in the case of earthly princes who do not incur any great danger thereby; for they are invested with public authority, in order that they may maintain justice.

Whether a man is bound to immediate restitution, or may he put it off?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to immediate restitution, and can lawfully delay to restore. For affirmative precepts do not bind for always. Now the necessity of making restitution is binding through an affirmative precept. Therefore a man is not bound to immediate restitution.

Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to do what is impossible. But it is sometimes impossible to make restitution at once. Therefore no man is bound to immediate restitution.

Objection 3: Further, restitution is an act of virtue, viz. of justice. Now time is one of the circumstances requisite for virtuous acts. Since then the other circumstances are not determinate for acts of virtue, but are determinable according to the dictate of prudence, it seems that neither in restitution is there any fixed time, so that a man be bound to restore at once.

On the contrary, All matters of restitution seem to come under one head. Now a man who hires the services of a wage-earner, must not delay compensation, as appears from Lev. 19:13, “The wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until the morning.” Therefore neither is it lawful, in other cases of restitution, to delay, and restitution should be made at once.

I answer that, Even as it is a sin against justice to take another’s property, so also is it to withhold it, since, to withhold the property of another against the owner’s will, is to deprive him of the use of what belongs to him, and to do him an injury. Now it is clear that it is wrong to remain in sin even for a short time; and one is bound to renounce one’s sin at once, according to Ecclus. 21:2, “Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent.” Consequently one is bound to immediate restitution, if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the thing.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the precept about the making of restitution is affirmative in form, it implies a negative precept forbidding us to withhold another’s property.

Reply to Objection 2: When one is unable to restore at once, this very inability excuses one from immediate restitution: even as a person is altogether excused from making restitution if he is altogether unable to make it. He is, however, bound either himself or through another to ask the person to whom he owes compensation to grant him a remission or a respite.

Reply to Objection 3: Whenever the omission of a circumstance is contrary to virtue that circumstance must be looked upon as determinate, and we are bound to observe it: and since delay of restitution involves a sin of unjust detention which is opposed to just detention, it stands to reason that the time is determinate in the point of restitution being immediate.

VICES OPPOSED TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (Q[63])

OF RESPECT OF PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid parts of justice. First we shall consider respect of persons which is opposed to distributive justice; secondly we shall consider the vices opposed to commutative justice.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether respect of persons is a sin?

(2) Whether it takes place in the dispensation of spiritualities?

(3) Whether it takes place in showing honor?

(4) Whether it takes place in judicial sentences?

Whether respect of persons is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons is not a sin. For the word "person" includes a reference to personal dignity [*Cf. [2894]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2]. Now it belongs to distributive justice to consider personal dignity. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, in human affairs persons are of more importance than things, since things are for the benefit of persons and not conversely. But respect of things is not a sin. Much less, therefore, is respect of persons.

Objection 3: Further, no injustice or sin can be in God. Yet God seems to respect persons, since of two men circumstanced alike He sometimes upraises one by grace, and leaves the other in sin, according to Mat. 24:40: "Two shall be in a bed [Vulg.: 'field' [*'Bed' is the reading of Luk. 17:34], one shall be taken, and one shall be left." Therefore respect of persons is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing but sin is forbidden in the Divine law. Now respect of persons is forbidden, Dt. 1:17: “Neither shall you respect any man’s person.” Therefore respect of persons is a sin.

I answer that, Respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice. For the equality of distributive justice consists in allotting various things to various persons in proportion to their personal dignity. Accordingly, if one considers that personal property by reason of which the thing allotted to a particular person is due to him, this is respect not of the person but of the cause. Hence a gloss on Eph. 6:9, “There is no respect of persons with God [Vulg.: ‘Him’],” says that “a just judge regards causes, not persons.” For instance if you promote a man to a professorship on account of his having sufficient knowledge, you consider the due cause, not the person; but if, in conferring something on someone, you consider in him not the fact that what you give him is proportionate or due to him, but the fact that he is this particular man (e.g. Peter or Martin), then there is respect of the person, since you give him something not for some cause that renders him worthy of it, but simply because he is this person. And any circumstance that does not amount to a reason why this man be worthy of this gift, is to be referred to his person: for instance if a man promote someone to a prelacy or a professorship, because he is rich or because he is a relative of his, it is respect of persons. It may happen, however, that a circumstance of person makes a man worthy as regards one thing, but not as regards another: thus consanguinity makes a man worthy to be appointed heir to an estate, but not to be chosen for a position of ecclesiastical authority: wherefore consideration of the same circumstance of person will amount to respect of persons in one matter and not in another. It follows, accordingly, that respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice in that it fails to observe due proportion. Now nothing but sin is opposed to virtue: and therefore respect of persons is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: In distributive justice we consider those circumstances of a person which result in dignity or right, whereas in respect of persons we consider circumstances that do not so result.

Reply to Objection 2: Persons are rendered proportionate to and worthy of things which are distributed among them, by reason of certain things pertaining to circumstances of person, wherefore such conditions ought to be considered as the proper cause. But when we consider the persons themselves, that which is not a cause is considered as though it were; and so it is clear that although persons are more worthy, absolutely speaking, yet they are not more worthy in this regard.

Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold giving. one belongs to justice, and occurs when we give a man his due: in such like givings respect of persons takes place. The other giving belongs to liberality, when one gives gratis that which is not a man's due: such is the bestowal of the gifts of grace, whereby sinners are chosen by God. In such a giving there is no place for respect of persons, because anyone may, without injustice, give of his own as much as he will, and to whom he will, according to Mat. 20:14,15, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will? . . . Take what is thine, and go thy way."

Whether respect of persons takes place in the dispensation of spiritual goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods. For it would seem to savor of respect of persons if a man confers ecclesiastical dignity or benefice on account of consanguinity, since consanguinity is not a cause whereby a man is rendered worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice. Yet this apparently is not a sin, for ecclesiastical prelates are wont to do so. Therefore the sin of respect of persons does not take place in the conferring of spiritual goods.

Objection 2: Further, to give preference to a rich man rather than to a poor man seems to pertain to respect of persons, according to James 2:2,3. Nevertheless dispensations to marry within forbidden degrees are more readily granted to the rich and powerful than to others. Therefore the sin of respect of persons seems not to take place in the dispensation of spiritual goods.

Objection 3: Further, according to jurists [*Cap. Cum dilectus.] it suffices to choose a good man, and it is not requisite that one choose the better man. But it would seem to savor of respect of persons to choose one who is less good for a higher position. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.

Objection 4: Further, according to the law of the Church (Cap. Cum dilectus.) the person to be chosen should be "a member of the flock." Now this would seem to imply respect of persons, since sometimes more competent persons would be found elsewhere. Therefore respect of persons is not a sin in spiritual matters.

On the contrary, It is written (James 2:1): “Have not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . with respect of persons.” On these words a gloss of Augustine says: “Who is there that would tolerate the promotion of a rich man to a position of honor in the Church, to the exclusion of a poor man more learned and holier?” [*Augustine, Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.]

I answer that, As stated above [2895](A[1]), respect of persons is a sin, in so far as it is contrary to justice. Now the graver the matter in which justice is transgressed, the more grievous the sin: so that, spiritual things being of greater import than temporal, respect of persons is a more grievous sin in dispensing spiritualities than in dispensing temporalities. And since it is respect of persons when something is allotted to a person out of proportion to his deserts, it must be observed that a person’s worthiness may be considered in two ways. First, simply and absolutely: and in this way the man who abounds the more in the spiritual gifts of grace is the more worthy. Secondly, in relation to the common good; for it happens at times that the less holy and less learned man may conduce more to the common good, on account of worldly authority or activity, or something of the kind. And since the dispensation of spiritualities is directed chiefly to the common good, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” it follows that in the dispensation of spiritualities the simply less good are sometimes preferred to the better, without respect of persons, just as God sometimes bestows gratuitous graces on the less worthy.

Reply to Objection 1: We must make a distinction with regard to a prelate’s kinsfolk: for sometimes they are less worthy, both absolutely speaking, and in relation to the common good: and then if they are preferred to the more worthy, there is a sin of respect of persons in the dispensation of spiritual goods, whereof the ecclesiastical superior is not the owner, with power to give them away as he will, but the dispenser, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.” Sometimes however the prelate’s kinsfolk are as worthy as others, and then without respect of persons he can lawfully give preference to his kindred since there is at least this advantage, that he can trust the more in their being of one mind with him in conducting the business of the Church. Yet he would have to forego so doing for fear of scandal, if anyone might take an example from him and give the goods of the Church to their kindred without regard to their deserts.

Reply to Objection 2: Dispensations for contracting marriage came into use for the purpose of strengthening treaties of peace: and this is more necessary for the common good in relation to persons of standing, so that there is no respect of persons in granting dispensations more readily to such persons.

Reply to Objection 3: In order that an election be not rebutted in a court of law, it suffices to elect a good man, nor is it necessary to elect the better man, because otherwise every election might have a flaw. But as regards the conscience of an elector, it is necessary to elect one who is better, either absolutely speaking, or in relation to the common good. For if it is possible to have one who is more competent for a post, and yet another be preferred, it is necessary to have some cause for this. If this cause have anything to do with the matter in point, he who is elected will, in this respect, be more competent; and if that which is taken for cause have nothing to do with the matter, it will clearly be respect of persons.

Reply to Objection 4: The man who is taken from among the members of a particular Church, is generally speaking more useful as regards the common good, since he loves more the Church wherein he was brought up. For this reason it was commanded (Dt. 17:15): “Thou mayest not make a man of another nation king, who is not thy brother.”

Whether respect of persons takes place in showing honor and respect?

Objection 1: It would seem that respect of persons does not take place in showing honor and respect. For honor is apparently nothing else than “reverence shown to a person in recognition of his virtue,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 5). Now prelates and princes should be honored although they be wicked, even as our parents, of whom it is written (Ex. 20:12): “Honor thy father and thy mother.” Again masters, though they be wicked, should be honored by their servants, according to 1 Tim. 6:1: “Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor.” Therefore it seems that it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.

Objection 2: Further, it is commanded (Lev. 19:32): “Rise up before the hoary head, and, honor the person of the aged man.” But this seems to savor of respect of persons, since sometimes old men are not virtuous; according to Dan. 13:5: “Iniquity came out from the ancients of the people [*Vulg.: ‘Iniquity came out of Babylon from the ancient judges, that seemed to govern the people.’].” Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.

Objection 3: Further, on the words of James 2:1, “Have not the faith . . . with respect of persons,” a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. ad Hieron. clxvii.] says: “If the saying of James, ‘If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring,’ etc., refer to our daily meetings, who sins not here, if however he sin at all?” Yet it is respect of persons to honor the rich for their riches, for Gregory says in a homily (xxviii in Evang.): “Our pride is blunted, since in men we honor, not the nature wherein they are made to God’s image, but wealth,” so that, wealth not being a due cause of honor, this will savor of respect of persons. Therefore it is not a sin to respect persons in showing honor.

On the contrary, A gloss on James 2:1, says: “Whoever honors the rich for their riches, sins,” and in like manner, if a man be honored for other causes that do not render him worthy of honor. Now this savors of respect of persons. Therefore it is a sin to respect persons in showing honor.

I answer that, To honor a person is to recognize him as having virtue, wherefore virtue alone is the due cause of a person being honored. Now it is to be observed that a person may be honored not only for his own virtue, but also for another’s: thus princes and prelates, although they be wicked, are honored as standing in God’s place, and as representing the community over which they are placed, according to Prov. 26:8, “As he that casteth a stone into the heap of Mercury, so is he that giveth honor to a fool.” For, since the gentiles ascribed the keeping of accounts to Mercury, “the heap of Mercury” signifies the casting up of an account, when a merchant sometimes substitutes a pebble [*’Lapillus’ or ‘calculus’ whence the English word ‘calculate’] for one hundred marks. So too, is a fool honored if he stand in God’s place or represent the whole community: and in the same way parents and masters should be honored, on account of their having a share of the dignity of God Who is the Father and Lord of all. The aged should be honored, because old age is a sign of virtue, though this sign fail at times: wherefore, according to Wis. 4:8,9, “venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years; but the understanding of a man is gray hairs, and a spotless life is old age.” The rich ought to be honored by reason of their occupying a higher position in the community: but if they be honored merely for their wealth, it will be the sin of respect of persons.

Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear.

Whether the sin of respect of persons takes place in judicial sentences?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences. For respect of persons is opposed to distributive justice, as stated above [2896](A[1]): whereas judicial sentences seem to pertain chiefly to commutative justice. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.

Objection 2: Further, penalties are inflicted according to a sentence. Now it is not a sin to respect persons in pronouncing penalties, since a heavier punishment is inflicted on one who injures the person of a prince than on one who injures the person of others. Therefore respect of persons does not take place in judicial sentences.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:10): “In judging be merciful to the fatherless.” But this seems to imply respect of the person of the needy. Therefore in judicial sentences respect of persons is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 18:5): “It is not good to accept the person in judgment [*Vulg.: ‘It is not good to accept the person of the wicked, to decline from the truth of judgment.’].”

I answer that, As stated above ([2897]Q[60], A[1]), judgment is an act of justice, in as much as the judge restores to the equality of justice, those things which may cause an opposite inequality. Now respect of persons involves a certain inequality, in so far as something is allotted to a person out of that proportion to him in which the equality of justice consists. Wherefore it is evident that judgment is rendered corrupt by respect of persons.

Reply to Objection 1: A judgment may be looked at in two ways. First, in view of the thing judged, and in this way judgment is common to commutative and distributive justice: because it may be decided by judgment how some common good is to be distributed among many, and how one person is to restore to another what he has taken from him. Secondly, it may be considered in view of the form of judgment, in as much as, even in commutative justice, the judge takes from one and gives to another, and this belongs to distributive justice. In this way respect of persons may take place in any judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: When a person is more severely punished on account of a crime committed against a greater person, there is no respect of persons, because the very difference of persons causes, in that case, a diversity of things, as stated above ([2898]Q[58], A[10], ad 3;[2899] Q[61], A[2], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: In pronouncing judgment one ought to succor the needy as far as possible, yet without prejudice to justice: else the saying of Ex. 23:3 would apply: “Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment.”

OF MURDER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices opposed to commutative justice. We must consider (1) those sins that are committed in relation to involuntary commutations; (2) those that are committed with regard to voluntary commutations. Sins are committed in relation to involuntary commutations by doing an injury to one’s neighbor against his will: and this can be done in two ways, namely by deed or by word. By deed when one’s neighbor is injured either in his own person, or in a person connected with him, or in his possessions.

We must therefore consider these points in due order, and in the first place we shall consider murder whereby a man inflicts the greatest injury on his neighbor. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to kill dumb animals or even plants?(2) Whether it is lawful to kill a sinner?

(3) Whether this is lawful to a private individual, or to a public person only?

(4) Whether this is lawful to a cleric?

(5) Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

(6) Whether it is lawful to kill a just man?

(7) Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

(8) Whether accidental homicide is a mortal sin?

Whether it is unlawful to kill any living thing?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill any living thing. For the Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): “They that resist the ordinance of God purchase to themselves damnation [*Vulg.: ‘He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase themselves damnation.’].” Now Divine providence has ordained that all living things should be preserved, according to Ps. 146:8,9, “Who maketh grass to grow on the mountains . . . Who giveth to beasts their food.” Therefore it seems unlawful to take the life of any living thing.

Objection 2: Further, murder is a sin because it deprives a man of life. Now life is common to all animals and plants. Hence for the same reason it is apparently a sin to slay dumb animals and plants.

Objection 3: Further, in the Divine law a special punishment is not appointed save for a sin. Now a special punishment had to be inflicted, according to the Divine law, on one who killed another man’s ox or sheep (Ex. 22:1). Therefore the slaying of dumb animals is a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): “When we hear it said, ‘Thou shalt not kill,’ we do not take it as referring to trees, for they have no sense, nor to irrational animals, because they have no fellowship with us. Hence it follows that the words, ‘Thou shalt not kill’ refer to the killing of a man.”

I answer that, There is no sin in using a thing for the purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that the imperfect are for the perfect, even as in the process of generation nature proceeds from imperfection to perfection. Hence it is that just as in the generation of a man there is first a living thing, then an animal, and lastly a man, so too things, like the plants, which merely have life, are all alike for animals, and all animals are for man. Wherefore it is not unlawful if man use plants for the good of animals, and animals for the good of man, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3).

Now the most necessary use would seem to consist in the fact that animals use plants, and men use animals, for food, and this cannot be done unless these be deprived of life: wherefore it is lawful both to take life from plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use of men. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God Himself: for it is written (Gn. 1:29,30): “Behold I have given you every herb . . . and all trees . . . to be your meat, and to all beasts of the earth”: and again (Gn. 9:3): “Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat to you.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Divine ordinance the life of animals and plants is preserved not for themselves but for man. Hence, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20), “by a most just ordinance of the Creator, both their life and their death are subject to our use.”

Reply to Objection 2: Dumb animals and plants are devoid of the life of reason whereby to set themselves in motion; they are moved, as it were by another, by a kind of natural impulse, a sign of which is that they are naturally enslaved and accommodated to the uses of others.

Reply to Objection 3: He that kills another’s ox, sins, not through killing the ox, but through injuring another man in his property. Wherefore this is not a species of the sin of murder but of the sin of theft or robbery.

Whether it is lawful to kill sinners?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to kill men who have sinned. For our Lord in the parable (Mat. 13) forbade the uprooting of the cockle which denotes wicked men according to a gloss. Now whatever is forbidden by God is a sin. Therefore it is a sin to kill a sinner.

Objection 2: Further, human justice is conformed to Divine justice. Now according to Divine justice sinners are kept back for repentance, according to Ezech. 33:11, “I desire not the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live.” Therefore it seems altogether unjust to kill sinners.

Objection 3: Further, it is not lawful, for any good end whatever, to do that which is evil in itself, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6). Now to kill a man is evil in itself, since we are bound to have charity towards all men, and “we wish our friends to live and to exist," according to Ethic. ix, 4. Therefore it is nowise lawful to kill a man who has sinned.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:18): "Wizards thou shalt not suffer to live"; and (Ps. 100:8): "In the morning I put to death all the wicked of the land."

I answer that, As stated above [2900](A[1]), it is lawful to kill dumb animals, in so far as they are naturally directed to man's use, as the imperfect is directed to the perfect. Now every part is directed to the whole, as imperfect to perfect, wherefore every part is naturally for the sake of the whole. For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common good, since "a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump" (1 Cor. 5:6).

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord commanded them to forbear from uprooting the cockle in order to spare the wheat, i.e. the good. This occurs when the wicked cannot be slain without the good being killed with them, either because the wicked lie hidden among the good, or because they have many followers, so that they cannot be killed without danger to the good, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. iii, 2). Wherefore our Lord teaches that we should rather allow the wicked to live, and that vengeance is to be delayed until the last judgment, rather than that the good be put to death together with the wicked. When, however, the good incur no danger, but rather are protected and saved by the slaying of the wicked, then the latter may be lawfully put to death.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom, God sometimes slays sinners forthwith in order to deliver the good, whereas sometimes He allows them time to repent, according as He knows what is expedient for His elect. This also does human justice imitate according to its powers; for it puts to death those who are dangerous to others, while it allows time for repentance to those who sin without grievously harming others.

Reply to Objection 3: By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Ps. 48:21: “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them,” and Prov. 11:29: “The fool shall serve the wise.” Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).

Whether it is lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is commanded in the Divine law. Yet, on account of the sin of the molten calf, Moses commanded (Ex. 32:27): “Let every man kill his brother, and friend, and neighbor.” Therefore it is lawful for private individuals to kill a sinner.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), man, on account of sin, is compared to the beasts. Now it is lawful for any private individual to kill a wild beast, especially if it be harmful. Therefore for the same reason, it is lawful for any private individual to kill a man who has sinned.

Objection 3: Further, a man, though a private individual, deserves praise for doing what is useful for the common good. Now the slaying of evildoers is useful for the common good, as stated above [2901](A[2]). Therefore it is deserving of praise if even private individuals kill evil-doers.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) [*Can. Quicumque percutit, caus. xxiii, qu. 8]: “A man who, without exercising public authority, kills an evil-doer, shall be judged guilty of murder, and all the more, since he has dared to usurp a power which God has not given him.”

I answer that, As stated above [2902](A[2]), it is lawful to kill an evildoer in so far as it is directed to the welfare of the whole community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the community’s welfare. Thus it belongs to a physician to cut off a decayed limb, when he has been entrusted with the care of the health of the whole body. Now the care of the common good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evildoers to death.

Reply to Objection 1: The person by whose authority a thing is done really does the thing as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Hence according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 21), “He slays not who owes his service to one who commands him, even as a sword is merely the instrument to him that wields it.” Wherefore those who, at the Lord’s command, slew their neighbors and friends, would seem not to have done this themselves, but rather He by whose authority they acted thus: just as a soldier slays the foe by the authority of his sovereign, and the executioner slays the robber by the authority of the judge.

Reply to Objection 2: A beast is by nature distinct from man, wherefore in the case of a wild beast there is no need for an authority to kill it; whereas, in the case of domestic animals, such authority is required, not for their sake, but on account of the owner’s loss. On the other hand a man who has sinned is not by nature distinct from good men; hence a public authority is requisite in order to condemn him to death for the common good.

Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for any private individual to do anything for the common good, provided it harm nobody: but if it be harmful to some other, it cannot be done, except by virtue of the judgment of the person to whom it pertains to decide what is to be taken from the parts for the welfare of the whole.

Whether it is lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for clerics to kill evil-doers. For clerics especially should fulfil the precept of the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:16): “Be ye followers of me as I also am of Christ,” whereby we are called upon to imitate God and His saints. Now the very God whom we worship puts evildoers to death, according to Ps. 135:10, “Who smote Egypt with their firstborn.” Again Moses made the Levites slay twenty-three thousand men on account of the worship of the calf (Ex. 32), the priest Phinees slew the Israelite who went in to the woman of Madian (Num. 25), Samuel killed Agag king of Amalec (1 Kings 15), Elias slew the priests of Baal (3 Kings 18), Mathathias killed the man who went up to the altar to sacrifice (1 Mac.

2); and, in the New Testament, Peter killed Ananias and Saphira (Acts 5). Therefore it seems that even clerics may kill evil-doers.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual power is greater than the secular and is more united to God. Now the secular power as "God's minister" lawfully puts evil-doers to death, according to Rom. 13:4. Much more therefore may clerics, who are God's ministers and have spiritual power, put evil-doers to death.

Objection 3: Further, whosoever lawfully accepts an office, may lawfully exercise the functions of that office. Now it belongs to the princely office to slay evildoers, as stated above [2903](A[3]). Therefore those clerics who are earthly princes may lawfully slay malefactors.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3): "It behooveth . . . a bishop to be without crime [*Vulg.: 'blameless.' 'Without crime' is the reading in Tit. 1:7] . . . not given to wine, no striker."

I answer that, It is unlawful for clerics to kill, for two reasons. First, because they are chosen for the ministry of the altar, whereon is represented the Passion of Christ slain "Who, when He was struck did not strike [Vulg.: 'When He suffered, He threatened not']" (1 Pet. 2:23). Therefore it becomes not clerics to strike or kill: for ministers should imitate their master, according to Ecclus. 10:2, "As the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers." The other reason is because clerics are entrusted with the ministry of the New Law, wherein no punishment of death or of bodily maiming is appointed: wherefore they should abstain from such things in order that they may be fitting ministers of the New Testament.

Reply to Objection 1: God works in all things without exception whatever is right, yet in each one according to its mode. Wherefore everyone should imitate God in that which is specially becoming to him. Hence, though God slays evildoers even corporally, it does not follow that all should imitate Him in this. As regards Peter, he did not put Ananias and Saphira to death by his own authority or with his own hand, but published their death sentence pronounced by God. The Priests or Levites of the Old Testament were the ministers of the Old Law, which appointed corporal penalties, so that it was fitting for them to slay with their own hands.

Reply to Objection 2: The ministry of clerics is concerned with better things than corporal slayings, namely with things pertaining to spiritual welfare, and so it is not fitting for them to meddle with minor matters.

Reply to Objection 3: Ecclesiastical prelates accept the office of earthly princes, not that they may inflict capital punishment themselves, but that this may be carried into effect by others in virtue of their authority.

Whether it is lawful to kill oneself?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill himself. For murder is a sin in so far as it is contrary to justice. But no man can do an injustice to himself, as is proved in Ethic. v, 11. Therefore no man sins by killing himself.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful, for one who exercises public authority, to kill evil-doers. Now he who exercises public authority is sometimes an evil-doer. Therefore he may lawfully kill himself.

Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for a man to suffer spontaneously a lesser danger that he may avoid a greater: thus it is lawful for a man to cut off a decayed limb even from himself, that he may save his whole body. Now sometimes a man, by killing himself, avoids a greater evil, for example an unhappy life, or the shame of sin. Therefore a man may kill himself.

Objection 4: Further, Samson killed himself, as related in Judges 16, and yet he is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11). Therefore it is lawful for a man to kill himself.

Objection 5: Further, it is related (2 Mac. 14:42) that a certain Razias killed himself, “choosing to die nobly rather than to fall into the hands of the wicked, and to suffer abuses unbecoming his noble birth.” Now nothing that is done nobly and bravely is unlawful. Therefore suicide is not unlawful.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 20): “Hence it follows that the words ‘Thou shalt not kill’ refer to the killing of a man—not another man; therefore, not even thyself. For he who kills himself, kills nothing else than a man.”

I answer that, It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corruptions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law and to charity. Secondly, because every part, as such, belongs to the whole. Now every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the community. Hence by killing himself he injures the community, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11). Thirdly, because life is God's gift to man, and is subject to His power, Who kills and makes to live. Hence whoever takes his own life, sins against God, even as he who kills another's slave, sins against that slave's master, and as he who usurps to himself judgment of a matter not entrusted to him. For it belongs to God alone to pronounce sentence of death and life, according to Dt. 32:39, "I will kill and I will make to live."

Reply to Objection 1: Murder is a sin, not only because it is contrary to justice, but also because it is opposed to charity which a man should have towards himself: in this respect suicide is a sin in relation to oneself. In relation to the community and to God, it is sinful, by reason also of its opposition to justice.

Reply to Objection 2: One who exercises public authority may lawfully put to death an evil-doer, since he can pass judgment on him. But no man is judge of himself. Wherefore it is not lawful for one who exercises public authority to put himself to death for any sin whatever: although he may lawfully commit himself to the judgment of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is made master of himself through his free-will: wherefore he can lawfully dispose of himself as to those matters which pertain to this life which is ruled by man's free-will. But the passage from this life to another and happier one is subject not to man's free-will but to the power of God. Hence it is not lawful for man to take his own life that he may pass to a happier life, nor that he may escape any unhappiness whatsoever of the present life, because the ultimate and most fearsome evil of this life is death, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore to bring death upon oneself in order to escape the other afflictions of this life, is to adopt a greater evil in order to avoid a lesser. In like manner it is unlawful to take one's own life on account of one's having committed a sin, both because by so doing one does oneself a very great injury, by depriving oneself of the time needful for repentance, and because it is not lawful to slay an evildoer except by the sentence of the public authority. Again it is unlawful for a woman to kill herself lest she be violated, because she ought not to commit on herself the very great sin of suicide, to avoid the lesser sir;

of another. For she commits no sin in being violated by force, provided she does not consent, since "without consent of the mind there is no stain on the body," as the Blessed Lucy declared. Now it is evident that fornication and adultery are less grievous sins than taking a man's, especially one's own, life: since the latter is most grievous, because one injures oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love. Moreover it is most dangerous since no time is left wherein to expiate it by repentance. Again it is not lawful for anyone to take his own life for fear he should consent to sin, because "evil must not be done that good may come" (Rom. 3:8) or that evil may be avoided especially if the evil be of small account and an uncertain event, for it is uncertain whether one will at some future time consent to a sin, since God is able to deliver man from sin under any temptation whatever.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 21), "not even Samson is to be excused that he crushed himself together with his enemies under the ruins of the house, except the Holy Ghost, Who had wrought many wonders through him, had secretly commanded him to do this." He assigns the same reason in the case of certain holy women, who at the time of persecution took their own lives, and who are commemorated by the Church.

Reply to Objection 5: It belongs to fortitude that a man does not shrink from being slain by another, for the sake of the good of virtue, and that he may avoid sin. But that a man take his own life in order to avoid penal evils has indeed an appearance of fortitude (for which reason some, among whom was Razias, have killed themselves thinking to act from fortitude), yet it is not true fortitude, but rather a weakness of soul unable to bear penal evils, as the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7) and Augustine (De Civ. Dei 22,23) declare.

Whether it is lawful to kill the innocent?

Objection 1: It would seem that in some cases it is lawful to kill the innocent. The fear of God is never manifested by sin, since on the contrary "the fear of the Lord driveth out sin" (Ecclus. 1:27). Now Abraham was commended in that he feared the Lord, since he was willing to slay his innocent son. Therefore one may, without sin, kill an innocent person.

Objection 2: Further, among those sins that are committed against one’s neighbor, the more grievous seem to be those whereby a more grievous injury is inflicted on the person sinned against. Now to be killed is a greater injury to a sinful than to an innocent person, because the latter, by death, passes forthwith from the unhappiness of this life to the glory of heaven. Since then it is lawful in certain cases to kill a sinful man, much more is it lawful to slay an innocent or a righteous person.

Objection 3: Further, what is done in keeping with the order of justice is not a sin. But sometimes a man is forced, according to the order of justice, to slay an innocent person: for instance, when a judge, who is bound to judge according to the evidence, condemns to death a man whom he knows to be innocent but who is convicted by false witnesses; and again the executioner, who in obedience to the judge puts to death the man who has been unjustly sentenced.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 23:7): “The innocent and just person thou shalt not put to death.”

I answer that, An individual man may be considered in two ways: first, in himself; secondly, in relation to something else. If we consider a man in himself, it is unlawful to kill any man, since in every man though he be sinful, we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him. Nevertheless, as stated above [2904](A[2]) the slaying of a sinner becomes lawful in relation to the common good, which is corrupted by sin. On the other hand the life of righteous men preserves and forwards the common good, since they are the chief part of the community. Therefore it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent.

Reply to Objection 1: God is Lord of death and life, for by His decree both the sinful and the righteous die. Hence he who at God’s command kills an innocent man does not sin, as neither does God Whose behest he executes: indeed his obedience to God’s commands is a proof that he fears Him.

Reply to Objection 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and so acts more in opposition to charity: secondly, because he inflicts an injury on a man who is less deserving of one, and so acts more in opposition to justice: thirdly, because he deprives the community of a greater good: fourthly, because he despises God more, according to Lk. 10:16, “He that despiseth you despiseth Me.” On the other hand it is accidental to the slaying that the just man whose life is taken be received by God into glory.

Reply to Objection 3: If the judge knows that man who has been convicted by false witnesses, is innocent he must, like Daniel, examine the witnesses with great care, so as to find a motive for acquitting the innocent: but if he cannot do this he should remit him for judgment by a higher tribunal. If even this is impossible, he does not sin if he pronounce sentence in accordance with the evidence, for it is not he that puts the innocent man to death, but they who stated him to be guilty. He that carries out the sentence of the judge who has condemned an innocent man, if the sentence contains an inexcusable error, he should not obey, else there would be an excuse for the executions of the martyrs: if however it contain no manifest injustice, he does not has no right to discuss the judgment of his superior; nor is it he who slays the innocent man, but the judge whose minister he is.

Whether it is lawful to kill a man in self-defense?

Objection 1: It would seem that nobody may lawfully kill a man in self-defense. For Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “I do not agree with the opinion that one may kill a man lest one be killed by him; unless one be a soldier, exercise a public office, so that one does it not for oneself but for others, having the power to do so, provided it be in keeping with one’s person.” Now he who kills a man in self-defense, kills him lest he be killed by him. Therefore this would seem to be unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, he says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): “How are they free from sin in sight of Divine providence, who are guilty of taking a man’s life for the sake of these contemptible things?” Now among contemptible things he reckons “those which men may forfeit unwillingly,” as appears from the context (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): and the chief of these is the life of the body. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to take another’s life for the sake of the life of his own body.

Objection 3: Further, Pope Nicolas [*Nicolas I, Dist. 1, can. De his clericis] says in the Decretals: “Concerning the clerics about whom you have consulted Us, those, namely, who have killed a pagan in self-defense, as to whether, after making amends by repenting, they may return to their former state, or rise to a higher degree; know that in no case is it lawful for them to kill any man under any circumstances whatever." Now clerics and laymen are alike bound to observe the moral precepts. Therefore neither is it lawful for laymen to kill anyone in self-defense.

Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than fornication or adultery. Now nobody may lawfully commit simple fornication or adultery or any other mortal sin in order to save his own life; since the spiritual life is to be preferred to the life of the body. Therefore no man may lawfully take another's life in self-defense in order to save his own life.

Objection 5: Further, if the tree be evil, so is the fruit, according to Mat. 7:17. Now self-defense itself seems to be unlawful, according to Rom. 12:19: "Not defending [Douay: 'revenging'] yourselves, my dearly beloved." Therefore its result, which is the slaying of a man, is also unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:2): "If a thief be found breaking into a house or undermining it, and be wounded so as to die; he that slew him shall not be guilty of blood." Now it is much more lawful to defend one's life than one's house. Therefore neither is a man guilty of murder if he kill another in defense of his own life.

I answer that, Nothing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is intended, while the other is beside the intention. Now moral acts take their species according to what is intended, and not according to what is beside the intention, since this is accidental as explained above (Q[43], A[3]; [2905]FS, Q[12], A[1]). Accordingly the act of self-defense may have two effects, one is the saving of one's life, the other is the slaying of the aggressor. Therefore this act, since one's intention is to save one's own life, is not unlawful, seeing that it is natural to everything to keep itself in "being," as far as possible. And yet, though proceeding from a good intention, an act may be rendered unlawful, if it be out of proportion to the end. Wherefore if a man, in self-defense, uses more than necessary violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repel force with moderation his defense will be lawful, because according to the jurists [*Cap. Significasti, De Homicid. volunt. vel casual.], "it is lawful to repel force by force, provided one does not exceed the limits of a blameless defense." Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of moderate self-defense in order to avoid killing the other man, since one is bound to take more care of one's own life than of another's. But as it is unlawful to take a man's life, except for the public authority acting for the common good, as stated above [2906](A[3]), it is not lawful for a man to intend killing a man in self-defense, except for such as have public authority, who while intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to the public good, as in the case of a soldier fighting against the foe, and in the minister of the judge struggling with robbers, although even these sin if they be moved by private animosity.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted from Augustine refer to the case when one man intends to kill another to save himself from death. The passage quoted in the Second Objection is to be understood in the same sense. Hence he says pointedly, "for the sake of these things," whereby he indicates the intention. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity results from the act though sinless of taking a man's life, as appears in the case of a judge who justly condemns a man to death. For this reason a cleric, though he kill a man in self-defense, is irregular, albeit he intends not to kill him, but to defend himself.

Reply to Objection 4: The act of fornication or adultery is not necessarily directed to the preservation of one's own life, as is the act whence sometimes results the taking of a man's life.

Reply to Objection 5: The defense forbidden in this passage is that which comes from revengeful spite. Hence a gloss says: "Not defending yourselves—that is, not striking your enemy back."

Whether one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance?

Objection 1: It would seem that one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance. For we read (Gn. 4:23,24) that Lamech slew a man in mistake for a wild beast [*The text of the Bible does not say so, but this was the Jewish traditional commentary on Gn. 4:23], and that he was accounted guilty of murder. Therefore one incurs the guilt of murder through killing a man by chance.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ex. 21:22): "If . . . one strike a woman with child, and she miscarry indeed . . . if her death ensue thereupon, he shall render life for life." Yet this may happen without any intention of causing her death. Therefore one is guilty of murder through killing someone by chance.

Objection 3: Further, the Decretals [*Dist. 1] contain several canons prescribing penalties for unintentional homicide. Now penalty is not due save for guilt. Therefore he who kills a man by chance, incurs the guilt of murder.

On the contrary, Augustine says to Publicola (Ep. xlvii): “When we do a thing for a good and lawful purpose, if thereby we unintentionally cause harm to anyone, it should by no means be imputed to us.” Now it sometimes happens by chance that a person is killed as a result of something done for a good purpose. Therefore the person who did it is not accounted guilty.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 6) “chance is a cause that acts beside one’s intention.” Hence chance happenings, strictly speaking, are neither intended nor voluntary. And since every sin is voluntary, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xiv) it follows that chance happenings, as such, are not sins.

Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle is called an accidental cause. Wherefore he who does not remove something whence homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary homicide. This happens in two ways: first when a man causes another’s death through occupying himself with unlawful things which he ought to avoid: secondly, when he does not take sufficient care. Hence, according to jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person’s death: whereas if he be occupied with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone’s death.

Reply to Objection 1: Lamech did not take sufficient care to avoid taking a man’s life: and so he was not excused from being guilty of homicide.

Reply to Objection 2: He that strikes a woman with child does something unlawful: wherefore if there results the death either of the woman or of the animated fetus, he will not be excused from homicide, especially seeing that death is the natural result of such a blow.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the canons a penalty, is inflicted on those who cause death unintentionally, through doing something unlawful, or failing to take sufficient care.

OF OTHER INJURIES COMMITTED ON THE PERSON (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider other sinful injuries committed on the person. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The mutilation of members;

(2) Blows;

(3) Imprisonment;

(4) Whether the sins that consist in inflicting such like injuries are aggravated through being perpetrated on persons connected with others?

Whether in some cases it may be lawful to maim anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem that in no case can it be lawful to maim anyone. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20) that "sin consists in departing from what is according to nature, towards that which is contrary to nature." Now according to nature it is appointed by God that a man's body should be entire in its members, and it is contrary to nature that it should be deprived of a member. Therefore it seems that it is always a sin to maim a person.

Objection 2: Further, as the whole soul is to the whole body, so are the parts of the soul to the parts of the body (De Anima ii, 1). But it is unlawful to deprive a man of his soul by killing him, except by public authority. Therefore neither is it lawful to maim anyone, except perhaps by public authority.

Objection 3: Further, the welfare of the soul is to be preferred to the welfare of the body. Now it is not lawful for a man to maim himself for the sake of the soul's welfare: since the council of Nicea [*P. I, sect. 4, can. i] punished those who castrated themselves that they might preserve chastity. Therefore it is not lawful for any other reason to maim a person.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 21:24): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot."

I answer that, Since a member is part of the whole human body, it is for the sake of the whole, as the imperfect for the perfect. Hence a member of the human body is to be disposed of according as it is expedient for the body. Now a member of the human body is of itself useful to the good of the whole body, yet, accidentally it may happen to be hurtful, as when a decayed member is a source of corruption to the whole body. Accordingly so long as a member is healthy and retains its natural disposition, it cannot be cut off without injury to the whole body. But as the whole of man is directed as to his end to the whole of the community of which he is a part, as stated above ([2907]Q[61], A[1];[2908] Q[64], AA[2],5), it may happen that although the removal of a member may be detrimental to the whole body, it may nevertheless be directed to the good of the community, in so far as it is applied to a person as a punishment for the purpose of restraining sin. Hence just as by public authority a person is lawfully deprived of life altogether on account of certain more heinous sins, so is he deprived of a member on account of certain lesser sins. But this is not lawful for a private individual, even with the consent of the owner of the member, because this would involve an injury to the community, to whom the man and all his parts belong. If, however, the member be decayed and therefore a source of corruption to the whole body, then it is lawful with the consent of the owner of the member, to cut away the member for the welfare of the whole body, since each one is entrusted with the care of his own welfare. The same applies if it be done with the consent of the person whose business it is to care for the welfare of the person who has a decayed member: otherwise it is altogether unlawful to maim anyone.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents that which is contrary to a particular nature from being in harmony with universal nature: thus death and corruption, in the physical order, are contrary to the particular nature of the thing corrupted, although they are in keeping with universal nature. In like manner to maim anyone, though contrary to the particular nature of the body of the person maimed, is nevertheless in keeping with natural reason in relation to the common good.

Reply to Objection 2: The life of the entire man is not directed to something belonging to man; on the contrary whatever belongs to man is directed to his life. Hence in no case does it pertain to a person to take anyone’s life, except to the public authority to whom is entrusted the procuring of the common good. But the removal of a member can be directed to the good of one man, and consequently in certain cases can pertain to him.

Reply to Objection 3: A member should not be removed for the sake of the bodily health of the whole, unless otherwise nothing can be done to further the good of the whole. Now it is always possible to further one's spiritual welfare otherwise than by cutting off a member, because sin is always subject to the will: and consequently in no case is it allowable to maim oneself, even to avoid any sin whatever. Hence Chrysostom, in his exposition on Mat. 19:12 (Hom. lxii in Matth.), "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," says: "Not by maiming themselves, but by destroying evil thoughts, for a man is accursed who maims himself, since they are murderers who do such things." And further on he says: "Nor is lust tamed thereby, on the contrary it becomes more importunate, for the seed springs in us from other sources, and chiefly from an incontinent purpose and a careless mind: and temptation is curbed not so much by cutting off a member as by curbing one's thoughts."

Whether it is lawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apostle says (Eph. 6:4): "You, fathers, provoke not your children to anger"; and further on (Eph. 9:6): "And you, masters, do the same thing to your slaves [Vulg.: 'to them'] forbearing threatenings." Now some are provoked to anger by blows, and become more troublesome when threatened. Therefore neither should parents strike their children, nor masters their slaves.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9) that "a father's words are admonitory and not coercive." Now blows are a kind of coercion. Therefore it is unlawful for parents to strike their children.

Objection 3: Further, everyone is allowed to impart correction, for this belongs to the spiritual almsdeeds, as stated above ([2909]Q[32], A[2]). If, therefore, it is lawful for parents to strike their children for the sake of correction, for the same reason it will be lawful for any person to strike anyone, which is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 13:24): “He that spareth the rod hateth his son,” and further on (Prov. 23:13): “Withhold not correction from a child, for if thou strike him with the rod, he shall not die. Thou shalt beat him with the rod, and deliver his soul from hell.” Again it is written (Ecclus. 33:28): “Torture and fetters are for a malicious slave.”

I answer that, Harm is done a body by striking it, yet not so as when it is maimed: since maiming destroys the body’s integrity, while a blow merely affects the sense with pain, wherefore it causes much less harm than cutting off a member. Now it is unlawful to do a person a harm, except by way of punishment in the cause of justice. Again, no man justly punishes another, except one who is subject to his jurisdiction. Therefore it is not lawful for a man to strike another, unless he have some power over the one whom he strikes. And since the child is subject to the power of the parent, and the slave to the power of his master, a parent can lawfully strike his child, and a master his slave that instruction may be enforced by correction.

Reply to Objection 1: Since anger is a desire for vengeance, it is aroused chiefly when a man deems himself unjustly injured, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii). Hence when parents are forbidden to provoke their children to anger, they are not prohibited from striking their children for the purpose of correction, but from inflicting blows on them without moderation. The command that masters should forbear from threatening their slaves may be understood in two ways. First that they should be slow to threaten, and this pertains to the moderation of correction; secondly, that they should not always carry out their threats, that is that they should sometimes by a merciful forgiveness temper the judgment whereby they threatened punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: The greater power should exercise the greater coercion. Now just as a city is a perfect community, so the governor of a city has perfect coercive power: wherefore he can inflict irreparable punishments such as death and mutilation. On the other hand the father and the master who preside over the family household, which is an imperfect community, have imperfect coercive power, which is exercised by inflicting lesser punishments, for instance by blows, which do not inflict irreparable harm.

Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to impart correction to a willing subject. But to impart it to an unwilling subject belongs to those only who have charge over him. To this pertains chastisement by blows.

Whether it is lawful to imprison a man?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to imprison a man. An act which deals with undue matter is evil in its genus, as stated above ([2910]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now man, having a free-will, is undue matter for imprisonment which is inconsistent with free-will. Therefore it is unlawful to imprison a man.

Objection 2: Further, human justice should be ruled by Divine justice. Now according to Ecclus. 15:14, “God left man in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore it seems that a man ought not to be coerced by chains or prisons.

Objection 3: Further, no man should be forcibly prevented except from doing an evil deed; and any man can lawfully prevent another from doing this. If, therefore, it were lawful to imprison a man, in order to restrain him from evil deeds, it would be lawful for anyone to put a man in prison; and this is clearly false. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, We read in Lev. 24 that a man was imprisoned for the sin of blasphemy.

I answer that, In the goods three things may be considered in due order. First, the substantial integrity of the body, and this is injured by death or maiming. Secondly, pleasure or rest of the senses, and to this striking or anything causing a sense of pain is opposed. Thirdly, the movement or use of the members, and this is hindered by binding or imprisoning or any kind of detention.

Therefore it is unlawful to imprison or in any way detain a man, unless it be done according to the order of justice, either in punishment, or as a measure of precaution against some evil.

Reply to Objection 1: A man who abuses the power entrusted to him deserves to lose it, and therefore when a man by sinning abuses the free use of his members, he becomes a fitting matter for imprisonment.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the order of His wisdom God sometimes restrains a sinner from accomplishing a sin, according to Job 5:12: “Who bringeth to nought the designs of the malignant, so that their hand cannot accomplish what they had begun, while sometimes He allows them to do what they will.” In like manner, according to human justice, men are imprisoned, not for every sin but for certain ones.

Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful for anyone to restrain a man for a time from doing some unlawful deed there and then: as when a man prevents another from throwing himself over a precipice, or from striking another. But to him alone who has the right of disposing in general of the actions and of the life of another does it belong primarily to imprison or fetter, because by so doing he hinders him from doing not only evil but also good deeds.

Whether the sin is aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin is not aggravated by the fact that the aforesaid injuries are perpetrated on those who are connected with others. Such like injuries take their sinful character from inflicting an injury on another against his will. Now the evil inflicted on a man’s own person is more against his will than that which is inflicted on a person connected with him. Therefore an injury inflicted on a person connected with another is less grievous.

Objection 2: Further, Holy Writ reproves those especially who do injuries to orphans and widows: hence it is written (Ecclus. 35:17): “He will not despise the prayers of the fatherless, nor the widow when she poureth out her complaint.” Now the widow and the orphan are not connected with other persons. Therefore the sin is not aggravated through an injury being inflicted on one who is connected with others.

Objection 3: Further, the person who is connected has a will of his own just as the principal person has, so that something may be voluntary for him and yet against the will of the principal person, as in the case of adultery which pleases the woman but not the husband. Now these injuries are sinful in so far as they consist in an involuntary commutation. Therefore such like injuries are of a less sinful nature.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 28:32) as though indicating an aggravating circumstance: “Thy sons and thy daughters shall be given to another people, thy eyes looking on [*Vulg.: ‘May thy sons and thy daughters be given,’ etc.].”

I answer that, Other things being equal, an injury is a more grievous sin according as it affects more persons; and hence it is that it is a more grievous sin to strike or injure a person in authority than a private individual, because it conduces to the injury of the whole community, as stated above ([2911]FS, Q[73], A[9]). Now when an injury is inflicted on one who is connected in any way with another, that injury affects two persons, so that, other things being equal, the sin is aggravated by this very fact. It may happen, however, that in view of certain circumstances, a sin committed against one who is not connected with any other person, is more grievous, on account of either the dignity of the person, or the greatness of the injury.

Reply to Objection 1: An injury inflicted on a person connected with others is less harmful to the persons with whom he is connected, than if it were perpetrated immediately on them, and from this point of view it is a less grievous sin. But all that belongs to the injury of the person with whom he is connected, is added to the sin of which a man is guilty through injuring the other one in himself.

Reply to Objection 2: Injuries done to widows and orphans are more insisted upon both through being more opposed to mercy, and because the same injury done to such persons is more grievous to them since they have no one to turn to for relief.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that the wife voluntarily consents to the adultery, lessens the sin and injury, so far as the woman is concerned, for it would be more grievous, if the adulterer oppressed her by violence. But this does not remove the injury as affecting her husband, since “the wife hath not power of her own body; but the husband” (1 Cor. 7:4). The same applies to similar cases. of adultery, however, as it is opposed not only to justice but also to chastity, we shall speak in the treatise on Temperance ([2912]Q[154], A[8]).

OF THEFT AND ROBBERY (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sins opposed to justice, whereby a man injures his neighbor in his belongings; namely theft and robbery.

Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is natural to man to possess external things?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a man to possess something as his own?

(3) Whether theft is the secret taking of another’s property?

(4) Whether robbery is a species of sin distinct from theft?

(5) Whether every theft is a sin?

(6) Whether theft is a mortal sin?

(7) Whether it is lawful to thieve in a case of necessity?

(8) Whether every robbery is a mortal sin?

(9) Whether robbery is a more grievous sin than theft?

Whether it is natural for man to possess external things?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is God’s. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper to God, according to Ps. 23:1, “The earth is the Lord’s,” etc. Therefore it is not natural for man to possess external things.

Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man (Lk. 12:18), “I will gather all things that are grown to me, and my goods,” says [*Hom. in Luc. xii, 18]: “Tell me: which are thine? where did you take them from and bring them into being?” Now whatever man possesses naturally, he can fittingly call his own. Therefore man does not naturally possess external things.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Trin. i [*De Fide, ad Gratianum, i, 1]) “dominion denotes power.” But man has no power over external things, since he can work no change in their nature. Therefore the possession of external things is not natural to man.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 8:8): “Thou hast subjected all things under his feet.”

I answer that, External things can be considered in two ways. First, as regards their nature, and this is not subject to the power of man, but only to the power of God Whose mere will all things obey. Secondly, as regards their use, and in this way, man has a natural dominion over external things, because, by his reason and will, he is able to use them for his own profit, as they were made on his account: for the imperfect is always for the sake of the perfect, as stated above ([2913]Q[64], A[1]). It is by this argument that the Philosopher proves (Polit. i, 3) that the possession of external things is natural to man. Moreover, this natural dominion of man over other creatures, which is competent to man in respect of his reason wherein God's image resides, is shown forth in man's creation (Gn. 1:26) by the words: "Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea," etc.

Reply to Objection 1: God has sovereign dominion over all things: and He, according to His providence, directed certain things to the sustenance of man's body. For this reason man has a natural dominion over things, as regards the power to make use of them.

Reply to Objection 2: The rich man is reproved for deeming external things to belong to him principally, as though he had not received them from another, namely from God.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the dominion over external things as regards their nature. Such a dominion belongs to God alone, as stated above.

Whether it is lawful for a man to possess a thing as his own?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a man to possess a thing as his own. For whatever is contrary to the natural law is unlawful. Now according to the natural law all things are common property: and the possession of property is contrary to this community of goods. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to appropriate any external thing to himself.

Objection 2: Further, Basil in expounding the words of the rich man quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]), says: "The rich who deem as their own property the common goods they have seized upon, are like to those who by going beforehand to the play prevent others from coming, and appropriate to themselves what is intended for common use." Now it would be unlawful to prevent others from obtaining possession of common goods. Therefore it is unlawful to appropriate to oneself what belongs to the community.

Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp.], and his words are quoted in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii., Can. Sicut hi.]: "Let no man call his own that which is common property”: and by “common” he means external things, as is clear from the context. Therefore it seems unlawful for a man to appropriate an external thing to himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres., haer. 40): “The ‘Apostolici’ are those who with extreme arrogance have given themselves that name, because they do not admit into their communion persons who are married or possess anything of their own, such as both monks and clerics who in considerable number are to be found in the Catholic Church.” Now the reason why these people are heretics was because severing themselves from the Church, they think that those who enjoy the use of the above things, which they themselves lack, have no hope of salvation. Therefore it is erroneous to maintain that it is unlawful for a man to possess property.

I answer that, Two things are competent to man in respect of exterior things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for man to possess property. Moreover this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labor and leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens where there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everyone had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels arise more frequently where there is no division of the things possessed.

The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): “Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others,” etc.

Reply to Objection 1: Community of goods is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common and that nothing should be possessed as one’s own: but because the division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law, as stated above ([2914]Q[57], AA[2],3). Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.

Reply to Objection 2: A man would not act unlawfully if by going beforehand to the play he prepared the way for others: but he acts unlawfully if by so doing he hinders others from going. In like manner a rich man does not act unlawfully if he anticipates someone in taking possession of something which at first was common property, and gives others a share: but he sins if he excludes others indiscriminately from using it. Hence Basil says (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18): "Why are you rich while another is poor, unless it be that you may have the merit of a good stewardship, and he the reward of patience?"

Reply to Objection 3: When Ambrose says: "Let no man call his own that which is common," he is speaking of ownership as regards use, wherefore he adds: "He who spends too much is a robber."

Whether the essence of theft consists in taking another's thing secretly?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to theft to take another's thing secretly. For that which diminishes a sin, does not, apparently, belong to the essence of a sin. Now to sin secretly tends to diminish a sin, just as, on the contrary, it is written as indicating an aggravating circumstance of the sin of some (Is. 3:9): "They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it." Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing secretly.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Serm. lxiv, de temp., A[2], OBJ[3], Can. Sicut hi.]: and his words are embodied in the Decretals [*Dist. xlvii]: "It is no less a crime to take from him that has, than to refuse to succor the needy when you can and are well off." Therefore just as theft consists in taking another's thing, so does it consist in keeping it back.

Objection 3: Further, a man may take by stealth from another, even that which is his own, for instance a thing that he has deposited with another, or that has been taken away from him unjustly. Therefore it is not essential to theft that it should consist in taking another's thing secretly.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): "'Fur' [thief] is derived from 'furvus' and so from 'fuscus' [dark], because he takes advantage of the night."

I answer that, Three things combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another's. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another's not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carry off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly: and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in "taking another's thing secretly."

Reply to Objection 1: Secrecy is sometimes a cause of sin, as when a man employs secrecy in order to commit a sin, for instance in fraud and guile. In this way it does not diminish sin, but constitutes a species of sin: and thus it is in theft. In another way secrecy is merely a circumstance of sin, and thus it diminishes sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal.

Reply to Objection 2: To keep back what is due to another, inflicts the same kind of injury as taking a thing unjustly: wherefore an unjust detention is included in an unjust taking.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents that which belongs to one person simply, from belonging to another in some respect: thus a deposit belongs simply to the depositor, but with regard to its custody it is the depositary's, and the thing stolen is the thief's, not simply, but as regards its custody.

Whether theft and robbery are sins of different species?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft and robbery are not sins of different species. For theft and robbery differ as "secret" and "manifest": because theft is taking something secretly, while robbery is to take something violently and openly. Now in the other kinds of sins, the secret and the manifest do not differ specifically. Therefore theft and robbery are not different species of sin.

Objection 2: Further, moral actions take their species from the end, as stated above ([2915]FS, Q[1], A[3]; Q[18], A[6]). Now theft and robbery are directed to the same end, viz. the possession of another’s property. Therefore they do not differ specifically.

Objection 3: Further, just as a thing is taken by force for the sake of possession, so is a woman taken by force for pleasure: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “he who commits a rape is called a corrupter, and the victim of the rape is said to be corrupted.” Now it is a case of rape whether the woman be carried off publicly or secretly. Therefore the thing appropriated is said to be taken by force, whether it be done secretly or publicly. Therefore theft and robbery do not differ.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2) distinguishes theft from robbery, and states that theft is done in secret, but that robbery is done openly.

I answer that, Theft and robbery are vices contrary to justice, in as much as one man does another an injustice. Now “no man suffers an injustice willingly,” as stated in Ethic. v, 9. Wherefore theft and robbery derive their sinful nature, through the taking being involuntary on the part of the person from whom something is taken. Now the involuntary is twofold, namely, through violence and through ignorance, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore the sinful aspect of robbery differs from that of theft: and consequently they differ specifically.

Reply to Objection 1: In the other kinds of sin the sinful nature is not derived from something involuntary, as in the sins opposed to justice: and so where there is a different kind of involuntary, there is a different species of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The remote end of robbery and theft is the same. But this is not enough for identity of species, because there is a difference of proximate ends, since the robber wishes to take a thing by his own power, but the thief, by cunning.

Reply to Objection 3: The robbery of a woman cannot be secret on the part of the woman who is taken: wherefore even if it be secret as regards the others from whom she is taken, the nature of robbery remains on the part of the woman to whom violence is done.

Whether theft is always a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded by God, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): “He hath commanded no man to do wickedly.” Yet we find that God commanded theft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35,36): “And the children of Israel did as the Lord had commanded Moses [Vulg.: ‘as Moses had commanded’] . . . and they stripped the Egyptians.” Therefore theft is not always a sin.

Objection 2: Further, if a man finds a thing that is not his and takes it, he seems to commit a theft, for he takes another’s property. Yet this seems lawful according to natural equity, as the jurists hold. [*See loc. cit. in Reply.] Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.

Objection 3: Further, he that takes what is his own does not seem to sin, because he does not act against justice, since he does not destroy its equality. Yet a man commits a theft even if he secretly take his own property that is detained by or in the safe-keeping of another. Therefore it seems that theft is not always a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:15): “Thou shalt not steal.”

I answer that, If anyone consider what is meant by theft, he will find that it is sinful on two counts. First, because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one what is his, so that for this reason theft is contrary to justice, through being a taking of what belongs to another. Secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief, by laying hands on another’s property secretly and cunningly. Wherefore it is evident that every theft is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: It is no theft for a man to take another’s property either secretly or openly by order of a judge who has commanded him to do so, because it becomes his due by the very fact that it is adjudicated to him by the sentence of the court. Hence still less was it a theft for the Israelites to take away the spoils of the Egyptians at the command of the Lord, Who ordered this to be done on account of the ill-treatment accorded to them by the Egyptians without any cause: wherefore it is written significantly (Wis. 10:19): “The just took the spoils of the wicked.”

Reply to Objection 2: With regard to treasure-trove a distinction must be made. For some there are that were never in anyone’s possession, for instance precious stones and jewels, found on the seashore, and such the finder is allowed to keep [*Dig. I, viii, De divis. rerum: Inst. II, i, De rerum divis.]. The same applies to treasure hidden underground long since and belonging to no man, except that according to civil law the finder is bound to give half to the owner of the land, if the treasure trove be in the land of another person [*Inst. II, i, 39: Cod. X, xv, De Thesauris]. Hence in the parable of the Gospel (Mat. 13:44) it is said of the finder of the treasure hidden in a field that he bought the field, as though he purposed thus to acquire the right of possessing the whole treasure. On the other Land the treasure-trove may be nearly in someone's possession: and then if anyone take it with the intention, not of keeping it but of returning it to the owner who does not look upon such things as unappropriated, he is not guilty of theft. In like manner if the thing found appears to be unappropriated, and if the finder believes it to be so, although he keep it, he does not commit a theft [*Inst. II, i, 47]. In any other case the sin of theft is committed [*Dig. XLI, i, De acquirend, rerum dominio, 9: Inst. II, i, 48]: wherefore Augustine says in a homily (Serm. clxxviii; De Verb. Apost.): "If thou hast found a thing and not returned it, thou hast stolen it" (Dig. xiv, 5, can. Si quid invenisti).

Reply to Objection 3: He who by stealth takes his own property which is deposited with another man burdens the depositary, who is bound either to restitution, or to prove himself innocent. Hence he is clearly guilty of sin, and is bound to ease the depositary of his burden. On the other hand he who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained by another, he sins indeed; yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or compensation: but he sins against general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbor by acting this way.

Whether theft is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not a mortal sin. For it is written (Prov. 6:30): "The fault is not so great when a man hath stolen." But every mortal sin is a great fault. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, mortal sin deserves to be punished with death. But in the Law theft is punished not by death but by indemnity, according to Ex. 22:1, "If any man steal an ox or a sheep . . . he shall restore have oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, theft can be committed in small even as in great things. But it seems unreasonable for a man to be punished with eternal death for the theft of a small thing such as a needle or a quill. Therefore theft is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, No man is condemned by the Divine judgment save for a mortal sin. Yet a man is condemned for theft, according to Zech. 5:3, “This is the curse that goeth forth over the face of the earth; for every thief shall be judged as is there written.” Therefore theft is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[59], A[4]; [2916]FS, Q[72], A[5]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity as the spiritual life of the soul. Now charity consists principally in the love of God, and secondarily in the love of our neighbor, which is shown in our wishing and doing him well. But theft is a means of doing harm to our neighbor in his belongings; and if men were to rob one another habitually, human society would be undone. Therefore theft, as being opposed to charity, is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The statement that theft is not a great fault is in view of two cases. First, when a person is led to thieve through necessity. This necessity diminishes or entirely removes sin, as we shall show further on [2917](A[7]). Hence the text continues: “For he stealeth to fill his hungry soul.” Secondly, theft is stated not to be a great fault in comparison with the guilt of adultery, which is punished with death. Hence the text goes on to say of the thief that “if he be taken, he shall restore sevenfold . . . but he that is an adulterer . . . shall destroy his own soul.”

Reply to Objection 2: The punishments of this life are medicinal rather than retributive. For retribution is reserved to the Divine judgment which is pronounced against sinners “according to truth” (Rom. 2:2). Wherefore, according to the judgment of the present life the death punishment is inflicted, not for every mortal sin, but only for such as inflict an irreparable harm, or again for such as contain some horrible deformity. Hence according to the present judgment the pain of death is not inflicted for theft which does not inflict an irreparable harm, except when it is aggravated by some grave circumstance, as in the case of sacrilege which is the theft of a sacred thing, of peculation, which is theft of common property, as Augustine states (Tract. 1, Super Joan.), and of kidnaping which is stealing a man, for which the pain of death is inflicted (Ex. 21:16).

Reply to Objection 3: Reason accounts as nothing that which is little: so that a man does not consider himself injured in very little matters: and the person who takes such things can presume that this is not against the will of the owner. And if a person take such like very little things, he may be proportionately excused from mortal sin. Yet if his intention is to rob and injure his neighbor, there may be a mortal sin even in these very little things, even as there may be through consent in a mere thought.

Whether it is lawful to steal through stress of need?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to steal through stress of need. For penance is not imposed except on one who has sinned. Now it is stated (Extra, De furtis, Cap. Si quis): “If anyone, through stress of hunger or nakedness, steal food, clothing or beast, he shall do penance for three weeks.” Therefore it is not lawful to steal through stress of need.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that “there are some actions whose very name implies wickedness,” and among these he reckons theft. Now that which is wicked in itself may not be done for a good end. Therefore a man cannot lawfully steal in order to remedy a need.

Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now, according to Augustine (Contra Mendac. vii), it is unlawful to steal in order to succor one’s neighbor by giving him an alms. Therefore neither is it lawful to steal in order to remedy one’s own needs.

On the contrary, In cases of need all things are common property, so that there would seem to be no sin in taking another’s property, for need has made it common.

I answer that, Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or Divine right. Now according to the natural order established by Divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man’s needs by their means. Wherefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man’s needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. For this reason Ambrose [*Loc. cit., A[2], OBJ[3]] says, and his words are embodied in the Decretals (Dist. xlvii, can. Sicut ii): “It is the hungry man’s bread that you withhold, the naked man’s cloak that you store away, the money that you bury in the earth is the price of the poor man’s ransom and freedom.”

Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be succored by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. Nevertheless, if the need be so manifest and urgent, that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to succor his own need by means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly: nor is this properly speaking theft or robbery.

Reply to Objection 1: This decretal considers cases where there is no urgent need.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another’s property in a case of extreme need: because that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his own property by reason of that need.

Reply to Objection 3: In a case of a like need a man may also take secretly another’s property in order to succor his neighbor in need.

Whether robbery may be committed without sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that robbery may be committed without sin. For spoils are taken by violence, and this seems to belong to the essence of robbery, according to what has been said [2918](A[4]). Now it is lawful to take spoils from the enemy; for Ambrose says (De Patriarch. 4 [*De Abraham i, 3]): “When the conqueror has taken possession of the spoils, military discipline demands that all should be reserved for the sovereign,” in order, to wit, that he may distribute them. Therefore in certain cases robbery is lawful.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to take from a man what is not his. Now the things which unbelievers have are not theirs, for Augustine says (Ep. ad Vincent. Donat. xciii.): “You falsely call things your own, for you do not possess them justly, and according to the laws of earthly kings you are commanded to forfeit them.” Therefore it seems that one may lawfully rob unbelievers.

Objection 3: Further, earthly princes violently extort many things from their subjects: and this seems to savor of robbery. Now it would seem a grievous matter to say that they sin in acting thus, for in that case nearly every prince would be damned. Therefore in some cases robbery is lawful.

On the contrary, Whatever is taken lawfully may be offered to God in sacrifice and oblation. Now this cannot be done with the proceeds of robbery, according to Is. 61:8, “I am the Lord that love judgment, and hate robbery in a holocaust.” Therefore it is not lawful to take anything by robbery.

I answer that, Robbery implies a certain violence and coercion employed in taking unjustly from a man that which is his. Now in human society no man can exercise coercion except through public authority: and, consequently, if a private individual not having public authority takes another’s property by violence, he acts unlawfully and commits a robbery, as burglars do. As regards princes, the public power is entrusted to them that they may be the guardians of justice: hence it is unlawful for them to use violence or coercion, save within the bounds of justice—either by fighting against the enemy, or against the citizens, by punishing evil-doers: and whatever is taken by violence of this kind is not the spoils of robbery, since it is not contrary to justice. On the other hand to take other people’s property violently and against justice, in the exercise of public authority, is to act unlawfully and to be guilty of robbery; and whoever does so is bound to restitution.

Reply to Objection 1: A distinction must be made in the matter of spoils. For if they who take spoils from the enemy, are waging a just war, such things as they seize in the war become their own property. This is no robbery, so that they are not bound to restitution. Nevertheless even they who are engaged in a just war may sin in taking spoils through cupidity arising from an evil intention, if, to wit, they fight chiefly not for justice but for spoil. For Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xix; Serm. lxxxii) that “it is a sin to fight for booty.” If, however, those who take the spoil, are waging an unjust war, they are guilty of robbery, and are bound to restitution.

Reply to Objection 2: Unbelievers possess their goods unjustly in so far as they are ordered by the laws of earthly princes to forfeit those goods. Hence these may be taken violently from them, not by private but by public authority.

Reply to Objection 3: It is no robbery if princes exact from their subjects that which is due to them for the safe-guarding of the common good, even if they use violence in so doing: but if they extort something unduly by means of violence, it is robbery even as burglary is. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 4): “If justice be disregarded, what is a king but a mighty robber? since what is a robber but a little king?” And it is written (Ezech. 22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her, are like wolves ravening the prey.” Wherefore they are bound to restitution, just as robbers are, and by so much do they sin more grievously than robbers, as their actions are fraught with greater and more universal danger to public justice whose wardens they are.

Whether theft is a more grievous sin than robbery?

Objection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another’s property: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above ([2919]Q[55], AA[4],5). Therefore theft is a more grievous sin than robbery.

Objection 2: Further, shame is fear about a wicked deed, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Now men are more ashamed of theft than of robbery. Therefore theft is more wicked than robbery.

Objection 3: Further, the more persons a sin injures the more grievous it would seem to be. Now the great and the lowly may be injured by theft: whereas only the weak can be injured by robbery, since it is possible to use violence towards them. Therefore the sin of theft seems to be more grievous than the sin of robbery.

On the contrary, According to the laws robbery is more severely punished than theft.

I answer that, Robbery and theft are sinful, as stated above ([2920]AA[4],6), on account of the involuntariness on the part of the person from whom something is taken: yet so that in theft the involuntariness is due to ignorance, whereas in robbery it is due to violence. Now a thing is more involuntary through violence than through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the will than ignorance. Therefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft. There is also another reason, since robbery not only inflicts a loss on a person in his things, but also conduces to the ignominy and injury of his person, and this is of graver import than fraud or guile which belong to theft. Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: Men who adhere to sensible things think more of external strength which is evidenced in robbery, than of internal virtue which is forfeit through sin: wherefore they are less ashamed of robbery than of theft.

Reply to Objection 3: Although more persons may be injured by theft than by robbery, yet more grievous injuries may be inflicted by robbery than by theft: for which reason also robbery is more odious.

OF THE INJUSTICE OF A JUDGE, IN JUDGING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those vices opposed to commutative justice, that consist in words injurious to our neighbors. We shall consider (1) those which are connected with judicial proceedings, and (2) injurious words uttered extra-judicially.

Under the first head five points occur for our consideration: (1) The injustice of a judge in judging; (2) The injustice of the prosecutor in accusing; (3) The injustice of the defendant in defending himself; (4) The injustice of the witnesses in giving evidence; (5) The injustice of the advocate in defending.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can justly judge one who is not his subject?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a judge, on account of the evidence, to deliver judgment in opposition to the truth which is known to him?

(3) Whether a judge can justly sentence a man who is not accused?

(4) Whether he can justly remit the punishment?

Whether a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can justly judge one who is not subject to his jurisdiction. For it is stated (Dan. 13) that Daniel sentenced the ancients who were convicted of bearing false witness. But these ancients were not subject to Daniel; indeed they were judges of the people.

Therefore a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.

Objection 2: Further, Christ was no man’s subject, indeed He was “King of kings and Lord of lords” (Apoc. 19:16). Yet He submitted to the judgment of a man. Therefore it seems that a man may lawfully judge one that is not subject to his jurisdiction.

Objection 3: Further, according to the law [*Cap. Licet ratione, de Foro Comp.] a man is tried in this or that court according to his kind of offense. Now sometimes the defendant is not the subject of the man whose business it is to judge in that particular place, for instance when the defendant belongs to another diocese or is exempt. Therefore it seems that a man may judge one that is not his subject.

On the contrary, Gregory [*Regist. xi, epist. 64] in commenting on Dt. 23:25, “If thou go into thy friend’s corn,” etc. says: “Thou mayest not put the sickle of judgment to the corn that is entrusted to another.”

I answer that, A judge’s sentence is like a particular law regarding some particular fact. Wherefore just as a general law should have coercive power, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 9), so too the sentence of a judge should have coercive power, whereby either party is compelled to comply with the judge’s sentence; else the judgment would be of no effect. Now coercive power is not exercised in human affairs, save by those who hold public authority: and those who have this authority are accounted the superiors of those over whom they preside whether by ordinary or by delegated authority. Hence it is evident that no man can judge others than his subjects and this in virtue either of delegated or of ordinary authority.

Reply to Objection 1: In judging those ancients Daniel exercised an authority delegated to him by Divine instinct. This is indicated where it is said (Dan. 13:45) that “the Lord raised up the . . . spirit of a young boy.”

Reply to Objection 2: In human affairs a man may submit of his own accord to the judgment of others although these be not his superiors, an example of which is when parties agree to a settlement by arbitrators. Wherefore it is necessary that the arbitrator should be upheld by a penalty, since the arbitrators through not exercising authority in the case, have not of themselves full power of coercion. Accordingly in this way did Christ of his own accord submit to human judgment: and thus too did Pope Leo [*Leo

IV] submit to the judgment of the emperor [*Can. Nos si incompetenter, caus. ii, qu. 7].

Reply to Objection 3: The bishop of the defendant’s diocese becomes the latter’s superior as regards the fault committed, even though he be exempt: unless perchance the defendant offend in a matter exempt from the bishop’s authority, for instance in administering the property of an exempt monastery. But if an exempt person commits a theft, or a murder or the like, he may be justly condemned by the ordinary.

Whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment against the truth that he knows, on account of evidence to the contrary. For it is written (Dt. 17:9): “Thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time; and thou shalt ask of them, and they shall show thee the truth of the judgment.” Now sometimes certain things are alleged against the truth, as when something is proved by means of false witnesses. Therefore it is unlawful for a judge to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in opposition to the truth which he knows.

Objection 2: Further, in pronouncing judgment a man should conform to the Divine judgment, since “it is the judgment of God” (Dt. 1:17). Now “the judgment of God is according to the truth” (Rom. 2:2), and it was foretold of Christ (Is. 11:3,4): “He shall not judge according to the sight of the eyes, nor reprove according to the hearing of the ears. But He shall judge the poor with justice, and shall reprove with equity for the meek of the earth.” Therefore the judge ought not to pronounce judgment according to the evidence before him if it be contrary to what he knows himself.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why evidence is required in a court of law, is that the judge may have a faithful record of the truth of the matter, wherefore in matters of common knowledge there is no need of judicial procedure, according to 1 Tim. 5:24, “Some men’s sins are manifest, going before to judgment.” Consequently, if the judge by his personal knowledge is aware of the truth, he should pay no heed to the evidence, but should pronounce sentence according to the truth which he knows.

Objection 4: Further, the word “conscience” denotes application of knowledge to a matter of action as stated in the [2921]FP, Q[79], A[13]. Now it is a sin to act contrary to one’s knowledge. Therefore a judge sins if he pronounces sentence according to the evidence but against his conscience of the truth.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Ambrose, Super Ps. 118, serm. 20] says in his commentary on the Psalter: “A good judge does nothing according to his private opinion but pronounces sentence according to the law and the right.” Now this is to pronounce judgment according to what is alleged and proved in court. Therefore a judge ought to pronounce judgment in accordance with these things, and not according to his private opinion.

I answer that, As stated above [2922](A[1]; Q[60], AA[2],6) it is the duty of a judge to pronounce judgment in as much as he exercises public authority, wherefore his judgment should be based on information acquired by him, not from his knowledge as a private individual, but from what he knows as a public person. Now the latter knowledge comes to him both in general and in particular—in general through the public laws, whether Divine or human, and he should admit no evidence that conflicts therewith—in some particular matter, through documents and witnesses, and other legal means of information, which in pronouncing his sentence, he ought to follow rather than the information he has acquired as a private individual. And yet this same information may be of use to him, so that he can more rigorously sift the evidence brought forward, and discover its weak points. If, however, he is unable to reject that evidence juridically, he must, as stated above, follow it in pronouncing sentence.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why, in the passage quoted, it is stated that the judges should first of all be asked their reasons, is to make it clear that the judges ought to judge the truth in accordance with the evidence.

Reply to Objection 2: To judge belongs to God in virtue of His own power: wherefore His judgment is based on the truth which He Himself knows, and not on knowledge imparted by others: the same is to be said of Christ, Who is true God and true man: whereas other judges do not judge in virtue of their own power, so that there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: The Apostle refers to the case where something is well known not to the judge alone, but both to him and to others, so that the guilty party can by no means deny his guilt (as in the case of notorious criminals), and is convicted at once from the evidence of the fact. If, on the other hand, it be well known to the judge, but not to others, or to others, but not to the judge, then it is necessary for the judge to sift the evidence.

Reply to Objection 4: In matters touching his own person, a man must form his conscience from his own knowledge, but in matters concerning the public authority, he must form his conscience in accordance with the knowledge attainable in the public judicial procedure.

Whether a judge may condemn a man who is not accused?

Objection 1: It would seem that a judge may pass sentence on a man who is not accused. For human justice is derived from Divine justice. Now God judges the sinner even though there be no accuser. Therefore it seems that a man may pass sentence of condemnation on a man even though there be no accuser.

Objection 2: Further, an accuser is required in judicial procedure in order that he may relate the crime to the judge. Now sometimes the crime may come to the judge's knowledge otherwise than by accusation; for instance, by denunciation, or by evil report, or through the judge himself being an eye-witness. Therefore a judge may condemn a man without there being an accuser.

Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy persons are related in Holy Writ, as models of human conduct. Now Daniel was at the same time the accuser and the judge of the wicked ancients (Dan. 13). Therefore it is not contrary to justice for a man to condemn anyone as judge while being at the same time his accuser.

On the contrary, Ambrose in his commentary on 1 Cor. 5:2, expounding the Apostle's sentence on the fornicator, says that "a judge should not condemn without an accuser, since our Lord did not banish Judas, who was a thief, yet was not accused."

I answer that, A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above ([2923]Q[58], A[2]), justice is not between a man and himself but between one man and another. Hence a judge must needs judge between two parties, which is the case when one is the prosecutor, and the other the defendant. Therefore in criminal cases the judge cannot sentence a man unless the latter has an accuser, according to Acts 25:16: “It is not the custom of the Romans to condemn any man, before that he who is accused have his accusers present, and have liberty to make his answer, to clear himself of the crimes” of which he is accused.

Reply to Objection 1: God, in judging man, takes the sinner’s conscience as his accuser, according to Rom. 2:15, “Their thoughts between themselves accusing, or also defending one another”; or again, He takes the evidence of the fact as regards the deed itself, according to Gn. 4:10, “The voice of thy brother’s blood crieth to Me from the earth.”

Reply to Objection 2: Public disgrace takes the place of an accuser. Hence a gloss on Gn. 4:10, “The voice of thy brother’s blood,” etc. says: “There is no need of an accuser when the crime committed is notorious.” In a case of denunciation, as stated above ([2924]Q[33], A[7]), the amendment, not the punishment, of the sinner is intended: wherefore when a man is denounced for a sin, nothing is done against him, but for him, so that no accuser is required. The punishment that is inflicted is on account of his rebellion against the Church, and since this rebellion is manifest, it stands instead of an accuser. The fact that the judge himself was an eye-witness, does not authorize him to proceed to pass sentence, except according to the order of judicial procedure.

Reply to Objection 3: God, in judging man, proceeds from His own knowledge of the truth, whereas man does not, as stated above [2925](A[2]). Hence a man cannot be accuser, witness and judge at the same time, as God is. Daniel was at once accuser and judge, because he was the executor of the sentence of God, by whose instinct he was moved, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).

Whether the judge can lawfully remit the punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judge can lawfully remit the punishment. For it is written (James 2:13): “Judgment without mercy” shall be done “to him that hath not done mercy.” Now no man is punished for not doing what he cannot do lawfully. Therefore any judge can lawfully do mercy by remitting the punishment.

Objection 2: Further, human judgment should imitate the Divine judgment. Now God remits the punishment to sinners, because He desires not the death of the sinner, according to Ezech. 18:23. Therefore a human judge also may lawfully remit the punishment to one who repents.

Objection 3: Further, it is lawful for anyone to do what is profitable to some one and harmful to none. Now the remission of his punishment profits the guilty man and harms nobody. Therefore the judge can lawfully loose a guilty man from his punishment.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 13:8,9) concerning anyone who would persuade a man to serve strange gods: "Neither let thy eye spare him to pity and conceal him, but thou shalt presently put him to death": and of the murderer it is written (Dt. 19:12,13): "He shall die. Thou shalt not pity him."

I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said ([2926]AA[2],3), with regard to the question in point, two things may be observed in connection with a judge. One is that he has to judge between accuser and defendant, while the other is that he pronounces the judicial sentence, in virtue of his power, not as a private individual but as a public person. Accordingly on two counts a judge is hindered from loosing a guilty person from his punishment. First on the part of the accuser, whose right it sometimes is that the guilty party should be punished—for instance on account of some injury committed against the accuser—because it is not in the power of a judge to remit such punishment, since every judge is bound to give each man his right. Secondly, he finds a hindrance on the part of the commonwealth, whose power he exercises, and to whose good it belongs that evil-doers should be punished.

Nevertheless in this respect there is a difference between judges of lower degree and the supreme judge, i.e. the sovereign, to whom the entire public authority is entrusted. For the inferior judge has no power to exempt a guilty man from punishment against the laws imposed on him by his superior. Wherefore Augustine in commenting on John 19:11, "Thou shouldst not have any power against Me," says (Tract. cxvi in Joan.): "The power which God gave Pilate was such that he was under the power of Caesar, so that he was by no means free to acquit the person accused." On the other hand the sovereign who has full authority in the commonwealth, can lawfully remit the punishment to a guilty person, provided the injured party consent to the remission, and that this do not seem detrimental to the public good.

Reply to Objection 1: There is a place for the judge’s mercy in matters that are left to the judge’s discretion, because in like matters a good man is slow to punish as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But in matters that are determined in accordance with Divine or human laws, it is not left to him to show mercy.

Reply to Objection 2: God has supreme power of judging, and it concerns Him whatever is done sinfully against anyone. Therefore He is free to remit the punishment, especially since punishment is due to sin chiefly because it is done against Him. He does not, however, remit the punishment, except in so far as it becomes His goodness, which is the source of all laws.

Reply to Objection 3: If the judge were to remit punishment inordinately, he would inflict an injury on the community, for whose good it behooves ill-deeds to be punished, in order that. men may avoid sin. Hence the text, after appointing the punishment of the seducer, adds (Dt. 13:11): “That all Israel hearing may fear, and may do no more anything like this.” He would also inflict harm on the injured person; who is compensated by having his honor restored in the punishment of the man who has injured him.

OF MATTERS CONCERNING UNJUST ACCUSATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider matters pertaining to unjust accusation. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man is bound to accuse?

(2) Whether the accusation should be made in writing?

(3) How is an accusation vitiated?

(4) How should those be punished who have accused a man wrongfully?

Whether a man is bound to accuse?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to accuse. For no man is excused on account of sin from fulfilling a Divine precept, since he would thus profit by his sin. Yet on account of sin some are disqualified from accusing, such as those who are excommunicate or of evil fame, or who are accused of grievous crimes and are not yet proved to be innocent [*1 Tim. 1:5]. Therefore a man is not bound by a Divine precept to accuse.

Objection 2: Further, every duty depends on charity which is “the end of the precept” [*Can. Definimus, caus. iv, qu. 1; caus. vi, qu. 1]: wherefore it is written (Rom. 13:8): “Owe no man anything, but to love one another.” Now that which belongs to charity is a duty that man owes to all both of high and of low degree, both superiors and inferiors. Since therefore subjects should not accuse their superiors, nor persons of lower degree, those of a higher degree, as shown in several chapters (Decret. II, qu. vii), it seems that it is no man’s duty to accuse.

Objection 3: Further, no man is bound to act against the fidelity which he owes his friend; because he ought not to do to another what he would not have others do to him. Now to accuse anyone is sometimes contrary to the fidelity that one owes a friend; for it is written (Prov. 11:13): “He that walketh deceitfully, revealeth secrets; but he that is faithful, concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend.” Therefore a man is not bound to accuse.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 5:1): “If any one sin, and hear the voice of one swearing, and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2927]Q[33], AA[6],7;[2928] Q[67], A[3], ad 2), the difference between denunciation and accusation is that in denunciation we aim at a brother’s amendment, whereas in accusation we intend the punishment of his crime. Now the punishments of this life are sought, not for their own sake, because this is not the final time of retribution, but in their character of medicine, conducing either to the amendment of the sinner, or to the good of the commonwealth whose calm is ensured by the punishment of evil-doers. The former of these is intended in denunciation, as stated, whereas the second regards properly accusation. Hence in the case of a crime that conduces to the injury of the commonwealth, a man is bound to accusation, provided he can offer sufficient proof, since it is the accuser’s duty to prove: as, for example, when anyone’s sin conduces to the bodily or spiritual corruption of the community. If, however, the sin be not such as to affect the community, or if he cannot offer sufficient proof, a man is not bound to attempt to accuse, since no man is bound to do what he cannot duly accomplish.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents a man being debarred by sin from doing what men are under an obligation to do: for instance from meriting eternal life, and from receiving the sacraments of the Church. Nor does a man profit by this: indeed it is a most grievous fault to fail to do what one is bound to do, since virtuous acts are perfections of man.

Reply to Objection 2: Subjects are debarred from accusing their superiors, “if it is not the affection of charity but their own wickedness that leads them to defame and disparage the conduct of their superiors” [*Append. Grat. ad can. Sunt nonnulli, caus. ii, qu. 7]—or again if the subject who wishes to accuse his superior is himself guilty of crime [*Decret. II, qu. vii, can. Praesumunt.]. Otherwise, provided they be in other respects qualified to accuse, it is lawful for subjects to accuse their superiors out of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: It is contrary to fidelity to make known secrets to the injury of a person; but not if they be revealed for the good of the community, which should always be preferred to a private good. Hence it is unlawful to receive any secret in detriment to the common good: and yet a thing is scarcely a secret when there are sufficient witnesses to prove it.

Whether it is necessary for the accusation to be made in writing?

Objection 1: It would seem unnecessary for the accusation to be made in writing. For writing was devised as an aid to the human memory of the past. But an accusation is made in the present. Therefore the accusation needs not to be made in writing.

Objection 2: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Per scripta) that “no man may accuse or be accused in his absence.” Now writing seems to be useful in the fact that it is a means of notifying something to one who is absent, as Augustine declares (De Trin. x, 1). Therefore the accusation need not be in writing: and all the more that the canon declares that “no accusation in writing should be accepted.”

Objection 3: Further, a man’s crime is made known by denunciation, even as by accusation. Now writing is unnecessary in denunciation. Therefore it is seemingly unnecessary in accusation.

On the contrary, It is laid down (Decret. II, qu. viii, can. Accusatorum) that “the role of accuser must never be sanctioned without the accusation be in writing.”

I answer that, As stated above ([2929]Q[67], A[3]), when the process in a criminal case goes by way of accusation, the accuser is in the position of a party, so that the judge stands between the accuser and the accused for the purpose of the trial of justice, wherein it behooves one to proceed on certainties, as far as possible. Since however verbal utterances are apt to escape one’s memory, the judge would be unable to know for certain what had been said and with what qualifications, when he comes to pronounce sentence, unless it were drawn up in writing. Hence it has with reason been established that the accusation, as well as other parts of the judicial procedure, should be put into writing.

Reply to Objection 1: Words are so many and so various that it is difficult to remember each one. A proof of this is the fact that if a number of people who have heard the same words be asked what was said, they will not agree in repeating them, even after a short time. And since a slight difference of words changes the sense, even though the judge’s sentence may have to be pronounced soon afterwards, the certainty of judgment requires that the accusation be drawn up in writing.

Reply to Objection 2: Writing is needed not only on account of the absence of the person who has something to notify, or of the person to whom something is notified, but also on account of the delay of time as stated above (ad 1). Hence when the canon says, “Let no accusation be accepted in writing” it refers to the sending of an accusation by one who is absent: but it does not exclude the necessity of writing when the accuser is present.

Reply to Objection 3: The denouncer does not bind himself to give proofs: wherefore he is not punished if he is unable to prove. For this reason writing is unnecessary in a denunciation: and it suffices that the denunciation be made verbally to the Church, who will proceed, in virtue of her office, to the correction of the brother.

Whether an accusation is rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion?

Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu. iii [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.], “calumny consists in falsely charging a person with a crime.” Now sometimes one man falsely accuses another of a crime through ignorance of fact which excuses him. Therefore it seems that an accusation is not always rendered unjust through being slanderous.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated by the same authority that “collusion consists in hiding the truth about a crime.” But seemingly this is not unlawful, because one is not bound to disclose every crime, as stated above [2930](A[1]; Q[33], A[7]). Therefore it seems that an accusation is not rendered unjust by collusion.

Objection 3: Further, it is stated by the same authority that “evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from an accusation.” But this can be done without injustice: for it is stated there also: “If a man repent of having made a wicked accusation and inscription* in a matter which he cannot prove, and come to an understanding with the innocent party whom he has accused, let them acquit one another.” [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation. The effect of this endorsement or inscription was that the accuser bound himself, if he failed to prove the accusation, to suffer the same punishment as the accused would have to suffer if proved guilty.] Therefore evasion does not render an accusation unjust.

On the contrary, It is stated by the same authority: “The rashness of accusers shows itself in three ways. For they are guilty either of calumny, or of collusion, or of evasion.”

I answer that, As stated above [2931](A[1]), accusation is ordered for the common good which it aims at procuring by means of knowledge of the crime. Now no man ought to injure a person unjustly, in order to promote the common good. Wherefore a man may sin in two ways when making an accusation: first through acting unjustly against the accused, by charging him falsely with the commission of a crime, i.e. by calumniating him; secondly, on the part of the commonwealth, whose good is intended chiefly in an accusation, when anyone with wicked intent hinders a sin being punished. This again happens in two ways: first by having recourse to fraud in making the accusation. This belongs to collusion [prevaricatio] for "he that is guilty of collusion is like one who rides astraddle [varicator], because he helps the other party, and betrays his own side" [*Append. Grat. ad can. Si quem poenituerit.]. Secondly by withdrawing altogether from the accusation. This is evasion [tergiversatio] for by desisting from what he had begun he seems to turn his back [tergum vertere].

Reply to Objection 1: A man ought not to proceed to accuse except of what he is quite certain about, wherein ignorance of fact has no place. Yet he who falsely charges another with a crime is not a calumniator unless he gives utterance to false accusations out of malice. For it happens sometimes that a man through levity of mind proceeds to accuse someone, because he believes too readily what he hears, and this pertains to rashness; while, on the other hand sometimes a man is led to make an accusation on account of an error for which he is not to blame. All these things must be weighed according to the judge's prudence, lest he should declare a man to have been guilty of calumny, who through levity of mind or an error for which he is not to be blamed has uttered a false accusation.

Reply to Objection 2: Not everyone who hides the truth about a crime is guilty of collusion, but only he who deceitfully hides the matter about which he makes the accusation, by collusion with the defendant, dissembling his proofs, and admitting false excuses.

Reply to Objection 3: Evasion consists in withdrawing altogether from the accusation, by renouncing the intention of accusing, not anyhow, but inordinately. There are two ways, however, in which a man may rightly desist from accusing without committing a sin—in one way, in the very process of accusation, if it come to his knowledge that the matter of his accusation is false, and then by mutual consent the accuser and the defendant acquit one another—in another way, if the accusation be quashed by the sovereign to whom belongs the care of the common good, which it is intended to procure by the accusation.

Whether an accuser who fails to prove his indictment is bound to the punishment of retaliation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation. For sometimes a man is led by a just error to make an accusation, in which case the judge acquit the accuser, as stated in Decret. II, qu. iii. [*Append. Grat., ad can. Si quem poenituerit.] Therefore the accuser who fails to prove his indictment is not bound to the punishment of retaliation.

Objection 2: Further, if the punishment of retaliation ought to be inflicted on one who has accused unjustly, this will be on account of the injury he has done to someone—but not on account of any injury done to the person of the accused, for in that case the sovereign could not remit this punishment, nor on account of an injury to the commonwealth, because then the accused could not acquit him. Therefore the punishment of retaliation is not due to one who has failed to prove his accusation.

Objection 3: Further, the one same sin does not deserve a twofold punishment, according to Nahum 1:9 [*Septuagint version]: “God shall not judge the same thing a second time.” But he who fails to prove his accusation, incurs the punishment due to defamation [*Can. Infames, caus. vi, qu. 1], which punishment even the Pope seemingly cannot remit, according to a statement of Pope Gelasius [*Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.]: “Although we are able to save souls by Penance, we are unable to remove the defamation.” Therefore he is not bound to suffer the punishment of retaliation.

On the contrary, Pope Hadrian I says (Cap. lii): “He that fails to prove his accusation, must himself suffer the punishment which his accusation inferred.”

I answer that, As stated above [2932](A[2]), in a case, where the procedure is by way of accusation, the accuser holds the position of a party aiming at the punishment of the accused. Now the duty of the judge is to establish the equality of justice between them: and the equality of justice requires that a man should himself suffer whatever harm he has intended to be inflicted on another, according to Ex. 21:24, “Eye for eye, tooth for tooth.” Consequently it is just that he who by accusing a man has put him in danger of being punished severely, should himself suffer a like punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5) justice does not always require counterpassion, because it matters considerably whether a man injures another voluntarily or not. Voluntary injury deserves punishment, involuntary deserves forgiveness. Hence when the judge becomes aware that a man has made a false accusation, not with a mind to do harm, but involuntarily through ignorance or a just error, he does not impose the punishment of retaliation.

Reply to Objection 2: He who accuses wrongfully sins both against the person of the accused and against the commonwealth; wherefore he is punished on both counts. This is the meaning of what is written (Dt. 19:18–20): “And when after most diligent inquisition, they shall find that the false witness hath told a lie against his brother: then shall render to him as he meant to do to his brother,” and this refers to the injury done to the person: and afterwards, referring to the injury done to the commonwealth, the text continues: “And thou shalt take away the evil out of the midst of thee, that others hearing may fear, and may not dare to do such things.” Specially, however, does he injure the person of the accused, if he accuse him falsely. Wherefore the accused, if innocent, may condone the injury done to himself, particularly if the accusation were made not calumniously but out of levity of mind. But if the accuser desist from accusing an innocent man, through collusion with the latter’s adversary, he inflicts an injury on the commonwealth: and this cannot be condoned by the accused, although it can be remitted by the sovereign, who has charge of the commonwealth.

Reply to Objection 3: The accuser deserves the punishment of retaliation in compensation for the harm he attempts to inflict on his neighbor: but the punishment of disgrace is due to him for his wickedness in accusing another man calumniously. Sometimes the sovereign remits the punishment, and not the disgrace, and sometimes he removes the disgrace also: wherefore the Pope also can remove this disgrace. When Pope Gelasius says: “We cannot remove the disgrace,” he may mean either the disgrace attaching to the deed [infamia facti], or that sometimes it is not expedient to remove it, or again he may be referring to the disgrace inflicted by the civil judge, as Gratian states (Callist. I, Epist. ad omn. Gall. episc.).

OF SINS COMMITTED AGAINST JUSTICE ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those sins which are committed against justice on the part of the defendant. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a mortal sin to deny the truth which would lead to one’s condemnation?

(2) Whether it is lawful to defend oneself with calumnies?

(3) Whether it is lawful to escape condemnation by appealing?

(4) Whether it is lawful for one who has been condemned to defend himself by violence if he be able to do so?

Whether one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one’s condemnation?

Objection 1: It would seem one can, without a mortal sin, deny the truth which would lead to one’s condemnation. For Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi super Ep. ad Heb.): “I do not say that you should lay bare your guilt publicly, nor accuse yourself before others.” Now if the accused were to confess the truth in court, he would lay bare his guilt and be his own accuser. Therefore he is not bound to tell the truth: and so he does not sin mortally if he tell a lie in court.

Objection 2: Further, just as it is an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to rescue another man from death, so is it an officious lie when one tells a lie in order to free oneself from death, since one is more bound towards oneself than towards another. Now an officious lie is considered not a mortal but a venial sin. Therefore if the accused denies the truth in court, in order to escape death, he does not sin mortally.

Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above ([2933]Q[24], A[12]). But that the accused lie by denying himself to be guilty of the crime laid to his charge is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love we owe God, nor as to the love due to our neighbor. Therefore such a lie is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Whatever is opposed to the glory of God is a mortal sin, because we are bound by precept to “do all to the glory of God” (1 Cor. 10:31). Now it is to the glory of God that the accused confess that which is alleged against him, as appears from the words of Josue to Achan, “My son, give glory to the Lord God of Israel, and confess and tell me what thou hast done, hide it not” (Joshua 7:19). Therefore it is a mortal sin to lie in order to cover one’s guilt.

I answer that, Whoever acts against the due order of justice, sins mortally, as stated above ([2934]Q[59], A[4]). Now it belongs to the order of justice that a man should obey his superior in those matters to which the rights of his authority extend. Again, the judge, as stated above ([2935]Q[67] , A[1]), is the superior in relation to the person whom he judges. Therefore the accused is in duty bound to tell the judge the truth which the latter exacts from him according to the form of law. Hence if he refuse to tell the truth which he is under obligation to tell, or if he mendaciously deny it, he sins mortally. If, on the other hand, the judge asks of him that which he cannot ask in accordance with the order of justice, the accused is not bound to satisfy him, and he may lawfully escape by appealing or otherwise: but it is not lawful for him to lie.

Reply to Objection 1: When a man is examined by the judge according to the order of justice, he does not lay bare his own guilt, but his guilt is unmasked by another, since the obligation of answering is imposed on him by one whom he is bound to obey.

Reply to Objection 2: To lie, with injury to another person, in order to rescue a man from death is not a purely officious lie, for it has an admixture of the pernicious lie: and when a man lies in court in order to exculpate himself, he does an injury to one whom he is bound to obey, since he refuses him his due, namely an avowal of the truth.

Reply to Objection 3: He who lies in court by denying his guilt, acts both against the love of God to whom judgment belongs, and against the love of his neighbor, and this not only as regards the judge, to whom he refuses his due, but also as regards his accuser, who is punished if he fail to prove his accusation. Hence it is written (Ps. 140:4): “Incline not my heart to evil words, to make excuses in sins”: on which words a gloss says: “Shameless men are wont by lying to deny their guilt when they have been found out.” And Gregory in expounding Job 31:33, “If as a man I have hid my sin,” says (Moral. xxii, 15): “It is a common vice of mankind to sin in secret, by lying to hide the sin that has been committed, and when convicted to aggravate the sin by defending oneself.”

Whether it is lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies. Because, according to civil law (Cod. II, iv, De transact. 18), when a man is on trial for his life it is lawful for him to bribe his adversary. Now this is done chiefly by defending oneself with calumnies. Therefore the accused who is on trial for his life does not sin if he defend himself with calumnies.

Objection 2: Further, an accuser who is guilty of collusion with the accused, is punishable by law (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Yet no punishment is imposed on the accused for collusion with the accuser. Therefore it would seem lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 14:16): “A wise man feareth and declineth from evil, the fool leapeth over and is confident.” Now what is done wisely is no sin. Therefore no matter how a man declines from evil, he does not sin.

On the contrary, In criminal cases an oath has to be taken against calumnious allegations (Extra, De juramento calumniae, cap. Inhaerentes): and this would not be the case if it were lawful to defend oneself with calumnies. Therefore it is not lawful for the accused to defend himself with calumnies.

I answer that, It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must require of him according to the order of justice; as, for instance, when the accused is already disgraced through the commission of some crime, or certain indications of his guilt have already been discovered, or again when his guilt is already more or less proven. On the other hand it is never lawful to make a false declaration.

As regards what he may do lawfully, a man can employ either lawful means, and such as are adapted to the end in view, which belongs to prudence; or he can use unlawful means, unsuitable to the proposed end, and this belongs to craftiness, which is exercised by fraud and guile, as shown above ([2936]Q[55], AA[3], seqq.). His conduct in the former case is praiseworthy, in the latter sinful. Accordingly it is lawful for the accused to defend himself by withholding the truth that he is not bound to avow, by suitable means, for instance by not answering such questions as he is not bound to answer. This is not to defend himself with calumnies, but to escape prudently. But it is unlawful for him, either to utter a falsehood, or to withhold a truth that he is bound to avow, or to employ guile or fraud, because fraud and guile have the force of a lie, and so to use them would be to defend oneself with calumnies.

Reply to Objection 1: Human laws leave many things unpunished, which according to the Divine judgment are sins, as, for example, simple fornication; because human law does not exact perfect virtue from man, for such virtue belongs to few and cannot be found in so great a number of people as human law has to direct. That a man is sometimes unwilling to commit a sin in order to escape from the death of the body, the danger of which threatens the accused who is on trial for his life, is an act of perfect virtue, since “death is the most fearful of all temporal things” (Ethic. iii, 6). Wherefore if the accused, who is on trial for his life, bribes his adversary, he sins indeed by inducing him to do what is unlawful, yet the civil law does not punish this sin, and in this sense it is said to be lawful.

Reply to Objection 2: If the accuser is guilty of collusion with the accused and the latter is guilty, he incurs punishment, and so it is evident that he sins. Wherefore, since it is a sin to induce a man to sin, or to take part in a sin in any way—for the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32), that “they . . . are worthy of death . . . that consent” to those who sin—it is evident that the accused also sins if he is guilty of collusion with his adversary. Nevertheless according to human laws no punishment is inflicted on him, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 3: The wise man hides himself not by slandering others but by exercising prudence.

Whether it is lawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for the accused to escape judgment by appealing. The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “Let every soul be subject to the higher powers.” Now the accused by appealing refuses to be subject to a higher power, viz. the judge. Therefore he commits a sin.

Objection 2: Further, ordinary authority is more binding than that which we choose for ourselves. Now according to the Decretals (II, qu. vi, cap. A judicibus) it is unlawful to appeal from the judges chosen by common consent. Much less therefore is it lawful to appeal from ordinary judges.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is lawful once is always lawful. But it is not lawful to appeal after the tenth day [*Can. Anteriorum, caus. ii, qu. 6], nor a third time on the same point [*Can. Si autem, caus. ii, qu. 6]. Therefore it would seem that an appeal is unlawful in itself.

On the contrary, Paul appealed to Caesar (Acts 25).

I answer that, There are two motives for which a man appeals. First through confidence in the justice of his cause, seeing that he is unjustly oppressed by the judge, and then it is lawful for him to appeal, because this is a prudent means of escape. Hence it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. vi, can. Omnis oppressus): “All those who are oppressed are free, if they so wish, to appeal to the judgment of the priests, and no man may stand in their way.” Secondly, a man appeals in order to cause a delay, lest a just sentence be pronounced against him. This is to defend oneself calumniously, and is unlawful as stated above [2937](A[2]). For he inflicts an injury both on the judge, whom he hinders in the exercise of his office, and on his adversary, whose justice he disturbs as far as he is able. Hence it is laid down (II, qu. vi, can. Omnino puniendus): “Without doubt a man should be punished if his appeal be declared unjust.”

Reply to Objection 1: A man should submit to the lower authority in so far as the latter observes the order of the higher authority. If the lower authority departs from the order of the higher, we ought not to submit to it, for instance “if the proconsul order one thing and the emperor another,” according to a gloss on Rom. 13:2. Now when a judge oppresses anyone unjustly, in this respect he departs from the order of the higher authority, whereby he is obliged to judge justly. Hence it is lawful for a man who is oppressed unjustly, to have recourse to the authority of the higher power, by appealing either before or after sentence has been pronounced. And since it is to be presumed that there is no rectitude where true faith is lacking, it is unlawful for a Catholic to appeal to an unbelieving judge, according to Decretals II, qu. vi, can. Catholicus: “The Catholic who appeals to the decision of a judge of another faith shall be excommunicated, whether his case be just or unjust.” Hence the Apostle also rebuked those who went to law before unbelievers (1 Cor. 6:6).

Reply to Objection 2: It is due to a man’s own fault or neglect that, of his own accord, he submits to the judgment of one in whose justice he has no confidence. Moreover it would seem to point to levity of mind for a man not to abide by what he has once approved of. Hence it is with reason that the law refuses us the faculty of appealing from the decision of judges of our own choice, who have no power save by virtue of the consent of the litigants. On the other hand the authority of an ordinary judge depends, not on the consent of those who are subject to his judgment, but on the authority of the king or prince who appointed him. Hence, as a remedy against his unjust oppression, the law allows one to have recourse to appeal, so that even if the judge be at the same time ordinary and chosen by the litigants, it is lawful to appeal from his decision, since seemingly his ordinary authority occasioned his being chosen as arbitrator. Nor is it to be imputed as a fault to the man who consented to his being arbitrator, without adverting to the fact that he was appointed ordinary judge by the prince.

Reply to Objection 3: The equity of the law so guards the interests of the one party that the other is not oppressed. Thus it allows ten days for appeal to be made, this being considered sufficient time for deliberating on the expediency of an appeal. If on the other hand there were no fixed time limit for appealing, the certainty of judgment would ever be in suspense, so that the other party would suffer an injury. The reason why it is not allowed to appeal a third time on the same point, is that it is not probable that the judges would fail to judge justly so many times.

Whether a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man who is condemned to death may lawfully defend himself if he can. For it is always lawful to do that to which nature inclines us, as being of natural right, so to speak. Now, to resist corruption is an inclination of nature not only in men and animals but also in things devoid of sense. Therefore if he can do so, the accused, after condemnation, may lawfully resist being put to death.

Objection 2: Further, just as a man, by resistance, escapes the death to which he has been condemned, so does he by flight. Now it is lawful seemingly to escape death by flight, according to Ecclus. 9:18, “Keep thee far from the man that hath power to kill [and not to quicken]” [*The words in the brackets are not in the Vulgate]. Therefore it is also lawful for the accused to resist.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 24:11): “Deliver them that are led to death: and those that are drawn to death forbear not to deliver.” Now a man is under greater obligation to himself than to another. Therefore it is lawful for a condemned man to defend himself from being put to death.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:2): “He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.” Now a condemned man, by defending himself, resists the power in the point of its being ordained by God “for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of the good” [*1 Pet. 2:14]. Therefore he sins in defending himself.

I answer that, A man may be condemned to death in two ways. First justly, and then it is not lawful for the condemned to defend himself, because it is lawful for the judge to combat his resistance by force, so that on his part the fight is unjust, and consequently without any doubt he sins.

Secondly a man is condemned unjustly: and such a sentence is like the violence of robbers, according to Ezech. 22:21, “Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood.” Wherefore even as it is lawful to resist robbers, so is it lawful, in a like case, to resist wicked princes; except perhaps in order to avoid scandal, whence some grave disturbance might be feared to arise.

Reply to Objection 1: Reason was given to man that he might ensue those things to which his nature inclines, not in all cases, but in accordance with the order of reason. Hence not all self-defense is lawful, but only such as is accomplished with due moderation.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is condemned to death, he has not to kill himself, but to suffer death: wherefore he is not bound to do anything from which death would result, such as to stay in the place whence he would be led to execution. But he may not resist those who lead him to death, in order that he may not suffer what is just for him to suffer. Even so, if a man were condemned to die of hunger, he does not sin if he partakes of food brought to him secretly, because to refrain from taking it would be to kill himself.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the wise man does not direct that one should deliver a man from death in opposition to the order of justice: wherefore neither should a man deliver himself from death by resisting against justice.

OF INJUSTICE WITH REGARD TO THE PERSON OF THE WITNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider injustice with regard to the person of the witness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man is bound to give evidence?

(2) Whether the evidence of two or three witnesses suffices?

(3) Whether a man's evidence may be rejected without any fault on his part?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to bear false witness?

Whether a man is bound to give evidence?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is not bound to give evidence. Augustine say (QQ. Gn. 1:26) [*Cf. Contra Faust. xxii, 33,34], that when Abraham said of his wife (Gn. 20:2), "She is my sister," he wished the truth to be concealed and not a lie be told. Now, by hiding the truth a man abstains from giving evidence. Therefore a man is not bound to give evidence.

Objection 2: Further, no man is bound to act deceitfully. Now it is written (Prov. 11:13): "He that walketh deceitfully revealeth secrets, but he that is faithful concealeth the thing committed to him by his friend." Therefore a man is not always bound to give evidence, especially on matters committed to him as a secret by a friend.

Objection 3: Further, clerics and priests, more than others, are bound to those things that are necessary for salvation. Yet clerics and priests are forbidden to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life. Therefore it is not necessary for salvation to give evidence.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Can. Quisquis, caus. xi, qu. 3, cap. Falsidicus; cf. Isidore, Sentent. iii, 55] says: "Both he who conceals the truth and he who tells a lie are guilty, the former because he is unwilling to do good, the latter because he desires to hurt."

I answer that, We must make a distinction in the matter of giving evidence: because sometimes a certain man's evidence is necessary, and sometimes not. If the necessary evidence is that of a man subject to a superior whom, in matters pertaining to justice, he is bound to obey, without doubt he is bound to give evidence on those points which are required of him in accordance with the order of justice, for instance on manifest things or when ill-report has preceded. If however he is required to give evidence on other points, for instance secret matters, and those of which no ill-report has preceded, he is not bound to give evidence. On the other hand, if his evidence be required by authority of a superior whom he is bound to obey, we must make a distinction: because if his evidence is required in order to deliver a man from an unjust death or any other penalty, or from false defamation, or some loss, in such cases he is bound to give evidence. Even if his evidence is not demanded, he is bound to do what he can to declare the truth to someone who may profit thereby. For it is written (Ps. 81:4): "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy from the hand of the sinner"; and (Prov. 24:11): "Deliver them that are led to death"; and (Rom. 1:32): "They are worthy of death, not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them," on which words a gloss says: "To be silent when one can disprove is to consent." In matters pertaining to a man's condemnation, one is not bound to give evidence, except when one is constrained by a superior in accordance with the order of justice; since if the truth of such a matter be concealed, no particular injury is inflicted on anyone. Or, if some danger threatens the accuser, it matters not since he risked the danger of his own accord: whereas it is different with the accused, who incurs the danger against his will.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of concealment of the truth in a case when a man is not compelled by his superior's authority to declare the truth, and when such concealment is not specially injurious to any person.

Reply to Objection 2: A man should by no means give evidence on matters secretly committed to him in confession, because he knows such things, not as man but as God's minister: and the sacrament is more binding than any human precept. But as regards matters committed to man in some other way under secrecy, we must make a distinction. Sometimes they are of such a nature that one is bound to make them known as soon as they come to our knowledge, for instance if they conduce to the spiritual or corporal corruption of the community, or to some grave personal injury, in short any like matter that a man is bound to make known either by giving evidence or by denouncing it. Against such a duty a man cannot be obliged to act on the plea that the matter is committed to him under secrecy, for he would break the faith he owes to another. On the other hand sometimes they are such as one is not bound to make known, so that one may be under obligation not to do so on account of their being committed to one under secrecy. In such a case one is by no means bound to make them known, even if the superior should command; because to keep faith is of natural right, and a man cannot be commanded to do what is contrary to natural right.

Reply to Objection 3: It is unbecoming for ministers of the altar to slay a man or to cooperate in his slaying, as stated above ([2938]Q[64], A[4]); hence according to the order of justice they cannot be compelled to give evidence when a man is on trial for his life.

Whether the evidence of two or three persons suffices?

Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons is not sufficient. For judgment requires certitude. Now certitude of the truth is not obtained by the assertions of two or three witnesses, for we read that Naboth was unjustly condemned on the evidence of two witnesses (3 Kings 21). Therefore the evidence of two or three witnesses does not suffice.

Objection 2: Further, in order for evidence to be credible it must agree. But frequently the evidence of two or three disagrees in some point. Therefore it is of no use for proving the truth in court.

Objection 3: Further, it is laid down (Decret. II, qu. iv, can. Praesul.): “A bishop shall not be condemned save on the evidence of seventy-two witnesses; nor a cardinal priest of the Roman Church, unless there be sixty-four witnesses. Nor a cardinal deacon of the Roman Church, unless there be twenty-seven witnesses; nor a subdeacon, an acolyte, an exorcist, a reader or a doorkeeper without seven witnesses.” Now the sin of one who is of higher dignity is more grievous, and consequently should be treated more severely. Therefore neither is the evidence of two or three witnesses sufficient for the condemnation of other persons.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 17:6): “By the mouth of two or three witnesses shall he die that is to be slain,” and further on (Dt. 19:15): “In the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand.”

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3), “we must not expect to find certitude equally in every matter.” For in human acts, on which judgments are passed and evidence required, it is impossible to have demonstrative certitude, because they a about things contingent and variable. Hence the certitude of probability suffices, such as may reach the truth in the greater number, cases, although it fail in the minority. No it is probable that the assertion of sever witnesses contains the truth rather than the assertion of one: and since the accused is the only one who denies, while several witness affirm the same as the prosecutor, it is reasonably established both by Divine and by human law, that the assertion of several witnesses should be upheld. Now all multitude is comprised of three elements, the beginning, the middle and the end. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 1), "we reckon 'all' and 'whole' to consist of three parts." Now we have a triple voucher when two agree with the prosecutor: hence two witnesses are required; or for the sake of greater certitude three, which is the perfect number. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 4:12): "A threefold cord is not easily broken": and Augustine, commenting on Jn. 8:17, "The testimony of two men is true," says (Tract. xxxvi) that "there is here a mystery by which we are given to understand that Trinity wherein is perpetual stability of truth."

Reply to Objection 1: No matter how great a number of witnesses may be determined, the evidence might sometimes be unjust, since is written (Ex. 23:2): "Thou shalt not follow the multitude to do evil." And yet the fact that in so many it is not possible to have certitude without fear of error, is no reason why we should reject the certitude which can probably be had through two or three witnesses, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: If the witnesses disagree certain principal circumstances which change the substance of the fact, for instance in time, place, or persons, which are chiefly in question, their evidence is of no weight, because if they disagree in such things, each one would seem to be giving distinct evidence and to be speaking of different facts. For instance, one say that a certain thing happened at such and such a time or place, while another says it happened at another time or place, they seem not to be speaking of the same event. The evidence is not weakened if one witness says that he does not remember, while the other attests to a determinate time or place And if on such points as these the witness for prosecution and defense disagree altogether, and if they be equal in number on either side, and of equal standing, the accused should have the benefit of the doubt, because the judge ought to be more inclined to acquit than to condemn, except perhaps in favorable suits, such as a pleading for liberty and the like. If, however, the witnesses for the same side disagree, the judge ought to use his own discretion in discerning which side to favor, by considering either the number of witnesses, or their standing, or the favorableness of the suit, or the nature of the business and of the evidence

Much more ought the evidence of one witness to be rejected if he contradict himself when questioned about what he has seen and about what he knows; not, however, if he contradict himself when questioned about matters of opinion and report, since he may be moved to answer differently according to the different things he has seen and heard.

On the other hand if there be discrepancy of evidence in circumstances not touching the substance of the fact, for instance, whether the weather were cloudy or fine, whether the house were painted or not, or such like matters, such discrepancy does not weaken the evidence, because men are not wont to take much notice of such things, wherefore they easily forget them. Indeed, a discrepancy of this kind renders the evidence more credible, as Chrysostom states (Hom. i in Matth.), because if the witnesses agreed in every point, even in the minutest of details, they would seem to have conspired together to say the same thing: but this must be left to the prudent discernment of the judge.

Reply to Objection 3: This passage refers specially to the bishops, priests, deacons and clerics of the Roman Church, on account of its dignity: and this for three reasons. First because in that Church those men ought to be promoted whose sanctity makes their evidence of more weight than that of many witnesses. Secondly, because those who have to judge other men, often have many opponents on account of their justice, wherefore those who give evidence against them should not be believed indiscriminately, unless they be very numerous. Thirdly, because the condemnation of any one of them would detract in public opinion from the dignity and authority of that Church, a result which would be more fraught with danger than if one were to tolerate a sinner in that same Church, unless he were very notorious and manifest, so that a grave scandal would arise if he were tolerated.

Whether a man’s evidence can be rejected without any fault of his?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man’s evidence ought not to be rejected except on account of some fault. For it a penalty on some that their evidence is inadmissible, as in the case of those who are branded with infamy. Now a penalty must not be inflicted save for a fault. Therefore it would seem that no man’s evidence ought to be rejected save on account of a fault.

Objection 2: Further, “Good is to be presumed of every one, unless the contrary appear” [*Cap. Dudum, de Praesumpt.]. Now it pertains to a man’s goodness that he should give true evidence. Since therefore there can be no proof of the contrary, unless there be some fault of his, it would seem that no man’s evidence should be rejected save for some fault.

Objection 3: Further, no man is rendered unfit for things necessary for salvation except by some sin. But it is necessary for salvation to give true evidence, as stated above [2939](A[1]). Therefore no man should be excluded from giving evidence save for some fault.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. xiii, 44): “As to the bishop who is said to have been accused by his servants, you are to know that they should by no means have been heard”: which words are embodied in the Decretals II, qu. 1, can. Imprimis.

I answer that, As stated above [2940](A[2]), the authority of evidence is not infallible but probable; and consequently the evidence for one side is weakened by whatever strengthens the probability of the other. Now the reliability of a person’s evidence is weakened, sometimes indeed on account of some fault of his, as in the case of unbelievers and persons of evil repute, as well as those who are guilty of a public crime and who are not allowed even to accuse; sometimes, without any fault on his part, and this owing either to a defect in the reason, as in the case of children, imbeciles and women, or to personal feeling, as in the case of enemies, or persons united by family or household ties, or again owing to some external condition, as in the case of poor people, slaves, and those who are under authority, concerning whom it is to be presumed that they might easily be induced to give evidence against the truth.

Thus it is manifest that a person’s evidence may be rejected either with or without some fault of his.

Reply to Objection 1: If a person is disqualified from giving evidence this is done as a precaution against false evidence rather than as a punishment.

Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Good is to be presumed of everyone unless the contrary appear, provided this does not threaten injury to another: because, in that case, one ought to be careful not to believe everyone readily, according to 1 Jn. 4:1: “Believe not every spirit.”

Reply to Objection 3: To give evidence is necessary for salvation, provided the witness be competent, and the order of justice observed. Hence nothing hinders certain persons being excused from giving evidence, if they be considered unfit according to law.

Whether it is always a mortal sin to give false evidence?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always a mortal sin to give false evidence. For a person may happen to give false evidence, through ignorance of fact. Now such ignorance excuses from mortal sin. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, a lie that benefits someone and hurts no man is officious, and this is not a mortal sin. Now sometimes a lie of this kind occurs in false evidence, as when a person gives false evidence in order to save a man from death, or from an unjust sentence which threatens him through other false witnesses or a perverse judge. Therefore in such cases it is not a mortal sin to give false evidence.

Objection 3: Further, a witness is required to take an oath in order that he may fear to commit a mortal sin of perjury. But this would not be necessary, if it were already a mortal sin to give false evidence. Therefore the giving of false evidence is not always mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 19:5): “A false witness shall not be unpunished.”

I answer that, False evidence has a threefold deformity. The first is owing to perjury, since witnesses are admitted only on oath and on this count it is always a mortal sin. Secondly, owing to the violation of justice, and on this account it is a mortal sin generically, even as any kind of injustice. Hence the prohibition of false evidence by the precept of the decalogue is expressed in this form when it is said (Ex. 20:16), “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor.” For one does nothing against a man by preventing him from doing someone an injury, but only by taking away his justice. Thirdly, owing to the falsehood itself, by reason of which every lie is a sin: on this account, the giving of false evidence is not always a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: In giving evidence a man ought not to affirm as certain, as though he knew it, that about which he is not certain and he should confess his doubt in doubtful terms, and that which he is certain about, in terms of certainty. Owing however to the frailty of the human memory, a man sometimes thinks he is certain about something that is not true; and then if after thinking over the matter with due care he deems himself certain about that false thing, he does not sin mortally if he asserts it, because the evidence which he gives is not directly an intentionally, but accidentally contrary to what he intends.

Reply to Objection 2: An unjust judgment is not a judgment, wherefore the false evidence given in an unjust judgment, in order to prevent injustice is not a mortal sin by virtue of the judgment, but only by reason of the oath violated.

Reply to Objection 3: Men abhor chiefly those sin that are against God, as being most grievous and among them is perjury: whereas they do not abhor so much sins against their neighbor. Consequently, for the greater certitude of evidence, the witness is required to take a oath.

OF INJUSTICE IN JUDGMENT ON THE PART OF COUNSEL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the injustice which takes place in judgment on the part of counsel, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?

(2) Whether certain persons should be prohibited from exercising the office of advocate?

(3) Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?

(4) Whether he sins if he accept a fee for defending a suit?

Whether an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor?

Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor. For it is written (Ex. 23:5): “If thou see the ass of him that hateth thee lie underneath his burden, thou shalt not pass by, but shall lift him up with him.” Now no less a danger threatens the poor man whose suit is being unjustly prejudiced, than if his ass were to lie underneath its burden. Therefore an advocate is bound to defend the suits of the poor.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a homily (ix in Evang.): “Let him that hath understanding beware lest he withhold his knowledge; let him that hath abundance of wealth watch lest he slacken his merciful bounty; let him who is a servant to art share his skill with his neighbor; let him who has an opportunity of speaking with the wealthy plead the cause of the poor: for the slightest gift you have received will be reputed a talent.” Now every man is bound, not to hide but faithfully to dispense the talent committed to him; as evidenced by the punishment inflicted on the servant who hid his talent (Mat. 25:30). Therefore an advocate is bound to plead for the poor.

Objection 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it seems that in such a case an advocate is bound to defend the poor man’s suit.

On the contrary, He that lacks food is no less in need than he that lacks an advocate. Yet he that is able to give food is not always bound to feed the needy. Therefore neither is an advocate always bound to defend the suits of the poor.

I answer that, Since defense of the poor man’s suit belongs to the works of mercy, the answer to this inquiry is the same as the one given above with regard to the other works of mercy ([2941]Q[32], AA[5],9). Now no man is sufficient to bestow a work of mercy on all those who need it. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 28), “since one cannot do good to all, we ought to consider those chiefly who by reason of place, time, or any other circumstance, by a kind of chance are more closely united to us.” He says “by reason of place,” because one is not bound to search throughout the world for the needy that one may succor them; and it suffices to do works of mercy to those one meets with. Hence it is written (Ex. 23:4): “If thou meet thy enemy’s ass going astray, bring it back to him.” He says also “by reason of time,” because one is not bound to provide for the future needs of others, and it suffices to succor present needs. Hence it is written (1 Jn. 3:17): “He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall put up his bowels from him, how doth the charity of God abide in him?” Lastly he says, “or any other circumstance,” because one ought to show kindness to those especially who are by any tie whatever united to us, according to 1 Tim. 5:8, “If any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel.”

It may happen however that these circumstances concur, and then we have to consider whether this particular man stands in such a need that it is not easy to see how he can be succored otherwise, and then one is bound to bestow the work of mercy on him. If, however, it is easy to see how he can be otherwise succored, either by himself, or by some other person still more closely united to him, or in a better position to help him, one is not bound so strictly to help the one in need that it would be a sin not to do so: although it would be praiseworthy to do so where one is not bound to. Therefore an advocate is not always bound to defend the suits of the poor, but only when the aforesaid circumstances concur, else he would have to put aside all other business, and occupy himself entirely in defending the suits of poor people. The same applies to a physician with regard to attendance on the sick.

Reply to Objection 1: So long as the ass lies under the burden, there is no means of help in this case, unless those who are passing along come to the man’s aid, and therefore they are bound to help. But they would not be so bound if help were possible from another quarter.

Reply to Objection 2: A man is bound to make good use of the talent bestowed on him, according to the opportunities afforded by time, place, and other circumstances, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every need is such that it is one’s duty to remedy it, but only such as we have stated above.

Whether it is fitting that the law should debar certain persons from the office of advocate?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for the law to debar certain persons from the office of advocate. For no man should be debarred from doing works of mercy. Now it belongs to the works of mercy to defend a man’s suit, as stated above [2942](A[1]). Therefore no man should be debarred from this office.

Objection 2: Further, contrary causes have not, seemingly, the same effect. Now to be busy with Divine things and to be busy about sin are contrary to one another. Therefore it is unfitting that some should be debarred from the office of advocate, on account of religion, as monks and clerics, while others are debarred on account of sin, as persons of ill-repute and heretics.

Objection 3: Further, a man should love his neighbor as himself. Now it is a duty of love for an advocate to plead a person’s cause. Therefore it is unfitting that certain persons should be debarred from pleading the cause of others, while they are allowed to advocate their own cause.

On the contrary, According to Decretals III, qu. vii, can. Infames, many persons are debarred from the office of advocate.

I answer that, In two ways a person is debarred from performing a certain act: first because it is impossible to him, secondly because it is unbecoming to him: but, whereas the man to whom a certain act is impossible, is absolutely debarred from performing it, he to whom an act is unbecoming is not debarred altogether, since necessity may do away with its unbecomingness. Accordingly some are debarred from the office of advocate because it is impossible to them through lack of sense—either interior, as in the case of madmen and minors—or exterior, as in the case of the deaf and dumb. For an advocate needs to have both interior skill so that he may be able to prove the justice of the cause he defends, and also speech and hearing, that he may speak and hear what is said to him. Consequently those who are defective in these points, are altogether debarred from being advocates either in their own or in another’s cause. The becomingness of exercising this office is removed in two ways. First, through a man being engaged in higher things. Wherefore it is unfitting that monks or priests should be advocates in any cause whatever, or that clerics should plead in a secular court, because such persons are engaged in Divine things. Secondly, on account of some personal defect, either of body (for instance a blind man whose attendance in a court of justice would be unbecoming) or of soul, for it ill becomes one who has disdained to be just himself, to plead for the justice of another. Wherefore it is unbecoming that persons of ill repute, unbelievers, and those who have been convicted of grievous crimes should be advocates. Nevertheless this unbecomingness is outweighed by necessity: and for this reason such persons can plead either their own cause or that of persons closely connected with them. Moreover, clerics can be advocates in the cause of their own church, and monks in the cause of their own monastery, if the abbot direct them to do so.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain persons are sometimes debarred by unbecomingness, and others by inability from performing works of mercy: for not all the works of mercy are becoming to all persons: thus it ill becomes a fool to give counsel, or the ignorant to teach.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as virtue is destroyed by “too much” and “too little,” so does a person become incompetent by “more” and “less.” For this reason some, like religious and clerics, are debarred from pleading in causes, because they are above such an office; and others because they are less than competent to exercise it, such as persons of ill-repute and unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3: The necessity of pleading the causes of others is not so pressing as the necessity of pleading one’s own cause, because others are able to help themselves otherwise: hence the comparison fails.

Whether an advocate sins by defending an unjust cause?

Objection 1: It would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause. For just as a physician proves his skill by healing a desperate disease, so does an advocate prove his skill, if he can defend an unjust cause. Now a physician is praised if he heals a desperate malady. Therefore an advocate also commits no sin, but ought to be praised, if he defends an unjust cause.

Objection 2: Further, it is always lawful to desist from committing a sin. Yet an advocate is punished if he throws up his brief (Decret. II, qu. iii, can. Si quem poenit.). Therefore an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause, when once he has undertaken its defense.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem to be a greater sin for an advocate to use unjust means in defense of a just cause (e.g. by producing false witnesses, or alleging false laws), than to defend an unjust cause, since the former is a sin against the form, the latter against the matter of justice. Yet it is seemingly lawful for an advocate to make use of such underhand means, even as it is lawful for a soldier to lay ambushes in a battle. Therefore it would seem that an advocate does not sin by defending an unjust cause.

On the contrary, It is said (2 Paralip. 19:2): “Thou helpest the ungodly . . . and therefore thou didst deserve . . . the wrath of the Lord.” Now an advocate by defending an unjust cause, helps the ungodly. Therefore he sins and deserves the wrath of the Lord.

I answer that, It is unlawful to cooperate in an evil deed, by counseling, helping, or in any way consenting, because to counsel or assist an action is, in a way, to do it, and the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that “they . . . are worthy of death, not only they that do” a sin, “but they also that consent to them that do” it. Hence it was stated above ([2943]Q[62], A[7]), that all such are bound to restitution. Now it is evident that an advocate provides both assistance and counsel to the party for whom he pleads. Wherefore, if knowingly he defends an unjust cause, without doubt he sins grievously, and is bound to restitution of the loss unjustly incurred by the other party by reason of the assistance he has provided. If, however, he defends an unjust cause unknowingly, thinking it just, he is to be excused according to the measure in which ignorance is excusable.

Reply to Objection 1: The physician injures no man by undertaking to heal a desperate malady, whereas the advocate who accepts service in an unjust cause, unjustly injures the party against whom he pleads unjustly. Hence the comparison fails. For though he may seem to deserve praise for showing skill in his art, nevertheless he sins by reason of injustice in his will, since he abuses his art for an evil end.

Reply to Objection 2: If an advocate believes from the outset that the cause is just, and discovers afterwards while the case is proceeding that it is unjust, he ought not to throw up his brief in such a way as to help the other side, or so as to reveal the secrets of his client to the other party. But he can and must give up the case, or induce his client to give way, or make some compromise without prejudice to the opposing party.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([2944]Q[40], A[3]), it is lawful for a soldier, or a general to lay ambushes in a just war, by prudently concealing what he has a mind to do, but not by means of fraudulent falsehoods, since we should keep faith even with a foe, as Tully says (De offic. iii, 29). Hence it is lawful for an advocate, in defending his case, prudently to conceal whatever might hinder its happy issue, but it is unlawful for him to employ any kind of falsehood.

Whether it is lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading. Works of mercy should not be done with a view to human remuneration, according to Lk. 14:12, “When thou makest a dinner or a supper, call not thy friends . . . nor thy neighbors who are rich: lest perhaps they also invite thee again, and a recompense be made to thee.” Now it is a work of mercy to plead another’s cause, as stated above (A[1]). Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take payment in money for pleading.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual things are not to be bartered with temporal things. But pleading a person’s cause seems to be a spiritual good since it consists in using one’s knowledge of law. Therefore it is not lawful for an advocate to take a fee for pleading.

Objection 3: Further, just as the person of the advocate concurs towards the pronouncement of the verdict, so do the persons of the judge and of the witness. Now, according to Augustine (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.), “the judge should not sell a just sentence, nor the witness true evidence.” Therefore neither can an advocate sell a just pleading.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that “an advocate may lawfully sell his pleading, and a lawyer his advice.”

I answer that, A man may justly receive payment for granting what he is not bound to grant. Now it is evident that an advocate is not always bound to consent to plead, or to give advice in other people’s causes. Wherefore, if he sell his pleading or advice, he does not act against justice. The same applies to the physician who attends on a sick person to heal him, and to all like persons; provided, however, they take a moderate fee, with due consideration for persons, for the matter in hand, for the labor entailed, and for the custom of the country. If, however, they wickedly extort an immoderate fee, they sin against justice. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.) that “it is customary to demand from them restitution of what they have extorted by a wicked excess, but not what has been given to them in accordance with a commendable custom.”

Reply to Objection 1: Man is not bound to do gratuitously whatever he can do from motives of mercy: else no man could lawfully sell anything, since anything may be given from motives of mercy. But when a man does give a thing out of mercy, he should seek, not a human, but a Divine reward. In like manner an advocate, when he mercifully pleads the cause of a poor man, should have in view not a human but a Divine meed; and yet he is not always bound to give his services gratuitously.

Reply to Objection 2: Though knowledge of law is something spiritual, the use of that knowledge is accomplished by the work of the body: hence it is lawful to take money in payment of that use, else no craftsman would be allowed to make profit by his art.

Reply to Objection 3: The judge and witnesses are common to either party, since the judge is bound to pronounce a just verdict, and the witness to give true evidence. Now justice and truth do not incline to one side rather than to the other: and consequently judges receive out of the public funds a fixed pay for their labor; and witnesses receive their expenses (not as payment for giving evidence, but as a fee for their labor) either from both parties or from the party by whom they are adduced, because no man "serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge [*Vulg.: 'Who serveth as a soldier,']" (1 Cor. 9:7). On the other hand an advocate defends one party only, and so he may lawfully accept fee from the party he assists.

OF REVILING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider injuries inflicted by words uttered extrajudicially. We shall consider (1) reviling, (2) backbiting, (3) tale bearing, (4) derision, (5) cursing.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is reviling?

(2) Whether every reviling is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether one ought to check revilers?

(4) Of the origin of reviling.

Whether reviling consists in words?

Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words. Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words seem to inflict no injury on one's neighbor, either in his person, or in his belongings. Therefore reviling does not consist in words.

Objection 2: Further, reviling seems to imply dishonor. But a man can be dishonored or slighted by deeds more than by words. Therefore it seems that reviling consists, not in words but in deeds.

Objection 3: Further, a dishonor inflicted by words is called a railing or a taunt. But reviling seems to differ from railing or taunt. Therefore reviling does not consist in words.

On the contrary, Nothing, save words, is perceived by the hearing. Now reviling is perceived by the hearing according to Jer. 20:10, “I heard reviling [Douay: ‘contumelies’] on every side.” Therefore reviling consists in words.

I answer that, Reviling denotes the dishonoring of a person, and this happens in two ways: for since honor results from excellence, one person dishonors another, first, by depriving him of the excellence for which he is honored. This is done by sins of deed, whereof we have spoken above (Q[64], seqq.). Secondly, when a man publishes something against another’s honor, thus bringing it to the knowledge of the latter and of other men. This reviling properly so called, and is done I some kind of signs. Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), “compared with words all other signs are very few, for words have obtained the chief place among men for the purpose of expressing whatever the mind conceives.” Hence reviling, properly speaking consists in words: wherefore, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a reviler [contumeliosus] “is hasty and bursts out [tumet] in injurious words.” Since, however, things are also signified by deeds, which on this account have the same significance as words, it follows that reviling in a wider sense extends also to deeds. Wherefore a gloss on Rom. 1:30, “contumelious, proud,” says: “The contumelious are those who by word or deed revile and shame others.”

Reply to Objection 1: Our words, if we consider them in their essence, i.e. as audible sound injure no man, except perhaps by jarring of the ear, as when a person speaks too loud. But, considered as signs conveying something to the knowledge of others, they may do many kinds of harm. Such is the harm done to a man to the detriment of his honor, or of the respect due to him from others. Hence the reviling is greater if one man reproach another in the presence of many: and yet there may still be reviling if he reproach him by himself. in so far as the speaker acts unjustly against the respect due to the hearer.

Reply to Objection 2: One man slights another by deeds in so far as such deeds cause or signify that which is against that other man’s honor. In the former case it is not a matter of reviling but of some other kind of injustice, of which we have spoken above (QQ[64],65,66): where as in the latter case there is reviling, in so far as deeds have the significant force of words.

Reply to Objection 3: Railing and taunts consist in words, even as reviling, because by all of them a man’s faults are exposed to the detriment of his honor. Such faults are of three kinds. First, there is the fault of guilt, which is exposed by “reviling” words. Secondly, there is the fault of both guilt and punishment, which is exposed by “taunts” [convicium], because “vice” is commonly spoken of in connection with not only the soul but also the body. Hence if one man says spitefully to another that he is blind, he taunts but does not revile him: whereas if one man calls another a thief, he not only taunts but also reviles him. Thirdly, a man reproaches another for his inferiority or indigence, so as to lessen the honor due to him for any kind of excellence. This is done by “upbraiding” words, and properly speaking, occurs when one spitefully reminds a man that one has succored him when he was in need. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 20:15): “He will give a few things and upbraid much.” Nevertheless these terms are sometimes employed one for the other.

Whether reviling or railing is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that reviling or railing is not a mortal sin. For no mortal sin is an act of virtue. Now railing is the act of a virtue, viz. of wittiness {eutrapelia} [*Cf. [2945]FS, Q[60], A[5]] to which it pertains to rail well, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8). Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, mortal sin is not to be found in perfect men; and yet these sometimes give utterance to railing or reviling. Thus the Apostle says (Gal. 3:1): “O senseless Galatians!,” and our Lord said (Lk. 24:25): “O foolish and slow of heart to believe!” Therefore railing or reviling is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, although that which is a venial sin by reason of its genus may become mortal, that which is mortal by reason of its genus cannot become venial, as stated above ([2946]FS, Q[88], AA[4],6). Hence if by reason of its genus it were a mortal sin to give utterance to railing or reviling, it would follow that it is always a mortal sin. But this is apparently untrue, as may be seen in the case of one who utters a reviling word indeliberately or through slight anger. Therefore reviling or railing is not a mortal sin, by reason of its genus.

On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin deserves the eternal punishment of hell. Now railing or reviling deserves the punishment of hell, according to Mat. 5:22, “Whosoever shall say to his brother . . . Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire.” Therefore railing or reviling is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above [2947](A[1]), words are injurious to other persons, not as sounds, but as signs, and this signification depends on the speaker’s inward intention. Hence, in sins of word, it seems that we ought to consider with what intention the words are uttered. Since then railing or reviling essentially denotes a dishonoring, if the intention of the utterer is to dishonor the other man, this is properly and essentially to give utterance to railing or reviling: and this is a mortal sin no less than theft or robbery, since a man loves his honor no less than his possessions. If, on the other hand, a man says to another a railing or reviling word, yet with the intention, not of dishonoring him, but rather perhaps of correcting him or with some like purpose, he utters a railing or reviling not formally and essentially, but accidentally and materially, in so far to wit as he says that which might be a railing or reviling. Hence this may be sometimes a venial sin, and sometimes without any sin at all. Nevertheless there is need of discretion in such matters, and one should use such words with moderation, because the railing might be so grave that being uttered inconsiderately it might dishonor the person against whom it is uttered. In such a case a man might commit a mortal sin, even though he did not intend to dishonor the other man: just as were a man incautiously to injure grievously another by striking him in fun, he would not be without blame.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to wittiness to utter some slight mockery, not with intent to dishonor or pain the person who is the object of the mockery, but rather with intent to please and amuse: and this may be without sin, if the due circumstances be observed. On the other hand if a man does not shrink from inflicting pain on the object of his witty mockery, so long as he makes others laugh, this is sinful, as stated in the passage quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as it is lawful to strike a person, or damnify him in his belongings for the purpose of correction, so too, for the purpose of correction, may one say a mocking word to a person whom one has to correct. It is thus that our Lord called the disciples "foolish," and the Apostle called the Galatians "senseless." Yet, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 19), "seldom and only when it is very necessary should we have recourse to invectives, and then so as to urge God's service, not our own."

Reply to Objection 3: Since the sin of railing or reviling depends on the intention of the utterer, it may happen to be a venial sin, if it be a slight railing that does not inflict much dishonor on a man, and be uttered through lightness of heart or some slight anger, without the fixed purpose of dishonoring him, for instance when one intends by such a word to give but little pain.

Whether one ought to suffer oneself to be reviled?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled. For he that suffers himself to be reviled, encourages the reviler. But one ought not to do this. Therefore one ought not to suffer oneself to be reviled, but rather reply to the reviler.

Objection 2: Further, one ought to love oneself more than another. Now one ought not to suffer another to be reviled, wherefore it is written (Prov. 26:10): "He that putteth a fool to silence appeaseth anger." Therefore neither should one suffer oneself to be reviled.

Objection 3: Further, a man is not allowed to revenge himself, for it is said: "Vengeance belongeth to Me, I will repay" [*Heb. 10:30]. Now by submitting to be reviled a man revenges himself, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxii, in Ep. ad Rom.): "If thou wilt be revenged, be silent; thou hast dealt him a fatal blow." Therefore one ought not by silence to submit to reviling words, but rather answer back.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 37:13): "They that sought evils to me spoke vain things," and afterwards (Ps. 37:14) he says: "But I as a deaf man, heard not; and as a dumb man not opening his mouth."

I answer that, Just as we need patience in things done against us, so do we need it in those said against us. Now the precepts of patience in those things done against us refer to the preparedness of the mind, according to Augustine’s (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19) exposition on our Lord’s precept, “If one strike thee on thy right cheek, turn to him also the other” [*The words as quoted by St. Thomas are a blending of Mat. 5:39 and Lk. 6:29]: that is to say, a man ought to be prepared to do so if necessary. But he is not always bound to do this actually: since not even did our Lord do so, for when He received a blow, He said: “Why strikest thou Me?” (Jn. 18:23). Consequently the same applies to the reviling words that are said against us. For we are bound to hold our minds prepared to submit to be reviled, if it should be expedient. Nevertheless it sometimes behooves us to withstand against being reviled, and this chiefly for two reasons. First, for the good of the reviler; namely, that his daring may be checked, and that he may not repeat the attempt, according to Prov. 26:5, “Answer a fool according to his folly, lest he imagine himself to be wise.” Secondly, for the good of many who would be prevented from progressing in virtue on account of our being reviled. Hence Gregory says (Hom. ix, Super Ezech.): “Those who are so placed that their life should be an example to others, ought, if possible, to silence their detractors, lest their preaching be not heard by those who could have heard it, and they continue their evil conduct through contempt of a good life.”

Reply to Objection 1: The daring of the railing reviler should be checked with moderation, i.e. as a duty of charity, and not through lust for one’s own honor. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:4): “Answer not a fool according to his folly, lest thou be like him.”

Reply to Objection 2: When one man prevents another from being reviled there is not the danger of lust for one’s own honor as there is when a man defends himself from being reviled: indeed rather would it seem to proceed from a sense of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: It would be an act of revenge to keep silence with the intention of provoking the reviler to anger, but it would be praiseworthy to be silent, in order to give place to anger. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 8:4): “Strive not with a man that is full of tongue, and heap not wood upon his fire.”

Whether reviling arises from anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not arise from anger. For it is written (Prov. 11:2): “Where pride is, there shall also be reviling [Douay: ‘reproach’].” But anger is a vice distinct from pride. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:3): “All fools are meddling with revilings [Douay: ‘reproaches’].” Now folly is a vice opposed to wisdom, as stated above ([2948]Q[46], A[1]); whereas anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

Objection 3: Further, no sin is diminished by its cause. But the sin of reviling is diminished if one gives vent to it through anger: for it is a more grievous sin to revile out of hatred than out of anger. Therefore reviling does not arise from anger.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 45) that “anger gives rise to revilings.”

I answer that, While one sin may arise from various causes, it is nevertheless said to have its source chiefly in that one from which it is wont to arise most frequently, through being closely connected with its end. Now reviling is closely connected with anger’s end, which is revenge: since the easiest way for the angry man to take revenge on another is to revile him. Therefore reviling arises chiefly from anger.

Reply to Objection 1: Reviling is not directed to the end of pride which is excellency. Hence reviling does not arise directly from pride. Nevertheless pride disposes a man to revile, in so far as those who think themselves to excel, are more prone to despise others and inflict injuries on them, because they are more easily angered, through deeming it an affront to themselves whenever anything is done against their will.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6) “anger listens imperfectly to reason”: wherefore an angry man suffers a defect of reason, and in this he is like the foolish man. Hence reviling arises from folly on account of the latter’s kinship with anger.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) “an angry man seeks an open offense, but he who hates does not worry about this.” Hence reviling which denotes a manifest injury belongs to anger rather than to hatred.

OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction] (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is backbiting?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Of its comparison with other sins;

(4) Whether it is a sin to listen to backbiting?

Whether backbiting is suitably defined as the blackening of another's character by secret words?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not as defined by some [*Albert the Great, Sum. Theol. II, cxvii.], "the blackening of another's good name by words uttered in secret." For "secretly" and "openly" are circumstances that do not constitute the species of a sin, because it is accidental to a sin that it be known by many or by few. Now that which does not constitute the species of a sin, does not belong to its essence, and should not be included in its definition. Therefore it does not belong to the essence of backbiting that it should be done by secret words.

Objection 2: Further, the notion of a good name implies something known to the public. If, therefore, a person's good name is blackened by backbiting, this cannot be done by secret words, but by words uttered openly.

Objection 3: Further, to detract is to subtract, or to diminish something already existing. But sometimes a man's good name is blackened, even without subtracting from the truth: for instance, when one reveals the crimes which a man has in truth committed. Therefore not every blackening of a good name is backbiting.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 10:11): "If a serpent bite in silence, he is nothing better that backbiteth."

I answer that, Just as one man injures another by deed in two ways—openly, as by robbery or by doing him any kind of violence—and secretly, as by theft, or by a crafty blow, so again one man injures another by words in two ways—in one way, openly, and this is done by reviling him, as stated above ([2949]Q[72], A[1])—and in another way secretly, and this is done by backbiting. Now from the fact that one man openly utters words against another man, he would appear to think little of him, so that for this reason he dishonors him, so that reviling is detrimental to the honor of the person reviled. On the other hand, he that speaks against another secretly, seems to respect rather than slight him, so that he injures directly, not his honor but his good name, in so far as by uttering such words secretly, he, for his own part, causes his hearers to have a bad opinion of the person against whom he speaks. For the backbiter apparently intends and aims at being believed. It is therefore evident that backbiting differs from reviling in two points: first, in the way in which the words are uttered, the reviler speaking openly against someone, and the backbiter secretly; secondly, as to the end in view, i.e. as regards the injury inflicted, the reviler injuring a man's honor, the backbiter injuring his good name.

Reply to Objection 1: In involuntary commutations, to which are reduced all injuries inflicted on our neighbor, whether by word or by deed, the kind of sin is differentiated by the circumstances "secretly" and "openly," because involuntariness itself is diversified by violence and by ignorance, as stated above (Q[65], A[4]; [2950]FS, Q[6], AA[5],8).

Reply to Objection 2: The words of a backbiter are said to be secret, not altogether, but in relation to the person of whom they are said, because they are uttered in his absence and without his knowledge. On the other hand, the reviler speaks against a man to his face. Wherefore if a man speaks ill of another in the presence of several, it is a case of backbiting if he be absent, but of reviling if he alone be present: although if a man speak ill of an absent person to one man alone, he destroys his good name not altogether but partly.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to backbite [detrehere] another, not because he detracts from the truth, but because he lessens his good name. This is done sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly. Directly, in four ways: first, by saying that which is false about him; secondly, by stating his sin to be greater than it is; thirdly, by revealing something unknown about him; fourthly, by ascribing his good deeds to a bad intention. Indirectly, this is done either by gainsaying his good, or by maliciously concealing it, or by diminishing it.

Whether backbiting is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is not a mortal sin. For no act of virtue is a mortal sin. Now, to reveal an unknown sin, which pertains to backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), is an act of the virtue of charity, whereby a man denounces his brother's sin in order that he may amend: or else it is an act of justice, whereby a man accuses his brother. Therefore backbiting is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Prov. 24:21, "Have nothing to do with detractors," says: "The whole human race is in peril from this vice." But no mortal sin is to be found in the whole of mankind, since many refrain from mortal sin: whereas they are venial sins that are found in all. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix to St. Augustine's work] reckons it a slight sin "to speak ill without hesitation or forethought." But this pertains to backbiting. Therefore backbiting is a venial sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:30): "Backbiters, hateful to God," which epithet, according to a gloss, is inserted, "lest it be deemed a slight sin because it consists in words."

I answer that, As stated above ([2951]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should be judged chiefly from the intention of the speaker. Now backbiting by its very nature aims at blackening a man's good name. Wherefore, properly speaking, to backbite is to speak ill of an absent person in order to blacken his good name. Now it is a very grave matter to blacken a man's good name, because of all temporal things a man's good name seems the most precious, since for lack of it he is hindered from doing many things well. For this reason it is written (Ecclus. 41:15): "Take care of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand treasures precious and great." Therefore backbiting, properly speaking, is a mortal sin. Nevertheless it happens sometimes that a man utters words, whereby someone's good name is tarnished, and yet he does not intend this, but something else. This is not backbiting strictly and formally speaking, but only materially and accidentally as it were. And if such defamatory words be uttered for the sake of some necessary good, and with attention to the due circumstances, it is not a sin and cannot be called backbiting. But if they be uttered out of lightness of heart or for some unnecessary motive, it is not a mortal sin, unless perchance the spoken word be of such a grave nature, as to cause a notable injury to a man’s good name, especially in matters pertaining to his moral character, because from the very nature of the words this would be a mortal sin. And one is bound to restore a man his good name, no less than any other thing one has taken from him, in the manner stated above ([2952]Q[62], A[2]) when we were treating of restitution.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, it is not backbiting to reveal a man’s hidden sin in order that he may mend, whether one denounce it, or accuse him for the good of public justice.

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss does not assert that backbiting is to be found throughout the whole of mankind, but “almost,” both because “the number of fools is infinite,” [*Eccles. 1:15] and few are they that walk in the way of salvation, [*Cf. Mat. 7:14] and because there are few or none at all who do not at times speak from lightness of heart, so as to injure someone’s good name at least slightly, for it is written (James 3:2): “If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man.”

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is referring to the case when a man utters a slight evil about someone, not intending to injure him, but through lightness of heart or a slip of the tongue.

Whether backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is the gravest of all sins committed against one’s neighbor. Because a gloss on Ps. 108:4, “Instead of making me a return of love they detracted me,” a gloss says: “Those who detract Christ in His members and slay the souls of future believers are more guilty than those who killed the flesh that was soon to rise again.” From this it seems to follow that backbiting is by so much a graver sin than murder, as it is a graver matter to kill the soul than to kill the body. Now murder is the gravest of the other sins that are committed against one’s neighbor. Therefore backbiting is absolutely the gravest of all.

Objection 2: Further, backbiting is apparently a graver sin than reviling, because a man can withstand reviling, but not a secret backbiting. Now backbiting is seemingly a graver sin than adultery, because adultery unites two persons in one flesh, whereas reviling severs utterly those who were united. Therefore backbiting is more grievous than adultery: and yet of all other sins a man commits against his neighbor, adultery is most grave.

Objection 3: Further, reviling arises from anger, while backbiting arises from envy, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). But envy is a graver sin than anger. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than reviling; and so the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 4: Further, the gravity of a sin is measured by the gravity of the defect that it causes. Now backbiting causes a most grievous defect, viz. blindness of mind. For Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 2): “What else do backbiters but blow on the dust and stir up the dirt into their eyes, so that the more they breathe of detraction, the less they see of the truth?” Therefore backbiting is the most grievous sin committed against one’s neighbor.

On the contrary, It is more grievous to sin by deed than by word. But backbiting is a sin of word, while adultery, murder, and theft are sins of deed. Therefore backbiting is not graver than the other sins committed against one’s neighbor.

I answer that, The essential gravity of sins committed against one’s neighbor must be weighed by the injury they inflict on him, since it is thence that they derive their sinful nature. Now the greater the good taken away, the greater the injury. And while man’s good is threefold, namely the good of his soul, the good of his body, and the good of external things; the good of the soul, which is the greatest of all, cannot be taken from him by another save as an occasional cause, for instance by an evil persuasion, which does not induce necessity. On the other hand the two latter goods, viz. of the body and of external things, can be taken away by violence. Since, however, the goods of the body excel the goods of external things, those sins which injure a man’s body are more grievous than those which injure his external things. Consequently, among other sins committed against one’s neighbor, murder is the most grievous, since it deprives man of the life which he already possesses: after this comes adultery, which is contrary to the right order of human generation, whereby man enters upon life. In the last place come external goods, among which a man’s good name takes precedence of wealth because it is more akin to spiritual goods, wherefore it is written (Prov. 22:1): “A good name is better than great riches.” Therefore backbiting according to its genus is a more grievous sin than theft, but is less grievous than murder or adultery. Nevertheless the order may differ by reason of aggravating or extenuating circumstances.

The accidental gravity of a sin is to be considered in relation to the sinner, who sins more grievously, if he sins deliberately than if he sins through weakness or carelessness. In this respect sins of word have a certain levity, in so far as they are apt to occur through a slip of the tongue, and without much forethought.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who detract Christ by hindering the faith of His members, disparage His Godhead, which is the foundation of our faith. Wherefore this is not simple backbiting but blasphemy.

Reply to Objection 2: Reviling is a more grievous sin than backbiting, in as much as it implies greater contempt of one's neighbor: even as robbery is a graver sin than theft, as stated above ([2953]Q[66], A[9]). Yet reviling is not a more grievous sin than adultery. For the gravity of adultery is measured, not from its being a union of bodies, but from being a disorder in human generation. Moreover the reviler is not the sufficient cause of unfriendliness in another man, but is only the occasional cause of division among those who were united, in so far, to wit, as by declaring the evils of another, he for his own part severs that man from the friendship of other men, though they are not forced by his words to do so. Accordingly a backbiter is a murderer "occasionally," since by his words he gives another man an occasion for hating or despising his neighbor. For this reason it is stated in the Epistle of Clement [*Ad Jacob. Ep. i], that "backbiters are murderers," i.e. occasionally; because "he that hateth his brother is a murderer" (1 Jn. 3:15).

Reply to Objection 3: Anger seeks openly to be avenged, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2): wherefore backbiting which takes place in secret, is not the daughter of anger, as reviling is, but rather of envy, which strives by any means to lessen one's neighbor's glory. Nor does it follow from this that backbiting is more grievous than reviling: since a lesser vice can give rise to a greater sin, just as anger gives birth to murder and blasphemy. For the origin of a sin depends on its inclination to an end, i.e. on the thing to which the sin turns, whereas the gravity of a sin depends on what it turns away from.

Reply to Objection 4: Since "a man rejoiceth in the sentence of his mouth" (Prov. 15:23), it follows that a backbiter more and more loves and believes what he says, and consequently more and more hates his neighbor, and thus his knowledge of the truth becomes less and less. This effect however may also result from other sins pertaining to hate of one's neighbor.

Whether it is a grave sin for the listener to suffer the backbiter?

Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to others than to himself. But it is praiseworthy for a man to suffer his own backbiters: for Gregory says (Hom. ix, super Ezech): “Just as we ought not to incite the tongue of backbiters, lest they perish, so ought we to suffer them with equanimity when they have been incited by their own wickedness, in order that our merit may be the greater.” Therefore a man does not sin if he does not withstand those who backbite others.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 4:30): “In no wise speak against the truth.” Now sometimes a person tells the truth while backbiting, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore it seems that one is not always bound to withstand a backbiter.

Objection 3: Further, no man should hinder what is profitable to others. Now backbiting is often profitable to those who are backbitten: for Pope Pius [*St. Pius I] says [*Append. Grat. ad can. Oves, caus. vi, qu. 1]: “Not unfrequently backbiting is directed against good persons, with the result that those who have been unduly exalted through the flattery of their kindred, or the favor of others, are humbled by backbiting.” Therefore one ought not to withstand backbiters.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): “Take care not to have an itching tongue, nor tingling ears, that is, neither detract others nor listen to backbiters.”

I answer that, According to the Apostle (Rom. 1:32), they “are worthy of death . . . not only they that” commit sins, “but they also that consent to them that do them.” Now this happens in two ways. First, directly, when, to wit, one man induces another to sin, or when the sin is pleasing to him: secondly, indirectly, that is, if he does not withstand him when he might do so, and this happens sometimes, not because the sin is pleasing to him, but on account of some human fear.

Accordingly we must say that if a man list ens to backbiting without resisting it, he seems to consent to the backbiter, so that he becomes a participator in his sin. And if he induces him to backbite, or at least if the detraction be pleasing to him on account of his hatred of the person detracted, he sins no less than the detractor, and sometimes more. Wherefore Bernard says (De Consid. ii, 13): “It is difficult to say which is the more to be condemned the backbiter or he that listens to backbiting.” If however the sin is not pleasing to him, and he fails to withstand the backbiter, through fear negligence, or even shame, he sins indeed, but much less than the backbiter, and, as a rule venially. Sometimes too this may be a mortal sin, either because it is his official duty to cor. rect the backbiter, or by reason of some consequent danger; or on account of the radical reason for which human fear may sometimes be a mortal sin, as stated above ([2954]Q[19], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: No man hears himself backbitten, because when a man is spoken evil of in his hearing, it is not backbiting, properly speaking, but reviling, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Yet it is possible for the detractions uttered against a person to come to his knowledge through others telling him, and then it is left to his discretion whether he will suffer their detriment to his good name, unless this endanger the good of others, as stated above ([2955]Q[72], A[3]). Wherefore his patience may deserve commendation for as much as he suffers patiently being detracted himself. But it is not left to his discretion to permit an injury to be done to another’s good name, hence he is accounted guilty if he fails to resist when he can, for the same reason whereby a man is bound to raise another man’s ass lying “underneath his burden,” as commanded in Dt. 21:4 [*Ex. 23:5].

Reply to Objection 2: One ought not always to withstand a backbiter by endeavoring to convince him of falsehood, especially if one knows that he is speaking the truth: rather ought one to reprove him with words, for that he sins in backbiting his brother, or at least by our pained demeanor show him that we are displeased with his backbiting, because according to Prov. 25:23, “the north wind driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue.”

Reply to Objection 3: The profit one derives from being backbitten is due, not to the intention of the backbiter, but to the ordinance of God Who produces good out of every evil. Hence we should none the less withstand backbiters, just as those who rob or oppress others, even though the oppressed and the robbed may gain merit by patience.

OF TALE-BEARING [*'Susurratio,' i.e. whispering] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider tale-bearing: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?

(2) Which of the two is the more grievous?

Whether tale-bearing is a sin distinct from backbiting?

Objection 1: It would seem that tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting. Isidore says (Etym. x): “The susurro [tale-bearer] takes his name from the sound of his speech, for he speaks disparagingly not to the face but into the ear.” But to speak of another disparagingly belongs to backbiting. Therefore tale-bearing is not a distinct sin from backbiting.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 19:16): “Thou shalt not be an informer [Douay: ‘a detractor’] nor a tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] among the people.” But an informer is apparently the same as a backbiter. Therefore neither does tale-bearing differ from backbiting.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): “The tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] and the double-tongued is accursed.” But a double-tongued man is apparently the same as a backbiter, because a backbiter speaks with a double tongue, with one in your absence, with another in your presence. Therefore a tale-bearer is the same as a backbiter.

On the contrary, A gloss on Rom. 1:29,30, “Tale-bearers, backbiters [Douay: ‘whisperers, detractors’]” says: “Tale-bearers sow discord among friends; backbiters deny or disparage others’ good points.”

I answer that, The tale-bearer and the backbiter agree in matter, and also in form or mode of speaking, since they both speak evil secretly of their neighbor: and for this reason these terms are sometimes used one for the other. Hence a gloss on Ecclus. 5:16, “Be not called a tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’]” says: “i.e. a backbiter.” They differ however in end, because the backbiter intends to blacken his neighbor’s good name, wherefore he brings forward those evils especially about his neighbor which are likely to defame him, or at least to depreciate his good name: whereas a tale-bearer intends to sever friendship, as appears from the gloss quoted above and from the saying of Prov. 26:20, “Where the tale-bearer is taken away, contentions shall cease.” Hence it is that a tale-bearer speaks such ill about his neighbors as may stir his hearer’s mind against them, according to Ecclus. 28:11, “A sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst of them that are at peace.”

Reply to Objection 1: A tale-bearer is called a backbiter in so far as he speaks ill of another; yet he differs from a backbiter since he intends not to speak ill as such, but to say anything that may stir one man against another, though it be good simply, and yet has a semblance of evil through being unpleasant to the hearer.

Reply to Objection 2: An informer differs from a tale-bearer and a backbiter, for an informer is one who charges others publicly with crimes, either by accusing or by railing them, which does not apply to a backbiter or tale-bearer.

Reply to Objection 3: A double-tongued person is properly speaking a tale-bearer. For since friendship is between two, the tale-bearer strives to sever friendship on both sides. Hence he employs a double tongue towards two persons, by speaking ill of one to the other: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 28:15): “The tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] and the double-tongued is accursed,” and then it is added, “for he hath troubled many that were peace.”

Whether backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing?

Objection 1: It would seem that backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing. For sins of word consist in speaking evil. Now a backbiter speaks of his neighbor things that are evil simply, for such things lead to the loss or depreciation of his good name: whereas a tale-bearer is only intent on saying what is apparently evil, because to wit they are unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 2: Further, he that deprives. a man of his good name, deprives him not merely of one friend, but of many, because everyone is minded to scorn the friendship of a person with a bad name. Hence it is reproached against a certain individual [*King Josaphat] (2 Paralip 19:2): “Thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord.” But tale-bearing deprives one of only one friend. Therefore backbiting is a graver sin than tale-bearing.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:11): “He that backbiteth [Douay:,’detracteth’] his brother . . . detracteth the law,” and consequently God the giver of the law. Wherefore the sin of backbiting seems to be a sin against God, which is most grievous, as stated above (Q[20], A[3]; [2956]FS, Q[73], A[3]). On the other hand the sin of tale-bearing is against one’s neighbor. Therefore the sin of backbiting is graver than the sin of tale-bearing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:17): “An evil mark of disgrace is upon the double-tongued; but to the tale-bearer [Douay: ‘whisperer’] hatred, and enmity, and reproach.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[73], A[3]; [2957]FS, Q[73], A[8]), sins against one’s neighbor are the more grievous, according as they inflict a greater injury on him: and an injury is so much the greater, according to the greatness of the good which it takes away. Now of all one’s external goods a friend takes the first place, since “no man can live without friends,” as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 1). Hence it is written (Ecclus. 6:15): “Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend.” Again, a man’s good name whereof backbiting deprives him, is most necessary to him that he may be fitted for friendship. Therefore tale-bearing is a greater sin than backbiting or even reviling, because a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be honored, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii).

Reply to Objection 1: The species and gravity of a sin depend on the end rather than on the material object, wherefore, by reason of its end, tale-bearing is worse than backbiting, although sometimes the backbiter says worse things.

Reply to Objection 2: A good name is a disposition for friendship, and a bad name is a disposition for enmity. But a disposition falls short of the thing for which it disposes. Hence to do anything that leads to a disposition for enmity is a less grievous sin than to do what conduces directly to enmity.

Reply to Objection 3: He that backbites his brother, seems to detract the law, in so far as he despises the precept of love for one’s neighbor: while he that strives to sever friendship seems to act more directly against this precept. Hence the latter sin is more specially against God, because “God is charity” (1 Jn. 4:16), and for this reason it is written (Prov. 6:16): “Six things there are, which the Lord hateth, and the seventh His soul detesteth,” and the seventh is “he (Prov. 6:19) that soweth discord among brethren.”

OF DERISION [*Or mockery] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now speak of derision, under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether derision is a special sin distinct from the other sins whereby one’s neighbor is injured by words?

(2) Whether derision is a mortal sin?

Whether derision is a special sin distinct from those already mentioned?

Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from reviling.

Objection 2: Further, no man is derided except for something reprehensible which puts him to shame. Now such are sins; and if they be imputed to a person publicly, it is a case of reviling, if privately, it amounts to backbiting or tale-bearing. Therefore derision is not distinct from the foregoing vices.

Objection 3: Further, sins of this kind are distinguished by the injury they inflict on one’s neighbor. Now the injury inflicted on a man by derision affects either his honor, or his good name, or is detrimental to his friendship. Therefore derision is not a sin distinct from the foregoing.

On the contrary, Derision is done in jest, wherefore it is described as “making fun.” Now all the foregoing are done seriously and not in jest. Therefore derision differs from all of them.

I answer that, As stated above ([2958]Q[72], A[2]), sins of word should be weighed chiefly by the intention of the speaker, wherefore these sins are differentiated according to the various intentions of those who speak against another. Now just as the railer intends to injure the honor of the person he rails, the backbiter to depreciate a good name, and the tale-bearer to destroy friendship, so too the derider intends to shame the person he derides. And since this end is distinct from the others, it follows that the sin of derision is distinct from the foregoing sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Laughing to scorn and derision agree as to the end but differ in mode, because derision is done with the "mouth," i.e. by words and laughter, while laughing to scorn is done by wrinkling the nose, as a gloss says on Ps. 2:4, "He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them": and such a distinction does not differentiate the species. Yet they both differ from reviling, as being shamed differs from being dishonored: for to be ashamed is "to fear dishonor," as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 15).

Reply to Objection 2: For doing a virtuous deed a man deserves both respect and a good name in the eyes of others, and in his own eyes the glory of a good conscience, according to 2 Cor. 1:12, "Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience." Hence, on the other hand, for doing a reprehensible, i.e. a vicious action, a man forfeits his honor and good name in the eyes of others—and for this purpose the reviler and the backbiter speak of another person—while in his own eyes, he loses the glory of his conscience through being confused and ashamed at reprehensible deeds being imputed to him—and for this purpose the derider speaks ill of him. It is accordingly evident that derision agrees with the foregoing vices as to the matter but differs as to the end.

Reply to Objection 3: A secure and calm conscience is a great good, according to Prov. 15:15, "A secure mind is like a continual feast." Wherefore he that disturbs another's conscience by confounding him inflicts a special injury on him: hence derision is a special kind of sin.

Whether derision can be a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that derision cannot be a mortal sin. Every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But derision does not seem contrary to charity, for sometimes it takes place in jest among friends, wherefore it is known as "making fun." Therefore derision cannot be a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, the greatest derision would appear to be that which is done as an injury to God. But derision is not always a mortal sin when it tends to the injury of God: else it would be a mortal sin to relapse into a venial sin of which one has repented. For Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. ii, 16) that “he who continues to do what he has repented of, is a derider and not a penitent.” It would likewise follow that all hypocrisy is a mortal sin, because, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 15) “the ostrich signifies the hypocrite, who derides the horse, i.e. the just man, and his rider, i.e. God.” Therefore derision is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, reviling and backbiting seem to be graver sins than derision, because it is more to do a thing seriously than in jest. But not all backbiting or reviling is a mortal sin. Much less therefore is derision a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:34): “He derideth [Vulg.: ‘shall scorn’] the scorners.” But God’s derision is eternal punishment for mortal sin, as appears from the words of Ps. 2:4, “He that dwelleth in heaven shall laugh at them.” Therefore derision is a mortal sin.

I answer that, The object of derision is always some evil or defect. Now when an evil is great, it is taken, not in jest, but seriously: consequently if it is taken in jest or turned to ridicule (whence the terms ‘derision’ and ‘jesting’), this is because it is considered to be slight. Now an evil may be considered to be slight in two ways: first, in itself, secondly, in relation to the person. When anyone makes game or fun of another’s evil or defect, because it is a slight evil in itself, this is a venial sin by reason of its genus. on the other hand this defect may be considered as a slight evil in relation to the person, just as we are wont to think little of the defects of children and imbeciles: and then to make game or fun of a person, is to scorn him altogether, and to think him so despicable that his misfortune troubles us not one whit, but is held as an object of derision. In this way derision is a mortal sin, and more grievous than reviling, which is also done openly: because the reviler would seem to take another’s evil seriously; whereas the derider does so in fun, and so would seem the more to despise and dishonor the other man. Wherefore, in this sense, derision is a grievous sin, and all the more grievous according as a greater respect is due to the person derided.

Consequently it is an exceedingly grievous sin to deride God and the things of God, according to Is. 37:23, “Whom hast thou reproached, and whom hast thou blasphemed, and against whom hast thou exalted thy voice?” and he replies: “Against the Holy One of Israel.” In the second place comes derision of one’s parents, wherefore it is written (Prov. 30:17):

“The eye that mocketh at his father, and that despiseth the labor of his mother in bearing him, let the ravens of the brooks pick it out, and the young eagles eat it.” Further, the derision of good persons is grievous, because honor is the reward of virtue, and against this it is written (Job 12:4): “The simplicity of the just man is laughed to scorn.” Such like derision does very much harm: because it turns men away from good deeds, according to Gregory (Moral. xx, 14), “Who when they perceive any good points appearing in the acts of others, directly pluck them up with the hand of a mischievous reviling.”

Reply to Objection 1: Jesting implies nothing contrary to charity in relation to the person with whom one jests, but it may imply something against charity in relation to the person who is the object of the jest, on account of contempt, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Neither he that relapses into a sin of which he has repented, nor a hypocrite, derides God explicitly, but implicitly, in so far as either’s behavior is like a derider’s. Nor is it true that to commit a venial sin is to relapse or dissimulate altogether, but only dispositively and imperfectly.

Reply to Objection 3: Derision considered in itself is less grievous than backbiting or reviling, because it does not imply contempt, but jest. Sometimes however it includes greater contempt than reviling does, as stated above, and then it is a grave sin.

OF CURSING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider cursing. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one may lawfully curse another?

(2) Whether one may lawfully curse an irrational creature?

(3) Whether cursing is a mortal sin?

(4) Of its comparison with other sins.

Whether it is lawful to curse anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to curse anyone. For it is unlawful to disregard the command of the Apostle in whom Christ spoke, according to 2 Cor. 13:3. Now he commanded (Rom. 12:14), “Bless and curse not.” Therefore it is not lawful to curse anyone.

Objection 2: Further, all are bound to bless God, according to Dan. 3:82, “O ye sons of men, bless the Lord.” Now the same mouth cannot both bless God and curse man, as proved in the third chapter of James. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another man.

Objection 3: Further, he that curses another would seem to wish him some evil either of fault or of punishment, since a curse appears to be a kind of imprecation. But it is not lawful to wish ill to anyone, indeed we are bound to pray that all may be delivered from evil. Therefore it is unlawful for any man to curse.

Objection 4: Further, the devil exceeds all in malice on account of his obstinacy. But it is not lawful to curse the devil, as neither is it lawful to curse oneself; for it is written (Ecclus. 21:30): “While the ungodly curseth the devil, he curseth his own soul.” Much less therefore is it lawful to curse a man.

Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Num. 23:8, “How shall I curse whom God hath not cursed?” says: “There cannot be a just cause for cursing a sinner if one be ignorant of his sentiments.” Now one man cannot know another man’s sentiments, nor whether he is cursed by God. Therefore no man may lawfully curse another.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 27:26): “Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law.” Moreover Eliseus cursed the little boys who mocked him (4 Kings 2:24).

I answer that, To curse [maledicere] is the same as to speak ill [malum dicere]. Now “speaking” has a threefold relation to the thing spoken. First, by way of assertion, as when a thing is expressed in the indicative mood: in this way “maledicere” signifies simply to tell someone of another’s evil, and this pertains to backbiting, wherefore tellers of evil [maledici] are sometimes called backbiters. Secondly, speaking is related to the thing spoken, by way of cause, and this belongs to God first and foremost, since He made all things by His word, according to Ps. 32:9, “He spoke and they were made”; while secondarily it belongs to man, who, by his word, commands others and thus moves them to do something: it is for this purpose that we employ verbs in the imperative mood. Thirdly, “speaking” is related to the thing spoken by expressing the sentiments of one who desires that which is expressed in words; and for this purpose we employ the verb in the optative mood.

Accordingly we may omit the first kind of evil speaking which is by way of simple assertion of evil, and consider the other two kinds. And here we must observe that to do something and to will it are consequent on one another in the matter of goodness and wickedness, as shown above ([2959]FS, Q[20], A[3]). Hence in these two ways of evil speaking, by way of command and by way of desire, there is the same aspect of lawfulness and unlawfulness, for if a man commands or desires another’s evil, as evil, being intent on the evil itself, then evil speaking will be unlawful in both ways, and this is what is meant by cursing. On the other hand if a man commands or desires another’s evil under the aspect of good, it is lawful; and it may be called cursing, not strictly speaking, but accidentally, because the chief intention of the speaker is directed not to evil but to good.

Now evil may be spoken, by commanding or desiring it, under the aspect of a twofold good. Sometimes under the aspect of just, and thus a judge lawfully curses a man whom he condemns to a just penalty: thus too the Church curses by pronouncing anathema. In the same way the prophets in the Scriptures sometimes call down evils on sinners, as though conforming their will to Divine justice, although such like imprecation may be taken by way of foretelling. Sometimes evil is spoken under the aspect of useful, as when one wishes a sinner to suffer sickness or hindrance of some kind, either that he may himself reform, or at least that he may cease from harming others.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle forbids cursing strictly so called with an evil intent: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: To wish another man evil under the aspect of good, is not opposed to the sentiment whereby one wishes him good simply, in fact rather is it in conformity therewith.

Reply to Objection 4: In the devil both nature and guilt must be considered. His nature indeed is good and is from God nor is it lawful to curse it. On the other hand his guilt is deserving of being cursed, according to Job 3:8, “Let them curse it who curse the day.” Yet when a sinner curses the devil on account of his guilt, for the same reason he judges himself worthy of being cursed; and in this sense he is said to curse his own soul.

Reply to Objection 5: Although the sinner's sentiments cannot be perceived in themselves, they can be perceived through some manifest sin, which has to be punished. Likewise although it is not possible to know whom God curses in respect of final reprobation, it is possible to know who is accursed of God in respect of being guilty of present sin.

Whether it is lawful to curse an irrational creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful to curse an irrational creature. Cursing would seem to be lawful chiefly in its relation to punishment. Now irrational creatures are not competent subjects either of guilt or of punishment. Therefore it is unlawful to curse them.

Objection 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the nature which God made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the devil, as stated above [2960](A[1]). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.

Objection 3: Further, irrational creatures are either stable, as bodies, or transient, as the seasons. Now, according to Gregory (Moral. iv, 2), "it is useless to curse what does not exist, and wicked to curse what exists." Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.

On the contrary, our Lord cursed the fig tree, as related in Mat. 21:19; and Job cursed his day, according to Job 3:1.

I answer that, Benediction and malediction, properly speaking, regard things to which good or evil may happen, viz. rational creatures: while good and evil are said to happen to irrational creatures in relation to the rational creature for whose sake they are. Now they are related to the rational creature in several ways. First by way of ministration, in so far as irrational creatures minister to the needs of man. In this sense the Lord said to man (Gn. 3:17): "Cursed is the earth in thy work," so that its barrenness would be a punishment to man. Thus also David cursed the mountains of Gelboe, according to Gregory's expounding (Moral. iv, 3). Again the irrational creature is related to the rational creature by way of signification: and thus our Lord cursed the fig tree in signification of Judea. Thirdly, the irrational creature is related to rational creatures as something containing them, namely by way of time or place: and thus Job cursed the day of his birth, on account of the original sin which he contracted in birth, and on account of the consequent penalties. In this sense also we may understand David to have cursed the mountains of Gelboe, as we read in 2 Kings 1:21, namely on account of the people slaughtered there.

But to curse irrational beings, considered as creatures of God, is a sin of blasphemy; while to curse them considered in themselves is idle and vain and consequently unlawful.

From this the Replies to the objections may easily be gathered.

Whether cursing is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is not a mortal sin. For Augustine in a homily On the Fire of Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the appendix of St. Augustine’s works] reckons cursing among slight sins. But such sins are venial. Therefore cursing is not a mortal but a venial Sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which proceeds from a slight movement of the mind does not seem to be generically a mortal sin. But cursing sometimes arises from a slight movement. Therefore cursing is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, evil deeds are worse than evil words. But evil deeds are not always mortal sins. Much less therefore is cursing a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Nothing save mortal sin excludes one from the kingdom of God. But cursing excludes from the kingdom of God, according to 1 Cor. 6:10, “Nor cursers [Douay: ‘railers’], nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God.” Therefore cursing is a mortal sin.

I answer that, The evil words of which we are speaking now are those whereby evil is uttered against someone by way of command or desire. Now to wish evil to another man, or to conduce to that evil by commanding it, is, of its very nature, contrary to charity whereby we love our neighbor by desiring his good. Consequently it is a mortal sin, according to its genus, and so much the graver, as the person whom we curse has a greater claim on our love and respect. Hence it is written (Lev. 20:9): “He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die.”

It may happen however that the word uttered in cursing is a venial sin either through the slightness of the evil invoked on another in cursing him, or on account of the sentiments of the person who utters the curse; because he may say such words through some slight movement, or in jest, or without deliberation, and sins of word should be weighed chiefly with regard to the speaker’s intention, as stated above ([2961]Q[72], A[2]).

From this the Replies to the Objections may be easily gathered.

Whether cursing is a graver sin than backbiting?

Objection 1: It would seem that cursing is a graver sin than backbiting. Cursing would seem to be a kind of blasphemy, as implied in the canonical epistle of Jude (verse 9) where it is said that “when Michael the archangel, disputing with the devil, contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of blasphemy [Douay: ‘railing speech’],” where blasphemy stands for cursing, according to a gloss. Now blasphemy is a graver sin than backbiting. Therefore cursing is a graver sin than backbiting.

Objection 2: Further, murder is more grievous than backbiting, as stated above ([2962]Q[73], A[3]). But cursing is on a par with the sin of murder; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xix, super Matth.): “When thou sayest: ‘Curse him down with his house, away with everything,’ you are no better than a murderer.” Therefore cursing is graver than backbiting.

Objection 3: Further, to cause a thing is more than to signify it. But the curser causes evil by commanding it, whereas the backbiter merely signifies an evil already existing. Therefore the curser sins more grievously than the backbiter.

On the contrary, It is impossible to do well in backbiting, whereas cursing may be either a good or an evil deed, as appears from what has been said [2963](A[1]). Therefore backbiting is graver than cursing.

I answer that, As stated in the [2964]FP, Q[48], A[5], evil is twofold, evil of fault, and evil of punishment; and of the two, evil of fault is the worse ([2965]FP, Q[48], A[6]). Hence to speak evil of fault is worse than to speak evil of punishment, provided the mode of speaking be the same. Accordingly it belongs to the reviler, the tale-bearer, the backbiter and the derider to speak evil of fault, whereas it belongs to the evil-speaker, as we understand it here, to speak evil of punishment, and not evil of fault except under the aspect of punishment. But the mode of speaking is not the same, for in the case of the four vices mentioned above, evil of fault is spoken by way of assertion, whereas in the case of cursing evil of punishment is spoken, either by causing it in the form of a command, or by wishing it. Now the utterance itself of a person’s fault is a sin, in as much as it inflicts an injury on one’s neighbor, and it is more grievous to inflict an injury, than to wish to inflict it, other things being equal.

Hence backbiting considered in its generic aspect is a graver sin than the cursing which expresses a mere desire; while the cursing which is expressed by way of command, since it has the aspect of a cause, will be more or less grievous than backbiting, according as it inflicts an injury more or less grave than the blackening of a man’s good name. Moreover this must be taken as applying to these vices considered in their essential aspects: for other accidental points might be taken into consideration, which would aggravate or extenuate the aforesaid vices.

Reply to Objection 1: To curse a creature, as such, reflects on God, and thus accidentally it has the character of blasphemy; not so if one curse a creature on account of its fault: and the same applies to backbiting.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [2966](A[3]), cursing, in one way, includes the desire for evil, where if the curser desire the evil of another’s violent death, he does not differ, in desire, from a murderer, but he differs from him in so far as the external act adds something to the act of the will.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers cursing by way of command.

BY SINS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (Q[77])

OF CHEATING, WHICH IS COMMITTED IN BUYING AND SELLING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those sins which relate to voluntary commutations. First, we shall consider cheating, which is committed in buying and selling: secondly, we shall consider usury, which occurs in loans. In connection with the other voluntary commutations no special kind of sin is to be found distinct from rapine and theft.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Of unjust sales as regards the price; namely, whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?

(2) Of unjust sales on the part of the thing sold;

(3) Whether the seller is bound to reveal a fault in the thing sold?

(4) Whether it is lawful in trading to sell a thing at a higher price than was paid for it?

Whether it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth. In the commutations of human life, civil laws determine that which is just. Now according to these laws it is just for buyer and seller to deceive one another (Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 8,15): and this occurs by the seller selling a thing for more than its worth, and the buyer buying a thing for less than its worth. Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth

Objection 2: Further, that which is common to all would seem to be natural and not sinful. Now Augustine relates that the saying of a certain jester was accepted by all, “You wish to buy for a song and to sell at a premium," which agrees with the saying of Prov. 20:14, "It is naught, it is naught, saith every buyer: and when he is gone away, then he will boast." Therefore it is lawful to sell a thing for more than its worth.

Objection 3: Further, it does not seem unlawful if that which honesty demands be done by mutual agreement. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13), in the friendship which is based on utility, the amount of the recompense for a favor received should depend on the utility accruing to the receiver: and this utility sometimes is worth more than the thing given, for instance if the receiver be in great need of that thing, whether for the purpose of avoiding a danger, or of deriving some particular benefit. Therefore, in contracts of buying and selling, it is lawful to give a thing in return for more than its worth.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 7:12): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them." But no man wishes to buy a thing for more than its worth. Therefore no man should sell a thing to another man for more than its worth.

I answer that, It is altogether sinful to have recourse to deceit in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to deceive one's neighbor so as to injure him. Hence Tully says (De Offic. iii, 15): "Contracts should be entirely free from double-dealing: the seller must not impose upon the bidder, nor the buyer upon one that bids against him."

But, apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves, and from this point of view, buying and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice versa, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3). Now whatever is established for the common advantage, should not be more of a burden to one party than to another, and consequently all contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented, as stated in Ethic. v, 5. Therefore if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth, or, conversely, the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the equality of justice: and consequently, to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.

Secondly we may speak of buying and selling, considered as accidentally tending to the advantage of one party, and to the disadvantage of the other:

for instance, when a man has great need of a certain thing, while an other man will suffer if he be without it. In such a case the just price will depend not only on the thing sold, but on the loss which the sale brings on the seller. And thus it will be lawful to sell a thing for more than it is worth in itself, though the price paid be not more than it is worth to the owner. Yet if the one man derive a great advantage by becoming possessed of the other man's property, and the seller be not at a loss through being without that thing, the latter ought not to raise the price, because the advantage accruing to the buyer, is not due to the seller, but to a circumstance affecting the buyer. Now no man should sell what is not his, though he may charge for the loss he suffers.

On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([2967]FS, Q[96], A[2]) human law is given to the people among whom there are many lacking virtue, and it is not given to the virtuous alone. Hence human law was unable to forbid all that is contrary to virtue; and it suffices for it to prohibit whatever is destructive of human intercourse, while it treats other matters as though they were lawful, not by approving of them, but by not punishing them. Accordingly, if without employing deceit the seller disposes of his goods for more than their worth, or the buyer obtain them for less than their worth, the law looks upon this as licit, and provides no punishment for so doing, unless the excess be too great, because then even human law demands restitution to be made, for instance if a man be deceived in regard to more than half the amount of the just price of a thing [*Cod. IV, xliv, De Rescind. Vend. 2,8].

On the other hand the Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue. Hence, according to the Divine law, it is reckoned unlawful if the equality of justice be not observed in buying and selling: and he who has received more than he ought must make compensation to him that has suffered loss, if the loss be considerable. I add this condition, because the just price of things is not fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a slight addition or subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says “this jester, either by looking into himself or by his experience of others, thought that all men are inclined to wish to buy for a song and sell at a premium. But since in reality this is wicked, it is in every man’s power to acquire that justice whereby he may resist and overcome this inclination.” And then he gives the example of a man who gave the just price for a book to a man who through ignorance asked a low price for it. Hence it is evident that this common desire is not from nature but from vice, wherefore it is common to many who walk along the broad road of sin.

Reply to Objection 3: In commutative justice we consider chiefly real equality. On the other hand, in friendship based on utility we consider equality of usefulness, so that the recompense should depend on the usefulness accruing, whereas in buying it should be equal to the thing bought.

Whether a sale is rendered unlawful through a fault in the thing sold?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sale is not rendered unjust and unlawful through a fault in the thing sold. For less account should be taken of the other parts of a thing than of what belongs to its substance. Yet the sale of a thing does not seem to be rendered unlawful through a fault in its substance: for instance, if a man sell instead of the real metal, silver or gold produced by some chemical process, which is adapted to all the human uses for which silver and gold are necessary, for instance in the making of vessels and the like. Much less therefore will it be an unlawful sale if the thing be defective in other ways.

Objection 2: Further, any fault in the thing, affecting the quantity, would seem chiefly to be opposed to justice which consists in equality. Now quantity is known by being measured: and the measures of things that come into human use are not fixed, but in some places are greater, in others less, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 7). Therefore just as it is impossible to avoid defects on the part of the thing sold, it seems that a sale is not rendered unlawful through the thing sold being defective.

Objection 3: Further, the thing sold is rendered defective by lacking a fitting quality. But in order to know the quality of a thing, much knowledge is required that is lacking in most buyers. Therefore a sale is not rendered unlawful by a fault (in the thing sold).

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): “It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good man should not depart from the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor have any connection with fraud.”

I answer that, A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing which is sold. One, in respect of the thing’s substance: and if the seller be aware of a fault in the thing he is selling, he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. Hence we find it written against certain people (Is. 1:22), “Thy silver is turned into dross, thy wine is mingled with water”: because that which is mixed is defective in its substance.

Another defect is in respect of quantity which is known by being measured: wherefore if anyone knowingly make use of a faulty measure in selling, he is guilty of fraud, and the sale is illicit. Hence it is written (Dt. 25:13,14): “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater and a less: neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel and a less,” and further on (Dt. 25:16): “For the Lord . . . abhorreth him that doth these things, and He hateth all injustice.”

A third defect is on the part of the quality, for instance, if a man sell an unhealthy animal as being a healthy one: and if anyone do this knowingly he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, and the sale, in consequence, is illicit.

In all these cases not only is the man guilty of a fraudulent sale, but he is also bound to restitution. But if any of the foregoing defects be in the thing sold, and he knows nothing about this, the seller does not sin, because he does that which is unjust materially, nor is his deed unjust, as shown above ([2968]Q[59], A[2]). Nevertheless he is bound to compensate the buyer, when the defect comes to his knowledge. Moreover what has been said of the seller applies equally to the buyer. For sometimes it happens that the seller thinks his goods to be specifically of lower value, as when a man sells gold instead of copper, and then if the buyer be aware of this, he buys it unjustly and is bound to restitution: and the same applies to a defect in quantity as to a defect in quality.

Reply to Objection 1: Gold and silver are costly not only on account of the usefulness of the vessels and other like things made from them, but also on account of the excellence and purity of their substance. Hence if the gold or silver produced by alchemists has not the true specific nature of gold and silver, the sale thereof is fraudulent and unjust, especially as real gold and silver can produce certain results by their natural action, which the counterfeit gold and silver of alchemists cannot produce. Thus the true metal has the property of making people joyful, and is helpful medicinally against certain maladies. Moreover real gold can be employed more frequently, and lasts longer in its condition of purity than counterfeit gold. If however real gold were to be produced by alchemy, it would not be unlawful to sell it for the genuine article, for nothing prevents art from employing certain natural causes for the production of natural and true effects, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) of things produced by the art of the demons.

Reply to Objection 2: The measures of salable commodities must needs be different in different places, on account of the difference of supply: because where there is greater abundance, the measures are wont to be larger. However in each place those who govern the state must determine the just measures of things salable, with due consideration for the conditions of place and time. Hence it is not lawful to disregard such measures as are established by public authority or custom.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 16) the price of things salable does not depend on their degree of nature, since at times a horse fetches a higher price than a slave; but it depends on their usefulness to man. Hence it is not necessary for the seller or buyer to be cognizant of the hidden qualities of the thing sold, but only of such as render the thing adapted to man’s use, for instance, that the horse be strong, run well and so forth. Such qualities the seller and buyer can easily discover.

Whether the seller is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?

Objection 1: It would seem that the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold. Since the seller does not bind the buyer to buy, he would seem to leave it to him to judge of the goods offered for sale. Now judgment about a thing and knowledge of that thing belong to the same person. Therefore it does not seem imputable to the seller if the buyer be deceived in his judgment, and be hurried into buying a thing without carefully inquiring into its condition.

Objection 2: Further, it seems foolish for anyone to do what prevents him carrying out his work. But if a man states the defects of the goods he has for sale, he prevents their sale: wherefore Tully (De Offic. iii, 13) pictures a man as saying: “Could anything be more absurd than for a public crier, instructed by the owner, to cry: ‘I offer this unhealthy horse for sale?’” Therefore the seller is not bound to state the defects of the thing sold.

Objection 3: Further, man needs more to know the road of virtue than to know the faults of things offered for sale. Now one is not bound to offer advice to all or to tell them the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, though one should not tell anyone what is false. Much less therefore is a seller bound to tell the faults of what he offers for sale, as though he were counseling the buyer.

Objection 4: Further, if one were bound to tell the faults of what one offers for sale, this would only be in order to lower the price. Now sometimes the price would be lowered for some other reason, without any defect in the thing sold: for instance, if the seller carry wheat to a place where wheat fetches a high price, knowing that many will come after him carrying wheat; because if the buyers knew this they would give a lower price. But apparently the seller need not give the buyer this information. Therefore, in like manner, neither need he tell him the faults of the goods he is selling.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 10): “In all contracts the defects of the salable commodity must be stated; and unless the seller make them known, although the buyer has already acquired a right to them, the contract is voided on account of the fraudulent action.”

I answer that, It is always unlawful to give anyone an occasion of danger or loss, although a man need not always give another the help or counsel which would be for his advantage in any way; but only in certain fixed cases, for instance when someone is subject to him, or when he is the only one who can assist him. Now the seller who offers goods for sale, gives the buyer an occasion of loss or danger, by the very fact that he offers him defective goods, if such defect may occasion loss or danger to the buyer—loss, if, by reason of this defect, the goods are of less value, and he takes nothing off the price on that account—danger, if this defect either hinder the use of the goods or render it hurtful, for instance, if a man sells a lame for a fleet horse, a tottering house for a safe one, rotten or poisonous food for wholesome. Wherefore if such like defects be hidden, and the seller does not make them known, the sale will be illicit and fraudulent, and the seller will be bound to compensation for the loss incurred.

On the other hand, if the defect be manifest, for instance if a horse have but one eye, or if the goods though useless to the buyer, be useful to someone else, provided the seller take as much as he ought from the price, he is not bound to state the defect of the goods, since perhaps on account of that defect the buyer might want him to allow a greater rebate than he need. Wherefore the seller may look to his own indemnity, by withholding the defect of the goods.

Reply to Objection 1: Judgment cannot be pronounced save on what is manifest: for "a man judges of what he knows" (Ethic. i, 3). Hence if the defects of the goods offered for sale be hidden, judgment of them is not sufficiently left with the buyer unless such defects be made known to him. The case would be different if the defects were manifest.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no need to publish beforehand by the public crier the defects of the goods one is offering for sale, because if he were to begin by announcing its defects, the bidders would be frightened to buy, through ignorance of other qualities that might render the thing good and serviceable. Such defect ought to be stated to each individual that offers to buy: and then he will be able to compare the various points one with the other, the good with the bad: for nothing prevents that which is defective in one respect being useful in many others.

Reply to Objection 3: Although a man is not bound strictly speaking to tell everyone the truth about matters pertaining to virtue, yet he is so bound in a case when, unless he tells the truth, his conduct would endanger another man in detriment to virtue: and so it is in this case.

Reply to Objection 4: The defect in a thing makes it of less value now than it seems to be: but in the case cited, the goods are expected to be of less value at a future time, on account of the arrival of other merchants, which was not foreseen by the buyers. Wherefore the seller, since he sells his goods at the price actually offered him, does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating what is going to happen. If however he were to do so, or if he lowered his price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice.

Whether, in trading, it is lawful to sell a thing at a higher price than what was paid for it?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful, in trading, to sell a thing for a higher price than we paid for it. For Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxviii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Mat. 21:12: “He that buys a thing in order that he may sell it, entire and unchanged, at a profit, is the trader who is cast out of God’s temple.” Cassiodorus speaks in the same sense in his commentary on Ps. 70:15, “Because I have not known learning, or trading” according to another version [*The Septuagint]: “What is trade,” says he, “but buying at a cheap price with the purpose of retailing at a higher price?” and he adds: “Such were the tradesmen whom Our Lord cast out of the temple.” Now no man is cast out of the temple except for a sin. Therefore such like trading is sinful.

Objection 2: Further, it is contrary to justice to sell goods at a higher price than their worth, or to buy them for less than their value, as shown above [2969](A[1]). Now if you sell a thing for a higher price than you paid for it, you must either have bought it for less than its value, or sell it for more than its value. Therefore this cannot be done without sin.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot. lii): “Shun, as you would the plague, a cleric who from being poor has become wealthy, or who, from being a nobody has become a celebrity.” Now trading would net seem to be forbidden to clerics except on account of its sinfulness. Therefore it is a sin in trading, to buy at a low price and to sell at a higher price.

On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:15, “Because I have not known learning,” [*Cf. OBJ 1] says: “The greedy tradesman blasphemes over his losses; he lies and perjures himself over the price of his wares. But these are vices of the man, not of the craft, which can be exercised without these vices.” Therefore trading is not in itself unlawful.

I answer that, A tradesman is one whose business consists in the exchange of things. According to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), exchange of things is twofold; one, natural as it were, and necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken in exchange for a commodity, in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such like trading, properly speaking, does not belong to tradesmen, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants who have to provide the household or the state with the necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit, and this kind of exchange, properly speaking, regards tradesmen, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3). The former kind of exchange is commendable because it supplies a natural need: but the latter is justly deserving of blame, because, considered in itself, it satisfies the greed for gain, which knows no limit and tends to infinity. Hence trading, considered in itself, has a certain debasement attaching thereto, in so far as, by its very nature, it does not imply a virtuous or necessary end. Nevertheless gain which is the end of trading, though not implying, by its nature, anything virtuous or necessary, does not, in itself, connote anything sinful or contrary to virtue: wherefore nothing prevents gain from being directed to some necessary or even virtuous end, and thus trading becomes lawful. Thus, for instance, a man may intend the moderate gain which he seeks to acquire by trading for the upkeep of his household, or for the assistance of the needy: or again, a man may take to trade for some public advantage, for instance, lest his country lack the necessaries of life, and seek gain, not as an end, but as payment for his labor.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Chrysostom refers to the trading which seeks gain as a last end. This is especially the case where a man sells something at a higher price without its undergoing any change. For if he sells at a higher price something that has changed for the better, he would seem to receive the reward of his labor. Nevertheless the gain itself may be lawfully intended, not as a last end, but for the sake of some other end which is necessary or virtuous, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Not everyone that sells at a higher price than he bought is a tradesman, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on the contrary, he buys not for sale but for possession, and afterwards, for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to another, or again in having it carried by another. In this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust.

Reply to Objection 3: Clerics should abstain not only from things that are evil in themselves, but even from those that have an appearance of evil.

This happens in trading, both because it is directed to worldly gain, which clerics should despise, and because trading is open to so many vices, since “a merchant is hardly free from sins of the lips” [*’A merchant is hardly free from negligence, and a huckster shall not be justified from the sins of the lips’] (Ecclus. 26:28). There is also another reason, because trading engages the mind too much with worldly cares, and consequently withdraws it from spiritual cares; wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:4): “No man being a soldier to God entangleth himself with secular businesses.” Nevertheless it is lawful for clerics to engage in the first mentioned kind of exchange, which is directed to supply the necessaries of life, either by buying or by selling.

BY SINS COMMITTED IN LOANS (Q[78])

OF THE SIN OF USURY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which is to receive usury?

(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for any other kind of consideration, by way of payment for the loan?

(3) Whether a man is bound to restore just gains derived from money taken in usury?

(4) Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?

Whether it is a sin to take usury for money lent?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to take usury for money lent. For no man sins through following the example of Christ. But Our Lord said of Himself (Lk. 19:23): “At My coming I might have exacted it,” i.e. the money lent, “with usury.” Therefore it is not a sin to take usury for lending money.

Objection 2: Further, according to Ps. 18:8, “The law of the Lord is unspotted,” because, to wit, it forbids sin. Now usury of a kind is allowed in the Divine law, according to Dt. 23:19,20: “Thou shalt not fenerate to thy brother money, nor corn, nor any other thing, but to the stranger”: nay more, it is even promised as a reward for the observance of the Law, according to Dt. 28:12: “Thou shalt fenerate* to many nations, and shalt not borrow of any one.” [*’Faeneraberis’—‘Thou shalt lend upon usury.’ The Douay version has simply ‘lend.’ The objection lays stress on the word ‘faeneraberis’: hence the necessity of rendering it by ‘fenerate.’] Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.

Objection 3: Further, in human affairs justice is determined by civil laws. Now civil law allows usury to be taken. Therefore it seems to be lawful.

Objection 4: Further, the counsels are not binding under sin. But, among other counsels we find (Lk. 6:35): “Lend, hoping for nothing thereby.” Therefore it is not a sin to take usury.

Objection 5: Further, it does not seem to be in itself sinful to accept a price for doing what one is not bound to do. But one who has money is not bound in every case to lend it to his neighbor. Therefore it is lawful for him sometimes to accept a price for lending it.

Objection 6: Further, silver made into coins does not differ specifically from silver made into a vessel. But it is lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver vessel. Therefore it is also lawful to accept a price for the loan of a silver coin. Therefore usury is not in itself a sin.

Objection 7: Further, anyone may lawfully accept a thing which its owner freely gives him. Now he who accepts the loan, freely gives the usury. Therefore he who lends may lawfully take the usury.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:25): “If thou lend money to any of thy people that is poor, that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner, nor oppress them with usuries.”

I answer that, To take usury for money lent is unjust in itself, because this is to sell what does not exist, and this evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice. In order to make this evident, we must observe that there are certain things the use of which consists in their consumption: thus we consume wine when we use it for drink and we consume wheat when we use it for food. Wherefore in such like things the use of the thing must not be reckoned apart from the thing itself, and whoever is granted the use of the thing, is granted the thing itself and for this reason, to lend things of this kin is to transfer the ownership. Accordingly if a man wanted to sell wine separately from the use of the wine, he would be selling the same thing twice, or he would be selling what does not exist, wherefore he would evidently commit a sin of injustice. In like manner he commits an injustice who lends wine or wheat, and asks for double payment, viz. one, the return of the thing in equal measure, the other, the price of the use, which is called usury.

On the other hand, there are things the use of which does not consist in their consumption: thus to use a house is to dwell in it, not to destroy it. Wherefore in such things both may be granted: for instance, one man may hand over to another the ownership of his house while reserving to himself the use of it for a time, or vice versa, he may grant the use of the house, while retaining the ownership. For this reason a man may lawfully make a charge for the use of his house, and, besides this, revendicate the house from the person to whom he has granted its use, as happens in renting and letting a house.

Now money, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5; Polit. i, 3) was invented chiefly for the purpose of exchange: and consequently the proper and principal use of money is its consumption or alienation whereby it is sunk in exchange. Hence it is by its very nature unlawful to take payment for the use of money lent, which payment is known as usury: and just as a man is bound to restore other ill-gotten goods, so is he bound to restore the money which he has taken in usury.

Reply to Objection 1: In this passage usury must be taken figuratively for the increase of spiritual goods which God exacts from us, for He wishes us ever to advance in the goods which we receive from Him: and this is for our own profit not for His.

Reply to Objection 2: The Jews were forbidden to take usury from their brethren, i.e. from other Jews. By this we are given to understand that to take usury from any man is evil simply, because we ought to treat every man as our neighbor and brother, especially in the state of the Gospel, whereto all are called. Hence it is said without any distinction in Ps. 14:5: “He that hath not put out his money to usury,” and (Ezech. 18:8): “Who hath not taken usury [*Vulg.: ‘If a man . . . hath not lent upon money, nor taken any increase . . . he is just.’].” They were permitted, however, to take usury from foreigners, not as though it were lawful, but in order to avoid a greater evil, lest, to wit, through avarice to which they were prone according to Is. 56:11, they should take usury from the Jews who were worshippers of God.

Where we find it promised to them as a reward, “Thou shalt fenerate to many nations,” etc., fenerating is to be taken in a broad sense for lending, as in Ecclus. 29:10, where we read: “Many have refused to fenerate, not out of wickedness,” i.e. they would not lend. Accordingly the Jews are promised in reward an abundance of wealth, so that they would be able to lend to others.

Reply to Objection 3: Human laws leave certain things unpunished, on account of the condition of those who are imperfect, and who would be deprived of many advantages, if all sins were strictly forbidden and punishments appointed for them. Wherefore human law has permitted usury, not that it looks upon usury as harmonizing with justice, but lest the advantage of many should be hindered. Hence it is that in civil law [*Inst. II, iv, de Usufructu] it is stated that “those things according to natural reason and civil law which are consumed by being used, do not admit of usufruct,” and that “the senate did not (nor could it) appoint a usufruct to such things, but established a quasi-usufruct,” namely by permitting usury. Moreover the Philosopher, led by natural reason, says (Polit. i, 3) that “to make money by usury is exceedingly unnatural.”

Reply to Objection 4: A man is not always bound to lend, and for this reason it is placed among the counsels. Yet it is a matter of precept not to seek profit by lending: although it may be called a matter of counsel in comparison with the maxims of the Pharisees, who deemed some kinds of usury to be lawful, just as love of one’s enemies is a matter of counsel. Or again, He speaks here not of the hope of usurious gain, but of the hope which is put in man. For we ought not to lend or do any good deed through hope in man, but only through hope in God.

Reply to Objection 5: He that is not bound to lend, may accept repayment for what he has done, but he must not exact more. Now he is repaid according to equality of justice if he is repaid as much as he lent. Wherefore if he exacts more for the usufruct of a thing which has no other use but the consumption of its substance, he exacts a price of something non-existent: and so his exaction is unjust.

Reply to Objection 6: The principal use of a silver vessel is not its consumption, and so one may lawfully sell its use while retaining one’s ownership of it. On the other hand the principal use of silver money is sinking it in exchange, so that it is not lawful to sell its use and at the same time expect the restitution of the amount lent. It must be observed, however, that the secondary use of silver vessels may be an exchange, and such use may not be lawfully sold. In like manner there may be some secondary use of silver money; for instance, a man might lend coins for show, or to be used as security.

Reply to Objection 7: He who gives usury does not give it voluntarily simply, but under a certain necessity, in so far as he needs to borrow money which the owner is unwilling to lend without usury.

Whether it is lawful to ask for any other kind of consideration for money lent?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may ask for some other kind of consideration for money lent. For everyone may lawfully seek to indemnify himself. Now sometimes a man suffers loss through lending money. Therefore he may lawfully ask for or even exact something else besides the money lent.

Objection 2: Further, as stated in Ethic. v, 5, one is in duty bound by a point of honor, to repay anyone who has done us a favor. Now to lend money to one who is in straits is to do him a favor for which he should be grateful. Therefore the recipient of a loan, is bound by a natural debt to repay something. Now it does not seem unlawful to bind oneself to an obligation of the natural law. Therefore it is not unlawful, in lending money to anyone, to demand some sort of compensation as condition of the loan.

Objection 3: Further, just as there is real remuneration, so is there verbal remuneration, and remuneration by service, as a gloss says on Is. 33:15, “Blessed is he that shaketh his hands from all bribes [*Vulg.: ‘Which of you shall dwell with everlasting burnings? . . . He that shaketh his hands from all bribes.’].” Now it is lawful to accept service or praise from one to whom one has lent money. Therefore in like manner it is lawful to accept any other kind of remuneration.

Objection 4: Further, seemingly the relation of gift to gift is the same as of loan to loan. But it is lawful to accept money for money given. Therefore it is lawful to accept repayment by loan in return for a loan granted.

Objection 5: Further, the lender, by transferring his ownership of a sum of money removes the money further from himself than he who entrusts it to a merchant or craftsman. Now it is lawful to receive interest for money entrusted to a merchant or craftsman. Therefore it is also lawful to receive interest for money lent.

Objection 6: Further, a man may accept a pledge for money lent, the use of which pledge he might sell for a price: as when a man mortgages his land or the house wherein he dwells. Therefore it is lawful to receive interest for money lent.

Objection 7: Further, it sometimes happens that a man raises the price of his goods under guise of loan, or buys another’s goods at a low figure; or raises his price through delay in being paid, and lowers his price that he may be paid the sooner. Now in all these cases there seems to be payment for a loan of money: nor does it appear to be manifestly illicit. Therefore it seems to be lawful to expect or exact some consideration for money lent.

On the contrary, Among other conditions requisite in a just man it is stated (Ezech. 18:17) that he “hath not taken usury and increase.”

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), a thing is reckoned as money “if its value can be measured by money.” Consequently, just as it is a sin against justice, to take money, by tacit or express agreement, in return for lending money or anything else that is consumed by being used, so also is it a like sin, by tacit or express agreement to receive anything whose price can be measured by money. Yet there would be no sin in receiving something of the kind, not as exacting it, nor yet as though it were due on account of some agreement tacit or expressed, but as a gratuity: since, even before lending the money, one could accept a gratuity, nor is one in a worse condition through lending.

On the other hand it is lawful to exact compensation for a loan, in respect of such things as are not appreciated by a measure of money, for instance, benevolence, and love for the lender, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: A lender may without sin enter an agreement with the borrower for compensation for the loss he incurs of something he ought to have, for this is not to sell the use of money but to avoid a loss. It may also happen that the borrower avoids a greater loss than the lender incurs, wherefore the borrower may repay the lender with what he has gained. But the lender cannot enter an agreement for compensation, through the fact that he makes no profit out of his money: because he must not sell that which he has not yet and may be prevented in many ways from having.

Reply to Objection 2: Repayment for a favor may be made in two ways. In one way, as a debt of justice; and to such a debt a man may be bound by a fixed contract; and its amount is measured according to the favor received. Wherefore the borrower of money or any such thing the use of which is its consumption is not bound to repay more than he received in loan: and consequently it is against justice if he be obliged to pay back more. In another way a man's obligation to repayment for favor received is based on a debt of friendship, and the nature of this debt depends more on the feeling with which the favor was conferred than on the greatness of the favor itself. This debt does not carry with it a civil obligation, involving a kind of necessity that would exclude the spontaneous nature of such a repayment.

Reply to Objection 3: If a man were, in return for money lent, as though there had been an agreement tacit or expressed, to expect or exact repayment in the shape of some remuneration of service or words, it would be the same as if he expected or exacted some real remuneration, because both can be priced at a money value, as may be seen in the case of those who offer for hire the labor which they exercise by work or by tongue. If on the other hand the remuneration by service or words be given not as an obligation, but as a favor, which is not to be appreciated at a money value, it is lawful to take, exact, and expect it.

Reply to Objection 4: Money cannot be sold for a greater sum than the amount lent, which has to be paid back: nor should the loan be made with a demand or expectation of aught else but of a feeling of benevolence which cannot be priced at a pecuniary value, and which can be the basis of a spontaneous loan. Now the obligation to lend in return at some future time is repugnant to such a feeling, because again an obligation of this kind has its pecuniary value. Consequently it is lawful for the lender to borrow something else at the same time, but it is unlawful for him to bind the borrower to grant him a loan at some future time.

Reply to Objection 5: He who lends money transfers the ownership of the money to the borrower. Hence the borrower holds the money at his own risk and is bound to pay it all back: wherefore the lender must not exact more. On the other hand he that entrusts his money to a merchant or craftsman so as to form a kind of society, does not transfer the ownership of his money to them, for it remains his, so that at his risk the merchant speculates with it, or the craftsman uses it for his craft, and consequently he may lawfully demand as something belonging to him, part of the profits derived from his money.

Reply to Objection 6: If a man in return for money lent to him pledges something that can be valued at a price, the lender must allow for the use of that thing towards the repayment of the loan. Else if he wishes the gratuitous use of that thing in addition to repayment, it is the same as if he took money for lending, and that is usury, unless perhaps it were such a thing as friends are wont to lend to one another gratis, as in the case of the loan of a book.

Reply to Objection 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of the price has the character of a loan, so that whatever he demands beyond the just price in consideration of this delay, is like a price for a loan, which pertains to usury. In like manner if a buyer wishes to buy goods at a lower price than what is just, for the reason that he pays for the goods before they can be delivered, it is a sin of usury; because again this anticipated payment of money has the character of a loan, the price of which is the rebate on the just price of the goods sold. On the other hand if a man wishes to allow a rebate on the just price in order that he may have his money sooner, he is not guilty of the sin of usury.

Whether a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to restore whatever profits he has made out of money gotten by usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): “If the root be holy, so are the branches.” Therefore likewise if the root be rotten so are the branches. But the root was infected with usury. Therefore whatever profit is made therefrom is infected with usury. Therefore he is bound to restore it.

Objection 2: Further, it is laid down (Extra, De Usuris, in the Decretal: ‘Cum tu sicut asseris’): “Property accruing from usury must be sold, and the price repaid to the persons from whom the usury was extorted.” Therefore, likewise, whatever else is acquired from usurious money must be restored.

Objection 3: Further, that which a man buys with the proceeds of usury is due to him by reason of the money he paid for it. Therefore he has no more right to the thing purchased than to the money he paid. But he was bound to restore the money gained through usury. Therefore he is also bound to restore what he acquired with it.

On the contrary, A man may lawfully hold what he has lawfully acquired. Now that which is acquired by the proceeds of usury is sometimes lawfully acquired. Therefore it may be lawfully retained.

I answer that, As stated above [2970](A[1]), there are certain things whose use is their consumption, and which do not admit of usufruct, according to law (ibid., ad 3). Wherefore if such like things be extorted by means of usury, for instance money, wheat, wine and so forth, the lender is not bound to restore more than he received (since what is acquired by such things is the fruit not of the thing but of human industry), unless indeed the other party by losing some of his own goods be injured through the lender retaining them: for then he is bound to make good the loss.

On the other hand, there are certain things whose use is not their consumption: such things admit of usufruct, for instance house or land property and so forth. Wherefore if a man has by usury extorted from another his house or land, he is bound to restore not only the house or land but also the fruits accruing to him therefrom, since they are the fruits of things owned by another man and consequently are due to him.

Reply to Objection 1: The root has not only the character of matter, as money made by usury has; but has also somewhat the character of an active cause, in so far as it administers nourishment. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Further, Property acquired from usury does not belong to the person who paid usury, but to the person who bought it. Yet he that paid usury has a certain claim on that property just as he has on the other goods of the usurer. Hence it is not prescribed that such property should be assigned to the persons who paid usury, since the property is perhaps worth more than what they paid in usury, but it is commanded that the property be sold, and the price be restored, of course according to the amount taken in usury.

Reply to Objection 3: The proceeds of money taken in usury are due to the person who acquired them not by reason of the usurious money as instrumental cause, but on account of his own industry as principal cause. Wherefore he has more right to the goods acquired with usurious money than to the usurious money itself.

Whether it is lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to borrow money under a condition of usury. For the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32) that they "are worthy of death . . . not only they that do" these sins, "but they also that consent to them that do them." Now he that borrows money under a condition of usury consents in the sin of the usurer, and gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he sins also.

Objection 2: Further, for no temporal advantage ought one to give another an occasion of committing a sin: for this pertains to active scandal, which is always sinful, as stated above ([2971]Q[43], A[2]). Now he that seeks to borrow from a usurer gives him an occasion of sin. Therefore he is not to be excused on account of any temporal advantage.

Objection 3: Further, it seems no less necessary sometimes to deposit one's money with a usurer than to borrow from him. Now it seems altogether unlawful to deposit one's money with a usurer, even as it would be unlawful to deposit one's sword with a madman, a maiden with a libertine, or food with a glutton. Neither therefore is it lawful to borrow from a usurer.

On the contrary, He that suffers injury does not sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 11), wherefore justice is not a mean between two vices, as stated in the same book (ch. 5). Now a usurer sins by doing an injury to the person who borrows from him under a condition of usury. Therefore he that accepts a loan under a condition of usury does not sin.

I answer that, It is by no means lawful to induce a man to sin, yet it is lawful to make use of another's sin for a good end, since even God uses all sin for some good, since He draws some good from every evil as stated in the Enchiridion (xi). Hence when Publicola asked whether it were lawful to make use of an oath taken by a man swearing by false gods (which is a manifest sin, for he gives Divine honor to them) Augustine (Ep. xlvii) answered that he who uses, not for a bad but for a good purpose, the oath of a man that swears by false gods, is a party, not to his sin of swearing by demons, but to his good compact whereby he kept his word. If however he were to induce him to swear by false gods, he would sin.

Accordingly we must also answer to the question in point that it is by no means lawful to induce a man to lend under a condition of usury: yet it is lawful to borrow for usury from a man who is ready to do so and is a usurer by profession; provided the borrower have a good end in view, such as the relief of his own or another's need. Thus too it is lawful for a man who has fallen among thieves to point out his property to them (which they sin in taking) in order to save his life, after the example of the ten men who said to Ismahel (Jer. 41:8): "Kill us not: for we have stores in the field."

Reply to Objection 1: He who borrows for usury does not consent to the usurer's sin but makes use of it. Nor is it the usurer's acceptance of usury that pleases him, but his lending, which is good.

Reply to Objection 2: He who borrows for usury gives the usurer an occasion, not for taking usury, but for lending; it is the usurer who finds an occasion of sin in the malice of his heart. Hence there is passive scandal on his part, while there is no active scandal on the part of the person who seeks to borrow. Nor is this passive scandal a reason why the other person should desist from borrowing if he is in need, since this passive scandal arises not from weakness or ignorance but from malice.

Reply to Objection 3: If one were to entrust one's money to a usurer lacking other means of practising usury; or with the intention of making a greater profit from his money by reason of the usury, one would be giving a sinner matter for sin, so that one would be a participator in his guilt. If, on the other hand, the usurer to whom one entrusts one's money has other means of practising usury, there is no sin in entrusting it to him that it may be in safer keeping, since this is to use a sinner for a good purpose.

OF THE QUASI-INTEGRAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quasi-integral parts of justice, which are "to do good," and "to decline from evil," and the opposite vices. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether these two are parts of justice?

(2) Whether transgression is a special sin?

(3) Whether omission is a special sin?

(4) Of the comparison between omission and transgression.

Whether to decline from evil and to do good are parts of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that to decline from evil and to do good are not parts of justice. For it belongs to every virtue to perform a good deed and to avoid an evil one. But parts do not exceed the whole. Therefore to decline from evil and to do good should not be reckoned parts of justice, which is a special kind of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 33:15, “Turn away from evil and do good,” says: “The former,” i.e. to turn away from evil, “avoids sin, the latter,” i.e. to do good, “deserves the life and the palm.” But any part of a virtue deserves the life and the palm. Therefore to decline from evil is not a part of justice.

Objection 3: Further, things that are so related that one implies the other, are not mutually distinct as parts of a whole. Now declining from evil is implied in doing good: since no one does evil and good at the same time. Therefore declining from evil and doing good are not parts of justice.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Correp. et Grat. i) declares that “declining from evil and doing good” belong to the justice of the law.

I answer that, If we speak of good and evil in general, it belongs to every virtue to do good and to avoid evil: and in this sense they cannot be reckoned parts of justice, except justice be taken in the sense of “all virtue” [*Cf.[2972] Q[58], A[5]]. And yet even if justice be taken in this sense it regards a certain special aspect of good; namely, the good as due in respect of Divine or human law.

On the other hand justice considered as a special virtue regards good as due to one’s neighbor. And in this sense it belongs to special justice to do good considered as due to one’s neighbor, and to avoid the opposite evil, that, namely, which is hurtful to one’s neighbor; while it belongs to general justice to do good in relation to the community or in relation to God, and to avoid the opposite evil.

Now these two are said to be quasi-integral parts of general or of special justice, because each is required for the perfect act of justice. For it belongs to justice to establish equality in our relations with others, as shown above ([2973]Q[58], A[2]): and it pertains to the same cause to establish and to preserve that which it has established. Now a person establishes the equality of justice by doing good, i.e. by rendering to another his due: and he preserves the already established equality of justice by declining from evil, that is by inflicting no injury on his neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil are here considered under a special aspect, by which they are appropriated to justice. The reason why these two are reckoned parts of justice under a special aspect of good and evil, while they are not reckoned parts of any other moral virtue, is that the other moral virtues are concerned with the passions wherein to do good is to observe the mean, which is the same as to avoid the extremes as evils: so that doing good and avoiding evil come to the same, with regard to the other virtues. On the other hand justice is concerned with operations and external things, wherein to establish equality is one thing, and not to disturb the equality established is another.

Reply to Objection 2: To decline from evil, considered as a part of justice, does not denote a pure negation, viz.”not to do evil”; for this does not deserve the palm, but only avoids the punishment. But it implies a movement of the will in repudiating evil, as the very term “decline” shows. This is meritorious; especially when a person resists against an instigation to do evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Doing good is the completive act of justice, and the principal part, so to speak, thereof. Declining from evil is a more imperfect act, and a secondary part of that virtue. Hence it is a. material part, so to speak, thereof, and a necessary condition of the formal and completive part.

Whether transgression is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that transgression is not a special sin. For no species is included in the definition of its genus. Now transgression is included in the definition of sin; because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that sin is “a transgression of the Divine law.” Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.

Objection 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a “word, deed or desire against the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgression is also against nature, or custom. Therefore transgression is not a species of sin.

Objection 3: Further, no species contains all the parts into which its genus is divided. Now the sin of transgression extends to all the capital vices, as well as to sins of thought, word and deed. Therefore transgression is not a special sin.

On the contrary, It is opposed to a special virtue, namely justice.

I answer that, The term transgression is derived from bodily movement and applied to moral actions. Now a person is said to transgress in bodily movement, when he steps [graditur] beyond [trans] a fixed boundary—and it is a negative precept that fixes the boundary that man must not exceed in his moral actions. Wherefore to transgress, properly speaking, is to act against a negative precept.

Now materially considered this may be common to all the species of sin, because man transgresses a Divine precept by any species of mortal sin. But if we consider it formally, namely under its special aspect of an act against a negative precept, it is a special sin in two ways. First, in so far as it is opposed to those kinds of sin that are opposed to the other virtues: for just as it belongs properly to legal justice to consider a precept as binding, so it belongs properly to a transgression to consider a precept as an object of contempt. Secondly, in so far as it is distinct from omission which is opposed to an affirmative precept.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as legal justice is “all virtue” ([2974]Q[58], A[5]) as regards its subject and matter, so legal injustice is materially “all sin.” It is in this way that Ambrose defined sin, considering it from the point of view of legal injustice.

Reply to Objection 2: The natural inclination concerns the precepts of the natural law. Again, a laudable custom has the force of a precept; since as Augustine says in an epistle On the Fast of the Sabbath (Ep. xxxvi), “a custom of God’s people should be looked upon as law.” Hence both sin and transgression may be against a laudable custom and against a natural inclination.

Reply to Objection 3: All these species of sin may include transgression, if we consider them not under their proper aspects, but under a special aspect, as stated above. The sin of omission, however, is altogether distinct from the sin of transgression.

Whether omission is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that omission is not a special sin. For every sin is either original or actual. Now omission is not original sin, for it is not contracted through origin nor is it actual sin, for it may be altogether without act, as stated above ([2975]FS, Q[71], A[5]) when we were treating of sins in general. Therefore omission is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is voluntary. Now omission sometimes is not voluntary but necessary, as when a woman is violated after taking a vow of virginity, or when one lose that which one is under an obligation to restore, or when a priest is bound to say Mass, and is prevented from doing so. Therefore omission is not always a sin.

Objection 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time when any special sin begins. But this is not possible in the case of omission, since one is not altered by not doing a thing, no matter when the omission occurs, and yet the omission is not always sinful. Therefore omission is not a special sin.

Objection 4: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But it is not possible to assign any special virtue to which omission is opposed, both because the good of any virtue can be omitted, and because justice to which it would seem more particularly opposed, always requires an act, even in declining from evil, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), while omission may be altogether without act. Therefore omission is not a special sin.

On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): “To him . . . who knoweth to do good and doth it not, to him it is sin.”

I answer that, omission signifies the non-fulfilment of a good, not indeed of any good, but of a good that is due. Now good under the aspect of due belongs properly to justice; to legal justice, if the thing due depends on Divine or human law; to special justice, if the due is something in relation to one’s neighbor. Wherefore, in the same way as justice is a special virtue, as stated above ([2976]Q[58], AA[6],7), omission is a special sin distinct from the sins which are opposed to the other virtues; and just as doing good, which is the opposite of omitting it, is a special part of justice, distinct from avoiding evil, to which transgression is opposed, so too is omission distinct from transgression.

Reply to Objection 2: Omission is not original but actual sin, not as though it had some act essential to it, but for as much as the negation of an act is reduced to the genus of act, and in this sense non-action is a kind of action, as stated above ([2977]FS, Q[71], A[6], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 2: Omission, as stated above, is only of such good as is due and to which one is bound. Now no man is bound to the impossible: wherefore no man sins by omission, if he does not do what he cannot. Accordingly she who is violated after vowing virginity, is guilty of an omission, not through not having virginity, but through not repenting of her past sin, or through not doing what she can to fulfil her vow by observing continence. Again a priest is not bound to say Mass, except he have a suitable opportunity, and if this be lacking, there is no omission. And in like manner, a person is bound to restitution, supposing he has the wherewithal; if he has not and cannot have it, he is not guilty of an omission, provided he does what he can. The same applies to other similar cases.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the sin of transgression is opposed to negative precepts which regard the avoidance of evil, so the sin of omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, which regard the doing of good. Now affirmative precepts bind not for always, but for a fixed time, and at that time the sin of omission begins. But it may happen that then one is unable to do what one ought, and if this inability is without any fault on his part, he does not omit his duty, as stated above (ad 2; [2978]FS, Q[71], A[5]). On the other hand if this inability is due to some previous fault of his (for instance, if a man gets drunk at night, and cannot get up for matins, as he ought to), some say that the sin of omission begins when he engages in an action that is illicit and incompatible with the act to which he is bound. But this does not seem to be true, for supposing one were to rouse him by violence and that he went to matins, he would not omit to go, so that, evidently, the previous drunkenness was not an omission, but the cause of an omission. Consequently, we must say that the omission begins to be imputed to him as a sin, when the time comes for the action; and yet this is on account of a preceding cause by reason of which the subsequent omission becomes voluntary.

Reply to Objection 4: Omission is directly opposed to justice, as stated above; because it is a non-fulfilment of a good of virtue, but only under the aspect of due, which pertains to justice. Now more is required for an act to be virtuous and meritorious than for it to be sinful and demeritorious, because “good results from an entire cause, whereas evil arises from each single defect” [*Dionysius, De Div. Nom. iv]. Wherefore the merit of justice requires an act, whereas an omission does not.

Whether a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sin of omission is more grievous than a sin of transgression. For “delictum” would seem to signify the same as “derelictum” [*Augustine, QQ. in Levit., qu. xx], and therefore is seemingly the same as an omission. But “delictum” denotes a more grievous offence than transgression, because it deserves more expiation as appears from Lev. 5. Therefore the sin of omission is more grievous than the sin of transgression.

Objection 2: Further, the greater evil is opposed to the greater good, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 10). Now to do good is a more excellent part of justice, than to decline from evil, to which transgression is opposed, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore omission is a graver sin than transgression.

Objection 3: Further, sins of transgression may be either venial or mortal. But sins of omission seem to be always mortal, since they are opposed to an affirmative precept. Therefore omission would seem to be a graver sin than transgression.

Objection 4: Further, the pain of loss which consists in being deprived of seeing God and is inflicted for the sin of omission, is a greater punishment than the pain of sense, which is inflicted for the sin of transgression, as Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiii super Matth.). Now punishment is proportionate to fault. Therefore the sin of omission is graver than the sin of transgression.

On the contrary, It is easier to refrain from evil deeds than to accomplish good deeds. Therefore it is a graver sin not to refrain from an evil deed, i.e. “to transgress,” than not to accomplish a good deed, which is “to omit.”

I answer that, The gravity of a sin depends on its remoteness from virtue. Now contrariety is the greatest remoteness, according to Metaph. x [*Didot. ed. ix, 4]. Wherefore a thing is further removed from its contrary than from its simple negation; thus black is further removed from white than not-white is, since every black is not-white, but not conversely. Now it is evident that transgression is contrary to an act of virtue, while omission denotes the negation thereof: for instance it is a sin of omission, if one fail to give one’s parents due reverence, while it is a sin of transgression to revile them or injure them in any way. Hence it is evident that, simply and absolutely speaking, transgression is a graver sin than omission, although a particular omission may be graver than a particular transgression.

Reply to Objection 1: “Delictum” in its widest sense denotes any kind of omission; but sometimes it is taken strictly for the omission of something concerning God, or for a man’s intentional and as it were contemptuous dereliction of duty: and then it has a certain gravity, for which reason it demands a greater expiation.

Reply to Objection 2: The opposite of “doing good” is both “not doing good,” which is an omission, and “doing evil,” which is a transgression: but the first is opposed by contradiction, the second by contrariety, which implies greater remoteness: wherefore transgression is the more grievous sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as omission is opposed to affirmative precepts, so is transgression opposed to negative precepts: wherefore both, strictly speaking, have the character of mortal sin. Transgression and omission, however, may be taken broadly for any infringement of an affirmative or negative precept, disposing to the opposite of such precept: and so taking both in a broad sense they may be venial sins.

Reply to Objection 4: To the sin of transgression there correspond both the pain of loss on account of the aversion from God, and the pain of sense, on account of the inordinate conversion to a mutable good. In like manner omission deserves not only the pain of loss, but also the pain of sense, according to Mat. 7:19, “Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit shall be cut down, and shall be cast into the fire”; and this on account of the root from which it grows, although it does not necessarily imply conversion to any mutable good.

OF THE POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the potential parts of justice, namely the virtues annexed thereto; under which head there are two points of consideration:

(1) What virtues are annexed to justice?

(2) The individual virtues annexed to justice.

Whether the virtues annexed to justice are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues annexed to justice are unsuitably enumerated Tully [*De Invent. ii, 53] reckons six, viz. “religion, piety, gratitude, revenge, observance, truth.” Now revenge is seemingly a species of commutative justice whereby revenge is taken for injuries inflicted, as stated above ([2979]Q[61], A[4]). Therefore it should not be reckoned among the virtues annexed to justice.

Objection 2: Further, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons seven, viz. “innocence, friendship, concord, piety, religion, affection, humanity,” several of which are omitted by Tully. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice would seem to be insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 3: Further, others reckon five parts of justice, viz. “obedience” in respect of one’s superiors, “discipline” with regard to inferiors, “equity” as regards equals, “fidelity” and “truthfulness” towards all; and of these “truthfulness” alone is mentioned by Tully. Therefore he would seem to have enumerated insufficiently the virtues annexed to justice.

Objection 4: Further, the peripatetic Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons nine parts annexed to justice viz. “liberality, kindliness, revenge, commonsense, [*{eugnomosyne}] piety, gratitude, holiness, just exchange” and “just lawgiving”; and of all these it is evident that Tully mentions none but “revenge.” Therefore he would appear to have made an incomplete enumeration.

Objection 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions {epieikeia} as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, Two points must be observed about the virtues annexed to a principal virtue. The first is that these virtues have something in common with the principal virtue; and the second is that in some respect they fall short of the perfection of that virtue. Accordingly since justice is of one man to another as stated above ([2980]Q[58], A[2]), all the virtues that are directed to another person may by reason of this common aspect be annexed to justice. Now the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another his due according to equality, as stated above ([2981]Q[58], A[11]). Wherefore in two ways may a virtue directed to another person fall short of the perfection of justice: first, by falling short of the aspect of equality; secondly, by falling short of the aspect of due. For certain virtues there are which render another his due, but are unable to render the equal due. In the first place, whatever man renders to God is due, yet it cannot be equal, as though man rendered to God as much as he owes Him, according to Ps. 115:12, “What shall I render to the Lord for all the things that He hath rendered to me?” In this respect “religion” is annexed to justice since, according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53), it consists in offering service and ceremonial rites or worship to “some superior nature that men call divine.” Secondly, it is not possible to make to one’s parents an equal return of what one owes to them, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. viii, 14); and thus “piety” is annexed to justice, for thereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), a man “renders service and constant deference to his kindred and the well-wishers of his country.” Thirdly, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), man is unable to offer an equal meed for virtue, and thus “observance” is annexed to justice, consisting according to Tully (De invent. ii, 53) in the “deference and honor rendered to those who excel in worth.”

A falling short of the just due may be considered in respect of a twofold due, moral or legal: wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13) assigns a corresponding twofold just. The legal due is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation; and this due is chiefly the concern of justice, which is the principal virtue. On the other hand, the moral due is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue: and since a due implies necessity, this kind of due has two degrees. For one due is so necessary that without it moral rectitude cannot be ensured: and this has more of the character of due. Moreover this due may be considered from the point of view of the debtor, and in this way it pertains to this kind of due that a man represent himself to others just as he is, both in word and deed. Wherefore to justice is annexed “truth,” whereby, as Tully says (De invent. ii, 53), present, past and future things are told without perversion. It may also be considered from the point of view of the person to whom it is due, by comparing the reward he receives with what he has done—sometimes in good things; and then annexed to justice we have “gratitude” which “consists in recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back,” as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53)—and sometimes in evil things, and then to justice is annexed “revenge,” whereby, as Tully states (De invent. ii, 53), “we resist force, injury or anything obscure* by taking vengeance or by self-defense.” [*St. Thomas read ‘obscurum,’ and explains it as meaning ‘derogatory,’ infra[2982] Q[108], A[2]. Cicero, however, wrote ‘obfuturum,’ i.e. ‘hurtful.’]

There is another due that is necessary in the sense that it conduces to greater rectitude, although without it rectitude may be ensured. This due is the concern of “liberality,” “affability” or “friendship,” or the like, all of which Tully omits in the aforesaid enumeration because there is little of the nature of anything due in them.

Reply to Objection 1: The revenge taken by authority of a public power, in accordance with a judge’s sentence, belongs to commutative justice: whereas the revenge which a man takes on his own initiative, though not against the law, or which a man seeks to obtain from a judge, belongs to the virtue annexed to justice.

Reply to Objection 2: Macrobius appears to have considered the two integral parts of justice, namely, “declining from evil,” to which “innocence” belongs, and “doing good,” to which the six others belong. Of these, two would seem to regard relations between equals, namely, “friendship” in the external conduct and “concord” internally; two regard our relations toward superiors, namely, “piety” to parents, and “religion” to God; while two regard our relations towards inferiors, namely, “condescension,” in so far as their good pleases us, and “humanity,” whereby we help them in their needs. For Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man is said to be “humane, through having a feeling of love and pity towards men: this gives its name to humanity whereby we uphold one another.” In this sense “friendship” is understood as directing our external conduct towards others, from which point of view the Philosopher treats of it in Ethic. iv, 6. “Friendship” may also be taken as regarding properly the affections, and as the Philosopher describes it in Ethic. viii and ix. In this sense three things pertain to friendship, namely, “benevolence” which is here called “affection”; “concord,” and “beneficence” which is here called “humanity.” These three, however, are omitted by Tully, because, as stated above, they have little of the nature of a due.

Reply to Objection 3: “Obedience” is included in observance, which Tully mentions, because both reverential honor and obedience are due to persons who excel. “Faithfulness whereby a man’s acts agree with his words” [*Cicero, De Repub. iv, De Offic. i, 7], is contained in “truthfulness” as to the observance of one’s promises: yet “truthfulness” covers a wider ground, as we shall state further on ([2983]Q[109], AA[1],3). “Discipline” is not due as a necessary duty, because one is under no obligation to an inferior as such, although a superior may be under an obligation to watch over his inferiors, according to Mat. 24:45, “A faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family”: and for this reason it is omitted by Tully. It may, however, be included in humanity mentioned by Macrobius; and equity under {epieikeia} or under “friendship.”

Reply to Objection 4: This enumeration contains some belonging to true justice. To particular justice belongs “justice of exchange,” which he describes as “the habit of observing equality in commutations.” To legal justice, as regards things to be observed by all, he ascribes “legislative justice,” which he describes as “the science of political commutations relating to the community.” As regards things which have to be done in particular cases beside the general laws, he mentions “common sense” or “good judgment*,” which is our guide in such like matters, as stated above ([2984]Q[51], A[4]) in the treatise on prudence: wherefore he says that it is a “voluntary justification,” because by his own free will man observes what is just according to his judgment and not according to the written law. [*St. Thomas indicates the Greek derivation: {eugnomosyne} quasi ‘bona {gnome}.’] These two are ascribed to prudence as their director, and to justice as their executor. {Eusebeia} [piety] means “good worship” and consequently is the same as religion, wherefore he says that it is the science of “the service of God” (he speaks after the manner of Socrates who said that ‘all the virtues are sciences’) [*Aristotle, Ethic. vi, 13]: and “holiness” comes to the same, as we shall state further on ([2985]Q[81], A[8]). {Eucharistia} (gratitude) means “good thanksgiving,” and is mentioned by Macrobius: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a kind man is one who is ready of his own accord to do good, and is of gentle speech”: and Andronicus too says that “kindliness is a habit of voluntary beneficence.” “Liberality” would seem to pertain to “humanity.”

Reply to Objection 5: {Epieikeia} is annexed, not to particular but to legal justice, and apparently is the same as that which goes by the name of {eugnomosyne} [common sense].

OF RELIGION (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider each of the foregoing virtues, in so far as our present scope demands. We shall consider (1) religion, (2) piety, (3) observance, (4) gratitude, (5) revenge, (6) truth, (7) friendship, (8) liberality, (9) {epieikeia}. Of the other virtues that have been mentioned we have spoken partly in the treatise on charity, viz. of concord and the like, and partly in this treatise on justice, for instance, of right commutations and of innocence. of legislative justice we spoke in the treatise on prudence.

Religion offers a threefold consideration: (1) Religion considered in itself; (2) its acts; (3) the opposite vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether religion regards only our relation to God?

(2) Whether religion is a virtue?

(3) Whether religion is one virtue?

(4) Whether religion is a special virtue?

(5) Whether religion is a theological virtue?

(6) Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?

(7) Whether religion has any external actions?

(8) Whether religion is the same as holiness?

Whether religion directs man to God alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not direct man to God alone. It is written (James 1:27): “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation, and to keep oneself unspotted from this world.” Now “to visit the fatherless and widows” indicates an order between oneself and one’s neighbor, and “to keep oneself unspotted from this world” belongs to the order of a man within himself. Therefore religion does not imply order to God alone.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 1) that “since in speaking Latin not only unlettered but even most cultured persons ere wont to speak of religion as being exhibited, to our human kindred and relations as also to those who are linked with us by any kind of tie, that term does not escape ambiguity when it is a question of Divine worship, so that we be able to say without hesitation that religion is nothing else but the worship of God.” Therefore religion signifies a relation not only to God but also to our kindred.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly “latria” pertains to religion. Now “latria signifies servitude,” as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). And we are bound to serve not only God, but also our neighbor, according to Gal. 5:13, “By charity of the spirit serve one another.” Therefore religion includes a relation to one’s neighbor also.

Objection 4: Further, worship belongs to religion. Now man is said to worship not only God, but also his neighbor, according to the saying of Cato [*Dionysius Cato, Breves Sententiae], “Worship thy parents.” Therefore religion directs us also to our neighbor, and not only to God.

Objection 5: Further, all those who are in the state of grace are subject to God. Yet not all who are in a state of grace are called religious, but only those who bind themselves by certain vows and observances, and to obedience to certain men. Therefore religion seemingly does not denote a relation of subjection of man to God.

On the contrary, Tully says (Rhet. ii, 53) that “religion consists in offering service and ceremonial rites to a superior nature that men call divine.”

I answer that, as Isidore says (Etym. x), “according to Cicero, a man is said to be religious from ‘religio,’ because he often ponders over, and, as it were, reads again [relegit], the things which pertain to the worship of God,” so that religion would seem to take its name from reading over those things which belong to Divine worship because we ought frequently to ponder over such things in our hearts, according to Prov. 3:6, “In all thy ways think on Him.” According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3) it may also take its name from the fact that “we ought to seek God again, whom we had lost by our neglect” [*St. Augustine plays on the words ‘reeligere,’ i.e. to choose over again, and ‘negligere,’ to neglect or despise.]. Or again, religion may be derived from “religare” [to bind together], wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55): “May religion bind us to the one Almighty God.” However, whether religion take its name from frequent reading, or from a repeated choice of what has been lost through negligence, or from being a bond, it denotes properly a relation to God. For it is He to Whom we ought to be bound as to our unfailing principle; to Whom also our choice should be resolutely directed as to our last end; and Whom we lose when we neglect Him by sin, and should recover by believing in Him and confessing our faith.

Reply to Objection 1: Religion has two kinds of acts. Some are its proper and immediate acts, which it elicits, and by which man is directed to God alone, for instance, sacrifice, adoration and the like. But it has other acts, which it produces through the medium of the virtues which it commands, directing them to the honor of God, because the virtue which is concerned with the end, commands the virtues which are concerned with the means. Accordingly "to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation" is an act of religion as commanding, and an act of mercy as eliciting; and "to keep oneself unspotted from this world" is an act of religion as commanding, but of temperance or of some similar virtue as eliciting.

Reply to Objection 2: Religion is referred to those things one exhibits to one's human kindred, if we take the term religion in a broad sense, but not if we take it in its proper sense. Hence, shortly before the passage quoted, Augustine says: "In a stricter sense religion seems to denote, not any kind of worship, but the worship of God."

Reply to Objection 3: Since servant implies relation to a lord, wherever there is a special kind of lordship there must needs be a special kind of service. Now it is evident that lordship belongs to God in a special and singular way, because He made all things, and has supreme dominion over all. Consequently a special kind of service is due to Him, which is known as "latria" in Greek; and therefore it belongs to religion.

Reply to Objection 4: We are said to worship those whom we honor, and to cultivate [*In the Latin the same word 'colere' stands for 'worship' and 'cultivate']: a man's memory or presence: we even speak of cultivating things that are beneath us, thus a farmer [agricola] is one who cultivates the land, and an inhabitant [incola] is one who cultivates the place where he dwells. Since, however, special honor is due to God as the first principle of all things, to Him also is due a special kind of worship, which in Greek is {Eusebeia} or {Theosebeia}, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1).

Reply to Objection 5: Although the name "religious" may be given to all in general who worship God, yet in a special way religious are those who consecrate their whole life to the Divine worship, by withdrawing from human affairs. Thus also the term “contemplative” is applied, not to those who contemplate, but to those who give up their whole lives to contemplation. Such men subject themselves to man, not for man’s sake but for God’s sake, according to the word of the Apostle (Gal. 4:14), “You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus.”

Whether religion is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a virtue. Seemingly it belongs to religion to pay reverence to God. But reverence is an act of fear which is a gift, as stated above ([2986]Q[19], A[9]). Therefore religion is not a virtue but a gift

Objection 2: Further, every virtue is a free exercise of the will, wherefore it is described as an “elective” or voluntary “habit” [*Ethic. ii, 6]. Now, as stated above (A[1], ad 3) “latria” belongs to religion, and “latria” denotes a kind of servitude. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. ii, 1, aptitude for virtue is in us by nature, wherefore things pertaining to virtue belong to the dictate of natural reason. Now, it belongs to religion “to offer ceremonial worship to the Godhead” [*Cf. A[1]], and ceremonial matters, as stated above ([2987]FS, Q[99], A[3], ad 2; [2988]FS, Q[101]) , do not belong to the dictate of natural reason. Therefore religion is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is enumerated with the other virtues, as appears from what has been said above ([2989]Q[80]).

I answer that, As stated above (Q[58], A[3]; [2990]FS, Q[55], AA[3],4) “a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise,” wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to render anyone his due has the aspect of good, since by rendering a person his due, one becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner. But order comes under the aspect of good, just as mode and species, according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii). Since then it belongs to religion to pay due honor to someone, namely, to God, it is evident that religion is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: To pay reverence to God is an act of the gift of fear. Now it belongs to religion to do certain things through reverence for God.

Hence it follows, not that religion is the same as the gift of fear, but that it is referred thereto as to something more excellent; for the gifts are more excellent than the moral virtues, as stated above (Q[9], A[1], ad 3; [2991]FS, Q[68], A[8]).

Reply to Objection 2: Even a slave can voluntarily do his duty by his master, and so “he makes a virtue of necessity” [*Jerome, Ep. liv, ad Furiam.], by doing his duty voluntarily. In like manner, to render due service to God may be an act of virtue, in so far as man does so voluntarily.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the dictate of natural reason that man should do something through reverence for God. But that he should do this or that determinate thing does not belong to the dictate of natural reason, but is established by Divine or human law.

Whether religion is one virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not one virtue. Religion directs us to God, as stated above [2992](A[1]). Now in God there are three Persons; and also many attributes, which differ at least logically from one another. Now a logical difference in the object suffices for a difference of virtue, as stated above (Q[50], A[2], ad 2). Therefore religion is not one virtue.

Objection 2: Further, of one virtue there is seemingly one act, since habits are distinguished by their acts. Now there are many acts of religion, for instance to worship, to serve, to vow, to pray, to sacrifice and many such like. Therefore religion is not one virtue.

Objection 3: Further, adoration belongs to religion. Now adoration is paid to images under one aspect, and under another aspect to God Himself. Since, then, a difference of aspect distinguishes virtues, it would seem that religion is not one virtue.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): “One God [Vulg.: ‘Lord’], one faith.” Now true religion professes faith in one God. Therefore religion is one virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([2993]FS, Q[54], A[2], ad 1), habits are differentiated according to a different aspect of the object. Now it belongs to religion to show reverence to one God under one aspect, namely, as the first principle of the creation and government of things. Wherefore He

Himself says (Malach. 1:6): “If . . . I be a father, where is My honor?” For it belongs to a father to beget and to govern. Therefore it is evident that religion is one virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The three Divine Persons are the one principle of the creation and government of things, wherefore they are served by one religion. The different aspects of the attributes concur under the aspect of first principle, because God produces all things, and governs them by the wisdom, will and power of His goodness. Wherefore religion is one virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: By the one same act man both serves and worships God, for worship regards the excellence of God, to Whom reverence is due: while service regards the subjection of man who, by his condition, is under an obligation of showing reverence to God. To these two belong all acts ascribed to religion, because, by them all, man bears witness to the Divine excellence and to his own subjection to God, either by offering something to God, or by assuming something Divine.

Reply to Objection 3: The worship of religion is paid to images, not as considered in themselves, nor as things, but as images leading us to God incarnate. Now movement to an image as image does not stop at the image, but goes on to the thing it represents. Hence neither “latria” nor the virtue of religion is differentiated by the fact that religious worship is paid to the images of Christ.

Whether religion is a special virtue, distinct from the others?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not a special virtue distinct from the others. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): “Any action whereby we are united to God in holy fellowship, is a true sacrifice.” But sacrifice belongs to religion. Therefore every virtuous deed belongs to religion; and consequently religion is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): “Do all to the glory of God.” Now it belongs to religion to do anything in reverence of God, as stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2]). Therefore religion is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the charity whereby we love God is not distinct from the charity whereby we love our neighbor. But according to Ethic. viii, 8 “to be honored is almost to be loved.” Therefore the religion whereby we honor God is not a special virtue distinct from observance, or “dulia,” or piety whereby we honor our neighbor. Therefore religion is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice, distinct from the other parts.

I answer that, Since virtue is directed to the good, wherever there is a special aspect of good, there must be a special virtue. Now the good to which religion is directed, is to give due honor to God. Again, honor is due to someone under the aspect of excellence: and to God a singular excellence is competent, since He infinitely surpasses all things and exceeds them in every way. Wherefore to Him is special honor due: even as in human affairs we see that different honor is due to different personal excellences, one kind of honor to a father, another to the king, and so on. Hence it is evident that religion is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Every virtuous deed is said to be a sacrifice, in so far as it is done out of reverence of God. Hence this does not prove that religion is a general virtue, but that it commands all other virtues, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 2: Every deed, in so far as it is done in God’s honor, belongs to religion, not as eliciting but as commanding: those belong to religion as eliciting which pertain to the reverence of God by reason of their specific character.

Reply to Objection 3: The object of love is the good, but the object of honor and reverence is something excellent. Now God’s goodness is communicated to the creature, but the excellence of His goodness is not. Hence the charity whereby God is loved is not distinct from the charity whereby our neighbor is loved; whereas the religion whereby God is honored, is distinct from the virtues whereby we honor our neighbor.

Whether religion is a theological virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is a theological virtue. Augustine says (Enchiridion iii) that “God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity,” which are theological virtues. Now it belongs to religion to pay worship to God. Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

Objection 2: Further, a theological virtue is one that has God for its object. Now religion has God for its object, since it directs us to God alone, as stated above [2994](A[1]). Therefore religion is a theological virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral, as is clear from what has been said (FS, QQ[57],58,62). Now it is evident that religion is not an intellectual virtue, because its perfection does not depend on the consideration of truth: nor is it a moral virtue, which consists properly in observing the mean between too much and too little. for one cannot worship God too much, according to Ecclus. 43:33, “Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can; for He is above all praise.” Therefore it remains that it is a theological virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned a part of justice which is a moral virtue.

I answer that, As stated above [2995](A[4]) religion pays due worship to God. Hence two things are to be considered in religion: first that which it offers to God, viz. worship, and this is by way of matter and object in religion; secondly, that to which something is offered, viz. God, to Whom worship is paid. And yet the acts whereby God is worshiped do not reach out to God himself, as when we believe God we reach out to Him by believing; for which reason it was stated (Q[1], AA[1],2,4) that God is the object of faith, not only because we believe in a God, but because we believe God.

Now due worship is paid to God, in so far as certain acts whereby God is worshiped, such as the offering of sacrifices and so forth, are done out of reverence for God. Hence it is evident that God is related to religion not as matter or object, but as end: and consequently religion is not a theological virtue whose object is the last end, but a moral virtue which is properly about things referred to the end.

Reply to Objection 1: The power or virtue whose action deals with an end, moves by its command the power or virtue whose action deals with matters directed to that end. Now the theological virtues, faith, hope and charity have an act in reference to God as their proper object: wherefore, by their command, they cause the act of religion, which performs certain deeds directed to God: and so Augustine says that God is worshiped by faith, hope and charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Religion directs man to God not as its object but as its end.

Reply to Objection 3: Religion is neither a theological nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and observes a mean, not in the passions, but in actions directed to God, by establishing a kind of equality in them. And when I say “equality,” I do not mean absolute equality, because it is not possible to pay God as much as we owe Him, but equality in consideration of man’s ability and God’s acceptance.

And it is possible to have too much in matters pertaining to the Divine worship, not as regards the circumstance of quantity, but as regards other circumstances, as when Divine worship is paid to whom it is not due, or when it is not due, or unduly in respect of some other circumstance.

Whether religion should be preferred to the other moral virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion should not be preferred to the other moral virtues. The perfection of a moral virtue consists in its observing the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But religion fails to observe the mean of justice, since it does not render an absolute equal to God. Therefore religion is not more excellent than the other moral virtues.

Objection 2: Further, what is offered by one man to another is the more praiseworthy, according as the person it is offered to is in greater need: wherefore it is written (Is. 57:7): “Deal thy bread to the hungry.” But God needs nothing that we can offer Him, according to Ps. 15:2, “I have said: Thou art my God, for Thou hast no need of my goods.” Therefore religion would seem less praiseworthy than the other virtues whereby man’s needs are relieved.

Objection 3: Further, the greater. the obligation to do a thing, the less praise does it deserve, according to 1 Cor. 9:16, “If I preach the Gospel, it is no glory to me: a necessity lieth upon me.” Now the more a thing is due, the greater the obligation of paying it. Since, then, what is paid to God by man is in the highest degree due to Him, it would seem that religion is less praiseworthy than the other human virtues.

On the contrary, The precepts pertaining to religion are given precedence (Ex. 20) as being of greatest importance. Now the order of precepts is proportionate to the order of virtues, since the precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Therefore religion is the chief of the moral virtues.

I answer that, Whatever is directed to an end takes its goodness from being ordered to that end; so that the nearer it is to the end the better it is. Now moral virtues, as stated above [2996](A[5]; Q[4], A[7]), are about matters that are ordered to God as their end. And religion approaches nearer to God than the other moral virtues, in so far as its actions are directly and immediately ordered to the honor of God. Hence religion excels among the moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is praised because of the will, not because of the ability: and therefore if a man fall short of equality which is the mean of justice, through lack of ability, his virtue deserves no less praise, provided there be no failing on the part of his will.

Reply to Objection 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to God not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sake of His glory, and on account of its usefulness to us.

Reply to Objection 3: Where there is an obligation to do a thing it loses the luster of supererogation, but not the merit of virtue, provided it be done voluntarily. Hence the argument proves nothing.

Whether religion has an external act?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion has not an external act. It is written (Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” Now external acts pertain, not to the spirit but to the body. Therefore religion, to which adoration belongs, has acts that are not external but internal.

Objection 2: Further, the end of religion is to pay God reverence and honor. Now it would savor of irreverence towards a superior, if one were to offer him that which properly belongs to his inferior. Since then whatever man offers by bodily actions, seems to be directed properly to the relief of human needs, or to the reverence of inferior creatures, it would seem unbecoming to employ them in showing reverence to God.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) commends Seneca for finding fault with those who offered to idols those things that are wont to be offered to men, because, to wit, that which befits mortals is unbecoming to immortals. But such things are much less becoming to the true God, Who is “exalted above all gods” [*Ps. 94:3]. Therefore it would seem wrong to worship God with bodily actions. Therefore religion has no bodily actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 83:3): “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.” Now just as internal actions belong to the heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh. Therefore it seems that God ought to be worshiped not only by internal but also by external actions.

I answer that, We pay God honor and reverence, not for His sake (because He is of Himself full of glory to which no creature can add anything), but for our own sake, because by the very fact that we revere and honor God, our mind is subjected to Him; wherein its perfection consists, since a thing is perfected by being subjected to its superior, for instance the body is perfected by being quickened by the soul, and the air by being enlightened by the sun. Now the human mind, in order to be united to God, needs to be guided by the sensible world, since “invisible things . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 1:20). Wherefore in the Divine worship it is necessary to make use of corporeal things, that man’s mind may be aroused thereby, as by signs, to the spiritual acts by means of which he is united to God. Therefore the internal acts of religion take precedence of the others and belong to religion essentially, while its external acts are secondary, and subordinate to the internal acts.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking of that which is most important and directly intended in the worship of God.

Reply to Objection 2: These external things are offered to God, not as though He stood in need of them, according to Ps. 49:13, “Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? or shall I drink the blood of goats?” but as signs of the internal and spiritual works, which are of themselves acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): “The visible sacrifice is the sacrament or sacred sign of the invisible sacrifice.”

Reply to Objection 3: Idolaters are ridiculed for offering to idols things pertaining to men, not as signs arousing them to certain spiritual things, but as though they were of themselves acceptable to the idols; and still more because they were foolish and wicked.

Whether religion is the same as sanctity?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion is not the same as sanctity. Religion is a special virtue, as stated above [2997](A[4]): whereas sanctity is a general virtue, because it makes us faithful, and fulfil our just obligations to God, according to Andronicus [*De Affectibus]. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.

Objection 2: Further, sanctity seems to denote a kind of purity. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii) that "sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and altogether unspotted purity." Now purity would seem above all to pertain to temperance which repels bodily uncleanness. Since then religion belongs to justice, it would seem that sanctity is not the same as religion.

Objection 3: Further, things that are opposite members of a division are not identified with one another. But in an enumeration given above (Q[80], ad 4) of the parts of justice, sanctity is reckoned as distinct from religion. Therefore sanctity is not the same as religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:74,75): "That . . . we may serve Him . . . in holiness and justice." Now, "to serve God" belongs to religion, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3], ad 2). Therefore religion is the same as sanctity.

I answer that, The word "sanctity" seems to have two significations. In one way it denotes purity; and this signification fits in with the Greek, for {hagios} means "unsoiled." In another way it denotes firmness, wherefore in olden times the term "sancta" was applied to such things as were upheld by law and were not to be violated. Hence a thing is said to be sacred [sancitum] when it is ratified by law. Again, in Latin, this word "sanctus" may be connected with purity, if it be resolved into "sanguine tinctus, since, in olden times, those who wished to be purified were sprinkled with the victim's blood," according to Isidore (Etym. x). In either case the signification requires sanctity to be ascribed to those things that are applied to the Divine worship; so that not only men, but also the temple, vessels and such like things are said to be sanctified through being applied to the worship of God. For purity is necessary in order that the mind be applied to God, since the human mind is soiled by contact with inferior things, even as all things depreciate by admixture with baser things, for instance, silver by being mixed with lead. Now in order for the mind to be united to the Supreme Being it must be withdrawn from inferior things: and hence it is that without purity the mind cannot be applied to God. Wherefore it is written (Heb. 12:14): “Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God.” Again, firmness is required for the mind to be applied to God, for it is applied to Him as its last end and first beginning, and such things must needs be most immovable. Hence the Apostle said (Rom. 8:38,39): “I am sure that neither death, nor life . . . shall separate me [*Vulg.: ‘shall be able to separate us’] from the love of God.”

Accordingly, it is by sanctity that the human mind applies itself and its acts to God: so that it differs from religion not essentially but only logically. For it takes the name of religion according as it gives God due service in matters pertaining specially to the Divine worship, such as sacrifices, oblations, and so forth; while it is called sanctity, according as man refers to God not only these but also the works of the other virtues, or according as man by means of certain good works disposes himself to the worship of God

Reply to Objection 1: Sanctity is a special virtue according to its essence; and in this respect it is in a way identified with religion. But it has a certain generality, in so far as by its command it directs the acts of all the virtues to the Divine good, even as legal justice is said to be a general virtue, in so far as it directs the acts of all the virtues to the common good.

Reply to Objection 2: Temperance practices purity, yet not so as to have the character of sanctity unless it be referred to God. Hence of virginity itself Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “it is honored not for what it is, but for being consecrated to God.”

Reply to Objection 3: Sanctity differs from religion as explained above, not really but logically.

OF DEVOTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the acts of religion. First, we shall consider the interior acts, which, as stated above, are its principal acts; secondly, we shall consider its exterior acts, which are secondary. The interior acts of religion are seemingly devotion and prayer. Accordingly we shall treat first of devotion, and afterwards of prayer.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether devotion is a special act?

(2) Whether it is an act of religion?

(3) Of the cause of devotion?

(4) Of its effect?

Whether devotion is a special act?

Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not a special act. That which qualifies other acts is seemingly not a special act. Now devotion seems to qualify other acts, for it is written (2 Paralip 29:31): “All the multitude offered victims, and praises, and holocausts with a devout mind.” Therefore devotion is not a special act.

Objection 2: Further, no special kind of act is common to various genera of acts. But devotion is common to various genera of acts, namely, corporal and spiritual acts: for a person is said to meditate devoutly and to genuflect devoutly. Therefore devotion is not a special act.

Objection 3: Further, every special act belongs either to an appetitive or to a cognitive virtue or power. But devotion belongs to neither, as may be seen by going through the various species of acts of either faculty, as enumerated above (FP, QQ[78], seqq.; [2998]FS, Q[23], A[4]). Therefore devotion is not a special act.

On the contrary, Merits are acquired by acts as stated above (FS, Q[21], AA[34]). But devotion has a special reason for merit. Therefore devotion is a special act.

I answer that, Devotion is derived from “devote” [*The Latin ‘devovere’ means ‘to vow’]; wherefore those persons are said to be “devout” who, in a way, devote themselves to God, so as to subject themselves wholly to Him. Hence in olden times among the heathens a devotee was one who vowed to his idols to suffer death for the safety of his army, as Livy relates of the two Decii (Decad. I, viii, 9; x, 28). Hence devotion is apparently nothing else but the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 35:20,21) that “the multitude of the children of Israel . . . offered first-fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind.” Now it is evident that the will to do readily what concerns the service of God is a special kind of act. Therefore devotion is a special act of the will.

Reply to Objection 1: The mover prescribes the mode of the movement of the thing moved. Now the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, and the will, in so far as it regards the end, moves both itself and whatever is directed to the end, as stated above ([2999]FS, Q[9], A[3]). Wherefore, since devotion is an act of the will whereby a man offers himself for the service of God Who is the last end, it follows that devotion prescribes the mode to human acts, whether they be acts of the will itself about things directed to the end, or acts of the other powers that are moved by the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Devotion is to be found in various genera of acts, not as a species of those genera, but as the motion of the mover is found virtually in the movements of the things moved.

Reply to Objection 3: Devotion is an act of the appetitive part of the soul, and is a movement of the will, as stated above.

Whether devotion is an act of religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion. Devotion, as stated above [3000](A[1]), consists in giving oneself up to God. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) “the Divine love produces ecstasy, for it takes the lover away from himself and gives him to the beloved.” Therefore devotion is an act of charity rather than of religion.

Objection 2: Further, charity precedes religion; and devotion seems to precede charity; since, in the Scriptures, charity is represented by fire, while devotion is signified by fatness which is the material of fire [*Cant. 8:6; Ps. 52:6]. Therefore devotion is not an act of religion.

Objection 3: Further, by religion man is directed to God alone, as stated above ([3001]Q[81], A[1]). But devotion is directed also to men; for we speak of people being devout to certain holy men, and subjects are said to be devoted to their masters; thus Pope Leo says [*Serm. viii, De Pass. Dom.] that the Jews “out of devotion to the Roman laws,” said: “We have no king but Caesar.” Therefore devotion is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, Devotion is derived from “devovere,” as stated [3002](A[1]). But a vow is an act of religion. Therefore devotion is also an act of religion.

I answer that, It belongs to the same virtue, to will to do something, and to have the will ready to do it, because both acts have the same object. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1): “It is justice whereby men both will end do just actions.” Now it is evident that to do what pertains to the worship or service of God, belongs properly to religion, as stated above ([3003]Q[81]). Wherefore it belongs to that virtue to have the will ready to do such things, and this is to be devout. Hence it is evident that devotion is an act of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs immediately to charity that man should give himself to God, adhering to Him by a union of the spirit; but it belongs immediately to religion, and, through the medium of religion, to charity which is the principle of religion, that man should give himself to God for certain works of Divine worship.

Reply to Objection 2: Bodily fatness is produced by the natural heat in the process of digestion, and at the same time the natural heat thrives, as it were, on this fatness. In like manner charity both causes devotion (inasmuch as love makes one ready to serve one’s friend) and feeds on devotion. Even so all friendship is safeguarded and increased by the practice and consideration of friendly deeds.

Reply to Objection 3: Devotion to God’s holy ones, dead or living, does not terminate in them, but passes on to God, in so far as we honor God in His servants. But the devotion of subjects to their temporal masters is of another kind, just as service of a temporal master differs from the service of God.

Whether contemplation or meditation is the cause of devotion?

Objection 1: It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle considerations about abstract matters are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion.

Objection 2: Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to greater devotion by considering Christ’s Passion and other mysteries of His humanity than by considering the greatness of His Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.

Objection 3: Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion, it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the female sex, who are defective in contemplation. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:4): "In my meditation a fire shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore meditation is the cause of devotion.

I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, of Whom Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:55, says that "God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout." But the intrinsic cause on our part must needs be meditation or contemplation. For it was stated above [3004](A[1]) that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will arises from the intelligence." Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Indeed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of God's goodness and loving kindness, according to Ps. 72:28, "It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and this consideration wakens love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God, according to Ps. 120:1,2, "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth"; and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His strength.

Reply to Objection 1: The consideration of such things as are of a nature to awaken our love [*'Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] of

God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance to devotion.

Reply to Objection 2: Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love [‘dilectio,’ the interior act of charity; cf. Q[27]] and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of the Preface [*Preface for Christmastide], “that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible.” Wherefore matters relating to Christ’s humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead.

Reply to Objection 3: Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is increased.

Whether joy is an effect of devotion?

Objection 1: It would seem that joy is not an effect of devotion. As stated above (A[3], ad 2), Christ’s Passion is the chief incentive to devotion. But the consideration thereof causes an affliction of the soul, according to Lam. 3:19, “Remember my poverty . . . the wormwood and the gall,” which refers to the Passion, and afterwards (Lam. 3:20) it is said: “I will be mindful and remember, and my soul shall languish within me.” Therefore delight or joy is not the effect of devotion.

Objection 2: Further, devotion consists chiefly in an interior sacrifice of the spirit. But it is written (Ps. 50:19): “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” Therefore affliction is the effect of devotion rather than gladness or joy.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory of Nyssa says (De Homine xii) [*Orat. funebr. de Placilla Imp.] that “just as laughter proceeds from joy, so tears and groans are signs of sorrow.” But devotion makes some people shed tears. Therefore gladness or joy is not the effect of devotion.

On the contrary, We say in the Collect [*Thursday after fourth Sunday of Lent]: “That we who are punished by fasting may be comforted by a holy devotion.”

I answer that, The direct and principal effect of devotion is the spiritual joy of the mind, though sorrow is its secondary and indirect effect. For it has been stated [3005](A[3]) that devotion is caused by a twofold consideration: chiefly by the consideration of God’s goodness, because this consideration belongs to the term, as it were, of the movement of the will in surrendering itself to God, and the direct result of this consideration is joy, according to Ps. 76:4, “I remembered God, and was delighted”; but accidentally this consideration causes a certain sorrow in those who do not yet enjoy God fully, according to Ps. 41:3, “My soul hath thirsted after the strong living God,” and afterwards it is said (Ps. 41:4): “My tears have been my bread,” etc. Secondarily devotion is caused as stated [3006](A[3]), by the consideration of one’s own failings; for this consideration regards the term from which man withdraws by the movement of his devout will, in that he trusts not in himself, but subjects himself to God. This consideration has an opposite tendency to the first: for it is of a nature to cause sorrow directly (when one thinks over one’s own failings), and joy accidentally, namely, through hope of the Divine assistance. It is accordingly evident that the first and direct effect of devotion is joy, while the secondary and accidental effect is that “sorrow which is according to God” [*2 Cor. 7:10].

Reply to Objection 1: In the consideration of Christ’s Passion there is something that causes sorrow, namely, the human defect, the removal of which made it necessary for Christ to suffer [*Lk. 24:25]; and there is something that causes joy, namely, God’s loving-kindness to us in giving us such a deliverance.

Reply to Objection 2: The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is rejoiced, by the consideration of God’s goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help.

Reply to Objection 3: Tears are caused not only through sorrow, but also through a certain tenderness of the affections, especially when one considers something that gives joy mixed with pain. Thus men are wont to shed tears through a sentiment of piety, when they recover their children or dear friends, whom they thought to have lost. In this way tears arise from devotion.

OF PRAYER (SEVENTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider prayer, under which head there are seventeen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive or of the cognitive power?

(2) Whether it is fitting to pray to God?

(3) Whether prayer is an act of religion?

(4) Whether we ought to pray to God alone?

(5) Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?

(6) Whether we ought to ask for temporal things when we pray?

(7) Whether we ought to pray for others?

(8) Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?

(9) Of the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer;

(10) Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?

(11) Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?

(12) Whether prayer should be vocal?

(13) Whether attention is requisite in prayer?

(14) Whether prayer should last a long time?

(15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16]

(16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by praying? [*Art. 15]

(17) of the different kinds of prayer.

Whether prayer is an act of the appetitive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is an act of the appetitive power. It belongs to prayer to be heard. Now it is the desire that is heard by God, according to Ps. 9:38, “The Lord hath heard the desire of the poor.” Therefore prayer is desire. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: and therefore prayer is also.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii): “It is useful to begin everything with prayer, because thereby we surrender ourselves to God and unite ourselves to Him.” Now union with God is effected by love which belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore prayer belongs to the appetitive power.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 6) that there are two operations of the intellective part. Of these the first is “the understanding of indivisibles,” by which operation we apprehend what a thing is: while the second is “synthesis” and “analysis,” whereby we apprehend that a thing is or is not. To these a third may be added, namely, “reasoning,” whereby we proceed from the known to the unknown. Now prayer is not reducible to any of these operations. Therefore it is an operation, not of the intellective, but of the appetitive power.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “to pray is to speak.” Now speech belongs to the intellect. Therefore prayer is an act, not of the appetitive, but of the intellective power.

I answer that, According to Cassiodorus [*Comment. in Ps. 38:13] “prayer [oratio] is spoken reason [oris ratio].” Now the speculative and practical reason differ in this, that the speculative merely apprehends its object, whereas the practical reason not only apprehends but causes. Now one thing is the cause of another in two ways: first perfectly, when it necessitates its effect, and this happens when the effect is wholly subject to the power of the cause; secondly imperfectly, by merely disposing to the effect, for the reason that the effect is not wholly subject to the power of the cause. Accordingly in this way the reason is cause of certain things in two ways: first, by imposing necessity; and in this way it belongs to reason, to command not only the lower powers and the members of the body, but also human subjects, which indeed is done by commanding; secondly, by leading up to the effect, and, in a way, disposing to it, and in this sense the reason asks for something to be done by things not subject to it, whether they be its equals or its superiors. Now both of these, namely, to command and to ask or beseech, imply a certain ordering, seeing that man proposes something to be effected by something else, wherefore they pertain to the reason to which it belongs to set in order. For this reason the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that the "reason exhorts us to do what is best."

Now in the present instance we are speaking of prayer [*This last paragraph refers to the Latin word 'oratio' [prayer] which originally signified a speech, being derived in the first instance from 'os,' 'oris' (the mouth).] as signifying a beseeching or petition, in which sense Augustine [*Rabanus, De Univ. vi, 14]: says (De Verb. Dom.) that "prayer is a petition," and Damascene states (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Accordingly it is evident that prayer, as we speak of it now, is an act of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord is said to hear the desire of the poor, either because desire is the cause of their petition, since a petition is like the interpreter of a desire, or in order to show how speedily they are heard, since no sooner do the poor desire something than God hears them before they put up a prayer, according to the saying of Is. 65:24, "And it shall come to pass, that before they call, I will hear."

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3007]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3008]FS, Q[9], A[1], ad 3), the will moves the reason to its end: wherefore nothing hinders the act of reason, under the motion of the will, from tending to an end such as charity which is union with God. Now prayer tends to God through being moved by the will of charity, as it were, and this in two ways. First, on the part of the object of our petition, because when we pray we ought principally to ask to be united to God, according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life." Secondly, on the part of the petitioner, who ought to approach the person whom he petitions, either locally, as when he petitions a man, or mentally, as when he petitions God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "when we call upon God in our prayers, we unveil our mind in His presence": and in the same sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that "prayer is the raising up of the mind to God."

Reply to Objection 3: These three acts belong to the speculative reason, but to the practical reason it belongs in addition to cause something by way of command or of petition, as stated above.

Whether it is becoming to pray?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unbecoming to pray. Prayer seems to be necessary in order that we may make our needs known to the person to whom we pray. But according to Mat. 6:32, “Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things.” Therefore it is not becoming to pray to God.

Objection 2: Further, by prayer we bend the mind of the person to whom we pray, so that he may do what is asked of him. But God’s mind is unchangeable and inflexible, according to 1 Kings 15:29, “But the Triumpher in Israel will not spare, and will not be moved to repentance.” Therefore it is not fitting that we should pray to God.

Objection 3: Further, it is more liberal to give to one that asks not, than to one who asks because, according to Seneca (De Benefic. ii, 1), “nothing is bought more dearly than what is bought with prayers.” But God is supremely liberal. Therefore it would seem unbecoming to pray to God.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:1): “We ought always to pray, and not to faint.”

I answer that, Among the ancients there was a threefold error concerning prayer. Some held that human affairs are not ruled by Divine providence; whence it would follow that it is useless to pray and to worship God at all: of these it is written (Malach. 3:14): “You have said: He laboreth in vain that serveth God.” Another opinion held that all things, even in human affairs, happen of necessity, whether by reason of the unchangeableness of Divine providence, or through the compelling influence of the stars, or on account of the connection of causes: and this opinion also excluded the utility of prayer. There was a third opinion of those who held that human affairs are indeed ruled by Divine providence, and that they do not happen of necessity; yet they deemed the disposition of Divine providence to be changeable, and that it is changed by prayers and other things pertaining to the worship of God. All these opinions were disproved in the [3009]FP, Q[19], AA[7],8; [3010]FP, Q[22], AA[2],4; [3011]FP, Q[115], A[6]; [3012]FP, Q[116]. Wherefore it behooves us so to account for the utility of prayer as neither to impose necessity on human affairs subject to Divine providence, nor to imply changeableness on the part of the Divine disposition.

In order to throw light on this question we must consider that Divine providence disposes not only what effects shall take place, but also from what causes and in what order these effects shall proceed. Now among other causes human acts are the causes of certain effects. Wherefore it must be that men do certain actions, not that thereby they may change the Divine disposition, but that by those actions they may achieve certain effects according to the order of the Divine disposition: and the same is to be said of natural causes. And so is it with regard to prayer. For we pray not that we may change the Divine disposition, but that we may impetrate that which God has disposed to be fulfilled by our prayers in other words "that by asking, men may deserve to receive what Almighty God from eternity has disposed to give," as Gregory says (Dial. i, 8)

Reply to Objection 1: We need to pray to God, not in order to make known to Him our needs or desires but that we ourselves may be reminded of the necessity of having recourse to God's help in these matters.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, our motive in praying is, not Divine disposition, we may change the Divine disposition, but that, by our prayers, we may obtain what God has appointed.

Reply to Objection 3: God bestows many things on us out of His liberality, even without our asking for them: but that He wishes to bestow certain things on us at our asking, is for the sake of our good, namely, that we may acquire confidence in having recourse to God, and that we may recognize in Him the Author of our goods. Hence Chrysostom says [*Implicitly [Hom. ii, de Orat.: Hom. xxx in Genes.]; Cf. Caten. Aur. on Lk. 18]: "Think what happiness is granted thee, what honor bestowed on thee, when thou conversest with God in prayer, when thou talkest with Christ, when thou askest what thou wilt, whatever thou desirest."

Whether prayer is an act of religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not an act of religion. Since religion is a part of justice, it resides in the will as in its subject. But prayer belongs to the intellective part, as stated above [3013](A[1]). Therefore prayer seems to be an act, not of religion, but of the gift of understanding whereby the mind ascends to God.

Objection 2: Further, the act of "latria" falls under a necessity of precept. But prayer does not seem to come under a necessity of precept, but to come from the mere will, since it is nothing else than a petition for what we will. Therefore prayer seemingly is not an act of religion.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to religion that one "offers worship end ceremonial rites to the Godhead" [*Cicero, Rhet. ii, 53]. But prayer seems not to offer anything to God, but to. ask to obtain something from Him. Therefore prayer is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 140:2): "Let my prayer be directed as incense in Thy sight": and a gloss on the passage says that "it was to signify this that under the old Law incense was said to be offered for a sweet smell to the Lord." Now this belongs to religion. Therefore prayer is an act of religion.

I answer that, As stated above ([3014]Q[81], AA[2],4), it belongs properly to religion to show honor to God, wherefore all those things through which reverence is shown to God, belong to religion. Now man shows reverence to God by means of prayer, in so far as he subjects himself to Him, and by praying confesses that he needs Him as the Author of his goods. Hence it is evident that prayer is properly an act of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: The will moves the other powers of the soul to its end, as stated above ([3015]Q[82], A[1], ad 1), and therefore religion, which is in the will, directs the acts of the other powers to the reverence of God. Now among the other powers of the soul the intellect is the highest, and the nearest to the will; and consequently after devotion which belongs to the will, prayer which belongs to the intellective part is the chief of the acts of religion, since by it religion directs man's intellect to God.

Reply to Objection 2: It is a matter of precept not only that we should ask for what we desire, but also that we should desire aright. But to desire comes under a precept of charity, whereas to ask comes under a precept of religion, which precept is expressed in Mat. 7:7, where it is said: "Ask and ye shall receive" [*Vulg.: 'Ask and it shall be given you.'].

Reply to Objection 3: By praying man surrenders his mind to God, since he subjects it to Him with reverence and, so to speak, presents it to Him, as appears from the words of Dionysius quoted above (A[1], OBJ[2]).

Wherefore just as the human mind excels exterior things, whether bodily members, or those external things that are employed for God’s service, so too, prayer surpasses other acts of religion.

Whether we ought to pray to God alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought to pray to God alone. Prayer is an act of religion, as stated above [3016](A[3]). But God alone is to be worshiped by religion. Therefore we should pray to God alone.

Objection 2: Further, it is useless to pray to one who is ignorant of the prayer. But it belongs to God alone to know one’s prayer, both because frequently prayer is uttered by an interior act which God alone knows, rather than by words, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:15), “I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding”: and again because, as Augustine says (De Cura pro mortuis xiii) the “dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing.” Therefore we ought to pray to God alone.

Objection 3: Further, if we pray to any of the saints, this is only because they are united to God. Now some yet living in this world, or even some who are in Purgatory, are closely united to God by grace, and yet we do not pray to them. Therefore neither should we pray to the saints who are in Paradise.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1), “Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints.”

I answer that, Prayer is offered to a person in two ways: first, as to be fulfilled by him, secondly, as to be obtained through him. In the first way we offer prayer to God alone, since all our prayers ought to be directed to the acquisition of grace and glory, which God alone gives, according to Ps. 83:12, “The Lord will give grace and glory.” But in the second way we pray to the saints, whether angels or men, not that God may through them know our petitions, but that our prayers may be effective through their prayers and merits. Hence it is written (Apoc. 8:4) that “the smoke of the incense,” namely “the prayers of the saints ascended up before God.” This is also clear from the very style employed by the Church in praying: since we beseech the Blessed Trinity “to have mercy on us,” while we ask any of the saints “to pray for us.”

Reply to Objection 1: To Him alone do we offer religious worship when praying, from Whom we seek to obtain what we pray for, because by so doing we confess that He is the Author of our goods: but not to those whom we call upon as our advocates in God's presence.

Reply to Objection 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral. xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know about what happens to us, even as regards the interior movements of the heart, is made known to them in the Word: and it is most becoming to their exalted position that they should know the petitions we make to them by word or thought; and consequently the petitions which we raise to them are known to them through Divine manifestation.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in this world or in Purgatory, do not yet enjoy the vision of the Word, so as to be able to know what we think or say. Wherefore we do not seek their assistance by praying to them, but ask it of the living by speaking to them.

Whether we ought to ask for something definite when we pray?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray to God. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), “to pray is to ask becoming things of God”; wherefore it is useless to pray for what is inexpedient, according to James 4:3, “You ask, and receive not: because you ask amiss.” Now according to Rom. 8:26, “we know not what we should pray for as we ought.” Therefore we ought not to ask for anything definite when we pray.

Objection 2: Further, those who ask another person for something definite strive to incline his will to do what they wish themselves. But we ought not to endeavor to make God will what we will; on the contrary, we ought to strive to will what He wills, according to a gloss on Ps. 32:1, “Rejoice in the Lord, O ye just.” Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite when we pray.

Objection 3: Further, evil things are not to be sought from God; and as to good things, God Himself invites us to take them. Now it is useless to ask a person to give you what he invites you to take. Therefore we ought not to ask God for anything definite in our prayers.

On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 6 and Lk. 11) taught His disciples to ask definitely for those things which are contained in the petitions of the Lord’s Prayer.

I answer that, According to Valerius Maximus [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2], “Socrates deemed that we should ask the immortal gods for nothing else but that they should grant us good things, because they at any rate know what is good for each one whereas when we pray we frequently ask for what it had been better for us not to obtain.” This opinion is true to a certain extent, as to those things which may have an evil result, and which man may use ill or well, such as “riches, by which,” as stated by the same authority (Fact. et Dict. Memor. vii, 2), “many have come to an evil end; honors, which have ruined many; power, of which we frequently witness the unhappy results; splendid marriages, which sometimes bring about the total wreck of a family.” Nevertheless there are certain goods which man cannot ill use, because they cannot have an evil result. Such are those which are the object of beatitude and whereby we merit it: and these the saints seek absolutely when they pray, as in Ps. 79:4, “Show us Thy face, and we shall be saved,” and again in Ps. 118:35, “Lead me into the path of Thy commandments.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although man cannot by himself know what he ought to pray for, “the Spirit,” as stated in the same passage, “helpeth our infirmity,” since by inspiring us with holy desires, He makes us ask for what is right. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 4:24) that true adorers “must adore . . . in spirit and in truth.”

Reply to Objection 2: When in our prayers we ask for things concerning our salvation, we conform our will to God’s, of Whom it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that “He will have all men to be saved.”

Reply to Objection 3: God so invites us to take good things, that we may approach to them not by the steps of the body, but by pious desires and devout prayers.

Whether man ought to ask God for temporal things when he prays?

Objection 1: It would seem that man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays. We seek what we ask for in prayer. But we should not seek for temporal things, for it is written (Mat. 6:33): “Seek ye . . . first the kingdom of God, and His justice: and all these things shall be added unto you,” that is to say, temporal things, which, says He, we are not to seek, but they will be added to what we seek. Therefore temporal things are not to be asked of God in prayer.

Objection 2: Further, no one asks save for that which he is solicitous about. Now we ought not to have solicitude for temporal things, according to the saying of Mat. 6:25, “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat.” Therefore we ought not to ask for temporal things when we pray.

Objection 3: Further, by prayer our mind should be raised up to God. But by asking for temporal things, it descends to things beneath it, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18), “While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.” Therefore man ought not to ask God for temporal things when he prays.

Objection 4: Further, man ought not to ask of God other than good and useful things. But sometimes temporal things, when we have them, are harmful, not only in a spiritual sense, but also in a material sense. Therefore we should not ask God for them in our prayers.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 30:8): “Give me only the necessaries of life.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 12): “It is lawful to pray for what it is lawful to desire.” Now it is lawful to desire temporal things, not indeed principally, by placing our end therein, but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as instruments in performing acts of virtue, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 8). Augustine too says the same to Proba (ad Probam, de orando Deum, Ep. cxxx, 6,7) when he states that “it is not unbecoming for anyone to desire enough for a livelihood, and no more; for this sufficiency is desired, not for its own sake, but for the welfare of the body, or that we should desire to be clothed in a way befitting one’s station, so as not to be out of keeping with those among whom we have to live. Accordingly we ought to pray that we may keep these things if we have them, and if we have them not, that we may gain possession of them.”

Reply to Objection 1: We should seek temporal things not in the first but in the second place. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 16): “When He says that this” (i.e. the kingdom of God) “is to be sought first, He implies that the other” (i.e. temporal goods) “is to be sought afterwards, not in time but in importance, this as being our good, the other as our need.”

Reply to Objection 2: Not all solicitude about temporal things is forbidden, but that which is superfluous and inordinate, as stated above ([3017]Q[55], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 3: When our mind is intent on temporal things in order that it may rest in them, it remains immersed therein; but when it is intent on them in relation to the acquisition of beatitude, it is not lowered by them, but raises them to a higher level.

Reply to Objection 4: From the very fact that we ask for temporal things not as the principal object of our petition, but as subordinate to something else, we ask God for them in the sense that they may be granted to us in so far as they are expedient for salvation.

Whether we ought to pray for others?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for others. In praying we ought to conform to the pattern given by our Lord. Now in the Lord’s Prayer we make petitions for ourselves, not for others; thus we say: “Give us this day our daily bread,” etc. Therefore we should not pray for others.

Objection 2: Further, prayer is offered that it may be heard. Now one of the conditions required for prayer that it may be heard is that one pray for oneself, wherefore Augustine in commenting on Jn. 16:23, “If you ask the Father anything in My name He will give it you,” says (Tract. cii): “Everyone is heard when he prays for himself, not when he prays for all; wherefore He does not say simply ‘He will give it,’ but ‘He will give it you. ‘“ Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others, but only for ourselves.

Objection 3: Further, we are forbidden to pray for others, if they are wicked, according to Jer. 7:16, “Therefore do not then pray for this people . . . and do not withstand Me, for I will not hear thee.” On the other hand we are not bound to pray for the good, since they are heard when they pray for themselves. Therefore it would seem that we ought not to pray for others.

On the contrary, It is written (James 5:16): “Pray one for another, that you may be saved.”

I answer that, As stated above [3018](A[6]), when we pray we ought to ask for what we ought to desire. Now we ought to desire good things not only for ourselves, but also for others: for this is essential to the love which we owe to our neighbor, as stated above (Q[25], AA[1],12; Q[27], A[2]; Q[31], A[1]). Therefore charity requires us to pray for others. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.) [*Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: “Necessity binds us to pray for ourselves, fraternal charity urges us to pray for others: and the prayer that fraternal charity proffers is sweeter to God than that which is the outcome of necessity.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Cyprian says (De orat. Dom.), “We say ‘Our Father’ and not ‘My Father,’ ‘Give us’ and not ‘Give me,’ because the Master of unity did not wish us to pray privately, that is for ourselves alone, for He wished each one to pray for all, even as He Himself bore all in one.”

Reply to Objection 2: It is a condition of prayer that one pray for oneself: not as though it were necessary in order that prayer be meritorious, but as being necessary in order that prayer may not fail in its effect of impetration. For it sometimes happens that we pray for another with piety and perseverance, and ask for things relating to his salvation, and yet it is not granted on account of some obstacle on the part of the person we are praying for, according to Jer. 15:1, “If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people.” And yet the prayer will be meritorious for the person who prays thus out of charity, according to Ps. 34:13, “My prayer shall be turned into my bosom, i.e. though it profit them not, I am not deprived of my reward,” as the gloss expounds it.

Reply to Objection 3: We ought to pray even for sinners, that they may be converted, and for the just that they may persevere and advance in holiness. Yet those who pray are heard not for all sinners but for some: since they are heard for the predestined, but not for those who are foreknown to death; even as the correction whereby we correct the brethren, has an effect in the predestined but not in the reprobate, according to Eccles. 7:14, “No man can correct whom God hath despised.” Hence it is written (1 Jn. 5:16): “He that knoweth his brother to sin a sin which is not to death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him, who sinneth not to death.” Now just as the benefit of correction must not be refused to any man so long as he lives here below, because we cannot distinguish the predestined from the reprobate, as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xv), so too no man should be denied the help of prayer.

We ought also to pray for the just for three reasons: First, because the prayers of a multitude are more easily heard, wherefore a gloss on Rom. 15:30, “Help me in your prayers,” says: “The Apostle rightly tells the lesser brethren to pray for him, for many lesser ones, if they be united together in one mind, become great, and it is impossible for the prayers of a multitude not to obtain” that which is possible to be obtained by prayer. Secondly, that many may thank God for the graces conferred on the just, which graces conduce to the profit of many, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 1:11). Thirdly, that the more perfect may not wax proud, seeing that they find that they need the prayers of the less perfect.

Whether we ought to pray for our enemies?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to pray for our enemies. According to Rom. 15:4, “what things soever were written, were written for our learning.” Now Holy Writ contains many imprecations against enemies; thus it is written (Ps. 6:11): “Let all my enemies be ashamed and be . . . troubled, let them be ashamed and be troubled very speedily [*Vulg.: ‘Let them be turned back and be ashamed.’].” Therefore we too should pray against rather than for our enemies.

Objection 2: Further, to be revenged on one’s enemies is harmful to them. But holy men seek vengeance of their enemies according to Apoc. 6:10, “How long . . . dost Thou not . . . revenge our blood on them that dwell on earth?” Wherefore they rejoice in being revenged on their enemies, according to Ps. 57:11, “The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge.” Therefore we should not pray for our enemies, but against them.

Objection 3: Further, man’s deed should not be contrary to his prayer. Now sometimes men lawfully attack their enemies, else all wars would be unlawful, which is opposed to what we have said above ([3019]Q[40], A[1]). Therefore we should not pray for our enemies.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:44): “Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you.”

I answer that, To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated above [3020](A[7]). Wherefore we are bound to pray for our enemies in the same manner as we are bound to love them. Now it was explained above in the treatise on charity (Q[25], AA[8],9), how we are bound to love our enemies, namely, that we must love in them their nature, not their sin. and that to love our enemies in general is a matter of precept, while to love them in the individual is not a matter of precept, except in the preparedness of the mind, so that a man must be prepared to love his enemy even in the individual and to help him in a case of necessity, or if his enemy should beg his forgiveness. But to love one’s enemies absolutely in the individual, and to assist them, is an act of perfection.

In like manner it is a matter of obligation that we should not exclude our enemies from the general prayers which we offer up for others: but it is a matter of perfection, and not of obligation, to pray for them individually, except in certain special cases.

Reply to Objection 1: The imprecations contained in Holy Writ may be understood in four ways. First, according to the custom of the prophets “to foretell the future under the veil of an imprecation," as Augustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 21]. Secondly, in the sense that certain temporal evils are sometimes inflicted by God on the wicked for their correction. Thirdly, because they are understood to be pronounced, not against the men themselves, but against the kingdom of sin, with the purpose, to wit, of destroying sin by the correction of men. Fourthly, by way of conformity of our will to the Divine justice with regard to the damnation of those who are obstinate in sin.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states in the same book (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 22), "the martyrs' vengeance is the overthrow of the kingdom of sin, because they suffered so much while it reigned": or as he says again (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. lxviii), "their prayer for vengeance is expressed not in words but in their minds, even as the blood of Abel cried from the earth." They rejoice in vengeance not for its own sake, but for the sake of Divine justice.

Reply to Objection 3: It is lawful to attack one's enemies, that they may be restrained from sin: and this is for their own good and for the good of others. Consequently it is even lawful in praying to ask that temporal evils be inflicted on our enemies in order that they may mend their ways. Thus prayer and deed will not be contrary to one another.

Whether the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are fittingly assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer are not fittingly assigned. It is useless to ask for that to be hallowed which is always holy. But the name of God is always holy, according to Lk. 1:49, "Holy is His name." Again, His kingdom is everlasting, according to Ps. 144:13, "Thy kingdom is a kingdom of all ages." Again, God's will is always fulfilled, according to Isa 46:10, "All My will shall be done." Therefore it is useless to ask for "the name of God to be hallowed," for "His kingdom to come," and for "His will to be done."

Objection 2: Further, one must withdraw from evil before attaining good. Therefore it seems unfitting for the petitions relating to the attainment of good to be set forth before those relating to the removal of evil.

Objection 3: Further, one asks for a thing that it may be given to one. Now the chief gift of God is the Holy Ghost, and those gifts that we receive through Him. Therefore the petitions seem to be unfittingly assigned, since they do not correspond to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 4: Further, according to Luke, only five petitions are mentioned in the Lord's Prayer, as appears from the eleventh chapter. Therefore it was superfluous for Matthew to mention seven.

Objection 5: Further, it seems useless to seek to win the benevolence of one who forestalls us by his benevolence. Now God forestalls us by His benevolence, since "He first hath loved us" (1 Jn. 4:19). Therefore it is useless to preface the petitions with the words our "Father Who art in heaven," which seem to indicate a desire to win God's benevolence.

On the contrary, The authority of Christ, who composed this prayer, suffices.

I answer that, The Lord's Prayer is most perfect, because, as Augustine says (ad Probam Ep. cxxx, 12), "if we pray rightly and fittingly, we can say nothing else but what is contained in this prayer of our Lord." For since prayer interprets our desires, as it were, before God, then alone is it right to ask for something in our prayers when it is right that we should desire it. Now in the Lord's Prayer not only do we ask for all that we may rightly desire, but also in the order wherein we ought to desire them, so that this prayer not only teaches us to ask, but also directs all our affections. Thus it is evident that the first thing to be the object of our desire is the end, and afterwards whatever is directed to the end. Now our end is God towards Whom our affections tend in two ways: first, by our willing the glory of God, secondly, by willing to enjoy His glory. The first belongs to the love whereby we love God in Himself, while the second belongs to the love whereby we love ourselves in God. Wherefore the first petition is expressed thus: "Hallowed be Thy name," and the second thus: "Thy kingdom come," by which we ask to come to the glory of His kingdom.

To this same end a thing directs us in two ways: in one way, by its very nature, in another way, accidentally. Of its very nature the good which is useful for an end directs us to that end. Now a thing is useful in two ways to that end which is beatitude: in one way, directly and principally, according to the merit whereby we merit beatitude by obeying God, and in this respect we ask: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven"; in another way instrumentally, and as it were helping us to merit, and in this respect we say: "Give us this day our daily bread," whether we understand this of the sacramental Bread, the daily use of which is profitable to man, and in which all the other sacraments are contained, or of the bread of the body, so that it denotes all sufficiency of food, as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11), since the Eucharist is the chief sacrament, and bread is the chief food: thus in the Gospel of Matthew we read, “supersubstantial,” i.e. “principal,” as Jerome expounds it.

We are directed to beatitude accidentally by the removal of obstacles. Now there are three obstacles to our attainment of beatitude. First, there is sin, which directly excludes a man from the kingdom, according to 1 Cor. 6:9,10, “Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, etc., shall possess the kingdom of God”; and to this refer the words, “Forgive us our trespasses.” Secondly, there is temptation which hinders us from keeping God’s will, and to this we refer when we say: “And lead us not into temptation,” whereby we do not ask not to be tempted, but not to be conquered by temptation, which is to be led into temptation. Thirdly, there is the present penal state which is a kind of obstacle to a sufficiency of life, and to this we refer in the words, “Deliver us from evil.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 5), when we say, “Hallowed be Thy name, we do not mean that God’s name is not holy, but we ask that men may treat it as a holy thing,” and this pertains to the diffusion of God’s glory among men. When we say, “Thy kingdom come, we do not imply that God is not reigning now,” but “we excite in ourselves the desire for that kingdom, that it may come to us, and that we may reign therein,” as Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 11). The words, “Thy will be done rightly signify, ‘May Thy commandments be obeyed’ on earth as in heaven, i.e. by men as well as by angels” (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 6). Hence these three petitions will be perfectly fulfilled in the life to come; while the other four, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxv), belong to the needs of the present life

Reply to Objection 2: Since prayer is the interpreter of desire, the order of the petitions corresponds with the order, not of execution, but of desire or intention, where the end precedes the things that are directed to the end, and attainment of good precedes removal of evil.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 11) adapts the seven petitions to the gifts and beatitudes. He says: “If it is fear God whereby blessed are the poor in spirit, let us ask that God’s name be hallowed among men with a chaste fear. If it is piety whereby blessed are the meek, let us ask that His kingdom may come, so that we become meek and no longer resist Him. If it is knowledge whereby blessed are they that mourn, let us pray that His will be done, for thus we shall mourn no more. If it is fortitude whereby blessed ere they that hunger, let us pray that our daily bread be given to us. If it is counsel whereby blessed are the merciful, let us forgive the trespasses of others that our own may be forgiven. If it is understanding whereby blessed are the pure in heart, let us pray lest we have a double heart by seeking after worldly things which ere the occasion of our temptations. If it is wisdom whereby blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God, let us pray to be delivered from evil: for if we be delivered we shall by that very fact become the free children of God."

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Enchiridion cxvi), "Luke included not seven but five petitions in the Lord's Prayer, for by omitting it, he shows that the third petition is a kind of repetition of the two that precede, and thus helps us to understand it"; because, to wit, the will of God tends chiefly to this—that we come to the knowledge of His holiness and to reign together with Him. Again the last petition mentioned by Matthew, "Deliver us from evil," is omitted by Luke, so that each one may know himself to be delivered from evil if he be not led into temptation.

Reply to Objection 5: Prayer is offered up to God, not that we may bend Him, but that we may excite in ourselves the confidence to ask: which confidence is excited in us chiefly by the consideration of His charity in our regard, whereby he wills our good—wherefore we say: "Our Father"; and of His excellence, whereby He is able to fulfil it—wherefore we say: "Who art in heaven."

Whether prayer is proper to the rational creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not proper to the rational creature. Asking and receiving apparently belong to the same subject. But receiving is becoming also to uncreated Persons, viz. the Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it is competent to them to pray: for the Son said (Jn. 14:16): "I will ask My [Vulg.: 'the'] Father," and the Apostle says of the Holy Ghost (Rom. 8:26): "The Spirit . . . asketh for us."

Objection 2: Angels are above rational creatures, since they are intellectual substances. Now prayer is becoming to the angels, wherefore we read in the Ps. 96:7: “Adore Him, all you His angels.” Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creature.

Objection 3: Further, the same subject is fitted to pray as is fitted to call upon God, since this consists chiefly in prayer. But dumb animals are fitted to call upon God, according to Ps. 146:9, “Who giveth to beasts their food and to the young ravens that call upon Him.” Therefore prayer is not proper to the rational creatures.

On the contrary, Prayer is an act of reason, as stated above [3021](A[1]). But the rational creature is so called from his reason. Therefore prayer is proper to the rational creature.

I answer that, As stated above [3022](A[1]) prayer is an act of reason, and consists in beseeching a superior; just as command is an act of reason, whereby an inferior is directed to something. Accordingly prayer is properly competent to one to whom it is competent to have reason, and a superior whom he may beseech. Now nothing is above the Divine Persons; and dumb animals are devoid of reason. Therefore prayer is unbecoming both the Divine Persons and dumb animals, and it is proper to the rational creature.

Reply to Objection 1: Receiving belongs to the Divine Persons in respect of their nature, whereas prayer belongs to one who receives through grace. The Son is said to ask or pray in respect of His assumed, i.e. His human, nature and not in respect of His Godhead: and the Holy Ghost is said to ask, because He makes us ask.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [3023]FP, Q[79], A[8], intellect and reason are not distinct powers in us: but they differ as the perfect from the imperfect. Hence intellectual creatures which are the angels are distinct from rational creatures, and sometimes are included under them. In this sense prayer is said to be proper to the rational creature.

Reply to Objection 3: The young ravens are said to call upon God, on account of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire to attain the Divine goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God, on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God.

Whether the saints in heaven pray for us?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in heaven do not pray for us. A man’s action is more meritorious for himself than for others. But the saints in heaven do not merit for themselves, neither do they pray for themselves, since they are already established in the term. Neither therefore do they pray for us.

Objection 2: Further, the saints conform their will to God perfectly, so that they will only what God wills. Now what God wills is always fulfilled. Therefore it would be useless for the saints to pray for us.

Objection 3: Further, just as the saints in heaven are above, so are those in Purgatory, for they can no longer sin. Now those in Purgatory do not pray for us, on the contrary we pray for them. Therefore neither do the saints in heaven pray for us.

Objection 4: Further, if the saints in heaven pray for us, the prayers of the higher saints would be more efficacious; and so we ought not to implore the help of the lower saints’ prayers but only of those of the higher saints.

Objection 5: Further, the soul of Peter is not Peter. If therefore the souls of the saints pray for us, so long as they are separated from their bodies, we ought not to call upon Saint Peter, but on his soul, to pray for us: yet the Church does the contrary. The saints therefore do not pray for us, at least before the resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): “This is . . . he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God.”

I answer that, As Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6), the error of Vigilantius consisted in saying that “while we live, we can pray one for another; but that after we are dead, none of our prayers for others can be heard, seeing that not even the martyrs’ prayers are granted when they pray for their blood to be avenged.” But this is absolutely false, because, since prayers offered for others proceed from charity, as stated above ([3024]AA[7],8), the greater the charity of the saints in heaven, the more they pray for wayfarers, since the latter can be helped by prayers: and the more closely they are united to God, the more are their prayers efficacious: for the Divine order is such that lower beings receive an overflow of the excellence of the higher, even as the air receives the brightness of the sun. Wherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): “Going to God by His own power . . . to make intercession for us” [*Vulg.: ‘He is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him, always living to make intercession for us.’]. Hence Jerome says (Cont. Vigilant. 6): “If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body and having to be solicitous for themselves, can pray for others, how much more now that they have the crown of victory and triumph.”

Reply to Objection 1: The saints in heaven, since they are blessed, have no lack of bliss, save that of the body’s glory, and for this they pray. But they pray for us who lack the ultimate perfection of bliss: and their prayers are efficacious in impetrating through their previous merits and through God’s acceptance.

Reply to Objection 2: The saints impetrate what ever God wishes to take place through their prayers: and they pray for that which they deem will be granted through their prayers according to God’s will.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in Purgatory though they are above us on account of their impeccability, yet they are below us as to the pains which they suffer: and in this respect they are not in a condition to pray, but rather in a condition that requires us to pray for them.

Reply to Objection 4: It is God’s will that inferior beings should be helped by all those that are above them, wherefore we ought to pray not only to the higher but also to the lower saints; else we should have to implore the mercy of God alone. Nevertheless it happens sometime that prayers addressed to a saint of lower degree are more efficacious, either because he is implored with greater devotion, or because God wishes to make known his sanctity.

Reply to Objection 5: It is because the saints while living merited to pray for us, that we invoke them under the names by which they were known in this life, and by which they are better known to us: and also in order to indicate our belief in the resurrection, according to the saying of Ex. 3:6, “I am the God of Abraham,” etc.

Whether prayer should be vocal?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer ought not to be vocal. As stated above [3025](A[4]), prayer is addressed chiefly to God. Now God knows the language of the heart. Therefore it is useless to employ vocal prayer.

Objection 2: Further, prayer should lift man’s mind to God, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). But words, like other sensible objects, prevent man from ascending to God by contemplation. Therefore we should not use words in our prayers.

Objection 3: Further, prayer should be offered to God in secret, according to Mat. 6:6, “But thou, when thou shalt pray, enter into thy chamber, and having shut the door, pray to thy Father in secret.” But prayer loses its secrecy by being expressed vocally. Therefore prayer should not be vocal.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 141:2): “I cried to the Lord with my voice, with my voice I made supplication to the Lord.”

I answer that, Prayer is twofold, common and individual. Common prayer is that which is offered to God by the ministers of the Church representing the body of the faithful: wherefore such like prayer should come to the knowledge of the whole people for whom it is offered: and this would not be possible unless it were vocal prayer. Therefore it is reasonably ordained that the ministers of the Church should say these prayers even in a loud voice, so that they may come to the knowledge of all.

On the other hand individual prayer is that which is offered by any single person, whether he pray for himself or for others; and it is not essential to such a prayer as this that it be vocal. And yet the voice is employed in such like prayers for three reasons. First, in order to excite interior devotion, whereby the mind of the person praying is raised to God, because by means of external signs, whether of words or of deeds, the human mind is moved as regards apprehension, and consequently also as regards the affections. Hence Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9) that “by means of words and other signs we arouse ourselves more effectively to an increase of holy desires.” Hence then alone should we use words and such like signs when they help to excite the mind internally. But if they distract or in any way impede the mind we should abstain from them; and this happens chiefly to those whose mind is sufficiently prepared for devotion without having recourse to those signs. Wherefore the Psalmist (Ps. 26:8) said: “My heart hath said to Thee: ‘My face hath sought Thee,’” and we read of Anna (1 Kings 1:13) that “she spoke in her heart.” Secondly, the voice is used in praying as though to pay a debt, so that man may serve God with all that he has from God, that is to say, not only with his mind, but also with his body: and this applies to prayer considered especially as satisfactory. Hence it is written (Osee 14:3): “Take away all iniquity, and receive the good: and we will render the calves of our lips.” Thirdly, we have recourse to vocal prayer, through a certain overflow from the soul into the body, through excess of feeling, according to Ps. 15:9, “My heart hath been glad, and my tongue hath rejoiced.”

Reply to Objection 1: Vocal prayer is employed, not in order to tell God something He does not know, but in order to lift up the mind of the person praying or of other persons to God.

Reply to Objection 2: Words about other matters distract the mind and hinder the devotion of those who pray: but words signifying some object of devotion lift up the mind, especially one that is less devout.

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], “Our Lord forbids one to pray in presence of others in order that one may be seen by others. Hence when you pray, do nothing strange to draw men’s attention, either by shouting so as to be heard by others, or by openly striking the heart, or extending the hands, so as to be seen by many. And yet, “according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 3), “it is not wrong to be seen by men, but to do this or that in order to be seen by men.”

Whether attention is a necessary condition of prayer?

Objection 1: It would seem that attention is a necessary condition of prayer. It is written (Jn. 4:24): “God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth.” But prayer is not in spirit unless it be attentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.

Objection 2: Further, prayer is “the ascent of the mind to God” [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii, 24]. But the mind does not ascend to God if the prayer is inattentive. Therefore attention is a necessary condition of prayer.

Objection 3: Further, it is a necessary condition of prayer that it should be altogether sinless. Now if a man allows his mind to wander while praying he is not free of sin, for he seems to make light of God; even as if he were to speak to another man without attending to what he was saying. Hence Basil says [*De Constit. Monach. i] that the “Divine assistance is to be implored, not lightly, nor with a mind wandering hither and thither: because he that prays thus not only will not obtain what he asks, nay rather will he provoke God to anger." Therefore it would seem a necessary condition of prayer that it should be attentive.

On the contrary, Even holy men sometimes suffer from a wandering of the mind when they pray, according to Ps. 39:13, "My heart hath forsaken me."

I answer that, This question applies chiefly to vocal prayer. Accordingly we must observe that a thing is necessary in two ways. First, a thing is necessary because thereby the end is better obtained: and thus attention is absolutely necessary for prayer. Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary when without it something cannot obtain its effect. Now the effect of prayer is threefold. The first is an effect which is common to all acts quickened by charity, and this is merit. In order to realize this effect, it is not necessary that prayer should be attentive throughout; because the force of the original intention with which one sets about praying renders the whole prayer meritorious, as is the case with other meritorious acts. The second effect of prayer is proper thereto, and consists in impetration: and again the original intention, to which God looks chiefly, suffices to obtain this effect. But if the original intention is lacking, prayer lacks both merit and impetration: because, as Gregory [*Hugh St. Victor, Expos. in Reg. S. Aug. iii] says, "God hears not the prayer of those who pay no attention to their prayer." The third effect of prayer is that which it produces at once; this is the spiritual refreshment of the mind, and for this effect attention is a necessary condition: wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 14:14): "If I pray in a tongue . . . my understanding is without fruit."

It must be observed, however, that there are three kinds of attention that can be brought to vocal prayer: one which attends to the words, lest we say them wrong, another which attends to the sense of the words, and a third, which attends to the end of prayer, namely, God, and to the thing we are praying for. That last kind of attention is most necessary, and even idiots are capable of it. Moreover this attention, whereby the mind is fixed on God, is sometimes so strong that the mind forgets all other things, as Hugh of St. Victor states [*De Modo Orandi ii].

Reply to Objection 1: To pray in spirit and in truth is to set about praying through the instigation of the Spirit, even though afterwards the mind wander through weakness.

Reply to Objection 2: The human mind is unable to remain aloft for long on account of the weakness of nature, because human weakness weighs down the soul to the level of inferior things: and hence it is that when, while praying, the mind ascends to God by contemplation, of a sudden it wanders off through weakness.

Reply to Objection 3: Purposely to allow one's mind to wander in prayer is sinful and hinders the prayer from having fruit. It is against this that Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): "When you pray God with psalms and hymns, let your mind attend to that which your lips pronounce." But to wander in mind unintentionally does not deprive prayer of its fruit. Hence Basil says (De Constit. Monach. i): "If you are so truly weakened by sin that you are unable to pray attentively, strive as much as you can to curb yourself, and God will pardon you, seeing that you are unable to stand in His presence in a becoming manner, not through negligence but through frailty."

Whether prayer should last a long time?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer should not be continual. It is written (Mat. 6:7): "When you are praying, speak not much." Now one who prays a long time needs to speak much, especially if his be vocal prayer. Therefore prayer should not last a long time.

Objection 2: Further, prayer expresses the desire. Now a desire is all the holier according as it is centered on one thing, according to Ps. 26:4, "One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after." Therefore the shorter prayer is, the more is it acceptable to God.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to be wrong to transgress the limits fixed by God, especially in matters concerning Divine worship, according to Ex. 19:21: "Charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the limits to see the Lord, and a very great multitude of them should perish." But God has fixed for us the limits of prayer by instituting the Lord's Prayer (Mat. 6). Therefore it is not right to prolong our prayer beyond its limits.

Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that we ought to pray continually. For our Lord said (Lk. 18:1): "We ought always to pray, and not to faint": and it is written (1 Thess. 5:17): "Pray without ceasing."

I answer that, We may speak about prayer in two ways: first, by considering it in itself; secondly, by considering it in its cause. The not cause of prayer is the desire of charity, from which prayer ought to arise: and this desire ought to be in us continually, either actually or virtually, for the virtue of this desire remains in whatever we do out of charity; and we ought to "do all things to the glory of God" (1 Cor. 10:31). From this point of view prayer ought to be continual: wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam, Ep. cxxx, 9): "Faith, hope and charity are by themselves a prayer of continual longing." But prayer, considered in itself, cannot be continual, because we have to be busy about other works, and, as Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx, 9), "we pray to God with our lips at certain intervals and seasons, in order to admonish ourselves by means of such like signs, to take note of the amount of our progress in that desire, and to arouse ourselves more eagerly to an increase thereof." Now the quantity of a thing should be commensurate with its end, for instance the quantity of the dose should be commensurate with health. And so it is becoming that prayer should last long enough to arouse the fervor of the interior desire: and when it exceeds this measure, so that it cannot be continued any longer without causing weariness, it should be discontinued. Wherefore Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx): "It is said that the brethren in Egypt make frequent but very short prayers, rapid ejaculations, as it were, lest that vigilant and erect attention which is so necessary in prayer slacken and languish, through the strain being prolonged. By so doing they make it sufficiently clear not only that this attention must not be forced if we are unable to keep it up, but also that if we are able to continue, it should not be broken off too soon." And just as we must judge of this in private prayers by considering the attention of the person praying, so too, in public prayers we must judge of it by considering the devotion of the people.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (ad Probam. Ep. cxxx), "to pray with many words is not the same as to pray long; to speak long is one thing, to be devout long is another. For it is written that our Lord passed the whole night in prayer, and that He 'prayed the longer' in order to set us an example." Further on he says: "When praying say little, yet pray much so long as your attention is fervent. For to say much in prayer is to discuss your need in too many words: whereas to pray much is to knock at the door of Him we pray, by the continuous and devout clamor of the heart. Indeed this business is frequently done with groans rather than with words, with tears rather than with speech."

Reply to Objection 2: Length of prayer consists, not in praying for many things, but in the affections persisting in the desire of one thing.

Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord instituted this prayer, not that we might use no other words when we pray, but that in our prayers we might have none but these things in view, no matter how we express them or think of them.

Reply to Objection 4: One may pray continually, either through having a continual desire, as stated above; or through praying at certain fixed times, though interruptedly; or by reason of the effect, whether in the person who prays—because he remains more devout even after praying, or in some other person—as when by his kindness a man incites another to pray for him, even after he himself has ceased praying.

Whether prayer is meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is obtained by means of prayer according to Lk. 11:13, "(How much more) will your Father from heaven give the good Spirit to them that ask Him!" Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Objection 2: Further, if prayer merits anything, this would seem to be chiefly that which is besought in prayer. Yet it does not always merit this, because even the saints' prayers are frequently not heard; thus Paul was not heard when he besought the sting of the flesh to be removed from him. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

Objection 3: Further, prayer is based chiefly on faith, according to James 1:6, "But let him ask in faith, nothing wavering." Now faith is not sufficient for merit, as instanced in those who have lifeless faith. Therefore prayer is not a meritorious act.

On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 34:13, "My prayer shall be turned into my bosom," explains them as meaning, "if my prayer does not profit them, yet shall not I be deprived of my reward." Now reward is not due save to merit. Therefore prayer is meritorious.

I answer that, As stated above [3026](A[13]) prayer, besides causing spiritual consolation at the time of praying, has a twofold efficacy in respect of a future effect, namely, efficacy in meriting and efficacy in impetrating. Now prayer, like any other virtuous act, is efficacious in meriting, because it proceeds from charity as its root, the proper object of which is the eternal good that we merit to enjoy. Yet prayer proceeds from charity through the medium of religion, of which prayer is an act, as stated above [3027](A[3]), and with the concurrence of other virtues requisite for the goodness of prayer, viz. humility and faith. For the offering of prayer itself to God belongs to religion, while the desire for the thing. that we pray to be accomplished belongs to charity. Faith is necessary in reference to God to Whom we pray; that is, we need to believe that we can obtain from Him what we seek. Humility is necessary on the part of the person praying, because he recognizes his neediness. Devotion too is necessary: but this belongs to religion, for it is its first act and a necessary condition of all its secondary acts, as stated above (Q[82], AA[1],2).

As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace of God to Whom we pray, and Who instigates us to pray. Wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cv, 1): “He would not urge us to ask, unless He were willing to give”; and Chrysostom [*Cf. Catena Aurea of St. Thomas on Lk. 18. The words as quoted are not to be found in the words of Chrysostom] says: “He never refuses to grant our prayers, since in His loving-kindness He urged us not to faint in praying.”

Reply to Objection 1: Neither prayer nor any other virtuous act is meritorious without sanctifying grace. And yet even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is “a gift of God,” as Augustine states (De Persever. xxiii).

Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes the merit of prayer regards chiefly something distinct from the object of one’s petition. For the chief object of merit is beatitude, whereas the direct object of the petition of prayer extends sometimes to certain other things, as stated above ([3028]AA[6],7). Accordingly if this other thing that we ask for ourselves be not useful for our beatitude, we do not merit it; and sometimes by asking for and desiring such things we lose merit for instance if we ask of God the accomplishment of some sin, which would be an impious prayer. And sometimes it is not necessary for salvation, nor yet manifestly contrary thereto; and then although he who prays may merit eternal life by praying, yet he does not merit to obtain what he asks for. Hence Augustine says (Liber. Sentent. Prosperi sent. ccxii): “He who faithfully prays God for the necessaries of this life, is both mercifully heard, and mercifully not heard. For the physician knows better than the sick man what is good for the disease.” For this reason, too, Paul was not heard when he prayed for the removal of the sting in his flesh, because this was not expedient. If, however, we pray for something that is useful for our beatitude, through being conducive to salvation, we merit it not only by praying, but also by doing other good deeds: therefore without any doubt we receive what we ask for, yet when we ought to receive it: “since certain things are not denied us, but are deferred that they may be granted at a suitable time,” according to Augustine (Tract. cii in Joan.): and again this may be hindered if we persevere not in asking for it. Wherefore Basil says (De Constit. Monast. i): “The reason why sometimes thou hast asked and not received, is because thou hast asked amiss, either inconsistently, or lightly, or because thou hast asked for what was not good for thee, or because thou hast ceased asking.” Since, however, a man cannot condignly merit eternal life for another, as stated above ([3029]FS, Q[114], A[6]), it follows that sometimes one cannot condignly merit for another things that pertain to eternal life. For this reason we are not always heard when we pray for others, as stated above (A[7], ad 2,3). Hence it is that four conditions are laid down; namely, to ask—“for ourselves—things necessary for salvation—piously—perseveringly”; when all these four concur, we always obtain what we ask for.

Reply to Objection 3: Prayer depends chiefly on faith, not for its efficacy in meriting, because thus it depends chiefly on charity, but for its efficacy in impetrating, because it is through faith that man comes to know of God’s omnipotence and mercy, which are the source whence prayer impetrates what it asks for.

Whether sinners impetrate anything from God by their prayers?

Objection 1: It would seem that sinners impetrate nothing from God by their prayers. It is written (Jn. 9:31): “We know that God doth not hear sinners”; and this agrees with the saying of Prov. 28:9, “He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination.” Now an abominable prayer impetrates nothing from God. Therefore sinners impetrate nothing from God.

Objection 2: Further, the just impetrate from God what they merit, as stated above (A[15], ad 2). But sinners cannot merit anything since they lack grace and charity which is the “power of godliness,” according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, “Having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the power thereof.” and so their prayer is impious, and yet piety it required in order that prayer may be impetrative, as stated above (A[15], ad 2). Therefore sinners impetrate nothing by their prayers.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xiv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “The Father is unwilling to hear the prayer which the Son has not inspired.” Now in the prayer inspired by Christ we say: “Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us”: and sinners do not fulfil this. Therefore either they lie in saying this, and so are unworthy to be heard, or, if they do not say it, they are not heard, because they do not observe the form of prayer instituted by Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. xliv, super Joan.): “If God were not to hear sinners, the publican would have vainly said: Lord, be merciful to me a sinner”; and Chrysostom [*Hom. xviii of the same Opus Imperfectum] says: “Everyone that asketh shall receive, that is to say whether he be righteous or sinful.”

I answer that, In the sinner, two things are to be considered: his nature which God loves, and the sin which He hates. Accordingly when a sinner prays for something as sinner, i.e. in accordance with a sinful desire, God hears him not through mercy but sometimes through vengeance when He allows the sinner to fall yet deeper into sin. For “God refuses in mercy what He grants in anger,” as Augustine declares (Tract. lxxiii in Joan.). On the other hand God hears the sinner’s prayer if it proceed from a good natural desire, not out of justice, because the sinner does not merit to be heard, but out of pure mercy [*Cf. A[15], ad 1], provided however he fulfil the four conditions given above, namely, that he beseech for himself things necessary for salvation, piously and perseveringly.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine states (Tract. xliv super Joan.), these words were spoken by the blind man before being anointed, i.e. perfectly enlightened, and consequently lack authority. And yet there is truth in the saying if it refers to a sinner as such, in which sense also the sinner's prayer is said to be an abomination.

Reply to Objection 2: There can be no godliness in the sinner's prayer as though his prayer were quickened by a habit of virtue: and yet his prayer may be godly in so far as he asks for something pertaining to godliness. Even so a man who has not the habit of justice is able to will something just, as stated above ([3030]Q[59], A[2]). And though his prayer is not meritorious, it can be impetrative, because merit depends on justice, whereas impetration rests on grace.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[7], ad 1) the Lord's Prayer is pronounced in the common person of the whole Church: and so if anyone say the Lord's Prayer while unwilling to forgive his neighbor's trespasses, he lies not, although his words do not apply to him personally: for they are true as referred to the person of the Church, from which he is excluded by merit, and consequently he is deprived of the fruit of his prayer. Sometimes, however, a sinner is prepared to forgive those who have trespassed against him, wherefore his prayers are heard, according to Ecclus. 28:2, "Forgive thy neighbor if he hath hurt thee, and then shall thy sins be forgiven to thee when thou prayest."

Whether the parts of prayer are fittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings?

Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of prayer are unfittingly described as supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings. Supplication would seem to be a kind of adjuration. Yet, according to Origen (Super Matth. Tract. xxxv), "a man who wishes to live according to the gospel need not adjure another, for if it be unlawful to swear, it is also unlawful to adjure." Therefore supplication is unfittingly reckoned a part of prayer.

Objection 2: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), "to pray is to ask becoming things of God." Therefore it is unfitting to distinguish "prayers" from "intercessions."

Objection 3: Further, thanksgivings regard the past, while the others regard the future. But the past precedes the future. Therefore thanksgivings are unfittingly placed after the others.

On the contrary, suffices the authority of the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:1).

I answer that, Three conditions are requisite for prayer. First, that the person who prays should approach God Whom he prays: this is signified in the word “prayer,” because prayer is “the raising up of one’s mind to God.” The second is that there should be a petition, and this is signified in the word “intercession.” In this case sometimes one asks for something definite, and then some say it is “intercession” properly so called, or we may ask for some thing indefinitely, for instance to be helped by God, or we may simply indicate a fact, as in Jn. 11:3, “Behold, he whom Thou lovest is sick,” and then they call it “insinuation.” The third condition is the reason for impetrating what we ask for: and this either on the part of God, or on the part of the person who asks. The reason of impetration on the part of God is His sanctity, on account of which we ask to be heard, according to Dan. 9:17,18, “For Thy own sake, incline, O God, Thy ear”; and to this pertains “supplication” [obsecratio] which means a pleading through sacred things, as when we say, “Through Thy nativity, deliver us, O Lord.” The reason for impetration on the part of the person who asks is “thanksgiving”; since “through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet greater benefits,” as we say in the collect [*Ember Friday in September and Postcommunion of the common of a Confessor Bishop]. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 2:1 says that “in the Mass, the consecration is preceded by supplication,” in which certain sacred things are called to mind; that “prayers are in the consecration itself,” in which especially the mind should be raised up to God; and that “intercessions are in the petitions that follow, and thanksgivings at the end.”

We may notice these four things in several of the Church’s collects. Thus in the collect of Trinity Sunday the words, “Almighty eternal God” belong to the offering up of prayer to God; the words, “Who hast given to Thy servants,” etc. belong to thanksgiving; the words, “grant, we beseech Thee,” belong to intercession; and the words at the end, “Through Our Lord,” etc. belong to supplication.

In the “Conferences of the Fathers” (ix, cap. 11, seqq.) we read: “Supplication is bewailing one’s sins; prayer is vowing something to God;

intercession is praying for others; thanksgiving is offered by the mind to God in ineffable ecstasy.” The first explanation, however, is the better.

Reply to Objection 1: “Supplication” is an adjuration not for the purpose of compelling, for this is forbidden, but in order to implore mercy.

Reply to Objection 2: “Prayer” in the general sense includes all the things mentioned here; but when distinguished from the others it denotes properly the ascent to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Among things that are diverse the past precedes the future; but the one and same thing is future before it is past. Hence thanksgiving for other benefits precedes intercession: but one and the same benefit is first sought, and finally, when it has been received, we give thanks for it. Intercession is preceded by prayer whereby we approach Him of Whom we ask: and prayer is preceded by supplication, whereby through the consideration of God’s goodness we dare approach Him.

OF ADORATION (THREE ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the external acts of latria, and in the first place, adoration whereby one uses one’s body to reverence God; secondly, those acts whereby some external thing is offered to God; thirdly, those acts whereby something belonging to God is assumed.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether adoration is an act of latria?

(2) Whether adoration denotes an internal or an external act?

(3) Whether adoration requires a definite place?

Whether adoration is an act of latria or religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoration is not an act of latria or religion. The worship of religion is due to God alone. But adoration is not due to God alone: since we read (Gn. 18:2) that Abraham adored the angels; and (3 Kings 1:23) that the prophet Nathan, when he was come in to king David, “worshiped him bowing down to the ground.” Therefore adoration is not an act of religion.

Objection 2: Further, the worship of religion is due to God as the object of beatitude, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3): whereas adoration is due to Him by reason of His majesty, since a gloss on Ps. 28:2, “Adore ye the Lord in His holy court,” says: “We pass from these courts into the court where we adore His majesty.” Therefore adoration is not an act of latria.

Objection 3: Further, the worship of one same religion is due to the three Persons. But we do not adore the three Persons with one adoration, for we genuflect at each separate invocation of Them [*At the adoration of the Cross, on Good Friday]. Therefore adoration is nol an act of latria.

On the contrary, are the words quoted Mat. 4:10: “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou serve.”

I answer that, Adoration is directed to the reverence of the person adored. Now it is evident from what we have said ([3031]Q[81], AA[2],4) that it is proper to religion to show reverence to God. Hence the adoration whereby we adore God is an act of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is due to God on account of His excellence, which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we pay to God, and which belongs to latria, differs from the reverence which we pay to certain excellent creatures; this belongs to dulia, and we shall speak of it further on ([3032]Q[103]). And since external actions are signs of internal reverence, certain external tokens significative of reverence are offered to creatures of excellence, and among these tokens the chief is adoration: yet there is one thing which is offered to God alone, and that is sacrifice. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 4): “Many tokens of Divine worship are employed in doing honor to men, either through excessive humility, or through pernicious flattery; yet so that those to whom these honors are given are recognized as being men to whom we owe esteem and reverence and even adoration if they be far above us. But who ever thought it his duty to sacrifice to any other than one whom he either knew or deemed or pretended to be a God?” Accordingly it was with the reverence due to an excellent creature that Nathan adored David; while it was the reverence due to God with which Mardochai refused to adore Aman fearing “lest he should transfer the honor of his God to a man” (Esther 13:14).

Again with the reverence due to an excellent creature Abraham adored the angels, as did also Josue (Jos. 5:15): though we may understand them to have adored, with the adoration of latria, God Who appeared and spoke to them in the guise of an angel. It was with the reverence due to God that John was forbidden to adore the angel (Apoc. 22:9), both to indicate the dignity which he had acquired through Christ, whereby man is made equal to an angel: wherefore the same text goes on: “I am thy fellow-servant and of thy brethren”; as also to exclude any occasion of idolatry, wherefore the text continues: “Adore God.”

Reply to Objection 2: Every Divine excellency is included in His majesty: to which it pertains that we should be made happy in Him as in the sovereign good.

Reply to Objection 3: Since there is one excellence of the three Divine Persons, one honor and reverence is due to them and consequently one adoration. It is to represent this that where it is related (Gn. 18:2) that three men appeared to Abraham, we are told that he addressed one, saying: “Lord, if I have found favor in thy sight,” etc. The triple genuflection represents the Trinity of Persons, not a difference of adoration.

Whether adoration denotes an action of the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not denote an act of the body. It is written (Jn. 4:23): “The true adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.” Now what is done in spirit has nothing to do with an act of the body. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body.

Objection 2: Further, the word adoration is taken from “oratio” [prayer]. But prayer consists chiefly in an interior act, according to 1 Cor. 14:15, “I will pray with the spirit, I will pray also with the understanding.” Therefore adoration denotes chiefly a spiritual act.

Objection 3: Further, acts of the body pertain to sensible knowledge: whereas we approach God not by bodily but by spiritual sense. Therefore adoration does not denote an act of the body.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 20:5, “Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them,” says: “Thou shalt neither worship them in mind, nor adore them outwardly.”

I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 12), since we are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration; namely, a spiritual adoration, consisting in the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily adoration, which consists in an exterior humbling of the body. And since in all acts of latria that which is without is referred to that which is within as being of greater import, it follows that exterior adoration is offered on account of interior adoration, in other words we exhibit signs of humility in our bodies in order to incite our affections to submit to God, since it is connatural to us to proceed from the sensible to the intelligible.

Reply to Objection 1: Even bodily adoration is done in spirit, in so far as it proceeds from and is directed to spiritual devotion.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as prayer is primarily in the mind, and secondarily expressed in words, as stated above ([3033]Q[83], A[12]), so too adoration consists chiefly in an interior reverence of God, but secondarily in certain bodily signs of humility; thus when we genuflect we signify our weakness in comparison with God, and when we prostrate ourselves we profess that we are nothing of ourselves.

Reply to Objection 3: Though we cannot reach God with the senses, our mind is urged by sensible signs to approach God.

Whether adoration requires a definite place?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoration does not require a definite place. It is written (Jn. 4:21): “The hour cometh, when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem, adore the Father”; and the same reason seems to apply to other places. Therefore a definite place is not necessary for adoration.

Objection 2: Further, exterior adoration is directed to interior adoration. But interior adoration is shown to God as existing everywhere. Therefore exterior adoration does not require a definite place.

Objection 3: Further, the same God is adored in the New as in the Old Testament. Now in the Old Testament they adored towards the west, because the door of the Tabernacle looked to the east (Ex. 26:18 seqq.). Therefore for the same reason we ought now to adore towards the west, if any definite place be requisite for adoration.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 56:7): “My house shall be called the house of prayer,” which words are also quoted (Jn. 2:16).

I answer that, As stated above [3034](A[2]), the chief part of adoration is the internal devotion of the mind, while the secondary part is something external pertaining to bodily signs. Now the mind internally apprehends God as not comprised in a place; while bodily signs must of necessity be in some definite place and position. Hence a definite place is required for adoration, not chiefly, as though it were essential thereto, but by reason of a certain fittingness, like other bodily signs.

Reply to Objection 1: By these words our Lord foretold the cessation of adoration, both according to the rite of the Jews who adored in Jerusalem, and according to the rite of the Samaritans who adored on Mount Garizim. For both these rites ceased with the advent of the spiritual truth of the Gospel, according to which "a sacrifice is offered to God in every place," as stated in Malach. 1:11.

Reply to Objection 2: A definite place is chosen for adoration, not on account of God Who is adored, as though He were enclosed in a place, but on account of the adorers; and this for three reasons. First, because the place is consecrated, so that those who pray there conceive a greater devotion and are more likely to be heard, as may be seen in the prayer of Solomon (3 Kings 8). Secondly, on account of the sacred mysteries and other signs of holiness contained therein. Thirdly, on account of the concourse of many adorers, by reason of which their prayer is more likely to be heard, according to Mat. 18:20, "Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them."

Reply to Objection 3: There is a certain fittingness in adoring towards the east. First, because the Divine majesty is indicated in the movement of the heavens which is from the east. Secondly, because Paradise was situated in the east according to the Septuagint version of Gn. 2:8, and so we signify our desire to return to Paradise. Thirdly, on account of Christ Who is "the light of the world" [*Jn. 8:12; 9:5], and is called "the Orient" (Zech. 6:12). Who mounteth above the heaven of heavens to the east (Ps. 67:34), and is expected to come from the east, according to Mat. 24:27, "As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west; so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be."

OF SACRIFICE (FOUR ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider those acts whereby external things are offered to God. These give rise to a twofold consideration: (1) Of things given to God by the faithful; (2) Of vows, whereby something is promised to Him.

Under the first head we shall consider sacrifices, oblations, first-fruits, and tithes. About sacrifices there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?

(2) Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?

(3) Whether the offering of a sacrifice is a special act of virtue?

(4) Whether all are bound to offer sacrifice?

Whether offering a sacrifice to God is of the law of nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that offering a sacrifice to God is not of the natural law. Things that are of the natural law are common among all men. Yet this is not the case with sacrifices: for we read of some, e.g. Melchisedech (Gn. 14:18), offering bread and wine in sacrifice, and of certain animals being offered by some, and others by others. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is not of the natural law.

Objection 2: Further, things that are of the natural law were observed by all just men. Yet we do not read that Isaac offered sacrifice; nor that Adam did so, of whom nevertheless it is written (Wis. 10:2) that wisdom “brought him out of his sin.” Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not of the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5,19) that sacrifices are offered in signification of something. Now words which are chief among signs, as he again says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 3), “signify, not by nature but by convention,” according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i, 2). Therefore sacrifices are not of the natural law.

On the contrary, At all times and among all nations there has always been the offering of sacrifices. Now that which is observed by all is seemingly natural. Therefore the offering of sacrifices is of the natural law.

I answer that, Natural reason tells man that he is subject to a higher being, on account of the defects which he perceives in himself, and in which he needs help and direction from someone above him: and whatever this superior being may be, it is known to all under the name of God. Now just as in natural things the lower are naturally subject to the higher, so too it is a dictate of natural reason in accordance with man’s natural inclination that he should tender submission and honor, according to his mode, to that which is above man. Now the mode befitting to man is that he should employ sensible signs in order to signify anything, because he derives his knowledge from sensibles. Hence it is a dictate of natural reason that man should use certain sensibles, by offering them to God in sign of the subjection and honor due to Him, like those who make certain offerings to their lord in recognition of his authority. Now this is what we mean by a sacrifice, and consequently the offering of sacrifice is of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3035]FS, Q[95], A[2]), certain things belong generically to the natural law, while their determination belongs to the positive law; thus the natural law requires that evildoers should be punished; but that this or that punishment should be inflicted on them is a matter determined by God or by man. In like manner the offering of sacrifice belongs generically to the natural law, and consequently all are agreed on this point, but the determination of sacrifices is established by God or by man, and this is the reason for their difference.

Reply to Objection 2: Adam, Isaac and other just men offered sacrifice to God in a manner befitting the times in which they lived, according to Gregory, who says (Moral. iv, 3) that in olden times original sin was remitted through the offering of sacrifices. Nor does Scripture mention all the sacrifices of the just, but only those that have something special connected with them. Perhaps the reason why we read of no sacrifice being offered by Adam may be that, as the origin of sin is ascribed to him, the origin of sanctification ought not to be represented as typified in him. Isaac was a type of Christ, being himself offered in sacrifice; and so there was no need that he should be represented as offering a sacrifice.

Reply to Objection 3: It is natural to man to express his ideas by signs, but the determination of those signs depends on man’s pleasure.

Whether sacrifice should be offered to God alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrifice should not be offered to the most high God alone. Since sacrifice ought to be offered to God, it would seem that it ought to be offered to all such as are partakers of the Godhead. Now holy men are made “partakers of the Divine nature,” according to 2 Pet. 1:4; wherefore of them is it written (Ps. 81:6): “I have said, You are gods”: and angels too are called “sons of God,” according to Job 1:6. Thus sacrifice should be offered to all these.

Objection 2: Further, the greater a person is the greater the honor due to him from man. Now the angels and saints are far greater than any earthly princes: and yet the subjects of the latter pay them much greater honor, by prostrating before them, and offering them gifts, than is implied by offering an animal or any other thing in sacrifice. Much more therefore may one offer sacrifice to the angels and saints.

Objection 3: Further, temples and altars are raised for the offering of sacrifices. Yet temples and altars are raised to angels and saints. Therefore sacrifices also may be offered to them.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 22:20): “He that sacrificeth to gods shall be put to death, save only to the Lord.”

I answer that, As stated above [3036](A[1]), a sacrifice is offered in order that something may be represented. Now the sacrifice that is offered outwardly represents the inward spiritual sacrifice, whereby the soul offers itself to God according to Ps. 50:19, “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit,” since, as stated above (Q[81], A[7]; Q[84], A[2]), the outward acts of religion are directed to the inward acts. Again the soul offers itself in sacrifice to God as its beginning by creation, and its end by beatification: and according to the true faith God alone is the creator of our souls, as stated in the [3037]FP, Q[90], A[3]; FS, Q[118], A[2], while in Him alone the beatitude of our soul consists, as stated above ([3038]FS, Q[1], A[8]; [3039]FS, Q[2], A[8]; [3040]FS, Q[3], AA[1],7,8). Wherefore just as to God alone ought we to offer spiritual sacrifice, so too ought we to offer outward sacrifices to Him alone: even so “in our prayers and praises we proffer significant words to Him to Whom in our hearts we offer the things which we designate thereby,” as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 19). Moreover we find that in every country the people are wont to show the sovereign ruler some special sign of honor, and that if this be shown to anyone else, it is a crime of high-treason. Therefore, in the Divine law, the death punishment is assigned to those who offer Divine honor to another than God.

Reply to Objection 1: The name of the Godhead is communicated to certain ones, not equally with God, but by participation; hence neither is equal honor due to them.

Reply to Objection 2: The offering of a sacrifice is measured not by the value of the animal killed, but by its signification, for it is done in honor of the sovereign Ruler of the whole universe. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), “the demons rejoice, not in the stench of corpses, but in receiving divine honors.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 19), “we do not raise temples and priesthoods to the martyrs, because not they but their God is our God. Wherefore the priest says not: I offer sacrifice to thee, Peter or Paul. But we give thanks to God for their triumphs, and urge ourselves to imitate them.”

Whether the offering of sacrifice is a special act of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of virtue. Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 6): “A true sacrifice is any work done that we may cleave to God in holy fellowship.” But not every good work is a special act of some definite virtue. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the mortification of the body by fasting belongs to abstinence, by continence belongs to chastity, by martyrdom belongs to fortitude. Now all these things seem to be comprised in the offering of sacrifice, according to Rom. 12:1, “Present your bodies a living sacrifice.” Again the Apostle says (Heb. 13:16): “Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained.” Now it belongs to charity, mercy and liberality to do good and to impart. Therefore the offering of sacrifice is not a special act of a definite virtue.

Objection 3: Further, a sacrifice is apparently anything offered to God. Now many things are offered to God, such as devotion, prayer, tithes, first-fruits, oblations, and holocausts. Therefore sacrifice does not appear to be a special act of a definite virtue.

On the contrary, The law contains special precepts about sacrifices, as appears from the beginning of Leviticus.

I answer that, As stated above ([3041]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), where an act of one virtue is directed to the end of another virtue it partakes somewhat of its species; thus when a man thieves in order to commit fornication, his theft assumes, in a sense, the deformity of fornication, so that even though it were not a sin otherwise, it would be a sin from the very fact that it was directed to fornication. Accordingly, sacrifice is a special act deserving of praise in that it is done out of reverence for God; and for this reason it belongs to a definite virtue, viz. religion. But it happens that the acts of the other virtues are directed to the reverence of God, as when a man gives alms of his own things for God's sake, or when a man subjects his own body to some affliction out of reverence for God; and in this way the acts also of other virtues may be called sacrifices. On the other hand there are acts that are not deserving of praise save through being done out of reverence for God: such acts are properly called sacrifices, and belong to the virtue of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: The very fact that we wish to cling to God in a spiritual fellowship pertains to reverence for God: and consequently the act of any virtue assumes the character of a sacrifice through being done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship.

Reply to Objection 2: Man's good is threefold. There is first his soul's good which is offered to God in a certain inward sacrifice by devotion, prayer and other like interior acts: and this is the principal sacrifice. The second is his body's good, which is, so to speak, offered to God in martyrdom, and abstinence or continency. The third is the good which consists of external things: and of these we offer a sacrifice to God, directly when we offer our possession to God immediately, and indirectly when we share them with our neighbor for God's sake.

Reply to Objection 3: A "sacrifice," properly speaking, requires that something be done to the thing which is offered to God, for instance animals were slain and burnt, the bread is broken, eaten, blessed. The very word signifies this, since "sacrifice" is so called because a man does something sacred [facit sacrum]. On the other hand an "oblation" is properly the offering of something to God even if nothing be done thereto, thus we speak of offering money or bread at the altar, and yet nothing is done to them. Hence every sacrifice is an oblation, but not conversely. "First-fruits" are oblations, because they were offered to God, according to

Dt. 26, but they are not a sacrifice, because nothing sacred was done to them. “Tithes,” however, are neither a sacrifice nor an oblation, properly speaking, because they are not offered immediately to God, but to the ministers of Divine worship.

Whether all are bound to offer sacrifices?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are not bound to offer sacrifices. The Apostle says (Rom. 3:19): “What things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are in the Law.” Now the law of sacrifices was not given to all, but only to the Hebrew people. Therefore all are not bound to offer sacrifices.

Objection 2: Further, sacrifices are offered to God in order to signify something. But not everyone is capable of understanding these significations. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.

Objection 3: Further, priests [*’Sacerdotes’: Those who give or administer sacred things (sacra dantes): cf. 1 Cor. 4:1] are so called because they offer sacrifice to God. But all are not priests. Therefore not all are bound to offer sacrifices.

On the contrary, The offering of sacrifices of is of the natural law, as stated above [3042](A[1]). Now all are bound to do that which is of the natural law. Therefore all are bound to offer sacrifice to God.

I answer that, Sacrifice is twofold, as stated above [3043](A[2]). The first and principal is the inward sacrifice, which all are bound to offer, since all are obliged to offer to God a devout mind. The other is the outward sacrifice, and this again is twofold. There is a sacrifice which is deserving of praise merely through being offered to God in protestation of our subjection to God: and the obligation of offering this sacrifice was not the same for those under the New or the Old Law, as for those who were not under the Law. For those who are under the Law are bound to offer certain definite sacrifices according to the precepts of the Law, whereas those who were not under the Law were bound to perform certain outward actions in God’s honor, as became those among whom they dwelt, but not definitely to this or that action. The other outward sacrifice is when the outward actions of the other virtues are performed out of reverence for God; some of which are a matter of precept; and to these all are bound, while others are works of supererogation, and to these all are not bound.

Reply to Objection 1: All were not bound to offer those particular sacrifices which were prescribed in the Law: but they were bound to some sacrifices inward or outward, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Though all do not know explicitly the power of the sacrifices, they know it implicitly, even as they have implicit faith, as stated above (Q[2], AA 6,7).

Reply to Objection 3: The priests offer those sacrifices which are specially directed to the Divine worship, not only for themselves but also for others. But there are other sacrifices, which anyone can offer to God for himself as explained above ([3044]AA[2],3).

OF OBLATIONS AND FIRST-FRUITS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider oblations and first-fruits. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any oblations are necessary as a matter of precept?

(2) To whom are oblations due?

(3) of what things they should be made?

(4) In particular, as to first-fruits, whether men are bound to offer them?

Whether men are under a necessity of precept to make oblations?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to make oblations. Men are not bound, at the time of the Gospel, to observe the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, as stated above ([3045]FS, Q[103], AA[3] ,4). Now the offering of oblations is one of the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law, since it is written (Ex. 23:14): “Three times every year you shall celebrate feasts with Me,” and further on (Ex. 23:15): “Thou shalt not appear empty before Me.” Therefore men are not now under a necessity of precept to make oblations.

Objection 2: Further, before they are made, oblations depend on man’s will, as appears from our Lord’s saying (Mat. 5:23), “If . . . thou offer thy gift at the altar,” as though this were left to the choice of the offerer: and when once oblations have been made, there is no way of offering them again. Therefore in no way is a man under a necessity of precept to make oblations.

Objection 3: Further, if anyone is bound to give a certain thing to the Church, and fails to give it, he can be compelled to do so by being deprived of the Church’s sacraments. But it would seem unlawful to refuse the sacraments of the Church to those who refuse to make oblations according to a decree of the sixth council [*Can. Trullan, xxiii], quoted I, qu. i, can. Nullus: “Let none who dispense Holy Communion exact anything of the recipient, and if they exact anything let them be deposed.” Therefore it is not necessary that men should make oblations.

On the contrary, Gregory says [*Gregory VII; Concil. Roman. v, can. xii]: “Let every Christian take care that he offer something to God at the celebration of Mass.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3046]Q[85], A[3], ad 3), the term “oblation” is common to all things offered for the Divine worship, so that if a thing be offered to be destroyed in worship of God, as though it were being made into something holy, it is both an oblation and a sacrifice. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 29:18): “Thou shalt offer the whole ram for a burnt-offering upon the altar; it is an oblation to the Lord, a most sweet savor of the victim of the Lord”; and (Lev. 2:1): “When anyone shall offer an oblation of sacrifice to the Lord, his offering shall be of fine flour.” If, on the other hand, it be offered with a view to its remaining entire and being deputed to the worship of God or to the use of His ministers, it will be an oblation and not a sacrifice. Accordingly it is essential to oblations of this kind that they be offered voluntarily, according to Ex. 25:2, of “every man that offereth of his own accord you shall take them.” Nevertheless it may happen in four ways that one is bound to make oblations. First, on account of a previous agreement: as when a person is granted a portion of Church land, that he may make certain oblations at fixed times, although this has the character of rent. Secondly, by reason of a previous assignment or promise; as when a man offers a gift among the living, or by will bequeaths to the Church something whether movable or immovable to be delivered at some future time. Thirdly, on account of the need of the Church, for instance if her ministers were without means of support. Fourthly, on account of custom; for the faithful are bound at certain solemn feasts to make certain customary oblations. In the last two cases, however, the oblation remains voluntary, as regards, to wit, the quantity or kind of the thing offered.

Reply to Objection 1: Under the New Law men are not bound to make oblations on account of legal solemnities, as stated in Exodus, but on account of certain other reasons, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Some are bound to make oblations, both before making them, as in the first, third, and. fourth cases, and after they have made them by assignment or promise: for they are bound to offer in reality that which has been already offered to the Church by way of assignment.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who do not make the oblations they are bound to make may be punished by being deprived of the sacraments, not by the priest himself to whom the oblations should be made, lest he seem to exact, something for bestowing the sacraments, but by someone superior to him.

Whether oblations are due to priests alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that oblations are not due to priests alone. For chief among oblations would seem to be those that are deputed to the sacrifices of victims. Now whatever is given to the poor is called a “victim in Scripture according to Heb. 13:16, “Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such victims [Douay: ‘sacrifices’] God’s favor is obtained. Much more therefore are oblations due to the poor.

Objection 2: Further, in many parishes monks have a share in the oblations. Now “the case of clerics is distinct from the case of monks,” as Jerome states [*Ep. xiv, ad Heliod.]. Therefore oblations art not due to priests alone.

Objection 3: Further, lay people with the consent of the Church buy oblations such as loaves and so forth, and they do so for no other reason than that they may make use thereof themselves. Therefore oblations may have reference to the laity.

On the contrary, A canon of Pope Damasus [*Damasus I] quoted X, qu. i [*Can. Hanc consuetudinem], says: “None but the priests whom day by day we see serving the Lord may eat and drink of the oblations which are offered within the precincts of the Holy Church: because in the Old

Testament the Lord forbade the children of Israel to eat the sacred loaves, with the exception of Aaron and his sons" (Lev. 24:8,9).

I answer that, The priest is appointed mediator and stands, so to speak, "between" the people and God, as we read of Moses (Dt. 5:5), wherefore it belongs to him to set forth the Divine teachings and sacraments before the people; and besides to offer to the Lord things appertaining to the people, their prayers, for instance, their sacrifices and oblations. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): "Every high priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins." Hence the oblations which the people offer to God concern the priests, not only as regards their turning them to their own use, but also as regards the faithful dispensation thereof, by spending them partly on things appertaining to the Divine worship, partly on things touching their own livelihood (since they that serve the altar partake with the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13), and partly for the good of the poor, who, as far as possible, should be supported from the possessions of the Church: for our Lord had a purse for the use of the poor, as Jerome observes on Mat. 17:26, "That we may not scandalize them."

Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is given to the poor is not a sacrifice properly speaking; yet it is called a sacrifice in so far as it is given to them for God's sake. In like manner, and for the same reason, it can be called an oblation, though not properly speaking, since it is not given immediately to God. Oblations properly so called fall to the use of the poor, not by the dispensation of the offerers, but by the dispensation of the priests.

Reply to Objection 2: Monks or other religious may receive oblations under three counts. First, as poor, either by the dispensation of the priests, or by ordination of the Church; secondly, through being ministers of the altar, and then they can accept oblations that are freely offered; thirdly, if the parishes belong to them, and they can accept oblations, having a right to them as rectors of the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: Oblations when once they are consecrated, such as sacred vessels and vestments, cannot be granted to the use of the laity: and this is the meaning of the words of Pope Damasus. But those which are unconsecrated may be allowed to the use of layfolk by permission of the priests, whether by way of gift or by way of sale.

Whether a man may make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not make oblations of whatever he lawfully possesses. According to human law [*Dig. xii, v, de Condict. ob. turp. vel iniust. caus. 4] "the whore's is a shameful trade in what she does but not in what she takes," and consequently what she takes she possesses lawfully. Yet it is not lawful for her to make an oblation with her gains, according to Dt. 23:18, "Thou shalt not offer the hire of a strumpet . . . in the house of the Lord thy God." Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever one possesses lawfully.

Objection 2: Further, in the same passage it is forbidden to offer "the price of a dog" in the house of God. But it is evident that a man possesses lawfully the price of a dog he has lawfully sold. Therefore it is not lawful to make an oblation of whatever we possess lawfully.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Malachi 1:8): "If you offer the lame and the sick, is it not evil?" Yet an animal though lame or sick is a lawful possession. Therefore it would seem that not of every lawful possession may one make an oblation.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 3:9): "Honor the Lord with thy substance." Now whatever a man possesses lawfully belongs to his substance. Therefore he may make oblations of whatever he possesses lawfully.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. cxiii), "shouldst thou plunder one weaker than thyself and give some of the spoil to the judge, if he should pronounce in thy favor, such is the force of justice that even thou wouldst not be pleased with him: and if this should not please thee, neither does it please thy God." Hence it is written (Ecclus. 34:21): "The offering of him that sacrificeth of a thing wrongfully gotten is stained." Therefore it is evident that an oblation must not be made of things unjustly acquired or possessed. In the Old Law, however, wherein the figure was predominant, certain things were reckoned unclean on account of their signification, and it was forbidden to offer them. But in the New Law all God's creatures are looked upon as clean, as stated in Titus 1:15: and consequently anything that is lawfully possessed, considered in itself, may be offered in oblation. But it may happen accidentally that one may not make an oblation of what one possesses lawfully; for instance if it be detrimental to another person, as in the case of a son who offers to God the means of supporting his father (which our Lord condemns, Mat. 15:5), or if it give rise to scandal or contempt, or the like.

Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law it was forbidden to make an offering of the hire of a strumpet on account of its uncleanness, and in the New Law, on account of scandal, lest the Church seem to favor sin if she accept oblations from the profits of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Law, a dog was deemed an unclean animal. Yet other unclean animals were redeemed and their price could be offered, according to Lev. 27:27, “If it be an unclean animal, he that offereth it shall redeem it.” But a dog was neither offered nor redeemed, both because idolaters used dogs in sacrifices to their idols, and because they signify robbery, the proceeds of which cannot be offered in oblation. However, this prohibition ceased under the New Law.

Reply to Objection 3: The oblation of a blind or lame animal was declared unlawful for three reasons. First, on account of the purpose for which it was offered, wherefore it is written (Malach. 1:8): “If you offer the blind in sacrifice, is it not evil?” and it behooved sacrifices to be without blemish. Secondly, on account of contempt, wherefore the same text goes on (Malach. 1:12): “You have profaned” My name, “in that you say: The table of the Lord is defiled and that which is laid thereupon is contemptible.” Thirdly, on account of a previous vow, whereby a man has bound himself to offer without blemish whatever he has vowed: hence the same text says further on (Malach. 1:14): “Cursed is the deceitful man that hath in his flock a male, and making a vow offereth in sacrifice that which is feeble to the Lord.” The same reasons avail still in the New Law, but when they do not apply the unlawfulness ceases.

Whether men are bound to pay first-fruits?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to pay first-fruits. After giving the law of the first-born the text continues (Ex. 13:9): “It shall be as a sign in thy hand,” so that, apparently, it is a ceremonial precept. But ceremonial precepts are not to be observed in the New Law. Neither therefore ought first-fruits to be paid.

Objection 2: Further, first-fruits were offered to the Lord for a special favor conferred on that people, wherefore it is written (Dt. 26:2,3): “Thou shalt take the first of all thy fruits . . . and thou shalt go to the priest that shall be in those days, and say to him: I profess this day before the Lord thy God, that I am come into the land, for which He swore to our fathers, that He would give it us.” Therefore other nations are not bound to pay first-fruits.

Objection 3: That which one is bound to do should be something definite. But neither in the New Law nor in the Old do we find mention of a definite amount of first-fruits. Therefore one is not bound of necessity to pay them.

On the contrary, It is laid down (16, qu. vii, can. Decimas): “We confirm the right of priests to tithes and first-fruits, and everybody must pay them.”

I answer that, First-fruits are a kind of oblation, because they are offered to God with a certain profession (Dt. 26); where the same passage continues: “The priest taking the basket containing the first-fruits from the hand of him that bringeth the first-fruits, shall set it before the altar of the Lord thy God,” and further on (Dt. 26:10) he is commanded to say: “Therefore now I offer the first-fruits of the land, which the Lord hath given me.” Now the first-fruits were offered for a special reason, namely, in recognition of the divine favor, as though man acknowledged that he had received the fruits of the earth from God, and that he ought to offer something to God in return, according to 1 Paral 29:14, “We have given Thee what we received of Thy hand.” And since what we offer God ought to be something special, hence it is that man was commanded to offer God his first-fruits, as being a special part of the fruits of the earth: and since a priest is “ordained for the people “in the things that appertain to God” (Heb. 5:1), the first-fruits offered by the people were granted to the priest’s use.” Wherefore it is written (Num. 18:8): “The Lord said to Aaron: Behold I have given thee the charge of My first-fruits.” Now it is a point of natural law that man should make an offering in God’s honor out of the things he has received from God, but that the offering should be made to any particular person, or out of his first-fruits, or in such or such a quantity, was indeed determined in the Old Law by divine command; but in the New Law it is fixed by the declaration of the Church, in virtue of which men are bound to pay first-fruits according to the custom of their country and the needs of the Church’s ministers.

Reply to Objection 1: The ceremonial observances were properly speaking signs of the future, and consequently they ceased when the foreshadowed truth was actually present. But the offering of first-fruits was for a sign of a past favor, whence arises the duty of acknowledgment in accordance with the dictate of natural reason. Hence taken in a general sense this obligation remains.

Reply to Objection 2: First-fruits were offered in the Old Law, not only on account of the favor of the promised land given by God, but also on account of the favor of the fruits of the earth, which were given by God. Hence it is written (Dt. 26:10): “I offer the first-fruits of the land which the Lord hath given me,” which second motive is common among all people. We may also reply that just as God granted the land of promise to the Jews by a special favor, so by a general favor He bestowed the lordship of the earth on the whole of mankind, according to Ps. 113:24, “The earth He has given to the children of men.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Jerome says [*Comment. in Ezech. 45:13,14; cf. Cap. Decimam, de Decim. Primit. et Oblat.]: “According to the tradition of the ancients the custom arose for those who had most to give the priests a fortieth part, and those who had least, one sixtieth, in lieu of first-fruits.” Hence it would seem that first-fruits should vary between these limits according to the custom of one’s country. And it was reasonable that the amount of first-fruits should not be fixed by law, since, as stated above, first-fruits are offered by way of oblation, a condition of which is that it should be voluntary.

OF TITHES (FOUR ARTICLES)

Next we must consider tithes, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether men are bound by precept to pay tithes?

(2) Of what things ought tithes to be paid?

(3) To whom ought they to be paid?

(4) Who ought to pay tithes?

Whether men are bound to pay tithes under a necessity of precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound by precept to pay tithes. The commandment to pay tithes is contained in the Old Law (Lev. 27:30), “All tithes of the land, whether of corn or of the fruits of trees, are the Lord’s,” and further on (Lev. 27:32): “Of all the tithes of oxen and sheep and goats, that pass under the shepherd’s rod, every tenth that cometh shall be sanctified to the Lord.” This cannot be reckoned among the moral precepts, because natural reason does not dictate that one ought to give a tenth part, rather than a ninth or eleventh. Therefore it is either a judicial or a ceremonial precept. Now, as stated above ([3047]FS, Q[103], A[3]; [3048]FS, Q[104], A[3]), during the time of grace men are hound neither to the ceremonial nor to the judicial precepts of the Old Law. Therefore men are not bound now to pay tithes.

Objection 2: Further, during the time of grace men are bound only to those things which were commanded by Christ through the Apostles, according to Mat. 28:20, “Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you”; and Paul says (Acts 20:27): “I have not spared to declare unto you all the counsel of God.” Now neither in the teaching of Christ nor in that of the apostles is there any mention of the paying of tithes: for the saying of our Lord about tithes (Mat. 23:23), “These things you ought to have done” seems to refer to the past time of legal observance: thus Hilary says (Super Matth. can. xxiv): “The tithing of herbs, which was useful in foreshadowing the future, was not to be omitted.” Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound to pay tithes.

Objection 3: Further, during the time of grace, men are not more bound to the legal observances than before the Law. But before the Law tithes were given, by reason not of a precept but of a vow. For we read (Gn. 28:20, 22) that Jacob “made a vow” saying: “If God shall be with me, and shall keep me in the way by which I walk . . . of all the things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee.” Neither, therefore, during the time of grace are men bound to pay tithes.

Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law men were bound to pay three kinds of tithe. For it is written (Num. 18:23,24): “The sons of Levi . . . shall . . . be content with the oblation of tithes, which I have separated for their uses and necessities.” Again, there were other tithes of which we read (Dt. 14:22,23): “Every year thou shalt set aside the tithes of all thy fruits, that the earth bringeth forth year by year; and thou shalt eat before the Lord thy

God in the place which He shall choose.” And there were yet other tithes, of which it is written (Dt. 14:28): “The third year thou shalt separate another tithe of all things that grow to thee at that time, and shalt lay it up within thy gates. And the Levite that hath no other part nor possession with thee, and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the widow, that are within thy gates, shall . . . eat and be filled.” Now during the time of grace men are not bound to pay the second and third tithes. Neither therefore are they bound to pay the first.

Objection 5: Further, a debt that is due without any time being fixed for its payment, must be paid at once under pain of sin. Accordingly if during the time of grace men are bound, under necessity of precept, to pay tithes in those countries where tithes are not paid, they would all be in a state of mortal sin, and so would also be the ministers of the Church for dissembling. But this seems unreasonable. Therefore during the time of grace men are not bound under necessity of precept to pay tithes.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Append. Serm. cclxxcii], whose words are quoted 16, qu. i [*Can. Decimae], says: “It is a duty to pay tithes, and whoever refuses to pay them takes what belongs to another.”

I answer that, In the Old Law tithes were paid for the sustenance of the ministers of God. Hence it is written (Malach. 3:10): “Bring all the tithes into My [Vulg.: ‘the’] store-house that there may be meat in My house.” Hence the precept about the paying of tithes was partly moral and instilled in the natural reason; and partly judicial, deriving its force from its divine institution. Because natural reason dictates that the people should administer the necessaries of life to those who minister the divine worship for the welfare of the whole people even as it is the people’s duty to provide a livelihood for their rulers and soldiers and so forth. Hence the Apostle proves this from human custom, saying (1 Cor. 9:7): “Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charge? Who planteth a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof?” But the fixing of the proportion to be offered to the ministers of divine worship does not belong to the natural law, but was determined by divine institution, in accordance with the condition of that people to whom the law was being given. For they were divided into twelve tribes, and the twelfth tribe, namely that of Levi, was engaged exclusively in the divine ministry and had no possessions whence to derive a livelihood: and so it was becomingly ordained that the remaining eleven tribes should give one-tenth part of their revenues to the Levites [*Num. 18:21] that the latter might live respectably; and also because some, through negligence, would disregard this precept. Hence, so far as the tenth part was fixed, the precept was judicial, since all institutions established among this people for the special purpose of preserving equality among men, in accordance with this people's condition, are called "judicial precepts." Nevertheless by way of consequence these institutions foreshadowed something in the future, even as everything else connected with them, according to 1 Cor. 12, "All these things happened to them in figure." In this respect they had something in common with the "ceremonial precepts," which were instituted chiefly that they might be signs of the future. Hence the precept about paying tithes foreshadowed something in the future. For ten is, in a way, the perfect number (being the first numerical limit, since the figures do not go beyond ten but begin over again from one), and therefore he that gave a tenth, which is the sign of perfection, reserving the nine other parts for himself, acknowledged by a sign that imperfection was his part, and that the perfection which was to come through Christ was to be hoped for from God. Yet this proves it to be, not a ceremonial but a judicial precept, as stated above.

There is this difference between the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Law, as we stated above ([3049]FS, Q[104], A[3]), that it is unlawful to observe the ceremonial precepts at the time of the New Law, whereas there is no sin in keeping the judicial precepts during the time of grace although they are not binding. Indeed they are bound to be observed by some, if they be ordained by the authority of those who have power to make laws. Thus it was a judicial precept of the Old Law that he who stole a sheep should restore four sheep (Ex. 22:1), and if any king were to order this to be done his subjects would be bound to obey. In like manner during the time of the New Law the authority of the Church has established the payment of tithe; thus showing a certain kindliness, lest the people of the New Law should give less to the ministers of the New Testament than did the people of the Old Law to the ministers of the Old Testament; for the people of the New Law are under greater obligations, according to Mat. 5:20, "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven," and, moreover, the ministers of the New

Testament are of greater dignity than the ministers of the Old Testament, as the Apostle shows (2 Cor. 3:7,8).

Accordingly it is evident that man’s obligation to pay tithes arises partly from natural law, partly from the institution of the Church; who, nevertheless, in consideration of the requirements of time and persons might ordain the payment of some other proportion.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The precept about paying tithes, in so far as it was a moral precept, was given in the Gospel by our Lord when He said (Mat. 10:10) [*The words as quoted are from Lk. 10:7: Matthew has ‘meat’ instead of ‘hire’]: “The workman is worthy of his hire,” and the Apostle says the same (1 Cor. 9:4 seqq.). But the fixing of the particular proportion is left to the ordinance of the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: Before the time of the Old Law the ministry of the divine worship was not entrusted to any particular person; although it is stated that the first-born were priests, and that they received a double portion. For this very reason no particular portion was directed to be given to the ministers of the divine worship: but when they met with one, each man of his own accord gave him what he deemed right. Thus Abraham by a kind of prophetic instinct gave tithes to Melchisedech, the priest of the Most High God, according to Gn. 14:20, and again Jacob made a vow to give tithes [*Gn. 28:20], although he appears to have vowed to do so, not by paying them to ministers, but for the purpose of the divine worship, for instance for the fulfilling of sacrifices, hence he said significantly: “I will offer tithes to Thee.”

Reply to Objection 4: The second kind of tithe, which was reserved for the offering of sacrifices, has no place in the New Law, since the legal victims had ceased. But the third kind of tithe which they had to eat with the poor, is increased in the New Law, for our Lord commanded us to give to the poor not merely the tenth part, but all our surplus, according to Lk. 11:41: “That which remaineth, give alms.” Moreover the tithes that are given to the ministers of the Church should be dispensed by them for the use of the poor.

Reply to Objection 5: The ministers of the Church ought to be more solicitous for the increase of spiritual goods in the people, than for the amassing of temporal goods: and hence the Apostle was unwilling to make use of the right given him by the Lord of receiving his livelihood from those to whom he preached the Gospel, lest he should occasion a hindrance to the Gospel of Christ [*1 Cor. 9:12]. Nor did they sin who did not contribute to his upkeep, else the Apostle would not have omitted to reprove them. In like manner the ministers of the Church rightly refrain from demanding the Church's tithes, when they could not demand them without scandal, on account of their having fallen into desuetude, or for some other reason. Nevertheless those who do not give tithes in places where the Church does not demand them are not in a state of damnation, unless they be obstinate, and unwilling to pay even if tithes were demanded of them.

Whether men are bound to pay tithes of all things?

Objection 1: It would seem that men are not bound to give tithes of all things. The paying of tithes seems to be an institution of the Old Law. Now the Old Law contains no precept about personal tithes, viz. those that are payable on property acquired by one's own act, for instance by commerce or soldiering. Therefore no man is bound to pay tithes on such things.

Objection 2: Further, it is not right to make oblations of that which is ill-gotten, as stated above ([3050]Q[86], A[3]). Now oblations, being offered to God immediately, seem to be more closely connected with the divine worship than tithes which are offered to the ministers. Therefore neither should tithes be paid on ill-gotten goods.

Objection 3: Further, in the last chapter of Leviticus (30,32) the precept of paying tithes refers only to "corn, fruits of trees" and animals "that pass under the shepherd's rod." But man derives a revenue from other smaller things, such as the herbs that grow in his garden and so forth. Therefore neither on these things is a man bound to pay tithes.

Objection 4: Further, man cannot pay except what is in his power. Now a man does not always remain in possession of all his profit from land and stock, since sometimes he loses them by theft or robbery; sometimes they are transferred to another person by sale; sometimes they are due to some other person, thus taxes are due to princes, and wages due to workmen. Therefore one ought not to pay tithes on such like things.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 28:22): “Of all things that Thou shalt give to me, I will offer tithes to Thee.”

I answer that, In judging about a thing we should look to its principle. Now the principle of the payment of tithes is the debt whereby carnal things are due to those who sow spiritual things, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:11), “If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?” [thus implying that on the contrary “it is no great matter if we reap your carnal things”] [*The phrase in the brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition]. For this debt is the principle on which is based the commandment of the Church about the payment of tithes. Now whatever man possesses comes under the designation of carnal things. Therefore tithes must be paid on whatever one possesses.

Reply to Objection 1: In accordance with the condition of that people there was a special reason why the Old Law did not include a precept about personal tithes; because, to wit, all the other tribes had certain possessions wherewith they were able to provide a sufficient livelihood for the Levites who had no possessions, but were not forbidden to make a profit out of other lawful occupations as the other Jews did. On the other hand the people of the New Law are spread abroad throughout the world, and many of them have no possessions, but live by trade, and these would contribute nothing to the support of God’s ministers if they did not pay tithes on their trade profits. Moreover the ministers of the New Law are more strictly forbidden to occupy themselves in money-making trades, according to 2 Tim. 2:4, “No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business.” Wherefore in the New Law men are bound to pay personal tithes, according to the custom of their country and the needs of the ministers: hence Augustine, whose words are quoted 16, qu. 1, cap. Decimae, says [*Append. Serm. cclxxvii]: “Tithes must be paid on the profits of soldiering, trade or craft.”

Reply to Objection 2: Things are ill-gotten in two ways. First, because the getting itself was unjust: such, for instance, are things gotten by robbery, theft or usury: and these a man is bound to restore, and not to pay tithes on them. If, however, a field be bought with the profits of usury, the usurer is bound to pay tithes on the produce, because the latter is not gotten usuriously but given by God. On the other hand certain things are said to be ill-gotten, because they are gotten of a shameful cause, for instance of whoredom or stage-playing, and the like. Such things a man is not bound to restore, and consequently he is bound to pay tithes on them in the same way as other personal tithes. Nevertheless the Church must not accept the tithe so long as those persons remain in sin, lest she appear to have a share in their sins: but when they have done penance, tithes may be accepted from them on these things.

Reply to Objection 3: Things directed to an end must be judged according to their fittingness to the end. Now the payment of tithes is due not for its own sake, but for the sake of the ministers, to whose dignity it is unbecoming that they should demand minute things with careful exactitude, for this is reckoned sinful according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2). Hence the Old Law did not order the payment of tithes on such like minute things, but left it to the judgment of those who are willing to pay, because minute things are counted as nothing. Wherefore the Pharisees who claimed for themselves the perfect justice of the Law, paid tithes even on these minute things: nor are they reproved by our Lord on that account, but only because they despised greater, i.e. spiritual, precepts; and rather did He show them to be deserving of praise in this particular, when He said (Mat. 23:23): “These things you ought to have done,” i.e. during the time of the Law, according to Chrysostom’s [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] commentary. This also seems to denote fittingness rather than obligation. Therefore now too men are not bound to pay tithes on such minute things, except perhaps by reason of the custom of one’s country.

Reply to Objection 4: A man is not bound to pay tithes on what he has lost by theft or robbery, before he recovers his property: unless he has incurred the loss through his own fault or neglect, because the Church ought not to be the loser on that account. If he sell wheat that has not been tithed, the Church can command the tithes due to her, both from the buyer who has a thing due to the Church, and from the seller, because so far as he is concerned he has defrauded the Church: yet if one pays, the other is not bound. Tithes are due on the fruits of the earth, in so far as these fruits are the gift of God. Wherefore tithes do not come under a tax, nor are they subject to workmen’s wages. Hence it is not right to deduct one’s taxes and the wages paid to workmen, before paying tithes: but tithes must be paid before anything else on one’s entire produce.

Whether tithes should be paid to the clergy?

Objection 1: It would seem that tithes should not be paid to the clergy. Tithes were paid to the Levites in the Old Testament, because they had no portion in the people’s possessions, according to Num. 18:23,24. But in the New Testament the clergy have possessions not only ecclesiastical, but sometimes also patrimonial: moreover they receive first-fruits, and oblations for the living and the dead. Therefore it is unnecessary to pay tithes to them.

Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that a man dwells in one parish, and farms in another; or a shepherd may take his flock within the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds of one parish during one part of the year, and within the bounds of another parish during the other part of the year; or he may have his sheepfold in one parish, and graze the sheep in another. Now in all these and similar cases it seems impossible to decide to which clergy the tithes ought to be paid. Therefore it would seem that no fixed tithe ought to be paid to the clergy.

Objection 3: Further, it is the general custom in certain countries for the soldiers to hold the tithes from the Church in fee; and certain religious receive tithes. Therefore seemingly tithes are not due only to those of the clergy who have care of souls.

On the contrary, It is written (Num. 18:21): “I have given to the sons of Levi all the tithes of Israel for a possession, for the ministry wherewith they serve Me in the Tabernacle.” Now the clergy are the successors of the sons of Levi in the New Testament. Therefore tithes are due to the clergy alone.

I answer that, Two things have to be considered with regard to tithes: namely, the right to receive tithes, and the things given in the name of tithes. The right to receive tithes is a spiritual thing, for it arises from the debt in virtue of which the ministers of the altar have a right to the expenses of their ministry, and temporal things are due to those who sow spiritual things. This debt concerns none but the clergy who have care of souls, and so they alone are competent to have this right.

On the other hand the things given in the name of tithes are material, wherefore they may come to be used by anyone, and thus it is that they fall into the hands of the laity.

Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law, as stated above (A[1], ad 4), special tithes were earmarked for the assistance of the poor. But in the New Law the tithes are given to the clergy, not only for their own support, but also that the clergy may use them in assisting the poor. Hence they are not unnecessary; indeed Church property, oblations and first-fruits as well as tithes are all necessary for this same purpose.

Reply to Objection 2: Personal tithes are due to the church in whose parish a man dwells, while predial tithes seem more reasonably to belong to the church within whose bounds the land is situated. The law, however, prescribes that in this matter a custom that has obtained for a long time must be observed [*Cap. Cum sint, and Cap. Ad apostolicae, de Decimis, etc.]. The shepherd who grazes his flock at different seasons in two parishes, should pay tithe proportionately to both churches. And since the fruit of the flock is derived from the pasture, the tithe of the flock is due to the church in whose lands the flock grazes, rather than to the church on whose land the fold is situated.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the Church can hand over to a layman the things she receives under the title of tithe, so too can she allow him to receive tithes that are yet to be paid, the right of receiving being reserved to the ministers of the Church. The motive may be either the need of the Church, as when tithes are due to certain soldiers through being granted to them in fee by the Church, or it may be the succoring of the poor; thus certain tithes have been granted by way of alms to certain lay religious, or to those that have no care of souls. Some religious, however, are competent to receive tithes, because they have care of souls.

Whether the clergy also are bound to pay tithes?

Objection 1: It would seem that clerics also are bound to pay tithes. By common law [*Cap. Cum homines, de Decimis, etc.] the parish church should receive the tithes on the lands which are in its territory. Now it happens sometimes that the clergy have certain lands of their own on the territory of some parish church, or that one church has ecclesiastical property on the territory of another. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are bound to pay predial tithes.

Objection 2: Further, some religious are clerics; and yet they are bound to pay tithes to churches on account of the lands which they cultivate even with their own hands [*Cap. Ex parte, and Cap. Nuper.]. Therefore it would seem that the clergy are not immune from the payment of tithes.

Objection 3: Further, in the eighteenth chapter of Numbers (26,28), it is prescribed not only that the Levites should receive tithes from the people, but also that they should themselves pay tithes to the high-priest. Therefore the clergy are bound to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, no less than the laity are bound to pay tithes to the clergy.

Objection 4: Further, tithes should serve not only for the support of the clergy, but also for the assistance of the poor. Therefore, if the clergy are exempt from paying tithes, so too are the poor. Yet the latter is not true. Therefore the former is false.

On the contrary, A decretal of Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says: “It is a new form of exaction when the clergy demand tithes from the clergy” [*Cap. Novum genus, de Decimis, etc.].

I answer that, The cause of giving cannot be the cause of receiving, as neither can the cause of action be the cause of passion; yet it happens that one and the same person is giver and receiver, even as agent and patient, on account of different causes and from different points of view. Now tithes are due to the clergy as being ministers of the altar and sowers of spiritual things among the people. Wherefore those members of the clergy as such, i.e. as having ecclesiastical property, are not bound to pay tithes; whereas from some other cause through holding property in their own right, either by inheriting it from their kindred, or by purchase, or in any other similar manner, they are bound to the payment of tithes.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear, because the clergy like anyone else are bound to pay tithes on their own lands to the parish church, even though they be the clergy of that same church, because to possess a thing as one’s private property is not the same as possessing it in common. But church lands are not tithable, even though they be within the boundaries of another parish.

Reply to Objection 2: Religious who are clerics, if they have care of souls, and dispense spiritual things to the people, are not bound to pay tithes, but they may receive them. Another reason applies to other religious, who though clerics do not dispense spiritual things to the people; for according to the ordinary law they are bound to pay tithes, but they are somewhat exempt by reason of various concessions granted by the Apostolic See [*Cap. Ex multiplici, Ex parte, and Ad audientiam, de Decimis, etc.].

Reply to Objection 3: In the Old Law first-fruits were due to the priests, and tithes to the Levites; and since the Levites were below the priests, the Lord commanded that the former should pay the high-priest “the tenth part of the tenth” [*Num. 18:26] instead of first-fruits: wherefore for the same reason the clergy are bound now to pay tithes to the Sovereign Pontiff, if he demanded them. For natural reason dictates that he who has charge of the common estate of a multitude should be provided with all goods, so that he may be able to carry out whatever is necessary for the common welfare.

Reply to Objection 4: Tithes should be employed for the assistance of the poor, through the dispensation of the clergy. Hence the poor have no reason for accepting tithes, but they are bound to pay them.

SERVICE BY PROMISE (Q[88])

OF VOWS (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider vows, whereby something is promised to God. Under this head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) What is a vow?

(2) What is the matter of a vow?

(3) Of the obligation of vows;

(4) Of the use of taking vows;

(5) Of what virtue is it an act?

(6) Whether it is more meritorious to do a thing from a vow, than without a vow?

(7) Of the solemnizing of a vow;

(8) Whether those who are under another’s power can take vows?

(9) Whether children may be bound by vow to enter religion?

(10) Whether a vow is subject to dispensation or commutation?

(11) Whether a dispensation can be granted in a solemn vow of continence?

(12) Whether the authority of a superior is required in a dispensation from a vow?

Whether a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow consists in nothing but a purpose of the will. According to some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III, xxviii, qu. 1; Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38], “a vow is a conception of a good purpose after a firm deliberation of the mind, whereby a man binds himself before God to do or not to do a certain thing.” But the conception of a good purpose and so forth, may consist in a mere movement of the will. Therefore a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

Objection 2: Further, the very word vow seems to be derived from “voluntas” [will], for one is said to do a thing “proprio voto” [by one’s own vow] when one does it voluntarily. Now to “purpose” is an act of the will, while to “promise” is an act of the reason. Therefore a vow consists in a mere act of the will.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 9:62): “No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.” Now from the very fact that a man has a purpose of doing good, he puts his hand to the plough. Consequently, if he look back by desisting from his good purpose, he is not fit for the kingdom of God. Therefore by a mere good purpose a man is bound before God, even without making a promise; and consequently it would seem that a vow consists in a mere purpose of the will.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): “If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him.” Therefore to vow is to promise, and a vow is a promise.

I answer that, A vow denotes a binding to do or omit some particular thing. Now one man binds himself to another by means of a promise, which is an act of the reason to which faculty it belongs to direct. For just as a man by commanding or praying, directs, in a fashion, what others are to do for him, so by promising he directs what he himself is to do for another. Now a promise between man and man can only be expressed in words or any other outward signs; whereas a promise can be made to God by the mere inward thought, since according to 1 Kings 16:7, “Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.” Yet we express words outwardly sometimes, either to arouse ourselves, as was stated above with regard to prayer ([3051]Q[83], A[12]), or to call others to witness, so that one may refrain from breaking the vow, not only through fear of God, but also through respect of men. Now a promise is the outcome from a purpose of doing something: and a purpose presupposes deliberation, since it is the act of a deliberate will. Accordingly three things are essential to a vow: the first is deliberation. the second is a purpose of the will; and the third is a promise, wherein is completed the nature of a vow. Sometimes, however, two other things are added as a sort of confirmation of the vow, namely, pronouncement by word of mouth, according to Ps. 65:13, “I will pay Thee my vows which my lips have uttered”; and the witnessing of others. Hence the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 38) that a vow is “the witnessing of a spontaneous promise and ought to be made to God and about things relating to God”: although the “witnessing” may strictly refer to the inward protestation.

Reply to Objection 1: The conceiving of a good purpose is not confirmed by the deliberation of the mind, unless the deliberation lead to a promise.

Reply to Objection 2: Man’s will moves the reason to promise something relating to things subject to his will, and a vow takes its name from the will forasmuch as it proceeds from the will as first mover.

Reply to Objection 3: He that puts his hand to the plough does something already; while he that merely purposes to do something does nothing so far. When, however, he promises, he already sets about doing, although he does not yet fulfil his promise: even so, he that puts his hand to the plough does not plough yet, nevertheless he stretches out his hand for the purpose of ploughing.

Whether a vow should always be about a better good?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow need not be always about a better good. A greater good is one that pertains to supererogation. But vows are not only about matters of supererogation, but also about matters of salvation: thus in Baptism men vow to renounce the devil and his pomps, and to keep the faith, as a gloss observes on Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God”; and Jacob vowed (Gn. 28:21) that the Lord should be his God. Now this above all is necessary for salvation. Therefore vows are not only about a better good.

Objection 2: Further, Jephte is included among the saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet he killed his innocent daughter on account of his vow (Judges 11). Since, then, the slaying of an innocent person is not a better good, but is in itself unlawful, it seems that a vow may be made not only about a better good, but also about something unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, things that tend to be harmful to the person, or that are quite useless, do not come under the head of a better good. Yet sometimes vows are made about immoderate vigils or fasts which tend to injure the person: and sometimes vows are about indifferent matters and such as are useful to no purpose. Therefore a vow is not always about a better good.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:22): “If thou wilt not promise thou shalt be without sin.”

I answer that, As stated above [3052](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to God. Now a promise is about something that one does voluntarily for someone else: since it would be not a promise but a threat to say that one would do something against someone. In like manner it would be futile to promise anyone something unacceptable to him. Wherefore, as every sin is against God, and since no work is acceptable to God unless it be virtuous, it follows that nothing unlawful or indifferent, but only some act of virtue, should be the matter of a vow. But as a vow denotes a voluntary promise, while necessity excludes voluntariness, whatever is absolutely necessary, whether to be or not to be, can nowise be the matter of a vow. For it would be foolish to vow that one would die or that one would not fly.

On the other hand, if a thing be necessary. not absolutely but on the supposition of an end—for instance if salvation be unattainable without it—it may be the matter of a vow in so far as it is done voluntarily, but not in so far as there is a necessity for doing it. But that which is not necessary, neither absolutely, nor on the supposition of an end, is altogether voluntary, and therefore is most properly the matter of a vow. And this is said to be a greater good in comparison with that which is universally necessary for salvation. Therefore, properly speaking, a vow is said to be about a better good.

Reply to Objection 1: Renouncing the devil’s pomps and keeping the faith of Christ are the matter of baptismal vows, in so far as these things are done voluntarily, although they are necessary for salvation. The same answer applies to Jacob’s vow: although it may also be explained that Jacob vowed that he would have the Lord for his God, by giving Him a special form of worship to which he was not bound, for instance by offering tithes and so forth as mentioned further on in the same passage.

Reply to Objection 2: Certain things are good, whatever be their result; such are acts of virtue, and these can be, absolutely speaking, the matter of a vow: some are evil, whatever their result may be; as those things which are sins in themselves, and these can nowise be the matter of a vow: while some, considered in themselves, are good, and as such may be the matter of a vow, yet they may have an evil result, in which case the vow must not be kept. It was thus with the vow of Jephte, who as related in Judges 11:30,31, "made a vow to the Lord, saying: If Thou wilt deliver the children of Ammon into my hands, whosoever shall first come forth out of the doors of my house, and shall meet me when I return in peace . . . the same will I offer a holocaust to the Lord." For this could have an evil result if, as indeed happened, he were to be met by some animal which it would be unlawful to sacrifice, such as an ass or a human being. Hence Jerome says [*Implicitly 1 Contra Jovin.: Comment. in Micheam vi, viii: Comment. in Jerem. vii. The quotation is from Peter Comestor, Hist. Scholast.]: "In vowing he was foolish, through lack of discretion, and in keeping his vow he was wicked." Yet it is premised (Judges 11:29) that "the Spirit of the Lord came upon him," because his faith and devotion, which moved him to make that vow, were from the Holy Ghost; and for this reason he is reckoned among the saints, as also by reason of the victory which he obtained, and because it is probable that he repented of his sinful deed, which nevertheless foreshadowed something good.

Reply to Objection 3: The mortification of one's own body, for instance by vigils and fasting, is not acceptable to God except in so far as it is an act of virtue; and this depends on its being done with due discretion, namely, that concupiscence be curbed without overburdening nature. on this condition such things may be the matter of a vow. Hence the Apostle after saying (Rom. 12:1), "Present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing to God," adds, "your reasonable service." Since, however, man is easily mistaken in judging of matters concerning himself, such vows as these are more fittingly kept or disregarded according to the judgment of a superior, yet so that, should a man find that without doubt he is seriously burdened by keeping such a vow, and should he be unable to appeal to his superior, he ought not to keep it. As to vows about vain and useless things they should be ridiculed rather than kept.

Whether all vows are binding?

Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not all binding. For man needs things that are done by another, more than God does, since He has no need for our goods (Ps. 15:2). Now according to the prescription of human laws [*Dig. L. xii, de pollicitat., i] a simple promise made to a man is not binding; and this seems to be prescribed on account of the changeableness of the human will. Much less binding therefore is a simple promise made to God, which we call a vow.

Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is impossible. Now sometimes that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him, either because it depends on another's decision, as when, for instance, a man vows to enter a monastery, the monks of which refuse to receive him: or on account of some defect arising, for instance when a woman vows virginity, and afterwards is deflowered; or when a man vows to give a sum of money, and afterwards loses it. Therefore a vow is not always binding.

Objection 3: Further, if a man is bound to pay something, he must do so at once. But a man is not bound to pay his vow at once, especially if it be taken under a condition to be fulfilled in the future. Therefore a vow is not always binding.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3,4): "Whatsoever thou hast vowed, pay it; and it is much better not to vow, than after a vow not to perform the things promised."

I answer that, For one to be accounted faithful one must keep one's promises. Wherefore, according to Augustine [*Ep. xxxii, 2: De Mendac. xx] faith takes its name "from a man's deed agreeing with his word" [*'Fides . . . fiunt dicta' Cicero gives the same etymology (De Offic. i, 7)]. Now man ought to be faithful to God above all, both on account of God's sovereignty, and on account of the favors he has received from God. Hence man is obliged before all to fulfill the vows he has made to God, since this is part of the fidelity he owes to God. On the other hand, the breaking of a vow is a kind of infidelity. Wherefore Solomon gives the reason why vows should be paid to God, because "an unfaithful . . . promise displeaseth Him" [*Eccles. 5:3].

Reply to Objection 1: Honesty demands that a man should keep any promise he makes to another man, and this obligation is based on the natural law. But for a man to be under a civil obligation through a promise he has made, other conditions are requisite. And although God needs not our goods, we are under a very great obligation to Him: so that a vow made to Him is most binding.

Reply to Objection 2: If that which a man has vowed becomes impossible to him through any cause whatsoever, he must do what he can, so that he have at least a will ready to do what he can. Hence if a man has vowed to enter a monastery, he must endeavor to the best of his power to be received there. And if his intention was chiefly to bind himself to enter the religious life, so that, in consequence, he chose this particular form of religious life, or this place, as being most agreeable to him, he is bound, should he be unable to be received there, to enter the religious life elsewhere. But if his principal intention is to bind himself to this particular kind of religious life, or to this particular place, because the one or the other pleases him in some special way, he is not bound to enter another religious house, if they are unwilling to receive him into this particular one. on the other hand, if he be rendered incapable of fulfilling his vow through his own fault, he is bound over and above to do penance for his past fault: thus if a woman has vowed virginity and is afterwards violated, she is bound not only to observe what is in her power, namely, perpetual continency, but also to repent of what she has lost by sinning.

Reply to Objection 3: The obligation of a vow is caused by our own will and intention, wherefore it is written (Dt. 23:23): “That which is once gone out of thy lips, thou shalt observe, and shalt do as thou hast promised to the Lord thy God, and hast spoken with thy own will and with thy own mouth.” Wherefore if in taking a vow, it is one’s intention and will to bind oneself to fulfil it at once, one is bound to fulfil it immediately. But if one intend to fulfil it at a certain time, or under a certain condition, one is not bound to immediate fulfilment. And yet one ought not to delay longer than one intended to bind oneself, for it is written (Dt. 23:21): “When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy God thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.”

Whether it is expedient to take vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to take vows. It is not expedient to anyone to deprive himself of the good that God has given him. Now one of the greatest goods that God has given man is liberty whereof he seems to be deprived by the necessity implicated in a vow. Therefore it would seem inexpedient for man to take vows.

Objection 2: Further, no one should expose himself to danger. But whoever takes a vow exposes himself to danger, since that which, before taking a vow, he could omit without danger, becomes a source of danger to him if he should not fulfil it after taking the vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): “Since thou hast vowed, thou hast bound thyself, thou canst not do otherwise. If thou dost not what thou hast vowed thou wilt not be as thou wouldst have been hadst thou not vowed. For then thou wouldst have been less great, not less good: whereas now if thou breakest faith with God (which God forbid) thou art the more unhappy, as thou wouldst have been happier, hadst thou kept thy vow.” Therefore it is not expedient to take vows.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:16): “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” But we do not read that either Christ or the Apostles took any vows. Therefore it would seem inexpedient to take vows.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 75:12): “Vow ye and pay to the Lord your God.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3053]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made to God. Now one makes a promise to a man under one aspect, and to God under another. Because we promise something to a man for his own profit; since it profits him that we should be of service to him, and that we should at first assure him of the future fulfilment of that service: whereas we make promises to God not for His but for our own profit. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): “He is a kind and not a needy exactor, for he does not grow rich on our payments, but makes those who pay Him grow rich in Him.” And just as what we give God is useful not to Him but to us, since “what is given Him is added to the giver,” as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.), so also a promise whereby we vow something to God, does not conduce to His profit, nor does He need to be assured by us, but it conduces to our profit, in so far as by vowing we fix our wills immovably on that which it is expedient to do. Hence it is expedient to take vows.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as one's liberty is not lessened by one being unable to sin, so, too, the necessity resulting from a will firmly fixed to good does not lessen the liberty, as instanced in God and the blessed. Such is the necessity implied by a vow, bearing a certain resemblance to the confirmation of the blessed. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.) that "happy is the necessity that compels us to do the better things."

Reply to Objection 2: When danger arises from the deed itself, this deed is not expedient, for instance that one cross a river by a tottering bridge: but if the danger arise through man's failure in the deed, the latter does not cease to be expedient: thus it is expedient to mount on horseback, though there be the danger of a fall from the horse: else it would behoove one to desist from all good things, that may become dangerous accidentally. Wherefore it is written (Eccles. 11:4): "He that observeth the wind shall not sow, and he that considereth the clouds shall never reap." Now a man incurs danger, not from the vow itself, but from his fault, when he changes his mind by breaking his vow. Hence, Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii, ad Arment. et Paulin.): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment."

Reply to Objection 3: It was incompetent for Christ, by His very nature, to take a vow, both because He was God, and because, as man, His will was firmly fixed on the good, since He was a "comprehensor." By a kind of similitude, however, He is represented as saying (Ps. 21:26): "I will pay my vows in the sight of them that fear Him," when He is speaking of His body, which is the Church.

The apostles are understood to have vowed things pertaining to the state of perfection when "they left all things and followed Christ."

Whether a vow is an act of latria or religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not an act of latria or religion. Every act of virtue is matter for a vow. Now it would seem to pertain to the same virtue to promise a thing and to do it. Therefore a vow pertains to any virtue and not to religion especially.

Objection 2: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. ii, 53) it belongs to religion to offer God worship and ceremonial rites. But he who takes a vow does not yet offer something to God, but only promises it. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

Objection 3: Further, religious worship should be offered to none but God. But a vow is made not only to God, but also to the saints and to one’s superiors, to whom religious vow obedience when they make their profession. Therefore, a vow is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 19:21): “(The Egyptians) shall worship Him with sacrifices and offerings and they shall make vows to the Lord, and perform them.” Now, the worship of God is properly the act of religion or latria. Therefore, a vow is an act of latria or religion.

I answer that, As stated above ([3054]Q[81], A[1], ad 1), every act of virtue belongs to religion or latria by way of command, in so far as it is directed to the reverence of God which is the proper end of latria. Now the direction of other actions to their end belongs to the commanding virtue, not to those which are commanded. Therefore the direction of the acts of any virtue to the service of God is the proper act of latria.

Now, it is evident from what has been said above ([3055]AA[1],2) that a vow is a promise made to God, and that a promise is nothing else than a directing of the thing promised to the person to whom the promise is made. Hence a vow is a directing of the thing vowed to the worship or service of God. And thus it is clear that to take a vow is properly an act of latria or religion.

Reply to Objection 1: The matter of a vow is sometimes the act of another virtue, as, for instance, keeping the fast or observing continency; while sometimes it is an act of religion, as offering a sacrifice or praying. But promising either of them to God belongs to religion, for the reason given above. Hence it is evident that some vows belong to religion by reason only of the promise made to God, which is the essence of a vow, while others belong thereto by reason also of the thing promised, which is the matter of the vow.

Reply to Objection 2: He who promises something gives it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is why we thank not only a giver, but also one who promises to give.

Reply to Objection 3: A vow is made to God alone, whereas a promise may be made to a man also: and this very promise of good, which is fore made to a man, may be the matter of a vow, and in so far as it is a virtuous act. This is how we are to understand vows whereby we vow something to the saints or to one’s superiors: so that the promise made to the saints or to one’s superiors is the matter of the vow, in so far as one vows to God to fulfil what one has promised to the saints or one’s superiors.

Whether it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do something in fulfilment of a vow, than without a vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is more praiseworthy and meritorious to do a thing without a vow than in fulfilment of a vow. Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. ii): “We should abstain or fast without putting ourselves under the necessity of fasting, lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly.” Now he who vows to fast puts himself under the necessity of fasting. Therefore it would be better for him to fast without taking the vow.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 9:7): “Everyone as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver.” Now some fulfil sorrowfully what they have vowed: and this seems to be due to the necessity arising from the vow, for necessity is a cause of sorrow according to Metaph. v [*Ed. Did. iv, 5]. Therefore, it is better to do something without a vow, than in fulfilment of a vow.

Objection 3: Further, a vow is necessary for the purpose of fixing the will on that which is vowed, as stated above [3056](A[4]). But the will cannot be more fixed on a thing than when it actually does that thing. Therefore it is no better to do a thing in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow.

On the contrary, A gloss on the words of Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye and pay,” says: “Vows are counseled to the will.” But a counsel is about none but a better good. Therefore it is better to do a deed in fulfilment of a vow than without a vow: since he that does it without a vow fulfils only one counsel, viz. the counsel to do it, whereas he that does it with a vow, fulfils two counsels, viz. the counsel to vow and the counsel to do it.

I answer that, For three reasons it is better and more meritorious to do one and the same deed with a vow than without. First, because to vow, as stated above [3057](A[5]) is an act of religion which is the chief of the moral virtues. Now the more excellent the virtue the better and more meritorious the deed. Wherefore the act of an inferior virtue is the better the more meritorious for being commanded by a superior virtue, whose act it becomes through being commanded by it, just as the act of faith or hope is better if it be commanded by charity. Hence the works of the other moral virtues (for instance, fasting, which is an act of abstinence; and being continent, which is an act of chastity) are better and more meritorious, if they be done in fulfilment of a vow, since thus they belong to the divine worship, being like sacrifices to God. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virg. viii) that "not even is virginity honorable as such, but only when it is consecrated to God, and cherished by godly continence."

Secondly, because he that vows something and does it, subjects himself to God more than he that only does it; for he subjects himself to God not only as to the act, but also as to the power, since in future he cannot do something else. Even so he gives more who gives the tree with its fruit, than he that gives the fruit only, as Anselm [*Eadmer] observes (De Simil. viii). For this reason, we thank even those who promise, as stated above (A[5], ad 2).

Thirdly, because a vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the perfection of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 4), just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above ([3058]Q[14], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted should be understood as referring to necessity of coercion which causes an act to be involuntary and excludes devotion. Hence he says pointedly: "Lest that which we are free to do be done without devotion and unwillingly." On the other hand the necessity resulting from a vow is caused by the immobility of the will, wherefore it strengthens the will and increases devotion. Hence the argument does not conclude.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in so far as it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow, in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the will, causes not sorrow but joy. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Arment. et Paulin. cxxcii): "Repent not of thy vow: thou shouldst rather rejoice that thou canst no longer do what thou mightest lawfully have done to thy detriment." If, however, the very deed, considered in itself, were to become disagreeable and involuntary after one has taken the vow, the will to fulfil it remaining withal, it is still more meritorious than if it were done without the vow, since the fulfilment of a vow is an act of religion which is a greater virtue than abstinence, of which fasting is an act.

Reply to Objection 3: He who does something without having vowed it has an immovable will as regards the individual deed which he does and at the time when he does it; but his will does not remain altogether fixed for the time to come, as does the will of one who makes a vow: for the latter has bound his will to do something, both before he did that particular deed, and perchance to do it many times.

Whether a vow is solemnized by the reception of holy orders, and by the profession of a certain rule?

Objection 1: It would seem that a vow is not solemnized by the reception of holy orders and by the profession of a certain rule. As stated above [3059] (A[1]), a vow is a promise made to God. Now external actions pertaining to solemnity seem to be directed, not to God, but to men. Therefore they are related to vows accidentally: and consequently a solemnization of this kind is not a proper circumstance of a vow.

Objection 2: Further, whatever belongs to the condition of a thing, would seem to be applicable to all in which that thing is found. Now many things may be the subject of a vow, which have no connection either with holy orders, or to any particular rule: as when a man vows a pilgrimage, or something of the kind. Therefore the solemnization that takes place in the reception of holy orders or in the profession of a certain rule does not belong to the condition of a vow.

Objection 3: Further, a solemn vow seems to be the same as a public vow. Now many other vows may be made in public besides that which is pronounced in receiving holy orders or in professing a certain rule; which latter, moreover, may be made in private. Therefore not only these vows are solemn.

On the contrary, These vows alone are an impediment to the contract of marriage, and annul marriage if it be contracted, which is the effect of a solemn vow, as we shall state further on in the Third Part of this work [* [3060]XP, Q[53], A[2]].

I answer that, The manner in which a thing is solemnized depends on its nature [conditio]: thus when a man takes up arms he solemnizes the fact in one way, namely, with a certain display of horses and arms and a concourse of soldiers, while a marriage is solemnized in another way, namely, the array of the bridegroom and bride and the gathering of their kindred. Now a vow is a promise made to God: wherefore, the solemnization of a vow consists in something spiritual pertaining to God; i.e. in some spiritual blessing or consecration which, in accordance with the institution of the apostles, is given when a man makes profession of observing a certain rule, in the second degree after the reception of holy orders, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi). The reason of this is that solemnization is not wont to be employed, save when a man gives himself up entirely to some particular thing. For the nuptial solemnization takes place only when the marriage is celebrated, and when the bride and bridegroom mutually deliver the power over their bodies to one another. In like manner a vow is solemnized when a man devotes himself to the divine ministry by receiving holy orders, or embraces the state of perfection by renouncing the world and his own will by the profession of a certain rule.

Reply to Objection 1: This kind of solemnization regards not only men but also God in so far as it is accompanied by a spiritual consecration or blessing, of which God is the author, though man is the minister, according to Num. 6:27, “They shall invoke My name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them.” Hence a solemn vow is more binding with God than a simple vow, and he who breaks a solemn vow sins more grievously. When it is said that a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn vow, this refers to the fact that the transgressor of either commits a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not customary to solemnize particular acts, but the embracing of a new state, as we have said above. Hence when a man vows particular deeds, such as a pilgrimage, or some special fast, such a vow is not competent to be solemnized, but only such as the vow whereby a man entirely devotes himself to the divine ministry or service: and yet many particular works are included under this vow as under a universal.

Reply to Objection 3: Through being pronounced in public vows may have a certain human solemnity, but not a spiritual and divine solemnity, as the aforesaid vows have, even when they are pronounced before a few persons. Hence the publicity of a vow differs from its solemnization.

Whether those who are subject to another’s power are hindered from taking vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are subject to another’s power are not hindered from taking vows. The lesser bond is surpassed by the greater. Now the obligation of one man subject to another is a lesser bond than a vow whereby one is under an obligation to God. Therefore those who are subject to another’s power are not hindered from taking vows.

Objection 2: Further, children are under their parents’ power. Yet children may make religious profession even without the consent of their parents. Therefore one is not hindered from taking vows, through being subject to another’s power.

Objection 3: Further, to do is more than to promise. But religious who are under the power of their superiors can do certain things such as to say some psalms, or abstain from certain things. Much more therefore seemingly can they promise such things to God by means of vows.

Objection 4: Further, whoever does what he cannot do lawfully sins. But subjects do not sin by taking vows, since nowhere do we find this forbidden. Therefore it would seem that they can lawfully take vows.

On the contrary, It is commanded (Num. 30:4–6) that “if a woman vow any thing . . . being in her father’s house, and yet but a girl in age,” she is not bound by the vow, unless her father consent: and the same is said there (Num. 30:7–9) of the woman that has a husband. Therefore in like manner other persons that are subject to another’s power cannot bind themselves by vow.

I answer that, As stated above [3061](A[1]), a vow is a promise made to God. Now no man can firmly bind himself by a promise to do what is in another’s power, but only to that which is entirely in his own power. Now whoever is subject to another, as to the matter wherein he is subject to him, it does not lie in his power to do as he will, but it depends on the will of the other. And therefore without the consent of his superior he cannot bind himself firmly by a vow in those matters wherein he is subject to another.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing but what is virtuous can be the subject of a promise made to God, as stated above [3062](A[2]). Now it is contrary to virtue for a man to offer to God that which belongs to another, as stated above (Q[86], A[3]). Hence the conditions necessary for a vow are not altogether ensured, when a man who is under another’s power vows that which is in that other’s power, except under the condition that he whose power it concerns does not gainsay it.

Reply to Objection 2: As soon as a man comes of age, if he be a freeman he is in his own power in all matters concerning his person, for instance with regard to binding himself by vow to enter religion, or with regard to contracting marriage. But he is not in his own power as regards the arrangements of the household, so that in these matters he cannot vow anything that shall be valid without the consent of his father.

A slave, through being in his master’s power, even as regards his personal deeds, cannot bind himself by vow to enter religion, since this would withdraw him from his master’s service.

Reply to Objection 3: A religious is subject to his superior as to his actions connected with his profession of his rule. Wherefore even though one may be able to do something now and then, when one is not being occupied with other things by one’s superior, yet since there is no time when his superior cannot occupy him with something, no vow of a religious stands without the consent of his superior, as neither does the vow of a girl while in (her father’s) house without his consent; nor of a wife, without the consent of her husband.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the vow of one who is subject to another’s power does not stand without the consent of the one to whom he is subject, he does not sin by vowing; because his vow is understood to contain the requisite condition, providing, namely, that his superior approve or do not gainsay it.

Whether children can bind themselves by vow to enter religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that children cannot bind themselves by vow to enter religion. Since a vow requires deliberation of the mind, it is fitting that those alone should vow who have the use of reason. But this is lacking in children just as in imbeciles and madmen. Therefore just as imbeciles and madmen cannot bind themselves to anything by vow, so neither, seemingly, can children bind themselves by vow to enter religion.

Objection 2: Further, that which can be validly done by one cannot be annulled by another. Now a vow to enter religion made by a boy or girl before the age of puberty can be revoked by the parents or guardian (20, qu.

ii, cap. Puella). Therefore it seems that a boy or girl cannot validly make a vow before the age of fourteen.

Objection 3: Further, according to the rule of Blessed Benedict [*Ch. 58] and a statute of Innocent IV, a year's probation is granted to those who enter religion, so that probation may precede the obligation of the vow. Therefore it seems unlawful, before the year of probation, for children to be bound by vow to enter religion.

On the contrary, That which is not done aright is invalid without being annulled by anyone. But the vow pronounced by a maiden, even before attaining the age of puberty, is valid, unless it be annulled by her parents within a year (20, qu. ii, cap. Puella). Therefore even before attaining to puberty children can lawfully and validly be bound by a vow to enter religion.

I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said above [3063](A[7]), vows are of two kinds, simple and solemn. And since, as stated in the same article, the solemnization of a vow consists in a spiritual blessing and consecration bestowed through the ministry of the Church, it follows that it comes under the Church's dispensation. Now a simple vow takes its efficacy from the deliberation of the mind, whereby one intends to put oneself under an obligation. That such an obligation be of no force may happen in two ways. First, through defect of reason, as in madmen and imbeciles, who cannot bind themselves by vow so long as they remain in a state of madness or imbecility. Secondly, through the maker of a vow being subject to another's power, as stated above [3064](A[8]). Now these two circumstances concur in children before the age of puberty, because in most instances they are lacking in reason, and besides are naturally under the care of their parents, or guardians in place of their parents: wherefore in both events their vows are without force. It happens, however, through a natural disposition which is not subject to human laws, that the use of reason is accelerated in some, albeit few, who on this account are said to be capable of guile: and yet they are not, for this reason, exempt in any way from the care of their parents; for this care is subject to human law, which takes into account that which is of most frequent occurrence.

Accordingly we must say that boys or girls who have not reached the years of puberty and have not attained the use of reason can nowise bind themselves to anything by vow. If, however, they attain the use of reason, before reaching the years of puberty, they can for their own part, bind themselves by vow; but their vows can be annulled by their parents, under whose care they are still subject.

Yet no matter how much they be capable of guile before the years of puberty, they cannot be bound by a solemn religious vow, on account of the Church’s decree [*Sext. Decret. cap. Is qui, de Reg. et transeunt. ad Relig.] which considers the majority of cases. But after the years of puberty have been reached, they can bind themselves by religious vows, simple or solemn, without the consent of their parents.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of children who have not yet reached the use of reason: for their vows then are invalid, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The vows of persons subject to another’s power contain an implied condition, namely, that they be not annulled by the superior. This condition renders them licit and valid if it be fulfilled, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument avails in the case of solemn vows which are taken in profession.

Whether vows admit of dispensation?

Objection 1: It would seem that vows are not subject to dispensation. It is less to have a vow commuted than to be dispensed from keeping it. But a vow cannot be commuted, according to Lev. 27:9,10, “A beast that may be sacrificed to the Lord, if anyone shall vow, shall be holy, and cannot be changed, neither a better for a worse, nor a worse for a better.” Much less, therefore, do vows admit of dispensation.

Objection 2: Further, no man can grant a dispensation in matters concerning the natural law and in the Divine precepts, especially those of the First Table, since these aim directly at the love of God, which is the last end of the precepts. Now the fulfilment of a vow is a matter of the natural law, and is commanded by the Divine law, as shown above [3065](A[3]), and belongs to the precepts of the First Table since it is an act of religion. Therefore vows do not admit of dispensation.

Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is based on the fidelity which a man owes to God, as stated above [3066](A[3]). But no man can dispense in such a matter as this. Neither, therefore, can any one grant a dispensation from a vow.

On the contrary, That which proceeds from the common will of many has apparently greater stability than that which proceeds from the individual will of some one person. Now the law which derives its force from the common will admits of dispensation by a man. Therefore it seems that vows also admit of dispensation by a man.

I answer that, The dispensation from a vow is to be taken in the same sense as a dispensation given in the observance of a law because, as stated above ([3067]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3068]FS, Q[97], A[4]), a law is made with an eye to that which is good in the majority of instances. But since, in certain cases this is not good, there is need for someone to decide that in that particular case the law is not to be observed. This is properly speaking to dispense in the law: for a dispensation would seem to denote a commensurate distribution or application of some common thing to those that are contained under it, in the same way as a person is said to dispense food to a household.

In like manner a person who takes a vow makes a law for himself as it were, and binds himself to do something which in itself and in the majority of cases is a good. But it may happen that in some particular case this is simply evil, or useless, or a hindrance to a greater good: and this is essentially contrary to that which is the matter of a vow, as is clear from what has been said above [3069](A[2]). Therefore it is necessary, in such a case, to decide that the vow is not to be observed. And if it be decided absolutely that a particular vow is not to be observed, this is called a “dispensation” from that vow; but if some other obligation be imposed in lieu of that which was to have been observed, the vow is said to be “commuted.” Hence it is less to commute a vow than to dispense from a vow: both, however, are in the power of the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: An animal that could be lawfully sacrificed was deemed holy from the very moment that it was the subject of a vow, being, as it were, dedicated to the worship of God: and for this reason it could not be changed: even so neither may one now exchange for something better, or worse, that which one has vowed, if it be already consecrated, e.g. a chalice or a house. On the other hand, an animal that could not be sacrificed, through not being the lawful matter of a sacrifice, could and had to be bought back, as the law requires. Even so, vows can be commuted now, if no consecration has intervened.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as man is bound by natural law and Divine precept to fulfil his vow, so, too, is he bound under the same heads to obey the law or commands of his superiors. And yet when he is dispensed from keeping a human law, this does not involve disobedience to that human law, for this would be contrary to the natural law and the Divine command; but it amounts to this—that what was law is not law in this particular case. Even so, when a superior grants a dispensation, that which was contained under a vow is by his authority no longer so contained, in so far as he decides that in this case such and such a thing is not fitting matter for a vow. Consequently when an ecclesiastical superior dispenses someone from a vow, he does not dispense him from keeping a precept of the natural or of the Divine law, but he pronounces a decision on a matter to which a man had bound himself of his own accord, and of which he was unable to consider every circumstance.

Reply to Objection 3: The fidelity we owe to God does not require that we fulfil that which it would be wrong or useless to vow, or which would be an obstacle to the greater good whereunto the dispensation from that vow would conduce. Hence the dispensation from a vow is not contrary to the fidelity due to God.

Whether it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency. As stated above, one reason for granting a dispensation from a vow is if it be an obstacle to a greater good. But a vow of continency, even though it be solemn, may be an obstacle to a greater good, since the common good is more God-like than the good of an individual. Now one man’s continency may be an obstacle to the good of the whole community, for instance, in the case where, if certain persons who have vowed continency were to marry, the peace of their country might be procured. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency.

Objection 2: Further, religion is a more excellent virtue than chastity. Now if a man vows an act of religion, e.g. to offer sacrifice to God he can be dispensed from that vow. Much more, therefore, can he be dispensed from the vow of continency which is about an act of chastity.

Objection 3: Further, just as the observance of a vow of abstinence may be a source of danger to the person, so too may be the observance of a vow of continency. Now one who takes a vow of abstinence can be dispensed from that vow if it prove a source of danger to his body. Therefore for the same reason one may be dispensed from a vow of continency.

Objection 4: Further, just as the vow of continency is part of the religious profession, whereby the vow is solemnized, so also are the vows of poverty and obedience. But it is possible to be dispensed from the vows of poverty and obedience, as in the case of those who are appointed bishops after making profession. Therefore it seems that it is possible to be dispensed from a solemn vow of continency.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No price is worthy of a continent soul.”

Further, (Extra, De Statu Monach.) at the end of the Decretal, Cum ad Monasterium it is stated that the “renouncing of property, like the keeping of chastity, is so bound up with the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can disperse from its observance.”

I answer that, Three things may be considered in a solemn vow of continency: first, the matter of the vow, namely, continency; secondly, the perpetuity of the vow, namely, when a person binds himself by vow to the perpetual observance of chastity: thirdly, the solemnity of the vow. Accordingly, some [*William of Auxerre, Sum. Aur. III. vii. 1, qu. 5] say that the solemn vow cannot be a matter of dispensation, on account of the continency itself for which no worthy price can be found, as is stated by the authority quoted above. The reason for this is assigned by some to the fact that by continency man overcomes a foe within himself, or to the fact that by continency man is perfectly conformed to Christ in respect of purity of both body and soul. But this reason does not seem to be cogent since the goods of the soul, such as contemplation and prayer, far surpass the goods of the body and still more conform us to God, and yet one may be dispensed from a vow of prayer or contemplation. Therefore, continency itself absolutely considered seems no reason why the solemn vow thereof cannot be a matter of dispensation; especially seeing that the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:34) exhorts us to be continent on account of contemplation, when he says that the unmarried woman . . .”thinketh on the things of God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’],” and since the end is of more account than the means.

Consequently others [*Albertus Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 38] find the reason for this in the perpetuity and universality of this vow. For they assert that the vow of continency cannot be canceled, save by something altogether contrary thereto, which is never lawful in any vow. But this is evidently false, because just as the practice of carnal intercourse is contrary to continency, so is eating flesh or drinking wine contrary to abstinence from such things, and yet these latter vows may be a matter for dispensation.

For this reason others [*Innocent IV, on the above decretal] maintain that one may be dispensed even from a solemn vow of continency, for the sake of some common good or common need, as in the case of the example given above (OBJ[1]), of a country being restored to peace through a certain marriage to be contracted. Yet since the Decretal quoted says explicitly that “not even the Sovereign Pontiff can dispense a monk from keeping chastity,” it follows seemingly, that we must maintain that, as stated above (A[10], ad 1; cf.Lev. 27:9, 10, 28), whatsoever has once been sanctified to the Lord cannot be put to any other use. For no ecclesiastical prelate can make that which is sanctified to lose its consecration, not even though it be something inanimate, for instance a consecrated chalice to be not consecrated, so long as it remains entire. Much less, therefore, can a prelate make a man that is consecrated to God cease to be consecrated, so long as he lives. Now the solemnity of a vow consists in a kind of consecration or blessing of the person who takes the vow, as stated above [3070](A[7]). Hence no prelate of the Church can make a man, who has pronounced a solemn vow, to be quit of that to which he was consecrated, e.g. one who is a priest, to be a priest no more, although a prelate may, for some particular reason, inhibit him from exercising his order. In like manner the Pope cannot make a man who has made his religious profession cease to be a religious, although certain jurists have ignorantly held the contrary.

We must therefore consider whether continency is essentially bound up with the purpose for which the vow is solemnized. because if not, the solemnity of the consecration can remain without the obligation of continency, but not if continency is essentially bound up with that for which the vow is solemnized. Now the obligation of observing continency is connected with Holy orders, not essentially but by the institution of the Church; wherefore it seems that the Church can grant a dispensation from the vow of continency solemnized by the reception of Holy Orders. on the other hand the obligation of observing; continency is an essential condition of the religious state, whereby a man renounces the world and binds himself wholly to God’s service, for this is incompatible with matrimony, in which state a man is under the obligation of taking to himself a wife, of begetting children, of looking after his household, and of procuring whatever is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:33) that “he that is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided.” Hence the “monk” takes his name from “unity” [*The Greek {monos}] in contrast with this division. For this reason the Church cannot dispense from a vow solemnized by the religious profession; and the reason assigned by the Decretal is because “chastity is bound up with the monastic rule.”

Reply to Objection 1: Perils occasioned by human affairs should be obviated by human means, not by turning divine things to a human use. Now a professed religious is dead to the world and lives to God, and so he must not be called back to the human life on the pretext of any human contingency.

Reply to Objection 2: A vow of temporal continency can be a matter of dispensation, as also a vow of temporal prayer or of temporal abstinence. But the fact that no dispensation can be granted from a vow of continency solemnized by profession is due, not to its being an act of chastity, but because through the religious profession it is already an act of religion.

Reply to Objection 3: Food is directly ordered to the upkeep of the person, therefore abstinence from food may be a direct source of danger to the person: and so on this count a vow of abstinence is a matter of dispensation. On the other hand sexual intercourse is directly ordered to the upkeep not of the person but of the species, wherefore to abstain from such intercourse by continency does not endanger the person. And if indeed accidentally it prove a source of danger to the person, this danger may be obviated by some other means, for instance by abstinence, or other corporal remedies.

Reply to Objection 4: A religious who is made a bishop is no more absolved from his vow of poverty than from his vow of continency, since he must have nothing of his own and must hold himself as being the dispenser of the common goods of the Church. In like manner neither is he dispensed from his vow of obedience; it is an accident that he is not bound to obey if he have no superior; just as the abbot of a monastery, who nevertheless is not dispensed from his vow of obedience.

The passage of Ecclesiasticus, which is put forward in the contrary sense, should be taken as meaning that neither fruitfulness of the of the flesh nor any bodily good is to be compared with continency, which is reckoned one of the goods of the soul, as Augustine declares (De Sanct. Virg. viii). Wherefore it is said pointedly "of a continent soul," not "of a continent body."

Whether the authority of a prelate is required for commutation or the dispensation of a vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that the authority of a prelate is not required for the commutation or dispensation of a vow. A person may enter religion without the authority of a superior prelate. Now by entering religion one is absolved from the vows he made in the world, even from the vow of making a pilgrimage to the Holy Land [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.]. Therefore the commutation or dispensation of a vow is possible without the authority of a superior prelate.

Objection 2: Further, to dispense anyone from a vow seems to consist in deciding in what circumstances he need not keep that vow. But if the prelate is at fault in his decision, the person who took the vow does not seem to be absolved from his vow, since no prelate can grant a dispensation contrary to the divine precept about keeping one's vows, as stated above (A[10], ad 2; A[11]). Likewise, when anyone rightly determines of his own authority that in his case a vow is not to be kept, he would seem not to be bound; since a vow need not be kept if it have an evil result (A[2], ad 2). Therefore the Authority of a prelate is not required that one may be dispensed from a vow.

Objection 3: Further, if it belongs to a prelate's power to grant dispensations from vows, on the same count it is competent to all prelates, but it does not belong to all to dispense from every vow. Therefore it does not belong to the power of a prelate to dispense from vows.

On the contrary, A vow binds one to do something, even as a law does. Now the superior's authority is requisite for a dispensation from a precept of the law, as stated above ([3071]FS, Q[96], A[6]; [3072]FS, Q[97], A[4]). Therefore it is likewise required in a dispensation from a vow.

I answer that, As stated above ([3073]AA[1],2), a vow is a promise made to God about something acceptable to Him. Now if you promise something to anyone it depends on his decision whether he accept what you promise. Again in the Church a prelate stands in God's place. Therefore a commutation or dispensation of vows requires the authority of a prelate who in God's stead declares what is acceptable to God, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: "For . . . have pardoned . . . for your sakes . . . in the person of Christ." And he says significantly "for your sakes," since whenever we ask a prelate for a dispensation we should do so to honor Christ in Whose person he dispenses, or to promote the interests of the Church which is His Body.

Reply to Objection 1: All other vows are about some particular works, whereas by the religious life a man consecrates his whole life to God's service. Now the particular is included in the universal, wherefore a Decretal [*Cap. Scripturae, de Voto et Voti redempt.] says that "a man is not deemed a vow-breaker if he exchange a temporal service for the perpetual service of religion." And yet a man who enters religion is not bound to fulfil the vows, whether of fasting or of praying or the like, which he made when in the world, because by entering religion he dies to his former life, and it is unsuitable to the religious life that each one should have his own observances, and because the burden of religion is onerous enough without requiring the addition of other burdens.

Reply to Objection 2: Some have held that prelates can dispense from vows at their will, for the reason that every vow supposes as a condition that the superior prelate be willing; thus it was stated above [3074](A[8]) that the vow of a subject, e.g. of a slave or a son, supposes this condition, if "the father or master consent," or "does not dissent." And thus a subject might break his vow without any remorse of conscience, whenever his superior tells him to.

But this opinion is based on a false supposition: because a spiritual prelate being, not a master, but a dispenser, his power is given "unto edification, not for destruction" (2 Cor. 10:8), and consequently, just as he cannot command that which is in itself displeasing to God, namely, sin, so neither can he forbid what is in itself pleasing to God, namely, works of virtue. Therefore absolutely speaking man can vow them. But it does belong to a prelate to decide what is the more virtuous and the more acceptable to God. Consequently in matters presenting no difficulty, the prelate's dispensation would not excuse one from sin: for instance, if a prelate were to dispense a person from a vow to enter the religious life, without any apparent cause to prevent him from fulfilling his vow. But if some cause were to appear, giving rise, at least, to doubt, he could hold to the prelate's decision whether of commutation or of dispensation. He could not, however, follow his own judgment in the matter, because he does not stand in the place of God; except perhaps in the case when the thing he has vowed is clearly unlawful, and he is unable to have recourse to the prelate.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the Sovereign Pontiff holds the place of Christ throughout the whole Church, he exercises absolute power of dispensing from all vows that admit of dispensation. To other and inferior prelates is the power committed of dispensing from those vows that are commonly made and frequently require dispensation, in order that men may easily have recourse to someone; such are the vows of pilgrimage (Cap. de Peregin., de Voto et Voti redempt.), fasting and the like, and of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, are reserved to the Sovereign Pontiff [*Cap. Ex multa].

OF OATHS (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider those external acts of religion, whereby something Divine is taken by man: and this is either a sacrament or the Name of God. The place for treating of the taking of a sacrament will be in the Third Part of this work: of the taking of God's Name we shall treat now. The Name of God is taken by man in three ways. First, by way of oath in order to confirm one's own assertion: secondly, by way of adjuration as an inducement to others: thirdly, by way of invocation for the purpose of prayer or praise. Accordingly we must first treat of oaths: and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) What is an oath?

(2) Whether it is lawful?

(3) What are the accompanying conditions of an oath?

(4) Of what virtue is it an act?

(5) Whether oaths are desirable, and to be employed frequently as something useful and good?

(6) Whether it is lawful to swear by a creature?

(7) Whether an oath is binding?

(8) Which is more binding, an oath or a vow?

(9) Whether an oath is subject to dispensation?

(10) Who may lawfully swear, and when?

Whether to swear is to call God to witness?

Objection 1: It would seem that to swear is not to call God to witness. Whoever invokes the authority of Holy Writ calls God to witness, since it is His word that Holy Writ contains. Therefore, if to swear is to call God to witness, whoever invoked the authority of Holy Writ would swear. But this is false Therefore the antecedent is false also.

Objection 2: Further, one does not pay anything to a person by calling him to witness. But he who swears by God pays something to Him for it is written (Mat. 5:33): “Thou shall pay [Douay: ‘perform’] thy oaths to the Lord”; and Augustine says [*Serm. clxxx] that to swear [jurare] is “to pay the right [jus reddere] of truth to God.” Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.

Objection 3: Further, the duties of a judge differ from the duties of a witness, as shown above (QQ[67],70). Now sometimes a man, by swearing, implores the Divine judgment, according to Ps. 7:5, “If I have rendered to them that repaid me evils, let me deservedly fall empty before my enemies.” Therefore to swear is not to call God to witness.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on perjury (Serm. clxxx): “When a man says: ‘By God,’ what else does he mean but that God is his witness?”

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), oaths are taken for the purpose of confirmation. Now speculative propositions receive confirmation from reason, which proceeds from principles known naturally and infallibly true. But particular contingent facts regarding man cannot be confirmed by a necessary reason, wherefore propositions regarding such things are wont to be confirmed by witnesses. Now a human witness does not suffice to confirm such matters for two reasons. First, on account of man's lack of truth, for many give way to lying, according to Ps. 16:10, "Their mouth hath spoken lies [Vulg.: 'proudly']." Secondly, on account of this lack of knowledge, since he can know neither the future, nor secret thoughts, nor distant things: and yet men speak about such things, and our everyday life requires that we should have some certitude about them. Hence the need to have recourse to a Divine witness, for neither can God lie, nor is anything hidden from Him. Now to call God to witness is named "jurare" [to swear] because it is established as though it were a principle of law [jure] that what a man asserts under the invocation of God as His witness should be accepted as true. Now sometimes God is called to witness when we assert present or past events, and this is termed a "declaratory oath"; while sometimes God is called to witness in confirmation of something future, and this is termed a "promissory oath." But oaths are not employed in order to substantiate necessary matters, and such as come under the investigation of reason; for it would seem absurd in a scientific discussion to wish to prove one's point by an oath.

Reply to Objection 1: It is one thing to employ a Divine witness already given, as when one adduces the authority of Holy Scripture; and another to implore God to bear witness, as in an oath.

Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to pay his oaths to God because he performs what he swears to do, or because, from the very fact that he calls upon God to witness, he recognizes Him as possessing universal knowledge and unerring truth.

Reply to Objection 3: A person is called to give witness, in order that he may make known the truth about what is alleged. Now there are two ways in which God makes known whether the alleged facts are true or not. In one way He reveals the truth simply, either by inward inspiration, or by unveiling the facts, namely, by making public what was hitherto secret: in another way by punishing the lying witness, and then He is at once judge and witness, since by punishing the liar He makes known his lie. Hence oaths are of two kinds: one is a simple contestation of God, as when a man says "God is my witness," or, "I speak before God," or, "By God," which has the same meaning, as Augustine states [*See argument On the contrary]; the other is by cursing, and consists in a man binding himself or something of his to punishment if what is alleged be not true.

Whether it is lawful to swear?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear. Nothing forbidden in the Divine Law is lawful. Now swearing is forbidden (Mat. 5:34), “But I say to you not to swear at all”; and (James 5:12), “Above all things, my brethren, swear not.” Therefore swearing is unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, whatever comes from an evil seems to be unlawful, because according to Mat. 7:18, “neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit.” Now swearing comes from an evil, for it is written (Mat. 5:37): “But let your speech be: Yea, yea: No, no. And that which is over and above these is of evil.” Therefore swearing is apparently unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, to seek a sign of Divine Providence is to tempt God, and this is altogether unlawful, according to Dt. 6:16, “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.” Now he that swears seems to seek a sign of Divine Providence, since he asks God to bear witness, and this must be by some evident effect. Therefore it seems that swearing is altogether unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): “Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God . . . and shalt swear by His name.”

I answer that, Nothing prevents a thing being good in itself, and yet becoming a source of evil to one who makes use thereof unbecomingly: thus to receive the Eucharist is good, and yet he that receives it “unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself” (1 Cor. 11:29). Accordingly in answer to the question in point it must be stated that an oath is in itself lawful and commendable. This is proved from its origin and from its end. From its origin, because swearing owes its introduction to the faith whereby man believes that God possesses unerring truth and universal knowledge and foresight of all things: and from its end, since oaths are employed in order to justify men, and to put an end to controversy (Heb. 6:16).

Yet an oath becomes a source of evil to him that makes evil use of it, that is who employs it without necessity and due caution. For if a man calls God as witness, for some trifling reason, it would seemingly prove him to have but little reverence for God, since he would not treat even a good man in this manner. Moreover, he is in danger of committing perjury, because man easily offends in words, according to James 3:2, “If any man offend not in word, the same is a perfect man.” Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:9): “Let not thy mouth be accustomed to swearing, for in it there are many falls.”

Reply to Objection 1: Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says: “Observe that our Saviour forbade us to swear, not by God, but by heaven and earth. For it is known that the Jews have this most evil custom of swearing by the elements.” Yet this answer does not suffice, because James adds, “nor by any other oath.” Wherefore we must reply that, as Augustine states (De Mendacio xv), “when the Apostle employs an oath in his epistles, he shows how we are to understand the saying, ‘I say to you, not to swear at all’; lest, to wit, swearing lead us to swear easily and from swearing easily, we contract the habit, and, from swearing habitually, we fall into perjury. Hence we find that he swore only when writing, because thought brings caution and avoids hasty words.”

Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i. 17): “If you have to swear, note that the necessity arises from the infirmity of those whom you convince, which infirmity is indeed an evil. Accordingly He did not say: ‘That which is over and above is evil,’ but ‘is of evil.’ For you do no evil; since you make good use of swearing, by persuading another to a useful purpose: yet it ‘comes of the evil’ of the person by whose infirmity you are forced to swear.”

Reply to Objection 3: He who swears tempts not God, because it is not without usefulness and necessity that he implores the Divine assistance. Moreover, he does not expose himself to danger, if God be unwilling to bear witness there and then: for He certainly will bear witness at some future time, when He “will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of hearts” (1 Cor. 4:5). And this witness will be lacking to none who swears, neither for nor against him.

Whether three accompanying conditions of an oath are suitably assigned, namely, justice, judgment, and truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that justice, judgment and truth are unsuitably assigned as the conditions accompanying an oath. Things should not be enumerated as diverse, if one of them includes the other. Now of these three, one includes another, since truth is a part of justice, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53): and judgment is an act of justice, as stated above ([3075]Q[60], A[1]). Therefore the three accompanying conditions of an oath are unsuitably assigned.

Objection 2: Further, many other things are required for an oath, namely, devotion, and faith whereby we believe that God knows all things and cannot lie. Therefore the accompanying conditions of an oath are insufficiently enumerated.

Objection 3: Further, these three are requisite in man's every deed: since he ought to do nothing contrary to justice and truth, or without judgment, according to 1 Tim. 5:21, "Do nothing without prejudice," i.e. without previous judgment [*Vulg.: 'Observe these things without prejudice, doing nothing by declining to either side.']. Therefore these three should not be associated with an oath any more than with other human actions.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 4:2): "Thou shalt swear: As the Lord liveth, in truth, and in judgment, and in justice": which words Jerome expounds, saying: "Observe that an oath must be accompanied by these conditions, truth, judgment and justice."

I answer that, As stated above [3076](A[2]), an oath is not good except for one who makes good use of it. Now two conditions are required for the good use of an oath. First, that one swear, not for frivolous, but for urgent reasons, and with discretion; and this requires judgment or discretion on the part of the person who swears. Secondly, as regards the point to be confirmed by oath, that it be neither false, nor unlawful, and this requires both truth, so that one employ an oath in order to confirm what is true, and justice, so that one confirm what is lawful. A rash oath lacks judgment, a false oath lacks truth, and a wicked or unlawful oath lacks justice.

Reply to Objection 1: Judgment does not signify here the execution of justice, but the judgment of discretion, as stated above. Nor is truth here to be taken for the part of justice, but for a condition of speech.

Reply to Objection 2: Devotion, faith and like conditions requisite for the right manner of swearing are implied by judgment: for the other two regard the things sworn to as stated above. We might also reply that justice regards the reason for swearing.

Reply to Objection 3: There is great danger in swearing, both on account of the greatness of God Who is called upon to bear witness, and on account of the frailty of the human tongue, the words of which are confirmed by oath. Hence these conditions are more requisite for an oath than for other human actions.

Whether an oath is an act of religion or latria?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not an act of religion, or latria. Acts of religion are about holy and divine things. But oaths are employed in connection with human disputes, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16). Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to religion to give worship to God, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). But he who swears offers nothing to God, but calls God to be his witness. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion or latria.

Objection 3: Further, the end of religion or latria is to show reverence to God. But the end of an oath is not this, but rather the confirmation of some assertion. Therefore swearing is not an act of religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:13): “Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only, and thou shalt swear by His name.” Now he speaks there of the servitude of religion. Therefore swearing is an act of religion.

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above [3077](A[1]), he that swears calls God to witness in confirmation of what he says. Now nothing is confirmed save by what is more certain and more powerful. Therefore in the very fact that a man swears by God, he acknowledges God to be more powerful, by reason of His unfailing truth and His universal knowledge; and thus in a way he shows reverence to God. For this reason the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16) that “men swear by one greater than themselves,” and Jerome commenting on Mat. 5:34, says that “he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears.” The Philosopher, too, states (Metaph. i, 3) that “to swear is to give very great honor.” Now to show reverence to God belongs to religion or latria. wherefore it is evident that an oath is an act of religion or latria.

Reply to Objection 1: Two things may be observed in an oath. The witness adduced, and this is Divine: and the thing witnessed to, or that which makes it necessary to call the witness, and this is human. Accordingly an oath belongs to religion by reason of the former, and not of the latter.

Reply to Objection 2: In the very fact that a man takes God as witness by way of an oath, he acknowledges Him to be greater: and this pertains to the reverence and honor of God, so that he offers something to God, namely, reverence and honor.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatsoever we do, we should do it in honor of God: wherefore there is no hindrance, if by intending to assure a man, we show reverence to God. For we ought so to perform our actions in God’s honor that they may conduce to our neighbor’s good, since God also works for His own glory and for our good.

Whether oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good?

Objection 1: It would seem that oaths are desirable and to be used frequently as something useful and good. Just as a vow is an act of religion, so is an oath. Now it is commendable and more meritorious to do a thing by vow, because a vow is an act of religion, as stated above ([3078]Q[88], A[5]). Therefore for the same reason, to do or say a thing with an oath is more commendable, and consequently oaths are desirable as being good essentially.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. 5:34, says that “he who swears either reveres or loves the person by whom he swears.” Now reverence and love of God are desirable as something good essentially. Therefore swearing is also.

Objection 3: Further, swearing is directed to the purpose of confirming or assuring. But it is a good thing for a man to confirm his assertion. Therefore an oath is desirable as a good thing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 23:12): “A man that sweareth much shall be filled with iniquity”: and Augustine says (De Mendacio xv) that “the Lord forbade swearing, in order that for your own part you might not be fond of it, and take pleasure in seeking occasions of swearing, as though it were a good thing.”

I answer that, Whatever is required merely as a remedy for an infirmity or a defect, is not reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary: this is clear in the case of medicine which is required as a remedy for sickness. Now an oath is required as a remedy to a defect, namely, some man’s lack of belief in another man. Wherefore an oath is not to be reckoned among those things that are desirable for their own sake, but among those that are necessary for this life; and such things are used unduly whenever they are used outside the bounds of necessity. For this reason Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17): “He who understands that swearing is not to be held as a good thing,” i.e. desirable for its own sake, “restrains himself as far as he can from uttering oaths, unless there be urgent need.”

Reply to Objection 1: There is no parity between a vow and an oath: because by a vow we direct something to the honor of God, so that for this very reason a vow is an act of religion. On the other hand, in an oath reverence for the name of God is taken in confirmation of a promise. Hence what is confirmed by oath does not, for this reason, become an act of religion, since moral acts take their species from the end.

Reply to Objection 2: He who swears does indeed make use of his reverence or love for the person by whom he swears: he does not, however, direct his oath to the reverence or love of that person, but to something else that is necessary for the present life.

Reply to Objection 3: Even as a medicine is useful for healing, and yet, the stronger it is, the greater harm it does if it be taken unduly, so too an oath is useful indeed as a means of confirmation, yet the greater the reverence it demands the more dangerous it is, unless it be employed aright; for, as it is written (Ecclus. 23:13), “if he make it void,” i.e. if he deceive his brother, “his sin shall be upon him: and if he dissemble it,” by swearing falsely, and with dissimulation, “he offendeth double,” [because, to wit, “pretended equity is a twofold iniquity,” as Augustine [*Enarr. in Ps. lxiii, 7] declares]: “and if he swear in vain,” i.e. without due cause and necessity, “he shall not be justified.”

Whether it is lawful to swear by creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to swear by creatures. It is written (Mat. 5:34–36): "I say to you not to swear at all, neither by heaven . . . nor by the earth . . . nor by Jerusalem . . . nor by thy head": and Jerome, expounding these words, says: "Observe that the Saviour does not forbid swearing by God, but by heaven and earth," etc.

Objection 2: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now a punishment is appointed for one who swears by creatures: for it is written (22, qu. i, can. Clericum): "If a cleric swears by creatures he must be very severely rebuked: and if he shall persist in this vicious habit we wish that he be excommunicated." Therefore it is unlawful to swear by creatures.

Objection 3: Further, an oath is an act of religion, as stated above [3079] (A[4]). But religious worship is not due to any creature, according to Rom. 1:23, 25. Therefore it is not lawful to swear by a creature.

On the contrary, Joseph swore "by the health of Pharaoh" (Gn. 42:16). Moreover it is customary to swear by the Gospel, by relics, and by the saints.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), there are two kinds of oath. One is uttered a simple contestation or calling God as witness: and this kind of oath, like faith, is based on God's truth. Now faith is essentially and chiefly about God Who is the very truth, and secondarily about creatures in which God's truth is reflected, as stated above ([3080]Q[1], A[1]). In like manner an oath is chiefly referred to God Whose testimony is invoked; and secondarily an appeal by oath is made to certain creatures considered, not in themselves, but as reflecting the Divine truth. Thus we swear by the Gospel, i.e. by God Whose truth is made known in the Gospel; and by the saints who believed this truth and kept it.

The other way of swearing is by cursing and in this kind of oath a creature is adduced that the judgment of God may be wrought therein. Thus a man is wont to swear by his head, or by his son, or by some other thing that he loves, even as the Apostle swore (2 Cor. 1:23), saying: "I call God to witness upon my soul."

As to Joseph's oath by the health of Pharaoh this may be understood in both ways: either by way of a curse, as though he pledged Pharao's health to God; or by way of contestation, as though he appealed to the truth of God's justice which the princes of the earth are appointed to execute.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbade us to swear by creatures so as to give them the reverence due to God. Hence Jerome adds that "the Jews, through swearing by the angels and the like, worshipped creatures with a Divine honor."

In the same sense a cleric is punished, according to the canons (22, qu. i, can. Clericum, OBJ[2]), for swearing by a creature, for this savors of the blasphemy of unbelief. Hence in the next chapter, it is said: "If any one swears by God's hair or head, or otherwise utter blasphemy against God, and he be in ecclesiastical orders, let him be degraded."

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Religious worship is shown to one whose testimony is invoked by oath: hence the prohibition (Ex. 23:13): "By the name of strange gods you shall not swear." But religious worship is not given to creatures employed in an oath in the ways mentioned above.

Whether an oath has a binding force?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath has no binding force. An oath is employed in order to confirm the truth of an assertion. But when a person makes an assertion about the future his assertion is true, though it may not be verified. Thus Paul lied not (2 Cor. 1:15, seqq.) though he went not to Corinth, as he had said he would (1 Cor. 16:5). Therefore it seems that an oath is not binding.

Objection 2: Further, virtue is not contrary to virtue (Categ. viii, 22). Now an oath is an act of virtue, as stated above [3081](A[4]). But it would sometimes be contrary to virtue, or an obstacle thereto, if one were to fulfil what one has sworn to do: for instance, if one were to swear to commit a sin, or to desist from some virtuous action. Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Objection 3: Further, sometimes a man is compelled against his will to promise something under oath. Now, "such a person is loosed by the Roman Pontiffs from the bond of his oath" (Extra, De Jurejur., cap. Verum in ea quaest., etc.). Therefore an oath is not always binding.

Objection 4: Further, no person can be under two opposite obligations. Yet sometimes the person who swears and the person to whom he swears have opposite intentions. Therefore an oath cannot always be binding.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:33): “Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.”

I answer that, An obligation implies something to be done or omitted; so that apparently it regards neither the declaratory oath (which is about something present or past), nor such oaths as are about something to be effected by some other cause (as, for example, if one were to swear that it would rain tomorrow), but only such as are about things to be done by the person who swears.

Now just as a declaratory oath, which is about the future or the present, should contain the truth, so too ought the oath which is about something to be done by us in the future. Yet there is a difference: since, in the oath that is about the past or present, this obligation affects, not the thing that already has been or is, but the action of the swearer, in the point of his swearing to what is or was already true; whereas, on the contrary, in the oath that is made about something to be done by us, the obligation falls on the thing guaranteed by oath. For a man is bound to make true what he has sworn, else his oath lacks truth.

Now if this thing be such as not to be in his power, his oath is lacking in judgment of discretion: unless perchance what was possible when he swore become impossible to him through some mishap. as when a man swore to pay a sum of money, which is subsequently taken from him by force or theft. For then he would seem to be excused from fulfilling his oath, although he is bound to do what he can, as, in fact, we have already stated with regard to the obligation of a vow ([3082]Q[88], A[3], ad 2). If, on the other hand, it be something that he can do, but ought not to, either because it is essentially evil, or because it is a hindrance to a good, then his oath is lacking in justice: wherefore an oath must not be kept when it involves a sin or a hindrance to good. For in either case “its result is evil” [*Cf. Bede, Homil. xix, in Decoll. S. Joan. Bapt.]

Accordingly we must conclude that whoever swears to do something is bound to do what he can for the fulfilment of truth; provided always that the other two accompanying conditions be present, namely, judgment and justice.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not the same with a simple assertion, and with an oath wherein God is called to witness: because it suffices for the truth of an assertion, that a person say what he proposes to do, since it is already true in its cause, namely, the purpose of the doer. But an oath should not be employed, save in a matter about which one is firmly certain: and, consequently, if a man employ an oath, he is bound, as far as he can, to make true what he has sworn, through reverence of the Divine witness invoked, unless it leads to an evil result, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: An oath may lead to an evil result in two ways. First, because from the very outset it has an evil result, either through being evil of its very nature (as, if a man were to swear to commit adultery), or through being a hindrance to a greater good, as if a man were to swear not to enter religion, or not to become a cleric, or that he would not accept a prelacy, supposing it would be expedient for him to accept, or in similar cases. For oaths of this kind are unlawful from the outset: yet with a difference: because if a man swear to commit a sin, he sinned in swearing, and sins in keeping his oath: whereas if a man swear not to perform a greater good, which he is not bound to do withal, he sins indeed in swearing (through placing an obstacle to the Holy Ghost, Who is the inspirer of good purposes), yet he does not sin in keeping his oath, though he does much better if he does not keep it.

Secondly, an oath leads to an evil result through some new and unforeseen emergency. An instance is the oath of Herod, who swore to the damsel, who danced before him, that he would give her what she would ask of him. For this oath could be lawful from the outset, supposing it to have the requisite conditions, namely, that the damsel asked what it was right to grant. but the fulfilment of the oath was unlawful. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 50): “Sometimes it is wrong to fulfil a promise, and to keep an oath; as Herod, who granted the slaying of John, rather than refuse what he had promised.”

Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold obligation in the oath which a man takes under compulsion: one, whereby he is beholden to the person to whom he promises something; and this obligation is cancelled by the compulsion, because he that used force deserves that the promise made to him should not be kept. The other is an obligation whereby a man is beholden to God, in virtue of which he is bound to fulfil what he has promised in His name. This obligation is not removed in the tribunal of conscience, because that man ought rather to suffer temporal loss, than violate his oath. He can, however, seek in a court of justice to recover what he has paid, or denounce the matter to his superior even if he has sworn to the contrary, because such an oath would lead to evil results since it would be contrary to public justice. The Roman Pontiffs, in absolving men from oaths of this kind, did not pronounce such oaths to be unbinding, but relaxed the obligation for some just cause.

Reply to Objection 4: When the intention of the swearer is not the same as the intention of the person to whom he swears, if this be due to the swearer's guile, he must keep his oath in accordance with the sound understanding of the person to whom the oath is made. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 31): "However artful a man may be in wording his oath, God Who witnesses his conscience accepts his oath as understood by the person to whom it is made." And that this refers to the deceitful oath is clear from what follows: "He is doubly guilty who both takes God's name in vain, and tricks his neighbor by guile." If, however, the swearer uses no guile, he is bound in accordance with his own intention. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 7): "The human ear takes such like words in their natural outward sense, but the Divine judgment interprets them according to our inward intention."

Whether an oath is more binding than a vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is more binding than a vow. A vow is a simple promise: whereas an oath includes, besides a promise, an appeal to God as witness. Therefore an oath is more binding than a vow.

Objection 2: Further, the weaker is wont to be confirmed by the stronger. Now a vow is sometimes confirmed by an oath. Therefore an oath is stronger than a vow.

Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow arises from the deliberation of the mind, a stated above ([3083]Q[88], A[1]); while the obligation of an oath results from the truth of God Whose testimony is invoked. Since therefore God's truth is something greater than human deliberation, it seems that the obligation of an oath is greater than that of a vow.

On the contrary, A vow binds one to God while an oath sometimes binds one to man. Now one is more bound to God than to man. Therefore a vow is more binding than an oath.

I answer that, The obligation both of vow and of an oath arises from something Divine; but in different ways. For the obligation of a vow arises from the fidelity we owe God, which binds us to fulfil our promises to Him. On the other hand, the obligation of an oath arises from the reverence we owe Him which binds us to make true what we promise in His name. Now every act of infidelity includes an irreverence, but not conversely, because the infidelity of a subject to his lord would seem to be the greatest irreverence. Hence a vow by its very nature is more binding than an oath.

Reply to Objection 1: A vow is not any kind of promise, but a promise made to God; and to be unfaithful to God is most grievous.

Reply to Objection 2: An oath is added to a vow not because it is more stable, but because greater stability results from "two immutable things" [*Heb. 6:18].

Reply to Objection 3: Deliberation of the mind gives a vow its stability, on the part of the person who takes the vow: but it has a greater cause of stability on the part of God, to Whom the vow is offered.

Whether anyone can dispense from an oath?

Objection 1: It would seem that no one can dispense from an oath. Just as truth is required for a declaratory oath, which is about the past or the present, so too is it required for a promissory oath, which is about the future. Now no one can dispense a man from swearing to the truth about present or past things. Therefore neither can anyone dispense a man from making truth that which he has promised by oath to do in the future.

Objection 2: Further, a promissory oath is used for the benefit of the person to whom the promise is made. But, apparently, he cannot release the other from his oath, since it would be contrary to the reverence of God. Much less therefore can a dispensation from this oath be granted by anyone.

Objection 3: Further, any bishop can grant a dispensation from a vow, except certain vows reserved to the Pope alone, as stated above ([3084]Q[88], A[12], ad 3). Therefore in like manner, if an oath admits of dispensation, any bishop can dispense from an oath. And yet seemingly this is to be against the law [*Caus. XV, qu. 6, can. Auctoritatem, seqq.: Cap. Si vero, de Jurejurando]. Therefore it would seem that an oath does not admit of dispensation.

On the contrary, A vow is more binding than an oath, as stated above [3085](A[8]). But a vow admits of dispensation and therefore an oath does also.

I answer that, As stated above ([3086]Q[88], A[10]), the necessity of a dispensation both from the law and from a vow arises from the fact that something which is useful and morally good in itself and considered in general, may be morally evil and hurtful in respect of some particular emergency: and such a case comes under neither law nor vow. Now anything morally evil or hurtful is incompatible with the matter of an oath: for if it be morally evil it is opposed to justice, and if it be hurtful it is contrary to judgment. Therefore an oath likewise admits of dispensation.

Reply to Objection 1: A dispensation from an oath does not imply a permission to do anything against the oath: for this is impossible, since the keeping of an oath comes under a Divine precept, which does not admit of dispensation: but it implies that what hitherto came under an oath no longer comes under it, as not being due matter for an oath, just as we have said with regard to vows ([3087]Q[88], A[10], ad 2). Now the matter of a declaratory oath, which is about something past or present, has already acquired a certain necessity, and has become unchangeable, wherefore the dispensation will regard not the matter but the act itself of the oath: so that such a dispensation would be directly contrary to the Divine precept. On the other hand, the matter of a promissory oath is something future, which admits of change, so that, to wit, in certain emergencies, it may be unlawful or hurtful, and consequently undue matter for an oath. Therefore a promissory oath admits of dispensation, since such dispensation regards the matter of an oath, and is not contrary to the Divine precept about the keeping of oaths.

Reply to Objection 2: One man may promise something under oath to another in two ways. First, when he promises something for his benefit: for instance, if he promise to serve him, or to give him money: and from such a promise he can be released by the person to whom he made it: for he is understood to have already kept his promise to him when he acts towards him according to his will. Secondly, one man promises another something pertaining to God’s honor or to the benefit of others: for instance, if a man promise another under oath that he will enter religion, or perform some act of kindness. In this case the person to whom the promise is made cannot release him that made the promise, because it was made principally not to him but to God: unless perchance it included some condition, for instance, “provided he give his consent” or some such like condition.

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes that which is made the matter of a promissory oath is manifestly opposed to justice, either because it is a sin, as when a man swears to commit a murder, or because it is an obstacle to a greater good, as when a man swears not to enter a religion: and such an oath requires no dispensation. But in the former case a man is bound not to keep such an oath, while in the latter it is lawful for him to keep or not to keep the oath, as stated above (A[7], ad 2). Sometimes what is promised on oath is doubtfully right or wrong, useful or harmful, either in itself or under the circumstance. In this case any bishop can dispense. Sometimes, however, that which is promised under oath is manifestly lawful and beneficial. An oath of this kind seemingly admits not of dispensation but of commutation, when there occurs something better to be done for the common good, in which case the matter would seem to belong chiefly to the power of the Pope, who has charge over the whole Church; and even of absolute relaxation, for this too belongs in general to the Pope in all matters regarding the administration of things ecclesiastical. Thus it is competent to any man to cancel an oath made by one of his subjects in matters that come under his authority: for instance, a father may annul his daughter’s oath, and a husband his wife’s (Num. 30:6, seqq.), as stated above with regard to vows ([3088]Q[88], AA[8],9).

Whether an oath is voided by a condition of person or time?

Objection 1: It would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time. An oath, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), is employed for the purpose of confirmation. Now it is competent to anyone to confirm his assertion, and at any time. Therefore it would seem that an oath is not voided by a condition of person or time.

Objection 2: Further, to swear by God is more than to swear by the Gospels: wherefore Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “If there is a reason for swearing, it seems a small thing to swear by God, but a great thing to swear by the Gospels. To those who think thus, it must be said: Nonsense! the

Scriptures were made for God’s sake, not God for the sake of the Scriptures.” Now men of all conditions and at all times are wont to swear by God. Much more, therefore, is it lawful to swear by the Gospels.

Objection 3: Further, the same effect does not proceed from contrary causes, since contrary causes produce contrary effects. Now some are debarred from swearing on account of some personal defect; children, for instance, before the age of fourteen, and persons who have already committed perjury. Therefore it would seem that a person ought not to be debarred from swearing either on account of his dignity, as clerics, or on account of the solemnity of the time.

Objection 4: Further, in this world no living man is equal in dignity to an angel: for it is written (Mat. 11:11) that “he that is the lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he,” namely than John the Baptist, while yet living. Now an angel is competent to swear, for it is written (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel “swore by Him that liveth for ever and ever.” Therefore no man ought to be excused from swearing, on account of his dignity.

On the contrary, It is stated (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter): “Let a priest be examined ‘by his sacred consecration,’ instead of being put on his oath”: and (22, qu. v, can. Nullus): “Let no one in ecclesiastical orders dare to swear on the Holy Gospels to a layman.”

I answer that, Two things are to be considered in an oath. One is on the part of God, whose testimony is invoked, and in this respect we should hold an oath in the greatest reverence. For this reason children before the age of puberty are debarred from taking oaths [*Caus. XXII, qu. 5, can. Parvuli], and are not called upon to swear, because they have not yet attained the perfect use of reason, so as to be able to take a oath with due reverence. Perjurers also are debarred from taking an oath, because it is presumed from their antecedents that they will not treat an oath with the reverence due to it. For this same reason, in order that oaths might be treated with due reverence the law says (22, qu. v, can. Honestum): “It is becoming that he who ventures to swear on holy things should do so fasting, with all propriety and fear of God.”

The other thing to be considered is on the part of the man, whose assertion is confirmed by oath. For a man’s assertion needs no confirmation save because there is a doubt about it. Now it derogates from a person’s dignity that one should doubt about the truth of what he says, wherefore “it becomes not persons of great dignity to swear.” For this reason the law says (II, qu. v, can. Si quis presbyter) that “priests should not swear for trifling reasons.” Nevertheless it is lawful for them to swear if there be need for it, or if great good may result therefrom. Especially is this the case in spiritual affairs, when moreover it is becoming that they should take oath on days of solemnity, since they ought then to devote themselves to spiritual matters. Nor should they on such occasions take oaths temporal matters, except perhaps in cases grave necessity.

Reply to Objection 1: Some are unable to confirm their own assertions on account of their own defect: and some there are whose words should be so certain that they need no confirmation.

Reply to Objection 2: The greater the thing sworn by, the holier and the more binding is the oath, considered in itself, as Augustine states (Ad Public., Ep. xlvii): and accordingly is a graver matter to swear by God than the Gospels. Yet the contrary may be the case on account of the manner of swearing for instance, an oath by the Gospels might be taken with deliberation and solemnity, and an oath by God frivolously and without deliberation.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing from arising out of contrary causes, by way of superabundance and defect. It is in this way that some are debarred from swearing, through being of so great authority that it is unbecoming for them to swear; while others are of such little authority that their oaths have no standing.

Reply to Objection 4: The angel’s oath is adduced not on account of any defect in the angel, as though one ought not to credit his mere word, but in order to show that the statement made issues from God’s infallible disposition. Thus too God is sometimes spoken of by Scripture as swearing, in order to express the immutability of His word, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:17).

OF THE TAKING OF GOD’S NAME BY WAY OF ADJURATION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the taking of God’s name by way of adjuration: under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

(2) Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

(3) Whether it is lawful to adjure irrational creatures?

Whether it is lawful to adjure a man?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to adjure a man. Origen says (Tract. xxxv super Matth.): “I deem that a man who wishes to live according to the Gospel should not adjure another man. For if, according to the Gospel mandate of Christ, it be unlawful to swear, it is evident that neither is it lawful to adjure: and consequently it is manifest that the high-priest unlawfully adjured Jesus by the living God.”

Objection 2: Further, whoever adjures a man, compels him after a fashion. But it is unlawful to compel a man against his will. Therefore seemingly it is also unlawful to adjure a man.

Objection 3: Further, to adjure is to induce a person to swear. Now it belongs to man’s superior to induce him to swear, for the superior imposes an oath on his subject. Therefore subjects cannot adjure their superiors.

On the contrary, Even when we pray God we implore Him by certain holy things: and the Apostle too besought the faithful “by the mercy of God” (Rom. 12:1): and this seems to be a kind of adjuration. Therefore it is lawful to adjure.

I answer that, A man who utters a promissory oath, swearing by his reverence for the Divine name, which he invokes in confirmation of his promise, binds himself to do what he has undertaken, and so orders himself unchangeably to do a certain thing. Now just as a man can order himself to do a certain thing, so too can he order others, by beseeching his superiors, or by commanding his inferiors, as stated above ([3089]Q[83], A[1]). Accordingly when either of these orderings is confirmed by something Divine it is an adjuration. Yet there is this difference between them, that man is master of his own actions but not of those of others; wherefore he can put himself under an obligation by invoking the Divine name, whereas he cannot put others under such an obligation unless they be his subjects, whom he can compel on the strength of the oath they have taken.

Therefore, if a man by invoking the name of God, or any holy thing, intends by this adjuration to put one who is not his subject under an obligation to do a certain thing, in the same way as he would bind himself by oath, such an adjuration is unlawful, because he usurps over another a power which he has not. But superiors may bind their inferiors by this kind of adjuration, if there be need for it.

If, however, he merely intend, through reverence of the Divine name or of some holy thing, to obtain something from the other man without putting him under any obligation, such an adjuration may be lawfully employed in respect of anyone.

Reply to Objection 1: Origen is speaking of an adjuration whereby a man intends to put another under an obligation, in the same way as he would bind himself by oath: for thus did the high-priest presume to adjure our Lord Jesus Christ [*Mat. 26:63].

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the adjuration which imposes an obligation.

Reply to Objection 3: To adjure is not to induce a man to swear, but to employ terms resembling an oath in order to provoke another to do a certain thing.

Moreover, we adjure God in one way and man in another; because when we adjure a man we intend to alter his will by appealing to his reverence for a holy thing: and we cannot have such an intention in respect of God Whose will is immutable. If we obtain something from God through His eternal will, it is due, not to our merits, but to His goodness.

Whether it is lawful to adjure the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure the demons. Origen says (Tract. xxxv, super Matth.): “To adjure the demons is not accordance with the power given by our Saviour: for this is a Jewish practice.” Now rather than imitate the rites of the Jews, we should use the power given by Christ. Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

Objection 2: Further, many make use of necromantic incantations when invoking the demons by something Divine: and this is an adjuration. Therefore, if it be lawful to adjure the demons, it is lawful to make use of necromantic incantations, which is evidently false. Therefore the antecedent is false also.

Objection 3: Further, whoever adjures a person, by that very fact associates himself with him. Now it is not lawful to have fellowship with the demons, according to 1 Cor. 10:20, “I would not that you should be made partakers with devils.” Therefore it is not lawful to adjure the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:17): “In My name they shall cast out devils.” Now to induce anyone to do a certain thing for the sake of God’s name is to adjure. Therefore it is lawful to adjure the demons.

I answer that, As stated in the preceding article, there are two ways of adjuring: one by way of prayer or inducement through reverence of some holy thing: the other by way of compulsion. In the first way it is not lawful to adjure the demons because such a way seems to savor of benevolence or friendship, which it is unlawful to bear towards the demons. As to the second kind of adjuration, which is by compulsion, we may lawfully use it for some purposes, and not for others. For during the course of this life the demons are our adversaries: and their actions are not subject to our disposal but to that of God and the holy angels, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), “the rebel spirit is ruled by the just spirit.” Accordingly we may repulse the demons, as being our enemies, by adjuring them through the power of God’s name, lest they do us harm of soul or body, in accord with the Divine power given by Christ, as recorded by Lk. 10:19: “Behold, I have given you power to tread upon serpents and scorpions, and upon all the power of the enemy: and nothing shall hurt you.”

It is not, however, lawful to adjure them for the purpose of learning something from them, or of obtaining something through them, for this would amount to holding fellowship with them: except perhaps when certain holy men, by special instinct or Divine revelation, make use of the demons’ actions in order to obtain certain results: thus we read of the Blessed James [*the Greater; cf. Apocrypha, N.T., Hist. Certam. Apost. vi, 19] that he caused Hermogenes to be brought to him, by the instrumentality of the demons.

Reply to Objection 1: Origen is speaking of adjuration made, not authoritatively by way of compulsion, but rather by way of a friendly appeal.

Reply to Objection 2: Necromancers adjure and invoke the demons in order to obtain or learn something from them: and this is unlawful, as stated above. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on our Lord’s words to the unclean spirit (Mk. 1:25), “Speak no more, and go out of the man,” says:

“A salutary teaching is given us here, lest we believe the demons, however much they speak the truth.”

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the adjuration whereby the demon’s help is besought in doing or learning something: for this savors of fellowship with them. On the other hand, to repulse the demons by adjuring them, is to sever oneself from their fellowship.

Whether it is lawful to adjure an irrational creature?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful to adjure an irrational creature. An adjuration consists of spoken words. But it is useless to speak to one that understands not, such as an irrational creature. Therefore it is vain and unlawful to adjure an irrational creature.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly wherever adjuration is admissible, swearing is also admissible. But swearing is not consistent with an irrational creature. Therefore it would seem unlawful to employ adjuration towards one.

Objection 3: Further, there are two ways of adjuring, as explained above ([3090]AA[1],2). One is by way of appeal; and this cannot be employed towards irrational creatures, since they are not masters of their own actions. The other kind of adjuration is by way of compulsion: and, seemingly, neither is it lawful to use this towards them, because we have not the power to command irrational creatures, but only He of Whom it was said (Mat. 8:27): “For the winds and the sea obey Him.” Therefore in no way, apparently, is it lawful to adjure irrational creatures.

On the contrary, Simon and Jude are related to have adjured dragons and to have commanded them to withdraw into the desert. [*From the apocryphal Historiae Certam. Apost. vi. 19.]

I answer that, Irrational creatures are directed to their own actions by some other agent. Now the action of what is directed and moved is also the action of the director and mover: thus the movement of the arrow is an operation of the archer. Wherefore the operation of the irrational creature is ascribed not only to it, but also and chiefly to God, Who disposes the movements of all things. It is also ascribed to the devil, who, by God’s permission, makes use of irrational creatures in order to inflict harm on man.

Accordingly the adjuration of an irrational creature may be of two kinds. First, so that the adjuration is referred to the irrational creature in itself: and in this way it would be vain to adjure an irrational creature. Secondly, so that it be referred to the director and mover of the irrational creature, and in this sense a creature of this kind may be adjured in two ways. First, by way of appeal made to God, and this relates to those who work miracles by calling on God: secondly, by way of compulsion, which relates to the devil, who uses the irrational creature for our harm. This is the kind of adjuration used in the exorcisms of the Church, whereby the power of the demons is expelled from an irrational creature. But it is not lawful to adjure the demons by beseeching them to help us.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF TAKING THE DIVINE NAME FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVOKING IT BY MEANS OF PRAISE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the taking of the Divine name for the purpose of invoking it by prayer or praise. Of prayer we have already spoken (Q[83]). Wherefore we must speak now of praise. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God should be praised with the lips?

(2) Whether God should be praised with song?

Whether God should be praised with the lips?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with the lips. The Philosopher says (Ethic. 1,12): “The best of men ere accorded not praise, but something greater.” But God transcends the very best of all things. Therefore God ought to be given, not praise, but something greater than praise: wherefore He is said (Ecclus. 43:33) to be “above all praise.”

Objection 2: Further, divine praise is part of divine worship, for it is an act of religion. Now God is worshiped with the mind rather than with the lips: wherefore our Lord quoted against certain ones the words of Is. 29:13, “This people . . . honors [Vulg.: ‘glorifies’] Me with their lips, but their heart is far from Me.” Therefore the praise of God lies in the heart rather than on the lips.

Objection 3: Further, men are praised with the lips that they may be encouraged to do better: since just as being praised makes the wicked proud, so does it incite the good to better things. Wherefore it is written (Prov. 27:21): “As silver is tried in the fining-pot . . . so a man is tried by the mouth of him that praiseth.” But God is not incited to better things by man’s words, both because He is unchangeable, and because He is supremely good, and it is not possible for Him to grow better. Therefore God should not be praised with the lips.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 62:6): “My mouth shall praise Thee with joyful lips.”

I answer that, We use words, in speaking to God, for one reason, and in speaking to man, for another reason. For when speaking to man we use words in order to tell him our thoughts which are unknown to him. Wherefore we praise a man with our lips, in order that he or others may learn that we have a good opinion of him: so that in consequence we may incite him to yet better things; and that we may induce others, who hear him praised, to think well of him, to reverence him, and to imitate him. On the other hand we employ words, in speaking to God, not indeed to make known our thoughts to Him Who is the searcher of hearts, but that we may bring ourselves and our hearers to reverence Him.

Consequently we need to praise God with our lips, not indeed for His sake, but for our own sake; since by praising Him our devotion is aroused towards Him, according to Ps. 49:23: “The sacrifice of praise shall glorify Me, and there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God.” And forasmuch as man, by praising God, ascends in his affections to God, by so much is he withdrawn from things opposed to God, according to Is. 48:9, “For My praise I will bridle thee lest thou shouldst perish.” The praise of the lips is also profitable to others by inciting their affections towards God, wherefore it is written (Ps. 33:2): “His praise shall always be in my mouth,” and farther on: “Let the meek hear and rejoice. O magnify the Lord with me.”

Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of God in two ways. First, with regard to His essence; and thus, since He is incomprehensible and ineffable, He is above all praise. In this respect we owe Him reverence and the honor of latria; wherefore Ps. 64:2 is rendered by Jerome in his Psalter [*Translated from the Hebrew]: “Praise to Thee is speechless, O God,” as regards the first, and as to the second, “A vow shall be paid to Thee.” Secondly, we may speak of God as to His effects which are ordained for our good. In this respect we owe Him praise; wherefore it is written (Is. 63:7): “I will remember the tender mercies of the Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things that the Lord hath bestowed upon us.” Again, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): “Thou wilt find that all the sacred hymns,” i.e. divine praises “of the sacred writers, are directed respectively to the Blessed Processions of the Thearchy,” i.e. of the Godhead, “showing forth and praising the names of God.”

Reply to Objection 2: It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one praise not with the heart. For the heart speaks God’s praises when it fervently recalls “the glorious things of His works” [*Cf. Ecclus. 17:7,8]. Yet the outward praise of the lips avails to arouse the inward fervor of those who praise, and to incite others to praise God, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: We praise God, not for His benefit, but for ours as stated.

Whether God should be praised with song?

Objection 1: It would seem that God should not be praised with song. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:16): “Teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles.” Now we should employ nothing in the divine worship, save what is delivered to us on the authority of Scripture. Therefore it would seem that, in praising God, we should employ, not corporal but spiritual canticles.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome in his commentary on Eph. 5:19, “Singing and making melody in your hearts to the Lord,” says: “Listen, young men whose duty it is to recite the office in church: God is to be sung not with the voice but with the heart. Nor should you, like play-actors, ease your throat and jaws with medicaments, and make the church resound with theatrical measures and airs.” Therefore God should not be praised with song.

Objection 3: Further, the praise of God is competent to little and great, according to Apoc. 14, “Give praise to our God, all ye His servants; and you that fear Him, little and great.” But the great, who are in the church, ought not to sing: for Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): “I hereby ordain that in this See the ministers of the sacred altar must not sing” (Cf. Decret., dist.

xcii., cap. In sancta Romana Ecclesia). Therefore singing is unsuitable to the divine praises.

Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law God was praised with musical instruments and human song, according to Ps. 32:2,3: “Give praise to the Lord on the harp, sing to Him with the psaltery, the instrument of ten strings. Sing to Him a new canticle.” But the Church does not make use of musical instruments such as harps and psalteries, in the divine praises, for fear of seeming to imitate the Jews. Therefore in like manner neither should song be used in the divine praises.

Objection 5: Further, the praise of the heart is more important than the praise of the lips. But the praise of the heart is hindered by singing, both because the attention of the singers is distracted from the consideration of what they are singing, so long as they give all their attention to the chant, and because others are less able to understand the thing that are sung than if they were recited without chant. Therefore chants should not be employed in the divine praises.

On the contrary, Blessed Ambrose established singing in the Church of Milan, a Augustine relates (Confess. ix).

I answer that, As stated above [3091](A[1]), the praise of the voice is necessary in order to arouse man’s devotion towards God. Wherefore whatever is useful in conducing to this result is becomingly adopted in the divine praises. Now it is evident that the human soul is moved in various ways according to various melodies of sound, as the Philosopher state (Polit. viii, 5), and also Boethius (De Musica, prologue). Hence the use of music in the divine praises is a salutary institution, that the souls of the faint-hearted may be the more incited to devotion. Wherefore Augustine say (Confess. x, 33): “I am inclined to approve of the usage of singing in the church, that so by the delight of the ears the faint-hearted may rise to the feeling of devotion”: and he says of himself (Confess. ix, 6): “I wept in Thy hymns and canticles, touched to the quick by the voices of Thy sweet-attuned Church.”

Reply to Objection 1: The name of spiritual canticle may be given not only to those that are sung inwardly in spirit, but also to those that are sung outwardly with the lips, inasmuch as such like canticles arouse spiritual devotion.

Reply to Objection 2: Jerome does not absolutely condemn singing, but reproves those who sing theatrically in church not in order to arouse devotion, but in order to show off, or to provoke pleasure. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 33): “When it befalls me to be more moved by the voice than by the words sung, I confess to have sinned penally, and then had rather not hear the singer.”

Reply to Objection 3: To arouse men to devotion by teaching and preaching is a more excellent way than by singing. Wherefore deacons and prelates, whom it becomes to incite men’s minds towards God by means of preaching and teaching, ought not to be instant in singing, lest thereby they be withdrawn from greater things. Hence Gregory says (Regist. iv, ep. 44): “It is a most discreditable custom for those who have been raised to the diaconate to serve as choristers, for it behooves them to give their whole time to the duty of preaching and to taking charge of the alms.”

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Polit. viii, 6), “Teaching should not be accompanied with a flute or any artificial instrument such as the harp or anything else of this kind: but only with such things as make good hearers.” For such like musical instruments move the soul to pleasure rather than create a good disposition within it. In the Old Testament instruments of this description were employed, both because the people were more coarse and carnal—so that they needed to be aroused by such instruments as also by earthly promises—and because these material instruments were figures of something else.

Reply to Objection 5: The soul is distracted from that which is sung by a chant that is employed for the purpose of giving pleasure. But if the singer chant for the sake of devotion, he pays more attention to what he says, both because he lingers more thereon, and because, as Augustine remarks (Confess. x, 33), “each affection of our spirit, according to its variety, has its own appropriate measure in the voice, and singing, by some hidden correspondence wherewith it is stirred.” The same applies to the hearers, for even if some of them understand not what is sung, yet they understand why it is sung, namely, for God’s glory: and this is enough to arouse their devotion.

OF SUPERSTITION (TWO ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider the vices that are opposed to religion. First we shall consider those which agree with religion in giving worship to God; secondly, we shall treat of those vices which are manifestly contrary to religion, through showing contempt of those things that pertain to the worship of God. The former come under the head of superstition, the latter under that of irreligion. Accordingly we must consider in the first place, superstition and its parts, and afterwards irreligion and its parts.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether superstition is a vice opposed to religion?

(2) Whether it has several parts or species?

Whether superstition is a vice contrary to religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that superstition is not a vice contrary to religion. One contrary is not included in the definition of the other. But religion is included in the definition of superstition: for the latter is defined as being “immoderate observance of religion,” according to a gloss on Col. 2:23, “Which things have indeed a show of wisdom in superstition.” Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x): “Cicero [*De Natura Deorum ii, 28] states that the superstitious were so called because they spent the day in praying and offering sacrifices that their children might survive [superstites] them.” But this may be done even in accordance with true religious worship. Therefore superstition is not a vice opposed to religion.

Objection 3: Further, superstition seems to denote an excess. But religion admits of no excess, since, as stated above ([3092]Q[81], A[5], ad 3), there is no possibility of rendering to God, by religion, the equal of what we owe Him. Therefore superstition is not a vice contrary to religion.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. Serm. ix): “Thou strikest the first chord in the worship of one God, and the beast of superstition hath fallen.” Now the worship of one God belongs to religion. Therefore superstition is contrary to religion.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]), religion is a moral virtue. Now every moral virtue observes a mean, as stated above ([3093]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore a twofold vice is opposed to a moral virtue. One by way of excess, the other by way of deficiency. Again, the mean of virtue may be exceeded, not only with regard to the circumstance called "how much," but also with regard to other circumstances: so that, in certain virtues such as magnanimity and magnificence; vice exceeds the mean of virtue, not through tending to something greater than the virtue, but possibly to something less, and yet it goes beyond the mean of virtue, through doing something to whom it ought not, or when it ought not, and in like manner as regards other circumstances, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. iv, 1,2,3).

Accordingly superstition is a vice contrary to religion by excess, not that it offers more to the divine worship than true religion, but because it offers divine worship either to whom it ought not, or in a manner it ought not.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as we speak metaphorically of good among evil things—thus we speak of a good thief—so too sometimes the names of the virtues are employed by transposition in an evil sense. Thus prudence is sometimes used instead of cunning, according to Lk. 16:8, "The children of this world are more prudent [Douay: 'wiser'] in their generation than the children of light." It is in this way that superstition is described as religion.

Reply to Objection 2: The etymology of a word differs from its meaning. For its etymology depends on what it is taken from for the purpose of signification: whereas its meaning depends on the thing to which it is applied for the purpose of signifying it. Now these things differ sometimes: for "lapis" [a stone] takes its name from hurting the foot [laedere pedem], but this is not its meaning, else iron, since it hurts the foot, would be a stone. In like manner it does not follow that "superstition" means that from which the word is derived.

Reply to Objection 3: Religion does not admit of excess, in respect of absolute quantity, but it does admit of excess in respect of proportionate quantity, in so far, to wit, as something may be done in divine worship that ought not to be done.

Whether there are various species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not various species of superstition. According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13), "if one contrary includes many kinds, so does the other." Now religion, to which superstition is contrary, does not include various species; but all its acts belong to the one species. Therefore neither has superstition various species.

Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But religion, to which superstition is opposed, relates to those things whereby we are directed to God, as stated above ([3094]Q[81], A[1]). Therefore superstition, which is opposed to religion, is not specified according to divinations of human occurrences, or by the observances of certain human actions.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Col. 2:23, “Which things have . . . a show of wisdom in superstition,” adds: “that is to say in a hypocritical religion.” Therefore hypocrisy should be reckoned a species of superstition.

On the contrary, Augustine assigns the various species of superstition (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20).

I answer that, As stated above, sins against religion consist in going beyond the mean of virtue in respect of certain circumstances [3095](A[1]). For as we have stated ([3096]FS, Q[72], A[9]), not every diversity of corrupt circumstances differentiates the species of a sin, but only that which is referred to diverse objects, for diverse ends: since it is in this respect that moral acts are diversified specifically, as stated above ([3097]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3098]FS, Q[18], AA[2],6).

Accordingly the species of superstition are differentiated, first on the part of the mode, secondly on the part of the object. For the divine worship may be given either to whom it ought to be given, namely, to the true God, but “in an undue mode,” and this is the first species of superstition; or to whom it ought not to be given, namely, to any creature whatsoever, and this is another genus of superstition, divided into many species in respect of the various ends of divine worship. For the end of divine worship is in the first place to give reverence to God, and in this respect the first species of this genus is “idolatry,” which unduly gives divine honor to a creature. The second end of religion is that man may be taught by God Whom he worships; and to this must be referred “divinatory” superstition, which consults the demons through compacts made with them, whether tacit or explicit. Thirdly, the end of divine worship is a certain direction of human acts according to the precepts of God the object of that worship: and to this must be referred the superstition of certain “observances.”

Augustine alludes to these three (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20), where he says that “anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols is superstitious,” and this refers to the first species. Then he goes on to say, “or any agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens,” which refers to the second species; and a little further on he adds: “To this kind belong all sorts of amulets and such like,” and this refers to the third species.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “good results from a cause that is one and entire, whereas evil arises from each single defect.” Wherefore several vices are opposed to one virtue, as stated above [3099](A[1]; Q[10], A[5]). The saying of the Philosopher is true of opposites wherein there is the same reason of multiplicity.

Reply to Objection 2: Divinations and certain observances come under the head of superstition, in so far as they depend on certain actions of the demons: and thus they pertain to compacts made with them.

Reply to Objection 3: Hypocritical religion is taken here for “religion as applied to human observances,” as the gloss goes on to explain. Wherefore this hypocritical religion is nothing else than worship given to God in an undue mode: as, for instance, if a man were, in the time of grace, to wish to worship God according to the rite of the Old Law. It is of religion taken in this sense that the gloss speaks literally.

OF SUPERSTITION CONSISTING IN UNDUE WORSHIP OF THE TRUE GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the species of superstition. We shall treat (1) Of the superstition which consists in giving undue worship to the true God; (2) Of the superstition of idolatry; (3) of divinatory superstition; (4) of the superstition of observances.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?

(2) Whether there can be anything superfluous therein?

Whether there can be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anything pernicious in the worship of the true God. It is written (Joel 2:32): “Everyone that shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved.” Now whoever worships God calls upon His name. Therefore all worship of God is conducive to salvation, and consequently none is pernicious.

Objection 2: Further, it is the same God that is worshiped by the just in any age of the world. Now before the giving of the Law the just worshiped God in whatever manner they pleased, without committing mortal sin: wherefore Jacob bound himself by his own vow to a special kind of worship, as related in Genesis 28. Therefore now also no worship of God is pernicious.

Objection 3: Further, nothing pernicious is tolerated in the Church. Yet the Church tolerates various rites of divine worship: wherefore Gregory, replying to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xi, ep. 64), who stated that there existed in the churches various customs in the celebration of Mass, wrote: “I wish you to choose carefully whatever you find likely to be most pleasing to God, whether in the Roman territory, or in the land of the Gauls, or in any part of the Church.” Therefore no way of worshiping God is pernicious.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Jerome (Ep. lxxv, ad Aug.) See Opp. August. Ep. lxxxii] in a letter to Jerome (and the words are quoted in a gloss on Gal. 2:14) says that “after the Gospel truth had been preached the legal observances became deadly,” and yet these observances belonged to the worship of God. Therefore there can be something deadly in the divine worship.

I answer that, As Augustine states (Cont. Mendac. xiv), “a most pernicious lie is that which is uttered in matters pertaining to Christian religion.” Now it is a lie if one signify outwardly that which is contrary to the truth. But just as a thing is signified by word, so it is by deed: and it is in this signification by deed that the outward worship of religion consists, as shown above ([3100]Q[81], A[7]). Consequently, if anything false is signified by outward worship, this worship will be pernicious.

Now this happens in two ways. In the first place, it happens on the part of the thing signified, through the worship signifying something discordant therefrom: and in this way, at the time of the New Law, the mysteries of Christ being already accomplished, it is pernicious to make use of the ceremonies of the Old Law whereby the mysteries of Christ were foreshadowed as things to come: just as it would be pernicious for anyone to declare that Christ has yet to suffer. In the second place, falsehood in outward worship occurs on the part of the worshiper, and especially in common worship which is offered by ministers impersonating the whole Church. For even as he would be guilty of falsehood who would, in the name of another person, proffer things that are not committed to him, so too does a man incur the guilt of falsehood who, on the part of the Church, gives worship to God contrary to the manner established by the Church or divine authority, and according to ecclesiastical custom. Hence Ambrose [*Comment. in 1 ad1 Cor. 11:27, quoted in the gloss of Peter Lombard] says: “He is unworthy who celebrates the mystery otherwise than Christ delivered it.” For this reason, too, a gloss on Col. 2:23 says that superstition is “the use of human observances under the name of religion.”

Reply to Objection 1: Since God is truth, to invoke God is to worship Him in spirit and truth, according to Jn. 4:23. Hence a worship that contains falsehood, is inconsistent with a salutary calling upon God.

Reply to Objection 2: Before the time of the Law the just were instructed by an inward instinct as to the way of worshiping God, and others followed them. But afterwards men were instructed by outward precepts about this matter, and it is wicked to disobey them.

Reply to Objection 3: The various customs of the Church in the divine worship are in no way contrary to the truth: wherefore we must observe them, and to disregard them is unlawful.

Whether there can be any excess in the worship of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be excess in the worship of God. It is written (Ecclus. 43:32): “Glorify the Lord as much as ever you can, for He will yet far exceed.” Now the divine worship is directed to the glorification of God. Therefore there can be no excess in it.

Objection 2: Further, outward worship is a profession of inward worship, “whereby God is worshiped with faith, hope, and charity,” as Augustine says (Enchiridion iii). Now there can be no excess in faith, hope, and charity. Neither, therefore, can there be in the worship of God.

Objection 3: Further, to worship God consists in offering to Him what we have received from Him. But we have received all our goods from God. Therefore if we do all that we possibly can for God’s honor, there will be no excess in the divine worship.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 18) “that the good and true Christian rejects also superstitious fancies, from Holy Writ.” But Holy Writ teaches us to worship God. Therefore there can be superstition by reason of excess even in the worship of God.

I answer that, A thing is said to be in excess in two ways. First, with regard to absolute quantity, and in this way there cannot be excess in the worship of God, because whatever man does is less than he owes God. Secondly, a thing is in excess with regard to quantity of proportion, through not being proportionate to its end. Now the end of divine worship is that man may give glory to God, and submit to Him in mind and body. Consequently, whatever a man may do conducing to God’s glory, and subjecting his mind to God, and his body, too, by a moderate curbing of the concupiscences, is not excessive in the divine worship, provided it be in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, and in keeping with the customs of those among whom he lives.

On the other hand if that which is done be, in itself, not conducive to God’s glory, nor raise man’s mind to God, nor curb inordinate concupiscence, or again if it be not in accordance with the commandments of God and of the Church, or if it be contrary to the general custom—which, according to Augustine [*Ad Casulan. Ep. xxxvi], “has the force of law”—all this must be reckoned excessive and superstitious, because consisting, as it does, of mere externals, it has no connection with the internal worship of God. Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) quotes the words of Lk. 17:21, “The kingdom of God is within you,” against the “superstitious,” those, to wit, who pay more attention to externals.

Reply to Objection 1: The glorification of God implies that what is done is done for God’s glory: and this excludes the excess denoted by superstition.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith, hope and charity subject the mind to God, so that there can be nothing excessive in them. It is different with external acts, which sometimes have no connection with these virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers excess by way of absolute quantity.

OF IDOLATRY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider idolatry: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether idolatry is a species of superstition?

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) Whether it is the gravest sin?

(4) Of the cause of this sin.

Whether idolatry is rightly reckoned a species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not rightly reckoned a species of superstition. Just as heretics are unbelievers, so are idolaters. But heresy is a species of unbelief, as stated above ([3101]Q[11], A[1]). Therefore idolatry is also a species of unbelief and not of superstition.

Objection 2: Further, latria pertains to the virtue of religion to which superstition is opposed. But latria, apparently, is univocally applied to idolatry and to that which belongs to the true religion. For just as we speak univocally of the desire of false happiness, and of the desire of true happiness, so too, seemingly, we speak univocally of the worship of false gods, which is called idolatry, and of the worship of the true God, which is the latria of true religion. Therefore idolatry is not a species of superstition.

Objection 3: Further, that which is nothing cannot be the species of any genus. But idolatry, apparently, is nothing: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:4): “We know that an idol is nothing in the world,” and further on (1 Cor. 10:19): “What then? Do I say that what is offered in sacrifice to idols is anything? Or that the idol is anything?” implying an answer in the negative. Now offering things to idols belongs properly to idolatry. Therefore since idolatry is like to nothing, it cannot be a species of superstition.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to superstition to give divine honor to whom that honor is not due. Now divine honor is undue to idols, just as it is undue to other creatures, wherefore certain people are reproached (Rom.

1:25) for that they "worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator." Therefore this species of superstition is unfittingly called idolatry, and should rather be named "worship of creatures."

On the contrary, It is related (Acts 17:16) that when Paul awaited Silas and Timothy at Athens, "his spirit was stirred within him seeing the whole city given to idolatry," and further on (Acts 17:22) he says: "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things you are too superstitious." Therefore idolatry belongs to superstition.

I answer that, As stated above ([3102]Q[92], A[2]), it belongs to superstition to exceed the due mode of divine worship, and this is done chiefly when divine worship is given to whom it should not be given. Now it should be given to the most high uncreated God alone, as stated above ([3103]Q[81], A[1]) when we were treating of religion. Therefore it is superstition to give worship to any creature whatsoever.

Now just as this divine worship was given to sensible creatures by means of sensible signs, such as sacrifices, games, and the like, so too was it given to a creature represented by some sensible form or shape, which is called an "idol." Yet divine worship was given to idols in various ways. For some, by means of a nefarious art, constructed images which produced certain effects by the power of the demons: wherefore they deemed that the images themselves contained something God-like, and consequently that divine worship was due to them. This was the opinion of Hermes Trismegistus [*De Natura Deorum, ad Asclep], as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei viii, 23): while others gave divine worship not to the images, but to the creatures represented thereby. The Apostle alludes to both of these (Rom. 1:23, 25). For, as regards the former, he says: "They changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four-footed beasts, and of creeping things," and of the latter he says: "Who worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator."

These latter were of three ways of thinking. For some deemed certain men to have been gods, whom they worshipped in the images of those men: for instance, Jupiter, Mercury, and so forth. Others again deemed the whole world to be one god, not by reason of its material substance, but by reason of its soul, which they believed to be God, for they held God to be nothing else than a soul governing the world by movement and reason: even as a man is said to be wise in respect not of his body but of his soul. Hence they thought that divine worship ought to be given to the whole world and to all its parts, heaven, air, water, and to all such things: and to these they referred the names of their gods, as Varro asserted, and Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii, 5). Lastly, others, namely, the Platonists, said that there is one supreme god, the cause of all things. After him they placed certain spiritual substances created by the supreme god. These they called “gods,” on account of their having a share of the godhead; but we call them “angels.” After these they placed the souls of the heavenly bodies, and beneath these the demons which they stated to be certain animal denizens of the air, and beneath these again they placed human souls, which they believed to be taken up into the fellowship of the gods or of the demons by reason of the merit of their virtue. To all these they gave divine worship, as Augustine relates (De Civ . . Dei xviii, 14).

The last two opinions were held to belong to “natural theology” which the philosophers gathered from their study of the world and taught in the schools: while the other, relating to the worship of men, was said to belong to “mythical theology” which was wont to be represented on the stage according to the fancies of poets. The remaining opinion relating to images was held to belong to “civil theology,” which was celebrated by the pontiffs in the temples [*De Civ. Dei vi, 5].

Now all these come under the head of the superstition of idolatry. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20): “Anything invented by man for making and worshipping idols, or for giving Divine worship to a creature or any part of a creature, is superstitious.”

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is not faith, but a confession of faith by outward signs, so superstition is a confession of unbelief by external worship. Such a confession is signified by the term idolatry, but not by the term heresy, which only means a false opinion. Therefore heresy is a species of unbelief, but idolatry is a species of superstition.

Reply to Objection 2: The term latria may be taken in two senses. In one sense it may denote a human act pertaining to the worship of God: and then its signification remains the same, to whomsoever it be shown, because, in this sense, the thing to which it is shown is not included in its definition. Taken thus latria is applied univocally, whether to true religion or to idolatry, just as the payment of a tax is univocally the same, whether it is paid to the true or to a false king. In another sense latria denotes the same as religion, and then, since it is a virtue, it is essential thereto that divine worship be given to whom it ought to be given; and in this way latria is applied equivocally to the latria of true religion, and to idolatry: just as prudence is applied equivocally to the prudence that is a virtue, and to that which is carnal.

Reply to Objection 3: The saying of the Apostle that “an idol is nothing in the world” means that those images which were called idols, were not animated, or possessed of a divine power, as Hermes maintained, as though they were composed of spirit and body. In the same sense we must understand the saying that “what is offered in sacrifice to idols is not anything,” because by being thus sacrificed the sacrificial flesh acquired neither sanctification, as the Gentiles thought, nor uncleanness, as the Jews held.

Reply to Objection 4: It was owing to the general custom among the Gentiles of worshipping any kind of creature under the form of images that the term “idolatry” was used to signify any worship of a creature, even without the use of images.

Whether idolatry is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not a sin. Nothing is a sin that the true faith employs in worshipping God. Now the true faith employs images for the divine worship: since both in the Tabernacle were there images of the cherubim, as related in Ex. 25, and in the Church are images set up which the faithful worship. Therefore idolatry, whereby idols are worshipped, is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, reverence should be paid to every superior. But the angels and the souls of the blessed are our superiors. Therefore it will be no sin to pay them reverence by worship, of sacrifices or the like.

Objection 3: Further, the most high God should be honored with an inward worship, according to Jn. 4:24, “God . . . they must adore . . . in spirit and in truth”: and Augustine says (Enchiridion iii), that “God is worshipped by faith, hope and charity.” Now a man may happen to worship idols outwardly, and yet not wander from the true faith inwardly. Therefore it seems that we may worship idols outwardly without prejudice to the divine worship.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 20:5): “Thou shalt not adore them,” i.e. outwardly, “nor serve them,” i.e. inwardly, as a gloss explains it: and it is a question of graven things and images. Therefore it is a sin to worship idols whether outwardly or inwardly.

I answer that, There has been a twofold error in this matter. For some [*The School of Plato] have thought that to offer sacrifices and other things pertaining to latria, not only to God but also to the others aforesaid, is due and good in itself, since they held that divine honor should be paid to every superior nature, as being nearer to God. But this is unreasonable. For though we ought to revere all superiors, yet the same reverence is not due to them all: and something special is due to the most high God Who excels all in a singular manner: and this is the worship of latria.

Nor can it be said, as some have maintained, that “these visible sacrifices are fitting with regard to other gods, and that to the most high God, as being better than those others, better sacrifices, namely, the service of a pure mind, should be offered” [*Augustine, as quoted below]. The reason is that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 19), “external sacrifices are signs of internal, just as audible words are signs of things. Wherefore, just as by prayer and praise we utter significant words to Him, and offer to Him in our hearts the things they signify, so too in our sacrifices we ought to realize that we should offer a visible sacrifice to no other than to Him Whose invisible sacrifice we ourselves should be in our hearts.”

Others held that the outward worship of latria should be given to idols, not as though it were something good or fitting in itself, but as being in harmony with the general custom. Thus Augustine (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) quotes Seneca as saying: “We shall adore,” says he, “in such a way as to remember that our worship ss in accordance with custom rather than with the reality”: and (De Vera Relig. v) Augustine says that “we must not seek religion from the philosophers, who accepted the same things for sacred, as did the people; and gave utterance in the schools to various and contrary opinions about the nature of their gods, and the sovereign good.” This error was embraced also by certain heretics [*The Helcesaitae], who affirmed that it is not wrong for one who is seized in time of persecution to worship idols outwardly so long as he keeps the faith in his heart.

But this is evidently false. For since outward worship is a sign of the inward worship, just as it is a wicked lie to affirm the contrary of what one holds inwardly of the true faith so too is it a wicked falsehood to pay outward worship to anything counter to the sentiments of one’s heart. Wherefore Augustine condemns Seneca (De Civ. Dei vi, 10) in that “his worship of idols was so much the more infamous forasmuch as the things he did dishonestly were so done by him that the people believed him to act honestly.”

Reply to Objection 1: Neither in the Tabernacle or Temple of the Old Law, nor again now in the Church are images set up that the worship of latria may be paid to them, but for the purpose of signification, in order that belief in the excellence of angels and saints may be impressed and confirmed in the mind of man. It is different with the image of Christ, to which latria is due on account of His Divinity, as we shall state in the [3104]TP, Q[25], A[3].

The Replies to the Second and Third Objections are evident from what has been said above.

Whether idolatry is the gravest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that idolatry is not the gravest of sins. The worst is opposed to the best (Ethic. viii, 10). But interior worship, which consists of faith, hope and charity, is better than external worship. Therefore unbelief, despair and hatred of God, which are opposed to internal worship, are graver sins than idolatry, which is opposed to external worship.

Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is against God the more grievous it is. Now, seemingly, a man acts more directly against God by blaspheming, or denying the faith, than by giving God’s worship to another, which pertains to idolatry. Therefore blasphemy and denial of the faith are more grievous sins than idolatry.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that lesser evils are punished with greater evils. But the sin of idolatry was punished with the sin against nature, as stated in Rom. 1:26. Therefore the sin against nature is a graver sin than idolatry.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xx, 5): “Neither do we say that you,” viz. the Manichees, “are pagans, or a sect of pagans, but that you bear a certain likeness to them since you worship many gods: and yet you are much worse than they are, for they worship things that exist, but should not be worshiped as gods, whereas you worship things that exist not at all.” Therefore the vice of heretical depravity is more grievous than idolatry.

Objection 5: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Gal. 4:9, “How turn you again to the weak and needy elements?” says: “The observance of the Law, to which they were then addicted, was a sin almost equal to the worship of idols, to which they had been given before their conversion.” Therefore idolatry is not the most grievous sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on the saying of Lev. 15:25, about the uncleanness of a woman suffering from an issue of blood, says: “Every sin is an uncleanness of the soul, but especially idolatry.”

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the sin itself, and thus idolatry is the most grievous sin. For just as the most heinous crime in an earthly commonwealth would seem to be for a man to give royal honor to another than the true king, since, so far as he is concerned, he disturbs the whole order of the commonwealth, so, in sins that are committed against God, which indeed are the greater sins, the greatest of all seems to be for a man to give God’s honor to a creature, since, so far as he is concerned, he sets up another God in the world, and lessens the divine sovereignty. Secondly, the gravity of a sin may be considered on the part of the sinner. Thus the sin of one that sins knowingly is said to be graver than the sin of one that sins through ignorance: and in this way nothing hinders heretics, if they knowingly corrupt the faith which they have received, from sinning more grievously than idolaters who sin through ignorance. Furthermore other sins may be more grievous on account of greater contempt on the part of the sinner.

Reply to Objection 1: Idolatry presupposes internal unbelief, and to this it adds undue worship. But in a case of external idolatry without internal unbelief, there is an additional sin of falsehood, as stated above [3105] (A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Idolatry includes a grievous blasphemy, inasmuch as it deprives God of the singleness of His dominion and denies the faith by deeds.

Reply to Objection 3: Since it is essential to punishment that it be against the will, a sin whereby another sin is punished needs to be more manifest, in order that it may make the man more hateful to himself and to others; but it need not be a more grievous sin: and in this way the sin against nature is less grievous than the sin of idolatry. But since it is more manifest, it is assigned as a fitting punishment of the sin of idolatry, in order that, as by idolatry man abuses the order of the divine honor, so by the sin against nature he may suffer confusion from the abuse of his own nature.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as to the genus of the sin, the Manichean heresy is more grievous than the sin of other idolaters, because it is more derogatory to the divine honor, since they set up two gods in opposition to one another, and hold many vain and fabulous fancies about God. It is different with other heretics, who confess their belief in one God and worship Him alone.

Reply to Objection 5: The observance of the Law during the time of grace is not quite equal to idolatry as to the genus of the sin, but almost equal, because both are species of pestiferous superstition.

Whether the cause of idolatry was on the part of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the cause of idolatry was not on the part of man. In man there is nothing but either nature, virtue, or guilt. But the cause of idolatry could not be on the part of man’s nature, since rather does man’s natural reason dictate that there is one God, and that divine worship should not be paid to the dead or to inanimate beings. Likewise, neither could idolatry have its cause in man on the part of virtue, since “a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit,” according to Mat. 7:18: nor again could it be on the part of guilt, because, according to Wis. 14:27, “the worship of abominable idols is the cause and the beginning and end of all evil.” Therefore idolatry has no cause on the part of man.

Objection 2: Further, those things which have a cause in man are found among men at all times. Now idolatry was not always, but is stated [*Peter Comestor, Hist. Genes. xxxvii, xl] to have been originated either by Nimrod, who is related to have forced men to worship fire, or by Ninus, who caused the statue of his father Bel to be worshiped. Among the Greeks, as related by Isidore (Etym. viii, 11), Prometheus was the first to set up statues of men: and the Jews say that Ismael was the first to make idols of clay. Moreover, idolatry ceased to a great extent in the sixth age. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): “It was not possible to learn, for the first time, except from their” (i.e. the demons’) “teaching, what each of them desired or disliked, and by what name to invite or compel him: so as to give birth to the magic arts and their professors”: and the same observation seems to apply to idolatry. Therefore idolatry had no cause on the part of man.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 14:14): “By the vanity of men they,” i.e. idols, “came into the world.”

I answer that, Idolatry had a twofold cause. One was a dispositive cause; this was on the part of man, and in three ways. First, on account of his inordinate affections, forasmuch as he gave other men divine honor, through either loving or revering them too much. This cause is assigned (Wis. 14:15): “A father being afflicted with bitter grief, made to himself the image of his son, who was quickly taken away: and him who then had died as a man he began to worship as a god.” The same passage goes on to say (Wis. 14:21) that “men serving either their affection, or their kings, gave the incommunicable name [Vulg.: ‘names’],” i.e. of the Godhead, “to stones and wood.” Secondly, because man takes a natural pleasure in representations, as the Philosopher observes (Poet. iv), wherefore as soon as the uncultured man saw human images skillfully fashioned by the diligence of the craftsman, he gave them divine worship; hence it is written (Wis. 13:11–17): “If an artist, a carpenter, hath cut down a tree, proper for his use, in the wood . . . and by the skill of his art fashioneth it, and maketh it like the image of a man . . . and then maketh prayer to it, inquiring concerning his substance, and his children, or his marriage.” Thirdly, on account of their ignorance of the true God, inasmuch as through failing to consider His excellence men gave divine worship to certain creatures, on account of their beauty or power, wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:1,2): “All men . . . neither by attending to the works have acknowledged who was the workman, but have imagined either the fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and the moon, to be the gods that rule the world.”

The other cause of idolatry was completive, and this was on the part of the demons, who offered themselves to be worshipped by men, by giving answers in the idols, and doing things which to men seemed marvelous. Hence it is written (Ps. 95:5): “All the gods of the Gentiles are devils.”

Reply to Objection 1: The dispositive cause of idolatry was, on the part of man, a defect of nature, either through ignorance in his intellect, or disorder in his affections, as stated above; and this pertains to guilt. Again, idolatry is stated to be the cause, beginning and end of all sin, because there is no kind of sin that idolatry does not produce at some time, either through leading expressly to that sin by causing it, or through being an occasion thereof, either as a beginning or as an end, in so far as certain sins were employed in the worship of idols; such as homicides, mutilations, and so forth. Nevertheless certain sins may precede idolatry and dispose man thereto.

Reply to Objection 2: There was no idolatry in the first age, owing to the recent remembrance of the creation of the world, so that man still retained in his mind the knowledge of one God. In the sixth age idolatry was banished by the doctrine and power of Christ, who triumphed over the devil.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the consummative cause of idolatry.

OF SUPERSTITION IN DIVINATIONS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider superstition in divinations, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether divination is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a species of superstition?

(3) Of the species of divination;

(4) Of divination by means of demons;

(5) Of divination by the stars;

(6) Of divination by dreams;

(7) Of divination by auguries and like observances;

(8) Of divination by lots.

Whether divination is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is derived from something “divine”: and things that are divine pertain to holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): “Who dares to say that learning is an evil?” and again: “I could nowise admit that intelligence can be an evil.” But some arts are divinatory, as the Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that divination is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore divination is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune tellers”: and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can. Qui divinationes): “Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a penance of five years’ duration, according to the fixed grades of penance.”

I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians, concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes, because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the future as though it were present, as stated in the [3106]FP, Q[14], A[13]; [3107]FP, Q[57], A[3]; [3108]FP, Q[86], A[4]. Hence it is written (Is. 41:23): “Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods.” Therefore if anyone presume to foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever, except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God. It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): “They are called divines, as though they were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men.”

Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does not divine, i.e. cause something divine, but rather receives something divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself, in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that “divination is always taken in an evil sense.”

Reply to Objection 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation thereof, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the devil’s deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).

Reply to Objection 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future by human means, but not by the undue means of divination.

Whether divination is a species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin. Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.

Objection 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.

Objection 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.

On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an operation of the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly, under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of the demons." Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23), "whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is superstitious." Therefore divination is a species of superstition.

I answer that, As stated above [3109](A[1]; QQ[92],94), superstition denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an oath (Q[89], A[4], ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all divination results from the demons' operation, either because the demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): "Who hath not regard to vanities and lying follies." Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of superstition.

Reply to Objection 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind of superstition as regards the mode of operation.

Reply to Objection 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express with the demons.

Reply to Objection 3: In the New Law man’s mind is restrained from solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters. On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises, there were consultations about the future in connection with religious matters. Hence where it is written (Is. 8:19): “And when they shall say to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their enchantments,” it is added by way of answer: “Should not the people seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg.: ‘seek of their God, for the living of the dead?’]”

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not several species of divination.

Objection 2: Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as stated above ([3110]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3111]FS, Q[18], A[6]). But all divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the future. Therefore all divinations are of one species.

Objection 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for whether one detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived. Therefore there are not several species of divination.

On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination (Etym. viii, 9).

I answer that, As stated above [3112](A[2]), all divinations seek to acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help, or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have been explained in the [3113]FP, Q[57], A[3]. When demons are expressly invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in order to foretell the future: and this species is called "prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded [praestringuntur]. Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called "divination by dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead, and this species is called "necromancy," for as Isidore observes (Etym. viii) in Greek, {nekron} "means dead and {manteia} divination, because after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem to come to life, to divine and to answer questions." Sometimes they foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are possessed: this is divination by "pythons," of whom Isidore says that "pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the inventor of divination." Sometimes they foretell the future by means of shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called "geomancy," if in water "hydromancy," if in the air "aeromancy," if in fire "pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the altars of demons, "aruspicy."

The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," who are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days on which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so called from the chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as "auspice" is derived from watching birds [avium inspectione]. These are chiefly wont to be observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If, however, these observations have for their object men's words uttered unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an "omen": and as Valerius Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, "the observing of omens has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time: 'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here': and on hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their intention of advancing further." If, however, the observation regards the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of figures in certain bodies, there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is taken from observing the lines of the hand is called "chiromancy," i.e. divination of the hand (because {cheir} is the Greek for hand): while the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the shoulder-blades of an animal is called "spatulamancy."

To this second species of divination, which is without express invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult, whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by observing the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out several unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest score; or by observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are named "sortilege."

Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the head of "necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the disposition or movement of some other being, and this belongs to "augury"; while the third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult; and this belongs to “sortilege.” Under each of these many others are contained, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general, but not the same special, character of sin: for it is much more grievous to invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the demons’ interference.

Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters, according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.

Reply to Objection 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by them, not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative sciences.

Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1 Pet. 2:22, “Who did no sin.” Yet our Lord asked the demon: “What is thy name?” and the latter replied: “My name is Legion, for we are many” (Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the occult.

Objection 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter inquired of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue of the coming war (1 Kings 28:8, sqq.). Therefore the divination that consists in questioning demons is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): “Neither let there be found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . . . that consulteth pythonic spirits.”

I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking him.

This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against certain persons (Is. 28:15): “You have said: We have entered into a league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell.” And still more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result. For the demon who intends man’s perdition endeavors, by his answers, even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words of Lk. 4:35, “He rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace,” says: “Although the demon confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his speech, lest together with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to care little for such things, however much he may seem to speak the truth. For it is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek knowledge from the demons.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to Bede’s commentary on Lk. 8:30, “Our Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease, which he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might shine forth more graciously.” Now it is one thing to question a demon who comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the power of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.

Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3), “there is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man, being about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted to appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things.”

Reply to Objection 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by invoking the demon.

Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes: thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease. Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the stars is not unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, human science originates from experiments, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means whereby some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Objection 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God’s creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is not unlawful.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): “Those astrologers whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and condemns.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3114]AA[1],2), the operation of the demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false and vain opinions, in order that man’s mind may become entangled in vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if, by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident that those things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this mean,: even so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.

However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable statement: since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can they be ascribed to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are referable to a common higher cause, which is divine providence. on the contrary the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because the former are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they always occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable. Consequently it is impossible to acquire foreknowledge of the future from an observation of the stars, except in so far as effects can be foreknown from their causes.

Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi [*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what occurs accidentally, neither is a "being" properly speaking, nor is "one"—for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave—for these and like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things. Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term, just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of a natural thing.

In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will: for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense, with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who held that "such is the will of man, as is the day which the father of men and of gods," i.e. the sun or the heavens, "brings on" [*Odyssey xviii, 135].

Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will's operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since, however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on the free-will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the inclination of the heavenly bodies.

Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion; and so the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance, drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a superstitious divination.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First, because a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Secondly, because of the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17): “When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that this is due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden in his mind. And since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who desire to deceive man for they are permitted to know certain things about temporal affairs.” Wherefore he concludes: “Thus a good Christian should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, especially of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become the dupe of the demons and by making a compact of partnership with them enmesh itself in their fellowship.”

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful. It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are instructed by

God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15,16): “By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds, then He,” God to wit, “openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn.” Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by dreams.

Objection 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking, make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh’s butler and of his chief baker (Gn. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king of Babylon (Dan. 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): “Neither let there be found among you any one that . . . observeth dreams.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3115]AA[2],6), divination is superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion. Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future occurrences; for instance, when a person’s mind becomes anxious through what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of them.

Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold: one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a man’s thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body: because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.

In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper’s imagination is affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num. 12:6, “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” Sometimes, however, it is due to the action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.

Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit, through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gn. 44:5) that Joseph’s steward said: “The cup which you have stolen is that in which my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine [augurari]”: and he himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gn. 44:15): “Know you not that there is no one like me in the science of divining?” Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Objection 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding future occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, “The kite in the air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork have observed the time of their coming.” Now natural knowledge is infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make use of the birds’ knowledge in order to know the future, and this is divination by augury.

Objection 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32). Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham’s servant, acted in like manner (Gn. 24). Therefore it seems that this kind of divination is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): “Neither let there be found among you anyone . . . that observeth omens.”

I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed are also the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them. Now the cause of dumb animals’ actions is a certain instinct whereby they are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their actions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first place it may be due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have naught but a sensitive soul, every power of which is the act of a bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding bodies, and primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future, in so far as they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies and of the surrounding air, to which certain future events are due. Yet in this matter we must observe two things: first, that such observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly bodies, as stated above ([3116]AA[5],6): secondly, that they be not applied to other matters than those which in some way may have reference to these animals (since they acquire through the heavenly bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary for their life—such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so forth).

In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause, namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and sometimes according to the action of the demons.

Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set according to the order of nature or of divine providence.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes., qu. cxlv], when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.

Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that birds have about things concerning them; and in order to know these things it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus from the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.

Reply to Objection 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation of a dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for his instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words, having previously prayed to God.

Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, “My lots are in Thy hands,” says: “It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt.”

Objection 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both in the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq.) that Josue, at the Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan had eaten honey (1 Kings 14:58, sqq.): Jonas, when fleeing from the face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonah 1:7, sqq.): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk. 1:9): and the apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship (Acts 1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i.e. single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are called "popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege, because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, sqq.). Therefore it would seem that divination by lot is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can. Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under pain of anathema."

I answer that, As stated above [3117](A[3]), sortilege consists, properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession, an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know what ought to be done, it is called "sortilege of consultation"; if one seeks to know what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of divination." Now the actions of man that are required for sortilege and their results are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone practicing sortilege is so minded as though the human acts requisite for sortilege depended for their result on the dispositions of the stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from the interference of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is superstitious and unlawful.

Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in “sortilege of allotment,” it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.

If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech. 21:21) that “the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols, and consulted entrails”: sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and forbidden by the canons.

Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov. 16:33, “Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the Lord”: sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. OBJ[1]].

Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Lk. 1:8, says: “He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men.” Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): “But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks that he ought, after the apostles’ example, to consult God by casting lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so, except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring forth prayer to God.” Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep. lv): “Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things of this life.” Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act. Apost. i): “Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was decided by lot,” because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not yet poured forth into the Church: “whereas the same deacons were ordained not by lot but by the choice of the disciples.” It is different with earthly honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in the distribution of earthly possessions.

If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), “If, at a time of persecution, the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no other means of coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by lot.” Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): “If thou aboundest in that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of whom surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee, thou couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt give that which thou canst not give to both.”

This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.

Reply to Objection 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is directed to the investigation of someone’s hidden sin, by means of something done by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of lots. But in so far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it surpasses the common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v., can. Consuluist i]: “The sacred canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by means of the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must presume, by a superstitious innovation, to practice what is not sanctioned by the teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable that public crimes should be judged by our authority, after the culprit has made spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been approved, with due regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown crimes must be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men.” The same would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that it approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in strength or skill.

OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the magic art;

(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;

(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;

(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.

Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft: secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end, namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to practice these observances.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children" who abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book, and wisdom." Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice it.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above [3118](A[1]), the reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future is because they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to God. Yet the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about things necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener intellect, as Augustine says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon. 3,4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, even though it achieve its result through the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth from the dead": which search relies on the demons’ help. Now through the observances of the magic art, knowledge of the truth is sought “by means of certain signs agreed upon by compact with the demons” [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above[3119] Q[92], A[2]]. Therefore it is unlawful to practice the notary art.

I answer that, The magic art is both unlawful and futile. It is unlawful, because the means it employs for acquiring knowledge have not in themselves the power to cause science, consisting as they do in gazing certain shapes, and muttering certain strange words, and so forth. Wherefore this art does not make use of these things as causes, but as signs; not however as signs instituted by God, as are the sacramental signs. It follows, therefore, that they are empty signs, and consequently a kind of “agreement or covenant made with the demons for the purpose of consultation and of compact by tokens” [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20; see above Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore the magic art is to be absolutely repudiated and avoided by Christian, even as other arts of vain and noxious superstition, as Augustine declares (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23). This art is also useless for the acquisition of science. For since it is not intended by means of this art to acquire science in a manner connatural to man, namely, by discovery and instruction, the consequence is that this effect is expected either from God or from the demons. Now it is certain that some have received wisdom and science infused into them by God, as related of Solomon (3 Kings 3 and 2 Paralip 1). Moreover, our Lord said to His disciples (Lk. 21:15): “I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries shall not be able to resist and gainsay.” However, this gift is not granted to all, or in connection with any particular observance, but according to the will of the Holy Ghost, as stated in 1 Cor. 12:8, “To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit,” and afterwards it is said (1 Cor. 12:11): “All these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according as He will.” On the other hand it does not belong to the demons to enlighten the intellect, as stated in the [3120]FP, Q[109], A[3]. Now the acquisition of knowledge and wisdom is effected by the enlightening of the intellect, wherefore never did anyone acquire knowledge by means of the demons. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 9): “Porphyry confesses that the intellectual soul is in no way cleansed by theurgic inventions,” i.e. the operations “of the demons, so as to be fitted to see its God, and discern what is true,” such as are all scientific conclusions. The demons may, however, be able by speaking to men to express in words certain teachings of the sciences, but this is not what is sought by means of magic.

Reply to Objection 1: It is a good thing to acquire knowledge, but it is not good to acquire it by undue means, and it is to this end that the magic art tends.

Reply to Objection 2: The abstinence of these children was not in accordance with a vain observance of the notary art, but according to the authority of the divine law, for they refused to be defiled by the meat of Gentiles. Hence as a reward for their obedience they received knowledge from God, according to Ps. 118:100, “I have had understanding above the ancients, because I have sought Thy commandments.”

Reply to Objection 3: To seek knowledge of the future from the demons is a sin not only because they are ignorant of the future, but also on account of the fellowship entered into with them, which also applies to the case in point.

Whether observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health or the like, are unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the alteration of bodies, as for the purpose of acquiring health, or the like, are lawful. It is lawful to make use of the natural forces of bodies in order to produce their proper effects. Now in the physical order things have certain occult forces, the reason of which man is unable to assign; for instance that the magnet attracts iron, and many like instances, all of which Augustine enumerates (De Civ. Dei xxi, 5,7). Therefore it would seem lawful to employ such like forces for the alteration of bodies.

Objection 2: Further, artificial bodies are subject to the heavenly bodies, just as natural bodies are. Now natural bodies acquire certain occult forces resulting from their species through the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore artificial bodies, e.g. images, also acquire from the heavenly bodies a certain occult force for the production of certain effects. Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of them and of such like things.

Objection 3: Further, the demons too are able to alter bodies in many ways, as Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 8,9). But their power is from God. Therefore it is lawful to make use of their power for the purpose of producing these alterations.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that "to superstition belong the experiments of magic arts, amulets and nostrums condemned by the medical faculty, consisting either of incantations or of certain cyphers which they call characters, or of any kind of thing worn or fastened on."

I answer that, In things done for the purpose of producing some bodily effect we must consider whether they seem able to produce that effect naturally: for if so it will not be unlawful to do so, since it is lawful to employ natural causes in order to produce their proper effects. But, if they seem unable to produce those effects naturally, it follows that they are employed for the purpose of producing those effects, not as causes but only as signs, so that they come under the head of "compact by tokens entered into with the demons" [*Augustine, De Doctr. Christ.; see above[3121] Q[92], A[2]]. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6): "The demons are allured by means of creatures, which were made, not by them, but by God. They are enticed by various objects differing according to the various things in which they delight, not as animals by meat, but as spirits by signs, such as are to each one's liking, by means of various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals, songs and rites."

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing superstitious or unlawful in employing natural things simply for the purpose of causing certain effects such as they are thought to have the natural power of producing. But if in addition there be employed certain characters, words, or any other vain observances which clearly have no efficacy by nature, it will be superstitious and unlawful.

Reply to Objection 2: The natural forces of natural bodies result from their substantial forms which they acquire through the influence of heavenly bodies; wherefore through this same influence they acquire certain active forces. On the other hand the forms of artificial bodies result from the conception of the craftsman; and since they are nothing else but composition, order and shape, as stated in Phys. i, 5, they cannot have a natural active force. Consequently, no force accrues to them from the influence of heavenly bodies, in so far as they are artificial, but only in respect of their natural matter. Hence it is false, what Porphyry held, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11), that “by herbs, stones, animals, certain particular sounds, words, shapes and devices, or again by certain movements of the stars observed in the course of the heavens it is possible for men to fashion on earth forces capable of carrying into effect the various dispositions of the stars,” as though the results of the magic arts were to be ascribed to the power of the heavenly bodies. In fact as Augustine adds (De Civ. Dei x, 11), “all these things are to be ascribed to the demons, who delude the souls that are subject to them.”

Wherefore those images called astronomical also derive their efficacy from the actions of the demons: a sign of this is that it is requisite to inscribe certain characters on them which do not conduce to any effect naturally, since shape is not a principle of natural action. Yet astronomical images differ from necromantic images in this, that the latter include certain explicit invocations and trickery, wherefore they come under the head of explicit agreements made with the demons: whereas in the other images there are tacit agreements by means of tokens in certain shapes or characters.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the domain of the divine majesty, to Whom the demons are subject, that God should employ them to whatever purpose He will. But man has not been entrusted with power over the demons, to employ them to whatsoever purpose he will; on the contrary, it is appointed that he should wage war against the demons. Hence in no way is it lawful for man to make use of the demons’ help by compacts either tacit or express.

Whether observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that observances directed to the purpose of fortune-telling are not unlawful. Sickness is one of the misfortunes that occur to man. Now sickness in man is preceded by certain symptoms, which the physician observes. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe such like signs.

Objection 2: Further, it is unreasonable to deny that which nearly everybody experiences. Now nearly everyone experiences that certain times, or places, hearing of certain words meetings of men or animals, uncanny or ungainly actions, are presages of good or evil to come. Therefore it seems not unlawful to observe these things.

Objection 3: Further, human actions and occurrences are disposed by divine providence in a certain order: and this order seems to require that precedent events should be signs of subsequent occurrences: wherefore, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:6), the things that happened to the fathers of old are signs of those that take place in our time. Now it is not unlawful to observe the order that proceeds from divine providence. Therefore it is seemingly not unlawful to observe these presages.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20) that “a thousand vain observances are comprised under the head of compacts entered into with the demons: for instance, the twitching of a limb; a stone, a dog, or a boy coming between friends walking together; kicking the door-post when anyone passes in front of one’s house; to go back to bed if you happen to sneeze while putting on your shoes; to return home if you trip when going forth; when the rats have gnawed a hole in your clothes, to fear superstitiously a future evil rather than to regret the actual damage.”

I answer that, Men attend to all these observances, not as causes but as signs of future events, good or evil. Nor do they observe them as signs given by God, since these signs are brought forward, not on divine authority, but rather by human vanity with the cooperation of the malice of the demons, who strive to entangle men’s minds with such like trifles. Accordingly it is evident that all these observances are superstitious and unlawful: they are apparently remains of idolatry, which authorized the observance of auguries, of lucky and unlucky days which is allied to divination by the stars, in respect of which one day differentiated from another: except that these observances are devoid of reason and art, wherefore they are yet more vain and superstitious.

Reply to Objection 1: The causes of sickness are seated in us, and they produce certain signs of sickness to come, which physicians lawfully observe. Wherefore it is not unlawful to consider a presage of future events as proceeding from its cause; as when a slave fears a flogging when he sees his master’s anger. Possibly the same might be said if one were to fear for child lest it take harm from the evil eye, of which we have spoken in the

[3122]FP, Q[117], A[3], ad 2. But this does not apply to this kind of observances.

Reply to Objection 2: That men have at first experienced a certain degree of truth in these observances is due to chance. But afterwards when a man begins to entangle his mind with observances of this kind, many things occur in connection with them through the trickery of the demons, "so that men, through being entangled in these observances, become yet more curious, and more and more embroiled in the manifold snares of a pernicious error," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23).

Reply to Objection 3: Among the Jewish people of whom Christ was to be born, not only words but also deeds were prophetic, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. iv, 2; xxii, 24). Wherefore it is lawful to apply those deeds to our instruction, as signs given by God. Not all things, however, that occur through divine providence are ordered so as to be signs of the future. Hence the argument does not prove.

Whether it is unlawful to wear divine words at the neck?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to wear divine words at the neck. Divine words are no less efficacious when written than when uttered. But it is lawful to utter sacred words for the purpose of producing certain effects; (for instance, in order to heal the sick), such as the "Our Father" or the "Hail Mary," or in any way whatever to call on the Lord's name, according to Mk. 16:17,18, "In My name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues, they shall take up serpents." Therefore it seems to be lawful to wear sacred words at one's neck, as a remedy for sickness or for any kind of distress.

Objection 2: Further, sacred words are no less efficacious on the human body than on the bodies of serpents and other animals. Now certain incantations are efficacious in checking serpents, or in healing certain other animals: wherefore it is written (Ps. 57:5): "Their madness is according to the likeness of a serpent, like the deaf asp that stoppeth her ears, which will not hear the voice of the charmers, nor of the wizard that charmeth wisely." Therefore it is lawful to wear sacred words as a remedy for men.

Objection 3: Further, God's word is no less holy than the relics of the saints; wherefore Augustine says (Lib. L. Hom. xxvi) that "God's word is of no less account than the Body of Christ." Now it is lawful for one to wear the relics of the saints at one's neck, or to carry them about one in any way for the purpose of self-protection. Therefore it is equally lawful to have recourse to the words of Holy Writ, whether uttered or written, for one's protection.

Objection 4: On the other hand, Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.) [*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, and falsely ascribed to him]: "Some wear round their necks a passage in writing from the Gospel. Yet is not the Gospel read in church and heard by all every day? How then, if it does a man no good to have the Gospels in his ears, will he find salvation by wearing them round his neck? Moreover, where is the power of the Gospel? In the shapes of the letters or in the understanding of the sense? If in the shapes, you do well to wear them round your neck; if in the understanding, you will then do better to bear them in your heart than to wear them round your neck."

I answer that, In every incantation or wearing of written words, two points seem to demand caution. The first is the thing said or written, because if it is connected with invocation of the demons it is clearly superstitious and unlawful. In like manner it seems that one should beware lest it contain strange words, for fear that they conceal something unlawful. Hence Chrysostom says [*Cf. the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum, among St. Chrysostom's works, falsely ascribed to him] that "many now after the example of the Pharisees who enlarged their fringes, invent and write Hebrew names of angels, and fasten them to their persons. Such things seem fearsome to those who do not understand them." Again, one should take care lest it contain anything false, because in that case also the effect could not be ascribed to God, Who does not bear witness to a falsehood.

In the second place, one should beware lest besides the sacred words it contain something vain, for instance certain written characters, except the sign of the Cross; or if hope be placed in the manner of writing or fastening, or in any like vanity, having no connection with reverence for God, because this would be pronounced superstitious: otherwise, however, it is lawful. Hence it is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, cap. Non liceat Christianis): "In blending together medicinal herbs, it is not lawful to make use of observances or incantations, other than the divine symbol, or the Lord's Prayer, so as to give honor to none but God the Creator of all."

Reply to Objection 1: It is indeed lawful to pronounce divine words, or to invoke the divine name, if one do so with a mind to honor God alone, from Whom the result is expected: but it is unlawful if it be done in connection with any vain observance.

Reply to Objection 2: Even in the case of incantations of serpents or any animals whatever, if the mind attend exclusively to the sacred words and to the divine power, it will not be unlawful. Such like incantations, however, often include unlawful observances, and rely on the demons for their result, especially in the case of serpents, because the serpent was the first instrument employed by the devil in order to deceive man. Hence a gloss on the passage quoted says: “Note that Scripture does not commend everything whence it draws its comparisons, as in the case of the unjust judge who scarcely heard the widow’s request.”

Reply to Objection 3: The same applies to the wearing of relics, for if they be worn out of confidence in God, and in the saints whose relics they are, it will not be unlawful. But if account were taken in this matter of some vain circumstance (for instance that the casket be three-cornered, or the like, having no bearing on the reverence due to God and the saints), it would be superstitious and unlawful.

Reply to Objection 4: Chrysostom is speaking the case in which more attention is paid the written characters than to the understanding of the words.

OF THE TEMPTATION OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices that are opposed to religion, through lack of religion, and which are manifestly contrary thereto, so that they come under the head of irreligion. Such are the vices which pertain to contempt or irreverence for God and holy things. Accordingly we shall consider: (1) Vices pertaining directly to irreverence for God; (2) Vices pertaining to irreverence for holy things. With regard to the first we shall consider the temptation whereby God is tempted, and perjury, whereby God’s name is taken with irreverence. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) In what the temptation of God consists;

(2) Whether it is a sin?

(3) To what virtue it is opposed;

(4) Of its comparison with other vices.

Whether the temptation of God consists in certain deeds, wherein the expected result is ascribed to the power of God alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God does not consist in certain deeds wherein the result is expected from the power of God alone. Just as God is tempted by man so is man tempted by God, man, and demons. But when man is tempted the result is not always expected from his power. Therefore neither is God tempted when the result is expected from His power alone.

Objection 2: Further, all those who work miracles by invoking the divine name look for an effect due to God's power alone. Therefore, if the temptation of God consisted in such like deeds, all who work miracles would tempt God.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to man's perfection that he should put aside human aids and put his hope in God alone. Hence Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 9:3, "Take nothing for your journey," etc. says: "The Gospel precept points out what is required of him that announces the kingdom of God, namely, that he should not depend on worldly assistance, and that, taking assurance from his faith, he should hold himself to be the more able to provide for himself, the less he seeks these things." And the Blessed Agatha said: "I have never treated my body with bodily medicine, I have my Lord Jesus Christ, Who restores all things by His mere word." [*Office of St. Agatha, eighth Responsory (Dominican Breviary).] But the temptation of God does not consist in anything pertaining to perfection. Therefore the temptation of God does not consist in such like deeds, wherein the help of God alone is expected.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 36): "Christ who gave proof of God's power by teaching and reproving openly, yet not allowing the rage of His enemies to prevail against Him, nevertheless by fleeing and hiding, instructed human weakness, lest it should dare to tempt God when it has to strive to escape from that which it needs to avoid." From this it would seem that the temptation of God consists in omitting to do what one can in order to escape from danger, and relying on the assistance of God alone.

I answer that, Properly speaking, to tempt is to test the person tempted. Now we put a person to the test by words or by deeds. By words, that we may find out whether he knows what we ask, or whether he can and will grant it: by deeds, when, by what we do, we probe another's prudence, will or power. Either of these may happen in two ways. First, openly, as when one declares oneself a tempter: thus Samson (Judges 14:12) proposed a riddle to the Philistines in order to tempt them. In the second place it may be done with cunning and by stealth, as the Pharisees tempted Christ, as we read in Mat. 22:15, sqq. Again this is sometimes done explicitly, as when anyone intends, by word or deed, to put some person to the test; and sometimes implicitly, when, to wit, though he does not intend to test a person, yet that which he does or says can seemingly have no other purpose than putting him to a test.

Accordingly, man tempts God sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now we speak with God in words when we pray. Hence a man tempts God explicitly in his prayers when he asks something of God with the intention of probing God's knowledge, power or will. He tempts God explicitly by deeds when he intends, by whatever he does, to experiment on God's power, good will or wisdom. But He will tempt God implicitly, if, though he does not intend to make an experiment on God, yet he asks for or does something which has no other use than to prove God's power, goodness or knowledge. Thus when a man wishes his horse to gallop in order to escape from the enemy, this is not giving the horse a trial: but if he make the horse gallop with out any useful purpose, it seems to be nothing else than a trial of the horse's speed; and the same applies to all other things. Accordingly when a man in his prayers or deeds entrusts himself to the divine assistance for some urgent or useful motive, this is not to tempt God: for it is written (2 Paralip 20:12): "As we know not what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee." But if this be done without any useful or urgent motive, this is to tempt God implicitly. Wherefore a gloss on Dt. 6:16, "Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God," says: "A man tempts God, if having the means at hand, without reason he chooses a dangerous course, trying whether he can be delivered by God."

Reply to Objection 1: Man also is sometimes tempted by means of deeds, to test his ability or knowledge or will to uphold or oppose those same deeds.

Reply to Objection 2: When saints work miracles by their prayers, they are moved by a motive of necessity or usefulness to ask for that which is an effect of the divine power.

Reply to Objection 3: The preachers of God’s kingdom dispense with temporal aids, so as to be freer to give their time to the word of God: wherefore if they depend on God alone, it does not follow that they tempt God. But if they were to neglect human assistance without any useful or urgent motive, they would be tempting God. Hence Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 36) says that “Paul fled, not through ceasing to believe in God, but lest he should tempt God, were he not to flee when he had the means of flight.” The Blessed Agatha had experience of God’s kindness towards her, so that either she did not suffer such sickness as required bodily medicine, or else she felt herself suddenly cured by God.

Whether it is a sin to tempt God?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a sin to tempt God. For God has not commanded sin. Yet He has commanded men to try, which is the same as to tempt, Him: for it is written (Malach. 3:10): “Bring all the tithes into the storehouse, that there may be meat in My house; and try Me in this, saith the Lord, if I open not unto you the flood-gates of heaven.” Therefore it seems not to be a sin to tempt God.

Objection 2: Further, a man is tempted not only in order to test his knowledge and his power, but also to try his goodness or his will. Now it is lawful to test the divine goodness or will, for it is written (Ps. 33:9): “O taste and see that the Lord is sweet,” and (Rom. 12:2): “That you may prove what is the good, and the acceptable, and the perfect will of God.” Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

Objection 3: Further, Scripture never blames a man for ceasing from sin, but rather for committing a sin. Now Achaz is blamed because when the Lord said: “Ask thee a sign of the Lord thy God,” he replied: “I will not ask, and I will not tempt the Lord,” and then it was said to him: “Is it a small thing for you to be grievous to men, that you are grievous to my God also?” (Is. 7:11–13). And we read of Abraham (Gn. 15:8) that he said to the Lord: “Whereby may I know that I shall possess it?” namely, the land which God had promised him. Again Gedeon asked God for a sign of the victory promised to him (Judges 6:36, sqq.). Yet they were not blamed for so doing. Therefore it is not a sin to tempt God.

On the contrary, It is forbidden in God’s Law, for it is written (Dt. 6:10): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.”

I answer that, As stated above [3123](A[1]), to tempt a person is to put him to a test. Now one never tests that of which one is certain. Wherefore all temptation proceeds from some ignorance or doubt, either in the tempter (as when one tests a thing in order to know its qualities), or in others (as when one tests a thing in order to prove it to others), and in this latter way God is said to tempt us. Now it is a sin to be ignorant of or to doubt that which pertains to God’s perfection. Wherefore it is evident that it is a sin to tempt God in order that the tempter himself may know God’s power.

On the other hand, if one were to test that which pertains to the divine perfection, not in order to know it oneself, but to prove it to others: this is not tempting God, provided there be just motive of urgency, or a pious motive of usefulness, and other requisite conditions. For thus did the apostles ask the Lord that signs might be wrought in the name of Jesus Christ, as related in Acts 4:30, in order, to wit, that Christ’s power might be made manifest to unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 1: The paying of tithes was prescribed in the Law, as stated above ([3124]Q[87], A[1]). Hence there was a motive of urgency to pay it, through the obligation of the Law, and also a motive of usefulness, as stated in the text quoted—“that there may be meat in God’s house”: wherefore they did not tempt God by paying tithes. The words that follow, “and try Me,” are not to be understood causally, as though they had to pay tithes in order to try if “God would open the flood-gates of heaven,” but consecutively, because, to wit, if they paid tithes, they would prove by experience the favors which God would shower upon them.

Reply to Objection 2: There is a twofold knowledge of God’s goodness or will. One is speculative and as to this it is not lawful to doubt or to prove whether God’s will be good, or whether God is sweet. The other knowledge of God’s will or goodness is effective or experimental and thereby a man experiences in himself the taste of God’s sweetness, and complacency in

God’s will, as Dionysius says of Hierotheos (Div. Nom. ii) that “he learnt divine thing through experience of them.” It is in this way that we are told to prove God’s will, and to taste His sweetness.

Reply to Objection 3: God wished to give a sign to Achaz, not for him alone, but for the instruction of the whole people. Hence he was reproved because, by refusing to ask a sign, he was an obstacle to the common welfare. Nor would he have tempted God by asking, both because he would have asked through God commanding him to do so, and because it was a matter relating to the common good. Abraham asked for a sign through the divine instinct, and so he did not sin. Gedeon seems to have asked a sign through weakness of faith, wherefore he is not to be excused from sin, as a gloss observes: just as Zachary sinned in saying to the angel (Lk. 1:18): “Whereby shall I know this?” so that he was punished for his unbelief.

It must be observed, however, that there are two ways of asking God for a sign: first in order to test God’s power or the truth of His word, and this of its very nature pertains to the temptation of God. Secondly, in order to be instructed as to what is God’s pleasure in some particular matter; and this nowise comes under the head of temptation of God.

Whether temptation of God is opposed to the virtue of religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man doubts God, as stated above [3125](A[2]). Now doubt about God comes under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): “Before prayer prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,” that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, “prays for what God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to do.” Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope. Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, “And they tempted God in their hearts,” says that “to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully, with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts.” Now deceit is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is opposed, not to religion, but to truth.

On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God is to pray to Him inordinately." Now to pray to God becomingly is an act of religion as stated above ([3126]Q[83], A[15]). Therefore to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

I answer that, As clearly shown above ([3127]Q[81], A[5]), the end of religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3128]Q[81], A[7]), it belongs to religion to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that, through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence towards God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . . under the mighty hand of God," and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God." Therefore also this kind of temptation is a species of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed to the truth.

Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint version. The Vulgate has “twenty-three thousand.”], whereas for the sin of temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9, “Your fathers tempted Me,” and further on, “so I swore in My wrath that they should not enter into My rest.” Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition.

Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin than superstition.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave disrespectfully to one’s parents, than to pay others the respect we owe to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of all (Malach. 1:6). Therefore. temptation of God whereby we behave irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.

On the contrary, A gloss on Dt. 17:2, “When there shall be found among you,” etc. says: “The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the Creator.”

I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the superstitious man professes an error, as shown above (Q[94], A[1], ad 1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of the divine excellence, as stated above [3129](A[2]). Therefore the sin of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God.

Reply to Objection 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is written (Ex. 32:34): “And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin also of theirs.”

Reply to Objection 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as regards the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents, which can without sin be given to others.

OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?

(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?

(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?

Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above ([3130]Q[89], A[3]), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to something unjust.

Objection 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man’s statement is confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the human statement which is confirmed on oath.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): “Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are deceived themselves”; and he gives three examples. The first is: “Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true, whereas it is false”; the second is: “Take the instance of another who knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were true”; and the third is: “Take another, who thinks his statement false, and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true,” of whom he says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for perjury.

On the contrary, Perjury is defined “a falsehood confirmed by oath” [*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].

I answer that, As stated above ([3131]Q[92], A[2]), moral acts take their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, “whichever of these three be lacking, there is perjury,” but in different order. For first and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger of lapsing into falsehood.

Reply to Objection 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight, since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys. ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by swearing what is false.

Reply to Objection 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false, it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way, on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty except the mind be guilty."

Whether all perjury is sinful?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is perplexed.

Objection 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore not all perjury is sinful.

Objection 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly not all perjury is sinful.

Objection 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made. Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx), in speaking of perjury: “See how you should detest this horrible beast and exterminate it from all human business.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3132]Q[89], A[1]), to swear is to call God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it belongs to show reverence to God.

Reply to Objection 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.

Reply to Objection 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is doing could not be a matter of an oath.

Reply to Objection 3: When one man swears or promises to do another’s will, there is to be understood this requisite condition—that the thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or immoderate.

Reply to Objection 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his share of the state’s burdens if he takes a share of its goods.

The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some particular “college” is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as stated above ([3133]FS, Q[96], A[4]).

Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): “Referring to the question whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath. Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to be punished as for a mortal sin.” Therefore not all perjury is a mortal sin.

OBJ 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, “it is a greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels.” Now it is not always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance, if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the Gospels.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [*Cap. Cum dilectus, de Ord. Cognit.]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is written (Lev. 19:12): “Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name.” Therefore it is a mortal sin.

I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i, 2), “that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so.” Now we know that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of God, since, as stated above [3134](A[2]), the reason why it is sinful is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3135]Q[89], A[7], ad 3), coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through such fear as may overcome a high-principled man.

When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.

Reply to Objection 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently is excused from the sin of perjury.

It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels, than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is not the case in a declaratory oath.

Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one enjoin an oath on another person.

Objection 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to impose an oath on one who swears falsely.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): “If anyone sin, and hear the voice of one swearing falsely [*’Falsely’ is not in the Vulgate’], and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity.” Hence it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath of such a man.

Objection 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who swears falsely.

I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): “For if he knows not that the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: ‘Swear to me’ in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human temptation” (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting whether the man will speak the truth). “This is the evil whereof Our Lord says (Mat. 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil. But if he knows the man to have done so,” i.e. the contrary of what he swears to, “and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand of the slayer.”

If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose instance he demands it.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of one who demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an oath in order that he may be more certain.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii), “though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others.” Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear falsely.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce another’s perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had to be denounced “to those who would do the perjurer good rather than harm.” Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend to another person’s injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would not apply to the case, as stated above ([3136]Q[33], A[7];[3137] Q[68], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil. Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one may use lawfully.

OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1) Sacrilege; (2) Simony.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is sacrilege?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) Of the species of sacrilege;

(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.

Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. Si quis suadente]): “They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the sovereign’s decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the sovereign be worthy of honor.” Now this seems to have no connection with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation of something sacred.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on can. Constituit.] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public offices, “he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege.” Yet public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.

Objection 3: Further, God’s power is greater than man’s. Now sacred things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the violation of a sacred thing.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a man is said to be sacrilegious because he selects,” i.e. steals, “sacred things.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]; [3138]FS, Q[101], A[4]), a thing is called “sacred” through being deputed to the divine worship. Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the head of sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, “Being ministers of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly.” Hence by an extension of the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it, is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.

Reply to Objection 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, “But you are washed, but you are sanctified.” Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): “You are a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased people.” Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or dishonor. Now as “honor is in the person who honors and not in the one who is honored” (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.

Whether sacrilege is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv) “They are guilty of sacrilege who through ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by their negligence.” But this is done in every sin, because sin is “a word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God,” according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic. v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.

On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore sacrilege is a special sin.

I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a special sin.

Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 3), “When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to death,” as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the divine law who assail God’s law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege, through perverting the words of the divine law.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.

Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a sacred place for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.

Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.

Objection 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin. Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the various sacred things.

Objection 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned. If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according to the sacred things.

On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects. Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above [3139](A[1]). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred things.

I answer that, As stated above [3140](A[1]), the sin of sacrilege consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.

Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is written (2 Macc. 5:19): “God did not choose the people for the place’s sake, but the place for the people’s sake.” Hence sacrilege committed against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.

In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a material, but also a formal difference.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one species in one respect, and to different species in another respect. Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, “animal,” but differ in the species “colored thing,” if one be white and the other black. In like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by blows or by copulation.

Reply to Objection 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that “a trifle on a priest’s lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy.” But formally and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to be said of other instances.

Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?

Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, 13; Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric.]. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Objection 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, “There shall not rise a double affliction.” But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges. Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): “Neither have we taken an occasion of covetousness.” But it seems to involve an occasion of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a fitting punishment of sacrilege.

On the contrary, It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]: “If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi”: and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21): “Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried purest silver.”

I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just, and that “by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be tormented” (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines, that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.

Reply to Objection 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body, but excommunication in its stead.

Reply to Objection 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise spiritual things.

Reply to Objection 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause, this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility, and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.

ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) What is simony?

(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?

(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?

(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?

(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?

(6) Of the punishment of simony.

Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing." Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per pecunias.]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God, whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his slave or any other of his possessions." But unbelief, like faith, is an act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above ([3141]Q[10], A[2]). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will.

Objection 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice, and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says in a homily (v, in Ev.): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you possess." Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something spiritual.

Objection 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of whom we read (Acts 8:18,19) that "he offered the apostles money" that he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on whomsoever he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost." But we do not read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will to sell a spiritual thing.

Objection 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind of legal compromise—Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that simony is defined insufficiently.

Objection 6: Further, anything connected with spiritual things is itself spiritual. Therefore it is superfluous to add "or connected with spiritual things."

Objection 7: Further, according to some, the Pope cannot commit simony: yet he can buy or sell something spiritual. Therefore simony is not the will to buy or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing.

On the contrary, Gregory VII says (Regist. [*Caus. I, qu. i, can. Presbyter, qu. iii, can. Altare]): "None of the faithful is ignorant that buying or selling altars, tithes, or the Holy Ghost is the heresy of simony."

I answer that, As stated above ([3142]FS, Q[18], A[2]) an act is evil generically when it bears on undue matter. Now a spiritual thing is undue matter for buying and selling for three reasons. First, because a spiritual thing cannot be appraised at any earthly price, even as it is said concerning wisdom (Prov. 3:15), “she is more precious than all riches, and all things that are desired, are not to be compared with her”: and for this reason Peter, in condemning the wickedness of Simon in its very source, said (Acts 8:20): “Keep thy money to thyself to perish with thee, because thou hast thought that the gift of God may be purchased with money.”

Secondly, because a thing cannot be due matter for sale if the vendor is not the owner thereof, as appears from the authority quoted (OBJ[1]). Now ecclesiastical superiors are not owners, but dispensers of spiritual things, according to 1 Cor. 4:1, “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the ministers of God.”

Thirdly, because sale is opposed to the source of spiritual things, since they flow from the gratuitous will of God. Wherefore Our Lord said (Mat. 10:8): “Freely have you received, freely give.”

Therefore by buying or selling a spiritual thing, a man treats God and divine things with irreverence, and consequently commits a sin of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion consists in a kind of protestation of faith, without, sometimes, faith being in one’s heart, so too the vices opposed to religion include a certain protestation of unbelief without, sometimes, unbelief being in the mind. Accordingly simony is said to be a “heresy,” as regards the outward protestation, since by selling a gift of the Holy Ghost a man declares, in a way, that he is the owner of a spiritual gift; and this is heretical. It must, however, be observed that Simon Magus, besides wishing the apostles to sell him a grace of the Holy Ghost for money, said that the world was not created by God, but by some heavenly power, as Isidore states (Etym. viii, 5): and so for this reason simoniacs are reckoned with other heretics, as appears from Augustine’s book on heretics.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3143]Q[58], A[4]), justice, with all its parts, and consequently all the opposite vices, is in the will as its subject. Hence simony is fittingly defined from its relation to the will. This act is furthermore described as “express,” in order to signify that it proceeds from choice, which takes the principal part in virtue and vice. Nor does everyone sin against the Holy Ghost that sins from choice, but only he who chooses sin through contempt of those things whereby man is wont to be withdrawn from sin, as stated above ([3144]Q[14], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: The kingdom of heaven is said to be bought when a man gives what he has for God’s sake. But this is to employ the term “buying” in a wide sense, and as synonymous with merit: nor does it reach to the perfect signification of buying, both because neither “the sufferings of this time,” nor any gift or deed of ours, “are worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in us” (Rom. 8:18), and because merit consists chiefly, not in an outward gift, action or passion, but in an inward affection.

Reply to Objection 4: Simon the magician wished to buy a spiritual power in order that afterwards he might sell it. For it is written (I, qu. iii [*Can. Salvator]), that “Simon the magician wished to buy the gift of the Holy Ghost, in order that he might make money by selling the signs to be wrought by him.” Hence those who sell spiritual things are likened in intention to Simon the magician: while those who wish to buy them are likened to him in act. Those who sell them imitate, in act, Giezi the disciple of Eliseus, of whom we read (4 Kings 5:20–24) that he received money from the leper who was healed: wherefore the sellers of spiritual things may be called not only “simoniacs” but also “giezites.”

Reply to Objection 5: The terms “buying” and “selling” cover all kinds of non-gratuitous contracts. Wherefore it is impossible for the exchange or agency of prebends or ecclesiastical benefices to be made by authority of the parties concerned without danger of committing simony, as laid down by law [*Cap. Quaesitum, de rerum Permutat.; cap. Super, de Transact.]. Nevertheless the superior, in virtue of his office, can cause these exchanges to be made for useful or necessary reasons.

Reply to Objection 6: Even as the soul lives by itself, while the body lives through being united to the soul; so, too, certain things are spiritual by themselves, such as the sacraments and the like, while others are called spiritual, through adhering to those others. Hence (I, qu. iii, cap. Siquis objecerit) it is stated that “spiritual things do not progress without corporal things, even as the soul has no bodily life without the body.”

Reply to Objection 7: The Pope can be guilty of the vice of simony, like any other man, since the higher a man’s position the more grievous is his sin. For although the possessions of the Church belong to him as dispenser in chief, they are not his as master and owner. Therefore, were he to accept money from the income of any church in exchange for a spiritual thing, he would not escape being guilty of the vice of simony. In like manner he might commit simony by accepting from a layman moneys not belonging to the goods of the Church.

Whether it is always unlawful to give money for the sacraments?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not always unlawful to give money for the sacraments. Baptism is the door of the sacraments, as we shall state in the [3145]TP, Q[68], A[6]; [3146]TP, Q[73], A[3]. But seemingly it is lawful in certain cases to give money for Baptism, for instance if a priest were unwilling to baptize a dying child without being paid. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell the sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, the greatest of the sacraments is the Eucharist, which is consecrated in the Mass. But some priests receive a prebend or money for singing masses. Much more therefore is it lawful to buy or sell the other sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, the sacrament of Penance is a necessary sacrament consisting chiefly in the absolution. But some persons demand money when absolving from excommunication. Therefore it is not always unlawful to buy or sell a sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, custom makes that which otherwise were sinful to be not sinful; thus Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 47) that “it was no crime to have several wives, so long as it was the custom.” Now it is the custom in some places to give something in the consecration of bishops, blessings of abbots, ordinations of the clergy, in exchange for the chrism, holy oil, and so forth. Therefore it would seem that it is not unlawful.

Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that someone maliciously hinders a person from obtaining a bishopric or some like dignity. But it is lawful for a man to make good his grievance. Therefore it is lawful, seemingly, in such a case to give money for a bishopric or a like ecclesiastical dignity.

Objection 6: Further, marriage is a sacrament. But sometimes money is given for marriage. Therefore it is lawful to sell a sacrament.

On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Qui per pecunias]): “Whosoever shall consecrate anyone for money, let him be cut off from the priesthood.”

I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are of all things most spiritual, inasmuch as they are the cause of spiritual grace, on which no price can be set, and which is essentially incompatible with a non-gratuitous giving. Now the sacraments are dispensed through the ministers of the Church, whom the people are bound to support, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:13), “Know you not, that they who work in the holy place, eat the things that are of the holy place; and they that serve the altar, partake with the altar?”

Accordingly we must answer that to receive money for the spiritual grace of the sacraments, is the sin of simony, which cannot be excused by any custom whatever, since “custom does not prevail over natural or divine law” [*Cap. Cum tanto, de Consuetud.; cf. [3147]FS, Q[97], A[3]]. Now by money we are to understand anything that has a pecuniary value, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 1). On the other hand, to receive anything for the support of those who administer the sacraments, in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs, is not simony, nor is it a sin. For it is received not as a price of goods, but as a payment for their need. Hence a gloss of Augustine on 1 Tim. 5:17, “Let the priests that rule well,” says: “They should look to the people for a supply to their need, but to the Lord for the reward of their ministry.”

Reply to Objection 1: In a case of necessity anyone may baptize. And since nowise ought one to sin, if the priest be unwilling to baptize without being paid, one must act as though there were no priest available for the baptism. Hence the person who is in charge of the child can, in such a case, lawfully baptize it, or cause it to be baptized by anyone else. He could, however, lawfully buy the water from the priest, because it is merely a bodily element. But if it were an adult in danger of death that wished to be baptized, and the priest were unwilling to baptize him without being paid, he ought, if possible, to be baptized by someone else. And if he is unable to have recourse to another, he must by no means pay a price for Baptism, and should rather die without being baptized, because for him the baptism of desire would supply the lack of the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: The priest receives money, not as the price for consecrating the Eucharist, or for singing the Mass (for this would be simoniacal), but as payment for his livelihood, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The money exacted of the person absolved is not the price of his absolution (for this would be simoniacal), but a punishment of a past crime for which he was excommunicated.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, "custom does not prevail over natural or divine law" whereby simony is forbidden. Wherefore the custom, if such there be, of demanding anything as the price of a spiritual thing, with the intention of buying or selling it, is manifestly simoniacal, especially when the demand is made of a person unwilling to pay. But if the demand be made in payment of a stipend recognized by custom it is not simoniacal, provided there be no intention of buying or selling, but only of doing what is customary, and especially if the demand be acceded to voluntarily. In all these cases, however, one must beware of anything having an appearance of simony or avarice, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22), "From all appearance of evil restrain yourselves."

Reply to Objection 5: It would be simoniacal to buy off the opposition of one's rivals, before acquiring the right to a bishopric or any dignity or prebend, by election, appointment or presentation, since this would be to use money as a means of obtaining a spiritual thing. But it is lawful to use money as a means of removing unjust opposition, after one has already acquired that right.

Reply to Objection 6: Some [*Innocent IV on Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia] say that it is lawful to give money for Matrimony because no grace is conferred thereby. But this is not altogether true, as we shall state in the Third Part of the work [*[3148]XP, Q[42], A[3]]. Wherefore we must reply that Matrimony is not only a sacrament of the Church, but also an office of nature. Consequently it is lawful to give money for Matrimony considered as an office of nature, but unlawful if it be considered as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, according to the law [*Cap. Cum in Ecclesia, de Simonia], it is forbidden to demand anything for the Nuptial Blessing.

Whether it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions?

Objection 1: It seems that it is lawful to give and receive money for spiritual actions. The use of prophecy is a spiritual action. But something used to be given of old for the use of prophecy, as appears from 1 Kings 9:7,8, and 3 Kings 14:3. Therefore it would seem that it is lawful to give and receive money for a spiritual action.

Objection 2: Further, prayer, preaching, divine praise, are most spiritual actions. Now money is given to holy persons in order to obtain the assistance of their prayers, according to Lk. 16:9, “Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity.” To preachers also, who sow spiritual things, temporal things are due according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:14). Moreover, something is given to those who celebrate the divine praises in the ecclesiastical office, and make processions: and sometimes an annual income is assigned to them. Therefore it is lawful to receive something for spiritual actions.

Objection 3: Further, science is no less spiritual than power. Now it is lawful to receive money for the use of science: thus a lawyer may sell his just advocacy, a physician his advice for health, and a master the exercise of his teaching. Therefore in like manner it would seem lawful for a prelate to receive something for the use of his spiritual power, for instance, for correction, dispensation, and so forth.

Objection 4: Further, religion is the state of spiritual perfection. Now in certain monasteries something is demanded from those who are received there. Therefore it is lawful to demand something for spiritual things.

On the contrary, It is stated (I, qu. i [*Can. Quidquid invisibilis]): “It is absolutely forbidden to make a charge for what is acquired by the consolation of invisible grace, whether by demanding a price or by seeking any kind of return whatever.” Now all these spiritual things are acquired through an invisible grace. Therefore it is not lawful to charge a price or return for them.

I answer that, Just as the sacraments are called spiritual, because they confer a spiritual grace, so, too, certain other things are called spiritual, because they flow from spiritual grace and dispose thereto. And yet these things are obtainable through the ministry of men, according to 1 Cor. 9:7, “Who serveth as a soldier at any time at his own charges? Who feedeth the flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?” Hence it is simoniacal to sell or buy that which is spiritual in such like actions; but to receive or give something for the support of those who minister spiritual things in accordance with the statutes of the Church and approved customs is lawful, yet in such wise that there be no intention of buying or selling, and that no pressure be brought to bear on those who are unwilling to give, by withholding spiritual things that ought to be administered, for then there would be an appearance of simony. But after the spiritual things have been freely bestowed, then the statutory and customary offerings and other dues may be exacted from those who are unwilling but able to pay, if the superior authorize this to be done.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, certain gifts were freely offered to the good prophets, for their livelihood, but not as a price for the exercise of their gift of prophecy. Wicked prophets, however, abused this exercise by demanding payment for it.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who give alms to the poor in order to obtain from them the assistance of their prayers do not give with the intent of buying their prayers; but by their gratuitous beneficence inspire the poor with the mind to pray for them freely and out of charity. Temporal things are due to the preacher as means for his support, not as a price of the words he preaches. Hence a gloss on 1 Tim. 5:11, “Let the priests that rule well,” says: “Their need allows them to receive the wherewithal to live, charity demands that this should be given to them: yet the Gospel is not for sale, nor is a livelihood the object of preaching: for if they sell it for this purpose, they sell a great thing for a contemptible price.” In like manner temporal things are given to those who praise God by celebrating the divine office whether for the living or for the dead, not as a price but as a means of livelihood; and the same purpose is fulfilled when alms are received for making processions in funerals. Yet it is simoniacal to do such things by contract, or with the intention of buying or selling. Hence it would be an unlawful ordinance if it were decreed in any church that no procession would take place at a funeral unless a certain sum of money were paid, because such an ordinance would preclude the free granting of pious offices to any person. The ordinance would be more in keeping with the law, if it were decreed that this honor would be accorded to all who gave a certain alms, because this would not preclude its being granted to others. Moreover, the former ordinance has the appearance of an exaction, whereas the latter bears a likeness to a gratuitous remuneration.

Reply to Objection 3: A person to whom a spiritual power is entrusted is bound by virtue of his office to exercise the power entrusted to him in dispensing spiritual things. Moreover, he receives a statutory payment from the funds of the Church as a means of livelihood. Therefore, if he were to accept anything for the exercise of his spiritual power, this would imply, not a hiring of his labor (which he is bound to give, as a duty arising out of the office he has accepted), but a sale of the very use of a spiritual grace. For this reason it is unlawful for him to receive anything for any dispensing whatever, or for allowing someone else to take his duty, or for correcting his subjects, or for omitting to correct them. On the other hand it is lawful for him to receive “procurations,” when he visits his subjects, not as a price for correcting them, but as a means of livelihood. He that is possessed of science, without having taken upon himself the obligation of using it for the benefit of others can lawfully receive a price for his learning or advice, since this is not a sale of truth or science, but a hiring of labor. If, on the other hand, he be so bound by virtue of his office, this would amount to a sale of the truth, and consequently he would sin grievously. For instance, those who in certain churches are appointed to instruct the clerics of that church and other poor persons, and are in receipt of an ecclesiastical benefice for so doing, are not allowed to receive anything in return, either for teaching, or for celebrating or omitting any feasts.

Reply to Objection 4: It is unlawful to exact or receive anything as price for entering a monastery: but, in the case of small monasteries, that are unable to support so many persons, it is lawful, while entrance to the monastery is free, to accept something for the support of those who are about to be received into the monastery, if its revenues are insufficient. In like manner it is lawful to be easier in admitting to a monastery a person who has proved his regard for that monastery by the generosity of his alms: just as, on the other hand, it is lawful to incite a person’s regard for a monastery by means of temporal benefits, in order that he may thereby be induced to enter the monastery; although it is unlawful to agree to give or receive something for entrance into a monastery (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio).

Whether it is lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful to receive money for things annexed to spiritual things. Seemingly all temporal things are annexed to spiritual things, since temporal things ought to be sought for the sake of spiritual things. If, therefore, it is unlawful to sell what is annexed to spiritual things, it will be unlawful to sell anything temporal, and this is clearly false.

Objection 2: Further, nothing would seem to be more annexed to spiritual things than consecrated vessels. Yet it is lawful to sell a chalice for the ransom of prisoners, according to Ambrose (De Offic. ii, 28). Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

Objection 3: Further, things annexed to spiritual things include right of burial, right of patronage, and, according to ancient writers, right of the first-born (because before the Lord the first-born exercised the priestly office), and the right to receive tithes. Now Abraham bought from Ephron a double cave for a burying-place (Gn. 23:8, sqq.), and Jacob bought from Esau the right of the first-born (Gn. 25:31, sqq.). Again the right of patronage is transferred with the property sold, and is granted "in fee." Tithes are granted to certain soldiers, and can be redeemed. Prelates also at times retain for themselves the revenues of prebends of which they have the presentation, although a prebend is something annexed to a spiritual thing. Therefore it is lawful to sell things annexed to spiritual things.

On the contrary, Pope Paschal [*Paschal II] says (cf. I, qu. iii, cap. Si quis objecerit): "Whoever sells one of two such things, that the one is unproductive without the other, leaves neither unsold. Wherefore let no person sell a church, or a prebend, or anything ecclesiastical."

I answer that, A thing may be annexed to spiritual things in two ways. First, as being dependent on spiritual things. Thus to have to spiritual things, because it is not competent save to those who hold a clerical office. Hence such things can by no means exist apart from spiritual things. Consequently it is altogether unlawful to sell such things, because the sale thereof implies the sale of things spiritual. Other things are annexed to spiritual things through being directed thereto, for instance the right of patronage, which is directed to the presentation of clerics to ecclesiastical benefices; and sacred vessels, which are directed to the use of the sacraments. Wherefore such things as these do not presuppose spiritual things, but precede them in the order of time. Hence in a way they can be sold, but not as annexed to spiritual things.

Reply to Objection 1: All things temporal are annexed to spiritual things, as to their end, wherefore it is lawful to sell temporal things, but their relation to spiritual things cannot be the matter of a lawful sale.

Reply to Objection 2: Sacred vessels also are annexed to spiritual things as to their end, wherefore their consecration cannot be sold. Yet their material can be sold for the needs of the Church or of the poor provided they first be broken, after prayer has been said over them, since when once broken, they are considered to be no longer sacred vessels but mere metal: so that if like vessels were to be made out of the same material they would have to be consecrated again.

Reply to Objection 3: We have no authority for supposing that the double cave which Abraham bought for a burial place was consecrated for that purpose: wherefore Abraham could lawfully buy that site to be used for burial, in order to turn it into a sepulchre: even so it would be lawful now to buy an ordinary field as a site for a cemetery or even a church. Nevertheless because even among the Gentiles burial places are looked upon as religious, if Ephron intended to accept the price as payment for a burial place, he sinned in selling, though Abraham did not sin in buying, because he intended merely to buy an ordinary plot of ground. Even now, it is lawful in a case of necessity to sell or buy land on which there has previously been a church, as we have also said with regard to sacred vessels (Reply OBJ[2]). Or again, Abraham is to be excused because he thus freed himself of a grievance. For although Ephron offered him the burial place for nothing, Abraham deemed that he could not accept it gratis without prejudice to himself.

The right of the first-born was due to Jacob by reason of God’s choice, according to Malach. 1:2,3, “I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau.” Wherefore Esau sinned by selling his birthright, yet Jacob sinned not in buying, because he is understood to have freed himself of his grievance.

The right of patronage cannot be the matter of a direct sale, nor can it be granted “in fee,” but is transferred with the property sold or granted.

The spiritual right of receiving tithes is not granted to layfolk, but merely the temporal commodities which are granted in the name of tithe, as stated above ([3149]Q[87], A[3]).

With regard to the granting of benefices it must, however, be observed, that it is not unlawful for a bishop, before presenting a person to a benefice, to decide, for some reason, to retain part of the revenues of the benefice in question, and to spend it on some pious object. But, on the other hand, if he were to require part of the revenues of that benefice to be given to him by the beneficiary, it would be the same as though he demanded payment from him, and he would not escape the guilt of simony.

Whether it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or for an oral remuneration?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to grant spiritual things in return for an equivalent of service, or an oral remuneration. Gregory says (Regist. iii, ep. 18): “It is right that those who serve the interests of the Church should be rewarded.” Now an equivalent of service denotes serving the interests of the Church. Therefore it seems lawful to confer ecclesiastical benefices for services received.

Objection 2: Further, to confer an ecclesiastical benefice for service received seems to indicate a carnal intention, no less than to do so on account of kinship. Yet the latter seemingly is not simoniacal since it implies no buying or selling. Therefore neither is the former simoniacal.

Objection 3: Further, that which is done only at another’s request would seem to be done gratis: so that apparently it does not involve simony, which consists in buying or selling. Now oral remuneration denotes the conferring of an ecclesiastical benefice at some person’s request. Therefore this is not simoniacal.

Objection 4: Further, hypocrites perform spiritual deeds in order that they may receive human praise, which seems to imply oral remuneration: and yet hypocrites are not said to be guilty of simony. Therefore oral remuneration does not entail simony.

On the contrary, Pope Urban [*Urban II, Ep. xvii ad Lucium] says: “Whoever grants or acquires ecclesiastical things, not for the purpose for which they were instituted but for his own profit, in consideration of an oral remuneration or of an equivalent in service rendered or money received, is guilty of simony.”

I answer that, As stated above [3150](A[2]), the term “money” denotes “anything that can have a pecuniary value.” Now it is evident that a man’s service is directed to some kind of usefulness, which has a pecuniary value, wherefore servants are hired for a money wage. Therefore to grant a spiritual thing for a service rendered or to be rendered is the same as to grant it for the money, received or promised, at which that service could be valued. If likewise, to grant a person’s request for the bestowal of a temporary favor is directed to some kind of usefulness which has a pecuniary value. Wherefore just as a man contracts the guilt of simony by accepting money or any eternal thing which comes under the head of “real remuneration,” so too does he contract it, by receiving “oral remuneration” or an “equivalent in service rendered.”

Reply to Objection 1: If a cleric renders a prelate a lawful service, directed to spiritual things (e.g. to the good of the Church, or benefit of her ministers), he becomes worthy of an ecclesiastical benefice by reason of the devotion that led him to render the service, as he would by reason of any other good deed. Hence this is not a case of remuneration for service rendered, such as Gregory has in mind. But if the service be unlawful, or directed to carnal things (e.g. a service rendered to the prelate for the profit of his kindred, or the increase of his patrimony, or the like), it will be a case of remuneration for service rendered, and this will be simony.

Reply to Objection 2: The bestowal of a spiritual thing gratis on a person by reason of kinship or of any carnal affection is unlawful and carnal, but not simoniacal: since nothing is received in return, wherefore it does not imply a contract of buying and selling, on which simony is based. But to present a person to an ecclesiastical benefice with the understanding or intention that he provide for one’s kindred from the revenue is manifest simony.

Reply to Objection 3: Oral remuneration denotes either praise that pertains to human favor, which has its price, or a request whereby man’s favor is obtained or the contrary avoided. Hence if one intend this chiefly one commits simony. Now to grant a request made for an unworthy person implies, seemingly, that this is one’s chief intention wherefore the deed itself is simoniacal. But if the request be made for a worthy person, the deed itself is not simoniacal, because it is based on a worthy cause, on account of which a spiritual thing is granted to the person for whom the request is made. Nevertheless there may be simony in the intention, if one look, not to the worthiness of the person, but to human favor. If, however, a person asks for himself, that he may obtain the cure of souls, his very presumption renders him unworthy, and so his request is made for an unworthy person. But, if one be in need, one may lawfully seek for oneself an ecclesiastical benefice without the cure of souls.

Reply to Objection 4: A hypocrite does not give a spiritual thing for the sake of praise, he only makes a show of it, and under false pretenses stealthily purloins rather than buys human praise: so that seemingly the hypocrite is not guilty of simony.

Whether those who are guilty of simony are fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are guilty of simony are not fittingly punished by being deprived of what they have acquired by simony. Simony is committed by acquiring spiritual things in return for a remuneration. Now certain spiritual things cannot be lost when once acquired, such as all characters that are imprinted by a consecration. Therefore it is not a fitting punishment for a person to be deprived of what he has acquired simoniacally.

Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that one who has obtained the episcopate by simony commands a subject of his to receive orders from him: and apparently the subject should obey, so long as the Church tolerates him. Yet no one ought to receive from him that has not the power to give. Therefore a bishop does not lose his episcopal power, if he has acquired it by simony.

Objection 3: Further, no one should be punished for what was done without his knowledge and consent, since punishment is due for sin which is voluntary, as was shown above ([3151]FS, Q[74], AA[1],2; [3152]FS, Q[77], A[7]). Now it happens sometimes that a person acquires something spiritual, which others have procured for him without his knowledge and consent. Therefore he should not be punished by being deprived of what has been bestowed on him.

Objection 4: Further, no one should profit by his own sin. Yet, if a person who has acquired an ecclesiastical benefice by simony, were to restore what he has received, this would sometimes turn to the profit of those who had a share in his simony; for instance, when a prelate and his entire chapter have consented to the simony. Therefore that which has been acquired by simony ought not always to be restored.

Objection 5: Further, sometimes a person obtains admission to a monastery by simony, and there takes the solemn vow of profession. But no one should be freed from the obligation of a vow on account of a fault he has committed. Therefore he should not be expelled from the monastic state which he has acquired by simony.

Objection 6: Further, in this world external punishment is not inflicted for the internal movements of the heart, whereof God alone is the judge. Now simony is committed in the mere intention or will, wherefore it is defined in reference to the will, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore a person should not always be deprived of what he has acquired by simony.

Objection 7: Further, to be promoted to greater dignity is much less than to retain that which one has already received. Now sometimes those who are guilty of simony are, by dispensation, promoted to greater dignity. Therefore they should not always be deprived of what they have received.

On the contrary, It is written (I, qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus): “He that has been ordained shall profit nothing from his ordination or promotion that he has acquired by the bargain, but shall forfeit the dignity or cure that he has acquired with his money.”

I answer that, No one can lawfully retain that which he has acquired against the owner’s will. For instance, if a steward were to give some of his lord’s property to a person, against his lord’s will and orders, the recipient could not lawfully retain what he received. Now Our Lord, Whose stewards and ministers are the prelates of churches, ordered spiritual things to be given gratis, according to Mat. 10:8, “Freely have you received, freely give.” Wherefore whosoever acquires spiritual things in return for a remuneration cannot lawfully retain them. Moreover, those who are guilty of simony, by either selling or buying spiritual things, as well as those who act as go-between, are sentenced to other punishments, namely, infamy and deposition, if they be clerics, and excommunication if they be laymen, as stated qu. i, cap. Si quis Episcopus [*Qu. iii, can. Si quis praebendas].

Reply to Objection 1: He that has received a sacred Order simoniacally, receives the character of the Order on account of the efficacy of the sacrament: but he does not receive the grace nor the exercise of the Order, because he has received the character by stealth as it were, and against the will of the Supreme Lord. Wherefore he is suspended, by virtue of the law, both as regards himself, namely, that he should not busy himself about exercising his Order, and as regards others, namely, that no one may communicate with him in the exercise of his Order, whether his sin be public or secret. Nor may he reclaim the money which he basely gave, although the other party unjustly retains it.

Again, a man who is guilty of simony, through having conferred Orders simoniacally, or through having simoniacally granted or received a benefice, or through having been a go-between in a simoniacal transaction, if he has done so publicly, is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards both himself and others; but if he has acted in secret he is suspended by virtue of the law, as regards himself alone, and not as regards others.

Reply to Objection 2: One ought not to receive Orders from a bishop one knows to have been promoted simoniacally, either on account of his command or for fear of his excommunication: and such as receive Orders from him do not receive the exercise of their Orders, even though they are ignorant of his being guilty of simony; and they need to receive a dispensation. Some, however, maintain that one ought to receive Orders in obedience to his command unless one can prove him to be guilty of simony, but that one ought not to exercise the Order without a dispensation. But this is an unreasonable statement, because no one should obey a man to the extent of communicating with him in an unlawful action. Now he that is, by virtue of the law, suspended as regards both himself and others, confers Orders unlawfully: wherefore no one should communicate with him, by receiving Orders from him for any cause whatever. If, however, one be not certain on the point, one ought not to give credence to another’s sin, and so one ought with a good conscience to receive Orders from him. And if the bishop has been guilty of simony otherwise than by a simoniacal promotion, and the fact be a secret, one can receive Orders from him because he is not suspended as regards others, but only as regards himself, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: To be deprived of what one has received is not only the punishment of a sin, but is also sometimes the effect of acquiring unjustly, as when one buys a thing of a person who cannot sell it. Wherefore if a man, knowingly and spontaneously, receives Orders or an ecclesiastical benefice simoniacally, not only is he deprived of what he has received, by forfeiting the exercise of his order, and resigning the benefice and the fruits acquired therefrom, but also in addition to this he is punished by being marked with infamy. Moreover, he is bound to restore not only the fruit actually acquired, but also such as could have been acquired by a careful possessor (which, however, is to be understood of the net fruits, allowance being made for expenses incurred on account of the fruits), excepting those fruits that have been expended for the good of the Church.

On the other hand, if a man's promotion be procured simoniacally by others, without his knowledge and consent, he forfeits the exercise of his Order, and is bound to resign the benefice obtained together with fruits still extant; but he is not bound to restore the fruits which he has consumed, since he possessed them in good faith. Exception must be made in the case when his promotion has been deceitfully procured by an enemy of his; or when he expressly opposes the transaction, for then he is not bound to resign, unless subsequently he agree to the transaction, by paying what was promised.

Reply to Objection 4: Money, property, or fruits simoniacally received, must be restored to the Church that has incurred loss by their transfer, notwithstanding the fact that the prelate or a member of the chapter of that church was at fault, since others ought not to be the losers by his sin: in suchwise, however, that, as far as possible, the guilty parties be not the gainers. But if the prelate and the entire chapter be at fault, restitution must be made, with the consent of superior authority, either to the poor or to some other church.

Reply to Objection 5: If there are any persons who have been simoniacally admitted into a monastery, they must quit: and if the simony was committed with their knowledge since the holding of the General Council [*Fourth Lateran Council, A.D. 1215, held by Innocent III], they must be expelled from their monastery without hope of return, and do perpetual penance under a stricter rule, or in some house of the same order, if a stricter one be not found. If, however, this took place before the Council, they must be placed in other houses of the same order. If this cannot be done, they must be received into monasteries of the same order, by way of compensation, lest they wander about the world, but they must not be admitted to their former rank, and must be assigned a lower place.

On the other hand, if they were received simoniacally, without their knowledge, whether before or after the Council, then after quitting they may be received again, their rank being changed as stated.

Reply to Objection 6: In God's sight the mere will makes a man guilty of simony; but as regards the external ecclesiastical punishment he is not punished as a simoniac, by being obliged to resign, but is bound to repent of his evil intention.

Reply to Objection 7: The Pope alone can grant a dispensation to one who has knowingly received a benefice (simoniacally). In other cases the bishop also can dispense, provided the beneficiary first of all renounce what he has received simoniacally, so that he will receive either the lesser dispensation allowing him to communicate with the laity, or a greater dispensation, allowing him after doing penance to retain his order in some other Church; or again a greater dispensation, allowing him to remain in the same Church, but in minor orders; or a full dispensation allowing him to exercise even the major orders in the same Church, but not to accept a prelacy.

OF PIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)

After religion we must consider piety, the consideration of which will render the opposite vices manifest. Accordingly four points of inquiry arise with regard to piety:

(1) To whom does piety extend?

(2) What does piety make one offer a person?

(3) Whether piety is a special virtue?

(4) Whether the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion?

Whether piety extends to particular human individuals?

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not extend to particular human individuals. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that piety denotes, properly speaking, the worship of God, which the Greeks designate by the term {eusebeia}. But the worship of God does not denote relation to man, but only to God. Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain human individuals.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i): “Piety, on her day, provides a banquet, because she fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy.” Now the works of mercy are to be done to all, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i). Therefore piety does not extend definitely to certain special persons.

Objection 3: Further, in human affairs there are many other mutual relations besides those of kindred and citizenship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), and on each of them is founded a kind of friendship, which would seem to be the virtue of piety, according to a gloss on 2 Tim. 3:5, “Having an appearance indeed of piety [Douay: ‘godliness’].” Therefore piety extends not only to one’s kindred and fellow-citizens.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “it is by piety that we do our duty towards our kindred and well-wishers of our country and render them faithful service.”

I answer that, Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to their various excellence and the various benefits received from them. on both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, and is for us the first principle of being and government. In the second place, the principles of our being and government are our parents and our country, that have given us birth and nourishment. Consequently man is debtor chiefly to his parents and his country, after God. Wherefore just as it belongs to religion to give worship to God, so does it belong to piety, in the second place, to give worship to one’s parents and one’s country.

The worship due to our parents includes the worship given to all our kindred, since our kinsfolk are those who descend from the same parents, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12). The worship given to our country includes homage to all our fellow-citizens and to all the friends of our country. Therefore piety extends chiefly to these.

Reply to Objection 1: The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due to God includes the worship due to our parents as a particular. Hence it is written (Malach. 1:6): “If I be a father, where is My honor?” Consequently the term piety extends also to the divine worship.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), “the term piety is often used in connection with works of mercy, in the language of the common people; the reason for which I consider to be the fact that God Himself has declared that these works are more pleasing to Him than sacrifices. This custom has led to the application of the word ‘pious’ to God Himself.”

Reply to Objection 3: The relations of a man with his kindred and fellow-citizens are more referable to the principles of his being than other relations: wherefore the term piety is more applicable to them.

Whether piety provides support for our parents?

Objection 1: It seems that piety does not provide support for our parents. For, seemingly, the precept of the decalogue, “Honor thy father and mother,” belongs to piety. But this prescribes only the giving of honor. Therefore it does not belong to piety to provide support for one’s parents.

Objection 2: Further, a man is bound to lay up for those whom he is bound to support. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:14), “neither ought the children to lay up for the parents.” Therefore piety does not oblige them to support their parents.

Objection 3: Further, piety extends not only to one’s parents, but also to other kinsmen and to one’s fellow-citizens, as stated above [3153](A[1]). But one is not bound to support all one’s kindred and fellow-citizens. Therefore neither is one bound to support one’s parents.

On the contrary, our Lord (Mat. 15:3–6) reproved the Pharisees for hindering children from supporting their parents.

I answer that, We owe something to our parents in two ways: that is to say, both essentially, and accidentally. We owe them essentially that which is due to a father as such: and since he is his son’s superior through being the principle of his being, the latter owes him reverence and service. Accidentally, that is due to a father, which it befits him to receive in respect of something accidental to him, for instance, if he be ill, it is fitting that his children should visit him and see to his cure; if he be poor, it is fitting that they should support him; and so on in like instance, all of which come under the head of service due. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “piety gives both duty and homage”: “duty” referring to service, and “homage” to reverence or honor, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), “we are said to give homage to those whose memory or presence we honor.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to our Lord’s interpretation (Mat. 15:3–6) the honor due to our parents includes whatever support we owe them; and the reason for this is that support is given to one’s father because it is due to him as to one greater.

Reply to Objection 2: Since a father stands in the relation of principle, and his son in the relation of that which is from a principle, it is essentially fitting for a father to support his son: and consequently he is bound to support him not only for a time, but for all his life, and this is to lay by. On the other hand, for the son to bestow something on his father is accidental, arising from some momentary necessity, wherein he is bound to support him, but not to lay by as for a long time beforehand, because naturally parents are not the successors of their children, but children of their parents.

Reply to Objection 3: As Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), “we offer homage and duty to all our kindred and to the well-wishers of our country”; not, however, equally to all, but chiefly to our parents, and to others according to our means and their personal claims.

Whether piety is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues. For the giving of service and homage to anyone proceeds from love. But it belongs to piety. Therefore piety is not a distinct virtue from charity.

Objection 2: Further, it is proper to religion to give worship to God. But piety also gives worship to God, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x). Therefore piety is not distinct from religion.

Objection 3: Further, piety, whereby we give our country worship and duty, seems to be the same as legal justice, which looks to the common good. But legal justice is a general virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore piety is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is accounted by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) as a part of justice.

I answer that, A special virtue is one that regards an object under a special aspect. Since, then, the nature of justice consists in rendering another person his due, wherever there is a special aspect of something due to a person, there is a special virtue. Now a thing is indebted in a special way to that which is its connatural principle of being and government. And piety regards this principle, inasmuch as it pays duty and homage to our parents and country, and to those who are related thereto. Therefore piety is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is a protestation of faith, hope and charity, whereby man is primarily directed to God, so again piety is a protestation of the charity we bear towards our parents and country.

Reply to Objection 2: God is the principle of our being and government in a far more excellent manner than one's father or country. Hence religion, which gives worship to God, is a distinct virtue from piety, which pays homage to our parents and country. But things relating to creatures are transferred to God as the summit of excellence and causality, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): wherefore, by way of excellence, piety designates the worship of God, even as God, by way of excellence, is called "Our Father."

Reply to Objection 3: Piety extends to our country in so far as the latter is for us a principle of being: but legal justice regards the good of our country, considered as the common good: wherefore legal justice has more of the character of a general virtue than piety has.

Whether the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion?

Objection 1: It seems that the duties of piety towards one's parents should be omitted for the sake of religion. For Our Lord said (Lk. 14:26): "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple." Hence it is said in praise of James and John (Mat. 4:22) that they left "their nets and father, and followed" Christ. Again it is said in praise of the Levites (Dt. 33:9): "Who hath said to his father, and to his mother: I do not know you; and to his brethren: I know you not; and their own children they have not known. These have kept Thy word." Now a man who knows not his parents and other kinsmen, or who even hates them, must needs omit the duties of piety. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lk. 9:59,60) that in answer to him who said: “Suffer me first to go and bury my father,” Our Lord replied: “Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou, and preach the kingdom of God.” Now the latter pertains to religion, while it is a duty of piety to bury one’s father. Therefore a duty of piety should be omitted for the sake of religion.

Objection 3: Further, God is called “Our Father” by excellence. Now just as we worship our parents by paying them the duties of piety so do we worship God by religion. Therefore the duties of piety should be omitted for the sake of the worship of religion.

Objection 4: Further, religious are bound by a vow which they may not break to fulfil the observances of religion. Now in accordance with those observances they are hindered from supporting their parents, both on the score of poverty, since they have nothing of their own, and on the score of obedience, since they may not leave the cloister without the permission of their superior. Therefore the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of religion.

On the contrary, Our Lord reproved the Pharisees (Mat. 15:3–6) who taught that for the sake of religion one ought to refrain from paying one’s parents the honor we owe them.

I answer that, Religion and piety are two virtues. Now no virtue is opposed to another virtue, since according to the Philosopher, in his book on the Categories (Cap. De oppos.), “good is not opposed to good.” Therefore it is impossible that religion and piety mutually hinder one another, so that the act of one be excluded by the act of the other. Now, as stated above ([3154]FS, Q[7], A[2]; [3155]FS, Q[18], A[3]), the act of every virtue is limited by the circumstances due thereto, and if it overstep them it will be an act no longer of virtue but of vice. Hence it belongs to piety to pay duty and homage to one’s parents according to the due mode. But it is not the due mode that man should tend to worship his father rather than God, but, as Ambrose says on Lk. 12:52, “the piety of divine religion takes precedence of the claims of kindred.”

Accordingly, if the worship of one’s parents take one away from the worship of God it would no longer be an act of piety to pay worship to one’s parents to the prejudice of God. Hence Jerome says (Ep. ad Heliod.): “Though thou trample upon thy father, though thou spurn thy mother, turn not aside, but with dry eyes hasten to the standard of the cross; it is the highest degree of piety to be cruel in this matter.” Therefore in such a case the duties of piety towards one’s parents should be omitted for the sake of the worship religion gives to God. If, however, by paying the services due to our parents, we are not withdrawn from the service of God, then will it be an act of piety, and there will be no need to set piety aside for the sake of religion.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory expounding this saying of our Lord says (Hom. xxxvii in Ev.) that “when we find our parents to be a hindrance in our way to God, we must ignore them by hating and fleeing from them.” For if our parents incite us to sin, and withdraw us from the service of God, we must, as regards this point, abandon and hate them. It is in this sense that the Levites are said to have not known their kindred, because they obeyed the Lord’s command, and spared not the idolaters (Ex. 32). James and John are praised for leaving their parents and following our Lord, not that their father incited them to evil, but because they deemed it possible for him to find another means of livelihood, if they followed Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord forbade the disciple to bury his father because, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxviii in Matth.), “Our Lord by so doing saved him from many evils, such as the sorrows and worries and other things that one anticipates under these circumstances. For after the burial the will had to be read, the estate had to be divided, and so forth: but chiefly, because there were others who could see to the funeral.” Or, according to Cyril’s commentary on Lk. 9, “this disciple’s request was, not that he might bury a dead father, but that he might support a yet living father in the latter’s old age, until at length he should bury him. This is what Our Lord did not grant, because there were others, bound by the duties of kindred, to take care of him.”

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever we give our parents out of piety is referred by us to God; just as other works of mercy which we perform with regard to any of our neighbors are offered to God, according to Mat. 25:40: “As long as you did it to one of . . . My least . . . you did it to Me.” Accordingly, if our carnal parents stand in need of our assistance, so that they have no other means of support, provided they incite us to nothing against God, we must not abandon them for the sake of religion. But if we cannot devote ourselves to their service without sin, or if they can be supported without our assistance, it is lawful to forego their service, so as to give more time to religion.

Reply to Objection 4: We must speak differently of one who is yet in the world, and of one who has made his profession in religion. For he that is in the world, if he has parents unable to find support without him, he must not leave them and enter religion, because he would be breaking the commandment prescribing the honoring of parents. Some say, however, that even then he might abandon them, and leave them in God's care. But this, considered aright, would be to tempt God: since, while having human means at hand, he would be exposing his parents to danger, in the hope of God's assistance. on the other hand, if the parents can find means of livelihood without him, it is lawful for him to abandon them and enter religion, because children are not bound to support their parents except in cases of necessity, as stated above. He that has already made his profession in religion is deemed to be already dead to the world: wherefore he ought not, under pretext of supporting his parents, to leave the cloister where he is buried with Christ, and busy himself once more with worldly affairs. Nevertheless he is bound, saving his obedience to his superiors, and his religious state withal, to make points efforts for his parents' support.

OF OBSERVANCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF, AND OF ITS PARTS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider observance and its parts, the considerations of which will manifest the contrary vices.

Under the head of observance there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?

(2) What does observance offer?

(3) Of its comparison with piety.

Whether observance is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that observance is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. For virtues are distinguished by their objects. But the object of observance is not distinct from the object of piety: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity." But worship and honor are paid also by piety to our parents, who excel in dignity. Therefore observance is not a distinct virtue from piety.

Objection 2: Further, just as honor and worship are due to those that are in a position of dignity, so also are they due to those who excel in science and virtue. But there is no special virtue whereby we pay honor and worship to those who excel in science and virtue. Therefore observance, whereby we pay worship and honor to those who excel in dignity, is not a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, we have many duties towards those who are in a position of dignity, the fulfilment of which is required by law, according to Rom. 13:7, “Render . . . to all men their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due,” etc. Now the fulfilment of the requirements of the law belongs to legal justice, or even to special justice. Therefore observance is not by itself a special virtue distinct from other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons observance along with the other parts of justice, which are special virtues.

I answer that, As explained above ([3156]Q[101], AA[1],3;[3157] Q[80]), according to the various excellences of those persons to whom something is due, there must needs be a corresponding distinction of virtues in a descending order. Now just as a carnal father partakes of the character of principle in a particular way, which character is found in God in a universal way, so too a person who, in some way, exercises providence in one respect, partakes of the character of father in a particular way, since a father is the principle of generation, of education, of learning and of whatever pertains to the perfection of human life: while a person who is in a position of dignity is as a principle of government with regard to certain things: for instance, the governor of a state in civil matters, the commander of an army in matters of warfare, a professor in matters of learning, and so forth. Hence it is that all such persons are designated as “fathers,” on account of their being charged with like cares: thus the servants of Naaman said to him (4 Kings 5:13): “Father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing,” etc.

Therefore, just as, in a manner, religion, whereby worship is given to find piety, whereby we worship our so under piety we find observance, whereby worship and honor are paid to persons in positions of dignity.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3158]Q[101], A[3], ad 2), religion goes by the name of piety by way of supereminence, although piety properly so called is distinct from religion; and in the same way piety can be called observance by way of excellence, although observance properly speaking is distinct from piety.

Reply to Objection 2: By the very fact of being in a position of dignity a man not only excels as regards his position, but also has a certain power of governing subjects, wherefore it is fitting that he should be considered as a principle inasmuch as he is the governor of others. On the other hand, the fact that a man has perfection of science and virtue does not give him the character of a principle in relation to others, but merely a certain excellence in himself. Wherefore a special virtue is appointed for the payment of worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. Yet, forasmuch as science, virtue and all like things render a man fit for positions of dignity, the respect which is paid to anyone on account of any excellence whatever belongs to the same virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to special justice, properly speaking, to pay the equivalent to those to whom we owe anything. Now this cannot be done to the virtuous, and to those who make good use of their position of dignity, as neither can it be done to God, nor to our parents. Consequently these matters belong to an annexed virtue, and not to special justice, which is a principal virtue.

Legal justice extends to the acts of all the virtues, as stated above ([3159]Q[58], A[6]).

Whether it belongs to observance to pay worship and honor to those who are in positions of dignity?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to observance to pay worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x), we are said to worship those persons whom we hold in honor, so that worship and honor would seem to be the same. Therefore it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to justice that we pay what we owe: wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honor to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly defined as giving worship and honor to all.

Objection 3: Further, not only do we owe honor to persons of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear and a certain payment of remuneration, according to Rom. 13:7, “Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor.” Moreover, we owe them reverence and subjection, according to Heb. 13:17, “Obey your prelates, and be subject to them.” Therefore observance is not fittingly defined as paying worship and honor.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “it is by observance that we pay worship and honor to those who excel in some kind of dignity.”

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones to their due end: thus a sailor governs his ship by steering it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration: first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence there is due to him honor, which is the recognition of some kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his government, there is due to him worship, consisting in rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by repaying him, according to one’s faculty, for the benefits we received from him.

Reply to Objection 1: Worship includes not only honor, but also whatever other suitable actions are connected with the relations between man and man.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3160]Q[80]), debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by law; and thus man owes honor and worship to those persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty: it is in this way that we owe worship and honor to persons in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply to Objection 3: Honor is due to the excellence of persons in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank: while fear is due to them on account of their power to use compulsion: and to the exercise of their government there is due both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the command of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repayment of their labor.

Whether observance is a greater virtue than piety?

Objection 1: It seems that observance is a greater virtue than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by observance is compared to a father who is worshiped by piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the household which a father governs is part of the state which is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater, and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore observance is a greater virtue than piety.

Objection 2: Further, persons in positions of dignity take care of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the private good, which we ought to set aside for the common good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the danger of death for the sake of the common good. Therefore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in positions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which pays worship to one's kindred.

Objection 3: Further honor and reverence are due to the virtuous in the first place after God. Now honor and reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of observance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore observance takes the first place after religion.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion, which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honoring our parents which refers to piety. Therefore piety follows immediately after religion in the order of excellence.

I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the common good, as when one serves them in the administration of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety. Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must needs take into consideration the different relations in which other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and education, which originate in the father, belong more to one’s substance than external government, the principle of which is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch as it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom we are more strictly bound.

Reply to Objection 1: The prince is compared to the father as a universal to a particular power, as regards external government, but not as regards the father being a principle of generation: for in this way the father should be compared with the divine power from which all things derive their being.

Reply to Objection 2: In so far as persons in positions of dignity are related to the common good, their worship does not pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The rendering of honor or worship should be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as considered in himself, but also as compared to those who pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered in themselves, are more worthy of honor than the persons of one’s parents, yet children are under a greater obligation, on account of the benefits they have received from their parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship and honor to their parents than to virtuous persons who are not of their kindred.

OF DULIA (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall consider (1) dulia, whereby we pay honor and other things pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position; (2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether honor is a spiritual or a corporal thing?

(2) Whether honor is due to those only who are in a higher position?

(3) Whether dulia, which pays honor and worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue, distinct from latria?

(4) Whether it contains several species?

Whether honor denotes something corporal?

Objection 1: It seems that honor does not denote something corporal. For honor is showing reverence in acknowledgment of virtue, as may be gathered from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5). Now showing reverence is something spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated above ([3161]Q[81], A[2], ad 1). Therefore honor is something spiritual.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “honor is the reward of virtue.” Now, since virtue consists chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit. Therefore honor does not consist of corporal things.

Objection 3: Further, honor is distinct from praise, as also from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external things. Therefore honor consists of things internal and spiritual.

On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of 1 Tim. 5:3, “Honor widows that are widows indeed,” and (1 Tim. 5:17), “let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor” etc. says (Ep. ad Ageruch.): “Honor here stands either for almsgiving or for remuneration.” Now both of these pertain to spiritual things. Therefore honor consists of corporal things.

I answer that, Honor denotes a witnessing to a person’s excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honored seek a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5; viii, 8). Now witness is borne either before God or before man. Before God, Who is the searcher of hearts, the witness of one’s conscience suffices. wherefore honor, so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknowledges either God’s excellence or another man’s excellence before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness, save by means of signs, either by words, as when one proclaims another’s excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds, for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like. Accordingly honor consists of signs, external and corporal.

Reply to Objection 1: Reverence is not the same as honor: but on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honor, in so far as one man honors another out of the reverence he has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honor, in so far as a person is honored in order that he may be held in reverence by others.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in human and corporal things can be greater than honor, since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs in acknowledgment of excelling virtue. It is, however, due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made known, according to Mat. 5:15, “Neither do men light a candle, and put it under a bushel, but upon a candlestick, that it may shine to all that are in the house.” In this sense honor is said to be the reward of virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise is distinguished from honor in two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal signs, whereas honor consists of any external signs, so that praise is included in honor. Secondly, because by paying honor to a person we bear witness to a person’s excelling goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand, honor is given even to the best, which is not referred to an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 5).

Glory is the effect of honor and praise, since the result of our bearing witness to a person’s goodness is that his goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The word “glory” signifies this, for “glory” is the same as {kleria}, wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. 16:27 observes that glory is “clear knowledge together with praise.”

Whether honor is properly due to those who are above us?

Objection 1: It seems that honor is not properly due to those who are above us. For an angel is above any human wayfarer, according to Mat. 11:11, “He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist.” Yet an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honor him (Apoc. 22:10). Therefore honor is not due to those who are above us.

Objection 2: Further, honor is due to a person in acknowledgment of his virtue, as stated above [3162](A[1]; Q[63], A[3]). But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous. Therefore honor is not due to them, as neither is it due to the demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 12:10): “With honor preventing one another,” and we read (1 Pet. 2:17): “Honor all men.” But this would not be so if honor were due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honor is not due properly to those who are above us.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Tob. 1:16) that Tobias “had ten talents of silver of that which he had been honored by the king”: and we read (Esther 6:11) that Assuerus honored Mardochaeus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence: “This honor is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to honor.” Therefore honor is paid to those also who are beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honor is not due properly to those who are above us.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 12) that “honor is due to the best.”

I answer that, As stated above [3163](A[1]), honor is nothing but an acknowledgment of a person’s excelling goodness. Now a person’s excellence may be considered, not only in relation to those who honor him, in the point of his being more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation to other persons, and in this way honor is always due to a person, on account of some excellence or superiority.

For the person honored has no need to be more excellent than those who honor him; it may suffice for him to be more excellent than some others, or again he may be more excellent than those who honor him in some respect and not simply.

Reply to Objection 1: The angel forbade John to pay him, not any kind of honor, but the honor of adoration and latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to pay the honor of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of John himself, for which Christ equaled him to the angels “according to the hope of glory of the children of God”: wherefore he refused to be honored by him as though he were superior to him.

Reply to Objection 2: A wicked superior is honored for the excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being God’s minister, and because the honor paid to him is paid to the whole community over which he presides. As for the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honor.

Reply to Objection 3: In every man is to be found something that makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, according to Phil. 2:3, “In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves,” and thus, too, we should all be on the alert to do honor to one another.

Reply to Objection 4: Private individuals are sometimes honored by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity but on account of some excellence of their virtue: and in this way Tobias and Mardochaeus were honored by kings.

Whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from latria?

Objection 1. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. 7:1, “O Lord my God, in Thee have I put my trust,” says: “Lord of all by His power, to Whom dulia is due; God by creation, to Whom we owe latria.” Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 8), “to be loved is like being honored.” Now the charity with which we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neighbor. Therefore dulia whereby we honor our neighbor is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honor God.

Objection 3: Further, the movement whereby one is moved towards an image is the same as the movement whereby one is moved towards the thing represented by the image. Now by dulia we honor a man as being made to the image of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. 2:22,23) that “they esteemed not the honor of holy souls, for God created man incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him.” Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby God is honored.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x), that “the homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he commanded servants to obey their masters and which in Greek is called dulia, is distinct from latria which denotes the homage that consists in the worship of God.”

I answer that, According to what has been stated above ([3164]Q[101], A[3]), where there are different aspects of that which is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore dulia, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by observance we honor all those who excel in dignity, while dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is called piety by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of excellence, so again latria is called dulia by way of excellence, inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now the creature does not partake of the power to create by reason of which latria is due to God: and so this gloss drew a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but dulia in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a creature.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason why we love our neighbor is God, since that which we love in our neighbor through charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which we love God is the same as that with which we love our neighbor. Yet there are other friendships distinct from charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving God and another for serving man, and for honoring the one or the other, latria and dulia are not the same virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Movement towards an image as such is referred to the thing represented by the image: yet not every movement towards an image is referred to the image as such, and consequently sometimes the movement to the image differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accordingly we must reply that the honor or subjection of dulia regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not always refer this to God actually.

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement towards the thing need not be towards its image. Wherefore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His image.

Whether dulia has various species?

Objection 1: It seems that dulia has various species. For by dulia we show honor to our neighbor. Now different neighbors are honored under different aspects, for instance king, father and master, as the Philosopher states

(Ethic. ix, 2). Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into specifically different virtues.

Objection 2: Further, the mean differs specifically from the extremes, as pale differs from white and black. Now hyperdulia is apparently a mean between latria and dulia: for it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.

Objection 3: Further, just as in the rational creature we find the image of God, for which reason it is honored, so too in the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the aspect of likeness denoted by an image differs from the aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since honor is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for instance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.

On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is dulia.

I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia signifies servitude, as stated above [3165](A[3]). Taken in this sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the species of observance, mentioned by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes dulia in a wide sense.

Reply to Objection 2: Hyperdulia is the highest species of dulia taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to God.

Reply to Objection 3: Man owes neither subjection nor honor to an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross of Christ, the honor we pay to it is the same as that which we pay to Christ, just as the king’s robe receives the same honor as the king himself, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv).

OF OBEDIENCE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider obedience, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether one man is bound to obey another?

(2) Whether obedience is a special virtue?

(3) Of its comparison with other virtues;

(4) Whether God must be obeyed in all things?

(5) Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?

(6) Whether the faithful are bound to obey the secular power?

Whether one man is bound to obey another?

Objection 1: It seems that one man is not bound to obey another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by his own counsel, according to Ecclus. 15:14, “God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.” Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

Objection 2: Further, if one man were bound to obey another, he would have to look upon the will of the person commanding him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God’s will alone, which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. Therefore man is bound to obey none but God.

Objection 3: Further, the more gratuitous the service the more is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

On the contrary, It is prescribed (Heb. 13:17): “Obey your prelates and be subject to them.”

I answer that, Just as the actions of natural things proceed from natural powers, so do human actions proceed from the human will. In natural things it behooved the higher to move the lower to their actions by the excellence of the natural power bestowed on them by God: and so in human affairs also the higher must move the lower by their will in virtue of a divinely established authority. Now to move by reason and will is to command. Wherefore just as in virtue of the divinely established natural order the lower natural things need to be subject to the movement of the higher, so too in human affairs, in virtue of the order of natural and divine law, inferiors are bound to obey their superiors.

Reply to Objection 1: God left man in the hand of his own counsel, not as though it were lawful to him to do whatever he will, but because, unlike irrational creatures, he is not compelled by natural necessity to do what he ought to do, but is left the free choice proceeding from his own counsel. And just as he has to proceed on his own counsel in doing other things, so too has he in the point of obeying his superiors. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxv), “When we humbly give way to another’s voice, we overcome ourselves in our own hearts.”

Reply to Objection 2: The will of God is the first rule whereby all rational wills are regulated: and to this rule one will approaches more than another, according to a divinely appointed order. Hence the will of the one man who issues a command may be as a second rule to the will of this other man who obeys him.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing may be deemed gratuitous in two ways. In one way on the part of the deed itself, because, to wit, one is not bound to do it; in another way, on the part of the doer, because he does it of his own free will. Now a deed is rendered virtuous, praiseworthy and meritorious, chiefly according as it proceeds from the will. Wherefore although obedience be a duty, if one obey with a prompt will, one’s merit is not for that reason diminished, especially before God, Who sees not only the outward deed, but also the inward will.

Whether obedience is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that obedience is not a special virtue. For disobedience is contrary to obedience. But disobedience is a general sin, because Ambrose says (De Parad. viii) that “sin is to disobey the divine law.” Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, every special virtue is either theological or moral. But obedience is not a theological virtue, since it is not comprised under faith, hope or charity. Nor is it a moral virtue, since it does not hold the mean between excess and deficiency, for the more obedient one is the more is one praised. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience is the more meritorious and praiseworthy, the less it holds its own.” But every special virtue is the more to be praised the more it holds its own, since virtue requires a man to exercise his will and choice, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore obedience is not a special virtue.

Objection 4: Further, virtues differ in species according to their objects. Now the object of obedience would seem to be the command of a superior, of which, apparently, there are as many kinds as there are degrees of superiority. Therefore obedience is a general virtue, comprising many special virtues.

On the contrary, obedience is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, as stated above ([3166]Q[80]).

I answer that, A special virtue is assigned to all good deeds that have a special reason of praise: for it belongs properly to virtue to render a deed good. Now obedience to a superior is due in accordance with the divinely established order of things, as shown above [3167](A[1]), and therefore it is a good, since good consists in mode, species and order, as Augustine states (De Natura Boni iii) [*Cf. [3168]FP, Q[5], A[5]]. Again, this act has a special aspect of praiseworthiness by reason of its object. For while subjects have many obligations towards their superiors, this one, that they are bound to obey their commands, stands out as special among the rest. Wherefore obedience is a special virtue, and its specific object is a command tacit or express, because the superior’s will, however it become known, is a tacit precept, and a man’s obedience seems to be all the more prompt, forasmuch as by obeying he forestalls the express command as soon as he understands his superior’s will.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents the one same material object from admitting two special aspects to which two special virtues correspond: thus a soldier, by defending his king’s fortress, fulfils both an act of fortitude, by facing the danger of death for a good end, and an act of justice, by rendering due service to his lord. Accordingly the aspect of precept, which obedience considers, occurs in acts of all virtues, but not in all acts of virtue, since not all acts of virtue are a matter of precept, as stated above ([3169]FS, Q[96], A[3]). Moreover, certain things are sometimes a matter of precept, and pertain to no other virtue, such things for instance as are not evil except because they are forbidden. Wherefore, if obedience be taken in its proper sense, as considering formally and intentionally the aspect of precept, it will be a special virtue, and disobedience a special sin: because in this way it is requisite for obedience that one perform an act of justice or of some other virtue with the intention of fulfilling a precept; and for disobedience that one treat the precept with actual contempt. On the other hand, if obedience be taken in a wide sense for the performance of any action that may be a matter of precept, and disobedience for the omission of that action through any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue, and disobedience a general sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Obedience is not a theological virtue, for its direct object is not God, but the precept of any superior, whether expressed or inferred, namely, a simple word of the superior, indicating his will, and which the obedient subject obeys promptly, according to Titus 3:1, “Admonish them to be subject to princes, and to obey at a word,” etc.

It is, however, a moral virtue, since it is a part of justice, and it observes the mean between excess and deficiency. Excess thereof is measured in respect, not of quantity, but of other circumstances, in so far as a man obeys either whom he ought not, or in matters wherein he ought not to obey, as we have stated above regarding religion ([3170]Q[92], A[2]). We may also reply that as in justice, excess is in the person who retains another’s property, and deficiency in the person who does not receive his due, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4), so too obedience observes the mean between excess on the part of him who fails to pay due obedience to his superior, since he exceeds in fulfilling his own will, and deficiency on the part of the superior, who does not receive obedience. Wherefore in this way obedience will be a mean between two forms of wickedness, as was stated above concerning justice ([3171]Q[58], A[10]).

Reply to Objection 3: Obedience, like every virtue requires the will to be prompt towards its proper object, but not towards that which is repugnant to it. Now the proper object of obedience is a precept, and this proceeds from another’s will. Wherefore obedience make a man’s will prompt in fulfilling the will of another, the maker, namely, of the precept. If that which is prescribed to him is willed by him for its own sake apart from its being prescribed, as happens in agreeable matters, he tends towards it at once by his own will and seems to comply, not on account of the precept, but on account of his own will. But if that which is prescribed is nowise willed for its own sake, but, considered in itself, repugnant to his own will, as happens in disagreeable matters, then it is quite evident that it is not fulfilled except on account of the precept. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience perishes or diminishes when it holds its own in agreeable matters," because, to wit, one's own will seems to tend principally, not to the accomplishment of the precept, but to the fulfilment of one's own desire; but that "it increases in disagreeable or difficult matters," because there one's own will tends to nothing beside the precept. Yet this must be understood as regards outward appearances: for, on the other hand, according to the judgment of God, Who searches the heart, it may happen that even in agreeable matters obedience, while holding its own, is nonetheless praiseworthy, provided the will of him that obeys tend no less devotedly [*Cf.[3172] Q[82], A[2]] to the fulfilment of the precept.

Reply to Objection 4: Reverence regards directly the person that excels: wherefore it admits a various species according to the various aspects of excellence. Obedience, on the other hand, regards the precept of the person that excels, and therefore admits of only one aspect. And since obedience is due to a person's precept on account of reverence to him, it follows that obedience to a man is of one species, though the causes from which it proceeds differ specifically.

Whether obedience is the greatest of the virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that obedience is the greatest of the virtues. For it is written (1 Kings 15:22): "Obedience is better than sacrifices." Now the offering of sacrifices belongs to religion, which is the greatest of all moral virtues, as shown above ([3173]Q[81], A[6]). Therefore obedience is the greatest of all virtues.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that "obedience is the only virtue that ingrafts virtues in the soul and protects them when ingrafted.” Now the cause is greater than the effect. Therefore obedience is greater than all the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “evil should never be done out of obedience: yet sometimes for the sake of obedience we should lay aside the good we are doing.” Now one does not lay aside a thing except for something better. Therefore obedience, for whose sake the good of other virtues is set aside, is better than other virtues.

On the contrary, obedience deserves praise because it proceeds from charity: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience should be practiced, not out of servile fear, but from a sense of charity, not through fear of punishment, but through love of justice.” Therefore charity is a greater virtue than obedience.

I answer that, Just as sin consists in man contemning God and adhering to mutable things, so the merit of a virtuous act consists in man contemning created goods and adhering to God as his end. Now the end is greater than that which is directed to the end. Therefore if a man contemns created goods in order that he may adhere to God, his virtue derives greater praise from his adhering to God than from his contemning earthly things. And so those, namely the theological, virtues whereby he adheres to God in Himself, are greater than the moral virtues, whereby he holds in contempt some earthly thing in order to adhere to God.

Among the moral virtues, the greater the thing which a man contemns that he may adhere to God, the greater the virtue. Now there are three kinds of human goods that man may contemn for God’s sake. The lowest of these are external goods, the goods of the body take the middle place, and the highest are the goods of the soul; and among these the chief, in a way, is the will, in so far as, by his will, man makes use of all other goods. Therefore, properly speaking, the virtue of obedience, whereby we contemn our own will for God’s sake, is more praiseworthy than the other moral virtues, which contemn other goods for the sake of God.

Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience is rightly preferred to sacrifices, because by sacrifices another’s body is slain whereas by obedience we slay our own will.” Wherefore even any other acts of virtue are meritorious before God through being performed out of obedience to God’s will. For were one to suffer even martyrdom, or to give all one’s goods to the poor, unless one directed these things to the fulfilment of the divine will, which pertains directly to obedience, they could not be meritorious: as neither would they be if they were done without charity, which cannot exist apart from obedience. For it is written (1 Jn. 2:4,5): “He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not His commandments, is a liar . . . but he that keepeth His word, in him in very deed the charity of God is perfected”: and this because friends have the same likes and dislikes.

Reply to Objection 1: Obedience proceeds from reverence, which pays worship and honor to a superior, and in this respect it is contained under different virtues, although considered in itself, as regarding the aspect of precept, it is one special virtue. Accordingly, in so far as it proceeds from reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a way, under observance; while in so far as it proceeds from reverence for one’s parents, it is contained under piety; and in so far as it proceeds from reverence for God, it comes under religion, and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion. Wherefore from this point of view it is more praiseworthy to obey God than to offer sacrifice, as well as because, “in a sacrifice we slay another’s body, whereas by obedience we slay our own will,” as Gregory says (Moral. xxxv). As to the special case in which Samuel spoke, it would have been better for Saul to obey God than to offer in sacrifice the fat animals of the Amalekites against the commandment of God.

Reply to Objection 2: All acts of virtue, in so far as they come under a precept, belong to obedience. Wherefore according as acts of virtue act causally or dispositively towards their generation and preservation, obedience is said to ingraft and protect all virtues. And yet it does not follow that obedience takes precedence of all virtues absolutely, for two reasons. First, because though an act of virtue come under a precept, one may nevertheless perform that act of virtue without considering the aspect of precept. Consequently, if there be any virtue, whose object is naturally prior to the precept, that virtue is said to be naturally prior to obedience. Such a virtue is faith, whereby we come to know the sublime nature of divine authority, by reason of which the power to command is competent to God. Secondly, because infusion of grace and virtues may precede, even in point of time, all virtuous acts: and in this way obedience is not prior to all virtues, neither in point of time nor by nature.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two kinds of good. There is that to which we are bound of necessity, for instance to love God, and so forth: and by no means may such a good be set aside on account of obedience. But there is another good to which man is not bound of necessity, and this good we ought sometimes to set aside for the sake of obedience to which we are bound of necessity, since we ought not to do good by falling into sin. Yet as Gregory remarks (Moral. xxxv), “he who forbids his subjects any single good, must needs allow them many others, lest the souls of those who obey perish utterly from starvation, through being deprived of every good.” Thus the loss of one good may be compensated by obedience and other goods.

Whether God ought to be obeyed in all things?

Objection 1: It seems that God need not be obeyed in all things. For it is written (Mat. 9:30,31) that our Lord after healing the two blind men commanded them, saying: “See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country.” Yet they are not blamed for so doing. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to obey God in all things.

Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do anything contrary to virtue. Now we find that God commanded certain things contrary to virtue: thus He commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gn. 22); and the Jews to steal the property of the Egyptians (Ex. 11), which things are contrary to justice; and Osee to take to himself a woman who was an adulteress (Osee 3), and this is contrary to chastity. Therefore God is not to be obeyed in all things.

Objection 3: Further, whoever obeys God conforms his will to the divine will even as to the thing willed. But we are not bound in all things to conform our will to the divine will as to the thing willed, as stated above ([3174]FS, Q[19], A[10]). Therefore man is not bound to obey God in all things.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 24:7): “All things that the Lord hath spoken we will do, and we will be obedient.”

I answer that, As stated above [3175](A[1]), he who obeys is moved by the command of the person he obeys, just as natural things are moved by their motive causes. Now just a God is the first mover of all things that are moved naturally, so too is He the first mover of all wills, as shown above ([3176]FS, Q[9], A[6]). Therefore just as all natural things are subject to the divine motion by a natural necessity so too all wills, by a kind of necessity of justice, are bound to obey the divine command.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord in telling the blind men to conceal the miracle had no intention of binding them with the force of a divine precept, but, as Gregory says (Moral. xix), “gave an example to His servants who follow Him that they might wish to hide their virtue and yet that it should be proclaimed against their will, in order that others might profit by their example.”

Reply to Objection 2: Even as God does nothing contrary to nature (since “the nature of a thing is what God does therein,” according to a gloss on Rom. 11), and yet does certain things contrary to the wonted course of nature; so to God can command nothing contrary to virtue since virtue and rectitude of human will consist chiefly in conformity with God’s will and obedience to His command, although it be contrary to the wonted mode of virtue. Accordingly, then, the command given to Abraham to slay his innocent son was not contrary to justice, since God is the author of life an death. Nor again was it contrary to justice that He commanded the Jews to take things belonging to the Egyptians, because all things are His, and He gives them to whom He will. Nor was it contrary to chastity that Osee was commanded to take an adulteress, because God Himself is the ordainer of human generation, and the right manner of intercourse with woman is that which He appoints. Hence it is evident that the persons aforesaid did not sin, either by obeying God or by willing to obey Him.

Reply to Objection 3: Though man is not always bound to will what God wills, yet he is always bound to will what God wills him to will. This comes to man’s knowledge chiefly through God’s command, wherefore man is bound to obey God’s commands in all things.

Whether subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things?

Objection 1: It seems that subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things. For the Apostle says (Col. 3:20): “Children, obey your parents in all things,” and farther on (Col. 3:22): “Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh.” Therefore in like manner other subjects are bound to obey their superiors in all things.

Objection 2: Further, superiors stand between God and their subjects, according to Dt. 5:5, “I was the mediator and stood between the Lord and you at that time, to show you His words.” Now there is no going from extreme to extreme, except through that which stands between. Therefore the commands of a superior must be esteemed the commands of God, wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 4:14): “You . . . received me as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus” and (1 Thess. 2:13): “When you had received of us the word of the hearing of God, you received it, not as the word of men, but, as it is indeed, the word of God.” Therefore as man is bound to obey God in all things, so is he bound to obey his superiors.

Objection 3: Further, just as religious in making their profession take vows of chastity and poverty, so do they also vow obedience. Now a religious is bound to observe chastity and poverty in all things. Therefore he is also bound to obey in all things.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 5:29): “We ought to obey God rather than men.” Now sometimes the things commanded by a superior are against God. Therefore superiors are not to be obeyed in all things.

I answer that, As stated above ([3177]AA[1],4), he who obeys is moved at the bidding of the person who commands him, by a certain necessity of justice, even as a natural thing is moved through the power of its mover by a natural necessity. That a natural thing be not moved by its mover, may happen in two ways. First, on account of a hindrance arising from the stronger power of some other mover; thus wood is not burnt by fire if a stronger force of water intervene. Secondly, through lack of order in the movable with regard to its mover, since, though it is subject to the latter’s action in one respect, yet it is not subject thereto in every respect. Thus, a humor is sometimes subject to the action of heat, as regards being heated, but not as regards being dried up or consumed. In like manner there are two reasons, for which a subject may not be bound to obey his superior in all things. First on account of the command of a higher power. For as a gloss says on Rom. 13:2, “They that resist [Vulg.: ‘He that resisteth’] the power, resist the ordinance of God” (cf. St. Augustine, De Verb. Dom. viii). “If a commissioner issue an order, are you to comply, if it is contrary to the bidding of the proconsul? Again if the proconsul command one thing, and the emperor another, will you hesitate, to disregard the former and serve the latter? Therefore if the emperor commands one thing and God another, you must disregard the former and obey God.” Secondly, a subject is not bound to obey his superior if the latter command him to do something wherein he is not subject to him. For Seneca says (De Beneficiis iii): “It is wrong to suppose that slavery falls upon the whole man: for the better part of him is excepted.” His body is subjected and assigned to his master but his soul is his own. Consequently in matters touching the internal movement of the will man is not bound to obey his fellow-man, but God alone.

Nevertheless man is bound to obey his fellow-man in things that have to be done externally by means of the body: and yet, since by nature all men are equal, he is not bound to obey another man in matters touching the nature of the body, for instance in those relating to the support of his body or the begetting of his children. Wherefore servants are not bound to obey their masters, nor children their parents, in the question of contracting marriage or of remaining in the state of virginity or the like. But in matters concerning the disposal of actions and human affairs, a subject is bound to obey his superior within the sphere of his authority; for instance a soldier must obey his general in matters relating to war, a servant his master in matters touching the execution of the duties of his service, a son his father in matters relating to the conduct of his life and the care of the household; and so forth.

Reply to Objection 1: When the Apostle says “in all things,” he refers to matters within the sphere of a father’s or master’s authority.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both internal and external, wherefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. On the other hand, inferiors are not subject to their superiors in all things, but only in certain things and in a particular way, in respect of which the superior stands between God and his subjects, whereas in respect of other matters the subject is immediately under God, by Whom he is taught either by the natural or by the written law.

Reply to Objection 3: Religious profess obedience as to the regular mode of life, in respect of which they are subject to their superiors: wherefore they are bound to obey in those matters only which may belong to the regular mode of life, and this obedience suffices for salvation. If they be willing to obey even in other matters, this will belong to the superabundance of perfection; provided, however, such things be not contrary to God or to the rule they profess, for obedience in this case would be unlawful.

Accordingly we may distinguish a threefold obedience; one, sufficient for salvation, and consisting in obeying when one is bound to obey: secondly, perfect obedience, which obeys in all things lawful: thirdly, indiscreet obedience, which obeys even in matters unlawful.

Whether Christians are bound to obey the secular powers?

Objection 1: It seems that Christians are not bound to obey the secular power. For a gloss on Mat. 17:25, “Then the children are free,” says: “If in every kingdom the children of the king who holds sway over that kingdom are free, then the children of that King, under Whose sway are all kingdoms, should be free in every kingdom.” Now Christians, by their faith in Christ, are made children of God, according to Jn. 1:12: “He gave them power to be made the sons of God, to them that believe in His name.” Therefore they are not bound to obey the secular power.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 7:4): “You . . . are become dead to the law by the body of Christ,” and the law mentioned here is the divine law of the Old Testament. Now human law whereby men are subject to the secular power is of less account than the divine law of the Old Testament. Much more, therefore, since they have become members of Christ’s body, are men freed from the law of subjection, whereby they were under the power of secular princes.

Objection 3: Further, men are not bound to obey robbers, who oppress them with violence. Now, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv): “Without justice, what else is a kingdom but a huge robbery?” Since therefore the authority of secular princes is frequently exercised with injustice, or owes its origin to some unjust usurpation, it seems that Christians ought not to obey secular princes.

On the contrary, It is written (Titus 3:1): “Admonish them to be subject to princes and powers,” and (1 Pet. 2:13,14): “Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God’s sake: whether it be to the king as excelling, or to governors as sent by him.”

I answer that, Faith in Christ is the origin and cause of justice, according to Rom. 3:22, “The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ:” wherefore faith in Christ does not void the order of justice, but strengthens it." Now the order of justice requires that subjects obey their superiors, else the stability of human affairs would cease. Hence faith in Christ does not excuse the faithful from the obligation of obeying secular princes.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3178](A[5]), subjection whereby one man is bound to another regards the body; not the soul, which retains its liberty. Now, in this state of life we are freed by the grace of Christ from defects of the soul, but not from defects of the body, as the Apostle declares by saying of himself (Rom. 7:23) that in his mind he served the law of God, but in his flesh the law of sin. Wherefore those that are made children of God by grace are free from the spiritual bondage of sin, but not from the bodily bondage, whereby they are held bound to earthly masters, as a gloss observes on 1 Tim. 6:1, "Whosoever are servants under the yoke," etc.

Reply to Objection 2: The Old Law was a figure of the New Testament, and therefore it had to cease on the advent of truth. And the comparison with human law does not stand because thereby one man is subject to another. Yet man is bound by divine law to obey his fellow-man.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is bound to obey secular princes in so far as this is required by order of justice. Wherefore if the prince's authority is not just but usurped, or if he commands what is unjust, his subjects are not bound to obey him, except perhaps accidentally, in order to avoid scandal or danger.

OF DISOBEDIENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider disobedience, under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(2) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

Whether disobedience is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is not a mortal sin. For every sin is a disobedience, as appears from Ambrose's definition given above ([3179]Q[104], A[2], OBJ[1]). Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, every sin would be mortal.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that disobedience is born of vainglory. But vainglory is not a mortal sin. Neither therefore is disobedience.

Objection 3: Further, a person is said to be disobedient when he does not fulfil a superior’s command. But superiors often issue so many commands that it is seldom, if ever, possible to fulfil them. Therefore if disobedience were a mortal sin, it would follow that man cannot avoid mortal sin, which is absurd. Wherefore disobedience is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, The sin of disobedience to parents is reckoned (Rom. 1:30; 2 Tim. 3:2) among other mortal sins.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[24], A[12]; [3180]FS, Q[72], A[5]; [3181]FS, Q[88], A[1]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity which is the cause of spiritual life. Now by charity we love God and our neighbor. The charity of God requires that we obey His commandments, as stated above (Q[24], A[12]). Therefore to be disobedient to the commandments of God is a mortal sin, because it is contrary to the love of God.

Again, the commandments of God contain the precept of obedience to superiors. Wherefore also disobedience to the commands of a superior is a mortal sin, as being contrary to the love of God, according to Rom. 13:2, “He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.” It is also contrary to the love of our neighbor, as it withdraws from the superior who is our neighbor the obedience that is his due.

Reply to Objection 1: The definition given by Ambrose refers to mortal sin, which has the character of perfect sin. Venial sin is not disobedience, because it is not contrary to a precept, but beside it. Nor again is every mortal sin disobedience, properly and essentially, but only when one contemns a precept, since moral acts take their species from the end. And when a thing is done contrary to a precept, not in contempt of the precept, but with some other purpose, it is not a sin of disobedience except materially, and belongs formally to another species of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Vainglory desires display of excellence. And since it seems to point to a certain excellence that one be not subject to another’s command, it follows that disobedience arises from vainglory. But there is nothing to hinder mortal sin from arising out of venial sin, since venial sin is a disposition to mortal.

Reply to Objection 3: No one is bound to do the impossible: wherefore if a superior makes a heap of precepts and lays them upon his subjects, so that they are unable to fulfil them, they are excused from sin. Wherefore superiors should refrain from making a multitude of precepts.

Whether disobedience is the most grievous of sins?

Objection 1: It seems that disobedience is the most grievous of sins. For it is written (1 Kings 15:23): “It is like the sin of witchcraft to rebel, and like the crime of idolatry to refuse to obey.” But idolatry is the most grievous of sins, as stated above ([3182]Q[94], A[3]). Therefore disobedience is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 2: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost is one that removes the obstacles of sin, as stated above ([3183]Q[14], A[2]). Now disobedience makes a man contemn a precept which, more than anything, prevents a man from sinning. Therefore disobedience is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and consequently is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that “by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners.” Now the cause is seemingly greater than its effect. Therefore disobedience seems to be a more grievous sin than the others that are caused thereby.

On the contrary, Contempt of the commander is a more grievous sin than contempt of his command. Now some sins are against the very person of the commander, such as blasphemy and murder. Therefore disobedience is not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Not every disobedience is equally a sin: for one disobedience may be greater than another, in two ways. First, on the part of the superior commanding, since, although a man should take every care to obey each superior, yet it is a greater duty to obey a higher than a lower authority, in sign of which the command of a lower authority is set aside if it be contrary to the command of a higher authority. Consequently the higher the person who commands, the more grievous is it to disobey him: so that it is more grievous to disobey God than man. Secondly, on the part of the things commanded. For the person commanding does not equally desire the fulfilment of all his commands: since every such person desires above all the end, and that which is nearest to the end. Wherefore disobedience is the more grievous, according as the unfulfilled commandment is more in the intention of the person commanding. As to the commandments of God, it is evident that the greater the good commanded, the more grievous the disobedience of that commandment, because since God's will is essentially directed to the good, the greater the good the more does God wish it to be fulfilled. Consequently he that disobeys the commandment of the love of God sins more grievously than one who disobeys the commandment of the love of our neighbor. On the other hand, man's will is not always directed to the greater good: hence, when we are bound by a mere precept of man, a sin is more grievous, not through setting aside a greater good, but through setting aside that which is more in the intention of the person commanding.

Accordingly the various degrees of disobedience must correspond with the various degrees of precepts: because the disobedience in which there is contempt of God's precept, from the very nature of disobedience is more grievous than a sin committed against a man, apart from the latter being a disobedience to God. And I say this because whoever sins against his neighbor acts also against God's commandment. And if the divine precept be contemned in a yet graver matter, the sin is still more grievous. The disobedience that contains contempt of a man's precept is less grievous than the sin which contemns the man who made the precept, because reverence for the person commanding should give rise to reverence for his command. In like manner a sin that directly involves contempt of God, such as blasphemy, or the like, is more grievous (even if we mentally separate the disobedience from the sin) than would be a sin involving contempt of God's commandment alone.

Reply to Objection 1: This comparison of Samuel is one, not of equality but of likeness, because disobedience redounds to the contempt of God just as idolatry does, though the latter does so more.

Reply to Objection 2: Not every disobedience is sin against the Holy Ghost, but only that which obstinacy is added: for it is not the contempt of any obstacle to sin that constitutes sin against the Holy Ghost, else the contempt of any good would be a sin against the Holy Ghost, since any good may hinder a man from committing sin. The sin against the Holy Ghost consists in the contempt of those goods which lead directly to repentance and the remission of sins.

Reply to Objection 3: The first sin of our first parent, from which sin was transmitted to a men, was not disobedience considered as a special sin, but pride, from which then man proceeded to disobey. Hence the Apostle in these words seems to take disobedience in its relation to every sin.

OF THANKFULNESS OR GRATITUDE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider thankfulness or gratitude, and ingratitude. Concerning thankfulness there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether thankfulness is a special virtue distinct from other virtues?

(2) Who owes more thanks to God, the innocent or the penitent?

(3) Whether man is always bound to give thanks for human favors?

(4) Whether thanksgiving should be deferred?

(5) Whether thanksgiving should be measured according to the favor received or the disposition of the giver?

(6) Whether one ought to pay back more than one has received?

Whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that thankfulness is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtue. For we have received the greatest benefits from God, and from our parents. Now the honor which we pay to God in return belongs to the virtue of religion, and the honor with which we repay our parents belongs to the virtue of piety. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude is not distinct from the other virtues.

Objection 2: Further, proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4). Now the purpose of giving thanks is repayment (Ethic. 5,4). Therefore thanksgiving, which belongs to gratitude, is an act of justice. Therefore gratitude is not a special virtue, distinct from other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, acknowledgment of favor received is requisite for the preservation of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13; ix, 1). Now friendship is associated with all the virtues, since they are the reason for which man is loved. Therefore thankfulness or gratitude, to which it belongs to repay favors received, is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully reckons thankfulness a special part of justice (De Invent. Rhet. ii).

I answer that, As stated above ([3184]FS, Q[60], A[3]), the nature of the debt to be paid must needs vary according to various causes giving rise to the debt, yet so that the greater always includes the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our begetting and upbringing: thirdly it is found in the person that excels in dignity, from whom general favors proceed; fourthly it is found in a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private favors, on account of which we are under particular obligation to him.

Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from whom we have received some particular favor, it follows that after religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as falling short thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as religion is superexcelling piety, so is it excelling thankfulness or gratitude: wherefore giving thanks to God was reckoned above ([3185]Q[83], A[17]) among things pertaining to religion.

Reply to Objection 2: Proportionate repayment belongs to commutative justice, when it answers to the legal due; for instance when it is contracted that so much be paid for so much. But the repayment that belongs to the virtue of thankfulness or gratitude answers to the moral debt, and is paid spontaneously. Hence thanksgiving is less thankful when compelled, as Seneca observes (De Beneficiis iii).

Reply to Objection 3: Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is preserved by repayment of favors, although repayment of favors belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.

Whether the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent?

Objection 1: It seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent. For the greater the gift one has received from God, the more one is bound to give Him thanks. Now the gift of innocence is greater than that of justice restored. Therefore it seems that the innocent is more bound to give thanks to God than the penitent.

Objection 2: Further, a man owes love to his benefactor just as he owes him gratitude. Now Augustine says (Confess. ii): “What man, weighing his own infirmity, would dare to ascribe his purity and innocence to his own strength; that so he should love Thee the less, as if he had less needed Thy mercy, whereby Thou remittest sins to those that turn to Thee?” And farther on he says: “And for this let him love Thee as much, yea and more, since by Whom he sees me to have been recovered from such deep torpor of sin, by Him he sees himself to have been from the like torpor of sin preserved.” Therefore the innocent is also more bound to give thanks than the penitent.

Objection 3: Further, the more a gratuitous favor is continuous, the greater the thanksgiving due for it. Now the favor of divine grace is more continuous in the innocent than in the penitent. For Augustine says (Confess. iii): “To Thy grace I ascribe it, and to Thy mercy, that Thou hast melted away my sins as it were ice. To Thy grace I ascribe also whatsoever I have not done of evil; for what might I not have done? . . . Yea, all I confess to have been forgiven me, both what evils I committed by my own wilfulness, and what by Thy guidance committed not.” Therefore the innocent is more bound to give thanks than the penitent.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 7:43): “To whom more is forgiven, he loveth more [*Vulg.: ‘To whom less is forgiven, he loveth less’ Lk. 7:47].” Therefore for the same reason he is bound to greater thanksgiving.

I answer that, Thanksgiving [gratiarum actio] in the recipient corresponds to the favor [gratia] of the giver: so that when there is greater favor on the part of the giver, greater thanks are due on the part of the recipient. Now a favor is something bestowed “gratis”: wherefore on the part of the giver the favor may be greater on two counts. First, owing to the quantity of the thing given: and in this way the innocent owes greater thanksgiving, because he receives a greater gift from God, also, absolutely speaking, a more continuous gift, other things being equal. Secondly, a favor may be said to be greater, because it is given more gratuitously; and in this sense the penitent is more bound to give thanks than the innocent, because what he receives from God is more gratuitously given: since, whereas he was deserving of punishment, he has received grace. Wherefore, although the gift bestowed on the innocent is, considered absolutely, greater, yet the gift bestowed on the penitent is greater in relation to him: even as a small gift bestowed on a poor man is greater to him than a great gift is to a rich man. And since actions are about singulars, in matters of action, we have to take note of what is such here and now, rather than of what is such absolutely, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii) in treating of the voluntary and the involuntary.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether a man is bound to give thanks to every benefactor?

Objection 1: It seems that the a man is not bound to give thanks to every benefactor. For a man may benefit himself just as he may harm himself, according to Ecclus. 14:5, “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” But a man cannot thank himself, since thanksgiving seems to pass from one person to another. Therefore thanksgiving is not due to every benefactor.

Objection 2: Further, gratitude is a repayment of an act of grace. But some favors are granted without grace, and are rudely, slowly and grudgingly given. Therefore gratitude is not always due to a benefactor.

Objection 3: Further, no thanks are due to one who works for his own profit. But sometimes people bestow favors for their own profit. Therefore thanks are not due to them.

Objection 4: Further, no thanks are due to a slave, for all that he is belongs to his master. Yet sometimes a slave does a good turn to his master. Therefore gratitude is not due to every benefactor .

Objection 5: Further, no one is bound to do what he cannot do equitably and advantageously. Now it happens at times that the benefactor is very well off, and it would be of no advantage to him to be repaid for a favor he has bestowed. Again it happens sometimes that the benefactor from being virtuous has become wicked, so that it would not seem equitable to repay him. Also the recipient of a favor may be a poor man, and is quite unable to repay. Therefore seemingly a man is not always bound to repayment for favors received.

Objection 6: Further, no one is bound to do for another what is inexpedient and hurtful to him. Now sometimes it happens that repayment of a favor would be hurtful or useless to the person repaid. Therefore favors are not always to be repaid by gratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 5:18): “In all things give thanks.”

I answer that, Every effect turns naturally to its cause; wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that “God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all”: for the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent. Now it is evident that a benefactor, as such, is cause of the beneficiary. Hence the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each. And, as stated above with regard to a father ([3186]Q[31], A[3];[3187] Q[101], A[2]), a man owes his benefactor, as such, honor and reverence, since the latter stands to him in the relation of principle; but accidentally he owes him assistance or support, if he need it.

Reply to Objection 1: In the words of Seneca (1 Benef. v), “just as a man is liberal who gives not to himself but to others, and gracious who forgives not himself but others, and merciful who is moved, not by his own misfortunes but by another’s, so too, no man confers a favor on himself, he is but following the bent of his nature, which moves him to resist what hurts him, and to seek what is profitable.” Wherefore in things that one does for oneself, there is no place for gratitude or ingratitude, since a man cannot deny himself a thing except by keeping it. Nevertheless things which are properly spoken of in relation to others are spoken of metaphorically in relation to oneself, as the Philosopher states regarding justice (Ethic. v, 11), in so far, to wit, as the various parts of man are considered as though they were various persons.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the mark of a happy disposition to see good rather than evil. Wherefore if someone has conferred a favor, not as he ought to have conferred it, the recipient should not for that reason withhold his thanks. Yet he owes less thanks, than if the favor had been conferred duly, since in fact the favor is less, for, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. ii.) “promptness enhances, delay discounts a favor.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Seneca observes (De Benef. vi), “it matters much whether a person does a kindness to us for his own sake, or for ours, or for both his and ours. He that considers himself only, and benefits because cannot otherwise benefit himself, seems to me like a man who seeks fodder for his cattle.” And farther on: “If he has done it for me in common with himself, having both of us in his mind, I am ungrateful and not merely unjust, unless I rejoice that what was profitable to him is profitable to me also. It is the height of malevolence to refuse to recognize a kindness, unless the giver has been the loser thereby.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), “when a slave does what is wont to be demanded of a slave, it is part of his service: when he does more than a slave is bound to do, it is a favor: for as soon as he does anything from a motive of friendship, if indeed that be his motive, it is no longer called service.” Wherefore gratitude is due even to a slave, when he does more than his duty.

Reply to Objection 5: A poor man is certainly not ungrateful if he does what he can. For since kindness depends on the heart rather than on the deed, so too gratitude depends chiefly the heart. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. ii): “Who receives a favor gratefully, has already begun to pay it back: and that we are grateful for favors received should be shown by the outpourings of the heart, not only in his hearing but everywhere.” From this it is evident that however well off a man may be, it is possible to thank him for his kindness by showing him reverence and honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14): “He that abounds should be repaid with honor, he that is in want should be repaid with money”: and Seneca writes (De Benef. vi): “There are many ways of repaying those who are well off, whatever we happen to owe them; such as good advice, frequent fellowship, affable and pleasant conversation without flattery.” Therefore there is no need for a man to desire neediness or distress in his benefactor before repaying his kindness, because, as Seneca says (De Benef. vi), “it were inhuman to desire this in one from whom you have received no favor; how much more so to desire it in one whose kindness has made you his debtor!”

If, however, the benefactor has lapsed from virtue, nevertheless he should be repaid according to his state, that he may return to virtue if possible. But if he be so wicked as to be incurable, then his heart has changed, and consequently no repayment is due for his kindness, as heretofore. And yet, as far as it possible without sin, the kindness he has shown should be held in memory, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3).

Reply to Objection 6: As stated in the preceding reply, repayment of a favor depends chiefly on the affection of the heart: wherefore repayment should be made in such a way as to prove most beneficial. If, however, through the benefactor’s carelessness it prove detrimental to him, this is not imputed to the person who repays him, as Seneca observes (De Benef. vii): “It is my duty to repay, and not to keep back and safeguard my repayment.”

Whether a man is bound to repay a favor at once?

Objection 1: It seems that a man is bound to repay a favor at once. For we are bound to restore at once what we owe, unless the term be fixed. Now there is no term prescribed for the repayment of favors, and yet this repayment is a duty, as stated above [3188](A[3]). Therefore a man is bound to repay a favor at once.

Objection 2: Further, a good action would seem to be all the more praiseworthy according as it is done with greater earnestness. Now earnestness seems to make a man do his duty without any delay. Therefore it is apparently more praiseworthy to repay a favor at once.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii) that “it is proper to a benefactor to act freely and quickly.” Now repayment ought to equal the favor received. Therefore it should be done at once.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. iv): “He that hastens to repay, is animated with a sense, not of gratitude but of indebtedness.”

I answer that, Just as in conferring a favor two things are to be considered, namely, the affection of the heart and the gift, so also must these things be considered in repaying the favor. As regards the affection of the heart, repayment should be made at once, wherefore Seneca says (De Benef. ii): “Do you wish to repay a favor? Receive it graciously.” As regards the gift, one ought to wait until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor. In fact, if instead of choosing a convenient time, one wished to repay at once, favor for favor, it would not seem to be a virtuous, but a constrained repayment. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iv), “he that wishes to repay too soon, is an unwilling debtor, and an unwilling debtor is ungrateful.”

Reply to Objection 1: A legal debt must be paid at once, else the equality of justice would not be preserved, if one kept another’s property without his consent. But a moral debt depends on the equity of the debtor: and therefore it should be repaid in due time according as the rectitude of virtue demands.

Reply to Objection 2: Earnestness of the will is not virtuous unless it be regulated by reason; wherefore it is not praiseworthy to forestall the proper time through earnestness.

Reply to Objection 3: Favors also should be conferred at a convenient time and one should no longer delay when the convenient time comes; and the same is to be observed in repaying favors.

Whether in giving thanks we should look at the benefactor’s disposition or at the deed?

Objection 1: It seems that in repaying favors we should not look at the benefactor’s disposition but at the deed. For repayment is due to beneficence, and beneficence consists in deeds, as the word itself denotes. Therefore in repaying favors we should look at the deed.

Objection 2: Further, thanksgiving, whereby we repay favors, is a part of justice. But justice considers equality between giving and taking. Therefore also in repaying favors we should consider the deed rather than the disposition of the benefactor.

Objection 3: Further, no one can consider what he does not know. Now God alone knows the interior disposition. Therefore it is impossible to repay a favor according to the benefactor’s disposition.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Benef. i): “We are sometimes under a greater obligation to one who has given little with a large heart, and has bestowed a small favor, yet willingly.”

I answer that, The repayment of a favor may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received.

On the other hand, repayment of a favor belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt. For in the repayment of friendship we have to consider the cause of friendship; so that in the friendship that is based on the useful, repayment should be made according to the usefulness accruing from the favor conferred, and in the friendship based on virtue repayment should be made with regard for the choice or disposition of the giver, since this is the chief requisite of virtue, as stated in Ethic. viii, 13. And likewise, since gratitude regards the favor inasmuch as it is bestowed gratis, and this regards the disposition of the giver, it follows again that repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.

Reply to Objection 1: Every moral act depends on the will. Hence a kindly action, in so far as it is praiseworthy and is deserving of gratitude, consists materially in the thing done, but formally and chiefly in the will. Hence Seneca says (De Benef. i): “A kindly action consists not in deed or gift, but in the disposition of the giver or doer.”

Reply to Objection 2: Gratitude is a part of justice, not indeed as a species is part of a genus, but by a kind of reduction to the genus of justice, as stated above ([3189]Q[80]). Hence it does not follow that we shall find the same kind of debt in both virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: God alone sees man’s disposition in itself: but in so far as it is shown by certain signs, man also can know it. It is thus that a benefactor’s disposition is known by the way in which he does the kindly action, for instance through his doing it joyfully and readily.

Whether the repayment of gratitude should surpass the favor received?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no need for the repayment of gratitude to surpass the favor received. For it is not possible to make even equal repayment to some, for instance, one’s parents, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). Now virtue does not attempt the impossible. Therefore gratitude for a favor does not tend to something yet greater.

Objection 2: Further, if one person repays another more than he has received by his favor, by that very fact he gives him something his turn, as it were. But the latter owes him repayment for the favor which in his turn the former has conferred on him. Therefore he that first conferred a favor will be bound to a yet greater repayment, and so on indefinitely. Now virtue does not strive at the indefinite, since “the indefinite removes the nature of good” (Metaph. ii, text. 8). Therefore repayment of gratitude should not surpass the favor received.

Objection 3: Further, justice consists in equality. But “more” is excess of equality. Since therefore excess is sinful in every virtue, it seems that to repay more than the favor received is sinful and opposed to justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5): “We should repay those who are gracious to us, by being gracious to them return,” and this is done by repaying more than we have received. Therefore gratitude should incline to do something greater.

I answer that, As stated above [3190](A[5]), gratitude regards the favor received according the intention of the benefactor; who seems be deserving of praise, chiefly for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so. Wherefore the beneficiary is under a moral obligation to bestow something gratis in return. Now he does not seem to bestow something gratis, unless he exceeds the quantity of the favor received: because so long as he repays less or an equivalent, he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received. Therefore gratitude always inclines, as far as possible, to pay back something more.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], ad 5; A[5]), in repaying favors we must consider the disposition rather than the deed. Accordingly, if we consider the effect of beneficence, which a son receives from his parents namely, to be and to live, the son cannot make an equal repayment, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14). But if we consider the will of the giver and of the repayer, then it is possible for the son to pay back something greater to his father, as Seneca declares (De Benef. iii). If, however, he were unable to do so, the will to pay back would be sufficient for gratitude.

Reply to Objection 2: The debt of gratitude flows from charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Rom. 13:8, “Owe no man anything, but to love one another.” Wherefore it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude has no limit.

Reply to Objection 3: As in injustice, which is a cardinal virtue, we consider equality of things, so in gratitude we consider equality of wills. For while on the one hand the benefactor of his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary repays something over and above what he has received.

OF INGRATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider ingratitude, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether ingratitude is always a sin?

(2) Whether ingratitude is a special sin?

(3) Whether every act of ingratitude is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether favors should be withdrawn from the ungrateful?

Whether ingratitude is always a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not always a sin. For Seneca says (De Benef. iii) that “he who does not repay a favor is ungrateful.” But sometimes it is impossible to repay a favor without sinning, for instance if one man has helped another to commit a sin. Therefore, since it is not a sin to refrain from sinning, it seems that ingratitude is not always a sin.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is in the power of the person who commits it: because, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i), “no man sins in what he cannot avoid.” Now sometimes it is not in the power of the sinner to avoid ingratitude, for instance when he has not the means of repaying. Again forgetfulness is not in our power, and yet Seneca declares (De Benef. iii) that “to forget a kindness is the height of ingratitude.” Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

Objection 3: Further, there would seem to be no repayment in being unwilling to owe anything, according to the Apostle (Rom. 13:8), “Owe no man anything.” Yet “an unwilling debtor is ungrateful,” as Seneca declares (De Benef. iv). Therefore ingratitude is not always a sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is reckoned among other sins (2 Tim. 3:2), where it is written: “Disobedient to parents, ungrateful, wicked.” etc.

I answer that, As stated above ([3191]Q[106], A[4], ad 1, A[6]) a debt of gratitude is a moral debt required by virtue. Now a thing is a sin from the fact of its being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that every ingratitude is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Gratitude regards a favor received: and he that helps another to commit a sin does him not a favor but an injury: and so no thanks are due to him, except perhaps on account of his good will, supposing him to have been deceived, and to have thought to help him in doing good, whereas he helped him to sin. In such a case the repayment due to him is not that he should be helped to commit a sin, because this would be repaying not good but evil, and this is contrary to gratitude.

Reply to Objection 2: No man is excused from ingratitude through inability to repay, for the very reason that the mere will suffices for the repayment of the debt of gratitude, as stated above ([3192]Q[106], A[6], ad 1).

Forgetfulness of a favor received amounts to ingratitude, not indeed the forgetfulness that arises from a natural defect, that is not subject to the will, but that which arises from negligence. For, as Seneca observes (De Benef. iii), “when forgetfulness of favors lays hold of a man, he has apparently given little thought to their repayment.”

Reply to Objection 3: The debt of gratitude flows from the debt of love, and from the latter no man should wish to be free. Hence that anyone should owe this debt unwillingly seems to arise from lack of love for his benefactor.

Whether ingratitude is a special sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is not a special sin. For whoever sins acts against God his sovereign benefactor. But this pertains to ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is contained under different kinds of sin. But one can be ungrateful by committing different kinds of sin, for instance by calumny, theft, or something similar committed against a benefactor. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca writes (De Benef. iii): “It is ungrateful to take no notice of a kindness, it is ungrateful not to repay one, but it is the height of ingratitude to forget it.” Now these do not seem to belong to the same species of sin. Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

On the contrary, Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude or thankfulness, which is a special virtue. Therefore it is a special sin.

I answer that, Every vice is denominated from a deficiency of virtue, because deficiency is more opposed to virtue: thus illiberality is more opposed to liberality than prodigality is. Now a vice may be opposed to the virtue of gratitude by way of excess, for instance if one were to show gratitude for things for which gratitude is not due, or sooner than it is due, as stated above ([3193]Q[106], A[4]). But still more opposed to gratitude is the vice denoting deficiency of gratitude, because the virtue of gratitude, as stated above ([3194]Q[106], A[6]), inclines to return something more. Wherefore ingratitude is properly denominated from being a deficiency of gratitude. Now every deficiency or privation takes its species from the opposite habit: for blindness and deafness differ according to the difference of sight and hearing. Therefore just as gratitude or thankfulness is one special virtue, so also is ingratitude one special sin.

It has, however, various degrees corresponding in their order to the things required for gratitude. The first of these is to recognize the favor received, the second to express one’s appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according to one’s means. And since what is last in the order of generation is first in the order of destruction, it follows that the first degree of ingratitude is when a man fails to repay a favor, the second when he declines to notice or indicate that he has received a favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way. Moreover, since opposite affirmation includes negation, it follows that it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.

Reply to Objection 1: In every sin there is material ingratitude to God, inasmuch as a man does something that may pertain to ingratitude. But formal ingratitude is when a favor is actually contemned, and this is a special sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders the formal aspect of some special sin from being found materially in several kinds of sin, and in this way the aspect of ingratitude is to be found in many kinds of sin.

Reply to Objection 3: These three are not different species but different degrees of one special sin.

Whether ingratitude is always a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ingratitude is always a mortal sin. For one ought to be grateful to God above all. But one is not ungrateful to God by committing a venial sin: else every man would be guilty of ingratitude. Therefore no ingratitude is a venial sin.

Objection 2: Further, a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity, as stated above ([3195]Q[24], A[12]). But ingratitude is contrary to charity, since the debt of gratitude proceeds from that virtue, as stated above ([3196]Q[106], A[1], ad 3; A[6], ad 2). Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Benef. ii): “Between the giver and the receiver of a favor there is this law, that the former should forthwith forget having given, and the latter should never forget having received.” Now, seemingly, the reason why the giver should forget is that he may be unaware of the sin of the recipient, should the latter prove ungrateful; and there would be no necessity for that if ingratitude were a slight sin. Therefore ingratitude is always a mortal sin.

Objection 4: On the contrary, No one should be put in the way of committing a mortal sin. Yet, according to Seneca (De Benef. ii), “sometimes it is necessary to deceive the person who receives assistance, in order that he may receive without knowing from whom he has received.” But this would seem to put the recipient in the way of ingratitude. Therefore ingratitude is not always a mortal sin.

I answer that, As appears from what we have said above [3197](A[2]), a man may be ungrateful in two ways: first, by mere omission, for instance by failing to recognize the favor received, or to express his appreciation of it or to pay something in return, and this is not always a mortal sin, because, as stated above (Q[106], A[6]), the debt of gratitude requires a man to make a liberal return, which, however, he is not bound to do; wherefore if he fail to do so, he does not sin mortally. It is nevertheless a venial sin, because it arises either from some kind of negligence or from some disinclination to virtue in him. And yet ingratitude of this kind may happen to be a mortal sin, by reason either of inward contempt, or of the kind of thing withheld, this being needful to the benefactor, either simply, or in some case of necessity.

Secondly, a man may be ungrateful, because he not only omits to pay the debt of gratitude, but does the contrary. This again is sometimes mortal and sometimes a venial sin, according to the kind of thing that is done.

It must be observed, however, that when ingratitude arises from a mortal sin, it has the perfect character of ingratitude, and when it arises from venial sin, it has the imperfect character.

Reply to Objection 1: By committing a venial sin one is not ungrateful to God to the extent of incurring the guilt of perfect ingratitude: but there is something of ingratitude in a venial sin, in so far as it removes a virtuous act of obedience to God.

Reply to Objection 2: When ingratitude is a venial sin it is not contrary to, but beside charity: since it does not destroy the habit of charity, but excludes some act thereof.

Reply to Objection 3: Seneca also says (De Benef. vii): “When we say that a man after conferring a favor should forget about it, it is a mistake to suppose that we mean him to shake off the recollection of a thing so very praiseworthy. When we say: He must not remember it, we mean that he must not publish it abroad and boast about it.”

Reply to Objection 4: He that is unaware of a favor conferred on him is not ungrateful, if he fails to repay it, provided he be prepared to do so if he knew. It is nevertheless commendable at times that the object of a favor should remain in ignorance of it, both in order to avoid vainglory, as when Blessed Nicolas threw gold into a house secretly, wishing to avoid popularity: and because the kindness is all the greater through the benefactor wishing not to shame the person on whom he is conferring the favor.

Whether favors should be withheld from the ungrateful?

Objection 1: It seems that favors should withheld from the ungrateful. For it is written (Wis. 16:29): “The hope of the unthankful shall melt away as the winter’s ice.” But this hope would not melt away unless favors were withheld from him. Therefore favors should be withheld from the ungrateful.

Objection 2: Further, no one should afford another an occasion of committing sin. But the ungrateful in receiving a favor is given an occasion of ingratitude. Therefore favors should not be bestowed on the ungrateful.

Objection 3: Further, “By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17). Now he that is ungrateful when he receives a favor sins against the favor. Therefore he should be deprived of the favor.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:35) that “the Highest . . . is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil.” Now we should prove ourselves His children by imitating Him (Lk. 6:36). Therefore we should not withhold favors from the ungrateful.

I answer that, There are two points to be considered with regard to an ungrateful person. The first is what he deserves to suffer and thus it is certain that he deserves to be deprived of our favor. The second is, what ought his benefactor to do? For in the first place he should not easily judge him to be ungrateful, since, as Seneca remarks (De Benef. iii), “a man is often grateful although he repays not,” because perhaps he has not the means or the opportunity of repaying. Secondly, he should be inclined to turn his ungratefulness into gratitude, and if he does not achieve this by being kind to him once, he may by being so a second time. If, however, the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of what the ungrateful man deserves to suffer.

Reply to Objection 2: He that bestows a favor on an ungrateful person affords him an occasion not of sin but of gratitude and love. And if the recipient takes therefrom an occasion of ingratitude, this is not to be imputed to the bestower.

Reply to Objection 3: He that bestows a favor must not at once act the part of a punisher of ingratitude, but rather that of a kindly physician, by healing the ingratitude with repeated favors.

OF VENGEANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider vengeance, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether vengeance is lawful?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Of the manner of taking vengeance;

(4) On whom should vengeance be taken?

Whether vengeance is lawful?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not lawful. For whoever usurps what is God’s sins. But vengeance belongs to God, for it is written (Dt. 32:35, Rom. 12:19): “Revenge to Me, and I will repay.” Therefore all vengeance is unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, he that takes vengeance on a man does not bear with him. But we ought to bear with the wicked, for a gloss on Cant 2:2, “As the lily among the thorns,” says: “He is not a good man that cannot bear with a wicked one.” Therefore we should not take vengeance on the wicked.

Objection 3: Further, vengeance is taken by inflicting punishment, which is the cause of servile fear. But the New Law is not a law of fear, but of love, as Augustine states (Contra Adamant. xvii). Therefore at least in the New Testament all vengeance is unlawful.

Objection 4: Further, a man is said to avenge himself when he takes revenge for wrongs inflicted on himself. But, seemingly, it is unlawful even for a judge to punish those who have wronged him: for Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: “Let us learn after Christ’s example to bear our own wrongs with magnanimity, yet not to suffer God’s wrongs, not even by listening to them.” Therefore vengeance seems to be unlawful.

Objection 5: Further, the sin of a multitude is more harmful than the sin of only one: for it is written (Ecclus. 26:5–7): “Of three things my heart hath been afraid . . . the accusation of a city, and the gathering together of the people, and a false calumny.” But vengeance should not be taken on the sin of a multitude, for a gloss on Mat. 13:29,30, “Lest perhaps . . . you root up the wheat . . . suffer both to grow,” says that “a multitude should not be excommunicated, nor should the sovereign.” Neither therefore is any other vengeance lawful.

On the contrary, We should look to God for nothing save what is good and lawful. But we are to look to God for vengeance on His enemies: for it is written (Lk. 18:7): “Will not God revenge His elect who cry to Him day and night?” as if to say: “He will indeed.” Therefore vengeance is not essentially evil and unlawful.

I answer that, Vengeance consists in the infliction of a penal evil on one who has sinned. Accordingly, in the matter of vengeance, we must consider the mind of the avenger. For if his intention is directed chiefly to the evil of the person on whom he takes vengeance and rests there, then his vengeance is altogether unlawful: because to take pleasure in another’s evil belongs to hatred, which is contrary to the charity whereby we are bound to love all men. Nor is it an excuse that he intends the evil of one who has unjustly inflicted evil on him, as neither is a man excused for hating one that hates him: for a man may not sin against another just because the latter has already sinned against him, since this is to be overcome by evil, which was forbidden by the Apostle, who says (Rom. 12:21): “Be not overcome by evil, but overcome evil by good.”

If, however, the avenger’s intention be directed chiefly to some good, to be obtained by means of the punishment of the person who has sinned (for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others be not disturbed, that justice may be upheld, and God honored), then vengeance may be lawful, provided other due circumstances be observed.

Reply to Objection 1: He who takes vengeance on the wicked in keeping with his rank and position does not usurp what belongs to God but makes use of the power granted him by God. For it is written (Rom. 13:4) of the earthly prince that “he is God’s minister, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.” If, however, a man takes vengeance outside the order of divine appointment, he usurps what is God’s and therefore sins.

Reply to Objection 2: The good bear with the wicked by enduring patiently, and in due manner, the wrongs they themselves receive from them: but they do not bear with them as to endure the wrongs they inflict on God and their neighbor. For Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperfectum, Hom. v in Matth., falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom] says: “It is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to overlook God’s wrongs is most wicked.”

Reply to Objection 3: The law of the Gospel is the law of love, and therefore those who do good out of love, and who alone properly belong to the Gospel, ought not to be terrorized by means of punishment, but only those who are not moved by love to do good, and who, though they belong to the Church outwardly, do not belong to it in merit.

Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes a wrong done to a person reflects on God and the Church: and then it is the duty of that person to avenge the wrong. For example, Elias made fire descend on those who were come to seize him (4 Kings 1); likewise Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (4 Kings 2); and Pope Sylverius excommunicated those who sent him into exile (XXIII, Q. iv, Cap. Guilisarius). But in so far as the wrong inflicted on a man affects his person, he should bear it patiently if this be expedient. For these precepts of patience are to be understood as referring to preparedness of the mind, as Augustine states (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i).

Reply to Objection 5: When the whole multitude sins, vengeance must be taken on them, either in respect of the whole multitude—thus the Egyptians were drowned in the Red Sea while they were pursuing the children of Israel (Ex. 14), and the people of Sodom were entirely destroyed (Gn. 19)—or as regards part of the multitude, as may be seen in the punishment of those who worshipped the calf.

Sometimes, however, if there is hope of many making amends, the severity of vengeance should be brought to bear on a few of the principals, whose punishment fills the rest with fear; thus the Lord (Num 25) commanded the princes of the people to be hanged for the sin of the multitude.

On the other hand, if it is not the whole but only a part of the multitude that has sinned, then if the guilty can be separated from the innocent, vengeance should be wrought on them: provided, however, that this can be done without scandal to others; else the multitude should be spared and severity foregone. The same applies to the sovereign, whom the multitude follow. For his sin should be borne with, if it cannot be punished without scandal to the multitude: unless indeed his sin were such, that it would do more harm to the multitude, either spiritually or temporally, than would the scandal that was feared to arise from his punishment.

Whether vengeance is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance is not a special and distinct virtue. For just as the good are rewarded for their good deeds, so are the wicked punished for their evil deeds. Now the rewarding of the good does not belong to a special virtue, but is an act of commutative justice. Therefore in the same way vengeance should not be accounted a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, there is no need to appoint a special virtue for an act to which a man is sufficiently disposed by the other virtues. Now man is sufficiently disposed by the virtues of fortitude or zeal to avenge evil. Therefore vengeance should not be reckoned a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, there is a special vice opposed to every special virtue. But seemingly no special vice is opposed to vengeance. Therefore it is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of justice.

I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1), aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue. Now there is a special inclination of nature to remove harm, for which reason animals have the irascible power distinct from the concupiscible. Man resists harm by defending himself against wrongs, lest they be inflicted on him, or he avenges those which have already been inflicted on him, with the intention, not of harming, but of removing the harm done. And this belongs to vengeance, for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by “vengeance we resist force, or wrong, and in general whatever is obscure” [*’Obscurum’ Cicero wrote ‘obfuturum’ but the sense is the same as St. Thomas gives in the parenthesis] “(i.e. derogatory), either by self-defense or by avenging it.” Therefore vengeance is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as repayment of a legal debt belongs to commutative justice, and as repayment of a moral debt, arising from the bestowal of a particular favor, belongs to the virtue of gratitude, so too the punishment of sins, so far as it is the concern of public justice, is an act of commutative justice; while so far as it is concerned in defending the rights of the individual by whom a wrong is resisted, it belongs to the virtue of revenge.

Reply to Objection 2: Fortitude disposes to vengeance by removing an obstacle thereto, namely, fear of an imminent danger. Zeal, as denoting the fervor of love, signifies the primary root of vengeance, in so far as a man avenges the wrong done to God and his neighbor, because charity makes him regard them as his own. Now every act of virtue proceeds from charity as its root, since, according to Gregory (Hom. xxvii in Ev.), “there are no green leaves on the bough of good works, unless charity be the root.”

Reply to Objection 3: Two vices are opposed to vengeance: one by way of excess, namely, the sin of cruelty or brutality, which exceeds the measure in punishing: while the other is a vice by way of deficiency and consists in being remiss in punishing, wherefore it is written (Prov. 13:24): “He that spareth the rod hateth his son.” But the virtue of vengeance consists in observing the due measure of vengeance with regard to all the circumstances.

Whether vengeance should be wrought by means of punishments customary among men?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should not be wrought by means of punishments customary among men. For to put a man to death is to uproot him. But our Lord forbade (Mat. 13:29) the uprooting of the cockle, whereby the children of the wicked one are signified. Therefore sinners should not be put to death.

Objection 2: Further, all who sin mortally seem to be deserving of the same punishment. Therefore if some who sin mortally are punished with death, it seems that all such persons should be punished with death: and this is evidently false.

Objection 3: Further, to punish a man publicly for his sin seems to publish his sin: and this would seem to have a harmful effect on the multitude, since the example of sin is taken by them as an occasion for sin. Therefore it seems that the punishment of death should not be inflicted for a sin.

On the contrary, These punishments are fixed by the divine law as appears from what we have said above ([3198]FS, Q[105], A[2]).

I answer that, Vengeance is lawful and virtuous so far as it tends to the prevention of evil. Now some who are not influenced by motive of virtue are prevented from committing sin, through fear of losing those things which they love more than those they obtain by sinning, else fear would be no restraint to sin. Consequently vengeance for sin should be taken by depriving a man of what he loves most. Now the things which man loves most are life, bodily safety, his own freedom, and external goods such as riches, his country and his good name. Wherefore, according to Augustine's reckoning (De Civ. Dei xxi), "Tully writes that the laws recognize eight kinds of punishment": namely, "death," whereby man is deprived of life; "stripes," "retaliation," or the loss of eye for eye, whereby man forfeits his bodily safety; "slavery," and "imprisonment," whereby he is deprived of freedom; "exile" whereby he is banished from his country; "fines," whereby he is mulcted in his riches; "ignominy," whereby he loses his good name.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord forbids the uprooting of the cockle, when there is fear lest the wheat be uprooted together with it. But sometimes the wicked can be uprooted by death, not only without danger, but even with great profit, to the good. Wherefore in such a case the punishment of death may be inflicted on sinners.

Reply to Objection 2: All who sin mortally are deserving of eternal death, as regards future retribution, which is in accordance with the truth of the divine judgment. But the punishments of this life are more of a medicinal character; wherefore the punishment of death is inflicted on those sins alone which conduce to the grave undoing of others.

Reply to Objection 3: The very fact that the punishment, whether of death or of any kind that is fearsome to man, is made known at the same time as the sin, makes man's will avers to sin: because the fear of punishment is greater than the enticement of the example of sin.

Whether vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily?

Objection 1: It seems that vengeance should be taken on those who have sinned involuntarily. For the will of one man does not follow from the will of another. Yet one man is punished for another, according to Ex. 20:5, "I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generation." Thus for the sin of Cham, his son Chanaan was curse (Gn. 9:25) and for the sin of Giezi, his descendants were struck with leprosy (4 Kings 5). Again the blood of Christ lays the descendants of the Jews under the ban of punishment, for they said (Mat. 27:25): "His blood be upon us and upon our children." Moreover we read (Josue 7) that the people of Israel were delivered into the hands of their enemies for the sin of Achan, and that the same people were overthrown by the Philistines on account of the sin of the sons of Heli (1 Kings 4). Therefore a person is to be punished without having deserved it voluntarily.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is voluntary except what is in a man's power. But sometimes a man is punished for what is not in his power; thus a man is removed from the administration of the Church on account of being infected with leprosy; and a Church ceases to be an episcopal see on account of the depravity or evil of the people. Therefore vengeance is taken not only for voluntary sins.

Objection 3: Further, ignorance makes an act involuntary. Now vengeance is sometimes taken on the ignorant. Thus the children of the people of Sodom, though they were in invincible ignorance, perished with their parents (Gn. 19). Again, for the sin of Dathan and Abiron their children were swallowed up together with them (Num 16). Moreover, dumb animals, which are devoid of reason, were commanded to be slain on account of the sin of the Amalekites (1 Kings 15). Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.

Objection 4: Further, compulsion is most opposed to voluntariness. But a man does not escape the debt of punishment through being compelled by fear to commit a sin. Therefore vengeance is sometimes taken on those who have deserved it involuntarily.

Objection 5: Further Ambrose says on Lk. 5 that "the ship in which Judas was, was in distress"; wherefore "Peter, who was calm in the security of his own merits, was in distress about those of others." But Peter did not will the sin of Judas. Therefore a person is sometimes punished without having voluntarily deserved it.

On the contrary, Punishment is due to sin. But every sin is voluntary according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii; Retract. i). Therefore vengeance should be taken only on those who have deserved it voluntarily.

I answer that, Punishment may be considered in two ways. First, under the aspect of punishment, and in this way punishment is not due save for sin, because by means of punishment the equality of justice is restored, in so far as he who by sinning has exceeded in following his own will suffers something that is contrary to this will. Wherefore, since every sin is voluntary, not excluding original sin, as stated above ([3199]FS, Q[81], A[1]), it follows that no one is punished in this way, except for something done voluntarily. Secondly, punishment may be considered as a medicine, not only healing the past sin, but also preserving from future sin, or conducing to some good, and in this way a person is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, yet not without cause.

It must, however, be observed that a medicine never removes a greater good in order to promote a lesser; thus the medicine of the body never blinds the eye, in order to repair the heel: yet sometimes it is harmful in lesser things that it may be helpful in things of greater consequence. And since spiritual goods are of the greatest consequence, while temporal goods are least important, sometimes a person is punished in his temporal goods without any fault of his own. Such are many of the punishments inflicted by God in this present life for our humiliation or probation. But no one is punished in spiritual goods without any fault on his part, neither in this nor in the future life, because in the latter punishment is not medicinal, but a result of spiritual condemnation.

Reply to Objection 1: A man is never condemned to a spiritual punishment for another man's sin, because spiritual punishment affects the soul, in respect of which each man is master of himself. But sometimes a man is condemned to punishment in temporal matters for the sin of another, and this for three reasons. First, because one man may be the temporal goods of another, and so he may be punished in punishment of the latter: thus children, as to the body, are a belonging of their father, and slaves are a possession of their master. Secondly, when one person's sin is transmitted to another, either by "imitation," as children copy the sins of their parents, and slaves the sins of their masters, so as to sin with greater daring; or by way of "merit," as the sinful subjects merit a sinful superior, according to Job 34:30, "Who maketh a man that is a hypocrite to reign for the sins of the people?" Hence the people of Israel were punished for David's sin in numbering the people (2 Kings 24). This may also happen through some kind of "consent" or "connivance": thus sometimes even the good are punished in temporal matters together with the wicked, for not having condemned their sins, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 9). Thirdly, in order to mark the unity of human fellowship, whereby one man is bound to be solicitous for another, lest he sin; and in order to inculcate horror of sin, seeing that the punishment of one affects all, as though all were one body, as Augustine says in speaking of the sin of Achan (QQ. sup. Josue viii). The saying of the Lord, "Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation,” seems to belong to mercy rather than to severity, since He does not take vengeance forthwith, but waits for some future time, in order that the descendants at least may mend their ways; yet should the wickedness of the descendants increase, it becomes almost necessary to take vengeance on them.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine states (QQ. sup. Josue viii), human judgment should conform to the divine judgment, when this is manifest, and God condemns men spiritually for their own sins. But human judgment cannot be conformed to God’s hidden judgments, whereby He punishes certain persons in temporal matters without any fault of theirs, since man is unable to grasp the reasons of these judgments so as to know what is expedient for each individual. Wherefore according to human judgment a man should never be condemned without fault of his own to an inflictive punishment, such as death, mutilation or flogging. But a man may be condemned, even according to human judgment, to a punishment of forfeiture, even without any fault on his part, but not without cause: and this in three ways.

First, through a person becoming, without any fault of his, disqualified for having or acquiring a certain good: thus for being infected with leprosy a man is removed from the administration of the Church: and for bigamy, or through pronouncing a death sentence a man is hindered from receiving sacred orders.

Secondly, because the particular good that he forfeits is not his own but common property: thus that an episcopal see be attached to a certain church belongs to the good of the whole city, and not only to the good of the clerics.

Thirdly, because the good of one person may depend on the good of another: thus in the crime of high treason a son loses his inheritance through the sin of his parent.

Reply to Objection 3: By the judgment of God children are punished in temporal matters together with their parents, both because they are a possession of their parents, so that their parents are punished also in their person, and because this is for their good lest, should they be spared, they might imitate the sins of their parents, and thus deserve to be punished still more severely. Vengeance is wrought on dumb animals and any other irrational creatures, because in this way their owners are punished; and also in horror of sin.

Reply to Objection 4: An act done through compulsion of fear is not involuntary simply, but has an admixture of voluntariness, as stated above ([3200]FS, Q[6], AA[5],6).

Reply to Objection 5: The other apostles were distressed about the sin of Judas, in the same way as the multitude is punished for the sin of one, in commendation of unity, as state above (Reply OBJ[1],2).

OF TRUTH (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider truth and the vices opposed thereto. Concerning truth there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether truth is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether it is a part of justice?

(4) Whether it inclines to that which is less?

Whether truth is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a virtue. For the first of virtues is faith, whose object is truth. Since then the object precedes the habit and the act, it seems that truth is not a virtue, but something prior to virtue.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), it belongs to truth that a man should state things concerning himself to be neither more nor less than they are. But this is not always praiseworthy—neither in good things, since according to Prov. 27:2, “Let another praise thee, and not thy own mouth”—nor even in evil things, because it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is. 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.” Therefore truth is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or intellectual, or moral. Now truth is not a theological virtue, because its object is not God but temporal things. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that by “truth we faithfully represent things as they are were, or will be.” Likewise it is not one of the intellectual virtues, but their end. Nor again is it a moral virtue, since it is not a mean between excess and deficiency, for the more one tells the truth, the better it is. Therefore truth is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher both in the Second and in the Fourth Book of Ethics places truth among the other virtues.

I answer that, Truth can be taken in two ways. First, for that by reason of which a thing is said to be true, and thus truth is not a virtue, but the object or end of a virtue: because, taken in this way, truth is not a habit, which is the genus containing virtue, but a certain equality between the understanding or sign and the thing understood or signified, or again between a thing and its rule, as stated in the [3201]FP, Q[16], A[1]; [3202]FP, Q[21], A[2]. Secondly, truth may stand for that by which a person says what is true, in which sense one is said to be truthful. This truth or truthfulness must needs be a virtue, because to say what is true is a good act: and virtue is “that which makes its possessor good, and renders his action good.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes truth in the first sense.

Reply to Objection 2: To state that which concerns oneself, in so far as it is a statement of what is true, is good generically. Yet this does not suffice for it to be an act of virtue, since it is requisite for that purpose that it should also be clothed with the due circumstances, and if these be not observed, the act will be sinful. Accordingly it is sinful to praise oneself without due cause even for that which is true: and it is also sinful to publish one’s sin, by praising oneself on that account, or in any way proclaiming it uselessly.

Reply to Objection 3: A person who says what is true, utters certain signs which are in conformity with things; and such signs are either words, or external actions, or any external thing. Now such kinds of things are the subject-matter of the moral virtues alone, for the latter are concerned with the use of the external members, in so far as this use is put into effect at the command of the will. Wherefore truth is neither a theological, nor an intellectual, but a moral virtue. And it is a mean between excess and deficiency in two ways. First, on the part of the object, secondly, on the part of the act. On the part of the object, because the true essentially denotes a kind of equality, and equal is a mean between more and less. Hence for the very reason that a man says what is true about himself, he observes the mean between one that says more than the truth about himself, and one that says less than the truth. On the part of the act, to observe the mean is to tell the truth, when one ought, and as one ought. Excess consists in making known one’s own affairs out of season, and deficiency in hiding them when one ought to make them known.

Whether truth is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a special virtue. For the true and the good are convertible. Now goodness is not a special virtue, in fact every virtue is goodness, because “it makes its possessor good.” Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, to make known what belongs to oneself is an act of truth as we understand it here. But this belongs to every virtue, since every virtuous habit is made known by its own act. Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the truth of life is the truth whereby one lives aright, and of which it is written (Is. 38:3): “I beseech Thee . . . remember how I have walked before Thee in truth, and with a perfect heart.” Now one lives aright by any virtue, as follows from the definition of virtue given above ([3203]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Therefore truth is not a special virtue.

Objection 4: Further, truth seems to be the same as simplicity, since hypocrisy is opposed to both. But simplicity is not a special virtue, since it rectifies the intention, and that is required in every virtue. Therefore neither is truth a special virtue.

On the contrary, It is numbered together with other virtues (Ethic. ii, 7).

I answer that, The nature of human virtue consists in making a man’s deed good. Consequently whenever we find a special aspect of goodness in human acts, it is necessary that man be disposed thereto by a special virtue. And since according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii) good consists in order, it follows that a special aspect of good will be found where there is a special order. Now there is a special order whereby our externals, whether words or deeds, are duly ordered in relation to some thing, as sign to thing signified: and thereto man is perfected by the virtue of truth. Wherefore it is evident that truth is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The true and the good are convertible as to subject, since every true thing is good, and every good thing is true. But considered logically, they exceed one another, even as the intellect and will exceed one another. For the intellect understands the will and many things besides, and the will desires things pertaining to the intellect, and many others. Wherefore the “true” considered in its proper aspect as a perfection of the intellect is a particular good, since it is something appetible: and in like manner the “good” considered in its proper aspect as the end of the appetite is something true, since it is something intelligible. Therefore since virtue includes the aspect of goodness, it is possible for truth to be a special virtue, just as the “true” is a special good; yet it is not possible for goodness to be a special virtue, since rather, considered logically, it is the genus of virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: The habits of virtue and vice take their species from what is directly intended, and not from that which is accidental and beside the intention. Now that a man states that which concerns himself, belongs to the virtue of truth, as something directly intended: although it may belong to other virtues consequently and beside his principal intention. For the brave man intends to act bravely: and that he shows his fortitude by acting bravely is a consequence beside his principal intention.

Reply to Objection 3: The truth of life is the truth whereby a thing is true, not whereby a person says what is true. Life like anything else is said to be true, from the fact that it attains its rule and measure, namely, the divine law; since rectitude of life depends on conformity to that law. This truth or rectitude is common to every virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: Simplicity is so called from its opposition to duplicity, whereby, to wit, a man shows one thing outwardly while having another in his heart: so that simplicity pertains to this virtue. And it rectifies the intention, not indeed directly (since this belongs to every virtue), but by excluding duplicity, whereby a man pretends one thing and intends another.

Whether truth is a part of justice?

Objection 1: It seems that truth is not a part of justice. For it seems proper to justice to give another man his due. But, by telling the truth, one does not seem to give another man his due, as is the case in all the foregoing parts of justice. Therefore truth is not a part of justice.

Objection 2: Further, truth pertains to the intellect: whereas justice is in the will, as stated above ([3204]Q[58], A[4]). Therefore truth is not a part of justice.

Objection 3: Further, according to Jerome truth is threefold, namely, “truth of life,” “truth of justice,” and “truth of doctrine.” But none of these is a part of justice. For truth of life comprises all virtues, as stated above (A[2], ad 3): truth of justice is the same as justice, so that it is not one of its parts; and truth of doctrine belongs rather to the intellectual virtues. Therefore truth is nowise a part of justice.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons truth among the parts of justice.

I answer that, As stated above ([3205]Q[80]), a virtue is annexed to justice, as secondary to a principal virtue, through having something in common with justice, while falling short from the perfect virtue thereof. Now the virtue of truth has two things in common with justice. In the first place it is directed to another, since the manifestation, which we have stated to be an act of truth, is directed to another, inasmuch as one person manifests to another the things that concern himself. In the second place, justice sets up a certain equality between things, and this the virtue of truth does also, for it equals signs to the things which concern man himself. Nevertheless it falls short of the proper aspect of justice, as to the notion of debt: for this virtue does not regard legal debt, which justice considers, but rather the moral debt, in so far as, out of equity, one man owes another a manifestation of the truth. Therefore truth is a part of justice, being annexed thereto as a secondary virtue to its principal.

Reply to Objection 1: Since man is a social animal, one man naturally owes another whatever is necessary for the preservation of human society. Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed one another, as declaring the truth one to another. Hence the virtue of truth does, in a manner, regard something as being due.

Reply to Objection 2: Truth, as known, belongs to the intellect. But man, by his own will, whereby he uses both habits and members, utters external signs in order to manifest the truth, and in this way the manifestation of the truth is an act of the will.

Reply to Objection 3: The truth of which we are speaking now differs from the truth of life, as stated in the preceding A[2], ad 3.

We speak of the truth of justice in two ways. In one way we refer to the fact that justice itself is a certain rectitude regulated according to the rule of the divine law; and in this way the truth of justice differs from the truth of life, because by the truth of life a man lives aright in himself, whereas by the truth of justice a man observes the rectitude of the law in those judgments which refer to another man: and in this sense the truth of justice has nothing to do with the truth of which we speak now, as neither has the truth of life. In another way the truth of justice may be understood as referring to the fact that, out of justice, a man manifests the truth, as for instance when a man confesses the truth, or gives true evidence in a court of justice. This truth is a particular act of justice, and does not pertain directly to this truth of which we are now speaking, because, to wit, in this manifestation of the truth a man's chief intention is to give another man his due. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) in describing this virtue: "We are not speaking of one who is truthful in his agreements, nor does this apply to matters in which justice or injustice is questioned."

The truth of doctrine consists in a certain manifestation of truths relating to science wherefore neither does this truth directly pertain to this virtue, but only that truth whereby a man, both in life and in speech, shows himself to be such as he is, and the things that concern him, not other, and neither greater nor less, than they are. Nevertheless since truths of science, as known by us, are something concerning us, and pertain to this virtue, in this sense the truth of doctrine may pertain to this virtue, as well as any other kind of truth whereby a man manifests, by word or deed, what he knows.

Whether the virtue of truth inclines rather to that which is less?

Objection 1: It seems that the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less. For as one incurs falsehood by saying more, so does one by saying less: thus it is no more false that four are five, than that four are three. But "every falsehood is in itself evil, and to be avoided," as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore the virtue of truth does not incline to that which is less rather than to that which is greater.

Objection 2: Further, that a virtue inclines to the one extreme rather than to the other, is owing to the fact that the virtue's mean is nearer to the one extreme than to the other: thus fortitude is nearer to daring than to timidity. But the mean of truth is not nearer to one extreme than to the other; because truth, since it is a kind of equality, holds to the exact mean. Therefore truth does not more incline to that which is less.

Objection 3: Further, to forsake the truth for that which is less seems to amount to a denial of the truth, since this is to subtract therefrom; and to forsake the truth for that which is greater seems to amount to an addition thereto. Now to deny the truth is more repugnant to truth than to add something to it, because truth is incompatible with the denial of truth, whereas it is compatible with addition. Therefore it seems that truth should incline to that which is greater rather than to that which is less.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “by this virtue a man declines rather from the truth towards that which is less.”

I answer that, There are two ways of declining from the truth to that which is less. First, by affirming, as when a man does not show the whole good that is in him, for instance science, holiness and so forth. This is done without prejudice to truth, since the lesser is contained in the greater: and in this way this virtue inclines to what is less. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), “this seems to be more prudent because exaggerations give annoyance.” For those who represent themselves as being greater than they are, are a source of annoyance to others, since they seem to wish to surpass others: whereas those who make less account of themselves are a source of pleasure, since they seem to defer to others by their moderation. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:6): “Though I should have a mind to glory, I shall not be foolish: for I will say the truth. But I forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me or anything he heareth from me.”

Secondly, one may incline to what is less by denying, so as to say that what is in us is not. In this way it does not belong to this virtue to incline to what is less, because this would imply falsehood. And yet this would be less repugnant to the truth, not indeed as regards the proper aspect of truth, but as regards the aspect of prudence, which should be safeguarded in all the virtues. For since it is fraught with greater danger and is more annoying to others, it is more repugnant to prudence to think or boast that one has what one has not, than to think or say that one has not what one has.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TRUTH, AND FIRST OF LYING (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to truth, and (1) lying: (2) dissimulation or hypocrisy: (3) boasting and the opposite vice. Concerning lying there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether lying, as containing falsehood, is always opposed to truth?

(2) Of the species of lying;

(3) Whether lying is always a sin?

(4) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

Whether lying is always opposed to truth?

Objection 1: It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.

Objection 2: Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by words." Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the "liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie." But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.

I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above ([3206]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7).

Now it has been said above ([3207]Q[109], A[1], ad 3) that the virtue of truth—and consequently the opposite vices—regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.

Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood—materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.

However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word “mendacium” [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the “mind.” Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker’s intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters’ falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.

That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form’s effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth.

Reply to Objection 1: We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that “a lie is a false signification by words,” the term “words” denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.

Reply to Objection 3: The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause.

Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?

Objection 1: It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into “officious,” “jocose” and “mischievous” lies. For a division should be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for a “jocose” lie is told in order to make fun, an “officious” lie for some useful purpose, and a “mischievous” lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is “in religious doctrine”; the second is “a lie that profits no one and injures someone”; the third “profits one party so as to injure another”; the fourth is “told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving”; the fifth is “told out of the desire to please”; the sixth “injures no one, and profits /someone in saving his money”; the seventh “injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death”; the eighth “injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body.” Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into “boasting,” which exceeds the truth in speech, and “irony,” which falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 5:7, “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,” says “that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice.” The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds.

I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division of lying. In this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to “boasting,” and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to “irony.” This division is an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.

Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a “mischievous” lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good—either of pleasure and then it is a “jocose” lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the “officious” lie, whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. In this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.

Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under “mischievous” lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie “in religious doctrine,” or against man, and this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie, which “profits no one, and injures someone”; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the third kind of lie, “which profits one, and injures another.” Of these the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above ([3208]FS, Q[73], A[3]): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter’s gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.

After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution; and this is the lie which is told “out of mere lust of lying and deceiving.” This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying.”

The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told “with a desire to please”: and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which “profits someone in saving his money”; or his body, and this is the seventh kind, which “saves a man from death”; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which “saves him from unlawful defilement of his body.”

Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether every lie is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Objection 2: Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that “God built them houses” (Ex. 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus (Gn. 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Gn. 27:27–29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10,11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Objection 4: Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.

Objection 5: Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says (Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill." Therefore not every lie is a sin.

Objection 6: Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 7:14): "Be not willing to make any manner of lie."

I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).

Reply to Objection 1: It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard."

Reply to Objection 2: The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Ex. 2:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie was not meritorious.

Reply to Objection 3: In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically." As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said (Gn. 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.

Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense.

Reply to Objection 4: A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).

Reply to Objection 5: A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising—since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for granted—nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Cor. 1), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.

Reply to Objection 6: An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify.”

Whether every lie is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written (Ps. 6:7): “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie,” and (Wis. 1:11): “The mouth that belieth killeth the soul.” Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: “Thou shalt not bear false witness.” Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): “Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity.” Now no one is said to break his faith or “to be guilty of iniquity,” for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.

Objection 4: Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that “we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty.” Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that “it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie.” Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.

On the contrary, Augustine says on Ps. 5:7, “Thou wilt destroy,” etc.: “There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor’s good.”

But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.

I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above ([3209]Q[24], A[12];[3210] Q[35], A[3]). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.

A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man’s good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one’s neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one’s neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.

As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one’s neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one’s neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one’s neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.

Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Ps. 5:7, “Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.”

Reply to Objection 2: Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (Q[44], A[1], ad 3; [3211]FS, Q[100], A[5], ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor.

Reply to Objection 3: Even a venial sin can be called “iniquity” in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:4): “Every sin is iniquity [*Vulg.: ‘And sin is iniquity.’].” It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.

Reply to Objection 4: The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his exposition of Is. 65:21, ‘And they shall build houses’) explains that God “built them spiritual houses.” Secondly, it may be considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.

Reply to Objection 5: Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that “it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie”: although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: “Unless perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.

OF DISSIMULATION AND HYPOCRISY (FOUR ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider dissimulation and hypocrisy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all dissimulation is a sin?

(2) Whether hypocrisy is dissimulation?

(3) Whether it is opposed to truth?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

Whether all dissimulation is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that not all dissimulation is a sin. For it is written (Lk. 24:28) that our Lord "pretended [Douay: 'made as though'] he would go farther"; and Ambrose in his book on the Patriarchs (De Abraham i) says of Abraham that he "spoke craftily to his servants, when he said" (Gn. 22:5): "I and the boy will go with speed as far as yonder, and after we have worshipped, will return to you." Now to pretend and to speak craftily savor of dissimulation: and yet it is not to be said that there was sin in Christ or Abraham. Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Objection 2: Further, no sin is profitable. But according to Jerome, in his commentary on Gal. 2:11, "When Peter [Vulg.: 'Cephas'] was come to Antioch:—The example of Jehu, king of Israel, who slew the priest of Baal, pretending that he desired to worship idols, should teach us that dissimulation is useful and sometimes to be employed"; and David "changed his countenance before" Achis, king of Geth (1 Kings 21:13). Therefore not all dissimulation is a sin.

Objection 3: Further, good is contrary to evil. Therefore if it is evil to simulate good, it is good to simulate evil.

Objection 4: Further, it is written in condemnation of certain people (Is. 3:9): “They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom, and they have not hid it.” Now it pertains to dissimulation to hide one’s sin. Therefore it is reprehensible sometimes not to simulate. But it is never reprehensible to avoid sin. Therefore dissimulation is not a sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 16:14, “In three years,” etc., says: “Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness.” But to sin openly is always a sin. Therefore dissimulation is always a sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([3212]Q[109], A[3];[3213] Q[110], A[1]), it belongs to the virtue of truth to show oneself outwardly by outward signs to be such as one is. Now outward signs are not only words, but also deeds. Accordingly just as it is contrary to truth to signify by words something different from that which is in one’s mind, so also is it contrary to truth to employ signs of deeds or things to signify the contrary of what is in oneself, and this is what is properly denoted by dissimulation. Consequently dissimulation is properly a lie told by the signs of outward deeds. Now it matters not whether one lie in word or in any other way, as stated above ([3214]Q[110], A[1], OBJ[2]). Wherefore, since every lie is a sin, as stated above ([3215]Q[110], A[3]), it follows that also all dissimulation is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), “To pretend is not always a lie: but only when the pretense has no signification, then it is a lie. When, however, our pretense refers to some signification, there is no lie, but a representation of the truth.” And he cites figures of speech as an example, where a thing is “pretended,” for we do not mean it to be taken literally but as a figure of something else that we wish to say. In this way our Lord “pretended He would go farther,” because He acted as if wishing to go farther; in order to signify something figuratively either because He was far from their faith, according to Gregory (Hom. xxiii in Ev.); or, as Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii), because, “as He was about to go farther away from them by ascending into heaven, He was, so to speak, held back on earth by their hospitality.”

Abraham also spoke figuratively. Wherefore Ambrose (De Abraham i) says that Abraham “foretold what he knew not”: for he intended to return alone after sacrificing his son: but by his mouth the Lord expressed what He was about to do. It is evident therefore that neither dissembled.

Reply to Objection 2: Jerome employs the term "simulation" in a broad sense for any kind of pretense. David's change of countenance was a figurative pretense, as a gloss observes in commenting on the title of Ps. 33, "I will bless the Lord at all times." There is no need to excuse Jehu's dissimulation from sin or lie, because he was a wicked man, since he departed not from the idolatry of Jeroboam (4 Kings 10:29,31). And yet he is praised withal and received an earthly reward from God, not for his dissimulation, but for his zeal in destroying the worship of Baal.

Reply to Objection 3: Some say that no one may pretend to be wicked, because no one pretends to be wicked by doing good deeds, and if he do evil deeds, he is evil. But this argument proves nothing. Because a man might pretend to be evil, by doing what is not evil in itself but has some appearance of evil: and nevertheless this dissimulation is evil, both because it is a lie, and because it gives scandal; and although he is wicked on this account, yet his wickedness is not the wickedness he simulates. And because dissimulation is evil in itself, its sinfulness is not derived from the thing simulated, whether this be good or evil.

Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man lies when he signifies by word that which he is not, yet lies not when he refrains from saying what he is, for this is sometimes lawful; so also does a man dissemble, when by outward signs of deeds or things he signifies that which he is not, yet he dissembles not if he omits to signify what he is. Hence one may hide one's sin without being guilty of dissimulation. It is thus that we must understand the saying of Jerome on the words of Isa. 3:9, that the "second remedy after shipwreck is to hide one's sin," lest, to wit, others be scandalized thereby.

Whether hypocrisy is the same as dissimulation?

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation. For dissimulation consists in lying by deeds. But there may be hypocrisy in showing outwardly what one does inwardly, according to Mat. 6:2, "When thou dost an alms-deed sound not a trumpet before thee, as the hypocrites do." Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7): "Some there are who wear the habit of holiness, yet are unable to attain the merit of perfection. We must by no means deem these to have joined the ranks of the hypocrites, since it is one thing to sin from weakness, and another to sin from malice.” Now those who wear the habit of holiness, without attaining the merit of perfection, are dissemblers, since the outward habit signifies works of perfection. Therefore dissimulation is not the same as hypocrisy.

Objection 3: Further, hypocrisy consists in the mere intention. For our Lord says of hypocrites (Mat. 23:5) that “all their works they do for to be seen of men”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that “they never consider what it is that they do, but how by their every action they may please men.” But dissimulation consists, not in the mere intention, but in the outward action: wherefore a gloss on Job 36:13, “Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God,” says that “the dissembler simulates one thing and does another: he pretends chastity, and delights in lewdness, he makes a show of poverty and fills his purse.” Therefore hypocrisy is not the same as dissimulation.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x): “‘Hypocrite’ is a Greek word corresponding to the Latin ‘simulator,’ for whereas he is evil within,” he “shows himself outwardly as being good; {hypo} denoting falsehood, and {krisis}, judgment.”

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “the word hypocrite is derived from the appearance of those who come on to the stage with a disguised face, by changing the color of their complexion, so as to imitate the complexion of the person they simulate, at one time under the guise of a man, at another under the guise of a woman, so as to deceive the people in their acting.” Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. ii) that “just as hypocrites by simulating other persons act the parts of those they are not (since he that acts the part of Agamemnon is not that man himself but pretends to be), so too in the Church and in every department of human life, whoever wishes to seem what he is not is a hypocrite: for he pretends to be just without being so in reality.”

We must conclude, therefore, that hypocrisy is dissimulation, not, however, any form of dissimulation, but only when one person simulates another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man.

Reply to Objection 1: The outward deed is a natural sign of the intention. Accordingly when a man does good works pertaining by their genus to the service of God, and seeks by their means to please, not God but man, he simulates a right intention which he has not. Wherefore Gregory says

(Moral.) that “hypocrites make God’s interests subservient to worldly purposes, since by making a show of saintly conduct they seek, not to turn men to God, but to draw to themselves the applause of their approval:” and so they make a lying pretense of having a good intention, which they have not, although they do not pretend to do a good deed without doing it.

Reply to Objection 2: The habit of holiness, for instance the religious or the clerical habit, signifies a state whereby one is bound to perform works of perfection. And so when a man puts on the habit of holiness, with the intention of entering the state of perfection, if he fail through weakness, he is not a dissembler or a hypocrite, because he is not bound to disclose his sin by laying aside the habit of holiness. If, however, he were to put on the habit of holiness in order to make a show of righteousness, he would be a hypocrite and a dissembler.

Reply to Objection 3: In dissimulation, as in a lie, there are two things: one by way of sign, the other by way of thing signified. Accordingly the evil intention in hypocrisy is considered as a thing signified, which does not tally with the sign: and the outward words, or deeds, or any sensible objects are considered in every dissimulation and lie as a sign.

Whether hypocrisy is contrary to the virtue of truth?

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is not contrary to the virtue of truth. For in dissimulation or hypocrisy there is a sign and a thing signified. Now with regard to neither of these does it seem to be opposed to any special virtue: for a hypocrite simulates any virtue, and by means of any virtuous deeds, such as fasting, prayer and alms deeds, as stated in Mat. 6:1–18. Therefore hypocrisy is not specially opposed to the virtue of truth.

Objection 2: Further, all dissimulation seems to proceed from guile, wherefore it is opposed to simplicity. Now guile is opposed to prudence as above stated ([3216]Q[55], A[4]). Therefore, hypocrisy which is dissimulation is not opposed to truth, but rather to prudence or simplicity.

Objection 3: Further, the species of moral acts is taken from their end. Now the end of hypocrisy is the acquisition of gain or vainglory: wherefore a gloss on Job 27:8, “What is the hope of the hypocrite, if through covetousness he take by violence,” says: “A hypocrite or, as the Latin has it, a dissimulator, is a covetous thief: for through desire of being honored for holiness, though guilty of wickedness, he steals praise for a life which is not his.” [*The quotation is from St. Gregory’s Moralia, Bk XVIII.] Therefore since covetousness or vainglory is not directly opposed to truth, it seems that neither is hypocrisy or dissimulation.

On the contrary, All dissimulation is a lie, as stated above [3217](A[1]). Now a lie is directly opposed to truth. Therefore dissimulation or hypocrisy is also.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. text. 13, 24, x), “contrariety is opposition as regards form,” i.e. the specific form. Accordingly we must reply that dissimulation or hypocrisy may be opposed to a virtue in two ways, in one way directly, in another way indirectly. Its direct opposition or contrariety is to be considered with regard to the very species of the act, and this species depends on that act’s proper object. Wherefore since hypocrisy is a kind of dissimulation, whereby a man simulates a character which is not his, as stated in the preceding article, it follows that it is directly opposed to truth whereby a man shows himself in life and speech to be what he is, as stated in Ethic. iv, 7.

The indirect opposition or contrariety of hypocrisy may be considered in relation to any accident, for instance a remote end, or an instrument of action, or anything else of that kind.

Reply to Objection 1: The hypocrite in simulating a virtue regards it as his end, not in respect of its existence, as though he wished to have it, but in respect of appearance, since he wishes to seem to have it. Hence his hypocrisy is not opposed to that virtue, but to truth, inasmuch as he wishes to deceive men with regard to that virtue. And he performs acts of that virtue, not as intending them for their own sake, but instrumentally, as signs of that virtue, wherefore his hypocrisy has not, on that account, a direct opposition to that virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3218]Q[55], AA[3],4,5), the vice directly opposed to prudence is cunning, to which it belongs to discover ways of achieving a purpose, that are apparent and not real: while it accomplishes that purpose, by guile in words, and by fraud in deeds: and it stands in relation to prudence, as guile and fraud to simplicity. Now guile and fraud are directed chiefly to deception, and sometimes secondarily to injury. Wherefore it belongs directly to simplicity to guard oneself from deception, and in this way the virtue of simplicity is the same as the virtue of truth as stated above ([3219]Q[109], A[2], ad 4). There is, however, a mere logical difference between them, because by truth we mean the concordance between sign and thing signified, while simplicity indicates that one does not tend to different things, by intending one thing inwardly, and pretending another outwardly.

Reply to Objection 3: Gain or glory is the remote end of the dissembler as also of the liar. Hence it does not take its species from this end, but from the proximate end, which is to show oneself other than one is. Wherefore it sometimes happens to a man to pretend great things of himself, for no further purpose than the mere lust of hypocrisy, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7), and as also we have said above with regard to lying ([3220]Q[110], A[2]).

Whether hypocrisy is always a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that hypocrisy is always a mortal sin. For Jerome says on Is. 16:14: “Of the two evils it is less to sin openly than to simulate holiness”: and a gloss on Job 1:21 [*St. Augustine on Ps. 63:7], “As it hath pleased the Lord,” etc., says that “pretended justice is no justice, but a twofold sin”: and again a gloss on Lam. 4:6, “The iniquity . . . of my people is made greater than the sin of Sodom,” says: “He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom.” Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 8) that hypocrites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a hypocrite always sins mortally.

Objection 3: Further, no one deserves the anger of God and exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin. Now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy according to Job 36:13, “Dissemblers and crafty men prove the wrath of God”: and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing God, according to Job 13:16, “No hypocrite shall come before His presence.” Therefore hypocrisy is always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.

Further, the intention of a hypocrite is to appear to be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin.

Further, hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy.

I answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of holiness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont to use the term, it is evident that hypocrisy is a mortal sin: for no one is entirely deprived of holiness save through mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin, then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived of holiness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love of God or of his neighbor, it will be a mortal sin: for instance if he were to simulate holiness in order to disseminate false doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment, though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance when a man takes pleasure in the pretense itself: of such a man it is said in Ethic. iv, 7 that “he would seem to be vain rather than evil”; for the same applies to simulation as to a lie.

It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF BOASTING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts of lying according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Under the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of inquiry:

(1) To which virtue is it opposed?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

Whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of truth?

Objection 1: It seems that boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written (Esther 1:3,4) that Assuerus "made a great feast . . . that he might show the riches of the glory" and "of his kingdom, and the greatness and boasting of his power." Therefore boasting is not opposed to the virtue of truth.

Objection 2: Further, boasting is reckoned by Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 4) to be one of the four species of pride, "when," to wit, "a man boasts of having what he has not." Hence it is written (Jer. 48:29,30): "We have heard the pride of Moab, he is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according to it." Moreover, Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 7) that boasting arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is opposed, not to truth, but to humility.

Objection 3: Further, boasting seems to be occasioned by riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches brought us?" Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality. Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 7), that boasting is opposed to truth.

I answer that, "Jactantia" [boasting] seems properly to denote the uplifting of self by words: since if a man wishes to throw [jactare] a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself above oneself [*Or 'tall-talking' as we should say in English]. This happens in two ways. For sometimes a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in himself, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be: and this the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. 12:6): "I forbear lest any man should think of me above that which he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me." In another way a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of things as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the uplifting of self above what others think of one: although in either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes boasting as exceeding men’s opinion.

Reply to Objection 2: The sin of boasting may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and thus it is opposed to truth; as stated (in the body of the article and[3221] Q[110], A[2]). Secondly, with regard to its cause, from which more frequently though not always it arises: and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes to boasting, not from arrogance, but from some kind of vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit. Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself, is a kind of pride; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is very often its cause. For this reason Gregory reckons boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting, and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory considered as its end.

Reply to Objection 3: Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways. First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides himself on his riches. Hence (Prov. 8:18) “riches” are significantly described as “proud” [Douay: ‘glorious’]. Secondly, as being the end of boasting, since according to Ethic. iv, 7, some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves, so as to make profit thereby; for instance, they pretend to be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.

Whether boasting is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For it is written (Prov. 28:25): “He that boasteth, and puffeth himself, stirreth up quarrels.” Now it is a mortal sin to stir up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, according to Prov. 6:19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is forbidden in God’s law is a mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. 6:2, “Extol not thyself in the thoughts of thy soul,” says: “This is a prohibition of boasting and pride.” Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end of lying; for according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), “the boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for no further purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honor, sometimes for the sake of money.” Thus it is evident that it is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is always a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Boasting arises from vainglory, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17). Now vainglory is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin which only the very perfect avoid. For Gregory says (Moral. viii, 30) that “it belongs to the very perfect, by outward deeds so to seek the glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted by the praise awarded them.” Therefore boasting is not always a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([3222]Q[110], A[4]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a lie, and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which is contrary to God’s glory—thus it is said in the person of the king of Tyre (Ezech. 28:2): “Thy heart is lifted up, and thou hast said: I am God”—or contrary to the love of our neighbor, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks out into invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee who said (Lk. 18:11): “I am not as the rest of men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican.” Sometimes it is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things that are against neither God nor his neighbor. Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a mortal sin, then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for this very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and injury of his neighbor: wherefore boasting of this kind is more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honor." Yet it is not always a mortal sin because the gain may be such as not to injure another man.

Reply to Objection 1: To boast in order to stir quarrels is a mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the cause of quarrels, not intentionally but accidentally: and consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that account.

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss speaks of boasting as arising from pride that is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Boasting does not always involve a mischievous lie, but only where it is contrary to the love of God or our neighbor, either in itself or in its cause. That a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 7): wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it would be against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought our mind to rest as in its last end.

To boast for the sake of glory or gain seen to involve an officious lie: provided it be do without injury to others, for then it would once become a mischievous lie.

IRONY* (TWO ARTICLES)

[*Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek {eironia}, whence it is derived: dissimulation of one's own good points.]

We must now consider irony, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether irony is a sin?

(2) Of its comparison with boasting.

Whether irony is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that irony, which consists in belittling oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one’s being strengthened by God: and yet this leads one to belittle oneself, according to Prov. 30:1,2: “The vision which the man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men.” Also it is written (Amos 7:14): “Amos answered . . . I am not a prophet.” Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles himself in words, is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine, bishop of the English (Regist. xii): “It is the mark of a well-disposed mind to acknowledge one’s fault when one is not guilty.” But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, it is not a sin to shun pride. But “some belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost., Serm. xxix): “If thou liest on account of humility, if thou wert not a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying.”

I answer that, To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus, except through corruption of one of its circumstances. Secondly, a person belittles himself by forsaking the truth, for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is always a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has human or worldly folly annexed to it, according to 1 Cor. 3:18, “If any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let him become a fool that he may be wise.” But there is another wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to say, “is foolishness with God.” Accordingly, he that is strengthened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted continues, “and the wisdom of men is not with me,” and farther on, “and I have known the science of the saints” [*Vulg.: ‘and I have not known the science of the saints’].

It may also be replied that “the wisdom of men” is that which is acquired by human reason, while the “wisdom of the saints” is that which is received by divine inspiration.

Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, since, to wit, he was not of the race of prophets: hence the text goes on, “nor am I the son of a prophet.”

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge to be sinful: which would be a lie of irony.

Reply to Objection 3: A man should not commit one sin in order to avoid another: and so he ought not to lie in any way at all in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliii in Joan.): “Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth”: and Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 3) that “it is a reckless humility that entangles itself with lies.”

Whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting?

Objection 1: It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony. Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:25): “When he shall speak low, trust him not: because there are seven mischiefs in his heart.” Now it belongs to irony to speak low. Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7): “Those who speak with irony and belittle themselves are more gracious, seemingly, in their manners.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3223]Q[110], AA[2],4), one lie is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the matter which it is about—thus a lie about a matter of religious doctrine is most grievous—and sometimes on account of the motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous than an officious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie about the same matter, either by words, or by any other outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person: so that in this respect they are equal.

But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive, namely, the desire of gain or honor: whereas irony arises from a man’s averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that “boasting is a more grievous sin than irony.”

Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles himself for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive cunningly: and then irony is more grievous.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument applies to irony and boasting, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or on account of its matter: for it has been said that in this way they are equal.

Reply to Objection 2: Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal, the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes, or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus our Lord said of certain men (Mat. 6:16) that “they disfigure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast.” Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that it is “the practice of boasters both to make overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves”: and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the words of Ecclus. 19:23, “There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit,” and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks of the man who, through deceitful humility, “speaks low” wickedly.

OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the friendliness which is called affability, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarreling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a special virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of justice?

Whether friendliness is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that friendliness is not a special virtue. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 3) that “the perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue.” Now any virtue is the cause of friendship: “since the good is lovable to all,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of every virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) of this kind of friend that he “takes everything in a right manner both from those he loves and from those who are not his friends.” Now it seems to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incompatible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, virtue “observes the mean according as a wise man decides” (Ethic. ii, 6). Now it is written (Eccles. 7:5): “The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth”: wherefore “it belongs to a virtuous man to be most wary of pleasure” (Ethic. ii, 9). Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), “is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, but fears to give pain.” Therefore this kind of friendliness is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. 4:7): “Make thyself affable to the congregation of the poor.” Therefore affability, which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[109], A[2]; [3224]FS, Q[55], A[3]), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above (Q[109], A[2]). And it behooves man to be maintained in a becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words, so that they behave towards one another in a becoming manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called friendliness.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher speaks of a twofold friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affection whereby one man loves another and may result from any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity ([3225]Q[23], A[1], A[3], ad 1; QQ[25],26), what things belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds; this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a becoming manner towards those with whom he is in contact.

Reply to Objection 2: Every man is naturally every man’s friend by a certain general love; even so it is written (Ecclus. 13:19) that “every beast loveth its like.” This love is signified by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us. Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united to us by special friendship.

Reply to Objection 3: When it is said that “the heart of the wise is where there is mourning” it is not that he may bring sorrow to his neighbor, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:15): “If, because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not now according to charity”: but that he may bring consolation to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. 7:38, “Be not wanting in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn.” Again, “the heart of fools is where there is mirth,” not that they may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others’ gladness. Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures, which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to Ps. 132:1, “Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.”

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6), for the sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:8): “Although I made you sorrowful by my epistle, I do not repent,” and further on (2 Cor. 7:9), “I am glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto repentance.” For this reason we should not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:26): “Hast thou daughters? Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay towards them.”

Whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice?

Objection 1: It seems that this kind of friendship is not a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom we live. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above ([3226]FS, Q[60], A[5]; [3227]FS, Q[61], A[3]). Therefore this virtue is a part of temperance rather than of justice.

Objection 3: Further, to give equal things to those who are unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above ([3228]Q[59], AA[1],2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6), this virtue “treats in like manner known and unknown, companions and strangers.” Therefore this virtue rather than being a part of justice is opposed thereto.

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i) accounts friendship a part of justice.

I answer that, This virtue is a part of justice, being annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common with justice it is directed to another person, even as justice is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound to another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to pay, or by some debt arising out of a favor received. For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them for some good purpose.

Reply to Objection 1: As we have said above ([3229]Q[109], A[3], ad 1), because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in equity, the manifestation of truth without which human society could not last. Now as man could not live in society without truth, so likewise, not without joy, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), no one could abide a day with the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow-men; unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for their good.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellowship, which have their origin in the reason, in so far as one man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures need not to be curbed as though they were noisome.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Philosopher does not mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as he says (Ethic. iv, 6), “it is not fitting to please and displease intimate friends and strangers in the same way.” This likeness consists in this, that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner.

OF FLATTERY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid virtue: (1) Flattery, and (2) Quarreling. Concerning flattery there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether flattery is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

Whether flattery is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that flattery is not a sin. For flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, according to Prov. 31:28, “Her children rose up and called her blessed: her husband, and he praised her.” Moreover, there is no evil in wishing to please others, according to 1 Cor. 10:33, “I . . . in all things please all men.” Therefore flattery is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, evil is contrary to good, and blame to praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery. Therefore flattery is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, detraction is contrary to flattery. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 5) that detraction is a remedy against flattery. “It must be observed,” says he, “that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often allowed to be rent by detractions but are uplifted by immoderate praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the tongue of the detractor may humble.” But detraction is an evil, as stated above ([3230]Q[73], AA[2],3). Therefore flattery is a good.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. 13:18, “Woe to them that sew cushions under every elbow,” says, “that is to say, sweet flattery.” Therefore flattery is a sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([3231]Q[114], A[1], ad 3), although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil. Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere intention of pleasing he is said to be “complaisant,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6): whereas if he do it with the intention of making some gain out of it, he is called a “flatterer” or “adulator.” As a rule, however, the term “flattery” is wont to be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary behavior towards their fellows.

Reply to Objection 1: One may praise a person both well and ill, according as one observes or omits the due circumstances. For if while observing other due circumstances one were to wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship. But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. 9:24, “The sinner is praised in the desires of his soul”; or they may be uncertain, according to Ecclus. 27:8, “Praise not a man before he speaketh,” and again (Ecclus. 11:2), “Praise not a man for his beauty”; or because there may be fear lest human praise should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written, (Ecclus. 11:30), “Praise not any man before death.” Again, in like manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein. But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil, according to Ps. 52:6, “God hath scattered the bones of them that please men,” and according to the words of the Apostle (Gal. 1:10), “If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ.”

Reply to Objection 2: Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circumstances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders two vices being contrary to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said, but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.

Whether flattery is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is evil because it is harmful.” But flattery is most harmful, according to Ps. 9:24, “For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul, and the unjust man is blessed. The sinner hath provoked the Lord.” Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. ad Celant): “Nothing so easily corrupts the human mind as flattery”: and a gloss on Ps. 69:4, “Let them be presently turned away blushing for shame that say to me: ’Tis well, ’Tis well,” says: “The tongue of the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor.” Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.

Objection 2: Further, whoever does harm by words, harms himself no less than others: wherefore it is written (Ps. 36:15): “Let their sword enter into their own hearts.” Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally: hence a gloss on Ps. 140:5, “Let not the oil of the sinner fatten my head,” says: “The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive of vice.” Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in himself.

Objection 3: Further, it is written in the Decretals (D. XLVI, Cap. 3): “The cleric who shall be found to spend his time in flattery and treachery shall be degraded from his office." Now such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory (xli, de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, "if one desire to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one's own choice, or out of necessity."

I answer that, As stated above ([3232]Q[112], A[2]), a mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is sometimes contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbor, whom he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin, according to Is. 5:20. "Woe to you that call evil good." Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is written (Prov. 27:6): "Better are the wounds of a friend than the deceitful kisses of an enemy." Thirdly, by way of occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent downfall, as may be understood from what has been said above concerning scandal ([3233]Q[43], AA[3],4). If, however, one man flatters another from the mere craving to please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted speak of the flatterer who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does harm to goods that are of greater consequence. namely, spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above (Q[43], A[1], ad 3; [3234]FS, Q[73], A[8], ad 3; [3235]FS, Q[80], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: This argument applies to one that flatters with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional cause of the harm he does to others.

Reply to Objection 3: The passage quoted refers to the man who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.

OF QUARRELING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider quarreling; concerning which there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is opposed to the virtue of friendship?

(2) Of its comparison with flattery?

Whether quarreling is opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability?

Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is not opposed to the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarreling seems to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord is opposed to charity, as stated above ([3236]Q[37], A[1]). Therefore quarreling is also.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 26:21): “An angry man stirreth up strife.” Now anger is opposed to meekness. Therefore strife or quarreling is also.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 4:1): “From whence are wars and quarrels [Douay: ‘contentions’] among you? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences which war in your members?” Now it would seem contrary to temperance to follow one’s concupiscences. Therefore it seems that quarreling is opposed not to friendship but to temperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarreling to friendship (Ethic. iv, 6).

I answer that, Quarreling consists properly in words, when, namely, one person contradicts another’s words. Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity. Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagreeable: whence arises quarreling, which is opposed to the aforesaid friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that "those who are opposed to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome."

Reply to Objection 1: Contention pertains rather to the contradiction of discord, while quarreling belongs to the contradiction which has the intention of displeasing.

Reply to Objection 2: The direct opposition of virtues to vices depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although quarreling arises at times from anger, it may arise from many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly opposed to meekness.

Reply to Objection 3: James speaks there of concupiscence considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus, a gloss on Rom. 7:7 says: "The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil."

Whether quarreling is a more grievous sin than flattery?

Objection 1: It seems that quarreling is a less grievous sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to be. Now flattery does more harm than quarreling, for it is written (Is. 3:12): "O My people, they that call thee blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps." Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.

Objection 2: Further, there appears to be a certain amount of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that sins deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarreling.

Objection 3: Further, shame is fear of what is vile, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9). But a man is more ashamed to be a flatterer than a quarreler. Therefore quarreling is a less grievous sin than flattery.

On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now quarreling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual state: for it is written (1 Tim. 3:2,3) that it "behooveth a bishop to be . . . not quarrelsome"; and (2 Tim. 3:24): "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle." Therefore quarreling seems to be a more grievous sin than flattery.

I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways. In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has a greater tendency to please than to displease: and so the quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure sins more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends by deception to acquire undue honor or gain: while sometimes quarreling is more grievous; for instance, when one intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker to contempt.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the flatterer may do harm by deceiving secretly, so the quarreler may do harm sometimes by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous sin than theft, as stated above ([3237]Q[66], A[9]).

Reply to Objection 2: In human acts, the more grievous is not always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt. In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accompanied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarreling, through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently more grievous.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the objection, shame regards the vileness of a sin; wherefore a man is not always more ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarreling, although quarreling is more grievous.

OF LIBERALITY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices, namely, covetousness and prodigality.

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether liberality is a virtue?

(2) What is its matter?

(3) Of its act;

(4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather than to take?

(5) Whether liberality is a part of justice?

(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.

Whether liberality is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a natural inclination for one to provide for oneself more than for others: and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the contrary, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1), “it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he leaves for himself the lesser things.” Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, man sustains life by means of riches, and wealth contributes to happiness instrumentally, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous, for the Philosopher says of him (Ethic. iv, 1) that “he is inclined neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away.”

Objection 3: Further, the virtues are connected with one another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be liberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or spend liberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore liberality is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “the Gospel contains many instances in which a just liberality is inculcated.” Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not pertain to virtue. Therefore liberality is a virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19), “it belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill.” Now we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul, but also those that are without, such as the things of this world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it follows that liberality is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Ambrose (Serm. lxiv de Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii, 18) excess of riches is granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "It is a commendable liberality not to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want."

Reply to Objection 2: It does not belong to a liberal man so to give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support, nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus to be of help to certain people"; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all at once, but to dispense them: unless he do as Eliseus did, who slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by any household cares." For this belongs to the state of perfection, of which we shall speak farther on (Q[184][3238], Q[186], A[3]).

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of virtue, is directed to happiness.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1), "those who spend much on intemperance are not liberal but prodigal"; and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of other sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "If you assist to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give for the sake of boasting rather than of pity." Wherefore those who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even as men perform works of other virtues, before having the habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous people, as stated above ([3239]FS, Q[65], A[1]). In like manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal, although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): “Liberality is proportionate to a man’s substance,” i.e. his means, “for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the giver”: and Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “it is the heart that makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value.”

Whether liberality is about money?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not about money. For every moral virtue is about operations and passions. Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated in Ethic. v, 1. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue, it seems that it is about passions and not about money.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man to make use of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real than artificial riches, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 5,6). Therefore liberality is not chiefly about money.

Objection 3: Further, different virtues have different matter, since habits are distinguished by their objects. But external things are the matter of distributive and commutative justice. Therefore they are not the matter of liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “liberality seems to be a mean in the matter of money.”

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) it belongs to the liberal man to part with things. Hence liberality is also called open-handedness [largitas], because that which is open does not withhold things but parts of them. The term “liberality” seems also to allude to this, since when a man quits hold of a thing he frees it [liberat], so to speak, from his keeping and ownership, and shows his mind to be free of attachment thereto. Now those things which are the subject of a man’s free-handedness towards others are the goods he possesses, which are denoted by the term “money.” Therefore the proper matter of liberality is money.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 3), liberality depends not on the quantity given, but on the heart of the giver. Now the heart of the giver is disposed according to the passions of love and desire, and consequently those of pleasure and sorrow, towards the things given. Hence the interior passions are the immediate matter of liberality, while exterior money is the object of those same passions.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in his book De Disciplina Christi (Tract. de divers, i), everything whatsoever man has on earth, and whatsoever he owns, goes by the name of "'pecunia' [money], because in olden times men's possessions consisted entirely of 'pecora' [flocks]." And the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "We give the name of money to anything that can be valued in currency."

Reply to Objection 3: Justice establishes equality in external things, but has nothing to do, properly speaking, with the regulation of internal passions: wherefore money is in one way the matter of liberality, and in another way of justice.

Whether using money is the act of liberality?

Objection 1: It seems that using money is not the act of liberality. For different virtues have different acts. But using money is becoming to other virtues, such as justice and magnificence. Therefore it is not the proper act of liberality.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to a liberal man, not only to give but also to receive and keep. But receiving and keeping do not seem to be connected with the use of money. Therefore using money seems to be unsuitably assigned as the proper act of liberality.

Objection 3: Further, the use of money consists not only in giving it but also in spending it. But the spending of money refers to the spender, and consequently is not an act of liberality: for Seneca says (De Benef. v): "A man is not liberal by giving to himself." Therefore not every use of money belongs to liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1): "In whatever matter a man is virtuous, he will make the best use of that matter: Therefore he that has the virtue with regard to money will make the best use of riches." Now such is the liberal man. Therefore the good use of money is the act of liberality.

I answer that, The species of an act is taken from its object, as stated above ([3240]FS, Q[18], A[2]). Now the object or matter of liberality is money and whatever has a money value, as stated in the foregoing Article (ad 2). And since every virtue is consistent with its object, it follows that, since liberality is a virtue, its act is consistent with money. Now money comes under the head of useful goods, since all external goods are directed to man's use. Hence the proper act of liberality is making use of money or riches.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to liberality to make good use of riches as such, because riches are the proper matter of liberality. On the other hand it belongs to justice to make use of riches under another aspect, namely, that of debt, in so far as an external thing is due to another. And it belongs to magnificence to make use of riches under a special aspect, in so far, to wit, as they are employed for the fulfilment of some great deed. Hence magnificence stands in relation to liberality as something in addition thereto, as we shall explain farther on ([3241]Q[134]).

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to a virtuous man not only to make good use of his matter or instrument, but also to provide opportunities for that good use. Thus it belongs to a soldier's fortitude not only to wield his sword against the foe, but also to sharpen his sword and keep it in its sheath. Thus, too, it belongs to liberality not only to use money, but also to keep it in preparation and safety in order to make fitting use of it.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated (A[2], ad 1), the internal passions whereby man is affected towards money are the proximate matter of liberality. Hence it belongs to liberality before all that a man should not be prevented from making any due use of money through an inordinate affection for it. Now there is a twofold use of money: one consists in applying it to one's own use, and would seem to come under the designation of costs or expenditure; while the other consists in devoting it to the use of others, and comes under the head of gifts. Hence it belongs to liberality that one be not hindered by an immoderate love of money, either from spending it becomingly, or from making suitable gifts. Therefore liberality is concerned with giving and spending, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). The saying of Seneca refers to liberality as regards giving: for a man is not said to be liberal for the reason that he gives something to himself.

Whether it belongs to a liberal man chiefly to give?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a liberal man chiefly to give. For liberality, like all other moral virtues, is regulated by prudence. Now it seems to belong very much to prudence that a man should keep his riches. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "those who have not earned money, but have received the money earned by others, spend it more liberally, because they have not experienced the want of it." Therefore it seems that giving does not chiefly belong to the liberal man.

Objection 2: Further, no man is sorry for what he intends chiefly to do, nor does he cease from doing it. But a liberal man is sometimes sorry for what he has given, nor does he give to all, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. Therefore it does not belong chiefly to a liberal man to give.

Objection 3: Further, in order to accomplish what he intends chiefly, a man employs all the ways he can. Now a liberal man is not a beggar, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1); and yet by begging he might provide himself with the means of giving to others. Therefore it seems that he does not chiefly aim at giving.

Objection 4: Further, man is bound to look after himself rather than others. But by spending he looks after himself, whereas by giving he looks after others. Therefore it belongs to a liberal man to spend rather than to give.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "it belongs to a liberal man to surpass in giving."

I answer that, It is proper to a liberal man to use money. Now the use of money consists in parting with it. For the acquisition of money is like generation rather than use: while the keeping of money, in so far as it is directed to facilitate the use of money, is like a habit. Now in parting with a thing—for instance, when we throw something—the farther we put it away the greater the force [virtus] employed. Hence parting with money by giving it to others proceeds from a greater virtue than when we spend it on ourselves. But it is proper to a virtue as such to tend to what is more perfect, since "virtue is a kind of perfection" (Phys. vii, text. 17,18). Therefore a liberal man is praised chiefly for giving.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to prudence to keep money, lest it be stolen or spent uselessly. But to spend it usefully is not less but more prudent than to keep it usefully: since more things have to be considered in money's use, which is likened to movement, than in its keeping, which is likened to rest. As to those who, having received money that others have earned, spend it more liberally, through not having experienced the want of it, if their inexperience is the sole cause of their liberal expenditure they have not the virtue of liberality. Sometimes, however, this inexperience merely removes the impediment to liberality, so that it makes them all the more ready to act liberally, because, not unfrequently, the fear of want that results from the experience of want hinders those who have acquired money from using it up by acting with liberality; as does likewise the love they have for it as being their own effect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1).

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in this and the preceding Article, it belongs to liberality to make fitting use of money, and consequently to give it in a fitting manner, since this is a use of money. Again, every virtue is grieved by whatever is contrary to its act, and avoids whatever hinders that act. Now two things are opposed to suitable giving; namely, not giving what ought suitably to be given, and giving something unsuitably. Wherefore the liberal man is grieved at both: but especially at the former, since it is more opposed to his proper act. For this reason, too, he does not give to all: since his act would be hindered were he to give to everyone: for he would not have the means of giving to those to whom it were fitting for him to give.

Reply to Objection 3: Giving and receiving are related to one another as action and passion. Now the same thing is not the principle of both action and passion. Hence, since liberality is a principle of giving, it does not belong to the liberal man to be ready to receive, and still less to beg. Hence the verse:

‘In this world he that wishes to be pleasing to many Should give often, take seldom, ask never.’ But he makes provision in order to give certain things according as liberality requires; such are the fruits of his own possessions, for he is careful about realizing them that he may make a liberal use thereof.

Reply to Objection 4: To spend on oneself is an inclination of nature; hence to spend money on others belongs properly to a virtue.

Whether liberality is a part of justice?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is not a part of justice. For justice regards that which is due. Now the more a thing is due the less liberally is it given. Therefore liberality is not a part of justice, but is incompatible with it.

Objection 2: Further, justice is about operation as stated above (Q[58], A[9]; [3242]FS, Q[60], AA[2],3): whereas liberality is chiefly about the love and desire of money, which are passions. Therefore liberality seems to belong to temperance rather than to justice.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs chiefly to liberality to give becomingly, as stated [3243](A[4]). But giving becomingly belongs to beneficence and mercy, which pertain to charity, as state above (QQ[30],31). Therefore liberality is a part of charity rather than of justice.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): "Justice has to do with the fellowship of mankind. For the notion of fellowship is divided into two parts, justice and beneficence, also called liberality or kind-heartedness." Therefore liberality pertains to justice.

I answer that, Liberality is not a species of justice, since justice pays another what is his whereas liberality gives another what is one's own. There are, however, two points in which it agrees with justice: first, that it is directed chiefly to another, as justice is; secondly, that it is concerned with external things, and so is justice, albeit under a different aspect, a stated in this Article and above (A[2], ad 3). Hence it is that liberality is reckoned by some to be a part of justice, being annexed thereto as to a principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Although liberality does no consider the legal due that justice considers, it considers a certain moral due. This due is based on a certain fittingness and not on an obligation: so that it answers to the idea of due in the lowest degree.

Reply to Objection 2: Temperance is about concupiscence in pleasures of the body. But the concupiscence and delight in money is not referable to the body but rather to the soul. Hence liberality does not properly pertain to temperance.

Reply to Objection 3: The giving of beneficence and mercy proceeds from the fact that a man has a certain affection towards the person to whom he gives: wherefore this giving belongs to charity or friendship. But the giving of liberality arises from a person being affected in a certain way towards money, in that he desires it not nor loves it: so that when it is fitting he gives it not only to his friends but also to those whom he knows not. Hence it belong not to charity, but to justice, which is about external things.

Whether liberality is the greatest of the virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that liberality is the greatest of the virtues. For every virtue of man is a likeness to the divine goodness. Now man is likened chiefly by liberality to God, “Who giveth to all men abundantly, and upbraideth not” (James 1:5). Therefore liberality is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), “in things that are great, but not in bulk, to be greatest is to be best.” Now the nature of goodness seems to pertain mostly to liberality, since “the good is self-communicative,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “justice reclines to severity, liberality to goodness.” Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.

Objection 3: Further, men are honored and loved on account of virtue. Now Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that “bounty above all makes a man famous”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “among the virtuous the liberal are the most beloved.” Therefore liberality is the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “justice seems to be more excellent than liberality, although liberality is more pleasing.” The Philosopher also says (Rhet. i, 9) that “brave and just men are honored chiefly and, after them, those who are liberal.”

I answer that, Every virtue tends towards a good; wherefore the greater virtue is that which tends towards the greater good. Now liberality tends towards a good in two ways: in one way, primarily and of its own nature; in another way, consequently. Primarily and of its very nature it tends to set in order one’s own affection towards the possession and use of money. In this way temperance, which moderates desires and pleasures relating to one’s own body, takes precedence of liberality: and so do fortitude and justice, which, in a manner, are directed to the common good, one in time of peace, the other in time of war: while all these are preceded by those virtues which are directed to the Divine good. For the Divine good surpasses all manner of human good; and among human goods the public good surpasses the good of the individual; and of the last named the good of the body surpasses those goods that consist of external things. Again, liberality is ordained to a good consequently, and in this way it is directed to all the aforesaid goods. For by reason of his not being a lover of money, it follows that a man readily makes use of it, whether for himself. Or for the good of others, or for God's glory. Thus it derives a certain excellence from being useful in many ways. Since, however, we should judge of things according to that which is competent to them primarily and in respect of their nature, rather than according to that which pertains to them consequently, it remains to be said that liberality is not the greatest of virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: God's giving proceeds from His love for those to whom He gives, not from His affection towards the things He gives, wherefore it seems to pertain to charity, the greatest of virtues, rather than to liberality.

Reply to Objection 2: Every virtue shares the nature of goodness by giving forth its own act: and the acts of certain other virtues are better than money which liberality gives forth.

Reply to Objection 3: The friendship whereby a liberal man is beloved is not that which is based on virtue, as though he were better than others, but that which is based on utility, because he is more useful in external goods, which as a rule men desire above all others. For the same reason he becomes famous.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO LIBERALITY, AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, OF COVETOUSNESS (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to liberality: and (1) covetousness; (2) prodigality.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether covetousness is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) To which virtue it is opposed;

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(5) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

(6) Whether it is a sin of the flesh or a spiritual sin?

(7) Whether it is a capital vice?

(8) Of its daughters.

Whether covetousness is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not aa sin. For covetousness [avaritia] denotes a certain greed for gold [aeris aviditas*], because, to wit, it consists in a desire for money, under which all external goods may be comprised. [*The Latin for covetousness "avaritia" is derived from "aveo" to desire; but the Greek {philargyria} signifies literally "love of money": and it is to this that St. Thomas is alluding (cf. A[2], OBJ[2])]. Now it is not a sin to desire external goods: since man desires them naturally, both because they are naturally subject to man, and because by their means man's life is sustained (for which reason they are spoken of as his substance). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is against either God, or one's neighbor, or oneself, as stated above ([3244]FS, Q[72], A[4]). But covetousness is not, properly speaking, a sin against God: since it is opposed neither to religion nor to the theological virtues, by which man is directed to God. Nor again is it a sin against oneself, for this pertains properly to gluttony and lust, of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:18): "He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body." In like manner neither is it apparently a sin against one's neighbor, since a man harms no one by keeping what is his own. Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, things that occur naturally are not sins. Now covetousness comes naturally to old age and every kind of defect, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore covetousness is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:5): "Let your manners be without covetousness, contented with such things as you have."

I answer that, In whatever things good consists in a due measure, evil must of necessity ensue through excess or deficiency of that measure. Now in all things that are for an end, the good consists in a certain measure: since whatever is directed to an end must needs be commensurate with the end, as, for instance, medicine is commensurate with health, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 6). External goods come under the head of things useful for an end, as stated above (Q[117], A[3]; [3245]FS, Q[2] , A[1]). Hence it must needs be that man's good in their respect consists in a certain measure, in other words, that man seeks, according to a certain measure, to have external riches, in so far as they are necessary for him to live in keeping with his condition of life. Wherefore it will be a sin for him to exceed this measure, by wishing to acquire or keep them immoderately. This is what is meant by covetousness, which is defined as "immoderate love of possessing." It is therefore evident that covetousness is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: It is natural to man to desire external things as means to an end: wherefore this desire is devoid of sin, in so far as it is held in check by the rule taken from the nature of the end. But covetousness exceeds this rule, and therefore is a sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Covetousness may signify immoderation about external things in two ways. First, so as to regard immediately the acquisition and keeping of such things, when, to wit, a man acquires or keeps them more than is due. In this way it is a sin directly against one's neighbor, since one man cannot over-abound in external riches, without another man lacking them, for temporal goods cannot be possessed by many at the same time. Secondly, it may signify immoderation in the internal affection which a man has for riches when, for instance, a man loves them, desires them, or delights in them, immoderately. In this way by covetousness a man sins against himself, because it causes disorder in his affections, though not in his body as do the sins of the flesh.

As a consequence, however, it is a sin against God, just as all mortal sins, inasmuch as man contemns things eternal for the sake of temporal things.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural inclinations should be regulated according to reason, which is the governing power in human nature. Hence though old people seek more greedily the aid of external things, just as everyone that is in need seeks to have his need supplied, they are not excused from sin if they exceed this due measure of reason with regard to riches.

Whether covetousness is a special sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii): "Covetousness, which in Greek is called {philargyria}, applies not only to silver or money, but also to anything that is desired immoderately.” Now in every sin there is immoderate desire of something, because sin consists in turning away from the immutable good, and adhering to mutable goods, as state above ([3246]FS, Q[71], A[6], OBJ[3]). Therefore covetousness is a general sin.

Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x), “the covetous [avarus] man” is so called because he is “greedy for brass [avidus aeris],” i.e. money: wherefore in Greek covetousness is called {philargyria}, i.e. “love of silver.” Now silver, which stands for money, signifies all external goods the value of which can be measured by money, as stated above ([3247]Q[117], A[2], ad 2). Therefore covetousness is a desire for any external thing: and consequently seems to be a general sin.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Rom. 7:7, “For I had not known concupiscence,” says: “The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.” Now the law seems to forbid especially the concupiscence of covetousness: hence it is written (Ex. 20:17): “Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods.” Therefore the concupiscence of covetousness is all evil, and so covetousness is a general sin.

On the contrary, Covetousness is numbered together with other special sins (Rom. 1:29), where it is written: “Being filled with all iniquity, malice, fornication, covetousness” [Douay: ‘avarice’], etc.

I answer that, Sins take their species from their objects, as stated above ([3248]FS, Q[72], A[1]). Now the object of a sin is the good towards which an inordinate appetite tends. Hence where there is a special aspect of good inordinately desired, there is a special kind of sin. Now the useful good differs in aspect from the delightful good. And riches, as such, come under the head of useful good, since they are desired under the aspect of being useful to man. Consequently covetousness is a special sin, forasmuch as it is an immoderate love of having possessions, which are comprised under the name of money, whence covetousness [avaritia] is denominated.

Since, however, the verb “to have,” which seems to have been originally employed in connection with possessions whereof we are absolute masters, is applied to many other things (thus a man is said to have health, a wife, clothes, and so forth, as stated in De Praedicamentis), consequently the term “covetousness” has been amplified to denote all immoderate desire for having anything whatever. Thus Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Ev.) that “covetousness is a desire not only for money, but also for knowledge and high places, when prominence is immoderately sought after.” In this way covetousness is not a special sin: and in this sense Augustine speaks of covetousness in the passage quoted in the First Objection. Wherefore this suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: All those external things that are subject to the uses of human life are comprised under the term “money,” inasmuch as they have the aspect of useful good. But there are certain external goods that can be obtained by money, such as pleasures, honors, and so forth, which are desirable under another aspect. Wherefore the desire for such things is not properly called covetousness, in so far as it is a special vice.

Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the inordinate concupiscence for anything whatever. For it is easy to understand that if it is forbidden to covet another’s possessions it is also forbidden to covet those things that can be obtained by means of those possessions.

Whether covetousness is opposed to liberality?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not opposed to liberality. For Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. 5:6, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” says, (Hom. xv in Matth.) that there are two kinds of justice, one general, and the other special, to which covetousness is opposed: and the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. v, 2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

Objection 2: Further, the sin of covetousness consists in a man’s exceeding the measure in the things he possesses. But this measure is appointed by justice. Therefore covetousness is directly opposed to justice and not to liberality.

Objection 3: Further, liberality is a virtue that observes the mean between two contrary vices, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 7; iv, 1). But covetousness has no contrary and opposite sin, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1,2). Therefore covetousness is not opposed to liberality.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:9): “A covetous man shall not be satisfied with money, and he that loveth riches shall have no fruits from them.” Now not to be satisfied with money and to love it inordinately are opposed to liberality, which observes the mean in the desire of riches. Therefore covetousness is opposed to liberality.

I answer that, Covetousness denotes immoderation with regard to riches in two ways. First, immediately in respect of the acquisition and keeping of riches. In this way a man obtains money beyond his due, by stealing or retaining another’s property. This is opposed to justice, and in this sense covetousness is mentioned (Ezech. 22:27): “Her princes in the midst of her are like wolves ravening the prey to shed blood . . . and to run after gains through covetousness.” Secondly, it denotes immoderation in the interior affections for riches; for instance, when a man loves or desires riches too much, or takes too much pleasure in them, even if he be unwilling to steal. In this way covetousness is opposed to liberality, which moderates these affections, as stated above ([3249]Q[117], A[2], ad 3, A[3], ad 3, A[6]). In this sense covetousness is spoken of (2 Cor. 9:5): “That they would . . . prepare this blessing before promised, to be ready, so as a blessing, not as covetousness,” where a gloss observes: “Lest they should regret what they had given, and give but little.”

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom and the Philosopher are speaking of covetousness in the first sense: covetousness in the second sense is called illiberality [*{aneleutheria}] by the Philosopher.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs properly to justice to appoint the measure in the acquisition and keeping of riches from the point of view of legal due, so that a man should neither take nor retain another’s property. But liberality appoints the measure of reason, principally in the interior affections, and consequently in the exterior taking and keeping of money, and in the spending of the same, in so far as these proceed from the interior affection, looking at the matter from the point of view not of the legal but of the moral debt, which latter depends on the rule of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Covetousness as opposed to justice has no opposite vice: since it consists in having more than one ought according to justice, the contrary of which is to have less than one ought, and this is not a sin but a punishment. But covetousness as opposed to liberality has the vice of prodigality opposed to it.

Whether covetousness is always a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is always a mortal sin. For no one is worthy of death save for a mortal sin. But men are worthy of death on account of covetousness. For the Apostle after saying (Rom. 1:29): “Being filled with all iniquity . . . fornication, covetousness [Douay: ‘avarice’],” etc. adds (Rom. 1:32): “They who do such things are worthy of death.” Therefore covetousness is a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, the least degree of covetousness is to hold to one’s own inordinately. But this seemingly is a mortal sin: for Basil says (Serm. super. Luc. xii, 18): “It is the hungry man’s bread that thou keepest back, the naked man’s cloak that thou hoardest, the needy man’s money that thou possessest, hence thou despoilest as many as thou mightest succor.”

Now it is a mortal sin to do an injustice to another, since it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. Much more therefore is all covetousness a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, no one is struck with spiritual blindness save through a mortal sin, for this deprives a man of the light of grace. But, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xv in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. Chrysostom], “Lust for money brings darkness on the soul.” Therefore covetousness, which is lust for money, is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 3:12, “If any man build upon this foundation,” says (cf. St. Augustine, De Fide et Oper. xvi) that “he builds wood, hay, stubble, who thinks in the things of the world, how he may please the world,” which pertains to the sin of covetousness. Now he that builds wood, hay, stubble, sins not mortally but venially, for it is said of him that “he shall be saved, yet so as by fire.” Therefore covetousness is some times a venial sin.

I answer that, As stated above [3250](A[3]) covetousness is twofold. In one way it is opposed to justice, and thus it is a mortal sin in respect of its genus. For in this sense covetousness consists in the unjust taking or retaining of another’s property, and this belongs to theft or robbery, which are mortal sins, as stated above (Q[66], AA[6],8). Yet venial sin may occur in this kind of covetousness by reason of imperfection of the act, as stated above (Q[66], A[6], ad 3), when we were treating of theft.

In another way covetousness may be take as opposed to liberality: in which sense it denotes inordinate love of riches. Accordingly if the love of riches becomes so great as to be preferred to charity, in such wise that a man, through love of riches, fear not to act counter to the love of God and his neighbor, covetousness will then be a mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the inordinate nature of his love stops short of this, so that although he love riches too much, yet he does not prefer the love of them to the love of God, and is unwilling for the sake of riches to do anything in opposition to God or his neighbor, then covetousness is a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness is numbered together with mortal sins, by reason of the aspect under which it is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Basil is speaking of a case wherein a man is bound by a legal debt to give of his goods to the poor, either through fear of their want or on account of his having too much.

Reply to Objection 3: Lust for riches, properly speaking, brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of God.

Whether covetousness is the greatest of sins?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is the greatest of sins. For it is written (Ecclus. 10:9): “Nothing is more wicked than a covetous man,” and the text continues: “There is not a more wicked thing than to love money: for such a one setteth even his own soul to sale.” Tully also says (De Offic. i, under the heading, ‘True magnanimity is based chiefly on two things’): “Nothing is so narrow or little minded as to love money.” But this pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to charity, the more grievous it is. Now covetousness is most opposed to charity: for Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36) that “greed is the bane of charity.” Therefore covetousness is the greatest of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is indicated by its being incurable: wherefore the sin against the Holy Ghost is said to be most grievous, because it is irremissible. But covetousness is an incurable sin: hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “old age and helplessness of any kind make men illiberal.” Therefore covetousness is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:5) that covetousness is “a serving of idols.” Now idolatry is reckoned among the most grievous sins.

Therefore covetousness is also.

On the contrary, Adultery is a more grievous sin than theft, according to Prov. 6:30. But theft pertains to covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not the most grievous of sins.

I answer that, Every sin, from the very fact that it is an evil, consists in the corruption or privation of some good: while, in so far as it is voluntary, it consists in the desire of some good. Consequently the order of sins may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the good that is despised or corrupted by sin, and then the greater the good the graver the sin. From this point of view a sin that is against God is most grievous; after this comes a sin that is committed against a man's person, and after this comes a sin against external things, which are deputed to man's use, and this seems to belong to covetousness. Secondly, the degrees of sin may be considered on the part of the good to which the human appetite is inordinately subjected; and then the lesser the good, the more deformed is the sin: for it is more shameful to be subject to a lower than to a higher good. Now the good of external things is the lowest of human goods: since it is less than the good of the body, and this is less than the good of the soul, which is less than the Divine good. From this point of view the sin of covetousness, whereby the human appetite is subjected even to external things, has in a way a greater deformity. Since, however, corruption or privation of good is the formal element in sin, while conversion to a mutable good is the material element, the gravity of the sin is to be judged from the point of view of the good corrupted, rather than from that of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence we must assert that covetousness is not simply the most grievous of sins.

Reply to Objection 1: These authorities speak of covetousness on the part of the good to which the appetite is subjected. Hence (Ecclus. 10:10) it is given as a reason that the covetous man "setteth his own soul to sale"; because, to wit, he exposes his soul—that is, his life—to danger for the sake of money. Hence the text continues: "Because while he liveth he hath cast away"—that is, despised—"his bowels," in order to make money. Tully also adds that it is the mark of a "narrow mind," namely, that one be willing to be subject to money.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is taking greed generally, in reference to any temporal good, not in its special acceptation for covetousness: because greed for any temporal good is the bane of charity, inasmuch as a man turns away from the Divine good through cleaving to a temporal good.

Reply to Objection 3: The sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable in one way, covetousness in another. For the sin against the Holy Ghost is incurable by reason of contempt: for instance, because a man contemns God’s mercy, or His justice, or some one of those things whereby man’s sins are healed: wherefore incurability of this kind points to the greater gravity of the sin. on the other hand, covetousness is incurable on the part of a human defect; a thing which human nature ever seeks to remedy, since the more deficient one is the more one seeks relief from external things, and consequently the more one gives way to covetousness. Hence incurability of this kind is an indication not of the sin being more grievous, but of its being somewhat more dangerous.

Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is compared to idolatry on account of a certain likeness that it bears to it: because the covetous man, like the idolater, subjects himself to an external creature, though not in the same way. For the idolater subjects himself to an external creature by paying it Divine honor, whereas the covetous man subjects himself to an external creature by desiring it immoderately for use, not for worship. Hence it does not follow that covetousness is as grievous a sin as idolatry.

Whether covetousness is a spiritual sin?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a spiritual sin. For spiritual sins seem to regard spiritual goods. But the matter of covetousness is bodily goods, namely, external riches. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual sin is condivided with sin of the flesh. Now covetousness is seemingly a sin of the flesh, for it results from the corruption of the flesh, as instanced in old people who, through corruption of carnal nature, fall into covetousness. Therefore covetousness is not a spiritual sin.

Objection 3: Further, a sin of the flesh is one by which man’s body is disordered, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), “He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body.” Now covetousness disturbs man even in his body; wherefore Chrysostom (Hom. xxix in Matth.) compares the covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil (Mk. 5) and was troubled in body. Therefore covetousness seems not to be a spiritual sin.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers covetousness among spiritual vices.

I answer that, Sins are seated chiefly in the affections: and all the affections or passions of the soul have their term in pleasure and sorrow, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 5). Now some pleasures are carnal and some spiritual. Carnal pleasures are those which are consummated in the carnal senses—for instance, the pleasures of the table and sexual pleasures: while spiritual pleasures are those which are consummated in the mere apprehension of the soul. Accordingly, sins of the flesh are those which are consummated in carnal pleasures, while spiritual sins are consummated in pleasures of the spirit without pleasure of the flesh. Such is covetousness: for the covetous man takes pleasure in the consideration of himself as a possessor of riches. Therefore covetousness is a spiritual sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Covetousness with regard to a bodily object seeks the pleasure, not of the body but only of the soul, forasmuch as a man takes pleasure in the fact that he possesses riches: wherefore it is not a sin of the flesh. Nevertheless by reason of its object it is a mean between purely spiritual sins, which seek spiritual pleasure in respect of spiritual objects (thus pride is about excellence), and purely carnal sins, which seek a purely bodily pleasure in respect of a bodily object.

Reply to Objection 2: Movement takes its species from the term "whereto" and not from the term "wherefrom." Hence a vice of the flesh is so called from its tending to a pleasure of the flesh, and not from its originating in some defect of the flesh.

Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom compares a covetous man to the man who was possessed by the devil, not that the former is troubled in the flesh in the same way as the latter, but by way of contrast, since while the possessed man, of whom we read in Mk. 5, stripped himself, the covetous man loads himself with an excess of riches.

Whether covetousness is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It seems that covetousness is not a capital vice. For covetousness is opposed to liberality as the mean, and to prodigality as extreme. But neither is liberality a principal virtue, nor prodigality a capital vice. Therefore covetousness also should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([3251]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), those vices are called capital which have principal ends, to which the ends of other vices are directed. But this does not apply to covetousness: since riches have the aspect, not of an end, but rather of something directed to an end, as stated in Ethic. i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not a capital vice.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xv), that “covetousness arises sometimes from pride, sometimes from fear. For there are those who, when they think that they lack the needful for their expenses, allow the mind to give way to covetousness. And there are others who, wishing to be thought more of, are incited to greed for other people’s property.” Therefore covetousness arises from other vices instead of being a capital vice in respect of other vices.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) reckons covetousness among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated in the Second Objection, a capital vice is one which under the aspect of end gives rise to other vices: because when an end is very desirable, the result is that through desire thereof man sets about doing many things either good or evil. Now the most desirable end is happiness or felicity, which is the last end of human life, as stated above ([3252]FS, Q[1], AA[4],7,8): wherefore the more a thing is furnished with the conditions of happiness, the more desirable it is. Also one of the conditions of happiness is that it be self-sufficing, else it would not set man’s appetite at rest, as the last end does. Now riches give great promise of self-sufficiency, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii): the reason of which, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), is that we “use money in token of taking possession of something,” and again it is written (Eccles. 10:19): “All things obey money.” Therefore covetousness, which is desire for money, is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is perfected in accordance with reason, but vice is perfected in accordance with the inclination of the sensitive appetite. Now reason and sensitive appetite do not belong chiefly to the same genus, and consequently it does not follow that principal vice is opposed to principal virtue. Wherefore, although liberality is not a principal virtue, since it does not regard the principal good of the reason, yet covetousness is a principal vice, because it regards money, which occupies a principal place among sensible goods, for the reason given in the Article.

On the other hand, prodigality is not directed to an end that is desirable principally, indeed it seems rather to result from a lack of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “a prodigal man is a fool rather than a knave.”

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that money is directed to something else as its end: yet in so far as it is useful for obtaining all sensible things, it contains, in a way, all things virtually. Hence it has a certain likeness to happiness, as stated in the Article.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a capital vice from arising sometimes out of other vices, as stated above (Q[36], A[4], ad 1; [3253]FS, Q[84], A[4]), provided that itself be frequently the source of others.

Whether treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy are daughters of covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of covetousness are not as commonly stated, namely, “treachery, fraud, falsehood, perjury, restlessness, violence, and insensibility to mercy.” For covetousness is opposed to liberality, as stated above [3254](A[3]). Now treachery, fraud, and falsehood are opposed to prudence, perjury to religion, restlessness to hope, or to charity which rests in the beloved object, violence to justice, insensibility to mercy. Therefore these vices have no connection with covetousness.

Objection 2: Further, treachery, fraud and falsehood seem to pertain to the same thing, namely, the deceiving of one’s neighbor. Therefore they should not be reckoned as different daughters of covetousness.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore (Comment. in Deut.) enumerates nine daughters of covetousness; which are “lying, fraud, theft, perjury, greed of filthy lucre, false witnessing, violence, inhumanity, rapacity.” Therefore the former reckoning of daughters is insufficient.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 1) mentions many kinds of vices as belonging to covetousness which he calls illiberality, for he speaks of those who are “sparing, tight-fisted, skinflints [*{kyminopristes}], misers [*{kimbikes}], who do illiberal deeds,” and of those who “batten on whoredom, usurers, gamblers, despoilers of the dead, and robbers.” Therefore it seems that the aforesaid enumeration is insufficient.

Objection 5: Further, tyrants use much violence against their subjects. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “tyrants who destroy cities and despoil sacred places are not to be called illiberal,” i.e. covetous. Therefore violence should not be reckoned a daughter of covetousness.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) assigns to covetousness the daughters mentioned above.

I answer that, The daughters of covetousness are the vices which arise therefrom, especially in respect of the desire of an end. Now since covetousness is excessive love of possessing riches, it exceeds in two things. For in the first place it exceeds in retaining, and in this respect covetousness gives rise to “insensibility to mercy,” because, to wit, a man’s heart is not softened by mercy to assist the needy with his riches [*See[3255] Q[30], A[1]]. In the second place it belongs to covetousness to exceed in receiving, and in this respect covetousness may be considered in two ways. First as in the thought [affectu]. In this way it gives rise to “restlessness,” by hindering man with excessive anxiety and care, for “a covetous man shall not be satisfied with money” (Eccles. 5:9). Secondly, it may be considered in the execution [effectu]. In this way the covetous man, in acquiring other people’s goods, sometimes employs force, which pertains to “violence,” sometimes deceit, and then if he has recourse to words, it is “falsehood,” if it be mere words, “perjury” if he confirm his statement by oath; if he has recourse to deeds, and the deceit affects things, we have “fraud”; if persons, then we have “treachery,” as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no need for the daughters of a capital sin to belong to that same kind of vice: because a sin of one kind allows of sins even of a different kind being directed to its end; seeing that it is one thing for a sin to have daughters, and another for it to have species.

Reply to Objection 2: These three are distinguished as stated in the Article.

Reply to Objection 3: These nine are reducible to the seven aforesaid. For lying and false witnessing are comprised under falsehood, since false witnessing is a special kind of lie, just as theft is a special kind of fraud, wherefore it is comprised under fraud; and greed of filthy lucre belongs to restlessness; rapacity is comprised under violence, since it is a species thereof; and inhumanity is the same as insensibility to mercy.

Reply to Objection 4: The vices mentioned by Aristotle are species rather than daughters of illiberality or covetousness. For a man may be said to be illiberal or covetous through a defect in giving. If he gives but little he is said to be "sparing"; if nothing, he is "tightfisted": if he gives with great reluctance, he is said to be {kyminopristes} [skinflint], a cumin-seller, as it were, because he makes a great fuss about things of little value. Sometimes a man is said to be illiberal or covetous, through an excess in receiving, and this in two ways. In one way, through making money by disgraceful means, whether in performing shameful and servile works by means of illiberal practices, or by acquiring more through sinful deeds, such as whoredom or the like, or by making a profit where one ought to have given gratis, as in the case of usury, or by laboring much to make little profit. In another way, in making money by unjust means, whether by using violence on the living, as robbers do, or by despoiling the dead, or by preying on one's friends, as gamblers do.

Reply to Objection 5: Just as liberality is about moderate sums of money, so is illiberality. Wherefore tyrants who take great things by violence, are said to be, not illiberal, but unjust.

OF PRODIGALITY (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider prodigality, under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

(2) Whether prodigality is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a graver sin that covetousness?

Whether prodigality is opposite to covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not opposite to covetousness. For opposites cannot be together in the same subject. But some are at the same time prodigal and covetous. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.

Objection 2: Further, opposites relate to one same thing. But covetousness, as opposed to liberality, relates to certain passions whereby man is affected towards money: whereas prodigality does not seem to relate to any passions of the soul, since it is not affected towards money, or to anything else of the kind. Therefore prodigality is not opposite to covetousness.

Objection 3: Further, sin takes its species chiefly from its end, as stated above ([3256]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Now prodigality seems always to be directed to some unlawful end, for the sake of which the prodigal squanders his goods. Especially is it directed to pleasures, wherefore it is stated (Lk. 15:13) of the prodigal son that he “wasted his substance living riotously.” Therefore it seems that prodigality is opposed to temperance and insensibility rather than to covetousness and liberality.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1) that prodigality is opposed to liberality, and illiberality, to which we give here the name of covetousness.

I answer that, In morals vices are opposed to one another and to virtue in respect of excess and deficiency. Now covetousness and prodigality differ variously in respect of excess and deficiency. Thus, as regards affection for riches, the covetous man exceeds by loving them more than he ought, while the prodigal is deficient, by being less careful of them than he ought: and as regards external action, prodigality implies excess in giving, but deficiency in retaining and acquiring, while covetousness, on the contrary, denotes deficiency in giving, but excess in acquiring and retaining. Hence it is evident that prodigality is opposed to covetousness.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing prevents opposites from being in the same subject in different respects. For a thing is denominated more from what is in it principally. Now just as in liberality, which observes the mean, the principal thing is giving, to which receiving and retaining are subordinate, so, too, covetousness and prodigality regard principally giving. Wherefore he who exceeds in giving is said to be “prodigal,” while he who is deficient in giving is said to be “covetous.” Now it happens sometimes that a man is deficient in giving, without exceeding in receiving, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). And in like manner it happens sometimes that a man exceeds in giving, and therefore is prodigal, and yet at the same time exceeds in receiving. This may be due either to some kind of necessity, since while exceeding in giving he is lacking in goods of his own, so that he is driven to acquire unduly, and this pertains to covetousness; or it may be due to inordinateness of the mind, for he gives not for a good purpose, but, as though despising virtue, cares not whence or how he receives. Wherefore he is prodigal and covetous in different respects.

Reply to Objection 2: Prodigality regards passions in respect of money, not as exceeding, but as deficient in them.

Reply to Objection 3: The prodigal does not always exceed in giving for the sake of pleasures which are the matter of temperance, but sometimes through being so disposed as not to care about riches, and sometimes on account of something else. More frequently, however, he inclines to intemperance, both because through spending too much on other things he becomes fearless of spending on objects of pleasure, to which the concupiscence of the flesh is more prone; and because through taking no pleasure in virtuous goods, he seeks for himself pleasures of the body. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) “that many a prodigal ends in becoming intemperate.”

Whether prodigality is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is not a sin. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): “Covetousness [Douay: ‘desire of money’] is the root of all evils.” But it is not the root of prodigality, since this is opposed to it. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:17,18): “Charge the rich of this world . . . to give easily, to communicate to others.” Now this is especially what prodigal persons do. Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to prodigality to exceed in giving and to be deficient in solicitude about riches. But this is most becoming to the perfect, who fulfil the words of Our Lord (Mat. 6:34), “Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow,” and (Mat. 19:21), “Sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor.” Therefore prodigality is not a sin.

On the contrary, The prodigal son is held to blame for his prodigality.

I answer that, As stated above [3257](A[1]), the opposition between prodigality and covetousness is one of excess and deficiency; either of which destroys the mean of virtue. Now a thing is vicious and sinful through corrupting the good of virtue. Hence it follows that prodigality is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Some expound this saying of the Apostle as referring, not to actual covetousness, but to a kind of habitual covetousness, which is the concupiscence of the “fomes” [*Cf. [3258]FS, Q[81], A[3], ad 2], whence all sins arise. Others say that he is speaking of a general covetousness with regard to any kind of good: and in this sense also it is evident that prodigality arises from covetousness; since the prodigal seeks to acquire some temporal good inordinately, namely, to give pleasure to others, or at least to satisfy his own will in giving. But to one that reviews the passage correctly, it is evident that the Apostle is speaking literally of the desire of riches, for he had said previously (1 Tim. 6:9): “They that will become rich,” etc. In this sense covetousness is said to be “the root of all evils,” not that all evils always arise from covetousness, but because there is no evil that does not at some time arise from covetousness. Wherefore prodigality sometimes is born of covetousness, as when a man is prodigal in going to great expense in order to curry favor with certain persons from whom he may receive riches.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle bids the rich to be ready to give and communicate their riches, according as they ought. The prodigal does not do this: since, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. iv, 1), “his giving is neither good, nor for a good end, nor according as it ought to be. For sometimes they give much to those who ought to be poor, namely, to buffoons and flatterers, whereas to the good they give nothing.”

Reply to Objection 3: The excess in prodigality consists chiefly, not in the total amount given, but in the amount over and above what ought to be given. Hence sometimes the liberal man gives more than the prodigal man, if it be necessary. Accordingly we must reply that those who give all their possessions with the intention of following Christ, and banish from their minds all solicitude for temporal things, are not prodigal but perfectly liberal.

Whether prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness?

Objection 1: It seems that prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness. For by covetousness a man injures his neighbor by not communicating his goods to him, whereas by prodigality a man injures himself, because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the wasting of riches, which are the means whereby a man lives, is an undoing of his very being.” Now he that injures himself sins more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5, “He that is evil to himself, to whom will he be good?” Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

Objection 2: Further, a disorder that is accompanied by a laudable circumstance is less sinful. Now the disorder of covetousness is sometimes accompanied by a laudable circumstance, as in the case of those who are unwilling to spend their own, lest they be driven to accept from others: whereas the disorder of prodigality is accompanied by a circumstance that calls for blame, inasmuch as we ascribe prodigality to those who are intemperate, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 1). Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

Objection 3: Further, prudence is chief among the moral virtues, as stated above (Q[56], A[1], ad 1; [3259]FS, Q[61], A[2], ad 1). Now prodigality is more opposed to prudence than covetousness is: for it is written (Prov. 21:20): “There is a treasure to be desired, and oil in the dwelling of the just; and the foolish man shall spend it”: and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that “it is the mark of a fool to give too much and receive nothing.” Therefore prodigality is a more grievous sin than covetousness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 6) that “the prodigal seems to be much better than the illiberal man.”

I answer that, Prodigality considered in itself is a less grievous sin than covetousness, and this for three reasons. First, because covetousness differs more from the opposite virtue: since giving, wherein the prodigal exceeds, belongs to liberality more than receiving or retaining, wherein the covetous man exceeds. Secondly, because the prodigal man is of use to the many to whom he gives, while the covetous man is of use to no one, not even to himself, as stated in Ethic. iv, 6. Thirdly, because prodigality is easily cured. For not only is the prodigal on the way to old age, which is opposed to prodigality, but he is easily reduced to a state of want, since much useless spending impoverishes him and makes him unable to exceed in giving. Moreover, prodigality is easily turned into virtue on account of its likeness thereto. On the other hand, the covetous man is not easily cured, for the reason given above ([3260]Q[118], A[5], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1: The difference between the prodigal and the covetous man is not that the former sins against himself and the latter against another. For the prodigal sins against himself by spending that which is his, and his means of support, and against others by spending the wherewithal to help others. This applies chiefly to the clergy, who are the dispensers of the Church’s goods, that belong to the poor whom they defraud by their prodigal expenditure. In like manner the covetous man sins against others, by being deficient in giving; and he sins against himself, through deficiency in spending: wherefore it is written (Eccles. 6:2): “A man to whom God hath given riches . . . yet doth not give him the power to eat thereof.” Nevertheless the prodigal man exceeds in this, that he injures both himself and others yet so as to profit some; whereas the covetous man profits neither others nor himself, since he does not even use his own goods for his own profit.

Reply to Objection 2: In speaking of vices in general, we judge of them according to their respective natures: thus, with regard to prodigality we note that it consumes riches to excess, and with regard to covetousness that it retains them to excess. That one spend too much for the sake of intemperance points already to several additional sins, wherefore the prodigal of this kind is worse, as stated in Ethic. iv, 1. That an illiberal or covetous man refrain from taking what belongs to others, although this appears in itself to call for praise, yet on account of the motive for which he does so it calls for blame, since he is unwilling to accept from others lest he be forced to give to others.

Reply to Objection 3: All vices are opposed to prudence, even as all virtues are directed by prudence: wherefore if a vice be opposed to prudence alone, for this very reason it is deemed less grievous.

OF “EPIKEIA” OR EQUITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider “epikeia,” under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether “epikeia” is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of justice?

Whether “epikeia” [*{epieikeia}] is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that “epikeia” is not a virtue. For no virtue does away with another virtue. Yet “epikeia” does away with another virtue, since it sets aside that which is just according to law, and seemingly is opposed to severity. Therefore “epikeia” is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): “With regard to these earthly laws, although men pass judgment on them when they make them, yet, when once they are made and established, the judge must pronounce judgment not on them but according to them.” But seemingly “epikeia” pronounces judgment on the law, when it deems that the law should not be observed in some particular case. Therefore “epikeia” is a vice rather than a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, apparently it belongs to “epikeia” to consider the intention of the lawgiver, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). But it belongs to the sovereign alone to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, wherefore the Emperor says in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions, under Law i: “It is fitting and lawful that We alone should interpret between equity and law.” Therefore the act of “epikeia” is unlawful: and consequently “epikeia” is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) states it to be a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([3261]FS, Q[96], A[6]), when we were treating of laws, since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to what commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens sometimes to be injurious—for instance, if a madman were to put his sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates of justice and the common good. This is the object of “epikeia” which we call equity. Therefore it is evident that “epikeia” is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: “Epikeia” does not set aside that which is just in itself but that which is just as by law established. Nor is it opposed to severity, which follows the letter of the law when it ought to be followed. To follow the letter of the law when it ought not to be followed is sinful. Hence it is written in the Codex of Laws and Constitutions under Law v: “Without doubt he transgresses the law who by adhering to the letter of the law strives to defeat the intention of the lawgiver.”

Reply to Objection 2: It would be passing judgment on a law to say that it was not well made; but to say that the letter of the law is not to be observed in some particular case is passing judgment not on the law, but on some particular contingency.

Reply to Objection 3: Interpretation is admissible in doubtful cases where it is not allowed to set aside the letter of the law without the interpretation of the sovereign. But when the case is manifest there is need, not of interpretation, but of execution.

Whether “epikeia” is a part of justice?

Objection 1: It seems that “epikeia” is not a part of justice. For, as stated above ([3262]Q[58], A[7]), justice is twofold, particular and legal. Now “epikeia” is not a part of particular justice, since it extends to all virtues, even as legal justice does. In like manner, neither is it a part of legal justice, since its operation is beside that which is established by law. Therefore it seems that “epikeia” is not a part of justice.

Objection 2: Further, a more principal virtue is not assigned as the part of a less principal virtue: for it is to the cardinal virtue, as being principal, that secondary virtues are assigned as parts. Now “epikeia” seems to be a more principal virtue than justice, as implied by its name: for it is derived from {epi}, i.e. “above,” and {dikaion}, i.e. “just.” Therefore “epikeia” is not a part of justice.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that “epikeia” is the same as modesty. For where the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5), “Let your modesty be known to all men,” the Greek has {epieikeia} [*{to epieikes}]. Now, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii), modesty is a part of temperance. Therefore “epikeia” is not a part of justice.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 10) that “epikeia is a kind of justice.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3263]Q[48]), a virtue has three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. A subjective part is one of which the whole is predicated essentially, and it is less than the whole. This may happen in two ways. For sometimes one thing is predicated of many in one common ratio, as animal of horse and ox: and sometimes one thing is predicated of many according to priority and posteriority, as "being" of substance and accident.

Accordingly, "epikeia" is a part of justice taken in a general sense, for it is a kind of justice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10). Wherefore it is evident that "epikeia" is a subjective part of justice; and justice is predicated of it with priority to being predicated of legal justice, since legal justice is subject to the direction of "epikeia." Hence "epikeia" is by way of being a higher rule of human actions.

Reply to Objection 1: Epikeia corresponds properly to legal justice, and in one way is contained under it, and in another way exceeds it. For if legal justice denotes that which complies with the law, whether as regards the letter of the law, or as regards the intention of the lawgiver, which is of more account, then "epikeia" is the more important part of legal justice. But if legal justice denote merely that which complies with the law with regard to the letter, then "epikeia" is a part not of legal justice but of justice in its general acceptation, and is condivided with legal justice, as exceeding it.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 10), "epikeia is better than a certain," namely, legal, "justice," which observes the letter of the law: yet since it is itself a kind of justice, it is not better than all justice.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to "epikeia" to moderate something, namely, the observance of the letter of the law. But modesty, which is reckoned a part of temperance, moderates man's outward life—for instance, in his deportment, dress or the like. Possibly also the term {epieikeia} is applied in Greek by a similitude to all kinds of moderation.

OF PIETY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gift that corresponds to justice; namely, piety. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a gift of the Holy Ghost?

(2) Which of the beatitudes and fruits corresponds to it?

Whether piety is a gift?

Objection 1: It seems that piety is not a gift. For the gifts differ from the virtues, as stated above ([3264]FS, Q[68], A[1]). But piety is a virtue, as stated above (Q[101], A[3]). Therefore piety is not a gift.

Objection 2: Further, the gifts are more excellent than the virtues, above all the moral virtues, as above ([3265]FS, Q[68], A[8]). Now among the parts of justice religion is greater than piety. Therefore if any part of justice is to be accounted a gift, it seems that religion should be a gift rather than piety.

Objection 3: Further, the gifts and their acts remain in heaven, as stated above ([3266]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of piety cannot remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that “piety fills the inmost recesses of the heart with works of mercy”: and so there will be no piety in heaven since there will be no unhappiness [*Cf. Q[30], A[1]]. Therefore piety is not a gift.

On the contrary, It is reckoned among the gifts in the eleventh chapter of Isaias (verse 2) [Douay: ‘godliness’] [*”Pietas,” whence our English word “pity,” which is the same as mercy.]

I answer that, As stated above ([3267]FS, Q[68], A[1]; [3268]FS, Q[69], AA[1],3), the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habitual dispositions of the soul, rendering it amenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost. Now the Holy Ghost moves us to this effect among others, of having a filial affection towards God, according to Rom. 8:15, “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).” And since it belongs properly to piety to pay duty and worship to one’s father, it follows that piety, whereby, at the Holy Ghost’s instigation, we pay worship and duty to God as our Father, is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: The piety that pays duty and worship to a father in the flesh is a virtue: but the piety that is a gift pays this to God as Father.

Reply to Objection 2: To pay worship to God as Creator, as religion does, is more excellent than to pay worship to one’s father in the flesh, as the piety that is a virtue does. But to pay worship to God as Father is yet more excellent than to pay worship to God as Creator and Lord. Wherefore religion is greater than the virtue of piety: while the gift of piety is greater than religion.

Reply to Objection 3: As by the virtue of piety man pays duty and worship not only to his father in the flesh, but also to all his kindred on account of their being related to his father so by the gift of piety he pays worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their relationship to God. Hence it belongs to piety to honor the saints, and not to contradict the Scriptures whether one understands them or not, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Consequently it also assists those who are in a state of unhappiness. And although this act has no place in heaven, especially after the Day of Judgment, yet piety will exercise its principal act, which is to revere God with filial affection: for it is then above all that this act will be fulfilled, according to Wis. 5:5, “Behold how they are numbered among the children of God.” The saints will also mutually honor one another. Now, however, before the Judgment Day, the saints have pity on those also who are living in this unhappy state.

Whether the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” corresponds to the gift of piety?

Objection 1: It seems that the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” does not correspond to the gift of piety. For piety is the gift corresponding to justice, to which rather belongs the fourth beatitude, “Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice,” or the fifth beatitude, “Blessed are the merciful,” since as stated above (A[1], OBJ[3]), the works of mercy belong to piety. Therefore the second beatitude does not pertain to the gift of piety.

Objection 2: Further, the gift of piety is directed by the gift of knowledge, which is united to it in the enumeration of the gifts (Is. 11). Now direction and execution extend to the same matter. Since, then, the third beatitude, “Blessed are they that mourn,” corresponds to the gift of knowledge, it seems that the second beatitude corresponds to piety.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits correspond to the beatitudes and gifts, as stated above ([3269]FS, Q[70], A[2]). Now among the fruits, goodness and benignity seem to agree with piety rather than mildness, which pertains to meekness. Therefore the second beatitude does not correspond to the gift of piety.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): “Piety is becoming to the meek.”

I answer that, In adapting the beatitudes to the gifts a twofold congruity may be observed. One is according to the order in which they are given, and Augustine seems to have followed this: wherefore he assigns the first beatitude to the lowest gift, namely, fear, and the second beatitude, “Blessed are the meek,” to piety, and so on. Another congruity may be observed in keeping with the special nature of each gift and beatitude. In this way one must adapt the beatitudes to the gifts according to their objects and acts: and thus the fourth and fifth beatitudes would correspond to piety, rather than the second. Yet the second beatitude has a certain congruity with piety, inasmuch as meekness removes the obstacles to acts of piety.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Taking the beatitudes and gifts according to their proper natures, the same beatitude must needs correspond to knowledge and piety: but taking them according to their order, different beatitudes correspond to them, although a certain congruity may be observed, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: In the fruits goodness and benignity may be directly ascribed to piety; and mildness indirectly in so far as it removes obstacles to acts of piety, as stated above.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the precepts of justice, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

(2) Of the first precept of the decalogue;

(3) Of the second;

(4) Of the third;

(5) Of the fourth;

(6) Of the other six.

Whether the precepts of the decalogue are precepts of justice?

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice. For the intention of a lawgiver is “to make the citizens virtuous in respect of every virtue,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore, according to Ethic. v, 1, “the law prescribes about all acts of all virtues.” Now the precepts of the decalogue are the first. principles of the whole Divine Law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not pertain to justice alone.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that to justice belong especially the judicial precepts, which are condivided with the moral precepts, as stated above ([3270]FS, Q[99], A[4]). But the precepts of the decalogue are moral precepts, as stated above ([3271]FS, Q[100], A[3]). Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are not precepts of justice.

Objection 3: Further, the Law contains chiefly precepts about acts of justice regarding the common good, for instance about public officers and the like. But there is no mention of these in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore it seems that the precepts of the decalogue do not properly belong to justice.

Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue are divided into two tables, corresponding to the love of God and the love of our neighbor, both of which regard the virtue of charity. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue belong to charity rather than to justice.

On the contrary, Seemingly justice is the sole virtue whereby we are directed to another. Now we are directed to another by all the precepts of the decalogue, as is evident if one consider each of them. Therefore all the precepts of the decalogue pertain to justice.

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are the first principles of the Law: and the natural reason assents to them at once, as to principles that are most evident. Now it is altogether evident that the notion of duty, which is essential to a precept, appears in justice, which is of one towards another. Because in those matters that relate to himself it would seem at a glance that man is master of himself, and that he may do as he likes: whereas in matters that refer to another it appears manifestly that a man is under obligation to render to another that which is his due. Hence the precepts of the decalogue must needs pertain to justice. Wherefore the first three precepts are about acts of religion, which is the chief part of justice; the fourth precept is about acts of piety, which is the second part of justice; and the six remaining are about justice commonly so called, which is observed among equals.

Reply to Objection 1: The intention of the law is to make all men virtuous, but in a certain order, namely, by first of all giving them precepts about those things where the notion of duty is most manifest, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The judicial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts, in so far as these are directed to one's neighbor, just as the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts in so far as these are directed to God. Hence neither precepts are contained in the decalogue: and yet they are determinations of the precepts of the decalogue, and therefore pertain to justice.

Reply to Objection 3: Things that concern the common good must needs be administered in different ways according to the difference of men. Hence they were to be given a place not among the precepts of the decalogue, but among the judicial precepts.

Reply to Objection 4: The precepts of the decalogue pertain to charity as their end, according to 1 Tim. 1:5, "The end of the commandment is charity": but they belong to justice, inasmuch as they refer immediately to acts of justice.

Whether the first precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the first precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For man is more bound to God than to his father in the flesh, according to Heb. 12:9, "How much more shall we [Vulg.: 'shall we not much more'] obey the Father of spirits and live?" Now the precept of piety, whereby man honors his father, is expressed affirmatively in these words: "Honor thy father and thy mother." Much more, therefore, should the first precept of religion, whereby all honor God, be expressed affirmatively, especially as affirmation is naturally prior to negation.

Objection 2: Further, the first precept of the decalogue pertains to religion, as stated above [3272](A[1]). Now religion, since it is one virtue, has one act. Yet in the first precept three acts are forbidden: since we read first: "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me"; secondly, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing”; and thirdly, “Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.” Therefore the first precept is unfittingly expressed.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De decem chord. ix) that “the first precept forbids the sin of superstition.” But there are many wicked superstitions besides idolatry, as stated above ([3273]Q[92], A[2]). Therefore it was insufficient to forbid idolatry alone.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, It pertains to law to make men good, wherefore it behooved the precepts of the Law to be set in order according to the order of generation, the order, to wit, of man’s becoming good. Now two things must be observed in the order of generation. The first is that the first part is the first thing to be established; thus in the generation of an animal the first thing to be formed is the heart, and in building a home the first thing to be set up is the foundation: and in the goodness of the soul the first part is goodness of the will, the result of which is that a man makes good use of every other goodness. Now the goodness of the will depends on its object, which is its end. Wherefore since man was to be directed to virtue by means of the Law, the first thing necessary was, as it were, to lay the foundation of religion, whereby man is duly directed to God, Who is the last end of man’s will.

The second thing to be observed in the order of generation is that in the first place contraries and obstacles have to be removed. Thus the farmer first purifies the soil, and afterwards sows his seed, according to Jer. 4:3, “Break up anew your fallow ground, and sow not upon thorns.” Hence it behooved man, first of all to be instructed in religion, so as to remove the obstacles to true religion. Now the chief obstacle to religion is for man to adhere to a false god, according to Mat. 6:24, “You cannot serve God and mammon.” Therefore in the first precept of the Law the worship of false gods is excluded.

Reply to Objection 1: In point of fact there is one affirmative precept about religion, namely: “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath Day.” Still the negative precepts had to be given first, so that by their means the obstacles to religion might be removed. For though affirmation naturally precedes negation, yet in the process of generation, negation, whereby obstacles are removed, comes first, as stated in the Article. Especially is this true in matters concerning God, where negation is preferable to affirmation, on account of our insufficiency, as Dionysius observes (Coel. Hier. ii).

Reply to Objection 2: People worshiped strange gods in two ways. For some served certain creatures as gods without having recourse to images. Hence Varro says that for a long time the ancient Romans worshiped gods without using images: and this worship is first forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.” Among others the worship of false gods was observed by using certain images: and so the very making of images was fittingly forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven thing,” as also the worship of those same images, by the words, “Thou shalt not adore them,” etc.

Reply to Objection 3: All other kinds of superstition proceed from some compact, tacit or explicit, with the demons; hence all are understood to be forbidden by the words, “Thou shalt not have strange gods.”

Whether the second precept of the decalogue is fittingly expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the second precept of the decalogue is unfittingly expressed. For this precept, “Thou shalt not take the name of thy God in vain” is thus explained by a gloss on Ex. 20:7: “Thou shalt not deem the Son of God to be a creature,” so that it forbids an error against faith. Again, a gloss on the words of Dt. 5:11, “Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain, “ adds, i.e. “by giving the name of God to wood or stone,” as though they forbade a false confession of faith, which, like error, is an act of unbelief. Now unbelief precedes superstition, as faith precedes religion. Therefore this precept should have preceded the first, whereby superstition is forbidden.

Objection 2: Further, the name of God is taken for many purposes—for instance, those of praise, of working miracles, and generally speaking in conjunction with all we say or do, according to Col. 3:17, “All whatsoever you do in word or in work . . . do ye in the name of the Lord.” Therefore the precept forbidding the taking of God’s name in vain seems to be more universal than the precept forbidding superstition, and thus should have preceded it.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ex. 20:7 expounds the precept, “Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain,” namely, by swearing to nothing. Hence this precept would seem to forbid useless swearing, that is to say, swearing without judgment. But false swearing, which is without truth, and unjust swearing, which is without justice, are much more grievous. Therefore this precept should rather have forbidden them.

Objection 4: Further, blasphemy or any word or deed that is an insult to God is much more grievous than perjury. Therefore blasphemy and other like sins should rather have been forbidden by this precept.

Objection 5: Further, God’s names are many. Therefore it should not have been said indefinitely: “Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain.”

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, In one who is being instructed in virtue it is necessary to remove obstacles to true religion before establishing him in true religion. Now a thing is opposed to true religion in two ways. First, by excess, when, to wit, that which belongs to religion is given to others than to whom it is due, and this pertains to superstition. Secondly, by lack, as it were, of reverence, when, to wit, God is contemned, and this pertains to the vice of irreligion, as stated above (Q[97], in the preamble, and in the Article that follows). Now superstition hinders religion by preventing man from acknowledging God so as to worship Him: and when a man’s mind is engrossed in some undue worship, he cannot at the same time give due worship to God, according to Is. 28:20, “The bed is straitened, so that one must fall out,” i.e. either the true God or a false god must fall out from man’s heart, “and a short covering cannot cover both.” On the other hand, irreligion hinders religion by preventing man from honoring God after he has acknowledged Him. Now one must first of all acknowledge God with a view to worship, before honoring Him we have acknowledged.

For this reason the precept forbidding superstition is placed before the second precept, which forbids perjury that pertains to irreligion.

Reply to Objection 1: These expositions are mystical. The literal explanation is that which is given Dt. 5:11: “Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain,” namely, “by swearing on that which is not [*Vulg.: ‘for he shall not be unpunished that taketh His name upon a vain thing’].”

Reply to Objection 2: This precept does not forbid all taking of the name of God, but properly the taking of God’s name in confirmation of a man’s word by way of an oath, because men are wont to take God’s name more frequently in this way. Nevertheless we may understand that in consequence all inordinate taking of the Divine name is forbidden by this precept: and it is in this sense that we are to take the explanation quoted in the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: To swear to nothing means to swear to that which is not. This pertains to false swearing, which is chiefly called perjury, as stated above ([3274]Q[98], A[1], ad 3). For when a man swears to that which is false, his swearing is vain in itself, since it is not supported by the truth. on the other hand, when a man swears without judgment, through levity, if he swear to the truth, there is no vanity on the part of the oath itself, but only on the part of the swearer.

Reply to Objection 4: Just as when we instruct a man in some science, we begin by putting before him certain general maxims, even so the Law, which forms man to virtue by instructing him in the precepts of the decalogue, which are the first of all precepts, gave expression, by prohibition or by command, to those things which are of most common occurrence in the course of human life. Hence the precepts of the decalogue include the prohibition of perjury, which is of more frequent occurrence than blasphemy, since man does not fall so often into the latter sin.

Reply to Objection 5: Reverence is due to the Divine names on the part of the thing signified, which is one, and not on the part of the signifying words, which are many. Hence it is expressed in the singular: “Thou shalt not take the name of . . . thy God in vain”: since it matters not in which of God’s names perjury is committed.

Whether the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is fittingly expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the third precept of the decalogue, concerning the hallowing of the Sabbath, is unfittingly expressed. For this, understood spiritually, is a general precept: since Bede in commenting on Lk. 13:14, “The ruler of the synagogue being angry that He had healed on the Sabbath,” says (Comment. iv): “The Law forbids, not to heal man on the Sabbath, but to do servile works,” i.e. “to burden oneself with sin.” Taken literally it is a ceremonial precept, for it is written (Ex. 31:13): “See that you keep My Sabbath: because it is a sign between Me and you in your generations." Now the precepts of the decalogue are both spiritual and moral. Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.

Objection 2: Further, the ceremonial precepts of the Law contain "sacred things, sacrifices, sacraments and observances," as stated above ([3275]FS, Q[101], A[4]). Now sacred things comprised not only sacred days, but also sacred places and sacred vessels, and so on. Moreover, there were many sacred days other than the Sabbath. Therefore it was unfitting to omit all other ceremonial observances and to mention only that of the Sabbath.

Objection 3: Further, whoever breaks a precept of the decalogue, sins. But in the Old Law some who broke the observances of the Sabbath did not sin—for instance, those who circumcised their sons on the eighth day, and the priests who worked in the temple on the Sabbath. Also Elias (3 Kings 19), who journeyed for forty days unto the mount of God, Horeb, must have traveled on a Sabbath: the priests also who carried the ark of the Lord for seven days, as related in Josue 7, must be understood to have carried it on a Sabbath. Again it is written (Lk. 13:15): "Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath day loose his ox or his ass . . . and lead them to water?" Therefore it is unfittingly placed among the precepts of the decalogue.

Objection 4: Further, the precepts of the decalogue have to be observed also under the New Law. Yet in the New Law this precept is not observed, neither in the point of the Sabbath day, nor as to the Lord's day, on which men cook their food, travel, fish, and do many like things. Therefore the precept of the observance of the Sabbath is unfittingly expressed.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The obstacles to true religion being removed by the first and second precepts of the decalogue, as stated above ([3276]AA[2],3), it remained for the third precept to be given whereby man is established in true religion. Now it belongs to religion to give worship to God: and just as the Divine scriptures teach the interior worship under the guise of certain corporal similitudes, so is external worship given to God under the guise of sensible signs. And since for the most part man is induced to pay interior worship, consisting in prayer and devotion, by the interior prompting of the Holy Ghost, a precept of the Law as necessary respecting the exterior worship that consists in sensible signs. Now the precepts of the decalogue are, so to speak, first and common principles of the Law, and consequently the third precept of the decalogue describes the exterior worship of God as the sign of a universal boon that concerns all. This universal boon was the work of the Creation of the world, from which work God is stated to have rested on the seventh day: and sign of this we are commanded to keep holy seventh day—that is, to set it aside as a day to be given to God. Hence after the precept about the hallowing of the Sabbath the reason for it is given: “For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth . . . and rested on the seventh day.”

Reply to Objection 1: The precept about hallowing the Sabbath, understood literally, is partly oral and partly ceremonial. It is a moral precept in the point of commanding man to aside a certain time to be given to Divine things. For there is in man a natural inclination to set aside a certain time for each necessary thing, such as refreshment of the body, sleep, and so forth. Hence according to the dictate of reason, man sets aside a certain time for spiritual refreshment, by which man’s mind is refreshed in God. And thus to have a certain time set aside for occupying oneself with Divine things is the matter of a moral precept. But, in so far as this precept specializes the time as a sign representing the Creation of the world, it is a ceremonial precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its allegorical signification, as representative of Christ’s rest in the tomb on the seventh day: also in its moral signification, as representing cessation from all sinful acts, and the mind’s rest in God, in which sense, too, it is a general precept. Again, it is a ceremonial precept in its analogical signification, as foreshadowing the enjoyment of God in heaven. Hence the precept about hallowing the Sabbath is placed among the precepts of the decalogue, as a moral, but not as a ceremonial precept.

Reply to Objection 2: The other ceremonies of the Law are signs of certain particular Divine works: but the observance of the Sabbath is representative of a general boon, namely, the production of all creatures. Hence it was fitting that it should be placed among the general precepts of the decalogue, rather than any other ceremonial precept of the Law.

Reply to Objection 3: Two things are to be observed in the hallowing of the Sabbath. One of these is the end: and this is that man occupy himself with Divine things, and is signified in the words: “Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath day.” For in the Law those things are said to be holy which are applied to the Divine worship. The other thing is cessation from work, and is signified in the words (Ex. 20:11), “On the seventh day . . . thou shalt do no work.” The kind of work meant appears from Lev. 23:3, “You shall do no servile work on that day [*Vulg.: ‘You shall do no work on that day’].” Now servile work is so called from servitude: and servitude is threefold. One, whereby man is the servant of sin, according to Jn. 8:34, “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin,” and in this sense all sinful acts are servile. Another servitude is whereby one man serves another. Now one man serves another not with his mind but with his body, as stated above ([3277]Q[104], AA[5],6, ad 1). Wherefore in this respect those works are called servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work. In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath day, because that would be contrary to the end of the Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself with works connected with God’s service. For this reason, according to Jn. 7:23, “a man [*Vulg.: ‘If a man,’ etc.] receives circumcision on the Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken”: and for this reason too we read (Mat. 12:5), that “on the Sabbath days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath,” i.e. do corporal works on the Sabbath, “and are without blame.” Accordingly, the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing. Wherefore a gloss on Num 28 says that “smiths and like craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame.” On the other hand, those works that are called servile in the first or second way are contrary to the observance of the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast day is more against this precept than to do some other but lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says (De decem chord. iii): “It would be better if the Jew did some useful work on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre: and their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the new moon.” It is not, however, against this precept to sin venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy holiness.

Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile, in so far as they are common to those who serve and those who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his neighbor, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-being of the body, according to Prov. 24:11, “Deliver them that are led to death”: secondarily as regards avoiding damage to one’s property, according to Dt. 22:1, “Thou shalt not pass by if thou seest thy brother’s ox or his sheep go astray, but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother.” Hence a corporal work pertaining to the preservation of one’s own bodily well-being does not profane the Sabbath: for it is not against the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as preserve the health of the body. For this reason the Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought in self-defense on the Sabbath day (1 Macc. 2), nor Elias when he fled from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For this same reason our Lord (Mat. 12:3) excused His disciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need which they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written (Jn. 7:23): “Are you angry at Me because I have healed the whole man on the Sabbath day?” And again, a bodily work that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord says (Mat. 12:11): “What man shall there be among you, that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up?”

Reply to Objection 4: In the New Law the observance of the Lord’s day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the Church and the custom of Christian people. For this observance is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord’ day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are permitted on the Lord’s day which were forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And again in the New Law, dispensation is more easily granted than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works, on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are changeable in point of place and time.

Whether the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is fittingly expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the fourth precept, about honoring one’s parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of which we have spoken (QQ[101],102, seq.). Therefore it seems that there should not have been given a special precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.

Objection 2: Further, piety pays worship not only to one’s parents, but also to one’s country, and also to other blood kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated above ([3278]Q[101], AA[1],2). Therefore it was unfitting for this precept to mention only the honoring of one’s father and mother.

Objection 3: Further, we owe our parents not merely honor but also support. Therefore the mere honoring of one’s parents is unfittingly prescribed.

Objection 4: Further, sometimes those who honor their parents die young, and on the contrary those who honor them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to supplement this precept with the promise, “That thou mayest be long-lived upon earth.”

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now to our parents, of all our neighbors, we are under the greatest obligation. Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God, a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain affinity to the precepts of the First Table.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3279]Q[101], A[2]), piety directs us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some special debt.

Reply to Objection 2: The debt to one’s parents precedes the debt to one’s kindred and country since it is because we are born of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this precept of honoring our parents is understood to command whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as secondary matter included in the principal matter.

Reply to Objection 3: Reverential honor is due to one’s parents as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them accidentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavery, or the like, as stated above ([3280]Q[101], A[2]). And since that which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a special precept of honoring our parents: and this honor, as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and whatever else is due to our parents.

Reply to Objection 4: A long life is promised to those who honor their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Tim. 4:8): “Piety [Douay: ‘godliness’] is profitable to all things, having promise of the life that now is and of that which is to come.” And with reason. Because the man who is grateful for a favor deserves, with a certain congruity, that the favor should be continued to him, and he who is ungrateful for a favor deserves to lose it. Now we owe the favor of bodily life to our parents after God: wherefore he that honors his parents deserves the prolongation of his life, because he is grateful for that favor: while he that honors not his parents deserves to be deprived of life because he is ungrateful for the favor. However, present goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated above (FS, Q[114], A[12]). Wherefore sometimes in accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments, which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who are undutiful to their parents, live longer.

Whether the other six precepts of the decalogue are fittingly expressed?

Objection 1: It seems that the other six precepts of the decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient for salvation that one refrain from injuring one's neighbor; but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to Rom. 13:7, "Render . . . to all men their dues." Now the last six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbor. Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.

Objection 2: Further, these precepts forbid murder, adultery, stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries can be inflicted on one's neighbor, as appears from those which have been specified above (QQ[72], seq.). Therefore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly expressed.

Objection 3: Further, concupiscence may be taken in two ways. First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. 6:21, "The desire [concupiscentia] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom": secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James 4:1, "From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not . . . from your concupiscences which war in your members?" Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. Therefore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include some that forbid concupiscence.

Objection 4: Further, murder is a more grievous sin than adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to have precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence, after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man pays what is due God, and after the fourth precept pertaining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents—which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any special reason—it was necessary in due sequence to give certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called, which pays to all indifferently what is due to them.

Reply to Objection 1: Man is bound towards all persons in general to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts, which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted on one’s neighbor, had to be given a place, as general precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbor are paid in different ways to different people: hence it did not behoove to include affirmative precepts about those duties among the precepts of the decalogue.

Reply to Objection 2: All other injuries that are inflicted on our neighbor are reducible to those that are forbidden by these precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of generality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on the person of our neighbor are understood to be forbidden under the head of murder as being the principal of all. Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one’s neighbor, especially by way of lust, are understood to be forbidden together with adultery: those that come under the head of damage done to property are understood to be forbidden together with theft: and those that are comprised under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.

Reply to Objection 3: The precepts forbidding concupiscence do not include the prohibition of first movements of concupiscence, that do not go farther than the bounds of sensuality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure.

Reply to Objection 4: Murder in itself is an object not of concupiscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a certain kind of good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft has an aspect of good, i.e. of something useful: and good of its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible. Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery had to be forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence of murder.

TREATISE ON FORTITUDE AND TEMPERANCE (QQ[123]-170)

OF FORTITUDE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider fortitude. We must (1) consider the virtue itself of fortitude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto; (4) the precepts that pertain to it.

Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered: (1) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom; (3) the vices opposed to fortitude.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fortitude is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether fortitude is only about fear and daring?

(4) Whether it is only about fear of death?

(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters?

(6) Whether endurance is its chief act?

(7) Whether its action is directed to its own good?

(8) Whether it takes pleasure in its own action?

(9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?

(10) Whether it makes use of anger in its action?

(11) Whether it is a cardinal virtue?

(12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal virtues.

Whether fortitude is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:9): “Virtue is perfected in infirmity.” But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, if it is a virtue, it is either theological, intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above ([3281]FS, Q[57], A[2]; [3282]FS, Q[62], A[3]). Neither, apparently, is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 7,8): “Some seem to be brave through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers,” both of which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral virtue, “and some are called brave on account of certain passions”; for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonor, or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated above ([3283]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Therefore fortitude is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, human virtue resides chiefly in the soul, since it is a “good quality of the mind,” as stated above (Ethic. iii, 7,8). But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv, xxi, xxii) numbers fortitude among the virtues.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) “virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and renders his work good.” Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work good. Now man’s good is to be in accordance with reason, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). Wherefore it belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his work accord with reason. This happens in three ways: first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice; thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason. First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to something other than what the rectitude of reason requires; and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance. Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that which is in accordance with reason, on account of some difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to resist the aforesaid difficulty even as a man, by fortitude of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.

Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as it conforms man to reason.

Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body, of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or fortitude, as also to acknowledge one’s own infirmity, and this belongs to the perfection that is called humility.

Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a person performs the exterior act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude without having the virtue. This may be done in three ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult as though it were not difficult: and this again happens in three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance, through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; sometimes it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming dangers—when, for instance, one has often experienced escape from danger; and sometimes this is owing to a certain science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending themselves against them; thus Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i), “No man fears to do what he is confident of having learned to do well.” Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion, whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end, but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as honor, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.

Reply to Objection 3: The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection, is so called from its likeness to fortitude of the body. Nor is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of his natural temperament, as stated above ([3284]FS, Q[63], A[1]).

Whether fortitude is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue. For it is written (Wis. 7:7): “She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,” where the text has “virtue” for “fortitude.” Since then the term “virtue” is common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “Fortitude is not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honor of the virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue”; and he says the same further on in connection with other vices. Now this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, fortitude would seem to derive its name from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand firm, as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore fortitude is a general virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii) numbers it among the other virtues.

I answer that, As stated above ([3285]FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), the term “fortitude” can be taken in two ways. First, as simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue, since as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii), it is requisite for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly, fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore Tully says (Rhet. ii), that “fortitude is deliberate facing of dangers and bearing of toils.” In this sense fortitude is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special matter.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (De Coelo i, 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power. Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action, as stated in Metaph. v, 17. And since this latter meaning is the more common, the term “virtue,” as denoting the extreme limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to stand firm against all kinds of assaults.

Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense, as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds. Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear, is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less difficult.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection takes fortitude in the first sense.

Whether fortitude is about fear and dying?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not about fear and daring. For Gregory says (Moral. vii): “The fortitude of the just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence, to quench the lusts of the present life.” Therefore fortitude seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and daring.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii), that it belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and daring, but rather with a man’s toilsome deeds and external dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear and daring.

Objection 3: Further, not only daring, but also hope, is opposed to fear, as stated above ([3286]FS, Q[45], A[1], ad 2) in the treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be about daring any more than about hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 9) that fortitude is about fear and daring.

I answer that, As stated above [3287](A[1]), it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear, which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty, as stated above ([3288]FS, Q[42], AA[3],5) in the treatise on passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason. And it behooves one not only firmly to bear the assault of these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the future, which seems to come under the notion of daring. Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing fear and moderating daring.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues. Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to temperance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by saying: “To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal reward.”

Reply to Objection 2: Dangers and toils do not withdraw the will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be immediately about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils, these being the objects of those passions.

Reply to Objection 3: Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of approach and withdrawal, as stated above ([3289]FS, Q[45], A[1]). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from Tully’s definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not about hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as stated above ([3290]FS, Q[45], A[2]).

Whether fortitude is only about dangers of death?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not only about dangers of death. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that “fortitude is love bearing all things readily for the sake of the object beloved”: and (Music. vi) he says that fortitude is “the love which dreads no hardship, not even death.” Therefore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also about other afflictions.

Objection 2: Further, all the passions of the soul need to be reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not only about fear of death, but also about other fears.

Objection 3: Further, no virtue is about extremes. But fear of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is not about fear of death.

On the contrary, Andronicus says that “fortitude is a virtue of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of death.”

I answer that, As stated above [3291](A[3]), it belongs to the virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now it behooves one to hold firmly the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm against great things, will in consequence stand firm against less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme: and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxii) that “the soul is shaken by its fellow body, with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed.” Therefore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of death.

Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through bearing well even the greatest evils; while through bearing others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense.

Reply to Objection 2: Since fear is born of love, any virtue that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberality, which moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with temperance and other virtues. But to love one’s own life is natural: and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying the fear of death.

Reply to Objection 3: In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding right reason: wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.

Whether fortitude is properly about dangers of death in battle?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not commended in connection with battle. Therefore fortitude is not properly about dangers of death in battle.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that “fortitude is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters”: and Tully (De Offic. i), under the heading, “That it pertains to fortitude to excel in battle rather than in civil life,” says: “Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are many things in civil life that are more important and more glorious than those connected with war.” Now greater fortitude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not properly concerned with death in battle.

Objection 3: Further, war is directed to the preservation of a country’s temporal peace: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix) that “wars are waged in order to insure peace.” Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to the danger of death for the temporal peace of one’s country, since this same peace is the occasion of much license in morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude is not about the danger of death in battle.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that fortitude is chiefly about death in battle.

I answer that, As stated above [3292](A[4]), fortitude strengthens a man’s mind against the greatest danger, which is that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue; and it is essential to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness, storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the like, do not seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good. on the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in battle come to man directly on account of some good, because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle; secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or even private individual does not refrain from giving a just judgment through fear of the impending sword, or any other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death, not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as occur in singular combat, which may be called by the general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring in battle.

Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger of any other kind of death; especially since man may be in danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck or robbers.

Reply to Objection 1: Martyrs face the fight that is waged against their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign good which is God; wherefore their fortitude is praised above all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been valiant in battle. [*Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34.]

Reply to Objection 2: Personal and civil business is differentiated from the business of war that regards general wars. However, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and so with regard to these also there may be fortitude properly so called.

Reply to Objection 3: The peace of the state is good in itself, nor does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of it. For there are many others who make good use of it; and many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges, are much greater than those which are occasioned by it, and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.

Whether endurance is the chief act of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that endurance is not the chief act of fortitude. For virtue “is about the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, to be able to act on another seems to argue greater power than not to be changed by another. Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude to attack rather than to endure.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary is more distant from the other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it regards attack rather than endurance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that "certain persons are" said to be brave chiefly because they endure affliction.

I answer that, As stated above [3293](A[3]), and according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 9), "fortitude is more concerned to allay fear, than to moderate daring." For it is more difficult to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates daring, whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.

Reply to Objection 1: Endurance is more difficult than aggression, for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person, whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though one were the stronger party; and it is more difficult to contend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come; and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden movements; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something arduous. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present; this is not the behavior of a brave man."

Reply to Objection 2: Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely [fortissime] to good, the result being that it does not yield to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue concerns the soul rather than the body.

Reply to Objection 3: He that endures fears not, though he is confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not present to the aggressor.

Whether the brave man acts for the sake of the good of his habit?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of action the end, though first in intention, is last in execution. Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible for the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his habit.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): “We love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make bold to counsel us to be virtuous,” namely by saying that we should desire virtue for its own sake, “without loving happiness. If they succeed in their endeavor, we shall surely cease to love virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake of which alone we love virtue.” But fortitude is a virtue. Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude but to happiness.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that “fortitude is love ready to bear all things for God’s sake.” Now God is not the habit of fortitude, but something better, since the end must needs be better than what is directed to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the sake of the good of his habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that “to the brave man fortitude itself is a good”: and such is his end.

I answer that, An end is twofold: proximate and ultimate. Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a likeness of that agent’s form into something else: thus the end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat into some passive matter, and the end of the builder is to introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made, external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done, human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proximate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his remote end is happiness or God.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a habit were its end, instead of the likeness of the habit in act, as stated. The other two objections consider the ultimate end.

Whether the brave man delights in his act?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man delights in his act. For “delight is the unhindered action of a connatural habit” (Ethic. x, 4,6,8). Now the brave deed proceeds from a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the brave man takes pleasure in his act.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. 5:22, “But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace,” says that deeds of virtue are called “fruits because they refresh man’s mind with a holy and pure delight.” Now the brave man performs acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.

Objection 3: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man does all things with pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that “the brave man seems to have no delight in his act.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3294]FS, Q[31], AA[3],4,5) where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is twofold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul. It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue, since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul—for instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary for acts of virtue, and things connected with them—but also to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact, such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one side, has something that affords him delight, namely as regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Macc. 6:30) that Eleazar said: “I suffer grievous pains in body: but in soul am well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee.”

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious assistance of God’s grace, which has more strength to raise the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius, while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that he felt as though he were walking on roses.

Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the delight of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3; iii, 9) that “it is not necessary for a brave man to delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not to be sad.”

Reply to Objection 1: The vehemence of the action or passion of one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man from feeling delight in its proper operation.

Reply to Objection 2: Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on account of their end; yet they can be painful by their nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9) that “to perform deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in so far as one attains the end.”

Reply to Objection 3: In the brave man spiritual sorrow is overcome by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of great bodily pain.

Whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden occurrences?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “fortitude is the deliberate facing of danger, and bearing of toil.” Therefore fortitude does not deal chiefly with sudden happenings.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “The brave man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his forethought, lest he should say afterwards: This befell me because I did not think it could possibly happen.” But it is not possible to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that the “brave man is of good hope.” But hope looks forward to the future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences. Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with sudden happenings.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.”

I answer that, Two things must be considered in the operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice: and thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences: because the brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear them more easily: since according to Gregory (Hom. xxv in Evang.), “the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed with the shield of foreknowledge.” The other thing to be considered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature. Wherefore if a person without forethought does that which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.

Yet is it possible for a person even without the habit of fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long forethought: in the same way as a brave man prepares himself when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the brave man makes use of anger in his action?

Objection 1: It seems that the brave man does not use anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instrument of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man should not employ anger for his action.

Objection 2: Further, if a man is competent to do a thing by himself, he should not seek the assistance of something weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is impotent: wherefore Seneca says (De Ira i): “Reason by itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action but also to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason to seek help from anger? the steadfast from the unstaid, the trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick?” Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.

Objection 3: Further, just as people are more earnest in doing deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should not employ anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “anger helps the brave.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3295]FS, Q[24], A[2]), concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from the mind of a wise or good man: whereas the Peripatetics, of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above ([3296]FS, Q[24], A[2]), gave the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport themselves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the command of reason, so that it may cooperate by rendering action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should employ both anger and the other passions of the soul, modified according to the dictate of reason. On the other hand, the Stoics gave the name of passions to certain immoderate emotions of the sensitive appetite, wherefore they called them sicknesses or diseases, and for this reason severed them altogether from virtue.

Accordingly the brave man employs moderate anger for his action, but not immoderate anger.

Reply to Objection 1: Anger that is moderated in accordance with reason is subject to the command of reason: so that man uses it at his will, which would not be the case were it immoderate.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason employs anger for its action, not as seeking its assistance, but because it uses the sensitive appetite as an instrument, just as it uses the members of the body. Nor is it unbecoming for the instrument to be more imperfect than the principal agent, even as the hammer is more imperfect than the smith. Moreover, Seneca was a follower of the Stoics, and the above words were aimed by him directly at Aristotle.

Reply to Objection 3: Whereas fortitude, as stated above [3297](A[6]), has two acts, namely endurance and aggression, it employs anger, not for the act of endurance, because the reason by itself performs this act, but for the act of aggression, for which it employs anger rather than the other passions, since it belongs to anger to strike at the cause of sorrow, so that it directly cooperates with fortitude in attacking. On the other hand, sorrow by its very nature gives way to the thing that hurts; though accidentally it helps in aggression, either as being the cause of anger, as stated above ([3298]FS, Q[47], A[3]), or as making a person expose himself to danger in order to escape from sorrow. In like manner desire, by its very nature, tends to a pleasurable good, to which it is directly contrary to withstand danger: yet accidentally sometimes it helps one to attack, in so far as one prefers to risk dangers rather than lack pleasure. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): “Of all the cases in which fortitude arises from a passion, the most natural is when a man is brave through anger, making his choice and acting for a purpose,” i.e. for a due end; “this is true fortitude.”

Whether fortitude is a cardinal virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a cardinal virtue. For, as stated above [3299](A[10]), anger is closely allied with fortitude. Now anger is not accounted a principal passion; nor is daring which belongs to fortitude. Therefore neither should fortitude be reckoned a cardinal virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the object of virtue is good. But the direct object of fortitude is not good, but evil, for it is endurance of evil and toil, as Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii). Therefore fortitude is not a cardinal virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the cardinal virtues are about those things upon which human life is chiefly occupied, just as a door turns upon a hinge [cardine]. But fortitude is about dangers of death which are of rare occurrence in human life. Therefore fortitude should not be reckoned a cardinal or principal virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxii), Ambrose in his commentary on Lk. 6:20, and Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv), number fortitude among the four cardinal or principal virtues.

I answer that, As stated above ([3300]FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), those virtues are said to be cardinal or principal which have a foremost claim to that which belongs to the virtues in common. And among other conditions of virtue in general one is that it is stated to "act steadfastly," according to Ethic. ii, 4. Now fortitude above all lays claim to praise for steadfastness. Because he that stands firm is so much the more praised, as he is more strongly impelled to fall or recede. Now man is impelled to recede from that which is in accordance with reason, both by the pleasing good and the displeasing evil. But bodily pain impels him more strongly than pleasure. For Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36): "There is none that does not shun pain more than he desires pleasure. For we perceive that even the most untamed beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by the fear of pain." And among the pains of the mind and dangers those are mostly feared which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm. Therefore fortitude is a cardinal virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Daring and anger do not cooperate with fortitude in its act of endurance, wherein its steadfastness is chiefly commended: for it is by that act that the brave man curbs fear, which is a principal passion, as stated above ([3301]FS, Q[25], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 2: Virtue is directed to the good of reason which it behooves to safeguard against the onslaught of evils. And fortitude is directed to evils of the body, as contraries which it withstands, and to the good of reason, as the end, which it intends to safeguard.

Reply to Objection 3: Though dangers of death are of rare occurrence, yet the occasions of those dangers occur frequently, since on account of justice which he pursues, and also on account of other good deeds, man encounters mortal adversaries.

Whether fortitude excels among all other virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude excels among all other virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i): “Fortitude is higher, so to speak, than the rest.”

Objection 2: Further, virtue is about that which is difficult and good. But fortitude is about most difficult things. Therefore it is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, the person of a man is more excellent than his possessions. But fortitude is about a man’s person, for it is this that a man exposes to the danger of death for the good of virtue: whereas justice and the other moral virtues are about other and external things. Therefore fortitude is the chief of the moral virtues.

Objection 4: On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i): “Justice is the most resplendent of the virtues and gives its name to a good man.”

Objection 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 19): “Those virtues must needs be greatest which are most profitable to others.” Now liberality seems to be more useful than fortitude. Therefore it is a greater virtue.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), “In things that are great, but not in bulk, to be great is to be good”: wherefore the better a virtue the greater it is. Now reason’s good is man’s good, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) prudence, since it is a perfection of reason, has the good essentially: while justice effects this good, since it belongs to justice to establish the order of reason in all human affairs: whereas the other virtues safeguard this good, inasmuch as they moderate the passions, lest they lead man away from reason’s good. As to the order of the latter, fortitude holds the first place, because fear of dangers of death has the greatest power to make man recede from the good of reason: and after fortitude comes temperance, since also pleasures of touch excel all others in hindering the good of reason. Now to be a thing essentially ranks before effecting it, and the latter ranks before safeguarding it by removing obstacles thereto. Wherefore among the cardinal virtues, prudence ranks first, justice second, fortitude third, temperance fourth, and after these the other virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Ambrose places fortitude before the other virtues, in respect of a certain general utility, inasmuch as it is useful both in warfare, and in matters relating to civil or home life. Hence he begins by saying (De Offic. i): “Now we come to treat of fortitude, which being higher so to speak than the others, is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters."

Reply to Objection 2: Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult. Hence the greatness of a virtue is measured according to its goodness rather than its difficulty.

Reply to Objection 3: A man does not expose his person to dangers of death except in order to safeguard justice: wherefore the praise awarded to fortitude depends somewhat on justice. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i) that "fortitude without justice is an occasion of injustice; since the stronger a man is the more ready is he to oppress the weaker."

The Fourth argument is granted.

Reply to Objection 5: Liberality is useful in conferring certain particular favors: whereas a certain general utility attaches to fortitude, since it safeguards the whole order of justice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that "just and brave men are most beloved, because they are most useful in war and peace."

OF MARTYRDOM (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider martyrdom, under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?

(2) Of what virtue is it the act?

(3) Concerning the perfection of this act;

(4) The pain of martyrdom;

(5) Its cause.

Whether martyrdom is an act of virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of virtue. For all acts of virtue are voluntary. But martyrdom is sometimes not voluntary, as in the case of the Innocents who were slain for Christ's sake, and of whom Hillary says (Super Matth. i) that "they attained the ripe age of eternity through the glory of martyrdom." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, nothing unlawful is an act of virtue. Now it is unlawful to kill oneself, as stated above ([3302]Q[64], A[5]), and yet martyrdom is achieved by so doing: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "during persecution certain holy women, in order to escape from those who threatened their chastity, threw themselves into a river, and so ended their lives, and their martyrdom is honored in the Catholic Church with most solemn veneration." Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, it is praiseworthy to offer oneself to do an act of virtue. But it is not praiseworthy to court martyrdom, rather would it seem to be presumptuous and rash. Therefore martyrdom is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, The reward of beatitude is not due save to acts of virtue. Now it is due to martyrdom, since it is written (Mat. 5:10): "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice' sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." Therefore martyrdom is an act of virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([3303]Q[123], AA[1],3), it belongs to virtue to safeguard man in the good of reason. Now the good of reason consists in the truth as its proper object, and in justice as its proper effect, as shown above ([3304]Q[109], AA[1],2;[3305] Q[123], A[12]). And martyrdom consists essentially in standing firmly to truth and justice against the assaults of persecution. Hence it is evident that martyrdom is an act of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Some have said that in the case of the Innocents the use of their free will was miraculously accelerated, so that they suffered martyrdom even voluntarily. Since, however, Scripture contains no proof of this, it is better to say that these babes in being slain obtained by God's grace the glory of martyrdom which others acquire by their own will. For the shedding of one's blood for Christ's sake takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore just as in the case of baptized children the merit of Christ is conducive to the acquisition of glory through the baptismal grace, so in those who were slain for Christ's sake the merit of Christ's martyrdom is conducive to the acquisition of the martyr's palm. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (De Diversis lxvi), as though he were addressing them: "A man that does not believe that children are benefited by the baptism of Christ will doubt of your being crowned in suffering for Christ. You were not old enough to believe in Christ's future sufferings, but you had a body wherein you could endure suffering of Christ Who was to suffer."

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i) that "possibly the Church was induced by certain credible witnesses of Divine authority thus to honor the memory of those holy women [*Cf.[3306] Q[64], A[1], ad 2]."

Reply to Objection 3: The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue. Now it has been stated ([3307]FS, Q[108], A[1], ad 4) that some of the precepts of the Divine Law are to be understood in reference to the preparation of the mind, in the sense that man ought to be prepared to do such and such a thing, whenever expedient. In the same way certain things belong to an act of virtue as regards the preparation of the mind, so that in such and such a case a man should act according to reason. And this observation would seem very much to the point in the case of martyrdom, which consists in the right endurance of sufferings unjustly inflicted. Nor ought a man to give another an occasion of acting unjustly: yet if anyone act unjustly, one ought to endure it in moderation.

Whether martyrdom is an act of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of fortitude. For the Greek {martyr} signifies a witness. Now witness is borne to the faith of Christ. according to Acts 1:8, "You shall be witnesses unto Me," etc. and Maximus says in a sermon: "The mother of martyrs is the Catholic faith which those glorious warriors have sealed with their blood." Therefore martyrdom is an act of faith rather than of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, a praiseworthy act belongs chiefly to the virtue which inclines thereto, is manifested thereby, and without which the act avails nothing. Now charity is the chief incentive to martyrdom: Thus Maximus says in a sermon: "The charity of Christ is victorious in His martyrs." Again the greatest proof of charity lies in the act of martyrdom, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Moreover without charity martyrdom avails nothing, according to 1 Cor. 13:3, "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore martyrdom is an act of charity rather than of fortitude.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on St. Cyprian: “It is easy to honor a martyr by singing his praises, but it is a great thing to imitate his faith and patience.” Now that which calls chiefly for praise in a virtuous act, is the virtue of which it is the act. Therefore martyrdom is an act of patience rather than of fortitude.

On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): “Blessed martyrs, with what praise shall I extol you? Most valiant warriors, how shall I find words to proclaim the strength of your courage?” Now a person is praised on account of the virtue whose act he performs. Therefore martyrdom is an act of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above ([3308]Q[123], A[1], seqq.), it belongs to fortitude to strengthen man in the good of virtue, especially against dangers, and chiefly against dangers of death, and most of all against those that occur in battle. Now it is evident that in martyrdom man is firmly strengthened in the good of virtue, since he cleaves to faith and justice notwithstanding the threatening danger of death, the imminence of which is moreover due to a kind of particular contest with his persecutors. Hence Cyprian says in a sermon (Ep. ad Mart. et Conf. ii): “The crowd of onlookers wondered to see an unearthly battle, and Christ’s servants fighting erect, undaunted in speech, with souls unmoved, and strength divine.” Wherefore it is evident that martyrdom is an act of fortitude; for which reason the Church reads in the office of Martyrs: They “became valiant in battle” [*Heb. 11:34].

Reply to Objection 1: Two things must be considered in the act of fortitude. one is the good wherein the brave man is strengthened, and this is the end of fortitude; the other is the firmness itself, whereby a man does not yield to the contraries that hinder him from achieving that good, and in this consists the essence of fortitude. Now just as civic fortitude strengthens a man’s mind in human justice, for the safeguarding of which he braves the danger of death, so gratuitous fortitude strengthens man’s soul in the good of Divine justice, which is “through faith in Christ Jesus,” according to Rom. 3:22. Thus martyrdom is related to faith as the end in which one is strengthened, but to fortitude as the eliciting habit.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity inclines one to the act of martyrdom, as its first and chief motive cause, being the virtue commanding it, whereas fortitude inclines thereto as being its proper motive cause, being the virtue that elicits it. Hence martyrdom is an act of charity as commanding, and of fortitude as eliciting. For this reason also it manifests both virtues. It is due to charity that it is meritorious, like any other act of virtue: and for this reason it avails not without charity.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3309]Q[123], A[6]), the chief act of fortitude is endurance: to this and not to its secondary act, which is aggression, martyrdom belongs. And since patience serves fortitude on the part of its chief act, viz. endurance, hence it is that martyrs are also praised for their patience.

Whether martyrdom is an act of the greatest perfection?

Objection 1: It seems that martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection. For seemingly that which is a matter of counsel and not of precept pertains to perfection, because, to wit, it is not necessary for salvation. But it would seem that martyrdom is necessary for salvation, since the Apostle says (Rom. 10:10), “With the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation,” and it is written (1 Jn. 3:16), that “we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren.” Therefore martyrdom does not pertain to perfection.

Objection 2: Further, it seems to point to greater perfection that a man give his soul to God, which is done by obedience, than that he give God his body, which is done by martyrdom: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxv) that “obedience is preferable to all sacrifices.” Therefore martyrdom is not an act of the greatest perfection.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem better to do good to others than to maintain oneself in good, since the “good of the nation is better than the good of the individual,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now he that suffers martyrdom profits himself alone, whereas he that teaches does good to many. Therefore the act of teaching and guiding subjects is more perfect than the act of martyrdom.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Sanct. Virgin. xlvi) prefers martyrdom to virginity which pertains to perfection. Therefore martyrdom seems to belong to perfection in the highest degree.

I answer that, We may speak of an act of virtue in two ways. First, with regard to the species of that act, as compared to the virtue proximately eliciting it. In this way martyrdom, which consists in the due endurance of death, cannot be the most perfect of virtuous acts, because endurance of death is not praiseworthy in itself, but only in so far as it is directed to some good consisting in an act of virtue, such as faith or the love of God, so that this act of virtue being the end is better.

A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to the perfection of life, since, as the Apostle says (Col. 3:14), that “charity . . . is the bond of perfection.” Now, of all virtuous acts martyrdom is the greatest proof of the perfection of charity: since a man’s love for a thing is proved to be so much the greater, according as that which he despises for its sake is more dear to him, or that which he chooses to suffer for its sake is more odious. But it is evident that of all the goods of the present life man loves life itself most, and on the other hand he hates death more than anything, especially when it is accompanied by the pains of bodily torment, “from fear of which even dumb animals refrain from the greatest pleasures,” as Augustine observes (QQ[83], qu. 36). And from this point of view it is clear that martyrdom is the most perfect of human acts in respect of its genus, as being the sign of the greatest charity, according to Jn. 15:13: “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.”

Reply to Objection 1: There is no act of perfection, which is a matter of counsel, but what in certain cases is a matter of precept, as being necessary for salvation. Thus Augustine declares (De Adult. Conjug. xiii) that a man is under the obligation of observing continency, through the absence or sickness of his wife. Hence it is not contrary to the perfection of martyrdom if in certain cases it be necessary for salvation, since there are cases when it is not necessary for salvation to suffer martyrdom; thus we read of many holy martyrs who through zeal for the faith or brotherly love gave themselves up to martyrdom of their own accord. As to these precepts, they are to be understood as referring to the preparation of the mind.

Reply to Objection 2: Martyrdom embraces the highest possible degree of obedience, namely obedience unto death; thus we read of Christ (Phil. 2:8) that He became “obedient unto death.” Hence it is evident that martyrdom is of itself more perfect than obedience considered absolutely.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers martyrdom according to the proper species of its act, whence it derives no excellence over all other virtuous acts; thus neither is fortitude more excellent than all virtues.

Whether death is essential to martyrdom?

Objection 1: It seems that death is not essential to martyrdom. For Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption (Epist. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): “I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace”: and Gregory says (Hom. iii in Evang.): “Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom, since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit.” Therefore there can be martyrdom without suffering death.

Objection 2: Further, we read of certain women as commended for despising life for the sake of safeguarding the integrity of the flesh: wherefore seemingly the integrity of chastity is preferable to the life of the body. Now sometimes the integrity of the flesh has been forfeited or has been threatened in confession of the Christian faith, as in the case of Agnes and Lucy. Therefore it seems that the name of martyr should be accorded to a woman who forfeits the integrity of the flesh for the sake of Christ’s faith, rather than if she were to forfeit even the life of the body: wherefore also Lucy said: “If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will gain me a twofold crown.”

Objection 3: Further, martyrdom is an act of fortitude. But it belongs to fortitude to brave not only death but also other hardships, as Augustine declares (Music. vi). Now there are many other hardships besides death, which one may suffer for Christ’s faith, namely imprisonment, exile, being stripped of one’s goods, as mentioned in Heb. 10:34, for which reason we celebrate the martyrdom of Pope Saint Marcellus, notwithstanding that he died in prison. Therefore it is not essential to martyrdom that one suffer the pain of death.

Objection 4: Further, martyrdom is a meritorious act, as stated above (A[2], ad 1; A[3]). Now it cannot be a meritorious act after death. Therefore it is before death; and consequently death is not essential to martyrdom.

On the contrary, Maximus says in a sermon on the martyrs that “in dying for the faith he conquers who would have been vanquished in living without faith.”

I answer that As stated above [3310](A[2]), a martyr is so called as being a witness to the Christian faith, which teaches us to despise things visible for the sake of things invisible, as stated in Heb. 11. Accordingly it belongs to martyrdom that a man bear witness to the faith in showing by deed that he despises all things present, in order to obtain invisible goods to come. Now so long as a man retains the life of the body he does not show by deed that he despises all things relating to the body. For men are wont to despise both their kindred and all they possess, and even to suffer bodily pain, rather than lose life. Hence Satan testified against Job (Job 2:4): “Skin for skin, and all that a man hath he will give for his soul” [Douay: ‘life’] i.e. for the life of his body. Therefore the perfect notion of martyrdom requires that a man suffer death for Christ’s sake.

Reply to Objection 1: The authorities quoted, and the like that one may meet with, speak of martyrdom by way of similitude.

Reply to Objection 2: When a woman forfeits the integrity of the flesh, or is condemned to forfeit it under pretext of the Christian faith, it is not evident to men whether she suffers this for love of the Christian faith, or rather through contempt of chastity. Wherefore in the sight of men her testimony is not held to be sufficient, and consequently this is not martyrdom properly speaking. In the sight of God, however, Who searcheth the heart, this may be deemed worthy of a reward, as Lucy said.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3311]Q[123], AA[4],5), fortitude regards danger of death chiefly, and other dangers consequently; wherefore a person is not called a martyr merely for suffering imprisonment, or exile, or forfeiture of his wealth, except in so far as these result in death.

Reply to Objection 4: The merit of martyrdom is not after death, but in the voluntary endurance of death, namely in the fact that a person willingly suffers being put to death. It happens sometimes, however, that a man lives for some time after being mortally wounded for Christ’s sake, or after suffering for the faith of Christ any other kind of hardship inflicted by persecution and continued until death ensues. The act of martyrdom is meritorious while a man is in this state, and at the very time that he is suffering these hardships.

Whether faith alone is the cause of martyrdom?

Objection 1: It seems that faith alone is the cause of martyrdom. For it is written (1 Pet. 4:15,16): “Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or a thief, or a railer, or a coveter of other men’s things. But if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but let him glorify God in this name.” Now a man is said to be a Christian because he holds the faith of Christ. Therefore only faith in Christ gives the glory of martyrdom to those who suffer.

Objection 2: Further, a martyr is a kind of witness. But witness is borne to the truth alone. Now one is not called a martyr for bearing witness to any truth, but only for witnessing to the Divine truth, otherwise a man would be a martyr if he were to die for confessing a truth of geometry or some other speculative science, which seems ridiculous. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

Objection 3: Further, those virtuous deeds would seem to be of most account which are directed to the common good, since “the good of the nation is better than the good of the individual,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). If, then, some other good were the cause of martyrdom, it would seem that before all those would be martyrs who die for the defense of their country. Yet this is not consistent with Church observance, for we do not celebrate the martyrdom of those who die in a just war. Therefore faith alone is the cause of martyrdom.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:10): “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’ sake,” which pertains to martyrdom, according to a gloss, as well as Jerome’s commentary on this passage. Now not only faith but also the other virtues pertain to justice. Therefore other virtues can be the cause of martyrdom.

I answer that, As stated above [3312](A[4]), martyrs are so called as being witnesses, because by suffering in body unto death they bear witness to the truth; not indeed to any truth, but to the truth which is in accordance with godliness, and was made known to us by Christ: wherefore Christ’s martyrs are His witnesses. Now this truth is the truth of faith. Wherefore the cause of all martyrdom is the truth of faith.

But the truth of faith includes not only inward belief, but also outward profession, which is expressed not only by words, whereby one confesses the faith, but also by deeds, whereby a person shows that he has faith, according to James 2:18, “I will show thee, by works, my faith.” Hence it is written of certain people (Titus 1:16): “They profess that they know God but in their works they deny Him.” Thus all virtuous deeds, inasmuch as they are referred to God, are professions of the faith whereby we come to know that God requires these works of us, and rewards us for them: and in this way they can be the cause of martyrdom. For this reason the Church celebrates the martyrdom of Blessed John the Baptist, who suffered death, not for refusing to deny the faith, but for reproving adultery.

Reply to Objection 1: A Christian is one who is Christ’s. Now a person is said to be Christ’s, not only through having faith in Christ, but also because he is actuated to virtuous deeds by the Spirit of Christ, according to Rom. 8:9, “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His”; and again because in imitation of Christ he is dead to sins, according to Gal. 5:24, “They that are Christ’s have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.” Hence to suffer as a Christian is not only to suffer in confession of the faith, which is done by words, but also to suffer for doing any good work, or for avoiding any sin, for Christ’s sake, because this all comes under the head of witnessing to the faith.

Reply to Objection 2: The truth of other sciences has no connection with the worship of the Godhead: hence it is not called truth according to godliness, and consequently the confession thereof cannot be said to be the direct cause of martyrdom. Yet, since every lie is a sin, as stated above ([3313]Q[110], AA[3],4), avoidance of a lie, to whatever truth it may be contrary, may be the cause of martyrdom inasmuch as a lie is a sin against the Divine Law.

Reply to Objection 3: The good of one’s country is paramount among human goods: yet the Divine good, which is the proper cause of martyrdom, is of more account than human good. Nevertheless, since human good may become Divine, for instance when it is referred to God, it follows that any human good in so far as it is referred to God, may be the cause of martyrdom.

OF FEAR* (FOUR ARTICLES)

[*St. Thomas calls this vice indifferently ‘fear’ or ‘timidity.’ The translation requires one to adhere to these terms on account of the connection with the passion of fear. Otherwise ‘cowardice’ would be a better rendering.]

We must now consider the vices opposed to fortitude: (1) Fear; (2) Fearlessness; (3) Daring.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fear is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it excuses from sin, or diminishes it?

Whether fear is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a sin. For fear is a passion, as stated above ([3314]FS, Q[23], A[4]; Q[42]). Now we are neither praised nor blamed for passions, as stated in Ethic. ii. Since then every sin is blameworthy, it seems that fear is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, nothing that is commanded in the Divine Law is a sin: since the “law of the Lord is unspotted” (Ps. 18:8). Yet fear is commanded in God’s law, for it is written (Eph. 6:5): “Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling.” Therefore fear is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, nothing that is naturally in man is a sin, for sin is contrary to nature according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii). Now fear is natural to man: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that “a man would be insane or insensible to pain, if nothing, not even earthquakes nor deluges, inspired him with fear.” Therefore fear is not a sin. .

On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 10:28): “Fear ye not them that kill the body,” and it is written (Ezech. 2:6): “Fear not, neither be thou afraid of their words.”

I answer that, A human act is said to be a sin on account of its being inordinate, because the good of a human act consists in order, as stated above ([3315]Q[109], A[2];[3316] Q[114], A[1]). Now this due order requires that the appetite be subject to the ruling of reason. And reason dictates that certain things should be shunned and some sought after. Among things to be shunned, it dictates that some are to be shunned more than others; and among things to be sought after, that some are to be sought after more than others. Moreover, the more a good is to be sought after, the more is the opposite evil to be shunned. The result is that reason dictates that certain goods are to be sought after more than certain evils are to be avoided. Accordingly when the appetite shuns what the reason dictates that we should endure rather than forfeit others that we should rather seek for, fear is inordinate and sinful. On the other hand, when the appetite fears so as to shun what reason requires to be shunned, the appetite is neither inordinate nor sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear in its generic acceptation denotes avoidance in general. Hence in this way it does not include the notion of good or evil: and the same applies to every other passion. Wherefore the Philosopher says that passions call for neither praise nor blame, because, to wit, we neither praise nor blame those who are angry or afraid, but only those who behave thus in an ordinate or inordinate manner.

Reply to Objection 2: The fear which the Apostle inculcates is in accordance with reason, namely that servants should fear lest they be lacking in the service they owe their masters.

Reply to Objection 3: Reason dictates that we should shun the evils that we cannot withstand, and the endurance of which profits us nothing. Hence there is no sin in fearing them.

Whether the sin of fear is contrary to fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude: because fortitude is about dangers of death, as stated above ([3317]Q[123], AA[4],5). But the sin of fear is not always connected with dangers of death, for a gloss on Ps. 127:1, “Blessed are all they that fear the Lord,” says that “it is human fear whereby we dread to suffer carnal dangers, or to lose worldly goods.” Again a gloss on Mat. 27:44, “He prayed the third time, saying the selfsame word,” says that “evil fear is threefold, fear of death, fear of pain, and fear of contempt.” Therefore the sin of fear is not contrary to fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, the chief reason why a man is commended for fortitude is that he exposes himself to the danger of death. Now sometimes a man exposes himself to death through fear of slavery or shame. Thus

Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei i) that Cato, in order not to be Caesar’s slave, gave himself up to death. Therefore the sin of fear bears a certain likeness to fortitude instead of being opposed thereto.

Objection 3: Further, all despair arises from fear. But despair is opposed not to fortitude but to hope, as stated above (Q[20], A[1]; [3318]FS, Q[40], A[4]). Neither therefore is the sin of fear opposed to fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that timidity is opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[19], A[3]; [3319]FS, Q[43], A[1]), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in Ethic. iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fortitude which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fortitude. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.]

Reply to Objection 1: The passages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above ([3320]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3321]FS, Q[18], A[6]): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hardships is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fortitude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that “to die in order to escape poverty, lust, or something disagreeable is an act not of fortitude but of cowardice: for to shun hardships is a mark of effeminacy.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3322]FS, Q[45], A[2]), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.

Wherefore, just as fortitude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fortitude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.

Whether fear is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above ([3323]FS, Q[23], A[1]), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above ([3324]FS, Q[74], A[4]). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from God. But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, “Whosoever is fearful,” etc., says that “a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage.” Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Dt. 20:8, “What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?” says: “We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches.” Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, For mortal sin alone is the pain of hell due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, “But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable,” etc., “shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death.” Therefore fear is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above [3325](A[1]), fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appetites, without the accession of the rational appetite’s consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational appetite which is called the will, which deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin. For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality.

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from accomplishing what he purposed doing.

Reply to Objection 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.

Whether fear excuses from sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above [3326](A[1]). But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Objection 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Objection 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual. Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), “one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one’s own wickedness.” Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q[1], Cap. Constat.): “A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse.”

I answer that, As stated above [3327](A[3]), fear is sinful in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body. and evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one’s sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.

Reply to Objection 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.

Reply to Objection 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man’s goods, it follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man’s evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the

Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue.

OF FEARLESSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

Whether fearlessness is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): “The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.” Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death, according to Mat. 10:28, “Fear ye not them that kill the body,” etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Is. 51:12, “Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?” Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.

Objection 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above ([3328]Q[125], A[2]). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), “the love of God to the abasement of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city.” Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.

On the contrary, It is said of the unjust judge (Lk. 18:2) that “he feared not God nor regarded man.”

I answer that, Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): “No man ever hated his own flesh.” Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them* less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect ‘se’ instead of ‘ea.’ We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the saying of Job 41:24,25: “He [Vulg.: ‘who’] was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing”: and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the “Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing.” [*”A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts.”] It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.

Reply to Objection 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. 1:28): “He that is without fear cannot be justified.”

Reply to Objection 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): “A wise man feareth and declineth from evil.”

Reply to Objection 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): “He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing.” But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.

Whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, fearlessness is a vice, either through lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom. Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

Objection 3: Further, vices are opposed to virtue and extremes to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearlessness is not opposed thereto.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii) reckons fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above ([3329]Q[123], A[3]), fortitude is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fearlessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far as a man fears not what he ought to fear.

Reply to Objection 1: The act of fortitude is to endure death without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but according to reason: this the fearless man does not do.

Reply to Objection 2: Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it from being opposed to other virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear. Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes in different respects.

OF DARING [*Excessive daring or foolhardiness] (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider daring; and under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether daring is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude?

Whether daring is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is written (Job 39:21) concerning the horse, by which according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi) the godly preacher is denoted, that “he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men [*Vulg.: ‘he pranceth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men’].” But no vice redounds to a man’s praise. Therefore it is not a sin to be daring.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9), “one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has been counseled.” But daring helps this quickness in doing. Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.

Objection 3: Further, daring is a passion caused by hope, as stated above ([3330]FS, Q[45], A[2]) when we were treating of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 8:18): “Go not on the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils.” Now no man’s fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin. Therefore daring is a sin.

I answer that, Daring, as stated above ([3331]FS, Q[23], A[1]; Q[55]), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks moderation, either by excess or by deficiency, and on this account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess, thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring as implying excess is accounted a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The daring spoken of there is that which is moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the virtue of fortitude.

Reply to Objection 2: It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful; for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to prudence, as stated above ([3332]Q[58], A[3]). Wherefore daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy as it is directed by reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Some vices are unnamed, and so also are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 4,5,6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be applied to certain vices and virtues: and in order to designate vices we employ especially the names of those passions the object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object, and so we use them rather to designate virtues.

Whether daring is opposed to fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that daring is not opposed to fortitude. For excess of daring seems to result from presumption of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to humility rather than to fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, daring does not seem to call for blame, except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to justice.

Objection 3: Further, fortitude is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above ([3333]Q[123], A[3]). Now since timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice in opposition to fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above ([3334]Q[126], A[2]), it belongs to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion, and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is concerned about fear and daring, as stated above ([3335]Q[122], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: Opposition between vice and virtue does not depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's very species. Wherefore it is not necessary that daring be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the direct opposition of a vice does not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Wherefore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of daring consists in a man taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to him: and nature inclines him to do this except in so far as such inclination is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), "the daring are precipitate and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present," namely through fear.

OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the parts of fortitude; first we shall consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we shall treat of each part.

Whether the parts of fortitude are suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It seems that the parts of fortitude are unsuitably assigned. For Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) assigns four parts to fortitude, namely "magnificence," "confidence," "patience," and "perseverance." Now magnificence seems to pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about money, and "a magnificent man must needs be liberal," as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is a part of justice, as stated above ([3336]Q[117], A[5]). Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, confidence is apparently the same as hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude, but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Objection 3: Further, fortitude makes a man behave aright in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.

Objection 4: Further, according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) patience denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude and not a part thereof.

Objection 5: Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written (Mat. 24:13): “He that shall persevere to the end he shall be saved.” Therefore perseverance should not be accounted a part of fortitude.

Objection 6: Further, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) reckons seven parts of fortitude, namely “magnanimity, confidence, security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability.” Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude, and these are, “courage, strength of will, magnanimity, manliness, perseverance, magnificence.” Therefore it seems that Tully’s reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.

Objection 7: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. iii) reckons five parts of fortitude. The first is “civic” fortitude, which produces brave deeds through fear of dishonor or punishment; the second is “military” fortitude, which produces brave deeds as a result of warlike art or experience; the third is the fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion, especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome; the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts of fortitude are unfitting.

I answer that, As stated above ([3337]Q[48]), a virtue can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude; and potential parts, because what fortitude practices in face of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain other virtues practice in the matter of certain minor hardships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above ([3338]Q[123], AA[3],6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and endurance. Now two things are required for the act of aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind, and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression. In this respect Tully mentions "confidence," of which he says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "with this the mind is much assured and firmly hopeful in great and honorable undertakings." The second regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in not failing to accomplish what one has confidently begun. In this respect Tully mentions "magnificence," which he describes as being "the discussion and administration," i.e. accomplishment "of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind," so as to combine execution with greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus "magnificence" is referred by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv) to great expenses, and "magnanimity," which seems to be the same as confidence, to great honors. Again, two things are requisite for the other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its greatness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this respect he mentions "patience," which he describes as "the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit." The other is that by the prolonged suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose courage, according to Heb. 12:3, "That you be not wearied, fainting in your minds." In this respect he mentions "perseverance," which accordingly he describes as "the fixed and continued persistence in a well considered purpose." If these two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence in the matter of liberality adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this respect, it belongs.

Reply to Objection 2: Hope whereby one confides in God is accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q[17], A[5]; [3339]FS, Q[62], A[3]). But by confidence which here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself, yet under God withal.

Reply to Objection 3: To venture on anything great seems to involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous. Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other great things, they have a certain connection with fortitude by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply to Objection 4: Patience endures not only dangers of death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude: but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part thereof.

Reply to Objection 5: Perseverance as denoting persistence in a good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense stated in the body of the Article.

Reply to Objection 6: Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid mentioned by Tully, namely “confidence, magnificence, forbearance,” which he puts in the place of patience, and “firmness,” which he substitutes for perseverance. And he adds three, two of which, namely “magnanimity” and “security,” are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because confidence denotes a man’s hope for great things: and hope for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity. For it has been stated above ([3340]FS, Q[40], A[2]) that hope presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magnitude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one’s own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat contrary to hope, as stated above, ([3341]FS, Q[40], A[4], ad 1). Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnificence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplishing great things, but also in discussing them generously in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance, so that one may be called persevering through not desisting on account of delays, and constant through not desisting on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius he mentions "perseverance" and "magnificence," and with Macrobius, "magnanimity." "Strength of will" is the same as patience or forbearance, for he says that "strength of will is a habit that makes one ready to attempt what ought to be attempted, and to endure what reason says should be endured"—i.e. good courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines it as "strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose." Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says that "manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of virtue." Besides magnificence he mentions {andragathia}, i.e. manly goodness which we may render "strenuousness." For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy, but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude to that accomplishment, and this belongs to {andragathia}, strenuousness: wherefore he says that {andragathia} is the virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by Tully.

Reply to Objection 7: The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above ([3342]Q[123], A[1], ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned parts but modes of fortitude.

OF MAGNANIMITY* (EIGHT ARTICLES)

[*Not in the ordinary restricted sense but as explained by the author]

We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude, including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accordingly we shall consider (1) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence; (3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we shall treat (1) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether magnanimity is about honors?

(2) Whether magnanimity is only about great honors?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Whether it is a special virtue?

(5) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(6) Of its relation to confidence;

(7) Of its relation to assurance;

(8) Of its relation to goods of fortune.

Whether magnanimity is about honors?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not about honors. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as its very name shows, since "magnanimity" signifies greatness of mind, and "mind" denotes the irascible part, as appears from De Anima iii, 42, where the Philosopher says that "in the sensitive appetite are desire and mind," i.e. the concupiscible and irascible parts. But honor is a concupiscible good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems that magnanimity is not about honors.

Objection 2: Further, since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it must needs be about either passions or operations. Now it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But honor is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

Objection 3: Further, the nature of magnanimity seems to regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the virtuous are praised not for desiring honors, but for shunning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honors.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “magnanimity is about honor and dishonor.”

I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about which is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act, which consists in the right use of such matter. And since a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act. Now an act may be called great in two ways: in one way proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely great when it consists in the best use of the greatest thing.

The things which come into man’s use are external things, and among these honor is the greatest simply, both because it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a person’s virtue, as stated above ([3343]Q[103], AA[1],2); and because it is offered to God and to the best; and again because, in order to obtain honor even as to avoid shame, men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that magnanimity is about honors.

Reply to Objection 1: Good and evil absolutely considered regard the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is that magnanimity regards honor, inasmuch, to wit, as honor has the aspect of something great or difficult.

Reply to Objection 2: Although honor is neither a passion nor an operation, yet it is the object of a passion, namely hope, which tends to a difficult good. Wherefore magnanimity is immediately about the passions of hope, and mediately about honor as the object of hope: even so, we have stated ([3344]Q[123], AA[4],5) with regard to fortitude that it is about dangers of death in so far as they are the object of fear and daring.

Reply to Objection 3: Those are worthy of praise who despise riches in such a way as to do nothing unbecoming in order to obtain them, nor have too great a desire for them. If, however, one were to despise honors so as not to care to do what is worthy of honor, this would be deserving of blame. Accordingly magnanimity is about honors in the sense that a man strives to do what is deserving of honor, yet not so as to think much of the honor accorded by man.

Whether magnanimity is essentially about great honors?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not essentially about great honors. For the proper matter of magnanimity is honor, as stated above [3345](A[1]). But great and little are accidental to honor. Therefore it is not essential to magnanimity to be about great honors.

Objection 2: Further, just as magnanimity is about honor, so is meekness about anger. But it is not essential to meekness to be about either great or little anger. Therefore neither is it essential to magnanimity to be about great honor.

Objection 3: Further, small honor is less aloof from great honor than is dishonor. But magnanimity is well ordered in relation to dishonor, and consequently in relation to small honors also. Therefore it is not only about great honors.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that magnanimity is about great honors.

I answer that According to the Philosopher (Phys. vii, 17, 18), virtue is a perfection, and by this we are to understand the perfection of a power, and that it regards the extreme limit of that power, as stated in De Coelo i, 116. Now the perfection of a power is not perceived in every operation of that power, but in such operations as are great or difficult: for every power, however imperfect, can extend to ordinary and trifling operations. Hence it is essential to a virtue to be about the difficult and the good, as stated in Ethic. ii, 3.

Now the difficult and the good (which amount to the same) in an act of virtue may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of view of reason, in so far as it is difficult to find and establish the rational means in some particular matter: and this difficulty is found only in the act of intellectual virtues, and also of justice. The other difficulty is on the part of the matter, which may involve a certain opposition to the moderation of reason, which moderation has to be applied thereto: and this difficulty regards chiefly the other moral virtues, which are about the passions, because the passions resist reason as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4).

Now as regards the passions it is to be observed that the greatness of this power of resistance to reason arises chiefly in some cases from the passions themselves, and in others from the things that are the objects of the passions. The passions themselves have no great power of resistance, unless they be violent, because the sensitive appetite, which is the seat of the passions, is naturally subject to reason. Hence the resisting virtues that are about these passions regard only that which is great in such passions: thus fortitude is about very great fear and daring; temperance about the concupiscence of the greatest pleasures, and likewise meekness about the greatest anger. On the other hand, some passions have great power of resistance to reason arising from the external things themselves that are the objects of those passions: such are the love or desire of money or of honor. And for these it is necessary to have a virtue not only regarding that which is greatest in those passions, but also about that which is ordinary or little: because things external, though they be little, are very desirable, as being necessary for human life. Hence with regard to the desire of money there are two virtues, one about ordinary or little sums of money, namely liberality, and another about large sums of money, namely “magnificence.”

In like manner there are two virtues about honors, one about ordinary honors. This virtue has no name, but is denominated by its extremes, which are {philotimia}, i.e. love of honor, and {aphilotimia}, i.e. without love of honor: for sometimes a man is commended for loving honor, and sometimes for not caring about it, in so far, to wit, as both these things may be done in moderation. But with regard to great honors there is “magnanimity.” Wherefore we must conclude that the proper matter of magnanimity is great honor, and that a magnanimous man tends to such things as are deserving of honor.

Reply to Objection 1: Great and little are accidental to honor considered in itself: but they make a great difference in their relation to reason, the mode of which has to be observed in the use of honor, for it is much more difficult to observe it in great than in little honors.

Reply to Objection 2: In anger and other matters only that which is greatest presents any notable difficulty, and about this alone is there any need of a virtue. It is different with riches and honors which are things existing outside the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: He that makes good use of great things is much more able to make good use of little things. Accordingly the magnanimous man looks upon great honors as a thing of which he is worthy, or even little honors as something he deserves, because, to wit, man cannot sufficiently honor virtue which deserves to be honored by God. Hence he is not uplifted by great honors, because he does not deem them above him; rather does he despise them, and much more such as are ordinary or little. In like manner he is not cast down by dishonor, but despises it, since he recognizes that he does not deserve it.

Whether magnanimity is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a virtue. For every moral virtue observes the mean. But magnanimity observes not the mean but the greater extreme: because the “magnanimous man deems himself worthy of the greatest things” (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, he that has one virtue has them all, as stated above ([3346]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But one may have a virtue without having magnanimity: since the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “whosoever is worthy of little things and deems himself worthy of them, is temperate, but he is not magnanimous.” Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, “Virtue is a good quality of the mind,” as stated above ([3347]FS, Q[55], A[4]). But magnanimity implies certain dispositions of the body: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) of “a magnanimous man that his gait is slow, his voice deep, and his utterance calm.” Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But magnanimity is opposed to humility, since “the magnanimous deems himself worthy of great things, and despises others,” according to Ethic. iv, 3. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

Objection 5: Further, the properties of every virtue are praiseworthy. But magnanimity has certain properties that call for blame. For, in the first place, the magnanimous is unmindful of favors; secondly, he is remiss and slow of action; thirdly, he employs irony [*Cf. Q[113]] towards many;

fourthly, he is unable to associate with others; fifthly, because he holds to the barren things rather than to those that are fruitful. Therefore magnanimity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is written in praise of certain men (2 Macc. 15:18): “Nicanor hearing of the valor of Judas’ companions, and the greatness of courage [animi magnitudinem] with which they fought for their country, was afraid to try the matter by the sword.” Now, only deeds of virtue are worthy of praise. Therefore magnanimity which consists in greatness of courage is a virtue.

I answer that, The essence of human virtue consists in safeguarding the good of reason in human affairs, for this is man’s proper good. Now among external human things honors take precedence of all others, as stated above [3348](A[1]; [3349]FS, Q[11], A[2], OBJ[3]). Therefore magnanimity, which observes the mode of reason in great honors, is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), “the magnanimous in point of quantity goes to extremes,” in so far as he tends to what is greatest, “but in the matter of becomingness, he follows the mean,” because he tends to the greatest things according to reason, for “he deems himself worthy in accordance with his worth” (Ethic. iv, 3), since his aims do not surpass his deserts.

Reply to Objection 2: The mutual connection of the virtues does not apply to their acts, as though every one were competent to practice the acts of all the virtues. Wherefore the act of magnanimity is not becoming to every virtuous man, but only to great men. on the other hand, as regards the principles of virtue, namely prudence and grace, all virtues are connected together, since their habits reside together in the soul, either in act or by way of a proximate disposition thereto. Thus it is possible for one to whom the act of magnanimity is not competent, to have the habit of magnanimity, whereby he is disposed to practice that act if it were competent to him according to his state.

Reply to Objection 3: The movements of the body are differentiated according to the different apprehensions and emotions of the soul. And so it happens that to magnanimity there accrue certain fixed accidents by way of bodily movements. For quickness of movement results from a man being intent on many things which he is in a hurry to accomplish, whereas the magnanimous is intent only on great things; these are few and require great attention, wherefore they call for slow movement. Likewise shrill and rapid speaking is chiefly competent to those who are quick to quarrel about anything, and this becomes not the magnanimous who are busy only about great things. And just as these dispositions of bodily movements are competent to the magnanimous man according to the mode of his emotions, so too in those who are naturally disposed to magnanimity these conditions are found naturally.

Reply to Objection 4: There is in man something great which he possesses through the gift of God; and something defective which accrues to him through the weakness of nature. Accordingly magnanimity makes a man deem himself worthy of great things in consideration of the gifts he holds from God: thus if his soul is endowed with great virtue, magnanimity makes him tend to perfect works of virtue; and the same is to be said of the use of any other good, such as science or external fortune. On the other hand, humility makes a man think little of himself in consideration of his own deficiency, and magnanimity makes him despise others in so far as they fall away from God’s gifts: since he does not think so much of others as to do anything wrong for their sake. Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God’s gifts in them. Hence it is written of the just man (Ps. 14:4): “In his sight a vile person is contemned [*Douay: ‘The malignant is brought to nothing, but he glorifieth,’ etc.],” which indicates the contempt of magnanimity, “but he honoreth them that fear the Lord,” which points to the reverential bearing of humility. It is therefore evident that magnanimity and humility are not contrary to one another, although they seem to tend in contrary directions, because they proceed according to different considerations.

Reply to Objection 5: These properties in so far as they belong to a magnanimous man call not for blame, but for very great praise. For in the first place, when it is said that the magnanimous is not mindful of those from whom he has received favors, this points to the fact that he takes no pleasure in accepting favors from others unless he repay them with yet greater favor; this belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in the act of which he wishes to excel, even as in the acts of other virtues. Again, in the second place, it is said that he is remiss and slow of action, not that he is lacking in doing what becomes him, but because he does not busy himself with all kinds of works, but only with great works, such as are becoming to him. He is also said, in the third place, to employ irony, not as opposed to truth, and so as either to say of himself vile things that are not true, or deny of himself great things that are true, but because he does not disclose all his greatness, especially to the large number of those who are beneath him, since, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), “it belongs to a magnanimous man to be great towards persons of dignity and affluence, and unassuming towards the middle class.” In the fourth place, it is said that he cannot associate with others: this means that he is not at home with others than his friends: because he altogether shuns flattery and hypocrisy, which belong to littleness of mind. But he associates with all, both great and little, according as he ought, as stated above (ad 1). It is also said, fifthly, that he prefers to have barren things, not indeed any, but good, i.e. virtuous; for in all things he prefers the virtuous to the useful, as being greater: since the useful is sought in order to supply a defect which is inconsistent with magnanimity.

Whether magnanimity is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is operative in every virtue. But the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 3) that “whatever is great in each virtue belongs to the magnanimous.” Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the acts of different virtues are not ascribed to any special virtue. But the acts of different virtues are ascribed to the magnanimous man. For it is stated in Ethic. iv, 3 that “it belongs to the magnanimous not to avoid reproof” (which is an act of prudence), “nor to act unjustly” (which is an act of justice), “that he is ready to do favors” (which is an act of charity), “that he gives his services readily” (which is an act of liberality), that “he is truthful” (which is an act of truthfulness), and that “he is not given to complaining” (which is an act of patience). Therefore magnanimity is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is a special ornament of the soul, according to the saying of Is. 61:10, “He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation,” and afterwards he adds, “and as a bride adorned with her jewels.” But magnanimity is the ornament of all the virtues, as stated in Ethic. iv. Therefore magnanimity is a general virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) distinguishes it from the other virtues.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]), it belongs to a special virtue to establish the mode of reason in a determinate matter. Now magnanimity establishes the mode of reason in a determinate matter, namely honors, as stated above ([3350]AA[1],2): and honor, considered in itself, is a special good, and accordingly magnanimity considered in itself is a special virtue.

Since, however, honor is the reward of every virtue, as stated above ([3351]Q[103], A[1], ad 2), it follows that by reason of its matter it regards all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity is not about any kind of honor, but great honor. Now, as honor is due to virtue, so great honor is due to a great deed of virtue. Hence it is that the magnanimous is intent on doing great deeds in every virtue, in so far, to wit, as he tends to what is worthy of great honors.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the magnanimous tends to great things, it follows that he tends chiefly to things that involve a certain excellence, and shuns those that imply defect. Now it savors of excellence that a man is beneficent, generous and grateful. Wherefore he shows himself ready to perform actions of this kind, but not as acts of the other virtues. on the other hand, it is a proof of defect, that a man thinks so much of certain external goods or evils, that for their sake he abandons and gives up justice or any virtue whatever. Again, all concealment of the truth indicates a defect, since it seems to be the outcome of fear. Also that a man be given to complaining denotes a defect, because by so doing the mind seems to give way to external evils. Wherefore these and like things the magnanimous man avoids under a special aspect, inasmuch as they are contrary to his excellence or greatness.

Reply to Objection 3: Every virtue derives from its species a certain luster or adornment which is proper to each virtue: but further adornment results from the very greatness of a virtuous deed, through magnanimity which makes all virtues greater as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.

Whether magnanimity is a part of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that magnanimity is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not a part of itself. But magnanimity appears to be the same as fortitude. For Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): “If magnanimity, which is also called fortitude, be in thy soul, thou shalt live in great assurance”: and Tully says (De Offic. i): “If a man is brave we expect him to be magnanimous, truth-loving, and far removed from deception.” Therefore magnanimity is not a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a magnanimous man is not {philokindynos}, that is, a lover of danger. But it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger. Therefore magnanimity has nothing in common with fortitude so as to be called a part thereof.

Objection 3: Further, magnanimity regards the great in things to be hoped for, whereas fortitude regards the great in things to be feared or dared. But good is of more import than evil. Therefore magnanimity is a more important virtue than fortitude. Therefore it is not a part thereof.

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnanimity as a part of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above ([3352]FS, Q[61], A[3]), a principal virtue is one to which it belongs to establish a general mode of virtue in a principal matter. Now one of the general modes of virtue is firmness of mind, because “a firm standing is necessary in every virtue,” according to Ethic. ii. And this is chiefly commended in those virtues that tend to something difficult, in which it is most difficult to preserve firmness. Wherefore the more difficult it is to stand firm in some matter of difficulty, the more principal is the virtue which makes the mind firm in that matter.

Now it is more difficult to stand firm in dangers of death, wherein fortitude confirms the mind, than in hoping for or obtaining the greatest goods, wherein the mind is confirmed by magnanimity, for, as man loves his life above all things, so does he fly from dangers of death more than any others. Accordingly it is clear that magnanimity agrees with fortitude in confirming the mind about some difficult matter; but it falls short thereof, in that it confirms the mind about a matter wherein it is easier to stand firm. Hence magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1,3), “to lack evil is looked upon as a good,” wherefore not to be overcome by a grievous evil, such as the danger of death, is looked upon as though it were the obtaining of a great good, the former belonging to fortitude, and the latter to magnanimity: in this sense fortitude and magnanimity may be considered as identical. Since, however, there is a difference as regards the difficulty on the part of either of the aforesaid, it follows that properly speaking magnanimity, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), is a distinct virtue from fortitude.

Reply to Objection 2: A man is said to love danger when he exposes himself to all kinds of dangers, which seems to be the mark of one who thinks "many" the same as "great." This is contrary to the nature of a magnanimous man, for no one seemingly exposes himself to danger for the sake of a thing that he does not deem great. But for things that are truly great, a magnanimous man is most ready to expose himself to danger, since he does something great in the act of fortitude, even as in the acts of the other virtues. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that the magnanimous man is not {mikrokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for small things, but {megalokindynos}, i.e. endangering himself for great things. And Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.): "Thou wilt be magnanimous if thou neither seekest dangers like a rash man, nor fearest them like a coward. For nothing makes the soul a coward save the consciousness of a wicked life."

Reply to Objection 3: Evil as such is to be avoided: and that one has to withstand it is accidental; in so far, to wit, as one has to suffer an evil in order to safeguard a good. But good as such is to be desired, and that one avoids it is only accidental, in so far, to wit, as it is deemed to surpass the ability of the one who desires it. Now that which is so essentially is always of more account than that which is so accidentally. Wherefore the difficult in evil things is always more opposed to firmness of mind than the difficult in good things. Hence the virtue of fortitude takes precedence of the virtue of magnanimity. For though good is simply of more import than evil, evil is of more import in this particular respect.

Whether confidence belongs to magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that confidence does not belong to magnanimity. For a man may have assurance not only in himself, but also in another, according to 2 Cor. 3:4,5, “Such confidence we have, through Christ towards God, not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.” But this seems inconsistent with the idea of magnanimity. Therefore confidence does not belong to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, confidence seems to be opposed to fear, according to Is. 12:2, “I will deal confidently and will not fear.” But to be without fear seems more akin to fortitude. Therefore confidence also belongs to fortitude rather than to magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, reward is not due except to virtue. But a reward is due to confidence, according to Heb. 3:6, where it is said that we are the house of Christ, “if we hold fast the confidence and glory of hope unto the end.” Therefore confidence is a virtue distinct from magnanimity: and this is confirmed by the fact that Macrobius enumerates it with magnanimity (In Somn. Scip. i).

On the contrary, Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii) seems to substitute confidence for magnanimity, as stated above in the preceding Question (ad 6) and in the prologue to this.

I answer that, Confidence takes its name from “fides” [faith]: and it belongs to faith to believe something and in somebody. But confidence belongs to hope, according to Job 11:18, “Thou shalt have confidence, hope being set before thee.” Wherefore confidence apparently denotes chiefly that a man derives hope through believing the word of one who promises to help him. Since, however, faith signifies also a strong opinion, and since one may come to have a strong opinion about something, not only on account of another’s statement, but also on account of something we observe in another, it follows that confidence may denote the hope of having something, which hope we conceive through observing something either in oneself—for instance, through observing that he is healthy, a man is confident that he will live long. or in another, for instance, through observing that another is friendly to him and powerful, a man is confident that he will receive help from him.

Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that magnanimity is chiefly about the hope of something difficult. Wherefore, since confidence denotes a certain strength of hope arising from some observation which gives one a strong opinion that one will obtain a certain good, it follows that confidence belongs to magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), it belongs to the "magnanimous to need nothing," for need is a mark of the deficient. But this is to be understood according to the mode of a man, hence he adds "or scarcely anything." For it surpasses man to need nothing at all. For every man needs, first, the Divine assistance, secondly, even human assistance, since man is naturally a social animal, for he is sufficient by himself to provide for his own life. Accordingly, in so far as he needs others, it belongs to a magnanimous man to have confidence in others, for it is also a point of excellence in a man that he should have at hand those who are able to be of service to him. And in so far as his own ability goes, it belongs to a magnanimous man to be confident in himself.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3353]FS, Q[23], A[2]; [3354]FS, Q[40], A[4]), when we were treating of the passions, hope is directly opposed to despair, because the latter is about the same object, namely good. But as regards contrariety of objects it is opposed to fear, because the latter's object is evil. Now confidence denotes a certain strength of hope, wherefore it is opposed to fear even as hope is. Since, however, fortitude properly strengthens a man in respect of evil, and magnanimity in respect of the obtaining of good, it follows that confidence belongs more properly to magnanimity than to fortitude. Yet because hope causes daring, which belongs to fortitude, it follows in consequence that confidence pertains to fortitude.

Reply to Objection 3: Confidence, as stated above, denotes a certain mode of hope: for confidence is hope strengthened by a strong opinion. Now the mode applied to an affection may call for commendation of the act, so that it become meritorious, yet it is not this that draws it to a species of virtue, but its matter. Hence, properly speaking, confidence cannot denote a virtue, though it may denote the conditions of a virtue. For this reason it is reckoned among the parts of fortitude, not as an annexed virtue, except as identified with magnanimity by Tully (De Suv. Rhet. ii), but as an integral part, as stated in the preceding Question.

Whether security belongs to magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that security does not belong to magnanimity. For security, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6), denotes freedom from the disturbance of fear. But fortitude does this most effectively. Wherefore security is seemingly the same as fortitude. But fortitude does not belong to magnanimity; rather the reverse is the case. Neither therefore does security belong to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that a man “is said to be secure because he is without care.” But this seems to be contrary to virtue, which has a care for honorable things, according to 2 Tim. 2:15, “Carefully study to present thyself approved unto God.” Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity, which does great things in all the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, virtue is not its own reward. But security is accounted the reward of virtue, according to Job 11:14,18, “If thou wilt put away from thee the iniquity that is in thy hand . . . being buried thou shalt sleep secure.” Therefore security does not belong to magnanimity or to any other virtue, as a part thereof.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: “Magnanimity consists of two things,” that “it belongs to magnanimity to give way neither to a troubled mind, nor to man, nor to fortune.” But a man’s security consists in this. Therefore security belongs to magnanimity.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear makes a man take counsel,” because, to wit he takes care to avoid what he fears. Now security takes its name from the removal of this care, of which fear is the cause: wherefore security denotes perfect freedom of the mind from fear, just as confidence denotes strength of hope. Now, as hope directly belongs to magnanimity, so fear directly regards fortitude. Wherefore as confidence belongs immediately to magnanimity, so security belongs immediately to fortitude.

It must be observed, however, that as hope is the cause of daring, so is fear the cause of despair, as stated above when we were treating of the passion ([3355]FS, Q[45], A[2]). Wherefore as confidence belongs indirectly to fortitude, in so far as it makes use of daring, so security belongs indirectly to magnanimity, in so far as it banishes despair.

Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude is chiefly commended, not because it banishes fear, which belongs to security, but because it denotes a firmness of mind in the matter of the passion. Wherefore security is not the same as fortitude, but is a condition thereof.

Reply to Objection 2: Not all security is worthy of praise but only when one puts care aside, as one ought, and in things when one should not fear: in this way it is a condition of fortitude and of magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 3: There is in the virtues a certain likeness to, and participation of, future happiness, as stated above ([3356]FS, Q[5], AA[3],7). Hence nothing hinders a certain security from being a condition of a virtue, although perfect security belongs to virtue's reward.

Whether goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity. For according to Seneca (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi): "virtue suffices for itself." Now magnanimity takes every virtue great, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, no virtuous man despises what is helpful to him. But the magnanimous man despises whatever pertains to goods of fortune: for Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading: "Magnanimity consists of two things," that "a great soul is commended for despising external things." Therefore a magnanimous man is not helped by goods of fortune.

Objection 3: Further, Tully adds (De Offic. i) that "it belongs to a great soul so to bear what seems troublesome, as nowise to depart from his natural estate, or from the dignity of a wise man." And Aristotle says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "a magnanimous man does not grieve at misfortune." Now troubles and misfortunes are opposed to goods of fortune, for every one grieves at the loss of what is helpful to him. Therefore external goods of fortune do not conduce to magnanimity.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "good fortune seems to conduce to magnanimity."

I answer that, As stated above [3357](A[1]), magnanimity regards two things: honor as its matter, and the accomplishment of something great as its end. Now goods of fortune conduce to both these things. For since honor is conferred on the virtuous, not only by the wise, but also by the multitude who hold these goods of fortune in the highest esteem, the result is that they show greater honor to those who possess goods of fortune. Likewise goods of fortune are useful organs or instruments of virtuous deeds: since we can easily accomplish things by means of riches, power and friends. Hence it is evident that goods of fortune conduce to magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue is said to be sufficient for itself, because it can be without even these external goods; yet it needs them in order to act more expeditiously.

Reply to Objection 2: The magnanimous man despises external goods, inasmuch as he does not think them so great as to be bound to do anything unbecoming for their sake. Yet he does not despise them, but that he esteems them useful for the accomplishment of virtuous deeds.

Reply to Objection 3: If a man does not think much of a thing, he is neither very joyful at obtaining it, nor very grieved at losing it. Wherefore, since the magnanimous man does not think much of external goods, that is goods of fortune, he is neither much uplifted by them if he has them, nor much cast down by their loss.

OF PRESUMPTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnanimity; and in the first place, those that are opposed thereto by excess. These are three, namely, presumption, ambition, and vainglory. Secondly, we shall consider pusillanimity which is opposed to it by way of deficiency. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether presumption is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

Whether presumption is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not a sin. For the Apostle says: “Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch forth [Vulg.: ‘and stretching forth’] myself to those that are before.” But it seems to savor of presumption that one should tend to what is above oneself. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 7) “we should not listen to those who would persuade us to relish human things because we are men, or mortal things because we are mortal, but we should relish those that make us immortal”: and (Metaph. i) “that man should pursue divine things as far as possible.” Now divine and immortal things are seemingly far above man. Since then presumption consists essentially in tending to what is above oneself, it seems that presumption is something praiseworthy, rather than a sin.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves.” If then presumption, by which one strives at that for which one is not sufficient, be a sin, it seems that man cannot lawfully even think of anything good: which is absurd. Therefore presumption is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 37:3): “O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?” and a gloss answers: “From a creature’s evil will.” Now all that comes of the root of an evil will is a sin. Therefore presumption is a sin.

I answer that, Since whatever is according to nature, is ordered by the Divine Reason, which human reason ought to imitate, whatever is done in accordance with human reason in opposition to the order established in general throughout natural things is vicious and sinful. Now it is established throughout all natural things, that every action is commensurate with the power of the agent, nor does any natural agent strive to do what exceeds its ability. Hence it is vicious and sinful, as being contrary to the natural order, that any one should assume to do what is above his power: and this is what is meant by presumption, as its very name shows. Wherefore it is evident that presumption is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders that which is above the active power of a natural thing, and yet not above the passive power of that same thing: thus the air is possessed of a passive power by reason of which it can be so changed as to obtain the action and movement of fire, which surpass the active power of air. Thus too it would be sinful and presumptuous for a man while in a state of imperfect virtue to attempt the immediate accomplishment of what belongs to perfect virtue. But it is not presumptuous or sinful for a man to endeavor to advance towards perfect virtue. In this way the Apostle stretched himself forth to the things that were before him, namely continually advancing forward.

Reply to Objection 2: Divine and immortal things surpass man according to the order of nature. Yet man is possessed of a natural power, namely the intellect, whereby he can be united to immortal and Divine things. In this respect the Philosopher says that “man ought to pursue immortal and divine things,” not that he should do what it becomes God to do, but that he should be united to Him in intellect and will.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), “what we can do by the help of others we can do by ourselves in a sense.” Hence since we can think and do good by the help of God, this is not altogether above our ability. Hence it is not presumptuous for a man to attempt the accomplishment of a virtuous deed: but it would be presumptuous if one were to make the attempt without confidence in God’s assistance.

Whether presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

Objection 1: It seems that presumption is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For presumption is accounted a species of the sin against the Holy Ghost, as stated above ([3358]Q[14], A[2];[3359] Q[21], A[1]). But the sin against the Holy Ghost is not opposed to magnanimity, but to charity. Neither therefore is presumption opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to magnanimity that one should deem oneself worthy of great things. But a man is said to be presumptuous even if he deem himself worthy of small things, if they surpass his ability. Therefore presumption is not directly opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, the magnanimous man looks upon external goods as little things. Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “on account of external fortune the presumptuous disdain and wrong others, because they deem external goods as something great.” Therefore presumption is opposed to magnanimity, not by excess, but only by deficiency.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 3) that the “vain man,” i.e. a vaporer or a wind-bag, which with us denotes a presumptuous man, “is opposed to the magnanimous man by excess.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3360]Q[129], A[3], ad 1), magnanimity observes the means, not as regards the quantity of that to which it tends, but in proportion to our own ability: for it does not tend to anything greater than is becoming to us.

Now the presumptuous man, as regards that to which he tends, does not exceed the magnanimous, but sometimes falls far short of him: but he does exceed in proportion to his own ability, whereas the magnanimous man does not exceed his. It is in this way that presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not every presumption that is accounted a sin against the Holy Ghost, but that by which one contemns the Divine justice through inordinate confidence in the Divine mercy. The latter kind of presumption, by reason of its matter, inasmuch, to wit, as it implies contempt of something Divine, is opposed to charity, or rather to the gift of fear, whereby we revere God. Nevertheless, in so far as this contempt exceeds the proportion to one's own ability, it can be opposed to magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 2: Presumption, like magnanimity, seems to tend to something great. For we are not, as a rule, wont to call a man presumptuous for going beyond his powers in something small. If, however, such a man be called presumptuous, this kind of presumption is not opposed to magnanimity, but to that virtue which is about ordinary honor, as stated above ([3361]Q[129], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: No one attempts what is above his ability, except in so far as he deems his ability greater than it is. In this one may err in two ways. First only as regards quantity, as when a man thinks he has greater virtue, or knowledge, or the like, than he has. Secondly, as regards the kind of thing, as when he thinks himself great, and worthy of great things, by reason of something that does not make him so, for instance by reason of riches or goods of fortune. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), "those who have these things without virtue, neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things, nor are rightly called magnanimous."

Again, the thing to which a man sometimes tends in excess of his ability, is sometimes in very truth something great, simply as in the case of Peter, whose intent was to suffer for Christ, which has exceeded his power; while sometimes it is something great, not simply, but only in the opinion of fools, such as wearing costly clothes, despising and wronging others. This savors of an excess of magnanimity, not in any truth, but in people's opinion. Hence Seneca says (De Quat. Virtut.) that "when magnanimity exceeds its measure, it makes a man high-handed, proud, haughty restless, and bent on excelling in all things, whether in words or in deeds, without any considerations of virtue." Thus it is evident that the presumptuous man sometimes falls short of the magnanimous in reality, although in appearance he surpasses him.

OF AMBITION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider ambition: and under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

Whether ambition is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not a sin. For ambition denotes the desire of honor. Now honor is in itself a good thing, and the greatest of external goods: wherefore those who care not for honor are reproved. Therefore ambition is not a sin; rather is it something deserving of praise, in so far as a good is laudably desired.

Objection 2: Further, anyone may, without sin, desire what is due to him as a reward. Now honor is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 12; iv, 3; viii, 14). Therefore ambition of honor is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, that which heartens a man to do good and disheartens him from doing evil, is not a sin. Now honor heartens men to do good and to avoid evil; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that “with the bravest men, cowards are held in dishonor, and the brave in honor”: and Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that “honor fosters the arts.” Therefore ambition is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:5) that “charity is not ambitious, seeketh not her own.” Now nothing is contrary to charity, except sin. Therefore ambition is a sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([3362]Q[103], AA[1],2), honor denotes reverence shown to a person in witness of his excellence. Now two things have to be considered with regard to man’s honor. The first is that a man has not from himself the thing in which he excels, for this is, as it were, something Divine in him, wherefore on this count honor is due principally, not to him but to God. The second point that calls for observation is that the thing in which man excels is given to him by God, that he may profit others thereby: wherefore a man ought so far to be pleased that others bear witness to his excellence, as this enables him to profit others.

Now the desire of honor may be inordinate in three ways. First, when a man desires recognition of an excellence which he has not: this is to desire more than his share of honor. Secondly, when a man desires honor for himself without referring it to God. Thirdly, when a man's appetite rests in honor itself, without referring it to the profit of others. Since then ambition denotes inordinate desire of honor, it is evident that it is always a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The desire for good should be regulated according to reason, and if it exceed this rule it will be sinful. In this way it is sinful to desire honor in disaccord with the order of reason. Now those are reproved who care not for honor in accordance with reason's dictate that they should avoid what is contrary to honor.

Reply to Objection 2: Honor is not the reward of virtue, as regards the virtuous man, in this sense that he should seek for it as his reward: since the reward he seeks is happiness, which is the end of virtue. But it is said to be the reward of virtue as regards others, who have nothing greater than honor whereby to reward the virtuous; which honor derives greatness from the very fact that it bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that it is not an adequate reward, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as some are heartened to do good and disheartened from doing evil, by the desire of honor, if this be desired in due measure; so, if it be desired inordinately, it may become to man an occasion of doing many evil things, as when a man cares not by what means he obtains honor. Wherefore Sallust says (Catilin.) that "the good as well as the wicked covet honors for themselves, but the one," i.e. the good, "go about it in the right way," whereas "the other," i.e. the wicked, "through lack of the good arts, make use of deceit and falsehood." Yet they who, merely for the sake of honor, either do good or avoid evil, are not virtuous, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 8), where he says that they who do brave things for the sake of honor are not truly brave.

Whether ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess?

Objection 1: It seems that ambition is not opposed to magnanimity by excess. For one mean has only one extreme opposed to it on the one side.

Now presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess as stated above ([3363]Q[130], A[2]). Therefore ambition is not opposed to it by excess.

Objection 2: Further, magnanimity is about honors; whereas ambition seems to regard positions of dignity: for it is written (2 Macc. 4:7) that "Jason ambitiously sought the high priesthood." Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, ambition seems to regard outward show: for it is written (Acts 25:27) that "Agrippa and Berenice . . . with great pomp [ambitione] . . . had entered into the hall of audience" [*'Praetorium.' The Vulgate has 'auditorium,' but the meaning is the same], and (2 Para. 16:14) that when Asa died they "burned spices and . . . ointments over his body" with very great pomp [ambitione]. But magnanimity is not about outward show. Therefore ambition is not opposed to magnanimity.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) that "the more a man exceeds in magnanimity, the more he desires himself alone to dominate others." But this pertains to ambition. Therefore ambition denotes an excess of magnanimity.

I answer that, As stated above [3364](A[1]), ambition signifies inordinate love of honor. Now magnanimity is about honors and makes use of them in a becoming manner. Wherefore it is evident that ambition is opposed to magnanimity as the inordinate to that which is well ordered.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnanimity regards two things. It regards one as its end, in so far as it is some great deed that the magnanimous man attempts in proportion to his ability. In this way presumption is opposed to magnanimity by excess: because the presumptuous man attempts great deeds beyond his ability. The other thing that magnanimity regards is its matter, viz. honor, of which it makes right use: and in this way ambition is opposed to magnanimity by excess. Nor is it impossible for one mean to be exceeded in various respects.

Reply to Objection 2: Honor is due to those who are in a position of dignity, on account of a certain excellence of their estate: and accordingly inordinate desire for positions of dignity pertains to ambition. For if a man were to have an inordinate desire for a position of dignity, not for the sake of honor, but for the sake of a right use of a dignity exceeding his ability, he would not be ambitious but presumptuous.

Reply to Objection 3: The very solemnity of outward worship is a kind of honor, wherefore in such cases honor is wont to be shown. This is signified by the words of James 2:2,3: “If there shall come into your assembly a man having a golden ring, in fine apparel . . . and you . . . shall say to him: Sit thou here well,” etc. Wherefore ambition does not regard outward worship, except in so far as this is a kind of honor.

OF VAINGLORY (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider vainglory: under which head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether desire of glory is a sin?

(2) Whether it is opposed to magnanimity?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a capital vice?

(5) Of its daughters.

Whether the desire of glory is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that the desire of glory is not a sin. For no one sins in being likened to God: in fact we are commanded (Eph. 5:1): “Be ye . . . followers of God, as most dear children.” Now by seeking glory man seems to imitate God, Who seeks glory from men: wherefore it is written (Is. 43:6,7): “Bring My sons from afar, and My daughters from the ends of the earth. And every one that calleth on My name, I have created him for My glory.” Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which incites a mar to do good is apparently not a sin. Now the desire of glory incites men to do good. For Tully says (De Tusc. Quaest. i) that “glory inflames every man to strive his utmost”: and in Holy Writ glory is promised for good works, according to Rom. 2:7: “To them, indeed, who according to patience in good work . . . glory and honor” [*Vulg.: ‘Who will render to every man according to his works, to them indeed who . . . seek glory and honor and incorruption, eternal life.’]. Therefore the desire for glory is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that glory is “consistent good report about a person, together with praise”: and this comes to the same as what Augustine says (Contra Maximin. iii), viz. that glory is, “as it were, clear knowledge with praise.” Now it is no sin to desire praiseworthy renown: indeed, it seems itself to call for praise, according to Ecclus. 41:15, “Take care of a good name,” and Rom. 12:17, “Providing good things not only in the sight of God, but also in the sight of all men.” Therefore the desire of vainglory is not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v): “He is better advised who acknowledges that even the love of praise is sinful.”

I answer that, Glory signifies a certain clarity, wherefore Augustine says (Tract. lxxxii, c, cxiv in Joan.) that to be “glorified is the same as to be clarified.” Now clarity and comeliness imply a certain display: wherefore the word glory properly denotes the display of something as regards its seeming comely in the sight of men, whether it be a bodily or a spiritual good. Since, however, that which is clear simply can be seen by many, and by those who are far away, it follows that the word glory properly denotes that somebody’s good is known and approved by many, according to the saying of Sallust (Catilin.) [*The quotation is from Livy: Hist., Lib. XXII C, 39]: “I must not boast while I am addressing one man.”

But if we take the word glory in a broader sense, it not only consists in the knowledge of many, but also in the knowledge of few, or of one, or of oneself alone, as when one considers one’s own good as being worthy of praise. Now it is not a sin to know and approve one’s own good: for it is written (1 Cor. 2:12): “Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God that we may know the things that are given us from God.” Likewise it is not a sin to be willing to approve one’s own good works: for it is written (Mat. 5:16): “Let your light shine before men.” Hence the desire for glory does not, of itself, denote a sin: but the desire for empty or vain glory denotes a sin: for it is sinful to desire anything vain, according to Ps. 4:3, “Why do you love vanity, and seek after lying?”

Now glory may be called vain in three ways. First, on the part of the thing for which one seeks glory: as when a man seeks glory for that which is unworthy of glory, for instance when he seeks it for something frail and perishable: secondly, on the part of him from whom he seeks glory, for instance a man whose judgment is uncertain: thirdly, on the part of the man himself who seeks glory, for that he does not refer the desire of his own glory to a due end, such as God’s honor, or the spiritual welfare of his neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says on Jn. 13:13, “You call Me Master and Lord; and you say well” (Tract. lviii in Joan.): “Self-complacency is fraught with danger of one who has to beware of pride. But He Who is above all, however much He may praise Himself, does not uplift Himself. For knowledge of God is our need, not His: nor does any man know Him unless he be taught of Him Who knows.” It is therefore evident that God seeks glory, not for His own sake, but for ours. In like manner a man may rightly seek his own glory for the good of others, according to Mat. 5:16, “That they may see your good works, and glorify your Father Who is in heaven.”

Reply to Objection 2: That which we receive from God is not vain but true glory: it is this glory that is promised as a reward for good works, and of which it is written (2 Cor. 10:17,18): “He that glorieth let him glory in the Lord, for not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom God commendeth.” It is true that some are heartened to do works of virtue, through desire for human glory, as also through the desire for other earthly goods. Yet he is not truly virtuous who does virtuous deeds for the sake of human glory, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei v).

Reply to Objection 3: It is requisite for man’s perfection that he should know himself; but not that he should be known by others, wherefore it is not to be desired in itself. It may, however, be desired as being useful for something, either in order that God may be glorified by men, or that men may become better by reason of the good they know to be in another man, or in order that man, knowing by the testimony of others’ praise the good which is in him, may himself strive to persevere therein and to become better. In this sense it is praiseworthy that a man should “take care of his good name,” and that he should “provide good things in the sight of God and men”: but not that he should take an empty pleasure in human praise.

Whether vainglory is opposed to magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity. For, as stated above [3365](A[1]), vainglory consists in glorying in things that are not, which pertains to falsehood; or in earthly and perishable things, which pertains to covetousness; or in the testimony of men, whose judgment is uncertain, which pertains to imprudence. Now these vices are not contrary to magnanimity. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, vainglory is not, like pusillanimity, opposed to magnanimity by way of deficiency, for this seems inconsistent with vainglory. Nor is it opposed to it by way of excess, for in this way presumption and ambition are opposed to magnanimity, as stated above ([3366]Q[130], A[2];[3367] Q[131], A[2]): and these differ from vainglory. Therefore vainglory is not opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Phil. 2:3, “Let nothing be done through contention, neither by vainglory,” says: “Some among them were given to dissension and restlessness, contending with one another for the sake of vainglory.” But contention [*Cf. Q[38]] is not opposed to magnanimity. Neither therefore is vainglory.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading, “Magnanimity consists in two things: We should beware of the desire for glory, since it enslaves the mind, which a magnanimous man should ever strive to keep untrammeled.” Therefore it is opposed to magnanimity.

I answer that, As stated above ([3368]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory is an effect of honor and praise: because from the fact that a man is praised, or shown any kind of reverence, he acquires charity in the knowledge of others. And since magnanimity is about honor, as stated above ([3369]Q[129], AA[1],2), it follows that it also is about glory: seeing that as a man uses honor moderately, so too does he use glory in moderation. Wherefore inordinate desire of glory is directly opposed to magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 1: To think so much of little things as to glory in them is itself opposed to magnanimity. Wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that honor is of little account to him. In like manner he thinks little of other things that are sought for honor’s sake, such as power and wealth. Likewise it is inconsistent with magnanimity to glory in things that are not; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv) that he cares more for truth than for opinion. Again it is incompatible with magnanimity for a man to glory in the testimony of human praise, as though he deemed this something great; wherefore it is said of the magnanimous man (Ethic. iv), that he cares not to be praised. And so, when a man looks upon little things as though they were great, nothing hinders this from being contrary to magnanimity, as well as to other virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: He that is desirous of vainglory does in truth fall short of being magnanimous, because he glories in what the magnanimous man thinks little of, as stated in the preceding Reply. But if we consider his estimate, he is opposed to the magnanimous man by way of excess, because the glory which he seeks is something great in his estimation, and he tends thereto in excess of his deserts.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3370]Q[127], A[2], ad 2), the opposition of vices does not depend on their effects. Nevertheless contention, if done intentionally, is opposed to magnanimity: since no one contends save for what he deems great. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the magnanimous man is not contentious, because nothing is great in his estimation.

Whether vainglory is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is a mortal sin. For nothing precludes the eternal reward except a mortal sin. Now vainglory precludes the eternal reward: for it is written (Mat. 6:1): “Take heed, that you do not give justice before men, to be seen by them: otherwise you shall not have a reward of your Father Who is in heaven.” Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, whoever appropriates to himself that which is proper to God, sins mortally. Now by desiring vainglory, a man appropriates to himself that which is proper to God. For it is written (Is. 42:8): “I will not give My glory to another,” and (1 Tim. 1:17): “To . . . the only God be honor and glory.” Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, apparently a sin is mortal if it be most dangerous and harmful. Now vainglory is a sin of this kind, because a gloss of Augustine on 1 Thess. 2:4, “God, Who proveth our hearts,” says: “Unless a man war against the love of human glory he does not perceive its baneful power, for though it be easy for anyone not to desire praise as long as one does not get it, it is difficult not to take pleasure in it, when it is given.” Chrysostom also says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that “vainglory enters secretly, and robs us insensibly of all our inward possessions.” Therefore vainglory is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “while other vices find their abode in the servants of the devil, vainglory finds a place even in the servants of Christ.” Yet in the latter there is no mortal sin. Therefore vainglory is not a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([3371]Q[24], A[12];[3372] Q[110], A[4]; [3373] Q[112], A[2]), a sin is mortal through being contrary to charity. Now the sin of vainglory, considered in itself, does not seem to be contrary to charity as regards the love of one’s neighbor: yet as regards the love of God it may be contrary to charity in two ways. In one way, by reason of the matter about which one glories: for instance when one glories in something false that is opposed to the reverence we owe God, according to Ezech. 28:2, “Thy heart is lifted up, and Thou hast said: I am God,” and 1 Cor. 4:7, “What hast thou that thou hast not received? And if thou hast received, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?” Or again when a man prefers to God the temporal good in which he glories: for this is forbidden (Jer. 9:23,24): “Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, and let not the strong man glory in his strength, and let not the rich man glory in his riches. But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.” Or again when a man prefers the testimony of man to God’s; thus it is written in reproval of certain people (Jn. 12:43): “For they loved the glory of men more than the glory of God.”

In another way vainglory may be contrary to charity, on the part of the one who glories, in that he refers his intention to glory as his last end: so that he directs even virtuous deeds thereto, and, in order to obtain it, forbears not from doing even that which is against God. In this way it is a mortal sin. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 14) that “this vice,” namely the love of human praise, “is so hostile to a godly faith, if the heart desires glory more than it fears or loves God, that our Lord said (Jn. 5:44): How can you believe, who receive glory one from another, and the glory which is from God alone, you do not seek?”

If, however, the love of human glory, though it be vain, be not inconsistent with charity, neither as regards the matter gloried in, nor as to the intention of him that seeks glory, it is not a mortal but a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: No man, by sinning, merits eternal life: wherefore a virtuous deed loses its power to merit eternal life, if it be done for the sake of vainglory, even though that vainglory be not a mortal sin. On the other hand when a man loses the eternal reward simply through vainglory, and not merely in respect of one act, vainglory is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Not every man that is desirous of vainglory, desires the excellence which belongs to God alone. For the glory due to God alone differs from the glory due to a virtuous or rich man.

Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory is stated to be a dangerous sin, not only on account of its gravity, but also because it is a disposition to grave sins, in so far as it renders man presumptuous and too self-confident: and so it gradually disposes a man to lose his inward goods.

Whether vainglory is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It seems that vainglory is not a capital vice. For a vice that always arises from another vice is seemingly not capital. But vainglory always arises from pride. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, honor would seem to take precedence of glory, for this is its effect. Now ambition which is inordinate desire of honor is not a capital vice. Neither therefore is the desire of vainglory.

Objection 3: Further, a capital vice has a certain prominence. But vainglory seems to have no prominence, neither as a sin, because it is not always a mortal sin, nor considered as an appetible good, since human glory is apparently a frail thing, and is something outside man himself. Therefore vainglory is not a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi) numbers vainglory among the seven capital vices.

I answer that, The capital vices are enumerated in two ways. For some reckon pride as one of their number: and these do not place vainglory among the capital vices. Gregory, however (Moral. xxxi), reckons pride to be the queen of all the vices, and vainglory, which is the immediate offspring of pride, he reckons to be a capital vice: and not without reason. For pride, as we shall state farther on ([3374]Q[152], AA[1],2), denotes inordinate desire of excellence. But whatever good one may desire, one desires a certain perfection and excellence therefrom: wherefore the end of every vice is directed to the end of pride, so that this vice seems to exercise a kind of causality over the other vices, and ought not to be reckoned among the special sources of vice, known as the capital vices. Now among the goods that are the means whereby man acquires honor, glory seems to be the most conducive to that effect, inasmuch as it denotes the manifestation of a man’s goodness: since good is naturally loved and honored by all. Wherefore, just as by the glory which is in God’s sight man acquires honor in Divine things, so too by the glory which is in the sight of man he acquires excellence in human things. Hence on account of its close connection with excellence, which men desire above all, it follows that it is most desirable. And since many vices arise from the inordinate desire thereof, it follows that vainglory is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not impossible for a capital vice to arise from pride, since as stated above (in the body of the Article and [3375]FS, Q[84], A[2]) pride is the queen and mother of all the vices.

Reply to Objection 2: Praise and honor, as stated above [3376](A[2]), stand in relation to glory as the causes from which it proceeds, so that glory is compared to them as their end. For the reason why a man loves to be honored and praised is that he thinks thereby to acquire a certain renown in the knowledge of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory stands prominent under the aspect of desirability, for the reason given above, and this suffices for it to be reckoned a capital vice. Nor is it always necessary for a capital vice to be a mortal sin; for mortal sin can arise from venial sin, inasmuch as venial sin can dispose man thereto.

Whether the daughters of vainglory are suitably reckoned to be disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and love of novelties?

Objection 1: It seems that the daughters of vainglory are unsuitably reckoned to be “disobedience, boastfulness, hypocrisy, contention, obstinacy, discord, and eccentricity [*Praesumptio novitatum, literally ‘presumption of novelties’].” For according to Gregory (Moral. xxiii) boastfulness is numbered among the species of pride. Now pride does not arise from vainglory, rather is it the other way about, as Gregory says (Moral. xxxi). Therefore boastfulness should not be reckoned among the daughters of vainglory.

Objection 2: Further, contention and discord seem to be the outcome chiefly of anger. But anger is a capital vice condivided with vainglory. Therefore it seems that they are not the daughters of vainglory.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xix in Matth.) that vainglory is always evil, but especially in philanthropy, i.e. mercy. And yet this is nothing new, for it is an established custom among men. Therefore eccentricity should not be specially reckoned as a daughter of vainglory.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi), who there assigns the above daughters to vainglory.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[34], A[5]; Q[35], A[4]; [3377]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), the vices which by their very nature are such as to be directed to the end of a certain capital vice, are called its daughters. Now the end of vainglory is the manifestation of one’s own excellence, as stated above ([3378]AA[1],4): and to this end a man may tend in two ways. In one way directly, either by words, and this is boasting, or by deeds, and then if they be true and call for astonishment, it is love of novelties which men are wont to wonder at most; but if they be false, it is hypocrisy. In another way a man strives to make known his excellence by showing that he is not inferior to another, and this in four ways. First, as regards the intellect, and thus we have “obstinacy,” by which a man is too much attached to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe one that is better. Secondly, as regards the will, and then we have “discord,” whereby a man is unwilling to give up his own will, and agree with others. Thirdly, as regards “speech,” and then we have “contention,” whereby a man quarrels noisily with another. Fourthly as regards deeds, and this is “disobedience,” whereby a man refuses to carry out the command of his superiors.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3379]Q[112], A[1], ad 2), boasting is reckoned a kind of pride, as regards its interior cause, which is arrogance: but outward boasting, according to Ethic. iv, is directed sometimes to gain, but more often to glory and honor, and thus it is the result of vainglory.

Reply to Objection 2: Anger is not the cause of discord and contention, except in conjunction with vainglory, in that a man thinks it a glorious thing for him not to yield to the will and words of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Vainglory is reproved in connection with almsdeeds on account of the lack of charity apparent in one who prefers vainglory to the good of his neighbor, seeing that he does the latter for the sake of the former. But a man is not reproved for presuming to give alms as though this were something novel.

OF PUSILLANIMITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider pusillanimity. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pusillanimity is a sin?

(2) To what virtue is it opposed?

Whether pusillanimity is a sin?

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not a sin. For every sin makes a man evil, just as every virtue makes a man good. But a fainthearted man is not evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “a fainthearted man is especially one who is worthy of great goods, yet does not deem himself worthy of them.” Now no one is worthy of great goods except the virtuous, since as the Philosopher again says (Ethic. iv, 3), “none but the virtuous are truly worthy of honor.” Therefore the fainthearted are virtuous: and consequently pusillanimity is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, “Pride is the beginning of all sin” (Ecclus. 10:15). But pusillanimity does not proceed from pride, since the proud man sets himself above what he is, while the fainthearted man withdraws from the things he is worthy of. Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that “he who deems himself less worthy than he is, is said to be fainthearted.” Now sometimes holy men deem themselves less worthy than they are; for instance, Moses and Jeremias, who were worthy of the office God chose them for, which they both humbly declined (Ex. 3:11; Jer. 1:6). Therefore pusillanimity is not a sin.

On the contrary, Nothing in human conduct is to be avoided save sin. Now pusillanimity is to be avoided: for it is written (Col. 3:21): “Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Therefore pusillanimity is a sin.

I answer that, Whatever is contrary to a natural inclination is a sin, because it is contrary to a law of nature. Now everything has a natural inclination to accomplish an action that is commensurate with its power: as is evident in all natural things, whether animate or inanimate. Now just as presumption makes a man exceed what is proportionate to his power, by striving to do more than he can, so pusillanimity makes a man fall short of what is proportionate to his power, by refusing to tend to that which is commensurate thereto. Wherefore as presumption is a sin, so is pusillanimity. Hence it is that the servant who buried in the earth the money he had received from his master, and did not trade with it through fainthearted fear, was punished by his master (Mat. 25; Lk. 19).

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher calls those evil who injure their neighbor: and accordingly the fainthearted is said not to be evil, because he injures no one, save accidentally, by omitting to do what might be profitable to others. For Gregory says (Pastoral. i) that if "they who demur to do good to their neighbor in preaching be judged strictly, without doubt their guilt is proportionate to the good they might have done had they been less retiring."

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders a person who has a virtuous habit from sinning venially and without losing the habit, or mortally and with loss of the habit of gratuitous virtue. Hence it is possible for a man, by reason of the virtue which he has, to be worthy of doing certain great things that are worthy of great honor, and yet through not trying to make use of his virtue, he sins sometimes venially, sometimes mortally.

Again it may be replied that the fainthearted is worthy of great things in proportion to his ability for virtue, ability which he derives either from a good natural disposition, or from science, or from external fortune, and if he fails to use those things for virtue, he becomes guilty of pusillanimity.

Reply to Objection 3: Even pusillanimity may in some way be the result of pride: when, to wit, a man clings too much to his own opinion, whereby he thinks himself incompetent for those things for which he is competent. Hence it is written (Prov. 26:16): "The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that speak sentences." For nothing hinders him from depreciating himself in some things, and having a high opinion of himself in others. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastoral. i) of Moses that "perchance he would have been proud, had he undertaken the leadership of a numerous people without misgiving: and again he would have been proud, had he refused to obey the command of his Creator."

Reply to Objection 4: Moses and Jeremias were worthy of the office to which they were appointed by God, but their worthiness was of Divine grace: yet they, considering the insufficiency of their own weakness, demurred; though not obstinately lest they should fall into pride.

Whether pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity?

Objection 1: It seems that pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity. For the Philosopher says (Ethic., 3) that "the fainthearted man knows not himself: for he would desire the good things, of which he is worthy, if he knew himself." Now ignorance of self seems opposed to prudence. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to prudence.

Objection 2: Further our Lord calls the servant wicked and slothful who through pusillanimity refused to make use of the money. Moreover the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the fainthearted seem to be slothful. Now sloth is opposed to solicitude, which is an act of prudence, as stated above ([3380]Q[47], A[9]). Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, pusillanimity seems to proceed from inordinate fear: hence it is written (Is. 35:4): "Say to the fainthearted: Take courage and fear not." It also seems to proceed from inordinate anger, according to Col. 3:21, "Fathers, provoke not your children to indignation, lest they be discouraged." Now inordinate fear is opposed to fortitude, and inordinate anger to meekness. Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

Objection 4: Further, the vice that is in opposition to a particular virtue is the more grievous according as it is more unlike that virtue. Now pusillanimity is more unlike magnanimity than presumption is. Therefore if pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity, it follows that it is a more grievous sin than presumption: yet this is contrary to the saying of Ecclus. 37:3, "O wicked presumption, whence camest thou?" Therefore pusillanimity is not opposed to magnanimity.

On the contrary, Pusillanimity and magnanimity differ as greatness and littleness of soul, as their very names denote. Now great and little are opposites. Therefore pusillanimity is opposed to magnanimity.

I answer that, Pusillanimity may be considered in three ways. First, in itself; and thus it is evident that by its very nature it is opposed to magnanimity, from which it differs as great and little differ in connection with the same subject. For just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from great things out of littleness of soul. Secondly, it may be considered in reference to its cause, which on the part of the intellect is ignorance of one’s own qualification, and on the part of the appetite is the fear of failure in what one falsely deems to exceed one’s ability. Thirdly, it may be considered in reference to its effect, which is to shrink from the great things of which one is worthy. But, as stated above ([3381]Q[132], A[2], ad 3), opposition between vice and virtue depends rather on their respective species than on their cause or effect. Hence pusillanimity is directly opposed to magnanimity.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers pusillanimity as proceeding from a cause in the intellect. Yet it cannot be said properly that it is opposed to prudence, even in respect of its cause: because ignorance of this kind does not proceed from indiscretion but from laziness in considering one’s own ability, according to Ethic. iv, 3, or in accomplishing what is within one’s power.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers pusillanimity from the point of view of its effect.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the point of view of cause. Nor is the fear that causes pusillanimity always a fear of the dangers of death: wherefore it does not follow from this standpoint that pusillanimity is opposed to fortitude. As regards anger, if we consider it under the aspect of its proper movement, whereby a man is roused to take vengeance, it does not cause pusillanimity, which disheartens the soul; on the contrary, it takes it away. If, however, we consider the causes of anger, which are injuries inflicted whereby the soul of the man who suffers them is disheartened, it conduces to pusillanimity.

Reply to Objection 4: According to its proper species pusillanimity is a graver sin than presumption, since thereby a man withdraws from good things, which is a very great evil according to Ethic. iv. Presumption, however, is stated to be “wicked” on account of pride whence it proceeds.

OF MAGNIFICENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider magnificence and the vices opposed to it. With regard to magnificence there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether magnificence is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) What is its matter?

(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

Whether magnificence is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a virtue. For whoever has one virtue has all the virtues, as stated above ([3382]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But one may have the other virtues without having magnificence: because the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “not every liberal man is magnificent.” Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, moral virtue observes the mean, according to Ethic. ii, 6. But magnificence does not seemingly observe the mean, for it exceeds liberality in greatness. Now “great” and “little” are opposed to one another as extremes, the mean of which is “equal,” as stated in Metaph. x. Hence magnificence observes not the mean, but the extreme. Therefore it is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to a natural inclination, but on the contrary perfects it, as stated above ([3383]Q[108], A[2];[3384] Q[117], A[1], OBJ[1]). Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 2) the “magnificent man is not lavish towards himself”: and this is opposed to the natural inclination one has to look after oneself. Therefore magnificence is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 4) “act is right reason about things to be made.” Now magnificence is about things to be made, as its very name denotes [*Magnificence= magna facere—i.e. to make great things]. Therefore it is an act rather than a virtue.

On the contrary, Human virtue is a participation of Divine power. But magnificence [virtutis] belongs to Divine power, according to Ps. 47:35:

“His magnificence and His power is in the clouds.” Therefore magnificence is a virtue.

I answer that, According to De Coelo i, 16, “we speak of virtue in relation to the extreme limit of a thing’s power,” not as regards the limit of deficiency, but as regards the limit of excess, the very nature of which denotes something great. Wherefore to do something great, whence magnificence takes its name, belongs properly to the very notion of virtue. Hence magnificence denotes a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Not every liberal man is magnificent as regards his actions, because he lacks the wherewithal to perform magnificent deeds. Nevertheless every liberal man has the habit of magnificence, either actually or in respect of a proximate disposition thereto, as explained above (Q[129], A[3], ad 2), as also ([3385]FS, Q[65], A[1]) when we were treating of the connection of virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that magnificence observes the extreme, if we consider the quantity of the thing done: yet it observes the mean, if we consider the rule of reason, which it neither falls short of nor exceeds, as we have also said of magnanimity ([3386]Q[129], A[3], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to magnificence to do something great. But that which regards a man’s person is little in comparison with that which regards Divine things, or even the affairs of the community at large. Wherefore the magnificent man does not intend principally to be lavish towards himself, not that he does not seek his own good, but because to do so is not something great. Yet if anything regarding himself admits of greatness, the magnificent man accomplishes it magnificently: for instance, things that are done once, such as a wedding, or the like; or things that are of a lasting nature; thus it belongs to a magnificent man to provide himself with a suitable dwelling, as stated in Ethic. iv.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) “there must needs be a virtue of act,” i.e. a moral virtue, whereby the appetite is inclined to make good use of the rule of act: and this is what magnificence does. Hence it is not an act but a virtue.

Whether magnificence is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a special virtue. For magnificence would seem to consist in doing something great. But it may belong to any virtue to do something great, if the virtue be great: as in the case of one who has a great virtue of temperance, for he does a great work of temperance. Therefore, magnificence is not a special virtue, but denotes a perfect degree of any virtue.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly that which tends to a thing is the same as that which does it. But it belongs to magnanimity to tend to something great, as stated above ([3387]Q[129], AA[1],2). Therefore it belongs to magnanimity likewise to do something great. Therefore magnificence is not a special virtue distinct from magnanimity.

Objection 3: Further, magnificence seems to belong to holiness, for it is written (Ex. 15:11): “Magnificent [Douay: ‘glorious’] in holiness,” and (Ps. 95:6): “Holiness and magnificence [Douay: ‘Majesty’] in His sanctuary.” Now holiness is the same as religion, as stated above ([3388]Q[81], A[8]). Therefore magnificence is apparently the same as religion. Therefore it is not a special virtue, distinct from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons it with other special virtues (Ethic. ii, 7; iv 2).

I answer that, It belongs to magnificence to do [facere] something great, as its name implies [magnificence= magna facere—i.e. to make great things]. Now “facere” may be taken in two ways, in a strict sense, and in a broad sense. Strictly “facere” means to work something in external matter, for instance to make a house, or something of the kind; in a broad sense “facere” is employed to denote any action, whether it passes into external matter, as to burn or cut, or remain in the agent, as to understand or will.

Accordingly if magnificence be taken to denote the doing of something great, the doing [factio] being understood in the strict sense, it is then a special virtue. For the work done is produced by act: in the use of which it is possible to consider a special aspect of goodness, namely that the work produced [factum] by the act is something great, namely in quantity, value, or dignity, and this is what magnificence does. In this way magnificence is a special virtue.

If, on the other hand, magnificence take its name from doing something great, the doing [facere] being understood in a broad sense, it is not a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every perfect virtue to do something great in the genus of that virtue, if “doing” [facere] be taken in the broad sense, but not if it be taken strictly, for this is proper to magnificence.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to magnanimity not only to tend to something great, but also to do great works in all the virtues, either by making [faciendo], or by any kind of action, as stated in Ethic. iv, 3: yet so that magnanimity, in this respect, regards the sole aspect of great, while the other virtues which, if they be perfect, do something great, direct their principal intention, not to something great, but to that which is proper to each virtue: and the greatness of the thing done is sometimes consequent upon the greatness of the virtue.

On the other hand, it belongs to magnificence not only to do something great, “doing” [facere] being taken in the strict sense, but also to tend with the mind to the doing of great things. Hence Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that “magnificence is the discussing and administering of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad and noble purpose of mind, discussion” referring to the inward intention, and “administration” to the outward accomplishment. Wherefore just as magnanimity intends something great in every matter, it follows that magnificence does the same in every work that can be produced in external matter [factibili].

Reply to Objection 3: The intention of magnificence is the production of a great work. Now works done by men are directed to an end: and no end of human works is so great as the honor of God: wherefore magnificence does a great work especially in reference to the Divine honor. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “the most commendable expenditure is that which is directed to Divine sacrifices”: and this is the chief object of magnificence. For this reason magnificence is connected with holiness, since its chief effect is directed to religion or holiness.

Whether the matter of magnificence is great expenditure?

Objection 1: It seems that the matter of magnificence is not great expenditure. For there are not two virtues about the same matter. But liberality is about expenditure, as stated above ([3389]Q[117], A[2]). Therefore magnificence is not about expenditure.

Objection 2: Further, “every magnificent man is liberal” (Ethic. iv, 2). But liberality is about gifts rather than about expenditure. Therefore magnificence also is not chiefly about expenditure, but about gifts.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to magnificence to produce an external work. But not even great expenditure is always the means of producing an external work, for instance when one spends much in sending presents. Therefore expenditure is not the proper matter of magnificence.

Objection 4: Further, only the rich are capable of great expenditure. But the poor are able to possess all the virtues, since “the virtues do not necessarily require external fortune, but are sufficient for themselves,” as Seneca says (De Ira i: De vita beata xvi). Therefore magnificence is not about great expenditure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “magnificence does not extend, like liberality, to all transactions in money, but only to expensive ones, wherein it exceeds liberality in scale.” Therefore it is only about great expenditure.

I answer that, As stated above [3390](A[2]), it belongs to magnificence to intend doing some great work. Now for the doing of a great work, proportionate expenditure is necessary, for great works cannot be produced without great expenditure. Hence it belongs to magnificence to spend much in order that some great work may be accomplished in becoming manner. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “a magnificent man will produce a more magnificent work with equal,” i.e. proportionate, “expenditure.” Now expenditure is the outlay of a sum of money; and a man may be hindered from making that outlay if he love money too much. Hence the matter of magnificence may be said to be both this expenditure itself, which the magnificent man uses to produce a great work, and also the very money which he employs in going to great expense, and as well as the love of money, which love the magnificent man moderates, lest he be hindered from spending much.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3391]Q[129], A[2]), those virtues that are about external things experience a certain difficulty arising from the genus itself of the thing about which the virtue is concerned, and another difficulty besides arising from the greatness of that same thing. Hence the need for two virtues, concerned about money and its use; namely, liberality, which regards the use of money in general, and magnificence, which regards that which is great in the use of money.

Reply to Objection 2: The use of money regards the liberal man in one way and the magnificent man in another. For it regards the liberal man, inasmuch as it proceeds from an ordinate affection in respect of money; wherefore all due use of money (such as gifts and expenditure), the obstacles to which are removed by a moderate love of money, belongs to liberality. But the use of money regards the magnificent man in relation to some great work which has to be produced, and this use is impossible without expenditure or outlay.

Reply to Objection 3: The magnificent man also makes gifts of presents, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2, but not under the aspect of gift, but rather under the aspect of expenditure directed to the production of some work, for instance in order to honor someone, or in order to do something which will reflect honor on the whole state: as when he brings to effect what the whole state is striving for.

Reply to Objection 4: The chief act of virtue is the inward choice, and a virtue may have this without outward fortune: so that even a poor man may be magnificent. But goods of fortune are requisite as instruments to the external acts of virtue: and in this way a poor man cannot accomplish the outward act of magnificence in things that are great simply. Perhaps, however, he may be able to do so in things that are great by comparison to some particular work; which, though little in itself, can nevertheless be done magnificently in proportion to its genus: for little and great are relative terms, as the Philosopher says (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.).

Whether magnificence is a part of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that magnificence is not a part of fortitude. For magnificence agrees in matter with liberality, as stated above [3392](A[3]). But liberality is a part, not of fortitude, but of justice. Therefore magnificence is not a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and darings. But magnificence seems to have nothing to do with fear, but only with expenditure, which is a kind of action. Therefore magnificence seems to pertain to justice, which is about actions, rather than to fortitude.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “the magnificent man is like the man of science.” Now science has more in common with prudence than with fortitude. Therefore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) and Macrobius (De Somn. Scip. i) and Andronicus reckon magnificence to be a part of fortitude.

I answer that, Magnificence, in so far as it is a special virtue, cannot be reckoned a subjective part of fortitude, since it does not agree with this virtue in the point of matter: but it is reckoned a part thereof, as being annexed to it as secondary to principal virtue.

In order for a virtue to be annexed to a principal virtue, two things are necessary, as stated above ([3393]Q[80]). The one is that the secondary virtue agree with the principal, and the other is that in some respect it be exceeded thereby. Now magnificence agrees with fortitude in the point that as fortitude tends to something arduous and difficult, so also does magnificence: wherefore seemingly it is seated, like fortitude, in the irascible. Yet magnificence falls short of fortitude, in that the arduous thing to which fortitude tends derives its difficulty from a danger that threatens the person, whereas the arduous thing to which magnificence tends, derives its difficulty from the dispossession of one’s property, which is of much less account than danger to one’s person. Wherefore magnificence is accounted a part of fortitude.

Reply to Objection 1: Justice regards operations in themselves, as viewed under the aspect of something due: but liberality and magnificence regard sumptuary operations as related to the passions of the soul, albeit in different ways. For liberality regards expenditure in reference to the love and desire of money, which are passions of the concupiscible faculty, and do not hinder the liberal man from giving and spending: so that this virtue is in the concupiscible. On the other hand, magnificence regards expenditure in reference to hope, by attaining to the difficulty, not simply, as magnanimity does, but in a determinate matter, namely expenditure: wherefore magnificence, like magnanimity, is apparently in the irascible part.

Reply to Objection 2: Although magnificence does not agree with fortitude in matter, it agrees with it as the condition of its matter: since it tends to something difficult in the matter of expenditure, even as fortitude tends to something difficult in the matter of fear.

Reply to Objection 3: Magnificence directs the use of art to something great, as stated above and in the preceding Article. Now art is in the reason. Wherefore it belongs to the magnificent man to use his reason by observing proportion of expenditure to the work he has in hand. This is especially necessary on account of the greatness of both those things, since if he did not take careful thought, he would incur the risk of a great loss.

OF MEANNESS* (TWO ARTICLES)

[*”Parvificentia,” or doing mean things, just as “magnificentia” is doing great things.]

We must now consider the vices opposed to magnificence: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether meanness is a vice?

(2) Of the vice opposed to it.

Whether meanness is a vice?

Objection 1: It seems that meanness is not a vice. For just as vice moderates great things, so does it moderate little things: wherefore both the liberal and the magnificent do little things. But magnificence is a virtue. Therefore likewise meanness is a virtue rather than a vice.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “careful reckoning is mean.” But careful reckoning is apparently praiseworthy, since man’s good is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv, 4). Therefore meanness is not a vice.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “a mean man is loth to spend money.” But this belongs to covetousness or illiberality. Therefore meanness is not a distinct vice from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii) accounts meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.

I answer that, As stated above ([3394]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3395]FS, Q[18], A[6]), moral acts take their species from their end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean [parvificus] because he intends to do something little [parvum]. Now according to the Philosopher (De Praedic. Cap. Ad aliquid.) great and little are relative terms: and when we say that a mean man intends to do something little, this must be understood in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little or great in two ways: in one way as regards the work itself to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 4) that “the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce a more magnificent result.” On the other hand, the mean man intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “he seeks how he may spend least.” As a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is, he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that “the mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good” of the magnificent work, “for the trifle” that he is unwilling to spend. Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe the proportion that reason demands between expenditure and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it is manifest that meanness is a vice.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtue moderates little things, according to the rule of reason: from which rule the mean man declines, as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for moderating little things, but for declining from the rule of reason in moderating great or little things: hence meanness is a vice.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), “fear makes us take counsel”: wherefore a mean man is careful in his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because then a man does not regulate his affections according to reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in pursuance of his inordinate affections.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the magnificent man has this in common with the liberal man, that he spends his money readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend. Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure, which is a more difficult accomplishment: wherefore meanness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2) that “although meanness and its contrary vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither do they harm one’s neighbor, nor are they very disgraceful.”

Whether there is a vice opposed to meanness?

Objection 1: It seems that there is no vice opposed to meanness. For great is opposed to little. Now, magnificence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

Objection 2: Further, since meanness is a vice by deficiency, as stated above [3396](A[1]), it seems that if any vice is opposed to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending. But those who spend much, where they ought to spend little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according to Ethic. iv, 2, and thus they have something of meanness. Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

Objection 3: Further, moral acts take their species from their end, as stated above [3397](A[1]). Now those who spend excessively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as stated in Ethic. iv, 2. But this belongs to vainglory, which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above (Q[131], A[2]). Therefore no vice is opposed to meanness.

On the contrary, stands the authority of the Philosopher who (Ethic. ii, 8; iv, 2) places magnificence as a mean between two opposite vices.

I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and great are relative terms, as stated above [3398](A[1]). Now just as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work, so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist between expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due proportion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion, by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This vice is called in Greek {banausia}, so called from the Greek {baunos}, because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything. It is also called {apyrokalia}, i.e. lacking good fire, since like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence in Latin it may be called "consumptio" [waste].

Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence is so called from the great work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed to meanness.

Reply to Objection 2: To the one same vice there is opposed the virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice. Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to meanness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work, by spending much where it behooved to spend little. But it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work, which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far as when it behooves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.

Reply to Objection 3: Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason, whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as vainglory or any other.

OF PATIENCE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider patience. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether patience is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues?

(3) Whether it can be had without grace?

(4) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(5) Whether it is the same as longanimity?

Whether patience is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a virtue. For the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv). Yet patience is not there, since no evils have to be borne there, according to Is. 49:10 and Apoc. 7:16, “They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the heat nor the sun strike them.” Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, no virtue can be found in the wicked, since virtue it is “that makes its possessor good.” Yet patience is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may amass money, according to Eccles. 5:16, “All the days of his life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery and in sorrow.” Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits differ from the virtues, as stated above ([3399]FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 3). But patience is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:22). Therefore patience is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Patientia i): “The virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it upon us.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3400]Q[123], A[1]), the moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. 7:10, “The sorrow of the world worketh death,” and Ecclus. 30:25, “Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” Hence the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this patience does. Wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia ii): “A man’s patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal mind,” i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, “lest he abandon with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to better things.” It is therefore evident that patience is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The moral virtues do not remain in heaven as regards the same act that they have on the way, in relation, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience, in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv) that “patience itself will not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience will be eternal.”

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Patientia ii; v) “properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing them. As for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil, their patience is neither marvelous nor praiseworthy, for it is no patience at all: we may marvel at their hardness of heart, but we must refuse to call them patient.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3401]FS, Q[11], A[1]), the very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. Now the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts. Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue. but as to the pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being overcome by sorrow.

Whether patience is the greatest of the virtues?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is the greatest of the virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the greatest. Now “patience hath a perfect work” (James 1:4). Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, all the virtues are directed to the good of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience; for it is written (Lk. 21:19): “In your patience you shall possess your souls.” Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly that which is the safeguard and cause of other things is greater than they are. But according to Gregory (Hom. xxxv in Evang.) “patience is the root and safeguard of all the virtues.” Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues which Gregory (Moral. xxii) and Augustine (De Morib. Eccl. xv) call principal.

I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed to good. For it is virtue that “makes its possessor good, and renders the latter’s work good” (Ethic. ii, 6). Hence it follows that a virtue’s superiority and preponderance over other virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which are effective of good, incline a man more directly to good than those which are a check on the things which lead man away from good: and just as among those that are effective of good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater good (thus faith, hope, and charity /are greater than prudence and justice); so too among those that are a check on things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good. But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.

Reply to Objection 1: Patience is said to have a perfect work in bearing hardships: for these give rise first to sorrow, which is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is moderated by meekness; thirdly, to hatred, which charity removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice forbids. Now that which removes the principle is the most perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this respect, that it is more perfect simply.

Reply to Objection 2: Possession denotes undisturbed ownership; wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked by hardships and disturb the soul.

Reply to Objection 3: Patience is said to be the root and safeguard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their obstacles.

Whether it is possible to have patience without grace?

Objection 1: It seems that it is possible to have patience without grace. For the more his reason inclines to a thing, the more is it possible for the rational creature to accomplish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of grace; for Augustine says (De Patientia iii) that "men endure many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sinfully." Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this is to be truly patient.

Objection 2: Further, some who are not in a state of grace have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils: hence some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help of grace.

Objection 3: Further, it is quite evident that some go through much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body. Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul, and this is to be truly patient.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 61:6): "From Him," i.e. from God, "is my patience."

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv), "the strength of desire helps a man to bear toil and pain: and no one willingly undertakes to bear what is painful, save for the sake of that which gives pleasure." The reason of this is because sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul, wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient."

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity save through grace, according to Rom. 5:5, "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us." Therefore it is clearly impossible to have patience without the help of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: The inclination of reason would prevail in human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply to Objection 2: The good of a social virtue [*Cf. [3402]FS, Q[61], A[5]] is commensurate with human nature; and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not without the help of God's grace [*Cf. [3403]FS, Q[109], A[2]]. On the other hand, the good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Even the endurance of those evils which a man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence there is no comparison between this endurance and patience which proceeds from a supernatural love.

Whether patience is a part of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that patience is not a part of fortitude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above ([3404]Q[123], A[6]), the proper act of fortitude is to endure; and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the Liber Sententiarum Prosperi [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, Hom. xxxv in Evang.] that "patience consists in enduring evils inflicted by others." Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, fortitude is about fear and daring, as stated above ([3405]Q[123], A[3]), and thus it is in the irascible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and consequently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the whole cannot be without its part. Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons it a part of fortitude.

I answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of fortitude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal virtue. For it belongs to patience "to suffer with an equal mind the evils inflicted by others," as Gregory says in a homily (xxxv in Evang.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that are connected with the danger of death, and about these evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave (Sent. 811).

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to fortitude to endure, not anything indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure, namely dangers of death: whereas it may pertain to patience to endure any kind of evil.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of fortitude consists not only in holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by things present; and it is in the latter respect that patience is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear, which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves in a praiseworthy manner by suffering [patiendo] things which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of fortitude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Nevertheless patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance, although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to temperance to control these sorrows besides their contrary pleasures: whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake not the good of virtue on account of such like sorrows, however great they be.

Reply to Objection 3: It may be granted that patience in a certain respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts evils on him; for Chrysostom [*Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says on Mat. 4:10, “Begone Satan,” that “it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own wrongs, but to endure God’s wrongs patiently is most wicked”: and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus (Ep. cxxxviii) that “the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight against our enemies.” But in so far as patience regards all kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue.

Whether patience is the same as longanimity? [*Longsuffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on account of the comparison with magnanimity.]

Objection 1: It seems that patience is the same as longanimity. For Augustine says (De Patientia i) that “we speak of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer, but because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted.” Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:4): “The Most High is a patient rewarder.” Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing is not contrary to two things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby one awaits a delay: for one is said to be impatient of delay, as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the same as longanimity.

Objection 3: Further, just as time is a circumstance of wrongs endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a long time, is not distinct from patience.

Objection 4: On the contrary, a gloss [*Origen, Comment. in Ep. ad Rom. ii] on Rom. 2:4, “Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffering?” says: “It seems that longanimity differs from patience, because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently.”

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magnanimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring, fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas if it be delayed a long time, it is more difficult. Secondly, because the very delay of the good we hope for, is of a nature to cause sorrow, according to Prov. 13:12, “Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.” Hence there may be patience in bearing this trial, as in enduring any other sorrows. Accordingly longanimity and constancy are both comprised under patience, in so far as both the delay of the hoped for good (which regards longanimity) and the toil which man endures in persistently accomplishing a good work (which regards constancy) may be considered under the one aspect of grievous evil.

For this reason Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) in defining patience, says that “patience is the voluntary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difficult things for the sake of virtue or profit.” By saying “arduous” he refers to constancy in good; when he says “difficult” he refers to the grievousness of evil, which is the proper object of patience; and by adding “continued” or “long lasting,” he refers to longanimity, in so far as it has something in common with patience.

This suffices for the Replies to the First and Second Objections.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is a long way off as to place, though distant from us, is not simply distant from things in nature, as that which is a long way off in point of time: hence the comparison fails. Moreover, what is remote as to place offers no difficulty save in the point of time, since what is placed a long way from us is a long time coming to us.

We grant the fourth argument. We must observe, however, that the reason for the difference assigned by this gloss is that it is hard to bear with those who sin through weakness, merely because they persist a long time in evil, wherefore it is said that they are borne with longanimity: whereas the very fact of sinning through pride seems to be unendurable; for which reason those who sin through pride are stated to be borne with patience.

OF PERSEVERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider perseverance and the vices opposed to it. Under the head of perseverance there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether perseverance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a part of fortitude?

(3) Of its relation to constancy;

(4) Whether it needs the help of grace?

Whether perseverance is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a virtue. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), continency is greater than perseverance. But continency is not a virtue, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, "by virtue man lives aright," according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Now according to the same authority (De Persever. i), no one can be said to have perseverance while living, unless he persevere until death. Therefore perseverance is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, it is requisite of every virtue that one should persist unchangeably in the work of that virtue, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. But this is what we understand by perseverance: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "perseverance is the fixed and continued persistence in a well-considered purpose." Therefore perseverance is not a special virtue, but a condition of every virtue.

On the contrary, Andronicus [*Chrysippus: in De Affect.] says that "perseverance is a habit regarding things to which we ought to stand, and those to which we ought not to stand, as well as those that are indifferent." Now a habit that directs us to do something well, or to omit something, is a virtue. Therefore perseverance is a virtue.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3), “virtue is about the difficult and the good”; and so where there is a special kind of difficulty or goodness, there is a special virtue. Now a virtuous deed may involve goodness or difficulty on two counts. First, from the act’s very species, which is considered in respect of the proper object of that act: secondly, from the length of time, since to persist long in something difficult involves a special difficulty. Hence to persist long in something good until it is accomplished belongs to a special virtue.

Accordingly just as temperance and fortitude are special virtues, for the reason that the one moderates pleasures of touch (which is of itself a difficult thing), while the other moderates fear and daring in connection with dangers of death (which also is something difficult in itself), so perseverance is a special virtue, since it consists in enduring delays in the above or other virtuous deeds, so far as necessity requires.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is taking perseverance there, as it is found in one who bears those things which are most difficult to endure long. Now it is difficult to endure, not good, but evil. And evils that involve danger of death, for the most part are not endured for a long time, because often they soon pass away: wherefore it is not on this account that perseverance has its chief title to praise. Among other evils foremost are those which are opposed to pleasures of touch, because evils of this kind affect the necessaries of life: such are the lack of food and the like, which at times call for long endurance. Now it is not difficult to endure these things for a long time for one who grieves not much at them, nor delights much in the contrary goods; as in the case of the temperate man, in whom these passions are not violent. But they are most difficult to bear for one who is strongly affected by such things, through lacking the perfect virtue that moderates these passions. Wherefore if perseverance be taken in this sense it is not a perfect virtue, but something imperfect in the genus of virtue. On the other hand, if we take perseverance as denoting long persistence in any kind of difficult good, it is consistent in one who has even perfect virtue: for even if it is less difficult for him to persist, yet he persists in the more perfect good. Wherefore such like perseverance may be a virtue, because virtue derives perfection from the aspect of good rather than from the aspect of difficulty.

Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes a virtue and its act go by the same name: thus Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. lxxix): “Faith is to believe without seeing.” Yet it is possible to have a habit of virtue without performing the act: thus a poor man has the habit of magnificence without exercising the act. Sometimes, however, a person who has the habit, begins to perform the act, yet does not accomplish it, for instance a builder begins to build a house, but does not complete it. Accordingly we must reply that the term “perseverance” is sometimes used to denote the habit whereby one chooses to persevere, sometimes for the act of persevering: and sometimes one who has the habit of perseverance chooses to persevere and begins to carry out his choice by persisting for a time, yet completes not the act, through not persisting to the end. Now the end is twofold: one is the end of the work, the other is the end of human life. Properly speaking it belongs to perseverance to persevere to the end of the virtuous work, for instance that a soldier persevere to the end of the fight, and the magnificent man until his work be accomplished. There are, however, some virtues whose acts must endure throughout the whole of life, such as faith, hope, and charity, since they regard the last end of the entire life of man. Wherefore as regards these which are the principal virtues, the act of perseverance is not accomplished until the end of life. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of perseverance as denoting the consummate act of perseverance.

Reply to Objection 3: Unchangeable persistence may belong to a virtue in two ways. First, on account of the intended end that is proper to that virtue; and thus to persist in good for a long time until the end, belongs to a special virtue called perseverance, which intends this as its special end. Secondly, by reason of the relation of the habit to its subject: and thus unchangeable persistence is consequent upon every virtue, inasmuch as virtue is a “quality difficult to change.”

Whether perseverance is a part of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance is not a part of fortitude. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 7), “perseverance is about pains of touch.” But these belong to temperance. Therefore perseverance is a part of temperance rather than of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, every part of a moral virtue is about certain passions which that virtue moderates. Now perseverance does not imply moderation of the passions: since the more violent the passions, the more praiseworthy is it to persevere in accordance with reason. Therefore it seems that perseverance is a part not of a moral virtue, but rather of prudence which perfects the reason.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Persev. i) that no one can lose perseverance; whereas one can lose the other virtues. Therefore perseverance is greater than all the other virtues. Now a principal virtue is greater than its part. Therefore perseverance is not a part of a virtue, but is itself a principal virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) reckons perseverance as a part of fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3406]FS, Q[61], AA[3],4), a principal virtue is one to which is principally ascribed something that lays claim to the praise of virtue, inasmuch as it practices it in connection with its own matter, wherein it is most difficult of accomplishment. In accordance with this it has been stated (Q[123], A[2]) that fortitude is a principal virtue, because it observes firmness in matters wherein it is most difficult to stand firm, namely in dangers of death. Wherefore it follows of necessity that every virtue which has a title to praise for the firm endurance of something difficult must be annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal virtue. Now the endurance of difficulty arising from delay in accomplishing a good work gives perseverance its claim to praise: nor is this so difficult as to endure dangers of death. Therefore perseverance is annexed to fortitude, as secondary to principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The annexing of secondary to principal virtues depends not only on the matter [*Cf.[3407] Q[136], A[4], ad 2], but also on the mode, because in everything form is of more account than matter. Wherefore although, as to matter, perseverance seems to have more in common with temperance than with fortitude, yet, in mode, it has more in common with fortitude, in the point of standing firm against the difficulty arising from length of time.

Reply to Objection 2: The perseverance of which the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. vii, 4,7) does not moderate any passions, but consists merely in a certain firmness of reason and will. But perseverance, considered as a virtue, moderates certain passions, namely fear of weariness or failure on account of the delay. Hence this virtue, like fortitude, is in the irascible.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of perseverance, as denoting, not a virtuous habit, but a virtuous act sustained to the end, according to Mat. 24:13, “He that shall persevere to the end, he shall be saved.” Hence it is incompatible with such like perseverance for it to be lost, since it would no longer endure to the end.

Whether constancy pertains to perseverance?

Objection 1: It seems that constancy does not pertain to perseverance. For constancy pertains to patience, as stated above (Q[137], A[5]): and patience differs from perseverance. Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, “virtue is about the difficult and the good.” Now it does not seem difficult to be constant in little works, but only in great deeds, which pertain to magnificence. Therefore constancy pertains to magnificence rather than to perseverance.

Objection 3: Further, if constancy pertained to perseverance, it would seem nowise to differ from it, since both denote a kind of unchangeableness. Yet they differ: for Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i) condivides constancy with firmness by which he indicates perseverance, as stated above (Q[128] , A[6]). Therefore constancy does not pertain to perseverance.

On the contrary, One is said to be constant because one stands to a thing. Now it belongs to perseverance to stand to certain things, as appears from the definition given by Andronicus. Therefore constancy belongs to perseverance.

I answer that, Perseverance and constancy agree as to end, since it belongs to both to persist firmly in some good: but they differ as to those things which make it difficult to persist in good. Because the virtue of perseverance properly makes man persist firmly in good, against the difficulty that arises from the very continuance of the act: whereas constancy makes him persist firmly in good against difficulties arising from any other external hindrances. Hence perseverance takes precedence of constancy as a part of fortitude, because the difficulty arising from continuance of action is more intrinsic to the act of virtue than that which arises from external obstacles.

Reply to Objection 1: External obstacles to persistence in good are especially those which cause sorrow. Now patience is about sorrow, as stated above ([3408]Q[136], A[1]). Hence constancy agrees with perseverance as to end: while it agrees with patience as to those things which occasion difficulty. Now the end is of most account: wherefore constancy pertains to perseverance rather than to patience.

Reply to Objection 2: It is more difficult to persist in great deeds: yet in little or ordinary deeds, it is difficult to persist for any length of time, if not on account of the greatness of the deed which magnificence considers, yet from its very continuance which perseverance regards. Hence constancy may pertain to both.

Reply to Objection 3: Constancy pertains to perseverance in so far as it has something in common with it: but it is not the same thing in the point of their difference, as stated in the Article.

Whether perseverance needs the help of grace? [*Cf. FS, Q[109], A[10]]

Objection 1: It seems that perseverance does not need the help of grace. For perseverance is a virtue, as stated above [3409](A[1]). Now according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii) virtue acts after the manner of nature. Therefore the sole inclination of virtue suffices for perseverance. Therefore this does not need the help of grace.

Objection 2: Further, the gift of Christ’s grace is greater than the harm brought upon us by Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15, seqq. Now “before sin man was so framed that he could persevere by means of what he had received,” as Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi). Much more therefore can man, after being repaired by the grace of Christ, persevere without the help of a further grace.

Objection 3: Further, sinful deeds are sometimes more difficult than deeds of virtue: hence it is said in the person of the wicked (Wis. 5:7): “We . . . have walked through hard ways.” Now some persevere in sinful deeds without the help of another. Therefore man can also persevere in deeds of virtue without the help of grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Persev. i): “We hold that perseverance is a gift of God, whereby we persevere unto the end, in Christ.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2; A[2], ad 3), perseverance has a twofold signification. First, it denotes the habit of perseverance, considered as a virtue. In this way it needs the gift of habitual grace, even as the other infused virtues. Secondly, it may be taken to denote the act of perseverance enduring until death: and in this sense it needs not only habitual grace, but also the gratuitous help of God sustaining man in good until the end of life, as stated above ([3410]FS, Q[109], A[10]), when we were treating of grace. Because, since the free-will is changeable by its very nature, which changeableness is not taken away from it by the habitual grace bestowed in the present life, it is not in the power of the free-will, albeit repaired by grace, to abide unchangeably in good, though it is in its power to choose this: for it is often in our power to choose yet not to accomplish.

Reply to Objection 1: The virtue of perseverance, so far as it is concerned, inclines one to persevere: yet since it is a habit, and a habit is a thing one uses at will, it does not follow that a person who has the habit of virtue uses it unchangeably until death.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. xi), “it was given to the first man, not to persevere, but to be able to persevere of his free-will: because then no corruption was in human nature to make perseverance difficult. Now, however, by the grace of Christ, the predestined receive not only the possibility of persevering, but perseverance itself. Wherefore the first man whom no man threatened, of his own free-will rebelling against a threatening God, forfeited so great a happiness and so great a facility of avoiding sin: whereas these, although the world rage against their constancy, have persevered in faith.”

Reply to Objection 3: Man is able by himself to fall into sin, but he cannot by himself arise from sin without the help of grace. Hence by falling into sin, so far as he is concerned man makes himself to be persevering in sin, unless he be delivered by God’s grace. On the other hand, by doing good he does not make himself to be persevering in good, because he is able, by himself, to sin: wherefore he needs the help of grace for that end.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO PERSEVERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to perseverance; under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Of effeminacy;

(2) Of pertinacity.

Whether effeminacy* is opposed to perseverance? [*Mollities, literally ‘softness’]

Objection 1: It seems that effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 6:9,10, “Nor adulterers, nor the effeminate, nor liers with mankind,” expounds the text thus: “Effeminate—i.e. obscene, given to unnatural vice.” But this is opposed to chastity. Therefore effeminacy is not a vice opposed to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “delicacy is a kind of effeminacy.” But to be delicate seems akin to intemperance. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance but to temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “the man who is fond of amusement is effeminate.” Now immoderate fondness of amusement is opposed to {eutrapelia}, which is the virtue about pleasures of play, as stated in Ethic. iv, 8. Therefore effeminacy is not opposed to perseverance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “the persevering man is opposed to the effeminate.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3411]Q[137], AA[1],2), perseverance is deserving of praise because thereby a man does not forsake a good on account of long endurance of difficulties and toils: and it is directly opposed to this, seemingly, for a man to be ready to forsake a good on account of difficulties which he cannot endure. This is what we understand by effeminacy, because a thing is said to be “soft” if it readily yields to the touch. Now a thing is not declared to be soft through yielding to a heavy blow, for walls yield to the battering-ram. Wherefore a man is not said to be effeminate if he yields to heavy blows. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is no wonder, if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or sorrows; but he is to be pardoned if he struggles against them.” Now it is evident that fear of danger is more impelling than the desire of pleasure: wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i) under the heading "True magnanimity consists of two things: It is inconsistent for one who is not cast down by fear, to be defeated by lust, or who has proved himself unbeaten by toil, to yield to pleasure." Moreover, pleasure itself is a stronger motive of attraction than sorrow, for the lack of pleasure is a motive of withdrawal, since lack of pleasure is a pure privation. Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7), properly speaking an effeminate man is one who withdraws from good on account of sorrow caused by lack of pleasure, yielding as it were to a weak motion.

Reply to Objection 1: This effeminacy is caused in two ways. In one way, by custom: for where a man is accustomed to enjoy pleasures, it is more difficult for him to endure the lack of them. In another way, by natural disposition, because, to wit, his mind is less persevering through the frailty of his temperament. This is how women are compared to men, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): wherefore those who are passively sodomitical are said to be effeminate, being womanish themselves, as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: Toil is opposed to bodily pleasure: wherefore it is only toilsome things that are a hindrance to pleasures. Now the delicate are those who cannot endure toils, nor anything that diminishes pleasure. Hence it is written (Dt. 28:56): "The tender and delicate woman, that could not go upon the ground, nor set down her foot for . . . softness [Douay: 'niceness']." Thus delicacy is a kind of effeminacy. But properly speaking effeminacy regards lack of pleasures, while delicacy regards the cause that hinders pleasure, for instance toil or the like.

Reply to Objection 3: In play two things may be considered. In the first place there is the pleasure, and thus inordinate fondness of play is opposed to {eutrapelia}. Secondly, we may consider the relaxation or rest which is opposed to toil. Accordingly just as it belongs to effeminacy to be unable to endure toilsome things, so too it belongs thereto to desire play or any other relaxation inordinately.

Whether pertinacity is opposed to perseverance?

Objection 1: It seems that pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance. For Gregory says (Moral. xxxi) that pertinacity arises from vainglory. But vainglory is not opposed to perseverance but to magnanimity, as stated above ([3412]Q[132], A[2]). Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance.

Objection 2: Further, if it is opposed to perseverance, this is so either by excess or by deficiency. Now it is not opposed by excess: because the pertinacious also yield to certain pleasure and sorrow, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) “they rejoice when they prevail, and grieve when their opinions are rejected.” And if it be opposed by deficiency, it will be the same as effeminacy, which is clearly false. Therefore pertinacity is nowise opposed to perseverance.

Objection 3: Further, just as the persevering man persists in good against sorrow, so too do the continent and the temperate against pleasures, the brave against fear, and the meek against anger. But pertinacity is over-persistence in something. Therefore pertinacity is not opposed to perseverance more than to other virtues.

On the contrary, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that pertinacity is to perseverance as superstition is to religion. But superstition is opposed to religion, as stated above ([3413]Q[92], A[1]). Therefore pertinacity is opposed to perseverance.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “a person is said to be pertinacious who holds on impudently, as being utterly tenacious.” “Pervicacious” has the same meaning, for it signifies that a man “perseveres in his purpose until he is victorious: for the ancients called ‘vicia’ what we call victory.” These the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9) calls {ischyrognomones}, that is “head-strong,” or {idiognomones}, that is “self-opinionated,” because they abide by their opinions more than they should; whereas the effeminate man does so less than he ought, and the persevering man, as he ought. Hence it is clear that perseverance is commended for observing the mean, while pertinacity is reproved for exceeding the mean, and effeminacy for falling short of it.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why a man is too persistent in his own opinion, is that he wishes by this means to make a show of his own excellence: wherefore this is the result of vainglory as its cause. Now it has been stated above ([3414]Q[127], A[2], ad 1;[3415] Q[133], A[2]), that opposition of vices to virtues depends, not on their cause, but on their species.

Reply to Objection 2: The pertinacious man exceeds by persisting inordinately in something against many difficulties: yet he takes a certain pleasure in the end, just as the brave and the persevering man. Since, however, this pleasure is sinful, seeing that he desires it too much, and shuns the contrary pain, he is like the incontinent or effeminate man.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the other virtues persist against the onslaught of the passions, they are not commended for persisting in the same way as perseverance is. As to continence, its claim to praise seems to lie rather in overcoming pleasures. Hence pertinacity is directly opposed to perseverance.

OF THE GIFT OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the gift corresponding to fortitude, and this is the gift of fortitude. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fortitude is a gift?

(2) Which among the beatitudes and fruits correspond to it?

Whether fortitude is a gift?

Objection 1: It seems that fortitude is not a gift. For the virtues differ from the gifts: and fortitude is a virtue. Therefore it should not be reckoned a gift.

Objection 2: Further, the acts of the gift remain in heaven, as stated above ([3416]FS, Q[68], A[6]). But the act of fortitude does not remain in heaven: for Gregory says (Moral. i) that “fortitude encourages the fainthearted against hardships, which will be altogether absent from heaven.” Therefore fortitude is not a gift.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that “it is a sign of fortitude to cut oneself adrift from all the deadly pleasures of the passing show.” Now noisome pleasures and delights are the concern of temperance rather than of fortitude. Therefore it seems that fortitude is not the gift corresponding to the virtue of fortitude.

On the contrary, Fortitude is reckoned among the other gifts of the Holy Ghost (Is. 11:2).

I answer that, Fortitude denotes a certain firmness of mind, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3417]FS, Q[61], A[3]): and this firmness of mind is required both in doing good and in enduring evil, especially with regard to goods or evils that are difficult. Now man, according to his proper and connatural mode, is able to have this firmness in both these respects, so as not to forsake the good on account of difficulties, whether in accomplishing an arduous work, or in enduring grievous evil. In this sense fortitude denotes a special or general virtue, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]).

Yet furthermore man's mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, in order that he may attain the end of each work begun, and avoid whatever perils may threaten. This surpasses human nature: for sometimes it is not in a man's power to attain the end of his work, or to avoid evils or dangers, since these may happen to overwhelm him in death. But the Holy Ghost works this in man, by bringing him to everlasting life, which is the end of all good deeds, and the release from all perils. A certain confidence of this is infused into the mind by the Holy Ghost Who expels any fear of the contrary. It is in this sense that fortitude is reckoned a gift of the Holy Ghost. For it has been stated above ([3418]FS, Q[68], AA[1],2) that the gifts regard the motion of the mind by the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 1: Fortitude, as a virtue, perfects the mind in the endurance of all perils whatever; but it does not go so far as to give confidence of overcoming all dangers: this belongs to the fortitude that is a gift of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: The gifts have not the same acts in heaven as on the way: for they exercise acts in connection with the enjoyment of the end. Hence the act of fortitude there is to enjoy full security from toil and evil.

Reply to Objection 3: The gift of fortitude regards the virtue of fortitude not only because it consists in enduring dangers, but also inasmuch as it consists in accomplishing any difficult work. Wherefore the gift of fortitude is directed by the gift of counsel, which seems to be concerned chiefly with the greater goods.

Whether the fourth beatitude: "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," corresponds to the gift of fortitude?

Objection 1: It seems that the fourth beatitude, "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice," does not correspond to the gift of fortitude. For the gift of piety and not the gift of fortitude corresponds to the virtue of justice. Now hungering and thirsting after justice pertain to the act of justice. Therefore this beatitude corresponds to the gift of piety rather than to the gift of fortitude.

Objection 2: Further, hunger and thirst after justice imply a desire for good. Now this belongs properly to charity, to which the gift of wisdom, and not the gift of fortitude, corresponds, as stated above ([3419]Q[45]). Therefore this beatitude corresponds, not to the gift of fortitude, but to the gift of wisdom.

Objection 3: Further, the fruits are consequent upon the beatitudes, since delight is essential to beatitude, according to Ethic. i, 8. Now the fruits, apparently, include none pertaining to fortitude. Therefore neither does any beatitude correspond to it.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i): “Fortitude becomes the hungry and thirsty: since those who desire to enjoy true goods, and wish to avoid loving earthly and material things, must toil.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3420]Q[121], A[2]), Augustine makes the beatitudes correspond to the gifts according to the order in which they are set forth, observing at the same time a certain fittingness between them. Wherefore he ascribes the fourth beatitude, concerning the hunger and thirst for justice, to the fourth gift, namely fortitude.

Yet there is a certain congruity between them, because, as stated (A[1]), fortitude is about difficult things. Now it is very difficult, not merely to do virtuous deeds, which receive the common designation of works of justice, but furthermore to do them with an unsatiable desire, which may be signified by hunger and thirst for justice.

Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), we may understand here not only particular, but also universal justice, which is related to all virtuous deeds according to Ethic. v, 1, wherein whatever is hard is the object of that fortitude which is a gift.

Reply to Objection 2: Charity is the root of all the virtues and gifts, as stated above (Q[23], A[8], ad 3; [3421]FS, Q[68], A[4], ad 3). Hence whatever pertains to fortitude may also be referred to charity.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two of the fruits which correspond sufficiently to the gift of fortitude: namely, patience, which regards the enduring of evils: and longanimity, which may regard the long delay and accomplishment of goods.

OF THE PRECEPTS OF FORTITUDE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the precepts of fortitude:
(1) The precepts of fortitude itself;

(2) The precepts of its parts.

Whether the precepts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?

Objection 1: It seems that the precepts of fortitude are not suitably given in the Divine Law. For the New Law is more perfect than the Old Law. Yet the Old Law contains precepts of fortitude (Dt. 20). Therefore precepts of fortitude should have been given in the New Law also.

Objection 2: Further, affirmative precepts are of greater import than negative precepts, since the affirmative include the negative, but not vice versa. Therefore it is unsuitable for the Divine Law to contain none but negative precepts in prohibition of fear.

Objection 3: Further, fortitude is one of the principal virtues, as stated above (Q[123], A[2]; [3422]FS, Q[61], A[2]). Now the precepts are directed to the virtues as to their end: wherefore they should be proportionate to them. Therefore the precepts of fortitude should have been placed among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the chief precepts of the Law.

On the contrary, stands Holy Writ which contains these precepts.

I answer that, Precepts of law are directed to the end intended by the lawgiver. Wherefore precepts of law must needs be framed in various ways according to the various ends intended by lawgivers, so that even in human affairs there are laws of democracies, others of kingdoms, and others again of tyrannical governments. Now the end of the Divine Law is that man may adhere to God: wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts both of fortitude and of the other virtues, with a view to directing the mind to God. For this reason it is written (Dt. 20:3,4): “Fear ye them not: because the Lord your God is in the midst of you, and will fight for you against your enemies.”

As to human laws, they are directed to certain earthly goods, and among them we find precepts of fortitude according to the requirements of those goods.

Reply to Objection 1: The Old Testament contained temporal promises, while the promises of the New Testament are spiritual and eternal, according to Augustine (Contra Faust. iv). Hence in the Old Law there was need for the people to be taught how to fight, even in a bodily contest, in order to obtain an earthly possession. But in the New Testament men were to be taught how to come to the possession of eternal life by fighting spiritually, according to Mat. 11:12, "The kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent bear it away." Hence Peter commands (1 Pet. 5:8,9): "Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about, seeking whom he may devour: whom resist ye, strong in faith," as also James 4:7: "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." Since, however, men while tending to spiritual goods may be withdrawn from them by corporal dangers, precepts of fortitude had to be given even in the New Law, that they might bravely endure temporal evils, according to Mat. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body."

Reply to Objection 2: The law gives general directions in its precepts. But the things that have to be done in cases of danger are not, like the things to be avoided, reducible to some common thing. Hence the precepts of fortitude are negative rather than affirmative.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3423]Q[122], A[1]), the precepts of the decalogue are placed in the Law, as first principles, which need to be known to all from the outset. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue had to be chiefly about those acts of justice in which the notion of duty is manifest, and not about acts of fortitude, because it is not so evident that it is a duty for a person not to fear dangers of death.

Whether the precepts of the parts of fortitude are suitably given in the Divine Law?

Objection 1: It seems that the precept of the parts of fortitude are unsuitably given in the Divine Law. For just as patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, so also are magnificence, magnanimity, and confidence, as stated above ([3424]Q[128]). Now we find precepts of patience in the Divine Law, as also of perseverance. Therefore there should also have been precepts of magnificence and magnanimity.

Objection 2: Further, patience is a very necessary virtue, since it is the guardian of the other virtues, as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxv). Now the other virtues are commanded absolutely. Therefore patience should not have been commanded merely, as Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i), as to the preparedness of the mind.

Objection 3: Further, patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude, as stated above ([3425]Q[128];[3426] Q[136], A[4];[3427] Q[137], A[2]). Now the precepts of fortitude are not affirmative but only negative, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the precepts of patience and perseverance should have been negative and not affirmative.

The contrary, however, follows from the way in which they are given by Holy Writ.

I answer that, The Divine Law instructs man perfectly about such things as are necessary for right living. Now in order to live aright man needs not only the principal virtues, but also the secondary and annexed virtues. Wherefore the Divine Law contains precepts not only about the acts of the principal virtues, but also about the acts of the secondary and annexed virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Magnificence and magnanimity do not belong to the genus of fortitude, except by reason of a certain excellence of greatness which they regard in their respective matters. Now things pertaining to excellence come under the counsels of perfection rather than under precepts of obligation. Wherefore, there was need of counsels, rather than of precepts about magnificence and magnanimity. On the other hand, the hardships and toils of the present life pertain to patience and perseverance, not by reason of any greatness observable in them, but on account of the very nature of those virtues. Hence the need of precepts of patience and perseverance.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3428]Q[3], A[2]), although affirmative precepts are always binding, they are not binding for always, but according to place and time. Wherefore just as the affirmative precepts about the other virtues are to be understood as to the preparedness of the mind, in the sense that man be prepared to fulfil them when necessary, so too are the precepts of patience to be understood in the same way.

Reply to Objection 3: Fortitude, as distinct from patience and perseverance, is about the greatest dangers wherein one must proceed with caution; nor is it necessary to determine what is to be done in particular. On the other hand, patience and perseverance are about minor hardships and toils, wherefore there is less danger in determining, especially in general, what is to be done in such cases.

OF TEMPERANCE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider temperance: (1) Temperance itself; (2) its parts; (3) its precepts. With regard to temperance we must consider (1) temperance itself; (2) the contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether temperance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether it is only about desires and pleasures?

(4) Whether it is only about pleasures of touch?

(5) Whether it is about pleasures of taste, as such, or only as a kind of touch?

(6) What is the rule of temperance?

(7) Whether it is a cardinal, or principal, virtue?

(8) Whether it is the greatest of virtues ?

Whether temperance is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that temperance is not a virtue. For no virtue goes against the inclination of nature, since “there is in us a natural aptitude for virtue,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. Now temperance withdraws us from pleasures to which nature inclines, according to Ethic. ii, 3,8. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, virtues are connected with one another, as stated above ([3429]FS, Q[65], A[1]). But some people have temperance without having the other virtues: for we find many who are temperate, and yet covetous or timid. Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, to every virtue there is a corresponding gift, as appears from what we have said above ([3430]FS, Q[68], A[4]). But seemingly no gift corresponds to temperance, since all the gifts have been already ascribed to the other virtues (QQ[8],9,19,45,52, 71,139). Therefore temperance is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. vi, 15): “Temperance is the name of a virtue.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3431]FS, Q[55], A[3]), it is essential to virtue to incline man to good. Now the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Hence human virtue is that which inclines man to something in accordance with reason. Now temperance evidently inclines man to this, since its very name implies moderation or temperateness, which reason causes. Therefore temperance is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Nature inclines everything to whatever is becoming to it. Wherefore man naturally desires pleasures that are becoming to him. Since, however, man as such is a rational being, it follows that those pleasures are becoming to man which are in accordance with reason. From such pleasures temperance does not withdraw him, but from those which are contrary to reason. Wherefore it is clear that temperance is not contrary to the inclination of human nature, but is in accord with it. It is, however, contrary to the inclination of the animal nature that is not subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The temperance which fulfils the conditions of perfect virtue is not without prudence, while this is lacking to all who are in sin. Hence those who lack other virtues, through being subject to the opposite vices, have not the temperance which is a virtue, though they do acts of temperance from a certain natural disposition, in so far as certain imperfect virtues are either natural to man, as stated above ([3432]FS, Q[63], A[1]), or acquired by habituation, which virtues, through lack of prudence, are not perfected by reason, as stated above ([3433]FS, Q[65], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: Temperance also has a corresponding gift, namely, fear, whereby man is withheld from the pleasures of the flesh, according to Ps. 118:120: “Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear.” The gift of fear has for its principal object God, Whom it avoids offending, and in this respect it corresponds to the virtue of hope, as stated above ([3434]Q[19], A[9], ad 1). But it may have for its secondary object whatever a man shuns in order to avoid offending God. Now man stands in the greatest need of the fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the matter of temperance: wherefore the gift of fear corresponds to temperance also.

Whether temperance is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a special virtue. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xv) that "it belongs to temperance to preserve one's integrity and freedom from corruption for God's sake." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 42) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is tranquillity of soul." But this is common to every virtue. Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) that "we cannot separate the beautiful from the virtuous," and that "whatever is just is beautiful." Now the beautiful is considered as proper to temperance, according to the same authority (Tully, De Offic. i, 27). Therefore temperance is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 10) reckons it a special virtue.

I answer that, It is customary in human speech to employ a common term in a restricted sense in order to designate the principal things to which that common term is applicable: thus the word "city" is used antonomastically* to designate Rome. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we substitute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle]. Accordingly the word "temperance" has a twofold acceptation. First, in accordance with its common signification: and thus temperance is not a special but a general virtue, because the word "temperance" signifies a certain temperateness or moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions: and this is common to every moral virtue. Yet there is a logical difference between temperance and fortitude, even if we take them both as general virtues: since temperance withdraws man from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason, while fortitude incites him to endure or withstand those things on account of which he forsakes the good of reason.

On the other hand, if we take temperance antonomastically, as withholding the appetite from those things which are most seductive to man, it is a special virtue, for thus it has, like fortitude, a special matter.

Reply to Objection 1: Man’s appetite is corrupted chiefly by those things which seduce him into forsaking the rule of reason and Divine law. Wherefore integrity, which Augustine ascribes to temperance, can, like the latter, be taken in two ways: first, in a general sense, and secondly in a sense of excellence.

Reply to Objection 2: The things about which temperance is concerned have a most disturbing effect on the soul, for the reason that they are natural to man, as we shall state further on ([3435]AA[4],5). Hence tranquillity of soul is ascribed to temperance by way of excellence, although it is a common property of all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Although beauty is becoming to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance, by way of excellence, for two reasons. First, in respect of the generic notion of temperance, which consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty, as attested by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Secondly, because the things from which temperance withholds us, hold the lowest place in man, and are becoming to him by reason of his animal nature, as we shall state further on ([3436]AA[4],5; Q[142], A[4]), wherefore it is natural that such things should defile him. In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance which above all hinders man from being defiled. In like manner honesty [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum] is a special attribute of temperance: for Isidore says (Etym. x): “An honest man is one who has no defilement, for honesty means an honorable state.” This is most applicable to temperance, which withstands the vices that bring most dishonor on man, as we shall state further on (Q[142], A[4]).

Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that “temperance is reason’s firm and moderate mastery of lust and other wanton emotions of the mind.” Now all the passions of the soul are called emotions of the mind. Therefore it seems that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

Objection 2: Further, “Virtue is about the difficult and the good” [*Ethic. ii, 3]. Now it seems more difficult to temper fear, especially with regard to dangers of death, than to moderate desires and pleasures, which are despised on account of deadly pains and dangers, according to Augustine (QQ[83], qu. 36). Therefore it seems that the virtue of temperance is not chiefly about desires and pleasures.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) “the grace of moderation belongs to temperance”: and Tully says (De Offic. ii, 27) that “it is the concern of temperance to calm all disturbances of the mind and to enforce moderation.” Now moderation is needed, not only in desires and pleasures, but also in external acts and whatever pertains to the exterior. Therefore temperance is not only about desires and pleasures.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym.) [*The words quoted do not occur in the work referred to; Cf. his De Summo Bono xxxvii, xlii, and De Different. ii, 39]: that “it is temperance whereby lust and desire are kept under control.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[136], A[1]), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against the passions that rebel against reason. Now the movement of the soul’s passions is twofold, as stated above ([3437]FS, Q[23], A[2]), when we were treating of the passions: the one, whereby the sensitive appetite pursues sensible and bodily goods, the other whereby it flies from sensible and bodily evils.

The first of these movements of the sensitive appetite rebels against reason chiefly by lack of moderation. Because sensible and bodily goods, considered in their species, are not in opposition to reason, but are subject to it as instruments which reason employs in order to attain its proper end: and that they are opposed to reason is owing to the fact that the sensitive appetite fails to tend towards them in accord with the mode of reason. Hence it belongs properly to moral virtue to moderate those passions which denote a pursuit of the good.

On the other hand, the movement of the sensitive appetite in flying from sensible evil is mostly in opposition to reason, not through being immoderate, but chiefly in respect of its flight: because, when a man flies from sensible and bodily evils, which sometimes accompany the good of reason, the result is that he flies from the good of reason. Hence it belongs to moral virtue to make man while flying from evil to remain firm in the good of reason.

Accordingly, just as the virtue of fortitude, which by its very nature bestows firmness, is chiefly concerned with the passion, viz. fear, which regards flight from bodily evils, and consequently with daring, which attacks the objects of fear in the hope of attaining some good, so, too, temperance, which denotes a kind of moderation, is chiefly concerned with those passions that tend towards sensible goods, viz. desire and pleasure, and consequently with the sorrows that arise from the absence of those pleasures. For just as daring presupposes objects of fear, so too such like sorrow arises from the absence of the aforesaid pleasures.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3438]FS, Q[23], AA[1],2; [3439]FS, Q[25], A[1]), when we were treating of the passions, those passions which pertain to avoidance of evil, presuppose the passions pertaining to the pursuit of good; and the passions of the irascible presuppose the passions of the concupiscible. Hence, while temperance directly moderates the passions of the concupiscible which tend towards good, as a consequence, it moderates all the other passions, inasmuch as moderation of the passions that precede results in moderation of the passions that follow: since he that is not immoderate in desire is moderate in hope, and grieves moderately for the absence of the things he desires.

Reply to Objection 2: Desire denotes an impulse of the appetite towards the object of pleasure and this impulse needs control, which belongs to temperance. on the other hand fear denotes a withdrawal of the mind from certain evils, against which man needs firmness of mind, which fortitude bestows. Hence temperance is properly about desires, and fortitude about fears.

Reply to Objection 3: External acts proceed from the internal passions of the soul: wherefore their moderation depends on the moderation of the internal passions.

Whether temperance is only about desires and pleasures of touch?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not only about desires and pleasures of touch. For Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xix) that “the function of temperance is to control and quell the desires which draw us to the things which withdraw us from the laws of God and from the fruit of His goodness"; and a little further on he adds that "it is the duty of temperance to spurn all bodily allurements and popular praise." Now we are withdrawn from God's laws not only by the desire for pleasures of touch, but also by the desire for pleasures of the other senses, for these, too, belong to the bodily allurements, and again by the desire for riches or for worldly glory: wherefore it is written (1 Tim. 6:10). "Desire [*'Cupiditas,' which is the Douay version following the Greek {philargyria} renders 'desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Therefore temperance is not only about desires of pleasures of touch.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that "one who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but he is not magnificent." Now honors, whether small or great, of which he is speaking there, are an object of pleasure, not of touch, but in the soul's apprehension. Therefore temperance is not only about desires for pleasures of touch.

Objection 3: Further, things that are of the same genus would seem to pertain to the matter of a particular virtue under one same aspect. Now all pleasures of sense are apparently of the same genus. Therefore they all equally belong to the matter of temperance.

Objection 4: Further, spiritual pleasures are greater than the pleasures of the body, as stated above ([3440]FS, Q[31], A[5]) in the treatise on the passions. Now sometimes men forsake God's laws and the state of virtue through desire for spiritual pleasures, for instance, through curiosity in matters of knowledge: wherefore the devil promised man knowledge, saying (Gn. 3:5): "Ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evil." Therefore temperance is not only about pleasures of touch.

Objection 5: Further, if pleasures of touch were the proper matter of temperance, it would follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch. But it is not about all, for instance, about those which occur in games. Therefore pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of temperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "temperance is properly about desires of pleasures of touch."

I answer that, As stated above [3441](A[3]), temperance is about desires and pleasures in the same way as fortitude is about fear and daring. Now fortitude is about fear and daring with respect to the greatest evils whereby nature itself is dissolved; and such are dangers of death. Wherefore in like manner temperance must needs be about desires for the greatest pleasures. And since pleasure results from a natural operation, it is so much the greater according as it results from a more natural operation. Now to animals the most natural operations are those which preserve the nature of the individual by means of meat and drink, and the nature of the species by the union of the sexes. Hence temperance is properly about pleasures of meat and drink and sexual pleasures. Now these pleasures result from the sense of touch. Wherefore it follows that temperance is about pleasures of touch.

Reply to Objection 1: In the passage quoted Augustine apparently takes temperance, not as a special virtue having a determinate matter, but as concerned with the moderation of reason, in any matter whatever: and this is a general condition of every virtue. However, we may also reply that if a man can control the greatest pleasures, much more can he control lesser ones. Wherefore it belongs chiefly and properly to temperance to moderate desires and pleasures of touch, and secondarily other pleasures.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher takes temperance as denoting moderation in external things, when, to wit, a man tends to that which is proportionate to him, but not as denoting moderation in the soul's emotions, which pertains to the virtue of temperance.

Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses play a different part in man and in other animals. For in other animals pleasures do not result from the other senses save in relation to sensibles of touch: thus the lion is pleased to see the stag, or to hear its voice, in relation to his food. On the other hand man derives pleasure from the other senses, not only for this reason, but also on account of the becomingness of the sensible object. Wherefore temperance is about the pleasures of the other senses, in relation to pleasures of touch, not principally but consequently: while in so far as the sensible objects of the other senses are pleasant on account of their becomingness, as when a man is pleased at a well-harmonized sound, this pleasure has nothing to do with the preservation of nature. Hence these passions are not of such importance that temperance can be referred to them antonomastically.

Reply to Objection 4: Although spiritual pleasures are by their nature greater than bodily pleasures, they are not so perceptible to the senses, and consequently they do not so strongly affect the sensitive appetite, against whose impulse the good of reason is safeguarded by moral virtue. We may also reply that spiritual pleasures, strictly speaking, are in accordance with reason, wherefore they need no control, save accidentally, in so far as one spiritual pleasure is a hindrance to another greater and more binding.

Reply to Objection 5: Not all pleasures of touch regard the preservation of nature, and consequently it does not follow that temperance is about all pleasures of touch.

Whether temperance is about the pleasures proper to the taste?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste. For pleasures of the taste result from food and drink, which are more necessary to man's life than sexual pleasures, which regard the touch. But according to what has been said [3442](A[4]), temperance is about pleasures in things that are necessary to human life. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste rather than about those proper to the touch.

Objection 2: Further, temperance is about the passions rather than about things themselves. Now, according to De Anima ii, 3, "the touch is the sense of food," as regards the very substance of the food, whereas "savor" which is the proper object of the taste, is "the pleasing quality of the food." Therefore temperance is about the taste rather than about the touch.

Objection 3: Further, according to Ethic. vii, 4,7: "temperance and intemperance are about the same things, and so are continence and incontinence, perseverance, and effeminacy," to which delicacy pertains. Now delicacy seems to regard the delight taken in savors which are the object of the taste. Therefore temperance is about pleasures proper to the taste.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that "seemingly temperance and intemperance have little if anything to do with the taste."

I answer that, As stated above [3443](A[4]), temperance is about the greatest pleasures, which chiefly regard the preservation of human life either in the species or in the individual. In these matters certain things are to be considered as principal and others as secondary. The principal thing is the use itself of the necessary means, of the woman who is necessary for the preservation of the species, or of food and drink which are necessary for the preservation of the individual: while the very use of these necessary things has a certain essential pleasure annexed thereto.

In regard to either use we consider as secondary whatever makes the use more pleasurable, such as beauty and adornment in woman, and a pleasing savor and likewise odor in food. Hence temperance is chiefly about the pleasure of touch, that results essentially from the use of these necessary things, which use is in all cases attained by the touch. Secondarily, however, temperance and intemperance are about pleasures of the taste, smell, or sight, inasmuch as the sensible objects of these senses conduce to the pleasurable use of the necessary things that have relation to the touch. But since the taste is more akin to the touch than the other senses are, it follows that temperance is more about the taste than about the other senses.

Reply to Objection 1: The use of food and the pleasure that essentially results therefrom pertain to the touch. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3) that “touch is the sense of food, for food is hot or cold, wet or dry.” To the taste belongs the discernment of savors, which make the food pleasant to eat, in so far as they are signs of its being suitable for nourishment.

Reply to Objection 2: The pleasure resulting from savor is additional, so to speak, whereas the pleasure of touch results essentially from the use of food and drink.

Reply to Objection 3: Delicacy regards principally the substance of the food, but secondarily it regards its delicious savor and the way in which it is served.

Whether the rule of temperance depends on the need of the present life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the present life. For higher things are not regulated according to lower. Now, as temperance is a virtue of the soul, it is above the needs of the body. Therefore the rule of temperance does not depend on the needs of the body.

Objection 2: Further, whoever exceeds a rule sins. Therefore if the needs of the body were the rule of temperance, it would be a sin against temperance to indulge in any other pleasure than those required by nature, which is content with very little. But this would seem unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, no one sins in observing a rule. Therefore if the need of the body were the rule of temperance, there would be no sin in using any pleasure for the needs of the body, for instance, for the sake of health. But this is apparently false. Therefore the need of the body is not the rule of temperance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi): “In both Testaments the temperate man finds confirmation of the rule forbidding him to love the things of this life, or to deem any of them desirable for its own sake, and commanding him to avail himself of those things with the moderation of a user not the attachment of a lover, in so far as they are requisite for the needs of this life and of his station.”

I answer that, As stated above [3444](A[1]; Q[109], A[2]; Q[123], A[12]), the good of moral virtue consists chiefly in the order of reason: because “man’s good is to be in accord with reason,” as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now the principal order of reason is that by which it directs certain things towards their end, and the good of reason consists chiefly in this order; since good has the aspect of end, and the end is the rule of whatever is directed to the end. Now all the pleasurable objects that are at man’s disposal, are directed to some necessity of this life as to their end. Wherefore temperance takes the need of this life, as the rule of the pleasurable objects of which it makes use, and uses them only for as much as the need of this life requires.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the need of this life is regarded as a rule in so far as it is an end. Now it must be observed that sometimes the end of the worker differs from the end of the work, thus it is clear that the end of building is a house, whereas sometimes the end of the builder is profit. Accordingly the end and rule of temperance itself is happiness; while the end and rule of the thing it makes use of is the need of human life, to which whatever is useful for life is subordinate.

Reply to Objection 2: The need of human life may be taken in two ways. First, it may be taken in the sense in which we apply the term “necessary” to that without which a thing cannot be at all; thus food is necessary to an animal. Secondly, it may be taken for something without which a thing cannot be becomingly. Now temperance regards not only the former of these needs, but also the latter. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11) that “the temperate man desires pleasant things for the sake of health, or for the sake of a sound condition of body.” Other things that are not necessary for this purpose may be divided into two classes. For some are a hindrance to health and a sound condition of body; and these temperance makes not use of whatever, for this would be a sin against temperance. But others are not a hindrance to those things, and these temperance uses moderately, according to the demands of place and time, and in keeping with those among whom one dwells. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) says that the “temperate man also desires other pleasant things,” those namely that are not necessary for health or a sound condition of body, “so long as they are not prejudicial to these things.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 2), temperance regards need according to the requirements of life, and this depends not only on the requirements of the body, but also on the requirements of external things, such as riches and station, and more still on the requirements of good conduct. Hence the Philosopher adds (Ethic. iii, 11) that “the temperate man makes use of pleasant things provided that not only they be not prejudicial to health and a sound bodily condition, but also that they be not inconsistent with good,” i.e. good conduct, nor “beyond his substance,” i.e. his means. And Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxi) that the “temperate man considers the need” not only “of this life” but also “of his station.”

Whether temperance is a cardinal virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is not a cardinal virtue. For the good of moral virtue depends on reason. But temperance is about those things that are furthest removed from reason, namely about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Therefore temperance, seemingly, is not a principal virtue.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the impetus the more difficult is it to control. Now anger, which is controlled by meekness, seems to be more impetuous than desire, which is controlled by temperance. For it is written (Prov. 27:4): “Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth; and who can bear the violence [impetum] of one provoked?” Therefore meekness is a principal virtue rather than temperance.

Objection 3: Further, hope as a movement of the soul takes precedence of desire and concupiscence, as stated above ([3445]FS, Q[25], A[4]). But humility controls the presumption of immoderate hope. Therefore, seemingly, humility is a principal virtue rather than temperance which controls concupiscence.

On the contrary, Gregory reckons temperance among the principal virtues (Moral. ii, 49).

I answer that, As stated above (Q[123], A[11]; Q[61], A[3]), a principal or cardinal virtue is so called because it has a foremost claim to praise on account of one of those things that are requisite for the notion of virtue in general. Now moderation, which is requisite in every virtue, deserves praise principally in pleasures of touch, with which temperance is concerned, both because these pleasures are most natural to us, so that it is more difficult to abstain from them, and to control the desire for them, and because their objects are more necessary to the present life, as stated above [3446](A[4]). For this reason temperance is reckoned a principal or cardinal virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The longer the range of its operation, the greater is the agent's power [virtus] shown to be: wherefore the very fact that the reason is able to moderate desires and pleasures that are furthest removed from it, proves the greatness of reason's power. This is how temperance comes to be a principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: The impetuousness of anger is caused by an accident, for instance, a painful hurt; wherefore it soon passes, although its impetus be great. On the other hand, the impetuousness of the desire for pleasures of touch proceeds from a natural cause, wherefore it is more lasting and more general, and consequently its control regards a more principal virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: The object of hope is higher than the object of desire, wherefore hope is accounted the principal passion in the irascible. But the objects of desires and pleasures of touch move the appetite with greater force, since they are more natural. Therefore temperance, which appoints the mean in such things, is a principal virtue.

Whether temperance is the greatest of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that temperance is the greatest of the virtues. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that "what we observe and seek most in temperance is the safeguarding of what is honorable, and the regard for what is beautiful.” Now virtue deserves praise for being honorable and beautiful. Therefore temperance is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, the more difficult the deed the greater the virtue. Now it is more difficult to control desires and pleasures of touch than to regulate external actions, the former pertaining to temperance and the latter to justice. Therefore temperance is a greater virtue than justice.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly the more general a thing is, the more necessary and the better it is. Now fortitude is about dangers of death which occur less frequently than pleasures of touch, for these occur every day; so that temperance is in more general use than fortitude. Therefore temperance is a more excellent virtue than fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 9) that the “greatest virtues are those which are most profitable to others, for which reason we give the greatest honor to the brave and the just.”

I answer that, As the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 2) “the good of the many is more of the godlike than the good of the individual,” wherefore the more a virtue regards the good of the many, the better it is. Now justice and fortitude regard the good of the many more than temperance does, since justice regards the relations between one man and another, while fortitude regards dangers of battle which are endured for the common weal: whereas temperance moderates only the desires and pleasures which affect man himself. Hence it is evident that justice and fortitude are more excellent virtues than temperance: while prudence and the theological virtues are more excellent still.

Reply to Objection 1: Honor and beauty are especially ascribed to temperance, not on account of the excellence of the good proper to temperance, but on account of the disgrace of the contrary evil from which it withdraws us, by moderating the pleasures common to us and the lower animals.

Reply to Objection 2: Since virtue is about the difficult and the good, the excellence of a virtue is considered more under the aspect of good, wherein justice excels, than under the aspect of difficult, wherein temperance excels.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is general because it regards the many conduces more to the excellence of goodness than that which is general because it occurs frequently: fortitude excels in the former way, temperance in the latter. Hence fortitude is greater simply, although in some respects temperance may be described as greater not only than fortitude but also than justice.

OF THE VICES OPPOSED TO TEMPERANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices opposed to temperance. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether insensibility is a sin?

(2) Whether intemperance is a childish sin?

(3) Of the comparison between intemperance and timidity;

(4) Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of vices?

Whether insensibility is a vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that insensibility is not a vice. For those are called insensible who are deficient with regard to pleasures of touch. Now seemingly it is praiseworthy and virtuous to be altogether deficient in such matters: for it is written (Dan. 10:2,3): “In those days Daniel mourned the days of three weeks, I ate no desirable bread, and neither flesh nor wine entered my mouth, neither was I anointed with ointment.” Therefore insensibility is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, “man’s good is to be in accord with reason,” according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now abstinence from all pleasures of touch is most conducive to man’s progress in the good of reason: for it is written (Dan. 1:17) that “to the children” who took pulse for their food (Dan. 1:12), “God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book and wisdom.” Therefore insensibility, which rejects these pleasures altogether, is not sinful.

Objection 3: Further, that which is a very effective means of avoiding sin would seem not to be sinful. Now the most effective remedy in avoiding sin is to shun pleasures, and this pertains to insensibility. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 9) that “if we deny ourselves pleasures we are less liable to sin.” Therefore there is nothing vicious in insensibility.

On the contrary, Nothing save vice is opposed to virtue. Now insensibility is opposed to the virtue of temperance according to the

Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 11). Therefore insensibility is a vice.

I answer that, Whatever is contrary to the natural order is vicious. Now nature has introduced pleasure into the operations that are necessary for man's life. Wherefore the natural order requires that man should make use of these pleasures, in so far as they are necessary for man's well-being, as regards the preservation either of the individual or of the species. Accordingly, if anyone were to reject pleasure to the extent of omitting things that are necessary for nature's preservation, he would sin, as acting counter to the order of nature. And this pertains to the vice of insensibility.

It must, however, be observed that it is sometimes praiseworthy, and even necessary for the sake of an end, to abstain from such pleasures as result from these operations. Thus, for the sake of the body's health, certain persons refrain from pleasures of meat, drink, and sex; as also for the fulfilment of certain engagements: thus athletes and soldiers have to deny themselves many pleasures, in order to fulfil their respective duties. In like manner penitents, in order to recover health of soul, have recourse to abstinence from pleasures, as a kind of diet, and those who are desirous of giving themselves up to contemplation and Divine things need much to refrain from carnal things. Nor do any of these things pertain to the vice of insensibility, because they are in accord with right reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Daniel abstained thus from pleasures, not through any horror of pleasure as though it were evil in itself, but for some praiseworthy end, in order, namely, to adapt himself to the heights of contemplation by abstaining from pleasures of the body. Hence the text goes on to tell of the revelation that he received immediately afterwards.

Reply to Objection 2: Since man cannot use his reason without his sensitive powers. which need a bodily organ. as stated in the [3447]FP, Q[84], AA[7],8, man needs to sustain his body in order that he may use his reason. Now the body is sustained by means of operations that afford pleasure: wherefore the good of reason cannot be in a man if he abstain from all pleasures. Yet this need for using pleasures of the body will be greater or less, according as man needs more or less the powers of his body in accomplishing the act of reason. Wherefore it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures, but not for those who are in duty bound to bodily occupations and carnal procreation.

Reply to Objection 3: In order to avoid sin, pleasure must be shunned, not altogether, but so that it is not sought more than necessity requires.

Whether intemperance is a childish sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not a childish sin. For Jerome in commenting on Mat. 18:3, “Unless you be converted, and become as little children,” says that “a child persists not in anger, is unmindful of injuries, takes no pleasure in seeing a beautiful woman,” all of which is contrary to intemperance. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

Objection 2: Further, children have none but natural desires. Now “in respect of natural desires few sin by intemperance,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11). Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

Objection 3: Further, children should be fostered and nourished: whereas concupiscence and pleasure, about which intemperance is concerned, are always to be thwarted and uprooted, according to Col. 3:5, “Mortify . . . your members upon the earth, which are . . . concupiscence” [*Vulg.: ‘your members which are upon the earth, fornication . . . concupiscence’], etc. Therefore intemperance is not a childish sin.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that “we apply the term intemperance* to childish faults.” [*{Akolasia} which Aristotle refers to {kolazo} to punish, so that its original sense would be ‘impunity’ or ‘unrestraint.’]

I answer that, A thing is said to be childish for two reasons. First, because it is becoming to children, and the Philosopher does not mean that the sin of intemperance is childish in this sense. Secondly. by way of likeness, and it is in this sense that sins of intemperance are said to be childish. For the sin of intemperance is one of unchecked concupiscence, which is likened to a child in three ways. First, as rewards that which they both desire, for like a child concupiscence desires something disgraceful. This is because in human affairs a thing is beautiful according as it harmonizes with reason. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 27) under the heading “Comeliness is twofold,” that “the beautiful is that which is in keeping with man’s excellence in so far as his nature differs from other animals.” Now a child does not attend to the order of reason; and in like manner “concupiscence does not listen to reason,” according to Ethic. vii, 6. Secondly, they are alike as to the result. For a child, if left to his own will, becomes more self-willed: hence it is written (Ecclus. 30:8): “A horse not broken becometh stubborn, and a child left to himself will become headstrong.” So, too, concupiscence, if indulged, gathers strength: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 5): “Lust served became a custom, and custom not resisted became necessity.” Thirdly, as to the remedy which is applied to both. For a child is corrected by being restrained; hence it is written (Prov. 23:13,14): “Withhold not correction from a child . . . Thou shalt beat him with a rod, and deliver his soul from Hell.” In like manner by resisting concupiscence we moderate it according to the demands of virtue. Augustine indicates this when he says (Music. vi, 11) that if the mind be lifted up to spiritual things, and remain fixed “thereon, the impulse of custom,” i.e. carnal concupiscence, “is broken, and being suppressed is gradually weakened: for it was stronger when we followed it, and though not wholly destroyed, it is certainly less strong when we curb it.” Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that “as a child ought to live according to the direction of his tutor, so ought the concupiscible to accord with reason.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes the term “childish” as denoting what is observed in children. It is not in this sense that the sin of intemperance is said to be childish, but by way of likeness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: A desire may be said to be natural in two ways. First, with regard to its genus, and thus temperance and intemperance are about natural desires, since they are about desires of food and sex, which are directed to the preservation of nature. Secondly, a desire may be called natural with regard to the species of the thing that nature requires for its own preservation; and in this way it does not happen often that one sins in the matter of natural desires, for nature requires only that which supplies its need, and there is no sin in desiring this, save only where it is desired in excess as to quantity. This is the only way in which sin can occur with regard to natural desires, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11).

There are other things in respect of which sins frequently occur, and these are certain incentives to desire devised by human curiosity [*Cf. Q[167]], such as the nice [curiosa] preparation of food, or the adornment of women.

And though children do not affect these things much, yet intemperance is called a childish sin for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 3: That which regards nature should be nourished and fostered in children, but that which pertains to the lack of reason in them should not be fostered, but corrected, as stated above.

Whether cowardice* is a greater vice than intemperance? [*Cf. Q[125]]

Objection 1: It would seem that cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance. For a vice deserves reproach through being opposed to the good of virtue. Now cowardice is opposed to fortitude, which is a more excellent virtue than temperance, as stated above [3448](A[2]; Q[141], A[8]). Therefore cowardice is a greater vice than intemperance.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the difficulty to be surmounted, the less is a man to be reproached for failure, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is no wonder, in fact it is pardonable, if a man is mastered by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.” Now seemingly it is more difficult to control pleasures than other passions; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3, that “it is more difficult to contend against pleasure than against anger, which would seem to be stronger than fear.” Therefore intemperance, which is overcome by pleasure, is a less grievous sin than cowardice, which is overcome by fear.

Objection 3: Further, it is essential to sin that it be voluntary. Now cowardice is more voluntary than intemperance, since no man desires to be intemperate, whereas some desire to avoid dangers of death, which pertains to cowardice. Therefore cowardice is a more grievous sin than intemperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that “intemperance seems more akin to voluntary action than cowardice.” Therefore it is more sinful.

I answer that, one may be compared with another in two ways. First, with regard to the matter or object; secondly, on the part of the man who sins: and in both ways intemperance is a more grievous sin than cowardice.

First, as regards the matter. For cowardice shuns dangers of death, to avoid which the principal motive is the necessity of preserving life. On the other hand, intemperance is about pleasures, the desire of which is not so necessary for the preservation of life, because, as stated above (A[2], ad 2), intemperance is more about certain annexed pleasures or desires than about natural desires or pleasures. Now the more necessary the motive of sin the less grievous the sin. Wherefore intemperance is a more grievous vice than cowardice, on the part of the object or motive matter.

In like manner again, on the part of the man who sins, and this for three reasons. First, because the more sound-minded a man is, the more grievous his sin, wherefore sins are not imputed to those who are demented. Now grave fear and sorrow, especially in dangers of death, stun the human mind, but not so pleasure which is the motive of intemperance. Secondly, because the more voluntary a sin the graver it is. Now intemperance has more of the voluntary in it than cowardice has, and this for two reasons. The first is because actions done through fear have their origin in the compulsion of an external agent, so that they are not simply voluntary but mixed, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, whereas actions done for the sake of pleasure are simply voluntary. The second reason is because the actions of an intemperate man are more voluntary individually and less voluntary generically. For no one would wish to be intemperate, yet man is enticed by individual pleasures which make of him an intemperate man. Hence the most effective remedy against intemperance is not to dwell on the consideration of singulars. It is the other way about in matters relating to cowardice: because the particular action that imposes itself on a man is less voluntary, for instance to cast aside his shield, and the like, whereas the general purpose is more voluntary, for instance to save himself by flight. Now that which is more voluntary in the particular circumstances in which the act takes place, is simply more voluntary. Wherefore intemperance, being simply more voluntary than cowardice, is a greater vice. Thirdly, because it is easier to find a remedy for intemperance than for cowardice, since pleasures of food and sex, which are the matter of intemperance, are of everyday occurrence, and it is possible for man without danger by frequent practice in their regard to become temperate; whereas dangers of death are of rare occurrence, and it is more dangerous for man to encounter them frequently in order to cease being a coward.

Reply to Objection 1: The excellence of fortitude in comparison with temperance may be considered from two standpoints. First, with regard to the end, which has the aspect of good: because fortitude is directed to the common good more than temperance is. And from this point of view cowardice has a certain precedence over intemperance, since by cowardice some people forsake the defense of the common good. Secondly, with regard to the difficulty, because it is more difficult to endure dangers of death than to refrain from any pleasures whatever: and from this point of view there is no need for cowardice to take precedence of intemperance. For just as it is a greater strength that does not succumb to a stronger force, so on the other hand to be overcome by a stronger force is proof of a lesser vice, and to succumb to a weaker force, is the proof of a greater vice.

Reply to Objection 2: Love of self-preservation, for the sake of which one shuns perils of death, is much more connatural than any pleasures whatever of food and sex which are directed to the preservation of life. Hence it is more difficult to overcome the fear of dangers of death, than the desire of pleasure in matters of food and sex: although the latter is more difficult to resist than anger, sorrow, and fear, occasioned by certain other evils.

Reply to Objection 3: The voluntary, in cowardice, depends rather on a general than on a particular consideration: wherefore in such cases we have the voluntary not simply but in a restricted sense.

Whether intemperance is the most disgraceful of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins. As honor is due to virtue so is disgrace due to sin. Now some sins are more grievous than intemperance: for instance murder, blasphemy, and the like. Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.

Objection 2: Further, those sins which are the more common are seemingly less disgraceful, since men are less ashamed of them. Now sins of intemperance are most common, because they are about things connected with the common use of human life, and in which many happen to sin. Therefore sins of intemperance do not seem to be most disgraceful.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) temperance and intemperance are about human desires and pleasures. Now certain desires and pleasures are more shameful than human desires and pleasures; such are brutal pleasures and those caused by disease as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore intemperance is not the most disgraceful of sins.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that “intemperance is justly more deserving of reproach than other vices.”

I answer that, Disgrace is seemingly opposed to honor and glory. Now honor is due to excellence, as stated above ([3449]Q[103], A[1]), and glory denotes clarity ([3450]Q[103], A[1], ad 3). Accordingly intemperance is most disgraceful for two reasons. First, because it is most repugnant to human excellence, since it is about pleasures common to us and the lower animals, as stated above ([3451]Q[141], AA[2],3). Wherefore it is written (Ps. 48:21): “Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them.” Secondly, because it is most repugnant to man’s clarity or beauty; inasmuch as the pleasures which are the matter of intemperance dim the light of reason from which all the clarity and beauty of virtue arises: wherefore these pleasures are described as being most slavish.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says [*Moral. xxxiii. 12], “the sins of the flesh,” which are comprised under the head of intemperance, although less culpable, are more disgraceful. The reason is that culpability is measured by inordinateness in respect of the end, while disgrace regards shamefulness, which depends chiefly on the unbecomingness of the sin in respect of the sinner.

Reply to Objection 2: The commonness of a sin diminishes the shamefulness and disgrace of a sin in the opinion of men, but not as regards the nature of the vices themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: When we say that intemperance is most disgraceful, we mean in comparison with human vices, those, namely, that are connected with human passions which to a certain extent are in conformity with human nature. But those vices which exceed the mode of human nature are still more disgraceful. Nevertheless such vices are apparently reducible to the genus of intemperance, by way of excess: for instance, if a man delight in eating human flesh, or in committing the unnatural vice.

OF THE PARTS OF TEMPERANCE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)

We must now consider the parts of temperance: we shall consider these same parts (1) in general; (2) each of them in particular.

Whether the parts of temperance are rightly assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) unbecomingly assigns the parts of temperance, when he asserts them to be “continence, mildness, and modesty.” For continence is reckoned to be distinct from virtue (Ethic. vii, 1): whereas temperance is comprised under virtue. Therefore continence is not a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, mildness seemingly softens hatred or anger. But temperance is not about these things, but about pleasures of touch, as stated above ([3452]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore mildness is not a part of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, modesty concerns external action, wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:5): “Let your modesty be known to all men.” Now external actions are the matter of justice, as stated above ([3453]Q[58], A[8]). Therefore modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

Objection 4: Further, Macrobius (In Somn. Scip. i, 8) reckons many more parts of temperance: for he says that “temperance results in modesty, shamefacedness, abstinence, chastity, honesty, moderation, lowliness, sobriety, purity.” Andronicus also says [*De Affectibus] that “the companions of temperance are gravity, continence, humility, simplicity, refinement, method, contentment.” [*’Per-se-sufficientiam’ which could be rendered ‘self-sufficiency,’ but for the fact that this is taken in a bad sense. See[3454] Q[169], A[1].] Therefore it seems that Tully insufficiently reckoned the parts of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above (QQ[48],128), a cardinal virtue may have three kinds of parts, namely integral, subjective, and potential. The integral parts of a virtue are the conditions the concurrence of which are necessary for virtue: and in this respect there are two integral parts of temperance, “shamefacedness,” whereby one recoils from the disgrace that is contrary to temperance, and “honesty,” whereby one loves the beauty of temperance. For, as stated above ([3455]Q[141], A[2], ad 3), temperance more than any other virtue lays claim to a certain comeliness, and the vices of intemperance excel others in disgrace.

The subjective parts of a virtue are its species: and the species of a virtue have to be differentiated according to the difference of matter or object. Now temperance is about pleasures of touch, which are of two kinds. For some are directed to nourishment: and in these as regards meat, there is “abstinence,” and as regards drink properly there is “sobriety.” Other pleasures are directed to the power of procreation, and in these as regards the principal pleasure of the act itself of procreation, there is “chastity,” and as to the pleasures incidental to the act, resulting, for instance, from kissing, touching, or fondling, we have “purity.”

The potential parts of a principal virtue are called secondary virtues: for while the principal virtue observes the mode in some principal matter, these observe the mode in some other matter wherein moderation is not so difficult. Now it belongs to temperance to moderate pleasures of touch, which are most difficult to moderate. Wherefore any virtue that is effective of moderation in some matter or other, and restrains the appetite in its impulse towards something, may be reckoned a part of temperance, as a virtue annexed thereto.

This happens in three ways: first, in the inward movements of the soul; secondly, in the outward movements and actions of the body; thirdly, in outward things. Now besides the movement of concupiscence, which temperance moderates and restrains, we find in the soul three movements towards a particular object. In the first place there is the movement of the will when stirred by the impulse of passion: and this movement is restrained by “continence,” the effect of which is that, although a man suffer immoderate concupiscences, his will does not succumb to them. Another inward movement towards something is the movement of hope, and of the resultant daring, and this is moderated or restrained by “humility.” The third movement is that of anger, which tends towards revenge, and this is restrained by “meekness” or “mildness.”

With regard to bodily movements and actions, moderation and restraint is the effect of “modesty,” which, according to Andronicus, has three parts. The first of these enables one to discern what to do and what not to do, and to observe the right order, and to persevere in what we do: this he assigns to “method.” The second is that a man observe decorum in what he does, and this he ascribes to “refinement.” The third has to do with the conversation or any other intercourse between a man and his friends, and this is called “gravity.”

With regard to external things, a twofold moderation has to be observed. First, we must not desire too many, and to this Macrobius assigns “lowliness,” and Andronicus “contentment”; secondly, we must not be too nice in our requirements, and to this Macrobius ascribes “moderation,” Andronicus “simplicity.”

Reply to Objection 1: It is true that continence differs from virtue, just as imperfect differs from perfect, as we shall state further on ([3456]Q[165], A[1]); and in this sense it is condivided with virtue. Yet it has something in common with temperance both as to matter, since it is about pleasures of touch, and as to mode, since it is a kind of restraint. Hence it is suitably assigned as a part of temperance.

Reply to Objection 2: Mildness or meekness is reckoned a part of temperance not because of a likeness of matter, but because they agree as to the mode of restraint and moderation as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of external action justice considers what is due to another. Modesty does not consider this, but only a certain moderation. Hence it is reckoned a part not of justice but of temperance.

Reply to Objection 4: Under modesty Tully includes whatever pertains to the moderation of bodily movements and external things, as well as the moderation of hope which we reckoned as pertaining to humility.

OF SHAMEFACEDNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of temperance in particular: and in the first place the integral parts, which are shamefacedness and honesty. With regard to shamefacedness there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?

(2) What is its object?

(3) Who are the cause of a man being ashamed?

(4) What kind of people are ashamed?

Whether shamefacedness is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that shamefacedness is a virtue. For it is proper to a virtue “to observe the mean as fixed by reason”: this is clear from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6. Now shamefacedness observes the mean in this way, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. ii, 7). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is praiseworthy is either a virtue or something connected with virtue. Now shamefacedness is praiseworthy. But it is not part of a virtue. For it is not a part of prudence, since it is not in the reason but in the appetite; nor is it a part of justice. since shamefacedness implies a certain passion, whereas justice is not about the passions; nor again is it a part of fortitude, because it belongs to fortitude to be persistent and aggressive, while it belongs to shamefacedness to recoil from something; nor lastly is it a part of temperance, since the latter is about desires, whereas shamefacedness is a kind of fear according as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 9) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Hence it follows that shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the honest and the virtuous are convertible according to Tully (De Offic. i, 27). Now shamefacedness is a part of honesty: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness is the companion and familiar of the restful mind, averse to wantonness, a stranger to any kind of excess, the friend of sobriety and the support of what is honest, a seeker after the beautiful.” Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, every vice is opposed to a virtue. Now certain vices are opposed to shamefacedness, namely shamelessness and inordinate prudery. Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

Objection 5: Further, “like acts beget like habits,” according to Ethic. ii, 1. Now shamefacedness implies a praiseworthy act; wherefore from many such acts a habit results. But a habit of praiseworthy deeds is a virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore shamefacedness is a virtue.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 9) that shamefacedness is not a virtue.

I answer that, Virtue is taken in two ways, in a strict sense and in a broad sense. Taken strictly virtue is a perfection, as stated in Phys. vii, 17,18. Wherefore anything that is inconsistent with perfection, though it be good, falls short of the notion of virtue. Now shamefacedness is inconsistent with perfection, because it is the fear of something base, namely of that which is disgraceful. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that “shamefacedness is fear of a base action.” Now just as hope is about a possible and difficult good, so is fear about a possible and arduous evil, as stated above ([3457]FS, Q[40], A[1]; [3458]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3459]FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we were treating of the passions. But one who is perfect as to a virtuous habit, does not apprehend that which would be disgraceful and base to do, as being possible and arduous, that is to say difficult for him to avoid; nor does he actually do anything base, so as to be in fear of disgrace. Therefore shamefacedness, properly speaking, is not a virtue, since it falls short of the perfection of virtue.

Taken, however, in a broad sense virtue denotes whatever is good and praiseworthy in human acts or passions; and in this way /shamefacedness is sometimes called a virtue, since it is a praiseworthy passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Observing the mean is not sufficient for the notion of virtue, although it is one of the conditions included in virtue’s definition: but it is requisite, in addition to this, that it be “an elective habit,” that is to say, operating from choice. Now shamefacedness denotes, not a habit but a passion, nor does its movement result from choice, but from an impulse of passion. Hence it falls short of the notion of virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, shamefacedness is fear of baseness and disgrace. Now it has been stated ([3460]Q[142], A[4]) that the vice of intemperance is most base and disgraceful. Wherefore shamefacedness pertains more to temperance than to any other virtue, by reason of its motive cause, which is a base action though not according to the species of the passion, namely fear. Nevertheless in so far as the vices opposed to other virtues are base and disgraceful, shamefacedness may also pertain to other virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness fosters honesty, by removing that which is contrary thereto, but not so as to attain to the perfection of honesty.

Reply to Objection 4: Every defect causes a vice, but not every good is sufficient for the notion of virtue. Consequently it does not follow that whatever is directly opposed to vice is a virtue, although every vice is opposed to a virtue, as regards its origin. Hence shamelessness, in so far as it results from excessive love of disgraceful things, is opposed to temperance.

Reply to Objection 5: Being frequently ashamed causes the habit of an acquired virtue whereby one avoids disgraceful things which are the object of shamefacedness, without continuing to be ashamed in their regard: although as a consequence of this acquired virtue, a man would be more ashamed, if confronted with the matter of shamefacedness.

Whether shamefacedness is about a disgraceful action?

Objection 1: It would seem that shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shamefacedness is fear of disgrace.” Now sometimes those who do nothing wrong suffer ignominy, according to Ps. 67:8, “For thy sake I have borne reproach, shame hath covered my face.” Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Objection 2: Further, nothing apparently is disgraceful but what is sinful. Yet man is ashamed of things that are not sins, for instance when he performs a menial occupation. Therefore it seems that shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

Objection 3: Further, virtuous deeds are not disgraceful but most beautiful according to Ethic. i, 8. Yet sometimes people are ashamed to do virtuous deeds, according to Lk. 9:26, “He that shall be ashamed of Me and My words, of him the Son of man shall be ashamed,” etc. Therefore shamefacedness is not about a disgraceful action.

Objection 4: Further, if shamefacedness were properly about a disgraceful action, it would follow that the more disgraceful the action the more ashamed would one be. Yet sometimes a man is more ashamed of lesser sins, while he glories in those which are most grievous, according to Ps. 51:3, “Why dost thou glory in malice?” Therefore shamefacedness is not properly about a disgraceful action.

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, (De Nat. Hom. xx)] say that “shamefacedness is fear of doing a disgraceful deed or of a disgraceful deed done.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3461]FS, Q[41], A[2]; [3462]FS, Q[42], A[3]), when we were treating of the passions, fear is properly about an arduous evil, one, namely, that is difficult to avoid. Now disgrace is twofold. There is the disgrace inherent to vice, which consists in the deformity of a voluntary act: and this, properly speaking, has not the character of an arduous evil. For that which depends on the will alone does not appear to be arduous and above man’s ability: wherefore it is not apprehended as fearful, and for this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that such evils are not a matter of fear.

The other kind of disgrace is penal so to speak, and it consists in the reproach that attaches to a person, just as the clarity of glory consists in a person being honored. And since this reproach has the character of an arduous evil, just as honor has the character of an arduous good, shamefacedness, which is fear of disgrace, regards first and foremost reproach or ignominy. And since reproach is properly due to vice, as honor is due to virtue, it follows that shamefacedness regards also the disgrace inherent to vice. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “a man is less ashamed of those defects which are not the result of any fault of his own.”

Now shamefacedness regards fault in two ways. In one way a man refrains from vicious acts through fear of reproach: in another way a man while doing a disgraceful deed avoids the public eye through fear of reproach. In the former case, according to Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx), we speak of a person “blushing,” in the latter we say that he is “ashamed.” Hence he says that “the man who is ashamed acts in secret, but he who blushes fears to be disgraced.”

Reply to Objection 1: Shamefacedness properly regards disgrace as due to sin which is a voluntary defect. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “a man is more ashamed of those things of which he is the cause.” Now the virtuous man despises the disgrace to which he is subject on account of virtue, because he does not deserve it; as the Philosopher says of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3). Thus we find it said of the apostles (Acts 5:41) that “they (the apostles) went from the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were accounted worthy to suffer reproach for the name of Jesus.” It is owing to imperfection of virtue that a man is sometimes ashamed of the reproaches which he suffers on account of virtue, since the more virtuous a man is, the more he despises external things, whether good or evil. Wherefore it is written (Is. 51:7): “Fear ye not the reproach of men.”

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3463]Q[63], A[3]), though honor is not really due save to virtue alone, yet it regards a certain excellence: and the same applies to reproach, for though it is properly due to sin alone, yet, at least in man’s opinion, it regards any kind of defect. Hence a man is ashamed of poverty, disrepute, servitude, and the like.

Reply to Objection 3: Shamefacedness does not regard virtuous deeds as such. Yet it happens accidentally that a man is ashamed of them either because he looks upon them as vicious according to human opinion, or because he is afraid of being marked as presumptuous or hypocritical for doing virtuous deeds.

Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes more grievous sins are less shameful, either because they are less disgraceful, as spiritual sins in comparison with sins of the flesh, or because they connote a certain abundance of some temporal good; thus a man is more ashamed of cowardice than of daring, of theft than of robbery, on account of a semblance of power. The same applies to other sins.

Whether man is more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him. For it is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “men are more shamefaced of those from whom they desire approbation.” Now men desire this especially from people of the better sort who are sometimes not connected with them. Therefore man is not more shamefaced of those who are more closely connected with him.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly those are more closely connected who perform like deeds. Now man is not made ashamed of his sin by those whom he knows to be guilty of the same sin, because according to Rhet. ii, 6, “a man does not forbid his neighbor what he does himself.” Therefore he is not more shamefaced of those who are most closely connected with him.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men take more shame from those who retail their information to many, such as jokers and fable-tellers.” But those who are more closely connected with a man do not retail his vices. Therefore one should not take shame chiefly from them.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men are most liable to be made ashamed by those among whom they have done nothing amiss; by those of whom they ask something for the first time; by those whose friends they wish to become.” Now these are less closely connected with us. Therefore man is not made most ashamed by those who are more closely united to him.

On the contrary, It is stated in Rhet. ii, 6 that “man is made most ashamed by those who are to be continually with him.”

I answer that, Since reproach is opposed to honor, just as honor denotes attestation to someone’s excellence, especially the excellence which is according to virtue, so too reproach, the fear of which is shamefacedness, denotes attestation to a person’s defect, especially that which results from sin. Hence the more weighty a person’s attestation is considered to be, the more does he make another person ashamed. Now a person’s attestation may be considered as being more weighty, either because he is certain of the truth or because of its effect. Certitude of the truth attaches to a person’s attestations for two reasons. First on account of the rectitude of his judgement, as in the case of wise and virtuous men, by whom man is more desirous of being honored and by whom he is brought to a greater sense of shame. Hence children and the lower animals inspire no one with shame, by reason of their lack of judgment. Secondly, on account of his knowledge of the matter attested, because “everyone judges well of what is known to him” [*Ethic. i, 3]. In this way we are more liable to be made ashamed by persons connected with us, since they are better acquainted with our deeds: whereas strangers and persons entirely unknown to us, who are ignorant of what we do, inspire us with no shame at all.

An attestation receives weight from its effect by reason of some advantage or harm resulting therefrom; wherefore men are more desirous of being honored by those who can be of use to them, and are more liable to be made ashamed by those who are able to do them some harm. And for this reason again, in a certain respect, persons connected with us make us more ashamed, since we are to be continually in their society, as though this entailed a continual harm to us: whereas the harm that comes from strangers and passersby ceases almost at once.

Reply to Objection 1: People of the better sort make us ashamed for the same reason as those who are more closely connected with us; because just as the attestation of the better men carries more weight since they have a more universal knowledge of things, and in their judgments hold fast to the truth: so, too, the attestation of those among whom we live is more cogent since they know more about our concerns in detail.

Reply to Objection 2: We fear not the attestation of those who are connected with us in the likeness of sin, because we do not think that they look upon our defect as disgraceful.

Reply to Objection 3: Tale-bearers make us ashamed on account of the harm they do by making many think ill of us.

Reply to Objection 4: Even those among whom we have done no wrong, make us more ashamed, on account of the harm that would follow, because, to wit, we should forfeit the good opinion they had of us: and again because when contraries are put in juxtaposition their opposition seems greater, so that when a man notices something disgraceful in one whom he esteemed good, he apprehends it as being the more disgraceful. The reason why we are made more ashamed by those of whom we ask something for the first time, or whose friends we wish to be, is that we fear to suffer some injury, by being disappointed in our request, or by failing to become their friends.

Whether even virtuous men can be ashamed?

Objection 1: It would seem that even virtuous men can be ashamed. For contraries have contrary effects. Now those who excel in wickedness are not ashamed, according to Jer. 3:3, “Thou hadst a harlot’s forehead, thou wouldst not blush.” Therefore those who are virtuous are more inclined to be ashamed.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 6) that “men are ashamed not only of vice, but also of the signs of evil”: and this happens also in the virtuous. Therefore virtuous men can be ashamed.

Objection 3: Further, shamefacedness is “fear of disgrace” [*Ethic. iv, 9]. Now virtuous people may happen to be ignominious, for instance if they are slandered, or if they suffer reproach undeservedly. Therefore a virtuous man can be ashamed.

Objection 4: Further, shamefacedness is a part of temperance, as stated above ([3464]Q[143]). Now a part is not separated from its whole. Since then temperance is in a virtuous man, it means that shamefacedness is also.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that a “virtuous man is not shamefaced.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3465]AA[1],2) shamefacedness is fear of some disgrace. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil is not feared: first, because it is not reckoned an evil; secondly because one reckons it impossible with regard to oneself, or as not difficult to avoid.

Accordingly shame may be lacking in a person in two ways. First, because the things that should make him ashamed are not deemed by him to be disgraceful; and in this way those who are steeped in sin are without shame, for instead of disapproving of their sins, they boast of them. Secondly, because they apprehend disgrace as impossible to themselves, or as easy to avoid. In this way the old and the virtuous are not shamefaced. Yet they are so disposed, that if there were anything disgraceful in them they would be ashamed of it. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “shame is in the virtuous hypothetically.”

Reply to Objection 1: Lack of shame occurs in the best and in the worst men through different causes, as stated in the Article. In the average men it is found, in so far as they have a certain love of good, and yet are not altogether free from evil.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to the virtuous man to avoid not only vice, but also whatever has the semblance of vice, according to 1 Thess. 5:22, “From all appearance of evil refrain yourselves.” The Philosopher, too, says (Ethic. iv, 9) that the virtuous man should avoid “not only what is really evil, but also those things that are regarded as evil.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 1) the virtuous man despises ignominy and reproach, as being things he does not deserve, wherefore he is not much ashamed of them. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, shame, like the other passions, may forestall reason.

Reply to Objection 4: Shamefacedness is a part of temperance, not as though it entered into its essence, but as a disposition to it: wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43) that “shamefacedness lays the first foundation of temperance,” by inspiring man with the horror of whatever is disgraceful.

OF HONESTY* (FOUR ARTICLES)

[*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum.]

We must now consider honesty, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The relation between the honest and the virtuous;

(2) Its relation with the beautiful [*As honesty here denotes moral goodness, so beauty stands for moral beauty];

(3) Its relation with the useful and the pleasant;

(4) Whether honesty is a part of temperance?

Whether honesty is the same as virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty is not the same as virtue. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) that “the honest is what is desired for its own sake.” Now virtue is desired, not for its own sake, but for the sake of happiness, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9) that “happiness is the reward and the end of virtue.” Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 2: Further, according to Isidore (Etym. x) “honesty means an honorable state.” Now honor is due to many things besides virtue, since “it is praise that is the proper due of virtue” (Ethic. i, 12). Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the “principal part of virtue is the interior choice,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 13). But honesty seems to pertain rather to exterior conduct, according to 1 Cor. 14:40, “Let all things be done decently [honeste] and according to order” among you. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

Objection 4: Further, honesty apparently consists in external wealth. According to Ecclus. 11:14, “good things and evil, life and death [poverty and riches] are from God” [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition. For riches the Vulgate has ‘honestas’]. But virtue does not consist in external wealth. Therefore honesty is not the same as virtue.

On the contrary, Tully (De Offic. i, 5; Rhet. ii, 53) divides honesty into the four principal virtues, into which virtue is also divided. Therefore honesty is the same as virtue.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x) “honesty means an honorable state,” wherefore a thing may be said to be honest through being worthy of honor. Now honor, as stated above ([3466]Q[144], A[2], ad 2), is due to excellence: and the excellence of a man is gauged chiefly according to his virtue, as stated in Phys. vii, 17. Therefore, properly speaking, honesty refers to the same thing as virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), of those things that are desired for their own sake, some are desired for their own sake alone, and never for the sake of something else, such as happiness which is the last end; while some are desired, not only for their own sake, inasmuch as they have an aspect of goodness in themselves, even if no further good accrued to us through them, but also for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are conducive to some more perfect good. It is thus that the virtues are desirable for their own sake: wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52) that “some things allure us by their own force, and attract us by their own worth, such as virtue, truth, knowledge.” And this suffices to give a thing the character of honest.

Reply to Objection 2: Some of the things which are honored besides virtue are more excellent than virtue, namely God and happiness, and such like things are not so well known to us by experience as virtue which we practice day by day. Hence virtue has a greater claim to the name of honesty. Other things which are beneath virtue are honored, in so far as they are a help to the practice of virtue, such as rank, power, and riches [*Ethic. i, 8]. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that these things “are honored by some people, but in truth it is only the good man who is worthy of honor.” Now a man is good in respect of virtue. Wherefore praise is due to virtue in so far as the latter is desirable for the sake of something else, while honor is due to virtue for its own sake: and it is thus that virtue has the character of honesty.

Reply to Objection 3: As we have stated honest denotes that to which honor is due. Now honor is an attestation to someone’s excellence, as stated above ([3467]Q[103], AA[1],2). But one attests only to what one knows; and the internal choice is not made known save by external actions. Wherefore external conduct has the character of honesty, in so far as it reflects internal rectitude. For this reason honesty consists radically in the internal choice, but its expression lies in the external conduct.

Reply to Objection 4: It is because the excellence of wealth is commonly regarded as making a man deserving of honor, that sometimes the name of honesty is given to external prosperity.

Whether the honest is the same as the beautiful?

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest is not the same as the beautiful. For the aspect of honest is derived from the appetite, since the honest is “what is desirable for its own sake” [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. But the beautiful regards rather the faculty of vision to which it is pleasing. Therefore the beautiful is not the same as the honest.

Objection 2: Further, beauty requires a certain clarity, which is characteristic of glory: whereas the honest regards honor. Since then honor and glory differ, as stated above ([3468]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), it seems also that the honest and the beautiful differ.

Objection 3: Further, honesty is the same as virtue, as stated above [3469](A[1]). But a certain beauty is contrary to virtue, wherefore it is written (Ezech. 16:15): “Trusting in thy beauty thou playest the harlot because of thy renown.” Therefore the honest is not the same as the beautiful.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:23,24): “Those that are our uncomely [inhonesta] parts, have more abundant comeliness [honestatem], but our comely [honesta] parts have no need.” Now by uncomely parts he means the baser members, and by comely parts the beautiful members. Therefore the honest and the beautiful are apparently the same.

I answer that, As may be gathered from the words of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion. For he states that God is said to be beautiful, as being “the cause of the harmony and clarity of the universe.” Hence the beauty of the body consists in a man having his bodily limbs well proportioned, together with a certain clarity of color. In like manner spiritual beauty consists in a man’s conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason. Now this is what is meant by honesty, which we have stated [3470](A[1]) to be the same as virtue; and it is virtue that moderates according to reason all that is connected with man. Wherefore “honesty is the same as spiritual beauty.” Hence Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 30): “By honesty I mean intelligible beauty, which we properly designate as spiritual,” and further on he adds that “many things are beautiful to the eye, which it would be hardly proper to call honest.”

Reply to Objection 1: The object that moves the appetite is an apprehended good. Now if a thing is perceived to be beautiful as soon as it is apprehended, it is taken to be something becoming and good. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the beautiful and the good are beloved by all.” Wherefore the honest, inasmuch as it implies spiritual beauty, is an object of desire, and for this reason Tully says (De Offic. i, 5): “Thou perceivest the form and the features, so to speak, of honesty; and were it to be seen with the eye, would, as Plato declares, arouse a wondrous love of wisdom.”

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3471]Q[103], A[1], ad 3), glory is the effect of honor: because through being honored or praised, a person acquires clarity in the eyes of others. Wherefore, just as the same thing makes a man honorable and glorious, so is the same thing honest and beautiful.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument applies to the beauty of the body: although it might be replied that to be proud of one’s honesty is to play the harlot because of one’s spiritual beauty, according to Ezech. 28:17, “Thy heart was lifted up with thy beauty, thou hast lost thy wisdom in thy beauty.”

Whether the honest differs from the useful and the pleasant?

Objection 1: It would seem that the honest does not differ from the useful and the pleasant. For the honest is “what is desirable for its own sake” [*Cicero, De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53]. Now pleasure is desired for its own sake, for “it seems ridiculous to ask a man why he wishes to be pleased,” as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore the honest does not differ from the pleasant.

Objection 2: Further, riches are comprised under the head of useful good: for Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 52): “There is a thing that attracts the desire not by any force of its own, nor by its very nature, but on account of its fruitfulness and utility”: and “that is money.” Now riches come under the head of honesty, for it is written (Ecclus. 11:14): “Poverty and riches [honestas] are from God,” and (Ecclus. 13:2): “He shall take a burden upon him that hath fellowship with one more honorable,” i.e. richer, “than himself.” Therefore the honest differs not from the useful.

Objection 3: Further, Tully proves (De Offic. ii, 3) that nothing can be useful unless it be honest: and Ambrose makes the same statement (De Offic. ii, 6). Therefore the useful differs not from the honest.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Q[83], qu. 30): “The honest is that which is desirable for its own sake: the useful implies reference to something else.”

I answer that, The honest concurs in the same subject with the useful and the pleasant, but it differs from them in aspect. For, as stated above [3472] (A[2]), a thing is said to be honest, in so far as it has a certain beauty through being regulated by reason. Now whatever is regulated in accordance with reason is naturally becoming to man. Again, it is natural for a thing to take pleasure in that which is becoming to it. Wherefore an honest thing is naturally pleasing to man: and the Philosopher proves this with regard to acts of virtue (Ethic. i, 8). Yet not all that is pleasing is honest, since a thing may be becoming according to the senses, but not according to reason. A pleasing thing of this kind is beside man’s reason which perfects his nature. Even virtue itself, which is essentially honest, is referred to something else as its end namely happiness. Accordingly the honest the useful, and the pleasant concur in the one subject.

Nevertheless they differ in aspect. For a thing is said to be honest as having a certain excellence deserving of honor on account of its spiritual beauty: while it is said to be pleasing, as bringing rest to desire, and useful, as referred to something else. The pleasant, however, extends to more things than the useful and the honest: since whatever is useful and honest is pleasing in some respect, whereas the converse does not hold (Ethic. ii, 3).

Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be honest, if it is desired for its own sake by the rational appetite. which tends to that which is in accordance with reason: while a thing is said to be pleasant if it is desired for its own sake by the sensitive appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Riches are denominated honesty according of the opinion of the many who honor wealth: or because they are intended to be the instruments of virtuous deeds, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: Tully and Ambrose mean to say that nothing incompatible with honesty can be simply and truly useful, since it follows that it is contrary to man’s last end, which is a good in accordance with reason; although it may perhaps be useful in some respect, with regard to a particular end. But they do not mean to say that every useful thing as such may be classed among those that are honest.

Whether honesty should be reckoned a part of temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that honesty should not be reckoned a part of temperance. For it is not possible for a thing to be part and whole in respect of one same thing. Now "temperance is a part of honesty," according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53). Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated (3 Esdra 3:21) that "wine . . . makes all thoughts honest." But the use of wine, especially in excess, in which sense the passage quoted should seemingly be taken, pertains to intemperance rather than to temperance. Therefore honesty is not a part of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the honest is that which is deserving of honor. Now "it is the just and the brave who receive most honor," according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 9). Therefore honesty pertains, not to temperance, but rather to justice and fortitude: wherefore Eleazar said as related in 2 Macc. 6:28: "I suffer an honorable [honesta] death, for the most venerable and most holy laws."

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i] reckons honesty a part of temperance, and Ambrose (De Offic. i, 43) ascribes honesty as pertaining especially to temperance.

I answer that, As stated above [3473](A[2]), honesty is a kind of spiritual beauty. Now the disgraceful is opposed to the beautiful: and opposites are most manifest of one another. Wherefore seemingly honesty belongs especially to temperance, since the latter repels that which is most disgraceful and unbecoming to man, namely animal lusts. Hence by its very name temperance is most significative of the good of reason to which it belongs to moderate and temper evil desires. Accordingly honesty, as being ascribed for a special reason to temperance, is reckoned as a part thereof, not as a subjective part, nor as an annexed virtue, but as an integral part or condition attaching thereto.

Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is accounted a subjective part of honesty taken in a wide sense: it is not thus that the latter is reckoned a part of temperance.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is intoxicated, "the wine makes his thoughts honest" according to his own reckoning because he deems himself great and deserving of honor [*Cf.[3474] Q[148], A[6]].

Reply to Objection 3: Greater honor is due to justice and fortitude than to temperance, because they excel in the point of a greater good: yet greater honor is due to temperance, because the vices which it holds in check are the most deserving of reproach, as stated above. Thus honesty is more to be ascribed to temperance according to the rule given by the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23) when he says that “our uncomely parts have more abundant comeliness,” which, namely, destroys whatever is uncomely.

OF ABSTINENCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subjective parts of temperance: first, those which are about pleasures of food; secondly, those which are about pleasures of sex. The first consideration will include abstinence, which is about meat and drink, and sobriety, which is specifically about drink.

With regard to abstinence three points have to be considered: (1) Abstinence itself; (2) its act which is fasting; (3) its opposite vice which is gluttony. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether abstinence is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

Whether abstinence is a virtue?

Objection 1: It seems that abstinence is not a virtue. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): “The kingdom of God is not in speech but in power [virtute].” Now the kingdom of God does not consist in abstinence, for the Apostle says (Rom. 14:17): “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink,” where a gloss [*Cf. St. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11] observes that “justice consists neither in abstaining nor in eating.” Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. x, 11) addressing himself to God: “This hast Thou taught me, that I should set myself to take food as physic.” Now it belongs not to virtue, but to the medical art to regulate medicine. Therefore, in like manner, to regulate one’s food, which belongs to abstinence, is an act not of virtue but of art.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue “observes the mean,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6,7. But abstinence seemingly inclines not to the mean but to deficiency, since it denotes retrenchment. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, no virtue excludes another virtue. But abstinence excludes patience: for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “impatience not unfrequently dislodges the abstainer’s mind from its peaceful seclusion.” Likewise he says (Pastor. iii, 19) that “sometimes the sin of pride pierces the thoughts of the abstainer,” so that abstinence excludes humility. Therefore abstinence is not a virtue.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:5,6): “Join with your faith virtue, and with virtue knowledge, and with knowledge abstinence”; where abstinence is numbered among other virtues. Therefore abstinence is a virtue.

I answer that, Abstinence by its very name denotes retrenchment of food. Hence the term abstinence may be taken in two ways. First, as denoting retrenchment of food absolutely, and in this way it signifies neither a virtue nor a virtuous act, but something indifferent. Secondly, it may be taken as regulated by reason, and then it signifies either a virtuous habit or a virtuous act. This is the meaning of Peter’s words quoted above, where he says that we ought “to join abstinence with knowledge,” namely that in abstaining from food a man should act with due regard for those among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of health.

Reply to Objection 1: The use of and abstinence from food, considered in themselves, do not pertain to the kingdom of God, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:8): “Meat doth not commend us to God. For neither, if we eat not [*Vulg.: ‘Neither if we eat . . . nor if we eat not’], shall we have the less, nor if we eat, shall we have the more,” i.e. spiritually. Nevertheless they both belong to the kingdom of God, in so far as they are done reasonably through faith and love of God.

Reply to Objection 2: The regulation of food, in the point of quantity and quality, belongs to the art of medicine as regards the health of the body: but in the point of internal affections with regard to the good of reason, it belongs to abstinence. Hence Augustine says (QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): “It makes no difference whatever to virtue what or how much food a man takes, so long as he does it with due regard for the people among whom he lives, for his own person, and for the requirements of his health: but it matters how readily and uncomplainingly he does without food when bound by duty or necessity to abstain.”

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to temperance to bridle the pleasures which are too alluring to the soul, just as it belongs to fortitude to strengthen the soul against fears that deter it from the good of reason. Wherefore, just as fortitude is commended on account of a certain excess, from which all the parts of fortitude take their name, so temperance is commended for a kind of deficiency, from which all its parts are denominated. Hence abstinence, since it is a part of temperance, is named from deficiency, and yet it observes the mean, in so far as it is in accord with right reason.

Reply to Objection 4: Those vices result from abstinence in so far as it is not in accord with right reason. For right reason makes one abstain as one ought, i.e. with gladness of heart, and for the due end, i.e. for God's glory and not one's own.

Whether abstinence is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that abstinence is not a special virtue. For every virtue is praiseworthy by itself. But abstinence is not praiseworthy by itself; for Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19) that "the virtue of abstinence is praised only on account of the other virtues." Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Pet. xlii) that "the saints abstain from meat and drink, not that any creature of God is evil, but merely in order to chastise the body." Now this belongs to chastity, as its very name denotes. Therefore abstinence is not a special virtue distinct from chastity.

Objection 3: Further, as man should be content with moderate meat, so should he be satisfied with moderate clothes, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, "Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we should be [Vulg.: 'are'] content." Now there is no special virtue in being content with moderate clothes. Neither, therefore, is there in abstinence which moderates food.

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons abstinence as a special part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ([3475]Q[136], A[1];[3476] Q[141], A[3]) moral virtue maintains the good of reason against the onslaught of the passions: hence whenever we find a special motive why a passion departs from the good of reason, there is need of a special virtue. Now pleasures of the table are of a nature to withdraw man from the good of reason, both because they are so great, and because food is necessary to man who needs it for the maintenance of life, which he desires above all other things. Therefore abstinence is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Virtues are of necessity connected together, as stated above ([3477]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Wherefore one virtue receives help and commendation from another, as justice from fortitude. Accordingly in this way the virtue of abstinence receives commendation on account of the other virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: The body is chastised by means of abstinence, not only against the allurements of lust, but also against those of gluttony: since by abstaining a man gains strength for overcoming the onslaughts of gluttony, which increase in force the more he yields to them. Yet abstinence is not prevented from being a special virtue through being a help to chastity, since one virtue helps another.

Reply to Objection 3: The use of clothing was devised by art, whereas the use of food is from nature. Hence it is more necessary to have a special virtue for the moderation of food than for the moderation of clothing.

OF FASTING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider fasting: under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether fasting is an act of virtue?

(2) Of what virtue is it the act?

(3) Whether it is a matter of precept?

(4) Whether anyone is excused from fulfilling this precept?

(5) The time of fasting;

(6) Whether it is requisite for fasting to eat but once?

(7) The hour of eating for those who fast;

(8) The meats from which it is necessary to abstain.

Whether fasting is an act of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is acceptable to God. But fasting is not always acceptable to God, according to Is. 58:3, “Why have we fasted and Thou hast not regarded?” Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, no act of virtue forsakes the mean of virtue. Now fasting forsakes the mean of virtue, which in the virtue of abstinence takes account of the necessity of supplying the needs of nature, whereas by fasting something is retrenched therefrom: else those who do not fast would not have the virtue of abstinence. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, that which is competent to all, both good and evil, is not an act of virtue. Now such is fasting, since every one is fasting before eating. Therefore fasting is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with other virtuous acts (2 Cor. 6:5,6) where the Apostle says: “In fasting, in knowledge, in chastity, etc. [Vulg.: ‘in chastity, in knowledge’].”

I answer that, An act is virtuous through being directed by reason to some virtuous [honestum] [*Cf.[3478] Q[145], A[1]] good. Now this is consistent with fasting, because fasting is practiced for a threefold purpose. First, in order to bridle the lusts of the flesh, wherefore the Apostle says (2 Cor. 6:5,6): “In fasting, in chastity,” since fasting is the guardian of chastity. For, according to Jerome [*Contra Jov. ii.] “Venus is cold when Ceres and Bacchus are not there,” that is to say, lust is cooled by abstinence in meat and drink. Secondly, we have recourse to fasting in order that the mind may arise more freely to the contemplation of heavenly things: hence it is related (Dan. 10) of Daniel that he received a revelation from God after fasting for three weeks. Thirdly, in order to satisfy for sins: wherefore it is written (Joel 2:12): “Be converted to Me with all your heart, in fasting and in weeping and in mourning.” The same is declared by Augustine in a sermon (De orat. et Jejun. [*Serm. lxxii (ccxxx, de Tempore)]): “Fasting cleanses the soul, raises the mind, subjects one’s flesh to the spirit, renders the heart contrite and humble, scatters the clouds of concupiscence, quenches the fire of lust, kindles the true light of chastity.”

Reply to Objection 1: An act that is virtuous generically may be rendered vicious by its connection with certain circumstances. Hence the text goes on to say: “Behold in the day of your fast your own will is founded,” and a little further on (Is. 58:4): “You fast for debates and strife and strike with the fist wickedly.” These words are expounded by Gregory (Pastor. iii, 19) as follows: “The will indicates joy and the fist anger. In vain then is the flesh restrained if the mind allowed to drift to inordinate movements be wrecked by vice.” And Augustine says (in the same sermon) that “fasting loves not many words, deems wealth superfluous, scorns pride, commends humility, helps man to perceive what is frail and paltry.”

Reply to Objection 2: The mean of virtue is measured not according to quantity but according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Now reason judges it expedient, on account of some special motive, for a man to take less food than would be becoming to him under ordinary circumstances, for instance in order to avoid sickness, or in order to perform certain bodily works with greater ease: and much more does reason direct this to the avoidance of spiritual evils and the pursuit of spiritual goods. Yet reason does not retrench so much from one’s food as to refuse nature its necessary support: thus Jerome says:* “It matters not whether thou art a long or a short time in destroying thyself, since to afflict the body immoderately, whether by excessive lack of nourishment, or by eating or sleeping too little, is to offer a sacrifice of stolen goods.” [*The quotation is from the Corpus of Canon Law (Cap. Non mediocriter, De Consecrationibus, dist. 5). Gratian there ascribes the quotation to St. Jerome, but it is not to be found in the saint’s works.] In like manner right reason does not retrench so much from a man’s food as to render him incapable of fulfilling his duty. Hence Jerome says (in the same reference) “Rational man forfeits his dignity, if he sets fasting before chastity, or night-watchings before the well-being of his senses.”

Reply to Objection 3: The fasting of nature, in respect of which a man is said to be fasting until he partakes of food, consists in a pure negation, wherefore it cannot be reckoned a virtuous act. Such is only the fasting of one who abstains in some measure from food for a reasonable purpose. Hence the former is called natural fasting [jejunium jejunii] [*Literally the ‘fast of fasting’]: while the latter is called the faster’s fast, because he fasts for a purpose.

Whether fasting is an act of abstinence?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not an act of abstinence. For Jerome [*The quotation is from the Ordinary Gloss, where the reference is lacking] commenting on Mat. 17:20, “This kind of devil” says: “To fast is to abstain not only from food but also from all manner of lusts.” Now this belongs to every virtue. Therefore fasting is not exclusively an act of abstinence.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a Lenten Homily (xvi in Evang.) that “the Lenten fast is a tithe of the whole year.” Now paying tithes is an act of religion, as stated above ([3479]Q[87], A[1]). Therefore fasting is an act of religion and not of abstinence.

Objection 3: Further, abstinence is a part of temperance, as stated above (QQ[143],146, A[1], ad 3). Now temperance is condivided with fortitude, to which it belongs to endure hardships, and this seems very applicable to fasting. Therefore fasting is not an act of abstinence.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “fasting is frugality of fare and abstinence from food.”

I answer that, Habit and act have the same matter. Wherefore every virtuous act about some particular matter belongs to the virtue that appoints the mean in that matter. Now fasting is concerned with food, wherein the mean is appointed by abstinence. Wherefore it is evident that fasting is an act of abstinence.

Reply to Objection 1: Properly speaking fasting consists in abstaining from food, but speaking metaphorically it denotes abstinence from anything harmful, and such especially is sin.

We may also reply that even properly speaking fasting is abstinence from all manner of lust, since, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), an act ceases to be virtuous by the conjunction of any vice.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents the act of one virtue belonging to another virtue, in so far as it is directed to the end of that virtue, as explained above ([3480]Q[32], A[1], ad 2;[3481] Q[85], A[3]). Accordingly there is no reason why fasting should not be an act of religion, or of chastity, or of any other virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to fortitude as a special virtue, to endure, not any kind of hardship, but only those connected with the danger of death.

To endure hardships resulting from privation of pleasure of touch, belongs to temperance and its parts: and such are the hardships of fasting.

Whether fasting is a matter of precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that fasting is not a matter of precept. For precepts are not given about works of supererogation which are a matter of counsel. Now fasting is a work of supererogation: else it would have to be equally observed at all places and times. Therefore fasting is not a matter of precept.

Objection 2: Further, whoever infringes a precept commits a mortal sin. Therefore if fasting were a matter of precept, all who do not fast would sin mortally, and a widespreading snare would be laid for men.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 17) that “the Wisdom of God having taken human nature, and called us to a state of freedom, instituted a few most salutary sacraments whereby the community of the Christian people, that is, of the free multitude, should be bound together in subjection to one God.” Now the liberty of the Christian people seems to be hindered by a great number of observances no less than by a great number of sacraments. For Augustine says (Ad inquis. Januar., Ep. lv) that “whereas God in His mercy wished our religion to be distinguished by its freedom and the evidence and small number of its solemn sacraments, some people render it oppressive with slavish burdens.” Therefore it seems that the Church should not have made fasting a matter of precept.

On the contrary, Jerome (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi) speaking of fasting says: “Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were laws of the apostles.” Therefore fasting is a matter of precept.

I answer that, Just as it belongs to the secular authority to make legal precepts which apply the natural law to matters of common weal in temporal affairs, so it belongs to ecclesiastical superiors to prescribe by statute those things that concern the common weal of the faithful in spiritual goods.

Now it has been stated above [3482](A[1]) that fasting is useful as atoning for and preventing sin, and as raising the mind to spiritual things. And everyone is bound by the natural dictate of reason to practice fasting as far as it is necessary for these purposes. Wherefore fasting in general is a matter of precept of the natural law, while the fixing of the time and manner of fasting as becoming and profitable to the Christian people, is a matter of precept of positive law established by ecclesiastical authority: the latter is the Church fast, the former is the fast prescribed by nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Fasting considered in itself denotes something not eligible but penal: yet it becomes eligible in so far as it is useful to some end. Wherefore considered absolutely it is not binding under precept, but it is binding under precept to each one that stands in need of such a remedy. And since men, for the most part, need this remedy, both because "in many things we all offend" (James 3:2), and because "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" (Gal. 5:17), it was fitting that the Church should appoint certain fasts to be kept by all in common. In doing this the Church does not make a precept of a matter of supererogation, but particularizes in detail that which is of general obligation.

Reply to Objection 2: Those commandments which are given under the form of a general precept, do not bind all persons in the same way, but subject to the requirements of the end intended by the lawgiver. It will be a mortal sin to disobey a commandment through contempt of the lawgiver's authority, or to disobey it in such a way as to frustrate the end intended by him: but it is not a mortal sin if one fails to keep a commandment, when there is a reasonable motive, and especially if the lawgiver would not insist on its observance if he were present. Hence it is that not all, who do not keep the fasts of the Church, sin mortally.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine is speaking there of those things "that are neither contained in the authorities of Holy Scripture, nor found among the ordinances of bishops in council, nor sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church." On the other hand, the fasts that are of obligation are appointed by the councils of bishops and are sanctioned by the custom of the universal Church. Nor are they opposed to the freedom of the faithful, rather are they of use in hindering the slavery of sin, which is opposed to spiritual freedom, of which it is written (Gal. 5:13): "You, brethren, have been called unto liberty; only make not liberty an occasion to the flesh."

Whether all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that all are bound to keep the fasts of the Church. For the commandments of the Church are binding even as the commandments of God, according to Lk. 10:16, “He that heareth you heareth Me.” Now all are bound to keep the commandments of God. Therefore in like manner all are bound to keep the fasts appointed by the Church.

Objection 2: Further, children especially are seemingly not exempt from fasting, on account of their age: for it is written (Joel 2:15): “Sanctify a fast,” and further on (Joel 2:16): “Gather together the little ones, and them that suck the breasts.” Much more therefore are all others bound to keen the fasts.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual things should be preferred to temporal, and necessary things to those that are not necessary. Now bodily works are directed to temporal gain; and pilgrimages, though directed to spiritual things, are not a matter of necessity. Therefore, since fasting is directed to a spiritual gain, and is made a necessary thing by the commandment of the Church, it seems that the fasts of the Church ought not to be omitted on account of a pilgrimage, or bodily works.

Objection 4: Further, it is better to do a thing willingly than through necessity, as stated in 2 Cor. 9:7. Now the poor are wont to fast through necessity, owing to lack of food. Much more therefore ought they to fast willingly.

On the contrary, It seems that no righteous man is bound to fast. For the commandments of the Church are not binding in opposition to Christ’s teaching. But our Lord said (Lk. 5:34) that “the children of the bridegroom cannot fast whilst the bridegroom is with them [*Vulg.: ‘Can you make the children of the bridegroom fast, whilst the bridegroom is with them?’].” Now He is with all the righteous by dwelling in them in a special manner [*Cf. [3483]FP, Q[8], A[3]], wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): “Behold I am with you . . . even to the consummation of the world.” Therefore the righteous are not bound by the commandment of the Church to fast.

I answer that, As stated above ([3484]FS, Q[90], A[2]; [3485]FS, Q[98], AA[2],6), general precepts are framed according to the requirements of the many. Wherefore in making such precepts the lawgiver considers what happens generally and for the most part, and he does not intend the precept to be binding on a person in whom for some special reason there is something incompatible with observance of the precept. Yet discretion must be brought to bear on the point. For if the reason be evident, it is lawful for a man to use his own judgment in omitting to fulfil the precept, especially if custom be in his favor, or if it be difficult for him to have recourse to superior authority. on the other hand, if the reason be doubtful, one should have recourse to the superior who has power to grant a dispensation in such cases. And this must be done in the fasts appointed by the Church, to which all are bound in general, unless there be some special obstacle to this observance.

Reply to Objection 1: The commandments of God are precepts of the natural law, which are, of themselves, necessary for salvation. But the commandments of the Church are about matters which are necessary for salvation, not of themselves, but only through the ordinance of the Church. Hence there may be certain obstacles on account of which certain persons are not bound to keep the fasts in question.

Reply to Objection 2: In children there is a most evident reason for not fasting, both on account of their natural weakness, owing to which they need to take food frequently, and not much at a time, and because they need much nourishment owing to the demands of growth, which results from the residuum of nourishment. Wherefore as long as the stage of growth lasts, which as a rule lasts until they have completed the third period of seven years, they are not bound to keep the Church fasts: and yet it is fitting that even during that time they should exercise themselves in fasting, more or less, in accordance with their age. Nevertheless when some great calamity threatens, even children are commanded to fast, in sign of more severe penance, according to Jonah 3:7, “Let neither men nor beasts . . . taste anything . . . nor drink water.”

Reply to Objection 3: Apparently a distinction should be made with regard to pilgrims and working people. For if the pilgrimage or laborious work can be conveniently deferred or lessened without detriment to the bodily health and such external conditions as are necessary for the upkeep of bodily or spiritual life, there is no reason for omitting the fasts of the Church. But if one be under the necessity of starting on the pilgrimage at once, and of making long stages, or of doing much work, either for one’s bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life, and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast:

because in ordering fasts the Church would not seem to have intended to prevent other pious and more necessary undertakings. Nevertheless, in such cases one ought seemingly, to seek the superior’s dispensation; except perhaps when the above course is recognized by custom, since when superiors are silent they would seem to consent.

Reply to Objection 4: Those poor who can provide themselves with sufficient for one meal are not excused, on account of poverty, from keeping the fasts of the Church. On the other hand, those would seem to be exempt who beg their food piecemeal, since they are unable at any one time to have a sufficiency of food.

Reply to Objection 5: This saying of our Lord may be expounded in three ways. First, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxx in Matth.), who says that “the disciples, who are called children of the bridegroom, were as yet of a weakly disposition, wherefore they are compared to an old garment.” Hence while Christ was with them in body they were to be fostered with kindness rather than drilled with the harshness of fasting. According to this interpretation, it is fitting that dispensations should be granted to the imperfect and to beginners, rather than to the elders and the perfect, according to a gloss on Ps. 130:2, “As a child that is weaned is towards his mother.” Secondly, we may say with Jerome [*Bede, Comment. in Luc. v] that our Lord is speaking here of the fasts of the observances of the Old Law. Wherefore our Lord means to say that the apostles were not to be held back by the old observances, since they were to be filled with the newness of grace. Thirdly, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), who states that fasting is of two kinds. one pertains to those who are humbled by disquietude, and this is not befitting perfect men, for they are called “children of the bridegroom”; hence when we read in Luke: “The children of the bridegroom cannot fast [*Hom. xiii, in Matth.],” we read in Mat. 9:15: “The children of the bridegroom cannot mourn [*Vulg.: ‘Can the children of the bridegroom mourn?’].” The other pertains to the mind that rejoices in adhering to spiritual things: and this fasting is befitting the perfect.

Whether the times for the Church fast are fittingly ascribed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the times for the Church fast are unfittingly appointed. For we read (Mat. 4) that Christ began to fast immediately after being baptized. Now we ought to imitate Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:16, “Be ye followers of me, as I also am of Christ.” Therefore we ought to fast immediately after the Epiphany when Christ’s baptism is celebrated.

Objection 2: Further, it is unlawful in the New Law to observe the ceremonies of the Old Law. Now it belongs to the solemnities of the Old Law to fast in certain particular months: for it is written (Zech. 8:19): “The fast of the fourth month and the fast of the fifth, and the fast of the seventh, and the fast of the tenth shall be to the house of Judah, joy and gladness and great solemnities.” Therefore the fast of certain months, which are called Ember days, are unfittingly kept in the Church.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii, 27), just as there is a fast “of sorrow,” so is there a fast “of joy.” Now it is most becoming that the faithful should rejoice spiritually in Christ’s Resurrection. Therefore during the five weeks which the Church solemnizes on account of Christ’s Resurrection, and on Sundays which commemorate the Resurrection, fasts ought to be appointed.

On the contrary, stands the general custom of the Church.

I answer that, As stated above ([3486]AA[1],3), fasting is directed to two things, the deletion of sin, and the raising of the mind to heavenly things. Wherefore fasting ought to be appointed specially for those times, when it behooves man to be cleansed from sin, and the minds of the faithful to be raised to God by devotion: and these things are particularly requisite before the feast of Easter, when sins are loosed by baptism, which is solemnly conferred on Easter-eve, on which day our Lord’s burial is commemorated, because “we are buried together with Christ by baptism unto death” (Rom. 6:4). Moreover at the Easter festival the mind of man ought to be devoutly raised to the glory of eternity, which Christ restored by rising from the dead, and so the Church ordered a fast to be observed immediately before the Paschal feast; and for the same reason, on the eve of the chief festivals, because it is then that one ought to make ready to keep the coming feast devoutly. Again it is the custom in the Church for Holy orders to be conferred every quarter of the year (in sign whereof our Lord fed four thousand men with seven loaves, which signify the New Testament year as Jerome says [*Comment. in Marc. viii]): and then both the ordainer, and the candidates for ordination, and even the whole people, for whose good they are ordained, need to fast in order to make themselves ready for the ordination. Hence it is related (Lk. 6:12) that before choosing His disciples our Lord "went out into a mountain to pray": and Ambrose [*Exposit. in Luc.] commenting on these words says: "What shouldst thou do, when thou desirest to undertake some pious work, since Christ prayed before sending His apostles?"

With regard to the forty day's fast, according to Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) there are three reasons for the number. First, "because the power of the Decalogue is accomplished in the four books of the Holy Gospels: since forty is the product of ten multiplied by four." Or "because we are composed of four elements in this mortal body through whose lusts we transgress the Lord's commandments which are delivered to us in the Decalogue. Wherefore it is fitting we should punish that same body forty times. or, because, just as under the Law it was commanded that tithes should be paid of things, so we strive to pay God a tithe of days, for since a year is composed of three hundred and sixty-six days, by punishing ourselves for thirty-six days" (namely, the fasting days during the six weeks of Lent) "we pay God a tithe of our year." According to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 16) a fourth reason may be added. For the Creator is the "Trinity," Father, Son, and Holy Ghost: while the number "three" refers to the invisible creature, since we are commanded to love God, with our whole heart, with our whole soul, and with our whole mind: and the number "four" refers to the visible creature, by reason of heat, cold, wet and dry. Thus the number "ten" [*Ten is the sum of three, three, and four] signifies all things, and if this be multiplied by four which refers to the body whereby we make use of things, we have the number forty.

Each fast of the Ember days is composed of three days, on account of the number of months in each season: or on account of the number of Holy orders which are conferred at these times.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ needed not baptism for His own sake, but in order to commend baptism to us. Wherefore it was competent for Him to fast, not before, but after His baptism, in order to invite us to fast before our baptism.

Reply to Objection 2: The Church keeps the Ember fasts, neither at the very same time as the Jews, nor for the same reasons. For they fasted in

July, which is the fourth month from April (which they count as the first), because it was then that Moses coming down from Mount Sinai broke the tables of the Law (Ex. 32), and that, according to Jer. 39:2, “the walls of the city were first broken through.” In the fifth month, which we call August, they fasted because they were commanded not to go up on to the mountain, when the people had rebelled on account of the spies (Num. 14): also in this month the temple of Jerusalem was burnt down by Nabuchodonosor (Jer. 52) and afterwards by Titus. In the seventh month which we call October, Godolias was slain, and the remnants of the people were dispersed (Jer. 51). In the tenth month, which we call January, the people who were with Ezechiel in captivity heard of the destruction of the temple (Ezech. 4).

Reply to Objection 3: The “fasting of joy” proceeds from the instigation of the Holy Ghost Who is the Spirit of liberty, wherefore this fasting should not be a matter of precept. Accordingly the fasts appointed by the commandment of the Church are rather “fasts of sorrow” which are inconsistent with days of joy. For this reason fasting is not ordered by the Church during the whole of the Paschal season, nor on Sundays: and if anyone were to fast at these times in contradiction to the custom of Christian people, which as Augustine declares (Ep. xxxvi) “is to be considered as law,” or even through some erroneous opinion (thus the Manichees fast, because they deem such fasting to be of obligation)—he would not be free from sin. Nevertheless fasting considered in itself is commendable at all times; thus Jerome wrote (Ad Lucin., Ep. lxxi): “Would that we might fast always.”

Whether it is requisite for fasting that one eat but once?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for fasting that one eat but once. For, as stated above [3487](A[2]), fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, which observes due quantity of food not less than the number of meals. Now the quantity of food is not limited for those who fast. Therefore neither should the number of meals be limited.

Objection 2: Further, Just as man is nourished by meat, so is he by drink: wherefore drink breaks the fast, and for this reason we cannot receive the Eucharist after drinking. Now we are not forbidden to drink at various hours of the day. Therefore those who fast should not be forbidden to eat several times.

Objection 3: Further, digestives are a kind of food: and yet many take them on fasting days after eating. Therefore it is not essential to fasting to take only one meal.

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Christian people.

I answer that, Fasting is instituted by the Church in order to bridle concupiscence, yet so as to safeguard nature. Now only one meal is seemingly sufficient for this purpose, since thereby man is able to satisfy nature; and yet he withdraws something from concupiscence by minimizing the number of meals. Therefore it is appointed by the Church, in her moderation, that those who fast should take one meal in the day.

Reply to Objection 1: It was not possible to fix the same quantity of food for all, on account of the various bodily temperaments, the result being that one person needs more, and another less food: whereas, for the most part, all are able to satisfy nature by only one meal.

Reply to Objection 2: Fasting is of two kinds [*Cf. A[1], ad 3]. One is the natural fast, which is requisite for receiving the Eucharist. This is broken by any kind of drink, even of water, after which it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist. The fast of the Church is another kind and is called the “fasting of the faster,” and this is not broken save by such things as the Church intended to forbid in instituting the fast. Now the Church does not intend to command abstinence from drink, for this is taken more for bodily refreshment, and digestion of the food consumed, although it nourishes somewhat. It is, however, possible to sin and lose the merit of fasting, by partaking of too much drink: as also by eating immoderately at one meal.

Reply to Objection 3: Although digestives nourish somewhat they are not taken chiefly for nourishment, but for digestion. Hence one does not break one’s fast by taking them or any other medicines, unless one were to take digestives, with a fraudulent intention, in great quantity and by way of food.

Whether the ninth hour is suitably fixed for the faster’s meal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ninth hour is not suitably fixed for the faster’s meal. For the state of the New Law is more perfect than the state of the Old Law. Now in the Old Testament they fasted until evening, for it is written (Lev. 23:32): “It is a sabbath . . . you shall afflict your souls,” and then the text continues: “From evening until evening you shall celebrate your sabbaths.” Much more therefore under the New Testament should the fast be ordered until the evening.

Objection 2: Further, the fast ordered by the Church is binding on all. But all are not able to know exactly the ninth hour. Therefore it seems that the fixing of the ninth hour should not form part of the commandment to fast.

Objection 3: Further, fasting is an act of the virtue of abstinence, as stated above [3488](A[2]). Now the mean of moral virtue does not apply in the same way to all, since what is much for one is little for another, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Therefore the ninth hour should not be fixed for those who fast.

On the contrary, The Council of Chalons [*The quotation is from the Capitularies (Cap. 39) of Theodulf, bishop of Orleans (760–821) and is said to be found in the Corpus Juris, Cap. Solent, dist. 1, De Consecratione] says: “During Lent those are by no means to be credited with fasting who eat before the celebration of the office of Vespers,” which in the Lenten season is said after the ninth hour. Therefore we ought to fast until the ninth hour.

I answer that, As stated above ([3489]AA[1],3,5), fasting is directed to the deletion and prevention of sin. Hence it ought to add something to the common custom, yet so as not to be a heavy burden to nature. Now the right and common custom is for men to eat about the sixth hour: both because digestion is seemingly finished (the natural heat being withdrawn inwardly at night-time on account of the surrounding cold of the night), and the humor spread about through the limbs (to which result the heat of the day conduces until the sun has reached its zenith), and again because it is then chiefly that the nature of the human body needs assistance against the external heat that is in the air, lest the humors be parched within. Hence, in order that those who fast may feel some pain in satisfaction for their sins, the ninth hour is suitably fixed for their meal.

Moreover, this hour agrees with the mystery of Christ’s Passion, which was brought to a close at the ninth hour, when “bowing His head, He gave up the ghost” (Jn. 19:30): because those who fast by punishing their flesh, are conformed to the Passion of Christ, according to Gal. 5:24, “They that are Christ’s, have crucified their flesh with the vices and concupiscences.”

Reply to Objection 1: The state of the Old Testament is compared to the night, while the state of the New Testament is compared to the day, according to Rom. 13:12, “The night is passed and the day is at hand.” Therefore in the Old Testament they fasted until night, but not in the New Testament.

Reply to Objection 2: Fasting requires a fixed hour based, not on a strict calculation, but on a rough estimate: for it suffices that it be about the ninth hour, and this is easy for anyone to ascertain.

Reply to Objection 3: A little more or a little less cannot do much harm. Now it is not a long space of time from the sixth hour at which men for the most part are wont to eat, until the ninth hour, which is fixed for those who fast. Wherefore the fixing of such a time cannot do much harm to anyone, whatever his circumstances may be. If however this were to prove a heavy burden to a man on account of sickness, age, or some similar reason, he should be dispensed from fasting, or be allowed to forestall the hour by a little.

Whether it is fitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that those who fast should be bidden to abstain from flesh meat, eggs, and milk foods. For it has been stated above [3490](A[6]) that fasting was instituted as a curb on the concupiscence of the flesh. Now concupiscence is kindled by drinking wine more than by eating flesh; according to Prov. 20:1, “Wine is a luxurious thing,” and Eph. 5:18, “Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury.” Since then those who fast are not forbidden to drink wine, it seems that they should not be forbidden to eat flesh meat.

Objection 2: Further, some fish are as delectable to eat as the flesh of certain animals. Now “concupiscence is desire of the delectable,” as stated above ([3491]FS, Q[30], A[1]). Therefore since fasting which was instituted in order to bridle concupiscence does not exclude the eating of fish, neither should it exclude the eating of flesh meat.

Objection 3: Further, on certain fasting days people make use of eggs and cheese. Therefore one can likewise make use of them during the Lenten fast.

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the faithful.

I answer that, As stated above [3492](A[6]), fasting was instituted by the Church in order to bridle the concupiscences of the flesh, which regard pleasures of touch in connection with food and sex. Wherefore the Church forbade those who fast to partake of those foods which both afford most pleasure to the palate, and besides are a very great incentive to lust. Such are the flesh of animals that take their rest on the earth, and of those that breathe the air and their products, such as milk from those that walk on the earth, and eggs from birds. For, since such like animals are more like man in body, they afford greater pleasure as food, and greater nourishment to the human body, so that from their consumption there results a greater surplus available for seminal matter, which when abundant becomes a great incentive to lust. Hence the Church has bidden those who fast to abstain especially from these foods.

Reply to Objection 1: Three things concur in the act of procreation, namely, heat, spirit [*Cf. P. I., Q. 118, A[1], ad 3], and humor. Wine and other things that heat the body conduce especially to heat: flatulent foods seemingly cooperate in the production of the vital spirit: but it is chiefly the use of flesh meat which is most productive of nourishment, that conduces to the production of humor. Now the alteration occasioned by heat, and the increase in vital spirits are of short duration, whereas the substance of the humor remains a long time. Hence those who fast are forbidden the use of flesh meat rather than of wine or vegetables which are flatulent foods.

Reply to Objection 2: In the institution of fasting, the Church takes account of the more common occurrences. Now, generally speaking, eating flesh meat affords more pleasure than eating fish, although this is not always the case. Hence the Church forbade those who fast to eat flesh meat, rather than to eat fish.

Reply to Objection 3: Eggs and milk foods are forbidden to those who fast, for as much as they originate from animals that provide us with flesh: wherefore the prohibition of flesh meat takes precedence of the prohibition of eggs and milk foods. Again the Lenten fast is the most solemn of all, both because it is kept in imitation of Christ, and because it disposes us to celebrate devoutly the mysteries of our redemption. For this reason the eating of flesh meat is forbidden in every fast, while the Lenten fast lays a general prohibition even on eggs and milk foods. As to the use of the latter things in other fasts the custom varies among different people, and each person is bound to conform to that custom which is in vogue with those among whom he is dwelling. Hence Jerome says [*Augustine, De Lib. Arb. iii, 18; cf. De Nat. et Grat. lxvii]: “Let each province keep to its own practice, and look upon the commands of the elders as though they were the laws of the apostles.”

OF GLUTTONY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider gluttony. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether gluttony is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Its species;

(5) Whether it is a capital sin?

(6) Its daughters.

Whether gluttony is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a sin. For our Lord said (Mat. 15:11): “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man.” Now gluttony regards food which goes into a man. Therefore, since every sin defiles a man, it seems that gluttony is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, “No man sins in what he cannot avoid” [*Ep. lxxi, ad Lucin.]. Now gluttony is immoderation in food; and man cannot avoid this, for Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): “Since in eating pleasure and necessity go together, we fail to discern between the call of necessity and the seduction of pleasure,” and Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): “Who is it, Lord, that does not eat a little more than necessary?” Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, in every kind of sin the first movement is a sin. But the first movement in taking food is not a sin, else hunger and thirst would be sinful. Therefore gluttony is not a sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18) that “unless we first tame the enemy dwelling within us, namely our gluttonous appetite, we have not even stood up to engage in the spiritual combat.” But man’s inward enemy is sin. Therefore gluttony is a sin.

I answer that, Gluttony denotes, not any desire of eating and drinking, but an inordinate desire. Now desire is said to be inordinate through leaving the order of reason, wherein the good of moral virtue consists: and a thing is said to be a sin through being contrary to virtue. Wherefore it is evident that gluttony is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: That which goes into man by way of food, by reason of its substance and nature, does not defile a man spiritually. But the Jews, against whom our Lord is speaking, and the Manichees deemed certain foods to make a man unclean, not on account of their signification, but by reason of their nature [*Cf. [3493]FS, Q[102], A[6], ad 1]. It is the inordinate desire of food that defiles a man spiritually.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, the vice of gluttony does not regard the substance of food, but in the desire thereof not being regulated by reason. Wherefore if a man exceed in quantity of food, not from desire of food, but through deeming it necessary to him, this pertains, not to gluttony, but to some kind of inexperience. It is a case of gluttony only when a man knowingly exceeds the measure in eating, from a desire for the pleasures of the palate.

Reply to Objection 3: The appetite is twofold. There is the natural appetite, which belongs to the powers of the vegetal soul. In these powers virtue and vice are impossible, since they cannot be subject to reason; wherefore the appetitive power is differentiated from the powers of secretion, digestion, and excretion, and to it hunger and thirst are to be referred. Besides this there is another, the sensitive appetite, and it is in the concupiscence of this appetite that the vice of gluttony consists. Hence the first movement of gluttony denotes inordinateness in the sensitive appetite, and this is not without sin.

Whether gluttony is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a mortal sin. For every mortal sin is contrary to a precept of the Decalogue: and this, apparently, does not apply to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity, as stated above ([3494]Q[132], A[3]). But gluttony is not opposed to charity, neither as regards the love of God, nor as regards the love of one’s neighbor. Therefore gluttony is never a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Cf. Append. to St. Augustine’s works: Serm. civ (xli, de sanctis)]: “Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins.” But this pertains to gluttony. Therefore gluttony is accounted among the lesser, that is to say venial, sins.

Objection 4: On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 18): “As long as the vice of gluttony has a hold on a man, all that he has done valiantly is forfeited by him: and as long as the belly is unrestrained, all virtue comes to naught.” But virtue is not done away save by mortal sin. Therefore gluttony is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above [3495](A[1]), the vice of gluttony properly consists in inordinate concupiscence. Now the order of reason in regulating the concupiscence may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to things directed to the end, inasmuch as they may be incommensurate and consequently improportionate to the end; secondly, with regard to the end itself, inasmuch as concupiscence turns man away from his due end. Accordingly, if the inordinate concupiscence in gluttony be found to turn man away from the last end, gluttony will be a mortal sin. This is the case when he adheres to the pleasure of gluttony as his end, for the sake of which he contemns God, being ready to disobey God's commandments, in order to obtain those pleasures. On the other hand, if the inordinate concupiscence in the vice of gluttony be found to affect only such things as are directed to the end, for instance when a man has too great a desire for the pleasures of the palate, yet would not for their sake do anything contrary to God's law, it is a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The vice of gluttony becomes a mortal sin by turning man away from his last end: and accordingly, by a kind of reduction, it is opposed to the precept of hallowing the sabbath, which commands us to rest in our last end. For mortal sins are not all directly opposed to the precepts of the Decalogue, but only those which contain injustice: because the precepts of the Decalogue pertain specially to justice and its parts, as stated above ([3496]Q[122], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 2: In so far as it turns man away from his last end, gluttony is opposed to the love of God, who is to be loved, as our last end, above all things: and only in this respect is gluttony a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine refers to gluttony as denoting inordinate concupiscence merely in regard of things directed to the end.

Reply to Objection 4: Gluttony is said to bring virtue to naught, not so much on its own account, as on account of the vices which arise from it. For Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19): "When the belly is distended by gluttony, the virtues of the soul are destroyed by lust."

Whether gluttony is the greatest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is the greatest of sins. For the grievousness of a sin is measured by the grievousness of the punishment. Now the sin of gluttony is most grievously punished, for Chrysostom says [*Hom. xiii in Matth.]: “Gluttony turned Adam out of Paradise, gluttony it was that drew down the deluge at the time of Noah.” According to Ezech. 16:49, “This was the iniquity of Sodom, thy sister . . . fulness of bread,” etc. Therefore the sin of gluttony is the greatest of all.

Objection 2: Further, in every genus the cause is the most powerful. Now gluttony is apparently the cause of other sins, for a gloss on Ps. 135:10, “Who smote Egypt with their first-born,” says: “Lust, concupiscence, pride are the first-born of gluttony.” Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins.

Objection 3: Further, man should love himself in the first place after God, as stated above ([3497]Q[25], A[4]). Now man, by the vice of gluttony, inflicts an injury on himself: for it is written (Ecclus. 37:34): “By surfeiting many have perished.” Therefore gluttony is the greatest of sins, at least excepting those that are against God.

On the contrary, The sins of the flesh, among which gluttony is reckoned, are less culpable according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii).

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in three ways. First and foremost it depends on the matter in which the sin is committed: and in this way sins committed in connection with Divine things are the greatest. From this point of view gluttony is not the greatest sin, for it is about matters connected with the nourishment of the body. Secondly, the gravity of a sin depends on the person who sins, and from this point of view the sin of gluttony is diminished rather than aggravated, both on account of the necessity of taking food, and on account of the difficulty of proper discretion and moderation in such matters. Thirdly, from the point of view of the result that follows, and in this way gluttony has a certain gravity, inasmuch as certain sins are occasioned thereby.

Reply to Objection 1: These punishments are to be referred to the vices that resulted from gluttony, or to the root from which gluttony sprang, rather than to gluttony itself. For the first man was expelled from Paradise on account of pride, from which he went on to an act of gluttony: while the deluge and the punishment of the people of Sodom were inflicted for sins occasioned by gluttony.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection argues from the standpoint of the sins that result from gluttony. Nor is a cause necessarily more powerful, unless it be a direct cause: and gluttony is not the direct cause but the accidental cause, as it were, and the occasion of other vices.

Reply to Objection 3: The glutton intends, not the harm to his body, but the pleasure of eating: and if injury results to his body, this is accidental. Hence this does not directly affect the gravity of gluttony, the guilt of which is nevertheless aggravated, if a man incur some bodily injury through taking too much food.

Whether the species of gluttony are fittingly distinguished?

Objection 1: It seems that the species of gluttony are unfittingly distinguished by Gregory who says (Moral. xxx, 18): “The vice of gluttony tempts us in five ways. Sometimes it forestalls the hour of need; sometimes it seeks costly meats; sometimes it requires the food to be daintily cooked; sometimes it exceeds the measure of refreshment by taking too much; sometimes we sin by the very heat of an immoderate appetite”—which are contained in the following verse: “Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.”

For the above are distinguished according to diversity of circumstance. Now circumstances, being the accidents of an act, do not differentiate its species. Therefore the species of gluttony are not distinguished according to the aforesaid.

Objection 2: Further, as time is a circumstance, so is place. If then gluttony admits of one species in respect of time, it seems that there should likewise be others in respect of place and other circumstances.

Objection 3: Further, just as temperance observes due circumstances, so do the other moral virtues. Now the species of the vices opposed to the other moral virtues are not distinguished according to various circumstances. Neither, therefore, are the species of gluttony distinguished thus.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory quoted above.

I answer that, As stated above [3498](A[1]), gluttony denotes inordinate concupiscence in eating. Now two things are to be considered in eating, namely the food we eat, and the eating thereof. Accordingly, the inordinate concupiscence may be considered in two ways. First, with regard to the food consumed: and thus, as regards the substance or species of food a man seeks “sumptuous”—i.e. costly food; as regards its quality, he seeks food prepared too nicely—i.e. “daintily”; and as regards quantity, he exceeds by eating “too much.”

Secondly, the inordinate concupiscence is considered as to the consumption of food: either because one forestalls the proper time for eating, which is to eat “hastily,” or one fails to observe the due manner of eating, by eating “greedily.”

Isidore [*De Summo Bon. ii, 42] comprises the first and second under one heading, when he says that the glutton exceeds in “what” he eats, or in “how much,” “how” or “when he eats.”

Reply to Objection 1: The corruption of various circumstances causes the various species of gluttony, on account of the various motives, by reason of which the species of moral things are differentiated. For in him that seeks sumptuous food, concupiscence is aroused by the very species of the food; in him that forestalls the time concupiscence is disordered through impatience of delay, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 2: Place and other circumstances include no special motive connected with eating, that can cause a different species of gluttony.

Reply to Objection 3: In all other vices, whenever different circumstances correspond to different motives, the difference of circumstances argues a specific difference of vice: but this does not apply to all circumstances, as stated above ([3499]FS, Q[72], A[9]).

Whether gluttony is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that gluttony is not a capital vice. For capital vices denote those whence, under the aspect of final cause, other vices originate. Now food, which is the matter of gluttony, has not the aspect of end, since it is sought, not for its own sake, but for the body’s nourishment. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, a capital vice would seem to have a certain pre-eminence in sinfulness. But this does not apply to gluttony, which, in respect of its genus, is apparently the least of sins, seeing that it is most akin to what is in respect of its genus, is apparently the least gluttony is not a capital vice.

Objection 3: Further, sin results from a man forsaking the food of virtue on account of something useful to the present life, or pleasing to the senses. Now as regards goods having the aspect of utility, there is but one capital vice, namely covetousness. Therefore, seemingly, there would be but one capital vice in respect of pleasures: and this is lust, which is a greater vice than gluttony, and is about greater pleasures. Therefore gluttony is not a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) reckons gluttony among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above ([3500]FS, Q[84], A[3]), a capital vice denotes one from which, considered as final cause, i.e. as having a most desirable end, other vices originate: wherefore through desiring that end men are incited to sin in many ways. Now an end is rendered most desirable through having one of the conditions of happiness which is desirable by its very nature: and pleasure is essential to happiness, according to Ethic. i, 8; x, 3,7,8. Therefore the vice of gluttony, being about pleasures of touch which stand foremost among other pleasures, is fittingly reckoned among the capital vices.

Reply to Objection 1: It is true that food itself is directed to something as its end: but since that end, namely the sustaining of life, is most desirable and whereas life cannot be sustained without food, it follows that food too is most desirable: indeed, nearly all the toil of man’s life is directed thereto, according to Eccles. 6:7, “All the labor of man is for his mouth.” Yet gluttony seems to be about pleasures of food rather than about food itself; wherefore, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. liii), “with such food as is good for the worthless body, men desire to be fed,” wherein namely the pleasure consists, “rather than to be filled: since the whole end of that desire is this—not to thirst and not to hunger.”

Reply to Objection 2: In sin the end is ascertained with respect to the conversion, while the gravity of sin is determined with regard to the aversion. Wherefore it does not follow that the capital sin which has the most desirable end surpasses the others in gravity.

Reply to Objection 3: That which gives pleasure is desirable in itself: and consequently corresponding to its diversity there are two capital vices, namely gluttony and lust. On the other hand, that which is useful is desirable, not in itself, but as directed to something else: wherefore seemingly in all useful things there is one aspect of desirability. Hence there is but one capital vice, in respect of such things.

Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to gluttony?

Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to gluttony, to wit, “unseemly joy, scurrility, uncleanness, loquaciousness, and dullness of mind as regards the understanding.” For unseemly joy results from every sin, according to Prov. 2:14, “Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.” Likewise dullness of mind is associated with every sin, according to Prov. 14:22, “They err that work evil.” Therefore they are unfittingly reckoned to be daughters of gluttony.

Objection 2: Further, the uncleanness which is particularly the result of gluttony would seem to be connected with vomiting, according to Is. 28:8, “All tables were full of vomit and filth.” But this seems to be not a sin but a punishment; or even a useful thing that is a matter of counsel, according to Ecclus. 31:25, “If thou hast been forced to eat much, arise, go out, and vomit; and it shall refresh thee.” Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore (QQ. in Deut. xvi) reckons scurrility as a daughter of lust. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the daughters of gluttony.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to gluttony.

I answer that, As stated above ([3501]AA[1],2,3), gluttony consists properly in an immoderate pleasure in eating and drinking. Wherefore those vices are reckoned among the daughters of gluttony, which are the results of eating and drinking immoderately. These may be accounted for either on the part of the soul or on the part of the body. on the part of the soul these results are of four kinds. First, as regards the reason, whose keenness is dulled by immoderate meat and drink, and in this respect we reckon as a daughter of gluttony, “dullness of sense in the understanding,” on account of the fumes of food disturbing the brain. Even so, on the other hand, abstinence conduces to the penetrating power of wisdom, according to

Eccles. 2:3, “I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind in wisdom.” Secondly, as regards the. appetite, which is disordered in many ways by immoderation in eating and drinking, as though reason were fast asleep at the helm, and in this respect “unseemly joy” is reckoned, because all the other inordinate passions are directed to joy or sorrow, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. To this we must refer the saying of 3 Esdra 3:20, that “wine . . . gives every one a confident and joyful mind.” Thirdly, as regards inordinate words, and thus we have “loquaciousness,” because as Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 19), “unless gluttons were carried away by immoderate speech, that rich man who is stated to have feasted sumptuously every day would not have been so tortured in his tongue.” Fourthly, as regards inordinate action, and in this way we have “scurrility,” i.e. a kind of levity resulting from lack of reason, which is unable not only to bridle the speech, but also to restrain outward behavior. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:4, “Or foolish talking or scurrility,” says that “fools call this geniality—i.e. jocularity, because it is wont to raise a laugh.” Both of these, however, may be referred to the words which may happen to be sinful, either by reason of excess which belongs to “loquaciousness,” or by reason of unbecomingness, which belongs to “scurrility.”

On the part of the body, mention is made of “uncleanness,” which may refer either to the inordinate emission of any kind of superfluities, or especially to the emission of the semen. Hence a gloss on Eph. 5:3, “But fornication and all uncleanness,” says: “That is, any kind of incontinence that has reference to lust.”

Reply to Objection 1: Joy in the act or end of sin results from every sin, especially the sin that proceeds from habit, but the random riotous joy which is described as “unseemly” arises chiefly from immoderate partaking of meat or drink. In like manner, we reply that dullness of sense as regards matters of choice is common to all sin, whereas dullness of sense in speculative matters arises chiefly from gluttony, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although it does one good to vomit after eating too much, yet it is sinful to expose oneself to its necessity by immoderate meat or drink. However, it is no sin to procure vomiting as a remedy for sickness if the physician prescribes it.

Reply to Objection 3: Scurrility proceeds from the act of gluttony, and not from the lustful act, but from the lustful will: wherefore it may be referred to either vice.

OF SOBRIETY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider sobriety and the contrary vice, namely drunkenness. As regards sobriety there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is the matter of sobriety?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) Whether the use of wine is lawful?

(4) To whom especially is sobriety becoming?

Whether drink is the matter of sobriety?

Objection 1: It would seem that drink is not the matter proper to sobriety. For it is written (Rom. 12:3): “Not to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety.” Therefore sobriety is also about wisdom, and not only about drink.

Objection 2: Further, concerning the wisdom of God, it is written (Wis. 8:7) that “she teacheth sobriety [Douay: ‘temperance’], and prudence, and justice, and fortitude,” where sobriety stands for temperance. Now temperance is not only about drink, but also about meat and sexual matters. Therefore sobriety is not only about drink.

Objection 3: Further, sobriety would seem to take its name from “measure” [*’Bria,’ a measure, a cup; Cf. Facciolati and Forcellini’s Lexicon]. Now we ought to be guided by the measure in all things appertaining to us: for it is written (Titus 2:12): “We should live soberly and justly and godly,” where a gloss remarks: “Soberly, in ourselves”; and (1 Tim. 2:9): “Women . . . in decent apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety.” Consequently it would seem that sobriety regards not only the interior man, but also things appertaining to external apparel. Therefore drink is not the matter proper to sobriety.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 31:32): “Wine taken with sobriety is equal life to men; if thou drink it moderately, thou shalt be sober.”

I answer that, When a virtue is denominated from some condition common to the virtues, the matter specially belonging to it is that in which it is most difficult and most commendable to satisfy that condition of virtue: thus fortitude is about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Now sobriety takes its name from “measure,” for a man is said to be sober because he observes the “bria,” i.e. the measure. Wherefore sobriety lays a special claim to that matter wherein /the observance of the measure is most deserving of praise. Such matter is the drinking of intoxicants, because the measured use thereof is most profitable, while immoderate excess therein is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 31:37,38): “Sober drinking is health to soul and body; wine drunken with excess raiseth quarrels, and wrath and many ruins.” For this reason sobriety is especially concerned with drink, not any kind of drink, but that which by reason of its volatility is liable to disturb the brain, such as wine and all intoxicants. Nevertheless, sobriety may be employed in a general sense so as to apply to any matter, as stated above ([3502]Q[123], A[2];[3503] Q[141], A[2]) with regard to fortitude and temperance.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the material wine intoxicates a man as to his body, so too, speaking figuratively, the consideration of wisdom is said to be an inebriating draught, because it allures the mind by its delight, according to Ps. 22:5, “My chalice which inebriateth me, how goodly is it!” Hence sobriety is applied by a kind of metaphor in speaking of the contemplation of wisdom.

Reply to Objection 2: All the things that belong properly to temperance are necessary to the present life, and their excess is harmful. Wherefore it behooves one to apply a measure in all such things. This is the business of sobriety: and for this reason sobriety is used to designate temperance. Yet slight excess is more harmful in drink than in other things, wherefore sobriety is especially concerned with drink.

Reply to Objection 3: Although a measure is needful in all things, sobriety is not properly employed in connection with all things, but only in those wherein there is most need for a measure.

Whether sobriety is by itself a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is not by itself a special virtue. For abstinence is concerned with both meat and drink. Now there is no special virtue about meat. Therefore neither is sobriety, which is about drink, a special virtue.

Objection 2: Further, abstinence and gluttony are about pleasures of touch as sensitive to food. Now meat and drink combine together to make food, since an animal needs a combination of wet and dry nourishment. Therefore sobriety, which is about drink, is not a. special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, just as in things pertaining to nourishment, drink is distinguished from meat, so are there various kinds of meats and of drinks. Therefore if sobriety is by itself a special virtue, seemingly there will be a special virtue corresponding to each different kind of meat or drink, which is unreasonable. Therefore it would seem that sobriety is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somno Scip. i, 8] reckons sobriety to be a special part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ([3504]Q[146], A[2]), it belongs to moral virtue to safeguard the good of reason against those things which may hinder it. Hence wherever we find a special hindrance to reason, there must needs be a special virtue to remove it. Now intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance to the use of reason, inasmuch as it disturbs the brain by its fumes. Wherefore in order to remove this hindrance to reason a special virtue, which is sobriety, is requisite.

Reply to Objection 1: Meat and drink are alike capable of hindering the good of reason, by embroiling the reason with immoderate pleasure: and in this respect abstinence is about both meat and drink alike. But intoxicating drink is a special kind of hindrance, as stated above, wherefore it requires a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: The virtue of abstinence is about meat and drink, considered, not as food but as a hindrance to reason. Hence it does not follow that special kinds of virtue correspond to different kinds of food.

Reply to Objection 3: In all intoxicating drinks there is one kind of hindrance to the use of reason: so that the difference of drinks bears an accidental relation to virtue. Hence this difference does not call for a difference of virtue. The same applies to the difference of meats.

Whether the use of wine is altogether unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that the use of wine is altogether unlawful. For without wisdom, a man cannot be in the state of salvation: since it is written (Wis. 7:28): “God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom,” and further on (Wis. 9:19): “By wisdom they were healed, whosoever have pleased Thee, O Lord, from the beginning.” Now the use of wine is a hindrance to wisdom, for it is written (Eccles. 2:3): “I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom.” Therefore wine-drinking is altogether unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 14:21): “It is good not to eat flesh, and not to drink wine, nor anything whereby thy brother is offended or scandalized, or made weak.” Now it is sinful to forsake the good of virtue, as likewise to scandalize one’s brethren. Therefore it is unlawful to make use of wine.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i] that “after the deluge wine and flesh were sanctioned: but Christ came in the last of the ages and brought back the end into line with the beginning.” Therefore it seems unlawful to use wine under the Christian law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:23): “Do not still drink water, but use a little wine for thy stomach’s sake, and thy frequent infirmities”; and it is written (Ecclus. 31:36): “Wine drunken with moderation is the joy of the soul and the heart.”

I answer that, No meat or drink, considered in itself, is unlawful, according to Mat. 15:11, “Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man.” Wherefore it is not unlawful to drink wine as such. Yet it may become unlawful accidentally. This is sometimes owing to a circumstance on the part of the drinker, either because he is easily the worse for taking wine, or because he is bound by a vow not to drink wine: sometimes it results from the mode of drinking, because to wit he exceeds the measure in drinking: and sometimes it is on account of others who would be scandalized thereby.

Reply to Objection 1: A man may have wisdom in two ways. First, in a general way, according as it is sufficient for salvation: and in this way it is required, in order to have wisdom, not that a man abstain altogether from wine, but that he abstain from its immoderate use. Secondly, a man may have wisdom in some degree of perfection: and in this way, in order to receive wisdom perfectly, it is requisite for certain persons that they abstain altogether from wine, and this depends on circumstances of certain persons and places.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle does not declare simply that it is good to abstain from wine, but that it is good in the case where this would give scandal to certain people.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ withdraws us from some things as being altogether unlawful, and from others as being obstacles to perfection. It is in the latter way that he withdraws some from the use of wine, that they may aim at perfection, even as from riches and the like.

Whether sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing?

Objection 1: It would seem that sobriety is more requisite in persons of greater standing. For old age gives a man a certain standing; wherefore honor and reverence are due to the old, according to Lev. 19:32, “Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man.” Now the Apostle declares that old men especially should be exhorted to sobriety, according to Titus 2:2, “That the aged man be sober.” Therefore sobriety is most requisite in persons of standing.

Objection 2: Further, a bishop has the highest degree in the Church: and the Apostle commands him to be sober, according to 1 Tim. 3:2, “It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless, the husband of one wife, sober, prudent,” etc. Therefore sobriety is chiefly required in persons of high standing.

Objection 3: Further, sobriety denotes abstinence from wine. Now wine is forbidden to kings, who hold the highest place in human affairs: while it is allowed to those who are in a state of affliction, according to Prov. 31:4, “Give not wine to kings,” and further on (Prov. 31:6), “Give strong drink to them that are sad, and wine to them that are grieved in mind.” Therefore sobriety is more requisite in persons of standing.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:11): “The women in like manner, chaste . . . sober,” etc., and (Titus 2:6) “Young men in like manner exhort that they be sober.”

I answer that, Virtue includes relationship to two things, to the contrary vices which it removes, and to the end to which it leads. Accordingly a particular virtue is more requisite in certain persons for two reasons. First, because they are more prone to the concupiscences which need to be restrained by virtue, and to the vices which are removed by virtue. In this respect, sobriety is most requisite in the young and in women, because concupiscence of pleasure thrives in the young on account of the heat of youth, while in women there is not sufficient strength of mind to resist concupiscence. Hence, according to Valerius Maximus [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1] among the ancient Romans women drank no wine. Secondly, sobriety is more requisite in certain persons, as being more necessary for the operations proper to them. Now immoderate use of wine is a notable obstacle to the use of reason: wherefore sobriety is specially prescribed to the old, in whom reason should be vigorous in instructing others: to bishops and all ministers of the Church, who should fulfil their spiritual duties with a devout mind; and to kings, who should rule their subjects with wisdom.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF DRUNKENNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider drunkenness. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether drunkenness is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether it is the most grievous sin?

(4) Whether it excuses from sin?

Whether drunkenness is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a sin. For every sin has a corresponding contrary sin, thus timidity is opposed to daring, and presumption to pusillanimity. But no sin is opposed to drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is voluntary [*Augustine, De Vera Relig. xiv]. But no man wishes to be drunk, since no man wishes to be deprived of the use of reason. Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, whoever causes another to sin, sins himself. Therefore, if drunkenness were a sin, it would follow that it is a sin to ask a man to drink that which makes him drunk, which would seem very hard.

Objection 4: Further, every sin calls for correction. But correction is not applied to drunkards: for Gregory [*Cf. Canon Denique, dist. 4 where Gratian refers to a letter of St. Gregory to St. Augustine of Canterbury] says that “we must forbear with their ways, lest they become worse if they be compelled to give up the habit.” Therefore drunkenness is not a sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 13:13): “Not in rioting and drunkenness.”

I answer that, Drunkenness may be understood in two ways. First, it may signify the defect itself of a man resulting from his drinking much wine, the consequence being that he loses the use of reason. In this sense drunkenness denotes not a sin, but a penal defect resulting from a fault. Secondly, drunkenness may denote the act by which a man incurs this defect. This act may cause drunkenness in two ways. In one way, through the wine being too strong, without the drinker being cognizant of this: and in this way too, drunkenness may occur without sin, especially if it is not through his negligence, and thus we believe that Noah was made drunk as related in Gn. 9. In another way drunkenness may result from inordinate concupiscence and use of wine: in this way it is accounted a sin, and is comprised under gluttony as a species under its genus. For gluttony is divided into “surfeiting [Douay:,’rioting’] and drunkenness,” which are forbidden by the Apostle (Rom. 13:13).

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 11), insensibility which is opposed to temperance “is not very common,” so that like its species which are opposed to the species of intemperance it has no name. Hence the vice opposed to drunkenness is unnamed; and yet if a man were knowingly to abstain from wine to the extent of molesting nature grievously, he would not be free from sin.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection regards the resulting defect which is involuntary: whereas immoderate use of wine is voluntary, and it is in this that the sin consists.

Reply to Objection 3: Even as he that is drunk is excused if he knows not the strength of the wine, so too is he that invites another to drink excused from sin, if he be unaware that the drinker is the kind of person to be made drunk by the drink offered. But if ignorance be lacking neither is excused from sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes the correction of a sinner is to be foregone, as stated above ([3505]Q[33], A[6]). Hence Augustine says in a letter (Ad Aurel. Episc. Ep. xxii), "Meseems, such things are cured not by bitterness, severity, harshness, but by teaching rather than commanding, by advice rather than threats. Such is the course to be followed with the majority of sinners: few are they whose sins should be treated with severity."

Whether drunkenness is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is not a mortal sin. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine's works] that "drunkenness if indulged in assiduously, is a mortal sin." Now assiduity denotes a circumstance which does not change the species of a sin; so that it cannot aggravate a sin infinitely, and make a mortal sin of a venial sin, as shown above ([3506]FS, Q[88], A[5]). Therefore if drunkenness /is not a mortal sin for some other reason, neither is it for this.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says [*Serm. civ in the Appendix to St. Augustine's works]: "Whenever a man takes more meat and drink than is necessary, he should know that this is one of the lesser sins." Now the lesser sins are called venial. Therefore drunkenness, which is caused by immoderate drink, is a venial sin.

Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin should be committed on the score of medicine. Now some drink too much at the advice of the physician, that they may be purged by vomiting; and from this excessive drink drunkenness ensues. Therefore drunkenness is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, We read in the Canons of the apostles (Can. xli, xlii): "A bishop, priest or deacon who is given to drunkenness or gambling, or incites others thereto, must either cease or be deposed; a subdeacon, reader or precentor who does these things must either give them up or be excommunicated; the same applies to the laity." Now such punishments are not inflicted save for mortal sins. Therefore drunkenness is a mortal sin.

I answer that, The sin of drunkenness, as stated in the foregoing Article, consists in the immoderate use and concupiscence of wine. Now this may happen to a man in three ways. First, so that he knows not the drink to be immoderate and intoxicating: and then drunkenness may be without sin, as stated above [3507](A[1]). Secondly, so that he perceives the drink to be immoderate, but without knowing it to be intoxicating, and then drunkenness may involve a venial sin. Thirdly, it may happen that a man is well aware that the drink is immoderate and intoxicating, and yet he would rather be drunk than abstain from drink. Such a man is a drunkard properly speaking, because morals take their species not from things that occur accidentally and beside the intention, but from that which is directly intended. In this way drunkenness is a mortal sin, because then a man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, whereby he performs virtuous deeds and avoids sin, and thus he sins mortally by running the risk of falling into sin. For Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i.]): “We learn that we should shun drunkenness, which prevents us from avoiding grievous sins. For the things we avoid when sober, we unknowingly commit through drunkenness.” Therefore drunkenness, properly speaking, is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Assiduity makes drunkenness a mortal sin, not on account of the mere repetition of the act, but because it is impossible for a man to become drunk assiduously, without exposing himself to drunkenness knowingly and willingly, since he has many times experienced the strength of wine and his own liability to drunkenness.

Reply to Objection 2: To take more meat or drink than is necessary belongs to the vice of gluttony, which is not always a mortal sin: but knowingly to take too much drink to the point of being drunk, is a mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 31): “Drunkenness is far from me: Thou wilt have mercy, that it come not near me. But full feeding sometimes hath crept upon Thy servant.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3508]Q[141], A[6]), meat and drink should be moderate in accordance with the demands of the body’s health. Wherefore, just as it happens sometimes that the meat and drink which are moderate for a healthy man are immoderate for a sick man, so too it may happen conversely, that what is excessive for a healthy man is moderate for one that is ailing. In this way when a man eats or drinks much at the physician’s advice in order to provoke vomiting, he is not to be deemed to have taken excessive meat or drink. There is, however, no need for intoxicating drink in order to procure vomiting, since this is caused by drinking lukewarm water: wherefore this is no sufficient cause for excusing a man from drunkenness.

Whether drunkenness is the gravest of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness is the gravest of sins. For Chrysostom says (Hom. lviii in Matth.) that “nothing gains the devil’s favor so much as drunkenness and lust, the mother of all the vices.” And it is written in the Decretals (Dist. xxxv, can. Ante omnia): “Drunkenness, more than anything else, is to be avoided by the clergy, for it foments and fosters all the vices.”

Objection 2: Further, from the very fact that a thing excludes the good of reason, it is a sin. Now this is especially the effect of drunkenness. Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the gravity of a sin is shown by the gravity of its punishment. Now seemingly drunkenness is punished most severely; for Ambrose says [*De Elia et de Jejunio v] that “there would be no slavery, were there no drunkards.” Therefore drunkenness is the greatest of sins.

On the contrary, According to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), spiritual vices are greater than carnal vices. Now drunkenness is one of the carnal vices. Therefore it is not the greatest of sins.

I answer that, A thing is said to be evil because it removes a good. Wherefore the greater the good removed by an evil, the graver the evil. Now it is evident that a Divine good is greater than a human good. Wherefore the sins that are directly against God are graver than the sin of drunkenness, which is directly opposed to the good of human reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Man is most prone to sins of intemperance, because such like concupiscences and pleasures are connatural to us, and for this reason these sins are said to find greatest favor with the devil, not for being graver than other sins, but because they occur more frequently among men.

Reply to Objection 2: The good of reason is hindered in two ways: in one way by that which is contrary to reason, in another by that which takes away the use of reason. Now that which is contrary to reason has more the character of an evil, than that which takes away the use of reason for a time, since the use of reason, which is taken away by drunkenness, may be either good or evil, whereas the goods of virtue, which are taken away by things that are contrary to reason, are always good.

Reply to Objection 3: Drunkenness was the occasional cause of slavery, in so far as Cham brought the curse of slavery on to his descendants, for having laughed at his father when the latter was made drunk. But slavery was not the direct punishment of drunkenness.

Whether drunkenness excuses from sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that drunkenness does not excuse from sin. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5) that “the drunkard deserves double punishment.” Therefore drunkenness aggravates a sin instead of excusing from it.

Objection 2: Further, one sin does not excuse another, but increases it. Now drunkenness is a sin. Therefore it is not an excuse for sin.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that just as man’s reason is tied by drunkenness, so is it by concupiscence. But concupiscence is not an excuse for sin: neither therefore is drunkenness.

On the contrary, According to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 43), Lot was to be excused from incest on account of drunkenness.

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in drunkenness, as stated above [3509](A[1]), namely the resulting defect and the preceding act. on the part of the resulting defect whereby the use of reason is fettered, drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, in so far as it causes an act to be involuntary through ignorance. But on the part of the preceding act, a distinction would seem necessary; because, if the drunkenness that results from that act be without sin, the subsequent sin is entirely excused from fault, as perhaps in the case of Lot. If, however, the preceding act was sinful, the person is not altogether excused from the subsequent sin, because the latter is rendered voluntary through the voluntariness of the preceding act, inasmuch as it was through doing something unlawful that he fell into the subsequent sin. Nevertheless, the resulting sin is diminished, even as the character of voluntariness is diminished. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 44) that “Lot’s guilt is to be measured, not by the incest, but by his drunkenness.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher does not say that the drunkard deserves more severe punishment, but that he deserves double punishment for his twofold sin. Or we may reply that he is speaking in view of the law of a certain Pittacus, who, as stated in Polit. ii, 9, ordered “those guilty of assault while drunk to be more severely punished than if they had been sober, because they do wrong in more ways than one.” In this, as Aristotle observes (Polit. ii, 9), “he seems to have considered the advantage,” namely of the prevention of wrong, “rather than the leniency which one should have for drunkards,” seeing that they are not in possession of their faculties.

Reply to Objection 2: Drunkenness may be an excuse for sin, not in the point of its being itself a sin, but in the point of the defect that results from it, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Concupiscence does not altogether fetter the reason, as drunkenness does, unless perchance it be so vehement as to make a man insane. Yet the passion of concupiscence diminishes sin, because it is less grievous to sin through weakness than through malice.

OF CHASTITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider chastity: (1) The virtue itself of chastity: (2) virginity, which is a part of chastity: (3) lust, which is the contrary vice. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether chastity is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a general virtue?

(3) Whether it is a virtue distinct from abstinence?

(4) Of its relation to purity.

Whether chastity is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a virtue. For here we are treating of virtues of the soul. But chastity, seemingly, belongs to the body: for a person is said to be chaste because he behaves in a certain way as regards the use of certain parts of the body. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, virtue is “a voluntary habit,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But chastity, apparently, is not voluntary, since it can be taken away by force from a woman to whom violence is done. Therefore it seems that chastity is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, there is no virtue in unbelievers. Yet some unbelievers are chaste. Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, the fruits are distinct from the virtues. But chastity is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. 5:23). Therefore chastity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Decem Chord. [*Serm. ix de Tempore]): “Whereas thou shouldst excel thy wife in virtue, since chastity is a virtue, thou yieldest to the first onslaught of lust, while thou wishest thy wife to be victorious.”

I answer that, Chastity takes its name from the fact that reason “chastises” concupiscence, which, like a child, needs curbing, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12). Now the essence of human virtue consists in being something moderated by reason, as shown above ([3510]FS, Q[64], A[1]). Therefore it is evident that chastity is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Chastity does indeed reside in the soul as its subject, though its matter is in the body. For it belongs to chastity that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), “so long as her mind holds to its purpose, whereby she has merited to be holy even in body, not even the violence of another’s lust can deprive her body of its holiness, which is safeguarded by her persevering continency.” He also says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “in the mind there is a virtue which is the companion of fortitude, whereby it is resolved to suffer any evil whatsoever rather than consent to evil.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. iv, 3), “it is impossible to have any true virtue unless one be truly just; nor is it possible to be just unless one live by faith.” Whence he argues that in unbelievers there is neither true chastity, nor any other virtue, because, to wit, they are not referred to the due end, and as he adds (Contra Julian. iv, 3) “virtues are distinguished from vices not by their functions,” i.e. their acts, “but by their ends.”

Reply to Objection 4: Chastity is a virtue in so far as it works in accordance with reason, but in so far as it delights in its act, it is reckoned among the fruits.

Whether chastity is a general virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is a general virtue. For Augustine says (De Mendacio xx) that "chastity of the mind is the well-ordered movement of the mind that does not prefer the lesser to the greater things." But this belongs to every virtue. Therefore chastity is a general virtue.

Objection 2: Further, "Chastity" takes its name from "chastisement" [*Cf. A[1]]. Now every movement of the appetitive part should be chastised by reason. Since, then, every moral virtue curbs some movement of the appetite, it seems that every moral virtue is chastity.

Objection 3: Further, chastity is opposed to fornication. But fornication seems to belong to every kind of sin: for it is written (Ps. 72:27): "Thou shalt destroy [Vulg.: 'hast destroyed'] all them that go awhoring from [Douay: 'are disloyal to'] Thee." Therefore chastity is a general virtue.

On the contrary, Macrobius [*In Somn. Scip. i, 8] reckons it to be a part of temperance.

I answer that, The word "chastity" is employed in two ways. First, properly; and thus it is a special virtue having a special matter, namely the concupiscences relating to venereal pleasures. Secondly, the word "chastity" is employed metaphorically: for just as a mingling of bodies conduces to venereal pleasure which is the proper matter of chastity and of lust its contrary vice, so too the spiritual union of the mind with certain things conduces to a pleasure which is the matter of a spiritual chastity metaphorically speaking, as well as of a spiritual fornication likewise metaphorically so called. For if the human mind delight in the spiritual union with that to which it behooves it to be united, namely God, and refrains from delighting in union with other things against the requirements of the order established by God, this may be called a spiritual chastity, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste virgin to Christ." If, on the other hand, the mind be united to any other things whatsoever, against the prescription of the Divine order, it will be called spiritual fornication, according to Jer. 3:1, "But thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers.” Taking chastity in this sense, it is a general virtue, because every virtue withdraws the human mind from delighting in a union with unlawful things. Nevertheless, the essence of this chastity consists principally in charity and the other theological virtues, whereby the human mind is united to God.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument takes chastity in the metaphorical sense.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above [3511](A[1]; Q[142], A[2]), the concupiscence of that which gives pleasure is especially likened to a child, because the desire of pleasure is connatural to us, especially of pleasures of touch which are directed to the maintenance of nature. Hence it is that if the concupiscence of such pleasures be fostered by consenting to it, it will wax very strong, as in the case of a child left to his own will. Wherefore the concupiscence of these pleasures stands in very great need of being chastised: and consequently chastity is applied antonomastically to such like concupiscences, even as fortitude is about those matters wherein we stand in the greatest need of strength of mind.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers spiritual fornication metaphorically so called, which is opposed to spiritual chastity, as stated.

Whether chastity is a distinct virtue from abstinence?

Objection 1: It would seem that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence. Because where the matter is generically the same, one virtue suffices. Now it would seem that things pertaining to the same sense are of one genus. Therefore, since pleasures of the palate which are the matter of abstinence, and venereal pleasures which are the matter of chastity, pertain to the touch, it seems that chastity is not a distinct virtue from abstinence.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12) likens all vices of intemperance to childish sins, which need chastising. Now “chastity” takes its name from “chastisement” of the contrary vices. Since then certain vices are bridled by abstinence, it seems that abstinence is chastity.

Objection 3: Further, the pleasures of the other senses are the concern of temperance in so far as they refer to pleasures of touch; which are the matter of temperance. Now pleasures of the palate, which are the matter of abstinence, are directed to venereal pleasures, which are the matter of chastity: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. cxlvii ad Amand. Cf. Gratian, Dist. xliv.], commenting on Titus 1:7, “Not given to wine, no striker,” etc.: “The belly and the organs of generation are neighbors, that the neighborhood of the organs may indicate their complicity in vice.” Therefore abstinence and chastity are not distinct virtues.

On the contrary, The Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5,6) reckons “chastity” together with “fastings” which pertain to abstinence.

I answer that, As stated above ([3512]Q[141], A[4]), temperance is properly about the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch: so that where there are different kinds of pleasure, there are different virtues comprised under temperance. Now pleasures are proportionate to the actions whose perfections they are, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4,5: and it is evident that actions connected with the use of food whereby the nature of the individual is maintained differ generically from actions connected with the use of matters venereal, whereby the nature of the species is preserved. Therefore chastity, which is about venereal pleasures, is a distinct virtue from abstinence, which is about pleasures of the palate.

Reply to Objection 1: Temperance is chiefly about pleasures of touch, not as regards the sense’s judgment concerning the objects of touch. which judgment is of uniform character concerning all such objects, but as regards the use itself of those objects, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Now the uses of meats, drinks, and venereal matters differ in character. Wherefore there must needs be different virtues, though they regard the one sense.

Reply to Objection 2: Venereal pleasures are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate: and therefore they are in greater need of chastisement and restraint, since if one consent to them this increases the force of concupiscence and weakens the strength of the mind. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): “I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its heights as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state.”

Reply to Objection 3: The pleasures of the other senses do not pertain to the maintenance of man’s nature, except in so far as they are directed to pleasures of touch. Wherefore in the matter of such pleasures there is no other virtue comprised under temperance. But the pleasures of the palate, though directed somewhat to venereal pleasures, are essentially directed to the preservation of man’s life: wherefore by their very nature they have a special virtue, although this virtue which is called abstinence directs its act to chastity as its end.

Whether purity belongs especially to chastity?

Objection 1: It would seem that purity does not belong especially to chastity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that “purity is a virtue of the soul.” Therefore it is not something belonging to chastity, but is of itself a virtue distinct from chastity.

Objection 2: Further, “pudicitia” [purity] is derived from “pudor,” which is equivalent to shame. Now shame, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 15], is about a disgraceful act, and this is common to all sinful acts. Therefore purity belongs no more to chastity than to the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 12) that “every kind of intemperance is most deserving of reproach.” Now it would seem to belong to purity to avoid all that is deserving of reproach. Therefore purity belongs to all the parts of temperance, and not especially to chastity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perseverantia xx): “We must give praise to purity, that he who has ears to hear, may put to none but a lawful use the organs intended for procreation.” Now the use of these organs is the proper matter of chastity. Therefore purity belongs properly to chastity.

I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2]), “pudicitia” [purity] takes its name from “pudor,” which signifies shame. Hence purity must needs be properly about the things of which man is most ashamed. Now men are most ashamed of venereal acts, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. Dei xiv, 18), so much so that even the conjugal act, which is adorned by the honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] of marriage, is not devoid of shame: and this because the movement of the organs of generation is not subject to the command of reason, as are the movements of the other external members. Now man is ashamed not only of this sexual union but also of all the signs thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 6). Consequently purity regards venereal matters properly, and especially the signs thereof, such as impure looks, kisses, and touches. And since the latter are more wont to be observed, purity regards rather these external signs, while chastity regards rather sexual union. Therefore purity is directed to chastity, not as a virtue distinct therefrom, but as expressing a circumstance of chastity. Nevertheless the one is sometimes used to designate the other.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is here speaking of purity as designating chastity.

Reply to Objection 2: Although every vice has a certain disgrace, the vices of intemperance are especially disgraceful, as stated above ([3513]Q[142], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 3: Among the vices of intemperance, venereal sins are most deserving of reproach, both on account of the insubordination of the genital organs, and because by these sins especially, the reason is absorbed.

OF VIRGINITY (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider virginity: and under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) In what does virginity consist?

(2) Whether it is lawful?

(3) Whether it is a virtue?

(4) Of its excellence in comparison with marriage;

(5) Of its excellence in comparison with the other virtues.

Whether virginity consists in integrity of the flesh?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity does not consist in integrity of the flesh. For Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup.) [*The quotation is from De Sancta Virgin. xiii] that "virginity is the continual meditation on incorruption in a corruptible flesh." But meditation does not concern the flesh. Therefore virginity is not situated in the flesh.

Objection 2: Further, virginity denotes a kind of purity. Now Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "purity dwells in the soul." Therefore virginity is not incorruption of the flesh.

Objection 3: Further, the integrity of the flesh would seem to consist in the seal of virginal purity. Yet sometimes the seal is broken without loss of virginity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18) that "those organs may be injured through being wounded by mischance. Physicians, too, sometimes do for the sake of health that which makes one shudder to see: and a midwife has been known to destroy by touch the proof of virginity that she sought.” And he adds: “Nobody, I think, would be so foolish as to deem this maiden to have forfeited even bodily sanctity, though she lost the integrity of that organ.” Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

Objection 4: Further, corruption of the flesh consists chiefly in resolution of the semen: and this may take place without copulation, whether one be asleep or awake. Yet seemingly virginity is not lost without copulation: for Augustine says (De Virgin. xiii) that “virginal integrity and holy continency that refrains from all sexual intercourse is the portion of angels.” Therefore virginity does not consist in incorruption of the flesh.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “virginity is continence whereby integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh.”

I answer that, Virginity takes its name apparently from “viror” [freshness], and just as a thing is described as fresh and retaining its freshness, so long as it is not parched by excessive heat, so too, virginity denotes that the person possessed thereof is unseared by the heat of concupiscence which is experienced in achieving the greatest bodily pleasure which is that of sexual intercourse. Hence, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 5) that “virginal chastity is integrity free of pollution.”

Now venereal pleasures offer three points for consideration. The first is on the part of the body, viz. the violation of the seal of virginity. The second is the link between that which concerns the soul and that which concerns the body, and this is the resolution of the semen, causing sensible pleasure. The third is entirely on the part of the soul, namely the purpose of attaining this pleasure. Of these three the first is accidental to the moral act, which as such must be considered in reference to the soul. The second stands in the relation of matter to the moral act, since the sensible passions are the matters of moral acts. But the third stands in the position of form and complement, because the essence of morality is perfected in that which concerns the reason. Since then virginity consists in freedom from the aforesaid corruption, it follows that the integrity of the bodily organ is accidental to virginity; while freedom from pleasure in resolution of the semen is related thereto materially; and the purpose of perpetually abstaining from this pleasure is the formal and completive element in virginity.

Reply to Objection 1: This definition of Augustine's expresses directly that which is formal in virginity. For "meditation" denotes reason's purpose; and the addition "perpetual" does not imply that a virgin must always retain this meditation actually, but that she should bear in mind the purpose of always persevering therein. The material element is expressed indirectly by the words "on incorruption in a corruptible body." This is added to show the difficulty of virginity: for if the flesh were incorruptible, it would not be difficult to maintain a perpetual meditation on incorruption.

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that purity, as to its essence, is in the soul; but as to its matter, it is in the body: and it is the same with virginity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that "although virginity resides in the flesh," and for this reason is a bodily quality, "yet it is a spiritual thing, which a holy continency fosters and preserves."

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the integrity of a bodily organ is accidental to virginity, in so far as a person, through purposely abstaining from venereal pleasure, retains the integrity of a bodily organ. Hence if the organ lose its integrity by chance in some other way, this is no more prejudicial to virginity than being deprived of a hand or foot.

Reply to Objection 4: Pleasure resulting from resolution of semen may arise in two ways. If this be the result of the mind's purpose, it destroys virginity, whether copulation takes place or not. Augustine, however, mentions copulation, because such like resolution is the ordinary and natural result thereof. In another way this may happen beside the purpose of the mind, either during sleep, or through violence and without the mind's consent, although the flesh derives pleasure from it, or again through weakness of nature, as in the case of those who are subject to a flow of semen. In such cases virginity is not forfeit, because such like pollution is not the result of impurity which excludes virginity.

Whether virginity is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is unlawful. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the natural law is unlawful. Now just as the words of Gn. 2:16, “Of every tree” that is in “paradise, thou shalt eat,” indicate a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the individual, so also the words of Gn. 1:28, “Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,” express a precept of the natural law, in reference to the preservation of the species. Therefore just as it would be a sin to abstain from all food, as this would be to act counter to the good of the individual, so too it is a sin to abstain altogether from the act of procreation, for this is to act against the good of the species.

Objection 2: Further, whatever declines from the mean of virtue is apparently sinful. Now virginity declines from the mean of virtue, since it abstains from all venereal pleasures: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2), that “he who revels in every pleasure, and abstains from not even one, is intemperate: but he who refrains from all is loutish and insensible.” Therefore virginity is something sinful.

Objection 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a vice. Now in olden times those were punished who led a celibate life, as Valerius Maximus asserts [*Dict. Fact. Mem. ii, 9]. Hence according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. iii) Plato “is said to have sacrificed to nature, in order that he might atone for his perpetual continency as though it were a sin.” Therefore virginity is a sin.

On the contrary, No sin is a matter of direct counsel. But virginity is a matter of direct counsel: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:25): “Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel.” Therefore virginity is not an unlawful thing.

I answer that, In human acts, those are sinful which are against right reason. Now right reason requires that things directed to an end should be used in a measure proportionate to that end. Again, man’s good is threefold as stated in Ethic. i, 8; one consisting in external things, for instance riches; another, consisting in bodily goods; the third, consisting in the goods of the soul among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. x, 7), and as our Lord declared (Lk. 10:42), “Mary hath chosen the better part.” Of these goods those that are external are directed to those which belong to the body, and those which belong to the body are directed to those which belong to the soul; and furthermore those which belong to the active life are directed to those which belong to the life of contemplation. Accordingly, right reason dictates that one use external goods in a measure proportionate to the body, and in like manner as regards the rest. Wherefore if a man refrain from possessing certain things (which otherwise it were good for him to possess), for the sake of his body's good, or of the contemplation of truth, this is not sinful, but in accord /with right reason. In like manner if a man abstain from bodily pleasures, in order more freely to give himself to the contemplation of truth, this is in accordance with the rectitude of reason. Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34): "The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord: that she may be holy in both body and in spirit. But she that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." Therefore it follows that virginity instead of being sinful is worthy of praise.

Reply to Objection 1: A precept implies a duty, as stated above ([3514]Q[122], A[1]). Now there are two kinds of duty. There is the duty that has to be fulfilled by one person; and a duty of this kind cannot be set aside without sin. The other duty has to be fulfilled by the multitude, and the fulfilment of this kind of duty is not binding on each one of the multitude. For the multitude has many obligations which cannot be discharged by the individual; but are fulfilled by one person doing this, and another doing that. Accordingly the precept of natural law which binds man to eat must needs be fulfilled by each individual, otherwise the individual cannot be sustained. On the other hand, the precept of procreation regards the whole multitude of men, which needs not only to multiply in body, but also to advance spiritually. Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while others abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard-bearers, and others fight with the sword: yet all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person.

Reply to Objection 2: The person who, beside the dictate of right reason, abstains from all pleasures through aversion, as it were, for pleasure as such, is insensible as a country lout. But a virgin does not refrain from every pleasure, but only from that which is venereal: and abstains therefrom according to right reason, as stated above. Now the mean of virtue is fixed with reference, not to quantity but to right reason, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6: wherefore it is said of the magnanimous (Ethic. iv, 3) that “in point of quantity he goes to the extreme, but in point of becomingness he follows the mean.”

Reply to Objection 3: Laws are framed according to what occurs more frequently. Now it seldom happened in olden times that anyone refrained from all venereal pleasure through love of the contemplation of truth: as Plato alone is related to have done. Hence it was not through thinking this a sin, that he offered sacrifice, but “because he yielded to the false opinion of his fellow countrymen,” as Augustine remarks (De Vera Relig. iii).

Whether virginity is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not a virtue. For “no virtue is in us by nature,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). Now virginity is in us by nature, since all are virgins when born. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, whoever has one virtue has all virtues, as stated above ([3515]FS, Q[65], A[1]). Yet some have other virtues without having virginity: else, since none can go to the heavenly kingdom without virtue, no one could go there without virginity, which would involve the condemnation of marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is recovered by penance. But virginity is not recovered by penance: wherefore Jerome says [*Ep. xxii ad Eustoch.]: “Other things God can do, but He cannot restore the virgin after her downfall.” Therefore seemingly virginity is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, no virtue is lost without sin. Yet virginity is lost without sin, namely by marriage. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

Objection 5: Further, virginity is condivided with widowhood and conjugal purity. But neither of these is a virtue. Therefore virginity is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 3): “Love of virginity moves us to say something about virginity, lest by passing it over we should seem to cast a slight on what is a virtue of high degree.”

I answer that, As stated above [3516](A[1]), the formal and completive element in virginity is the purpose of abstaining from venereal pleasure, which purpose is rendered praiseworthy by its end, in so far, to wit, as this is done in order to have leisure for Divine things: while the material element in virginity is integrity of the flesh free of all experience of venereal pleasure. Now it is manifest that where a good action has a special matter through having a special excellence, there is a special kind of virtue: for example, magnificence which is about great expenditure is for this reason a special virtue distinct from liberality, which is about all uses of money in general. Now to keep oneself free from the experience of venereal pleasure has an excellence of its own deserving of greater praise than keeping oneself free from inordinate venereal pleasure. Wherefore virginity is a special virtue being related to chastity as magnificence to liberality.

Reply to Objection 1: Men have from their birth that which is material in virginity, namely integrity of the flesh and freedom from venereal experience. But they have not that which is formal in virginity, namely the purpose of safeguarding this integrity for God’s sake, which purpose gives virginity its character of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. xi): “Nor do we praise virgins for being virgins, but, because their virginity is consecrated to God by holy continency.”

Reply to Objection 2: Virtues are connected together by reason of that which is formal in them, namely charity, or by reason of prudence, as stated above ([3517]Q[129], A[3], ad 2), but not by reason of that which is material in them. For nothing hinders a virtuous man from providing the matter of one virtue, and not the matter of another virtue: thus a poor man has the matter of temperance, but not that of magnificence. It is in this way that one who has the other virtues lacks the matter of virginity, namely the aforesaid integrity of the flesh: nevertheless he can have that which is formal in virginity, his mind being so prepared that he has the purpose of safeguarding this same integrity of the flesh, should it be fitting for him to do so: even as a poor man may be so prepared in mind as to have the purpose of being magnificent in his expenditure, were he in a position to do so: or again as a prosperous man is so prepared in mind as to purpose bearing misfortune with equanimity: without which preparedness of the mind no man can be virtuous.

Reply to Objection 3: Virtue can be recovered by penance as regards that which is formal in virtue, but not as to that which is material therein. For if a magnificent man has squandered all his wealth he does not recover his riches by repenting of his sin. In like manner a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity.

As regards the matter of virginity there is that which can be miraculously restored by God, namely the integrity of the organ, which we hold to be accidental to virginity: while there is something else which cannot be restored even by miracle, to wit, that one who has experienced venereal lust should cease to have had that experience. For God cannot make that which is done not to have been done, as stated in the [3518]FP, Q[25] , A[4].

Reply to Objection 4: Virginity as a virtue denotes the purpose, confirmed by vow, of observing perpetual integrity. For Augustine says (De Virgin. viii) that “by virginity, integrity of the flesh is vowed, consecrated and observed in honor of the Creator of both soul and flesh.” Hence virginity, as a virtue, is never lost without sin.

Reply to Objection 5: Conjugal chastity is deserving of praise merely because it abstains from unlawful pleasures: hence no excellence attaches to it above that of chastity in general. Widowhood, however, adds something to chastity in general; but it does not attain to that which is perfect in this matter, namely to entire freedom from venereal pleasure; virginity alone achieves this. Wherefore virginity alone is accounted a virtue above chastity, even as magnificence is reckoned above liberality.

Whether virginity is more excellent than marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is not more excellent than marriage. For Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi): “Continence was equally meritorious in John who remained unmarried and Abraham who begot children.” Now a greater virtue has greater merit. Therefore virginity is not a greater virtue than conjugal chastity.

Objection 2: Further, the praise accorded a virtuous man depends on his virtue. If, then, virginity were preferable to conjugal continence, it would seem to follow that every virgin is to be praised more than any married woman. But this is untrue. Therefore virginity is not preferable to marriage.

Objection 3: Further, the common good takes precedence of the private good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2). Now marriage is directed to the common good: for Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): “What food is to a man’s wellbeing, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race.” On the other hand, virginity is ordered to the individual good, namely in order to avoid what the Apostle calls the “tribulation of the flesh,” to which married people are subject (1 Cor. 7:28). Therefore virginity is not greater than conjugal continence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xix): “Both solid reason and the authority of Holy Writ show that neither is marriage sinful, nor is it to be equaled to the good of virginal continence or even to that of widowhood.”

I answer that, According to Jerome (Contra Jovin. i) the error of Jovinian consisted in holding virginity not to be preferable to marriage. This error is refuted above all by the example of Christ Who both chose a virgin for His mother, and remained Himself a virgin, and by the teaching of the Apostle who (1 Cor. 7) counsels virginity as the greater good. It is also refuted by reason, both because a Divine good takes precedence of a human good, and because the good of the soul is preferable to the good of the body, and again because the good of the contemplative life is better than that of the active life. Now virginity is directed to the good of the soul in respect of the contemplative life, which consists in thinking “on the things of God” [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’], whereas marriage is directed to the good of the body, namely the bodily increase of the human race, and belongs to the active life, since the man and woman who embrace the married life have to think “on the things of the world,” as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:34). Without doubt therefore virginity is preferable to conjugal continence.

Reply to Objection 1: Merit is measured not only by the kind of action, but still more by the mind of the agent. Now Abraham had a mind so disposed, that he was prepared to observe virginity, if it were in keeping with the times for him to do so. Wherefore in him conjugal continence was equally meritorious with the virginal continence of John, as regards the essential reward, but not as regards the accidental reward. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that both “the celibacy of John and the marriage of Abraham fought Christ’s battle in keeping with the difference of the times: but John was continent even in deed, whereas Abraham was continent only in habit.”

Reply to Objection 2: Though virginity is better than conjugal continence, a married person may be better than a virgin for two reasons. First, on the part of chastity itself; if to wit, the married person is more prepared in mind to observe virginity, if it should be expedient, than the one who is actually a virgin. Hence Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xxii) charges the virgin to say: “I am no better than Abraham, although the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage.” Further on he gives the reason for this: “For what I do now, he would have done better, if it were fitting for him to do it then; and what they did I would even do now if it behooved me now to do it.” Secondly, because perhaps the person who is not a virgin has some more excellent virtue. Wherefore Augustine says (De Virgin. xliv): “Whence does a virgin know the things that belong to the Lord, however solicitous she be about them, if perchance on account of some mental fault she be not yet ripe for martyrdom, whereas this woman to whom she delighted in preferring herself is already able to drink the chalice of the Lord?”

Reply to Objection 3: The common good takes precedence of the private good, if it be of the same genus: but it may be that the private good is better generically. It is thus that the virginity that is consecrated to God is preferable to carnal fruitfulness. Hence Augustine says (De Virgin. ix): “It must be confessed that the fruitfulness of the flesh, even of those women who in these times seek naught else from marriage but children in order to make them servants of Christ, cannot compensate for lost virginity.”

Whether virginity is the greatest of virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that virginity is the greatest of virtues. For Cyprian says (De Virgin. [*De Habitu Virg.]): “We address ourselves now to the virgins. Sublime is their glory, but no less exalted is their vocation. They are a flower of the Church’s sowing, the pride and ornament of spiritual grace, the most honored portion of Christ’s flock.”

Objection 2: Further, a greater reward is due to the greater virtue. Now the greatest reward is due to virginity, namely the hundredfold fruit, according to a gloss on Mat. 13:23. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 3: Further, the more a virtue conforms us to Christ, the greater it is. Now virginity above all conforms us to Christ; for it is declared in the Apocalypse 14:4 that virgins “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” and (Apoc. 14:3) that they sing “a new canticle,” which “no” other “man” could say. Therefore virginity is the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): “No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom,” and (De Virgin. xlv): “The authority of the Church informs the faithful in no uncertain manner, so that they know in what place the martyrs and the holy virgins who have departed this life are commemorated in the Sacrament of the Altar.” By this we are given to understand that martyrdom, and also the monastic state, are preferable to virginity.

I answer that, A thing may excel all others in two ways. First, in some particular genus: and thus virginity is most excellent, namely in the genus of chastity, since it surpasses the chastity both of widowhood and of marriage. And because comeliness is ascribed to chastity antonomastically, it follows that surpassing beauty is ascribed to chastity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Virgin. i, 7): “Can anyone esteem any beauty greater than a virgin’s, since she is beloved of her King, approved by her Judge, dedicated to her Lord, consecrated to her God?” Secondly, a thing may be most excellent simply, and in this way virginity is not the most excellent of the virtues. Because the end always excels that which is directed to the end; and the more effectively a thing is directed to the end, the better it is. Now the end which renders virginity praiseworthy is that one may have leisure for Divine things, as stated above [3519](A[4]). Wherefore the theological virtues as well as the virtue of religion, the acts of which consist in being occupied about Divine things, are preferable to virginity. Moreover, martyrs work more mightily in order to cleave to God—since for this end they hold their own life in contempt; and those who dwell in monasteries—since for this end they give up their own will and all that they may possess—than virgins who renounce venereal pleasure for that same purpose. Therefore virginity is not simply the greatest of virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Virgins are “the more honored portion of Christ’s flock,” and “their glory more sublime” in comparison with widows and married women.

Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold fruit is ascribed to virginity, according to Jerome [*Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.], on account of its superiority to widowhood, to which the sixtyfold fruit is ascribed, and to marriage, to which is ascribed the thirtyfold fruit. But according to Augustine (De QQ. Evang. i, 9), “the hundredfold fruit is given to martyrs, the sixtyfold to virgins, and the thirtyfold to married persons.” Wherefore it does not follow that virginity is simply the greatest of virtues, but only in comparison with other degrees of chastity.

Reply to Objection 3: Virgins “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” because they imitate Christ, by integrity not only of the mind but also of the flesh, as Augustine says (De Virgin. xxvii). Wherefore they follow the Lamb in more ways, but this does not imply that they follow more closely, because other virtues make us cleave to God more closely by imitation of the mind. The “new hymn” which virgins alone sing, is their joy at having preserved integrity of the flesh.

OF LUST (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the vice of lust which is opposed to chastity: (1) Lust in general; (2) its species. Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) What is the matter of lust?

(2) Whether all copulation is unlawful?

(3) Whether lust is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether lust is a capital vice?

(5) Concerning its daughters.

Whether the matter of lust is only venereal desires and pleasures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of lust is not only venereal desires and pleasures. For Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that “lust affects to be called surfeit and abundance.” But surfeit regards meat and drink, while abundance refers to riches. Therefore lust is not properly about venereal desires and pleasures.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 20:1): “Wine is a lustful [Douay: ‘luxurious’] thing.” Now wine is connected with pleasure of meat and drink. Therefore these would seem to be the matter of lust.

Objection 3: Further, lust is defined “as the desire of wanton pleasure” [*Alexander of Hales, Summ. Theol. ii, cxvli]. But wanton pleasure regards not only venereal matters but also many others. Therefore lust is not only about venereal desires and pleasures.

On the contrary, To the lustful it is said (De Vera Relig. iii [*Written by St. Augustine]): “He that soweth in the flesh, of the flesh shall reap corruption.” Now the sowing of the flesh refers to venereal pleasures. Therefore these belong to lust.

I answer that, As Isidore says (Etym. x), “a lustful man is one who is debauched with pleasures.” Now venereal pleasures above all debauch a man’s mind. Therefore lust is especially concerned with such like pleasures.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as temperance chiefly and properly applies to pleasures of touch, yet consequently and by a kind of likeness is referred to other matters, so too, lust applies chiefly to venereal pleasures, which more than anything else work the greatest havoc in a man’s mind, yet secondarily it applies to any other matters pertaining to excess. Hence a gloss on Gal. 5:19 says “lust is any kind of surfeit.”

Reply to Objection 2: Wine is said to be a lustful thing, either in the sense in which surfeit in any matter is ascribed to lust, or because the use of too much wine affords an incentive to venereal pleasure.

Reply to Objection 3: Although wanton pleasure applies to other matters, the name of lust has a special application to venereal pleasures, to which also wantonness is specially applicable, as Augustine remarks (De Civ. xiv, 15,16).

Whether no venereal act can be without sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that no venereal act can be without sin. For nothing but sin would seem to hinder virtue. Now every venereal act is a great hindrance to virtue. For Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10): “I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of a woman, and those bodily contacts.” Therefore, seemingly, no venereal act is without sin.

Objection 2: Further, any excess that makes one forsake the good of reason is sinful, because virtue is corrupted by “excess” and “deficiency” as stated in Ethic. ii, 2. Now in every venereal act there is excess of pleasure, since it so absorbs the mind, that “it is incompatible with the act of understanding,” as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. vii, 11); and as Jerome [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.; Cf. Jerome, Ep. cxxiii ad Ageruch.] states, rendered the hearts of the prophets, for the moment, insensible to the spirit of prophecy. Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

Objection 3: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. Now original sin is transmitted to children by concupiscence, without which no venereal act is possible, as Augustine declares (De Nup. et Concup. i, 24). Therefore no venereal act can be without sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxv): “This is a sufficient answer to heretics, if only they will understand that no sin is committed in that which is against neither nature, nor morals, nor a commandment”: and he refers to the act of sexual intercourse between the patriarchs of old and their several wives. Therefore not every venereal act is a sin.

I answer that, A sin, in human acts, is that which is against the order of reason. Now the order of reason consists in its ordering everything to its end in a fitting manner. Wherefore it is no sin if one, by the dictate of reason, makes use of certain things in a fitting manner and order for the end to which they are adapted, provided this end be something truly good. Now just as the preservation of the bodily nature of one individual is a true good, so, too, is the preservation of the nature of the human species a very great good. And just as the use of food is directed to the preservation of life in the individual, so is the use of venereal acts directed to the preservation of the whole human race. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi): “What food is to a man’s well being, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the whole human race.” Wherefore just as the use of food can be without sin, if it be taken in due manner and order, as required for the welfare of the body, so also the use of venereal acts can be without sin, provided they be performed in due manner and order, in keeping with the end of human procreation.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing may be a hindrance to virtue in two ways. First, as regards the ordinary degree of virtue, and as to this nothing but sin is an obstacle to virtue. Secondly, as regards the perfect degree of virtue, and as to this virtue may be hindered by that which is not a sin, but a lesser good. In this way sexual intercourse casts down the mind not from virtue, but from the height, i.e. the perfection of virtue. Hence Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. viii): “Just as that was good which Martha did when busy about serving holy men, yet better still that which Mary did in hearing the word of God: so, too, we praise the good of Susanna’s conjugal chastity, yet we prefer the good of the widow Anna, and much more that of the Virgin Mary.”

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[152], A[2], ad 2; [3520]FS, Q[64], A[2]), the mean of virtue depends not on quantity but on conformity with right reason: and consequently the exceeding pleasure attaching to a venereal act directed according to reason, is not opposed to the mean of virtue. Moreover, virtue is not concerned with the amount of pleasure experienced by the external sense, as this depends on the disposition of the body; what matters is how much the interior appetite is affected by that pleasure. Nor does it follow that the act in question is contrary to virtue, from the fact that the free act of reason in considering spiritual things is incompatible with the aforesaid pleasure. For it is not contrary to virtue, if the act of reason be sometimes interrupted for something that is done in accordance with reason, else it would be against virtue for a person to set himself to sleep. That venereal concupiscence and pleasure are not subject to the command and moderation of reason, is due to the punishment of the first sin, inasmuch as the reason, for rebelling against God, deserved that its body should rebel against it, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13).

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13), “the child, shackled with original sin, is born of fleshly concupiscence (which is not imputed as sin to the regenerate) as of a daughter of sin.” Hence it does not follow that the act in question is a sin, but that it contains something penal resulting from the first sin.

Whether the lust that is about venereal acts can be a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that lust about venereal acts cannot be a sin. For the venereal act consists in the emission of semen which is the surplus from food, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. i, 18). But there is no sin attaching to the emission of other superfluities. Therefore neither can there be any sin in venereal acts.

Objection 2: Further, everyone can lawfully make what use he pleases of what is his. But in the venereal act a man uses only what is his own, except perhaps in adultery or rape. Therefore there can be no sin in venereal acts, and consequently lust is no sin.

Objection 3: Further, every sin has an opposite vice. But, seemingly, no vice is opposed to lust. Therefore lust is not a sin.

On the contrary, The cause is more powerful than its effect. Now wine is forbidden on account of lust, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 5:18), “Be not drunk with wine wherein is lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].” Therefore lust is forbidden.

Further, it is numbered among the works of the flesh: Gal. 5:19 [Douay: ‘luxury’].

I answer that, The more necessary a thing is, the more it behooves one to observe the order of reason in its regard; wherefore the more sinful it becomes if the order of reason be forsaken. Now the use of venereal acts, as stated in the foregoing Article, is most necessary for the common good, namely the preservation of the human race. Wherefore there is the greatest necessity for observing the order of reason in this matter: so that if anything be done in this connection against the dictate of reason’s ordering, it will be a sin. Now lust consists essentially in exceeding the order and mode of reason in the matter of venereal acts. Wherefore without any doubt lust is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher says in the same book (De Gener. Anim. i, 18), “the semen is a surplus that is needed.” For it is said to be superfluous, because it is the residue from the action of the nutritive power, yet it is needed for the work of the generative power. But the other superfluities of the human body are such as not to be needed, so that it matters not how they are emitted, provided one observe the decencies of social life. It is different with the emission of semen, which should be accomplished in a manner befitting the end for which it is needed.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:20) in speaking against lust, “You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body.” Wherefore by inordinately using the body through lust a man wrongs God Who is the Supreme Lord of our body. Hence Augustine says (De Decem. Chord. 10 [*Serm. ix (xcvi de Temp.)]): “God Who thus governs His servants for their good, not for His, made this order and commandment, lest unlawful pleasures should destroy His temple which thou hast begun to be.”

Reply to Objection 3: The opposite of lust is not found in many, since men are more inclined to pleasure. Yet the contrary vice is comprised under insensibility, and occurs in one who has such a dislike for sexual intercourse as not to pay the marriage debt.

Whether lust is a capital vice?

Objection 1: It seems that lust is not a capital vice. For lust is apparently the same as “uncleanness,” according to a gloss on Eph. 5:3 (Cf. 2 Cor. 12:21). But uncleanness is a daughter of gluttony, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that “as pride of mind leads to the depravity of lust, so does humility of mind safeguard the chastity of the flesh.” Now it is seemingly contrary to the nature of a capital vice to arise from another vice. Therefore lust is not a capital vice.

Objection 3: Further, lust is caused by despair, according to Eph. 4:19, “Who despairing, have given themselves up to lasciviousness.” But despair is not a capital vice; indeed, it is accounted a daughter of sloth, as stated above ([3521]Q[35], A[4], ad 2). Much less, therefore, is lust a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places lust among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[148], A[5]; [3522]FS, Q[84], AA[3],4), a capital vice is one that has a very desirable end, so that through desire for that end, a man proceeds to commit many sins, all of which are said to arise from that vice as from a principal vice. Now the end of lust is venereal pleasure, which is very great. Wherefore this pleasure is very desirable as regards the sensitive appetite, both on account of the intensity of the pleasure, and because such like concupiscence is connatural to man. Therefore it is evident that lust is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3523]Q[148], A[6]), according to some, the uncleanness which is reckoned a daughter of gluttony is a certain uncleanness of the body, and thus the objection is not to the point. If, however, it denote the uncleanness of lust, we must reply that it is caused by gluttony materially—in so far as gluttony provides the bodily matter of lust—and not under the aspect of final cause, in which respect chiefly the capital vices are said to be the cause of others.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3524]Q[132], A[4], ad 1), when we were treating of vainglory, pride is accounted the common mother of all sins, so that even the capital vices originate therefrom.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain persons refrain from lustful pleasures chiefly through hope of the glory to come, which hope is removed by despair, so that the latter is a cause of lust, as removing an obstacle thereto, not as its direct cause; whereas this is seemingly necessary for a capital vice.

Whether the daughters of lust are fittingly described?

Objection 1: It would seem that the daughters of lust are unfittingly reckoned to be "blindness of mind, thoughtlessness, inconstancy, rashness, self-love, hatred of God, love of this world and abhorrence or despair of a future world." For mental blindness, thoughtlessness and rashness pertain to imprudence, which is to be found in every sin, even as prudence is in every virtue. Therefore they should not be reckoned especially as daughters of lust.

Objection 2: Further, constancy is reckoned a part of fortitude, as stated above (Q[128], ad 6;[3525] Q[137], A[3]). But lust is contrary, not to fortitude but to temperance. Therefore inconstancy is not a daughter of lust.

Objection 3: Further, "Self-love extending to the contempt of God" is the origin of every sin, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28). Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of lust.

Objection 4: Further, Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] mentions four, namely, "obscene," "scurrilous," "wanton" and "foolish talking." There the aforesaid enumeration would seem to be superfluous.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45).

I answer that, When the lower powers are strongly moved towards their objects, the result is that the higher powers are hindered and disordered in their acts. Now the effect of the vice of lust is that the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, is most vehemently intent on its object, to wit, the object of pleasure, on account of the vehemence of the pleasure. Consequently the higher powers, namely the reason and the will, are most grievously disordered by lust.

Now the reason has four acts in matters of action. First there is simple understanding, which apprehends some end as good, and this act is hindered by lust, according to Dan. 13:56, “Beauty hath deceived thee, and lust hath perverted thy heart.” In this respect we have “blindness of mind.” The second act is counsel about what is to be done for the sake of the end: and this is also hindered by the concupiscence of lust. Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1), speaking of lecherous love: “This thing admits of neither counsel nor moderation, thou canst not control it by counseling.” In this respect there is “rashness,” which denotes absence of counsel, as stated above ([3526]Q[53], A[3]). The third act is judgment about the things to be done, and this again is hindered by lust. For it is said of the lustful old men (Dan. 13:9): “They perverted their own mind . . . that they might not . . . remember just judgments.” In this respect there is “thoughtlessness.” The fourth act is the reason’s command about the thing to be done, and this also is impeded by lust, in so far as through being carried away by concupiscence, a man is hindered from doing what his reason ordered to be done. [To this “inconstancy” must be referred.] [*The sentence in brackets is omitted in the Leonine edition.] Hence Terence says (Eunuch., act 1, sc. 1) of a man who declared that he would leave his mistress: “One little false tear will undo those words.”

On the part of the will there results a twofold inordinate act. One is the desire for the end, to which we refer “self-love,” which regards the pleasure which a man desires inordinately, while on the other hand there is “hatred of God,” by reason of His forbidding the desired pleasure. The other act is the desire for the things directed to the end. With regard to this there is “love of this world,” whose pleasures a man desires to enjoy, while on the other hand there is “despair of a future world,” because through being held back by carnal pleasures he cares not to obtain spiritual pleasures, since they are distasteful to him.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), intemperance is the chief corruptive of prudence: wherefore the vices opposed to prudence arise chiefly from lust, which is the principal species of intemperance.

Reply to Objection 2: The constancy which is a part of fortitude regards hardships and objects of fear; but constancy in refraining from pleasures pertains to continence which is a part of temperance, as stated above ([3527]Q[143]). Hence the inconstancy which is opposed thereto is to be reckoned a daughter of lust. Nevertheless even the first named inconstancy arises from lust, inasmuch as the latter enfeebles a man's heart and renders it effeminate, according to Osee 4:11, "Fornication and wine and drunkenness take away the heart [Douay: 'understanding']." Vegetius, too, says (De Re Milit. iii) that "the less a man knows of the pleasures of life, the less he fears death." Nor is there any need, as we have repeatedly stated, for the daughters of a capital vice to agree with it in matter (cf.[3528] Q[35], A[4], ad 2;[3529] Q[118], A[8], ad 1;[3530] Q[148], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 3: Self-love in respect of any goods that a man desires for himself is the common origin of all sins; but in the special point of desiring carnal pleasures for oneself, it is reckoned a daughter of lust.

Reply to Objection 4: The sins mentioned by Isidore are inordinate external acts, pertaining in the main to speech; wherein there is a fourfold inordinateness. First, on account of the matter, and to this we refer "obscene words": for since "out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh" (Mat. 12:34), the lustful man, whose heart is full of lewd concupiscences, readily breaks out into lewd words. Secondly, on account of the cause: for, since lust causes thoughtlessness and rashness, the result is that it makes a man speak without weighing or giving a thought to his words. which are described as "scurrilous." Thirdly, on account of the end: for since the lustful man seeks pleasure, he directs his speech thereto, and so gives utterance to "wanton words." Fourthly, on account of the sentiments expressed by his words, for through causing blindness of mind, lust perverts a man's sentiments, and so he gives way "to foolish talking," for instance, by expressing a preference for the pleasures he desires to anything else.

OF THE PARTS OF LUST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of lust, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Into what parts is lust divided?

(2) Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

(3) Whether it is the greatest of sins?

(4) Whether there is mortal sin in touches, kisses and such like seduction?

(5) Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

(6) Of seduction;

(7) Of rape;

(8) Of adultery;

(9) Of incest;

(10) Of sacrilege;

(11) Of the sin against nature;

(12) Of the order of gravity in the aforesaid sins.

Whether six species are fittingly assigned to lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that six species are unfittingly assigned to lust, namely, “simple fornication, adultery, incest, seduction, rape, and the unnatural vice.” For diversity of matter does not diversify the species. Now the aforesaid division is made with regard to diversity of matter, according as the woman with whom a man has intercourse is married or a virgin, or of some other condition. Therefore it seems that the species of lust are diversified in this way.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly the species of one vice are not differentiated by things that belong to another vice. Now adultery does not differ from simple fornication, save in the point of a man having intercourse with one who is another’s, so that he commits an injustice. Therefore it seems that adultery should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Objection 3: Further, just as a man may happen to have intercourse with a woman who is bound to another man by marriage, so may it happen that a man has intercourse with a woman who is bound to God by vow. Therefore sacrilege should be reckoned a species of lust, even as adultery is.

Objection 4: Further, a married man sins not only if he be with another woman, but also if he use his own wife inordinately. But the latter sin is comprised under lust. Therefore it should be reckoned among the species thereof.

Objection 5: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): “Lest again, when I come, God humble me among you, and I mourn many of them /that sinned before, and have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness that they have committed.” Therefore it seems that also uncleanness and lasciviousness should be reckoned species of lust, as well as fornication.

Objection 6: Further, the thing divided is not to be reckoned among its parts. But lust is reckoned together with the aforesaid: for it is written (Gal. 5:19): “The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust [Douay: ‘luxury’].” Therefore it seems that fornication is unfittingly reckoned a species of lust.

On the contrary, The aforesaid division is given in the Decretals 36, qu. i [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa].

I answer that As stated above ([3531]Q[153], A[3]), the sin of lust consists in seeking venereal pleasure not in accordance with right reason. This may happen in two ways. First, in respect of the matter wherein this pleasure is sought; secondly, when, whereas there is due matter, other due circumstances are not observed. And since a circumstance, as such, does not specify a moral act, whose species is derived from its object which is also its matter, it follows that the species of lust must be assigned with respect to its matter or object.

Now this same matter may be discordant with right reason in two ways. First, because it is inconsistent with the end of the venereal act. In this way, as hindering the begetting of children, there is the “vice against nature,” which attaches to every venereal act from which generation cannot follow; and, as hindering the due upbringing and advancement of the child when born, there is “simple fornication,” which is the union of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. Secondly, the matter wherein the venereal act is consummated may be discordant with right reason in relation to other persons; and this in two ways. First, with regard to the woman, with whom a man has connection, by reason of due honor not being paid to her; and thus there is “incest,” which consists in the misuse of a woman who is related by consanguinity or affinity. Secondly, with regard to the person under whose authority the woman is placed: and if she be under the authority of a husband, it is “adultery,” if under the authority of her father, it is “seduction,” in the absence of violence, and “rape” if violence be employed.

These species are differentiated on the part of the woman rather than of the man, because in the venereal act the woman is passive and is by way of matter, whereas the man is by way of agent; and it has been stated above (OBJ[1]) that the aforesaid species are assigned with regard to a difference of matter.

Reply to Objection 1: The aforesaid diversity of matter is connected with a formal difference of object, which difference results from different modes of opposition to right reason, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3532]FS, Q[18], A[7]), nothing hinders the deformities of different vices concurring in the one act, and in this way adultery is comprised under lust and injustice. Nor is this deformity of injustice altogether accidental to lust: since the lust that obeys concupiscence so far as to lead to injustice, is thereby shown to be more grievous.

Reply to Objection 3: Since a woman, by vowing continence, contracts a spiritual marriage with God, the sacrilege that is committed in the violation of such a woman is a spiritual adultery. In like manner, the other kinds of sacrilege pertaining to lustful matter are reduced to other species of lust.

Reply to Objection 4: The sin of a husband with his wife is not connected with undue matter, but with other circumstances, which do not constitute the species of a moral act, as stated above ([3533]FS, Q[18], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 5: As a gloss says on this passage, “uncleanness” stands for lust against nature, while “lasciviousness” is a man’s abuse of boys, wherefore it would appear to pertain to seduction. We may also reply that “lasciviousness” relates to certain acts circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth.

Reply to Objection 6: According to a gloss on this passage "lust" there signifies any kind of excess.

Whether simple fornication is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that simple fornication is not a mortal sin. For things that come under the same head would seem to be on a par with one another. Now fornication comes under the same head as things that are not mortal sins: for it is written (Acts 15:29): "That you abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." But there is not mortal sin in these observances, according to 1 Tim. 4:4, "Nothing is rejected that is received with thanksgiving." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, no mortal sin is the matter of a Divine precept. But the Lord commanded (Osee 1:2): "Go take thee a wife of fornications, and have of her children of fornications." Therefore fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, no mortal sin is mentioned in Holy Writ without disapprobation. Yet simple fornication is mentioned without disapprobation by Holy Writ in connection with the patriarchs. Thus we read (Gn. 16:4) that Abraham went in to his handmaid Agar; and further on (Gn. 30:5, 9) that Jacob went in to Bala and Zelpha the handmaids of his wives; and again (Gn. 38:18) that Juda was with Thamar whom he thought to be a harlot. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 4: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But simple fornication is not contrary to charity, neither as regards the love of God, since it is not a sin directly against. God, nor as regards the love of our neighbor, since thereby no one is injured. Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 5: Further, every mortal sin leads to eternal perdition. But simple fornication has not this result: because a gloss of Ambrose [*The quotation is from the Gloss of Peter Lombard, who refers it to St. Ambrose: whereas it is from Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, "Godliness is profitable to all things," says: "The whole of Christian teaching is summed up in mercy and godliness: if a man conforms to this, even though he gives way to the inconstancy of the flesh, doubtless he will be punished, but he will not perish.” Therefore simple fornication is not a mortal sin.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xvi) that “what food is to the well-being of the body, such is sexual intercourse to the welfare of the human race.” But inordinate use of food is not always a mortal sin. Therefore neither is all inordinate sexual intercourse; and this would seem to apply especially to simple fornication, which is the least grievous of the aforesaid species.

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:13): “Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know a crime.” Now crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore fornication and all intercourse with other than one’s wife is a mortal sin.

Further, nothing but mortal sin debars a man from God’s kingdom. But fornication debars him, as shown by the words of the Apostle (Gal. 5:21), who after mentioning fornication and certain other vices, adds: “They who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God.” Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

Further, it is written in the Decretals (XXII, qu. i, can. Praedicandum): “They should know that the same penance is to be enjoined for perjury as for adultery, fornication, and wilful murder and other criminal offenses.” Therefore simple fornication is a criminal or mortal sin.

I answer that, Without any doubt we must hold simple fornication to be a mortal sin, notwithstanding that a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. in Deut., qu. 37] on Dt. 23:17, says: “This is a prohibition against going with whores, whose vileness is venial.” For instead of “venial” it should be “venal,” since such is the wanton’s trade. In order to make this evident, we must take note that every sin committed directly against human life is a mortal sin. Now simple fornication implies an inordinateness that tends to injure the life of the offspring to be born of this union. For we find in all animals where the upbringing of the offspring needs care of both male and female, that these come together not indeterminately, but the male with a certain female, whether one or several; such is the case with all birds: while, on the other hand, among those animals, where the female alone suffices for the offspring’s upbringing, the union is indeterminate, as in the case of dogs and like animals. Now it is evident that the upbringing of a human child requires not only the mother’s care for his nourishment, but much more the care of his father as guide and guardian, and under whom he progresses in goods both internal and external. Hence human nature rebels against an indeterminate union of the sexes and demands that a man should be united to a determinate woman and should abide with her a long time or even for a whole lifetime. Hence it is that in the human race the male has a natural solicitude for the certainty of offspring, because on him devolves the upbringing of the child: and this certainly would cease if the union of sexes were indeterminate.

This union with a certain definite woman is called matrimony; which for the above reason is said to belong to the natural law. Since, however, the union of the sexes is directed to the common good of the whole human race, and common goods depend on the law for their determination, as stated above ([3534]FS, Q[90], A[2]), it follows that this union of man and woman, which is called matrimony, is determined by some law. What this determination is for us will be stated in the Third Part of this work (XP, Q[50], seqq.), where we shall treat of the sacrament of matrimony. Wherefore, since fornication is an indeterminate union of the sexes, as something incompatible with matrimony, it is opposed to the good of the child's upbringing, and consequently it is a mortal sin.

Nor does it matter if a man having knowledge of a woman by fornication, make sufficient provision for the upbringing of the child: because a matter that comes under the determination of the law is judged according to what happens in general, and not according to what may happen in a particular case.

Reply to Objection 1: Fornication is reckoned in conjunction with these things, not as being on a par with them in sinfulness, but because the matters mentioned there were equally liable to cause dispute between Jews and Gentiles, and thus prevent them from agreeing unanimously. For among the Gentiles, fornication was not deemed unlawful, on account of the corruption of natural reason: whereas the Jews, taught by the Divine law, considered it to be unlawful. The other things mentioned were loathsome to the Jews through custom introduced by the law into their daily life. Hence the Apostles forbade these things to the Gentiles, not as though they were unlawful in themselves, but because they were loathsome to the Jews, as stated above ([3535]FS, Q[103], A[4], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: Fornication is said to be a sin, because it is contrary to right reason. Now man’s reason is right, in so far as it is ruled by the Divine Will, the first and supreme rule. Wherefore that which a man does by God’s will and in obedience to His command, is not contrary to right reason, though it may seem contrary to the general order of reason: even so, that which is done miraculously by the Divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature. Therefore just as Abraham did not sin in being willing to slay his innocent son, because he obeyed God, although considered in itself it was contrary to right human reason in general, so, too, Osee sinned not in committing fornication by God’s command. Nor should such a copulation be strictly called fornication, though it be so called in reference to the general course of things. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): “When God commands a thing to be done against the customs or agreement of any people, though it were never done by them heretofore, it is to be done”; and afterwards he adds: “For as among the powers of human society, the greater authority is obeyed in preference to the lesser, so must God in preference to all.”

Reply to Objection 3: Abraham and Jacob went in to their handmaidens with no purpose of fornication, as we shall show further on when we treat of matrimony ([3536]XP, Q[65], A[5], ad 2). As to Juda there is no need to excuse him, for he also caused Joseph to be sold.

Reply to Objection 4: Simple fornication is contrary to the love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the good of the child to be born, as we have shown, since it is an act of generation accomplished in a manner disadvantageous to the future child.

Reply to Objection 5: A person, who, while given to works of piety, yields to the inconstancy of the flesh, is freed from eternal loss, in so far as these works dispose him to receive the grace to repent, and because by such works he makes satisfaction for his past inconstancy; but not so as to be freed by pious works, if he persist in carnal inconstancy impenitent until death.

Reply to Objection 6: One copulation may result in the begetting of a man, wherefore inordinate copulation, which hinders the good of the future child, is a mortal sin as to the very genus of the act, and not only as to the inordinateness of concupiscence. On the other hand, one meal does not hinder the good of a man’s whole life, wherefore the act of gluttony is not a mortal sin by reason of its genus. It would, however, be a mortal sin, if a man were knowingly to partake of a food which would alter the whole condition of his life, as was the case with Adam.

Nor is it true that fornication is the least of the sins comprised under lust, for the marriage act that is done out of sensuous pleasure is a lesser sin.

Whether fornication is the most grievous of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that fornication is the most grievous of sins. For seemingly a sin is the more grievous according as it proceeds from a greater sensuous pleasure. Now the greatest sensuous pleasure is in fornication, for a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:9 says that the “flame of sensuous pleasure is most fierce in lust.” Therefore it seems that fornication is the gravest of sins.

Objection 2: Further, a sin is the more grievous that is committed against a person more closely united to the sinner: thus he sins more grievously who strikes his father than one who strikes a stranger. Now according to 1 Cor. 6:18, “He that committeth fornication sinneth against his own body,” which is most intimately connected with a man. Therefore it seems that fornication is the most grievous of sins.

Objection 3: Further, the greater a good is, the graver would seem to be the sin committed against it. Now the sin of fornication is seemingly opposed to the good of the whole human race, as appears from what was said in the foregoing Article. It is also against Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:15, “Shall I . . . take the members of Christ, and make them the members of a harlot?” Therefore fornication is the most grievous of sins.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 12) that the sins of the flesh are less grievous than spiritual sins.

I answer that, The gravity of a sin may be measured in two ways, first with regard to the sin in itself, secondly with regard to some accident. The gravity of a sin is measured with regard to the sin itself, by reason of its species, which is determined according to the good to which that sin is opposed. Now fornication is contrary to the good of the child to be born. Wherefore it is a graver sin, as to its species, than those sins which are contrary to external goods, such as theft and the like; while it is less grievous than those which are directly against God, and sins that are injurious to the life of one already born, such as murder.

Reply to Objection 1: The sensual pleasure that aggravates a sin is that which is in the inclination of the will. But the sensual pleasure that is in the sensitive appetite, lessens sin, because a sin is the less grievous according as it is committed under the impulse of a greater passion. It is in this way that the greatest sensual pleasure is in fornication. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christiano [*Serm. ccxciii; ccl de Temp.; see Appendix to St. Augustine's works]) that of all a Christian's conflicts, the most difficult combats are those of chastity; wherein the fight is a daily one, but victory rare: and Isidore declares (De Summo Bono ii, 39) that "mankind is subjected to the devil by carnal lust more than by anything else," because, to wit, the vehemence of this passion is more difficult to overcome.

Reply to Objection 2: The fornicator is said to sin against his own body, not merely because the pleasure of fornication is consummated in the flesh, which is also the case in gluttony, but also because he acts against the good of his own body by an undue resolution and defilement thereof, and an undue association with another. Nor does it follow from this that fornication is the most grievous sin, because in man reason is of greater value than the body, wherefore if there be a sin more opposed to reason, it will be more grievous.

Reply to Objection 3: The sin of fornication is contrary to the good of the human race, in so far as it is prejudicial to the individual begetting of the one man that may be born. Now one who is already an actual member of the human species attains to the perfection of the species more than one who is a man potentially, and from this point of view murder is a more grievous sin than fornication and every kind of lust, through being more opposed to the good of the human species. Again, a Divine good is greater than the good of the human race: and therefore those sins also that are against God are more grievous. Moreover, fornication is a sin against God, not directly as though the fornicator intended to offend God, but consequently, in the same way as all mortal sins. And just as the members of our body are Christ's members, so too, our spirit is one with Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:17, "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Wherefore also spiritual sins are more against Christ than fornication is.

Whether there can be mortal sin in touches and kisses?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no mortal sin in touches and kisses. For the Apostle says (Eph. 5:3): “Fornication and all uncleanness, or covetousness, let it not so much as be named among you, as becometh saints,” then he adds: “Or obscenity” (which a gloss refers to “kissing and fondling”), “or foolish talking” (as “soft speeches”), “or scurrility” (which “fools call geniality—i.e. jocularity”), and afterwards he continues (Eph. 5:5): “For know ye this and understand that no fornicator, or unclean, or covetous person (which is the serving of idols), hath inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God,” thus making no further mention of obscenity, as neither of foolish talking or scurrility. Therefore these are not mortal sins.

Objection 2: Further, fornication is stated to be a mortal sin as being prejudicial to the good of the future child’s begetting and upbringing. But these are not affected by kisses and touches or blandishments. Therefore there is no mortal sin in these.

Objection 3: Further, things that are mortal sins in themselves can never be good actions. Yet kisses, touches, and the like can be done sometimes without sin. Therefore they are not mortal sins in themselves.

On the contrary, A lustful look is less than a touch, a caress or a kiss. But according to Mat. 5:28, “Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart.” Much more therefore are lustful kisses and other like things mortal sins.

Further, Cyprian says (Ad Pompon, de Virgin., Ep. lxii), “By their very intercourse, their blandishments, their converse, their embraces, those who are associated in a sleep that knows neither honor nor shame, acknowledge their disgrace and crime.” Therefore by doing these things a man is guilty of a crime, that is, of mortal sin.

I answer that, A thing is said to be a mortal works. /sin in two ways. First, by reason of its species, and in this way a kiss, caress, or touch does not, of its very nature, imply a mortal sin, for it is possible to do such things without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause. Secondly, a thing is said to be a mortal sin by reason of its cause: thus he who gives an alms, in order to lead someone into heresy, sins mortally on account of his corrupt intention. Now it has been stated above ([3537]FS, Q[74], A[8]), that it is a mortal sin not only to consent to the act, but also to the delectation of a mortal sin.

Wherefore since fornication is a mortal sin, and much more so the other kinds of lust, it follows that in such like sins not only consent to the act but also consent to the pleasure is a mortal sin. Consequently, when these kisses and caresses are done for this delectation, it follows that they are mortal sins, and only in this way are they said to be lustful. Therefore in so far as they are lustful, they are mortal sins.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle makes no further mention of these three because they are not sinful except as directed to those that he had mentioned before.

Reply to Objection 2: Although kisses and touches do not by their very nature hinder the good of the human offspring, they proceed from lust, which is the source of this hindrance: and on this account they are mortally sinful.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that such things are not mortal sins in their species.

Whether nocturnal pollution is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that nocturnal pollution is a sin. For the same things are the matter of merit and demerit. Now a man may merit while he sleeps, as was the case with Solomon, who while asleep obtained the gift of wisdom from the Lord (3 Kings 3:2, Par. 1). Therefore a man may demerit while asleep; and thus nocturnal pollution would seem to be a sin.

Objection 2: Further, whoever has the use of reason can sin. Now a man has the use of reason while asleep, since in our sleep we frequently discuss matters, choose this rather than that, consenting to one thing, or dissenting to another. Therefore one may sin while asleep, so that nocturnal pollution is not prevented by sleep from being a sin, seeing that it is a sin according to its genus.

Objection 3: Further, it is useless to reprove and instruct one who cannot act according to or against reason. Now man, while asleep, is instructed and reproved by God, according to Job 33:15,16, “By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep is wont to lay hold of men [*Vulg.: ‘When deep sleep falleth upon men.’ St. Thomas is apparently quoting from memory, as the passage is given correctly above[3538], Q[95], A[6], OBJ[1]] . . . Then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn.” Therefore a man, while asleep, can act according to or against his reason, and this is to do good or sinful actions, and thus it seems that nocturnal pollution is a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15): “When the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker presents itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter is unable to distinguish the imaginary from the real union of bodies, the flesh is at once moved, with the result that usually follows such motions; and yet there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things while one is awake.”

I answer that, Nocturnal pollution may be considered in two ways. First, in itself; and thus it has not the character of a sin. For every sin depends on the judgment of reason, since even the first movement of the sensuality has nothing sinful in it, except in so far as it can be suppressed by reason; wherefore in the absence of reason’s judgment, there is no sin in it. Now during sleep reason has not a free judgment. For there is no one who while sleeping does not regard some of the images formed by his imagination as though they were real, as stated above in the [3539]FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Wherefore what a man does while he sleeps and is deprived of reason’s judgment, is not imputed to him as a sin, as neither are the actions of a maniac or an imbecile.

Secondly, nocturnal pollution may be considered with reference to its cause. This may be threefold. One is a bodily cause. For when there is excess of seminal humor in the body, or when the humor is disintegrated either through overheating of the body or some other disturbance, the sleeper dreams things that are connected with the discharge of this excessive or disintegrated humor: the same thing happens when nature is cumbered with other superfluities, so that phantasms relating to the discharge of those superfluities are formed in the imagination. Accordingly if this excess of humor be due to a sinful cause (for instance excessive eating or drinking), nocturnal pollution has the character of sin from its cause: whereas if the excess or disintegration of these superfluities be not due to a sinful cause, nocturnal pollution is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

A second cause of nocturnal pollution is on the part of the soul and the inner man: for instance when it happens to the sleeper on account of some previous thought. For the thought which preceded while he was awake, is sometimes purely speculative, for instance when one thinks about the sins of the flesh for the purpose of discussion; while sometimes it is accompanied by a certain emotion either of concupiscence or of abhorrence. Now nocturnal pollution is more apt to arise from thinking about carnal sins with concupiscence for such pleasures, because this leaves its trace and inclination in the soul, so that the sleeper is more easily led in his imagination to consent to acts productive of pollution. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that "in so far as certain movements in some degree pass" from the waking state to the state of sleep, "the dreams of good men are better than those of any other people": and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15) that "even during sleep, the soul may have conspicuous merit on account of its good disposition." Thus it is evident that nocturnal pollution may be sinful on the part of its cause. on the other hand, it may happen that nocturnal pollution ensues after thoughts about carnal acts, though they were speculative, or accompanied by abhorrence, and then it is not sinful, neither in itself nor in its cause.

The third cause is spiritual and external; for instance when by the work of a devil the sleeper's phantasms are disturbed so as to induce the aforesaid result. Sometimes this is associated with a previous sin, namely the neglect to guard against the wiles of the devil. Hence the words of the hymn at even: "Our enemy repress, that so our bodies no uncleanness know" [*Translation W. K. Blount].

On the other hand, this may occur without any fault on man's part, and through the wickedness of the devil alone. Thus we read in the Collationes Patrum (Coll. xxii, 6) of a man who was ever wont to suffer from nocturnal pollution on festivals, and that the devil brought this about in order to prevent him from receiving Holy Communion. Hence it is manifest that nocturnal pollution is never a sin, but is sometimes the result of a previous sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Solomon did not merit to receive wisdom from God while he was asleep. He received it in token of his previous desire. It is for this reason that his petition is stated to have been pleasing to God (3 Kings 3:10), as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii, 15).

Reply to Objection 2: The use of reason is more or less hindered in sleep, according as the inner sensitive powers are more or less overcome by sleep, on account of the violence or attenuation of the evaporations. Nevertheless it is always hindered somewhat, so as to be unable to elicit a judgment altogether free, as stated in the [3540]FP, Q[84], A[8], ad 2. Therefore what it does then is not imputed to it as a sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Reason's apprehension is not hindered during sleep to the same extent as its judgment, for this is accomplished by reason turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of human thought. Hence nothing hinders man's reason during sleep from apprehending anew something arising out of the traces left by his previous thoughts and phantasms presented to him, or again through Divine revelation, or the interference of a good or bad angel.

Whether seduction should be reckoned a species of lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust. For seduction denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, according to the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1) [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]. But this may occur between an unmarried man and an unmarried woman, which pertains to fornication. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust, distinct from fornication.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Patriarch. [*De Abraham i, 4]): "Let no man be deluded by human laws: all seduction is adultery." Now a species is not contained under another that is differentiated in opposition to it. Therefore since adultery is a species of lust, it seems that seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Objection 3: Further, to do a person an injury would seem to pertain to injustice rather than to lust. Now the seducer does an injury to another, namely the violated maiden's father, who "can take the injury as personal to himself" [*Gratian, ad can. Lex illa], and sue the seducer for damages. Therefore seduction should not be reckoned a species of lust.

On the contrary, Seduction consists properly in the venereal act whereby a virgin is violated. Therefore, since lust is properly about venereal actions, it would seem that seduction is a species of lust.

I answer that, When the matter of a vice has a special deformity, we must reckon it to be a determinate species of that vice. Now lust is a sin concerned with venereal matter, as stated above ([3541]Q[153], A[1]). And a special deformity attaches to the violation of a virgin who is under her father’s care: both on the part of the maid, who through being violated without any previous compact of marriage is both hindered from contracting a lawful marriage and is put on the road to a wanton life from which she was withheld lest she should lose the seal of virginity: and on the part of the father, who is her guardian, according to Ecclus. 42:11, “Keep a sure watch over a shameless daughter, lest at any time she make thee become a laughing-stock to thy enemies.” Therefore it is evident that seduction which denotes the unlawful violation of a virgin, while still under the guardianship of her parents, is a determinate species of lust.

Reply to Objection 1: Although a virgin is free from the bond of marriage, she is not free from her father’s power. Moreover, the seal of virginity is a special obstacle to the intercourse of fornication, in that it should be removed by marriage only. Hence seduction is not simple fornication, since the latter is intercourse with harlots, women, namely, who are no longer virgins, as a gloss observes on 2 Cor. 12:, “And have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication,” etc.

Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose here takes seduction in another sense, as applicable in a general way to any sin of lust. Wherefore seduction, in the words quoted, signifies the intercourse between a married man and any woman other than his wife. This is clear from his adding: “Nor is it lawful for the husband to do what the wife may not.” In this sense, too, we are to understand the words of Num. 5:13: “If [Vulg.: ‘But’] the adultery is secret, and cannot be provided by witnesses, because she was not found in adultery [stupro].”

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents a sin from having a greater deformity through being united to another sin. Now the sin of lust obtains a greater deformity from the sin of injustice, because the concupiscence would seem to be more inordinate, seeing that it refrains not from the pleasurable object so that it may avoid an injustice. In fact a twofold injustice attaches to it. One is on the part of the virgin, who, though not violated by force, is nevertheless seduced, and thus the seducer is bound to compensation. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:16,17): “If a man seduce a virgin not yet espoused, and lie with her, he shall endow her and have her to wife. If the maid’s father will not give her to him, he shall give money according to the dowry, which virgins are wont to receive.” The other injury is done to the maid’s father: wherefore the seducer is bound by the Law to a penalty in his regard. For it is written (Dt. 22:28,29): “If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, who is not espoused, and taking her, lie with her, and the matter come to judgment: he that lay with her shall give to the father of the maid fifty sicles of silver, and shall have her to wife, and because he hath humbled her, he may not put her away all the days of his life”: and this, lest he should prove to have married her in mockery, as Augustine observes. [*QQ. in Dt., qu. xxxiv.]

Whether rape is a species of lust, distinct from seduction?

Objection 1: It would seem that rape is not a species of lust, distinct from seduction. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 26) that “seduction [stuprum], or rape, properly speaking, is unlawful intercourse, and takes its name from its causing corruption: wherefore he that is guilty of rape is a seducer.” Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a species of lust distinct from seduction.

Objection 2: Further, rape, apparently, implies violence. For it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that “rape is committed when a maid is taken away by force from her father’s house that after being violated she may be taken to wife.” But the employment of force is accidental to lust, for this essentially regards the pleasure of intercourse. Therefore it seems that rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

Objection 3: Further, the sin of lust is curbed by marriage: for it is written (1 Cor. 7:2): “For fear of fornication, let every man have his own wife.” Now rape is an obstacle to subsequent marriage, for it was enacted in the council of Meaux: “We decree that those who are guilty of rape, or of abducting or seducing women, should not have those women in marriage, although they should have subsequently married them with the consent of their parents.” Therefore rape is not a determinate species of lust distinct from seduction.

Objection 4: Further, a man may have knowledge of his newly married wife without committing a sin of lust. Yet he may commit rape if he take her away by force from her parents’ house, and have carnal knowledge of her. Therefore rape should not be reckoned a determinate species of lust.

On the contrary, Rape is unlawful sexual intercourse, as Isidore states (Etym. v, 26). But this pertains to the sin of lust. Therefore rape is a species of lust.

I answer that, Rape, in the sense in which we speak of it now, is a species of lust: and sometimes it coincides with seduction; sometimes there is rape without seduction, and sometimes seduction without rape.

They coincide when a man employs force in order unlawfully to violate a virgin. This force is employed sometimes both towards the virgin and towards her father; and sometimes towards the father and not to the virgin, for instance if she allows herself to be taken away by force from her father’s house. Again, the force employed in rape differs in another way, because sometimes a maid is taken away by force from her parents’ house, and is forcibly violated: while sometimes, though taken away by force, she is not forcibly violated, but of her own consent, whether by act of fornication or by the act of marriage: for the conditions of rape remain no matter how force is employed. There is rape without seduction if a man abduct a widow or one who is not a virgin. Hence Pope Symmachus says [*Ep. v ad Caesarium; Cf. can. Raptores xxxvi, qu. 2], “We abhor abductors whether of widows or of virgins on account of the heinousness of their crime.”

There is seduction without rape when a man, without employing force, violates a virgin unlawfully.

Reply to Objection 1: Since rape frequently coincides with seduction, the one is sometimes used to signify the other.

Reply to Objection 2: The employment of force would seem to arise from the greatness of concupiscence, the result being that a man does not fear to endanger himself by offering violence.

Reply to Objection 3: The rape of a maiden who is promised in marriage is to be judged differently from that of one who is not so promised. For one who is promised in marriage must be restored to her betrothed, who has a right to her in virtue of their betrothal: whereas one that is not promised to another must first of all be restored to her father’s care, and then the abductor may lawfully marry her with her parents’ consent. Otherwise the marriage is unlawful, since whosoever steals a thing he is bound to restore it. Nevertheless rape does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, although it is an impediment to its being contracted. As to the decree of the council in question, it was made in abhorrence of this crime, and has been abrogated. Wherefore Jerome [*The quotation is from Can. Tria. xxxvi, qu. 2] declares the contrary: “Three kinds of lawful marriage,” says he, “are mentioned in Holy Writ. The first is that of a chaste maiden given away lawfully in her maidenhood to a man. The second is when a man finds a maiden in the city, and by force has carnal knowledge of her. If the father be willing, the man shall endow her according to the father’s estimate, and shall pay the price of her purity [*Cf. Dt. 22:23–29]. The third is, when the maiden is taken away from such a man, and is given to another at the father’s will.”

We may also take this decree to refer to those who are promised to others in marriage, especially if the betrothal be expressed by words in the present tense.

Reply to Objection 4: The man who is just married has, in virtue of the betrothal, a certain right in her: wherefore, although he sins by using violence, he is not guilty of the crime of rape. Hence Pope Gelasius says [*Can. Lex illa, xxvii, qu. 2; xxxvi, qu. 1]: “This law of bygone rulers stated that rape was committed when a maiden, with regard to whose marriage nothing had so far been decided, was taken away by force.”

Whether adultery is determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species?

Objection 1: It would seem that adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the other species. For adultery takes its name from a man having intercourse “with a woman who is not his own [ad alteram],” according to a gloss [*St. Augustine: Serm. li, 13 de Divers. lxiii] on Ex. 20:14. Now a woman who is not one’s own may be of various conditions, namely either a virgin, or under her father’s care, or a harlot, or of any other description. Therefore it seems that adultery is not a species of lust distinct from the others.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says [*Contra Jovin. i]: “It matters not for what reason a man behaves as one demented. Hence Sixtus the Pythagorean says in his Maxims: He that is insatiable of his wife is an adulterer,” and in like manner one who is over enamored of any woman. Now every kind of lust includes a too ardent love. Therefore adultery is in every kind of lust: and consequently it should not be reckoned a species of lust.

Objection 3: Further, where there is the same kind of deformity, there would seem to be the same species of sin. Now, apparently, there is the same kind of deformity in seduction and adultery: since in either case a woman is violated who is under another person’s authority. Therefore adultery is not a determinate species of lust, distinct from the others.

On the contrary, Pope Leo [*St. Augustine, De Bono Conjug. iv; Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 5] says that “adultery is sexual intercourse with another man or woman in contravention of the marriage compact, whether through the impulse of one’s own lust, or with the consent of the other party.” Now this implies a special deformity of lust. Therefore adultery is a determinate species of lust.

I answer that, Adultery, as its name implies, “is access to another’s marriage-bed [ad alienum torum]” [*Cf. Append. Gratian, ad can. Ille autem. xxxii, qu. 1]. By so doing a man is guilty of a twofold offense against chastity and the good of human procreation. First, by accession to a woman who is not joined to him in marriage, which is contrary to the good of the upbringing of his own children. Secondly, by accession to a woman who is united to another in marriage, and thus he hinders the good of another’s children. The same applies to the married woman who is corrupted by adultery. Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 23:32,33): “Every woman . . . that leaveth her husband . . . shall be guilty of sin. For first she hath been unfaithful to the law of the Most High” (since there it is commanded: “Thou shalt not commit adultery”); “and secondly, she hath offended against her husband,” by making it uncertain that the children are his: “thirdly, she hath fornicated in adultery, and hath gotten children of another man,” which is contrary to the good of her offspring. The first of these, however, is common to all mortal sins, while the two others belong especially to the deformity of adultery. Hence it is manifest that adultery is a determinate species of lust, through having a special deformity in venereal acts.

Reply to Objection 1: If a married man has intercourse with another woman, his sin may be denominated either with regard to him, and thus it is always adultery, since his action is contrary to the fidelity of marriage, or with regard to the woman with whom he has intercourse; and thus sometimes it is adultery, as when a married man has intercourse with another’s wife; and sometimes it has the character of seduction, or of some other sin, according to various conditions affecting the woman with whom he has intercourse: and it has been stated above [3542](A[1]) that the species of lust correspond to the various conditions of women.

Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is specially ordained for the good of human offspring, as stated above [3543](A[2]). But adultery is specially opposed to matrimony, in the point of breaking the marriage faith which is due between husband and wife. And since the man who is too ardent a lover of his wife acts counter to the good of marriage if he use her indecently, although he be not unfaithful, he may in a sense be called an adulterer; and even more so than he that is too ardent a lover of another woman.

Reply to Objection 3: The wife is under her husband's authority, as united to him in marriage: whereas the maid is under her father's authority, as one who is to be married by that authority. Hence the sin of adultery is contrary to the good of marriage in one way, and the sin of seduction in another; wherefore they are reckoned to differ specifically. Of other matters concerning adultery we shall speak in the Third Part [*[3544]XP, Q[59], A[3] ; XP, QQ[60],62], when we treat of matrimony.

Whether incest is a determinate species of lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that incest is not a determinate species of lust. For incest [*'Incestus' is equivalent to 'in-castus = 'unchaste'] takes its name from being a privation of chastity. But all kinds of lust are opposed to chastity. Therefore it seems that incest is not a species of lust, but is lust itself in general.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Cf. Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]) that "incest is intercourse between a man and a woman related by consanguinity or affinity." Now affinity differs from consanguinity. Therefore it is not one but several species of lust.

Objection 3: Further, that which does not, of itself, imply a deformity, does not constitute a determinate species of vice. But intercourse between those who are related by consanguinity or affinity does not, of itself, contain any deformity, else it would never have been lawful. Therefore incest is not a determinate species of lust.

On the contrary, The species of lust are distinguished according to the various conditions of women with whom a man has unlawful intercourse.

Now incest implies a special condition on the part of the woman, because it is unlawful intercourse with a woman related by consanguinity or affinity as stated (OBJ[2]). Therefore incest is a determinate species of lust.

I answer that, As stated above ([3545]AA[1],6) wherever we find something incompatible with the right use of venereal actions, there must needs be a determinate species of lust. Now sexual intercourse with women related by consanguinity or affinity is unbecoming to venereal union on three counts. First, because man naturally owes a certain respect to his parents and therefore to his other blood relations, who are descended in near degree from the same parents: so much so indeed that among the ancients, as Valerius Maximus relates [*Dict. Fact. Memor. ii, 1], it was not deemed right for a son to bathe with his father, lest they should see one another naked. Now from what has been said (Q[142], A[4]: Q[151], A[4]), it is evident that in venereal acts there is a certain shamefulness inconsistent with respect, wherefore men are ashamed of them. Wherefore it is unseemly that such persons should be united in venereal intercourse. This reason seems to be indicated (Lev. 18:7) where we read: “She is thy mother, thou shalt not uncover her nakedness,” and the same is expressed further on with regard to others.

The second reason is because blood relations must needs live in close touch with one another. Wherefore if they were not debarred from venereal union, opportunities of venereal intercourse would be very frequent and thus men’s minds would be enervated by lust. Hence in the Old Law [*Lev. 18] the prohibition was apparently directed specially to those persons who must needs live together.

The third reason is, because this would hinder a man from having many friends: since through a man taking a stranger to wife, all his wife’s relations are united to him by a special kind of friendship, as though they were of the same blood as himself. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16): “The demands of charity are most perfectly satisfied by men uniting together in the bonds that the various ties of friendship require, so that they may live together in a useful and becoming amity; nor should one man have many relationships in one, but each should have one.”

Aristotle adds another reason (2 Polit. ii): for since it is natural that a man should have a liking for a woman of his kindred, if to this be added the love that has its origin in venereal intercourse, his love would be too ardent and would become a very great incentive to lust: and this is contrary to chastity. Hence it is evident that incest is a determinate species of lust.

Reply to Objection 1: Unlawful intercourse between persons related to one another would be most prejudicial to chastity, both on account of the opportunities it affords, and because of the excessive ardor of love, as stated in the Article. Wherefore the unlawful intercourse between such persons is called "incest" antonomastically.

Reply to Objection 2: Persons are related by affinity through one who is related by consanguinity: and therefore since the one depends on the other, consanguinity and affinity entail the same kind of unbecomingness.

Reply to Objection 3: There is something essentially unbecoming and contrary to natural reason in sexual intercourse between persons related by blood, for instance between parents and children who are directly and immediately related to one another, since children naturally owe their parents honor. Hence the Philosopher instances a horse (De Animal. ix, 47) which covered its own mother by mistake and threw itself over a precipice as though horrified at what it had done, because some animals even have a natural respect for those that have begotten them. There is not the same essential unbecomingness attaching to other persons who are related to one another not directly but through their parents: and, as to this, becomingness or unbecomingness varies according to custom, and human or Divine law: because, as stated above [3546](A[2]), sexual intercourse, being directed to the common good, is subject to law. Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), whereas the union of brothers and sisters goes back to olden times, it became all the more worthy of condemnation when religion forbade it.

Whether sacrilege can be a species of lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege cannot be a species of lust. For the same species is not contained under different genera that are not subalternated to one another. Now sacrilege is a species of irreligion, as stated above ([3547]Q[99], A[2]). Therefore sacrilege cannot be reckoned a species of lust.

Objection 2: Further, the Decretals (XXXVI, qu. 1 [*Append. Grat. ad can. Lex illa]), do not place sacrilege among other sins which are reckoned species of lust. Therefore it would seem not to be a species of lust.

Objection 3: Further, something derogatory to a sacred thing may be done by the other kinds of vice, as well as by lust. But sacrilege is not reckoned a species of gluttony, or of any other similar vice. Therefore neither should it be reckoned a species of lust.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) that “if it is wicked, through covetousness, to go beyond one’s earthly bounds, how much more wicked is it through venereal lust to transgress the bounds of morals!” Now to go beyond one’s earthly bounds in sacred matters is a sin of sacrilege. Therefore it is likewise a sin of sacrilege to overthrow the bounds of morals through venereal desire in sacred matters. But venereal desire pertains to lust. Therefore sacrilege is a species of lust.

I answer that, As stated above ([3548]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7), the act of a virtue or vice, that is directed to the end of another virtue or vice, assumes the latter’s species: thus, theft committed for the sake of adultery, passes into the species of adultery. Now it is evident that as Augustine states (De Virgin. 8), the observance of chastity, by being directed to the worship of God, becomes an act of religion, as in the case of those who vow and keep chastity. Wherefore it is manifest that lust also, by violating something pertaining to the worship of God, belongs to the species of sacrilege: and in this way sacrilege may be accounted a species of lust.

Reply to Objection 1: Lust, by being directed to another vice as its end, becomes a species of that vice: and so a species of lust may be also a species of irreligion, as of a higher genus.

Reply to Objection 2: The enumeration referred to, includes those sins which are species of lust by their very nature: whereas sacrilege is a species of lust in so far as it is directed to another vice as its end, and may coincide with the various species of lust. For unlawful intercourse between persons mutually united by spiritual relationship, is a sacrilege after the manner of incest. Intercourse with a virgin consecrated to God, inasmuch as she is the spouse of Christ, is sacrilege resembling adultery. If the maiden be under her father’s authority, it will be spiritual seduction; and if force be employed it will be spiritual rape, which kind of rape even the civil law punishes more severely than others. Thus the Emperor Justinian says [*Cod. i, iii de Episc. et Cler. 5]: “If any man dare, I will not say to rape, but even to tempt a consecrated virgin with a view to marriage, he shall be liable to capital punishment."

Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is committed on a consecrated thing. Now a consecrated thing is either a consecrated person, who is desired for sexual intercourse, and thus it is a kind of lust, or it is desired for possession, and thus it is a kind of injustice. Sacrilege may also come under the head of anger, for instance, if through anger an injury be done to a consecrated person. Again, one may commit a sacrilege by partaking gluttonously of sacred food. Nevertheless, sacrilege is ascribed more specially to lust which is opposed to chastity for the observance of which certain persons are specially consecrated.

Whether the unnatural vice is a species of lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not a species of lust. For no mention of the vice against nature is made in the enumeration given above (A[1], OBJ[1]). Therefore it is not a species of lust.

Objection 2: Further, lust is contrary to virtue; and so it is comprised under vice. But the unnatural vice is comprised not under vice, but under bestiality, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5). Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

Objection 3: Further, lust regards acts directed to human generation, as stated above ([3549]Q[153], A[2]): Whereas the unnatural vice concerns acts from which generation cannot follow. Therefore the unnatural vice is not a species of lust.

On the contrary, It is reckoned together with the other species of lust (2 Cor. 12:21) where we read: "And have not done penance for the uncleanness, and fornication, and lasciviousness," where a gloss says: "Lasciviousness, i.e., unnatural lust."

I answer that, As stated above ([3550]AA[6],9) wherever there occurs a special kind of deformity whereby the venereal act is rendered unbecoming, there is a determinate species of lust. This may occur in two ways: First, through being contrary to right reason, and this is common to all lustful vices; secondly, because, in addition, it is contrary to the natural order of the venereal act as becoming to the human race: and this is called "the unnatural vice." This may happen in several ways. First, by procuring pollution, without any copulation, for the sake of venereal pleasure: this pertains to the sin of “uncleanness” which some call “effeminacy.” Secondly, by copulation with a thing of undue species, and this is called “bestiality.” Thirdly, by copulation with an undue sex, male with male, or female with female, as the Apostle states (Rom. 1:27): and this is called the “vice of sodomy.” Fourthly, by not observing the natural manner of copulation, either as to undue means, or as to other monstrous and bestial manners of copulation.

Reply to Objection 1: There we enumerated the species of lust that are not contrary to human nature: wherefore the unnatural vice was omitted.

Reply to Objection 2: Bestiality differs from vice, for the latter is opposed to human virtue by a certain excess in the same matter as the virtue, and therefore is reducible to the same genus.

Reply to Objection 3: The lustful man intends not human generation but venereal pleasures. It is possible to have this without those acts from which human generation follows: and it is that which is sought in the unnatural vice.

Whether the unnatural vice is the greatest sin among the species of lust?

Objection 1: It would seem that the unnatural vice is not the greatest sin among the species of lust. For the more a sin is contrary to charity the graver it is. Now adultery, seduction and rape which are injurious to our neighbor are seemingly more contrary to the love of our neighbor, than unnatural sins, by which no other person is injured. Therefore the unnatural sin is not the greatest among the species of lust.

Objection 2: Further, sins committed against God would seem to be the most grievous. Now sacrilege is committed directly against God, since it is injurious to the Divine worship. Therefore sacrilege is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly, a sin is all the more grievous according as we owe a greater love to the person against whom that sin is committed. Now the order of charity requires that a man love more those persons who are united to him—and such are those whom he defiles by incest—than persons who are not connected with him, and whom in certain cases he defiles by the unnatural vice. Therefore incest is a graver sin than the unnatural vice.

Objection 4: Further, if the unnatural vice is most grievous, the more it is against nature the graver it would seem to be. Now the sin of uncleanness or effeminacy would seem to be most contrary to nature, since it would seem especially in accord with nature that agent and patient should be distinct from one another. Hence it would follow that uncleanness is the gravest of unnatural vices. But this is not true. Therefore unnatural vices are not the most grievous among sins of lust.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De adult. conjug. [*The quotation is from Cap. Adulterii xxxii, qu. 7. Cf. Augustine, De Bono Conjugali, viii.]) that "of all these," namely the sins belonging to lust, "that which is against nature is the worst."

I answer that, In every genus, worst of all is the corruption of the principle on which the rest depend. Now the principles of reason are those things that are according to nature, because reason presupposes things as determined by nature, before disposing of other things according as it is fitting. This may be observed both in speculative and in practical matters. Wherefore just as in speculative matters the most grievous and shameful error is that which is about things the knowledge of which is naturally bestowed on man, so in matters of action it is most grave and shameful to act against things as determined by nature. Therefore, since by the unnatural vices man transgresses that which has been determined by nature with regard to the use of venereal actions, it follows that in this matter this sin is gravest of all. After it comes incest, which, as stated above [3551](A[9]), is contrary to the natural respect which we owe persons related to us.

With regard to the other species of lust they imply a transgression merely of that which is determined by right reason, on the presupposition, however, of natural principles. Now it is more against reason to make use of the venereal act not only with prejudice to the future offspring, but also so as to injure another person besides. Wherefore simple fornication, which is committed without injustice to another person, is the least grave among the species of lust. Then, it is a greater injustice to have intercourse with a woman who is subject to another's authority as regards the act of generation, than as regards merely her guardianship. Wherefore adultery is more grievous than seduction. And both of these are aggravated by the use of violence. Hence rape of a virgin is graver than seduction, and rape of a wife than adultery. And all these are aggravated by coming under the head of sacrilege, as stated above (A[10], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the ordering of right reason proceeds from man, so the order of nature is from God Himself: wherefore in sins contrary to nature, whereby the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God, the Author of nature. Hence Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): “Those foul offenses that are against nature should be everywhere and at all times detested and punished, such as were those of the people of Sodom, which should all nations commit, they should all stand guilty of the same crime, by the law of God which hath not so made men that they should so abuse one another. For even that very intercourse which should be between God and us is violated, when that same nature, of which He is the Author, is polluted by the perversity of lust.”

Reply to Objection 2: Vices against nature are also against God, as stated above (ad 1), and are so much more grievous than the depravity of sacrilege, as the order impressed on human nature is prior to and more firm than any subsequently established order.

Reply to Objection 3: The nature of the species is more intimately united to each individual, than any other individual is. Wherefore sins against the specific nature are more grievous.

Reply to Objection 4: Gravity of a sin depends more on the abuse of a thing than on the omission of the right use. Wherefore among sins against nature, the lowest place belongs to the sin of uncleanness, which consists in the mere omission of copulation with another. While the most grievous is the sin of bestiality, because use of the due species is not observed. Hence a gloss on Gn. 37:2, “He accused his brethren of a most wicked crime,” says that “they copulated with cattle.” After this comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the “vas” than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.

OF CONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the potential parts of temperance: (1) continence; (2) clemency; (3) modesty. Under the first head we must consider continence and incontinence. With regard to continence there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether continence is a virtue?

(2) What is its matter?

(3) What is its subject?

(4) Of its comparison with temperance.

Whether continence is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is not a virtue. For species and genus are not co-ordinate members of the same division. But continence is co-ordinated with virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1,9). Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, no one sins by using a virtue, since, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18,19), “a virtue is a thing that no one makes ill use of.” Yet one may sin by containing oneself: for instance, if one desire to do a good, and contain oneself from doing it. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, no virtue withdraws man from that which is lawful, but only from unlawful things: for a gloss on Gal. 5:23, “Faith, modesty,” etc., says that by continence a man refrains even from things that are lawful. Therefore continence is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Every praiseworthy habit would seem to be a virtue. Now such is continence, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that “continence is a habit unconquered by pleasure.” Therefore continence is a virtue.

I answer that, The word “continence” is taken by various people in two ways. For some understand continence to denote abstention from all venereal pleasure: thus the Apostle joins continence to chastity (Gal. 5:23). In this sense perfect continence is virginity in the first place, and widowhood in the second. Wherefore the same applies to continence understood thus, as to virginity which we have stated above ([3552]Q[152], A[3]) to be a virtue. Others, however, understand continence as signifying that whereby a man resists evil desires, which in him are vehement. In this sense the Philosopher takes continence (Ethic. vii, 7), and thus also it is used in the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. xii, 10,11). In this way continence has something of the nature of a virtue, in so far, to wit, as the reason stands firm in opposition to the passions, lest it be led astray by them: yet it does not attain to the perfect nature of a moral virtue, by which even the sensitive appetite is subject to reason so that vehement passions contrary to reason do not arise in the sensitive appetite. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 9) that “continence is not a virtue but a mixture,” inasmuch as it has something of virtue, and somewhat falls short of virtue.

If, however, we take virtue in a broad sense, for any principle of commendable actions, we may say that continence is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher includes continence in the same division with virtue in so far as the former falls short of virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking, man is that which is according to reason. Wherefore from the very fact that a man holds [tenet se] to that which is in accord with reason, he is said to contain himself. Now whatever pertains to perversion of reason is not according to reason. Hence he alone is truly said to be continent who stands to that which is in accord with right reason, and not to that which is in accord with perverse reason. Now evil desires are opposed to right reason, even as good desires are opposed to perverse reason. Wherefore he is properly and truly continent who holds to right reason, by abstaining from evil desires, and not he who holds to perverse reason, by abstaining from good desires: indeed, the latter should rather be said to be obstinate in evil.

Reply to Objection 3: The gloss quoted takes continence in the first sense, as denoting a perfect virtue, which refrains not merely from unlawful goods, but also from certain lawful things that are lesser goods, in order to give its whole attention to the more perfect goods.

Whether desires for pleasures of touch are the matter of continence?

Objection 1: It would seem that desires for pleasures of touch are not the matter of continence. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 46): “General decorum by its consistent form and the perfection of what is virtuous is restrained* in its every action.” [*”Continentem” according to St. Thomas’ reading; St. Ambrose wrote “concinentem = harmonious”].

Objection 2: Further, continence takes its name from a man standing for the good of right reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Now other passions lead men astray from right reason with greater vehemence than the desire for pleasures of touch: for instance, the fear of mortal dangers, which stupefies a man, and anger which makes him behave like a madman, as Seneca remarks [*De Ira i, 1]. Therefore continence does not properly regard the desires for pleasures of touch.

Objection 3: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54): “It is continence that restrains cupidity with the guiding hand of counsel.” Now cupidity is generally used to denote the desire for riches rather than the desire for pleasures of touch, according to 1 Tim. 6:10, “Cupidity [Douay: ‘The desire of money’] ({philargyria}), is the root of all evils.” Therefore continence is not properly about the desires for pleasures of touch

Objection 4: Further, there are pleasures of touch not only in venereal matters but also in eating. But continence is wont to be applied only to the use of venereal matters. Therefore the desire for pleasures of touch is not its proper matter.

Objection 5: Further, among pleasures of touch some are not human but bestial, both as regards food—for instance, the pleasure of eating human flesh; and as regards venereal matters—for instance the abuse of animals or boys. But continence is not about such like things, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5. Therefore desires for pleasures of touch are not the proper matter of continence.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “continence and incontinence are about the same things as temperance and intemperance.” Now temperance and intemperance are about the desires for pleasures of touch, as stated above ([3553]Q[141], A[4]). Therefore continence and incontinence are also about that same matter.

I answer that, Continence denotes, by its very name, a certain curbing, in so far as a man contains himself from following his passions. Hence continence is properly said in reference to those passions which urge a man towards the pursuit of something, wherein it is praiseworthy that reason should withhold man from pursuing: whereas it is not properly about those passions, such as fear and the like, which denote some kind of withdrawal:

since in these it is praiseworthy to remain firm in pursuing what reason dictates, as stated above (Q[123], AA[3],4). Now it is to be observed that natural inclinations are the principles of all supervening inclinations, as stated above ([3554]FP, Q[60], A[2]). Wherefore the more they follow the inclination of nature, the more strongly do the passions urge to the pursuance of an object. Now nature inclines chiefly to those things that are necessary to it, whether for the maintenance of the individual, such as food, or for the maintenance of the species, such as venereal acts, the pleasures of which pertain to the touch. Therefore continence and incontinence refer properly to desires for pleasures of touch.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as temperance may be used in a general sense in connection with any matter; but is properly applied to that matter wherein it is best for man to be curbed: so, too, continence properly speaking regards that matter wherein it is best and most difficult to contain oneself, namely desires for pleasures of touch, and yet in a general sense and relatively may be applied to any other matter: and in this sense Ambrose speaks of continence.

Reply to Objection 2: Properly speaking we do not speak of continence in relation to fear, but rather of firmness of mind which fortitude implies. As to anger, it is true that it begets an impulse to the pursuit of something, but this impulse follows an apprehension of the soul—in so far as a man apprehends that someone has injured him—rather than an inclination of nature. Wherefore a man may be said to be continent of anger, relatively but not simply.

Reply to Objection 3: External goods, such as honors, riches and the like, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4), seem to be objects of choice in themselves indeed, but not as being necessary for the maintenance of nature. Wherefore in reference to such things we speak of a person as being continent or incontinent, not simply, but relatively, by adding that they are continent or incontinent in regard to wealth, or honor and so forth. Hence Tully either understood continence in a general sense, as including relative continence, or understood cupidity in a restricted sense as denoting desire for pleasures of touch.

Reply to Objection 4: Venereal pleasures are more vehement than pleasures of the palate: wherefore we are wont to speak of continence and incontinence in reference to venereal matters rather than in reference to food; although according to the Philosopher they are applicable to both.

Reply to Objection 5: Continence is a good of the human reason: wherefore it regards those passions which can be connatural to man. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that “if a man were to lay hold of a child with desire of eating him or of satisfying an unnatural passion whether he follow up his desire or not, he is said to be continent [*See A[4]], not absolutely, but relatively.”

Whether the subject of continence is the concupiscible power?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of continence is the concupiscible power. For the subject of a virtue should be proportionate to the virtue’s matter. Now the matter of continence, as stated [3555](A[2]), is desires for the pleasures of touch, which pertain to the concupiscible power. Therefore continence is in the concupiscible power.

Objection 2: Further, “Opposites are referred to one same thing” [*Categ. viii]. But incontinence is in the concupiscible, whose passions overcome reason, for Andronicus says [*De Affectibus] that “incontinence is the evil inclination of the concupiscible, by following which it chooses wicked pleasures in disobedience to reason.” Therefore continence is likewise in the concupiscible.

Objection 3: Further, the subject of a human virtue is either the reason, or the appetitive power, which is divided into the will, the concupiscible and the irascible. Now continence is not in the reason, for then it would be an intellectual virtue; nor is it in the will, since continence is about the passions which are not in the will; nor again is it in the irascible, because it is not properly about the passions of the irascible, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore it follows that it is in the concupiscible.

On the contrary, Every virtue residing in a certain power removes the evil act of that power. But continence does not remove the evil act of the concupiscible: since “the continent man has evil desires,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9). Therefore continence is not in the concupiscible power.

I answer that, Every virtue while residing in a subject, makes that subject have a different disposition from that which it has while subjected to the opposite vice. Now the concupiscible has the same disposition in one who is continent and in one who is incontinent, since in both of them it breaks out into vehement evil desires. Wherefore it is manifest that continence is not in the concupiscible as its subject. Again the reason has the same disposition in both, since both the continent and the incontinent have right reason, and each of them, while undisturbed by passion, purposes not to follow his unlawful desires. Now the primary difference between them is to be found in their choice: since the continent man, though subject to vehement desires, chooses not to follow them, because of his reason; whereas the incontinent man chooses to follow them, although his reason forbids. Hence continence must needs reside in that power of the soul, whose act it is to choose; and that is the will, as stated above ([3556]FS, Q[13], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Continence has for its matter the desires for pleasures of touch, not as moderating them (this belongs to temperance which is in the concupiscible), but its business with them is to resist them. For this reason it must be in another power, since resistance is of one thing against another.

Reply to Objection 2: The will stands between reason and the concupiscible, and may be moved by either. In the continent man it is moved by the reason, in the incontinent man it is moved by the concupiscible. Hence continence may be ascribed to the reason as to its first mover, and incontinence to the concupiscible power: though both belong immediately to the will as their proper subject.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the passions are not in the will as their subject, yet it is in the power of the will to resist them: thus it is that the will of the continent man resists desires.

Whether continence is better than temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that continence is better than temperance. For it is written (Ecclus. 26:20): “No price is worthy of a continent soul.” Therefore no virtue can be equalled to continence.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the reward a virtue merits, the greater the virtue. Now continence apparently merits the greater reward; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:5): “He . . . is not crowned, except he strive lawfully,” and the continent man, since he is subject to vehement evil desires, strives more than the temperate man, in whom these things are not vehement. Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

Objection 3: Further, the will is a more excellent power than the concupiscible. But continence is in the will, whereas temperance is in the concupiscible, as stated above [3557](A[3]). Therefore continence is a greater virtue than temperance.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) and Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckon continence to be annexed to temperance, as to a principal virtue.

I answer that, As stated above [3558](A[1]), continence has a twofold signification. In one way it denotes cessation from all venereal pleasures; and if continence be taken in this sense, it is greater than temperance considered absolutely, as may be gathered from what we said above (Q[152], A[5]) concerning the preeminence of virginity over chastity considered absolutely. In another way continence may be taken as denoting the resistance of the reason to evil desires when they are vehement in a man: and in this sense temperance is far greater than continence, because the good of a virtue derives its praise from that which is in accord with reason. Now the good of reason flourishes more in the temperate man than in the continent man, because in the former even the sensitive appetite is obedient to reason, being tamed by reason so to speak, whereas in the continent man the sensitive appetite strongly resists reason by its evil desires. Hence continence is compared to temperance, as the imperfect to the perfect.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted may be understood in two ways. First in reference to the sense in which continence denotes abstinence from all things venereal: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a continent soul,” in the genus of chastity the fruitfulness of the flesh is the purpose of marriage is equalled to the continence of virginity or of widowhood, as stated above ([3559]Q[152], AA[4],5). Secondly it may be understood in reference to the general sense in which continence denotes any abstinence from things unlawful: and thus it means that “no price is worthy of a continent soul,” because its value is not measured with gold or silver, which are appreciable according to weight.

Reply to Objection 2: The strength or weakness of concupiscence may proceed from two causes. For sometimes it is owing to a bodily cause: because some people by their natural temperament are more prone to concupiscence than others; and again opportunities for pleasure which inflame the concupiscence are nearer to hand for some people than for others. Such like weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, whereas strength of concupiscence increases it. on the other hand, weakness or strength of concupiscence arises from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for instance the vehemence of charity, or the strength of reason, as in the case of a temperate man. In this way weakness of concupiscence, by reason of its cause, increases merit, whereas strength of concupiscence diminishes it.

Reply to Objection 3: The will is more akin to the reason than the concupiscible power is. Wherefore the good of reason—on account of which virtue is praised by the very fact that it reaches not only to the will but also to the concupiscible power, as happens in the temperate man—is shown to be greater than if it reach only to the will, as in the case of one who is continent.

OF INCONTINENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider incontinence: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

(2) Whether incontinence is a sin?

(3) The comparison between incontinence and intemperance;

(4) Which is the worse, incontinence in anger, or incontinence in desire?

Whether incontinence pertains to the soul or to the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body. For sexual diversity comes not from the soul but from the body. Now sexual diversity causes diversity of incontinence: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5) that women are not described either as continent or as incontinent. Therefore incontinence pertains not to the soul but to the body.

Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to the soul does not result from the temperament of the body. But incontinence results from the bodily temperament: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “it is especially people of a quick or choleric and atrabilious temper whose incontinence is one of unbridled desire.” Therefore incontinence regards the body.

Objection 3: Further, victory concerns the victor rather than the vanquished. Now a man is said to be incontinent, because “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” and overcomes it. Therefore incontinence pertains to the flesh rather than to the soul.

On the contrary, Man differs from beast chiefly as regards the soul. Now they differ in respect of continence and incontinence, for we ascribe neither continence nor incontinence to the beasts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore incontinence is chiefly on the part of the soul.

I answer that, Things are ascribed to their direct causes rather than to those which merely occasion them. Now that which is on the part of the body is merely an occasional cause of incontinence; since it is owing to a bodily disposition that vehement passions can arise in the sensitive appetite which is a power of the organic body. Yet these passions, however vehement they be, are not the sufficient cause of incontinence, but are merely the occasion thereof, since, so long as the use of reason remains, man is always able to resist his passions. If, however, the passions gain such strength as to take away the use of reason altogether—as in the case of those who become insane through the vehemence of their passions—the essential conditions of continence or incontinence cease, because such people do not retain the judgment of reason, which the continent man follows and the incontinent forsakes. From this it follows that the direct cause of incontinence is on the part of the soul, which fails to resist a passion by the reason. This happens in two ways, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7): first, when the soul yields to the passions, before the reason has given its counsel; and this is called “unbridled incontinence” or “impetuosity”: secondly, when a man does not stand to what has been counselled, through holding weakly to reason’s judgment; wherefore this kind of incontinence is called “weakness.” Hence it is manifest that incontinence pertains chiefly to the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: The human soul is the form of the body, and has certain powers which make use of bodily organs. The operations of these organs conduce somewhat to those operations of the soul which are accomplished without bodily instruments, namely to the acts of the intellect and of the will, in so far as the intellect receives from the senses, and the will is urged by passions of the sensitive appetite. Accordingly, since woman, as regards the body, has a weak temperament, the result is that for the most part, whatever she holds to, she holds to it weakly; although in /rare cases the opposite occurs, according to Prov. 31:10, “Who shall find a valiant woman?” And since small and weak things “are accounted as though they were not” [*Aristotle, Phys. ii, 5] the Philosopher speaks of women as though they had not the firm judgment of reason, although the contrary happens in some women. Hence he states that “we do not describe women as being continent, because they are vacillating” through being unstable of reason, and “are easily led” so that they follow their passions readily.

Reply to Objection 2: It is owing to the impulse of passion that a man at once follows his passion before his reason counsels him. Now the impulse of passion may arise either from its quickness, as in bilious persons [*Cf. [3560]FS, Q[46], A[5]], or from its vehemence, as in the melancholic, who on account of their earthy temperament are most vehemently aroused. Even so, on the other hand, a man fails to stand to that which is counselled, because he holds to it in weakly fashion by reason of the softness of his temperament, as we have stated with regard to woman (ad 1). This is also the case with phlegmatic temperaments, for the same reason as in women. And these results are due to the fact that the bodily temperament is an occasional but not a sufficient cause of incontinence, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: In the incontinent man concupiscence of the flesh overcomes the spirit, not necessarily, but through a certain negligence of the spirit in not resisting strongly.

Whether incontinence is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that incontinence is not a sin. For as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): “No man sins in what he cannot avoid.” Now no man can by himself avoid incontinence, according to Wis. 8:21, “I know [Vulg.: ‘knew’] that I could not . . . be continent, except God gave it.” Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, apparently every sin originates in the reason. But the judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man. Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, no one sins in loving God vehemently. Now a man becomes incontinent through the vehemence of divine love: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “Paul, through incontinence of divine love, exclaimed: I live, now not I” (Gal. 2:20). Therefore incontinence is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is numbered together with other sins (2 Tim. 3:3) where it is written: “Slanderers, incontinent, unmerciful,” etc. Therefore incontinence is a sin.

I answer that, Incontinence about a matter may be considered in two ways. First it may be considered properly and simply: and thus incontinence is about concupiscences of pleasures of touch, even as intemperance is, as we have said in reference to continence ([3561]Q[155], A[2]). In this way incontinence is a sin for two reasons: first, because the incontinent man goes astray from that which is in accord with reason; secondly, because he plunges into shameful pleasures. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “incontinence is censurable not only because it is wrong”—that is, by straying from reason—“but also because it is wicked”—that is, by following evil desires. Secondly, incontinence about a matter is considered, properly—inasmuch as it is a straying from reason—but not simply; for instance when a man does not observe the mode of reason in his desire for honor, riches, and so forth, which seem to be good in themselves. About such things there is incontinence, not simply but relatively, even as we have said above in reference to continence ([3562]Q[155], A[2], ad 3). In this way incontinence is a sin, not from the fact that one gives way to wicked desires, but because one fails to observe the mode of reason even in the desire for things that are of themselves desirable.

Thirdly, incontinence is said to be about a matter, not properly, but metaphorically. for instance about the desires for things of which one cannot make an evil use, such as the desire for virtue. A man may be said to be incontinent in these matters metaphorically, because just as the incontinent man is entirely led by his evil desire, even so is a man entirely led by his good desire which is in accord with reason. Such like incontinence is no sin, but pertains to the perfection of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Man can avoid sin and do good, yet not without God’s help, according to Jn. 15:5: “Without Me you can do nothing.” Wherefore the fact that man needs God’s help in order to be continent, does not show incontinence to be no sin, for, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, “what we can do by means of a friend we do, in a way, ourselves.”

Reply to Objection 2: The judgment of reason is overcome in the incontinent man, not necessarily, for then he would commit no sin, but through a certain negligence on account of his not standing firm in resisting the passion by holding to the judgment formed by his reason.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument takes incontinence metaphorically and not properly.

Whether the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate?

Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate. For, seemingly, the more a man acts against his conscience, the more gravely he sins, according to Lk. 12:47, “That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.” Now the incontinent man would seem to act against his conscience more than the intemperate because, according to Ethic. vii, 3, the incontinent man, though knowing how wicked are the things he desires, nevertheless acts through passion, whereas the intemperate man judges what he desires to be good. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Objection 2: Further, apparently, the graver a sin is, the more incurable it is: wherefore the sins against the Holy Ghost, being most grave, are declared to be unpardonable. Now the sin of incontinence would appear to be more incurable than the sin of intemperance. For a person’s sin is cured by admonishment and correction, which seemingly are no good to the incontinent man, since he knows he is doing wrong, and does wrong notwithstanding: whereas it seems to the intemperate man that he is doing well, so that it were good for him to be admonished. Therefore it would appear that the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

Objection 3: Further, the more eagerly man sins, the more grievous his sin. Now the incontinent sins more eagerly than the intemperate, since the incontinent man has vehement passions and desires, which the intemperate man does not always have. Therefore the incontinent man sins more gravely than the intemperate.

On the contrary, Impenitence aggravates every sin: wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. serm. xi, 12,13) that “impenitence is a sin against the Holy Ghost.” Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) “the intemperate man is not inclined to be penitent, for he holds on to his choice: but every incontinent man is inclined to repentance.” Therefore the intemperate man sins more gravely than the incontinent.

I answer that, According to Augustine [*De Duab. Anim. x, xi] sin is chiefly an act of the will, because “by the will we sin and live aright” [*Retract. i, 9]. Consequently where there is a greater inclination of the will to sin, there is a graver sin. Now in the intemperate man, the will is inclined to sin in virtue of its own choice, which proceeds from a habit acquired through custom: whereas in the incontinent man, the will is inclined to sin through a passion. And since passion soon passes, whereas a habit is “a disposition difficult to remove,” the result is that the incontinent man repents at once, as soon as the passion has passed; but not so the intemperate man; in fact he rejoices in having sinned, because the sinful act has become connatural to him by reason of his habit. Wherefore in reference to such persons it is written (Prov. 2:14) that “they are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.” Hence it follows that “the intemperate man is much worse than the incontinent,” as also the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 7).

Reply to Objection 1: Ignorance in the intellect sometimes precedes the inclination of the appetite and causes it, and then the greater the ignorance, the more does it diminish or entirely excuse the sin, in so far as it renders it involuntary. On the other hand, ignorance in the reason sometimes follows the inclination of the appetite, and then such like ignorance, the greater it is, the graver the sin, because the inclination of the appetite is shown thereby to be greater. Now in both the incontinent and the intemperate man, ignorance arises from the appetite being inclined to something, either by passion, as in the incontinent, or by habit, as in the intemperate. Nevertheless greater ignorance results thus in the intemperate than in the incontinent. In one respect as regards duration, since in the incontinent man this ignorance lasts only while the passion endures, just as an attack of intermittent fever lasts as long as the humor is disturbed: whereas the ignorance of the intemperate man endures without ceasing, on account of the endurance of the habit, wherefore it is likened to phthisis or any chronic disease, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 8). In another respect the ignorance of the intemperate man is greater as regards the thing ignored. For the ignorance of the incontinent man regards some particular detail of choice (in so far as he deems that he must choose this particular thing now): whereas the intemperate man’s ignorance is about the end itself, inasmuch as he judges this thing good, in order that he may follow his desires without being curbed. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7,8) that “the incontinent man is better than the intemperate, because he retains the best principle [*{To beltiston, e arche}, ‘the best thing, i.e. the principle’],” to wit, the right estimate of the end.

Reply to Objection 2: Mere knowledge does not suffice to cure the incontinent man, for he needs the inward assistance of grace which quenches concupiscence, besides the application of the external remedy of admonishment and correction, which induce him to begin to resist his desires, so that concupiscence is weakened, as stated above ([3563]Q[142], A[2]). By these same means the intemperate man can be cured. But his curing is more difficult, for two reasons. The first is on the part of reason, which is corrupt as regards the estimate of the last end, which holds the same position as the principle in demonstrations. Now it is more difficult to bring back to the truth one who errs as to the principle; and it is the same in practical matters with one who errs in regard to the end. The other reason is on the part of the inclination of the appetite: for in the intemperate man this proceeds from a habit, which is difficult to remove, whereas the inclination of the incontinent man proceeds from a passion, which is more easily suppressed.

Reply to Objection 3: The eagerness of the will, which increases a sin, is greater in the intemperate man than in the incontinent, as explained above. But the eagerness of concupiscence in the sensitive appetite is sometimes greater in the incontinent man, because he does not sin except through vehement concupiscence, whereas the intemperate man sins even through slight concupiscence and sometimes forestalls it. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that we blame more the intemperate man, “because he pursues pleasure without desiring it or with calm,” i.e. slight desire. “For what would he have done if he had desired it with passion?”

Whether the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire?

Objection 1: It would seem that the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire. For the more difficult it is to resist the passion, the less grievous, apparently is incontinence: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7): “It is not wonderful, indeed it is pardonable if a person is overcome by strong and overwhelming pleasures or pains.” Now, “as Heraclitus says, it is more difficult to resist desire than anger” [*Ethic. ii. 3]. Therefore incontinence of desire is less grievous than incontinence of anger.

Objection 2: Further, one is altogether excused from sin if the passion be so vehement as to deprive one of the judgment of reason, as in the case of one who becomes demented through passion. Now he that is incontinent in anger retains more of the judgment of reason, than one who is incontinent in desire: since “anger listens to reason somewhat, but desire does not” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 6). Therefore the incontinent in anger is worse than the incontinent in desire.

Objection 3: Further, the more dangerous a sin the more grievous it is. Now incontinence of anger would seem to be more dangerous, since it leads a man to a greater sin, namely murder, for this is a more grievous sin than adultery, to which incontinence of desire leads. Therefore incontinence of anger is graver than incontinence of desire.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “incontinence of anger is less disgraceful than incontinence of desire.”

I answer that, The sin of incontinence may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the passion which occasions the downfall of reason. In this way incontinence of desire is worse than incontinence of anger, because the movement of desire is more inordinate than the movement of anger. There are four reasons for this, and the Philosopher indicates them, Ethic. vii, 6: First, because the movement of anger partakes somewhat of reason, since the angry man tends to avenge the injury done to him, and reason dictates this in a certain degree. Yet he does not tend thereto perfectly, because he does not intend the due mode of vengeance. on the other hand, the movement of desire is altogether in accord with sense and nowise in accord with reason. Secondly, because the movement of anger results more from the bodily temperament owing to the quickness of the movement of the bile which tends to anger. Hence one who by bodily temperament is disposed to anger is more readily angry than one who is disposed to concupiscence is liable to be concupiscent: wherefore also it happens more often that the children of those who are disposed to anger are themselves disposed to anger, than that the children of those who are disposed to concupiscence are also disposed to concupiscence. Now that which results from the natural disposition of the body is deemed more deserving of pardon. Thirdly, because anger seeks to work openly, whereas concupiscence is fain to disguise itself and creeps in by stealth. Fourthly, because he who is subject to concupiscence works with pleasure, whereas the angry man works as though forced by a certain previous displeasure.

Secondly, the sin of incontinence may be considered with regard to the evil into which one falls through forsaking reason; and thus incontinence of anger is, for the most part, more grievous, because it leads to things that are harmful to one’s neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: It is more difficult to resist pleasure perseveringly than anger, because concupiscence is enduring. But for the moment it is more difficult to resist anger, on account of its impetuousness.

Reply to Objection 2: Concupiscence is stated to be without reason, not as though it destroyed altogether the judgment of reason, but because nowise does it follow the judgment of reason: and for this reason it is more disgraceful.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers incontinence with regard to its result.

OF CLEMENCY AND MEEKNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider clemency and meekness, and the contrary vices. Concerning the virtues themselves there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether clemency and meekness are altogether identical?

(2) Whether each of them is a virtue?

(3) Whether each is a part of temperance?

(4) Of their comparison with the other virtues.

Whether clemency and meekness are absolutely the same?

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are absolutely the same. For meekness moderates anger, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5). Now anger is “desire of vengeance” [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2]. Since, then, clemency “is leniency of a superior in inflicting punishment on an inferior,” as Seneca states (De Clementia ii, 3), and vengeance is taken by means of punishment, it would seem that clemency and meekness are the same.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) that “clemency is a virtue whereby the mind is restrained by kindness when unreasonably provoked to hatred of a person,” so that apparently clemency moderates hatred. Now, according to Augustine [*Ep. ccxi], hatred is caused by anger; and this is the matter of meekness and clemency. Therefore seemingly clemency and meekness are absolutely the same.

Objection 3: Further, the same vice is not opposed to different virtues. But the same vice, namely cruelty, is opposed to meekness and clemency. Therefore it seems that meekness and clemency are absolutely the same.

On the contrary, According to the aforesaid definition of Seneca (OBJ[1]) “clemency is leniency of a superior towards an inferior”: whereas meekness is not merely of superior to inferior, but of each to everyone. Therefore meekness and clemency are not absolutely the same.

I answer that, As stated in Ethic. ii, 3, a moral virtue is “about passions and actions.” Now internal passions are principles of external actions, and are likewise obstacles thereto. Wherefore virtues that moderate passions, to a certain extent, concur towards the same effect as virtues that moderate actions, although they differ specifically. Thus it belongs properly to justice to restrain man from theft, whereunto he is inclined by immoderate love or desire of money, which is restrained by liberality; so that liberality concurs with justice towards the effect, which is abstention from theft. This applies to the case in point; because through the passion of anger a man is provoked to inflict a too severe punishment, while it belongs directly to clemency to mitigate punishment, and this might be prevented by excessive anger.

Consequently meekness, in so far as it restrains the onslaught of anger, concurs with clemency towards the same effect; yet they differ from one another, inasmuch as clemency moderates external punishment, while meekness properly mitigates the passion of anger.

Reply to Objection 1: Meekness regards properly the desire itself of vengeance; whereas clemency regards the punishment itself which is applied externally for the purpose of vengeance.

Reply to Objection 2: Man’s affections incline to the moderation of things that are unpleasant to him in themselves. Now it results from one man loving another that he takes no pleasure in the latter’s punishment in itself, but only as directed to something else, for instance justice, or the correction of the person punished. Hence love makes one quick to mitigate punishment—and this pertains to clemency—while hatred is an obstacle to such mitigation. For this reason Tully says that “the mind provoked to hatred” that is to punish too severely, “is restrained by clemency,” from inflicting too severe a punishment, so that clemency directly moderates not hatred but punishment.

Reply to Objection 3: The vice of anger, which denotes excess in the passion of anger, is properly opposed to meekness, which is directly concerned with the passion of anger; while cruelty denotes excess in punishing. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “those are called cruel who have reason for punishing, but lack moderation in punishing.” Those who delight in a man’s punishment for its own sake may be called savage or brutal, as though lacking the human feeling that leads one man to love another.

Whether both clemency and meekness are virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue. For no virtue is opposed to another virtue. Yet both of these are apparently opposed to severity, which is a virtue. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, “Virtue is destroyed by excess and defect” [*Ethic. ii, 2]. But both clemency and meekness consist in a certain decrease; for clemency decreases punishment, and meekness decreases anger. Therefore neither clemency nor meekness is a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, meekness or mildness is included (Mat. 5:4) among the beatitudes, and (Gal. 5:23) among the fruits. Now the virtues differ from the beatitudes and fruits. Therefore they are not comprised under virtue.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 5): “Every good man is conspicuous for his clemency and meekness.” Now it is virtue properly that belongs to a good man, since “virtue it is that makes its possessor good, and renders his works good also” (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore clemency and meekness are virtues.

I answer that, The nature of moral virtue consists in the subjection of appetite to reason, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 13). Now this is verified both in clemency and in meekness. For clemency, in mitigating punishment, “is guided by reason,” according to Seneca (De Clementia ii, 5), and meekness, likewise, moderates anger according to right reason, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Wherefore it is manifest that both clemency and meekness are virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Meekness is not directly opposed to severity; for meekness is about anger. On the other hand, severity regards the external infliction of punishment, so that accordingly it would seem rather to be opposed to clemency, which also regards external punishing, as stated above [3564](A[1]). Yet they are not really opposed to one another, since they are both according to right reason. For severity is inflexible in the infliction of punishment when right reason requires it; while clemency mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite. Wherefore they are not opposed to one another as they are not about the same thing.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5), “the habit that observes the mean in anger is unnamed; so that the virtue is denominated from the diminution of anger, and is designated by the name of meekness.” For the virtue is more akin to diminution than to excess, because it is more natural to man to desire vengeance for injuries done to him, than to be lacking in that desire, since “scarcely anyone belittles an injury done to himself,” as Sallust observes [*Cf. Q[120]]. As to clemency, it mitigates punishment, not in respect of that which is according to right reason, but as regards that which is according to common law, which is the object of legal justice: yet on account of some particular consideration, it mitigates the punishment, deciding, as it were, that a man is not to be punished any further. Hence Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 1): “Clemency grants this, in the first place, that those whom she sets free are declared immune from all further punishment; and remission of punishment due amounts to a pardon.” Wherefore it is clear that clemency is related to severity as equity [the Greek ‘epieikeia’ [*Cf. Q[120]]] to legal justice, whereof severity is a part, as regards the infliction of punishment in accordance with the law. Yet clemency differs from equity, as we shall state further on (A[3], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: The beatitudes are acts of virtue: while the fruits are delights in virtuous acts. Wherefore nothing hinders meekness being reckoned both virtue, and beatitude and fruit.

Whether the aforesaid virtues are parts of temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid virtues are not parts of temperance. For clemency mitigates punishment, as stated above [3565] (A[2]). But the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 10) ascribes this to equity, which pertains to justice, as stated above (Q[120], A[2]). Therefore seemingly clemency is not a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, temperance is concerned with concupiscences; whereas meekness and clemency regard, not concupiscences, but anger and vengeance. Therefore they should not be reckoned parts of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4): “A man may be said to be of unsound mind when he takes pleasure in cruelty.” Now this is opposed to clemency and meekness. Since then an unsound mind is opposed to prudence, it seems that clemency and meekness are parts of prudence rather than of temperance.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “clemency is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.” Tully also (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons clemency a part of temperance.

I answer that, Parts are assigned to the principal virtues, in so far as they imitate them in some secondary matter as to the mode whence the virtue derives its praise and likewise its name. Thus the mode and name of justice consist in a certain “equality,” those of fortitude in a certain “strength of mind,” those of temperance in a certain “restraint,” inasmuch as it restrains the most vehement concupiscences of the pleasures of touch. Now clemency and meekness likewise consist in a certain restraint, since clemency mitigates punishment, while meekness represses anger, as stated above ([3566]AA[1],2). Therefore both clemency and meekness are annexed to temperance as principal virtue, and accordingly are reckoned to be parts thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Two points must be considered in the mitigation of punishment. one is that punishment should be mitigated in accordance with the lawgiver’s intention, although not according to the letter of the law; and in this respect it pertains to equity. The other point is a certain moderation of a man’s inward disposition, so that he does not exercise his power of inflicting punishment. This belongs properly to clemency, wherefore

Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “it is temperance of the soul in exercising the power of taking revenge.” This moderation of soul comes from a certain sweetness of disposition, whereby a man recoils from anything that may be painful to another. Wherefore Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 3) that “clemency is a certain smoothness of the soul”; for, on the other hand, there would seem to be a certain roughness of soul in one who fears not to pain others.

Reply to Objection 2: The annexation of secondary to principal virtues depends on the mode of virtue, which is, so to speak, a kind of form of the virtue, rather than on the matter. Now meekness and clemency agree with temperance in mode, as stated above, though they agree not in matter.

Reply to Objection 3: “Unsoundness” is corruption of “soundness.” Now just as soundness of body is corrupted by the body lapsing from the condition due to the human species, so unsoundness of mind is due to the mind lapsing from the disposition due to the human species. This occurs both in respect of the reason, as when a man loses the use of reason, and in respect of the appetitive power, as when a man loses that humane feeling whereby “every man is naturally friendly towards all other men” (Ethic. viii, 1). The unsoundness of mind that excludes the use of reason is opposed to prudence. But that a man who takes pleasure in the punishment of others is said to be of unsound mind, is because he seems on this account to be devoid of the humane feeling which gives rise to clemency.

Whether clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that clemency and meekness are the greatest virtues. For virtue is deserving of praise chiefly because it directs man to happiness that consists in the knowledge of God. Now meekness above all directs man to the knowledge of God: for it is written (James 1:21): “With meekness receive the ingrafted word,” and (Ecclus. 5:13): “Be meek to hear the word” of God. Again, Dionysius says (Ep. viii ad Demophil.) that “Moses was deemed worthy of the Divine apparition on account of his great meekness.” Therefore meekness is the greatest of virtues.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly a virtue is all the greater according as it is more acceptable to God and men. Now meekness would appear to be most acceptable to God. For it is written (Ecclus. 1:34,35): “That which is agreeable” to God is “faith and meekness”; wherefore Christ expressly invites us to be meek like unto Himself (Mat. 11:29), where He says: “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart”; and Hilary declares [*Comment. in Matth. iv, 3] that “Christ dwells in us by our meekness of soul.” Again, it is most acceptable to men; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:19): “My son, do thy works in meekness, and thou shalt be beloved above the glory of men”: for which reason it is also declared (Prov. 20:28) that the King’s “throne is strengthened by clemency.” Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest of virtues.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 2) that “the meek are they who yield to reproaches, and resist not evil, but overcome evil by good.” Now this seems to pertain to mercy or piety which would seem to be the greatest of virtues: because a gloss of Ambrose [*Hilary the deacon] on 1 Tim. 4:8, “Piety [Douay: ‘Godliness’] is profitable to all things,” observes that “piety is the sum total of the Christian religion.” Therefore meekness and clemency are the greatest virtues.

On the contrary, They are not reckoned as principal virtues, but are annexed to another, as to a principal, virtue.

I answer that, Nothing prevents certain virtues from being greatest, not indeed simply, nor in every respect, but in a particular genus. It is impossible for clemency or meekness to be absolutely the greatest virtues, since they owe their praise to the fact that they withdraw a man from evil, by mitigating anger or punishment. Now it is more perfect to obtain good than to lack evil. Wherefore those virtues like faith, hope, charity, and likewise prudence and justice, which direct one to good simply, are absolutely greater virtues than clemency and meekness.

Yet nothing prevents clemency and meekness from having a certain restricted excellence among the virtues which resist evil inclinations. For anger, which is mitigated by meekness, is, on account of its impetuousness, a very great obstacle to man’s free judgment of truth: wherefore meekness above all makes a man self-possessed. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 10:31): “My son, keep thy soul in meekness.” Yet the concupiscences of the pleasures of touch are more shameful, and harass more incessantly, for which reason temperance is more rightly reckoned as a principal virtue. as stated above ([3567]Q[141], A[7], ad 2). As to clemency, inasmuch as it mitigates punishment, it would seem to approach nearest to charity, the greatest of the virtues, since thereby we do good towards our neighbor, and hinder his evil.

Reply to Objection 1: Meekness disposes man to the knowledge of God, by removing an obstacle; and this in two ways. First, because it makes man self-possessed by mitigating his anger, as stated above; secondly, because it pertains to meekness that a man does not contradict the words of truth, which many do through being disturbed by anger. Wherefore Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7): “To be meek is not to contradict Holy Writ, whether we understand it, if it condemn our evil ways, or understand it not, as though we might know better and have a clearer insight of the truth.”

Reply to Objection 2: Meekness and clemency make us acceptable to God and men, in so far as they concur with charity, the greatest of the virtues, towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils.

Reply to Objection 3: Mercy and piety agree indeed with meekness and clemency by concurring towards the same effect, namely the mitigation of our neighbor’s evils. Nevertheless they differ as to motive. For piety relieves a neighbor’s evil through reverence for a superior, for instance God or one’s parents: mercy relieves a neighbor’s evil, because this evil is displeasing to one, in so far as one looks upon it as affecting oneself, as stated above ([3568]Q[30], A[2]): and this results from friendship which makes friends rejoice and grieve for the same things: meekness does this, by removing anger that urges to vengeance, and clemency does this through leniency of soul, in so far as it judges equitable that a person be no further punished.

OF ANGER (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must next consider the contrary vices: (1) Anger that is opposed to meekness; (2) Cruelty that is opposed to clemency. Concerning anger there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful to be angry?

(2) Whether anger is a sin?

(3) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is the most grievous of sins?

(5) Of its species;

(6) Whether anger is a capital vice?

(7) Of its daughters;

(8) Whether it has a contrary vice?

Whether it is lawful to be angry?

Objection 1: It would seem that it cannot be lawful to be angry. For Jerome in his exposition on Mat. 5:22, “Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc. says: “Some codices add ‘without cause.’ However, in the genuine codices the sentence is unqualified, and anger is forbidden altogether.” Therefore it is nowise lawful to be angry.

Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) “The soul’s evil is to be without reason.” Now anger is always without reason: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that “anger does not listen perfectly to reason”; and Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “when anger sunders the tranquil surface of the soul, it mangles and rends it by its riot”; and Cassian says (De Inst. Caenob. viii, 6): “From whatever cause it arises, the angry passion boils over and blinds the eye of the mind.” Therefore it is always evil to be angry.

Objection 3: Further, anger is “desire for vengeance” [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 2] according to a gloss on Lev. 19:17, “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.” Now it would seem unlawful to desire vengeance, since this should be left to God, according to Dt. 32:35, “Revenge is Mine.” Therefore it would seem that to be angry is always an evil.

Objection 4: Further, all that makes us depart from likeness to God is evil. Now anger always makes us depart from likeness to God, since God judges with tranquillity according to Wis. 12:18. Therefore to be angry is always an evil.

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “He that is angry without cause, shall be in danger; but he that is angry with cause, shall not be in danger:

for without anger, teaching will be useless, judgments unstable, crimes unchecked." Therefore to be angry is not always an evil.

I answer that, Properly speaking anger is a passion of the sensitive appetite, and gives its name to the irascible power, as stated above ([3569]FS, Q[46], A[1]) when we were treating of the passions. Now with regard to the passions of the soul, it is to be observed that evil may be found in them in two ways. First by reason of the passion's very species, which is derived from the passion's object. Thus envy, in respect of its species, denotes an evil, since it is displeasure at another's good, and such displeasure is in itself contrary to reason: wherefore, as the Philosopher remarks (Ethic. ii, 6), "the very mention of envy denotes something evil." Now this does not apply to anger, which is the desire for revenge, since revenge may be desired both well and ill. Secondly, evil is found in a passion in respect of the passion's quantity, that is in respect of its excess or deficiency; and thus evil may be found in anger, when, to wit, one is angry, more or less than right reason demands. But if one is angry in accordance with right reason, one's anger is deserving of praise.

Reply to Objection 1: The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason; and accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil, as stated above ([3570]FS, Q[24], A[2]) when we were treating of the passions. It is in this sense that Jerome considers anger; for he speaks of the anger whereby one is angry with one's neighbor, with the intent of doing him a wrong.—But, according to the Peripatetics, to whose opinion Augustine inclines (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), anger and the other passions of the soul are movements of the sensitive appetite, whether they be moderated or not, according to reason: and in this sense anger is not always evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently; in this way it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently, inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in accordance with reason, this anger is good, and is called "zealous anger." Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): "We must beware lest, when we use anger as an instrument of virtue, it overrule the mind, and go before it as its mistress, instead of following in reason's train, ever ready, as its handmaid, to obey." This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason. Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “zealous anger troubles the eye of reason, whereas sinful anger blinds it.” Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated: since art also would be hindered in its act, if it were to deliberate about what has to be done, while having to act.

Reply to Objection 3: It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice; and to this the sensitive appetite can tend, in so far as it is moved thereto by the reason: and when revenge is taken in accordance with the order of judgment, it is God’s work, since he who has power to punish “is God’s minister,” as stated in Rom. 13:4.

Reply to Objection 4: We can and ought to be like to God in the desire for good; but we cannot be altogether likened to Him in the mode of our desire, since in God there is no sensitive appetite, as in us, the movement of which has to obey reason. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “anger is more firmly erect in withstanding vice, when it bows to the command of reason.”

Whether anger is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a sin. For we demerit by sinning. But “we do not demerit by the passions, even as neither do we incur blame thereby,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Consequently no passion is a sin. Now anger is a passion as stated above ([3571]FS, Q[46], A[1]) in the treatise on the passions. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, in every sin there is conversion to some mutable good. But in anger there is conversion not to a mutable good, but to a person’s evil. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, “No man sins in what he cannot avoid,” as Augustine asserts [*De Lib. Arb. iii, 18]. But man cannot avoid anger, for a gloss on Ps. 4:5, “Be ye angry and sin not,” says: “The movement of anger is not in our power.” Again, the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. vii, 6) that “the angry man acts with displeasure.” Now displeasure is contrary to the will. Therefore anger is not a sin.

Objection 4: Further, sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4,30]. But it is not contrary to man’s nature to be angry, and it is the natural act of a power, namely the irascible; wherefore Jerome says in a letter [*Ep. xii ad Anton. Monach.] that “to be angry is the property of man.” Therefore it is not a sin to be angry.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 4:31): “Let all indignation and anger [*Vulg.: ‘Anger and indignation’] . . . be put away from you.”

I answer that, Anger, as stated above [3572](A[1]), is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. Now the order of reason, in regard to anger, may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the appetible object to which anger tends, and that is revenge. Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy, and is called “zealous anger” [*Cf. Greg., Moral. v, 45]. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or again contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, namely the maintaining of justice and the correction of defaults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger.

Secondly, the order of reason in regard to anger may be considered in relation to the mode of being angry, namely that the movement of anger should not be immoderately fierce, neither internally nor externally; and if this condition be disregarded, anger will not lack sin, even though just vengeance be desired.

Reply to Objection 1: Since passion may be either regulated or not regulated by reason, it follows that a passion considered absolutely does not include the notion of merit or demerit, of praise or blame. But as regulated by reason, it may be something meritorious and deserving of praise; while on the other hand, as not regulated by reason, it may be demeritorious and blameworthy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that “it is he who is angry in a certain way, that is praised or blamed.”

Reply to Objection 2: The angry man desires the evil of another, not for its own sake but for the sake of revenge, towards which his appetite turns as to a mutable good.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is master of his actions through the judgment of his reason, wherefore as to the movements that forestall that judgment, it is not in man’s power to prevent them as a whole, i.e. so that none of them arise, although his reason is able to check each one, if it arise. Accordingly it is stated that the movement of anger is not in man’s power, to the extent namely that no such movement arise. Yet since this movement is somewhat in his power, it is not entirely sinless if it be inordinate. The statement of the Philosopher that “the angry man acts with displeasure,” means that he is displeased, not with his being angry, but with the injury which he deems done to himself: and through this displeasure he is moved to seek vengeance.

Reply to Objection 4: The irascible power in man is naturally subject to his reason, wherefore its act is natural to man, in so far as it is in accord with reason, and in so far as it is against reason, it is contrary to man’s nature.

Whether all anger is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that all anger is a mortal sin. For it is written (Job 5:2): “Anger killeth the foolish man [*Vulg.: ‘Anger indeed killeth the foolish’],” and he speaks of the spiritual killing, whence mortal sin takes its name. Therefore all anger is a mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, nothing save mortal sin is deserving of eternal condemnation. Now anger deserves eternal condemnation; for our Lord said (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his brother shall be in danger of the judgment”: and a gloss on this passage says that “the three things mentioned there, namely judgment, council, and hell-fire, signify in a pointed manner different abodes in the state of eternal damnation corresponding to various sins.” Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, whatsoever is contrary to charity is a mortal sin. Now anger is of itself contrary to charity, as Jerome declares in his commentary on Mat. 5:22, “Whosoever is angry with his brother,” etc.

where he says that this is contrary to the love of your neighbor. Therefore anger is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 4:5, “Be ye angry and sin not,” says: “Anger is venial if it does not proceed to action.”

I answer that, The movement of anger may be inordinate and sinful in two ways, as stated above [3573](A[2]). First, on the part of the appetible object, as when one desires unjust revenge; and thus anger is a mortal sin in the point of its genus, because it is contrary to charity and justice. Nevertheless such like anger may happen to be a venial sin by reason of the imperfection of the act. This imperfection is considered either in relation to the subject desirous of vengeance, as when the movement of anger forestalls the judgment of his reason; or in relation to the desired object, as when one desires to be avenged in a trifling matter, which should be deemed of no account, so that even if one proceeded to action, it would not be a mortal sin, for instance by pulling a child slightly by the hair, or by some other like action. Secondly, the movement of anger may be inordinate in the mode of being angry, for instance, if one be too fiercely angry inwardly, or if one exceed in the outward signs of anger. In this way anger is not a mortal sin in the point of its genus; yet it may happen to be a mortal sin, for instance if through the fierceness of his anger a man fall away from the love of God and his neighbor.

Reply to Objection 1: It does not follow from the passage quoted that all anger is a mortal sin, but that the foolish are killed spiritually by anger, because, through not checking the movement of anger by their reason, they fall into mortal sins, for instance by blaspheming God or by doing injury to their neighbor.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord said this of anger, by way of addition to the words of the Law: “Whosoever shall kill shall be in danger of the judgment” (Mat. 5:21). Consequently our Lord is speaking here of the movement of anger wherein a man desires the killing or any grave injury of his neighbor: and should the consent of reason be given to this desire, without doubt it will be a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin, but it is not always so, as appears from what we have said.

Whether anger is the most grievous sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger is the most grievous sin. For Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlviii in Joan.] that “nothing is more repulsive than the look of an angry man, and nothing uglier than a ruthless* face, and most of all than a cruel soul.” [*’Severo.’ The correct text is ‘Si vero.’ The translation would then run thus . . . ‘and nothing uglier.’ And if his ‘face is ugly, how much uglier is his soul!’]. Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

Objection 2: Further, the more hurtful a sin is, the worse it would seem to be; since, according to Augustine (Enchiridion xii), “a thing is said to be evil because it hurts.” Now anger is most hurtful, because it deprives man of his reason, whereby he is master of himself; for Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii in Joan.) that “anger differs in no way from madness; it is a demon while it lasts, indeed more troublesome than one harassed by a demon.” Therefore anger is the most grievous sin.

Objection 3: Further, inward movements are judged according to their outward effects. Now the effect of anger is murder, which is a most grievous sin. Therefore anger is a most grievous sin.

On the contrary, Anger is compared to hatred as the mote to the beam; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “Lest anger grow into hatred and a mote become a beam.” Therefore anger is not the most grievous sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([3574]AA[1],2), the inordinateness of anger is considered in a twofold respect, namely with regard to an undue object, and with regard to an undue mode of being angry. As to the appetible object which it desires, anger would seem to be the least of sins, for anger desires the evil of punishment for some person, under the aspect of a good that is vengeance. Hence on the part of the evil which it desires the sin of anger agrees with those sins which desire the evil of our neighbor, such as envy and hatred; but while hatred desires absolutely another’s evil as such, and the envious man desires another’s evil through desire of his own glory, the angry man desires another’s evil under the aspect of just revenge. Wherefore it is evident that hatred is more grievous than envy, and envy than anger: since it is worse to desire evil as an evil, than as a good; and to desire evil as an external good such as honor or glory, than under the aspect of the rectitude of justice. On the part of the good, under the aspect of which the angry man desires an evil, anger concurs with the sin of concupiscence that tends to a good. In this respect again, absolutely speaking. the sin of anger is apparently less grievous than that of concupiscence, according as the good of justice, which the angry man desires, is better than the pleasurable or useful good which is desired by the subject of concupiscence. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 4) that “the incontinent in desire is more disgraceful than the incontinent in anger.”

On the other hand, as to the inordinateness which regards the mode of being angry, anger would seem to have a certain pre-eminence on account of the strength and quickness of its movement, according to Prov. 27:4, “Anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth: and who can bear the violence of one provoked?” Hence Gregory says (Moral. v, 45): “The heart goaded by the pricks of anger is convulsed, the body trembles, the tongue entangles itself, the face is inflamed, the eyes are enraged and fail utterly to recognize those whom we know: the tongue makes sounds indeed, but there is no sense in its utterance.”

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is alluding to the repulsiveness of the outward gestures which result from the impetuousness of anger.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the inordinate movement of anger, that results from its impetuousness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Murder results from hatred and envy no less than from anger: yet anger is less grievous, inasmuch as it considers the aspect of justice, as stated above.

Whether the Philosopher suitably assigns the species of anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of anger are unsuitably assigned by the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) where he says that some angry persons are “choleric,” some “sullen,” and some “ill-tempered” or “stern.” According to him, a person is said to be “sullen” whose anger “is appeased with difficulty and endures a long time.” But this apparently pertains to the circumstance of time. Therefore it seems that anger can be differentiated specifically in respect also of the other circumstances.

Objection 2: Further, he says (Ethic. iv, 5) that “ill-tempered” or “stern” persons “are those whose anger is not appeased without revenge, or punishment.” Now this also pertains to the unquenchableness of anger. Therefore seemingly the ill-tempered is the same as bitterness.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord mentions three degrees of anger, when He says (Mat. 5:22): “Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment: and whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca, shall be in danger of the council, and whosoever shall say” to his brother, “Thou fool.” But these degrees are not referable to the aforesaid species. Therefore it seems that the above division of anger is not fitting.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi] says “there are three species of irascibility,” namely, “the anger which is called wrath [*’Fellea,’ i.e. like gall. But in [3575]FS, Q[46], A[8], St. Thomas quoting the same authority has {Cholos} which we render ‘wrath’],” and “ill-will” which is a disease of the mind, and “rancour.” Now these three seem to coincide with the three aforesaid. For “wrath” he describes as “having beginning and movement,” and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) ascribes this to “choleric” persons: “ill-will” he describes as “an anger that endures and grows old,” and this the Philosopher ascribes to “sullenness”; while he describes “rancour” as “reckoning the time for vengeance,” which tallies with the Philosopher’s description of the “ill-tempered.” The same division is given by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16). Therefore the aforesaid division assigned by the Philosopher is not unfitting.

I answer that, The aforesaid distinction may be referred either to the passion, or to the sin itself of anger. We have already stated when treating of the passions ([3576]FS, Q[46], A[8]) how it is to be applied to the passion of anger. And it would seem that this is chiefly what Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene had in view. Here, however, we have to take the distinction of these species in its application to the sin of anger, and as set down by the Philosopher.

For the inordinateness of anger may be considered in relation to two things. First, in relation to the origin of anger, and this regards “choleric” persons, who are angry too quickly and for any slight cause. Secondly, in relation to the duration of anger, for that anger endures too long; and this may happen in two ways. In one way, because the cause of anger, to wit, the inflicted injury, remains too long in a man’s memory, the result being that it gives rise to a lasting displeasure, wherefore he is “grievous” and “sullen” to himself. In another way, it happens on the part of vengeance, which a man seeks with a stubborn desire: this applies to “ill-tempered” or “stern” people, who do not put aside their anger until they have inflicted punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not time, but a man’s propensity to anger, or his pertinacity in anger, that is the chief point of consideration in the aforesaid species.

Reply to Objection 2: Both “sullen” and “ill-tempered” people have a long-lasting anger, but for different reasons. For a “sullen” person has an abiding anger on account of an abiding displeasure, which he holds locked in his breast; and as he does not break forth into the outward signs of anger, others cannot reason him out of it, nor does he of his own accord lay aside his anger, except his displeasure wear away with time and thus his anger cease. On the other hand, the anger of “ill-tempered” persons is long-lasting on account of their intense desire for revenge, so that it does not wear out with time, and can be quelled only by revenge.

Reply to Objection 3: The degrees of anger mentioned by our Lord do not refer to the different species of anger, but correspond to the course of the human act [*Cf. [3577]FS, Q[46], A[8], OBJ[3]]. For the first degree is an inward conception, and in reference to this He says: “Whosoever is angry with his brother.” The second degree is when the anger is manifested by outward signs, even before it breaks out into effect; and in reference to this He says: “Whosoever shall say to his brother, Raca!” which is an angry exclamation. The third degree is when the sin conceived inwardly breaks out into effect. Now the effect of anger is another’s hurt under the aspect of revenge; and the least of hurts is that which is done by a mere word; wherefore in reference to this He says: “Whosoever shall say to his brother Thou fool!” Consequently it is clear that the second adds to the first, and the third to both the others; so that, if the first is a mortal sin, in the case referred to by our Lord, as stated above (A[3], ad 2), much more so are the others. Wherefore some kind of condemnation is assigned as corresponding to each one of them. In the first case “judgment” is assigned, and this is the least severe, for as Augustine says [*Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 9], “where judgment is to be delivered, there is an opportunity for defense”: in the second case “council” is assigned, “whereby the judges deliberate together on the punishment to be inflicted”: to the third case is assigned “hell-fire,” i.e. “decisive condemnation.”

Whether anger should be reckoned among the capital vices?

Objection 1: It would seem that anger should not be reckoned among the capital sins. For anger is born of sorrow which is a capital vice known by the name of sloth. Therefore anger should not be reckoned a capital vice.

Objection 2: Further, hatred is a graver sin than anger. Therefore it should be reckoned a capital vice rather than anger.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Prov. 29:22, “An angry [Douay: ‘passionate’] man provoketh quarrels,” says: “Anger is the door to all vices: if it be closed, peace is ensured within to all the virtues; if it be opened, the soul is armed for every crime.” Now no capital vice is the origin of all sins, but only of certain definite ones. Therefore anger should not be reckoned among the capital vices.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) places anger among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above ([3578]FS, Q[84], A[3],4), a capital vice is defined as one from which many vices arise. Now there are two reasons for which many vices can arise from anger. The first is on the part of its object which has much of the aspect of desirability, in so far as revenge is desired under the aspect of just or honest*, which is attractive by its excellence, as stated above [3579](A[4]). [*Honesty must be taken here in its broad sense as synonymous with moral goodness, from the point of view of decorum; Cf. Q[145], A[1]]. The second is on the part of its impetuosity, whereby it precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action. Therefore it is evident that anger is a capital vice.

Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow whence anger arises is not, for the most part, the vice of sloth, but the passion of sorrow, which results from an injury inflicted.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (Q[118], A[7]; Q[148], A[5]; Q[153], A[4]; [3580]FS, Q[84], A[4]), it belongs to the notion of a capital vice to have a most desirable end, so that many sins are committed through the desire thereof. Now anger, which desires evil under the aspect of good, has a more desirable end than hatred has, since the latter desires evil under the aspect of evil: wherefore anger is more a capital vice than hatred is.

Reply to Objection 3: Anger is stated to be the door to the vices accidentally, that is by removing obstacles, to wit by hindering the judgment of reason, whereby man is withdrawn from evil. It is, however, directly the cause of certain special sins, which are called its daughters.

Whether six daughters are fittingly assigned to anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that six daughters are unfittingly assigned to anger, namely "quarreling, swelling of the mind, contumely, clamor, indignation and blasphemy." For blasphemy is reckoned by Isidore [*QQ. in Deut., qu. xvi] to be a daughter of pride. Therefore it should not be accounted a daughter of anger.

Objection 2: Further, hatred is born of anger, as Augustine says in his rule (Ep. ccxi). Therefore it should be placed among the daughters of anger.

Objection 3: Further, "a swollen mind" would seem to be the same as pride. Now pride is not the daughter of a vice, but "the mother of all vices," as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 45). Therefore swelling of the mind should not be reckoned among the daughters of anger.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) assigns these daughters to anger.

I answer that, Anger may be considered in three ways. First, as consisting in thought, and thus two vices arise from anger. one is on the part of the person with whom a man is angry, and whom he deems unworthy [indignum] of acting thus towards him, and this is called "indignation." The other vice is on the part of the man himself, in so far as he devises various means of vengeance, and with such like thoughts fills his mind, according to Job 15:2, "Will a wise man . . . fill his stomach with burning heat?" And thus we have "swelling of the mind."

Secondly, anger may be considered, as expressed in words: and thus a twofold disorder arises from anger. One is when a man manifests his anger in his manner of speech, as stated above (A[5], ad 3) of the man who says to his brother, "Raca": and this refers to "clamor," which denotes disorderly and confused speech. The other disorder is when a man breaks out into injurious words, and if these be against God, it is "blasphemy," if against one's neighbor, it is "contumely."

Thirdly, anger may be considered as proceeding to deeds; and thus anger gives rise to "quarrels," by which we are to understand all manner of injuries inflicted on one's neighbor through anger.

Reply to Objection 1: The blasphemy into which a man breaks out deliberately proceeds from pride, whereby a man lifts himself up against God: since, according to Ecclus. 10:14, “the beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God,” i.e. to fall away from reverence for Him is the first part of pride [*Cf.[3581] Q[162], A[7], ad 2]; and this gives rise to blasphemy. But the blasphemy into which a man breaks out through a disturbance of the mind, proceeds from anger.

Reply to Objection 2: Although hatred sometimes arises from anger, it has a previous cause, from which it arises more directly, namely displeasure, even as, on the other hand, love is born of pleasure. Now through displeasure, a man is moved sometimes to anger, sometimes to hatred. Wherefore it was fitting to reckon that hatred arises from sloth rather than from anger.

Reply to Objection 3: Swelling of the mind is not taken here as identical with pride, but for a certain effort or daring attempt to take vengeance; and daring is a vice opposed to fortitude.

Whether there is a vice opposed to anger resulting from lack of anger?

Objection 1: It would seem that there. is not a vice opposed to anger, resulting from lack of anger. For no vice makes us like to God. Now by being entirely without anger, a man becomes like to God, Who judges “with tranquillity” (Wis. 12:18). Therefore seemingly it is not a vice to be altogether without anger.

Objection 2: Further, it is not a vice to lack what is altogether useless. But the movement of anger is useful for no purpose, as Seneca proves in the book he wrote on anger (De Ira i, 9, seqq.). Therefore it seems that lack of anger is not a vice.

Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “man’s evil is to be without reason.” Now the judgment of reason remains unimpaired, if all movement of anger be done away. Therefore no lack of anger amounts to a vice.

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xi in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “He who is not angry, whereas he has cause to be, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices, it fosters negligence, and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong.”

I answer that, Anger may be understood in two ways. In one way, as a simple movement of the will, whereby one inflicts punishment, not through passion, but in virtue of a judgment of the reason: and thus without doubt lack of anger is a sin. This is the sense in which anger is taken in the saying of Chrysostom, for he says (Hom. xi in Matth., in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom): “Anger, when it has a cause, is not anger but judgment. For anger, properly speaking, denotes a movement of passion”: and when a man is angry with reason, his anger is no longer from passion: wherefore he is said to judge, not to be angry. In another way anger is taken for a movement of the sensitive appetite, which is with passion resulting from a bodily transmutation. This movement is a necessary sequel, in man, to the movement of his will, since the lower appetite necessarily follows the movement of the higher appetite, unless there be an obstacle. Hence the movement of anger in the sensitive appetite cannot be lacking altogether, unless the movement of the will be altogether lacking or weak. Consequently lack of the passion of anger is also a vice, even as the lack of movement in the will directed to punishment by the judgment of reason.

Reply to Objection 1: He that is entirely without anger when he ought to be angry, imitates God as to lack of passion, but not as to God’s punishing by judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: The passion of anger, like all other movements of the sensitive appetite, is useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution [*Cf. [3582]FS, Q[24], A[3]] of reason’s dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose, whereas “nature does nothing without purpose” [*Aristotle, De Coelo i, 4].

Reply to Objection 3: When a man acts inordinately, the judgment of his reason is cause not only of the simple movement of the will but also of the passion in the sensitive appetite, as stated above. Wherefore just as the removal of the effect is a sign that the cause is removed, so the lack of anger is a sign that the judgment of reason is lacking.

OF CRUELTY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider cruelty, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

(2) Of its comparison with savagery or brutality.

Whether cruelty is opposed to clemency?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty is not opposed to clemency. For Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “those are said to be cruel who exceed in punishing,” which is contrary to justice. Now clemency is reckoned a part, not of justice but of temperance. Therefore apparently cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 6:23): “They are cruel, and will have no mercy”; so that cruelty would seem opposed to mercy. Now mercy is not the same as clemency, as stated above ([3583]Q[157], A[4], ad 3). Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

Objection 3: Further, clemency is concerned with the infliction of punishment, as stated above ([3584]Q[157], A[1]): whereas cruelty applies to the withdrawal of beneficence, according to Prov. 11:17, “But he that is cruel casteth off even his own kindred.” Therefore cruelty is not opposed to clemency.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “the opposite of clemency is cruelty, which is nothing else but hardness of heart in exacting punishment.”

I answer that, Cruelty apparently takes its name from “cruditas” [rawness]. Now just as things when cooked and prepared are wont to have an agreeable and sweet savor, so when raw they have a disagreeable and bitter taste. Now it has been stated above ([3585]Q[157], A[3], ad 1; A[4], ad 3) that clemency denotes a certain smoothness or sweetness of soul, whereby one is inclined to mitigate punishment. Hence cruelty is directly opposed to clemency.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as it belongs to equity to mitigate punishment according to reason, while the sweetness of soul which inclines one to this belongs to clemency: so too, excess in punishing, as regards the external action, belongs to injustice; but as regards the hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase punishment, belongs to cruelty.

Reply to Objection 2: Mercy and clemency concur in this, that both shun and recoil from another’s unhappiness, but in different ways. For it belongs to mercy [*Cf.[3586] Q[30], A[1]] to relieve another’s unhappiness by a beneficent action, while it belongs to clemency to mitigate another’s unhappiness by the cessation of punishment. And since cruelty denotes excess in exacting punishment, it is more directly opposed to clemency than to mercy; yet on account of the mutual likeness of these virtues, cruelty is sometimes taken for mercilessness.

Reply to Objection 3: Cruelty is there taken for mercilessness, which is lack of beneficence. We may also reply that withdrawal of beneficence is in itself a punishment.

Whether cruelty differs from savagery or brutality?

Objection 1: It would seem that cruelty differs not from savagery or brutality. For seemingly one vice is opposed in one way to one virtue. Now both savagery and cruelty are opposed to clemency by way of excess. Therefore it would seem that savagery and cruelty are the same.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “severity is as it were savagery with verity, because it holds to justice without attending to piety”: so that savagery would seem to exclude that mitigation of punishment in delivering judgment which is demanded by piety. Now this has been stated to belong to cruelty (A[1], ad 1). Therefore cruelty is the same as savagery.

Objection 3: Further, just as there is a vice opposed to a virtue by way of excess, so is there a vice opposed to it by way of deficiency, which latter is opposed both to the virtue which is the mean, and to the vice which is in excess. Now the same vice pertaining to deficiency is opposed to both cruelty and savagery, namely remission or laxity. For Gregory says (Moral. xx, 5): “Let there be love, but not that which enervates, let there be severity, but without fury, let there be zeal without unseemly savagery, let there be piety without undue clemency.” Therefore savagery is the same as cruelty.

On the contrary, Seneca says (De Clementia ii, 4) that “a man who is angry without being hurt, or with one who has not offended him, is not said to be cruel, but to be brutal or savage.”

I answer that, “Savagery” and “brutality” take their names from a likeness to wild beasts which are also described as savage. For animals of this kind attack man that they may feed on his body, and not for some motive of justice the consideration of which belongs to reason alone. Wherefore, properly speaking, brutality or savagery applies to those who in inflicting punishment have not in view a default of the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's torture. Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: for such like pleasure is not human but bestial, and resulting as it does either from evil custom, or from a corrupt nature, as do other bestial emotions. On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty differs from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness differs from bestiality, as stated in Ethic. vii, 5.

Reply to Objection 1: Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestiality, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue, which the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 5) calls "heroic" or "god-like," which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.

Reply to Objection 2: A severe man is not said to be simply savage, because this implies a vice; but he is said to be "savage as regards the truth," on account of some likeness to savagery which is not inclined to mitigate punishment.

Reply to Objection 3: Remission of punishment is not a vice, except it disregard the order of justice, which requires a man to be punished on account of his offense, and which cruelty exceeds. On the other hand, cruelty disregards this order altogether. Wherefore remission of punishment is opposed to cruelty, but not to savagery.

OF MODESTY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider modesty: and (1) Modesty in general; (2) Each of its species. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

(2) What is the matter of modesty?

Whether modesty is a part of temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is not a part of temperance. For modesty is denominated from mode. Now mode is requisite in every virtue: since virtue is directed to good; and "good," according to Augustine (De Nat. Boni 3), "consists in mode, species, and order." Therefore modesty is a general virtue, and consequently should not be reckoned a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, temperance would seem to be deserving of praise chiefly on account of its moderation. Now this gives modesty its name. Therefore modesty is the same as temperance, and not one of its parts.

Objection 3: Further, modesty would seem to regard the correction of our neighbor, according to 2 Tim. 2:24,25, "The servant of the Lord must not wrangle, but be mild towards all men . . . with modesty admonishing them that resist the truth." Now admonishing wrong-doers is an act of justice or of charity, as stated above ([3587]Q[33], A[1]). Therefore seemingly modesty is a part of justice rather than of temperance.

On the contrary, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) reckons modesty as a part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ([3588]Q[141], A[4];[3589] Q[157], A[3]), temperance brings moderation into those things wherein it is most difficult to be moderate, namely the concupiscences of pleasures of touch. Now whenever there is a special virtue about some matter of very great moment, there must needs be another virtue about matters of lesser import: because the life of man requires to be regulated by the virtues with regard to everything: thus it was stated above ([3590]Q[134], A[3], ad 1), that while magnificence is about great expenditure, there is need in addition for liberality, which is concerned with ordinary expenditure. Hence there is need for a virtue to moderate other lesser matters where moderation is not so difficult. This virtue is called modesty, and is annexed to temperance as its principal.

Reply to Objection 1: When a name is common to many it is sometimes appropriated to those of the lowest rank; thus the common name of angel is appropriated to the lowest order of angels. In the same way, mode which is observed by all virtues in common, is specially appropriated to the virtue which prescribes the mode in the slightest things.

Reply to Objection 2: Some things need tempering on account of their strength, thus we temper strong wine. But moderation is necessary in all things: wherefore temperance is more concerned with strong passions, and modesty about weaker passions.

Reply to Objection 3: Modesty is to be taken there for the general moderation which is necessary in all virtues.

Whether modesty is only about outward actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that modesty is only about outward actions. For the inward movements of the passions cannot be known to other persons. Yet the Apostle enjoins (Phil. 4:5): “Let your modesty be known to all men.” Therefore modesty is only about outward actions.

Objection 2: Further, the virtues that are about the passions are distinguished from justice which is about operations. Now modesty is seemingly one virtue. Therefore, if it be about outward works, it will not be concerned with inward passions.

Objection 3: Further, no one same virtue is both about things pertaining to the appetite—which is proper to the moral virtues—and about things pertaining to knowledge—which is proper to the intellectual virtues—and again about things pertaining to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. Therefore, if modesty be one virtue, it cannot be about all these things.

On the contrary, In all these things it is necessary to observe the “mode” whence modesty takes its name. Therefore modesty is about all of them.

I answer that, As stated above [3591](A[1]), modesty differs from temperance, in that temperance moderates those matters where restraint is most difficult, while modesty moderates those that present less difficulty. Authorities seem to have had various opinions about modesty. For wherever they found a special kind of good or a special difficulty of moderation, they withdrew it from the province of modesty, which they confined to lesser matters. Now it is clear to all that the restraint of pleasures of touch presents a special difficulty: wherefore all distinguished temperance from modesty.

In addition to this, moreover, Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54) considered that there was a special kind of good in the moderation of punishment; wherefore he severed clemency also from modesty, and held modesty to be about the remaining ordinary matters that require moderation. These seemingly are of four kinds. one is the movement of the mind towards some excellence, and this is moderated by “humility.” The second is the desire of things pertaining to knowledge, and this is moderated by “studiousness” which is opposed to curiosity. The third regards bodily movements and actions, which require to be done becomingly and honestly [*Cf.[3592] Q[145], A[1]], whether we act seriously or in play. The fourth regards outward show, for instance in dress and the like.

To some of these matters, however, other authorities appointed certain special virtues: thus Andronicus [*De Affectibus] mentions “meekness, simplicity, humility,” and other kindred virtues, of which we have spoken above (Q[143]); while Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) assigned {eutrapelia} to pleasures in games, as stated above ([3593]FS, Q[60], A[5]). All these are comprised under modesty as understood by Tully; and in this way modesty regards not only outward but also inward actions.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks of modesty as regarding externals. Nevertheless the moderation of the inner man may be shown by certain outward signs.

Reply to Objection 2: Various virtues assigned by various authorities are comprised under modesty. Wherefore nothing prevents modesty from regarding matters which require different virtues. Yet there is not so great a difference between the various parts of modesty, as there is between justice, which is about operations, and temperance, which is about passions, because in actions and passions that present no great difficulty on the part of the matter, but only on the part of moderation, there is but one virtue, one namely for each kind of moderation.

Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection also is clear.

OF HUMILITY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must consider next the species of modesty: (1) Humility, and pride which is opposed to it; (2) Studiousness, and its opposite, Curiosity; (3) Modesty as affecting words or deeds; (4) Modesty as affecting outward attire.

Concerning humility there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether humility is a virtue?

(2) Whether it resides in the appetite, or in the judgment of reason?

(3) Whether by humility one ought to subject oneself to all men?

(4) Whether it is a part of modesty or temperance?

(5) Of its comparison with the other virtues;

(6) Of the degrees of humility.

Whether humility is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a virtue. For virtue conveys the notion of a penal evil, according to Ps. 104:18, “They humbled his feet in fetters.” Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, virtue and vice are mutually opposed. Now humility seemingly denotes a vice, for it is written (Ecclus. 19:23): “There is one that humbleth himself wickedly.” Therefore humility is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, no virtue is opposed to another virtue. But humility is apparently opposed to the virtue of magnanimity, which aims at great things, whereas humility shuns them. Therefore it would seem that humility is not a virtue.

Objection 4: Further, virtue is “the disposition of that which is perfect” (Phys. vii, text. 17). But humility seemingly belongs to the imperfect: wherefore it becomes not God to be humble, since He can be subject to none. Therefore it seems that humility is not a virtue.

Objection 5: Further, every moral virtue is about actions and passions, according to Ethic. ii, 3. But humility is not reckoned by the Philosopher among the virtues that are about passions, nor is it comprised under justice which is about actions. Therefore it would seem not to be a virtue.

On the contrary, Origen commenting on Lk. 1:48, “He hath regarded the humility of His handmaid,” says (Hom. viii in Luc.): “One of the virtues, humility, is particularly commended in Holy Writ; for our Saviour said: ‘Learn of Me, because I am meek, and humble of heart.’”

I answer that, As stated above ([3594]FS, Q[23], A[2]) when we were treating of the passions, the difficult good has something attractive to the appetite, namely the aspect of good, and likewise something repulsive to the appetite, namely the difficulty of obtaining it. In respect of the former there arises the movement of hope, and in respect of the latter, the movement of despair. Now it has been stated above ([3595]FS, Q[61], A[2]) that for those appetitive movements which are a kind of impulse towards an object, there is need of a moderating and restraining moral virtue, while for those which are a kind of recoil, there is need, on the part of the appetite, of a moral virtue to strengthen it and urge it on. Wherefore a twofold virtue is necessary with regard to the difficult good: one, to temper and restrain the mind, lest it tend to high things immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility: and another to strengthen the mind against despair, and urge it on to the pursuit of great things according to right reason; and this is magnanimity. Therefore it is evident that humility is a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: As Isidore observes (Etym. x), “a humble man is so called because he is, as it were, ‘humo acclinis’” [*Literally, ‘bent to the ground’], i.e. inclined to the lowest place. This may happen in two ways. First, through an extrinsic principle, for instance when one is cast down by another, and thus humility is a punishment. Secondly, through an intrinsic principle: and this may be done sometimes well, for instance when a man, considering his own failings, assumes the lowest place according to his mode: thus Abraham said to the Lord (Gn. 18:27), “I will speak to my Lord, whereas I am dust and ashes.” In this way humility is a virtue. Sometimes, however, this may be ill-done, for instance when man, “not understanding his honor, compares himself to senseless beasts, and becomes like to them” (Ps. 48:13).

Reply to Objection 2: As stated (ad 1), humility, in so far as it is a virtue, conveys the notion of a praiseworthy self-abasement to the lowest place. Now this is sometimes done merely as to outward signs and pretense: wherefore this is “false humility,” of which Augustine says in a letter (Ep. cxlix) that it is “grievous pride,” since to wit, it would seem to aim at excellence of glory. Sometimes, however, this is done by an inward movement of the soul, and in this way, properly speaking, humility is reckoned a virtue, because virtue does not consist externals, but chiefly in the inward choice of the mind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 5).

Reply to Objection 3: Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great things against right reason: while magnanimity urges the mind to great things in accord with right reason. Hence it is clear that magnanimity is not opposed to humility: indeed they concur in this, that each is according to right reason.

Reply to Objection 4: A thing is said to be perfect in two ways. First absolutely; such a thing contains no defect, neither in its nature nor in respect of anything else, and thus God alone is perfect. To Him humility is fitting, not as regards His Divine nature, but only as regards His assumed nature. Secondly, a thing may be said to be perfect in a restricted sense, for instance in respect of its nature or state or time. Thus a virtuous man is perfect: although in comparison with God his perfection is found wanting, according to the word of Is. 40:17, “All nations are before Him as if they had no being at all.” In this way humility may be competent to every man.

Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher intended to treat of virtues as directed to civic life, wherein the subjection of one man to another is defined according to the ordinance of the law, and consequently is a matter of legal justice. But humility, considered as a special virtue, regards chiefly the subjection of man to God, for Whose sake he humbles himself by subjecting himself to others.

Whether humility has to do with the appetite?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility concerns, not the appetite but the judgment of reason. Because humility is opposed to pride. Now pride concerns things pertaining to knowledge: for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 22) that “pride, when it extends outwardly to the body, is first of all shown in the eyes”: wherefore it is written (Ps. 130:1), “Lord, my heart is not exalted, nor are my eyes lofty.” Now eyes are the chief aids to knowledge. Therefore it would seem that humility is chiefly concerned with knowledge, whereby one thinks little of oneself.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that “almost the whole of Christian teaching is humility.” Consequently nothing contained in Christian teaching is incompatible with humility. Now Christian teaching admonishes us to seek the better things, according to 1 Cor. 12:31, “Be zealous for the better gifts.” Therefore it belongs to humility to restrain not the desire of difficult things but the estimate thereof.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the same virtue both to restrain excessive movement, and to strengthen the soul against excessive withdrawal: thus fortitude both curbs daring and fortifies the soul against fear. Now it is magnanimity that strengthens the soul against the difficulties that occur in the pursuit of great things. Therefore if humility were to curb the desire of great things, it would follow that humility is not a distinct virtue from magnanimity, which is evidently false. Therefore humility is concerned, not with the desire but with the estimate of great things.

Objection 4: Further, Andronicus [*De Affectibus] assigns humility to outward show; for he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade." Therefore it is not concerned with the movement of the appetite.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]) that "the humble man is one who chooses to be an abject in the house of the Lord, rather than to dwell in the tents of sinners." But choice concerns the appetite. Therefore humility has to do with the appetite rather than with the estimative power.

I answer that, As stated above [3596](A[1]), it belongs properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne towards that which is above him. For this purpose he must know his disproportion to that which surpasses his capacity. Hence knowledge of one's own deficiency belongs to humility, as a rule guiding the appetite. Nevertheless humility is essentially in the appetite itself; and consequently it must be said that humility, properly speaking, moderates the movement of the appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: Lofty eyes are a sign of pride, inasmuch as it excludes respect and fear: for fearing and respectful persons are especially wont to lower the eyes, as though not daring to compare themselves with others. But it does not follow from this that humility is essentially concerned with knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: It is contrary to humility to aim at greater things through confiding in one's own powers: but to aim at greater things through confidence in God's help, is not contrary to humility; especially since the more one subjects oneself to God, the more is one exalted in God's sight. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): "It is one thing to raise oneself to God, and another to raise oneself up against God. He that abases himself before Him, him He raiseth up; he that raises himself up against Him, him He casteth down."

Reply to Objection 3: In fortitude there is the same reason for restraining daring and for strengthening the soul against fear: since the reason in both cases is that man should set the good of reason before dangers of death. But the reason for restraining presumptuous hope which pertains to humility is not the same as the reason for strengthening the soul against despair.

Because the reason for strengthening the soul against despair is the acquisition of one’s proper good lest man, by despair, render himself unworthy of a good which was competent to him; while the chief reason for suppressing presumptuous hope is based on divine reverence, which shows that man ought not to ascribe to himself more than is competent to him according to the position in which God has placed him. Wherefore humility would seem to denote in the first place man’s subjection to God; and for this reason Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) ascribes humility, which he understands by poverty of spirit, to the gift of fear whereby man reveres God. Hence it follows that the relation of fortitude to daring differs from that of humility to hope. Because fortitude uses daring more than it suppresses it: so that excess of daring is more like fortitude than lack of daring is. On the other hand, humility suppresses hope or confidence in self more than it uses it; wherefore excessive self-confidence is more opposed to humility than lack of confidence is.

Reply to Objection 4: Excess in outward expenditure and parade is wont to be done with a view of boasting, which is suppressed by humility. Accordingly humility has to do, in a secondary way, with externals, as signs of the inward movement of the appetite.

Whether one ought, by humility, to subject oneself to all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men. For, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), humility consists chiefly in man’s subjection to God. Now one ought not to offer to a man that which is due to God, as is the case with all acts of religious worship. Therefore, by humility, one ought not to subject oneself to man.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Nat. et Gratia xxxiv): “Humility should take the part of truth, not of falsehood.” Now some men are of the highest rank, who cannot, without falsehood, subject themselves to their inferiors. Therefore one ought not, by humility, to subject oneself to all men.

Objection 3: Further no one ought to do that which conduces to the detriment of another’s spiritual welfare. But if a man subject himself to another by humility, this is detrimental to the person to whom he subjects himself; for the latter might wax proud, or despise the other. Hence

Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “Lest through excessive humility the superior lose his authority.” Therefore a man ought not, by humility, to subject himself to all.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:3): “In humility, let each esteem others better than themselves.”

I answer that, We may consider two things in man, namely that which is God’s, and that which is man’s. Whatever pertains to defect is man’s: but whatever pertains to man’s welfare and perfection is God’s, according to the saying of Osee 13:9, “Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.” Now humility, as stated above (A[1], ad 5; A[2], ad 3), properly regards the reverence whereby man is subject to God. Wherefore every man, in respect of that which is his own, ought to subject himself to every neighbor, in respect of that which the latter has of God’s: but humility does not require a man to subject what he has of God’s to that which may seem to be God’s in another. For those who have a share of God’s gifts know that they have them, according to 1 Cor. 2:12: “That we may know the things that are given us from God.” Wherefore without prejudice to humility they may set the gifts they have received from God above those that others appear to have received from Him; thus the Apostle says (Eph. 3:5): “(The mystery of Christ) was not known to the sons of men as it is now revealed to His holy apostles.” In like manner. humility does not require a man to subject that which he has of his own to that which his neighbor has of man’s: otherwise each one would have to esteem himself a greater sinner than anyone else: whereas the Apostle says without prejudice to humility (Gal. 2:15): “We by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.” Nevertheless a man may esteem his neighbor to have some good which he lacks himself, or himself to have some evil which another has not: by reason of which, he may subject himself to him with humility.

Reply to Objection 1: We must not only revere God in Himself, but also that which is His in each one, although not with the same measure of reverence as we revere God. Wherefore we should subject ourselves with humility to all our neighbors for God’s sake, according to 1 Pet. 2:13, “Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God’s sake”; but to God alone do we owe the worship of latria.

Reply to Objection 2: If we set what our neighbor has of God’s above that which we have of our own, we cannot incur falsehood. Wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 71] on Phil. 2:3, “Esteem others better than themselves,” says: “We must not esteem by pretending to esteem; but we should in truth think it possible for another person to have something that is hidden to us and whereby he is better than we are, although our own good whereby we are apparently better than he, be not hidden.”

Reply to Objection 3: Humility, like other virtues, resides chiefly inwardly in the soul. Consequently a man, by an inward act of the soul, may subject himself to another, without giving the other man an occasion of detriment to his spiritual welfare. This is what Augustine means in his Rule (Ep. ccxi): “With fear, the superior should prostrate himself at your feet in the sight of God.” On the other hand, due moderation must be observed in the outward acts of humility even as of other virtues, lest they conduce to the detriment of others. If, however, a man does as he ought, and others take therefrom an occasion of sin, this is not imputed to the man who acts with humility; since he does not give scandal, although others take it.

Whether humility is a part of modesty or temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is not a part of modesty or temperance. For humility regards chiefly the reverence whereby one is subject to God, as stated above [3597](A[3]). Now it belongs to a theological virtue to have God for its object. Therefore humility should be reckoned a theological virtue rather than a part of temperance or modesty.

Objection 2: Further, temperance is in the concupiscible, whereas humility would seem to be in the irascible, just as pride which is opposed to it, and whose object is something difficult. Therefore apparently humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

Objection 3: Further, humility and magnanimity are about the same object, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But magnanimity is reckoned a part, not of temperance but of fortitude, as stated above ([3598]Q[129], A[5]). Therefore it would seem that humility is not a part of temperance or modesty.

On the contrary, Origen says (Hom. viii super Luc.): “If thou wilt hear the name of this virtue, and what it was called by the philosophers, know that humility which God regards is the same as what they called {metriotes}, i.e. measure or moderation." Now this evidently pertains to modesty or temperance. Therefore humility is a part of modesty or temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ([3599]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3600] Q[157], A[3], ad 2), in assigning parts to a virtue we consider chiefly the likeness that results from the mode of the virtue. Now the mode of temperance, whence it chiefly derives its praise, is the restraint or suppression of the impetuosity of a passion. Hence whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance. Now just as meekness suppresses the movement of anger, so does humility suppress the movement of hope, which is the movement of a spirit aiming at great things. Wherefore, like meekness, humility is accounted a part of temperance. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) says that a man who aims at small things in proportion to his mode is not magnanimous but "temperate," and such a man we may call humble. Moreover, for the reason given above ([3601]Q[160], A[2]), among the various parts of temperance, the one under which humility is comprised is modesty as understood by Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 54), inasmuch as humility is nothing else than a moderation of spirit: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 3:4): "In the incorruptibility of a quiet and meek spirit."

Reply to Objection 1: The theological virtues, whose object is our last end, which is the first principle in matters of appetite, are the causes of all the other virtues. Hence the fact that humility is caused by reverence for God does not prevent it from being a part of modesty or temperance.

Reply to Objection 2: Parts are assigned to a principal virtue by reason of a sameness, not of subject or matter, but of formal mode, as stated above ([3602]Q[137], A[2], ad 1;[3603] Q[157], A[3], ad 2). Consequently, although humility is in the irascible as its subject, it is assigned as a part of modesty or temperance by reason of its mode.

Reply to Objection 3: Although humility and magnanimity agree as to matter, they differ as to mode, by reason of which magnanimity is reckoned a part of fortitude, and humility a part of temperance.

Whether humility is the greatest of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that humility is the greatest of the virtues. For Chrysostom, expounding the story of the Pharisee and the publican (Lk. 18), says [*Eclog. hom. vii de Humil. Animi.] that “if humility is such a fleet runner even when hampered by sin that it overtakes the justice that is the companion of pride, whither will it not reach if you couple it with justice? It will stand among the angels by the judgment seat of God.” Hence it is clear that humility is set above justice. Now justice is either the most exalted of all the virtues, or includes all virtues, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore humility is the greatest of the virtues.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. [*S. 10, C[1]]): “Are you thinking of raising the great fabric of spirituality? Attend first of all to the foundation of humility.” Now this would seem to imply that humility is the foundation of all virtue. Therefore apparently it is greater than the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, the greater virtue deserves the greater reward. Now the greatest reward is due to humility, since “he that humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Lk. 14:11). Therefore humility is the greatest of virtues.

Objection 4: Further, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. 16), “Christ’s whole life on earth was a lesson in moral conduct through the human nature which He assumed.” Now He especially proposed His humility for our example, saying (Mat. 11:29): “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.” Moreover, Gregory says (Pastor. iii, 1) that the “lesson proposed to us in the mystery of our redemption is the humility of God.” Therefore humility would seem to be the greatest of virtues.

On the contrary, Charity is set above all the virtues, according to Col. 3:14, “Above all . . . things have charity.” Therefore humility is not the greatest of virtues.

I answer that, The good of human virtue pertains to the order of reason: which order is considered chiefly in reference to the end: wherefore the theological virtues are the greatest because they have the last end for their object. Secondarily, however, it is considered in reference to the ordering of the means to the end. This ordinance, as to its essence, is in the reason itself from which it issues, but by participation it is in the appetite ordered by the reason; and this ordinance is the effect of justice, especially of legal justice. Now humility makes a man a good subject to ordinance of all kinds and in all matters; while every other virtue has this effect in some special matter.

Therefore after the theological virtues, after the intellectual virtues which regard the reason itself, and after justice, especially legal justice, humility stands before all others.

Reply to Objection 1: Humility is not set before justice, but before that justice which is coupled with pride, and is no longer a virtue; even so, on the other hand, sin is pardoned through humility: for it is said of the publican (Lk. 18:14) that through the merit of his humility "he went down into his house justified." Hence Chrysostom says [*De incompr. Nat. Dei, Hom. v]: "Bring me a pair of two-horse chariots: in the one harness pride with justice, in the other sin with humility: and you will see that sin outrunning justice wins not by its own strength, but by that of humility: while you will see the other pair beaten, not by the weakness of justice, but by the weight and size of pride."

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the orderly assembly of virtues is, by reason of a certain likeness, compared to a building, so again that which is the first step in the acquisition of virtue is likened to the foundation, which is first laid before the rest of the building. Now the virtues are in truth infused by God. Wherefore the first step in the acquisition of virtue may be understood in two ways. First by way of removing obstacles: and thus humility holds the first place, inasmuch as it expels pride, which "God resisteth," and makes man submissive and ever open to receive the influx of Divine grace. Hence it is written (James 4:6): "God resisteth the proud, and giveth grace to the humble." In this sense humility is said to be the foundation of the spiritual edifice. Secondly, a thing is first among virtues directly, because it is the first step towards God. Now the first step towards God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God must believe." In this sense faith is the foundation in a more excellent way than humility.

Reply to Objection 3: To him that despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised: thus heavenly treasures are promised to those who despise earthly riches, according to Mat. 6:19,20, "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth . . . but lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven." Likewise heavenly consolations are promised to those who despise worldly joys, according to Mat. 4:5, "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." In the same way spiritual uplifting is promised to humility, not that humility alone merits it, but because it is proper to it to despise earthly uplifting. Wherefore Augustine says (De Poenit. [*Serm. cccli]): "Think not that he who humbles himself remains for ever abased, for it is written: ‘He shall be exalted.’ And do not imagine that his exaltation in men’s eyes is effected by bodily uplifting.”

Reply to Objection 4: The reason why Christ chiefly proposed humility to us, was because it especially removes the obstacle to man’s spiritual welfare consisting in man’s aiming at heavenly and spiritual things, in which he is hindered by striving to become great in earthly things. Hence our Lord, in order to remove an obstacle to our spiritual welfare, showed by giving an example of humility, that outward exaltation is to be despised. Thus humility is, as it were, a disposition to man’s untrammeled access to spiritual and divine goods. Accordingly as perfection is greater than disposition, so charity, and other virtues whereby man approaches God directly, are greater than humility.

Whether twelve degrees of humility are fittingly distinguished in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict?

Objection 1: It would seem that the twelve degrees of humility that are set down in the Rule of the Blessed Benedict [*St. Thomas gives these degrees in the reverse order to that followed by St. Benedict] are unfittingly distinguished. The first is to be “humble not only in heart, but also to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground”; the second is “to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice”; the third is “not to be easily moved, and disposed to laughter”; the fourth is “to maintain silence until one is asked”; the fifth is “to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery”; the sixth is “to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all”; the seventh is “to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes”; the eighth is “to confess one’s sin”; the ninth is “to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances”; the tenth is “to subject oneself to a superior”; the eleventh is “not to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires”; the twelfth is “to fear God and to be always mindful of everything that God has commanded.” For among these there are some things pertaining to the other virtues, such as obedience and patience. Again there are some that seem to involve a false opinion—and this is inconsistent with any virtue—namely to declare oneself more despicable than all men, and to confess and believe oneself to be in all ways worthless and unprofitable. Therefore these are unfittingly placed among the degrees of humility.

Objection 2: Further, humility proceeds from within to externals, as do other virtues. Therefore in the aforesaid degrees, those which concern outward actions are unfittingly placed before those which pertain to inward actions.

Objection 3: Further, Anselm (De Simil. ci, seqq.) gives seven degrees of humility, the first of which is “to acknowledge oneself contemptible”; the second, “to grieve for this”; the third, “to confess it”; the fourth, “to convince others of this, that is to wish them to believe it”; the fifth, “to bear patiently that this be said of us”; the sixth, “to suffer oneself to be treated with contempt”; the seventh, “to love being thus treated.” Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Mat. 3:15 says: “Perfect humility has three degrees. The first is to subject ourselves to those who are above us, and not to set ourselves above our equals: this is sufficient. The second is to submit to our equals, and not to set ourselves before our inferiors; this is called abundant humility. The third degree is to subject ourselves to inferiors, and in this is perfect righteousness.” Therefore the aforesaid degrees would seem to be too numerous.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi): “The measure of humility is apportioned to each one according to his rank. It is imperiled by pride, for the greater a man is the more liable is he to be entrapped.” Now the measure of a man’s greatness cannot be fixed according to a definite number of degrees. Therefore it would seem that it is not possible to assign the aforesaid degrees to humility.

I answer that, As stated above [3604](A[2]) humility has essentially to do with the appetite, in so far as a man restrains the impetuosity of his soul, from tending inordinately to great things: yet its rule is in the cognitive faculty, in that we should not deem ourselves to be above what we are. Also, the principle and origin of both these things is the reverence we bear to God. Now the inward disposition of humility leads to certain outward signs in words, deeds, and gestures, which manifest that which is hidden within, as happens also with the other virtues. For “a man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, by his countenance” (Ecclus. 19:26). Wherefore the aforesaid degrees of humility include something regarding the root of humility, namely the twelfth degree, “that a man fear God and bear all His commandments in mind.”

Again, they include certain things with regard to the appetite, lest one aim inordinately at one’s own excellence. This is done in three ways. First, by not following one’s own will, and this pertains to the eleventh degree; secondly, by regulating it according to one’s superior judgment, and this applies to the tenth degree; thirdly, by not being deterred from this on account of the difficulties and hardships that come in our way, and this belongs to the ninth degree.

Certain things also are included referring to the estimate a man forms in acknowledging his own deficiency, and this in three ways. First by acknowledging and avowing his own shortcomings; this belongs to the eighth degree: secondly, by deeming oneself incapable of great things, and this pertains to the seventh degree: thirdly, that in this respect one should put others before oneself, and this belongs to the sixth degree.

Again, some things are included that refer to outward signs. One of these regards deeds, namely that in one’s work one should not depart from the ordinary way; this applies to the fifth degree. Two others have reference to words, namely that one should not be in a hurry to speak, which pertains to the fourth degree, and that one be not immoderate in speech, which refers to the second. The others have to do with outward gestures, for instance in restraining haughty looks, which regards the first, and in outwardly checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth, and this belongs to the third degree.

Reply to Objection 1: It is possible, without falsehood, to deem and avow oneself the most despicable of men, as regards the hidden faults which we acknowledge in ourselves, and the hidden gifts of God which others have. Hence Augustine says (De Virginit. lii): “Bethink you that some persons are in some hidden way better than you, although outwardly you are better than they.” Again, without falsehood one may avow and believe oneself in all ways unprofitable and useless in respect of one’s own capability, so as to refer all one’s sufficiency to God, according to 2 Cor. 3:5, “Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves: but our sufficiency is from God.” And there is nothing unbecoming in ascribing to humility those things that pertain to other virtues, since, just as one vice arises from another, so, by a natural sequence, the act of one virtue proceeds from the act of another.

Reply to Objection 2: Man arrives at humility in two ways. First and chiefly by a gift of grace, and in this way the inner man precedes the outward man. The other way is by human effort, whereby he first of all restrains the outward man, and afterwards succeeds in plucking out the inward root. It is according to this order that the degrees of humility are here enumerated.

Reply to Objection 3: All the degrees mentioned by Anselm are reducible to knowledge, avowal, and desire of one's own abasement. For the first degree belongs to the knowledge of one's own deficiency; but since it would be wrong for one to love one's own failings, this is excluded by the second degree. The third and fourth degrees regard the avowal of one's own deficiency; namely that not merely one simply assert one's failing, but that one convince another of it. The other three degrees have to do with the appetite, which seeks, not outward excellence, but outward abasement, or bears it with equanimity, whether it consist of words or deeds. For as Gregory says (Regist. ii, 10, Ep. 36), "there is nothing great in being humble towards those who treat us with regard, for even worldly people do this: but we should especially be humble towards those who make us suffer," and this belongs to the fifth and sixth degrees: or the appetite may even go so far as lovingly to embrace external abasement, and this pertains to the seventh degree; so that all these degrees are comprised under the sixth and seventh mentioned above.

Reply to Objection 4: These degrees refer, not to the thing itself, namely the nature of humility, but to the degrees among men, who are either of higher or lower or of equal degree.

Reply to Objection 5: This argument also considers the degrees of humility not according to the nature of the thing, in respect of which the aforesaid degrees are assigned, but according to the various conditions of men.

OF PRIDE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must next consider pride, and (1) pride in general; (2) the first man's sin, which we hold to have been pride. Under the first head there are eight

points of inquiry:
(1) Whether pride is a sin?

(2) Whether it is a special vice?

(3) Wherein does it reside as in its subject?

(4) Of its species;

(5) Whether it is a mortal sin?

(6) Whether it is the most grievous of all sins?

(7) Of its relation to other sins;

(8) Whether it should be reckoned a capital vice?

Whether pride is a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a sin. For no sin is the object of God's promise. For God's promises refer to what He will do; and He is not the author of sin. Now pride is numbered among the Divine promises: for it is written (Is. 60:15): "I will make thee to be an everlasting pride [Douay: 'glory'], a joy unto generation and generation." Therefore pride is not a sin.

Objection 2: Further, it is not a sin to wish to be like unto God: for every creature has a natural desire for this; and especially does this become the rational creature which is made to God's image and likeness. Now it is said in Prosper's Lib. Sent. 294, that "pride is love of one's own excellence, whereby one is likened to God who is supremely excellent." Hence Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Pride imitates exaltedness; whereas Thou alone art God exalted over all." Therefore pride is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, a sin is opposed not only to a virtue but also to a contrary vice, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But no vice is found to be opposed to pride. Therefore pride is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Tob. 4:14): "Never suffer pride to reign in thy mind or in thy words."

I answer that, Pride [superbia] is so called because a man thereby aims higher [supra] than he is; wherefore Isidore says (Etym. x): "A man is said to be proud, because he wishes to appear above (super) what he really is";

for he who wishes to overstep beyond what he is, is proud. Now right reason requires that every man's will should tend to that which is proportionate to him. Therefore it is evident that pride denotes something opposed to right reason, and this shows it to have the character of sin, because according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 4), "the soul's evil is to be opposed to reason." Therefore it is evident that pride is a sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Pride [superbia] may be understood in two ways. First, as overpassing [supergreditur] the rule of reason, and in this sense we say that it is a sin. Secondly, it may simply denominate "super-abundance"; in which sense any super-abundant thing may be called pride: and it is thus that God promises pride as significant of super-abundant good. Hence a gloss of Jerome on the same passage (Is. 61:6) says that "there is a good and an evil pride"; or "a sinful pride which God resists, and a pride that denotes the glory which He bestows."

It may also be replied that pride there signifies abundance of those things in which men may take pride.

Reply to Objection 2: Reason has the direction of those things for which man has a natural appetite; so that if the appetite wander from the rule of reason, whether by excess or by default, it will be sinful, as is the case with the appetite for food which man desires naturally. Now pride is the appetite for excellence in excess of right reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13) that pride is the "desire for inordinate exaltation": and hence it is that, as he asserts (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13; xix, 12), "pride imitates God inordinately: for it hath equality of fellowship under Him, and wishes to usurp Hi. dominion over our fellow-creatures."

Reply to Objection 3: Pride is directly opposed to the virtue of humility, which, in a way, is concerned about the same matter as magnanimity, as stated above ([3605]Q[161], A[1], ad 3). Hence the vice opposed to pride by default is akin to the vice of pusillanimity, which is opposed by default to magnanimity. For just as it belongs to magnanimity to urge the mind to great things against despair, so it belongs to humility to withdraw the mind from the inordinate desire of great things against presumption. Now pusillanimity, if we take it for a deficiency in pursuing great things, is properly opposed to magnanimity by default; but if we take it for the mind's attachment to things beneath what is becoming to a man, it is opposed to humility by default; since each proceeds from a smallness of mind. In the same way, on the other hand, pride may be opposed by excess, both to magnanimity and humility, from different points of view: to humility, inasmuch as it scorns subjection, to magnanimity, inasmuch as it tends to great things inordinately. Since, however, pride implies a certain elation, it is more directly opposed to humility, even as pusillanimity, which denotes littleness of soul in tending towards great things, is more directly opposed to magnanimity.

Whether pride is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a special sin. For Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “you will find no sin that is not labelled pride”; and Prosper says (De Vita Contempl. iii, 2) that “without pride no sin is, or was, or ever will be possible.” Therefore pride is a general sin.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Job 33:17, “That He may withdraw man from wickedness [*Vulg.: ‘From the things that he is doing, and may deliver him from pride’],” says that “a man prides himself when he transgresses His commandments by sin.” Now according to Ambrose [*De Parad. viii], “every sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience of the heavenly commandments.” Therefore every sin is pride.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin is opposed to a special virtue. But pride is opposed to all the virtues, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23): “Pride is by no means content with the destruction of one virtue; it raises itself up against all the powers of the soul, and like an all-pervading and poisonous disease corrupts the whole body”; and Isidore says (Etym. [*De Summo Bono ii, 38]) that it is “the downfall of all virtues.” Therefore pride is not a special sin.

Objection 4: Further, every special sin has a special matter. Now pride has a general matter, for Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that “one man is proud of his gold, another of his eloquence: one is elated by mean and earthly things, another by sublime and heavenly virtues.” Therefore pride is not a special but a general sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix): “If he look into the question carefully, he will find that, according to God’s law, pride is a very different sin from other vices.” Now the genus is not different from its species. Therefore pride is not a general but a special sin.

I answer that, The sin of pride may be considered in two ways. First with regard to its proper species, which it has under the aspect of its proper object. In this way pride is a special sin, because it has a special object: for it is inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, as stated (A[1], ad 2). Secondly, it may be considered as having a certain influence towards other sins. In this way it has somewhat of a generic character, inasmuch as all sins may arise from pride, in two ways. First directly, through other sins being directed to the end of pride which is one’s own excellence, to which may be directed anything that is inordinately desired. Secondly, indirectly and accidentally as it were, that is by removing an obstacle, since pride makes a man despise the Divine law which hinders him from sinning, according to Jer. 2:20, “Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou saidst: I will not serve.”

It must, however, be observed that this generic character of pride admits of the possibility of all vices arising from pride sometimes, but it does not imply that all vices originate from pride always. For though one may break the commandments of the Law by any kind of sin, through contempt which pertains to pride, yet one does not always break the Divine commandments through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance. and sometimes through weakness: and for this reason Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “many things are done amiss which are not done through pride.”

Reply to Objection 1: These words are introduced by Augustine into his book De Nat. et Grat., not as being his own, but as those of someone with whom he is arguing. Hence he subsequently disproves the assertion, and shows that not all sins are committed through pride. We might, however, reply that these authorities must be understood as referring to the outward effect of pride, namely the breaking of the commandments, which applies to every sin, and not to the inward act of pride, namely contempt of the commandment. For sin is committed, not always through contempt, but sometimes through ignorance, sometimes through weakness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: A man may sometimes commit a sin effectively, but not affectively; thus he who, in ignorance, slays his father, is a parricide effectively, but not affectively, since he did not intend it. Accordingly he who breaks God’s commandment is said to pride himself against God, effectively always, but not always affectively.

Reply to Objection 3: A sin may destroy a virtue in two ways. In one way by direct contrariety to a virtue, and thus pride does not corrupt every virtue, but only humility; even as every special sin destroys the special virtue opposed to it, by acting counter thereto. In another way a sin destroys a virtue, by making ill use of that virtue: and thus pride destroys every virtue, in so far as it finds an occasion of pride in every virtue, just as in everything else pertaining to excellence. Hence it does not follow that it is a general sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Pride regards a special aspect in its object, which aspect may be found in various matters: for it is inordinate love of one's excellence, and excellence may be found in various things.

Whether the subject of pride is the irascible faculty?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of pride is not the irascible faculty. For Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17): "A swollen mind is an obstacle to truth, for the swelling shuts out the light." Now the knowledge of truth pertains, not to the irascible but to the rational faculty. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 8) that "the proud observe other people's conduct not so as to set themselves beneath them with humility, but so as to set themselves above them with pride": wherefore it would seem that pride originates in undue observation. Now observation pertains not to the irascible but to the rational faculty.

Objection 3: Further. pride seeks pre-eminence not only in sensible things, but also in spiritual and intelligible things: while it consists essentially in the contempt of God, according to Ecclus. 10:14, "The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God." Now the irascible, since it is a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot extend to God and things intelligible. Therefore pride cannot be in the irascible.

Objection 4: Further, as stated in Prosper's Liber Sententiarum, sent. 294, "Pride is love of one's own excellence." But love is not in the irascible, but in the concupiscible. Therefore pride is not in the irascible.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. ii, 49) opposes pride to the gift of fear. Now fear belongs to the irascible. Therefore pride is in the irascible.

I answer that, The subject of any virtue or vice is to be ascertained from its proper object: for the object of a habit or act cannot be other than the object of the power, which is the subject of both. Now the proper object of pride is something difficult, for pride is the desire of one’s own excellence, as stated above ([3606]AA[1],2). Wherefore pride must needs pertain in some way to the irascible faculty. Now the irascible may be taken in two ways. First in a strict sense, and thus it is a part of the sensitive appetite, even as anger, strictly speaking, is a passion of the sensitive appetite. Secondly, the irascible may be taken in a broader sense, so as to belong also to the intellective appetite, to which also anger is sometimes ascribed. It is thus that we attribute anger to God and the angels, not as a passion, but as denoting the sentence of justice pronouncing judgment. Nevertheless the irascible understood in this broad sense is not distinct from the concupiscible power, as stated above in the [3607]FP, Q[59], A[4]; FS, Q[82], A[5], ad 1 and 2.

Consequently if the difficult thing which is the object of pride, were merely some sensible object, whereto the sensitive appetite might tend, pride would have to be in the irascible which is part of the sensitive appetite. But since the difficult thing which pride has in view is common both to sensible and to spiritual things, we must needs say that the subject of pride is the irascible not only strictly so called, as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also in its wider acceptation, as applicable to the intellective appetite. Wherefore pride is ascribed also to the demons.

Reply to Objection 1: Knowledge of truth is twofold. One is purely speculative, and pride hinders this indirectly by removing its cause. For the proud man subjects not his intellect to God, that he may receive the knowledge of truth from Him, according to Mat. 11:25, “Thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent,” i.e. from the proud, who are wise and prudent in their own eyes, “and hast revealed them to little ones,” i.e. to the humble.

Nor does he deign to learn anything from man, whereas it is written (Ecclus. 6:34): “If thou wilt incline thy ear, thou shalt receive instruction.” The other knowledge of truth is affective, and this is directly hindered by pride, because the proud, through delighting in their own excellence, disdain the excellence of truth; thus Gregory says (Moral. xxiii, 17) that “the proud, although certain hidden truths be conveyed to their understanding, cannot realize their sweetness: and if they know of them they cannot relish them." Hence it is written (Prov. 11:2): "Where humility is there also is wisdom."

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3608]Q[161], AA[2], 6), humility observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem. Now pride does not observe this rule of right reason, for he esteems himself greater than he is: and this is the outcome of an inordinate desire for his own excellence, since a man is ready to believe what he desires very much, the result being that his appetite is borne towards things higher than what become him. Consequently whatsoever things lead a man to inordinate self-esteem lead him to pride: and one of those is the observing of other people's failings, just as, on the other hand, in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxiii, 17), "holy men, by a like observation of other people's virtues, set others above themselves." Accordingly the conclusion is not that pride is in the rational faculty, but that one of its causes is in the reason.

Reply to Objection 3: Pride is in the irascible, not only as a part of the sensitive appetite, but also as having a more general signification, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), "love precedes all other emotions of the soul, and is their cause," wherefore it may be employed to denote any of the other emotions. It is in this sense that pride is said to be "love of one's own excellence," inasmuch as love makes a man presume inordinately on his superiority over others, and this belongs properly to pride.

Whether the four species of pride are fittingly assigned by Gregory?

Objection 1: It seems that the four species of pride are unfittingly assigned by Gregory, who says (Moral. xxiii, 6): "There are four marks by which every kind of pride of the arrogant betrays itself; either when they think that their good is from themselves, or if they believe it to be from above, yet they think that it is due to their own merits; or when they boast of having what they have not, or despise others and wish to appear the exclusive possessors of what they have." For pride is a vice distinct from unbelief, just as humility is a distinct virtue from faith. Now it pertains to unbelief, if a man deem that he has not received his good from God, or that he has the good of grace through his own merits. Therefore this should not be reckoned a species of pride.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing should not be reckoned a species of different genera. Now boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as stated above ([3609]Q[110], A[2];[3610] Q[112]). Therefore it should not be accounted a species of pride.

Objection 3: Further, some other things apparently pertain to pride, which are not mentioned here. For Jerome [*Reference unknown] says that "nothing is so indicative of pride as to show oneself ungrateful": and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 14) that "it belongs to pride to excuse oneself of a sin one has committed." Again, presumption whereby one aims at having what is above one, would seem to have much to do with pride. Therefore the aforesaid division does not sufficiently account for the different species of pride.

Objection 4: Further, we find other divisions of pride. For Anselm [*Eadmer, De Similit. xxii, seqq.] divides the uplifting of pride, saying that there is "pride of will, pride of speech, end pride of deed." Bernard [*De Grad. Humil. et Superb. x, seqq.] also reckons twelve degrees of pride, namely "curiosity, frivolity of mind, senseless mirth, boasting, singularity, arrogance, presumption, defense of one's sins, deceitful confession, rebelliousness, license, sinful habit." Now these apparently are not comprised under the species mentioned by Gregory. Therefore the latter would seem to be assigned unfittingly.

On the contrary, The authority of Gregory suffices.

I answer that, As stated above ([3611]AA[1],2,3), pride denotes immoderate desire of one's own excellence, a desire, to wit, that is not in accord with right reason. Now it must be observed that all excellence results from a good possessed. Such a good may be considered in three ways. First, in itself. For it is evident that the greater the good that one has, the greater the excellence that one derives from it. Hence when a man ascribes to himself a good greater than what he has, it follows that his appetite tends to his own excellence in a measure exceeding his competency: and thus we have the third species of pride, namely "boasting of having what one has not."

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause, in so far as to have a thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it of another. Hence when a man esteems the good he has received of another as though he had it of himself, the result is that his appetite is borne towards his own excellence immoderately. Now one is cause of one’s own good in two ways, efficiently and meritoriously: and thus we have the first two species of pride, namely “when a man thinks he has from himself that which he has from God,” or “when he believes that which he has received from above to be due to his own merits.”

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to the manner of having it, in so far as a man obtains greater excellence through possessing some good more excellently than other men; the result again being that his appetite is borne inordinately towards his own excellence: and thus we have the fourth species of pride, which is “when a man despises others and wishes to be singularly conspicuous.”

Reply to Objection 1: A true judgment may be destroyed in two ways. First, universally: and thus in matters of faith, a true judgment is destroyed by unbelief. Secondly, in some particular matter of choice, and unbelief does not do this. Thus a man who commits fornication, judges that for the time being it is good for him to commit fornication; yet he is not an unbeliever, as he would be, were he to say that universally fornication is good. It is thus in the question in point: for it pertains to unbelief to assert universally that there is a good which is not from God, or that grace is given to men for their merits, whereas, properly speaking, it belongs to pride and not to unbelief, through inordinate desire of one’s own excellence, to boast of one’s goods as though one had them of oneself, or of one’s own merits.

Reply to Objection 2: Boasting is reckoned a species of lying, as regards the outward act whereby a man falsely ascribes to himself what he has not: but as regards the inward arrogance of the heart it is reckoned by Gregory to be a species of pride.

Reply to Objection 3: The ungrateful man ascribes to himself what he has from another: wherefore the first two species of pride pertain to ingratitude. To excuse oneself of a sin one has committed, belongs to the third species, since by so doing a man ascribes to himself the good of innocence which he has not. To aim presumptuously at what is above one, would seem to belong chiefly to the fourth species, which consists in wishing to be preferred to others.

Reply to Objection 4: The three mentioned by Anselm correspond to the progress of any particular sin: for it begins by being conceived in thought, then is uttered in word, and thirdly is accomplished in deed.

The twelve degrees mentioned by Bernard are reckoned by way of opposition to the twelve degrees of humility, of which we have spoken above ([3612]Q[161], A[6]). For the first degree of humility is to “be humble in heart, and to show it in one’s very person, one’s eyes fixed on the ground”: and to this is opposed “curiosity,” which consists in looking around in all directions curiously and inordinately. The second degree of humility is “to speak few and sensible words, and not to be loud of voice”: to this is opposed “frivolity of mind,” by which a man is proud of speech. The third degree of humility is “not to be easily moved and disposed to laughter,” to which is opposed “senseless mirth.” The fourth degree of humility is “to maintain silence until one is asked,” to which is opposed “boasting.” The fifth degree of humility is “to do nothing but to what one is exhorted by the common rule of the monastery,” to which is opposed “singularity,” whereby a man wishes to seem more holy than others. The sixth degree of humility is “to believe and acknowledge oneself viler than all,” to which is opposed “arrogance,” whereby a man sets himself above others. The seventh degree of humility is “to think oneself worthless and unprofitable for all purposes,” to which is opposed “presumption,” whereby a man thinks himself capable of things that are above him. The eighth degree of humility is “to confess one’s sins,” to which is opposed “defense of one’s sins.” The ninth degree is “to embrace patience by obeying under difficult and contrary circumstances,” to which is opposed “deceitful confession,” whereby a man being unwilling to be punished for his sins confesses them deceitfully. The tenth degree of humility is “obedience,” to which is opposed “rebelliousness.” The eleventh degree of humility is “not to delight in fulfilling one’s own desires”; to this is opposed “license,” whereby a man delights in doing freely whatever he will. The last degree of humility is “fear of God”: to this is opposed “the habit of sinning,” which implies contempt of God.

In these twelve degrees not only are the species of pride indicated, but also certain things that precede and follow them, as we have stated above with regard to humility ([3613]Q[161], A[6]).

Whether pride is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not a mortal sin. For a gloss on Ps. 7:4, “O Lord my God, if I have done this thing,” says: “Namely, the universal sin which is pride.” Therefore if pride were a mortal sin, so would every sin be.

Objection 2: Further, every mortal sin is contrary to charity. But pride is apparently not contrary to charity, neither as to the love of God, nor as to the love of one’s neighbor, because the excellence which, by pride, one desires inordinately, is not always opposed to God’s honor, or our neighbor’s good. Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, every mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But pride is not opposed to virtue; on the contrary, it arises therefrom, for as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23), “sometimes a man is elated by sublime and heavenly virtues.” Therefore pride is not a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 23) that “pride is a most evident sign of the reprobate, and contrariwise, humility of the elect.” But men do not become reprobate on account of venial sins. Therefore pride is not a venial but a mortal sin.

I answer that, Pride is opposed to humility. Now humility properly regards the subjection of man to God, as stated above ([3614]Q[161], A[1], ad 5). Hence pride properly regards lack of this subjection, in so far as a man raises himself above that which is appointed to him according to the Divine rule or measure, against the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 10:13), “But we will not glory beyond our measure; but according to the measure of the rule which God hath measured to us.” Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): “The beginning of the pride of man is to fall off from God” because, to wit, the root of pride is found to consist in man not being, in some way, subject to God and His rule. Now it is evident that not to be subject to God is of its very nature a mortal sin, for this consists in turning away from God: and consequently pride is, of its genus, a mortal sin. Nevertheless just as in other sins which are mortal by their genus (for instance fornication and adultery) there are certain motions that are venial by reason of their imperfection (through forestalling the judgment of reason, and being without its consent), so too in the matter of pride it happens that certain motions of pride are venial sins, when reason does not consent to them.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3615](A[2]) pride is a general sin, not by its essence but by a kind of influence, in so far as all sins may have their origin in pride. Hence it does not follow that all sins are mortal, but only such as arise from perfect pride, which we have stated to be a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Pride is always contrary to the love of God, inasmuch as the proud man does not subject himself to the Divine rule as he ought. Sometimes it is also contrary to the love of our neighbor; when, namely, a man sets himself inordinately above his neighbor: and this again is a transgression of the Divine rule, which has established order among men, so that one ought to be subject to another.

Reply to Objection 3: Pride arises from virtue, not as from its direct cause, but as from an accidental cause, in so far as a man makes a virtue an occasion for pride. And nothing prevents one contrary from being the accidental cause of another, as stated in Phys. viii, 1. Hence some are even proud of their humility.

Whether pride is the most grievous of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the most grievous of sins. For the more difficult a sin is to avoid, the less grievous it would seem to be. Now pride is most difficult to avoid; for Augustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), “Other sins find their vent in the accomplishment of evil deeds, whereas pride lies in wait for good deeds to destroy them.” Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

Objection 2: Further, “The greater evil is opposed to the greater good,” as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. viii, 10). Now humility to which pride is opposed is not the greatest of virtues, as stated above (Q[61], A[5]). Therefore the vices that are opposed to greater virtues, such as unbelief, despair, hatred of God, murder, and so forth, are more grievous sins than pride.

Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is not punished by a lesser evil. But pride is sometimes punished by other sins according to Rom. 1:28, where it is stated that on account of their pride of heart, men of science were delivered “to a reprobate sense, to do those things which are not convenient.” Therefore pride is not the most grievous of sins.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 118:51, “The proud did iniquitously,” says: “The greatest sin in man is pride.”

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in sin, conversion to a mutable good, and this is the material part of sin; and aversion from the immutable good, and this gives sin its formal aspect and complement. Now on the part of the conversion, there is no reason for pride being the greatest of sins, because uplifting which pride covets inordinately, is not essentially most incompatible with the good of virtue. But on the part of the aversion, pride has extreme gravity, because in other sins man turns away from God, either through ignorance or through weakness, or through desire for any other good whatever; whereas pride denotes aversion from God simply through being unwilling to be subject to God and His rule. Hence Boethius [*Cf. Cassian, de Caenob. Inst. xii, 7] says that “while all vices flee from God, pride alone withstands God”; for which reason it is specially stated (James 4:6) that “God resisteth the proud.” Wherefore aversion from God and His commandments, which is a consequence as it were in other sins, belongs to pride by its very nature, for its act is the contempt of God. And since that which belongs to a thing by its nature is always of greater weight than that which belongs to it through something else, it follows that pride is the most grievous of sins by its genus, because it exceeds in aversion which is the formal complement of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: A sin is difficult to avoid in two ways. First, on account of the violence of its onslaught; thus anger is violent in its onslaught on account of its impetuosity; and “still more difficult is it to resist concupiscence, on account of its connaturality,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 3,9. A difficulty of this kind in avoiding sin diminishes the gravity of the sin; because a man sins the more grievously, according as he yields to a less impetuous temptation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 12,15).

Secondly, it is difficult to avoid a sin, on account of its being hidden. In this way it is difficult to avoid pride, since it takes occasion even from good deeds, as stated (A[5], ad 3). Hence Augustine says pointedly that it “lies in wait for good deeds”; and it is written (Ps. 141:4): “In the way wherein I walked, the proud [*Cf. Ps. 139:6, ‘The proud have hidden a net for me.’] [Vulg.: ‘they’] have hidden a snare for me.” Hence no very great gravity attaches to the movement of pride while creeping in secretly, and before it is discovered by the judgment of reason: but once discovered by reason, it is easily avoided, both by considering one’s own infirmity, according to Ecclus. 10:9, “Why is earth and ashes proud?” and by considering God’s greatness, according to Job 15:13, “Why doth thy spirit swell against God?” as well as by considering the imperfection of the goods on which man prides himself, according to Is. 40:6, “All flesh is grass, and all the glory thereof as the flower of the field”; and farther on (Is. 64:6), “all our justices” are become “like the rag of a menstruous woman.”

Reply to Objection 2: Opposition between a vice and a virtue is inferred from the object, which is considered on the part of conversion. In this way pride has no claim to be the greatest of sins, as neither has humility to be the greatest of virtues. But it is the greatest on the part of aversion, since it brings greatness upon other sins. For unbelief, by the very fact of its arising out of proud contempt, is rendered more grievous than if it be the outcome of ignorance or weakness. The same applies to despair and the like.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in syllogisms that lead to an impossible conclusion one is sometimes convinced by being faced with a more evident absurdity, so too, in order to overcome their pride, God punishes certain men by allowing them to fall into sins of the flesh, which though they be less grievous are more evidently shameful. Hence Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 38) that “pride is the worst of all vices; whether because it is appropriate to those who are of highest and foremost rank, or because it originates from just and virtuous deeds, so that its guilt is less perceptible. on the other hand, carnal lust is apparent to all, because from the outset it is of a shameful nature: and yet, under God’s dispensation, it is less grievous than pride. For he who is in the clutches of pride and feels it not, falls into the lusts of the flesh, that being thus humbled he may rise from his abasement.”

From this indeed the gravity of pride is made manifest. For just as a wise physician, in order to cure a worse disease, allows the patient to contract one that is less dangerous, so the sin of pride is shown to be more grievous by the very fact that, as a remedy, God allows men to fall into other sins.

Whether pride is the first sin of all?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride is not the first sin of all. For the first is maintained in all that follows. Now pride does not accompany all sins, nor is it the origin of all: for Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xx) that many things are done "amiss which are not done with pride." Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14) that the "beginning of . . . pride is to fall off from God." Therefore falling away from God precedes pride.

Objection 3: Further, the order of sins would seem to be according to the order of virtues. Now, not humility but faith is the first of all virtues. Therefore pride is not the first sin of all.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Tim. 3:13): "Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse"; so that apparently man's beginning of wickedness is not the greatest of sins. But pride is the greatest of sins as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore pride is not the first sin.

Objection 5: Further, resemblance and pretense come after the reality. Now the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that "pride apes fortitude and daring." Therefore the vice of daring precedes the vice of pride.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): "Pride is the beginning of all sin."

I answer that, The first thing in every genus is that which is essential. Now it has been stated above [3616](A[6]) that aversion from God, which is the formal complement of sin, belongs to pride essentially, and to other sins, consequently. Hence it is that pride fulfils the conditions of a first thing, and is "the beginning of all sins," as stated above ([3617]FS, Q[84], A[2]), when we were treating of the causes of sin on the part of the aversion which is the chief part of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Pride is said to be "the beginning of all sin," not as though every sin originated from pride, but because any kind of sin is naturally liable to arise from pride.

Reply to Objection 2: To fall off from God is said to be the beginning of pride, not as though it were a distinct sin from pride, but as being the first part of pride. For it has been said above [3618](A[5]) that pride regards chiefly subjection to God which it scorns, and in consequence it scorns to be subject to a creature for God’s sake.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no need for the order of virtues to be the same as that of vices. For vice is corruptive of virtue. Now that which is first to be generated is the last to be corrupted. Wherefore as faith is the first of virtues, so unbelief is the last of sins, to which sometimes man is led by other sins. Hence a gloss on Ps. 136:7, “Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof,” says that “by heaping vice upon vice a man will lapse into unbelief,” and the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:19) that “some rejecting a good conscience have made shipwreck concerning the faith.”

Reply to Objection 4: Pride is said to be the most grievous of sins because that which gives sin its gravity is essential to pride. Hence pride is the cause of gravity in other sins. Accordingly previous to pride there may be certain less grievous sins that are committed through ignorance or weakness. But among the grievous sins the first is pride, as the cause whereby other sins are rendered more grievous. And as that which is the first in causing sins is the last in the withdrawal from sin, a gloss on Ps. 18:13, “I shall be cleansed from the greatest sin,” says: “Namely from the sin of pride, which is the last in those who return to God, and the first in those who withdraw from God.”

Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher associates pride with feigned fortitude, not that it consists precisely in this, but because man thinks he is more likely to be uplifted before men, if he seem to be daring or brave.

Whether pride should be reckoned a capital vice?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride should be reckoned a capital vice, since Isidore [*Comment. in Deut. xvi] and Cassian [*De Inst. Caenob. v, 1: Collat. v, 2] number pride among the capital vices.

Objection 2: Further, pride is apparently the same as vainglory, since both covet excellence. Now vainglory is reckoned a capital vice. Therefore pride also should be reckoned a capital vice.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Virginit. xxxi) that “pride begets envy, nor is it ever without this companion.” Now envy is reckoned a capital vice, as stated above ([3619]Q[36], A[4]). Much more therefore is pride a capital vice.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45) does not include pride among the capital vices.

I answer that, As stated above ([3620]AA[2],5, ad 1) pride may be considered in two ways; first in itself, as being a special sin; secondly, as having a general influence towards all sins. Now the capital vices are said to be certain special sins from which many kinds of sin arise. Wherefore some, considering pride in the light of a special sin, numbered it together with the other capital vices. But Gregory, taking into consideration its general influence towards all vices, as explained above (A[2], OBJ[3]), did not place it among the capital vices, but held it to be the "queen and mother of all the vices." Hence he says (Moral. xxxi, 45): "Pride, the queen of vices, when it has vanquished and captured the heart, forthwith delivers it into the hands of its lieutenants the seven principal vices, that they may despoil it and produce vices of all kinds."

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Pride is not the same as vainglory, but is the cause thereof: for pride covets excellence inordinately: while vainglory covets the outward show of excellence.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that envy, which is a capital vice, arises from pride, does not prove that pride is a capital vice, but that it is still more principal than the capital vices themselves.

OF THE FIRST MAN'S SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the first man's sin which was pride: and (1) his sin; (2) its punishment; (3) the temptation whereby he was led to sin.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether pride was the first man's first sin?

(2) What the first man coveted by sinning?

(3) Whether his sin was more grievous than all other sins?

(4) Which sinned more grievously, the man or the woman?

Whether pride was the first man's first sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that pride was not the first man’s first sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:19) that “by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners.” Now the first man’s first sin is the one by which all men were made sinners in the point of original sin. Therefore disobedience, and not pride, was the first man’s first sin.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says, commenting on Lk. 4:3, “And the devil said to Him,” that the devil in tempting Christ observed the same order as in overcoming the first man. Now Christ was first tempted to gluttony, as appears from Mat. 4:3, where it was said to Him: “If thou be the Son of God, command that these stones be made bread.” Therefore the first man’s first sin was not pride but gluttony.

Objection 3: Further, man sinned at the devil’s suggestion. Now the devil in tempting man promised him knowledge (Gn. 3:5). Therefore inordinateness in man was through the desire of knowledge, which pertains to curiosity. Therefore curiosity, and not pride, was the first sin.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, Gen. ad lit. xi] on 1 Tim. 2:14, “The woman being seduced was in the transgression,” says: “The Apostle rightly calls this seduction, for they were persuaded to accept a falsehood as being true; namely that God had forbidden them to touch that tree, because He knew that if they touched it, they would be like gods, as though He who made them men, begrudged them the godhead . . .” Now it pertains to unbelief to believe such a thing. Therefore man’s first sin was unbelief and not pride.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): “Pride is the beginning of all sin.” Now man’s first sin is the beginning of all sin, according to Rom. 5:12, “By one man sin entered into this world.” Therefore man’s first sin was pride.

I answer that, Many movements may concur towards one sin, and the character of sin attaches to that one in which inordinateness is first found. And it is evident that inordinateness is in the inward movement of the soul before being in the outward act of the body; since, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 18), the sanctity of the body is not forfeited so long as the sanctity of the soul remains. Also, among the inward movements, the appetite is moved towards the end before being moved towards that which is desired for the sake of the end; and consequently man’s first sin was where it was possible for his appetite to be directed to an inordinate end.

Now man was so appointed in the state of innocence, that there was no rebellion of the flesh against the spirit. Wherefore it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason. It remains therefore that the first inordinateness of the human appetite resulted from his coveting inordinately some spiritual good. Now he would not have coveted it inordinately, by desiring it according to his measure as established by the Divine rule. Hence it follows that man's first sin consisted in his coveting some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride. Therefore it is evident that man's first sin was pride.

Reply to Objection 1: Man's disobedience to the Divine command was not willed by man for his own sake, for this could not happen unless one presuppose inordinateness in his will. It remains therefore that he willed it for the sake of something else. Now the first thing he coveted inordinately was his own excellence; and consequently his disobedience was the result of his pride. This agrees with the statement of Augustine, who says (Ad Oros [*Dial. QQ. lxv, qu. 4]) that "man puffed up with pride obeyed the serpent's prompting, and scorned God's commands."

Reply to Objection 2: Gluttony also had a place in the sin of our first parents. For it is written (Gn. 3:6): "The woman saw that the tree was good to eat, and fair to the eyes, and delightful to behold, and she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat." Yet the very goodness and beauty of the fruit was not their first motive for sinning, but the persuasive words of the serpent, who said (Gn. 3:5): "Your eyes shall be opened and you shall be as Gods": and it was by coveting this that the woman fell into pride. Hence the sin of gluttony resulted from the sin of pride.

Reply to Objection 3: The desire for knowledge resulted in our first parents from their inordinate desire for excellence. Hence the serpent began by saying: "You shall be as Gods," and added: "Knowing good and evil."

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30), "the woman had not believed the serpent's statement that they were debarred by God from a good and useful thing, were her mind not already filled with the love of her own power, and a certain proud self-presumption." This does not mean that pride preceded the promptings of the serpent, but that as soon as the serpent had spoken his words of persuasion, her mind was puffed up, the result being that she believed the demon to have spoken truly.

Whether the first man’s pride consisted in his coveting God’s likeness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the first man’s pride did not consist in his coveting the Divine likeness. For no one sins by coveting that which is competent to him according to his nature. Now God’s likeness is competent to man according to his nature: for it is written (Gn. 1:26): “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem that man coveted God’s likeness in order that he might obtain knowledge of good and evil: for this was the serpent’s suggestion: “You shall be as Gods knowing good and evil.” Now the desire of knowledge is natural to man, according to the saying of the Philosopher at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: “All men naturally desire knowledge.” Therefore he did not sin by coveting God’s likeness.

Objection 3: Further, no wise man chooses the impossible. Now the first man was endowed with wisdom, according to Ecclus. 17:5, “He filled them with the knowledge of understanding.” Since then every sin consists in a deliberate act of the appetite, namely choice, it would seem that the first man did not sin by coveting something impossible. But it is impossible for man to be like God, according to the saying of Ex. 15:11, “Who is like to Thee among the strong, O Lord?” Therefore the first man did not sin by coveting God’s likeness.

On the contrary, Augustine commenting on Ps. 68:5 [*Enarr. in Ps. 68], “Then did I restore [Douay: ‘pay’] that which I took not away,” says: “Adam and Eve wished to rob the Godhead and they lost happiness.”

I answer that, likeness is twofold. One is a likeness of absolute equality [*Cf. [3621]FP, Q[93], A[1]]: and such a likeness to God our first parents did not covet, since such a likeness to God is not conceivable to the mind, especially of a wise man.

The other is a likeness of imitation, such as is possible for a creature in reference to God, in so far as the creature participates somewhat of God’s likeness according to its measure. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): “The same things are like and unlike to God; like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He can be imitated; unlike, according as an effect falls short of its cause.” Now every good existing in a creature is a participated likeness of the first good.

Wherefore from the very fact that man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, as stated in the foregoing Article, it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordinately.

It must, however, be observed that the proper object of the appetite is a thing not possessed. Now spiritual good, in so far as the rational creature participates in the Divine likeness, may be considered in reference to three things. First, as to natural being: and this likeness was imprinted from the very outset of their creation, both on man—of whom it is written (Gn. 1:26) that God made man “to His image and likeness”—and on the angel, of whom it is written (Ezech. 28:12): “Thou wast the seal of resemblance.” Secondly, as to knowledge: and this likeness was bestowed on the angel at his creation, wherefore immediately after the words just quoted, “Thou wast the seal of resemblance,” we read: “Full of wisdom.” But the first man, at his creation, had not yet received this likeness actually but only in potentiality. Thirdly, as to the power of operation: and neither angel nor man received this likeness actually at the very outset of his creation, because to each there remained something to be done whereby to obtain happiness.

Accordingly, while both (namely the devil and the first man) coveted God’s likeness inordinately, neither of them sinned by coveting a likeness of nature. But the first man sinned chiefly by coveting God’s likeness as regards “knowledge of good and evil,” according to the serpent’s instigation, namely that by his own natural power he might decide what was good, and what was evil for him to do; or again that he should of himself foreknow what good and what evil would befall him. Secondarily he sinned by coveting God’s likeness as regards his own power of operation, namely that by his own natural power he might act so as to obtain happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that “the woman’s mind was filled with love of her own power.” On the other hand, the devil sinned by coveting God’s likeness, as regards power. Wherefore Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 13) that “he wished to enjoy his own power rather than God’s.” Nevertheless both coveted somewhat to be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in contempt of the order of the Divine rule.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the likeness of nature: and man did not sin by coveting this, as stated.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not a sin to covet God's likeness as to knowledge, absolutely; but to covet this likeness inordinately, that is, above one's measure, this is a sin. Hence Augustine commenting on Ps. 70:18, "O God, who is like Thee?" says: "He who desires to be of himself, even as God is of no one, wishes wickedly to be like God. Thus did the devil, who was unwilling to be subject to Him, and man who refused to be, as a servant, bound by His command."

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the likeness of equality.

Whether the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15): "Great was the wickedness in sinning, when it was so easy to avoid sin." Now it was very easy for our first parents to avoid sin, because they had nothing within them urging them to sin. Therefore the sin of our first parents was more grievous than other sins.

Objection 2: Further, punishment is proportionate to guilt. Now the sin of our first parents was most severely punished, since by it "death entered into this world," as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12). Therefore that sin was more grievous than other sins.

Objection 3: Further, the first in every genus is seemingly the greatest (Metaph. ii, 4 [*Ed. Diel. i, 1]). Now the sin of our first parents was the first among sins of men. Therefore it was the greatest.

On the contrary, Origen says [*Peri Archon i, 3]: "I think that a man who stands on the highest step of perfection cannot fail or fall suddenly: this can happen only by degrees and little by little." Now our first parents were established on the highest and perfect grade. Therefore their first sin was not the greatest of all sins.

I answer that, There is a twofold gravity to be observed in sin. one results from the very species of the sin: thus we say that adultery is a graver sin than simple fornication. The other gravity of sin results from some circumstance of place, person, or time. The former gravity is more essential to sin and is of greater moment: hence a sin is said to be grave in respect of this gravity rather than of the other. Accordingly we must say that the first man’s sin was not graver than all other sins of men, as regards the species of the sin. For though pride, of its genus, has a certain pre-eminence over other sins, yet the pride whereby one denies or blasphemes God is greater than the pride whereby one covets God’s likeness inordinately, such as the pride of our first parents, as stated [3622](A[2]).

But if we consider the circumstances of the persons who sinned, that sin was most grave on account of the perfection of their state. We must accordingly conclude that this sin was most grievous relatively but not simply.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the gravity of sin as resulting from the person of the sinner.

Reply to Objection 2: The severity of the punishment awarded to that first sin corresponds to the magnitude of the sin, not as regards its species but as regards its being the first sin: because it destroyed the innocence of our original state, and by robbing it of innocence brought disorder upon the whole human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Where things are directly subordinate, the first must needs be the greatest. Such is not the order among sins, for one follows from another accidentally. And thus it does not follow that the first sin is the greatest.

Whether Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s?

Objection 1: It would seem that Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s. For it is written (1 Tim. 2:14): “Adam was not seduced, but the woman being seduced was in the transgression”: and so it would seem that the woman sinned through ignorance, but the man through assured knowledge. Now the latter is the graver sin, according to Lk. 12:47,48, “That servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes: but he that knew not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes.” Therefore Adam’s sin was more grievous than Eve’s.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Decem Chordis 3 [*Serm. ix; xcvi de Temp.]): “If the man is the head, he should live better, and give an example of good deeds to his wife, that she may imitate him.” Now he who ought to do better, sins more grievously, if he commit a sin. Therefore Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

Objection 3: Further, the sin against the Holy Ghost would seem to be the most grievous. Now Adam, apparently, sinned against the Holy Ghost, because while sinning he relied on God’s mercy [*Cf.[3623] Q[21], A[2], OBJ[3]. St. Thomas is evidently alluding to the words of Peter Lombard quoted there], and this pertains to the sin of presumption. Therefore it seems that Adam sinned more grievously than Eve.

On the contrary, Punishment corresponds to guilt. Now the woman was more grievously punished than the man, as appears from Gn. 3. Therefore she sinned more grievously than the man.

I answer that, As stated [3624](A[3]), the gravity of a sin depends on the species rather than on a circumstance of that sin. Accordingly we must assert that, if we consider the condition attaching to these persons, the man’s sin is the more grievous, because he was more perfect than the woman.

As regards the genus itself of the sin, the sin of each is considered to be equal, for each sinned by pride. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 35): “Eve in excusing herself betrays disparity of sex, though parity of pride.”

But as regards the species of pride, the woman sinned more grievously, for three reasons. First, because she was more puffed up than the man. For the woman believed in the serpent’s persuasive words, namely that God had forbidden them to eat of the tree, lest they should become like to Him; so that in wishing to attain to God’s likeness by eating of the forbidden fruit, her pride rose to the height of desiring to obtain something against God’s will. On the other hand, the man did not believe this to be true; wherefore he did not wish to attain to God’s likeness against God’s will: but his pride consisted in wishing to attain thereto by his own power. Secondly, the woman not only herself sinned, but suggested sin to the man; wherefore she sinned against both God and her neighbor. Thirdly, the man’s sin was diminished by the fact that, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 42), “he consented to the sin out of a certain friendly good-will, on account of which a man sometimes will offend God rather than make an enemy of his friend. That he ought not to have done so is shown by the just issue of the Divine sentence.”

It is therefore evident that the woman’s sin was more grievous than the man’s.

Reply to Objection 1: The woman was deceived because she was first of all puffed up with pride. Wherefore her ignorance did not excuse, but aggravated her sin, in so far as it was the cause of her being puffed up with still greater pride.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers the circumstance of personal condition, on account of which the man’s sin was more grievous than the woman’s.

Reply to Objection 3: The man’s reliance on God’s mercy did not reach to contempt of God’s justice, wherein consists the sin against the Holy Ghost, but as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi [*De Civ. Dei xiv, 11]), it was due to the fact that, “having had no experience of God’s severity, he thought the sin to be venial,” i.e. easily forgiven [*Cf. [3625]FS, Q[89], A[3], ad 1].

OF THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE FIRST MAN’S SIN (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the punishments of the first sin; and under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Death, which is the common punishment; (2) the other particular punishments mentioned in Genesis.

Whether death is the punishment of our first parents’ sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that death is not the punishment of our first parents’ sin. For that which is natural to man cannot be called a punishment of sin, because sin does not perfect nature but vitiates it. Now death is natural to man: and this is evident both from the fact that his body is composed of contraries, and because “mortal” is included in the definition of man. Therefore death is not a punishment of our first parents’ sin.

Objection 2: Further, death and other bodily defects are similarly found in man as well as in other animals, according to Eccles. 3:19, “The death of man and of beasts is one, and the condition of them both equal.” But in dumb animals death is not a punishment of sin. Therefore neither is it so in men.

Objection 3: Further, the sin of our first parents was the sin of particular individuals: whereas death affects the entire human nature. Therefore it would seem that it is not a punishment of our first parents’ sin.

Objection 4: Further, all are equally descended from our first parents. Therefore if death were the punishment of our first parents' sin, it would follow that all men would suffer death in equal measure. But this is clearly untrue, since some die sooner, and some more painfully, than others. Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Objection 5: Further, the evil of punishment is from God, as stated above ([3626]FP, Q[48], A[6]; [3627]FP, Q[49], A[2]). But death, apparently, is not from God: for it is written (Wis. 1:13): "God made not death." Therefore death is not the punishment of the first sin.

Objection 6: Further, seemingly, punishments are not meritorious, since merit is comprised under good, and punishment under evil. Now death is sometimes meritorious, as in the case of a martyr's death. Therefore it would seem that death is not a punishment.

Objection 7: Further, punishment would seem to be painful. But death apparently cannot be painful, since man does not feel it when he is dead, and he cannot feel it when he is not dying. Therefore death is not a punishment of sin.

Objection 8: Further, if death were a punishment of sin, it would have followed sin immediately. But this is not true, for our first parents lived a long time after their sin (Gn. 5:5). Therefore, seemingly, death is not a punishment of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): "By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death."

I answer that, If any one, on account of his fault, be deprived of a favor bestowed on him the privation of that favor is a punishment of that fault. Now as we stated in the [3628]FP, Q[95], A[1]; [3629]FP, Q[97], A[1], God bestowed this favor on man, in his primitive state, that as long as his mind was subject to God, the lower powers of his soul would be subject to his rational mind, and his body to his soul. But inasmuch as through sin man's mind withdrew from subjection to God, the result was that neither were his lower powers wholly subject to his reason, whence there followed so great a rebellion of the carnal appetite against the reason: nor was the body wholly subject to the soul; whence arose death and other bodily defects. For life and soundness of body depend on the body being subject to the soul, as the perfectible is subject to its perfection. Consequently, on the other hand, death, sickness, and all defects of the body are due to the lack of the body’s subjection to the soul.

It is therefore evident that as the rebellion of the carnal appetite against the spirit is a punishment of our first parents’ sin, so also are death and all defects of the body.

Reply to Objection 1: A thing is said to be natural if it proceeds from the principles of nature. Now the essential principles of nature are form and matter. The form of man is his rational soul, which is, of itself, immortal: wherefore death is not natural to man on the part of his form. The matter of man is a body such as is composed of contraries, of which corruptibility is a necessary consequence, and in this respect death is natural to man. Now this condition attached to the nature of the human body results from a natural necessity, since it was necessary for the human body to be the organ of touch, and consequently a mean between objects of touch: and this was impossible, were it not composed of contraries, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 11). On the other hand, this condition is not attached to the adaptability of matter to form because, if it were possible, since the form is incorruptible, its matter should rather be incorruptible. In the same way a saw needs to be of iron, this being suitable to its form and action, so that its hardness may make it fit for cutting. But that it be liable to rust is a necessary result of such a matter and is not according to the agent’s choice; for, if the craftsman were able, of the iron he would make a saw that would not rust. Now God Who is the author of man is all-powerful, wherefore when He first made man, He conferred on him the favor of being exempt from the necessity resulting from such a matter: which favor, however, was withdrawn through the sin of our first parents. Accordingly death is both natural on account of a condition attaching to matter, and penal on account of the loss of the Divine favor preserving man from death [*Cf. [3630]FS, Q[85], A[6]].

Reply to Objection 2: This likeness of man to other animals regards a condition attaching to matter, namely the body being composed of contraries. But it does not regard the form, for man’s soul is immortal, whereas the souls of dumb animals are mortal.

Reply to Objection 3: Our first parents were made by God not only as particular individuals, but also as principles of the whole human nature to be transmitted by them to their posterity, together with the Divine favor preserving them from death. Hence through their sin the entire human nature, being deprived of that favor in their posterity, incurred death.

Reply to Objection 4: A twofold defect arises from sin. One is by way of a punishment appointed by a judge: and such a defect should be equal in those to whom the sin pertains equally. The other defect is that which results accidentally from this punishment; for instance, that one who has been deprived of his sight for a sin he has committed, should fall down in the road. Such a defect is not proportionate to the sin, nor does a human judge take it into account, since he cannot foresee chance happenings. Accordingly, the punishment appointed for the first sin and proportionately corresponding thereto, was the withdrawal of the Divine favor whereby the rectitude and integrity of human nature was maintained. But the defects resulting from this withdrawal are death and other penalties of the present life. Wherefore these punishments need not be equal in those to whom the first sin equally appertains. Nevertheless, since God foreknows all future events, Divine providence has so disposed that these penalties are apportioned in different ways to various people. This is not on account of any merits or demerits previous to this life, as Origen held [*Peri Archon ii, 9]: for this is contrary to the words of Rom. 9:11, “When they . . . had not done any good or evil”; and also contrary to statements made in the [3631]FP, Q[90], A[4]; [3632]FP, Q[118], A[3], namely that the soul is not created before the body: but either in punishment of their parents’ sins, inasmuch as the child is something belonging to the father, wherefore parents are often punished in their children; or again it is for a remedy intended for the spiritual welfare of the person who suffers these penalties, to wit that he may thus be turned away from his sins, or lest he take pride in his virtues, and that he may be crowned for his patience.

Reply to Objection 5: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as an evil of human nature, and thus it is not of God, but is a defect befalling man through his fault. Secondly, as having an aspect of good, namely as being a just punishment, and thus it is from God. Wherefore Augustine says (Retract. i, 21) that God is not the author of death, except in so far as it is a punishment.

Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 5), “just as the wicked abuse not only evil but also good things, so do the righteous make good use not only of good but also of evil things. Hence it is that both evil men make evil use of the law, though the law is good, while good men die well, although death is an evil." Wherefore inasmuch as holy men make good use of death, their death is to them meritorious.

Reply to Objection 7: Death may be considered in two ways. First, as the privation of life, and thus death cannot be felt, since it is the privation of sense and life. In this way it involves not pain of sense but pain of loss. Secondly, it may be considered as denoting the corruption which ends in the aforesaid privation. Now we may speak of corruption even as of generation in two ways: in one way as being the term of alteration, and thus in the first instant in which life departs, death is said to be present. In this way also death has no pain of sense. In another way corruption may be taken as including the previous alteration: thus a person is said to die, when he is in motion towards death; just as a thing is said to be engendered, while in motion towards the state of having been engendered: and thus death may be painful.

Reply to Objection 8: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. [*De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. i, 16. Cf. Gen. ad lit. ii. 32]), "although our first parents lived thereafter many years, they began to die on the day when they heard the death-decree, condemning them to decline to old age."

Whether the particular punishments of our first parents are suitably appointed in Scripture?

Objection 1: It would seem that the particular punishments of our first parents are unsuitably appointed in Scripture. For that which would have occurred even without sin should not be described as a punishment for sin. Now seemingly there would have been "pain in child-bearing," even had there been no sin: for the disposition of the female sex is such that offspring cannot be born without pain to the bearer. Likewise the "subjection of woman to man" results from the perfection of the male, and the imperfection of the female sex. Again it belongs to the nature of the earth "to bring forth thorns and thistles," and this would have occurred even had there been no sin. Therefore these are unsuitable punishments of the first sin.

Objection 2: Further, that which pertains to a person's dignity does not, seemingly, pertain to his punishment. But the "multiplying of conceptions" pertains to a woman’s dignity. Therefore it should not be described as the woman’s punishment.

Objection 3: Further, the punishment of our first parents’ sin is transmitted to all, as we have stated with regard to death [3633](A[1]). But all “women’s conceptions” are not “multiplied,” nor does “every man eat bread in the sweat of his face.” Therefore these are not suitable punishments of the first sin.

Objection 4: Further, the place of paradise was made for man. Now nothing in the order of things should be without purpose. Therefore it would seem that the exclusion of man from paradise was not a suitable punishment of man.

Objection 5: Further, this place of the earthly paradise is said to be naturally inaccessible. Therefore it was useless to put other obstacles in the way lest man should return thither, to wit the cherubim, and the “flaming sword turning every way.”

Objection 6: Further, immediately after his sin man was subject to the necessity of dying, so that he could not be restored to immortality by the beneficial tree of life. Therefore it was useless to forbid him to eat of the tree of life, as instanced by the words of Gn. 3:22: “See, lest perhaps he . . . take . . . of the tree of life . . . and live for ever.”

Objection 7: Further, to mock the unhappy seems inconsistent with mercy and clemency, which are most of all ascribed to God in Scripture, according to Ps. 144:9, “His tender mercies are over all His works.” Therefore God is unbecomingly described as mocking our first parents, already reduced through sin to unhappy straits, in the words of Gn. 3:22, “Behold Adam is become as one of Us, knowing good and evil.”

Objection 8: Further, clothes are necessary to man, like food, according to 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and wherewith to be covered, with these we are content.” Therefore just as food was appointed to our first parents before their sin, so also should clothing have been ascribed to them. Therefore after their sin it was unsuitable to say that God made for them garments of skin.

Objection 9: Further, the punishment inflicted for a sin should outweigh in evil the gain realized through the sin: else the punishment would not deter one from sinning. Now through sin our first parents gained in this, that their eyes were opened, according to Gn. 3:7. But this outweighs in good all the penal evils which are stated to have resulted from sin. Therefore the punishments resulting from our first parents' sin are unsuitably described.

On the contrary, These punishments were appointed by God, Who does all things, "in number, weight, and measure [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight.']" (Wis. 11:21).

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, on account of their sin, our first parents were deprived of the Divine favor, whereby the integrity of human nature was maintained in them, and by the withdrawal of this favor human nature incurred penal defects. Hence they were punished in two ways. In the first place by being deprived of that which was befitting the state of integrity, namely the place of the earthly paradise: and this is indicated (Gn. 3:23) where it is stated that "God sent him out of the paradise of pleasure." And since he was unable, of himself, to return to that state of original innocence, it was fitting that obstacles should be placed against his recovering those things that were befitting his original state, namely food (lest he should take of the tree of life) and place; for "God placed before . . . paradise . . . Cherubim, and a flaming sword." Secondly, they were punished by having appointed to them things befitting a nature bereft of the aforesaid favor: and this as regards both the body and the soul. With regard to the body, to which pertains the distinction of sex, one punishment was appointed to the woman and another to the man. To the woman punishment was appointed in respect of two things on account of which she is united to the man; and these are the begetting of children, and community of works pertaining to family life. As regards the begetting of children, she was punished in two ways: first in the weariness to which she is subject while carrying the child after conception, and this is indicated in the words (Gn. 3:16), "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions"; secondly, in the pain which she suffers in giving birth, and this is indicated by the words (Gn. 3:16), "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth." As regards family life she was punished by being subjected to her husband's authority, and this is conveyed in the words (Gn. 3:16), "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power."

Now, just as it belongs to the woman to be subject to her husband in matters relating to the family life, so it belongs to the husband to provide the necessaries of that life. In this respect he was punished in three ways. First, by the barrenness of the earth, in the words (Gn. 3:17), "Cursed is the earth in thy work." Secondly, by the cares of his toil, without which he does not win the fruits of the earth; hence the words (Gn. 3:17), "With labor and toil shalt thou eat thereof all the days of thy life." Thirdly, by the obstacles encountered by the tillers of the soil, wherefore it is written (Gn. 3:18), "Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."

Likewise a triple punishment is ascribed to them on the part of the soul. First, by reason of the confusion they experienced at the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit; hence it is written (Gn. 3:7): "The eyes of them both were opened; and . . . they perceived themselves to be naked." Secondly, by the reproach for their sin, indicated by the words (Gn. 3:22), "Behold Adam is become as one of Us." Thirdly, by the reminder of their coming death, when it was said to him (Gn. 3:19): "Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return." To this also pertains that God made them garments of skin, as a sign of their mortality.

Reply to Objection 1: In the state of innocence child-bearing would have been painless: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Just as, in giving birth, the mother would then be relieved not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity, so in bearing and conceiving the union of both sexes would be one not of lustful desire but of deliberate action" [*Cf. [3634]FP, Q[98], A[2]].

The subjection of the woman to her husband is to be understood as inflicted in punishment of the woman, not as to his headship (since even before sin the man was the "head" and governor "of the woman"), but as to her having now to obey her husband's will even against her own.

If man had not sinned, the earth would have brought forth thorns and thistles to be the food of animals, but not to punish man, because their growth would bring no labor or punishment for the tiller of the soil, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 18). Alcuin [*Interrog. et Resp. in Gen. lxxix], however, holds that, before sin, the earth brought forth no thorns and thistles, whatever: but the former opinion is the better.

Reply to Objection 2: The multiplying of her conceptions was appointed as a punishment to the woman, not on account of the begetting of children, for this would have been the same even before sin, but on account of the numerous sufferings to which the woman is subject, through carrying her offspring after conception. Hence it is expressly stated: "I will multiply thy sorrows, and thy conceptions."

Reply to Objection 3: These punishments affect all somewhat. For any woman who conceives must needs suffer sorrows and bring forth her child with pain: except the Blessed Virgin, who “conceived without corruption, and bore without pain” [*St. Bernard, Serm. in Dom. inf. oct. Assum. B. V. M.], because her conceiving was not according to the law of nature, transmitted from our first parents. And if a woman neither conceives nor bears, she suffers from the defect of barrenness, which outweighs the aforesaid punishments. Likewise whoever tills the soil must needs eat his bread in the sweat of his brow: while those who do not themselves work on the land, are busied with other labors, for “man is born to labor” (Job 5:7): and thus they eat the bread for which others have labored in the sweat of their brow.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the place of the earthly paradise avails not man for his use, it avails him for a lesson; because he knows himself deprived of that place on account of sin, and because by the things that have a bodily existence in that paradise, he is instructed in things pertaining to the heavenly paradise, the way to which is prepared for man by Christ.

Reply to Objection 5: Apart from the mysteries of the spiritual interpretation, this place would seem to be inaccessible, chiefly on account of the extreme heat in the middle zone by reason of the nighness of the sun. This is denoted by the “flaming sword,” which is described as “turning every way,” as being appropriate to the circular movement that causes this heat. And since the movements of corporal creatures are set in order through the ministry of the angels, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4), it was fitting that, besides the sword turning every way, there should be cherubim “to keep the way of the tree of life.” Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 40): “It is to be believed that even in the visible paradise this was done by heavenly powers indeed, so that there was a fiery guard set there by the ministry of angels.”

Reply to Objection 6: After sin, if man had ate of the tree of life, he would not thereby have recovered immortality, but by means of that beneficial food he might have prolonged his life. Hence in the words “And live for ever,” “for ever” signifies “for a long time.” For it was not expedient for man to remain longer in the unhappiness of this life.

Reply to Objection 7: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 39), “these words of God are not so much a mockery of our first parents as a deterrent to others, for whose benefit these things are written, lest they be proud likewise, because Adam not only failed to become that which he coveted to be, but did not keep that to which he was made."

Reply to Objection 8: Clothing is necessary to man in his present state of unhappiness for two reasons. First, to supply a deficiency in respect of external harm caused by, for instance, extreme heat or cold. Secondly, to hide his ignominy and to cover the shame of those members wherein the rebellion of the flesh against the spirit is most manifest. Now these two motives do not apply to the primitive state. because then man's body could not be hurt by any outward thing, as stated in the [3635]FP, Q[97], A[2], nor was there in man's body anything shameful that would bring confusion on him. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23): "And they were both naked, to wit Adam and his wife, and were not ashamed." The same cannot be said of food, which is necessary to entertain the natural heat, and to sustain the body.

Reply to Objection 9: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 31), "We must not imagine that our first parents were created with their eyes closed, especially since it is stated that the woman saw that the tree was fair, and good to eat. Accordingly the eyes of both were opened so that they saw and thought on things which had not occurred to their minds before, this was a mutual concupiscence such as they had not hitherto."

OF OUR FIRST PARENTS' TEMPTATION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider our first parents' temptation, concerning which there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?

(2) Of the manner and order of that temptation.

Whether it was fitting for man to be tempted by the devil?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for man to be tempted by the devil. For the same final punishment is appointed to the angels' sin and to man's, according to Mat. 25:41, "Go [Vulg.: 'Depart from Me'] you cursed into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil and his angels." Now the angels' first sin did not follow a temptation from without.

Therefore neither should man’s first sin have resulted from an outward temptation.

Objection 2: Further, God, Who foreknows the future, knew that through the demon’s temptation man would fall into sin, and thus He knew full well that it was not expedient for man to be tempted. Therefore it would seem unfitting for God to allow him to be tempted.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to savor of punishment that anyone should have an assailant, just as on the other hand the cessation of an assault is akin to a reward. Now punishment should not precede fault. Therefore it was unfitting for man to be tempted before he sinned.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:11): “He that hath not been tempted [Douay: ‘tried’], what manner of things doth he know?”

I answer that, God’s wisdom “orders all things sweetly” (Wis. 8:1), inasmuch as His providence appoints to each one that which is befitting it according to its nature. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “it belongs to providence not to destroy, but to maintain, nature.” Now it is a condition attaching to human nature that one creature can be helped or impeded by another. Wherefore it was fitting that God should both allow man in the state of innocence to be tempted by evil angels, and should cause him to be helped by good angels. And by a special favor of grace, it was granted him that no creature outside himself could harm him against his own will, whereby he was able even to resist the temptation of the demon.

Reply to Objection 1: Above the human nature there is another that admits of the possibility of the evil of fault: but there is not above the angelic nature. Now only one that is already become evil through sin can tempt by leading another into evil. Hence it was fitting that by an evil angel man should be tempted to sin, even as according to the order of nature he is moved forward to perfection by means of a good angel. An angel could be perfected in good by something above him, namely by God, but he could not thus be led into sin, because according to James 1:13, “God is not a tempter of evils.”

Reply to Objection 2: Just as God knew that man, through being tempted, would fall into sin, so too He knew that man was able, by his free will, to resist the tempter. Now the condition attaching to man’s nature required that he should be left to his own will, according to Ecclus. 15:14, “God left” man “in the hand of his own counsel.” Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.

xi, 4): “It seems to me that man would have had no prospect of any special praise, if he were able to lead a good life simply because there was none to persuade him to lead an evil life; since both by nature he had the power, and in his power he had the will, not to consent to the persuader.”

Reply to Objection 3: An assault is penal if it be difficult to resist it: but, in the state of innocence, man was able, without any difficulty, to resist temptation. Consequently the tempter’s assault was not a punishment to man.

Whether the manner and order of the first temptation was fitting?

Objection 1: It would seem that the manner and order of the first temptation was not fitting. For just as in the order of nature the angel was above man, so was the man above the woman. Now sin came upon man through an angel: therefore in like manner it should have come upon the woman through the man; in other words the woman should have been tempted by the man, and not the other way about.

Objection 2: Further, the temptation of our first parents was by suggestion. Now the devil is able to make suggestions to man without making use of an outward sensible creature. Since then our first parents were endowed with a spiritual mind, and adhered less to sensible than to intelligible things, it would have been more fitting for man to be tempted with a merely spiritual, instead of an outward, temptation.

Objection 3: Further, one cannot fittingly suggest an evil except through some apparent good. But many other animals have a greater appearance of good than the serpent has. Therefore man was unfittingly tempted by the devil through a serpent.

Objection 4: Further, the serpent is an irrational animal. Now wisdom, speech, and punishment are not befitting an irrational animal. Therefore the serpent is unfittingly described (Gn. 3:1) as “more subtle than any of the beasts of the earth,” or as “the most prudent of all beasts” according to another version [*The Septuagint]: and likewise is unfittingly stated to have spoken to the woman, and to have been punished by God.

On the contrary, That which is first in any genus should be proportionate to all that follow it in that genus. Now in every kind of sin we find the same order as in the first temptation. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12), it begins with the concupiscence of sin in the sensuality, signified by the serpent; extends to the lower reason, by pleasure, signified by the woman; and reaches to the higher reason by consent in the sin, signified by the man. Therefore the order of the first temptation was fitting.

I answer that, Man is composed of a twofold nature, intellective and sensitive. Hence the devil, in tempting man, made use of a twofold incentive to sin: one on the part of the intellect, by promising the Divine likeness through the acquisition of knowledge which man naturally desires to have; the other on the part of sense. This he did by having recourse to those sensible things, which are most akin to man, partly by tempting the man through the woman who was akin to him in the same species; partly by tempting the woman through the serpent, who was akin to them in the same genus; partly by suggesting to them to eat of the forbidden fruit, which was akin to them in the proximate genus.

Reply to Objection 1: In the act of tempting the devil was by way of principal agent; whereas the woman was employed as an instrument of temptation in bringing about the downfall of the man, both because the woman was weaker than the man, and consequently more liable to be deceived, and because, on account of her union with man, the devil was able to deceive the man especially through her. Now there is no parity between principal agent and instrument, because the principal agent must exceed in power, which is not requisite in the instrumental agent.

Reply to Objection 2: A suggestion whereby the devil suggests something to man spiritually, shows the devil to have more power against man than outward suggestion has, since by an inward suggestion, at least, man’s imagination is changed by the devil [*Cf. [3636]FP, Q[91], A[3]]; whereas by an outward suggestion, a change is wrought merely on an outward creature. Now the devil had a minimum of power against man before sin, wherefore he was unable to tempt him by inward suggestion, but only by outward suggestion.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 3), “we are not to suppose that the devil chose the serpent as his means of temptation; but as he was possessed of the lust of deceit, he could only do so by the animal he was allowed to use for that purpose.”

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29), “the serpent is described as most prudent or subtle, on account of the cunning of the devil, who wrought his wiles in it: thus, we speak of a prudent or cunning tongue, because it is the instrument of a prudent or cunning man in advising something prudently or cunningly. Nor indeed (Gen. ad lit. xi, 28) did the serpent understand the sounds which were conveyed through it to the woman; nor again are we to believe that its soul was changed into a rational nature, since not even men, who are rational by nature, know what they say when a demon speaks in them. Accordingly (Gen. ad lit. xi, 29) the serpent spoke to man, even as the ass on which Balaam sat spoke to him, except that the former was the work of a devil, whereas the latter was the work of an angel. Hence (Gen. ad lit. xi, 36) the serpent was not asked why it had done this, because it had not done this in its own nature, but the devil in it, who was already condemned to everlasting fire on account of his sin: and the words addressed to the serpent were directed to him who wrought through the serpent."

Moreover, as again Augustine says (Super Gen. contra Manich. ii, 17,18), "his, that is, the devil's, punishment mentioned here is that for which we must be on our guard against him, not that which is reserved till the last judgment. For when it was said to him: 'Thou art cursed among all cattle and beasts of the earth,' the cattle are set above him, not in power, but in the preservation of their nature, since the cattle lost no heavenly bliss, seeing that they never had it, but they continue to live in the nature which they received." It is also said to him: "'Upon thy breast and belly shalt thou creep,'" according to another version [*The Septuagint] "Here the breast signifies pride, because it is there that the impulse of the soul dominates, while the belly denotes carnal desire, because this part of the body is softest to the touch: and on these he creeps to those whom he wishes to deceive." The words, "'Earth shalt thou eat all the days of thy life' may be understood in two ways. Either 'Those shall belong to thee, whom thou shalt deceive by earthly lust,' namely sinners who are signified under the name of earth, or a third kind of temptation, namely curiosity, is signified by these words: for to eat earth is to look into things deep and dark." The putting of enmities between him and the woman "means that we cannot be tempted by the devil, except through that part of the soul which bears or reflects the likeness of a woman. The seed of the devil is the temptation to evil, the seed of the woman is the fruit of good works, whereby the temptation to evil is resisted. Wherefore the serpent lies in wait for the woman's heel, that if at any time she fall away towards what is unlawful, pleasure may seize hold of her: and she watches his head that she may shut him out at the very outset of the evil temptation."

OF STUDIOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider studiousness and its opposite, curiosity. Concerning studiousness there are two points of inquiry:
(1) What is the matter of studiousness?

(2) Whether it is a part of temperance?

Whether the proper matter of studiousness is knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not the proper matter of studiousness. For a person is said to be studious because he applies study to certain things. Now a man ought to apply study to every matter, in order to do aright what has to be done. Therefore seemingly knowledge is not the special matter of studiousness.

Objection 2: Further, studiousness is opposed to curiosity. Now curiosity, which is derived from "cura" [care], may also refer to elegance of apparel and other such things, which regard the body; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 13:14): "Make not provision [curam] for the flesh in its concupiscences."

Objection 3: Further it is written (Jer. 6:13): "From the least of them even to the greatest, all study [Douay: 'are given to'] covetousness." Now covetousness is not properly about knowledge, but rather about the possession of wealth, as stated above ([3637]Q[118], A[2]). Therefore studiousness, which is derived from "study," is not properly about knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (Prov. 27:11): "Study wisdom, my son, and make my heart joyful, that thou mayest give an answer to him that reproacheth." Now study, which is commended as a virtue, is the same as that to which the Law urges. Therefore studiousness is properly about "knowledge."

I answer that, Properly speaking, study denotes keen application of the mind to something. Now the mind is not applied to a thing except by knowing that thing. Wherefore the mind’s application to knowledge precedes its application to those things to which man is directed by his knowledge. Hence study regards knowledge in the first place, and as a result it regards any other things the working of which requires to be directed by knowledge. Now the virtues lay claim to that matter about which they are first and foremost; thus fortitude is concerned about dangers of death, and temperance about pleasures of touch. Therefore studiousness is properly ascribed to knowledge.

Reply to Objection 1: Nothing can be done aright as regards other matters, except in so far as is previously directed by the knowing reason. Hence studiousness, to whatever matter it be applied, has a prior regard for knowledge.

Reply to Objection 2: Man’s mind is drawn, on account of his affections, towards the things for which he has an affection, according to Mat. 6:21, “Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.” And since man has special affection for those things which foster the flesh, it follows that man’s thoughts are concerned about things that foster his flesh, so that man seeks to know how he may best sustain his body. Accordingly curiosity is accounted to be about things pertaining to the body by reason of things pertaining to knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: Covetousness craves the acquisition of gain, and for this it is very necessary to be skilled in earthly things. Accordingly studiousness is ascribed to things pertaining to covetousness.

Whether studiousness is a part of temperance?

Objection 1: It would seem that studiousness is not a part of temperance. For a man is said to be studious by reason of his studiousness. Now all virtuous persons without exception are called studious according to the Philosopher, who frequently employs the term “studious” ({spoudaios}) in this sense (Ethic. ix, 4,8,9). [*In the same sense Aristotle says in Ethic. iii, 2, that “every vicious person is ignorant of what he ought to do.”] Therefore studiousness is a general virtue, and not a part of temperance.

Objection 2: Further, studiousness, as stated [3638](A[1]), pertains to knowledge. But knowledge has no connection with the moral virtues which are in the appetitive part of the soul, and pertains rather to the intellectual virtues which are in the cognitive part: wherefore solicitude is an act of prudence as stated above (Q[47], A[9]). Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

Objection 3: Further, a virtue that is ascribed as part of a principal virtue resembles the latter as to mode. Now studiousness does not resemble temperance as to mode, because temperance takes its name from being a kind of restraint, wherefore it is more opposed to the vice that is in excess: whereas studiousness is denominated from being the application of the mind to something, so that it would seem to be opposed to the vice that is in default, namely, neglect of study, rather than to the vice which is in excess, namely curiosity. wherefore, on account of its resemblance to the latter, Isidore says (Etym. x) that “a studious man is one who is curious to study.” Therefore studiousness is not a part of temperance.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): “We are forbidden to be curious: and this is a great gift that temperance bestows.” Now curiosity is prevented by moderate studiousness. Therefore studiousness is a part of temperance.

I answer that, As stated above ([3639]Q[141], AA[3],4,5), it belongs to temperance to moderate the movement of the appetite, lest it tend excessively to that which is desired naturally. Now just as in respect of his corporeal nature man naturally desires the pleasures of food and sex, so, in respect of his soul, he naturally desires to know something; thus the Philosopher observes at the beginning of his Metaphysics i, 1: “All men have a natural desire for knowledge.”

The moderation of this desire pertains to the virtue of studiousness; wherefore it follows that studiousness is a potential part of temperance, as a subordinate virtue annexed to a principal virtue. Moreover, it is comprised under modesty for the reason given above ([3640]Q[160], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: Prudence is the complement of all the moral virtues, as stated in Ethic. vi, 13. Consequently, in so far as the knowledge of prudence pertains to all the virtues, the term “studiousness,” which properly regards knowledge, is applied to all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: The act of a cognitive power is commanded by the appetitive power, which moves all the powers, as stated above ([3641]FS, Q[9], A[1]). Wherefore knowledge regards a twofold good. One is connected with the act of knowledge itself; and this good pertains to the intellectual virtues, and consists in man having a true estimate about each thing. The other good pertains to the act of the appetitive power, and consists in man’s appetite being directed aright in applying the cognitive power in this or that way to this or that thing. And this belongs to the virtue of seriousness. Wherefore it is reckoned among the moral virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 93) in order to be virtuous we must avoid those things to which we are most naturally inclined. Hence it is that, since nature inclines us. chiefly to fear dangers of death, and to seek pleasures of the flesh, fortitude is chiefly commended for a certain steadfast perseverance against such dangers, and temperance for a certain restraint from pleasures of the flesh. But as regards knowledge, man has contrary inclinations. For on the part of the soul, he is inclined to desire knowledge of things; and so it behooves him to exercise a praiseworthy restraint on this desire, lest he seek knowledge immoderately: whereas on the part of his bodily nature, man is inclined to avoid the trouble of seeking knowledge. Accordingly, as regards the first inclination studiousness is a kind of restraint, and it is in this sense that it is reckoned a part of temperance. But as to the second inclination, this virtue derives its praise from a certain keenness of interest in seeking knowledge of things; and from this it takes its name. The former is more essential to this virtue than the latter: since the desire to know directly regards knowledge, to which studiousness is directed, whereas the trouble of learning is an obstacle to knowledge, wherefore it is regarded by this virtue indirectly, as by that which removes an obstacle.

OF CURIOSITY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider curiosity, under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the vice of curiosity can regard intellective knowledge?

(2) Whether it is about sensitive knowledge?

Whether curiosity can be about intellective knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge. Because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), there can be no mean and extremes in things which are essentially good. Now intellective knowledge is essentially good: because man’s perfection would seem to consist in his intellect being reduced from potentiality to act, and this is done by the knowledge of truth. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the good of the human soul is to be in accordance with reason,” whose perfection consists in knowing the truth. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about intellective knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, that which makes man like to God, and which he receives from God, cannot be an evil. Now all abundance of knowledge is from God, according to Ecclus. 1:1, “All wisdom is from the Lord God,” and Wis. 7:17, “He hath given me the true knowledge of things that are, to know the disposition of the whole world, and the virtues of the elements,” etc. Again, by knowing the truth man is likened to God, since “all things are naked and open to His eyes” (Heb. 4:13), and “the Lord is a God of all knowledge” (1 Kings 2:3). Therefore however abundant knowledge of truth may be, it is not evil but good. Now the desire of good is not sinful. Therefore the vice of curiosity cannot be about the intellective knowledge of truth.

Objection 3: Further, if the vice of curiosity can be about any kind of intellective knowledge, it would be chiefly about the philosophical sciences. But, seemingly, there is no sin in being intent on them: for Jerome says (Super Daniel 1:8): “Those who refused to partake of the king’s meat and wine, lest they should be defiled, if they had considered the wisdom and teaching of the Babylonians to be sinful, would never have consented to learn that which was unlawful”: and Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 40) that “if the philosophers made any true statements, we must claim them for our own use, as from unjust possessors.” Therefore curiosity about intellective knowledge cannot be sinful.

On the contrary, Jerome [*Comment. in Ep. ad Ephes. iv, 17] says: “Is it not evident that a man who day and night wrestles with the dialectic art, the student of natural science whose gaze pierces the heavens, walks in vanity of understanding and darkness of mind?” Now vanity of understanding and darkness of mind are sinful. Therefore curiosity about intellective sciences may be sinful.

I answer that, As stated above ([3642]Q[166], A[2], ad 2) studiousness is directly, not about knowledge itself, but about the desire and study in the pursuit of knowledge. Now we must judge differently of the knowledge itself of truth, and of the desire and study in the pursuit of the knowledge of truth. For the knowledge of truth, strictly speaking, is good, but it may be evil accidentally, by reason of some result, either because one takes pride in knowing the truth, according to 1 Cor. 8:1, “Knowledge puffeth up,” or because one uses the knowledge of truth in order to sin.

On the other hand, the desire or study in pursuing the knowledge of truth may be right or wrong. First, when one tends by his study to the knowledge of truth as having evil accidentally annexed to it, for instance those who study to know the truth that they may take pride in their knowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. 21): “Some there are who forsaking virtue, and ignorant of what God is, and of the majesty of that nature which ever remains the same, imagine they are doing something great, if with surpassing curiosity and keenness they explore the whole mass of this body which we call the world. So great a pride is thus begotten, that one would think they dwelt in the very heavens about which they argue.” In like manner, those who study to learn something in order to sin are engaged in a sinful study, according to the saying of Jer. 9:5, “They have taught their tongue to speak lies, they have labored to commit iniquity.”

Secondly, there may be sin by reason of the appetite or study directed to the learning of truth being itself inordinate; and this in four ways. First, when a man is withdrawn by a less profitable study from a study that is an obligation incumbent on him; hence Jerome says [*Epist. xxi ad Damas]: “We see priests forsaking the gospels and the prophets, reading stage-plays, and singing the love songs of pastoral idylls.” Secondly, when a man studies to learn of one, by whom it is unlawful to be taught, as in the case of those who seek to know the future through the demons. This is superstitious curiosity, of which Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 4): “Maybe, the philosophers were debarred from the faith by their sinful curiosity in seeking knowledge from the demons.”

Thirdly, when a man desires to know the truth about creatures, without referring his knowledge to its due end, namely, the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29) that “in studying creatures, we must not be moved by empty and perishable curiosity; but we should ever mount towards immortal and abiding things.”

Fourthly, when a man studies to know the truth above the capacity of his own intelligence, since by so doing men easily fall into error: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 3:22): “Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into things above thy ability . . . and in many of His works be not curious,” and further on (Ecclus. 3:26), “For . . . the suspicion of them hath deceived many, and hath detained their minds in vanity.”

Reply to Objection 1: Man’s good consists in the knowledge of truth; yet man’s sovereign good consists, not in the knowledge of any truth, but in the perfect knowledge of the sovereign truth, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7,8). Hence there may be sin in the knowledge of certain truths, in so far as the desire of such knowledge is not directed in due manner to the knowledge of the sovereign truth, wherein supreme happiness consists.

Reply to Objection 2: Although this argument shows that the knowledge of truth is good in itself, this does not prevent a man from misusing the knowledge of truth for an evil purpose, or from desiring the knowledge of truth inordinately, since even the desire for good should be regulated in due manner.

Reply to Objection 3: The study of philosophy is in itself lawful and commendable, on account of the truth which the philosophers acquired through God revealing it to them, as stated in Rom. 1:19. Since, however, certain philosophers misuse the truth in order to assail the faith, the Apostle says (Col. 2:8): “Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit, according to the tradition of men . . . and not according to Christ”: and Dionysius says (Ep. vii ad Polycarp.) of certain philosophers that “they make an unholy use of divine things against that which is divine, and by divine wisdom strive to destroy the worship of God.”

Whether the vice of curiosity is about sensitive knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vice of curiosity is not about sensitive knowledge. For just as some things are known by the sense of sight, so too are some things known by the senses of touch and taste. Now the vice concerned about objects of touch and taste is not curiosity but lust or gluttony. Therefore seemingly neither is the vice of curiosity about things known by the sight.

Objection 2: Further, curiosity would seem to refer to watching games; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. vi, 8) that when "a fall occurred in the fight, a mighty cry of the whole people struck him strongly, and overcome by curiosity Alypius opened his eyes." But it does not seem to be sinful to watch games, because it gives pleasure on account of the representation, wherein man takes a natural delight, as the Philosopher states (Poet. vi). Therefore the vice of curiosity is not about the knowledge of sensible objects.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem to pertain to curiosity to inquire into our neighbor's actions, as Bede observes [*Comment. in 1 Jn. 2:16]. Now, seemingly, it is not a sin to inquire into the actions of others, because according to Ecclus. 17:12, God "gave to every one of them commandment concerning his neighbor." Therefore the vice of curiosity does not regard the knowledge of such like particular sensible objects.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 38) that "concupiscence of the eyes makes men curious." Now according to Bede (Comment. in 1 Jn. 2:16) "concupiscence of the eyes refers not only to the learning of magic arts, but also to sight-seeing, and to the discovery and dispraise of our neighbor's faults," and all these are particular objects of sense. Therefore since concupiscence of the eves is a sin, even as concupiscence of the flesh and pride of life, which are members of the same division (1 Jn. 2:16), it seems that the vice of curiosity is about the knowledge of sensible things.

I answer that, The knowledge of sensible things is directed to two things. For in the first place, both in man and in other animals, it is directed to the upkeep of the body, because by knowledge of this kind, man and other animals avoid what is harmful to them, and seek those things that are necessary for the body's sustenance. In the second place, it is directed in a manner special to man, to intellective knowledge, whether speculative or practical. Accordingly to employ study for the purpose of knowing sensible things may be sinful in two ways. First, when the sensitive knowledge is not directed to something useful, but turns man away from some useful consideration. Hence Augustine says (Confess. x, 35), "I go no more to see a dog coursing a hare in the circus; but in the open country, if I happen to be passing, that coursing haply will distract me from some weighty thought, and draw me after it . . . and unless Thou, having made me see my weakness, didst speedily admonish me, I become foolishly dull." Secondly, when the knowledge of sensible things is directed to something harmful, as looking on a woman is directed to lust: even so the busy inquiry into other people’s actions is directed to detraction. on the other hand, if one be ordinately intent on the knowledge of sensible things by reason of the necessity of sustaining nature, or for the sake of the study of intelligible truth, this studiousness about the knowledge of sensible things is virtuous.

Reply to Objection 1: Lust and gluttony are about pleasures arising from the use of objects of touch, whereas curiosity is about pleasures arising from the knowledge acquired through all the senses. According to Augustine (Confess. x, 35) “it is called concupiscence of the eyes” because “the sight is the sense chiefly used for obtaining knowledge, so that all sensible things are said to be seen,” and as he says further on: “By this it may more evidently be discerned wherein pleasure and wherein curiosity is the object of the senses; for pleasure seeketh objects beautiful, melodious, fragrant, savory, soft; but curiosity, for trial’s sake, seeketh even the contraries of these, not for the sake of suffering annoyance, but out of the lust of experiment and knowledge.”

Reply to Objection 2: Sight-seeing becomes sinful, when it renders a man prone to the vices of lust and cruelty on account of things he sees represented. Hence Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.] that such sights make men adulterers and shameless.

Reply to Objection 3: One may watch other people’s actions or inquire into them, with a good intent, either for one’s own good—that is in order to be encouraged to better deeds by the deeds of our neighbor—or for our neighbor’s good—that is in order to correct him, if he do anything wrong, according to the rule of charity and the duty of one’s position. This is praiseworthy, according to Heb. 10:24, “Consider one another to provoke unto charity and to good works.” But to observe our neighbor’s faults with the intention of looking down upon them, or of detracting them, or even with no further purpose than that of disturbing them, is sinful: hence it is written (Prov. 24:15), “Lie not in wait, nor seek after wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest.”

OF MODESTY AS CONSISTING IN THE OUTWARD MOVEMENTS OF THE BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider modesty as consisting in the outward movements of the body, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in the outward movements of the body that are done seriously?

(2) Whether there can be a virtue about playful actions?

(3) Of the sin consisting in excess of play;

(4) Of the sin consisting in lack of play.

Whether any virtue regards the outward movements of the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that no virtue regards the outward movements of the body. For every virtue pertains to the spiritual beauty of the soul, according to Ps. 44:14, “All the glory of the king’s daughter is within,” and a gloss adds, “namely, in the conscience.” Now the movements of the body are not within, but without. Therefore there can be no virtue about them.

Objection 2: Further, “Virtues are not in us by nature,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 1). But outward bodily movements are in man by nature, since it is by nature that some are quick, and some slow of movement, and the same applies to other differences of outward movements. Therefore there is no virtue about movements of this kind.

Objection 3: Further, every moral virtue is either about actions directed to another person, as justice, or about passions, as temperance and fortitude. Now outward bodily movements are not directed to another person, nor are they passions. Therefore no virtue is connected with them.

Objection 4: Further, study should be applied to all works of virtue, as stated above ([3643]Q[166], A[1], OBJ[1]; A[2], ad 1). Now it is censurable to apply study to the ordering of one’s outward movements: for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “A becoming gait is one that reflects the carriage of authority, has the tread of gravity, and the foot-print of tranquillity: yet so that there be neither study nor affectation, but natural and artless movement.” Therefore seemingly there is no virtue about the style of outward movements.

On the contrary, The beauty of honesty [*Cf.[3644] Q[145], A[1]] pertains to virtue. Now the style of outward movements pertains to the beauty of honesty. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “The sound of the voice and the gesture of the body are distasteful to me, whether they be unduly soft and nerveless, or coarse and boorish. Let nature be our model; her reflection is gracefulness of conduct and beauty of honesty.” Therefore there is a virtue about the style of outward movement.

I answer that, Moral virtue consists in the things pertaining to man being directed by his reason. Now it is manifest that the outward movements of man are dirigible by reason, since the outward members are set in motion at the command of reason. Hence it is evident that there is a moral virtue concerned with the direction of these movements.

Now the direction of these movements may be considered from a twofold standpoint. First, in respect of fittingness to the person; secondly, in respect of fittingness to externals, whether persons, business, or place. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Beauty of conduct consists in becoming behavior towards others, according to their sex and person,” and this regards the first. As to the second, he adds: “This is the best way to order our behavior, this is the polish becoming to every action.”

Hence Andronicus [*De Affectibus] ascribes two things to these outward movements: namely “taste” [ornatus] which regards what is becoming to the person, wherefore he says that it is the knowledge of what is becoming in movement and behavior; and “methodicalness” [bona ordinatio] which regards what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one’s surroundings, wherefore he calls it “the practical knowledge of separation,” i.e. of the distinction of “acts.”

Reply to Objection 1: Outward movements are signs of the inward disposition, according to Ecclus. 19:27, “The attire of the body, and the laughter of the teeth, and the gait of the man, show what he is”; and Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that “the habit of mind is seen in the gesture of the body,” and that “the body’s movement is an index of the soul.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although it is from natural disposition that a man is inclined to this or that style of outward movement, nevertheless what is lacking to nature can be supplied by the efforts of reason. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let nature guide the movement: and if nature fail in any respect, surely effort will supply the defect.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated (ad 1) outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18) that “from these things,” i.e. the outward movements, “the man that lies hidden in our hearts is esteemed to be either frivolous, or boastful, or impure, or on the other hand sedate, steady, pure, and free from blemish.” It is moreover from our outward movements that other men form their judgment about us, according to Ecclus. 19:26, “A man is known by his look, and a wise man, when thou meetest him, is known by his countenance.” Hence moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons, according to the saying of Augustine in his Rule (Ep. ccxi), “In all your movements, let nothing be done to offend the eye of another, but only that which is becoming to the holiness of your state.” Wherefore the moderation of outward movements may be reduced to two virtues, which the Philosopher mentions in Ethic. iv, 6,7. For, in so far as by outward movements we are directed to other persons, the moderation of our outward movements belongs to “friendliness or affability” [*Cf.[3645] Q[114], A[1]]. This regards pleasure or pain which may arise from words or deeds in reference to others with whom a man comes in contact. And, in so far as outward movements are signs of our inward disposition, their moderation belongs to the virtue of truthfulness [*Cf. Q[9]], whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly.

Reply to Objection 4: It is censurable to study the style of one’s outward movements, by having recourse to pretense in them, so that they do not agree with one’s inward disposition. Nevertheless it behooves one to study them, so that if they be in any way inordinate, this may be corrected. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 18): “Let them be without artifice, but not without correction.”

Whether there can be a virtue about games?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be a virtue about games. For Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 23): “Our Lord said: ‘Woe to you who laugh, for you shall weep.’ Wherefore I consider that all, and not only excessive, games should be avoided.” Now that which can be done virtuously is not to be avoided altogether. Therefore there cannot be a virtue about games.

Objection 2: Further, “Virtue is that which God forms in us, without us,” as stated above ([3646]FS, Q[55], A[4]). Now Chrysostom says [*Hom. vi in Matth.]: “It is not God, but the devil, that is the author of fun. Listen to what happened to those who played: ‘The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.’” Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 6) that “playful actions are not directed to something else.” But it is a requisite of virtue that the agent in choosing should “direct his action to something else,” as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4). Therefore there can be no virtue about games.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Music. ii, 15): “I pray thee, spare thyself at times: for it becomes a wise man sometimes to relax the high pressure of his attention to work.” Now this relaxation of the mind from work consists in playful words or deeds. Therefore it becomes a wise and virtuous man to have recourse to such things at times. Moreover the Philosopher [*Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8] assigns to games the virtue of {eutrapelia}, which we may call “pleasantness.”

I answer that, Just as man needs bodily rest for the body’s refreshment, because he cannot always be at work, since his power is finite and equal to a certain fixed amount of labor, so too is it with his soul, whose power is also finite and equal to a fixed amount of work. Consequently when he goes beyond his measure in a certain work, he is oppressed and becomes weary, and all the more since when the soul works, the body is at work likewise, in so far as the intellective soul employs forces that operate through bodily organs. Now sensible goods are connatural to man, and therefore, when the soul arises above sensibles, through being intent on the operations of reason, there results in consequence a certain weariness of soul, whether the operations with which it is occupied be those of the practical or of the speculative reason. Yet this weariness is greater if the soul be occupied with the work of contemplation, since thereby it is raised higher above sensible things; although perhaps certain outward works of the practical reason entail a greater bodily labor. In either case, however, one man is more soul-wearied than another, according as he is more intensely occupied with works of reason. Now just as weariness of the body is dispelled by resting the body, so weariness of the soul must needs be remedied by resting the soul: and the soul’s rest is pleasure, as stated above ([3647]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3648]FS, Q[31], A[1], ad 2). Consequently, the remedy for weariness of soul must needs consist in the application of some pleasure, by slackening the tension of the reason's study. Thus in the Conferences of the Fathers xxiv, 21, it is related of Blessed John the Evangelist, that when some people were scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples, he is said to have told one of them who carried a bow to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the Blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man's mind would break if its tension were never relaxed.

Now such like words or deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul's delight, are called playful or humorous. Hence it is necessary at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul. This is in agreement with the statement of the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 8) that "in the intercourse of this life there is a kind of rest that is associated with games": and consequently it is sometimes necessary to make use of such things.

Nevertheless it would seem that in this matter there are three points which require especial caution. The first and chief is that the pleasure in question should not be sought in indecent or injurious deeds or words. Wherefore Tully says (De Offic. i, 29) that "one kind of joke is discourteous, insolent, scandalous, obscene." Another thing to be observed is that one lose not the balance of one's mind altogether. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 20): "We should beware lest, when we seek relaxation of mind, we destroy all that harmony which is the concord of good works": and Tully says (De Offic. i, 29), that, "just as we do not allow children to enjoy absolute freedom in their games, but only that which is consistent with good behavior, so our very fun should reflect something of an upright mind." Thirdly, we must be careful, as in all other human actions, to conform ourselves to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances, so that our fun "befit the hour and the man," as Tully says (De Offic. i, 29).

Now these things are directed according to the rule of reason: and a habit that operates according to reason is virtue. Therefore there can be a virtue about games. The Philosopher gives it the name of wittiness ({eutrapelia}), and a man is said to be pleasant through having a happy turn* of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty. [*{Eutrapelia} is derived from {trepein} = 'to turn'].

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, fun should fit with business and persons; wherefore Tully says (De Invent. Rhet. i, 17) that “when the audience is weary, it will be useful for the speaker to try something novel or amusing, provided that joking be not incompatible with the gravity of the subject.” Now the sacred doctrine is concerned with things of the greatest moment, according to Prov. 8:6, “Hear, for I will speak of great things.” Wherefore Ambrose does not altogether exclude fun from human speech, but from the sacred doctrine; hence he begins by saying: “Although jokes are at times fitting and pleasant, nevertheless they are incompatible with the ecclesiastical rule; since how can we have recourse to things which are not to be found in Holy Writ?”

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Chrysostom refers to the inordinate use of fun, especially by those who make the pleasure of games their end; of whom it is written (Wis. 15:12): “They have accounted our life a pastime.” Against these Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “We are so begotten by nature that we appear to be made not for play and fun, but rather for hardships, and for occupations of greater gravity and moment.”

Reply to Objection 3: Playful actions themselves considered in their species are not directed to an end: but the pleasure derived from such actions is directed to the recreation and rest of the soul, and accordingly if this be done with moderation, it is lawful to make use of fun. Hence Tully says (De Offic. i, 29): “It is indeed lawful to make use of play and fun, but in the same way as we have recourse to sleep and other kinds of rest, then only when we have done our duty by grave and serious matters.”

Whether there can be sin in the excess of play?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the excess of play. For that which is an excuse for sin is not held to be sinful. Now play is sometimes an excuse for sin, for many things would be grave sins if they were done seriously, whereas if they be done in fun, are either no sin or but slightly sinful. Therefore it seems that there is no sin in excessive play.

Objection 2: Further, all other vices are reducible to the seven capital vices, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 17). But excess of play does not seem reducible to any of the capital vices. Therefore it would seem not to be a sin.

Objection 3: Further, comedians especially would seem to exceed in play, since they direct their whole life to playing. Therefore if excess of play were a sin, all actors would be in a state of sin; moreover all those who employ them, as well as those who make them any payment, would sin as accomplices of their sin. But this would seem untrue; for it is related in the Lives of the Fathers (ii. 16; viii. 63) that is was revealed to the Blessed Paphnutius that a certain jester would be with him in the life to come.

On the contrary, A gloss on Prov. 14:13, “Laughter shall be mingled with sorrow and mourning taketh hold of the end of joy,” remarks: “A mourning that will last for ever.” Now there is inordinate laughter and inordinate joy in excessive play. Therefore there is mortal sin therein, since mortal sin alone is deserving of everlasting mourning.

I answer that, In all things dirigible according to reason, the excessive is that which goes beyond, and the deficient is that which falls short of the rule of reason. Now it has been stated [3649](A[2]) that playful or jesting words or deeds are dirigible according to reason. Wherefore excessive play is that which goes beyond the rule of reason: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of the very species of the acts employed for the purpose of fun, and this kind of jesting, according to Tully (De Offic. i, 29), is stated to be “discourteous, insolent, scandalous, and obscene,” when to wit a man, for the purpose of jesting, employs indecent words or deeds, or such as are injurious to his neighbor, these being of themselves mortal sins. And thus it is evident that excessive play is a mortal sin.

Secondly, there may be excess in play, through lack of due circumstances: for instance when people make use of fun at undue times or places, or out of keeping with the matter in hand, or persons. This may be sometimes a mortal sin on account of the strong attachment to play, when a man prefers the pleasure he derives therefrom to the love of God, so as to be willing to disobey a commandment of God or of the Church rather than forego, such like amusements. Sometimes, however, it is a venial sin, for instance where a man is not so attached to amusement as to be willing for its sake to do anything in disobedience to God.

Reply to Objection 1: Certain things are sinful on account of the intention alone, because they are done in order to injure someone. Such an intention is excluded by their being done in fun, the intention of which is to please, not to injure: in these cases fun excuses from sin, or diminishes it. Other things, however, are sins according to their species, such as murder, fornication, and the like: and fun is no excuse for these; in fact they make fun scandalous and obscene.

Reply to Objection 2: Excessive play pertains to senseless mirth, which Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) calls a daughter of gluttony. Wherefore it is written (Ex. 32:6): “The people sat down to eat and drink, and they rose up to play.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated [3650](A[2]), play is necessary for the intercourse of human life. Now whatever is useful to human intercourse may have a lawful employment ascribed to it. Wherefore the occupation of play-actors, the object of which is to cheer the heart of man, is not unlawful in itself; nor are they in a state of sin provided that their playing be moderated, namely that they use no unlawful words or deeds in order to amuse, and that they do not introduce play into undue matters and seasons. And although in human affairs, they have no other occupation in reference to other men, nevertheless in reference to themselves, and to God, they perform other actions both serious and virtuous, such as prayer and the moderation of their own passions and operations, while sometimes they give alms to the poor. Wherefore those who maintain them in moderation do not sin but act justly, by rewarding them for their services. on the other hand, if a man spends too much on such persons, or maintains those comedians who practice unlawful mirth, he sins as encouraging them in their sin. Hence Augustine says (Tract. c. in Joan.) that “to give one’s property to comedians is a great sin, not a virtue”; unless by chance some play-actor were in extreme need, in which case one would have to assist him, for Ambrose says (De Offic. [*Quoted in Canon Pasce, dist. 86]): “Feed him that dies of hunger; for whenever thou canst save a man by feeding him, if thou hast not fed him, thou hast slain him.”

Whether there is a sin in lack of mirth?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no sin in lack of mirth. For no sin is prescribed to a penitent. But Augustine speaking of a penitent says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. 15) [*Spurious]: “Let him refrain from games and the sights of the world, if he wishes to obtain the grace of a full pardon.” Therefore there is no sin in lack of mirth.

Objection 2: Further, no sin is included in the praise given to holy men. But some persons are praised for having refrained from mirth; for it is written (Jer. 15:17): “I sat not in the assembly of jesters,” and (Tobias 3:17): “Never have I joined myself with them that play; neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness.” Therefore there can be no sin in the lack of mirth.

Objection 3: Further, Andronicus counts austerity to be one of the virtues, and he describes it as a habit whereby a man neither gives nor receives the pleasures of conversation. Now this pertains to the lack of mirth. Therefore the lack of mirth is virtuous rather than sinful.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 8) reckons the lack of mirth to be a vice.

I answer that, In human affairs whatever is against reason is a sin. Now it is against reason for a man to be burdensome to others, by offering no pleasure to others, and by hindering their enjoyment. Wherefore Seneca [*Martin of Braga, Formula Vitae Honestae: cap. De Continentia] says (De Quat. Virt., cap. De Continentia): “Let your conduct be guided by wisdom so that no one will think you rude, or despise you as a cad.” Now a man who is without mirth, not only is lacking in playful speech, but is also burdensome to others, since he is deaf to the moderate mirth of others. Consequently they are vicious, and are said to be boorish or rude, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iv, 8).

Since, however, mirth is useful for the sake of the rest and pleasures it affords; and since, in human life, pleasure and rest are not in quest for their own sake, but for the sake of operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 6, it follows that “lack of mirth is less sinful than excess thereof.” Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 10): “We should make few friends for the sake of pleasure, since but little sweetness suffices to season life, just as little salt suffices for our meat.”

Reply to Objection 1: Mirth is forbidden the penitent because he is called upon to mourn for his sins. Nor does this imply a vice in default, because this very diminishment of mirth in them is in accordance with reason.

Reply to Objection 2: Jeremias speaks there in accordance with the times, the state of which required that man should mourn; wherefore he adds: “I sat alone, because Thou hast filled me with threats.” The words of Tobias 3 refer to excessive mirth; and this is evident from his adding: “Neither have I made myself partaker with them that walk in lightness.”

Reply to Objection 3: Austerity, as a virtue, does not exclude all pleasures, but only such as are excessive and inordinate; wherefore it would seem to pertain to affability, which the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 6) calls “friendliness,” or {eutrapelia}, otherwise wittiness. Nevertheless he names and defines it thus in respect of its agreement with temperance, to which it belongs to restrain pleasure.

OF MODESTY IN THE OUTWARD APPAREL (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider modesty as connected with the outward apparel, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?

(2) Whether women sin mortally by excessive adornment?

Whether there can be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with outward apparel. For outward adornment does not belong to us by nature, wherefore it varies according to different times and places. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12) that “among the ancient Romans it was scandalous for one to wear a cloak with sleeves and reaching to the ankles, whereas now it is scandalous for anyone hailing from a reputable place to be without them.” Now according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1) there is in us a natural aptitude for the virtues. Therefore there is no virtue or vice about such things.

Objection 2: Further, if there were virtue and vice in connection with outward attire, excess in this matter would be sinful. Now excess in outward attire is not apparently sinful, since even the ministers of the altar use most precious vestments in the sacred ministry. Likewise it would seem not to be sinful to be lacking in this, for it is said in praise of certain people (Heb. 11:37): “They wandered about in sheepskins and in goatskins.” Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in this matter.

Objection 3: Further, every virtue is either theological, or moral, or intellectual. Now an intellectual virtue is not conversant with matter of this kind, since it is a perfection regarding the knowledge of truth. Nor is there a theological virtue connected therewith, since that has God for its object; nor are any of the moral virtues enumerated by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7), connected with it. Therefore it seems that there cannot be virtue and vice in connection with this kind of attire.

On the contrary, Honesty [*Cf. Q[145]] pertains to virtue. Now a certain honesty is observed in the outward apparel; for Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 19): “The body should be bedecked naturally and without affectation, with simplicity, with negligence rather than nicety, not with costly and dazzling apparel, but with ordinary clothes, so that nothing be lacking to honesty and necessity, yet nothing be added to increase its beauty.” Therefore there can be virtue and vice in the outward attire.

I answer that, It is not in the outward things themselves which man uses, that there is vice, but on the part of man who uses them immoderately. This lack of moderation occurs in two ways. First, in comparison with the customs of those among whom one lives; wherefore Augustine says (Confess. iii, 8): “Those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men, are to be avoided according to the customs generally prevailing, so that a thing agreed upon and confirmed by custom or law of any city or nation may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or foreigner. For any part, which harmonizeth not with its whole, is offensive.” Secondly, the lack of moderation in the use of these things may arise from the inordinate attachment of the user, the result being that a man sometimes takes too much pleasure in using them, either in accordance with the custom of those among whom he dwells or contrary to such custom. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “We must avoid excessive pleasure in the use of things, for it leads not only wickedly to abuse the customs of those among whom we dwell, but frequently to exceed their bounds, so that, whereas it lay hidden, while under the restraint of established morality, it displays its deformity in a most lawless outbreak.”

In point of excess, this inordinate attachment occurs in three ways. First when a man seeks glory from excessive attention to dress; in so far as dress and such like things are a kind of ornament. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xl in Ev.): “There are some who think that attention to finery and costly dress is no sin. Surely, if this were no fault, the word of God would not say so expressly that the rich man who was tortured in hell had been clothed in purple and fine linen. No one, forsooth, seeks costly apparel" (such, namely, as exceeds his estate) "save for vainglory." Secondly, when a man seeks sensuous pleasure from excessive attention to dress, in so far as dress is directed to the body's comfort. Thirdly, when a man is too solicitous [*Cf.[3651] Q[55], A[6]] in his attention to outward apparel.

Accordingly Andronicus [*De Affectibus] reckons three virtues in connection with outward attire; namely "humility," which excludes the seeking of glory, wherefore he says that humility is "the habit of avoiding excessive expenditure and parade"; "contentment" [*Cf. Q[143], OBJ[4]], which excludes the seeking of sensuous pleasure, wherefore he says that "contentedness is the habit that makes a man satisfied with what is suitable, and enables him to determine what is becoming in his manner of life" (according to the saying of the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:8): "Having food and wherewith to be covered, with these let us be content;"—and "simplicity," which excludes excessive solicitude about such things, wherefore he says that "simplicity is a habit that makes a man contented with what he has."

In the point of deficiency there may be inordinate attachment in two ways. First, through a man's neglect to give the requisite study or trouble to the use of outward apparel. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that "it is a mark of effeminacy to let one's cloak trail on the ground to avoid the trouble of lifting it up." Secondly, by seeking glory from the very lack of attention to outward attire. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "not only the glare and pomp of outward things, but even dirt and the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God's service"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "both excess and inordinate defect are a subject of ostentation."

Reply to Objection 1: Although outward attire does not come from nature, it belongs to natural reason to moderate it; so that we are naturally inclined to be the recipients of the virtue that moderates outward raiment.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are placed in a position of dignity, or again the ministers of the altar, are attired in more costly apparel than others, not for the sake of their own glory, but to indicate the excellence of their office or of the Divine worship: wherefore this is not sinful in them.

Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “Whoever uses outward things in such a way as to exceed the bounds observed by the good people among whom he dwells, either signifies something by so doing, or is guilty of sin, inasmuch as he uses these things for sensual pleasure or ostentation.”

Likewise there may be sin on the part of deficiency: although it is not always a sin to wear coarser clothes than other people. For, if this be done through ostentation or pride, in order to set oneself above others, it is a sin of superstition; whereas, if this be done to tame the flesh, or to humble the spirit, it belongs to the virtue of temperance. Hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12): “Whoever uses transitory things with greater restraint than is customary with those among whom he dwells, is either temperate or superstitious.” Especially, however, is the use of coarse raiment befitting to those who by word and example urge others to repentance, as did the prophets of whom the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted. Wherefore a gloss on Mat. 3:4, says: “He who preaches penance, wears the garb of penance.”

Reply to Objection 3: This outward apparel is an indication of man’s estate; wherefore excess, deficiency, and mean therein, are referable to the virtue of truthfulness, which the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7) assigns to deeds and words, which are indications of something connected with man’s estate.

Whether the adornment of women is devoid of mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin. For whatever is contrary to a precept of the Divine law is a mortal sin. Now the adornment of women is contrary to a precept of the Divine law; for it is written (1 Pet. 3:3): “Whose,” namely women’s, “adorning, let it not be the outward plaiting of the hair, or the wearing of gold, or the putting on of apparel.” Wherefore a gloss of Cyprian says: “Those who are clothed in silk and purple cannot sincerely put on Christ: those who are bedecked with gold and pearls and trinkets have forfeited the adornments of mind and body.” Now this is not done without a mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women cannot be devoid of mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.): “I hold that not only virgins and widows, but also wives and all women without exception, should be admonished that nowise should they deface God’s work and fabric, the clay that He has fashioned, with the aid of yellow pigments, black powders or rouge, or by applying any dye that alters the natural features." And afterwards he adds: "They lay hands on God, when they strive to reform what He has formed. This is an assault on the Divine handiwork, a distortion of the truth. Thou shalt not be able to see God, having no longer the eyes that God made, but those the devil has unmade; with him shalt thou burn on whose account thou art bedecked." But this is not due except to mortal sin. Therefore the adornment of women is not devoid of mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, just as it is unbecoming for a woman to wear man's clothes, so is it unbecoming for her to adorn herself inordinately. Now the former is a sin, for it is written (Dt. 22:5): "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel." Therefore it seems that also the excessive adornment of women is a mortal sin.

Objection 4: On the contrary, If this were true it would seem that the makers of these means of adornment sin mortally.

I answer that, As regards the adornment of women, we must bear in mind the general statements made above [3652](A[1]) concerning outward apparel, and also something special, namely that a woman's apparel may incite men to lust, according to Prov. 7:10, "Behold a woman meeteth him in harlot's attire, prepared to deceive souls."

Nevertheless a woman may use means to please her husband, lest through despising her he fall into adultery. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 7:34) that the woman "that is married thinketh on the things of the world, how she may please her husband." Wherefore if a married woman adorn herself in order to please her husband she can do this without sin.

But those women who have no husband nor wish to have one, or who are in a state of life inconsistent with marriage, cannot without sin desire to give lustful pleasure to those men who see them, because this is to incite them to sin. And if indeed they adorn themselves with this intention of provoking others to lust, they sin mortally; whereas if they do so from frivolity, or from vanity for the sake of ostentation, it is not always mortal, but sometimes venial. And the same applies to men in this respect. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "I do not wish you to be hasty in forbidding the wearing of gold or costly attire except in the case of those who being neither married nor wishful to marry, should think how they may please God: whereas the others think on the things of the world, either husbands how they may please their wives, or wives how they may please their husbands, except that it is unbecoming for women though married to uncover their hair, since the Apostle commands them to cover the head." Yet in this case some might be excused from sin, when they do this not through vanity but on account of some contrary custom: although such a custom is not to be commended.

Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on this passage, "The wives of those who were in distress despised their husbands, and decked themselves that they might please other men": and the Apostle forbids this. Cyprian is speaking in the same sense; yet he does not forbid married women to adorn themselves in order to please their husbands, lest the latter be afforded an occasion of sin with other women. Hence the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:9): "Women . . . in ornate [Douay: 'decent'] apparel, adorning themselves with modesty and sobriety, not with plaited hair, or gold, or pearls, or costly attire": whence we are given to understand that women are not forbidden to adorn themselves soberly and moderately but to do so excessively, shamelessly, and immodestly.

Reply to Objection 2: Cyprian is speaking of women painting themselves: this is a kind of falsification, which cannot be devoid of sin. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ccxlv ad Possid.): "To dye oneself with paints in order to have a rosier or a paler complexion is a lying counterfeit. I doubt whether even their husbands are willing to be deceived by it, by whom alone" (i.e. the husbands) "are they to be permitted, but not ordered, to adorn themselves." However, such painting does not always involve a mortal sin, but only when it is done for the sake of sensuous pleasure or in contempt of God, and it is to like cases that Cyprian refers.

It must, however, be observed that it is one thing to counterfeit a beauty one has not, and another to hide a disfigurement arising from some cause such as sickness or the like. For this is lawful, since according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:23), "such as we think to be the less honorable members of the body, about these we put more abundant honor."

Reply to Objection 3: As stated in the foregoing Article, outward apparel should be consistent with the estate of the person, according to the general custom. Hence it is in itself sinful for a woman to wear man's clothes, or vice versa; especially since this may be a cause of sensuous pleasure; and it is expressly forbidden in the Law (Dt. 22) because the Gentiles used to practice this change of attire for the purpose of idolatrous superstition. Nevertheless this may be done sometimes without sin on account of some necessity, either in order to hide oneself from enemies, or through lack of other clothes, or for some similar motive.

Reply to Objection 4: In the case of an art directed to the production of goods which men cannot use without sin, it follows that the workmen sin in making such things, as directly affording others an occasion of sin; for instance, if a man were to make idols or anything pertaining to idolatrous worship. But in the case of an art the products of which may be employed by man either for a good or for an evil use, such as swords, arrows, and the like, the practice of such an art is not sinful. These alone should be called arts; wherefore Chrysostom says [*Hom. xlix super Matth.]: “The name of art should be applied to those only which contribute towards and produce necessaries and mainstays of life.” In the case of an art that produces things which for the most part some people put to an evil use, although such arts are not unlawful in themselves, nevertheless, according to the teaching of Plato, they should be extirpated from the State by the governing authority. Accordingly, since women may lawfully adorn themselves, whether to maintain the fitness of their estate, or even by adding something thereto, in order to please their husbands, it follows that those who make such means of adornment do not sin in the practice of their art, except perhaps by inventing means that are superfluous and fantastic. Hence Chrysostom says (Super Matth.) that “even the shoemakers’ and clothiers’ arts stand in need of restraint, for they have lent their art to lust, by abusing its needs, and debasing art by art.”

OF THE PRECEPTS OF TEMPERANCE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the precepts of temperance:

(1) The precepts of temperance itself;

(2) The precepts of its parts.

Whether the precepts of temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. Because fortitude is a greater virtue than temperance, as stated above (Q[123], A[12]; Q[141], A[8]; [3653]FS, Q[66], A[4]). Now there is no precept of fortitude among the precepts of the decalogue, which are the most important among the precepts of the Law. Therefore it was unfitting to include among the precepts of the decalogue the prohibition of adultery, which is contrary to temperance, as stated above (Q[154], AA[1],8).

Objection 2: Further, temperance is not only about venereal matters, but also about pleasures of meat and drink. Now the precepts of the decalogue include no prohibition of a vice pertaining to pleasures of meat and drink, or to any other species of lust. Neither, therefore, should they include a precept prohibiting adultery, which pertains to venereal pleasure.

Objection 3: Further, in the lawgiver's intention inducement to virtue precedes the prohibition of vice, since vices are forbidden in order that obstacles to virtue may be removed. Now the precepts of the decalogue are the most important in the Divine law. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue should have included an affirmative precept directly prescribing the virtue of temperance, rather than a negative precept forbidding adultery which is directly opposed thereto.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Scripture in the decalogue (Ex. 20:14, 17).

I answer that, As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), "the end of the commandment is charity," which is enjoined upon us in the two precepts concerning the love of God and of our neighbor. Wherefore the decalogue contains those precepts which tend more directly to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery would seem most of all opposed to the love of our neighbor, since thereby a man lays hold of another's property for his own use, by abusing his neighbor's wife. Wherefore the precepts of the decalogue include a special prohibition of adultery, not only as committed in deed, but also as desired in thought.

Reply to Objection 1: Among the species of vices opposed to fortitude there is not one that is so directly opposed to the love of our neighbor as adultery, which is a species of lust that is opposed to temperance. And yet the vice of daring, which is opposed to fortitude, is wont to be sometimes the cause of murder, which is forbidden by one of the precepts of the decalogue: for it is written (Ecclus. 8:18): “Go not on the way with a bold man lest he burden thee with his evils.”

Reply to Objection 2: Gluttony is not directly opposed to the love of our neighbor, as adultery is. Nor indeed is any other species of lust, for a father is not so wronged by the seduction of the virgin over whom he has no connubial right, as is the husband by the adultery of his wife, for he, not the wife herself, has power over her body [*1 Cor. 7:4].

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3654]Q[122], AA[1],4) the precepts of the decalogue are universal principles of the Divine law; hence they need to be common precepts. Now it was not possible to give any common affirmative precepts of temperance, because the practice of temperance varies according to different times, as Augustine remarks (De Bono Conjug. xv, 7), and according to different human laws and customs.

Whether the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are suitably given in the Divine law?

Objection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the virtues annexed to temperance are unsuitably given in the Divine law. For the precepts of the Decalogue, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), are certain universal principles of the whole Divine law. Now “pride is the beginning of all sin,” according to Ecclus. 10:15. Therefore among the precepts of the Decalogue there should have been one forbidding pride.

Objection 2: Further, a place before all should have been given in the decalogue to those precepts by which men are especially induced to fulfil the Law, because these would seem to be the most important. Now since humility subjects man to God, it would seem most of all to dispose man to the fulfilment of the Divine law; wherefore obedience is accounted one of the degrees of humility, as stated above ([3655]Q[161], A[6]); and the same apparently applies to meekness, the effect of which is that a man does not contradict the Divine Scriptures, as Augustine observes (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 7). Therefore it seems that the Decalogue should have contained precepts of humility and meekness.

Objection 3: Further, it was stated in the foregoing Article that adultery is forbidden in the decalogue, because it is contrary to the love of our neighbor. But inordinateness of outward movements, which is contrary to modesty, is opposed to neighborly love: wherefore Augustine says in his

Rule (Ep. ccxii): “In all your movements let nothing be done to offend the eye of any person whatever.” Therefore it seems that this kind of inordinateness should also have been forbidden by a precept of the Decalogue.

On the contrary, suffices the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The virtues annexed to temperance may be considered in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, in their effects. Considered in themselves they have no direct connection with the love of God or of our neighbor; rather do they regard a certain moderation of things pertaining to man himself. But considered in their effects, they may regard the love of God or of our neighbor: and in this respect the decalogue contains precepts that relate to the prohibition of the effects of the vices opposed to the parts of temperance. Thus the effect of anger, which is opposed to meekness, is sometimes that a man goes on to commit murder (and this is forbidden in the Decalogue), and sometimes that he refuses due honor to his parents, which may also be the result of pride, which leads many to transgress the precepts of the first table.

Reply to Objection 1: Pride is the beginning of sin, but it lies hidden in the heart; and its inordinateness is not perceived by all in common. Hence there was no place for its prohibition among the precepts of the Decalogue, which are like first self-evident principles.

Reply to Objection 2: Those precepts which are essentially an inducement to the observance of the Law presuppose the Law to be already given, wherefore they cannot be first precepts of the Law so as to have a place in the Decalogue.

Reply to Objection 3: Inordinate outward movement is not injurious to one’s neighbor, if we consider the species of the act, as are murder, adultery, and theft, which are forbidden in the decalogue; but only as being signs of an inward inordinateness, as stated above ([3656]Q[168], A[1], ad 1,3).

TREATISE ON GRATUITOUS GRACES (QQ[171]-182)

OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

After treating individually of all the virtues and vices that pertain to men of all conditions and estates, we must now consider those things which pertain especially to certain men. Now there is a triple difference between men as regards things connected with the soul's habits and acts. First, in reference to the various gratuitous graces, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, 7: "There are diversities of graces . . . and to one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge," etc. Another difference arises from the diversities of life, namely the active and the contemplative life, which correspond to diverse purposes of operation, wherefore it is stated (1 Cor. 12:4, 7) that "there are diversities of operations." For the purpose of operation in Martha, who "was busy about much serving," which pertains to the active life, differed from the purpose of operation in Mary, "who sitting . . . at the Lord's feet, heard His word" (Lk. 10:39,40), which pertains to the contemplative life. A third difference corresponds to the various duties and states of life, as expressed in Eph. 4:11, "And He gave some apostles; and some prophets; and other some evangelists; and other some pastors and doctors": and this pertains to diversity of ministries, of which it is written (1 Cor. 12:5): "There are diversities of ministries."

With regard to gratuitous graces, which are the first object to be considered, it must be observed that some of them pertain to knowledge, some to speech, and some to operation. Now all things pertaining to knowledge may be comprised under "prophecy," since prophetic revelation extends not only to future events relating to man, but also to things relating to God, both as to those which are to be believed by all and are matters of "faith," and as to yet higher mysteries, which concern the perfect and belong to "wisdom." Again, prophetic revelation is about things pertaining to spiritual substances, by whom we are urged to good or evil; this pertains to the "discernment of spirits." Moreover it extends to the direction of human acts, and this pertains to "knowledge," as we shall explain further on ([3657]Q[177]). Accordingly we must first of all consider prophecy, and rapture which is a degree of prophecy.

Prophecy admits of four heads of consideration: (1) its essence; (2) its cause; (3) the mode of prophetic knowledge; (4) the division of prophecy.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?

(2) Whether it is a habit?

(3) Whether it is only about future contingencies?

(4) Whether a prophet knows all possible matters of prophecy?

(5) Whether a prophet distinguishes that which he perceives by the gift of God, from that which he perceives by his own spirit?

(6) Whether anything false can be the matter of prophecy?

Whether prophecy pertains to knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge. For it is written (Ecclus. 48:14) that after death the body of Eliseus prophesied, and further on (Ecclus. 49:18) it is said of Joseph that "his bones were visited, and after death they prophesied." Now no knowledge remains in the body or in the bones after death. Therefore prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 14:3): "He that prophesieth, speaketh to men unto edification." Now speech is not knowledge itself, but its effect. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, every cognitive perfection excludes folly and madness. Yet both of these are consistent with prophecy; for it is written (Osee 9:7): "Know ye, O Israel, that the prophet was foolish and mad [*Vulg.: 'the spiritual man was mad']." Therefore prophecy is not a cognitive perfection.

Objection 4: Further, just as revelation regards the intellect, so inspiration regards, apparently, the affections, since it denotes a kind of motion. Now prophecy is described as “inspiration” or “revelation,” according to Cassiodorus [*Prolog. super Psalt. i]. Therefore it would seem that prophecy does not pertain to the intellect more than to the affections.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Kings 9:9): “For he that is now called a prophet, in time past was called a seer.” Now sight pertains to knowledge. Therefore prophecy pertains to knowledge.

I answer that, Prophecy first and chiefly consists in knowledge, because, to wit, prophets know things that are far [procul] removed from man’s knowledge. Wherefore they may be said to take their name from {phanos}, “apparition,” because things appear to them from afar. Wherefore, as Isidore states (Etym. vii, 8), “in the Old Testament, they were called Seers, because they saw what others saw not, and surveyed things hidden in mystery.” Hence among heathen nations they were known as “vates, on account of their power of mind [vi mentis],” [*The Latin ‘vates’ is from the Greek {phates}, and may be rendered ‘soothsayer’] (Etym. viii, 7).

Since, however, it is written (1 Cor. 12:7): “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” and further on (1 Cor. 14:12): “Seek to abound unto the edification of the Church,” it follows that prophecy consists secondarily in speech, in so far as the prophets declare for the instruction of others, the things they know through being taught of God, according to the saying of Is. 21:10, “That which I have heard of the Lord of hosts, the God of Israel, I have declared unto you.” Accordingly, as Isidore says (Etym. viii, 7), “prophets” may be described as “proefatores [foretellers], because they tell from afar [porro fantur],” that is, speak from a distance, “and foretell the truth about things to come.”

Now those things above human ken which are revealed by God cannot be confirmed by human reason, which they surpass as regards the operation of the Divine power, according to Mk. 16:20, “They . . . preached everywhere, the Lord working withal and confirming the word with signs that followed.” Hence, thirdly, prophecy is concerned with the working of miracles, as a kind of confirmation of the prophetic utterances. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): “There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face, in all the signs and wonders.”

Reply to Objection 1: These passages speak of prophecy in reference to the third point just mentioned, which regards the proof of prophecy.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the prophetic utterances.

Reply to Objection 3: Those prophets who are described as foolish and mad are not true but false prophets, of whom it is said (Jer. 3:16): "Hearken not to the words of the prophets that prophesy to you, and deceive you; they speak a vision of their own heart, and not out of the mouth of the Lord," and (Ezech. 13:3): "Woe to the foolish prophets, that follow their own spirit, and see nothing."

Reply to Objection 4: It is requisite to prophecy that the intention of the mind be raised to the perception of Divine things: wherefore it is written (Ezech. 2:1): "Son of man, stand upon thy feet, and I will speak to thee." This raising of the intention is brought about by the motion of the Holy Ghost, wherefore the text goes on to say: "And the Spirit entered into me . . . and He set me upon my feet." After the mind's intention has been raised to heavenly things, it perceives the things of God; hence the text continues: "And I heard Him speaking to me." Accordingly inspiration is requisite for prophecy, as regards the raising of the mind, according to Job 32:8, "The inspiration of the Almighty giveth understanding": while revelation is necessary, as regards the very perception of Divine things, whereby prophecy is completed; by its means the veil of darkness and ignorance is removed, according to Job 12:22, "He discovereth great things out of darkness."

Whether prophecy is a habit?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is a habit. For according to Ethic. ii, 5, "there are three things in the soul, power, passion, and habit." Now prophecy is not a power, for then it would be in all men, since the powers of the soul are common to them. Again it is not a passion, since the passions belong to the appetitive faculty, as stated above ([3658]FS, Q[22] , A[2]); whereas prophecy pertains principally to knowledge, as stated in the foregoing Article. Therefore prophecy is a habit.

Objection 2: Further, every perfection of the soul, which is not always in act, is a habit. Now prophecy is a perfection of the soul; and it is not always in act, else a prophet could not be described as asleep. Therefore seemingly prophecy is a habit.

Objection 3: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. Now grace is something in the soul, after the manner of a habit, as stated above ([3659]FS, Q[110], A[2]). Therefore prophecy is a habit.

On the contrary, A habit is something "whereby we act when we will," as the Commentator [*Averroes or Ibn Roshd, 1120–1198] says (De Anima iii). But a man cannot make use of prophecy when he will, as appears in the case of Eliseus (4 Kings 3:15), "who on Josaphat inquiring of him concerning the future, and the spirit of prophecy failing him, caused a minstrel to be brought to him, that the spirit of prophecy might come down upon him through the praise of psalmody, and fill his mind with things to come," as Gregory observes (Hom. i super Ezech.). Therefore prophecy is not a habit.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13), "all that is made manifest is light," because, to wit, just as the manifestation of the material sight takes place through material light, so too the manifestation of intellectual sight takes place through intellectual light. Accordingly manifestation must be proportionate to the light by means of which it takes place, even as an effect is proportionate to its cause. Since then prophecy pertains to a knowledge that surpasses natural reason, as stated above [3660](A[1]), it follows that prophecy requires an intellectual light surpassing the light of natural reason. Hence the saying of Micah 7:8: "When I sit in darkness, the Lord is my light." Now light may be in a subject in two ways: first, by way of an abiding form, as material light is in the sun, and in fire; secondly, by way of a passion, or passing impression, as light is in the air. Now the prophetic light is not in the prophet's intellect by way of an abiding form, else a prophet would always be able to prophesy, which is clearly false. For Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy is lacking to the prophet, nor is it always within the call of his mind, yet so that in its absence he knows that its presence is due to a gift." Hence Eliseus said of the Sunamite woman (4 Kings 4:27): "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and hath not told me." The reason for this is that the intellectual light that is in a subject by way of an abiding and complete form, perfects the intellect chiefly to the effect of knowing the principle of the things manifested by that light; thus by the light of the active intellect the intellect knows chiefly the first principles of all things known naturally. Now the principle of things pertaining to supernatural knowledge, which are manifested by prophecy, is God Himself, Whom the prophets do not see in His essence, although He is seen by the blessed in heaven, in whom this light is by way of an abiding and complete form, according to Ps. 35:10, “In Thy light we shall see light.”

It follows therefore that the prophetic light is in the prophet’s soul by way of a passion or transitory impression. This is indicated Ex. 33:22: “When my glory shall pass, I will set thee in a hole of the rock,” etc., and 3 Kings 19:11: “Go forth and stand upon the mount before the Lord; and behold the Lord passeth,” etc. Hence it is that even as the air is ever in need of a fresh enlightening, so too the prophet’s mind is always in need of a fresh revelation; thus a disciple who has not yet acquired the principles of an art needs to have every detail explained to him. Wherefore it is written (Is. 1:4): “In the morning He wakeneth my ear, so that I may hear Him as a master.” This is also indicated by the very manner in which prophecies are uttered: thus it is stated that “the Lord spake to such and such a prophet,” or that “the word of the Lord,” or “the hand of the Lord was made upon him.”

But a habit is an abiding form. Wherefore it is evident that, properly speaking, prophecy is not a habit.

Reply to Objection 1: This division of the Philosopher’s does not comprise absolutely all that is in the soul, but only such as can be principles of moral actions, which are done sometimes from passion, sometimes from habit, sometimes from mere power, as in the case of those who perform an action from the judgment of their reason before having the habit of that action.

However, prophecy may be reduced to a passion, provided we understand passion to denote any kind of receiving, in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that “to understand is, in a way, to be passive.” For just as, in natural knowledge, the possible intellect is passive to the light of the active intellect, so too in prophetic knowledge the human intellect is passive to the enlightening of the Divine light.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as in corporeal things, when a passion ceases, there remains a certain aptitude to a repetition of the passion—thus wood once ignited is more easily ignited again, so too in the prophet’s intellect, after the actual enlightenment has ceased, there remains an aptitude to be enlightened anew—thus when the mind has once been aroused to devotion, it is more easily recalled to its former devotion. Hence Augustine says (De orando Deum. Ep. cxxx, 9) that our prayers need to be frequent, “lest devotion be extinguished as soon as it is kindled.”

We might, however, reply that a person is called a prophet, even while his prophetic enlightenment ceases to be actual, on account of his being deputed by God, according to Jer. 1:5, “And I made thee a prophet unto the nations.”

Reply to Objection 3: Every gift of grace raises man to something above human nature, and this may happen in two ways. First, as to the substance of the act—for instance, the working of miracles, and the knowledge of the uncertain and hidden things of Divine wisdom—and for such acts man is not granted a habitual gift of grace. Secondly, a thing is above human nature as to the mode but not the substance of the act—for instance to love God and to know Him in the mirror of His creatures—and for this a habitual gift of grace is bestowed.

Whether prophecy is only about future contingencies?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is only about future contingencies. For Cassiodorus says [*Prol. super Psalt. i] that “prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with unchangeable truth.” Now issues pertain to future contingencies. Therefore the prophetic revelation is about future contingencies alone.

Objection 2: Further, according to 1 Cor. 12, the grace of prophecy is differentiated from wisdom and faith, which are about Divine things; and from the discernment of spirits, which is about created spirits; and from knowledge, which is about human things. Now habits and acts are differentiated by their objects, as stated above ([3661]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Therefore it seems that the object of prophecy is not connected with any of the above. Therefore it follows that it is about future contingencies alone.

Objection 3: Further, difference of object causes difference of species, as stated above ([3662]FS, Q[54], A[2]). Therefore, if one prophecy is about future contingencies, and another about other things, it would seem to follow that these are different species of prophecy.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that some prophecies are “about the future, for instance (Is. 7:14), ‘Behold a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son’”; some are “about the past, as (Gn. 1:1), ‘In the beginning God created heaven and earth’”; some are “about the present,” as (1 Cor. 14:24,25), “If all prophesy, and there come in one that believeth not . . . the secrets of his heart are made manifest.” Therefore prophecy is not about future contingencies alone.

I answer that, A manifestation made by means of a certain light can extend to all those things that are subject to that light: thus the body’s sight extends to all colors, and the soul’s natural knowledge extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect. Now prophetic knowledge comes through a Divine light, whereby it is possible to know all things both Divine and human, both spiritual and corporeal; and consequently the prophetic revelation extends to them all. Thus by the ministry of spirits a prophetic revelation concerning the perfections of God and the angels was made to Is. 6:1, where it is written, “I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated.” Moreover his prophecy contains matters referring to natural bodies, according to the words of Is. 40:12, “Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of His hand,” etc. It also contains matters relating to human conduct, according to Is. 58:1, “Deal thy bread to the hungry,” etc.; and besides this it contains things pertaining to future events, according to Is. 47:9, “Two things shall come upon thee suddenly in one day, barrenness and widowhood.”

Since, however, prophecy is about things remote from our knowledge, it must be observed that the more remote things are from our knowledge the more pertinent they are to prophecy. Of such things there are three degrees. One degree comprises things remote from the knowledge, either sensitive or intellective, of some particular man, but not from the knowledge of all men; thus a particular man knows by sense things present to him locally, which another man does not know by human sense, since they are removed from him. Thus Eliseus knew prophetically what his disciple Giezi had done in his absence (4 Kings 5:26), and in like manner the secret thoughts of one man are manifested prophetically to another, according to 1 Cor. 14:25; and again in this way what one man knows by demonstration may be revealed to another prophetically.

The second degree comprises those things which surpass the knowledge of all men without exception, not that they are in themselves unknowable, but on account of a defect in human knowledge; such as the mystery of the Trinity, which was revealed by the Seraphim saying: “Holy, Holy, Holy,” etc. (Is. 6:3).

The last degree comprises things remote from the knowledge of all men, through being in themselves unknowable; such are future contingencies, the truth of which is indeterminate. And since that which is predicated universally and by its very nature, takes precedence of that which is predicated in a limited and relative sense, it follows that revelation of future events belongs most properly to prophecy, and from this prophecy apparently takes its name. Hence Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): “And since a prophet is so called because he foretells the future, his name loses its significance when he speaks of the past or present.”

Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is there defined according to its proper signification; and it is in this sense that it is differentiated from the other gratuitous graces.

Reply to Objection 2: This is evident from what has just been said. We might also reply that all those things that are the matter of prophecy have the common aspect of being unknowable to man except by Divine revelation; whereas those that are the matter of “wisdom,” “knowledge,” and the “interpretation of speeches,” can be known by man through natural reason, but are manifested in a higher way through the enlightening of the Divine light. As to “faith,” although it is about things invisible to man, it is not concerned with the knowledge of the things believed, but with a man’s certitude of assent to things known by others.

Reply to Objection 3: The formal element in prophetic knowledge is the Divine light, which being one, gives unity of species to prophecy, although the things prophetically manifested by the Divine light are diverse.

Whether by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically?

Objection 1: It would seem that by the Divine revelation a prophet knows all that can be known prophetically. For it is written (Amos 3:7): “The Lord God doth nothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets.” Now whatever is revealed prophetically is something done by God. Therefore there is not one of them but what is revealed to the prophet.

Objection 2: Further, “God’s works are perfect” (Dt. 32:4). Now prophecy is a “Divine revelation,” as stated above [3663](A[3]). Therefore it is perfect; and this would not be so unless all possible matters of prophecy were revealed prophetically, since “the perfect is that which lacks nothing” (Phys. iii, 6). Therefore all possible matters of prophecy are revealed to the prophet.

Objection 3: Further, the Divine light which causes prophecy is more powerful than the right of natural reason which is the cause of human science. Now a man who has acquired a science knows whatever pertains to that science; thus a grammarian knows all matters of grammar. Therefore it would seem that a prophet knows all matters of prophecy.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.) that “sometimes the spirit of prophecy indicates the present to the prophet’s mind and nowise the future; and sometimes it points not to the present but to the future.” Therefore the prophet does not know all matters of prophecy.

I answer that, Things which differ from one another need not exist simultaneously, save by reason of some one thing in which they are connected and on which they depend: thus it has been stated above ([3664]FS, Q[65], AA[1],2) that all the virtues must needs exist simultaneously on account of prudence and charity. Now all the things that are known through some principle are connected in that principle and depend thereon. Hence he who knows a principle perfectly, as regards all to which its virtue extends, knows at the same time all that can be known through that principle; whereas if the common principle is unknown, or known only in a general way, it does not follow that one knows all those things at the same time, but each of them has to be manifested by itself, so that consequently some of them may be known, and some not.

Now the principle of those things that are prophetically manifested by the Divine light is the first truth, which the prophets do not see in itself. Wherefore there is no need for their knowing all possible matters of prophecy; but each one knows some of them according to the special revelation of this or that matter.

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord reveals to the prophets all things that are necessary for the instruction of the faithful; yet not all to every one, but some to one, and some to another.

Reply to Objection 2: Prophecy is by way of being something imperfect in the genus of Divine revelation: hence it is written (1 Cor. 13:8) that “prophecies shall be made void,” and that “we prophesy in part,” i.e. imperfectly. The Divine revelation will be brought to its perfection in heaven; wherefore the same text continues (1 Cor. 113:10): “When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away.” Consequently it does not follow that nothing is lacking to prophetic revelation, but that it lacks none of those things to which prophecy is directed.

Reply to Objection 3: He who has a science knows the principles of that science, whence whatever is pertinent to that science depends; wherefore to have the habit of a science perfectly, is to know whatever is pertinent to that science. But God Who is the principle of prophetic knowledge is not known in Himself through prophecy; wherefore the comparison fails.

Whether the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophet always distinguishes what he says by his own spirit from what he says by the prophetic spirit. For Augustine states (Confess. vi, 13) that his mother said “she could, through a certain feeling, which in words she could not express, discern betwixt Divine revelations, and the dreams of her own soul.” Now prophecy is a Divine revelation, as stated above [3665](A[3]). Therefore the prophet always distinguishes what he says by the spirit of prophecy, from what he says by his own spirit.

Objection 2: Further, God commands nothing impossible, as Jerome [*Pelagius. Ep. xvi, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] says. Now the prophets were commanded (Jer. 23:28): “The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath My word, let him speak My word with truth.” Therefore the prophet can distinguish what he has through the spirit of prophecy from what he sees otherwise.

Objection 3: Further, the certitude resulting from a Divine light is greater than that which results from the light of natural reason. Now he that has science, by the light of natural reason knows for certain that he has it.

Therefore he that has prophecy by a Divine light is much more certain that he has it.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. i super Ezech.): “It must be observed that sometimes the holy prophets, when consulted, utter certain things by their own spirit, through being much accustomed to prophesying, and think they are speaking by the prophetic spirit.”

I answer that, The prophet’s mind is instructed by God in two ways: in one way by an express revelation, in another way by a most mysterious instinct to “which the human mind is subjected without knowing it,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 17). Accordingly the prophet has the greatest certitude about those things which he knows by an express revelation, and he has it for certain that they are revealed to him by God; wherefore it is written (Jer. 26:15): “In truth the Lord sent me to you, to speak all these words in your hearing.” Else, were he not certain about this, the faith which relies on the utterances of the prophet would not be certain. A sign of the prophet’s certitude may be gathered from the fact that Abraham being admonished in a prophetic vision, prepared to sacrifice his only-begotten son, which he nowise would have done had he not been most certain of the Divine revelation.

On the other hand, his position with regard to the things he knows by instinct is sometimes such that he is unable to distinguish fully whether his thoughts are conceived of Divine instinct or of his own spirit. And those things which we know by Divine instinct are not all manifested with prophetic certitude, for this instinct is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. It is thus that we are to understand the saying of Gregory. Lest, however, this should lead to error, “they are very soon set aright by the Holy Ghost [*For instance, cf. 2 Kings 7:3 seqq.], and from Him they hear the truth, so that they reproach themselves for having said what was untrue,” as Gregory adds (Hom. i super Ezech.).

The arguments set down in the first place consider the revelation that is made by the prophetic spirit; wherefore the answer to all the objections is clear.

Whether things known or declared prophetically can be false?

Objection 1: It would seem that things known or declared prophetically can be false. For prophecy is about future contingencies, as stated above (A[3]). Now future contingencies may possibly not happen; else they would happen of necessity. Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Objection 2: Further, Isaias prophesied to Ezechias saying (Is. 38:1): “Take order with thy house, for thou shalt surely die, and shalt not live,” and yet fifteen years were added to his life (4 Kings 20:6). Again the Lord said (Jer. 18:7,8): “I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them.” This is instanced in the example of the Ninevites, according to Jn. 3:10: “The Lord [Vulg.: ‘God’] had mercy with regard to the evil which He had said that He would do to them, and He did it not.” Therefore the matter of prophecy can be false.

Objection 3: Further, in a conditional proposition, whenever the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the consequent of a conditional proposition stands in the same relation to the antecedent, as the conclusion to the premises in a syllogism, and a syllogism whose premises are necessary always leads to a necessary conclusion, as we find proved in I Poster. 6. But if the matter of a prophecy cannot be false, the following conditional proposition must needs be true: “If a thing has been prophesied, it will be.” Now the antecedent of this conditional proposition is absolutely necessary, since it is about the past. Therefore the consequent is also necessary absolutely; yet this is unfitting, for then prophecy would not be about contingencies. Therefore it is untrue that the matter of prophecy cannot be false.

On the contrary, Cassiodorus says [*Prol. in Psalt. i] that “prophecy is a Divine inspiration or revelation, announcing the issue of things with invariable truth.” Now the truth of prophecy would not be invariable, if its matter could be false. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.

I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said ([3666]AA[1],3,5), prophecy is a kind of knowledge impressed under the form of teaching on the prophet’s intellect, by Divine revelation. Now the truth of knowledge is the same in disciple and teacher since the knowledge of the disciple is a likeness of the knowledge of the teacher, even as in natural things the form of the thing generated is a likeness of the form of the generator. Jerome speaks in this sense when he says [*Comment. in Daniel ii, 10] that “prophecy is the seal of the Divine foreknowledge.” Consequently the same truth must needs be in prophetic knowledge and utterances, as in the Divine knowledge, under which nothing false can possibly come, as stated in the [3667]FP, Q[16], A[8]. Therefore nothing false can come under prophecy.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the [3668]FP, Q[14], A[13] the certitude of the Divine foreknowledge does not exclude the contingency of future singular events, because that knowledge regards the future as present and already determinate to one thing. Wherefore prophecy also, which is an “impressed likeness” or “seal of the Divine foreknowledge,” does not by its unchangeable truth exclude the contingency of future things.

Reply to Objection 2: The Divine foreknowledge regards future things in two ways. First, as they are in themselves, in so far, to wit, as it sees them in their presentiality: secondly, as in their causes, inasmuch as it sees the order of causes in relation to their effects. And though future contingencies, considered as in themselves, are determinate to one thing, yet, considered as in their causes, they are not so determined but that they can happen otherwise. Again, though this twofold knowledge is always united in the Divine intellect, it is not always united in the prophetic revelation, because an imprint made by an active cause is not always on a par with the virtue of that cause. Hence sometimes the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge, in so far as the latter regards future contingencies in themselves: and such things happen in the same way as foretold, for example this saying of Is. 7:14: “Behold a virgin shall conceive.” Sometimes, however, the prophetic revelation is an imprinted likeness of the Divine foreknowledge as knowing the order of causes to effects; and then at times the event is otherwise than foretold. Yet the prophecy does not cover a falsehood, for the meaning of the prophecy is that inferior causes, whether they be natural causes or human acts, are so disposed as to lead to such a result. In this way we are to understand the saying of Is. 38:1: “Thou shalt die, and not live”; in other words, “The disposition of thy body has a tendency to death”: and the saying of Jonah 3:4, “Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed,” that is to say, “Its merits demand that it should be destroyed.” God is said “to repent,” metaphorically, inasmuch as He bears Himself after the manner of one who repents, by “changing His sentence, although He changes not His counsel” [*Cf. [3669]FP, Q[19], A[7], ad 2].

Reply to Objection 3: Since the same truth of prophecy is the same as the truth of Divine foreknowledge, as stated above, the conditional proposition: “If this was prophesied, it will be,” is true in the same way as the proposition: “If this was foreknown, it will be”: for in both cases it is impossible for the antecedent not to be. Hence the consequent is necessary, considered, not as something future in our regard, but as being present to the Divine foreknowledge, as stated in the [3670]FP, Q[14], A[13], ad 2.

OF THE CAUSE OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the cause of prophecy. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prophecy is natural?

(2) Whether it is from God by means of the angels?

(3) Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?

(4) Whether a good life is requisite?

(5) Whether any prophecy is from the demons?

(6) Whether prophets of the demons ever tell what is true?

Whether prophecy can be natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy can be natural. For Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that “sometimes the mere strength of the soul is sufficiently cunning to foresee certain things”: and Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13) that the human soul, according as it is withdrawn from the sense of the body, is able to foresee the future [*Cf. [3671]FP, Q[86], A[4], ad 2]. Now this pertains to prophecy. Therefore the soul can acquire prophecy naturally.

Objection 2: Further, the human soul’s knowledge is more alert while one wakes than while one sleeps. Now some, during sleep, naturally foresee the future, as the Philosopher asserts (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De Divinat. per Somn. ii, which is annexed to the work quoted]). Much more therefore can a man naturally foreknow the future.

Objection 3: Further, man, by his nature, is more perfect than dumb animals. Yet some dumb animals have foreknowledge of future things that concern them. Thus ants foreknow the coming rains, which is evident from their gathering grain into their nest before the rain commences; and in like manner fish foreknow a coming storm, as may be gathered from their movements in avoiding places exposed to storm. Much more therefore can men foreknow the future that concerns themselves, and of such things is prophecy. Therefore prophecy comes from nature.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 29:18): “When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad”; wherefore it is evident that prophecy is necessary for the stability of the human race. Now “nature does not fail in necessaries” [*Aristotle, de Anima iii, 9]. Therefore it seems that prophecy is from nature.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Pet. 1:21): “For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time, but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Ghost.” Therefore prophecy comes not from nature, but through the gift of the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[171], A[6], ad 2) prophetic foreknowledge may regard future things in two ways: in one way, as they are in themselves; in another way, as they are in their causes. Now, to foreknow future things, as they are in themselves, is proper to the Divine intellect, to Whose eternity all things are present, as stated in the [3672]FP, Q[14], A[13]. Wherefore such like foreknowledge of the future cannot come from nature, but from Divine revelation alone. On the other hand, future things can be foreknown in their causes with a natural knowledge even by man: thus a physician foreknows future health or death in certain causes, through previous experimental knowledge of the order of those causes to such effects. Such like knowledge of the future may be understood to be in a man by nature in two ways. In one way that the soul, from that which it holds, is able to foreknow the future, and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): “Some have deemed the human soul to contain a certain power of divination.” This seems to be in accord with the opinion of Plato [*Phaed. xxvii; Civit. vi], who held that our souls have knowledge of all things by participating in the ideas; but that this knowledge is obscured in them by union with the body; yet in some more, in others less, according to a difference in bodily purity. According to this it might be said that men, whose souls are not much obscured through union with the body, are able to foreknow such like future things by their own knowledge. Against this opinion Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13): “How is it that the soul cannot always have this power of divination, since it always wishes to have it?”

Since, however, it seems truer, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the soul acquires knowledge from sensibles, as stated in the [3673]FP, Q[84], A[6], it is better to have recourse to another explanation, and to hold that men have no such foreknowledge of the future, but that they can acquire it by means of experience, wherein they are helped by their natural disposition, which depends on the perfection of a man’s imaginative power, and the clarity of his understanding.

Nevertheless this latter foreknowledge of the future differs in two ways from the former, which comes through Divine revelation. First, because the former can be about any events whatever, and this infallibly; whereas the latter foreknowledge, which can be had naturally, is about certain effects, to which human experience may extend. Secondly, because the former prophecy is “according to the unchangeable truth” [*[3674]Q[171], A[3], OBJ[1]], while the latter is not, and can cover a falsehood. Now the former foreknowledge, and not the latter, properly belongs to prophecy, because, as stated above ([3675]Q[171], A[3]), prophetic knowledge is of things which naturally surpass human knowledge. Consequently we must say that prophecy strictly so called cannot be from nature, but only from Divine revelation.

Reply to Objection 1: When the soul is withdrawn from corporeal things, it becomes more adapted to receive the influence of spiritual substances [*Cf. FP, Q[88], A[4], ad 2], and also is more inclined to receive the subtle motions which take place in the human imagination through the impression of natural causes, whereas it is hindered from receiving them while occupied with sensible things. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 26) that “the soul, at the approach of death, foresees certain future things, by reason of the subtlety of its nature,” inasmuch as it is receptive even of slight impressions. Or again, it knows future things by a revelation of the angels; but not by its own power, because according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 13), “if this were so, it would be able to foreknow the future whenever it willed,” which is clearly false.

Objection 2: Knowledge of the future by means of dreams, comes either from the revelation of spiritual substances, or from a corporeal cause, as stated above ([3676]Q[95], A[6]), when we were treating of divination. Now both these causes are more applicable to a person while asleep than while awake, because, while awake, the soul is occupied with external sensibles, so that it is less receptive of the subtle impressions either of spiritual substances, or even of natural causes; although as regards the perfection of judgment, the reason is more alert in waking than in sleeping.

Reply to Objection 3: Even dumb animals have no foreknowledge of future events, except as these are foreknown in their causes, whereby their imagination is moved more than man's, because man's imagination, especially in waking, is more disposed according to reason than according to the impression of natural causes. Yet reason effects much more amply in man, that which the impression of natural causes effects in dumb animals; and Divine grace by inspiring the prophecy assists man still more.

Reply to Objection 4: The prophetic light extends even to the direction of human acts; and in this way prophecy is requisite for the government of a people, especially in relation to Divine worship; since for this nature is not sufficient, and grace is necessary.

Whether prophetic revelation comes through the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophetic revelation does not come through the angels. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that Divine wisdom "conveyeth herself into holy souls," and "maketh the friends of God, and the prophets." Now wisdom makes the friends of God immediately. Therefore it also makes the prophets immediately, and not through the medium of the angels.

Objection 2: Further, prophecy is reckoned among the gratuitous graces. But the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, "There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit." Therefore the prophetic revelation is not made by means of an angel.

Objection 3: Further, Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i] says that prophecy is a "Divine revelation": whereas if it were conveyed by the angels, it would be called an angelic revelation. Therefore prophecy is not bestowed by means of the angels.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): “Our glorious fathers received Divine visions by means of the heavenly powers”; and he is speaking there of prophetic visions. Therefore prophetic revelation is conveyed by means of the angels.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), “Things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God.’].” Now the Divine ordering, according to Dionysius [*Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v], is such that the lowest things are directed by middle things. Now the angels hold a middle position between God and men, in that they have a greater share in the perfection of the Divine goodness than men have. Wherefore the Divine enlightenments and revelations are conveyed from God to men by the angels. Now prophetic knowledge is bestowed by Divine enlightenment and revelation. Therefore it is evident that it is conveyed by the angels.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity which makes man a friend of God, is a perfection of the will, in which God alone can form an impression; whereas prophecy is a perfection of the intellect, in which an angel also can form an impression, as stated in the [3677]FP, Q[111], A[1], wherefore the comparison fails between the two.

Reply to Objection 2: The gratuitous graces are ascribed to the Holy Ghost as their first principle: yet He works grace of this kind in men by means of the angels.

Reply to Objection 3: The work of the instrument is ascribed to the principal agent by whose power the instrument acts. And since a minister is like an instrument, prophetic revelation, which is conveyed by the ministry of the angels, is said to be Divine.

Whether a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy?

Objection 1: It would seem that a natural disposition is requisite for prophecy. For prophecy is received by the prophet according to the disposition of the recipient, since a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2, “The Lord will roar from Sion,” says: “Anyone who wishes to make a comparison naturally turns to those things of which he has experience, and among which his life is spent. For example, sailors compare their enemies to the winds, and their losses to a shipwreck. In like manner Amos, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to that which is inspired by the lion’s roar.” Now that which is received by a thing according to the mode of the recipient requires a natural disposition. Therefore prophecy requires a natural disposition.

Objection 2: Further, the considerations of prophecy are more lofty than those of acquired science. Now natural indisposition hinders the considerations of acquired science, since many are prevented by natural indisposition from succeeding to grasp the speculations of science. Much more therefore is a natural disposition requisite for the contemplation of prophecy.

Objection 3: Further, natural indisposition is a much greater obstacle than an accidental impediment. Now the considerations of prophecy are hindered by an accidental occurrence. For Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*The quotation is from Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that “at the time of the marriage act, the presence of the Holy Ghost will not be vouchsafed, even though it be a prophet that fulfils the duty of procreation.” Much more therefore does a natural indisposition hinder prophecy; and thus it would seem that a good natural disposition is requisite for prophecy.

On the contrary, Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.): “He,” namely the Holy Ghost, “fills the boy harpist and makes him a Psalmist; He fills the herdsman plucking wild figs, and makes him a prophet.” Therefore prophecy requires no previous disposition, but depends on the will alone of the Holy Ghost, of Whom it is written (1 Cor. 12:2): “All these things, one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to every one according as He will.”

I answer that, As stated above [3678](A[1]), prophecy in its true and exact sense comes from Divine inspiration; while that which comes from a natural cause is not called prophecy except in a relative sense. Now we must observe that as God Who is the universal efficient cause requires neither previous matter nor previous disposition of matter in His corporeal effects, for He is able at the same instant to bring into being matter and disposition and form, so neither does He require a previous disposition in His spiritual effects, but is able to produce both the spiritual effect and at the same time the fitting disposition as requisite according to the order of nature. More than this, He is able at the same time, by creation, to produce the subject, so as to dispose a soul for prophecy and give it the prophetic grace, at the very instant of its creation.

Reply to Objection 1: It matters not to prophecy by what comparisons the thing prophesied is expressed; and so the Divine operation makes no change in a prophet in this respect. Yet if there be anything in him incompatible with prophecy, it is removed by the Divine power.

Reply to Objection 2: The considerations of science proceed from a natural cause, and nature cannot work without a previous disposition in matter. This cannot be said of God Who is the cause of prophecy.

Reply to Objection 3: A natural indisposition, if not removed, might be an obstacle to prophetic revelation, for instance if a man were altogether deprived of the natural senses. In the same way a man might be hindered from the act of prophesying by some very strong passion, whether of anger, or of concupiscence as in coition, or by any other passion. But such a natural indisposition as this is removed by the Divine power, which is the cause of prophecy.

Whether a good life is requisite for prophecy?

Objection 1: It would seem that a good life is requisite for prophecy. For it is written (Wis. 7:27) that the wisdom of God “through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls,” and “maketh the friends of God, and prophets.” Now there can be no holiness without a good life and sanctifying grace. Therefore prophecy cannot be without a good life and sanctifying grace.

Objection 2: Further, secrets are not revealed save to a friend, according to Jn. 15:15, “But I have called you friends, because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father, I have made known to you.” Now God reveals His secrets to the prophets (Amos 3:7). Therefore it would seem that the prophets are the friends of God; which is impossible without charity. Therefore seemingly prophecy cannot be without charity; and charity is impossible without sanctifying grace.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 7:15): “Beware of false prophets, who come to you in the clothing of sheep, but inwardly they are ravening wolves.” Now all who are without grace are likened inwardly to a ravening wolf, and consequently all such are false prophets. Therefore no man is a true prophet except he be good by grace.

Objection 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*Cf. De Divinat. per Somn. i, which is annexed to the work quoted]) that “if interpretation of dreams is from God, it is unfitting for it to be bestowed on any but the best.” Now it is evident that the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore the gift of prophecy is vouchsafed only to the best men.

On the contrary, To those who had said, “Lord, have we not prophesied in Thy name?” this reply is made: “I never knew you” (Mat. 7:22,23). Now “the Lord knoweth who are His” (2 Tim. 2:19). Therefore prophecy can be in those who are not God’s by grace.

I answer that, A good life may be considered from two points of view. First, with regard to its inward root, which is sanctifying grace. Secondly, with regard to the inward passions of the soul and the outward actions. Now sanctifying grace is given chiefly in order that man’s soul may be united to God by charity. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18): “A man is not transferred from the left side to the right, unless he receive the Holy Ghost, by Whom he is made a lover of God and of his neighbor.” Hence whatever can be without charity can be without sanctifying grace, and consequently without goodness of life. Now prophecy can be without charity; and this is clear on two counts. First, on account of their respective acts: for prophecy pertains to the intellect, whose act precedes the act of the will, which power is perfected by charity. For this reason the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) reckons prophecy with other things pertinent to the intellect, that can be had without charity. Secondly, on account of their respective ends. For prophecy like other gratuitous graces is given for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 12:7, “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit”; and is not directly intended to unite man’s affections to God, which is the purpose of charity. Therefore prophecy can be without a good life, as regards the first root of this goodness.

If, however, we consider a good life, with regard to the passions of the soul, and external actions, from this point of view an evil life is an obstacle to prophecy. For prophecy requires the mind to be raised very high in order to contemplate spiritual things, and this is hindered by strong passions, and the inordinate pursuit of external things. Hence we read of the sons of the prophets (4 Kings 4:38) that they “dwelt together with [Vulg.: ‘before’]” Eliseus, leading a solitary life, as it were, lest worldly employment should be a hindrance to the gift of prophecy.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes the gift of prophecy is given to a man both for the good of others, and in order to enlighten his own mind; and such are those whom Divine wisdom, “conveying itself” by sanctifying grace to their minds, “maketh the friends of God, and prophets.” Others, however, receive the gift of prophecy merely for the good of others. Hence Jerome commenting on Mat. 7:22, says: “Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but either to the invoking the name of Christ, or to the condemnation of those who invoke, and for the good of those who see and hear.”

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory [*Hom. xxvii in Ev.] expounding this passage [*Jn. 15:15] says: “Since we love the lofty things of heaven as soon as we hear them, we know them as soon as we love them, for to love is to know. Accordingly He had made all things known to them, because having renounced earthly desires they were kindled by the torches of perfect love.” In this way the Divine secrets are not always revealed to prophets.

Reply to Objection 3: Not all wicked men are ravening wolves, but only those whose purpose is to injure others. For Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, among the works of St. John Chrysostom, and falsely ascribed to him] that “Catholic teachers, though they be sinners, are called slaves of the flesh, but never ravening wolves, because they do not purpose the destruction of Christians.” And since prophecy is directed to the good of others, it is manifest that such are false prophets, because they are not sent for this purpose by God.

Reply to Objection 4: God’s gifts are not always bestowed on those who are simply the best, but sometimes are vouchsafed to those who are best as regards the receiving of this or that gift. Accordingly God grants the gift of prophecy to those whom He judges best to give it to.

Whether any prophecy comes from the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that no prophecy comes from the demons. For prophecy is “a Divine revelation,” according to Cassiodorus [*Prol. in Psalt. i]. But that which is done by a demon is not Divine. Therefore no prophecy can be from a demon.

Objection 2: Further, some kind of enlightenment is requisite for prophetic knowledge, as stated above (Q[171], AA[2],3). Now the demons do not enlighten the human intellect, as stated above in the FP, Q[119], A[3]. Therefore no prophecy can come from the demons.

Objection 3: Further, a sign is worthless if it betokens contraries. Now prophecy is a sign in confirmation of faith; wherefore a gloss on Rom. 12:6, “Either prophecy to be used according to the rule of faith,” says: “Observe that in reckoning the graces, he begins with prophecy, which is the first proof of the reasonableness of our faith; since believers, after receiving the Spirit, prophesied.” Therefore prophecy cannot be bestowed by the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (3 Kings 18:19): “Gather unto me all Israel unto mount Carmel, and the prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the prophets of the grove four hundred, who eat at Jezebel’s table.” Now these were worshippers of demons. Therefore it would seem that there is also a prophecy from the demons.

I answer that, As stated above ([3679]Q[171], A[1]), prophecy denotes knowledge far removed from human knowledge. Now it is evident that an intellect of a higher order can know some things that are far removed from the knowledge of an inferior intellect. Again, above the human intellect there is not only the Divine intellect, but also the intellects of good and bad angels according to the order of nature. Hence the demons, even by their natural knowledge, know certain things remote from men’s knowledge, which they can reveal to men: although those things which God alone knows are remote simply and most of all.

Accordingly prophecy, properly and simply, is conveyed by Divine revelations alone; yet the revelation which is made by the demons may be called prophecy in a restricted sense. Wherefore those men to whom something is revealed by the demons are styled in the Scriptures as prophets, not simply, but with an addition, for instance as “false prophets,” or “prophets of idols.” Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): “When the evil spirit lays hold of a man for such purposes as these,” namely visions, “he makes him either devilish, or possessed, or a false prophet.”

Reply to Objection 1: Cassiodorus is here defining prophecy in its proper and simple acceptation.

Reply to Objection 2: The demons reveal what they know to men, not by enlightening the intellect, but by an imaginary vision, or even by audible speech; and in this way this prophecy differs from true prophecy.

Reply to Objection 3: The prophecy of the demons can be distinguished from Divine prophecy by certain, and even outward, signs. Hence Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “some prophesy by the spirit of the devil, such as diviners, but they may be discerned by the fact that the devil sometimes utters what is false, the Holy Ghost never.” Wherefore it is written (Dt. 18:21,22): “If in silent thought thou answer: How shall I know the word that the Lord hath spoken? Thou shalt have this sign: Whatsoever that same prophet foretelleth in the name of the Lord, and it come not to pass, that thing the Lord hath not spoken.”

Whether the prophets of the demons ever foretell the truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth. For Ambrose [*Hilary the Deacon (Ambrosiaster) on 1 Cor. 12:3] says that “Every truth, by whomsoever spoken, is from the Holy Ghost.” Now the prophets of the demons do not speak from the Holy Ghost, because “there is no concord between Christ and Belial [*’What concord hath Christ with Belial?’]” (2 Cor. 6:15). Therefore it would seem that they never foretell the truth.

Objection 2: Further, just as true prophets are inspired by the Spirit of truth, so the prophets of the demons are inspired by the spirit of untruth, according to 3 Kings 22:22, “I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets.” Now the prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost never speak false, as stated above (Q[111], A[6]). Therefore the prophets of the demons never speak truth.

Objection 3: Further, it is said of the devil (Jn. 8:44) that “when he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own, for the devil is a liar, and the father thereof,” i.e. of lying. Now by inspiring his prophets, the devil speaks only of his own, for he is not appointed God’s minister to declare the truth, since “light hath no fellowship with darkness [*Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath light with darkness?’]” (2 Cor. 6:14). Therefore the prophets of the demons never foretell the truth.

On the contrary, A gloss on Num. 22:14, says that “Balaam was a diviner, for he sometimes foreknew the future by help of the demons and the magic art.” Now he foretold many true things, for instance that which is to be found in Num. 24:17: “A star shall rise out of Jacob, and a scepter shall spring up from Israel.” Therefore even the prophets of the demons foretell the truth.

I answer that, As the good is in relation to things, so is the true in relation to knowledge. Now in things it is impossible to find one that is wholly devoid of good. Wherefore it is also impossible for any knowledge to be wholly false, without some mixture of truth. Hence Bede says [*Comment. in Luc. xvii, 12; Cf. Augustine, QQ. Evang. ii, 40] that “no teaching is so false that it never mingles truth with falsehood.” Hence the teaching of the demons, with which they instruct their prophets, contains some truths whereby it is rendered acceptable. For the intellect is led astray to falsehood by the semblance of truth, even as the will is seduced to evil by the semblance of goodness. Wherefore Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. xix, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]: “The devil is allowed sometimes to speak true things, in order that his unwonted truthfulness may gain credit for his lie.”

Reply to Objection 1: The prophets of the demons do not always speak from the demons’ revelation, but sometimes by Divine inspiration. This was evidently the case with Balaam, of whom we read that the Lord spoke to him (Num. 22:12), though he was a prophet of the demons, because God makes use even of the wicked for the profit of the good. Hence He foretells certain truths even by the demons’ prophets, both that the truth may be rendered more credible, since even its foes bear witness to it, and also in order that men, by believing such men, may be more easily led on to truth. Wherefore also the Sibyls foretold many true things about Christ.

Yet even when the demons’ prophets are instructed by the demons, they foretell the truth, sometimes by virtue of their own nature, the author of which is the Holy Ghost, and sometimes by revelation of the good spirits, as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19): so that even then this truth which the demons proclaim is from the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: A true prophet is always inspired by the Spirit of truth, in Whom there is no falsehood, wherefore He never says what is not true; whereas a false prophet is not always instructed by the spirit of untruth, but sometimes even by the Spirit of truth. Even the very spirit of untruth sometimes declares true things, sometimes false, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Those things are called the demons' own, which they have of themselves, namely lies and sins; while they have, not of themselves but of God, those things which belong to them by nature: and it is by virtue of their own nature that they sometimes foretell the truth, as stated above (ad 1). Moreover God makes use of them to make known the truth which is to be accomplished through them, by revealing Divine mysteries to them through the angels, as already stated (Gen. ad lit. xii, 19; [3680]FP, Q[109], A[4], ad 1).

OF THE MANNER IN WHICH PROPHETIC KNOWLEDGE IS CONVEYED (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the manner in which prophetic knowledge is conveyed, and under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the prophets see God's very essence?

(2) Whether the prophetic revelation is effected by the infusion of certain species, or by the infusion of Divine light alone?

(3) Whether prophetic revelation is always accompanied by abstraction from the sense?

(4) Whether prophecy is always accompanied by knowledge of the things prophesied?

Whether the prophets see the very essence of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets see the very essence of God, for a gloss on Is. 38:1, "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die and not live," says: "Prophets can read in the book of God's foreknowledge in which all things are written." Now God's foreknowledge is His very essence. Therefore prophets see God's very essence.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 7) that "in that eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we see with the mind's eye the type both of our being and of our actions." Now, of all men, prophets have the highest knowledge of Divine things. Therefore they, especially, see the Divine essence.

Objection 3: Further, future contingencies are foreknown by the prophets “with unchangeable truth.” Now future contingencies exist thus in God alone. Therefore the prophets see God Himself.

On the contrary, The vision of the Divine essence is not made void in heaven; whereas “prophecy is made void” (1 Cor. 13:8). Therefore prophecy is not conveyed by a vision of the Divine essence.

I answer that, Prophecy denotes Divine knowledge as existing afar off. Wherefore it is said of the prophets (Heb. 11:13) that “they were beholding . . . afar off.” But those who are in heaven and in the state of bliss see, not as from afar off, but rather, as it were, from near at hand, according to Ps. 139:14, “The upright shall dwell with Thy countenance.” Hence it is evident that prophetic knowledge differs from the perfect knowledge, which we shall have in heaven, so that it is distinguished therefrom as the imperfect from the perfect, and when the latter comes the former is made void, as appears from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 13:10).

Some, however, wishing to discriminate between prophetic knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed, have maintained that the prophets see the very essence of God (which they call the “mirror of eternity”) [*Cf. De Veritate, xii, 6; Sent. II, D, XI, part 2, art. 2, ad 4], not, however, in the way in which it is the object of the blessed, but as containing the types [*Cf. FP, Q[15]] of future events. But this is altogether impossible. For God is the object of bliss in His very essence, according to the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): “Happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these,” i.e. creatures. Now it is not possible to see the types of creatures in the very essence of God without seeing It, both because the Divine essence is Itself the type of all things that are made—the ideal type adding nothing to the Divine essence save only a relationship to the creature—and because knowledge of a thing in itself—and such is the knowledge of God as the object of heavenly bliss—precedes knowledge of that thing in its relation to something else—and such is the knowledge of God as containing the types of things. Consequently it is impossible for prophets to see God as containing the types of creatures, and yet not as the object of bliss. Therefore we must conclude that the prophetic vision is not the vision of the very essence of God, and that the prophets do not see in the Divine essence Itself the things they do see, but that they see them in certain images, according as they are enlightened by the Divine light.

Wherefore Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), in speaking of prophetic visions, says that “the wise theologian calls that vision divine which is effected by images of things lacking a bodily form through the seer being rapt in divine things.” And these images illumined by the Divine light have more of the nature of a mirror than the Divine essence: since in a mirror images are formed from other things, and this cannot be said of God. Yet the prophet’s mind thus enlightened may be called a mirror, in so far as a likeness of the truth of the Divine foreknowledge is formed therein, for which reason it is called the “mirror of eternity,” as representing God’s foreknowledge, for God in His eternity sees all things as present before Him, as stated above ([3681]Q[172], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: The prophets are said to read the book of God’s foreknowledge, inasmuch as the truth is reflected from God’s foreknowledge on the prophet’s mind.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to see in the First Truth the type of his existence, in so far as the image of the First Truth shines forth on man’s mind, so that he is able to know himself.

Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that future contingencies are in God according to unalterable truth, it follows that God can impress a like knowledge on the prophet’s mind without the prophet seeing God in His essence.

Whether, in prophetic revelation, new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s mind, or merely a new light?

Objection 1: It would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed on the prophet’s mind, but only a new light. For a gloss of Jerome on Amos 1:2 says that “prophets draw comparisons from things with which they are conversant.” But if prophetic vision were effected by means of species newly impressed, the prophet’s previous experience of things would be inoperative. Therefore no new species are impressed on the prophet’s soul, but only the prophetic light.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), “it is not imaginative but intellective vision that makes the prophet”; wherefore it is declared (Dan. 10:1) that “there is need of understanding in a vision.” Now intellective vision, as stated in the same book (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6) is not effected by means of images, but by the very truth of things. Therefore it would seem that prophetic revelation is not effected by impressing species on the soul.

Objection 3: Further, by the gift of prophecy the Holy Ghost endows man with something that surpasses the faculty of nature. Now man can by his natural faculties form all kinds of species of things. Therefore it would seem that in prophetic revelation no new species of things are impressed, but merely an intellectual light.

On the contrary, It is written (Osee 12:10): “I have multiplied” their “visions, and I have used similitudes, by the ministry of the prophets.” Now multiplicity of visions results, not from a diversity of intellectual light, which is common to every prophetic vision, but from a diversity of species, whence similitudes also result. Therefore it seems that in prophetic revelation new species of things are impressed, and not merely an intellectual light.

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), “prophetic knowledge pertains most of all to the intellect.” Now two things have to be considered in connection with the knowledge possessed by the human mind, namely the acceptance or representation of things, and the judgment of the things represented. Now things are represented to the human mind under the form of species: and according to the order of nature, they must be represented first to the senses, secondly to the imagination, thirdly to the passive intellect, and these are changed by the species derived from the phantasms, which change results from the enlightening action of the active intellect. Now in the imagination there are the forms of sensible things not only as received from the senses, but also transformed in various ways, either on account of some bodily transformation (as in the case of people who are asleep or out of their senses), or through the coordination of the phantasms, at the command of reason, for the purpose of understanding something. For just as the various arrangements of the letters of the alphabet convey various ideas to the understanding, so the various coordinations of the phantasms produce various intelligible species of the intellect.

As to the judgment formed by the human mind, it depends on the power of the intellectual light.

Now the gift of prophecy confers on the human mind something which surpasses the natural faculty in both these respects, namely as to the judgment which depends on the inflow of intellectual light, and as to the acceptance or representation of things, which is effected by means of certain species. Human teaching may be likened to prophetic revelation in the second of these respects, but not in the first. For a man represents certain things to his disciple by signs of speech, but he cannot enlighten him inwardly as God does.

But it is the first of these two that holds the chief place in prophecy, since judgment is the complement of knowledge. Wherefore if certain things are divinely represented to any man by means of imaginary likenesses, as happened to Pharaoh (Gn. 41:1–7) and to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:1–2), or even by bodily likenesses, as happened to Balthasar (Dan. 5:5), such a man is not to be considered a prophet, unless his mind be enlightened for the purpose of judgment; and such an apparition is something imperfect in the genus of prophecy. Wherefore some [*Rabbi Moyses, Doct. Perplex. II, xxxvi] have called this "prophetic ecstasy," and such is divination by dreams. And yet a man will be a prophet, if his intellect be enlightened merely for the purpose of judging of things seen in imagination by others, as in the case of Joseph who interpreted Pharaoh's dream. But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), "especially is he a prophet who excels in both respects, so," to wit, "as to see in spirit likenesses significant of things corporeal, and understand them by the quickness of his intellect."

Now sensible forms are divinely presented to the prophet's mind, sometimes externally by means of the senses—thus Daniel saw the writing on the wall (Dan. 5:25)—sometimes by means of imaginary forms, either of exclusively Divine origin and not received through the senses (for instance, if images of colors were imprinted on the imagination of one blind from birth), or divinely coordinated from those derived from the senses—thus Jeremiah saw the "boiling caldron . . . from the face of the north" (Jer. 1:13)—or by the direct impression of intelligible species on the mind, as in the case of those who receive infused scientific knowledge or wisdom, such as Solomon or the apostles.

But intellectual light is divinely imprinted on the human mind—sometimes for the purpose of judging of things seen by others, as in the case of Joseph, quoted above, and of the apostles whose understanding our Lord opened “that they might understand the scriptures” (Lk. 24:45); and to this pertains the “interpretation of speeches”—sometimes for the purpose of judging according to Divine truth, of the things which a man apprehends in the ordinary course of nature—sometimes for the purpose of discerning truthfully and efficaciously what is to be done, according to Is. 63:14, “The Spirit of the Lord was their leader.”

Hence it is evident that prophetic revelation is conveyed sometimes by the mere infusion of light, sometimes by imprinting species anew, or by a new coordination of species.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, sometimes in prophetic revelation imaginary species previously derived from the senses are divinely coordinated so as to accord with the truth to be revealed, and then previous experience is operative in the production of the images, but not when they are impressed on the mind wholly from without.

Reply to Objection 2: Intellectual vision is not effected by means of bodily and individual images, but by an intelligible image. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 11) that “the soul possesses a certain likeness of the species known to it.” Sometimes this intelligible image is, in prophetic revelation, imprinted immediately by God, sometimes it results from pictures in the imagination, by the aid of the prophetic light, since a deeper truth is gathered from these pictures in the imagination by means of the enlightenment of the higher light.

Reply to Objection 3: It is true that man is able by his natural powers to form all kinds of pictures in the imagination, by simply considering these pictures, but not so that they be directed to the representation of intelligible truths that surpass his intellect, since for this purpose he needs the assistance of a supernatural light.

Whether the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses. For it is written (Num. 12:6): “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” Now a gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter, “a vision that takes place by dreams and apparitions consists of things which seem to be said or done.” But when things seem to be said or done, which are neither said nor done, there is abstraction from the senses. Therefore prophecy is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Objection 2: Further, when one power is very intent on its own operation, other powers are drawn away from theirs; thus men who are very intent on hearing something fail to see what takes place before them. Now in the prophetic vision the intellect is very much uplifted, and intent on its act. Therefore it seems that the prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing cannot, at the same time, tend in opposite directions. Now in the prophetic vision the mind tends to the acceptance of things from above, and consequently it cannot at the same time tend to sensible objects. Therefore it would seem necessary for prophetic revelation to be always accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

Objection 4: On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 14:32): “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets.” Now this were impossible if the prophet were not in possession of his faculties, but abstracted from his senses. Therefore it would seem that prophetic vision is not accompanied by abstraction from the senses.

I answer that, As stated in the foregoing Article, the prophetic revelation takes place in four ways: namely, by the infusion of an intelligible light, by the infusion of intelligible species, by impression or coordination of pictures in the imagination, and by the outward presentation of sensible images. Now it is evident that there is no abstraction from the senses, when something is presented to the prophet’s mind by means of sensible species—whether these be divinely formed for this special purpose, as the bush shown to Moses (Ex. 3:2), and the writing shown to Daniel (Dan. 5:)—or whether they be produced by other causes; yet so that they are ordained by Divine providence to be prophetically significant of something, as, for instance, the Church was signified by the ark of Noah.

Again, abstraction from the external senses is not rendered necessary when the prophet’s mind is enlightened by an intellectual light, or impressed with intelligible species, since in us the perfect judgment of the intellect is effected by its turning to sensible objects, which are the first principles of our knowledge, as stated in the [3682]FP, Q[84], A[6].

When, however, prophetic revelation is conveyed by images in the imagination, abstraction from the senses is necessary lest the things thus seen in imagination be taken for objects of external sensation. Yet this abstraction from the senses is sometimes complete, so that a man perceives nothing with his senses; and sometimes it is incomplete, so that he perceives something with his senses, yet does not fully discern the things he perceives outwardly from those he sees in imagination. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): “Those images of bodies which are formed in the soul are seen just as bodily things themselves are seen by the body, so that we see with our eyes one who is present, and at the same time we see with the soul one who is absent, as though we saw him with our eyes.”

Yet this abstraction from the senses takes place in the prophets without subverting the order of nature, as is the case with those who are possessed or out of their senses; but is due to some well-ordered cause. This cause may be natural—for instance, sleep—or spiritual—for instance, the intenseness of the prophets’ contemplation; thus we read of Peter (Acts 10:9) that while he was praying in the supper-room [*Vulg.: ‘the house-top’ or ‘upper-chamber’] “he fell into an ecstasy”—or he may be carried away by the Divine power, according to the saying of Ezechiel 1:3: “The hand of the Lord was upon him.”

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted refers to prophets in whom imaginary pictures were formed or coordinated, either while asleep, which is denoted by the word “dream,” or while awake, which is signified by the word “vision.”

Reply to Objection 2: When the mind is intent, in its act, upon distant things which are far removed from the senses, the intensity of its application leads to abstraction from the senses; but when it is intent, in its act, upon the coordination of or judgment concerning objects of sense, there is no need for abstraction from the senses.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the prophetic mind results not from its own power, but from a power acting on it from above. Hence there is no abstraction from the senses when the prophet’s mind is led to judge or coordinate matters relating to objects of sense, but only when the mind is raised to the contemplation of certain more lofty things.

Reply to Objection 4: The spirit of the prophets is said to be subject to the prophets as regards the prophetic utterances to which the Apostle refers in the words quoted; because, to wit, the prophets in declaring what they have seen speak their own mind, and are not thrown off their mental balance, like persons who are possessed, as Priscilla and Montanus maintained. But as regards the prophetic revelation itself, it would be more correct to say that the prophets are subject to the. spirit of prophecy, i.e. to the prophetic gift.

Whether prophets always know the things which they prophesy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophets always know the things which they prophesy. For, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9), “those to whom signs were shown in spirit by means of the likenesses of bodily things, had not the gift of prophecy, unless the mind was brought into action, so that those signs were also understood by them.” Now what is understood cannot be unknown. Therefore the prophet is not ignorant of what he prophesies.

Objection 2: Further, the light of prophecy surpasses the light of natural reason. Now one who possesses a science by his natural light, is not ignorant of his scientific acquirements. Therefore he who utters things by the prophetic light cannot ignore them.

Objection 3: Further, prophecy is directed for man’s enlightenment; wherefore it is written (2 Pet. 1:19): “We have the more firm prophetical word, whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.” Now nothing can enlighten others unless it be lightsome in itself. Therefore it would seem that the prophet is first enlightened so as to know what he declares to others.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 11:51): “And this he” (Caiphas) “spoke, not of himself, but being the High Priest of that year, he prophesied that Jesus should die for the nation,” etc. Now Caiphas knew this not. Therefore not every prophet knows what he prophesies.

I answer that, In prophetic revelation the prophet’s mind is moved by the Holy Ghost, as an instrument that is deficient in regard to the principal agent. Now the prophet’s mind is moved not only to apprehend something, but also to speak or to do something; sometimes indeed to all these three together, sometimes to two, sometimes to one only, and in each case there may be a defect in the prophet’s knowledge. For when the prophet’s mind is moved to think or apprehend a thing, sometimes he is led merely to apprehend that thing, and sometimes he is further led to know that it is divinely revealed to him.

Again, sometimes the prophet’s mind is moved to speak something, so that he understands what the Holy Ghost means by the words he utters; like David who said (2 Kings 23:2): “The Spirit of the Lord hath spoken by me”; while, on the other hand, sometimes the person whose mind is moved to utter certain words knows not what the Holy Ghost means by them, as was the case with Caiphas (Jn. 11:51).

Again, when the Holy Ghost moves a man’s mind to do something, sometimes the latter understands the meaning of it, like Jeremias who hid his loin-cloth in the Euphrates (Jer. 13:1–11); while sometimes he does not understand it—thus the soldiers, who divided Christ’s garments, understood not the meaning of what they did.

Accordingly, when a man knows that he is being moved by the Holy Ghost to think something, or signify something by word or deed, this belongs properly to prophecy; whereas when he is moved, without his knowing it, this is not perfect prophecy, but a prophetic instinct. Nevertheless it must be observed that since the prophet’s mind is a defective instrument, as stated above, even true prophets know not all that the Holy Ghost means by the things they see, or speak, or even do.

And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections, since the arguments given at the beginning refer to true prophets whose minds are perfectly enlightened from above.

OF THE DIVISION OF PROPHECY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the division of prophecy, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) The division of prophecy into its species;

(2) Whether the more excellent prophecy is that which is without imaginative vision?

(3) The various degrees of prophecy;

(4) Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?

(5) Whether a comprehensor can be a prophet?

(6) Whether prophecy advanced in perfection as time went on?

Whether prophecy is fittingly divided into the prophecy of divine predestination, of foreknowledge, and of denunciation?

Objection 1: It would seem that prophecy is unfittingly divided according to a gloss on Mat. 1:23, “Behold a virgin shall be with child,” where it is stated that “one kind of prophecy proceeds from the Divine predestination, and must in all respects be accomplished so that its fulfillment is independent of our will, for instance the one in question. Another prophecy proceeds from God’s foreknowledge: and into this our will enters. And another prophecy is called denunciation, which is significative of God’s disapproval.” For that which results from every prophecy should not be reckoned a part of prophecy. Now all prophecy is according to the Divine foreknowledge, since the prophets “read in the book of foreknowledge,” as a gloss says on Is. 38:1. Therefore it would seem that prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be reckoned a species of prophecy.

Objection 2: Further, just as something is foretold in denunciation, so is something foretold in promise, and both of these are subject to alteration. For it is written (Jer. 18:7,8): “I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it. If that nation against which I have spoken shall repent of their evil, I also will repent”—and this pertains to the prophecy of denunciation, and afterwards the text continues in reference to the prophecy of promise (Jer. 18:9,10): “I will suddenly speak of a nation and of a kingdom, to build up and plant it. If it shall do evil in My sight . . . I will repent of the good that I have spoken to do unto it.” Therefore as there is reckoned to be a prophecy of denunciation, so should there be a prophecy of promise.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. vii, 8): “There are seven kinds of prophecy. The first is an ecstasy, which is the transport of the mind: thus Peter saw a vessel descending from heaven with all manner of beasts therein. The second kind is a vision, as we read in Isaias, who says (Is. 6:1): ‘I saw the Lord sitting,’ etc. The third kind is a dream: thus Jacob in a dream, saw a ladder. The fourth kind is from the midst of a cloud: thus God spake to Moses. The fifth kind is a voice from heaven, as that which called to Abraham saying (Gn. 22:11): ‘Lay not thy hand upon the boy.’ The sixth kind is taking up a parable, as in the example of Balaam (Num. 23:7; 24:15). The seventh kind is the fullness of the Holy Ghost, as in the case of nearly all the prophets.” Further, he mentions three kinds of vision; “one by the eyes of the body, another by the soul’s imagination, a third by the eyes of the mind.” Now these are not included in the aforesaid division. Therefore it is insufficient.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Jerome to whom the gloss above quoted is ascribed.

I answer that, The species of moral habits and acts are distinguished according to their objects. Now the object of prophecy is something known by God and surpassing the faculty of man. Wherefore, according to the difference of such things, prophecy is divided into various species, as assigned above. Now it has been stated above (Q[71], A[6], ad 2) that the future is contained in the Divine knowledge in two ways. First, as in its cause: and thus we have the prophecy of “denunciation,” which is not always fulfilled. but it foretells the relation of cause to effect, which is sometimes hindered by some other occurrence supervening. Secondly, God foreknows certain things in themselves—either as to be accomplished by Himself, and of such things is the prophecy of “predestination,” since, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30), “God predestines things which are not in our power”—or as to be accomplished through man’s free-will, and of such is the prophecy of “foreknowledge.” This may regard either good or evil, which does not apply to the prophecy of predestination, since the latter regards good alone. And since predestination is comprised under foreknowledge, the gloss in the beginning of the Psalter assigns only two species to prophecy, namely of “foreknowledge,” and of “denunciation.”

Reply to Objection 1: Foreknowledge, properly speaking, denotes precognition of future events in themselves, and in this sense it is reckoned a species of prophecy. But in so far as it is used in connection with future events, whether as in themselves, or as in their causes, it is common to every species of prophecy.

Reply to Objection 2: The prophecy of promise is included in the prophecy of denunciation, because the aspect of truth is the same in both. But it is denominated in preference from denunciation, because God is more inclined to remit punishment than to withdraw promised blessings.

Reply to Objection 3: Isidore divides prophecy according to the manner of prophesying. Now we may distinguish the manner of prophesying—either according to man’s cognitive powers, which are sense, imagination, and intellect, and then we have the three kinds of vision mentioned both by him and by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7)—or according to the different ways in which the prophetic current is received. Thus as regards the enlightening of the intellect there is the “fullness of the Holy Ghost” which he mentions in the seventh place. As to the imprinting of pictures on the imagination he mentions three, namely “dreams,” to which he gives the third place; “vision,” which occurs to the prophet while awake and regards any kind of ordinary object, and this he puts in the second place; and “ecstasy,” which results from the mind being uplifted to certain lofty things, and to this he assigns the first place. As regards sensible signs he reckons three kinds of prophecy, because a sensible sign is—either a corporeal thing offered externally to the sight, such as “a cloud,” which he mentions in the fourth place—or a “voice” sounding from without and conveyed to man’s hearing—this he puts in the fifth place—or a voice proceeding from a man, conveying something under a similitude, and this pertains to the “parable” to which he assigns the sixth place.

Whether the prophecy which is accompanied by intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prophecy which has intellective and imaginative vision is more excellent than that which is accompanied by intellective vision alone. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 9): “He is less a prophet, who sees in spirit nothing but the signs representative of things, by means of the images of things corporeal: he is more a prophet, who is merely endowed with the understanding of these signs; but most of all is he a prophet, who excels in both ways,” and this refers to the prophet who has intellective together with imaginative vision. Therefore this kind of prophecy is more excellent.

Objection 2: Further, the greater a thing’s power is, the greater the distance to which it extends. Now the prophetic light pertains chiefly to the mind, as stated above ([3683]Q[173], A[2]). Therefore apparently the prophecy that extends to the imagination is greater than that which is confined to the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome (Prol. in Lib. Reg.) distinguishes the “prophets” from the “sacred writers.” Now all those whom he calls prophets (such as Isaias, Jeremias, and the like) had intellective together with imaginative vision: but not those whom he calls sacred writers, as writing by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost (such as Job, David, Solomon, and the like). Therefore it would seem more proper to call prophets those who had intellective together with imaginative vision, than those who had intellective vision alone.

Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “it is impossible for the Divine ray to shine on us, except as screened round about by the many-colored sacred veils.” Now the prophetic revelation is conveyed by the infusion of the divine ray. Therefore it seems that it cannot be without the veils of phantasms.

On the contrary, A gloss says at the beginning of the Psalter that “the most excellent manner of prophecy is when a man prophesies by the mere inspiration of the Holy Ghost, apart from any outward assistance of deed, word, vision, or dream.”

I answer that, The excellence of the means is measured chiefly by the end. Now the end of prophecy is the manifestation of a truth that surpasses the faculty of man. Wherefore the more effective this manifestation is, the more excellent the prophecy. But it is evident that the manifestation of divine truth by means of the bare contemplation of the truth itself, is more effective than that which is conveyed under the similitude of corporeal things, for it approaches nearer to the heavenly vision whereby the truth is seen in God’s essence. Hence it follows that the prophecy whereby a supernatural truth is seen by intellectual vision, is more excellent than that in which a supernatural truth is manifested by means of the similitudes of corporeal things in the vision of the imagination.

Moreover the prophet’s mind is shown thereby to be more lofty: even as in human teaching the hearer, who is able to grasp the bare intelligible truth the master propounds, is shown to have a better understanding than one who needs to be taken by the hand and helped by means of examples taken from objects of sense. Hence it is said in commendation of David’s prophecy (2 Kings 23:3): “The strong one of Israel spoke to me,” and further on (2 Kings 23:4): “As the light of the morning, when the sun riseth, shineth in the morning without clouds.”

Reply to Objection 1: When a particular supernatural truth has to be revealed by means of corporeal images, he that has both, namely the intellectual light and the imaginary vision, is more a prophet than he that has only one, because his prophecy is more perfect; and it is in this sense that Augustine speaks as quoted above. Nevertheless the prophecy in which the bare intelligible truth is revealed is greater than all.

Reply to Objection 2: The same judgment does not apply to things that are sought for their own sake, as to things sought for the sake of something else. For in things sought for their own sake, the agent’s power is the more effective according as it extends to more numerous and more remote objects; even so a physician is thought more of, if he is able to heal more people, and those who are further removed from health. on the other hand, in things sought only for the sake of something else, that agent would seem to have greater power, who is able to achieve his purpose with fewer means and those nearest to hand: thus more praise is awarded the physician who is able to heal a sick person by means of fewer and more gentle remedies. Now, in the prophetic knowledge, imaginary vision is required, not for its own sake, but on account of the manifestation of the intelligible truth. Wherefore prophecy is all the more excellent according as it needs it less.

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that a particular predicate is applicable to one thing and less properly to another, does not prevent this latter from being simply better than the former: thus the knowledge of the blessed is more excellent than the knowledge of the wayfarer, although faith is more properly predicated of the latter knowledge, because faith implies an imperfection of knowledge. In like manner prophecy implies a certain obscurity, and remoteness from the intelligible truth; wherefore the name of prophet is more properly applied to those who see by imaginary vision. And yet the more excellent prophecy is that which is conveyed by intellectual vision, provided the same truth be revealed in either case. If, however, the intellectual light be divinely infused in a person, not that he may know some supernatural things, but that he may be able to judge, with the certitude of divine truth, of things that can be known by human reason, such intellectual prophecy is beneath that which is conveyed by an imaginary vision leading to a supernatural truth. It was this kind of prophecy that all those had who are included in the ranks of the prophets, who moreover were called prophets for the special reason that they exercised the prophetic calling officially. Hence they spoke as God's representatives, saying to the people: "Thus saith the Lord": but not so the authors of the "sacred writings," several of whom treated more frequently of things that can be known by human reason, not in God's name, but in their own, yet with the assistance of the Divine light withal.

Reply to Objection 4: In the present life the enlightenment by the divine ray is not altogether without any veil of phantasms, because according to his present state of life it is unnatural to man not to understand without a phantasm. Sometimes, however, it is sufficient to have phantasms abstracted in the usual way from the senses without any imaginary vision divinely vouchsafed, and thus prophetic vision is said to be without imaginary vision.

Whether the degrees of prophecy can be distinguished according to the imaginary vision?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy cannot be distinguished according to the imaginary vision. For the degrees of a thing bear relation to something that is on its own account, not on account of something else. Now, in prophecy, intellectual vision is sought on its own account, and imaginary vision on account of something else, as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Therefore it would seem that the degrees of prophecy are distinguished not according to imaginary, but only according to intellectual, vision.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly for one prophet there is one degree of prophecy. Now one prophet receives revelation through various imaginary visions. Therefore a difference of imaginary visions does not entail a difference of prophecy.

Objection 3: Further, according to a gloss [*Cassiodorus, super Prolog. Hieron. in Psalt.], prophecy consists of words, deeds, dreams, and visions. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should not be distinguished according to imaginary vision, to which vision and dreams pertain, rather than according to words and deeds.

On the contrary, The medium differentiates the degrees of knowledge: thus science based on direct [*"Propter quid"] proofs is more excellent than science based on indirect [*”Quia”] premises or than opinion, because it comes through a more excellent medium. Now imaginary vision is a kind of medium in prophetic knowledge. Therefore the degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to imaginary vision.

I answer that, As stated above ([3684]Q[173], A[2]), the prophecy wherein, by the intelligible light, a supernatural truth is revealed through an imaginary vision, holds the mean between the prophecy wherein a supernatural truth is revealed without imaginary vision, and that wherein through the intelligible light and without an imaginary vision, man is directed to know or do things pertaining to human conduct. Now knowledge is more proper to prophecy than is action; wherefore the lowest degree of prophecy is when a man, by an inward instinct, is moved to perform some outward action. Thus it is related of Samson (Judges 15:14) that “the Spirit of the Lord came strongly upon him, and as the flax [*’Lina.’ St. Thomas apparently read ‘ligna’ (‘wood’)] is wont to be consumed at the approach of fire, so the bands with which he was bound were broken and loosed.” The second degree of prophecy is when a man is enlightened by an inward light so as to know certain things, which, however, do not go beyond the bounds of natural knowledge: thus it is related of Solomon (3 Kings 4:32,33) that “he spoke . . . parables . . . and he treated about trees from the cedar that is in Libanus unto the hyssop that cometh out of the wall, and he discoursed of beasts and of fowls, and of creeping things and of fishes”: and all of this came from divine inspiration, for it was stated previously (3 Kings 4:29): “God gave to Solomon wisdom and understanding exceeding much.”

Nevertheless these two degrees are beneath prophecy properly so called, because they do not attain to supernatural truth. The prophecy wherein supernatural truth is manifested through imaginary vision is differentiated first according to the difference between dreams which occur during sleep, and vision which occurs while one is awake. The latter belongs to a higher degree of prophecy, since the prophetic light that draws the soul away to supernatural things while it is awake and occupied with sensible things would seem to be stronger than that which finds a man’s soul asleep and withdrawn from objects of sense. Secondly the degrees of this prophecy are differentiated according to the expressiveness of the imaginary signs whereby the intelligible truth is conveyed. And since words are the most expressive signs of intelligible truth, it would seem to be a higher degree of prophecy when the prophet, whether awake or asleep, hears words expressive of an intelligible truth, than when he sees things significative of truth, for instance “the seven full ears of corn” signified “seven years of plenty” (Gn. 41:22, 26). In such like signs prophecy would seem to be the more excellent, according as the signs are more expressive, for instance when Jeremias saw the burning of the city under the figure of a boiling cauldron (Jer. 1:13). Thirdly, it is evidently a still higher degree of prophecy when a prophet not only sees signs of words or deeds, but also, either awake or asleep, sees someone speaking or showing something to him, since this proves the prophet’s mind to have approached nearer to the cause of the revelation. Fourthly, the height of a degree of prophecy may be measured according to the appearance of the person seen: for it is a higher degree of prophecy, if he who speaks or shows something to the waking or sleeping prophet be seen by him under the form of an angel, than if he be seen by him under the form of man: and higher still is it, if he be seen by the prophet whether asleep or awake, under the appearance of God, according to Is. 6:1, “I saw the Lord sitting.”

But above all these degrees there is a third kind of prophecy, wherein an intelligible and supernatural truth is shown without any imaginary vision. However, this goes beyond the bounds of prophecy properly so called, as stated above (A[2], ad 3); and consequently the degrees of prophecy are properly distinguished according to imaginary vision.

Reply to Objection 1: We are unable to know how to distinguish the intellectual light, except by means of imaginary or sensible signs. Hence the difference in the intellectual light is gathered from the difference in the things presented to the imagination.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3685]Q[171], A[2]), prophecy is by way, not of an abiding habit, but of a transitory passion; wherefore there is nothing inconsistent if one and the same prophet, at different times, receive various degrees of prophetic revelation.

Reply to Objection 3: The words and deeds mentioned there do not pertain to the prophetic revelation, but to the announcement, which is made according to the disposition of those to whom that which is revealed to the prophet is announced; and this is done sometimes by words, sometimes by deeds. Now this announcement, and the working of miracles, are something consequent upon prophecy, as stated above ([3686]Q[171], A[1]).

Whether Moses was the greatest of the prophets?

Objection 1: It would seem that Moses was not the greatest of the prophets. For a gloss at the beginning of the Psalter says that "David is called the prophet by way of excellence." Therefore Moses was not the greatest of all.

Objection 2: Further, greater miracles were wrought by Josue, who made the sun and moon to stand still (Josh. 10:12–14), and by Isaias, who made the sun to turn back (Is. 38:8), than by Moses, who divided the Red Sea (Ex. 14:21). In like manner greater miracles were wrought by Elias, of whom it is written (Ecclus. 48:4,5): "Who can glory like to thee? Who raisedst up a dead man from below." Therefore Moses was not the greatest of the prophets.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 11:11) that "there hath not risen, among them that are born of women, a greater than John the Baptist." Therefore Moses was not greater than all the prophets.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 34:10): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses."

I answer that, Although in some respect one or other of the prophets was greater than Moses, yet Moses was simply the greatest of all. For, as stated above [3687](A[3]; Q[171], A[1]), in prophecy we may consider not only the knowledge, whether by intellectual or by imaginary vision, but also the announcement and the confirmation by miracles. Accordingly Moses was greater than the other prophets. First, as regards the intellectual vision, since he saw God's very essence, even as Paul in his rapture did, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27). Hence it is written (Num. 12:8) that he saw God "plainly and not by riddles." Secondly, as regards the imaginary vision, which he had at his call, as it were, for not only did he hear words, but also saw one speaking to him under the form of God, and this not only while asleep, but even when he was awake. Hence it is written (Ex. 33:11) that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Thirdly, as regards the working of miracles which he wrought on a whole nation of unbelievers. Wherefore it is written (Dt. 34:10,11): "There arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face: in all the signs and wonders, which He sent by him, to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants, and to his whole land."

Reply to Objection 1: The prophecy of David approaches near to the vision of Moses, as regards the intellectual vision, because both received a revelation of intelligible and supernatural truth, without any imaginary vision. Yet the vision of Moses was more excellent as regards the knowledge of the Godhead; while David more fully knew and expressed the mysteries of Christ's incarnation.

Reply to Objection 2: These signs of the prophets mentioned were greater as to the substance of the thing done; yet the miracles of Moses were greater as regards the way in which they were done, since they were wrought on a whole people.

Reply to Objection 3: John belongs to the New Testament, whose ministers take precedence even of Moses, since they are spectators of a fuller revelation, as stated in 2 Cor. 3.

Whether there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is a degree of prophecy in the blessed. For, as stated above [3688](A[4]), Moses saw the Divine essence, and yet he is called a prophet. Therefore in like manner the blessed can be called prophets.

Objection 2: Further, prophecy is a "divine revelation." Now divine revelations are made even to the blessed angels. Therefore even blessed angels can be prophets.

Objection 3: Further, Christ was a comprehensor from the moment of His conception; and yet He calls Himself a prophet (Mat. 13:57), when He says: "A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country." Therefore even comprehensors and the blessed can be called prophets.

Objection 4: Further, it is written of Samuel (Ecclus. 46:23): "He lifted up his voice from the earth in prophecy to blot out the wickedness of the nation." Therefore other saints can likewise be called prophets after they have died.

On the contrary, The prophetic word is compared (2 Pet. 1:19) to a "light that shineth in a dark place." Now there is no darkness in the blessed. Therefore they cannot be called prophets.

I answer that, Prophecy denotes vision of some supernatural truth as being far remote from us. This happens in two ways. First, on the part of the knowledge itself, because, to wit, the supernatural truth is not known in itself, but in some of its effects; and this truth will be more remote if it be known by means of images of corporeal things, than if it be known in its intelligible effects; and such most of all is the prophetic vision, which is conveyed by images and likenesses of corporeal things. Secondly, vision is remote on the part of the seer, because, to wit, he has not yet attained completely to his ultimate perfection, according to 2 Cor. 5:6, “While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord.”

Now in neither of these ways are the blessed remote; wherefore they cannot be called prophets.

Reply to Objection 1: This vision of Moses was interrupted after the manner of a passion, and was not permanent like the beatific vision, wherefore he was as yet a seer from afar. For this reason his vision did not entirely lose the character of prophecy.

Reply to Objection 2: The divine revelation is made to the angels, not as being far distant, but as already wholly united to God; wherefore their revelation has not the character of prophecy.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ was at the same time comprehensor and wayfarer [*Cf. TP, QQ[9], seqq.]. Consequently the notion of prophecy is not applicable to Him as a comprehensor, but only as a wayfarer.

Reply to Objection 4: Samuel had not yet attained to the state of blessedness. Wherefore although by God’s will the soul itself of Samuel foretold to Saul the issue of the war as revealed to him by God, this pertains to the nature of prophecy. It is not the same with the saints who are now in heaven. Nor does it make any difference that this is stated to have been brought about by the demons’ art, because although the demons are unable to evoke the soul of a saint, or to force it to do any particular thing, this can be done by the power of God, so that when the demon is consulted, God Himself declares the truth by His messenger: even as He gave a true answer by Elias to the King’s messengers who were sent to consult the god of Accaron (4 Kings 1).

It might also be replied [*The Book of Ecclesiasticus was not as yet declared by the Church to be Canonical Scripture; Cf. [3689]FP, Q[89], A[8], ad 2] that it was not the soul of Samuel, but a demon impersonating him; and that the wise man calls him Samuel, and describes his prediction as prophetic, in accordance with the thoughts of Saul and the bystanders who were of this opinion.

Whether the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of prophecy change as time goes on. For prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine things, as stated above [3690](A[2]). Now according to Gregory (Hom. in Ezech.), "knowledge of God went on increasing as time went on." Therefore degrees of prophecy should be distinguished according to the process of time.

Objection 2: Further, prophetic revelation is conveyed by God speaking to man; while the prophets declared both in words and in writing the things revealed to them. Now it is written (1 Kings 3:1) that before the time of Samuel "the word of the Lord was precious," i.e. rare; and yet afterwards it was delivered to many. In like manner the books of the prophets do not appear to have been written before the time of Isaias, to whom it was said (Is. 8:1): "Take thee a great book and write in it with a man's pen," after which many prophets wrote their prophecies. Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy made progress.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 11:13): "The prophets and the law prophesied until John"; and afterwards the gift of prophecy was in Christ's disciples in a much more excellent manner than in the prophets of old, according to Eph. 3:5, "In other generations" the mystery of Christ "was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed to His holy apostles and prophets in the Spirit." Therefore it would seem that in course of time the degree of prophecy advanced.

On the contrary, As stated above [3691](A[4]), Moses was the greatest of the prophets, and yet he preceded the other prophets. Therefore prophecy did not advance in degree as time went on.

I answer that, As stated above [3692](A[2]), prophecy is directed to the knowledge of Divine truth, by the contemplation of which we are not only instructed in faith, but also guided in our actions, according to Ps. 42:3, "Send forth Thy light and Thy truth: they have conducted me." Now our faith consists chiefly in two things: first, in the true knowledge of God, according to Heb. 11:6, "He that cometh to God must believe that He is";

secondly, in the mystery of Christ's incarnation, according to Jn. 14:1, "You believe in God, believe also in Me." Accordingly, if we speak of prophecy as directed to the Godhead as its end, it progressed according to three divisions of time, namely before the law, under the law, and under grace. For before the law, Abraham and the other patriarchs were prophetically taught things pertinent to faith in the Godhead. Hence they are called prophets, according to Ps. 104:15, "Do no evil to My prophets," which words are said especially on behalf of Abraham and Isaac. Under the Law prophetic revelation of things pertinent to faith in the Godhead was made in a yet more excellent way than hitherto, because then not only certain special persons or families but the whole people had to be instructed in these matters. Hence the Lord said to Moses (Ex. 6:2,3): "I am the Lord that appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, by the name of God almighty, and My name Adonai I did not show to them"; because previously the patriarchs had been taught to believe in a general way in God, one and Almighty, while Moses was more fully instructed in the simplicity of the Divine essence, when it was said to him (Ex. 3:14): "I am Who am"; and this name is signified by Jews in the word "Adonai" on account of their veneration for that unspeakable name. Afterwards in the time of grace the mystery of the Trinity was revealed by the Son of God Himself, according to Mat. 28:19: "Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

In each state, however, the most excellent revelation was that which was given first. Now the first revelation, before the Law, was given to Abraham, for it was at that time that men began to stray from faith in one God by turning aside to idolatry, whereas hitherto no such revelation was necessary while all persevered in the worship of one God. A less excellent revelation was made to Isaac, being founded on that which was made to Abraham. Wherefore it was said to him (Gn. 26:24): "I am the God of Abraham thy father," and in like manner to Jacob (Gn. 28:13): "I am the God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac." Again in the state of the Law the first revelation which was given to Moses was more excellent, and on this revelation all the other revelations to the prophets were founded. And so, too, in the time of grace the entire faith of the Church is founded on the revelation vouchsafed to the apostles, concerning the faith in one God and three Persons, according to Mat. 16:18, "On this rock," i.e. of thy confession, "I will build My Church."

As to the faith in Christ's incarnation, it is evident that the nearer men were to Christ, whether before or after Him, the more fully, for the most part, were they instructed on this point, and after Him more fully than before, as the Apostle declares (Eph. 3:5).

As regards the guidance of human acts, the prophetic revelation varied not according to the course of time, but according as circumstances required, because as it is written (Prov. 29:18), "When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." Wherefore at all times men were divinely instructed about what they were to do, according as it was expedient for the spiritual welfare of the elect.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Gregory is to be referred to the time before Christ's incarnation, as regards the knowledge of this mystery.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 27), "just as in the early days of the Assyrian kingdom promises were made most explicitly to Abraham, so at the outset of the western Babylon," which is Rome, "and under its sway Christ was to come, in Whom were to be fulfilled the promises made through the prophetic oracles testifying in word and writing to that great event to come," the promises, namely, which were made to Abraham. "For while prophets were scarcely ever lacking to the people of Israel from the time that they began to have kings, it was exclusively for their benefit, not for that of the nations. But when those prophetic writings were being set up with greater publicity, which at some future time were to benefit the nations, it was fitting to begin when this city," Rome to wit, "was being built, which was to govern the nations."

The reason why it behooved that nation to have a number of prophets especially at the time of the kings, was that then it was not over-ridden by other nations, but had its own king; wherefore it behooved the people, as enjoying liberty, to have prophets to teach them what to do.

Reply to Objection 3: The prophets who foretold the coming of Christ could not continue further than John, who with his finger pointed to Christ actually present. Nevertheless as Jerome says on this passage, "This does not mean that there were no more prophets after John. For we read in the Acts of the apostles that Agabus and the four maidens, daughters of Philip, prophesied." John, too, wrote a prophetic book about the end of the Church;

and at all times there have not been lacking persons having the spirit of prophecy, not indeed for the declaration of any new doctrine of faith, but for the direction of human acts. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 26) that "the emperor Theodosius sent to John who dwelt in the Egyptian desert, and whom he knew by his ever-increasing fame to be endowed with the prophetic spirit: and from him he received a message assuring him of victory."

OF RAPTURE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider rapture. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?

(2) Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive or to the appetitive power?

(3) Whether Paul when in rapture saw the essence of God?

(4) Whether he was withdrawn from his senses?

(5) Whether, when in that state, his soul was wholly separated from his body?

(6) What did he know, and what did he not know about this matter?

Whether the soul of man is carried away to things divine?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of man is not carried away to things divine. For some define rapture as "an uplifting by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature" [*Reference unknown; Cf. De Veritate xiii, 1]. Now it is in accordance with man's nature that he be uplifted to things divine; for Augustine says at the beginning of his Confessions: "Thou madest us, Lord, for Thyself, and our heart is restless, till it rest in Thee." Therefore man's soul is not carried away to things divine.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. viii) that "God's justice is seen in this that He treats all things according to their mode and dignity." But it is not in accordance with man's mode and worth that he be raised above what he is according to nature. Therefore it would seem that man’s soul is not carried away to things divine.

Objection 3: Further, rapture denotes violence of some kind. But God rules us not by violence or force, as Damascene says [*De Fide Orth. ii, 30]. Therefore man’s soul is not carried away to things divine.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:2): “I know a man in Christ . . . rapt even to the third heaven.” On which words a gloss says: “Rapt, that is to say, uplifted contrary to nature.”

I answer that, Rapture denotes violence of a kind as stated above (OBJ[3]); and “the violent is that which has its principle without, and in which he that suffers violence concurs not at all” (Ethic. iii, 1). Now everything concurs in that to which it tends in accordance with its proper inclination, whether voluntary or natural. Wherefore he who is carried away by some external agent, must be carried to something different from that to which his inclination tends. This difference arises in two ways: in one way from the end of the inclination—for instance a stone, which is naturally inclined to be borne downwards, may be thrown upwards; in another way from the manner of tending—for instance a stone may be thrown downwards with greater velocity than consistent with its natural movement.

Accordingly man’s soul also is said to be carried away, in a twofold manner, to that which is contrary to its nature: in one way, as regards the term of transport—as when it is carried away to punishment, according to Ps. 49:22, “Lest He snatch you away, and there be none to deliver you”; in another way, as regards the manner connatural to man, which is that he should understand the truth through sensible things. Hence when he is withdrawn from the apprehension of sensibles, he is said to be carried away, even though he be uplifted to things whereunto he is directed naturally: provided this be not done intentionally, as when a man betakes himself to sleep which is in accordance with nature, wherefore sleep cannot be called rapture, properly speaking.

This withdrawal, whatever its term may be, may arise from a threefold cause. First, from a bodily cause, as happens to those who suffer abstraction from the senses through weakness: secondly, by the power of the demons, as in those who are possessed: thirdly, by the power of God. In this last sense we are now speaking of rapture, whereby a man is uplifted by the spirit of God to things supernatural, and withdrawn from his senses, according to Ezech. 8:3, “The spirit lifted me up between the earth and the heaven, and brought me in the vision of God into Jerusalem.”

It must be observed, however, that sometimes a person is said to be carried away, not only through being withdrawn from his senses, but also through being withdrawn from the things to which he was attending, as when a person’s mind wanders contrary to his purpose. But this is to use the expression in a less proper signification.

Reply to Objection 1: It is natural to man to tend to divine things through the apprehension of things sensible, according to Rom. 1:20, “The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.” But the mode, whereby a man is uplifted to divine things and withdrawn from his senses, is not natural to man.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to man’s mode and dignity that he be uplifted to divine things, from the very fact that he is made to God’s image. And since a divine good infinitely surpasses the faculty of man in order to attain that good, he needs the divine assistance which is bestowed on him in every gift of grace. Hence it is not contrary to nature, but above the faculty of nature that man’s mind be thus uplifted in rapture by God.

Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Damascene refers to those things which a man does by himself. But as to those things which are beyond the scope of the free-will, man needs to be uplifted by a stronger operation, which in a certain respect may be called force if we consider the mode of operation, but not if we consider its term to which man is directed both by nature and by his intention.

Whether rapture pertains to the cognitive rather than to the appetitive power?

Objection 1: It would seem that rapture pertains to the appetitive rather than to the cognitive power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): “The Divine love causes ecstasy.” Now love pertains to the appetitive power. Therefore so does ecstasy or rapture.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3) that “he who fed the swine debased himself by a dissipated mind and an unclean life; whereas Peter, when the angel delivered him and carried him into ecstasy, was not beside himself, but above himself.” Now the prodigal son sank into the depths by his appetite. Therefore in those also who are carried up into the heights it is the appetite that is affected.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 30:1, “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped, let me never be confounded,” says in explaining the title [*Unto the end, a psalm for David, in an ecstasy]: “{Ekstasis} in Greek signifies in Latin ‘excessus mentis,’ an aberration of the mind. This happens in two ways, either through dread of earthly things or through the mind being rapt in heavenly things and forgetful of this lower world.” Now dread of earthly things pertains to the appetite. Therefore rapture of the mind in heavenly things, being placed in opposition to this dread, also pertains to the appetite.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ps. 115:2, “I said in my excess: Every man is a liar,” says: “We speak of ecstasy, not when the mind wanders through fear, but when it is carried aloft on the wings of revelation.” Now revelation pertains to the intellective power. Therefore ecstasy or rapture does also.

I answer that, We can speak of rapture in two ways. First, with regard to the term of rapture, and thus, properly speaking, rapture cannot pertain to the appetitive, but only to the cognitive power. For it was stated [3693] (A[1]) that rapture is outside the inclination of the person who is rapt; whereas the movement of the appetitive power is an inclination to an appetible good. Wherefore, properly speaking, in desiring something, a man is not rapt, but is moved by himself.

Secondly, rapture may be considered with regard to its cause, and thus it may have a cause on the part of the appetitive power. For from the very fact that the appetite is strongly affected towards something, it may happen, owing to the violence of his affection, that a man is carried away from everything else. Moreover, it has an effect on the appetitive power, when for instance a man delights in the things to which he is rapt. Hence the Apostle said that he was rapt, not only “to the third heaven”—which pertains to the contemplation of the intellect—but also into “paradise,” which pertains to the appetite.

Reply to Objection 1: Rapture adds something to ecstasy. For ecstasy means simply a going out of oneself by being placed outside one’s proper order [*Cf. [3694]FS, Q[28], A[3]]; while rapture denotes a certain violence in addition. Accordingly ecstasy may pertain to the appetitive power, as when a man’s appetite tends to something outside him, and in this sense Dionysius says that “the Divine love causes ecstasy,” inasmuch as it makes man’s appetite tend to the object loved. Hence he says afterwards that “even God Himself, the cause of all things, through the overflow of His loving goodness, goes outside Himself in His providence for all beings.” But even if this were said expressly of rapture, it would merely signify that love is the cause of rapture.

Reply to Objection 2: There is a twofold appetite in man; to wit, the intellective appetite which is called the will, and the sensitive appetite known as the sensuality. Now it is proper to man that his lower appetite be subject to the higher appetite, and that the higher move the lower. Hence man may become outside himself as regards the appetite, in two ways. In one way, when a man’s intellective appetite tends wholly to divine things, and takes no account of those things whereto the sensitive appetite inclines him; thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “Paul being in ecstasy through the vehemence of Divine love” exclaimed: “I live, now not I, but Christ liveth in me.”

In another way, when a man tends wholly to things pertaining to the lower appetite, and takes no account of his higher appetite. It is thus that “he who fed the swine debased himself”; and this latter kind of going out of oneself, or being beside oneself, is more akin than the former to the nature of rapture because the higher appetite is more proper to man. Hence when through the violence of his lower appetite a man is withdrawn from the movement of his higher appetite, it is more a case of being withdrawn from that which is proper to him. Yet, because there is no violence therein, since the will is able to resist the passion, it falls short of the true nature of rapture, unless perchance the passion be so strong that it takes away entirely the use of reason, as happens to those who are mad with anger or love.

It must be observed. however, that both these excesses affecting the appetite may cause an excess in the cognitive power, either because the mind is carried away to certain intelligible objects, through being drawn away from objects of sense, or because it is caught up into some imaginary vision or fanciful apparition.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as love is a movement of the appetite with regard to good, so fear is a movement of the appetite with regard to evil. Wherefore either of them may equally cause an aberration of mind; and all the more since fear arises from love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).

Whether Paul, when in rapture, saw the essence of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, did not see the essence of God. For just as we read of Paul that he was rapt to the third heaven, so we read of Peter (Acts 10:10) that “there came upon him an ecstasy of mind.” Now Peter, in his ecstasy, saw not God’s essence but an imaginary vision. Therefore it would seem that neither did Paul see the essence of God.

Objection 2: Further, the vision of God is beatific. But Paul, in his rapture, was not beatified; else he would never have returned to the unhappiness of this life, but his body would have been glorified by the overflow from his soul, as will happen to the saints after the resurrection, and this clearly was not the case. Therefore Paul when in rapture saw not the essence of God.

Objection 3: Further, according to 1 Cor. 13:10–12, faith and hope are incompatible with the vision of the Divine essence. But Paul when in this state had faith and hope. Therefore he saw not the essence of God.

Objection 4: Further, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7), “pictures of bodies are seen in the imaginary vision.” Now Paul is stated (2 Cor. 12:2, 4) to have seen certain pictures in his rapture, for instance of the “third heaven” and of “paradise.” Therefore he would seem to have been rapt to an imaginary vision rather than to the vision of the Divine essence.

On the contrary, Augustine (Ep. CXLVII, 13; ad Paulin., de videndo Deum) concludes that “possibly God’s very substance was seen by some while yet in this life: for instance by Moses, and by Paul who in rapture heard unspeakable words, which it is not granted unto man to utter.”

I answer that, Some have said that Paul, when in rapture, saw “not the very essence of God, but a certain reflection of His clarity.” But Augustine clearly comes to an opposite decision, not only in his book (De videndo Deum), but also in Gen. ad lit. xii, 28 (quoted in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12:2). Indeed the words themselves of the Apostle indicate this. For he says that “he heard secret words, which it is not granted unto man to utter”: and such would seem to be words pertaining to the vision of the blessed, which transcends the state of the wayfarer, according to Is. 64:4, “Eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that love [Vulg.: ‘wait for’] Thee” [*1 Cor. 2:9]. Therefore it is more becoming to hold that he saw God in His essence.

Reply to Objection 1: Man’s mind is rapt by God to the contemplation of divine truth in three ways. First, so that he contemplates it through certain imaginary pictures, and such was the ecstasy that came upon Peter. Secondly, so that he contemplates the divine truth through its intelligible effects; such was the ecstasy of David, who said (Ps. 115:11): “I said in my excess: Every man is a liar.” Thirdly, so that he contemplates it in its essence. Such was the rapture of Paul, as also of Moses [*Cf. Q[174], A[4]]; and not without reason, since as Moses was the first Teacher of the Jews, so was Paul the first “Teacher of the gentiles” [*Cf. [3695]FP, Q[68], A[4]].

Reply to Objection 2: The Divine essence cannot be seen by a created intellect save through the light of glory, of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall see light.” But this light can be shared in two ways. First by way of an abiding form, and thus it beatifies the saints in heaven. Secondly, by way of a transitory passion, as stated above ([3696]Q[171] , A[2]) of the light of prophecy; and in this way that light was in Paul when he was in rapture. Hence this vision did not beatify him simply, so as to overflow into his body, but only in a restricted sense. Consequently this rapture pertains somewhat to prophecy.

Reply to Objection 3: Since, in his rapture, Paul was beatified not as to the habit, but only as to the act of the blessed, it follows that he had not the act of faith at the same time, although he had the habit.

Reply to Objection 4: In one way by the third heaven we may understand something corporeal, and thus the third heaven denotes the empyrean [*1 Tim. 2:7; Cf. [3697]FP, Q[12], A[11], ad 2], which is described as the “third,” in relation to the aerial and starry heavens, or better still, in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens. Moreover Paul is stated to be rapt to the “third heaven,” not as though his rapture consisted in the vision of something corporeal, but because this place is appointed for the contemplation of the blessed. Hence the gloss on 2 Cor. 12 says that the “third heaven is a spiritual heaven, where the angels and the holy souls enjoy the contemplation of God: and when Paul says that he was rapt to this heaven he means that God showed him the life wherein He is to be seen forevermore.”

In another way the third heaven may signify a supra-mundane vision. Such a vision may be called the third heaven in three ways. First, according to the order of the cognitive powers. In this way the first heaven would indicate a supramundane bodily vision, conveyed through the senses; thus was seen the hand of one writing on the wall (Dan. 5:5); the second heaven would be an imaginary vision such as Isaias saw, and John in the Apocalypse; and the third heaven would denote an intellectual vision according to Augustine's explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,28,34). Secondly, the third heaven may be taken according to the order of things knowable, the first heaven being "the knowledge of heavenly bodies, the second the knowledge of heavenly spirits, the third the knowledge of God Himself." Thirdly, the third heaven may denote the contemplation of God according to the degrees of knowledge whereby God is seen. The first of these degrees belongs to the angels of the lowest hierarchy [*Cf. [3698]FP, Q[108], A[1]], the second to the angels of the middle hierarchy, the third to the angels of the highest hierarchy, according to the gloss on 2 Cor. 12.

And since the vision of God cannot be without delight, he says that he was not only "rapt to the third heaven" by reason of his contemplation, but also into "Paradise" by reason of the consequent delight.

Whether Paul, when in rapture, was withdrawn from his senses?

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul, when in rapture, was not withdrawn from his senses. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28): "Why should we not believe that when so great an apostle, the teacher of the gentiles, was rapt to this most sublime vision, God was willing to vouchsafe him a glimpse of that eternal life which is to take the place of the present life?" Now in that future life after the resurrection the saints will see the Divine essence without being withdrawn from the senses of the body. Therefore neither did such a withdrawal take place in Paul.

Objection 2: Further, Christ was truly a wayfarer, and also enjoyed an uninterrupted vision of the Divine essence, without, however, being withdrawn from His senses. Therefore there was no need for Paul to be withdrawn from his senses in order for him to see the essence of God.

Objection 3: Further, after seeing God in His essence, Paul remembered what he had seen in that vision; hence he said (2 Cor. 12:4): "He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter.” Now the memory belongs to the sensitive faculty according to the Philosopher (De Mem. et Remin. i). Therefore it seems that Paul, while seeing the essence of God, was not withdrawn from his senses.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27): “Unless a man in some way depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body or by turning away and withdrawing from his carnal senses, so that he truly knows not as the Apostle said, whether he be in the body or out of the body, he is not rapt and caught up into that vision.*” [*The text of St. Augustine reads: “when he is rapt,” etc.]

I answer that, The Divine essence cannot be seen by man through any cognitive power other than the intellect. Now the human intellect does not turn to intelligible objects except by means of the phantasms [*Cf. [3699]FP, Q[84], A[7]] which it takes from the senses through the intelligible species; and it is in considering these phantasms that the intellect judges of and coordinates sensible objects. Hence in any operation that requires abstraction of the intellect from phantasms, there must be also withdrawal of the intellect from the senses. Now in the state of the wayfarer it is necessary for man’s intellect, if it see God’s essence, to be withdrawn from phantasms. For God’s essence cannot be seen by means of a phantasm, nor indeed by any created intelligible species [*Cf. [3700]FP, Q[12], A[2]], since God’s essence infinitely transcends not only all bodies, which are represented by phantasms, but also all intelligible creatures. Now when man’s intellect is uplifted to the sublime vision of God’s essence, it is necessary that his mind’s whole attention should be summoned to that purpose in such a way that he understand naught else by phantasms, and be absorbed entirely in God. Therefore it is impossible for man while a wayfarer to see God in His essence without being withdrawn from his senses.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[3], OBJ[2]), after the resurrection, in the blessed who see God in His essence, there will be an overflow from the intellect to the lower powers and even to the body. Hence it is in keeping with the rule itself of the divine vision that the soul will turn towards phantasms and sensible objects. But there is no such overflow in those who are raptured, as stated (A[3], OBJ[2], ad 2), and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect of Christ’s soul was glorified by the habit of the light of glory, whereby He saw the Divine essence much more fully than an angel or a man. He was, however, a wayfarer on account of the passibility of His body, in respect of which He was “made a little lower than the angels” (Heb. 2:9), by dispensation, and not on account of any defect on the part of His intellect. Hence there is no comparison between Him and other wayfarers.

Reply to Objection 3: Paul, after seeing God in His essence, remembered what he had known in that vision, by means of certain intelligible species that remained in his intellect by way of habit; even as in the absence of the sensible object, certain impressions remain in the soul which it recollects when it turns to the phantasms. And so this was the knowledge that he was unable wholly to think over or express in words.

Whether, while in this state, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body?

Objection 1: It would seem that, while in this state, Paul’s soul was wholly separated from his body. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6,7): “While we are in the body we are absent from the Lord. For we walk by faith, and not by sight” [*’Per speciem,’ i.e. by an intelligible species]. Now, while in that state, Paul was not absent from the Lord, for he saw Him by a species, as stated above [3701](A[3]). Therefore he was not in the body.

Objection 2: Further, a power of the soul cannot be uplifted above the soul’s essence wherein it is rooted. Now in this rapture the intellect, which is a power of the soul, was withdrawn from its bodily surroundings through being uplifted to divine contemplation. Much more therefore was the essence of the soul separated from the body.

Objection 3: Further, the forces of the vegetative soul are more material than those of the sensitive soul. Now in order for him to be rapt to the vision of God, it was necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the sensitive soul, as stated above [3702](A[4]). Much more, therefore, was it necessary for him to be withdrawn from the forces of the vegetative soul. Now when these forces cease to operate, the soul is no longer in any way united to the body. Therefore it would seem that in Paul’s rapture it was necessary for the soul to be wholly separated from the body.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. CXLVII, 13, ad Paulin.; de videndo Deum): “It is not incredible that this sublime revelation” (namely, that they should see God in His essence) “was vouchsafed certain saints, without their departing this life so completely as to leave nothing but a corpse for burial.” Therefore it was not necessary for Paul’s soul, when in rapture, to be wholly separated from his body.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], OBJ[1]), in the rapture of which we are speaking now, man is uplifted by God’s power, “from that which is according to nature to that which is above nature.” Wherefore two things have to be considered: first, what pertains to man according to nature; secondly, what has to be done by God in man above his nature. Now, since the soul is united to the body as its natural form, it belongs to the soul to have a natural disposition to understand by turning to phantasms; and this is not withdrawn by the divine power from the soul in rapture, since its state undergoes no change, as stated above (A[3], ad 2,3). Yet, this state remaining, actual conversion to phantasms and sensible objects is withdrawn from the soul, lest it be hindered from being uplifted to that which transcends all phantasms, as stated above [3703](A[4]). Therefore it was not necessary that his soul in rapture should be so separated from the body as to cease to be united thereto as its form; and yet it was necessary for his intellect to be withdrawn from phantasms and the perception of sensible objects.

Reply to Objection 1: In this rapture Paul was absent from the Lord as regards his state, since he was still in the state of a wayfarer, but not as regards the act by which he saw God by a species, as stated above (A[3], ad 2,3).

Reply to Objection 2: A faculty of the soul is not uplifted by the natural power above the mode becoming the essence of the soul; but it can be uplifted by the divine power to something higher, even as a body by the violence of a stronger power is lifted up above the place befitting it according to its specific nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The forces of the vegetative soul do not operate through the soul being intent thereon, as do the sensitive forces, but by way of nature. Hence in the case of rapture there is no need for withdrawal from them, as from the sensitive powers, whose operations would lessen the intentness of the soul on intellective knowledge.

Did Paul know whether his soul were separated from his body?

Objection 1: It would seem that Paul was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body. For he says (2 Cor. 12:2): “I know a man in Christ rapt even to the third heaven.” Now man denotes something composed of soul and body; and rapture differs from death. Seemingly therefore he knew that his soul was not separated from his body by death, which is the more probable seeing that this is the common opinion of the Doctors.

Objection 2: Further, it appears from the same words of the Apostle that he knew whither he was rapt, since it was “to the third heaven.” Now this shows that he knew whether he was in the body or not, for if he knew the third heaven to be something corporeal, he must have known that his soul was not separated from his body, since a corporeal thing cannot be an object of sight save through the body. Therefore it would seem that he was not ignorant whether his soul were separated from his body.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 28) that “when in rapture, he saw God with the same vision as the saints see Him in heaven.” Now from the very fact that the saints see God, they know whether their soul is separated from their body. Therefore Paul too knew this.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 12:3): “Whether in the body, or out of the body, I know not, God knoweth.”

I answer that, The true answer to this question must be gathered from the Apostle’s very words, whereby he says he knew something, namely that he was “rapt even to the third heaven,” and that something he knew not, namely “whether” he were “in the body or out of the body.” This may be understood in two ways. First, the words “whether in the body or out of the body” may refer not to the very being of the man who was rapt (as though he knew not whether his soul were in his body or not), but to the mode of rapture, so that he ignored whether his body besides his soul, or, on the other hand, his soul alone, were rapt to the third heaven. Thus Ezechiel is stated (Ezech. 8:3) to have been “brought in the vision of God into Jerusalem.” This was the explanation of a certain Jew according to Jerome (Prolog. super Daniel.), where he says that “lastly our Apostle” (thus said the Jew) “durst not assert that he was rapt in his body, but said: ‘Whether in the body or out of the body, I know not.’”

Augustine, however, disapproves of this explanation (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3 seqq.) for this reason that the Apostle states that he knew he was rapt even to the third heaven. Wherefore he knew it to be really the third heaven to which he was rapt, and not an imaginary likeness of the third heaven: otherwise if he gave the name of third heaven to an imaginary third heaven, in the same way he might state that he was rapt in the body, meaning, by body, an image of his body, such as appears in one’s dreams. Now if he knew it to be really the third heaven, it follows that either he knew it to be something spiritual and incorporeal, and then his body could not be rapt thither; or he knew it to be something corporeal, and then his soul could not be rapt thither without his body, unless it were separated from his body. Consequently we must explain the matter otherwise, by saying that the Apostle knew himself to be rapt both in soul and body, but that he ignored how his soul stood in relation to his body, to wit, whether it were accompanied by his body or not.

Here we find a diversity of opinions. For some say that the Apostle knew his soul to be united to his body as its form, but ignored whether it were abstracted from its senses, or again whether it were abstracted from the operations of the vegetative soul. But he could not but know that it was abstracted from the senses, seeing that he knew himself to be rapt; and as to his being abstracted from the operation of the vegetative soul, this was not of such importance as to require him to be so careful in mentioning it. It follows, then, that the Apostle ignored whether his soul were united to his body as its form, or separated from it by death. Some, however, granting this say that the Apostle did not consider the matter while he was in rapture, because he was wholly intent upon God, but that afterwards he questioned the point, when taking cognizance of what he had seen. But this also is contrary to the Apostle's words, for he there distinguishes between the past and what happened subsequently, since he states that at the present time he knows that he was rapt "fourteen years ago," and that at the present time he knows not "whether he was in the body or out of the body."

Consequently we must assert that both before and after he ignored whether his soul were separated from his body. Wherefore Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 5), after discussing the question at length, concludes: "Perhaps then we must infer that he ignored whether, when he was rapt to the third heaven, his soul was in his body (in the same way as the soul is in the body, when we speak of a living body either of a waking or of a sleeping man, or of one that is withdrawn from his bodily senses during ecstasy), or whether his soul went out of his body altogether, so that his body lay dead."

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes by the figure of synecdoche a part of man, especially the soul which is the principal part, denotes a man. or again we might take this to mean that he whom he states to have been rapt was a man not at the time of his rapture, but fourteen years afterwards: for he says "I know a man," not "I know a rapt man." Again nothing hinders death brought about by God being called rapture; and thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 3): "If the Apostle doubted the matter, who of us will dare to be certain about it?" Wherefore those who have something to say on this subject speak with more conjecture than certainty.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle knew that either the heaven in question was something incorporeal, or that he saw something incorporeal in that heaven; yet this could be done by his intellect, even without his soul being separated from his body.

Reply to Objection 3: Paul's vision, while he was in rapture, was like the vision of the blessed in one respect, namely as to the thing seen; and, unlike, in another respect, namely as to the mode of seeing, because he saw not so perfectly as do the saints in heaven. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 36): "Although, when the Apostle was rapt from his carnal senses to the third heaven, he lacked that full and perfect knowledge of things which is in the angels, in that he knew not whether he was in the body, or out of the body, this will surely not be lacking after reunion with the body in the resurrection of the dead, when this corruptible will put on incorruption."

OF THE GRACE OF TONGUES (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider those gratuitous graces that pertain to speech, and (1) the grace of tongues; (2) the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by the grace of tongues a man acquires the knowledge of all languages?

(2) Of the comparison between this gift and the grace of prophecy.

Whether those who received the gift of tongues spoke in every language?

Objection 1: It seems that those who received the gift of tongues did not speak in every language. For that which is granted to certain persons by the divine power is the best of its kind: thus our Lord turned the water into good wine, as stated in Jn. 2:10. Now those who had the gift of tongues spoke better in their own language; since a gloss on Heb. 1, says that "it is not surprising that the epistle to the Hebrews is more graceful in style than the other epistles, since it is natural for a man to have more command over his own than over a strange language. For the Apostle wrote the other epistles in a foreign, namely the Greek, idiom; whereas he wrote this in the Hebrew tongue." Therefore the apostles did not receive the knowledge of all languages by a gratuitous grace.

Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one is sufficient; and much less does God Whose work is more orderly than nature's. Now God could make His disciples to be understood by all, while speaking one tongue: hence a gloss on Acts 2:6, "Every man heard them speak in his own tongue," says that "they spoke in every tongue, or speaking in their own, namely the Hebrew language, were understood by all, as though they spoke the language proper to each." Therefore it would seem that they had not the knowledge to speak in all languages.

Objection 3: Further, all graces flow from Christ to His body, which is the Church, according to Jn. 1:16, "Of His fullness we all have received." Now we do not read that Christ spoke more than one language, nor does each one of the faithful now speak save in one tongue. Therefore it would seem that Christ's disciples did not receive the grace to the extent of speaking in all languages.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:4) that "they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and they began to speak with divers tongues, according as the Holy Ghost gave them to speak"; on which passage a gloss of Gregory [*Hom. xxx in Ev.] says that "the Holy Ghost appeared over the disciples under the form of fiery tongues, and gave them the knowledge of all tongues."

I answer that, Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His faith everywhere, according to Mat. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea, according to Is. 27:6, "When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.: 'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill the face of the world with seed." Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to Gn. 11, so when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might be applied by the gift of tongues.

Reply to Objection 1: As it is written (1 Cor. 12:7), “the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit”; and consequently both Paul and the other apostles were divinely instructed in the languages of all nations sufficiently for the requirements of the teaching of the faith. But as regards the grace and elegance of style which human art adds to a language, the Apostle was instructed in his own, but not in a foreign tongue. Even so they were sufficiently instructed in wisdom and scientific knowledge, as required for teaching the faith, but not as to all things known by acquired science, for instance the conclusions of arithmetic and geometry.

Reply to Objection 2: Although either was possible, namely that, while speaking in one tongue they should be understood by all, or that they should speak in all tongues, it was more fitting that they should speak in all tongues, because this pertained to the perfection of their knowledge, whereby they were able not only to speak, but also to understand what was said by others. Whereas if their one language were intelligible to all, this would either have been due to the knowledge of those who understood their speech, or it would have amounted to an illusion, since a man’s words would have had a different sound in another’s ears, from that with which they were uttered. Hence a gloss says on Acts 2:6 that “it was a greater miracle that they should speak all kinds of tongues”; and Paul says (1 Cor. 14:18): “I thank my God I speak with all your tongues.”

Reply to Objection 3: Christ in His own person purposed preaching to only one nation, namely the Jews. Consequently, although without any doubt He possessed most perfectly the knowledge of all languages, there was no need for Him to speak in every tongue. And therefore, as Augustine says (Tract. xxxii in Joan.), “whereas even now the Holy Ghost is received, yet no one speaks in the tongues of all nations, because the Church herself already speaks the languages of all nations: since whoever is not in the Church, receives not the Holy Ghost.”

Whether the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the grace of prophecy. For, seemingly, better things are proper to better persons, according to the Philosopher (Topic. iii, 1). Now the gift of tongues is proper to the New Testament, hence we sing in the sequence of Pentecost [*The sequence: ‘Sancti Spiritus adsit nobis gratia’ ascribed to King Robert of France, the reputed author of the ‘Veni Sancte Spiritus.’ Cf. Migne, Patr. Lat. tom. CXLI]: “On this day Thou gavest Christ’s apostles an unwonted gift, a marvel to all time”: whereas prophecy is more pertinent to the Old Testament, according to Heb. 1:1, “God Who at sundry times and in divers manners spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets.” Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.

Objection 2: Further, that whereby we are directed to God is seemingly more excellent than that whereby we are directed to men. Now, by the gift of tongues, man is directed to God, whereas by prophecy he is directed to man; for it is written (1 Cor. 14:2,3): “He that speaketh in a tongue, speaketh not unto men, but unto God . . . but he that prophesieth, speaketh unto men unto edification.” Therefore it would seem that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy.

Objection 3: Further, the gift of tongues abides like a habit in the person who has it, and “he can use it when he will”; wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 14:18): “I thank my God I speak with all your tongues.” But it is not so with the gift of prophecy, as stated above ([3704]Q[171], A[2]). Therefore the gift of tongues would seem to be more excellent than the gift of prophecy.

Objection 4: Further, the “interpretation of speeches” would seem to be contained under prophecy, because the Scriptures are expounded by the same Spirit from Whom they originated. Now the interpretation of speeches is placed after “divers kinds of tongues” (1 Cor. 12:10). Therefore it seems that the gift of tongues is more excellent than the gift of prophecy, particularly as regards a part of the latter.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:5): “Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues.”

I answer that, The gift of prophecy surpasses the gift of tongues, in three ways. First, because the gift of tongues regards the utterance of certain words, which signify an intelligible truth, and this again is signified by the phantasms which appear in an imaginary vision; wherefore Augustine compares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 8) the gift of tongues to an imaginary vision. On the other hand, it has been stated above ([3705]Q[173], A[2]) that the gift of prophecy consists in the mind itself being enlightened so as to know an intelligible truth. Wherefore, as the prophetic enlightenment is more excellent than the imaginary vision, as stated above ([3706]Q[174], A[2]), so also is prophecy more excellent than the gift of tongues considered in itself. Secondly, because the gift of prophecy regards the knowledge of things, which is more excellent than the knowledge of words, to which the gift of tongues pertains.

Thirdly, because the gift of prophecy is more profitable. The Apostle proves this in three ways (1 Cor. 14); first, because prophecy is more profitable to the edification of the Church, for which purpose he that speaketh in tongues profiteth nothing, unless interpretation follow (1 Cor. 14:4,5). Secondly, as regards the speaker himself, for if he be enabled to speak in divers tongues without understanding them, which pertains to the gift of prophecy, his own mind would not be edified (1 Cor. 14:7–14). Thirdly, as to unbelievers for whose especial benefit the gift of tongues seems to have been given; since perchance they might think those who speak in tongues to be mad (1 Cor. 14:23), for instance the Jews deemed the apostles drunk when the latter spoke in various tongues (Acts 2:13): whereas by prophecies the unbeliever is convinced, because the secrets of his heart are made manifest (Acts 2:25).

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3707]Q[174], A[3], ad 1), it belongs to the excellence of prophecy that a man is not only enlightened by an intelligible light, but also that he should perceive an imaginary vision: and so again it belongs to the perfection of the Holy Ghost’s operation, not only to fill the mind with the prophetic light, and the imagination with the imaginary vision, as happened in the Old Testament, but also to endow the tongue with external erudition, in the utterance of various signs of speech. All this is done in the New Testament, according to 1 Cor. 14:26, “Every one of you hath a psalm, hath a doctrine, hath a tongue, hath a revelation,” i.e. a prophetic revelation.

Reply to Objection 2: By the gift of prophecy man is directed to God in his mind, which is more excellent than being directed to Him in his tongue. “He that speaketh in a tongue “is said to speak “not unto men,” i.e. to men’s understanding or profit, but unto God’s understanding and praise. On the other hand, by prophecy a man is directed both to God and to man; wherefore it is the more perfect gift.

Reply to Objection 3: Prophetic revelation extends to the knowledge of all things supernatural; wherefore from its very perfection it results that in this imperfect state of life it cannot be had perfectly by way of habit, but only imperfectly by way of passion. on the other hand, the gift of tongues is confined to a certain particular knowledge, namely of human words; wherefore it is not inconsistent with the imperfection of this life, that it should be had perfectly and by way of habit.

Reply to Objection 4: The interpretation of speeches is reducible to the gift of prophecy, inasmuch as the mind is enlightened so as to understand and explain any obscurities of speech arising either from a difficulty in the things signified, or from the words uttered being unknown, or from the figures of speech employed, according to Dan. 5:16, “I have heard of thee, that thou canst interpret obscure things, and resolve difficult things.” Hence the interpretation of speeches is more excellent than the gift of tongues, as appears from the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:5), “Greater is he that prophesieth than he that speaketh with tongues; unless perhaps he interpret.” Yet the interpretation of speeches is placed after the gift of tongues, because the interpretation of speeches extends even to the interpretation of divers kinds of tongues.

OF THE GRATUITOUS GRACE CONSISTING IN WORDS (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the gratuitous grace that attaches to words; of which the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): “To one . . . by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, and to another the word of knowledge.” Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?

(2) To whom is the grace becoming?

Whether any gratuitous grace attaches to words?

Objection 1: It would seem that a gratuitous grace does not attach to words. For grace is given for that which surpasses the faculty of nature. But natural reason has devised the art of rhetoric whereby a man is able to speak so as to teach, please, and persuade, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 12).

Now this belongs to the grace of words. Therefore it would seem that the grace of words is not a gratuitous grace.

Objection 2: Further, all grace pertains to the kingdom of God. But the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:20): “The kingdom of God is not in speech, but in power.” Therefore there is no gratuitous grace connected with words.

Objection 3: Further, no grace is given through merit, since “if by grace, it is not now of works” (Rom. 11:6). But the word is sometimes given to a man on his merits. For Gregory says (Moral. xi, 15) in explanation of Ps. 118:43, “Take not Thou the word of truth utterly out of my mouth” that “the word of truth is that which Almighty God gives to them that do it, and takes away from them that do it not.” Therefore it would seem that the gift of the word is not a gratuitous grace.

Objection 4: Further, it behooves man to declare in words things pertaining to the virtue of faith, no less than those pertaining to the gift of wisdom or of knowledge. Therefore if the word of wisdom and the word of knowledge are reckoned gratuitous graces, the word of faith should likewise be placed among the gratuitous graces.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 6:5): “A gracious tongue in a good man shall abound [Vulg.: ‘aboundeth’].” Now man’s goodness is by grace. Therefore graciousness in words is also by grace.

I answer that, The gratuitous graces are given for the profit of others, as stated above ([3708]FS, Q[111], AA[1],4). Now the knowledge a man receives from God cannot be turned to another’s profit, except by means of speech. And since the Holy Ghost does not fail in anything that pertains to the profit of the Church, He provides also the members of the Church with speech; to the effect that a man not only speaks so as to be understood by different people, which pertains to the gift of tongues, but also speaks with effect, and this pertains to the grace “of the word.”

This happens in three ways. First, in order to instruct the intellect, and this is the case when a man speaks so as “to teach.” Secondly, in order to move the affections, so that a man willingly hearkens to the word of God. This is the case when a man speaks so as “to please” his hearers, not indeed with a view to his own favor, but in order to draw them to listen to God’s word. Thirdly, in order that men may love that which is signified by the word, and desire to fulfill it, and this is the case when a man so speaks as “to sway” his hearers. In order to effect this the Holy Ghost makes use of the human tongue as of an instrument; but He it is Who perfects the work within. Hence Gregory says in a homily for Pentecost (Hom. xxx in Ev.): “Unless the Holy Ghost fill the hearts of the hearers, in vain does the voice of the teacher resound in the ears of the body.”

Reply to Objection 1: Even as by a miracle God sometimes works in a more excellent way those things which nature also can work, so too the Holy Ghost effects more excellently by the grace of words that which art can effect in a less efficient manner.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is speaking there of the word that relies on human eloquence without the power of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore he says just before (1 Cor. 4:19): “I . . . will know, not the speech of them that are puffed up, but the power”: and of himself he had already said (1 Cor. 2:4): “My speech and my preaching was not in the persuasive words of human wisdom, but in the showing of the spirit and power.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the grace of the word is given to a man for the profit of others. Hence it is withdrawn sometimes through the fault of the hearer, and sometimes through the fault of the speaker. The good works of either of them do not merit this grace directly, but only remove the obstacles thereto. For sanctifying grace also is withdrawn on account of a person’s fault, and yet he does not merit it by his good works, which, however, remove the obstacles to grace.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, the grace of the word is directed to the profit of others. Now if a man communicates his faith to others this is by the word of knowledge or of wisdom. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that “to know how faith may profit the godly and be defended against the ungodly, is apparently what the Apostle means by knowledge.” Hence it was not necessary for him to mention the word of faith, but it was sufficient for him to mention the word of knowledge and of wisdom.

Whether the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming to women?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of the word of wisdom and knowledge is becoming even to women. For teaching is pertinent to this grace, as stated in the foregoing Article. Now it is becoming to a woman to teach; for it is written (Prov. 4:3,4): “I was an only son in the sight of my mother, and she taught me [*Vulg.: ‘I was my father’s son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother. And he taught me.’].” Therefore this grace is becoming to women.

Objection 2: Further, the grace of prophecy is greater than the grace of the word, even as the contemplation of truth is greater than its utterance. But prophecy is granted to women, as we read of Deborah (Judges 4:4), and of Holda the prophetess, the wife of Sellum (4 Kings 22:14), and of the four daughters of Philip (Acts 21:9). Moreover the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:5): “Every woman praying or prophesying,” etc. Much more therefore would it seem that the grace of the word is becoming to a woman.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 4:10): “As every man hath received grace ministering the same one to another.” Now some women receive the grace of wisdom and knowledge, which they cannot minister to others except by the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is becoming to women.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34): “Let women keep silence in the churches,” and (1 Tim. 2:12): “I suffer not a woman to teach.” Now this pertains especially to the grace of the word. Therefore the grace of the word is not becoming to women.

I answer that, Speech may be employed in two ways: in one way privately, to one or a few, in familiar conversation, and in this respect the grace of the word may be becoming to women; in another way, publicly, addressing oneself to the whole church, and this is not permitted to women. First and chiefly, on account of the condition attaching to the female sex, whereby woman should be subject to man, as appears from Gn. 3:16. Now teaching and persuading publicly in the church belong not to subjects but to the prelates (although men who are subjects may do these things if they be so commissioned, because their subjection is not a result of their natural sex, as it is with women, but of some thing supervening by accident). Secondly, lest men’s minds be enticed to lust, for it is written (Ecclus. 9:11): “Her conversation burneth as fire.” Thirdly, because as a rule women are not perfected in wisdom, so as to be fit to be intrusted with public teaching.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted speaks of private teaching whereby a father instructs his son.

Reply to Objection 2: The grace of prophecy consists in God enlightening the mind, on the part of which there is no difference of sex among men, according to Col. 3:10,11, “Putting on the new” man, “him who is renewed unto knowledge, according to the image of Him that created him, where there is neither male nor female [*Vulg.: ‘Neither Gentile nor Jew, circumcision nor uncircumcision, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.’ Cf. [3709]FP, Q[93], A[6], ad 2 footnote].” Now the grace of the word pertains to the instruction of men among whom the difference of sex is found. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: The recipients of a divinely conferred grace administer it in different ways according to their various conditions. Hence women, if they have the grace of wisdom or of knowledge, can administer it by teaching privately but not publicly.

OF THE GRACE OF MIRACLES (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the grace of miracles, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?

(2) To whom is it becoming?

Whether there is a gratuitous grace of working miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that no gratuitous grace is directed to the working of miracles. For every grace puts something in the one to whom it is given (Cf. [3710]FS, Q[90], A[1]). Now the working of miracles puts nothing in the soul of the man who receives it since miracles are wrought at the touch even of a dead body. Thus we read (4 Kings 13:21) that “some . . . cast the body into the sepulchre of Eliseus. And when it had touched the bones of Eliseus, the man came to life, and stood upon his feet.” Therefore the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace.

Objection 2: Further, the gratuitous graces are from the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4, “There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Now the working of miracles is effected even by the unclean spirit, according to Mat. 24:24, “There shall arise false Christs and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders.” Therefore it would seem that the working of miracles does not belong to a gratuitous grace.

Objection 3: Further, miracles are divided into “signs,” “wonders” or “portents,” and “virtues.” [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:9, where the Douay version renders ‘virtus’ by ‘power.’ The use of the word ‘virtue’ in the sense of a miracle is now obsolete, and the generic term ‘miracle’ is elsewhere used in its stead: Cf. 1 Cor. 12:10, 28; Heb. 2:4; Acts 2:22]. Therefore it is unreasonable to reckon the “working of miracles” a gratuitous grace, any more than the “working of signs” and “wonders.”

Objection 4: Further, the miraculous restoring to health is done by the power of God. Therefore the grace of healing should not be distinguished from the working of miracles.

Objection 5: Further, the working of miracles results from faith—either of the worker, according to 1 Cor. 13:2, “If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains,” or of other persons for whose sake miracles are wrought, according to Mat. 13:58, “And He wrought not many miracles there, because of their unbelief.” Therefore, if faith be reckoned a gratuitous grace, it is superfluous to reckon in addition the working of signs as another gratuitous grace.

On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:9,10) says that among other gratuitous graces, “to another” is given “the grace of healing . . . to another, the working of miracles.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3711]Q[177], A[1]), the Holy Ghost provides sufficiently for the Church in matters profitable unto salvation, to which purpose the gratuitous graces are directed. Now just as the knowledge which a man receives from God needs to be brought to the knowledge of others through the gift of tongues and the grace of the word, so too the word uttered needs to be confirmed in order that it be rendered credible. This is done by the working of miracles, according to Mk. 16:20, “And confirming the word with signs that followed”: and reasonably so. For it is natural to man to arrive at the intelligible truth through its sensible effects. Wherefore just as man led by his natural reason is able to arrive at some knowledge of God through His natural effects, so is he brought to a certain degree of supernatural knowledge of the objects of faith by certain supernatural effects which are called miracles. Therefore the working of miracles belongs to a gratuitous grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as prophecy extends to whatever can be known supernaturally, so the working of miracles extends to all things that can be done supernaturally; the cause whereof is the divine omnipotence which cannot be communicated to any creature. Hence it is impossible for the principle of working miracles to be a quality abiding as a habit in the soul. On the other hand, just as the prophet’s mind is moved by divine inspiration to know something supernaturally, so too is it possible for the mind of the miracle worker to be moved to do something resulting in the miraculous effect which God causes by His power. Sometimes this takes place after prayer, as when Peter raised to life the dead Tabitha (Acts 9:40): sometimes without any previous prayer being expressed, as when Peter by upbraiding the lying Ananias and Saphira delivered them to death (Acts 5:4, 9). Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 30) that “the saints work miracles, sometimes by authority, sometimes by prayer.” In either case, however, God is the principal worker, for He uses instrumentally either man’s inward movement, or his speech, or some outward action, or again the bodily contact of even a dead body. Thus when Josue had said as though authoritatively (Josh. 10:12): “Move not, O sun, toward Gabaon,” it is said afterwards (Josh. 10:14): “There was not before or after so long a day, the Lord obeying the voice of a man.”

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord is speaking there of the miracles to be wrought at the time of Antichrist, of which the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:9) that the coming of Antichrist will be “according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders.” To quote the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 19), “it is a matter of debate whether they are called signs and lying wonders, because he will deceive the senses of mortals by imaginary visions, in that he will seem to do what he does not, or because, though they be real wonders, they will seduce into falsehood them that believe.” They are said to be real, because the things themselves will be real, just as Pharaoh’s magicians made real frogs and real serpents; but they will not be real miracles, because they will be done by the power of natural causes, as stated in the [3712]FP, Q[114], A[4]; whereas the working of miracles which is ascribed to a gratuitous grace, is done by God’s power for man’s profit.

Reply to Objection 3: Two things may be considered in miracles. One is that which is done: this is something surpassing the faculty of nature, and in this respect miracles are called “virtues.” The other thing is the purpose for which miracles are wrought, namely the manifestation of something supernatural, and in this respect they are commonly called “signs”: but on account of some excellence they receive the name of “wonder” or “prodigy,” as showing something from afar [procul].

Reply to Objection 4: The “grace of healing” is mentioned separately, because by its means a benefit, namely bodily health, is conferred on man in addition to the common benefit bestowed in all miracles, namely the bringing of men to the knowledge of God.

Reply to Objection 5: The working of miracles is ascribed to faith for two reasons. First, because it is directed to the confirmation of faith, secondly, because it proceeds from God’s omnipotence on which faith relies. Nevertheless, just as besides the grace of faith, the grace of the word is necessary that people may be instructed in the faith, so too is the grace of miracles necessary that people may be confirmed in their faith.

Whether the wicked can work miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles. For miracles are wrought through prayer, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). Now the prayer of a sinner is not granted, according to Jn. 9:31, “We know that God doth not hear sinners,” and Prov. 28:9, “He that turneth away his ear from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination.” Therefore it would seem that the wicked cannot work miracles.

Objection 2: Further, miracles are ascribed to faith, according to Mat. 17:19, “If you have faith as a grain of mustard seed you shall say to this mountain: Remove from hence hither, and it shall remove.” Now “faith without works is dead,” according to James 2:20, so that, seemingly, it is devoid of its proper operation. Therefore it would seem that the wicked, since they do not good works, cannot work miracles.

Objection 3: Further, miracles are divine attestations, according to Heb. 2:4, “God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles”: wherefore in the Church the canonization of certain persons is based on the attestation of miracles. Now God cannot bear witness to a falsehood. Therefore it would seem that wicked men cannot work miracles.

Objection 4: Further, the good are more closely united to God than the wicked. But the good do not all work miracles. Much less therefore do the wicked.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:2): “If I should have all faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing.” Now whosoever has not charity is wicked, because “this gift alone of the Holy Ghost distinguishes the children of the kingdom from the children of perdition,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18). Therefore it would seem that even the wicked can work miracles.

I answer that, Some miracles are not true but imaginary deeds, because they delude man by the appearance of that which is not; while others are true deeds, yet they have not the character of a true miracle, because they are done by the power of some natural cause. Both of these can be done by the demons, as stated above (A[1], ad 2).

True miracles cannot be wrought save by the power of God, because God works them for man’s benefit, and this in two ways: in one way for the confirmation of truth declared, in another way in proof of a person’s holiness, which God desires to propose as an example of virtue. In the first way miracles can be wrought by any one who preaches the true faith and calls upon Christ’s name, as even the wicked do sometimes. In this way even the wicked can work miracles. Hence Jerome commenting on Mat. 7:22, “Have not we prophesied in Thy name?” says: “Sometimes prophesying, the working of miracles, and the casting out of demons are accorded not to the merit of those who do these things, but to the invoking of Christ’s name, that men may honor God, by invoking Whom such great miracles are wrought.”

In the second way miracles are not wrought except by the saints, since it is in proof of their holiness that miracles are wrought during their lifetime or after death, either by themselves or by others. For we read (Acts 19:11,12) that “God wrought by the hand of Paul . . . miracles” and “even there were brought from his body to the sick, handkerchiefs . . . and the diseases departed from them.” In this way indeed there is nothing to prevent a sinner from working miracles by invoking a saint; but the miracle is ascribed not to him, but to the one in proof of whose holiness such things are done.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3713]Q[83], A[16]) when we were treating of prayer, the prayer of impetration relies not on merit but on God’s mercy, which extends even to the wicked, wherefore the prayers even of sinners are sometimes granted by God. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xliv in Joan.) that “the blind man spoke these words before he was anointed,” that is, before he was perfectly enlightened; “since God does hear sinners.” When it is said that the prayer of one who hears not the law is an abomination, this must be understood so far as the sinner’s merit is concerned; yet it is sometimes granted, either for the spiritual welfare of the one who prays—as the publican was heard (Lk. 18:14)—or for the good of others and for God’s glory.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith without works is said to be dead, as regards the believer, who lives not, by faith, with the life of grace. But nothing hinders a living thing from working through a dead instrument, as a man through a stick. It is thus that God works while employing instrumentally the faith of a sinner.

Reply to Objection 3: Miracles are always true witnesses to the purpose for which they are wrought. Hence wicked men who teach a false doctrine never work true miracles in confirmation of their teaching, although sometimes they may do so in praise of Christ’s name which they invoke, and by the power of the sacraments which they administer. If they teach a true doctrine, sometimes they work true miracles as confirming their teaching, but not as an attestation of holiness. Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79): “Magicians work miracles in one way, good Christians in another, wicked Christians in another. Magicians by private compact with the demons, good Christians by their manifest righteousness, evil Christians by the outward signs of righteousness.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 79), “the reason why these are not granted to all holy men is lest by a most baneful error the weak be deceived into thinking such deeds to imply greater gifts than the deeds of righteousness whereby eternal life is obtained.”

OF THE DIVISION OF LIFE INTO ACTIVE AND CONTEMPLATIVE (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider active and contemplative life. This consideration will be fourfold: (1) Of the division of life into active and contemplative; (2) Of the contemplative life; (3) Of the active life; (4) Of the comparison between the active and the contemplative life.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?

(2) Whether this is an adequate division?

Whether life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative. For the soul is the principle of life by its essence: since the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that “in living things to live is to be.” Now the soul is the principle of action and contemplation by its powers. Therefore it would seem that life is not fittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Objection 2: Further, the division of that which comes afterwards is unfittingly applied to that which comes first. Now active and contemplative, or “speculative” and “practical,” are differences of the intellect (De Anima iii, 10); while “to live” comes before “to understand,” since “to live” comes first to living things through the vegetative soul, as the Philosopher states (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Objection 3: Further, the word “life” implies movement, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vi): whereas contemplation consists rather in rest, according to Wis. 8:16: “When I enter into my house, I shall repose myself with her.” Therefore it would seem that life is unfittingly divided into active and contemplative.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv super Ezech.): “There is a twofold life wherein Almighty God instructs us by His holy word, the active life and the contemplative.”

I answer that, Properly speaking, those things are said to live whose movement or operation is from within themselves. Now that which is proper to a thing and to which it is most inclined is that which is most becoming to it from itself; wherefore every living thing gives proof of its life by that operation which is most proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Thus the life of plants is said to consist in nourishment and generation; the life of animals in sensation and movement; and the life of men in their understanding and acting according to reason. Wherefore also in men the life of every man would seem to be that wherein he delights most, and on which he is most intent; thus especially does he wish “to associate with his friends” (Ethic. ix, 12).

Accordingly since certain men are especially intent on the contemplation of truth, while others are especially intent on external actions, it follows that man’s life is fittingly divided into active and contemplative.

Reply to Objection 1: Each thing’s proper form that makes it actually “to be” is properly that thing’s principle of operation. Hence “to live” is, in living things, “to be,” because living things through having “being” from their form, act in such and such a way.

Reply to Objection 2: Life in general is not divided into active and contemplative, but the life of man, who derives his species from having an intellect, wherefore the same division applies to intellect and human life.

Reply to Objection 3: It is true that contemplation enjoys rest from external movements. Nevertheless to contemplate is itself a movement of the intellect, in so far as every operation is described as a movement; in which sense the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that sensation and understanding are movements of a kind, in so far as movement is defined “the act of a perfect thing.” In this way Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) ascribes three movements to the soul in contemplation, namely, “straight,” “circular,” and “oblique” [*Cf.[3714] Q[180], A[6]].

Whether life is adequately divided into active and contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that life is not adequately divided into active and contemplative. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5) that there are three most prominent kinds of life, the life of “pleasure,” the “civil” which would seem to be the same as the active, and the “contemplative” life. Therefore the division of life into active and contemplative would seem to be inadequate.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 1,2,3,19) mentions three kinds of life, namely the life of “leisure” which pertains to the contemplative, the “busy” life which pertains to the active, and a third “composed of both.” Therefore it would seem that life is inadequately divided into active and contemplative.

Objection 3: Further, man’s life is diversified according to the divers actions in which men are occupied. Now there are more than two occupations of human actions. Therefore it would seem that life should be divided into more kinds than the active and the contemplative.

On the contrary, These two lives are signified by the two wives of Jacob; the active by Lia, and the contemplative by Rachel: and by the two hostesses of our Lord; the contemplative life by Mary, and the active life by Martha, as Gregory declares (Moral. vi, 37 [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.]). Now this signification would not be fitting if there were more than two lives. Therefore life is adequately divided into active and contemplative.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), this division applies to the human life as derived from the intellect. Now the intellect is divided into active and contemplative, since the end of intellective knowledge is either the knowledge itself of truth, which pertains to the contemplative intellect, or some external action, which pertains to the practical or active intellect. Therefore life too is adequately divided into active and contemplative.

Reply to Objection 1: The life of pleasure places its end in pleasures of the body, which are common to us and dumb animals; wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. Ethic. i, 5), it is the life "of a beast." Hence it is not included in this division of the life of a man into active and contemplative.

Reply to Objection 2: A mean is a combination of extremes, wherefore it is virtually contained in them, as tepid in hot and cold, and pale in white and black. In like manner active and contemplative comprise that which is composed of both. Nevertheless as in every mixture one of the simples predominates, so too in the mean state of life sometimes the contemplative, sometimes the active element, abounds.

Reply to Objection 3: All the occupations of human actions, if directed to the requirements of the present life in accord with right reason, belong to the active life which provides for the necessities of the present life by means of well-ordered activity. If, on the other hand, they minister to any concupiscence whatever, they belong to the life of pleasure, which is not comprised under the active life. Those human occupations that are directed to the consideration of truth belong to the contemplative life.

OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the contemplative life, under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the contemplative life pertains to the intellect only, or also to the affections?

(2) Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?

(3) Whether the contemplative life consists in one action or in several?

(4) Whether the consideration of any truth whatever pertains to the contemplative life?

(5) Whether the contemplative life of man in this state can arise to the vision of God?

(6) Of the movements of contemplation assigned by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv);

(7) Of the pleasure of contemplation;

(8) Of the duration of contemplation.

Whether the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections, and pertains wholly to the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the affections and pertains wholly to the intellect. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, text. 3 [*Ed Did. ia, 1]) that “the end of contemplation is truth.” Now truth pertains wholly to the intellect. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life wholly regards the intellect.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37; Hom. xix in Ezech.) that “Rachel, which is interpreted ‘vision of the principle’ [*Or rather, ‘One seeing the principle,’ if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.], signifies the contemplative life.” Now the vision of a principle belongs properly to the intellect. Therefore the contemplative life belongs properly to the intellect.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it belongs to the contemplative life, “to rest from external action.” Now the affective or appetitive power inclines to external actions. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life has nothing to do with the appetitive power.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life is to cling with our whole mind to the love of God and our neighbor, and to desire nothing beside our Creator.” Now desire and love pertain to the affective or appetitive power, as stated above ([3715]FS, Q[25], A[2]; [3716]FS, Q[26], A[2]). Therefore the contemplative life has also something to do with the affective or appetitive power.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[179], A[1]) theirs is said to be the contemplative who are chiefly intent on the contemplation of truth. Now intention is an act of the will, as stated above ([3717]FS, Q[12], A[1]), because intention is of the end which is the object of the will. Consequently the contemplative life, as regards the essence of the action, pertains to the intellect, but as regards the motive cause of the exercise of that action it belongs to the will, which moves all the other powers, even the intellect, to their actions, as stated above ([3718]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [3719]FS, Q[9], A[1]).

Now the appetitive power moves one to observe things either with the senses or with the intellect, sometimes for love of the thing seen because, as it is written (Mat. 6:21), “where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also,” sometimes for love of the very knowledge that one acquires by observation. Wherefore Gregory makes the contemplative life to consist in the “love of God,” inasmuch as through loving God we are aflame to gaze on His beauty. And since everyone delights when he obtains what he loves, it follows that the contemplative life terminates in delight, which is seated in the affective power, the result being that love also becomes more intense.

Reply to Objection 1: From the very fact that truth is the end of contemplation, it has the aspect of an appetible good, both lovable and delightful, and in this respect it pertains to the appetitive power.

Reply to Objection 2: We are urged to the vision of the first principle, namely God, by the love thereof; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life tramples on all cares and longs to see the face of its Creator.”

Reply to Objection 3: The appetitive power moves not only the bodily members to perform external actions, but also the intellect to practice the act of contemplation, as stated above.

Whether the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life is to cling to the love of God and our neighbor with the whole mind.” Now all the moral virtues, since their acts are prescribed by the precepts of the Law, are reducible to the love of God and of our neighbor, for “love . . . is the fulfilling of the Law” (Rom. 13:10). Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is chiefly directed to the contemplation of God; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the mind tramples on all cares and longs to gaze on the face of its Creator.” Now no one can accomplish this without cleanness of heart, which is a result of moral virtue [*Cf.[3720] Q[8], A[7]]. For it is written (Mat. 5:8): “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God”: and (Heb. 12:14): “Follow peace with all men, and holiness, without which no man shall see God.” Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life gives beauty to the soul,” wherefore it is signified by Rachel, of whom it is said (Gn. 29:17) that she was “of a beautiful countenance.” Now the beauty of the soul consists in the moral virtues, especially temperance, as Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 43,45,46). Therefore it seems that the moral virtues pertain to the contemplative life.

On the contrary, The moral virtues are directed to external actions. Now Gregory says (Moral. vi [*Hom. xiv in Ezech.; Cf. A[1], OBJ[3]]) that it belongs to the contemplative life “to rest from external action.” Therefore the moral virtues do not pertain to the contemplative life.

I answer that, A thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways, essentially or dispositively. The moral virtues do not belong to the contemplative life essentially, because the end of the contemplative life is the consideration of truth: and as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 4), “knowledge,” which pertains to the consideration of truth, “has little influence on the moral virtues”: wherefore he declares (Ethic. x, 8) that the moral virtues pertain to active but not to contemplative happiness.

On the other hand, the moral virtues belong to the contemplative life dispositively. For the act of contemplation, wherein the contemplative life essentially consists, is hindered both by the impetuosity of the passions which withdraw the soul’s intention from intelligible to sensible things, and by outward disturbances. Now the moral virtues curb the impetuosity of the passions, and quell the disturbance of outward occupations. Hence moral virtues belong dispositively to the contemplative life.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3721](A[1]), the contemplative life has its motive cause on the part of the affections, and in this respect the love of God and our neighbor is requisite to the contemplative life. Now motive causes do not enter into the essence of a thing, but dispose and perfect it. Wherefore it does not follow that the moral virtues belong essentially to the contemplative life.

Reply to Objection 2: Holiness or cleanness of heart is caused by the virtues that are concerned with the passions which hinder the purity of the reason; and peace is caused by justice which is about operations, according to Is. 32:17, “The work of justice shall be peace”: since he who refrains from wronging others lessens the occasions of quarrels and disturbances. Hence the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life by causing peace and cleanness of heart.

Reply to Objection 3: Beauty, as stated above ([3722]Q[145], A[2]), consists in a certain clarity and due proportion. Now each of these is found radically in the reason; because both the light that makes beauty seen, and the establishing of due proportion among things belong to reason. Hence since the contemplative life consists in an act of the reason, there is beauty in it by its very nature and essence; wherefore it is written (Wis. 8:2) of the contemplation of wisdom: “I became a lover of her beauty.”

On the other hand, beauty is in the moral virtues by participation, in so far as they participate in the order of reason; and especially is it in temperance, which restrains the concupiscences which especially darken the light of reason. Hence it is that the virtue of chastity most of all makes man apt for contemplation, since venereal pleasures most of all weigh the mind down to sensible objects, as Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 10).

Whether there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life. For Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 3,4] distinguishes between “contemplation,” “meditation,” and “cogitation.” Yet all these apparently pertain to contemplation. Therefore it would seem that there are various actions pertaining to the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:18): “But we . . . beholding [speculantes] the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same clarity [*Vulg.: ‘into the same image from glory to glory.’].” Now this belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore in addition to the three aforesaid, vision [speculatio] belongs to the contemplative life.

Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that “the first and greatest contemplation is admiration of the Majesty.” Now according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) admiration is a kind of fear. Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

Objection 4: Further, “Prayer,” “reading,” and “meditation” [*Hugh of St. Victor, Alleg. in N.T. iii, 4] are said to belong to the contemplative life. Again, “hearing” belongs to the contemplative life: since it is stated that Mary (by whom the contemplative life is signified) “sitting . . . at the Lord’s feet, heard His word” (Lk. 10:39). Therefore it would seem that several acts are requisite for the contemplative life.

On the contrary, Life signifies here the operation on which a man is chiefly intent. Wherefore if there are several operations of the contemplative life, there will be, not one, but several contemplative lives.

I answer that, We are now speaking of the contemplative life as applicable to man. Now according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) between man and angel there is this difference, that an angel perceives the truth by simple apprehension, whereas man arrives at the perception of a simple truth by a process from several premises. Accordingly, then, the contemplative life has one act wherein it is finally completed, namely the contemplation of truth, and from this act it derives its unity. Yet it has many acts whereby it arrives at this final act. Some of these pertain to the reception of principles, from which it proceeds to the contemplation of truth; others are concerned with deducing from the principles, the truth, the knowledge of which is sought; and the last and crowning act is the contemplation itself of the truth.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Richard of St. Victor “cogitation” would seem to regard the consideration of the many things from which a person intends to gather one simple truth. Hence cogitation may comprise not only the perceptions of the senses in taking cognizance of certain effects, but also the imaginations. and again the reason’s discussion of the various signs or of anything that conduces to the truth in view: although, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7), cogitation may signify any actual operation of the intellect. “Meditation” would seem to be the process of reason from certain principles that lead to the contemplation of some truth: and “consideration” has the same meaning, according to Bernard (De Consid. ii, 2), although, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), every operation of the intellect may be called “consideration.” But “contemplation” regards the simple act of gazing on the truth; wherefore Richard says again (De Grat. Contempl. i, 4) that “contemplation is the soul’s clear and free dwelling upon the object of its gaze; meditation is the survey of the mind while occupied in searching for the truth: and cogitation is the mind’s glance which is prone to wander.”

Reply to Objection 2: According to a gloss [*Cf. De Trin. xv, 8] of Augustine on this passage, “beholding” [speculatio] denotes “seeing in a mirror [speculo], not from a watch-tower [specula].” Now to see a thing in a mirror is to see a cause in its effect wherein its likeness is reflected. Hence “beholding” would seem to be reducible to meditation.

Reply to Objection 3: Admiration is a kind of fear resulting from the apprehension of a thing that surpasses our faculties: hence it results from the contemplation of the sublime truth. For it was stated above [3723](A[1]) that contemplation terminates in the affections.

Reply to Objection 4: Man reaches the knowledge of truth in two ways. First, by means of things received from another. In this way, as regards the things he receives from God, he needs “prayer,” according to Wis. 7:7, “I called upon” God, “and the spirit of wisdom came upon me”: while as regards the things he receives from man, he needs “hearing,” in so far as he receives from the spoken word, and “reading,” in so far as he receives from the tradition of Holy Writ. Secondly, he needs to apply himself by his personal study, and thus he requires “meditation.”

Whether the contemplative life consists in the mere contemplation of God, or also in the consideration of any truth whatever?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of God, but also in the consideration of any truth. For it is written (Ps. 138:14): “Wonderful are Thy works, and my soul knoweth right well.” Now the knowledge of God’s works is effected by any contemplation of the truth. Therefore it would seem that it pertains to the contemplative life to contemplate not only the divine truth, but also any other.

Objection 2: Further, Bernard says (De Consid. v, 14) that “contemplation consists in admiration first of God’s majesty, secondly of His judgments, thirdly of His benefits, fourthly of His promises.” Now of these four the first alone regards the divine truth, and the other three pertain to His effects. Therefore the contemplative life consists not only in the contemplation of the divine truth, but also in the consideration of truth regarding the divine effects.

Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor [*De Grat. Contempl. i, 6] distinguishes six species of contemplation. The first belongs to “the imagination alone,” and consists in thinking of corporeal things. The second is in “the imagination guided by reason,” and consists in considering the order and disposition of sensible objects. The third is in “the reason based on the imagination”; when, to wit, from the consideration of the visible we rise to the invisible. The fourth is in “the reason and conducted by the reason,” when the mind is intent on things invisible of which the imagination has no cognizance. The fifth is “above the reason,” but not contrary to reason, when by divine revelation we become cognizant of things that cannot be comprehended by the human reason. The sixth is “above reason and contrary to reason”; when, to wit, by the divine enlightening we know things that seem contrary to human reason, such as the doctrine of the mystery of the Trinity. Now only the last of these would seem to pertain to the divine truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth regards not only the divine truth, but also that which is considered in creatures.

Objection 4: Further, in the contemplative life the contemplation of truth is sought as being the perfection of man. Now any truth is a perfection of the human intellect. Therefore the contemplative life consists in the contemplation of any truth.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that “in contemplation we seek the principle which is God.”

I answer that, As stated above [3724](A[2]), a thing may belong to the contemplative life in two ways: principally, and secondarily, or dispositively. That which belongs principally to the contemplative life is the contemplation of the divine truth, because this contemplation is the end of the whole human life. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that “the contemplation of God is promised us as being the goal of all our actions and the everlasting perfection of our joys.” This contemplation will be perfect in the life to come, when we shall see God face to face, wherefore it will make us perfectly happy: whereas now the contemplation of the divine truth is competent to us imperfectly, namely “through a glass” and “in a dark manner” (1 Cor. 13:12). Hence it bestows on us a certain inchoate beatitude, which begins now and will be continued in the life to come; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7) places man’s ultimate happiness in the contemplation of the supreme intelligible good.

Since, however, God’s effects show us the way to the contemplation of God Himself, according to Rom. 1:20, “The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made,” it follows that the contemplation of the divine effects also belongs to the contemplative life, inasmuch as man is guided thereby to the knowledge of God. Hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxix) that “in the study of creatures we must not exercise an empty and futile curiosity, but should make them the stepping-stone to things unperishable and everlasting.”

Accordingly it is clear from what has been said ([3725]AA[1],2,3) that four things pertain, in a certain order, to the contemplative life; first, the moral virtues; secondly, other acts exclusive of contemplation; thirdly, contemplation of the divine effects; fourthly, the complement of all which is the contemplation of the divine truth itself.

Reply to Objection 1: David sought the knowledge of God’s works, so that he might be led by them to God; wherefore he says elsewhere (Ps. 142:5,6): “I meditated on all Thy works: I meditated upon the works of Thy hands: I stretched forth my hands to Thee.”

Reply to Objection 2: By considering the divine judgments man is guided to the consideration of the divine justice; and by considering the divine benefits and promises, man is led to the knowledge of God’s mercy or goodness, as by effects already manifested or yet to be vouchsafed.

Reply to Objection 3: These six denote the steps whereby we ascend by means of creatures to the contemplation of God. For the first step consists in the mere consideration of sensible objects; the second step consists in going forward from sensible to intelligible objects; the third step is to judge of sensible objects according to intelligible things; the fourth is the absolute consideration of the intelligible objects to which one has attained by means of sensibles; the fifth is the contemplation of those intelligible objects that are unattainable by means of sensibles, but which the reason is able to grasp; the sixth step is the consideration of such intelligible things as the reason can neither discover nor grasp, which pertain to the sublime contemplation of divine truth, wherein contemplation is ultimately perfected.

Reply to Objection 4: The ultimate perfection of the human intellect is the divine truth: and other truths perfect the intellect in relation to the divine truth.

Whether in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the present state of life the contemplative life can reach to the vision of the Divine essence. For, as stated in Gn. 32:30, Jacob said: “I have seen God face to face, and my soul has been saved.” Now the vision of God’s face is the vision of the Divine essence. Therefore it would seem that in the present life one may come, by means of contemplation, to see God in His essence.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that “contemplative men withdraw within themselves in order to explore spiritual things, nor do they ever carry with them the shadows of things corporeal, or if these follow them they prudently drive them away: but being desirous of seeing the incomprehensible light, they suppress all the images of their limited comprehension, and through longing to reach what is above them, they overcome that which they are.” Now man is not hindered from seeing the Divine essence, which is the incomprehensible light, save by the necessity of turning to corporeal phantasms. Therefore it would seem that the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the incomprehensible light in its essence.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 35): “All creatures are small to the soul that sees its Creator: wherefore when the man of God,” the blessed Benedict, to wit, “saw a fiery globe in the tower and angels returning to heaven, without doubt he could only see such things by the light of God.” Now the blessed Benedict was still in this life. Therefore the contemplation of the present life can extend to the vision of the essence of God.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one reaches such a height of contemplation as to fix the eyes of his mind on the ray itself of incomprehensible light.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), “no one seeing God lives this mortal life wherein the bodily senses have their play: and unless in some way he depart this life, whether by going altogether out of his body, or by withdrawing from his carnal senses, he is not caught up into that vision.” This has been carefully discussed above (Q[175], AA[4],5), where we spoke of rapture, and in the [3726]FP, Q[12], A[2], where we treated of the vision of God.

Accordingly we must state that one may be in this life in two ways. First, with regard to act, that is to say by actually making use of the bodily senses, and thus contemplation in the present life can nowise attain to the vision of God’s essence. Secondly, one may be in this life potentially and not with regard to act, that is to say, when the soul is united to the mortal body as its form, yet so as to make use neither of the bodily senses, nor even of the imagination, as happens in rapture; and in this way the contemplation of the present life can attain to the vision of the Divine essence. Consequently the highest degree of contemplation in the present life is that which Paul had in rapture, whereby he was in a middle state between the present life and the life to come.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Ep. i ad Caium. Monach.), “if anyone seeing God, understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but something belonging to God.” And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “By no means is God seen now in His glory; but the soul sees something of lower degree, and is thereby refreshed so that afterwards it may attain to the glory of vision.” Accordingly the words of Jacob, “I saw God face to face” do not imply that he saw God’s essence, but that he saw some shape [*Cf. [3727]FP, Q[12], A[11], ad 1], imaginary of course, wherein God spoke to him. Or, “since we know a man by his face, by the face of God he signified his knowledge of Him,” according to a gloss of Gregory on the same passage.

Reply to Objection 2: In the present state of life human contemplation is impossible without phantasms, because it is connatural to man to see the intelligible species in the phantasms, as the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, 7). Yet intellectual knowledge does not consist in the phantasms themselves, but in our contemplating in them the purity of the intelligible truth: and this not only in natural knowledge, but also in that which we obtain by revelation. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that “the Divine glory shows us the angelic hierarchies under certain symbolic figures, and by its power we are brought back to the single ray of light,” i.e. to the simple knowledge of the intelligible truth. It is in this sense that we must understand the statement of Gregory that “contemplatives do not carry along with them the shadows of things corporeal,” since their contemplation is not fixed on them, but on the consideration of the intelligible truth.

Reply to Objection 3: By these words Gregory does not imply that the blessed Benedict, in that vision, saw God in His essence, but he wishes to show that because “all creatures are small to him that sees God,” it follows that all things can easily be seen through the enlightenment of the Divine light. Wherefore he adds: “For however little he may see of the Creator’s light, all created things become petty to him.”

Whether the operation of contemplation is fittingly divided into a threefold movement, circular, straight and oblique?

Objection 1: It would seem that the operation of contemplation is unfittingly divided into a threefold movement, “circular,” “straight,” and “oblique” (Div. Nom. iv). For contemplation pertains exclusively to rest, according to Wis. 8:16, “When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her.” Now movement is opposed to rest. Therefore the operations of the contemplative life should not be described as movements.

Objection 2: Further, the action of the contemplative life pertains to the intellect, whereby man is like the angels. Now Dionysius describes these movements as being different in the angels from what they are in the soul. For he says (Div. Nom. iv) that the “circular” movement in the angel is “according to his enlightenment by the beautiful and the good.” On the other hand, he assigns the circular movement of the soul to several things: the first of which is the “withdrawal of the soul into itself from externals”;

the second is “a certain concentration of its powers, whereby it is rendered free of error and of outward occupation”; and the third is “union with those things that are above it.” Again, he describes differently their respective straight movements. For he says that the straight movement of the angel is that by which he proceeds to the care of those things that are beneath him. On the other hand, he describes the straight movement of the soul as being twofold: first, “its progress towards things that are near it”; secondly, “its uplifting from external things to simple contemplation.” Further, he assigns a different oblique movement to each. For he assigns the oblique movement of the angels to the fact that “while providing for those who have less they remain unchanged in relation to God”: whereas he assigns the oblique movement of the soul to the fact that “the soul is enlightened in Divine knowledge by reasoning and discoursing.” Therefore it would seem that the operations of contemplation are unfittingly assigned according to the ways mentioned above.

Objection 3: Further, Richard of St. Victor (De Contempl. i, 5) mentions many other different movements in likeness to the birds of the air. “For some of these rise at one time to a great height, at another swoop down to earth, and they do so repeatedly; others fly now to the right, now to the left again and again; others go forwards or lag behind many times; others fly in a circle now more now less extended; and others remain suspended almost immovably in one place.” Therefore it would seem that there are only three movements of contemplation.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).

I answer that, As stated above ([3728]Q[119], A[1], ad 3), the operation of the intellect, wherein contemplation essentially consists, is called a movement, in so far as movement is the act of a perfect thing, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 1). Since, however, it is through sensible objects that we come to the knowledge of intelligible things, and since sensible operations do not take place without movement, the result is that even intelligible operations are described as movements, and are differentiated in likeness to various movements. Now of bodily movements, local movements are the most perfect and come first, as proved in Phys. viii, 7; wherefore the foremost among intelligible operations are described by being likened to them. These movements are of three kinds; for there is the “circular” movement, by which a thing moves uniformly round one point as center, another is the “straight” movement, by which a thing goes from one point to another; the third is “oblique,” being composed as it were of both the others. Consequently, in intelligible operations, that which is simply uniform is compared to circular movement; the intelligible operation by which one proceeds from one point to another is compared to the straight movement; while the intelligible operation which unites something of uniformity with progress to various points is compared to the oblique movement.

Reply to Objection 1: External bodily movements are opposed to the quiet of contemplation, which consists in rest from outward occupations: but the movements of intellectual operations belong to the quiet of contemplation.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is like the angels in intellect generically, but the intellective power is much higher in the angel than in man. Consequently these movements must be ascribed to souls and angels in different ways, according as they are differently related to uniformity. For the angelic intellect has uniform knowledge in two respects. First, because it does not acquire intelligible truth from the variety of composite objects; secondly, because it understands the truth of intelligible objects not discursively, but by simple intuition. On the other hand, the intellect of the soul acquires intelligible truth from sensible objects, and understands it by a certain discoursing of the reason.

Wherefore Dionysius assigns the “circular” movement of the angels to the fact that their intuition of God is uniform and unceasing, having neither beginning nor end: even as a circular movement having neither beginning nor end is uniformly around the one same center. But on the part of the soul, ere it arrive at this uniformity, its twofold lack of uniformity needs to be removed. First, that which arises from the variety of external things: this is removed by the soul withdrawing from externals, and so the first thing he mentions regarding the circular movement of the soul is “the soul’s withdrawal into itself from external objects.” Secondly, another lack of uniformity requires to be removed from the soul, and this is owing to the discoursing of reason. This is done by directing all the soul’s operations to the simple contemplation of the intelligible truth, and this is indicated by his saying in the second place that “the soul’s intellectual powers must be uniformly concentrated,” in other words that discoursing must be laid aside and the soul’s gaze fixed on the contemplation of the one simple truth. In this operation of the soul there is no error, even as there is clearly no error in the understanding of first principles which we know by simple intuition. Afterwards these two things being done, he mentions thirdly the uniformity which is like that of the angels, for then all things being laid aside, the soul continues in the contemplation of God alone. This he expresses by saying: “Then being thus made uniform unitedly,” i.e. conformably, “by the union of its powers, it is conducted to the good and the beautiful.” The “straight” movement of the angel cannot apply to his proceeding from one thing to another by considering them, but only to the order of his providence, namely to the fact that the higher angel enlightens the lower angels through the angels that are intermediate. He indicates this when he says: “The angel’s movement takes a straight line when he proceeds to the care of things subject to him, taking in his course whatever things are direct,” i.e. in keeping with the dispositions of the direct order. Whereas he ascribes the “straight” movement in the soul to the soul’s proceeding from exterior sensibles to the knowledge of intelligible objects. The “oblique” movement in the angels he describes as being composed of the straight and circular movements, inasmuch as their care for those beneath them is in accordance with their contemplation of God: while the “oblique” movement in the soul he also declares to be partly straight and partly circular, in so far as in reasoning it makes use of the light received from God.

Reply to Objection 3: These varieties of movement that are taken from the distinction between above and below, right and left, forwards and backwards, and from varying circles, are all comprised under either straight and oblique movement, because they all denote discursions of reason. For if the reason pass from the genus to the species, or from the part to the whole, it will be, as he explains, from above to below: if from one opposite to another, it will be from right to left; if from the cause to the effect, it will be backwards and forwards; if it be about accidents that surround a thing near at hand or far remote, the movement will be circular. The discoursing of reason from sensible to intelligible objects, if it be according to the order of natural reason, belongs to the straight movement; but if it be according to the Divine enlightenment, it will belong to the oblique movement as explained above (ad 2). That alone which he describes as immobility belongs to the circular movement.

Wherefore it is evident that Dionysius describes the movement of contemplation with much greater fulness and depth.

Whether there is delight in contemplation?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no delight in contemplation. For delight belongs to the appetitive power; whereas contemplation resides chiefly in the intellect. Therefore it would seem that there is no delight in contemplation.

Objection 2: Further, all strife and struggle is a hindrance to delight. Now there is strife and struggle in contemplation. For Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "when the soul strives to contemplate God, it is in a state of struggle; at one time it almost overcomes, because by understanding and feeling it tastes something of the incomprehensible light, and at another time it almost succumbs, because even while tasting, it fails." Therefore there is no delight in contemplation.

Objection 3: Further, delight is the result of a perfect operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Now the contemplation of wayfarers is imperfect, according to 1 Cor. 13:12, "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." Therefore seemingly there is no delight in the contemplative life.

Objection 4: Further, a lesion of the body is an obstacle to delight. Now contemplation causes a lesion of the body; wherefore it is stated (Gn. 32) that after Jacob had said (Gn. 32:30), "'I have seen God face to face' . . . he halted on his foot (Gn. 32:31) . . . because he touched the sinew of his thigh and it shrank" (Gn. 32:32). Therefore seemingly there is no delight in contemplation.

On the contrary, It is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16): "Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any tediousness, but joy and gladness": and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that "the contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable."

I answer that, There may be delight in any particular contemplation in two ways. First by reason of the operation itself [*Cf. [3729]FS, Q[3], A[5]], because each individual delights in the operation which befits him according to his own nature or habit. Now contemplation of the truth befits a man according to his nature as a rational animal: the result being that "all men naturally desire to know," so that consequently they delight in the knowledge of truth. And more delightful still does this become to one who has the habit of wisdom and knowledge, the result of which is that he contemplates without difficulty. Secondly, contemplation may be delightful on the part of its object, in so far as one contemplates that which one loves; even as bodily vision gives pleasure, not only because to see is pleasurable in itself, but because one sees a person whom one loves. Since, then, the contemplative life consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, of which charity is the motive, as stated above ([3730]AA[1],2, ad 1), it follows that there is delight in the contemplative life, not only by reason of the contemplation itself, but also by reason of the Divine love.

In both respects the delight thereof surpasses all human delight, both because spiritual delight is greater than carnal pleasure, as stated above ([3731]FS, Q[31], A[5]), when we were treating of the passions, and because the love whereby God is loved out of charity surpasses all love. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:9): “O taste and see that the Lord is sweet.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although the contemplative life consists chiefly in an act of the intellect, it has its beginning in the appetite, since it is through charity that one is urged to the contemplation of God. And since the end corresponds to the beginning, it follows that the term also and the end of the contemplative life has its being in the appetite, since one delights in seeing the object loved, and the very delight in the object seen arouses a yet greater love. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “when we see one whom we love, we are so aflame as to love him more.” And this is the ultimate perfection of the contemplative life, namely that the Divine truth be not only seen but also loved.

Reply to Objection 2: Strife or struggle arising from the opposition of an external thing, hinders delight in that thing. For a man delights not in a thing against which he strives: but in that for which he strives; when he has obtained it, other things being equal, he delights yet more: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3) that “the more peril there was in the battle, the greater the joy in the triumph.” But there is no strife or struggle in contemplation on the part of the truth which we contemplate, though there is on the part of our defective understanding and our corruptible body which drags us down to lower things, according to Wis. 9:15, “The corruptible body ss a load upon the soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that museth upon many things.” Hence it is that when man attains to the contemplation of truth, he loves it yet more, while he hates the more his own deficiency and the weight of his corruptible body, so as to say with the Apostle (Rom. 7:24): “Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?” Wherefore Gregory say (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “When God is once known by desire and understanding, He withers all carnal pleasure in us.”

Reply to Objection 3: The contemplation of God in this life is imperfect in comparison with the contemplation in heaven; and in like manner the delight of the wayfarer’s contemplation is imperfect as compared with the delight of contemplation in heaven, of which it is written (Ps. 35:9): “Thou shalt make them drink of the torrent of Thy pleasure.” Yet, though the contemplation of Divine things which is to be had by wayfarers is imperfect, it is more delightful than all other contemplation however perfect, on account of the excellence of that which is contemplated. Hence the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. i, 5): “We may happen to have our own little theories about those sublime beings and godlike substances, and though we grasp them but feebly, nevertheless so elevating is the knowledge that they give us more delight than any of those things that are round about us”: and Gregory says in the same sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The contemplative life is sweetness exceedingly lovable; for it carries the soul away above itself, it opens heaven and discovers the spiritual world to the eyes of the mind.”

Reply to Objection 4: After contemplation Jacob halted with one foot, “because we need to grow weak in the love of the world ere we wax strong in the love of God,” as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.). “Thus when we have known the sweetness of God, we have one foot sound while the other halts; since every one who halts on one foot leans only on that foot which is sound.”

Whether the contemplative life is continuous?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is not continuous. For the contemplative life consists essentially in things pertaining to the intellect. Now all the intellectual perfections of this life will be made void, according to 1 Cor. 13:8, “Whether prophecies shall be made void, or tongues shall cease, or knowledge shall be destroyed.” Therefore the contemplative life is made void.

Objection 2: Further, a man tastes the sweetness of contemplation by snatches and for a short time only: wherefore Augustine says (Confess. x, 40), “Thou admittest me to a most unwonted affection in my inmost soul, to a strange sweetness . . . yet through my grievous weight I sink down again.” Again, Gregory commenting on the words of Job 4:15, “When a spirit passed before me,” says (Moral. v, 33): “The mind does not remain long at rest in the sweetness of inward contemplation, for it is recalled to itself and beaten back by the very immensity of the light.” Therefore the contemplative life is not continuous.

Objection 3: Further, that which is not connatural to man cannot be continuous. Now the contemplative life, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 7), “is better than the life which is according to man.” Therefore seemingly the contemplative life is not continuous.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): “Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her,” since as Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.), “the contemplative life begins here so that it may be perfected in our heavenly home.”

I answer that, A thing may be described as continuous in two ways: first, in regard to its nature; secondly, in regard to us. It is evident that in regard to itself contemplative life is continuous for two reasons: first, because it is about incorruptible and unchangeable things; secondly, because it has no contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, as stated in Topic. i, 13. But even in our regard contemplative life is continuous—both because it is competent to us in respect of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect, wherefore it can endure after this life—and because in the works of the contemplative life we work not with our bodies, so that we are the more able to persevere in the works thereof, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. x, 7).

Reply to Objection 1: The manner of contemplation is not the same here as in heaven: yet the contemplative life is said to remain by reason of charity, wherein it has both its beginning and its end. Gregory speaks in this sense (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The contemplative life begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home, because the fire of love which begins to burn here is aflame with a yet greater love when we see Him Whom we love.”

Reply to Objection 2: No action can last long at its highest pitch. Now the highest point of contemplation is to reach the uniformity of Divine contemplation, according to Dionysius [*Cf. Coel. Hier. iii], and as we have stated above (A[6], ad 2). Hence although contemplation cannot last long in this respect, it can be of long duration as regards the other contemplative acts.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher declares the contemplative life to be above man, because it befits us “so far as there is in us something divine” (Ethic. x, 7), namely the intellect, which is incorruptible and impassible in itself, wherefore its act can endure longer.

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the active life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the works of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?

(2) Whether prudence pertains to the active life?

(3) Whether teaching pertains to the active life?

(4) Of the duration of the active life.

Whether all the actions of the moral virtues pertain to the active life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life. For seemingly the active life regards only our relations with other persons: hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “the active life is to give bread to the hungry,” and after mentioning many things that regard our relations with other people he adds finally, “and to give to each and every one whatever he needs.” Now we are directed in our relations to others, not by all the acts of moral virtues, but only by those of justice and its parts, as stated above (Q[58], AA[2],8; [3732]FS, Q[60], AA[2],3). Therefore the acts of the moral virtues do not all pertain to the active life.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that Lia who was blear-eyed but fruitful signifies the active life: which "being occupied with work, sees less, and yet since it urges one's neighbor both by word and example to its imitation it begets a numerous offspring of good deeds." Now this would seem to belong to charity, whereby we love our neighbor, rather than to the moral virtues. Therefore seemingly the acts of moral virtue do not pertain to the active life.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([3733]Q[180], A[2]), the moral virtues dispose one to the contemplative life. Now disposition and perfection belong to the same thing. Therefore it would seem that the moral virtues do not pertain to the active life.

On the contrary, Isidore says (De Summo Bono iii, 15): "In the active life all vices must first of all be extirpated by the practice of good works, in order that in the contemplative life the mind's eye being purified one may advance to the contemplation of the Divine light." Now all vices are not extirpated save by acts of the moral virtues. Therefore the acts of the moral virtues pertain to the active life.

I answer that, As stated above ([3734]Q[179], A[1]) the active and the contemplative life differ according to the different occupations of men intent on different ends: one of which occupations is the consideration of the truth; and this is the end of the contemplative life, while the other is external work to which the active life is directed.

Now it is evident that the moral virtues are directed chiefly, not to the contemplation of truth but to operation. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that "for virtue knowledge is of little or no avail." Hence it is clear that the moral virtues belong essentially to the active life; for which reason the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 8) subordinates the moral virtues to active happiness.

Reply to Objection 1: The chief of the moral virtues is justice by which one man is directed in his relations towards another, as the Philosopher proves (Ethic. v, 1). Hence the active life is described with reference to our relations with other people, because it consists in these things, not exclusively, but principally.

Reply to Objection 2: It is possible, by the acts of all the moral virtues, for one to direct one's neighbor to good by example: and this is what Gregory here ascribes to the active life.

Reply to Objection 3: Even as the virtue that is directed to the end of another virtue passes, as it were, into the species of the latter virtue, so again when a man makes use of things pertaining to the active life, merely as dispositions to contemplation, such things are comprised under the contemplative life. On the other hand, when we practice the works of the moral virtues, as being good in themselves, and not as dispositions to the contemplative life, the moral virtues belong to the active life.

It may also be replied, however, that the active life is a disposition to the contemplative life.

Whether prudence pertains to the active life?

Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not pertain to the active life. For just as the contemplative life belongs to the cognitive power, so the active life belongs to the appetitive power. Now prudence belongs not to the appetitive but to the cognitive power. Therefore prudence does not belong to the active life.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that the "active life being occupied with work, sees less," wherefore it is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. But prudence requires clear eyes, so that one may judge aright of what has to be done. Therefore it seems that prudence does not pertain to the active life.

Objection 3: Further, prudence stands between the moral and the intellectual virtues. Now just as the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above [3735](A[1]), so do the intellectual virtues pertain to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that prudence pertains neither to the active nor to the contemplative life, but to an intermediate kind of life, of which Augustine makes mention (De Civ. Dei xix, 2,3,19).

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that prudence pertains to active happiness, to which the moral virtues belong.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; [3736]FS, Q[18], A[6]), if one thing be directed to another as its end, it is drawn, especially in moral matters, to the species of the thing to which it is directed: for instance "he who commits adultery that he may steal, is a thief rather than an adulterer," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2). Now it is evident that the knowledge of prudence is directed to the works of the moral virtues as its end, since it is “right reason applied to action” (Ethic. vi, 5); so that the ends of the moral virtues are the principles of prudence, as the Philosopher says in the same book. Accordingly, as it was stated above (A[1], ad 3) that the moral virtues in one who directs them to the quiet of contemplation belong to the contemplative life, so the knowledge of prudence, which is of itself directed to the works of the moral virtues, belongs directly to the active life, provided we take prudence in its proper sense as the Philosopher speaks of it.

If, however, we take it in a more general sense, as comprising any kind of human knowledge, then prudence, as regards a certain part thereof, belongs to the contemplative life. In this sense Tully (De Offic. i, 5) says that “the man who is able most clearly and quickly to grasp the truth and to unfold his reasons, is wont to be considered most prudent and wise.”

Reply to Objection 1: Moral works take their species from their end, as stated above ([3737]FS, Q[18], AA[4],6), wherefore the knowledge pertaining to the contemplative life is that which has its end in the very knowledge of truth; whereas the knowledge of prudence, through having its end in an act of the appetitive power, belongs to the active life.

Reply to Objection 2: External occupation makes a man see less in intelligible things, which are separated from sensible objects with which the works of the active life are concerned. Nevertheless the external occupation of the active life enables a man to see more clearly in judging of what is to be done, which belongs to prudence, both on account of experience, and on account of the mind’s attention, since “brains avail when the mind is attentive” as Sallust observes [*Bell. Catilin., LI].

Reply to Objection 3: Prudence is said to be intermediate between the intellectual and the moral virtues because it resides in the same subject as the intellectual virtues, and has absolutely the same matter as the moral virtues. But this third kind of life is intermediate between the active and the contemplative life as regards the things about which it is occupied, because it is occupied sometimes with the contemplation of the truth, sometimes with eternal things.

Whether teaching is a work of the active or of the contemplative life?

Objection 1: It would seem that teaching is a work not of the active but of the contemplative life. For Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that "the perfect who have been able to contemplate heavenly goods, at least through a glass, proclaim them to their brethren, whose minds they inflame with love for their hidden beauty." But this pertains to teaching. Therefore teaching is a work of the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, act and habit would seem to be referable to the same kind of life. Now teaching is an act of wisdom: for the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1) that "to be able to teach is an indication of knowledge." Therefore since wisdom or knowledge pertain to the contemplative life, it would seem that teaching also belongs to the contemplative life.

Objection 3: Further, prayer, no less than contemplation, is an act of the contemplative life. Now prayer, even when one prays for another, belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore it would seem that it belongs also to the contemplative life to acquaint another, by teaching him, of the truth we have meditated.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "The active life is to give bread to the hungry, to teach the ignorant the words of wisdom."

I answer that, The act of teaching has a twofold object. For teaching is conveyed by speech, and speech is the audible sign of the interior concept. Accordingly one object of teaching is the matter or object of the interior concept; and as to this object teaching belongs sometimes to the active, sometimes to the contemplative life. It belongs to the active life, when a man conceives a truth inwardly, so as to be directed thereby in his outward action; but it belongs to the contemplative life when a man conceives an intelligible truth, in the consideration and love whereof he delights. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ, 1): "Let them choose for themselves the better part," namely the contemplative life, "let them be busy with the word, long for the sweetness of teaching, occupy themselves with salutary knowledge," thus stating clearly that teaching belongs to the contemplative life.

The other object of teaching is on the part of the speech heard, and thus the object of teaching is the hearer. As to this object all doctrine belongs to the active life to which external actions pertain.

Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted speaks expressly of doctrine as to its matter, in so far as it is concerned with the consideration and love of truth.

Reply to Objection 2: Habit and act have a common object. Hence this argument clearly considers the matter of the interior concept. For it pertains to the man having wisdom and knowledge to be able to teach, in so far as he is able to express his interior concept in words, so as to bring another man to understand the truth.

Reply to Objection 3: He who prays for another does nothing towards the man for whom he prays, but only towards God Who is the intelligible truth; whereas he who teaches another does something in his regard by external action. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether the active life remains after this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life remains after this life. For the acts of the moral virtues belong to the active life, as stated above [3738](A[1]). But the moral virtues endure after this life according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 9). Therefore the active life remains after this life.

Objection 2: Further, teaching others belongs to the active life, as stated above [3739](A[3]). But in the life to come when “we shall be like the angels,” teaching will be possible: even as apparently it is in the angels of whom one “enlightens, cleanses, and perfects” [*Coel. Hier. iii, viii] another, which refers to the “receiving of knowledge,” according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it would seem that the active life remains after this life.

Objection 3: Further, the more lasting a thing is in itself, the more is it able to endure after this life. But the active life is seemingly more lasting in itself: for Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that “we can remain fixed in the active life, whereas we are nowise able to maintain an attentive mind in the contemplative life.” Therefore the active life is much more able than the contemplative to endure after this life.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “The active life ends with this world, but the contemplative life begins here, to be perfected in our heavenly home.”

I answer that, As stated above [3740](A[1]), the active life has its end in external actions: and if these be referred to the quiet of contemplation, for that very reason they belong to the contemplative life. But in the future life of the blessed the occupation of external actions will cease, and if there be any external actions at all, these will be referred to contemplation as their end. For, as Augustine says at the end of De Civitate Dei xxii, 30, “there we shall rest and we shall see, we shall see and love, we shall love and praise.” And he had said before (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that “there God will be seen without end, loved without wearying, praised without tiring: such will be the occupation of all, the common love, the universal activity.”

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3741]Q[136], A[1], ad 1), the moral virtues will remain not as to those actions which are about the means, but as to the actions which are about the end. Such acts are those that conduce to the quiet of contemplation, which in the words quoted above Augustine denotes by “rest,” and this rest excludes not only outward disturbances but also the inward disturbance of the passions.

Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life, as stated above ([3742]Q[180], A[4]), consists chiefly in the contemplation of God, and as to this, one angel does not teach another, since according to Mat. 18:10, “the little ones’ angels,” who belong to the lower order, “always see the face of the Father”; and so, in the life to come, no man will teach another of God, but “we shall” all “see Him as He is” (1 Jn. 3:2). This is in keeping with the saying of Jeremiah 31:34: “They shall teach no more every man his neighbor . . . saying: Know the Lord: for all shall know me, from the least of them even to the greatest.”

But as regards things pertaining to the “dispensation of the mysteries of God,” one angel teaches another by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting him: and thus they have something of the active life so long as the world lasts, from the fact that they are occupied in administering to the creatures below them. This is signified by the fact that Jacob saw angels “ascending” the ladder—which refers to contemplation—and “descending”—which refers to action. Nevertheless, as Gregory remarks (Moral. ii, 3), “they do not wander abroad from the Divine vision, so as to be deprived of the joys of inward contemplation.” Hence in them the active life does not differ from the contemplative life as it does in us for whom the works of the active life are a hindrance to contemplation.

Nor is the likeness to the angels promised to us as regards the administering to lower creatures, for this is competent to us not by reason of our natural order, as it is to the angels, but by reason of our seeing God.

Reply to Objection 3: That the durability of the active life in the present state surpasses the durability of the contemplative life arises not from any property of either life considered in itself, but from our own deficiency, since we are withheld from the heights of contemplation by the weight of the body. Hence Gregory adds (Moral. ii, 3) that “the mind through its very weakness being repelled from that immense height recoils on itself.”

OF THE ACTIVE LIFE IN COMPARISON WITH THE CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the active life in comparison with the contemplative life, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Which of them is of greater import or excellence?

(2) Which of them has the greater merit?

(3) Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?

(4) Of their order.

Whether the active life is more excellent than the contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative. For “that which belongs to better men would seem to be worthier and better,” as the Philosopher says (Top. iii, 1). Now the active life belongs to persons of higher rank, namely prelates, who are placed in a position of honor and power; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “in our actions we must not love honor or power in this life.” Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.

Objection 2: Further, in all habits and acts, direction belongs to the more important; thus the military art, being the more important, directs the art of the bridle-maker [*Ethic. i, 1]. Now it belongs to the active life to direct and command the contemplative, as appears from the words addressed to Moses (Ex. 19:21), “Go down and charge the people, lest they should have a mind to pass the” fixed “limits to see the Lord.” Therefore the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.

Objection 3: Further, no man should be taken away from a greater thing in order to be occupied with lesser things: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:31): “Be zealous for the better gifts.” Now some are taken away from the state of the contemplative life to the occupations of the active life, as in the case of those who are transferred to the state of prelacy. Therefore it would seem that the active life is more excellent than the contemplative.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Lk. 10:42): “Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her.” Now Mary figures the contemplative life. Therefore the contemplative life is more excellent than the active.

I answer that, Nothing prevents certain things being more excellent in themselves, whereas they are surpassed by another in some respect. Accordingly we must reply that the contemplative life is simply more excellent than the active: and the Philosopher proves this by eight reasons (Ethic. x, 7,8). The first is, because the contemplative life becomes man according to that which is best in him, namely the intellect, and according to its proper objects, namely things intelligible; whereas the active life is occupied with externals. Hence Rachael, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is interpreted “the vision of the principle,” [*Or rather, ‘One seeing the principle,’ if derived from {rah} and {irzn}; Cf. Jerome, De Nom. Hebr.] whereas as Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) the active life is signified by Lia who was blear-eyed. The second reason is because the contemplative life can be more continuous, although not as regards the highest degree of contemplation, as stated above ([3743]Q[180], A[8], ad 2; [3744] Q[181], A[4], ad 3), wherefore Mary, by whom the contemplative life is signified, is described as “sitting” all the time “at the Lord’s feet.” Thirdly, because the contemplative life is more delightful than the active; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) that “Martha was troubled, but Mary feasted.” Fourthly, because in the contemplative life man is more self-sufficient, since he needs fewer things for that purpose; wherefore it was said (Lk. 10:41): “Martha, Martha, thou art careful and art troubled about many things.” Fifthly, because the contemplative life is loved more for its own sake, while the active life is directed to something else. Hence it is written (Ps. 36:4): “One thing I have asked of the Lord, this will I seek after, that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, that I may see the delight of the Lord.” Sixthly, because the contemplative life consists in leisure and rest, according to Ps. 45:11, “Be still and see that I am God.” Seventhly, because the contemplative life is according to Divine things, whereas active life is according to human things; wherefore Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. Serm. civ): “‘In the beginning was the Word’: to Him was Mary hearkening: ‘The Word was made flesh’: Him was Martha serving.” Eighthly, because the contemplative life is according to that which is most proper to man, namely his intellect; whereas in the works of the active life the lower powers also, which are common to us and brutes, have their part; wherefore (Ps. 35:7) after the words, “Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord,” that which is special to man is added (Ps. 35:10): “In Thy light we shall see light.”

Our Lord adds a ninth reason (Lk. 10:42) when He says: “Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her,” which words Augustine (De Verb. Dom. Serm. ciii) expounds thus: “Not—Thou hast chosen badly but—She has chosen better. Why better? Listen—because it shall not be taken away from her. But the burden of necessity shall at length be taken from thee: whereas the sweetness of truth is eternal.”

Yet in a restricted sense and in a particular case one should prefer the active life on account of the needs of the present life. Thus too the Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2): “It is better to be wise than to be rich, yet for one who is in need, it is better to be rich . . .”

Reply to Objection 1: Not only the active life concerns prelates, they should also excel in the contemplative life; hence Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1): “A prelate should be foremost in action, more uplifted than others in contemplation.”

Reply to Objection 2: The contemplative life consists in a certain liberty of mind. For Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that “the contemplative life obtains a certain freedom of mind, for it thinks not of temporal but of eternal things.” And Boethius says (De Consol. v, 2): “The soul of man must needs be more free while it continues to gaze on the Divine mind, and less so when it stoops to bodily things.” Wherefore it is evident that the active life does not directly command the contemplative life, but prescribes certain works of the active life as dispositions to the contemplative life; which it accordingly serves rather than commands. Gregory refers to this when he says (Hom. iii in Ezech.) that “the active life is bondage, whereas the contemplative life is freedom.”

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active life, on account of some necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to forsake contemplation altogether. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest toil,” the work namely of the active life. “If no one imposes this burden upon us we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us. Yet even then we must not altogether forsake the delights of truth, lest we deprive ourselves of its sweetness, and this burden overwhelm us.” Hence it is clear that when a person is called from the contemplative life to the active life, this is done by way not of subtraction but of addition.

Whether the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative. For merit implies relation to meed; and meed is due to labor, according to 1 Cor. 3:8, “Every man shall receive his own reward according to his own labor.” Now labor is ascribed to the active life, and rest to the contemplative life; for Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): “Whosoever is converted to God must first of all sweat from labor, i.e. he must take Lia, that afterwards he may rest in the embraces of Rachel so as to see the principle.” Therefore the active life is of greater merit than the contemplative.

Objection 2: Further, the contemplative life is a beginning of the happiness to come; wherefore Augustine commenting on Jn. 21:22, “So I will have him to remain till I come,” says (Tract. cxxiv in Joan.): “This may be expressed more clearly: Let perfect works follow Me conformed to the example of My passion, and let contemplation begun here remain until I come, that it may be perfected when I shall come.” And Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that “contemplation begins here, so as to be perfected in our heavenly home.” Now the life to come will be a state not of meriting but of receiving the reward of our merits. Therefore the contemplative life would seem to have less of the character of merit than the active, but more of the character of reward.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.) that “no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls.” Now by the zeal for souls a man turns to the occupations of the active life. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is not of greater merit than the active.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): “Great are the merits of the active life, but greater still those of the contemplative.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3745]FS, Q[114], A[4]), the root of merit is charity; and, while, as stated above (Q[25], A[1]), charity consists in the love of God and our neighbor, the love of God is by itself more meritorious than the love of our neighbor, as stated above (Q[27], A[8]). Wherefore that which pertains more directly to the love of God is generically more meritorious than that which pertains directly to the love of our neighbor for God’s sake. Now the contemplative life pertains directly and immediately to the love of God; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that “the love of” the Divine “truth seeks a holy leisure,” namely of the contemplative life, for it is that truth above all which the contemplative life seeks, as stated above (Q[181], A[4], ad 2). On the other hand, the active life is more directly concerned with the love of our neighbor, because it is “busy about much serving” (Lk. 10:40). Wherefore the contemplative life is generically of greater merit than the active life. This is moreover asserted by Gregory (Hom. iii in Ezech.): “The contemplative life surpasses in merit the active life, because the latter labors under the stress of present work,” by reason of the necessity of assisting our neighbor, “while the former with heartfelt relish has a foretaste of the coming rest,” i.e. the contemplation of God.

Nevertheless it may happen that one man merits more by the works of the active life than another by the works of the contemplative life. For instance through excess of Divine love a man may now and then suffer separation from the sweetness of Divine contemplation for the time being, that God’s will may be done and for His glory’s sake. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 9:3): “I wished myself to be an anathema from Christ, for my brethren”; which words Chrysostom expounds as follows (De Compunct. i, 7 [*Ad Demetr. de Compunct. Cordis.]): “His mind was so steeped in the love of Christ that, although he desired above all to be with Christ, he despised even this, because thus he pleased Christ.”

Reply to Objection 1: External labor conduces to the increase of the accidental reward; but the increase of merit with regard to the essential reward consists chiefly in charity, whereof external labor borne for Christ's sake is a sign. Yet a much more expressive sign thereof is shown when a man, renouncing whatsoever pertains to this life, delights to occupy himself entirely with Divine contemplation.

Reply to Objection 2: In the state of future happiness man has arrived at perfection, wherefore there is no room for advancement by merit; and if there were, the merit would be more efficacious by reason of the greater charity. But in the present life contemplation is not without some imperfection, and can always become more perfect; wherefore it does not remove the idea of merit, but causes a yet greater merit on account of the practice of greater Divine charity.

Reply to Objection 3: A sacrifice is rendered to God spiritually when something is offered to Him; and of all man's goods, God specially accepts that of the human soul when it is offered to Him in sacrifice. Now a man ought to offer to God, in the first place, his soul, according to Ecclus. 30:24, "Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God"; in the second place, the souls of others, according to Apoc. 22:17, "He that heareth, let him say: Come." And the more closely a man unites his own or another's soul to God, the more acceptable is his sacrifice to God; wherefore it is more acceptable to God that one apply one's own soul and the souls of others to contemplation than to action. Consequently the statement that "no sacrifice is more acceptable to God than zeal for souls," does not mean that the merit of the active life is preferable to the merit of the contemplative life, but that it is more meritorious to offer to God one's own soul and the souls of others, than any other external gifts.

Whether the contemplative life is hindered by the active life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active life. For the contemplative life requires a certain stillness of mind, according to Ps. 45:11, "Be still, and see that I am God"; whereas the active life involves restlessness, according to Lk. 10:41, "Martha, Martha, thou art careful and troubled about many things." Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Objection 2: Further, clearness of vision is a requisite for the contemplative life. Now active life is a hindrance to clear vision; for

Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) that it “is blear-eyed and fruitful, because the active life, being occupied with work, sees less.” Therefore the active life hinders the contemplative.

Objection 3: Further, one contrary hinders the other. Now the active and the contemplative life are apparently contrary to one another, since the active life is busy about many things, while the contemplative life attends to the contemplation of one; wherefore they differ in opposition to one another. Therefore it would seem that the contemplative life is hindered by the active.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): “Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation, must first of all train in the camp of action.”

I answer that, The active life may be considered from two points of view. First, as regards the attention to and practice of external works: and thus it is evident that the active life hinders the contemplative, in so far as it is impossible for one to be busy with external action, and at the same time give oneself to Divine contemplation. Secondly, active life may be considered as quieting and directing the internal passions of the soul; and from this point of view the active life is a help to the contemplative, since the latter is hindered by the inordinateness of the internal passions. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): “Those who wish to hold the fortress of contemplation must first of all train in the camp of action. Thus after careful study they will learn whether they no longer wrong their neighbor, whether they bear with equanimity the wrongs their neighbors do to them, whether their soul is neither overcome with joy in the presence of temporal goods, nor cast down with too great a sorrow when those goods are withdrawn. In this way they will known when they withdraw within themselves, in order to explore spiritual things, whether they no longer carry with them the shadows of the things corporeal, or, if these follow them, whether they prudently drive them away.” Hence the work of the active life conduces to the contemplative, by quelling the interior passions which give rise to the phantasms whereby contemplation is hindered.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for these arguments consider the occupation itself of external actions, and not the effect which is the quelling of the passions.

Whether the active life precedes the contemplative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the active life does not precede the contemplative. For the contemplative life pertains directly to the love of God; while the active life pertains to the love of our neighbor. Now the love of God precedes the love of our neighbor, since we love our neighbor for God's sake. Seemingly therefore the contemplative life also precedes the active life.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ezech.): "It should be observed that while a well-ordered life proceeds from action to contemplation, sometimes it is useful for the soul to turn from the contemplative to the active life." Therefore the active is not simply prior to the contemplative.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem that there is not necessarily any order between things that are suitable to different subjects. Now the active and the contemplative life are suitable to different subjects; for Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37): "Often those who were able to contemplate God so long as they were undisturbed have fallen when pressed with occupation; and frequently they who might live advantageously occupied with the service of their fellow-creatures are killed by the sword of their inaction."

I answer that, A thing is said to precede in two ways. First, with regard to its nature; and in this way the contemplative life precedes the active, inasmuch as it applies itself to things which precede and are better than others, wherefore it moves and directs the active life. For the higher reason which is assigned to contemplation is compared to the lower reason which is assigned to action, and the husband is compared to his wife, who should be ruled by her husband, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3,7,12).

Secondly, a thing precedes with regard to us, because it comes first in the order of generation. In this way the active precedes the contemplative life, because it disposes one to it, as stated above [3746](A[1]; Q[181], A[1], ad 3); and, in the order of generation, disposition precedes form, although the latter precedes simply and according to its nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The contemplative life is directed to the love of God, not of any degree, but to that which is perfect; whereas the active life is necessary for any degree of the love of our neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. iii in Ezech.): "Without the contemplative life it is possible to enter the heavenly kingdom, provided one omit not the good actions we are able to do; but we cannot enter therein without the active life, if we neglect to do the good we can do."

From this it is also evident that the active precedes the contemplative life, as that which is common to all precedes, in the order of generation, that which is proper to the perfect.

Reply to Objection 2: Progress from the active to the contemplative life is according to the order of generation; whereas the return from the contemplative life to the active is according to the order of direction, in so far as the active life is directed by the contemplative. Even thus habit is acquired by acts, and by the acquired habit one acts yet more perfectly, as stated in Ethic. ii, 7.

Reply to Objection 3: He that is prone to yield to his passions on account of his impulse to action is simply more apt for the active life by reason of his restless spirit. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "there be some so restless that when they are free from labor they labor all the more, because the more leisure they have for thought, the worse interior turmoil they have to bear." Others, on the contrary, have the mind naturally pure and restful, so that they are apt for contemplation, and if they were to apply themselves wholly to action, this would be detrimental to them. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. vi, 37) that "some are so slothful of mind that if they chance to have any hard work to do they give way at the very outset." Yet, as he adds further on, "often . . . love stimulates slothful souls to work, and fear restrains souls that are disturbed in contemplation." Consequently those who are more adapted to the active life can prepare themselves for the contemplative by the practice of the active life; while none the less, those who are more adapted to the contemplative life can take upon themselves the works of the active life, so as to become yet more apt for contemplation.

TREATISE ON THE STATES OF LIFE (QQ[183]-189)

OF MAN’S VARIOUS DUTIES AND STATES IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider man’s various states and duties. We shall consider (1) man’s duties and states in general; (2) the state of the perfect in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What constitutes a state among men?

(2) Whether among men there should be various states and duties?

(3) Of the diversity of duties;

(4) Of the diversity of states.

Whether the notion of a state denotes a condition of freedom or servitude?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notion of a state does not denote a condition of freedom or servitude. For “state” takes its name from “standing.” Now a person is said to stand on account of his being upright; and Gregory says (Moral. vii, 17): “To fall by speaking harmful words is to forfeit entirely the state of righteousness.” But a man acquires spiritual uprightness by submitting his will to God; wherefore a gloss on Ps. 32:1, “Praise becometh the upright,” says: “The upright are those who direct their heart according to God’s will.” Therefore it would seem that obedience to the Divine commandments suffices alone for the notion of a state.

Objection 2: Further, the word “state” seems to denote immobility according to 1 Cor. 15:48, “Be ye steadfast [stabiles] and immovable”; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xxi in Ezech.): “The stone is foursquare, and is stable on all sides, if no disturbance will make it fall.” Now it is virtue that enables us “to act with immobility,” according to Ethic. ii, 4. Therefore it would seem that a state is acquired by every virtuous action.

Objection 3: Further, the word “state” seems to indicate height of a kind; because to stand is to be raised upwards. Now one man is made higher than another by various duties; and in like manner men are raised upwards in various ways by various grades and orders. Therefore the mere difference of grades, orders, or duties suffices for a difference of states.

On the contrary, It is thus laid down in the Decretals (II, qu. vi, can. Si Quando): “Whenever anyone intervene in a cause where life or state is at stake he must do so, not by a proxy, but in his own person”; and “state” here has reference to freedom or servitude. Therefore it would seem that nothing differentiates a man’s state, except that which refers to freedom or servitude.

I answer that, “State,” properly speaking, denotes a kind of position, whereby a thing is disposed with a certain immobility in a manner according with its nature. For it is natural to man that his head should be directed upwards, his feet set firmly on the ground, and his other intermediate members disposed in becoming order; and this is not the case if he lie down, sit, or recline, but only when he stands upright: nor again is he said to stand, if he move, but only when he is still. Hence it is again that even in human acts, a matter is said to have stability [statum] in reference to its own disposition in the point of a certain immobility or restfulness. Consequently matters which easily change and are extrinsic to them do not constitute a state among men, for instance that a man be rich or poor, of high or low rank, and so forth. Wherefore in the civil law [*Dig. I, IX, De Senatoribus] (Lib. Cassius ff. De Senatoribus) it is said that if a man be removed from the senate, he is deprived of his dignity rather than of his state. But that alone seemingly pertains to a man’s state, which regards an obligation binding his person, in so far, to wit, as a man is his own master or subject to another, not indeed from any slight or unstable cause, but from one that is firmly established; and this is something pertaining to the nature of freedom or servitude. Therefore state properly regards freedom or servitude whether in spiritual or in civil matters.

Reply to Objection 1: Uprightness as such does not pertain to the notion of state, except in so far as it is connatural to man with the addition of a certain restfulness. Hence other animals are said to stand without its being required that they should be upright; nor again are men said to stand, however upright their position be, unless they be still.

Reply to Objection 2: Immobility does not suffice for the notion of state; since even one who sits or lies down is still, and yet he is not said to stand.

Reply to Objection 3: Duty implies relation to act; while grades denote an order of superiority and inferiority. But state requires immobility in that which regards a condition of the person himself.

Whether there should be different duties or states in the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be different duties or states in the Church. For distinction is opposed to unity. Now the faithful of Christ are called to unity according to Jn. 17:21,22: "That they . . . may be one in Us . . . as We also are one." Therefore there should not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.

Objection 2: Further, nature does not employ many means where one suffices. But the working of grace is much more orderly than the working of nature. Therefore it were more fitting for things pertaining to the operations of grace to be administered by the same persons, so that there would not be a distinction of duties and states in the Church.

Objection 3: Further, the good of the Church seemingly consists chiefly in peace, according to Ps. 147:3, "Who hath placed peace in thy borders," and 2 Cor. 13:11, "Have peace, and the God of peace . . . shall be with you." Now distinction is a hindrance to peace, for peace would seem to result from likeness, according to Ecclus. 13:19, "Every beast loveth its like," while the Philosopher says (Polit. vii, 5) that "a little difference causes dissension in a state." Therefore it would seem that there ought not to be a distinction of states and duties in the Church.

On the contrary, It is written in praise of the Church (Ps. 44:10) that she is "surrounded with variety": and a gloss on these words says that "the Queen," namely the Church, "is bedecked with the teaching of the apostles, the confession of martyrs, the purity of virgins, the sorrowings of penitents."

I answer that, The difference of states and duties in the Church regards three things. In the first place it regards the perfection of the Church. For even as in the order of natural things, perfection, which in God is simple and uniform, is not to be found in the created universe except in a multiform and manifold manner, so too, the fulness of grace, which is centered in Christ as head, flows forth to His members in various ways, for the perfecting of the body of the Church. This is the meaning of the Apostle's words (Eph. 4:11,12): "He gave some apostles, and some prophets, and other some evangelists, and other some pastors and doctors for the perfecting of the saints." Secondly, it regards the need of those actions which are necessary in the Church. For a diversity of actions requires a diversity of men appointed to them, in order that all things may be accomplished without delay or confusion; and this is indicated by the Apostle (Rom. 12:4,5), "As in one body we have many members, but all the members have not the same office, so we being many are one body in Christ." Thirdly, this belongs to the dignity and beauty of the Church, which consist in a certain order; wherefore it is written (3 Kings 10:4,5) that "when the queen of Saba saw all the wisdom of Solomon . . . and the apartments of his servants, and the order of his ministers . . . she had no longer any spirit in her." Hence the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:20) that "in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and of earth."

Reply to Objection 1: The distinction of states and duties is not an obstacle to the unity of the Church, for this results from the unity of faith, charity, and mutual service, according to the saying of the Apostle (Eph. 4:16): "From whom the whole body being compacted," namely by faith, "and fitly joined together," namely by charity, "by what every joint supplieth," namely by one man serving another.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as nature does not employ many means where one suffices, so neither does it confine itself to one where many are required, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), "If the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing?" Hence there was need in the Church, which is Christ's body, for the members to be differentiated by various duties, states, and grades.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in the natural body the various members are held together in unity by the power of the quickening spirit, and are dissociated from one another as soon as that spirit departs, so too in the Church's body the peace of the various members is preserved by the power of the Holy Spirit, Who quickens the body of the Church, as stated in Jn.

6:64. Hence the Apostle says (Eph. 4:3): “Careful to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.” Now a man departs from this unity of spirit when he seeks his own; just as in an earthly kingdom peace ceases when the citizens seek each man his own. Besides, the peace both of mind and of an earthly commonwealth is the better preserved by a distinction of duties and states, since thereby the greater number have a share in public actions. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:24,25) that “God hath tempered [the body] together that there might be no schism in the body, but the members might be mutually careful one for another.”

Whether duties differ according to their actions?

Objection 1: It would seem that duties do not differ according to their actions. For there are infinite varieties of human acts both in spirituals and in temporals. Now there can be no certain distinction among things that are infinite in number. Therefore human duties cannot be differentiated according to a difference of acts.

Objection 2: Further, the active and the contemplative life differ according to their acts, as stated above ([3747]Q[179], A[1]). But the distinction of duties seems to be other than the distinction of lives. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.

Objection 3: Further, even ecclesiastical orders, states, and grades seemingly differ according to their acts. If, then, duties differ according to their acts it would seem that duties, grades, and states differ in the same way. Yet this is not true, since they are divided into their respective parts in different ways. Therefore duties do not differ according to their acts.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “officium [duty] takes its name from ‘efficere’ [to effect], as though it were instead of ‘efficium,’ by the change of one letter for the sake of the sound.” But effecting pertains to action. Therefore duties differ according to their acts.

I answer that, As stated above [3748](A[2]), difference among the members of the Church is directed to three things: perfection, action, and beauty; and according to these three we may distinguish a threefold distinction among the faithful. One, with regard to perfection, and thus we have the difference of states, in reference to which some persons are more perfect than others. Another distinction regards action and this is the distinction of duties: for persons are said to have various duties when they are appointed to various actions. A third distinction regards the order of ecclesiastical beauty: and thus we distinguish various grades according as in the same state or duty one person is above another. Hence according to a variant text [*The Septuagint] it is written (Ps. 47:4): “In her grades shall God be known.”

Reply to Objection 1: The material diversity of human acts is infinite. It is not thus that duties differ, but by their formal diversity which results from diverse species of acts, and in this way human acts are not infinite.

Reply to Objection 2: Life is predicated of a thing absolutely: wherefore diversity of acts which are becoming to man considered in himself. But efficiency, whence we have the word “office” (as stated above), denotes action tending to something else according to Metaph. ix, text. 16 [*Ed. Did. viii, 8]. Hence offices differ properly in respect of acts that are referred to other persons; thus a teacher is said to have an office, and so is a judge, and so forth. Wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vi, 19) that “to have an office is to be officious,” i.e. harmful “to no one, but to be useful to all.”

Reply to Objection 3: Differences of state, offices and grades are taken from different things, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Yet these three things may concur in the same subject: thus when a person is appointed to a higher action, he attains thereby both office and grade, and sometimes, besides this, a state of perfection, on account of the sublimity of the act, as in the case of a bishop. The ecclesiastical orders are particularly distinct according to divine offices. For Isidore says (Etym. vi): “There are various kinds of offices; but the foremost is that which relates to sacred and Divine things.”

Whether the difference of states applies to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the difference of states does not apply to those who are beginning, progressing, or perfect. For “diverse genera have diverse species and differences” [*Aristotle, Categ. ii]. Now this difference of beginning, progress, and perfection is applied to the degrees of charity, as stated above ([3749]Q[24], A[9]), where we were treating of charity. Therefore it would seem that the differences of states should not be assigned in this manner.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [3750](A[1]), state regards a condition of servitude or freedom, which apparently has no connection with the aforesaid difference of beginning, progress, and perfection. Therefore it is unfitting to divide state in this way.

Objection 3: Further, the distinction of beginning, progress, and perfection seems to refer to "more" and "less," and this seemingly implies the notion of grades. But the distinction of grades differs from that of states, as we have said above ([3751]AA[2],3). Therefore state is unfittingly divided according to beginning, progress, and perfection.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 11): "There are three states of the converted, the beginning, the middle, and the perfection"; and (Hom. xv in Ezech.): "Other is the beginning of virtue, other its progress, and other still its perfection."

I answer that, As stated above [3752](A[1]) state regards freedom or servitude. Now in spiritual things there is a twofold servitude and a twofold freedom: for there is the servitude of sin and the servitude of justice; and there is likewise a twofold freedom, from sin, and from justice, as appears from the words of the Apostle (Rom. 6:20, 22), "When you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice . . . but now being made free from sin," you are . . ."become servants to God."

Now the servitude of sin or justice consists in being inclined to evil by a habit of sin, or inclined to good by a habit of justice: and in like manner freedom from sin is not to be overcome by the inclination to sin, and freedom from justice is not to be held back from evil for the love of justice. Nevertheless, since man, by his natural reason, is inclined to justice, while sin is contrary to natural reason, it follows that freedom from sin is true freedom which is united to the servitude of justice, since they both incline man to that which is becoming to him. In like manner true servitude is the servitude of sin, which is connected with freedom from justice, because man is thereby hindered from attaining that which is proper to him. That a man become the servant of justice or sin results from his efforts, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 6:16): "To whom you yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants you are whom you obey, whether it be of sin unto death, or of obedience unto justice." Now in every human effort we can distinguish a beginning, a middle, and a term; and consequently the state of spiritual servitude and freedom is differentiated according to these things, namely, the beginning—to which pertains the state of beginners—the middle, to which pertains the state of the proficient—and the term, to which belongs the state of the perfect.

Reply to Objection 1: Freedom from sin results from charity which "is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Hence it is written (2 Cor. 3:17): "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." Wherefore the same division applies to charity as to the state of those who enjoy spiritual freedom.

Reply to Objection 2: Men are said to be beginners, proficient, and perfect (so far as these terms indicate different states), not in relation to any occupation whatever, but in relation to such occupations as pertain to spiritual freedom or servitude, as stated above [3753](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 3: As already observed (A[3], ad 3), nothing hinders grade and state from concurring in the same subject. For even in earthly affairs those who are free, not only belong to a different state from those who are in service, but are also of a different grade.

OF THE STATE OF PERFECTION IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider those things that pertain to the state of perfection whereto the other states are directed. For the consideration of offices in relation to other acts belongs to the legislator; and in relation to the sacred ministry it comes under the consideration of orders of which we shall treat in the Third Part [*XP, Q[34]].

Concerning the state of the perfect, a three-fold consideration presents itself: (1) The state of perfection in general; (2) Things relating to the perfection of bishops; (3) Things relating to the perfection of religious.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether perfection bears any relation to charity?

(2) Whether one can be perfect in this life?

(3) Whether the perfection of this life consists chiefly in observing the counsels or the commandments?

(4) Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?

(5) Whether especially prelates and religious are in the state of perfection?

(6) Whether all prelates are in the state of perfection?

(7) Which is the more perfect, the episcopal or the religious state?

(8) The comparison between religious and parish priests and archdeacons.

Whether the perfection of the Christian life consists chiefly in charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the perfection of the Christian life does not consist chiefly in charity. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:20): “In malice be children, but in sense be perfect.” But charity regards not the senses but the affections. Therefore it would seem that the perfection of the Christian life does not chiefly consist in charity.

Objection 2: Further,’it is written (Eph. 6:13): “Take unto you the armor of God, that you may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect”; and the text continues (Eph. 6:14, 16), speaking of the armor of God: “Stand therefore having your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breast-plate of justice . . . in all things taking the shield of faith.” Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists not only in charity, but also in other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, virtues like other habits, are specified by their acts. Now it is written (James 1:4) that “patience hath a perfect work.” Therefore seemingly the state of perfection consists more specially in patience.

On the contrary, It is written (Col. 3:14): “Above all things have charity, which is the bond of perfection,” because it binds, as it were, all the other virtues together in perfect unity.

I answer that, A thing is said to be perfect in so far as it attains its proper end, which is the ultimate perfection thereof. Now it is charity that unites us to God, Who is the last end of the human mind, since “he that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him” (1 Jn. 4:16). Therefore the perfection of the Christian life consists radically in charity.

Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of the human senses would seem to consist chiefly in their concurring together in the unity of truth, according to 1 Cor. 1:10, “That you be perfect in the same mind [sensu], and in the same judgment.” Now this is effected by charity which operates consent in us men. Wherefore even the perfection of the senses consists radically in the perfection of charity.

Reply to Objection 2: A man may be said to be perfect in two ways. First, simply: and this perfection regards that which belongs to a thing's nature, for instance an animal may be said to be perfect when it lacks nothing in the disposition of its members and in such things as are necessary for an animal's life. Secondly, a thing is said to be perfect relatively: and this perfection regards something connected with the thing externally, such as whiteness or blackness or something of the kind. Now the Christian life consists chiefly in charity whereby the soul is united to God; wherefore it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He that loveth not abideth in death." Hence the perfection of the Christian life consists simply in charity, but in the other virtues relatively. And since that which is simply, is paramount and greatest in comparison with other things, it follows that the perfection of charity is paramount in relation to the perfection that regards the other virtues.

Reply to Objection 3: Patience is stated to have a perfect work in relation to charity, in so far as it is an effect of the abundance of charity that a man bears hardships patiently, according to Rom. 8:35, "Who . . . shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation? Or distress?" etc.

Whether any one can be perfect in this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that none can be perfect in this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." Now in this life that which is in part is not done away; for in this life faith and hope, which are in part, remain. Therefore none can be perfect in this life.

Objection 2: Further, "The perfect is that which lacks nothing" (Phys. iii, 6). Now there is no one in this life who lacks nothing; for it is written (James 3:2): "In many things we all offend"; and (Ps. 138:16): "Thy eyes did see my imperfect being." Therefore none is perfect in this life.

Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life, as stated [3754] (A[1]), relates to charity, which comprises the love of God and of our neighbor. Now, neither as to the love of God can one have perfect charity in this life, since according to Gregory (Hom. xiv in Ezech.) "the furnace of love which begins to burn here, will burn more fiercely when we see Him Whom we love"; nor as to the love of our neighbor, since in this life we cannot love all our neighbors actually, even though we love them habitually; and habitual love is imperfect. Therefore it seems that no one can be perfect in this life.

On the contrary, The Divine law does not prescribe the impossible. Yet it prescribes perfection according to Mat. 5:48, “Be you . . . perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.” Therefore seemingly one can be perfect in this life.

I answer that, As stated above [3755](A[1]), the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity. Now perfection implies a certain universality because according to Phys. iii, 6, “the perfect is that which lacks nothing.” Hence we may consider a threefold perfection. One is absolute, and answers to a totality not only on the part of the lover, but also on the part of the object loved, so that God be loved as much as He is lovable. Such perfection as this is not possible to any creature, but is competent to God alone, in Whom good is wholly and essentially.

Another perfection answers to an absolute totality on the part of the lover, so that the affective faculty always actually tends to God as much as it possibly can; and such perfection as this is not possible so long as we are on the way, but we shall have it in heaven.

The third perfection answers to a totality neither on the part of the object served, nor on the part of the lover as regards his always actually tending to God, but on the part of the lover as regards the removal of obstacles to the movement of love towards God, in which sense Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII, qu. 36) that “carnal desire is the bane of charity; to have no carnal desires is the perfection of charity.” Such perfection as this can be had in this life, and in two ways. First, by the removal from man’s affections of all that is contrary to charity, such as mortal sin; and there can be no charity apart from this perfection, wherefore it is necessary for salvation. Secondly, by the removal from man’s affections not only of whatever is contrary to charity, but also of whatever hinders the mind’s affections from tending wholly to God. Charity is possible apart from this perfection, for instance in those who are beginners and in those who are proficient.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking there of heavenly perfection which is not possible to those who are on the way.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who are perfect in this life are said to “offend in many things” with regard to venial sins, which result from the weakness of the present life: and in this respect they have an “imperfect being” in comparison with the perfection of heaven.

Reply to Objection 3: As the conditions of the present life do not allow of a man always tending actually to God, so neither does it allow of his tending actually to each individual neighbor; but it suffices for him to tend to all in common and collectively, and to each individual habitually and according to the preparedness of his mind. Now in the love of our neighbor, as in the love of God we may observe a twofold perfection: one without which charity is impossible, and consisting in one’s having in one’s affections nothing that is contrary to the love of one’s neighbor; and another without which it is possible to have charity. The latter perfection may be considered in three ways. First, as to the extent of love, through a man loving not only his friends and acquaintances but also strangers and even his enemies, for as Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) this is a mark of the perfect children of God. Secondly, as to the intensity of love, which is shown by the things which man despises for his neighbor’s sake, through his despising not only external goods for the sake of his neighbor, but also bodily hardships and even death, according to Jn. 15:13, “Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends.” Thirdly, as to the effect of love, so that a man will surrender not only temporal but also spiritual goods and even himself, for his neighbor’s sake, according to the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:15), “But I most gladly will spend and be spent myself for your souls.”

Whether, in this life, perfection consists in the observance of the commandments or of the counsels?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in this life, perfection consists in the observance not of the commandments but of the counsels. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me.” Now this is a counsel. Therefore perfection regards the counsels and not the precepts.

Objection 2: Further, all are bound to the observance of the commandments, since this is necessary for salvation. Therefore, if the perfection of the Christian life consists in observing the commandments, it follows that perfection is necessary for salvation, and that all are bound thereto; and this is evidently false.

Objection 3: Further, the perfection of the Christian life is gauged according to charity, as stated above [3756](A[1]). Now the perfection of charity, seemingly, does not consist in the observance of the commandments, since the perfection of charity is preceded both by its increase and by its beginning, as Augustine says (Super Canonic. Joan. Tract. ix). But the beginning of charity cannot precede the observance of the commandments, since according to Jn. 14:23, “If any one love Me, he will keep My word.” Therefore the perfection of life regards not the commandments but the counsels.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 6:5): “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart,” and (Lev. 19:18): “Thou shalt love thy neighbor [Vulg.: ‘friend’] as thyself”; and these are the commandments of which our Lord said (Mat. 22:40): “On these two commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets.” Now the perfection of charity, in respect of which the Christian life is said to be perfect, consists in our loving God with our whole heart, and our neighbor as ourselves. Therefore it would seem that perfection consists in the observance of the precepts.

I answer that, Perfection is said to consist in a thing in two ways: in one way, primarily and essentially; in another, secondarily and accidentally. Primarily and essentially the perfection of the Christian life consists in charity, principally as to the love of God, secondarily as to the love of our neighbor, both of which are the matter of the chief commandments of the Divine law, as stated above. Now the love of God and of our neighbor is not commanded according to a measure, so that what is in excess of the measure be a matter of counsel. This is evident from the very form of the commandment, pointing, as it does, to perfection—for instance in the words, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart”: since “the whole” is the same as “the perfect,” according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 6), and in the words, “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” since every one loves himself most. The reason of this is that “the end of the commandment is charity,” according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5); and the end is not subject to a measure, but only such things as are directed to the end, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. i, 3); thus a physician does not measure the amount of his healing, but how much medicine or diet he shall employ for the purpose of healing. Consequently it is evident that perfection consists essentially in the observance of the commandments;

wherefore Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii): “Why then should not this perfection be prescribed to man, although no man has it in this life?”

Secondarily and instrumentally, however, perfection consists in the observance of the counsels, all of which, like the commandments, are directed to charity; yet not in the same way. For the commandments, other than the precepts of charity, are directed to the removal of things contrary to charity, with which, namely, charity is incompatible, whereas the counsels are directed to the removal of things that hinder the act of charity, and yet are not contrary to charity, such as marriage, the occupation of worldly business, and so forth. Hence Augustine says (Enchiridion cxxi): “Whatever things God commands, for instance, ‘Thou shalt not commit adultery,’ and whatever are not commanded, yet suggested by a special counsel, for instance, ‘It is good for a man not to touch a woman,’ are then done aright when they are referred to the love of God, and of our neighbor for God’s sake, both in this world and in the world to come.” Hence it is that in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, cap. vii) the abbot Moses says: “Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, penury and loss of all one’s wealth, these are not perfection but means to perfection, since not in them does the school of perfection find its end, but through them it achieves its end,” and he had already said that “we endeavor to ascend by these steps to the perfection of charity.”

Reply to Objection 1: In this saying of our Lord something is indicated as being the way to perfection by the words, “Go, sell all thou hast, and give to the poor”; and something else is added wherein perfection consists, when He said, “And follow Me.” Hence Jerome in his commentary on Mat. 19:27, says that “since it is not enough merely to leave, Peter added that which is perfect: ‘And have followed Thee’”; and Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 5:27, “Follow Me,” says: “He commands him to follow, not with steps of the body, but with devotion of the soul, which is the effect of charity.” Wherefore it is evident from the very way of speaking that the counsels are means of attaining to perfection, since it is thus expressed: “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell,” etc., as though He said: “By so doing thou shalt accomplish this end.”

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii) “the perfection of charity is prescribed to man in this life, because one runs not right unless one knows whither to run. And how shall we know this if no commandment declares it to us?” And since that which is a matter of precept can be fulfilled variously, one does not break a commandment through not fulfilling it in the best way, but it is enough to fulfil it in any way whatever. Now the perfection of Divine love is a matter of precept for all without exception, so that even the perfection of heaven is not excepted from this precept, as Augustine says (De Perf. Justit. viii [*Cf. De Spir. et Lit. XXXVI]), and one escapes transgressing the precept, in whatever measure one attains to the perfection of Divine love. The lowest degree of Divine love is to love nothing more than God, or contrary to God, or equally with God, and whoever fails from this degree of perfection nowise fulfils the precept. There is another degree of the Divine love, which cannot be fulfilled so long as we are on the way, as stated above [3757](A[2]), and it is evident that to fail from this is not to be a transgressor of the precept; and in like manner one does not transgress the precept, if one does not attain to the intermediate degrees of perfection, provided one attain to the lowest.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as man has a certain perfection of his nature as soon as he is born, which perfection belongs to the very essence of his species, while there is another perfection which he acquires by growth, so again there is a perfection of charity which belongs to the very essence of charity, namely that man love God above all things, and love nothing contrary to God, while there is another perfection of charity even in this life, whereto a man attains by a kind of spiritual growth, for instance when a man refrains even from lawful things, in order more freely to give himself to the service of God.

Whether whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that whoever is perfect is in the state of perfection. For, as stated above (A[3], ad 3), just as bodily perfection is reached by bodily growth, so spiritual perfection is acquired by spiritual growth. Now after bodily growth one is said to have reached the state of perfect age. Therefore seemingly also after spiritual growth, when one has already reached spiritual perfection, one is in the state of perfection.

Objection 2: Further, according to Phys. v, 2, movement “from one contrary to another” has the same aspect as “movement from less to more.”

Now when a man is changed from sin to grace, he is said to change his state, in so far as the state of sin differs from the state of grace. Therefore it would seem that in the same manner, when one progresses from a lesser to a greater grace, so as to reach the perfect degree, one is in the state of perfection.

Objection 3: Further, a man acquires a state by being freed from servitude. But one is freed from the servitude of sin by charity, because "charity covereth all sins" (Prov. 10:12). Now one is said to be perfect on account of charity, as stated above [3758](A[1]). Therefore, seemingly, whoever has perfection, for this very reason has the state of perfection.

On the contrary, Some are in the state of perfection, who are wholly lacking in charity and grace, for instance wicked bishops or religious. Therefore it would seem that on the other hand some have the perfection of life, who nevertheless have not the state of perfection.

I answer that, As stated above ([3759]Q[183], A[1]), state properly regards a condition of freedom or servitude. Now spiritual freedom or servitude may be considered in man in two ways: first, with respect to his internal actions; secondly, with respect to his external actions. And since according to 1 Kings 16:7, "man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart," it follows that with regard to man's internal disposition we consider his spiritual state in relation to the Divine judgment, while with regard to his external actions we consider man's spiritual state in relation to the Church. It is in this latter sense that we are now speaking of states, namely in so far as the Church derives a certain beauty from the variety of states [*Cf.[3760] Q[183], A[2]].

Now it must be observed, that so far as men are concerned, in order that any one attain to a state of freedom or servitude there is required first of all an obligation or a release. For the mere fact of serving someone does not make a man a slave, since even the free serve, according to Gal. 5:13, "By charity of the spirit serve one another": nor again does the mere fact of ceasing to serve make a man free, as in the case of a runaway slave; but properly speaking a man is a slave if he be bound to serve, and a man is free if he be released from service. Secondly, it is required that the aforesaid obligation be imposed with a certain solemnity; even as a certain solemnity is observed in other matters which among men obtain a settlement in perpetuity.

Accordingly, properly speaking, one is said to be in the state of perfection, not through having the act of perfect love, but through binding himself in perpetuity and with a certain solemnity to those things that pertain to perfection. Moreover it happens that some persons bind themselves to that which they do not keep, and some fulfil that to which they have not bound themselves, as in the case of the two sons (Mat. 21:28, 30), one of whom when his father said: “Work in my vineyard,” answered: “I will not,” and “afterwards . . . he went,” while the other “answering said: I go . . . and he went not.” Wherefore nothing hinders some from being perfect without being in the state of perfection, and some in the state of perfection without being perfect.

Reply to Objection 1: By bodily growth a man progresses in things pertaining to nature, wherefore he attains to the state of nature; especially since “what is according to nature is,” in a way, “unchangeable” [*Ethic. v, 7], inasmuch as nature is determinate to one thing. In like manner by inward spiritual growth a man reaches the state of perfection in relation to the Divine judgment. But as regards the distinctions of ecclesiastical states, a man does not reach the state of perfection except by growth in respect of external actions.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument also regards the interior state. Yet when a man passes from sin to grace, he passes from servitude to freedom; and this does not result from a mere progress in grace, except when a man binds himself to things pertaining to grace.

Reply to Objection 3: Again this argument considers the interior state. Nevertheless, although charity causes the change of condition from spiritual servitude to spiritual freedom, an increase of charity has not the same effect.

Whether religious and prelates are in the state of perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that prelates and religious are not in the state of perfection. For the state of perfection differs from the state of the beginners and the proficient. Now no class of men is specially assigned to the state of the proficient or of the beginners. Therefore it would seem that neither should any class of men be assigned to the state of perfection.

Objection 2: Further, the outward state should answer to the inward, else one is guilty of lying, “which consists not only in false words, but also in deceitful deeds," according to Ambrose in one of his sermons (xxx de Tempore). Now there are many prelates and religious who have not the inward perfection of charity. Therefore, if all religious and prelates are in the state of perfection, it would follow that all of them that are not perfect are in mortal sin, as deceivers and liars.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [3761](A[1]), perfection is measured according to charity. Now the most perfect charity would seem to be in the martyrs, according to Jn. 15:13, "Greater love than this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends": and a gloss on Heb. 12:4, "For you have not yet resisted unto blood," says: "In this life no love is more perfect than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who strove against sin even unto blood." Therefore it would seem that the state of perfection should be ascribed to the martyrs rather than to religious and bishops.

On the contrary, Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) ascribes perfection to bishops as being perfecters, and (Eccl. Hier. vi) to religious (whom he calls monks or {therapeutai}, i.e. servants of God) as being perfected.

I answer that, As stated above [3762](A[4]), there is required for the state of perfection a perpetual obligation to things pertaining to perfection, together with a certain solemnity. Now both these conditions are competent to religious and bishops. For religious bind themselves by vow to refrain from worldly affairs, which they might lawfully use, in order more freely to give themselves to God, wherein consists the perfection of the present life. Hence Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), speaking of religious: "Some call them {therapeutai}," i.e. servants, "on account of their rendering pure service and homage to God; others call them {monachoi}" [*i.e. solitaries; whence the English word 'monk'], "on account of the indivisible and single-minded life which by their being wrapped in," i.e. contemplating, "indivisible things, unites them in a Godlike union and a perfection beloved of God" [*Cf. Q[180], A[6]]. Moreover, the obligation in both cases is undertaken with a certain solemnity of profession and consecration; wherefore Dionysius adds (Eccl. Hier. vi): "Hence the holy legislation in bestowing perfect grace on them accords them a hallowing invocation."

In like manner bishops bind themselves to things pertaining to perfection when they take up the pastoral duty, to which it belongs that a shepherd "lay down his life for his sheep," according to Jn. 10:15. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:12): “Thou . . . hast confessed a good confession before many witnesses,” that is to say, “when he was ordained,” as a gloss says on this passage. Again, a certain solemnity of consecration is employed together with the aforesaid profession, according to 2 Tim. 1:6: “Stir up the grace of God which is in thee by the imposition of my hands,” which the gloss ascribes to the grace of the episcopate. And Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that “when the high priest,” i.e. the bishop, “is ordained, he receives on his head the most holy imposition of the sacred oracles, whereby it is signified that he is a participator in the whole and entire hierarchical power, and that not only is he the enlightener in all things pertaining to his holy discourses and actions, but that he also confers this on others.”

Reply to Objection 1: Beginning and increase are sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of perfection; hence it is only to the state of perfection that some are admitted under certain obligations and with solemnity.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who enter the state of perfection do not profess to be perfect, but to tend to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): “Not as though I had already attained, or were already perfect; but I follow after, if I may by any means apprehend”: and afterwards (Phil. 3:15): “Let us therefore as many as are perfect, be thus minded.” Hence a man who takes up the state of perfection is not guilty of lying or deceit through not being perfect, but through withdrawing his mind from the intention of reaching perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: Martyrdom is the most perfect act of charity. But an act of perfection does not suffice to make the state of perfection, as stated above [3763](A[4]).

Whether all ecclesiastical prelates are in the state of perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that all ecclesiastical prelates are in a state of perfection. For Jerome commenting on Titus 1:5, “Ordain . . . in every city,” etc. says: “Formerly priest was the same as bishop,” and afterwards he adds: “Just as priests know that by the custom of the Church they are subject to the one who is placed over them, so too, bishops should recognize that, by custom rather than by the very ordinance of our Lord, they are above the priests, and are together the rightful governors of the

Church.” Now bishops are in the state of perfection. Therefore those priests also are who have the cure of souls.

Objection 2: Further, just as bishops together with their consecration receive the cure of souls, so also do parish priests and archdeacons, of whom a gloss on Acts 6:3, “Brethren, look ye out . . . seven men of good reputation,” says: “The apostles decided here to appoint throughout the Church seven deacons, who were to be of a higher degree, and as it were the supports of that which is nearest to the altar.” Therefore it would seem that these also are in the state of perfection.

Objection 3: Further, just as bishops are bound to “lay down their life for their sheep,” so too are parish priests and archdeacons. But this belongs to the perfection of charity, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Therefore it would seem that parish priests and archdeacons also are in the state of perfection.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v): “The order of pontiffs is consummative and perfecting, that of the priests is illuminative and light-giving, that of the ministers is cleansing and discretive.” Hence it is evident that perfection is ascribed to bishops only.

I answer that, In priests and deacons having cure of souls two things may be considered, namely their order and their cure. Their order is directed to some act in the Divine offices. Wherefore it has been stated above ([3764]Q[183], A[3], ad 3) that the distinction of orders is comprised under the distinction of offices. Hence by receiving a certain order a man receives the power of exercising certain sacred acts, but he is not bound on this account to things pertaining to perfection, except in so far as in the Western Church the receiving of a sacred order includes the taking of a vow of continence, which is one of the things pertaining to perfection, as we shall state further on ([3765]Q[186], A[4]). Therefore it is clear that from the fact that a man receives a sacred order a man is not placed simply in the state of perfection, although inward perfection is required in order that one exercise such acts worthily.

In like manner, neither are they placed in the state of perfection on the part of the cure which they take upon themselves. For they are not bound by this very fact under the obligation of a perpetual vow to retain the cure of souls; but they can surrender it—either by entering religion, even without their bishop’s permission (cf. Decret. xix, qu. 2, can. Duae sunt)—or again an archdeacon may with his bishop’s permission resign his arch-deaconry or parish, and accept a simple prebend without cure, which would be nowise lawful, if he were in the state of perfection; for “no man putting his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God” (Lk. 9:62). On the other hand bishops, since they are in the state of perfection, cannot abandon the episcopal cure, save by the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff (to whom alone it belongs also to dispense from perpetual vows), and this for certain causes, as we shall state further on ([3766]Q[185], A[4]). Wherefore it is manifest that not all prelates are in the state of perfection, but only bishops.

Reply to Objection 1: We may speak of priest and bishop in two ways. First, with regard to the name: and thus formerly bishops and priests were not distinct. For bishops are so called “because they watch over others,” as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xix, 19); while the priests according to the Greek are “elders.” [*Referring to the Greek {episkopos} and {presbyteros} from which the English ‘bishop’ and ‘priest’ are derived.] Hence the Apostle employs the term “priests” in reference to both, when he says (1 Tim. 5:17): “Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor”; and again he uses the term “bishops” in the same way, wherefore addressing the priests of the Church of Ephesus he says (Acts 20:28): “Take heed to yourselves” and “to the whole flock, wherein the Holy Ghost hath placed you bishops, to rule the church of God.”

But as regards the thing signified by these terms, there was always a difference between them, even at the time of the apostles. This is clear on the authority of Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), and of a gloss on Lk. 10:1, “After these things the Lord appointed,” etc. which says: “Just as the apostles were made bishops, so the seventy-two disciples were made priests of the second order.” Subsequently, however, in order to avoid schism, it became necessary to distinguish even the terms, by calling the higher ones bishops and the lower ones priests. But to assert that priests nowise differ from bishops is reckoned by Augustine among heretical doctrines (De Heres. liii), where he says that the Arians maintained that “no distinction existed between a priest and a bishop.”

Reply to Objection 2: Bishops have the chief cure of the sheep of their diocese, while parish priests and archdeacons exercise an inferior ministry under the bishops. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 12:28, “to one, helps, to another, governments [*Vulg.: ‘God hath set some in the church . . . helps, governments,’ etc.],” says: “Helps, namely assistants to those who are in authority,” as Titus was to the Apostle, or as archdeacons to the bishop; “governments, namely persons of lesser authority, such as priests who have to instruct the people”: and Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that “just as we see the whole hierarchy culminating in Jesus, so each office culminates in its respective godlike hierarch or bishop.” Also it is said (XVI, qu. i, can. Cunctis): “Priests and deacons must all take care not to do anything without their bishop’s permission.” Wherefore it is evident that they stand in relation to their bishop as wardens or mayors to the king; and for this reason, just as in earthly governments the king alone receives a solemn blessing, while others are appointed by simple commission, so too in the Church the episcopal cure is conferred with the solemnity of consecration, while the archdeacon or parish priest receives his cure by simple appointment; although they are consecrated by receiving orders before having a cure.

Reply to Objection 3: As parish priests and archdeacons have not the chief cure, but a certain ministry as committed to them by the bishop, so the pastoral office does not belong to them in chief, nor are they bound to lay down their life for the sheep, except in so far as they have a share in their cure. Hence we should say that they have an office pertaining to perfection rather than that they attain the state of perfection.

Whether the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates?

Objection 1: It would seem that the religious state is more perfect than that of prelates. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go” and “sell” all [Vulg.: ‘what’] “thou hast, and give to the poor”; and religious do this. But bishops are not bound to do so; for it is said (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): “Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally.” Therefore religious are in a more perfect state than bishops.

Objection 2: Further, perfection consists more especially in the love of God than in the love of our neighbor. Now the religious state is directly ordered to the love of God, wherefore it takes its name from “service and homage to God,” as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi); [*Quoted above A[5]] whereas the bishop’s state would seem to be ordered to the love of our neighbor, of whose cure he is the “warden,” and from this he takes his name, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei. xix, 19). Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than that of bishops.

Objection 3: Further, the religious state is directed to the contemplative life, which is more excellent than the active life to which the episcopal state is directed. For Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7) that “Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the active life desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias, who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator, exclaimed against being sent to preach.” Therefore it would seem that the religious state is more perfect than the episcopal state.

On the contrary, It is not lawful for anyone to pass from a more excellent to a less excellent state; for this would be to look back [*Cf. Lk. 9:62]. Yet a man may pass from the religious to the episcopal state, for it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that “the holy ordination makes a monk to be a bishop.” Therefore the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious.

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), “the agent is ever more excellent than the patient.” Now in the genus of perfection according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v, vi), bishops are in the position of “perfecters,” whereas religious are in the position of being “perfected”; the former of which pertains to action, and the latter to passion. Whence it is evident that the state of perfection is more excellent in bishops than in religious.

Reply to Objection 1: Renunciation of one’s possessions may be considered in two ways. First, as being actual: and thus it is not essential, but a means, to perfection, as stated above [3767](A[3]). Hence nothing hinders the state of perfection from being without renunciation of one’s possessions, and the same applies to other outward practices. Secondly, it may be considered in relation to one’s preparedness, in the sense of being prepared to renounce or give away all: and this belongs directly to perfection. Hence Augustine says (De QQ. Evang. ii, qu. 11): “Our Lord shows that the children of wisdom understand righteousness to consist neither in eating nor in abstaining, but in bearing want patiently.” Wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 4:12): “I know . . . both to abound and to suffer need.” Now bishops especially are bound to despise all things for the honor of God and the spiritual welfare of their flock, when it is necessary for them to do so, either by giving to the poor of their flock, or by suffering “with joy the being stripped of” their “own goods” [*Heb. 10:34].

Reply to Objection 2: That bishops are busy about things pertaining to the love of their neighbor, arises out of the abundance of their love of God. Hence our Lord asked Peter first of all whether he loved Him, and afterwards committed the care of His flock to him. And Gregory says (Pastor. i, 5): “If the pastoral care is a proof of love, he who refuses to feed God’s flock, though having the means to do so, is convicted of not loving the supreme Pastor.” And it is a sign of greater love if a man devotes himself to others for his friend’s sake, than if he be willing only to serve his friend.

Reply to Objection 3: As Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1), “a prelate should be foremost in action, and more uplifted than others in contemplation,” because it is incumbent on him to contemplate, not only for his own sake, but also for the purpose of instructing others. Hence Gregory applies (Hom. v in Ezech.) the words of Ps. 144:7, “They shall publish the memory . . . of Thy sweetness,” to perfect men returning after their contemplation.

Whether parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious?

Objection 1: It would seem that also parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious. For Chrysostom says in his Dialogue (De Sacerdot. vi): “Take for example a monk, such as Elias, if I may exaggerate somewhat, he is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people and compelled to carry the sins of many, remains firm and strong.” A little further on he says: “If I were given the choice, where would I prefer to please, in the priestly office, or in the monastic solitude, without hesitation I should choose the former.” Again in the same book (ch. 5) he says: “If you compare the toils of this project, namely of the monastic life, with a well-employed priesthood, you will find them as far distant from one another as a common citizen is from a king.” Therefore it would seem that priests who have the cure of souls are more perfect than religious.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (ad Valerium, Ep. xxi): “Let thy religious prudence observe that in this life, and especially at these times, there is nothing so difficult, so onerous, so perilous as the office of bishop, priest, or deacon; while in God’s sight there is no greater blessing, if one engage in the fight as ordered by our Commander-in-chief.” Therefore religious are not more perfect than priests or deacons.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Ep. lx, ad Aurel.): “It would be most regrettable, were we to exalt monks to such a disastrous degree of pride, and deem the clergy deserving of such a grievous insult,” as to assert that ‘a bad monk is a good clerk,’ “since sometimes even a good monk makes a bad clerk.” And a little before this he says that “God’s servants,” i.e. monks, “must not be allowed to think that they may easily be chosen for something better,” namely the clerical state, “if they should become worse thereby,” namely by leaving the monastic state. Therefore it would seem that those who are in the clerical state are more perfect than religious.

Objection 4: Further, it is not lawful to pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state. Yet it is lawful to pass from the monastic state to a priestly office with a cure attached, as appears (XVI, qu. i, can. Si quis monachus) from a decree of Pope Gelasius, who says: “If there be a monk, who by the merit of his exemplary life is worthy of the priesthood, and the abbot under whose authority he fights for Christ his King, ask that he be made a priest, the bishop shall take him and ordain him in such place as he shall choose fitting.” And Jerome says (Ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): “In the monastery so live as to deserve to be a clerk.” Therefore parish priests and archdeacons are more perfect than religious.

Objection 5: Further, bishops are in a more perfect state than religious, as shown above [3768](A[7]). But parish priests and archdeacons. through having cure of souls, are more like bishops than religious are. Therefore they are more perfect.

Objection 6: Further, virtue “is concerned with the difficult and the good” (Ethic. ii, 3). Now it is more difficult to lead a good life in the office of parish priest or archdeacon than in the religious state. Therefore parish priests and archdeacons have more perfect virtue than religious.

On the contrary, It is stated (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce): “If a man while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading a secular life is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, since he is led by a private law, there is no reason why he should be constrained by a public law.” Now a man is not led by the law of the Holy Ghost, which is here called a “private law,” except to something more perfect. Therefore it would seem that religious are more perfect than archdeacons or parish priests.

I answer that, When we compare things in the point of super-eminence, we look not at that in which they agree, but at that wherein they differ. Now in parish priests and archdeacons three things may be considered, their state, their order, and their office. It belongs to their state that they are seculars, to their order that they are priests or deacons, to their office that they have the cure of souls committed to them.

Accordingly, if we compare these with one who is a religious by state, a deacon or priest by order, having the cure of souls by office, as many monks and canons regular have, this one will excel in the first point, and in the other points he will be equal. But if the latter differ from the former in state and office, but agree in order, such as religious priests and deacons not having the cure of souls, it is evident that the latter will be more excellent than the former in state, less excellent in office, and equal in order.

We must therefore consider which is the greater, preeminence of state or of office; and here, seemingly, we should take note of two things, goodness and difficulty. Accordingly, if we make the comparison with a view to goodness, the religious state surpasses the office of parish priest or archdeacon, because a religious pledges his whole life to the quest of perfection, whereas the parish priest or archdeacon does not pledge his whole life to the cure of souls, as a bishop does, nor is it competent to him, as it is to a bishop, to exercise the cure of souls in chief, but only in certain particulars regarding the cure of souls committed to his charge, as stated above (A[6], ad 2). Wherefore the comparison of their religious state with their office is like the comparisons of the universal with the particular, and of a holocaust with a sacrifice which is less than a holocaust according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence it is said (XIX, qu. i, can. Clerici qui monachorum.): “Clerics who wish to take the monastic vows through being desirous of a better life must be allowed by their bishops the free entrance into the monastery.”

This comparison, however, must be considered as regarding the genus of the deed; for as regards the charity of the doer it happens sometimes that a deed which is of less account in its genus is of greater merit if it be done out of greater charity.

On the other hand, if we consider the difficulty of leading a good life in religion, and in the office of one having the cure of souls, in this way it is more difficult to lead a good life together with the exercise of the cure of souls, on account of outward dangers: although the religious life is more difficult as regards the genus of the deed, by reason of the strictness of religious observance. If, however, the religious is also without orders, as in the case of religious lay brethren, then it is evident that the pre-eminence of order excels in the point of dignity, since by holy orders a man is appointed to the most august ministry of serving Christ Himself in the sacrament of the altar. For this requires a greater inward holiness than that which is requisite for the religious state, since as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) the monastic order must follow the priestly orders, and ascend to Divine things in imitation of them. Hence, other things being equal, a cleric who is in holy orders, sins more grievously if he do something contrary to holiness than a religious who is not in holy orders: although a religious who is not in orders is bound to regular observance to which persons in holy orders are not bound.

Reply to Objection 1: We might answer briefly these quotations from Chrysostom by saying that he speaks not of a priest of lesser order who has the cure of souls, but of a bishop, who is called a high-priest; and this agrees with the purpose of that book wherein he consoles himself and Basil in that they were chosen to be bishops. We may, however, pass this over and reply that he speaks in view of the difficulty. For he had already said: “When the pilot is surrounded by the stormy sea and is able to bring the ship safely out of the tempest, then he deserves to be acknowledged by all as a perfect pilot”; and afterwards he concludes, as quoted, with regard to the monk, “who is not to be compared with one who, cast among the people . . . remains firm”; and he gives the reason why, because “both in the calm end in the storm he piloted himself to safety.” This proves nothing more than that the state of one who has the cure of souls is fraught with more danger than the monastic state; and to keep oneself innocent in face of a greater peril is proof of greater virtue. on the other hand, it also indicates greatness of virtue if a man avoid dangers by entering religion; hence he does not say that “he would prefer the priestly office to the monastic solitude,” but that “he would rather please” in the former than in the latter, since this is a proof of greater virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: This passage quoted from Augustine also clearly refers to the question of difficulty which proves the greatness of virtue in those who lead a good life, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine there compares monks with clerics as regards the pre-eminence of order, not as regards the distinction between religious and secular life.

Reply to Objection 4: Those who are taken from the religious state to receive the cure of souls, being already in sacred orders, attain to something they had not hitherto, namely the office of the cure, yet they do not put aside what they had already. For it is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): “With regard to those monks who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.”

On the other hand, parish priests and archdeacons, when they enter religion, resign their cure, in order to enter the state of perfection. This very fact shows the excellence of the religious life. When religious who are not in orders are admitted to the clerical state and to the sacred orders, they are clearly promoted to something better, as stated: this is indicated by the very way in which Jerome expresses himself: “So live in the monastery as to deserve to be a clerk.”

Reply to Objection 5: Parish priests and archdeacons are more like bishops than religious are, in a certain respect, namely as regards the cure of souls which they have subordinately; but as regards the obligation in perpetuity, religious are more like a bishop, as appears from what we have said above ([3769]AA[5],6).

Reply to Objection 6: The difficulty that arises from the arduousness of the deed adds to the perfection of virtue; but the difficulty that results from outward obstacles sometimes lessens the perfection of virtue—for instance, when a man loves not virtue so much as to wish to avoid the obstacles to virtue, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:25), “Everyone that striveth for the mastery refraineth himself from all things”: and sometimes it is a sign of perfect virtue—for instance, when a man forsakes not virtue, although he is hindered in the practice of virtue unawares or by some unavoidable cause. In the religious state there is greater difficulty arising from the arduousness of deeds; whereas for those who in any way at all live in the world, there is greater difficulty resulting from obstacles to virtue, which obstacles the religious has had the foresight to avoid.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE EPISCOPAL STATE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider things pertaining to the episcopal state. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?

(2) Whether it is lawful to refuse the office of bishop definitively?

(3) Whether the better man should be chosen for the episcopal office?

(4) Whether a bishop may pass over to the religious state?

(5) Whether he may lawfully abandon his subjects in a bodily manner?

(6) Whether he can have anything of his own?

(7) Whether he sins mortally by not distributing ecclesiastical goods to the poor?

(8) Whether religious who are appointed to the episcopal office are bound to religious observances?

Whether it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to desire the office of a bishop. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:1): “He that desires [Vulg.: ‘If a man desire’] the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.” Now it is lawful and praiseworthy to desire a good work. Therefore it is even praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.

Objection 2: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as we have said above ([3770]Q[184], A[7]). But it is praiseworthy to desire to enter the religious state. Therefore it is also praiseworthy to desire promotion to the episcopal state.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 11:26): “He that hideth up corn shall be cursed among the people; but a blessing upon the head of them that sell.” Now a man who is apt, both in manner of life and by knowledge, for the episcopal office, would seem to hide up the spiritual corn, if he shun the episcopal state, whereas by accepting the episcopal office he enters the state of a dispenser of spiritual corn. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop, and blameworthy to refuse it.

Objection 4: Further, the deeds of the saints related in Holy Writ are set before us as an example, according to Rom. 15:4, “What things soever were written, were written for our learning.” Now we read (Is. 6:8) that Isaias offered himself for the office of preacher, which belongs chiefly to bishops. Therefore it would seem praiseworthy to desire the office of a bishop.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The higher place, without which the people cannot be ruled, though it be filled becomingly, is unbecomingly desired.”

I answer that, Three things may be considered in the episcopal office. One is principal and final, namely the bishop’s work, whereby the good of our neighbor is intended, according to Jn. 21:17, “Feed My sheep.” Another thing is the height of degree, for a bishop is placed above others, according to Mat. 24:45, “A faithful and a wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family.” The third is something resulting from these, namely reverence, honor, and a sufficiency of temporalities, according to 1 Tim. 5:17, “Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor.” Accordingly, to desire the episcopal office on account of these incidental goods is manifestly unlawful, and pertains to covetousness or ambition. Wherefore our Lord said against the Pharisees (Mat. 23:6,7): “They love the first places at feasts, and the first chairs in the synagogues, and salutations in the market-place, and to be called by men, Rabbi.” As regards the second, namely the height of degree, it is presumptuous to desire the episcopal office. Hence our Lord reproved His disciples for seeking precedence, by saying to them (Mat. 20:25): “You know that the princes of the gentiles lord it over them.” Here Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.) that in these words “He points out that it is heathenish to seek precedence; and thus by comparing them to the gentiles He converted their impetuous soul.”

On the other hand, to desire to do good to one’s neighbor is in itself praiseworthy, and virtuous. Nevertheless, since considered as an episcopal act it has the height of degree attached to it, it would seem that, unless there be manifest and urgent reason for it, it would be presumptuous for any man to desire to be set over others in order to do them good. Thus Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8) that “it was praiseworthy to seek the office of a bishop when it was certain to bring one into graver dangers.” Wherefore it was not easy to find a person to accept this burden, especially seeing that it is through the zeal of charity that one divinely instigated to do so, according to Gregory, who says (Pastor. i, 7) that “Isaias being desirous of profiting his neighbor, commendably desired the office of preacher.”

Nevertheless, anyone may, without presumption, desire to do such like works if he should happen to be in that office, or to be worthy of doing them; so that the object of his desire is the good work and not the precedence in dignity. Hence Chrysostom* says: “It is indeed good to desire a good work, but to desire the primacy of honor is vanity. For primacy seeks one that shuns it, and abhors one that desires it.” [*The quotation is from the Opus Imperfectum in Matth. (Hom. xxxv), falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom.]

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), “when the Apostle said this he who was set over the people was the first to be dragged to the torments of martyrdom,” so that there was nothing to be desired in the episcopal office, save the good work. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that when the Apostle said, “‘Whoever desireth the office of bishop, desireth a good work,’ he wished to explain what the episcopacy is: for it denotes work and not honor: since {skopos} signifies ‘watching.’ Wherefore if we like we may render {episkopein} by the Latin ‘superintendere’ [to watch over]: thus a man may know himself to be no bishop if he loves to precede rather than to profit others.” For, as he observed shortly before, “in our actions we should seek, not honor nor power in this life, since all things beneath the sun are vanity, but the work itself which that honor or power enables us to do.” Nevertheless, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 8), “while praising the desire” (namely of the good work) “he forthwith turns this object of praise into one of fear, when he adds: It behooveth . . . a bishop to be blameless,” as though to say: “I praise what you seek, but learn first what it is you seek.”

Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the religious and the episcopal state, for two reasons. First, because perfection of life is a prerequisite of the episcopal state, as appears from our Lord asking Peter if he loved Him more than the others, before committing the pastoral office to him, whereas perfection is not a prerequisite of the religious state, since the latter is the way to perfection. Hence our Lord did not say (Mat. 19:21): “If thou art perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast,” but “If thou wilt be perfect.” The reason for this difference is because, according to Dionysius

(Eccl. Hier. vi), perfection pertains actively to the bishop, as the “perfecter,” but to the monk passively as one who is “perfected”: and one needs to be perfect in order to bring others to perfection, but not in order to be brought to perfection. Now it is presumptuous to think oneself perfect, but it is not presumptuous to tend to perfection. Secondly, because he who enters the religious state subjects himself to others for the sake of a spiritual profit, and anyone may lawfully do this. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “No man is debarred from striving for the knowledge of truth, since this pertains to a praiseworthy ease.” On the other hand, he who enters the episcopal state is raised up in order to watch over others, and no man should seek to be raised thus, according to Heb. 5:4, “Neither doth any man take the honor to himself, but he that is called by God”: and Chrysostom says: “To desire supremacy in the Church is neither just nor useful. For what wise man seeks of his own accord to submit to such servitude and peril, as to have to render an account of the whole Church? None save him who fears not God’s judgment, and makes a secular abuse of his ecclesiastical authority, by turning it to secular uses.”

Reply to Objection 3: The dispensing of spiritual corn is not to be carried on in an arbitrary fashion, but chiefly according to the appointment and disposition of God, and in the second place according to the appointment of the higher prelates, in whose person it is said (1 Cor. 4:1): “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.” Wherefore a man is not deemed to hide spiritual corn if he avoids governing or correcting others, and is not competent to do so, neither in virtue of his office nor of his superior’s command; thus alone is he deemed to hide it, when he neglects to dispense it while under obligation to do so in virtue of his office, or obstinately refuses to accept the office when it is imposed on him. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): “The love of truth seeks a holy leisure, the demands of charity undertake an honest labor. If no one imposes this burden upon us, we must devote ourselves to the research and contemplation of truth, but if it be imposed on us, we must bear it because charity demands it of us.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), “Isaias, who wishing to be sent, knew himself to be already cleansed by the live coal taken from the altar, shows us that no one should dare uncleansed to approach the sacred ministry. Since, then, it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed, it is safer to decline the office of preacher."

Whether it is lawful for a man to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful to refuse absolutely an appointment to the episcopate. For as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "Isaias wishing to be of profit to his neighbor by means of the active life, desired the office of preaching, whereas Jeremias who was fain to hold fast to the love of his Creator by contemplation exclaimed against being sent to preach." Now no man sins by being unwilling to forgo better things in order to adhere to things that are not so good. Since then the love of God surpasses the love of our neighbor, and the contemplative life is preferable to the active, as shown above ([3771]Q[25], A[1];[3772] Q[26], A[2]; [3773] Q[182], A[1]) it would seem that a man sins not if he refuse absolutely the episcopal office.

Objection 2: Further, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 7), "it is very difficult for anyone to be able to know that he is cleansed: nor should anyone uncleansed approach the sacred ministry." Therefore if a man perceives that he is not cleansed, however urgently the episcopal office be enjoined him, he ought not to accept it.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome (Prologue, super Marc.) says that "it is related of the Blessed Mark* that after receiving the faith he cut off his thumb that he might be excluded from the priesthood." [*This prologue was falsely ascribed to St. Jerome, and the passage quoted refers, not to St. Mark the Evangelist, but to a hermit of that name. (Cf. Baronius, Anno Christi, 45, num. XLIV)] Likewise some take a vow never to accept a bishopric. Now to place an obstacle to a thing amounts to the same as refusing it altogether. Therefore it would seem that one may, without sin, refuse the episcopal office absolutely.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. xlviii ad Eudox.): "If Mother Church requires your service, neither accept with greedy conceit, nor refuse with fawning indolence"; and afterwards he adds: "Nor prefer your ease to the needs of the Church: for if no good men were willing to assist her in her labor, you would seek in vain how we could be born of her."

I answer that, Two things have to be considered in the acceptance of the episcopal office: first, what a man may fittingly desire according to his own will; secondly, what it behooves a man to do according to the will of another. As regards his own will it becomes a man to look chiefly to his own spiritual welfare, whereas that he look to the spiritual welfare of others becomes a man according to the appointment of another having authority, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). Hence just as it is a mark of an inordinate will that a man of his own choice incline to be appointed to the government of others, so too it indicates an inordinate will if a man definitively refuse the aforesaid office of government in direct opposition to the appointment of his superior: and this for two reasons.

First, because this is contrary to the love of our neighbor, for whose good a man should offer himself according as place and time demand: hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "the demands of charity undertake an honest labor." Secondly, because this is contrary to humility, whereby a man submits to his superior's commands: hence Gregory says (Pastor. i, 6): "In God's sight humility is genuine when it does not obstinately refuse to submit to what is usefully prescribed."

Reply to Objection 1: Although simply and absolutely speaking the contemplative life is more excellent than the active, and the love of God better than the love of our neighbor, yet, on the other hand, the good of the many should be preferred to the good of the individual. Wherefore Augustine says in the passage quoted above: "Nor prefer your own ease to the needs of the Church," and all the more since it belongs to the love of God that a man undertake the pastoral care of Christ's sheep. Hence Augustine, commenting on Jn. 21:17, "Feed My sheep," says (Tract. cxxiii in Joan.): "Be it the task of love to feed the Lord's flock, even as it was the mark of fear to deny the Shepherd."

Moreover prelates are not transferred to the active life, so as to forsake the contemplative; wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19) that "if the burden of the pastoral office be imposed, we must not abandon the delights of truth," which are derived from contemplation.

Reply to Objection 2: No one is bound to obey his superior by doing what is unlawful, as appears from what was said above concerning obedience ([3774]Q[104], A[5]). Accordingly it may happen that he who is appointed to the office of prelate perceive something in himself on account of which it is unlawful for him to accept a prelacy. But this obstacle may sometimes be removed by the very person who is appointed to the pastoral cure—for instance, if he have a purpose to sin, he may abandon it—and for this reason he is not excused from being bound to obey definitely the superior who has appointed him. Sometimes, however, he is unable himself to remove the impediment that makes the pastoral office unlawful to him, yet the prelate who appoints him can do so—for instance, if he be irregular or excommunicate. In such a case he ought to make known his defect to the prelate who has appointed him; and if the latter be willing to remove the impediment, he is bound humbly to obey. Hence when Moses had said (Ex. 4:10): “I beseech thee, Lord, I am not eloquent from yesterday, and the day before,” the Lord answered (Ex. 4:12): “I will be in thy mouth, and I will teach thee what thou shalt speak.” At other times the impediment cannot be removed, neither by the person appointing nor by the one appointed—for instance, if an archbishop be unable to dispense from an irregularity; wherefore a subject, if irregular, would not be bound to obey him by accepting the episcopate or even sacred orders.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not in itself necessary for salvation to accept the episcopal office, but it becomes necessary by reason of the superior’s command. Now one may lawfully place an obstacle to things thus necessary for salvation, before the command is given; else it would not be lawful to marry a second time, lest one should thus incur an impediment to the episcopate or holy orders. But this would not be lawful in things necessary for salvation. Hence the Blessed Mark did not act against a precept by cutting off his finger, although it is credible that he did this by the instigation of the Holy Ghost, without which it would be unlawful for anyone to lay hands on himself. If a man take a vow not to accept the bishop’s office, and by this intend to bind himself not even to accept it in obedience to his superior prelate, his vow is unlawful; but if he intend to bind himself, so far as it lies with him, not to seek the episcopal office, nor to accept it except under urgent necessity, his vow is lawful, because he vows to do what it becomes a man to do.

Whether he that is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is appointed to the episcopate ought to be better than others. For our Lord, when about to commit the pastoral office to Peter, asked him if he loved Him more than the others. Now a man is the better through loving God the more. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be appointed to the episcopal office except he be better than others.

Objection 2: Further, Pope Symmachus says (can. Vilissimus I, qu. 1): “A man is of very little worth who though excelling in dignity, excels not in knowledge and holiness.” Now he who excels in knowledge and holiness is better. Therefore a man ought not to be appointed to the episcopate unless he be better than others.

Objection 3: Further, in every genus the lesser are governed by the greater, as corporeal things are governed by things spiritual, and the lower bodies by the higher, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 3). Now a bishop is appointed to govern others. Therefore he should be better than others.

On the contrary, The Decretal [*Can. Cum dilectus, de Electione] says that “it suffices to choose a good man, nor is it necessary to choose the better man.”

I answer that, In designating a man for the episcopal office, something has to be considered on the part of the person designate, and something on the part of the designator. For on the part of the designator, whether by election or by appointment, it is required that he choose such a one as will dispense the divine mysteries faithfully. These should be dispensed for the good of the Church, according to 1 Cor. 14:12, “Seek to abound unto the edifying of the Church”; and the divine mysteries are not committed to men for their own meed, which they should await in the life to come. Consequently he who has to choose or appoint one for a bishop is not bound to take one who is best simply, i.e. according to charity, but one who is best for governing the Church, one namely who is able to instruct, defend, and govern the Church peacefully. Hence Jerome, commenting on Titus 1:5, says against certain persons that “some seek to erect as pillars of the Church, not those whom they know to be more useful to the Church, but those whom they love more, or those by whose obsequiousness they have been cajoled or undone, or for whom some person in authority has spoken, and, not to say worse than this, have succeeded by means of gifts in being made clerics.”

Now this pertains to the respect of persons, which in such matters is a grave sin. Wherefore a gloss of Augustine [*Ep. clxvii ad Hieron.] on James 2:1, “Brethren, have not . . . with respect of persons,” says: “If this distinction of sitting and standing be referred to ecclesiastical honors, we must not deem it a slight sin to ‘have the faith of the Lord of glory with respect of persons.’ For who would suffer a rich man to be chosen for the Church’s seat of honor, in despite of a poor man who is better instructed and holier?”

On the part of the person appointed, it is not required that he esteem himself better than others, for this would be proud and presumptuous; but it suffices that he perceive nothing in himself which would make it unlawful for him to take up the office of prelate. Hence although Peter was asked by our Lord if he loved Him more than the others, he did not, in his reply, set himself before the others, but answered simply that he loved Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord knew that, by His own bestowal, Peter was in other respects fitted to govern the Church: wherefore He questioned him about his greater love, to show that when we find a man otherwise fitted for the government of the Church, we must look chiefly to his pre-eminence in the love of God.

Reply to Objection 2: This statement refers to the pursuits of the man who is placed in authority. For he should aim at showing himself to be more excellent than others in both knowledge and holiness. Wherefore Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 1) “the occupations of a prelate ought to excel those of the people, as much as the shepherd’s life excels that of his flock.” But he is not to be blamed and looked upon as worthless if he excelled not before being raised to the prelacy.

Reply to Objection 3: According to 1 Cor. 12:4 seqq., “there are diversities of graces . . . and . . . of ministries . . . and . . . of operations.” Hence nothing hinders one from being more fitted for the office of governing, who does not excel in the grace of holiness. It is otherwise in the government of the natural order, where that which is higher in the natural order is for that very reason more fitted to dispose of those that are lower.

Whether a bishop may lawfully forsake the episcopal cure, in order to enter religion?

Objection 1: It seems that a bishop cannot lawfully forsake his episcopal cure in order to enter religion. For no one can lawfully pass from a more perfect to a less perfect state; since this is “to look back,” which is condemned by the words of our Lord (Lk. 9:62), “No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.” Now the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious, as shown above ([3775]Q[184], A[7]). Therefore just as it is unlawful to return to the world from the religious state, so is it unlawful to pass from the episcopal to the religious state.

Objection 2: Further, the order of grace is more congruous than the order of nature. Now according to nature a thing is not moved in contrary directions; thus if a stone be naturally moved downwards, it cannot naturally return upwards from below. But according to the order of grace it is lawful to pass from the religious to the episcopal state. Therefore it is not lawful to pass contrariwise from the episcopal to the religious state.

Objection 3: Further, in the works of grace nothing should be inoperative. Now when once a man is consecrated bishop he retains in perpetuity the spiritual power of giving orders and doing like things that pertain to the episcopal office: and this power would seemingly remain inoperative in one who gives up the episcopal cure. Therefore it would seem that a bishop may not forsake the episcopal cure and enter religion.

On the contrary, No man is compelled to do what is in itself unlawful. Now those who seek to resign their episcopal cure are compelled to resign (Extra, de Renunt. cap. Quidam). Therefore apparently it is not unlawful to give up the episcopal cure.

I answer that, The perfection of the episcopal state consists in this that for love of God a man binds himself to work for the salvation of his neighbor, wherefore he is bound to retain the pastoral cure so long as he is able to procure the spiritual welfare of the subjects entrusted to his care: a matter which he must not neglect—neither for the sake of the quiet of divine contemplation, since the Apostle, on account of the needs of his subjects, suffered patiently to be delayed even from the contemplation of the life to come, according to Phil. 1:22–25, “What I shall choose I know not, but I am straitened between two, having a desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ, a thing by far better. But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you. And having this confidence, I know that I shall abide”; nor for the sake of avoiding any hardships or of acquiring any gain whatsoever, because as it is written (Jn. 10:11), “the good shepherd giveth his life for his sheep.”

At times, however, it happens in several ways that a bishop is hindered from procuring the spiritual welfare of his subjects. Sometimes on account of his own defect, either of conscience (for instance if he be guilty of murder or simony), or of body (for example if he be old or infirm), or of irregularity arising, for instance, from bigamy. Sometimes he is hindered through some defect in his subjects, whom he is unable to profit. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 3): “The wicked must be borne patiently, when there are some good who can be succored, but when there is no profit at all for the good, it is sometimes useless to labor for the wicked. Wherefore the perfect when they find that they labor in vain are often minded to go elsewhere in order to labor with fruit.” Sometimes again this hindrance arises on the part of others, as when scandal results from a certain person being in authority: for the Apostle says (1 Cor. 8:13): “If meat scandalize my brother, I will never eat flesh”: provided, however, the scandal is not caused by the wickedness of persons desirous of subverting the faith or the righteousness of the Church; because the pastoral cure is not to be laid aside on account of scandal of this kind, according to Mat. 15:14, “Let them alone,” those namely who were scandalized at the truth of Christ’s teaching, “they are blind, and leaders of the blind.”

Nevertheless just as a man takes upon himself the charge of authority at the appointment of a higher superior, so too it behooves him to be subject to the latter’s authority in laying aside the accepted charge for the reasons given above. Hence Innocent III says (Extra, de Renunt., cap. Nisi cum pridem): “Though thou hast wings wherewith thou art anxious to fly away into solitude, they are so tied by the bonds of authority, that thou art not free to fly without our permission.” For the Pope alone can dispense from the perpetual vow, by which a man binds himself to the care of his subjects, when he took upon himself the episcopal office.

Reply to Objection 1: The perfection of religious and that of bishops are regarded from different standpoints. For it belongs to the perfection of a religious to occupy oneself in working out one’s own salvation, whereas it belongs to the perfection of a bishop to occupy oneself in working for the salvation of others. Hence so long as a man can be useful to the salvation of his neighbor, he would be going back, if he wished to pass to the religious state, to busy himself only with his own salvation, since he has bound himself to work not only for his own but also for others’ salvation. Wherefore Innocent III says in the Decretal quoted above that “it is more easily allowable for a monk to ascend to the episcopacy, than for a bishop to descend to the monastic life. If, however, he be unable to procure the salvation of others it is meet he should seek his own.”

Reply to Objection 2: On account of no obstacle should a man forego the work of his own salvation, which pertains to the religious state. But there may be an obstacle to the procuring of another’s salvation; wherefore a monk may be raised to the episcopal state wherein he is able also to work out his own salvation. And a bishop, if he be hindered from procuring the salvation of others, may enter the religious life, and may return to his bishopric should the obstacle cease, for instance by the correction of his subjects, cessation of the scandal, healing of his infirmity, removal of his ignorance by sufficient instruction. Again, if he owed his promotion to simony of which he was in ignorance, and resigning his episcopate entered the religious life, he can be reappointed to another bishopric [*Cap. Post translat., de Renunt.]. On the other hand, if a man be deposed from the episcopal office for some sin, and confined in a monastery that he may do penance, he cannot be reappointed to a bishopric. Hence it is stated (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): “The holy synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate.”

Reply to Objection 3: Even in natural things power remains inactive on account of a supervening obstacle, for instance the act of sight ceases through an affliction of the eye. So neither is it unreasonable if, through the occurrence of some obstacle from without, the episcopal power remain without the exercise of its act.

Whether it is lawful for a bishop on account of bodily persecution to abandon the flock committed to his care?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is unlawful for a bishop, on account of some temporal persecution, to withdraw his bodily presence from the flock committed to his care. For our Lord said (Jn. 10:12) that he is a hireling and no true shepherd, who “seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth”: and Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.) that “the wolf comes upon the sheep when any man by his injustice and robbery oppresses the faithful and the humble.” Therefore if, on account of the persecution of a tyrant, a bishop withdraws his bodily presence from the flock entrusted to his care, it would seem that he is a hireling and not a shepherd.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 6:1): “My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger,” and afterwards (Prov. 6:3): “Run about, make haste, stir up thy friend.” Gregory expounds these words and says (Pastor. iii, 4): “To be surety for a friend, is to vouch for his good conduct by engaging oneself to a stranger. And whoever is put forward as an example to the lives of others, is warned not only to watch but even to rouse his friend.” Now he cannot do this if he withdraw his bodily presence from his flock. Therefore it would seem that a bishop should not on account of persecution withdraw his bodily presence from his flock.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the perfection of the bishop’s state that he devote himself to the care of his neighbor. Now it is unlawful for one who has professed the state of perfection to forsake altogether the things that pertain to perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a bishop to withdraw his bodily presence from the execution of his office, except perhaps for the purpose of devoting himself to works of perfection in a monastery.

On the contrary, our Lord commanded the apostles, whose successors bishops are (Mat. 10:23): “When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another.”

I answer that, In any obligation the chief thing to be considered is the end of the obligation. Now bishops bind themselves to fulfil the pastoral office for the sake of the salvation of their subjects. Consequently when the salvation of his subjects demands the personal presence of the pastor, the pastor should not withdraw his personal presence from his flock, neither for the sake of some temporal advantage, nor even on account of some impending danger to his person, since the good shepherd is bound to lay down his life for his sheep.

On the other hand, if the salvation of his subjects can be sufficiently provided for by another person in the absence of the pastor, it is lawful for the pastor to withdraw his bodily presence from his flock, either for the sake of some advantage to the Church, or on account of some danger to his person. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ccxxviii ad Honorat.): “Christ’s servants may flee from one city to another, when one of them is specially sought out by persecutors: in order that the Church be not abandoned by others who are not so sought for. When, however, the same danger threatens all, those who stand in need of others must not be abandoned by those whom they need.” For “if it is dangerous for the helmsman to leave the ship when the sea is calm, how much more so when it is stormy,” as Pope Nicholas I says (cf. VII, qu. i, can. Sciscitaris).

Reply to Objection 1: To flee as a hireling is to prefer temporal advantage or one’s bodily welfare to the spiritual welfare of one’s neighbor. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xiv in Ev.): “A man cannot endanger himself for the sake of his sheep, if he uses his authority over them not through love of them but for the sake of earthly gain: wherefore he fears to stand in the way of danger lest he lose what he loves.” But he who, in order to avoid danger, leaves the flock without endangering the flock, does not flee as a hireling.

Reply to Objection 2: If he who is surety for another be unable to fulfil his engagement, it suffices that he fulfil it through another. Hence if a superior is hindered from attending personally to the care of his subjects, he fulfils his obligation if he do so through another.

Reply to Objection 3: When a man is appointed to a bishopric, he embraces the state of perfection as regards one kind of perfection; and if he be hindered from the practice thereof, he is not bound to another kind of perfection, so as to be obliged to enter the religious state. Yet he is under the obligation of retaining the intention of devoting himself to his neighbor’s salvation, should an opportunity offer, and necessity require it of him.

Whether it is lawful for a bishop to have property of his own?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for a bishop to have property of his own. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me”; whence it would seem to follow that voluntary poverty is requisite for perfection. Now bishops are in the state of perfection. Therefore it would seem unlawful for them to possess anything as their own.

Objection 2: Further, bishops take the place of the apostles in the Church, according to a gloss on Lk. 10:1. Now our Lord commanded the apostles to possess nothing of their own, according to Mat. 10:9, “Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses”; wherefore Peter said for himself and the other apostles (Mat. 19:27): “Behold we have left all things and have followed Thee.” Therefore it would seem that bishops are bound to keep this command, and to possess nothing of their own.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): “The Greek {kleros} denotes the Latin ‘sors.’ Hence clerics are so called either because they are of the Lord’s estate, or because the Lord Himself is the estate, i.e. portion of clerics. Now he that possesses the Lord, can have nothing besides God; and if he have gold and silver, possessions, and chattels of all kinds, with such a portion the Lord does not vouchsafe to be his portion also.” Therefore it would seem that not only bishops but even clerics should have nothing of their own.

On the contrary, It is stated (XII, qu. i, can. Episcopi de rebus): “Bishops, if they wish, may bequeath to their heirs their personal or acquired property, and whatever belongs to them personally.”

I answer that, No one is bound to works of supererogation, unless he binds himself specially thereto by vow. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): “Since you have taken the vow, you have already bound yourself, you can no longer do otherwise. Before you were bound by the vow, you were free to submit.” Now it is evident that to live without possessing anything is a work of supererogation, for it is a matter not of precept but of counsel. Wherefore our Lord after saying to the young man: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments,” said afterwards by way of addition: “If thou wilt be perfect go sell” all “that thou hast, and give to the poor” (Mat. 19:17, 21). Bishops, however, do not bind themselves at their ordination to live without possessions of their own; nor indeed does the pastoral office, to which they bind themselves, make it necessary for them to live without anything of their own. Therefore bishops are not bound to live without possessions of their own.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3776]Q[184], A[3], ad 1) the perfection of the Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, but voluntary poverty conduces instrumentally to the perfection of life. Hence it does not follow that where there is greater poverty there is greater perfection; indeed the highest perfection is compatible with great wealth, since Abraham, to whom it was said (Gn. 17:1): “Walk before Me and be perfect,” is stated to have been rich (Gn. 13:2).

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of our Lord can be understood in three ways. First, mystically, that we should possess neither gold nor silver means that the preacher should not rely chiefly on temporal wisdom and eloquence; thus Jerome expounds the passage.

Secondly, according to Augustine’s explanation (De Consens. Ev. ii, 30), we are to understand that our Lord said this not in command but in permission. For he permitted them to go preaching without gold or silver or other means, since they were to receive the means of livelihood from those to whom they preached; wherefore He added: “For the workman is worthy of his meat.” And yet if anyone were to use his own means in preaching the Gospel, this would be a work of supererogation, as Paul says in reference to himself (1 Cor. 9:12, 15).

Thirdly, according to the exposition of Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Rom. xvi, 3], we are to understand that our Lord laid these commands on His disciples in reference to the mission on which they were sent to preach to the Jews, so that they might be encouraged to trust in His power, seeing that He provided for their wants without their having means of their own. But it does not follow from this that they, or their successors, were obliged to preach the Gospel without having means of their own: since we read of Paul (2 Cor. 11:8) that he “received wages” of other churches for preaching to the Corinthians, wherefore it is clear that he possessed something sent to him by others. And it seems foolish to say that so many holy bishops as Athanasius, Ambrose, and Augustine would have disobeyed these commandments if they believed themselves bound to observe them.

Reply to Objection 3: Every part is less than the whole. Accordingly a man has other portions together with God, if he becomes less intent on things pertaining to God by occupying himself with things of the world. Now neither bishops nor clerics ought thus to possess means of their own, that while busy with their own they neglect those that concern the worship of God.

Whether bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which accrue to them?

Objection 1: It would seem that bishops sin mortally if they distribute not to the poor the ecclesiastical goods which they acquire. For Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. lxiv, de Temp., among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] expounding Lk. 12:16, “The land of a certain . . . man brought forth plenty of fruits,” says: “Let no man claim as his own that which he has taken and obtained by violence from the common property in excess of his requirements”; and afterwards he adds: “It is not less criminal to take from him who has, than, when you are able and have plenty to refuse him who has not.” Now it is a mortal sin to take another’s property by violence. Therefore bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor that which they have in excess.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss of Jerome on Is. 3:14, “The spoil of the poor is in your house,” says that “ecclesiastical goods belong to the poor.” Now whoever keeps for himself or gives to others that which belongs to another, sins mortally and is bound to restitution. Therefore if bishops keep for themselves, or give to their relations or friends, their surplus of ecclesiastical goods, it would seem that they are bound to restitution.

Objection 3: Further, much more may one take what is necessary for oneself from the goods of the Church, than accumulate a surplus therefrom. Yet Jerome says in a letter to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam; cause. xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome]: “It is right that those clerics who receive no goods from their parents and relations should be supported from the funds of the Church. But those who have sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor, they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege.” Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:16): “If any of the faithful have widows, let him minister to them, and let not the Church be charged, that there may be sufficient for them that are widows indeed.” Much more therefore do bishops sin mortally if they give not to the poor the surplus of their ecclesiastical goods.

On the contrary, Many bishops do not give their surplus to the poor, but would seem commendably to lay it out so as to increase the revenue of the Church.

I answer that, The same is not to be said of their own goods which bishops may possess, and of ecclesiastical goods. For they have real dominion over their own goods; wherefore from the very nature of the case they are not bound to give these things to others, and may either keep them for themselves or bestow them on others at will. Nevertheless they may sin in this disposal by inordinate affection, which leads them either to accumulate more than they should, or not to assist others, in accordance with the demands of charity; yet they are not bound to restitution, because such things are entrusted to their ownership.

On the other hand, they hold ecclesiastical goods as dispensers or trustees. For Augustine says (Ep. clxxxv ad Bonif.): “If we possess privately what is enough for us, other things belong not to us but to the poor, and we have the dispensing of them; but we can claim ownership of them only by wicked theft.” Now dispensing requires good faith, according to 1 Cor. 4:2, “Here now it is required among the dispensers that a man be found faithful.” Moreover ecclesiastical goods are to be applied not only to the good of the poor, but also to the divine worship and the needs of its ministers. Hence it is said (XII, qu. ii, can. de reditibus): “Of the Church’s revenues or the offerings of the faithful only one part is to be assigned to the bishop, two parts are to be used by the priest, under pain of suspension, for the ecclesiastical fabric, and for the benefit of the poor; the remaining part is to be divided among the clergy according to their respective merits.” Accordingly if the goods which are assigned to the use of the bishop are distinct from those which are appointed for the use of the poor, or the ministers, or for the ecclesiastical worship, and if the bishop keeps back for himself part of that which should be given to the poor, or to the ministers for their use, or expended on the divine worship, without doubt he is an unfaithful dispenser, sins mortally, and is bound to restitution.

But as regards those goods which are deputed to his private use, the same apparently applies as to his own property, namely that he sins through immoderate attachment thereto or use thereof, if he exceeds moderation in what he keeps for himself, and fails to assist others according to the demands of charity.

On the other hand, if no distinction is made in the aforesaid goods, their distribution is entrusted to his good faith; and if he fail or exceed in a slight degree, this may happen without prejudice to his good faith, because in such matters a man cannot possibly decide precisely what ought to be done. On the other hand, if the excess be very great he cannot be ignorant of the fact; consequently he would seem to be lacking in good faith, and is guilty of mortal sin. For it is written (Mat. 24:48–51) that “if that evil servant shall say in his heart: My lord is long a-coming,” which shows contempt of God’s judgment, “and shall begin to strike his fellow-servants,” which is a sign of pride, “and shall eat and drink with drunkards,” which proceeds from lust, “the lord of that servant shall come in a day that he hopeth not . . . and shall separate him,” namely from the fellowship of good men, “and appoint his portion with hypocrites,” namely in hell.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Ambrose refers to the administration not only of ecclesiastical things but also of any goods whatever from which a man is bound, as a duty of charity, to provide for those who are in need. But it is not possible to state definitely when this need is such as to impose an obligation under pain of mortal sin, as is the case in other points of detail that have to be considered in human acts: for the decision in such matters is left to human prudence.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above the goods of the Church have to be employed not only for the use of the poor, but also for other purposes. Hence if a bishop or cleric wish to deprive himself of that which is assigned to his own use, and give it to his relations or others, he sins not so long as he observes moderation, so, to wit, that they cease to be in want without becoming the richer thereby. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): “It is a commendable liberality if you overlook not your kindred when you know them to be in want; yet not so as to wish to make them rich with what you can give to the poor.”

Reply to Objection 3: The goods of churches should not all be given to the poor, except in a case of necessity: for then, as Ambrose says (De Offic. ii, 28), even the vessels consecrated to the divine worship are to be sold for the ransom of prisoners, and other needs of the poor. In such a case of necessity a cleric would sin if he chose to maintain himself on the goods of the Church, always supposing him to have a patrimony of his own on which to support himself.

Reply to Objection 4: The goods of the churches should be employed for the good of the poor. Consequently a man is to be commended if, there being no present necessity for helping the poor, he spends the surplus from the Church revenue, in buying property, or lays it by for some future use connected with the Church or the needs of the poor. But if there be a pressing need for helping the poor, to lay by for the future is a superfluous and inordinate saving, and is forbidden by our Lord Who said (Mat. 6:34): “Be . . . not solicitous for the morrow.”

Whether religious who are raised to the episcopate are bound to religious observances?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious who are raised to the episcopate are not bound to religious observances. For it is said (XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that a “canonical election loosens a monk from the yoke imposed by the rule of the monastic profession, and the holy ordination makes of a monk a bishop.” Now the regular observances pertain to the yoke of the rule. Therefore religious who are appointed bishops are not bound to religious observances.

Objection 2: Further, he who ascends from a lower to a higher degree is seemingly not bound to those things which pertain to the lower degree: thus it was stated above ([3777]Q[88], A[12], ad 1) that a religious is not bound to keep the vows he made in the world. But a religious who is appointed to the episcopate ascends to something greater, as stated above (Q[84], A[7]). Therefore it would seem that a bishop is not bound to those things whereto he was bound in the state of religion.

Objection 3: Further, religious would seem to be bound above all to obedience, and to live without property of their own. But religious who are appointed bishops, are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, since they are above them; nor apparently are they bound to poverty, since according to the decree quoted above (OBJ[1]) “when the holy ordination has made of a monk a bishop he enjoys the right, as the lawful heir, of claiming his paternal inheritance.” Moreover they are sometimes allowed to make a will. Much less therefore are they bound to other regular observances.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, can. De Monachis): “With regard to those who after long residence in a monastery attain to the order of clerics, we bid them not to lay aside their former purpose.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) the religious state pertains to perfection, as a way of tending to perfection, while the episcopal state pertains to perfection, as a professorship of perfection. Hence the religious state is compared to the episcopal state, as the school to the professorial chair, and as disposition to perfection. Now the disposition is not voided at the advent of perfection, except as regards what perchance is incompatible with perfection, whereas as to that wherein it is in accord with perfection, it is confirmed the more. Thus when the scholar has become a professor it no longer becomes him to be a listener, but it becomes him to read and meditate even more than before. Accordingly we must assert that if there be among religious observances any that instead of being an obstacle to the episcopal office, are a safeguard of perfection, such as continence, poverty, and so forth, a religious, even after he has been made a bishop, remains bound to observe these, and consequently to wear the habit of his order, which is a sign of this obligation.

On the other hand, a man is not bound to keep such religious observances as may be incompatible with the episcopal office, for instance solitude, silence, and certain severe abstinences or watchings and such as would render him bodily unable to exercise the episcopal office. For the rest he may dispense himself from them, according to the needs of his person or office, and the manner of life of those among whom he dwells, in the same way as religious superiors dispense themselves in such matters.

Reply to Objection 1: He who from being a monk becomes a bishop is loosened from the yoke of the monastic profession, not in everything, but in those that are incompatible with the episcopal office, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The vows of those who are living in the world are compared to the vows of religion as the particular to the universal, as stated above ([3778]Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But the vows of religion are compared to the episcopal dignity as disposition to perfection. Now the particular is superfluous when one has the universal, whereas the disposition is still necessary when perfection has been attained.

Reply to Objection 3: It is accidental that religious who are bishops are not bound to obey the superiors of their order, because, to wit, they have ceased to be their subjects; even as those same religious superiors. Nevertheless the obligation of the vow remains virtually, so that if any person be lawfully set above them, they would be bound to obey them, inasmuch as they are bound to obey both the statutes of their rule in the way mentioned above, and their superiors if they have any.

As to property they can nowise have it. For they claim their paternal inheritance not as their own, but as due to the Church. Hence it is added

(XVIII, qu. i, can. Statutum) that after he has been ordained bishop at the altar to which he is consecrated and appointed according to the holy canons, he must restore whatever he may acquire.

Nor can he make any testament at all, because he is entrusted with the sole administration of things ecclesiastical, and this ends with his death, after which a testament comes into force according to the Apostle (Heb. 9:17). If, however, by the Pope’s permission he make a will, he is not to be understood to bequeath property of his own, but we are to understand that by apostolic authority the power of his administration has been prolonged so as to remain in force after his death.

OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH THE RELIGIOUS STATE PROPERLY CONSISTS (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider things pertaining to the religious state: which consideration will be fourfold. In the first place we shall consider those things in which the religious state consists chiefly; secondly, those things which are lawfully befitting to religious; thirdly, the different kinds of religious orders; fourthly, the entrance into the religious state.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the religious state is perfect?

(2) Whether religious are bound to all the counsels?

(3) Whether voluntary poverty is required for the religious state?

(4) Whether continency is necessary?

(5) Whether obedience is necessary?

(6) Whether it is necessary that these should be the matter of a vow?

(7) Of the sufficiency of these vows;

(8) Of their comparison one with another;

(9) Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses a statute of his rule?

(10) Whether, other things being equal, a religious sins more grievously by the same kind of sin than a secular person?

Whether religion implies a state of perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that religion does not imply a state of perfection. For that which is necessary for salvation does not seemingly pertain to perfection. But religion is necessary for salvation, whether because “thereby we are bound [religamur] to the one almighty God,” as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 55), or because it takes its name from “our returning [religimus] to God Whom we had lost by neglecting Him” [*Cf. [3779] Q[81], A[1]], according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 3). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Objection 2: Further, religion according to Tully (De Invent. Rhet. ii, 53) is that “which offers worship and ceremony to the Divine nature.” Now the offering of worship and ceremony to God would seem to pertain to the ministry of holy orders rather than to the diversity of states, as stated above ([3780]Q[40], A[2];[3781] Q[183], A[3]). Therefore it would seem that religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is distinct from the state of beginners and that of the proficient. But in religion also some are beginners, and some are proficient. Therefore religion does not denote the state of perfection.

Objection 4: Further, religion would seem a place of repentance; for it is said in the Decrees (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): “The holy synod orders that any man who has been degraded from the episcopal dignity to the monastic life and a place of repentance, should by no means rise again to the episcopate.” Now a place of repentance is opposed to the state of perfection; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vi) places penitents in the lowest place, namely among those who are to be cleansed. Therefore it would seem that religion is not the state of perfection.

On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Collat. i, 7) abbot Moses speaking of religious says: “We must recognize that we have to undertake the hunger of fasting, watchings, bodily toil, privation, reading, and other acts of virtue, in order by these degrees to mount to the perfection of charity.” Now things pertaining to human acts are specified and denominated from the intention of the end. Therefore religious belong to the state of perfection.

Moreover Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that those who are called servants of God, by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, are united to the perfection beloved of Him.

I answer that, As stated above ([3782]Q[141], A[2]) that which is applicable to many things in common is ascribed antonomastically to that to which it is applicable by way of excellence. Thus the name of “fortitude” is claimed by the virtue which preserves the firmness of the mind in regard to most difficult things, and the name of “temperance,” by that virtue which tempers the greatest pleasures. Now religion as stated above ([3783]Q[81] , A[2]; A[3], ad 2) is a virtue whereby a man offers something to the service and worship of God. Wherefore those are called religious antonomastically, who give themselves up entirely to the divine service, as offering a holocaust to God. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): “Some there are who keep nothing for themselves, but sacrifice to almighty God their tongue, their senses, their life, and the property they possess.” Now the perfection of man consists in adhering wholly to God, as stated above ([3784]Q[184], A[2]), and in this sense religion denotes the state of perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: To offer something to the worship of God is necessary for salvation, but to offer oneself wholly, and one’s possessions to the worship of God belongs to perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3785]Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4], ad 1,2;[3786] Q[85], A[3]) when we were treating of the virtue of religion, religion has reference not only to the offering of sacrifices and other like things that are proper to religion, but also to the acts of all the virtues which in so far as these are referred to God’s service and honor become acts of religion. Accordingly if a man devotes his whole life to the divine service, his whole life belongs to religion, and thus by reason of the religious life that they lead, those who are in the state of perfection are called religious.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3787]Q[184], AA[4],6) religion denotes the state of perfection by reason of the end intended. Hence it does not follow that whoever is in the state of perfection is already perfect, but that he tends to perfection. Hence Origen commenting on Mat. 19:21, “If thou wilt be perfect,” etc., says (Tract. viii in Matth.) that “he who has exchanged riches for poverty in order to become perfect does not become perfect at the very moment of giving his goods to the poor; but from that day the contemplation of God will begin to lead him to all the virtues." Thus all are not perfect in religion, but some are beginners, some proficient.

Reply to Objection 4: The religious state was instituted chiefly that we might obtain perfection by means of certain exercises, whereby the obstacles to perfect charity are removed. By the removal of the obstacles of perfect charity, much more are the occasions of sin cut off, for sin destroys charity altogether. Wherefore since it belongs to penance to cut out the causes of sin, it follows that the religious state is a most fitting place for penance. Hence (XXXIII, qu. ii, cap. Admonere) a man who had killed his wife is counseled to enter a monastery which is described as "better and lighter," rather than to do public penance while remaining in the world.

Whether every religious is bound to keep all the counsels?

Objection 1: It would seem that every religious is bound to keep all the counsels. For whoever professes a certain state of life is bound to observe whatever belongs to that state. Now each religious professes the state of perfection. Therefore every religious is bound to keep all the counsels that pertain to the state of perfection.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that "he who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness." Now it belongs specially to religious to renounce the world. Therefore it belongs to them also to do all the good they can. and so it would seem that each of them is bound to fulfil all the counsels.

Objection 3: Further, if it is not requisite for the state of perfection to fulfil all the counsels, it would seem enough to fulfil some of them. But this is false, since some who lead a secular life fulfil some of the counsels, for instance those who observe continence. Therefore it would seem that every religious who is in the state of perfection is bound to fulfil whatever pertains to perfection: and such are the counsels.

On the contrary, one is not bound, unless one bind oneself, to do works of supererogation. But every religious does not bind himself to keep all the counsels, but to certain definite ones, some to some, others to others. Therefore all are not bound to keep all of them.

I answer that, A thing pertains to perfection in three ways. First, essentially, and thus, as stated above ([3788]Q[184], A[3]) the perfect observance of the precepts of charity belongs to perfection. Secondly, a thing belongs to perfection consequently: such are those things that result from the perfection of charity, for instance to bless them that curse you (Lk. 6:27), and to keep counsels of a like kind, which though they be binding as regards the preparedness of the mind, so that one has to fulfil them when necessity requires; yet are sometimes fulfilled, without there being any necessity, through superabundance of charity. Thirdly, a thing belongs to perfection instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, abstinence, and the like.

Now it has been stated [3789](A[1]) that the perfection of charity is the end of the religious state. And the religious state is a school or exercise for the attainment of perfection, which men strive to reach by various practices, just as a physician may use various remedies in order to heal. But it is evident that for him who works for an end it is not necessary that he should already have attained the end, but it is requisite that he should by some means tend thereto. Hence he who enters the religious state is not bound to have perfect charity, but he is bound to tend to this, and use his endeavors to have perfect charity.

For the same reason he is not bound to fulfil those things that result from the perfection of charity, although he is bound to intend to fulfil them: against which intention he acts if he contemns them, wherefore he sins not by omitting them but by contempt of them.

In like manner he is not bound to observe all the practices whereby perfection may be attained, but only those which are definitely prescribed to him by the rule which he has professed.

Reply to Objection 1: He who enters religion does not make profession to be perfect, but he professes to endeavor to attain perfection; even as he who enters the schools does not profess to have knowledge, but to study in order to acquire knowledge. Wherefore as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii, 2), Pythagoras was unwilling to profess to be a wise man, but acknowledged himself, “a lover of wisdom.” Hence a religious does not violate his profession if he be not perfect, but only if he despises to tend to perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as, though all are bound to love God with their whole heart, yet there is a certain wholeness of perfection which cannot be omitted without sin, and another wholeness which can be omitted without sin ([3790]Q[184], A[2], ad 3), provided there be no contempt, as stated above (ad 1), so too, all, both religious and seculars, are bound, in a certain measure, to do whatever good they can, for to all without exception it is said (Eccles. 9:10): “Whatsoever thy hand is able to do, do it earnestly.” Yet there is a way of fulfilling this precept, so as to avoid sin, namely if one do what one can as required by the conditions of one’s state of life: provided there be no contempt of doing better things, which contempt sets the mind against spiritual progress.

Reply to Objection 3: There are some counsels such that if they be omitted, man’s whole life would be taken up with secular business; for instance if he have property of his own, or enter the married state, or do something of the kind that regards the essential vows of religion themselves; wherefore religious are bound to keep all such like counsels. Other counsels there are, however, about certain particular better actions, which can be omitted without one’s life being taken up with secular actions; wherefore there is no need for religious to be bound to fulfil all of them.

Whether poverty is required for religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that poverty is not required for religious perfection. For that which it is unlawful to do does not apparently belong to the state of perfection. But it would seem to be unlawful for a man to give up all he possesses; since the Apostle (2 Cor. 8:12) lays down the way in which the faithful are to give alms saying: “If the will be forward, it is accepted according to that which a man hath,” i.e. “you should keep back what you need,” and afterwards he adds (2 Cor. 8:13): “For I mean not that others should be eased, and you burthened,” i.e. “with poverty,” according to a gloss. Moreover a gloss on 1 Tim. 6:8, “Having food, and wherewith to be covered,” says: “Though we brought nothing, and will carry nothing away, we must not give up these temporal things altogether.” Therefore it seems that voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 2: Further, whosoever exposes himself to danger sins. But he who renounces all he has and embraces voluntary poverty exposes himself to danger—not only spiritual, according to Prov. 30:9, “Lest perhaps . . . being compelled by poverty, I should steal and forswear the name of my God,” and Ecclus. 27:1, “Through poverty many have sinned”—but also corporal, for it is written (Eccles. 7:13): “As wisdom is a defense, so money is a defense,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that “the waste of property appears to be a sort of ruining of one’s self, since thereby man lives.” Therefore it would seem that voluntary poverty is not requisite for the perfection of religious life.

Objection 3: Further, “Virtue observes the mean,” as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. But he who renounces all by voluntary poverty seems to go to the extreme rather than to observe the mean. Therefore he does not act virtuously: and so this does not pertain to the perfection of life.

Objection 4: Further, the ultimate perfection of man consists in happiness. Now riches conduce to happiness; for it is written (Ecclus. 31:8): “Blessed is the rich man that is found without blemish,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that “riches contribute instrumentally to happiness.” Therefore voluntary poverty is not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 5: Further, the episcopal state is more perfect than the religious state. But bishops may have property, as stated above ([3791]Q[185], A[6]). Therefore religious may also.

Objection 6: Further, almsgiving is a work most acceptable to God, and as Chrysostom says (Hom. ix in Ep. ad Hebr.) “is a most effective remedy in repentance.” Now poverty excludes almsgiving. Therefore it would seem that poverty does not pertain to religious perfection.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. viii, 26): “There are some of the righteous who bracing themselves up to lay hold of the very height of perfection, while they aim at higher objects within, abandon all things without.” Now, as stated above, ([3792]AA[1],2), it belongs properly to religious to brace themselves up in order to lay hold of the very height of perfection. Therefore it belongs to them to abandon all outward things by voluntary poverty.

I answer that, As stated above [3793](A[2]), the religious state is an exercise and a school for attaining to the perfection of charity. For this it is necessary that a man wholly withdraw his affections from worldly things; since Augustine says (Confess. x, 29), speaking to God: “Too little doth he love Thee, who loves anything with Thee, which he loveth not for Thee." Wherefore he says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that "greater charity means less cupidity, perfect charity means no cupidity." Now the possession of worldly things draws a man's mind to the love of them: hence Augustine says (Ep. xxxi ad Paulin. et Theras.) that "we are more firmly attached to earthly things when we have them than when we desire them: since why did that young man go away sad, save because he had great wealth? For it is one thing not to wish to lay hold of what one has not, and another to renounce what one already has; the former are rejected as foreign to us, the latter are cut off as a limb." And Chrysostom says (Hom. lxiii in Matth.) that "the possession of wealth kindles a greater flame and the desire for it becomes stronger."

Hence it is that in the attainment of the perfection of charity the first foundation is voluntary poverty, whereby a man lives without property of his own, according to the saying of our Lord (Mat. 19:21), "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast, and give to the poor . . . and come, follow Me."

Reply to Objection 1: As the gloss adds, "when the Apostle said this (namely "not that you should be burthened," i.e. with poverty)," he did not mean that "it were better not to give: but he feared for the weak, whom he admonished so to give as not to suffer privation." Hence in like manner the other gloss means not that it is unlawful to renounce all one's temporal goods, but that this is not required of necessity. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30): "Our Lord does not wish," namely does not command us "to pour out our wealth all at once, but to dispense it; or perhaps to do as did Eliseus who slew his oxen, and fed the poor with that which was his own so that no household care might hold him back."

Reply to Objection 2: He who renounces all his possessions for Christ's sake exposes himself to no danger, neither spiritual nor corporal. For spiritual danger ensues from poverty when the latter is not voluntary; because those who are unwillingly poor, through the desire of money-getting, fall into many sins, according to 1 Tim. 6:9, "They that will become rich, fall into temptation and into the snare of the devil." This attachment is put away by those who embrace voluntary poverty, but it gathers strength in those who have wealth, as stated above. Again bodily danger does not threaten those who, intent on following Christ, renounce all their possessions and entrust themselves to divine providence. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): “Those who seek first the kingdom of God and His justice are not weighed down by anxiety lest they lack what is necessary.”

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), the mean of virtue is taken according to right reason, not according to the quantity of a thing. Consequently whatever may be done in accordance with right reason is not rendered sinful by the greatness of the quantity, but all the more virtuous. It would, however, be against right reason to throw away all one’s possessions through intemperance, or without any useful purpose; whereas it is in accordance with right reason to renounce wealth in order to devote oneself to the contemplation of wisdom. Even certain philosophers are said to have done this; for Jerome says (Ep. xlviii ad Paulin.): “The famous Theban, Crates, once a very wealthy man, when he was going to Athens to study philosophy, cast away a large amount of gold; for he considered that he could not possess both gold and virtue at the same time.” Much more therefore is it according to right reason for a man to renounce all he has, in order perfectly to follow Christ. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): “Poor thyself, follow Christ poor.”

Reply to Objection 4: Happiness or felicity is twofold. One is perfect, to which we look forward in the life to come; the other is imperfect, in respect of which some are said to be happy in this life. The happiness of this life is twofold, one is according to the active life, the other according to the contemplative life, as the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 7,8). Now wealth conduces instrumentally to the happiness of the active life which consists in external actions, because as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) “we do many things by friends, by riches, by political influence, as it were by instruments.” On the other hand, it does not conduce to the happiness of the contemplative life, rather is it an obstacle thereto, inasmuch as the anxiety it involves disturbs the quiet of the soul, which is most necessary to one who contemplates. Hence it is that the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. x, 8) that “for actions many things are needed, but the contemplative man needs no such things,” namely external goods, “for his operation; in fact they are obstacles to his contemplation.”

Man is directed to future happiness by charity; and since voluntary poverty is an efficient exercise for the attaining of perfect charity, it follows that it is of great avail in acquiring the happiness of heaven. Wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “Go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven.” Now riches once they are possessed are in themselves of a nature to hinder the perfection of charity, especially by enticing and distracting the mind. Hence it is written (Mat. 13:22) that “the care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches choketh up the word” of God, for as Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ev.) by “preventing the good desire from entering into the heart, they destroy life at its very outset.” Consequently it is difficult to safeguard charity amidst riches: wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 19:23) that “a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven,” which we must understand as referring to one who actually has wealth, since He says that this is impossible for him who places his affection in riches, according to the explanation of Chrysostom (Hom. lxiii in Matth.), for He adds (Mat. 19:24): “It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Hence it is not said simply that the “rich man” is blessed, but “the rich man that is found without blemish, and that hath not gone after gold,” and this because he has done a difficult thing, wherefore the text continues (Mat. 19:9): “Who is he? and we will praise him; for he hath done wonderful things in his life,” namely by not loving riches though placed in the midst of them.

Reply to Objection 5: The episcopal state is not directed to the attainment of perfection, but rather to the effect that, in virtue of the perfection which he already has, a man may govern others, by administering not only spiritual but also temporal things. This belongs to the active life, wherein many things occur that may be done by means of wealth as an instrument, as stated (ad 4). Wherefore it is not required of bishops, who make profession of governing Christ’s flock, that they have nothing of their own, whereas it is required of religious who make profession of learning to obtain perfection.

Reply to Objection 6: The renouncement of one’s own wealth is compared to almsgiving as the universal to the particular, and as the holocaust to the sacrifice. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.) that those who assist “the needy with the things they possess, by their good deeds offer sacrifice, since they offer up something to God and keep back something for themselves; whereas those who keep nothing for themselves offer a holocaust which is greater than a sacrifice.” Wherefore Jerome also says (Contra Vigilant.): “When you declare that those do better who retain the use of their possessions, and dole out the fruits of their possessions to the poor, it is not I but the Lord Who answers you; If thou wilt be perfect,” etc., and afterwards he goes on to say: “This man whom you praise belongs to the second and third degree, and we too commend him: provided we acknowledge the first as to be preferred to the second and third.” For this reason in order to exclude the error of Vigilantius it is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xxxviii): “It is a good thing to give away one’s goods by dispensing them to the poor: it is better to give them away once for all with the intention of following the Lord, and, free of solicitude, to be poor with Christ.”

Whether perpetual continence is required for religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that perpetual continence is not required for religious perfection. For all perfection of the Christian life began with Christ’s apostles. Now the apostles do not appear to have observed continence, as evidenced by Peter, of whose mother-in-law we read Mat. 8:14. Therefore it would seem that perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 2: Further, the first example of perfection is shown to us in the person of Abraham, to whom the Lord said (Gn. 17:1): “Walk before Me, and be perfect.” Now the copy should not surpass the example. Therefore perpetual continence is not requisite for religious perfection.

Objection 3: Further, that which is required for religious perfection is to be found in every religious order. Now there are some religious who lead a married life. Therefore religious perfection does not require perpetual continence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): “Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and of the spirit, perfecting sanctification in the fear of God.” Now cleanness of flesh and spirit is safeguarded by continence, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:34): “The unmarried woman and the virgin thinketh on the things of the Lord that she may be holy both in spirit and in body [Vulg.: ‘both in body and in spirit’].” Therefore religious perfection requires continence.

I answer that, The religious state requires the removal of whatever hinders man from devoting himself entirely to God's service. Now the use of sexual union hinders the mind from giving itself wholly to the service of God, and this for two reasons. First, on account of its vehement delectation, which by frequent repetition increases concupiscence, as also the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iii, 12): and hence it is that the use of venery withdraws the mind from that perfect intentness on tending to God. Augustine expresses this when he says (Solil. i, 10): "I consider that nothing so casts down the manly mind from its height as the fondling of women, and those bodily contacts which belong to the married state." Secondly, because it involves man in solicitude for the control of his wife, his children, and his temporalities which serve for their upkeep. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:32,33): "He that is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God: but he that is with a wife is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife."

Therefore perpetual continence, as well as voluntary poverty, is requisite for religious perfection. Wherefore just as Vigilantius was condemned for equaling riches to poverty, so was Jovinian condemned for equaling marriage to virginity.

Reply to Objection 1: The perfection not only of poverty but also of continence was introduced by Christ Who said (Mat. 19:12): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs, for the kingdom of heaven," and then added: "He that can take, let him take it." And lest anyone should be deprived of the hope of attaining perfection, he admitted to the state of perfection those even who were married. Now the husbands could not without committing an injustice forsake their wives, whereas men could without injustice renounce riches. Wherefore Peter whom He found married, He severed not from his wife, while "He withheld from marriage John who wished to marry" [*Prolog. in Joan. among the supposititious works of St. Jerome].

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxii), "the chastity of celibacy is better than the chastity of marriage, one of which Abraham had in use, both of them in habit. For he lived chastely, and he might have been chaste without marrying, but it was not requisite then." Nevertheless if the patriarchs of old had perfection of mind together with wealth and marriage, which is a mark of the greatness of their virtue, this is no reason why any weaker person should presume to have such great virtue that he can attain to perfection though rich and married; as neither does a man unarmed presume to attack his enemy, because Samson slew many foes with the jaw-bone of an ass. For those fathers, had it been seasonable to observe continence and poverty, would have been most careful to observe them.

Reply to Objection 3: Such ways of living as admit of the use of marriage are not the religious life simply and absolutely speaking, but in a restricted sense, in so far as they have a certain share in those things that belong to the religious state.

Whether obedience belongs to religious perfection?

Objection 1: It would seem that obedience does not belong to religious perfection. For those things seemingly belong to religious perfection, which are works of supererogation and are not binding upon all. But all are bound to obey their superiors, according to the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 13:17), “Obey your prelates, and be subject to them.” Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to religious perfection.

Objection 2: Further, obedience would seem to belong properly to those who have to be guided by the sense of others, and such persons are lacking in discernment. Now the Apostle says (Heb. 5:14) that “strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil.” Therefore it would seem that obedience does not belong to the state of the perfect.

Objection 3: Further, if obedience were requisite for religious perfection, it would follow that it is befitting to all religious. But it is not becoming to all; since some religious lead a solitary life, and have no superior whom they obey. Again religious superiors apparently are not bound to obedience. Therefore obedience would seem not to pertain to religious perfection.

Objection 4: Further, if the vow of obedience were requisite for religion, it would follow that religious are bound to obey their superiors in all things, just as they are bound to abstain from all venery by their vow of continence. But they are not bound to obey them in all things, as stated above ([3794]Q[104], A[5]), when we were treating of the virtue of obedience. Therefore the vow of obedience is not requisite for religion.

Objection 5: Further, those services are most acceptable to God which are done freely and not of necessity, according to 2 Cor. 9:7, “Not with sadness or of necessity.” Now that which is done out of obedience is done of necessity of precept. Therefore those good works are more deserving of praise which are done of one’s own accord. Therefore the vow of obedience is unbecoming to religion whereby men seek to attain to that which is better.

On the contrary, Religious perfection consists chiefly in the imitation of Christ, according to Mat. 19:21, “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor, and follow Me.” Now in Christ obedience is commended above all according to Phil. 2:8, “He became [Vulg.: ‘becoming’] obedient unto death.” Therefore seemingly obedience belongs to religious perfection.

I answer that, As stated above ([3795]AA[2],3) the religious state is a school and exercise for tending to perfection. Now those who are being instructed or exercised in order to attain a certain end must needs follow the direction of someone under whose control they are instructed or exercised so as to attain that end as disciples under a master. Hence religious need to be placed under the instruction and command of someone as regards things pertaining to the religious life; wherefore it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam): “The monastic life denotes subjection and discipleship.” Now one man is subjected to another’s command and instruction by obedience: and consequently obedience is requisite for religious perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: To obey one’s superiors in matters that are essential to virtue is not a work of supererogation, but is common to all: whereas to obey in matters pertaining to the practice of perfection belongs properly to religious. This latter obedience is compared to the former as the universal to the particular. For those who live in the world, keep something for themselves, and offer something to God; and in the latter respect they are under obedience to their superiors: whereas those who live in religion give themselves wholly and their possessions to God, as stated above ([3796]AA[1],3). Hence their obedience is universal.

Reply to Objection 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1,2), by performing actions we contract certain habits, and when we have acquired the habit we are best able to perform the actions. Accordingly those who have not attained to perfection, acquire perfection by obeying, while those who have already acquired perfection are most ready to obey, not as though they need to be directed to the acquisition of perfection, but as maintaining themselves by this means in that which belongs to perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: The subjection of religious is chiefly in reference to bishops, who are compared to them as perfecters to perfected, as Dionysius states (Eccl. Hier. vi), where he also says that the “monastic order is subjected to the perfecting virtues of the bishops, and is taught by their godlike enlightenment.” Hence neither hermits nor religious superiors are exempt from obedience to bishops; and if they be wholly or partly exempt from obedience to the bishop of the diocese, they are nevertheless bound to obey the Sovereign Pontiff, not only in matters affecting all in common, but also in those which pertain specially to religious discipline.

Reply to Objection 4: The vow of obedience taken by religious, extends to the disposition of a man’s whole life, and in this way it has a certain universality, although it does not extend to all individual acts. For some of these do not belong to religion, through not being of those things that concern the love of God and of our neighbor, such as rubbing one’s beard, lifting a stick from the ground and so forth, which do not come under a vow nor under obedience; and some are contrary to religion. Nor is there any comparison with continence whereby acts are excluded which are altogether contrary to religion.

Reply to Objection 5: The necessity of coercion makes an act involuntary and consequently deprives it of the character of praise or merit; whereas the necessity which is consequent upon obedience is a necessity not of coercion but of a free will, inasmuch as a man is willing to obey, although perhaps he would not be willing to do the thing commanded considered in itself. Wherefore since by the vow of obedience a man lays himself under the necessity of doing for God’s sake certain things that are not pleasing in themselves, for this very reason that which he does is the more acceptable to God, though it be of less account, because man can give nothing greater to God, than by subjecting his will to another man’s for God’s sake. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xviii, 7) it is stated that “the Sarabaitae are the worst class of monks, because through providing for their own needs without being subject to superiors, they are free to do as they will; and yet day and night they are more busily occupied in work than those who live in monasteries.”

Whether it is requisite for religious perfection that poverty, continence, and obedience should come under a vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not requisite for religious perfection that the three aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and obedience, should come under a vow. For the school of perfection is founded on the principles laid down by our Lord. Now our Lord in formulating perfection (Mat. 19:21) said: “If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast, and give to the poor,” without any mention of a vow. Therefore it would seem that a vow is not necessary for the school of religion.

Objection 2: Further, a vow is a promise made to God, wherefore (Eccles. 5:3) the wise man after saying: “If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it,” adds at once, “for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth Him.” But when a thing is being actually given there is no need for a promise. Therefore it suffices for religious perfection that one keep poverty, continence, and obedience without. vowing them.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Ad Pollent., de Adult. Conjug. i, 14): “The services we render are more pleasing when we might lawfully not render them, yet do so out of love.” Now it is lawful not to render a service which we have not vowed, whereas it is unlawful if we have vowed to render it. Therefore seemingly it is more pleasing to God to keep poverty, continence, and obedience without a vow. Therefore a vow is not requisite for religious perfection.

On the contrary, In the Old Law the Nazareans were consecrated by vow according to Num. 6:2, “When a man or woman shall make a vow to be sanctified and will consecrate themselves to the Lord,” etc. Now these were a figure of those “who attain the summit of perfection,” as a gloss [*Cf. Moral. ii] of Gregory states. Therefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection.

I answer that, It belongs to religious to be in the state of perfection, as shown above (Q[174], A[5]). Now the state of perfection requires an obligation to whatever belongs to perfection: and this obligation consists in binding oneself to God by means of a vow. But it is evident from what has been said ([3797]AA[3],4,5) that poverty, continence, and obedience belong to the perfection of the Christian life. Consequently the religious state requires that one be bound to these three by vow. Hence Gregory says

(Hom. xx in Ezech.): “When a man vows to God all his possessions, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust”; and afterwards he says that this refers to those who renounce the present world.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord declared that it belongs to the perfection of life that a man follow Him, not anyhow, but in such a way as not to turn back. Wherefore He says again (Lk. 9:62): “No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.” And though some of His disciples went back, yet when our Lord asked (Jn. 6:68,69), “Will you also go away?” Peter answered for the others: “Lord, to whom shall we go?” Hence Augustine says (De Consensu Ev. ii, 17) that “as Matthew and Mark relate, Peter and Andrew followed Him after drawing their boats on to the beach, not as though they purposed to return, but as following Him at His command.” Now this unwavering following of Christ is made fast by a vow: wherefore a vow is requisite for religious perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: As Gregory says (Moral. ii) religious perfection requires that a man give “his whole life” to God. But a man cannot actually give God his whole life, because that life taken as a whole is not simultaneous but successive. Hence a man cannot give his whole life to God otherwise than by the obligation of a vow.

Reply to Objection 3: Among other services that we can lawfully give, is our liberty, which is dearer to man than aught else. Consequently when a man of his own accord deprives himself by vow of the liberty of abstaining from things pertaining to God’s service, this is most acceptable to God. Hence Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Paulin. et Arment.): “Repent not of thy vow; rejoice rather that thou canst no longer do lawfully, what thou mightest have done lawfully but to thy own cost. Happy the obligation that compels to better things.”

Whether it is right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not right to say that religious perfection consists in these three vows. For the perfection of life consists of inward rather than of outward acts, according to Rom. 14:17, “The Kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.” Now the religious vow binds a man to things belonging to perfection. Therefore vows of inward actions, such as contemplation, love of God and our neighbor, and so forth, should pertain to the religious state, rather than the vows of poverty, continence, and obedience which refer to outward actions.

Objection 2: Further, the three aforesaid come under the religious vow, in so far as they belong to the practice of tending to perfection. But there are many other things that religious practice, such as abstinence, watchings, and the like. Therefore it would seem that these three vows are incorrectly described as pertaining to the state of perfection.

Objection 3: Further, by the vow of obedience a man is bound to do according to his superior’s command whatever pertains to the practice of perfection. Therefore the vow of obedience suffices without the two other vows.

Objection 4: Further, external goods comprise not only riches but also honors. Therefore, if religious, by the vow of poverty, renounce earthly riches, there should be another vow whereby they may despise worldly honors.

On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, de Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium) that “the keeping of chastity and the renouncing of property are affixed to the monastic rule.”

I answer that, The religious state may be considered in three ways. First, as being a practice of tending to the perfection of charity: secondly, as quieting the human mind from outward solicitude, according to 1 Cor. 7:32: “I would have you to be without solicitude”: thirdly, as a holocaust whereby a man offers himself and his possessions wholly to God; and in corresponding manner the religious state is constituted by these three vows.

First, as regards the practice of perfection a man is required to remove from himself whatever may hinder his affections from tending wholly to

God, for it is in this that the perfection of charity consists. Such hindrances are of three kinds. First, the attachment to external goods, which is removed by the vow of poverty; secondly, the concupiscence of sensible pleasures, chief among which are venereal pleasures, and these are removed by the vow of continence; thirdly, the inordinateness of the human will, and this is removed by the vow of obedience. In like manner the disquiet of worldly solicitude is aroused in man in reference especially to three things. First, as regards the dispensing of external things, and this solicitude is removed from man by the vow of poverty; secondly, as regards the control of wife and children, which is cut away by the vow of continence; thirdly, as regards the disposal of one's own actions, which is eliminated by the vow of obedience, whereby a man commits himself to the disposal of another.

Again, "a holocaust is the offering to God of all that one has," according to Gregory (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Now man has a threefold good, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 8). First, the good of external things, which he wholly offers to God by the vow of voluntary poverty: secondly, the good of his own body, and this good he offers to God especially by the vow of continence, whereby he renounces the greatest bodily pleasures. the third is the good of the soul, which man wholly offers to God by the vow of obedience, whereby he offers God his own will by which he makes use of all the powers and habits of the soul. Therefore the religious state is fittingly constituted by the three vows.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [3798](A[1]), the end whereunto the religious vow is directed is the perfection of charity, since all the interior acts of virtue belong to charity as to their mother, according to 1 Cor. 13:4, "Charity is patient, is kind," etc. Hence the interior acts of virtue, for instance humility, patience, and so forth, do not come under the religious vow, but this is directed to them as its end.

Reply to Objection 2: All other religious observances are directed to the three aforesaid principal vows; for if any of them are ordained for the purpose of procuring a livelihood, such as labor, questing, and so on, they are to be referred to poverty; for the safeguarding of which religious seek a livelihood by these means. Other observances whereby the body is chastised, such as watching, fasting, and the like, are directly ordained for the observance of the vow of continence. And such religious observances as regard human actions whereby a man is directed to the end of religion, namely the love of God and his neighbor (such as reading, prayer, visiting the sick, and the like), are comprised under the vow of obedience that applies to the will, which directs its actions to the end according to the ordering of another person. The distinction of habit belongs to all three vows, as a sign of being bound by them: wherefore the religious habit is given or blessed at the time of profession.

Reply to Objection 3: By obedience a man offers to God his will, to which though all human affairs are subject, yet some are subject to it alone in a special manner, namely human actions, since passions belong also to the sensitive appetite. Wherefore in order to restrain the passions of carnal pleasures and of external objects of appetite, which hinder the perfection of life, there was need for the vows of continence and poverty; but for the ordering of one's own actions accordingly as the state of perfection requires, there was need for the vow of obedience.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3), strictly and truly speaking honor is not due save to virtue. Since, however, external goods serve instrumentally for certain acts of virtue, the consequence is that a certain honor is given to their excellence especially by the common people who acknowledge none but outward excellence. Therefore since religious tend to the perfection of virtue it becomes them not to renounce the honor which God and all holy men accord to virtue, according to Ps. 138:17, "But to me Thy friends, O God, are made exceedingly honorable." On the other hand, they renounce the honor that is given to outward excellence, by the very fact that they withdraw from a worldly life: hence no special vow is needed for this.

Whether the vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vow of obedience is not the chief of the three religious vows. For the perfection of the religious life was inaugurated by Christ. Now Christ gave a special counsel of poverty; whereas He is not stated to have given a special counsel of obedience. Therefore the vow of poverty is greater than the vow of obedience.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 26:20) that "no price is worthy of a continent soul." Now the vow of that which is more worthy is itself more excellent. Therefore the vow of continence is more excellent than the vow of obedience.

Objection 3: Further, the greater a vow the more indispensable it would seem to be. Now the vows of poverty and continence "are so inseparable from the monastic rule, that not even the Sovereign Pontiff can allow them to be broken," according to a Decretal (De Statu Monach., cap. Cum ad monasterium): yet he can dispense a religious from obeying his superior. Therefore it would seem that the vow of obedience is less than the vow of poverty and continence.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xxxv, 14): "Obedience is rightly placed before victims, since by victims another's flesh, but by obedience one's own will, is sacrificed." Now the religious vows are holocausts, as stated above ([3799]AA[1],3, ad 6). Therefore the vow of obedience is the chief of all religious vows.

I answer that, The vow of obedience is the chief of the three religious vows, and this for three reasons.

First, because by the vow of obedience man offers God something greater, namely his own will; for this is of more account than his own body, which he offers God by continence, and than external things, which he offers God by the vow of poverty. Wherefore that which is done out of obedience is more acceptable to God than that which is done of one's own will, according to the saying of Jerome (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): "My words are intended to teach you not to rely on your own judgment": and a little further on he says: "You may not do what you will; you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess as much as you receive, clothe yourself with what is given to you." Hence fasting is not acceptable to God if it is done of one's own will, according to Is. 58:3, "Behold in the day of your fast your own will is found."

Secondly, because the vow of obedience includes the other vows, but not vice versa: for a religious, though bound by vow to observe continence and poverty, yet these also come under obedience, as well as many other things besides the keeping of continence and poverty.

Thirdly, because the vow of obedience extends properly to those acts that are closely connected with the end of religion; and the more closely a thing is connected with the end, the better it is.

It follows from this that the vow of obedience is more essential to the religious life. For if a man without taking a vow of obedience were to observe, even by vow, voluntary poverty and continence, he would not therefore belong to the religious state, which is to be preferred to virginity observed even by vow; for Augustine says (De Virgin. xlvi): “No one, methinks, would prefer virginity to the monastic life.” [*St. Augustine wrote not ‘monasterio’ but ‘martyrio’—to ‘martyrdom’; and St. Thomas quotes the passage correctly above[3800], Q[124], A[3] and[3801] Q[152], A[5]].

Reply to Objection 1: The counsel of obedience was included in the very following of Christ, since to obey is to follow another’s will. Consequently it is more pertinent to perfection than the vow of poverty, because as Jerome, commenting on Mat. 19:27, “Behold we have left all things,” observes, “Peter added that which is perfect when he said: And have followed Thee.”

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted mean that continence is to be preferred, not to all other acts of virtue, but to conjugal chastity, or to external riches of gold and silver which are measured by weight [*’Pondere,’ referring to the Latin ‘ponderatio’ in the Vulgate, which the Douay version renders ‘price.’]. Or again continence is taken in a general sense for abstinence from ali evil, as stated above ([3802]Q[155], A[4], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: The Pope cannot dispense a religious from his vow of obedience so as to release him from obedience to every superior in matters relating to the perfection of life, for he cannot exempt him from obedience to himself. He can, however, exempt him from subjection to a lower superior, but this is not to dispense him from his vow of obedience.

Whether a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his rule?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious sins mortally whenever he transgresses the things contained in his rule. For to break a vow is a sin worthy of condemnation, as appears from 1 Tim. 5:11,12, where the Apostle says that widows who “will marry have [Vulg.: ‘having’] damnation, because they have made void their first faith.” But religious are bound to a rule by the vows of their profession. Therefore they sin mortally by transgressing the things contained in their rule.

Objection 2: Further, the rule is enjoined upon a religious in the same way as a law. Now he who transgresses a precept of law sins mortally. Therefore it would seem that a monk sins mortally if he transgresses the things contained in his rule.

Objection 3: Further, contempt involves a mortal sin. Now whoever repeatedly does what he ought not to do seems to sin from contempt. Therefore it would seem that a religious sins mortally by frequently transgressing the things contained in his rule.

On the contrary, The religious state is safer than the secular state; wherefore Gregory at the beginning of his Morals [*Epist. Missoria, ad Leand. Episc. i] compares the secular life to the stormy sea, and the religious life to the calm port. But if every transgression of the things contained in his rule were to involve a religious in mortal sin, the religious life would be fraught with danger of account of its multitude of observances. Therefore not every transgression of the things contained in the rule is a mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1,2), a thing is contained in the rule in two ways. First, as the end of the rule, for instance things that pertain to the acts of the virtues; and the transgression of these, as regards those which come under a common precept, involves a mortal sin; but as regards those which are not included in the common obligation of a precept, the transgression thereof does not involve a mortal sin, except by reason of contempt, because, as stated above [3803](A[2]), a religious is not bound to be perfect, but to tend to perfection, to which the contempt of perfection is opposed.

Secondly, a thing is contained in the rule through pertaining to the outward practice, such as all external observances, to some of which a religious is bound by the vow of his profession. Now the vow of profession regards chiefly the three things aforesaid, namely poverty, continence, and obedience, while all others are directed to these. Consequently the transgression of these three involves a mortal sin, while the transgression of the others does not involve a mortal sin, except either by reason of contempt of the rule (since this is directly contrary to the profession whereby a man vows to live according to the rule), or by reason of a precept, whether given orally by a superior, or expressed in the rule, since this would be to act contrary to the vow of obedience.

Reply to Objection 1: He who professes a rule does not vow to observe all the things contained in the rule, but he vows the regular life which consists essentially in the three aforesaid things. Hence in certain religious orders precaution is taken to profess, not the rule, but to live according to the rule, i.e. to tend to form one’s conduct in accordance with the rule as a kind of model; and this is set aside by contempt. Yet greater precaution is observed in some religious orders by professing obedience according to the rule, so that only that which is contrary to a precept of the rule is contrary to the profession, while the transgression or omission of other things binds only under pain of venial sin, because, as stated above (A[7], ad 2), such things are dispositions to the chief vows. And venial sin is a disposition to mortal, as stated above ([3804]FS, Q[88], A[3]), inasmuch as it hinders those things whereby a man is disposed to keep the chief precepts of Christ’s law, namely the precepts of charity.

There is also a religious order, that of the Friars Preachers, where such like transgressions or omissions do not, by their very nature, involve sin, either mortal or venial; but they bind one to suffer the punishment affixed thereto, because it is in this way that they are bound to observe such things. Nevertheless they may sin venially or mortally through neglect, concupiscence, or contempt.

Reply to Objection 2: Not all the contents of the law are set forth by way of precept; for some are expressed under the form of ordinance or statute binding under pain of a fixed punishment. Accordingly, just as in the civil law the transgression of a legal statute does not always render a man deserving of bodily death, so neither in the law of the Church does every ordinance or statute bind under mortal sin; and the same applies to the statutes of the rule.

Reply to Objection 3: An action or transgression proceeds from contempt when a man’s will refuses to submit to the ordinance of the law or rule, and from this he proceeds to act against the law or rule. on the other hand, he does not sin from contempt, but from some other cause, when he is led to do something against the ordinance of the law or rule through some particular cause such as concupiscence or anger, even though he often repeat the same kind of sin through the same or some other cause. Thus

Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxix) that “not all sins are committed through proud contempt.” Nevertheless the frequent repetition of a sin leads dispositively to contempt, according to the words of Prov. 18:3, “The wicked man, when he is come into the depth of sins, contemneth.”

Whether a religious sins more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious does not sin more grievously than a secular by the same kind of sin. For it is written (2 Paralip 30:18,19): “The Lord Who is good will show mercy to all them who with their whole heart seek the Lord the God of their fathers, and will not impute it to them that they are not sanctified.” Now religious apparently follow the Lord the God of their fathers with their whole heart rather than seculars, who partly give themselves and their possessions to God and reserve part for themselves, as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Therefore it would seem that it is less imputed to them if they fall short somewhat of their sanctification.

Objection 2: Further, God is less angered at a man’s sins if he does some good deeds, according to 2 Paralip 19:2,3, “Thou helpest the ungodly, and thou art joined in friendship with them that hate the Lord, and therefore thou didst deserve indeed the wrath of the Lord: but good works are found in thee.” Now religious do more good works than seculars. Therefore if they commit any sins, God is less angry with them.

Objection 3: Further, this present life is not carried through without sin, according to James 3:2, “In many things we all offend.” Therefore if the sins of religious were more grievous than those of seculars it would follow that religious are worse off than seculars: and consequently it would not be a wholesome counsel to enter religion.

On the contrary, The greater the evil the more it would seem to be deplored. But seemingly the sins of those who are in the state of holiness and perfection are the most deplorable, for it is written (Jer. 23:9): “My heart is broken within me,” and afterwards (Jer. 23:11): “For the prophet and the priest are defiled; and in My house I have found their wickedness.” Therefore religious and others who are in the state of perfection, other things being equal, sin more grievously.

I answer that, A sin committed by a religious may be in three ways more grievous than a like sin committed by a secular. First, if it be against his religious vow; for instance if he be guilty of fornication or theft, because by fornication he acts against the vow of continence, and by theft against the vow of poverty; and not merely against a precept of the divine law. Secondly, if he sin out of contempt, because thereby he would seem to be the more ungrateful for the divine favors which have raised him to the state of perfection. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 10:29) that the believer "deserveth worse punishments" who through contempt tramples under foot the Son of God. Hence the Lord complains (Jer. 11:15): "What is the meaning that My beloved hath wrought much wickedness in My house?" Thirdly, the sin of a religious may be greater on account of scandal, because many take note of his manner of life: wherefore it is written (Jer. 23:14): "I have seen the likeness of adulterers, and the way of lying in the Prophets of Jerusalem; and they strengthened the hands of the wicked, that no man should return from his evil doings."

On the other hand, if a religious, not out of contempt, but out of weakness or ignorance, commit a sin that is not against the vow of his profession, without giving scandal (for instance if he commit it in secret) he sins less grievously in the same kind of sin than a secular, because his sin if slight is absorbed as it were by his many good works, and if it be mortal, he more easily recovers from it. First, because he has a right intention towards God, and though it be intercepted for the moment, it is easily restored to its former object. Hence Origen commenting on Ps. 36:24, "When he shall fall he shall not be bruised," says (Hom. iv in Ps. 36): "The wicked man, if he sin, repents not, and fails to make amends for his sin. But the just man knows how to make amends and recover himself; even as he who had said: 'I know not the man,' shortly afterwards when the Lord had looked on him, knew to shed most bitter tears, and he who from the roof had seen a woman and desired her knew to say: 'I have sinned and done evil before Thee.'" Secondly, he is assisted by his fellow-religious to rise again, according to Eccles. 4:10, "If one fall he shall be supported by the other: woe to him that is alone, for when he falleth he hath none to lift him up."

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to things done through weakness or ignorance, but not to those that are done out of contempt.

Reply to Objection 2: Josaphat also, to whom these words were addressed, sinned not out of contempt, but out of a certain weakness of human affection.

Reply to Objection 3: The just sin not easily out of contempt; but sometimes they fall into a sin through ignorance or weakness from which they easily arise. If, however, they go so far as to sin out of contempt, they become most wicked and incorrigible, according to the word of Jer. 2:20: “Thou hast broken My yoke, thou hast burst My bands, and thou hast said: ‘I will not serve.’ For on every high hill and under every green tree thou didst prostitute thyself.” Hence Augustine says (Ep. lxxviii ad Pleb. Hippon.): “From the time I began to serve God, even as I scarcely found better men than those who made progress in monasteries, so have I not found worse than those who in the monastery have fallen.”

OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE COMPETENT TO RELIGIOUS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the things that are competent to religious; and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is lawful for them to teach, preach, and do like things?

(2) Whether it is lawful for them to meddle in secular business?

(3) Whether they are bound to manual labor?

(4) Whether it is lawful for them to live on alms?

(5) Whether it is lawful for them to quest?

(6) Whether it is lawful for them to wear coarser clothes than other persons?

Whether it is lawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like. For it is said (VII, qu. i, can. Hoc nequaquam) in an ordinance of a synod of Constantinople [*Pseudosynod held by Photius in the year 879]: “The monastic life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care.” And Jerome says (ad Ripar. et Desider. [*Contra Vigilant. xvi]): “A monk’s duty is not to teach but to lament.” Again Pope

Leo [*Leo I, Ep. cxx ad Theodoret., 6, cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Adjicimus]: says "Let none dare to preach save the priests of the Lord, be he monk or layman, and no matter what knowledge he may boast of having." Now it is not lawful to exceed the bounds of one's office or transgress the ordinance of the Church. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for religious to teach, preach, and the like.

Objection 2: Further, in an ordinance of the Council of Nicea (cf. XVI, qu. i, can. Placuit) it is laid down as follows: "It is our absolute and peremptory command addressed to all that monks shall not hear confessions except of one another, as is right, that they shall not bury the dead except those dwelling with them in the monastery, or if by chance a brother happen to die while on a visit." But just as the above belong to the duty of clerics, so also do preaching and teaching. Therefore since "the business of a monk differs from that of a cleric," as Jerome says (Ep. xiv ad Heliod.), it would seem unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and the like.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Regist. v, Ep. 1): "No man can fulfil ecclesiastical duties, and keep consistently to the monastic rule": and this is quoted XVI, qu. i, can. Nemo potest. Now monks are bound to keep consistently to the monastic rule. Therefore it would seem that they cannot fulfil ecclesiastical duties, whereof teaching and preaching are a part. Therefore seemingly it is unlawful for them to preach, teach, and do similar things.

On the contrary, Gregory is quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Ex auctoritate) as saying: "By authority of this decree framed in virtue of our apostolic power and the duty of our office, be it lawful to monk priests who are configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penance, and absolve from sin."

I answer that, A thing is declared to be unlawful to a person in two ways. First, because there is something in him contrary to that which is declared unlawful to him: thus to no man is it lawful to sin, because each man has in himself reason and an obligation to God's law, to which things sin is contrary. And in this way it is said to be unlawful for a person to preach, teach, or do like things, because there is in him something incompatible with these things, either by reason of a precept—thus those who are irregular by ordinance of the Church may not be raised to the sacred orders

—or by reason of sin, according to Ps. 49:16, “But to the sinner God hath said: Why dost thou declare My justice?”

In this way it is not unlawful for religious to preach, teach, and do like things, both because they are bound neither by vow nor by precept of their rule to abstain from these things, and because they are not rendered less apt for these things by any sin committed, but on the contrary they are the more apt through having taken upon themselves the practice of holiness. For it is foolish to say that a man is rendered less fit for spiritual duties through advancing himself in holiness; and consequently it is foolish to declare that the religious state is an obstacle to the fulfilment of such like duties. This error is rejected by Pope Boniface [*Boniface IV] for the reasons given above. His words which are quoted (XVI, qu. i, can. Sunt. nonnulli) are these: “There are some who without any dogmatic proof, and with extreme daring, inspired with a zeal rather of bitterness than of love, assert that monks though they be dead to the world and live to God, are unworthy of the power of the priestly office, and that they cannot confer penance, nor christen, nor absolve in virtue of the power divinely bestowed on them in the priestly office. But they are altogether wrong.” He proves this first because it is not contrary to the rule; thus he continues: “For neither did the Blessed Benedict the saintly teacher of monks forbid this in any way,” nor is it forbidden in other rules. Secondly, he refutes the above error from the usefulness of the monks, when he adds at the end of the same chapter: “The more perfect a man is, the more effective is he in these, namely in spiritual works.”

Secondly, a thing is said to be unlawful for a man, not on account of there being in him something contrary thereto, but because he lacks that which enables him to do it: thus it is unlawful for a deacon to say mass, because he is not in priestly orders; and it is unlawful for a priest to deliver judgment because he lacks the episcopal authority. Here, however, a distinction must be made. Because those things which are a matter of an order, cannot be deputed to one who has not the order, whereas matters of jurisdiction can be deputed to those who have not ordinary jurisdiction: thus the delivery of a judgment is deputed by the bishop to a simple priest. In this sense it is said to be unlawful for monks and other religious to preach, teach, and so forth, because the religious state does not give them the power to do these things.

They can, however, do them if they receive orders, or ordinary jurisdiction, or if matters of jurisdiction be delegated to them.

Reply to Objection 1: It results from the words quoted that the fact of their being monks does not give monks the power to do these things, yet it does not involve in them anything contrary to the performance of these acts.

Reply to Objection 2: Again, this ordinance of the Council of Nicea forbids monks to claim the power of exercising those acts on the ground of their being monks, but it does not forbid those acts being delegated to them.

Reply to Objection 3: These two things are incompatible, namely, the ordinary cure of ecclesiastical duties, and the observance of the monastic rule in a monastery. But this does not prevent monks and other religious from being sometimes occupied with ecclesiastical duties through being deputed thereto by superiors having ordinary cure; especially members of religious orders that are especially instituted for that purpose, as we shall say further on ([3805]Q[188], A[4]).

Whether it is lawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business. For in the decree quoted above [3806](A[1]) of Pope Boniface it is said that the "Blessed Benedict bade them to be altogether free from secular business; and this is most explicitly prescribed by the apostolic doctrine and the teaching of all the Fathers, not only to religious, but also to all the canonical clergy," according to 2 Tim. 2:4, "No man being a soldier to God, entangleth himself with secular business." Now it is the duty of all religious to be soldiers of God. Therefore it is unlawful for them to occupy themselves with secular business.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:11): "That you use your endeavor to be quiet, and that you do your own business," which a gloss explains thus—"by refraining from other people's affairs, so as to be the better able to attend to the amendment of your own life." Now religious devote themselves in a special way to the amendment of their life. Therefore they should not occupy themselves with secular business.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome, commenting on Mat. 11:8, "Behold they that are clothed in soft garments are in the houses of kings," says: "Hence we gather that an austere life and severe preaching should avoid the palaces of kings and the mansions of the voluptuous.” But the needs of secular business induce men to frequent the palaces of kings. Therefore it is unlawful for religious to occupy themselves with secular business.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 16:1): “I commend to you Phoebe our Sister,” and further on (Rom. 16:2), “that you assist her in whatsoever business she shall have need of you.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3807]Q[186], AA[1],7, ad 1), the religious state is directed to the attainment of the perfection of charity, consisting principally in the love of God and secondarily in the love of our neighbor. Consequently that which religious intend chiefly and for its own sake is to give themselves to God. Yet if their neighbor be in need, they should attend to his affairs out of charity, according to Gal. 6:2, “Bear ye one another’s burthens: and so you shall fulfil the law of Christ,” since through serving their neighbor for God’s sake, they are obedient to the divine love. Hence it is written (James 1:27): “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation,” which means, according to a gloss, to assist the helpless in their time of need.

We must conclude therefore that it is unlawful for either monks or clerics to carry on secular business from motives of avarice; but from motives of charity, and with their superior’s permission, they may occupy themselves with due moderation in the administration and direction of secular business. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. xxxviii, can. Decrevit): “The holy synod decrees that henceforth no cleric shall buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless, orphans, or widows, or when the bishop of the city commands him to take charge of the business connected with the Church.” And the same applies to religious as to clerics, because they are both debarred from secular business on the same grounds, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 1: Monks are forbidden to occupy themselves with secular business from motives of avarice, but not from motives of charity.

Reply to Objection 2: To occupy oneself with secular business on account of another’s need is not officiousness but charity.

Reply to Objection 3: To haunt the palaces of kings from motives of pleasure, glory, or avarice is not becoming to religious, but there is nothing unseemly in their visiting them from motives of piety. Hence it is written (4

Kings 4:13): “Hast thou any business, and wilt thou that I speak to the king or to the general of the army?” Likewise it becomes religious to go to the palaces of kings to rebuke and guide them, even as John the Baptist rebuked Herod, as related in Mat. 14:4.

Whether religious are bound to manual labor?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious are bound to manual labor. For religious are not exempt from the observance of precepts. Now manual labor is a matter of precept according to 1 Thess. 4:11, “Work with your own hands as we commanded you”; wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxx): “But who can allow these insolent men,” namely religious that do no work, of whom he is speaking there, “who disregard the most salutary admonishment of the Apostle, not merely to be borne with as being weaker than others, but even to preach as though they were holier than others.” Therefore it would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. xxi)] on 2 Thess. 3:10, “If any man will not work, neither let him eat,” says: “Some say that this command of the Apostle refers to spiritual works, and not to the bodily labor of the farmer or craftsman”; and further on: “But it is useless for them to try to hide from themselves and from others the fact that they are unwilling not only to fulfil, but even to understand the useful admonishments of charity”; and again: “He wishes God’s servants to make a living by working with their bodies.” Now religious especially are called servants of God, because they give themselves entirely to the service of God, as Dionysius asserts (Eccl. Hier. vi). Therefore it would seem that they are bound to manual labor.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): “I would fain know how they would occupy themselves, who are unwilling to work with their body. We occupy our time, say they, with prayers, psalms, reading, and the word of God.” Yet these things are no excuse, and he proves this, as regards each in particular. For in the first place, as to prayer, he says: “One prayer of the obedient man is sooner granted than ten thousand prayers of the contemptuous”: meaning that those are contemptuous and unworthy to be heard who work not with their hands. Secondly, as to the divine praises he adds: “Even while working with their hands they can easily sing hymns to God.” Thirdly, with regard to reading, he goes on to say: “Those who say they are occupied in reading, do they not find there what the Apostle commanded? What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read but not to obey what one reads?” Fourthly, he adds in reference to preaching [*Cap. xviii]: “If one has to speak, and is so busy that he cannot spare time for manual work, can all in the monastery do this? And since all cannot do this, why should all make this a pretext for being exempt? And even if all were able, they should do so by turns, not only so that the others may be occupied in other works, but also because it suffices that one speak while many listen.” Therefore it would seem that religious should not desist from manual labor on account of such like spiritual works to which they devote themselves.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:33, “Sell what you possess,” says: “Not only give your clothes to the poor, but sell what you possess, that having once for all renounced all your possessions for the Lord’s sake, you may henceforth work with the labor of your hands, so as to have wherewith to live or to give alms.” Now it belongs properly to religious to renounce all they have. Therefore it would seem likewise to belong to them to live and give alms through the labor of their hands.

Objection 5: Further, religious especially would seem to be bound to imitate the life of the apostles, since they profess the state of perfection. Now the apostles worked with their own hands, according to 1 Cor. 4:12: “We labor, working with our own hands.” Therefore it would seem that religious are bound to manual labor.

On the contrary, Those precepts that are commonly enjoined upon all are equally binding on religious and seculars. But the precept of manual labor is enjoined upon all in common, as appears from 2 Thess. 3:6, “Withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,” etc. (for by brother he signifies every Christian, according to 1 Cor. 7:12, “If any brother have a wife that believeth not”). Now it is written in the same passage (2 Thess. 3:10): “If any man will not work, neither let him eat.” Therefore religious are not bound to manual labor any more than seculars are.

I answer that, Manual labor is directed to four things. First and principally to obtain food; wherefore it was said to the first man (Gn. 3:19): “In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread,” and it is written (Ps. 127:2): “For thou shalt eat the labors of thy hands.” Secondly, it is directed to the removal of idleness whence arise many evils; hence it is written (Ecclus. 33:28,29): “Send” thy slave “to work, that he be not idle, for idleness hath taught much evil.” Thirdly, it is directed to the curbing of concupiscence, inasmuch as it is a means of afflicting the body; hence it is written (2 Cor. 6:5,6): “In labors, in watchings, in fastings, in chastity.” Fourthly, it is directed to almsgiving, wherefore it is written (Eph. 4:28): “He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands the thing which is good, that he may have something to give to him that suffereth need.” Accordingly, in so far as manual labor is directed to obtaining food, it comes under a necessity of precept in so far as it is necessary for that end: since that which is directed to an end derives its necessity from that end, being, in effect, so far necessary as the end cannot be obtained without it. Consequently he who has no other means of livelihood is bound to work with his hands, whatever his condition may be. This is signified by the words of the Apostle: “If any man will not work, neither let him eat,” as though to say: “The necessity of manual labor is the necessity of meat.” So that if one could live without eating, one would not be bound to work with one’s hands. The same applies to those who have no other lawful means of livelihood: since a man is understood to be unable to do what he cannot do lawfully. Wherefore we find that the Apostle prescribed manual labor merely as a remedy for the sin of those who gained their livelihood by unlawful means. For the Apostle ordered manual labor first of all in order to avoid theft, as appears from Eph. 4:28, “He that stole, let him now steal no more; but rather let him labor, working with his hands.” Secondly, to avoid the coveting of others’ property, wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): “Work with your own hands, as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are without.” Thirdly, to avoid the discreditable pursuits whereby some seek a livelihood. Hence he says (2 Thess. 3:10–12): “When we were with you, this we declared to you: that if any man will not work, neither let him eat. For we have heard that there are some among you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling” (namely, as a gloss explains it, “who make a living by meddling in unlawful things). Now we charge them that are such, and beseech them . . . that working with silence, they would eat their own bread.” Hence Jerome states (Super epist. ad Galat. [*Preface to Bk. ii of

Commentary]) that the Apostle said this “not so much in his capacity of teacher as on account of the faults of the people.”

It must, however, be observed that under manual labor are comprised all those human occupations whereby man can lawfully gain a livelihood, whether by using his hands, his feet, or his tongue. For watchmen, couriers, and such like who live by their labor, are understood to live by their handiwork: because, since the hand is “the organ of organs” [*De Anima iii, 8], handiwork denotes all kinds of work, whereby a man may lawfully gain a livelihood.

In so far as manual labor is directed to the removal of idleness, or the affliction of the body, it does not come under a necessity of precept if we consider it in itself, since there are many other means besides manual labor of afflicting the body or of removing idleness: for the flesh is afflicted by fastings and watchings, and idleness is removed by meditation on the Holy Scriptures and by the divine praises. Hence a gloss on Ps. 118:82, “My eyes have failed for Thy word,” says: “He is not idle who meditates only on God’s word; nor is he who works abroad any better than he who devotes himself to the study of knowing the truth.” Consequently for these reasons religious are not bound to manual labor, as neither are seculars, except when they are so bound by the statutes of their order. Thus Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic Monach.): “The Egyptian monasteries are wont to admit none unless they work or labor, not so much for the necessities of life, as for the welfare of the soul, lest it be led astray by wicked thoughts.” But in so far as manual labor is directed to almsgiving, it does not come under the necessity of precept, save perchance in some particular case, when a man is under an obligation to give alms, and has no other means of having the wherewithal to assist the poor: for in such a case religious would be bound as well as seculars to do manual labor.

Reply to Objection 1: This command of the Apostle is of natural law: wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:6, “That you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly,” says, “otherwise than the natural order requires,” and he is speaking of those who abstained from manual labor. Hence nature has provided man with hands instead of arms and clothes, with which she has provided other animals, in order that with his hands he may obtain these and all other necessaries. Hence it is clear that this precept, even as all the precepts of the natural law, is binding on both religious and seculars alike. Yet not everyone sins that works not with his hands, because those precepts of the natural law which regard the good of the many are not binding on each individual, but it suffices that one person apply himself to this business and another to that; for instance, that some be craftsmen, others husbandmen, others judges, and others teachers, and so forth, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 12:17), “If the whole body were the eye, where would be the hearing? If the whole were the hearing, where would be the smelling?”

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss is taken from Augustine’s De operibus Monachorum, cap. 21, where he speaks against certain monks who declared it to be unlawful for the servants of God to work with their hands, on account of our Lord’s saying (Mat. 6:25): “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat.” Nevertheless his words do not imply that religious are bound to work with their hands, if they have other means of livelihood. This is clear from his adding: “He wishes the servants of God to make a living by working with their bodies.” Now this does not apply to religious any more than to seculars, which is evident for two reasons. First, on account of the way in which the Apostle expresses himself, by saying: “That you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly.” For he calls all Christians brothers, since at that time religious orders were not as yet founded. Secondly, because religious have no other obligations than what seculars have, except as required by the rule they profess: wherefore if their rule contain nothing about manual labor, religious are not otherwise bound to manual labor than seculars are.

Reply to Objection 3: A man may devote himself in two ways to all the spiritual works mentioned by Augustine in the passage quoted: in one way with a view to the common good, in another with a view to his private advantage. Accordingly those who devote themselves publicly to the aforesaid spiritual works are thereby exempt from manual labor for two reasons: first, because it behooves them to be occupied exclusively with such like works; secondly, because those who devote themselves to such works have a claim to be supported by those for whose advantage they work.

On the other hand, those who devote themselves to such works not publicly but privately as it were, ought not on that account to be exempt from manual labor, nor have they a claim to be supported by the offerings of the faithful, and it is of these that Augustine is speaking. For when he says: “They can sing hymns to God even while working with their hands; like the craftsmen who give tongue to fable telling without withdrawing their hands from their work,” it is clear that he cannot refer to those who sing the canonical hours in the church, but to those who tell psalms or hymns as private prayers. Likewise what he says of reading and prayer is to be referred to the private prayer and reading which even lay people do at times, and not to those who perform public prayers in the church, or give public lectures in the schools. Hence he does not say: “Those who say they are occupied in teaching and instructing,” but: “Those who say they are occupied in reading.” Again he speaks of that preaching which is addressed, not publicly to the people, but to one or a few in particular by way of private admonishment. Hence he says expressly: “If one has to speak.” For according to a gloss on 1 Cor. 2:4, “Speech is addressed privately, preaching to many.”

Reply to Objection 4: Those who despise all for God’s sake are bound to work with their hands, when they have no other means of livelihood, or of almsgiving (should the case occur where almsgiving were a matter of precept), but not otherwise, as stated in the Article. It is in this sense that the gloss quoted is to be understood.

Reply to Objection 5: That the apostles worked with their hands was sometimes a matter of necessity, sometimes a work of supererogation. It was of necessity when they failed to receive a livelihood from others. Hence a gloss on 1 Cor. 4:12, “We labor, working with our own hands,” adds, “because no man giveth to us.” It was supererogation, as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12, where the Apostle says that he did not use the power he had of living by the Gospel. The Apostle had recourse to this supererogation for three motives. First, in order to deprive the false apostles of the pretext for preaching, for they preached merely for a temporal advantage; hence he says (2 Cor. 11:12): “But what I do, that I will do that I may cut off the occasion from them,” etc. Secondly, in order to avoid burdening those to whom he preached; hence he says (2 Cor. 12:13): “What is there that you have had less than the other churches, but that I myself was not burthensome to you?” Thirdly, in order to give an example of work to the idle; hence he says (2 Thess. 3:8,9): “We worked night and day . . . that we might give ourselves a pattern unto you, to imitate us.” However, the

Apostle did not do this in places like Athens where he had facilities for preaching daily, as Augustine observes (De oper. Monach. xviii). Yet religious are not for this reason bound to imitate the Apostle in this matter, since they are not bound to all works of supererogation: wherefore neither did the other apostles work with their hands.

Whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to live on alms. For the Apostle (1 Tim. 5:16) forbids those widows who have other means of livelihood to live on the alms of the Church, so that the Church may have “sufficient for them that are widows indeed.” And Jerome says to Pope Damasus [*Cf. Cf. Can. Clericos, cause. i, qu. 2; Can. Quoniam, cause xvi, qu. 1; Regul. Monach. iv among the supposititious works of St. Jerome] that “those who have sufficient income from their parents and their own possessions, if they take what belongs to the poor they commit and incur the guilt of sacrilege, and by the abuse of such things they eat and drink judgment to themselves.” Now religious if they be able-bodied can support themselves by the work of their hands. Therefore it would seem that they sin if they consume the alms belonging to the poor.

Objection 2: Further, to live at the expense of the faithful is the stipend appointed to those who preach the Gospel in payment of their labor or work, according to Mat. 10:10: “The workman is worthy of his meat.” Now it belongs not to religious to preach the Gospel, but chiefly to prelates who are pastors and teachers. Therefore religious cannot lawfully live on the alms of the faithful.

Objection 3: Further, religious are in the state of perfection. But it is more perfect to give than to receive alms; for it is written (Acts 20:35): “It is a more blessed thing to give, rather than to receive.” Therefore they should not live on alms, but rather should they give alms of their handiwork.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to religious to avoid obstacles to virtue and occasions of sin. Now the receiving of alms offers an occasion of sin, and hinders an act of virtue; hence a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, “That we might give ourselves a pattern unto you,” says: “He who through idleness eats often at another’s table, must needs flatter the one who feeds him.” It is also written (Ex. 23:8): “Neither shalt thou take bribes which . . . blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just," and (Prov. 22:7): "The borrower is servant to him that lendeth." This is contrary to religion, wherefore a gloss on 2 Thess. 3:9, "That we might give ourselves a pattern," etc., says, "our religion calls men to liberty." Therefore it would seem that religious should not live on alms.

Objection 5: Further, religious especially are bound to imitate the perfection of the apostles; wherefore the Apostle says (Phil. 3:15): "Let us . . . as many as are perfect, be thus minded." But the Apostle was unwilling to live at the expense of the faithful, either in order to cut off the occasion from the false apostles as he himself says (2 Cor. 11:12), or to avoid giving scandal to the weak, as appears from 1 Cor. 9:12. It would seem therefore that religious ought for the same reasons to refrain from living on alms. Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. 28): "Cut off the occasion of disgraceful marketing whereby you lower yourselves in the esteem of others, and give scandal to the weak: and show men that you seek not an easy livelihood in idleness, but the kingdom of God by the narrow and strait way."

On the contrary, Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): The Blessed Benedict after leaving his home and parents dwelt for three years in a cave, and while there lived on the food brought to him by a monk from Rome. Nevertheless, although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he sought to live by the labor of his hands. Therefore religious may lawfully live on alms.

I answer that, A man may lawfully live on what is his or due to him. Now that which is given out of liberality becomes the property of the person to whom it is given. Wherefore religious and clerics whose monasteries or churches have received from the munificence of princes or of any of the faithful any endowment whatsoever for their support, can lawfully live on such endowment without working with their hands, and yet without doubt they live on alms. Wherefore in like manner if religious receive movable goods from the faithful they can lawfully live on them. For it is absurd to say that a person may accept an alms of some great property but not bread or some small sum of money. Nevertheless since these gifts would seem to be bestowed on religious in order that they may have more leisure for religious works, in which the donors of temporal goods wish to have a share, the use of such gifts would become unlawful for them if they abstained from religious works, because in that case, so far as they are concerned, they would be thwarting the intention of those who bestowed those gifts.

A thing is due to a person in two ways. First, on account of necessity, which makes all things common, as Ambrose [*Basil, Serm. de Temp. lxiv, among the supposititious works of St. Ambrose] asserts. Consequently if religious be in need they can lawfully live on alms. Such necessity may occur in three ways. First, through weakness of body, the result being that they are unable to make a living by working with their hands. Secondly, because that which they gain by their handiwork is insufficient for their livelihood: wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii) that “the good works of the faithful should not leave God’s servants who work with their hands without a supply of necessaries, that when the hour comes for them to nourish their souls, so as to make it impossible for them to do these corporal works, they be not oppressed by want.” Thirdly, because of the former mode of life of those who were unwont to work with their hands: wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi) that “if they had in the world the wherewithal easily to support this life without working, and gave it to the needy when they were converted to God, we must credit their weakness and bear with it.” For those who have thus been delicately brought up are wont to be unable to bear the toil of bodily labor.

In another way a thing becomes due to a person through his affording others something whether temporal or spiritual, according to 1 Cor. 9:11, “If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great matter if we reap your carnal things?” And in this sense religious may live on alms as being due to them in four ways. First, if they preach by the authority of the prelates. Secondly, if they be ministers of the altar, according to 1 Cor. 9:13,14, “They that serve the altar partake with the altar. So also the lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel.” Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxi): “If they be gospelers, I allow, they have” (a claim to live at the charge of the faithful): “if they be ministers of the altar and dispensers of the sacraments, they need not insist on it, but it is theirs by perfect right.” The reason for this is because the sacrament of the altar wherever it be offered is common to all the faithful. Thirdly, if they devote themselves to the study of Holy Writ to the common profit of the whole Church. Wherefore Jerome says (Contra Vigil. xiii): “It is still the custom in Judea, not only among us but also among the Hebrews, for those who meditate on the law of the Lord day and night, end have no other share on earth but God alone, to be supported by the subscriptions of the synagogues and of the whole world." Fourthly, if they have endowed the monastery with the goods they possessed, they may live on the alms given to the monastery. Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxv) that "those who renouncing or distributing their means, whether ample or of any amount whatever, have desired with pious and salutary humility to be numbered among the poor of Christ, have a claim on the community and on brotherly love to receive a livelihood in return. They are to be commended indeed if they work with their hands, but if they be unwilling, who will dare to force them? Nor does it matter, as he goes on to say, to which monasteries, or in what place any one of them has bestowed his goods on his needy brethren; for all Christians belong to one commonwealth."

On the other hand, in the default of any necessity, or of their affording any profit to others, it is unlawful for religious to wish to live in idleness on the alms given to the poor. Hence Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxii): "Sometimes those who enter the profession of God's service come from a servile condition of life, from tilling the soil or working at some trade or lowly occupation. In their case it is not so clear whether they came with the purpose of serving God, or of evading a life of want and toil with a view to being fed and clothed in idleness, and furthermore to being honored by those by whom they were wont to be despised and downtrodden. Such persons surely cannot excuse themselves from work on the score of bodily weakness, for their former mode of life is evidence against them." And he adds further on (De oper. Monach. xxv): "If they be unwilling to work, neither let them eat. For if the rich humble themselves to piety, it is not that the poor may be exalted to pride; since it is altogether unseemly that in a life wherein senators become laborers, laborers should become idle, and that where the lords of the manor have come after renouncing their ease, the serfs should live in comfort."

Reply to Objection 1: These authorities must be understood as referring to cases of necessity, that is to say, when there is no other means of succoring the poor: for then they would be bound not only to refrain from accepting alms, but also to give what they have for the support of the needy.

Reply to Objection 2: Prelates are competent to preach in virtue of their office, but religious may be competent to do so in virtue of delegation; and thus when they work in the field of the Lord, they may make their living thereby, according to 2 Tim. 2:6, “The husbandman that laboreth must first partake of the fruits,” which a gloss explains thus, “that is to say, the preacher, who in the field of the Church tills the hearts of his hearers with the plough of God’s word.” Those also who minister to the preachers may live on alms. Hence a gloss on Rom. 15:27, “If the Gentiles have been made partakers of their spiritual things, they ought also in carnal things to minister to them,” says, “namely, to the Jews who sent preachers from Jerusalem.” There are moreover other reasons for which a person has a claim to live at the charge of the faithful, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Other things being equal, it is more perfect to give than to receive. Nevertheless to give or to give up all one’s possessions for Christ’s sake, and to receive a little for one’s livelihood is better than to give to the poor part by part, as stated above ([3808]Q[186], A[3], ad 6).

Reply to Objection 4: To receive gifts so as to increase one’s wealth, or to accept a livelihood from another without having a claim to it, and without profit to others or being in need oneself, affords an occasion of sin. But this does not apply to religious, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: Whenever there is evident necessity for religious living on alms without doing any manual work, as well as an evident profit to be derived by others, it is not the weak who are scandalized, but those who are full of malice like the Pharisees, whose scandal our Lord teaches us to despise (Mat. 15:12–14). If, however, these motives of necessity and profit be lacking, the weak might possibly be scandalized thereby; and this should be avoided. Yet the same scandal might be occasioned through those who live in idleness on the common revenues.

Whether it is lawful for religious to beg?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to beg. For Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxviii): “The most cunning foe has scattered on all sides a great number of hypocrites wearing the monastic habit, who go wandering about the country,” and afterwards he adds: “They all ask, they all demand to be supported in their profitable penury, or to be paid for a pretended holiness.” Therefore it would seem that the life of mendicant religious is to be condemned.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Thess. 4:11): “That you . . . work with your own hands as we commanded you, and that you walk honestly towards them that are without: and that you want nothing of any man’s”: and a gloss on this passage says: “You must work and not be idle, because work is both honorable and a light to the unbeliever: and you must not covet that which belongs to another and much less beg or take anything.” Again a gloss [*St. Augustine, (De oper. Monach. iii)] on 2 Thess. 3:10, “If any man will not work,” etc. says: “He wishes the servants of God to work with the body, so as to gain a livelihood, and not be compelled by want to ask for necessaries.” Now this is to beg. Therefore it would seem unlawful to beg while omitting to work with one’s hands.

Objection 3: Further, that which is forbidden by law and contrary to justice, is unbecoming to religious. Now begging is forbidden in the divine law; for it is written (Dt. 15:4): “There shall be no poor nor beggar among you,” and (Ps. 36:25): “I have not seen the just forsaken, nor his seed seeking bread.” Moreover an able-bodied mendicant is punished by civil law, according to the law (XI, xxvi, de Valid. Mendicant.). Therefore it is unfitting for religious to beg.

Objection 4: Further, “Shame is about that which is disgraceful,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15). Now Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 30) that “to be ashamed to beg is a sign of good birth.” Therefore it is disgraceful to beg: and consequently this is unbecoming to religious.

Objection 5: Further, according to our Lord’s command it is especially becoming to preachers of the Gospel to live on alms, as stated above [3809] (A[4]). Yet it is not becoming that they should beg, since a gloss on 2 Tim. 2:6, “The husbandman, that laboreth,” etc. says: “The Apostle wishes the gospeler to understand that to accept necessaries from those among whom he labors is not mendicancy but a right.” Therefore it would seem unbecoming for religious to beg.

On the contrary, It becomes religious to live in imitation of Christ. Now Christ was a mendicant, according to Ps. 39:18, “But I am a beggar and poor”; where a gloss says: “Christ said this of Himself as bearing the ‘form of a servant,’” and further on: “A beggar is one who entreats another, and a poor man is one who has not enough for himself.” Again it is written (Ps. 69:6): “I am needy and poor”; where a gloss says: “‘Needy,’ that is a suppliant; ‘and poor,’ that is, not having enough for myself, because I have no worldly wealth.” And Jerome says in a letter [*Reference unknown]: “Beware lest whereas thy Lord,” i.e. Christ, “begged, thou amass other people’s wealth.” Therefore it becomes religious to beg.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in reference to mendicancy. The first is on the part of the act itself of begging, which has a certain abasement attaching to it; since of all men those would seem most abased who are not only poor, but are so needy that they have to receive their meat from others. In this way some deserve praise for begging out of humility, just as they abase themselves in other ways, as being the most efficacious remedy against pride which they desire to quench either in themselves or in others by their example. For just as a disease that arises from excessive heat is most efficaciously healed by things that excel in cold, so proneness to pride is most efficaciously healed by those things which savor most of abasement. Hence it is said in the Decretals (II, cap. Si quis semel, de Paenitentia): “To condescend to the humblest duties, and to devote oneself to the lowliest service is an exercise of humility; for thus one is able to heal the disease of pride and human glory.” Hence Jerome praises Fabiola (Ep. lxxvii ad ocean.) for that she desired “to receive alms, having poured forth all her wealth for Christ’s sake.” The Blessed Alexis acted in like manner, for, having renounced all his possessions for Christ’s sake he rejoiced in receiving alms even from his own servants. It is also related of the Blessed Arsenius in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 6) that he gave thanks because he was forced by necessity to ask for alms. Hence it is enjoined to some people as a penance for grievous sins to go on a pilgrimage begging. Since, however, humility like the other virtues should not be without discretion, it behooves one to be discreet in becoming a mendicant for the purpose of humiliation, lest a man thereby incur the mark of covetousness or of anything else unbecoming. Secondly, mendicancy may be considered on the part of that which one gets by begging: and thus a man may be led to beg by a twofold motive. First, by the desire to have wealth or meat without working for it, and such like mendicancy is unlawful; secondly, by a motive of necessity or usefulness. The motive is one of necessity if a man has no other means of livelihood save begging; and it is a motive of usefulness if he wishes to accomplish something useful, and is unable to do so without the alms of the faithful. Thus alms are besought for the building of a bridge, or church, or for any other work whatever that is conducive to the common good: thus scholars may seek alms that they may devote themselves to the study of wisdom. In this way mendicancy is lawful to religious no less than to seculars.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there explicitly of those who beg from motives of covetousness.

Reply to Objection 2: The first gloss speaks of begging from motives of covetousness, as appears from the words of the Apostle; while the second gloss speaks of those who without effecting any useful purpose, beg their livelihood in order to live in idleness. on the other hand, he lives not idly who in any way lives usefully.

Reply to Objection 3: This precept of the divine law does not forbid anyone to beg, but it forbids the rich to be so stingy that some are compelled by necessity to beg. The civil law imposes a penalty on able-bodied mendicants who beg from motives neither of utility nor of necessity.

Reply to Objection 4: Disgrace is twofold; one arises from lack of honesty [*Cf.[3810] Q[145], A[1]], the other from an external defect, thus it is disgraceful for a man to be sick or poor. Such like uncomeliness of mendicancy does not pertain to sin, but it may pertain to humility, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: Preachers have the right to be fed by those to whom they preach: yet if they wish to seek this by begging so as to receive it as a free gift and not as a right this will be a mark of greater humility.

Whether it is lawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for religious to wear coarser clothes than others. For according to the Apostle (1 Thess. 5:22) we ought to “refrain from all appearance of evil.” Now coarseness of clothes has an appearance of evil; for our Lord said (Mat. 7:15): “Beware of false prophets who come to you in the clothing of sheep”: and a gloss on Apoc. 6:8, “Behold a pale horse,” says: “The devil finding that he cannot succeed, neither by outward afflictions nor by manifest heresies, sends in advance false brethren, who under the guise of religion assume the characteristics of the black and red horses by corrupting the faith.” Therefore it would seem that religious should not wear coarse clothes.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (Ep. lii ad Nepotian.): “Avoid somber,” i.e. black, “equally with glittering apparel. Fine and coarse clothes are equally to be shunned, for the one exhales pleasure, the other vainglory.” Therefore, since vainglory is a graver sin than the use of pleasure, it would seem that religious who should aim at what is more perfect ought to avoid coarse rather than fine clothes.

Objection 3: Further, religious should aim especially at doing works of penance. Now in works of penance we should use, not outward signs of sorrow, but rather signs of joy; for our Lord said (Mat. 6:16): “When you fast, be not, as the hypocrites, sad,” and afterwards He added: “But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head and wash thy face.” Augustine commenting on these words (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): “In this chapter we must observe that not only the glare and pomp of outward things, but even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation, all the more dangerous as being a decoy under the guise of God’s service.” Therefore seemingly religious ought not to wear coarse clothes.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 11:37): “They wandered about in sheep-skins in goat-skins,” and a gloss adds—“as Elias and others.” Moreover it is said in the Decretal XXI, qu. iv, can. Omnis jactantia: “If any persons be found to deride those who wear coarse and religious apparel they must be reproved. For in the early times all those who were consecrated to God went about in common and coarse apparel.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12), “in all external things, it is not the use but the intention of the user that is at fault.” In order to judge of this it is necessary to observe that coarse and homely apparel may be considered in two ways. First, as being a sign of a man’s disposition or condition, because according to Ecclus. 19:27, “the attire . . . of the man” shows “what he is.” In this way coarseness of attire is sometimes a sign of sorrow: wherefore those who are beset with sorrow are wont to wear coarser clothes, just as on the other hand in times of festivity and joy they wear finer clothes. Hence penitents make use of coarse apparel, for example, the king (Jonah 3:6) who “was clothed with sack-cloth,” and Achab (3 Kings 21:27) who “put hair-cloth upon his flesh.” Sometimes, however, it is a sign of the contempt of riches and worldly ostentation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustico Monach.): “Let your somber attire indicate your purity of mind, your coarse robe prove your contempt of the world, yet so that your mind be not inflated withal, lest your speech belie your habit." In both these ways it is becoming for religious to wear coarse attire, since religion is a state of penance and of contempt of worldly glory.

But that a person wish to signify this to others arises from three motives. First, in order to humble himself: for just as a man's mind is uplifted by fine clothes, so is it humbled by lowly apparel. Hence speaking of Achab who "put hair-cloth on his flesh," the Lord said to Elias: "Hast thou not seen Achab humbled before Me?" (3 Kings 21:29). Secondly, in order to set an example to others; wherefore a gloss on Mat. 3:4, "(John) had his garments of camel's hair," says: "He who preaches penance is clothed in the habit of penance." Thirdly, on account of vainglory; thus Augustine says (cf. OBJ[3]) that "even the weeds of mourning may be a subject of ostentation."

Accordingly in the first two ways it is praiseworthy to wear humble apparel, but in the third way it is sinful.

Secondly, coarse and homely attire may be considered as the result of covetousness or negligence, and thus also it is sinful.

Reply to Objection 1: Coarseness of attire has not of itself the appearance of evil, indeed it has more the appearance of good, namely of the contempt of worldly glory. Hence it is that wicked persons hide their wickedness under coarse clothing. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 24) that "the sheep should not dislike their clothing for the reason that the wolves sometimes hide themselves under it."

Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking there of the coarse attire that is worn on account of human glory.

Reply to Objection 3: According to our Lord's teaching men should do no deeds of holiness for the sake of show: and this is especially the case when one does something strange. Hence Chrysostom [*Hom. xiii in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: "While praying a man should do nothing strange, so as to draw the gaze of others, either by shouting or striking his breast, or casting up his hands," because the very strangeness draws people's attention to him. Yet blame does not attach to all strange behavior that draws people's attention, for it may be done well or ill. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12) that "in the practice of the Christian religion when a man draws attention to himself by unwonted squalor and shabbiness, since he acts thus voluntarily and not of necessity, we can gather from his other deeds whether his behavior is motivated by contempt of excessive dress or by affectation." Religious, however, would especially seem not to act thus from affectation, since they wear a coarse habit as a sign of their profession whereby they profess contempt of the world.

OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the different kinds of religious life, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are different kinds of religious life or only one?

(2) Whether a religious order can be established for the works of the active life?

(3) Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?

(4) Whether a religious order can be established for preaching and the exercise of like works?

(5) Whether a religious order can be established for the study of science?

(6) Whether a religious order that is directed to the contemplative life is more excellent than one that is directed to the active life?

(7) Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common?

(8) Whether the religious life of solitaries is to be preferred to the religious life of those who live in community?

Whether there is only one religious order?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one religious order. For there can be no diversity in that which is possessed wholly and perfectly; wherefore there can be only one sovereign good, as stated in the [3811]FP, Q[6] , AA[2],3,4. Now as Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.), "when a man vows to Almighty God all that he has, all his life, all his knowledge, it is a holocaust," without which there is no religious life. Therefore it would seem that there are not many religious orders but only one.

Objection 2: Further, things which agree in essentials differ only accidentally. Now there is no religious order without the three essential vows of religion, as stated above ([3812]Q[186], AA[6],7). Therefore it would seem that religious orders differ not specifically, but only accidentally.

Objection 3: Further, the state of perfection is competent both to religious and to bishops, as stated above ([3813]Q[185], AA[5],7). Now the episcopate is not diversified specifically, but is one wherever it may be; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxlvi ad Evan.): “Wherever a bishop is, whether at Rome, or Gubbio, or Constantinople, or Reggio, he has the same excellence, the same priesthood.” Therefore in like manner there is but one religious order.

Objection 4: Further, anything that may lead to confusion should be removed from the Church. Now it would seem that a diversity of religious orders might confuse the Christian people, as stated in the Decretal de Statu Monach. et Canon. Reg. [*Cap. Ne Nimia, de Relig. Dom.]. Therefore seemingly there ought not to be different religious orders.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 44:10) that it pertains to the adornment of the queen that she is “surrounded with variety.”

I answer that, As stated above (Q[186], A, 7;[3814] Q[187], A[2]), the religious state is a training school wherein one aims by practice at the perfection of charity. Now there are various works of charity to which a man may devote himself; and there are also various kinds of exercise. Wherefore religious orders may be differentiated in two ways. First, according to the different things to which they may be directed: thus one may be directed to the lodging of pilgrims, another to visiting or ransoming captives. Secondly, there may be various religious orders according to the diversity of practices; thus in one religious order the body is chastised by abstinence in food, in another by the practice of manual labor, scantiness of clothes, or the like.

Since, however, the end imports most in every matter, [*Arist., Topic. vi 8] religious orders differ more especially according to their various ends than according to their various practices.

Reply to Objection 1: The obligation to devote oneself wholly to God’s service is common to every religious order; hence religious do not differ in this respect, as though in one religious order a person retained some one thing of his own, and in another order some other thing. But the difference is in respect of the different things wherein one may serve God, and whereby a man may dispose himself to the service of God.

Reply to Objection 2: The three essential vows of religion pertain to the practice of religion as principles to which all other matters are reduced, as stated above ([3815]Q[186], A[7]). But there are various ways of disposing oneself to the observance of each of them. For instance one disposes oneself to observe the vow of continence, by solitude of place, by abstinence, by mutual fellowship, and by many like means. Accordingly it is evident that the community of the essential vows is compatible with diversity of religious life, both on account of the different dispositions and on account of the different ends, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: In matters relating to perfection, the bishop stands in the position of agent, and the religious as passive, as stated above ([3816]Q[184], A[7]). Now the agent, even in natural things, the higher it is, is so much the more one, whereas the things that are passive are various. Hence with reason the episcopal state is one, while religious orders are many.

Reply to Objection 4: Confusion is opposed to distinction and order. Accordingly the multitude of religious orders would lead to confusion, if different religious orders were directed to the same end and in the same way, without necessity or utility. Wherefore to prevent this happening it has been wholesomely forbidden to establish a new religious order without the authority of the Sovereign Pontiff.

Whether a religious order should be established for the works of the active life?

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order should be established for the works of the active life. For every religious order belongs to the state of perfection, as stated above ([3817]Q[184], A[5];[3818] Q[186], A[1]). Now the perfection of the religious state consists in the contemplation of divine things. For Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi) that they are “called servants of God by reason of their rendering pure service and subjection to God, and on account of the indivisible and singular life which unites them by holy reflections,” i.e. contemplations, “on invisible things, to the Godlike unity and the perfection beloved of God.” Therefore seemingly no religious order should be established for the works of the active life.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly the same judgment applies to canons regular as to monks, according to Extra, De Postul., cap. Ex parte; and De Statu Monach., cap. Quod Dei timorem: for it is stated that “they are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks”: and the same would seem to apply to all other religious. Now the monastic rule was established for the purpose of the contemplative life; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. lviii ad Paulin.): “If you wish to be what you are called, a monk,” i.e. a solitary, “what business have you in a city?” The same is found stated in Extra, De Renuntiatione, cap. Nisi cum pridem; and De Regular., cap. Licet quibusdam. Therefore it would seem that every religious order is directed to the contemplative life, and none to the active life.

Objection 3: Further, the active life is concerned with the present world. Now all religious are said to renounce the world; wherefore Gregory says (Hom. xx in Ezech.): “He who renounces this world, and does all the good he can, is like one who has gone out of Egypt and offers sacrifice in the wilderness.” Therefore it would seem that no religious order can be directed to the active life.

On the contrary, It is written (James 1:27): “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation.” Now this belongs to the active life. Therefore religious life can be fittingly directed to the active life.

I answer that, As stated above [3819](A[1]), the religious state is directed to the perfection of charity, which extends to the love of God and of our neighbor. Now the contemplative life which seeks to devote itself to God alone belongs directly to the love of God, while the active life, which ministers to our neighbor’s needs, belongs directly to the love of one’s neighbor. And just as out of charity we love our neighbor for God’s sake, so the services we render our neighbor redound to God, according to Mat. 25:40, “What you have done [Vulg.: ‘As long as you did it’] to one of these My least brethren, you did it to Me.” Consequently those services which we render our neighbor, in so far as we refer them to God, are described as sacrifices, according to Heb. 13:16, “Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God’s favor is obtained.” And since it belongs properly to religion to offer sacrifice to God, as stated above (Q[81], A[1], ad 1; A[4], ad 1), it follows that certain religious orders are fittingly directed to the works of the active life. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4) the Abbot Nesteros in distinguishing the various aims of religious orders says: “Some direct their intention exclusively to the hidden life of the desert and purity of heart; some are occupied with the instruction of the brethren and the care of the monasteries; while others delight in the service of the guesthouse,” i.e. in hospitality.

Reply to Objection 1: Service and subjection rendered to God are not precluded by the works of the active life, whereby a man serves his neighbor for God’s sake, as stated in the Article. Nor do these works preclude singularity of life; not that they involve man’s living apart from his fellow-men, but in the sense that each man individually devotes himself to things pertaining to the service of God; and since religious occupy themselves with the works of the active life for God’s sake, it follows that their action results from their contemplation of divine things. Hence they are not entirely deprived of the fruit of the contemplative life.

Reply to Objection 2: The same judgment applies to monks and to all other religious, as regards things common to all religious orders: for instance as regards their devoting themselves wholly to the divine service, their observance of the essential vows of religion, and their refraining from worldly business. But it does not follow that this likeness extends to other things that are proper to the monastic profession, and are directed especially to the contemplative life. Hence in the aforesaid Decretal, De Postulando, it is not simply stated that “the same judgment applies to canons regular” as “to monks,” but that it applies “in matters already mentioned,” namely that “they are not to act as advocates in lawsuits.” Again the Decretal quoted, De Statu Monach., after the statement that “canons regular are not considered to be separated from the fellowship of monks,” goes on to say: “Nevertheless they obey an easier rule.” Hence it is evident that they are not bound to all that monks are bound.

Reply to Objection 3: A man may be in the world in two ways: in one way by his bodily presence, in another way by the bent of his mind. Hence our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 15:19): “I have chosen you out of the world,” and yet speaking of them to His Father He said (Jn. 17:11): “These are in the world, and I come to Thee.” Although, then, religious who are occupied with the works of the active life are in the world as to the presence of the body, they are not in the world as regards their bent of mind, because they are occupied with external things, not as seeking anything of the world, but merely for the sake of serving God: for "they . . . use this world, as if they used it not," to quote 1 Cor. 7:31. Hence (James 1:27) after it is stated that "religion clean and undefiled . . . is . . . to visit the fatherless and widows in their tribulation," it is added, "and to keep one's self unspotted from this world," namely to avoid being attached to worldly things.

Whether a religious order can be directed to soldiering?

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order can be directed to soldiering. For all religious orders belong to the state of perfection. Now our Lord said with reference to the perfection of Christian life (Mat. 5:39): "I say to you not to resist evil; but if one strike thee on the right cheek, turn to him also the other," which is inconsistent with the duties of a soldier. Therefore no religious order can be established for soldiering.

Objection 2: Further, the bodily encounter of the battlefield is more grievous than the encounter in words that takes place between counsel at law. Yet religious are forbidden to plead at law, as appears from the Decretal De Postulando quoted above (A[2], OBJ[2]). Therefore it is much less seemly for a religious order to be established for soldiering.

Objection 3: Further, the religious state is a state of penance, as we have said above ([3820]Q[187], A[6]). Now according to the code of laws soldiering is forbidden to penitents. for it is said in the Decretal De Poenit., Dist. v, cap. 3: "It is altogether opposed to the rules of the Church, to return to worldly soldiering after doing penance." Therefore it is unfitting for any religious order to be established for soldiering.

Objection 4: Further, no religious order may be established for an unjust object. But as Isidore says (Etym. xviii, 1), "A just war is one that is waged by order of the emperor." Since then religious are private individuals, it would seem unlawful for them to wage war; and consequently no religious order may be established for this purpose.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. clxxxix; ad Bonifac.), "Beware of thinking that none of those can please God who handle war-like weapons. Of such was holy David to whom the Lord gave great testimony." Now religious orders are established in order that men may please God.

Therefore nothing hinders the establishing of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering.

I answer that, As stated above [3821](A[2]), a religious order may be established not only for the works of the contemplative life, but also for the works of the active life, in so far as they are concerned in helping our neighbor and in the service of God, but not in so far as they are directed to a worldly object. Now the occupation of soldiering may be directed to the assistance of our neighbor, not only as regards private individuals, but also as regards the defense of the whole commonwealth. Hence it is said of Judas Machabeus (1 Macc. 3:2,3) that "he [Vulg.: 'they'] fought with cheerfulness the battle of Israel, and he got his people great honor." It can also be directed to the upkeep of divine worship, wherefore (1 Macc. 3:21) Judas is stated to have said: "We will fight for our lives and our laws," and further on (1 Macc. 13:3) Simon said: "You know what great battles I and my brethren, and the house of my father, have fought for the laws and the sanctuary."

Hence a religious order may be fittingly established for soldiering, not indeed for any worldly purpose, but for the defense of divine worship and public safety, or also of the poor and oppressed, according to Ps. 81:4: "Rescue the poor, and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner."

Reply to Objection 1: Not to resist evil may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense of forgiving the wrong done to oneself, and thus it may pertain to perfection, when it is expedient to act thus for the spiritual welfare of others. Secondly, in the sense of tolerating patiently the wrongs done to others: and this pertains to imperfection, or even to vice, if one be able to resist the wrongdoer in a becoming manner. Hence Ambrose says (De Offic. i, 27): "The courage whereby a man in battle defends his country against barbarians, or protects the weak at home, or his friends against robbers is full of justice": even so our Lord says in the passage quoted [*Lk. 6:30 "Of him that taketh away thy goods, ask them not again"; Cf. Mat. 5:40], " . . . thy goods, ask them not again." If, however, a man were not to demand the return of that which belongs to another, he would sin if it were his business to do so: for it is praiseworthy to give away one's own, but not another's property. And much less should the things of God be neglected, for as Chrysostom [*Hom. v in Matth. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, “it is most wicked to overlook the wrongs done to God.”

Reply to Objection 2: It is inconsistent with any religious order to act as counsel at law for a worldly object, but it is not inconsistent to do so at the orders of one’s superior and in favor of one’s monastery, as stated in the same Decretal, or for the defense of the poor and widows. Wherefore it is said in the Decretals (Dist. lxxxviii, cap. 1): “The holy synod has decreed that henceforth no cleric is to buy property or occupy himself with secular business, save with a view to the care of the fatherless . . . and widows.” Likewise to be a soldier for the sake of some worldly object is contrary to all religious life, but this does not apply to those who are soldiers for the sake of God’s service.

Reply to Objection 3: Worldly soldiering is forbidden to penitents, but the soldiering which is directed to the service of God is imposed as a penance on some people, as in the case of those upon whom it is enjoined to take arms in defense of the Holy Land.

Reply to Objection 4: The establishment of a religious order for the purpose of soldiering does not imply that the religious can wage war on their own authority; but they can do so only on the authority of the sovereign or of the Church.

Whether a religious order can be established for preaching or hearing confessions?

Objection 1: It would seem that no religious order may be established for preaching, or hearing confessions. For it is said (VII, qu. i [*Cap. Hoc nequaquam; Cf.[3822] Q[187], A[1], OBJ[1]]): “The monastic life is one of subjection and discipleship, not of teaching, authority, or pastoral care,” and the same apparently applies to religious. Now preaching and hearing confessions are the actions of a pastor and teacher. Therefore a religious order should not be established for this purpose.

Objection 2: Further, the purpose for which a religious order is established would seem to be something most proper to the religious life, as stated above [3823](A[1]). Now the aforesaid actions are not proper to religious but to bishops. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the purpose of such actions.

Objection 3: Further, it seems unfitting that the authority to preach and hear confessions should be committed to an unlimited number of men; and there is no fixed number of those who are received into a religious order. Therefore it is unfitting for a religious order to be established for the purpose of the aforesaid actions.

Objection 4: Further, preachers have a right to receive their livelihood from the faithful of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 9. If then the office of preaching be committed to a religious order established for that purpose, it follows that the faithful of Christ are bound to support an unlimited number of persons, which would be a heavy burden on them. Therefore a religious order should not be established for the exercise of these actions.

Objection 5: Further, the organization of the Church should be in accordance with Christ's institution. Now Christ sent first the twelve apostles to preach, as related in Luke 9, and afterwards He sent the seventy-two disciples, as stated in Luke 10. Moreover, according to the gloss of Bede on "And after these things" (Lk. 10:1), "the apostles are represented by the bishops, the seventy-two disciples by the lesser priests," i.e. the parish priests. Therefore in addition to bishops and parish priests, no religious order should be established for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions.

On the contrary, In the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 4), Abbot Nesteros, speaking of the various kinds of religious orders, says: "Some choosing the care of the sick, others devoting themselves to the relief of the afflicted and oppressed, or applying themselves to teaching, or giving alms to the poor, have been most highly esteemed on account of their devotion and piety." Therefore just as a religious order may be established for the care of the sick, so also may one be established for teaching the people by preaching and like works.

I answer that, As stated above [3824](A[2]), it is fitting for a religious order to be established for the works of the active life, in so far as they are directed to the good of our neighbor, the service of God, and the upkeep of divine worship. Now the good of our neighbor is advanced by things pertaining to the spiritual welfare of the soul rather than by things pertaining to the supplying of bodily needs, in proportion to the excellence of spiritual over corporal things. Hence it was stated above (Q[32], A[3]) that spiritual works of mercy surpass corporal works of mercy. Moreover this is more pertinent to the service of God, to Whom no sacrifice is more acceptable than zeal for souls, as Gregory says (Hom. xii in Ezech.). Furthermore, it is a greater thing to employ spiritual arms in defending the faithful against the errors of heretics and the temptations of the devil, than to protect the faithful by means of bodily weapons. Therefore it is most fitting for a religious order to be established for preaching and similar works pertaining to the salvation of souls.

Reply to Objection 1: He who works by virtue of another, acts as an instrument. And a minister is like an “animated instrument,” as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2 [*Cf. Ethic. viii, 11]). Hence if a man preach or do something similar by the authority of his superiors, he does not rise above the degree of “discipleship” or “subjection,” which is competent to religious.

Reply to Objection 2: Some religious orders are established for soldiering, to wage war, not indeed on their own authority, but on that of the sovereign or of the Church who are competent to wage war by virtue of their office, as stated above (A[3], ad 4). In the same way certain religious orders are established for preaching and hearing confessions, not indeed by their own authority, but by the authority of the higher and lower superiors, to whom these things belong by virtue of their office. Consequently to assist one’s superiors in such a ministry is proper to a religious order of this kind.

Reply to Objection 3: Bishops do not allow these religious severally and indiscriminately to preach or hear confessions, but according to the discretion of the religious superiors, or according to their own appointment.

Reply to Objection 4: The faithful are not bound by law to contribute to the support of other than their ordinary prelates, who receive the tithes and offerings of the faithful for that purpose, as well as other ecclesiastical revenues. But if some men are willing to minister to the faithful by exercising the aforesaid acts gratuitously, and without demanding payment as of right, the faithful are not burdened thereby because their temporal contributions can be liberally repaid by those men, nor are they bound by law to contribute, but by charity, and yet not so that they be burdened thereby and others eased, as stated in 2 Cor. 8:13. If, however, none be found to devote themselves gratuitously to services of this kind, the ordinary prelate is bound, if he cannot suffice by himself, to seek other suitable persons and support them himself.

Reply to Objection 5: The seventy-two disciples are represented not only by the parish priests, but by all those of lower order who in any way assist the bishops in their office. For we do not read that our Lord appointed the seventy-two disciples to certain fixed parishes, but that “He sent them two and two before His face into every city and place whither He Himself was to come.” It was fitting, however, that in addition to the ordinary prelates others should be chosen for these duties on account of the multitude of the faithful, and the difficulty of finding a sufficient number of persons to be appointed to each locality, just as it was necessary to establish religious orders for military service, on account of the secular princes being unable to cope with unbelievers in certain countries.

Whether a religious order should be established for the purpose of study?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order should not be established for the purpose of study. For it is written (Ps. 70:15,16): “Because I have not known letters [Douay: ‘learning’], I will enter into the powers of the Lord,” i.e. “Christian virtue,” according to a gloss. Now the perfection of Christian virtue, seemingly, pertains especially to religious. Therefore it is not for them to apply themselves to the study of letters.

Objection 2: Further, that which is a source of dissent is unbecoming to religious, who are gathered together in the unity of peace. Now study leads to dissent: wherefore different schools of thought arose among the philosophers. Hence Jerome (Super Epist. ad Tit. 1:5) says: “Before a diabolical instinct brought study into religion, and people said: I am of Paul, I of Apollo, I of Cephas,” etc. Therefore it would seem that no religious order should be established for the purpose of study.

Objection 3: Further, those who profess the Christian religion should profess nothing in common with the Gentiles. Now among the Gentiles were some who professed philosophy, and even now some secular persons are known as professors of certain sciences. Therefore the study of letters does not become religious.

On the contrary, Jerome (Ep. liii ad Paulin.) urges him to acquire learning in the monastic state, saying: “Let us learn on earth those things the knowledge of which will remain in heaven,” and further on: “Whatever you seek to know, I will endeavor to know with you.”

I answer that As stated above [3825](A[2]), religion may be ordained to the active and to the contemplative life. Now chief among the works of the active life are those which are directly ordained to the salvation of souls, such as preaching and the like. Accordingly the study of letters is becoming to the religious life in three ways. First, as regards that which is proper to the contemplative life, to which the study of letters helps in a twofold manner. In one way by helping directly to contemplate, namely by enlightening the intellect. For the contemplative life of which we are now speaking is directed chiefly to the consideration of divine things, as stated above (Q[180], A[4]), to which consideration man is directed by study; for which reason it is said in praise of the righteous (Ps. 1:2) that "he shall meditate day and night" on the law of the Lord, and (Ecclus. 39:1): "The wise man will seek out the wisdom of all the ancients, and will be occupied in the prophets." In another way the study of letters is a help to the contemplative life indirectly, by removing the obstacles to contemplation, namely the errors which in the contemplation of divine things frequently beset those who are ignorant of the scriptures. Thus we read in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. x, 3) that the Abbot Serapion through simplicity fell into the error of the Anthropomorphites, who thought that God had a human shape. Hence Gregory says (Moral. vi) that "some through seeking in contemplation more than they are able to grasp, fall away into perverse doctrines, and by failing to be the humble disciples of truth become the masters of error." Hence it is written (Eccles. 2:3): "I thought in my heart to withdraw my flesh from wine, that I might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly."

Secondly, the study of letters is necessary in those religious orders that are founded for preaching and other like works; wherefore the Apostle (Titus 1:9), speaking of bishops to whose office these acts belong, says: "Embracing that faithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers." Nor does it matter that the apostles were sent to preach without having studied letters, because, as Jerome says (Ep. liii ad Paulin.), "whatever others acquire by exercise and daily meditation in God's law, was taught them by the Holy Ghost."

Thirdly, the study of letters is becoming to religious as regards that which is common to all religious orders. For it helps us to avoid the lusts of the flesh; wherefore Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rust. Monach.): “Love the science of the Scriptures and thou shalt have no love for carnal vice.” For it turns the mind away from lustful thoughts, and tames the flesh on account of the toil that study entails according to Ecclus. 31:1, “Watching for riches* consumeth the flesh.” [*Vigilia honestatis St. Thomas would seem to have taken ‘honestas’ in the sense of virtue]. It also helps to remove the desire of riches, wherefore it is written (Wis. 7:8): “I . . . esteemed riches nothing in comparison with her,” and (1 Macc. 12:9): “We needed none of these things,” namely assistance from without, “having for our comfort the holy books that are in our hands.” It also helps to teach obedience, wherefore Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xvii): “What sort of perverseness is this, to wish to read, but not to obey what one reads?” Hence it is clearly fitting that a religious order be established for the study of letters.

Reply to Objection 1: This commentary of the gloss is an exposition of the Old Law of which the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): “The letter killeth.” Hence not to know letters is to disapprove of the circumcision of the “letter” and other carnal observances.

Reply to Objection 2: Study is directed to knowledge which, without charity, “puffeth up,” and consequently leads to dissent, according to Prov. 13:10, “Among the proud there are always dissensions”: whereas, with charity, it “edifieth and begets concord.” Hence the Apostle after saying (1 Cor. 1:5): “You are made rich . . . in all utterance and in all knowledge,” adds (1 Cor. 1:10): “That you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you.” But Jerome is not speaking here of the study of letters, but of the study of dissensions which heretics and schismatics have brought into the Christian religion.

Reply to Objection 3: The philosophers professed the study of letters in the matter of secular learning: whereas it becomes religious to devote themselves chiefly to the study of letters in reference to the doctrine that is “according to godliness” (Titus 1:1). It becomes not religious, whose whole life is devoted to the service of God, to seek for other learning, save in so far as it is referred to the sacred doctrine. Hence Augustine says at the end of De Musica vi, 17: “Whilst we think that we should not overlook those whom heretics delude by the deceitful assurance of reason and knowledge, we are slow to advance in the consideration of their methods. Yet we should not be praised for doing this, were it not that many holy sons of their most loving mother the Catholic Church had done the same under the necessity of confounding heretics.”

Whether a religious order that is devoted to the contemplative life is more excellent than on that is given to the active life?

Objection 1: It would seem that a religious order which is devoted to the contemplative life is not more excellent than one which is given to the active life. For it is said (Extra, de Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet), quoting the words of Innocent III: “Even as a greater good is preferred to a lesser, so the common profit takes precedence of private profit: and in this case teaching is rightly preferred to silence, responsibility to contemplation, work to rest.” Now the religious order which is directed to the greater good is better. Therefore it would seem that those religious orders that are directed to the active life are more excellent than those which are directed to the contemplative life.

Objection 2: Further, every religious order is directed to the perfection of charity, as stated above ([3826]AA[1],2). Now a gloss on Heb. 12:4, “For you have not yet resisted unto blood,” says: “In this life there is no more perfect love than that to which the holy martyrs attained, who fought against sin unto blood.” Now to fight unto blood is becoming those religious who are directed to military service, and yet this pertains to the active life. Therefore it would seem that religious orders of this kind are the most excellent.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly the stricter a religious order is, the more excellent it is. But there is no reason why certain religious orders directed to the active life should not be of stricter observance than those directed to the contemplative life. Therefore they are more excellent.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 10:42) that the “best part” was Mary’s, by whom the contemplative life is signified.

I answer that, As stated above [3827](A[1]), the difference between one religious order and another depends chiefly on the end, and secondarily on the exercise. And since one thing cannot be said to be more excellent than another save in respect of that in which it differs therefrom, it follows that the excellence of one religious order over another depends chiefly on their ends, and secondarily on their respective exercises. Nevertheless each of these comparisons is considered in a different way. For the comparison with respect to the end is absolute, since the end is sought for its own sake; whereas the comparison with respect to exercise is relative, since exercise is sought not for its own sake, but for the sake of the end. Hence a religious order is preferable to another, if it be directed to an end that is absolutely more excellent either because it is a greater good or because it is directed to more goods. If, however, the end be the same, the excellence of one religious order over another depends secondarily, not on the amount of exercise, but on the proportion of the exercise to the end in view. Wherefore in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2) Blessed Antony is quoted, as preferring discretion whereby a man moderates all his actions, to fastings, watchings, and all such observances.

Accordingly we must say that the work of the active life is twofold. one proceeds from the fulness of contemplation, such as teaching and preaching. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. v in Ezech.) that the words of Ps. 144:7, “They shall publish the memory of . . . Thy sweetness,” refer “to perfect men returning from their contemplation.” And this work is more excellent than simple contemplation. For even as it is better to enlighten than merely to shine, so is it better to give to others the fruits of one’s contemplation than merely to contemplate. The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like, which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in cases of necessity, as stated above ([3828]Q[182], A[1]). Accordingly the highest place in religious orders is held by those which are directed to teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the episcopal perfection, even as in other things “the end of that which is first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is second,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place belongs to those which are directed to contemplation, and the third to those which are occupied with external actions.

Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious order excels another through being directed to higher action in the same genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to ransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or if it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.

Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as directed to the salvation of souls.

Reply to Objection 2: Those religious orders that are established for the purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the enemy’s blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in certain cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious; even as in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of contemplation.

Reply to Objection 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief object of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Is. 58:5): “Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict his soul for a day?” Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as being necessary for taming the flesh, “which if done without discretion, is liable to make us fail altogether,” as the Blessed Antony observes. Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent through having stricter observances, but because its observances are directed by greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the taming of the flesh is more efficaciously directed to continence by means of abstinence in meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and thirst, than by the privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and nakedness, or by bodily labor.

Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common?

Objection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): “If thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg.: ‘what’] thou hast and give to the poor.” Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs to the perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something in common do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that they do not quite reach to the perfection of Christian life.

Objection 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving the counsel of virginity said (1 Cor. 7:32): “I would have you to be without solicitude.” Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow; and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Mat. 6:34) saying: “Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow.” Therefore it would seem that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by having something in common.

Objection 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod. Episc.) says in reference to certain people: “They are richer in the monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the world were beggars.” But it is derogatory to religious perfection that one should possess wealth of one’s own. Therefore it is also derogatory to religious perfection to possess anything in common.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy man named Isaac, that “when his disciples humbly signified that he should accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the monastery, he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty, held firmly to his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly possessions is no monk at all”: and this refers to possessions held in common, and which were offered him for the common use of the monastery. Therefore it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess anything in common.

Objection 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to His disciples, said (Mat. 10:9,10): “Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses, nor script for your journey.” By these words, as Jerome says in his commentary, “He reproves those philosophers who are commonly called Bactroperatae [*i.e. staff and scrip bearers], who as despising the world and valuing all things at naught carried their pantry about with them.” Therefore it would seem derogatory to religious perfection that one should keep something whether for oneself or for the common use.

On the contrary, Prosper [*Julianus Pomerius, among the works of Prosper] says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII, qu. 1, can. Expedit): “It is sufficiently clear both that for the sake of perfection one should renounce having anything of one’s own, and that the possession of revenues, which are of course common property, is no hindrance to the perfection of the Church.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3829]Q[184], A[3], ad 1;[3830] Q[185], A[6], ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 27): “Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which is perfect, namely, ‘We have followed Thee,’” while poverty is like an instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says: “Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and privation of all one’s possessions are not perfection, but means of perfection.”

Now the privation of one’s possessions, or poverty, is a means of perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Mat. 13:22): “That which was sown [Vulg.: ‘He that received the seed’] among thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word.” The second is the love of riches, which increases with the possession of wealth; wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that “since it is difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not say: ‘It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven,’ but: ‘It is difficult.’” The third is vainglory or elation which results from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, “They that trust in their own strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches.”

Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long as external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, and as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does not hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care, but only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine, commenting on Mat. 6:25, “Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat,” says (De Serm. in Monte [*The words quoted are from De Operibus Monach. xxvi]): “In saying this He does not forbid them to procure these things in so far as they needed them, but to be intent on them, and for their sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in preaching the Gospel.” Yet the possession of much wealth increases the weight of care, which is a great distraction to man’s mind and hinders him from giving himself wholly to God’s service. The other two, however, namely the love of riches and taking pride or glorying in riches, result only from an abundance of wealth.

Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the care that one takes of one’s own wealth, pertains to love of self, whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care that is given to things held in common pertains to the love of charity which “seeketh not her own,” but looks to the common good. And since religion is directed to the perfection of charity, and charity is perfected in “the love of God extending to contempt of self” [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xiv, 28], it is contrary to religious perfection to possess anything in private. But the care that is given to common goods may pertain to charity, although it may prove an obstacle to some higher act of charity, such as divine contemplation or the instructing of one’s neighbor. Hence it is evident that to have excessive riches in common, whether in movable or in immovable property, is an obstacle to perfection, though not absolutely incompatible with it; while it is not an obstacle to religious perfection to have enough external things, whether movables or immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we consider poverty in relation to the common end of religious orders, which is to devote oneself to the service of God. But if we consider poverty in relation to the special end of any religious order, then this end being presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is adapted to that religious order; and each religious order will be the more perfect in respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty more adapted to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the outward and bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance of outward things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that “many things are needed for action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to his contemplation.” Accordingly it is clear that a religious order directed to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering or the lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common riches; whereas those religious orders which are directed to the contemplative life are the more perfect, according as the poverty they profess burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the care of temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious life as the religious life requires a greater care of spiritual things.

Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's contemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only. Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a threefold degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid degrees of religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order which is directed to the bodily actions of the active life should have an abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of a religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate, unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished by their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting time. This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example. For He had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were kept the things that were offered to Him, as related in Jn. 12:6.

Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: "If anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that He deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own uses," namely by paying the tax—because among those poor His disciples held a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was spent chiefly on their needs. For it is stated (Jn. 4:8) that "His disciples were gone into the city to buy meats," and (Jn. 13:29) that the disciples "thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus had said to him: But those things which we have need of for the festival day, or that he should give something to the poor." From this it is evident that to keep money by, or any other common property for the support of religious of the same order, or of any other poor, is in accordance with the perfection which Christ taught by His example. Moreover, after the resurrection, the disciples from whom all religious orders took their origin kept the price of the lands, and distributed it according as each one had need (Acts 4:34,35).

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3831]Q[184], A[3], ad 1), this saying of our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but that it is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above ([3832]Q[186], A[8]), it is the least of the three chief means of perfection; since the vow of continence excels the vow of poverty, and the vow of obedience excels them both. Since, however, the means are sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is better, not for being a greater instrument, but for being more adapted to the end. Thus a physician does not heal the more the more medicine he gives, but the more the medicine is adapted to the disease. Accordingly it does not follow that a religious order is the more perfect, according as the poverty it professes is more perfect, but according as its poverty is more adapted to the end both common and special. Granted even that the religious order which exceeds others in poverty be more perfect in so far as it is poorer, this would not make it more perfect simply. For possibly some other religious order might surpass it in matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be more perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better simply.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord's words (Mat. 6:34), "Be not solicitous for tomorrow," do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow; for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: "It has been our experience that those who have attempted to practice the privation of all means of livelihood, so as not to have the wherewithal to procure themselves food for one day, have been deceived so unawares that they were unable to finish properly the work they had undertaken." And, as Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii), "if this saying of our Lord, 'Be not solicitous for tomorrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by for the morrow, those who shut themselves up for many days from the sight of men, and apply their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be unable to provide themselves with these things." Again he adds afterwards: "Are we to suppose that the more holy they are, the less do they resemble the birds?" And further on (De oper. Monach. xxiv): "For if it be argued from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they answer rightly: Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the money that was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was imminent, was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus provide for the needs of the saints?"

Accordingly the saying: "Be not solicitous for tomorrow," according to Jerome (Super Matth.) is to be rendered thus: "It is enough that we think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it to God": according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "It is enough to endure the toil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary things": according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): "When we do any good action, we should bear in mind not temporal things which are denoted by the morrow, but eternal things."

Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are excessive riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of which even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton. But they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use, merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining to the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the common use.

Reply to Objection 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions, because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth, the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection. Hence Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): "He was as afraid of forfeiting the security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his perishable wealth." It is not, however, related that he refused to accept such things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life.

Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5,6) that bread, wine, and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial riches. Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of money, and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid them to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be understood has been shown above (Q[185], A[6] , ad 2; [3833]FS, Q[108], A[2], ad 3).

Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life. For it is written (Eccles. 4:9): “It is better . . . that two should be together, than one; for they have the advantage of their society.” Therefore the religious life of those who live in community would seem to be more perfect.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Mat. 18:20): “Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.” But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ. Therefore it would seem better to live in community than in solitude.

Objection 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now obedience and humility are better observed in company than in solitude; for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach.): “In solitude pride quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he does what he likes”; whereas when instructing one who lives in community, he says: “You may not do what you will, you must eat what you are bidden to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren, you must fear the superior of the monastery as God, love him as a father.” Therefore it would seem that the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life.

Objection 4: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 11:33): “No man lighteth a candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel.” Now those who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and to be doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious life is not more perfect.

Objection 5: Further, that which is in accord with man’s nature is apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1). Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more perfect than to lead a community life.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that “those are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give their whole mind to a life of prayer.”

I answer that, Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that "solitude," even as fasting and other like things, is "a sure means of acquiring purity of heart." Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to action but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, "I . . . will lead her into solitude [Douay: 'the wilderness']; and I will speak to her heart." Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders that are directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the active life; except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ, Who as Luke relates (6:12), "went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God." On the other hand, it is suitable to those religious orders that are directed to contemplation.

It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one "that lacks nothing," and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 6]. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative who has already attained to perfection. This happens in two ways: in one way by the gift only of God, as in the case of John the Baptist, who was "filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother's womb" (Lk. 1:11), so that he was in the desert even as a boy; in another way by the practice of virtuous action, according to Heb. 5:14: "Strong meat is for the perfect; for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil."

Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in two ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "It pleases me that you have the fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself. Secondly, as regards the affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained by the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as Gregory says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, "To whom I have given a house in the wilderness" (Job 39:6), "What profits solitude of the body, if solitude of the heart be lacking?" Hence a social life is necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude befits those who are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach., Ep. cxxv): "Far from condemning the solitary life, we have often commended it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from the monastic school to be such as not to be deterred by the hard noviciate of the desert, and such as have given proof of their conduct for a considerable time.

Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that which is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries, if duly practiced, surpasses the community life. But if it be undertaken without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very great danger, unless the grace of God supply that which others acquire by practice, as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the Blessed Benedict.

Reply to Objection 1: Solomon shows that two are better than one, on account of the help which one affords the other either by “lifting him” up, or by “warming him,” i.e. giving him spiritual heat (Eccles. 4:10,11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not require this help.

Reply to Objection 2: According to 1 Jn. 4:16, “He that abideth in charity abideth in God and God in him.” Wherefore just as Christ is in the midst of those who are united together in the fellowship of brotherly love, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes himself to divine contemplation through love of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Actual obedience is required of those who need to be schooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of perfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently “led by the spirit of God” so that they need not to obey others actually. Nevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), “no one is forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a praiseworthy leisure.” That a man be placed “on a candlestick,” does not concern him but his superiors, and “if this burden is not placed on us,” as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), “we must devote ourselves to the contemplation of truth,” for which purpose solitude is most helpful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary life are most useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine says (De Morib. Eccl. xxxi): “They dwell in the most lonely places, content to live on water and the bread that is brought to them from time to time, enjoying colloquy with God to whom they have adhered with a pure mind. To some they seem to have renounced human intercourse more than is right: but these understand not how much such men profit us by the spirit of their prayers, what an example to us is the life of those whom we are forbidden to see in the body.”

Reply to Objection 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two motives. one is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship on account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The other is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that “he who associates not with others is either a beast or a god,” i.e. a godly man.

OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the commandments should enter religion?

(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter religion?

(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to fulfil their vow?

(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there in perpetuity?

(5) Whether children should be received into religion?

(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through deference to one’s parents?

(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion?

(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another?

(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?

(10) Whether serious deliberation with one’s relations and friends is requisite for entrance into religion?

Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should enter religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had kept the commandments “from his youth.” Now all religious orders originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be allowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the observance of the commandments.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech., and Moral. xxii): “No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a beginning of a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish great things.” Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to the perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the counsels, unless one be already practiced in the observance of the precepts.

Objection 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], “order should be observed in ascending to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the summit by overpassing the steps.” [*The rest of the quotation is from Regist. v, Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc.]. “For we are well aware that walls when built receive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight before they are seasoned they bring down the whole building” (Dist. xlviii, can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that one should not enter religion unless one be practiced in the observance of the precepts.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, “As a child that is weaned is towards his mother,” says: “First we are conceived in the womb of Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother’s milk for a father’s control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine, by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the beginning with God.” Afterwards it goes on to say: “For those who are just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the hands of the Church as it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Afterwards they are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and being weaned so to speak, begin to fast and keep other difficult observances. Many, like the heretics and schismatics, have perverted this order by being weaned before the time. Hence they have come to naught." Now this order is apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or induce others to enter religion, before they are practiced in the easier observance of the commandments. Therefore they would seem to be heretics or schismatics.

Objection 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to that which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels, because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by the other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. Seeing then that the right order requires one to pass from that which comes first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not to pass to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being first of all practiced in the observance of the commandments.

On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the observance of the counsels. For it is stated (Lk. 5:28) that "leaving all things he . . . followed Him." Therefore it is not necessary for a person to be practiced in the observance of the commandments before passing to the perfection of the counsels.

I answer that, As shown above ([3834]Q[188], A[1]), the religious state is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are those things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it is evident that the observances of the religious state, while removing the obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other manner of sins.

Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not practiced, in order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: “The young man lies when he says: ‘All these have I kept from my youth.’ For if he had fulfilled this commandment, ‘Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,’ why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast and give to the poor?” But this means that he lied as to the perfect observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract. viii super Matth.) that “it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews that when our Lord had said to him: ‘Go, sell all thou hast,’ the rich man began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How sayest thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, seeing that it is written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself? Behold many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are clothed in filth, and die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all manner of good things, and nothing whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For it is impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially to have such great wealth.” This also refers to the perfect fulfilment of this precept. on the other hand, it is true that he kept the commandments imperfectly and in a general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the observance of the precepts of charity, as stated above ([3835]Q[184], A[3]). Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the counsels is useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our Lord called not only the innocent youth but also the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His call, and the youth obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the religious life more easily than those who presume on their innocency. It is to the former that our Lord says (Mat. 21:31): “The publicans and the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you.”

Reply to Objection 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in three ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state need not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be a cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a layman. Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this way it is clear that one man begins straightway not only from a higher state, but even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest degree to which another man attains throughout his whole life. Hence Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy Benedict began at a high degree of grace and perfection in his daily life."

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3836]Q[184], A[6]) the holy orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for the attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid on the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the burden of religion seasons the walls, i.e. men, by drawing out the damp of vice.

Reply to Objection 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that it is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has to pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics" and "schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath [*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking 'retributio,' which Douay renders 'reward,' as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is the Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of angels, namely the Word that is in the beginning with God." The example which is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on them as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them inwardly to take upon themselves difficult things of their own choice. Hence after Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the Church observes a fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), "is not confined to any particular age; He ceases not when men die, He is not excluded from the maternal womb." Gregory also in a homily for Pentecost (xxx in Ev.) says: "He fills the boy harpist and makes him a psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge [*Dan. 1:8–17]," and afterwards he adds: "No time is needed to learn whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch." Again it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not in man’s power to stop the Spirit,” and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess. 5:19): “Extinguish not the Spirit,” and (Acts 7:51) it is said against certain persons: “You always resist the Holy Ghost.”

Reply to Objection 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the ends, so to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the precepts of charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that these precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but that the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of time, for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the species. But the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels is directed to the observance of the precepts together with the counsels; as an imperfect to a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, since “nature,” as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, 10), “begins with perfect things.” And yet it is not necessary for the precepts first of all to be observed without the counsels, and afterwards with the counsels, just as it is not necessary for one to be an ass before being a man, or married before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary for a person first of all to keep the commandments in the world before entering religion; especially as the worldly life does not dispose one to religious perfection, but is more an obstacle thereto.

Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the religious vow.

Now before profession a year of probation is allowed, according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret., cap. Non solum., de Regular. et Transeunt, ad Relig.] who moreover forbade anyone to be bound to the religious life by profession before completing the year of probation. Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone while yet in the world to be bound by vow to enter religion.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews “should be persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free will” (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil what one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter religion.

Objection 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of falling; wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33,34): “If a man open a pit . . . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay the price of the beasts.” Now through being bound by vow to enter religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to enter religion.

On the contrary, It is written, (Ps. 75:12): “Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God”; and a gloss of Augustine says that “some vows concern the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the like.” Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore it is better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.

I answer that, As stated above ([3837]Q[88], A[6]), when we were treating of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is more praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to vow is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man’s will to do good; and just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will obstinate in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through proceeding from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore it is in itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.

Reply to Objection 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious order. This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded by a year’s probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds him to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a year's probation.

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood as referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end, because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided; indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et Paulin.), "happy is the necessity that compels us to better things."

Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of the will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself, instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from it. But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate from the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after being baptized.

Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation of entering religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health he refused to become a monk." And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to retain them in peace." Now this would not be if he were bound to enter religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep one's vow of entering religion.

Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power. Now it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself to enter religion.

Objection 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one. Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land; and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not necessarily to be fulfilled.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): “If thou hast vowed anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeaseth him”; and a gloss on Ps. 75:12, “Vow ye, and pay to the Lord your God,” says: “To vow depends on the will: but after the vow has been taken the fulfilment is of obligation.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3838]Q[88], A[1]), when we were treating of vows, a vow is a promise made to God in matters concerning God. Now, as Gregory says in a letter to Boniface [*Innoc. I, Epist. ii, Victricio Epo. Rotomag., cap. 14; Cf. can. Viduas: cause. xxvii, qu. 1]: “If among men of good faith contracts are wont to be absolutely irrevocable, how much more shall the breaking of this promise given to God be deserving of punishment!” Therefore a man is under an obligation to fulfil what he has vowed, provided this be something pertaining to God.

Now it is evident that entrance into religion pertains very much to God, since thereby man devotes himself entirely to the divine service, as stated above ([3839]Q[186], A[1]). Hence it follows that he who binds himself to enter religion is under an obligation to enter religion according as he intends to bind himself by his vow: so that if he intend to bind himself absolutely, he is obliged to enter as soon as he can, through the cessation of a lawful impediment; whereas if he intend to bind himself to a certain fixed time, or under a certain fixed condition, he is bound to enter religion when the time comes or the condition is fulfilled.

Reply to Objection 1: This priest had made, not a solemn, but a simple vow. Hence he was not a monk in effect, so as to be bound by law to dwell in a monastery and renounce his cure. However, in the court of conscience one ought to advise him to renounce all and enter religion. Hence (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Per tuas) the Bishop of Grenoble, who had accepted the episcopate after vowing to enter religion, without having fulfilled his vow, is counseled that if “he wish to heal his conscience he should renounce the government of his see and pay his vows to the Most High."

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([3840]Q[88], A[3], ad 2), when we were treating of vows, he who has bound himself by vow to enter a certain religious order is bound to do what is in his power in order to be received in that order; and if he intend to bind himself simply to enter the religious life, if he be not admitted to one, he is bound to go to another; whereas if he intend to bind himself only to one particular order, he is bound only according to the measure of the obligation to which he has engaged himself.

Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion being perpetual is greater than the vow of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, which is a temporal vow; and as Alexander III says (Extra, De Voto et Voti Redemptione, cap. Scripturae), "he who exchanges a temporary service for the perpetual service of religion is in no way guilty of breaking his vow."

Moreover it may be reasonably stated that also by entrance into religion a man obtains remission of all his sins. For if by giving alms a man may forthwith satisfy for his sins, according to Dan. 4:24, "Redeem thou thy sins with alms," much more does it suffice to satisfy for all his sins that a man devote himself wholly to the divine service by entering religion, for this surpasses all manner of satisfaction, even that of public penance, according to the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. i, cap. Admonere) just as a holocaust exceeds a sacrifice, as Gregory declares (Hom. xx in Ezech.). Hence we read in the Lives of the Fathers (vi, 1) that by entering religion one receives the same grace as by being baptized. And yet even if one were not thereby absolved from all debt of punishment, nevertheless the entrance into religion is more profitable than a pilgrimage to the Holy Land, as regards the advancement in good, which is preferable to absolution from punishment.

Whether he who has vowed to enter religion is bound to remain in religion in perpetuity?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who has vowed to enter religion, is bound in perpetuity to remain in religion. For it is better not to enter religion than to leave after entering, according to 2 Pet. 2:21, "It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it to turn back," and Lk. 9:62, "No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God.” But he who bound himself by the vow to enter religion, is under the obligation to enter, as stated above [3841](A[3]). Therefore he is also bound to remain for always.

Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to avoid that which gives rise to scandal, and is a bad example to others. Now by leaving after entering religion a man gives a bad example and is an occasion of scandal to others, who are thereby withdrawn from entering or incited to leave. Therefore it seems that he who enters religion in order to fulfil a vow which he had previously taken, is bound to remain evermore.

Objection 3: Further, the vow to enter religion is accounted a perpetual vow: wherefore it is preferred to temporal vows, as stated above (A[3], ad 3;[3842] Q[88], A[12], ad 1). But this would not be so if a person after vowing to enter religion were to enter with the intention of leaving. It seems, therefore, that he who vows to enter religion is bound also to remain in perpetuity.

On the contrary, The vow of religious profession, for the reason that it binds a man to remain in religion for evermore, has to be preceded by a year of probation; whereas this is not required before the simple vow whereby a man binds himself to enter religion. Therefore it seems that he who vows to enter religion is not for that reason bound to remain there in perpetuity.

I answer that, The obligation of a vow proceeds from the will: because “to vow is an act of the will” according to Augustine [*Gloss of Peter Lombard on Ps. 75:12]. Consequently the obligation of a vow extends as far as the will and intention of the person who takes the vow. Accordingly if in vowing he intend to bind himself not only to enter religion, but also to remain there evermore, he is bound to remain in perpetuity. If, on the other hand, he intend to bind himself to enter religion for the purpose of trial, while retaining the freedom to remain or not remain, it is clear that he is not bound to remain. If, however, in vowing he thought merely of entering religion, without thinking of being free to leave, or of remaining in perpetuity, it would seem that he is bound to enter religion according to the form prescribed by common law, which is that those who enter should be given a year’s probation. Wherefore he is not bound to remain for ever.

Reply to Objection 1: It is better to enter religion with the purpose of making a trial than not to enter at all, because by so doing one disposes oneself to remain always. Nor is a person accounted to turn or to look back, save when he omits to do that which he engaged to do: else whoever does a good work for a time, would be unfit for the kingdom of God, unless he did it always, which is evidently false.

Reply to Objection 2: A man who has entered religion gives neither scandal nor bad example by leaving, especially if he do so for a reasonable motive; and if others are scandalized, it will be passive scandal on their part, and not active scandal on the part of the person leaving, since in doing so, he has done what was lawful, and expedient on account of some reasonable motive, such as sickness, weakness, and the like.

Reply to Objection 3: He who enters with the purpose of leaving forthwith, does not seem to fulfil his vow, since this was not his intention in vowing. Hence he must change that purpose, at least so as to wish to try whether it is good for him to remain in religion, but he is not bound to remain for evermore.

Whether children should be received in religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to be received in religion. Because it is said (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Nullus): “No one should be tonsured unless he be of legal age and willing.” But children, seemingly, are not of legal age; nor have they a will of their own, not having perfect use of reason. Therefore it seems that they ought not to be received in religion.

Objection 2: Further, the state of religion would seem to be a state of repentance; wherefore religion is derived [*Cf.[3843] Q[81], A[1]] from “religare” [to bind] or from “re-eligere” [to choose again], as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 3 [*Cf. De Vera Relig. lv]). But repentance does not become children. Therefore it seems that they should not enter religion.

Objection 3: Further, the obligation of a vow is like that of an oath. But children under the age of fourteen ought not to be bound by oath (Decret. XXII, qu. v, cap. Pueri and cap. Honestum.). Therefore it would seem that neither should they be bound by vow.

Objection 4: Further, it is seemingly unlawful to bind a person to an obligation that can be justly canceled. Now if any persons of unripe age bind themselves to religion, they can be withdrawn by their parents or guardians. For it is written in the Decretals (XX, qu. ii, can. Puella) that “if a maid under twelve years of age shall take the sacred veil of her own accord, her parents or guardians, if they choose, can at once declare the deed null and void.” It is therefore unlawful for children, especially of unripe age, to be admitted or bound to religion.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:14): “Suffer the little children, and forbid them not to come to Me.” Expounding these words Origen says (Tract. vii in Matth.) that “the disciples of Jesus before they have been taught the conditions of righteousness [*Cf. Mat. 19:16–30], rebuke those who offer children and babes to Christ: but our Lord urges His disciples to stoop to the service of children. We must therefore take note of this, lest deeming ourselves to excel in wisdom we despise the Church’s little ones, as though we were great, and forbid the children to come to Jesus.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 1), the religious vow is twofold. One is the simple vow consisting in a mere promise made to God, and proceeding from the interior deliberation of the mind. Such a vow derives its efficacy from the divine law. Nevertheless it may encounter a twofold obstacle. First, through lack of deliberation, as in the case of the insane, whose vows are not binding [*Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Sicut tenor]. The same applies to children who have not reached the required use of reason, so as to be capable of guile, which use boys attain, as a rule, at about the age of fourteen, and girls at the age of twelve, this being what is called “the age of puberty,” although in some it comes earlier and in others it is delayed, according to the various dispositions of nature. Secondly, the efficacy of a simple vow encounters an obstacle, if the person who makes a vow to God is not his own master; for instance, if a slave, though having the use of reason, vows to enter religion, or even is ordained, without the knowledge of his master: for his master can annul this, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). And since boys and girls under the age of puberty are naturally in their father’s power as regards the disposal of their manner of life, their father may either cancel or approve their vow, if it please him to do so, as it is expressly said with regard to a woman (Num. 30:4).

Accordingly if before reaching the age of puberty a child makes a simple vow, not yet having full use of reason, he is not bound in virtue of the vow; but if he has the use of reason before reaching the age of puberty, he is bound, so far as he is concerned, by his vow; yet this obligation may be removed by his father's authority, under whose control he still remains, because the ordinance of the law whereby one man is subject to another considers what happens in the majority of cases. If, however, the

child has passed the age of puberty, his vow cannot be annulled by the authority of his parents; though if he has not the full use of reason, he would not be bound in the sight of God.

The other is the solemn vow which makes a man a monk or a religious. Such a vow is subject to the ordinance of the Church, on account of the solemnity attached to it. And since the Church considers what happens in the majority of cases, a profession made before the age of puberty, however much the person who makes profession may have the use of reason, or be capable of guile, does not take effect so as to make him a religious (Extra, De Regular., etc. cap. Significatum est.).

Nevertheless, although they cannot be professed before the age of puberty, they can, with the consent of their parents, be received into religion to be educated there: thus it is related of John the Baptist (Lk. 1:80) that "the child grew and was strengthened in spirit, and was in the deserts." Hence, as Gregory states (Dial. ii, 3), "the Roman nobles began to give their sons to the blessed Benedict to be nurtured for Almighty God"; and this is most fitting, according to Lam. 3:27, "It is good for a man when he has borne the yoke from his youth." It is for this reason that by common custom children are made to apply themselves to those duties or arts with which they are to pass their lives.

Reply to Objection 1: The legal age for receiving the tonsure and taking the solemn vow of religion is the age of puberty, when a man is able to make use of his own will; but before the age of puberty it is possible to have reached the lawful age to receive the tonsure and be educated in a religious house.

Reply to Objection 2: The religious state is chiefly directed to the attachment of perfection, as stated above ([3844]Q[186], A[1], ad 4); and accordingly it is becoming to children, who are easily drawn to it. But as a consequence it is called a state of repentance, inasmuch as occasions of sin are removed by religious observances, as stated above ([3845]Q[186], A[1], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 3: Even as children are not bound to take oaths (as the canon states), so are they not bound to take vows. If, however, they bind themselves by vow or oath to do something, they are bound in God’s sight, if they have the use of reason, but they are not bound in the sight of the Church before reaching the age of fourteen.

Reply to Objection 4: A woman who has not reached the age of puberty is not rebuked (Num. 30:4) for taking a vow without her parents’ consent: but the vow can be made void by her parents. Hence it is evident that she does not sin in vowing. But we are given to understand that she binds herself by vow, so far as she may, without prejudice to her parents’ authority.

Whether one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s parents?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought to be withdrawn from entering religion through deference to one’s parents. For it is not lawful to omit that which is of obligation in order to do that which is optional. Now deference to one’s parents comes under an obligation of the precept concerning the honoring of our parents (Ex. 20:12); wherefore the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:4): “If any widow have children or grandchildren, let her learn first to govern her own house, and to make a return of duty to her parents.” But the entrance to religion is optional. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to omit deference to one’s parents for the sake of entering religion.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly the subjection of a son to his father is greater than that of a slave to his master, since sonship is natural, while slavery results from the curse of sin, as appears from Gn. 9:25. Now a slave cannot set aside the service of his master in order to enter religion or take holy orders, as stated in the Decretals (Dist. LIV, cap. Si servus). Much less therefore can a son set aside the deference due to his father in order to enter religion.

Objection 3: Further, a man is more indebted to his parents than to those to whom he owes money. Now persons who owe money to anyone cannot enter religion. For Gregory says (Regist. viii, Ep. 5) that “those who are engaged in trade must by no means be admitted into a monastery, when they seek admittance, unless first of all they withdraw from public business” (Dist. liii, can. Legem.). Therefore seemingly much less may children enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents.

On the contrary, It is related (Mat. 4:22) that James and John “left their nets and father, and followed our Lord.” By this, says Hilary (Can. iii in Matth.), “we learn that we who intend to follow Christ are not bound by the cares of the secular life, and by the ties of home.”

I answer that, As stated above ([3846]Q[101], A[2], ad 2) when we were treating of piety, parents as such have the character of a principle, wherefore it is competent to them as such to have the care of their children. Hence it is unlawful for a person having children to enter religion so as altogether to set aside the care for their children, namely without providing for their education. For it is written (1 Tim. 5:8) that “if any man have not care of his own . . . he hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel.”

Nevertheless it is accidentally competent to parents to be assisted by their children, in so far, to wit, as they are placed in a condition of necessity. Consequently we must say that when their parents are in such need that they cannot fittingly be supported otherwise than by the help of their children, these latter may not lawfully enter religion in despite of their duty to their parents. If, however, the parents’ necessity be not such as to stand in great need of their children’s assistance, the latter may, in despite of the duty they owe their parents, enter religion even against their parents’ command, because after the age of puberty every freeman enjoys freedom in things concerning the ordering of his state of life, especially in such as belong to the service of God, and “we should more obey the Father of spirits that we may live [*’Shall we not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?’],” as says the Apostle (Heb. 12:9), than obey our parents. Hence as we read (Mat. 8:22; Lk. 9:62) our Lord rebuked the disciple who was unwilling to follow him forthwith on account of his father’s burial: for there were others who could see to this, as Chrysostom remarks [*Hom. xxvii in Matth.].

Reply to Objection 1: The commandment of honoring our parents extends not only to bodily but also to spiritual service, and to the paying of deference. Hence even those who are in religion can fulfil the commandment of honoring their parents, by praying for them and by revering and assisting them, as becomes religious, since even those who live in the world honor their parents in different ways as befits their condition.

Reply to Objection 2: Since slavery was imposed in punishment of sin, it follows that by slavery man forfeits something which otherwise he would be competent to have, namely the free disposal of his person, for “a slave belongs wholly to his master” [*Aristotle, Polit. i, 2]. On the other hand, the son, through being subject to his father, is not hindered from freely disposing of his person by transferring himself to the service of God; which is most conducive to man’s good.

Reply to Objection 3: He who is under a certain fixed obligation cannot lawfully set it aside so long as he is able to fulfil it. Wherefore if a person is under an obligation to give an account to someone or to pay a certain fixed debt, he cannot lawfully evade this obligation in order to enter religion. If, however, he owes a sum of money, and has not wherewithal to pay the debt, he must do what he can, namely by surrendering his goods to his creditor. According to civil law [*Cod. IV, x, de Oblig. et Action, 12] money lays an obligation not on the person of a freeman, but on his property, because the person of a freeman “is above all pecuniary consideration” [*Dig. L, xvii, de div. reg. Jur. ant. 106,176]. Hence, after surrendering his property, he may lawfully enter religion, nor is he bound to remain in the world in order to earn the means of paying the debt.

On the other hand, he does not owe his father a special debt, except as may arise in a case of necessity, as stated above.

Whether parish priests may lawfully enter religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion. For Gregory says (Past. iii, 4) that “he who undertakes the cure of souls, receives an awful warning in the words: ‘My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, thou hast engaged fast thy hand to a stranger’” (Prov. 6:1); and he goes on to say, “because to be surety for a friend is to take charge of the soul of another on the surety of one’s own behavior.” Now he who is under an obligation to a man for a debt, cannot enter religion, unless he pay what he owes, if he can. Since then a priest is able to fulfil the cure of souls, to which obligation he has pledged his soul, it would seem unlawful for him to lay aside the cure of souls in order to enter religion.

Objection 2: Further, what is lawful to one is likewise lawful to all. But if all priests having cure of souls were to enter religion, the people would be left without a pastor’s care, which would be unfitting. Therefore it seems that parish priests cannot lawfully enter religion.

Objection 3: Further, chief among the acts to which religious orders are directed are those whereby a man gives to others the fruit of his contemplation. Now such acts are competent to parish priests and archdeacons, whom it becomes by virtue of their office to preach and hear confessions. Therefore it would seem unlawful for a parish priest or archdeacon to pass over to religion.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. ii, cap. Duce sunt leges.): “If a man, while governing the people in his church under the bishop and leading a secular life, is inspired by the Holy Ghost to desire to work out his salvation in a monastery or under some canonical rule, even though his bishop withstand him, we authorize him to go freely.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 3;[3847] Q[88], A[12], ad 1), the obligation of a perpetual vow stands before every other obligation. Now it belongs properly to bishops and religious to be bound by perpetual vow to devote themselves to the divine service [*Cf.[3848] Q[184], A[5]], while parish priests and archdeacons are not, as bishops are, bound by a perpetual and solemn vow to retain the cure of souls. Wherefore bishops “cannot lay aside their bishopric for any pretext whatever, without the authority of the Roman Pontiff” (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.): whereas archdeacons and parish priests are free to renounce in the hands of the bishop the cure entrusted to them, without the Pope’s special permission, who alone can dispense from perpetual vows. Therefore it is evident that archdeacons and parish priests may lawfully enter religion.

Reply to Objection 1: Parish priests and archdeacons have bound themselves to the care of their subjects, as long as they retain their archdeaconry or parish, but they did not bind themselves to retain their archdeaconry or parish for ever.

Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says (Contra Vigil.): “Although they,” namely religious, “are sorely smitten by thy poisonous tongue, about whom you argue, saying; ‘If all shut themselves up and live in solitude, who will go to church? who will convert worldlings? who will be able to urge sinners to virtue?’ If this holds true, if all are fools with thee, who can be wise? Nor will virginity be commendable, for if all be virgins, and none marry, the human race will perish. Virtue is rare, and is not desired by many.” It is therefore evident that this is a foolish alarm; thus might a man fear to draw water lest the river run dry. [*St. Thomas gives no reply to the third objection, which is sufficiently solved in the body of the article.]

Whether it is lawful to pass from one religious order to another?

Objection 1: It seems unlawful to pass from one religious order to another, even a stricter one. For the Apostle says (Heb. 10:25): “Not forsaking our assembly, as some are accustomed”; and a gloss observes: “Those namely who yield through fear of persecution, or who presuming on themselves withdraw from the company of sinners or of the imperfect, that they may appear to be righteous.” Now those who pass from one religious order to another more perfect one would seem to do this. Therefore this is seemingly unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, the profession of monks is stricter than that of canons regular (Extra, De Statu Monach. et Canonic. Reg., cap. Quod Dei timorem). But it is unlawful for anyone to pass from the state of canon regular to the monastic state. For it is said in the Decretals (XIX, qu. iii, can. Mandamus): “We ordain and without any exception forbid any professed canon regular to become a monk, unless (which God forbid) he have fallen into public sin.” Therefore it would seem unlawful for anyone to pass from one religious order to another of higher rank.

Objection 3: Further, a person is bound to fulfil what he has vowed, as long as he is able lawfully to do so; thus if a man has vowed to observe continence, he is bound, even after contracting marriage by words in the present tense, to fulfil his vow so long as the marriage is not consummated, because he can fulfil the vow by entering religion. Therefore if a person may lawfully pass from one religious order to another, he will be bound to do so if he vowed it previously while in the world. But this would seem objectionable, since in many cases it might give rise to scandal. Therefore a religious may not pass from one religious order to another stricter one.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (XX, qu. iv, can. Virgines): “If sacred virgins design for the good of their soul to pass to another monastery on account of a stricter life, and decide to remain there, the holy synod allows them to do so": and the same would seem to apply to any religious. Therefore one may lawfully pass from one religious order to another.

I answer that, It is not commendable to pass from one religious order to another: both because this frequently gives scandal to those who remain; and because, other things being equal, it is easier to make progress in a religious order to which one is accustomed than in one to which one is not habituated. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xiv, 5) Abbot Nesteros says: "It is best for each one that he should, according to the resolve he has made, hasten with the greatest zeal and care to reach the perfection of the work he has undertaken, and nowise forsake the profession he has chosen." And further on he adds (cap. 6) by way of reason: "For it is impossible that one and the same man should excel in all the virtues at once, since if he endeavor to practice them equally, he will of necessity, while trying to attain them all, end in acquiring none of them perfectly": because the various religious orders excel in respect of various works of virtue.

Nevertheless one may commendably pass from one religious order to another for three reasons. First, through zeal for a more perfect religious life, which excellence depends, as stated above ([3849]Q[188], A[6]), not merely on severity, but chiefly on the end to which a religious order is directed, and secondarily on the discretion whereby the observances are proportionate to the due end. Secondly, on account of a religious order falling away from the perfection it ought to have: for instance, if in a more severe religious order, the religious begin to live less strictly, it is commendable for one to pass even to a less severe religious order if the observance is better. Hence in the Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. xix, 3,5,6) Abbot John says of himself that he had passed from the solitary life, in which he was professed, to a less severe life, namely of those who lived in community, because the hermetical life had fallen into decline and laxity. Thirdly, on account of sickness or weakness, the result of which sometimes is that one is unable to keep the ordinances of a more severe religious order, though able to observe those of a less strict religion.

There is, however, a difference in these three cases. For in the first case one ought, on account of humility, to seek permission: yet this cannot be denied, provided it be certain that this other religion is more severe. "And if there be a probable doubt about this, one should ask one's superior to decide" (Extra, De Regular. et Transeunt. ad Relig., cap. Licet.). In like manner the superior's decision should be sought in the second case. In the third case it is also necessary to have a dispensation.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who pass to a stricter religious order, do so not out of presumption that they may appear righteous, but out of devotion, that they may become more righteous.

Reply to Objection 2: Religious orders whether of monks or of canons regular are destined to the works of the contemplative life. Chief among these are those which are performed in the divine mysteries, and these are the direct object of the orders of canons regular, the members of which are essentially religious clerics. On the other hand, monastic religious are not essentially clerics, according to the Decretals (XVI, qu. i, cap. Alia causa). Hence although monastic orders are more severe, it would be lawful, supposing the members to be lay monks, to pass from the monastic order to an order of canons regular, according to the statement of Jerome (Ep. cxxv, ad Rustic. Monach.): "So live in the monastery as to deserve to become a cleric"; but not conversely, as expressed in the Decretal quoted (XIX, qu. iii). If, however, the monks be clerics devoting themselves to the sacred ministry, they have this in common with canons regular coupled with greater severity, and consequently it will be lawful to pass from an order of canons regular to a monastic order, provided withal that one seek the superior's permission (XIX, qu. iii; cap. Statuimus).

Reply to Objection 3: The solemn vow whereby a person is bound to a less strict order, is more binding than the simple vow whereby a person is bound to a stricter order. For if after taking a simple vow a person were to be married, his marriage would not be invalid, as it would be after his taking a solemn vow. Consequently a person who is professed in a less severe order is not bound to fulfil a simple vow he has taken on entering a more severe order.

Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?

Objection 1: It would seem that no one ought to induce others to enter religion. For the blessed Benedict prescribes in his Rule (lviii) that "those who seek to enter religion must not easily be admitted, but spirits must be tested whether they be of God"; and Cassian has the same instruction (De

Inst. Caenob. iv, 3). Much less therefore is it lawful to induce anyone to enter religion.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 23:15): “Woe to you . . . because you go round about the sea and the land to make one proselyte, and when he is made you make him the child of hell twofold more than yourselves.” Now thus would seem to do those who induce persons to enter religion. Therefore this would seem blameworthy.

Objection 3: Further, no one should induce another to do what is to his prejudice. But those who are induced to enter religion, sometimes take harm therefrom, for sometimes they are under obligation to enter a stricter religion. Therefore it would not seem praiseworthy to induce others to enter religion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ex. 26:3, seqq. [*St. Thomas quotes the sense, not the words]): “Let one curtain draw the other.” Therefore one man should draw another to God’s service.

I answer that, Those who induce others to enter religion not only do not sin, but merit a great reward. For it is written (James 5:20): “He who causeth a sinner to be converted from the error of his way, shall save his soul from death, and shall cover a multitude of sins”; and (Dan. 12:3): “They that instruct many to justice shall be as stars for all eternity.”

Nevertheless such inducement may be affected by a threefold inordinateness. First, if one person force another by violence to enter religion: and this is forbidden in the Decretals (XX, qu. iii, cap. Praesens). Secondly, if one person persuade another simoniacally to enter religion, by giving him presents: and this is forbidden in the Decretal (I, qu. ii, cap. Quam pio). But this does not apply to the case where one provides a poor person with necessaries by educating him in the world for the religious life; or when without any compact one gives a person little presents for the sake of good fellowship. Thirdly, if one person entices another by lies: for it is to be feared that the person thus enticed may turn back on finding himself deceived, and thus “the last state of that man” may become “worse than the first” (Lk. 11:26).

Reply to Objection 1: Those who are induced to enter religion have still a time of probation wherein they make a trial of the hardships of religion, so that they are not easily admitted to the religious life.

Reply to Objection 2: According to Hilary (Can. xxiv in Matth.) this saying of our Lord was a forecast of the wicked endeavors of the Jews, after the preaching of Christ, to draw Gentiles or even Christians to observe the Jewish ritual, thereby making them doubly children of hell, because, to wit, they were not forgiven the former sins which they committed while adherents of Judaism, and furthermore they incurred the guilt of Jewish perfidy; and thus interpreted these words have nothing to do with the case in point.

According to Jerome, however, in his commentary on this passage of Matthew, the reference is to the Jews even at the time when it was yet lawful to keep the legal observances, in so far as he whom they converted to Judaism "from paganism, was merely misled; but when he saw the wickedness of his teachers, he returned to his vomit, and becoming a pagan deserved greater punishment for his treachery." Hence it is manifest that it is not blameworthy to draw others to the service of God or to the religious life, but only when one gives a bad example to the person converted, whence he becomes worse.

Reply to Objection 3: The lesser is included in the greater. Wherefore a person who is bound by vow or oath to enter a lesser order, may be lawfully induced to enter a greater one. unless there be some special obstacle, such as ill-health, or the hope of making greater progress in the lesser order. On the other hand, one who is bound by vow or oath to enter a greater order, cannot be lawfully induced to enter a lesser order, except for some special and evident motive, and then with the superior's dispensation.

Whether it is praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time?

Objection 1: It would not seem praiseworthy to enter religion without taking counsel of many, and previously deliberating for a long time. For it is written (1 Jn. 4:1): "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits if they be of God." Now sometimes a man's purpose of entering religion is not of God, since it often comes to naught through his leaving the religious life; for it is written (Acts 5:38,39): "If this counsel or this work be of God, you cannot overthrow it." Therefore it would seem that one ought to make a searching inquiry before entering religion.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 25:9): “Treat thy cause with thy friend.” Now a man’s cause would seem to be especially one that concerns a change in his state of life. Therefore seemingly one ought not to enter religion without discussing the matter with one’s friends.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord (Lk. 14:28) in making a comparison with a man who has a mind to build a tower, says that he doth “first sit down and reckon the charges that are necessary, whether he have wherewithal to finish it,” lest he become an object of mockery, for that “this man began to build and was not able to finish.” Now the wherewithal to build the tower, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Laetum ccxliii), is nothing less than that “each one should renounce all his possessions.” Yet it happens sometimes that many cannot do this, nor keep other religious observances; and in signification of this it is stated (1 Kings 17:39) that David could not walk in Saul’s armor, for he was not used to it. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to enter religion without long deliberation beforehand and taking counsel of many.

On the contrary, It is stated (Mat. 4:20) that upon our Lord’s calling them, Peter and Andrew “immediately leaving their nets, followed Him.” Here Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Matth.): “Such obedience as this does Christ require of us, that we delay not even for a moment.”

I answer that, Long deliberation and the advice of many are required in great matters of doubt, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3); while advice is unnecessary in matters that are certain and fixed. Now with regard to entering religion three points may be considered. First, the entrance itself into religion, considered by itself; and thus it is certain that entrance into religion is a greater good, and to doubt about this is to disparage Christ Who gave this counsel. Hence Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. c, 2): “The East,” that is Christ, “calleth thee, and thou turnest to the West,” namely mortal and fallible man. Secondly, the entrance into religion may be considered in relation to the strength of the person who intends to enter. And here again there is no room for doubt about the entrance to religion, since those who enter religion trust not to be able to stay by their own power, but by the assistance of the divine power, according to Is. 40:31, “They that hope in the Lord shall renew their strength, they shall take wings as eagles, they shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint.” Yet if there be some special obstacle (such as bodily weakness, a burden of debts, or the like) in such cases a man must deliberate and take counsel with such as are likely to help and not hinder him. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 37:12): “Treat with a man without religion concerning holiness [*The Douay version supplies the negative: ‘Treat not . . . nor with . . . ‘], with an unjust man concerning justice,” meaning that one should not do so, wherefore the text goes on (Ecclus. 37:14,15), “Give no heed to these in any matter of counsel, but be continually with a holy man.” In these matters, however, one should not take long deliberation. Wherefore Jerome says (Ep. and Paulin. liii): “Hasten, I pray thee, cut off rather than loosen the rope that holds the boat to the shore.” Thirdly, we may consider the way of entering religion, and which order one ought to enter, and about such matters also one may take counsel of those who will not stand in one’s way.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying: “Try the spirits, if they be of God,” applies to matters admitting of doubt whether the spirits be of God; thus those who are already in religion may doubt whether he who offers himself to religion be led by the spirit of God, or be moved by hypocrisy. Wherefore they must try the postulant whether he be moved by the divine spirit. But for him who seeks to enter religion there can be no doubt but that the purpose of entering religion to which his heart has given birth is from the spirit of God, for it is His spirit “that leads” man “into the land of uprightness” (Ps. 142:10).

Nor does this prove that it is not of God that some turn back; since not all that is of God is incorruptible: else corruptible creatures would not be of God, as the Manicheans hold, nor could some who have grace from God lose it, which is also heretical. But God’s “counsel” whereby He makes even things corruptible and changeable, is imperishable according to Is. 46:10, “My counsel shall stand and all My will shall be done.” Hence the purpose of entering religion needs not to be tried whether it be of God, because “it requires no further demonstration,” as a gloss says on 1 Thess. 5:21, “Prove all things.”

Reply to Objection 2: Even as “the flesh lusteth against the spirit” (Gal. 5:17), so too carnal friends often thwart our spiritual progress, according to Mic. 7:6, “A man’s enemies are they of his own household.” Wherefore Cyril expounding Lk. 9:61, “Let me first take my leave of them that are at my house,” says [*Cf. St. Thomas’s Catena Aurea]: “By asking first to take his leave of them that were at his house, he shows he was somewhat of two minds. For to communicate with his neighbors, and consult those who are unwilling to relish righteousness, is an indication of weakness and turning back. Hence he hears our Lord say: ‘No man putting his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God,’ because he looks back who seeks delay in order to go home and confer with his kinsfolk.”

Reply to Objection 3: The building of the tower signifies the perfection of Christian life; and the renunciation of one’s possessions is the wherewithal to build this tower. Now no one doubts or deliberates about wishing to have the wherewithal, or whether he is able to build the tower if he have the wherewithal, but what does come under deliberation is whether one has the wherewithal. Again it need not be a matter of deliberation whether one ought to renounce all that one has, or whether by so doing one may be able to attain to perfection; whereas it is a matter of deliberation whether that which one is doing amounts to the renunciation of all that he has, since unless he does renounce (which is to have the wherewithal) he cannot, as the text goes on to state, be Christ’s disciple, and this is to build the tower.

The misgiving of those who hesitate as to whether they may be able to attain to perfection by entering religion is shown by many examples to be unreasonable. Hence Augustine says (Confess. viii, 11): “On that side whither I had set my face, and whither I trembled to go, there appeared to me the chaste dignity of continency . . . honestly alluring me to come and doubt not, and stretching forth to receive and embrace me, her holy hands full of multitudes of good examples. There were so many young men and maidens here, a multitude of youth and every age, grave widows and aged virgins . . . And she smiled at me with a persuasive mockery as though to say: Canst not thou what these youths and these maidens can? Or can they either in themselves, and not rather in the Lord their God? . . . Why standest thou in thyself, and so standest not? Cast thyself upon Him; fear not, He will not withdraw Himself that thou shouldst fall. Cast thyself fearlessly upon Him: He will receive and will heal thee.”

The example quoted of David is not to the point, because “the arms of Saul,” as a gloss on the passage observes, “are the sacraments of the Law, as being burdensome”: whereas religion is the sweet yoke of Christ, for as Gregory says (Moral. iv, 33), “what burden does He lay on the shoulders of the mind, Who commands us to shun all troublesome desires, Who warns us to turn aside from the rough paths of this world?”

To those indeed who take this sweet yoke upon themselves He promises the refreshment of the divine fruition and the eternal rest of their souls.

To which may He Who made this promise bring us, Jesus Christ our Lord, “Who is over all things God blessed for ever. Amen.”

THIRD PART (TP) OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA (QQ[1]-90)

PROLOGUE

Forasmuch as our Saviour the Lord Jesus Christ, in order to “save His people from their sins” (Mat. 1:21), as the angel announced, showed unto us in His own Person the way of truth, whereby we may attain to the bliss of eternal life by rising again, it is necessary, in order to complete the work of theology, that after considering the last end of human life, and the virtues and vices, there should follow the consideration of the Saviour of all, and of the benefits bestowed by Him on the human race.

Concerning this we must consider (1) the Saviour Himself; (2) the sacraments by which we attain to our salvation; (3) the end of immortal life to which we attain by the resurrection.

Concerning the first, a double consideration occurs: the first, about the mystery of the Incarnation itself, whereby God was made man for our salvation; the second, about such things as were done and suffered by our Saviour—i.e. God incarnate.

TREATISE ON THE INCARNATION (QQ[1]-59)

OF THE FITNESS OF THE INCARNATION (SIX ARTICLES)

Concerning the first, three things occur to be considered: first, the fitness of the Incarnation; secondly, the mode of union of the Word Incarnate; thirdly, what follows this union.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is fitting for God to become incarnate?

(2) Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race?

(3) Whether if there had been no sin God would have become incarnate?

(4) Whether He became incarnate to take away original sin rather than actual?

(5) Whether it was fitting for God to become incarnate from the beginning of the world?

(6) Whether His Incarnation ought to have been deferred to the end of the world?

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate. Since God from all eternity is the very essence of goodness, it was best for Him to be as He had been from all eternity. But from all eternity He had been without flesh. Therefore it was most fitting for Him not to be united to flesh. Therefore it was not fitting for God to become incarnate.

Objection 2: Further, it is not fitting to unite things that are infinitely apart, even as it would not be a fitting union if one were “to paint a figure in which the neck of a horse was joined to the head of a man" [*Horace, Ars. Poet., line 1]. But God and flesh are infinitely apart; since God is most simple, and flesh is most composite—especially human flesh. Therefore it was not fitting that God should be united to human flesh.

Objection 3: Further, a body is as distant from the highest spirit as evil is from the highest good. But it was wholly unfitting that God, Who is the highest good, should assume evil. Therefore it was not fitting that the highest uncreated spirit should assume a body.

Objection 4: Further, it is not becoming that He Who surpassed the greatest things should be contained in the least, and He upon Whom rests the care of great things should leave them for lesser things. But God—Who takes care of the whole world—the whole universe of things cannot contain. Therefore it would seem unfitting that "He should be hid under the frail body of a babe in swathing bands, in comparison with Whom the whole universe is accounted as little; and that this Prince should quit His throne for so long, and transfer the government of the whole world to so frail a body," as Volusianus writes to Augustine (Ep. cxxxv).

On the contrary, It would seem most fitting that by visible things the invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the whole world made, as is clear from the word of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20): "For the invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1), by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, and the power or might of God—"His goodness, for He did not despise the weakness of His own handiwork; His justice, since, on man's defeat, He caused the tyrant to be overcome by none other than man, and yet He did not snatch men forcibly from death; His wisdom, for He found a suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; His power, or infinite might, for there is nothing greater than for God to become incarnate . . ."

I answer that, To each things, that is befitting which belongs to it by reason of its very nature; thus, to reason befits man, since this belongs to him because he is of a rational nature. But the very nature of God is goodness, as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i). Hence, what belongs to the essence of goodness befits God. But it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature, and this is brought about chiefly by “His so joining created nature to Himself that one Person is made up of these three—the Word, a soul and flesh,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii). Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.

Reply to Objection 1: The mystery of the Incarnation was not completed through God being changed in any way from the state in which He had been from eternity, but through His having united Himself to the creature in a new way, or rather through having united it to Himself. But it is fitting that a creature which by nature is mutable, should not always be in one way. And therefore, as the creature began to be, although it had not been before, so likewise, not having been previously united to God in Person, it was afterwards united to Him.

Reply to Objection 2: To be united to God in unity of person was not fitting to human flesh, according to its natural endowments, since it was above its dignity; nevertheless, it was fitting that God, by reason of His infinite goodness, should unite it to Himself for man’s salvation.

Reply to Objection 3: Every mode of being wherein any creature whatsoever differs from the Creator has been established by God’s wisdom, and is ordained to God’s goodness. For God, Who is uncreated, immutable, and incorporeal, produced mutable and corporeal creatures for His own goodness. And so also the evil of punishment was established by God’s justice for God’s glory. But evil of fault is committed by withdrawing from the art of the Divine wisdom and from the order of the Divine goodness. And therefore it could be fitting to God to assume a nature created, mutable, corporeal, and subject to penalty, but it did not become Him to assume the evil of fault.

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine replies (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): “The Christian doctrine nowhere holds that God was so joined to human flesh as either to desert or lose, or to transfer and as it were, contract within this frail body, the care of governing the universe. This is the thought of men unable to see anything but corporeal things . . . God is great not in mass, but in might. Hence the greatness of His might feels no straits in narrow surroundings. Nor, if the passing word of a man is heard at once by many, and wholly by each, is it incredible that the abiding Word of God should be everywhere at once?” Hence nothing unfitting arises from God becoming incarnate.

Whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for the reparation of the human race that the Word of God should become incarnate. For since the Word of God is perfect God, as has been said ([3850]FP, Q[4], AA[1],2), no power was added to Him by the assumption of flesh. Therefore, if the incarnate Word of God restored human nature. He could also have restored it without assuming flesh.

Objection 2: Further, for the restoration of human nature, which had fallen through sin, nothing more is required than that man should satisfy for sin. Now man can satisfy, as it would seem, for sin; for God cannot require from man more than man can do, and since He is more inclined to be merciful than to punish, as He lays the act of sin to man’s charge, so He ought to credit him with the contrary act. Therefore it was not necessary for the restoration of human nature that the Word of God should become incarnate.

Objection 3: Further, to revere God pertains especially to man’s salvation; hence it is written (Mal. 1:6): “If, then, I be a father, where is my honor? and if I be a master, where is my fear?” But men revere God the more by considering Him as elevated above all, and far beyond man’s senses, hence (Ps. 112:4) it is written: “The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens”; and farther on: “Who is as the Lord our God?” which pertains to reverence. Therefore it would seem unfitting to man’s salvation that God should be made like unto us by assuming flesh.

On the contrary, What frees the human race from perdition is necessary for the salvation of man. But the mystery of the Incarnation is such; according to Jn. 3:16: “God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting.” Therefore it was necessary for man’s salvation that God should become incarnate.

I answer that, A thing is said to be necessary for a certain end in two ways. First, when the end cannot be without it; as food is necessary for the preservation of human life. Secondly, when the end is attained better and more conveniently, as a horse is necessary for a journey. In the first way it was not necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. For God with His omnipotent power could have restored human nature in many other ways. But in the second way it was necessary that God should become incarnate for the restoration of human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 10): “We shall also show that other ways were not wanting to God, to Whose power all things are equally subject; but that there was not a more fitting way of healing our misery.”

Now this may be viewed with respect to our “furtherance in good.” First, with regard to faith, which is made more certain by believing God Himself Who speaks; hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 2): “In order that man might journey more trustfully toward the truth, the Truth itself, the Son of God, having assumed human nature, established and founded faith.” Secondly, with regard to hope, which is thereby greatly strengthened; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): “Nothing was so necessary for raising our hope as to show us how deeply God loved us. And what could afford us a stronger proof of this than that the Son of God should become a partner with us of human nature?” Thirdly, with regard to charity, which is greatly enkindled by this; hence Augustine says (De Catech. Rudib. iv): “What greater cause is there of the Lord’s coming than to show God’s love for us?” And he afterwards adds: “If we have been slow to love, at least let us hasten to love in return.” Fourthly, with regard to well-doing, in which He set us an example; hence Augustine says in a sermon (xxii de Temp.): “Man who might be seen was not to be followed; but God was to be followed, Who could not be seen. And therefore God was made man, that He Who might be seen by man, and Whom man might follow, might be shown to man.” Fifthly, with regard to the full participation of the Divinity, which is the true bliss of man and end of human life; and this is bestowed upon us by Christ’s humanity; for Augustine says in a sermon (xiii de Temp.): “God was made man, that man might be made God.”

So also was this useful for our “withdrawal from evil.” First, because man is taught by it not to prefer the devil to himself, nor to honor him who is the author of sin; hence Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): “Since human nature is so united to God as to become one person, let not these proud spirits dare to prefer themselves to man, because they have no bodies.”

Secondly, because we are thereby taught how great is man’s dignity, lest we should sully it with sin; hence Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xvi): “God has proved to us how high a place human nature holds amongst creatures, inasmuch as He appeared to men as a true man.” And Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Nativity (xxi): “Learn, O Christian, thy worth; and being made a partner of the Divine nature, refuse to return by evil deeds to your former worthlessness.” Thirdly, because, “in order to do away with man’s presumption, the grace of God is commended in Jesus Christ, though no merits of ours went before,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17). Fourthly, because “man’s pride, which is the greatest stumbling-block to our clinging to God, can be convinced and cured by humility so great,” as Augustine says in the same place. Fifthly, in order to free man from the thraldom of sin, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 13), “ought to be done in such a way that the devil should be overcome by the justice of the man Jesus Christ,” and this was done by Christ satisfying for us. Now a mere man could not have satisfied for the whole human race, and God was not bound to satisfy; hence it behooved Jesus Christ to be both God and man. Hence Pope Leo says in the same sermon: “Weakness is assumed by strength, lowliness by majesty, mortality by eternity, in order that one and the same Mediator of God and men might die in one and rise in the other—for this was our fitting remedy. Unless He was God, He would not have brought a remedy; and unless He was man, He would not have set an example.”

And there are very many other advantages which accrued, above man’s apprehension.

Reply to Objection 1: This reason has to do with the first kind of necessity, without which we cannot attain to the end.

Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction may be said to be sufficient in two ways—first, perfectly, inasmuch as it is condign, being adequate to make good the fault committed, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man cannot be sufficient for sin, both because the whole of human nature has been corrupted by sin, whereas the goodness of any person or persons could not be made up adequately for the harm done to the whole of the nature; and also because a sin committed against God has a kind of infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, because the greater the person we offend, the more grievous the offense. Hence for condign satisfaction it was necessary that the act of the one satisfying should have an infinite efficiency, as being of God and man. Secondly, man’s satisfaction may be termed sufficient, imperfectly—i.e. in the acceptation of him who is content with it, even though it is not condign, and in this way the satisfaction of a mere man is sufficient. And forasmuch as every imperfect presupposes some perfect thing, by which it is sustained, hence it is that satisfaction of every mere man has its efficiency from the satisfaction of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: By taking flesh, God did not lessen His majesty; and in consequence did not lessen the reason for reverencing Him, which is increased by the increase of knowledge of Him. But, on the contrary, inasmuch as He wished to draw nigh to us by taking flesh, He greatly drew us to know Him.

Whether, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate?

Objection 1: It would seem that if man had not sinned, God would still have become incarnate. For the cause remaining, the effect also remains. But as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 17): “Many other things are to be considered in the Incarnation of Christ besides absolution from sin”; and these were discussed above [3851](A[2]). Therefore if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the omnipotence of the Divine power to perfect His works, and to manifest Himself by some infinite effect. But no mere creature can be called an infinite effect, since it is finite of its very essence. Now, seemingly, in the work of the Incarnation alone is an infinite effect of the Divine power manifested in a special manner by which power things infinitely distant are united, inasmuch as it has been brought about that man is God. And in this work especially the universe would seem to be perfected, inasmuch as the last creature—viz. man—is united to the first principle—viz. God. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 3: Further, human nature has not been made more capable of grace by sin. But after sin it is capable of the grace of union, which is the greatest grace. Therefore, if man had not sinned, human nature would have been capable of this grace; nor would God have withheld from human nature any good it was capable of. Therefore, if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

Objection 4: Further, God’s predestination is eternal. But it is said of Christ (Rom. 1:4): “Who was predestined the Son of God in power.” Therefore, even before sin, it was necessary that the Son of God should become incarnate, in order to fulfil God’s predestination.

Objection 5: Further, the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to the first man, as is plain from Gn. 2:23. “This now is bone of my bones,” etc. which the Apostle says is “a great sacrament . . . in Christ and in the Church,” as is plain from Eph. 5:32. But man could not be fore-conscious of his fall, for the same reason that the angels could not, as Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi, 18). Therefore, even if man had not sinned, God would have become incarnate.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. viii, 2), expounding what is set down in Lk. 19:10, “For the Son of Man is come to seek and to save that which was lost”; “Therefore, if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would not have come.” And on 1 Tim. 1:15, “Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners,” a gloss says, “There was no cause of Christ’s coming into the world, except to save sinners. Take away diseases, take away wounds, and there is no need of medicine.”

I answer that, There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to be given to this opinion.

For such things as spring from God’s will, and beyond the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.

Reply to Objection 1: All the other causes which are assigned in the preceding article have to do with a remedy for sin. For if man had not sinned, he would have been endowed with the light of Divine wisdom, and would have been perfected by God with the righteousness of justice in order to know and carry out everything needful. But because man, on deserting

God, had stooped to corporeal things, it was necessary that God should take flesh, and by corporeal things should afford him the remedy of salvation. Hence, on Jn. 1:14, “And the Word was made flesh,” St. Augustine says (Tract. ii): “Flesh had blinded thee, flesh heals thee; for Christ came and overthrew the vices of the flesh.”

Reply to Objection 2: The infinity of Divine power is shown in the mode of production of things from nothing. Again, it suffices for the perfection of the universe that the creature be ordained in a natural manner to God as to an end. But that a creature should be united to God in person exceeds the limits of the perfection of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: A double capability may be remarked in human nature: one, in respect of the order of natural power, and this is always fulfilled by God, Who apportions to each according to its natural capability; the other in respect to the order of the Divine power, which all creatures implicitly obey; and the capability we speak of pertains to this. But God does not fulfil all such capabilities, otherwise God could do only what He has done in creatures, and this is false, as stated above ([3852]FP, Q[105], A[6]). But there is no reason why human nature should not have been raised to something greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater good therefrom; hence it is written (Rom. 5:20): “Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.” Hence, too, in the blessing of the Paschal candle, we say: “O happy fault, that merited such and so great a Redeemer!”

Reply to Objection 4: Predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of future things; and hence, as God predestines the salvation of anyone to be brought about by the prayers of others, so also He predestined the work of the Incarnation to be the remedy of human sin.

Reply to Objection 5: Nothing prevents an effect from being revealed to one to whom the cause is not revealed. Hence, the mystery of the Incarnation could be revealed to the first man without his being fore-conscious of his fall. For not everyone who knows the effect knows the cause.

Whether God became incarnate in order to take away actual sin, rather than to take away original sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that God became incarnate as a remedy for actual sins rather than for original sin. For the more grievous the sin, the more it runs counter to man’s salvation, for which God became incarnate. But actual sin is more grievous than original sin; for the lightest punishment is due to original sin, as Augustine says (Contra Julian. v, 11). Therefore the Incarnation of Christ is chiefly directed to taking away actual sins.

Objection 2: Further, pain of sense is not due to original sin, but merely pain of loss, as has been shown ([3853]FS, Q[87], A[5]). But Christ came to suffer the pain of sense on the Cross in satisfaction for sins—and not the pain of loss, for He had no defect of either the beatific vision or fruition. Therefore He came in order to take away actual sin rather than original sin.

Objection 3: Further, as Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 3): “This must be the mind of the faithful servant, to account the benefits of his Lord, which have been bestowed on all alike, as though they were bestowed on himself alone. For as if speaking of himself alone, Paul writes to the Galatians 2:20: ‘Christ . . . loved me and delivered Himself for me.’” But our individual sins are actual sins; for original sin is the common sin. Therefore we ought to have this conviction, so as to believe that He has come chiefly for actual sins.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:29): “Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world.”

I answer that, It is certain that Christ came into this world not only to take away that sin which is handed on originally to posterity, but also in order to take away all sins subsequently added to it; not that all are taken away (and this is from men’s fault, inasmuch as they do not adhere to Christ, according to Jn. 3:19: “The light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than the light”), but because He offered what was sufficient for blotting out all sins. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:15–16): “But not as the offense, so also the gift . . . For judgment indeed was by one unto condemnation, but grace is of many offenses unto justification.”

Moreover, the more grievous the sin, the more particularly did Christ come to blot it out. But “greater” is said in two ways: in one way “intensively,” as a more intense whiteness is said to be greater, and in this way actual sin is greater than original sin; for it has more of the nature of voluntary, as has been shown ([3854]FS, Q[81], A[1]). In another way a thing is said to be greater “extensively,” as whiteness on a greater superficies is said to be greater; and in this way original sin, whereby the whole human race is infected, is greater than any actual sin, which is proper to one person. And in this respect Christ came principally to take away original sin, inasmuch as "the good of the race is a more Divine thing than the good of an individual," as is said Ethic. i, 2.

Reply to Objection 1: This reason looks to the intensive greatness of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: In the future award the pain of sense will not be meted out to original sin. Yet the penalties, such as hunger, thirst, death, and the like, which we suffer sensibly in this life flow from original sin. And hence Christ, in order to satisfy fully for original sin, wished to suffer sensible pain, that He might consume death and the like in Himself.

Reply to Objection 3: Chrysostom says (De Compunctione Cordis ii, 6): "The Apostle used these words, not as if wishing to diminish Christ's gifts, ample as they are, and spreading throughout the whole world, but that he might account himself alone the occasion of them. For what does it matter that they are given to others, if what are given to you are as complete and perfect as if none of them were given to another than yourself?" And hence, although a man ought to account Christ's gifts as given to himself, yet he ought not to consider them not to be given to others. And thus we do not exclude that He came to wipe away the sin of the whole nature rather than the sin of one person. But the sin of the nature is as perfectly healed in each one as if it were healed in him alone. Hence, on account of the union of charity, what is vouchsafed to all ought to be accounted his own by each one.

Whether it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was fitting that God should become incarnate in the beginning of the human race. For the work of the Incarnation sprang from the immensity of Divine charity, according to Eph. 2:4,5: "But God (Who is rich in mercy), for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us . . . even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ." But charity does not tarry in bringing assistance to a friend who is suffering need, according to Prov. 3:28: "Say not to thy friend: Go, and come again, and tomorrow I will give to thee, when thou canst give at present." Therefore God ought not to have put off the work of the Incarnation, but ought thereby to have brought relief to the human race from the beginning.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): “Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.” But more would have been saved had God become incarnate at the beginning of the human race; for in the various centuries very many, through not knowing God, perished in their sin. Therefore it was fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.

Objection 3: Further, the work of grace is not less orderly than the work of nature. But nature takes its rise with the more perfect, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii). Therefore the work of Christ ought to have been perfect from the beginning. But in the work of the Incarnation we see the perfection of grace, according to Jn. 1:14: “The Word was made flesh”; and afterwards it is added: “Full of grace and truth.” Therefore Christ ought to have become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): “But when the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law”: upon which a gloss says that “the fulness of the time is when it was decreed by God the Father to send His Son.” But God decreed everything by His wisdom. Therefore God became incarnate at the most fitting time; and it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the human race.

I answer that, Since the work of the Incarnation is principally ordained to the restoration of the human race by blotting out sin, it is manifest that it was not fitting for God to become incarnate at the beginning of the human race before sin. For medicine is given only to the sick. Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. 9:12,13): “They that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill . . . For I am not come to call the just, but sinners.”

Nor was it fitting that God should become incarnate immediately after sin. First, on account of the manner of man’s sin, which had come of pride; hence man was to be liberated in such a manner that he might be humbled, and see how he stood in need of a deliverer. Hence on the words in Gal. 3:19, “Being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator,” a gloss says: “With great wisdom was it so ordered that the Son of Man should not be sent immediately after man’s fall. For first of all God left man under the natural law, with the freedom of his will, in order that he might know his natural strength; and when he failed in it, he received the law; whereupon, by the fault, not of the law, but of his nature, the disease gained strength; so that having recognized his infirmity he might cry out for a physician, and beseech the aid of grace."

Secondly, on account of the order of furtherance in good, whereby we proceed from imperfection to perfection. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46,47): "Yet that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual . . . The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly."

Thirdly, on account of the dignity of the incarnate Word, for on the words (Gal. 4:4), "But when the fulness of the time was come," a gloss says: "The greater the judge who was coming, the more numerous was the band of heralds who ought to have preceded him."

Fourthly, lest the fervor of faith should cool by the length of time, for the charity of many will grow cold at the end of the world. Hence (Lk. 18:8) it is written: "But yet the Son of Man, when He cometh, shall He find think you, faith on earth?"

Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not put off bringing assistance to a friend: always bearing in mind the circumstances as well as the state of the persons. For if the physician were to give the medicine at the very outset of the ailment, it would do less good, and would hurt rather than benefit. And hence the Lord did not bestow upon the human race the remedy of the Incarnation in the beginning, lest they should despise it through pride, if they did not already recognize their disease.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine replies to this (De Sex Quest. Pagan., Ep. cii), saying ([3855]Q[2]) that "Christ wished to appear to man and to have His doctrine preached to them when and where He knew those were who would believe in Him. But in such times and places as His Gospel was not preached He foresaw that not all, indeed, but many would so bear themselves towards His preaching as not to believe in His corporeal presence, even were He to raise the dead." But the same Augustine, taking exception to this reply in his book (De Perseverantia ix), says: "How can we say the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not believe when such great wonders were wrought in their midst, or would not have believed had they been wrought, when God Himself bears witness that they would have done penance with great humility if these signs of Divine power had been wrought in their midst?” And he adds in answer (De Perseverantia xi): “Hence, as the Apostle says (Rom. 9:16), ‘it is not of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy’; Who (succors whom He will of) those who, as He foresaw, would believe in His miracles if wrought amongst them, (while others) He succors not, having judged them in His predestination secretly yet justly. Therefore let us unshrinkingly believe His mercy to be with those who are set free, and His truth with those who are condemned.” [*The words in brackets are not in the text of St. Augustine].

Reply to Objection 3: Perfection is prior to imperfection, both in time and nature, in things that are different (for what brings others to perfection must itself be perfect); but in one and the same, imperfection is prior in time though posterior in nature. And thus the eternal perfection of God precedes in duration the imperfection of human nature; but the latter’s ultimate perfection in union with God follows.

Whether the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the work of the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world. For it is written (Ps. 91:11): “My old age in plentiful mercy”—i.e. “in the last days,” as a gloss says. But the time of the Incarnation is especially the time of mercy, according to Ps. 101:14: “For it is time to have mercy on it.” Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

Objection 2: Further, as has been said (A[5], ad 3), in the same subject, perfection is subsequent in time to imperfection. Therefore, what is most perfect ought to be the very last in time. But the highest perfection of human nature is in the union with the Word, because “in Christ it hath pleased the Father that all the fulness of the Godhead should dwell,” as the Apostle says (Col. 1:19, and 2:9). Therefore the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

Objection 3: Further, what can be done by one ought not to be done by two. But the one coming of Christ at the end of the world was sufficient for the salvation of human nature. Therefore it was not necessary for Him to come beforehand in His Incarnation; and hence the Incarnation ought to have been put off till the end of the world.

On the contrary, It is written (Hab. 3:2): “In the midst of the years Thou shalt make it known.” Therefore the mystery of the Incarnation which was made known to the world ought not to have been put off till the end of the world.

I answer that, As it was not fitting that God should become incarnate at the beginning of the world, so also it was not fitting that the Incarnation should be put off till the end of the world. And this is shown first from the union of the Divine and human nature. For, as it has been said (A[5], ad 3), perfection precedes imperfection in time in one way, and contrariwise in another way imperfection precedes perfection. For in that which is made perfect from being imperfect, imperfection precedes perfection in time, whereas in that which is the efficient cause of perfection, perfection precedes imperfection in time. Now in the work of the Incarnation both concur; for by the Incarnation human nature is raised to its highest perfection; and in this way it was not becoming that the Incarnation should take place at the beginning of the human race. And the Word incarnate is the efficient cause of the perfection of human nature, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness we have all received”; and hence the work of the Incarnation ought not to have been put off till the end of the world. But the perfection of glory to which human nature is to be finally raised by the Word Incarnate will be at the end of the world.

Secondly, from the effect of man’s salvation; for, as is said Qq. Vet et Nov. Test., qu. 83, “it is in the power of the Giver to have pity when, or as much as, He wills. Hence He came when He knew it was fitting to succor, and when His boons would be welcome. For when by the feebleness of the human race men’s knowledge of God began to grow dim and their morals lax, He was pleased to choose Abraham as a standard of the restored knowledge of God and of holy living; and later on when reverence grew weaker, He gave the law to Moses in writing; and because the gentiles despised it and would not take it upon themselves, and they who received it would not keep it, being touched with pity, God sent His Son, to grant to all remission of their sin and to offer them, justified, to God the Father.” But if this remedy had been put off till the end of the world, all knowledge and reverence of God and all uprightness of morals would have been swept away from the earth.

Thirdly, this appears fitting to the manifestation of the Divine power, which has saved men in several ways—not only by faith in some future thing, but also by faith in something present and past.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss has in view the mercy of God, which leads us to glory. Nevertheless, if it is referred to the mercy shown the human race by the Incarnation of Christ, we must reflect that, as Augustine says (Retract. i), the time of the Incarnation may be compared to the youth of the human race, "on account of the strength and fervor of faith, which works by charity"; and to old age—i.e. the sixth age—on account of the number of centuries, for Christ came in the sixth age. And although youth and old age cannot be together in a body, yet they can be together in a soul, the former on account of quickness, the latter on account of gravity. And hence Augustine says elsewhere (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 44) that "it was not becoming that the Master by Whose imitation the human race was to be formed to the highest virtue should come from heaven, save in the time of youth." But in another work (De Gen. cont. Manich. i, 23) he says: that Christ came in the sixth age—i.e. in the old age—of the human race.

Reply to Objection 2: The work of the Incarnation is to be viewed not as merely the terminus of a movement from imperfection to perfection, but also as a principle of perfection to human nature, as has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:11, "For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world" (Hom. xxviii): "There are two comings of Christ: the first, for the remission of sins; the second, to judge the world. For if He had not done so, all would have perished together, since all have sinned and need the glory of God." Hence it is plain that He ought not to have put off the coming in mercy till the end of the world.

OF THE MODE OF UNION OF THE WORD INCARNATE (TWELVE ARTICLES)

Now we must consider the mode of union of the Incarnate Word; and, first, the union itself; secondly, the Person assuming; thirdly, the nature assumed.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature?

(2) Whether it took place in the Person?

(3) Whether it took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?

(4) Whether the Person or hypostasis of Christ is composite after the Incarnation?

(5) Whether any union of body and soul took place in Christ?

(6) Whether the human nature was united to the Word accidentally?

(7) Whether the union itself is something created?

(8) Whether it is the same as assumption?

(9) Whether the union of the two natures is the greatest union?

(10) Whether the union of the two natures in Christ was brought about by grace?

(11) Whether any merits preceded it?

(12) Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?

Whether the Union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature. For Cyril says (he is quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1): “We must understand not two natures, but one incarnate nature of the Word of God”; and this could not be unless the union took place in the nature. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the nature.

Objection 2: Further, Athanasius says that, as the rational soul and the flesh together form the human nature, so God and man together form a certain one nature; therefore the union took place in the nature.

Objection 3: Further, of two natures one is not denominated by the other unless they are to some extent mutually transmuted. But the Divine and human natures in Christ are denominated one by the other; for Cyril says (quoted in the acts of the Council of Chalcedon, part ii, act. 1) that the Divine nature “is incarnate”; and Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. i ad Cledon.) that the human nature is “deified,” as appears from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11). Therefore from two natures one seems to have resulted.

On the contrary, It is said in the declaration of the Council of Chalcedon: “We confess that in these latter times the only-begotten Son of God appeared in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation—the distinction of natures not having been taken away by the union.” Therefore the union did not take place in the nature.

I answer that, To make this question clear we must consider what is “nature.” Now it is to be observed that the word “nature” comes from nativity. Hence this word was used first of all to signify the begetting of living beings, which is called “birth” or “sprouting forth,” the word “natura” meaning, as it were, “nascitura.” Afterwards this word “nature” was taken to signify the principle of this begetting; and because in living things the principle of generation is an intrinsic principle, this word “nature” was further employed to signify any intrinsic principle of motion: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that “nature is the principle of motion in that in which it is essentially and not accidentally.” Now this principle is either form or matter. Hence sometimes form is called nature, and sometimes matter. And because the end of natural generation, in that which is generated, is the essence of the species, which the definition signifies, this essence of the species is called the “nature.” And thus Boethius defines nature (De Duab. Nat.): “Nature is what informs a thing with its specific difference,”—i.e. which perfects the specific definition. But we are now speaking of nature as it signifies the essence, or the “what-it-is,” or the quiddity of the species.

Now, if we take nature in this way, it is impossible that the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the nature. For one thing is made of two or more in three ways. First, from two complete things which remain in their perfection. This can only happen to those whose form is composition, order, or figure, as a heap is made up of many stones brought together without any order, but solely with juxtaposition; and a house is made of stones and beams arranged in order, and fashioned to a figure. And in this way some said the union was by manner of confusion (which is without order) or by manner of commensuration (which is with order). But this cannot be. First, because neither composition nor order nor figure is a substantial form, but accidental; and hence it would follow that the union of the Incarnation was not essential, but accidental, which will be disproved later on [3856](A[6]).

Secondly, because thereby we should not have an absolute unity, but relative only, for there remain several things actually. Thirdly, because the form of such is not a nature, but an art, as the form of a house; and thus one nature would not be constituted in Christ, as they wish.

Secondly, one thing is made up of several things, perfect but changed, as a mixture is made up of its elements; and in this way some have said that the union of the Incarnation was brought about by manner of combination. But this cannot be. First, because the Divine Nature is altogether immutable, as has been said ([3857]FP, Q[9], AA[1],2), hence neither can it be changed into something else, since it is incorruptible; nor can anything else be changed into it, for it cannot be generated. Secondly, because what is mixed is of the same species with none of the elements; for flesh differs in species from any of its elements. And thus Christ would be of the same nature neither with His Father nor with His Mother. Thirdly, because there can be no mingling of things widely apart; for the species of one of them is absorbed, e.g. if we were to put a drop of water in a flagon of wine. And hence, since the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds the human nature, there could be no mixture, but the Divine Nature alone would remain.

Thirdly, a thing is made up of things not mixed nor changed, but imperfect; as man is made up of soul and body, and likewise of divers members. But this cannot be said of the mystery of the Incarnation. First, because each nature, i.e. the Divine and the human, has its specific perfection. Secondly, because the Divine and human natures cannot constitute anything after the manner of quantitative parts, as the members make up the body; for the Divine Nature is incorporeal; nor after the manner of form and matter, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of anything, especially of anything corporeal, since it would follow that the species resulting therefrom would be communicable to several, and thus there would be several Christs. Thirdly, because Christ would exist neither in human nature nor in the Divine Nature: since any difference varies the species, as unity varies number, as is said (Metaph. viii, text. 10).

Reply to Objection 1: This authority of Cyril is expounded in the Fifth Synod (i.e. Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 8) thus: “If anyone proclaiming one nature of the Word of God to be incarnate does not receive it as the Fathers taught, viz. that from the Divine and human natures (a union in subsistence having taken place) one Christ results, but endeavors from these words to introduce one nature or substance of the Divinity and flesh of Christ, let such a one be anathema.” Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the Nature of the Word of God united flesh to Itself in Person.

Reply to Objection 2: From the soul and body a double unity, viz. of nature and person—results in each individual—of nature inasmuch as the soul is united to the body, and formally perfects it, so that one nature springs from the two as from act and potentiality or from matter and form. But the comparison is not in this sense, for the Divine Nature cannot be the form of a body, as was proved ([3858]FP, Q[3], A[8]). Unity of person results from them, however, inasmuch as there is an individual subsisting in flesh and soul; and herein lies the likeness, for the one Christ subsists in the Divine and human natures.

Reply to Objection 3: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,11), the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate because It is united to flesh personally, and not that It is changed into flesh. So likewise the flesh is said to be deified, as he also says (De Fide Orth. 15,17), not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining, and hence it may be considered as deified, inasmuch as it becomes the flesh of the Word of God, but not that it becomes God.

Whether the union of the Incarnate Word took place in the Person?

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnate Word did not take place in the person. For the Person of God is not distinct from His Nature, as we said ([3859]FP, Q[39], A[1]). If, therefore, the union did not take place in the nature, it follows that it did not take place in the person.

Objection 2: Further, Christ’s human nature has no less dignity than ours. But personality belongs to dignity, as was stated above ([3860]FP, Q[29], A[3], ad 2). Hence, since our human nature has its proper personality, much more reason was there that Christ’s should have its proper personality.

Objection 3: Further, as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), a person is an individual substance of rational nature. But the Word of God assumed an individual human nature, for “universal human nature does not exist of itself, but is the object of pure thought,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth.

iii, 11). Therefore the human nature of Christ has its personality. Hence it does not seem that the union took place in the person.

On the contrary, We read in the Synod of Chalcedon (Part ii, act. 5): “We confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is not parted or divided into two persons, but is one and the same only-Begotten Son and Word of God.” Therefore the union took place in the person.

I answer that, Person has a different meaning from “nature.” For nature, as has been said [3861](A[1]), designates the specific essence which is signified by the definition. And if nothing was found to be added to what belongs to the notion of the species, there would be no need to distinguish the nature from the suppositum of the nature (which is the individual subsisting in this nature), because every individual subsisting in a nature would be altogether one with its nature. Now in certain subsisting things we happen to find what does not belong to the notion of the species, viz. accidents and individuating principles, which appears chiefly in such as are composed of matter and form. Hence in such as these the nature and the suppositum really differ; not indeed as if they were wholly separate, but because the suppositum includes the nature, and in addition certain other things outside the notion of the species. Hence the suppositum is taken to be a whole which has the nature as its formal part to perfect it; and consequently in such as are composed of matter and form the nature is not predicated of the suppositum, for we do not say that this man is his manhood. But if there is a thing in which there is nothing outside the species or its nature (as in God), the suppositum and the nature are not really distinct in it, but only in our way of thinking, inasmuch it is called “nature” as it is an essence, and a “suppositum” as it is subsisting. And what is said of a suppositum is to be applied to a person in rational or intellectual creatures; for a person is nothing else than “an individual substance of rational nature,” according to Boethius. Therefore, whatever adheres to a person is united to it in person, whether it belongs to its nature or not. Hence, if the human nature is not united to God the Word in person, it is nowise united to Him; and thus belief in the Incarnation is altogether done away with, and Christian faith wholly overturned. Therefore, inasmuch as the Word has a human nature united to Him, which does not belong to His Divine Nature, it follows that the union took place in the Person of the Word, and not in the nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Although in God Nature and Person are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, as was said above, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, it follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the person, and not in the nature.

Reply to Objection 2: Personality pertains of necessity to the dignity of a thing, and to its perfection so far as it pertains to the dignity and perfection of that thing to exist by itself (which is understood by the word "person"). Now it is a greater dignity to exist in something nobler than oneself than to exist by oneself. Hence the human nature of Christ has a greater dignity than ours, from this very fact that in us, being existent by itself, it has its own personality, but in Christ it exists in the Person of the Word. Thus to perfect the species belongs to the dignity of a form, yet the sensitive part in man, on account of its union with the nobler form which perfects the species, is more noble than in brutes, where it is itself the form which perfects.

Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God "did not assume human nature in general, but 'in atomo'"—that is, in an individual—as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) otherwise every man would be the Word of God, even as Christ was. Yet we must bear in mind that not every individual in the genus of substance, even in rational nature, is a person, but that alone which exists by itself, and not that which exists in some more perfect thing. Hence the hand of Socrates, although it is a kind of individual, is not a person, because it does not exist by itself, but in something more perfect, viz. in the whole. And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person.

Whether the union of the Word Incarnate took place in the suppositum or hypostasis?

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum or hypostasis. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv, xxxviii): “Both the Divine and human substance are one Son of God, but they are one thing [aliud] by reason of the Word and another thing [aliud] by reason of the man.” And Pope Leo says in his letter to Flavian (Ep. xxviii): “One of these is glorious with miracles, the other succumbs under injuries.” But “one” [aliud] and “the other” [aliud] differ in suppositum. Therefore the union of the Word Incarnate did not take place in the suppositum.

Objection 2: Further, hypostasis is nothing more than a “particular substance,” as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). But it is plain that in Christ there is another particular substance beyond the hypostasis of the Word, viz. the body and the soul and the resultant of these. Therefore there is another hypostasis in Him besides the hypostasis of the Word.

Objection 3: Further, the hypostasis of the Word is not included in any genus or species, as is plain from [3862]FP, Q[3], A[5]. But Christ, inasmuch as He is made man, is contained under the species of man; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): “Within the limits of our nature He came, Who far surpasses the whole order of nature supersubstantially.” Now nothing is contained under the human species unless it be a hypostasis of the human species. Therefore in Christ there is another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word of God; and hence the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5): “In our Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures and one hypostasis.”

I answer that, Some who did not know the relation of hypostasis to person, although granting that there is but one person in Christ, held, nevertheless, that there is one hypostasis of God and another of man, and hence that the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis. Now this, for three reasons, is clearly erroneous. First, because person only adds to hypostasis a determinate nature, viz. rational, according to what Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.), “a person is an individual substance of rational nature”; and hence it is the same to attribute to the human nature in Christ a proper hypostasis and a proper person. And the holy Fathers, seeing this, condemned both in the Fifth Council held at Constantinople, saying: “If anyone seeks to introduce into the mystery of the Incarnation two subsistences or two persons, let him be anathema. For by the incarnation of one of the Holy Trinity, God the Word, the Holy Trinity received no augment of person or subsistence." Now "subsistence" is the same as the subsisting thing, which is proper to hypostasis, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because if it is granted that person adds to hypostasis something in which the union can take place, this something is nothing else than a property pertaining to dignity; according as it is said by some that a person is a "hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity." If, therefore, the union took place in the person and not in the hypostasis, it follows that the union only took place in regard to some dignity. And this is what Cyril, with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 3), condemned in these terms: "If anyone after the uniting divides the subsistences in the one Christ, only joining them in a union of dignity or authority or power, and not rather in a concourse of natural union, let him be anathema." Thirdly, because to the hypostasis alone are attributed the operations and the natural properties, and whatever belongs to the nature in the concrete; for we say that this man reasons, and is risible, and is a rational animal. So likewise this man is said to be a suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man and receives its predication. Therefore, if there is any hypostasis in Christ besides the hypostasis of the Word, it follows that whatever pertains to man is verified of some other than the Word, e.g. that He was born of a Virgin, suffered, was crucified, was buried. And this, too, was condemned with the approval of the Council of Ephesus (part iii, can. 4) in these words: "If anyone ascribes to two persons or subsistences such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the saints, or by Himself of Himself, and, moreover, applies some of them to the man, taken as distinct from the Word of God, and some of them (as if they could be used of God alone) only to the Word of God the Father, let him be anathema." Therefore it is plainly a heresy condemned long since by the Church to say that in Christ there are two hypostases, or two supposita, or that the union did not take place in the hypostasis or suppositum. Hence in the same Synod (can. 2) it is said: "If anyone does not confess that the Word was united to flesh in subsistence, and that Christ with His flesh is both—to wit, God and man—let him be anathema."

Reply to Objection 1: As accidental difference makes a thing “other” [alterum], so essential difference makes “another thing” [aliud]. Now it is plain that the “otherness” which springs from accidental difference may pertain to the same hypostasis or suppositum in created things, since the same thing numerically can underlie different accidents. But it does not happen in created things that the same numerically can subsist in divers essences or natures. Hence just as when we speak of “otherness” in regard to creatures we do not signify diversity of suppositum, but only diversity of accidental forms, so likewise when Christ is said to be one thing or another thing, we do not imply diversity of suppositum or hypostasis, but diversity of nature. Hence Gregory Nazianzen says in a letter to Chelidonius (Ep. ci): “In the Saviour we may find one thing and another, yet He is not one person and another. And I say ‘one thing and another’; whereas, on the contrary, in the Trinity we say one Person and another (so as not to confuse the subsistences), but not one thing and another.”

Reply to Objection 2: Hypostasis signifies a particular substance, not in every way, but as it is in its complement. Yet as it is in union with something more complete, it is not said to be a hypostasis, as a hand or a foot. So likewise the human nature in Christ, although it is a particular substance, nevertheless cannot be called a hypostasis or suppositum, seeing that it is in union with a completed thing, viz. the whole Christ, as He is God and man. But the complete being with which it concurs is said to be a hypostasis or suppositum.

Reply to Objection 3: In created things a singular thing is placed in a genus or species, not on account of what belongs to its individuation, but on account of its nature, which springs from its form, and in composite things individuation is taken more from matter. Hence we say that Christ is in the human species by reason of the nature assumed, and not by reason of the hypostasis.

Whether after the Incarnation the Person or Hypostasis of Christ is composite?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Person of Christ is not composite. For the Person of Christ is naught else than the Person or hypostasis of the Word, as appears from what has been said [3863](A[2]). But in the Word, Person and Nature do not differ, as appears from [3864]FP, Q[39], A[1].

Therefore since the Nature of the Word is simple, as was shown above ([3865]FP, Q[3], A[7]), it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composite.

Objection 2: Further, all composition requires parts. But the Divine Nature is incompatible with the notion of a part, for every part implicates the notion of imperfection. Therefore it is impossible that the Person of Christ be composed of two natures.

Objection 3: Further, what is composed of others would seem to be homogeneous with them, as from bodies only a body can be composed. Therefore if there is anything in Christ composed of the two natures, it follows that this will not be a person but a nature; and hence the union in Christ will take place in the nature, which is contrary to A[2].

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4,5), “In the Lord Jesus Christ we acknowledge two natures, but one hypostasis composed from both.”

I answer that, The Person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the Nature of the Word. Secondly, in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature; and thus the Person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one subsisting being in Him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence He is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two.

And thereby the solution to the first is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: This composition of a person from natures is not so called on account of parts, but by reason of number, even as that in which two things concur may be said to be composed of them.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not verified in every composition, that the thing composed is homogeneous with its component parts, but only in the parts of a continuous thing; for the continuous is composed solely of continuous [parts]. But an animal is composed of soul and body, and neither of these is an animal.

Whether in Christ there is any union of soul and body?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no union of soul and body. For from the union of soul and body in us a person or a human hypostasis is caused. Hence if the soul and body were united in Christ, it follows that a hypostasis resulted from their union. But this was not the hypostasis of God the Word, for It is eternal. Therefore in Christ there would be a person or hypostasis besides the hypostasis of the Word, which is contrary to [3866]AA[2],3.

Objection 2: Further, from the union of soul and body results the nature of the human species. But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3), that “we must not conceive a common species in the Lord Jesus Christ.” Therefore there was no union of soul and body in Him.

Objection 3: Further, the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of quickening it. But the body of Christ could be quickened by the Word of God Himself, seeing He is the fount and principle of life. Therefore in Christ there was no union of soul and body.

On the contrary, The body is not said to be animated save from its union with the soul. Now the body of Christ is said to be animated, as the Church chants: “Taking an animate body, He deigned to be born of a Virgin” [*Feast of the Circumcision, Ant. ii, Lauds]. Therefore in Christ there was a union of soul and body.

I answer that, Christ is called a man univocally with other men, as being of the same species, according to the Apostle (Phil. 2:7), “being made in the likeness of a man.” Now it belongs essentially to the human species that the soul be united to the body, for the form does not constitute the species, except inasmuch as it becomes the act of matter, and this is the terminus of generation through which nature intends the species. Hence it must be said that in Christ the soul was united to the body; and the contrary is heretical, since it destroys the truth of Christ’s humanity.

Reply to Objection 1: This would seem to be the reason which was of weight with such as denied the union of the soul and body in Christ, viz. lest they should thereby be forced to admit a second person or hypostasis in Christ, since they saw that the union of soul and body in mere men resulted in a person. But this happens in mere men because the soul and body are so united in them as to exist by themselves. But in Christ they are united together, so as to be united to something higher, which subsists in the nature composed of them. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or Person. Nor does it therefore follow that the union of the soul and body in Christ is of less effect than in us, for its union with something nobler does not lessen but increases its virtue and worth; just as the sensitive soul in animals constitutes the species, as being considered the ultimate form, yet it does not do so in man, although it is of greater effect and dignity, and this because of its union with a further and nobler perfection, viz. the rational soul, as has been said above (A[2], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Damascene may be taken in two ways: First, as referring to human nature, which, as it is in one individual alone, has not the nature of a common species, but only inasmuch as either it is abstracted from every individual, and considered in itself by the mind, or according as it is in all individuals. Now the Son of God did not assume human nature as it exists in the pure thought of the intellect, since in this way He would not have assumed human nature in reality, unless it be said that human nature is a separate idea, just as the Platonists conceived of man without matter. But in this way the Son of God would not have assumed flesh, contrary to what is written (Lk. 24:39), “A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have.” Neither can it be said that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in all the individuals of the same species, otherwise He would have assumed all men. Therefore it remains, as Damascene says further on (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that He assumed human nature “in atomo,” i.e. in an individual; not, indeed, in another individual which is a suppositum or a person of that nature, but in the Person of the Son of God.

Secondly, this saying of Damascene may be taken not as referring to human nature, as if from the union of soul and body one common nature (viz. human) did not result, but as referring to the union of the two natures Divine and human: which do not combine so as to form a third something that becomes a common nature, for in this way it would become predicable of many, and this is what he is aiming at, since he adds: “For there was not generated, neither will there ever be generated, another Christ, Who from the Godhead and manhood, and in the Godhead and manhood, is perfect God and perfect man.”

Reply to Objection 3: There are two principles of corporeal life: one the effective principle, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of all life; the other, the formal principle of life, for since “in living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), just as everything is formally by its form, so likewise the body lives by the soul: in this way a body could not live by the Word, Which cannot be the form of a body.

Whether the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human nature was united to the Word of God accidentally. For the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) of the Son of God, that He was "in habit found as a man." But habit is accidentally associated with that to which it pertains, whether habit be taken for one of the ten predicaments or as a species of quality. Therefore human nature is accidentally united to the Son of God.

Objection 2: Further, whatever comes to a thing that is complete in being comes to it accidentally, for an accident is said to be what can come or go without the subject being corrupted. But human nature came to Christ in time, Who had perfect being from eternity. Therefore it came to Him accidentally.

Objection 3: Further, whatever does not pertain to the nature or the essence of a thing is its accident, for whatever is, is either a substance or an accident. But human nature does not pertain to the Divine Essence or Nature of the Son of God, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above [3867](A[1]). Hence the human nature must have accrued accidentally to the Son of God.

Objection 4: Further, an instrument accrues accidentally. But the human nature was the instrument of the Godhead in Christ, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), that "the flesh of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead." Therefore it seems that the human nature was united to the Son of God accidentally.

On the contrary, Whatever is predicated accidentally, predicates, not substance, but quantity, or quality, or some other mode of being. If therefore the human nature accrues accidentally, when we say Christ is man, we do not predicate substance, but quality or quantity, or some other mode of being, which is contrary to the Decretal of Pope Alexander III, who says (Conc. Later. iii): "Since Christ is perfect God and perfect man, what foolhardiness have some to dare to affirm that Christ as man is not a substance?"

I answer that, In evidence of this question we must know that two heresies have arisen with regard to the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. The first confused the natures, as Eutyches and Dioscorus, who held that from the two natures one nature resulted, so that they confessed Christ to be “from” two natures (which were distinct before the union), but not “in” two natures (the distinction of nature coming to an end after the union). The second was the heresy of Nestorius and Theodore of Mopsuestia, who separated the persons. For they held the Person of the Son of God to be distinct from the Person of the Son of man, and said these were mutually united: first, “by indwelling,” inasmuch as the Word of God dwelt in the man, as in a temple; secondly, “by unity of intention,” inasmuch as the will of the man was always in agreement with the will of the Word of God; thirdly, “by operation,” inasmuch as they said the man was the instrument of the Word of God; fourthly, “by greatness of honor,” inasmuch as all honor shown to the Son of God was equally shown to the Son of man, on account of His union with the Son of God; fifthly, “by equivocation,” i.e. communication of names, inasmuch as we say that this man is God and the Son of God. Now it is plain that these modes imply an accidental union.

But some more recent masters, thinking to avoid these heresies, through ignorance fell into them. For some conceded one person in Christ, but maintained two hypostases, or two supposita, saying that a man, composed of body and soul, was from the beginning of his conception assumed by the Word of God. And this is the first opinion set down by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6). But others desirous of keeping the unity of person, held that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, but that these two were mutually separate, and were united to the Word accidentally, so that the number of persons might not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master sets down (Sent. iii, D, 6).

But both of these opinions fall into the heresy of Nestorius; the first, indeed, because to maintain two hypostases or supposita in Christ is the same as to maintain two persons, as was shown above [3868](A[3]). And if stress is laid on the word “person,” we must have in mind that even Nestorius spoke of unity of person on account of the unity of dignity and honor. Hence the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) directs an anathema against such a one as holds “one person in dignity, honor and adoration, as Theodore and Nestorius foolishly wrote.” But the other opinion falls into the error of Nestorius by maintaining an accidental union. For there is no difference in saying that the Word of God is united to the Man Christ by indwelling, as in His temple (as Nestorius said), or by putting on man, as a garment, which is the third opinion; rather it says something worse than Nestorius—to wit, that the soul and body are not united.

Now the Catholic faith, holding the mean between the aforesaid positions, does not affirm that the union of God and man took place in the essence or nature, nor yet in something accidental, but midway, in a subsistence or hypostasis. Hence in the fifth Council (Constantinople II, coll. viii, can. 5) we read: “Since the unity may be understood in many ways, those who follow the impiety of Apollinaris and Eutyches, professing the destruction of what came together” (i.e. destroying both natures), “confess a union by mingling; but the followers of Theodore and Nestorius, maintaining division, introduce a union of purpose. But the Holy Church of God, rejecting the impiety of both these treasons, confesses a union of the Word of God with flesh, by composition, which is in subsistence.” Therefore it is plain that the second of the three opinions, mentioned by the Master (Sent. iii, D, 6), which holds one hypostasis of God and man, is not to be called an opinion, but an article of Catholic faith. So likewise the first opinion which holds two hypostases, and the third which holds an accidental union, are not to be styled opinions, but heresies condemned by the Church in Councils.

Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): “Examples need not be wholly and at all points similar, for what is wholly similar is the same, and not an example, and especially in Divine things, for it is impossible to find a wholly similar example in the Theology,” i.e. in the Godhead of Persons, “and in the Dispensation,” i.e. the mystery of the Incarnation. Hence the human nature in Christ is likened to a habit, i.e. a garment, not indeed in regard to accidental union, but inasmuch as the Word is seen by the human nature, as a man by his garment, and also inasmuch as the garment is changed, for it is shaped according to the figure of him who puts it on, and yet he is not changed from his form on account of the garment. So likewise the human nature assumed by the Word of God is ennobled, but the Word of God is not changed, as Augustine says (Qq. 83, qu. 73).

Reply to Objection 2: Whatever accrues after the completion of the being comes accidentally, unless it be taken into communion with the complete being, just as in the resurrection the body comes to the soul which pre-exists, yet not accidentally, because it is assumed unto the same being, so that the body has vital being through the soul; but it is not so with whiteness, for the being of whiteness is other than the being of man to which whiteness comes. But the Word of God from all eternity had complete being in hypostasis or person; while in time the human nature accrued to it, not as if it were assumed unto one being inasmuch as this is of the nature (even as the body is assumed to the being of the soul), but to one being inasmuch as this is of the hypostasis or person. Hence the human nature is not accidentally united to the Son of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Accident is divided against substance. Now substance, as is plain from Metaph. v, 25, is taken in two ways: first, for essence or nature; secondly, for suppositum or hypostasis—hence the union having taken place in the hypostasis, is enough to show that it is not an accidental union, although the union did not take place in the nature.

Reply to Objection 4: Not everything that is assumed as an instrument pertains to the hypostasis of the one who assumes, as is plain in the case of a saw or a sword; yet nothing prevents what is assumed into the unity of the hypostasis from being as an instrument, even as the body of man or his members. Hence Nestorius held that the human nature was assumed by the Word merely as an instrument, and not into the unity of the hypostasis. And therefore he did not concede that the man was really the Son of God, but His instrument. Hence Cyril says (Epist. ad Monach. Aegyptii): “The Scripture does not affirm that this Emmanuel,” i.e. Christ, “was assumed for the office of an instrument, but as God truly humanized,” i.e. made man. But Damascene held that the human nature in Christ is an instrument belonging to the unity of the hypostasis.

Whether the union of the Divine nature and the human is anything created?

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Divine and human natures is not anything created. For there can be nothing created in God, because whatever is in God is God. But the union is in God, for God Himself is united to human nature. Therefore it seems that the union is not anything created.

Objection 2: Further, the end holds first place in everything. But the end of the union is the Divine hypostasis or Person in which the union is terminated. Therefore it seems that this union ought chiefly to be judged with reference to the dignity of the Divine hypostasis, which is not anything created. Therefore the union is nothing created.

Objection 3: Further, “That which is the cause of a thing being such is still more so” (Poster. i). But man is said to be the Creator on account of the union. Therefore much more is the union itself nothing created, but the Creator.

On the contrary, Whatever has a beginning in time is created. Now this union was not from eternity, but began in time. Therefore the union is something created.

I answer that, The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the Divine and the human nature, inasmuch as they come together in one Person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above ([3869]FP, Q[13], A[7]), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God. And hence we must say that the union of which we are speaking is not really in God, except only in our way of thinking; but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really. Therefore we must say it is something created.

Reply to Objection 1: This union is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, for God is said to be united to a creature inasmuch as the creature is really united to God without any change in Him.

Reply to Objection 2: The specific nature of a relation, as of motion, depends on the subject. And since this union has its being nowhere save in a created nature, as was said above, it follows that it has a created being.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is called Creator and is God because of the union, inasmuch as it is terminated in the Divine hypostasis; yet it does not follow that the union itself is the Creator or God, because that a thing is said to be created regards its being rather than its relation.

Whether union is the same as assumption?

Objection 1: It would seem that union is the same as assumption. For relations, as motions, are specified by their termini. Now the term of assumption and union is one and the same, viz. the Divine hypostasis. Therefore it seems that union and assumption are not different.

Objection 2: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the same thing seems to be what unites and what assumes, and what is united and what is assumed. But union and assumption seem to follow the action and passion of the thing uniting and the united, of the thing assuming and the assumed. Therefore union seems to be the same as assumption.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): “Union is one thing, incarnation is another; for union demands mere copulation, and leaves unsaid the end of the copulation; but incarnation and humanation determine the end of copulation.” But likewise assumption does not determine the end of copulation. Therefore it seems that union is the same as assumption.

On the contrary, The Divine Nature is said to be united, not assumed.

I answer that, As was stated above [3870](A[7]), union implies a certain relation of the Divine Nature and the human, according as they come together in one Person. Now all relations which begin in time are brought about by some change; and change consists in action and passion. Hence the “first” and principal difference between assumption and union must be said to be that union implies the relation: whereas assumption implies the action, whereby someone is said to assume, or the passion, whereby something is said to be assumed. Now from this difference another “second” difference arises, for assumption implies “becoming,” whereas union implies “having become,” and therefore the thing uniting is said to be united, but the thing assuming is not said to be assumed. For the human nature is taken to be in the terminus of assumption unto the Divine hypostasis when man is spoken of; and hence we can truly say that the Son of God, Who assumes human nature unto Himself, is man. But human nature, considered in itself, i.e. in the abstract, is viewed as assumed; and we do not say the Son of God is human nature. From this same follows a “third” difference, which is that a relation, especially one of equiparance, is no more to one extreme than to the other, whereas action and passion bear themselves differently to the agent and the patient, and to different termini. And hence assumption determines the term whence and the term whither; for assumption means a taking to oneself from another. But union determines none of these things. hence it may be said indifferently that the human nature is united with the Divine, or conversely. But the Divine Nature is not said to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is joined to the Divine personality, so that the Divine Person subsists in human nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Union and assumption have not the same relation to the term, but a different relation, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: What unites and what assumes are not the same. For whatsoever Person assumes unites, and not conversely. For the Person of the Father united the human nature to the Son, but not to Himself; and hence He is said to unite and not to assume. So likewise the united and the assumed are not identical, for the Divine Nature is said to be united, but not assumed.

Reply to Objection 3: Assumption determines with whom the union is made on the part of the one assuming, inasmuch as assumption means taking unto oneself [ad se sumere], whereas incarnation and humanation (determine with whom the union is made) on the part of the thing assumed, which is flesh or human nature. And thus assumption differs logically both from union and from incarnation or humanation.

Whether the union of the two natures in Christ is the greatest of all unions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the two natures in Christ is not the greatest of all unions. For what is united falls short of the unity of what is one, since what is united is by participation, but one is by essence. Now in created things there are some that are simply one, as is shown especially in unity itself, which is the principle of number. Therefore the union of which we are speaking does not imply the greatest of all unions.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the distance between things united, the less the union. Now, the things united by this union are most distant—namely, the Divine and human natures; for they are infinitely apart. Therefore their union is the least of all.

Objection 3: Further, from union there results one. But from the union of soul and body in us there arises what is one in person and nature; whereas from the union of the Divine and human nature there results what is one in person only. Therefore the union of soul and body is greater than that of the Divine and human natures; and hence the union of which we speak does not imply the greatest unity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 10) that "man is in the Son of God, more than the Son in the Father." But the Son is in the Father by unity of essence, and man is in the Son by the union of the Incarnation. Therefore the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Essence, which nevertheless is the greatest union; and thus the union of the Incarnation implies the greatest unity.

I answer that, Union implies the joining of several in some one thing. Therefore the union of the Incarnation may be taken in two ways: first, in regard to the things united; secondly, in regard to that in which they are united. And in this regard this union has a pre-eminence over other unions; for the unity of the Divine Person, in which the two natures are united, is the greatest. But it has no pre-eminence in regard to the things united.

Reply to Objection 1: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than numerical unity, which is the principle of number. For the unity of a Divine Person is an uncreated and self-subsisting unity, not received into another by participation. Also, it is complete in itself, having in itself whatever pertains to the nature of unity; and therefore it is not compatible with the nature of a part, as in numerical unity, which is a part of number, and which is shared in by the things numbered. And hence in this respect the union of the Incarnation is higher than numerical unity by reason of the unity of the Divine Person, and not by reason of the human nature, which is not the unity of the Divine Person, but is united to it.

Reply to Objection 2: This reason regards the things united, and not the Person in Whom the union takes place.

Reply to Objection 3: The unity of the Divine Person is greater than the unity of person and nature in us; and hence the union of the Incarnation is greater than the union of soul and body in us.

And because what is urged in the argument "on the contrary" rests upon what is untrue—namely, that the union of the Incarnation is greater than the unity of the Divine Persons in Essence—we must say to the authority of

Augustine that the human nature is not more in the Son of God than the Son of God in the Father, but much less. But the man in some respects is more in the Son than the Son in the Father—namely, inasmuch as the same suppositum is signified when I say “man,” meaning Christ, and when I say “Son of God”; whereas it is not the same suppositum of Father and Son.

Whether the union of the Incarnation took place by grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace. For grace is an accident, as was shown above ([3871]FS, Q[110], A[2]). But the union of the human nature to the Divine did not take place accidentally, as was shown above [3872](A[6]). Therefore it seems that the union of the Incarnation did not take place by grace.

Objection 2: Further, the subject of grace is the soul. But it is written (Col. 2:9): “In Christ [Vulg.: ‘Him’] dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally.” Therefore it seems that this union did not take place by grace.

Objection 3: Further, every saint is united to God by grace. If, therefore, the union of the Incarnation was by grace, it would seem that Christ is said to be God no more than other holy men.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): “By the same grace every man is made a Christian, from the beginning of his faith, as this man from His beginning was made Christ.” But this man became Christ by union with the Divine Nature. Therefore this union was by grace.

I answer that, As was said above ([3873]FS, Q[110], A[1]), grace is taken in two ways:—first, as the will of God gratuitously bestowing something; secondly, as the free gift of God. Now human nature stands in need of the gratuitous will of God in order to be lifted up to God, since this is above its natural capability. Moreover, human nature is lifted up to God in two ways: first, by operation, as the saints know and love God; secondly, by personal being, and this mode belongs exclusively to Christ, in Whom human nature is assumed so as to be in the Person of the Son of God. But it is plain that for the perfection of operation the power needs to be perfected by a habit, whereas that a nature has being in its own suppositum does not take place by means of a habit.

And hence we must say that if grace be understood as the will of God gratuitously doing something or reputing anything as well-pleasing or acceptable to Him, the union of the Incarnation took place by grace, even as the union of the saints with God by knowledge and love. But if grace be taken as the free gift of God, then the fact that the human nature is united to the Divine Person may be called a grace, inasmuch as it took place without being preceded by any merits—but not as though there were an habitual grace, by means of which the union took place.

Reply to Objection 1: The grace which is an accident is a certain likeness of the Divinity participated by man. But by the Incarnation human nature is not said to have participated a likeness of the Divine nature, but is said to be united to the Divine Nature itself in the Person of the Son. Now the thing itself is greater than a participated likeness of it.

Reply to Objection 2: Habitual grace is only in the soul; but the grace, i.e. the free gift of God, of being united to the Divine Person belongs to the whole human nature, which is composed of soul and body. And hence it is said that the fulness of the Godhead dwelt corporeally in Christ because the Divine Nature is united not merely to the soul, but to the body also. Although it may also be said that it dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. not as in a shadow, as it dwelt in the sacraments of the old law, of which it is said in the same place (Col. 2:17) that they are the "shadow of things to come but the body is Christ" [Vulg.: 'Christ's'], inasmuch as the body is opposed to the shadow. And some say that the Godhead is said to have dwelt in Christ corporeally, i.e. in three ways, just as a body has three dimensions: first, by essence, presence, and power, as in other creatures; secondly, by sanctifying grace, as in the saints; thirdly, by personal union, which is proper to Christ.

Hence the reply to the third is manifest, viz. because the union of the Incarnation did not take place by habitual grace alone, but in subsistence or person.

Whether any merits preceded the union of the Incarnation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the union of the Incarnation followed upon certain merits, because upon Ps. 32:22, "Let Thy mercy, o Lord, be upon us, as," etc. a gloss says: "Here the prophet's desire for the Incarnation and its merited fulfilment are hinted at." Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit.

Objection 2: Further, whoever merits anything merits that without which it cannot be. But the ancient Fathers merited eternal life, to which they were able to attain only by the Incarnation; for Gregory says (Moral. xiii): “Those who came into this world before Christ’s coming, whatsoever eminency of righteousness they may have had, could not, on being divested of the body, at once be admitted into the bosom of the heavenly country, seeing that He had not as yet come Who, by His own descending, should place the souls of the righteous in their everlasting seat.” Therefore it would seem that they merited the Incarnation.

Objection 3: Further, of the Blessed Virgin it is sung that “she merited to bear the Lord of all” [*Little Office of B. V. M., Dominican Rite, Ant. at Benedictus], and this took place through the Incarnation. Therefore the Incarnation falls under merit.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. xv): “Whoever can find merits preceding the singular generation of our Head, may also find merits preceding the repeated regeneration of us His members.” But no merits preceded our regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: “Not by the works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us, by the laver of regeneration.” Therefore no merits preceded the generation of Christ.

I answer that, With regard to Christ Himself, it is clear from the above [3874](A[10]) that no merits of His could have preceded the union. For we do not hold that He was first of all a mere man, and that afterwards by the merits of a good life it was granted Him to become the Son of God, as Photinus held; but we hold that from the beginning of His conception this man was truly the Son of God, seeing that He had no other hypostasis but that of the Son of God, according to Luke 1:35: “The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God.” And hence every operation of this man followed the union. Therefore no operation of His could have been meritorious of the union.

Neither could the needs of any other man whatsoever have merited this union condignly: first, because the meritorious works of man are properly ordained to beatitude, which is the reward of virtue, and consists in the full enjoyment of God. Whereas the union of the Incarnation, inasmuch as it is in the personal being, transcends the union of the beatified mind with God, which is by the act of the soul in fruition; and therefore it cannot fall under merit. Secondly, because grace cannot fall under merit, for the principle of merit does not fall under merit; and therefore neither does grace, for it is the principle of merit. Hence, still less does the Incarnation fall under merit, since it is the principle of grace, according to Jn. 1:17: “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.” Thirdly, because the Incarnation is for the reformation of the entire human nature, and therefore it does not fall under the merit of any individual man, since the goodness of a mere man cannot be the cause of the good of the entire nature. Yet the holy Fathers merited the Incarnation congruously by desiring and beseeching; for it was becoming that God should harken to those who obeyed Him.

And thereby the reply to the First Objection is manifest.

Reply to Objection 2: It is false that under merit falls everything without which there can be no reward. For there is something pre-required not merely for reward, but also for merit, as the Divine goodness and grace and the very nature of man. And again, the mystery of the Incarnation is the principle of merit, because “of His fulness we all have received” (Jn. 1:16).

Reply to Objection 3: The Blessed Virgin is said to have merited to bear the Lord of all; not that she merited His Incarnation, but because by the grace bestowed upon her she merited that grade of purity and holiness, which fitted her to be the Mother of God.

Whether the grace of union was natural to the man Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of union was not natural to the man Christ. For the union of the Incarnation did not take place in the nature, but in the Person, as was said above [3875](A[2]). Now a thing is denominated from its terminus. Therefore this grace ought rather to be called personal than natural.

Objection 2: Further, grace is divided against nature, even as gratuitous things, which are from God, are distinguished from natural things, which are from an intrinsic principle. But if things are divided in opposition to one another, one is not denominated by the other. Therefore the grace of Christ was not natural to Him.

Objection 3: Further, natural is that which is according to nature. But the grace of union is not natural to Christ in regard to the Divine Nature, otherwise it would belong to the other Persons; nor is it natural to Him according to the human nature, otherwise it would belong to all men, since they are of the same nature as He. Therefore it would seem that the grace of union is nowise natural to Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): “In the assumption of human nature, grace itself became somewhat natural to that man, so as to leave no room for sin in Him.”

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), nature designates, in one way, nativity; in another, the essence of a thing. Hence natural may be taken in two ways: first, for what is only from the essential principles of a thing, as it is natural to fire to mount; secondly, we call natural to man what he has had from his birth, according to Eph. 2:3: “We were by nature children of wrath”; and Wis. 12:10: “They were a wicked generation, and their malice natural.” Therefore the grace of Christ, whether of union or habitual, cannot be called natural as if caused by the principles of the human nature of Christ, although it may be called natural, as if coming to the human nature of Christ by the causality of His Divine Nature. But these two kinds of grace are said to be natural to Christ, inasmuch as He had them from His nativity, since from the beginning of His conception the human nature was united to the Divine Person, and His soul was filled with the gift of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the union did not take place in the nature, yet it was caused by the power of the Divine Nature, which is truly the nature of Christ, and it, moreover, belonged to Christ from the beginning of His nativity.

Reply to Objection 2: The union is not said to be grace and natural in the same respect; for it is called grace inasmuch as it is not from merit; and it is said to be natural inasmuch as by the power of the Divine Nature it was in the humanity of Christ from His nativity.

Reply to Objection 3: The grace of union is not natural to Christ according to His human nature, as if it were caused by the principles of the human nature, and hence it need not belong to all men. Nevertheless, it is natural to Him in regard to the human nature on account of the “property” of His birth, seeing that He was conceived by the Holy Ghost, so that He might be the natural Son of God and of man. But it is natural to Him in regard to the Divine Nature, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the active principle of this grace; and this belongs to the whole Trinity—to wit, to be the active principle of this grace.

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE PERSON ASSUMING (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the union on the part of the Person assuming, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether to assume is befitting to a Divine Person?

(2) Whether it is befitting to the Divine Nature?

(3) Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?

(4) Whether one Person can assume without another?

(5) Whether each Person can assume?

(6) Whether several Persons can assume one individual nature?

(7) Whether one Person can assume two individual natures?

(8) Whether it was more fitting for the Person of the Son of God to assume human nature than for another Divine Person?

Whether it is befitting for a Divine Person to assume?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature. For a Divine Person signifies something most perfect. Now no addition can be made to what is perfect. Therefore, since to assume is to take to oneself, and consequently what is assumed is added to the one who assumes, it does not seem to be befitting to a Divine Person to assume a created nature.

Objection 2: Further, that to which anything is assumed is communicated in some degree to what is assumed to it, just as dignity is communicated to whosoever is assumed to a dignity. But it is of the nature of a person to be incommunicable, as was said above ([3876]FP, Q[29], A[1]). Therefore it is not befitting to a Divine Person to assume, i.e. to take to Himself.

Objection 3: Further, person is constituted by nature. But it is repugnant that the thing constituted should assume the constituent, since the effect does not act on its cause. Hence it is not befitting to a Person to assume a nature.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): “This God, i.e. the only-Begotten one, took the form,” i.e. the nature, “of a servant to His own Person.” But the only-Begotten God is a Person. Therefore it is befitting to a Person to take, i.e. to assume a nature.

I answer that, In the word “assumption” are implied two things, viz. the principle and the term of the act, for to assume is to take something to oneself. Now of this assumption a Person is both the principle and the term. The principle—because it properly belongs to a person to act, and this assuming of flesh took place by the Divine action. Likewise a Person is the term of this assumption, because, as was said above ([3877]Q[2], AA[1] ,2), the union took place in the Person, and not in the nature. Hence it is plain that to assume a nature is most properly befitting to a Person.

Reply to Objection 1: Since the Divine Person is infinite, no addition can be made to it: Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: “We do not conceive the mode of conjunction to be according to addition”; just as in the union of man with God, nothing is added to God by the grace of adoption, but what is Divine is united to man; hence, not God but man is perfected.

Reply to Objection 2: A Divine Person is said to be incommunicable inasmuch as It cannot be predicated of several supposita, but nothing prevents several things being predicated of the Person. Hence it is not contrary to the nature of person to be communicated so as to subsist in several natures, for even in a created person several natures may concur accidentally, as in the person of one man we find quantity and quality. But this is proper to a Divine Person, on account of its infinity, that there should be a concourse of natures in it, not accidentally, but in subsistence.

Reply to Objection 3: As was said above ([3878]Q[2], A[1]), the human nature constitutes a Divine Person, not simply, but forasmuch as the Person is denominated from such a nature. For human nature does not make the Son of Man to be simply, since He was from eternity, but only to be man. It is by the Divine Nature that a Divine Person is constituted simply. Hence the Divine Person is not said to assume the Divine Nature, but to assume the human nature.

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume. Because, as was said above [3879](A[1]), to assume is to take to oneself. But the Divine Nature did not take to Itself human nature, for the union did not take place in the nature, as was said above (Q[2], AA[1],3). Hence it is not befitting to the Divine Nature to assume human nature.

Objection 2: Further, the Divine Nature is common to the three Persons. If, therefore, it is befitting to the Divine Nature to assume, it consequently is befitting to the three Persons; and thus the Father assumed human nature even as the Son, which is erroneous.

Objection 3: Further, to assume is to act. But to act befits a person, not a nature, which is rather taken to be the principle by which the agent acts. Therefore to assume is not befitting to the nature.

On the contrary, Augustine (Fulgentius) says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): “That nature which remains eternally begotten of the Father” (i.e. which is received from the Father by eternal generation) “took our nature free of sin from His Mother.”

I answer that, As was said above [3880](A[1]), in the word assumption two things are signified—to wit, the principle and the term of the action. Now to be the principle of the assumption belongs to the Divine Nature in itself, because the assumption took place by Its power; but to be the term of the assumption does not belong to the Divine Nature in itself, but by reason of the Person in Whom It is considered to be. Hence a Person is primarily and more properly said to assume, but it may be said secondarily that the Nature assumed a nature to Its Person. And after the same manner the Nature is also said to be incarnate, not that it is changed to flesh, but that it assumed the nature of flesh. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6): “Following the blessed Athanasius and Cyril we say that the Nature of God is incarnate.”

Reply to Objection 1: “Oneself” is reciprocal, and points to the same suppositum. But the Divine Nature is not a distinct suppositum from the Person of the Word. Hence, inasmuch as the Divine Nature took human nature to the Person of the Word, It is said to take it to Itself. But although the Father takes human nature to the Person of the Word, He did not thereby take it to Himself, for the suppositum of the Father and the Son is not one. and hence it cannot properly be said that the Father assumes human nature.

Reply to Objection 2: What is befitting to the Divine Nature in Itself is befitting to the three Persons, as goodness, wisdom, and the like. But to assume belongs to It by reason of the Person of the Word, as was said above, and hence it is befitting to that Person alone.

Reply to Objection 3: As in God "what is" and "whereby it is" are the same, so likewise in Him "what acts" and "whereby it acts" are the same, since everything acts, inasmuch as it is a being. Hence the Divine Nature is both that whereby God acts, and the very God Who acts.

Whether the Nature abstracted from the Personality can assume?

Objection 1: It would seem that if we abstract the Personality by our mind, the Nature cannot assume. For it was said above [3881](A[1]) that it belongs to the Nature to assume by reason of the Person. But what belongs to one by reason of another cannot belong to it if the other is removed; as a body, which is visible by reason of color, without color cannot be seen. Hence if the Personality be mentally abstracted, the Nature cannot assume.

Objection 2: Further, assumption implies the term of union, as was said above [3882](A[1]). But the union cannot take place in the nature, but only in the Person. Therefore, if the Personality be abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.

Objection 3: Further, it has been said above ([3883]FP, Q[40], A[3]) that in the Godhead if the Personality is abstracted, nothing remains. But the one who assumes is something. Therefore, if the Personality is abstracted, the Divine Nature cannot assume.

On the contrary, In the Godhead Personality signifies a personal property; and this is threefold, viz. Paternity, Filiation and Procession, as was said above ([3884]FP, Q[30], A[2]). Now if we mentally abstract these, there still remains the omnipotence of God, by which the Incarnation was wrought, as the angel says (Lk. 1:37): "No word shall be impossible with God." Therefore it seems that if the Personality be removed, the Divine Nature can still assume.

I answer that, The intellect stands in two ways towards God. First, to know God as He is, and in this manner it is impossible for the intellect to circumscribe something in God and leave the rest, for all that is in God is one, except the distinction of Persons; and as regards these, if one is removed the other is taken away, since they are distinguished by relations only which must be together at the same time. Secondly, the intellect stands towards God, not indeed as knowing God as He is, but in its own way, i.e. understanding manifoldly and separately what in God is one: and in this way our intellect can understand the Divine goodness and wisdom, and the like, which are called essential attributes, without understanding Paternity or Filiation, which are called Personalities. And hence if we abstract Personality by our intellect, we may still understand the Nature assuming.

Reply to Objection 1: Because in God "what is," and "whereby it is," are one, if any one of the things which are attributed to God in the abstract is considered in itself, abstracted from all else, it will still be something subsisting, and consequently a Person, since it is an intellectual nature. Hence just as we now say three Persons, on account of holding three personal properties, so likewise if we mentally exclude the personal properties there will still remain in our thought the Divine Nature as subsisting and as a Person. And in this way It may be understood to assume human nature by reason of Its subsistence or Personality.

Reply to Objection 2: Even if the personal properties of the three Persons are abstracted by our mind, nevertheless there will remain in our thoughts the one Personality of God, as the Jews consider. And the assumption can be terminated in It, as we now say it is terminated in the Person of the Word.

Reply to Objection 3: If we mentally abstract the Personality, it is said that nothing remains by way of resolution, i.e. as if the subject of the relation and the relation itself were distinct because all we can think of in God is considered as a subsisting suppositum. However, some of the things predicated of God can be understood without others, not by way of resolution, but by the way mentioned above.

Whether one Person without another can assume a created nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that one Person cannot assume a created nature without another assuming it. For "the works of the Trinity are inseparable," as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxviii). But as the three Persons have one essence, so likewise They have one operation. Now to assume is an operation. Therefore it cannot belong to one without belonging to another.

Objection 2: Further, as we say the Person of the Son became incarnate, so also did the Nature; for “the whole Divine Nature became incarnate in one of Its hypostases,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6). But the Nature is common to the three Persons. Therefore the assumption is.

Objection 3: Further, as the human nature in Christ is assumed by God, so likewise are men assumed by Him through grace, according to Rom. 14:3: “God hath taken him to Him.” But this assumption pertains to all the Persons; therefore the first also.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that the mystery of the Incarnation pertains to “discrete theology,” i.e. according to which something “distinct” is said of the Divine Persons.

I answer that, As was said above [3885](A[1]), assumption implies two things, viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the act of assumption proceeds from the Divine power, which is common to the three Persons, but the term of the assumption is a Person, as stated above [3886](A[2]). Hence what has to do with action in the assumption is common to the three Persons; but what pertains to the nature of term belongs to one Person in such a manner as not to belong to another; for the three Persons caused the human nature to be united to the one Person of the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: This reason regards the operation, and the conclusion would follow if it implied this operation only, without the term, which is a Person.

Reply to Objection 2: The Nature is said to be incarnate, and to assume by reason of the Person in Whom the union is terminated, as stated above ([3887]AA[1],2), and not as it is common to the three Persons. Now “the whole Divine Nature is” said to be “incarnate”; not that It is incarnate in all the Persons, but inasmuch as nothing is wanting to the perfection of the Divine Nature of the Person incarnate, as Damascene explains there.

Reply to Objection 3: The assumption which takes place by the grace of adoption is terminated in a certain participation of the Divine Nature, by an assimilation to Its goodness, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “That you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature”; and hence this assumption is common to the three Persons, in regard to the principle and the term. But the assumption which is by the grace of union is common on the part of the principle, but not on the part of the term, as was said above.

Whether each of the Divine Persons could have assumed human nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that no other Divine Person could have assumed human nature except the Person of the Son. For by this assumption it has been brought about that God is the Son of Man. But it was not becoming that either the Father or the Holy Ghost should be said to be a Son; for this would tend to the confusion of the Divine Persons. Therefore the Father and Holy Ghost could not have assumed flesh.

Objection 2: Further, by the Divine Incarnation men have come into possession of the adoption of sons, according to Rom. 8:15: “For you have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the spirit of adoption of sons.” But sonship by adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship which does not belong to the Father nor the Holy Ghost; hence it is said (Rom. 8:29): “For whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son.” Therefore it seems that no other Person except the Person of the Son could have become incarnate.

Objection 3: Further, the Son is said to be sent and to be begotten by the temporal nativity, inasmuch as He became incarnate. But it does not belong to the Father to be sent, for He is innascible, as was said above ([3888]FP, Q[32], A[3]; [3889]FP, Q[43], A[4]). Therefore at least the Person of the Father cannot become incarnate.

On the contrary, Whatever the Son can do, so can the Father and the Holy Ghost, otherwise the power of the three Persons would not be one. But the Son was able to become incarnate. Therefore the Father and the Holy Ghost were able to become incarnate.

I answer that, As was said above ([3890]AA[1],2,4), assumption implies two things, viz. the act of the one assuming and the term of the assumption. Now the principle of the act is the Divine power, and the term is a Person. But the Divine power is indifferently and commonly in all the Persons. Moreover, the nature of Personality is common to all the Persons, although the personal properties are different. Now whenever a power regards several things indifferently, it can terminate its action in any of them indifferently, as is plain in rational powers, which regard opposites, and can do either of them. Therefore the Divine power could have united human nature to the Person of the Father or of the Holy Ghost, as It united it to the Person of the Son. And hence we must say that the Father or the Holy Ghost could have assumed flesh even as the Son.

Reply to Objection 1: The temporal sonship, whereby Christ is said to be the Son of Man, does not constitute His Person, as does the eternal Sonship; but is something following upon the temporal nativity. Hence, if the name of son were transferred to the Father or the Holy Ghost in this manner, there would be no confusion of the Divine Persons.

Reply to Objection 2: Adoptive sonship is a certain participation of natural sonship; but it takes place in us, by appropriation, by the Father, Who is the principle of natural sonship, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost, Who is the love of the Father and Son, according to Gal. 4:6: “God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts crying, Abba, Father.” And therefore, even as by the Incarnation of the Son we receive adoptive sonship in the likeness of His natural sonship, so likewise, had the Father become incarnate, we should have received adoptive sonship from Him, as from the principle of the natural sonship, and from the Holy Ghost as from the common bond of Father and Son.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the Father to be innascible as to eternal birth, and the temporal birth would not destroy this. But the Son of God is said to be sent in regard to the Incarnation, inasmuch as He is from another, without which the Incarnation would not suffice for the nature of mission.

Whether several Divine Persons can assume one and the same individual nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that two Divine Persons cannot assume one and the same individual nature. For, this being granted, there would either be several men or one. But not several, for just as one Divine Nature in several Persons does not make several gods, so one human nature in several persons does not make several men. Nor would there be only one man, for one man is “this man,” which signifies one person; and hence the distinction of three Divine Persons would be destroyed, which cannot be allowed. Therefore neither two nor three Persons can take one human nature.

Objection 2: Further, the assumption is terminated in the unity of Person, as has been said above [3891](A[2]). But the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are not one Person. Therefore the three Persons cannot assume one human nature.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4), and Augustine (De Trin. i, 11,12,13), that from the Incarnation of God the Son it follows that whatever is said of the Son of God is said of the Son of Man, and conversely. Hence, if three Persons were to assume one human nature, it would follow that whatever is said of each of the three Persons would be said of the man; and conversely, what was said of the man could be said of each of the three Persons. Therefore what is proper to the Father, viz. to beget the Son, would be said of the man, and consequently would be said of the Son of God; and this could not be. Therefore it is impossible that the three Persons should assume one human nature.

On the contrary, The Incarnate Person subsists in two natures. But the three Persons can subsist in one Divine Nature. Therefore they can also subsist in one human nature in such a way that the human nature be assumed by the three Persons.

I answer that, As was said above ([3892]Q[2], A[5], ad 1), by the union of the soul and body in Christ neither a new person is made nor a new hypostasis, but one human nature is assumed to the Divine Person or hypostasis, which, indeed, does not take place by the power of the human nature, but by the power of the Divine Person. Now such is the characteristic of the Divine Persons that one does not exclude another from communicating in the same nature, but only in the same Person. Hence, since in the mystery of the Incarnation “the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer,” as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), we must judge of it in regard to the quality of the Divine Person assuming, and not according to the quality of the human nature assumed. Therefore it is not impossible that two or three Divine Persons should assume one human nature, but it would be impossible for them to assume one human hypostasis or person; thus Anselm says in the book De Concep. Virg. (Cur Deus Homo ii, 9), that “several Persons cannot assume one and the same man to unity of Person.”

Reply to Objection 1: In the hypothesis that three Persons assume one human nature, it would be true to say that the three Persons were one man, because of the one human nature. For just as it is now true to say the three Persons are one God on account of the one Divine Nature, so it would be true to say they are one man on account of the one human nature. Nor would "one" imply unity of person, but unity in human nature; for it could not be argued that because the three Persons were one man they were one simply. For nothing hinders our saying that men, who are many simply, are in some respect one, e.g. one people, and as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 3): "The Spirit of God and the spirit of man are by nature different, but by inherence one spirit results," according to 1 Cor. 6:17: "He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit."

Reply to Objection 2: In this supposition the human nature would be assumed to the unity, not indeed of one Person, but to the unity of each Person, so that even as the Divine Nature has a natural unity with each Person, so also the human nature would have a unity with each Person by assumption.

Reply to Objection 3: In the mystery of the Incarnation, there results a communication of the properties belonging to the nature, because whatever belongs to the nature can be predicated of the Person subsisting in that nature, no matter to which of the natures it may apply. Hence in this hypothesis, of the Person of the Father may be predicated what belongs to the human nature and what belongs to the Divine; and likewise of the Person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. But what belongs to the Person of the Father by reason of His own Person could not be attributed to the Person of the Son or Holy Ghost on account of the distinction of Persons which would still remain. Therefore it might be said that as the Father was unbegotten, so the man was unbegotten, inasmuch as "man" stood for the Person of the Father. But if one were to go on to say, "The man is unbegotten; the Son is man; therefore the Son is unbegotten," it would be the fallacy of figure of speech or of accident; even as we now say God is unbegotten, because the Father is unbegotten, yet we cannot conclude that the Son is unbegotten, although He is God.

Whether one Divine Person can assume two human natures?

Objection 1: It would seem that one Divine Person cannot assume two human natures. For the nature assumed in the mystery of the Incarnation has no other suppositum than the suppositum of the Divine Person, as is plain from what has been stated above ([3893]Q[2], AA[3],6). Therefore, if we suppose one Person to assume two human natures, there would be one suppositum of two natures of the same species; which would seem to imply a contradiction, for the nature of one species is only multiplied by distinct supposita.

Objection 2: Further, in this hypothesis it could not be said that the Divine Person incarnate was one man, seeing that He would not have one human nature; neither could it be said that there were several, for several men have distinct supposita, whereas in this case there would be only one suppositum. Therefore the aforesaid hypothesis is impossible.

Objection 3: Further, in the mystery of the Incarnation the whole Divine Nature is united to the whole nature assumed, i.e. to every part of it, for Christ is “perfect God and perfect man, complete God and complete man,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 7). But two human natures cannot be wholly united together, inasmuch as the soul of one would be united to the body of the other; and, again, two bodies would be together, which would give rise to confusion of natures. Therefore it is not possibly for one Divine Person to assume two human natures.

On the contrary, Whatever the Father can do, that also can the Son do. But after the Incarnation the Father can still assume a human nature distinct from that which the Son has assumed; for in nothing is the power of the Father or the Son lessened by the Incarnation of the Son. Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation the Son can assume another human nature distinct from the one He has assumed.

I answer that, What has power for one thing, and no more, has a power limited to one. Now the power of a Divine Person is infinite, nor can it be limited by any created thing. Hence it may not be said that a Divine Person so assumed one human nature as to be unable to assume another. For it would seem to follow from this that the Personality of the Divine Nature was so comprehended by one human nature as to be unable to assume another to its Personality; and this is impossible, for the Uncreated cannot be comprehended by any creature. Hence it is plain that, whether we consider the Divine Person in regard to His power, which is the principle of the union, or in regard to His Personality, which is the term of the union, it has to be said that the Divine Person, over and beyond the human nature which He has assumed, can assume another distinct human nature.

Reply to Objection 1: A created nature is completed in its essentials by its form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter. And hence, if the composition of matter and form constitutes a new suppositum, the consequence is that the nature is multiplied by the multiplication of supposita. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the union of form and matter, i.e. of soul and body, does not constitute a new suppositum, as was said above [3894](A[6]). Hence there can be a numerical multitude on the part of the nature, on account of the division of matter, without distinction of supposita.

Reply to Objection 2: It might seem possible to reply that in such a hypothesis it would follow that there were two men by reason of the two natures, just as, on the contrary, the three Persons would be called one man, on account of the one nature assumed, as was said above (A[6], ad 1). But this does not seem to be true; because we must use words according to the purpose of their signification, which is in relation to our surroundings. Consequently, in order to judge of a word's signification or co-signification, we must consider the things which are around us, in which a word derived from some form is never used in the plural unless there are several supposita. For a man who has on two garments is not said to be "two persons clothed," but "one clothed with two garments"; and whoever has two qualities is designated in the singular as "such by reason of the two qualities." Now the assumed nature is, as it were, a garment, although this similitude does not fit at all points, as has been said above ([3895]Q[2], A[6], ad 1). And hence, if the Divine Person were to assume two human natures, He would be called, on account of the unity of suppositum, one man having two human natures. Now many men are said to be one people, inasmuch as they have some one thing in common, and not on account of the unity of suppositum. So likewise, if two Divine Persons were to assume one singular human nature, they would be said to be one man, as stated (A[6], ad 1), not from the unity of suppositum, but because they have some one thing in common.

Reply to Objection 3: The Divine and human natures do not bear the same relation to the one Divine Person, but the Divine Nature is related first of all thereto, inasmuch as It is one with It from eternity; and afterwards the human nature is related to the Divine Person, inasmuch as it is assumed by the Divine Person in time, not indeed that the nature is the Person, but that the Person of God subsists in human nature. For the Son of God is His Godhead, but is not His manhood. And hence, in order that the human nature may be assumed by the Divine Person, the Divine Nature must be united by a personal union with the whole nature assumed, i.e. in all its parts. Now in the two natures assumed there would be a uniform relation to the Divine Person, nor would one assume the other. Hence it would not be necessary for one of them to be altogether united to the other, i.e. all the parts of one with all the parts of the other.

Whether it was more fitting that the Person of the Son rather than any other Divine Person should assume human nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not more fitting that the Son of God should become incarnate than the Father or the Holy Ghost. For by the mystery of the Incarnation men are led to the true knowledge of God, according to Jn. 18:37: “For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, to give testimony to the truth.” But by the Person of the Son of God becoming incarnate many have been kept back from the true knowledge of God, since they referred to the very Person of the Son what was said of the Son in His human nature, as Arius, who held an inequality of Persons, according to what is said (Jn. 14:28): “The Father is greater than I.” Now this error would not have arisen if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, for no one would have taken the Father to be less than the Son. Hence it seems fitting that the Person of the Father, rather than the Person of the Son, should have become incarnate.

Objection 2: Further, the effect of the Incarnation would seem to be, as it were, a second creation of human nature, according to Gal. 6:15: “For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.” But the power of creation is appropriated to the Father. Therefore it would have been more becoming to the Father than to the Son to become incarnate.

Objection 3: Further, the Incarnation is ordained to the remission of sins, according to Mat. 1:21: “Thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins.” Now the remission of sins is attributed to the

Holy Ghost according to Jn. 20:22,23: “Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Therefore it became the Person of the Holy Ghost rather than the Person of the Son to become incarnate.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 1): “In the mystery of the Incarnation the wisdom and power of God are made known: the wisdom, for He found a most suitable discharge for a most heavy debt; the power, for He made the conquered conquer.” But power and wisdom are appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: “Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God.” Therefore it was fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate.

I answer that, It was most fitting that the Person of the Son should become incarnate. First, on the part of the union; for such as are similar are fittingly united. Now the Person of the Son, Who is the Word of God, has a certain common agreement with all creatures, because the word of the craftsman, i.e. his concept, is an exemplar likeness of whatever is made by him. Hence the Word of God, Who is His eternal concept, is the exemplar likeness of all creatures. And therefore as creatures are established in their proper species, though movably, by the participation of this likeness, so by the non-participated and personal union of the Word with a creature, it was fitting that the creature should be restored in order to its eternal and unchangeable perfection; for the craftsman by the intelligible form of his art, whereby he fashioned his handiwork, restores it when it has fallen into ruin. Moreover, He has a particular agreement with human nature, since the Word is a concept of the eternal Wisdom, from Whom all man’s wisdom is derived. And hence man is perfected in wisdom (which is his proper perfection, as he is rational) by participating the Word of God, as the disciple is instructed by receiving the word of his master. Hence it is said (Ecclus. 1:5): “The Word of God on high is the fountain of wisdom.” And hence for the consummate perfection of man it was fitting that the very Word of God should be personally united to human nature.

Secondly, the reason of this fitness may be taken from the end of the union, which is the fulfilling of predestination, i.e. of such as are preordained to the heavenly inheritance, which is bestowed only on sons, according to Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.” Hence it was fitting that by Him Who is the natural Son, men should share this likeness of sonship by adoption, as the Apostle says in the same chapter (Rom. 8:29): “For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son.”

Thirdly, the reason for this fitness may be taken from the sin of our first parent, for which the Incarnation supplied the remedy. For the first man sinned by seeking knowledge, as is plain from the words of the serpent, promising to man the knowledge of good and evil. Hence it was fitting that by the Word of true knowledge man might be led back to God, having wandered from God through an inordinate thirst for knowledge.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing which human malice cannot abuse, since it even abuses God’s goodness, according to Rom. 2:4: “Or despisest thou the riches of His goodness?” Hence, even if the Person of the Father had become incarnate, men would have been capable of finding an occasion of error, as though the Son were not able to restore human nature.

Reply to Objection 2: The first creation of things was made by the power of God the Father through the Word; hence the second creation ought to have been brought about through the Word, by the power of God the Father, in order that restoration should correspond to creation according to 2 Cor. 5:19: “For God indeed was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.”

Reply to Objection 3: To be the gift of the Father and the Son is proper to the Holy Ghost. But the remission of sins is caused by the Holy Ghost, as by the gift of God. And hence it was more fitting to man’s justification that the Son should become incarnate, Whose gift the Holy Ghost is.

OF THE MODE OF UNION ON THE PART OF THE HUMAN NATURE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the union on the part of what was assumed. About which we must consider first what things were assumed by the Word of God; secondly, what were co-assumed, whether perfections or defects.

Now the Son of God assumed human nature and its parts. Hence a threefold consideration arises. First, with regard to the nature; secondly, with regard to its parts; thirdly, with regard to the order of the assumption.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether human nature was more capable of being assumed than any other nature?

(2) Whether He assumed a person?

(3) Whether He assumed a man?

(4) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature abstracted from all individuals?

(5) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in all its individuals?

(6) Whether it was becoming that He should assume human nature in any man begotten of the stock of Adam?

Whether human nature was more assumable by the Son of God than any other nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that human nature is not more capable of being assumed by the Son of God than any other nature. For Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): “In deeds wrought miraculously the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer.” Now the power of God Who wrought the Incarnation, which is a most miraculous work, is not limited to one nature, since the power of God is infinite. Therefore human nature is not more capable of being assumed than any other creature.

Objection 2: Further, likeness is the foundation of the fittingness of the Incarnation of the Divine Person, as above stated ([3896]Q[3], A[8]). But as in rational creatures we find the likeness of image, so in irrational creatures we find the image of trace. Therefore the irrational creature was as capable of assumption as human nature.

Objection 3: Further, in the angelic nature we find a more perfect likeness than in human nature, as Gregory says: (Hom. de Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.), where he introduces Ezech. 28:12: “Thou wast the seal of resemblance.” And sin is found in angels, even as in man, according to Job 4:18: “And in His angels He found wickedness.” Therefore the angelic nature was as capable of assumption as the nature of man.

Objection 4: Further, since the highest perfection belongs to God, the more like to God a thing is, the more perfect it is. But the whole universe is more perfect than its parts, amongst which is human nature. Therefore the whole universe is more capable of being assumed than human nature.

On the contrary, It is said (Prov. 8:31) by the mouth of Begotten Wisdom: “My delights were to be with the children of men”; and hence there would seem some fitness in the union of the Son of God with human nature.

I answer that, A thing is said to be assumable as being capable of being assumed by a Divine Person, and this capability cannot be taken with reference to the natural passive power, which does not extend to what transcends the natural order, as the personal union of a creature with God transcends it. Hence it follows that a thing is said to be assumable according to some fitness for such a union. Now this fitness in human nature may be taken from two things, viz. according to its dignity, and according to its need. According to its dignity, because human nature, as being rational and intellectual, was made for attaining to the Word to some extent by its operation, viz. by knowing and loving Him. According to its need—because it stood in need of restoration, having fallen under original sin. Now these two things belong to human nature alone. For in the irrational creature the fitness of dignity is wanting, and in the angelic nature the aforesaid fitness of need is wanting. Hence it follows that only human nature was assumable.

Reply to Objection 1: Creatures are said to be "such" with reference to their proper causes, not with reference to what belongs to them from their first and universal causes; thus we call a disease incurable, not that it cannot be cured by God, but that it cannot be cured by the proper principles of the subject. Therefore a creature is said to be not assumable, not as if we withdrew anything from the power of God, but in order to show the condition of the creature, which has no capability for this.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of image is found in human nature, forasmuch as it is capable of God, viz. by attaining to Him through its own operation of knowledge and love. But the likeness of trace regards only a representation by Divine impression, existing in the creature, and does not imply that the irrational creature, in which such a likeness is, can attain to God by its own operation alone. For what does not come up to the less, has no fitness for the greater; as a body which is not fitted to be perfected by a sensitive soul is much less fitted for an intellectual soul. Now much greater and more perfect is the union with God in personal being than the union by operation. And hence the irrational creature which falls short of the union with God by operation has no fitness to be united with Him in personal being.

Reply to Objection 3: Some say that angels are not assumable, since they are perfect in their personality from the beginning of their creation, inasmuch as they are not subject to generation and corruption; hence they cannot be assumed to the unity of a Divine Person, unless their personality be destroyed, and this does not befit the incorruptibility of their nature nor the goodness of the one assuming, to Whom it does not belong to corrupt any perfection in the creature assumed. But this would not seem totally to disprove the fitness of the angelic nature for being assumed. For God by producing a new angelic nature could join it to Himself in unity of Person, and in this way nothing pre-existing would be corrupted in it. But as was said above, there is wanting the fitness of need, because, although the angelic nature in some is the subject of sin, their sin is irremediable, as stated above ([3897]FP, Q[64], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 4: The perfection of the universe is not the perfection of one person or suppositum, but of something which is one by position or order, whereof very many parts are not capable of assumption, as was said above. Hence it follows that only human nature is capable of being assumed.

Whether the Son of God assumed a person?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed a person. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "assumed human nature 'in atomo,'" i.e. in an individual. But an individual in rational nature is a person, as is plain from Boethius (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that the Son of God "assumed what He had sown in our nature." But He sowed our personality there. Therefore the Son of God assumed a person.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is absorbed unless it exist. But Innocent III [*Paschas. Diac., De Spiritu Sanct. ii] says in a Decretal that "the Person of God absorbed the person of man." Therefore it would seem that the person of man existed previous to its being assumed.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii) that "God assumed the nature, not the person, of man."

I answer that, A thing is said to be assumed inasmuch as it is taken into another. Hence, what is assumed must be presupposed to the assumption, as what is moved locally is presupposed to the motion. Now a person in human nature is not presupposed to assumption; rather, it is the term of the assumption, as was said ([3898]Q[3], AA[1],2). For if it were presupposed, it must either have been corrupted—in which case it was useless; or it remains after the union—and thus there would be two persons, one assuming and the other assumed, which is false, as was shown above ([3899]Q[2], A[6]). Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person.

Reply to Objection 1: The Son of God assumed human nature "in atomo," i.e. in an individual, which is no other than the uncreated suppositum, the Person of the Son of God. Hence it does not follow that a person was assumed.

Reply to Objection 2: Its proper personality is not wanting to the nature assumed through the loss of anything pertaining to the perfection of the human nature but through the addition of something which is above human nature, viz. the union with a Divine Person.

Reply to Objection 3: Absorption does not here imply the destruction of anything pre-existing, but the hindering what might otherwise have been. For if the human nature had not been assumed by a Divine Person, the human nature would have had its own personality; and in this way is it said, although improperly, that the Person "absorbed the person," inasmuch as the Divine Person by His union hindered the human nature from having its personality.

Whether the Divine Person assumed a man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Divine Person assumed a man. For it is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee," which a gloss expounds of Christ; and Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): "The Son of God assumed a man, and in him bore things human."

Objection 2: Further, the word "man" signifies a human nature. But the Son of God assumed a human nature. Therefore He assumed a man.

Objection 3: Further, the Son of God is a man. But He is not one of the men He did not assume, for with equal reason He would be Peter or any other man. Therefore He is the man whom He assumed.

On the contrary, Is the authority of Felix, Pope and Martyr, which is quoted by the Council of Ephesus: “We believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, because He is the Eternal Son and Word of God, and not a man assumed by God, in such sort that there is another besides Him. For the Son of God did not assume a man, so that there be another besides Him.”

I answer that, As has been said above [3900](A[2]), what is assumed is not the term of the assumption, but is presupposed to the assumption. Now it was said (Q[3], AA[1],2) that the individual to Whom the human nature is assumed is none other than the Divine Person, Who is the term of the assumption. Now this word “man” signifies human nature, as it is in a suppositum, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4,11), this word God signifies Him Who has human nature. And hence it cannot properly be said that the Son assumed a man, granted (as it must be, in fact) that in Christ there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But according to such as hold that there are two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, it may fittingly and properly be said that the Son of God assumed a man. Hence the first opinion quoted in Sent. iii, D. 6, grants that a man was assumed. But this opinion is erroneous, as was said above (Q[2], A[6]).

Reply to Objection 1: These phrases are not to be taken too literally, but are to be loyally explained, wherever they are used by holy doctors; so as to say that a man was assumed, inasmuch as his nature was assumed; and because the assumption terminated in this—that the Son of God is man.

Reply to Objection 2: The word “man” signifies human nature in the concrete, inasmuch as it is in a suppositum; and hence, since we cannot say a suppositum was assumed, so we cannot say a man was assumed.

Reply to Objection 3: The Son of God is not the man whom He assumed, but the man whose nature He assumed.

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature abstracted from all individuals. For the assumption of human nature took place for the common salvation of all men; hence it is said of Christ (1 Tim. 4:10) that He is “the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful.” But nature as it is in individuals withdraws from its universality.

Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature as it is abstracted from all individuals.

Objection 2: Further, what is noblest in all things ought to be attributed to God. But in every genus what is of itself is best. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed self-existing [per se] man, which, according to Platonists, is human nature abstracted from its individuals. Therefore the Son of God ought to have assumed this.

Objection 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above [3901](A[3]). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in individuals, as is plain from what has been said [3902](A[3]). Therefore the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from individuals.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought; for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11). Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is separated from individuals.

I answer that, The nature of man or of any other sensible thing, beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, 26,27,29,51), because sensible matter belongs to the specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition, as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations, according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God, having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the Son of God assumed human nature in order to show

Himself in men’s sight, according to Baruch 3:38: “Afterwards He was seen upon earth, and conversed with men.”

Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be in the Son of God from eternity. Neither can we say that the Son of God assumed human nature as it is in a human intellect, for this would mean nothing else but that He is understood to assume a human nature; and thus if He did not assume it in reality, this would be a false understanding; nor would this assumption of the human nature be anything but a fictitious Incarnation, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).

Reply to Objection 1: The incarnate Son of God is the common Saviour of all, not by a generic or specific community, such as is attributed to the nature separated from the individuals, but by a community of cause, whereby the incarnate Son of God is the universal cause of human salvation.

Reply to Objection 2: Self-existing [per se] man is not to be found in nature in such a way as to be outside the singular, as the Platonists held, although some say Plato believed that the separate man was only in the Divine intellect. And hence it was not necessary for it to be assumed by the Word, since it had been with Him from eternity.

Reply to Objection 3: Although human nature was not assumed in the concrete, as if the suppositum were presupposed to the assumption, nevertheless it is assumed in an individual, since it is assumed so as to be in an individual.

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought to have assumed human nature in all individuals. For what is assumed first and by itself is human nature. But what belongs essentially to a nature belongs to all who exist in the nature. Therefore it was fitting that human nature should be assumed by the Word of God in all its supposita.

Objection 2: Further, the Divine Incarnation proceeded from Divine Love; hence it is written (Jn. 3:16): “God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son.” But love makes us give ourselves to our friends as much as we can, and it was possible for the Son of God to assume several human natures, as was said above ([3903]Q[3], A[7]), and with equal reason all. Hence it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature in all its supposita.

Objection 3: Further, a skilful workman completes his work in the shortest manner possible. But it would have been a shorter way if all men had been assumed to the natural sonship than for one natural Son to lead many to the adoption of sons, as is written Gal. 4:5 (cf. Heb. 2:10). Therefore human nature ought to have been assumed by God in all its supposita.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11) that the Son of God "did not assume human nature as a species, nor did He assume all its hypostases."

I answer that, It was unfitting for human nature to be assumed by the Word in all its supposita. First, because the multitude of supposita of human nature, which are natural to it, would have been taken away. For since we must not see any other suppositum in the assumed nature, except the Person assuming, as was said above [3904](A[3]), if there was no human nature except what was assumed, it would follow that there was but one suppositum of human nature, which is the Person assuming. Secondly, because this would have been derogatory to the dignity of the incarnate Son of God, as He is the First-born of many brethren, according to the human nature, even as He is the First-born of all creatures according to the Divine, for then all men would be of equal dignity. Thirdly, because it is fitting that as one Divine suppositum is incarnate, so He should assume one human nature, so that on both sides unity might be found.

Reply to Objection 1: To be assumed belongs to the human nature of itself, because it does not belong to it by reason of a person, as it belongs to the Divine Nature to assume by reason of the Person; not, however, that it belongs to it of itself as if belonging to its essential principles, or as its natural property in which manner it would belong to all its supposita.

Reply to Objection 2: The love of God to men is shown not merely in the assumption of human nature, but especially in what He suffered in human nature for other men, according to Rom. 5:8: "But God commendeth His charity towards us; because when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us,” which would not have taken place had He assumed human nature in all its supposita.

Reply to Objection 3: In order to shorten the way, which every skilful workman does, what can be done by one must not be done by many. Hence it was most fitting that by one man all the rest should be saved.

Whether it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature of the stock of Adam, for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:26): “For it was fitting that we should have such a high priest . . . separated from sinners.” But He would have been still further separated from sinners had He not assumed human nature of the stock of Adam, a sinner. Hence it seems that He ought not to have assumed human nature of the stock of Adam.

Objection 2: Further, in every genus the principle is nobler than what is from the principle. Hence, if He wished to assume human nature, He ought to have assumed it in Adam himself.

Objection 3: Further, the Gentiles were greater sinners than the Jews, as a gloss says on Gal. 2:15: “For we by nature are Jews, and not of the Gentiles, sinners.” Hence, if He wished to assume human nature from sinners, He ought rather to have assumed it from the Gentiles than from the stock of Abraham, who was just.

On the contrary, (Lk. 3), the genealogy of our Lord is traced back to Adam.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 18): “God was able to assume human nature elsewhere than from the stock of Adam, who by his sin had fettered the whole human race; yet God judged it better to assume human nature from the vanquished race, and thus to vanquish the enemy of the human race.” And this for three reasons: First, because it would seem to belong to justice that he who sinned should make amends; and hence that from the nature which he had corrupted should be assumed that whereby satisfaction was to be made for the whole nature. Secondly, it pertains to man’s greater dignity that the conqueror of the devil should spring from the stock conquered by the devil. Thirdly, because God’s power is thereby made more manifest, since, from a corrupt and weakened nature, He assumed that which was raised to such might and glory.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ ought to be separated from sinners as regards sin, which He came to overthrow, and not as regards nature which He came to save, and in which “it behooved Him in all things to be made like to His brethren,” as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:17). And in this is His innocence the more wonderful, seeing that though assumed from a mass tainted by sin, His nature was endowed with such purity.

Reply to Objection 2: As was said above (ad 1) it behooved Him Who came to take away sins to be separated from sinners as regards sin, to which Adam was subject, whom Christ “brought out of his sin,” as is written (Wis. 10:2). For it behooved Him Who came to cleanse all, not to need cleansing Himself; just as in every genus of motion the first mover is immovable as regards that motion, and the first to alter is itself unalterable. Hence it was not fitting that He should assume human nature in Adam himself.

Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ ought especially to be separated from sinners as regards sin, and to possess the highest innocence, it was fitting that between the first sinner and Christ some just men should stand midway, in whom certain forecasts of (His) future holiness should shine forth. And hence, even in the people from whom Christ was to be born, God appointed signs of holiness, which began in Abraham, who was the first to receive the promise of Christ, and circumcision, as a sign that the covenant should be kept, as is written (Gn. 17:11).

OF THE PARTS OF HUMAN NATURE WHICH WERE ASSUMED (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the assumption of the parts of human nature; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?

(2) Whether He ought to have assumed an earthly body, i.e. one of flesh and blood?

(3) Whether He ought to have assumed a soul?

(4) Whether He ought to have assumed an intellect?

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a true body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a true body. For it is written (Phil. 2:7), that He was “made in the likeness of men.” But what is something in truth is not said to be in the likeness thereof. Therefore the Son of God did not assume a true body.

Objection 2: Further, the assumption of a body in no way diminishes the dignity of the Godhead; for Pope Leo says (Serm. de Nativ.) that “the glorification did not absorb the lesser nature, nor did the assumption lessen the higher.” But it pertains to the dignity of God to be altogether separated from bodies. Therefore it seems that by the assumption God was not united to a body.

Objection 3: Further, signs ought to correspond to the realities. But the apparitions of the Old Testament which were signs of the manifestation of Christ were not in a real body, but by visions in the imagination, as is plain from Is. 60:1: “I saw the Lord sitting,” etc. Hence it would seem that the apparition of the Son of God in the world was not in a real body, but only in imagination.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 13): “If the body of Christ was a phantom, Christ deceived us, and if He deceived us, He is not the Truth. But Christ is the Truth. Therefore His body was not a phantom.” Hence it is plain that He assumed a true body.

I answer that, As is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii). The Son of God was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body; but His body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from the essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true body. Therefore granted, as already proved ([3905]Q[4], A[1]), that it was fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His body was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount of Him, did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken place; since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming, Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work, since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute this error (Lk. 24:37, 39), when the disciples, “troubled and frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit,” and not a true body; wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: “Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.”

Reply to Objection 1: This likeness indicates the truth of the human nature in Christ—just as all that truly exist in human nature are said to be like in species—and not a mere imaginary likeness. In proof of this the Apostle subjoins (Phil. 2:8) that He became “obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross”; which would have been impossible, had it been only an imaginary likeness.

Reply to Objection 2: By assuming a true body the dignity of the Son of God is nowise lessened. Hence Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum ii): “He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, that He might become a servant; yet did He not lose the fulness of the form of God.” For the Son of God assumed a true body, not so as to become the form of a body, which is repugnant to the Divine simplicity and purity—for this would be to assume a body to the unity of the nature, which is impossible, as is plain from what has been stated above ([3906]Q[2], A[1]): but, the natures remaining distinct, He assumed a body to the unity of Person.

Reply to Objection 3: The figure ought to correspond to the reality as regards the likeness and not as regards the truth of the thing. For if they were alike in all points, it would no longer be a likeness but the reality itself, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26). Hence it was more fitting that the apparitions of the old Testament should be in appearance only, being figures; and that the apparition of the Son of God in the world should be in a real body, being the thing prefigured by these figures. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:17): “Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s.”

Whether the Son of God ought to have assumed a carnal or earthly body?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ had not a carnal or earthly, but a heavenly body. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:41): “The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man from heaven, heavenly.” But the first man, i.e. Adam, was of the earth as regards his body, as is plain from Gn. 1. Therefore the second man, i.e. Christ, was of heaven as regards the body.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (1 Cor. 15:50): “Flesh and blood shall not [Vulg.: ‘cannot’] possess the kingdom of God.” But the kingdom of God is in Christ chiefly. Therefore there is no flesh or blood in Him, but rather a heavenly body.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is best is to be attributed to God. But of all bodies a heavenly body is the best. Therefore it behooved Christ to assume such a body.

On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 24:39): “A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” Now flesh and bones are not of the matter of heavenly bodies, but are composed of the inferior elements. Therefore the body of Christ was not a heavenly, but a carnal and earthly body.

I answer that, By the reasons which proved that the body of Christ was not an imaginary one, it may also be shown that it was not a heavenly body. First, because even as the truth of the human nature of Christ would not have been maintained had His body been an imaginary one, such as Manes supposed, so likewise it would not have been maintained if we supposed, as did Valentine, that it was a heavenly body. For since the form of man is a natural thing, it requires determinate matter, to wit, flesh and bones, which must be placed in the definition of man, as is plain from the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 39). Secondly, because this would lessen the truth of such things as Christ did in the body. For since a heavenly body is impassible and incorruptible, as is proved De Coel. i, 20, if the Son of God had assumed a heavenly body, He would not have truly hungered or thirsted, nor would he have undergone His passion and death. Thirdly, this would have detracted from God’s truthfulness. For since the Son of God showed Himself to men, as if He had a carnal and earthly body, the manifestation would have been false, had He had a heavenly body. Hence (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) it is said: “The Son of God was born, taking flesh of the Virgin’s body, and not bringing it with Him from heaven.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said in two ways to have come down from heaven. First, as regards His Divine Nature; not indeed that the Divine Nature ceased to be in heaven, but inasmuch as He began to be here below in a new way, viz. by His assumed. nature, according to Jn. 3:13: “No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man, Who is in heaven.”

Secondly, as regards His body, not indeed that the very substance of the body of Christ descended from heaven, but that His body was formed by a heavenly power, i.e. by the Holy Ghost. Hence Augustine, explaining the passage quoted, says (Ad Orosium [*Dial. Qq. lxv, qu. 4, work of an unknown author]): “I call Christ a heavenly man because He was not conceived of human seed.” And Hilary expounds it in the same way (De Trin. x).

Reply to Objection 2: Flesh and blood are not taken here for the substance of flesh and blood, but for the corruption of flesh, which was not in Christ as far as it was sinful; but as far as it was a punishment; thus, for a time, it was in Christ, that He might carry through the work of our redemption.

Reply to Objection 3: It pertains to the greatest glory of God to have raised a weak and earthly body to such sublimity. Hence in the General Council of Ephesus (P. II, Act. I) we read the saying of St. Theophilus: “Just as the best workmen are esteemed not merely for displaying their skill in precious materials, but very often because by making use of the poorest . . . lay and commonest earth, they show the power of their craft; so the best of all workmen, the Word of God, did not come down to us by taking a heavenly body of some most precious matter, but shewed the greatness of His skill in clay.”

Whether the Son of God assumed a soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul. For John has said, teaching the mystery of the Incarnation (Jn. 1:14): “The Word was made flesh”—no mention being made of a soul. Now it is not said that “the Word was made flesh” as if changed to flesh, but because He assumed flesh. Therefore He seems not to have assumed a soul.

Objection 2: Further, a soul is necessary to the body, in order to quicken it. But this was not necessary for the body of Christ, as it would seem, for of the Word of God it is written (Ps. 35:10): Lord, “with Thee is the fountain of life.” Therefore it would seem altogether superfluous for the soul to be there, when the Word was present. But “God and nature do nothing uselessly,” as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 32; ii, 56). Therefore the Word would seem not to have assumed a soul.

Objection 3: Further, by the union of soul and body is constituted the common nature, which is the human species. But “in the Lord Jesus Christ we are not to look for a common species,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3). Therefore He did not assume a soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxi): “Let us not hearken to such as say that only a human body was assumed by the Word of God; and take ‘the Word was made flesh’ to mean that the man had no soul nor any other part of a man, save flesh.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 69,55), it was first of all the opinion of Arius and then of Apollinaris that the Son of God assumed only flesh, without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body. And consequently it followed that there were not two natures in Christ, but only one; for from a soul and body one human nature is constituted. But this opinion cannot hold, for three reasons. First, because it is counter to the authority of Scripture, in which our Lord makes mention of His soul, Mat. 26:38: “My soul is sorrowful even unto death”; and Jn. 10:18: “I have power to lay down My soul [animam meam: Douay: ‘My life’].” But to this Apollinaris replied that in these words soul is taken metaphorically, in which way mention is made in the Old Testament of the soul of God (Is. 1:14): “My soul hateth your new moons and your solemnities.” But, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), the Evangelists relate how Jesus wondered, was angered, sad, and hungry. Now these show that He had a true soul, just as that He ate, slept and was weary shows that He had a true human body: otherwise, if these things are a metaphor, because the like are said of God in the Old Testament, the trustworthiness of the Gospel story is undermined. For it is one thing that things were foretold in a figure, and another that historical events were related in very truth by the Evangelists. Secondly, this error lessens the utility of the Incarnation, which is man’s liberation. For Augustine [*Vigilius Tapsensis] argues thus (Contra Felician. xiii): “If the Son of God in taking flesh passed over the soul, either He knew its sinlessness, and trusted it did not need a remedy; or He considered it unsuitable to Him, and did not bestow on it the boon of redemption; or He reckoned it altogether incurable, and was unable to heal it; or He cast it off as worthless and seemingly unfit for any use. Now two of these reasons imply a blasphemy against God. For how shall we call Him omnipotent, if He is unable to heal what is beyond hope? Or God of all, if

He has not made our soul. And as regards the other two reasons, in one the cause of the soul is ignored, and in the other no place is given to merit. Is He to be considered to understand the cause of the soul, Who seeks to separate it from the sin of wilful transgression, enabled as it is to receive the law by the endowment of the habit of reason? Or how can His generosity be known to any one who says it was despised on account of its ignoble sinfulness? If you look at its origin, the substance of the soul is more precious than the body: but if at the sin of transgression, on account of its intelligence it is worse than the body. Now I know and declare that Christ is perfect wisdom, nor have I any doubt that He is most loving; and because of the first of these He did not despise what was better and more capable of prudence; and because of the second He protected what was most wounded." Thirdly, this position is against the truth of the Incarnation. For flesh and the other parts of man receive their species through the soul. Hence, if the soul is absent, there are no bones nor flesh, except equivocally, as is plain from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9; Metaph. vii, 34).

Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "The Word was made flesh," "flesh" is taken for the whole man, as if we were to say, "The Word was made man," as Is. 40:5: "All flesh together shall see that the mouth of the Lord hath spoken." And the whole man is signified by flesh, because, as is said in the authority quoted, the Son of God became visible by flesh; hence it is subjoined: "And we saw His glory." Or because, as Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80), "in all that union the Word is the highest, and flesh the last and lowest. Hence, wishing to commend the love of God's humility to us, the Evangelist mentioned the Word and flesh, leaving the soul on one side, since it is less than the Word and nobler than flesh." Again, it was reasonable to mention flesh, which, as being farther away from the Word, was less assumable, as it would seem.

Reply to Objection 2: The Word is the fountain of life, as the first effective cause of life; but the soul is the principle of the life of the body, as its form. Now the form is the effect of the agent. Hence from the presence of the Word it might rather have been concluded that the body was animated, just as from the presence of fire it may be concluded that the body, in which fire adheres, is warm.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not unfitting, indeed it is necessary to say that in Christ there was a nature which was constituted by the soul coming to the body. But Damascene denied that in Jesus Christ there was a common species, i.e. a third something resulting from the Godhead and the humanity.

Whether the Son of God assumed a human mind or intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind or intellect. For where a thing is present, its image is not required. But man is made to God's image, as regards his mind, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 3,6). Hence, since in Christ there was the presence of the Divine Word itself, there was no need of a human mind.

Objection 2: Further, the greater light dims the lesser. But the Word of God, Who is "the light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written Jn. 1:9, is compared to the mind as the greater light to the lesser; since our mind is a light, being as it were a lamp enkindled by the First Light (Prov. 20:27): "The spirit of a man is the lamp of the Lord." Therefore in Christ Who is the Word of God, there is no need of a human mind.

Objection 3: Further, the assumption of human nature by the Word of God is called His Incarnation. But the intellect or human mind is nothing carnal, either in its substance or in its act. for it is not the act of a body, as is proved De Anima iii, 6. Hence it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a human mind.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xiv): "Firmly hold and nowise doubt that Christ the Son of God has true flesh and a rational soul of the same kind as ours, since of His flesh He says (Lk. 24:39): 'Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.' And He proves that He has a soul, saying (Jn. 10:17): 'I lay down My soul [Douay: 'life'] that I may take it again.' And He proves that He has an intellect, saying (Mat. 11:29): 'Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.' And God says of Him by the prophet (Is. 52:13): 'Behold my servant shall understand.'"

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Haeres. 49,50), "the Apollinarists thought differently from the Catholic Church concerning the soul of Christ, saying with the Arians, that Christ took flesh alone, without a soul; and on being overcome on this point by the Gospel witness, they went on to say that the mind was wanting to Christ's soul, but that the Word supplied its place." But this position is refuted by the same arguments as the preceding. First, because it runs counter to the Gospel story, which relates how He marveled (as is plain from Mat. 8:10). Now marveling cannot be without reason, since it implies the collation of effect and cause, i.e. inasmuch as when we see an effect and are ignorant of its cause, we seek to know it, as is said Metaph. i, 2. Secondly, it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, which is the justification of man from sin. For the human soul is not capable of sin nor of justifying grace except through the mind. Hence it was especially necessary for the mind to be assumed. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that "the Word of God assumed a body and an intellectual and rational soul," and adds afterwards: "The whole was united to the whole, that He might bestow salvation on me wholly; for what was not assumed is not curable." Thirdly, it is against the truth of the Incarnation. For since the body is proportioned to the soul as matter to its proper form, it is not truly human flesh if it is not perfected by human, i.e. a rational soul. And hence if Christ had had a soul without a mind, He would not have had true human flesh, but irrational flesh, since our soul differs from an animal soul by the mind alone. Hence Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 80) that from this error it would have followed that the Son of God "took an animal with the form of a human body," which, again, is against the Divine truth, which cannot suffer any fictitious untruth.

Reply to Objection 1: Where a thing is by its presence, its image is not required to supply the place of the thing, as where the emperor is the soldiers do not pay homage to his image. Yet the image of a thing is required together with its presence, that it may be perfected by the presence of the thing, just as the image in the wax is perfected by the impression of the seal, and as the image of man is reflected in the mirror by his presence. Hence in order to perfect the human mind it was necessary that the Word should unite it to Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: The greater light dims the lesser light of another luminous body; but it does not dim, rather it perfects the light of the body illuminated—at the presence of the sun the light of the stars is put out, but the light of the air is perfected. Now the intellect or mind of man is, as it were, a light lit up by the light of the Divine Word; and hence by the presence of the Word the mind of man is perfected rather than overshadowed.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the intellective power is not the act of a body, nevertheless the essence of the human soul, which is the form of the body, requires that it should be more noble, in order that it may have the power of understanding; and hence it is necessary that a better disposed body should correspond to it.

OF THE ORDER OF ASSUMPTION (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the order of the foregoing assumption, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul?

(2) Whether He assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit or mind?

(3) Whether the soul was assumed previous to the flesh?

(4) Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word previous to being united to the soul?

(5) Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts?

(6) Whether it was assumed through the medium of grace?

Whether the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul. For the mode in which the Son of God is united to human nature and its parts, is more perfect than the mode whereby He is in all creatures. But He is in all creatures immediately by essence, power and presence. Much more, therefore, is the Son of God united to flesh without the medium of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, the soul and flesh are united to the Word of God in unity of hypostasis or person. But the body pertains immediately to the human hypostasis or person, even as the soul. Indeed, the human body, since it is matter, would rather seem to be nearer the hypostasis than the soul, which is a form, since the principle of individuation, which is implied in the word “hypostasis,” would seem to be matter. Hence the Son of God did not assume flesh through the medium of the soul.

Objection 3: Further, take away the medium and you separate what were joined by the medium; for example, if the superficies be removed color would leave the body, since it adheres to the body through the medium of the superficies. But though the soul was separated from the body by death, yet there still remained the union of the Word to the flesh, as will be shown ([3907]Q[50], AA[2],3). Hence the Word was not joined to flesh through the medium of the soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvi): “The greatness of the Divine power fitted to itself a rational soul, and through it a human body, so as to raise the whole man to something higher.”

I answer that, A medium is in reference to a beginning and an end. Hence as beginning and end imply order, so also does a medium. Now there is a twofold order: one, of time; the other, of nature. But in the mystery of the Incarnation nothing is said to be a medium in the order of time, for the Word of God united the whole human nature to Himself at the same time, as will appear ([3908]Q[30], A[3]). An order of nature between things may be taken in two ways: first, as regards rank of dignity, as we say the angels are midway between man and God; secondly, as regards the idea of causality, as we say a cause is midway between the first cause and the last effect. And this second order follows the first to some extent; for as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii), God acts upon the more remote substances through the less remote. Hence if we consider the rank of dignity, the soul is found to be midway between God and flesh; and in this way it may be said that the Son of God united flesh to Himself, through the medium of the soul. But even as regards the second order of causality the soul is to some extent the cause of flesh being united to the Son of God. For the flesh would not have been assumable, except by its relation to the rational soul, through which it becomes human flesh. For it was said above ([3909]Q[4], A[1]) that human nature was assumable before all others.

Reply to Objection 1: We may consider a twofold order between creatures and God: the first is by reason of creatures being caused by God and depending on Him as on the principle of their being; and thus on account of the infinitude of His power God touches each thing immediately, by causing and preserving it, and so it is that God is in all things by essence, presence and power. But the second order is by reason of things being directed to God as to their end; and it is here that there is a medium between the creature and God, since lower creatures are directed to God by higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); and to this order pertains the assumption of human nature by the Word of God, Who is the term of the assumption; and hence it is united to flesh through the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: If the hypostasis of the Word of God were constituted simply by human nature, it would follow that the body was nearest to it, since it is matter which is the principle of individuation; even as the soul, being the specific form, would be nearer the human nature. But because the hypostasis of the Word is prior to and more exalted than the human nature, the more exalted any part of the human nature is, the nearer it is to the hypostasis of the Word. And hence the soul is nearer the Word of God than the body is.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents one thing being the cause of the aptitude and congruity of another, and yet if it be taken away the other remains; because although a thing's becoming may depend on another, yet when it is in being it no longer depends on it, just as a friendship brought about by some other may endure when the latter has gone; or as a woman is taken in marriage on account of her beauty, which makes a woman's fittingness for the marriage tie, yet when her beauty passes away, the marriage tie still remains. So likewise, when the soul was separated, the union of the Word with flesh still endured.

Whether the Son of God assumed a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind. For nothing is a medium between itself and another. But the spirit is nothing else in essence but the soul itself, as was said above ([3910]FP, Q[77], A[1], ad 1). Therefore the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind.

Objection 2: Further, what is the medium of the assumption is itself more assumable. But the spirit or mind is not more assumable than the soul; which is plain from the fact that angelic spirits are not assumable, as was said above ([3911]Q[4], A[1]). Hence it seems that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit.

Objection 3: Further, that which comes later is assumed by the first through the medium of what comes before. But the soul implies the very essence, which naturally comes before its power—the mind. Therefore it would seem that the Son of God did not assume a soul through the medium of the spirit or mind.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii): “The invisible and unchangeable Truth took a soul by means of the spirit, and a body by means of the soul.”

I answer that, As stated above [3912](A[1]), the Son of God is said to have assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, on account of the order of dignity, and the congruity of the assumption. Now both these may be applied to the intellect, which is called the spirit, if we compare it with the other parts of the soul. For the soul is assumed congruously only inasmuch as it has a capacity for God, being in His likeness: which is in respect of the mind that is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: “Be renewed in the spirit of your mind.” So, too, the intellect is the highest and noblest of the parts of the soul, and the most like to God, and hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6) that “the Word of God is united to flesh through the medium of the intellect; for the intellect is the purest part of the soul, God Himself being an intellect.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect is not distinct from the soul in essence, it is distinct from the other parts of the soul as a power; and it is in this way that it has the nature of a medium.

Reply to Objection 2: Fitness for assumption is wanting to the angelic spirits, not from any lack of dignity, but because of the irremediableness of their fall, which cannot be said of the human spirit, as is clear from what has been said above ([3913]FP, Q[62], A[8]; [3914]FP, Q[64], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The soul, between which and the Word of God the intellect is said to be a medium, does not stand for the essence of the soul, which is common to all the powers, but for the lower powers, which are common to every soul.

Whether the soul was assumed before the flesh by the Son of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was assumed before the flesh by the Word. For the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul, as was said above [3915](A[1]). Now the medium is reached before the end. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul before the body.

Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ is nobler than the angels, according to Ps. 96:8: “Adore Him, all you His angels.” But the angels were created in the beginning, as was said above ([3916]FP, Q[46], A[3]). Therefore the soul of Christ also (was created in the beginning). But it was not created before it was assumed, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2,3,9), that “neither the soul nor the body of Christ ever had any hypostasis save the hypostasis of the Word.” Therefore it would seem that the soul was assumed before the flesh, which was conceived in the womb of the Virgin.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 1:14): “We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] full of grace and truth,” and it is added afterwards that “of His fulness we have all received” (Jn. 1:16), i.e. all the faithful of all time, as Chrysostom expounds it (Hom. xiii in Joan.). Now this could not have been unless the soul of Christ had all fulness of grace and truth before all the saints, who were from the beginning of the world, for the cause is not subsequent to the effect. Hence since the fulness of grace and truth was in the soul of Christ from union with the Word, according to what is written in the same place: “We saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth,” it would seem in consequence that from the beginning of the world the soul of Christ was assumed by the Word of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 6): “The intellect was not, as some untruthfully say, united to the true God, and henceforth called Christ, before the Incarnation which was of the Virgin.”

I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8; ii, 8) maintained that all souls, amongst which he placed Christ’s soul, were created in the beginning. But this is not fitting, if we suppose that it was first of all created, but not at once joined to the Word, since it would follow that this soul once had its proper subsistence without the Word; and thus, since it was assumed by the Word, either the union did not take place in the subsistence, or the pre-existing subsistence of the soul was corrupted. So likewise it is not fitting to suppose that this soul was united to the Word from the beginning, and that it afterwards became incarnate in the womb of the Virgin; for thus His soul would not seem to be of the same nature as ours, which are created at the same time that they are infused into bodies. Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian. xxxv) that “Christ’s flesh was not of a different nature to ours, nor was a different soul infused into it in the beginning than into other men.”

Reply to Objection 1: As was said above [3917](A[1]), the soul of Christ is said to be the medium in the union of the flesh with the Word, in the order of nature; but it does not follow from this that it was the medium in the order of time.

Reply to Objection 2: As Pope Leo says in the same Epistle, Christ’s soul excels our soul “not by diversity of genus, but by sublimity of power”; for it is of the same genus as our souls, yet excels even the angels in “fulness of grace and truth.” But the mode of creation is in harmony with the generic property of the soul; and since it is the form of the body, it is consequently created at the same time that it is infused into and united with the body; which does not happen to angels, since they are substances entirely free from matter.

Reply to Objection 3: Of the fulness of Christ all men receive according to the faith they have in Him; for it is written (Rom. 3:22) that “the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe in Him.” Now just as we believe in Him as already born; so the ancients believed in Him as about to be born, since “having the same spirit of faith . . . we also believe,” as it is written (2 Cor. 4:13). But the faith which is in Christ has the power of justifying by reason of the purpose of the grace of God, according to Rom. 4:5: “But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in

Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God.” Hence because this purpose is eternal, there is nothing to hinder some from being justified by the faith of Jesus Christ, even before His soul was full of grace and truth.

Whether the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii): “Most firmly hold, and nowise doubt that the flesh of Christ was not conceived in the womb of the Virgin without the Godhead before it was assumed by the Word.” But the flesh of Christ would seem to have been conceived before being united to the rational soul, because matter or disposition is prior to the completive form in order of generation. Therefore the flesh of Christ was assumed before being united to the soul.

Objection 2: Further, as the soul is a part of human nature, so is the body. But the human soul in Christ had no other principle of being than in other men, as is clear from the authority of Pope Leo, quoted above (A[3]). Therefore it would seem that the body of Christ had no other principle of being than we have. But in us the body is begotten before the rational soul comes to it. Therefore it was the same in Christ; and thus the flesh was assumed by the Word before being united to the soul.

Objection 3: Further, as is said (De Causis), the first cause excels the second in bringing about the effect, and precedes it in its union with the effect. But the soul of Christ is compared to the Word as a second cause to a first. Hence the Word was united to the flesh before it was to the soul.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): “At the same time the Word of God was made flesh, and flesh was united to a rational and intellectual soul.” Therefore the union of the Word with the flesh did not precede the union with the soul.

I answer that, The human flesh is assumable by the Word on account of the order which it has to the rational soul as to its proper form. Now it has not this order before the rational soul comes to it, because when any matter becomes proper to any form, at the same time it receives that form; hence the alteration is terminated at the same instant in which the substantial form is introduced. And hence it is that the flesh ought not to have been assumed before it was human flesh; and this happened when the rational soul came to it. Therefore since the soul was not assumed before the flesh, inasmuch as it is against the nature of the soul to be before it is united to the body, so likewise the flesh ought not to have been assumed before the soul, since it is not human flesh before it has a rational soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Human flesh depends upon the soul for its being; and hence, before the coming of the soul, there is no human flesh, but there may be a disposition towards human flesh. Yet in the conception of Christ, the Holy Ghost, Who is an agent of infinite might, disposed the matter and brought it to its perfection at the same time.

Reply to Objection 2: The form actually gives the species; but the matter in itself is in potentiality to the species. And hence it would be against the nature of a form to exist before the specific nature. And therefore the dissimilarity between our origin and Christ's origin, inasmuch as we are conceived before being animated, and Christ's flesh is not, is by reason of what precedes the perfection of the nature, viz. that we are conceived from the seed of man, and Christ is not. But a difference which would be with reference to the origin of the soul, would bespeak a diversity of nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The Word of God is understood to be united to the flesh before the soul by the common mode whereby He is in the rest of creatures by essence, power, and presence. Yet I say "before," not in time, but in nature; for the flesh is understood as a being, which it has from the Word, before it is understood as animated, which it has from the soul. But by the personal union we understand the flesh as united to the soul before it is united to the Word, for it is from its union with the soul that it is capable of being united to the Word in Person; especially since a person is found only in the rational nature

Whether the whole human nature was assumed through the medium of the parts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed the whole human nature through the medium of its parts. For Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xviii) that "the invisible and unchangeable Truth assumed the soul through the medium of the spirit, and the body through the medium of the soul, and in this way the whole man." But the spirit, soul, and body are parts of the whole man. Therefore He assumed all, through the medium of the parts.

Objection 2: Further, the Son of God assumed flesh through the medium of the soul because the soul is more like to God than the body. But the parts of human nature, since they are simpler than the body, would seem to be more like to God, Who is most simple, than the whole. Therefore He assumed the whole through the medium of the parts.

Objection 3: Further, the whole results from the union of parts. But the union is taken to be the term of the assumption, and the parts are presupposed to the assumption. Therefore He assumed the whole by the parts.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 16): “In our Lord Jesus Christ we do not behold parts of parts, but such as are immediately joined, i.e. the Godhead and the manhood.” Now the humanity is a whole, which is composed of soul and body, as parts. Therefore the Son of God assumed the parts through the medium of the whole.

I answer that, When anything is said to be a medium in the assumption of the Incarnation, we do not signify order of time, because the assumption of the whole and the parts was simultaneous. For it has been shown ([3918]AA[3] ,4) that the soul and body were mutually united at the same time in order to constitute the human nature of the Word. But it is order of nature that is signified. Hence by what is prior in nature, that is assumed which is posterior in nature. Now a thing is prior in nature in two ways: First on the part of the agent, secondly on the part of the matter; for these two causes precede the thing. On the part of the agent—that is simply first, which is first included in his intention; but that is relatively first, with which his operation begins—and this because the intention is prior to the operation. On the part of the matter—that is first which exists first in the transmutation of the matter. Now in the Incarnation the order depending on the agent must be particularly considered, because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii), “in such things the whole reason of the deed is the power of the doer.” But it is manifest that, according to the intention of the doer, what is complete is prior to what is incomplete, and, consequently, the whole to the parts. Hence it must be said that the Word of God assumed the parts of human nature, through the medium of the whole; for even as He assumed the body on account of its relation to the rational soul, so likewise He assumed a body and soul on account of their relation to human nature.

Reply to Objection 1: From these words nothing may be gathered, except that the Word, by assuming the parts of human nature, assumed the whole human nature. And thus the assumption of parts is prior in the order of the intellect, if we consider the operation, but not in order of time; whereas the assumption of the nature is prior if we consider the intention: and this is to be simply first, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: God is so simple that He is also most perfect; and hence the whole is more like to God than the parts, inasmuch as it is more perfect.

Reply to Objection 3: It is a personal union wherein the assumption is terminated, not a union of nature, which springs from a conjunction of parts.

Whether the human nature was assumed through the medium of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God assumed human nature through the medium of grace. For by grace we are united to God. But the human nature in Christ was most closely united to God. Therefore the union took place by grace.

Objection 2: Further, as the body lives by the soul, which is its perfection, so does the soul by grace. But the human nature was fitted for the assumption by the soul. Therefore the Son of God assumed the soul through the medium of grace.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 11) that the incarnate Word is like our spoken word. But our word is united to our speech by means of “breathing” [spiritus]. Therefore the Word of God is united to flesh by means of the Holy Spirit, and hence by means of grace, which is attributed to the Holy Spirit, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: “Now there are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.”

On the contrary, Grace is an accident in the soul, as was shown above ([3919]FS, Q[110], A[2]). Now the union of the Word with human nature took place in the subsistence, and not accidentally, as was shown above (Q[2], A[6]). Therefore the human nature was not assumed by means of grace.

I answer that, In Christ there was the grace of union and habitual grace. Therefore grace cannot be taken to be the medium of the assumption of the human nature, whether we speak of the grace of union or of habitual grace. For the grace of union is the personal being that is given gratis from above to the human nature in the Person of the Word, and is the term of the assumption. Whereas the habitual grace pertaining to the spiritual holiness of the man is an effect following the union, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth"—by which we are given to understand that because this Man (as a result of the union) is the Only-begotten of the Father, He is full of grace and truth. But if by grace we understand the will of God doing or bestowing something gratis, the union took place by grace, not as a means, but as the efficient cause.

Reply to Objection 1: Our union with God is by operation, inasmuch as we know and love Him; and hence this union is by habitual grace, inasmuch as a perfect operation proceeds from a habit. Now the union of the human nature with the Word of God is in personal being, which depends not on any habit, but on the nature itself.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the substantial perfection of the body; grace is but an accidental perfection of the soul. Hence grace cannot ordain the soul to personal union, which is not accidental, as the soul ordains the body.

Reply to Objection 3: Our word is united to our speech, by means of breathing [spiritus], not as a formal medium, but as a moving medium. For from the word conceived within, the breathing proceeds, from which the speech is formed. And similarly from the eternal Word proceeds the Holy Spirit, Who formed the body of Christ, as will be shown ([3920]Q[32], A[1]). But it does not follow from this that the grace of the Holy Spirit is the formal medium in the aforesaid union.

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST AS AN INDIVIDUAL MAN (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider such things as were co-assumed by the Son of God in human nature; and first what belongs to perfection; secondly, what belongs to defect.

Concerning the first, there are three points of consideration: (1) The grace of Christ; (2) His knowledge; (3) His power.

With regard to His grace we must consider two things: (1) His grace as He is an individual man; (2) His grace as He is the Head of the Church. Of the grace of union we have already spoken ([3921]Q[2]).

Under the first head there are thirteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in the soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?

(2) Whether in Christ there were virtues?

(3) Whether He had faith?

(4) Whether He had hope?

(5) Whether in Christ there were the gifts?

(6) Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?

(7) Whether in Christ there were any gratuitous graces?

(8) Whether in Christ there was prophecy?

(9) Whether there was the fulness of grace in Him?

(10) Whether such fulness was proper to Christ?

(11) Whether the grace of Christ was infinite?

(12) Whether it could have been increased?

(13) How this grace stood towards the union?

Whether in the Soul of Christ there was any habitual grace?

Objection 1: It would seem there was no habitual grace in the soul assumed by the Word. For grace is a certain partaking of the Godhead by the rational creature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “By Whom He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.” Now Christ is God not by participation, but in truth. Therefore there was no habitual grace in Him.

Objection 2: Further, grace is necessary to man, that he may operate well, according to 1 Cor. 15:10: “I have labored more abundantly than all they; yet not I, but the grace of God with me”; and in order that he may reach eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: “The grace of God (is) life everlasting.” Now the inheritance of everlasting life was due to Christ by the mere fact of His being the natural Son of God; and by the fact of His being the Word, by Whom all things were made, He had the power of doing all things well. Therefore His human nature needed no further grace beyond union with the Word.

Objection 3: Further, what operates as an instrument does not need a habit for its own operations, since habits are rooted in the principal agent. Now the human nature in Christ was “as the instrument of the Godhead,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15). Therefore there was no need of habitual grace in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2): “The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him”—which (Spirit), indeed, is said to be in man by habitual grace, as was said above ([3922]FP, Q[8], A[3]; [3923]FP, Q[43], AA[3],6). Therefore there was habitual grace in Christ.

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose habitual grace in Christ for three reasons. First, on account of the union of His soul with the Word of God. For the nearer any recipient is to an inflowing cause, the more does it partake of its influence. Now the influx of grace is from God, according to Ps. 83:12: “The Lord will give grace and glory.” And hence it was most fitting that His soul should receive the influx of Divine grace. Secondly, on account of the dignity of this soul, whose operations were to attain so closely to God by knowledge and love, to which it is necessary for human nature to be raised by grace. Thirdly, on account of the relation of Christ to the human race. For Christ, as man, is the “Mediator of God and men,” as is written, 1 Tim. 2:5; and hence it behooved Him to have grace which would overflow upon others, according to Jn. 1:16: “And of His fulness we have all received, and grace for grace.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is the true God in Divine Person and Nature. Yet because together with unity of person there remains distinction of natures, as stated above ([3924]Q[2], AA[1],2), the soul of Christ. is not essentially Divine. Hence it behooves it to be Divine by participation, which is by grace.

Reply to Objection 2: To Christ, inasmuch as He is the natural Son of God, is due an eternal inheritance, which is the uncreated beatitude through the uncreated act of knowledge and love of God, i.e. the same whereby the Father knows and loves Himself. Now the soul was not capable of this act, on account of the difference of natures. Hence it behooved it to attain to God by a created act of fruition which could not be without grace. Likewise, inasmuch as He was the Word of God, He had the power of doing all things well by the Divine operation. And because it is necessary to admit a human operation, distinct from the Divine operation, as will be shown ([3925]Q[19], A[1]), it was necessary for Him to have habitual grace, whereby this operation might be perfect in Him.

Reply to Objection 3: The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead—not, indeed, an inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act. And hence the nature of the action demanded that he should have habitual grace.

Whether in Christ there were virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were no virtues. For Christ had the plenitude of grace. Now grace is sufficient for every good act, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: “My grace is sufficient for thee.” Therefore there were no virtues in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 1), virtue is contrasted with a “certain heroic or godlike habit” which is attributed to godlike men. But this belongs chiefly to Christ. Therefore Christ had not virtues, but something higher than virtue.

Objection 3: Further, as was said above ([3926]FS, Q[65], AA[1],2), all the virtues are bound together. But it was not becoming for Christ to have all the virtues, as is clear in the case of liberality and magnificence, for these have to do with riches, which Christ spurned, according to Mat. 8:20: “The Son of man hath not where to lay His head.” Temperance and continence also regard wicked desires, from which Christ was free. Therefore Christ had not the virtues.

On the contrary, on Ps. 1:2, “But His will is in the law of the Lord,” a gloss says: “This refers to Christ, Who is full of all good.” But a good quality of the mind is a virtue. Therefore Christ was full of all virtue.

I answer that, As was said above ([3927]FS, Q[110], AA[3],4), as grace regards the essence of the soul, so does virtue regard its power. Hence it is necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its essence, so do the virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a principle is, the more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in consequence, the virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul’s acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Grace suffices a man for all whereby he is ordained to beatitude; nevertheless, it effects some of these by itself—as to make him pleasing to God, and the like; and some others through the medium of the virtues which proceed from grace.

Reply to Objection 2: A heroic or godlike habit only differs from virtue commonly so called by a more perfect mode, inasmuch as one is disposed to good in a higher way than is common to all. Hence it is not hereby proved that Christ had not the virtues, but that He had them most perfectly beyond the common mode. In this sense Plotinus gave to a certain sublime degree of virtue the name of “virtue of the purified soul” (cf. [3928]FS, Q[61] , A[5]).

Reply to Objection 3: Liberality and magnificence are praiseworthy in regard to riches, inasmuch as anyone does not esteem wealth to the extent of wishing to retain it, so as to forego what ought to be done. But he esteems them least who wholly despises them, and casts them aside for love of perfection. And hence by altogether contemning all riches, Christ showed the highest kind of liberality and magnificence; although He also performed the act of liberality, as far as it became Him, by causing to be distributed to the poor what was given to Himself. Hence, when our Lord said to Judas (Jn. 13:21), “That which thou dost do quickly,” the disciples understood our Lord to have ordered him to give something to the poor. But Christ had no evil desires whatever, as will be shown ([3929]Q[15], AA[1],2); yet He was not thereby prevented from having temperance, which is the more perfect in man, as he is without evil desires. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 9), the temperate man differs from the continent in this—that the temperate has not the evil desires which the continent suffers. Hence, taking continence in this sense, as the Philosopher takes it, Christ, from the very fact that He had all virtue, had not continence, since it is not a virtue, but something less than virtue.

Whether in Christ there was faith?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was faith in Christ. For faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, e.g. temperance and liberality. Now these were in Christ, as stated above [3930](A[2]). Much more, therefore, was there faith in Him.

Objection 2: Further, Christ did not teach virtues which He had not Himself, according to Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to do and to teach.” But of Christ it is said (Heb. 12:2) that He is “the author and finisher of our faith.” Therefore there was faith in Him before all others.

Objection 3: Further, everything imperfect is excluded from the blessed. But in the blessed there is faith; for on Rom. 1:17, “the justice of God is revealed therein from faith to faith,” a gloss says: “From the faith of words and hope to the faith of things and sight.” Therefore it would seem that in Christ also there was faith, since it implies nothing imperfect.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 11:1): “Faith is the evidence of things that appear not.” But there was nothing that did not appear to Christ, according to what Peter said to Him (Jn. 21:17): “Thou knowest all things.” Therefore there was no faith in Christ.

I answer that, As was said above ([3931]SS, Q[1], A[4]), the object of faith is a Divine thing not seen. Now the habit of virtue, as every other habit, takes its species from the object. Hence, if we deny that the Divine thing was not seen, we exclude the very essence of faith. Now from the first moment of His conception Christ saw God’s Essence fully, as will be made clear (Q[34], A[1]). Hence there could be no faith in Him.

Reply to Objection 1: Faith is a nobler virtue than the moral virtues, seeing that it has to do with nobler matter; nevertheless, it implies a certain defect with regard to that matter; and this defect was not in Christ. And hence there could be no faith in Him, although the moral virtues were in Him, since in their nature they imply no defect with regard to their matter.

Reply to Objection 2: The merit of faith consists in this—that man through obedience assents to what things he does not see, according to Rom. 1:5: “For obedience to the faith in all nations for His name.” Now

Christ had most perfect obedience to God, according to Phil. 2:8: “Becoming obedient unto death.” And hence He taught nothing pertaining to merit which He did not fulfil more perfectly Himself.

Reply to Objection 3: As a gloss says in the same place, faith is that “whereby such things as are not seen are believed.” But faith in things seen is improperly so called, and only after a certain similitude with regard to the certainty and firmness of the assent.

Whether in Christ there was hope?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was hope in Christ. For it is said in the Person of Christ (Ps. 30:1): “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped.” But the virtue of hope is that whereby a man hopes in God. Therefore the virtue of hope was in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, hope is the expectation of the bliss to come, as was shown above ([3932]SS, Q[17], A[5], ad 3). But Christ awaited something pertaining to bliss, viz. the glorifying of His body. Therefore it seems there was hope in Him.

Objection 3: Further, everyone may hope for what pertains to his perfection, if it has yet to come. But there was something still to come pertaining to Christ’s perfection, according to Eph. 4:12: “For the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the building up [Douay: ‘edifying’] of the body of Christ.” Hence it seems that it befitted Christ to have hope.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:24): “What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?” Thus it is clear that as faith is of the unseen, so also is hope. But there was no faith in Christ, as was said above [3933](A[1]): neither, consequently, was there hope.

I answer that, As it is of the nature of faith that one assents to what one sees not, so is it of the nature of hope that one expects what as yet one has not; and as faith, forasmuch as it is a theological virtue, does not regard everything unseen, but only God; so likewise hope, as a theological virtue, has God Himself for its object, the fruition of Whom man chiefly expects by the virtue of hope; yet, in consequence, whoever has the virtue of hope may expect the Divine aid in other things, even as he who has the virtue of faith believes God not only in Divine things, but even in whatsoever is divinely revealed. Now from the beginning of His conception Christ had the Divine fruition fully, as will be shown ([3934]Q[34], A[4]), and hence he had not the virtue of hope. Nevertheless He had hope as regards such things as He did not yet possess, although He had not faith with regard to anything; because, although He knew all things fully, wherefore faith was altogether wanting to Him, nevertheless He did not as yet fully possess all that pertained to His perfection, viz. immortality and glory of the body, which He could hope for.

Reply to Objection 1: This is said of Christ with reference to hope, not as a theological virtue, but inasmuch as He hoped for some other things not yet possessed, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: The glory of the body does not pertain to beatitude as being that in which beatitude principally consists, but by a certain outpouring from the soul's glory, as was said above ([3935]FS, Q[4], A[6]). Hence hope, as a theological virtue, does not regard the bliss of the body but the soul's bliss, which consists in the Divine fruition.

Reply to Objection 3: The building up of the church by the conversion of the faithful does not pertain to the perfection of Christ, whereby He is perfect in Himself, but inasmuch as it leads others to a share of His perfection. And because hope properly regards what is expected by him who hopes, the virtue of hope cannot properly be said to be in Christ, because of the aforesaid reason.

Whether in Christ there were the gifts?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts were not in Christ. For, as is commonly said, the gifts are given to help the virtues. But what is perfect in itself does not need an exterior help. Therefore, since the virtues of Christ were perfect, it seems there were no gifts in Him.

Objection 2: Further, to give and to receive gifts would not seem to belong to the same; since to give pertains to one who has, and to receive pertains to one who has not. But it belongs to Christ to give gifts according to Ps. 67:19. "Thou hast given gifts to men [Vulg.: 'Thou hast received gifts in men']." Therefore it was not becoming that Christ should receive gifts of the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, four gifts would seem to pertain to the contemplation of earth, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding, and counsel which pertains to prudence; hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) enumerates these with the intellectual virtues. But Christ had the contemplation of heaven. Therefore He had not these gifts.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 4:1): “Seven women shall take hold of one man”: on which a gloss says: “That is, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost shall take hold of Christ.”

I answer that, As was said above ([3936]FS, Q[68], A[1]), the gifts, properly, are certain perfections of the soul’s powers, inasmuch a[9] these have a natural aptitude to be moved by the Holy Ghost, according to Luke 4:1: “And Jesus, being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan, and was led by the Spirit into the desert.” Hence it is manifest that in Christ the gifts were in a pre-eminent degree.

Reply to Objection 1: What is perfect in the order of its nature needs to be helped by something of a higher nature; as man, however perfect, needs to be helped by God. And in this way the virtues, which perfect the powers of the soul, as they are controlled by reason, no matter how perfect they are, need to be helped by the gifts, which perfect the soul’s powers, inasmuch as these are moved by the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not a recipient and a giver of the gifts of the Holy Ghost, in the same respect; for He gives them as God and receives them as man. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that “the Holy Ghost never quitted the human nature of Christ, from Whose Divine nature He proceedeth.”

Reply to Objection 3: In Christ there was not only heavenly knowledge, but also earthly knowledge, as will be said (Q[15], A[10]). And yet even in heaven the gifts of the Holy Ghost will still exist, in a certain manner, as was said above ([3937]FS, Q[68], A[6]).

Whether in Christ there was the gift of fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of fear. For hope would seem to be stronger than fear; since the object of hope is goodness, and of fear, evil. as was said above ([3938]FS, Q[40], A[1]; [3939]FS, Q[42], A[1]). But in Christ there was not the virtue of hope, as was said above [3940](A[4]). Hence, likewise, there was not the gift of fear in Him.

Objection 2: Further, by the gift of fear we fear either to be separated from God, which pertains to "chaste" fear—or to be punished by Him, which pertains to "servile" fear, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. ix). But Christ did not fear being separated from God by sin, nor being punished by Him on account of a fault, since it was impossible for Him to sin, as will be said ([3941]Q[15], AA[1],2). Now fear is not of the impossible. Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that "perfect charity casteth out fear." But in Christ there was most perfect charity, according to Eph. 3:19: "The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge." Therefore in Christ there was not the gift of fear.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:3): "And He shall be filled with the spirit of the fear of the Lord."

I answer that, As was said above ([3942]FS, Q[42], A[1]), fear regards two objects, one of which is an evil causing terror; the other is that by whose power an evil can be inflicted, as we fear the king inasmuch as he has the power of putting to death. Now whoever can hurt would not be feared unless he had a certain greatness of might, to which resistance could not easily be offered; for what we easily repel we do not fear. And hence it is plain that no one is feared except for some pre-eminence. And in this way it is said that in Christ there was the fear of God, not indeed as it regards the evil of separation from God by fault, nor as it regards the evil of punishment for fault; but inasmuch as it regards the Divine pre-eminence, on account of which the soul of Christ, led by the Holy Spirit, was borne towards God in an act of reverence. Hence it is said (Heb. 5:7) that in all things "he was heard for his reverence." For Christ as man had this act of reverence towards God in a fuller sense and beyond all others. And hence Scripture attributes to Him the fulness of the fear of the Lord.

Reply to Objection 1: The habits of virtues and gifts regard goodness properly and of themselves; but evil, consequently; since it pertains to the nature of virtue to render acts good, as is said Ethic. ii, 6. And hence the nature of the gift of fear regards not that evil which fear is concerned with, but the pre-eminence of that goodness, viz. of God, by Whose power evil may be inflicted. on the other hand, hope, as a virtue, regards not only the author of good, but even the good itself, as far as it is not yet possessed. And hence to Christ, Who already possessed the perfect good of beatitude, we do not attribute the virtue of hope, but we do attribute the gift of fear.

Reply to Objection 2: This reason is based on fear in so far as it regards the evil object.

Reply to Objection 3: Perfect charity casts out servile fear, which principally regards punishment. But this kind of fear was not in Christ.

Whether the gratuitous graces were in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that the gratuitous graces were not in Christ. For whoever has anything in its fulness, to him it does not pertain to have it by participation. Now Christ has grace in its fulness, according to Jn. 1:14: “Full of grace and truth.” But the gratuitous graces would seem to be certain participations, bestowed distributively and particularly upon divers subjects, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: “Now there are diversities of graces.” Therefore it would seem that there were no gratuitous graces in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, what is due to anyone would not seem to be gratuitously bestowed on him. But it was due to the man Christ that He should abound in the word of wisdom and knowledge, and to be mighty in doing wonderful works and the like, all of which pertain to gratuitous graces: since He is “the power of God and the wisdom of God,” as is written 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to have the gratuitous graces.

Objection 3: Further, gratuitous graces are ordained to the benefit of the faithful. But it does not seem that a habit which a man does not use is for the benefit of others, according to Ecclus. 20:32: “Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen: what profit is there in them both?” Now we do not read that Christ made use of these gratuitously given graces, especially as regards the gift of tongues. Therefore not all the gratuitous graces were in Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan. cclxxxvii) that “as in the head are all the senses, so in Christ were all the graces.”

I answer that, As was said above ([3943]FS, Q[3], AA[1],4), the gratuitous graces are ordained for the manifestation of faith and spiritual doctrine. For it behooves him who teaches to have the means of making his doctrine clear; otherwise his doctrine would be useless. Now Christ is the first and chief teacher of spiritual doctrine and faith, according to Heb. 2:3,4: “Which having begun to be declared by the Lord was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders.” Hence it is clear that all the gratuitous graces were most excellently in Christ, as in the first and chief teacher of the faith.

Reply to Objection 1: As sanctifying grace is ordained to meritorious acts both interior and exterior, so likewise gratuitous grace is ordained to certain exterior acts manifestive of the faith, as the working of miracles, and the like. Now of both these graces Christ had the fulness. since inasmuch as His soul was united to the Godhead, He had the perfect power of effecting all these acts. But other saints who are moved by God as separated and not united instruments, receive power in a particular manner in order to bring about this or that act. And hence in other saints these graces are divided, but not in Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said to be the power of God and the wisdom of God, inasmuch as He is the Eternal Son of God. But in this respect it does not pertain to Him to have grace, but rather to be the bestower of grace. but it pertains to Him in His human nature to have grace.

Reply to Objection 3: The gift of tongues was bestowed on the apostles, because they were sent to teach all nations; but Christ wished to preach personally only in the one nation of the Jews, as He Himself says (Mat. 15:24): “I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel”; and the Apostle says (Rom. 15:8): “I say that Christ Jesus was minister of the circumcision.” And hence it was not necessary for Him to speak several languages. Yet was a knowledge of all languages not wanting to Him, since even the secrets of hearts, of which all words are signs, were not hidden from Him, as will be shown ([3944]Q[10], A[2]). Nor was this knowledge uselessly possessed. just as it is not useless to have a habit, which we do not use when there is no occasion.

Whether in Christ there was the gift of prophecy?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the gift of prophecy. For prophecy implies a certain obscure and imperfect knowledge, according to Num. 12:6: “If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream.” But Christ had full and unveiled knowledge, much more than Moses, of whom it is subjoined that “plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see God” (Num. 6:8). Therefore we ought not to admit prophecy in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, as faith has to do with what is not seen, and hope with what is not possessed, so prophecy has to do with what is not present, but distant; for a prophet means, as it were, a teller of far-off things. But in Christ there could be neither faith nor hope, as was said above ([3945]AA[3],4). Hence prophecy also ought not to be admitted in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, a prophet is in an inferior order to an angel; hence Moses, who was the greatest of the prophets, as was said above ([3946]SS, Q[174], A[4]) is said (Acts 7:38) to have spoken with an angel in the desert. But Christ was “made lower than the angels,” not as to the knowledge of His soul, but only as regards the sufferings of His body, as is shown Heb. 2:9. Therefore it seems that Christ was not a prophet.

On the contrary, It is written of Him (Dt. 18:15): “Thy God will raise up to thee a prophet of thy nation and of thy brethren,” and He says of Himself (Mat. 13:57; Jn. 4:44): “A prophet is not without honor, save in his own country.”

I answer that, A prophet means, as it were, a teller or seer of far-off things, inasmuch as he knows and announces what things are far from men’s senses, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi, 18). Now we must bear in mind that no one can be called a prophet for knowing and announcing what is distant from others, with whom he is not. And this is clear in regard to place and time. For if anyone living in France were to know and announce to others living in France what things were transpiring in Syria, it would be prophetical, as Eliseus told Giezi (4 Kings 5:26) how the man had leaped down from his chariot to meet him. But if anyone living in Syria were to announce what things were there, it would not be prophetical. And the same appears in regard to time. For it was prophetical of Isaias to announce that Cyrus, King of the Persians, would rebuild the temple of God, as is clear from Is. 44:28. But it was not prophetical of Esdras to write it, in whose time it took place. Hence if God or angels, or even the blessed, know and announce what is beyond our knowing, this does not pertain to prophecy, since they nowise touch our state. Now Christ before His passion touched our state, inasmuch as He was not merely a “comprehensor,” but a “wayfarer.” Hence it was prophetical in Him to know and announce what was beyond the knowledge of other “wayfarers”: and for this reason He is called a prophet.

Reply to Objection 1: These words do not prove that enigmatical knowledge, viz. by dream and vision, belongs to the nature of prophecy; but the comparison is drawn between other prophets, who saw Divine things in dreams and visions, and Moses, who saw God plainly and not by riddles, and who yet is called a prophet, according to Dt. 24:10: “And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses.” Nevertheless it may be said that although Christ had full and unveiled knowledge as regards the intellective part, yet in the imaginative part He had certain similitudes, in which Divine things could be viewed, inasmuch as He was not only a “comprehensor,” but a “wayfarer.”

Reply to Objection 2: Faith regards such things as are unseen by him who believes; and hope, too, is of such things as are not possessed by the one who hopes; but prophecy is of such things as are beyond the sense of men, with whom the prophet dwells and converses in this state of life. And hence faith and hope are repugnant to the perfection of Christ’s beatitude; but prophecy is not.

Reply to Objection 3: Angels, being “comprehensors,” are above prophets, who are merely “wayfarers”; but not above Christ, Who was both a “comprehensor” and a “wayfarer.”

Whether in Christ there was the fulness of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the fulness of grace. For the virtues flow from grace, as was said above ([3947]FS, Q[110], A[4]). But in Christ there were not all the virtues; for there was neither faith nor hope in Him, as was shown above ([3948]AA[3],4). Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace.

Objection 2: Further, as is plain from what was said above ([3949]FS, Q[111], A[2]), grace is divided into operating and cooperating. Now operating grace signifies that whereby the ungodly is justified, which has no place in Christ, Who never lay under any sin. Therefore in Christ there was not the fulness of grace.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (James 1:17): “Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.” But what comes thus is possessed partially, and not fully. Therefore no creature, not even the soul of Christ, can have the fulness of the gifts of grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): “We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] full of grace and truth.”

I answer that, To have fully is to have wholly and perfectly. Now totality and perfection can be taken in two ways: First as regards their “intensive” quantity; for instance, I may say that some man has whiteness fully, because he has as much of it as can naturally be in him; secondly, “as regards power”; for instance, if anyone be said to have life fully, inasmuch as he has it in all the effects or works of life; and thus man has life fully, but senseless animals or plants have not. Now in both these ways Christ has the fulness of grace. First, since He has grace in its highest degree, in the most perfect way it can be had. And this appears, first, from the nearness of Christ’s soul to the cause of grace. For it was said above [3950](A[1]) that the nearer a recipient is to the inflowing cause, the more it receives. And hence the soul of Christ, which is more closely united to God than all other rational creatures, receives the greatest outpouring of His grace. Secondly, in His relation to the effect. For the soul of Christ so received grace, that, in a manner, it is poured out from it upon others. And hence it behooved Him to have the greatest grace; as fire which is the cause of heat in other hot things, is of all things the hottest.

Likewise, as regards the “virtue” of grace, He had grace fully, since He had it for all the operations and effects of grace; and this, because grace was bestowed on Him, as upon a universal principle in the genus of such as have grace. Now the virtue of the first principle of a genus universally extends itself to all the effects of that genus; thus the force of the sun, which is the universal cause of generation, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), extends to all things that come under generation. Hence the second fulness of grace is seen in Christ inasmuch as His grace extends to all the effects of grace, which are the virtues, gifts, and the like.

Reply to Objection 1: Faith and hope signify effects of grace with certain defects on the part of the recipient of grace, inasmuch as faith is of the unseen, and hope of what is not yet possessed. Hence it was not necessary that in Christ, Who is the author of grace, there should be any defects such as faith and hope imply; but whatever perfection is in faith and hope was in Christ most perfectly; as in fire there are not all the modes of heat which are defective by the subject's defect, but whatever belongs to the perfection of heat.

Reply to Objection 2: It pertains essentially to operating grace to justify; but that it makes the ungodly to be just is accidental to it on the part of the subject, in which sin is found. Therefore the soul of Christ was justified by operating grace, inasmuch as it was rendered just and holy by it from the beginning of His conception; not that it was until then sinful, or even not just.

Reply to Objection 3: The fulness of grace is attributed to the soul of Christ according to the capacity of the creature and not by comparison with the infinite fulness of the Divine goodness.

Whether the fulness of grace is proper to Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. For what is proper to anyone belongs to him alone. But to be full of grace is attributed to some others; for it was said to the Blessed Virgin (Lk. 1:28): "Hail, full of grace"; and again it is written (Acts 6:8): "Stephen, full of grace and fortitude." Therefore the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.

Objection 2: Further, what can be communicated to others through Christ does not seem to be proper to Christ. But the fulness of grace can be communicated to others through Christ, since the Apostle says (Eph. 3:19): "That you may be filled unto all the fulness of God." Therefore the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ.

Objection 3: Further, the state of the wayfarer seems to be proportioned to the state of the comprehensor. But in the state of the comprehensor there will be a certain fulness, since "in our heavenly country with its fulness of all good, although some things are bestowed in a pre-eminent way, yet nothing is possessed singularly," as is clear from Gregory (Hom. De Cent. Ovib.; xxxiv in Ev.). Therefore in the state of the comprehensor the fulness of grace is possessed by everyone, and hence the fulness of grace is not proper to Christ. on the contrary, The fulness of grace is attributed to Christ inasmuch as He is the only-begotten of the Father, according to Jn. 1:14:

“We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” But to be the Only-begotten of the Father is proper to Christ. Therefore it is proper to Him to be full of grace and truth.

I answer that, The fulness of grace may be taken in two ways: First, on the part of grace itself, or secondly on the part of the one who has grace. Now on the part of grace itself there is said to be the fulness of grace when the limit of grace is attained, as to essence and power, inasmuch as grace is possessed in its highest possible excellence and in its greatest possible extension to all its effects. And this fulness of grace is proper to Christ. But on the part of the subject there is said to be the fulness of grace when anyone fully possesses grace according to his condition—whether as regards intensity, by reason of grace being intense in him, to the limit assigned by God, according to Eph. 4:1: “But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ”—or “as regards power,” by reason of a man having the help of grace for all that belongs to his office or state, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:8): “To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men.” And this fulness of grace is not proper to Christ, but is communicated to others by Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: The Blessed Virgin is said to be full of grace, not on the part of grace itself—since she had not grace in its greatest possible excellence—nor for all the effects of grace; but she is said to be full of grace in reference to herself, i.e. inasmuch as she had sufficient grace for the state to which God had chosen her, i.e. to be the mother of His Only-begotten. So, too, Stephen is said to be full of grace, since he had sufficient grace to be a fit minister and witness of God, to which office he had been called. And the same must be said of others. Of these fulnesses one is greater than another, according as one is divinely pre-ordained to a higher or lower state.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle is there speaking of that fulness which has reference to the subject, in comparison with what man is divinely pre-ordained to; and this is either something in common, to which all the saints are pre-ordained, or something special, which pertains to the pre-eminence of some. And in this manner a certain fulness of grace is common to all the saints, viz. to have grace enough to merit eternal life, which consists in the enjoyment of God. And this is the fulness of grace which the Apostle desires for the faithful to whom he writes.

Reply to Objection 3: These gifts which are in common in heaven, viz.: vision, possession and fruition, and the like, have certain gifts corresponding to them in this life which are also common to all the saints. Yet there are certain prerogatives of saints, both in heaven and on earth, which are not possessed by all.

Whether the grace of Christ is infinite?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s grace is infinite. For everything immeasurable is infinite. But the grace of Christ is immeasurable; since it is written (Jn. 3:34): “For God doth not give the Spirit by measure to His Son [*’To His Son’ is lacking in the Vulgate], namely Christ.” Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

Objection 2: Further, an infinite effect betokens an infinite power which can only spring from an infinite essence. But the effect of Christ’s grace is infinite, since it extends to the salvation of the whole human race; for He is the propitiation for our sins . . . and for those of the whole world, as is said (1 Jn. 2:2). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

Objection 3: Further, every finite thing by addition can attain to the quantity of any other finite thing. Therefore if the grace of Christ is finite the grace of any other man could increase to such an extent as to reach to an equality with Christ’s grace, against what is written (Job 28:17): “Gold nor crystal cannot equal it,” as Gregory expounds it (Moral. xviii). Therefore the grace of Christ is infinite.

On the contrary, Grace is something created in the soul. But every created thing is finite, according to Wis. 11:21: “Thou hast ordered all things in measure and number and weight.” Therefore the grace of Christ is not infinite.

I answer that, As was made clear above ([3951]Q[2], A[10]), a twofold grace may be considered in Christ; the first being the grace of union, which, as was said ([3952]Q[6], A[6]), is for Him to be personally united to the Son of God, which union has been bestowed gratis on the human nature; and it is clear that this grace is infinite, as the Person of God is infinite. The second is habitual grace; which may be taken in two ways: first as a being, and in this way it must be a finite being, since it is in the soul of Christ, as in a subject, and Christ’s soul is a creature having a finite capacity; hence the being of grace cannot be infinite, since it cannot exceed its subject. Secondly it may be viewed in its specific nature of grace; and thus the grace of Christ can be termed infinite, since it is not limited, i.e. it has whatsoever can pertain to the nature of grace, and what pertains to the nature of grace is not bestowed on Him in a fixed measure; seeing that "according to the purpose" of God to Whom it pertains to measure grace, it is bestowed on Christ's soul as on a universal principle for bestowing grace on human nature, according to Eph. 1:5,6, "He hath graced us in His beloved Son"; thus we might say that the light of the sun is infinite, not indeed in being, but in the nature of light, as having whatever can pertain to the nature of light.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the Father "doth not give the Spirit by measure," it may be expounded of the gift which God the Father from all eternity gave the Son, viz. the Divine Nature, which is an infinite gift. Hence the comment of a certain gloss: "So that the Son may be as great as the Father is." Or again, it may be referred to the gift which is given the human nature, to be united to the Divine Person, and this also is an infinite gift. Hence a gloss says on this text: "As the Father begot a full and perfect Word, it is united thus full and perfect to human nature." Thirdly, it may be referred to habitual grace, inasmuch as the grace of Christ extends to whatever belongs to grace. Hence Augustine expounding this (Tract. xiv in Joan.) says: "The division of the gifts is a measurement. For to one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom, to another the word of knowledge." But Christ the giver does not receive by measure.

Reply to Objection 2: The grace of Christ has an infinite effect, both because of the aforesaid infinity of grace, and because of the unity [*Perhaps we should read 'infinity'—Ed.] of the Divine Person, to Whom Christ's soul is united.

Reply to Objection 3: The lesser can attain by augment to the quantity of the greater, when both have the same kind of quantity. But the grace of any man is compared to the grace of Christ as a particular to a universal power; hence as the force of fire, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the sun's strength, so the grace of a man, no matter how much it increases, can never equal the grace of Christ.

Whether the grace of Christ could increase?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace of Christ could increase. For to every finite thing addition can be made. But the grace of Christ was finite. Therefore it could increase.

Objection 2: Further, it is by Divine power that grace is increased, according to 2 Cor. 9:8: “And God is able to make all grace abound in you.” But the Divine power, being infinite, is confined by no limits. Therefore it seems that the grace of Christ could have been greater.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 2:52) that the child “Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men.” Therefore the grace of Christ could increase.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): “We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] as it were . . . the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.” But nothing can be or can be thought greater than that anyone should be the Only-begotten of the Father. Therefore no greater grace can be or can be thought than that of which Christ was full.

I answer that, For a form to be incapable of increase happens in two ways: First on the part of the subject; secondly, on the part of the form itself. On the part of the subject, indeed, when the subject reaches the utmost limit wherein it partakes of this form, after its own manner, e.g. if we say that air cannot increase in heat, when it has reached the utmost limit of heat which can exist in the nature of air, although there may be greater heat in actual existence, viz. the heat of fire. But on the part of the form, the possibility of increase is excluded when a subject reaches the utmost perfection which this form can have by nature, e.g. if we say the heat of fire cannot be increased because there cannot be a more perfect grade of heat than that to which fire attains. Now the proper measure of grace, like that of other forms, is determined by the Divine wisdom, according to Wis. 11:21: “Thou hast ordered all things in number, weight and measure.” And it is with reference to its end that a measure is set to every form. as there is no greater gravity than that of the earth, because there is no lower place than that of the earth. Now the end of grace is the union of the rational creature with God. But there can neither be nor be thought a greater union of the rational creature with God than that which is in the Person. And hence the grace of Christ reached the highest measure of grace. Hence it is clear that the grace of Christ cannot be increased on the part of grace. But neither can it be increased on the part of the subject, since Christ as man was a true and full comprehensor from the first instant of His conception. Hence there could have been no increase of grace in Him, as there could be none in the rest of the blessed, whose grace could not increase, seeing that they have reached their last end. But as regards men who are wholly wayfarers, their grace can be increased not merely on the part of the form, since they have not attained the highest degree of grace, but also on the part of the subject, since they have not yet attained their end.

Reply to Objection 1: If we speak of mathematical quantity, addition can be made to any finite quantity, since there is nothing on the part of finite quantity which is repugnant to addition. But if we speak of natural quantity, there may be repugnance on the part of the form to which a determined quantity is due, even as other accidents are determined. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 41) that “there is naturally a term of all things, and a fixed limit of magnitude and increase.” And hence to the quantity of the whole there can be no addition. And still more must we suppose a term in the forms themselves, beyond which they may not go. Hence it is not necessary that addition should be capable of being made to Christ’s grace, although it is finite in its essence.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the Divine power can make something greater and better than the habitual grace of Christ, yet it could not make it to be ordained to anything greater than the personal union with the Only-begotten Son of the Father; and to this union, by the purpose of the Divine wisdom, the measure of grace is sufficient.

Reply to Objection 3: Anyone may increase in wisdom and grace in two ways. First inasmuch as the very habits of wisdom and grace are increased; and in this way Christ did not increase. Secondly, as regards the effects, i.e. inasmuch as they do wiser and greater works; and in this way Christ increased in wisdom and grace even as in age, since in the course of time He did more perfect works, to prove Himself true man, both in the things of God, and in the things of man.

Whether the habitual grace of Christ followed after the union?

Objection 1: It would seem that the habitual grace did not follow after the union. For nothing follows itself. But this habitual grace seems to be the same as the grace of union; for Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv):

“Every man becomes a Christian from the beginning of his belief, by the same grace whereby this Man from His beginning became Christ”; and of these two the first pertains to habitual grace and the second to the grace of union. Therefore it would seem that habitual grace did not follow upon the union.

Objection 2: Further, disposition precedes perfection, if not in time, at least in thought. But the habitual grace seems to be a disposition in human nature for the personal union. Therefore it seems that the habitual grace did not follow but rather preceded the union.

Objection 3: Further, the common precedes the proper. But habitual grace is common to Christ and other men; and the grace of union is proper to Christ. Therefore habitual grace is prior in thought to the union. Therefore it does not follow it.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 42:1): “Behold my servant, I will uphold Him . . .”and farther on: “I have given My Spirit upon Him”; and this pertains to the gift of habitual grace. Hence it remains that the assumption of human nature to the unity of the Person preceded the habitual grace of Christ.

I answer that, The union of the human nature with the Divine Person, which, as we have said above ([3953]Q[2], A[10];[3954] Q[6], A[6]), is the grace of union, precedes the habitual grace of Christ, not in order of time, but by nature and in thought; and this for a triple reason: First, with reference to the order of the principles of both. For the principle of the union is the Person of the Son assuming human nature, Who is said to be sent into the world, inasmuch as He assumed human nature; but the principle of habitual grace, which is given with charity, is the Holy Ghost, Who is said to be sent inasmuch as He dwells in the mind by charity. Now the mission of the Son is prior, in the order of nature, to the mission of the Holy Ghost, even as in the order of nature the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, and love from wisdom. Hence the personal union, according to which the mission of the Son took place, is prior in the order of nature to habitual grace, according to which the mission of the Holy Ghost takes place. Secondly, the reason of this order may be taken from the relation of grace to its cause. For grace is caused in man by the presence of the Godhead, as light in the air by the presence of the sun. Hence it is written (Ezech. 43:2): “The glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of the east . . . and the earth shone with His majesty.” But the presence of God in Christ is by the union of human nature with the Divine Person. Hence the habitual grace of Christ is understood to follow this union, as light follows the sun. Thirdly, the reason of this union can be taken from the end of grace, since it is ordained to acting rightly, and action belongs to the suppositum and the individual. Hence action and, in consequence, grace ordaining thereto, presuppose the hypostasis which operates. Now the hypostasis did not exist in the human nature before the union, as is clear from[3955] Q[4], A[2]. Therefore the grace of union precedes, in thought, habitual grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine here means by grace the gratuitous will of God, bestowing benefits gratis; and hence every man is said to be made a Christian by the same grace whereby a Man became Christ, since both take place by the gratuitous will of God without merits.

Reply to Objection 2: As disposition in the order of generation precedes the perfection to which it disposes, in such things as are gradually perfected; so it naturally follows the perfection which one has already obtained; as heat, which was a disposition to the form of fire, is an effect flowing from the form of already existing fire. Now the human nature in Christ is united to the Person of the Word from the beginning without succession. Hence habitual grace is not understood to have preceded the union, but to have followed it; as a natural property. Hence, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): “Grace is in a manner natural to the Man Christ.”

Reply to Objection 3: The common precedes the proper, when both are of the same genus; but when they are of divers genera, there is nothing to prevent the proper being prior to the common. Now the grace of union is not in the same genus as habitual grace; but is above all genera even as the Divine Person Himself. Hence there is nothing to prevent this proper from being before the common since it does not result from something being added to the common, but is rather the principle and source of that which is common.

OF THE GRACE OF CHRIST, AS HE IS THE HEAD OF THE CHURCH (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the grace of Christ as the Head of the Church; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?

(2) Whether He is the Head of men as regards their bodies or only as regards their souls?

(3) Whether He is the Head of all men?

(4) Whether He is the Head of the angels?

(5) Whether the grace of Christ as Head of the Church is the same as His habitual grace as an individual man?

(6) Whether to be Head of the Church is proper to Christ?

(7) Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?

(8) Whether Anti-christ can be called the head of all the wicked?

Whether Christ is the Head of the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to be Head of the Church. For the head imparts sense and motion to the members. Now spiritual sense and motion which are by grace, are not imparted to us by the Man Christ, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 12; xv, 24), “not even Christ, as man, but only as God, bestows the Holy Ghost.” Therefore it does not belong to Him as man to be Head of the Church.

Objection 2: Further, it is not fitting for the head to have a head. But God is the Head of Christ, as man, according to 1 Cor. 11:3, “The Head of Christ is God.” Therefore Christ Himself is not a head.

Objection 3: Furthermore, the head of a man is a particular member, receiving an influx from the heart. But Christ is the universal principle of the whole Church. Therefore He is not the Head of the Church.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:22): “And He . . . hath made Him head over all the Church.”

I answer that, As the whole Church is termed one mystic body from its likeness to the natural body of a man, which in divers members has divers acts, as the Apostle teaches (Rom. 12; 1 Cor. 12), so likewise Christ is called the Head of the Church from a likeness with the human head, in which we may consider three things, viz. order, perfection, and power:

“Order,” indeed; for the head is the first part of man, beginning from the higher part; and hence it is that every principle is usually called a head according to Ezech. 16:25: “At every head of the way, thou hast set up a sign of thy prostitution”—“Perfection,” inasmuch as in the head dwell all the senses, both interior and exterior, whereas in the other members there is only touch, and hence it is said (Is. 9:15): “The aged and honorable, he is the head”—“Power,” because the power and movement of the other members, together with the direction of them in their acts, is from the head, by reason of the sensitive and motive power there ruling; hence the ruler is called the head of a people, according to 1 Kings 15:17: “When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?” Now these three things belong spiritually to Christ. First, on account of His nearness to God His grace is the highest and first, though not in time, since all have received grace on account of His grace, according to Rom. 8:29: “For whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born amongst many brethren.” Secondly, He had perfection as regards the fulness of all graces, according to Jn. 1:14, “We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] . . . full of grace and truth,” as was shown[3956], Q[7], A[9]. Thirdly, He has the power of bestowing grace on all the members of the Church, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness we have all received.” And thus it is plain that Christ is fittingly called the Head of the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: To give grace or the Holy Ghost belongs to Christ as He is God, authoritatively; but instrumentally it belongs also to Him as man, inasmuch as His manhood is the instrument of His Godhead. And hence by the power of the Godhead His actions were beneficial, i.e. by causing grace in us, both meritoriously and efficiently. But Augustine denies that Christ as man gives the Holy Ghost authoritatively. Even other saints are said to give the Holy Ghost instrumentally, or ministerially, according to Gal. 3:5: “He . . . who giveth to you the Spirit.”

Reply to Objection 2: In metaphorical speech we must not expect a likeness in all respects; for thus there would be not likeness but identity. Accordingly a natural head has not another head because one human body is not part of another; but a metaphorical body, i.e. an ordered multitude, is part of another multitude as the domestic multitude is part of the civil multitude; and hence the father who is head of the domestic multitude has a head above him, i.e. the civil governor. And hence there is no reason why God should not be the Head of Christ, although Christ Himself is Head of the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: The head has a manifest pre-eminence over the other exterior members; but the heart has a certain hidden influence. And hence the Holy Ghost is likened to the heart, since He invisibly quickens and unifies the Church; but Christ is likened to the Head in His visible nature in which man is set over man.

Whether Christ is the Head of men as to their bodies or only as to their souls?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of men as to their bodies. For Christ is said to be the Head of the Church inasmuch as He bestows spiritual sense and the movement of grace on the Church. But a body is not capable of this spiritual sense and movement. Therefore Christ is not the Head of men as regards their bodies.

Objection 2: Further, we share bodies with the brutes. If therefore Christ was the Head of men as to their bodies, it would follow that He was the Head of brute animals; and this is not fitting.

Objection 3: Further, Christ took His body from other men, as is clear from Mat. 1 and Luke 3. But the head is the first of the members, as was said above (A[1], ad 3). Therefore Christ is not the Head of the Church as regards bodies.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 3:21): “Who will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory.”

I answer that, The human body has a natural relation to the rational soul, which is its proper form and motor. Inasmuch as the soul is its form, it receives from the soul life and the other properties which belong specifically to man; but inasmuch as the soul is its motor, the body serves the soul instrumentally. Therefore we must hold that the manhood of Christ had the power of “influence,” inasmuch as it is united to the Word of God, to Whom His body is united through the soul, as stated above ([3957]Q[6], A[1]). Hence the whole manhood of Christ, i.e. according to soul and body, influences all, both in soul and body; but principally the soul, and secondarily the body: First, inasmuch as the “members of the body are presented as instruments of justice” in the soul that lives through Christ, as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:13): secondly, inasmuch as the life of glory flows from the soul on to the body, according to Rom. 8:11: “He that raised up Jesus from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in you.”

Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual sense of grace does not reach to the body first and principally, but secondarily and instrumentally, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: The body of an animal has no relation to a rational soul, as the human body has. Hence there is no parity.

Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ drew the matter of His body from other men, yet all draw from Him the immortal life of their body, according to 1 Cor. 15:22: “And as in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive.”

Whether Christ is the Head of all men?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not the Head of all men. For the head has no relation except to the members of its body. Now the unbaptized are nowise members of the Church which is the body of Christ, as it is written (Eph. 1:23). Therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle writes to the Ephesians (5:25,27): “Christ delivered Himself up for” the Church “that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing.” But there are many of the faithful in whom is found the spot or the wrinkle of sin. Therefore Christ is not the Head of all the faithful.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law are compared to Christ as the shadow to the body, as is written (Col. 2:17). But the fathers of the Old Testament in their day served unto these sacraments, according to Heb. 8:5: “Who serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things.” Hence they did not pertain to Christ’s body, and therefore Christ is not the Head of all men.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 4:10): “Who is the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful,” and (1 Jn. 2:2): “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.” Now to save men and to be a propitiation for their sins belongs to Christ as Head. Therefore Christ is the Head of all men.

I answer that, This is the difference between the natural body of man and the Church's mystical body, that the members of the natural body are all together, and the members of the mystical are not all together—neither as regards their natural being, since the body of the Church is made up of the men who have been from the beginning of the world until its end—nor as regards their supernatural being, since, of those who are at any one time, some there are who are without grace, yet will afterwards obtain it, and some have it already. We must therefore consider the members of the mystical body not only as they are in act, but as they are in potentiality. Nevertheless, some are in potentiality who will never be reduced to act, and some are reduced at some time to act; and this according to the triple class, of which the first is by faith, the second by the charity of this life, the third by the fruition of the life to come. Hence we must say that if we take the whole time of the world in general, Christ is the Head of all men, but diversely. For, first and principally, He is the Head of such as are united to Him by glory; secondly, of those who are actually united to Him by charity; thirdly, of those who are actually united to Him by faith; fourthly, of those who are united to Him merely in potentiality, which is not yet reduced to act, yet will be reduced to act according to Divine predestination; fifthly, of those who are united to Him in potentiality, which will never be reduced to act; such are those men existing in the world, who are not predestined, who, however, on their departure from this world, wholly cease to be members of Christ, as being no longer in potentiality to be united to Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: Those who are unbaptized, though not actually in the Church, are in the Church potentially. And this potentiality is rooted in two things—first and principally, in the power of Christ, which is sufficient for the salvation of the whole human race; secondly, in free-will.

Reply to Objection 2: To be "a glorious Church not having spot or wrinkle" is the ultimate end to which we are brought by the Passion of Christ. Hence this will be in heaven, and not on earth, in which "if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves," as is written (1 Jn. 1:8). Nevertheless, there are some, viz. mortal, sins from which they are free who are members of Christ by the actual union of charity; but such as are tainted with these sins are not members of Christ actually, but potentially; except, perhaps, imperfectly, by formless faith, which unites to God, relatively but not simply, viz. so that man partake of the life of grace. For, as is written

(James 2:20): “Faith without works is dead.” Yet such as these receive from Christ a certain vital act, i.e. to believe, as if a lifeless limb were moved by a man to some extent.

Reply to Objection 3: The holy Fathers made use of the legal sacraments, not as realities, but as images and shadows of what was to come. Now it is the same motion to an image as image, and to the reality, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. ii). Hence the ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to Him, and hence the ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.

Whether Christ is the Head of the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is not the head of the angels. For the head and members are of one nature. But Christ as man is not of the same nature with the angels, but only with men, since, as is written (Heb. 2:16): “For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold.” Therefore Christ as man is not the head of the angels.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is the head of such as belong to the Church, which is His Body, as is written (Eph. 1:23). But the angels do not belong to the Church. For the Church is the congregation of the faithful: and in the angels there is no faith, for they do not “walk by faith” but “by sight,” otherwise they would be “absent from the Lord,” as the Apostle argues (2 Cor. 5:6,7). Therefore Christ as man is not head of the angels.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix; xxiii in Joan.), that as “the Word” which “was in the beginning with the Father” quickens souls, so the “Word made flesh” quickens bodies, which angels lack. But the Word made flesh is Christ as man. Therefore Christ as man does not give life to angels, and hence as man He is not the head of the angels.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:10), “Who is the head of all Principality and Power,” and the same reason holds good with the other orders of angels. Therefore Christ is the Head of the angels.

I answer that, As was said above (A[1], ad 2), where there is one body we must allow that there is one head. Now a multitude ordained to one end, with distinct acts and duties, may be metaphorically called one body. But it is manifest that both men and angels are ordained to one end, which is the glory of the Divine fruition. Hence the mystical body of the Church consists not only of men but of angels. Now of all this multitude Christ is the Head, since He is nearer God, and shares His gifts more fully, not only than man, but even than angels; and of His influence not only men but even angels partake, since it is written (Eph. 1:20–22): that God the Father set "Him," namely Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all Principality and Power and Virtue and Dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come. And He hath subjected all things under His feet." Therefore Christ is not only the Head of men, but of angels. Hence we read (Mat. 4:11) that "angels came and ministered to Him."

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's influence over men is chiefly with regard to their souls; wherein men agree with angels in generic nature, though not in specific nature. By reason of this agreement Christ can be said to be the Head of the angels, although the agreement falls short as regards the body.

Reply to Objection 2: The Church, on earth, is the congregation of the faithful; but, in heaven, it is the congregation of comprehensors. Now Christ was not merely a wayfarer, but a comprehensor. And therefore He is the Head not merely of the faithful, but of comprehensors, as having grace and glory most fully.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine here uses the similitude of cause and effect, i.e. inasmuch as corporeal things act on bodies, and spiritual things on spiritual things. Nevertheless, the humanity of Christ, by virtue of the spiritual nature, i.e. the Divine, can cause something not only in the spirits of men, but also in the spirits of angels, on account of its most close conjunction with God, i.e. by personal union.

Whether the grace of Christ, as Head of the Church, is the same as His habitual grace, inasmuch as He is Man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the grace whereby Christ is Head of the Church and the individual grace of the Man are not the same. For the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15): "If by the offense of one many died, much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." But the actual sin of Adam is distinct from original sin which he transmitted to his posterity. Hence the personal grace which is proper to Christ is distinct from His grace, inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, which flows to others from Him.

Objection 2: Further, habits are distinguished by acts. But the personal grace of Christ is ordained to one act, viz. the sanctification of His soul; and the capital grace is ordained to another, viz. to sanctifying others. Therefore the personal grace of Christ is distinct from His grace as He is the Head of the Church.

Objection 3: Further, as was said above ([3958]Q[6], A[6]), in Christ we distinguish a threefold grace, viz. the grace of union, capital grace, and the individual grace of the Man. Now the individual grace of Christ is distinct from the grace of union. Therefore it is also distinct from the capital grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:16): “Of His fulness we all have received.” Now He is our Head, inasmuch as we receive from Him. Therefore He is our Head, inasmuch as He has the fulness of grace. Now He had the fulness of grace, inasmuch as personal grace was in Him in its perfection, as was said above ([3959]Q[7], A[9]). Hence His capital and personal grace are not distinct.

I answer that, Since everything acts inasmuch as it is a being in act, it must be the same act whereby it is in act and whereby it acts, as it is the same heat whereby fire is hot and whereby it heats. Yet not every act whereby anything is in act suffices for its being the principle of acting upon others. For since the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 19), the agent must act on others by reason of a certain pre-eminence. Now it was said above [3960](A[1]; Q[7], A[9]) grace was received by the soul of Christ in the highest way; and therefore from this pre-eminence of grace which He received, it is from Him that this grace is bestowed on others—and this belongs to the nature of head. Hence the personal grace, whereby the soul of Christ is justified, is essentially the same as His grace, as He is the Head of the Church, and justifies others; but there is a distinction of reason between them.

Reply to Objection 1: Original sin in Adam, which is a sin of the nature, is derived from his actual sin, which is a personal sin, because in him the person corrupted the nature; and by means of this corruption the sin of the first man is transmitted to posterity, inasmuch as the corrupt nature corrupts the person. Now grace is not vouchsafed us by means of human nature, but solely by the personal action of Christ Himself. Hence we must not distinguish a twofold grace in Christ, one corresponding to the nature, the other to the person as in Adam we distinguish the sin of the nature and of the person.

Reply to Objection 2: Different acts, one of which is the reason and the cause of the other, do not diversify a habit. Now the act of the personal grace which is formally to sanctify its subject, is the reason of the justification of others, which pertains to capital grace. Hence it is that the essence of the habit is not diversified by this difference.

Reply to Objection 3: Personal and capital grace are ordained to an act; but the grace of union is not ordained to an act, but to the personal being. Hence the personal and the capital grace agree in the essence of the habit; but the grace of union does not, although the personal grace can be called in a manner the grace of union, inasmuch as it brings about a fitness for the union; and thus the grace of union, the capital, and the personal grace are one in essence, though there is a distinction of reason between them.

Whether it is proper to Christ to be Head of the Church?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not proper to Christ to be Head of the Church. For it is written (1 Kings 15:17): “When thou wast a little one in thy own eyes, wast thou not made the head of the tribes of Israel?” Now there is but one Church in the New and the Old Testament. Therefore it seems that with equal reason any other man than Christ might be head of the Church.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is called Head of the Church from His bestowing grace on the Church’s members. But it belongs to others also to grant grace to others, according to Eph. 4:29: “Let no evil speech proceed from your mouth; but that which is good to the edification of faith, that it may administer grace to the hearers.” Therefore it seems to belong also to others than Christ to be head of the Church.

Objection 3: Further, Christ by His ruling over the Church is not only called “Head,” but also “Shepherd” and “Foundation.” Now Christ did not retain for Himself alone the name of Shepherd, according to 1 Pet. 5:4, “And when the prince of pastors shall appear, you shall receive a never-fading crown of glory”; nor the name of Foundation, according to Apoc. 21:14: “And the wall of the city had twelve foundations.” Therefore it seems that He did not retain the name of Head for Himself alone.

On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:19): “The head” of the Church is that “from which the whole body, by joints and bands being supplied with nourishment and compacted groweth unto the increase of God.” But this belongs only to Christ. Therefore Christ alone is Head of the Church.

I answer that, The head influences the other members in two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; secondly, by a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power of justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others; and in this way others may be called heads of the Church, according to Amos 6:1, “Ye great men, heads of the people”; differently, however, from Christ. First, inasmuch as Christ is the Head of all who pertain to the Church in every place and time and state; but all other men are called heads with reference to certain special places, as bishops of their Churches. Or with reference to a determined time as the Pope is the head of the whole Church, viz. during the time of his Pontificate, and with reference to a determined state, inasmuch as they are in the state of wayfarers. Secondly, because Christ is the Head of the Church by His own power and authority; while others are called heads, as taking Christ’s place, according to 2 Cor. 2:10, “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes I have done it in the person of Christ,” and 2 Cor. 5:20, “For Christ therefore we are ambassadors, God, as it were, exhorting by us.”

Reply to Objection 1: The word “head” is employed in that passage in regard to exterior government; as a king is said to be the head of his kingdom.

Reply to Objection 2: Man does not distribute grace by interior influx, but by exteriorly persuading to the effects of grace.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xlvi in Joan.): “If the rulers of the Church are Shepherds, how is there one Shepherd, except that all these are members of one Shepherd?” So likewise others may be called foundations and heads, inasmuch as they are members of the one Head and Foundation. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (Tract. xlvii), “He gave to His members to be shepherds; yet none of us calleth himself the Door. He kept this for Himself alone.” And this because by door is implied the principal authority, inasmuch as it is by the door that all enter the house; and it is Christ alone by “Whom also we have access . . . into this grace, wherein we stand” (Rom. 5:2); but by the other names above-mentioned there may be implied not merely the principal but also the secondary authority.

Whether the devil is the head of all the wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that the devil is not the head of the wicked. For it belongs to the head to diffuse sense and movement into the members, as a gloss says, on Eph. 1:22, “And made Him head,” etc. But the devil has no power of spreading the evil of sin, which proceeds from the will of the sinner. Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of the wicked.

Objection 2: Further, by every sin a man is made evil. But not every sin is from the devil; and this is plain as regards the demons, who did not sin through the persuasion of another; so likewise not every sin of man proceeds from the devil, for it is said (De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxii): “Not all our wicked thoughts are always raised up by the suggestion of the devil; but sometimes they spring from the movement of our will.” Therefore the devil is not the head of all the wicked.

Objection 3: Further, one head is placed on one body. But the whole multitude of the wicked do not seem to have anything in which they are united, for evil is contrary to evil and springs from divers defects, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the devil cannot be called the head of all the wicked.

On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xiv] on Job 18:17, “Let the memory of him perish from the earth,” says: “This is said of every evil one, yet so as to be referred to the head,” i.e. the devil.

I answer that, As was said above [3961](A[6]), the head not only influences the members interiorly, but also governs them exteriorly, directing their actions to an end. Hence it may be said that anyone is the head of a multitude, either as regards both, i.e. by interior influence and exterior governance, and thus Christ is the Head of the Church, as was stated [3962](A[6]); or as regards exterior governance, and thus every prince or prelate is head of the multitude subject to him. And in this way the devil is head of all the wicked. For, as is written (Job 41:25): “He is king over all the children of pride.” Now it belongs to a governor to lead those whom he governs to their end. But the end of the devil is the aversion of the rational creature from God; hence from the beginning he has endeavored to lead man from obeying the Divine precept. But aversion from God has the nature of an end, inasmuch as it is sought for under the appearance of liberty, according to Jer. 2:20: “Of old time thou hast broken my yoke, thou hast burst my bands, and thou saidst, ‘I will not serve.’” Hence, inasmuch as some are brought to this end by sinning, they fall under the rule and government of the devil, and therefore he is called their head.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the devil does not influence the rational mind interiorly, yet he beguiles it to evil by persuasion.

Reply to Objection 2: A governor does not always suggest to his subjects to obey his will; but proposes to all the sign of his will, in consequence of which some are incited by inducement, and some of their own free-will, as is plain in the leader of an army, whose standard all the soldiers follow, though no one persuades them. Therefore in the same way, the first sin of the devil, who “sinneth from the beginning” (1 Jn. 3:8), is held out to all to be followed, and some imitate at his suggestion, and some of their own will without any suggestion. And hence the devil is the head of all the wicked, inasmuch as they imitate Him, according to Wis. 2:24,25: “By the envy of the devil, death came into the world. And they follow him that are of his side.”

Reply to Objection 3: All sins agree in aversion from God, although they differ by conversion to different changeable goods.

Whether Anti-christ may be called the head of all the wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that Antichrist is not the head of the wicked. For there are not several heads of one body. But the devil is the head of the multitude of the wicked. Therefore Anti-christ is not their head.

Objection 2: Further, Anti-christ is a member of the devil. Now the head is distinguished from the members. Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.

Objection 3: Further, the head has an influence over the members. But Anti-christ has no influence over the wicked who have preceded him. Therefore Anti-christ is not the head of the wicked.

On the contrary, A gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xv] on Job 21:29, “Ask any of them that go by the way,” says: “Whilst he was speaking of the body of all the wicked, suddenly he turned his speech to Anti-christ the head of all evil-doers.”

I answer that, As was said above [3963](A[1]), in the head are found three things: order, perfection, and the power of influencing. But as regards the order of the body, Anti-christ is not said to be the head of the wicked as if his sin had preceded, as the sin of the devil preceded. So likewise he is not called the head of the wicked from the power of influencing, although he will pervert some in his day by exterior persuasion; nevertheless those who were before him were not beguiled into wickedness by him nor have imitated his wickedness. Hence he cannot be called the head of all the wicked in this way, but of some. Therefore it remains to be said that he is the head of all the wicked by reason of the perfection of his wickedness. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, “Showing himself as if he were God,” a gloss says: “As in Christ dwelt the fulness of the Godhead, so in Anti-christ the fulness of all wickedness.” Not indeed as if his humanity were assumed by the devil into unity of person, as the humanity of Christ by the Son of God; but that the devil by suggestion infuses his wickedness more copiously into him than into all others. And in this way all the wicked who have gone before are signs of Anti-christ, according to 2 Thess. 2:7, “For the mystery of iniquity already worketh.”

Reply to Objection 1: The devil and Anti-christ are not two heads, but one; since Anti-christ is called the head, inasmuch as the wickedness of the devil is most fully impressed on him. Hence, on 2 Thess. 2:4, “Showing himself as if he were God,” a gloss says: “The head of all the wicked, namely the devil, who is king over all the children of pride will be in him.” Now he is said to be in him not by personal union, nor by indwelling, since “the Trinity alone dwells in the mind” (as is said De Eccles. Dogm. lxxxiii), but by the effect of wickedness.

Reply to Objection 2: As the head of Christ is God, and yet He is the Head of the Church, as was said above (A[1], ad 2), so likewise Anti-christ is a member of the devil and yet is head of the wicked.

Reply to Objection 3: Anti-christ is said to be the head of all the wicked not by a likeness of influence, but by a likeness of perfection. For in him the devil, as it were, brings his wickedness to a head, in the same way that anyone is said to bring his purpose to a head when he executes it.

OF CHRIST’S KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider Christ’s knowledge; concerning which the consideration will be twofold. First, of Christ’s knowledge in general; secondly, of each particular kind of knowledge He had.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?

(2) Whether He had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?

(3) Whether He had an imprinted or infused knowledge?

(4) Whether He had any acquired knowledge?

Whether Christ had any knowledge besides the Divine?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no knowledge except the Divine. For knowledge is necessary that things may be known thereby. But by His Divine knowledge Christ knew all things. Therefore any other knowledge would have been superfluous in Him.

Objection 2: Further, the lesser light is dimmed by the greater. But all created knowledge in comparison with the uncreated knowledge of God is as the lesser to the greater light. Therefore there shone in Christ no other knowledge except the Divine.

Objection 3: Further, the union of the human nature with the Divine took place in the Person, as is clear from[3964] Q[2], A[2]. Now, according to some there is in Christ a certain “knowledge of the union,” whereby Christ knew what belongs to the mystery of the Incarnation more fully than anyone else. Hence, since the personal union contains two natures, it would seem that there are not two knowledges in Christ, but one only, pertaining to both natures.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarnat. vii): “God assumed the perfection of human nature in the flesh; He took upon Himself the sense of man, but not the swollen sense of the flesh.” But created knowledge pertains to the sense of man. Therefore in Christ there was created knowledge.

I answer that, As said above ([3965]Q[5]), the Son of God assumed an entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved Him to have created knowledge, for three reasons. First, on account of the soul’s perfection. For the soul, considered in itself, is in potentiality to knowing intelligible things. since it is like “a tablet on which nothing is written,” and yet it may be written upon through the possible intellect, whereby it may become all things, as is said De Anima iii, 18. Now what is in potentiality is imperfect unless reduced to act. But it was fitting that the Son of God should assume, not an imperfect, but a perfect human nature, since the whole human race was to be brought back to perfection by its means. Hence it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfected by a knowledge, which would be its proper perfection. And therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in Christ besides the Divine knowledge, otherwise the soul of Christ would have been more imperfect than the souls of the rest of men. Secondly, because, since everything is on account of its operation, as stated De Coel. ii, 17, Christ would have had an intellective soul to no purpose if He had not understood by it; and this pertains to created knowledge. Thirdly, because some created knowledge pertains to the nature of the human soul, viz. that whereby we naturally know first principles; since we are here taking knowledge for any cognition of the human intellect. Now nothing natural was wanting to Christ, since He took the whole human nature, as stated above ([3966]Q[5]). And hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4] condemned the opinion of those who denied that in Christ there are two knowledges or wisdoms.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ knew all things with the Divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very Essence of God; since God’s understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. xii, text. 39). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature. Therefore, if there had been no other knowledge in the soul of Christ, it would have known nothing; and thus it would have been assumed to no purpose, since everything is on account of its operation.

Reply to Objection 2: If the two lights are supposed to be in the same order, the lesser is dimmed by the greater, as the light of the sun dims the light of a candle, both being in the class of illuminants. But if we suppose two lights, one of which is in the class of illuminants and the other in the class of illuminated, the lesser light is not dimmed by the greater, but rather is strengthened, as the light of the air by the light of the sun. And in this manner the light of knowledge is not dimmed, but rather is heightened in the soul of Christ by the light of the Divine knowledge, which is "the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world," as is written Jn. 1:9.

Reply to Objection 3: On the part of what are united we hold there is a knowledge in Christ, both as to His Divine and as to His human nature; so that, by reason of the union whereby there is one hypostasis of God and man, the things of God are attributed to man, and the things of man are attributed to God, as was said above ([3967]Q[3], AA[1],6). But on the part of the union itself we cannot admit any knowledge in Christ. For this union is in personal being, and knowledge belongs to person only by reason of a nature.

Whether Christ had the knowledge which the blessed or comprehensors have?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed or comprehensors. For the knowledge of the blessed is a participation of Divine light, according to Ps. 35:10: "In Thy light we shall see light." Now Christ had not a participated light, but He had the Godhead Itself substantially abiding in Him, according to Col. 2:9: "For in Him dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead corporeally." Therefore in Christ there was not the knowledge of the blessed.

Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the blessed makes them blessed, according to Jn. 17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ Whom Thou hast sent." But this Man was blessed through being united to God in person, according to Ps. 64:5: "Blessed is He Whom Thou hast chosen and taken to Thee." Therefore it is not necessary to suppose the knowledge of the blessed in Him.

Objection 3: Further, to man belongs a double knowledge—one by nature, one above nature. Now the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God, is not natural to man, but above his nature. But in Christ there was another and much higher supernatural knowledge, i.e. the Divine knowledge. Therefore there was no need of the knowledge of the blessed in Christ.

On the contrary, The knowledge of the blessed consists in the knowledge of God. But He knew God fully, even as He was man, according to Jn. 8:55: “I do know Him, and do keep His word.” Therefore in Christ there was the knowledge of the blessed.

I answer that, What is in potentiality is reduced to act by what is in act; for that whereby things are heated must itself be hot. Now man is in potentiality to the knowledge of the blessed, which consists in the vision of God; and is ordained to it as to an end; since the rational creature is capable of that blessed knowledge, inasmuch as he is made in the image of God. Now men are brought to this end of beatitude by the humanity of Christ, according to Heb. 2:10: “For it became Him, for Whom are all things, and by Whom are all things, Who had brought many children unto glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His passion.” And hence it was necessary that the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, should belong to Christ pre-eminently, since the cause ought always to be more efficacious than the effect.

Reply to Objection 1: The Godhead is united to the manhood of Christ in Person, not in essence or nature; yet with the unity of Person remains the distinction of natures. And therefore the soul of Christ, which is a part of human nature, through a light participated from the Divine Nature, is perfected with the beatific knowledge whereby it sees God in essence.

Reply to Objection 2: By the union this Man is blessed with the uncreated beatitude, even as by the union He is God; yet besides the uncreated beatitude it was necessary that there should be in the human nature of Christ a created beatitude, whereby His soul was established in the last end of human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The beatific vision and knowledge are to some extent above the nature of the rational soul, inasmuch as it cannot reach it of its own strength; but in another way it is in accordance with its nature, inasmuch as it is capable of it by nature, having been made to the likeness of God, as stated above. But the uncreated knowledge is in every way above the nature of the human soul.

Whether Christ had an imprinted or infused knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was not in Christ another infused knowledge besides the beatific knowledge. For all other knowledge compared to the beatific knowledge is like imperfect to perfect. But imperfect knowledge is removed by the presence of perfect knowledge, as the clear “face-to-face” vision removes the enigmatical vision of faith, as is plain from 1 Cor. 13:10,12. Since, therefore, in Christ there was the beatific knowledge, as stated above [3968](A[2]), it would seem that there could not be any other imprinted knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, an imperfect mode of cognition disposes towards a more perfect, as opinion, the result of dialectical syllogisms, disposes towards science, which results from demonstrative syllogisms. Now, when perfection is reached, there is no further need of the disposition, even as on reaching the end motion is no longer necessary. Hence, since every created cognition is compared to beatific cognition, as imperfect to perfect and as disposition to its term, it seems that since Christ had beatific knowledge, it was not necessary for Him to have any other knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, as corporeal matter is in potentiality to sensible forms, so the possible intellect is in potentiality to intelligible forms. Now corporeal matter cannot receive two forms at once! one more perfect and the other less perfect. Therefore neither can the soul receive a double knowledge at once, one more perfect and the other less perfect; and hence the same conclusion as above.

On the contrary, It is written (Col. 2:3) that in Christ “are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.”

I answer that, As stated above [3969](A[1]), it was fitting that the human nature assumed by the Word of God should not be imperfect. Now everything in potentiality is imperfect unless it be reduced to act. But the passive intellect of man is in potentiality to all intelligible things. and it is reduced to act by intelligible species, which are its completive forms, as is plain from what is said De Anima iii, 32,38. And hence we must admit in the soul of Christ an infused knowledge, inasmuch as the Word of God imprinted upon the soul of Christ, which is personally united to Him, intelligible species of all things to which the possible intellect is in potentiality; even as in the beginning of the creation of things, the Word of God imprinted intelligible species upon the angelic mind, as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). And therefore, even as in the angels, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24,30), there is a double knowledge—one the morning knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word; the other the evening knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures by infused species; so likewise, besides the Divine and uncreated knowledge in Christ, there is in His soul a beatific knowledge, whereby He knows the Word, and things in the Word; and an infused or imprinted knowledge, whereby He knows things in their proper nature by intelligible species proportioned to the human mind.

Reply to Objection 1: The imperfect vision of faith is essentially opposed to manifest vision, seeing that it is of the essence of faith to have reference to the unseen, as was said above ([3970]SS, Q[1], A[4]). But cognition by infused species includes no opposition to beatific cognition. Therefore there is no parity.

Reply to Objection 2: Disposition is referred to perfection in two ways: first, as a way leading to perfection; secondly, as an effect proceeding from perfection; thus matter is disposed by heat to receive the form of fire, and, when this comes, the heat does not cease, but remains as an effect of this form. So, too, opinion caused by a dialectical syllogism is a way to knowledge, which is acquired by demonstration, yet, when this has been acquired, there may still remain the knowledge gained by the dialectical syllogism, following, so to say, the demonstrative knowledge, which is based on the cause, since he who knows the cause is thereby enabled the better to understand the probable signs from which dialectical syllogisms proceed. So likewise in Christ, together with the beatific knowledge, there still remains infused knowledge, not as a way to beatitude, but as strengthened by beatitude.

Reply to Objection 3: The beatific knowledge is not by a species, that is a similitude of the Divine Essence, or of whatever is known in the Divine Essence, as is plain from what has been said in the [3971]FP, Q[12], A[2]; but it is a knowledge of the Divine Essence immediately, inasmuch as the Divine Essence itself is united to the beatified mind as an intelligible to an intelligent being; and the Divine Essence is a form exceeding the capacity of any creature whatsoever. Hence, together with this super-exceeding form, there is nothing to hinder from being in the rational mind, intelligible species, proportioned to its nature.

Whether Christ had any acquired knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no empiric and acquired knowledge. For whatever befitted Christ, He had most perfectly. Now Christ did not possess acquired knowledge most perfectly, since He did not devote Himself to the study of letters, by which knowledge is acquired in its perfection; for it is said (Jn. 7:15): “The Jews wondered, saying: How doth this Man know letters, having never learned?” Therefore it seems that in Christ there was no acquired knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, nothing can be added to what is full. But the power of Christ’s soul was filled with intelligible species divinely infused, as was said above (A. 3). Therefore no acquired species could accrue to His soul.

Objection 3: Further, he who already has the habit of knowledge, acquires no new habit, through what he receives from the senses (otherwise two forms of the same species would be in the same thing together); but the habit which previously existed is strengthened and increased. Therefore, since Christ had the habit of infused knowledge, it does not seem that He acquired a new knowledge through what He perceived by the senses.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:8): “Whereas . . . He was the Son of God, He learned obedience by the things which He suffered,” i.e. “experienced,” says a gloss. Therefore there was in the soul of Christ an empiric knowledge, which is acquired knowledge.

I answer that, As is plain from A[1], nothing that God planted in our nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but an active intellect. Hence it is necessary to say that in the soul of Christ there was not merely a passive, but also an active intellect. But if in other things God and nature make nothing in vain, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 31; ii, 59), still less in the soul of Christ is there anything in vain. Now what has not its proper operation is useless, as is said in De Coel. ii, 17. Now the proper operation of the active intellect is to make intelligible species in act, by abstracting them from phantasms; hence, it is said (De Anima iii, 18) that the active intellect is that “whereby everything is made actual.” And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active intellect—which means that there was acquired knowledge in Him, which some call empiric. And hence, although I wrote differently (Sent. iii, D, xiv, A[3]; D, xviii, A[3]), it must be said that in Christ there was acquired knowledge, which is properly knowledge in a human fashion, both as regards the subject receiving and as regards the active cause. For such knowledge springs from Christ’s active intellect, which is natural to the human soul. But infused knowledge is attributed to the soul, on account of a light infused from on high, and this manner of knowing is proportioned to the angelic nature. But the beatific knowledge, whereby the very Essence of God is seen, is proper and natural to God alone, as was said in the [3972]FP, Q[12], A[4].

Reply to Objection 1: Since there is a twofold way of acquiring knowledge—by discovery and by being taught—the way of discovery is the higher, and the way of being taught is secondary. Hence it is said (Ethic. i, 4): “He indeed is the best who knows everything by himself: yet he is good who obeys him that speaks aright.” And hence it was more fitting for Christ to possess a knowledge acquired by discovery than by being taught, especially since He was given to be the Teacher of all, according to Joel 2:23: “Be joyful in the Lord your God, because He hath given you a Teacher of justice.”

Reply to Objection 2: The human mind has two relations—one to higher things, and in this respect the soul of Christ was full of the infused knowledge. The other relation is to lower things, i.e. to phantasms, which naturally move the human mind by virtue of the active intellect. Now it was necessary that even in this respect the soul of Christ should be filled with knowledge, not that the first fulness was insufficient for the human mind in itself, but that it behooved it to be also perfected with regard to phantasms.

Reply to Objection 3: Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed together; for the habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the human mind to phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot be again acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different nature, as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from phantasms. And hence there is no parity between these habits.

OF THE BEATIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

Now we must consider each of the aforesaid knowledges. Since, however, we have treated of the Divine knowledge in the FP, Q[14], it now remains to speak of the three others: (1) of the beatific knowledge; (2) of the infused knowledge; (3) of the acquired knowledge.

But again, because much has been said in the FP, Q[12], of the beatific knowledge, which consists in the vision of God, we shall speak here only of such things as belong properly to the soul of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?

(2) Whether it knew all things in the Word?

(3) Whether the soul of Christ knew the infinite in the Word?

(4) Whether it saw the Word or the Divine Essence clearer than did any other creature?

Whether the soul of Christ comprehended the Word or the Divine Essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended and comprehends the Word or Divine Essence. For Isidore says (De Summo Bono i, 3) that “the Trinity is known only to Itself and to the Man assumed.” Therefore the Man assumed communicates with the Holy Trinity in that knowledge of Itself which is proper to the Trinity. Now this is the knowledge of comprehension. Therefore the soul of Christ comprehends the Divine Essence.

Objection 2: Further, to be united to God in personal being is greater than to be united by vision. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), “the whole Godhead in one Person is united to the human nature in Christ.” Therefore much more is the whole Divine Nature seen by the soul of Christ; and hence it would seem that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence.

Objection 3: Further, what belongs by nature to the Son of God belongs by grace to the Son of Man, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13). But to comprehend the Divine Essence belongs by nature to the Son of God.

Therefore it belongs by grace to the Son of Man; and thus it seems that the soul of Christ comprehended the Divine Essence by grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 14): “Whatsoever comprehends itself is finite to itself.” But the Divine Essence is not finite with respect to the soul of Christ, since It infinitely exceeds it. Therefore the soul of Christ does not comprehend the Word.

I answer that, As is plain from Q[2], AA[1],6, the union of the two natures in the Person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused, i.e. “the uncreated remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the creature,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3,4). Now it is impossible for any creature to comprehend the Divine Essence, as was shown in the [3973]FP, Q[12], AA[1],4,7, seeing that the infinite is not comprehended by the finite. And hence it must be said that the soul of Christ nowise comprehends the Divine Essence.

Reply to Objection 1: The Man assumed is reckoned with the Divine Trinity in the knowledge of Itself, not indeed as regards comprehension, but by reason of a certain most excellent knowledge above the rest of creatures.

Reply to Objection 2: Not even in the union by personal being does the human nature comprehend the Word of God or the Divine Nature, for although it was wholly united to the human nature in the one Person of the Son, yet the whole power of the Godhead was not circumscribed by the human nature. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): “I would have you know that it is not the Christian doctrine that God was united to flesh in such a manner as to quit or lose the care of the world’s government, neither did Ne narrow or reduce it when He transferred it to that little body.” So likewise the soul of Christ sees the whole Essence of God, yet does not comprehend It; since it does not see It totally, i.e. not as perfectly as It is knowable, as was said in the [3974]FP, Q[12], A[7].

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Augustine is to be understood of the grace of union, by reason of which all that is said of the Son of God in His Divine Nature is also said of the Son of Man on account of the identity of suppositum. And in this way it may be said that the Son of Man is a comprehensor of the Divine Essence, not indeed by His soul, but in His Divine Nature; even as we may also say that the Son of Man is the Creator.

Objection 2: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word. For it is written (Mk. 13:32): “But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven nor the Son, but the Father.” Therefore He does not know all things in the Word.

Objection 2: Further, the more perfectly anyone knows a principle the more he knows in the principle. But God sees His Essence more perfectly than the soul of Christ does. Therefore He knows more than the soul of Christ knows in the Word. Therefore the soul of Christ does not know all things in the Word.

Objection 3: Further, the extent depends on the number of things known. If, therefore, the soul of Christ knew in the Word all that the Word knows, it would follow that the knowledge of the soul of Christ would equal the Divine knowledge, i.e. the created would equal the uncreated, which is impossible.

On the contrary, on Apoc. 5:12, “The Lamb that was slain is worthy to receive . . . divinity and wisdom,” a gloss says, i.e. “the knowledge of all things.”

I answer that, When it is inquired whether Christ knows all things in the Word, “all things” may be taken in two ways: First, properly, to stand for all that in any way whatsoever is, will be, or was done, said, or thought, by whomsoever and at any time. And in this way it must be said that the soul of Christ knows all things in the Word. For every created intellect knows in the Word, not all simply, but so many more things the more perfectly it sees the Word. Yet no beatified intellect fails to know in the Word whatever pertains to itself. Now to Christ and to His dignity all things to some extent belong, inasmuch as all things are subject to Him. Moreover, He has been appointed Judge of all by God, “because He is the Son of Man,” as is said Jn. 5:27; and therefore the soul of Christ knows in the Word all things existing in whatever time, and the thoughts of men, of which He is the Judge, so that what is said of Him (Jn. 2:25), “For He knew what was in man,” can be understood not merely of the Divine knowledge, but also of His soul’s knowledge, which it had in the Word. Secondly, “all things” may be taken widely, as extending not merely to such things as are in act at some time, but even to such things as are in potentiality, and never have been nor ever will be reduced to act. Now some of these are in the Divine power alone, and not all of these does the soul of Christ know in the Word. For this would be to comprehend all that God could do, which would be to comprehend the Divine power, and, consequently, the Divine Essence. For every power is known from the knowledge of all it can do. Some, however, are not only in the power of God, but also in the power of the creature; and all of these the soul of Christ knows in the Word; for it comprehends in the Word the essence of every creature, and, consequently, its power and virtue, and all things that are in the power of the creature.

Reply to Objection 1: Arius and Eunomius understood this saying, not of the knowledge of the soul, which they did not hold to be in Christ, as was said above ([3975]Q[9], A[1]), but of the Divine knowledge of the Son, Whom they held to be less than the Father as regards knowledge. But this will not stand, since all things were made by the Word of God, as is said Jn. 1:3, and, amongst other things, all times were made by Him. Now He is not ignorant of anything that was made by Him.

He is said, therefore, not to know the day and the hour of the Judgment, for that He does not make it known, since, on being asked by the apostles (Acts 1:7), He was unwilling to reveal it; and, on the contrary, we read (Gn. 22:12): “Now I know that thou fearest God,” i.e. “Now I have made thee know.” But the Father is said to know, because He imparted this knowledge to the Son. Hence, by saying but the Father, we are given to understand that the Son knows, not merely in the Divine Nature, but also in the human, because, as Chrysostom argues (Hom. lxxviii in Matth.), if it is given to Christ as man to know how to judge—which is greater—much more is it given to Him to know the less, viz. the time of Judgment. Origen, however (in Matth. Tract. xxx), expounds it of His body, which is the Church, which is ignorant of this time. Lastly, some say this is to be understood of the adoptive, and not of the natural Son of God.

Reply to Objection 2: God knows His Essence so much the more perfectly than the soul of Christ, as He comprehends it. And hence He knows all things, not merely whatever are in act at any time, which things He is said to know by knowledge of vision, but also what ever He Himself can do, which He is said to know by simple intelligence, as was shown in the [3976]FP, Q[14], A[9]. Therefore the soul of Christ knows all things that God knows in Himself by the knowledge of vision, but not all that God knows in Himself by knowledge of simple intelligence; and thus in Himself God knows many more things than the soul of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: The extent of knowledge depends not merely on the number of knowable things, but also on the clearness of the knowledge. Therefore, although the knowledge of the soul of Christ which He has in the Word is equal to the knowledge of vision as regards the number of things known, nevertheless the knowledge of God infinitely exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ in clearness of cognition, since the uncreated light of the Divine intellect infinitely exceeds any created light received by the soul of Christ; although, absolutely speaking, the Divine knowledge exceeds the knowledge of the soul of Christ, not only as regards the mode of knowing, but also as regards the number of things known, as was stated above.

Whether the soul of Christ can know the infinite in the Word?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite in the Word. For that the infinite should be known is repugnant to the definition of the infinite which (Phys. iii, 63) is said to be that “from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken.” But it is impossible for the definition to be separated from the thing defined, since this would mean that contradictories exist together. Therefore it is impossible that the soul of Christ knows the infinite.

Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of the infinite is infinite. But the knowledge of the soul of Christ cannot be infinite, because its capacity is finite, since it is created. Therefore the soul of Christ cannot know the infinite.

Objection 3: Further, there can be nothing greater than the infinite. But more is contained in the Divine knowledge, absolutely speaking, than in the knowledge of Christ’s soul, as stated above [3977](A[2]). Therefore the soul of Christ does not know the infinite.

On the contrary, The soul of Christ knows all its power and all it can do. Now it can cleanse infinite sins, according to 1 Jn. 2:2: “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.” Therefore the soul of Christ knows the infinite.

I answer that, Knowledge regards only being, since being and truth are convertible. Now a thing is said to be a being in two ways: First, simply, i.e. whatever is a being in act; secondly, relatively, i.e. whatever is a being in potentiality. And because, as is said Metaph. ix, 20, everything is known as it is in act, and not as it is in potentiality, knowledge primarily and essentially regards being in act, and secondarily regards being in potentiality, which is not knowable of itself, but inasmuch as that in whose power it exists is known. Hence, with regard to the first mode of knowledge, the soul of Christ does not know the infinite. Because there is not an infinite number in act, even though we were to reckon all that are in act at any time whatsoever, since the state of generation and corruption will not last for ever: consequently there is a certain number not only of things lacking generation and corruption, but also of things capable of generation and corruption. But with regard to the other mode of knowing, the soul of Christ knows infinite things in the Word, for it knows, as stated above [3978](A[2]), all that is in the power of the creature. Hence, since in the power of the creature there is an infinite number of things, it knows the infinite, as it were, by a certain knowledge of simple intelligence, and not by a knowledge of vision.

Reply to Objection 1: As we said in the [3979]FP, Q[8], A[1], the infinite is taken in two ways. First, on the part of a form, and thus we have the negatively infinite, i.e. a form or act not limited by being received into matter or a subject; and this infinite of itself is most knowable on account of the perfection of the act, although it is not comprehensible by the finite power of the creature; for thus God is said to be infinite. And this infinite the soul of Christ knows, yet does not comprehend. Secondly, there is the infinite as regards matter, which is taken privatively, i.e. inasmuch as it has not the form it ought naturally to have, and in this way we have infinite in quantity. Now such an infinite of itself, is unknown: inasmuch as it is, as it were, matter with privation of form as is said Phys. iii, 65. But all knowledge is by form or act. Therefore if this infinite is to be known according to its mode of being, it cannot be known. For its mode is that part be taken after part, as is said Phys. iii, 62,63. And in this way it is true that, if we take something from it, i.e. taking part after part, there always remains something to be taken. But as material things can be received by the intellect immaterially, and many things unitedly, so can infinite things be received by the intellect, not after the manner of infinite, but finitely; and thus what are in themselves infinite are, in the intellect of the knower, finite. And in this way the soul of Christ knows an infinite number of things, inasmuch as it knows them not by discoursing from one to another, but in a certain unity, i.e. in any creature in whose potentiality infinite things exist, and principally in the Word Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: There is nothing to hinder a thing from being infinite in one way and finite in another, as when in quantities we imagine a surface infinite in length and finite in breadth. Hence, if there were an infinite number of men, they would have a relative infinity, i.e. in multitude; but, as regards the essence, they would be finite, since the essence of all would be limited to one specific nature. But what is simply infinite in its essence is God, as was said in the [3980]FP, Q[7], A[2]. Now the proper object of the intellect is “what a thing is,” as is said De Anima iii, 26, to which pertains the notion of the species. And thus the soul of Christ, since it has a finite capacity, attains to, but does not comprehend, what is simply infinite in essence, as stated above (A[1]). But the infinite in potentiality which is in creatures can be comprehended by the soul of Christ, since it is compared to that soul according to its essence, in which respect it is not infinite. For even our intellect understands a universal—for example, the nature of a genus or species, which in a manner has infinity, inasmuch as it can be predicated of an infinite number.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is infinite in every way can be but one. Hence the Philosopher says (De Coel. i, 2,3,) that, since bodies have dimensions in every part, there cannot be several infinite bodies. Yet if anything were infinite in one way only, nothing would hinder the existence of several such infinite things; as if we were to suppose several lines of infinite length drawn on a surface of finite breadth. Hence, because infinitude is not a substance, but is accidental to things that are said to be infinite, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, 37,38); as the infinite is multiplied by different subjects, so, too, a property of the infinite must be multiplied, in such a way that it belongs to each of them according to that particular subject. Now it is a property of the infinite that nothing is greater than it. Hence, if we take one infinite line, there is nothing greater in it than the infinite; so, too, if we take any one of other infinite lines, it is plain that each has infinite parts. Therefore of necessity in this particular line there is nothing greater than all these infinite parts; yet in another or a third line there will be more infinite parts besides these. We observe this in numbers also, for the species of even numbers are infinite, and likewise the species of odd numbers are infinite; yet there are more even and odd numbers than even. And thus it must be said that nothing is greater than the simply and in every way infinite; but than the infinite which is limited in some respect, nothing is greater in that order; yet we may suppose something greater outside that order. In this way, therefore, there are infinite things in the potentiality of the creature, and yet there are more in the power of God than in the potentiality of the creature. So, too, the soul of Christ knows infinite things by the knowledge of simple intelligence; yet God knows more by this manner of knowledge or understanding.

Whether the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more clearly than does any other creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than does any other creature. For the perfection of knowledge depends upon the medium of knowing; as the knowledge we have by means of a demonstrative syllogism is more perfect than that which we have by means of a probable syllogism. But all the blessed see the Word immediately in the Divine Essence Itself, as was said in the [3981]FP, Q[12], A[2]. Therefore the soul of Christ does not see the Word more perfectly than any other creature.

Objection 2: Further, the perfection of vision does not exceed the power of seeing. But the rational power of a soul such as is the soul of Christ is below the intellective power of an angel, as is plain from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the soul of Christ did not see the Word more perfectly than the angels.

Objection 3: Further, God sees His Word infinitely more perfectly than does the soul of Christ. Hence there are infinite possible mediate degrees between the manner in which God sees His Word, and the manner in which the soul of Christ sees the Word. Therefore we cannot assert that the soul of Christ sees the Word or the Divine Essence more perfectly than does every other creature.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that God set Christ “on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion and every name that is named not only in this world, but also in that which is to come.” But in that heavenly glory the higher anyone is the more perfectly does he know God. Therefore the soul of Christ sees God more perfectly than does any other creature.

I answer that, The vision of the Divine Essence is granted to all the blessed by a partaking of the Divine light which is shed upon them from the fountain of the Word of God, according to Ecclus. 1:5: “The Word of God on high is the fountain of Wisdom.” Now the soul of Christ, since it is united to the Word in person, is more closely joined to the Word of God than any other creature. Hence it more fully receives the light in which God is seen by the Word Himself than any other creature. And therefore more perfectly than the rest of creatures it sees the First Truth itself, which is the Essence of God; hence it is written (Jn. 1:14): “And we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father,” “full” not only of “grace” but also of “truth.”

Reply to Objection 1: Perfection of knowledge, on the part of the thing known, depends on the medium; but as regards the knower, it depends on the power or habit. And hence it is that even amongst men one sees a conclusion in a medium more perfectly than another does. And in this way the soul of Christ, which is filled with a more abundant light, knows the Divine Essence more perfectly than do the other blessed, although all see the Divine Essence in itself.

Reply to Objection 2: The vision of the Divine Essence exceeds the natural power of any creature, as was said in the [3982]FP, Q[12], A[4]. And hence the degrees thereof depend rather on the order of grace in which Christ is supreme, than on the order of nature, in which the angelic nature is placed before the human.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3983]Q[7], A[12]), there cannot be a greater grace than the grace of Christ with respect to the union with the Word; and the same is to be said of the perfection of the Divine vision; although, absolutely speaking, there could be a higher and more sublime degree by the infinity of the Divine power.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE IMPRINTED OR INFUSED IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the knowledge imprinted or infused in the soul of Christ, and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ knows all things by this knowledge?

(2) Whether He could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?

(3) Whether this knowledge was collative?

(4) Of the comparison of this knowledge with the angelic knowledge;

(5) Whether it was a habitual knowledge?

(6) Whether it was distinguished by various habits?

Whether by this imprinted or infused knowledge Christ knew all things?

Objection 1: It would seem that by this knowledge Christ did not know all things. For this knowledge is imprinted upon Christ for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul does not seem to be in potentiality to all things simply, but only to those things with regard to which it can be reduced to act by the active intellect, which is its proper motor; and these are knowable by natural reason. Therefore by this knowledge Christ did not know what exceeded the natural reason.

Objection 2: Further, phantasms are to the human intellect as colors to sight, as is said De Anima iii, 18,31,39. But it does not pertain to the perfection of the power of seeing to know what is without color. Therefore it does not pertain to the perfection of human intellect to know things of which there are no phantasms, such as separate substances. Hence, since this knowledge was in Christ for the perfection of His intellective soul, it seems that by this knowledge He did not know separate substances.

Objection 3: Further, it does not belong to the perfection of the intellect to know singulars. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know singulars.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:2) that “the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, of knowledge and counsel shall fill Him [*Vulg.: ‘The Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon Him, the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel . . . the Spirit of knowledge . . . ‘; cf. Ecclus. 15:5],” under which are included all that may be known; for the knowledge of all Divine things belongs to wisdom, the knowledge of all immaterial things to understanding, the knowledge of all conclusions to knowledge [scientia], the knowledge of all practical things to counsel. Hence it would seem that by this knowledge Christ had the knowledge of all things.

I answer that, As was said above ([3984]Q[9], A[1]), it was fitting that the soul of Christ should be wholly perfected by having each of its powers reduced to act. Now it must be borne in mind that in the human soul, as in every creature, there is a double passive power: one in comparison with a natural agent; the other in comparison with the first agent, which can reduce any creature to a higher act than a natural agent can reduce it, and this is usually called the obediential power of a creature. Now both powers of Christ’s soul were reduced to act by this divinely imprinted knowledge. And hence, by it the soul of Christ knew: First, whatever can be known by force of a man’s active intellect, e.g. whatever pertains to human sciences; secondly, by this knowledge Christ knew all things made known to man by Divine revelation, whether they belong to the gift of wisdom or the gift of prophecy, or any other gift of the Holy Ghost; since the soul of Christ knew these things more fully and completely than others. Yet He did not know the Essence of God by this knowledge, but by the first alone, of which we spoke above ([3985]Q[10]).

Reply to Objection 1: This reason refers to the natural power of an intellective soul in comparison with its natural agent, which is the active intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: The human soul in the state of this life, since it is somewhat fettered by the body, so as to be unable to understand without phantasms, cannot understand separate substances. But after the state of this life the separated soul will be able, in a measure, to know separate substances by itself, as was said in the [3986]FP, Q[89], AA[1],2, and this is especially clear as regards the souls of the blessed. Now before His Passion, Christ was not merely a wayfarer but also a comprehensor; hence His soul could know separate substances in the same way that a separated soul could.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge of singulars pertains to the perfection of the intellective soul, not in speculative knowledge, but in practical knowledge, which is imperfect without the knowledge of singulars, in which operations exist, as is said Ethic. vi, 7. Hence for prudence are required the remembrance of past things, knowledge of present things, and foresight of future things, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, since Christ had the fulness of prudence by the gift of counsel, He consequently knew all singular things—present, past, and future.

Whether Christ could use this knowledge by turning to phantasms?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ could not understand by this knowledge except by turning to phantasms, because, as is stated De Anima iii, 18,31,39, phantasms are compared to man's intellective soul as colors to sight. But Christ's power of seeing could not become actual save by turning to colors. Therefore His intellective soul could understand nothing except by turning to phantasms.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul is of the same nature as ours. otherwise He would not be of the same species as we, contrary to what the Apostle says (Phil. 2:7) " . . . being made in the likeness of men." But our soul cannot understand except by turning to phantasms. Hence, neither can Christ's soul otherwise understand.

Objection 3: Further, senses are given to man to help his intellect. Hence, if the soul of Christ could understand without turning to phantasms, which arise in the senses, it would follow that in the soul of Christ the senses were useless, which is not fitting. Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ can only understand by turning to phantasms.

On the contrary, The soul of Christ knew certain things which could not be known by the senses, viz. separate substances. Therefore it could understand without turning to phantasms.

I answer that, In the state before His Passion Christ was at the same time a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as will be more clearly shown ([3987]Q[15], A[10]). Especially had He the conditions of a wayfarer on the part of the body, which was passible; but the conditions of a comprehensor He had chiefly on the part of the soul. Now this is the condition of the soul of a comprehensor, viz. that it is nowise subject to its body, or dependent upon it, but wholly dominates it. Hence after the resurrection glory will flow from the soul to the body. But the soul of man on earth needs to turn to phantasms, because it is fettered by the body and in a measure subject to and dependent upon it. And hence the blessed both before and after the resurrection can understand without turning to phantasms. And this must be said of the soul of Christ, which had fully the capabilities of a comprehensor.

Reply to Objection 1: This likeness which the Philosopher asserts is not with regard to everything. For it is manifest that the end of the power of seeing is to know colors; but the end of the intellective power is not to know phantasms, but to know intelligible species, which it apprehends from and in phantasms, according to the state of the present life. Therefore there is a likeness in respect of what both powers regard, but not in respect of that in which the condition of both powers is terminated. Now nothing prevents a thing in different states from reaching its end by different ways: albeit there is never but one proper end of a thing. Hence, although the sight knows nothing without color; nevertheless in a certain state the intellect can know without phantasms, but not without intelligible species.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul of Christ was of the same nature as our souls, yet it had a state which our souls have not yet in fact, but only in hope, i.e. the state of comprehension.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the soul of Christ could understand without turning to phantasms, yet it could also understand by turning to phantasms. Hence the senses were not useless in it; especially as the senses are not afforded to man solely for intellectual knowledge, but for the need of animal life.

Whether this knowledge is collative?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not this knowledge by way of comparison. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): “We do not uphold counsel or choice in Christ.” Now these things are withheld from Christ only inasmuch as they imply comparison and discursion. Therefore it seems that there was no collative or discursive knowledge in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, man needs comparison and discursion of reason in order to find out the unknown. But the soul of Christ knew everything, as was said above ([3988]Q[10], A[2]). Hence there was no discursive or collative knowledge in Him.

Objection 3: Further, the knowledge in Christ’s soul was like that of comprehensors, who are likened to the angels, according to Mat. 22:30. Now there is no collative or discursive knowledge in the angels, as Dionysius shows (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore there was no discursive or collative knowledge in the soul of Christ.

On the contrary, Christ had a rational soul, as was shown ([3989]Q[5], A[4]). Now the proper operation of a rational soul consists in comparison and discursion from one thing to another. Therefore there was collative and discursive knowledge in Christ.

I answer that, Knowledge may be discursive or collative in two ways. First, in the acquisition of the knowledge, as happens to us, who proceed from one thing to the knowledge of another, as from causes to effects, and conversely. And in this way the knowledge in Christ’s soul was not discursive or collative, since this knowledge which we are now considering was divinely infused, and not acquired by a process of reasoning. Secondly, knowledge may be called discursive or collative in use; as at times those who know, reason from cause to effect, not in order to learn anew, but wishing to use the knowledge they have. And in this way the knowledge in Christ’s soul could be collative or discursive; since it could conclude one thing from another, as it pleased, as in Mat. 17:24,25, when our Lord asked Peter: “Of whom do the kings of the earth receive tribute, of their own children, or of strangers?” On Peter replying: “Of strangers,” He concluded: “Then the children are free.”

Reply to Objection 1: From Christ is excluded that counsel which is with doubt; and consequently choice, which essentially includes such counsel; but the practice of using counsel is not excluded from Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: This reason rests upon discursion and comparison, as used to acquire knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: The blessed are likened to the angels in the gifts of graces; yet there still remains the difference of natures. And hence to use comparison and discursion is connatural to the souls of the blessed, but not to angels.

Whether in Christ this knowledge was greater than the knowledge of the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that this knowledge was not greater in Christ than in the angels. For perfection is proportioned to the thing perfected. But the human soul in the order of nature is below the angelic nature. Therefore since the knowledge we are now speaking of is imprinted upon Christ's soul for its perfection, it seems that this knowledge is less than the knowledge by which the angelic nature is perfected.

Objection 2: Further, the knowledge of Christ's soul was in a measure comparative and discursive, which cannot be said of the angelic knowledge. Therefore the knowledge of Christ's soul was less than the knowledge of the angels.

Objection 3: Further, the more immaterial knowledge is, the greater it is. But the knowledge of the angels is more immaterial than the knowledge of Christ's soul, since the soul of Christ is the act of a body, and turns to phantasms, which cannot be said of the angels. Therefore the knowledge of angels is greater than the knowledge of Christ's soul.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): "For we see Jesus, Who was made a little lower than the angels, for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor"; from which it is plain that Christ is said to be lower than the angels only in regard to the suffering of death. And hence, not in knowledge.

I answer that, The knowledge imprinted on Christ's soul may be looked at in two ways: First, as regards what it has from the inflowing cause; secondly, as regards what it has from the subject receiving it. Now with regard to the first, the knowledge imprinted upon the soul of Christ was more excellent than the knowledge of the angels, both in the number of things known and in the certainty of the knowledge; since the spiritual light, which is imprinted on the soul of Christ, is much more excellent than the light which pertains to the angelic nature. But as regards the second, the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ is less than the angelic knowledge, in the manner of knowing that is natural to the human soul, i.e. by turning to phantasms, and by comparison and discursion.

And hereby the reply to the objections is made clear.

Whether this knowledge was habitual?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no habitual knowledge. For it has been said ([3990]Q[9], A[1]) that the highest perfection of knowledge befitted Christ's soul. But the perfection of an actually existing knowledge is greater than that of a potentially or habitually existing knowledge. Therefore it was fitting for Him to know all things actually. Therefore He had not habitual knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, since habits are ordained to acts, a habitual knowledge which is never reduced to act would seem useless. Now, since Christ knew all things, as was said[3991] Q[10], A[2], He could not have considered all things actually, thinking over one after another, since the infinite cannot be passed over by enumeration. Therefore the habitual knowledge of certain things would have been useless to Him—which is unfitting. Therefore He had an actual and not a habitual knowledge of what He knew.

Objection 3: Further, habitual knowledge is a perfection of the knower. But perfection is more noble than the thing perfected. If, therefore, in the soul of Christ there was any created habit of knowledge, it would follow that this created thing was nobler than the soul of Christ. Therefore there was no habitual knowledge in Christ's soul.

On the contrary, The knowledge of Christ we are now speaking about was univocal with our knowledge, even as His soul was of the same species as ours. But our knowledge is in the genus of habit. Therefore the knowledge of Christ was habitual.

I answer that, As stated above [3992](A[4]), the mode of the knowledge impressed on the soul of Christ befitted the subject receiving it. For the received is in the recipient after the mode of the recipient. Now the connatural mode of the human soul is that it should understand sometimes actually, and sometimes potentially. But the medium between a pure power and a completed act is a habit: and extremes and medium are of the same genus. Thus it is plain that it is the connatural mode of the human soul to receive knowledge as a habit. Hence it must be said that the knowledge imprinted on the soul of Christ was habitual, for He could use it when He pleased.

Reply to Objection 1: In Christ's soul there was a twofold knowledge—each most perfect of its kind: the first exceeding the mode of human nature, as by it He saw the Essence of God, and other things in It, and this was the most perfect, simply. Nor was this knowledge habitual, but actual with respect to everything He knew in this way. But the second knowledge was in Christ in a manner proportioned to human nature, i.e. inasmuch as He knew things by species divinely imprinted upon Him, and of this knowledge we are now speaking. Now this knowledge was not most perfect, simply, but merely in the genus of human knowledge; hence it did not behoove it to be always in act.

Reply to Objection 2: Habits are reduced to act by the command of the will, since a habit is that “with which we act when we wish.” Now the will is indeterminate in regard to infinite things. Yet it is not useless, even when it does not actually tend to all; provided it actually tends to everything in fitting place and time. And hence neither is a habit useless, even if all that it extends to is not reduced to act; provided that that which befits the due end of the will be reduced to act according as the matter in hand and the time require.

Reply to Objection 3: Goodness and being are taken in two ways: First, simply; and thus a substance, which subsists in its being and goodness, is a good and a being; secondly, being and goodness are taken relatively, and in this way an accident is a being and a good, not that it has being and goodness, but that its subject is a being and a good. And hence habitual knowledge is not simply better or more excellent than the soul of Christ; but relatively, since the whole goodness of habitual knowledge is added to the goodness of the subject.

Whether this knowledge was distinguished by divers habits?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the soul of Christ there was only one habit of knowledge. For the more perfect knowledge is, the more united it is; hence the higher angels understand by the more universal forms, as was said in the [3993]FP, Q[55], A[3]. Now Christ’s knowledge was most perfect. Therefore it was most one. Therefore it was not distinguished by several habits.

Objection 2: Further, our faith is derived from Christ’s knowledge; hence it is written (Heb. 12:2): “Looking on Jesus the author and finisher of faith.” But there is only one habit of faith about all things believed, as was said in the [3994]SS, Q[4], A[6]. Much more, therefore, was there only one habit of knowledge in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, knowledge is distinguished by the divers formalities of knowable things. But the soul of Christ knew everything under one formality, i.e. by a divinely infused light. Therefore in Christ there was only one habit of knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (Zech. 3:9) that on “one” stone, i.e. Christ, “there are seven eyes.” Now by the eye is understood knowledge. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were several habits of knowledge.

I answer that, As stated above ([3995]AA[4],5), the knowledge imprinted on Christ’s soul has a mode connatural to a human soul. Now it is connatural to a human soul to receive species of a lesser universality than the angels receive; so that it knows different specific natures by different intelligible species. But it so happens that we have different habits of knowledge, because there are different classes of knowable things, inasmuch as what are in one genus are known by one habit; thus it is said (Poster. i, 42) that “one science is of one class of object.” And hence the knowledge imprinted on Christ’s soul was distinguished by different habits.

Reply to Objection 1: As was said [3996](A[4]), the knowledge of Christ’s soul is most perfect, and exceeds the knowledge of angels with regard to what is in it on the part of God’s gift; but it is below the angelic knowledge as regards the mode of the recipient. And it pertains to this mode that this knowledge is distinguished by various habits, inasmuch as it regards more particular species.

Reply to Objection 2: Our faith rests upon the First Truth; and hence Christ is the author of our faith by the Divine knowledge, which is simply one.

Reply to Objection 3: The divinely infused light is the common formality for understanding what is divinely revealed, as the light of the active intellect is with regard to what is naturally known. Hence, in the soul of Christ there must be the proper species of singular things, in order to know each with proper knowledge; and in this way there must be divers habits of knowledge in Christ’s soul, as stated above.

OF THE ACQUIRED OR EMPIRIC KNOWLEDGE OF CHRIST’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the acquired or empiric knowledge of Christ’s soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ knew all things by this knowledge?

(2) Whether He advanced in this knowledge?

(3) Whether He learned anything from man?

(4) Whether He received anything from angels?

Whether Christ knew all things by this acquired or empiric knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not know everything by this knowledge. For this knowledge is acquired by experience. But Christ did not experience everything. Therefore He did not know everything by this knowledge.

Objection 2: Further, man acquires knowledge through the senses. But not all sensible things were subjected to Christ’s bodily senses. Therefore Christ did not know everything by this knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, the extent of knowledge depends on the things knowable. Therefore if Christ knew all things by this knowledge, His acquired knowledge would have been equal to His infused and beatific knowledge; which is not fitting. Therefore Christ did not know all things by this knowledge.

On the contrary, Nothing imperfect was in Christ’s soul. Now this knowledge of His would have been imperfect if He had not known all things by it, since the imperfect is that to which addition may be made. Hence Christ knew all things by this knowledge.

I answer that, Acquired knowledge is held to be in Christ’s soul, as we have said[3997] Q[9], A[4], by reason of the active intellect, lest its action, which is to make things actually intelligible, should be wanting; even as imprinted or infused knowledge is held to be in Christ’s soul for the perfection of the passive intellect. Now as the passive intellect is that by which “all things are in potentiality,” so the active intellect is that by which “all are in act,” as is said De Anima iii, 18. And hence, as the soul of Christ knew by infused knowledge all things to which the passive intellect is in any way in potentiality, so by acquired knowledge it knew whatever can be known by the action of the active intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: The knowledge of things may be acquired not merely by experiencing the things themselves, but by experiencing other things; since by virtue of the light of the active intellect man can go on to understand effects from causes, and causes from effects, like from like, contrary from contrary. Therefore Christ, though He did not experience all things, came to the knowledge of all things from what He did experience.

Reply to Objection 2: Although all sensible things were not subjected to Christ's bodily senses, yet other sensible things were subjected to His senses; and from this He could come to know other things by the most excellent force of His reason, in the manner described in the previous reply; just as in seeing heavenly bodies He could comprehend their powers and the effects they have upon things here below, which were not subjected to His senses; and for the same reason, from any other things whatsoever, He could come to the knowledge of yet other things.

Reply to Objection 3: By this knowledge the soul of Christ did not know all things simply, but all such as are knowable by the light of man's active intellect. Hence by this knowledge He did not know the essences of separate substances, nor past, present, or future singulars, which, nevertheless, He knew by infused knowledge, as was said above ([3998]Q[11]).

Whether Christ advanced in acquired or empiric knowledge?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not advance in this knowledge. For even as Christ knew all things by His beatific and His infused knowledge, so also did He by this acquired knowledge, as is plain from what has been said [3999](A[1]). But He did not advance in these knowledges. Therefore neither in this.

Objection 2: Further, to advance belongs to the imperfect, since the perfect cannot be added to. Now we cannot suppose an imperfect knowledge in Christ. Therefore Christ did not advance in this knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 22): "Whoever say that Christ advanced in wisdom and grace, as if receiving additional sensations, do not venerate the union which is in hypostasis.” But it is impious not to venerate this union. Therefore it is impious to say that His knowledge received increase.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 2:52): “Jesus advanced in wisdom and age and grace with God and men”; and Ambrose says (De Incar. Dom. vii) that “He advanced in human wisdom.” Now human wisdom is that which is acquired in a human manner, i.e. by the light of the active intellect. Therefore Christ advanced in this knowledge.

I answer that, There is a twofold advancement in knowledge: one in essence, inasmuch as the habit of knowledge is increased; the other in effect—e.g. if someone were with one and the same habit of knowledge to prove to someone else some minor truths at first, and afterwards greater and more subtle conclusions. Now in this second way it is plain that Christ advanced in knowledge and grace, even as in age, since as His age increased He wrought greater deeds, and showed greater knowledge and grace.

But as regards the habit of knowledge, it is plain that His habit of infused knowledge did not increase, since from the beginning He had perfect infused knowledge of all things; and still less could His beatific knowledge increase; while in the [4000]FP, Q[14], A[15], we have already said that His Divine knowledge could not increase. Therefore, if in the soul of Christ there was no habit of acquired knowledge, beyond the habit of infused knowledge, as appears to some [*Blessed Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure], and sometime appeared to me (Sent. iii, D, xiv), no knowledge in Christ increased in essence, but merely by experience, i.e. by comparing the infused intelligible species with phantasms. And in this way they maintain that Christ’s knowledge grew in experience, e.g. by comparing the infused intelligible species with what He received through the senses for the first time. But because it seems unfitting that any natural intelligible action should be wanting to Christ, and because to extract intelligible species from phantasms is a natural action of man’s active intellect, it seems becoming to place even this action in Christ. And it follows from this that in the soul of Christ there was a habit of knowledge which could increase by this abstraction of species; inasmuch as the active intellect, after abstracting the first intelligible species from phantasms, could abstract others, and others again.

Reply to Objection 1: Both the infused knowledge and the beatific knowledge of Christ’s soul were the effects of an agent of infinite power, which could produce the whole at once; and thus in neither knowledge did Christ advance; since from the beginning He had them perfectly. But the acquired knowledge of Christ is caused by the active intellect which does not produce the whole at once, but successively; and hence by this knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but step by step, and after a time, i.e. in His perfect age; and this is plain from what the Evangelist says, viz. that He increased in “knowledge and age” together.

Reply to Objection 2: Even this knowledge was always perfect for the time being, although it was not always perfect, simply and in comparison to the nature; hence it could increase.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of Damascene regards those who say absolutely that addition was made to Christ’s knowledge, i.e. as regards any knowledge of His, and especially as regards the infused knowledge which is caused in Christ’s soul by union with the Word; but it does not regard the increase of knowledge caused by the natural agent.

Whether Christ learned anything from man?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ learned something from man. For it is written (Lk. 2:46,47) that, “They found Him in the temple in the midst of the doctors, hearing them, and asking them questions.” But to ask questions and to reply pertains to a learner. Therefore Christ learned something from man.

Objection 2: Further, to acquire knowledge from a man’s teaching seems more noble than to acquire it from sensible things, since in the soul of the man who teaches the intelligible species are in act; but in sensible things the intelligible species are only in potentiality. Now Christ received empiric knowledge from sensible things, as stated above [4001](A[2]). Much more, therefore, could He receive knowledge by learning from men.

Objection 3: Further, by empiric knowledge Christ did not know everything from the beginning, but advanced in it, as was said above [4002](A[2]). But anyone hearing words which mean something, may learn something he does not know. Therefore Christ could learn from men something He did not know by this knowledge.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 45:4): “Behold, I have given Him for a witness to the people, for a leader and a master to the Gentiles.” Now a master is not taught, but teaches. Therefore Christ did not receive any knowledge by the teaching of any man.

I answer that, In every genus that which is the first mover is not moved according to the same species of movement; just as the first alterative is not itself altered. Now Christ is established by God the Head of the Church—yea, of all men, as was said above ([4003]Q[8], A[3]), so that not only all might receive grace through Him, but that all might receive the doctrine of Truth from Him. Hence He Himself says (Jn. 18:37): “For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth.” And thus it did not befit His dignity that He should be taught by any man.

Reply to Objection 1: As Origen says (Hom. xix in Luc.): “Our Lord asked questions not in order to learn anything, but in order to teach by questioning. For from the same well of knowledge came the question and the wise reply.” Hence the Gospel goes on to say that “all that heard Him were astonished at His wisdom and His answers.”

Reply to Objection 2: Whoever learns from man does not receive knowledge immediately from the intelligible species which are in his mind, but through sensible words, which are signs of intelligible concepts. Now as words formed by a man are signs of his intellectual knowledge; so are creatures, formed by God, signs of His wisdom. Hence it is written (Ecclus. 1:10) that God “poured” wisdom “out upon all His works.” Hence, just as it is better to be taught by God than by man, so it is better to receive our knowledge from sensible creatures and not by man’s teaching.

Reply to Objection 3: Jesus advanced in empiric knowledge, as in age, as stated above [4004](A[2]). Now as a fitting age is required for a man to acquire knowledge by discovery, so also that he may acquire it by being taught. But our Lord did nothing unbecoming to His age; and hence He did not give ear to hearing the lessons of doctrine until such time as He was able to have reached that grade of knowledge by way of experience. Hence Gregory says (Sup. Ezech. Lib. i, Hom. ii): “In the twelfth year of His age He deigned to question men on earth, since in the course of reason, the word of doctrine is not vouchsafed before the age of perfection.”

Whether Christ received knowledge from the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ received knowledge from the angels. For it is written (Lk. 22:43) that “there appeared to Him an angel from heaven, strengthening Him.” But we are strengthened by the comforting words of a teacher, according to Job 4:3,4: “Behold thou hast taught many and hast strengthened the weary hand. Thy words have confirmed them that were staggering.” Therefore Christ was taught by angels.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): “For I see that even Jesus—the super-substantial substance of supercelestial substances—when without change He took our substance upon Himself, was subject in obedience to the instructions of the Father and God by the angels.” Hence it seems that even Christ wished to be subject to the ordinations of the Divine law, whereby men are taught by means of angels.

Objection 3: Further, as in the natural order the human body is subject to the celestial bodies, so likewise is the human mind to angelic minds. Now Christ’s body was subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, for He felt the heat in summer and the cold in winter, and other human passions. Therefore His human mind was subject to the illuminations of supercelestial spirits.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that “the highest angels question Jesus, and learn the knowledge of His Divine work, and of the flesh assumed for us; and Jesus teaches them directly.” Now to teach and to be taught do not belong to the same. Therefore Christ did not receive knowledge from the angels.

I answer that, Since the human soul is midway between spiritual substances and corporeal things, it is perfected naturally in two ways. First by knowledge received from sensible things; secondly, by knowledge imprinted or infused by the illumination of spiritual substances. Now in both these ways the soul of Christ was perfected; first by empirical knowledge of sensible things, for which there is no need of angelic light, since the light of the active intellect suffices; secondly, by the higher impression of infused knowledge, which He received directly from God. For as His soul was united to the Word above the common mode, in unity of person, so above the common manner of men was it filled with knowledge and grace by the Word of God Himself; and not by the medium of angels, who in their beginning received the knowledge of things by the influence of the Word, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8).

Reply to Objection 1: This strengthening by the angel was for the purpose not of instructing Him, but of proving the truth of His human nature. Hence Bede says (on Lk. 22:43): “In testimony of both natures are the angels said to have ministered to Him and to have strengthened Him. For the Creator did not need help from His creature; but having become man, even as it was for our sake that He was sad, so was it for our sake that He was strengthened,” i.e. in order that our faith in the Incarnation might be strengthened.

Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius says that Christ was subject to the angelic instructions, not by reason of Himself, but by reason of what happened at His Incarnation, and as regards the care of Him whilst He was a child. Hence in the same place he adds that “Jesus’ withdrawal to Egypt decreed by the Father is announced to Joseph by angels, and again His return to Judaea from Egypt.”

Reply to Objection 3: The Son of God assumed a passible body (as will be said hereafter ([4005]Q[14], A[1])) and a soul perfect in knowledge and grace ([4006]Q[14] , A[1], ad 1; A[4]). Hence His body was rightly subject to the impression of heavenly bodies; but His soul was not subject to the impression of heavenly spirits.

OF THE POWER OF CHRIST’S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the power of Christ’s soul; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether He had omnipotence simply?

(2) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to corporeal creatures?

(3) Whether He had omnipotence with regard to His own body?

(4) Whether He had omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will?

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence. For Ambrose [*Gloss, Ord.] says on Lk. 1:32: “The power which the Son of God had naturally, the Man was about to receive in time.” Now this would seem to regard the soul principally, since it is the chief part of man. Hence since the Son of God had omnipotence from all eternity, it would seem that the soul of Christ received omnipotence in time.

Objection 2: Further, as the power of God is infinite, so is His knowledge. But the soul of Christ in a manner had the knowledge of all that God knows, as was said above ([4007]Q[10], A[2]). Therefore He had all power; and thus He was omnipotent.

Objection 3: Further, the soul of Christ has all knowledge. Now knowledge is either practical or speculative. Therefore He has a practical knowledge of what He knows, i.e. He knew how to do what He knows; and thus it seems that He can do all things.

On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex. 15:2,3: “He is my God and I will glorify Him,” and further on, “Almighty is His name.” Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence.

I answer that, As was said above ([4008]Q[2], A[1];[4009] Q[10], A[1]) in the mystery of the Incarnation the union in person so took place that there still remained the distinction of natures, each nature still retaining what belonged to it. Now the active principle of a thing follows its form, which is the principle of action. But the form is either the very nature of the thing, as in simple things; or is the constituent of the nature of the thing; as in such as are composed of matter and form.

And it is in this way that omnipotence flows, so to say, from the Divine Nature. For since the Divine Nature is the very uncircumscribed Being of God, as is plain from Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), it has an active power over everything that can have the nature of being; and this is to have omnipotence; just as every other thing has an active power over such things as the perfection of its nature extends to; as what is hot gives heat. Therefore since the soul of Christ is a part of human nature, it cannot possibly have omnipotence.

Reply to Objection 1: By union with the Person, the Man receives omnipotence in time, which the Son of God had from eternity; the result of which union is that as the Man is said to be God, so is He said to be omnipotent; not that the omnipotence of the Man is distinct (as neither is His Godhead) from that of the Son of God, but because there is one Person of God and man.

Reply to Objection 2: According to some, knowledge and active power are not in the same ratio; for an active power flows from the very nature of the thing, inasmuch as action is considered to come forth from the agent; but knowledge is not always possessed by the very essence or form of the knower, since it may be had by assimilation of the knower to the thing known by the aid of received species. But this reason seems not to suffice, because even as we may understand by a likeness obtained from another, so also may we act by a form obtained from another, as water or iron heats, by heat borrowed from fire. Hence there would be no reason why the soul of Christ, as it can know all things by the similitudes of all things impressed upon it by God, cannot do these things by the same similitudes.

It has, therefore, to be further considered that what is received in the lower nature from the higher is possessed in an inferior manner; for heat is not received by water in the perfection and strength it had in fire. Therefore, since the soul of Christ is of an inferior nature to the Divine Nature, the similitudes of things are not received in the soul of Christ in the perfection and strength they had in the Divine Nature. And hence it is that the knowledge of Christ's soul is inferior to Divine knowledge as regards the manner of knowing, for God knows (things) more perfectly than the soul of Christ; and also as regards the number of things known, since the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, and these God knows by the knowledge of simple intelligence; although it knows all things present, past, and future, which God knows by the knowledge of vision. So, too, the similitudes of things infused into Christ's soul do not equal the Divine power in acting, i.e. so as to do all that God can do, or to do in the same manner as God does, Who acts with an infinite might whereof the creature is not capable. Now there is no thing, to know which in some way an infinite power is needed, although a certain kind of knowledge belongs to an infinite power; yet there are things which can be done only by an infinite power, as creation and the like, as is plain from what has been said in the [4010]FP, Q[45]. Hence Christ's soul which, being a creature, is finite in might, can know, indeed, all things, but not in every way; yet it cannot do all things, which pertains to the nature of omnipotence; and, amongst other things, it is clear it cannot create itself.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's soul has practical and speculative knowledge; yet it is not necessary that it should have practical knowledge of those things of which it has speculative knowledge. Because for speculative knowledge a mere conformity or assimilation of the knower to the thing known suffices; whereas for practical knowledge it is required that the forms of the things in the intellect should be operative. Now to have a form and to impress this form upon something else is more than merely to have the form; as to be lightsome and to enlighten is more than merely to be lightsome. Hence the soul of Christ has a speculative knowledge of creation (for it knows the mode of God’s creation), but it has no practical knowledge of this mode, since it has no knowledge operative of creation.

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. For He Himself says (Mat. 28:18): “All power is given to Me in heaven and on earth.” Now by the words “heaven and earth” are meant all creatures, as is plain from Gn. 1:1: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ is the most perfect of all creatures. But every creature can be moved by another creature; for Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that “even as the denser and lower bodies are ruled in a fixed way by the subtler and stronger bodies; so are all bodies by the spirit of life, and the irrational spirit of life by the rational spirit of life, and the truant and sinful rational spirit of life by the rational, loyal, and righteous spirit of life.” But the soul of Christ moves even the highest spirits, enlightening them, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore it seems that the soul of Christ has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s soul had in its highest degree the “grace of miracles” or works of might. But every transmutation of the creature can belong to the grace of miracles; since even the heavenly bodies were miraculously changed from their course, as Dionysius proves (Ep. ad Polycarp). Therefore Christ’s soul had omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

On the contrary, To transmute creatures belongs to Him Who preserves them. Now this belongs to God alone, according to Heb. 1:3: “Upholding all things by the word of His power." Therefore God alone has omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures. Therefore this does not belong to Christ's soul.

I answer that, Two distinctions are here needed. of these the first is with respect to the transmutation of creatures, which is three-fold. The first is natural, being brought about by the proper agent naturally; the second is miraculous, being brought about by a supernatural agent above the wonted order and course of nature, as to raise the dead; the third is inasmuch as every creature may be brought to nothing.

The second distinction has to do with Christ's soul, which may be looked at in two ways: first in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace; secondly, as it is the instrument of the Word of God, personally united to Him. Therefore if we speak of the soul of Christ in its proper nature and with its power of nature or of grace, it had power to cause those effects proper to a soul (e.g. to rule the body and direct human acts, and also, by the fulness of grace and knowledge to enlighten all rational creatures falling short of its perfection), in a manner befitting a rational creature. But if we speak of the soul of Christ as it is the instrument of the Word united to Him, it had an instrumental power to effect all the miraculous transmutations ordainable to the end of the Incarnation, which is "to re-establish all things that are in heaven and on earth" [*Eph. 1:10]. But the transmutation of creatures, inasmuch as they may be brought to nothing, corresponds to their creation, whereby they were brought from nothing. And hence even as God alone can create, so, too, He alone can bring creatures to nothing, and He alone upholds them in being, lest they fall back to nothing. And thus it must be said that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence with regard to the transmutation of creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says (on the text quoted): "Power is given Him," i.e. to Christ as man, "Who a little while before was crucified, buried in the tomb, and afterwards rose again." But power is said to have been given Him, by reason of the union whereby it was brought about that a Man was omnipotent, as was said above (A[1], ad 1). And although this was made known to the angels before the Resurrection, yet after the Resurrection it was made known to all men, as Remigius says (cf. Catena Aurea). Now, "things are said to happen when they are made known"

[*Hugh of St. Victor: Qq. in Ep. ad Philip.]. Hence after the Resurrection our Lord says "that all power is given" to Him "in heaven and on earth."

Reply to Objection 2: Although every creature is transmutable by some other creature, except, indeed, the highest angel, and even it can be enlightened by Christ's soul; yet not every transmutation that can be made in a creature can be made by a creature; since some transmutations can be made by God alone. Yet all transmutations that can be made in creatures can be made by the soul of Christ, as the instrument of the Word, but not in its proper nature and power, since some of these transmutations pertain to the soul neither in the order of nature nor in the order of grace.

Reply to Objection 3: As was said in the [4011]SS, Q[178], A[1], ad 1, the grace of mighty works or miracles is given to the soul of a saint, so that these miracles are wrought not by his own, but by Divine power. Now this grace was bestowed on Christ's soul most excellently, i.e. not only that He might work miracles, but also that He might communicate this grace to others. Hence it is written (Mat. 10:1) that, "having called His twelve disciples together, He gave them power over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of diseases, and all manner of infirmities."

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence with regard to His own body?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to His own body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20,23) that "all natural things were voluntary to Christ; He willed to hunger, He willed to thirst, He willed to fear, He willed to die." Now God is called omnipotent because "He hath done all things whatsoever He would" (Ps. 113:11). Therefore it seems that Christ's soul had omnipotence with regard to the natural operations of the body.

Objection 2: Further, human nature was more perfect in Christ than in Adam, who had a body entirely subject to the soul, so that nothing could happen to the body against the will of the soul—and this on account of the original justice which it had in the state of innocence. Much more, therefore, had Christ's soul omnipotence with regard to His body.

Objection 3: Further, the body is naturally changed by the imaginations of the soul; and so much more changed, the stronger the soul's imagination, as was said in the [4012]FP, Q[117], A[3], ad 3. Now the soul of Christ had most perfect strength as regards both the imagination and the other powers. Therefore the soul of Christ was omnipotent with regard to His own body.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:17) that “it behooved Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren,” and especially as regards what belongs to the condition of human nature. But it belongs to the condition of human nature that the health of the body and its nourishment and growth are not subject to the bidding of reason or will, since natural things are subject to God alone Who is the author of nature. Therefore they were not subject in Christ. Therefore Christ’s soul was not omnipotent with regard to His own body.

I answer that, As stated above [4013](A[2]), Christ’s soul may be viewed in two ways. First, in its proper nature and power; and in this way, as it was incapable of making exterior bodies swerve from the course and order of nature, so, too, was it incapable of changing its own body from its natural disposition, since the soul, of its own nature, has a determinate relation to its body. Secondly, Christ’s soul may be viewed as an instrument united in person to God’s Word; and thus every disposition of His own body was wholly subject to His power. Nevertheless, since the power of an action is not properly attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, this omnipotence is attributed to the Word of God rather than to Christ’s soul.

Reply to Objection 1: This saving of Damascene refers to the Divine will of Christ, since, as he says in the preceding chapter (De Fide Orth. xix, 14,15), it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what was proper to it.

Reply to Objection 2: It was no part of the original justice which Adam had in the state of innocence that a man’s soul should have the power of changing his own body to any form, but that it should keep it from any hurt. Yet Christ could have assumed even this power if He had wished. But since man has three states—viz. innocence, sin, and glory, even as from the state of glory He assumed comprehension and from the state of innocence, freedom from sin—so also from the state of sin did He assume the necessity of being under the penalties of this life, as will be said ([4014]Q[14], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: If the imagination be strong, the body obeys naturally in some things, e.g. as regards falling from a beam set on high, since the imagination was formed to be a principle of local motion, as is said De Anima iii, 9,10. So, too, as regards alteration in heat and cold, and their consequences; for the passions of the soul, wherewith the heart is moved, naturally follow the imagination, and thus by commotion of the spirits the whole body is altered. But the other corporeal dispositions which have no natural relation to the imagination are not transmuted by the imagination, however strong it is, e.g. the shape of the hand, or foot, or such like.

Whether the soul of Christ had omnipotence as regards the execution of His will?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ had not omnipotence as regards the execution of His own will. For it is written (Mk. 7:24) that "entering into a house, He would that no man should know it, and He could not be hid." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.

Objection 2: Further, a command is a sign of will, as was said in the [4015]FP, Q[19], A[12]. But our Lord commanded certain things to be done, and the contrary came to pass, for it is written (Mat. 9:30, 31) that Jesus strictly charged them whose eyes had been opened, saying: "See that no man know this. But they going out spread His fame abroad in all that country." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in everything.

Objection 3: Further, a man does not ask from another for what he can do himself. But our Lord besought the Father, praying for what He wished to be done, for it is written (Lk. 6:12): "He went out into a mountain to pray, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God." Therefore He could not carry out the purpose of His will in all things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): "It is impossible for the will of the Saviour not to be fulfilled: nor is it possible for Him to will what He knows ought not to come to pass."

I answer that, Christ's soul willed things in two ways. First, what was to be brought about by Himself; and it must be said that He was capable of whatever He willed thus, since it would not befit His wisdom if He willed to do anything of Himself that was not subject to His will. Secondly, He wished things to be brought about by the Divine power, as the resurrection of His own body and such like miraculous deeds, which He could not effect by His own power, except as the instrument of the Godhead, as was said above [4016](A[2]).

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. 77): “What came to pass, this Christ must be said to have willed. For it must be remarked that this happened in the country of the Gentiles, to whom it was not yet time to preach. Yet it would have been invidious not to welcome such as came spontaneously for the faith. Hence He did not wish to be heralded by His own, and yet He wished to be sought; and so it came to pass.” Or it may be said that this will of Christ was not with regard to what was to be carried out by it, but with regard to what was to be done by others, which did not come under His human will. Hence in the letter of Pope Agatho, which was approved in the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. iv], we read: “When He, the Creator and Redeemer of all, wished to be hid and could not, must not this be referred only to His human will which He deigned to assume in time?”

Reply to Objection 2: As Gregory says (Moral. xix), by the fact that “Our Lord charged His mighty works to be kept secret, He gave an example to His servants coming after Him that they should wish their miracles to be hidden; and yet, that others may profit by their example, they are made public against their will.” And thus this command signified His will to fly from human glory, according to Jn. 8:50, “I seek not My own glory.” Yet He wished absolutely, and especially by His Divine will, that the miracle wrought should be published for the good of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ prayed both for things that were to be brought about by the Divine power, and for what He Himself was to do by His human will, since the power and operation of Christ’s soul depended on God, “Who works in all [Vulg.: ‘you’], both to will and to accomplish” (Phil. 2:13).

OF THE DEFECTS OF BODY ASSUMED BY THE SON OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the defects Christ assumed in the human nature; and first, of the defects of body; secondly, of the defects of soul.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Son of God should have assumed in human nature defects of body?

(2) Whether He assumed the obligation of being subject to these defects?

(3) Whether He contracted these defects?

(4) Whether He assumed all these defects?

Whether the Son of God in human nature ought to have assumed defects of body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Son of God ought not to have assumed human nature with defects of body. For as His soul is personally united to the Word of God, so also is His body. But the soul of Christ had every perfection, both of grace and truth, as was said above ([4017]Q[7], A[9]; Q[9], seqq.). Hence, His body also ought to have been in every way perfect, not having any imperfection in it.

Objection 2: Further, the soul of Christ saw the Word of God by the vision wherein the blessed see, as was said above ([4018]Q[9], A[2]), and thus the soul of Christ was blessed. Now by the beatification of the soul the body is glorified; since, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii), “God made the soul of a nature so strong that from the fulness of its blessedness there pours over even into the lower nature” (i.e. the body), “not indeed the bliss proper to the beatific fruition and vision, but the fulness of health” (i.e. the vigor of incorruptibility). Therefore the body of Christ was incorruptible and without any defect.

Objection 3: Further, penalty is the consequence of fault. But there was no fault in Christ, according to 1 Pet. 2:22: “Who did no guile.” Therefore defects of body, which are penalties, ought not to have been in Him.

Objection 4: Further, no reasonable man assumes what keeps him from his proper end. But by such like bodily defects, the end of the Incarnation seems to be hindered in many ways. First, because by these infirmities men were kept back from knowing Him, according to Is. 53:2,3: “[There was no sightliness] that we should be desirous of Him. Despised and the most abject of men, a man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity, and His look was, as it were, hidden and despised, whereupon we esteemed Him not.” Secondly, because the de. sire of the Fathers would not seem to be fulfilled, in whose person it is written (Is. 51:9): “Arise, arise, put on Thy strength, O Thou Arm of the Lord.” Thirdly, because it would seem more fitting for the devil’s power to be overcome and man’s weakness healed, by strength than by weakness. Therefore it does not seem to have been fitting that the Son of God assumed human nature with infirmities or defects of body.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 2:18): “For in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them also that are tempted.” Now He came to succor us. hence David said of Him (Ps. 120:1): “I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me.” Therefore it was fitting for the Son of God to assume flesh subject to human infirmities, in order to suffer and be tempted in it and so bring succor to us.

I answer that, It was fitting for the body assumed by the Son of God to be subject to human infirmities and defects; and especially for three reasons. First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the human race that the Son of God, having taken flesh, came into the world. Now one satisfies for another’s sin by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other. But these bodily defects, to wit, death, hunger, thirst, and the like, are the punishment of sin, which was brought into the world by Adam, according to Rom. 5:12: “By one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death.” Hence it was useful for the end of the Incarnation that He should assume these penalties in our flesh and in our stead, according to Is. 53:4, “Surely He hath borne our infirmities.” Secondly, in order to cause belief in the Incarnation. For since human nature is known to men only as it is subject to these defects, if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but imaginary, flesh, as the Manicheans held. And so, as is said, Phil. 2:7: “He . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.” Hence, Thomas, by the sight of His wounds, was recalled to the faith, as related Jn. 20:26. Thirdly, in order to show us an example of patience by valiantly bearing up against human passibility and defects. Hence it is said (Heb. 12:3) that He “endured such opposition from sinners against Himself, that you be not wearied. fainting in your minds.”

Reply to Objection 1: The penalties one suffers for another’s sin are the matter, as it were, of the satisfaction for that sin; but the principle is the habit of soul, whereby one is inclined to wish to satisfy for another, and from which the satisfaction has its efficacy, for satisfaction would not be efficacious unless it proceeded from charity, as will be explained

([4019]XP, Q[14], A[2]). Hence, it behooved the soul of Christ to be perfect as regards the habit of knowledge and virtue, in order to have the power of satisfying; but His body was subject to infirmities, that the matter of satisfaction should not be wanting.

Reply to Objection 2: From the natural relationship which is between the soul and the body, glory flows into the body from the soul's glory. Yet this natural relationship in Christ was subject to the will of His Godhead, and thereby it came to pass that the beatitude remained in the soul, and did not flow into the body; but the flesh suffered what belongs to a passible nature; thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) that, "it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it."

Reply to Objection 3: Punishment always follows sin actual or original, sometimes of the one punished, sometimes of the one for whom he who suffers the punishment satisfies. And so it was with Christ, according to Is. 53:5: "He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised for our sins."

Reply to Objection 4: The infirmity assumed by Christ did not impede, but greatly furthered the end of the Incarnation, as above stated. And although these infirmities concealed His Godhead, they made known His Manhood, which is the way of coming to the Godhead, according to Rom. 5:1,2: "By Jesus Christ we have access to God." Moreover, the ancient Fathers did not desire bodily strength in Christ, but spiritual strength, wherewith He vanquished the devil and healed human weakness.

Whether Christ was of necessity subject to these defects?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not of necessity subject to these defects. For it is written (Is. 53:7): "He was offered because it was His own will"; and the prophet is speaking of the offering of the Passion. But will is opposed to necessity. Therefore Christ was not of necessity subject to bodily defects.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20): "Nothing obligatory is seen in Christ: all is voluntary." Now what is voluntary is not necessary. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, necessity is induced by something more powerful. But no creature is more powerful than the soul of Christ, to which it pertained to preserve its own body. Therefore these defects were not of necessity in Christ.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 8:3) that “God” sent “His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh.” Now it is a condition of sinful flesh to be under the necessity of dying, and suffering other like passions. Therefore the necessity of suffering these defects was in Christ’s flesh.

I answer that, Necessity is twofold. one is a necessity of “constraint,” brought about by an external agent; and this necessity is contrary to both nature and will, since these flow from an internal principle. The other is “natural” necessity, resulting from the natural principles—either the form (as it is necessary for fire to heat), or the matter (as it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be dissolved). Hence, with this necessity, which results from the matter, Christ’s body was subject to the necessity of death and other like defects, since, as was said (A[1], ad 2), “it was by the consent of the Divine will that the flesh was allowed to do and suffer what belonged to it.” And this necessity results from the principles of human nature, as was said above in this article. But if we speak of necessity of constraint, as repugnant to the bodily nature, thus again was Christ’s body in its own natural condition subject to necessity in regard to the nail that pierced and the scourge that struck. Yet inasmuch as such necessity is repugnant to the will, it is clear that in Christ these defects were not of necessity as regards either the Divine will, or the human will of Christ considered absolutely, as following the deliberation of reason; but only as regards the natural movement of the will, inasmuch as it naturally shrinks from death and bodily hurt.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be “offered because it was His own will,” i.e. Divine will and deliberate human will; although death was contrary to the natural movement of His human will, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23,24).

Reply to Objection 2: This is plain from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing was more powerful than Christ’s soul, absolutely; yet there was nothing to hinder a thing being more powerful in regard to this or that effect, as a nail for piercing. And this I say, in so far as Christ’s soul is considered in its own proper nature and power.

Whether Christ contracted these defects?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ contracted bodily defects. For we are said to contract what we derive with our nature from birth. But Christ, together with human nature, derived His bodily defects and infirmities through His birth from His mother, whose flesh was subject to these defects. Therefore it seems that He contracted these defects.

Objection 2: Further, what is caused by the principles of nature is derived together with nature, and hence is contracted. Now these penalties are caused by the principles of human nature. Therefore Christ contracted them.

Objection 3: Further, Christ is likened to other men in these defects, as is written Heb. 2:17. But other men contract these defects. Therefore it seems that Christ contracted these defects.

On the contrary, These defects are contracted through sin, according to Rom. 5:12: “By one man sin entered into this world and by sin, death.” Now sin had no place in Christ. Therefore Christ did not contract these defects.

I answer that, In the verb “to contract” is understood the relation of effect to cause, i.e. that is said to be contracted which is derived of necessity together with its cause. Now the cause of death and such like defects in human nature is sin, since “by sin death entered into this world,” according to Rom. 5:12. And hence they who incur these defects, as due to sin, are properly said to contract them. Now Christ had not these defects, as due to sin, since, as Augustine [*Alcuin in the Gloss, Ord.], expounding Jn. 3:31, “He that cometh from above, is above all,” says: “Christ came from above, i.e. from the height of human nature, which it had before the fall of the first man.” For He received human nature without sin, in the purity which it had in the state of innocence. In the same way He might have assumed human nature without defects. Thus it is clear that Christ did not contract these defects as if taking them upon Himself as due to sin, but by His own will.

Reply to Objection 1: The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin, [*See introductory note to Q[27]] and therefore contracted these defects. But from the Virgin, Christ’s flesh assumed the nature without sin, and He might likewise have assumed the nature without its penalties. But He wished to bear its penalties in order to carry out the work of our redemption, as stated above [4020](A[1]). Therefore He had these defects—not that He contracted them, but that He assumed them.

Reply to Objection 2: The cause of death and other corporeal defects of human nature is twofold: the first is remote, and results from the material principles of the human body, inasmuch as it is made up of contraries. But this cause was held in check by original justice. Hence the proximate cause of death and other defects is sin, whereby original justice is withdrawn. And thus, because Christ was without sin, He is said not to have contracted these defects, but to have assumed them.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ was made like to other men in the quality and not in the cause of these defects; and hence, unlike others, He did not contract them.

Whether Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought to have assumed all the bodily defects of men. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6,18): “What is unassumable is incurable.” But Christ came to cure all our defects. Therefore He ought to have assumed all our defects.

Objection 2: Further it was said [4021](A[1]), that in order to satisfy for us, Christ ought to have had perfective habits of soul and defects of body. Now as regards the soul, He assumed the fulness of all grace. Therefore as regards the body, He ought to have assumed all defects.

Objection 3: Further, amongst all bodily defects death holds the chief place. Now Christ assumed death. Much more, therefore, ought He to have assumed other defects.

On the contrary, Contraries cannot take place simultaneously in the same. Now some infirmities are contrary to each other, being caused by contrary principles. Hence it could not be that Christ assumed all human infirmities.

I answer that, As stated above ([4022]AA[1],2), Christ assumed human defects in order to satisfy for the sin of human nature, and for this it was necessary for Him to have the fulness of knowledge and grace in His soul. Hence Christ ought to have assumed those defects which flow from the common sin of the whole nature, yet are not incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace. And thus it was not fitting for Him to assume all human defects or infirmities. For there are some defects that are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proneness towards evil, and a difficulty in well-doing. Some other defects do not flow from the whole of human nature in common on account of the sin of our first parent, but are caused in some men by certain particular causes, as leprosy, epilepsy, and the like; and these defects are sometimes brought about by the fault of the man, e.g. from inordinate eating; sometimes by a defect in the formative power. Now neither of these pertains to Christ, since His flesh was conceived of the Holy Ghost, Who has infinite wisdom and power, and cannot err or fail; and He Himself did nothing wrong in the order of His life. But there are some third defects, to be found amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our first parent, as death, hunger, thirst, and the like; and all these defects Christ assumed, which Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 11; iii, 20) calls “natural and indetractible passions”—natural, as following all human nature in common; indetractible, as implying no defect of knowledge or grace.

Reply to Objection 1: All particular defects of men are caused by the corruptibility and passibility of the body, some particular causes being added; and hence, since Christ healed the passibility and corruptibility of our body by assuming it, He consequently healed all other defects.

Reply to Objection 2: The fulness of all grace and knowledge was due to Christ’s soul of itself, from the fact of its being assumed by the Word of God; and hence Christ assumed all the fulness of knowledge and wisdom absolutely. But He assumed our defects economically, in order to satisfy for our sin, and not that they belonged to Him of Himself. Hence it was not necessary for Him to assume them all, but only such as sufficed to satisfy for the sin of the whole nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Death comes to all men from the sin of our first parent; but not other defects, although they are less than death. Hence there is no parity.

OF THE DEFECTS OF SOUL ASSUMED BY CHRIST (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the defects pertaining to the soul; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there was sin in Christ?

(2) Whether there was the “fomes” of sin in Him?

(3) Whether there was ignorance?

(4) Whether His soul was passible?

(5) Whether in Him there was sensible pain?

(6) Whether there was sorrow?

(7) Whether there was fear?

(8) Whether there was wonder?

(9) Whether there was anger?

(10) Whether He was at once wayfarer and comprehensor?

Whether there was sin in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was sin in Christ. For it is written (Ps. 21:2): “O God, My God . . . why hast Thou forsaken Me? Far from My salvation are the words of My sins.” Now these words are said in the person of Christ Himself, as appears from His having uttered them on the cross. Therefore it would seem that in Christ there were sins.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12) that “in Adam all have sinned”—namely, because all were in Adam by origin. Now Christ also was in Adam by origin. Therefore He sinned in him.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 2:18) that “in that, wherein He Himself hath suffered and been tempted, He is able to succor them also that are tempted.” Now above all do we require His help against sin. Therefore it seems that there was sin in Him.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (2 Cor. 5:21) that “Him that knew no sin” (i.e. Christ), “for us” God “hath made sin.” But that really is, which has been made by God. Therefore there was really sin in Christ.

Objection 5: Further, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi), “in the man Christ the Son of God gave Himself to us as a pattern of living.” Now man needs a pattern not merely of right living, but also of repentance for sin. Therefore it seems that in Christ there ought to have been sin, that He might repent of His sin, and thus afford us a pattern of repentance.

On the contrary, He Himself says (Jn. 8:46): “Which of you shall convince Me of sin?”

I answer that, As was said above ([4023]Q[14], A[1]), Christ assumed our defects that He might satisfy for us, that He might prove the truth of His human nature, and that He might become an example of virtue to us. Now it is plain that by reason of these three things He ought not to have assumed the defect of sin. First, because sin nowise works our satisfaction; rather, it impedes the power of satisfying, since, as it is written (Ecclus. 34:23), “The Most High approveth not the gifts of the wicked.” Secondly, the truth of His human nature is not proved by sin, since sin does not belong to human nature, whereof God is the cause; but rather has been sown in it against its nature by the devil, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 20). Thirdly, because by sinning He could afford no example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue. Hence Christ nowise assumed the defect of sin—either original or actual—according to what is written (1 Pet. 2:22): “Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 25), things are said of Christ, first, with reference to His natural and hypostatic property, as when it is said that God became man, and that He suffered for us; secondly, with reference to His personal and relative property, when things are said of Him in our person which nowise belong to Him of Himself. Hence, in the seven rules of Tichonius which Augustine quotes in De Doctr. Christ. iii, 31, the first regards “Our Lord and His Body,” since “Christ and His Church are taken as one person.” And thus Christ, speaking in the person of His members, says (Ps. 21:2): “The words of My sins”—not that there were any sins in the Head.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20), Christ was in Adam and the other fathers not altogether as we were. For we were in Adam as regards both seminal virtue and bodily substance, since, as he goes on to say: “As in the seed there is a visible bulk and an invisible virtue, both have come from Adam. Now Christ took the visible substance of His flesh from the Virgin’s flesh; but the virtue of His conception did not spring from the seed of man, but far otherwise—from on high.” Hence He was not in Adam according to seminal virtue, but only according to bodily substance. And therefore Christ did not receive human nature from Adam actively, but only materially—and from the Holy Ghost actively; even as Adam received his body materially from the slime of the earth—actively from God. And thus Christ did not sin in Adam, in whom He was only as regards His matter.

Reply to Objection 3: In His temptation and passion Christ has succored us by satisfying for us. Now sin does not further satisfaction, but hinders it, as has been said. Hence, it behooved Him not to have sin, but to be wholly free from sin; otherwise the punishment He bore would have been due to Him for His own sin.

Reply to Objection 4: God "made Christ sin"—not, indeed, in such sort that He had sin, but that He made Him a sacrifice for sin: even as it is written (Osee 4:8): "They shall eat the sins of My people"—they, i.e. the priests, who by the law ate the sacrifices offered for sin. And in that way it is written (Is. 53:6) that "the Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all" (i.e. He gave Him up to be a victim for the sins of all men); or "He made Him sin" (i.e. made Him to have "the likeness of sinful flesh"), as is written (Rom. 8:3), and this on account of the passible and mortal body He assumed.

Reply to Objection 5: A penitent can give a praiseworthy example, not by having sinned, but by freely bearing the punishment of sin. And hence Christ set the highest example to penitents, since He willingly bore the punishment, not of His own sin, but of the sins of others.

Whether there was the "fomes" of sin in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was the "fomes" of sin. For the "fomes" of sin, and the passibility and mortality of the body spring from the same principle, to wit, from the withdrawal of original justice, whereby the inferior powers of the soul were subject to the reason, and the body to the soul. Now passibility and mortality of body were in Christ. Therefore there was also the "fomes" of sin.

Objection 2: Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19), "it was by consent of the Divine will that the flesh of Christ was allowed to suffer and do what belonged to it." But it is proper to the flesh to lust after its pleasures. Now since the "fomes" of sin is nothing more than concupiscence, as the gloss says on Rom. 7:8, it seems that in Christ there was the "fomes" of sin.

Objection 3: Further, it is by reason of the “fomes” of sin that “the flesh lusteth against the spirit,” as is written (Gal. 5:17). But the spirit is shown to be so much the stronger and worthier to be crowned according as the more completely it overcomes its enemy—to wit, the concupiscence of the flesh, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, he “is not crowned except he strive lawfully.” Now Christ had a most valiant and conquering spirit, and one most worthy of a crown, according to Apoc. 6:2: “There was a crown given Him, and He went forth conquering that He might conquer.” Therefore it would especially seem that the “fomes” of sin ought to have been in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:20): “That which is conceived in her is of the Holy Ghost.” Now the Holy Ghost drives out sin and the inclination to sin, which is implied in the word “fomes.” Therefore in Christ there ought not to have been the “fomes” of sin.

I answer that, As was said above (Q[7], AA[2],9), Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are in the irrational part of the soul, make it subject to reason, and so much the more as the virtue is more perfect; thus, temperance controls the concupiscible appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite, as was said in the [4024]FS, Q[56], A[4]. But there belongs to the very nature of the “fomes” of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to what is contrary to reason. And hence it is plain that the more perfect the virtues are in any man, the weaker the “fomes” of sin becomes in him. Hence, since in Christ the virtues were in their highest degree, the “fomes” of sin was nowise in Him; inasmuch, also, as this defect cannot be ordained to satisfaction, but rather inclined to what is contrary to satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 1: The inferior powers pertaining to the sensitive appetite have a natural capacity to be obedient to reason; but not the bodily powers, nor those of the bodily humors, nor those of the vegetative soul, as is made plain Ethic. i, 13. And hence perfection of virtue, which is in accordance with right reason, does not exclude passibility of body; yet it excludes the “fomes” of sin, the nature of which consists in the resistance of the sensitive appetite to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The flesh naturally seeks what is pleasing to it by the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite; but the flesh of man, who is a rational animal, seeks this after the manner and order of reason. And thus with the concupiscence of the sensitive appetite Christ’s flesh naturally sought food, drink, and sleep, and all else that is sought in right reason, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 14). Yet it does not therefore follow that in Christ there was the “fomes” of sin, for this implies the lust after pleasurable things against the order of reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The spirit gives evidence of fortitude to some extent by resisting that concupiscence of the flesh which is opposed to it; yet a greater fortitude of spirit is shown, if by its strength the flesh is thoroughly overcome, so as to be incapable of lusting against the spirit. And hence this belonged to Christ, whose spirit reached the highest degree of fortitude. And although He suffered no internal assault on the part of the “fomes” of sin, He sustained an external assault on the part of the world and the devil, and won the crown of victory by overcoming them.

Whether in Christ there was ignorance?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was ignorance in Christ. For that is truly in Christ which belongs to Him in His human nature, although it does not belong to Him in His Divine Nature, as suffering and death. But ignorance belongs to Christ in His human nature; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21) that “He assumed an ignorant and enslaved nature.” Therefore ignorance was truly in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, one is said to be ignorant through defect of knowledge. Now some kind of knowledge was wanting to Christ, for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:21) “Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin.” Therefore there was ignorance in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Is. 8:4): “For before the child know to call his Father and his mother, the strength of Damascus . . . shall be taken away.” Therefore in Christ there was ignorance of certain things.

On the contrary, Ignorance is not taken away by ignorance. But Christ came to take away our ignorance; for “He came to enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death” (Lk. 1:79). Therefore there was no ignorance in Christ.

I answer that, As there was the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ, so too there was the fulness of all knowledge, as is plain from what has been said above ([4025]Q[7], A[9];[4026] Q[9]). Now as the fulness of grace and virtue in Christ excluded the “fomes” of sin, so the fulness of knowledge excluded ignorance, which is opposed to knowledge. Hence, even as the “fomes” of sin was not in Christ, neither was there ignorance in Him.

Reply to Objection 1: The nature assumed by Christ may be viewed in two ways. First, in its specific nature, and thus Damascene calls it “ignorant and enslaved”; hence he adds: “For man’s nature is a slave of Him” (i.e. God) “Who made it; and it has no knowledge of future things.” Secondly, it may be considered with regard to what it has from its union with the Divine hypostasis, from which it has the fulness of knowledge and grace, according to Jn. 1:14: “We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] as it were the Only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth”; and in this way the human nature in Christ was not affected with ignorance.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said not to have known sin, because He did not know it by experience; but He knew it by simple cognition.

Reply to Objection 3: The prophet is speaking in this passage of the human knowledge of Christ; thus he says: “Before the Child” (i.e. in His human nature) “know to call His father” (i.e. Joseph, who was His reputed father), “and His mother” (i.e. Mary), “the strength of Damascus . . . shall be taken away.” Nor are we to understand this as if He had been some time a man without knowing it; but “before He know” (i.e. before He is a man having human knowledge)—literally, “the strength of Damascus and the spoils of Samaria shall be taken away by the King of the Assyrians”—or spiritually, “before His birth He will save His people solely by invocation,” as a gloss expounds it. Augustine however (Serm. xxxii de Temp.) says that this was fulfilled in the adoration of the Magi. For he says: “Before He uttered human words in human flesh, He received the strength of Damascus, i.e. the riches which Damascus vaunted (for in riches the first place is given to gold). They themselves were the spoils of Samaria. Because Samaria is taken to signify idolatry; since this people, having turned away from the Lord, turned to the worship of idols. Hence these were the first spoils which the child took from the domination of idolatry.” And in this way “before the child know” may be taken to mean “before he show himself to know.”

Whether Christ’s soul was passible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul of Christ was not passible. For nothing suffers except by reason of something stronger; since “the agent is greater than the patient,” as is clear from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5). Now no creature was stronger than Christ’s soul. Therefore Christ’s soul could not suffer at the hands of any creature; and hence it was not passible; for its capability of suffering would have been to no purpose if it could not have suffered at the hands of anything.

Objection 2: Further, Tully (De Tusc. Quaes. iii) says that the soul’s passions are ailments [*Cf. [4027]FS, Q[24], A[2]]. But Christ’s soul had no ailment; for the soul’s ailment results from sin, as is plain from Ps. 40:5: “Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee.” Therefore in Christ’s soul there were no passions.

Objection 3: Further, the soul’s passions would seem to be the same as the “fomes” of sin, hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:5) calls them the “passions of sins.” Now the “fomes” of sin was not in Christ, as was said A[2]. Therefore it seems that there were no passions in His soul; and hence His soul was not passible.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) in the person of Christ: “My soul is filled with evils”—not sins, indeed, but human evils, i.e. “pains,” as a gloss expounds it. Hence the soul of Christ was passible.

I answer that, A soul placed in a body may suffer in two ways: first with a bodily passion; secondly, with an animal passion. It suffers with a bodily passion through bodily hurt; for since the soul is the form of the body, soul and body have but one being; and hence, when the body is disturbed by any bodily passion, the soul, too, must be disturbed, i.e. in the being which it has in the body. Therefore, since Christ’s body was passible and mortal, as was said above (Q[14], A[2]), His soul also was of necessity passible in like manner. But the soul suffers with an animal passion, in its operations—either in such as are proper to the soul, or in such as are of the soul more than of the body. And although the soul is said to suffer in this way through sensation and intelligence, as was said in the [4028]FS, Q[22], A[3]; [4029]FS, Q[41], A[1]; nevertheless the affections of the sensitive appetite are most properly called passions of the soul. Now these were in Christ, even as all else pertaining to man’s nature. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): “Our Lord having deigned to live in the form of a servant, took these upon Himself whenever He judged they ought to be assumed; for there was no false human affection in Him Who had a true body and a true human soul."

Nevertheless we must know that the passions were in Christ otherwise than in us, in three ways. First, as regards the object, since in us these passions very often tend towards what is unlawful, but not so in Christ. Secondly, as regards the principle, since these passions in us frequently forestall the judgment of reason; but in Christ all movements of the sensitive appetite sprang from the disposition of the reason. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9), that "Christ assumed these movements, in His human soul, by an unfailing dispensation, when He willed; even as He became man when He willed." Thirdly, as regards the effect, because in us these movements, at times, do not remain in the sensitive appetite, but deflect the reason; but not so in Christ, since by His disposition the movements that are naturally becoming to human flesh so remained in the sensitive appetite that the reason was nowise hindered in doing what was right. Hence Jerome says (on Mat. 26:37) that "Our Lord, in order to prove the reality of the assumed manhood, 'was sorrowful' in very deed; yet lest a passion should hold sway over His soul, it is by a propassion that He is said to have 'begun to grow sorrowful and to be sad'"; so that it is a perfect "passion" when it dominates the soul, i.e. the reason; and a "propassion" when it has its beginning in the sensitive appetite, but goes no further.

Reply to Objection 1: The soul of Christ could have prevented these passions from coming upon it, and especially by the Divine power; yet of His own will He subjected Himself to these corporeal and animal passions.

Reply to Objection 2: Tully is speaking there according to the opinions of the Stoics, who did not give the name of passions to all, but only to the disorderly movements of the sensitive appetite. Now, it is manifest that passions like these were not in Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: The "passions of sins" are movements of the sensitive appetite that tend to unlawful things; and these were not in Christ, as neither was the "fomes" of sin.

Whether there was sensible pain in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true sensible pain in Christ. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): “Since with Christ to die was life, what pain may He be supposed to have suffered in the mystery of His death, Who bestows life on such as die for Him?” And further on he says: “The Only-begotten assumed human nature, not ceasing to be God; and although blows struck Him and wounds were inflicted on Him, and scourges fell upon Him, and the cross lifted Him up, yet these wrought in deed the vehemence of the passion, but brought no pain; as a dart piercing the water.” Hence there was no true pain in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, it would seem to be proper to flesh conceived in original sin, to be subject to the necessity of pain. But the flesh of Christ was not conceived in sin, but of the Holy Ghost in the Virgin’s womb. Therefore it lay under no necessity of suffering pain.

Objection 3: Further, the delight of the contemplation of Divine things dulls the sense of pain; hence the martyrs in their passions bore up more bravely by thinking of the Divine love. But Christ’s soul was in the perfect enjoyment of contemplating God, Whom He saw in essence, as was said above ([4030]Q[9], A[2]). Therefore He could feel no pain.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 53:4): “Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows.”

I answer that, As is plain from what has been said in the [4031]FS, Q[35], A[7], for true bodily pain are required bodily hurt and the sense of hurt. Now Christ’s body was able to be hurt, since it was passible and mortal, as above stated (Q[14], AA[1],2); neither was the sense of hurt wanting to it, since Christ’s soul possessed perfectly all natural powers. Therefore no one should doubt but that in Christ there was true pain.

Reply to Objection 1: In all these and similar words, Hilary does not intend to exclude the reality of the pain, but the necessity of it. Hence after the foregoing he adds: “Nor, when He thirsted, or hungered, or wept, was the Lord seen to drink, or eat, or grieve. But in order to prove the reality of the body, the body’s customs were assumed, so that the custom of our body was atoned for by the custom of our nature. Or when He took drink or food, He acceded, not to the body’s necessity, but to its custom.” And he uses the word “necessity” in reference to the first cause of these defects, which is sin, as above stated ([4032]Q[14], AA[1],3), so that Christ’s flesh is said not to have lain under the necessity of these defects, in the sense that there was no sin in it. Hence he adds: “For He” (i.e. Christ) “had a body—one proper to His origin, which did not exist through the unholiness of our conception, but subsisted in the form of our body by the strength of His power.” But as regards the proximate cause of these defects, which is composition of contraries, the flesh of Christ lay under the necessity of these defects, as was said above ([4033]Q[14] , A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Flesh conceived in sin is subject to pain, not merely on account of the necessity of its natural principles, but from the necessity of the guilt of sin. Now this necessity was not in Christ; but only the necessity of natural principles.

Reply to Objection 3: As was said above ([4034]Q[14], A[1], ad 2), by the power of the Godhead of Christ the beatitude was economically kept in the soul, so as not to overflow into the body, lest His passibility and mortality should be taken away; and for the same reason the delight of contemplation was so kept in the mind as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, lest sensible pain should thereby be prevented.

Whether there was sorrow in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no sorrow. For it is written of Christ (Is. 42:4): “He shall not be sad nor troublesome.”

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 12:21): “Whatever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad.” And the reason of this the Stoics asserted to be that no one is saddened save by the loss of his goods. Now the just man esteems only justice and virtue as his goods, and these he cannot lose; otherwise the just man would be subject to fortune if he was saddened by the loss of the goods fortune has given him. But Christ was most just, according to Jer. 23:6: “This is the name that they shall call Him: The Lord, our just one.” Therefore there was no sorrow in Him.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 13,14) that all sorrow is “evil, and to be shunned.” But in Christ there was no evil to be shunned. Therefore there was no sorrow in Christ.

Objection 4: Furthermore, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): “Sorrow regards the things we suffer unwillingly.” But Christ suffered nothing against His will, for it is written (Is. 53:7): “He was offered because it was His own will.” Hence there was no sorrow in Christ.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Mat. 26:38): “My soul is sorrowful even unto death.” And Ambrose says (De Trin. ii.) that “as a man He had sorrow; for He bore my sorrow. I call it sorrow, fearlessly, since I preach the cross.”

I answer that, As was said above (A[5], ad 3), by Divine dispensation the joy of contemplation remained in Christ’s mind so as not to overflow into the sensitive powers, and thereby shut out sensible pain. Now even as sensible pain is in the sensitive appetite, so also is sorrow. But there is a difference of motive or object; for the object and motive of pain is hurt perceived by the sense of touch, as when anyone is wounded; but the object and motive of sorrow is anything hurtful or evil interiorly, apprehended by the reason or the imagination, as was said in the [4035]FS, Q[35], AA[2],7, as when anyone grieves over the loss of grace or money. Now Christ’s soul could apprehend things as hurtful either to Himself, as His passion and death—or to others, as the sin of His disciples, or of the Jews that killed Him. And hence, as there could be true pain in Christ, so too could there be true sorrow; otherwise, indeed, than in us, in the three ways above stated [4036](A[4]), when we were speaking of the passions of Christ’s soul in general.

Reply to Objection 1: Sorrow was not in Christ, as a perfect passion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a “propassion.” Hence it is written (Mat. 26:37): “He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad.” For “it is one thing to be sorrowful and another to grow sorrowful,” as Jerome says, on this text.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), “for the three passions”—desire, joy, and fear—the Stoics held three {eupatheias} i.e. good passions, in the soul of the wise man, viz. for desire, will—for joy, delight—for fear, caution. But as regards sorrow, they denied it could be in the soul of the wise man, for sorrow regards evil already present, and they thought that no evil could befall a wise man; and for this reason, because they believed that only the virtuous is good, since it makes men good, and that nothing is evil, except what is sinful, whereby men become wicked. Now although what is virtuous is man’s chief good, and what is sinful is man’s chief evil, since these pertain to reason which is supreme in man, yet there are certain secondary goods of man, which pertain to the body, or to the exterior things that minister to the body. And hence in the soul of the wise man there may be sorrow in the sensitive appetite by his apprehending these evils; without this sorrow disturbing the reason. And in this way are we to understand that “whatsoever shall befall the just man, it shall not make him sad,” because his reason is troubled by no misfortune. And thus Christ’s sorrow was a propassion, and not a passion.

Reply to Objection 3: All sorrow is an evil of punishment; but it is not always an evil of fault, except only when it proceeds from an inordinate affection. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9): “Whenever these affections follow reason, and are caused when and where needed, who will dare to call them diseases or vicious passions?”

Reply to Objection 4: There is no reason why a thing may not of itself be contrary to the will, and yet be willed by reason of the end, to which it is ordained, as bitter medicine is not of itself desired, but only as it is ordained to health. And thus Christ’s death and passion were of themselves involuntary, and caused sorrow, although they were voluntary as ordained to the end, which is the redemption of the human race.

Whether there was fear in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no fear in Christ. For it is written (Prov. 28:1): “The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread.” But Christ was most just. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. x): “I ask those who think thus, does it stand to reason that He should dread to die, Who by expelling all dread of death from the Apostles, encouraged them to the glory of martyrdom?” Therefore it is unreasonable that there should be fear in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, fear seems only to regard what a man cannot avoid. Now Christ could have avoided both the evil of punishment which He endured, and the evil of fault which befell others. Therefore there was no fear in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 4:33): Jesus “began to fear and to be heavy.”

I answer that, As sorrow is caused by the apprehension of a present evil, so also is fear caused by the apprehension of a future evil. Now the apprehension of a future evil, if the evil be quite certain, does not arouse fear. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that we do not fear a thing unless there is some hope of avoiding it. For when there is no hope of avoiding it the evil is considered present, and thus it causes sorrow rather than fear. Hence fear may be considered in two ways. First, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite naturally shrinks from bodily hurt, by sorrow if it is present, and by fear if it is future; and thus fear was in Christ, even as sorrow. Secondly, fear may be considered in the uncertainty of the future event, as when at night we are frightened at a sound, not knowing what it is; and in this way there was no fear in Christ, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23).

Reply to Objection 1: The just man is said to be "without dread," in so far as dread implies a perfect passion drawing man from what reason dictates. And thus fear was not in Christ, but only as a propassion. Hence it is said (Mk. 14:33) that Jesus "began to fear and to be heavy," with a propassion, as Jerome expounds (Mat. 26:37).

Reply to Objection 2: Hilary excludes fear from Christ in the same way that he excludes sorrow, i.e. as regards the necessity of fearing. And yet to show the reality of His human nature, He voluntarily assumed fear, even as sorrow.

Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ could have avoided future evils by the power of His Godhead, yet they were unavoidable, or not easily avoidable by the weakness of the flesh.

Whether there was wonder in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no wonder. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2) that wonder results when we see an effect without knowing its cause; and thus wonder belongs only to the ignorant. Now there was no ignorance in Christ, as was said A[3]. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15) that "wonder is fear springing from the imagination of something great"; and hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) that the "magnanimous man does not wonder." But Christ was most magnanimous. Therefore there was no wonder in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, no man wonders at what he himself can do. Now Christ could do whatsoever was great. Therefore it seems that He wondered at nothing.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 8:10): “Jesus hearing this,” i.e. the words of the centurion, “marveled.”

I answer that, Wonder properly regards what is new and unwonted. Now there could be nothing new and unwonted as regards Christ’s Divine knowledge, whereby He saw things in the Word; nor as regards the human knowledge, whereby He saw things by infused species. Yet things could be new and unwonted with regard to His empiric knowledge, in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day. Hence, if we speak of Christ with respect to His Divine knowledge, and His beatific and even His infused knowledge, there was no wonder in Christ. But if we speak of Him with respect to empiric knowledge, wonder could be in Him; and He assumed this affection for our instruction, i.e. in order to teach us to wonder at what He Himself wondered at. Hence Augustine says (Super Gen. Cont. Manich. i, 8): “Our Lord wondered in order to show us that we, who still need to be so affected, must wonder. Hence all these emotions are not signs of a disturbed mind, but of a master teaching.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was ignorant of nothing, yet new things might occur to His empiric knowledge, and thus wonder would be caused.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ did not marvel at the Centurion’s faith as if it was great with respect to Himself, but because it was great with respect to others.

Reply to Objection 3: He could do all things by the Divine power, for with respect to this there was no wonder in Him, but only with respect to His human empiric knowledge, as was said above.

Whether there was anger in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no anger in Christ. For it is written (James 1:20): “The anger of man worketh not the justice of God.” Now whatever was in Christ pertained to the justice of God, since of Him it is written (1 Cor. 1:30): “For He [Vulg.: ‘Who’] of God is made unto us . . . justice.” Therefore it seems that there was no anger in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, anger is opposed to meekness, as is plain from Ethic. iv, 5. But Christ was most meek. Therefore there was no anger in Him.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. v, 45) that “anger that comes of evil blinds the eye of the mind, but anger that comes of zeal disturbs it.” Now the mind’s eye in Christ was neither blinded nor disturbed. Therefore in Christ there was neither sinful anger nor zealous anger.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:17) that the words of Ps. 58:10, “the zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up,” were fulfilled in Him.

I answer that, As was said in the [4037]FS, Q[46], A[3], ad 3, and [4038]SS, Q[158], A[2], ad 3, anger is an effect of sorrow. or when sorrow is inflicted upon someone, there arises within him a desire of the sensitive appetite to repel this injury brought upon himself or others. Hence anger is a passion composed of sorrow and the desire of revenge. Now it was said [4039](A[6]) that sorrow could be in Christ. As to the desire of revenge it is sometimes with sin, i.e. when anyone seeks revenge beyond the order of reason: and in this way anger could not be in Christ, for this kind of anger is sinful. Sometimes, however, this desire is without sin—nay, is praiseworthy, e.g. when anyone seeks revenge according to justice, and this is zealous anger. For Augustine says (on Jn. 2:17) that “he is eaten up by zeal for the house of God, who seeks to better whatever He sees to be evil in it, and if he cannot right it, bears with it and sighs.” Such was the anger that was in Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v), anger is in man in two ways—sometimes it forestalls reason, and causes it to operate, and in this way it is properly said to work, for operations are attributed to the principal agent. It is in this way that we must understand that “the anger of man worketh not the justice of God.” Sometimes anger follows reason, and is, as it were, its instrument, and then the operation, which pertains to justice, is not attributed to anger but to reason.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the anger which outsteps the bounds of reason that is opposed to meekness, and not the anger which is controlled and brought within its proper bounds by reason, for meekness holds the mean in anger.

Reply to Objection 3: In us the natural order is that the soul’s powers mutually impede each other, i.e. if the operation of one power is intense, the operation of the other is weakened. This is the reason why any movement whatsoever of anger, even if it be tempered by reason, dims the mind’s eye of him who contemplates. But in Christ, by control of the Divine power, “every faculty was allowed to do what was proper to it,” and one power was not impeded by another. Hence, as the joy of His mind in contemplation did not impede the sorrow or pain of the inferior part, so, conversely, the passions of the inferior part no-wise impeded the act of reason.

Whether Christ was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor. For it belongs to a wayfarer to be moving toward the end of beatitude, and to a comprehensor it belongs to be resting in the end. Now to be moving towards the end and to be resting in the end cannot belong to the same. Therefore Christ could not be at once wayfarer and comprehensor.

Objection 2: Further, to tend to beatitude, or to obtain it, does not pertain to man’s body, but to his soul; hence Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios. cxviii) that “upon the inferior nature, which is the body, there overflows, not indeed the beatitude which belongs to such as enjoy and understand, the fulness of health, i.e. the vigor of incorruption.” Now although Christ had a passible body, He fully enjoyed God in His mind. Therefore Christ was not a wayfarer but a comprehensor.

Objection 3: Further, the Saints, whose souls are in heaven and whose bodies are in the tomb, enjoy beatitude in their souls, although their bodies are subject to death, yet they are called not wayfarers, but only comprehensors. Hence, with equal reason, would it seem that Christ was a pure comprehensor and nowise a wayfarer, since His mind enjoyed God although His body was mortal.

On the contrary, It is written (Jer. 14:8): “Why wilt Thou be as a stranger in the land, and as a wayfaring man turning in to lodge?”

I answer that, A man is called a wayfarer from tending to beatitude, and a comprehensor from having already obtained beatitude, according to 1 Cor. 9:24: “So run that you may comprehend [Douay: ‘obtain’]”; and Phil. 3:12: “I follow after, if by any means I may comprehend [Douay: ‘obtain’].” Now man’s perfect beatitude consists in both soul and body, as stated in the [4040]FS, Q[4], A[6]. In the soul, as regards what is proper to it, inasmuch as the mind sees and enjoys God; in the body, inasmuch as the body “will rise spiritual in power and glory and incorruption,” as is written 1 Cor. 15:42. Now before His passion Christ’s mind saw God fully, and thus He had beatitude as far as it regards what is proper to the soul; but beatitude was wanting with regard to all else, since His soul was passible, and His body both passible and mortal, as is clear from the above [4041](A[4]; Q[14], AA[1],2). Hence He was at once comprehensor, inasmuch as He had the beatitude proper to the soul, and at the same time wayfarer, inasmuch as He was tending to beatitude, as regards what was wanting to His beatitude.

Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible to be moving towards the end and resting in the end, in the same respect; but there is nothing against this under a different respect—as when a man is at once acquainted with what he already knows, and yet is a learner with regard to what he does not know.

Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude principally and properly belongs to the soul with regard to the mind, yet secondarily and, so to say, instrumentally, bodily goods are required for beatitude; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8), that exterior goods minister "organically" to beatitude.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between the soul of a saint and of Christ, for two reasons: first, because the souls of saints are not passible, as Christ's soul was; secondly, because their bodies do nothing by which they tend to beatitude, as Christ by His bodily sufferings tended to beatitude as regards the glory of His body.

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE APPLICABLE TO CHRIST IN HIS BEING AND BECOMING (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the consequences of the union; and first as to what belongs to Christ in Himself; secondly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation with His Father; thirdly, as to what belongs to Christ in relation to us.

Concerning the first, there occurs a double consideration. The first is about such things as belong to Christ in being and becoming; the second regards such things as belong to Christ by reason of unity.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether this is true: "God is man"?

(2) Whether this is true: "Man is God"?

(3) Whether Christ may be called a lordly man?

(4) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Son of God, and conversely?

(5) Whether what belongs to the Son of Man may be predicated of the Divine Nature, and what belongs to the Son of God of the human nature?

(6) Whether this is true: “The Son of God was made man”?

(7) Whether this is true: “Man became God”?

(8) Whether this is true: “Christ is a creature”?

(9) Whether this is true: “This man,” pointing out Christ, “began to be”? or “always was”?

(10) Whether this is true: “Christ as man is a creature”?

(11) Whether this is true: “Christ as man is God”?

(12) Whether this is true: “Christ as man is a hypostasis or person”?

Whether this is true: “God is man”?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: “God is man.” For every affirmative proposition of remote matter is false. Now this proposition, “God is man,” is on remote matter, since the forms signified by the subject and predicate are most widely apart. Therefore, since the aforesaid proposition is affirmative, it would seem to be false.

Objection 2: Further, the three Divine Persons are in greater mutual agreement than the human nature and the Divine. But in the mystery of the Incarnation one Person is not predicated of another; for we do not say that the Father is the Son, or conversely. Therefore it seems that the human nature ought not to be predicated of God by saying that God is man.

Objection 3: Further, Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.) that, “as the soul and the flesh are one man, so are God and man one Christ.” But this is false: “The soul is the body.” Therefore this also is false: “God is man.”

Objection 4: Further, it was said in the [4042]FP, Q[39], A[4] that what is predicated of God not relatively but absolutely, belongs to the whole Trinity and to each of the Persons. But this word “man” is not relative, but absolute. Hence, if it is predicated of God, it would follow that the whole Trinity and each of the Persons is man; and this is clearly false.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:6,7): “Who being in the form of God . . . emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of man, and in habit found as a man”; and thus He Who is in the form of God is man. Now He Who is in the form of God is God. Therefore God is man.

I answer that, This proposition “God is man,” is admitted by all Christians, yet not in the same way by all. For some admit the proposition, but not in the proper acceptation of the terms. Thus the Manicheans say the Word of God is man, not indeed true, but fictitious man, inasmuch as they say that the Son of God assumed an imaginary body, and thus God is called man as a bronze figure is called man if it has the figure of a man. So, too, those who held that Christ’s body and soul were not united, could not say that God is true man, but that He is figuratively called man by reason of the parts. Now both these opinions were disproved above ([4043]Q[2], A[5]; [4044] Q[5], A[1]).

Some, on the contrary, hold the reality on the part of man, but deny the reality on the part of God. For they say that Christ, Who is God and man, is God not naturally, but by participation, i.e. by grace; even as all other holy men are called gods—Christ being more excellently so than the rest, on account of His more abundant grace. And thus, when it is said that “God is man,” God does not stand for the true and natural God. And this is the heresy of Photinus, which was disproved above ([4045]Q[2], AA[10],11). But some admit this proposition, together with the reality of both terms, holding that Christ is true God and true man; yet they do not preserve the truth of the predication. For they say that man is predicated of God by reason of a certain conjunction either of dignity, or of authority, or of affection or indwelling. It was thus that Nestorius held God to be man—nothing further being meant than that God is joined to man by such a conjunction that man is dwelt in by God, and united to Him in affection, and in a share of the Divine authority and honor. And into the same error fall those who suppose two supposita or hypostases in Christ, since it is impossible to understand how, of two things distinct in suppositum or hypostasis, one can be properly predicated of the other: unless merely by a figurative expression, inasmuch as they are united in something, as if we were to say that Peter is John because they are somehow mutually joined together. And these opinions also were disproved above ([4046]Q[2], AA[3],6).

Hence, supposing the truth of the Catholic belief, that the true Divine Nature is united with true human nature not only in person, but also in suppositum or hypostasis; we say that this proposition is true and proper, “God is man”—not only by the truth of its terms, i.e. because Christ is true God and true man, but by the truth of the predication. For a word signifying the common nature in the concrete may stand for all contained in the common nature, as this word “man” may stand for any individual man. And thus this word “God,” from its very mode of signification, may stand for the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the [4047]FP, Q[39], A[4]. Now of every suppositum of any nature we may truly and properly predicate a word signifying that nature in the concrete, as “man” may properly and truly be predicated of Socrates and Plato. Hence, since the Person of the Son of God for Whom this word “God” stands, is a suppositum of human nature this word man may be truly and properly predicated of this word “God,” as it stands for the Person of the Son of God.

Reply to Objection 1: When different forms cannot come together in one suppositum, the proposition is necessarily in remote matter, the subject signifying one form and the predicate another. But when two forms can come together in one suppositum, the matter is not remote, but natural or contingent, as when I say: “Something white is musical.” Now the Divine and human natures, although most widely apart, nevertheless come together by the mystery of the Incarnation in one suppositum, in which neither exists accidentally, but [both] essentially. Hence this proposition is neither in remote nor in contingent, but in natural matter; and man is not predicated of God accidentally, but essentially, as being predicated of its hypostasis—not, indeed, by reason of the form signified by this word “God,” but by reason of the suppositum, which is a hypostasis of human nature.

Reply to Objection 2: The three Divine Persons agree in one Nature, and are distinguished in suppositum; and hence they are not predicated one of another. But in the mystery of the Incarnation the natures, being distinct, are not predicated one of the other, in the abstract. For the Divine Nature is not the human nature. But because they agree in suppositum, they are predicated of each other in the concrete.

Reply to Objection 3: “Soul” and “flesh” are taken in the abstract, even as Godhead and manhood; but in the concrete we say “animate” and “carnal” or “corporeal,” as, on the other hand, “God” and “man.” Hence in both cases the abstract is not predicated of the abstract, but only the concrete of the concrete.

Reply to Objection 4: This word “man” is predicated of God, because of the union in person, and this union implies a relation. Hence it does not follow the rule of those words which are absolutely predicated of God from eternity.

Whether this is true: “Man is God”?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: “Man is God.” For God is an incommunicable name; hence (Wis. 13:10; 14:21) idolaters are rebuked for giving the name of God, which is incommunicable, to wood and stones. Hence with equal reason does it seem unbecoming that this word “God” should be predicated of man.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is predicated of the predicate may be predicated of the subject. But this is true: “God is the Father,” or “God is the Trinity.” Therefore, if it is true that “Man is God,” it seems that this also is true: “Man is the Father,” or “Man is the Trinity.” But these are false. Therefore the first is false.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Ps. 80:10): “There shall be no new God in thee.” But man is something new; for Christ was not always man. Therefore this is false: “Man is God.”

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 9:5): “Of whom is Christ according to the flesh, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever.” Now Christ, according to the flesh, is man. Therefore this is true: “Man is God.”

I answer that, Granted the reality of both natures, i.e. Divine and human, and of the union in person and hypostasis, this is true and proper: “Man is God,” even as this: “God is man.” For this word “man” may stand for any hypostasis of human nature; and thus it may stand for the Person of the Son of God, Whom we say is a hypostasis of human nature. Now it is manifest that the word “God” is truly and properly predicated of the Person of the Son of God, as was said in the [4048]FP, Q[39], A[4]. Hence it remains that this is true and proper: “Man is God.”

Reply to Objection 1: Idolaters attributed the name of the Deity to stones and wood, considered in their own nature, because they thought there was something divine in them. But we do not attribute the name of the Deity to the man in His human nature, but in the eternal suppositum, which by union is a suppositum of human nature, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: This word “Father” is predicated of this word “God,” inasmuch as this word “God” stands for the Person of the Father. And in this way it is not predicated of the Person of the Son, because the Person of the Son is not the Person of the Father. And, consequently, it is not necessary that this word “Father” be predicated of this word “Man,” of which the Word “God” is predicated, inasmuch as “Man” stands for the Person of the Son.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the human nature in Christ is something new, yet the suppositum of the human nature is not new, but eternal. And because this word “God” is predicated of man not on account of the human nature, but by reason of the suppositum, it does not follow that we assert a new God. But this would follow, if we held that “Man” stands for a created suppositum: even as must be said by those who assert that there are two supposita in Christ [*Cf.[4049] Q[2], AA[3],6].

Whether Christ can be called a lordly man?

[*The question is hardly apposite in English. St. Thomas explains why we can say in Latin, e.g. ‘oratio dominica’ (the Lord’s Prayer) or ‘passio dominica’ (Our Lord’s Passion), but not speak of our Lord as ‘homo dominicus’ (a lordly man)].

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ can be called a lordly man. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36) that “we are to be counseled to hope for the goods that were in the Lordly Man”; and he is speaking of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ was a lordly man.

Objection 2: Further, as lordship belongs to Christ by reason of His Divine Nature, so does manhood belong to the human nature. Now God is said to be “humanized,” as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11), where he says that “being humanized manifests the conjunction with man.” Hence with like reason may it be said denominatively that this man is lordly.

Objection 3: Further, as “lordly” is derived from “lord,” so is Divine derived from “Deus” [God]. But Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iv) calls Christ the “most Divine Jesus.” Therefore with like reason may Christ be called a lordly man.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i, 19): “I do not see that we may rightly call Jesus Christ a lordly man, since He is the Lord Himself.”

I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 3), when we say “the Man Christ Jesus,” we signify the eternal suppositum, which is the Person of the Son of God, because there is only one suppositum of both natures. Now “God” and “Lord” are predicated essentially of the Son of God; and hence they ought not to be predicated denominatively, since this is derogatory to the truth of the union. Hence, since we say “lordly” denominatively from lord, it cannot truly and properly be said that this Man is lordly, but rather that He is Lord. But if, when we say “the Man Christ Jesus,” we mean a created suppositum, as those who assert two supposita in Christ, this man might be called lordly, inasmuch as he is assumed to a participation of Divine honor, as the Nestorians said. And, even in this way, the human nature is not called “divine” by essence, but “deified”—not, indeed, by its being converted into the Divine Nature, but by its conjunction with the Divine Nature in one hypostasis, as is plain from Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii, 11,17).

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine retracts these and the like words (Retract. i, 19); hence, after the foregoing words (Retract. i, 19), he adds: “Wherever I have said this,” viz. that Christ Jesus is a lordly man, “I wish it unsaid, having afterwards seen that it ought not to be said although it may be defended with some reason,” i.e. because one might say that He was called a lordly man by reason of the human nature, which this word “man” signifies, and not by reason of the suppositum.

Reply to Objection 2: This one suppositum, which is of the human and Divine natures, was first of the Divine Nature, i.e. from eternity. Afterwards in time it was made a suppositum of human nature by the Incarnation. And for this reason it is said to be “humanized”—not that it assumed a man, but that it assumed human nature. But the converse of this is not true, viz. that a suppositum of human nature assumed the Divine Nature; hence we may not say a “deified” or “lordly” man.

Reply to Objection 3: This word Divine is wont to be predicated even of things of which the word God is predicated essentially; thus we say that “the Divine Essence is God,” by reason of identity; and that “the Essence belongs to God,” or is “Divine,” on account of the different way of signifying; and we speak of the “Divine Word,” though the Word is God. So, too, we say “a Divine Person,” just as we say “the person of Plato,” on account of its different mode of signification. But “lordly” is not predicated of those of which “lord” is predicated; for we are not wont to call a man who is a lord, lordly; but whatsoever belongs to a lord is called lordly, as the “lordly will,” or the “lordly hand,” or the “lordly possession.” And hence the man Christ, Who is our Lord, cannot be called lordly; yet His flesh can be called “lordly flesh” and His passion the “lordly passion.”

Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God. For contrary things cannot be said of the same. Now, what belongs to human nature is contrary to what is proper to God, since God is uncreated, immutable, and eternal, and it belongs to the human nature to be created temporal and mutable. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.

Objection 2: Further, to attribute to God what is defective seems to be derogatory to the Divine honor, and to be a blasphemy. Now what pertains to the human nature contains a kind of defect, as to suffer, to die, and the like. Hence it seems that what pertains to the human nature can nowise be said of God.

Objection 3: Further, to be assumed pertains to the human nature; yet it does not pertain to God. Therefore what belongs to the human nature cannot be said of God.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that “God assumed the idioms,” i.e. the properties, “of flesh, since God is said to be passible, and the God of glory was crucified.”

I answer that, On this question there was a difference of opinion between Nestorians and Catholics. The Nestorians wished to divide words predicated of Christ, in this way, viz. that such as pertained to human nature should not be predicated of God, and that such as pertained to the Divine

Nature should not be predicated of the Man. Hence Nestorius said: “If anyone attempt to attribute sufferings to the Word, let him be anathema” [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 29]. But if there are any words applicable to both natures, of them they predicated what pertained to both natures, as “Christ” or “Lord.” Hence they granted that Christ was born of a Virgin, and that He was from eternity; but they did not say that God was born of a virgin, or that the Man was from eternity. Catholics on the other hand maintained that words which are said of Christ either in His Divine or in His human nature may be said either of God or of man. Hence Cyril says [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: “If anyone ascribes to two persons or substances,” i.e. hypostases, “such words as are in the evangelical and apostolic Scriptures, or have been said of Christ by the Saints, or by Himself of Himself, and believes that some are to be applied to the Man, and apportions some to the Word alone—let him be anathema.” And the reason of this is that, since there is one hypostasis of both natures, the same hypostasis is signified by the name of either nature. Thus whether we say “man” or “God,” the hypostasis of Divine and human nature is signified. And hence, of the Man may be said what belongs to the Divine Nature, as of a hypostasis of the Divine Nature; and of God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a hypostasis of human nature.

Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that in a proposition in which something is predicated of another, we must not merely consider what the predicate is predicated of, but also the reason of its being predicated. Thus, although we do not distinguish things predicated of Christ, yet we distinguish that by reason of which they are predicated, since those things that belong to the Divine Nature are predicated of Christ in His Divine Nature, and those that belong to the human nature are predicated of Christ in His human nature. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. i, 11): “We must distinguish what is said by Scripture in reference to the form of God, wherein He is equal to the Father, and what in reference to the form of a servant, wherein He is less than the Father”: and further on he says (De Trin. i, 13): “The prudent, careful, and devout reader will discern the reason and point of view of what is said.”

Reply to Objection 1: It is impossible for contraries to be predicated of the same in the same respects, but nothing prevents their being predicated of the same in different aspects. And thus contraries are predicated of Christ, not in the same, but in different natures.

Reply to Objection 2: If the things pertaining to defect were attributed to God in His Divine Nature, it would be a blasphemy, since it would be derogatory to His honor. But there is no kind of wrong done to God if they are attributed to Him in His assumed nature. Hence in a discourse of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. 10] it is said: “God accounts nothing a wrong which is the occasion of man’s salvation. For no lowliness that He assumed for us injures that Nature which can be subject to no injury, yet makes lower things Its own, to save our nature. Therefore, since these lowly and worthless things do no harm to the Divine Nature, but bring about our salvation, how dost thou maintain that what was the cause of our salvation was the occasion of harm to God?”

Reply to Objection 3: To be assumed pertains to human nature, not in its suppositum, but in itself; and thus it does not belong to God.

Whether what belongs to the human nature can be predicated of the Divine Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that what belongs to the human nature can be said of the Divine Nature. For what belongs to the human nature is predicated of the Son of God, and of God. But God is His own Nature. Therefore, what belongs to the human nature may be predicated of the Divine Nature.

Objection 2: Further, the flesh pertains to human nature. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6), “we say, after the blessed Athanasius and Cyril, that the Nature of the Word was incarnate.” Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human nature may be said of the Divine Nature.

Objection 3: Further, what belongs to the Divine Nature belongs to Christ’s human nature; such as to know future things and to possess saving power. Therefore it would seem with equal reason that what belongs to the human may be said of the Divine Nature.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4): “When we mention the Godhead we do not predicate of it the idioms,” i.e. the properties, “of the humanity; for we do not say that the Godhead is passible or creatable.” Now the Godhead is the Divine Nature. Therefore what is proper to the human nature cannot be said of the Divine Nature.

I answer that, What belongs to one cannot be said of another, unless they are both the same; thus “risible” can be predicated only of man. Now in the mystery of the Incarnation the Divine and human natures are not the same; but the hypostasis of the two natures is the same. And hence what belongs to one nature cannot be predicated of the other if they are taken in the abstract. Now concrete words stand for the hypostasis of the nature; and hence of concrete words we may predicate indifferently what belongs to either nature—whether the word of which they are predicated refers to one nature, as the word “Christ,” by which is signified “both the Godhead anointing and the manhood anointed”; or to the Divine Nature alone, as this word “God” or “the Son of God”; or to the manhood alone, as this word “Man” or “Jesus.” Hence Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Palaest. cxxiv): “It is of no consequence from what substance we name Christ; because since the unity of person remains inseparably, one and the same is altogether Son of Man by His flesh, and altogether Son of God by the Godhead which He has with the Father.”

Reply to Objection 1: In God, Person and Nature are really the same; and by reason of this identity the Divine Nature is predicated of the Son of God. Nevertheless, its mode of predication is different; and hence certain things are said of the Son of God which are not said of the Divine Nature; thus we say that the Son of God is born, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature is born; as was said in the [4050]FP, Q[39], A[5]. So, too, in the mystery of the Incarnation we say that the Son of God suffered, yet we do not say that the Divine Nature suffered.

Reply to Objection 2: Incarnation implies union with flesh, rather than any property of flesh. Now in Christ each nature is united to the other in person; and by reason of this union the Divine Nature is said to be incarnate and the human nature deified, as stated above ([4051]Q[2], A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: What belongs to the Divine Nature is predicated of the human nature—not, indeed, as it belongs essentially to the Divine Nature, but as it is participated by the human nature. Hence, whatever cannot be participated by the human nature (as to be uncreated and omnipotent), is nowise predicated of the human nature. But the Divine Nature received nothing by participation from the human nature; and hence what belongs to the human nature can nowise be predicated of the Divine Nature.

Whether this is true: “God was made man”?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: “God was made man.” For since man signifies a substance, to be made man is to be made simply. But this is false: “God was made simply.” Therefore this is false: “God was made man.”

Objection 2: Further, to be made man is to be changed. But God cannot be the subject of change, according to Malachi 3:6: “I am the Lord, and I change not.” Hence this is false: “God was made man.”

Objection 3: Further, man as predicated of Christ stands for the Person of the Son of God. But this is false: “God was made the Person of the Son of God.” Therefore this is false: “God was made man.”

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:14): “The Word was made flesh”: and as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epictetum), “when he said, ‘The Word was made flesh,’ it is as if it were said that God was made man.”

I answer that, A thing is said to be made that which begins to be predicated of it for the first time. Now to be man is truly predicated of God, as stated above [4052](A[1]), yet in such sort that it pertains to God to be man, not from eternity, but from the time of His assuming human nature. Hence, this is true, “God was made man”; though it is understood differently by some: even as this, “God is man,” as we said above [4053](A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: To be made man is to be made simply, in all those in whom human nature begins to be in a newly created suppositum. But God is said to have been made man, inasmuch as the human nature began to be in an eternally pre-existing suppositum of the Divine Nature. And hence for God to be made man does not mean that God was made simply.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, to be made implies that something. is newly predicated of another. Hence, whenever anything is predicated of another, and there is a change in that of which it is predicated, then to be made is to be changed; and this takes place in whatever is predicated absolutely, for whiteness or greatness cannot newly affect anything, unless it be newly changed to whiteness or greatness. But whatever is predicated relatively can be newly predicated of anything without its change, as a man may be made to be on the right side without being changed and merely by the change of him on whose left side he was. Hence in such cases, not all that is said to be made is changed, since it may happen by the change of something else. And it is thus we say of God: “Lord, Thou art made [Douay: ‘hast been’] our refuge” (Ps. 89:1). Now to be man belongs to God by reason of the union, which is a relation. And hence to be man is newly predicated of God without any change in Him, by a change in the human nature, which is assumed to a Divine Person. And hence, when it is said, “God was made man,” we understand no change on the part of God, but only on the part of the human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Man stands not for the bare Person of the Son of God, but inasmuch as it subsists in human nature. Hence, although this is false, “God was made the Person of the Son of God,” yet this is true: “God was made man” by being united to human nature.

Whether this is true: “Man was made God”?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: “Man was made God.” For it is written (Rom. 1:2,3): “Which He had promised before by His prophets in the holy Scriptures, concerning His Son Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh.” Now Christ, as man, is of the seed of David according to the flesh. Therefore man was made the Son of God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 13) that “such was this assumption, which made God man, and man God.” But by reason of this assumption this is true: “God was made man.” Therefore, in like manner, this is true: “Man was made God.”

Objection 3: Further, Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): “God was humanized and man was deified, or whatever else one may like to call it.” Now God is said to be humanized by being made man. Therefore with equal reason man is said to be deified by being made God; and thus it is true that “Man was made God.”

Objection 4: Further, when it is said that “God was made man,” the subject of the making or uniting is not God, but human nature, which the word “man” signifies. Now that seems to be the subject of the making, to which the making is attributed. Hence “Man was made God” is truer than “God was made man.”

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 2): “We do not say that man was deified, but that God was humanized.” Now to be made God is the same as to be deified. Hence this is false: “Man was made God.”

I answer that, This proposition, Man was made God, may be understood in three ways. First, so that the participle “made” absolutely determines either the subject or the predicate; and in this sense it is false, since neither the Man of Whom it is predicated was made, nor is God made, as will be said ([4054]AA[8],9). And in the same sense this is false: “God was made man.” But it is not of this sense that we are now speaking. Secondly, it may be so understood that the word “made” determines the composition, with this meaning: “Man was made God, i.e. it was brought about that Man is God.” And in this sense both are true, viz. that “Man was made God” and that “God was made Man.” But this is not the proper sense of these phrases; unless, indeed, we are to understand that “man” has not a personal but a simple supposition. For although “this man” was not made God, because this suppositum, viz. the Person of the Son of God, was eternally God, yet man, speaking commonly, was not always God. Thirdly, properly understood, this participle “made” attaches making to man with relation to God, as the term of the making. And in this sense, granted that the Person or hypostasis in Christ are the same as the suppositum of God and Man, as was shown ([4055]Q[2], AA[2],3), this proposition is false, because, when it is said, “Man was made God,” “man” has a personal suppositum: because, to be God is not verified of the Man in His human nature, but in His suppositum. Now the suppositum of human nature, of Whom “to be God” is verified, is the same as the hypostasis or Person of the Son of God, Who was always God. Hence it cannot be said that this Man began to be God, or is made God, or that He was made God.

But if there were a different hypostasis of God and man, so that “to be God” was predicated of the man, and, conversely, by reason of a certain conjunction of supposita, or of personal dignity, or of affection or indwelling, as the Nestorians said, then with equal reason might it be said that Man was made God, i.e. joined to God, and that God was made Man, i.e. joined to man.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle the relative “Who” which refers to the Person of the Son of God ought not to be considered as affecting the predicate, as if someone already existing of the “seed of David according to the flesh” was made the Son of God—and it is in this sense that the objection takes it. But it ought to be taken as affecting the subject, with this meaning—that the “Son of God was made to Him (‘namely to the honor of the Father,’ as a gloss expounds it), being of the seed of David according to the flesh,” as if to say “the Son of God having flesh of the seed of David to the honor of God.”

Reply to Objection 2: This saying of Augustine is to be taken in the sense that by the assumption that took place in the Incarnation it was brought about that Man is God and God is Man; and in this sense both sayings are true as stated above.

The same is to be said in reply to the third, since to be deified is the same as to be made God.

Reply to Objection 4: A term placed in the subject is taken materially, i.e. for the suppositum; placed in the predicate it is taken formally, i.e. for the nature signified. Hence when it is said that “Man was made God,” the being made is not attributed to the human nature but to the suppositum of the human nature, Which is God from eternity, and hence it does not befit Him to be made God. But when it is said that “God was made Man,” the making is taken to be terminated in the human nature. Hence, properly speaking, this is true: “God was made Man,” and this is false: “Man was made God”; even as if Socrates, who was already a man, were made white, and were pointed out, this would be true: “This man was made white today,” and this would be false; “This white thing was made man today.” Nevertheless, if on the part of the subject there is added some word signifying human nature in the abstract, it might be taken in this way for the subject of the making, e.g. if it were said that “human nature was made the Son of God’s.”

Whether this is true: “Christ is a creature”?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is true: “Christ is a creature.” For Pope Leo says [*Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. xii de Nativ.]: “A new and unheard of covenant: God Who is and was, is made a creature.” Now we may predicate of Christ whatever the Son of God became by the Incarnation. Therefore this is true; Christ is a creature.

Objection 2: Further, the properties of both natures may be predicated of the common hypostasis of both natures, no matter by what word they are signified, as stated above [4056](A[5]). But it is the property of human nature to be created, as it is the property of the Divine Nature to be Creator. Hence both may be said of Christ, viz. that He is a creature and that he is uncreated and Creator.

Objection 3: Further, the principal part of a man is the soul rather than the body. But Christ, by reason of the body which He took from the Virgin, is said simply to be born of the Virgin. Therefore by reason of the soul which is created by God, it ought simply to be said that He is a creature.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Trin. i): "Was Christ made by a word? Was Christ created by a command?" as if to say: "No!" Hence he adds: "How can there be a creature in God? For God has a simple not a composite Nature." Therefore it must not be granted that "Christ is a creature."

I answer that, As Jerome [*Gloss, Ord. in Osee 2:16] says, "words spoken amiss lead to heresy"; hence with us and heretics the very words ought not to be in common, lest we seem to countenance their error. Now the Arian heretics said that Christ was a creature and less than the Father, not only in His human nature, but even in His Divine Person. And hence we must not say absolutely that Christ is a "creature" or "less than the Father"; but with a qualification, viz. "in His human nature." But such things as could not be considered to belong to the Divine Person in Itself may be predicated simply of Christ by reason of His human nature; thus we say simply that Christ suffered, died and was buried: even as in corporeal and human beings, things of which we may doubt whether they belong to the whole or the part, if they are observed to exist in a part, are not predicated of the whole simply, i.e. without qualification, for we do not say that the Ethiopian is white but that he is white as regards his teeth; but we say without qualification that he is curly, since this can only belong to him as regards his hair.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes, for the sake of brevity, the holy doctors use the word "creature" of Christ, without any qualifying term; we should however take as understood the qualification, "as man."

Reply to Objection 2: All the properties of the human, just as of the Divine Nature, may be predicated equally of Christ. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that “Christ Who God and Man, is called created and uncreated, passible and impassible.” Nevertheless things of which we may doubt to what nature they belong, are not to be predicated without a qualification. Hence he afterwards adds (De Fide Orth. iv, 5) that “the one hypostasis,” i.e. of Christ, “is uncreated in its Godhead and created in its manhood”: even so conversely, we may not say without qualification, “Christ is incorporeal” or “impassible”; in order to avoid the error of Manes, who held that Christ had not a true body, nor truly suffered, but we must say, with a qualification, that Christ was incorporeal and impassible “in His Godhead.”

Reply to Objection 3: There can be no doubt how the birth from the Virgin applies to the Person of the Son of God, as there can be in the case of creation; and hence there is no parity.

Whether this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be?

Objection 1: It would seem that this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be. For Augustine says (Tract. cv in Joan.) that “before the world was, neither were we, nor the Mediator of God and men—the Man Jesus Christ.” But what was not always, has begun to be. Therefore this Man, i.e. Christ, began to be.

Objection 2: Further, Christ began to be Man. But to be man is to be simply. Therefore this man began to be, simply.

Objection 3: Further, “man” implies a suppositum of human nature. But Christ was not always a suppositum of human nature. Therefore this Man began to be.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 13:8): “Jesus Christ yesterday and today: and the same for ever.”

I answer that, We must not say that “this Man”—pointing to Christ—“began to be,” unless we add something. And this for a twofold reason. First, for this proposition is simply false, in the judgment of the Catholic Faith, which affirms that in Christ there is one suppositum and one hypostasis, as also one Person. For according to this, when we say “this Man,” pointing to Christ, the eternal suppositum is necessarily meant, with

Whose eternity a beginning in time is incompatible. Hence this is false: "This Man began to be." Nor does it matter that to begin to be refers to the human nature, which is signified by this word "man"; because the term placed in the subject is not taken formally so as to signify the nature, but is taken materially so as to signify the suppositum, as was said (A[1], ad 4). Secondly, because even if this proposition were true, it ought not to be made use of without qualification; in order to avoid the heresy of Arius, who, since he pretended that the Person of the Son of God is a creature, and less than the Father, so he maintained that He began to be, saying "there was a time when He was not."

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted must be qualified, i.e. we must say that the Man Jesus Christ was not, before the world was, "in His humanity."

Reply to Objection 2: With this word "begin" we cannot argue from the lower species to the higher. For it does not follow if "this began to be white," that therefore "it began to be colored." And this because "to begin" implies being now and not heretofore: for it does not follow if "this was not white hitherto" that "therefore it was not colored hitherto." Now, to be simply is higher than to be man. Hence this does not follow: "Christ began to be Man—therefore He began to be."

Reply to Objection 3: This word "Man," as it is taken for Christ, although it signifies the human nature, which began to be, nevertheless signifies the eternal suppositum which did not begin to be. Hence, since it signifies the suppositum when placed in the subject, and refers to the nature when placed in the predicate, therefore this is false: "The Man Christ began to be": but this is true: "Christ began to be Man."

Whether this is true: "Christ as Man is a creature"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this is false: "Christ as Man is a creature," or "began to be." For nothing in Christ is created except the human nature. But this is false: "Christ as Man is the human nature." Therefore this is also false; Christ as Man is a creature.

Objection 2: Further, the predicate is predicated of the term placed in reduplication, rather than of the subject of the proposition; as when I say: "A body as colored is visible," it follows that the colored is visible. But as stated ([4057]AA[8],9) we must not absolutely grant that “the Man Christ is a creature”; nor consequently that “Christ as Man is a creature.”

Objection 3: Further, whatever is predicated of a man as man is predicated of him “per se” and simply, for “per se” is the same as “inasmuch as itself,” as is said Metaph. v, text. 23. But this is false: “Christ as Man is per se and simply a creature.” Hence this, too, is false; “Christ as Man is a creature.”

On the contrary, Whatever is, is either Creator or creature. But this is false: “Christ as Man is Creator.” Therefore this is true: “Christ as Man is a creature.”

I answer that, When we say “Christ as Man” this word “man” may be added in the reduplication, either by reason of the suppositum or by reason of the nature. If it be added by reason of the suppositum, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is eternal and uncreated, this will be false: “Christ as Man is a creature.” But if it be added by reason of the human nature, it is true, since by reason of the human nature or in the human nature, it belongs to Him to be a creature, as was said [4058](A[8]).

It must however be borne in mind that the term covered by the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, since it is added as a predicate, which is taken formally, for it is the same to say “Christ as Man” and to say “Christ as He is a Man.” Hence this is to be granted rather than denied: “Christ as Man is a creature.” But if something further be added whereby [the term covered by the reduplication] is attracted to the suppositum, this proposition is to be denied rather than granted, for instance were one to say: “Christ as ‘this’ Man is a creature.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ is not the human nature, He has human nature. Now the word “creature” is naturally predicated not only of abstract, but also of concrete things; since we say that “manhood is a creature” and that “man is a creature.”

Reply to Objection 2: Man as placed in the subject refers to the suppositum—and as placed in the reduplication refers to the nature, as was stated above. And because the nature is created and the suppositum uncreated, therefore, although it is not granted that “this man is a creature,” yet it is granted that “Christ as Man is a creature.”

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to every man who is a suppositum of human nature alone to have his being only in human nature. Hence of every such suppositum it follows that if it is a creature as man, it is a creature simply. But Christ is a suppositum not merely of human nature, but also of the Divine Nature, in which He has an uncreated being. Hence it does not follow that, if He is a creature as Man, He is a creature simply.

Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is God”?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ, as Man, is God. For Christ is God by the grace of union. But Christ, as Man, has the grace of union. Therefore Christ as Man is God.

Objection 2: Further, to forgive sins is proper to God, according to Is. 43:25: “I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake.” But Christ as Man forgives sin, according to Mat. 9:6: “But that you may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins,” etc. Therefore Christ as Man is God.

Objection 3: Further, Christ is not Man in common, but is this particular Man. Now Christ, as this Man, is God, since by “this Man” we signify the eternal suppositum which is God naturally. Therefore Christ as Man is God.

On the contrary, Whatever belongs to Christ as Man belongs to every man. Now, if Christ as Man is God, it follows that every man is God—which is clearly false.

I answer that, This term “man” when placed in the reduplication may be taken in two ways. First as referring to the nature; and in this way it is not true that Christ as Man is God, because the human nature is distinct from the Divine by a difference of nature. Secondly it may be taken as referring to the suppositum; and in this way, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ is the Person of the Son of God, to Whom it essentially belongs to be God, it is true that Christ, as Man, is God. Nevertheless because the term placed in the reduplication signifies the nature rather than the suppositum, as stated above [4059](A[10]), hence this is to be denied rather than granted: “Christ as Man is God.”

Reply to Objection 1: It is not with regard to the same, that a thing moves towards, and that it is, something; for to move belongs to a thing because of its matter or subject—and to be in act belongs to it because of its form. So too it is not with regard to the same, that it belongs to Christ to be ordained to be God by the grace of union, and to be God. For the first belongs to Him in His human nature, and the second, in His Divine Nature. Hence this is true: “Christ as Man has the grace of union”; yet not this: “Christ as Man is God.”

Reply to Objection 2: The Son of Man has on earth the power of forgiving sins, not by virtue of the human nature, but by virtue of the Divine Nature, in which Divine Nature resides the power of forgiving sins authoritatively; whereas in the human nature it resides instrumentally and ministerially. Hence Chrysostom expounding this passage says [*Implicitly. Hom. xxx in Matth; cf. St. Thomas, Catena Aurea on Mk. 2:10]: “He said pointedly ‘on earth to forgive sins,’ in order to show that by an indivisible union He united human nature to the power of the Godhead, since although He was made Man, yet He remained the Word of God.”

Reply to Objection 3: When we say “this man,” the demonstrative pronoun “this” attracts “man” to the suppositum; and hence “Christ as this Man, is God, is a truer proposition than Christ as Man is God.”

Whether this is true: “Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person”?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as Man is a hypostasis or person. For what belongs to every man belongs to Christ as Man, since He is like other men according to Phil. 2:7: “Being made in the likeness of men.” But every man is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

Objection 2: Further, Christ as Man is a substance of rational nature. But He is not a universal substance: therefore He is an individual substance. Now a person is nothing else than an individual substance of rational nature; as Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.). Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

Objection 3: Further, Christ as Man is a being of human nature, and a suppositum and a hypostasis of the same nature. But every hypostasis and suppositum and being of human nature is a person. Therefore Christ as Man is a person.

On the contrary, Christ as Man is not an eternal person. Therefore if Christ as Man is a person it would follow that in Christ there are two persons—one temporal and the other eternal, which is erroneous, as was said above ([4060]Q[2], A[6];[4061] Q[4], A[2]).

I answer that, As was said ([4062]AA[10],11), the term “Man” placed in the reduplication may refer either to the suppositum or to the nature. Hence when it is said: “Christ as Man is a person,” if it is taken as referring to the suppositum, it is clear that Christ as Man is a person, since the suppositum of human nature is nothing else than the Person of the Son of God. But if it be taken as referring to the nature, it may be understood in two ways. First, we may so understand it as if it belonged to human nature to be in a person, and in this way it is true, for whatever subsists in human nature is a person. Secondly it may be taken that in Christ a proper personality, caused by the principles of the human nature, is due to the human nature; and in this way Christ as Man is not a person, since the human nature does not exist of itself apart from the Divine Nature, and yet the notion of person requires this.

Reply to Objection 1: It belongs to every man to be a person, inasmuch as everything subsisting in human nature is a person. Now this is proper to the Man Christ that the Person subsisting in His human nature is not caused by the principles of the human nature, but is eternal. Hence in one way He is a person, as Man; and in another way He is not, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The “individual substance,” which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance subsisting of itself and separate from all else; otherwise, a man’s hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and singular.

Reply to Objection 3: As a person signifies something complete and self-subsisting in rational nature, so a hypostasis, suppositum, and being of nature in the genus of substance, signify something that subsists of itself. Hence, as human nature is not of itself a person apart from the Person of the Son of God, so likewise it is not of itself a hypostasis or suppositum or a being of nature. Hence in the sense in which we deny that “Christ as Man is a person” we must deny all the other propositions.

OF CHRIST’S UNITY OF BEING (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider what pertains to Christ’s unity in common. For, in their proper place, we must consider what pertains to unity and plurality in detail: thus we concluded ([4063]Q[9]) that there is not only one knowledge in Christ, and it will be concluded hereafter ([4064]Q[35], A[2]) that there is not only one nativity in Christ.

Hence we must consider Christ's unity (1) of being; (2) of will; (3) of operation.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ is one or two?

(2) Whether there is only one being in Christ?

Whether Christ is one or two?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not one, but two. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): "Because the form of God took the form of a servant, both are God by reason of God Who assumed, yet both are Man by reason of the man assumed." Now "both" may only be said when there are two. Therefore Christ is two.

Objection 2: Further, where there is one thing and another there are two. Now Christ is one thing and another; for Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxv): "Being in the form of God . . . He took the form of a servant . . . being both in one; but He was one of these as Word, and the other as man." Therefore Christ is two.

Objection 3: Further, Christ is not only man; for, if He were a mere man, He would not be God. Therefore He is something else than man, and thus in Christ there is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.

Objection 4: Further, Christ is something that the Father is, and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.

Objection 5: Further, as in the mystery of the Trinity there are three Persons in one Nature, so in the mystery of the Incarnation there are two natures in one Person. But on account of the unity of the Nature, notwithstanding the distinction of Person, the Father and Son are one, according to Jn. 10:30: "I and the Father are one." Therefore, notwithstanding the unity of Person, Christ is two on account of the duality of nature.

Objection 6: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text. 18) that "one" and "two" are predicated denominatively. Now Christ has a duality of nature. Therefore Christ is two.

Objection 7: Further, as accidental form makes a thing otherwise [alterum] so does substantial form make another thing [aliud] as Porphyry says (Praedic.). Now in Christ there are two substantial natures, the human and the Divine. Therefore Christ is one thing and another. Therefore Christ is two.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): "Whatever is, inasmuch as it is, is one." But we confess that Christ is. Therefore Christ is one.

I answer that, Nature, considered in itself, as it is used in the abstract, cannot truly be predicated of the suppositum or person, except in God, in Whom "what it is" and "whereby it is" do not differ, as stated in the [4065]FP, Q[29], A[4], ad 1. But in Christ, since there are two natures, viz. the Divine and the human, one of them, viz. the Divine, may be predicated of Him both in the abstract and in the concrete, for we say that the Son of God, Who is signified by the word Christ, is the Divine Nature and is God. But the human nature cannot be predicated of Christ in the abstract, but only in the concrete, i.e. as it is signified by the suppositum. For we cannot truly say that "Christ is human nature," because human nature is not naturally predicated of its suppositum. But we say that Christ is a man, even as Christ is God. Now God signifies one having the Godhead, and man signifies one having manhood. Yet one having manhood is differently signified by the word "man" and by the word "Jesus" or "Peter." For this word "man" implies one having manhood indistinctly, even as the word "God" implies indistinctly one having the Godhead; but the word "Peter" or "Jesus" implies one having manhood distinctly, i.e. with its determinate individual properties, as "Son of God" implies one having the Godhead under a determinate personal property. Now the dual number is placed in Christ with regard to the natures. Hence, if both the natures were predicated in the abstract of Christ, it would follow that Christ is two. But because the two natures are not predicated of Christ, except as they are signified in the suppositum, it must be by reason of the suppositum that "one" or "two" be predicated of Christ.

Now some placed two supposita in Christ, and one Person, which, in their opinion, would seem to be the suppositum completed with its final completion. Hence, since they placed two supposita in Christ, they said that God is two, in the neuter. But because they asserted one Person, they said that Christ is one, in the masculine, for the neuter gender signifies something unformed and imperfect, whereas the masculine signifies something formed and perfect. on the other hand, the Nestorians, who asserted two Persons in Christ, said that Christ is two not only in the neuter, but also in the masculine. But since we maintain one person and one suppositum in Christ, as is clear from[4066] Q[2], AA[2],3, it follows that we say that Christ is one not merely in the masculine, but also in the neuter.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is not to be taken as if “both” referred to the predicate, so as to mean that Christ is both; but it refers to the subject. And thus “both” does not stand for two supposita, but for two words signifying two natures in the concrete. For I can say that “both, viz. God and Man, are God” on account of God Who assumes; and “both, viz. God and Man,” are Man on account of the man assumed.

Reply to Objection 2: When it is said that “Christ is one thing and another,” this saying is to be explained in this sense—“having this nature and another.” And it is in this way that Augustine explains it (Contra Felic. xi), where, after saying, “In the mediator of God and man, the Son of God is one thing, and the Son of Man another,” he adds: “I say another thing by reason of the difference of substance, and not another thing by reason of the unity of person.” Hence Gregory Nazianzen says (Ep. ad Chelid. ci): “If we must speak briefly, that of which the Saviour is, is one thing and another; thus the invisible is not the same as the visible; and what is without time is not the same as what is in time. Yet they are not one and another: far from it; for both these are one.”

Reply to Objection 3: This is false, “Christ is only man”; because it does not exclude another suppositum, but another nature, since terms placed in the predicate are taken formally. But if anything is added whereby it is drawn to the suppositum, it would be a true proposition—for instance, “Christ is only that which is man.” Nevertheless, it would not follow that He is “any other thing than man,” because “another thing,” inasmuch as it refers to a diversity of substance, properly refers to the suppositum. even as all relative things bearing a personal relation. But it does follow: “Therefore He has another nature.”

Reply to Objection 4: When it is said, “Christ is something that the Father is”; “something” signifies the Divine Nature, which is predicated even in the abstract of the Father and Son. But when it is said: “Christ is something that is not the Father"; "something" signifies, not the human nature as it is in the abstract, but as it is in the concrete; not, indeed, in a distinct, but in an indistinct suppositum, i.e. inasmuch as it underlies the nature and not the individuating properties. Hence it does not follow that Christ is one thing and another, or that He is two, since the suppositum of the human nature in Christ, which is the Person of the Son of God, does not reckon numerically with the Divine Nature, which is predicated of the Father and Son.

Reply to Objection 5: In the mystery of the Divine Trinity the Divine Nature is predicated, even in the abstract of the three Persons; hence it may be said simply that the three Persons are one. But in the mystery of the Incarnation both natures are not predicated in the abstract of Christ; hence it cannot be said simply that Christ is two.

Reply to Objection 6: Two signifies what has duality, not in another, but in the same thing of which "two" is predicated. Now what is predicated is said of the suppositum, which is implied by the word "Christ." Hence, although Christ has duality of nature, yet, because He has not duality of suppositum, it cannot be said that Christ is two.

Reply to Objection 7: Otherwise implies diversity of accident. Hence diversity of accident suffices for anything to be called "otherwise" simply. But "another thing" implies diversity of substance. Now not merely the nature, but also the suppositum is said to be a substance, as is said Metaph. v, text. 15. Hence diversity of nature does not suffice for anything to be called "another thing" simply, unless there is diversity of suppositum. But diversity of nature makes "another thing" relatively, i.e. in nature, if there is no diversity of suppositum.

Whether there is only one being in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is not merely one being, but two. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 13) that whatever follows the nature is doubled in Christ. But being follows the nature, for being is from the form. Hence in Christ there are two beings.

Objection 2: Further, the being of the Son of God is the Divine Nature itself, and is eternal: whereas the being of the Man Christ is not the Divine

Nature, but is a temporal being. Therefore there is not only one being in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, in the Trinity, although there are three Persons, yet on account of the unity of nature there is only one being. But in Christ there are two natures, though there is one Person. Therefore in Christ there is not only one being.

Objection 4: Further, in Christ the soul gives some being to the body, since it is its form. But it does not give the Divine being, since this is uncreated. Therefore in Christ there is another being besides the Divine being; and thus in Christ there is not only one being.

On the contrary, Everything is said to be a being, inasmuch as it is one, for one and being are convertible. Therefore, if there were two beings in Christ, and not one only, Christ would be two, and not one.

I answer that, Because in Christ there are two natures and one hypostasis, it follows that things belonging to the nature in Christ must be two; and that those belonging to the hypostasis in Christ must be only one. Now being pertains both to the nature and to the hypostasis; to the hypostasis as to that which has being—and to the nature as to that whereby it has being. For nature is taken after the manner of a form, which is said to be a being because something is by it; as by whiteness a thing is white, and by manhood a thing is man. Now it must be borne in mind that if there is a form or nature which does not pertain to the personal being of the subsisting hypostasis, this being is not said to belong to the person simply, but relatively; as to be white is the being of Socrates, not as he is Socrates, but inasmuch as he is white. And there is no reason why this being should not be multiplied in one hypostasis or person; for the being whereby Socrates is white is distinct from the being whereby he is a musician. But the being which belongs to the very hypostasis or person in itself cannot possibly be multiplied in one hypostasis or person, since it is impossible that there should not be one being for one thing.

If, therefore, the human nature accrued to the Son of God, not hypostatically or personally, but accidentally, as some maintained, it would be necessary to assert two beings in Christ—one, inasmuch as He is God—the other, inasmuch as He is Man; even as in Socrates we place one being inasmuch as he is white, and another inasmuch as he is a man, since "being white" does not pertain to the personal being of Socrates. But being possessed of a head, being corporeal, being animated—all these pertain to the one person of Socrates, and hence there arises from these only the one being of Socrates. And if it so happened that after the person of Socrates was constituted there accrued to him hands or feet or eyes, as happened to him who was born blind, no new being would be thereby added to Socrates, but only a relation to these, i.e. inasmuch as he would be said to be, not only with reference to what he had previously, but also with reference to what accrued to him afterwards. And thus, since the human nature is united to the Son of God, hypostatically or personally as was said above ([4067]Q[2], AA[5],6), and not accidentally, it follows that by the human nature there accrued to Him no new personal being, but only a new relation of the pre-existing personal being to the human nature, in such a way that the Person is said to subsist not merely in the Divine, but also in the human nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Being is consequent upon nature, not as upon that which has being, but as upon that whereby a thing is: whereas it is consequent upon person or hypostasis, as upon that which has being. Hence it has unity from the unity of hypostasis, rather than duality from the duality of the nature.

Reply to Objection 2: The eternal being of the Son of God, which is the Divine Nature, becomes the being of man, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of God to unity of Person.

Reply to Objection 3: As was said in the [4068]FP, Q[50], A[2], ad 3; [4069]FP, Q[75], A[5], ad 4, since the Divine Person is the same as the Nature, there is no distinction in the Divine Persons between the being of the Person and the being of the Nature, and, consequently, the three Persons have only one being. But they would have a triple being if the being of the Person were distinct in them from the being of the Nature.

Reply to Objection 4: In Christ the soul gives being to the body, inasmuch as it makes it actually animated, which is to give it the complement of its nature and species. But if we consider the body perfected by the soul, without the hypostasis having both—this whole, composed of soul and body, as signified by the word “humanity,” does not signify “what is,” but “whereby it is.” Hence being belongs to the subsisting person, inasmuch as it has a relation to such a nature, and of this relation the soul is the cause, inasmuch as it perfects human nature by informing the body.

OF CHRIST’S UNITY OF WILL (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider unity as regards the will; and under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the Divine will and the human are distinct in Christ?

(2) Whether in Christ’s human nature the will of sensuality is distinct from the will of reason?

(3) Whether as regards the reason there were several wills in Christ?

(4) Whether there was free-will in Christ?

(5) Whether Christ’s human will was always conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed?

(6) Whether there was any contrariety of wills in Christ?

Whether there are two wills in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are not two wills, one Divine, the other human. For the will is the first mover and first commander in whoever wills. But in Christ the first mover and commander was the Divine will, since in Christ everything human was moved by the Divine will. Hence it seems that in Christ there was only one will, viz. the Divine.

Objection 2: Further, an instrument is not moved by its own will but by the will of its mover. Now the human nature of Christ was the instrument of His Godhead. Hence the human nature of Christ was not moved by its own will, but by the Divine will.

Objection 3: Further, that alone is multiplied in Christ which belongs to the nature. But the will does not seem to pertain to nature: for natural things are of necessity; whereas what is voluntary is not of necessity. Therefore there is but one will in Christ.

Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that “to will in this or that way belongs not to our nature but to our intellect,” i.e. our personal intellect. But every will is this or that will, since there is nothing in a genus which is not at the same time in some one of its species. Therefore all will belongs to the person. But in Christ there was and is but one person. Therefore in Christ there is only one will.

On the contrary, our Lord says (Lk. 22:42): “Father, if Thou wilt, remove this chalice from Me. But yet not My will but Thine be done.” And Ambrose, quoting this to the Emperor Gratian (De Fide ii, 7) says: “As He assumed my will, He assumed my sorrow;” and on Lk. 22:42 he says: “His will, He refers to the Man—the Father’s, to the Godhead. For the will of man is temporal, and the will of the Godhead eternal.”

I answer that, Some placed only one will in Christ; but they seem to have had different motives for holding this. For Apollinaris did not hold an intellectual soul in Christ, but maintained that the Word was in place of the soul, or even in place of the intellect. Hence since “the will is in the reason,” as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9), it followed that in Christ there was no human will; and thus there was only one will in Him. So, too, Eutyches and all who held one composite nature in Christ were forced to place one will in Him. Nestorius, too, who maintained that the union of God and man was one of affection and will, held only one will in Christ. But later on, Macarius, Patriarch of Antioch, Cyrus of Alexandria, and Sergius of Constantinople and some of their followers, held that there is one will in Christ, although they held that in Christ there are two natures united in a hypostasis; because they believed that Christ’s human nature never moved with its own motion, but only inasmuch as it was moved by the Godhead, as is plain from the synodical letter of Pope Agatho [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 4].

And hence in the sixth Council held at Constantinople [*Act. 18] it was decreed that it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, in the following passage: “In accordance with what the Prophets of old taught us concerning Christ, and as He taught us Himself, and the Symbol of the Holy Fathers has handed down to us, we confess two natural wills in Him and two natural operations.” And this much it was necessary to say. For it is manifest that the Son of God assumed a perfect human nature, as was shown above (Q[5]; Q[9], A[1]). Now the will pertains to the perfection of human nature, being one of its natural powers, even as the intellect, as was stated in the FP, QQ[79],80. Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God suffered no diminution of what pertains to His Divine Nature, to which it belongs to have a will, as was said in the

[4070]FP, Q[19], A[1]. Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other Divine.

Reply to Objection 1: Whatever was in the human nature of Christ was moved at the bidding of the Divine will; yet it does not follow that in Christ there was no movement of the will proper to human nature, for the good wills of other saints are moved by God’s will, “Who worketh” in them “both to will and to accomplish,” as is written Phil. 2:13. For although the will cannot be inwardly moved by any creature, yet it can be moved inwardly by God, as was said in the [4071]FP, Q[105], A[4]. And thus, too, Christ by His human will followed the Divine will according to Ps. 39:9; “That I should do Thy will, O my God, I have desired it.” Hence Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): “Where the Son says to the Father, ‘Not what I will, but what Thou willest,’ what do you gain by adding your own words and saying ‘He shows that His will was truly subject to His Father,’ as if we denied that man’s will ought to be subject to God’s will?”

Reply to Objection 2: It is proper to an instrument to be moved by the principal agent, yet diversely, according to the property of its nature. For an inanimate instrument, as an axe or a saw, is moved by the craftsman with only a corporeal movement; but an instrument animated by a sensitive soul is moved by the sensitive appetite, as a horse by its rider; and an instrument animated with a rational soul is moved by its will, as by the command of his lord the servant is moved to act, the servant being like an animate instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2,4; Ethic. viii, 11). And hence it was in this manner that the human nature of Christ was the instrument of the Godhead, and was moved by its own will.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of the will is natural, and necessarily follows upon the nature; but the movement or act of this power—which is also called will—is sometimes natural and necessary, e.g. with respect to beatitude; and sometimes springs from free-will and is neither necessary nor natural, as is plain from what has been stated in the [4072]FS, Q[10], AA[1],[2] [*Cf. [4073]FP, Q[82], A[2]]. And yet even reason itself, which is the principle of this movement, is natural. Hence besides the Divine will it is necessary to place in Christ a human will, not merely as a natural power, or a natural movement, but even as a rational movement.

Reply to Objection 4: When we say “to will in a certain way,” we signify a determinate mode of willing. Now a determinate mode regards the thing of which it is the mode. Hence since the will pertains to the nature, “to will in a certain way” belongs to the nature, not indeed considered absolutely, but as it is in the hypostasis. Hence the human will of Christ had a determinate mode from the fact of being in a Divine hypostasis, i.e. it was always moved in accordance with the bidding of the Divine will.

Whether in Christ there was a will of sensuality besides the will of reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no will of sensuality besides the will of reason. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that “the will is in the reason, and in the sensitive appetite are the irascible and concupiscible parts.” Now sensuality signifies the sensitive appetite. Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13) the sensuality is signified by the serpent. But there was nothing serpent-like in Christ; for He had the likeness of a venomous animal without the venom, as Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 32). Hence in Christ there was no will of sensuality.

Objection 3: Further, will is consequent upon nature, as was said [4074] (A[1]). But in Christ there was only one nature besides the Divine. Hence in Christ there was only one human will.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 7): “Mine is the will which He calls His own; because as Man He assumed my sorrow.” From this we are given to understand that sorrow pertains to the human will of Christ. Now sorrow pertains to the sensuality, as was said in the [4075]FS, Q[23], A[1]; [4076]FS, Q[25], A[1]. Therefore, seemingly, in Christ there is a will of sensuality besides the will of reason.

I answer that, As was said ([4077]Q[9], A[1]), the Son of God assumed human nature together with everything pertaining to the perfection of human nature. Now in human nature is included animal nature, as the genus in its species. Hence the Son of God must have assumed together with the human nature whatever belongs to animal nature; one of which things is the sensitive appetite, which is called the sensuality. Consequently it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appetite, or sensuality. But it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it naturally obeys reason, is said to be “rational by participation,” as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). And because “the will is in the reason,” as stated above, it may equally be said that the sensuality is “a will by participation.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the will, essentially so called, which is only in the intellectual part; but the will by participation can be in the sensitive part, inasmuch as it obeys reason.

Reply to Objection 2: The sensuality is signified by the serpent—not as regards the nature of the sensuality, which Christ assumed, but as regards the corruption of the “fomes,” which was not in Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: “Where there is one thing on account of another, there seems to be only one” (Aristotle, Topic. iii); thus a surface which is visible by color is one visible thing with the color. So, too, because the sensuality is called the will, only because it partakes of the rational will, there is said to be but one human will in Christ, even as there is but one human nature.

Whether in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there were two wills as regards the reason. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that there is a double will in man, viz. the natural will which is called {thelesis}, and the rational will which is called {boulesis}. Now Christ in His human nature had whatever belongs to the perfection of human nature. Hence both the foregoing wills were in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, the appetitive power is diversified in man by the difference of the apprehensive power, and hence according to the difference of sense and intellect is the difference of sensitive and intellective appetite in man. But in the same way as regards man's apprehension, we hold the difference of reason and intellect; both of which were in Christ. Therefore there was a double will in Him, one intellectual and the other rational.

Objection 3: Further, some [*Hugh of St. Victor, De Quat. Volunt. Christ.] ascribe to Christ "a will of piety," which can only be on the part of reason. Therefore in Christ on the part of reason there are several wills.

On the contrary, In every order there is one first mover. But the will is the first mover in the genus of human acts. Therefore in one man there is only one will, properly speaking, which is the will of reason. But Christ is one man. Therefore in Christ there is only one human will.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), the will is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the act. Hence if the will is taken for the act, it is necessary to place two wills, i.e. two species of acts of the will in Christ on the part of the reason. For the will, as was said in the [4078]FS, Q[8], AA[2],3, regards both the end and the means; and is affected differently towards both. For towards the end it is borne simply and absolutely, as towards what is good in itself; but towards the means it is borne under a certain relation, as the goodness of the means depends on something else. Hence the act of the will, inasmuch as it is drawn to anything desired of itself, as health, which act is called by Damascene {thelesis}—i.e. simple will, and by the masters "will as nature," is different from the act of the will as it is drawn to anything that is desired only in order to something else, as to take medicine; and this act of the will Damascene calls {boulesis}—i.e. counseling will, and the masters, "will as reason.” But this diversity of acts does not diversify the power, since both acts regard the one common ratio of the object, which is goodness. Hence we must say that if we are speaking of the power of the will, in Christ there is but one human will, essentially so called and not by participation; but if we are speaking of the will as an act, we thus distinguish in Christ a will as nature, which is called {thelesis}, and a will as reason, which is called {boulesis}.

Reply to Objection 1: These two wills do not diversify the power but only the act, as we have said.

Reply to Objection 2: The intellect and the reason are not distinct powers, as was said in the [4079]FP, Q[79], A[8].

Reply to Objection 3: The “will of piety” would not seem to be distinct from the will considered as nature, inasmuch as it shrinks from another’s evil, absolutely considered.

Whether there was free-will in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there was no free-will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) that {gnome}, i.e. opinion, thinking or cogitation, and {proairesis}, i.e. choice, “cannot possibly be attributed to our Lord, if we wish to speak with propriety.” But in the things of faith especially we must speak with propriety. Therefore there was no choice in Christ and consequently no free-will, of which choice is the act.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is “a desire of something after taking counsel.” Now counsel does not appear to be in Christ, because we do not take counsel concerning such things as we are certain of. But Christ was certain of everything. Hence there was no counsel and consequently no free-will in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, free-will is indifferent. But Christ’s will was determined to good, since He could not sin; as stated above ([4080]Q[15], AA[1] ,2). Hence there was no free-will in Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:15): “He shall eat butter and honey, that He may know to refuse the evil and to choose the good,” which is an act of the free-will. Therefore there was free-will in Christ.

I answer that, As was said above [4081](A[3]), there was a twofold act of the will in Christ; one whereby He was drawn to anything willed in itself, which implies the nature of an end; the other whereby His will was drawn to anything willed on account of its being ordained to another—which pertains to the nature of means. Now, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) choice differs from will in this, that will of itself regards the end, while choice regards the means. And thus simple will is the same as the "will as nature"; but choice is the same as the "will as reason," and is the proper act of free-will, as was said in the [4082]FP, Q[83], A[3]. Hence, since "will as reason" is placed in Christ, we must also place choice, and consequently free-will, whose act is choice, as was said in the [4083]FP, Q[83], A[3]; [4084]FS, Q[13], A[1].

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene excludes choice from Christ, in so far as he considers that doubt is implied in the word choice. Nevertheless doubt is not necessary to choice, since it belongs even to God Himself to choose, according to Eph. 1:4: "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world," although in God there is no doubt. Yet doubt is accidental to choice when it is in an ignorant nature. We may also say the same of whatever else is mentioned in the passage quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: Choice presupposes counsel; yet it follows counsel only as determined by judgment. For what we judge to be done, we choose, after the inquiry of counsel, as is stated (Ethic. iii, 2,3). Hence if anything is judged necessary to be done, without any preceding doubt or inquiry, this suffices for choice. Therefore it is plain that doubt or inquiry belong to choice not essentially, but only when it is in an ignorant nature.

Reply to Objection 3: The will of Christ, though determined to good, is not determined to this or that good. Hence it pertains to Christ, even as to the blessed, to choose with a free-will confirmed in good.

Whether the human will of Christ was altogether conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human will in Christ did not will anything except what God willed. For it is written (Ps. 39:9) in the person of Christ: "That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it." Now he who desires to do another's will, wills what the other wills. Hence it seems that Christ's human will willed nothing but what was willed by His Divine will.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's soul had most perfect charity, which, indeed, surpasses the comprehension of all our knowledge, according to Eph. 3:19, "the charity of Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge." Now charity makes men will what God wills; hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that one mark of friendship is "to will and choose the same." Therefore the human will in Christ willed nothing else than was willed by His Divine will.

Objection 3: Further, Christ was a true comprehensor. But the Saints who are comprehensors in heaven will only what God wills, otherwise they would not be happy, because they would not obtain whatever they will, for "blessed is he who has what he wills, and wills nothing amiss," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5). Hence in His human will Christ wills nothing else than does the Divine will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. ii, 20): "When Christ says 'Not what I will, but what Thou wilt' He shows Himself to have willed something else than did His Father; and this could only have been by His human heart, since He did not transfigure our weakness into His Divine but into His human will."

I answer that, As was said ([4085]AA[2],3), in Christ according to His human nature there is a twofold will, viz. the will of sensuality, which is called will by participation, and the rational will, whether considered after the manner of nature, or after the manner of reason. Now it was said above (Q[13], A[3], ad 1; Q[14], A[1], ad 2) that by a certain dispensation the Son of God before His Passion "allowed His flesh to do and suffer what belonged to it." And in like manner He allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them. Now it is clear that the will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily hurt. In like manner, the will as nature turns from what is against nature and what is evil in itself, as death and the like; yet the will as reason may at time choose these things in relation to an end, as in a mere man the sensuality and the will absolutely considered shrink from burning, which, nevertheless, the will as reason may choose for the sake of health. Now it was the will of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of man's salvation. Hence it is plain that in His will of sensuality and in His rational will considered as nature, Christ could will what God did not; but in His will as reason He always willed the same as

God, which appears from what He says (Mat. 26:39): “Not as I will, but as Thou wilt.” For He willed in His reason that the Divine will should be fulfilled although He said that He willed something else by another will.

Reply to Objection 1: By His rational will Christ willed the Divine will to be fulfilled; but not by His will of sensuality, the movement of which does not extend to the will of God—nor by His will considered as nature which regards things absolutely considered and not in relation to the Divine will.

Reply to Objection 2: The conformity of the human will to the Divine regards the will of reason: according to which the wills even of friends agree, inasmuch as reason considers something willed in its relation to the will of a friend.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ was at once comprehensor and wayfarer, inasmuch as He was enjoying God in His mind and had a passible body. Hence things repugnant to His natural will and to His sensitive appetite could happen to Him in His passible flesh.

Whether there was contrariety of wills in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was contrariety of wills in Christ. For contrariety of wills regards contrariety of objects, as contrariety of movements springs from contrariety of termini, as is plain from the Philosopher (Phys. v, text. 49, seq.). Now Christ in His different wills wished contrary things. For in His Divine will He wished for death, from which He shrank in His human will, hence Athanasius says [*De Incarnat. et Cont. Arianos, written against Apollinarius]: “When Christ says ‘Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from Me; yet not My will, but Thine be done,’ and again, ‘The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh weak,’ He denotes two wills—the human, which through the weakness of the flesh shrank from the passion—and His Divine will eager for the passion.” Hence there was contrariety of wills in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Gal. 5:17) that “the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.” Now when the spirit desires one thing, and the flesh another, there is contrariety of wills. But this was in Christ; for by the will of charity which the Holy Spirit was causing in His mind, He willed the passion, according to Is. 53:7: “He was offered because it was His own will," yet in His flesh He shrank from the passion. Therefore there was contrariety of wills in Him.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lk. 22:43) that "being in an agony, He prayed the longer." Now agony seems to imply a certain struggle [*Greek, {agonia}] in a soul drawn to contrary things. Hence it seems that there was contrariety of will in Christ.

On the contrary, In the decisions of the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 18] it is said: "We confess two natural wills, not in opposition, as evil-minded heretics assert, but following His human will, and neither withstanding nor striving against, but rather being subject to, His Divine and omnipotent will."

I answer that, Contrariety can exist only where there is opposition in the same and as regards the same. For if the diversity exists as regards diverse things, and in diverse subjects, this would not suffice for the nature of contrariety, nor even for the nature of contradiction, e.g. if a man were well formed or healthy as regards his hand, but not as regards his foot. Hence for there to be contrariety of wills in anyone it is necessary, first, that the diversity of wills should regard the same. For if the will of one regards the doing of something with reference to some universal reason, and the will of another regards the not doing the same with reference to some particular reason, there is not complete contrariety of will, e.g. when a judge wishes a brigand to be hanged for the good of the commonwealth, and one of the latter's kindred wishes him not to be hanged on account of a private love, there is no contrariety of wills; unless, indeed, the desire of the private good went so far as to wish to hinder the public good for the private good—in that case the opposition of wills would regard the same.

Secondly, for contrariety of wills it is necessary that it should be in the same will. For if a man wishes one thing with his rational appetite, and wishes another thing with his sensitive appetite, there is no contrariety, unless the sensitive appetite so far prevailed as to change or at least keep back the rational appetite; for in this case something of the contrary movement of the sensitive appetite would reach the rational will.

And hence it must be said that although the natural and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the Divine will did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in Him. First, because neither the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the Divine will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion. For the absolute will of Christ wished the salvation of the human race, although it did not pertain to it to will this for the sake of something further; but the movement of sensuality could nowise extend so far. Secondly, because neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or retarded by the natural will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other hand, neither the Divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in His Divine will, and in His will of reason, that His natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to the order of their nature. Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition or contrariety of wills.

Reply to Objection 1: The fact of any will in Christ willing something else than did the Divine will, proceeded from the Divine will, by whose permission the human nature in Christ was moved by its proper movements, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15,18,19).

Reply to Objection 2: In us the desires of the spirit are impeded or retarded by the desires of the flesh: this did not occur in Christ. Hence in Christ there was no contrariety of flesh and spirit, as in us.

Reply to Objection 3: The agony in Christ was not in the rational soul, in as far as it implies a struggle in the will arising from a diversity of motives, as when anyone, on his reason considering one, wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary. For this springs from the weakness of the reason, which is unable to judge which is the best simply. Now this did not occur in Christ, since by His reason He judged it best that the Divine will regarding the salvation of the human race should be fulfilled by His passion. Nevertheless, there was an agony in Christ as regards the sensitive part, inasmuch as it implied a dread of coming trial, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 15; iii, 18,23).

OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST’S OPERATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the unity of Christ’s operation; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in Christ there was one or several operations of the Godhead and Manhood?

(2) Whether in Christ there were several operations of the human nature?

(3) Whether Christ by His human operation merited anything for Himself?

(4) Whether He merited anything for us by it?

Whether in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and Manhood?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): “The most loving operation of God is made manifest to us by the supersubstantial Word having taken flesh integrally and truly, and having operated and suffered whatsoever befits His human and Divine operation.” But he here mentions only one human and Divine operation, which is written in Greek {theandrike}, i.e. God-manlike. Hence it seems that there is but one composite operation in Christ.

Objection 2: Further, there is but one operation of the principal and instrumental agent. Now the human nature in Christ was the instrument of the Divine, as was said above ([4086]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4087] Q[8], A[1], ad 1;[4088] Q[18], A[1], ad 2). Hence the operations of the Divine and human natures in Christ are the same.

Objection 3: Further, since in Christ there are two natures in one hypostasis or person, whatever pertains to the hypostasis or person is one and the same. But operation pertains to the hypostasis or person, for it is only a subsisting suppositum that operates; hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1), acts belong to singulars. Hence in Christ there is only one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood.

Objection 4: Further, as being belongs to a subsisting hypostasis, so also does operation. But on account of the unity of hypostasis there is only one operation of the Godhead and the ([4089]Q[17], A[2]). Hence, on account of the same unity, there is one operation in Christ.

Objection 5: Further, as being belongs to a sub-operated there is one operation. But the same thing was operated by the Godhead and the Manhood, as the healing of the lepers or the raising of the dead. Hence it seems that in Christ there is but one operation of the Godhead and the Manhood.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 8): “How can the same operation spring from different powers? Cannot the lesser operate as the greater? And can there be one operation where there are different substances?”

I answer that, As was said above ([4090]Q[18], A[1]), the aforesaid heretics who placed one will in Christ placed one operation in Christ. Now in order better to understand their erroneous opinion, we must bear in mind that wherever there are several mutually ordained agents, the inferior is moved by the superior, as in man the body is moved by the soul and the lower powers by the reason. And thus the actions and movements of the inferior principle are things operated rather than operations. Now what pertains to the highest principle is properly the operation; thus we say of man that to walk, which belongs to the feet, and to touch, which belongs to the hand, are things operated by the man—one of which is operated by the soul through the feet, the other through the hands. And because it is the same soul that operates in both cases, there is only one indifferent operation, on the part of the thing operating, which is the first moving principle; but difference is found on the part of what is operated. Now, as in a mere man the body is moved by the soul, and the sensitive by the rational appetite, so in the Lord Jesus Christ the human nature is moved and ruled by the Divine. Hence they said that there is one indifferent operation on the part of the Godhead operating, but divers things operated, inasmuch as the Godhead of Christ did one thing by Itself, as to uphold all things by the word of His power—and another thing by His human nature, as to walk in body. Hence the Sixth Council [*Third Council of Constantinople, Act. 10] quotes the words of Severus the heretic, who said: “What things were done and wrought by the one Christ, differ greatly; for some are becoming to God, and some are human, as to walk bodily on the earth is indeed human, but to give hale steps to sickly limbs, wholly unable to walk on the ground, is becoming to God. Yet one, i.e. the Incarnate Word, wrought one and the other—neither was this from one nature, and that from another; nor can we justly affirm that because there are distinct things operated there are therefore two operating natures and forms.”

But herein they were deceived, for what is moved by another has a twofold action—one which it has from its own form—the other, which it has inasmuch as it is moved by another; thus the operation of an axe of itself is to cleave; but inasmuch as it is moved by the craftsman, its operation is to make benches. Hence the operation which belongs to a thing by its form is proper to it, nor does it belong to the mover, except in so far as he makes use of this kind of thing for his work: thus to heat is the proper operation of fire, but not of a smith, except in so far as he makes use of fire for heating iron. But the operation which belongs to the thing, as moved by another, is not distinct from the operation of the mover; thus to make a bench is not the work of the axe independently of the workman. Hence, wheresoever the mover and the moved have different forms or operative faculties, there must the operation of the mover and the proper operation of the moved be distinct; although the moved shares in the operation of the mover, and the mover makes use of the operation of the moved, and, consequently, each acts in communion with the other.

Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power whereby it acts; and so has the Divine. Hence the human nature has its proper operation distinct from the Divine, and conversely. Nevertheless, the Divine Nature makes use of the operation of the human nature, as of the operation of its instrument; and in the same way the human nature shares in the operation of the Divine Nature, as an instrument shares in the operation of the principal agent. And this is what Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flavian. xxviii): “Both forms” (i.e. both the Divine and the human nature in Christ) “do what is proper to each in union with the other, i.e. the Word operates what belongs to the Word, and the flesh carries out what belongs to flesh.”

But if there were only one operation of the Godhead and manhood in Christ, it would be necessary to say either that the human nature had not its proper form and power (for this could not possibly be said of the Divine), whence it would follow that in Christ there was only the Divine operation; or it would be necessary to say that from the Divine and human power there was made up one power. Now both of these are impossible. For by the first the human nature in Christ is supposed to be imperfect; and by the second a confusion of the natures is supposed. Hence it is with reason that the Sixth Council (Act. 18) condemned this opinion, and decreed as follows: “We confess two natural, indivisible, unconvertible, unconfused, and inseparable operations in the same Lord Jesus Christ our true God”; i.e. the Divine operation and the human operation.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius places in Christ a theandric, i.e. a God-manlike or Divino-human, operation not by any confusion of the operations or powers of both natures, but inasmuch as His Divine operation employs the human, and His human operation shares in the power of the Divine. Hence, as he says in a certain epistle (Ad Caium iv), “what is of man He works beyond man; and this is shown by the Virgin conceiving supernaturally and by the unstable waters bearing up the weight of bodily feet.” Now it is clear that to be begotten belongs to human nature, and likewise to walk; yet both were in Christ supernaturally. So, too, He wrought Divine things humanly, as when He healed the leper with a touch. Hence in the same epistle he adds: “He performed Divine works not as God does, and human works not as man does, but, God having been made man, by a new operation of God and man.”

Now, that he understood two operations in Christ, one of the Divine and the other of the human nature, is clear from what he says, Div. Nom. ii: “Whatever pertains to His human operation the Father and the Holy Ghost no-wise share in, except, as one might say, by their most gracious and merciful will,” i.e. inasmuch as the Father and the Holy Ghost in their mercy wished Christ to do and to suffer human things. And he adds: “He is truly the unchangeable God, and God’s Word by the sublime and unspeakable operation of God, which, being made man for us, He wrought.” Hence it is clear that the human operation, in which the Father and the Holy Ghost do not share, except by Their merciful consent, is distinct from His operation, as the Word of God, wherein the Father and the Holy Ghost share.

Reply to Objection 2: The instrument is said to act through being moved by the principal agent; and yet, besides this, it can have its proper operation through its own form, as stated above of fire. And hence the action of the instrument as instrument is not distinct from the action of the principal agent; yet it may have another operation, inasmuch as it is a thing. Hence the operation of Christ’s human nature, as the instrument of the Godhead, is not distinct from the operation of the Godhead; for the salvation wherewith the manhood of Christ saves us and that wherewith His Godhead saves us are not distinct; nevertheless, the human nature in Christ, inasmuch as it is a certain nature, has a proper operation distinct from the Divine, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: To operate belongs to a subsisting hypostasis; in accordance, however, with the form and nature from which the operation receives its species. Hence from the diversity of forms or natures spring the divers species of operations, but from the unity of hypostasis springs the numerical unity as regards the operation of the species: thus fire has two operations specifically different, namely, to illuminate and to heat, from the difference of light and heat, and yet the illumination of the fire that illuminates at one and the same time is numerically one. So, likewise, in Christ there are necessarily two specifically different operations by reason of His two natures; nevertheless, each of the operations at one and the same time is numerically one, as one walking and one healing.

Reply to Objection 4: Being and operation belong to the person by reason of the nature; yet in a different manner. For being belongs to the very constitution of the person, and in this respect it has the nature of a term; consequently, unity of person requires unity of the complete and personal being. But operation is an effect of the person by reason of a form or nature. Hence plurality of operations is not incompatible with personal unity.

Reply to Objection 5: The proper work of the Divine operation is different from the proper work of the human operation. Thus to heal a leper is a proper work of the Divine operation, but to touch him is the proper work of the human operation. Now both these operations concur in one work, inasmuch as one nature acts in union with the other.

Whether in Christ there are several human operations?

Objection 1: It would seem that in Christ there are several human operations. For Christ as man communicates with plants by His nutritive soul, with the brutes by His sensitive soul, and with the angels by His intellective soul, even as other men do. Now the operations of a plant as plant and of an animal as animal are different. Therefore Christ as man has several operations.

Objection 2: Further, powers and habits are distinguished by their acts. Now in Christ's soul there were divers powers and habits; therefore also divers operations.

Objection 3: Further, instruments ought to be proportioned to their operations. Now the human body has divers members of different form, and consequently fitted to divers operations. Therefore in Christ there are divers operations in the human nature.

On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), “operation is consequent upon the nature.” But in Christ there is only one human nature. Therefore in Christ there is only one human operation.

I answer that, Since it is by his reason that man is what he is; that operation is called human simply, which proceeds from the reason through the will, which is the rational appetite. Now if there is any operation in man which does not proceed from the reason and the will, it is not simply a human operation, but belongs to man by reason of some part of human nature—sometimes by reason of the nature of elementary bodies, as to be borne downwards—sometimes by reason of the force of the vegetative soul, as to be nourished, and to grow—sometimes by reason of the sensitive part, as to see and hear, to imagine and remember, to desire and to be angry. Now between these operations there is a difference. For the operations of the sensitive soul are to some extent obedient to reason, and consequently they are somewhat rational and human inasmuch as they obey reason, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13). But the operations that spring from the vegetative soul, or from the nature of elemental bodies, are not subject to reason; consequently they are nowise rational; nor simply human, but only as regards a part of human nature. Now it was said [4091](A[1]) that when a subordinate agent acts by its own form, the operations of the inferior and of the superior agent are distinct; but when the inferior agent acts only as moved by the superior agent, then the operation of the superior and the inferior agent is one.

And hence in every mere man the operations of the elemental body and of the vegetative soul are distinct from the will’s operation, which is properly human; so likewise the operations of the sensitive soul inasmuch as it is not moved by reason; but inasmuch as it is moved by reason, the operations of the sensitive and the rational part are the same. Now there is but one operation of the rational part if we consider the principle of the operation, which is the reason and the will; but the operations are many if we consider their relationship to various objects. And there were some who called this a diversity of things operated rather than of operations, judging the unity of the operation solely from the operative principle. And it is in this respect that we are now considering the unity and plurality of operations in Christ.

Hence in every mere man there is but one operation, which is properly called human; but besides this there are in a mere man certain other operations, which are not strictly human, as was said above. But in the Man Jesus Christ there was no motion of the sensitive part which was not ordered by reason. Even the natural and bodily operations pertained in some respects to His will, inasmuch as it was His will "that His flesh should do and suffer what belonged to it," as stated above ([4092]Q[18], A[5]). Much more, therefore, is there one operation in Christ, than in any other man whatsoever.

Reply to Objection 1: The operations of the sensitive and nutritive parts are not strictly human, as stated above; yet in Christ these operations were more human than in others.

Reply to Objection 2: Powers and habits are diversified by comparison with their objects. Hence in this way the diversity of operations corresponds to the divers powers and habits, as likewise to the divers objects. Now we do not wish to exclude this diversity of operations from Christ's humanity, nor that which springs from a diversity of time, but only that which regards the first active principle, as was said above.

(St. Thomas gives no reply to OBJ[3]; some codices add: Hence may be gathered the reply to the third objection.)

Whether the human action of Christ could be meritorious to Him?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human action of Christ could not be meritorious to Him. For before His death Christ was a comprehensor even as He is now. But comprehensors do not merit: because the charity of the comprehensor belongs to the reward of beatitude, since fruition depends upon it. Hence it does not seem to be the principle of merit, since merit and reward are not the same. Therefore Christ before His passion did not merit, even as He does not merit now.

Objection 2: Further, no one merits what is due to him. But because Christ is the Son of God by nature, the eternal inheritance is due to Him, which other men merit by their works. And hence Christ Who, from the beginning, was the Word of God, could not merit anything for Himself.

Objection 3: Further, whoever has the principle does not properly merit what flows from its possession. But Christ has the glory of the soul, whence, in the natural course, flowed the glory of the body, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dios cxviii); though by a dispensation it was brought about that in Christ the glory of the soul should not overflow to the body. Hence Christ did not merit the glory of the body.

Objection 4: Further, the manifestation of Christ's excellence is a good, not of Christ Himself, but of those who know Him. Hence it is promised as a reward to such as love Christ that He will be manifested to them, according to Jn. 14:21: "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father, and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him." Therefore Christ did not merit the manifestation of His greatness.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 2:8,9): "Becoming obedient unto death . . . For which cause God also hath exalted Him." Therefore by obeying He merited His exaltation and thus He merited something for Himself.

I answer that, To have any good thing of oneself is more excellent than to have it from another, for "what is of itself a cause is always more excellent than what is a cause through another," as is said Phys. viii, 5. Now a thing is said to have, of itself, that of which it is to some extent the cause. But of whatever good we possess the first cause by authority is God; and in this way no creature has any good of itself, according to 1 Cor. 4:7: "What hast thou that thou hast not received?" Nevertheless, in a secondary manner anyone may be a cause, to himself, of having certain good things, inasmuch as he cooperates with God in the matter, and thus whoever has anything by his own merit has it, in a manner, of himself. Hence it is better to have a thing by merit than without merit.

Now since all perfection and greatness must be attributed to Christ, consequently He must have by merit what others have by merit; unless it be of such a nature that its want would detract from Christ's dignity and perfection more than would accrue to Him by merit. Hence He merited neither grace nor knowledge nor the beatitude of His soul, nor the Godhead, because, since merit regards only what is not yet possessed, it would be necessary that Christ should have been without these at some time; and to be without them would have diminished Christ's dignity more than His merit would have increased it. But the glory of the body, and the like, are less than the dignity of meriting, which pertains to the virtue of charity. Hence we must say that Christ had, by merit, the glory of His body and whatever pertained to His outward excellence, as His Ascension, veneration, and the rest. And thus it is clear that He could merit for Himself.

Reply to Objection 1: Fruition, which is an act of charity, pertains to the glory of the soul, which Christ did not merit. Hence if He merited by charity, it does not follow that the merit and the reward are the same. Nor did He merit by charity inasmuch as it was the charity of a comprehensor, but inasmuch as it was that of a wayfarer. For He was at once a wayfarer and a comprehensor, as was said above ([4093]Q[15], A[10]). And therefore, since He is no longer a wayfarer, He is not in the state of meriting.

Reply to Objection 2: Because by nature Christ is God and the Son of God, the Divine glory and the lordship of all things are due to Him, as to the first and supreme Lord. Nevertheless a glory is due to Him as a beatified man; and this He has partly without merit, and partly with merit, as is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: It is by Divine appointment that there is an overflow of glory from the soul to the body, in keeping with human merit; so that as man merits by the act of the soul which he performs in the body, so he may be rewarded by the glory of the soul overflowing to the body. And hence not only the glory of the soul, but also the glory of the body falls under merit, according to Rom. 8:11: “He . . . shall quicken also our [Vulg.: ‘your’] mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg.: ‘you’].” And thus it could fall under Christ’s merit.

Reply to Objection 4: The manifestation of Christ’s excellence is His good as regards the being which it has in the knowledge of others; although in regard to the being which they have in themselves it chiefly belongs to the good of those who know Him. Yet even this is referred to Christ inasmuch as they are His members.

Whether Christ could merit for others?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit for others. For it is written (Ezech. 18:4): “The soul that sinneth, the same shall die.” Hence, for a like reason, the soul that meriteth, the same shall be recompensed. Therefore it is not possible that Christ merited for others.

Objection 2: Further, of the fulness of Christ’s grace we all receive, as is written Jn. 1:16. Now other men having Christ’s grace cannot merit for others. For it is written (Ezech. 14:20) that if “Noe and Daniel and Job be in the city [Vulg.: ‘the midst thereof’] . . . they shall deliver neither son nor daughter; but they shall only deliver their own souls by their justice.” Hence Christ could not merit anything for us.

Objection 3: Further, the “reward” that we merit is due “according to justice [Vulg.: ‘debt’] and not according to grace,” as is clear from Rom. 4:4. Therefore if Christ merited our salvation it follows that our salvation is not by God’s grace but by justice, and that He acts unjustly with those whom He does not save, since Christ’s merit extends to all.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:18): “As by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life.” But Adam’s demerits reached to the condemnation of others. Much more, therefore, does the merit of Christ reach others.

I answer that, As stated above ([4094]Q[8], AA[1],5), grace was in Christ not merely as in an individual, but also as in the Head of the whole Church, to Whom all are united, as members to a head, who constitute one mystical person. And hence it is that Christ’s merit extends to others inasmuch as they are His members; even as in a man the action of the head reaches in a manner to all his members, since it perceives not merely for itself alone, but for all the members.

Reply to Objection 1: The sin of an individual harms himself alone; but the sin of Adam, who was appointed by God to be the principle of the whole nature, is transmitted to others by carnal propagation. So, too, the merit of Christ, Who has been appointed by God to be the head of all men in regard to grace, extends to all His members.

Reply to Objection 2: Others receive of Christ’s fulness not indeed the fount of grace, but some particular grace. And hence it need not be that men merit for others, as Christ did.

Reply to Objection 3: As the sin of Adam reaches others only by carnal generation, so, too, the merit of Christ reaches others only by spiritual regeneration, which takes place in baptism; wherein we are incorporated with Christ, according to Gal. 3:27, “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ"; and it is by grace that it is granted to man to be incorporated with Christ. And thus man's salvation is from grace.

OF CHRIST'S SUBJECTION TO THE FATHER (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider such things as belong to Christ in relation to the Father. Some of these things are predicated of Him because of His relation to the Father, e.g. that He was subject to Him, that He prayed to Him, that He ministered, to Him by priesthood. And some are predicated, or may be predicated, of Him because of the Father's relation to Him, e.g. that the Father adopted Him and that He predestined Him.

Hence we must consider (1) Christ's subjection to the Father; (2) His prayer; (3) His priesthood; (4) Adoption—whether it is becoming to Him; (5) His predestination.

Under the first head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ is subject to the Father?

(2) Whether He is subject to Himself?

Whether we may say that Christ is subject to the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that we may not say that Christ was subject to the Father. For everything subject to the Father is a creature, since, as is said in De Eccles. Dogm. iv, "in the Trinity there is no dependence or subjection." But we cannot say simply that Christ is a creature, as was stated above ([4095]Q[16], A[8]). Therefore we cannot say simply that Christ is subject to God the Father.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is said to be subject to God when it is subservient to His dominion. But we cannot attribute subservience to the human nature of Christ; for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 21): "We must bear in mind that we may not call it" (i.e. Christ's human nature) "a servant; for the words 'subservience' and 'domination' are not names of the nature, but of relations, as the words 'paternity' and 'filiation.'" Hence Christ in His human nature is not subject to God the Father.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:28): "And when all things shall be subdued unto Him, then the Son also Himself shall be subject unto Him that put all things under Him." But, as is written (Heb. 2:8): "We see not as yet all things subject to Him.” Hence He is not yet subject to the Father, Who has subjected all things to Him.

On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 14:28), “The Father is greater than I”; and Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): “It is not without reason that the Scripture mentions both, that the Son is equal to the Father and the Father greater than the Son, for the first is said on account of the form of God, and the second on account of the form of a servant, without any confusion.” Now the less is subject to the greater. Therefore in the form of a servant Christ is subject to the Father.

I answer that, Whoever has a nature is competent to have what is proper to that nature. Now human nature from its beginning has a threefold subjection to God. The first regards the degree of goodness, inasmuch as the Divine Nature is the very essence of goodness as is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. i) while a created nature has a participation of the Divine goodness, being subject, so to say, to the rays of this goodness. Secondly, human nature is subject to God, as regards God’s power, inasmuch as human nature, even as every creature, is subject to the operation of the Divine ordinance. Thirdly, human nature is especially subject to God through its proper act, inasmuch as by its own will it obeys His command. This triple subjection to God Christ professes of Himself. The first (Mat. 19:17): “Why askest thou Me concerning good? One is good, God.” And on this Jerome remarks: “He who had called Him a good master, and had not confessed Him to be God or the Son of God, learns that no man, however holy, is good in comparison with God.” And hereby He gave us to understand that He Himself, in His human nature, did not attain to the height of Divine goodness. And because “in such things as are great, but not in bulk, to be great is the same as to be good,” as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8), for this reason the Father is said to be greater than Christ in His human nature. The second subjection is attributed to Christ, inasmuch as all that befell Christ is believed to have happened by Divine appointment; hence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that Christ “is subject to the ordinance of God the Father.” And this is the subjection of subservience, whereby “every creature serves God” (Judith 16:17), being subject to His ordinance, according to Wis. 16:24: “The creature serving Thee the Creator.” And in this way the Son of God (Phil. 2:7) is said to have taken “the form of a servant.” The third subjection He attributes to

Himself, saying (Jn. 8:29): “I do always the things that please Him.” And this is the subjection to the Father, of obedience unto death. Hence it is written (Phil. 2:8) that he became “obedient” to the Father “unto death.”

Reply to Objection 1: As we are not to understand that Christ is a creature simply, but only in His human nature, whether this qualification be added or not, as stated above ([4096]Q[16], A[8]), so also we are to understand that Christ is subject to the Father not simply but in His human nature, even if this qualification be not added; and yet it is better to add this qualification in order to avoid the error of Arius, who held the Son to be less than the Father.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation of subservience and dominion is based upon action and passion, inasmuch as it belongs to a servant to be moved by the will of his master. Now to act is not attributed to the nature as agent, but to the person, since “acts belong to supposita and to singulars,” according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Nevertheless action is attributed to the nature as to that whereby the person or hypostasis acts. Hence, although the nature is not properly said to rule or serve, yet every hypostasis or person may be properly said to be ruling or serving in this or that nature. And in this way nothing prevents Christ being subject or servant to the Father in human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8): “Christ will give the kingdom to God and the Father, when He has brought the faithful, over whom He now reigns by faith, to the vision,” i.e. to see the essence common to the Father and the Son: and then He will be totally subject to the Father not only in Himself, but also in His members by the full participation of the Godhead. And then all things will be fully subject to Him by the final accomplishment of His will concerning them; although even now all things are subject to Him as regards His power, according to Mat. 28:18: “All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth.”

Whether Christ is subject to Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not subject to Himself. For Cyril says in a synodal letter which the Council of Ephesus (Part I, ch. xxvi) received: “Christ is neither servant nor master of Himself. It is foolish, or rather impious, to think or say this.” And Damascene says the same (De

Fide Orth. iii, 21): “The one Being, Christ, cannot be the servant or master of Himself.” Now Christ is said to be the servant of the Father inasmuch as He is subject to Him. Hence Christ is not subject to Himself.

Objection 2: Further, servant has reference to master. Now nothing has a relation to itself, hence Hilary says (De Trin. vii) that nothing is like or equal to itself. Hence Christ cannot be said to be the servant of Himself, and consequently to be subject to Himself.

Objection 3: Further, “as the rational soul and flesh are one man; so God and man are one Christ,” as Athanasius says (Symb. Fid.). Now man is not said to be subject to himself or servant to himself or greater than himself because his body is subject to his soul. Therefore, Christ is not said to be subject to Himself because His Manhood is subject to His Godhead.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 7): “Truth shows in this way” (i.e. whereby the Father is greater than Christ in human nature) “that the Son is less than Himself.”

Further, as he argues (De Trin. i, 7), the form of a servant was so taken by the Son of God that the form of God was not lost. But because of the form of God, which is common to the Father and the Son, the Father is greater than the Son in human nature. Therefore the Son is greater than Himself in human nature.

Further, Christ in His human nature is the servant of God the Father, according to Jn. 20:17: “I ascend to My Father and to your Father to My God and your God.” Now whoever is the servant of the Father is the servant of the Son; otherwise not everything that belongs to the Father would belong to the Son. Therefore Christ is His own servant and is subject to Himself.

I answer that, As was said above (A[1], ad 2), to be master or servant is attributed to a person or hypostasis according to a nature. Hence when it is said that Christ is the master or servant of Himself, or that the Word of God is the Master of the Man Christ, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that this is understood to be said by reason of another hypostasis or person, as if there was the person of the Word of God ruling and the person of the man serving; and this is the heresy of Nestorius. Hence in the condemnation of Nestorius it is said in the Council of Ephesus (Part III, ch. i, anath. 6): “If anyone say that the Word begotten of God the Father is the God or Lord of Christ, and does not rather confess the same to be at once

God and man as the Word made flesh, according to the Scriptures, let him be anathema.” And in this sense it is denied by Cyril and Damascene (OBJ[1]); and in the same sense must it be denied that Christ is less than Himself or subject to Himself. Secondly, it may be understood of the diversity of natures in the one person or hypostasis. And thus we may say that in one of them, in which He agrees with the Father, He presides and rules together with the Father; and in the other nature, in which He agrees with us, He is subject and serves, and in this sense Augustine says that “the Son is less than Himself.”

Yet it must be borne in mind that since this name “Christ” is the name of a Person, even as the name “Son,” those things can be predicated essentially and absolutely of Christ which belong to Him by reason of the Person, Which is eternal; and especially those relations which seem more properly to pertain to the Person or the hypostasis. But whatever pertains to Him in His human nature is rather to be attributed to Him with a qualification; so that we say that Christ is simply greatest, Lord, Ruler, whereas to be subject or servant or less is to be attributed to Him with the qualification, in His human nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Cyril and Damascene deny that Christ is the head of Himself inasmuch as this implies a plurality of supposita, which is required in order that anyone may be the master of another.

Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is necessary that the master and the servant should be distinct; yet a certain notion of mastership and subservience may be preserved inasmuch as the same one is master of Himself in different respects.

Reply to Objection 3: On account of the divers parts of man, one of which is superior and the other inferior, the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11) that there is justice between a man and himself inasmuch as the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. Hence this way a man may be said to be subject and subservient to Himself as regards His different parts.

To the other arguments, the reply is clear from what has been said. For Augustine asserts that the Son is less than, or subject to, Himself in His human nature, and not by a diversity of supposita.

OF CHRIST’S PRAYER (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider Christ’s prayer; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is becoming that Christ should pray?

(2) Whether it pertains to Him in respect of His sensuality?

(3) Whether it is becoming to Him to pray for Himself or only for others?

(4) Whether every prayer of His was heard?

Whether it is becoming of Christ to pray?

Objection 1: It would seem unbecoming that Christ should pray. For, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), “prayer is the asking for becoming things from God.” But since Christ could do all things, it does not seem becoming to Him to ask anything from anyone. Therefore it does not seem fitting that Christ should pray.

Objection 2: Further, we need not ask in prayer for what we know for certain will happen; thus, we do not pray that the sun may rise tomorrow. Nor is it fitting that anyone should ask in prayer for what he knows will not happen. But Christ in all things knew what would happen. Therefore it was not fitting that He should ask anything in prayer.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24) that “prayer is the raising up of the mind to God.” Now Christ’s mind needed no uplifting to God, since His mind was always united to God, not only by the union of the hypostasis, but by the fruition of beatitude. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should pray.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 6:12): “And it came to pass in those days, that He went out into a mountain, and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God.”

I answer that, As was said in the [4097]SS, Q[83], AA[1],2, prayer is the unfolding of our will to God, that He may fulfill it. If, therefore, there had been but one will in Christ, viz. the Divine, it would nowise belong to Him to pray, since the Divine will of itself is effective of whatever He wishes by it, according to Ps. 134:6: “Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.” But because the Divine and the human wills are distinct in Christ, and the human will of itself is not efficacious enough to do what it wishes, except by Divine power, hence to pray belongs to Christ as man and as having a human will.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ as God and not as man was able to carry out all He wished, since as man He was not omnipotent, as stated above ([4098]Q[13], A[1]). Nevertheless being both God and man, He wished to offer prayers to the Father, not as though He were incompetent, but for our instruction. First, that He might show Himself to be from the Father; hence He says (Jn. 11:42): “Because of the people who stand about I have said it” (i.e. the words of the prayer) “that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me.” Hence Hilary says (De Trin. x): “He did not need prayer. It was for us He prayed, lest the Son should be unknown.” Secondly, to give us an example of prayer; hence Ambrose says (on Lk. 6:12): “Be not deceived, nor think that the Son of God prays as a weakling, in order to beseech what He cannot effect. For the Author of power, the Master of obedience persuades us to the precepts of virtue by His example.” Hence Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): “Our Lord in the form of a servant could have prayed in silence, if need be, but He wished to show Himself a suppliant of the Father, in such sort as to bear in mind that He was our Teacher.”

Reply to Objection 2: Amongst the other things which He knew would happen, He knew that some would be brought about by His prayer; and for these He not unbecomingly besought God.

Reply to Objection 3: To rise is nothing more than to move towards what is above. Now movement is taken in two ways, as is said De Anima iii, 7; first, strictly, according as it implies the passing from potentiality to act, inasmuch as it is the act of something imperfect, and thus to rise pertains to what is potentially and not actually above. Now in this sense, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 24), “the human mind of Christ did not need to rise to God, since it was ever united to God both by personal being and by the blessed vision.” Secondly, movement signifies the act of something perfect, i.e. something existing in act, as to understand and to feel are called movements; and in this sense the mind of Christ was always raised up to God, since He was always contemplating Him as existing above Himself.

Whether it pertains to Christ to pray according to His sensuality?

Objection 1: It would seem that it pertains to Christ to pray according to His sensuality. For it is written (Ps. 83:3) in the person of Christ: “My heart and My flesh have rejoiced in the Living God.” Now sensuality is called the appetite of the flesh. Hence Christ’s sensuality could ascend to the Living God by rejoicing; and with equal reason by praying.

Objection 2: Further, prayer would seem to pertain to that which desires what is besought. Now Christ besought something that His sensuality desired when He said (Mat. 26:39): “Let this chalice pass from Me.” Therefore Christ’s sensuality prayed.

Objection 3: Further, it is a greater thing to be united to God in person than to mount to Him in prayer. But the sensuality was assumed by God to the unity of Person, even as every other part of human nature. Much more, therefore, could it mount to God by prayer.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:7) that the Son of God in the nature that He assumed was “made in the likeness of men.” But the rest of men do not pray with their sensuality. Therefore, neither did Christ pray according to His sensuality.

I answer that, To pray according to sensuality may be understood in two ways. First as if prayer itself were an act of the sensuality; and in this sense Christ did not pray with His sensuality, since His sensuality was of the same nature and species in Christ as in us. Now in us the sensuality cannot pray for two reasons; first because the movement of the sensuality cannot transcend sensible things, and, consequently, it cannot mount to God, which is required for prayer; secondly, because prayer implies a certain ordering inasmuch as we desire something to be fulfilled by God; and this is the work of reason alone. Hence prayer is an act of the reason, as was said in the [4099]SS, Q[83], A[1].

Secondly, we may be said to pray according to the sensuality when our prayer lays before God what is in our appetite of sensuality; and in this sense Christ prayed with His sensuality inasmuch as His prayer expressed the desire of His sensuality, as if it were the advocate of the sensuality—and this, that He might teach us three things. First, to show that He had taken a true human nature, with all its natural affections: secondly, to show that a man may wish with his natural desire what God does not wish: thirdly, to show that man should subject his own will to the Divine will. Hence Augustine says in the Enchiridion (Serm. 1 in Ps. 32): “Christ acting as a man, shows the proper will of a man when He says ‘Let this chalice pass from Me’; for this was the human will desiring something proper to itself and, so to say, private. But because He wishes man to be righteous and to be directed to God, He adds: ‘Nevertheless not as I will but as Thou wilt,’ as if to say, ‘See thyself in Me, for thou canst desire something proper to thee, even though God wishes something else.’”

Reply to Objection 1: The flesh rejoices in the Living God, not by the act of the flesh mounting to God, but by the outpouring of the heart into the flesh, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite follows the movement of the rational appetite.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the sensuality wished what the reason besought, it did not belong to the sensuality to seek this by praying, but to the reason, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The union in person is according to the personal being, which pertains to every part of the human nature; but the uplifting of prayer is by an act which pertains only to the reason, as stated above. Hence there is no parity.

Whether it was fitting that Christ should pray for Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should pray for Himself. For Hilary says (De Trin. x): “Although His word of beseeching did not benefit Himself, yet He spoke for the profit of our faith.” Hence it seems that Christ prayed not for Himself but for us.

Objection 2: Further, no one prays save for what He wishes, because, as was said [4100](A[1]), prayer is an unfolding of our will to God that He may fulfil it. Now Christ wished to suffer what He suffered. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi): “A man, though unwilling, is often angry; though unwilling, is sad; though unwilling, sleeps; though unwilling, hungers and thirsts. But He” (i.e. Christ) “did all these things, because He wished.” Therefore it was not fitting that He should pray for Himself.

Objection 3: Further, Cyprian says (De Orat. Dom.): “The Doctor of Peace and Master of Unity did not wish prayers to be offered individually and privately, lest when we prayed we should pray for ourselves alone.” Now Christ did what He taught, according to Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to do and to teach.” Therefore Christ never prayed for Himself alone.

On the contrary, our Lord Himself said while praying (Jn. 17:1): “Glorify Thy Son.”

I answer that, Christ prayed for Himself in two ways. First, by expressing the desire of His sensuality, as stated above [4101](A[2]); or also of His simple will, considered as a nature; as when He prayed that the chalice of His Passion might pass from Him (Mat. 26:39). Secondly, by expressing the desire of His deliberate will, which is considered as reason; as when He prayed for the glory of His Resurrection (Jn. 17:1). And this is reasonable. For as we have said above (A[1], ad 1) Christ wished to pray to His Father in order to give us an example of praying; and also to show that His Father is the author both of His eternal procession in the Divine Nature, and of all the good that He possesses in the human nature. Now just as in His human nature He had already received certain gifts from His Father. so there were other gifts which He had not yet received, but which He expected to receive. And therefore, as He gave thanks to the Father for gifts already received in His human nature, by acknowledging Him as the author thereof, as we read (Mat. 26:27; Jn. 11:41): so also, in recognition of His Father, He besought Him in prayer for those gifts still due to Him in His human nature, such as the glory of His body, and the like. And in this He gave us an example, that we should give thanks for benefits received, and ask in prayer for those we have not as yet.

Reply to Objection 1: Hilary is speaking of vocal prayer, which was not necessary to Him for His own sake, but only for ours. Whence he says pointedly that “His word of beseeching did not benefit Himself.” For if “the Lord hears the desire of the poor,” as is said in the Ps. 9:38, much more the mere will of Christ has the force of a prayer with the Father: wherefore He said (Jn. 11:42): “I know that Thou hearest Me always, but because of the people who stand about have I said it, that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me.”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished indeed to suffer what He suffered, at that particular time: nevertheless He wished to obtain, after His passion, the glory of His body, which as yet He had not. This glory He expected to receive from His Father as the author thereof, and therefore it was fitting that He should pray to Him for it.

Reply to Objection 3: This very glory which Christ, while praying, besought for Himself, pertained to the salvation of others according to Rom.

4:25: “He rose again for our justification.” Consequently the prayer which He offered for Himself was also in a manner offered for others. So also anyone that asks a boon of God that he may use it for the good of others, prays not only for himself, but also for others.

Whether Christ’s prayer was always heard?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s prayer was not always heard. For He besought that the chalice of His passion might be taken from Him, as we read (Mat. 26:39): and yet it was not taken from Him. Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard.

Objection 2: Further, He prayed that the sin of those who crucified Him might be forgiven, as is related (Lk. 23:34). Yet not all were pardoned this sin, since the Jews were punished on account thereof. Therefore it seems that not every prayer of His was heard.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord prayed for them “who would believe in Him through the word” of the apostles, that they “might all be one in Him,” and that they might attain to being with Him (Jn. 17:20, 21, 24). But not all attain to this. Therefore not every prayer of His was heard.

Objection 4: Further, it is said (Ps. 21:3) in the person of Christ: “I shall cry by day, and Thou wilt not hear.” Not every prayer of His, therefore, was heard.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 5:7): “With a strong cry and tears offering up prayers . . . He was heard for His reverence.”

I answer that, As stated above [4102](A[1]), prayer is a certain manifestation of the human will. Wherefore, then is the request of one who prays granted, when his will is fulfilled. Now absolutely speaking the will of man is the will of reason; for we will absolutely that which we will in accordance with reason’s deliberation. Whereas what we will in accordance with the movement of sensuality, or even of the simple will, which is considered as nature is willed not absolutely but conditionally [secundum quid]—that is, provided no obstacle be discovered by reason’s deliberation. Wherefore such a will should rather be called a “velleity” than an absolute will; because one would will [vellet] if there were no obstacle.

But according to the will of reason, Christ willed nothing but what He knew God to will. Wherefore every absolute will of Christ, even human, was fulfilled, because it was in conformity with God; and consequently His every prayer was fulfilled. For in this respect also is it that other men’s prayers are fulfilled, in that their will is in conformity with God, according to Rom. 8:27: “And He that searcheth the hearts knoweth,” that is, approves of, “what the Spirit desireth,” that is, what the Spirit makes the saints to desire: “because He asketh for the saints according to God,” that is, in conformity with the Divine will.

Reply to Objection 1: This prayer for the passing of the chalice is variously explained by the Saints. For Hilary (Super Matth. 31) says: “When He asks that this may pass from Him, He does not pray that it may pass by Him, but that others may share in that which passes on from Him to them; So that the sense is: As I am partaking of the chalice of the passion, so may others drink of it, with unfailing hope, with unflinching anguish, without fear of death.”

Or according to Jerome (on Mat. 26:39): “He says pointedly, ‘This chalice,’ that is of the Jewish people, who cannot allege ignorance as an excuse for putting Me to death, since they have the Law and the Prophets, who foretold concerning Me.”

Or, according to Dionysius of Alexandria (De Martyr. ad Origen 7): “When He says ‘Remove this chalice from Me,’ He does not mean, ‘Let it not come to Me’; for if it come not, it cannot be removed. But, as that which passes is neither untouched nor yet permanent, so the Saviour beseeches, that a slightly pressing trial may be repulsed.”

Lastly, Ambrose, Origen and Chrysostom say that He prayed thus “as man,” being reluctant to die according to His natural will.

Thus, therefore, whether we understand, according to Hilary, that He thus prayed that other martyrs might be imitators of His Passion, or that He prayed that the fear of drinking His chalice might not trouble Him, or that death might not withhold Him, His prayer was entirely fulfilled. But if we understand that He prayed that He might not drink the chalice of His passion and death; or that He might not drink it at the hands of the Jews; what He besought was not indeed fulfilled, because His reason which formed the petition did not desire its fulfilment, but for our instruction, it was His will to make known to us His natural will, and the movement of His sensuality, which was His as man.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord did not pray for all those who crucified Him, as neither did He for all those who would believe in Him; but for those only who were predestinated to obtain eternal life through Him.

Wherefore the reply to the third objection is also manifest.

Reply to Objection 4: When He says: “I shall cry and Thou wilt not hear,” we must take this as referring to the desire of sensuality, which shunned death. But He is heard as to the desire of His reason, as stated above.

OF THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the Priesthood of Christ; and under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest?

(2) Of the victim offered by this priest;

(3) Of the effect of this priesthood;

(4) Whether the effect of His priesthood pertains to Himself, or only to others?

(5) Of the eternal duration of His priesthood;

(6) Whether He should be called “a priest according to the order of Melchisedech”?

Whether it is fitting that Christ should be a priest?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be a priest. For a priest is less than an angel; whence it is written (Zech. 3:1): “The Lord showed me the high-priest standing before the angel of the Lord.” But Christ is greater than the angels, according to Heb. 1:4: “Being made so much better than the angels, as He hath inherited a more excellent name than they.” Therefore it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest.

Objection 2: Further, things which were in the Old Testament were figures of Christ, according to Col. 2:17: “Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s.” But Christ was not descended from the priests of the Old Law, for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:14): “It is evident that our Lord sprang out of Judah, in which tribe Moses spoke nothing concerning priests.” Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should be a priest.

Objection 3: Further, in the Old Law, which is a figure of Christ, the lawgivers and the priests were distinct: wherefore the Lord said to Moses the lawgiver (Ex. 28:1): “Take unto thee Aaron, thy brother . . . that he [Vulg.: ‘they’] may minister to Me in the priest’s office.” But Christ is the giver of the New Law, according to Jer. 31:33: “I will give My law in their bowels.” Therefore it is unfitting that Christ should be a priest.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 4:14): “We have [Vulg.: ‘Having’] therefore a great high-priest that hath passed into the heavens, Jesus, the Son of God.”

I answer that, The office proper to a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch as He bestows Divine things on the people, wherefore “sacerdos” [priest] means a giver of sacred things [sacra dans], according to Malachi 2:7: “They shall seek the law at his,” i.e. the priest’s, “mouth”; and again, forasmuch as he offers up the people’s prayers to God, and, in a manner, makes satisfaction to God for their sins; wherefore the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1): “Every high-priest taken from among men is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins.” Now this is most befitting to Christ. For through Him are gifts bestowed on men, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “By Whom” (i.e. Christ) “He hath given us most great and precious promises, that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.” Moreover, He reconciled the human race to God, according to Col. 1:19,20: “In Him” (i.e. Christ) “it hath well pleased (the Father) that all fulness should dwell, and through Him to reconcile all things unto Himself.” Therefore it is most fitting that Christ should be a priest.

Reply to Objection 1: Hierarchical power appertains to the angels, inasmuch as they also are between God and man, as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. ix), so that the priest himself, as being between God and man, is called an angel, according to Malachi 2:7: “He is the angel of the Lord of hosts.” Now Christ was greater than the angels, not only in His Godhead, but also in His humanity, as having the fulness of grace and glory. Wherefore also He had the hierarchical or priestly power in a higher degree than the angels, so that even the angels were ministers of His priesthood, according to Mat. 4:11: “Angels came and ministered unto Him.” But, in regard to His passibility, He “was made a little lower than the angels,” as the Apostle says (Heb. 2:9): and thus He was conformed to those wayfarers who are ordained to the priesthood.

Reply to Objection 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 26): “What is like in every particular must be, of course, identical, and not a copy.” Since, therefore, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, He did not wish to be born of the stock of the figurative priests, that it might be made clear that His priesthood is not quite the same as theirs, but differs therefrom as truth from figure.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4103]Q[7], A[7], ad 1), other men have certain graces distributed among them: but Christ, as being the Head of all, has the perfection of all graces. Wherefore, as to others, one is a lawgiver, another is a priest, another is a king; but all these concur in Christ, as the fount of all grace. Hence it is written (Is. 33:22): “The Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our law-giver, the Lord is our King: He will” come and “save us.”

Whether Christ was Himself both priest and victim?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ Himself was not both priest and victim. For it is the duty of the priest to slay the victim. But Christ did not kill Himself. Therefore He was not both priest and victim.

Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ has a greater similarity to the Jewish priesthood, instituted by God, than to the priesthood of the Gentiles, by which the demons were worshiped. Now in the old Law man was never offered up in sacrifice: whereas this was very much to be reprehended in the sacrifices of the Gentiles, according to Ps. 105:38: “They shed innocent blood; the blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan.” Therefore in Christ’s priesthood the Man Christ should not have been the victim.

Objection 3: Further, every victim, through being offered to God, is consecrated to God. But the humanity of Christ was from the beginning consecrated and united to God. Therefore it cannot be said fittingly that Christ as man was a victim.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): “Christ hath loved us, and hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a victim [Douay: ‘sacrifice’] to God for an odor of sweetness.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x, 5): “Every visible sacrifice is a sacrament, that is a sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice.” Now the invisible sacrifice is that by which a man offers his spirit to God, according to Ps. 50:19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” Wherefore, whatever is offered to God in order to raise man’s spirit to Him, may be called a sacrifice.

Now man is required to offer sacrifice for three reasons. First, for the remission of sin, by which he is turned away from God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 5:1) that it appertains to the priest “to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins.” Secondly, that man may be preserved in a state of grace, by ever adhering to God, wherein his peace and salvation consist. Wherefore under the old Law the sacrifice of peace-offerings was offered up for the salvation of the offerers, as is prescribed in the third chapter of Leviticus. Thirdly, in order that the spirit of man be perfectly united to God: which will be most perfectly realized in glory. Hence, under the Old Law, the holocaust was offered, so called because the victim was wholly burnt, as we read in the first chapter of Leviticus.

Now these effects were conferred on us by the humanity of Christ. For, in the first place, our sins were blotted out, according to Rom. 4:25: “Who was delivered up for our sins.” Secondly, through Him we received the grace of salvation, according to Heb. 5:9: “He became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation.” Thirdly, through Him we have acquired the perfection of glory, according to Heb. 10:19: “We have [Vulg.: ‘Having’] a confidence in the entering into the Holies” (i.e. the heavenly glory) “through His Blood.” Therefore Christ Himself, as man, was not only priest, but also a perfect victim, being at the same time victim for sin, victim for a peace-offering, and a holocaust.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ did not slay Himself, but of His own free-will He exposed Himself to death, according to Is. 53:7: “He was offered because it was His own will.” Thus He is said to have offered Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: The slaying of the Man Christ may be referred to a twofold will. First, to the will of those who slew Him: and in this respect He was not a victim: for the slayers of Christ are not accounted as offering a sacrifice to God, but as guilty of a great crime: a similitude of which was borne by the wicked sacrifices of the Gentiles, in which they offered up men to idols. Secondly, the slaying of Christ may be considered in reference to the will of the Sufferer, Who freely offered Himself to suffering. In this respect He is a victim, and in this He differs from the sacrifices of the Gentiles.

(The reply to the third objection is wanting in the original manuscripts, but it may be gathered from the above.—Ed.)

[*Some editions, however, give the following reply:

Reply to Objection 3: The fact that Christ's manhood was holy from its beginning does not prevent that same manhood, when it was offered to God in the Passion, being sanctified in a new way—namely, as a victim actually offered then. For it acquired then the actual holiness of a victim, from the charity which it had from the beginning, and from the grace of union sanctifying it absolutely.]

Whether the effect of Christ's priesthood is the expiation of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of Christ's priesthood is not the expiation of sins. For it belongs to God alone to blot out sins, according to Is. 43:25: "I am He that blot out thy iniquities for My own sake." But Christ is priest, not as God, but as man. Therefore the priesthood of Christ does not expiate sins.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1–3) that the victims of the Old Testament could not "make" (the comers thereunto) "perfect: for then they would have ceased to be offered; because the worshipers once cleansed should have no conscience of sin any longer; but in them there is made a commemoration of sins every year." But in like manner under the priesthood of Christ a commemoration of sins is made in the words: "Forgive us our trespasses" (Mat. 6:12). Moreover, the Sacrifice is offered continuously in the Church; wherefore again we say: "Give us this day our daily bread." Therefore sins are not expiated by the priesthood of Christ.

Objection 3: Further, in the sin-offerings of the Old Law, a he-goat was mostly offered for the sin of a prince, a she-goat for the sin of some private individual, a calf for the sin of a priest, as we gather from Lev. 4:3,23,28. But Christ is compared to none of these, but to the lamb, according to Jer. 11:19: "I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim." Therefore it seems that His priesthood does not expiate sins.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 9:14): “The blood of Christ, Who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted unto God, shall cleanse our conscience from dead works, to serve the living God.” But dead works denote sins. Therefore the priesthood of Christ has the power to cleanse from sins.

I answer that, Two things are required for the perfect cleansing from sins, corresponding to the two things comprised in sin—namely, the stain of sin and the debt of punishment. The stain of sin is, indeed, blotted out by grace, by which the sinner’s heart is turned to God: whereas the debt of punishment is entirely removed by the satisfaction that man offers to God. Now the priesthood of Christ produces both these effects. For by its virtue grace is given to us, by which our hearts are turned to God, according to Rom. 3:24,25: “Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood.” Moreover, He satisfied for us fully, inasmuch as “He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows” (Is. 53:4). Wherefore it is clear that the priesthood of Christ has full power to expiate sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ was a priest, not as God, but as man, yet one and the same was both priest and God. Wherefore in the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. i, anath. 10] we read: “If anyone say that the very Word of God did not become our High-Priest and Apostle, when He became flesh and a man like us, but altogether another one, the man born of a woman, let him be anathema.” Hence in so far as His human nature operated by virtue of the Divine, that sacrifice was most efficacious for the blotting out of sins. For this reason Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 14): “So that, since four things are to be observed in every sacrifice—to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, for whom it is offered; the same one true Mediator reconciling us to God by the sacrifice of peace, was one with Him to Whom it was offered, united in Himself those for whom He offered it, at the same time offered it Himself, and was Himself that which He offered.”

Reply to Objection 2: Sins are commemorated in the New Law, not on account of the inefficacy of the priesthood of Christ, as though sins were not sufficiently expiated by Him: but in regard to those who either are not willing to be participators in His sacrifice, such as unbelievers, for whose sins we pray that they be converted; or who, after taking part in this sacrifice, fall away from it by whatsoever kind of sin. The Sacrifice which is offered every day in the Church is not distinct from that which Christ Himself offered, but is a commemoration thereof. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. De. x, 20): “Christ Himself both is the priest who offers it and the victim: the sacred token of which He wished to be the daily Sacrifice of the Church.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Origen says (Sup. Joan. i, 29), though various animals were offered up under the Old Law, yet the daily sacrifice, which was offered up morning and evening, was a lamb, as appears from Num. 38:3,4. By which it was signified that the offering up of the true lamb, i.e. Christ, was the culminating sacrifice of all. Hence (Jn. 1:29) it is said: “Behold the Lamb of God, behold Him Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: ‘sin’] of the world.”

Whether the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also to Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of the priesthood of Christ pertained not only to others, but also to Himself. For it belongs to the priest’s office to pray for the people, according to 2 Macc. 1:23: “The priests made prayer while the sacrifice was consuming.” Now Christ prayed not only for others, but also for Himself, as we have said above ([4104]Q[21], A[3]), and as expressly stated (Heb. 5:7): “In the days of His flesh, with a strong cry and tears He offered [Vulg.: ‘offering’] up prayers and supplications to Him that was able to save Him from death.” Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in Himself.

Objection 2: Further, in His passion Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice. But by His passion He merited, not only for others, but also for Himself, as stated above ([4105]Q[19], AA[3],4). Therefore the priesthood of Christ had an effect not only in others, but also in Himself.

Objection 3: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ. But the priest of the Old Law offered sacrifice not only for others, but also for himself: for it is written (Lev. 16:17) that “the high-priest goeth into the sanctuary to pray for himself and his house, and for the whole congregation of Israel.” Therefore the priesthood of Christ also had an effect not merely in others, but also in Himself.

On the contrary, We read in the acts of the Council of Ephesus [*Part III, ch. i, anath. 10]: “If anyone say that Christ offered sacrifice for Himself, and not rather for us alone (for He Who knew not sin needed no sacrifice), let him be anathema.” But the priest’s office consists principally in offering sacrifice. Therefore the priesthood of Christ had no effect in Himself.

I answer that, As stated above [4106](A[1]), a priest is set between God and man. Now he needs someone between himself and God, who of himself cannot approach to God; and such a one is subject to the priesthood by sharing in the effect thereof. But this cannot be said of Christ; for the Apostle says (Heb. 7:25): “Coming of Himself to God, always living to make intercession for us [Vulg.: ‘He is able to save for ever them that come to God by Him; always living,’ etc.].” And therefore it is not fitting for Christ to be the recipient of the effect of His priesthood, but rather to communicate it to others. For the influence of the first agent in every genus is such that it receives nothing in that genus: thus the sun gives but does not receive light; fire gives but does not receive heat. Now Christ is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood: for the priest of the Old Law was a figure of Him; while the priest of the New Law works in His person, according to 2 Cor. 2:10: “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.” Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should receive the effect of His priesthood.

Reply to Objection 1: Although prayer is befitting to priests, it is not their proper office, for it is befitting to everyone to pray both for himself and for others, according to James 5:16: “Pray for one another that you may be saved.” And so we may say that the prayer by which Christ prayed for Himself was not an action of His priesthood. But this answer seems to be precluded by the Apostle, who, after saying (Heb. 5:6), “Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech,” adds, “Who in the days of His flesh offering up payers,” etc., as quoted above (OBJ[1]): so that it seems that the prayer which Christ offered pertained to His priesthood. We must therefore say that other priests partake in the effect of their priesthood, not as priests, but as sinners, as we shall state farther on (ad 3). But Christ had, simply speaking, no sin; though He had the “likeness of sin in the flesh [Vulg.,: ‘sinful flesh’],” as is written Rom. 8:3. And, consequently, we must not say simply that He partook of the effect of His priesthood but with this qualification—in regard to the passibility of the flesh. Wherefore he adds pointedly, “that was able to save Him from death.”

Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in the offering of a sacrifice by any priest—namely, the sacrifice itself which is offered, and the devotion of the offerer. Now the proper effect of priesthood is that which results from the sacrifice itself. But Christ obtained a result from His passion, not as by virtue of the sacrifice, which is offered by way of satisfaction, but by the very devotion with which out of charity He humbly endured the passion.

Reply to Objection 3: A figure cannot equal the reality, wherefore the figural priest of the Old Law could not attain to such perfection as not to need a sacrifice of satisfaction. But Christ did not stand in need of this. Consequently, there is no comparison between the two; and this is what the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28): “The Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity; but the word of the oath, which was since the Law, the Son Who is perfected for evermore.”

Whether the priesthood of Christ endures for ever?

Objection 1: It would seem that the priesthood of Christ does not endure for ever. For as stated above (A[4], ad 1,3) those alone need the effect of the priesthood who have the weakness of sin, which can be expiated by the priest’s sacrifice. But this will not be for ever. For in the Saints there will be no weakness, according to Is. 60:21: “Thy people shall be all just”: while no expiation will be possible for the weakness of sin, since “there is no redemption in hell” (Office of the Dead, Resp. vii). Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.

Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of Christ was made manifest most of all in His passion and death, when “by His own blood He entered into the Holies” (Heb. 9:12). But the passion and death of Christ will not endure for ever, as stated Rom. 6:9: “Christ rising again from the dead, dieth now no more.” Therefore the priesthood of Christ will not endure for ever.

Objection 3: Further, Christ is a priest, not as God, but as man. But at one time Christ was not man, namely during the three days He lay dead. Therefore the priesthood of Christ endures not for ever.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): “Thou art a priest for ever.”

I answer that, In the priestly office, we may consider two things: first, the offering of the sacrifice; secondly, the consummation of the sacrifice, consisting in this, that those for whom the sacrifice is offered, obtain the end of the sacrifice. Now the end of the sacrifice which Christ offered consisted not in temporal but in eternal good, which we obtain through His death, according to Heb. 9:11: “Christ is [Vulg.: ‘being come’] a high-priest of the good things to come”; for which reason the priesthood of Christ is said to be eternal. Now this consummation of Christ’s sacrifice was foreshadowed in this, that the high-priest of the Old Law, once a year, entered into the Holy of Holies with the blood of a he-goat and a calf, as laid down, Lev. 16:11, and yet he offered up the he-goat and calf not within the Holy of Holies, but without. In like manner Christ entered into the Holy of Holies—that is, into heaven—and prepared the way for us, that we might enter by the virtue of His blood, which He shed for us on earth.

Reply to Objection 1: The Saints who will be in heaven will not need any further expiation by the priesthood of Christ, but having expiated, they will need consummation through Christ Himself, on Whom their glory depends, as is written (Apoc. 21:23): “The glory of God hath enlightened it”—that is, the city of the Saints—“and the Lamb is the lamp thereof.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ’s passion and death are not to be repeated, yet the virtue of that Victim endures for ever, for, as it is written (Heb. 10:14), “by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.”

Wherefore the reply to the third objection is clear.

As to the unity of this sacrifice, it was foreshadowed in the Law in that, once a year, the high-priest of the Law entered into the Holies, with a solemn oblation of blood, as set down, Lev. 16:11. But the figure fell short of the reality in this, that the victim had not an everlasting virtue, for which reason those sacrifices were renewed every year.

Whether the priesthood of Christ was according to the order of Melchisedech?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s priesthood was not according to the order of Melchisedech. For Christ is the fountain-head of the entire priesthood, as being the principal priest. Now that which is principal is not . secondary in regard to others, but others are secondary in its regard.

Therefore Christ should not be called a priest according to the order of Melchisedech.

Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of the Old Law was more akin to Christ's priesthood than was the priesthood that existed before the Law. But the nearer the sacraments were to Christ, the more clearly they signified Him; as is clear from what we have said in the [4107]SS, Q[2], A[7]. Therefore the priesthood of Christ should be denominated after the priesthood of the Law, rather than after the order of Melchisedech, which was before the Law.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:2,3): "That is 'king of peace,' without father, without mother, without genealogy; having neither beginning of days nor ending of life": which can be referred only to the Son of God. Therefore Christ should not be called a priest according to the order of Melchisedech, as of some one else, but according to His own order.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 109:4): "Thou art a priest for ever according to the order of Melchisedech."

I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 3) the priesthood of the Law was a figure of the priesthood of Christ, not as adequately representing the reality, but as falling far short thereof: both because the priesthood of the Law did not wash away sins, and because it was not eternal, as the priesthood of Christ. Now the excellence of Christ's over the Levitical priesthood was foreshadowed in the priesthood of Melchisedech, who received tithes from Abraham, in whose loins the priesthood of the Law was tithed. Consequently the priesthood of Christ is said to be "according to the order of Melchisedech," on account of the excellence of the true priesthood over the figural priesthood of the Law.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be according to the order of Melchisedech not as though the latter were a more excellent priest, but because he foreshadowed the excellence of Christ's over the Levitical priesthood.

Reply to Objection 2: Two things may be considered in Christ's priesthood: namely, the offering made by Christ, and (our) partaking thereof. As to the actual offering, the priesthood of Christ was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of the Law, by reason of the shedding of blood, than by the priesthood of Melchisedech in which there was no blood-shedding. But if we consider the participation of this sacrifice and the effect thereof, wherein the excellence of Christ’s priesthood over the priesthood of the Law principally consists, then the former was more distinctly foreshadowed by the priesthood of Melchisedech, who offered bread and wine, signifying, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) ecclesiastical unity, which is established by our taking part in the sacrifice of Christ [*Cf.[4108] Q[79], A[1]]. Wherefore also in the New Law the true sacrifice of Christ is presented to the faithful under the form of bread and wine.

Reply to Objection 3: Melchisedech is described as “without father, without mother, without genealogy,” and as “having neither beginning of days nor ending of life,” not as though he had not these things, but because these details in his regard are not supplied by Holy Scripture. And this it is that, as the Apostle says in the same passage, he is “likened unto the Son of God,” Who had no earthly father, no heavenly mother, and no genealogy, according to Is. 53:8: “Who shall declare His generation?” and Who in His Godhead has neither beginning nor end of days.

OF ADOPTION AS BEFITTING TO CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now come to consider whether adoption befits Christ: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?

(2) Whether this is fitting to God the Father alone?

(3) Whether it is proper to man to be adopted to the sonship of God?

(4) Whether Christ can be called the adopted Son?

Whether it is fitting that God should adopt sons?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting that God should adopt sons. For, as jurists say, no one adopts anyone but a stranger as his son. But no one is a stranger in relation to God, Who is the Creator of all. Therefore it seems unfitting that God should adopt.

Objection 2: Further, adoption seems to have been introduced in default of natural sonship. But in God there is natural sonship, as set down in the [4109]FP, Q[27], A[2]. Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.

Objection 3: Further, the purpose of adopting anyone is that he may succeed, as heir, the person who adopts him. But it does not seem possible for anyone to succeed God as heir, for He can never die. Therefore it is unfitting that God should adopt.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5) that “He hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children of God.” But the predestination of God is not ineffectual. Therefore God does adopt some as His sons.

I answer that, A man adopts someone as his son forasmuch as out of goodness he admits him as heir to his estate. Now God is infinitely good: for which reason He admits His creatures to a participation of good things; especially rational creatures, who forasmuch as they are made to the image of God, are capable of Divine beatitude. And this consists in the enjoyment of God, by which also God Himself is happy and rich in Himself—that is, in the enjoyment of Himself. Now a man’s inheritance is that which makes him rich. Wherefore, inasmuch as God, of His goodness, admits men to the inheritance of beatitude, He is said to adopt them. Moreover Divine exceeds human adoption, forasmuch as God, by bestowing His grace, makes man whom He adopts worthy to receive the heavenly inheritance; whereas man does not make him worthy whom he adopts; but rather in adopting him he chooses one who is already worthy.

Reply to Objection 1: Considered in his nature man is not a stranger in respect to God, as to the natural gifts bestowed on him: but he is as to the gifts of grace and glory; in regard to which he is adopted.

Reply to Objection 2: Man works in order to supply his wants: not so God, Who works in order to communicate to others the abundance of His perfection. Wherefore, as by the work of creation the Divine goodness is communicated to all creatures in a certain likeness, so by the work of adoption the likeness of natural sonship is communicated to men, according to Rom. 8:29: “Whom He foreknew . . . to be made conformable to the image of His Son.”

Reply to Objection 3: Spiritual goods can be possessed by many at the same time; not so material goods. Wherefore none can receive a material inheritance except the successor of a deceased person: whereas all receive the spiritual inheritance at the same time in its entirety without detriment to the ever-living Father.

Yet it might be said that God ceases to be, according as He is in us by faith, so as to begin to be in us by vision, as a gloss says on Rom. 8:17: “If sons, heirs also.”

Whether it is fitting that the whole Trinity should adopt?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that the whole Trinity should adopt. For adoption is said of God in likeness to human custom. But among men those only adopt who can beget: and in God this can be applied only to the Father. Therefore in God the Father alone can adopt.

Objection 2: Further, by adoption men become the brethren of Christ, according to Rom. 8:29: “That He might be the first-born among many brethren.” Now brethren are the sons of the same father; wherefore our Lord says (Jn. 20:17): “I ascend to My Father and to your Father.” Therefore Christ’s Father alone has adopted sons.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4, 5, 6): “God sent His Son . . . that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because you are sons of God, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your hearts, crying: ‘Abba’ [Father].” Therefore it belongs to Him to adopt, Who has the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this belongs to the Father alone. Therefore it befits the Father alone to adopt.

On the contrary, It belongs to Him to adopt us as sons, Whom we can call Father; whence it is written (Rom. 8:15): “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: ‘Abba’ [Father].” But when we say to God, “Our Father,” we address the whole Trinity: as is the case with the other names which are said of God in respect of creatures, as stated in the [4110]FP, Q[33], A[3], OBJ[1]; cf. [4111]FP, Q[45], A[6]. Therefore to adopt is befitting to the whole Trinity.

I answer that, There is this difference between an adopted son of God and the natural Son of God, that the latter is “begotten not made”; whereas the former is made, according to Jn. 1:12: “He gave them power to be made the sons of God.” Yet sometimes the adopted son is said to be begotten, by reason of the spiritual regeneration which is by grace, not by nature; wherefore it is written (James 1:18): “Of His own will hath He begotten us by the word of truth.” Now although, in God, to beget belongs to the Person of the Father, yet to produce any effect in creatures is common to the whole

Trinity, by reason of the oneness of their Nature: since, where there is one nature, there must needs be one power and one operation: whence our Lord says (Jn. 5:19): “What things soever the Father doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.” Therefore it belongs to the whole Trinity to adopt men as sons of God.

Reply to Objection 1: All human individuals are not of one individual nature, so that there need be one operation and one effect of them all, as is the case in God. Consequently in this respect no comparison is possible.

Reply to Objection 2: By adoption we are made the brethren of Christ, as having with Him the same Father: Who, nevertheless, is His Father in one way, and ours in another. Whence pointedly our Lord says, separately, “My Father,” and “Your Father” (Jn. 20:17). For He is Christ’s Father by natural generation; and this is proper to Him: whereas He is our Father by a voluntary operation, which is common to Him and to the Son and Holy Ghost: so that Christ is not the Son of the whole Trinity, as we are.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 2), adoptive sonship is a certain likeness of the eternal Sonship: just as all that takes place in time is a certain likeness of what has been from eternity. Now man is likened to the splendor of the Eternal Son by reason of the light of grace which is attributed to the Holy Ghost. Therefore adoption, though common to the whole Trinity, is appropriated to the Father as its author; to the Son, as its exemplar; to the Holy Ghost, as imprinting on us the likeness of this exemplar.

Whether it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the rational nature to be adopted. For God is not said to be the Father of the rational creature, save by adoption. But God is called the Father even of the irrational creature, according to Job 38:28: “Who is father of the rain? Or who begot the drops of dew?” Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.

Objection 2: Further, by reason of adoption some are called sons of God. But to be sons of God seems to be properly attributed by the Scriptures to the angels; according to Job 1:6: “On a certain day when the sons of God came to stand before the Lord.” Therefore it is not proper to the rational creature to be adopted.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is proper to a nature, belongs to all that have that nature: just as risibility belongs to all men. But to be adopted does not belong to every rational nature. Therefore it is not proper to human nature.

On the contrary, Adopted sons are the “heirs of God,” as is stated Rom. 8:17. But such an inheritance belongs to none but the rational nature. Therefore it is proper to the rational nature to be adopted.

I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 3), the sonship of adoption is a certain likeness of natural sonship. Now the Son of God proceeds naturally from the Father as the Intellectual Word, in oneness of nature with the Father. To this Word, therefore, something may be likened in three ways. First, on the part of the form but not on the part of its intelligibility: thus the form of a house already built is like the mental word of the builder in its specific form, but not in intelligibility, because the material form of a house is not intelligible, as it was in the mind of the builder. In this way every creature is like the Eternal Word; since it was made through the Word. Secondly, the creature is likened to the Word, not only as to its form, but also as to its intelligibility: thus the knowledge which is begotten in the disciple’s mind is likened to the word in the mind of the master. In this way the rational creature, even in its nature, is likened to the Word of God. Thirdly, a creature is likened to the Eternal Word, as to the oneness of the Word with the Father, which is by reason of grace and charity: wherefore our Lord prays (Jn. 17:21,22): “That they may be one in Us . . . as We also are one.” And this likeness perfects the adoption: for to those who are thus like Him the eternal inheritance is due. It is therefore clear that to be adopted belongs to the rational creature alone: not indeed to all, but only to those who have charity; which is “poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost” (Rom. 5:5); for which reason (Rom. 8:15) the Holy Ghost is called “the Spirit of adoption of sons.”

Reply to Objection 1: God is called the Father of the irrational creature, not properly speaking, by reason of adoption, but by reason of creation; according to the first-mentioned participation of likeness.

Reply to Objection 2: Angels are called sons of God by adoptive sonship, not that it belongs to them first; but because they were the first to receive the adoption of sons.

Reply to Objection 3: Adoption is a property resulting not from nature, but from grace, of which the rational nature is capable. Therefore it need not belong to every rational nature: but every rational creature must needs be capable of adoption.

Whether Christ as man is the adopted Son of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man is the adopted Son of God. For Hilary says (De Trin. ii) speaking of Christ: “The dignity of power is not forfeited when carnal humanity [*Some editions read ‘humilitas’—‘the humility or lowliness of the flesh’] is adopted.” Therefore Christ as man is the adopted Son of God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) that “by the same grace that Man is Christ, as from the birth of faith every man is a Christian.” But other men are Christians by the grace of adoption. Therefore this Man is Christ by adoption: and consequently He would seem to be an adopted son.

Objection 3: Further, Christ, as man, is a servant. But it is of greater dignity to be an adopted son than to be a servant. Therefore much more is Christ, as man, an adopted Son.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Incarn. viii): “We do not call an adopted son a natural son: the natural son is a true son.” But Christ is the true and natural Son of God, according to 1 Jn. 5:20: “That we may . . . be in His true Son, Jesus Christ.” Therefore Christ, as Man, is not an adopted Son.

I answer that, Sonship belongs properly to the hypostasis or person, not to the nature; whence in the [4112]FP, Q[32], A[3] we have stated that Filiation is a personal property. Now in Christ there is no other than the uncreated person or hypostasis, to Whom it belongs by nature to be the Son. But it has been said above (A[1], ad 2), that the sonship of adoption is a participated likeness of natural sonship: nor can a thing be said to participate in what it has essentially. Therefore Christ, Who is the natural Son of God, can nowise be called an adopted Son.

But according to those who suppose two persons or two hypostases or two supposita in Christ, no reason prevents Christ being called the adopted Son of God.

Reply to Objection 1: As sonship does not properly belong to the nature, so neither does adoption. Consequently, when it is said that "carnal humanity is adopted," the expression is metaphorical: and adoption is used to signify the union of human nature to the Person of the Son.

Reply to Objection 2: This comparison of Augustine is to be referred to the principle because, to wit, just as it is granted to any man without meriting it to be a Christian, so did it happen that this man without meriting it was Christ. But there is a difference on the part of the term: because by the grace of union Christ is the natural Son; whereas another man by habitual grace is an adopted son. Yet habitual grace in Christ does not make one who was not a son to be an adopted son, but is a certain effect of Filiation in the soul of Christ, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-begotten of the Father; full of grace and truth."

Reply to Objection 3: To be a creature, as also to be subservient or subject to God, regards not only the person, but also the nature: but this cannot be said of sonship. Wherefore the comparison does not hold.

OF THE PREDESTINATION OF CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We shall now consider the predestination of Christ. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ was predestinated?

(2) Whether He was predestinated as man?

(3) Whether His predestination is the exemplar of ours?

(4) Whether it is the cause of our predestination?

Whether it is befitting that Christ should be predestinated?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should be predestinated. For the term of anyone's predestination seems to be the adoption of sons, according to Eph. 1:5: "Who hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children." But it is not befitting to Christ to be an adopted Son, as stated above ([4113]Q[23], A[4]). Therefore it is not fitting that Christ be predestinated.

Objection 2: Further, we may consider two things in Christ: His human nature and His person. But it cannot be said that Christ is predestinated by reason of His human nature; for this proposition is false—“The human nature is Son of God.” In like manner neither by reason of the person; for this person is the Son of God, not by grace, but by nature: whereas predestination regards what is of grace, as stated in the [4114]FP, Q[23], AA[2],5. Therefore Christ was not predestinated to be the Son of God.

Objection 3: Further, just as that which has been made was not always, so also that which was predestinated; since predestination implies a certain antecedence. But, because Christ was always God and the Son of God, it cannot be said that that Man was “made the Son of God.” Therefore, for a like reason, we ought not to say that Christ was “predestinated the Son of God.”

On the contrary, The Apostle says, speaking of Christ (Rom. 1:4): “Who was predestinated the Son of God in power.”

I answer that, As is clear from what has been said in the [4115]FP, Q[23], AA[1],2, predestination, in its proper sense, is a certain Divine preordination from eternity of those things which are to be done in time by the grace of God. Now, that man is God, and that God is man, is something done in time by God through the grace of union. Nor can it be said that God has not from eternity pre-ordained to do this in time: since it would follow that something would come anew into the Divine Mind. And we must needs admit that the union itself of natures in the Person of Christ falls under the eternal predestination of God. For this reason do we say that Christ was predestinated.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle there speaks of that predestination by which we are predestinated to be adopted sons. And just as Christ in a singular manner above all others is the natural Son of God, so in a singular manner is He predestinated.

Reply to Objection 2: As a gloss [*From St. Augustine, De Praed. Sanct. xv] says on Rom. 1:4, some understood that predestination to refer to the nature and not to the Person—that is to say, that on human nature was bestowed the grace of being united to the Son of God in unity of Person.

But in that case the phrase of the Apostle would be improper, for two reasons. First, for a general reason: for we do not speak of a person’s nature, but of his person, as being predestinated: because to be predestinated is to be directed towards salvation, which belongs to a suppositum acting for the end of beatitude. Secondly, for a special reason. Because to be Son of God is not befitting to human nature; for this proposition is false: “The human nature is the Son of God”: unless one were to force from it such an exposition as: “Who was predestinated the Son of God in power”—that is, “It was predestinated that the Human nature should be united to the Son of God in the Person.”

Hence we must attribute predestination to the Person of Christ: not, indeed, in Himself or as subsisting in the Divine Nature, but as subsisting in the human nature. Wherefore the Apostle, after saying, “Who was made to Him of the seed of David according to the flesh,” added, “Who was predestinated the Son of God in power”: so as to give us to understand that in respect of His being of the seed of David according to the flesh, He was predestinated the Son of God in power. For although it is natural to that Person, considered in Himself, to be the Son of God in power, yet this is not natural to Him, considered in the human nature, in respect of which this befits Him according to the grace of union.

Reply to Objection 3: Origen commenting on Rom. 1:4 says that the true reading of this passage of the Apostle is: “Who was destined to be the Son of God in power”; so that no antecedence is implied. And so there would be no difficulty. Others refer the antecedence implied in the participle “predestinated,” not to the fact of being the Son of God, but to the manifestation thereof, according to the customary way of speaking in Holy Scripture, by which things are said to take place when they are made known; so that the sense would be—“Christ was predestinated to be made known as the Son of God.” But this is an improper signification of predestination. For a person is properly said to be predestinated by reason of his being directed to the end of beatitude: but the beatitude of Christ does not depend on our knowledge thereof.

It is therefore better to say that the antecedence implied in the participle “predestinated” is to be referred to the Person not in Himself, but by reason of the human nature: since, although that Person was the Son of God from eternity, it was not always true that one subsisting in human nature was the Son of God. Hence Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): “Jesus was predestinated, so that He Who according to the flesh was to be the son of David, should be nevertheless Son of God in power.”

Moreover, it must be observed that, although the participle "predestinated," just as this participle "made," implies antecedence, yet there is a difference. For "to be made" belongs to the thing in itself: whereas "to be predestinated" belongs to someone as being in the apprehension of one who pre-ordains. Now that which is the subject of a form or nature in reality, can be apprehended either as under that form or absolutely. And since it cannot be said absolutely of the Person of Christ that He began to be the Son of God, yet this is becoming to Him as understood or apprehended to exist in human nature, because at one time it began to be true that one existing in human nature was the Son of God; therefore this proposition—"Christ was predestinated the Son of God"—is truer than this—"Christ was made the Son of God."

Whether this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of God"?

Objection 1: It would seem that this proposition is false: "Christ as man was predestinated to be the Son of God." For at some time a man is that which he was predestinated to be: since God's predestination does not fail. If, therefore, Christ as man was predestinated the Son of God, it seems to follow that as man He is the Son of God. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false.

Objection 2: Further, what is befitting to Christ as man is befitting to any man; since He belongs to the same species as other men. If, therefore, Christ, as man, was predestinated the Son of God, it will follow that this is befitting to any other man. But the latter is false. Therefore the former is false.

Objection 3: Further, that is predestinated from eternity which is to take place at some time. But this proposition, "The Son of God was made man," is truer than this, "Man was made the Son of God." Therefore this proposition, "Christ, as the Son of God, was predestinated to be man," is truer than this, "Christ as Man was predestinated to be the Son of God."

On the contrary, Augustine (De Praedest. Sanct. xv) says: "Forasmuch as God the Son was made Man, we say that the Lord of Glory was predestinated."

I answer that, Two things may be considered in predestination. One on the part of eternal predestination itself: and in this respect it implies a certain antecedence in regard to that which comes under predestination. Secondly, predestination may be considered as regards its temporal effect, which is some gratuitous gift of God. Therefore from both points of view we must say that predestination is ascribed to Christ by reason of His human nature alone: for human nature was not always united to the Word; and by grace bestowed an it was it united in Person to the Son of God. Consequently, by reason of human nature alone can predestination be attributed to Christ. Wherefore Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): “This human nature of ours was predestinated to be raised to so great, so lofty, so exalted a position, that it would be impossible to raise it higher.” Now that is said to belong to anyone as man which belongs to him by reason of human nature. Consequently, we must say that “Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God.”

Reply to Objection 1: When we say, “Christ, as Man, was predestinated the Son of God,” this qualification, “as Man,” can be referred in two ways to the action signified by the participle. First, as regards what comes under predestination materially, and thus it is false. For the sense would be that it was predestinated that Christ, as Man, should be the Son of God. And in this sense the objection takes it.

Secondly, it may be referred to the very nature of the action itself: that is, forasmuch as predestination implies antecedence and gratuitous effect. And thus predestination belongs to Christ by reason of His human nature, as stated above. And in this sense He is said to be predestinated as Man.

Reply to Objection 2: Something may be befitting to a man by reason of human nature, in two ways. First, so that human nature be the cause thereof: thus risibility is befitting to Socrates by reason of human nature, being caused by its principles. In this manner predestination is not befitting either to Christ or to any other man, by reason of human nature. This is the sense of the objection. Secondly, a thing may be befitting to someone by reason of human nature, because human nature is susceptible of it. And in this sense we say that Christ was predestinated by reason of human nature; because predestination refers to the exaltation of human nature in Him, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Praedest. Sanct. xv): “The Word of God assumed Man to Himself in such a singular and ineffable manner that at the same time He may be truly and correctly called the Son of Man, because He assumed Men to Himself; and the Son of God, because it was the Only-begotten of God Who assumed human nature." Consequently, since this assumption comes under predestination by reason of its being gratuitous, we can say both that the Son of God was predestinated to be man, and that the Son of Man was predestinated to be the Son of God. But because grace was not bestowed on the Son of God that He might be man, but rather on human nature, that it might be united to the Son of God; it is more proper to say that "Christ, as Man, was predestinated to be the Son of God," than that, "Christ, as Son of God, was predestinated to be Man."

Whether Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours. For the exemplar exists before the exemplate. But nothing exists before the eternal. Since, therefore, our predestination is eternal, it seems that Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours.

Objection 2: Further, the exemplar leads us to knowledge of the exemplate. But there was no need for God to be led from something else to knowledge of our predestination; since it is written (Rom. 8:29): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated." Therefore Christ's predestination is not the exemplar of ours.

Objection 3: Further, the exemplar is conformed to the exemplate. But Christ's predestination seems to be of a different nature from ours: because we are predestinated to the sonship of adoption, whereas Christ was predestinated "Son of God in power," as is written (Rom. 1:4). Therefore His predestination is not the exemplar of ours.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. xv): "The Saviour Himself, the Mediator of God and men, the Man Christ Jesus is the most splendid light of predestination and grace." Now He is called the light of predestination and grace, inasmuch as our predestination is made manifest by His predestination and grace; and this seems to pertain to the nature of an exemplar. Therefore Christ's predestination is the exemplar of ours.

I answer that, Predestination may be considered in two ways. First, on the part of the act of predestination: and thus Christ's predestination cannot be said to be the exemplar of ours: for in the same way and by the same eternal act God predestinated us and Christ.

Secondly, predestination may be considered on the part of that to which anyone is predestinated, and this is the term and effect of predestination. In this sense Christ’s predestination is the exemplar of ours, and this in two ways. First, in respect of the good to which we are predestinated: for He was predestinated to be the natural Son of God, whereas we are predestinated to the adoption of sons, which is a participated likeness of natural sonship. Whence it is written (Rom. 8:29): “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son.” Secondly, in respect of the manner of obtaining this good—that is, by grace. This is most manifest in Christ; because human nature in Him, without any antecedent merits, was united to the Son of God: and of the fulness of His grace we all have received, as it is written (Jn. 1:16).

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the aforesaid act of the predestinator.

The same is to be said of the second objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The exemplate need not be conformed to the exemplar in all respects: it is sufficient that it imitate it in some.

Whether Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours. For that which is eternal has no cause. But our predestination is eternal. Therefore Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours.

Objection 2: Further, that which depends on the simple will of God has no other cause but God’s will. Now, our predestination depends on the simple will of God, for it is written (Eph. 1:11): “Being predestinated according to the purpose of Him, Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.” Therefore Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours.

Objection 3: Further, if the cause be taken away, the effect is also taken away. But if we take away Christ’s predestination, ours is not taken away; since even if the Son of God were not incarnate, our salvation might yet have been achieved in a different manner, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 10). Therefore Christ’s predestination is. not the cause of ours.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:5): “(Who) hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children through Jesus Christ.”

I answer that, if we consider predestination on the part of the very act of predestinating, then Christ’s predestination is not the cause of ours; because by one and the same act God predestinated both Christ and us. But if we consider predestination on the part of its term, thus Christ’s predestination is the cause of ours: for God, by predestinating from eternity, so decreed our salvation, that it should be achieved through Jesus Christ. For eternal predestination covers not only that which is to be accomplished in time, but also the mode and order in which it is to be accomplished in time.

Replies OBJ 1 and 2: These arguments consider predestination on the part of the act of predestinating.

Reply to Objection 3: If Christ were not to have been incarnate, God would have decreed men’s salvation by other means. But since He decreed the Incarnation of Christ, He decreed at the same time that He should be the cause of our salvation.

OF THE ADORATION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider things pertaining to Christ in reference to us; and first, the adoration of Christ, by which we adore Him; secondly, we must consider how He is our Mediator with God.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ’s Godhead and humanity are to be adored with one and the same adoration?

(2) Whether His flesh is to be adored with the adoration of “latria”?

(3) Whether the adoration of “latria” is to be given to the image of Christ?

(4) Whether “latria” is to be given to the Cross of Christ?

(5) Whether to His Mother?

(6) Concerning the adoration of the relics of Saints.

Whether Christ’s humanity and Godhead are to be adored with the same adoration?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration. For Christ’s Godhead is to be adored, as being common to Father and Son; wherefore it is written (Jn. 5:23): “That all may honor the Son, as they honor the Father.” But Christ’s humanity is not common to Him and the Father. Therefore Christ’s humanity and Godhead are not to be adored with the same adoration.

Objection 2: Further, honor is properly “the reward of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3). But virtue merits its reward by action. Since, therefore, in Christ the action of the Divine Nature is distinct from that of the human nature, as stated above ([4116]Q[19], A[1]), it seems that Christ’s humanity is to be adored with a different adoration from that which is given to His Godhead.

Objection 3: Further, if the soul of Christ were not united to the Word, it would have been worthy of veneration on account of the excellence of its wisdom and grace. But by being united to the Word it lost nothing of its worthiness. Therefore His human nature should receive a certain veneration proper thereto, besides the veneration which is given to His Godhead.

On the contrary, We read in the chapters of the Fifth Council [*Second Council of Constantinople, coll. viii, can. 9]: “If anyone say that Christ is adored in two natures, so as to introduce two distinct adorations, and does not adore God the Word made flesh with the one and the same adoration as His flesh, as the Church has handed down from the beginning; let such a one be anathema.”

I answer that, We may consider two things in a person to whom honor is given: the person himself, and the cause of his being honored. Now properly speaking honor is given to a subsistent thing in its entirety: for we do not speak of honoring a man’s hand, but the man himself. And if at any time it happen that we speak of honoring a man’s hand or foot, it is not by reason of these members being honored of themselves: but by reason of the whole being honored in them. In this way a man may be honored even in something external; for instance in his vesture, his image, or his messenger.

The cause of honor is that by reason of which the person honored has a certain excellence. for honor is reverence given to something on account of its excellence, as stated in the [4117]SS, Q[103], A[1]. If therefore in one man there are several causes of honor, for instance, rank, knowledge, and virtue, the honor given to him will be one in respect of the person honored, but several in respect of the causes of honor: for it is the man that is honored, both on account of knowledge and by reason of his virtue.

Since, therefore, in Christ there is but one Person of the Divine and human natures, and one hypostasis, and one suppositum, He is given one adoration and one honor on the part of the Person adored: but on the part of the cause for which He is honored, we can say that there are several adorations, for instance that He receives one honor on account of His uncreated knowledge, and another on account of His created knowledge.

But if it be said that there are several persons or hypostases in Christ, it would follow that there would be, absolutely speaking, several adorations. And this is what is condemned in the Councils. For it is written in the chapters of Cyril [*Council of Ephesus, Part I, ch. 26]: "If anyone dare to say that the man assumed should be adored besides the Divine Word, as though these were distinct persons; and does not rather honor the Emmanuel with one single adoration, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh; let him be anathema."

Reply to Objection 1: In the Trinity there are three Who are honored, but only one cause of honor. In the mystery of the Incarnation it is the reverse: and therefore only one honor is given to the Trinity and only one to Christ, but in a different way.

Reply to Objection 2: Operation is not the object but the motive of honor. And therefore there being two operations in Christ proves, not two adorations, but two causes of adoration.

Reply to Objection 3: If the soul of Christ were not united to the Word of God, it would be the principal thing in that Man. Wherefore honor would be due to it principally, since man is that which is principal in him [*Cf. Ethic. ix, 8]. But since Christ's soul is united to a Person of greater dignity, to that Person is honor principally due to Whom Christ's soul is united. Nor is the dignity of Christ's soul hereby diminished, but rather increased, as stated above ([4118]Q[2], A[2], ad 2).

Whether Christ's humanity should be adored with the adoration of "latria"?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's soul should not be adored with the adoration of "latria." For on the words of Ps. 98:5, "Adore His foot-stool for it is holy," a gloss says: "The flesh assumed by the Word of God is rightly adored by us: for no one partakes spiritually of His flesh unless he first adore it; but not indeed with the adoration called ‘latria,’ which is due to the Creator alone.” Now the flesh is part of the humanity. Therefore Christ’s humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of “latria.”

Objection 2: Further, the worship of “latria” is not to be given to any creature: since for this reason were the Gentiles reproved, that they “worshiped and served the creature,” as it is written (Rom. 1:25). But Christ’s humanity is a creature. Therefore it should not be adored with the adoration of “latria.”

Objection 3: Further, the adoration of “latria” is due to God in recognition of His supreme dominion, according to Dt. 6:13: “Thou shalt adore [Vulg.: ‘fear’; cf. Mat. 4:10] the Lord thy God, and shalt serve Him only.” But Christ as man is less than the Father. Therefore His humanity is not to be adored with the adoration of “latria.”

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): “On account of the incarnation of the Divine Word, we adore the flesh of Christ not for its own sake, but because the Word of God is united thereto in person.” And on Ps. 98:5, “Adore His foot-stool,” a gloss says: “He who adores the body of Christ, regards not the earth, but rather Him whose foot-stool it is, in Whose honor he adores the foot-stool.” But the incarnate Word is adored with the adoration of “latria.” Therefore also His body or His humanity.

I answer that, As stated above [4119](A[1]) adoration is due to the subsisting hypostasis: yet the reason for honoring may be something non-subsistent, on account of which the person, in whom it is, is honored. And so the adoration of Christ’s humanity may be understood in two ways. First, so that the humanity is the thing adored: and thus to adore the flesh of Christ is nothing else than to adore the incarnate Word of God: just as to adore a King’s robe is nothing else than to adore a robed King. And in this sense the adoration of Christ’s humanity is the adoration of “latria.” Secondly, the adoration of Christ’s humanity may be taken as given by reason of its being perfected with every gift of grace. And so in this sense the adoration of Christ’s humanity is the adoration not of “latria” but of “dulia.” So that one and the same Person of Christ is adored with “latria” on account of His Divinity, and with “dulia” on account of His perfect humanity.

Nor is this unfitting. For the honor of “latria” is due to God the Father Himself on account of His Godhead; and the honor of “dulia” on account of the dominion by which He rules over creatures. Wherefore on Ps. 7:1, “O Lord my God, in Thee have I hoped,” a gloss says: “Lord of all by power, to Whom ‘dulia’ is due: God of all by creation, to Whom ‘latria’ is due.”

Reply to Objection 1: That gloss is not to be understood as though the flesh of Christ were adored separately from its Godhead: for this could happen only, if there were one hypostasis of God, and another of man. But since, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 3): “If by a subtle distinction you divide what is seen from what is understood, it cannot be adored because it is a creature”—that is, with adoration of “latria.” And then thus understood as distinct from the Word of God, it should be adored with the adoration of “dulia”; not any kind of “dulia,” such as is given to other creatures, but with a certain higher adoration, which is called “hyperdulia.”

Hence appear the answers to the second and third objections. Because the adoration of “latria” is not given to Christ’s humanity in respect of itself; but in respect of the Godhead to which it is united, by reason of which Christ is not less than the Father.

Whether the image of Christ should be adored with the adoration of “latria”?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s image should not be adored with the adoration of “latria.” For it is written (Ex. 20:4): “Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything.” But no adoration should be given against the commandment of God. Therefore Christ’s image should not be adored with the adoration of “latria.”

Objection 2: Further, we should have nothing in common with the works of the Gentiles, as the Apostle says (Eph. 5:11). But the Gentiles are reproached principally for that “they changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the likeness of the image of a corruptible man,” as is written (Rom. 1:23). Therefore Christ’s image is not to be adored with the adoration of “latria.”

Objection 3: Further, to Christ the adoration of “latria” is due by reason of His Godhead, not of His humanity. But the adoration of “latria” is not due to the image of His Godhead, which is imprinted on the rational soul.

Much less, therefore, is it due to the material image which represents the humanity of Christ Himself.

Objection 4: Further, it seems that nothing should be done in the Divine worship that is not instituted by God; wherefore the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:23) when about to lay down the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Church, says: “I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you.” But Scripture does not lay down anything concerning the adoration of images. Therefore Christ’s image is not to be adored with the adoration of “latria.”

On the contrary, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 16) quotes Basil as saying: “The honor given to an image reaches to the prototype,” i.e. the exemplar. But the exemplar itself—namely, Christ—is to be adored with the adoration of “latria”; therefore also His image.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. i), there is a twofold movement of the mind towards an image: one indeed towards the image itself as a certain thing; another, towards the image in so far as it is the image of something else. And between these movements there is this difference; that the former, by which one is moved towards an image as a certain thing, is different from the movement towards the thing: whereas the latter movement, which is towards the image as an image, is one and the same as that which is towards the thing. Thus therefore we must say that no reverence is shown to Christ’s image, as a thing—for instance, carved or painted wood: because reverence is not due save to a rational creature. It follow therefore that reverence should be shown to it, in so far only as it is an image. Consequently the same reverence should be shown to Christ’s image as to Christ Himself. Since, therefore, Christ is adored with the adoration of “latria,” it follows that His image should be adored with the adoration of “latria.”

Reply to Objection 1: This commandment does not forbid the making of any graven thing or likeness, but the making thereof for the purpose of adoration, wherefore it is added: “Thou shalt not adore them nor serve them.” And because, as stated above, the movement towards the image is the same as the movement towards the thing, adoration thereof is forbidden in the same way as adoration of the thing whose image it is. Wherefore in the passage quoted we are to understand the prohibition to adore those images which the Gentiles made for the purpose of venerating their own gods, i.e. the demons, and so it is premised: “Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me.” But no corporeal image could be raised to the true God Himself, since He is incorporeal; because, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): “It is the highest absurdity and impiety to fashion a figure of what is Divine.” But because in the New Testament God was made man, He can be adored in His corporeal image.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle forbids us to have anything in common with the “unfruitful works” of the Gentiles, but not with their useful works. Now the adoration of images must be numbered among the unfruitful works in two respects. First, because some of the Gentiles used to adore the images themselves, as things, believing that there was something Divine therein, on account of the answers which the demons used to give in them, and on account of other such like wonderful effects. Secondly on account of the things of which they were images; for they set up images to certain creatures, to whom in these images they gave the veneration of “latria.” Whereas we give the adoration of “latria” to the image of Christ, Who is true God, not for the sake of the image, but for the sake of the thing whose image it is, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Reverence is due to the rational creature for its own sake. Consequently, if the adoration of “latria” were shown to the rational creature in which this image is, there might be an occasion of error—namely, lest the movement of adoration might stop short at the man, as a thing, and not be carried on to God, Whose image he is. This cannot happen in the case of a graven or painted image in insensible material.

Reply to Objection 4: The Apostles, led by the inward instinct of the Holy Ghost, handed down to the churches certain instructions which they did not put in writing, but which have been ordained, in accordance with the observance of the Church as practiced by the faithful as time went on. Wherefore the Apostle says (2 Thess. 2:14): “Stand fast; and hold the traditions which you have learned, whether by word”—that is by word of mouth—“or by our epistle”—that is by word put into writing. Among these traditions is the worship of Christ’s image. Wherefore it is said that Blessed Luke painted the image of Christ, which is in Rome.

Whether Christ’s cross should be worshipped with the adoration of “latria”?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s cross should not be worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” For no dutiful son honors that which dishonors his father, as the scourge with which he was scourged, or the gibbet on which he was hanged; rather does he abhor it. Now Christ underwent the most shameful death on the cross; according to Wis. 2:20: “Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death.” Therefore we should not venerate the cross but rather we should abhor it.

Objection 2: Further, Christ’s humanity is worshiped with the adoration of “latria,” inasmuch as it is united to the Son of God in Person. But this cannot be said of the cross. Therefore Christ’s cross should not be worshiped with the adoration of “latria.”

Objection 3: Further, as Christ’s cross was the instrument of His passion and death, so were also many other things, for instance, the nails, the crown, the lance; yet to these we do not show the worship of “latria.” It seems, therefore, that Christ’s cross should not be worshiped with the adoration of “latria.”

On the contrary, We show the worship of “latria” to that in which we place our hope of salvation. But we place our hope in Christ’s cross, for the Church sings:

“Dear Cross, best hope o’er all beside,
That cheers the solemn passion-tide:
Give to the just increase of grace,
Give to each contrite sinner peace.”

[*Hymn Vexilla Regis: translation of Father Aylward, O.P.]

Therefore Christ’s cross should be worshiped with the adoration of “latria.”

I answer that, As stated above [4120](A[3]), honor or reverence is due to a rational creature only; while to an insensible creature, no honor or reverence is due save by reason of a rational nature. And this in two ways. First, inasmuch as it represents a rational nature: secondly, inasmuch as it is united to it in any way whatsoever. In the first way men are wont to venerate the king’s image; in the second way, his robe. And both are venerated by men with the same veneration as they show to the king.

If, therefore, we speak of the cross itself on which Christ was crucified, it is to be venerated by us in both ways—namely, in one way in so far as it represents to us the figure of Christ extended thereon; in the other way, from its contact with the limbs of Christ, and from its being saturated with His blood. Wherefore in each way it is worshiped with the same adoration as Christ, viz. the adoration of “latria.” And for this reason also we speak to the cross and pray to it, as to the Crucified Himself. But if we speak of the effigy of Christ’s cross in any other material whatever—for instance, in stone or wood, silver or gold—thus we venerate the cross merely as Christ’s image, which we worship with the adoration of “latria,” as stated above [4121](A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: If in Christ’s cross we consider the point of view and intention of those who did not believe in Him, it will appear as His shame: but if we consider its effect, which is our salvation, it will appear as endowed with Divine power, by which it triumphed over the enemy, according to Col. 2:14,15: “He hath taken the same out of the way, fastening it to the cross, and despoiling the principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently, in open show, triumphing over them in Himself.” Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:18): “The Word of the cross to them indeed that perish is foolishness; but to them that are saved—that is, to us—it is the power of God.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ’s cross was not united to the Word of God in Person, yet it was united to Him in some other way, viz. by representation and contact. And for this sole reason reverence is shown to it.

Reply to Objection 3: By reason of the contact of Christ’s limbs we worship not only the cross, but all that belongs to Christ. Wherefore Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 11): “The precious wood, as having been sanctified by the contact of His holy body and blood, should be meetly worshiped; as also His nails, His lance, and His sacred dwelling-places, such as the manger, the cave and so forth.” Yet these very things do not represent Christ’s image as the cross does, which is called “the Sign of the Son of Man” that “will appear in heaven,” as it is written (Mat. 24:30). Wherefore the angel said to the women (Mk. 16:6): “You seek Jesus of Nazareth, Who was crucified”: he said not “pierced,” but “crucified.” For this reason we worship the image of Christ’s cross in any material, but not the image of the nails or of any such thing.

Whether the Mother of God should be worshipped with the adoration of “latria”?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God is to be worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” For it seems that the same honor is due to the king’s mother as to the king: whence it is written (3 Kings 2:19) that “a throne was set for the king’s mother, and she sat on His right hand.” Moreover, Augustine [*Sermon on the Assumption, work of an anonymous author] says: “It is right that the throne of God, the resting-place of the Lord of Heaven, the abode of Christ, should be there where He is Himself.” But Christ is worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” Therefore His Mother also should be.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 16): “The honor of the Mother reflects on the Son.” But the Son is worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” Therefore the Mother also.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s Mother is more akin to Him than the cross. But the cross is worshiped with the adoration of “latria.” Therefore also His Mother is to be worshiped with the same adoration.

On the contrary, The Mother of God is a mere creature. Therefore the worship of “latria” is not due to her.

I answer that, Since “latria” is due to God alone, it is not due to a creature so far as we venerate a creature for its own sake. For though insensible creatures are not capable of being venerated for their own sake, yet the rational creature is capable of being venerated for its own sake. Consequently the worship of “latria” is not due to any mere rational creature for its own sake. Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is a mere rational creature, the worship of “latria” is not due to her, but only that of “dulia”: but in a higher degree than to other creatures, inasmuch as she is the Mother of God. For this reason we say that not any kind of “dulia” is due to her, but “hyperdulia.”

Reply to Objection 1: The honor due to the king’s mother is not equal to the honor which is due to the king: but is somewhat like it, by reason of a certain excellence on her part. This is what is meant by the authorities quoted.

Reply to Objection 2: The honor given to the Mother reflects on her Son, because the Mother is to be honored for her Son’s sake. But not in the same way as honor given to an image reflects on its exemplar: because the image itself, considered as a thing, is not to be venerated in any way at all.

Reply to Objection 3: The cross, considered in itself, is not an object of veneration, as stated above ([4122]AA[4],5). But the Blessed Virgin is in herself an object of veneration. Hence there is no comparison.

Whether any kind of worship is due to the relics of the saints?

Objection 1: It would seem that the relics of the saints are not to be worshiped at all. For we should avoid doing what may be the occasion of error. But to worship the relics of the dead seems to savor of the error of the Gentiles, who gave honor to dead men. Therefore the relics of the saints are not to be honored.

Objection 2: Further, it seems absurd to venerate what is insensible. But the relics of the saints are insensible. Therefore it is absurd to venerate them.

Objection 3: Further, a dead body is not of the same species as a living body: consequently it does not seem to be identical with it. Therefore, after a saint's death, it seems that his body should not be worshiped.

On the contrary, It is written (De Eccles. Dogm. xl): "We believe that the bodies of the saints, above all the relics of the blessed martyrs, as being the members of Christ, should be worshiped in all sincerity": and further on: "If anyone holds a contrary opinion, he is not accounted a Christian, but a follower of Eunomius and Vigilantius."

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): "If a father's coat or ring, or anything else of that kind, is so much more cherished by his children, as love for one's parents is greater, in no way are the bodies themselves to be despised, which are much more intimately and closely united to us than any garment; for they belong to man's very nature." It is clear from this that he who has a certain affection for anyone, venerates whatever of his is left after his death, not only his body and the parts thereof, but even external things, such as his clothes, and such like. Now it is manifest that we should show honor to the saints of God, as being members of Christ, the children and friends of God, and our intercessors. Wherefore in memory of them we ought to honor any relics of theirs in a fitting manner: principally their bodies, which were temples, and organs of the Holy Ghost dwelling and operating in them, and are destined to be likened to the body of Christ by the glory of the Resurrection. Hence God Himself fittingly honors such relics by working miracles at their presence.

Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of Vigilantius, whose words are quoted by Jerome in the book he wrote against him (ch. ii) as follows: “We see something like a pagan rite introduced under pretext of religion; they worship with kisses I know not what tiny heap of dust in a mean vase surrounded with precious linen.” To him Jerome replies (Ep. ad Ripar. cix): “We do not adore, I will not say the relics of the martyrs, but either the sun or the moon or even the angels”—that is to say, with the worship of “latria.” “But we honor the martyrs’ relics, so that thereby we give honor to Him Whose martyrs [*The original meaning of the word ‘martyr,’ i.e. the Greek {martys} is ‘a witness’] they are: we honor the servants, that the honor shown to them may reflect on their Master.” Consequently, by honoring the martyrs’ relics we do not fall into the error of the Gentiles, who gave the worship of “latria” to dead men.

Reply to Objection 2: We worship that insensible body, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the soul, which was once united thereto, and now enjoys God; and for God’s sake, whose ministers the saints were.

Reply to Objection 3: The dead body of a saint is not identical with that which the saint had during life, on account of the difference of form, viz. the soul: but it is the same by identity of matter, which is destined to be reunited to its form.

OF CHRIST AS CALLED THE MEDIATOR OF GOD AND MAN (TWO ARTICLES)

We have now to consider how Christ is called the Mediator of God and man, and under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man?

(2) Whether this belongs to Him by reason of His human nature?

Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the Mediator of God and man. For a priest and a prophet seem to be mediators between God and man, according to Dt. 5:5: “I was the mediator and stood between God [Vulg.: ‘the Lord’] and you at that time.” But it is not proper to Christ to be a priest and a prophet. Neither, therefore, is it proper to Him to be Mediator.

Objection 2: Further, that which is fitting to angels, both good and bad, cannot be said to be proper to Christ. But to be between God and man is fitting to the good angels, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). It is also fitting to the bad angels—that is, the demons: for they have something in common with God—namely, “immortality”; and something they have in common with men—namely, “passibility of soul” and consequently unhappiness; as appears from what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13,15). Therefore it is not proper to Christ to be a Mediator of God and man.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to the office of Mediator to beseech one of those, between whom he mediates, for the other. But the Holy Ghost, as it is written (Rom. 8:26), “asketh” God “for us with unspeakable groanings.” Therefore the Holy Ghost is a Mediator between God and man. Therefore this is not proper to Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Tim. 2:5): “There is . . . one Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus.”

I answer that, Properly speaking, the office of a mediator is to join together and unite those between whom he mediates: for extremes are united in the mean [medio]. Now to unite men to God perfectively belongs to Christ, through Whom men are reconciled to God, according to 2 Cor. 5:19: “God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself.” And, consequently, Christ alone is the perfect Mediator of God and men, inasmuch as, by His death, He reconciled the human race to God. Hence the Apostle, after saying, “Mediator of God and man, the man Christ Jesus,” added: “Who gave Himself a redemption for all.”

However, nothing hinders certain others from being called mediators, in some respect, between God and man, forasmuch as they cooperate in uniting men to God, dispositively or ministerially.

Reply to Objection 1: The prophets and priests of the Old Law were called mediators between God and man, dispositively and ministerially: inasmuch as they foretold and foreshadowed the true and perfect Mediator of God and men. As to the priests of the New Law, they may be called mediators of God and men, inasmuch as they are the ministers of the true Mediator by administering, in His stead, the saving sacraments to men.

Reply to Objection 2: The good angels, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 13), cannot rightly be called mediators between God and men. “For since, in common with God, they have both beatitude and immortality, and none of these things in common with unhappy and mortal man, how much rather are they not aloof from men and akin to God, than established between them?” Dionysius, however, says that they do occupy a middle place, because, in the order of nature, they are established below God and above man. Moreover, they fulfill the office of mediator, not indeed principally and

perfectively, but ministerially and dispositively: whence (Mat. 4:11) it is said that “angels came and ministered unto Him”—namely, Christ. As to the demons, it is true that they have immortality in common with God, and unhappiness in common with men. “Hence for this purpose does the immortal and unhappy demon intervene, in order that he may hinder men from passing to a happy immortality,” and may allure them to an unhappy immortality. Whence he is like “an evil mediator, who separates friends” [*Augustine, De Civ. Dei xv].

But Christ had beatitude in common with God, mortality in common with men. Hence “for this purpose did He intervene, that having fulfilled the span of His mortality, He might from dead men make immortal—which He showed in Himself by rising again; and that He might confer beatitude on those who were deprived of it—for which reason He never forsook us.” Wherefore He is “the good Mediator, Who reconciles enemies” (De Civ. Dei xv).

Reply to Objection 3: Since the Holy Ghost is in everything equal to God, He cannot be said to be between, or a Mediator of, God and men: but Christ alone, Who, though equal to the Father in His Godhead, yet is less than the Father in His human nature, as stated above ([4123]Q[20], A[1]). Hence on Gal. 3:20, “Christ is a Mediator [Vulg.: ‘Now a mediator is not of one, but God is one’],” the gloss says: “Not the Father nor the Holy Ghost.” The Holy Ghost, however, is said “to ask for us,” because He makes us ask.

Whether Christ, is the Mediator of God and men?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ is not, as man, the Mediator of God and men. For Augustine says (Contra Felic. x): “One is the Person of

Christ: lest there be not one Christ, not one substance; lest, the office of Mediator being denied, He be called the Son either of God alone, or merely the Son of a man." But He is the Son of God and man, not as man, but as at the same time God and man. Therefore neither should we say that, as man alone, He is Mediator of God and man.

Objection 2: Further, just as Christ, as God, has a common nature with the Father and the Holy Ghost; so, as man, He has a common nature with men. But for the reason that, as God, He has the same nature as the Father and the Holy Ghost, He cannot be called Mediator, as God: for on 1 Tim. 2:5, "Mediator of God and man," a gloss says: "As the Word, He is not a Mediator, because He is equal to God, and God 'with God,' and at the same time one God." Therefore neither, as man, can He be called Mediator, on account of His having the same nature as men.

Objection 3: Further, Christ is called Mediator, inasmuch as He reconciled us to God: and this He did by taking away sin, which separated us from God. But to take away sin belongs to Christ, not as man, but as God. Therefore Christ is our Mediator, not as man, but as God.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 15): "Not because He is the Word, is Christ Mediator, since He Who is supremely immortal and supremely happy is far from us unhappy mortals; but He is Mediator, as man."

I answer that, We may consider two things in a mediator: first, that he is a mean; secondly, that he unites others. Now it is of the nature of a mean to be distant from each extreme: while it unites by communicating to one that which belongs to the other. Now neither of these can be applied to Christ as God, but only as man. For, as God, He does not differ from the Father and the Holy Ghost in nature and power of dominion: nor have the Father and the Holy Ghost anything that the Son has not, so that He be able to communicate to others something belonging to the Father or the Holy Ghost, as though it were belonging to others than Himself. But both can be applied to Him as man. Because, as man, He is distant both from God, by nature, and from man by dignity of both grace and glory. Again, it belongs to Him, as man, to unite men to God, by communicating to men both precepts and gifts, and by offering satisfaction and prayers to God for men. And therefore He is most truly called Mediator, as man.

Reply to Objection 1: If we take the Divine Nature from Christ, we consequently take from Him the singular fulness of grace, which belongs to Him as the Only-begotten of the Father, as it is written (Jn. 1:14). From which fulness it resulted that He was established over all men, and approached nearer to God.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ, as God, is in all things equal to the Father. But even in the human nature He is above all men. Therefore, as man, He can be Mediator, but not as God.

Reply to Objection 3: Although it belongs to Christ as God to take away sin authoritatively, yet it belongs to Him, as man, to satisfy for the sin of the human race. And in this sense He is called the Mediator of God and men.

ST. THOMAS AND THE IMMACULATE CONCEPTION

EDITORIAL NOTE

The privilege of the Virgin-Mother of God and the supreme prerogative of her Son may be seen from the following diagram:

THE LAW AND THE COURSE OF ORIGINAL SIN UNDER THE LAW. . . . . all descendants from Adam. . . . . spring from Adam materially and seminally. . . . . the body lies (not under the guilty, but) under the effects of original sin. . . . . the stricken body dispositively causes the soul to contract the guilt of original sin. . . . . all contract both debt and stain. . . . . all need a Redeemer to destroy the stain contracted PARTIALLY EXEMPT FROM THE LAW; PRIVILEGE OF IMMACULATE CONCEPTION. . . . . the Blessed Virgin. . . . . springs from Adam materially and seminally. . . . . the body lies (not under the guilt, but) under the effects of original sin. . . . . the stricken body would have dispositively caused the soul to contract the guilt of original sin. . . . . the soul at the moment of union with the body was prevented by the infusion of grace from contracting sin. . . . . Mary contracted the debt, but not the stain. . . . . Mary needed a Redeemer to prevent her from contracting the stain WHOLLY EXEMPT FROM THE LAW; MIRACULOUS CONCEPTION. . . . . Our Blessed Lord. . . . . springs from Adam materially, not seminally ([4124]Q[31], A[1]). . . . . His body lay under neither guilt nor effects of original sin. . . . . the body being entirely free, could not transmit the stain to His soul. . . . . no preventive grace needed. . . . . Jesus Christ contracted neither debt nor stain. . . . . Jesus Christ is not redeemed, but the Redeemer

It will thus be seen how accurately St. Thomas speaks of the “flesh” or body of our Blessed Lady. For it should be remembered that, according to St. Thomas, the human body is animated in succession by (1) a vegetative, (2) a sensitive, and (3) a rational soul. Hence his assertion that “the flesh of the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin” ([4125]Q[14], A[3], ad 1) means that the body of the Blessed Virgin, being descended from Adam both materially and seminally, contracted the bodily defects which are conveyed by seminal generation, and are the results of the privation of original justice ([4126]Q[69], A[4], ad 3). Before animation, therefore the body of the Blessed Virgin would not be infected with the guilt of original sin, because privation of grace can only be in that which is the subject of grace, viz. the rational soul. Nevertheless, before animation the body of the Blessed Virgin, being seminally descended from Adam, was such that it would have been the means of transmitting the taint of original sin to the rational soul at the very first instant of animation, unless the grace of the Redeemer intervened and sanctified her soul "in that self-same instant," thus redeeming her and preventing her from contracting the guilt of original sin.

Why, then, does St. Thomas say that because the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before animation, therefore she could be sanctified only after animation?

Such a conclusion would hold if it were a question of the order of Nature: "a thing must be before it is such [prius est esse quam esse tale]"; and therefore the soul must be, before it is sanctified. But if St. Thomas held for a posteriority of time, no matter how short, we ask how it was that he did not perceive the fallacy of the argument, since it might be neither before nor after, but in the very instant of, animation.

The question is answered thus: St. Thomas as a Doctor of the Church and in matters which were not then "de fide," is a witness to the expression of the faith of his time. Hence his line of argument coincides with, because it follows, that of St. Bernard, Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure. It was not likely that St. Thomas would differ from the great masters of his time, who failed to understand that the grace of redemption might at the same time be one of preservation and prevention. Nor is it likely that St. Thomas had any reliable information about the movement* in progress at that time towards a belief in the Immaculate Conception. [*Principally in England, where, owing to the influence of St. Anselm (1109), the doctrine was maintained by Eadmer (1137). Nicolas of St. Albans (1175), Osbert of Clare (1170), Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1253), William of Ware (1300), who was the master of Duns Scotus (1308)]. No doubt he knew something of it, but the names of its promoters would have weighed little with him as against those of Bernard, Albert, Peter, Alexander, and Bonaventure. And it must not be forgotten that among those who upheld the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, not a few ascribed the privilege as being absolute and not one of preservation and Redemption. Hence it is that St. Thomas insists on two things: (1) that the Mother of God was redeemed, and (2) that the grace of her sanctification was a grace of preservation. And, be it remarked in conclusion, these two points, so much insisted on by St. Thomas, are at the very basis of the Catholic doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.

OF THE SANCTIFICATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN (SIX ARTICLES)

After the foregoing treatise of the union of God and man and the consequences thereof, it remains for us to consider what things the Incarnate Son of God did or suffered in the human nature united to Him. This consideration will be fourfold. For we shall consider: (1) Those things that relate to His coming into the world; (2) Those things that relate to the course of His life in this world; (3) His departure from this world; (4) Those things that concern His exaltation after this life.

The first of these offers four points of consideration: (1) The Conception of Christ; (2) His Birth; (3) His Circumcision; (4) His Baptism. Concerning His Conception there are some points to be considered: (1) As to the Mother who conceived Him; (2) as to the mode of His Conception; (3) as to the perfection of the offspring conceived.

On the part of the Mother four points offer themselves to our consideration: (1) Her sanctification. (2) her virginity; (3) her espousals; (4) her annunciation, or preparation for conception.

Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, was sanctified before her birth from the womb?

(2) Whether she was sanctified before animation?

(3) Whether in virtue of this sanctification the fomes of sin was entirely taken away from her?

(4) Whether the result of this sanctification was that she never sinned?

(5) Whether in virtue of this sanctification she received the fulness of grace?

(6) Whether it was proper to her to be thus sanctified?

Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): “That was not first which is spiritual but that which is natural; afterwards that which is spiritual.” But by sanctifying grace man is born spiritually into a son of God according to Jn. 1:13: “(who) are born of God.” But birth from the womb is a natural birth. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan.): “The sanctification, by which we become temples of God, is only of those who are born again.” But no one is born again, who was not born previously. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb.

Objection 3: Further, whoever is sanctified by grace is cleansed from sin, both original and actual. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her birth from the womb, it follows that she was then cleansed from original sin. Now nothing but original sin could hinder her from entering the heavenly kingdom. If therefore she had died then, it seems that she would have entered the gates of heaven. But this was not possible before the Passion of Christ, according to the Apostle (Heb. 10:19): “We have [Vulg.: ‘having’] therefore a confidence in the entering into the Holies by His blood.” It seems therefore that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before her birth from the womb.

Objection 4: Further, original sin is contracted through the origin, just as actual sin is contracted through an act. But as long as one is in the act of sinning, one cannot be cleansed from actual sin. Therefore neither could the Blessed Virgin be cleansed from original sin as long as she was in the act of origin, by existence in her mother’s womb.

On the contrary, The Church celebrates the feast of our Lady’s Nativity. Now the Church does not celebrate feasts except of those who are holy. Therefore even in her birth the Blessed Virgin was holy. Therefore she was sanctified in the womb.

I answer that, Nothing is handed down in the canonical Scriptures concerning the sanctification of the Blessed Mary as to her being sanctified in the womb; indeed, they do not even mention her birth. But as Augustine, in his tractate on the Assumption of the Virgin, argues with reason, since her body was assumed into heaven, and yet Scripture does not relate this; so it may be reasonably argued that she was sanctified in the womb. For it is reasonable to believe that she, who brought forth "the Only-Begotten of the Father full of grace and truth," received greater privileges of grace than all others: hence we read (Lk. 1:28) that the angel addressed her in the words: "Hail full of grace!"

Moreover, it is to be observed that it was granted, by way of privilege, to others, to be sanctified in the womb; for instance, to Jeremias, to whom it was said (Jer. 1:5): "Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee"; and again, to John the Baptist, of whom it is written (Lk. 1:15): "He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost even from his mother's womb." It is therefore with reason that we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been sanctified before her birth from the womb.

Reply to Objection 1: Even in the Blessed Virgin, first was that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual: for she was first conceived in the flesh, and afterwards sanctified in the spirit.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks according to the common law, by reason of which no one is regenerated by the sacraments, save those who are previously born. But God did not so limit His power to the law of the sacraments, but that He can bestow His grace, by special privilege, on some before they are born from the womb.

Reply to Objection 3: The Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb from original sin, as to the personal stain; but she was not freed from the guilt to which the whole nature is subject, so as to enter into Paradise otherwise than through the Sacrifice of Christ; the same also is to be said of the Holy Fathers who lived before Christ.

Reply to Objection 4: Original sin is transmitted through the origin, inasmuch as through the origin the human nature is transmitted, and original sin, properly speaking, affects the nature. And this takes place when the off-spring conceived is animated. Wherefore nothing hinders the offspring conceived from being sanctified after animation: for after this it remains in the mother’s womb not for the purpose of receiving human nature, but for a certain perfecting of that which it has already received.

Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation. Because, as we have stated [4127](A[1]), more grace was bestowed on the Virgin Mother of God than on any saint. Now it seems to have been granted to some, to be sanctified before animation. For it is written (Jer. 1:5): “Before I formed thee in the bowels of thy mother, I knew thee”: and the soul is not infused before the formation of the body. Likewise Ambrose says of John the Baptist (Comment. in Luc. i, 15): “As yet the spirit of life was not in him and already he possessed the Spirit of grace.” Much more therefore could the Blessed Virgin be sanctified before animation.

Objection 2: Further, as Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. xviii), “it was fitting that this Virgin should shine with such a purity that under God none greater can be imagined”: wherefore it is written (Canticles 4:7): “Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee.” But the purity of the Blessed Virgin would have been greater, if she had never been stained by the contagion of original sin. Therefore it was granted to her to be sanctified before her flesh was animated.

Objection 3: Further, as it has been stated above, no feast is celebrated except of some saint. But some keep the feast of the Conception of the Blessed Virgin. Therefore it seems that in her very Conception she was holy; and hence that she was sanctified before animation.

Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 11:16): “If the root be holy, so are the branches.” Now the root of the children is their parents. Therefore the Blessed Virgin could be sanctified even in her parents, before animation.

On the contrary, The things of the Old Testament were figures of the New, according to 1 Cor. 10:11: “All things happened to them in figure.” Now the sanctification of the tabernacle, of which it is written (Ps. 45:5): “The most High hath sanctified His own tabernacle,” seems to signify the sanctification of the Mother of God, who is called “God’s Tabernacle,” according to Ps. 18:6: “He hath set His tabernacle in the sun.” But of the tabernacle it is written (Ex. 40:31,32): “After all things were perfected, the cloud covered the tabernacle of the testimony, and the glory of the Lord filled it.” Therefore also the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified until after all in her was perfected, viz. her body and soul.

I answer that, The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin cannot be understood as having taken place before animation, for two reasons. First, because the sanctification of which we are speaking, is nothing but the cleansing from original sin: for sanctification is a “perfect cleansing,” as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii). Now sin cannot be taken away except by grace, the subject of which is the rational creature alone. Therefore before the infusion of the rational soul, the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified.

Secondly, because, since the rational creature alone can be the subject of sin; before the infusion of the rational soul, the offspring conceived is not liable to sin. And thus, in whatever manner the Blessed Virgin would have been sanctified before animation, she could never have incurred the stain of original sin: and thus she would not have needed redemption and salvation which is by Christ, of whom it is written (Mat. 1:21): “He shall save His people from their sins.” But this is unfitting, through implying that Christ is not the “Saviour of all men,” as He is called (1 Tim. 4:10). It remains, therefore, that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified after animation.

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord says that He “knew” Jeremias before he was formed in the womb, by knowledge, that is to say, of predestination: but He says that He “sanctified” him, not before formation, but before he “came forth out of the womb,” etc.

As to what Ambrose says, viz. that in John the Baptist there was not the spirit of life when there was already the Spirit of grace, by spirit of life we are not to understand the life-giving soul, but the air which we breathe out [respiratus]. Or it may be said that in him as yet there was not the spirit of life, that is the soul, as to its manifest and complete operations.

Reply to Objection 2: If the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never incurred the stain of original sin, this would be derogatory to the dignity of Christ, by reason of His being the universal Saviour of all. Consequently after Christ, who, as the universal Saviour of all, needed not to be saved, the purity of the Blessed Virgin holds the highest place. For Christ did not contract original sin in any way whatever, but was holy in His very Conception, according to Lk. 1:35: “The Holy which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God.” But the Blessed Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but was cleansed therefrom before her birth from the womb. This is what is signified (Job 3:9) where it is written of the night of original sin: “Let it expect light,” i.e. Christ, “and not see it”—(because “no defiled thing cometh into her,” as is written Wis. 7:25), “nor the rising of the dawning of the day,” that is of the Blessed Virgin, who in her birth was immune from original sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the Church of Rome does not celebrate the Conception of the Blessed Virgin, yet it tolerates the custom of certain churches that do keep that feast, wherefore this is not to be entirely reprobated. Nevertheless the celebration of this feast does not give us to understand that she was holy in her conception. But since it is not known when she was sanctified, the feast of her Sanctification, rather than the feast of her Conception, is kept on the day of her conception.

Reply to Objection 4: Sanctification is twofold. one is that of the whole nature: inasmuch as the whole human nature is freed from all corruption of sin and punishment. This will take place at the resurrection. The other is personal sanctification. This is not transmitted to the children begotten of the flesh: because it does not regard the flesh but the mind. Consequently, though the parents of the Blessed Virgin were cleansed from original sin, nevertheless she contracted original sin, since she was conceived by way of fleshly concupiscence and the intercourse of man and woman: for Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): “All flesh born of carnal intercourse is sinful.”

Whether the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from the infection of the fomes?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin was not cleansed from the infection of the fomes. For just as the fomes, consisting in the rebellion of the lower powers against the reason, is a punishment of original sin; so also are death and other corporeal penalties. Therefore the fomes was not entirely removed from her.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (2 Cor. 12:9): “Power is made perfect in infirmity,” which refers to the weakness of the fomes, by reason of which he (the Apostle) felt the “sting of the flesh.” But it was not fitting that anything should be taken away from the Blessed Virgin, pertaining to the perfection of virtue. Therefore it was unfitting that the fomes should be entirely taken away from her.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that “the Holy Ghost came upon” the Blessed Virgin, “purifying her,” before she conceived the Son of God. But this can only be understood of purification from the fomes: for she committed no sin, as Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxvi). Therefore by the sanctification in the womb she was not absolutely cleansed from the fomes.

On the contrary, It is written (Canticles 4:7): “Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee!” But the fomes implies a blemish, at any rate in the flesh. Therefore the fomes was not in the Blessed Virgin.

I answer that, on this point there are various opinions. For some have held that the fomes was entirely taken away in that sanctification whereby the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb. Others say that it remained as far as it causes a difficulty in doing good, but was taken away as far as it causes a proneness to evil. Others again, that it was taken away as to the personal corruption, by which it makes us quick to do evil and slow to do good: but that it remained as to the corruption of nature, inasmuch as it is the cause of transmitting original sin to the offspring. Lastly, others say that, in her first sanctification, the fomes remained essentially, but was fettered; and that, when she conceived the Son of God, it was entirely taken away. In order to understand the question at issue, it must be observed that the fomes is nothing but a certain inordinate, but habitual, concupiscence of the sensitive appetite. for actual concupiscence is a sinful motion. Now sensual concupiscence is said to be inordinate, in so far as it rebels against reason; and this it does by inclining to evil, or hindering from good. Consequently it is essential to the fomes to incline to evil, or hinder from good. Wherefore to say that the fomes was in the Blessed Virgin without an inclination to evil, is to combine two contradictory statements.

In like manner it seems to imply a contradiction to say that the fomes remained as to the corruption of nature, but not as to the personal corruption. For, according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i.), it is lust that transmits original sin to the offspring. Now lust implies inordinate concupiscence, not entirely subject to reason: and therefore, if the fomes were entirely taken away as to personal corruption, it could not remain as to the corruption of nature.

It remains, therefore, for us to say, either that the fomes was entirely taken away from her by her first sanctification or that it was fettered. Now that the fomes was entirely taken away, might be understood in this way, that, by the abundance of grace bestowed on the Blessed Virgin, such a disposition of the soul's powers was granted to her, that the lower powers were never moved without the command of her reason: just as we have stated to have been the case with Christ ([4128]Q[15], A[2]), who certainly did not have the fomes of sin; as also was the case with Adam, before he sinned, by reason of original justice: so that, in this respect, the grace of sanctification in the Virgin had the force of original justice. And although this appears to be part of the dignity of the Virgin Mother, yet it is somewhat derogatory to the dignity of Christ, without whose power no one had been freed from the first sentence of condemnation. And though, through faith in Christ, some were freed from that condemnation, according to the spirit, before Christ's Incarnation, yet it does not seem fitting that any one should be freed from that condemnation, according to the flesh, except after His Incarnation, for it was then that immunity from condemnation was first to appear. Consequently, just as before the immortality of the flesh of Christ rising again, none obtained immortality of the flesh, so it seems unfitting to say that before Christ appeared in sinless flesh, His Virgin Mother's or anyone else's flesh should be without the fomes, which is called "the law of the flesh" or "of the members" (Rom. 7:23, 25).

Therefore it seems better to say that by the sanctification in the womb, the Virgin was not freed from the fomes in its essence, but that it remained fettered: not indeed by an act of her reason, as in holy men, since she had not the use of reason from the very first moment of her existence in her mother's womb, for this was the singular privilege of Christ: but by reason of the abundant grace bestowed on her in her sanctification, and still more perfectly by Divine Providence preserving her sensitive soul, in a singular manner, from any inordinate movement. Afterwards, however, at the conception of Christ's flesh, in which for the first time immunity from sin was to be conspicuous, it is to be believed that entire freedom from the fomes redounded from the Child to the Mother. This indeed is signified (Ezech. 43:2): "Behold the glory of the God of Israel came in by the way of the east," i.e. by the Blessed Virgin, "and the earth," i.e. her flesh, "shone with His," i.e. Christ's, "majesty."

Reply to Objection 1: Death and such like penalties do not of themselves incline us to sin. Wherefore though Christ assumed them, He did not assume the fomes. Consequently in order that the Blessed Virgin might be conformed to her Son, from “whose fulness” her grace was derived, the fomes was at first fettered and afterwards taken away: while she was not freed from death and other such penalties.

Reply to Objection 2: The “infirmity” of the flesh, that pertains to the fomes, is indeed to holy men an occasional cause of perfect virtue: but not the “sine qua non” of perfection: and it is quite enough to ascribe to the Blessed Virgin perfect virtue and abundant grace: nor is there any need to attribute to her every occasional cause of perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: The Holy Ghost effected a twofold purification in the Blessed Virgin. The first was, as it were, preparatory to Christ’s conception: which did not cleanse her from the stain of sin or fomes, but rather gave her mind a unity of purpose and disengaged it from a multiplicity of things (Cf. Dionysius, Div. Nom. iv), since even the angels are said to be purified, in whom there is no stain, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi). The second purification effected in her by the Holy Ghost was by means of the conception of Christ which was the operation of the Holy Ghost. And in respect of this, it may be said that He purified her entirely from the fomes.

Whether by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was preserved from all actual sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that by being sanctified in the womb the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all actual sin. For, as we have already stated [4129](A[3]), after her first sanctification the fomes remained in the Virgin. Now the motion of the fomes, even if it precede the act of the reason, is a venial sin, albeit extremely slight, as Augustine says in his work De Trinitate [*Cf. Sent. ii, D, 24]. Therefore there was some venial sin in the Blessed Virgin.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test. lxxiii on Lk. 2:35: “Thy own soul a sword shall pierce”) says that the Blessed Virgin “was troubled with wondering doubt at the death of our Lord.” But doubt in matters of faith is a sin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all actual sin.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom (Hom. xlv in Matth.) expounding the text: “Behold thy mother and thy brethren stand without, seeking thee,” says: “It is clear that they did this from mere vain glory.” Again, on Jn. 2:3: “They have no wine,” the same Chrysostom says that “she wished to do them a favor, and raise herself in their esteem, by means of her Son: and perchance she succumbed to human frailty, just as did His brethren when they said: ‘Manifest Thyself to the world.’” And a little further on he says: “For as yet she did not believe in Him as she ought.” Now it is quite clear that all this was sinful. Therefore the Blessed Virgin was not preserved from all sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. xxxvi): “In the matter of sin, it is my wish to exclude absolutely all questions concerning the holy Virgin Mary, on account of the honor due to Christ. For since she conceived and brought forth Him who most certainly was guilty of no sin, we know that an abundance of grace was given her that she might be in every way the conqueror of sin.”

I answer that, God so prepares and endows those, whom He chooses for some particular office, that they are rendered capable of fulfilling it, according to 2 Cor. 3:6: “(Who) hath made us fit ministers of the New Testament.” Now the Blessed Virgin was chosen by God to be His Mother. Therefore there can be no doubt that God, by His grace, made her worthy of that office, according to the words spoken to her by the angel (Lk. 1:30,31): “Thou hast found grace with God: behold thou shalt conceive,” etc. But she would not have been worthy to be the Mother of God, if she had ever sinned. First, because the honor of the parents reflects on the child, according to Prov. 17:6: “The glory of children are their fathers”: and consequently, on the other hand, the Mother’s shame would have reflected on her Son. Secondly, because of the singular affinity between her and Christ, who took flesh from her: and it is written (2 Cor. 6:15): “What concord hath Christ with Belial?” Thirdly, because of the singular manner in which the Son of God, who is the “Divine Wisdom” (1 Cor. 1:24) dwelt in her, not only in her soul but in her womb. And it is written (Wis. 1:4): “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins.”

We must therefore confess simply that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin, neither mortal nor venial; so that what is written (Cant 4:7) is fulfilled: “Thou art all fair, O my love, and there is not a spot in thee,” etc.

Reply to Objection 1: After her sanctification the fomes remained in the Blessed Virgin, but fettered; lest she should be surprised by some sudden inordinate act, antecedent to the act of reason. And although the grace of her sanctification contributed to this effect, yet it did not suffice; for otherwise the result of her sanctification would have been to render impossible in her any sensual movement not preceded by an act of reason, and thus she would. not have had the fomes, which is contrary to what we have said above [4130](A[3]). We must therefore say that the above mentioned fettering (of the fomes) was perfected by divine providence not permitting any inordinate motion to result from the fomes.

Reply to Objection 2: Origen (Hom. xvii in Luc.) and certain other doctors expound these words of Simeon as referring to the sorrow which she suffered at the time of our Lord’s Passion. Ambrose (in Luc. 2:35) says that the sword signifies “Mary’s prudence which took note of the heavenly mystery. For the word of God is living and effectual, and more piercing than any two-edged sword” (Heb. 4:12).

Others again take the sword to signify doubt. But this is to be understood of the doubt, not of unbelief, but of wonder and discussion. Thus Basil says (Ep. ad Optim.) that “the Blessed Virgin while standing by the cross, and observing every detail, after the message of Gabriel, and the ineffable knowledge of the Divine Conception, after that wondrous manifestation of miracles, was troubled in mind”: that is to say, on the one side seeing Him suffer such humiliation, and on the other considering His marvelous works.

Reply to Objection 3: In those words Chrysostom goes too far. They may, however, be explained as meaning that our Lord corrected in her, not the inordinate motion of vain glory in regard to herself, but that which might be in the thoughts of others.

Whether, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin received the fulness of grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that, by her sanctification in the womb, the Blessed Virgin did not receive the fulness or perfection of grace. For this seems to be Christ’s privilege, according to Jn. 1:14: “We saw Him [Vulg.: ‘His glory’] as the Only-Begotten [Vulg.: ‘as it were of the Only-Begotten’] full of grace and truth.” But what is proper to Christ ought not to be ascribed to some one else. Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not receive the fulness of grace at the time of her sanctification.

Objection 2: Further, nothing remains to be added to that which is full and perfect: for "the perfect is that which lacks nothing," as is said Phys. iii. But the Blessed Virgin received additional grace afterwards when she conceived Christ; for to her was it said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee: and again, when she was assumed into glory." Therefore it seems that she did not receive the fulness of grace at the time of her first sanctification.

Objection 3: Further, "God does nothing useless," as is said De Coelo et Mundo i. But it would have been useless for her to have certain graces, for she would never have put them to use: since we do not read that she taught which is the act of wisdom; or that she worked miracles, which is the act of one of the gratuitous graces. Therefore she had not the fulness of grace.

On the contrary, The angel said to her: "Hail, full of grace" (Lk. 1:28); which words Jerome expounds as follows, in a sermon on the Assumption (cf. Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.): "Full indeed of grace: for to others it is given in portions; whereas on Mary the fulness of grace was showered all at once."

I answer that, In every genus, the nearer a thing is to the principle, the greater the part which it has in the effect of that principle, whence Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that angels, being nearer to God, have a greater share than men, in the effects of the Divine goodness. Now Christ is the principle of grace, authoritatively as to His Godhead, instrumentally as to His humanity: whence (Jn. 1:17) it is written: "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." But the Blessed Virgin Mary was nearest to Christ in His humanity: because He received His human nature from her. Therefore it was due to her to receive a greater fulness of grace than others.

Reply to Objection 1: God gives to each one according to the purpose for which He has chosen him. And since Christ as man was predestinated and chosen to be "predestinated the Son of God in power . . . of sanctification" (Rom. 1:4), it was proper to Him to have such a fulness of grace that it overflowed from Him into all, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we have all received." Whereas the Blessed Virgin Mary received such a fulness of grace that she was nearest of all to the Author of grace; so that she received within her Him Who is full of all grace; and by bringing Him forth, she, in a manner, dispensed grace to all.

Reply to Objection 2: In natural things at first there is perfection of disposition, for instance when matter is perfectly disposed for the form. Secondly, there is the perfection of the form; and this is the more excellent, for the heat that proceeds from the form of fire is more perfect than that which disposed to the form of fire. Thirdly, there is the perfection of the end: for instance when fire has its qualities in the most perfect degree, having mounted to its own place.

In like manner there was a threefold perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin. The first was a kind of disposition, by which she was made worthy to be the mother of Christ: and this was the perfection of her sanctification. The second perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin was through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her womb. The third perfection of the end is that which she has in glory.

That the second perfection excels the first, and the third the second, appears (1) from the point of view of deliverance from evil. For at first in her sanctification she was delivered from original sin: afterwards, in the conception of the Son of God, she was entirely cleansed from the fomes: lastly, in her glorification she was also delivered from all affliction whatever. It appears (2) from the point of view of ordering to good. For at first in her sanctification she received grace inclining her to good: in the conception of the Son of God she received consummate grace confirming her in good; and in her glorification her grace was further consummated so as to perfect her in the enjoyment of all good.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no doubt that the Blessed Virgin received in a high degree both the gift of wisdom and the grace of miracles and even of prophecy, just as Christ had them. But she did not so receive them, as to put them and such like graces to every use, as did Christ: but accordingly as it befitted her condition of life. For she had the use of wisdom in contemplation, according to Lk. 2:19: “But Mary kept all these words, pondering them in her heart.” But she had not the use of wisdom as to teaching: since this befitted not the female sex, according to 1 Tim. 2:12: “But I suffer not a woman to teach.” The use of miracles did not become her while she lived: because at that time the Teaching of Christ was to be confirmed by miracles, and therefore it was befitting that Christ alone, and

His disciples who were the bearers of His doctrine, should work miracles. Hence of John the Baptist it is written (Jn. 10:41) that he “did no sign”; that is, in order that all might fix their attention on Christ. As to the use of prophecy, it is clear that she had it, from the canticle spoken by her: “My soul doth magnify the Lord” (Lk. 1:46, etc.).

Whether after Christ, it was proper to the Blessed Virgin to be sanctified in the womb?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was proper for the Blessed Virgin, after Christ, to be sanctified in the womb. For it has been said [4131](A[4]) that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified in the womb, in order that she might be worthy to be the mother of God. But this is proper to her. Therefore she alone was sanctified in the womb.

Objection 2: Further, some men seem to have been more closely connected with Christ than Jeremias and John the Baptist, who are said to have been sanctified in the womb. For Christ is specially called the Son of David and of Abraham, by reason of the promise specially made to them concerning Christ. Isaias also prophesied of Christ in the most express terms. And the apostles were in converse with Christ Himself. And yet these are not mentioned as having been sanctified in the womb. Therefore it was not befitting that either Jeremias or John the Baptist should be sanctified in the womb.

Objection 3: Further, Job says of himself (Job 31:18): “From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with me from [my mother’s] womb.” Nevertheless we do not for this reason say that he was sanctified in the womb. Neither therefore are we bound to say that Jeremias and John the Baptist were sanctified in the womb.

On the contrary, It is written of Jeremias (Jer. 1:5): “Before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee.” And of John the Baptist it is written (Lk. 1:15): “He shall be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother’s womb.”

I answer that, Augustine (Ep. ad Dardan.) seems to speak dubiously of their (Jeremias’ and John the Baptist’s) sanctification in the womb. For the leaping of John in the womb “might,” as he says, “signify the great truth,” viz. that the woman was the mother of God, “which was to be made known to his elders, though as yet unknown to the infant. Hence in the Gospel it is written, not that the infant in her womb believed, but that it ‘leaped’: and our eyes are witness that not only infants leap but also cattle. But this was unwonted because it was in the womb. And therefore, just as other miracles are wont to be done, this was done divinely, in the infant; not humanly by the infant. Perhaps also in this child the use of reason and will was so far accelerated that while yet in his mother’s womb he was able to acknowledge, believe, and consent, whereas in other children we have to wait for these things till they grow older: this again I count as a miraculous result of the divine power.”

But since it is expressly said (of John) in the Gospel that “he shall be filled with the Holy Ghost, even from his mother’s womb”; and of Jeremias, “Before thou camest forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee”; it seems that we must needs assert that they were sanctified in the womb, although, while in the womb, they had not the use of reason (which is the point discussed by Augustine); just as neither do children enjoy the use of free will as soon as they are sanctified by baptism.

Nor are we to believe that any others, not mentioned by Scripture, were sanctified in the womb. For such privileges of grace, which are bestowed on some, outside the common law, are ordered for the salvation of others, according to 1 Cor. 12:7: “The manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit,” which would not result from the sanctification of anyone unless it were made known to the Church.

And although it is not possible to assign a reason for God’s judgments, for instance, why He bestows such a grace on one and not on another, yet there seems to be a certain fittingness in both of these being sanctified in the womb, by their foreshadowing the sanctification which was to be effected through Christ. First, as to His Passion, according to Heb. 13:12: “Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate”: which Passion Jeremias foretold openly by words and by symbols, and most clearly foreshadowed by his own sufferings. Secondly, as to His Baptism (1 Cor. 6:11): “But you are washed, but you are sanctified”; to which Baptism John prepared men by his baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: The blessed Virgin, who was chosen by God to be His Mother, received a fuller grace of sanctification than John the Baptist and Jeremias, who were chosen to foreshadow in a special way the sanctification effected by Christ. A sign of this is that it was granted to the

Blessed Virgin thence-forward never to sin either mortally or venially: whereas to the others who were thus sanctified it was granted thenceforward not to sin mortally, through the protection of God's grace.

Reply to Objection 2: In other respects these saints might be more closely united to Christ than Jeremias and John the Baptist. But the latter were most closely united to Him by clearly foreshadowing His sanctification, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: The mercy of which Job speaks is not the infused virtue; but a certain natural inclination to the act of that virtue.

OF THE VIRGINITY OF THE MOTHER OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the virginity of the Mother of God; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether she was a virgin in conceiving?

(2) Whether she was a virgin in His Birth?

(3) Whether she remained a virgin after His Birth?

(4) Whether she took a vow of virginity?

Whether the Mother of God was a virgin in conceiving Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God was not a virgin in conceiving Christ. For no child having father and mother is conceived by a virgin mother. But Christ is said to have had not only a mother, but also a father, according to Lk. 2:33: "His father and mother were wondering at those things which were spoken concerning Him": and further on (Lk. 2:48) in the same chapter she says: "Behold I and Thy father [Vulg.: 'Thy father and I'] have sought Thee sorrowing." Therefore Christ was not conceived of a virgin mother.

Objection 2: Further (Mat. 1) it is proved that Christ was the Son of Abraham and David, through Joseph being descended from David. But this proof would have availed nothing if Joseph were not the father of Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ's Mother conceived Him of the seed of Joseph; and consequently that she was not a virgin in conceiving Him.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Gal. 4:4): “God sent His Son, made of a woman.” But according to the customary mode of speaking, the term “woman” applies to one who is known of a man. Therefore Christ was not conceived by a virgin mother.

Objection 4: Further, things of the same species have the same mode of generation: since generation is specified by its terminus just as are other motions. But Christ belonged to the same species as other men, according to Phil. 2:7: “Being made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.” Since therefore other men are begotten of the mingling of male and female, it seems that Christ was begotten in the same manner; and that consequently He was not conceived of a virgin mother.

Objection 5: Further, every natural form has its determinate matter, outside which it cannot be. But the matter of human form appears to be the semen of male and female. If therefore Christ’s body was not conceived of the semen of male and female, it would not have been truly a human body; which cannot be asserted. It seems therefore that He was not conceived of a virgin mother.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 7:14): “Behold a virgin shall conceive.”

I answer that, We must confess simply that the Mother of Christ was a virgin in conceiving for to deny this belongs to the heresy of the Ebionites and Cerinthus, who held Christ to be a mere man, and maintained that He was born of both sexes.

It is fitting for four reasons that Christ should be born of a virgin. First, in order to maintain the dignity or the Father Who sent Him. For since Christ is the true and natural Son of God, it was not fitting that He should have another father than God: lest the dignity belonging to God be transferred to another.

Secondly, this was befitting to a property of the Son Himself, Who is sent. For He is the Word of God: and the word is conceived without any interior corruption: indeed, interior corruption is incompatible with perfect conception of the word. Since therefore flesh was so assumed by the Word of God, as to be the flesh of the Word of God, it was fitting that it also should be conceived without corruption of the mother.

Thirdly, this was befitting to the dignity of Christ’s humanity in which there could be no sin, since by it the sin of the world was taken away, according to Jn. 1:29: “Behold the Lamb of God” (i.e. the Lamb without stain) “who taketh away the sin of the world.” Now it was not possible in a nature already corrupt, for flesh to be born from sexual intercourse without incurring the infection of original sin. Whence Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): “In that union,” viz. the marriage of Mary and Joseph, “the nuptial intercourse alone was lacking: because in sinful flesh this could not be without fleshly concupiscence which arises from sin, and without which He wished to be conceived, Who was to be without sin.”

Fourthly, on account of the very end of the Incarnation of Christ, which was that men might be born again as sons of God, “not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God” (Jn. 1:13), i.e. of the power of God, of which fact the very conception of Christ was to appear as an exemplar. Whence Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg.): “It behooved that our Head, by a notable miracle, should be born, after the flesh, of a virgin, that He might thereby signify that His members would be born, after the Spirit, of a virgin Church.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Bede says on Lk. 1:33: Joseph is called the father of the Saviour, not that he really was His father, as the Photinians pretended: but that he was considered by men to be so, for the safeguarding of Mary’s good name. Wherefore Luke adds (Lk. 3:23): “Being, as it was supposed, the son of Joseph.”

Or, according to Augustine (De Cons. Evang. ii), Joseph is called the father of Christ just as “he is called the husband of Mary, without fleshly mingling, by the mere bond of marriage: being thereby united to Him much more closely than if he were adopted from another family. Consequently that Christ was not begotten of Joseph by fleshly union is no reason why Joseph should not be called His father; since he would be the father even of an adopted son not born of his wife.”

Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says on Mat. 1:18: “Though Joseph was not the father of our Lord and Saviour, the order of His genealogy is traced down to Joseph”—first, because “the Scriptures are not wont to trace the female line in genealogies”: secondly, “Mary and Joseph were of the same tribe”; wherefore by law he was bound to take her as being of his kin. Likewise, as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i), “it was befitting to trace the genealogy down to Joseph, lest in that marriage any slight should be offered to the male sex, which is indeed the stronger: for truth suffered nothing thereby, since both Joseph and Mary were of the family of David.”

Reply to Objection 3: As the gloss says on this passage, the word "'mulier,' is here used instead of 'femina,' according to the custom of the Hebrew tongue: which applies the term signifying woman to those of the female sex who are virgins."

Reply to Objection 4: This argument is true of those things which come into existence by the way of nature: since nature, just as it is fixed to one particular effect, so it is determinate to one mode of producing that effect. But as the supernatural power of God extends to the infinite: just as it is not determinate to one effect, so neither is it determinate to one mode of producing any effect whatever. Consequently, just as it was possible for the first man to be produced, by the Divine power, "from the slime of the earth," so too was it possible for Christ's body to be made, by Divine power, from a virgin without the seed of the male.

Reply to Objection 5: According to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, ii, iv), in conception the seed of the male is not by way of matter, but by way of agent: and the female alone supplies the matter. Wherefore though the seed of the male was lacking in Christ's conception, it does not follow that due matter was lacking.

But if the seed of the male were the matter of the fetus in animal conception, it is nevertheless manifest that it is not a matter remaining under one form, but subject to transformation. And though the natural power cannot transmute other than determinate matter to a determinate form; nevertheless the Divine power, which is infinite, can transmute all matter to any form whatsoever. Consequently, just as it transmuted the slime of the earth into Adam's body, so could it transmute the matter supplied by His Mother into Christ's body, even though it were not the sufficient matter for a natural conception.

Whether Christ's Mother was a virgin in His birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Mother was not a virgin in His Birth. For Ambrose says on Lk. 2:23: "He who sanctified a strange womb, for the birth of a prophet, He it is who opened His Mother's womb, that He might go forth unspotted." But opening of the womb excludes virginity. Therefore Christ's Mother was not a virgin in His Birth.

Objection 2: Further, nothing should have taken place in the mystery of Christ, which would make His body to seem unreal. Now it seems to pertain not to a true but to an unreal body, to be able to go through a closed passage; since two bodies cannot be in one place at the same time. It was therefore unfitting that Christ's body should come forth from His Mother's closed womb: and consequently that she should remain a virgin in giving birth to Him.

Objection 3: Further, as Gregory says in the Homily for the octave of Easter [*xxvi in Evang.], that by entering after His Resurrection where the disciples were gathered, the doors being shut, our Lord "showed that His body was the same in nature but differed in glory": so that it seems that to go through a closed passage pertains to a glorified body. But Christ's body was not glorified in its conception, but was passible, having "the likeness of sinful flesh," as the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3). Therefore He did not come forth through the closed womb of the Virgin.

On the contrary, In a sermon of the Council of Ephesus (P. III, Cap. ix) it is said: "After giving birth, nature knows not a virgin: but grace enhances her fruitfulness, and effects her motherhood, while in no way does it injure her virginity." Therefore Christ's Mother was a virgin also in giving birth to Him.

I answer that, Without any doubt whatever we must assert that the Mother of Christ was a virgin even in His Birth: for the prophet says not only: "Behold a virgin shall conceive," but adds: "and shall bear a son." This indeed was befitting for three reasons. First, because this was in keeping with a property of Him whose Birth is in question, for He is the Word of God. For the word is not only conceived in the mind without corruption, but also proceeds from the mind without corruption. Wherefore in order to show that body to be the body of the very Word of God, it was fitting that it should be born of a virgin incorrupt. Whence in the sermon of the Council of Ephesus (quoted above) we read: "Whosoever brings forth mere flesh, ceases to be a virgin. But since she gave birth to the Word made flesh, God safeguarded her virginity so as to manifest His Word, by which Word He thus manifested Himself: for neither does our word, when brought forth, corrupt the mind; nor does God, the substantial Word, deigning to be born, destroy virginity."

Secondly, this is fitting as regards the effect of Christ’s Incarnation: since He came for this purpose, that He might take away our corruption. Wherefore it is unfitting that in His Birth He should corrupt His Mother’s virginity. Thus Augustine says in a sermon on the Nativity of Our Lord: “It was not right that He who came to heal corruption, should by His advent violate integrity.”

Thirdly, it was fitting that He Who commanded us to honor our father and mother should not in His Birth lessen the honor due to His Mother.

Reply to Objection 1: Ambrose says this in expounding the evangelist’s quotation from the Law: “Every male opening the womb shall be called holy to the Lord.” This, says Bede, “is said in regard to the wonted manner of birth; not that we are to believe that our Lord in coming forth violated the abode of her sacred womb, which His entrance therein had hallowed.” Wherefore the opening here spoken of does not imply the unlocking of the enclosure of virginal purity; but the mere coming forth of the infant from the maternal womb.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished so to show the reality of His body, as to manifest His Godhead at the same time. For this reason He mingled wondrous with lowly things. Wherefore, to show that His body was real, He was born of a woman. But in order to manifest His Godhead, He was born of a virgin, for “such a Birth befits a God,” as Ambrose says in the Christmas hymn.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have held that Christ, in His Birth, assumed the gift of “subtlety,” when He came forth from the closed womb of a virgin; and that He assumed the gift of “agility” when with dry feet He walked on the sea. But this is not consistent with what has been decided above (Q[14]). For these gifts of a glorified body result from an overflow of the soul’s glory on to the body, as we shall explain further on, in treating of glorified bodies ([4132]XP, Q[82]): and it has been said above (Q[13], A[3], ad 1; Q[16], A[1], ad 2) that before His Passion Christ “allowed His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it” (Damascene, De Fide Orth. iii): nor was there such an overflow of glory from His soul on to His body.

We must therefore say that all these things took place miraculously by Divine power. Whence Augustine says (Sup. Joan. Tract. 121): “To the substance of a body in which was the Godhead closed doors were no obstacle. For truly He had power to enter in by doors not open, in Whose

Birth His Mother’s virginity remained inviolate.” And Dionysius says in an epistle (Ad Caium iv) that “Christ excelled man in doing that which is proper to man: this is shown in His supernatural conception, of a virgin, and in the unstable waters bearing the weight of earthly feet.”

Whether Christ’s Mother remained a virgin after His birth?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth. For it is written (Mat. 1:18): “Before Joseph and Mary came together, she was found with child of the Holy Ghost.” Now the Evangelist would not have said this—“before they came together”—unless he were certain of their subsequent coming together; for no one says of one who does not eventually dine “before he dines” (cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.). It seems, therefore, that the Blessed Virgin subsequently had intercourse with Joseph; and consequently that she did not remain a virgin after (Christ’s) Birth.

Objection 2: Further, in the same passage (Mat. 1:20) are related the words of the angel to Joseph: “Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife.” But marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse. Therefore it seems that this must have at some time taken place between Mary and Joseph: and that, consequently she did not remain a virgin after (Christ’s) Birth.

Objection 3: Further, again in the same passage a little further on (Mat. 1:24,25) we read: “And” (Joseph) “took unto him his wife; and he knew her not till she brought forth her first-born Son.” Now this conjunction “till” is wont to designate a fixed time, on the completion of which that takes place which previously had not taken place. And the verb “knew” refers here to knowledge by intercourse (cf. Jerome, Contra Helvid.); just as (Gn. 4:1) it is said that “Adam knew his wife.” Therefore it seems that after (Christ’s) Birth, the Blessed Virgin was known by Joseph; and, consequently, that she did not remain a virgin after the Birth (of Christ).

Objection 4: Further, “first-born” can only be said of one who has brothers afterwards: wherefore (Rom. 8:29): “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son; that He might be the first-born among many brethren.” But the evangelist calls Christ the first-born by His Mother. Therefore she had other children after

Christ. And therefore it seems that Christ’s Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth.

Objection 5: Further, it is written (Jn. 2:12): “After this He went down to Capharnaum, He”—that is, Christ—“and His Mother and His brethren.” But brethren are those who are begotten of the same parent. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin had other sons after Christ.

Objection 6: Further, it is written (Mat. 27:55,56): “There were there”—that is, by the cross of Christ—“many women afar off, who had followed Jesus from Galilee, ministering unto Him; among whom was Mary Magdalen, and Mary the mother of James and Joseph, and the mother of the sons of Zebedee.” Now this Mary who is called “the mother of James and Joseph” seems to have been also the Mother of Christ; for it is written (Jn. 19:25) that “there stood by the cross of Jesus, Mary His Mother.” Therefore it seems that Christ’s Mother did not remain a virgin after His Birth.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 44:2): “This gate shall be shut, it shall not be opened, and no man shall pass through it; because the Lord the God of Israel hath entered in by it.” Expounding these words, Augustine says in a sermon (De Annunt. Dom. iii): “What means this closed gate in the House of the Lord, except that Mary is to be ever inviolate? What does it mean that ‘no man shall pass through it,’ save that Joseph shall not know her? And what is this—‘The Lord alone enters in and goeth out by it’—except that the Holy Ghost shall impregnate her, and that the Lord of angels shall be born of her? And what means this—‘it shall be shut for evermore’—but that Mary is a virgin before His Birth, a virgin in His Birth, and a virgin after His Birth?”

I answer that, Without any hesitation we must abhor the error of Helvidius, who dared to assert that Christ’s Mother, after His Birth, was carnally known by Joseph, and bore other children. For, in the first place, this is derogatory to Christ’s perfection: for as He is in His Godhead the Only-Begotten of the Father, being thus His Son in every respect perfect, so it was becoming that He should be the Only-begotten son of His Mother, as being her perfect offspring.

Secondly, this error is an insult to the Holy Ghost, whose “shrine” was the virginal womb [*”Sacrarium Spiritus Sancti” (Office of B. M. V., Ant. ad Benedictus, T. P.)], wherein He had formed the flesh of Christ: wherefore it was unbecoming that it should be desecrated by intercourse with man.

Thirdly, this is derogatory to the dignity and holiness of God’s Mother: for thus she would seem to be most ungrateful, were she not content with such a Son; and were she, of her own accord, by carnal intercourse to forfeit that virginity which had been miraculously preserved in her.

Fourthly, it would be tantamount to an imputation of extreme presumption in Joseph, to assume that he attempted to violate her whom by the angel’s revelation he knew to have conceived by the Holy Ghost.

We must therefore simply assert that the Mother of God, as she was a virgin in conceiving Him and a virgin in giving Him birth, did she remain a virgin ever afterwards.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says (Contra Helvid. i): “Although this particle ‘before’ often indicates a subsequent event, yet we must observe that it not infrequently points merely to some thing previously in the mind: nor is there need that what was in the mind take place eventually, since something may occur to prevent its happening. Thus if a man say: ‘Before I dined in the port, I set sail,’ we do not understand him to have dined in port after he set sail: but that his mind was set on dining in port.” In like manner the evangelist says: “Before they came together” Mary “was found with child, of the Holy Ghost,” not that they came together afterwards: but that, when it seemed that they would come together, this was forestalled through her conceiving by the Holy Ghost, the result being that afterwards they did not come together.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): “The Mother of God is called (Joseph’s) wife from the first promise of her espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know by carnal intercourse.” For, as Ambrose says on Lk. 1:27: “The fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union.”

Reply to Objection 3: Some have said that this is not to be understood of carnal knowledge, but of acquaintance. Thus Chrysostom says [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., Hom. 1: among the spurious works ascribed to Chrysostom] that “Joseph did not know her, until she gave birth, being unaware of her dignity: but after she had given birth, then did he know her. Because by reason of her child she surpassed the whole world in beauty and dignity: since she alone in the narrow abode of her womb received Him Whom the world cannot contain.”

Others again refer this to knowledge by sight. For as, while Moses was speaking with God, his face was so bright “that the children of Israel could not steadfastly behold it”; so Mary, while being “overshadowed” by the brightness of the “power of the Most High,” could not be gazed on by Joseph, until she gave birth. But afterwards she is acknowledged by Joseph, by looking on her face, not by lustful contact.

Jerome, however, grants that this is to be understood of knowledge by intercourse; but he observes that “before” or “until” has a twofold sense in Scripture. For sometimes it indicates a fixed time, as Gal. 3:19: The law “was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise.” On the other hand, it sometimes indicates an indefinite time, as in Ps. 122:2: “Our eyes are unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us”; from which it is not to be gathered that our eyes are turned from God as soon as His mercy has been obtained. In this sense those things are indicated “of which we might doubt if they had not been written down: while others are left out to be supplied by our understanding. Thus the evangelist says that the Mother of God was not known by her husband until she gave birth, that we may be given to understand that still less did he know her afterwards” (Adversus Helvid. v).

Reply to Objection 4: The Scriptures are wont to designate as the first-born, not only a child who is followed by others, but also the one that is born first. “Otherwise, if a child were not first-born unless followed by others, the first-fruits would not be due as long as there was no further produce” [*Jerome, Adversus Helvid. x]: which is clearly false, since according to the law the first-fruits had to be redeemed within a month (Num. 18:16).

Reply to Objection 5: Some, as Jerome says on Mat. 12:49,50, “suppose that the brethren of the Lord were Joseph’s sons by another wife. But we understand the brethren of the Lord to be not sons of Joseph, but cousins of the Saviour, the sons of Mary, His Mother’s sister.” For “Scripture speaks of brethren in four senses; namely, those who are united by being of the same parents, of the same nation, of the same family, by common affection.” Wherefore the brethren of the Lord are so called, not by birth, as being born of the same mother; but by relationship, as being blood-relations of His. But Joseph, as Jerome says (Contra Helvid. ix), is rather to be believed to have remained a virgin, “since he is not said to have had another wife,” and “a holy man does not live otherwise than chastely.”

Reply to Objection 6: Mary who is called “the mother of James and Joseph” is not to be taken for the Mother of our Lord, who is not wont to be named in the Gospels save under this designation of her dignity—“the Mother of Jesus.” This Mary is to be taken for the wife of Alphaeus, whose son was James the less, known as the “brother of the Lord” (Gal. 1:19).

Whether the Mother of God took a vow of virginity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Mother of God did not take a vow of virginity. For it is written (Dt. 7:14): “No one shall be barren among you of either sex.” But sterility is a consequence of virginity. Therefore the keeping of virginity was contrary to the commandment of the Old Law. But before Christ was born the old law was still in force. Therefore at that time the Blessed Virgin could not lawfully take a vow of virginity.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25): “Concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord; but I give counsel.” But the perfection of the counsels was to take its beginning from Christ, who is the “end of the Law,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 10:4). It was not therefore becoming that the Virgin should take a vow of virginity.

Objection 3: Further, the gloss of Jerome says on 1 Tim. 5:12, that “for those who are vowed to virginity, it is reprehensible not only to marry, but also to desire to be married.” But the Mother of Christ committed no sin for which she could be reprehended, as stated above ([4133]Q[27], A[4]). Since therefore she was “espoused,” as related by Lk. 1:27 it seems that she did not take a vow of virginity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. iv): “Mary answered the announcing angel: ‘How shall this be done, because I know not man?’ She would not have said this unless she had already vowed her virginity to God.”

I answer that, As we have stated in the [4134]SS, Q[88], A[6], works of perfection are more praiseworthy when performed in fulfilment of a vow. Now it is clear that for reasons already given ([4135]AA[1],2,3) virginity had a special place in the Mother of God. It was therefore fitting that her virginity should be consecrated to God by vow. Nevertheless because, while the Law was in force both men and women were bound to attend to the duty of begetting, since the worship of God was spread according to carnal origin, until Christ was born of that people; the Mother of God is not believed to have taken an absolute vow of virginity, before being espoused to Joseph, although she desired to do so, yet yielding her own will to God's judgment. Afterwards, however, having taken a husband, according as the custom of the time required, together with him she took a vow of virginity.

Reply to Objection 1: Because it seemed to be forbidden by the law not to take the necessary steps for leaving a posterity on earth, therefore the Mother of God did not vow virginity absolutely, but under the condition that it were pleasing to God. When, however, she knew that it was acceptable to God, she made the vow absolute, before the angel's Annunciation.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the fulness of grace was in Christ perfectly, yet some beginning of the fulness preceded in His Mother; so also the observance of the counsels, which is an effect of God's grace, began its perfection in Christ, but was begun after a fashion in His Virgin Mother.

Reply to Objection 3: These words of the Apostle are to be understood of those who vow chastity absolutely. Christ's Mother did not do this until she was espoused to Joseph. After her espousals, however, by their common consent she took a vow of virginity together with her spouse.

OF THE ESPOUSALS OF THE MOTHER OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)

We now consider the espousals of God's Mother: concerning which two points arise for inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin?

(2) Whether there was true marriage between our Lord's Mother and Joseph?

Whether Christ should have been born of an espoused virgin?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born of an espoused virgin. For espousals are ordered to carnal intercourse. But our Lord's Mother never wished to have carnal intercourse with her husband;

because this would be derogatory to the virginity of her mind. Therefore she should not have been espoused.

Objection 2: Further, that Christ was born of a virgin was miraculous, whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii): “This same power of God brought forth the infant’s limbs out of the virginal womb of His inviolate Mother, by which in the vigor of manhood He passed through the closed doors. If we are told why this happened, it will cease to be wonderful; if another instance be alleged, it will no longer be unique.” But miracles that are wrought in confirmation of the Faith should be manifest. Since, therefore, by her Espousals this miracle would be less evident, it seems that it was unfitting that Christ should be born of an espoused virgin.

Objection 3: Further, the martyr Ignatius, as Jerome says on Mat. 1:18, gives as a reason of the espousals of the Mother of God, “that the manner of His Birth might be hidden from the devil, who would think Him to be begotten not of a virgin but of a wife.” But this seems to be no reason at all. First, because by his natural cunning he knows whatever takes place in bodies. Secondly, because later on the demons, through many evident signs, knew Christ after a fashion: whence it is written (Mk. 1:23,24): “A man with an unclean spirit . . . cried out, saying: What have we to do with Thee, Jesus of Nazareth? Art Thou come to destroy us? I know . . . Thou art the Holy one of God.” Therefore it does not seem fitting that the Mother of God should have been espoused.

Objection 4: Further, Jerome gives as another reason, “lest the Mother of God should be stoned by the Jews as an adulteress.” But this reason seems to have no weight, for if she were not espoused, she could not be condemned for adultery. Therefore it does not seem reasonable that Christ should be born of an espoused virgin.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): “When as His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph”: and (Lk. 1:26,27): “The angel Gabriel was sent . . . to a virgin espoused to a man whose name was Joseph.”

I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should be born of an espoused virgin; first, for His own sake; secondly, for His Mother’s sake; thirdly, for our sake. For the sake of Christ Himself, for four reasons. First, lest He should be rejected by unbelievers as illegitimate: wherefore Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26,27: “How could we blame Herod or the Jews if they seem to persecute one who was born of adultery?”

Secondly, in order that in the customary way His genealogy might be traced through the male line. Thus Ambrose says on Lk. 3:23: “He Who came into the world, according to the custom of the world had to be enrolled Now for this purpose, it is the men that are required, because they represent the family in the senate and other courts. The custom of the Scriptures, too, shows that the ancestry of the men is always traced out.”

Thirdly, for the safety of the new-born Child: lest the devil should plot serious hurt against Him. Hence Ignatius says that she was espoused “that the manner of His Birth might be hidden from the devil.”

Fourthly, that He might be fostered by Joseph: who is therefore called His “father,” as bread-winner.

It was also fitting for the sake of the Virgin. First, because thus she was rendered exempt from punishment; that is, “lest she should be stoned by the Jews as an adulteress,” as Jerome says.

Secondly, that thus she might be safeguarded from ill fame. Whence Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26,27: “She was espoused lest she be wounded by the ill-fame of violated virginity, in whom the pregnant womb would betoken corruption.”

Thirdly, that, as Jerome says, Joseph might administer to her wants.

This was fitting, again, for our sake. First, because Joseph is thus a witness to Christ’s being born of a virgin. Wherefore Ambrose says: “Her husband is the more trustworthy witness of her purity, in that he would deplore the dishonor, and avenge the disgrace, were it not that he acknowledged the mystery.”

Secondly, because thereby the very words of the Virgin are rendered more credible by which she asserted her virginity. Thus Ambrose says: “Belief in Mary’s words is strengthened, the motive for a lie is removed. If she had not been espoused when pregnant, she would seem to have wished to hide her sin by a lie: being espoused, she had no motive for lying, since a woman’s pregnancy is the reward of marriage and gives grace to the nuptial bond.” These two reasons add strength to our faith.

Thirdly, that all excuse be removed from those virgins who, through want of caution, fall into dishonor. Hence Ambrose says: “It was not becoming that virgins should expose themselves to evil report, and cover themselves with the excuse that the Mother of the Lord had also been oppressed by ill-fame.”

Fourthly, because by this the universal Church is typified, which is a virgin and yet is espoused to one Man, Christ, as Augustine says (De Sanct. Virg. xii).

A fifth reason may be added: since the Mother of the Lord being both espoused and a virgin, both virginity and wedlock are honored in her person, in contradiction to those heretics who disparaged one or the other.

Reply to Objection 1: We must believe that the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, desired, from an intimate inspiration of the Holy Ghost, to be espoused, being confident that by the help of God she would never come to have carnal intercourse: yet she left this to God’s discretion. Wherefore she suffered nothing in detriment to her virginity.

Reply to Objection 2: As Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26: “Our Lord preferred that men should doubt of His origin rather than of His Mother’s purity. For he knew the delicacy of virgin modesty, and how easily the fair name of chastity is disparaged: nor did He choose that our faith in His Birth should be strengthened in detriment to His Mother.” We must observe, however, that some miracles wrought by God are the direct object of faith; such are the miracles of the virginal Birth, the Resurrection of our Lord, and the Sacrament of the Altar. Wherefore our Lord wished these to be more hidden, that belief in them might have greater merit. Whereas other miracles are for the strengthening of faith: and these it behooves to be manifest.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Trin. iii), the devil can do many things by his natural power which he is hindered by the Divine power from doing. Thus it may be that by his natural power the devil could know that the Mother of God knew not man, but was a virgin; yet was prevented by God from knowing the manner of the Divine Birth. That afterwards the devil after a fashion knew that He was the Son of God, makes no difficulty: because then the time had already come for Christ to make known His power against the devil, and to suffer persecution aroused by him. But during His infancy it behooved the malice of the devil to be withheld, lest he should persecute Him too severely: for Christ did not wish to suffer such things then, nor to make His power known, but to show Himself to be in all things like other infants. Hence Pope Leo (Serm. in Epiph. iv) says that “the Magi found the Child Jesus small in body, dependent on others, unable to speak, and in no way differing from the generality of human infants.”

Ambrose, however, expounding Lk. 1:26, seems to understand this of the devil’s members. For, after giving the above reason—namely, that the prince of the world might be deceived—he continues thus: “Yet still more did He deceive the princes of the world, since the evil disposition of the demons easily discovers even hidden things: but those who spend their lives in worldly vanities can have no acquaintance of Divine things.”

Reply to Objection 4: The sentence of adulteresses according to the Law was that they should be stoned, not only if they were already espoused or married, but also if their maidenhood were still under the protection of the paternal roof, until the day when they enter the married state. Thus it is written (Dt. 22:20,21): “If . . . virginity be not found in the damsel . . . the men of the city shall stone her to death, and she shall die; because she hath done a wicked thing in Israel, to play the whore in her father’s house.”

It may also be said, according to some writers, that the Blessed Virgin was of the family or kindred of Aaron, so that she was related to Elizabeth, as we are told (Lk. 1:36). Now a virgin of the priestly tribe was condemned to death for whoredom; for we read (Lev. 21:9): “If the daughter of a priest be taken in whoredom, and dishonor the name of her father, she shall be burnt with fire.”

Lastly, some understand the passage of Jerome to refer to the throwing of stones by ill-fame.

Whether there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no true marriage between Mary and Joseph. For Jerome says against Helvidius that Joseph “was Mary’s guardian rather than her husband.” But if this was a true marriage, Joseph was truly her husband. Therefore there was no true marriage between Mary and Joseph.

Objection 2: Further, on Mat. 1:16: “Jacob begot Joseph the husband of Mary,” Jerome says: “When thou readest ‘husband’ suspect not a marriage; but remember that Scripture is wont to speak of those who are betrothed as husband and wife.” But a true marriage is not effected by the betrothal, but by the wedding. Therefore, there was no true marriage between the Blessed Virgin and Joseph.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 1:19): “Joseph, her husband, being a just man, and not willing to take her away [*Douay: ‘publicly to expose her’], i.e. to take her to his home in order to cohabit with her, was minded to put her away privately, i.e. to postpone the wedding,” as Remigius [*Cf. Catena Aurea in Matth.] expounds. Therefore, it seems that, as the wedding was not yet solemnized, there was no true marriage: especially since, after the marriage contract, no one can lawfully put his wife away.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii): “It cannot be allowed that the evangelist thought that Joseph ought to sever his union with Mary” (since he said that Joseph was Mary’s husband) “on the ground that in giving birth to Christ, she had not conceived of him, but remained a virgin. For by this example the faithful are taught that if after marriage they remain continent by mutual consent, their union is still and is rightly called marriage, even without intercourse of the sexes.”

I answer that, Marriage or wedlock is said to be true by reason of its attaining its perfection. Now perfection of anything is twofold; first, and second. The first perfection of a thing consists in its very form, from which it receives its species; while the second perfection of a thing consists in its operation, by which in some way a thing attains its end. Now the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered. And the end of matrimony is the begetting and upbringing of children: the first of which is attained by conjugal intercourse; the second by the other duties of husband and wife, by which they help one another in rearing their offspring.

Thus we may say, as to the first perfection, that the marriage of the Virgin Mother of God and Joseph was absolutely true: because both consented to the nuptial bond, but not expressly to the bond of the flesh, save on the condition that it was pleasing to God. For this reason the angel calls Mary the wife of Joseph, saying to him (Mat. 1:20): “Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife”: on which words Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): “She is called his wife from the first promise of her espousals, whom he had not known nor ever was to know by carnal intercourse.”

But as to the second perfection which is attained by the marriage act, if this be referred to carnal intercourse, by which children are begotten; thus this marriage was not consummated. Wherefore Ambrose says on Lk. 1:26,27: “Be not surprised that Scripture calls Mary a wife. The fact of her marriage is declared, not to insinuate the loss of virginity, but to witness to the reality of the union.” Nevertheless, this marriage had the second perfection, as to upbringing of the child. Thus Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i): “All the nuptial blessings are fulfilled in the marriage of Christ’s parents, offspring, faith and sacrament. The offspring we know to have been the Lord Jesus; faith, for there was no adultery: sacrament, since there was no divorce. Carnal intercourse alone there was none.”

Reply to Objection 1: Jerome uses the term “husband” in reference to marriage consummated.

Reply to Objection 2: By marriage Jerome means the nuptial intercourse.

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. i super Matth. [*Opus Imperfectum among the supposititious works ascribed to St. Chrysostom]) the Blessed Virgin was so espoused to Joseph that she dwelt in his home: “for just as she who conceives in her husband’s house is understood to have conceived of him, so she who conceives elsewhere is suspect.” Consequently sufficient precaution would not have been taken to safeguard the fair fame of the Blessed Virgin, if she had not the entry of her husband’s house. Wherefore the words, “not willing to take her away” are better rendered as meaning, “not willing publicly to expose her,” than understood of taking her to his house. Hence the evangelist adds that “he was minded to put her away privately.” But although she had the entry of Joseph’s house by reason of her first promise of espousals, yet the time had not yet come for the solemnizing of the wedding; for which reason they had not yet consummated the marriage. Therefore, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.): “The evangelist does not say, ‘before she was taken to the house of her husband,’ because she was already in the house. For it was the custom among the ancients for espoused maidens to enter frequently the houses of them to whom they were betrothed.” Therefore the angel also said to Joseph: “Fear not to take unto thee Mary thy wife”; that is: “Fear not to solemnize your marriage with her.” Others, however, say that she was not yet admitted to his house, but only betrothed to him. But the first is more in keeping with the Gospel narrative.

OF THE ANNUNCIATION OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now have to consider the Blessed Virgin’s Annunciation, concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was befitting that announcement should be made to her of that which was to be begotten of her?

(2) By whom should this announcement be made?

(3) In what manner should this announcement be made?

(4) Of the order observed in the Annunciation.

Whether it was necessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unnecessary to announce to the Blessed Virgin that which was to be done in her. For there seems to have been no need of the Annunciation except for the purpose of receiving the Virgin’s consent. But her consent seems to have been unnecessary: because the Virginal Conception was foretold by a prophecy of “predestination,” which is “fulfilled without our consent,” as a gloss says on Mat. 1:22. There was no need, therefore, for this Annunciation.

Objection 2: Further, the Blessed Virgin believed in the Incarnation, for to disbelieve therein excludes man from the way of salvation; because, as the Apostle says (Rom. 3:22): “The justice of God (is) by faith of Jesus Christ.” But one needs no further instruction concerning what one believes without doubt. Therefore the Blessed Virgin had no need for the Incarnation of her Son to be announced to her.

Objection 3: Further, just as the Blessed Virgin conceived Christ in her body, so every pious soul conceives Him spiritually. Thus the Apostle says (Gal. 4:19): “My little children, of whom I am in labor again, until Christ be formed in you.” But to those who conceive Him spiritually no announcement is made of this conception. Therefore neither should it have been announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive the Son of God in her womb.

On the contrary, It is related (Lk. 1:31) that the angel said to her: “Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and shalt bring forth a son.”

I answer that, It was reasonable that it should be announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ. First, in order to maintain a becoming order in the union of the Son of God with the Virgin—namely, that she should be informed in mind concerning Him, before conceiving Him in the flesh. Thus Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. iii): “Mary is more blessed in receiving the faith of Christ, than in conceiving the flesh of Christ”; and further on he adds: “Her nearness as a Mother would have been of no profit to Mary, had she not borne Christ in her heart after a more blessed manner than in her flesh.”

Secondly, that she might be a more certain witness of this mystery, being instructed therein by God.

Thirdly, that she might offer to God the free gift of her obedience: which she proved herself right ready to do, saying: “Behold the handmaid of the Lord.”

Fourthly, in order to show that there is a certain spiritual wedlock between the Son of God and human nature. Wherefore in the Annunciation the Virgin’s consent was besought in lieu of that of the entire human nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The prophecy of predestination is fulfilled without the causality of our will; not without its consent.

Reply to Objection 2: The Blessed Virgin did indeed believe explicitly in the future Incarnation; but, being humble, she did not think such high things of herself. Consequently she required instruction in this matter.

Reply to Objection 3: The spiritual conception of Christ through faith is preceded by the preaching of the faith, for as much as “faith is by hearing” (Rom. 10:17). Yet man does not know for certain thereby that he has grace; but he does know that the faith, which he has received, is true.

Whether the annunciation should have been made by an angel to the Blessed Virgin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation should not have been made by an angel to our Blessed Lady. For revelations to the highest angels are made immediately by God, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). But the Mother of God is exalted above all the angels. Therefore it seems that the mystery of the Incarnation should have been announced to her by God immediately, and not by an angel.

Objection 2: Further, if in this matter it behooved the common order to be observed, by which Divine things are announced to men by angels; in like manner Divine things are announced to a woman by a man: wherefore the

Apostle says (1 Cor. 14:34,35): “Let women keep silence in the churches . . . but if they would learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home.” Therefore it seems that the mystery of the Incarnation should have been announced to the Blessed Virgin by some man: especially seeing that Joseph, her husband, was instructed thereupon by an angel, as is related (Mat. 1:20,21)

Objection 3: Further, none can becomingly announce what he knows not. But the highest angels did not fully know the mystery of the Incarnation: wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the question, “Who is this that cometh from Edom?” (Is. 63:1) is to be understood as made by them. Therefore it seems that the announcement of the Incarnation could not be made becomingly by any angel.

Objection 4: Further, greater things should be announced by messengers of greater dignity. But the mystery of the Incarnation is the greatest of all things announced by angels to men. It seems, therefore, if it behooved to be announced by an angel at all, that this should have been done by an angel of the highest order. But Gabriel is not of the highest order, but of the order of archangels, which is the last but one: wherefore the Church sings: “We know that the archangel Gabriel brought thee a message from God” [*Feast of Purification B.V.M. ix Resp. Brev. O.P.]. Therefore this announcement was not becomingly made by the archangel Gabriel.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:26): “The angel Gabriel was sent by God,” etc.

I answer that, It was fitting for the mystery of the Incarnation to be announced to the Mother of God by an angel, for three reasons. First, that in this also might be maintained the order established by God, by which Divine things are brought to men by means of the angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that “the angels were the first to be taught the Divine mystery of the loving kindness of Jesus: afterwards the grace of knowledge was imparted to us through them. Thus, then, the most god-like Gabriel made known to Zachary that a prophet son would be born to him; and, to Mary, how the Divine mystery of the ineffable conception of God would be realized in her.”

Secondly, this was becoming to the restoration of human nature which was to be effected by Christ. Wherefore Bede says in a homily (in Annunt.): “It was an apt beginning of man’s restoration that an angel should be sent by God to the Virgin who was to be hallowed by the Divine Birth: since the first cause of man’s ruin was through the serpent being sent by the devil to cajole the woman by the spirit of pride.”

Thirdly, because this was becoming to the virginity of the Mother of God. Wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ascribed to St. Jerome but not his work]: “It is well that an angel be sent to the Virgin; because virginity is ever akin to the angelic nature. Surely to live in the flesh and not according to the flesh is not an earthly but a heavenly life.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Mother of God was above the angels as regards the dignity to which she was chosen by God. But as regards the present state of life, she was beneath the angels. For even Christ Himself, by reason of His passible life, “was made a little lower than the angels,” according to Heb. 2:9. But because Christ was both wayfarer and comprehensor, He did not need to be instructed by angels, as regards knowledge of Divine things. The Mother of God, however, was not yet in the state of comprehension: and therefore she had to be instructed by angels concerning the Divine Conception.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Assumption (De Assump. B.V.M. [*Work of another author: among the works of St. Augustine]) a true estimation of the Blessed Virgin excludes her from certain general rules. For “neither did she ‘multiply her conceptions’ nor was she ‘under man’s, i.e. her husband’s,’ power (Gn. 3:16), who in her spotless womb conceived Christ of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore it was fitting that she should be informed of the mystery of the Incarnation by means not of a man, but of an angel. For this reason it was made known to her before Joseph: since the message was brought to her before she conceived, but to Joseph after she had conceived.

Reply to Objection 3: As may be gathered from the passage quoted from Dionysius, the angels were acquainted with the mystery of the Incarnation: and yet they put this question, being desirous that Christ should give them more perfect knowledge of the details of this mystery, which are incomprehensible to any created intellect. Thus Maximus [*Maximus of Constantinople] says that “there can be no question that the angels knew that the Incarnation was to take place. But it was not given to them to trace the manner of our Lord’s conception, nor how it was that He remained whole in the Father, whole throughout the universe, and was whole in the narrow abode of the Virgin.”

Reply to Objection 4: Some say that Gabriel was of the highest order; because Gregory says (Hom. de Centum Ovibus [*34 in Evang.]): “It was right that one of the highest angels should come, since his message was most sublime.” But this does nat imply that he was of the highest order of all, but in regard to the angels: since he was an archangel. Thus the Church calls him an archangel, and Gregory himself in a homily (De Centum Ovibus 34) says that “those are called archangels who announce sublime things.” It is therefore sufficiently credible that he was the highest of the archangels. And, as Gregory says (De Centum Ovibus 34), this name agrees with his office: for “Gabriel means ‘Power of God.’ This message therefore was fittingly brought by the ‘Power of God,’ because the Lord of hosts and mighty in battle was coming to overcome the powers of the air.”

Whether the angel of annunciation should have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angel of the Annunciation should not have appeared to the Virgin in a bodily vision. For “intellectual vision is more excellent than bodily vision,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii), and especially more becoming to an angel: since by intellectual vision an angel is seen in his substance; whereas in a bodily vision he is seen in the bodily shape which he assumes. Now since it behooved a sublime messenger to come to announce the Divine Conception, so, seemingly, he should have appeared in the most excellent kind of vision. Therefore it seems that the angel of the Annunciation appeared to the Virgin in an intellectual vision.

Objection 2: Further, imaginary vision also seems to excel bodily vision: just as the imagination is a higher power than the senses. But “the angel . . . appeared to Joseph in his sleep” (Mat. 1:20), which was clearly an imaginary vision. Therefore it seems that he should have appeared to the Blessed Virgin also in an imaginary vision.

Objection 3: Further, the bodily vision of a spiritual substance stupefies the beholder; thus we sing of the Virgin herself: “And the Virgin seeing the light was filled with fear” [*Feast of Annunciation, B.V.M. ii Resp. Brev. O.P.]. But it was better that her mind should be preserved from being thus troubled. Therefore it was not fitting that this announcement should be made in a bodily vision.

On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon (De Annunt. iii) pictures the Blessed Virgin as speaking thus: “To me came the archangel Gabriel with glowing countenance, gleaming robe, and wondrous step.” But these cannot pertain to other than bodily vision. Therefore the angel of the Annunciation appeared in a bodily vision to the Blessed Virgin.

I answer that, The angel of the Annunciation appeared in a bodily vision to the Blessed Virgin. And this indeed was fitting, first in regard to that which was announced. For the angel came to announce the Incarnation of the invisible God. Wherefore it was becoming that, in order to make this known, an invisible creature should assume a form in which to appear visibly: forasmuch as all the apparitions of the Old Testament are ordered to that apparition in which the Son of God appeared in the flesh.

Secondly, it was fitting as regards the dignity of the Mother of God, who was to receive the Son of God not only in her mind, but in her bodily womb. Therefore it behooved not only her mind, but also her bodily senses to be refreshed by the angelic vision.

Thirdly, it is in keeping with the certainty of that which was announced. For we apprehend with greater certainty that which is before our eyes, than what is in our imagination. Thus Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.) that the angel “came to the Virgin not in her sleep, but visibly. For since she was receiving from the angel a message exceeding great, before such an event she needed a vision of great solemnity.”

Reply to Objection 1: Intellectual vision excels merely imaginary and merely bodily vision. But Augustine himself says (De Annunt. iii) that prophecy is more excellent if accompanied by intellectual and imaginary vision, than if accompanied by only one of them. Now the Blessed Virgin perceived not only the bodily vision, but also the intellectual illumination. Wherefore this was a more excellent vision. Yet it would have been more excellent if she had perceived the angel himself in his substance by her intellectual vision. But it was incompatible with her state of wayfarer that she should see an angel in his essence.

Reply to Objection 2: The imagination is indeed a higher power than the exterior sense: but because the senses are the principle of human knowledge, the greatest certainty is in them, for the principles of knowledge must needs always be most certain. Consequently Joseph, to whom the angel appeared in his sleep, did not have so excellent a vision as the Blessed Virgin.

Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says on Lk. 1:11: “We are disturbed, and lose our presence of mind, when we are confronted by the presence of a superior power.” And this happens not only in bodily, but also in imaginary vision. Wherefore it is written (Gn. 15:12) that “when the sun was setting, a deep sleep fell upon Abram, and a great and darksome horror seized upon him.” But by being thus disturbed man is not harmed to such an extent that therefore he ought to forego the vision of an angel. First because from the very fact that man is raised above himself, in which matter his dignity is concerned, his inferior powers are weakened; and from this results the aforesaid disturbance: thus, also, when the natural heat is drawn within a body, the exterior parts tremble. Secondly, because, as Origen says (Hom. iv in Luc.): “The angel who appeared, knowing hers was a human nature, first sought to remedy the disturbance of mind to which a man is subject.” Wherefore both to Zachary and to Mary, as soon as they were disturbed, he said: “Fear not.” For this reason, as we read in the life of Anthony, “it is difficult to discern good from evil spirits. For if joy succeed fear, we should know that the help is from the Lord: because security of soul is a sign of present majesty. But if the fear with which we are stricken persevere, it is an enemy that we see.”

Moreover it was becoming to virginal modesty that the Virgin should be troubled. Because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 1:20: “It is the part of a virgin to be timid, to fear the advances of men, and to shrink from men’s addresses.”

But others says that as the Blessed Virgin was accustomed to angelic visions, she was not troubled at seeing this angel, but with wonder at hearing what the angel said to her, for she did not think so highly of herself. Wherefore the evangelist does not say that she was troubled at seeing the angel, but “at his saying.”

Whether the Annunciation took place in becoming order?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Annunciation did not take place in becoming order. For the dignity of the Mother of God results from the child she conceived. But the cause should be made known before the effect.

Therefore the angel should have announced to the Virgin the conception of her child before acknowledging her dignity in greeting her.

Objection 2: Further, proof should be omitted in things which admit of no doubt; and premised where doubt is possible. But the angel seems first to have announced what the virgin might doubt, and which, because of her doubt, would make her ask: “How shall this be done?” and afterwards to have given the proof, alleging both the instance of Elizabeth and the omnipotence of God. Therefore the Annunciation was made by the angel in unbecoming order.

Objection 3: Further, the greater cannot be adequately proved by the less. But it was a greater wonder for a virgin than for an old woman to be with child. Therefore the angel’s proof was insufficient to demonstrate the conception of a virgin from that of an old woman.

On the contrary, it is written (Rom. 13:1): “Those that are of God, are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God’].” Now the angel was “sent by God” to announce unto the Virgin, as is related Lk. 1:26. Therefore the Annunciation was made by the angel in the most perfect order.

I answer that, The Annunciation was made by the angel in a becoming manner. For the angel had a threefold purpose in regard to the Virgin. First, to draw her attention to the consideration of a matter of such moment. This he did by greeting her by a new and unwonted salutation. Wherefore Origen says, commenting on Luke (Hom. vi), that if “she had known that similar words had been addressed to anyone else, she, who had knowledge of the Law, would never have been astonished at the seeming strangeness of the salutation.” In which salutation he began by asserting her worthiness of the conception, by saying, “Full of grace”; then he announced the conception in the words, “The Lord is with thee”; and then foretold the honor which would result to her therefrom, by saying, “Blessed art thou among women.”

Secondly, he purposed to instruct her about the mystery of the Incarnation, which was to be fulfilled in her. This he did by foretelling the conception and birth, saying: “Behold, thou shalt conceive in thy womb,” etc.; and by declaring the dignity of the child conceived, saying: “He shall be great”; and further, by making known the mode of conception, when he said: “The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee.”

Thirdly, he purposed to lead her mind to consent. This he did by the instance of Elizabeth, and by the argument from Divine omnipotence.

Reply to Objection 1: To a humble mind nothing is more astonishing than to hear its own excellence. Now, wonder is most effective in drawing the mind's attention. Therefore the angel, desirous of drawing the Virgin's attention to the hearing of so great a mystery, began by praising her.

Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose says explicitly on Lk. 1:34, that the Blessed Virgin did not doubt the angel's words. For he says: "Mary's answer is more temperate than the words of the priest. She says: How shall this be? He replies: Whereby shall I know this? He denies that he believes, since he denies that he knows this. She does not doubt fulfilment when she asks how it shall be done."

Augustine, however, seems to assert that she doubted. For he says (De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. li): "To Mary, in doubt about the conception, the angel declares the possibility thereof." But such a doubt is one of wonder rather than of unbelief. And so the angel adduces a proof, not as a cure for unbelief, but in order to remove her astonishment.

Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says (Hexaemeron v): "For this reason had many barren women borne children, that the virginal birth might be credible."

The conception of the sterile Elizabeth is therefore adduced, not as a sufficient argument, but as a kind of figurative example.: consequently in support of this instance, the convincing argument is added taken from the Divine omnipotence.

OF THE MATTER FROM WHICH THE SAVIOUR'S BODY WAS CONCEIVED (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the Saviour's conception. First, as to the matter from which His body was conceived; secondly, as to the author of His conception; thirdly, as to the manner and order of His conception.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam?

(2) Whether it was derived from David?

(3) Of the genealogy of Christ which is given in the Gospels;

(4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be born of a woman?

(5) Whether His body was formed from the purest blood of the Virgin?

(6) Whether the flesh of Christ was in the patriarchs as to something signate?

(7) Whether the flesh of Christ in the patriarchs was subject to sin?

(8) Whether Christ paid tithes in the loins of Abraham?

Whether the flesh of Christ was derived from Adam?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was not derived from Adam. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:47): "The first man was of the earth, earthly: the second man, from heaven, heavenly." Now, the first man is Adam: and the second man is Christ. Therefore Christ is not derived from Adam, but has an origin distinct from him.

Objection 2: Further, the conception of Christ should have been most miraculous. But it is a greater miracle to form man's body from the slime of the earth, than from human matter derived from Adam. It seems therefore unfitting that Christ should take flesh from Adam. Therefore the body of Christ should not have been formed from the mass of the human race derived from Adam, but of some other matter.

Objection 3: Further, by "one man sin entered into this world," i.e. by Adam, because in him all nations sinned originally, as is clear from Rom. 5:12. But if Christ's body was derived from Adam, He would have been in Adam originally when he sinned: therefore he would have contracted original sin; which is unbecoming in His purity. Therefore the body of Christ was not formed of matter derived from Adam.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb. 2:16): "Nowhere doth He"—that is, the Son of God—"take hold of the angels: but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold." But the seed of Abraham was derived from Adam. Therefore Christ's body was formed of matter derived from Adam.

I answer that, Christ assumed human nature in order to cleanse it of corruption. But human nature did not need to be cleansed save in as far as it was soiled in its tainted origin whereby it was descended from Adam.

Therefore it was becoming that He should assume flesh of matter derived from Adam, that the nature itself might be healed by the assumption.

Reply to Objection 1: The second man, i.e. Christ, is said to be of heaven, not indeed as to the matter from which His body was formed, but either as to the virtue whereby it was formed; or even as to His very Godhead. But as to matter, Christ's body was earthly, as Adam's body was.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([4136]Q[29], A[1], ad 2) the mystery of Christ's Incarnation is miraculous, not as ordained to strengthen faith, but as an article of faith. And therefore in the mystery of the Incarnation we do not seek that which is most miraculous, as in those miracles that are wrought for the confirmation of faith' but what is most becoming to Divine wisdom, and most expedient to the salvation of man, since this is what we seek in all matters of faith.

It may also be said that in the mystery of the Incarnation the miracle is not only in reference to the matter of the conception, but rather in respect of the manner of the conception and birth; inasmuch as a virgin conceived and gave birth to God.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4137]Q[15], A[1], ad 2), Christ's body was in Adam in respect of a bodily substance—that is to say, that the corporeal matter of Christ's body was derived from Adam: but it was not there by reason of seminal virtue, because it was not conceived from the seed of man. Thus it did not contract original sin, as others who are descended from Adam by man's seed.

Whether Christ took flesh of the seed of David?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not take flesh of the seed of David. For Matthew, in tracing the genealogy of Christ, brings it down to Joseph. But Joseph was not Christ's father, as shown above ([4138]Q[28], A[1], ad 1,2). Therefore it seems that Christ was not descended from David.

Objection 2: Further, Aaron was of the tribe of Levi, as related Ex. 6. Now Mary the Mother of Christ is called the cousin of Elizabeth, who was a daughter of Aaron, as is clear from Lk. 1:5,36. Therefore, since David was of the tribe of Juda, as is shown Mat. 1, it seems that Christ was not descended from David.

Objection 3: Further, it is written of Jechonias (Jer. 22:30): “Write this man barren . . . for there shall not be a man of his seed that shall sit upon the throne of David.” Whereas of Christ it is written (Is. 9:7): “He shall sit upon the throne of David.” Therefore Christ was not of the seed of Jechonias: nor, consequently, of the family of David, since Matthew traces the genealogy from David through Jechonias.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 1:3): “Who was made to him of the seed of David according to the flesh.”

I answer that, Christ is said to have been the son especially of two of the patriarchs, Abraham and David, as is clear from Mat. 1:1. There are many reasons for this. First to these especially was the promise made concerning Christ. For it was said to Abraham (Gn. 22:18): “In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed”: which words the Apostle expounds of Christ (Gal. 3:16): “To Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, ‘And to his seeds’ as of many; but as of one, ‘And to thy seed,’ which is Christ.” And to David it was said (Ps. 131:11): “Of the fruit of thy womb I will set upon thy throne.” Wherefore the Jewish people, receiving Him with kingly honor, said (Mat. 21:9): “Hosanna to the Son of David.”

A second reason is because Christ was to be king, prophet, and priest. Now Abraham was a priest; which is clear from the Lord saying unto him (Gn. 15:9): “Take thee [Vulg.: ‘Me’] a cow of three years old,” etc. He was also a prophet, according to Gn. 20:7: “He is a prophet; and he shall pray for thee.” Lastly David was both king and prophet.

A third reason is because circumcision had its beginning in Abraham: while in David God’s election was most clearly made manifest, according to 1 Kings 13:14: “The Lord hath sought Him a man according to His own heart.” And consequently Christ is called in a most special way the Son of both, in order to show that He came for the salvation both of the circumcised and of the elect among the Gentiles.

Reply to Objection 1: Faustus the Manichean argued thus, in the desire to prove that Christ is not the Son of David, because He was not conceived of Joseph, in whom Matthew’s genealogy terminates. Augustine answered this argument thus (Contra Faust. xxii): “Since the same evangelist affirms that Joseph was Mary’s husband and that Christ’s mother was a virgin, and that Christ was of the seed of Abraham, what must we believe, but that Mary was not a stranger to the family of David: and that it is not without reason that she was called the wife of Joseph, by reason of the close alliance of their hearts, although not mingled in the flesh; and that the genealogy is traced down to Joseph rather than to her by reason of the dignity of the husband? So therefore we believe that Mary was also of the family of David: because we believe the Scriptures, which assert both that Christ was of the seed of David according to the flesh, and that Mary was His Mother, not by sexual intercourse but retaining her virginity." For as Jerome says on Mat. 1:18: "Joseph and Mary were of the same tribe: wherefore he was bound by law to marry her as she was his kinswoman. Hence it was that they were enrolled together at Bethlehem, as being descended from the same stock."

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory of Nazianzum answers this objection by saying that it happened by God's will, that the royal family was united to the priestly race, so that Christ, who is both king and priest, should be born of both according to the flesh. Wherefore Aaron, who was the first priest according to the Law, married a wife of the tribe of Juda, Elizabeth, daughter of Aminadab. It is therefore possible that Elizabeth's father married a wife of the family of David, through whom the Blessed Virgin Mary, who was of the family of David, would be a cousin of Elizabeth. or conversely, and with greater likelihood, that the Blessed Mary's father, who was of the family of David, married a wife of the family of Aaron.

Again, it may be said with Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii) that if Joachim, Mary's father, was of the family of Aaron (as the heretic Faustus pretended to prove from certain apocryphal writings), then we must believe that Joachim's mother, or else his wife, was of the family of David, so long as we say that Mary was in some way descended from David.

Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says on Lk. 3:25, this prophetical passage does not deny that a posterity will be born of the seed of Jechonias. And so Christ is of his seed. Neither is the fact that Christ reigned contrary to prophecy, for He did not reign with worldly honor; since He declared: "My kingdom is not of this world."

Whether Christ's genealogy is suitably traced by the evangelists?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s genealogy is not suitably traced by the Evangelists. For it is written (Is. 53:8): “Who shall declare His generation?” Therefore Christ’s genealogy should not have been set down.

Objection 2: Further, one man cannot possibly have two fathers. But Matthew says that “Jacob begot Joseph, the husband of Mary”: whereas Luke says that Joseph was the son of Heli. Therefore they contradict one another.

Objection 3: Further, there seem to be divergencies between them on several points. For Matthew, at the commencement of his book, beginning from Abraham and coming down to Joseph, enumerates forty-two generations. Whereas Luke sets down Christ’s genealogy after His Baptism, and beginning from Christ traces the series of generations back to God, counting in all seventy-seven generations, the first and last included. It seems therefore that their accounts of Christ’s genealogy do not agree.

Objection 4: Further, we read (4 Kings 8:24) that Joram begot Ochozias, who was succeeded by his son Joas: who was succeeded by his son Amasius: after whom reigned his son Azarias, called Ozias; who was succeeded by his son Joathan. But Matthew says that Joram begot Ozias. Therefore it seems that his account of Christ’s genealogy is unsuitable, since he omits three kings in the middle thereof.

Objection 5: Further, all those who are mentioned in Christ’s genealogy had both a father and a mother, and many of them had brothers also. Now in Christ’s genealogy Matthew mentions only three mothers—namely, Thamar, Ruth, and the wife of Urias. He also mentions the brothers of Judas and Jechonias, and also Phares and Zara. But Luke mentions none of these. Therefore the evangelists seem to have described the genealogy of Christ in an unsuitable manner.

On the contrary, The authority of Scripture suffices.

I answer that, As is written (2 Tim. 3:16), “All Holy Scripture is inspired of God [Vulg.: ‘All scripture inspired of God is profitable’], etc. Now what is done by God is done in perfect order, according to Rom. 13:1: “Those that are of God are ordained [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God’]. Therefore Christ’s genealogy is set down by the evangelists in a suitable order.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Mat. 1, Isaias speaks of the generation of Christ’s Godhead. Whereas Matthew relates the generation of

Christ in His humanity; not indeed by explaining the manner of the Incarnation, which is also unspeakable; but by enumerating Christ's forefathers from whom He was descended according to the flesh.

Reply to Objection 2: Various answers have been made by certain writers to this objection which was raised by Julian the Apostate; for some, as Gregory of Nazianzum, say that the people mentioned by the two evangelists are the same, but under different names, as though they each had two. But this will not stand: because Matthew mentions one of David's sons—namely, Solomon; whereas Luke mentions another—namely, Nathan, who according to the history of the kings (2 Kings 5:14) were clearly brothers.

Wherefore others said that Matthew gave the true genealogy of Christ: while Luke gave the supposititious genealogy; hence he began: "Being (as it was supposed) the son of Joseph." For among the Jews there were some who believed that, on account of the crimes of the kings of Juda, Christ would be born of the family of David, not through the kings, but through some other line of private individuals.

Others again have supposed that Matthew gave the forefathers according to the flesh: whereas Luke gave these according to the spirit, that is, righteous men, who are called (Christ's) forefathers by likeness of virtue.

But an answer is given in the Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. [*Part i, qu. lvi; part 2, qu. vi] to the effect that we are not to understand that Joseph is said by Luke to be the son of Heli: but that at the time of Christ, Heli and Joseph were differently descended from David. Hence Christ is said to have been supposed to be the son of Joseph, and also to have been the son of Heli as though (the Evangelist) were to say that Christ, from the fact that He was the son of Joseph, could be called the son of Heli and of all those who were descended from David; as the Apostle says (Rom. 9:5): "Of whom" (viz. the Jews) "is Christ according to the flesh."

Augustine again gives three solutions (De Qq. Evang. ii), saying: "There are three motives by one or other of which the evangelist was guided. For either one evangelist mentions Joseph's father of whom he was begotten; whilst the other gives either his maternal grandfather or some other of his later forefathers; or one was Joseph's natural father: the other is father by adoption. Or, according to the Jewish custom, one of those having died without children, a near relation of his married his wife, the son born of the latter union being reckoned as the son of the former”: which is a kind of legal adoption, as Augustine himself says (De Consensu Evang. ii, Cf. Retract. ii).

This last motive is the truest: Jerome also gives it commenting on Mat. 1:16; and Eusebius of Caesarea in his Church history (I, vii), says that it is given by Africanus the historian. For these writers says that Mathan and Melchi, at different times, each begot a son of one and the same wife, named Estha. For Mathan, who traced his descent through Solomon, had married her first, and died, leaving one son, whose name was Jacob: and after his death, as the law did not forbid his widow to remarry, Melchi, who traced his descent through Mathan, being of the same tribe though not of the same family as Mathan, married his widow, who bore him a son, called Heli; so that Jacob and Heli were uterine brothers born to different fathers. Now one of these, Jacob, on his brother Heli dying without issue, married the latter’s widow, according to the prescription of the law, of whom he had a son, Joseph, who by nature was his own son, but by law was accounted the son of Heli. Wherefore Matthew says “Jacob begot Joseph”: whereas Luke, who was giving the legal genealogy, speaks of no one as begetting.

And although Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) says that the Blessed Virgin Mary was connected with Joseph in as far as Heli was accounted as his father, for he says that she was descended from Melchi: yet must we also believe that she was in some way descended from Solomon through those patriarchs enumerated by Matthew, who is said to have set down Christ’s genealogy according to the flesh; and all the more since Ambrose states that Christ was of the seed of Jechonias.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Consensu Evang. ii) “Matthew purposed to delineate the royal personality of Christ; Luke the priestly personality: so that in Matthew’s genealogy is signified the assumption of our sins by our Lord Jesus Christ”: inasmuch as by his carnal origin “He assumed ‘the likeness of sinful flesh.’ But in Luke’s genealogy the washing away of our sins is signified,” which is effected by Christ’s sacrifice. “For which reason Matthew traces the generations downwards, Luke upwards.” For the same reason too “Matthew descends from David through Solomon, in whose mother David sinned; whereas Luke ascends to David through Nathan, through whose namesake, the prophet, God expiated his sin.” And hence it is also that, because “Matthew wished to signify that

Christ had condescended to our mortal nature, he set down the genealogy of Christ at the very outset of his Gospel, beginning with Abraham and descending to Joseph and the birth of Christ Himself. Luke, on the contrary, sets forth Christ's genealogy not at the outset, but after Christ's Baptism, and not in the descending but in the ascending order: as though giving prominence to the office of the priest in expiating our sins, to which John bore witness, saying: 'Behold Him who taketh away the sin of the world.' And in the ascending order, he passes Abraham and continues up to God, to whom we are reconciled by cleansing and expiating. With reason too he follows the origin of adoption; because by adoption we become children of God: whereas by carnal generation the Son of God became the Son of Man. Moreover he shows sufficiently that he does not say that Joseph was the son of Heli as though begotten by him, but because he was adopted by him, since he says that Adam was the son of God, inasmuch as he was created by God."

Again, the number forty pertains to the time of our present life: because of the four parts of the world in which we pass this mortal life under the rule of Christ. And forty is the product of four multiplied by ten: while ten is the sum of the numbers from one to four. The number ten may also refer to the decalogue; and the number four to the present life; or again to the four Gospels, according to which Christ reigns in us. And thus "Matthew, putting forward the royal personality of Christ, enumerates forty persons not counting Him" (cf. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. ii). But this is to be taken on the supposition that it be the same Jechonias at the end of the second, and at the commencement of the third series of fourteen, as Augustine understands it. According to him this was done in order to signify "that under Jechonias there was a certain defection to strange nations during the Babylonian captivity; which also foreshadowed the fact that Christ would pass from the Jews to the Gentiles."

On the other hand, Jerome (on Mat. 1:12–15) says that there were two Joachims—that is, Jechonias, father and son: both of whom are mentioned in Christ's genealogy, so as to make clear the distinction of the generations, which the evangelist divides into three series of fourteen; which amounts in all to forty-two persons. Which number may also be applied to the Holy Church: for it is the product of six, which signifies the labor of the present life, and seven, which signifies the rest of the life to come: for six times seven are forty-two. The number fourteen, which is the sum of ten and four, can also be given the same signification as that given to the number forty, which is the product of the same numbers by multiplication.

But the number used by Luke in Christ’s genealogy signifies the generality of sins. “For the number ten is shown in the ten precepts of the Law to be the number of righteousness. Now, to sin is to go beyond the restriction of the Law. And eleven is the number beyond ten.” And seven signifies universality: because “universal time is involved in seven days.” Now seven times eleven are seventy-seven: so that this number signifies the generality of sins which are taken away by Christ.

Reply to Objection 4: As Jerome says onMat. 1:8, 11: “Because Joram allied himself with the family of the most wicked Jezabel, therefore his memory is omitted down to the third generation, lest it should be inserted among the holy predecessors of the Nativity.” Hence as Chrysostom [*Cf. Opus Imperf. in Matth. Hom. i, falsely ascribed to Chrysostom] says: “Just as great was the blessing conferred on Jehu, who wrought vengeance on the house of Achab and Jezabel, so also great was the curse on the house of Joram, through the wicked daughter of Achab and Jezabel, so that until the fourth generation his posterity is cut off from the number of kings, according to Ex. 20:5: I shall visit [Vulg.: ‘Visiting’] the iniquity of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generations.”

It must also be observed that there were other kings who sinned and are mentioned in Christ’s genealogy: but their impiety was not continuous. For, as it is stated in the book De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. lxxxv: “Solomon through his father’s merits is included in the series of kings; and Roboam . . . through the merits of Asa,” who was son of his (Roboam’s) son, Abiam. “But the impiety of those three [*i.e. Ochozias, Joas, and Amasias, of whom St. Augustine asks in this question lxxxv, why they were omitted by St. Matthew] was continuous.”

Reply to Objection 5: As Jerome says on Mat. 1:3: “None of the holy women are mentioned in the Saviour’s genealogy, but only those whom Scripture censures, so that He who came for the sake of sinners, by being born of sinners, might blot out all sin.” Thus Thamar is mentioned, who is censured for her sin with her father-in-law; Rahab who was a whore; Ruth who was a foreigner; and Bethsabee, the wife of Urias, who was an adulteress. The last, however, is not mentioned by name, but is designated through her husband; both on account of his sin, for he was cognizant of the adultery and murder; and further in order that, by mentioning the husband by name, David’s sin might be recalled. And because Luke purposes to delineate Christ as the expiator of our sins, he makes no mention of these women. But he does mention Juda’s brethren, in order to show that they belong to God’s people: whereas Ismael, the brother of Isaac, and Esau, Jacob’s brother, were cut off from God’s people, and for this reason are not mentioned in Christ’s genealogy. Another motive was to show the emptiness of pride of birth: for many of Juda’s brethren were born of handmaidens, and yet all were patriarchs and heads of tribes. Phares and Zara are mentioned together, because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 3:23, “they are the type of the twofold life of man: one, according to the Law,” signified by Zara; “the other by Faith,” of which Phares is the type. The brethren of Jechonias are included, because they all reigned at various times: which was not the case with other kings: or, again, because they were alike in wickedness and misfortune.

Whether the matter of Christ’s body should have been taken from a woman?

Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of Christ’s body should not have been taken from a woman. For the male sex is more noble than the female. But it was most suitable that Christ should assume that which is perfect in human nature. Therefore it seems that He should not have taken flesh from a woman but rather from man: just as Eve was formed from the rib of a man.

Objection 2: Further, whoever is conceived of a woman is shut up in her womb. But it ill becomes God, Who fills heaven and earth, as is written Jer. 23:24, to be shut up within the narrow limits of the womb. Therefore it seems that He should not have been conceived of a woman.

Objection 3: Further, those who are conceived of a woman contract a certain uncleanness: as it is written (Job 25:4): “Can man be justified compared with God? Or he that is born of a woman appear clean?” But it was unbecoming that any uncleanness should be in Christ: for He is the Wisdom of God, of whom it is written (Wis. 7:25) that “no defiled thing cometh into her.” Therefore it does not seem right that He should have taken flesh from a woman.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): “God sent His Son, made of a woman.”

I answer that, Although the Son of God could have taken flesh from whatever matter He willed, it was nevertheless most becoming that He should take flesh from a woman. First because in this way the entire human nature was ennobled. Hence Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 11): “It was suitable that man’s liberation should be made manifest in both sexes. Consequently, since it behooved a man, being of the nobler sex, to assume, it was becoming that the liberation of the female sex should be manifested in that man being born of a woman.”

Secondly, because thus the truth of the Incarnation is made evident. Wherefore Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): “Thou shalt find in Christ many things both natural, and supernatural. In accordance with nature He was within the womb,” viz. of a woman’s body: “but it was above nature that a virgin should conceive and give birth: that thou mightest believe that He was God, who was renewing nature; and that He was man who, according to nature, was being born of a man.” And Augustine says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii): “If Almighty God had created a man formed otherwise than in a mother’s womb, and had suddenly produced him to sight . . . would He not have strengthened an erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to believe that He had become a true man? And whilst He is doing all things wondrously, would He have taken away that which He accomplished in mercy? But now, He, the mediator between God and man, has so shown Himself, that, uniting both natures in the unity of one Person, He has given a dignity to ordinary by extraordinary things, and tempered the extraordinary by the ordinary.”

Thirdly, because in this fashion the begetting of man is accomplished in every variety of manner. For the first man was made from the “slime of the earth,” without the concurrence of man or woman: Eve was made of man but not of woman: and other men are made from both man and woman. So that this fourth manner remained as it were proper to Christ, that He should be made of a woman without the concurrence of a man.

Reply to Objection 1: The male sex is more noble than the female, and for this reason He took human nature in the male sex. But lest the female sex should be despised, it was fitting that He should take flesh of a woman. Hence Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): “Men, despise not yourselves:

the Son of God became a man: despise not yourselves, women; the Son of God was born of a woman."

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine thus (Contra Faust. xxiii) replies to Faustus, who urged this objection; "By no means," says he, "does the Catholic Faith, which believes that Christ the Son of God was born of a virgin, according to the flesh, suppose that the same Son of God was so shut up in His Mother's womb, as to cease to be elsewhere, as though He no longer continued to govern heaven and earth, and as though He had withdrawn Himself from the Father. But you, Manicheans, being of a mind that admits of nought but material images, are utterly unable to grasp these things." For, as he again says (Ep. ad Volus. cxxxvii), "it belongs to the sense of man to form conceptions only through tangible bodies, none of which can be entire everywhere, because they must of necessity be diffused through their innumerable parts in various places . . . Far otherwise is the nature of the soul from that of the body: how much more the nature of God, the Creator of soul and body! . . . He is able to be entire everywhere, and to be contained in no place. He is able to come without moving from the place where He was; and to go without leaving the spot whence He came."

Reply to Objection 3: There is no uncleanness in the conception of man from a woman, as far as this is the work of God: wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): "That which God hath cleansed do not thou call common," i.e. unclean. There is, however, a certain uncleanness therein, resulting from sin, as far as lustful desire accompanies conception by sexual union. But this was not the case with Christ, as shown above ([4139]Q[28], A[1]). But if there were any uncleanness therein, the Word of God would not have been sullied thereby, for He is utterly unchangeable. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v): "God saith, the Creator of man: What is it that troubles thee in My Birth? I was not conceived by lustful desire. I made Myself a mother of whom to be born. If the sun's rays can dry up the filth in the drain, and yet not be defiled: much more can the Splendor of eternal light cleanse whatever It shines upon, but Itself cannot be sullied."

Whether the flesh of Christ was conceived of the Virgin's purest blood?

Objection 1: It would seem that the flesh of Christ was not conceived of the Virgin's purest blood: For it is said in the collect (Feast of the

Annunciation) that God “willed that His Word should take flesh from a Virgin.” But flesh differs from blood. Therefore Christ’s body was not taken from the Virgin’s blood.

Objection 2: Further, as the woman was miraculously formed from the man, so Christ’s body was formed miraculously from the Virgin. But the woman is not said to have been formed from the man’s blood, but rather from his flesh and bones, according to Gn. 2:23: “This now is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh.” It seems therefore that neither should Christ’s body have been formed from the Virgin’s blood, but from her flesh and bones.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s body was of the same species as other men’s bodies. But other men’s bodies are not formed from the purest blood but from the semen and the menstrual blood. Therefore it seems that neither was Christ’s body conceived of the purest blood of the Virgin.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that “the Son of God, from the Virgin’s purest blood, formed Himself flesh, animated with a rational soul.”

I answer that, As stated above [4140](A[4]), in Christ’s conception His being born of a woman was in accordance with the laws of nature, but that He was born of a virgin was above the laws of nature. Now, such is the law of nature that in the generation of an animal the female supplies the matter, while the male is the active principle of generation; as the Philosopher proves (De Gener. Animal. i). But a woman who conceives of a man is not a virgin. And consequently it belongs to the supernatural mode of Christ’s generation, that the active principle of generation was the supernatural power of God: but it belongs to the natural mode of His generation, that the matter from which His body was conceived is similar to the matter which other women supply for the conception of their offspring. Now, this matter, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal.), is the woman’s blood, not any of her blood, but brought to a more perfect stage of secretion by the mother’s generative power, so as to be apt for conception. And therefore of such matter was Christ’s body conceived.

Reply to Objection 1: Since the Blessed Virgin was of the same nature as other women, it follows that she had flesh and bones of the same nature as theirs. Now, flesh and bones in other women are actual parts of the body, the integrity of which results therefrom: and consequently they cannot be taken from the body without its being corrupted or diminished. But as Christ came to heal what was corrupt, it was not fitting that He should bring corruption or diminution to the integrity of His Mother. Therefore it was becoming that Christ's body should be formed not from the flesh or bones of the Virgin, but from her blood, which as yet is not actually a part, but is potentially the whole, as stated in De Gener. Animal. i. Hence He is said to have taken flesh from the Virgin, not that the matter from which His body was formed was actual flesh, but blood, which is flesh potentially.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4141]FP, Q[92], A[3], ad 2, Adam, through being established as a kind of principle of human nature, had in his body a certain proportion of flesh and bone, which belonged to him, not as an integral part of his personality, but in regard to his state as a principle of human nature. And from this was the woman formed, without detriment to the man. But in the Virgin's body there was nothing of this sort, from which Christ's body could be formed without detriment to His Mother's body.

Reply to Objection 3: Woman's semen is not apt for generation, but is something imperfect in the seminal order, which, on account of the imperfection of the female power, it has not been possible to bring to complete seminal perfection. Consequently this semen is not the necessary matter of conception; as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. i): wherefore there was none such in Christ's conception: all the more since, though it is imperfect in the seminal order, a certain concupiscence accompanies its emission, as also that of the male semen: whereas in that virginal conception there could be no concupiscence. Wherefore Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ's body was not conceived "seminally." But the menstrual blood, the flow of which is subject to monthly periods, has a certain natural impurity of corruption: like other superfluities, which nature does not heed, and therefore expels. Of such menstrual blood infected with corruption and repudiated by nature, the conception is not formed; but from a certain secretion of the pure blood which by a process of elimination is prepared for conception, being, as it were, more pure and more perfect than the rest of the blood. Nevertheless, it is tainted with the impurity of lust in the conception of other men: inasmuch as by sexual intercourse this blood is drawn to a place apt for conception. This, however, did not take place in Christ's conception: because this blood was brought together in the Virgin’s womb and fashioned into a child by the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore is Christ’s body said to be “formed of the most chaste and purest blood of the Virgin.”

Whether Christ’s body was in Adam and the other patriarchs, as to something signate?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was in Adam and the patriarchs as to something signate. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that the flesh of Christ was in Adam and Abraham “by way of a bodily substance.” But bodily substance is something signate. Therefore Christ’s flesh was in Adam, Abraham, and the other patriarchs, according to something signate.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (Rom. 1:3) that Christ “was made . . . of the seed of David according to the flesh.” But the seed of David was something signate in him. Therefore Christ was in David, according to something signate, and for the same reason in the other patriarchs.

Objection 3: Further, the human race is Christ’s kindred, inasmuch as He took flesh therefrom. But if that flesh were not something signate in Adam, the human race, which is descended from Adam, would seem to have no kindred with Christ: but rather with those other things from which the matter of His flesh was taken. Therefore it seems that Christ’s flesh was in Adam and the other patriarchs according to something signate.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that in whatever way Christ was in Adam and Abraham, other men were there also; but not conversely. But other men were not in Adam and Abraham by way of some signate matter, but only according to origin, as stated in the [4142]FP, Q[119] , A[1], A[2], ad 4. Therefore neither was Christ in Adam and Abraham according to something signate; and, for the same reason, neither was He in the other patriarchs.

I answer that, As stated above (A[5], ad 1), the matter of Christ’s body was not the flesh and bones of the Blessed Virgin, nor anything that was actually a part of her body, but her blood which was her flesh potentially. Now, whatever was in the Blessed Virgin, as received from her parents, was actually a part of her body. Consequently that which the Blessed Virgin received from her parents was not the matter of Christ’s body. Therefore we must say that Christ’s body was not in Adam and the other patriarchs according to something signate, in the sense that some part of Adam’s or of anyone else’s body could be singled out and designated as the very matter from which Christ’s body was to be formed: but it was there according to origin, just as was the flesh of other men. For Christ’s body is related to Adam and the other patriarchs through the medium of His Mother’s body. Consequently Christ’s body was in the patriarchs, in no other way than was His Mother’s body, which was not in the patriarchs according to signate matter: as neither were the bodies of other men, as stated in the [4143]FP, Q[119], A[1], A[2], ad 4.

Reply to Objection 1: The expression “Christ was in Adam according to bodily substance,” does not mean that Christ’s body was a bodily substance in Adam: but that the bodily substance of Christ’s body, i.e. the matter which He took from the Virgin, was in Adam as in its active principle, but not as in its material principle: in other words, by the generative power of Adam and his descendants down to the Blessed Virgin, this matter was prepared for Christ’s conception. But this matter was not fashioned into Christ’s body by the seminal power derived from Adam. Therefore Christ is said to have been in Adam by way of origin, according to bodily substance: but not according to seminal virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ’s body was not in Adam and the other patriarchs, according to seminal virtue, yet the Blessed Virgin’s body was thus in them, through her being conceived from the seed of a man. For this reason, through the medium of the Blessed Virgin, Christ is said to be of the seed of David, according to the flesh, by way of origin.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ and the human race are kindred, through the likeness of species. Now, specific likeness results not from remote but from proximate matter, and from the active principle which begets its like in species. Thus, then, the kinship of Christ and the human race is sufficiently preserved by His body being formed from the Virgin’s blood, derived in its origin from Adam and the other patriarchs. Nor is this kinship affected by the matter whence this blood is taken, as neither is it in the generation of other men, as stated in the [4144]FP, Q[119], A[2], ad 3.

Whether Christ’s flesh in the patriarchs was infected by sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s flesh was not infected by sin in the patriarchs. For it is written (Wis. 7:25) that “no defiled thing cometh into” Divine Wisdom. But Christ is the Wisdom of God according to 1 Cor. 1:24. Therefore Christ’s flesh was never defiled by sin.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ “assumed the first-fruits of our nature.” But in the primitive state human flesh was not infected by sin. Therefore Christ’s flesh was not infected either in Adam or in the other patriarchs.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that “human nature ever had, together with the wound, the balm with which to heal it.” But that which is infected cannot heal a wound; rather does it need to be healed itself. Therefore in human nature there was ever something preserved from infection, from which afterwards Christ’s body was formed.

On the contrary, Christ’s body is not related to Adam and the other patriarchs, save through the medium of the Blessed Virgin’s body, of whom He took flesh. But the body of the Blessed Virgin was wholly conceived in original sin, as stated above ([4145]Q[14], A[3], ad 1), and thus, as far as it was in the patriarchs, it was subject to sin. Therefore the flesh of Christ, as far as it was in the patriarchs, was subject to sin.

I answer that, When we say that Christ or His flesh was in Adam and the other patriarchs, we compare Him, or His flesh, to Adam and the other patriarchs. Now, it is manifest that the condition of the patriarchs differed from that of Christ: for the patriarchs were subject to sin, whereas Christ was absolutely free from sin. Consequently a twofold error may occur on this point. First, by attributing to Christ, or to His flesh, that condition which was in the patriarchs; by saying, for instance, that Christ sinned in Adam, since after some fashion He was in him. But this is false; because Christ was not in Adam in such a way that Adam’s sin belonged to Christ: forasmuch as He is not descended from him according to the law of concupiscence, or according to seminal virtue; as stated above (A[1], ad 3, A[6], ad 1;[4146] Q[15], A[1], ad 2).

Secondly, error may occur by attributing the condition of Christ or of His flesh to that which was actually in the patriarchs: by saying, for instance, that, because Christ’s flesh, as existing in Christ, was not subject to sin, therefore in Adam also and in the patriarchs there was some part of his body that was not subject to sin, and from which afterwards Christ’s body was formed; as some indeed held. For this is quite impossible. First, because Christ’s flesh was not in Adam and in the other patriarchs, according to something signate, distinguishable from the rest of his flesh, as pure from impure; as already stated (A[6]). Secondly, because since human flesh is infected by sin, through being conceived in lust, just as the entire flesh of a man is conceived through lust, so also is it entirely defiled by sin. Consequently we must say that the entire flesh of the patriarchs was subjected to sin, nor was there anything in them that was free from sin, and from which afterwards Christ’s body could be formed.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ did not assume the flesh of the human race subject to sin, but cleansed from all infection of sin. Thus it is that “no defiled thing cometh into the Wisdom of God.”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ is said to have assumed the first-fruits of our nature, as to the likeness of condition; forasmuch as He assumed flesh not infected by sin, like unto the flesh of man before sin. But this is not to be understood to imply a continuation of that primitive purity, as though the flesh of innocent man was preserved in its freedom from sin until the formation of Christ’s body.

Reply to Objection 3: Before Christ, there was actually in human nature a wound, i.e. the infection of original sin. But the balm to heal the wound was not there actually, but only by a certain virtue of origin, forasmuch as from those patriarchs the flesh of Christ was to be propagated.

Whether Christ paid tithes in Abraham’s loins?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ “paid tithes” in Abraham’s loins. For the Apostle says (Heb. 7:6–9) that Levi, the great-grandson of Abraham, “paid tithes in Abraham,” because, when the latter paid tithes to Melchisedech, “he was yet in his loins.” In like manner Christ was in Abraham’s loins when the latter paid tithes. Therefore Christ Himself also paid tithes in Abraham.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is of the seed of Abraham according to the flesh which He received from His Mother. But His Mother paid tithes in Abraham. Therefore for a like reason did Christ.

Objection 3: Further, “in Abraham tithe was levied on that which needed healing,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x). But all flesh subject to sin needed healing. Since therefore Christ’s flesh was the subject of sin, as stated above [4147](A[7]), it seems that Christ’s flesh paid tithes in Abraham.

Objection 4: Further, this does not seem to be at all derogatory to Christ’s dignity. For the fact that the father of a bishop pays tithes to a priest does not hinder his son, the bishop, from being of higher rank than an ordinary priest. Consequently, although we may say that Christ paid tithes when Abraham paid them to Melchisedech, it does not follow that Christ was not greater than Melchisedech.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x) that “Christ did not pay tithes there,” i.e. in Abraham, “for His flesh derived from him, not the heat of the wound, but the matter of the antidote.”

I answer that, It behooves us to say that the sense of the passage quoted from the Apostle is that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham. For the Apostle proves that the priesthood according to the order of Melchisedech is greater than the Levitical priesthood, from the fact that Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech, while Levi, from whom the legal priesthood was derived, was yet in his loins. Now, if Christ had also paid tithes in Abraham, His priesthood would not have been according to the order of Melchisedech, but of a lower order. Consequently we must say that Christ did not pay tithes in Abraham’s loins, as Levi did.

For since he who pays a tithe keeps nine parts to himself, and surrenders the tenth to another, inasmuch as the number ten is the sign of perfection, as being, in a sort, the terminus of all numbers which mount from one to ten, it follows that he who pays a tithe bears witness to his own imperfection and to the perfection of another. Now, to sin is due the imperfection of the human race, which needs to be perfected by Him who cleanses from sin. But to heal from sin belongs to Christ alone, for He is the “Lamb that taketh away the sin of the world” (Jn. 1:29), whose figure was Melchisedech, as the Apostle proves (Heb. 7). Therefore by giving tithes to Melchisedech, Abraham foreshadowed that he, as being conceived in sin, and all who were to be his descendants in contracting original sin, needed that healing which is through Christ. And Isaac, Jacob, and Levi, and all the others were in Abraham in such a way so as to be descended from him, not only as to bodily substance, but also as to seminal virtue, by which original sin is transmitted. Consequently, they all paid tithes in Abraham, i.e.

foreshadowed as needing to be healed by Christ. And Christ alone was in Abraham in such a manner as to descend from him, not by seminal virtue, but according to bodily substance. Therefore He was not in Abraham so as to need to be healed, but rather "as the balm with which the wound was to be healed." Therefore He did not pay tithes in Abraham's loins.

Thus the answer to the first objection is made manifest.

Reply to Objection 2: Because the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin, she was in Abraham as needing to be healed. Therefore she paid tithes in him, as descending from him according to seminal virtue. But this is not true of Christ's body, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's flesh is said to have been subject to sin, according as it was in the patriarchs, by reason of the condition in which it was in His forefathers, who paid the tithes: but not by reason of its condition as actually in Christ, who did not pay the tithes.

Reply to Objection 4: The levitical priesthood was handed down through carnal origin: wherefore it was not less in Abraham than in Levi. Consequently, since Abraham paid tithes to Melchisedech as to one greater than he, it follows that the priesthood of Melchisedech, inasmuch as he was a figure of Christ, was greater than that of Levi. But the priesthood of Christ does not result from carnal origin, but from spiritual grace. Therefore it is possible that a father pay tithes to a priest, as the less to the greater, and yet his son, if he be a bishop, is greater than that priest, not through carnal origin, but through the spiritual grace which he has received from Christ.

OF THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLE IN CHRIST'S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We shall now consider the active principle in Christ's conception: concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Holy Ghost was the active principle of Christ's conception?

(2) Whether it can be said that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost?

(3) Whether it can be said that the Holy Ghost is Christ's father according to the flesh?

(4) Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in Christ's conception?

Whether the accomplishment of Christ's conception should be attributed to the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that the accomplishment of Christ’s conception should not be attributed to the Holy Ghost, because. as Augustine says (De Trin. i), “The works of the Trinity are indivisible, just as the Essence of the Trinity is indivisible.” But the accomplishment of Christ’s conception was the work of God. Therefore it seems that it should not be attributed to the Holy Ghost any more than to the Father or the Son.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Gal. 4:4): “When the fulness of time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman”; which words Augustine expounds by saying (De Trin. iv): “Sent, in so far as made of a woman.” But the sending of the Son is especially attributed to the Father, as stated in the [4148]FP, Q[43], A[8]. Therefore His conception also, by reason of which He was “made of a woman,” should be attributed principally to the Father.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Prov. 9:1): “Wisdom hath built herself a house.” Now, Christ is Himself the Wisdom of God; according to 1 Cor. 1:24: “Christ the Power of God and the Wisdom of God.” And the house of this Wisdom is Christ’s body, which is also called His temple, according to Jn. 2:21: “But He spoke of the temple of His body.” Therefore it seems that the accomplishment of Christ’s conception should be attributed principally to the Son, and not, therefore, to the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): “The Holy Ghost shall come upon Thee.”

I answer that, The whole Trinity effected the conception of Christ’s body: nevertheless, this is attributed to the Holy Ghost, for three reasons. First, because this is befitting to the cause of the Incarnation, considered on the part of God. For the Holy Ghost is the love of Father and Son, as stated in the [4149]FP, Q[37], A[1]. Now, that the Son of God took to Himself flesh from the Virgin’s womb was due to the exceeding love of God: wherefore it is said (Jn. 3:16): “God so loved the world as to give His only-begotten Son.”

Secondly, this is befitting to the cause of the Incarnation, on the part of the nature assumed. Because we are thus given to understand that human nature was assumed by the Son of God into the unity of Person, not by reason of its merits, but through grace alone; which is attributed to the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:4: “There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Wherefore Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): “The manner in which Christ was born of the Holy Ghost . . . suggests to us the grace of God, whereby man, without any merits going before, in the very beginning of his nature when he began to exist was joined to God the Word, into so great unity of Person, that He Himself should be the Son of God."

Thirdly, because this is befitting the term of the Incarnation. For the term of the Incarnation was that that man, who was being conceived, should be the Holy one and the Son of God. Now, both of these are attributed to the Holy Ghost. For by Him men are made to be sons of God, according to Gal. 4:6: "Because you are sons, God hath sent the Spirit of His Son into your [Vulg.: 'our'] hearts, crying: Abba, Father." Again, He is the "Spirit of sanctification," according to Rom. 1:4. Therefore, just as other men are sanctified spiritually by the Holy Ghost; so as to be the adopted sons of God, so was Christ conceived in sanctity by the Holy Ghost, so as to be the natural Son of God. Hence, according to a gloss on Rom. 1:4, the words, "Who was predestinated the Son of God, in power," are explained by what immediately follows: "According to the Spirit of sanctification, i.e. through being conceived of the Holy Ghost." And the Angel of the Annunciation himself, after saying, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee," draws the conclusion: "Therefore also the Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God."

Reply to Objection 1: The work of the conception is indeed common to the whole Trinity; yet in some way it is attributed to each of the Persons. For to the Father is attributed authority in regard to the Person of the Son, who by this conception took to Himself (human nature). The taking itself (of human nature) is attributed to the Son: but the formation of the body taken by the Son is attributed to the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost is the Spirit of the Son, according to Gal. 4:6: "God sent the Spirit of His Son." For just as the power of the soul which is in the semen, through the spirit enclosed therein, fashions the body in the generation of other men, so the Power of God, which is the Son Himself, according to 1 Cor. 1:24: "Christ, the Power of God," through the Holy Ghost formed the body which He assumed. This is also shown by the words of the angel: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee," as it were, in order to prepare and fashion the matter of Christ's body; "and the Power of the Most High," i.e. Christ, "shall overshadow thee—that is to say, the incorporeal Light of the Godhead shall in thee take the corporeal substance of human nature: for a shadow is formed by light and body,” as Gregory says (Moral. xviii). The “Most High” is the Father, whose Power is the Son.

Reply to Objection 2: The mission refers to the Person assuming, who is sent by the Father; but the conception refers to the body assumed, which is formed by the operation of the Holy Ghost. And therefore, though mission and conception are in the same subject; since they differ in our consideration of them, mission is attributed to the Father, but the accomplishment of the conception to the Holy Ghost; whereas the assumption of flesh is attributed to the Son.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 52): “This may be understood in two ways. For, first, Christ’s house is the Church, which He built with His blood. Secondly, His body may be called His house, just as it is called His temple . . . and what is done by the Holy Ghost is done by the Son of God, because Theirs is one Nature and one Will.”

Whether it should be said that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not say that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost. Because on Rom. 11:36: “For of Him [ex ipso] and by Him, and in Him, are all things,” the gloss of Augustine says: “Notice that he does not say, ‘of Him’ [de ipso], but ‘of Him’ [ex ipso]. For of Him [ex ipso], are heaven and earth, since He made them: but not of Him [de ipso], since they are not made of His substance.” But the Holy Ghost did not form Christ’s body of [de] His own substance. Therefore we should not say that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, the active principle of [de] which something is conceived is as the seed in generation. But the Holy Ghost did not take the place of seed in Christ’s conception. For Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fidei) [*Written by Pelagius]: “We do not say, as some wicked wretches hold, that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed: but we say that Christ’s body was wrought,” i.e. formed, “by the power and might of the Creator.” Therefore we should not say that Christ’s body was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, no one thing is made of two, except they be in some way mingled. But Christ’s body was formed of [de] the Virgin Mary. If therefore we say that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost, it seems that a mingling took place of the Holy Ghost with the matter supplied by the Virgin: and this is clearly false. Therefore we should not say that Christ was conceived of [de] the Holy Ghost.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): “Before they came together, she was found with child, of [de] the Holy Ghost.”

I answer that, Conception is not attributed to Christ’s body alone, but also to Christ Himself by reason of His body. Now, in the Holy Ghost we may observe a twofold habitude to Christ. For to the Son of God Himself, who is said to have been conceived, He has a habitude of consubstantiality: while to His body He has the habitude of efficient cause. And this preposition of [de] signifies both habitudes: thus we say that a certain man is “of [de] his father.” And therefore we can fittingly say that Christ was conceived of the Holy Ghost in such a way that the efficiency of the Holy Ghost be referred to the body assumed, and the consubstantiality to the Person assuming.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s body, through not being consubstantial with the Holy Ghost, cannot properly be said to be conceived “of” [de] the Holy Ghost, but rather “from [ex] the Holy Ghost,” as Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. ii.): “What is from someone is either from his substance or from his power: from his substance, as the Son who is from the Father; from his power, as all things are from God, just as Mary conceived from the Holy Ghost.”

Reply to Objection 2: It seems that on this point there is a difference of opinion between Jerome and certain other Doctors, who assert that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed in this conception. For Chrysostom says (Hom. i in Matth. [*Opus Imperf., among the supposititious writings]): “When God’s Only-Begotten was about to enter into the Virgin, the Holy Ghost preceded Him; that by the previous entrance of the Holy Ghost, Christ might be born unto sanctification according to His body, the Godhead entering instead of the seed.” And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “God’s wisdom and power overshadowed her, like unto a Divine seed.”

But these expressions are easily explained. Because Chrysostom and Damascene compare the Holy Ghost, or also the Son, who is the Power of the Most High, to seed, by reason of the active power therein; while Jerome denies that the Holy Ghost took the place of seed, considered as a corporeal substance which is transformed in conception.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xl), Christ is said to be conceived or born of the Holy Ghost in one sense; of the Virgin Mary in another—of the Virgin Mary materially; of the Holy Ghost efficiently. Therefore there was no mingling here.

Whether the Holy Ghost should be called Christ’s father in respect of His humanity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost should be called Christ’s father in respect of His humanity. Because, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i): “The Father is the active principle in generation, the Mother supplies the matter.” But the Blessed Virgin is called Christ’s Mother, by reason of the matter which she supplied in His conception. Therefore it seems that the Holy Ghost can be called His father, through being the active principle in His conception.

Objection 2: Further, as the minds of other holy men are fashioned by the Holy Ghost, so also was Christ’s body fashioned by the Holy Ghost. But other holy men, on account of the aforesaid fashioning, are called the children of the whole Trinity, and consequently of the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that Christ should be called the Son of the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as His body was fashioned by the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, God is called our Father by reason of His having made us, according to Dt. 32:6: “Is not He thy Father, that hath possessed thee, and made thee and created thee?” But the Holy Ghost made Christ’s body, as stated above ([4150]AA[1],2). Therefore the Holy Ghost should be called Christ’s Father in respect of the body fashioned by Him.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xl): “Christ was born of the Holy Ghost not as a Son, and of the Virgin Mary as a Son.”

I answer that, The words “fatherhood,” “motherhood,” and “sonship,” result from generation; yet not from any generation, but from that of living things, especially animals. For we do not say that fire generated is the son of the fire generating it, except, perhaps, metaphorically; we speak thus only of animals in whom generation is more perfect. Nevertheless, the word “son” is not applied to everything generated in animals, but only to that which is generated into likeness of the generator. Wherefore, as Augustine says (Enchiridion xxxix), we do not say that a hair which is generated in a man is his son; nor do we say that a man who is born is the son of the seed;

for neither is the hair like the man nor is the man born like the seed, but like the man who begot him. And if the likeness be perfect, the sonship is perfect, whether in God or in man. But if the likeness be imperfect, the sonship is imperfect. Thus in man there is a certain imperfect likeness to God, both as regards his being created to God's image and as regards His being created unto the likeness of grace. Therefore in both ways man can be called His son, both because he is created to His image and because he is likened to Him by grace. Now, it must be observed that what is said in its perfect sense of a thing should not be said thereof in its imperfect sense: thus, because Socrates is said to be naturally a man, in the proper sense of "man," never is he called man in the sense in which the portrait of a man is called a man, although, perhaps, he may resemble another man. Now, Christ is the Son of God in the perfect sense of sonship. Wherefore, although in His human nature He was created and justified, He ought not to be called the Son of God, either in respect of His being created or of His being justified, but only in respect of His eternal generation, by reason of which He is the Son of the Father alone. Therefore nowise should Christ be called the Son of the Holy Ghost, nor even of the whole Trinity.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ was conceived of the Virgin Mary, who supplied the matter of His conception unto likeness of species. For this reason He is called her Son. But as man He was conceived of the Holy Ghost as the active principle of His conception, but not unto likeness of species, as a man is born of his father. Therefore Christ is not called the Son of the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: Men who are fashioned spiritually by the Holy Ghost cannot be called sons of God in the perfect sense of sonship. And therefore they are called sons of God in respect of imperfect sonship, which is by reason of the likeness of grace, which flows from the whole Trinity.

But with Christ it is different, as stated above.

The same reply avails for the Third Objection.

Whether the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ's body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in the conception of Christ's body. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that "the Holy Ghost came upon the Virgin, purifying her, and bestowing on her the power to receive and to bring forth the Word of God.” But she had from nature the passive power of generation, like any other woman. Therefore He bestowed on her an active power of generation. And thus she cooperated actively in Christ’s conception.

Objection 2: Further, all the powers of the vegetative soul are active, as the Commentator says (De Anima ii). But the generative power, in both man and woman, belongs to the vegetative soul. Therefore, both in man and woman, it cooperates actively in the conception of the child.

Objection 3: Further, in the conception of a child the woman supplies the matter from which the child’s body is naturally formed. But nature is an intrinsic principle of movement. Therefore it seems that in the very matter supplied by the Blessed Virgin there was an active principle.

On the contrary, The active principle in generation is called the “seminal virtue.” But, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x), Christ’s body “was taken from the Virgin, only as to corporeal matter, by the Divine power of conception and formation, but not by any human seminal virtue.” Therefore the Blessed Virgin did not cooperate actively in, the conception of Christ’s body.

I answer that, Some say that the Blessed Virgin cooperated actively in Christ’s conception, both by natural and by a supernatural power. By natural power, because they hold that in all natural matter there is an active principle. otherwise they believe that there would be no such thing as natural transformation. But in this they are deceived. Because a transformation is said to be natural by reason not only of an active but also of a passive intrinsic principle: for the Philosopher says expressly (Phys. viii) that in heavy and light things there is a passive, and not an active, principle of natural movement. Nor is it possible for matter to be active in its own formation, since it is not in act. Nor, again, is it possible for anything to put itself in motion except it be divided into two parts, one being the mover, the other being moved: which happens in animate things only, as is proved Phys. viii.

By a supernatural power, because they say that the mother requires not only to supply the matter, which is the menstrual blood, but also the semen, which, being mingled with that of the male, has an active power in generation. And since in the Blessed Virgin there was no resolution of semen, by reason of her inviolate virginity, they say that the Holy Ghost supernaturally bestowed on her an active power in the conception of Christ’s body, which power other mothers have by reason of the semen resolved. But this cannot stand, because, since “each thing is on account of its operation” (De Coel. ii), nature would not, for the purpose of the act of generation, distinguish the male and female sexes, unless the action of the male were distinct from that of the female. Now, in generation there are two distinct operations—that of the agent and that of the patient. Wherefore it follows that the entire active operation is on the part of the male, and the passive on the part of the female. For this reason in plants, where both forces are mingled, there is no distinction of male and female.

Since, therefore, the Blessed Virgin was not Christ’s Father, but His Mother, it follows that it was not given to her to exercise an active power in His conception: whether to cooperate actively so as to be His Father, or not to cooperate at all, as some say. whence it would follow that this active power was bestowed on her to no purpose. We must therefore say that in Christ’s conception itself she did not cooperate actively, but merely supplied the matter thereof. Nevertheless, before the conception she cooperated actively in the preparation of the matter so that it should be apt for the conception.

Reply to Objection 1: This conception had three privileges—namely, that it was without original sin; that it was not that of a man only, but of God and man; and that it was a virginal conception. And all three were effected by the Holy Ghost. Therefore Damascene says, as to the first, that the Holy Ghost “came upon the Virgin, purifying her”—that is, preserving her from conceiving with original sin. As to the second, he says: “And bestowing on her the power to receive,” i.e. to conceive, “the Word of God.” As to the third, he says: “And to give birth” to Him, i.e. that she might, while remaining a virgin, bring Him forth, not actively, but passively, just as other mothers achieve this through the action of the male seed.

Reply to Objection 2: The generative power of the female is imperfect compared to that of the male. And, therefore, just as in the arts the inferior art gives a disposition to the matter to which the higher art gives the form, as is stated Phys. ii, so also the generative power of the female prepares the matter, which is then fashioned by the active power of the male.

Reply to Objection 3: In order for a transformation to be natural, there is no need for an active principle in matter, but only for a passive principle, as stated above.

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF CHRIST’S CONCEPTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the mode and order of Christ’s conception, concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first instant of its conception?

(2) Whether it was animated in the first instant of its conception?

(3) Whether it was assumed by the Word in the first instant of its conception?

(4) Whether this conception was natural or miraculous?

Whether Christ’s body was formed in the first instant of its conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was not formed in the first instant of its conception. For it is written (Jn. 2:20): “Six-and-forty years was this Temple in building”; on which words Augustine comments as follows (De Trin. iv): “This number applies manifestly to the perfection of our Lord’s body.” He says, further (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 56): “It is not without reason that the Temple, which was a type of His body, is said to have been forty-six years in building: so that as many years as it took to build the Temple, in so many days was our Lord’s body perfected.” Therefore Christ’s body was not perfectly formed in the first instant of its conception.

Objection 2: Further, there was need of local movement for the formation of Christ’s body in order that the purest blood of the Virgin’s body might be brought where generation might aptly take place. Now, no body can be moved locally in an instant: since the time taken in movement is divided according to the division of the thing moved, as is proved Phys. vi. Therefore Christ’s body was not formed in an instant.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s body was formed of the purest blood of the Virgin, as stated above ([4151]Q[31], A[5]). But that matter could not be in the same instant both blood and flesh, because thus matter would have been at the same time the subject of two forms. Therefore the last instant in which it was blood was distinct from the first instant in which it was flesh.

But between any two instants there is an interval of time. Therefore Christ’s body was not formed in an instant, but during a space of time.

Objection 4: Further, as the augmentative power requires a fixed time for its act, so also does the generative power: for both are natural powers belonging to the vegetative soul. But Christ’s body took a fixed time to grow, like the bodies of other men: for it is written (Lk. 2:52) that He “advanced in wisdom and age.” Therefore it seems for the same reason that the formation of His body, since that, too, belongs to the generative power, was not instantaneous, but took a fixed time, like the bodies of other men.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii): “As soon as the angel announced it, as soon as the Spirit came down, the Word was in the womb, within the womb the Word was made flesh.”

I answer that, In the conception of Christ’s body three points may be considered: first, the local movement of the blood to the place of generation; secondly, the formation of the body from that matter; thirdly, the development whereby it was brought to perfection of quantity. of these, the second is the conception itself; the first is a preamble; the third, a result of the conception.

Now, the first could not be instantaneous: since this would be contrary to the very nature of the local movement of any body whatever, the parts of which come into a place successively. The third also requires a succession of time: both because there is no increase without local movement, and because increase is effected by the power of the soul already informing the body, the operation of which power is subject to time.

But the body’s very formation, in which conception principally consists, was instantaneous, for two reasons. First, because of the infinite power of the agent, viz. the Holy Ghost, by whom Christ’s body was formed, as stated above ([4152]Q[32], A[1]). For the greater the power of an agent, the more quickly can it dispose matter; and, consequently, an agent of infinite power can dispose matter instantaneously to its due form. Secondly, on the part of the Person of the Son, whose body was being formed. For it was unbecoming that He should take to Himself a body as yet unformed. While, if the conception had been going on for any time before the perfect formation of the body, the whole conception could not be attributed to the Son of God, since it is not attributed to Him except by reason of the assumption of that body. Therefore in the first instant in which the various parts of the matter were united together in the place of generation, Christ’s body was both perfectly formed and assumed. And thus is the Son of God said to have been conceived; nor could it be said otherwise.

Reply to Objection 1: Neither quotation from Augustine refers to formation alone of Christ’s body, but to its formation, together with a fixed development up to the time of His birth. Wherefore in the aforesaid number are foreshadowed the number of months during which Christ was in the Virgin’s womb.

Reply to Objection 2: This local movement is not comprised within the conception itself, but is a preamble thereto.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not possible to fix the last instant in which that matter was blood: but it is possible to fix the last period of time which continued without any interval up to the first instant in which Christ’s body was formed. And this instant was the terminus of the time occupied by the local movement of the matter towards the place of generation.

Reply to Objection 4: Increase is caused by the augmentative power of that which is the subject of increase: but the formation of the body is caused by the generative power, not of that which is generated, but of the father generating from seed, in which the formative power derived from the father’s soul has its operation. But Christ’s body was not formed by the seed of man, as stated above ([4153]Q[31], A[5], ad 3), but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the formation thereof should be such as to be worthy of the Holy Ghost. But the development of Christ’s body was the effect of the augmentative power in Christ’s soul: and since this was of the same species as ours, it behooved His body to develop in the same way as the bodies of other men, so as to prove the reality of His human nature.

Whether Christ’s body was animated in the first instant of its conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was not animated in the first instant of its conception. For Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Julian.): “Christ’s flesh was not of another nature than ours: nor was the beginning of His animation different from that of other men.” But the soul is not infused into other men at the first instant of their conception. Therefore neither should Christ’s soul have been infused into His body in the first instant of its conception.

Objection 2: Further, the soul, like any natural form, requires determinate quantity in its matter. But in the first instant of its conception Christ's body was not of the same quantity as the bodies of other men when they are animated: otherwise, if afterwards its development had been continuous, either its birth would have occurred sooner, or at the time of birth He would have been a bigger child than others. The former alternative is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. iv), where he proves that Christ was in the Virgin's womb for the space of nine months: while the latter is contrary to what Pope Leo says (Serm. iv in Epiph.): "They found the child Jesus nowise differing from the generality of infants." Therefore Christ's body was not animated in the first instant of its conception.

Objection 3: Further, whenever there is "before" and "after" there must be several instants. But according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. ii) in the generation of a man there must needs be "before" and "after": for he is first of all a living thing, and afterwards, an animal, and after that, a man. Therefore the animation of Christ could not be effected in the first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "At the very instant that there was flesh, it was the flesh of the Word of God, it was flesh animated with a rational and intellectual soul."

I answer that, For the conception to be attributed to the very Son of God, as we confess in the Creed, when we say, "who was conceived by the Holy Ghost," we must needs say that the body itself, in being conceived, was assumed by the Word of God. Now it has been shown above ([4154]Q[6], AA[1] ,2) that the Word of God assumed the body by means of the soul, and the soul by means of the spirit, i.e. the intellect. Wherefore in the first instant of its conception Christ's body must needs have been animated by the rational soul.

Reply to Objection 1: The beginning of the infusion of the soul may be considered in two ways. First, in regard to the disposition of the body. And thus, the beginning of the infusion of the soul into Christ's body was the same as in other men's bodies: for just as the soul is infused into another man's body as soon as it is formed, so was it with Christ. Secondly, this beginning may be considered merely in regard to time. And thus, because Christ's body was perfectly formed in a shorter space of time, so after a shorter space of time was it animated.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul requires due quantity in the matter into which it is infused: but this quantity allows of a certain latitude because it is not fixed to a certain amount. Now the quantity that a body has when the soul is first infused into it is in proportion to the perfect quantity to which it will attain by development: that is to say, men of greater stature have greater bodies at the time of first animation. But Christ at the perfect age was of becoming and middle stature: in proportion to which was the quantity of His body at the time when other men's bodies are animated; though it was less than theirs at the first instant of His conception. Nevertheless that quantity was not too small to safeguard the nature of an animated body; since it would have sufficed for the animation of a small man's body.

Reply to Objection 3: What the Philosopher says is true in the generation of other men, because the body is successively formed and disposed for the soul: whence, first, as being imperfectly disposed, it receives an imperfect soul; and afterwards, when it is perfectly disposed, it receives a perfect soul. But Christ's body, on account of the infinite power of the agent, was perfectly disposed instantaneously. Wherefore, at once and in the first instant it received a perfect form, that is, the rational soul.

Whether Christ's flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's flesh was first of all conceived, and afterwards assumed. Because what is not cannot be assumed. But Christ's flesh began to exist when it was conceived. Therefore it seems that it was assumed by the Word of God after it was conceived.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's flesh was assumed by the Word of God, by means of the rational soul. But it received the rational soul at the term of the conception. Therefore it was assumed at the term of the conception. But at the term of the conception it was already conceived. Therefore it was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed.

Objection 3: Further, in everything generated, that which is imperfect precedes in time that which is perfect: which is made clear by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix). But Christ's body is something generated. Therefore it did not attain to its ultimate perfection, which consisted in the union with the Word of God, at the first instant of its conception; but, first of all, the flesh was conceived and afterwards assumed.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Fide ad Petrum xviii [*Written by Fulgentius]): “Hold steadfastly, and doubt not for a moment that Christ’s flesh was not conceived in the Virgin’s womb, before being assumed by the Word.”

I answer that, As stated above, we may say properly that “God was made man,” but not that “man was made God”: because God took to Himself that which belongs to man—and that which belongs to man did not pre-exist, as subsisting in itself, before being assumed by the Word. But if Christ’s flesh had been conceived before being assumed by the Word, it would have had at some time an hypostasis other than that of the Word of God. And this is against the very nature of the Incarnation, which we hold to consist in this, that the Word of God was united to human nature and to all its parts in the unity of hypostasis: nor was it becoming that the Word of God should, by assuming human nature, destroy a pre-existing hypostasis of human nature or of any part thereof. It is consequently contrary to faith to assert that Christ’s flesh was first of all conceived and afterwards assumed by the Word of God.

Reply to Objection 1: If Christ’s flesh had been formed or conceived, not instantaneously, but successively, one of two things would follow: either that what was assumed was not yet flesh, or that the flesh was conceived before it was assumed. But since we hold that the conception was effected instantaneously, it follows that in that flesh the beginning and the completion of its conception were in the same instant. So that, as Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum xviii] says: “We say that the very Word of God was conceived in taking flesh, and that His very flesh was conceived by the Word taking flesh.”

From the above the reply to the Second Objection is clear. For in the same moment that this flesh began to be conceived, its conception and animation were completed.

Reply to Objection 3: The mystery of the Incarnation is not to be looked upon as an ascent, as it were, of a man already existing and mounting up to the dignity of the Union: as the heretic Photinus maintained. Rather is it to be considered as a descent, by reason of the perfect Word of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our nature; according to Jn. 6:38: “I came down from heaven.”

Whether Christ’s conception was natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s conception was natural. For Christ is called the Son of Man by reason of His conception in the flesh. But He is a true and natural Son of Man: as also is He the true and natural Son of God. Therefore His conception was natural.

Objection 2: Further, no creature can be the cause of a miraculous effect. But Christ’s conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, who is a mere creature: for we say that the Virgin conceived Christ. Therefore it seems that His conception was not miraculous, but natural.

Objection 3: Further, for a transformation to be natural, it is enough that the passive principle be natural, as stated above ([4155]Q[32], A[4]). But in Christ’s conception the passive principle on the part of His Mother was natural, as we have shown ([4156]Q[32], A[4]). Therefore Christ’s conception was natural.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.): “Christ does in a superhuman way those things that pertain to man: this is shown in the miraculous virginal conception.”

I answer that, As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): “In this mystery thou shalt find many things that are natural, and many that are supernatural.” For if we consider in this conception anything connected with the matter thereof, which was supplied by the mother, it was in all such things natural. But if we consider it on the part of the active power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since judgment of a thing should be pronounced in respect of its form rather than of its matter: and likewise in respect of its activity rather than of its passiveness: therefore is it that Christ’s conception should be described simply as miraculous and supernatural, although in a certain respect it was natural.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be a natural Son of Man, by reason of His having a true human nature, through which He is a Son of Man, although He had it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom sight has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously received.

Reply to Objection 2: The conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin, not as the active principle thereof, but because she supplied the matter, and because the conception took place in her womb.

Reply to Objection 3: A natural passive principle suffices for a transformation to be natural, when it is moved by its proper active principle in a natural and wonted way. But this is not so in the case in point. Therefore this conception cannot be called simply natural.

OF THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the perfection of the child conceived: and concerning this there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His conception?

(2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of free-will?

(3) Whether in that same instant He could merit?

(4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor?

Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of His conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not sanctified in the first instant of His conception. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:46): “That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: afterwards that which is spiritual.” But sanctification by grace is something spiritual. Therefore Christ received the grace of sanctification, not at the very beginning of His conception, but after a space of time.

Objection 2: Further, sanctification seems to be a cleansing from sin: according to 1 Cor. 6:1: “And such some of you were,” namely, sinners, “but you are washed, but you are sanctified.” But sin was never in Christ. Therefore it was not becoming that He should be sanctified by grace.

Objection 3: Further, as by the Word of God “all things were made,” so from the Word incarnate all men who are made holy receive holiness, according to Heb. 2:11: “Both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one.” But “the Word of God, by whom all things were made, was not Himself made"; as Augustine says (De Trin. i). Therefore Christ, by whom all are made holy, was not Himself made holy.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God"; and (Jn. 10:36): "Whom the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world."

I answer that, As stated above ([4157]Q[7], AA[9],10,12), the abundance of grace sanctifying Christ's soul flows from the very union of the Word, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." For it has been shown above ([4158]Q[33], AA[2],3) that in the first instant of conception, Christ's body was both animated and assumed by the Word of God. Consequently, in the first instant of His conception, Christ had the fulness of grace sanctifying His body and His soul.

Reply to Objection 1: The order set down by the Apostle in this passage refers to those who by advancing attain to the spiritual state. But the mystery of the Incarnation is considered as a condescension of the fulness of the Godhead into human nature rather than as the promotion of human nature, already existing, as it were, to the Godhead. Therefore in the man Christ there was perfection of spiritual life from the very beginning.

Reply to Objection 2: To be sanctified is to be made holy. Now something is made not only from its contrary, but also from that which is opposite to it, either by negation or by privation: thus white is made either from black or from not-white. We indeed from being sinners are made holy: so that our sanctification is a cleansing from sin. Whereas Christ, as man, was made holy, because He was not always thus sanctified by grace: yet He was not made holy from being a sinner, because He never sinned; but He was made holy from not-holy as man, not indeed by privation, as though He were at some time a man and not holy; but by negation—that is, when He was not man He had not human sanctity. Therefore at the same time He was made man and a holy man. For this reason the angel said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be born of thee." Which words Gregory expounds as follows (Moral. xviii): "In order to show the distinction between His holiness and ours, it is declared that He shall be born holy. For we, though we are made holy, yet are not born holy, because by the mere condition of a corruptible nature we are tied . . . But He alone is truly born holy who . . . was not conceived by the combining of carnal union."

Reply to Objection 3: The Father creates things through the Son, and the whole Trinity sanctifies men through the Man Christ, but not in the same way. For the Word of God has the same power and operation as God the Father: hence the Father does not work through the Son as an instrument, which is both mover and moved. Whereas the humanity of Christ is as the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above ([4159]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4160] Q[8], A[1], ad 1). Therefore Christ's humanity is both sanctified and sanctifier.

Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is, before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an operation. Since, therefore, Christ's soul began to exist in the first instant of His conception, as was made clear above ([4161]Q[33], A[2]), it seems impossible that He should have the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.

Objection 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice. But choice presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that choice is "the desire of what has been previously the object of deliberation." Therefore it seems impossible that Christ should have had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.

Objection 3: Further, the free-will is "a faculty of the will and reason," as stated in the [4162]FP, Q[83], A[2], OBJ[2]: consequently the use of free-will is an act of the will and the reason or intellect. But the act of the intellect presupposes an act of the senses; and this cannot exist without proper disposition of the organs—a condition which would seem impossible in the first instant of Christ's conception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have the use of free-will at the first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Trinity (Gregory: Regist. ix, Ep. 61): "As soon as the Word entered the womb, while retaining the reality of His Nature, He was made flesh, and a perfect man." But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.

I answer that, As stated above [4163](A[1]), spiritual perfection was becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection He attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit, but in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that operation is a "second act." We must, therefore, say that in the first instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the soul which can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will and intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the operation of the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much more, indeed, than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel, are not movements that may be described as "acts of an imperfect being," which attains perfection successively, but are "the acts of an already perfect being," as is said, De Anima iii, text. 28. We must therefore say that Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.

Reply to Objection 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not in time; but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and begins to act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is generated, begins to give heat and light. The action of heating, however, is not terminated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the action of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such an operation is the use of free-will, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended, there may be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel, as soon as this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen: and consequently they choose at once. From this it is clear that the deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the first instant of His conception, had the fulness of sanctifying grace, and in like manner the fulness of known truth; according to Jn. 1:14: "Full of grace and truth." Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty about all things, He could choose at once in an instant.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's intellect, in regard to His infused knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as stated above ([4164]Q[11], A[2]). Consequently His intellect and will could act without any action of the senses.

Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before it has received the rational soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal. ii, 3,4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant of His conception, through His body being already fashioned and endowed with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him to exercise the sense of touch in that same instant.

Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of His conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first instant of His conception. For the free-will bears the same relation to merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first instant of his creation, as was shown in the [4165]FP, Q[63], A[5]. Therefore neither could Christ's soul merit in the first instant of its creation—that is, in the first instant of Christ's conception.

Objection 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the [4166]FS, Q[109], A[5]; [4167]FS, Q[114], A[2]. Therefore it seems that the use of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His conception, was not meritorious.

Objection 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same thing again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows that afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. Therefore Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Paterius, Expos. Vet. et Nov. Test. super Ex. 40] says: "Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to the soul of Christ." But increase of merit would have been possible had He not merited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ merited in the first instant of His conception.

I answer that, As stated above [4168](A[1]), Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of, not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church. The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just as act is more perfect than habit; and “that which is by itself, than that which is by another” [*Aristotle, Phys. viii]. Since, therefore, the sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was so sanctified that He might sanctify others; consequently He was sanctified by reason of His own movement of the free-will towards God. Which movement, indeed, of the free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit in the first instant of His conception.

Reply to Objection 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good as to evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas to evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): “That which is beside nature is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because that which is beside nature is an exception to nature.” Therefore the free-will of a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the first instant of its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided, however, its nature be unimpaired.

Reply to Objection 2: That which man has at the first moment of his creation, in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him. but nothing hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at the very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ’s soul in the first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could merit. And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness, said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion xl).

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to someone from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality, which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not, indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so that it was due to Him from more causes than before.

Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His conception. For merit precedes reward, as fault precedes punishment. But Christ merited in the first instant of His conception, as stated above [4169](A[3]). Since, therefore, the state of comprehension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ was not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 24:26): “Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?” But glory belongs to the state of comprehension. Therefore Christ was not in the state of comprehension in the first instant of His conception, when as yet He had not suffered.

Objection 3: Further, what befits neither man nor angel seems proper to God; and therefore is not becoming to Christ as man. But to be always in the state of beatitude befits neither man nor angel: for if they had been created in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards. Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude in the first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 64:5): “Blessed is he whom Thou hast chosen, end taken to Thee”; which words, according to the gloss, refer to Christ’s human nature, which “was taken by the Word of God unto the unity of Person.” But human nature was taken by the Word of God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in the first instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in the state of beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor.

I answer that, As appears from what was said above [4170](A[3]), it was unbecoming that in His conception Christ should receive merely habitual grace without the act. Now, He received grace “not by measure” (Jn. 3:34), as stated above (Q[7], A[11]). But the grace of the “wayfarer,” being short of that of the “comprehensor,” is in less measure than that of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is manifest that in the first instant of His conception Christ received not only as much grace as comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have. And because that grace was not without its act, it follows that He was a comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence more clearly than other creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4171]Q[19], A[3]), Christ did not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have been a comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came through His Passion.

Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ was both God and man, He had, even in His humanity, something more than other creatures—namely, that He was in the state of beatitude from the very beginning.

OF CHRIST’S NATIVITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

After considering Christ’s conception, we must treat of His nativity. First, as to the nativity itself; secondly, as to His manifestation after birth.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person?

(2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed to Christ?

(3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His temporal birth?

(4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God?

(5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin Mother in respect of two filiations?

(6) Of the mode of the Nativity;

(7) Of its place;

(8) Of the time of the Nativity.

Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person?

Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather than the person. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum): “The eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born of human nature, except in a true human nature.” Consequently it becomes the Divine Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. Much more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), “nature” is so denominated from “nativity.” But things are denominated from one another by reason of some likeness. Therefore it seems that nativity regards the nature rather than the person.

Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to exist by nativity. But Christ’s Person did not begin to exist by His nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “Nativity regards the hypostasis, not the nature.”

I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways: first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that is born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly speaking, is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is to be generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, belongs to that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is said to be only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or hypostasis designates something as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but not to the nature.

But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be “the road to nature,” as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species.

Reply to Objection 1: On account of the identity of nature and hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put instead of person or hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and born in the human nature.

Reply to Objection 2: No movement or change is denominated from the subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of nativity.

Reply to Objection 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature. Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something is; whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.

Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be attributed to Christ. For “to be born is a certain movement of a thing that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures for it the benefit of existence” [*Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin. xii]. But Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be born in time.

Objection 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born. But the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore He needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no temporal birth.

Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person. But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is but one nativity.

Objection 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But this proposition is false; “Christ was born twice”: because the nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption; since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the use of the adverb “twice”: for a man is said to run twice whose running is interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a double nativity in Christ.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “We confess two nativities in Christ: one of the Father—eternal; and one which occurred in these latter times for our sake.”

I answer that, As stated above [4172](A[1]), nature is compared to nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. Now, movement is diversified according to the diversity of its termini, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in Christ there is a twofold nature: one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other which He received from His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of the Father from all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother in time.

Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of a certain heretic, Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra Felic. xii). “Let us suppose,” says he, “as many maintain, that in the world there is a universal soul, which, by its ineffable movement, so gives life to all seed, that it is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows life that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches the womb, being intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own purpose, it unites itself to the personality thereof, though manifestly it is not of the same substance; and thus of the active soul and passive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And so we confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as though, before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, but in a way much more sublime, the Son of God was born as man, just as the soul is held to be born together with the body: not as though they both made one substance, but that from both, one person results. Yet we do not say that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought that His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the flesh of the Son of God to have been from eternity: lest it be thought that He took, not a true human body, but some resemblance thereof."

Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is thus solved by Cyril in an epistle [*Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes., p. 1, cap. viii]: "We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own sake, of a second nativity, after that which is from the Father: for it is foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human nature to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this reason do we say that He was born in the flesh."

Reply to Objection 3: Nativity regards the person as its subject, the nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several transformations to be in the same subject: yet must they be diversified in respect of their termini. But we do not say this as though the eternal nativity were a transformation or a movement, but because it is designated by way of a transformation or movement.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in respect of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who runs at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a measure of duration.

Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated above ([4173]Q[32], A[4]), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter. But this does not seem sufficient to make her His Mother: otherwise wood might be called the mother of the bed or bench. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called the Mother of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, Christ was born miraculously of the Blessed Virgin. But a miraculous begetting does not suffice for motherhood or sonship: for we do not speak of Eve as being the daughter of Adam. Therefore neither should Christ be called the Son of the Blessed Virgin.

Objection 3: Further, motherhood seems to imply partial separation of the semen. But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), “Christ’s body was formed, not by a seminal process, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): “The generation of Christ was in this wise. When His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph,” etc.

I answer that, The Blessed Virgin Mary is in truth and by nature the Mother of Christ. For, as we have said above ([4174]Q[5], A[2];[4175] Q[31], A[5]), Christ’s body was not brought down from heaven, as the heretic Valentine maintained, but was taken from the Virgin Mother, and formed from her purest blood. And this is all that is required for motherhood, as has been made clear above ([4176]Q[31], A[5];[4177] Q[32], A[4]). Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly Christ’s Mother.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4178]Q[32], A[3]), not every generation implies fatherhood or motherhood and sonship, but only the generation of living things. Consequently when inanimate things are made from some matter, the relationship of motherhood and sonship does not follow from this, but only in the generation of living things, which is properly called nativity.

Reply to Objection 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “The temporal nativity by which Christ was born for our salvation is, in a way, natural, since a Man was born of a woman, and after the due lapse of time from His conception: but it is also supernatural, because He was begotten, not of seed, but of the Holy Ghost and the Blessed Virgin, above the law of conception.” Thus, then, on the part of the mother, this nativity was natural, but on the part of the operation of the Holy Ghost it was supernatural. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is the true and natural Mother of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4179]Q[31], A[5], ad 3;[4180] Q[32], A[4]), the resolution of the woman's semen is not necessary for conception; neither, therefore, is it required for motherhood.

Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God. For in the Divine mysteries we should not make any assertion that is not taken from Holy Scripture. But we read nowhere in Holy Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God, but that she is the "mother of Christ" or of "the Child," as may be seen from Mat. 1:18. Therefore we should not say that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is called God in respect of His Divine Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first originate from the Virgin. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God.

Objection 3: Further, the word "God" is predicated in common of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of God it seems to follow that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called Mother of God.

On the contrary, In the chapters of Cyril, approved in the Council of Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: "If anyone confess not that the Emmanuel is truly God, and that for this reason the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, since she begot of her flesh the Word of God made flesh, let him be anathema."

I answer that, As stated above ([4181]Q[16], A[1]), every word that signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of that nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the hypostasis, as above stated ([4182]Q[2], A[3]), it is manifest that this word "God" can stand for the hypostasis, having a human and a Divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the human nature can be attributed to that Person: both when a word is employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine Nature, and when a word is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth are attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature was taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of the conception, as stated above ([4183]Q[33], A[3]), it follows that it can be truly said that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from this is a woman called a man’s mother, that she conceived him and gave birth to him. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For the only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first subject to conception and birth, before this man were the Son of God, as Photinus said; or if the humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God.

Reply to Objection 1: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is solved by saying that, although we do not find it said expressly in Scripture that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find it expressly said in Scripture that “Jesus Christ is true God,” as may be seen 1 Jn. 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the “Mother of Jesus Christ,” which is clearly expressed Mat. 1:18. Therefore, from the words of Scripture it follows of necessity that she is the Mother of God.

Again, it is written (Rom. 9:5) that Christ is of the Jews “according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever.” But He is not of the Jews except through the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He who is “above all things, God blessed for ever,” is truly born of the Blessed Virgin as of His Mother.

Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius. But Cyril, in a letter against Nestorius [*Cf. Acta Conc. Ephes., p. 1, cap. ii], answers it thus: “Just as when a man’s soul is born with its body, they are considered as one being: and if anyone wish to say that the mother of the flesh is not the mother of the soul, he says too much. Something like this may be perceived in the generation of Christ. For the Word of God was born of the substance of God the Father: but because He took flesh, we must of necessity confess that in the flesh He was born of a woman.” Consequently we must say that the Blessed Virgin is called the Mother of God, not as though she were the Mother of the Godhead, but because she is the mother, according to His human nature, of the Person who has both the divine and the human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the name “God” is common to the three Persons, yet sometimes it stands for the Person of the Father alone, sometimes only for the Person of the Son or of the Holy Ghost, as stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [4184]FP, Q[39], A[4]). So that when we say, “The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God,” this word “God” stands only for the incarnate Person of the Son.

Whether there are two filiations in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are two filiations in Christ. For nativity is the cause of filiation. But in Christ there are two nativities. Therefore in Christ there are also two filiations.

Objection 2: Further, filiation, which is said of a man as being the son of someone, his father or his mother, depends, in a way, on him: because the very being of a relation consists “in being referred to another”; wherefore if one of two relatives be destroyed, the other is destroyed also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the Son of God the Father depends not on His Mother, because nothing eternal depends on what is temporal. Therefore Christ is not His Mother’s Son by temporal filiation. Either, therefore, He is not her Son at all, which is in contradiction to what has been said above ([4185]AA[3],4), or He must needs be her Son by some other temporal filiation. Therefore in Christ there are two filiations.

Objection 3: Further, one of two relatives enters the definition of the other; hence it is clear that of two relatives, one is specified from the other. But one and the same cannot be in diverse species. Therefore it seems impossible that one and the same relation be referred to extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said to be the Son of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, who are terms altogether diverse. Therefore it seems that Christ cannot, by the same relation, be called the Son of the Father and of His Mother Therefore in Christ there are two filiations.

On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), things pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; but not those things that pertain to the Person. But filiation belongs especially to the Person, since it is a personal property, as appears from what was said in the [4186]FP, Q[32], A[3]; [4187]FP, Q[40], A[2]. Therefore there is but one filiation in Christ.

I answer that, opinions differ on this question. For some, considering only the cause of filiation, which is nativity, put two filiations in Christ, just as there are two nativities. On the contrary, others, considering only the subject of filiation, which is the person or hypostasis, put only one filiation in Christ, just as there is but one hypostasis or person. Because the unity or plurality of a relation is considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or of its subject. For if it were considered in respect of its terms, every man would of necessity have in himself two filiations—one in reference to his father, and another in reference to his mother. But if we consider the question aright, we shall see that every man bears but one relation to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence he bears but one relation to both. The same is said of one master who teaches many disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs many subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations differ in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations being in the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and logic to others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and in the other; and therefore one and the same man may have different relations as the master of different disciples, or of the same disciples in regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man bears a relation to several in respect of various causes, but of the same species: thus a father may have several sons by several acts of generation. Wherefore the

paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of generation are specifically the same. And because several forms of the same species cannot at the same time be in the same subject, it is impossible for several paternities to be in a man who is the father of several sons by natural generation. But it would not be so were he the father of one son by natural generation and of another by adoption.

Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and the same nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His Mother in time: indeed, these two nativities differ specifically. Wherefore, as to this, we must say that there are various filiations, one temporal and the other eternal. Since, however, the subject of filiation is neither the nature nor part of the nature, but the person or hypostasis alone; and since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than the eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ but that which is in the eternal hypostasis. Now, every relation which is predicated of God from time does not put something real in the eternal God, but only something according to our way of thinking, as we have said in the [4188]FP, Q[13], A[7]. Therefore the filiation by which Christ is referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation of reason.

Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must needs say that there are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if we consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although lordship is not a real relation in God, yet is He really Lord through the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her motherhood to Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: Temporal nativity would cause a real temporal filiation in Christ if there were in Him a subject capable of such filiation. But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be receptive of a temporal relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said that it is receptive of temporal filiation by reason of the human nature, just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because human nature would need in some way to be the subject of filiation, just as in a way it is the subject of nativity; for since an Ethiopian is said to be white by reason of his teeth, it must be that his teeth are the subject of whiteness. But human nature can nowise be the subject of filiation, because this relation regards directly the person.

Reply to Objection 2: Eternal filiation does not depend on a temporal mother, but together with this eternal filiation we understand a certain temporal relation dependent on the mother, in respect of which relation Christ is called the Son of His Mother.

Reply to Objection 3: One and being are mutually consequent, as is said Metaph. iv. Therefore, just as it happens that in one of the extremes of a relation there is something real, whereas in the other there is not something real, but merely a certain aspect, as the Philosopher observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it happens that on the part of one extreme there is one relation, whereas on the part of the other there are many. Thus in man on the part of his parents there is a twofold relation, the one of paternity, the other of motherhood, which are specifically diverse, inasmuch as the father is the principle of generation in one way, and the mother in another (whereas if many be the principle of one action and in the same way—for instance, if many. together draw a ship along—there would be one and the same relation in all of them); but on the part of the child there is but one filiation in reality, though there be two in aspect, corresponding to the two relations in the parents, as considered by the intellect. And thus in one way there is only one real filiation in Christ, which is in respect of the Eternal Father: yet there is another temporal relation in regard to His temporal mother.

Whether Christ was born without His Mother suffering?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born without His Mother suffering. For just as man's death was a result of the sin of our first parents, according to Gn. 2:17: "In what day soever ye shall eat, ye shall [Vulg.: 'thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt] die"; so were the pains of childbirth, according to Gn. 3:16: "In sorrow shalt thou bring forth children." But Christ was willing to undergo death. Therefore for the same reason it seems that His birth should have been with pain.

Objection 2: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But Christ ended His life in pain, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely . . . He hath carried our sorrows." Therefore it seems that His nativity was not without the pains of childbirth.

Objection 3: Further, in the book on the birth of our Saviour [*Protevangelium Jacobi xix, xx] it is related that midwives were present at Christ's birth; and they would be wanted by reason of the mother's suffering pain. Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin suffered pain in giving birth to her Child.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. de Nativ. [*Supposititious]), addressing himself to the Virgin-Mother: "In conceiving thou wast all pure, in giving birth thou wast without pain."

I answer that, The pains of childbirth are caused by the infant opening the passage from the womb. Now it has been said above ([4189]Q[28], A[2], Replies to objections), that Christ came forth from the closed womb of His Mother, and, consequently, without opening the passage. Consequently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was there any corruption; on the contrary, there was much joy therein for that God-Man "was born into the world," according to Is. 35:1,2: "Like the lily, it shall bud forth and blossom, and shall rejoice with joy and praise."

Reply to Objection 1: The pains of childbirth in the woman follow from the mingling of the sexes. Wherefore (Gn. 3:16) after the words, "in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children," the following are added: "and thou shalt be under thy husband's power." But, as Augustine says (Serm. de Assumpt. B. Virg., [*Supposititious]), from this sentence we must exclude the Virgin-Mother of God; who, "because she conceived Christ without the defilement of sin, and without the stain of sexual mingling, therefore did she bring Him forth without pain, without violation of her virginal integrity, without detriment to the purity of her maidenhood." Christ, indeed, suffered death, but through His own spontaneous desire, in order to atone for us, not as a necessary result of that sentence, for He was not a debtor unto death.

Reply to Objection 2: As "by His death" Christ "destroyed our death" [*Preface of the Mass in Paschal-time], so by His pains He freed us from our pains; and so He wished to die a painful death. But the mother's pains in childbirth did not concern Christ, who came to atone for our sins. And therefore there was no need for His Mother to suffer in giving birth.

Reply to Objection 3: We are told (Lk. 2:7) that the Blessed Virgin herself "wrapped up in swaddling clothes" the Child whom she had brought forth, "and laid Him in a manger." Consequently the narrative of this book, which is apocryphal, is untrue. Wherefore Jerome says (Adv. Helvid. iv): "No midwife was there, no officious women interfered. She was both mother and midwife. 'With swaddling clothes,' says he, 'she wrapped up the child, and laid Him in a manger.'" These words prove the falseness of the apocryphal ravings.

Whether Christ should have been born in Bethlehem?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been born in Bethlehem. For it is written (Is. 2:3): “The law shall come forth from Sion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem.” But Christ is truly the Word of God. Therefore He should have come into the world at Jerusalem.

Objection 2: Further, it is said (Mat. 2:23) that it is written of Christ that “He shall be called a Nazarene”; which is taken from Is. 11:1: “A flower shall rise up out of his root”; for “Nazareth” is interpreted “a flower.” But a man is named especially from the place of his birth. Therefore it seems that He should have been born in Nazareth, where also He was conceived and brought up.

Objection 3: Further, for this was our Lord born into the world, that He might make known the true faith. according to Jn. 18:37: “For this was I born, and for this came I into the world; that I should give testimony to the truth.” But this would have been easier if He had been born in the city of Rome, which at that time ruled the world; whence Paul, writing to the Romans (1:8) says: “Your faith is spoken of in the whole world.” Therefore it seems that He should not have been born in Bethlehem.

On the contrary, It is written (Mic. 5:2): “And thou, Bethlehem, Ephrata . . . out of thee shall He come forth unto Me, that is to be the ruler in Israel.”

I answer that, Christ willed to be born in Bethlehem for two reasons. First, because “He was made . . . of the seed of David according to the flesh,” as it is written (Rom. 1:3); to whom also was a special promise made concerning Christ; according to 2 Kings 23:1: “The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said.” Therefore He willed to be born at Bethlehem, where David was born, in order that by the very birthplace the promise made to David might be shown to be fulfilled. The Evangelist points this out by saying: “Because He was of the house and of the family of David.” Secondly, because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.): “Bethlehem is interpreted ‘the house of bread.’ It is Christ Himself who said, ‘I am the living Bread which came down from heaven.’”

Reply to Objection 1: As David was born in Bethlehem, so also did he choose Jerusalem to set up his throne there, and to build there the Temple of

God, so that Jerusalem was at the same time a royal and a priestly city. Now, Christ’s priesthood and kingdom were “consummated” principally in His Passion. Therefore it was becoming that He should choose Bethlehem for His Birthplace and Jerusalem for the scene of His Passion.

At the same time, too, He put to silence the vain boasting of men who take pride in being born in great cities, where also they desire especially to receive honor. Christ, on the contrary, willed to be born in a mean city, and to suffer reproach in a great city.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished “to flower” by His holy life, not in His carnal birth. Therefore He wished to be fostered and brought up at Nazareth. But He wished to be born at Bethlehem away from home; because, as Gregory says (Hom. viii in Evang.), through the human nature which He had taken, He was born, as it were, in a foreign place—foreign not to His power, but to His Nature. And, again, as Bede says on Lk. 2:7: “In order that He who found no room at the inn might prepare many mansions for us in His Father’s house.”

Reply to Objection 3: According to a sermon in the Council of Ephesus [*P. iii, cap. ix]: “If He had chosen the great city of Rome, the change in the world would be ascribed to the influence of her citizens. If He had been the son of the Emperor, His benefits would have been attributed to the latter’s power. But that we might acknowledge the work of God in the transformation of the whole earth, He chose a poor mother and a birthplace poorer still.”

“But the weak things of the world hath God chosen, that He may confound the strong” (1 Cor. 1:27). And therefore, in order the more to show His power, He set up the head of His Church in Rome itself, which was the head of the world, in sign of His complete victory, in order that from that city the faith might spread throughout the world; according to Is. 26:5,6: “The high city He shall lay low . . . the feet of the poor,” i.e. of Christ, “shall tread it down; the steps of the needy,” i.e. of the apostles Peter and Paul.

Whether Christ was born at a fitting time?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born at a fitting time. Because Christ came in order to restore liberty to His own. But He was born at a time of subjection—namely, when the whole world, as it were, tributary to Augustus, was being enrolled, at his command as Luke relates (2:1). Therefore it seems that Christ was not born at a fitting time.

Objection 2: Further, the promises concerning the coming of Christ were not made to the Gentiles; according to Rom. 9:4: “To whom belong . . . the promises.” But Christ was born during the reign of a foreigner, as appears from Mat. 2:1: “When Jesus was born in the days of King Herod.” Therefore it seems that He was not born at a fitting time.

Objection 3: Further, the time of Christ’s presence on earth is compared to the day, because He is the “Light of the world”; wherefore He says Himself (Jn. 9:4): “I must work the works of Him that sent Me, whilst it is day.” But in summer the days are longer than in winter. Therefore, since He was born in the depth of winter, eight days before the Kalends of January, it seems that He was not born at a fitting time.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:4): “When the fulness of the time was come, God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the law.”

I answer that, There is this difference between Christ and other men, that, whereas they are born subject to the restrictions of time, Christ, as Lord and Maker of all time, chose a time in which to be born, just as He chose a mother and a birthplace. And since “what is of God is well ordered” and becomingly arranged, it follows that Christ was born at a most fitting time.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ came in order to bring us back from a state of bondage to a state of liberty. And therefore, as He took our mortal nature in order to restore us to life, so, as Bede says (Super Luc. ii, 4,5), “He deigned to take flesh at such a time that, shortly after His birth, He would be enrolled in Caesar’s census, and thus submit Himself to bondage for the sake of our liberty.”

Moreover, at that time, when the whole world lived under one ruler, peace abounded on the earth. Therefore it was a fitting time for the birth of Christ, for “He is our peace, who hath made both one,” as it is written (Eph. 2:14). Wherefore Jerome says on Is. 2:4: “If we search the page of ancient history, we shall find that throughout the whole world there was discord until the twenty-eighth year of Augustus Caesar: but when our Lord was born, all war ceased”; according to Is. 2:4: “Nation shall not lift up sword against nation.”

Again, it was fitting that Christ should be born while the world was governed by one ruler, because “He came to gather His own [Vulg.: ‘the children of God’] together in one” (Jn. 11:52), that there might be “one fold and one shepherd” (Jn. 10:16).

Reply to Objection 2: Christ wished to be born during the reign of a foreigner, that the prophecy of Jacob might be fulfilled (Gn. 49:10): “The sceptre shall not be taken away from Juda, nor a ruler from his thigh, till He come that is to be sent.” Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth. [*Opus Imperf., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom]), as long as the Jewish “people was governed by Jewish kings, however wicked, prophets were sent for their healing. But now that the Law of God is under the power of a wicked king, Christ is born; because a grave and hopeless disease demanded a more skilful physician.”

Reply to Objection 3: As says the author of the book De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., “Christ wished to be born, when the light of day begins to increase in length,” so as to show that He came in order that man might come nearer to the Divine Light, according to Lk. 1:79: “To enlighten them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death.”

In like manner He chose to be born in the rough winter season, that He might begin from then to suffer in body for us.

OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE NEWLY BORN CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the manifestation of the newly born Christ: concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to all?

(2) Whether it should have been made known to some?

(3) To whom should it have been made known?

(4) Whether He should have made Himself known, or should He rather have been manifested by others?

(5) By what other means should it have been made known?

(6) Of the order of these manifestations;

(7) Of the star by means of which His birth was made known;

(8) of the adoration of the Magi, who were informed of Christ’s nativity by means of the star.

Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to all?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth should have been made known to all. Because fulfilment should correspond to promise. Now, the promise of Christ’s coming is thus expressed (Ps. 49:3): “God shall come manifestly. But He came by His birth in the flesh.” Therefore it seems that His birth should have been made known to the whole world.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 1:15): “Christ came into this world to save sinners.” But this is not effected save in as far as the grace of Christ is made known to them; according to Titus 2:11,12: “The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men, instructing us, that denying ungodliness and worldly desires, we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in this world.” Therefore it seems that Christ’s birth should have been made known to all.

Objection 3: Further, God is most especially inclined to mercy; according to Ps. 144:9: “His tender mercies are over all His works.” But in His second coming, when He will “judge justices” (Ps. 70:3), He will come before the eyes of all; according to Mat. 24:27: “As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of Man be.” Much more, therefore, should His first coming, when He was born into the world according to the flesh, have been made known to all.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 45:15): “Thou art a hidden God, the Holy [Vulg.: ‘the God] of Israel, the Saviour.” And, again (Is. 43:3): “His look was, as it were, hidden and despised.”

I answer that, It was unfitting that Christ’s birth should be made known to all men without distinction. First, because this would have been a hindrance to the redemption of man, which was accomplished by means of the Cross; for, as it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): “If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.”

Secondly, because this would have lessened the merit of faith, which He came to offer men as the way to righteousness. according to Rom. 3:22: “The justice of God by faith of Jesus Christ.” For if, when Christ was born, His birth had been made known to all by evident signs, the very nature of faith would have been destroyed, since it is “the evidence of things that appear not,” as stated, Heb. 11:1.

Thirdly, because thus the reality of His human nature would have come into doubt. Whence Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusianum cxxxvii): “If He had not passed through the different stages of age from babyhood to youth, had neither eaten nor slept, would He not have strengthened an erroneous opinion, and made it impossible for us to believe that He had become true man? And while He is doing all things wondrously, would He have taken away that which He accomplished in mercy?”

Reply to Objection 1: According to the gloss, the words quoted must be understood of Christ’s coming as judge.

Reply to Objection 2: All men were to be instructed unto salvation, concerning the grace of God our Saviour, not at the very time of His birth, but afterwards, in due time, after He had “wrought salvation in the midst of the earth” (Ps. 73:12). Wherefore after His Passion and Resurrection, He said to His disciples (Mat. 28:19): “Going . . . teach ye all nations.”

Reply to Objection 3: For judgment to be passed, the authority of the judge needs to be known: and for this reason it behooves that the coming of Christ unto judgment should be manifest. But His first coming was unto the salvation of all, which is by faith that is of things not seen. And therefore it was fitting that His first coming should be hidden.

Whether Christ’s birth should have been made known to some?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth should not have been made known to anyone. For, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), it befitted the salvation of mankind that Christ’s first coming should be hidden. But Christ came to save all; according to 1 Tim. 4:10: “Who is the Saviour of all men, especially of the faithful.” Therefore Christ’s birth should not have been made known to anyone.

Objection 2: Further, before Christ was born, His future birth was made known to the Blessed Virgin and Joseph. Therefore it was not necessary that it should be made known to others after His birth.

Objection 3: Further, no wise man makes known that from which arise disturbance and harm to others. But, when Christ’s birth was made known, disturbance arose: for it is written (Mat. 2:3) that “King Herod, hearing” of

Christ's birth, "was troubled, and all Jerusalem with him." Moreover, this brought harm to others; because it was the occasion of Herod's killing "all the male children that were in Bethlehem . . . from two years old and under." Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ's birth to have been made known to anyone.

On the contrary, Christ's birth would have been profitable to none if it had been hidden from all. But it behooved Christ's birth to be profitable: else He were born in vain. Therefore it seems that Christ's birth should have been made known to some.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1) "what is of God is well ordered." Now it belongs to the order of Divine wisdom that God's gifts and the secrets of His wisdom are not bestowed on all equally, but to some immediately, through whom they are made known to others. Wherefore, with regard to the mystery of the Resurrection it is written (Acts 10:40,41): "God . . . gave" Christ rising again "to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses pre-ordained by God." Consequently, that His birth might be consistent with this, it should have been made known, not to all, but to some, through whom it could be made known to others.

Reply to Objection 1: As it would have been prejudicial to the salvation of mankind if God's birth had been made known to all men, so also would it have been if none had been informed of it. Because in either case faith is destroyed, whether a thing be perfectly manifest, or whether it be entirely unknown, so that no one can hear it from another; for "faith cometh by hearing" (Rom. 10:17).

Reply to Objection 2: Mary and Joseph needed to be instructed concerning Christ's birth before He was born, because it devolved on them to show reverence to the child conceived in the womb, and to serve Him even before He was born. But their testimony, being of a domestic character, would have aroused suspicion in regard to Christ's greatness: and so it behooved it to be made known to others, whose testimony could not be suspect.

Reply to Objection 3: The very disturbance that arose when it was known that Christ was born was becoming to His birth. First, because thus the heavenly dignity of Christ is made manifest. Wherefore Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.): "After the birth of the King of heaven, the earthly king is troubled: doubtless because earthly grandeur is covered with confusion when the heavenly majesty is revealed."

Secondly, thereby the judicial power of Christ was foreshadowed. Thus Augustine says in a sermon (30 de Temp.) on the Epiphany: "What will He be like in the judgment-seat; since from His cradle He struck terror into the heart of a proud king?"

Thirdly, because thus the overthrow of the devil's kingdom was foreshadowed. For, as Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Serm. v [*Opus Imperfectum in Matth., Hom. ii, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom]): "Herod was not so much troubled in himself as the devil in Herod. For Herod thought Him to be a man, but the devil thought Him to be God. Each feared a successor to his kingdom: the devil, a heavenly successor; Herod, an earthly successor." But their fear was needless: since Christ had not come to set up an earthly kingdom, as Pope Leo says, addressing himself to Herod: "Thy palace cannot hold Christ: nor is the Lord of the world content with the paltry power of thy scepter." That the Jews were troubled, who, on the contrary, should have rejoiced, was either because, as Chrysostom says, "wicked men could not rejoice at the coming of the Holy one," or because they wished to court favor with Herod, whom they feared; for "the populace is inclined to favor too much those whose cruelty it endures."

And that the children were slain by Herod was not harmful to them, but profitable. For Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (66 de Diversis): "It cannot be questioned that Christ, who came to set man free, rewarded those who were slain for Him; since, while hanging on the cross, He prayed for those who were putting Him to death."

Whether those to whom Christ's birth was made known were suitably chosen?

Objection 1: It would seem that those to whom Christ's birth was made known were not suitably chosen. For our Lord (Mat. 10:5) commanded His disciples, "Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles," so that He might be made known to the Jews before the Gentiles. Therefore it seems that much less should Christ's birth have been at once revealed to the Gentiles who "came from the east," as stated Mat. 2:1.

Objection 2: Further, the revelation of Divine truth should be made especially to the friends of God, according to Job 37 [Vulg.: Job 36:33]: “He sheweth His friend concerning it.” But the Magi seem to be God’s foes; for it is written (Lev. 19:31): “Go not aside after wizards [magi], neither ask anything of soothsayers.” Therefore Christ’s birth should not have been made known to the Magi.

Objection 3: Further, Christ came in order to set free the whole world from the power of the devil; whence it is written (Malachi 1:11): “From the rising of the sun even to the going down, My name is great among the Gentiles.” Therefore He should have been made known, not only to those who dwelt in the east, but also to some from all parts of the world.

Objection 4: Further, all the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of Christ. But the sacraments of the Old Law were dispensed through the ministry of the legal priesthood. Therefore it seems that Christ’s birth should have been made known rather to the priests in the Temple than to the shepherds in the fields.

Objection 5: Further, Christ was born of a Virgin-Mother, and was as yet a little child. It was therefore more suitable that He should be made known to youths and virgins than to old and married people or to widows, such as Simeon and Anna.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:18): “I know whom I have chosen.” But what is done by God’s wisdom is done becomingly. Therefore those to whom Christ’s birth was made known were suitably chosen.

I answer that, Salvation, which was to be accomplished by Christ, concerns all sorts and conditions of men: because, as it is written (Col. 3:11), in Christ “there is neither male nor female, [*These words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] neither Gentile nor Jew . . . bond nor free,” and so forth. And in order that this might be foreshadowed in Christ’s birth, He was made known to men of all conditions. Because, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (32 de Temp.), “the shepherds were Israelites, the Magi were Gentiles. The former were nigh to Him, the latter far from Him. Both hastened to Him together as to the cornerstone.” There was also another point of contrast: for the Magi were wise and powerful; the shepherds simple and lowly. He was also made known to the righteous as Simeon and Anna; and to sinners, as the Magi. He was made known both to men, and to women—namely, to Anna—so as to show no condition of men to be excluded from Christ’s redemption.

Reply to Objection 1: That manifestation of Christ’s birth was a kind of foretaste of the full manifestation which was to come. And as in the later manifestation the first announcement of the grace of Christ was made by Him and His Apostles to the Jews and afterwards to the Gentiles, so the first to come to Christ were the shepherds, who were the first-fruits of the Jews, as being near to Him; and afterwards came the Magi from afar, who were “the first-fruits of the Gentiles,” as Augustine says (Serm. 30 de Temp. cc.).

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Serm. 30 de Temp.): “As unskilfulness predominates in the rustic manners of the shepherd, so ungodliness abounds in the profane rites of the Magi. Yet did this Corner-Stone draw both to Itself; inasmuch as He came ‘to choose the foolish things that He might confound the wise,’ and ‘not to call the just, but sinners,’” so that “the proud might not boast, nor the weak despair.” Nevertheless, there are those who say that these Magi were not wizards, but wise astronomers, who are called Magi among the Persians or Chaldees.

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says [*Hom. ii in Matth. in the Opus Imperf., among the supposititious works of Chrysostom]: “The Magi came from the east, because the first beginning of faith came from the land where the day is born; since faith is the light of the soul.” Or, “because all who come to Christ come from Him and through Him”: whence it is written (Zech. 6:12): “Behold a Man, the Orient is His name.” Now, they are said to come from the east literally, either because, as some say, they came from the farthest parts of the east, or because they came from the neighboring parts of Judea that lie to the east of the region inhabited by the Jews. Yet it is to be believed that certain signs of Christ’s birth appeared also in other parts of the world: thus, at Rome the river flowed with oil [*Eusebius, Chronic. II, Olymp. 185]; and in Spain three suns were seen, which gradually merged into one [*Cf. Eusebius, Chronic. II, Olymp. 184].

Reply to Objection 4: As Chrysostom observes (Theophylact., Enarr. in Luc. ii, 8), the angel who announced Christ’s birth did not go to Jerusalem, nor did he seek the Scribes and Pharisees, for they were corrupted, and full of ill-will. But the shepherds were single-minded, and were like the patriarchs and Moses in their mode of life.

Moreover, these shepherds were types of the Doctors of the Church, to whom are revealed the mysteries of Christ that were hidden from the Jews.

Reply to Objection 5: As Ambrose says (on Lk. 2:25): “It was right that our Lord’s birth should be attested not only by the shepherds, but also by people advanced in age and virtue”: whose testimony is rendered the more credible by reason of their righteousness.

Whether Christ Himself should have made His birth know?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have Himself made His birth known. For “a direct cause is always of greater power than an indirect cause,” as is stated Phys. viii. But Christ made His birth known through others—for instance, to the shepherds through the angels, and to the Magi through the star. Much more, therefore, should He Himself have made His birth known.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 20:32): “Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is not seen; what profit is there in them both?” But Christ had, to perfection, the treasure of wisdom and grace from the beginning of His conception. Therefore, unless He had made the fulness of these gifts known by words and deeds, wisdom and grace would have been given Him to no purpose. But this is unreasonable: because “God and nature do nothing without a purpose” (De Coelo i).

Objection 3: Further, we read in the book De Infantia Salvatoris that in His infancy Christ worked many miracles. It seems therefore that He did Himself make His birth known.

On the contrary, Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv) that the Magi found the “infant Jesus in no way different from the generality of human infants.” But other infants do not make themselves known. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should Himself make His birth known.

I answer that, Christ’s birth was ordered unto man’s salvation, which is by faith. But saving faith confesses Christ’s Godhead and humanity. It behooved, therefore, Christ’s birth to be made known in such a way that the proof of His Godhead should not be prejudicial to faith in His human nature. But this took place while Christ presented a likeness of human weakness, and yet, by means of God’s creatures, He showed the power of the Godhead in Himself. Therefore Christ made His birth known, not by Himself, but by means of certain other creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: By the way of generation and movement we must of necessity come to the imperfect before the perfect. And therefore Christ was made known first through other creatures, and afterwards He Himself manifested Himself perfectly.

Reply to Objection 2: Although hidden wisdom is useless, yet there is no need for a wise man to make himself known at all times, but at a suitable time; for it is written (Ecclus. 20:6): “There is one that holdeth his peace because he knoweth not what to say: and there is another that holdeth his peace, knowing the proper time.” Hence the wisdom given to Christ was not useless, because at a suitable time He manifested Himself. And the very fact that He was hidden at a suitable time is a sign of wisdom.

Reply to Objection 3: The book De Infantia Salvatoris is apocryphal. Moreover, Chrysostom (Hom. xxi super Joan.) says that Christ worked no miracles before changing the water into wine, according to Jn. 2:11: “‘This beginning of miracles did Jesus.’ For if He had worked miracles at an early age, there would have been no need for anyone else to manifest Him to the Israelites; whereas John the Baptist says (Jn. 1:31): ‘That He may be made manifest in Israel; therefore am I come baptizing with water.’ Moreover, it was fitting that He should not begin to work miracles at an early age. For people would have thought the Incarnation to be unreal, and, out of sheer spite, would have crucified Him before the proper time.”

Whether Christ’s birth should have been manifested by means of the angels and the star?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth should not have been manifested by means of the angels. For angels are spiritual substances, according to Ps. 103:4: “Who maketh His [Vulg.: ‘makest Thy’] angels, spirits.” But Christ’s birth was in the flesh, and not in His spiritual substance. Therefore it should not have been manifested by means of angels.

Objection 2: Further, the righteous are more akin to the angels than to any other, according to Ps. 33:8: “The angel of the Lord shall encamp round about them that fear Him, and shall deliver them.” But Christ’s birth was not announced to the righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna, through the angels.

Therefore neither should it have been announced to the shepherds by means of the angels.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that neither ought it to have been announced to the Magi by means of the star. For this seems to favor the error of those who think that man's birth is influenced by the stars. But occasions of sin should be taken away from man. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ's birth should be announced by a star.

Objection 4: Further, a sign should be certain, in order that something be made known thereby. But a star does not seem to be a certain sign of Christ's birth. Therefore Christ's birth was not suitably announced by a star.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But this manifestation is the work of God. Therefore it was accomplished by means of suitable signs.

I answer that, As knowledge is imparted through a syllogism from something which we know better, so knowledge given by signs must be conveyed through things which are familiar to those to whom the knowledge is imparted. Now, it is clear that the righteous have, through the spirit of prophecy, a certain familiarity with the interior instinct of the Holy Ghost, and are wont to be taught thereby, without the guidance of sensible signs. Whereas others, occupied with material things, are led through the domain of the senses to that of the intellect. The Jews, however, were accustomed to receive Divine answers through the angels; through whom they also received the Law, according to Acts 7:53: "You [Vulg.: 'who'] . . . have received the Law by the disposition of angels." And the Gentiles, especially astrologers, were wont to observe the course of the stars. And therefore Christ's birth was made known to the righteous, viz. Simeon and Anna, by the interior instinct of the Holy Ghost, according to Lk. 2:26: "He had received an answer from the Holy Ghost that he should not see death before he had seen the Christ of the Lord." But to the shepherds and Magi, as being occupied with material things, Christ's birth was made known by means of visible apparitions. And since this birth was not only earthly, but also, in a way, heavenly, to both (shepherds and Magi) it is revealed through heavenly signs: for, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cciv): "The angels inhabit, and the stars adorn, the heavens: by both, therefore, do the 'heavens show forth the glory of God.'" Moreover, it was not without reason that Christ's birth was made known, by means of angels, to the shepherds, who, being Jews, were accustomed to frequent apparitions of the angels: whereas it was revealed by means of a star to the Magi, who were wont to consider the heavenly bodies. Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.): “Our Lord deigned to call them through things to which they were accustomed.” There is also another reason. For, as Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.): “To the Jews, as rational beings, it was fitting that a rational animal [*Cf. [4190]FP, Q[51], A[1], ad 2],” viz. an angel, “should preach. Whereas the Gentiles, who were unable to come to the knowledge of God through the reason, were led to God, not by words, but by signs. And as our Lord, when He was able to speak, was announced by heralds who spoke, so before He could speak He was manifested by speechless elements.” Again, there is yet another reason. For, as Augustine [*Pope Leo] says in a sermon on the Epiphany: “To Abraham was promised an innumerable progeny, begotten, not of carnal propagation, but of the fruitfulness of faith. For this reason it is compared to the multitude of stars; that a heavenly progeny might be hoped for.” Wherefore the Gentiles, “who are thus designated by the stars, are by the rising of a new star stimulated” to seek Christ, through whom they are made the seed of Abraham.

Reply to Objection 1: That which of itself is hidden needs to be manifested, but not that which in itself is manifest. Now, the flesh of Him who was born was manifest, whereas the Godhead was hidden. And therefore it was fitting that this birth should be made known by angels, who are the ministers of God. Wherefore also a certain “brightness” (Lk. 2:9) accompanied the angelic apparition, to indicate that He who was just born was the “Brightness of” the Father’s “glory.”

Reply to Objection 2: The righteous did not need the visible apparition of the angel; on account of their perfection the interior instinct of the Holy Ghost was enough for them.

Reply to Objection 3: The star which manifested Christ’s birth removed all occasion of error. For, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): “No astrologer has ever so far connected the stars with man’s fate at the time of his birth as to assert that one of the stars, at the birth of any man, left its orbit and made its way to him who was just born”: as happened in the case of the star which made known the birth of Christ. Consequently this does not corroborate the error of those who “think there is a connection between man’s birth and the course of the stars, for they do not hold that the course of the stars can be changed at a man’s birth.”

In the same sense Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.): “It is not an astronomer’s business to know from the stars those who are born, but to tell the future from the hour of a man’s birth: whereas the Magi did not know the time of the birth, so as to conclude therefrom some knowledge of the future; rather was it the other way about.”

Reply to Objection 4: Chrysostom relates (Hom. ii in Matth.) that, according to some apocryphal books, a certain tribe in the far east near the ocean was in the possession of a document written by Seth, referring to this star and to the presents to be offered: which tribe watched attentively for the rising of this star, twelve men being appointed to take observations, who at stated times repaired to the summit of a mountain with faithful assiduity: whence they subsequently perceived the star containing the figure of a small child, and above it the form of a cross.

Or we may say, as may be read in the book De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lxiii, that “these Magi followed the tradition of Balaam,” who said, “‘A star shall rise out of Jacob.’ Wherefore observing this star to be a stranger to the system of this world, they gathered that it was the one foretold by Balaam to indicate the King of the Jews.”

Or again, it may be said with Augustine, in a sermon on the Epiphany (ccclxxiv), that “the Magi had received a revelation through the angels” that the star was a sign of the birth of Christ: and he thinks it probable that these were “good angels; since in adoring Christ they were seeking for salvation.”

Or with Pope Leo, in a sermon on the Epiphany (xxxiv), that “besides the outward form which aroused the attention of their corporeal eyes, a more brilliant ray enlightened their minds with the light of faith.”

Whether Christ’s birth was made known in a becoming order?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s birth was made known in an unbecoming order. For Christ’s birth should have been made known to them first who were nearest to Christ, and who longed for Him most; according to Wis. 6:14: “She preventeth them that covet her, so that she first showeth herself unto them.” But the righteous were nearest to Christ by faith, and longed most for His coming; whence it is written (Lk. 2:25) of Simeon that “he was just and devout, waiting for the consolation of Israel.” Therefore Christ’s birth should have been made known to Simeon before the shepherds and Magi.

Objection 2: Further, the Magi were the “first-fruits of the Gentiles,” who were to believe in Christ. But first the “fulness of the Gentiles . . . come in” unto faith, and afterwards “all Israel” shall “be saved,” as is written (Rom. 11:25). Therefore Christ’s birth should have been made known to the Magi before the shepherds.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 2:16) that “Herod killed all the male children that were in Bethlehem, and in all the borders thereof, from two years old and under, according to the time which he had diligently inquired from the wise men”: so that it seems that the Magi were two years in coming to Christ after His birth. It was therefore unbecoming that Christ should be made known to the Gentiles so long after His birth.

On the contrary, It is written (Dan. 2:21): “He changes time and ages.” Consequently the time of the manifestation of Christ’s birth seems to have been arranged in a suitable order.

I answer that, Christ’s birth was first made known to the shepherds on the very day that He was born. For, as it is written (Lk. 2:8, 15, 16): “There were in the same country shepherds watching, and keeping the night-watches over their flock . . . And it came to pass, after the angels departed from them into heaven they [Vulg.: ‘the shepherds’] said one to another: Let us go over to Bethlehem . . . and they came with haste.” Second in order were the Magi, who came to Christ on the thirteenth day after His birth, on which day is kept the feast of the Epiphany. For if they had come after a year, or even two years, they would not have found Him in Bethlehem, since it is written (Lk. 2:39) that “after they had performed all things according to the law of the Lord”—that is to say, after they had offered up the Child Jesus in the Temple—“they returned into Galilee, to their city”—namely, “Nazareth.” In the third place, it was made known in the Temple to the righteous on the fortieth day after His birth, as related by Luke (2:22).

The reason of this order is that the shepherds represent the apostles and other believers of the Jews, to whom the faith of Christ was made known first; among whom there were “not many mighty, not many noble,” as we read 1 Cor. 1:26. Secondly, the faith of Christ came to the “fulness of the Gentiles”; and this is foreshadowed in the Magi. Thirdly it came to the fulness of the Jews, which is foreshadowed in the righteous. Wherefore also Christ was manifested to them in the Jewish Temple.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 9:30,31): “Israel, by following after the law of justice, is not come unto the law of justice”: but the Gentiles, “who followed not after justice,” forestalled the generality of the Jews in the justice which is of faith. As a figure of this, Simeon, “who was waiting for the consolation of Israel,” was the last to know Christ born: and he was preceded by the Magi and the shepherds, who did not await the coming of Christ with such longing.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the “fulness of the Gentiles came in” unto faith before the fulness of the Jews, yet the first-fruits of the Jews preceded the first-fruits of the Gentiles in faith. For this reason the birth of Christ was made known to the shepherds before the Magi.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two opinions about the apparition of the star seen by the Magi. For Chrysostom (Hom. ii in Matth. [*Opus Imperf. in Matth., falsely ascribed to Chrysostom]), and Augustine in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxi, cxxxii), say that the star was seen by the Magi during the two years that preceded the birth of Christ: and then, having first considered the matter and prepared themselves for the journey, they came from the farthest east to Christ, arriving on the thirteenth day after His birth. Wherefore Herod, immediately after the departure of the Magi, “perceiving that He was deluded by them,” commanded the male children to be killed “from two years old and under,” being doubtful lest Christ were already born when the star appeared, according as he had heard from the Magi.

But others say that the star first appeared when Christ was born, and that the Magi set off as soon as they saw the star, and accomplished a journey of very great length in thirteen days, owing partly to the Divine assistance, and partly to the fleetness of the dromedaries. And I say this on the supposition that they came from the far east. But others, again, say that they came from a neighboring country, whence also was Balaam, to whose teaching they were heirs; and they are said to have come from the east, because their country was to the east of the country of the Jews. In this case Herod killed the babes, not as soon as the Magi departed, but two years after: and that either because he is said to have gone to Rome in the meanwhile on account of an accusation brought against him, or because he was troubled at some imminent peril, and for the time being desisted from his anxiety to slay the child, or because he may have thought that the Magi, “being deceived by the illusory appearance of the star, and not finding the child, as they had expected to, were ashamed to return to him”: as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii). And the reason why he killed not only those who were two years old, but also the younger children, would be, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Innocents, because he feared lest a child whom the stars obey, might make himself appear older or younger.

Whether the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system?

Objection 1: It would seem that the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system. For Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxii): “While God yet clings to the breast, and suffers Himself to be wrapped in humble swaddling clothes, suddenly a new star shines forth in the heavens.” Therefore the star which appeared to the Magi belonged to the heavenly system.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cci): “Christ was made known to the shepherds by angels, to the Magi by a star. A heavenly tongue speaks to both, because the tongue of the prophets spoke no longer.” But the angels who appeared to the shepherds were really angels from heaven. Therefore also the star which appeared to the Magi was really a star from the heavens.

Objection 3: Further, stars which are not in the heavens but in the air are called comets, which do not appear at the birth of kings, but rather are signs of their approaching death. But this star was a sign of the King’s birth: wherefore the Magi said (Mat. 2:2): “Where is He that is born King of the Jews? For we have seen His star in the east.” Therefore it seems that it was a star from the heavens.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. ii): “It was not one of those stars which since the beginning of the creation observe the course appointed to them by the Creator; but this star was a stranger to the heavens, and made its appearance at the strange sight of a virgin in childbirth.”

I answer that, As Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Matth.), it is clear, for many reasons, that the star which appeared to the Magi did not belong to the heavenly system. First, because no other star approaches from the same quarter as this star, whose course was from north to south, these being the relative positions of Persia, whence the Magi came, and Judea. Secondly, from the time [at which it was seen]. For it appeared not only at night, but also at midday: and no star can do this, not even the moon. Thirdly, because it was visible at one time and hidden at another. For when they entered Jerusalem it hid itself: then, when they had left Herod, it showed itself again. Fourthly, because its movement was not continuous, but when the Magi had to continue their journey the star moved on; when they had to stop the star stood still; as happened to the pillar of a cloud in the desert. Fifthly, because it indicated the virginal Birth, not by remaining aloft, but by coming down below. For it is written (Mat. 2:9) that "the star which they had seen in the east went before them, until it came and stood over where the child was." Whence it is evident that the words of the Magi, "We have seen His star in the east," are to be taken as meaning, not that when they were in the east the star appeared over the country of Judea, but that when they saw the star it was in the east, and that it preceded them into Judea (although this is considered doubtful by some). But it could not have indicated the house distinctly, unless it were near the earth. And, as he [Chrysostom] observes, this does not seem fitting to a star, but "of some power endowed with reason." Consequently "it seems that this was some invisible force made visible under the form of a star."

Wherefore some say that, as the Holy Ghost, after our Lord's Baptism, came down on Him under the form of a dove, so did He appear to the Magi under the form of a star. While others say that the angel who, under a human form, appeared to the shepherds, under the form of a star, appeared to the Magi. But it seems more probable that it was a newly created star, not in the heavens, but in the air near the earth, and that its movement varied according to God's will. Wherefore Pope Leo says in a sermon on the Epiphany (xxxi): "A star of unusual brightness appeared to the three Magi in the east, which, through being more brilliant and more beautiful than the other stars, drew men's gaze and attention: so that they understood at once that such an unwonted event could not be devoid of purpose."

Reply to Objection 1: In Holy Scripture the air is sometimes called the heavens—for instance, "The birds of the heavens [Douay: 'air'] and the fishes of the sea."

Reply to Objection 2: The angels of heaven, by reason of their very office, come down to us, being “sent to minister.” But the stars of heaven do not change their position. Wherefore there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: As the star did not follow the course of the heavenly stars, so neither did it follow the course of the comets, which neither appear during the daytime nor vary their customary course. Nevertheless in its signification it has something in common with the comets. Because the heavenly kingdom of Christ “shall break in pieces, and shall consume all the kingdoms” of the earth, “and itself shall stand for ever” (Dan. 2:44).

Whether it was becoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay homage to Him?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unbecoming that the Magi should come to adore Christ and pay homage to Him. For reverence is due to a king from his subjects. But the Magi did not belong to the kingdom of the Jews. Therefore, since they knew by seeing the star that He that was born was the “King of the Jews,” it seems unbecoming that they should come to adore Him.

Objection 2: Further, it seems absurd during the reign of one king to proclaim a stranger. But in Judea Herod was reigning. Therefore it was foolish of the Magi to proclaim the birth of a king.

Objection 3: Further, a heavenly sign is more certain than a human sign. But the Magi had come to Judea from the east, under the guidance of a heavenly sign. Therefore it was foolish of them to seek human guidance besides that of the star, saying: “Where is He that is born King of the Jews?”

Objection 4: Further, the offering of gifts and the homage of adoration are not due save to kings already reigning. But the Magi did not find Christ resplendent with kingly grandeur. Therefore it was unbecoming for them to offer Him gifts and homage.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 60:3): “[The Gentiles] shall walk in the light, and kings in the brightness of thy rising.” But those who walk in the Divine light do not err. Therefore the Magi were right in offering homage to Christ.

I answer that, As stated above (A[3], ad 1), the Magi are the “first-fruits of the Gentiles” that believed in Christ; because their faith was a presage of the faith and devotion of the nations who were to come to Christ from afar. And therefore, as the devotion and faith of the nations is without any error through the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, so also we must believe that the Magi, inspired by the Holy Ghost, did wisely in paying homage to Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cc.): “Though many kings of the Jews had been born and died, none of them did the Magi seek to adore. And so they who came from a distant foreign land to a kingdom that was entirely strange to them, had no idea of showing such great homage to such a king as the Jews were wont to have. But they had learnt that such a King was born that by adoring Him they might be sure of obtaining from Him the salvation which is of God.”

Reply to Objection 2: By proclaiming [Christ King] the Magi foreshadowed the constancy of the Gentiles in confessing Christ even until death. Whence Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth.) that, while they thought of the King who was to come, the Magi feared not the king who was actually present. They had not yet seen Christ, and they were already prepared to die for Him.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cc.): “The star which led the Magi to the place where the Divine Infant was with His Virgin-Mother could bring them to the town of Bethlehem, in which Christ was born. Yet it hid itself until the Jews also bore testimony of the city in which Christ was to be born: so that, being encouraged by a twofold witness,” as Pope Leo says (Serm. xxxiv), “they might seek with more ardent faith Him, whom both the brightness of the star and the authority of prophecy revealed.” Thus they “proclaim” that Christ is born, and “inquire where; they believe and ask, as it were, betokening those who walk by faith and desire to see,” as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxcix). But the Jews, by indicating to them the place of Christ’s birth, “are like the carpenters who built the Ark of Noe, who provided others with the means of escape, and themselves perished in the flood. Those who asked, heard and went their way: the teachers spoke and stayed where they were; like the milestones that point out the way but walk not” (Augustine, Serm. cclxxiii). It was also by God’s will that, when they no longer saw the star, the Magi, by human instinct, went to Jerusalem, to seek in the royal city the new-born King, in order that Christ's birth might be publicly proclaimed first in Jerusalem, according to Is. 2:3: "The Law shall come forth from Sion, and the Word of the Lord from Jerusalem"; and also "in order that by the zeal of the Magi who came from afar, the indolence of the Jews who lived near at hand, might be proved worthy of condemnation" (Remig., Hom. in Matth. ii, 1).

Reply to Objection 4: As Chrysostom says (Hom. ii in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): "If the Magi had come in search of an earthly King, they would have been disconcerted at finding that they had taken the trouble to come such a long way for nothing. Consequently they would have neither adored nor offered gifts. But since they sought a heavenly King, though they found in Him no signs of royal pre-eminence, yet, content with the testimony of the star alone, they adored: for they saw a man, and they acknowledged a God." Moreover, they offer gifts in keeping with Christ's greatness: "gold, as to the great King; they offer up incense as to God, because it is used in the Divine Sacrifice; and myrrh, which is used in embalming the bodies of the dead, is offered as to Him who is to die for the salvation of all" (Gregory, Hom. x in Evang.). And hereby, as Gregory says (Hom. x in Evang.), we are taught to offer gold, "which signifies wisdom, to the new-born King, by the luster of our wisdom in His sight." We offer God incense, "which signifies fervor in prayer, if our constant prayers mount up to God with an odor of sweetness"; and we offer myrrh, "which signifies mortification of the flesh, if we mortify the ill-deeds of the flesh by refraining from them."

OF CHRIST'S CIRCUMCISION, AND OF THE OTHER LEGAL OBSERVANCES ACCOMPLISHED IN REGARD TO THE CHILD CHRIST (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider Christ's circumcision. And since the circumcision is a kind of profession of observing the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: "I testify . . . to every man circumcising himself that he is a debtor to do the whole Law," we shall have at the same time to inquire about the other legal observances accomplished in regard to the Child Christ. Therefore there are four points of inquiry:

(1) His circumcision;

(2) The imposition of His name;

(3) His presentation;

(4) His Mother’s purification.

Whether Christ should have been circumcised?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been circumcised. For on the advent of the reality, the figure ceases. But circumcision was prescribed to Abraham as a sign of the covenant concerning his posterity, as may be seen from Gn. 17. Now this covenant was fulfilled in Christ’s birth. Therefore circumcision should have ceased at once.

Objection 2: Further, “every action of Christ is a lesson to us” [*Innoc. III, Serm. xxii de Temp.]; wherefore it is written (Jn. 3:15): “I have given you an example, that as I have done to you, so you do also.” But we ought not to be circumcised; according to Gal. 5:2: “If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.” Therefore it seems that neither should Christ have been circumcised.

Objection 3: Further, circumcision was prescribed as a remedy of original sin. But Christ did not contract original sin, as stated above ([4191]Q[14], A[3];[4192] Q[15], A[1]). Therefore Christ should not have been circumcised.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 2:21): “After eight days were accomplished, that the child should be circumcised.”

I answer that, For several reasons Christ ought to have been circumcised. First, in order to prove the reality of His human nature, in contradiction to the Manicheans, who said that He had an imaginary body: and in contradiction to Apollinarius, who said that Christ’s body was consubstantial with His Godhead; and in contradiction to Valentine, who said that Christ brought His body from heaven. Secondly, in order to show His approval of circumcision, which God had instituted of old. Thirdly, in order to prove that He was descended from Abraham, who had received the commandment of circumcision as a sign of his faith in Him. Fourthly, in order to take away from the Jews an excuse for not receiving Him, if He were uncircumcised. Fifthly, “in order by His example to exhort us to be obedient” [*Bede, Hom. x in Evang.]. Wherefore He was circumcised on the eighth day according to the prescription of the Law (Lev. 12:3). Sixthly, “that He who had come in the likeness of sinful flesh might not reject the remedy whereby sinful flesh was wont to be healed." Seventhly, that by taking on Himself the burden of the Law, He might set others free therefrom, according to Gal. 4:4,5: "God sent His Son . . . made under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law."

Reply to Objection 1: Circumcision by the removal of the piece of skin in the member of generation, signified "the passing away of the old generation" [*Athanasius, De Sabb. et Circumcis.]: from the decrepitude of which we are freed by Christ's Passion. Consequently this figure was not completely fulfilled in Christ's birth, but in His Passion, until which time the circumcision retained its virtue and status. Therefore it behooved Christ to be circumcised as a son of Abraham before His Passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ submitted to circumcision while it was yet of obligation. And thus His action in this should be imitated by us, in fulfilling those things which are of obligation in our own time. Because "there is a time and opportunity for every business" (Eccl 8:6).

Moreover, according to Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.), "as we died when He died, and rose again when Christ rose from the dead, so were we circumcised spiritually through Christ: wherefore we need no carnal circumcision." And this is what the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): "In whom," [i.e. Christ] "you are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of" our Lord Jesus "Christ."

Reply to Objection 3: As Christ voluntarily took upon Himself our death, which is the effect of sin, whereas He had no sin Himself, in order to deliver us from death, and to make us to die spiritually unto sin, so also He took upon Himself circumcision, which was a remedy against original sin, whereas He contracted no original sin, in order to deliver us from the yoke of the Law, and to accomplish a spiritual circumcision in us—in order, that is to say, that, by taking upon Himself the shadow, He might accomplish the reality.

Whether His name was suitably given to Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that an unsuitable name was given to Christ. For the Gospel reality should correspond to the prophetic foretelling. But the prophets foretold another name for Christ: for it is written (Is. 7:14):

“Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and His name shall be called Emmanuel”; and (Is. 8:3): “Call His name, Hasten to take away the spoils; Make haste to take away the prey”; and (Is. 9:6): “His name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor God the Mighty, the Father of the world to come, the Prince of Peace”; and (Zech. 6:12): “Behold a Man, the Orient is His name.” Thus it was unsuitable that His name should be called Jesus.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 62:2): “Thou shalt be called by a new name, which the mouth of the Lord hath named [Vulg.: ‘shall name’].” But the name Jesus is not a new name, but was given to several in the Old Testament: as may be seen in the genealogy of Christ (Lk. 3:29), “Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for His name to be called Jesus.”

Objection 3: Further, the name Jesus signifies “salvation”; as is clear from Mat. 1:21: “She shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call His name Jesus. For He shall save His people from their sins.” But salvation through Christ was accomplished not only in the circumcision, but also in uncircumcision, as is declared by the Apostle (Rom. 4:11,12). Therefore this name was not suitably given to Christ at His circumcision.

On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, in which it is written (Lk. 2:21): “After eight days were accomplished, that the child should be circumcised, His name was called Jesus.”

I answer that, A name should answer to the nature of a thing. This is clear in the names of genera and species, as stated Metaph. iv: “Since a name is but an expression of the definition” which designates a thing’s proper nature.

Now, the names of individual men are always taken from some property of the men to whom they are given. Either in regard to time; thus men are named after the Saints on whose feasts they are born: or in respect of some blood relation; thus a son is named after his father or some other relation; and thus the kinsfolk of John the Baptist wished to call him “by his father’s name Zachary,” not by the name John, because “there” was “none of” his “kindred that” was “called by this name,” as related Lk. 1:59–61. Or, again, from some occurrence; thus Joseph “called the name of” the “first-born Manasses, saying: God hath made me to forget all my labors” (Gn. 41:51). Or, again, from some quality of the person who receives the name; thus it is written (Gn. 25:25) that “he that came forth first was red and hairy like a skin; and his name was called Esau,” which is interpreted “red.”

But names given to men by God always signify some gratuitous gift bestowed on them by Him; thus it was said to Abraham (Gn. 17:5): “Thou shalt be called Abraham; because I have made thee a father of many nations”: and it was said to Peter (Mat. 16:18): “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My Church.” Since, therefore, this prerogative of grace was bestowed on the Man Christ that through Him all men might be saved, therefore He was becomingly named Jesus, i.e. Saviour: the angel having foretold this name not only to His Mother, but also to Joseph, who was to be his foster-father.

Reply to Objection 1: All these names in some way mean the same as Jesus, which means “salvation.” For the name “Emmanuel, which being interpreted is ‘God with us,’” designates the cause of salvation, which is the union of the Divine and human natures in the Person of the Son of God, the result of which union was that “God is with us.”

When it was said, “Call his name, Hasten to take away,” etc., these words indicate from what He saved us, viz. from the devil, whose spoils He took away, according to Col. 2:15: “Despoiling the principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently.”

When it was said, “His name shall be called Wonderful,” etc., the way and term of our salvation are pointed out: inasmuch as “by the wonderful counsel and might of the Godhead we are brought to the inheritance of the life to come,” in which the children of God will enjoy “perfect peace” under “God their Prince.”

When it was said, “Behold a Man, the Orient is His name,” reference is made to the same, as in the first, viz. to the mystery of the Incarnation, by reason of which “to the righteous a light is risen up in darkness” (Ps. 111:4).

Reply to Objection 2: The name Jesus could be suitable for some other reason to those who lived before Christ—for instance, because they were saviours in a particular and temporal sense. But in the sense of spiritual and universal salvation, this name is proper to Christ, and thus it is called a “new” name.

Reply to Objection 3: As is related Gn. 17, Abraham received from God and at the same time both his name and the commandment of circumcision. For this reason it was customary among the Jews to name children on the very day of circumcision, as though before being circumcised they had not as yet perfect existence: just as now also children receive their names in

Baptism. Wherefore on Prov. 4:3, “I was my father’s son, tender, and as an only son in the sight of my mother,” the gloss says: “Why does Solomon call himself an only son in the sight of his mother, when Scripture testifies that he had an elder brother of the same mother, unless it be that the latter died unnamed soon after birth?” Therefore it was that Christ received His name at the time of His circumcision.

Whether Christ was becomingly presented in the temple?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was unbecomingly presented in the Temple. For it is written (Ex. 13:2): “Sanctify unto Me every first-born that openeth the womb among the children of Israel.” But Christ came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; and thus He did not open His Mother’s womb. Therefore Christ was not bound by this law to be presented in the Temple.

Objection 2: Further, that which is always in one’s presence cannot be presented to one. But Christ’s humanity was always in God’s presence in the highest degree, as being always united to Him in unity of person. Therefore there was no need for Him to be presented to the Lord.

Objection 3: Further, Christ is the principal victim, to whom all the victims of the old Law are referred, as the figure to the reality. But a victim should not be offered up for a victim. Therefore it was not fitting that another victim should be offered up for Christ.

Objection 4: Further, among the legal victims the principal was the lamb, which was a “continual sacrifice” [Vulg.: ‘holocaust’], as is stated Num. 28:6: for which reason Christ is also called “the Lamb—Behold the Lamb of God” (Jn. 1: 29). It was therefore more fitting that a lamb should be offered for Christ than “a pair of turtle doves or two young pigeons.”

On the contrary is the authority of Scripture which relates this as having taken place (Lk. 2:22).

I answer that, As stated above [4193](A[1]), Christ wished to be “made under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law” (Gal. 4:4,5), and that the “justification of the Law might be” spiritually “fulfilled” in His members. Now, the Law contained a twofold precept touching the children born. one was a general precept which affected all—namely, that “when the days of the mother’s purification were expired,” a sacrifice was to be offered either “for a son or for a daughter,” as laid down Lev. 12:6. And this sacrifice was for the expiation of the sin in which the child was conceived and born; and also for a certain consecration of the child, because it was then presented in the Temple for the first time. Wherefore one offering was made as a holocaust and another for sin.

The other was a special precept in the law concerning the first-born of “both man and beast”: for the Lord claimed for Himself all the first-born in Israel, because, in order to deliver the Israelites, He “slew every first-born in the land of Egypt, both men and cattle” (Ex. 12:12, 13, 29), the first-born of Israel being saved; which law is set down Ex. 13. Here also was Christ foreshadowed, who is “the First-born amongst many brethren” (Rom. 8:29).

Therefore, since Christ was born of a woman and was her first-born, and since He wished to be “made under the Law,” the Evangelist Luke shows that both these precepts were fulfilled in His regard. First, as to that which concerns the first-born, when he says (Lk. 2:22,23): “They carried Him to Jerusalem to present Him to the Lord: as it is written in the law of the Lord, ‘Every male opening the womb shall be called holy to the Lord.’” Secondly, as to the general precept which concerned all, when he says (Lk. 2:24): “And to offer a sacrifice according as it is written in the law of the Lord, a pair of turtle doves or two young pigeons.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory of Nyssa says (De Occursu Dom.): “It seems that this precept of the Law was fulfilled in God incarnate alone in a special manner exclusively proper to Him. For He alone, whose conception was ineffable, and whose birth was incomprehensible, opened the virginal womb which had been closed to sexual union, in such a way that after birth the seal of chastity remained inviolate.” Consequently the words “opening the womb” imply that nothing hitherto had entered or gone forth therefrom. Again, for a special reason is it written “‘a male,’ because He contracted nothing of the woman’s sin”: and in a singular way “is He called ‘holy,’ because He felt no contagion of earthly corruption, whose birth was wondrously immaculate” (Ambrose, on Lk. 2:23).

Reply to Objection 2: As the Son of God “became man, and was circumcised in the flesh, not for His own sake, but that He might make us to be God’s through grace, and that we might be circumcised in the spirit; so, again, for our sake He was presented to the Lord, that we may learn to offer ourselves to God” [*Athanasius, on Lk. 2:23]. And this was done after His circumcision, in order to show that “no one who is not circumcised from vice is worthy of Divine regard” [*Bede, on Lk. 2:23].

Reply to Objection 3: For this very reason He wished the legal victims to be offered for Him who was the true Victim, in order that the figure might be united to and confirmed by the reality, against those who denied that in the Gospel Christ preached the God of the Law. “For we must not think,” says Origen (Hom. xiv in Luc.) “that the good God subjected His Son to the enemy’s law, which He Himself had not given.”

Reply to Objection 4: The law ofLev. 12:6, 8 “commanded those who could, to offer, for a son or a daughter, a lamb and also a turtle dove or a pigeon: but those who were unable to offer a lamb were commanded to offer two turtle doves or two young pigeons” [*Bede, Hom. xv in Purif.]. “And so the Lord, who, ‘being rich, became poor for our [Vulg.: ‘your’] sakes, that through His poverty we [you] might be rich,” as is written 2 Cor. 8:9, “wished the poor man’s victim to be offered for Him” just as in His birth He was “wrapped in swaddling clothes and laid in a manger” [*Bede on Lk. 1]. Nevertheless, these birds have a figurative sense. For the turtle dove, being a loquacious bird, represents the preaching and confession of faith; and because it is a chaste animal, it signifies chastity; and being a solitary animal, it signifies contemplation. The pigeon is a gentle and simple animal, and therefore signifies gentleness and simplicity. It is also a gregarious animal; wherefore it signifies the active life. Consequently this sacrifice signified the perfection of Christ and His members. Again, “both these animals, by the plaintiveness of their song, represented the mourning of the saints in this life: but the turtle dove, being solitary, signifies the tears of prayer; whereas the pigeon, being gregarious, signifies the public prayers of the Church” [*Bede, Hom. xv in Purif.]. Lastly, two of each of these animals are offered, to show that holiness should be not only in the soul, but also in the body.

Whether it was fitting that the Mother of God should go to the temple to be purified?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for the Mother of God to go to the Temple to be purified. For purification presupposes uncleanness. But there was no uncleanness in the Blessed Virgin, as stated above

(QQ[27],28). Therefore she should not have gone to the Temple to be purified.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 12:2–4): “If a woman, having received seed, shall bear a man-child, she shall be unclean seven days”; and consequently she is forbidden “to enter into the sanctuary until the days of her purification be fulfilled.” But the Blessed Virgin brought forth a male child without receiving the seed of man. Therefore she had no need to come to the Temple to be purified.

Objection 3: Further, purification from uncleanness is accomplished by grace alone. But the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace; rather, indeed, did she have the very Author of grace with her. Therefore it was not fitting that the Blessed Virgin should come to the Temple to be purified.

On the contrary is the authority of Scripture, where it is stated (Lk. 2:22) that “the days of” Mary’s “purification were accomplished according to the law of Moses.”

I answer that, As the fulness of grace flowed from Christ on to His Mother, so it was becoming that the mother should be like her Son in humility: for “God giveth grace to the humble,” as is written James 4:6. And therefore, just as Christ, though not subject to the Law, wished, nevertheless, to submit to circumcision and the other burdens of the Law, in order to give an example of humility and obedience; and in order to show His approval of the Law; and, again, in order to take away from the Jews an excuse for calumniating Him: for the same reasons He wished His Mother also to fulfil the prescriptions of the Law, to which, nevertheless, she was not subject.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the Blessed Virgin had no uncleanness, yet she wished to fulfil the observance of purification, not because she needed it, but on account of the precept of the Law. Thus the Evangelist says pointedly that the days of her purification “according to the Law” were accomplished; for she needed no purification in herself.

Reply to Objection 2: Moses seems to have chosen his words in order to exclude uncleanness from the Mother of God, who was with child “without receiving seed.” It is therefore clear that she was not bound to fulfil that precept, but fulfilled the observance of purification of her own accord, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The sacraments of the Law did not cleanse from the uncleanness of sin which is accomplished by grace, but they foreshadowed this purification: for they cleansed by a kind of carnal purification, from the uncleanness of a certain irregularity, as stated in the [4194]FS, Q[102], A[5]; [4195]FS, Q[103], A[2]. But the Blessed Virgin contracted neither uncleanness, and consequently did not need to be purified.

OF THE BAPTISM OF JOHN (SIX ARTICLES)

We now proceed to consider the baptism wherewith Christ was baptized. And since Christ was baptized with the baptism of John, we shall consider (1) the baptism of John in general; (2) the baptizing of Christ. In regard to the former there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?

(2) Whether that baptism was from God?

(3) Whether it conferred grace?

(4) Whether others besides Christ should have received that baptism?

(5) Whether that baptism should have ceased when Christ was baptized?

(6) Whether those who received John's baptism had afterwards to receive Christ's baptism?

Whether it was fitting that John should baptize?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that John should baptize. For every sacramental rite belongs to some law. But John did not introduce a new law. Therefore it was not fitting that he should introduce the new rite of baptism.

Objection 2: Further, John "was sent by God . . . for a witness" (Jn. 1:6,7) as a prophet; according to Lk. 1:76: "Thou, child, shalt be called the prophet of the Highest." But the prophets who lived before Christ did not introduce any new rite, but persuaded men to observe the rites of the Law. as is clearly stated Malachi 4:4: "Remember the law of Moses My servant." Therefore neither should John have introduced a new rite of baptism.

Objection 3: Further, when there is too much of anything, nothing should be added to it. But the Jews observed a superfluity of baptisms; for it is written (Mk. 7:3,4) that “the Pharisees and all the Jews eat not without often washing their hands . . . and when they come from the market, unless they be washed, they eat not; and many other things there are that have been delivered to them to observe, the washings of cups and of pots, and of brazen vessels, and of beds.” Therefore it was unfitting that John should baptize.

On the contrary is the authority of Scripture (Mat. 3:5,6), which, after stating the holiness of John, adds many went out to him, “and were baptized in the Jordan.”

I answer that, It was fitting for John to baptize, for four reasons: first, it was necessary for Christ to be baptized by John, in order that He might sanctify baptism; as Augustine observes, super Joan. (Tract. xiii in Joan.).

Secondly, that Christ might be manifested. Whence John himself says (Jn. 1:31): “That He,” i.e. Christ, “may be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing with water.” For he announced Christ to the crowds that gathered around him; which was thus done much more easily than if he had gone in search of each individual, as Chrysostom observes, commenting on St. John (Hom. x in Matth.).

Thirdly, that by his baptism he might accustom men to the baptism of Christ; wherefore Gregory says in a homily (Hom. vii in Evang.) that therefore did John baptize, “that, being consistent with his office of precursor, as he had preceded our Lord in birth, so he might also by baptizing precede Him who was about to baptize.”

Fourthly, that by persuading men to do penance, he might prepare men to receive worthily the baptism of Christ. Wherefore Bede [*Cf. Scot. Erig. in Joan. iii, 24] says that “the baptism of John was as profitable before the baptism of Christ, as instruction in the faith profits the catechumens not yet baptized. For just as he preached penance, and foretold the baptism of Christ, and drew men to the knowledge of the Truth that hath appeared to the world, so do the ministers of the Church, after instructing men, chide them for their sins, and lastly promise them forgiveness in the baptism of Christ.”

Reply to Objection 1: The baptism of John was not a sacrament properly so called [per se], but a kind of sacramental, preparatory to the baptism of

Christ. Consequently, in a way, it belonged to the law of Christ, but not to the law of Moses.

Reply to Objection 2: John was not only a prophet, but “more than a prophet,” as stated Mat. 11:9: for he was the term of the Law and the beginning of the Gospel. Therefore it was in his province to lead men, both by word and deed, to the law of Christ rather than to the observance of the Old Law.

Reply to Objection 3: Those baptisms of the Pharisees were vain, being ordered merely unto carnal cleanliness. But the baptism of John was ordered unto spiritual cleanliness, since it led men to do penance, as stated above.

Whether the baptism of John was from God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the baptism of John was not from God. For nothing sacramental that is from God is named after a mere man: thus the baptism of the New Law is not named after Peter or Paul, but after Christ. But that baptism is named after John, according to Mat. 21:25: “The baptism of John . . . was it from heaven or from men?” Therefore the baptism of John was not from God.

Objection 2: Further, every doctrine that proceeds from God anew is confirmed by some signs: thus the Lord (Ex. 4) gave Moses the power of working signs; and it is written (Heb. 2:3,4) that our faith “having begun to be declared by the Lord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard Him, God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders.” But it is written of John the Baptist (Jn. 10:41) that “John did no sign.” Therefore it seems that the baptism wherewith he baptized was not from God.

Objection 3: Further, those sacraments which are instituted by God are contained in certain precepts of Holy Scripture. But there is no precept of Holy Writ commanding the baptism of John. Therefore it seems that it was not from God.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 1:33): “He who sent me to baptize with water said to me: ‘He upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit,’” etc.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the baptism of John—namely, the rite of baptism and the effect of baptism. The rite of baptism was not from men, but from God, who by an interior revelation of the Holy

Ghost sent John to baptize. But the effect of that baptism was from man, because it effected nothing that man could not accomplish. Wherefore it was not from God alone, except in as far as God works in man.

Reply to Objection 1: By the baptism of the New Law men are baptized inwardly by the Holy Ghost, and this is accomplished by God alone. But by the baptism of John the body alone was cleansed by the water. Wherefore it is written (Mat. 3:11): “I baptize you in water; but . . . He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost.” For this reason the baptism of John was named after him, because it effected nothing that he did not accomplish. But the baptism of the New Law is not named after the minister thereof, because he does not accomplish its principal effect, which is the inward cleansing.

Reply to Objection 2: The whole teaching and work of John was ordered unto Christ, who, by many miracles confirmed both His own teaching and that of John. But if John had worked signs, men would have paid equal attention to John and to Christ. Wherefore, in order that men might pay greater attention to Christ, it was not given to John to work a sign. Yet when the Jews asked him why he baptized, he confirmed his office by the authority of Scripture, saying: “I am the voice of one crying in the wilderness,” etc. as related, Jn. 1:23 (cf. Is. 40:3). Moreover, the very austerity of his life was a commendation of his office, because, as Chrysostom says, commenting on Matthew (Hom. x in Matth.), “it was wonderful to witness such endurance in a human body.”

Reply to Objection 3: The baptism of John was intended by God to last only for a short time, for the reasons given above [4196](A[1]). Therefore it was not the subject of a general commandment set down in Sacred Writ, but of a certain interior revelation of the Holy Ghost, as stated above.

Whether grace was given in the baptism of John?

Objection 1: It would seem that grace was given in the baptism of John. For it is written (Mk. 1:4): “John was in the desert baptizing and preaching the baptism of penance unto remission of sins.” But penance and remission of sins are the effect of grace. Therefore the baptism of John conferred grace.

Objection 2: Further, those who were about to be baptized by John “confessed their sins,” as related Mat. 3:6 and Mk. 1:5. But the confession of sins is ordered to their remission, which is effected by grace. Therefore grace was conferred in the baptism of John.

Objection 3: Further, the baptism of John was more akin than circumcision to the baptism of Christ. But original sin was remitted through circumcision: because, as Bede says (Hom. x in Circumcis.), “under the Law, circumcision brought the same saving aid to heal the wound of original sin as baptism is wont to bring now that grace is revealed.” Much more, therefore, did the baptism of John effect the remission of sins, which cannot be accomplished without grace.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:11): “I indeed baptize you in water unto penance.” Which words Gregory thus expounds in a certain homily (Hom. vii in Evang.): “John baptized, not in the Spirit, but in water: because he could not forgive sins.” But grace is given by the Holy Ghost, and by means thereof sins are taken away. Therefore the baptism of John did not confer grace.

I answer that, As stated above (A[2], ad 2), the whole teaching and work of John was in preparation for Christ: just as it is the duty of the servant and of the under-craftsman to prepare the matter for the form which is accomplished by the head-craftsman. Now grace was to be conferred on men through Christ, according to Jn. 1:17: “Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ.” Therefore the baptism of John did not confer grace, but only prepared the way for grace; and this in three ways: first, by John’s teaching, which led men to faith in Christ; secondly, by accustoming men to the rite of Christ’s baptism; thirdly, by penance, preparing men to receive the effect of Christ’s baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words, as Bede says (on Mk. 1:4), a twofold baptism of penance may be understood. one is that which John conferred by baptizing, which is called “a baptism of penance,” etc., by reason of its inducing men to do penance, and of its being a kind of protestation by which men avowed their purpose of doing penance. The other is the baptism of Christ, by which sins are remitted, and which John could not give, but only preach, saying: “He will baptize you in the Holy Ghost.”

Or it may be said that he preached the “baptism of penance,” i.e. which induced men to do penance, which penance leads men on to “the remission of sins.”

Or again, it may be said with Jerome [*Another author on Mk. 1 (inter op. Hier.)] that “by the baptism of Christ grace is given, by which sins are remitted gratis; and that what is accomplished by the bridegroom is begun by the bridesman,” i.e. by John. Consequently it is said that “he baptized and preached the baptism of penance unto remission of sins,” not as though he accomplished this himself, but because he began it by preparing the way for it.

Reply to Objection 2: That confession of sins was not made unto the remission of sins, to be realized immediately through the baptism of John, but to be obtained through subsequent penance and through the baptism of Christ, for which that penance was a preparation.

Reply to Objection 3: Circumcision was instituted as a remedy for original sin. Whereas the baptism of John was not instituted for this purpose, but was merely in preparation for the baptism of Christ, as stated above; whereas the sacraments attain their effect through the force of their institution.

Whether Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John. For, as stated above [4197](A[1]), “the reason why John baptized was that Christ might receive baptism,” as Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii). But what is proper to Christ should not be applicable to others. Therefore no others should have received that baptism.

Objection 2: Further, whoever is baptized either receives something from the baptism or confers something on the baptism. But no one could receive anything from the baptism of John, because thereby grace was not conferred, as stated above [4198](A[3]). On the other hand, no one could confer anything on baptism save Christ, who “sanctified the waters by the touch of His most pure flesh” [*Mag. Sent. iv, 3]. Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized with the baptism of John.

Objection 3: Further, if others were baptized with that baptism, this was only in order that they might be prepared for the baptism of Christ: and thus it would seem fitting that the baptism of John should be conferred on all, old and young, Gentile and Jew, just as the baptism of Christ. But we do not read that either children or Gentiles were baptized by the latter; for it is written (Mk. 1:5) that “there went out to him . . . all they of Jerusalem, and were baptized by him.” Therefore it seems that Christ alone should have been baptized by John.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): “It came to pass, when all the people were baptized, that Jesus also being baptized and praying, heaven was opened.”

I answer that, For two reasons it behooved others besides Christ to be baptized with the baptism of John. First, as Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. iv, v), “if Christ alone had been baptized with the baptism of John, some would have said that John’s baptism, with which Christ was baptized, was more excellent than that of Christ, with which others are baptized.”

Secondly, because, as above stated, it behooved others to be prepared by John’s baptism for the baptism of Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: The baptism of John was instituted not only that Christ might be baptized, but also for other reasons, as stated above [4199] (A[1]). And yet, even if it were instituted merely in order that Christ might be baptized therewith, it was still necessary for others to receive this baptism, in order to avoid the objection mentioned above.

Reply to Objection 2: Others who approached to be baptized by John could not, indeed, confer anything on his baptism: yet neither did they receive anything therefrom, save only the sign of penance.

Reply to Objection 3: This was the baptism of “penance,” for which children were not suited; wherefore they were not baptized therewith. But to bring the nations into the way of salvation was reserved to Christ alone, who is the “expectation of the nations,” as we read Gn. 49:10. Indeed, Christ forbade the apostles to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles before His Passion and Resurrection. Much less fitting, therefore, was it for the Gentiles to be baptized by John.

Whether John’s baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized?

Objection 1: It would seem that John’s baptism should have ceased after Christ was baptized. For it is written (Jn. 1:31): “That He may be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing in water.” But when Christ had been baptized, He was made sufficiently manifest, both by the testimony of John and by the dove coming down upon Him, and again by the voice of the Father bearing witness to Him. Therefore it seems that John’s baptism should not have endured thereafter.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. iv): “Christ was baptized, and John’s baptism ceased to avail.” Therefore it seems that, after Christ’s baptism, John should not have continued to baptize.

Objection 3: Further, John’s baptism prepared the way for Christ’s. But Christ’s baptism began as soon as He had been baptized; because “by the touch of His most pure flesh He endowed the waters with a regenerating virtue,” as Bede asserts (Mag. Sent. iv, 3). Therefore it seems that John’s baptism ceased when Christ had been baptized.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:22,23): “Jesus . . . came into the land of Judea . . . and baptized: and John also was baptizing.” But Christ did not baptize before being baptized. Therefore it seems that John continued to baptize after Christ had been baptized.

I answer that, It was not fitting for the baptism of John to cease when Christ had been baptized. First, because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix in Joan.), “if John had ceased to baptize” when Christ had been baptized, “men would think that he was moved by jealousy or anger.” Secondly, if he had ceased to baptize when Christ baptized, “he would have given His disciples a motive for yet greater envy.” Thirdly, because, by continuing to baptize, “he sent his hearers to Christ” (Hom. xxix in Joan.). Fourthly, because, as Bede [*Scot. Erig. Comment. in Joan.] says, “there still remained a shadow of the Old Law: nor should the forerunner withdraw until the truth be made manifest.”

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ was baptized, He was not as yet fully manifested: consequently there was still need for John to continue baptizing.

Reply to Objection 2: The baptism of John ceased after Christ had been baptized, not immediately, but when the former was cast into prison. Thus Chrysostom says (Hom. xxix in Joan.): “I consider that John’s death was allowed to take place, and that Christ’s preaching began in a great measure after John had died, so that the undivided allegiance of the multitude was transferred to Christ, and there was no further motive for the divergence of opinions concerning both of them.”

Reply to Objection 3: John’s baptism prepared the way not only for Christ to be baptized, but also for others to approach to Christ’s baptism:

and this did not take place as soon as Christ was baptized.

Whether those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had to be baptized with the baptism of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ. For John was not less than the apostles, since of him is it written (Mat. 11:11): “There hath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist.” But those who were baptized by the apostles were not baptized again, but only received the imposition of hands; for it is written (Acts 8:16,17) that some were “only baptized” by Philip “in the name of the Lord Jesus”: then the apostles—namely, Peter and John—“laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost.” Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized by John had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, the apostles were baptized with John’s baptism, since some of them were his disciples, as is clear from Jn. 1:37. But the apostles do not seem to have been baptized with the baptism of Christ: for it is written (Jn. 4:2) that “Jesus did not baptize, but His disciples.” Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had not to be baptized with the baptism of Christ.

Objection 3: Further, he who is baptized is less than he who baptizes. But we are not told that John himself was baptized with the baptism of Christ. Therefore much less did those who had been baptized by John need to receive the baptism of Christ.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Acts 19:1–5) that “Paul . . . found certain disciples; and he said to them: Have you received the Holy Ghost since ye believed? But they said to him: We have not so much as heard whether there be a Holy Ghost. And he said: In what then were you baptized? Who said: In John’s baptism.” Wherefore “they were” again “baptized in the name of our [Vulg.: ‘the’] Lord Jesus Christ.” Hence it seems that they needed to be baptized again, because they did not know of the Holy Ghost: as Jerome says on Joel 2:28 and in an epistle (lxix De Viro unius uxoris), and likewise Ambrose (De Spiritu Sancto). But some were baptized with John’s baptism who had full knowledge of the Trinity. Therefore these had no need to be baptized again with Christ’s baptism.

Objection 5: Further, on Rom. 10:8, “This is the word of faith, which we preach,” the gloss of Augustine says: “Whence this virtue in the water, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart, save by the efficacy of the word, not because it is uttered, but because it is believed?” Whence it is clear that the virtue of baptism depends on faith. But the form of John’s baptism signified the faith in which we are baptized; for Paul says (Acts 19:4): “John baptized the people with the baptism of penance, saying: That they should believe in Him who was to come after him—that is to say, in Jesus.” Therefore it seems that those who had been baptized with John’s baptism had no need to be baptized again with the baptism of Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): “Those who were baptized with John’s baptism needed to be baptized with the baptism of our Lord.”

I answer that, According to the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 2), “those who had been baptized by John without knowing of the existence of the Holy Ghost, and who based their hopes on his baptism, were afterwards baptized with the baptism of Christ: but those who did not base their hope on John’s baptism, and who believed in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, were not baptized afterwards, but received the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands made over them by the apostles.”

And this, indeed, is true as to the first part, and is confirmed by many authorities. But as to the second part, the assertion is altogether unreasonable. First, because John’s baptism neither conferred grace nor imprinted a character, but was merely “in water,” as he says himself (Mat. 3:11). Wherefore the faith or hope which the person baptized had in Christ could not supply this defect. Secondly, because, when in a sacrament, that is omitted which belongs of necessity to the sacrament, not only must the omission be supplied, but the whole must be entirely renewed. Now, it belongs of necessity to Christ’s baptism that it be given not only in water, but also in the Holy Ghost, according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” Wherefore in the case of those who had been baptized with John’s baptism in water only, not merely had the omission to be supplied by giving them the Holy Ghost by the imposition of hands, but they had to be baptized wholly anew “in water and the Holy Ghost.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. v): “After John, baptism was administered, and the reason why was because he gave not Christ’s baptism, but his own . . . That which Peter gave . . . and if any were given by Judas, that was Christ’s. And therefore if Judas baptized anyone, yet were they not rebaptized . . . For the baptism corresponds with him by whose authority it is given, not with him by whose ministry it is given.” For the same reason those who were baptized by the deacon Philip, who gave the baptism of Christ, were not baptized again, but received the imposition of hands by the apostles, just as those who are baptized by priests are confirmed by bishops.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says to Seleucianus (Ep. cclxv), “we deem that Christ’s disciples were baptized either with John’s baptism, as some maintain, or with Christ’s baptism, which is more probable. For He would not fail to administer baptism so as to have baptized servants through whom He baptized others, since He did not fail in His humble service to wash their feet.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): “Since, when John said, ‘I ought to be baptized by Thee,’ Christ answered, ‘Suffer it to be so now’: it follows that afterwards Christ did baptize John.” Moreover, he asserts that “this is distinctly set down in some of the apocryphal books.” At any rate, it is certain, as Jerome says on Mat. 3:13, that, “as Christ was baptized in water by John, so had John to be baptized in the Spirit by Christ.”

Reply to Objection 4: The reason why these persons were baptized after being baptized by John was not only because they knew not of the Holy Ghost, but also because they had not received the baptism of Christ.

Reply to Objection 5: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), our sacraments are signs of present grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law were signs of future grace. Wherefore the very fact that John baptized in the name of one who was to come, shows that he did not give the baptism of Christ, which is a sacrament of the New Law.

OF THE BAPTIZING OF CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the baptizing of Christ, concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ should have been baptized?

(2) Whether He should have been baptized with the baptism of John?

(3) Of the time when He was baptized;

(4) Of the place;

(5) Of the heavens being opened unto Him;

(6) Of the apparition of the Holy Ghost under the form of a dove;

(7) Whether that dove was a real animal?

(8) Of the voice of the Father witnessing unto Him.

Whether it was fitting that Christ should be baptized?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to be baptized. For to be baptized is to be washed. But it was not fitting for Christ to be washed, since there was no uncleanness in Him. Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ to be baptized.

Objection 2: Further, Christ was circumcised in order to fulfil the law. But baptism was not prescribed by the law. Therefore He should not have been baptized.

Objection 3: Further, the first mover in every genus is unmoved in regard to that movement; thus the heaven, which is the first cause of alteration, is unalterable. But Christ is the first principle of baptism, according to Jn. 1:33: “He upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth.” Therefore it was unfitting for Christ to be baptized.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:13) that “Jesus cometh from Galilee to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him.”

I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be baptized. First, because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 3:21: “Our Lord was baptized because He wished, not to be cleansed, but to cleanse the waters, that, being purified by the flesh of Christ that knew no sin, they might have the virtue of baptism”; and, as

Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), “that He might bequeath the sanctified waters to those who were to be baptized afterwards.” Secondly, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.), “although Christ was not a sinner, yet did He take a sinful nature and ‘the likeness of sinful flesh.’ Wherefore, though He needed not baptism for His own sake, yet carnal nature in others had need thereof.” And, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix) “Christ was baptized that He might plunge the old Adam entirely in the water.” Thirdly, He wished to be baptized, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxvi), “because He wished to do what He had commanded all to do.” And this is what He means by saying: “So it becometh us to fulfil all justice” (Mat. 3:15). For, as Ambrose says (on Lk. 3:21), “this is justice, to do first thyself that which thou wishest another to do, and so encourage others by thy example.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ was baptized, not that He might be cleansed, but that He might cleanse, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: It was fitting that Christ should not only fulfil what was prescribed by the Old Law, but also begin what appertained to the New Law. Therefore He wished not only to be circumcised, but also to be baptized.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ is the first principle of baptism’s spiritual effect. Unto this He was not baptized, but only in water.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism. For John’s baptism was the “baptism of penance.” But penance is unbecoming to Christ, since He had no sin. Therefore it seems that He should not have been baptized with John’s baptism.

Objection 2: Further, John’s baptism, as Chrysostom says (Hom. de Bapt. Christi), “was a mean between the baptism of the Jews and that of Christ.” But “the mean savors of the nature of the extremes” (Aristotle, De Partib. Animal.). Since, therefore, Christ was not baptized with the Jewish baptism, nor yet with His own, on the same grounds He should not have been baptized with the baptism of John.

Objection 3: Further, whatever is best in human things should be ascribed to Christ. But John’s baptism does not hold the first place among baptisms.

Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be baptized with John’s baptism.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:13) that “Jesus cometh to the Jordan, unto John, to be baptized by him.”

I answer that, As Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. xiii): “After being baptized, the Lord baptized, not with that baptism wherewith He was baptized.” Wherefore, since He Himself baptized with His own baptism, it follows that He was not baptized with His own, but with John’s baptism. And this was befitting: first, because John’s baptism was peculiar in this, that he baptized, not in the Spirit, but only “in water”; while Christ did not need spiritual baptism, since He was filled with the grace of the Holy Ghost from the beginning of His conception, as we have made clear above ([4200]Q[34], A[1]). And this is the reason given by Chrysostom (Hom. de Bapt. Christi). Secondly, as Bede says on Mk. 1:9, He was baptized with the baptism of John, that, “by being thus baptized, He might show His approval of John’s baptism.” Thirdly, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix), “by going to John to be baptized by him, He sanctified baptism.”

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [4201](A[1]), Christ wished to be baptized in order by His example to lead us to baptism. And so, in order that He might lead us thereto more efficaciously, He wished to be baptized with a baptism which He clearly needed not, that men who needed it might approach unto it. Wherefore Ambrose says on Lk. 3:21: “Let none decline the laver of grace, since Christ did not refuse the laver of penance.”

Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish baptism prescribed by the law was merely figurative, whereas John’s baptism, in a measure, was real, inasmuch as it induced men to refrain from sin; but Christ’s baptism is efficacious unto the remission of sin and the conferring of grace. Now Christ needed neither the remission of sin, which was not in Him, nor the bestowal of grace, with which He was filled. Moreover, since He is “the Truth,” it was not fitting that He should receive that which was no more than a figure. Consequently it was more fitting that He should receive the intermediate baptism than one of the extremes.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is a spiritual remedy. Now, the more perfect a thing is, the less remedy does it need. Consequently, from the very fact that Christ is most perfect, it follows that it was fitting that He should not receive the most perfect baptism: just as one who is healthy does not need a strong medicine.

Whether Christ was baptized at a fitting time?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was baptized at an unfitting time. For Christ was baptized in order that He might lead others to baptism by His example. But it is commendable that the faithful of Christ should be baptized, not merely before their thirtieth year, but even in infancy. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have been baptized at the age of thirty.

Objection 2: Further, we do not read that Christ taught or worked miracles before being baptized. But it would have been more profitable to the world if He had taught for a longer time, beginning at the age of twenty, or even before. Therefore it seems that Christ, who came for man’s profit, should have been baptized before His thirtieth year.

Objection 3: Further, the sign of wisdom infused by God should have been especially manifest in Christ. But in the case of Daniel this was manifested at the time of his boyhood; according to Dan. 13:45: “The Lord raised up the holy spirit of a young boy, whose name was Daniel.” Much more, therefore, should Christ have been baptized or have taught in His boyhood.

Objection 4: Further, John’s baptism was ordered to that of Christ as to its end. But “the end is first in intention and last in execution.” Therefore He should have been baptized by John either before all the others, or after them.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): “It came to pass, when all the people were baptized, that Jesus also being baptized, and praying;” and further on (Lk. 3:23): “And Jesus Himself was beginning about the age of thirty years.”

I answer that, Christ was fittingly baptized in His thirtieth year. First, because Christ was baptized as though for the reason that He was about forthwith to begin to teach and preach: for which purpose perfect age is required, such as is the age of thirty. Thus we read (Gn. 41:46) that “Joseph was thirty” years old when he undertook the government of Egypt. In like manner we read (2 Kings 5:4) that “David was thirty years old when he began to reign.” Again, Ezechiel began to prophesy in “his thirtieth year,” as we read Ezech. 1:1.

Secondly, because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. x in Matth.), “the law was about to pass away after Christ’s baptism: wherefore Christ came to be baptized at this age which admits of all sins; in order that by His observing the law, no one might say that because He Himself could not fulfil it, He did away with it.”

Thirdly, because by Christ’s being baptized at the perfect age, we are given to understand that baptism brings forth perfect men, according to Eph. 4:13: “Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ.” Hence the very property of the number seems to point to this. For thirty is product of three and ten: and by the number three is implied faith in the Trinity, while ten signifies the fulfilment of the commandments of the Law: in which two things the perfection of Christian life consists.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xl), Christ was baptized, not “as though He needed to be cleansed, or as though some peril threatened Him if He delayed to be baptized. But no small danger besets any other man who departs from this life without being clothed with the garment of incorruptibility”—namely, grace. And though it be a good thing to remain clean after baptism, “yet is it still better,” as he says, “to be slightly sullied now and then than to be altogether deprived of grace.”

Reply to Objection 2: The profit which accrues to men from Christ is chiefly through faith and humility: to both of which He conduced by beginning to teach not in His boyhood or youth, but at the perfect age. To faith, because in this manner His human nature is shown to be real, by its making bodily progress with the advance of time; and lest this progress should be deemed imaginary, He did not wish to show His wisdom and power before His body had reached the perfect age: to humility, lest anyone should presume to govern or teach others before attaining to perfect age.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ was set before men as an example to all. Wherefore it behooved that to be shown forth in Him, which is becoming to all according to the common law—namely, that He should teach after reaching the perfect age. But, as Gregory Nazianzen says (Orat. xxxix), that which seldom occurs is not the law of the Church; as “neither does one swallow make the spring.” For by special dispensation, in accordance with the ruling of Divine wisdom, it has been granted to some, contrary to the common law, to exercise the functions of governing or teaching. such as Solomon, Daniel, and Jeremias.

Reply to Objection 4: It was not fitting that Christ should be baptized by John either before or after all others. Because, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]), for this was Christ baptized, “that He might confirm the preaching and the baptism of John, and that John might bear witness to Him.” Now, men would not have had faith in John’s testimony except after many had been baptized by him. Consequently it was not fitting that John should baptize Him before baptizing anyone else. In like manner, neither was it fitting that he should baptize Him last. For as he (Chrysostom) says in the same passage: “As the light of the sun does not wait for the setting of the morning star, but comes forth while the latter is still above the horizon, and by its brilliance dims its shining: so Christ did not wait till John had run his course, but appeared while he was yet teaching and baptizing.”

Whether Christ should have been baptized in the Jordan?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been baptized in the Jordan. For the reality should correspond to the figure. But baptism was prefigured in the crossing of the Red Sea, where the Egyptians were drowned, just as our sins are blotted out in baptism. Therefore it seems that Christ should rather have been baptized in the sea than in the river Jordan.

Objection 2: Further, “Jordan” is interpreted a “going down.” But by baptism a man goes up rather than down: wherefore it is written (Mat. 3:16) that “Jesus being baptized, forthwith came up [Douay: ‘out’] from the water.” Therefore it seems unfitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan.

Objection 3: Further, while the children of Israel were crossing, the waters of the Jordan “were turned back,” as it is related Jos. 4, and as it is written Ps. 113:3,5. But those who are baptized go forward, not back. Therefore it was not fitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 1:9) that “Jesus was baptized by John in the Jordan.”

I answer that, It was through the river Jordan that the children of Israel entered into the land of promise. Now, this is the prerogative of Christ’s baptism over all other baptisms: that it is the entrance to the kingdom of God, which is signified by the land of promise; wherefore it is said (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” To this also is to be referred the dividing of the water of the Jordan by Elias, who was to be snatched up into heaven in a fiery chariot, as it is related 4 Kings 2: because, to wit, the approach to heaven is laid open by the fire of the Holy Ghost, to those who pass through the waters of baptism. Therefore it was fitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan.

Reply to Objection 1: The crossing of the Red Sea foreshadowed baptism in this—that baptism washes away sin: whereas the crossing of the Jordan foreshadows it in this—that it opens the gate to the heavenly kingdom: and this is the principal effect of baptism, and accomplished through Christ alone. And therefore it was fitting that Christ should be baptized in the Jordan rather than in the sea.

Reply to Objection 2: In baptism we “go up” by advancing in grace: for which we need to “go down” by humility, according to James 4:6: “He giveth grace to the humble.” And to this “going down” must the name of the Jordan be referred.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says in a sermon for the Epiphany (x): “As of yore the waters of the Jordan were held back, so now, when Christ was baptized, the torrent of sin was held back.” Or else this may signify that against the downward flow of the waters the river of blessings flowed upwards.

Whether the heavens should have been opened unto Christ at His baptism?

Objection 1: It would seem that the heavens should not have been opened unto Christ at His baptism. For the heavens should be opened unto one who needs to enter heaven, by reason of his being out of heaven. But Christ was always in heaven, according to Jn. 3:13: “The Son of Man who is in heaven.” Therefore it seems that the heavens should not have been opened unto Him.

Objection 2: Further, the opening of the heavens is understood either in a corporal or in a spiritual sense. But it cannot be understood in a corporal sense: because the heavenly bodies are impassible and indissoluble, according to Job 37:18: “Thou perhaps hast made the heavens with Him, which are most strong, as if they were of molten brass.” In like manner neither can it be understood in a spiritual sense, because the heavens were not previously closed to the eyes of the Son of God. Therefore it seems unbecoming to say that when Christ was baptized “the heavens were opened.”

Objection 3: Further, heaven was opened to the faithful through Christ’s Passion, according to Heb. 10:19: “We have [Vulg.: ‘Having’] a confidence in the entering into the holies by the blood of Christ.” Wherefore not even those who were baptized with Christ’s baptism, and died before His Passion, could enter heaven. Therefore the heavens should have been opened when Christ was suffering rather than when He was baptized.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:21): “Jesus being baptized and praying, heaven was opened.”

I answer that, As stated above [4202](A[1]; Q[38], A[1]), Christ wished to be baptized in order to consecrate the baptism wherewith we were to be baptized. And therefore it behooved those things to be shown forth which belong to the efficacy of our baptism: concerning which efficacy three points are to be considered. First, the principal power from which it is derived; and this, indeed, is a heavenly power. For which reason, when Christ was baptized, heaven was opened, to show that in future the heavenly power would sanctify baptism.

Secondly, the faith of the Church and of the person baptized conduces to the efficacy of baptism: wherefore those who are baptized make a profession of faith, and baptism is called the “sacrament of faith.” Now by faith we gaze on heavenly things, which surpass the senses and human reason. And in order to signify this, the heavens were opened when Christ was baptized.

Thirdly, because the entrance to the heavenly kingdom was opened to us by the baptism of Christ in a special manner, which entrance had been closed to the first man through sin. Hence, when Christ was baptized, the heavens were opened, to show that the way to heaven is open to the baptized.

Now after baptism man needs to pray continually, in order to enter heaven: for though sins are remitted through baptism, there still remain the fomes of sin assailing us from within, and the world and the devils assailing us from without. And therefore it is said pointedly (Lk. 3:21) that “Jesus being baptized and praying, heaven was opened”: because, to wit, the faithful after baptism stand in need of prayer. Or else, that we may be led to understand that the very fact that through baptism heaven is opened to believers is in virtue of the prayer of Christ. Hence it is said pointedly (Mat. 3:16) that “heaven was opened to Him”—that is, “to all for His sake.” Thus, for example, the Emperor might say to one asking a favor for another: “Behold, I grant this favor, not to him, but to thee”—that is, “to him for thy sake,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]).

Reply to Objection 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iv in Matth.; from the supposititious Opus Imperfectum), as Christ was baptized for man’s sake, though He needed no baptism for His own sake, so the heavens were opened unto Him as man, whereas in respect of His Divine Nature He was ever in heaven.

Reply to Objection 2: As Jerome says on Mat. 3:16,17, the heavens were opened to Christ when He was baptized, not by an unfolding of the elements, but by a spiritual vision: thus does Ezechiel relate the opening of the heavens at the beginning of his book. And Chrysostom proves this (Hom. iv in Matth.; from the supposititious Opus Imperfectum) by saying that “if the creature”—namely, heaven—“had been sundered he would not have said, ‘were opened to Him,’ since what is opened in a corporeal sense is open to all.” Hence it is said expressly (Mk. 1:10) that Jesus “forthwith coming up out of the water, saw the heavens opened”; as though the opening of the heavens were to be considered as seen by Christ. Some, indeed, refer this to the corporeal vision, and say that such a brilliant light shone round about Christ when He was baptized, that the heavens seemed to be opened. It can also be referred to the imaginary vision, in which manner Ezechiel saw the heavens opened: since such a vision was formed in Christ’s imagination by the Divine power and by His rational will, so as to signify that the entrance to heaven is opened to men through baptism. Lastly, it can be referred to intellectual vision: forasmuch as Christ, when He had sanctified baptism, saw that heaven was opened to men: nevertheless He had seen before that this would be accomplished.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s Passion is the common cause of the opening of heaven to men. But it behooves this cause to be applied to each one, in order that he enter heaven. And this is effected by baptism, according to Rom. 6:3: “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are baptized in His death.” Wherefore mention is made of the opening of the heavens at His baptism rather than at His Passion.

Or, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth.; from the supposititious Opus Imperfectum): “When Christ was baptized, the heavens were merely opened: but after He had vanquished the tyrant by the cross; since gates were no longer needed for a heaven which thenceforth would be never closed, the angels said, not ‘open the gates,’ but ‘Take them away.’” Thus Chrysostom gives us to understand that the obstacles which had hitherto hindered the souls of the departed from entering into heaven were entirely removed by the Passion: but at Christ’s baptism they were opened, as though the way had been shown by which men were to enter into heaven.

Whether it is fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Ghost came down on Him in the form of a dove?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting to say that when Christ was baptized the Holy Ghost came down on Him in the form of a dove. For the Holy Ghost dwells in man by grace. But the fulness of grace was in the Man-Christ from the beginning of His conception, because He was the “Only-begotten of the Father,” as is clear from what has been said above ([4203]Q[7], A[12];[4204] Q[34], A[1]). Therefore the Holy Ghost should not have been sent to Him at His baptism.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is said to have “descended” into the world in the mystery of the Incarnation, when “He emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant” (Phil. 2:7). But the Holy Ghost did not become incarnate. Therefore it is unbecoming to say that the Holy Ghost “descended upon Him.”

Objection 3: Further, that which is accomplished in our baptism should have been shown in Christ’s baptism, as in an exemplar. But in our baptism no visible mission of the Holy Ghost takes place. Therefore neither should a visible mission of the Holy Ghost have taken place in Christ’s baptism.

Objection 4: Further, the Holy Ghost is poured forth on others through Christ, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness we all have received.” But the Holy Ghost came down on the apostles in the form, not of a dove, but of fire. Therefore neither should He have come down on Christ in the form of a dove, but in the form of fire.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 3:22): “The Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape as a dove upon Him.”

I answer that, What took place with respect to Christ in His baptism, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iv in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]), “is connected with the mystery accomplished in all who were to be baptized afterwards.” Now, all those who are baptized with the baptism of Christ receive the Holy Ghost, unless they approach unworthily; according to Mat. 3:11: “He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost.” Therefore it was fitting that when our Lord was baptized the Holy Ghost should descend upon Him.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Trin. xv): “It is most absurd to say that Christ received the Holy Ghost, when He was already thirty years old: for when He came to be baptized, since He was without sin, therefore was He not without the Holy Ghost. For if it is written of John that ‘he shall be filled with the Holy Ghost from his mother’s womb,’ what must we say of the Man-Christ, whose conception in the flesh was not carnal, but spiritual? Therefore now,” i.e. at His baptism, “He deigned to foreshadow His body,” i.e. the Church, “in which those who are baptized receive the Holy Ghost in a special manner.”

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. ii), the Holy Ghost is said to have descended on Christ in a bodily shape, as a dove, not because the very substance of the Holy Ghost was seen, for He is invisible: nor as though that visible creature were assumed into the unity of the Divine Person; since it is not said that the Holy Ghost was the dove, as it is said that the Son of God is man by reason of the union. Nor, again, was the Holy Ghost seen under the form of a dove, after the manner in which John saw the slain Lamb in the Apocalypse (5:6): “For the latter vision took place in the spirit through spiritual images of bodies; whereas no one ever doubted that this dove was seen by the eyes of the body.” Nor, again, did the Holy Ghost appear under the form of a dove in the sense in which it is said (1 Cor. 10:4): “‘Now, the rock was Christ’: for the latter had already a created existence, and through the manner of its action was called by the name of Christ, whom it signified: whereas this dove came suddenly into existence, to fulfil the purpose of its signification, and afterwards ceased to exist, like the flame which appeared in the bush to Moses."

Hence the Holy Ghost is said to have descended upon Christ, not by reason of His being united to the dove: but either because the dove itself signified the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it "descended" when it came upon Him; or, again, by reason of the spiritual grace, which is poured out by God, so as to descend, as it were, on the creature, according to James 1:17: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights."

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xii in Matth.): "At the beginning of all spiritual transactions sensible visions appear, for the sake of them who cannot conceive at all an incorporeal nature . . . so that, though afterwards no such thing occur, they may shape their faith according to that which has occurred once for all." And therefore the Holy Ghost descended visibly, under a bodily shape, on Christ at His baptism, in order that we may believe Him to descend invisibly on all those who are baptized.

Reply to Objection 4: The Holy Ghost appeared over Christ at His baptism, under the form of a dove, for four reasons. First, on account of the disposition required in the one baptized—namely, that he approach in good faith: since! as it is written (Wis. 1:5): "The holy spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful." For the dove is an animal of a simple character, void of cunning and deceit: whence it is said (Mat. 10:16): "Be ye simple as doves."

Secondly, in order to designate the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are signified by the properties of the dove. For the dove dwells beside the running stream, in order that, on perceiving the hawk, it may plunge in and escape. This refers to the gift of wisdom, whereby the saints dwell beside the running waters of Holy Scripture, in order to escape the assaults of the devil. Again, the dove prefers the more choice seeds. This refers to the gift of knowledge, whereby the saints make choice of sound doctrines, with which they nourish themselves. Further, the dove feeds the brood of other birds. This refers to the gift of counsel, with which the saints, by teaching and example, feed men who have been the brood, i.e. imitators, of the devil. Again, the dove tears not with its beak. This refers to the gift of understanding, wherewith the saints do not rend sound doctrines, as heretics do. Again, the dove has no gall. This refers to the gift of piety, by reason of which the saints are free from unreasonable anger. Again, the dove builds its nest in the cleft of a rock. This refers to the gift of fortitude, wherewith the saints build their nest, i.e. take refuge and hope, in the death wounds of Christ, who is the Rock of strength. Lastly, the dove has a plaintive song. This refers to the gift of fear, wherewith the saints delight in bewailing sins.

Thirdly, the Holy Ghost appeared under the form of a dove on account of the proper effect of baptism, which is the remission of sins and reconciliation with God: for the dove is a gentle creature. Wherefore, as Chrysostom says, (Hom. xii in Matth.), “at the Deluge this creature appeared bearing an olive branch, and publishing the tidings of the universal peace of the whole world: and now again the dove appears at the baptism, pointing to our Deliverer.”

Fourthly, the Holy Ghost appeared over our Lord at His baptism in the form of a dove, in order to designate the common effect of baptism—namely, the building up of the unity of the Church. Hence it is written (Eph. 5:25–27): “Christ delivered Himself up . . . that He might present . . . to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing . . . cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.” Therefore it was fitting that the Holy Ghost should appear at the baptism under the form of a dove, which is a creature both loving and gregarious. Wherefore also it is said of the Church (Cant 6:8): “One is my dove.”

But on the apostles the Holy Ghost descended under the form of fire, for two reasons. First, to show with what fervor their hearts were to be moved, so as to preach Christ everywhere, though surrounded by opposition. And therefore He appeared as a fiery tongue. Hence Augustine says (Super Joan., Tract. vi): Our Lord “manifests” the Holy Ghost “visibly in two ways”—namely, “by the dove corning upon the Lord when He was baptized; by fire, coming upon the disciples when they were met together . . . In the former case simplicity is shown, in the latter fervor . . . We learn, then, from the dove, that those who are sanctified by the Spirit should be without guile: and from the fire, that their simplicity should not be left to wax cold. Nor let it disturb anyone that the tongues were cloven . . . in the dove recognize unity.”

Secondly, because, as Chrysostom says (Gregory, Hom. xxx in Ev.): “Since sins had to be forgiven,” which is effected in baptism, “meekness was required”; this is shown by the dove: “but when we have obtained grace we must look forward to be judged”; and this is signified by the fire.

Whether the dove in which the Holy Ghost appeared was real?

Objection 1: It would seem that the dove in which the Holy Ghost appeared was not real. For that seems to be a mere apparition which appears in its semblance. But it is stated (Lk. 3:22) that the “Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape as a dove upon Him.” Therefore it was not a real dove, but a semblance of a dove.

Objection 2: Further, just as “Nature does nothing useless, so neither does God” (De Coelo i). Now since this dove came merely “in order to signify something and pass away,” as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), a real dove would have been useless: because the semblance of a dove was sufficient for that purpose. Therefore it was not a real dove.

Objection 3: Further, the properties of a thing lead us to a knowledge of that thing. If, therefore, this were a real dove, its properties would have signified the nature of the real animal, and not the effect of the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that it was not a real dove.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xxii): “Nor do we say this as though we asserted that our Lord Jesus Christ alone had a real body, and that the Holy Ghost appeared to men’s eyes in a fallacious manner: but we say that both those bodies were real.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4205]Q[5], A[1]), it was unbecoming that the Son of God, who is the Truth of the Father, should make use of anything unreal; wherefore He took, not an imaginary, but a real body. And since the Holy Ghost is called the Spirit of Truth, as appears from Jn. 16:13, therefore He too made a real dove in which to appear, though He did not assume it into unity of person. Wherefore, after the words quoted above, Augustine adds: “Just as it behooved the Son of God not to deceive men, so it behooved the Holy Ghost not to deceive. But it was easy for Almighty God, who created all creatures out of nothing, to frame the body of a real dove without the help of other doves, just as it was easy for Him to form a true body in Mary’s womb without the seed of a man: since the corporeal creature obeys its Lord’s command and will, both in the mother’s womb in forming a man, and in the world itself in forming a dove.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Holy Ghost is said to have descended in the shape or semblance of a dove, not in the sense that the dove was not real, but in order to show that He did not appear in the form of His substance.

Reply to Objection 2: It was not superfluous to form a real dove, in which the Holy Ghost might appear, because by the very reality of the dove the reality of the Holy Ghost and of His effects is signified.

Reply to Objection 3: The properties of the dove lead us to understand the dove's nature and the effects of the Holy Ghost in the same way. Because from the very fact that the dove has such properties, it results that it signifies the Holy Ghost.

Whether it was becoming, when Christ was baptized that the Father's voice should be heard, bearing witness to the Son?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unbecoming when Christ was baptized for the Father's voice to be heard bearing witness to the Son. For the Son and the Holy Ghost, according as they have appeared visibly, are said to have been visibly sent. But it does not become the Father to be sent, as Augustine makes it clear (De Trin. ii). Neither, therefore, (does it become Him) to appear.

Objection 2: Further, the voice gives expression to the word conceived in the heart. But the Father is not the Word. Therefore He is unfittingly manifested by a voice.

Objection 3: Further, the Man-Christ did not begin to be Son of God at His baptism, as some heretics have stated: but He was the Son of God from the beginning of His conception. Therefore the Father's voice should have proclaimed Christ's Godhead at His nativity rather than at His baptism.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 3:17): "Behold a voice from heaven, saying: This is My beloved Son in whom I am well pleased."

I answer that, As stated above [4206](A[5]), that which is accomplished in our baptism should be manifested in Christ's baptism, which was the exemplar of ours. Now the baptism which the faithful receive is hallowed by the invocation and the power of the Trinity; according to Mat. 28:19: "Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." Wherefore, as Jerome says on Mat. 3:16,17: "The mystery of the Trinity is shown forth in Christ's baptism. our

Lord Himself is baptized in His human nature; the Holy Ghost descended in the shape of a dove: the Father's voice is heard bearing witness to the Son." Therefore it was becoming that in that baptism the Father should be manifested by a voice.

Reply to Objection 1: The visible mission adds something to the apparition, to wit, the authority of the sender. Therefore the Son and the Holy Ghost who are from another, are said not only to appear, but also to be sent visibly. But the Father, who is not from another, can appear indeed, but cannot be sent visibly.

Reply to Objection 2: The Father is manifested by the voice, only as producing the voice or speaking by it. And since it is proper to the Father to produce the Word—that is, to utter or to speak—therefore was it most becoming that the Father should be manifested by a voice, because the voice designates the word. Wherefore the very voice to which the Father gave utterance bore witness to the Sonship of the Word. And just as the form of the dove, in which the Holy Ghost was made manifest, is not the Nature of the Holy Ghost, nor is the form of man in which the Son Himself was manifested, the very Nature of the Son of God, so neither does the voice belong to the Nature of the Word or of the Father who spoke. Hence (Jn. 5:37) our Lord says: "Neither have you heard His," i.e. the Father's, "voice at any time, nor seen His shape." By which words, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xl in Joan.), "He gradually leads them to the knowledge of the philosophical truth, and shows them that God has neither voice nor shape, but is above all such forms and utterances." And just as the whole Trinity made both the dove and the human nature assumed by Christ, so also they formed the voice: yet the Father alone as speaking is manifested by the voice, just as the Son alone assumed human nature, and the Holy Ghost alone is manifested in the dove, as Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum] makes evident.

Reply to Objection 3: It was becoming that Christ's Godhead should not be proclaimed to all in His nativity, but rather that It should be hidden while He was subject to the defects of infancy. But when He attained to the perfect age, when the time came for Him to teach, to work miracles, and to draw men to Himself then did it behoove His Godhead to be attested from on high by the Father's testimony, so that His teaching might become the more credible. Hence He says (Jn. 5:37): "The Father Himself who sent Me, hath given testimony of Me.” And specially at the time of baptism, by which men are born again into adopted sons of God; since God’s sons by adoption are made to be like unto His natural Son, according to Rom. 8:29: “Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son.” Hence Hilary says (Super Matth. ii) that when Jesus was baptized, the Holy Ghost descended on Him, and the Father’s voice was heard saying: “‘This is My beloved Son,’ that we might know, from what was accomplished in Christ, that after being washed in the waters of baptism the Holy Ghost comes down upon us from on high, and that the Father’s voice declares us to have become the adopted sons of God.”

OF CHRIST’S MANNER OF LIFE (FOUR ARTICLES)

Having considered those things which relate to Christ’s entrance into the world, or to His beginning, it remains for us to consider those that relate to the process of His life. And we must consider (1) His manner of life; (2) His temptation; (3) His doctrine; (4) His miracles.

Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ should have led a solitary life, or have associated with men?

(2) Whether He should have led an austere life as regards food, drink, and clothing? Or should He have conformed Himself to others in these respects?

(3) Whether He should have adopted a lowly state of life, or one of wealth and honor?

(4) Whether He should have lived in conformity with the Law?

Whether Christ should have associated with men, or led a solitary life?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have associated with men, but should have led a solitary life. For it behooved Christ to show by His manner of life not only that He was man, but also that He was God. But it is not becoming that God should associate with men, for it is written (Dan. 2:11): “Except the gods, whose conversation is not with men”; and the Philosopher says (Polit. i) that he who lives alone is “either a beast”—that is, if he do this from being wild—“or a god,” if his motive be the contemplation of truth. Therefore it seems that it was not becoming for Christ to associate with men.

Objection 2: Further, while He lived in mortal flesh, it behooved Christ to lead a most perfect life. But the most perfect is the contemplative life, as we have stated in the [4207]SS, Q[182], AA[1],2. Now, solitude is most suitable to the contemplative life; according to Osee 2:14: “I will lead her into the wilderness, and I will speak to her heart.” Therefore it seems that Christ should have led a solitary life.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s manner of life should have been uniform: because it should always have given evidence of that which is best. But at times Christ avoided the crowd and sought lonely places: hence Remigius [*Cf. Catena Aurea, Matth. 5:1], commenting on Matthew, says: “We read that our Lord had three places of refuge: the ship, the mountain, the desert; to one or other of which He betook Himself whenever he was harassed by the crowd.” Therefore He ought always to have led a solitary life.

On the contrary, It is written (Baruch 3:38): “Afterwards He was seen upon earth and conversed with men.”

I answer that, Christ’s manner of life had to be in keeping with the end of His Incarnation, by reason of which He came into the world. Now He came into the world, first, that He might publish the truth. thus He says Himself (Jn. 18:37): “For this was I born, and for this came I into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth.” Hence it was fitting not that He should hide Himself by leading a solitary life, but that He should appear openly and preach in public. Wherefore (Lk. 4:42,43) He says to those who wished to stay Him: “To other cities also I must preach the kingdom of God: for therefore am I sent.”

Secondly, He came in order to free men from sin; according to 1 Tim. 1:15: “Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners.” And hence, as Chrysostom says, “although Christ might, while staying in the same place, have drawn all men to Himself, to hear His preaching, yet He did not do so; thus giving us the example to go about and seek those who perish, like the shepherd in his search of the lost sheep, and the physician in his attendance on the sick.”

Thirdly, He came that by Him “we might have access to God,” as it is written (Rom. 5:2). And thus it was fitting that He should give men confidence in approaching Him by associating familiarly with them.

Wherefore it is written (Mat. 9:10): “It came to pass as He was sitting . . . in the house, behold, many publicans and sinners came, and sat down with Jesus and His disciples.” On which Jerome comments as follows: “They had seen the publican who had been converted from a sinful to a better life: and consequently they did not despair of their own salvation.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ wished to make His Godhead known through His human nature. And therefore, since it is proper to man to do so, He associated with men, at the same time manifesting His Godhead to all, by preaching and working miracles, and by leading among men a blameless and righteous life.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4208]SS, Q[182], A[1]; [4209]SS, Q[188], A[6], the contemplative life is, absolutely speaking, more perfect than the active life, because the latter is taken up with bodily actions: yet that form of active life in which a man, by preaching and teaching, delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation, is more perfect than the life that stops at contemplation, because such a life is built on an abundance of contemplation, and consequently such was the life chosen by Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s action is our instruction. And therefore, in order to teach preachers that they ought not to be for ever before the public, our Lord withdrew Himself sometimes from the crowd. We are told of three reasons for His doing this. First, for the rest of the body: hence (Mk. 6:31) it is stated that our Lord said to His disciples: “Come apart into a desert place, and rest a little. For there were many coming and going: and they had not so much as time to eat.” But sometimes it was for the sake of prayer; thus it is written (Lk. 6:12): “It came to pass in those days, that He went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed the whole night in the prayer of God.” On this Ambrose remarks that “by His example He instructs us in the precepts of virtue.” And sometimes He did so in order to teach us to avoid the favor of men. Wherefore Chrysostom, commenting on Mat. 5:1, Jesus, “seeing the multitude, went up into a mountain,” says: “By sitting not in the city and in the market-place, but on a mountain and in a place of solitude, He taught us to do nothing for show, and to withdraw from the crowd, especially when we have to discourse of needful things.”

Whether it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this world?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was becoming that Christ should lead an austere life in this world. For Christ preached the perfection of life much more than John did. But John led an austere life in order that he might persuade men by his example to embrace a perfect life; for it is written (Mat. 3:4) that “the same John had his garment of camel’s hair and a leathern girdle about his loins: and his meat was locusts and wild honey”; on which Chrysostom comments as follows (Hom. x): “It was a marvelous and strange thing to behold such austerity in a human frame: which thing also particularly attracted the Jews.” Therefore it seems that an austere life was much more becoming to Christ.

Objection 2: Further, abstinence is ordained to continency; for it is written (Osee 4:10): “They shall eat and shall not be filled; they have committed fornication, and have not ceased.” But Christ both observed continency in Himself and proposed it to be observed by others when He said (Mat. 19:12): “There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven: he that can take it let him take it.” Therefore it seems that Christ should have observed an austere life both in Himself and in His disciples.

Objection 3: Further, it seems absurd for a man to begin a stricter form of life and to return to an easier life: for one might quote to his discredit that which is written, Lk. 14:30: “This man began to build, and was not able to finish.” Now Christ began a very strict life after His baptism, remaining in the desert and fasting for “forty days and forty nights.” Therefore it seems unbecoming that, after leading such a strict life, He should return to the common manner of living.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 11:19): “The Son of Man came eating and drinking.”

I answer that, As stated above [4210](A[1]), it was in keeping with the end of the Incarnation that Christ should not lead a solitary life, but should associate with men. Now it is most fitting that he who associates with others should conform to their manner of living; according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:22): “I became all things to all men.” And therefore it was most fitting that Christ should conform to others in the matter of eating and drinking. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xvi) that “John is described as ‘neither eating nor drinking,’ because he did not take the same food as the Jews. Therefore, unless our Lord had taken it, it would not be said of Him, in contrast, ‘eating and drinking.’”

Reply to Objection 1: In His manner of living our Lord gave an example of perfection as to all those things which of themselves relate to salvation. Now abstinence in eating and drinking does not of itself relate to salvation, according to Rom. 14:17: “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink.” And Augustine (De Qq. Evang. ii, qu. 11) explains Mat. 11:19, “Wisdom is justified by her children,” saying that this is because the holy apostles “understood that the kingdom of God does not consist in eating and drinking, but in suffering indigence with equanimity,” for they are neither uplifted by affluence, nor distressed by want. Again (De Doctr. Christ. iii), he says that in all such things “it is not making use of them, but the wantonness of the user, that is sinful.” Now both these lives are lawful and praiseworthy—namely, that a man withdraw from the society of other men and observe abstinence; and that he associate with other men and live like them. And therefore our Lord wished to give men an example of either kind of life.

As to John, according to Chrysostom (Hom. xxxvii super Matth.), “he exhibited no more than his life and righteous conduct . . . but Christ had the testimony also of miracles. Leaving, therefore, John to be illustrious by his fasting, He Himself came the opposite way, both coming unto publicans’ tables and eating and drinking.”

Reply to Objection 2: Just as by abstinence other men acquire the power of self-restraint, so also Christ, in Himself and in those that are His, subdued the flesh by the power of His Godhead. Wherefore, as we read Mat. 9:14, the Pharisees and the disciples of John fasted, but not the disciples of Christ. On which Bede comments, saying that “John drank neither wine nor strong drink: because abstinence is meritorious where the nature is weak. But why should our Lord, whose right by nature it is to forgive sins, avoid those whom He could make holier than such as abstain?”

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xiii super Matth.), “that thou mightest learn how great a good is fasting, and how it is a shield against the devil, and that after baptism thou shouldst give thyself up, not to luxury, but to fasting—for this cause did He fast, not as needing it Himself, but as teaching us . . . And for this did He proceed no further than Moses and Elias, lest His assumption of our flesh might seem incredible.” The mystical meaning, as Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Evang.), is that by Christ’s example the number “forty” is observed in His fast, because the power of the “decalogue is fulfilled throughout the four books of the Holy Gospel: since ten multiplied by four amounts to forty.” Or, because “we live in this mortal body composed of the four elements, and by its lusts we transgress the commandments of the Lord, which are expressed in the decalogue.” Or, according to Augustine (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 81): “To know the Creator and the creature is the entire teaching of wisdom. The Creator is the Trinity, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Now the creature is partly invisible, as the soul, to which the number three may be ascribed, for we are commanded to love God in three ways, ‘with our whole heart, our whole soul, and our whole mind’; and partly visible, as the body, to which the number four is applicable on account of its being subject to heat, moisture, cold, and dryness. Hence if we multiply ten, which may be referred to the entire moral code, by four, which number may be applied to the body, because it is the body that executes the law, the product is the number forty: in which,” consequently, “the time during which we sigh and grieve is shown forth.” And yet there was no inconsistency in Christ’s returning to the common manner of living, after fasting and (retiring into the) desert. For it is becoming to that kind of life, which we hold Christ to have embraced, wherein a man delivers to others the fruits of his contemplation, that he devote himself first of all to contemplation, and that he afterwards come down to the publicity of active life by associating with other men. Hence Bede says on Mk. 2:18: “Christ fasted, that thou mightest not disobey the commandment; He ate with sinners, that thou mightest discern His sanctity and acknowledge His power.”

Whether Christ should have led a life of poverty in this world?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have led a life of poverty in this world. Because Christ should have embraced the most eligible form of life. But the most eligible form of life is that which is a mean between riches and poverty; for it is written (Prov. 30:8): “Give me neither beggary nor riches; give me only the necessaries of life.” Therefore Christ should have led a life, not of poverty, but of moderation.

Objection 2: Further, external wealth is ordained to bodily use as to food and raiment. But Christ conformed His manner of life to those among whom He lived, in the matter of food and raiment. Therefore it seems that He should have observed the ordinary manner of life as to riches and poverty, and have avoided extreme poverty.

Objection 3: Further, Christ specially invited men to imitate His example of humility, according to Mat. 11:29: “Learn of Me, because I am meek and humble of heart.” But humility is most commendable in the rich; thus it is written (1 Tim. 6:11): “Charge the rich of this world not to be high-minded.” Therefore it seems that Christ should not have chosen a life of poverty.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 8:20): “The Son of Man hath not where to lay His head”: as though He were to say as Jerome observes: “Why desirest thou to follow Me for the sake of riches and worldly gain, since I am so poor that I have not even the smallest dwelling-place, and I am sheltered by a roof that is not Mine?” And on Mat. 17:26: “That we may not scandalize them, go to the sea,” Jerome says: “This incident, taken literally, affords edification to those who hear it when they are told that our Lord was so poor that He had not the wherewithal to pay the tax for Himself and His apostles.”

I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to lead a life of poverty in this world. First, because this was in keeping with the duty of preaching, for which purpose He says that He came (Mk. 1:38): “Let us go into the neighboring towns and cities, that I may preach there also: for to this purpose am I come.” Now in order that the preachers of God’s word may be able to give all their time to preaching, they must be wholly free from care of worldly matters: which is impossible for those who are possessed of wealth. Wherefore the Lord Himself, when sending the apostles to preach, said to them (Mat. 10:9): “Do not possess gold nor silver.” And the apostles (Acts 6:2) say: “It is not reasonable that we should leave the word of God and serve tables.”

Secondly, because just as He took upon Himself the death of the body in order to bestow spiritual life on us, so did He bear bodily poverty, in order to enrich us spiritually, according to 2 Cor. 8:9: “You know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ: that . . . He became poor for our [Vulg.: ‘your’] sakes that through His poverty we [Vulg.: ‘you’] might be rich.”

Thirdly, lest if He were rich His preaching might be ascribed to cupidity. Wherefore Jerome says on Mat. 10:9, that if the disciples had been possessed of wealth, “they had seemed to preach for gain, not for the salvation of mankind.” And the same reason applies to Christ.

Fourthly, that the more lowly He seemed by reason of His poverty, the greater might the power of His Godhead be shown to be. Hence in a sermon of the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, c. ix) we read: “He chose all that was poor and despicable, all that was of small account and hidden from the majority, that we might recognize His Godhead to have transformed the terrestrial sphere. For this reason did He choose a poor maid for His Mother, a poorer birthplace; for this reason did He live in want. Learn this from the manger.”

Reply to Objection 1: Those who wish to live virtuously need to avoid abundance of riches and beggary, in as far as these are occasions of sin: since abundance of riches is an occasion for being proud; and beggary is an occasion of thieving and lying, or even of perjury. But forasmuch as Christ was incapable of sin, He had not the same motive as Solomon for avoiding these things. Yet neither is every kind of beggary an occasion of theft and perjury, as Solomon seems to add (Prov. 30:8); but only that which is involuntary, in order to avoid which, a man is guilty of theft and perjury. But voluntary poverty is not open to this danger: and such was the poverty chosen by Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: A man may feed and clothe himself in conformity with others, not only by possessing riches, but also by receiving the necessaries of life from those who are rich. This is what happened in regard to Christ: for it is written (Lk. 8:2,3) that certain women followed Christ and “ministered unto Him of their substance.” For, as Jerome says on Mat. 27:55, “It was a Jewish custom, nor was it thought wrong for women, following the ancient tradition of their nation, out of their private means to provide their instructors with food and clothing. But as this might give scandal to the heathens, Paul says that he gave it up”: thus it was possible for them to be fed out of a common fund, but not to possess wealth, without their duty of preaching being hindered by anxiety.

Reply to Objection 3: Humility is not much to be praised in one who is poor of necessity. But in one who, like Christ, is poor willingly, poverty itself is a sign of very great humility.

Whether Christ conformed His conduct to the Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not conform His conduct to the Law. For the Law forbade any work whatsoever to be done on the Sabbath, since God “rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done.” But He healed a man on the Sabbath, and commanded him to take up his bed. Therefore it seems that He did not conform His conduct to the Law.

Objection 2: Further, what Christ taught, that He also did, according to Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to do and to teach.” But He taught (Mat. 15:11) that “not” all “that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man”: and this is contrary to the precept of the Law, which declared that a man was made unclean by eating and touching certain animals, as stated Lev. 11. Therefore it seems that He did not conform His conduct to the Law.

Objection 3: Further, he who consents to anything is of the same mind as he who does it, according to Rom. 1:32: “Not only they that do them, but they also that consent to them that do them.” But Christ, by excusing His disciples, consented to their breaking the Law by plucking the ears of corn on the Sabbath; as is related Mat. 12:1–8. Therefore it seems that Christ did not conform His conduct to the Law.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:17): “Do not think that I am come to destroy the Law or the Prophets.” Commenting on these words, Chrysostom says: “He fulfilled the Law . . . in one way, by transgressing none of the precepts of the Law; secondly, by justifying us through faith, which the Law, in the letter, was unable to do.”

I answer that, Christ conformed His conduct in all things to the precepts of the Law. In token of this He wished even to be circumcised; for the circumcision is a kind of protestation of a man’s purpose of keeping the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: “I testify to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole Law.”

And Christ, indeed, wished to conform His conduct to the Law, first, to show His approval of the Old Law. Secondly, that by obeying the Law He might perfect it and bring it to an end in His own self, so as to show that it was ordained to Him. Thirdly, to deprive the Jews of an excuse for slandering Him. Fourthly, in order to deliver men from subjection to the

Law, according to Gal. 4:4,5: “God sent His Son . . . made under the Law that He might redeem them who were under the Law.”

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord excuses Himself from any transgression of the Law in this matter, for three reasons. First, the precept of the hallowing of the Sabbath forbids not Divine work, but human work: for though God ceased on the seventh day from the creation of new creatures, yet He ever works by keeping and governing His creatures. Now that Christ wrought miracles was a Divine work: hence He says (Jn. 5:17): “My Father worketh until now; and I work.”

Secondly, He excuses Himself on the ground that this precept does not forbid works which are needful for bodily health. Wherefore He says (Lk. 13:15): “Doth not every one of you on the Sabbath-day loose his ox or his ass from the manger, and lead them to water?” And farther on (Lk. 14:5): “Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fall into a pit, and will not immediately draw him out on the Sabbath-day?” Now it is manifest that the miraculous works done by Christ related to health of body and soul.

Thirdly, because this precept does not forbid works pertaining to the worship of God. Wherefore He says (Mat. 12:5): “Have ye not read in the Law that on the Sabbath-days the priests in the Temple break the Sabbath, and are without blame?” And (Jn. 7:23) it is written that a man receives circumcision on the Sabbath-day. Now when Christ commanded the paralytic to carry his bed on the Sabbath-day, this pertained to the worship of God, i.e. to the praise of God’s power. And thus it is clear that He did not break the Sabbath: although the Jews threw this false accusation in His face, saying (Jn. 9:16): “This man is not of God, who keepeth not the Sabbath.”

Reply to Objection 2: By those words Christ wished to show that man is made unclean as to his soul, by the use of any sort of foods considered not in their nature, but only in some signification. And that certain foods are in the Law called “unclean” is due to some signification; whence Augustine says (Contra Faust. vi): “If a question be raised about swine and lambs, both are clean by nature, since ‘all God’s creatures are good’; but by a certain signification lambs are clean and swine unclean.”

Reply to Objection 3: The disciples also, when, being hungry, they plucked the ears of corn on the Sabbath, are to be excused from transgressing the Law, since they were pressed by hunger: just as David did not transgress the Law when, through being compelled by hunger, he ate the loaves which it was not lawful for him to eat.

OF CHRIST’S TEMPTATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider Christ’s temptation, concerning which there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted?

(2) Of the place;

(3) Of the time;

(4) Of the mode and order of the temptation.

Whether it was becoming that Christ should be tempted?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not becoming for Christ to be tempted. For to tempt is to make an experiment, which is not done save in regard to something unknown. But the power of Christ was known even to the demons; for it is written (Lk. 4:41) that “He suffered them not to speak, for they knew that He was Christ.” Therefore it seems that it was unbecoming for Christ to be tempted.

Objection 2: Further, Christ was come in order to destroy the works of the devil, according to 1 Jn. 3:8: “For this purpose the Son of God appeared, that He might destroy the works of the devil.” But it is not for the same to destroy the works of a certain one and to suffer them. Therefore it seems unbecoming that Christ should suffer Himself to be tempted by the devil.

Objection 3: Further, temptation is from a threefold source—the flesh, the world, and the devil. But Christ was not tempted either by the flesh or by the world. Therefore neither should He have been tempted by the devil.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:1): “Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert to be tempted by the devil.”

I answer that, Christ wished to be tempted; first that He might strengthen us against temptations. Hence Gregory says in a homily (xvi in Evang.): “It was not unworthy of our Redeemer to wish to be tempted, who came also to be slain; in order that by His temptations He might conquer our temptations, just as by His death He overcame our death.”

Secondly, that we might be warned, so that none, however holy, may think himself safe or free from temptation. Wherefore also He wished to be tempted after His baptism, because, as Hilary says (Super Matth., cap. iii.): “The temptations of the devil assail those principally who are sanctified, for he desires, above all, to overcome the holy. Hence also it is written (Ecclus. 2): Son, when thou comest to the service of God, stand in justice and in fear, and prepare thy soul for temptation.”

Thirdly, in order to give us an example: to teach us, to wit, how to overcome the temptations of the devil. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv) that Christ “allowed Himself to be tempted” by the devil, “that He might be our Mediator in overcoming temptations, not only by helping us, but also by giving us an example.”

Fourthly, in order to fill us with confidence in His mercy. Hence it is written (Heb. 4:15): “We have not a high-priest, who cannot have compassion on our infirmities, but one tempted in all things like as we are, without sin.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix): “Christ was known to the demons only so far as He willed; not as the Author of eternal life, but as the cause of certain temporal effects,” from which they formed a certain conjecture that Christ was the Son of God. But since they also observed in Him certain signs of human frailty, they did not know for certain that He was the Son of God: wherefore (the devil) wished to tempt Him. This is implied by the words of Mat. 4:2,3, saying that, after “He was hungry, the tempter” came “to Him,” because, as Hilary says (Super Matth., cap. iii), “Had not Christ’s weakness in hungering betrayed His human nature, the devil would not have dared to tempt Him.” Moreover, this appears from the very manner of the temptation, when he said: “If Thou be the Son of God.” Which words Ambrose explains as follows (In Luc. iv): “What means this way of addressing Him, save that, though he knew that the Son of God was to come, yet he did not think that He had come in the weakness of the flesh?”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ came to destroy the works of the devil, not by powerful deeds, but rather by suffering from him and his members, so as to conquer the devil by righteousness, not by power; thus Augustine says (De Trin. xiii) that “the devil was to be overcome, not by the power of God, but by righteousness.” And therefore in regard to Christ’s temptation we must consider what He did of His own will and what He suffered from the devil. For that He allowed Himself to be tempted was due to His own will. Wherefore it is written (Mat. 4:1): “Jesus was led by the Spirit into the desert, to be tempted by the devil”; and Gregory (Hom. xvi in Evang.) says this is to be understood of the Holy Ghost, to wit, that “thither did His Spirit lead Him, where the wicked spirit would find Him and tempt Him.” But He suffered from the devil in being “taken up” on to “the pinnacle of the Temple” and again “into a very high mountain.” Nor is it strange, as Gregory observes, “that He allowed Himself to be taken by him on to a mountain, who allowed Himself to be crucified by His members.” And we understand Him to have been taken up by the devil, not, as it were, by force, but because, as Origen says (Hom. xxi super Luc.), “He followed Him in the course of His temptation like a wrestler advancing of his own accord.”

Reply to Objection 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 4:15), Christ wished to be “tempted in all things, without sin.” Now temptation which comes from an enemy can be without sin: because it comes about by merely outward suggestion. But temptation which comes from the flesh cannot be without sin, because such a temptation is caused by pleasure and concupiscence; and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix), “it is not without sin that ‘the flesh desireth against the spirit.’” And hence Christ wished to be tempted by an enemy, but not by the flesh.

Whether Christ should have been tempted in the desert?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have been tempted in the desert. Because Christ wished to be tempted in order to give us an example, as stated above [4211](A[1]). But an example should be set openly before those who are to follow it. Therefore He should not have been tempted in the desert.

Objection 2: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xii in Matth.): “Then most especially does the devil assail by tempting us, when he sees us alone. Thus did he tempt the woman in the beginning when he found her apart from her husband.” Hence it seems that, by going into the desert to be tempted, He exposed Himself to temptation. Since, therefore, His temptation is an example to us, it seems that others too should take such steps as will lead them into temptation. And yet this seems a dangerous thing to do, since rather should we avoid the occasion of being tempted.

Objection 3: Further, Mat. 4:5, Christ's second temptation is set down, in which "the devil took" Christ up "into the Holy City, and set Him upon the pinnacle of the Temple": which is certainly not in the desert. Therefore He was not tempted in the desert only.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 1:13) that Jesus "was in the desert forty days and forty nights, and was tempted by Satan."

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2), Christ of His own free-will exposed Himself to be tempted by the devil, just as by His own free-will He submitted to be killed by His members; else the devil would not have dared to approach Him. Now the devil prefers to assail a man who is alone, for, as it is written (Eccles. 4:12), "if a man prevail against one, two shall withstand him." And so it was that Christ went out into the desert, as to a field of battle, to be tempted there by the devil. Hence Ambrose says on Lk. 4:1, that "Christ was led into the desert for the purpose of provoking the devil. For had he," i.e. the devil, "not fought, He," i.e. Christ, "would not have conquered." He adds other reasons, saying that "Christ in doing this set forth the mystery of Adam's delivery from exile," who had been expelled from paradise into the desert, and "set an example to us, by showing that the devil envies those who strive for better things."

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is set as an example to all through faith, according to Heb. 12:2: "Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith." Now faith, as it is written (Rom. 10:17), "cometh by hearing," but not by seeing: nay, it is even said (Jn. 20:29): "Blessed are they that have not seen and have believed." And therefore, in order that Christ's temptation might be an example to us, it behooved that men should not see it, and it was enough that they should hear it related.

Reply to Objection 2: The occasions of temptation are twofold. one is on the part of man—for instance, when a man causes himself to be near to sin by not avoiding the occasion of sinning. And such occasions of temptation should be avoided, as it is written of Lot (Gn. 19:17): "Neither stay thou in all the country about" Sodom.

Another occasion of temptation is on the part of the devil, who always "envies those who strive for better things," as Ambrose says (In Luc. iv, 1). And such occasions of temptation are not to be avoided. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. v in Matth. [*From the supposititious Opus Imperfectum]): “Not only Christ was led into the desert by the Spirit, but all God’s children that have the Holy Ghost. For it is not enough for them to sit idle; the Holy Ghost urges them to endeavor to do something great: which is for them to be in the desert from the devil’s standpoint, for no unrighteousness, in which the devil delights, is there. Again, every good work, compared to the flesh and the world, is the desert; because it is not according to the will of the flesh and of the world.” Now, there is no danger in giving the devil such an occasion of temptation; since the help of the Holy Ghost, who is the Author of the perfect deed, is more powerful* than the assault of the envious devil. [*All the codices read ‘majus.’ One of the earliest printed editions has ‘magis,’ which has much to commend it, since St. Thomas is commenting the text quoted from St. Chrysostom. The translation would run thus: ‘since rather is it (the temptation) a help from the Holy Ghost, who,’ etc.].

Reply to Objection 3: Some say that all the temptations took place in the desert. Of these some say that Christ was led into the Holy City, not really, but in an imaginary vision; while others say that the Holy City itself, i.e. Jerusalem, is called “a desert,” because it was deserted by God. But there is no need for this explanation. For Mark says that He was tempted in the desert by the devil, but not that He was tempted in the desert only.

Whether Christ’s temptation should have taken place after His fast?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s temptation should not have taken place after His fast. For it has been said above ([4212]Q[40], A[2]) that an austere mode of life was not becoming to Christ. But it savors of extreme austerity that He should have eaten nothing for forty days and forty nights, for Gregory (Hom. xvi inn Evang.) explains the fact that “He fasted forty days and forty nights,” saying that “during that time He partook of no food whatever.” It seems, therefore, that He should not thus have fasted before His temptation.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Mk. 1:13) that “He was in the desert forty days and forty nights; and was tempted by Satan.” Now, He fasted forty days and forty nights. Therefore it seems that He was tempted by the devil, not after, but during, His fast.

Objection 3: Further, we read that Christ fasted but once. But He was tempted by the devil, not only once, for it is written (Lk. 4:13) “that all the temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time.” As, therefore, He did not fast before the second temptation, so neither should He have fasted before the first.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 4:2,3): “When He had fasted forty days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry”: and then “the tempter came to Him.”

I answer that, It was becoming that Christ should wish to fast before His temptation. First, in order to give us an example. For since we are all in urgent need of strengthening ourselves against temptation, as stated above [4213](A[1]), by fasting before being tempted, He teaches us the need of fasting in order to equip ourselves against temptation. Hence the Apostle (2 Cor. 6:5, 7) reckons “fastings” together with the “armor of justice.”

Secondly, in order to show that the devil assails with temptations even those who fast, as likewise those who are given to other good works. And so Christ’s temptation took place after His fast, as also after His baptism. Hence since rather Chrysostom says (Hom. xiii super Matth.): “To instruct thee how great a good is fasting, and how it is a most powerful shield against the devil; and that after baptism thou shouldst give thyself up, not to luxury, but to fasting; for this cause Christ fasted, not as needing it Himself, but as teaching us.”

Thirdly, because after the fast, hunger followed, which made the devil dare to approach Him, as already stated (A[1], ad 1). Now, when “our Lord was hungry,” says Hilary (Super Matth. iii), “it was not because He was overcome by want of food, but because He abandoned His manhood to its nature. For the devil was to be conquered, not by God, but by the flesh.” Wherefore Chrysostom too says: “He proceeded no farther than Moses and Elias, lest His assumption of our flesh might seem incredible.”

Reply to Objection 1: It was becoming for Christ not to adopt an extreme form of austere life in order to show Himself outwardly in conformity with those to whom He preached. Now, no one should take up the office of preacher unless he be already cleansed and perfect in virtue, according to what is said of Christ, that “Jesus began to do and to teach” (Acts 1:1). Consequently, immediately after His baptism Christ adopted an austere form of life, in order to teach us the need of taming the flesh before passing on to the office of preaching, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 9:27): “I chastise my body, and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway.”

Reply to Objection 2: These words of Mark may be understood as meaning that “He was in the desert forty days and forty nights,” and that He fasted during that time: and the words, “and He was tempted by Satan,” may be taken as referring, not to the time during which He fasted, but to the time that followed: since Matthew says that “after He had fasted forty days and forty nights, afterwards He was hungry,” thus affording the devil a pretext for approaching Him. And so the words that follow, and the angels ministered to Him, are to be taken in sequence, which is clear from the words of Matthew (4:11): “Then the devil left Him,” i.e. after the temptation, “and behold angels came and ministered to Him.” And as to the words inserted by Mark, “and He was with the beasts,” according to Chrysostom (Hom. xiii in Matth.), they are set down in order to describe the desert as being impassable to man and full of beasts.

On the other hand, according to Bede’s exposition of Mk. 1:12,13, our Lord was tempted forty days and forty nights. But this is not to be understood of the visible temptations which are related by Matthew and Luke, and occurred after the fast, but of certain other assaults which perhaps Christ suffered from the devil during that time of His fast.

Reply to Objection 3: As Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13, the devil departed from Christ “for a time, because, later on, he returned, not to tempt Him, but to assail Him openly”—namely, at the time of His Passion. Nevertheless, He seemed in this later assault to tempt Christ to dejection and hatred of His neighbor; just as in the desert he had tempted Him to gluttonous pleasure and idolatrous contempt of God.

Whether the mode and order of the temptation were becoming?

Objection 1: It would seem that the mode and order of the temptation were unbecoming. For the devil tempts in order to induce us to sin. But if Christ had assuaged His bodily hunger by changing the stones into bread, He would not have sinned; just as neither did He sin when He multiplied the loaves, which was no less a miracle, in order to succor the hungry crowd. Therefore it seems that this was nowise a temptation.

Objection 2: Further, a counselor is inconsistent if he persuades the contrary to what he intends. But when the devil set Christ on a pinnacle of the Temple, he purposed to tempt Him to pride or vainglory. Therefore it was inconsistent to urge Him to cast Himself thence: for this would be contrary to pride or vainglory, which always seeks to rise.

Objection 3: Further, one temptation should lead to one sin. But in the temptation on the mountain he counseled two sins—namely, covetousness and idolatry. Therefore the mode of the temptation was unfitting.

Objection 4: Further, temptations are ordained to sin. But there are seven deadly sins, as we have stated in the [4214]FS, Q[84], A[4]. But the tempter only deals with three, viz. gluttony, vainglory, and covetousness. Therefore the temptation seems to have been incomplete.

Objection 5: Further, after overcoming all the vices, man is still tempted to pride or vainglory: since pride "worms itself in stealthily, and destroys even good works," as Augustine says (Ep. ccxi). Therefore Matthew unfittingly gives the last place to the temptation to covetousness on the mountain, and the second place to the temptation to vainglory in the Temple, especially since Luke puts them in the reverse order.

Objection 6: Further, Jerome says on Mat. 4:4 that "Christ purposed to overcome the devil by humility, not by might." Therefore He should not have repulsed him with a haughty rebuke, saying: "Begone, Satan."

Objection 7: Further, the gospel narrative seems to be false. For it seems impossible that Christ could have been set on a pinnacle of the Temple without being seen by others. Nor is there to be found a mountain so high that all the world can be seen from it, so that all the kingdoms of the earth could be shown to Christ from its summit. It seems, therefore, that Christ's temptation is unfittingly described.

On the contrary is the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The temptation which comes from the enemy takes the form of a suggestion, as Gregory says (Hom. xvi in Evang.). Now a suggestion cannot be made to everybody in the same way; it must arise from those things towards which each one has an inclination. Consequently the devil does not straight away tempt the spiritual man to grave sins, but he begins with lighter sins, so as gradually to lead him to those of greater magnitude. Wherefore Gregory (Moral. xxxi), expounding Job 39:25, "He smelleth the battle afar off, the encouraging of the captains and the shouting of the army,” says: “The captains are fittingly described as encouraging, and the army as shouting. Because vices begin by insinuating themselves into the mind under some specious pretext: then they come on the mind in such numbers as to drag it into all sorts of folly, deafening it with their bestial clamor.”

Thus, too, did the devil set about the temptation of the first man. For at first he enticed his mind to consent to the eating of the forbidden fruit, saying (Gn. 3:1): “Why hath God commanded you that you should not eat of every tree of paradise?” Secondly [he tempted him] to vainglory by saying: “Your eyes shall be opened.” Thirdly, he led the temptation to the extreme height of pride, saying: “You shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.” This same order did he observe in tempting Christ. For at first he tempted Him to that which men desire, however spiritual they may be—namely, the support of the corporeal nature by food. Secondly, he advanced to that matter in which spiritual men are sometimes found wanting, inasmuch as they do certain things for show, which pertains to vainglory. Thirdly, he led the temptation on to that in which no spiritual men, but only carnal men, have a part—namely, to desire worldly riches and fame, to the extent of holding God in contempt. And so in the first two temptations he said: “If Thou be the Son of God”; but not in the third, which is inapplicable to spiritual men, who are sons of God by adoption, whereas it does apply to the two preceding temptations.

And Christ resisted these temptations by quoting the authority of the Law, not by enforcing His power, “so as to give more honor to His human nature and a greater punishment to His adversary, since the foe of the human race was vanquished, not as by God, but as by man”; as Pope Leo says (Serm. 1, De Quadrag. 3).

Reply to Objection 1: To make use of what is needful for self-support is not the sin of gluttony; but if a man do anything inordinate out of the desire for such support, it can pertain to the sin of gluttony. Now it is inordinate for a man who has human assistance at his command to seek to obtain food miraculously for mere bodily support. Hence the Lord miraculously provided the children of Israel with manna in the desert, where there was no means of obtaining food otherwise. And in like fashion Christ miraculously provided the crowds with food in the desert, when there was no other means of getting food. But in order to assuage His hunger, He could have done otherwise than work a miracle, as did John the Baptist, according to Matthew (3:4); or He could have hastened to the neighboring country. Consequently the devil esteemed that if Christ was a mere man, He would fall into sin by attempting to assuage His hunger by a miracle.

Reply to Objection 2: It often happens that a man seeks to derive glory from external humiliation, whereby he is exalted by reason of spiritual good. Hence Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 12): “It must be noted that it is possible to boast not only of the beauty and splendor of material things, but even of filthy squalor.” And this is signified by the devil urging Christ to seek spiritual glory by casting His body down.

Reply to Objection 3: It is a sin to desire worldly riches and honors in an inordinate fashion. And the principal sign of this is when a man does something wrong in order to acquire such things. And so the devil was not satisfied with instigating to a desire for riches and honors, but he went so far as to tempt Christ, for the sake of gaining possession of these things, to fall down and adore him, which is a very great crime, and against God. Nor does he say merely, “if Thou wilt adore me,” but he adds, “if, falling down”; because, as Ambrose says on Lk. 4:5: “Ambition harbors yet another danger within itself: for, while seeking to rule, it will serve; it will bow in submission that it may be crowned with honor; and the higher it aims, the lower it abases itself.”

In like manner [the devil] in the preceding temptations tried to lead [Christ] from the desire of one sin to the commission of another; thus from the desire of food he tried to lead Him to the vanity of the needless working of a miracle; and from the desire of glory to tempt God by casting Himself headlong.

Reply to Objection 4: As Ambrose says on Lk. 4:13, Scripture would not have said that “‘all the temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him,’ unless the matter of all sins were included in the three temptations already related. For the causes of temptations are the causes of desires”—namely, “lust of the flesh, hope of glory, eagerness for power.”

Reply to Objection 5: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. ii): “It is not certain which happened first; whether the kingdoms of the earth were first shown to Him, and afterwards He was set on the pinnacle of the Temple; or the latter first, and the former afterwards. However, it matters not, provided it be made clear that all these things did take place.” It may be that the Evangelists set these things in different orders, because sometimes cupidity arises from vainglory, sometimes the reverse happens.

Reply to Objection 6: When Christ had suffered the wrong of being tempted by the devil saying, “If Thou be the Son of God cast Thyself down,” He was not troubled, nor did He upbraid the devil. But when the devil usurped to himself the honor due to God, saying, “All these things will I give Thee, if, falling down, Thou wilt adore me,” He was exasperated, and repulsed him, saying, “Begone, Satan”: that we might learn from His example to bear bravely insults leveled at ourselves, but not to allow ourselves so much as to listen to those which are aimed at God.

Reply to Objection 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. v in Matth.): “The devil set Him” (on a pinnacle of the Temple) “that He might be seen by all, whereas, unawares to the devil, He acted in such sort that He was seen by none.”

In regard to the words, “‘He showed Him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them,’ we are not to understand that He saw the very kingdoms, with the cities and inhabitants, their gold and silver: but that the devil pointed out the quarters in which each kingdom or city lay, and set forth to Him in words their glory and estate.” Or, again, as Origen says (Hom. xxx in Luc.), “he showed Him how, by means of the various vices, he was the lord of the world.”

OF CHRIST’S DOCTRINE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider Christ’s doctrine, about which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews only, or to the Gentiles also?

(2) Whether in preaching He should have avoided the opposition of the Jews?

(3) Whether He should have preached in an open or in a hidden manner?

(4) Whether He should have preached by word only, or also by writing?

Concerning the time when He began to teach, we have spoken above when treating of His baptism (Q[29], A[3]).

Whether Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have preached not only to the Jews, but also to the Gentiles. For it is written (Is. 49:6): “It is a small thing that thou shouldst be My servant to raise up the tribes of Israel [Vulg.: ‘Jacob’] and to convert the dregs of Jacob [Vulg.: ‘Israel’]: behold, I have given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be my salvation even to the farthest part of the earth.” But Christ gave light and salvation through His doctrine. Therefore it seems that it was “a small thing” that He preached to Jews alone, and not to the Gentiles.

Objection 2: Further, as it is written (Mat. 7:29): “He was teaching them as one having power.” Now the power of doctrine is made more manifest in the instruction of those who, like the Gentiles, have received no tidings whatever; hence the Apostle says (Rom. 15:20): “I have so preached the [Vulg.: ‘this’] gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man’s foundation.” Therefore much rather should Christ have preached to the Gentiles than to the Jews.

Objection 3: Further, it is more useful to instruct many than one. But Christ instructed some individual Gentiles, such as the Samaritan woman (Jn. 4) and the Chananaean woman (Mat. 15). Much more reason, therefore, was there for Christ to preach to the Gentiles in general.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 15:24): “I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost of the house of Israel.” And (Rom. 10:15) it is written: “How shall they preach unless they be sent?” Therefore Christ should not have preached to the Gentiles.

I answer that, It was fitting that Christ’s preaching, whether through Himself or through His apostles, should be directed at first to the Jews alone. First, in order to show that by His coming the promises were fulfilled which had been made to the Jews of old, and not to the Gentiles. Thus the Apostle says (Rom. 15:8): “I say that Christ . . . was minister of the circumcision,” i.e. the apostle and preacher of the Jews, “for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers.”

Secondly, in order to show that His coming was of God; because, as is written Rom. 13:1: “Those things which are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘those that are, are ordained of God’]” [*See Scriptural Index on this passage]. Now the right order demanded that the doctrine of Christ should be made known first to the Jews, who, by believing in and worshiping one God, were nearer to God, and that it should be transmitted through them to the Gentiles: just as in the heavenly hierarchy the Divine enlightenment comes to the lower angels through the higher. Hence on Mat. 15:24, “I was not sent but to the sheep that are lost in the house of Israel,” Jerome says: “He does not mean by this that He was not sent to the Gentiles, but that He was sent to the Jews first.” And so we read (Is. 66:19): “I will send of them that shall be saved,” i.e. of the Jews, “to the Gentiles . . . and they shall declare My glory unto the Gentiles.”

Thirdly, in order to deprive the Jews of ground for quibbling. Hence on Mat. 10:5, “Go ye not into the way of the Gentiles.” Jerome says: “It behooved Christ’s coming to be announced to the Jews first, lest they should have a valid excuse, and say that they had rejected our Lord because He had sent His apostles to the Gentiles and Samaritans.”

Fourthly, because it was through the triumph of the cross that Christ merited power and lordship over the Gentiles. Hence it is written (Apoc. 2:26, 28): “He that shall overcome . . . I will give him power over the nations . . . as I also have received of My Father”; and that because He became “obedient unto the death of the cross, God hath exalted Him . . . that in the name of Jesus every knee should bow . . .” and that “every tongue should confess Him” (Phil. 2:8–11). Consequently He did not wish His doctrine to be preached to the Gentiles before His Passion: it was after His Passion that He said to His disciples (Mat. 28:19): “Going, teach ye all nations.” For this reason it was that when, shortly before His Passion, certain Gentiles wished to see Jesus, He said: “Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone: but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit” (Jn. 12:20–25); and as Augustine says, commenting on this passage: “He called Himself the grain of wheat that must be mortified by the unbelief of the Jews, multiplied by the faith of the nations.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ was given to be the light and salvation of the Gentiles through His disciples, whom He sent to preach to them.

Reply to Objection 2: It is a sign, not of lesser, but of greater power to do something by means of others rather than by oneself. And thus the Divine power of Christ was specially shown in this, that He bestowed on the teaching of His disciples such a power that they converted the Gentiles to Christ, although these had heard nothing of Him.

Now the power of Christ's teaching is to be considered in the miracles by which He confirmed His doctrine, in the efficacy of His persuasion, and in the authority of His words, for He spoke as being Himself above the Law when He said: "But I say to you" (Mat. 5:22,28,32,34,39,44); and, again, in the force of His righteousness shown in His sinless manner of life.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as it was unfitting that Christ should at the outset make His doctrine known to the Gentiles equally with the Jews, in order that He might appear as being sent to the Jews, as to the first-born people; so neither was it fitting for Him to neglect the Gentiles altogether, lest they should be deprived of the hope of salvation. For this reason certain individual Gentiles were admitted, on account of the excellence of their faith and devotedness.

Whether Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have preached to the Jews without offending them. For, as Augustine says (De Agone Christ. xi): "In the Man Jesus Christ, a model of life is given us by the Son of God." But we should avoid offending not only the faithful, but even unbelievers, according to 1 Cor. 10:32: "Be without offense to the Jews, and to the Gentiles, and to the Church of God." Therefore it seems that, in His teaching, Christ should also have avoided giving offense to the Jews.

Objection 2: Further, no wise man should do anything that will hinder the result of his labor. Now through the disturbance which His teaching occasioned among the Jews, it was deprived of its results; for it is written (Lk. 11:53,54) that when our Lord reproved the Pharisees and Scribes, they "began vehemently to urge Him, end to oppress His mouth about many things; lying in wait for Him, and seeking to catch something from His mouth, that they might accuse Him." It seems therefore unfitting that He should have given them offense by His teaching.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:1): "An ancient man rebuke not; but entreat him as a father." But the priests and princes of the Jews were the elders of that people. Therefore it seems that they should not have been rebuked with severity.

On the contrary, It was foretold (Is. 8:14) that Christ would be "for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of offense to the two houses of Israel."

I answer that, The salvation of the multitude is to be preferred to the peace of any individuals whatsoever. Consequently, when certain ones, by their perverseness, hinder the salvation of the multitude, the preacher and the teacher should not fear to offend those men, in order that he may insure the salvation of the multitude. Now the Scribes and Pharisees and the princes of the Jews were by their malice a considerable hindrance to the salvation of the people, both because they opposed themselves to Christ's doctrine, which was the only way to salvation, and because their evil ways corrupted the morals of the people. For which reason our Lord, undeterred by their taking offense, publicly taught the truth which they hated, and condemned their vices. Hence we read (Mat. 15:12, 14) that when the disciples of our Lord said: "Dost Thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word, were scandalized?" He answered: "Let them alone: they are blind and leaders of the blind; and if the blind lead the blind, both fall into the pit."

Reply to Objection 1: A man ought so to avoid giving offense, as neither by wrong deed or word to be the occasion of anyone's downfall. "But if scandal arise from truth, the scandal should be borne rather than the truth be set aside," as Gregory says (Hom. vii in Ezech.).

Reply to Objection 2: By publicly reproving the Scribes and Pharisees, Christ promoted rather than hindered the effect of His teaching. Because when the people came to know the vices of those men, they were less inclined to be prejudiced against Christ by hearing what was said of Him by the Scribes and Pharisees, who were ever withstanding His doctrine.

Reply to Objection 3: This saying of the Apostle is to be understood of those elders whose years are reckoned not only in age and authority, but also in probity; according to Num. 11:16: "Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel, whom thou knowest to be ancients . . . of the people." But if by sinning openly they turn the authority of their years into an instrument of wickedness, they should be rebuked openly and severely, as also Daniel says (Dan. 13:52): "O thou that art grown old in evil days," etc.

Whether Christ should have taught all things openly?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have taught all things openly. For we read that He taught many things to His disciples apart: as is seen clearly in the sermon at the Supper. Wherefore He said: “That which you heard in the ear in the chambers shall be preached on the housetops” [*St. Thomas, probably quoting from memory, combines Mat. 10:27 with Lk. 12:3]. Therefore He did not teach all things openly.

Objection 2: Further, the depths of wisdom should not be expounded save to the perfect, according to 1 Cor. 2:6: “We speak wisdom among the perfect.” Now Christ’s doctrine contained the most profound wisdom. Therefore it should not have been made known to the imperfect crowd.

Objection 3: Further, it comes to the same, to hide the truth, whether by saying nothing or by making use of a language that is difficult to understand. Now Christ, by speaking to the multitudes a language they would not understand, hid from them the truth that He preached; since “without parables He did not speak to them” (Mat. 13:34). In the same way, therefore, He could have hidden it from them by saying nothing at all.

On the contrary, He says Himself (Jn. 18:20): “In secret I have spoken nothing.”

I answer that, Anyone’s doctrine may be hidden in three ways. First, on the part of the intention of the teacher, who does not wish to make his doctrine known to many, but rather to hide it. And this may happen in two ways—sometimes through envy on the part of the teacher, who desires to excel in his knowledge, wherefore he is unwilling to communicate it to others. But this was not the case with Christ, in whose person the following words are spoken (Wis. 7:13): “Which I have learned without guile, and communicate without envy, and her riches I hide not.” But sometimes this happens through the vileness of the things taught; thus Augustine says on Jn. 16:12: “There are some things so bad that no sort of human modesty can bear them.” Wherefore of heretical doctrine it is written (Prov. 9:17): “Stolen waters are sweeter.” Now, Christ’s doctrine is “not of error nor of uncleanness” (1 Thess. 2:3). Wherefore our Lord says (Mk. 4:21): “Doth a candle,” i.e. true and pure doctrine, “come in to be put under a bushel?”

Secondly, doctrine is hidden because it is put before few. And thus, again, did Christ teach nothing in secret: for He propounded His entire doctrine either to the whole crowd or to His disciples gathered together. Hence Augustine says on Jn. 18:20: “How can it be said that He speaks in secret when He speaks before so many men? . . . especially if what He says to few He wishes through them to be made known to many?”

Thirdly, doctrine is hidden, as to the manner in which it is propounded. And thus Christ spoke certain things in secret to the crowds, by employing parables in teaching them spiritual mysteries which they were either unable or unworthy to grasp: and yet it was better for them to be instructed in the knowledge of spiritual things, albeit hidden under the garb of parables, than to be deprived of it altogether. Nevertheless our Lord expounded the open and unveiled truth of these parables to His disciples, so that they might hand it down to others worthy of it; according to 2 Tim. 2:2: “The things which thou hast heard of me by many witnesses, the same command to faithful men, who shall be fit to teach others.” This is foreshadowed, Num. 4, where the sons of Aaron are commanded to wrap up the sacred vessels that were to be carried by the Levites.

Reply to Objection 1: As Hilary says, commenting on the passage quoted, “we do not read that our Lord was wont to preach at night, and expound His doctrine in the dark: but He says this because His speech is darkness to the carnal-minded, and His words are night to the unbeliever. His meaning, therefore, is that whatever He said we also should say in the midst of unbelievers, by openly believing and professing it.”

Or, according to Jerome, He speaks comparatively—that is to say, because He was instructing them in Judea, which was a small place compared with the whole world, where Christ’s doctrine was to be published by the preaching of the apostles.

Reply to Objection 2: By His doctrine our Lord did not make known all the depths of His wisdom, neither to the multitudes, nor, indeed, to His disciples, to whom He said (Jn. 16:12): “I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now.” Yet whatever things out of His wisdom He judged it right to make known to others, He expounded, not in secret, but openly; although He was not understood by all. Hence Augustine says on Jn. 18:20: “We must understand this, ‘I have spoken openly to the world,’ as though our Lord had said, ‘Many have heard Me’ . . . and, again, it was not ‘openly,’ because they did not understand.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, our Lord spoke to the multitudes in parables, because they were neither able nor worthy to receive the naked truth, which He revealed to His disciples.

And when it is said that “without parables He did not speak to them,” according to Chrysostom (Hom. xlvii in Matth.), we are to understand this of that particular sermon, since on other occasions He said many things to the multitude without parables. Or, as Augustine says (De Qq. Evang., qu. xvii), this means, “not that He spoke nothing literally, but that He scarcely ever spoke without introducing a parable, although He also spoke some things in the literal sense.”

Whether Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing. For the purpose of writing is to hand down doctrine to posterity. Now Christ’s doctrine was destined to endure for ever, according to Lk. 21:33: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away.” Therefore it seems that Christ should have committed His doctrine to writing.

Objection 2: Further, the Old Law was a foreshadowing of Christ, according to Heb. 10:1: “The Law has [Vulg.: ‘having’] a shadow of the good things to come.” Now the Old Law was put into writing by God, according to Ex. 24:12: “I will give thee” two “tables of stone and the law, and the commandments which I have written.” Therefore it seems that Christ also should have put His doctrine into writing.

Objection 3: Further, to Christ, who came to enlighten them that sit in darkness (Lk. 1:79), it belonged to remove occasions of error, and to open out the road to faith. Now He would have done this by putting His teaching into writing: for Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. i) that “some there are who wonder why our Lord wrote nothing, so that we have to believe what others have written about Him. Especially do those pagans ask this question who dare not blame or blaspheme Christ, and who ascribe to Him most excellent, but merely human, wisdom. These say that the disciples made out the Master to be more than He really was when they said that He was the Son of God and the Word of God, by whom all things were made.” And farther on he adds: “It seems as though they were prepared to believe whatever He might have written of Himself, but not what others at their discretion published about Him.” Therefore it seems that Christ should have Himself committed His doctrine to writing.

On the contrary, No books written by Him were to be found in the canon of Scripture.

I answer that, It was fitting that Christ should not commit His doctrine to writing. First, on account of His dignity: for the more excellent the teacher, the more excellent should be his manner of teaching. Consequently it was fitting that Christ, as the most excellent of teachers, should adopt that manner of teaching whereby His doctrine is imprinted on the hearts of His hearers; wherefore it is written (Mat. 7:29) that "He was teaching them as one having power." And so it was that among the Gentiles, Pythagoras and Socrates, who were teachers of great excellence, were unwilling to write anything. For writings are ordained, as to an end, unto the imprinting of doctrine in the hearts of the hearers.

Secondly, on account of the excellence of Christ's doctrine, which cannot be expressed in writing; according to Jn. 21:25: "There are also many other things which Jesus did: which, if they were written everyone, the world itself, I think, would not be able to contain the books that should be written." Which Augustine explains by saying: "We are not to believe that in respect of space the world could not contain them . . . but that by the capacity of the readers they could not be comprehended." And if Christ had committed His doctrine to writing, men would have had no deeper thought of His doctrine than that which appears on the surface of the writing.

Thirdly, that His doctrine might reach all in an orderly manner: Himself teaching His disciples immediately, and they subsequently teaching others, by preaching and writing: whereas if He Himself had written, His doctrine would have reached all immediately.

Hence it is said of Wisdom (Prov. 9:3) that "she hath sent her maids to invite to the tower." It is to be observed, however, that, as Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. i), some of the Gentiles thought that Christ wrote certain books treating of the magic art whereby He worked miracles: which art is condemned by the Christian learning. "And yet they who claim to have read those books of Christ do none of those things which they marvel at His doing according to those same books. Moreover, it is by a Divine judgment that they err so far as to assert that these books were, as it were, entitled as letters to Peter and Paul, for that they found them in several places depicted in company with Christ. No wonder that the inventors were deceived by the painters: for as long as Christ lived in the mortal flesh with His disciples, Paul was no disciple of His."

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same book: “Christ is the head of all His disciples who are members of His body. Consequently, when they put into writing what He showed forth and said to them, by no means must we say that He wrote nothing: since His members put forth that which they knew under His dictation. For at His command they, being His hands, as it were, wrote whatever He wished us to read concerning His deeds and words.”

Reply to Objection 2: Since the old Law was given under the form of sensible signs, therefore also was it fittingly written with sensible signs. But Christ’s doctrine, which is “the law of the spirit of life” (Rom. 8:2), had to be “written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in the fleshly tables of the heart,” as the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:3).

Reply to Objection 3: Those who were unwilling to believe what the apostles wrote of Christ would have refused to believe the writings of Christ, whom they deemed to work miracles by the magic art.

OF THE MIRACLES WORKED BY CHRIST, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the miracles worked by Christ: (1) In general; (2) Specifically, of each kind of miracle; (3) In particular, of His transfiguration.

Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ should have worked miracles?

(2) Whether He worked them by Divine power?

(3) When did He begin to work miracles?

(4) Whether His miracles are a sufficient proof of His Godhead?

Whether Christ should have worked miracles?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have worked miracles. For Christ’s deeds should have been consistent with His words. But He Himself said (Mat. 16:4): “A wicked and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet.” Therefore He should not have worked miracles.

Objection 2: Further, just as Christ, at His second coming, is to come "with" great power and majesty, as is written Mat. 24:30, so at His first coming He came in infirmity, according to Is. 53:3: "A man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity." But the working of miracles belongs to power rather than to infirmity. Therefore it was not fitting that He should work miracles in His first coming.

Objection 3: Further, Christ came that He might save men by faith; according to Heb. 12:2: "Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith." But miracles lessen the merit of faith; hence our Lord says (Jn. 4:48): "Unless you see signs and wonders you believe not." Therefore it seems that Christ should not have worked miracles.

On the contrary, It was said in the person of His adversaries (Jn. 11:47): "What do we; for this man doth many miracles?"

I answer that, God enables man to work miracles for two reasons. First and principally, in confirmation of the doctrine that a man teaches. For since those things which are of faith surpass human reason, they cannot be proved by human arguments, but need to be proved by the argument of Divine power: so that when a man does works that God alone can do, we may believe that what he says is from God: just as when a man is the bearer of letters sealed with the king's ring, it is to be believed that what they contain expresses the king's will.

Secondly, in order to make known God's presence in a man by the grace of the Holy Ghost: so that when a man does the works of God we may believe that God dwells in him by His grace. Wherefore it is written (Gal. 3:5): "He who giveth to you the Spirit, and worketh miracles among you."

Now both these things were to be made known to men concerning Christ—namely, that God dwelt in Him by grace, not of adoption, but of union: and that His supernatural doctrine was from God. And therefore it was most fitting that He should work miracles. Wherefore He Himself says (Jn. 10:38): "Though you will not believe Me, believe the works"; and (Jn. 5:36): "The works which the Father hath given Me to perfect . . . themselves . . . give testimony to Me."

Reply to Objection 1: These words, "a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas," mean, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xliii in Matth.), that "they did not receive a sign such as they sought, viz. from heaven": but not that He gave them no sign at all. Or that "He worked signs not for the sake of those whom He knew to be hardened, but to amend others." Therefore those signs were given, not to them, but to others.

Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ came "in the infirmity" of the flesh, which is manifested in the passions, yet He came "in the power of God" [*Cf. 2 Cor. 13:4], and this had to be made manifest by miracles.

Reply to Objection 3: Miracles lessen the merit of faith in so far as those are shown to be hard of heart who are unwilling to believe what is proved from the Scriptures unless (they are convinced) by miracles. Yet it is better for them to be converted to the faith even by miracles than that they should remain altogether in their unbelief. For it is written (1 Cor. 14:22) that signs are given "to unbelievers," viz. that they may be converted to the faith.

Whether Christ worked miracles by Divine power?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not work miracles by Divine power. For the Divine power is omnipotent. But it seems that Christ was not omnipotent in working miracles; for it is written (Mk. 6:5) that "He could not do any miracles there," i.e. in His own country. Therefore it seems that He did not work miracles by Divine power.

Objection 2: Further, God does not pray. But Christ sometimes prayed when working miracles; as may be seen in the raising of Lazarus (Jn. 11:41,42), and in the multiplication of the loaves, as related Mat. 14:19. Therefore it seems that He did not work miracles by Divine power.

Objection 3: Further, what is done by Divine power cannot be done by the power of any creature. But the things which Christ did could be done also by the power of a creature: wherefore the Pharisees said (Lk. 11:15) that He cast out devils "by Beelzebub the prince of devils." Therefore it seems that Christ did not work miracles by Divine power.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 14:10): "The Father who abideth in Me, He doth the works."

I answer that, as stated in the [4215]FP, Q[110], A[4], true miracles cannot be wrought save by Divine power: because God alone can change the order of nature; and this is what is meant by a miracle. Wherefore Pope Leo says (Ep. ad Flav. xxviii) that, while there are two natures in Christ, there is "one," viz. the Divine, which shines forth in miracles; and "another," viz. the human, "which submits to insults"; yet "each communicates its actions to the other": in as far as the human nature is the instrument of the Divine action, and the human action receives power from the Divine Nature, as stated above (Q[19], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that "He could not do any miracles there," it is not to be understood that He could not do them absolutely, but that it was not fitting for Him to do them: for it was unfitting for Him to work miracles among unbelievers. Wherefore it is said farther on: "And He wondered because of their unbelief." In like manner it is said (Gn. 18:17): "Can I hide from Abraham what I am about to do?" and Gn. 19:22: "I cannot do anything till thou go in thither."

Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom says on Mat. 14:19, "He took the five loaves and the two fishes, and, looking up to heaven, He blessed and brake: It was to be believed of Him, both that He is of the Father and that He is equal to Him . . . Therefore that He might prove both, He works miracles now with authority, now with prayer . . . in the lesser things, indeed, He looks up to heaven"—for instance, in multiplying the loaves—"but in the greater, which belong to God alone, He acts with authority; for example, when He forgave sins and raised the dead."

When it is said that in raising Lazarus He lifted up His eyes (Jn. 11:41), this was not because He needed to pray, but because He wished to teach us how to pray. Wherefore He said: "Because of the people who stand about have I said it: that they may believe that Thou hast sent Me."

Reply to Objection 3: Christ cast out demons otherwise than they are cast out by the power of demons. For demons are cast out from bodies by the power of higher demons in such a way that they retain their power over the soul: since the devil does not work against his own kingdom. On the other hand, Christ cast out demons, not only from the body, but still more from the soul. For this reason our Lord rebuked the blasphemy of the Jews, who said that He cast out demons by the power of the demons: first, by saying that Satan is not divided against himself; secondly, by quoting the instance of others who cast out demons by the Spirit of God; thirdly, because He could not have cast out a demon unless He had overcome Him by Divine power; fourthly, because there was nothing in common between His works and their effects and those of Satan; since Satan's purpose was to "scatter" those whom Christ "gathered" together [*Cf. Mat. 12:24–30; Mk. 3:22; Lk. 11:15–32].

Whether Christ began to work miracles when He changed water into wine at the marriage feast?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not begin to work miracles when He changed water into wine at the marriage feast. For we read in the book De Infantia Salvatoris that Christ worked many miracles in His childhood. But the miracle of changing water into wine at the marriage feast took place in the thirtieth or thirty-first year of His age. Therefore it seems that it was not then that He began to work miracles.

Objection 2: Further, Christ worked miracles by Divine power. Now He was possessed of Divine power from the first moment of His conception; for from that instant He was both God and man. Therefore it seems that He worked miracles from the very first.

Objection 3: Further, Christ began to gather His disciples after His baptism and temptation, as related Mat. 4:18 and Jn. 1:35. But the disciples gathered around Him, principally on account of His miracles: thus it is written (Lk. 5:4) that He called Peter when “he was astonished at” the miracle which He had worked in “the draught of fishes.” Therefore it seems that He worked other miracles before that of the marriage feast.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 2:11): “This beginning of miracles did Jesus in Cana of Galilee.”

I answer that, Christ worked miracles in order to confirm His doctrine, and in order to show forth His Divine power. Therefore, as to the first, it was unbecoming for Him to work miracles before He began to teach. And it was unfitting that He should begin to teach until He reached the perfect age, as we stated above, in speaking of His baptism ([4216]Q[39], A[3]). But as to the second, it was right that He should so manifest His Godhead by working miracles that men should believe in the reality of His manhood. And, consequently, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxi in Joan.), “it was fitting that He should not begin to work wonders from His early years: for men would have deemed the Incarnation to be imaginary and would have crucified Him before the proper time.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xvii in Joan.), in regard to the saying of John the Baptist, “‘That He may be made manifest in Israel, therefore am I come baptizing with water,’ it is clear that the wonders which some pretend to have been worked by Christ in His childhood are untrue and fictitious. For had Christ worked miracles from His early years, John would by no means have been unacquainted with Him, nor would the rest of the people have stood in need of a teacher to point Him out to them."

Reply to Objection 2: What the Divine power achieved in Christ was in proportion to the needs of the salvation of mankind, the achievement of which was the purpose of His taking flesh. Consequently He so worked miracles by the Divine power as not to prejudice our belief in the reality of His flesh.

Reply to Objection 3: The disciples were to be commended precisely because they followed Christ "without having seen Him work any miracles," as Gregory says in a homily (Hom. v in Evang.). And, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Joan.), "the need for working miracles arose then, especially when the disciples were already gathered around and attached to Him, and attentive to what was going on around them. Hence it is added: 'And His disciples believed in Him,'" not because they then believed in Him for the first time, but because then "they believed with greater discernment and perfection." Or they are called "disciples" because "they were to be disciples later on," as Augustine observes (De Consensu Evang. ii).

Whether the miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of His Godhead?

Objection 1: It would seem that the miracles which Christ worked were not a sufficient proof of His Godhead. For it is proper to Christ to be both God and man. But the miracles which Christ worked have been done by others also. Therefore they were not a sufficient proof of His Godhead.

Objection 2: Further, no power surpasses that of the Godhead. But some have worked greater miracles than Christ, for it is written (Jn. 14:12): "He that believeth in Me, the works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than these shall he do." Therefore it seems that the miracles which Christ worked are not sufficient proof of His Godhead.

Objection 3: Further, the particular is not a sufficient proof of the universal. But any one of Christ's miracles was one particular work. Therefore none of them was a sufficient proof of His Godhead, by reason of which He had universal power over all things.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 5:36): "The works which the Father hath given Me to perfect . . . themselves . . . give testimony of Me."

I answer that, The miracles which Christ worked were a sufficient proof of His Godhead in three respects. First, as to the very nature of the works, which surpassed the entire capability of created power, and therefore could not be done save by Divine power. For this reason the blind man, after his sight had been restored, said (Jn. 9:32,33): “From the beginning of the world it has not been heard, that any man hath opened the eyes of one born blind. Unless this man were of God, he could not do anything.”

Secondly, as to the way in which He worked miracles—namely, because He worked miracles as though of His own power, and not by praying, as others do. Wherefore it is written (Lk. 6:19) that “virtue went out from Him and healed all.” Whereby it is proved, as Cyril says (Comment. in Lucam) that “He did not receive power from another, but, being God by nature, He showed His own power over the sick. And this is how He worked countless miracles.” Hence on Mat. 8:16: “He cast out spirits with His word, and all that were sick He healed,” Chrysostom says: “Mark how great a multitude of persons healed, the Evangelists pass quickly over, not mentioning one by one . . . but in one word traversing an unspeakable sea of miracles.” And thus it was shown that His power was co-equal with that of God the Father, according to Jn. 5:19: “What things soever” the Father “doth, these the Son doth also in like manner”; and, again (Jn. 5:21): “As the Father raiseth up the dead and giveth life, so the Son also giveth life to whom He will.”

Thirdly, from the very fact that He taught that He was God; for unless this were true it would not be confirmed by miracles worked by Divine power. Hence it was said (Mk. 1:27): “What is this new doctrine? For with power He commandeth the unclean spirits, and they obey Him.”

Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of the Gentiles. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): “No suitable wonders; say they, show forth the presence of so great majesty, for the ghostly cleansing” whereby He cast out demons, “the cure of the sick, the raising of the dead to life, if other miracles be taken into account, are small things before God.” To this Augustine answers thus: “We own that the prophets did as much . . . But even Moses himself and the other prophets made Christ the Lord the object of their prophecy, and gave Him great glory . . . He, therefore, chose to do similar things to avoid the inconsistency of failing to do what He had done through others. Yet still He was bound to do something which no other had done: to be born of a virgin, to rise from the dead, and to ascend into heaven. If anyone deem this a slight thing for God to do, I know not what more he can expect. Having become man, ought He to have made another world, that we might believe Him to be Him by whom the world was made? But in this world neither a greater world could be made nor one equal to it: and if He had made a lesser world in comparison with this, that too would have been deemed a small thing."

As to the miracles worked by others, Christ did greater still. Hence on Jn. 15:24: "If I had not done in [Douay: 'among'] them the works that no other men hath done," etc., Augustine says: "None of the works of Christ seem to be greater than the raising of the dead: which thing we know the ancient prophets also did . . . Yet Christ did some works 'which no other man hath done.' But we are told in answer that others did works which He did not, and which none other did . . . But to heal with so great a power so many defects and ailments and grievances of mortal men, this we read concerning none soever of the men of old. To say nothing of those, each of whom by His bidding, as they came in His way, He made whole . . . Mark saith (6:56): 'Whithersoever He entered, into towns or into villages or into cities, they laid the sick in the streets, and besought Him that they might touch but the hem of His garment: and as many as touched Him were made whole.' These things none other did in them; for when He saith 'In them,' it is not to be understood to mean 'Among them,' or 'In their presence,' but wholly 'In them,' because He healed them . . . Therefore whatever works He did in them are works that none ever did; since if ever any other man did any one of them, by His doing he did it; whereas these works He did, not by their doing, but by Himself."

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine explains this passage of John as follows (Tract. lxxi): "What are these 'greater works' which believers in Him would do? That, as they passed by, their very shadow healed the sick? For it is greater that a shadow should heal than the hem of a garment . . . When, however, He said these words, it was the deeds and works of His words that He spoke of: for when He said . . . 'The Father who abideth in Me, He doth the works,' what works did He mean, then, but the words He was speaking? . . . and the fruits of those same words was the faith of those (who believed): but when the disciples preached the Gospel, not some few like those, but the very nations believed . . . (Tract. lxxii). Did not that rich man go away from His presence sorrowful? . . . and yet afterwards, what one individual, having heard from Him, did not, that many did when He spake by the mouth of His disciples . . . Behold, He did greater works when spoken of by men believing than when speaking to men hearing. But there is yet this difficulty: that He did these ‘greater works’ by the apostles: whereas He saith as meaning not only them: . . . ‘He that believeth in Me’ . . . Listen! . . . ‘He that believeth in Me, the works that I do, he also shall do’: first, ‘I do,’ then ‘he also shall do,’ because I do that he may do. What works—but that from ungodly he should be made righteous? . . . Which thing Christ worketh in him, truly, but not without him. Yes, I may affirm this to be altogether greater than to create” [*The words ‘to create’ are not in the text of St. Augustine] “heaven and earth . . . for ‘heaven and earth shall pass away’; but the salvation and justification of the predestinate shall remain . . . But also in the heavens . . . the angels are the works of Christ: and does that man do greater works than these, who co-operates with Christ in the work of his justification? . . . let him, who can, judge whether it be greater to create a righteous being than to justify an ungodly one. Certainly if both are works of equal power, the latter is a work of greater mercy.”

“But there is no need for us to understand all the works of Christ, where He saith ‘Greater than these shall he do.’ For by ‘these’ He meant, perhaps, those which He was doing at that hour: now at that time He was speaking words of faith: . . . and certainly it is less to preach words of righteousness, which thing He did without us, than to justify the ungodly, which thing He so doth in us that we also do it ourselves.”

Reply to Objection 3: When some particular work is proper to some agent, then that particular work is a sufficient proof of the whole power of that agent: thus, since the act of reasoning is proper to man, the mere fact that someone reasons about any particular proposition proves him to be a man. In like manner, since it is proper to God to work miracles by His own power, any single miracle worked by Christ by His own power is a sufficient proof that He is God.

OF (CHRIST’S) MIRACLES CONSIDERED SPECIFICALLY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider each kind of miracle:

(1) The miracles which He worked in spiritual substances;

(2) The miracles which He worked in heavenly bodies;

(3) The miracles which He worked in man;

(4) The miracles which He worked in irrational creatures.

Whether those miracles were fitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances?

Objection 1: It would seem that those miracles were unfitting which Christ worked in spiritual substances. For among spiritual substances the holy angels are above the demons; for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii): “The treacherous and sinful rational spirit of life is ruled by the rational, pious, and just spirit of life.” But we read of no miracles worked by Christ in the good angels. Therefore neither should He have worked miracles in the demons.

Objection 2: Further, Christ’s miracles were ordained to make known His Godhead. But Christ’s Godhead was not to be made known to the demons: since this would have hindered the mystery of His Passion, according to 1 Cor. 2:8: “If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.” Therefore He should not have worked miracles in the demons.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s miracles were ordained to the glory of God: hence it is written (Mat. 9:8) that “the multitudes seeing” that the man sick of the palsy had been healed by Christ, “feared, and glorified God that gave such power to men.” But the demons have no part in glorifying God; since “praise is not seemly in the mouth of a sinner” (Ecclus. 15:9). For which reason also “He suffered them not to speak” (Mk. 1:34; Lk. 4:41) those things which reflected glory on Him. Therefore it seems that it was unfitting for Him to work miracles in the demons.

Objection 4: Further, Christ’s miracles are ordained to the salvation of mankind. But sometimes the casting out of demons from men was detrimental to man, in some cases to the body: thus it is related (Mk.

9:24,25) that a demon at Christ’s command, “crying out and greatly tearing” the man, “went out of him; and he became as dead, so that many said: He is dead”; sometimes also to things: as when He sent the demons, at their own request, into the swine, which they cast headlong into the sea; wherefore the inhabitants of those parts “besought Him that He would depart from their coasts” (Mat. 8:31–34). Therefore it seems unfitting that He should have worked such like miracles.

On the contrary, this was foretold (Zech. 13:2), where it is written: “I will take away . . . the unclean spirit out of the earth.”

I answer that, The miracles worked by Christ were arguments for the faith which He taught. Now, by the power of His Godhead He was to rescue those who would believe in Him, from the power of the demons; according to Jn. 12:31: “Now shall the prince of this world be cast out.” Consequently it was fitting that, among other miracles, He should also deliver those who were obsessed by demons.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as men were to be delivered by Christ from the power of the demons, so by Him were they to be brought to the companionship of the angels, according to Col. 1:20: “Making peace through the blood of His cross, both as to the things on earth and the things that are in heaven.” Therefore it was not fitting to show forth to men other miracles as regards the angels, except by angels appearing to men: as happened in His Nativity, His Resurrection, and His Ascension.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix): “Christ was known to the demons just as much as He willed; and He willed just as far as there was need. But He was known to them, not as to the holy angels, by that which is eternal life, but by certain temporal effects of His power.” First, when they saw that Christ was hungry after fasting they deemed Him not to be the Son of God. Hence, on Lk. 4:3, “If Thou be the Son of God,” etc., Ambrose says: “What means this way of addressing Him? save that, though He knew that the Son of God was to come, yet he did not think that He had come in the weakness of the flesh?” But afterwards, when he saw Him work miracles, he had a sort of conjectural suspicion that He was the Son of God. Hence on Mk. 1:24, “I know who Thou art, the Holy one of God,” Chrysostom [*Victor of Antioch. Cf. Catena Aurea] says that “he had no certain or firm knowledge of God’s coming.” Yet he knew that He was “the Christ promised in the Law,” wherefore it is said (Lk. 4:41) that “they knew that He was Christ.” But it was rather from suspicion than from certainty that they confessed Him to be the Son of God. Hence Bede says on Lk. 4:41: “The demons confess the Son of God, and, as stated farther on, ‘they knew that He was Christ.’ For when the devil saw Him weakened by His fast, He knew Him to be a real man: but when He failed to overcome Him by temptation, He doubted lest He should be the Son of God. And now from the power of His miracles He either knew, or rather suspected that He was the Son of God. His reason therefore for persuading the Jews to crucify Him was not that he deemed Him not to be Christ or the Son of God, but because he did not foresee that he would be the loser by His death. For the Apostle says of this mystery” (1 Cor. 2:7,8), “which is hidden from the beginning, that ‘none of the princes of this world knew it,’ for if they had known it they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.”

Reply to Objection 3: The miracles which Christ worked in expelling demons were for the benefit, not of the demons, but of men, that they might glorify Him. Wherefore He forbade them to speak in His praise. First, to give us an example. For, as Athanasius says, “He restrained his speech, although he was confessing the truth; to teach us not to care about such things, although it may seem that what is said is true. For it is wrong to seek to learn from the devil when we have the Divine Scripture”: Besides, it is dangerous, since the demons frequently mix falsehood with truth. Or, as Chrysostom [*Cyril of Alexandria, Comment. in Luc.] says: “It was not meet for them to usurp the prerogative of the apostolic office. Nor was it fitting that the mystery of Christ should be proclaimed by a corrupt tongue” because “praise is not seemly in the mouth of a sinner” [*Cf. Theophylact, Enarr. in Luc.]. Thirdly, because, as Bede says, “He did not wish the envy of the Jews to be aroused thereby” [*Bede, Expos. in Luc. iv, 41]. Hence “even the apostles are commanded to be silent about Him, lest, if His Divine majesty were proclaimed, the gift of His Passion should be deferred.”

Reply to Objection 4: Christ came specially to teach and to work miracles for the good of man, and principally as to the salvation of his soul. Consequently, He allowed the demons, that He cast out, to do man some harm, either in his body or in his goods, for the salvation of man’s soul—namely, for man’s instruction. Hence Chrysostom says on Mat. 8:32 that Christ let the demons depart into the swine, “not as yielding to the demons, but first, to show . . . how harmful are the demons who attack men; secondly, that all might learn that the demons would not dare to hurt even the swine, except He allow them; thirdly, that they would have treated those men more grievously than they treated the swine, unless they had been protected by God's providence."

And for the same motives He allowed the man, who was being delivered from the demons, to suffer grievously for the moment; yet did He release him at once from that distress. By this, moreover, we are taught, as Bede says on Mk. 9:25, that "often, when after falling into sin we strive to return to God, we experience further and more grievous attacks from the old enemy. This he does, either that he may inspire us with a distaste for virtue, or that he may avenge the shame of having been cast out." For the man who was healed "became as dead," says Jerome, "because to those who are healed it is said, 'You are dead; and your life is hid with Christ in God'" (Col. 3:3)

Whether it was fitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was unfitting that Christ should work miracles in the heavenly bodies. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "it beseems Divine providence not to destroy, but to preserve, nature." Now, the heavenly bodies are by nature incorruptible and unchangeable, as is proved De Coelo i. Therefore it was unfitting that Christ should cause any change in the order of the heavenly bodies.

Objection 2: Further, the course of time is marked out by the movement of the heavenly bodies, according to Gn. 1:14: "Let there be lights made in the firmament of heaven . . . and let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days and years." Consequently if the movement of the heavenly bodies be changed, the distinction and order of the seasons is changed. But there is no report of this having been perceived by astronomers, "who gaze at the stars and observe the months," as it is written (Is. 47:13). Therefore it seems that Christ did not work any change in the movements of the heavenly bodies.

Objection 3: Further, it was more fitting that Christ should work miracles in life and when teaching, than in death: both because, as it is written (2 Cor. 13:4), "He was crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God," by which He worked miracles; and because His miracles were in confirmation of His doctrine. But there is no record of Christ having worked any miracles in the heavenly bodies during His lifetime: nay, more; when the Pharisees asked Him to give "a sign from heaven," He refused, as Matthew relates (12,16). Therefore it seems that neither in His death should He have worked any miracles in the heavenly bodies.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 23:44,45): "There was darkness over all the earth until the ninth hour; and the sun was darkened."

I answer that, As stated above ([4217]Q[43], A[4]) it behooved Christ's miracles to be a sufficient proof of His Godhead. Now this is not so sufficiently proved by changes wrought in the lower bodies, which changes can be brought about by other causes, as it is by changes wrought in the course of the heavenly bodies, which have been established by God alone in an unchangeable order. This is what Dionysius says in his epistle to Polycarp: "We must recognize that no alteration can take place in the order end movement of the heavens that is not caused by Him who made all and changes all by His word." Therefore it was fitting that Christ should work miracles even in the heavenly bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as it is natural to the lower bodies to be moved by the heavenly bodies, which are higher in the order of nature, so is it natural to any creature whatsoever to be changed by God, according to His will. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi; quoted by the gloss on Rom. 11:24: "Contrary to nature thou wert grafted," etc.): "God, the Creator and Author of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature: for whatsoever He does in each thing, that is its nature." Consequently the nature of a heavenly body is not destroyed when God changes its course: but it would be if the change were due to any other cause.

Reply to Objection 2: The order of the seasons was not disturbed by the miracle worked by Christ. For, according to some, this gloom or darkening of the sun, which occurred at the time of Christ's passion, was caused by the sun withdrawing its rays, without any change in the movement of the heavenly bodies, which measures the duration of the seasons. Hence Jerome says on Mat. 27:45: "It seems as though the 'greater light' withdrew its rays, lest it should look on its Lord hanging on the Cross, or bestow its radiancy on the impious blasphemers." And this withdrawal of the rays is not to be understood as though it were in the sun's power to send forth or withdraw its rays: for it sheds its light, not from choice, but by nature, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But the sun is said to withdraw its rays in so far as the Divine power caused the sun's rays not to reach the earth. On the other hand, Origen says this was caused by clouds coming between (the earth and the sun). Hence on Mat. 27:45 he says: "We must therefore suppose that many large and very dense clouds were massed together over Jerusalem and the land of Judea; so that it was exceedingly dark from the sixth to the ninth hour. Hence I am of opinion that, just as the other signs which occurred at the time of the Passion"—namely, "the rending of the veil, the quaking of the earth," etc.—"took place in Jerusalem only, so this also: . . . or if anyone prefer, it may be extended to the whole of Judea," since it is said that "'there was darkness over the whole earth,' which expression refers to the land of Judea, as may be gathered from 3 Kings 18:10, where Abdias says to Elias: 'As the Lord thy God liveth, there is no nation or kingdom whither my lord hath not sent to seek thee': which shows that they sought him among the nations in the neighborhood of Judea."

On this point, however, credence is to be given rather to Dionysius, who is an eyewitness as to this having occurred by the moon eclipsing the sun. For he says (Ep. ad Polycarp): "Without any doubt we saw the moon encroach on the sun," he being in Egypt at the time, as he says in the same letter. And in this he points out four miracles. The first is that the natural eclipse of the sun by interposition of the moon never takes place except when the sun and moon are in conjunction. But then the sun and moon were in opposition, it being the fifteenth day, since it was the Jewish Passover. Wherefore he says: "For it was not the time of conjunction."—The second miracle is that whereas at the sixth hour the moon was seen, together with the sun, in the middle of the heavens, in the evening it was seen to be in its place, i.e. in the east, opposite the sun. Wherefore he says: "Again we saw it," i.e. the moon, "return supernaturally into opposition with the sun," so as to be diametrically opposite, having withdrawn from the sun "at the ninth hour," when the darkness ceased, "until evening." From this it is clear that the wonted course of the seasons was not disturbed, because the Divine power caused the moon both to approach the sun supernaturally at an unwonted season, and to withdraw from the sun and return to its proper place according to the season. The third miracle was that the eclipse of the sun naturally always begins in that part of the sun which is to the west and spreads towards the east: and this is because the moon's proper movement from west to east is more rapid than that of the sun, and consequently the moon, coming up from the west, overtakes the sun and passes it on its eastward course. But in this case the moon had already passed the sun, and was distant from it by the length of half the heavenly circle, being opposite to it: consequently it had to return eastwards towards the sun, so as to come into apparent contact with it from the east, and continue in a westerly direction. This is what he refers to when he says: "Moreover, we saw the eclipse begin to the east and spread towards the western edge of the sun," for it was a total eclipse, "and afterwards pass away." The fourth miracle consisted in this, that in a natural eclipse that part of the sun which is first eclipsed is the first to reappear (because the moon, coming in front of the sun, by its natural movement passes on to the east, so as to come away first from the western portion of the sun, which was the first part to be eclipsed), whereas in this case the moon, while returning miraculously from the east to the west, did not pass the sun so as to be to the west of it: but having reached the western edge of the sun returned towards the east: so that the last portion of the sun to be eclipsed was the first to reappear. Consequently the eclipse began towards the east, whereas the sun began to reappear towards the west. And to this he refers by saying: "Again we observed that the occultation and emersion did not begin from the same point," i.e. on the same side of the sun, "but on opposite sides."

Chrysostom adds a fifth miracle (Hom. lxxxviii in Matth.), saying that "the darkness in this case lasted for three hours, whereas an eclipse of the sun lasts but a short time, for it is soon over, as those know who have seen one." Hence we are given to understand that the moon was stationary below the sun, except we prefer to say that the duration of the darkness was measured from the first moment of occultation of the sun to the moment when the sun had completely emerged from the eclipse.

But, as Origen says (on Mat. 27:45), "against this the children of this world object: How is it such a phenomenal occurrence is not related by any writer, whether Greek or barbarian?" And he says that someone of the name of Phlegon "relates in his chronicles that this took place during the reign of Tiberius Caesar, but he does not say that it occurred at the full moon." It may be, therefore, that because it was not the time for an eclipse, the various astronomers living then throughout the world were not on the lookout for one, and that they ascribed this darkness to some disturbance of the atmosphere. But in Egypt, where clouds are few on account of the tranquillity of the air, Dionysius and his companions were considerably astonished so as to make the aforesaid observations about this darkness.

Reply to Objection 3: Then, above all, was there need for miraculous proof of Christ’s Godhead, when the weakness of human nature was most apparent in Him. Hence it was that at His birth a new star appeared in the heavens. Wherefore Maximus says (Serm. de Nativ. viii): “If thou disdain the manger, raise thine eyes a little and gaze on the new star in the heavens, proclaiming to the world the birth of our Lord.” But in His Passion yet greater weakness appeared in His manhood. Therefore there was need for yet greater miracles in the greater lights of the world. And, as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxviii in Matth.): “This is the sign which He promised to them who sought for one saying: ‘An evil and adulterous generation seeketh a sign; and a sign shall not be given it, but the sign of Jonas the prophet,’ referring to His Cross . . . and Resurrection . . . For it was much more wonderful that this should happen when He was crucified than when He was walking on earth.”

Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on men?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ worked miracles unfittingly on men. For in man the soul is of more import than the body. Now Christ worked many miracles on bodies, but we do not read of His working any miracles on souls: for neither did He convert any unbelievers to the faith mightily, but by persuading and convincing them with outward miracles, nor is it related of Him that He made wise men out of fools. Therefore it seems that He worked miracles on men in an unfitting manner.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above ([4218]Q[43], A[2]), Christ worked miracles by Divine power: to which it is proper to work suddenly, perfectly, and without any assistance. Now Christ did not always heal men suddenly as to their bodies: for it is written (Mk. 8:22–25) that, “taking the blind man by the hand, He led him out of the town; and, spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands on him, He asked him if he saw anything. And, looking up, he said: I see men as it were trees walking. After that again He laid His hands upon his eyes, and he began to see, and was restored, so that he saw all things clearly." It is clear from this that He did not heal him suddenly, but at first imperfectly, and by means of His spittle. Therefore it seems that He worked miracles on men unfittingly.

Objection 3: Further, there is no need to remove at the same time things which do not follow from one another. Now bodily ailments are not always the result of sin, as appears from our Lord's words (Jn. 9:3): "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents, that he should be born blind." It was unseemly, therefore, for Him to forgive the sins of those who sought the healing of the body, as He is related to have done in the case of the man sick of the palsy (Mat. 9:2): the more that the healing of the body, being of less account than the forgiveness of sins, does not seem a sufficient argument for the power of forgiving sins.

Objection 4: Further, Christ's miracles were worked in order to confirm His doctrine, and witness to His Godhead, as stated above ([4219]Q[43], A[4]). Now no man should hinder the purpose of his own work. Therefore it seems unfitting that Christ commanded those who had been healed miraculously to tell no one, as appears from Mat. 9:30 and Mk. 8:26: the more so, since He commanded others to proclaim the miracles worked on them; thus it is related (Mk. 5:19) that, after delivering a man from the demons, He said to him: "Go into thy house to thy friends, and tell them, how great things the Lord hath done for thee."

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 7:37): "He hath done all things well: He hath made both the deaf to hear and the dumb to speak."

I answer that, The means should be proportionate to the end. Now Christ came into the world and taught in order to save man, according to Jn. 3:17: "For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world, but that the world may be saved by Him." Therefore it was fitting that Christ, by miraculously healing men in particular, should prove Himself to be the universal and spiritual Saviour of all.

Reply to Objection 1: The means are distinct from the end. Now the end for which Christ's miracles were worked was the health of the rational part, which is healed by the light of wisdom, and the gift of righteousness: the former of which presupposes the latter, since, as it is written (Wis. 1:4): "Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor dwell in a body subject to sins." Now it was unfitting that man should be made righteous unless he willed: for this would be both against the nature of righteousness, which implies rectitude of the will, and contrary to the very nature of man, which requires to be led to good by the free-will, not by force. Christ, therefore, justified man inwardly by the Divine power, but not against man's will. Nor did this pertain to His miracles, but to the end of His miracles. In like manner by the Divine power He infused wisdom into the simple minds of His disciples: hence He said to them (Lk. 21:15): "I will give you a mouth and wisdom" which "all your adversaries will not be able to resist and gainsay." And this, in so far as the enlightenment was inward, is not to be reckoned as a miracle, but only as regards the outward action—namely, in so far as men saw that those who had been unlettered and simple spoke with such wisdom and constancy. Wherefore it is written (Acts 4:13) that the Jews, "seeing the constancy of Peter and of John, understanding that they were illiterate and ignorant men . . . wondered."—And though such like spiritual effects are different from visible miracles, yet do they testify to Christ's doctrine and power, according to Heb. 2:4: "God also bearing them witness by signs and wonders and divers miracles, and distributions of the Holy Ghost."

Nevertheless Christ did work some miracles on the soul of man, principally by changing its lower powers. Hence Jerome, commenting on Mat. 9:9, "He rose up and followed Him," says: "Such was the splendor and majesty of His hidden Godhead, which shone forth even in His human countenance, that those who gazed on it were drawn to Him at first sight." And on Mat. 21:12, "(Jesus) cast out all them that sold and bought," the same Jerome says: "Of all the signs worked by our Lord, this seems to me the most wondrous—that one man, at that time despised, could, with the blows of one scourge, cast out such a multitude. For a fiery and heavenly light flashed from His eyes, and the majesty of His Godhead shone in His countenance." And Origen says on Jn. 2:15 that "this was a greater miracle than when He changed water into wine, for there He shows His power over inanimate matter, whereas here He tames the minds of thousands of men." Again, on Jn. 18:6, "They went backward and fell to the ground," Augustine says: "Though that crowd was fierce in hate and terrible with arms, yet did that one word . . . without any weapon, smite them through, drive them back, lay them prostrate: for God lay hidden in that flesh." Moreover, to this must be referred what Luke says (4:30)—namely, that Jesus, "passing through the midst of them, went His way," on which

Chrysostom observes (Hom. xlviii in Joan.): “That He stood in the midst of those who were lying in wait for Him, and was not seized by them, shows the power of His Godhead”; and, again, that which is written Jn. 8:59, “Jesus hid Himself and went out of the Temple,” on which Theophylact says: “He did not hide Himself in a corner of the Temple, as if afraid, or take shelter behind a wall or pillar; but by His heavenly power making Himself invisible to those who were threatening Him, He passed through the midst of them.”

From all these instances it is clear that Christ, when He willed, changed the minds of men by His Divine power, not only by the bestowal of righteousness and the infusion of wisdom, which pertains to the end of miracles, but also by outwardly drawing men to Himself, or by terrifying or stupefying them, which pertains to the miraculous itself.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ came to save the world, not only by Divine power, but also through the mystery of His Incarnation. Consequently in healing the sick He frequently not only made use of His Divine power, healing by way of command, but also by applying something pertaining to His human nature. Hence on Lk. 4:40, “He, laying His hands on every one of them, healed them,” Cyril says: “Although, as God, He might, by one word, have driven out all diseases, yet He touched them, showing that His own flesh was endowed with a healing virtue.” And on Mk. 8:23, “Spitting upon his eyes, laying His hands on him,” etc., Chrysostom [*Victor of Antioch] says: “He spat and laid His hands upon the blind man, wishing to show that His Divine word, accompanied by His operation, works wonders: for the hand signifies operation; the spittle signifies the word which proceeds from the mouth.” Again, on Jn. 9:6, “He made clay of the spittle, and spread the clay upon the eyes of the blind man,” Augustine says: “Of His spittle He made clay—because ‘the Word was made flesh.’” Or, again, as Chrysostom says, to signify that it was He who made man of “the slime of the earth.”

It is furthermore to be observed concerning Christ’s miracles that generally what He did was most perfect. Hence on Jn. 2:10, “Every man at first setteth forth good wine,” Chrysostom says: “Christ’s miracles are such as to far surpass the works of nature in splendor and usefulness.” Likewise in an instant He conferred perfect health on the sick. Hence on Mat. 8:15, “She arose and ministered to them,” Jerome says: “Health restored by our Lord returns wholly and instantly.”

There was, however, special reason for the contrary happening in the case of the man born blind, and this was his want of faith, as Chrysostom [*Victor of Antioch] says. Or as Bede observes on Mk. 8:23: “Whom He might have healed wholly and instantly by a single word, He heals little by little, to show the extent of human blindness, which hardly, and that only by degrees, can come back to the light: and to point out that each step forward in the way of perfection is due to the help of His grace.”

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4220]Q[43], A[2]), Christ worked miracles by Divine power. Now “the works of God are perfect” (Dt. 32:4). But nothing is perfect except it attain its end. Now the end of the outward healing worked by Christ is the healing of the soul. Consequently it was not fitting that Christ should heal a man’s body without healing his soul. Wherefore on Jn. 7:23, “I have healed the whole man on a Sabbath day,” Augustine says: “Because he was cured, so as to be whole in body; he believed, so as to be whole in soul.” To the man sick of the palsy it is said specially, “Thy sins are forgiven thee,” because, as Jerome observes on Mat. 9:5,6: “We are hereby given to understand that ailments of the body are frequently due to sin: for which reason, perhaps, first are his sins forgiven, that the cause of the ailment being removed, health may return.” Wherefore, also (Jn. 4:14), it is said: “Sin no more, lest some worse thing happen to thee.” Whence, says Chrysostom, “we learn that his sickness was the result of sin.”

Nevertheless, as Chrysostom says on Mat. 9:5: “By how much a soul is of more account than a body, by so much is the forgiving of sins a greater work than healing the body; but because the one is unseen He does the lesser and more manifest thing in order to prove the greater and more unseen.”

Reply to Objection 4: On Mat. 9:30, “See that no man know this,” Chrysostom says: “If in another place we find Him saying, ‘Go and declare the glory of God’ (cf. Mk. 5:19; Lk. 8:39), that is not contrary to this. For He instructs us to forbid them that would praise us on our own account: but if the glory be referred to God, then we must not forbid, but command, that it be done.”

Whether Christ worked miracles fittingly on irrational creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ worked miracles unfittingly on irrational creatures. For brute animals are more noble than plants. But Christ worked a miracle on plants as when the fig-tree withered away at His command (Mat. 21:19). Therefore Christ should have worked miracles also on brute animals.

Objection 2: Further, punishment is not justly inflicted save for fault. But it was not the fault of the fig-tree that Christ found no fruit on it, when fruit was not in season (Mk. 11:13). Therefore it seems unfitting that He withered it up.

Objection 3: Further, air and water are between heaven and earth. But Christ worked some miracles in the heavens, as stated above [4221](A[2]), and likewise in the earth, when it quaked at the time of His Passion (Mat. 27:51). Therefore it seems that He should also have worked miracles in the air and water, such as to divide the sea, as did Moses (Ex. 14:21); or a river, as did Josue (Josh. 3:16) and Elias (4 Kings 2:8); and to cause thunder to be heard in the air, as occurred on Mount Sinai when the Law was given (Ex. 19:16), and like to what Elias did (3 Kings 18:45).

Objection 4: Further, miraculous works pertain to the work of Divine providence in governing the world. But this work presupposes creation. It seems, therefore, unfitting that in His miracles Christ made use of creation: when, to wit, He multiplied the loaves. Therefore His miracles in regard to irrational creatures seem to have been unfitting.

On the contrary, Christ is “the wisdom of God” (1 Cor. 1:24), of whom it is said (Wis. 8:1) that “she ordereth all things sweetly.”

I answer that, As stated above, Christ’s miracles were ordained to the end that He should be recognized as having Divine power, unto the salvation of mankind. Now it belongs to the Divine power that every creature be subject thereto. Consequently it behooved Him to work miracles on every kind of creature, not only on man, but also on irrational creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: Brute animals are akin generically to man, wherefore they were created on the same day as man. And since He had worked many miracles on the bodies of men, there was no need for Him to work miracles on the bodies of brute animals. and so much the less that, as to their sensible and corporeal nature, the same reason applies to both men and animals, especially terrestrial. But fish, from living in water, are more alien from human nature; wherefore they were made on another day. On them Christ worked a miracle in the plentiful draught of fishes, related Lk. 5 and Jn. 21; and, again, in the fish caught by Peter, who found a stater in it (Mat. 17:26). As to the swine who were cast headlong into the sea, this was not the effect of a Divine miracle, but of the action of the demons, God permitting.

Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom says on Mat. 21:19: "When our Lord does any such like thing" on plants or brute animals, "ask not how it was just to wither up the fig-tree, since it was not the fruit season; to ask such a question is foolish in the extreme," because such things cannot commit a fault or be punished: "but look at the miracle, and wonder at the worker." Nor does the Creator "inflict" any hurt on the owner, if He choose to make use of His own creature for the salvation of others; rather, as Hilary says on Mat. 21:19, "we should see in this a proof of God's goodness, for when He wished to afford an example of salvation as being procured by Him, He exercised His mighty power on the human body: but when He wished to picture to them His severity towards those who wilfully disobey Him, He foreshadows their doom by His sentence on the tree." This is the more noteworthy in a fig-tree which, as Chrysostom observes (on Mat. 21:19), "being full of moisture, makes the miracle all the more remarkable."

Reply to Objection 3: Christ also worked miracles befitting to Himself in the air and water: when, to wit, as related Mat. 8:26, "He commanded the winds, and the sea, and there came a great calm." But it was not befitting that He who came to restore all things to a state of peace and calm should cause either a disturbance in the atmosphere or a division of waters. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 12:18): "You are not come to a fire that may be touched and approached [Vulg.: 'a mountain that might be touched, and a burning fire'], and a whirlwind, and darkness, and storm."

At the time of His Passion, however, the "veil was rent," to signify the unfolding of the mysteries of the Law; "the graves were opened," to signify that His death gave life to the dead; "the earth quaked and the rocks were rent," to signify that man's stony heart would be softened, and the whole world changed for the better by the virtue of His Passion.

Reply to Objection 4: The multiplication of the loaves was not effected by way of creation, but by an addition of extraneous matter transformed into loaves; hence Augustine says on Jn. 6:1–14: “Whence He multiplieth a few grains into harvests, thence in His hands He multiplied the five loaves”: and it is clearly by a process of transformation that grains are multiplied into harvests.

OF CHRIST’S TRANSFIGURATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We now consider Christ’s transfiguration; and here there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured?

(2) Whether the clarity of the transfiguration was the clarity of glory?

(3) Of the witnesses of the transfiguration;

(4) Of the testimony of the Father’s voice.

Whether it was fitting that Christ should be transfigured?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should be transfigured. For it is not fitting for a true body to be changed into various shapes [figuras], but only for an imaginary body. Now Christ’s body was not imaginary, but real, as stated above ([4222]Q[5], A[1]). Therefore it seems that it should not have been transfigured.

Objection 2: Further, figure is in the fourth species of quality, whereas clarity is in the third, since it is a sensible quality. Therefore Christ’s assuming clarity should not be called a transfiguration.

Objection 3: Further, a glorified body has four gifts, as we shall state farther on ([4223]XP, Q[82]), viz. impassibility, agility, subtlety, and clarity. Therefore His transfiguration should not have consisted in an assumption of clarity rather than of the other gifts.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 17:2) that Jesus “was transfigured” in the presence of three of His disciples.

I answer that, Our Lord, after foretelling His Passion to His disciples, had exhorted them to follow the path of His sufferings (Mat. 16:21, 24). Now in order that anyone go straight along a road, he must have some knowledge of the end: thus an archer will not shoot the arrow straight unless he first see the target. Hence Thomas said (Jn. 14:5): “Lord, we know not whither Thou goest; and how can we know the way?” Above all is this necessary when hard and rough is the road, heavy the going, but delightful the end. Now by His Passion Christ achieved glory, not only of His soul, not only of His soul, which He had from the first moment of His conception, but also of His body; according to Luke (24:26): “Christ ought [Vulg.: ‘ought not Christ’] to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory (?).” To which glory He brings those who follow the footsteps of His Passion, according to Acts 14:21: “Through many tribulations we must enter into the kingdom of God.” Therefore it was fitting that He should show His disciples the glory of His clarity (which is to be transfigured), to which He will configure those who are His; according to Phil. 3:21: “(Who) will reform the body of our lowness configured [Douay: ‘made like’] to the body of His glory.” Hence Bede says on Mk. 8:39: “By His loving foresight He allowed them to taste for a short time the contemplation of eternal joy, so that they might bear persecution bravely.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Mat. 17:2: “Let no one suppose that Christ,” through being said to be transfigured, “laid aside His natural shape and countenance, or substituted an imaginary or aerial body for His real body. The Evangelist describes the manner of His transfiguration when he says: ‘His face did shine as the sun, and His garments became white as snow.’ Brightness of face and whiteness of garments argue not a change of substance, but a putting on of glory.”

Reply to Objection 2: Figure is seen in the outline of a body, for it is “that which is enclosed by one or more boundaries” [*Euclid, bk i, def. xiv]. Therefore whatever has to do with the outline of a body seems to pertain to the figure. Now the clarity, just as the color, of a non-transparent body is seen on its surface, and consequently the assumption of clarity is called transfiguration.

Reply to Objection 3: Of those four gifts, clarity alone is a quality of the very person in himself; whereas the other three are not perceptible, save in some action or movement, or in some passion. Christ, then, did show in Himself certain indications of those three gifts—of agility, for instance, when He walked on the waves of the sea; of subtlety, when He came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; of impassibility, when He escaped unhurt from the hands of the Jews who wished to hurl Him down or to stone

Him. And yet He is not said, on account of this, to be transfigured, but only on account of clarity, which pertains to the aspect of His Person.

Whether this clarity was the clarity of glory?

Objection 1: It would seem that this clarity was not the clarity of glory. For a gloss of Bede on Mat. 17:2, “He was transfigured before them,” says: “In His mortal body He shows forth, not the state of immortality, but clarity like to that of future immortality.” But the clarity of glory is the clarity of immortality. Therefore the clarity which Christ showed to His disciples was not the clarity of glory.

Objection 2: Further, on Lk. 9:27 “(That) shall not taste death unless [Vulg.: ‘till’] they see the kingdom of God,” Bede’s gloss says: “That is, the glorification of the body in an imaginary vision of future beatitude.” But the image of a thing is not the thing itself. Therefore this was not the clarity of beatitude.

Objection 3: Further, the clarity of glory is only in a human body. But this clarity of the transfiguration was seen not only in Christ’s body, but also in His garments, and in “the bright cloud” which “overshaded” the disciples. Therefore it seems that this was not the clarity of glory.

On the contrary, Jerome says on the words “He was transfigured before them” (Mat. 17:2): “He appeared to the Apostles such as He will appear on the day of judgment.” And on Mat. 16:28, “Till they see the Son of Man coming in His kingdom,” Chrysostom says: “Wishing to show with what kind of glory He is afterwards to come, so far as it was possible for them to learn it, He showed it to them in their present life, that they might not grieve even over the death of their Lord.”

I answer that, The clarity which Christ assumed in His transfiguration was the clarity of glory as to its essence, but not as to its mode of being. For the clarity of the glorified body is derived from that of the soul, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Diosc. cxviii). And in like manner the clarity of Christ’s body in His transfiguration was derived from His God. head, as Damascene says (Orat. de Transfig.) and from the glory of His soul. That the glory of His soul did not overflow into His body from the first moment of Christ’s conception was due to a certain Divine dispensation, that, as stated above ([4224]Q[14], A[1], ad 2), He might fulfil the mysteries of our redemption in a passible body. This did not, however, deprive Christ of His power of outpouring the glory of His soul into His body. And this He did, as to clarity, in His transfiguration, but otherwise than in a glorified body. For the clarity of the soul overflows into a glorified body, by way of a permanent quality affecting the body. Hence bodily refulgence is not miraculous in a glorified body. But in Christ's transfiguration clarity overflowed from His Godhead and from His soul into His body, not as an immanent quality affecting His very body, but rather after the manner of a transient passion, as when the air is lit up by the sun. Consequently the refulgence, which appeared in Christ's body then, was miraculous: just as was the fact of His walking on the waves of the sea. Hence Dionysius says (Ep. ad Cai. iv): "Christ excelled man in doing that which is proper to man: this is shown in His supernatural conception of a virgin and in the unstable waters bearing the weight of material and earthly feet."

Wherefore we must not say, as Hugh of St. Victor [*Innocent III, De Myst. Miss. iv] said, that Christ assumed the gift of clarity in the transfiguration, of agility in walking on the sea, and of subtlety in coming forth from the Virgin's closed womb: because the gifts are immanent qualities of a glorified body. On the contrary, whatever pertained to the gifts, that He had miraculously. The same is to be said, as to the soul, of the vision in which Paul saw God in a rapture, as we have stated in the [4225]SS, Q[175], A[3], ad 2.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted prove, not that the clarity of Christ was not that of glory, but that it was not the clarity of a glorified body, since Christ's body was not as yet immortal. And just as it was by dispensation that in Christ the glory of the soul should not overflow into the body so was it possible that by dispensation it might overflow as to the gift of clarity and not as to that of impassibility.

Reply to Objection 2: This clarity is said to have been imaginary, not as though it were not really the clarity of glory, but because it was a kind of image representing that perfection of glory, in virtue of which the body will be glorious.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the clarity which was in Christ's body was a representation of His body's future clarity, so the clarity which was in His garments signified the future clarity of the saints, which will be surpassed by that of Christ, just as the brightness of the snow is surpassed by that of the sun. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xxxii) that Christ’s garments became resplendent, “because in the height of heavenly clarity all the saints will cling to Him in the refulgence of righteousness. For His garments signify the righteous, because He will unite them to Himself,” according to Is. 49:18: “Thou shalt be clothed with all these as with an ornament.”

The bright cloud signifies the glory of the Holy Ghost or the “power of the Father,” as Origen says (Tract. iii in Matth.), by which in the glory to come the saints will be covered. Or, again, it may be said fittingly that it signifies the clarity of the world redeemed, which clarity will cover the saints as a tent. Hence when Peter proposed to make tents, “a bright cloud overshaded” the disciples.

Whether the witnesses of the transfiguration were fittingly chosen?

Objection 1: It would seem that the witnesses of the transfiguration were unfittingly chosen. For everyone is a better witness of things that he knows. But at the time of Christ’s transfiguration no one but the angels had as yet any knowledge from experience of the glory to come. Therefore the witnesses of the transfiguration should have been angels rather than men.

Objection 2: Further, truth, not fiction, is becoming in a witness of the truth. Now, Moses and Elias were there, not really, but only in appearance; for a gloss on Lk. 9:30, “They were Moses and Elias,” says: “It must be observed that Moses and Elias were there neither in body nor in soul”; but that those bodies were formed “of some available matter. It is also credible that this was the result of the angelic ministries, through the angels impersonating them.” Therefore it seems that they were unsuitable witnesses.

Objection 3: Further, it is said (Acts 10:43) that “all the prophets give testimony” to Christ. Therefore not only Moses and Elias, but also all the prophets, should have been present as witnesses.

Objection 4: Further, Christ’s glory is promised as a reward to all the faithful (2 Cor. 3:18; Phil. 3:21), in whom He wished by His transfiguration to enkindle a desire of that glory. Therefore He should have taken not only Peter, James, and John, but all His disciples, to be witnesses of His transfiguration.

On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel.

I answer that, Christ wished to be transfigured in order to show men His glory, and to arouse men to a desire of it, as stated above [4226](A[1]). Now men are brought to the glory of eternal beatitude by Christ—not only those who lived after Him, but also those who preceded Him; therefore, when He was approaching His Passion, both “the multitude that followed” and that “which went before, cried saying: ‘Hosanna,’” as related Mat. 21:9, beseeching Him, as it were, to save them. Consequently it was fitting that witnesses should be present from among those who preceded Him—namely, Moses and Elias—and from those who followed after Him—namely, Peter, James, and John—that “in the mouth of two or three witnesses” this word might stand.

Reply to Objection 1: By His transfiguration Christ manifested to His disciples the glory of His body, which belongs to men only. It was therefore fitting that He should choose men and not angels as witnesses.

Reply to Objection 2: This gloss is said to be taken from a book entitled On the Marvels of Holy Scripture. It is not an authentic work, but is wrongly ascribed to St. Augustine; consequently we need not stand by it. For Jerome says on Mat. 17:3: “Observe that when the Scribes and Pharisees asked for a sign from heaven, He refused to give one; whereas here in order to increase the apostles’ faith, He gives a sign from heaven, Elias coming down thence, whither he had ascended, and Moses arising from the nether world.” This is not to be understood as though the soul of Moses was reunited to his body, but that his soul appeared through some assumed body, just as the angels do. But Elias appeared in his own body, not that he was brought down from the empyrean heaven, but from some place on high whither he was taken up in the fiery chariot.

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says on Mat. 17:3: “Moses and Elias are brought forward for many reasons.” And, first of all, “because the multitude said He was Elias or Jeremias or one of the prophets, He brings the leaders of the prophets with Him; that hereby at least they might see the difference between the servants and their Lord.” Another reason was “ . . . that Moses gave the Law . . . while Elias . . . was jealous for the glory of God.” Therefore by appearing together with Christ, they show how falsely the Jews “accused Him of transgressing the Law, and of blasphemously appropriating to Himself the glory of God.” A third reason was “to show that He has power of death and life, and that He is the judge of the dead and the living; by bringing with Him Moses who had died, and Elias who still lived.” A fourth reason was because, as Luke says (9:31), “they spoke” with Him “of His decease that He should accomplish in Jerusalem,” i.e. of His Passion and death. Therefore, “in order to strengthen the hearts of His disciples with a view to this,” He sets before them those who had exposed themselves to death for God’s sake: since Moses braved death in opposing Pharaoh, and Elias in opposing Achab. A fifth reason was that “He wished His disciples to imitate the meekness of Moses and the zeal of Elias.” Hilary adds a sixth reason—namely, in order to signify that He had been foretold by the Law, which Moses gave them, and by the prophets, of whom Elias was the principal.

Reply to Objection 4: Lofty mysteries should not be immediately explained to everyone, but should be handed down through superiors to others in their proper turn. Consequently, as Chrysostom says (on Mat. 17:3), “He took these three as being superior to the rest.” For “Peter excelled in the love” he bore to Christ and in the power bestowed on him; John in the privilege of Christ’s love for him on account of his virginity, and, again, on account of his being privileged to be an Evangelist; James on account of the privilege of martyrdom. Nevertheless He did not wish them to tell others what they had seen before His Resurrection; “lest,” as Jerome says on Mat. 17:19, “such a wonderful thing should seem incredible to them; and lest, after hearing of so great glory, they should be scandalized at the Cross” that followed; or, again, “lest [the Cross] should be entirely hindered by the people” [*Bede, Hom. xviii; cf. Catena Aurea]; and “in order that they might then be witnesses of spiritual things when they should be filled with the Holy Ghost” [*Hilary, in Matth. xvii].

Whether the testimony of the Father’s voice, saying, “This is My beloved Son,” was fittingly added?

Objection 1: It would seem that the testimony of the Father’s voice, saying, “This is My beloved Son,” was not fittingly added; for, as it is written (Job 33:14), “God speaketh once, and repeateth not the selfsame thing the second time.” But the Father’s voice had testified to this at the time of (Christ’s) baptism. Therefore it was not fitting that He should bear witness to it a second time.

Objection 2: Further, at the baptism the Holy Ghost appeared under the form of a dove at the same time as the Father's voice was heard. But this did not happen at the transfiguration. Therefore it seems that the testimony of the Father was made in an unfitting manner.

Objection 3: Further, Christ began to teach after His baptism. Nevertheless, the Father's voice did not then command men to hear him. Therefore neither should it have so commanded at the transfiguration.

Objection 4: Further, things should not be said to those who cannot bear them, according to Jn. 16:12: "I have yet many things to say to you, but you cannot bear them now." But the disciples could not bear the Father's voice; for it is written (Mat. 17:6) that "the disciples hearing, fell upon their face, and were very much afraid." Therefore the Father's voice should not have been addressed to them.

On the contrary is the authority of the Gospel.

I answer that, The adoption of the sons of God is through a certain conformity of image to the natural Son of God. Now this takes place in two ways: first, by the grace of the wayfarer, which is imperfect conformity; secondly, by glory, which is perfect conformity, according to 1 Jn. 3:2: "We are now the sons of God, and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be: we know that, when He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is." Since, therefore, it is in baptism that we acquire grace, while the clarity of the glory to come was foreshadowed in the transfiguration, therefore both in His baptism and in His transfiguration the natural sonship of Christ was fittingly made known by the testimony of the Father: because He alone with the Son and Holy Ghost is perfectly conscious of that perfect generation.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted are to be understood of God's eternal speaking, by which God the Father uttered the only-begotten and co-eternal Word. Nevertheless, it can be said that God uttered the same thing twice in a bodily voice, yet not for the same purpose, but in order to show the divers modes in which men can be partakers of the likeness of the eternal Sonship.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as in the Baptism, where the mystery of the first regeneration was proclaimed, the operation of the whole Trinity was made manifest, because the Son Incarnate was there, the Holy Ghost appeared under the form of a dove, and the Father made Himself known in the voice; so also in the transfiguration, which is the mystery of the second regeneration, the whole Trinity appears—the Father in the voice, the Son in the man, the Holy Ghost in the bright cloud; for just as in baptism He confers innocence, signified by the simplicity of the dove, so in the resurrection will He give His elect the clarity of glory and refreshment from all sorts of evil, which are signified by the bright cloud.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ came to give grace actually, and to promise glory by His words. Therefore it was fitting at the time of His transfiguration, and not at the time of His baptism, that men should be commanded to hear Him.

Reply to Objection 4: It was fitting that the disciples should be afraid and fall down on hearing the voice of the Father, to show that the glory which was then being revealed surpasses in excellence the sense and faculty of all mortal beings; according to Ex. 33:20: “Man shall not see Me and live.” This is what Jerome says on Mat. 17:6: “Such is human frailty that it cannot bear to gaze on such great glory.” But men are healed of this frailty by Christ when He brings them into glory. And this is signified by what He says to them: “Arise, and fear not.”

THE PASSION OF CHRIST (TWELVE ARTICLES)

In proper sequence we have now to consider all that relates to Christ’s leaving the world. In the first place, His Passion; secondly, His death; thirdly, His burial; and, fourthly, His descent into hell.

With regard to the Passion, there arises a threefold consideration: (1) The Passion itself; (2) the efficient cause of the Passion; (3) the fruits of the Passion.

Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for men’s deliverance?

(2) Whether there was any other possible means of delivering men?

(3) Whether this was the more suitable means?

(4) Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer on the cross?

(5) The extent of His sufferings;

(6) Whether the pain which He endured was the greatest?

(7) Whether His entire soul suffered?

(8) Whether His Passion hindered the joy of fruition?

(9) The time of the Passion;

(10) The place;

(11) Whether it was fitting for Him to be crucified with robbers?

(12) Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to the Godhead?

Whether it was necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for Christ to suffer for the deliverance of the human race. For the human race could not be delivered except by God, according to Is. 45:21: “Am not I the Lord, and there is no God else besides Me? A just God and a Saviour, there is none besides Me.” But no necessity can compel God, for this would be repugnant to His omnipotence. Therefore it was not necessary for Christ to suffer.

Objection 2: Further, what is necessary is opposed to what is voluntary. But Christ suffered of His own will; for it is written (Is. 53:7): “He was offered because it was His own will.” Therefore it was not necessary for Him to suffer.

Objection 3: Further, as is written (Ps. 24:10): “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.” But it does not seem necessary that He should suffer on the part of the Divine mercy, which, as it bestows gifts freely, so it appears to condone debts without satisfaction: nor, again, on the part of Divine justice, according to which man had deserved everlasting condemnation. Therefore it does not seem necessary that Christ should have suffered for man’s deliverance.

Objection 4: Further, the angelic nature is more excellent than the human, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But Christ did not suffer to repair the angelic nature which had sinned. Therefore, apparently, neither was it necessary for Him to suffer for the salvation of the human race.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:14): “As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting."

I answer that, As the Philosopher teaches (Metaph. v), there are several acceptations of the word "necessary." In one way it means anything which of its nature cannot be otherwise; and in this way it is evident that it was not necessary either on the part of God or on the part of man for Christ to suffer. In another sense a thing may be necessary from some cause quite apart from itself; and should this be either an efficient or a moving cause then it brings about the necessity of compulsion; as, for instance, when a man cannot get away owing to the violence of someone else holding him. But if the external factor which induces necessity be an end, then it will be said to be necessary from presupposing such end—namely, when some particular end cannot exist at all, or not conveniently, except such end be presupposed. It was not necessary, then, for Christ to suffer from necessity of compulsion, either on God's part, who ruled that Christ should suffer, or on Christ's own part, who suffered voluntarily. Yet it was necessary from necessity of the end proposed; and this can be accepted in three ways. First of all, on our part, who have been delivered by His Passion, according to John (3:14): "The Son of man must be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish, but may have life everlasting." Secondly, on Christ's part, who merited the glory of being exalted, through the lowliness of His Passion: and to this must be referred Lk. 24:26: "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory?" Thirdly, on God's part, whose determination regarding the Passion of Christ, foretold in the Scriptures and prefigured in the observances of the Old Testament, had to be fulfilled. And this is what St. Luke says (22:22): "The Son of man indeed goeth, according to that which is determined"; and (Lk. 24:44, 46): "These are the words which I spoke to you while I was yet with you, that all things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the law of Moses, and in the prophets, and in the psalms concerning Me: for it is thus written, and thus it behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead."

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is based on the necessity of compulsion on God's part.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument rests on the necessity of compulsion on the part of the man Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: That man should be delivered by Christ's Passion was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice, because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice: and with His mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature, as was said above ([4227]Q[1], A[2]), God gave him His Son to satisfy for him, according to Rom. 3:24,25: "Being justified freely by His grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood." And this came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction. Hence it is said (Eph. 2:4): "God, who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ."

Reply to Objection 4: The sin of the angels was irreparable; not so the sin of the first man ([4228]FP, Q[64], A[2]).

Whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the Passion of Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was no other possible way of human deliverance besides Christ's Passion. For our Lord says (Jn. 12:24): "Amen, amen I say to you, unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground dieth, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." Upon this St. Augustine (Tract. li) observes that "Christ called Himself the seed." Consequently, unless He suffered death, He would not otherwise have produced the fruit of our redemption.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord addresses the Father (Mat. 26:42): "My Father, if this chalice may not pass away but I must drink it, Thy will be done." But He spoke there of the chalice of the Passion. Therefore Christ's Passion could not pass away; hence Hilary says (Comm. 31 in Matth.): "Therefore the chalice cannot pass except He drink of it, because we cannot be restored except through His Passion."

Objection 3: Further, God's justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion in order that man might be delivered from sin. But Christ cannot let His justice pass; for it is written (2 Tim. 2:13): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself were He to deny His justice, since He is justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to be delivered otherwise than by Christ's Passion.

Objection 4: Further, there can be no falsehood underlying faith. But the Fathers of old believed that Christ would suffer. Consequently, it seems that it had to be that Christ should suffer.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): “We assert that the way whereby God deigned to deliver us by the man Jesus Christ, who is mediator between God and man, is both good and befitting the Divine dignity; but let us also show that other possible means were not lacking on God’s part, to whose power all things are equally subordinate.”

I answer that, A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two ways: first of all, simply and absolutely; or secondly, from supposition. Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the Passion of Christ, because “no word shall be impossible with God” (Lk. 1:37). Yet it was impossible if some supposition be made. For since it is impossible for God’s foreknowledge to be deceived and His will or ordinance to be frustrated, then, supposing God’s foreknowledge and ordinance regarding Christ’s Passion, it was not possible at the same time for Christ not to suffer, and for mankind to be delivered otherwise than by Christ’s Passion. And the same holds good of all things foreknown and preordained by God, as was laid down in the [4229]FP, Q[14], A[13].

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking there presupposing God’s foreknowledge and predetermination, according to which it was resolved that the fruit of man’s salvation should not follow unless Christ suffered.

Reply to Objection 2: In the same way we must understand what is here objected to in the second instance: “If this chalice may not pass away but I must drink of it”—that is to say, because Thou hast so ordained it—hence He adds: “Thy will be done.”

Reply to Objection 3: Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against another—for instance, against another man, or against the State, or any Prince in higher authority. But God has no one higher than Himself, for He is the sovereign and common good of the whole universe. Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly. And so David exclaimed when he sought mercy: “To Thee only have I sinned” (Ps. 50:6), as if to say: “Thou canst pardon me without injustice.”

Reply to Objection 4: Human faith, and even the Divine Scriptures upon which faith is based, are both based on the Divine foreknowledge and ordinance. And the same reason holds good of that necessity which comes of supposition, and of the necessity which arises of the Divine foreknowledge and will.

Whether there was any more suitable way of delivering the human race than by Christ’s Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was some other more suitable way of delivering the human race besides Christ’s Passion. For nature in its operation imitates the Divine work, since it is moved and regulated by God. But nature never employs two agents where one will suffice. Therefore, since God could have liberated mankind solely by His Divine will, it does not seem fitting that Christ’s Passion should have been added for the deliverance of the human race.

Objection 2: Further, natural actions are more suitably performed than deeds of violence, because violence is “a severance or lapse from what is according to nature,” as is said in De Coelo ii. But Christ’s Passion brought about His death by violence. Therefore it would have been more appropriate had Christ died a natural death rather than suffer for man’s deliverance.

Objection 3: Further, it seems most fitting that whatsoever keeps something unjustly and by violence, should be deprived of it by some superior power; hence Isaias says (52:3): “You were sold gratis, and you shall be redeemed without money.” But the devil possessed no right over man, whom he had deceived by guile, and whom he held subject in servitude by a sort of violence. Therefore it seems most suitable that Christ should have despoiled the devil solely by His power and without the Passion.

On the contrary, St. Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): “There was no other more suitable way of healing our misery” than by the Passion of Christ.

I answer that, Among means to an end that one is the more suitable whereby the various concurring means employed are themselves helpful to such end. But in this that man was delivered by Christ's Passion, many other things besides deliverance from sin concurred for man's salvation. In the first place, man knows thereby how much God loves him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and herein lies the perfection of human salvation; hence the Apostle says (Rom. 5:8): "God commendeth His charity towards us; for when as yet we were sinners . . . Christ died for us." Secondly, because thereby He set us an example of obedience, humility, constancy, justice, and the other virtues displayed in the Passion, which are requisite for man's salvation. Hence it is written (1 Pet. 2:21): "Christ also suffered for us, leaving you an example that you should follow in His steps." Thirdly, because Christ by His Passion not only delivered man from sin, but also merited justifying grace for him and the glory of bliss, as shall be shown later ([4230]Q[48], A[1];[4231] Q[49], AA[1], 5). Fourthly, because by this man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, according to 1 Cor. 6:20: "You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body." Fifthly, because it redounded to man's greater dignity, that as man was overcome and deceived by the devil, so also it should be a man that should overthrow the devil; and as man deserved death, so a man by dying should vanquish death. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 15:57): "Thanks be to God who hath given us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ." It was accordingly more fitting that we should be delivered by Christ's Passion than simply by God's good-will.

Reply to Objection 1: Even nature uses several means to one intent, in order to do something more fittingly: as two eyes for seeing; and the same can be observed in other matters.

Reply to Objection 2: As Chrysostom [*Athanasius, Orat. De Incarn. Verb.] says: "Christ had come in order to destroy death, not His own, (for since He is life itself, death could not be His), but men's death. Hence it was not by reason of His being bound to die that He laid His body aside, but because the death He endured was inflicted on Him by men. But even if His body had sickened and dissolved in the sight of all men, it was not befitting Him who healed the infirmities of others to have his own body afflicted with the same. And even had He laid His body aside without any sickness, and had then appeared, men would not have believed Him when He spoke of His resurrection. For how could Christ’s victory over death appear, unless He endured it in the sight of all men, and so proved that death was vanquished by the incorruption of His body?”

Reply to Objection 3: Although the devil assailed man unjustly, nevertheless, on account of sin, man was justly left by God under the devil’s bondage. And therefore it was fitting that through justice man should be delivered from the devil’s bondage by Christ making satisfaction on his behalf in the Passion. This was also a fitting means of overthrowing the pride of the devil, “who is a deserter from justice, and covetous of sway”; in that Christ “should vanquish him and deliver man, not merely by the power of His Godhead, but likewise by the justice and lowliness of the Passion,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii).

Whether Christ ought to have suffered on the cross?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have suffered on the cross. For the truth ought to conform to the figure. But in all the sacrifices of the Old Testament which prefigured Christ the beasts were slain with a sword and afterwards consumed by fire. Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have suffered on a cross, but rather by the sword or by fire.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that Christ ought not to assume “dishonoring afflictions.” But death on a cross was most dishonoring and ignominious; hence it is written (Wis. 2:20): “Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death.” Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have undergone the death of the cross.

Objection 3: Further, it was said of Christ (Mat. 21:9): “Blessed is He that cometh in the name of the Lord.” But death upon the cross was a death of malediction, as we read Dt. 21:23: “He is accursed of God that hangeth on a tree.” Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to be crucified.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): “He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross.”

I answer that, It was most fitting that Christ should suffer the death of the cross.

First of all, as an example of virtue. For Augustine thus writes (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 25): “God’s Wisdom became man to give us an example in righteousness of living. But it is part of righteous living not to stand in fear of things which ought not to be feared. Now there are some men who, although they do not fear death in itself, are yet troubled over the manner of their death. In order, then, that no kind of death should trouble an upright man, the cross of this Man had to be set before him, because, among all kinds of death, none was more execrable, more fear-inspiring, than this."

Secondly, because this kind of death was especially suitable in order to atone for the sin of our first parent, which was the plucking of the apple from the forbidden tree against God's command. And so, to atone for that sin, it was fitting that Christ should suffer by being fastened to a tree, as if restoring what Adam had purloined; according to Ps. 68:5: "Then did I pay that which I took not away." Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion [*Cf. Serm. ci De Tempore]: "Adam despised the command, plucking the apple from the tree: but all that Adam lost, Christ found upon the cross."

The third reason is because, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Passion (De Cruce et Latrone i, ii): "He suffered upon a high rood and not under a roof, in order that the nature of the air might be purified: and the earth felt a like benefit, for it was cleansed by the flowing of the blood from His side." And on Jn. 3:14: "The Son of man must be lifted up," Theophylact says: "When you hear that He was lifted up, understand His hanging on high, that He might sanctify the air who had sanctified the earth by walking upon it."

The fourth reason is, because, by dying on it, He prepares for us an ascent into heaven, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2] says. Hence it is that He says (Jn. 12:32): "If I be lifted up from the earth, I will draw all things to Myself."

The fifth reason is because it is befitting the universal salvation of the entire world. Hence Gregory of Nyssa observes (In Christ. Resurr., Orat. i) that "the shape of the cross extending out into four extremes from their central point of contact denotes the power and the providence diffused everywhere of Him who hung upon it." Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A. III, ad 2] also says that upon the cross "He dies with outstretched hands in order to draw with one hand the people of old, and with the other those who spring from the Gentiles."

The sixth reason is because of the various virtues denoted by this class of death. Hence Augustine in his book on the grace of the Old and New

Testament (Ep. cxl) says: “Not without purpose did He choose this class of death, that He might be a teacher of that breadth, and height, and length, and depth,” of which the Apostle speaks (Eph. 3:18): “For breadth is in the beam, which is fixed transversely above; this appertains to good works, since the hands are stretched out upon it. Length is the tree’s extent from the beam to the ground; and there it is planted—that is, it stands and abides—which is the note of longanimity. Height is in that portion of the tree which remains over from the transverse beam upwards to the top, and this is at the head of the Crucified, because He is the supreme desire of souls of good hope. But that part of the tree which is hidden from view to hold it fixed, and from which the entire rood springs, denotes the depth of gratuitous grace.” And, as Augustine says (Tract. cxix in Joan.): “The tree upon which were fixed the members of Him dying was even the chair of the Master teaching.”

The seventh reason is because this kind of death responds to very many figures. For, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion (Serm. ci De Tempore), an ark of wood preserved the human race from the waters of the Deluge; at the exodus of God’s people from Egypt, Moses with a rod divided the sea, overthrew Pharaoh and saved the people of God. the same Moses dipped his rod into the water, changing it from bitter to sweet; at the touch of a wooden rod a salutary spring gushed forth from a spiritual rock; likewise, in order to overcome Amalec, Moses stretched forth his arms with rod in hand; lastly, God’s law is entrusted to the wooden Ark of the Covenant; all of which are like steps by which we mount to the wood of the cross.

Reply to Objection 1: The altar of holocausts, upon which the sacrifices of animals were immolated, was constructed of timbers, as is set forth Ex. 27:, and in this respect the truth answers to the figure; but “it is not necessary for it to be likened in every respect, otherwise it would not be a likeness,” but the reality, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii). But. in particular, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, vide A, III, ad 2] says: “His head is not cut off, as was done to John; nor was He sawn in twain, like Isaias, in order that His entire and indivisible body might obey death, and that there might be no excuse for them who want to divide the Church.” While, instead of material fire, there was the spiritual fire of charity in Christ’s holocaust.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ refused to undergo dishonorable sufferings which are allied with defects of knowledge, or of grace, or even of virtue, but not those injuries inflicted from without—nay, more, as is written Heb. 12:2: “He endured the cross, despising the shame.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xiv), sin is accursed, and, consequently, so is death, and mortality, which comes of sin. “But Christ’s flesh was mortal, ‘having the resemblance of the flesh of sin’”; and hence Moses calls it “accursed,” just as the Apostle calls it “sin,” saying (2 Cor. 5:21): “Him that knew no sin, for us He hath made sin”—namely, because of the penalty of sin. “Nor is there greater ignominy on that account, because he said: ‘He is accursed of God.’” For, “unless God had hated sin, He would never have sent His Son to take upon Himself our death, and to destroy it. Acknowledge, then, that it was for us He took the curse upon Himself, whom you confess to have died for us.” Hence it is written (Gal. 3:13): “Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us.”

Whether Christ endured all suffering?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did endure all sufferings, because Hilary (De Trin. x) says: “God’s only-begotten Son testifies that He endured every kind of human sufferings in order to accomplish the sacrament of His death, when with bowed head He gave up the ghost.” It seems, therefore, that He did endure all human sufferings.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Is. 52:13): “Behold My servant shall understand, He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be exceeding high; as many as have been astonished at Him [Vulg.: ‘thee’], so shall His visage be inglorious among men, and His form among the sons of men.” But Christ was exalted in that He had all grace and all knowledge, at which many were astonished in admiration thereof. Therefore it seems that He was “inglorious,” by enduring every human suffering.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s Passion was ordained for man’s deliverance from sin, as stated above [4232](A[3]). But Christ came to deliver men from every kind of sin. Therefore He ought to have endured every kind of suffering.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 19:32): “The soldiers therefore came: and they broke the legs of the first, and of the other who was crucified with Him; but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, they did not break His legs.” Consequently, He did not endure every human suffering.

I answer that, Human sufferings may be considered under two aspects. First of all, specifically, and in this way it was not necessary for Christ to endure them all, since many are mutually exclusive, as burning and drowning; for we are dealing now with sufferings inflicted from without, since it was not beseeming for Him to endure those arising from within, such as bodily ailments, as already stated ([4233]Q[14], A[4]). But, speaking generically, He did endure every human suffering. This admits of a threefold acceptance. First of all, on the part of men: for He endured something from Gentiles and from Jews; from men and from women, as is clear from the women servants who accused Peter. He suffered from the rulers, from their servants and from the mob, according to Ps. 2:1,2: “Why have the Gentiles raged, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord and against His Christ.” He suffered from friends and acquaintances, as is manifest from Judas betraying and Peter denying Him.

Secondly, the same is evident on the part of the sufferings which a man can endure. For Christ suffered from friends abandoning Him; in His reputation, from the blasphemies hurled at Him; in His honor and glory, from the mockeries and the insults heaped upon Him; in things, for He was despoiled of His garments; in His soul, from sadness, weariness, and fear; in His body, from wounds and scourgings.

Thirdly, it may be considered with regard to His bodily members. In His head He suffered from the crown of piercing thorns; in His hands and feet, from the fastening of the nails; on His face from the blows and spittle; and from the lashes over His entire body. Moreover, He suffered in all His bodily senses: in touch, by being scourged and nailed; in taste, by being given vinegar and gall to drink; in smell, by being fastened to the gibbet in a place reeking with the stench of corpses, “which is called Calvary”; in hearing, by being tormented with the cries of blasphemers and scorners; in sight, by beholding the tears of His Mother and of the disciple whom He loved.

Reply to Objection 1: Hilary’s words are to be understood as to all classes of sufferings, but not as to their kinds.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness is sustained, not as to the number of the sufferings and graces, but as to their greatness; for, as He was uplifted above others in gifts of graces, so was He lowered beneath others by the ignominy of His sufferings.

Reply to Objection 3: The very least one of Christ’s sufferings was sufficient of itself to redeem the human race from all sins; but as to fittingness, it sufficed that He should endure all classes of sufferings, as stated above.

Whether the pain of Christ’s Passion was greater than all other pains?

Objection 1: It would seem that the pain of Christ’s Passion was not greater than all other pains. For the sufferer’s pain is increased by the sharpness and the duration of the suffering. But some of the martyrs endured sharper and more prolonged pains than Christ, as is seen in St. Lawrence, who was roasted upon a gridiron; and in St. Vincent, whose flesh was torn with iron pincers. Therefore it seems that the pain of the suffering Christ was not the greatest.

Objection 2: Further, strength of soul mitigates pain, so much so that the Stoics held there was no sadness in the soul of a wise man; and Aristotle (Ethic. ii) holds that moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions. But Christ had most perfect strength of soul. Therefore it seems that the greatest pain did not exist in Christ.

Objection 3: Further, the more sensitive the sufferer is, the more acute will the pain be. But the soul is more sensitive than the body, since the body feels in virtue of the soul; also, Adam in the state of innocence seems to have had a body more sensitive than Christ had, who assumed a human body with its natural defects. Consequently, it seems that the pain of a sufferer in purgatory, or in hell, or even Adam’s pain, if he suffered at all, was greater than Christ’s in the Passion.

Objection 4: Further, the greater the good lost, the greater the pain. But by sinning the sinner loses a greater good than Christ did when suffering; since the life of grace is greater than the life of nature: also, Christ, who lost His life, but was to rise again after three days, seems to have lost less than those who lose their lives and abide in death. Therefore it seems that Christ’s pain was not the greatest of all.

Objection 5: Further, the victim’s innocence lessens the sting of his sufferings. But Christ died innocent, according to Jer. 9:19: “I was as a meek lamb, that is carried to be a victim.” Therefore it seems that the pain of Christ’s Passion was not the greatest.

Objection 6: Further, there was nothing superfluous in Christ’s conduct. But the slightest pain would have sufficed to secure man’s salvation, because from His Divine Person it would have had infinite virtue. Therefore it would have been superfluous to choose the greatest of all pains.

On the contrary, It is written (Lam. 1:12) on behalf of Christ’s Person: “O all ye that pass by the way attend, and see if there be any sorrow like unto My sorrow.”

I answer that, As we have stated, when treating of the defects assumed by Christ ([4234]Q[15], AA[5],6), there was true and sensible pain in the suffering Christ, which is caused by something hurtful to the body: also, there was internal pain, which is caused from the apprehension of something hurtful, and this is termed “sadness.” And in Christ each of these was the greatest in this present life. This arose from four causes. First of all, from the sources of His pain. For the cause of the sensitive pain was the wounding of His body; and this wounding had its bitterness, both from the extent of the suffering already mentioned (A[5]) and from the kind of suffering, since the death of the crucified is most bitter, because they are pierced in nervous and highly sensitive parts—to wit, the hands and feet; moreover, the weight of the suspended body intensifies the agony. and besides this there is the duration of the suffering because they do not die at once like those slain by the sword. The cause of the interior pain was, first of all, all the sins of the human race, for which He made satisfaction by suffering; hence He ascribes them, so to speak, to Himself, saying (Ps. 21:2): “The words of my sins.” Secondly, especially the fall of the Jews and of the others who sinned in His death chiefly of the apostles, who were scandalized at His Passion. Thirdly, the loss of His bodily life, which is naturally horrible to human nature.

The magnitude of His suffering may be considered, secondly, from the susceptibility of the sufferer as to both soul and body. For His body was endowed with a most perfect constitution, since it was fashioned miraculously by the operation of the Holy Ghost; just as some other things made by miracles are better than others, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxii in Joan.) respecting the wine into which Christ changed the water at the wedding-feast. And, consequently, Christ's sense of touch, the sensitiveness of which is the reason for our feeling pain, was most acute. His soul likewise, from its interior powers, apprehended most vehemently all the causes of sadness.

Thirdly, the magnitude of Christ's suffering can be estimated from the singleness of His pain and sadness. In other sufferers the interior sadness is mitigated, and even the exterior suffering, from some consideration of reason, by some derivation or redundance from the higher powers into the lower; but it was not so with the suffering Christ, because "He permitted each one of His powers to exercise its proper function," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).

Fourthly, the magnitude of the pain of Christ's suffering can be reckoned by this, that the pain and sorrow were accepted voluntarily, to the end of men's deliverance from sin; and consequently He embraced the amount of pain proportionate to the magnitude of the fruit which resulted therefrom.

From all these causes weighed together, it follows that Christ's pain was the very greatest.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument follows from only one of the considerations adduced—namely, from the bodily injury, which is the cause of sensitive pain; but the torment of the suffering Christ is much more intensified from other causes, as above stated.

Reply to Objection 2: Moral virtue lessens interior sadness in one way, and outward sensitive pain in quite another; for it lessens interior sadness directly by fixing the mean, as being its proper matter, within limits. But, as was laid down in the [4235]FS, Q[64], A[2], moral virtue fixes the mean in the passions, not according to mathematical quantity, but according to quantity of proportion, so that the passion shall not go beyond the rule of reason. And since the Stoics held all sadness to be unprofitable, they accordingly believed it to be altogether discordant with reason, and consequently to be shunned altogether by a wise man. But in very truth some sadness is praiseworthy, as Augustine proves (De Civ. Dei xiv)—namely, when it flows from holy love, as, for instance, when a man is saddened over his own or others' sins. Furthermore, it is employed as a useful means of satisfying for sins, according to the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 7:10): “The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance, steadfast unto salvation.” And so to atone for the sins of all men, Christ accepted sadness, the greatest in absolute quantity, yet not exceeding the rule of reason. But moral virtue does not lessen outward sensitive pain, because such pain is not subject to reason, but follows the nature of the body; yet it lessens it indirectly by redundance of the higher powers into the lower. But this did not happen in Christ’s case, as stated above (cf. Q[14], A[1], ad 2; Q[45], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: The pain of a suffering, separated soul belongs to the state of future condemnation, which exceeds every evil of this life, just as the glory of the saints surpasses every good of the present life. Accordingly, when we say that Christ’s pain was the greatest, we make no comparison between His and the pain of a separated soul. But Adam’s body could not suffer, except he sinned. so that he would become mortal, and passible. And, though actually suffering, it would have felt less pain than Christ’s body, for the reasons already stated. From all this it is clear that even if by impassibility Adam had suffered in the state of innocence, his pain would have been less than Christ’s.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ grieved not only over the loss of His own bodily life, but also over the sins of all others. And this grief in Christ surpassed all grief of every contrite heart, both because it flowed from a greater wisdom and charity, by which the pang of contrition is intensified, and because He grieved at the one time for all sins, according to Is. 53:4: “Surely He hath carried our sorrows.” But such was the dignity of Christ’s life in the body, especially on account of the Godhead united with it, that its loss, even for one hour, would be a matter of greater grief than the loss of another man’s life for howsoever long a time. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) that the man of virtue loves his life all the more in proportion as he knows it to be better; and yet he exposes it for virtue’s sake. And in like fashion Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity, according to Jer. 12:7: “I have given My dear soul into the hands of her enemies.”

Reply to Objection 5: The sufferer’s innocence does lessen numerically the pain of the suffering, since, when a guilty man suffers, he grieves not merely on account of the penalty, but also because of the crime. whereas the innocent man grieves only for the penalty: yet this pain is more intensified by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved. Hence it is that even others are more deserving of blame if they do not compassionate him. according to Is. 57:1: “The just perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart.”

Reply to Objection 6: Christ willed to deliver the human race from sins not merely by His power, but also according to justice. And therefore He did not simply weigh what great virtue His suffering would have from union with the Godhead, but also how much, according to His human nature, His pain would avail for so great a satisfaction.

Whether Christ suffered in His whole soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul. For the soul suffers indirectly when the body suffers, inasmuch as it is the “act of the body.” But the soul is not, as to its every part, the “act of the body”; because the intellect is the act of no body, as is said De Anima iii. Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.

Objection 2: Further, every power of the soul is passive in regard to its proper object. But the higher part of reason has for its object the eternal types, “to the consideration and consultation of which it directs itself,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xii). But Christ could suffer no hurt from the eternal types, since they are nowise opposed to Him. Therefore it seems that He did not suffer in His whole soul.

Objection 3: Further, a sensitive passion is said to be complete when it comes into contact with the reason. But there was none such in Christ, but only “pro-passions”; as Jerome remarks on Mat. 26:37. Hence Dionysius says in a letter to John the Evangelist that “He endured only mentally the sufferings inflicted upon Him.” Consequently it does not seem that Christ suffered in His whole soul.

Objection 4: Further, suffering causes pain: but there is no pain in the speculative intellect, because, as the Philosopher says (Topic. i), “there is no sadness in opposition to the pleasure which comes of consideration.” Therefore it seems that Christ did not suffer in His whole soul.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 87:4) on behalf of Christ: “My soul is filled with evils”: upon which the gloss adds: “Not with vices, but with woes, whereby the soul suffers with the flesh; or with evils, viz. of a perishing people, by compassionating them." But His soul would not have been filled with these evils except He had suffered in His whole soul. Therefore Christ suffered in His entire soul.

I answer that, A whole is so termed with respect to its parts. But the parts of a soul are its faculties. So, then, the whole soul is said to suffer in so far as it is afflicted as to its essence, or as to all its faculties. But it must be borne in mind that a faculty of the soul can suffer in two ways: first of all, by its own passion; and this comes of its being afflicted by its proper object; thus, sight may suffer from superabundance of the visible object. In another way a faculty suffers by a passion in the subject on which it is based; as sight suffers when the sense of touch in the eye is affected, upon which the sense of sight rests, as, for instance, when the eye is pricked, or is disaffected by heat.

So, then, we say that if the soul be considered with respect to its essence, it is evident that Christ's whole soul suffered. For the soul's whole essence is allied with the body, so that it is entire in the whole body and in its every part. Consequently, when the body suffered and was disposed to separate from the soul, the entire soul suffered. But if we consider the whole soul according to its faculties, speaking thus of the proper passions of the faculties, He suffered indeed as to all His lower powers; because in all the soul's lower powers, whose operations are but temporal, there was something to be found which was a source of woe to Christ, as is evident from what was said above [4236](A[6]). But Christ's higher reason did not suffer thereby on the part of its object, which is God, who was the cause, not of grief, but rather of delight and joy, to the soul of Christ. Nevertheless, all the powers of Christ's soul did suffer according as any faculty is said to be affected as regards its subject, because all the faculties of Christ's soul were rooted in its essence, to which suffering extended when the body, whose act it is, suffered.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the intellect as a faculty is not the act of the body, still the soul's essence is the act of the body, and in it the intellective faculty is rooted, as was shown in the [4237]FP, Q[77], AA[6],8.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proceeds from passion on the part of the proper object, according to which Christ's higher reason did not suffer.

Reply to Objection 3: Grief is then said to be a true passion, by which the soul is troubled, when the passion in the sensitive part causes reason to deflect from the rectitude of its act, so that it then follows the passion, and has no longer free-will with regard to it. In this way passion of the sensitive part did not extend to reason in Christ, but merely subjectively, as was stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: The speculative intellect can have no pain or sadness on the part of its object, which is truth considered absolutely, and which is its perfection: nevertheless, both grief and its cause can reach it in the way mentioned above.

Whether Christ’s entire soul enjoyed blessed fruition during the Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s entire soul did not enjoy blessed fruition during the Passion. For it is not possible to be sad and glad at the one time, since sadness and gladness are contraries. But Christ’s whole soul suffered grief during the Passion, as was stated above [4238](A[7]). Therefore His whole soul could not enjoy fruition.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii) that, if sadness be vehement, it not only checks the contrary delight, but every delight; and conversely. But the grief of Christ’s Passion was the greatest, as shown above [4239](A[6]); and likewise the enjoyment of fruition is also the greatest, as was laid down in the first volume of the [4240]FS, Q[34], A[3]. Consequently, it was not possible for Christ’s whole soul to be suffering and rejoicing at the one time.

Objection 3: Further, beatific “fruition” comes of the knowledge and love of Divine things, as Augustine says (Doctr. Christ. i). But all the soul’s powers do not extend to the knowledge and love of God. Therefore Christ’s whole soul did not enjoy fruition.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): Christ’s Godhead “permitted His flesh to do and to suffer what was proper to it.” In like fashion, since it belonged to Christ’s soul, inasmuch as it was blessed, to enjoy fruition, His Passion did not impede fruition.

I answer that, As stated above [4241](A[7]), the whole soul can be understood both according to its essence and according to all its faculties. If it be understood according to its essence, then His whole soul did enjoy fruition, inasmuch as it is the subject of the higher part of the soul, to which it belongs, to enjoy the Godhead: so that as passion, by reason of the essence, is attributed to the higher part of the soul, so, on the other hand, by reason of the superior part of the soul, fruition is attributed to the essence. But if we take the whole soul as comprising all its faculties, thus His entire soul did not enjoy fruition: not directly, indeed, because fruition is not the act of any one part of the soul; nor by any overflow of glory, because, since Christ was still upon earth, there was no overflowing of glory from the higher part into the lower, nor from the soul into the body. But since, on the contrary, the soul's higher part was not hindered in its proper acts by the lower, it follows that the higher part of His soul enjoyed fruition perfectly while Christ was suffering.

Reply to Objection 1: The joy of fruition is not opposed directly to the grief of the Passion, because they have not the same object. Now nothing prevents contraries from being in the same subject, but not according to the same. And so the joy of fruition can appertain to the higher part of reason by its proper act; but grief of the Passion according to the subject. Grief of the Passion belongs to the essence of the soul by reason of the body, whose form the soul is; whereas the joy of fruition (belongs to the soul) by reason of the faculty in which it is subjected.

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's contention is true because of the overflow which takes place naturally of one faculty of the soul into another; but it was not so with Christ, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 3: Such argument holds good of the totality of the soul with regard to its faculties.

Whether Christ suffered at a suitable time?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer at a suitable time. For Christ's Passion was prefigured by the sacrifice of the Paschal lamb: hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7): "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." But the paschal lamb was slain "on the fourteenth day at eventide," as is stated in Ex. 12:6. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have suffered then; which is manifestly false: for He was then celebrating the Pasch with His disciples, according to Mark's account (14:12): "On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch"; whereas it was on the following day that He suffered.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion is called His uplifting, according to Jn. 3:14: "So must the Son of man be lifted up." And Christ is Himself called the Sun of Justice, as we read Mal. 4:2. Therefore it seems that He ought to have suffered at the sixth hour, when the sun is at its highest point, and yet the contrary appears from Mk. 15:25: "It was the third hour, and they crucified Him."

Objection 3: Further, as the sun is at its highest point in each day at the sixth hour, so also it reaches its highest point in every year at the summer solstice. Therefore Christ ought to have suffered about the time of the summer solstice rather than about the vernal equinox.

Objection 4: Further, the world was enlightened by Christ's presence in it, according to Jn. 9:5: "As long as I am in the world I am the light of the world." Consequently it was fitting for man's salvation that Christ should have lived longer in the world, so that He should have suffered, not in young, but in old, age.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 13:1): "Jesus, knowing that His hour was come for Him to pass out of this world to the Father"; and (Jn. 2:4): "My hour is not yet come." Upon which texts Augustine observes: "When He had done as much as He deemed sufficient, then came His hour, not of necessity, but of will, not of condition, but of power." Therefore Christ died at an opportune time.

I answer that, As was observed above [4242](A[1]), Christ's Passion was subject to His will. But His will was ruled by the Divine wisdom which "ordereth all things" conveniently and "sweetly" (Wis. 8:1). Consequently it must be said that Christ's Passion was enacted at an opportune time. Hence it is written in De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv: "The Saviour did everything in its proper place and season."

Reply to Objection 1: Some hold that Christ did die on the fourteenth day of the moon, when the Jews sacrificed the Pasch: hence it is stated (Jn. 18:28) that the Jews "went not into Pilate's hall" on the day of the Passion, "that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the Pasch." Upon this Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxii in Joan.): "The Jews celebrated the Pasch then; but He celebrated the Pasch on the previous day, reserving His own slaying until the Friday, when the old Pasch was kept." And this appears to tally with the statement (Jn. 13:1–5) that “before the festival day of the Pasch . . . when supper was done” . . . Christ washed “the feet of the disciples.”

But Matthew’s account (26:17) seems opposed to this; that “on the first day of the Azymes the disciples came to Jesus, saying: Where wilt Thou that we prepare for Thee to eat the Pasch?” From which, as Jerome says, “since the fourteenth day of the first month is called the day of the Azymes, when the lamb was slain, and when it was full moon,” it is quite clear that Christ kept the supper on the fourteenth and died on the fifteenth. And this comes out more clearly from Mk. 14:12: “On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch,” etc.; and from Lk. 22:7: “The day of the unleavened bread came, on which it was necessary that the Pasch should be killed.”

Consequently, then, others say that Christ ate the Pasch with His disciples on the proper day—that is, on the fourteenth day of the moon—“showing thereby that up to the last day He was not opposed to the law,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxi in Matth.): but that the Jews, being busied in compassing Christ’s death against the law, put off celebrating the Pasch until the following day. And on this account it is said of them that on the day of Christ’s Passion they were unwilling to enter Pilate’s hall, “that they might not be defiled, but that they might eat the Pasch.”

But even this solution does not tally with Mark, who says: “On the first day of the unleavened bread, when they sacrificed the Pasch.” Consequently Christ and the Jews celebrated the ancient Pasch at the one time. And as Bede says on Lk. 22:7,8: “Although Christ who is our Pasch was slain on the following day—that is, on the fifteenth day of the moon—nevertheless, on the night when the Lamb was sacrificed, delivering to the disciples to be celebrated, the mysteries of His body and blood, and being held and bound by the Jews, He hallowed the opening of His own immolation—that is, of His Passion.”

But the words (Jn. 13:1) “Before the festival day of the Pasch” are to be understood to refer to the fourteenth day of the moon, which then fell upon the Thursday: for the fifteenth day of the moon was the most solemn day of the Pasch with the Jews: and so the same day which John calls “before the festival day of the Pasch,” on account of the natural distinction of days, Matthew calls the first day of the unleavened bread, because, according to the rite of the Jewish festivity, the solemnity began from the evening of the preceding day. When it is said, then, that they were going to eat the Pasch on the fifteenth day of the month, it is to be understood that the Pasch there is not called the Paschal lamb, which was sacrificed on the fourteenth day, but the Paschal food—that is, the unleavened bread—which had to be eaten by the clean. Hence Chrysostom in the same passage gives another explanation, that the Pasch can be taken as meaning the whole feast of the Jews, which lasted seven days.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): "'It was about the sixth hour' when the Lord was delivered up by Pilate to be crucified," as John relates. For it "was not quite the sixth hour, but about the sixth—that is, it was after the fifth, and when part of the sixth had been entered upon until the sixth hour was ended—that the darkness began, when Christ hung upon the cross. It is understood to have been the third hour when the Jews clamored for the Lord to be crucified: and it is most clearly shown that they crucified Him when they clamored out. Therefore, lest anyone might divert the thought of so great a crime from the Jews to the soldiers, he says: 'It was the third hour, and they crucified Him,' that they before all may be found to have crucified Him, who at the third hour clamored for His crucifixion. Although there are not wanting some persons who wish the Parasceve to be understood as the third hour, which John recalls, saying: 'It was the Parasceve, about the sixth hour.' For 'Parasceve' is interpreted 'preparation.' But the true Pasch, which was celebrated in the Lord's Passion, began to be prepared from the ninth hour of the night—namely, when the chief priests said: 'He is deserving of death.'" According to John, then, "the sixth hour of the Parasceve" lasts from that hour of the night down to Christ's crucifixion; while, according to Mark, it is the third hour of the day.

Still, there are some who contend that this discrepancy is due to the error of a Greek transcriber: since the characters employed by them to represent 3 and 6 are somewhat alike.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv, "our Lord willed to redeem and reform the world by His Passion, at the time of year at which He had created it—that is, at the equinox. It is then that day grows upon night; because by our Saviour's Passion we are brought from darkness to light." And since the perfect enlightening will come about at Christ’s second coming, therefore the season of His second coming is compared (Mat. 24:32,33) to the summer in these words: “When the branch thereof is now tender, and the leaves come forth, you know that summer is nigh: so you also, when you shall see all these things, know ye that it is nigh even at the doors.” And then also shall be Christ’s greatest exaltation.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ willed to suffer while yet young, for three reasons. First of all, to commend the more His love by giving up His life for us when He was in His most perfect state of life. Secondly, because it was not becoming for Him to show any decay of nature nor to be subject to disease, as stated above ([4243]Q[14], A[4]). Thirdly, that by dying and rising at an early age Christ might exhibit beforehand in His own person the future condition of those who rise again. Hence it is written (Eph. 4:13): “Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ.”

Whether Christ suffered in a suitable place?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not suffer in a suitable place. For Christ suffered according to His human nature, which was conceived in Nazareth and born in Bethlehem. Consequently it seems that He ought not to have suffered in Jerusalem, but in Nazareth or Bethlehem.

Objection 2: Further, the reality ought to correspond with the figure. But Christ’s Passion was prefigured by the sacrifices of the Old Law, and these were offered up in the Temple. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have suffered in the Temple, and not outside the city gate.

Objection 3: Further, the medicine should correspond with the disease. But Christ’s Passion was the medicine against Adam’s sin: and Adam was not buried in Jerusalem, but in Hebron; for it is written (Josh. 14:15): “The name of Hebron before was called Cariath-Arbe: Adam the greatest in the land of [Vulg.: ‘among’] the Enacims was laid there.”

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 13:33): “It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem.” Therefore it was fitting that He should die in Jerusalem.

I answer that, According to the author of De Qq. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. lv, “the Saviour did everything in its proper place and season,” because, as all things are in His hands, so are all places: and consequently, since Christ suffered at a suitable time, so did He in a suitable place.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ died most appropriately in Jerusalem. First of all, because Jerusalem was God’s chosen place for the offering of sacrifices to Himself: and these figurative sacrifices foreshadowed Christ’s Passion, which is a true sacrifice, according to Eph. 5:2: “He hath delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.” Hence Bede says in a Homily (xxiii): “When the Passion drew nigh, our Lord willed to draw nigh to the place of the Passion”—that is to say, to Jerusalem—whither He came five days before the Pasch; just as, according to the legal precept, the Paschal lamb was led to the place of immolation five days before the Pasch, which is the tenth day of the moon.

Secondly, because the virtue of His Passion was to be spread over the whole world, He wished to suffer in the center of the habitable world—that is, in Jerusalem. Accordingly it is written (Ps. 73:12): “But God is our King before ages: He hath wrought salvation in the midst of the earth”—that is, in Jerusalem, which is called “the navel of the earth” [*Cf. Jerome’s comment on Ezech. 5:5].

Thirdly, because it was specially in keeping with His humility: that, as He chose the most shameful manner of death, so likewise it was part of His humility that He did not refuse to suffer in so celebrated a place. Hence Pope Leo says (Serm. I in Epiph.): “He who had taken upon Himself the form of a servant chose Bethlehem for His nativity and Jerusalem for His Passion.”

Fourthly, He willed to suffer in Jerusalem, where the chief priests dwelt, to show that the wickedness of His slayers arose from the chiefs of the Jewish people. Hence it is written (Acts 4:27): “There assembled together in this city against Thy holy child Jesus whom Thou hast anointed, Herod, and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel.”

Reply to Objection 2: For three reasons Christ suffered outside the gate, and not in the Temple nor in the city. First of all, that the truth might correspond with the figure. For the calf and the goat which were offered in most solemn sacrifice for expiation on behalf of the entire multitude were burnt outside the camp, as commanded in Lev. 16:27. Hence it is written

(Heb. 13:27): “For the bodies of those beasts, whose blood is brought into the holies by the high-priest for sin, are burned without the camp. Wherefore Jesus also, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate.”

Secondly, to set us the example of shunning worldly conversation. Accordingly the passage continues: “Let us go forth therefore to Him without the camp, bearing His reproach.”

Thirdly, as Chrysostom says in a sermon on the Passion (Hom. i De Cruce et Latrone): “The Lord was not willing to suffer under a roof, nor in the Jewish Temple, lest the Jews might take away the saving sacrifice, and lest you might think He was offered for that people only. Consequently, it was beyond the city and outside the walls, that you may learn it was a universal sacrifice, an oblation for the whole world, a cleansing for all.”

Reply to Objection 3: According to Jerome, in his commentary on Mat. 27:33, “someone explained ‘the place of Calvary’ as being the place where Adam was buried; and that it was so called because the skull of the first man was buried there. A pleasing interpretation indeed, and one suited to catch the ear of the people, but, still, not the true one. For the spots where the condemned are beheaded are outside the city and beyond the gates, deriving thence the name of Calvary—that is, of the beheaded. Jesus, accordingly, was crucified there, that the standards of martyrdom might be uplifted over what was formerly the place of the condemned. But Adam was buried close by Hebron and Arbe, as we read in the book of Jesus Ben Nave.” But Jesus was to be crucified in the common spot of the condemned rather than beside Adam’s sepulchre, to make it manifest that Christ’s cross was the remedy, not only for Adam’s personal sin, but also for the sin of the entire world.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for Christ to have been crucified with thieves, because it is written (2 Cor. 6:14): “What participation hath justice with injustice?” But for our sakes Christ “of God is made unto us justice” (1 Cor. 1:30); whereas iniquity applies to thieves. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to be crucified with thieves.

Objection 2: Further, on Mat. 26:35, “Though I should die with Thee, I will not deny Thee,” Origen (Tract. xxxv in Matth.) observes: “It was not men’s lot to die with Jesus, since He died for all.” Again, on Lk. 22:33, “I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and death,” Ambrose says: “Our Lord’s Passion has followers, but not equals.” It seems, then, much less fitting for Christ to suffer with thieves.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 27:44) that “the thieves who were crucified with Him reproached Him.” But in Lk. 22:42 it is stated that one of them who were crucified with Christ cried out to Him: “Lord, remember me when Thou shalt come into Thy kingdom.” It seems, then, that besides the blasphemous thieves there was another man who did not blaspheme Him: and so the Evangelist’s account does not seem to be accurate when it says that Christ was crucified with thieves.

On the contrary, It was foretold by Isaias (53:12): “And He was reputed with the wicked.”

I answer that, Christ was crucified between thieves from one intention on the part of the Jews, and from quite another on the part of God’s ordaining. As to the intention of the Jews, Chrysostom remarks (Hom. lxxxvii in Matth.) that they crucified the two thieves, one on either side, “that He might be made to share their guilt. But it did not happen so; because mention is never made of them; whereas His cross is honored everywhere. Kings lay aside their crowns to take up the cross: on their purple robes, on their diadems, on their weapons, on the consecrated table, everywhere the cross shines forth.”

As to God’s ordinance, Christ was crucified with thieves, because, as Jerome says on Mat. 27:33: “As Christ became accursed of the cross for us, so for our salvation He was crucified as a guilty one among the guilty.” Secondly, as Pope Leo observes (Serm. iv de Passione): “Two thieves were crucified, one on His right hand and one on His left, to set forth by the very appearance of the gibbet that separation of all men which shall be made in His hour of judgment.” And Augustine on Jn. 7:36: “The very cross, if thou mark it well, was a judgment-seat: for the judge being set in the midst, the one who believed was delivered, the other who mocked Him was condemned. Already He has signified what He shall do to the quick and the dead; some He will set on His right, others on His left hand.” Thirdly, according to Hilary (Comm. xxxiii in Matth.): “Two thieves are set, one upon His right and one upon His left, to show that all mankind is called to the sacrament of His Passion. But because of the cleavage between believers and unbelievers, the multitude is divided into right and left, those on the right being saved by the justification of faith.” Fourthly, because, as Bede says on Mk. 15:27: “The thieves crucified with our Lord denote those who, believing in and confessing Christ, either endure the conflict of martyrdom or keep the institutes of stricter observance. But those who do the like for the sake of everlasting glory are denoted by the faith of the thief on the right; while others who do so for the sake of human applause copy the mind and behavior of the one on the left.”

Reply to Objection 1: Just as Christ was not obliged to die, but willingly submitted to death so as to vanquish death by His power: so neither deserved He to be classed with thieves; but willed to be reputed with the ungodly that He might destroy ungodliness by His power. Accordingly, Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxiv in Joan.) that “to convert the thief upon the cross, and lead him into paradise, was no less a wonder than to shake the rocks.”

Reply to Objection 2: It was not fitting that anyone else should die with Christ from the same cause as Christ: hence Origen continues thus in the same passage: “All had been under sin, and all required that another should die for them, not they for others.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Consensu Evang. iii): We can understand Matthew “as putting the plural for the singular” when he said “the thieves reproached Him.” Or it may be said, with Jerome, that “at first both blasphemed Him, but afterwards one believed in Him on witnessing the wonders.”

Whether Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion is to be attributed to His Godhead; for it is written (1 Cor. 2:8): “If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory.” But Christ is the Lord of glory in respect of His Godhead. Therefore Christ’s Passion is attributed to Him in respect of His Godhead.

Objection 2: Further, the principle of men’s salvation is the Godhead Itself, according to Ps. 36:39: “But the salvation of the just is from the

Lord.” Consequently, if Christ’s Passion did not appertain to His Godhead, it would seem that it could not produce fruit in us.

Objection 3: Further, the Jews were punished for slaying Christ as for murdering God Himself; as is proved by the gravity of the punishment. Now this would not be so if the Passion were not attributed to the Godhead. Therefore Christ’s Passion should be so attributed.

On the contrary, Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.): “The Word is impassible whose Nature is Divine.” But what is impassible cannot suffer. Consequently, Christ’s Passion did not concern His Godhead.

I answer that, As stated above ([4244]Q[2], AA[1],2,3,6), the union of the human nature with the Divine was effected in the Person, in the hypostasis, in the suppositum, yet observing the distinction of natures; so that it is the same Person and hypostasis of the Divine and human natures, while each nature retains that which is proper to it. And therefore, as stated above ([4245]Q[16], A[4]), the Passion is to be attributed to the suppositum of the Divine Nature, not because of the Divine Nature, which is impassible, but by reason of the human nature. Hence, in a Synodal Epistle of Cyril [*Act. Conc. Ephes., P. i, cap. 26] we read: “If any man does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh and was crucified in the flesh, let him be anathema.” Therefore Christ’s Passion belongs to the “suppositum” of the Divine Nature by reason of the passible nature assumed, but not on account of the impassible Divine Nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord of glory is said to be crucified, not as the Lord of glory, but as a man capable of suffering.

Reply to Objection 2: As is said in a sermon of the Council of Ephesus [*P. iii, cap. 10], “Christ’s death being, as it were, God’s death”—namely, by union in Person—“destroyed death”; since He who suffered “was both God and man. For God’s Nature was not wounded, nor did It undergo any change by those sufferings.”

Reply to Objection 3: As the passage quoted goes on to say: “The Jews did not crucify one who was simply a man; they inflicted their presumptions upon God. For suppose a prince to speak by word of mouth, and that his words are committed to writing on a parchment and sent out to the cities, and that some rebel tears up the document, he will be led forth to endure the death sentence, not for merely tearing up a document, but as destroying the imperial message. Let not the Jew, then, stand in security, as crucifying a mere man; since what he saw was as the parchment, but what was hidden under it was the imperial Word, the Son by nature, not the mere utterance of a tongue."

OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF CHRIST'S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the efficient cause of Christ's Passion, concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ was slain by others, or by Himself?

(2) From what motive did He deliver Himself up to the Passion?

(3) Whether the Father delivered Him up to suffer?

(4) Whether it was fitting that He should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles, or rather of the Jews?

(5) Whether His slayers knew who He was?

(6) Of the sin of them who slew Christ.

Whether Christ was slain by another or by Himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not slain by another, but by Himself. For He says Himself (Jn. 10:18): "No men taketh My life from Me, but I lay it down of Myself." But he is said to kill another who takes away his life. Consequently, Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.

Objection 2: Further, those slain by others sink gradually from exhausted nature, and this is strikingly apparent in the crucified: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "Those who were crucified were tormented with a lingering death." But this did not happen in Christ's case, since "crying out, with a loud voice, He yielded up the ghost" (Mat. 27:50). Therefore Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.

Objection 3: Further, those slain by others suffer a violent death, and hence die unwillingly, because violent is opposed to voluntary. But Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "Christ's spirit did not quit the flesh unwillingly, but because He willed it, when He willed it, and as He willed it." Consequently Christ was not slain by others, but by Himself.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 18:33): “After they have scourged Him, they will put him to death.”

I answer that, A thing may cause an effect in two ways: in the first instance by acting directly so as to produce the effect; and in this manner Christ’s persecutors slew Him because they inflicted on Him what was a sufficient cause of death, and with the intention of slaying Him, and the effect followed, since death resulted from that cause. In another way someone causes an effect indirectly—that is, by not preventing it when he can do so; just as one person is said to drench another by not closing the window through which the shower is entering: and in this way Christ was the cause of His own Passion and death. For He could have prevented His Passion and death. Firstly, by holding His enemies in check, so that they would not have been eager to slay Him, or would have been powerless to do so. Secondly, because His spirit had the power of preserving His fleshly nature from the infliction of any injury; and Christ’s soul had this power, because it was united in unity of person with the Divine Word, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv). Therefore, since Christ’s soul did not repel the injury inflicted on His body, but willed His corporeal nature to succumb to such injury, He is said to have laid down His life, or to have died voluntarily.

Reply to Objection 1: When we hear the words, “No man taketh away My life from Me,” we must understand “against My will”: for that is properly said to be “taken away” which one takes from someone who is unwilling and unable to resist.

Reply to Objection 2: In order for Christ to show that the Passion inflicted by violence did not take away His life, He preserved the strength of His bodily nature, so that at the last moment He was able to cry out with a loud voice: and hence His death should be computed among His other miracles. Accordingly it is written (Mk. 15:39): “And the centurion who stood over against Him, seeing that crying out in this manner, He had given up the ghost, said: Indeed, this man was the Son of God.” It was also a subject of wonder in Christ’s death that He died sooner than the others who were tormented with the same suffering. Hence John says (19:32) that “they broke the legs of the first, and of the other that was crucified with Him,” that they might die more speedily; “but after they were come to Jesus, when they saw that He was already dead, they did not break His legs.” Mark also states (15:44) that “Pilate wondered that He should be already dead.” For as of His own will His bodily nature kept its vigor to the end, so likewise, when He willed, He suddenly succumbed to the injury inflicted.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ at the same time suffered violence in order to die, and died, nevertheless, voluntarily; because violence was inflicted on His body, which, however, prevailed over His body only so far as He willed it.

Whether Christ died out of obedience?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not die out of obedience. For obedience is referred to a command. But we do not read that Christ was commanded to suffer. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.

Objection 2: Further, a man is said to do from obedience what he does from necessity of precept. But Christ did not suffer necessarily, but voluntarily. Therefore He did not suffer out of obedience.

Objection 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than obedience. But we read that Christ suffered out of charity, according to Eph. 5:2: “Walk in love, as Christ also has loved us, and delivered Himself up for us.” Therefore Christ’s Passion ought to be ascribed rather to charity than to obedience.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): “He became obedient” to the Father “unto death.”

I answer that, It was befitting that Christ should suffer out of obedience. First of all, because it was in keeping with human justification, that “as by the disobedience of one man, many were made sinners: so also by the obedience of one, many shall be made just,” as is written Rom. 5:19. Secondly, it was suitable for reconciling man with God: hence it is written (Rom. 5:10): “We are reconciled to God by the death of His Son,” in so far as Christ’s death was a most acceptable sacrifice to God, according to Eph. 5:2: “He delivered Himself for us an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.” Now obedience is preferred to all sacrifices. according to 1 Kings 15:22: “Obedience is better than sacrifices.” Therefore it was fitting that the sacrifice of Christ’s Passion and death should proceed from obedience. Thirdly, it was in keeping with His victory whereby He triumphed over death and its author; because a soldier cannot conquer unless he obey his captain. And so the Man-Christ secured the victory through being obedient to God, according to Prov. 21:28: “An obedient man shall speak of victory.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ received a command from the Father to suffer. For it is written (Jn. 10:18): “I have power to lay down My life, and I have power to take it up again: (and) this commandment have I received of My Father”—namely, of laying down His life and of resuming it again. “From which,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. lix in Joan.), it is not to be understood “that at first He awaited the command, and that He had need to be told, but He showed the proceeding to be a voluntary one, and destroyed suspicion of opposition” to the Father. Yet because the Old Law was ended by Christ’s death, according to His dying words, “It is consummated” (Jn. 19:30), it may be understood that by His suffering He fulfilled all the precepts of the Old Law. He fulfilled those of the moral order which are founded on the precepts of charity, inasmuch as He suffered both out of love of the Father, according to Jn. 14:31: “That the world may know that I love the Father, and as the Father hath given Me commandment, so do I: arise, let us go hence”—namely, to the place of His Passion: and out of love of His neighbor, according to Gal. 2:20: “He loved me, and delivered Himself up for me.” Christ likewise by His Passion fulfilled the ceremonial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for sacrifices and oblations, in so far as all the ancient sacrifices were figures of that true sacrifice which the dying Christ offered for us. Hence it is written (Col. 2:16,17): “Let no man judge you in meat or drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ’s,” for the reason that Christ is compared to them as a body is to a shadow. Christ also by His Passion fulfilled the judicial precepts of the Law, which are chiefly ordained for making compensation to them who have suffered wrong, since, as is written Ps. 68:5: He “paid that which” He “took not away,” suffering Himself to be fastened to a tree on account of the apple which man had plucked from the tree against God’s command.

Reply to Objection 2: Although obedience implies necessity with regard to the thing commanded, nevertheless it implies free-will with regard to the fulfilling of the precept. And, indeed, such was Christ’s obedience, for, although His Passion and death, considered in themselves, were repugnant to the natural will, yet Christ resolved to fulfill God’s will with respect to the same, according to Ps. 39:9: “That I should do Thy will: O my God, I have desired it." Hence He said (Mat. 26:42): "If this chalice may not pass away, but I must drink it, Thy will be done."

Reply to Objection 3: For the same reason Christ suffered out of charity and out of obedience; because He fulfilled even the precepts of charity out of obedience only; and was obedient, out of love, to the Father's command.

Whether God the Father delivered up Christ to the Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to the Passion. For it is a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and death. But, as it is written (Dt. 32:4): "God is faithful, and without any iniquity." Therefore He did not hand over the innocent Christ to His Passion and death.

Objection 2: Further, it is not likely that a man be given over to death by himself and by another also. But Christ gave Himself up for us, as it is written (Is. 53:12): "He hath delivered His soul unto death." Consequently it does not appear that God the Father delivered Him up.

Objection 3: Further, Judas is held to be guilty because he betrayed Christ to the Jews, according to Jn. 6:71: "One of you is a devil," alluding to Judas, who was to betray Him. The Jews are likewise reviled for delivering Him up to Pilate; as we read in Jn. 18:35: "Thy own nation, and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me." Moreover, as is related in Jn. 19:16: Pilate "delivered Him to them to be crucified"; and according to 2 Cor. 6:14: there is no "participation of justice with injustice." It seems, therefore, that God the Father did not deliver up Christ to His Passion.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:32): "God hath not spared His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all."

I answer that, As observed above [4246](A[2]), Christ suffered voluntarily out of obedience to the Father. Hence in three respects God the Father did deliver up Christ to the Passion. In the first way, because by His eternal will He preordained Christ's Passion for the deliverance of the human race, according to the words of Isaias (53:6): "The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all"; and again (Is. 53:10): "The Lord was pleased to bruise Him in infirmity." Secondly, inasmuch as, by the infusion of charity, He inspired Him with the will to suffer for us; hence we read in the same passage: "He was offered because it was His own will" (Is. 53:7).

Thirdly, by not shielding Him from the Passion, but abandoning Him to His persecutors: thus we read (Mat. 27:46) that Christ, while hanging upon the cross, cried out: “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” because, to wit, He left Him to the power of His persecutors, as Augustine says (Ep. cxl).

Reply to Objection 1: It is indeed a wicked and cruel act to hand over an innocent man to torment and to death against his will. Yet God the Father did not so deliver up Christ, but inspired Him with the will to suffer for us. God’s “severity” (cf. Rom. 11:22) is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without penalty: and the Apostle indicates this when (Rom. 8:32) he says: “God spared not even His own Son.” Likewise His “goodness” (Rom. 11:22) shines forth, since by no penalty endured could man pay Him enough satisfaction: and the Apostle denotes this when he says: “He delivered Him up for us all”: and, again (Rom. 3:25): “Whom”—that is to say, Christ—God “hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His blood.”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ as God delivered Himself up to death by the same will and action as that by which the Father delivered Him up; but as man He gave Himself up by a will inspired of the Father. Consequently there is no contrariety in the Father delivering Him up and in Christ delivering Himself up.

Reply to Objection 3: The same act, for good or evil, is judged differently, accordingly as it proceeds from a different source. The Father delivered up Christ, and Christ surrendered Himself, from charity, and consequently we give praise to both: but Judas betrayed Christ from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly fear, for he stood in fear of Caesar; and these accordingly are held guilty.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to suffer at the hands of the Gentiles?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should suffer at the hands of the Gentiles. For since men were to be freed from sin by Christ’s death, it would seem fitting that very few should sin in His death. But the Jews sinned in His death, on whose behalf it is said (Mat. 21:38): “This is the heir; come, let us kill him.” It seems fitting, therefore, that the Gentiles should not be implicated in the sin of Christ’s slaying.

Objection 2: Further, the truth should respond to the figure. Now it was not the Gentiles but the Jews who offered the figurative sacrifices of the Old Law. Therefore neither ought Christ’s Passion, which was a true sacrifice, to be fulfilled at the hands of the Gentiles.

Objection 3: Further, as related Jn. 5:18, “the Jews sought to kill” Christ because “He did not only break the sabbath, but also said God was His Father, making Himself equal to God.” But these things seemed to be only against the Law of the Jews: hence they themselves said (Jn. 19:7): “According to the Law He ought to die because He made Himself the Son of God.” It seems fitting, therefore, that Christ should suffer, at the hands not of the Gentiles, but of the Jews, and that what they said was untrue: “It is not lawful for us to put any man to death,” since many sins are punishable with death according to the Law, as is evident from Lev. 20.

On the contrary, our Lord Himself says (Mat. 20:19): “They shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified.”

I answer that, The effect of Christ’s Passion was foreshown by the very manner of His death. For Christ’s Passion wrought its effect of salvation first of all among the Jews, very many of whom were baptized in His death, as is evident from Acts 2:41 and Acts 4:4. Afterwards, by the preaching of Jews, Christ’s Passion passed on to the Gentiles. Consequently it was fitting that Christ should begin His sufferings at the hands of the Jews, and, after they had delivered Him up, finish His Passion at the hands of the Gentiles.

Reply to Objection 1: In order to demonstrate the fulness of His love, on account of which He suffered, Christ upon the cross prayed for His persecutors. Therefore, that the fruits of His petition might accrue to Jews and Gentiles, Christ willed to suffer from both.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s Passion was the offering of a sacrifice, inasmuch as He endured death of His own free-will out of charity: but in so far as He suffered from His persecutors it was not a sacrifice, but a most grievous sin.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. cxiv in Joan.): “The Jews said that ‘it is not lawful for us to put any man to death,’ because they understood that it was not lawful for them to put any man to death” owing to the sacredness of the feast-day, which they had already begun to celebrate. or, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. lxxxiii in Joan.), because they wanted Him to be slain, not as a transgressor of the Law, but as a public enemy, since He had made Himself out to be a king, of which it was not their place to judge. Or, again, because it was not lawful for them to crucify Him (as they wanted to), but to stone Him, as they did to Stephen. Better still is it to say that the power of putting to death was taken from them by the Romans, whose subjects they were.

Whether Christ's persecutors knew who He was?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's persecutors did know who He was. For it is written (Mat. 21:38) that the husbandmen seeing the son said within themselves: "This is the heir; come, let us kill him." On this Jerome remarks: "Our Lord proves most manifestly by these words that the rulers of the Jews crucified the Son of God, not from ignorance, but out of envy: for they understood that it was He to whom the Father says by the Prophet: 'Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance.'" It seems, therefore, that they knew Him to be Christ or the Son of God.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord says (Jn. 15:24): "But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father." Now what is seen is known manifestly. Therefore the Jews, knowing Christ, inflicted the Passion on Him out of hatred.

Objection 3: Further, it is said in a sermon delivered in the Council of Ephesus (P. iii, cap. x): "Just as he who tears up the imperial message is doomed to die, as despising the prince's word; so the Jew, who crucified Him whom he had seen, will pay the penalty for daring to lay his hands on God the Word Himself." Now this would not be so had they not known Him to be the Son of God, because their ignorance would have excused them. Therefore it seems that the Jews in crucifying Christ knew Him to be the Son of God.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 2:8): "If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." And (Acts 3:17), Peter, addressing the Jews, says: "I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers." Likewise the Lord hanging upon the cross said: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do" (Lk. 23:34).

I answer that, Among the Jews some were elders, and others of lesser degree. Now according to the author of De Qq. Nov. et Vet. Test., qu. lxvi, the elders, who were called "rulers, knew," as did also the devils, "that He was the Christ promised in the Law: for they saw all the signs in Him which the prophets said would come to pass: but they did not know the mystery of His Godhead." Consequently the Apostle says: "If they had known it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory." It must, however, be understood that their ignorance did not excuse them from crime, because it was, as it were, affected ignorance. For they saw manifest signs of His Godhead; yet they perverted them out of hatred and envy of Christ; neither would they believe His words, whereby He avowed that He was the Son of God. Hence He Himself says of them (Jn. 15:22): "If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin; but now they have no excuse for their sin." And afterwards He adds (Jn. 15:24): "If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin." And so the expression employed by Job (21:14) can be accepted on their behalf: "(Who) said to God: depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways."

But those of lesser degree—namely, the common folk—who had not grasped the mysteries of the Scriptures, did not fully comprehend that He was the Christ or the Son of God. For although some of them believed in Him, yet the multitude did not; and if they doubted sometimes whether He was the Christ, on account of the manifold signs and force of His teaching, as is stated Jn. 7:31,41, nevertheless they were deceived afterwards by their rulers, so that they did not believe Him to be the Son of God or the Christ. Hence Peter said to them: "I know that you did it through ignorance, as did also your rulers"—namely, because they were seduced by the rulers.

Reply to Objection 1: Those words are spoken by the husbandmen of the vineyard; and these signify the rulers of the people, who knew Him to be the heir, inasmuch as they knew Him to be the Christ promised in the Law, but the words of Ps. 2:8 seem to militate against this answer: "Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance"; which are addressed to Him of whom it is said: "Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee." If, then, they knew Him to be the one to whom the words were addressed: "Ask of Me, and I will give Thee the Gentiles for Thy inheritance," it follows that they knew Him to be the Son of God. Chrysostom, too, says upon the same passage that "they knew Him to be the Son of God." Bede likewise, commenting on the words, "For they know not what they do" (Lk. 23:34), says: "It is to be observed that He does not pray for them who, understanding Him to be the Son of God, preferred to crucify Him rather than acknowledge Him." But to this it may be replied that they knew Him to be the Son of God, not from His Nature, but from the excellence of His singular grace.

Yet we may hold that they are said to have known also that He was verily the Son of God, in that they had evident signs thereof: yet out of hatred and envy, they refused credence to these signs, by which they might have known that He was the Son of God.

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted are preceded by the following: "If I had not done among them the works that no other man hath done, they would not have sin"; and then follow the words: "But now they have both seen and hated both Me and My Father." Now all this shows that while they beheld Christ's marvelous works, it was owing to their hatred that they did not know Him to be the Son of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Affected ignorance does not excuse from guilt, but seems, rather, to aggravate it: for it shows that a man is so strongly attached to sin that he wishes to incur ignorance lest he avoid sinning. The Jews therefore sinned, as crucifiers not only of the Man-Christ, but also as of God.

Whether the sin of those who crucified Christ was most grievous?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of Christ's crucifiers was not the most grievous. Because the sin which has some excuse cannot be most grievous. But our Lord Himself excused the sin of His crucifiers when He said: "Father, forgive them: for they know not what they do" (Lk. 23:34). Therefore theirs was not the most grievous sin.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): "He that hath delivered Me to thee hath the greater sin." But it was Pilate who caused Christ to be crucified by his minions. Therefore the sin of Judas the traitor seems to be greater than that of those who crucified Him.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v): "No one suffers injustice willingly"; and in the same place he adds: "Where no one suffers injustice, nobody works injustice." Consequently nobody wreaks injustice upon a willing subject. But Christ suffered willingly, as was shown above ([4247]AA[1],2). Therefore those who crucified Christ did Him no injustice; and hence their sin was not the most grievous.

On the contrary, Chrysostom, commenting on the words, “Fill ye up, then, the measure of your fathers” (Mat. 23:32), says: “In very truth they exceeded the measure of their fathers; for these latter slew men, but they crucified God.”

I answer that, As stated above [4248](A[5]), the rulers of the Jews knew that He was the Christ: and if there was any ignorance in them, it was affected ignorance, which could not excuse them. Therefore their sin was the most grievous, both on account of the kind of sin, as well as from the malice of their will. The Jews also of the common order sinned most grievously as to the kind of their sin: yet in one respect their crime was lessened by reason of their ignorance. Hence Bede, commenting on Lk. 23:34, “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,” says: “He prays for them who know not what they are doing, as having the zeal of God, but not according to knowledge.” But the sin of the Gentiles, by whose hands He was crucified, was much more excusable, since they had no knowledge of the Law.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above, the excuse made by our Lord is not to be referred to the rulers among the Jews, but to the common people.

Reply to Objection 2: Judas did not deliver up Christ to Pilate, but to the chief priests who gave Him up to Pilate, according to Jn. 18:35: “Thy own nation and the chief priests have delivered Thee up to me.” But the sin of all these was greater than that of Pilate, who slew Christ from fear of Caesar; and even greater than the sin of the soldiers who crucified Him at the governor’s bidding, not out of cupidity like Judas, nor from envy and hate like the chief priests.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ, indeed willed His Passion just as the Father willed it; yet He did not will the unjust action of the Jews. Consequently Christ’s slayers are not excused of their injustice. Nevertheless, whoever slays a man not only does a wrong to the one slain, but likewise to God and to the State; just as he who kills himself, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v). Hence it was that David condemned to death the man who “did not fear to lay hands upon the Lord’s anointed,” even though he (Saul) had requested it, as related 2 Kings 1:5–14.

OF THE EFFICIENCY OF CHRIST’S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)

We now have to consider Christ’s Passion as to its effect; first of all, as to the manner in which it was brought about; and, secondly, as to the effect in itself. Under the first heading there are six points for inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit?

(2) Whether it was by way of atonement?

(3) Whether it was by way of sacrifice?

(4) Whether it was by way of redemption?

(5) Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer?

(6) Whether (the Passion) secured man’s salvation efficiently?

Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of merit?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation by way of merit. For the sources of our sufferings are not within us. But no one merits or is praised except for that whose principle lies within him. Therefore Christ’s Passion wrought nothing by way of merit.

Objection 2: Further, from the beginning of His conception Christ merited for Himself and for us, as stated above ([4249]Q[9], A[4];[4250] Q[34], A[3]). But it is superfluous to merit over again what has been merited before. Therefore by His Passion Christ did not merit our salvation.

Objection 3: Further, the source of merit is charity. But Christ’s charity was not made greater by the Passion than it was before. Therefore He did not merit our salvation by suffering more than He had already.

On the contrary, on the words of Phil. 2:9, “Therefore God exalted Him,” etc., Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): “The lowliness” of the Passion “merited glory; glory was the reward of lowliness.” But He was glorified, not merely in Himself, but likewise in His faithful ones, as He says Himself (Jn. 17:10). Therefore it appears that He merited the salvation of the faithful.

I answer that, As stated above ([4251]Q[7], AA[1],9;[4252] Q[8], AA[1],5), grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an individual, but inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, so that it might overflow into

His members; and therefore Christ’s works are referred to Himself and to His members in the same way as the works of any other man in a state of grace are referred to himself. But it is evident that whosoever suffers for justice’s sake, provided that he be in a state of grace, merits his salvation thereby, according to Mat. 5:10: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice’s sake.” Consequently Christ by His Passion merited salvation, not only for Himself, but likewise for all His members.

Reply to Objection 1: Suffering, as such, is caused by an outward principle: but inasmuch as one bears it willingly, it has an inward principle.

Reply to Objection 2: From the beginning of His conception Christ merited our eternal salvation; but on our side there were some obstacles, whereby we were hindered from securing the effect of His preceding merits: consequently, in order to remove such hindrances, “it was necessary for Christ to suffer,” as stated above ([4253]Q[46], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s Passion has a special effect, which His preceding merits did not possess, not on account of greater charity, but because of the nature of the work, which was suitable for such an effect, as is clear from the arguments brought forward above all the fittingness of Christ’s Passion (Q[46], AA, 3,4).

Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation by way of atonement?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation by way of atonement. For it seems that to make the atonement devolves on him who commits the sin; as is clear in the other parts of penance, because he who has done the wrong must grieve over it and confess it. But Christ never sinned, according to 1 Pet. 2:22: “Who did no sin.” Therefore He made no atonement by His personal suffering.

Objection 2: Further, no atonement is made to another by committing a graver offense. But in Christ’s Passion the gravest of all offenses was perpetrated, because those who slew Him sinned most grievously, as stated above ([4254]Q[47], A[6]). Consequently it seems that atonement could not be made to God by Christ’s Passion.

Objection 3: Further, atonement implies equality with the trespass, since it is an act of justice. But Christ’s Passion does not appear equal to all the sins of the human race, because Christ did not suffer in His Godhead, but in

His flesh, according to 1 Pet. 4:1: “Christ therefore having suffered in the flesh.” Now the soul, which is the subject of sin, is of greater account than the flesh. Therefore Christ did not atone for our sins by His Passion.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 68:5) in Christ’s person: “Then did I pay that which I took not away.” But he has not paid who has not fully atoned. Therefore it appears that Christ by His suffering has fully atoned for our sins.

I answer that, He properly atones for an offense who offers something which the offended one loves equally, or even more than he detested the offense. But by suffering out of love and obedience, Christ gave more to God than was required to compensate for the offense of the whole human race. First of all, because of the exceeding charity from which He suffered; secondly, on account of the dignity of His life which He laid down in atonement, for it was the life of one who was God and man; thirdly, on account of the extent of the Passion, and the greatness of the grief endured, as stated above ([4255]Q[46], A[6]). And therefore Christ’s Passion was not only a sufficient but a superabundant atonement for the sins of the human race; according to 1 Jn. 2:2: “He is the propitiation for our sins: and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.”

Reply to Objection 1: The head and members are as one mystic person; and therefore Christ’s satisfaction belongs to all the faithful as being His members. Also, in so far as any two men are one in charity, the one can atone for the other as shall be shown later ([4256]XP, Q[13], A[2]). But the same reason does not hold good of confession and contrition, because atonement consists in an outward action, for which helps may be used, among which friends are to be computed.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s love was greater than His slayers’ malice: and therefore the value of His Passion in atoning surpassed the murderous guilt of those who crucified Him: so much so that Christ’s suffering was sufficient and superabundant atonement for His murderer’s crime.

Reply to Objection 3: The dignity of Christ’s flesh is not to be estimated solely from the nature of flesh, but also from the Person assuming it—namely, inasmuch as it was God’s flesh, the result of which was that it was of infinite worth.

Whether Christ’s Passion operated by way of sacrifice?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not operate by way of sacrifice. For the truth should correspond with the figure. But human flesh was never offered up in the sacrifices of the Old Law, which were figures of Christ: nay, such sacrifices were reputed as impious, according to Ps. 105:38: “And they shed innocent blood: the blood of their sons and of their daughters, which they sacrificed to the idols of Chanaan.” It seems therefore that Christ’s Passion cannot be called a sacrifice.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x) that “a visible sacrifice is a sacrament—that is, a sacred sign—of an invisible sacrifice.” Now Christ’s Passion is not a sign, but rather the thing signified by other signs. Therefore it seems that Christ’s Passion is not a sacrifice.

Objection 3: Further, whoever offers sacrifice performs some sacred rite, as the very word “sacrifice” shows. But those men who slew Christ did not perform any sacred act, but rather wrought a great wrong. Therefore Christ’s Passion was rather a malefice than a sacrifice.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:2): “He delivered Himself up for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness.”

I answer that, A sacrifice properly so called is something done for that honor which is properly due to God, in order to appease Him: and hence it is that Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): “A true sacrifice is every good work done in order that we may cling to God in holy fellowship, yet referred to that consummation of happiness wherein we can be truly blessed.” But, as is added in the same place, “Christ offered Himself up for us in the Passion”: and this voluntary enduring of the Passion was most acceptable to God, as coming from charity. Therefore it is manifest that Christ’s Passion was a true sacrifice. Moreover, as Augustine says farther on in the same book, “the primitive sacrifices of the holy Fathers were many and various signs of this true sacrifice, one being prefigured by many, in the same way as a single concept of thought is expressed in many words, in order to commend it without tediousness”: and, as Augustine observe, (De Trin. iv), “since there are four things to be noted in every sacrifice—to wit, to whom it is offered, by whom it is offered, what is offered, and for whom it is offered—that the same one true Mediator reconciling us with God through the peace-sacrifice might continue to be one with Him to whom He offered it, might be one with them for whom He offered it, and might Himself be the offerer and what He offered.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although the truth answers to the figure in some respects, yet it does not in all, since the truth must go beyond the figure. Therefore the figure of this sacrifice, in which Christ's flesh is offered, was flesh right fittingly, not the flesh of men, but of animals, as denoting Christ's. And this is a most perfect sacrifice. First of all, since being flesh of human nature, it is fittingly offered for men, and is partaken of by them under the Sacrament. Secondly, because being passible and mortal, it was fit for immolation. Thirdly, because, being sinless, it had virtue to cleanse from sins. Fourthly, because, being the offerer's own flesh, it was acceptable to God on account of His charity in offering up His own flesh. Hence it is that Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "What else could be so fittingly partaken of by men, or offered up for men, as human flesh? What else could be so appropriate for this immolation as mortal flesh? What else is there so clean for cleansing mortals as the flesh born in the womb without fleshly concupiscence, and coming from a virginal womb? What could be so favorably offered and accepted as the flesh of our sacrifice, which was made the body of our Priest?"

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking there of visible figurative sacrifices: and even Christ's Passion, although denoted by other figurative sacrifices, is yet a sign of something to be observed by us, according to 1 Pet. 4:1: "Christ therefore, having suffered in the flesh, be you also armed with the same thought: for he that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sins: that now he may live the rest of his time in the flesh, not after the desires of men, but according to the will of God."

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion was indeed a malefice on His slayers' part; but on His own it was the sacrifice of one suffering out of charity. Hence it is Christ who is said to have offered this sacrifice, and not the executioners.

Whether Christ's Passion brought about our salvation by way of redemption?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Passion did not effect our salvation by way of redemption. For no one purchases or redeems what never ceased to belong to him. But men never ceased to belong to God according to Ps. 23:1: "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof: the world and all they that dwell therein." Therefore it seems that Christ did not redeem us by His Passion.

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiii): "The devil had to be overthrown by Christ's justice." But justice requires that the man who has treacherously seized another's property shall be deprived of it, because deceit and cunning should not benefit anyone, as even human laws declare. Consequently, since the devil by treachery deceived and subjugated to himself man, who is God's creature, it seems that man ought not to be rescued from his power by way of redemption.

Objection 3: Further, whoever buys or redeems an object pays the price to the holder. But it was not to the devil, who held us in bondage, that Christ paid His blood as the price of our redemption. Therefore Christ did not redeem us by His Passion.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Pet. 1:18): "You were not redeemed with corruptible things as gold or silver from your vain conversation of the tradition of your fathers: but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb unspotted and undefiled." And (Gal. 3:13): "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." Now He is said to be a curse for us inasmuch as He suffered upon the tree, as stated above ([4257]Q[46], A[4]). Therefore He did redeem us by His Passion.

I answer that, Man was held captive on account of sin in two ways: first of all, by the bondage of sin, because (Jn. 8:34): "Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin"; and (2 Pet. 2:19): "By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave." Since, then, the devil had overcome man by inducing him to sin, man was subject to the devil's bondage. Secondly, as to the debt of punishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by God's justice: and this, too, is a kind of bondage, since it savors of bondage for a man to suffer what he does not wish, just as it is the free man's condition to apply himself to what he wills.

Since, then, Christ's Passion was a sufficient and a superabundant atonement for the sin and the debt of the human race, it was as a price at the cost of which we were freed from both obligations. For the atonement by which one satisfies for self or another is called the price, by which he ransoms himself or someone else from sin and its penalty, according to Dan. 4:24: "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Now Christ made satisfaction, not by giving money or anything of the sort, but by bestowing what was of greatest price—Himself—for us. And therefore Christ’s Passion is called our redemption.

Reply to Objection 1: Man is said to belong to God in two ways. First of all, in so far as he comes under God’s power: in which way he never ceased to belong to God; according to Dan. 4:22: “The Most High ruleth over the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will.” Secondly, by being united to Him in charity, according to Rom. 8:9: “If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His.” In the first way, then, man never ceased to belong to God, but in the second way he did cease because of sin. And therefore in so far as he was delivered from sin by the satisfaction of Christ’s Passion, he is said to be redeemed by the Passion of Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: Man by sinning became the bondsman both of God and of the devil. Through guilt he had offended God, and put himself under the devil by consenting to him; consequently he did not become God’s servant on account of his guilt, but rather, by withdrawing from God’s service, he, by God’s just permission, fell under the devil’s servitude on account of the offense perpetrated. But as to the penalty, man was chiefly bound to God as his sovereign judge, and to the devil as his torturer, according to Mat. 5:25: “Lest perhaps the adversary deliver thee to the judge, and the judge deliver thee to the officer”—that is, “to the relentless avenging angel,” as Chrysostom says (Hom. xi). Consequently, although, after deceiving man, the devil, so far as in him lay, held him unjustly in bondage as to both sin and penalty, still it was just that man should suffer it. God so permitting it as to the sin and ordaining it as to the penalty. And therefore justice required man’s redemption with regard to God, but not with regard to the devil.

Reply to Objection 3: Because, with regard to God, redemption was necessary for man’s deliverance, but not with regard to the devil, the price had to be paid not to the devil, but to God. And therefore Christ is said to have paid the price of our redemption—His own precious blood—not to the devil, but to God.

Whether it is proper to Christ to be the Redeemer?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to be the Redeemer, because it is written (Ps. 30:6): “Thou hast redeemed me, O

Lord, the God of Truth.” But to be the Lord God of Truth belongs to the entire Trinity. Therefore it is not proper to Christ.

Objection 2: Further, he is said to redeem who pays the price of redemption. But God the Father gave His Son in redemption for our sins, as is written (Ps. 110:9): “The Lord hath sent redemption to His people,” upon which the gloss adds, “that is, Christ, who gives redemption to captives.” Therefore not only Christ, but the Father also, redeemed us.

Objection 3: Further, not only Christ’s Passion, but also that of other saints conduced to our salvation, according to Col. 1:24: “I now rejoice in my sufferings for you, and fill up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ, in my flesh for His body, which is the Church.” Therefore the title of Redeemer belongs not only to Christ, but also to the other saints.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 3:13): “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the Law, being made a curse for us.” But only Christ was made a curse for us. Therefore only Christ ought to be called our Redeemer.

I answer that, For someone to redeem, two things are required—namely, the act of paying and the price paid. For if in redeeming something a man pays a price which is not his own, but another’s, he is not said to be the chief redeemer, but rather the other is, whose price it is. Now Christ’s blood or His bodily life, which “is in the blood,” is the price of our redemption (Lev. 17:11, 14), and that life He paid. Hence both of these belong immediately to Christ as man; but to the Trinity as to the first and remote cause, to whom Christ’s life belonged as to its first author, and from whom Christ received the inspiration of suffering for us. Consequently it is proper to Christ as man to be the Redeemer immediately; although the redemption may be ascribed to the whole Trinity as its first cause.

Reply to Objection 1: A gloss explains the text thus: “Thou, O Lord God of Truth, hast redeemed me in Christ, crying out, ‘Lord, into Thy hands I commend my spirit.’” And so redemption belongs immediately to the Man-Christ, but principally to God.

Reply to Objection 2: The Man-Christ paid the price of our redemption immediately, but at the command of the Father as the original author.

Reply to Objection 3: The sufferings of the saints are beneficial to the Church, as by way, not of redemption, but of example and exhortation, according to 2 Cor. 1:6: “Whether we be in tribulation, it is for your exhortation and salvation.”

Whether Christ’s Passion brought about our salvation efficiently?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation efficiently. For the efficient cause of our salvation is the greatness of the Divine power, according to Is. 59:1: “Behold the hand of the Lord is not shortened that it cannot save.” But “Christ was crucified through weakness,” as it is written (2 Cor. 13:4). Therefore, Christ’s Passion did not bring about our salvation efficiently.

Objection 2: Further, no corporeal agency acts efficiently except by contact: hence even Christ cleansed the leper by touching him “in order to show that His flesh had saving power,” as Chrysostom [*Theophylact, Enarr. in Luc.] says. But Christ’s Passion could not touch all mankind. Therefore it could not efficiently bring about the salvation of all men.

Objection 3: Further, it does not seem to be consistent for the same agent to operate by way of merit and by way of efficiency, since he who merits awaits the result from someone else. But it was by way of merit that Christ’s Passion accomplished our salvation. Therefore it was not by way of efficiency.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 1:18) that “the word of the cross to them that are saved . . . is the power of God.” But God’s power brings about our salvation efficiently. Therefore Christ’s Passion on the cross accomplished our salvation efficiently.

I answer that, There is a twofold efficient agency—namely, the principal and the instrumental. Now the principal efficient cause of man’s salvation is God. But since Christ’s humanity is the “instrument of the Godhead,” as stated above ([4258]Q[43], A[2]), therefore all Christ’s actions and sufferings operate instrumentally in virtue of His Godhead for the salvation of men. Consequently, then, Christ’s Passion accomplishes man’s salvation efficiently.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s Passion in relation to His flesh is consistent with the infirmity which He took upon Himself, but in relation to the Godhead it draws infinite might from It, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: “The weakness of God is stronger than men”; because Christ’s weakness, inasmuch as He is God, has a might exceeding all human power.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s Passion, although corporeal, has yet a spiritual effect from the Godhead united: and therefore it secures its efficacy by spiritual contact—namely, by faith and the sacraments of faith, as the Apostle says (Rom. 3:25): “Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood.”

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s Passion, according as it is compared with His Godhead, operates in an efficient manner: but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ’s soul it acts in a meritorious manner: considered as being within Christ’s very flesh, it acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts by way of redemption: but in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice, as shall be shown farther on ([4259]Q[49]).

OF THE EFFECTS OF CHRIST’S PASSION (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider what are the effects of Christ’s Passion, concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether we were freed from sin by Christ’s Passion?

(2) Whether we were thereby delivered from the power of the devil?

(3) Whether we were freed thereby from our debt of punishment?

(4) Whether we were thereby reconciled with God?

(5) Whether heaven’s gate was opened to us thereby?

(6) Whether Christ derived exaltation from it?

Whether we were delivered from sin through Christ’s Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that we were not delivered from sin through Christ’s Passion. For to deliver from sin belongs to God alone, according to Is. 43:25: “I am He who blot out your iniquities for My own sake.” But Christ did not suffer as God, but as man. Therefore Christ’s Passion did not free us from sin.

Objection 2: Further, what is corporeal does not act upon what is spiritual. But Christ’s Passion is corporeal, whereas sin exists in the soul, which is a spiritual creature. Therefore Christ’s Passion could not cleanse us from sin.

Objection 3: Further, one cannot be purged from a sin not yet committed, but which shall be committed hereafter. Since, then, many sins have been committed since Christ’s death, and are being committed daily, it seems that we were not delivered from sin by Christ’s death.

Objection 4: Further, given an efficient cause, nothing else is required for producing the effect. But other things besides are required for the forgiveness of sins, such as baptism and penance. Consequently it seems that Christ’s Passion is not the sufficient cause of the forgiveness of sins.

Objection 5: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): “Charity covereth all sins”; and (Prov. 15:27): “By mercy and faith, sins are purged away.” But there are many other things of which we have faith, and which excite charity. Therefore Christ’s Passion is not the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:5): “He loved us, and washed us from our sins in His own blood.”

I answer that, Christ’s Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity, because, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:8): “God commendeth His charity towards us: because when as yet we were sinners, according to the time, Christ died for us.” But it is by charity that we procure pardon of our sins, according to Lk. 7:47: “Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much.” Secondly, Christ’s Passion causes forgiveness of sins by way of redemption. For since He is our head, then, by the Passion which He endured from love and obedience, He delivered us as His members from our sins, as by the price of His Passion: in the same way as if a man by the good industry of his hands were to redeem himself from a sin committed with his feet. For, just as the natural body is one though made up of diverse members, so the whole Church, Christ’s mystic body, is reckoned as one person with its head, which is Christ. Thirdly, by way of efficiency, inasmuch as Christ’s flesh, wherein He endured the Passion, is the instrument of the Godhead, so that His sufferings and actions operate with Divine power for expelling sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ did not suffer as God, nevertheless His flesh is the instrument of the Godhead; and hence it is that His Passion has a kind of Divine Power of casting out sin, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ's Passion is corporeal, still it derives a kind of spiritual energy from the Godhead, to which the flesh is united as an instrument: and according to this power Christ's Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ by His Passion delivered us from our sins causally—that is, by setting up the cause of our deliverance, from which cause all sins whatsoever, past, present, or to come, could be forgiven: just as if a doctor were to prepare a medicine by which all sicknesses can be cured even in future.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, since Christ's Passion preceded, as a kind of universal cause of the forgiveness of sins, it needs to be applied to each individual for the cleansing of personal sins. Now this is done by baptism and penance and the other sacraments, which derive their power from Christ's Passion, as shall be shown later ([4260]Q[62], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 5: Christ's Passion is applied to us even through faith, that we may share in its fruits, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood." But the faith through which we are cleansed from sin is not "lifeless faith," which can exist even with sin, but "faith living" through charity; that thus Christ's Passion may be applied to us, not only as to our minds, but also as to our hearts. And even in this way sins are forgiven through the power of the Passion of Christ.

Whether we were delivered from the devil's power through Christ's Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that we were not delivered from the power of the devil through Christ's Passion. For he has no power over others, who can do nothing to them without the sanction of another. But without the Divine permission the devil could never do hurt to any man, as is evident in the instance of Job (1,2), where, by power received from God, the devil first injured him in his possessions, and afterwards in his body. In like manner it is stated (Mat. 8:31,32) that the devils could not enter into the swine except with Christ’s leave. Therefore the devil never had power over men: and hence we are not delivered from his power through Christ’s Passion.

Objection 2: Further, the devil exercises his power over men by tempting them and molesting their bodies. But even after the Passion he continues to do the same to men. Therefore we are not delivered from his power through Christ’s Passion.

Objection 3: Further, the might of Christ’s Passion endures for ever, as, according to Heb. 10:14: “By one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.” But deliverance rom the devil’s power is not found everywhere, since there are still idolaters in many regions of the world; nor will it endure for ever, because in the time of Antichrist he will be especially active in using his power to the hurt of men; because it is said of him (2 Thess. 2:9): “Whose coming is according to the working of Satan, in all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and in all seduction of iniquity.” Consequently it seems that Christ’s Passion is not the cause of the human race being delivered from the power of the devil.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 12:31), when His Passion was drawing nigh: “Now shall the prince of this world be cast out; and I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all things to Myself.” Now He was lifted up from the earth by His Passion on the cross. Therefore by His Passion the devil was deprived of his power over man.

I answer that, There are three things to be considered regarding the power which the devil exercised over men previous to Christ’s Passion. The first is on man’s own part, who by his sin deserved to be delivered over to the devil’s power, and was overcome by his tempting. Another point is on God’s part, whom man had offended by sinning, and who with justice left man under the devil’s power. The third is on the devil’s part, who out of his most wicked will hindered man from securing his salvation.

As to the first point, by Christ’s Passion man was delivered from the devil’s power, in so far as the Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sins, as stated above [4261](A[1]). As to the second, it must be said that Christ’s Passion freed us from the devil’s power, inasmuch as it reconciled us with God, as shall be shown later [4262](A[4]). But as to the third, Christ’s Passion delivered us from the devil, inasmuch as in Christ’s Passion he exceeded the limit of power assigned him by God, by conspiring to bring about Christ’s death, Who, being sinless, did not deserve to die. Hence

Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, cap. xiv): “The devil was vanquished by Christ’s justice: because, while discovering in Him nothing deserving of death, nevertheless he slew Him. And it is certainly just that the debtors whom he held captive should be set at liberty since they believed in Him whom the devil slew, though He was no debtor.”

Reply to Objection 1: The devil is said to have had such power over men not as though he were able to injure them without God’s sanction, but because he was justly permitted to injure men whom by tempting he had induced to give consent.

Reply to Objection 2: God so permitting it, the devil can still tempt men’s souls and harass their bodies: yet there is a remedy provided for man through Christ’s Passion, whereby he can safeguard himself against the enemy’s assaults, so as not to be dragged down into the destruction of everlasting death. And all who resisted the devil previous to the Passion were enabled to do so through faith in the Passion, although it was not yet accomplished. Yet in one respect no one was able to escape the devil’s hands, i.e. so as not to descend into hell. But after Christ’s Passion, men can defend themselves from this by its power.

Reply to Objection 3: God permits the devil to deceive men by certain persons, and in times and places, according to the hidden motive of His judgments; still, there is always a remedy provided through Christ’s Passion, for defending themselves against the wicked snares of the demons, even in Antichrist’s time. But if any man neglect to make use of this remedy, it detracts nothing from the efficacy of Christ’s Passion.

Whether men were freed from the punishment of sin through Christ’s Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that men were not freed from the punishment of sin by Christ’s Passion. For the chief punishment of sin is eternal damnation. But those damned in hell for their sins were not set free by Christ’s Passion, because “in hell there is no redemption” [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii]. It seems, therefore, that Christ’s Passion did not deliver men from the punishment of sin.

Objection 2: Further, no punishment should be imposed upon them who are delivered from the debt of punishment. But a satisfactory punishment is imposed upon penitents. Consequently, men were not freed from the debt of punishment by Christ’s Passion.

Objection 3: Further, death is a punishment of sin, according to Rom. 6:23: “The wages of sin is death.” But men still die after Christ’s Passion. Therefore it seems that we have not been delivered from the debt of punishment.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 53:4): “Surely He hath borne our iniquities and carried our sorrows.”

I answer that, Through Christ’s Passion we have been delivered from the debt of punishment in two ways. First of all, directly—namely, inasmuch as Christ’s Passion was sufficient and superabundant satisfaction for the sins of the whole human race: but when sufficient satisfaction has been paid, then the debt of punishment is abolished. In another way—indirectly, that is to say—in so far as Christ’s Passion is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, upon which the debt of punishment rests.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s Passion works its effect in them to whom it is applied, through faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. And, consequently, the lost in hell cannot avail themselves of its effects, since they are not united to Christ in the aforesaid manner.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (A[1], ad 4,5), in order to secure the effects of Christ’s Passion, we must be likened unto Him. Now we are likened unto Him sacramentally in Baptism, according to Rom. 6:4: “For we are buried together with Him by baptism into death.” Hence no punishment of satisfaction is imposed upon men at their baptism, since they are fully delivered by Christ’s satisfaction. But because, as it is written (1 Pet. 3:18), “Christ died” but “once for our sins,” therefore a man cannot a second time be likened unto Christ’s death by the sacrament of Baptism. Hence it is necessary that those who sin after Baptism be likened unto Christ suffering by some form of punishment or suffering which they endure in their own person; yet, by the co-operation of Christ’s satisfaction, much lighter penalty suffices than one that is proportionate to the sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s satisfaction works its effect in us inasmuch as we are incorporated with Him, as the members with their head, as stated above [4263](A[1]). Now the members must be conformed to their head. Consequently, as Christ first had grace in His soul with bodily passibility, and through the Passion attained to the glory of immortality, so we likewise, who are His members, are freed by His Passion from all debt of punishment, yet so that we first receive in our souls "the spirit of adoption of sons," whereby our names are written down for the inheritance of immortal glory, while we yet have a passible and mortal body: but afterwards, "being made conformable" to the sufferings and death of Christ, we are brought into immortal glory, according to the saying of the Apostle (Rom. 8:17): "And if sons, heirs also: heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ; yet so if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him."

Whether we were reconciled to God through Christ's Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that we were not reconciled to God through Christ's Passion. For there is no need of reconciliation between friends. But God always loved us, according to Wis. 11:25: "Thou lovest all the things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." Therefore Christ's Passion did not reconcile us to God.

Objection 2: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect: hence grace, which is the cause of meriting, does not come under merit. But God's love is the cause of Christ's Passion, according to Jn. 3:16: "God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son." It does not appear, then, that we were reconciled to God through Christ's Passion, so that He began to love us anew.

Objection 3: Further, Christ's Passion was completed by men slaying Him; and thereby they offended God grievously. Therefore Christ's Passion is rather the cause of wrath than of reconciliation to God.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 5:10): "We are reconciled to God by the death of His Son."

I answer that, Christ's Passion is in two ways the cause of our reconciliation to God. In the first way, inasmuch as it takes away sin by which men became God's enemies, according to Wis. 14:9: "To God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike"; and Ps. 5:7: "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." In another way, inasmuch as it is a most acceptable sacrifice to God. Now it is the proper effect of sacrifice to appease God: just as man likewise overlooks an offense committed against him on account of some pleasing act of homage shown him. Hence it is written (1 Kings

26:19): “If the Lord stir thee up against me, let Him accept of sacrifice.” And in like fashion Christ’s voluntary suffering was such a good act that, because of its being found in human nature, God was appeased for every offense of the human race with regard to those who are made one with the crucified Christ in the aforesaid manner (A[1], ad 4).

Reply to Objection 1: God loves all men as to their nature, which He Himself made; yet He hates them with respect to the crimes they commit against Him, according to Ecclus. 12:3: “The Highest hateth sinners.”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not said to have reconciled us with God, as if God had begun anew to love us, since it is written (Jer. 31:3): “I have loved thee with an everlasting love”; but because the source of hatred was taken away by Christ’s Passion, both through sin being washed away and through compensation being made in the shape of a more pleasing offering.

Reply to Objection 3: As Christ’s slayers were men, so also was the Christ slain. Now the charity of the suffering Christ surpassed the wickedness of His slayers. Accordingly Christ’s Passion prevailed more in reconciling God to the whole human race than in provoking Him to wrath.

Whether Christ opened the gate of heaven to us by His Passion?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not open the gate of heaven to us by His Passion. For it is written (Prov. 11:18): “To him that soweth justice, there is a faithful reward.” But the reward of justice is the entering into the kingdom of heaven. It seems, therefore, that the holy Fathers who wrought works of justice, obtained by faith the entering into the heavenly kingdom even without Christ’s Passion. Consequently Christ’s Passion is not the cause of the opening of the gate of the kingdom of heaven.

Objection 2: Further, Elias was caught up to heaven previous to Christ’s Passion (4 Kings 2). But the effect never precedes the cause. Therefore it seems that the opening of heaven’s gate is not the result of Christ’s Passion.

Objection 3: Further, as it is written (Mat. 3:16), when Christ was baptized the heavens were opened to Him. But His baptism preceded the Passion. Consequently the opening of heaven is not the result of Christ’s Passion.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Mic. 2:13): “For He shall go up that shall open the way before them.” But to open the way to heaven seems to be nothing else than to throw open its gate. Therefore it seems that the gate of heaven was opened to us, not by Christ's Passion, but by His Ascension.

On the contrary, is the saying of the Apostle (Heb. 10:19): "We have [Vulg.: 'having a'] confidence in the entering into the Holies"—that is, of the heavenly places—"through the blood of Christ."

I answer that, The shutting of the gate is the obstacle which hinders men from entering in. But it is on account of sin that men were prevented from entering into the heavenly kingdom, since, according to Is. 35:8: "It shall be called the holy way, and the unclean shall not pass over it." Now there is a twofold sin which prevents men from entering into the kingdom of heaven. The first is common to the whole race, for it is our first parents' sin, and by that sin heaven's entrance is closed to man. Hence we read in Gn. 3:24 that after our first parents' sin God "placed . . . cherubim and a flaming sword, turning every way, to keep the way of the tree of life." The other is the personal sin of each one of us, committed by our personal act.

Now by Christ's Passion we have been delivered not only from the common sin of the whole human race, both as to its guilt and as to the debt of punishment, for which He paid the penalty on our behalf; but, furthermore, from the personal sins of individuals, who share in His Passion by faith and charity and the sacraments of faith. Consequently, then the gate of heaven's kingdom is thrown open to us through Christ's Passion. This is precisely what the Apostle says (Heb. 9:11,12): "Christ being come a high-priest of the good things to come . . . by His own blood entered once into the Holies, having obtained eternal redemption." And this is foreshadowed (Num. 35:25, 28), where it is said that the slayer* "shall abide there"—that is to say, in the city of refuge—"until the death of the high-priest, that is anointed with the holy oil: but after he is dead, then shall he return home." [*The Septuagint has 'slayer,' the Vulgate, 'innocent'—i.e. the man who has slain 'without hatred and enmity.']

Reply to Objection 1: The holy Fathers, by doing works of justice, merited to enter into the heavenly kingdom, through faith in Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 11:33: The saints "by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought justice," and each of them was thereby cleansed from sin, so far as the cleansing of the individual is concerned. Nevertheless the faith and righteousness of no one of them sufficed for removing the barrier arising from the guilt of the whole human race: but this was removed at the cost of

Christ’s blood. Consequently, before Christ’s Passion no one could enter the kingdom of heaven by obtaining everlasting beatitude, which consists in the full enjoyment of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Elias was taken up into the atmospheric heaven, but not in to the empyrean heaven, which is the abode of the saints: and likewise Enoch was translated into the earthly paradise, where he is believed to live with Elias until the coming of Antichrist.

Reply to Objection 3: As was stated above ([4264]Q[39], A[5]), the heavens were opened at Christ’s baptism, not for Christ’s sake, to whom heaven was ever open, but in order to signify that heaven is opened to the baptized, through Christ’s baptism, which has its efficacy from His Passion.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ by His Passion merited for us the opening of the kingdom of heaven, and removed the obstacle; but by His ascension He, as it were, brought us to the possession of the heavenly kingdom. And consequently it is said that by ascending He “opened the way before them.”

Whether by His Passion Christ merited to be exalted?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ did not merit to be exalted on account of His Passion. For eminence of rank belongs to God alone, just as knowledge of truth, according to Ps. 112:4: “The Lord is high above all nations, and His glory above the heavens.” But Christ as man had the knowledge of all truth, not on account of any preceding merit, but from the very union of God and man, according to Jn. 1:14: “We saw His glory . . . as it were of the only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and of truth.” Therefore neither had He exaltation from the merit of the Passion but from the union alone.

Objection 2: Further, Christ merited for Himself from the first instant of His conception, as stated above ([4265]Q[34], A[3]). But His love was no greater during the Passion than before. Therefore, since charity is the principle of merit, it seems that He did not merit exaltation from the Passion more than before.

Objection 3: Further, the glory of the body comes from the glory of the soul, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.). But by His Passion Christ did not merit exaltation as to the glory of His soul, because His soul was beatified from the first instant of His conception. Therefore neither did He merit exaltation, as to the glory of His body, from the Passion.

On the contrary, It is written (Phil. 2:8): “He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross; for which cause God also exalted Him.”

I answer that, Merit implies a certain equality of justice: hence the Apostle says (Rom. 4:4): “Now to him that worketh, the reward is reckoned according to debt.” But when anyone by reason of his unjust will ascribes to himself something beyond his due, it is only just that he be deprived of something else which is his due; thus, “when a man steals a sheep he shall pay back four” (Ex. 22:1). And he is said to deserve it, inasmuch as his unjust will is chastised thereby. So likewise when any man through his just will has stripped himself of what he ought to have, he deserves that something further be granted to him as the reward of his just will. And hence it is written (Lk. 14:11): “He that humbleth himself shall be exalted.”

Now in His Passion Christ humbled Himself beneath His dignity in four respects. In the first place as to His Passion and death, to which He was not bound; secondly, as to the place, since His body was laid in a sepulchre and His soul in hell; thirdly, as to the shame and mockeries He endured; fourthly, as to His being delivered up to man’s power, as He Himself said to Pilate (Jn. 19:11): “Thou shouldst not have any power against Me, unless it were given thee from above.” And, consequently, He merited a four-fold exaltation from His Passion. First of all, as to His glorious Resurrection: hence it is written (Ps. 138:1): “Thou hast known my sitting down”—that is, the lowliness of My Passion—“and My rising up.” Secondly, as to His ascension into heaven: hence it is written (Eph. 4:9): “Now that He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended above all the heavens.” Thirdly, as to the sitting on the right hand of the Father and the showing forth of His Godhead, according to Is. 52:13: “He shall be exalted and extolled, and shall be exceeding high: as many have been astonished at him, so shall His visage be inglorious among men.” Moreover (Phil. 2:8) it is written: “He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of the cross: for which cause also God hath exalted Him, and hath given Him a name which is above all names”—that is to say, so that He shall be hailed as God by all; and all shall pay Him homage as God. And this is expressed in what follows: “That in the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.” Fourthly, as to His judiciary power: for it is written (Job 36:17):

“Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked cause and judgment Thou shalt recover.”

Reply to Objection 1: The source of meriting comes of the soul, while the body is the instrument of the meritorious work. And consequently the perfection of Christ’s soul, which was the source of meriting, ought not to be acquired in Him by merit, like the perfection of the body, which was the subject of suffering, and was thereby the instrument of His merit.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ by His previous merits did merit exaltation on behalf of His soul, whose will was animated with charity and the other virtues; but in the Passion He merited His exaltation by way of recompense even on behalf of His body: since it is only just that the body, which from charity was subjected to the Passion, should receive recompense in glory.

Reply to Objection 3: It was owing to a special dispensation in Christ that before the Passion the glory of His soul did not shine out in His body, in order that He might procure His bodily glory with greater honor, when He had merited it by His Passion. But it was not beseeming for the glory of His soul to be postponed, since the soul was united immediately with the Word; hence it was beseeming that its glory should be filled by the Word Himself. But the body was united with the Word through the soul.

OF THE DEATH OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the death of Christ; concerning which there are six subjects of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?

(2) Whether His death severed the union of Godhead and flesh?

(3) Whether His Godhead was separated from His soul?

(4) Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death?

(5) Whether His was the same body, living and dead?

(6) Whether His death conduced in any way to our salvation?

Whether it was fitting that Christ should die?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that Christ should die. For a first principle in any order is not affected by anything contrary to such order: thus fire, which is the principle of heat, can never become cold. But the Son of God is the fountain-head and principle of all life, according to Ps. 35:10: “With Thee is the fountain of life.” Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to die.

Objection 2: Further, death is a greater defect than sickness, because it is through sickness that one comes to die. But it was not beseeming for Christ to languish from sickness, as Chrysostom [*Athanasius, Orat. de Incarn. Verbi] says. Consequently, neither was it becoming for Christ to die.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Jn. 10:10): “I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly.” But one opposite does not lead to another. Therefore it seems that neither was it fitting for Christ to die.

On the contrary, It is written, (Jn. 11:50): “It is expedient that one man should die for the people . . . that the whole nation perish not”: which words were spoken prophetically by Caiphas, as the Evangelist testifies.

I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to die. First of all to satisfy for the whole human race, which was sentenced to die on account of sin, according to Gn. 2:17: “In what day soever ye shall [Vulg.: ‘thou shalt’] eat of it ye shall [Vulg.: ‘thou shalt’] die the death.” Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to the penalty deserved by that other. And so Christ resolved to die, that by dying He might atone for us, according to 1 Pet. 3:18: “Christ also died once for our sins.” Secondly, in order to show the reality of the flesh assumed. For, as Eusebius says (Orat. de Laud. Constant. xv), “if, after dwelling among men Christ were suddenly to disappear from men’s sight, as though shunning death, then by all men He would be likened to a phantom.” Thirdly, that by dying He might deliver us from fearing death: hence it is written (Heb. 2:14,15) that He communicated “to flesh and blood, that through death He might destroy him who had the empire of death and might deliver them who, through the fear of death, were all their lifetime subject to servitude.” Fourthly, that by dying in the body to the likeness of sin—that is, to its penalty—He might set us the example of dying to sin spiritually. Hence it is written (Rom. 6:10): “For in that He died to sin, He died once, but in that He liveth, He liveth unto God: so do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto God.” Fifthly, that by rising from the dead, and manifesting His power whereby He overthrew death, He might instill into us the hope of rising from the dead. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:12): “If Christ be preached that He rose again from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection from the dead?”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is the fountain of life, as God, and not as man: but He died as man, and not as God. Hence Augustine [*Vigilius Tapsensis] says against Felician: “Far be it from us to suppose that Christ so felt death that He lost His life inasmuch as He is life in Himself; for, were it so, the fountain of life would have run dry. Accordingly, He experienced death by sharing in our human feeling, which of His own accord He had taken upon Himself, but He did not lose the power of His Nature, through which He gives life to all things.”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ did not suffer death which comes of sickness, lest He should seem to die of necessity from exhausted nature: but He endured death inflicted from without, to which He willingly surrendered Himself, that His death might be shown to be a voluntary one.

Reply to Objection 3: One opposite does not of itself lead to the other, yet it does so indirectly at times: thus cold sometimes is the indirect cause of heat: and in this way Christ by His death brought us back to life, when by His death He destroyed our death; just as he who bears another’s punishment takes such punishment away.

Whether the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead was separated from the flesh when Christ died. For as Matthew relates (27:46), when our Lord was hanging upon the cross He cried out: “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” which words Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 23:46, explains as follows: “The man cried out when about to expire by being severed from the Godhead; for since the Godhead is immune from death, assuredly death could not be there, except life departed, for the Godhead is life.” And so it seems that when Christ died, the Godhead was separated from His flesh.

Objection 2: Further, extremes are severed when the mean is removed. But the soul was the mean through which the Godhead was united with the flesh, as stated above ([4266]Q[6], A[1]). Therefore since the soul was severed from the flesh by death, it seems that, in consequence, His Godhead was also separated from it.

Objection 3: Further, God's life-giving power is greater than that of the soul. But the body could not die unless the soul quitted it. Therefore, much less could it die unless the Godhead departed.

On the contrary, As stated above ([4267]Q[16], AA[4],5), the attributes of human nature are predicated of the Son of God only by reason of the union. But what belongs to the body of Christ after death is predicated of the Son of God—namely, being buried: as is evident from the Creed, in which it is said that the Son of God "was conceived and born of a Virgin, suffered, died, and was buried." Therefore Christ's Godhead was not separated from the flesh when He died.

I answer that, What is bestowed through God's grace is never withdrawn except through fault. Hence it is written (Rom. 11:29): "The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance." But the grace of union whereby the Godhead was united to the flesh in Christ's Person, is greater than the grace of adoption whereby others are sanctified: also it is more enduring of itself, because this grace is ordained for personal union, whereas the grace of adoption is referred to a certain affective union. And yet we see that the grace of adoption is never lost without fault. Since, then there was no sin in Christ, it was impossible for the union of the Godhead with the flesh to be dissolved. Consequently, as before death Christ's flesh was united personally and hypostatically with the Word of God, it remained so after His death, so that the hypostasis of the Word of God was not different from that of Christ's flesh after death, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii).

Reply to Objection 1: Such forsaking is not to be referred to the dissolving of the personal union, but to this, that God the Father gave Him up to the Passion: hence there "to forsake" means simply not to protect from persecutors. or else He says there that He is forsaken, with reference to the prayer He had made: "Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass away from Me," as Augustine explains it (De Gratia Novi Test.).

Reply to Objection 2: The Word of God is said to be united with the flesh through the medium of the soul, inasmuch as it is through the soul that the flesh belongs to human nature, which the Son of God intended to assume; but not as though the soul were the medium linking them together. But it is due to the soul that the flesh is human even after the soul has been separated from it—namely, inasmuch as by God’s ordinance there remains in the dead flesh a certain relation to the resurrection. And therefore the union of the Godhead with the flesh is not taken away.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul formally possesses the life-giving energy, and therefore, while it is present, and united formally, the body must necessarily be a living one, whereas the Godhead has not the life-giving energy formally, but effectively; because It cannot be the form of the body: and therefore it is not necessary for the flesh to be living while the union of the Godhead with the flesh remains, since God does not act of necessity, but of His own will.

Whether in Christ’s death there was a severance between His Godhead and His soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that there was a severance in death between Christ’s Godhead and His soul, because our Lord said (Jn. 10:18): “No man taketh away My soul from Me: but I lay it down of Myself, and I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it up again.” But it does not appear that the body can set the soul aside, by separating the soul from itself, because the soul is not subject to the power of the body, but rather conversely: and so it appears that it belongs to Christ, as the Word of God, to lay down His soul: but this is to separate it from Himself. Consequently, by death His soul was severed from the Godhead.

Objection 2: Further, Athanasius [*Vigilius Tapsensis, De Trin. vi; Bardenhewer assigns it to St. Athanasius: 45, iii. The full title is De Trinitate et Spiritu Sancto] says that he “is accursed who does not confess that the entire man, whom the Son of God took to Himself, after being assumed once more or delivered by Him, rose again from the dead on the third day.” But the entire man could not be assumed again, unless the entire man was at one time separated from the Word of God: and the entire man is made of soul and body. Therefore there was a separation made at one time of the Godhead from both the body and the soul.

Objection 3: Further, the Son of God is truly styled a man because of the union with the entire man. If then, when the union of the soul with the body was dissolved by death, the Word of God continued united with the soul, it would follow that the Son of God could be truly called a soul. But this is false, because since the soul is the form of the body, it would result in the

Word of God being the form of the body; which is impossible. Therefore, in death the soul of Christ was separated from the Word of God.

Objection 4: Further, the separated soul and body are not one hypostasis, but two. Therefore, if the Word of God remained united with Christ's soul and body, then, when they were severed by Christ's death, it seems to follow that the Word of God was two hypostases during such time as Christ was dead; which cannot be admitted. Therefore after Christ's death His soul did not continue to be united with the Word.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Although Christ died as man, and His holy soul was separated from His spotless body, nevertheless His Godhead remained unseparated from both—from the soul, I mean, and from the body."

I answer that, The soul is united with the Word of God more immediately and more primarily than the body is, because it is through the soul that the body is united with the Word of God, as stated above ([4268]Q[6], A[1]). Since, then, the Word of God was not separated from the body at Christ's death, much less was He separated from the soul. Accordingly, since what regards the body severed from the soul is affirmed of the Son of God—namely, that "it was buried"—so is it said of Him in the Creed that "He descended into hell," because His soul when separated from the body did go down into hell.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine (Tract. xlvii in Joan.), in commenting on the text of John, asks, since Christ is Word and soul and body, "whether He putteth down His soul, for that He is the Word? Or, for that He is a soul?" Or, again, "for that He is flesh?" And he says that, "should we say that the Word of God laid down His soul" . . . it would follow that "there was a time when that soul was severed from the Word"—which is untrue. "For death severed the body and soul . . . but that the soul was severed from the Word I do not affirm . . . But should we say that the soul laid itself down," it follows "that it is severed from itself: which is most absurd." It remains, therefore, that "the flesh itself layeth down its soul and taketh it again, not by its own power, but by the power of the Word dwelling in the flesh": because, as stated above [4269](A[2]), the Godhead of the Word was not severed from the flesh in death.

Reply to Objection 2: In those words Athanasius never meant to say that the whole man was reassumed—that is, as to all his parts—as if the Word of

God had laid aside the parts of human nature by His death; but that the totality of the assumed nature was restored once more in the resurrection by the resumed union of soul and body.

Reply to Objection 2: Through being united to human nature, the Word of God is not on that account called human nature: but He is called a man—that is, one having human nature. Now the soul and the body are essential parts of human nature. Hence it does not follow that the Word is a soul or a body through being united with both, but that He is one possessing a soul or a body.

Reply to Objection 4: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “In Christ’s death the soul was separated from the flesh: not one hypostasis divided into two: because both soul and body in the same respect had their existence from the beginning in the hypostasis of the Word; and in death, though severed from one another, each one continued to have the one same hypostasis of the Word. Wherefore the one hypostasis of the Word was the hypostasis of the Word, of the soul, and of the body. For neither soul nor body ever had an hypostasis of its own, besides the hypostasis of the Word: for there was always one hypostasis of the Word, and never two.”

Whether Christ was a man during the three days of His death?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was a man during the three days of His death, because Augustine says (De Trin. iii): “Such was the assuming [of nature] as to make God to be man, and man to be God.” But this assuming [of nature] did not cease at Christ’s death. Therefore it seems that He did not cease to be a man in consequence of death.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix) that “each man is his intellect”; consequently, when we address the soul of Peter after his death we say: “Saint Peter, pray for us.” But the Son of God after death was not separated from His intellectual soul. Therefore, during those three days the Son of God was a man.

Objection 3: Further, every priest is a man. But during those three days of death Christ was a priest: otherwise what is said in Ps. 109:4 would not be true: “Thou art a priest for ever.” Therefore Christ was a man during those three days.

On the contrary, When the higher [species] is removed, so is the lower. But the living or animated being is a higher species than animal and man, because an animal is a sensible animated substance. Now during those three days of death Christ's body was not living or animated. Therefore He was not a man.

I answer that, It is an article of faith that Christ was truly dead: hence it is an error against faith to assert anything whereby the truth of Christ's death is destroyed. Accordingly it is said in the Synodal epistle of Cyril [*Act. Conc. Ephes. P. I, cap. xxvi]: "If any man does not acknowledge that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, and was crucified in the flesh and tasted death in the flesh, let him be anathema." Now it belongs to the truth of the death of man or animal that by death the subject ceases to be man or animal; because the death of the man or animal results from the separation of the soul, which is the formal complement of the man or animal. Consequently, to say that Christ was a man during the three days of His death simply and without qualification, is erroneous. Yet it can be said that He was "a dead man" during those three days.

However, some writers have contended that Christ was a man during those three days, uttering words which are indeed erroneous, yet without intent of error in faith: as Hugh of Saint Victor, who (De Sacram. ii) contended that Christ, during the three days that followed His death, was a man, because he held that the soul is a man: but this is false, as was shown in the [4270]FP, Q[75], A[4]. Likewise the Master of the Sentences (iii, D, 22) held Christ to be a man during the three days of His death for quite another reason. For he believed the union of soul and flesh not to be essential to a man, and that for anything to be a man it suffices if it have a soul and body, whether united or separated: and that this is likewise false is clear both from what has been said in the [4271]FP, Q[75], A[4], and from what has been said above regarding the mode of union (Q[2] , A[5]).

Reply to Objection 1: The Word of God assumed a united soul and body: and the result of this assumption was that God is man, and man is God. But this assumption did not cease by the separation of the Word from the soul or from the flesh; yet the union of soul and flesh ceased.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is said to be his own intellect, not because the intellect is the entire man, but because the intellect is the chief part of man, in which man’s whole disposition lies virtually; just as the ruler of the city may be called the whole city, since its entire disposal is vested in him.

Reply to Objection 3: That a man is competent to be a priest is by reason of the soul, which is the subject of the character of order: hence a man does not lose his priestly order by death, and much less does Christ, who is the fount of the entire priesthood.

Whether Christ’s was identically the same body living and dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s was not identically the same body living and dead. For Christ truly died just as other men do. But the body of everyone else is not simply identically the same, dead and living, because there is an essential difference between them. Therefore neither is the body of Christ identically the same, dead and living.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 12), things specifically diverse are also numerically diverse. But Christ’s body, living and dead, was specifically diverse: because the eye or flesh of the dead is only called so equivocally, as is evident from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 9; Metaph. vii). Therefore Christ’s body was not simply identically the same, living and dead.

Objection 3: Further, death is a kind of corruption. But what is corrupted by substantial corruption after being corrupted, exists no longer, since corruption is change from being to non-being. Therefore, Christ’s body, after it was dead, did not remain identically the same, because death is a substantial corruption.

On the contrary, Athanasius says (Epist. ad Epict.): “In that body which was circumcised and carried, which ate, and toiled, and was nailed on the tree, there was the impassible and incorporeal Word of God: the same was laid in the tomb.” But Christ’s living body was circumcised and nailed on the tree; and Christ’s dead body was laid in the tomb. Therefore it was the same body living and dead.

I answer that, The expression “simply” can be taken in two senses. In the first instance by taking “simply” to be the same as “absolutely”; thus “that is said simply which is said without addition,” as the Philosopher put it (Topic. ii): and in this way the dead and living body of Christ was simply identically the same: since a thing is said to be “simply” identically the same from the identity of the subject. But Christ’s body living and dead was identical in its suppositum because alive and dead it had none other besides the Word of God, as was stated above [4272](A[2]). And it is in this sense that Athanasius is speaking in the passage quoted.

In another way “simply” is the same as “altogether” or “totally”: in which sense the body of Christ, dead and alive, was not “simply” the same identically, because it was not “totally” the same, since life is of the essence of a living body; for it is an essential and not an accidental predicate: hence it follows that a body which ceases to be living does not remain totally the same. Moreover, if it were to be said that Christ’s dead body did continue “totally” the same, it would follow that it was not corrupted—I mean, by the corruption of death: which is the heresy of the Gaianites, as Isidore says (Etym. viii), and is to be found in the Decretals (xxiv, qu. iii). And Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii) that “the term ‘corruption’ denotes two things: in one way it is the separation of the soul from the body and other things of the sort; in another way, the complete dissolving into elements. Consequently it is impious to say with Julian and Gaian that the Lord’s body was incorruptible after the first manner of corruption before the resurrection: because Christ’s body would not be consubstantial with us, nor truly dead, nor would we have been saved in very truth. But in the second way Christ’s body was incorrupt.”

Reply to Objection 1: The dead body of everyone else does not continue united to an abiding hypostasis, as Christ’s dead body did; consequently the dead body of everyone else is not the same “simply,” but only in some respect: because it is the same as to its matter, but not the same as to its form. But Christ’s body remains the same simply, on account of the identity of the suppositum, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Since a thing is said to be the same identically according to suppositum, but the same specifically according to form: wherever the suppositum subsists in only one nature, it follows of necessity that when the unity of species is taken away the unity of identity is also taken away. But the hypostasis of the Word of God subsists in two natures; and consequently, although in others the body does not remain the same according to the species of human nature, still it continues identically the same in Christ according to the suppositum of the Word of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Corruption and death do not belong to Christ by reason of the suppositum, from which suppositum follows the unity of identity; but by reason of the human nature, according to which is found the difference of death and of life in Christ's body.

Whether Christ's death conduced in any way to our salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's death did not conduce in any way to our salvation. For death is a sort of privation, since it is the privation of life. But privation has not any power of activity, because it is nothing positive. Therefore it could not work anything for our salvation.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's Passion wrought our salvation by way of merit. But Christ's death could not operate in this way, because in death the body is separated from the soul, which is the principle of meriting. Consequently, Christ's death did not accomplish anything towards our salvation.

Objection 3: Further, what is corporeal is not the cause of what is spiritual. But Christ's death was corporeal. Therefore it could not be the cause of our salvation, which is something spiritual.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "The one death of our Saviour," namely, that of the body, "saved us from our two deaths," that is, of the soul and the body.

I answer that, We may speak of Christ's death in two ways, "in becoming" and "in fact." Death is said to be "in becoming" when anyone from natural or enforced suffering is tending towards death: and in this way it is the same thing to speak of Christ's death as of His Passion: so that in this sense Christ's death is the cause of our salvation, according to what has been already said of the Passion ([4273]Q[48]). But death is considered in fact, inasmuch as the separation of soul and body has already taken place: and it is in this sense that we are now speaking of Christ's death. In this way Christ's death cannot be the cause of our salvation by way of merit, but only by way of causality, that is to say, inasmuch as the Godhead was not separated from Christ's flesh by death; and therefore, whatever befell Christ's flesh, even when the soul was departed, was conducive to salvation in virtue of the Godhead united. But the effect of any cause is properly estimated according to its resemblance to the cause. Consequently, since death is a kind of privation of one’s own life, the effect of Christ’s death is considered in relation to the removal of the obstacles to our salvation: and these are the death of the soul and of the body. Hence Christ’s death is said to have destroyed in us both the death of the soul, caused by sin, according to Rom. 4:25: “He was delivered up [namely unto death] for our sins”: and the death of the body, consisting in the separation of the soul, according to 1 Cor. 15:54: “Death is swallowed up in victory.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s death wrought our salvation from the power of the Godhead united, and not consisted merely as His death.

Reply to Objection 2: Though Christ’s death, considered “in fact” did not effect our salvation by way of merit, yet it did so by way of causality, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s death was indeed corporeal; but the body was the instrument of the Godhead united to Him, working by Its power, although dead.

OF CHRIST’S BURIAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider Christ’s burial, concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried?

(2) Concerning the manner of His burial;

(3) Whether His body was decomposed in the tomb?

(4) Concerning the length of time He lay in the tomb.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to be buried?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for Christ to have been buried, because it is said of Him (Ps. 87:6): “He is [Vulg.: ‘I am’] become as a man without help, free among the dead.” But the bodies of the dead are enclosed in a tomb; which seems contrary to liberty. Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ to have been buried.

Objection 2: Further, nothing should be done to Christ except it was helpful to our salvation. But Christ’s burial seems in no way to be conducive to our salvation. Therefore, it was not fitting for Him to be buried.

Objection 3: Further, it seems out of place for God who is above the high heavens to be laid in the earth. But what befalls the dead body of Christ is attributed to God by reason of the union. Therefore it appears to be unbecoming for Christ to be buried.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 26:10) of the woman who anointed Him: “She has wrought a good work upon Me,” and then He added (Mat. 26:12)—“for she, in pouring this ointment upon My body, hath done it for My burial.”

I answer that, It was fitting for Christ to be buried. First of all, to establish the truth of His death; for no one is laid in the grave unless there be certainty of death. Hence we read (Mk. 15:44,45), that Pilate by diligent inquiry assured himself of Christ’s death before granting leave for His burial. Secondly, because by Christ’s rising from the grave, to them who are in the grave, hope is given of rising again through Him, according to Jn. 5:25,28: “All that are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall live.” Thirdly, as an example to them who dying spiritually to their sins are hidden away “from the disturbance of men” (Ps. 30:21). Hence it is said (Col. 3:3): “You are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God.” Wherefore the baptized likewise who through Christ’s death die to sins, are as it were buried with Christ by immersion, according to Rom. 6:4: “We are buried together with Christ by baptism into death.”

Reply to Objection 1: Though buried, Christ proved Himself “free among the dead”: since, although imprisoned in the tomb, He could not be hindered from going forth by rising again.

Reply to Objection 2: As Christ's death wrought our salvation, so likewise did His burial. Hence Jerome says (Super Marc. xiv): "By Christ's burial we rise again"; and on Is. 53:9: "He shall give the ungodly for His burial," a gloss says: "He shall give to God and the Father the Gentiles who were without godliness, because He purchased them by His death and burial."

Reply to Objection 3: As is said in a discourse made at the Council of Ephesus [*P. iii, cap. 9], "Nothing that saves man is derogatory to God; showing Him to be not passible, but merciful": and in another discourse of the same Council [*P. iii, cap. 10]: "God does not repute anything as an injury which is an occasion of men's salvation. Thus thou shalt not deem God's Nature to be so vile, as though It may sometimes be subjected to injuries."

Whether Christ was buried in a becoming manner?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was buried in an unbecoming manner. For His burial should be in keeping with His death. But Christ underwent a most shameful death, according to Wis. 2:20: "Let us condemn Him to a most shameful death." It seems therefore unbecoming for honorable burial to be accorded to Christ, inasmuch as He was buried by men of position—namely, by Joseph of Arimathea, who was "a noble counselor," to use Mark's expression (Mk. 15:43), and by Nicodemus, who was "a ruler of the Jews," as John states (Jn. 3:1).

Objection 2: Further, nothing should be done to Christ which might set an example of wastefulness. But it seems to savor of waste that in order to bury Christ Nicodemus came "bringing a mixture of myrrh and aloes about a hundred pounds weight," as recorded by John (19:39), especially since a woman came beforehand to anoint His body for the burial, as Mark relates (Mk. 14:28). Consequently, this was not done becomingly with regard to Christ.

Objection 3: Further, it is not becoming for anything done to be inconsistent with itself. But Christ's burial on the one hand was simple, because "Joseph wrapped His body in a clean linen cloth," as is related by Matthew (27:59), "but not with gold or gems, or silk," as Jerome observes: yet on the other hand there appears to have been some display, inasmuch as they buried Him with fragrant spices (Jn. 19:40). Consequently, the manner of Christ's burial does not seem to have been seemly.

Objection 4: Further, "What things soever were written," especially of Christ, "were written for our learning," according to Rom. 15:4. But some of the things written in the Gospels touching Christ's burial in no wise seem to pertain to our instruction—as that He was buried "in a garden . . ."in a tomb which was not His own, which was "new," and "hewed out in a rock." Therefore the manner of Christ's burial was not becoming.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 11:10): "And His sepulchre shall be glorious."

I answer that, The manner of Christ's burial is shown to be seemly in three respects. First, to confirm faith in His death and resurrection. Secondly, to commend the devotion of those who gave Him burial. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i): "The Gospel mentions as praiseworthy the deed of those who received His body from the cross, and with due care and reverence wrapped it up and buried it." Thirdly, as to the mystery whereby those are molded who "are buried together with Christ into death" (Rom. 6:4).

Reply to Objection 1: With regard to Christ's death, His patience and constancy in enduring death are commended, and all the more that His death was the more despicable: but in His honorable burial we can see the power of the dying Man, who, even in death, frustrated the intent of His murderers, and was buried with honor: and thereby is foreshadowed the devotion of the faithful who in the time to come were to serve the dead Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: On that expression of the Evangelist (Jn. 19:40) that they buried Him "as the manner of the Jews is to bury," Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cxx): "He admonishes us that in offices of this kind which are rendered to the dead, the custom of each nation should be observed." Now it was the custom of this people to anoint bodies with various spices in order the longer to preserve them from corruption [*Cf. Catena Aurea in Joan. xix]. Accordingly it is said in De Doctr. Christ. iii that "in all such things, it is not the use thereof, but the luxury of the user that is at fault"; and, farther on: "what in other persons is frequently criminal, in a divine or prophetic person is a sign of something great." For myrrh and aloes by their bitterness denote penance, by which man keeps Christ within himself without the corruption of sin; while the odor of the ointments expresses good report.

Reply to Objection 3: Myrrh and aloes were used on Christ’s body in order that it might be preserved from corruption, and this seemed to imply a certain need (in the body): hence the example is set us that we may lawfully use precious things medicinally, from the need of preserving our body. But the wrapping up of the body was merely a question of becoming propriety. And we ought to content ourselves with simplicity in such things. Yet, as Jerome observes, by this act was denoted that “he swathes Jesus in clean linen, who receives Him with a pure soul.” Hence, as Bede says on Mark 15:46: “The Church’s custom has prevailed for the sacrifice of the altar to be offered not upon silk, nor upon dyed cloth, but on linen of the earth; as the Lord’s body was buried in a clean winding-sheet.”

Reply to Objection 4: Christ was buried “in a garden” to express that by His death and burial we are delivered from the death which we incur through Adam’s sin committed in the garden of paradise. But for this “was our Lord buried in the grave of a stranger,” as Augustine says in a sermon (ccxlviii), “because He died for the salvation of others; and a sepulchre is the abode of death.” Also the extent of the poverty endured for us can be thereby estimated: since He who while living had no home, after death was laid to rest in another’s tomb, and being naked was clothed by Joseph. But He is laid in a “new” sepulchre, as Jerome observes on Mat. 27:60, “lest after the resurrection it might be pretended that someone else had risen, while the other corpses remained. The new sepulchre can also denote Mary’s virginal womb.” And furthermore it may be understood that all of us are renewed by Christ’s burial; death and corruption being destroyed. Moreover, He was buried in a monument “hewn out of a rock,” as Jerome says on Mat. 27:64, “lest, if it had been constructed of many stones, they might say that He was stolen away by digging away the foundations of the tomb.” Hence the “great stone” which was set shows that “the tomb could not be opened except by the help of many hands. Again, if He had been buried in the earth, they might have said: They dug up the soil and stole Him away,” as Augustine observes [*Cf. Catena Aurea]. Hilary (Comment. in Matth. cap. xxxiii) gives the mystical interpretation, saying that “by the teaching of the apostles, Christ is borne into the stony heart of the gentile; for it is hewn out by the process of teaching, unpolished and new, untenanted and open to the entrance of the fear of God. And since naught besides Him must enter into our hearts, a great stone is rolled against the door.” Furthermore, as Origen says (Tract. xxxv in Matth.): “It was not written by hazard: ‘Joseph wrapped Christ’s body in a clean winding-sheet, and placed it in a new monument,’” and that “‘he rolled a great stone,’ because all things around the body of Jesus are clean, and new, and exceeding great.”

Whether Christ’s body was reduced to dust in the tomb?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body was reduced to dust in the tomb. For just as man dies in punishment of his first parent’s sin, so also does he return to dust, since it was said to the first man after his sin: “Dust thou art, and into dust thou shalt return” (Gn. 3:19). But Christ endured death in order to deliver us from death. Therefore His body ought to be made to return to dust, so as to free us from the same penalty.

Objection 2: Further, Christ’s body was of the same nature as ours. But directly after death our bodies begin to dissolve into dust, and are disposed towards putrefaction, because when the natural heat departs, there supervenes heat from without which causes corruption. Therefore it seems that the same thing happened to Christ’s body.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4274](A[1]), Christ willed to be buried in order to furnish men with the hope of rising likewise from the grave. Consequently, He sought likewise to return to dust so as to give to them who have returned to dust the hope of rising from the dust.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 15:10): “Nor wilt Thou suffer Thy holy one to see corruption”: and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iii) expounds this of the corruption which comes of dissolving into elements.

I answer that, It was not fitting for Christ’s body to putrefy, or in any way be reduced to dust, since the putrefaction of any body comes of that body’s infirmity of nature, which can no longer hold the body together. But as was said above ([4275]Q[50], A[1], ad 2), Christ’s death ought not to come from weakness of nature, lest it might not be believed to be voluntary: and therefore He willed to die, not from sickness, but from suffering inflicted on Him, to which He gave Himself up willingly. And therefore, lest His death might be ascribed to infirmity of nature, Christ did not wish His body to putrefy in any way or dissolve no matter how; but for the manifestation of His Divine power He willed that His body should continue incorrupt. Hence Chrysostom says (Cont. Jud. et Gent. quod ‘Christus sit Deus’) that “with other men, especially with such as have wrought strenuously, their deeds shine forth in their lifetime; but as soon as they die, their deeds go with them. But it is quite the contrary with Christ: because previous to the cross all is sadness and weakness, but as soon as He is crucified, everything comes to light, in order that you may learn it was not an ordinary man that was crucified.”

Reply to Objection 1: Since Christ was not subject to sin, neither was He prone to die or to return to dust. Yet of His own will He endured death for our salvation, for the reasons alleged above ([4276]Q[51], A[1]). But had His body putrefied or dissolved, this fact would have been detrimental to man’s salvation, for it would not have seemed credible that the Divine power was in Him. Hence it is on His behalf that it is written (Ps. 19:10): “What profit is there in my blood, whilst I go down to corruption?” as if He were to say: “If My body corrupt, the profit of the blood shed will be lost.”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s body was a subject of corruption according to the condition of its passible nature, but not as to the deserving cause of putrefaction, which is sin: but the Divine power preserved Christ’s body from putrefying, just as it raised it up from death.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ rose from the tomb by Divine power, which is not narrowed within bounds. Consequently, His rising from the grave was a sufficient argument to prove that men are to be raised up by Divine power, not only from their graves, but also from any dust whatever.

Whether Christ was in the tomb only one day and two nights?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not in the tomb during only one day and two nights; because He said (Mat. 12:40): “As Jonas was in the whale’s belly three days and three nights: so shall the Son of man be in the heart of the earth three days and three nights.” But He was in the heart of the earth while He was in the grave. Therefore He was not in the tomb for only one day and two nights.

Objection 2: Gregory says in a Paschal Homily (Hom. xxi): “As Samson carried off the gates of Gaza during the night, even so Christ rose in the night, taking away the gates of hell.” But after rising He was not in the tomb. Therefore He was not two whole nights in the grave.

Objection 3: Further, light prevailed over darkness by Christ’s death. But night belongs to darkness, and day to light. Therefore it was more fitting for Christ’s body to be in the tomb for two days and a night, rather than conversely.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv): “There were thirty-six hours from the evening of His burial to the dawn of the resurrection, that is, a whole night with a whole day, and a whole night.”

I answer that, The very time during which Christ remained in the tomb shows forth the effect of His death. For it was said above ([4277]Q[50], A[6]) that by Christ’s death we were delivered from a twofold death, namely, from the death of the soul and of the body: and this is signified by the two nights during which He remained in the tomb. But since His death did not come of sin, but was endured from charity, it has not the semblance of night, but of day: consequently it is denoted by the whole day during which Christ was in the sepulchre. And so it was fitting for Christ to be in the sepulchre during one day and two nights.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): “Some men, ignorant of Scriptural language, wished to compute as night those three hours, from the sixth to the ninth hour, during which the sun was darkened, and as day those other three hours during which it was restored to the earth, that is, from the ninth hour until its setting: for the coming night of the Sabbath follows, and if this be reckoned with its day, there will be already two nights and two days. Now after the Sabbath there follows the night of the first day of the Sabbath, that is, of the dawning Sunday, on which the Lord rose. Even so, the reckoning of the three days and three nights will not stand. It remains then to find the solution in the customary usage of speech of the Scriptures, whereby the whole is understood from the part”: so that we are able to take a day and a night as one natural day. And so the first day is computed from its ending, during which Christ died and was buried on the Friday; while the second. day is an entire day with twenty-four hours of night and day; while the night following belongs to the third day. “For as the primitive days were computed from light to night on account of man’s future fall, so these days are computed from the darkness to the daylight on account of man’s restoration” (De Trin. iv).

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. iv; cf. De Consens. Evang. iii), Christ rose with the dawn, when light appears in part, and still some part of the darkness of the night remains. Hence it is said of the women that “when it was yet dark” they came “to the sepulchre” (Jn. 20:1). Therefore, in consequence of this darkness, Gregory says (Hom. xxi) that Christ rose in the middle of the night, not that night is divided into two equal parts, but during the night itself: for the expression “early” can be taken as partly night and partly day, from its fittingness with both.

Reply to Objection 3: The light prevailed so far in Christ’s death (which is denoted by the one day) that it dispelled the darkness of the two nights, that is, of our twofold death, as stated above.

OF CHRIST’S DESCENT INTO HELL (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider Christ’s descent into hell; concerning which there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell?

(2) Into which hell did He descend?

(3) Whether He was entirely in hell?

(4) Whether He made any stay there?

(5) Whether He delivered the Holy Fathers from hell?

(6) Whether He delivered the lost from hell?

(7) Whether He delivered the children who died in original sin?

(8) Whether He delivered men from Purgatory?

Whether it was fitting for Christ to descend into hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to descend into hell, because Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. cliv.): “Nor could I find anywhere in the Scriptures hell mentioned as something good.” But Christ’s soul did not descend into any evil place, for neither do the souls of the just. Therefore it does not seem fitting for Christ’s soul to descend into hell.

Objection 2: Further, it cannot belong to Christ to descend into hell according to His Divine Nature, which is altogether immovable; but only according to His assumed nature. But that which Christ did or suffered in His assumed nature is ordained for man's salvation: and to secure this it does not seem necessary for Christ to descend into hell, since He delivered us from both guilt and penalty by His Passion which He endured in this world, as stated above ([4278]Q[49], AA[1],3). Consequently, it was not fitting that Christ should descend into hell.

Objection 3: Further, by Christ's death His soul was separated from His body, and this was laid in the sepulchre, as stated above ([4279]Q[51]). But it seems that He descended into hell, not according to His soul only, because seemingly the soul, being incorporeal, cannot be a subject of local motion; for this belongs to bodies, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 32; while descent implies corporeal motion. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to descend into hell.

On the contrary, It is said in the Creed: "He descended into hell": and the Apostle says (Eph. 4:9): "Now that He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?" And a gloss adds: "that is—into hell."

I answer that It was fitting for Christ to descend into hell. First of all, because He came to bear our penalty in order to free us from penalty, according to Is. 53:4: "Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows." But through sin man had incurred not only the death of the body, but also descent into hell. Consequently since it was fitting for Christ to die in order to deliver us from death, so it was fitting for Him to descend into hell in order to deliver us also from going down into hell. Hence it is written (Osee 13:14): "O death, I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite." Secondly, because it was fitting when the devil was overthrown by the Passion that Christ should deliver the captives detained in hell, according to Zech. 9:11: "Thou also by the blood of Thy Testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit." And it is written (Col. 2:15): "Despoiling the principalities and powers, He hath exposed them confidently." Thirdly, that as He showed forth His power on earth by living and dying, so also He might manifest it in hell, by visiting it and enlightening it. Accordingly it is written (Ps. 23:7): "Lift up your gates, O ye princes," which the gloss thus interprets: "that is—Ye princes of hell, take away your power, whereby hitherto you held men fast in hell”; and so “at the name of Jesus every knee should bow,” not only “of them that are in heaven,” but likewise “of them that are in hell,” as is said in Phil. 2:10.

Reply to Objection 1: The name of hell stands for an evil of penalty, and not for an evil of guilt. Hence it was becoming that Christ should descend into hell, not as liable to punishment Himself, but to deliver them who were.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s Passion was a kind of universal cause of men’s salvation, both of the living and of the dead. But a general cause is applied to particular effects by means of something special. Hence, as the power of the Passion is applied to the living through the sacraments which make us like unto Christ’s Passion, so likewise it is applied to the dead through His descent into hell. On which account it is written (Zech. 9:11) that “He sent forth prisoners out of the pit, in the blood of His testament,” that is, by the power of His Passion.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s soul descended into hell not by the same kind of motion as that whereby bodies are moved, but by that kind whereby the angels are moved, as was said in the [4280]FP, Q[53], A[1].

Whether Christ went down into the hell of the lost?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ went down into the hell of the lost, because it is said by the mouth of Divine Wisdom (Ecclus. 24:45): “I will penetrate to all the lower parts of the earth.” But the hell of the lost is computed among the lower parts of the earth according to Ps. 62:10: “They shall go into the lower parts of the earth.” Therefore Christ who is the Wisdom of God, went down even into the hell of the lost.

Objection 2: Further, Peter says (Acts 2:24) that “God hath raised up Christ, having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it was impossible that He should be holden by it.” But there are no sorrows in the hell of the Fathers, nor in the hell of the children, since they are not punished with sensible pain on account of any actual sin, but only with the pain of loss on account of original sin. Therefore Christ went down into the hell of the lost, or else into Purgatory, where men are tormented with sensible pain on account of actual sins.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 3:19) that “Christ coming in spirit preached to those spirits that were in prison, which had some time been incredulous”: and this is understood of Christ’s descent into hell, as Athanasius says (Ep. ad Epict.). For he says that “Christ’s body was laid in the sepulchre when He went to preach to those spirits who were in bondage, as Peter said.” But it is clear the unbelievers were in the hell of the lost. Therefore Christ went down into the hell of the lost.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv): “If the sacred Scriptures had said that Christ came into Abraham’s bosom, without naming hell or its woes, I wonder whether any person would dare to assert that He descended into hell. But since evident testimonies mention hell and its sorrows, there is no reason for believing that Christ went there except to deliver men from the same woes.” But the place of woes is the hell of the lost. Therefore Christ descended into the hell of the lost.

Objection 5: Further, as Augustine says in a sermon upon the Resurrection: Christ descending into hell “set free all the just who were held in the bonds of original sin.” But among them was Job, who says of himself (Job 17:16): “All that I have shall go down into the deepest pit.” Therefore Christ descended into the deepest pit.

On the contrary, Regarding the hell of the lost it is written (Job 10:21): “Before I go, and return no more, to a land that is dark and covered with the mist of death.” Now there is no “fellowship of light with darkness,” according to 2 Cor. 6:14. Therefore Christ, who is “the light,” did not descend into the hell of the lost.

I answer that, A thing is said to be in a place in two ways. First of all, through its effect, and in this way Christ descended into each of the hells, but in different manner. For going down into the hell of the lost He wrought this effect, that by descending thither He put them to shame for their unbelief and wickedness: but to them who were detained in Purgatory He gave hope of attaining to glory: while upon the holy Fathers detained in hell solely on account of original sin, He shed the light of glory everlasting.

In another way a thing is said to be in a place through its essence: and in this way Christ’s soul descended only into that part of hell wherein the just were detained. so that He visited them “in place,” according to His soul, whom He visited “interiorly by grace,” according to His Godhead. Accordingly, while remaining in one part of hell, He wrought this effect in a measure in every part of hell, just as while suffering in one part of the earth He delivered the whole world by His Passion.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, penetrated to all the lower parts of the earth, not passing through them locally with His soul, but by spreading the effects of His power in a measure to them all: yet so that He enlightened only the just: because the text quoted continues: “And I will enlighten all that hope in the Lord.”

Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow is twofold: one is the suffering of pain which men endure for actual sin, according to Ps. 17:6: “The sorrows of hell encompassed me.” Another sorrow comes of hoped-for glory being deferred, according to Prov. 13:12: “Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul”: and such was the sorrow which the holy Fathers suffered in hell, and Augustine refers to it in a sermon on the Passion, saying that “they besought Christ with tearful entreaty.” Now by descending into hell Christ took away both sorrows, yet in different ways: for He did away with the sorrows of pains by preserving souls from them, just as a physician is said to free a man from sickness by warding it off by means of physic. Likewise He removed the sorrows caused by glory deferred, by bestowing glory.

Reply to Objection 3: These words of Peter are referred by some to Christ’s descent into hell: and they explain it in this sense: “Christ preached to them who formerly were unbelievers, and who were shut up in prison”—that is, in hell—“in spirit”—that is, by His soul. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): “As He evangelized them who are upon the earth, so did He those who were in hell”; not in order to convert unbelievers unto belief, but to put them to shame for their unbelief, since preaching cannot be understood otherwise than as the open manifesting of His Godhead. which was laid bare before them in the lower regions by His descending in power into hell.

Augustine, however, furnishes a better exposition of the text in his Epistle to Evodius quoted above, namely, that the preaching is not to be referred to Christ’s descent into hell, but to the operation of His Godhead, to which He gave effect from the beginning of the world. Consequently, the sense is, that “to those (spirits) that were in prison”—that is, living in the mortal body, which is, as it were, the soul’s prison-house—“by the spirit” of His Godhead “He came and preached” by internal inspirations, and from without by the admonitions spoken by the righteous: to those, I say, He preached “which had been some time incredulous,” i.e. not believing in the preaching of Noe, “when they waited for the patience of God,” whereby the chastisement of the Deluge was put off: accordingly (Peter) adds: “In the days of Noe, when the Ark was being built.”

Reply to Objection 4: The expression “Abraham’s bosom” may be taken in two senses. First of all, as implying that restfulness, existing there, from sensible pain; so that in this sense it cannot be called hell, nor are there any sorrows there. In another way it can be taken as implying the privation of longed-for glory: in this sense it has the character of hell and sorrow. Consequently, that rest of the blessed is now called Abraham’s bosom, yet it is not styled hell, nor are sorrows said to be now in Abraham’s bosom.

Reply to Objection 5: As Gregory says (Moral. xiii): “Even the higher regions of hell he calls the deepest hell . . . For if relatively to the height of heaven this darksome air is infernal, then relatively to the height of this same air the earth lying beneath can be considered as infernal and deep. And again in comparison with the height of the same earth, those parts of hell which are higher than the other infernal mansions, may in this way be designated as the deepest hell.”

Whether the whole Christ was in hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole Christ was not in hell. For Christ’s body is one of His parts. But His body was not in hell. Therefore, the whole Christ was not in hell.

Objection 2: Further, nothing can be termed whole when its parts are severed. But the soul and body, which are the parts of human nature, were separated at His death, as stated above ([4281]Q[50], AA[3],4), and it was after death that He descended into hell. Therefore the whole (Christ) could not be in hell.

Objection 3: Further, the whole of a thing is said to be in a place when no part of it is outside such place. But there were parts of Christ outside hell; for instance, His body was in the grave, and His Godhead everywhere. Therefore the whole Christ was not in hell.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): “The whole Son is with the Father, the whole Son in heaven, on earth, in the Virgin’s womb, on the Cross, in hell, in paradise, into which He brought the robber.”

I answer that, It is evident from what was said in the [4282]FP, Q[31], A[2], ad 4, the masculine gender is referred to the hypostasis or person, while the neuter belongs to the nature. Now in the death of Christ, although the soul was separated from the body, yet neither was separated from the Person of the Son of God, as stated above (Q[50], A[2]). Consequently, it must be affirmed that during the three days of Christ's death the whole Christ was in the tomb, because the whole Person was there through the body united with Him, and likewise He was entirely in hell, because the whole Person of Christ was there by reason of the soul united with Him, and the whole Christ was then everywhere by reason of the Divine Nature.

Reply to Objection 1: The body which was then in the grave is not a part of the uncreated Person, but of the assumed nature. Consequently, the fact of Christ's body not being in hell does not prevent the whole Christ from being there: but proves that not everything appertaining to human nature was there.

Reply to Objection 2: The whole human nature is made up of the united soul and body; not so the Divine Person. Consequently when death severed the union of the soul with the body, the whole Christ remained, but His whole human nature did not remain.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Person is whole in each single place, but not wholly, because it is not circumscribed by any place: indeed, all places put together could not comprise His immensity; rather is it His immensity that embraces all things. But it happens in those things which are in a place corporeally and circumscriptively, that if a whole be in some place, then no part of it is outside that place. But this is not the case with God. Hence Augustine says (De Symbolo iii): "It is not according to times or places that we say that the whole Christ is everywhere, as if He were at one time whole in one place, at another time whole in another: but as being whole always and everywhere."

Whether Christ made any stay in hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not make any stay in hell. For Christ went down into hell to deliver men from thence. But He accomplished this deliverance at once by His descent, for, according to

Ecclus. 11:23: “It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich.” Consequently He does not seem to have tarried in hell.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in a sermon on the Passion (clx) that “of a sudden at our Lord and Saviour’s bidding all ‘the bars of iron were burst’” (Cf. Is. 45:2). Hence on behalf of the angels accompanying Christ it is written (Ps. 23:7, 9): “Lift up your gates, O ye princes.” Now Christ descended thither in order to break the bolts of hell. Therefore He did not make any stay in hell.

Objection 3: Further, it is related (Lk. 23:43) that our Lord while hanging on the cross said to the thief: “This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise”: from which it is evident that Christ was in paradise on that very day. But He was not there with His body. for that was in the grave. Therefore He was there with the soul which had gone down into hell: and consequently it appears that He made no stay in hell.

On the contrary, Peter says (Acts 2:24): “Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell, as it was impossible that He should be held by it.” Therefore it seems that He remained in hell until the hour of the Resurrection.

I answer that, As Christ, in order to take our penalties upon Himself, willed His body to be laid in the tomb, so likewise He willed His soul to descend into hell. But the body lay in the tomb for a day and two nights, so as to demonstrate the truth of His death. Consequently, it is to be believed that His soul was in hell, in order that it might be brought back out of hell simultaneously with His body from the tomb.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ descended into hell He delivered the saints who were there, not by leading them out at once from the confines of hell, but by enlightening them with the light of glory in hell itself. Nevertheless it was fitting that His soul should abide in hell as long as His body remained in the tomb.

Reply to Objection 2: By the expression “bars of hell” are understood the obstacles which kept the holy Fathers from quitting hell, through the guilt of our first parent’s sin; and these bars Christ burst asunder by the power of His Passion on descending into hell: nevertheless He chose to remain in hell for some time, for the reason stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord’s expression is not to be understood of the earthly corporeal paradise, but of a spiritual one, in which all are said to be who enjoy the Divine glory. Accordingly, the thief descended locally into hell with Christ, because it was said to him: “This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise”; still as to reward he was in paradise, because he enjoyed Christ’s Godhead just as the other saints did.

Whether Christ descending into hell delivered the holy Fathers from thence?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ descending into hell did not deliver the holy Fathers from thence. For Augustine (Epist. ad Evod. clxiv) says: “I have not yet discovered what Christ descending into hell bestowed upon those righteous ones who were in Abraham’s bosom, from whom I fail to see that He ever departed according to the beatific presence of His Godhead.” But had He delivered them, He would have bestowed much upon them. Therefore it does not appear that Christ delivered the holy Fathers from hell.

Objection 2: Further, no one is detained in hell except on account of sin. But during life the holy Fathers were justified from sin through faith in Christ. Consequently they did not need to be delivered from hell on Christ’s descent thither.

Objection 3: Further, if you remove the cause, you remove the effect. But that Christ went down into hell was due to sin which was taken away by the Passion, as stated above ([4283]Q[49], A[1]). Consequently, the holy Fathers were not delivered on Christ’s descent into hell.

On the contrary, Augustine says in the sermon on the Passion already quoted that when Christ descended into hell “He broke down the gate and ‘iron bars’ of hell, setting at liberty all the righteous who were held fast through original sin.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 2), when Christ descended into hell He worked through the power of His Passion. But through Christ’s Passion the human race was delivered not only from sin, but also from the debt of its penalty, as stated above (Q[49], AA[1],3). Now men were held fast by the debt of punishment in two ways: first of all for actual sin which each had committed personally: secondly, for the sin of the whole human race, which each one in his origin contracts from our first parent, as stated in Rom. 5 of which sin the penalty is the death of the body as well as exclusion from glory, as is evident from Gn. 2 and 3: because God cast out man from paradise after sin, having beforehand threatened him with death should he sin. Consequently, when Christ descended into hell, by the power of His Passion He delivered the saints from the penalty whereby they were excluded from the life of glory, so as to be unable to see God in His Essence, wherein man's beatitude lies, as stated in the [4284]FS, Q[3], A[8]. But the holy Fathers were detained in hell for the reason, that, owing to our first parent's sin, the approach to the life of glory was not opened. And so when Christ descended into hell He delivered the holy Fathers from thence. And this is what is written Zech. 9:11: "Thou also by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit, wherein is no water." And (Col. 2:15) it is written that "despoiling the principalities and powers," i.e. "of hell, by taking out Isaac and Jacob, and the other just souls," "He led them," i.e. "He brought them far from this kingdom of darkness into heaven," as the gloss explains.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking there against such as maintained that the righteous of old were subject to penal sufferings before Christ's descent into hell. Hence shortly before the passage quoted he says: "Some add that this benefit was also bestowed upon the saints of old, that on the Lord's coming into hell they were freed from their sufferings. But I fail to see how Abraham, into whose bosom the poor man was received, was ever in such sufferings." Consequently, when he afterwards adds that "he had not yet discovered what Christ's descent into hell had brought to the righteous of old," this must be understood as to their being freed from penal sufferings. Yet Christ bestowed something upon them as to their attaining glory: and in consequence He dispelled the suffering which they endured through their glory being delayed: still they had great joy from the very hope thereof, according to Jn. 8:56: "Abraham your father rejoiced that he might see my day." And therefore he adds: "I fail to see that He ever departed, according to the beatific presence of His Godhead," that is, inasmuch as even before Christ's coming they were happy in hope, although not yet fully happy in fact.

Reply to Objection 2: The holy Fathers while yet living were delivered from original as well as actual sin through faith in Christ; also from the penalty of actual sins, but not from the penalty of original sin, whereby they were excluded from glory, since the price of man's redemption was not yet paid: just as the faithful are now delivered by baptism from the penalty of actual sins, and from the penalty of original sin as to exclusion from glory, yet still remain bound by the penalty of original sin as to the necessity of dying in the body because they are renewed in the spirit, but not yet in the flesh, according to Rom. 8:10: “The body indeed is dead, because of sin; but the spirit liveth, because of justification.”

Reply to Objection 3: Directly Christ died His soul went down into hell, and bestowed the fruits of His Passion on the saints detained there; although they did not go out as long as Christ remained in hell, because His presence was part of the fulness of their glory.

Whether Christ delivered any of the lost from hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did deliver some of the lost from hell, because it is written (Is. 24:22): “And they shall be gathered together as in the gathering of one bundle into the pit, end they shall be shut up there in prison: and after many days they shall be visited.” But there he is speaking of the lost, who “had adored the host of heaven,” according to Jerome’s commentary. Consequently it seems that even the lost were visited at Christ’s descent into hell; and this seems to imply their deliverance.

Objection 2: Further, on Zech. 9:11: “Thou also by the blood of Thy testament hast sent forth Thy prisoners out of the pit wherein is no water,” the gloss observes: “Thou hast delivered them who were held bound in prisons, where no mercy refreshed them, which that rich man prayed for.” But only the lost are shut up in merciless prisons. Therefore Christ did deliver some from the hell of the lost.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s power was not less in hell than in this world, because He worked in every place by the power of His Godhead. But in this world He delivered some persons of every state. Therefore, in hell also, He delivered some from the state of the lost.

On the contrary, It is written (Osee 13:14): “O death, I will be thy death; O hell, I will be thy bite”: upon which the gloss says: “By leading forth the elect, and leaving there the reprobate.” But only the reprobate are in the hell of the lost. Therefore, by Christ’s descent into hell none were delivered from the hell of the lost.

I answer that, As stated above [4285](A[5]), when Christ descended into hell He worked by the power of His Passion. Consequently, His descent into hell brought the fruits of deliverance to them only who were united to His Passion through faith quickened by charity, whereby sins are taken away. Now those detained in the hell of the lost either had no faith in Christ's Passion, as infidels; or if they had faith, they had no conformity with the charity of the suffering Christ: hence they could not be cleansed from their sins. And on this account Christ's descent into hell brought them no deliverance from the debt of punishment in hell.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ descended into hell, all who were in any part of hell were visited in some respect: some to their consolation and deliverance, others, namely, the lost, to their shame and confusion. Accordingly the passage continues: "And the moon shall blush, and the sun be put to shame," etc.

This can also be referred to the visitation which will come upon them in the Day of Judgment, not for their deliverance, but for their yet greater confusion, according to Sophon. i, 12: "I will visit upon the men that are settled on their lees."

Reply to Objection 2: When the gloss says "where no mercy refreshed them," this is to be understood of the refreshing of full deliverance, because the holy Fathers could not be delivered from this prison of hell before Christ's coming.

Reply to Objection 3: It was not due to any lack of power on Christ's part that some were not delivered from every state in hell, as out of every state among men in this world; but it was owing to the very different condition of each state. For, so long as men live here below, they can be converted to faith and charity, because in this life men are not confirmed either in good or in evil, as they are after quitting this life.

Whether the children who died in original sin were delivered by Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that the children who died in original sin were delivered from hell by Christ's descending thither. For, like the holy Fathers, the children were kept in hell simply because of original sin. But the holy Fathers were delivered from hell, as stated above [4286](A[5]). Therefore the children were similarly delivered from hell by Christ.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15): "If by the offense of one, many died; much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many." But the children who die with none but original sin are detained in hell owing to their first parent's sin. Therefore, much more were they delivered from hell through the grace of Christ.

Objection 3: Further, as Baptism works in virtue of Christ's Passion, so also does Christ's descent into hell, as is clear from what has been said (A[4], ad 2, AA[5],6). But through Baptism children are delivered from original sin and hell. Therefore, they were similarly delivered by Christ's descent into hell.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 3:25): "God hath proposed Christ to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood." But the children who had died with only original sin were in no wise sharers of faith in Christ. Therefore, they did not receive the fruits of Christ's propitiation, so as to be delivered by Him from hell.

I answer that, As stated above [4287](A[6]), Christ's descent into hell had its effect of deliverance on them only who through faith and charity were united to Christ's Passion, in virtue whereof Christ's descent into hell was one of deliverance. But the children who had died in original sin were in no way united to Christ's Passion by faith and love: for, not having the use of free will, they could have no faith of their own; nor were they cleansed from original sin either by their parents' faith or by any sacrament of faith. Consequently, Christ's descent into hell did not deliver the children from thence. And furthermore, the holy Fathers were delivered from hell by being admitted to the glory of the vision of God, to which no one can come except through grace; according to Rom. 6:23: "The grace of God is life everlasting." Therefore, since children dying in original sin had no grace, they were not delivered from hell.

Reply to Objection 1: The holy Fathers, although still held bound by the debt of original sin, in so far as it touches human nature, were nevertheless delivered from all stain of sin by faith in Christ: consequently, they were capable of that deliverance which Christ brought by descending into hell. But the same cannot be said of the children, as is evident from what was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: When the Apostle says that the grace of God "hath abounded unto many," the word "many" [*The Vulgate reads 'plures,' i.e. 'many more'] is to be taken, not comparatively, as if more were saved by

Christ's grace than lost by Adam's sin: but absolutely, as if he said that the grace of the one Christ abounded unto many, just as Adam's sin was contracted by many. But as Adam's sin was contracted by those only who descended seminally from him according to the flesh, so Christ's grace reached those only who became His members by spiritual regeneration: which does not apply to children dying in original sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is applied to men in this life, in which man's state can be changed from sin into grace: but Christ's descent into hell was vouchsafed to the souls after this life when they are no longer capable of the said change. And consequently by baptism children are delivered from original sin and from hell, but not by Christ's descent into hell.

Whether Christ by His descent into hell delivered souls from purgatory?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ by His descent into hell delivered souls from Purgatory—for Augustine says (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv): "Because evident testimonies speak of hell and its pains, there is no reason for believing that the Saviour came thither except to rescue men from those same pains: but I still wish to know whether it was all whom He found there, or some whom He deemed worthy of such a benefit. Yet I do not doubt that Christ went into hell, and granted this favor to them who were suffering from its pains." But, as stated above [4288](A[6]), He did not confer the benefit of deliverance upon the lost: and there are no others in a state of penal suffering except those in Purgatory. Consequently Christ delivered souls from Purgatory.

Objection 2: Further, the very presence of Christ's soul had no less effect than His sacraments have. But souls are delivered from Purgatory by the sacraments, especially by the sacrament of the Eucharist, as shall be shown later ([4289]XP, Q[71], A[9]). Therefore much more were souls delivered from Purgatory by the presence of Christ descending into hell.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Poenit. ix), those whom Christ healed in this life He healed completely. Also, our Lord says (Jn. 7:23): "I have healed the whole man on the sabbath-day." But Christ delivered them who were in Purgatory from the punishment of the pain of loss, whereby they were excluded from glory. Therefore, He also delivered them from the punishment of Purgatory.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xiii): “Since our Creator and Redeemer, penetrating the bars of hell, brought out from thence the souls of the elect, He does not permit us to go thither, from whence He has already by descending set others free.” But He permits us to go to Purgatory. Therefore, by descending into hell, He did not deliver souls from Purgatory.

I answer that, As we have stated more than once (A[4], ad 2, AA[5],6,7), Christ’s descent into hell was one of deliverance in virtue of His Passion. Now Christ’s Passion had a virtue which was neither temporal nor transitory, but everlasting, according to Heb. 10:14: “For by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.” And so it is evident that Christ’s Passion had no greater efficacy then than it has now. Consequently, they who were such as those who are now in Purgatory, were not set free from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell. But if any were found such as are now set free from Purgatory by virtue of Christ’s Passion, then there was nothing to hinder them from being delivered from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell.

Reply to Objection 1: From this passage of Augustine it cannot be concluded that all who were in Purgatory were delivered from it, but that such a benefit was bestowed upon some persons, that is to say, upon such as were already cleansed sufficiently, or who in life, by their faith and devotion towards Christ’s death, so merited, that when He descended, they were delivered from the temporal punishment of Purgatory.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s power operates in the sacraments by way of healing and expiation. Consequently, the sacrament of the Eucharist delivers men from Purgatory inasmuch as it is a satisfactory sacrifice for sin. But Christ’s descent into hell was not satisfactory; yet it operated in virtue of the Passion, which was satisfactory, as stated above ([4290]Q[48], A[2]), but satisfactory in general, since its virtue had to be applied to each individual by something specially personal ([4291]Q[49], A[1], ad 4,5). Consequently, it does not follow of necessity that all were delivered from Purgatory by Christ’s descent into hell.

Reply to Objection 3: Those defects from which Christ altogether delivered men in this world were purely personal, and concerned the individual; whereas exclusion from God’s glory was a general defect and common to all human nature. Consequently, there was nothing to prevent those detained in Purgatory being delivered by Christ from their privation of glory, but not from the debt of punishment in Purgatory which pertains to personal defect. Just as on the other hand, the holy Fathers before Christ's coming were delivered from their personal defects, but not from the common defect, as was stated above (A[7], ad 1;[4292] Q[49], A[5], ad 1).

OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider those things that concern Christ's Exaltation; and we shall deal with (1) His Resurrection; (2) His Ascension; (3) His sitting at the right hand of God the Father; (4) His Judiciary Power. Under the first heading there is a fourfold consideration: (1) Christ's Resurrection in itself; (2) the quality of the Person rising; (3) the manifestation of the Resurrection; (4) its causality. Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry:

(1) The necessity of His Resurrection;

(2) The time of the Resurrection;

(3) Its order;

(4) Its cause.

Whether it was necessary for Christ to rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not necessary for Christ to rise again. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): "Resurrection is the rising again of an animate being, which was disintegrated and fallen." But Christ did not fall by sinning, nor was His body dissolved, as is manifest from what was stated above ([4293]Q[51], A[3]). Therefore, it does not properly belong to Him to rise again.

Objection 2: Further, whoever rises again is promoted to a higher state, since to rise is to be uplifted. But after death Christ's body continued to be united with the Godhead, hence it could not be uplifted to any higher condition. Therefore, it was not due to it to rise again.

Objection 3: Further, all that befell Christ's humanity was ordained for our salvation. But Christ's Passion sufficed for our salvation, since by it we were loosed from guilt and punishment, as is clear from what was said above ([4294]Q[49], A[1],3). Consequently, it was not necessary for Christ to rise again from the dead.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 24:46): “It behooved Christ to suffer and to rise again from the dead.”

I answer that, It behooved Christ to rise again, for five reasons. First of all; for the commendation of Divine Justice, to which it belongs to exalt them who humble themselves for God’s sake, according to Lk. 1:52: “He hath put down the mighty from their seat, and hath exalted the humble.” Consequently, because Christ humbled Himself even to the death of the Cross, from love and obedience to God, it behooved Him to be uplifted by God to a glorious resurrection; hence it is said in His Person (Ps. 138:2): “Thou hast known,” i.e. approved, “my sitting down,” i.e. My humiliation and Passion, “and my rising up,” i.e. My glorification in the resurrection; as the gloss expounds.

Secondly, for our instruction in the faith, since our belief in Christ’s Godhead is confirmed by His rising again, because, according to 2 Cor. 13:4, “although He was crucified through weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God.” And therefore it is written (1 Cor. 15:14): “If Christ be not risen again, then is our preaching vain, and our [Vulg.: ‘your’] faith is also vain”: and (Ps. 29:10): “What profit is there in my blood?” that is, in the shedding of My blood, “while I go down,” as by various degrees of evils, “into corruption?” As though He were to answer: “None. ‘For if I do not at once rise again but My body be corrupted, I shall preach to no one, I shall gain no one,’” as the gloss expounds.

Thirdly, for the raising of our hope, since through seeing Christ, who is our head, rise again, we hope that we likewise shall rise again. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 15:12): “Now if Christ be preached that He rose from the dead, how do some among you say, that there is no resurrection of the dead?” And (Job 19:25, 27): “I know,” that is with certainty of faith, “that my Redeemer,” i.e. Christ, “liveth,” having risen from the dead; “and” therefore “in the last day I shall rise out of the earth . . . this my hope is laid up in my bosom.”

Fourthly, to set in order the lives of the faithful: according to Rom. 6:4: “As Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life”: and further on; “Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more; so do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive to God."

Fifthly, in order to complete the work of our salvation: because, just as for this reason did He endure evil things in dying that He might deliver us from evil, so was He glorified in rising again in order to advance us towards good things; according to Rom. 4:25: "He was delivered up for our sins, and rose again for our justification."

Reply to Objection 1: Although Christ did not fall by sin, yet He fell by death, because as sin is a fall from righteousness, so death is a fall from life: hence the words of Mic. 7:8 can be taken as though spoken by Christ: "Rejoice not thou, my enemy, over me, because I am fallen: I shall rise again." Likewise, although Christ's body was not disintegrated by returning to dust, yet the separation of His soul and body was a kind of disintegration.

Reply to Objection 2: The Godhead was united with Christ's flesh after death by personal union, but not by natural union; thus the soul is united with the body as its form, so as to constitute human nature. Consequently, by the union of the body and soul, the body was uplifted to a higher condition of nature, but not to a higher personal state.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion wrought our salvation, properly speaking, by removing evils; but the Resurrection did so as the beginning and exemplar of all good things.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to rise again on the third day?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should have risen again on the third day. For the members ought to be in conformity with their head. But we who are His members do not rise from death on the third day, since our rising is put off until the end of the world. Therefore, it seems that Christ, who is our head, should not have risen on the third day, but that His Resurrection ought to have been deferred until the end of the world.

Objection 2: Further, Peter said (Acts 2:24) that "it was impossible for Christ to be held fast by hell" and death. Therefore it seems that Christ's rising ought not to have been deferred until the third day, but that He ought to have risen at once on the same day; especially since the gloss quoted above [4295](A[1]) says that "there is no profit in the shedding of Christ's blood, if He did not rise at once."

Objection 3: The day seems to start with the rising of the sun, the presence of which causes the day. But Christ rose before sunrise: for it is related (Jn. 20:1) that “Mary Magdalen cometh early, when it was yet dark, unto the sepulchre”: but Christ was already risen, for it goes on to say: “And she saw the stone taken away from the sepulchre.” Therefore Christ did not rise on the third day.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 20:19): “They shall deliver Him to the Gentiles to be mocked, and scourged, and crucified, and the third day He shall rise again.”

I answer that, As stated above [4296](A[1]) Christ’s Resurrection was necessary for the instruction of our faith. But our faith regards Christ’s Godhead and humanity, for it is not enough to believe the one without the other, as is evident from what has been said (Q[36], A[4]; cf. [4297]SS, Q[2], AA[7],8). Consequently, in order that our faith in the truth of His Godhead might be confirmed it was necessary that He should rise speedily, and that His Resurrection should not be deferred until the end of the world. But to confirm our faith regarding the truth of His humanity and death, it was needful that there should be some interval between His death and rising. For if He had risen directly after death, it might seem that His death was not genuine and consequently neither would His Resurrection be true. But to establish the truth of Christ’s death, it was enough for His rising to be deferred until the third day, for within that time some signs of life always appear in one who appears to be dead whereas he is alive.

Furthermore, by His rising on the third day, the perfection of the number “three” is commended, which is “the number of everything,” as having “beginning, middle, and end,” as is said in De Coelo i. Again in the mystical sense we are taught that Christ by “His one death” (i.e. of the body) which was light, by reason of His righteousness, “destroyed our two deaths” (i.e. of soul and body), which are as darkness on account of sin; consequently, He remained in death for one day and two nights, as Augustine observes (De Trin. iv).

And thereby is also signified that a third epoch began with the Resurrection: for the first was before the Law; the second under the Law; and the third under grace. Moreover the third state of the saints began with the Resurrection of Christ: for, the first was under figures of the Law; the second under the truth of faith; while the third will be in the eternity of glory, which Christ inaugurated by rising again.

Reply to Objection 1: The head and members are likened in nature, but not in power; because the power of the head is more excellent than that of the members. Accordingly, to show forth the excellence of Christ's power, it was fitting that He should rise on the third day, while the resurrection of the rest is put off until the end of the world.

Reply to Objection 2: Detention implies a certain compulsion. But Christ was not held fast by any necessity of death, but was "free among the dead": and therefore He abode a while in death, not as one held fast, but of His own will, just so long as He deemed necessary for the instruction of our faith. And a task is said to be done "at once" which is performed within a short space of time.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4298]Q[51], A[4], ad 1,2), Christ rose early when the day was beginning to dawn, to denote that by His Resurrection He brought us to the light of glory; just as He died when the day was drawing to its close, and nearing to darkness, in order to signify that by His death He would destroy the darkness of sin and its punishment. Nevertheless He is said to have risen on the third day, taking day as a natural day which contains twenty-four hours. And as Augustine says (De Trin. iv): "The night until the dawn, when the Lord's Resurrection was proclaimed, belongs to the third day. Because God, who made the light to shine forth from darkness, in order that by the grace of the New Testament and partaking of Christ's rising we might hear this—'once ye were darkness, but now light in the Lord'—insinuates in a measure to us that day draws its origin from night: for, as the first days are computed from light to darkness on account of man's coming fall, so these days are reckoned from darkness to light owing to man's restoration." And so it is evident that even if He had risen at midnight, He could be said to have risen on the third day, taking it as a natural day. But now that He rose early, it can be affirmed that He rose on the third day, even taking the artificial day which is caused by the sun's presence, because the sun had already begun to brighten the sky. Hence it is written (Mk. 16:2) that "the women come to the sepulchre, the sun being now risen"; which is not contrary to John's statement "when it was yet dark," as Augustine says (De Cons. Evang. iii), "because, as the day advances the more the light rises, the more are the remaining shadows dispelled.” But when Mark says “‘the sun being now risen,’ it is not to be taken as if the sun were already apparent over the horizon, but as coming presently into those parts.”

Whether Christ was the first to rise from the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not the first to rise from the dead, because we read in the Old Testament of some persons raised to life by Elias and Eliseus, according to Heb. 11:35: “Women received their dead raised to life again”: also Christ before His Passion raised three dead persons to life. Therefore Christ was not the first to rise from the dead.

Objection 2: Further, among the other miracles which happened during the Passion, it is narrated (Mat. 27:52) that “the monuments were opened, and many bodies of the saints who had slept rose again.” Therefore Christ was not the first to rise from the dead.

Objection 3: Further, as Christ by His own rising is the cause of our resurrection, so by His grace He is the cause of our grace, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness we all have received.” But in point of time some others had grace previous to Christ—for instance all the fathers of the Old Testament. Therefore some others came to the resurrection of the body before Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:20): “Christ is risen from the dead, the first fruits of them that sleep—because,” says the gloss, “He rose first in point of time and dignity.”

I answer that, Resurrection is a restoring from death to life. Now a man is snatched from death in two ways: first of all, from actual death, so that he begins in any way to live anew after being actually dead: in another way, so that he is not only rescued from death, but from the necessity, nay more, from the possibility of dying again. Such is a true and perfect resurrection, because so long as a man lives, subject to the necessity of dying, death has dominion over him in a measure, according to Rom. 8:10: “The body indeed is dead because of sin.” Furthermore, what has the possibility of existence, is said to exist in some respect, that is, in potentiality. Thus it is evident that the resurrection, whereby one is rescued from actual death only, is but an imperfect one.

Consequently, speaking of perfect resurrection, Christ is the first of them who rise, because by rising He was the first to attain life utterly immortal, according to Rom. 6:9: “Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more.” But by an imperfect resurrection, some others have risen before Christ, so as to be a kind of figure of His Resurrection.

And thus the answer to the first objection is clear: because both those raised from the dead in the old Testament, and those raised by Christ, so returned to life that they had to die again.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions regarding them who rose with Christ. Some hold that they rose to life so as to die no more, because it would be a greater torment for them to die a second time than not to rise at all. According to this view, as Jerome observes on Mat. 27:52,53, we must understand that “they had not risen before our Lord rose.” Hence the Evangelist says that “coming out of the tombs after His Resurrection, they came into the holy city, and appeared to many.” But Augustine (Ep. ad Evod. clxiv) while giving this opinion, says: “I know that it appears some, that by the death of Christ the Lord the same resurrection was bestowed upon the righteous as is promised to us in the end; and if they slept not again by laying aside their bodies, it remains to be seen how Christ can be understood to be ‘the first-born of the dead,’ if so many preceded Him unto that resurrection. Now if reply be made that this is said by anticipation, so that the monuments be understood to have been opened by the earthquake while Christ was still hanging on the cross, but that the bodies of the just did not rise then but after He had risen, the difficulty still arises—how is it that Peter asserts that it was predicted not of David but of Christ, that His body would not see corruption, since David’s tomb was in their midst; and thus he did not convince them, if David’s body was no longer there; for even if he had risen soon after his death, and his flesh had not seen corruption, his tomb might nevertheless remain. Now it seems hard that David from whose seed Christ is descended, was not in that rising of the just, if an eternal rising was conferred upon them. Also that saying in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11:40) regarding the ancient just would be hard to explain, ‘that they should not be perfected without us,’ if they were already established in that incorruption of the resurrection which is promised at the end when we shall be made perfect”: so that Augustine would seem to think that they rose to die again. In this sense Jerome also in commenting on

Matthew (27:52,53) says: “As Lazarus rose, so also many of the bodies of the saints rose, that they might bear witness to the risen Christ.” Nevertheless in a sermon for the Assumption [*Ep. ix ad Paul. et Eustoch.; among the supposititious works ascribed to St. Jerome] he seems to leave the matter doubtful. But Augustine’s reasons seem to be much more cogent.

Reply to Objection 3: As everything preceding Christ’s coming was preparatory for Christ, so is grace a disposition for glory. Consequently, it behooved all things appertaining to glory, whether they regard the soul, as the perfect fruition of God, or whether they regard the body, as the glorious resurrection, to be first in Christ as the author of glory: but that grace should be first in those that were ordained unto Christ.

Whether Christ was the cause of His own Resurrection?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ was not the cause of His own Resurrection. For whoever is raised up by another is not the cause of his own rising. But Christ was raised up by another, according to Acts 2:24: “Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the sorrows of hell”: and Rom. 8:11: “He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies.” Therefore Christ is not the cause of His own Resurrection.

Objection 2: Further, no one is said to merit, or ask from another, that of which he is himself the cause. But Christ by His Passion merited the Resurrection, as Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.): “The lowliness of the Passion is the meritorious cause of the glory of the Resurrection.” Moreover He asked the Father that He might be raised up again, according to Ps. 40:11: “But thou, O Lord, have mercy on me, and raise me up again.” Therefore He was not the cause of His rising again.

Objection 3: Further, as Damascene proves (De Fide Orth. iv), it is not the soul that rises again, but the body, which is stricken by death. But the body could not unite the soul with itself, since the soul is nobler. Therefore what rose in Christ could not be the cause of His Resurrection.

On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 10:18): “No one taketh My soul from Me, but I lay it down, and I take it up again.” But to rise is nothing else than to take the soul up again. Consequently, it appears that Christ rose again of His own power.

I answer that, As stated above ([4299]Q[50], AA[2],3) in consequence of death Christ’s Godhead was not separated from His soul, nor from His flesh. Consequently, both the soul and the flesh of the dead Christ can be considered in two respects: first, in respect of His Godhead; secondly, in respect of His created nature. Therefore, according to the virtue of the Godhead united to it, the body took back again the soul which it had laid aside, and the soul took back again the body which it had abandoned: and thus Christ rose by His own power. And this is precisely what is written (2 Cor. 13:4): “For although He was crucified through” our “weakness, yet He liveth by the power of God.” But if we consider the body and soul of the dead Christ according to the power of created nature, they could not thus be reunited, but it was necessary for Christ to be raised up by God.

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine power is the same thing as the operation of the Father and the Son; accordingly these two things are mutually consequent, that Christ was raised up by the Divine power of the Father, and by His own power.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ by praying besought and merited His Resurrection, as man and not as God.

Reply to Objection 3: According to its created nature Christ’s body is not more powerful than His soul; yet according to its Divine power it is more powerful. Again the soul by reason of the Godhead united to it is more powerful than the body in respect of its created nature. Consequently, it was by the Divine power that the body and soul mutually resumed each other, but not by the power of their created nature.

OF THE QUALITY OF CHRIST RISING AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the quality of the rising Christ, which presents four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ had a true body after His Resurrection?

(2) Whether He rose with His complete body?

(3) Whether His was a glorified body?

(4) Of the scars which showed in His body.

Whether Christ had a true body after His Resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not have a true body after His Resurrection. For a true body cannot be in the same place at the same time with another body. But after the Resurrection Christ's body was with another at the same time in the same place: since He entered among the disciples "the doors being shut," as is related in Jn. 20:26. Therefore it seems that Christ did not have a true body after His Resurrection.

Objection 2: Further, a true body does not vanish from the beholder's sight unless perchance it be corrupted. But Christ's body "vanished out of the sight" of the disciples as they gazed upon Him, as is related in Lk. 24:31. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not have a true body after His Resurrection.

Objection 3: Further, every true body has its determinate shape. But Christ's body appeared before the disciples "in another shape," as is evident from Mk. 15:12. Therefore it seems that Christ did not possess a true body after His Resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 24:37) that when Christ appeared to His disciples "they being troubled and frightened, supposed that they saw a spirit," as if He had not a true but an imaginary body: but to remove their fears He presently added: "Handle and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have." Consequently, He had not an imaginary but a true body.

I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): that is said to rise, which fell. But Christ's body fell by death; namely, inasmuch as the soul which was its formal perfection was separated from it. Hence, in order for it to be a true resurrection, it was necessary for the same body of Christ to be once more united with the same soul. And since the truth of the body's nature is from its form it follows that Christ's body after His Resurrection was a true body, and of the same nature as it was before. But had His been an imaginary body, then His Resurrection would not have been true, but apparent.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body after His Resurrection, not by miracle but from its glorified condition, as some say, entered in among the disciples while the doors were shut, thus existing with another body in the same place. But whether a glorified body can have this from some hidden property, so as to be with another body at the same time in the same place, will be discussed later ([4300]XP, Q[83], A[4]) when the common resurrection will be dealt with. For the present let it suffice to say that it was not from any property within the body, but by virtue of the Godhead united to it, that this body, although a true one, entered in among the disciples while the doors were shut. Accordingly Augustine says in a sermon for Easter (ccxlvii) that some men argue in this fashion: “If it were a body; if what rose from the sepulchre were what hung upon the tree, how could it enter through closed doors?” And he answers: “If you understand how, it is no miracle: where reason fails, faith abounds.” And (Tract. cxxi super Joan.) he says: “Closed doors were no obstacle to the substance of a Body wherein was the Godhead; for truly He could enter in by doors not open, in whose Birth His Mother’s virginity remained inviolate.” And Gregory says the same in a homily for the octave of Easter (xxvi in Evang.).

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([4301]Q[53], A[3]), Christ rose to the immortal life of glory. But such is the disposition of a glorified body that it is spiritual, i.e. subject to the spirit, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:44). Now in order for the body to be entirely subject to the spirit, it is necessary for the body’s every action to be subject to the will of the spirit. Again, that an object be seen is due to the action of the visible object upon the sight, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima ii). Consequently, whoever has a glorified body has it in his power to be seen when he so wishes, and not to be seen when he does not wish it. Moreover Christ had this not only from the condition of His glorified body, but also from the power of His Godhead, by which power it may happen that even bodies not glorified are miraculously unseen: as was by a miracle bestowed on the blessed Bartholomew, that “if he wished he could be seen, and not be seen if he did not wish it” [*Apocryphal Historia Apost. viii, 2]. Christ, then, is said to have vanished from the eyes of the disciples, not as though He were corrupted or dissolved into invisible elements; but because He ceased, of His own will, to be seen by them, either while He was present or while He was departing by the gift of agility.

Reply to Objection 3: As Severianus [*Peter Chrysologus: Serm. lxxxii] says in a sermon for Easter: “Let no one suppose that Christ changed His features at the Resurrection.” This is to be understood of the outline of His members; since there was nothing out of keeping or deformed in the body of Christ which was conceived of the Holy Ghost, that had to be righted at the Resurrection. Nevertheless He received the glory of clarity in the

Resurrection: accordingly the same writer adds: “but the semblance is changed, when, ceasing to be mortal, it becomes immortal; so that it acquired the glory of countenance, without losing the substance of the countenance.” Yet He did not come to those disciples in glorified appearance; but, as it lay in His power for His body to be seen or not, so it was within His power to present to the eyes of the beholders His form either glorified or not glorified, or partly glorified and partly not, or in any fashion whatsoever. Still it requires but a slight difference for anyone to seem to appear another shape.

Whether Christ’s body rose glorified?

[*Some editions give this article as the third, following the order of the introduction to the question. But this is evident from the first sentence of the body of A[3] (A[2] in the aforesaid editions), that the order of the Leonine edition is correct.]

Objection 1: It seems that Christ’s body did not rise glorified. For glorified bodies shine, according to Mat. 13:43: “Then shall the just shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father.” But shining bodies are seen under the aspect of light, but not of color. Therefore, since Christ’s body was beheld under the aspect of color, as it had been hitherto, it seems that it was not a glorified one.

Objection 2: Further, a glorified body is incorruptible. But Christ’s body seems not to have been incorruptible; because it was palpable, as He Himself says in Lk. 24:39: “Handle, and see.” Now Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxvi) that “what is handled must be corruptible, and that which is incorruptible cannot be handled.” Consequently, Christ’s body was not glorified.

Objection 3: Further, a glorified body is not animal, but spiritual, as is clear from 1 Cor. 15. But after the Resurrection Christ’s body seems to have been animal, since He ate and drank with His disciples, as we read in the closing chapters of Luke and John. Therefore, it seems that Christ’s body was not glorified.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil. 3:21): “He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory.”

I answer that, Christ’s was a glorified body in His Resurrection, and this is evident from three reasons. First of all, because His Resurrection was the exemplar and the cause of ours, as is stated in 1 Cor. 15:43. But in the resurrection the saints will have glorified bodies, as is written in the same place: “It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory.” Hence, since the cause is mightier than the effect, and the exemplar than the exemplate; much more glorious, then, was the body of Christ in His Resurrection. Secondly, because He merited the glory of His Resurrection by the lowliness of His Passion. Hence He said (Jn. 12:27): “Now is My soul troubled,” which refers to the Passion; and later He adds: “Father, glorify Thy name,” whereby He asks for the glory of the Resurrection. Thirdly, because as stated above ([4302]Q[34], A[4]), Christ’s soul was glorified from the instant of His conception by perfect fruition of the Godhead. But, as stated above ([4303]Q[14], A[1], ad 2), it was owing to the Divine economy that the glory did not pass from His soul to His body, in order that by the Passion He might accomplish the mystery of our redemption. Consequently, when this mystery of Christ’s Passion and death was finished, straightway the soul communicated its glory to the risen body in the Resurrection; and so that body was made glorious.

Reply to Objection 1: Whatever is received within a subject is received according to the subject’s capacity. Therefore, since glory flows from the soul into the body, it follows that, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii), the brightness or splendor of a glorified body is after the manner of natural color in the human body; just as variously colored glass derives its splendor from the sun’s radiance, according to the mode of the color. But as it lies within the power of a glorified man whether his body be seen or not, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), so is it in his power whether its splendor be seen or not. Accordingly it can be seen in its color without its brightness. And it was in this way that Christ’s body appeared to the disciples after the Resurrection.

Reply to Objection 2: We say that a body can be handled not only because of its resistance, but also on account of its density. But from rarity and density follow weight and lightness, heat and cold, and similar contraries, which are the principles of corruption in elementary bodies. Consequently, a body that can be handled by human touch is naturally corruptible. But if there be a body that resists touch, and yet is not disposed according to the qualities mentioned, which are the proper objects of human touch, such as a heavenly body, then such body cannot be said to be handled. But Christ's body after the Resurrection was truly made up of elements, and had tangible qualities such as the nature of a human body requires, and therefore it could naturally be handled; and if it had nothing beyond the nature of a human body, it would likewise be corruptible. But it had something else which made it incorruptible, and this was not the nature of a heavenly body, as some maintain, and into which we shall make fuller inquiry later ([4304]XP, Q[82], A[1]), but it was glory flowing from a beatified soul: because, as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor. cxviii): "God made the soul of such powerful nature, that from its fullest beatitude the fulness of health overflows into the body, that is, the vigor of incorruption." And therefore Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxvi): "Christ's body is shown to be of the same nature, but of different glory, after the Resurrection."

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii): "After the Resurrection, our Saviour in spiritual but true flesh partook of meat with the disciples, not from need of food, but because it lay in His power." For as Bede says on Lk. 24:41: "The thirsty earth sucks in the water, and the sun's burning ray absorbs it; the former from need, the latter by its power." Hence after the Resurrection He ate, "not as needing food, but in order thus to show the nature of His risen body." Nor does it follow that His was an animal body that stands in need of food.

Whether Christ's body rose again entire?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's body did not rise entire. For flesh and blood belong to the integrity of the body: whereas Christ seems not to have had both, for it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): "Flesh and blood can not possess the kingdom of God." But Christ rose in the glory of the kingdom of God. Therefore it seems that He did not have flesh and blood.

Objection 2: Further, blood is one of the four humors. Consequently, if Christ had blood, with equal reason He also had the other humors, from which corruption is caused in animal bodies. It would follow, then, that Christ's body was corruptible, which is unseemly. Therefore Christ did not have flesh and blood.

Objection 3: Further, the body of Christ which rose, ascended to heaven. But some of His blood is kept as relics in various churches. Therefore Christ's body did not rise with the integrity of all its parts.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 24:39) while addressing His disciples after the Resurrection: "A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have."

I answer that, As stated above [4305](A[2]), Christ's body in the Resurrection was "of the same nature, but differed in glory." Accordingly, whatever goes with the nature of a human body, was entirely in the body of Christ when He rose again. Now it is clear that flesh, bones, blood, and other such things, are of the very nature of the human body. Consequently, all these things were in Christ's body when He rose again; and this also integrally, without any diminution; otherwise it would not have been a complete resurrection, if whatever was lost by death had not been restored. Hence our Lord assured His faithful ones by saying (Mat. 10:30): "The very hairs of your head are all numbered": and (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall not perish."

But to say that Christ's body had neither flesh, nor bones, nor the other natural parts of a human body, belongs to the error of Eutyches, Bishop of Constantinople, who maintained that "our body in that glory of the resurrection will be impalpable, and more subtle than wind and air: and that our Lord, after the hearts of the disciples who handled Him were confirmed, brought back to subtlety whatever could be handled in Him" [*St. Gregory, Moral. in Job 14:56]. Now Gregory condemns this in the same book, because Christ's body was not changed after the Resurrection, according to Rom. 6:9: "Christ rising from the dead, dieth now no more." Accordingly, the very man who had said these things, himself retracted them at his death. For, if it be unbecoming for Christ to take a body of another nature in His conception, a heavenly one for instance, as Valentine asserted, it is much more unbecoming for Him at His Resurrection to resume a body of another nature, because in His Resurrection He resumed unto an everlasting life, the body which in His conception He had assumed to a mortal life.

Reply to Objection 1: Flesh and blood are not to be taken there for the nature of flesh and blood, but, either for the guilt of flesh and blood, as Gregory says [*St. Gregory, Moral. in Job 14:56], or else for the corruption of flesh and blood: because, as Augustine says (Ad Consent., De Resur.

Carn.), “there will be neither corruption there, nor mortality of flesh and blood.” Therefore flesh according to its substance possesses the kingdom of God, according to Lk. 24:39: “A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” But flesh, if understood as to its corruption, will not possess it; hence it is straightway added in the words of the Apostle: “Neither shall corruption possess incorruption.”

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in the same book: “Perchance by reason of the blood some keener critic will press us and say; If the blood was” in the body of Christ when He rose, “why not the rheum?” that is, the phlegm; “why not also the yellow gall?” that is, the gall proper; “and why not the black gall?” that is, the bile, “with which four humors the body is tempered, as medical science bears witness. But whatever anyone may add, let him take heed not to add corruption, lest he corrupt the health and purity of his own faith; because Divine power is equal to taking away such qualities as it wills from the visible and tractable body, while allowing others to remain, so that there be no defilement,” i.e. of corruption, “though the features be there; motion without weariness, the power to eat, without need of food.”

Reply to Objection 3: All the blood which flowed from Christ’s body, belonging as it does to the integrity of human nature, rose again with His body: and the same reason holds good for all the particles which belong to the truth and integrity of human nature. But the blood preserved as relics in some churches did not flow from Christ’s side, but is said to have flowed from some maltreated image of Christ.

Whether Christ’s body ought to have risen with its scars?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body ought not to have risen with its scars. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:52): “The dead shall rise incorrupt.” But scars and wounds imply corruption and defect. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ, the author of the resurrection, to rise again with scars.

Objection 2: Further, Christ’s body rose entire, as stated above [4306] (A[3]). But open scars are opposed to bodily integrity, since they interfere with the continuity of the tissue. It does not therefore seem fitting for the open wounds to remain in Christ’s body; although the traces of the wounds might remain, which would satisfy the beholder; thus it was that Thomas believed, to whom it was said: “Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed” (Jn. 20:29).

Objection 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that “some things are truly said of Christ after the Resurrection, which He did not have from nature but from special dispensation, such as the scars, in order to make it sure that it was the body which had suffered that rose again.” Now when the cause ceases, the effect ceases. Therefore it seems that when the disciples were assured of the Resurrection, He bore the scars no longer. But it ill became the unchangeableness of His glory that He should assume anything which was not to remain in Him for ever. Consequently, it seems that He ought not at His Resurrection to have resumed a body with scars.

On the contrary, Our Lord said to Thomas (Jn. 20:27): “Put in thy finger hither, and see My hands; and bring hither thy hand, and put it into My side, and be not faithless but believing.”

I answer that, It was fitting for Christ’s soul at His Resurrection to resume the body with its scars. In the first place, for Christ’s own glory. For Bede says on Lk. 24:40 that He kept His scars not from inability to heal them, “but to wear them as an everlasting trophy of His victory.” Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): “Perhaps in that kingdom we shall see on the bodies of the Martyrs the traces of the wounds which they bore for Christ’s name: because it will not be a deformity, but a dignity in them; and a certain kind of beauty will shine in them, in the body, though not of the body.” Secondly, to confirm the hearts of the disciples as to “the faith in His Resurrection” (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Thirdly, “that when He pleads for us with the Father, He may always show the manner of death He endured for us” (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Fourthly, “that He may convince those redeemed in His blood, how mercifully they have been helped, as He exposes before them the traces of the same death” (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Lastly, “that in the Judgment-day He may upbraid them with their just condemnation” (Bede, on Lk. 24:40). Hence, as Augustine says (De Symb. ii): “Christ knew why He kept the scars in His body. For, as He showed them to Thomas who would not believe except he handled and saw them, so will He show His wounds to His enemies, so that He who is the Truth may convict them, saying: ‘Behold the man whom you crucified; see the wounds you inflicted; recognize the side you pierced, since it was opened by you and for you, yet you would not enter.’”

Reply to Objection 1: The scars that remained in Christ’s body belong neither to corruption nor defect, but to the greater increase of glory, inasmuch as they are the trophies of His power; and a special comeliness will appear in the places scarred by the wounds.

Reply to Objection 2: Although those openings of the wounds break the continuity of the tissue, still the greater beauty of glory compensates for all this, so that the body is not less entire, but more perfected. Thomas, however, not only saw, but handled the wounds, because as Pope Leo [*Cf. Append. Opp. August., Serm. clxii] says: “It sufficed for his personal faith for him to have seen what he saw; but it was on our behalf that he touched what he beheld.”

Reply to Objection 3: Christ willed the scars of His wounds to remain on His body, not only to confirm the faith of His disciples, but for other reasons also. From these it seems that those scars will always remain on His body; because, as Augustine says (Ad Consent., De Resurr. Carn.): “I believe our Lord’s body to be in heaven, such as it was when He ascended into heaven.” And Gregory (Moral. xiv) says that “if aught could be changed in Christ’s body after His Resurrection, contrary to Paul’s truthful teaching, then the Lord after His Resurrection returned to death; and what fool would dare to say this, save he that denies the true resurrection of the flesh?” Accordingly, it is evident that the scars which Christ showed on His body after His Resurrection, have never since been removed from His body.

OF THE MANIFESTATION OF THE RESURRECTION (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the manifestation of the Resurrection: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ’s Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all men or only to some special individuals?

(2) Whether it was fitting that they should see Him rise?

(3) Whether He ought to have lived with the disciples after the Resurrection?

(4) Whether it was fitting for Him to appeal to the disciples “in another shape”?

(5) Whether He ought to have demonstrated the Resurrection by proofs?

(6) Of the cogency of those proofs.

Whether Christ's Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all. For just as a public penalty is due for public sin, according to 1 Tim. 5:20: "Them that sin reprove before all," so is a public reward due for public merit. But, as Augustine says (Tract. civ in Joan.), "the glory of the Resurrection is the reward of the humility of the Passion." Therefore, since Christ's Passion was manifested to all while He suffered in public, it seems that the glory of the Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all.

Objection 2: Further, as Christ's Passion is ordained for our salvation, so also is His Resurrection, according to Rom. 4:25: "He rose again for our justification." But what belongs to the public weal ought to be manifested to all. Therefore Christ's Resurrection ought to have been manifested to all, and not to some specially.

Objection 3: Further, they to whom it was manifested were witnesses of the Resurrection: hence it is said (Acts 3:15): "Whom God hath raised from the dead, of which we are witnesses." Now they bore witness by preaching in public: and this is unbecoming in women, according to 1 Cor. 14:34: "Let women keep silence in the churches": and 1 Tim. 2:12: "I suffer not a woman to teach." Therefore, it does not seem becoming for Christ's Resurrection to be manifested first of all to the women and afterwards to mankind in general.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:40): "Him God raised up the third day, and gave Him to be made manifest, not to all the people, but to witnesses preordained by God."

I answer that, Some things come to our knowledge by nature's common law, others by special favor of grace, as things divinely revealed. Now, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), the divinely established law of such things is that they be revealed immediately by God to higher persons, through whom they are imparted to others, as is evident in the ordering of the heavenly spirits. But such things as concern future glory are beyond the common ken of mankind, according to Is. 64:4: "The eye hath not seen, O

God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee.” Consequently, such things are not known by man except through Divine revelation, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): “God hath revealed them to us by His spirit.” Since, then, Christ rose by a glorious Resurrection, consequently His Resurrection was not manifested to everyone, but to some, by whose testimony it could be brought to the knowledge of others.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s Passion was consummated in a body that still had a passible nature, which is known to all by general laws: consequently His Passion could be directly manifested to all. But the Resurrection was accomplished “through the glory of the Father,” as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:4). Therefore it was manifested directly to some, but not to all.

But that a public penance is imposed upon public sinners, is to be understood of the punishment of this present life. And in like manner public merits should be rewarded in public, in order that others may be stirred to emulation. But the punishments and rewards of the future life are not publicly manifested to all, but to those specially who are preordained thereto by God.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as Christ’s Resurrection is for the common salvation of all, so it came to the knowledge of all; yet not so that it was directly manifested to all, but only to some, through whose testimony it could be brought to the knowledge of all.

Reply to Objection 3: A woman is not to be allowed to teach publicly in church; but she may be permitted to give familiar instruction to some privately. And therefore as Ambrose says on Lk. 24:22, “a woman is sent to them who are of her household,” but not to the people to bear witness to the Resurrection. But Christ appeared to the woman first, for this reason, that as a woman was the first to bring the source of death to man, so she might be the first to announce the dawn of Christ’s glorious Resurrection. Hence Cyril says on Jn. 20:17: “Woman who formerly was the minister of death, is the first to see and proclaim the adorable mystery of the Resurrection: thus womankind has procured absolution from ignominy, and removal of the curse.” Hereby, moreover, it is shown, so far as the state of glory is concerned, that the female sex shall suffer no hurt; but if women burn with greater charity, they shall also attain greater glory from the Divine vision:

because the women whose love for our Lord was more persistent—so much so that “when even the disciples withdrew” from the sepulchre “they did not depart” [*Gregory, Hom. xxv in Evang.]—were the first to see Him rising in glory.

Whether it was fitting that the disciples should see Him rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem fitting that the disciples should have seen Him rise again, because it was their office to bear witness to the Resurrection, according to Acts 4:33: “With great power did the apostles give testimony to the Resurrection of Jesus Christ our Lord.” But the surest witness of all is an eye-witness. Therefore it would have been fitting for them to see the very Resurrection of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, in order to have the certainty of faith the disciples saw Christ ascend into heaven, according to Acts 1:9: “While they looked on, He was raised up.” But it was also necessary for them to have faith in the Resurrection. Therefore it seems that Christ ought to have risen in sight of the disciples.

Objection 3: Further, the raising of Lazarus was a sign of Christ’s coming Resurrection. But the Lord raised up Lazarus in sight of the disciples. Consequently, it seems that Christ ought to have risen in sight of the disciples.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:9): The Lord “rising early the first day of the week, appeared first to Mary Magdalen.” Now Mary Magdalen did not see Him rise; but, while searching for Him in the sepulchre, she heard from the angel: “He is risen, He is not here.” Therefore no one saw Him rise again.

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “Those things that are of God, are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God].” Now the divinely established order is this, that things above men’s ken are revealed to them by angels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). But Christ on rising did not return to the familiar manner of life, but to a kind of immortal and God-like condition, according to Rom. 6:10: “For in that He liveth, He liveth unto God.” And therefore it was fitting for Christ’s Resurrection not to be witnessed by men directly, but to be proclaimed to them by angels. Accordingly, Hilary (Comment. Matth. cap. ult.) says: “An angel is therefore the first herald of the Resurrection, that it might be declared out of obedience to the Father's will."

Reply to Objection 1: The apostles were able to testify to the Resurrection even by sight, because from the testimony of their own eyes they saw Christ alive, whom they had known to be dead. But just as man comes from the hearing of faith to the beatific vision, so did men come to the sight of the risen Christ through the message already received from angels.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Ascension as to its term wherefrom, was not above men's common knowledge, but only as to its term whereunto. Consequently, the disciples were able to behold Christ's Ascension as to the term wherefrom, that is, according as He was uplifted from the earth; but they did not behold Him as to the term whereunto, because they did not see how He was received into heaven. But Christ's Resurrection transcended common knowledge as to the term wherefrom, according as His soul returned from hell and His body from the closed sepulchre; and likewise as to the term whereunto, according as He attained to the life of glory. Consequently, the Resurrection ought not to be accomplished so as to be seen by man.

Reply to Objection 3: Lazarus was raised so that he returned to the same life as before, which life is not beyond man's common ken. Consequently, there is no parity.

Whether Christ ought to have lived constantly with His disciples after the Resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought to have lived constantly with His Disciples, because He appeared to them after His Resurrection in order to confirm their faith in the Resurrection, and to bring them comfort in their disturbed state, according to Jn. 20:20: "The disciples were glad when they saw the Lord." But they would have been more assured and consoled had He constantly shown them His presence. Therefore it seems that He ought to have lived constantly with them.

Objection 2: Further, Christ rising from the dead did not at once ascend to heaven, but after forty days, as is narrated in Acts 1:3. But meanwhile He could have been in no more suitable place than where the disciples were met together. Therefore it seems that He ought to have lived with them continually.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii), we read how Christ appeared five times on the very day of His Resurrection: first "to the women at the sepulchre; secondly to the same on the way from the sepulchre; thirdly to Peter; fourthly to the two disciples going to the town; fifthly to several of them in Jerusalem when Thomas was not present." Therefore it also seems that He ought to have appeared several times on the other days before the Ascension.

Objection 4: Further, our Lord had said to them before the Passion (Mat. 26:32): "But after I shall be risen again, I will go before you into Galilee"; moreover an angel and our Lord Himself repeated the same to the women after the Resurrection: nevertheless He was seen by them in Jerusalem on the very day of the Resurrection, as stated above (OBJ[3]); also on the eighth day, as we read in Jn. 20:26. It seems, therefore, that He did not live with the disciples in a fitting way after the Resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 20:26) that "after eight days" Christ appeared to the disciples. Therefore He did not live constantly with them.

I answer that, Concerning the Resurrection two things had to be manifested to the disciples, namely, the truth of the Resurrection, and the glory of Him who rose. Now in order to manifest the truth of the Resurrection, it sufficed for Him to appear several times before them, to speak familiarly to them, to eat and drink, and let them touch Him. But in order to manifest the glory of the risen Christ, He was not desirous of living with them constantly as He had done before, lest it might seem that He rose unto the same life as before. Hence (Lk. 24:44) He said to them: "These are the words which I spoke to you, while I was yet with you." For He was there with them by His bodily presence, but hitherto He had been with them not merely by His bodily presence, but also in mortal semblance. Hence Bede in explaining those words of Luke, "while I was with you," says: "that is, while I was still in mortal flesh, in which you are yet: for He had then risen in the same flesh, but was not in the same state of mortality as they."

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's frequent appearing served to assure the disciples of the truth of the Resurrection; but continual intercourse might have led them into the error of believing that He had risen to the same life as was His before. Yet by His constant presence He promised them comfort in another life, according to Jn. 16:22: “I will see you again, and your heart shall rejoice; and your joy no man shall take from you.”

Reply to Objection 2: That Christ did not stay continually with the disciples was not because He deemed it more expedient for Him to be elsewhere: but because He judged it to be more suitable for the apostles’ instruction that He should not abide continually with them, for the reason given above. But it is quite unknown in what places He was bodily present in the meantime, since Scripture is silent, and His dominion is in every place (Cf. Ps. 102:22).

Reply to Objection 3: He appeared oftener on the first day, because the disciples were to be admonished by many proofs to accept the faith in His Resurrection from the very out set: but after they had once accepted it, they had no further need of being instructed by so many apparitions. Accordingly one reads in the Gospel that after the first day He appeared again only five times. For, as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii), after the first five apparitions “He came again a sixth time when Thomas saw Him; a seventh time was by the sea of Tiberias at the capture of the fishes; the eighth was on the mountain of Galilee, according to Matthew; the ninth occasion is expressed by Mark, ‘at length when they were at table,’ because no more were they going to eat with Him upon earth; the tenth was on the very day, when no longer upon the earth, but uplifted into the cloud, He was ascending into heaven. But, as John admits, not all things were written down. And He visited them frequently before He went up to heaven,” in order to comfort them. Hence it is written (1 Cor. 15:6,7) that “He was seen by more than five hundred brethren at once . . . after that He was seen by James”; of which apparitions no mention is made in the Gospels.

Reply to Objection 4: Chrysostom in explaining Mat. 26:32—“after I shall be risen again, I will go before you into Galilee,” says (Hom. lxxxiii in Matth.), “He goes not to some far off region in order to appear to them, but among His own people, and in those very places” in which for the most part they had lived with Him; “in order that they might thereby believe that He who was crucified was the same as He who rose again.” And on this account “He said that He would go into Galilee, that they might be delivered from fear of the Jews.”

Consequently, as Ambrose says (Expos. in Luc.), “The Lord had sent word to the disciples that they were to see Him in Galilee; yet He showed

Himself first to them when they were assembled together in the room out of fear. (Nor is there any breaking of a promise here, but rather a hastened fulfilling out of kindness)” [*Cf. Catena Aurea in Luc. xxiv, 36]: “afterwards, however, when their minds were comforted, they went into Galilee. Nor is there any reason to prevent us from supposing that there were few in the room, and many more on the mountain.” For, as Eusebius [*Of Caesarea; Cf. Migne, P. G., xxii, 1003] says, “Two Evangelists, Luke and John, write that He appeared in Jerusalem to the eleven only; but the other two said that an angel and our Saviour commanded not merely the eleven, but all the disciples and brethren, to go into Galilee. Paul makes mention of them when he says (1 Cor. 15:6): ‘Then He appeared to more then five hundred brethren at once.’” The truer solution, however, is this, that while they were in hiding in Jerusalem He appeared to them at first in order to comfort them; but in Galilee it was not secretly, nor once or twice, that He made Himself known to them with great power, “showing Himself to them alive after His Passion, by many proofs,” as Luke says (Acts 1:3). Or as Augustine writes (De Consens. Evang. iii): “What was said by the angel and by our Lord—that He would ‘go before them into Galilee,’ must be taken prophetically. For if we take Galilee as meaning ‘a passing,’ we must understand that they were going to pass from the people of Israel to the Gentiles, who would not believe in the preaching of the apostles unless He prepared the way for them in men’s hearts: and this is signified by the words ‘He shall go before you into Galilee.’ But if by Galilee we understand ‘revelation,’ we are to understand this as applying to Him not in the form of a servant, but in that form wherein He is equal to the Father, and which He has promised to them that love Him. Although He has gone before us in this sense, He has not abandoned us.”

Whether Christ should have appeared to the disciples “in another shape”?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ ought not to have appeared to the disciples “in another shape.” For a thing cannot appear in very truth other than it is. But there was only one shape in Christ. Therefore if He appeared under another, it was not a true but a false apparition. Now this is not at all fitting, because as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 14): “If He deceives He is not the Truth; yet Christ is the Truth.” Consequently, it seems that Christ ought not to have appeared to the disciples “in another shape.”

Objection 2: Further, nothing can appear in another shape than the one it has, except the beholder’s eyes be captivated by some illusions. But since such illusions are brought about by magical arts, they are unbecoming in Christ, according to what is written (2 Cor. 6:15): “What concord hath Christ with Belial?” Therefore it seems that Christ ought not to have appeared in another shape.

Objection 3: Further, just as our faith receives its surety from Scripture, so were the disciples assured of their faith in the Resurrection by Christ appearing to them. But, as Augustine says in an Epistle to Jerome (xxviii), if but one untruth be admitted into the Sacred Scripture, the whole authority of the Scriptures is weakened. Consequently, if Christ appeared to the disciples, in but one apparition, otherwise than He was, then whatever they saw in Christ after the Resurrection will be of less import, which is not fitting. Therefore He ought not to have appeared in another shape.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 16:12): “After that He appeared in another shape to two of them walking, as they were going into the country.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4307]AA[1],2), Christ’s Resurrection was to be manifested to men in the same way as Divine things are revealed. But Divine things are revealed to men in various ways, according as they are variously disposed. For, those who have minds well disposed, perceive Divine things rightly, whereas those not so disposed perceive them with a certain confusion of doubt or error: “for, the sensual men perceiveth not those things that are of the Spirit of God,” as is said in 1 Cor. 2:14. Consequently, after His Resurrection Christ appeared in His own shape to some who were well disposed to belief, while He appeared in another shape to them who seemed to be already growing tepid in their faith: hence these said (Lk. 24:21): “We hoped that it was He that should have redeemed Israel.” Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxiii in Evang.), that “He showed Himself to them in body such as He was in their minds: for, because He was as yet a stranger to faith in their hearts, He made pretense of going on farther,” that is, as if He were a stranger.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Qq. Evang. ii), “not everything of which we make pretense is a falsehood; but when what we pretend has no meaning then is it a falsehood. But when our pretense has some signification, it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth; otherwise everything said figuratively by wise and holy men, or even by our Lord Himself, would be set down as a falsehood, because it is not customary to take such expressions in the literal sense. And deeds, like words, are feigned without falsehood, in order to denote something else." And so it happened here. as has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): "Our Lord could change His flesh so that His shape really was other than they were accustomed to behold; for, before His Passion He was transfigured on the mountain, so that His face shone like the sun. But it did not happen thus now." For not without reason do we "understand this hindrance in their eyes to have been of Satan's doing, lest Jesus might be recognized." Hence Luke says (24:16) that "their eyes were held, that they should not know Him."

Reply to Objection 3: Such an argument would prove, if they had not been brought back from the sight of a strange shape to that of Christ's true countenance. For, as Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): "The permission was granted by Christ," namely, that their eyes should be held fast in the aforesaid way, "until the Sacrament of the bread; that when they had shared in the unity of His body, the enemy's hindrance may be understood to have been taken away, so that Christ might be recognized." Hence he goes on to say that "'their eyes were opened, and they knew Him'; not that they were hitherto walking with their eyes shut; but there was something in them whereby they were not permitted to recognize what they saw. This could be caused by the darkness or by some kind of humor."

Whether Christ should have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by proofs?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ should not have demonstrated the truth of His Resurrection by proofs. For Ambrose says (De Fide, ad Gratian. i): "Let there be no proofs where faith is required." But faith is required regarding the Resurrection. Therefore proofs are out of place there.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxvi): "Faith has no merit where human reason supplies the test." But it was no part of Christ's office to void the merit of faith. Consequently, it was not for Him to confirm the Resurrection by proofs.

Objection 3: Further, Christ came into the world in order that men might attain beatitude through Him, according to Jn. 10:10: “I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly.” But supplying proofs seems to be a hindrance in the way of man’s beatitude; because our Lord Himself said (Jn. 20:29): “Blessed are they that have not seen, and have believed.” Consequently, it seems that Christ ought not to manifest His Resurrection by any proofs.

On the contrary, It is related in Acts 1:3, that Christ appeared to His disciples “for forty days by many proofs, speaking of the Kingdom of God.”

I answer that, The word “proof” is susceptible of a twofold meaning: sometimes it is employed to designate any sort “of reason in confirmation of what is a matter of doubt” [*Tully, Topic. ii]: and sometimes it means a sensible sign employed to manifest the truth; thus also Aristotle occasionally uses the term in his works [*Cf. Prior. Anal. ii; Rhetor. i]. Taking “proof” in the first sense, Christ did not demonstrate His Resurrection to the disciples by proofs, because such argumentative proof would have to be grounded on some principles: and if these were not known to the disciples, nothing would thereby be demonstrated to them, because nothing can be known from the unknown. And if such principles were known to them, they would not go beyond human reason, and consequently would not be efficacious for establishing faith in the Resurrection, which is beyond human reason, since principles must be assumed which are of the same order, according to 1 Poster. But it was from the authority of the Sacred Scriptures that He proved to them the truth of His Resurrection, which authority is the basis of faith, when He said: “All things must needs be fulfilled which are written in the Law, and in the prophets, and in the Psalms, concerning Me”: as is set forth Lk. 24:44.

But if the term “proof” be taken in the second sense, then Christ is said to have demonstrated His Resurrection by proofs, inasmuch as by most evident signs He showed that He was truly risen. Hence where our version has “by many proofs,” the Greek text, instead of proof has {tekmerion}, i.e. “an evident sign affording positive proof” [*Cf. Prior. Anal. ii]. Now Christ showed these signs of the Resurrection to His disciples, for two reasons. First, because their hearts were not disposed so as to accept readily the faith in the Resurrection. Hence He says Himself (Lk. 24:25): “O foolish and slow of heart to believe": and (Mk. 16:14): "He upbraided them with their incredulity and hardness of heart." Secondly, that their testimony might be rendered more efficacious through the signs shown them, according to 1 Jn. 1:1, 3: "That which we have seen, and have heard, and our hands have handled . . . we declare."

Reply to Objection 1: Ambrose is speaking there of proofs drawn from human reason, which are useless for demonstrating things of faith, as was shown above.

Reply to Objection 2: The merit of faith arises from this, that at God's bidding man believes what he does not see. Accordingly, only that reason debars merit of faith which enables one to see by knowledge what is proposed for belief: and this is demonstrative argument. But Christ did not make use of any such argument for demonstrating His Resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated already (ad 2), the merit of beatitude, which comes of faith, is not entirely excluded except a man refuse to believe only such things as he can see. But for a man to believe from visible signs the things he does not see, does not entirely deprive him of faith nor of the merit of faith: just as Thomas, to whom it was said (Jn. 20:29): "'Because thou hast seen Me, Thomas, thou hast believed,' saw one thing and believed another" [*Gregory, Hom. xxvi]: the wounds were what he saw, God was the object of His belief. But his is the more perfect faith who does not require such helps for belief. Hence, to put to shame the faith of some men, our Lord said (Jn. 4:48): "Unless you see signs and wonders, you believe not." From this one can learn how they who are so ready to believe God, even without beholding signs, are blessed in comparison with them who do not believe except they see the like.

Whether the proofs which Christ made use of manifested sufficiently the truth of His Resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that the proofs which Christ made use of did not sufficiently manifest the truth of His Resurrection. For after the Resurrection Christ showed nothing to His disciples which angels appearing to men did not or could not show; because angels have frequently shown themselves to men under human aspect, have spoken and lived with them, and eaten with them, just as if they were truly men, as is evident from Genesis 18, of the angels whom Abraham entertained. and in the Book of

Tobias, of the angel who “conducted” him “and brought” him back. Nevertheless, angels have not true bodies naturally united to them; which is required for a resurrection. Consequently, the signs which Christ showed His disciples were not sufficient for manifesting His Resurrection.

Objection 2: Further, Christ rose again gloriously, that is, having a human nature with glory. But some of the things which Christ showed to His disciples seem contrary to human nature, as for instance, that “He vanished out of their sight,” and entered in among them “when the doors were shut”: and some other things seem contrary to glory, as for instance, that He ate and drank, and bore the scars of His wounds. Consequently, it seems that those proofs were neither sufficient nor fitting for establishing faith in the Resurrection.

Objection 3: Further, after the Resurrection Christ’s body was such that it ought not to be touched by mortal man; hence He said to Magdalen (Jn. 20:17): “Do not touch Me; for I am not yet ascended to My Father.” Consequently, it was not fitting for manifesting the truth of His Resurrection, that He should permit Himself to be handled by His disciples.

Objection 4: Further, clarity seems to be the principal of the qualities of a glorified body: yet He gave no sign thereof in His Resurrection. Therefore it seems that those proofs were insufficient for showing the quality of Christ’s Resurrection.

Objection 5: [*This objection is wanting in the older codices, and in the text of the Leonine edition, which, however, gives it in a note as taken from one of the more recent codices of the Vatican.]

Further, the angels introduced as witnesses for the Resurrection seem insufficient from the want of agreement on the part of the Evangelists. Because in Matthew’s account the angel is described as sitting upon the stone rolled back, while Mark states that he was seen after the women had entered the tomb; and again, whereas these mention one angel, John says that there were two sitting, and Luke says that there were two standing. Consequently, the arguments for the Resurrection do not seem to agree.

On the contrary, Christ, who is the Wisdom of God, “ordereth all things sweetly” and in a fitting manner, according to Wis. 8:1.

I answer that, Christ manifested His Resurrection in two ways: namely, by testimony; and by proof or sign: and each manifestation was sufficient in its own class. For in order to manifest His Resurrection He made use of a double testimony, neither of which can be rebutted. The first of these was the angels’ testimony, who announced the Resurrection to the women, as is seen in all the Evangelists: the other was the testimony of the Scriptures, which He set before them to show the truth of the Resurrection, as is narrated in the last chapter of Luke.

Again, the proofs were sufficient for showing that the Resurrection was both true and glorious. That it was a true Resurrection He shows first on the part of the body; and this He shows in three respects; first of all, that it was a true and solid body, and not phantastic or rarefied, like the air. And He establishes this by offering His body to be handled; hence He says in the last chapter of Luke (39): “Handle and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have.” Secondly, He shows that it was a human body, by presenting His true features for them to behold. Thirdly, He shows that it was identically the same body which He had before, by showing them the scars of the wounds; hence, as we read in the last chapter of Luke (39) he said to them: “See My hands and feet, that it is I Myself.”

Secondly, He showed them the truth of His Resurrection on the part of His soul reunited with His body: and He showed this by the works of the threefold life. First of all, in the operations of the nutritive life, by eating and drinking with His disciples, as we read in the last chapter of Luke. Secondly, in the works of the sensitive life, by replying to His disciples’ questions, and by greeting them when they were in His presence, showing thereby that He both saw and heard; thirdly, in the works of the intellective life by their conversing with Him, and discoursing on the Scriptures. And, in order that nothing might be wanting to make the manifestation complete, He also showed that He had the Divine Nature, by working the miracle of the draught of fishes, and further by ascending into heaven while they were beholding Him: because, according to Jn. 3:13: “No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven, the Son of Man who is in heaven.”

He also showed His disciples the glory of His Resurrection by entering in among them when the doors were closed: as Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): “Our Lord allowed them to handle His flesh which He had brought through closed doors, to show that His body was of the same nature but of different glory.” It likewise was part of the property of glory that “He vanished suddenly from their eyes,” as related in the last chapter of Luke;

because thereby it was shown that it lay in His power to be seen or not seen; and this belongs to a glorified body, as stated above ([4308]Q[54], A[1], ad 2, A[2], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 1: Each separate argument would not suffice of itself for showing perfectly Christ's Resurrection, yet all taken collectively establish it completely, especially owing to the testimonies of the Scriptures, the sayings of the angels, and even Christ's own assertion supported by miracles. As to the angels who appeared, they did not say they were men, as Christ asserted that He was truly a man. Moreover, the manner of eating was different in Christ and the angels: for since the bodies assumed by the angels were neither living nor animated, there was no true eating, although the food was really masticated and passed into the interior of the assumed body: hence the angels said to Tobias (12:18,19): "When I was with you . . . I seemed indeed to eat and drink with you; but I use an invisible meat." But since Christ's body was truly animated, His eating was genuine. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei xiii), "it is not the power but the need of eating that shall be taken away from the bodies of them who rise again." Hence Bede says on Lk. 24:41: "Christ ate because He could, not because He needed."

Reply to Objection 2: As was observed above, some proofs were employed by Christ to prove the truth of His human nature, and others to show forth His glory in rising again. But the condition of human nature, as considered in itself, namely, as to its present state, is opposite to the condition of glory, as is said in 1 Cor. 15:43: "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power." Consequently, the proofs brought forward for showing the condition of glory, seem to be in opposition to nature, not absolutely, but according to the present state, and conversely. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): "The Lord manifested two wonders, which are mutually contrary according to human reason, when after the Resurrection He showed His body as incorruptible and at the same time palpable."

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. cxxi super Joan.), "these words of our Lord, 'Do not touch Me, for I am not yet ascended to My Father,'" show "that in that woman there is a figure of the Church of the Gentiles, which did not believe in Christ until He was ascended to the Father. Or Jesus would have men to believe in Him, i.e. to touch Him spiritually, as being Himself one with the Father. For to that man's innermost perceptions He is, in some sort, ascended unto the Father, who has become so far proficient in Him, as to recognize in Him the equal with the Father . . . whereas she as yet believed in Him but carnally, since she wept for Him as for a man." But when one reads elsewhere of Mary having touched Him, when with the other women, she "'came up and took hold of His feet,' that matters little," as Severianus says [*Chrysologus, Serm. lxxvi], "for, the first act relates to figure, the other to sex; the former is of Divine grace, the latter of human nature." Or as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxvi in Joan.): "This woman wanted to converse with Christ just as before the Passion, and out of joy was thinking of nothing great, although Christ's flesh had become much nobler by rising again." And therefore He said: "I have not yet ascended to My Father"; as if to say: "Do not suppose I am leading an earthly life; for if you see Me upon earth, it is because I have not yet ascended to My Father, but I am going to ascend shortly." Hence He goes on to say: "I ascend to My Father, and to your Father."

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says ad Orosium (Dial. lxv, Qq.): "Our Lord rose in clarified flesh; yet He did not wish to appear before the disciples in that condition of clarity, because their eyes could not gaze upon that brilliancy. For if before He died for us and rose again the disciples could not look upon Him when He was transfigured upon the mountain, how much less were they able to gaze upon Him when our Lord's flesh was glorified." It must also be borne in mind that after His Resurrection our Lord wished especially to show that He was the same as had died; which the manifestation of His brightness would have hindered considerably: because change of features shows more than anything else the difference in the person seen: and this is because sight specially judges of the common sensibles, among which is one and many, or the same and different. But before the Passion, lest His disciples might despise its weakness, Christ meant to show them the glory of His majesty; and this the brightness of the body specially indicates. Consequently, before the Passion He showed the disciples His glory by brightness, but after the Resurrection by other tokens.

Reply to Objection 5: As Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. iii): "We can understand one angel to have been seen by the women, according to both Matthew and Mark, if we take them as having entered the sepulchre, that is, into some sort of walled enclosure, and that there they saw an angel sitting upon the stone which was rolled back from the monument, as

Matthew says; and that this is Mark's expression—'sitting on the right side'; afterwards when they scanned the spot where the Lord's body had lain, they beheld two angels, who were at first seated, as John says, and who afterwards rose so as to be seen standing, as Luke relates."

OF THE CAUSALITY OF CHRIST'S RESURRECTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the causality of Christ's Resurrection, concerning which there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ's Resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?

(2) Whether it is the cause of our justification?

Whether Christ's Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of our bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of our bodies, because, given a sufficient cause, the effect must follow of necessity. If, then, Christ's Resurrection be the sufficient cause of the resurrection of our bodies, then all the dead should have risen again as soon as He rose.

Objection 2: Further, Divine justice is the cause of the resurrection of the dead, so that the body may be rewarded or punished together with the soul, since they shared in merit or sin, as Dionysius says (Eccles. Hier. vii) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv). But God's justice must necessarily be accomplished, even if Christ had not risen. Therefore the dead would rise again even though Christ did not. Consequently Christ's Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of our bodies.

Objection 3: Further, if Christ's Resurrection be the cause of the resurrection of our bodies, it would be either the exemplar, or the efficient, or the meritorious cause. Now it is not the exemplar cause; because it is God who will bring about the resurrection of our bodies, according to Jn. 5:21: "The Father raiseth up the dead": and God has no need to look at any exemplar cause outside Himself. In like manner it is not the efficient cause; because an efficient cause acts only through contact, whether spiritual or corporeal. Now it is evident that Christ's Resurrection has no corporeal contact with the dead who shall rise again, owing to distance of time and place; and similarly it has no spiritual contact, which is through faith and charity, because even unbelievers and sinners shall rise again. Nor again is it the meritorious cause, because when Christ rose He was no longer a wayfarer, and consequently not in a state of merit. Therefore, Christ’s Resurrection does not appear to be in any way the cause of ours.

Objection 4: Further, since death is the privation of life, then to destroy death seems to be nothing else than to bring life back again; and this is resurrection. But “by dying, Christ destroyed our death” [*Preface of Mass in Paschal Time]. Consequently, Christ’s death, not His Resurrection, is the cause of our resurrection.

On the contrary, on 1 Cor. 15:12: “Now if Christ be preached, that He rose again from the dead,” the gloss says: “Who is the efficient cause of our resurrection.”

I answer that, As stated in 2 Metaphysics, text 4: “Whatever is first in any order, is the cause of all that come after it.” But Christ’s Resurrection was the first in the order of our resurrection, as is evident from what was said above ([4309]Q[53], A[3]). Hence Christ’s Resurrection must be the cause of ours: and this is what the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:20,21): “Christ is risen from the dead, the first-fruits of them that sleep; for by a man came death, and by a man the resurrection of the dead.”

And this is reasonable. Because the principle of human life-giving is the Word of God, of whom it is said (Ps. 35:10): “With Thee is the fountain of life”: hence He Himself says (Jn. 5:21): “As the Father raiseth up the dead, and giveth life; so the Son also giveth life to whom He will.” Now the divinely established natural order is that every cause operates first upon what is nearest to it, and through it upon others which are more remote; just as fire first heats the nearest air, and through it it heats bodies that are further off: and God Himself first enlightens those substances which are closer to Him, and through them others that are more remote, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiii). Consequently, the Word of God first bestows immortal life upon that body which is naturally united with Himself, and through it works the resurrection in all other bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: As was stated above, Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of ours through the power of the united Word, who operates according to His will. And consequently, it is not necessary for the effect to follow at once, but according as the Word of God disposes, namely, that first of all we be conformed to the suffering and dying Christ in this suffering and mortal life; and afterwards may come to share in the likeness of His Resurrection.

Reply to Objection 2: God’s justice is the first cause of our resurrection, whereas Christ’s Resurrection is the secondary, and as it were the instrumental cause. But although the power of the principal cause is not restricted to one instrument determinately, nevertheless since it works through this instrument, such instrument causes the effect. So, then, the Divine justice in itself is not tied down to Christ’s Resurrection as a means of bringing about our resurrection: because God could deliver us in some other way than through Christ’s Passion and Resurrection, as already stated ([4310]Q[46], A[2]). But having once decreed to deliver us in this way, it is evident that Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of ours.

Reply to Objection 3: Properly speaking, Christ’s Resurrection is not the meritorious cause, but the efficient and exemplar cause of our resurrection. It is the efficient cause, inasmuch as Christ’s humanity, according to which He rose again, is as it were the instrument of His Godhead, and works by Its power, as stated above ([4311]Q[13], AA[2],3). And therefore, just as all other things which Christ did and endured in His humanity are profitable to our salvation through the power of the Godhead, as already stated ([4312]Q[48], A[6]), so also is Christ’s Resurrection the efficient cause of ours, through the Divine power whose office it is to quicken the dead; and this power by its presence is in touch with all places and times; and such virtual contact suffices for its efficiency. And since, as was stated above (ad 2), the primary cause of human resurrection is the Divine justice, from which Christ has “the power of passing judgment, because He is the Son of Man” (Jn. 5:27); the efficient power of His Resurrection extends to the good and wicked alike, who are subject to His judgment.

But just as the Resurrection of Christ’s body, through its personal union with the Word, is first in point of time, so also is it first in dignity and perfection; as the gloss says on 1 Cor. 15:20,23. But whatever is most perfect is always the exemplar, which the less perfect copies according to its mode; consequently Christ’s Resurrection is the exemplar of ours. And this is necessary, not on the part of Him who rose again, who needs no exemplar, but on the part of them who are raised up, who must be likened to that Resurrection, according to Phil. 3:21: “He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory.” Now although the efficiency of Christ’s Resurrection extends to the resurrection of the good and wicked alike, still its exemplarity extends properly only to the just, who are made conformable with His Sonship, according to Rom. 8:29.

Reply to Objection 4: Considered on the part of their efficiency, which is dependent on the Divine power, both Christ’s death and His Resurrection are the cause both of the destruction of death and of the renewal of life: but considered as exemplar causes, Christ’s death—by which He withdrew from mortal life—is the cause of the destruction of our death; while His Resurrection, whereby He inaugurated immortal life, is the cause of the repairing of our life. But Christ’s Passion is furthermore a meritorious cause, as stated above ([4313]Q[48], A[1]).

Whether Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of souls, because Augustine says (Tract. xxiii super Joan.) that “bodies rise by His human dispensation, but souls rise by the Substance of God.” But Christ’s Resurrection does not belong to God’s Substance, but to the dispensation of His humanity. Therefore, although Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of bodies rising, nevertheless it does not seem to be the cause of the resurrection of souls.

Objection 2: Further, a body does not act upon a spirit. But the Resurrection belongs to His body, which death laid low. Therefore His Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of souls.

Objection 3: Further, since Christ’s Resurrection is the cause why bodies rise again, the bodies of all men shall rise again, according to 1 Cor. 15:51: “We shall all indeed rise again.” But the souls of all will not rise again, because according to Mat. 25:46: “some shall go into everlasting punishment.” Therefore Christ’s Resurrection is not the cause of the resurrection of souls.

Objection 4: Further, the resurrection of souls comes of the forgiveness of sins. But this was effected by Christ’s Passion, according to Apoc. 1:5: “He washed us from our sins in His own blood.” Consequently, Christ’s Passion even more than His Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of souls.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 4:25): “He rose again for our justification,” which is nothing else than the resurrection of souls: and on

Ps. 29:6: “In the evening weeping shall have place,” the gloss says, “Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of ours, both of the soul at present, and of the body in the future.”

I answer that, As stated above, Christ’s Resurrection works in virtue of the Godhead; now this virtue extends not only to the resurrection of bodies, but also to that of souls: for it comes of God that the soul lives by grace, and that the body lives by the soul. Consequently, Christ’s Resurrection has instrumentally an effective power not only with regard to the resurrection of bodies, but also with respect to the resurrection of souls. In like fashion it is an exemplar cause with regard to the resurrection of souls, because even in our souls we must be conformed with the rising Christ: as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:4–11) “Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life”: and as He, “rising again from the dead, dieth now no more, so let us reckon that we (Vulg.: ‘you’)” are dead to sin, that we may “live together with Him.”

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine says that the resurrection of souls is wrought by God’s Substance, as to participation, because souls become good and just by sharing in the Divine goodness, but not by sharing in anything created. Accordingly, after saying that souls rise by the Divine Substance, he adds: the soul is beatified by a participation with God, and not by a participation with a holy soul. But our bodies are made glorious by sharing in the glory of Christ’s body.

Reply to Objection 2: The efficacy of Christ’s Resurrection reaches souls not from any special virtue of His risen body, but from the virtue of the Godhead personally united with it.

Reply to Objection 3: The resurrection of souls pertains to merit, which is the effect of justification; but the resurrection of bodies is ordained for punishment or reward, which are the effects of Him who judges. Now it belongs to Christ, not to justify all men, but to judge them: and therefore He raises up all as to their bodies, but not as to their souls.

Reply to Objection 4: Two things concur in the justification of souls, namely, forgiveness of sin and newness of life through grace. Consequently, as to efficacy, which comes of the Divine power, the Passion as well as the Resurrection of Christ is the cause of justification as to both the above. But as to exemplarity, properly speaking Christ’s Passion and death are the cause of the forgiveness of guilt, by which forgiveness we die unto sin:

whereas Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of newness of life, which comes through grace or justice: consequently, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:25) that “He was delivered up,” i.e. to death, “for our sins,” i.e. to take them away, “and rose again for our justification.” But Christ’s Passion was also a meritorious cause, as stated above (A[1], ad 4;[4314] Q[48], A[1]).

OF THE ASCENSION OF CHRIST (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider Christ’s Ascension: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it belonged for Christ to ascend into heaven?

(2) According to which nature did it become Him to ascend?

(3) Whether He ascended by His own power?

(4) Whether He ascended above all the corporeal heavens?

(5) Whether He ascended above all spiritual creatures?

(6) Of the effect of the Ascension.

Whether it was fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting for Christ to ascend into heaven. For the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii) that “things which are in a state of perfection possess their good without movement.” But Christ was in a state of perfection, since He is the Sovereign Good in respect of His Divine Nature, and sovereignly glorified in respect of His human nature. Consequently, He has His good without movement. But ascension is movement. Therefore it was not fitting for Christ to ascend.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is moved, is moved on account of something better. But it was no better thing for Christ to be in heaven than upon earth, because He gained nothing either in soul or in body by being in heaven. Therefore it seems that Christ should not have ascended into heaven.

Objection 3: Further, the Son of God took human flesh for our salvation. But it would have been more beneficial for men if He had tarried always with us upon earth; thus He said to His disciples (Lk. 17:22): “The days will come when you shall desire to see one day of the Son of man; and you shall not see it.” Therefore it seems unfitting for Christ to have ascended into heaven.

Objection 4: Further, as Gregory says (Moral. xiv), Christ’s body was in no way changed after the Resurrection. But He did not ascend into heaven immediately after rising again, for He said after the Resurrection (Jn. 20:17): “I am not yet ascended to My Father.” Therefore it seems that neither should He have ascended after forty days.

On the contrary, Are the words of our Lord (Jn. 20:17): “I ascend to My Father and to your Father.”

I answer that, The place ought to be in keeping with what is contained therein. Now by His Resurrection Christ entered upon an immortal and incorruptible life. But whereas our dwelling-place is one of generation and corruption, the heavenly place is one of incorruption. And consequently it was not fitting that Christ should remain upon earth after the Resurrection; but it was fitting that He should ascend to heaven.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is best and possesses its good without movement is God Himself, because He is utterly unchangeable, according to Malachi 3:6: “I am the Lord, and I change not.” But every creature is changeable in some respect, as is evident from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. viii). And since the nature assumed by the Son of God remained a creature, as is clear from what was said above ([4315]Q[2], A[7];[4316] Q[16], AA[8],10; [4317] Q[20], A[1]), it is not unbecoming if some movement be attributed to it.

Reply to Objection 2: By ascending into heaven Christ acquired no addition to His essential glory either in body or in soul: nevertheless He did acquire something as to the fittingness of place, which pertains to the well-being of glory: not that His body acquired anything from a heavenly body by way of perfection or preservation; but merely out of a certain fittingness. Now this in a measure belonged to His glory; and He had a certain kind of joy from such fittingness, not indeed that He then began to derive joy from it when He ascended into heaven, but that He rejoiced thereat in a new way, as at a thing completed. Hence, on Ps. 15:11: “At Thy right hand are delights even unto the end,” the gloss says: “I shall delight in sitting nigh to Thee, when I shall be taken away from the sight of men.”

Reply to Objection 3: Although Christ’s bodily presence was withdrawn from the faithful by the Ascension, still the presence of His Godhead is ever with the faithful, as He Himself says (Mat. 28:20): “Behold, I am with you all days, even to the consummation of the world.” For, “by ascending into heaven He did not abandon those whom He adopted,” as Pope Leo says (De Resurrec., Serm. ii). But Christ’s Ascension into heaven, whereby He withdrew His bodily presence from us, was more profitable for us than His bodily presence would have been.

First of all, in order to increase our faith, which is of things unseen. Hence our Lord said (Jn. 26) that the Holy Ghost shall come and “convince the world . . . of justice,” that is, of the justice “of those that believe,” as Augustine says (Tract. xcv super Joan.): “For even to put the faithful beside the unbeliever is to put the unbeliever to shame”; wherefore he goes on to say (10): “‘Because I go to the Father; and you shall see Me no longer’”—“For ‘blessed are they that see not, yet believe.’ Hence it is of our justice that the world is reproved: because ‘you will believe in Me whom you shall not see.’”

Secondly, to uplift our hope: hence He says (Jn. 14:3): “If I shall go, and prepare a place for you, I will come again, and will take you to Myself; that where I am, you also may be.” For by placing in heaven the human nature which He assumed, Christ gave us the hope of going thither; since “wheresoever the body shall be, there shall the eagles also be gathered together,” as is written in Mat. 24:28. Hence it is written likewise (Mic. 2:13): “He shall go up that shall open the way before them.”

Thirdly, in order to direct the fervor of our charity to heavenly things. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 3:1,2): “Seek the things that are above, where Christ is sitting at the right hand of God. Mind the things that are above, not the things that are upon the earth”: for as is said (Mat. 6:21): “Where thy treasure is, there is thy heart also.” And since the Holy Ghost is love drawing us up to heavenly things, therefore our Lord said to His disciples (Jn. 16:7): “It is expedient to you that I go; for if I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you; but if I go, I will send Him to you.” On which words Augustine says (Tract. xciv super Joan.): “Ye cannot receive the Spirit, so long as ye persist in knowing Christ according to the flesh. But when Christ withdrew in body, not only the Holy Ghost, but both Father and Son were present with them spiritually."

Reply to Objection 4: Although a heavenly place befitted Christ when He rose to immortal life, nevertheless He delayed the Ascension in order to confirm the truth of His Resurrection. Hence it is written (Acts 1:3), that "He showed Himself alive after His Passion, by many proofs, for forty days appearing to them": upon which the gloss says that "because He was dead for forty hours, during forty days He established the fact of His being alive again. Or the forty days may be understood as a figure of this world, wherein Christ dwells in His Church: inasmuch as man is made out of the four elements, and is cautioned not to transgress the Decalogue."

Whether Christ's Ascension into heaven belonged to Him according to His Divine Nature?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Ascension into heaven belonged to Him according to His Divine Nature. For, it is written (Ps. 46:6): "God is ascended with jubilee": and (Dt. 33:26): "He that is mounted upon the heaven is thy helper." But these words were spoken of God even before Christ's Incarnation. Therefore it belongs to Christ to ascend into heaven as God.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to the same person to ascend into heaven as to descend from heaven, according to Jn. 3:13: "No man hath ascended into heaven, but He that descended from heaven": and Eph. 4:10: "He that descended is the same also that ascended." But Christ came down from heaven not as man, but as God: because previously His Nature in heaven was not human, but Divine. Therefore it seems that Christ ascended into heaven as God.

Objection 3: Further, by His Ascension Christ ascended to the Father. But it was not as man that He rose to equality with the Father; for in this respect He says: "He is greater than I," as is said in Jn. 14:28. Therefore it seems that Christ ascended as God.

On the contrary, on Eph. 4:10: "That He ascended, what is it, but because He also descended," a gloss says: "It is clear that He descended and ascended according to His humanity."

I answer that, The expression "according to" can denote two things; the condition of the one who ascends, and the cause of his ascension. When taken to express the condition of the one ascending, the Ascension in no wise belongs to Christ according to the condition of His Divine Nature; both because there is nothing higher than the Divine Nature to which He can ascend; and because ascension is local motion, a thing not in keeping with the Divine Nature, which is immovable and outside all place. Yet the Ascension is in keeping with Christ according to His human nature, which is limited by place, and can be the subject of motion. In this sense, then, we can say that Christ ascended into heaven as man, but not as God.

But if the phrase "according to" denote the cause of the Ascension, since Christ ascended into heaven in virtue of His Godhead, and not in virtue of His human nature, then it must be said that Christ ascended into heaven not as man, but as God. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Ascension: "It was our doing that the Son of man hung upon the cross; but it was His own doing that He ascended."

Reply to Objection 1: These utterances were spoken prophetically of God who was one day to become incarnate. Still it can be said that although to ascend does not belong to the Divine Nature properly, yet it can metaphorically; as, for instance, it is said "to ascend in the heart of man" (cf. Ps. 83:6), when his heart submits and humbles itself before God: and in the same way God is said to ascend metaphorically with regard to every creature, since He subjects it to Himself.

Reply to Objection 2: He who ascended is the same as He who descended. For Augustine says (De Symb. iv): "Who is it that descends? The God-Man. Who is it that ascends? The self-same God-Man." Nevertheless a twofold descent is attributed to Christ; one, whereby He is said to have descended from heaven, which is attributed to the God-Man according as He is God: for He is not to be understood as having descended by any local movement, but as having "emptied Himself," since "when He was in the form of God He took the form of a servant." For just as He is said to be emptied, not by losing His fulness, but because He took our littleness upon Himself, so likewise He is said to have descended from heaven, not that He deserted heaven, but because He assumed human nature in unity of person.

And there is another descent whereby He descended "into the lower regions of the earth," as is written Eph. 4:9; and this is local descent: hence this belongs to Christ according to the condition of human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ is said to ascend to the Father, inasmuch as He ascends to sit on the right hand of the Father; and this is befitting Christ in a measure according to His Divine Nature, and in a measure according to His human nature, as will be said later ([4318]Q[58], A[3])

Whether Christ ascended by His own power?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not ascend by His own power, because it is written (Mk. 16:19) that "the Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up to heaven"; and (Acts 1:9) that, "while they looked on, He was raised up, and a cloud received Him out of their sight." But what is taken up, and lifted up, appears to be moved by another. Consequently, it was not by His own power, but by another's that Christ was taken up into heaven.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's was an earthly body, like to ours. But it is contrary to the nature of an earthly body to be borne upwards. Moreover, what is moved contrary to its nature is nowise moved by its own power. Therefore Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own power.

Objection 3: Further, Christ's own power is Divine. But this motion does not seem to have been Divine, because, whereas the Divine power is infinite, such motion would be instantaneous; consequently, He would not have been uplifted to heaven "while" the disciples "looked on," as is stated in Acts 1:9. Therefore, it seems that Christ did not ascend to heaven by His own power.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 63:1): "This beautiful one in his robe, walking in the greatness of his strength." Also Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension (xxix): "It is to be noted that we read of Elias having ascended in a chariot, that it might be shown that one who was mere man needed another's help. But we do not read of our Saviour being lifted up either in a chariot or by angels, because He who had made all things was taken up above all things by His own power."

I answer that, There is a twofold nature in Christ, to wit, the Divine and the human. Hence His own power can be accepted according to both. Likewise a twofold power can be accepted regarding His human nature: one is natural, flowing from the principles of nature; and it is quite evident that Christ did not ascend into heaven by such power as this. The other is the power of glory, which is in Christ’s human nature; and it was according to this that He ascended to heaven.

Now there are some who endeavor to assign the cause of this power to the nature of the fifth essence. This, as they say, is light, which they make out to be of the composition of the human body, and by which they contend that contrary elements are reconciled; so that in the state of this mortality, elemental nature is predominant in human bodies: so that, according to the nature of this predominating element the human body is borne downwards by its own power: but in the condition of glory the heavenly nature will predominate, by whose tendency and power Christ’s body and the bodies of the saints are lifted up to heaven. But we have already treated of this opinion in the [4319]FP, Q[76], A[7], and shall deal with it more fully in treating of the general resurrection ([4320]XP, Q[84], A[1]).

Setting this opinion aside, others assign as the cause of this power the glorified soul itself, from whose overflow the body will be glorified, as Augustine writes to Dioscorus (Ep. cxviii). For the glorified body will be so submissive to the glorified soul, that, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), “wheresoever the spirit listeth, thither the body will be on the instant; nor will the spirit desire anything unbecoming to the soul or the body.” Now it is befitting the glorified and immortal body for it to be in a heavenly place, as stated above [4321](A[1]). Consequently, Christ’s body ascended into heaven by the power of His soul willing it. But as the body is made glorious by participation with the soul, even so, as Augustine says (Tract. xxiii in Joan.), “the soul is beatified by participating in God.” Consequently, the Divine power is the first source of the ascent into heaven. Therefore Christ ascended into heaven by His own power, first of all by His Divine power, and secondly by the power of His glorified soul moving His body at will.

Reply to Objection 1: As Christ is said to have risen by His own power, though He was raised to life by the power of the Father, since the Father’s power is the same as the Son’s; so also Christ ascended into heaven by His own power, and yet was raised up and taken up to heaven by the Father.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument proves that Christ did not ascend into heaven by His own power, i.e. that which is natural to human nature: yet He did ascend by His own power, i.e. His Divine power, as well as by His own power, i.e. the power of His beatified soul. And although to mount upwards is contrary to the nature of a human body in its present condition, in which the body is not entirely dominated by the soul, still it will not be unnatural or forced in a glorified body, whose entire nature is utterly under the control of the spirit.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the Divine power be infinite, and operate infinitely, so far as the worker is concerned, still the effect thereof is received in things according to their capacity, and as God disposes. Now a body is incapable of being moved locally in an instant, because it must be commensurate with space, according to the division of which time is reckoned, as is proved in Physics vi. Consequently, it is not necessary for a body moved by God to be moved instantaneously, but with such speed as God disposes.

Whether Christ ascended above all the heavens?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not ascend above all the heavens, for it is written (Ps. 10:5): “The Lord is in His holy temple, the Lord’s throne is in heaven.” But what is in heaven is not above heaven. Therefore Christ did not ascend above all the heavens.

Objection 2: [*This objection with its solution is omitted in the Leonine edition as not being in the original manuscript.]

Further, there is no place above the heavens, as is proved in De Coelo i. But every body must occupy a place. Therefore Christ’s body did not ascend above all the heavens.

Objection 3: Further, two bodies cannot occupy the same place. Since, then, there is no passing from place to place except through the middle space, it seems that Christ could not have ascended above all the heavens unless heaven were divided; which is impossible.

Objection 4: Further, it is narrated (Acts 1:9) that “a cloud received Him out of their sight.” But clouds cannot be uplifted beyond heaven. Consequently, Christ did not ascend above all the heavens.

Objection 5: Further, we believe that Christ will dwell for ever in the place whither He has ascended. But what is against nature cannot last for ever, because what is according to nature is more prevalent and of more frequent occurrence. Therefore, since it is contrary to nature for an earthly body to be above heaven, it seems that Christ’s body did not ascend above heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:10): “He ascended above all the heavens that He might fill all things.”

I answer that, The more fully anything corporeal shares in the Divine goodness, the higher its place in the corporeal order, which is order of place. Hence we see that the more formal bodies are naturally the higher, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv; De Coelo ii), since it is by its form that every body partakes of the Divine Essence, as is shown in Physics i. But through glory the body derives a greater share in the Divine goodness than any other natural body does through its natural form; while among other glorious bodies it is manifest that Christ’s body shines with greater glory. Hence it was most fitting for it to be set above all bodies. Thus it is that on Eph. 4:8: “Ascending on high,” the gloss says: “in place and dignity.”

Reply to Objection 1: God’s seat is said to be in heaven, not as though heaven contained Him, but rather because it is contained by Him. Hence it is not necessary for any part of heaven to be higher, but for Him to be above all the heavens; according to Ps. 8:2: “For Thy magnificence is elevated above the heavens, O God!”

Reply to Objection 2: [*Omitted in Leonine edition; see OBJ[2]]

A place implies the notion of containing; hence the first container has the formality of first place, and such is the first heaven. Therefore bodies need in themselves to be in a place, in so far as they are contained by a heavenly body. But glorified bodies, Christ’s especially, do not stand in need of being so contained, because they draw nothing from the heavenly bodies, but from God through the soul. So there is nothing to prevent Christ’s body from being beyond the containing radius of the heavenly bodies, and not in a containing place. Nor is there need for a vacuum to exist outside heaven, since there is no place there, nor is there any potentiality susceptive of a body, but the potentiality of reaching thither lies in Christ. So when Aristotle proves (De Coelo ii) that there is no body beyond heaven, this must be understood of bodies which are in a state of pure nature, as is seen from the proofs.

Reply to Objection 3: Although it is not of the nature of a body for it to be in the same place with another body, yet God can bring it about miraculously that a body be with another in the same place, as Christ did when He went forth from the Virgin’s sealed womb, also when He entered among the disciples through closed doors, as Gregory says (Hom. xxvi). Therefore Christ’s body can be in the same place with another body, not through some inherent property in the body, but through the assistance and operation of the Divine power.

Reply to Objection 4: That cloud afforded no support as a vehicle to the ascending Christ: but it appeared as a sign of the Godhead, just as God’s glory appeared to Israel in a cloud over the Tabernacle (Ex. 40:32; Num. 9:15).

Reply to Objection 5: A glorified body has the power to be in heaven or above heaven. not from its natural principles, but from the beatified soul, from which it derives its glory: and just as the upward motion of a glorified body is not violent, so neither is its rest violent: consequently, there is nothing to prevent it from being everlasting.

Whether Christ’s body ascended above every spiritual creature?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s body did not ascend above every spiritual creature. For no fitting comparison can be made between things which have no common ratio. But place is not predicated in the same ratio of bodies and of spiritual creatures, as is evident from what was said in the [4322]FP, Q[8], A[2], ad 1,2; [4323]FP, Q[52], A[1]. Therefore it seems that Christ’s body cannot be said to have ascended above every spiritual creature.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. lv) that a spirit always takes precedence over a body. But the higher place is due to the higher things. Therefore it does not seem that Christ ascended above every spiritual creature.

Objection 3: Further, in every place a body exists, since there is no such thing as a vacuum in nature. Therefore if no body obtains a higher place than a spirit in the order of natural bodies, then there will be no place above every spiritual creature. Consequently, Christ’s body could not ascend above every spiritual creature.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 1:21): “God set Him above all principality, and Power, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come.”

I answer that, The more exalted place is due to the nobler subject, whether it be a place according to bodily contact, as regards bodies, or whether it be by way of spiritual contact, as regards spiritual substances; thus a heavenly place which is the highest of places is becomingly due to spiritual substances, since they are highest in the order of substances. But although Christ's body is beneath spiritual substances, if we weigh the conditions of its corporeal nature, nevertheless it surpasses all spiritual substances in dignity, when we call to mind its dignity of union whereby it is united personally with God. Consequently, owing to this very fittingness, a higher place is due to it above every spiritual creature. Hence Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension (xxix in Evang.) that "He who had made all things, was by His own power raised up above all things."

Reply to Objection 1: Although a place is differently attributed to corporeal and spiritual substances, still in either case this remains in common, that the higher place is assigned to the worthier.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument holds good of Christ's body according to the conditions of its corporeal nature, but not according to its formality of union.

Reply to Objection 3: This comparison may be considered either on the part of the places; and thus there is no place so high as to exceed the dignity of a spiritual substance: in this sense the objection runs. Or it may be considered on the part of the dignity of the things to which a place is attributed: and in this way it is due to the body of Christ to be above spiritual creatures.

Whether Christ's Ascension is the cause of our salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's Ascension is not the cause of our salvation. For, Christ was the cause of our salvation in so far as He merited it. But He merited nothing for us by His Ascension, because His Ascension belongs to the reward of His exaltation: and the same thing is not both merit and reward, just as neither are a road and its terminus the same. Therefore it seems that Christ's Ascension is not the cause of our salvation.

Objection 2: Further, if Christ's Ascension be the cause of our salvation, it seems that this is principally due to the fact that His Ascension is the cause of ours. But this was bestowed upon us by His Passion, for it is written (Heb. 10:19): “We have [Vulg.: ‘Having’] confidence in the entering into the holies by” His “blood.” Therefore it seems that Christ’s Ascension was not the cause of our salvation.

Objection 3: Further, the salvation which Christ bestows is an everlasting one, according to Is. 51:6: “My salvation shall be for ever.” But Christ did not ascend into heaven to remain there eternally; for it is written (Acts 1:11): “He shall so come as you have seen Him going, into heaven.” Besides, we read of Him showing Himself to many holy people on earth after He went up to heaven. to Paul, for instance (Acts 9). Consequently, it seems that Christ’s Ascension is not the cause of our salvation.

On the contrary, He Himself said (Jn. 16:7): “It is expedient to you that I go”; i.e. that I should leave you and ascend into heaven.

I answer that, Christ’s Ascension is the cause of our salvation in two ways: first of all, on our part; secondly, on His.

On our part, in so far as by the Ascension our souls are uplifted to Him; because, as stated above (A[1], ad 3), His Ascension fosters, first, faith; secondly, hope; thirdly, charity. Fourthly, our reverence for Him is thereby increased, since we no longer deem Him an earthly man, but the God of heaven; thus the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:16): “If we have known Christ according to the flesh—‘that is, as mortal, whereby we reputed Him as a mere man,’” as the gloss interprets the words—“but now we know Him so no longer.”

On His part, in regard to those things which, in ascending, He did for our salvation. First, He prepared the way for our ascent into heaven, according to His own saying (Jn. 14:2): “I go to prepare a place for you,” and the words of Micheas (2:13), “He shall go up that shall open the way before them.” For since He is our Head the members must follow whither the Head has gone: hence He said (Jn. 14:3): “That where I am, you also may be.” In sign whereof He took to heaven the souls of the saints delivered from hell, according to Ps. 67:19 (Cf. Eph. 4:8): “Ascending on high, He led captivity captive,” because He took with Him to heaven those who had been held captives by the devil—to heaven, as to a place strange to human nature. captives in deed of a happy taking, since they were acquired by His victory.

Secondly, because as the high-priest under the Old Testament entered the holy place to stand before God for the people, so also Christ entered heaven “to make intercession for us,” as is said in Heb. 7:25. Because the very showing of Himself in the human nature which He took with Him to heaven is a pleading for us. so that for the very reason that God so exalted human nature in Christ, He may take pity on them for whom the Son of God took human nature. Thirdly, that being established in His heavenly seat as God and Lord, He might send down gifts upon men, according to Eph. 4:10: “He ascended above all the heavens, that He might fill all things,” that is, “with His gifts,” according to the gloss.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s Ascension is the cause of our salvation by way not of merit, but of efficiency, as was stated above regarding His Resurrection ([4324]Q[56], A[1], ad 3,4).

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s Passion is the cause of our ascending to heaven, properly speaking, by removing the hindrance which is sin, and also by way of merit: whereas Christ’s Ascension is the direct cause of our ascension, as by beginning it in Him who is our Head, with whom the members must be united.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ by once ascending into heaven acquired for Himself and for us in perpetuity the right and worthiness of a heavenly dwelling-place; which worthiness suffers in no way, if, from some special dispensation, He sometimes comes down in body to earth; either in order to show Himself to the whole world, as at the judgment; or else to show Himself particularly to some individual, e.g. in Paul’s case, as we read in Acts 9. And lest any man may think that Christ was not bodily present when this occurred, the contrary is shown from what the Apostle says in 1 Cor. 14:8, to confirm faith in the Resurrection: “Last of all He was seen also by me, as by one born out of due time”: which vision would not confirm the truth of the Resurrection except he had beheld Christ’s very body.

OF CHRIST’S SITTING AT THE RIGHT HAND OF THE FATHER (FOUR ARTICLES)

WE have now to consider Christ’s sitting at the right hand of the Father, concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ is seated at the right hand of the Father?

(2) Whether this belongs to Him according to the Divine Nature?

(3) Whether it belongs to Him according to His human nature?

(4) Whether it is something proper to Christ?

Whether it is fitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting that Christ should sit at the right hand of God the Father. For right and left are differences of bodily position. But nothing corporeal can be applied to God, since "God is a spirit," as we read in Jn. 4:24. Therefore it seems that Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father.

Objection 2: Further, if anyone sits at another's right hand, then the latter is seated on his left. Consequently, if Christ sits at the right hand of the Father, it follows that the Father is seated on the left of the Son; which is unseemly.

Objection 3: Further, sitting and standing savor of opposition. But Stephen (Acts 7:55) said: "Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing on the right hand of God." Therefore it seems that Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father.

On the contrary, It is written in the last chapter of Mark (16:19): "The Lord Jesus, after He had spoken to them, was taken up to heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God."

I answer that, The word "sitting" may have a twofold meaning; namely, "abiding" as in Lk. 24:49: "Sit [Douay: 'Stay'] you in the city": and royal or judiciary "power," as in Prov. 20:8: "The king, that sitteth on the throne of judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look." Now in either sense it belongs to Christ to sit at the Father's right hand. First of all inasmuch as He abides eternally unchangeable in the Father's bliss, which is termed His right hand, according to Ps. 15:11: "At Thy right hand are delights even to the end." Hence Augustine says (De Symb. i): "'Sitteth at the right hand of the Father': To sit means to dwell, just as we say of any man: 'He sat in that country for three years': Believe, then, that Christ dwells so at the right hand of the Father: for He is happy, and the Father's right hand is the name for His bliss." Secondly, Christ is said to sit at the right hand of the Father inasmuch as He reigns together with the Father, and has judiciary power from Him; just as he who sits at the king's right hand helps him in ruling and judging. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. ii): "By the expression 'right hand,’ understand the power which this Man, chosen of God, received, that He might come to judge, who before had come to be judged.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “We do not speak of the Father’s right hand as of a place, for how can a place be designated by His right hand, who Himself is beyond all place? Right and left belong to things definable by limit. But we style, as the Father’s right hand, the glory and honor of the Godhead.”

Reply to Objection 2: The argument holds good if sitting at the right hand be taken corporeally. Hence Augustine says (De Symb. i): “If we accept it in a carnal sense that Christ sits at the Father’s right hand, then the Father will be on the left. But there”—that is, in eternal bliss, “it is all right hand, since no misery is there.”

Reply to Objection 3: As Gregory says in a Homily on the Ascension (Hom. xxix in Evang.), “it is the judge’s place to sit, while to stand is the place of the combatant or helper. Consequently, Stephen in his toil of combat saw Him standing whom He had as his helper. But Mark describes Him as seated after the Ascension, because after the glory of His Ascension He will at the end be seen as judge.”

Whether it belongs to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as God to sit at the right hand of the Father. For, as God, Christ is the Father’s right hand. But it does not appear to be the same thing to be the right hand of anyone and to sit on his right hand. Therefore, as God, Christ does not sit at the right hand of the Father.

Objection 2: Further, in the last chapter of Mark (16:19) it is said that “the Lord Jesus was taken up into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God.” But it was not as God that Christ was taken up to heaven. Therefore neither does He, as God, sit at the right hand of God.

Objection 3: Further, Christ as God is the equal of the Father and of the Holy Ghost. Consequently, if Christ sits as God at the right hand of the Father, with equal reason the Holy Ghost sits at the right hand of the Father and of the Son, and the Father Himself on the right hand of the Son; which no one is found to say.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): that “what we style as the Father’s right hand, is the glory and honor of the Godhead, wherein the Son of God existed before ages as God and as consubstantial with the Father.”

I answer that, As may be gathered from what has been said [4325](A[1]) three things can be understood under the expression “right hand.” First of all, as Damascene takes it, “the glory of the Godhead”: secondly, according to Augustine “the beatitude of the Father”: thirdly, according to the same authority, “judiciary power.” Now as we observed [4326](A[1]) “sitting denotes” either abiding, or royal or judiciary dignity. Hence, to sit on the right hand of the Father is nothing else than to share in the glory of the Godhead with the Father, and to possess beatitude and judiciary power, and that unchangeably and royally. But this belongs to the Son as God. Hence it is manifest that Christ as God sits at the right hand of the Father; yet so that this preposition “at,” which is a transitive one, implies merely personal distinction and order of origin, but not degree of nature or dignity, for there is no such thing in the Divine Persons, as was shown in the [4327]FP, Q[42], AA[3],4.

Reply to Objection 1: The Son of God is called the Father’s “right hand” by appropriation, just as He is called the “Power” of the Father (1 Cor. 1:24). But “right hand of the Father,” in its three meanings given above, is something common to the three Persons.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ as man is exalted to Divine honor; and this is signified in the aforesaid sitting; nevertheless such honor belongs to Him as God, not through any assumption, but through His origin from eternity.

Reply to Objection 3: In no way can it be said that the Father is seated at the right hand of the Son or of the Holy Ghost; because the Son and the Holy Ghost derive their origin from the Father, and not conversely. The Holy Ghost, however, can be said properly to sit at the right hand of the Father or of the Son, in the aforesaid sense, although by a kind of appropriation it is attributed to the Son, to whom equality is appropriated; thus Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that “in the Father there is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Ghost the connection of unity with equality.”

Whether it belongs to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to Christ as man to sit at the right hand of the Father, because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “What we call the Father’s right hand is the glory and honor of the Godhead.” But the glory and honor of the Godhead do not belong to Christ as man. Consequently, it seems that Christ as man does not sit at the right hand of the Father.

Objection 2: Further, to sit on the ruler’s right hand seems to exclude subjection, because one so sitting seems in a measure to be reigning with him. But Christ as man is “subject unto” the Father, as is said in 1 Cor. 15:28. Therefore it seems that Christ as man does not sit at the Father’s right hand.

Objection 3: Further, on Rom. 8:34: “Who is at the right hand of God,” the gloss adds: “that is, equal to the Father in that honor, whereby God is the Father: or, on the right hand of the Father, that is, in the mightier gifts of God.” And on Heb. 1:3: “sitteth on the right hand of the majesty on high,” the gloss adds, “that is, in equality with the Father over all things, both in place and dignity.” But equality with God does not belong to Christ as man; for in this respect Christ Himself says (Jn. 14:28): “The Father is greater than I.” Consequently, it appears unseemly for Christ as man to sit on the Father’s right hand.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symb. ii): “By the expression ‘right hand’ understand the power which this Man, chosen of God, received, that He might come as judge, who before had come to be judged.”

I answer that, As stated above [4328](A[2]), by the expression “right hand” is understood either the glory of His Godhead, or His eternal beatitude, or His judicial and royal power. Now this preposition “at” signifies a kind of approach to the right hand; thus denoting something in common, and yet with a distinction, as already observed (De Symb. ii). And this can be in three ways: first of all, by something common in nature, and a distinction in person; and thus Christ as the Son of God, sits at the right hand of the Father, because He has the same Nature as the Father: hence these things belong to the Son essentially, just as to the Father; and this is to be in equality with the Father. Secondly, according to the grace of union, which, on the contrary, implies distinction of nature, and unity of person. According to this, Christ as man is the Son of God, and consequently sits at the Father’s right hand; yet so that the expression “as” does not denote condition of nature, but unity of suppositum, as explained above (Q[16], AA[10],11). Thirdly, the said approach can be understood according to habitual grace, which is more fully in Christ than in all other creatures, so much so that human nature in Christ is more blessed than all other creatures, and possesses over all other creatures royal and judiciary power.

So, then, if “as” denote condition of nature, then Christ, as God, sits “at the Father’s right hand,” that is, “in equality with the Father”; but as man, He sits “at the right hand of the Father,” that is, “in the Father’s mightier gifts beyond all other creatures,” that is to say, “in greater beatitude,” and “exercising judiciary power.” But if “as” denote unity of person, thus again as man, He sits at the Father’s right hand “as to equality of honor,” inasmuch as with the same honor we venerate the Son of God with His assumed nature, as was said above ([4329]Q[25], A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s humanity according to the conditions of His nature has not the glory or honor of the Godhead, which it has nevertheless by reason of the Person with whom it is united. Hence Damascene adds in the passage quoted: “In which,” that is, in the glory of the Godhead, “the Son of God existing before ages, as God and consubstantial with the Father, sits in His conglorified flesh; for, under one adoration the one hypostasis, together with His flesh, is adored by every creature.”

Reply to Objection 2: Christ as man is subject to the Father, if “as” denote the condition of nature: in which respect it does not belong to Him as man to sit at the Father’s right hand, by reason of their mutual equality. But it does thus belong to Him to sit at the right hand of the Father, according as is thereby denoted the excellence of beatitude and His judiciary power over every creature.

Reply to Objection 3: It does not belong to Christ’s human nature to be in equality with the Father, but only to the Person who assumed it; but it does belong even to the assumed human nature to share in God’s mightier gifts, in so far as it implies exaltation above other creatures.

Whether it is proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father, because the Apostle says (Eph. 2:4, 6): “God . . . hath raised us up together, and hath made us sit together in the heavenly places through Christ Jesus.” But to be raised up is not proper to Christ. Therefore for like reason neither is it proper to Him to sit “on the right hand” of God “on high” (Heb. 1:3).

Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Symb. i): “For Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father, is to dwell in His beatitude.” But many more share in this. Therefore it does not appear to be proper to Christ to sit at the right hand of the Father.

Objection 3: Further, Christ Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): “To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me in My throne: as I also have overcome, and am set down with My Father in His throne.” But it is by sitting on His Father’s throne that Christ is seated at His right hand. Therefore others who overcome likewise, sit at the Father’s right hand.

Objection 4: Further, the Lord says (Mat. 20:23): “To sit on My right or left hand, is not Mine to give to you, but to them for whom it is prepared by My Father.” But no purpose would be served by saying this, unless it was prepared for some. Consequently, to sit at the right hand is not proper to Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 1:13): “To which of the angels said He at any time: Sit thou on My right hand, i.e. ‘in My mightier gifts,’” or “‘as my equal in the Godhead’”? [*The comment is from the gloss of Peter Lombard] as if to answer: “To none.” But angels are higher than other creatures. Therefore, much less does it belong to anyone save Christ to sit at the Father’s right hand.

I answer that, As stated above [4330](A[3]), Christ is said to sit at the Father’s right hand inasmuch as He is on equality with the Father in respect of His Divine Nature, while in respect of His humanity, He excels all creatures in the possession of Divine gifts. But each of these belongs exclusively to Christ. Consequently, it belongs to no one else, angel or man, but to Christ alone, to sit at the right hand of the Father.

Reply to Objection 1: Since Christ is our Head, then what was bestowed on Christ is bestowed on us through Him. And on this account, since He is already raised up, the Apostle says that God has, so to speak, “raised us up together with Him,” still we ourselves are not raised up yet, but are to be raised up, according to Rom. 8:11: “He who raised up Jesus from the dead, shall quicken also your mortal bodies”: and after the same manner of speech the Apostle adds that “He has made us to sit together with Him, in the heavenly places”; namely, for the very reason that Christ our Head sits there.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the right hand is the Divine beatitude, then “to sit on the right hand” does not mean simply to be in beatitude, but to possess beatitude with a kind of dominative power, as a property and part of one’s nature. This belongs to Christ alone, and to no other creature. Yet it can be said that every saint in bliss is placed on God’s right hand; hence it is written (Mat. 25:33): “He shall set the sheep on His right hand.”

Reply to Objection 3: By the “throne” is meant the judiciary power which Christ has from the Father: and in this sense He is said “to sit in the Father’s throne.” But other saints have it from Christ; and in this respect they are said “to sit on Christ’s throne”; according to Mat. 19:28: “You also shall sit upon twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Chrysostom says (Hom. lxv in Matth.), “that place,” to wit, sitting at the right hand, “is closed not only to all men, but likewise to angels: for, Paul declares it to be the prerogative of Christ, saying: ‘To which of the angels said He at any time: Sit on My right hand?’” Our Lord therefore “replied not as though some were going to sit there one day, but condescending to the supplication of the questioners; since more than others they sought this one thing alone, to stand nigh to Him.” Still it can be said that the sons of Zebedee sought for higher excellence in sharing His judiciary power; hence they did not ask to sit on the Father’s right hand or left, but on Christ’s.

OF CHRIST’S JUDICIARY POWER (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider Christ’s judiciary power. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether judiciary power is to be attributed to Christ?

(2) Whether it belongs to Him as man?

(3) Whether He acquired it by merits?

(4) Whether His judiciary power is universal with regard to all men?

(5) Whether besides the judgment that takes place now in time, we are to expect Him in the future general judgment?

(6) Whether His judiciary power extends likewise to the angels?

It will be more suitable to consider the execution of the Last Judgment when we treat of things pertaining to the end of the world [*See XP, QQ[88], seqq.]. For the present it will be enough to touch on those points that concern Christ's dignity.

Whether judiciary power is to be specially attributed to Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power is not to be specially attributed to Christ. For judgment of others seems to belong to their lord; hence it is written (Rom. 14:4): "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant?" But, it belongs to the entire Trinity to be Lord over creatures. Therefore judiciary power ought not to be attributed specially to Christ.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): "The Ancient of days sat"; and further on (Dan. 7:10), "the judgment sat, and the books were opened." But the Ancient of days is understood to be the Father, because as Hilary says (De Trin. ii): "Eternity is in the Father." Consequently, judiciary power ought rather to be attributed to the Father than to Christ.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to belong to the same person to judge as it does to convince. But it belongs to the Holy Ghost to convince: for our Lord says (Jn. 16:8): "And when He is come," i.e. the Holy Ghost, "He will convince the world of sin, and of justice, and of judgment." Therefore judiciary power ought to be attributed to the Holy Ghost rather than to Christ.

On the contrary, It is said of Christ (Acts 10:42): "It is He who was appointed by God, to be judge of the living end of the dead."

I answer that, Three things are required for passing judgment: first, the power of coercing subjects; hence it is written (Ecclus. 7:6): "Seek not to be made a judge unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities." The second thing required is upright zeal, so as to pass judgment not out of hatred or malice, but from love of justice, according to Prov. 3:12: "For whom the Lord loveth, He chasteneth: and as a father in the son He pleaseth Himself." Thirdly, wisdom is needed, upon which judgment is based, according to Ecclus. 10:1: “A wise judge shall judge his people.” The first two are conditions for judging; but on the third the very rule of judgment is based, because the standard of judgment is the law of wisdom or truth, according to which the judgment is passed.

Now because the Son is Wisdom begotten, and Truth proceeding from the Father, and His perfect Image, consequently, judiciary power is properly attributed to the Son of God. Accordingly Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): “This is that unchangeable Truth, which is rightly styled the law of all arts, and the art of the Almighty Craftsman. But even as we and all rational souls judge aright of the things beneath us, so does He who alone is Truth itself pass judgment on us, when we cling to Him. But the Father judges Him not, for He is the Truth no less than Himself. Consequently, whatever the Father judges, He judges through It.” Further on he concludes by saying: “Therefore the Father judges no man, but has given all judgment to the Son.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that judiciary power is common to the entire Trinity, which is quite true: still by special appropriation such power is attributed to the Son, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. vi), eternity is attributed to the Father, because He is the Principle, which is implied in the idea of eternity. And in the same place Augustine says that the Son is the art of the Father. So, then, judiciary authority is attributed to the Father, inasmuch as He is the Principle of the Son, but the very rule of judgment is attributed to the Son who is the art and wisdom of the Father, so that as the Father does all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His art, so He judges all things through the Son, inasmuch as the Son is His wisdom and truth. And this is implied by Daniel, when he says in the first passage that “the Ancient of days sat,” and when he subsequently adds that the Son of Man “came even to the Ancient of days, who gave Him power, and glory, and a kingdom”: and thereby we are given to understand that the authority for judging lies with the Father, from whom the Son received the power to judge.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Tract. xcv in Joan.): “Christ said that the Holy Ghost shall convince the world of sin, as if to say ‘He shall pour out charity upon your hearts.’ For thus, when fear is driven away, you shall have freedom for convincing.” Consequently, then, judgment is attributed to the Holy Ghost, not as regards the rule of judgment, but as regards man’s desire to judge others aright.

Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ as man?

Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that judgment is attributed to the Son inasmuch as He is the law of the first truth. But this is Christ’s attribute as God. Consequently, judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man but as God.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to judiciary power to reward the good, just as to punish the wicked. But eternal beatitude, which is the reward of good works, is bestowed by God alone: thus Augustine says (Tract. xxiii super Joan.) that “the soul is made blessed by participation of God, and not by participation of a holy soul.” Therefore it seems that judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man, but as God.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to Christ’s judiciary power to judge secrets of hearts, according to 1 Cor. 4:5: “Judge not before the time; until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts.” But this belongs exclusively to the Divine power, according to Jer. 17:9,10: “The heart of man is perverse and unsearchable, who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart, and prove the reins: who give to every one according to his way.” Therefore judiciary power does not belong to Christ as man but as God.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:27): “He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man.”

I answer that, Chrysostom (Hom. xxxix in Joan.) seems to think that judiciary power belongs to Christ not as man, but only as God. Accordingly he thus explains the passage just quoted from John: “‘He gave Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man: wonder not at this.’ For He received judiciary power, not because He is man; but because He is the Son of the ineffable God, therefore is He judge. But since the expressions used were greater than those appertaining to man, He said in explanation: ‘Wonder not at this, because He is the Son of man, for He is likewise the Son of God.’” And he proves this by the effect of the Resurrection:

wherefore He adds: “Because the hour cometh when the dead in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God.”

But it must be observed that although the primary authority of judging rests with God, nevertheless the power to judge is committed to men with regard to those subject to their jurisdiction. Hence it is written (Dt. 1:16): “Judge that which is just”; and further on (Dt. 1:17): “Because it is the judgment of God,” that is to say, it is by His authority that you judge. Now it was said before ([4331]Q[8], AA[1],4) that Christ even in His human nature is Head of the entire Church, and that God has “put all things under His feet.” Consequently, it belongs to Him, even according to His human nature, to exercise judiciary power. on this account. it seems that the authority of Scripture quoted above must be interpreted thus: “He gave Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of Man”; not on account of the condition of His nature, for thus all men would have this kind of power, as Chrysostom objects (Hom. xxxix in Joan.); but because this belongs to the grace of the Head, which Christ received in His human nature.

Now judiciary power belongs to Christ in this way according to His human nature on three accounts. First, because of His likeness and kinship with men; for, as God works through intermediary causes, as being closer to the effects, so He judges men through the Man Christ, that His judgment may be sweeter to men. Hence (Heb. 4:15) the Apostle says: “For we have not a high-priest, who cannot have compassion on our infirmities; but one tempted in all things like as we are, without sin. Let us go therefore with confidence to the throne of His grace.” Secondly, because at the last judgment, as Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.), “there will be a resurrection of dead bodies, which God will raise up through the Son of Man”; just as by “the same Christ He raises souls,” inasmuch as “He is the Son of God.” Thirdly, because, as Augustine observes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii): “It was but right that those who were to be judged should see their judge. But those to be judged were the good and the bad. It follows that the form of a servant should be shown in the judgment to both good and wicked, while the form of God should be kept for the good alone.”

Reply to Objection 1: Judgment belongs to truth as its standard, while it belongs to the man imbued with truth, according as he is as it were one with truth, as a kind of law and “living justice” [*Aristotle, Ethic. v]. Hence Augustine quotes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. cxxvii) the saying of 1 Cor. 2:15:

“The spiritual man judgeth all things.” But beyond all creatures Christ’s soul was more closely united with truth, and more full of truth; according to Jn. 1:14: “We saw Him . . . full of grace and truth.” And according to this it belongs principally to the soul of Christ to judge all things.

Reply to Objection 2: It belongs to God alone to bestow beatitude upon souls by a participation with Himself; but it is Christ’s prerogative to bring them to such beatitude, inasmuch as He is their Head and the author of their salvation, according to Heb. 2:10: “Who had brought many children into glory, to perfect the author of their salvation by His Passion.”

Reply to Objection 3: To know and judge the secrets of hearts, of itself belongs to God alone; but from the overflow of the Godhead into Christ’s soul it belongs to Him also to know and to judge the secrets of hearts, as we stated above ([4332]Q[10], A[2]), when dealing with the knowledge of Christ. Hence it is written (Rom. 2:16): “In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ.”

Whether Christ acquired His judiciary power by His merits?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not acquire His judiciary power by His merits. For judiciary power flows from the royal dignity: according to Prov. 20:8: “The king that sitteth on the throne of judgment, scattereth away all evil with his look.” But it was without merits that Christ acquired royal power, for it is His due as God’s Only-begotten Son: thus it is written (Lk. 1:32): “The Lord God shall give unto Him the throne of David His father, and He shall reign in the house of Jacob for ever.” Therefore Christ did not obtain judiciary power by His merits.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4333](A[2]), judiciary power is Christ’s due inasmuch as He is our Head. But the grace of headship does not belong to Christ by reason of merit, but follows the personal union of the Divine and human natures: according to Jn. 1:14, 16: “We saw His glory . . . as of the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth . . . and of His fulness we all have received”: and this pertains to the notion of headship. Consequently, it seems that Christ did not have judiciary power from merits.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:15): “The spiritual man judgeth all things.” But a man becomes spiritual through grace, which is not from merits; otherwise it is “no more grace,” as is said in Rom. 11:6. Therefore it seems that judiciary power belongs neither to Christ nor to others from any merits, but from grace alone.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:17): “Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked, cause and judgment thou shalt recover.” And Augustine says (Serm. cxxvii): “The Judge shall sit, who stood before a judge; He shall condemn the truly wicked, who Himself was falsely reputed wicked.”

I answer that, There is nothing to hinder one and the same thing from being due to some one from various causes: as the glory of the body in rising was due to Christ not only as befitting His Godhead and His soul’s glory, but likewise “from the merit of the lowliness of His Passion” [*Cf. Augustine, Tract. civ in Joan.]. And in the same way it must be said that judiciary power belongs to the Man Christ on account of both His Divine personality, and the dignity of His headship, and the fulness of His habitual grace: and yet He obtained it from merit, so that, in accordance with the Divine justice, He should be judge who fought for God’s justice, and conquered, and was unjustly condemned. Hence He Himself says (Apoc. 3:21): “I have overcome and am set down in My Father’s throne [Vulg.: ‘with My Father in His throne’].” Now judiciary power is understood by “throne,” according to Ps. 9:5: “Thou hast sat on the throne, who judgest justice.”

Reply to Objection 1: This argument holds good of judiciary power according as it is due to Christ by reason of the union with the Word of God.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument is based on the ground of His grace as Head.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds good in regard to habitual grace, which perfects Christ’s soul. But although judiciary power be Christ’s due in these ways, it is not hindered from being His due from merit.

Whether judiciary power belongs to Christ with respect to all human affairs?

Objection 1: It would seem that judiciary power concerning all human affairs does not belong to Christ. For as we read in Lk. 12:13,14, when one of the crowd said to Christ: “Speak to my brother that he divide the inheritance with me; He said to him: Man, who hath appointed Me judge, or divider over you?” Consequently, He does not exercise judgment over all human affairs.

Objection 2: Further, no one exercises judgment except over his own subjects. But, according to Heb. 2:8, “we see not as yet all things subject to” Christ. Therefore it seems that Christ has not judgment over all human affairs.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that it is part of Divine judgment for the good to be afflicted sometimes in this world, and sometimes to prosper, and in like manner the wicked. But the same was the case also before the Incarnation. Consequently, not all God’s judgments regarding human affairs are included in Christ’s judiciary power.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:22): “The Father hath given all judgment to the Son.”

I answer that, If we speak of Christ according to His Divine Nature, it is evident that every judgment of the Father belongs to the Son; for, as the Father does all things through His Word, so He judges all things through His Word.

But if we speak of Christ in His human nature, thus again is it evident that all things are subject to His judgment. This is made clear if we consider first of all the relationship subsisting between Christ’s soul and the Word of God; for, if “the spiritual man judgeth all things,” as is said in 1 Cor. 2:15, inasmuch as his soul clings to the Word of God, how much more Christ’s soul, which is filled with the truth of the Word of God, passes judgment upon all things.

Secondly, the same appears from the merit of His death; because, according to Rom. 14:9: “To this end Christ died and rose again; that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living.” And therefore He has judgment over all men; and on this account the Apostle adds (Rom. 14:10): “We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ”: and (Dan. 7:14) it is written that “He gave Him power, and glory, and a kingdom; and all peoples, tribes, and tongues shall serve Him.”

Thirdly, the same thing is evident from comparison of human affairs with the end of human salvation. For, to whomsoever the substance is entrusted, the accessory is likewise committed. Now all human affairs are ordered for the end of beatitude, which is everlasting salvation, to which men are admitted, or from which they are excluded by Christ’s judgment, as is evident from Mat. 25:31,40. Consequently, it is manifest that all human affairs are included in Christ's judiciary power.

Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (A[3], OBJ[1]), judiciary power goes with royal dignity. Now Christ, although established king by God, did not wish while living on earth to govern temporarily an earthly kingdom; consequently He said (Jn. 18:36): "My kingdom is not of this world." In like fashion He did not wish to exercise judiciary power over temporal concerns, since He came to raise men to Divine things. Hence Ambrose observes on this passage in Luke: "It is well that He who came down with a Divine purpose should hold Himself aloof from temporal concerns; nor does He deign to be a judge of quarrels and an arbiter of property, since He is judge of the quick and the dead, and the arbitrator of merits."

Reply to Objection 2: All things are subject to Christ in respect of that power, which He received from the Father, over all things, according to Mat. 28:18: "All power is given to Me in heaven and in earth." But as to the exercise of this power, all things are not yet subject to Him: this will come to pass in the future, when He shall fulfil His will regarding all things, by saving some and punishing others.

Reply to Objection 3: Judgments of this kind were exercised by Christ before His Incarnation, inasmuch as He is the Word of God: and the soul united with Him personally became a partaker of this power by the Incarnation.

Whether after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there remains yet another General Judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that after the Judgment that takes place in the present time, there does not remain another General Judgment. For a judgment serves no purpose after the final allotment of rewards and punishments. But rewards and punishments are allotted in this present time: for our Lord said to the thief on the cross (Lk. 23:43): "This day thou shalt be with Me in paradise": and (Lk. 16:22) it is said that "the rich man died and was buried in hell." Therefore it is useless to look forward to a final Judgment.

Objection 2: Further, according to another (the Septuagint) version of Nahum 1:9, "God shall not judge the same thing a second time." But in the present time God judges both temporal and spiritual matters. Therefore, it does not seem that another final judgment is to be expected.

Objection 3: Further, reward and punishment correspond with merit and demerit. But merit and demerit bear relation to the body only in so far as it is the instrument of the soul. Therefore reward or punishment is not due to the body save as the soul's instrument. Therefore no other Judgment is called for at the end (of the world) to requite man with reward or punishment in the body, besides that Judgment in which souls are now punished or rewarded.

On the contrary, It is said in Jn. 12:48: "The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge you [Vulg.: 'him'] in the last day." Therefore there will be a Judgment at the last day besides that which takes place in the present time.

I answer that, Judgment cannot be passed perfectly upon any changeable subject before its consummation: just as judgment cannot be given perfectly regarding the quality of any action before its completion in itself and in its results: because many actions appear to be profitable, which in their effects prove to be hurtful. And in the same way perfect judgment cannot be passed upon any man before the close of his life, since he can be changed in many respects from good to evil, or conversely, or from good to better, or from evil to worse. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:27): "It is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the Judgment."

But it must be observed that although man's temporal life in itself ends with death, still it continues dependent in a measure on what comes after it in the future. In one way, as it still lives on in men's memories, in which sometimes, contrary to the truth, good or evil reputations linger on. In another way in a man's children, who are so to speak something of their parent, according to Ecclus. 30:4: "His father is dead, and he is as if he were not dead, for he hath left one behind him that is like himself." And yet many good men have wicked sons, and conversely. Thirdly, as to the result of his actions: just as from the deceit of Arius and other false leaders unbelief continues to flourish down to the close of the world; and even until then faith will continue to derive its progress from the preaching of the apostles. In a fourth way, as to the body, which is sometimes buried with honor and sometimes left unburied, and finally falls to dust utterly. In a fifth way, as to the things upon which a man's heart is set, such as temporal concerns, for example, some of which quickly lapse, while others endure longer.

Now all these things are submitted to the verdict of the Divine Judgment; and consequently, a perfect and public Judgment cannot be made of all these things during the course of this present time. Wherefore, there must be a final Judgment at the last day, in which everything concerning every man in every respect shall be perfectly and publicly judged.

Reply to Objection 1: Some men have held the opinion that the souls of the saints shall not be rewarded in heaven, nor the souls of the lost punished in hell, until the Judgment-day. That this is false appears from the testimony of the Apostle (2 Cor. 5:8), where he says: “We are confident and have a good will to be absent rather from the body, and to be present with the Lord”: that is, not to “walk by faith” but “by sight,” as appears from the context. But this is to see God in His Essence, wherein consists “eternal life,” as is clear from Jn. 17:3. Hence it is manifest that the souls separated from bodies are in eternal life.

Consequently, it must be maintained that after death man enters into an unchangeable state as to all that concerns the soul: and therefore there is no need for postponing judgment as to the reward of the soul. But since there are some other things pertaining to a man which go on through the whole course of time, and which are not foreign to the Divine judgment, all these things must be brought to judgment at the end of time. For although in regard to such things a man neither merits nor demerits, still in a measure they accompany his reward or punishment. Consequently all these things must be weighed in the final judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: “God shall not judge twice the same thing,” i.e. in the same respect; but it is not unseemly for God to judge twice according to different respects.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the reward or punishment of the body depends upon the reward or punishment of the soul, nevertheless, since the soul is changeable only accidentally, on account of the body, once it is separated from the body it enters into an unchangeable condition, and receives its judgment. But the body remains subject to change down to the close of time: and therefore it must receive its reward or punishment then, in the last Judgment.

Whether Christ’s judiciary power extends to the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ’s judiciary power does not extend to the angels, because the good and wicked angels alike were judged in the beginning of the world, when some fell through sin while others were confirmed in bliss. But those already judged have no need of being judged again. Therefore Christ’s judiciary power does not extend to the angels.

Objection 2: Further, the same person cannot be both judge and judged. But the angels will come to judge with Christ, according to Mat. 25:31: “When the Son of Man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him.” Therefore it seems that the angels will not be judged by Christ.

Objection 3: Further, the angels are higher than other creatures. If Christ, then, be judge not only of men but likewise of angels, then for the same reason He will be judge of all creatures; which seems to be false, since this belongs to God’s providence: hence it is written (Job 34:13): “What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?” Therefore Christ is not the judge of the angels.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 6:3): “Know you not that we shall judge angels?” But the saints judge only by Christ’s authority. Therefore, much more does Christ possess judiciary power over the angels.

I answer that, The angels are subjects of Christ’s judiciary power, not only with regard to His Divine Nature, as He is the Word of God, but also with regard to His human nature. And this is evident from three considerations. First of all, from the closeness of His assumed nature to God; because, according to Heb. 2:16: “For nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold.” Consequently, Christ’s soul is more filled with the truth of the Word of God than any angel: for which reason He also enlightens the angels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), and so He has power to judge them. Secondly, because by the lowliness of His Passion, human nature in Christ merited to be exalted above the angels; so that, as is said in Phil. 2:10: “In the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of those that are in heaven, on earth, and under the earth.” And therefore Christ has judiciary power even over the good and wicked angels: in token whereof it is said in the Apocalypse (7:11) that “all the angels stood round about the throne.” Thirdly, on account of what they do for men, of whom Christ is the Head in a special manner. Hence it is written (Heb. 1:14): “They are [Vulg.: ‘Are they not’] all ministering spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall receive the inheritance of salvation (?).” But they are submitted to Christ’s judgment, first, as regards the dispensing of those things which are done through them; which dispensing is likewise done by the Man Christ, to whom the angels ministered, as related (Mat. 4:11), and from whom the devils besought that they might be sent into the swine, according to Mat. 8:31. Secondly, as to other accidental rewards of the good angels, such as the joy which they have at the salvation of men, according to Lk. 15:10: “There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance”: and furthermore as to the accidental punishments of the devils wherewith they are either tormented here, or are shut up in hell; and this also belongs to the Man Christ: hence it is written (Mk. 1:24) that the devil cried out: “What have we to do with thee, Jesus of Nazareth? art Thou come to destroy us?” Thirdly, as to the essential reward of the good angels, which is everlasting bliss; and as to the essential punishment of the wicked angels, which is everlasting damnation. But this was done by Christ from the beginning of the world, inasmuch as He is the Word of God.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers judgment as to the essential reward and chief punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi): “Although the spiritual man judgeth all things, still he is judged by Truth Itself.” Consequently, although the angels judge, as being spiritual creatures, still they are judged by Christ, inasmuch as He is the Truth.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ judges not only the angels, but also the administration of all creatures. For if, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii) the lower things are ruled by God through the higher, in a certain order, it must be said that all things are ruled by Christ’s soul, which is above every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 2:5): “For God hath not subjected unto angels the world to come”—subject namely to Christ—“of whom we speak” [Douay: ‘whereof we speak’] [*The words “subject namely to Christ” are from a gloss]. Nor does it follow that God set another over the earth; since one and the same Person is God and Man, our Lord Jesus Christ.

Let what has been said of the Mystery of His Incarnation suffice for the present.

TREATISE ON THE SACRAMENTS (QQ[60]-90)

WHAT IS A SACRAMENT? (EIGHT ARTICLES)

After considering those things that concern the mystery of the incarnate Word, we must consider the sacraments of the Church which derive their efficacy from the Word incarnate Himself. First we shall consider the sacraments in general; secondly, we shall consider specially each sacrament.

Concerning the first our consideration will be fivefold: (1) What is a sacrament? (2) Of the necessity of the sacraments; (3) of the effects of the sacraments; (4) Of their cause; (5) Of their number.

Under the first heading there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?

(2) Whether every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament?

(3) Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only, or of several?

(4) Whether a sacrament is a sign that is something sensible?

(5) Whether some determinate sensible thing is required for a sacrament?

(6) Whether signification expressed by words is necessary for a sacrament?

(7) Whether determinate words are required?

(8) Whether anything may be added to or subtracted from these words?

Whether a sacrament is a kind of sign?

Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign. For sacrament appears to be derived from “sacring” [sacrando]; just as medicament, from “medicando” [healing]. But this seems to be of the nature of a cause rather than of a sign. Therefore a sacrament is a kind of cause rather than a kind of sign.

Objection 2: Further, sacrament seems to signify something hidden, according to Tob. 12:7: “It is good to hide the secret [sacramentum] of a king”; and Eph. 3:9: “What is the dispensation of the mystery [sacramenti] which hath been hidden from eternity in God.” But that which is hidden, seems foreign to the nature of a sign; for “a sign is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses,” as Augustine explains (De Doctr. Christ. ii). Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.

Objection 3: Further, an oath is sometimes called a sacrament: for it is written in the Decretals (Caus. xxii, qu. 5): “Children who have not attained the use of reason must not be obliged to swear: and whoever has foresworn himself once, must no more be a witness, nor be allowed to take a sacrament,” i.e. an oath. But an oath is not a kind of sign, therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a kind of sign.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x): “The visible sacrifice is the sacrament, i.e. the sacred sign, of the invisible sacrifice.”

I answer that, All things that are ordained to one, even in different ways, can be denominated from it: thus, from health which is in an animal, not only is the animal said to be healthy through being the subject of health: but medicine also is said to be healthy through producing health; diet through preserving it; and urine, through being a sign of health. Consequently, a thing may be called a “sacrament,” either from having a certain hidden sanctity, and in this sense a sacrament is a “sacred secret”; or from having some relationship to this sanctity, which relationship may be that of a cause, or of a sign or of any other relation. But now we are speaking of sacraments in a special sense, as implying the habitude of sign: and in this way a sacrament is a kind of sign.

Reply to Objection 1: Because medicine is an efficient cause of health, consequently whatever things are denominated from medicine are to be referred to some first active cause: so that a medicament implies a certain causality. But sanctity from which a sacrament is denominated, is not there taken as an efficient cause, but rather as a formal or a final cause. Therefore it does not follow that a sacrament need always imply causality.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers sacrament in the sense of a "sacred secret." Now not only God's but also the king's, secret, is said to be sacred and to be a sacrament: because according to the ancients, whatever it was unlawful to lay violent hands on was said to be holy or sacrosanct, such as the city walls, and persons of high rank. Consequently those secrets, whether Divine or human, which it is unlawful to violate by making them known to anybody whatever, are called "sacred secrets or sacraments."

Reply to Objection 3: Even an oath has a certain relation to sacred things, in so far as it consists in calling a sacred thing to witness. And in this sense it is called a sacrament: not in the sense in which we speak of sacraments now; the word "sacrament" being thus used not equivocally but analogically, i.e. by reason of a different relation to the one thing, viz. something sacred.

Whether every sign of a holy thing is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament. For all sensible creatures are signs of sacred things; according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made." And yet all sensible things cannot be called sacraments. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, whatever was done under the Old Law was a figure of Christ Who is the "Holy of Holies" (Dan. 9:24), according to 1 Cor. 10:11: "All (these) things happened to them in figure"; and Col. 2:17: "Which are a shadow of things to come, but the body is Christ's." And yet not all that was done by the Fathers of the Old Testament, not even all the ceremonies of the Law, were sacraments, but only in certain special cases, as stated in the [4334]FS, Q[101], A[4]. Therefore it seems that not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, even in the New Testament many things are done in sign of some sacred thing; yet they are not called sacraments; such as sprinkling with holy water, the consecration of an altar, and such like. Therefore not every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

On the contrary, A definition is convertible with the thing defined. Now some define a sacrament as being "the sign of a sacred thing"; moreover, this is clear from the passage quoted above [4335](A[1]) from Augustine. Therefore it seems that every sign of a sacred thing is a sacrament.

I answer that, Signs are given to men, to whom it is proper to discover the unknown by means of the known. Consequently a sacrament properly so called is that which is the sign of some sacred thing pertaining to man; so that properly speaking a sacrament, as considered by us now, is defined as being the “sign of a holy thing so far as it makes men holy.”

Reply to Objection 1: Sensible creatures signify something holy, viz. Divine wisdom and goodness inasmuch as these are holy in themselves; but not inasmuch as we are made holy by them. Therefore they cannot be called sacraments as we understand sacraments now.

Reply to Objection 2: Some things pertaining to the Old Testament signified the holiness of Christ considered as holy in Himself. Others signified His holiness considered as the cause of our holiness; thus the sacrifice of the Paschal Lamb signified Christ’s Sacrifice whereby we are made holy: and such like are properly styled sacraments of the Old Law.

Reply to Objection 3: Names are given to things considered in reference to their end and state of completeness. Now a disposition is not an end, whereas perfection is. Consequently things that signify disposition to holiness are not called sacraments, and with regard to these the objection is verified: only those are called sacraments which signify the perfection of holiness in man.

Whether a sacrament is a sign of one thing only?

Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is a sign of one thing only. For that which signifies many things is an ambiguous sign, and consequently occasions deception: this is clearly seen in equivocal words. But all deception should be removed from the Christian religion, according to Col. 2:8: “Beware lest any man cheat you by philosophy and vain deceit.” Therefore it seems that a sacrament is not a sign of several things.

Objection 2: Further, as stated above [4336](A[2]), a sacrament signifies a holy thing in so far as it makes man holy. But there is only one cause of man’s holiness, viz. the blood of Christ; according to Heb. 13:12: “Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate.” Therefore it seems that a sacrament does not signify several things.

Objection 3: Further, it has been said above (A[2], ad 3) that a sacrament signifies properly the very end of sanctification. Now the end of sanctification is eternal life, according to Rom. 6:22: “You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting.” Therefore it seems that the sacraments signify one thing only, viz. eternal life.

On the contrary, In the Sacrament of the Altar, two things are signified, viz. Christ’s true body, and Christ’s mystical body; as Augustine says (Liber Sent. Prosper.).

I answer that, As stated above [4337](A[2]) a sacrament properly speaking is that which is ordained to signify our sanctification. In which three things may be considered; viz. the very cause of our sanctification, which is Christ’s passion; the form of our sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; and the ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal life. And all these are signified by the sacraments. Consequently a sacrament is a sign that is both a reminder of the past, i.e. the passion of Christ; and an indication of that which is effected in us by Christ’s passion, i.e. grace; and a prognostic, that is, a foretelling of future glory.

Reply to Objection 1: Then is a sign ambiguous and the occasion of deception, when it signifies many things not ordained to one another. But when it signifies many things inasmuch as, through being mutually ordained, they form one thing, then the sign is not ambiguous but certain: thus this word “man” signifies the soul and body inasmuch as together they form the human nature. In this way a sacrament signifies the three things aforesaid, inasmuch as by being in a certain order they are one thing.

Reply to Objection 2: Since a sacrament signifies that which sanctifies, it must needs signify the effect, which is implied in the sanctifying cause as such.

Reply to Objection 3: It is enough for a sacrament that it signify that perfection which consists in the form, nor is it necessary that it should signify only that perfection which is the end.

Whether a sacrament is always something sensible?

Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament is not always something sensible. Because, according to the Philosopher (Prior. Anal. ii), every effect is a sign of its cause. But just as there are some sensible effects, so are there some intelligible effects; thus science is the effect of a demonstration. Therefore not every sign is sensible. Now all that is required for a sacrament is something that is a sign of some sacred thing, inasmuch as thereby man is sanctified, as stated above [4338](A[2]). Therefore something sensible is not required for a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, sacraments belong to the kingdom of God and the Divine worship. But sensible things do not seem to belong to the Divine worship: for we are told (Jn. 4:24) that "God is a spirit; and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth"; and (Rom. 14:17) that "the kingdom of God is not meat and drink." Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacraments.

Objection 3: Further. Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) that "sensible things are goods of least account, since without them man can live aright." But the sacraments are necessary for man's salvation, as we shall show farther on ([4339]Q[61], A[1]): so that man cannot live aright without them. Therefore sensible things are not required for the sacraments.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.): "The word is added to the element and this becomes a sacrament"; and he is speaking there of water which is a sensible element. Therefore sensible things are required for the sacraments.

I answer that, Divine wisdom provides for each thing according to its mode; hence it is written (Wis. 8:1) that "she . . . ordereth all things sweetly": wherefore also we are told (Mat. 25:15) that she "gave to everyone according to his proper ability." Now it is part of man's nature to acquire knowledge of the intelligible from the sensible. But a sign is that by means of which one attains to the knowledge of something else. Consequently, since the sacred things which are signified by the sacraments, are the spiritual and intelligible goods by means of which man is sanctified, it follows that the sacramental signs consist in sensible things: just as in the Divine Scriptures spiritual things are set before us under the guise of things sensible. And hence it is that sensible things are required for the sacraments; as Dionysius also proves in his book on the heavenly hierarchy (Coel. Hier. i).

Reply to Objection 1: The name and definition of a thing is taken principally from that which belongs to a thing primarily and essentially: and not from that which belongs to it through something else. Now a sensible effect being the primary and direct object of man’s knowledge (since all our knowledge springs from the senses) by its very nature leads to the knowledge of something else: whereas intelligible effects are not such as to be able to lead us to the knowledge of something else, except in so far as they are manifested by some other thing, i.e. by certain sensibles. It is for this reason that the name sign is given primarily and principally to things which are offered to the senses; hence Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that a sign “is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses.” But intelligible effects do not partake of the nature of a sign except in so far as they are pointed out by certain signs. And in this way, too, certain things which are not sensible are termed sacraments as it were, in so far as they are signified by certain sensible things, of which we shall treat further on ([4340]Q[63], A[1], ad 2; A[3], ad 2;[4341] Q[73], A[6];[4342] Q[74], A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things considered in their own nature do not belong to the worship or kingdom of God: but considered only as signs of spiritual things in which the kingdom of God consists.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there of sensible things, considered in their nature; but not as employed to signify spiritual things, which are the highest goods.

Whether determinate things are required for a sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that determinate things are not required for a sacrament. For sensible things are required in sacraments for the purpose of signification, as stated above [4343](A[4]). But nothing hinders the same thing being signified by divers sensible things: thus in Holy Scripture God is signified metaphorically, sometimes by a stone (2 Kings 22:2; Zech. 3:9; 1 Cor. 10:4; Apoc. 4:3); sometimes by a lion (Is. 31:4; Apoc. 5:5); sometimes by the sun (Is. 60:19,20; Mal. 4:2), or by something similar. Therefore it seems that divers things can be suitable to the same sacrament. Therefore determinate things are not required for the sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, the health of the soul is more necessary than that of the body. But in bodily medicines, which are ordained to the health of the body, one thing can be substituted for another which happens to be wanting. Therefore much more in the sacraments, which are spiritual remedies ordained to the health of the soul, can one thing be substituted for another when this happens to be lacking.

Objection 3: Further, it is not fitting that the salvation of men be restricted by the Divine Law: still less by the Law of Christ, Who came to save all. But in the state of the Law of nature determinate things were not required in the sacraments, but were put to that use through a vow, as appears from Gn. 28, where Jacob vowed that he would offer to God tithes and peace-offerings. Therefore it seems that man should not have been restricted, especially under the New Law, to the use of any determinate thing in the sacraments.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.”

I answer that, In the use of the sacraments two things may be considered, namely, the worship of God, and the sanctification of man: the former of which pertains to man as referred to God, and the latter pertains to God in reference to man. Now it is not for anyone to determine that which is in the power of another, but only that which is in his own power. Since, therefore, the sanctification of man is in the power of God Who sanctifies, it is not for man to decide what things should be used for his sanctification, but this should be determined by Divine institution. Therefore in the sacraments of the New Law, by which man is sanctified according to 1 Cor. 6:11, “You are washed, you are sanctified,” we must use those things which are determined by Divine institution.

Reply to Objection 1: Though the same thing can be signified by divers signs, yet to determine which sign must be used belongs to the signifier. Now it is God Who signifies spiritual things to us by means of the sensible things in the sacraments, and of similitudes in the Scriptures. And consequently, just as the Holy Ghost decides by what similitudes spiritual things are to be signified in certain passages of Scripture, so also must it be determined by Divine institution what things are to be employed for the purpose of signification in this or that sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Sensible things are endowed with natural powers conducive to the health of the body: and therefore if two of them have the same virtue, it matters not which we use. Yet they are ordained unto sanctification not through any power that they possess naturally, but only in virtue of the Divine institution. And therefore it was necessary that God should determine the sensible things to be employed in the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), diverse sacraments suit different times; just as different times are signified by different parts of the verb, viz. present, past, and future. Consequently, just as under the state of the Law of nature man was moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship God, so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God were determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary for a law to be given (to man) from without: both because the Law of nature had become obscured by man’s sins; and in order to signify more expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified. And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men have to make use in the sacraments. Nor is the way of salvation narrowed thereby: because the things which need to be used in the sacraments, are either in everyone’s possession or can be had with little trouble.

Whether words are required for the signification of the sacraments?

Objection 1: It seems that words are not required for the signification of the sacraments. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): “What else is a corporeal sacrament but a kind of visible word?” Wherefore to add words to the sensible things in the sacraments seems to be the same as to add words to words. But this is superfluous. Therefore words are not required besides the sensible things in the sacraments .

Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is some one thing, but it does not seem possible to make one thing of those that belong to different genera. Since, therefore, sensible things and words are of different genera, for sensible things are the product of nature, but words, of reason; it seems that in the sacraments, words are not required besides sensible things.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the New Law succeed those of the Old Law: since “the former were instituted when the latter were abolished,” as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix). But no form of words was required in the sacraments of the Old Law. Therefore neither is it required in those of the New Law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. 5:25,26): “Christ loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for it; that He might sanctify it, cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.” And Augustine says (Tract. xxx in Joan.): “The word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament.”

I answer that, The sacraments, as stated above ([4344]AA[2],3), are employed as signs for man’s sanctification. Consequently they can be considered in three ways: and in each way it is fitting for words to be added to the sensible signs. For in the first place they can be considered in regard to the cause of sanctification, which is the Word incarnate: to Whom the sacraments have a certain conformity, in that the word is joined to the sensible sign, just as in the mystery of the Incarnation the Word of God is united to sensible flesh.

Secondly, sacraments may be considered on the part of man who is sanctified, and who is composed of soul and body: to whom the sacramental remedy is adjusted, since it touches the body through the sensible element, and the soul through faith in the words. Hence Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.) on Jn. 15:3, “Now you are clean by reason of the word,” etc.: “Whence hath water this so great virtue, to touch the body and wash the heart, but by the word doing it, not because it is spoken, but because it is believed?”

Thirdly, a sacrament may be considered on the part of the sacramental signification. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) that “words are the principal signs used by men”; because words can be formed in various ways for the purpose of signifying various mental concepts, so that we are able to express our thoughts with greater distinctness by means of words. And therefore in order to insure the perfection of sacramental signification it was necessary to determine the signification of the sensible things by means of certain words. For water may signify both a cleansing by reason of its humidity, and refreshment by reason of its being cool: but when we say, “I baptize thee,” it is clear that we use water in baptism in order to signify a spiritual cleansing.

Reply to Objection 1: The sensible elements of the sacraments are called words by way of a certain likeness, in so far as they partake of a certain significative power, which resides principally in the very words, as stated above. Consequently it is not a superfluous repetition to add words to the visible element in the sacraments; because one determines the other, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although words and other sensible things are not in the same genus, considered in their natures, yet have they something in common as to the thing signified by them: which is more perfectly done in words than in other things. Wherefore in the sacraments, words and things, like form and matter, combine in the formation of one thing, in so far as the signification of things is completed by means of words, as above stated. And under words are comprised also sensible actions, such as cleansing and anointing and such like: because they have a like signification with the things.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), the sacraments of things present should be different from sacraments of things to come. Now the sacraments of the Old Law foretold the coming of Christ. Consequently they did not signify Christ so clearly as the sacraments of the New Law, which flow from Christ Himself, and have a certain likeness to Him, as stated above. Nevertheless in the Old Law, certain words were used in things pertaining to the worship of God, both by the priests, who were the ministers of those sacraments, according to Num. 6:23,24: “Thus shall you bless the children of Israel, and you shall say to them: The Lord bless thee,” etc.; and by those who made use of those sacraments, according to Dt. 26:3: “I profess this day before the Lord thy God,” etc.

Whether determinate words are required in the sacraments?

Objection 1: It seems that determinate words are not required in the sacraments. For as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i), “words are not the same for all.” But salvation, which is sought through the sacraments, is the same for all. Therefore determinate words are not required in the sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, words are required in the sacraments forasmuch as they are the principal means of signification, as stated above [4345](A[6]). But it happens that various words mean the same. Therefore determinate words are not required in the sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, corruption of anything changes its species. But some corrupt the pronunciation of words, and yet it is not credible that the sacramental effect is hindered thereby; else unlettered men and stammerers, in conferring sacraments, would frequently do so invalidly. Therefore it seems that determinate words are not required in the sacraments.

On the contrary, our Lord used determinate words in consecrating the sacrament of the Eucharist, when He said (Mat. 26:26): “This is My Body.” Likewise He commanded His disciples to baptize under a form of determinate words, saying (Mat. 28:19): “Go ye and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[6], ad 2), in the sacraments the words are as the form, and sensible things are as the matter. Now in all things composed of matter and form, the determining principle is on the part of the form, which is as it were the end and terminus of the matter. Consequently for the being of a thing the need of a determinate form is prior to the need of determinate matter: for determinate matter is needed that it may be adapted to the determinate form. Since, therefore, in the sacraments determinate sensible things are required, which are as the sacramental matter, much more is there need in them of a determinate form of words.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.), the word operates in the sacraments “not because it is spoken,” i.e. not by the outward sound of the voice, “but because it is believed” in accordance with the sense of the words which is held by faith. And this sense is indeed the same for all, though the same words as to their sound be not used by all. Consequently no matter in what language this sense is expressed, the sacrament is complete.

Reply to Objection 2: Although it happens in every language that various words signify the same thing, yet one of those words is that which those who speak that language use principally and more commonly to signify that particular thing: and this is the word which should be used for the sacramental signification. So also among sensible things, that one is used for the sacramental signification which is most commonly employed for the action by which the sacramental effect is signified: thus water is most commonly used by men for bodily cleansing, by which the spiritual cleansing is signified: and therefore water is employed as the matter of baptism.

Reply to Objection 3: If he who corrupts the pronunciation of the sacramental words—does so on purpose, he does not seem to intend to do what the Church intends: and thus the sacrament seems to be defective. But if he do this through error or a slip of the tongue, and if he so far mispronounce the words as to deprive them of sense, the sacrament seems to be defective. This would be the case especially if the mispronunciation be in the beginning of a word, for instance, if one were to say "in nomine matris" instead of "in nomine Patris." If, however, the sense of the words be not entirely lost by this mispronunciation, the sacrament is complete. This would be the case principally if the end of a word be mispronounced; for instance, if one were to say "patrias et filias." For although the words thus mispronounced have no appointed meaning, yet we allow them an accommodated meaning corresponding to the usual forms of speech. And so, although the sensible sound is changed, yet the sense remains the same.

What has been said about the various mispronunciations of words, either at the beginning or at the end, holds forasmuch as with us a change at the beginning of a word changes the meaning, whereas a change at the end generally speaking does not effect such a change: whereas with the Greeks the sense is changed also in the beginning of words in the conjugation of verbs.

Nevertheless the principle point to observe is the extent of the corruption entailed by mispronunciation: for in either case it may be so little that it does not alter the sense of the words; or so great that it destroys it. But it is easier for the one to happen on the part of the beginning of the words, and the other at the end.

Whether it is lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not lawful to add anything to the words in which the sacramental form consists. For these sacramental words are not of less importance than are the words of Holy Scripture. But it is not lawful to add anything to, or to take anything from, the words of Holy Scripture: for it is written (Dt. 4:2): "You shall not add to the word that I speak to you, neither shall you take away from it"; and (Apoc. 22:18,19): "I testify to everyone that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book: if any man shall add to these things, God shall add to him the plagues written in this book. And if any man shall take away . . . God shall take away his part out of the book of life.” Therefore it seems that neither is it lawful to add anything to, or to take anything from, the sacramental forms.

Objection 2: Further, in the sacraments words are by way of form, as stated above (A[6], ad 2; A[7]). But any addition or subtraction in forms changes the species, as also in numbers (Metaph. viii). Therefore it seems that if anything be added to or subtracted from a sacramental form, it will not be the same sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, just as the sacramental form demands a certain number of words, so does it require that these words should be pronounced in a certain order and without interruption. If therefore, the sacrament is not rendered invalid by addition or subtraction of words, in like manner it seems that neither is it, if the words be pronounced in a different order or with interruptions.

On the contrary, Certain words are inserted by some in the sacramental forms, which are not inserted by others: thus the Latins baptize under this form: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”; whereas the Greeks use the following form: “The servant of God, N . . . is baptized in the name of the Father,” etc. Yet both confer the sacrament validly. Therefore it is lawful to add something to, or to take something from, the sacramental forms.

I answer that, With regard to all the variations that may occur in the sacramental forms, two points seem to call for our attention. one is on the part of the person who says the words, and whose intention is essential to the sacrament, as will be explained further on ([4346]Q[64], A[8]). Wherefore if he intends by such addition or suppression to perform a rite other from that which is recognized by the Church, it seems that the sacrament is invalid: because he seems not to intend to do what the Church does.

The other point to be considered is the meaning of the words. For since in the sacraments, the words produce an effect according to the sense which they convey, as stated above (A[7], ad 1), we must see whether the change of words destroys the essential sense of the words: because then the sacrament is clearly rendered invalid. Now it is clear, if any substantial part of the sacramental form be suppressed, that the essential sense of the words is destroyed; and consequently the sacrament is invalid. Wherefore

Didymus says (De Spir. Sanct. ii): “If anyone attempt to baptize in such a way as to omit one of the aforesaid names,” i.e. of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, “his baptism will be invalid.” But if that which is omitted be not a substantial part of the form, such an omission does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently the validity of the sacrament. Thus in the form of the Eucharist—“For this is My Body,” the omission of the word “for” does not destroy the essential sense of the words, nor consequently cause the sacrament to be invalid; although perhaps he who makes the omission may sin from negligence or contempt.

Again, it is possible to add something that destroys the essential sense of the words: for instance, if one were to say: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father Who is greater, and of the Son Who is less,” with which form the Arians baptized: and consequently such an addition makes the sacrament invalid. But if the addition be such as not to destroy the essential sense, the sacrament is not rendered invalid. Nor does it matter whether this addition be made at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end: For instance, if one were to say, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father Almighty, and of the only Begotten Son, and of the Holy Ghost, the Paraclete,” the baptism would be valid; and in like manner if one were to say, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”; and may the Blessed Virgin succour thee, the baptism would be valid.

Perhaps, however, if one were to say, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary,” the baptism would be void; because it is written (1 Cor. 1:13): “Was Paul crucified for you or were you baptized in the name of Paul?” But this is true if the intention be to baptize in the name of the Blessed Virgin as in the name of the Trinity, by which baptism is consecrated: for such a sense would be contrary to faith, and would therefore render the sacrament invalid: whereas if the addition, “and in the name of the Blessed Virgin” be understood, not as if the name of the Blessed Virgin effected anything in baptism, but as intimating that her intercession may help the person baptized to preserve the baptismal grace, then the sacrament is not rendered void.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not lawful to add anything to the words of Holy Scripture as regards the sense; but many words are added by Doctors by way of explanation of the Holy Scriptures. Nevertheless, it is not lawful to add even words to Holy Scripture as though such words were a part thereof, for this would amount to forgery. It would amount to the same if anyone were to pretend that something is essential to a sacramental form, which is not so.

Reply to Objection 2: Words belong to a sacramental form by reason of the sense signified by them. Consequently any addition or suppression of words which does not add to or take from the essential sense, does not destroy the essence of the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: If the words are interrupted to such an extent that the intention of the speaker is interrupted, the sacramental sense is destroyed, and consequently, the validity of the sacrament. But this is not the case if the interruption of the speaker is so slight, that his intention and the sense of the words is not interrupted.

The same is to be said of a change in the order of the words. Because if this destroys the sense of the words, the sacrament is invalidated: as happens when a negation is made to precede or follow a word. But if the order is so changed that the sense of the words does not vary, the sacrament is not invalidated, according to the Philosopher’s dictum: “Nouns and verbs mean the same though they be transposed” (Peri Herm. x).

OF THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the necessity of the sacraments; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sacraments are necessary for man’s salvation?

(2) Whether they were necessary in the state that preceded sin?

(3) Whether they were necessary in the state after sin and before Christ?

(4) Whether they were necessary after Christ’s coming?

Whether sacraments are necessary for man’s salvation?

Objection 1: It seems that sacraments are not necessary for man’s salvation. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): “Bodily exercise is profitable to little.” But the use of sacraments pertains to bodily exercise; because sacraments are perfected in the signification of sensible things and words, as stated above ([4347]Q[60], A[6]). Therefore sacraments are not necessary for the salvation of man.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle was told (2 Cor. 12:9): “My grace is sufficient for thee.” But it would not suffice if sacraments were necessary for salvation. Therefore sacraments are not necessary for man’s salvation.

Objection 3: Further, given a sufficient cause, nothing more seems to be required for the effect. But Christ’s Passion is the sufficient cause of our salvation; for the Apostle says (Rom. 5:10): “If, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son: much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by His life.” Therefore sacraments are not necessary for man’s salvation.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): “It is impossible to keep men together in one religious denomination, whether true or false, except they be united by means of visible signs or sacraments.” But it is necessary for salvation that men be united together in the name of the one true religion. Therefore sacraments are necessary for man’s salvation.

I answer that, Sacraments are necessary unto man’s salvation for three reasons. The first is taken from the condition of human nature which is such that it has to be led by things corporeal and sensible to things spiritual and intelligible. Now it belongs to Divine providence to provide for each one according as its condition requires. Divine wisdom, therefore, fittingly provides man with means of salvation, in the shape of corporeal and sensible signs that are called sacraments.

The second reason is taken from the state of man who in sinning subjected himself by his affections to corporeal things. Now the healing remedy should be given to a man so as to reach the part affected by disease. Consequently it was fitting that God should provide man with a spiritual medicine by means of certain corporeal signs; for if man were offered spiritual things without a veil, his mind being taken up with the material world would be unable to apply itself to them.

The third reason is taken from the fact that man is prone to direct his activity chiefly towards material things. Lest, therefore, it should be too hard for man to be drawn away entirely from bodily actions, bodily exercise was offered to him in the sacraments, by which he might be trained to avoid superstitious practices, consisting in the worship of demons, and all manner of harmful action, consisting in sinful deeds.

It follows, therefore, that through the institution of the sacraments man, consistently with his nature, is instructed through sensible things; he is humbled, through confessing that he is subject to corporeal things, seeing that he receives assistance through them: and he is even preserved from bodily hurt, by the healthy exercise of the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 1: Bodily exercise, as such, is not very profitable: but exercise taken in the use of the sacraments is not merely bodily, but to a certain extent spiritual, viz. in its signification and in its causality.

Reply to Objection 2: God's grace is a sufficient cause of man's salvation. But God gives grace to man in a way which is suitable to him. Hence it is that man needs the sacraments that he may obtain grace.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is a sufficient cause of man's salvation. But it does not follow that the sacraments are not also necessary for that purpose: because they obtain their effect through the power of Christ's Passion; and Christ's Passion is, so to say, applied to man through the sacraments according to the Apostle (Rom. 6:3): "All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death."

Whether before sin sacraments were necessary to man?

Objection 1: It seems that before sin sacraments were necessary to man. For, as stated above (A[1], ad 2) man needs sacraments that he may obtain grace. But man needed grace even in the state of innocence, as we stated in the [4348]FP, Q[95], A[4] (cf. [4349]FS, Q[109], A[2]; [4350]FS, Q[114], A[2]). Therefore sacraments were necessary in that state also.

Objection 2: Further, sacraments are suitable to man by reason of the conditions of human nature, as stated above [4351](A[1]). But man's nature is the same before and after sin. Therefore it seems that before sin, man needed the sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, matrimony is a sacrament, according to Eph. 5:32: "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church." But matrimony was instituted before sin, as may be seen in Gn. 2. Therefore sacraments were necessary to man before sin.

On the contrary, None but the sick need remedies, according to Mat. 9:12: "They that are in health need not a physician." Now the sacraments are spiritual remedies for the healing of wounds inflicted by sin. Therefore they were not necessary before sin.

I answer that, Sacraments were not necessary in the state of innocence. This can be proved from the rectitude of that state, in which the higher (parts of man) ruled the lower, and nowise depended on them: for just as the mind was subject to God, so were the lower powers of the soul subject to the mind, and the body to the soul. And it would be contrary to this order if the soul were perfected either in knowledge or in grace, by anything corporeal; which happens in the sacraments. Therefore in the state of innocence man needed no sacraments, whether as remedies against sin or as means of perfecting the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: In the state of innocence man needed grace: not so that he needed to obtain grace by means of sensible signs, but in a spiritual and invisible manner.

Reply to Objection 2: Man's nature is the same before and after sin, but the state of his nature is not the same. Because after sin, the soul, even in its higher part, needs to receive something from corporeal things in order that it may be perfected: whereas man had no need of this in that state.

Reply to Objection 3: Matrimony was instituted in the state of innocence, not as a sacrament, but as a function of nature. Consequently, however, it foreshadowed something in relation to Christ and the Church: just as everything else foreshadowed Christ.

Whether there should have been sacraments after sin, before Christ?

Objection 1: It seems that there should have been no sacraments after sin, before Christ. For it has been stated that the Passion of Christ is applied to men through the sacraments: so that Christ's Passion is compared to the sacraments as cause to effect. But effect does not precede cause. Therefore there should have been no sacraments before Christ's coming.

Objection 2: Further, sacraments should be suitable to the state of the human race, as Augustine declares (Contra Faust. xix). But the state of the human race underwent no change after sin until it was repaired by Christ. Neither, therefore, should the sacraments have been changed, so that besides the sacraments of the natural law, others should be instituted in the law of Moses.

Objection 3: Further, the nearer a thing approaches to that which is perfect, the more like it should it be. Now the perfection of human salvation was accomplished by Christ; to Whom the sacraments of the Old Law were nearer than those that preceded the Law. Therefore they should have borne a greater likeness to the sacraments of Christ. And yet the contrary is the case, since it was foretold that the priesthood of Christ would be "according to the order of Melchisedech, and not . . . according to the order of Aaron" (Heb. 7:11). Therefore sacraments were unsuitably instituted before Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) that "the first sacraments which the Law commanded to be solemnized and observed were announcements of Christ's future coming." But it was necessary for man's salvation that Christ's coming should be announced beforehand. Therefore it was necessary that some sacraments should be instituted before Christ.

I answer that, Sacraments are necessary for man's salvation, in so far as they are sensible signs of invisible things whereby man is made holy. Now after sin no man can be made holy save through Christ, "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood, to the showing of His justice . . . that He Himself may be just, and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus Christ" (Rom. 3:25,26). Therefore before Christ's coming there was need for some visible signs whereby man might testify to his faith in the future coming of a Saviour. And these signs are called sacraments. It is therefore clear that some sacraments were necessary before Christ's coming.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion is the final cause of the old sacraments: for they were instituted in order to foreshadow it. Now the final cause precedes not in time, but in the intention of the agent. Consequently, there is no reason against the existence of sacraments before Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 2: The state of the human race after sin and before Christ can be considered from two points of view. First, from that of faith: and thus it was always one and the same: since men were made righteous, through faith in the future coming of Christ. Secondly, according as sin was more or less intense, and knowledge concerning Christ more or less explicit. For as time went on sin gained a greater hold on man, so much so that it clouded man's reason, the consequence being that the precepts of the natural law were insufficient to make man live aright, and it became necessary to have a written code of fixed laws, and together with these certain sacraments of faith. For it was necessary, as time went on, that the knowledge of faith should be more and more unfolded, since, as Gregory says (Hom. vi in Ezech.): “With the advance of time there was an advance in the knowledge of Divine things.” Consequently in the old Law there was also a need for certain fixed sacraments significative of man’s faith in the future coming of Christ: which sacraments are compared to those that preceded the Law, as something determinate to that which is indeterminate: inasmuch as before the Law it was not laid down precisely of what sacraments men were to make use: whereas this was prescribed by the Law; and this was necessary both on account of the overclouding of the natural law, and for the clearer signification of faith.

Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of Melchisedech which preceded the Law is more like the Sacrament of the New Law in its matter: in so far as “he offered bread and wine” (Gn. 14:18), just as bread and wine are offered in the sacrifice of the New Testament. Nevertheless the sacraments of the Mosaic Law are more like the thing signified by the sacrament, i.e. the Passion of Christ: as clearly appears in the Paschal Lamb and such like. The reason of this was lest, if the sacraments retained the same appearance, it might seem to be the continuation of one and the same sacrament, where there was no interruption of time.

Whether there was need for any sacraments after Christ came?

Objection 1: It seems that there was no need for any sacraments after Christ came. For the figure should cease with the advent of the truth. But “grace and truth came by Jesus Christ” (Jn. 1:17). Since, therefore, the sacraments are signs or figures of the truth, it seems that there was no need for any sacraments after Christ’s Passion.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments consist in certain elements, as stated above ([4352]Q[60], A[4]). But the Apostle says (Gal. 4:3,4) that “when we were children we were serving under the elements of the world”: but that now “when the fulness of time” has “come,” we are no longer children. Therefore it seems that we should not serve God under the elements of this world, by making use of corporeal sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, according to James 1:17 with God “there is no change, nor shadow of alteration.” But it seems to argue some change in the Divine will that God should give man certain sacraments for his sanctification now during the time of grace, and other sacraments before Christ’s coming. Therefore it seems that other sacraments should not have been instituted after Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) that the sacraments of the Old Law “were abolished because they were fulfilled; and others were instituted, fewer in number, but more efficacious, more profitable, and of easier accomplishment.”

I answer that, As the ancient Fathers were saved through faith in Christ’s future coming, so are we saved through faith in Christ’s past birth and Passion. Now the sacraments are signs in protestation of the faith whereby man is justified; and signs should vary according as they signify the future, the past, or the present; for as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix), “the same thing is variously pronounced as to be done and as having been done: for instance the word ‘passurus’ [going to suffer] differs from ‘passus’ [having suffered].” Therefore the sacraments of the New Law, that signify Christ in relation to the past, must needs differ from those of the Old Law, that foreshadowed the future.

Reply to Objection 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), the state of the New Law. is between the state of the Old Law, whose figures are fulfilled in the New, and the state of glory, in which all truth will be openly and perfectly revealed. Wherefore then there will be no sacraments. But now, so long as we know “through a glass in a dark manner,” (1 Cor. 13:12) we need sensible signs in order to reach spiritual things: and this is the province of the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 2: The Apostle calls the sacraments of the Old Law “weak and needy elements” (Gal. 4:9) because they neither contained nor caused grace. Hence the Apostle says that those who used these sacraments served God “under the elements of this world”: for the very reason that these sacraments were nothing else than the elements of this world. But our sacraments both contain and cause grace: consequently the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the head of the house is not proved to have a changeable mind, through issuing various commands to his household at various seasons, ordering things differently in winter and summer; so it does not follow that there is any change in God, because He instituted sacraments of one kind after Christ’s coming, and of another kind at the time of the Law. because the latter were suitable as foreshadowing grace; the former as signifying the presence of grace,

OF THE SACRAMENTS’ PRINCIPAL EFFECT, WHICH IS GRACE (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the effect of the sacraments. First of their principal effect, which is grace; secondly, of their secondary effect, which is a character. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the sacraments of the New Law are the cause of grace?

(2) Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts?

(3) Whether the sacraments contain grace?

(4) Whether there is any power in them for the causing of grace?

(5) Whether the sacraments derive this power from Christ’s Passion?

(6) Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace?

Whether the sacraments are the cause of grace?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments are not the cause of grace. For it seems that the same thing is not both sign and cause: since the nature of sign appears to be more in keeping with an effect. But a sacrament is a sign of grace. Therefore it is not its cause.

Objection 2: Further, nothing corporeal can act on a spiritual thing: since “the agent is more excellent than the patient,” as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii). But the subject of grace is the human mind, which is something spiritual. Therefore the sacraments cannot cause grace.

Objection 3: Further, what is proper to God should not be ascribed to a creature. But it is proper to God to cause grace, according to Ps. 83:12: “The Lord will give grace and glory.” Since, therefore, the sacraments consist in certain words and created things, it seems that they cannot cause grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.) that the baptismal water “touches the body and cleanses the heart.” But the heart is not cleansed save through grace. Therefore it causes grace: and for like reason so do the other sacraments of the Church.

I answer that, We must needs say that in some way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace. For it is evident that through the sacraments of the New Law man is incorporated with Christ: thus the Apostle says of Baptism (Gal. 3:27): “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ.” And man is made a member of Christ through grace alone.

Some, however, say that they are the cause of grace not by their own operation, but in so far as God causes grace in the soul when the sacraments are employed. And they give as an example a man who on presenting a leaden coin, receives, by the king’s command, a hundred pounds: not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own, caused him to be given that sum of money; this being the effect of the mere will of the king. Hence Bernard says in a sermon on the Lord’s Supper: “Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crozier, a bishop by means of a ring, so by the various sacraments various kinds of grace are conferred.” But if we examine the question properly, we shall see that according to the above mode the sacraments are mere signs. For the leaden coin is nothing but a sign of the king’s command that this man should receive money. In like manner the book is a sign of the conferring of a canonry. Hence, according to this opinion the sacraments of the New Law would be mere signs of grace; whereas we have it on the authority of many saints that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but also cause grace.

We must therefore say otherwise, that an efficient cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The principal cause works by the power of its form, to which form the effect is likened; just as fire by its own heat makes something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace: since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pet. 1:4: “He hath given us most great and precious promises; that we may be [Vulg.: ‘you may be made’] partakers of the Divine Nature.” But the instrumental cause works not by the power of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent: for instance, the couch is not like the axe, but like the art which is in the craftsman’s mind. And it is thus that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace: for they are instituted by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix): “All these things,” viz. pertaining to the sacraments, “are done and pass away, but the power,” viz. of God, “which works by them, remains ever.” Now that is, properly speaking, an instrument by which someone works: wherefore it is written (Titus 3:5): “He saved us by the laver of regeneration.”

Reply to Objection 1: The principal cause cannot properly be called a sign of its effect, even though the latter be hidden and the cause itself sensible and manifest. But an instrumental cause, if manifest, can be called a sign of a hidden effect, for this reason, that it is not merely a cause but also in a measure an effect in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. And in this sense the sacraments of the New Law are both cause and signs. Hence, too, is it that, to use the common expression, “they effect what they signify.” From this it is clear that they perfectly fulfil the conditions of a sacrament; being ordained to something sacred, not only as a sign, but also as a cause.

Reply to Objection 2: An instrument has a twofold action; one is instrumental, in respect of which it works not by its own power but by the power of the principal agent: the other is its proper action, which belongs to it in respect of its proper form: thus it belongs to an axe to cut asunder by reason of its sharpness, but to make a couch, in so far as it is the instrument of an art. But it does not accomplish the instrumental action save by exercising its proper action: for it is by cutting that it makes a couch. In like manner the corporeal sacraments by their operation, which they exercise on the body that they touch, accomplish through the Divine institution an instrumental operation on the soul; for example, the water of baptism, in respect of its proper power, cleanses the body, and thereby, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the Divine power, cleanses the soul: since from soul and body one thing is made. And thus it is that Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that it “touches the body and cleanses the heart.”

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers that which causes grace as principal agent; for this belongs to God alone, as stated above.

Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts?

Objection 1: It seems that sacramental grace confers nothing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts. For the grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the soul sufficiently, both in its essence and in its powers; as is clear from what was said in the [4353]FS, Q[110], AA[3],4. But grace is ordained to the perfecting of the soul. Therefore sacramental grace cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

Objection 2: Further, the soul's defects are caused by sin. But all sins are sufficiently removed by the grace of the virtues and gifts: because there is no sin that is not contrary to some virtue. Since, therefore, sacramental grace is ordained to the removal of the soul's defects, it cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

Objection 3: Further, every addition or subtraction of form varies the species (Metaph. viii). If, therefore, sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it follows that it is called grace equivocally: and so we are none the wiser when it is said that the sacraments cause grace.

On the contrary, If sacramental grace confers nothing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it is useless to confer the sacraments on those who have the virtues and gifts. But there is nothing useless in God's works. Therefore it seems that sacramental grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

I answer that, As stated in the [4354]FS, Q[110], AA[3],4, grace, considered in itself, perfects the essence of the soul, in so far as it is a certain participated likeness of the Divine Nature. And just as the soul's powers flow from its essence, so from grace there flow certain perfections into the powers of the soul, which are called virtues and gifts, whereby the powers are perfected in reference to their actions. Now the sacraments are ordained unto certain special effects which are necessary in the Christian life: thus Baptism is ordained unto a certain spiritual regeneration, by which man dies to vice and becomes a member of Christ: which effect is something special in addition to the actions of the soul's powers: and the same holds true of the other sacraments. Consequently just as the virtues and gifts confer, in addition to grace commonly so called, a certain special perfection ordained to the powers' proper actions, so does sacramental grace confer, over and above grace commonly so called, and in addition to the virtues and gifts, a certain Divine assistance in obtaining the end of the sacrament. It is thus that sacramental grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

Reply to Objection 1: The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers of the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary conduct: but as regards certain special effects which are necessary in a Christian life, sacramental grace is needed.

Reply to Objection 2: Vices and sins are sufficiently removed by virtues and gifts, as to present and future time. in so far as they prevent man from sinning. But in regard to past sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas their guilt remains, man is provided with a special remedy in the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: Sacramental grace is compared to grace commonly so called, as species to genus. Wherefore just as it is not equivocal to use the term "animal" in its generic sense, and as applied to a man, so neither is it equivocal to speak of grace commonly so called and of sacramental grace.

Whether the sacraments of the New Law contain grace?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace. For it seems that what is contained is in the container. But grace is not in the sacraments; neither as in a subject, because the subject of grace is not a body but a spirit; nor as in a vessel, for according to Phys. iv, "a vessel is a movable place," and an accident cannot be in a place. Therefore it seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace.

Objection 2: Further, sacraments are instituted as means whereby men may obtain grace. But since grace is an accident it cannot pass from one subject to another. Therefore it would be of no account if grace were in the sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, a spiritual thing is not contained by a corporeal, even if it be therein; for the soul is not contained by the body; rather does it contain the body. Since, therefore, grace is something spiritual, it seems that it cannot be contained in a corporeal sacrament.

On the contrary, Hugh of S. Victor says (De Sacram. i) that "a sacrament, through its being sanctified, contains an invisible grace."

I answer that, A thing is said to be in another in various ways; in two of which grace is said to be in the sacraments. First, as in its sign; for a sacrament is a sign of grace. Secondly, as in its cause; for, as stated above [4355](A[1]) a sacrament of the New Law is an instrumental cause of grace. Wherefore grace is in a sacrament of the New Law, not as to its specific likeness, as an effect in its univocal cause; nor as to some proper and permanent form proportioned to such an effect, as effects in non-univocal causes, for instance, as things generated are in the sun; but as to a certain instrumental power transient and incomplete in its natural being, as will be explained later on [4356](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: Grace is said to be in a sacrament not as in its subject; nor as in a vessel considered as a place, but understood as the instrument of some work to be done, according to Ezech. 9:1: “Everyone hath a destroying vessel [Douay: ‘weapon’] in his hand.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although an accident does not pass from one subject to another, nevertheless in a fashion it does pass from its cause into its subject through the instrument; not so that it be in each of these in the same way, but in each according to its respective nature.

Reply to Objection 3: If a spiritual thing exist perfectly in something, it contains it and is not contained by it. But, in a sacrament, grace has a passing and incomplete mode of being: and consequently it is not unfitting to say that the sacraments contain grace.

Whether there be in the sacraments a power of causing grace?

Objection 1: It seems that there is not in the sacraments a power of causing grace. For the power of causing grace is a spiritual power. But a spiritual power cannot be in a body; neither as proper to it, because power flows from a thing’s essence and consequently cannot transcend it; nor as derived from something else, because that which is received into anything follows the mode of the recipient. Therefore in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.

Objection 2: Further, whatever exists is reducible to some kind of being and some degree of good. But there is no assignable kind of being to which such a power can belong; as anyone may see by running. through them all. Nor is it reducible to some degree of good; for neither is it one of the goods of least account, since sacraments are necessary for salvation: nor is it an intermediate good, such as are the powers of the soul, which are natural powers; nor is it one of the greater goods, for it is neither grace nor a virtue of the mind. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.

Objection 3: Further, if there be such a power in the sacraments, its presence there must be due to nothing less than a creative act of God. But it seems unbecoming that so excellent a being created by God should cease to exist as soon as the sacrament is complete. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power for causing grace.

Objection 4: Further, the same thing cannot be in several. But several things concur in the completion of a sacrament, namely, words and things: while in one sacrament there can be but one power. Therefore it seems that there is no power of causing grace in the sacraments.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): “Whence hath water so great power, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?” And Bede says that “Our Lord conferred a power of regeneration on the waters by the contact of His most pure body.”

I answer that, Those who hold that the sacraments do not cause grace save by a certain coincidence, deny the sacraments any power that is itself productive of the sacramental effect, and hold that the Divine power assists the sacraments and produces their effect. But if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing about the sacramental effects. Now such power is proportionate to the instrument: and consequently it stands in comparison to the complete and perfect power of anything, as the instrument to the principal agent. For an instrument, as stated above [4357](A[1]), does not work save as moved by the principal agent, which works of itself. And therefore the power of the principal agent exists in nature completely and perfectly: whereas the instrumental power has a being that passes from one thing into another, and is incomplete; just as motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.

Reply to Objection 1: A spiritual power cannot be in a corporeal subject, after the manner of a permanent and complete power, as the argument proves. But there is nothing to hinder an instrumental spiritual power from being in a body; in so far as a body can be moved by a particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular spiritual effect; thus in the very voice which is perceived by the senses there is a certain spiritual power, inasmuch as it proceeds from a mental concept, of arousing the mind of the hearer. It is in this way that a spiritual power is in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are ordained by God unto the production of a spiritual effect.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as motion, through being an imperfect act, is not properly in a genus, but is reducible to a genus of perfect act, for instance, alteration to the genus of quality: so, instrumental power, properly speaking, is not in any genus, but is reducible to a genus and species of perfect act.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as an instrumental power accrues to an instrument through its being moved by the principal agent, so does a sacrament receive spiritual power from Christ's blessing and from the action of the minister in applying it to a sacramental use. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (St. Maximus of Turin, Serm. xii): "Nor should you marvel, if we say that water, a corporeal substance, achieves the cleansing of the soul. It does indeed, and penetrates every secret hiding-place of the conscience. For subtle and clear as it is, the blessing of Christ makes it yet more subtle, so that it permeates into the very principles of life and searches the inner-most recesses of the heart."

Reply to Objection 4: Just as the one same power of the principal agent is instrumentally in all the instruments that are ordained unto the production of an effect, forasmuch as they are one as being so ordained: so also the one same sacramental power is in both words and things, forasmuch as words and things combine to form one sacrament.

Whether the sacraments of the New Law derive their power from Christ's Passion?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not derive their power from Christ's Passion. For the power of the sacraments is in the causing of grace which is the principle of spiritual life in the soul. But as Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.): "The Word, as He was in the beginning with God, quickens souls; as He was made flesh, quickens bodies." Since, therefore, Christ's Passion pertains to the Word as made flesh, it seems that it cannot cause the power of the sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, the power of the sacraments seems to depend on faith. for as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.), the Divine Word perfects the sacrament "not because it is spoken, but because it is believed." But our faith regards not only Christ's Passion, but also the other mysteries of His humanity, and in a yet higher measure, His Godhead. Therefore it seems that the power of the sacraments is not due specially to Christ's Passion.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments are ordained unto man's justification, according to 1 Cor. 6:11: "You are washed . . . you are justified." Now justification is ascribed to the Resurrection, according to Rom. 4:25: "(Who) rose again for our justification." Therefore it seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ's Resurrection rather than from His Passion.

On the contrary, on Rom. 5:14: "After the similitude of the transgression of Adam," etc., the gloss says: "From the side of Christ asleep on the Cross flowed the sacraments which brought salvation to the Church." Consequently, it seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ's Passion.

I answer that, As stated above [4358](A[1]) a sacrament in causing grace works after the manner of an instrument. Now an instrument is twofold. the one, separate, as a stick, for instance; the other, united, as a hand. Moreover, the separate instrument is moved by means of the united instrument, as a stick by the hand. Now the principal efficient cause of grace is God Himself, in comparison with Whom Christ's humanity is as a united instrument, whereas the sacrament is as a separate instrument. Consequently, the saving power must needs be derived by the sacraments from Christ's Godhead through His humanity.

Now sacramental grace seems to be ordained principally to two things: namely, to take away the defects consequent on past sins, in so far as they are transitory in act, but endure in guilt; and, further, to perfect the soul in things pertaining to Divine Worship in regard to the Christian Religion. But it is manifest from what has been stated above ([4359]Q[48], AA[1],2,6; [4360] Q[49], AA[1],3) that Christ delivered us from our sins principally through His Passion, not only by way of efficiency and merit, but also by way of satisfaction. Likewise by His Passion He inaugurated the Rites of the Christian Religion by offering "Himself—an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (Eph. 5:2). Wherefore it is manifest that the sacraments of the Church derive their power specially from Christ's Passion, the virtue of which is in a manner united to us by our receiving the sacraments. It was in sign of this that from the side of Christ hanging on the Cross there flowed water and blood, the former of which belongs to Baptism, the latter to the Eucharist, which are the principal sacraments.

Reply to Objection 1: The Word, forasmuch as He was in the beginning with God, quickens souls as principal agent; but His flesh, and the mysteries accomplished therein, are as instrumental causes in the process of giving life to the soul: while in giving life to the body they act not only as instrumental causes, but also to a certain extent as exemplars, as we stated above ([4361]Q[56], A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: Christ dwells in us "by faith" (Eph. 3:17). Consequently, by faith Christ's power is united to us. Now the power of blotting out sin belongs in a special way to His Passion. And therefore men are delivered from sin especially by faith in His Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His Blood." Therefore the power of the sacraments which is ordained unto the remission of sins is derived principally from faith in Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 3: Justification is ascribed to the Resurrection by reason of the term "whither," which is newness of life through grace. But it is ascribed to the Passion by reason of the term "whence," i.e. in regard to the forgiveness of sin.

Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace. For, as stated above (A[5], ad 2) the sacraments of the New Law derive their efficacy from faith in Christ's Passion. But there was faith in Christ's Passion under the Old Law, as well as under the New, since we have "the same spirit of faith" (2 Cor. 4:13). Therefore just as the sacraments of the New Law confer grace, so did the sacraments of the Old Law.

Objection 2: Further, there is no sanctification save by grace. But men were sanctified by the sacraments of the Old Law: for it is written (Lev. 8:31): "And when he," i.e. Moses, "had sanctified them," i.e. Aaron and his sons, "in their vestments," etc. Therefore it seems that the sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace.

Objection 3: Further, Bede says in a homily on the Circumcision: "Under the Law circumcision provided the same health-giving balm against the wound of original sin, as baptism in the time of revealed grace." But

Baptism confers grace now. Therefore circumcision conferred grace; and in like manner, the other sacraments of the Law; for just as Baptism is the door of the sacraments of the New Law, so was circumcision the door of the sacraments of the Old Law: hence the Apostle says (Gal. 5:3): “I testify to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to the whole law.”

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 4:9): “Turn you again to the weak and needy elements?” i.e. “to the Law,” says the gloss, “which is called weak, because it does not justify perfectly.” But grace justifies perfectly. Therefore the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace.

I answer that, It cannot be said that the sacraments of the Old Law conferred sanctifying grace of themselves, i.e. by their own power: since thus Christ’s Passion would not have been necessary, according to Gal. 2:21: “If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.”

But neither can it be said that they derived the power of conferring sanctifying grace from Christ’s Passion. For as it was stated above (A[5]), the power of Christ’s Passion is united to us by faith and the sacraments, but in different ways; because the link that comes from faith is produced by an act of the soul; whereas the link that comes from the sacraments, is produced by making use of exterior things. Now nothing hinders that which is subsequent in point of time, from causing movement, even before it exists in reality, in so far as it pre-exists in an act of the soul: thus the end, which is subsequent in point of time, moves the agent in so far as it is apprehended and desired by him. On the other hand, what does not yet actually exist, does not cause movement if we consider the use of exterior things. Consequently, the efficient cause cannot in point of time come into existence after causing movement, as does the final cause. It is therefore clear that the sacraments of the New Law do reasonably derive the power of justification from Christ’s Passion, which is the cause of man’s righteousness; whereas the sacraments of the Old Law did not.

Nevertheless the Fathers of old were justified by faith in Christ’s Passion, just as we are. And the sacraments of the old Law were a kind of protestation of that faith, inasmuch as they signified Christ’s Passion and its effects. It is therefore manifest that the sacraments of the Old Law were not endowed with any power by which they conduced to the bestowal of justifying grace: and they merely signified faith by which men were justified.

Reply to Objection 1: The Fathers of old had faith in the future Passion of Christ, which, inasmuch as it was apprehended by the mind, was able to justify them. But we have faith in the past Passion of Christ, which is able to justify, also by the real use of sacramental things as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: That sanctification was but a figure: for they were said to be sanctified forasmuch as they gave themselves up to the Divine worship according to the rite of the Old Law, which was wholly ordained to the foreshadowing of Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 3: There have been many opinions about Circumcision. For, according to some, Circumcision conferred no grace, but only remitted sin. But this is impossible; because man is not justified from sin save by grace, according to Rom. 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace."

Wherefore others said that by Circumcision grace is conferred, as to the privative effects of sin, but not as to its positive effects. But this also appears to be false, because by Circumcision, children received the faculty of obtaining glory, which is the ultimate positive effect of grace. Moreover, as regards the order of the formal cause, positive effects are naturally prior to privative effects, though according to the order of the material cause, the reverse is the case: for a form does not exclude privation save by informing the subject.

Hence others say that Circumcision conferred grace also as regards a certain positive effect, i.e. by making man worthy of eternal life, but not so as to repress concupiscence which makes man prone to sin. And so at one time it seemed to me. But if the matter be considered carefully, this too appears to be untrue; because the very least grace is sufficient to resist any degree of concupiscence, and to merit eternal life.

And therefore it seems better to say that Circumcision was a sign of justifying faith: wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 4:11) that Abraham "received the sign of Circumcision, a seal of the justice of faith." Consequently grace was conferred in Circumcision in so far as it was a sign of Christ's future Passion, as will be made clear further on ([4362]Q[70], A[4]).

OF THE OTHER EFFECT OF THE SACRAMENTS, WHICH IS A CHARACTER (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the other effect of the sacraments, which is a character: and concerning this there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether by the sacraments a character is produced in the soul?

(2) What is this character?

(3) Of whom is this character?

(4) What is its subject?

(5) Is it indelible?

(6) Whether every sacrament imprints a character?

Whether a sacrament imprints a character on the soul?

Objection 1: It seems that a sacrament does not imprint a character on the soul. For the word “character” seems to signify some kind of distinctive sign. But Christ’s members are distinguished from others by eternal predestination, which does not imply anything in the predestined, but only in God predestinating, as we have stated in the [4363]FP, Q[23], A[2]. For it is written (2 Tim. 2:19): “The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal: The Lord knoweth who are His.” Therefore the sacraments do not imprint a character on the soul.

Objection 2: Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now a sign, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii) “is that which conveys something else to the mind, besides the species which it impresses on the senses.” But nothing in the soul can impress a species on the senses. Therefore it seems that no character is imprinted on the soul by the sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, just as the believer is distinguished from the unbeliever by the sacraments of the New Law, so was it under the Old Law. But the sacraments of the Old Law did not imprint a character; whence they are called “justices of the flesh” (Heb. 9:10) by the Apostle. Therefore neither seemingly do the sacraments of the New Law.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 1:21,22): “He . . . that hath anointed us is God; Who also hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the spirit in our hearts.” But a character means nothing else than a kind of sealing. Therefore it seems that by the sacraments God imprints His character on us.

I answer that, As is clear from what has been already stated ([4364]Q[62], A[5]) the sacraments of the New Law are ordained for a twofold purpose; namely, for a remedy against sins; and for the perfecting of the soul in things pertaining to the Divine worship according to the rite of the Christian life. Now whenever anyone is deputed to some definite purpose he is wont to receive some outward sign thereof; thus in olden times soldiers who enlisted in the ranks used to be marked with certain characters on the body, through being deputed to a bodily service. Since, therefore, by the sacraments men are deputed to a spiritual service pertaining to the worship of God, it follows that by their means the faithful receive a certain spiritual character. Wherefore Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): “If a deserter from the battle, through dread of the mark of enlistment on his body, throws himself on the emperor’s clemency, and having besought and received mercy, return to the fight; is that character renewed, when the man has been set free and reprimanded? is it not rather acknowledged and approved? Are the Christian sacraments, by any chance, of a nature less lasting than this bodily mark?”

Reply to Objection 1: The faithful of Christ are destined to the reward of the glory that is to come, by the seal of Divine Predestination. But they are deputed to acts becoming the Church that is now, by a certain spiritual seal that is set on them, and is called a character.

Reply to Objection 2: The character imprinted on the soul is a kind of sign in so far as it is imprinted by a sensible sacrament: since we know that a certain one has received the baptismal character, through his being cleansed by the sensible water. Nevertheless from a kind of likeness, anything that assimilates one thing to another, or discriminates one thing from another, even though it be not sensible, can be called a character or a seal; thus the Apostle calls Christ “the figure” or {charakter} “of the substance of the Father” (Heb. 1:3).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4365]Q[62], A[6]) the sacraments of the Old Law had not in themselves any spiritual power of producing a spiritual effect. Consequently in those sacraments there was no need of a spiritual character, and bodily circumcision sufficed, which the Apostle calls “a seal” (Rom. 4:11).

Whether a character is a spiritual power?

Objection 1: It seems that a character is not a spiritual power. For “character” seems to be the same thing as “figure”; hence (Heb. 1:3), where we read “figure of His substance, “for “figure” the Greek has {charakter}. Now “figure” is in the fourth species of quality, and thus differs from power which is in the second species. Therefore character is not a spiritual power.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii): “The Divine Beatitude admits him that seeks happiness to a share in Itself, and grants this share to him by conferring on him Its light as a kind of seal.” Consequently, it seems that a character is a kind of light. Now light belongs rather to the third species of quality. Therefore a character is not a power, since this seems to belong to the second species.

Objection 3: Further, character is defined by some thus: “A character is a holy sign of the communion of faith and of the holy ordination conferred by a hierarch.” Now a sign is in the genus of “relation,” not of “power.” Therefore a character is not a spiritual power.

Objection 4: Further, a power is in the nature of a cause and principle (Metaph. v). But a “sign” which is set down in the definition of a character is rather in the nature of an effect. Therefore a character is not a spiritual power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii): “There are three things in the soul, power, habit, and passion.” Now a character is not a passion: since a passion passes quickly, whereas a character is indelible, as will be made clear further on [4366](A[5]). In like manner it is not a habit: because no habit is indifferent to acting well or ill: whereas a character is indifferent to either, since some use it well, some ill. Now this cannot occur with a habit: because no one abuses a habit of virtue, or uses well an evil habit. It remains, therefore, that a character is a power.

I answer that, As stated above [4367](A[1]), the sacraments of the New Law produce a character, in so far as by them we are deputed to the worship of God according to the rite of the Christian religion. Wherefore Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), after saying that God “by a kind of sign grants a share of Himself to those that approach Him,” adds “by making them Godlike and communicators of Divine gifts.” Now the worship of God consists either in receiving Divine gifts, or in bestowing them on others. And for both these purposes some power is needed; for to bestow something on others, active power is necessary; and in order to receive, we need a passive power. Consequently, a character signifies a certain spiritual power ordained unto things pertaining to the Divine worship.

But it must be observed that this spiritual power is instrumental: as we have stated above ([4368]Q[62], A[4]) of the virtue which is in the sacraments. For to have a sacramental character belongs to God’s ministers: and a minister is a kind of instrument, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). Consequently, just as the virtue which is in the sacraments is not of itself in a genus, but is reducible to a genus, for the reason that it is of a transitory and incomplete nature: so also a character is not properly in a genus or species, but is reducible to the second species of quality.

Reply to Objection 1: Configuration is a certain boundary of quantity. Wherefore, properly speaking, it is only in corporeal things; and of spiritual things is said metaphorically. Now that which decides the genus or species of a thing must needs be predicated of it properly. Consequently, a character cannot be in the fourth species of quality, although some have held this to be the case.

Reply to Objection 2: The third species of quality contains only sensible passions or sensible qualities. Now a character is not a sensible light. Consequently, it is not in the third species of quality as some have maintained.

Reply to Objection 3: The relation signified by the word “sign” must needs have some foundation. Now the relation signified by this sign which is a character, cannot be founded immediately on the essence of the soul: because then it would belong to every soul naturally. Consequently, there must be something in the soul on which such a relation is founded. And it is in this that a character essentially consists. Therefore it need not be in the genus “relation” as some have held.

Reply to Objection 4: A character is in the nature of a sign in comparison to the sensible sacrament by which it is imprinted. But considered in itself, it is in the nature of a principle, in the way already explained.

Whether the sacramental character is the character of Christ?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental character is not the character of Christ. For it is written (Eph. 4:30): “Grieve not the Holy Spirit of God, whereby you are sealed.” But a character consists essentially in some. thing that seals. Therefore the sacramental character should be attributed to the Holy Ghost rather than to Christ.

Objection 2: Further, a character has the nature of a sign. And it is a sign of the grace that is conferred by the sacrament. Now grace is poured forth into the soul by the whole Trinity; wherefore it is written (Ps. 83:12): “The Lord will give grace and glory.” Therefore it seems that the sacramental character should not be attributed specially to Christ.

Objection 3: Further, a man is marked with a character that he may be distinguishable from others. But the saints are distinguishable from others by charity, which, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv), “alone separates the children of the Kingdom from the children of perdition”: wherefore also the children of perdition are said to have “the character of the beast” (Apoc. 13:16,17). But charity is not attributed to Christ, but rather to the Holy Ghost according to Rom. 5:5: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us”; or even to the Father, according to 2 Cor. 13:13: “The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the charity of God.” Therefore it seems that the sacramental character should not be attributed to Christ.

On the contrary, Some define character thus: “A character is a distinctive mark printed in a man’s rational soul by the eternal Character, whereby the created trinity is sealed with the likeness of the creating and re-creating Trinity, and distinguishing him from those who are not so enlikened, according to the state of faith.” But the eternal Character is Christ Himself, according to Heb. 1:3: “Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure,” or character, “of His substance.” It seems, therefore, that the character should properly be attributed to Christ.

I answer that, As has been made clear above [4369](A[1]), a character is properly a kind of seal, whereby something is marked, as being ordained to some particular end: thus a coin is marked for use in exchange of goods, and soldiers are marked with a character as being deputed to military service. Now the faithful are deputed to a twofold end. First and principally to the enjoyment of glory. And for this purpose they are marked with the seal of grace according to Ezech. 9:4: “Mark Thou upon the foreheads of the men that sigh and mourn”; and Apoc. 7:3: “Hurt not the earth, nor the sea, nor the trees, till we sign the servants of our God in their foreheads.”

Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or to bestow on others, things pertaining to the worship of God. And this, properly speaking, is the purpose of the sacramental character. Now the whole rite of the Christian religion is derived from Christ’s priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ’s Priesthood, flowing from Christ Himself.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle speaks there of that sealing by which a man is assigned to future glory, and which is effected by grace. Now grace is attributed to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is through love that God gives us something gratis, which is the very nature of grace: while the Holy Ghost is love. Wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 12:4): “There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.”

Reply to Objection 2: The sacramental character is a thing as regards the exterior sacrament, and a sacrament in regard to the ultimate effect. Consequently, something can be attributed to a character in two ways. First, if the character be considered as a sacrament: and thus it is a sign of the invisible grace which is conferred in the sacrament. Secondly, if it be considered as a character. And thus it is a sign conferring on a man a likeness to some principal person in whom is vested the authority over that to which he is assigned: thus soldiers who are assigned to military service, are marked with their leader’s sign, by which they are, in a fashion, likened to him. And in this way those who are deputed to the Christian worship, of which Christ is the author, receive a character by which they are likened to Christ. Consequently, properly speaking, this is Christ’s character.

Reply to Objection 3: A character distinguishes one from another, in relation to some particular end, to which he, who receives the character is ordained: as has been stated concerning the military character [4370](A[1]) by which a soldier of the king is distinguished from the enemy’s soldier in relation to the battle. In like manner the character of the faithful is that by which the faithful of Christ are distinguished from the servants of the devil, either in relation to eternal life, or in relation to the worship of the Church that now is. Of these the former is the result of charity and grace, as the objection runs; while the latter results from the sacramental character. Wherefore the “character of the beast” may be understood by opposition, to mean either the obstinate malice for which some are assigned to eternal punishment, or the profession of an unlawful form of worship.

Whether the character be subjected in the powers of the soul?

Objection 1: It seems that the character is not subjected in the powers of the soul. For a character is said to be a disposition to grace. But grace is subjected in the essence of the soul as we have stated in the [4371]FS, Q[110], A[4]. Therefore it seems that the character is in the essence of the soul and not in the powers.

Objection 2: Further, a power of the soul does not seem to be the subject of anything save habit and disposition. But a character, as stated above [4372](A[2]), is neither habit nor disposition, but rather a power: the subject of which is nothing else than the essence of the soul. Therefore it seems that the character is not subjected in a power of the soul, but rather in its essence.

Objection 3: Further, the powers of the soul are divided into those of knowledge and those of appetite. But it cannot be said that a character is only in a cognitive power, nor, again, only in an appetitive power: since it is neither ordained to knowledge only, nor to desire only. Likewise, neither can it be said to be in both, because the same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore it seems that a character is not subjected in a power of the soul, but rather in the essence.

On the contrary, A character, according to its definition given above [4373](A[3]), is imprinted in the rational soul “by way of an image.” But the image of the Trinity in the soul is seen in the powers. Therefore a character is in the powers of the soul.

I answer that, As stated above [4374](A[3]), a character is a kind of seal by which the soul is marked, so that it may receive, or bestow on others, things pertaining to Divine worship. Now the Divine worship consists in certain actions: and the powers of the soul are properly ordained to actions, just as the essence is ordained to existence. Therefore a character is subjected not in the essence of the soul, but in its power.

Reply to Objection 1: The subject is ascribed to an. accident in respect of that to which the accident disposes it proximately, but not in respect of that to which it disposes it remotely or indirectly. Now a character disposes the soul directly and proximately to the fulfilling of things pertaining to Divine worship: and because such cannot be accomplished suitably without the help of grace, since, according to Jn. 4:24, “they that adore” God “must adore Him in spirit and in truth,” consequently, the Divine bounty bestows grace on those who receive the character, so that they may accomplish worthily the service to which they are deputed. Therefore the subject should be ascribed to a character in respect of those actions that pertain to the Divine worship, rather than in respect of grace.

Reply to Objection 2: The subject of the natural power, which flows from the principles of the essence. Now a character is not a power of this kind. but a spiritual power coming from without. Wherefore, just as the essence of the soul, from which man has his natural life, is perfected by grace from which the soul derives spiritual life; so the natural power of the soul is perfected by a spiritual power, which is a character. For habit and disposition belong to a power of the soul, since they are ordained to actions of which the powers are the principles. And in like manner whatever is ordained to action, should be attributed to a power.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, a character is ordained unto things pertaining to the Divine worship; which is a protestation of faith expressed by exterior signs. Consequently, a character needs to be in the soul’s cognitive power, where also is faith.

Whether a character can be blotted out from the soul?

Objection 1: It seems that a character can be blotted out from the soul. Because the more perfect an accident is, the more firmly does it adhere to its subject. But grace is more perfect than a character; because a character is ordained unto grace as to a further end. Now grace is lost through sin. Much more, therefore, is a character so lost.

Objection 2: Further, by a character a man is deputed to the Divine worship, as stated above ([4375]AA[3],4). But some pass from the worship of God to a contrary worship by apostasy from the faith. It seems, therefore, that such lose the sacramental character.

Objection 3: Further, when the end ceases, the means to the end should cease also: thus after the resurrection there will be no marriage, because begetting will cease, which is the purpose of marriage. Now the exterior worship to which a character is ordained, will not endure in heaven, where there will be no shadows, but all will be truth without a veil. Therefore the sacramental character does not last in the soul for ever: and consequently it can be blotted out.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): “The Christian sacraments are not less lasting than the bodily mark” of military service. But the character of military service is not repeated, but is “recognized and approved” in the man who obtains the emperor’s forgiveness after offending him. Therefore neither can the sacramental character be blotted out.

I answer that, As stated above [4376](A[3]), in a sacramental character Christ’s faithful have a share in His Priesthood; in the sense that as Christ has the full power of a spiritual priesthood, so His faithful are likened to Him by sharing a certain spiritual power with regard to the sacraments and to things pertaining to the Divine worship. For this reason it is unbecoming that Christ should have a character: but His Priesthood is compared to a character, as that which is complete and perfect is compared to some participation of itself. Now Christ’s Priesthood is eternal, according to Ps. 109:4: “Thou art a priest for ever, according to the order of Melchisedech.” Consequently, every sanctification wrought by His Priesthood, is perpetual, enduring as long as the thing sanctified endures. This is clear even in inanimate things; for the consecration of a church or an altar lasts for ever unless they be destroyed. Since, therefore, the subject of a character is the soul as to its intellective part, where faith resides, as stated above (A[4], ad 3); it is clear that, the intellect being perpetual and incorruptible, a character cannot be blotted out from the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Both grace and character are in the soul, but in different ways. For grace is in the soul, as a form having complete existence therein: whereas a character is in the soul, as an instrumental power, as stated above [4377](A[2]). Now a complete form is in its subject according to the condition of the subject. And since the soul as long as it is a wayfarer is changeable in respect of the free-will, it results that grace is in the soul in a changeable manner. But an instrumental power follows rather the condition of the principal agent: and consequently a character exists in the soul in an indelible manner, not from any perfection of its own, but from the perfection of Christ's Priesthood, from which the character flows like an instrumental power.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii), "even apostates are not deprived of their baptism, for when they repent and return to the fold they do not receive it again; whence we conclude that it cannot be lost." The reason of this is that a character is an instrumental power, as stated above (ad 1), and the nature of an instrument as such is to be moved by another, but not to move itself; this belongs to the will. Consequently, however much the will be moved in the contrary direction, the character is not removed, by reason of the immobility of the principal mover.

Reply to Objection 3: Although external worship does not last after this life, yet its end remains. Consequently, after this life the character remains, both in the good as adding to their glory, and in the wicked as increasing their shame: just as the character of the military service remains in the soldiers after the victory, as the boast of the conquerors, and the disgrace of the conquered.

Whether a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law?

Objection 1: It seems that a character is imprinted by all the sacraments of the New Law: because each sacrament of the New Law makes man a participator in Christ's Priesthood. But the sacramental character is nothing but a participation in Christ's Priesthood, as already stated ([4378]AA[3],5). Therefore it seems that a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.

Objection 2: Further, a character may be compared to the soul in which it is, as a consecration to that which is consecrated. But by each sacrament of the New Law man becomes the recipient of sanctifying grace, as stated above ([4379]Q[62], A[1]). Therefore it seems that a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.

Objection 3: Further, a character is both a reality and a sacrament. But in each sacrament of the New Law, there is something which is only a reality, and something which is only a sacrament, and something which is both reality and sacrament. Therefore a character is imprinted by each sacrament of the New Law.

On the contrary, Those sacraments in which a character is imprinted, are not reiterated, because a character is indelible, as stated above [4380] (A[5]): whereas some sacraments are reiterated, for instance, penance and matrimony. Therefore not all the sacraments imprint a character.

I answer that, As stated above ([4381]Q[62], AA[1],5), the sacraments of the New Law are ordained for a twofold purpose, namely, as a remedy for sin, and for the Divine worship. Now all the sacraments, from the fact that they confer grace, have this in common, that they afford a remedy against sin: whereas not all the sacraments are directly ordained to the Divine worship. Thus it is clear that penance, whereby man is delivered from sin, does not afford man any advance in the Divine worship, but restores him to his former state.

Now a sacrament may belong to the Divine worship in three ways: first in regard to the thing done; secondly, in regard to the agent; thirdly, in regard to the recipient. In regard to the thing done, the Eucharist belongs to the Divine worship, for the Divine worship consists principally therein, so far as it is the sacrifice of the Church. And by this same sacrament a character is not imprinted on man; because it does not ordain man to any further sacramental action or benefit received, since rather is it “the end and consummation of all the sacraments,” as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). But it contains within itself Christ, in Whom there is not the character, but the very plenitude of the Priesthood.

But it is the sacrament of order that pertains to the sacramental agents: for it is by this sacrament that men are deputed to confer sacraments on others: while the sacrament of Baptism pertains to the recipients, since it confers on man the power to receive the other sacraments of the Church; whence it is called the “door of the sacraments.” In a way Confirmation also is ordained for the same purpose, as we shall explain in its proper place ([4382]Q[65], A[3]). Consequently, these three sacraments imprint a character, namely, Baptism, Confirmation, and order.

Reply to Objection 1: Every sacrament makes man of the a participator in Christ’s Priesthood, from the fact that it confers on him some effect thereof. But every sacrament does not depute a man to do or receive something pertaining to the worship of the priesthood of Christ: while it is just this that is required for a sacrament to imprint a character.

Reply to Objection 2: Man is sanctified by each of the sacraments, since sanctity means immunity from sin, which is the effect of grace. But in a special way some sacraments, which imprint a character, bestow on man a certain consecration, thus deputing him to the Divine worship: just as inanimate things are said to be consecrated forasmuch as they are deputed to Divine worship.

Reply to Objection 3: Although a character is a reality and a sacrament, it does not follow that whatever is a reality and a sacrament, is also a character. With regard to the other sacraments we shall explain further on what is the reality and what is the sacrament.

OF THE CAUSES OF THE SACRAMENTS (TEN ARTICLES)

In the next place we have to consider the causes of the sacraments, both as to authorship and as to ministration. Concerning which there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether God alone works inwardly in the sacraments?

(2) Whether the institution of the sacraments is from God alone?

(3) Of the power which Christ exercised over the sacraments;

(4) Whether He could transmit that power to others?

(5) Whether the wicked can have the power of administering the sacraments?

(6) Whether the wicked sin in administering the sacraments?

(7) Whether the angels can be ministers of the sacraments?

(8) Whether the minister’s intention is necessary in the sacraments?

(9) Whether right faith is required therein; so that it be impossible for an unbeliever to confer a sacrament?

(10) Whether a right intention is required therein?

Whether God alone, or the minister also, works inwardly unto the sacramental effect?

Objection 1: It seems that not God alone, but also the minister, works inwardly unto the sacramental effect. For the inward sacramental effect is to cleanse man from sin and enlighten him by grace. But it belongs to the ministers of the Church "to cleanse, enlighten and perfect," as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. v). Therefore it seems that the sacramental effect is the work not only of God, but also of the ministers of the Church.

Objection 2: Further, certain prayers are offered up in conferring the sacraments. But the prayers of the righteous are more acceptable to God than those of any other, according to Jn. 9:31: "If a man be a server of God, and doth His will, him He heareth." Therefore it stems that a man obtains a greater sacramental effect if he receive it from a good minister. Consequently, the interior effect is partly the work of the minister and not of God alone.

Objection 3: Further, man is of greater account than an inanimate thing. But an inanimate thing contributes something to the interior effect: since "water touches the body and cleanses the soul," as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Therefore the interior sacramental effect is partly the work of man and not of God alone.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 8:33): "God that justifieth." Since, then, the inward effect of all the sacraments is justification, it seems that God alone works the interior sacramental effect.

I answer that, There are two ways of producing an effect; first, as a principal agent; secondly, as an instrument. In the former way the interior sacramental effect is the work of God alone: first, because God alone can enter the soul wherein the sacramental effect takes place; and no agent can operate immediately where it is not: secondly, because grace which is an interior sacramental effect is from God alone, as we have established in the [4383]FS, Q[112], A[1]; while the character which is the interior effect of certain sacraments, is an instrumental power which flows from the principal agent, which is God. In the second way, however, the interior sacramental effect can be the work of man, in so far as he works as a minister. For a minister is of the nature of an instrument, since the action of both is applied to something extrinsic, while the interior effect is produced through the power of the principal agent, which is God.

Reply to Objection 1: Cleansing in so far as it is attributed to the ministers of the Church is not a washing from sin: deacons are said to "cleanse," inasmuch as they remove the unclean from the body of the faithful, or prepare them by their pious admonitions for the reception of the sacraments. In like manner also priests are said to "enlighten" God's people, not indeed by giving them grace, but by conferring on them the sacraments of grace; as Dionysius explains (Coel. Hier. v).

Reply to Objection 2: The prayers which are said in giving the sacraments, are offered to God, not on the part of the individual, but on the part of the whole Church, whose prayers are acceptable to God, according to Mat. 18:19: "If two of you shall consent upon earth, concerning anything whatsoever they shall ask, it shall be done to them by My Father." Nor is there any reason why the devotion of a just man should not contribute to this effect. But that which is the sacramental effect is not impetrated by the prayer of the Church or of the minister, but through the merit of Christ's Passion, the power of which operates in the sacraments, as stated above ([4384]Q[62], A[5]). Wherefore the sacramental effect is made no better by a better minister. And yet something in addition may be impetrated for the receiver of the sacrament through the devotion of the minister: but this is not the work of the minister, but the work of God Who hears the minister's prayer.

Reply to Objection 3: Inanimate things do not produce the sacramental effect, except instrumentally, as stated above. In like manner neither do men produce the sacramental effect, except ministerially, as also stated above.

Whether the sacraments are instituted by God alone?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments are not instituted by God alone. For those things which God has instituted are delivered to us in Holy Scripture. But in the sacraments certain things are done which are nowhere mentioned in Holy Scripture; for instance, the chrism with which men are confirmed, the oil with which priests are anointed, and many others, both words and actions, which we employ in the sacraments. Therefore the sacraments were not instituted by God alone.

Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is a kind of sign. Now sensible things have their own natural signification. Nor can it be said that God takes pleasure in certain significations and not in others; because He approves of all that He made. Moreover, it seems to be peculiar to the demons to be enticed to something by means of signs; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi): “The demons are enticed . . . by means of creatures, which were created not by them but by God, by various means of attraction according to their various natures, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit is drawn by a sign.” It seems, therefore, that there is no need for the sacraments to be instituted by God.

Objection 3: Further, the apostles were God’s vicegerents on earth: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:10): “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ,” i.e. as though Christ Himself had pardoned. Therefore it seems that the apostles and their successors can institute new sacraments.

On the contrary, The institutor of anything is he who gives it strength and power: as in the case of those who institute laws. But the power of a sacrament is from God alone, as we have shown above [4385](A[1]; Q[62], A[1]). Therefore God alone can institute a sacrament.

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above [4386](A[1]; Q[62], A[1]), the sacraments are instrumental causes of spiritual effects. Now an instrument has its power from the principal agent. But an agent in respect of a sacrament is twofold; viz. he who institutes the sacraments, and he who makes use of the sacrament instituted, by applying it for the production of the effect. Now the power of a sacrament cannot be from him who makes use of the sacrament: because he works but as a minister. Consequently, it follows that the power of the sacrament is from the institutor of the sacrament. Since, therefore, the power of the sacrament is from God alone, it follows that God alone can institute the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 1: Human institutions observed in the sacraments are not essential to the sacrament; but belong to the solemnity which is added to the sacraments in order to arouse devotion and reverence in the recipients. But those things that are essential to the sacrament, are instituted by Christ Himself, Who is God and man. And though they are not all handed down by the Scriptures, yet the Church holds them from the intimate tradition of the apostles, according to the saying of the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:34): “The rest I will set in order when I come.”

Reply to Objection 2: From their very nature sensible things have a certain aptitude for the signifying of spiritual effects: but this aptitude is fixed by the Divine institution to some special signification. This is what Hugh of St. Victor means by saying (De Sacram. i) that “a sacrament owes its signification to its institution.” Yet God chooses certain things rather than others for sacramental signification, not as though His choice were restricted to them, but in order that their signification be more suitable to them.

Reply to Objection 3: The apostles and their successors are God’s vicars in governing the Church which is built on faith and the sacraments of faith. Wherefore, just as they may not institute another Church, so neither may they deliver another faith, nor institute other sacraments: on the contrary, the Church is said to be built up with the sacraments “which flowed from the side of Christ while hanging on the Cross.”

Whether Christ as man had the power of producing the inward sacramental effect?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ as man had the power of producing the interior sacramental effect. For John the Baptist said (Jn. 1:33): “He, Who sent me to baptize in water, said to me: He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth with the Holy Ghost.” But to baptize with the Holy Ghost is to confer inwardly the grace of the Holy Ghost. And the Holy Ghost descended upon Christ as man, not as God: for thus He Himself gives the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that Christ, as man, had the power of producing the inward sacramental effect.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 9:6): “That you may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins.” But forgiveness of sins is an inward sacramental effect. Therefore it seems that Christ as man produces the inward sacramental effect.

Objection 3: Further, the institution of the sacraments belongs to him who acts as principal agent in producing the inward sacramental effect. Now it is clear that Christ instituted the sacraments. Therefore it is He that produces the inward sacramental effect.

Objection 4: Further, no one can confer the sacramental effect without conferring the sacrament, except he produce the sacramental effect by his own power. But Christ conferred the sacramental effect without conferring the sacrament; as in the case of Magdalen to whom He said: “Thy sins are forgiven Thee” (Lk. 7:48). Therefore it seems that Christ, as man, produces the inward sacramental effect.

Objection 5: Further, the principal agent in causing the inward effect is that in virtue of which the sacrament operates. But the sacraments derive their power from Christ’s Passion and through the invocation of His Name; according to 1 Cor. 1:13: “Was Paul then crucified for you? or were you baptized in the name of Paul?” Therefore Christ, as man, produces the inward sacramental effect.

On the contrary, Augustine (Isidore, Etym. vi) says: “The Divine power in the sacraments works inwardly in producing their salutary effect.” Now the Divine power is Christ’s as God, not as man. Therefore Christ produces the inward sacramental effect, not as man but as God.

I answer that, Christ produces the inward sacramental effect, both as God and as man, but not in the same way. For, as God, He works in the sacraments by authority: but, as man, His operation conduces to the inward sacramental effects meritoriously and efficiently, but instrumentally. For it has been stated ([4387]Q[48], AA[1],6;[4388] Q[49], A[1]) that Christ’s Passion which belongs to Him in respect of His human nature, is the cause of justification, both meritoriously and efficiently, not as the principal cause thereof, or by His own authority, but as an instrument, in so far as His humanity is the instrument of His Godhead, as stated above ([4389]Q[13], AA[2],3;[4390] Q[19], A[1]).

Nevertheless, since it is an instrument united to the Godhead in unity of Person, it has a certain headship and efficiency in regard to extrinsic instruments, which are the ministers of the Church and the sacraments themselves, as has been explained above [4391](A[1]). Consequently, just as Christ, as God, has power of “authority” over the sacraments, so, as man, He has the power of ministry in chief, or power of “excellence.” And this consists in four things. First in this, that the merit and power of His Passion operates in the sacraments, as stated above (Q[62], A[5]). And because the power of the Passion is communicated to us by faith, according to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His blood,” which faith we proclaim by calling on the name of Christ: therefore, secondly, Christ’s power of excellence over the sacraments consists in this, that they are sanctified by the invocation of His name. And because the sacraments derive their power from their institution, hence, thirdly, the excellence of Christ's power consists in this, that He, Who gave them their power, could institute the sacraments. And since cause does not depend on effect, but rather conversely, it belongs to the excellence of Christ's power, that He could bestow the sacramental effect without conferring the exterior sacrament. Thus it is clear how to solve the objections; for the arguments on either side are true to a certain extent, as explained above.

Whether Christ could communicate to ministers the power which He had in the sacraments?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ could not communicate to ministers the power which He had in the sacraments. For as Augustine argues against Maximin, "if He could, but would not, He was jealous of His power." But jealousy was far from Christ Who had the fulness of charity. Since, therefore, Christ did not communicate His power to ministers, it seems that He could not.

Objection 2: Further, on Jn. 14:12: "Greater than these shall he do," Augustine says (Tract. lxxii): "I affirm this to be altogether greater," namely, for a man from being ungodly to be made righteous, "than to create heaven and earth." But Christ could not communicate to His disciples the power of creating heaven and earth: neither, therefore, could He give them the power of making the ungodly to be righteous. Since, therefore, the justification of the ungodly is effected by the power that Christ has in the sacraments, it seems that He could not communicate that power to ministers.

Objection 3: Further, it belongs to Christ as Head of the Church that grace should flow from Him to others, according to Jn. 1:16: "Of His fulness we all have received." But this could not be communicated to others; since then the Church would be deformed, having many heads. Therefore it seems that Christ could not communicate His power to ministers.

On the contrary, on Jn. 1:31: "I knew Him not," Augustine says (Tract. v) that "he did not know that our Lord having the authority of baptizing . . . would keep it to Himself." But John would not have been in ignorance of this, if such a power were incommunicable. Therefore Christ could communicate His power to ministers.

I answer that, As stated above [4392](A[3]), Christ had a twofold power in the sacraments. one was the power of "authority," which belongs to Him as God: and this power He could not communicate to any creature; just as neither could He communicate the Divine Essence. The other was the power of "excellence," which belongs to Him as man. This power He could communicate to ministers; namely, by giving them such a fulness of grace—that their merits would conduce to the sacramental effect—that by the invocation of their names, the sacraments would be sanctified—and that they themselves might institute sacraments, and by their mere will confer the sacramental effect without observing the sacramental rite. For a united instrument, the more powerful it is, is all the more able to lend its power to the separated instrument; as the hand can to a stick.

Reply to Objection 1: It was not through jealousy that Christ refrained from communicating to ministers His power of excellence, but for the good of the faithful; lest they should put their trust in men, and lest there should be various kinds of sacraments, giving rise to division in the Church; as may be seen in those who said: "I am of Paul, I am of Apollo, and I of Cephas" (1 Cor. 1:12).

Reply to Objection 2: This objection is true of the power of authority, which belongs to Christ as God. At the same time the power of excellence can be called authority in comparison to other ministers. Whence on 1 Cor. 1:13: "Is Christ divided?" the gloss says that "He could give power of authority in baptizing, to those to whom He gave the power of administering it."

Reply to Objection 3: It was in order to avoid the incongruity of many heads in the Church, that Christ was unwilling to communicate to ministers His power of excellence. If, however, He had done so, He would have been Head in chief; the others in subjection to Him.

Whether the sacraments can be conferred by evil ministers?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacraments cannot be conferred by evil ministers. For the sacraments of the New Law are ordained for the purpose of cleansing from sin and for the bestowal of grace. Now evil men, being themselves unclean, cannot cleanse others from sin, according to Ecclus. 34:4: “Who [Vulg.: ‘What’] can be made clean by the unclean?” Moreover, since they have not grace, it seems that they cannot give grace, for “no one gives what he has not.” It seems, therefore, that the sacraments cannot be conferred by wicked men.

Objection 2: Further, all the power of the sacraments is derived from Christ, as stated above [4393](A[3]; Q[62], A[5]). But evil men are cut off from Christ: because they have not charity, by which the members are united to their Head, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: “He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.” Therefore it seems that the sacraments cannot be conferred by evil men.

Objection 3: Further, if anything is wanting that is required for the sacraments, the sacrament is invalid; for instance, if the required matter or form be wanting. But the minister required for a sacrament is one who is without the stain of sin, according to Lev. 21:17,18: “Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God, neither shall he approach to minister to Him.” Therefore it seems that if the minister be wicked, the sacrament has no effect.

On the contrary, Augustine says on Jn. 1:33: “He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit,” etc. (Tract. v in Joan.), that “John did not know that our Lord, having the authority of baptizing, would keep it to Himself, but that the ministry would certainly pass to both good and evil men . . . What is a bad minister to thee, where the Lord is good?”

I answer that, As stated above [4394](A[1]), the ministers of the Church work instrumentally in the sacraments, because, in a way, a minister is of the nature of an instrument. But, as stated above (Q[62], AA[1],4), an instrument acts not by reason of its own form, but by the power of the one who moves it. Consequently, whatever form or power an instrument has in addition to that which it has as an instrument, is accidental to it: for instance, that a physician’s body, which is the instrument of his soul, wherein is his medical art, be healthy or sickly; or that a pipe, through which water passes, be of silver or lead. Therefore the ministers of the Church can confer the sacraments, though they be wicked.

Reply to Objection 1: The ministers of the Church do not by their own power cleanse from sin those who approach the sacraments, nor do they confer grace on them: it is Christ Who does this by His own power while

He employs them as instruments. Consequently, those who approach the sacraments receive an effect whereby they are enlikened not to the ministers but to Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ's members are united to their Head by charity, so that they may receive life from Him; for as it is written (1 Jn. 3:14): "He that loveth not abideth in death." Now it is possible for a man to work with a lifeless instrument, and separated from him as to bodily union, provided it be united to him by some sort of motion: for a workman works in one way with his hand, in another with his axe. Consequently, it is thus that Christ works in the sacraments, both by wicked men as lifeless instruments, and by good men as living instruments.

Reply to Objection 3: A thing is required in a sacrament in two ways. First, as being essential to it: and if this be wanting, the sacrament is invalid; for instance, if the due form or matter be wanting. Secondly, a thing is required for a sacrament, by reason of a certain fitness. And in this way good ministers are required for a sacrament.

Whether wicked men sin in administering the sacraments?

Objection 1: It seems that wicked men do not sin in administering the sacraments. For just as men serve God in the sacraments, so do they serve Him in works of charity; whence it is written (Heb. 13:16): "Do not forget to do good and to impart, for by such sacrifices God's favor is obtained." But the wicked do not sin in serving God by works of charity: indeed, they should be persuaded to do so, according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable" to the king; "Redeem thou thy sins with alms." Therefore it seems that wicked men do not sin in administering the sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, whoever co-operates with another in his sin, is also guilty of sin, according to Rom. 1:32: "He is [Vulg.: 'They are'] worthy of death; not only he that commits the sin, but also he who consents to them that do them." But if wicked ministers sin in administering sacraments, those who receive sacraments from them, co-operate in their sin. Therefore they would sin also; which seems unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, it seems that no one should act when in doubt, for thus man would be driven to despair, as being unable to avoid sin. But if the wicked were to sin in administering sacraments, they would be in a state of perplexity: since sometimes they would sin also if they did not administer sacraments; for instance, when by reason of their office it is their bounden duty to do so; for it is written (1 Cor. 9:16): “For a necessity lieth upon me: Woe is unto me if I preach not the gospel.” Sometimes also on account of some danger; for instance, if a child in danger of death be brought to a sinner for baptism. Therefore it seems that the wicked do not sin in administering the sacraments.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i) that “it is wrong for the wicked even to touch the symbols,” i.e. the sacramental signs. And he says in the epistle to Demophilus: “It seems presumptuous for such a man,” i.e. a sinner, “to lay hands on priestly things; he is neither afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is, to take part in Divine things, with the thought that God does not see what he sees in himself: he thinks, by false pretenses, to cheat Him Whom he calls his Father; he dares to utter, in the person of Christ, words polluted by his infamy, I will not call them prayers, over the Divine symbols.”

I answer that, A sinful action consists in this, that a man “fails to act as he ought to,” as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii). Now it has been said (A[5], ad 3) that it is fitting for the ministers of sacraments to be righteous; because ministers should be like unto their Lord, according to Lev. 19:2: “Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy”; and Ecclus. 10:2: “As the judge of the people is himself, so also are his ministers.” Consequently, there can be no doubt that the wicked sin by exercising the ministry of God and the Church, by conferring the sacraments. And since this sin pertains to irreverence towards God and the contamination of holy things, as far as the man who sins is concerned, although holy things in themselves cannot be contaminated; it follows that such a sin is mortal in its genus.

Reply to Objection 1: Works of charity are not made holy by some process of consecration, but they belong to the holiness of righteousness, as being in a way parts of righteousness. Consequently, when a man shows himself as a minister of God, by doing works of charity, if he be righteous, he will be made yet holier; but if he be a sinner, he is thereby disposed to holiness. On the other hand, the sacraments are holy in themselves owing to their mystical consecration. Wherefore the holiness of righteousness is required in the minister, that he may be suitable for his ministry: for which reason he acts unbecomingly and sins, if while in a state of sin he attempts to fulfil that ministry.

Reply to Objection 2: He who approaches a sacrament, receives it from a minister of the Church, not because he is such and such a man, but because he is a minister of the Church. Consequently, as long as the latter is tolerated in the ministry, he that receives a sacrament from him, does not communicate in his sin, but communicates with the Church from. whom he has his ministry. But if the Church, by degrading, excommunicating, or suspending him, does not tolerate him in the ministry, he that receives a sacrament from him sins, because he communicates in his sin.

Reply to Objection 3: A man who is in mortal sin is not perplexed simply, if by reason of his office it be his bounden duty to minister sacraments; because he can repent of his sin and so minister lawfully. But there is nothing unreasonable in his being perplexed, if we suppose that he wishes to remain in sin.

However, in a case of necessity when even a lay person might baptize, he would not sin in baptizing. For it is clear that then he does not exercise the ministry of the Church, but comes to the aid of one who is in need of his services. It is not so with the other sacraments, which are not so necessary as baptism, as we shall show further on ([4395]Q[65], AA[3],4;[4396]Q[62], A[3]).

Whether angels can administer sacraments?

Objection 1: It seems that angels can administer sacraments. Because a higher minister can do whatever the lower can; thus a priest can do whatever a deacon can: but not conversely. But angels are higher ministers in the hierarchical order than any men whatsoever, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix). Therefore, since men can be ministers of sacraments, it seems that much more can angels be.

Objection 2: Further, in heaven holy men are likened to the angels (Mat. 22:30). But some holy men, when in heaven, can be ministers of the sacraments; since the sacramental character is indelible, as stated above ([4397]Q[63], A[5]). Therefore it seems that angels too can be ministers of sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([4398]Q[8], A[7]), the devil is head of the wicked, and the wicked are his members. But sacraments can be administered by the wicked. Therefore it seems that they can be administered even by demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 5:1): “Every high priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God.” But angels whether good or bad are not taken from among men. Therefore they are not ordained ministers in the things that appertain to God, i.e. in the sacraments.

I answer that, As stated above [4399](A[3]; Q[62], A[5]), the whole power of the sacraments flows from Christ’s Passion, which belongs to Him as man. And Him in their very nature men, not angels, resemble; indeed, in respect of His Passion, He is described as being “a little lower than the angels” (Heb. 2:9). Consequently, it belongs to men, but not to angels, to dispense the sacraments and to take part in their administration.

But it must be observed that as God did not bind His power to the sacraments, so as to be unable to bestow the sacramental effect without conferring the sacrament; so neither did He bind His power to the ministers of the Church so as to be unable to give angels power to administer the sacraments. And since good angels are messengers of truth; if any sacramental rite were performed by good angels, it should be considered valid, because it ought to be evident that this is being done by the will of God: for instance, certain churches are said to have been consecrated by the ministry of the angels [*See Acta S.S., September 29]. But if demons, who are “lying spirits,” were to perform a sacramental rite, it should be pronounced as invalid.

Reply to Objection 1: What men do in a less perfect manner, i.e. by sensible sacraments, which are proportionate to their nature, angels also do, as ministers of a higher degree, in a more perfect manner, i.e. invisibly—by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting.

Reply to Objection 2: The saints in heaven resemble the angels as to their share of glory, but not as to the conditions of their nature: and consequently not in regard to the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: Wicked men do not owe their power of conferring sacraments to their being members of the devil. Consequently, it does not follow that “a fortiori” the devil, their head, can do so.

Whether the minister’s intention is required for the validity of a sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the minister’s intention is not required for the validity of a sacrament. For the minister of a sacrament works instrumentally. But the perfection of an action does not depend on the intention of the instrument, but on that of the principal agent. Therefore the minister’s intention is not necessary for the perfecting of a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, one man’s intention cannot be known to another. Therefore if the minister’s intention were required for the validity of a sacrament, he who approaches a sacrament could not know whether he has received the sacrament. Consequently he could have no certainty in regard to salvation; the more that some sacraments are necessary for salvation, as we shall state further on ([4400]Q[65], A[4]).

Objection 3: Further, a man’s intention cannot bear on that to which he does not attend. But sometimes ministers of sacraments do not attend to what they say or do, through thinking of something else. Therefore in this respect the sacrament would be invalid through want of intention.

On the contrary, What is unintentional happens by chance. But this cannot be said of the sacramental operation. Therefore the sacraments require the intention of the minister.

I answer that, When a thing is indifferent to many uses, it must needs be determined to one, if that one has to be effected. Now those things which are done in the sacraments, can be done with various intent; for instance, washing with water, which is done in baptism, may be ordained to bodily cleanliness, to the health of the body, to amusement, and many other similar things. Consequently, it needs to be determined to one purpose, i.e. the sacramental effect, by the intention of him who washes. And this intention is expressed by the words which are pronounced in the sacraments; for instance the words, “I baptize thee in the name of the Father,” etc.

Reply to Objection 1: An inanimate instrument has no intention regarding the effect; but instead of the intention there is the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent. But an animate instrument, such as a minister, is not only moved, but in a sense moves itself, in so far as by his will he moves his bodily members to act. Consequently, his intention is required, whereby he subjects himself to the principal agent; that is, it is necessary that he intend to do that which Christ and the Church do.

Reply to Objection 2: On this point there are two opinions. For some hold that the mental intention of the minister is necessary; in the absence of which the sacrament is invalid: and that this defect in the case of children who have not the intention of approaching the sacrament, is made good by Christ, Who baptizes inwardly: whereas in adults, who have that intention, this defect is made good by their faith and devotion.

This might be true enough of the ultimate effect, i.e. justification from sins; but as to that effect which is both real and sacramental, viz. the character, it does not appear possible for it to be made good by the devotion of the recipient, since a character is never imprinted save by a sacrament.

Consequently, others with better reason hold that the minister of a sacrament acts in the person of the whole Church, whose minister he is; while in the words uttered by him, the intention of the Church is expressed; and that this suffices for the validity of the sacrament, except the contrary be expressed on the part either of the minister or of the recipient of the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: Although he who thinks of something else, has no actual intention, yet he has habitual intention, which suffices for the validity of the sacrament; for instance if, when a priest goes to baptize someone, he intends to do to him what the Church does. Wherefore if subsequently during the exercise of the act his mind be distracted by other matters, the sacrament is valid in virtue of his original intention. Nevertheless, the minister of a sacrament should take great care to have actual intention. But this is not entirely in man’s power, because when a man wishes to be very intent on something, he begins unintentionally to think of other things, according to Ps. 39:18: “My heart hath forsaken me.”

Whether faith is required of necessity in the minister of a sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that faith is required of necessity in the minister of a sacrament. For, as stated above [4401](A[8]), the intention of the minister is necessary for the validity of a sacrament. But “faith directs in intention” as Augustine says against Julian (In Psalm xxxi, cf. Contra Julian iv). Therefore, if the minister is without the true faith, the sacrament is invalid.

Objection 2: Further, if a minister of the Church has not the true faith, it seems that he is a heretic. But heretics, seemingly, cannot confer sacraments. For Cyprian says in an epistle against heretics (lxxiii): “Everything whatsoever heretics do, is carnal, void and counterfeit, so that nothing that they do should receive our approval.” And Pope Leo says in his epistle to Leo Augustus (clvi): “It is a matter of notoriety that the light of all the heavenly sacraments is extinguished in the see of Alexandria, by an act of dire and senseless cruelty. The sacrifice is no longer offered, the chrism is no longer consecrated, all the mysteries of religion have fled at the touch of the parricide hands of ungodly men.” Therefore a sacrament requires of necessity that the minister should have the true faith.

Objection 3: Further, those who have not the true faith seem to be separated from the Church by excommunication: for it is written in the second canonical epistle of John (10): “If any man come to you, and bring not this doctrine, receive him not into the house, nor say to him; God speed you”: and (Titus 3:10): “A man that is a heretic, after the first and second admonition avoid.” But it seems that an excommunicate cannot confer a sacrament of the Church: since he is separated from the Church, to whose ministry the dispensation of the sacraments belongs. Therefore a sacrament requires of necessity that the minister should have the true faith.

On the contrary, Augustine says against the Donatist Petilian: “Remember that the evil lives of wicked men are not prejudicial to God’s sacraments, by rendering them either invalid or less holy.”

I answer that, As stated above [4402](A[5]), since the minister works instrumentally in the sacraments, he acts not by his own but by Christ’s power. Now just as charity belongs to a man’s own power so also does faith. Wherefore, just as the validity of a sacrament does not require that the minister should have charity, and even sinners can confer sacraments, as stated above [4403](A[5]); so neither is it necessary that he should have faith, and even an unbeliever can confer a true sacrament, provided that the other essentials be there.

Reply to Objection 1: It may happen that a man’s faith is defective in regard to something else, and not in regard to the reality of the sacrament which he confers: for instance, he may believe that it is unlawful to swear in any case whatever, and yet he may believe that baptism is an efficient cause of salvation. And thus such unbelief does not hinder the intention of conferring the sacrament. But if his faith be defective in regard to the very sacrament that he confers, although he believe that no inward effect is caused by the thing done outwardly, yet he does know that the Catholic Church intends to confer a sacrament by that which is outwardly done. Wherefore, his unbelief notwithstanding, he can intend to do what the Church does, albeit he esteem it to be nothing. And such an intention suffices for a sacrament: because as stated above (A[8], ad 2) the minister of a sacrament acts in the person of the Church by whose faith any defect in the minister's faith is made good.

Reply to Objection 2: Some heretics in conferring sacraments do not observe the form prescribed by the Church: and these confer neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. But some do observe the form prescribed by the Church: and these confer indeed the sacrament but not the reality. I say this in the supposition that they are outwardly cut off from the Church; because from the very fact that anyone receives the sacraments from them, he sins; and consequently is hindered from receiving the effect of the sacrament. Wherefore Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Pet.) says: "Be well assured and have no doubt whatever that those who are baptized outside the Church, unless they come back to the Church, will reap disaster from their Baptism." In this sense Pope Leo says that "the light of the sacraments was extinguished in the Church of Alexandria"; viz. in regard to the reality of the sacrament, not as to the sacrament itself.

Cyprian, however, thought that heretics do not confer even the sacrament: but in this respect we do not follow his opinion. Hence Augustine says (De unico Baptismo xiii): "Though the martyr Cyprian refused to recognize Baptism conferred by heretics or schismatics, yet so great are his merits, culminating in the crown of martyrdom, that the light of his charity dispels the darkness of his fault, and if anything needed pruning, the sickle of his passion cut it off."

Reply to Objection 3: The power of administering the sacraments belongs to the spiritual character which is indelible, as explained above ([4404]Q[63], A[3]). Consequently, if a man be suspended by the Church, or excommunicated or degraded, he does not lose the power of conferring sacraments, but the permission to use this power. Wherefore he does indeed confer the sacrament, but he sins in so doing. He also sins that receives a sacrament from such a man: so that he does not receive the reality of the sacrament, unless ignorance excuses him.

Whether the validity of a sacrament requires a good intention in the minister?

Objection 1: It seems that the validity of a sacrament requires a good intention in the minister. For the minister’s intention should be in conformity with the Church’s intention, as explained above (A[8], ad 1). But the intention of the Church is always good. Therefore the validity of a sacrament requires of necessity a good intention in the minister.

Objection 2: Further, a perverse intention seems worse than a playful one. But a playful intention destroys a sacrament: for instance, if someone were to baptize anybody not seriously but in fun. Much more, therefore, does a perverse intention destroy a sacrament: for instance, if somebody were to baptize a man in order to kill him afterwards.

Objection 3: Further, a perverse intention vitiates the whole work, according to Lk. 11:34: “If thy eye be evil, thy” whole “body will be darksome.” But the sacraments of Christ cannot be contaminated by evil men; as Augustine says against Petilian (Cont. Litt. Petil ii). Therefore it seems that, if the minister’s intention is perverse, the sacrament is invalid.

On the contrary, A perverse intention belongs to the wickedness of the minister. But the wickedness of the minister does not annul the sacrament: neither, therefore, does his perverse intention.

I answer that, The minister’s intention may be perverted in two ways. First in regard to the sacrament: for instance, when a man does not intend to confer a sacrament, but to make a mockery of it. Such a perverse intention takes away the truth of the sacrament, especially if it be manifested outwardly.

Secondly, the minister’s intention may be perverted as to something that follows the sacrament: for instance, a priest may intend to baptize a woman so as to be able to abuse her; or to consecrate the Body of Christ, so as to use it for sorcery. And because that which comes first does not depend on that which follows, consequently such a perverse intention does not annul the sacrament; but the minister himself sins grievously in having such an intention.

Reply to Objection 1: The Church has a good intention both as to the validity of the sacrament and as to the use thereof: but it is the former intention that perfects the sacrament, while the latter conduces to the meritorious effect. Consequently, the minister who conforms his intention to the Church as to the former rectitude, but not as to the latter, perfects the sacrament indeed, but gains no merit for himself.

Reply to Objection 2: The intention of mimicry or fun excludes the first kind of right intention, necessary for the validity of a sacrament. Consequently, there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: A perverse intention perverts the action of the one who has such an intention, not the action of another. Consequently, the perverse intention of the minister perverts the sacrament in so far as it is his action: not in so far as it is the action of Christ, Whose minister he is. It is just as if the servant [minister] of some man were to carry alms to the poor with a wicked intention, whereas his master had commanded him with a good intention to do so.

OF THE NUMBER OF THE SACRAMENTS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the number of the sacraments: and concerning this there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are seven sacraments?

(2) The order of the sacraments among themselves;

(3) Their mutual comparison;

(4) Whether all the sacraments are necessary for salvation?

Whether there should be seven sacraments?

Objection 1: It seems that there ought not to be seven sacraments. For the sacraments derive their efficacy from the Divine power, and the power of Christ's Passion. But the Divine power is one, and Christ's Passion is one; since "by one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified" (Heb. 10:14). Therefore there should be but one sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, a sacrament is intended as a remedy for the defect caused by sin. Now this is twofold, punishment and guilt. Therefore two sacraments would be enough.

Objection 3: Further, sacraments belong to the actions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as Dionysius explains (Eccl. Hier. v). But, as he says, there are three actions of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, namely, "to cleanse, to enlighten, to perfect." Therefore there should be no more than three sacraments.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix) that the "sacraments" of the New Law are "less numerous" than those of the Old Law. But in the Old Law there was no sacrament corresponding to Confirmation and Extreme Unction. Therefore these should not be counted among the sacraments of the New Law.

Objection 5: Further, lust is not more grievous than other sins, as we have made clear in the [4405]FS, Q[74], A[5]; [4406]SS, Q[154], A[3]. But there is no sacrament instituted as a remedy for other sins. Therefore neither should matrimony be instituted as a remedy for lust.

Objection 6: On the other hand, It seems that there should be more than seven sacraments. For sacraments are a kind of sacred sign. But in the Church there are many sanctifications by sensible signs, such as Holy Water the Consecration of Altars, and such like. Therefore there are more than seven sacraments.

Objection 7: Further, Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) says that the sacraments of the Old Law were oblations, tithes and sacrifices. But the Sacrifice of the Church is one sacrament, called the Eucharist. Therefore oblations also and tithes should be called sacraments.

Objection 8: Further, there are three kinds of sin, original, mortal and venial. Now Baptism is intended as a remedy against original sin, and Penance against mortal sin. Therefore besides the seven sacraments, there should be another against venial sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([4407]Q[62], A[5];[4408] Q[63], A[1]), the sacraments of the Church were instituted for a twofold purpose: namely, in order to perfect man in things pertaining to the worship of God according to the religion of Christian life, and to be a remedy against the defects caused by sin. And in either way it is becoming that there should be seven sacraments.

For spiritual life has a certain conformity with the life of the body: just as other corporeal things have a certain likeness to things spiritual. Now a man attains perfection in the corporeal life in two ways: first, in regard to his own person; secondly, in regard to the whole community of the society in which he lives, for man is by nature a social animal. With regard to himself man is perfected in the life of the body, in two ways; first, directly [per se], i.e. by acquiring some vital perfection; secondly, indirectly [per accidens], i.e. by the removal of hindrances to life, such as ailments, or the like. Now the life of the body is perfected "directly," in three ways. First, by generation whereby a man begins to be and to live: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration, according to Titus 3:5: "By the laver of regeneration," etc. Secondly, by growth whereby a man is brought to perfect size and strength: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Confirmation, in which the Holy Ghost is given to strengthen us. Wherefore the disciples who were already baptized were bidden thus: "Stay you in the city till you be endued with power from on high" (Lk. 24:49). Thirdly, by nourishment, whereby life and strength are preserved to man; and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is the Eucharist. Wherefore it is said (Jn. 6:54): "Except you eat of the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you."

And this would be enough for man if he had an impassible life, both corporally and spiritually; but since man is liable at times to both corporal and spiritual infirmity, i.e. sin, hence man needs a cure from his infirmity; which cure is twofold. one is the healing, that restores health: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Penance, according to Ps. 40:5: "Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee." The other is the restoration of former vigor by means of suitable diet and exercise: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is Extreme Unction, which removes the remainder of sin, and prepares man for final glory. Wherefore it is written (James 5:15): "And if he be in sins they shall be forgiven him."

In regard to the whole community, man is perfected in two ways. First, by receiving power to rule the community and to exercise public acts: and corresponding to this in the spiritual life there is the sacrament of order, according to the saying of Heb. 7:27, that priests offer sacrifices not for themselves only, but also for the people. Secondly in regard to natural propagation. This is accomplished by Matrimony both in the corporal and in the spiritual life: since it is not only a sacrament but also a function of nature.

We may likewise gather the number of the sacraments from their being instituted as a remedy against the defect caused by sin. For Baptism is intended as a remedy against the absence of spiritual life; Confirmation, against the infirmity of soul found in those of recent birth; the Eucharist, against the soul’s proneness to sin; Penance, against actual sin committed after baptism; Extreme Unction, against the remainders of sins—of those sins, namely, which are not sufficiently removed by Penance, whether through negligence or through ignorance; order, against divisions in the community; Matrimony, as a remedy against concupiscence in the individual, and against the decrease in numbers that results from death.

Some, again, gather the number of sacraments from a certain adaptation to the virtues and to the defects and penal effects resulting from sin. They say that Baptism corresponds to Faith, and is ordained as a remedy against original sin; Extreme Unction, to Hope, being ordained against venial sin; the Eucharist, to Charity, being ordained against the penal effect which is malice. order, to Prudence, being ordained against ignorance; Penance to Justice, being ordained against mortal sin; Matrimony, to Temperance, being ordained against concupiscence; Confirmation, to Fortitude, being ordained against infirmity.

Reply to Objection 1: The same principal agent uses various instruments unto various effects, in accordance with the thing to be done. In the same way the Divine power and the Passion of Christ work in us through the various sacraments as through various instruments.

Reply to Objection 2: Guilt and punishment are diversified both according to species, inasmuch as there are various species of guilt and punishment, and according to men’s various states and habitudes. And in this respect it was necessary to have a number of sacraments, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 3: In hierarchical actions we must consider the agents, the recipients and the actions. The agents are the ministers of the Church; and to these the sacrament of order belongs. The recipients are those who approach the sacraments: and these are brought into being by Matrimony. The actions are “cleansing,” “enlightening,” and “perfecting.” Mere cleansing, however, cannot be a sacrament of the New Law, which confers grace: yet it belongs to certain sacramentals, i.e. catechism and exorcism. But cleansing coupled with enlightening, according to Dionysius, belongs to Baptism; and, for him who falls back into sin, they belong secondarily to Penance and Extreme Unction. And perfecting, as regards power, which is, as it were, a formal perfection, belongs to Confirmation: while, as regards the attainment of the end, it belongs to the Eucharist.

Reply to Objection 4: In the sacrament of Confirmation we receive the fulness of the Holy Ghost in order to be strengthened; while in Extreme Unction man is prepared for the immediate attainment of glory; and neither of these two purposes was becoming to the Old Testament. Consequently, nothing in the old Law could correspond to these sacraments. Nevertheless, the sacraments of the old Law were more numerous, on account of the various kinds of sacrifices and ceremonies.

Reply to Objection 5: There was need for a special sacrament to be applied as a remedy against venereal concupiscence: first because by this concupiscence, not only the person but also the nature is defiled: secondly, by reason of its vehemence whereby it clouds the reason.

Reply to Objection 6: Holy Water and other consecrated things are not called sacraments, because they do not produce the sacramental effect, which is the receiving of grace. They are, however, a kind of disposition to the sacraments: either by removing obstacles. thus holy water is ordained against the snares of the demons, and against venial sins: or by making things suitable for the conferring of a sacrament; thus the altar and vessels are consecrated through reverence for the Eucharist.

Reply to Objection 7: Oblations and tithes, both the Law of nature and in the Law of Moses, ere ordained not only for the sustenance of the ministers and the poor, but also figuratively; and consequently they were sacraments. But now they remain no longer as figures, and therefore they are not sacraments.

Reply to Objection 8: The infusion of grace is not necessary for the blotting out of venial sin. Wherefore, since grace is infused in each of the sacraments of the New Law, none of them was instituted directly against venial sin. This is taken away by certain sacramentals, for instance, Holy Water and such like. Some, however, hold that Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin. But of this we shall speak in its proper place ([4409]XP, Q[30], A[1]).

Whether the order of the sacraments, as given above, is becoming?

Objection 1: It seems that the order of the sacraments as given above is unbecoming. For according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:46), “that was . . . first . . . which is natural, afterwards that which is spiritual.” But man is begotten through Matrimony by a first and natural generation; while in Baptism he is regenerated as by a second and spiritual generation. Therefore Matrimony should precede Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, through the sacrament of order man receives the power of agent in sacramental actions. But the agent precedes his action. Therefore order should precede Baptism and the other sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, the Eucharist is a spiritual food; while Confirmation is compared to growth. But food causes, and consequently precedes, growth. Therefore the Eucharist precedes Confirmation.

Objection 4: Further, Penance prepares man for the Eucharist. But a disposition precedes perfection. Therefore Penance should precede the Eucharist.

Objection 5: Further, that which is nearer the last end comes after other things. But, of all the sacraments, Extreme Unction is nearest to the last end which is Happiness. Therefore it should be placed last among the sacraments.

On the contrary, The order of the sacraments, as given above, is commonly adopted by all.

I answer that, The reason of the order among the sacraments appears from what has been said above [4410](A[1]). For just as unity precedes multitude, so those sacraments which are intended for the perfection of the individual, naturally precede those which are intended for the perfection of the multitude; and consequently the last place among the sacraments is given to order and Matrimony, which are intended for the perfection of the multitude: while Matrimony is placed after order, because it has less participation in the nature of the spiritual life, to which the sacraments are ordained. Moreover, among things ordained to the perfection of the individual, those naturally come first which are ordained directly to the perfection of the spiritual life, and afterwards, those which are ordained thereto indirectly, viz. by removing some supervening accidental cause of harm; such are Penance and Extreme Unction: while, of these, Extreme Unction is naturally placed last, for it preserves the healing which was begun by Penance.

Of the remaining three, it is clear that Baptism which is a spiritual regeneration, comes first; then Confirmation, which is ordained to the formal perfection of power; and after these the Eucharist which is ordained to final perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: Matrimony as ordained to natural life is a function of nature. But in so far as it has something spiritual it is a sacrament. And because it has the least amount of spirituality it is placed last.

Reply to Objection 2: For a thing to be an agent it must first of all be perfect in itself. Wherefore those sacraments by which a man is perfected in himself, are placed before the sacrament of order, in which a man is made a perfecter of others.

Reply to Objection 3: Nourishment both precedes growth, as its cause; and follows it, as maintaining the perfection of size and power in man. Consequently, the Eucharist can be placed before Confirmation, as Dionysius places it (Eccl. Hier. iii, iv), and can be placed after it, as the Master does (iv, 2,8).

Reply to Objection 4: This argument would hold if Penance were required of necessity as a preparation to the Eucharist. But this is not true: for if anyone be without mortal sin, he does not need Penance in order to receive the Eucharist. Thus it is clear that Penance is an accidental preparation to the Eucharist, that is to say, sin being supposed. Wherefore it is written in the last chapter of the second Book of Paralipomenon (cf. 2 Paral 33:18): “Thou, O Lord of the righteous, didst not impose penance on righteous men.” [*The words quoted are from the apocryphal Prayer of Manasses, which, before the Council of Trent, was to be found inserted in some Latin copies of the Bible.]

Reply to Objection 5: Extreme Unction, for this very reason, is given the last place among those sacraments which are ordained to the perfection of the individual.

Whether the Eucharist is the greatest of the sacraments?

Objection 1: It seems that the Eucharist is not the principal of the sacraments. For the common good is of more account than the good of the individual (1 Ethic. ii). But Matrimony is ordained to the common good of the human race by means of generation: whereas the sacrament of the

Eucharist is ordained to the private good of the recipient. Therefore it is not the greatest of the sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, those sacraments, seemingly, are greater, which are conferred by a greater minister. But the sacraments of Confirmation and order are conferred by a bishop only, who is a greater minister than a mere minister such as a priest, by whom the sacraments of the Eucharist is conferred. Therefore those sacraments are greater.

Objection 3: Further, those sacraments are greater that have the greater power. But some of the sacraments imprint a character, viz. Baptism, Confirmation and order; whereas the Eucharist does not. Therefore those sacraments are greater.

Objection 4: Further, that seems to be greater, on which others depend without its depending on them. But the Eucharist depends on Baptism: since no one can receive the Eucharist except he has been baptized. Therefore Baptism is greater than the Eucharist.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii) that “No one receives hierarchical perfection save by the most God-like Eucharist.” Therefore this sacrament is greater than all the others and perfects them.

I answer that, Absolutely speaking, the sacrament of the Eucharist is the greatest of all the sacraments: and this may be shown in three ways. First of all because it contains Christ Himself substantially: whereas the other sacraments contain a certain instrumental power which is a share of Christ’s power, as we have shown above ([4411]Q[62], A[4], ad 3, A[5]). Now that which is essentially such is always of more account than that which is such by participation.

Secondly, this is made clear by considering the relation of the sacraments to one another. For all the other sacraments seem to be ordained to this one as to their end. For it is manifest that the sacrament of order is ordained to the consecration of the Eucharist: and the sacrament of Baptism to the reception of the Eucharist: while a man is perfected by Confirmation, so as not to fear to abstain from this sacrament. By Penance and Extreme Unction man is prepared to receive the Body of Christ worthily. And Matrimony at least in its signification, touches this sacrament; in so far as it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, of which union the Eucharist is a figure: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32): “This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church.”

Thirdly, this is made clear by considering the rites of the sacraments. For nearly all the sacraments terminate in the Eucharist, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): thus those who have been ordained receive Holy Communion, as also do those who have been baptized, if they be adults.

The remaining sacraments may be compared to one another in several ways. For on the ground of necessity, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments; while from the point of view of perfection, order comes first; while Confirmation holds a middle place. The sacraments of Penance and Extreme Unction are on a degree inferior to those mentioned above; because, as stated above [4412](A[2]), they are ordained to the Christian life, not directly, but accidentally, as it were, that is to say, as remedies against supervening defects. And among these, Extreme Unction is compared to Penance, as Confirmation to Baptism; in such a way, that Penance is more necessary, whereas Extreme Unction is more perfect.

Reply to Objection 1: Matrimony is ordained to the common good as regards the body. But the common spiritual good of the whole Church is contained substantially in the sacrament itself of the Eucharist.

Reply to Objection 2: By order and Confirmation the faithful of Christ are deputed to certain special duties; and this can be done by the prince alone. Consequently the conferring of these sacraments belongs exclusively to a bishop, who is, as it were, a prince in the Church. But a man is not deputed to any duty by the sacrament of the Eucharist, rather is this sacrament the end of all duties, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: The sacramental character, as stated above ([4413]Q[63], A[3]), is a kind of participation in Christ’s priesthood. Wherefore the sacrament that unites man to Christ Himself, is greater than a sacrament that imprints Christ’s character.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument proceeds on the ground of necessity. For thus Baptism, being of the greatest necessity, is the greatest of the sacraments, just as order and Confirmation have a certain excellence considered in their administration; and Matrimony by reason of its signification. For there is no reason why a thing should not be greater from a certain point of view which is not greater absolutely speaking.

Whether all the sacraments are necessary for salvation?

Objection 1: It seems that all the sacraments are necessary for salvation. For what is not necessary seems to be superfluous. But no sacrament is superfluous, because “God does nothing without a purpose” (De Coelo et Mundo i). Therefore all the sacraments are necessary for salvation.

Objection 2: Further, just as it is said of Baptism (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter in to the kingdom of God,” so of the Eucharist is it said (Jn. 6:54): “Except you eat of the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink of His blood, you shall not have life in you.” Therefore, just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is the Eucharist.

Objection 3: Further, a man can be saved without the sacrament of Baptism, provided that some unavoidable obstacle, and not his contempt for religion, debar him from the sacrament, as we shall state further on ([4414]Q[68], A[2]). But contempt of religion in any sacrament is a hindrance to salvation. Therefore, in like manner, all the sacraments are necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, Children are saved by Baptism alone without the other sacraments.

I answer that, Necessity of end, of which we speak now, is twofold. First, a thing may be necessary so that without it the end cannot be attained; thus food is necessary for human life. And this is simple necessity of end. Secondly, a thing is said to be necessary, if, without it, the end cannot be attained so becomingly: thus a horse is necessary for a journey. But this is not simple necessity of end.

In the first way, three sacraments are necessary for salvation. Two of them are necessary to the individual; Baptism, simply and absolutely; Penance, in the case of mortal sin committed after Baptism; while the sacrament of order is necessary to the Church, since “where there is no governor the people shall fall” (Prov. 11:14).

But in the second way the other sacraments are necessary. For in a sense Confirmation perfects Baptism; Extreme Unction perfects Penance; while Matrimony, by multiplying them, preserves the numbers in the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: For a thing not to be superfluous it is enough if it be necessary either in the first or the second way. It is thus that the sacraments are necessary, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: These words of our Lord are to be understood of spiritual, and not of merely sacramental, eating, as Augustine explains (Tract. xxvi super Joan.).

Reply to Objection 3: Although contempt of any of the sacraments is a hindrance to salvation, yet it does not amount to contempt of the sacrament, if anyone does not trouble to receive a sacrament that is not necessary for salvation. Else those who do not receive orders, and those who do not contract Matrimony, would be guilty of contempt of those sacraments.

OF THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We have now to consider each sacrament specially: (1) Baptism; (2) Confirmation; (3) the Eucharist; (4) Penance; (5) Extreme Unction; (6) Order; (7) Matrimony.

Concerning the first, our consideration will be twofold: (1) of Baptism itself; (2) of things preparatory to Baptism.

Concerning the first, four points arise for our consideration: (1) Things pertaining to the sacrament of Baptism; (2) The minister of this sacrament; (3) The recipients of this sacrament; (4) The effect of this sacrament.

Concerning the first there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) What is Baptism? Is it a washing?

(2) Of the institution of this sacrament;

(3) Whether water be the proper matter of this sacrament?

(4) Whether plain water be required?

(5) Whether this be a suitable form of this sacrament: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”?

(6) Whether one could baptize with this form: “I baptize thee in the name of Christ?”

(7) Whether immersion is necessary for Baptism?

(8) Whether trine immersion is necessary?

(9) Whether Baptism can be reiterated?

(10) Of the Baptismal rite;

(11) Of the various kinds of Baptism;

(12) Of the comparison between various Baptisms.

Whether Baptism is the mere washing?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism is not the mere washing. For the washing of the body is something transitory: but Baptism is something permanent. Therefore Baptism is not the mere washing; but rather is it “the regeneration, the seal, the safeguarding, the enlightenment,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv).

Objection 2: Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii) that “Baptism is water sanctified by God’s word for the blotting out of sins.” But the washing itself is not water, but a certain use of water.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Tract. lxxx super Joan.): “The word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament.” Now, the element is the water. Therefore Baptism is the water and not the washing.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 34:30): “He that washeth himself [baptizatur] after touching the dead, if he touch him again, what does his washing avail?” It seems, therefore, that Baptism is the washing or bathing.

I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism, three things may be considered: namely, that which is “sacrament only”; that which is “reality and sacrament”; and that which is “reality only.” That which is sacrament only, is something visible and outward; the sign, namely, of the inward effect: for such is the very nature of a sacrament. And this outward something that can be perceived by the sense is both the water itself and its use, which is the washing. Hence some have thought that the water itself is the sacrament: which seems to be the meaning of the passage quoted from Hugh of St. Victor. For in the general definition of a sacrament he says that it is “a material element”: and in defining Baptism he says it is “water.”

But this is not true. For since the sacraments of the New Law effect a certain sanctification, there the sacrament is completed where the sanctification is completed. Now, the sanctification is not completed in water; but a certain sanctifying instrumental virtue, not permanent but transient, passes from the water, in which it is, into man who is the subject of true sanctification. Consequently the sacrament is not completed in the very water, but in applying the water to man, i.e. in the washing. Hence the Master (iv, 3) says that “Baptism is the outward washing of the body done together with the prescribed form of words.”

The Baptismal character is both reality and sacrament: because it is something real signified by the outward washing; and a sacramental sign of the inward justification: and this last is the reality only, in this sacrament—namely, the reality signified and not signifying.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is both sacrament and reality—i.e. the character—and that which is reality only—i.e. the inward justification—remain: the character remains and is indelible, as stated above ([4415]Q[63], A[5]); the justification remains, but can be lost. Consequently Damascene defined Baptism, not as to that which is done outwardly, and is the sacrament only; but as to that which is inward. Hence he sets down two things as pertaining to the character—namely, “seal” and “safeguarding”; inasmuch as the character which is called a seal, so far as itself is concerned, safeguards the soul in good. He also sets down two things as pertaining to the ultimate reality of the sacrament—namely, “regeneration” which refers to the fact that man by being baptized begins the new life of righteousness; and “enlightenment,” which refers especially to faith, by which man receives spiritual life, according to Habac 2 (Heb. 10:38; cf. Habac 2:4): “But (My) just man liveth by faith”; and Baptism is a sort of protestation of faith; whence it is called the “Sacrament of Faith.” Likewise Dionysius defined Baptism by its relation to the other sacraments, saying (Eccl. Hier. ii) that it is “the principle that forms the habits of the soul for the reception of those most holy words and sacraments”; and again by its relation to heavenly glory, which is the universal end of all the sacraments, when he adds, “preparing the way for us, whereby we mount to the repose of the heavenly kingdom”; and again as to the beginning of spiritual life, when he adds, “the conferring of our most sacred and Godlike regeneration.”

Reply to Objection 2: As already stated, the opinion of Hugh of St. Victor on this question is not to be followed. Nevertheless the saying that “Baptism is water” may be verified in so far as water is the material principle of Baptism: and thus there would be “causal predication.”

Reply to Objection 3: When the words are added, the element becomes a sacrament, not in the element itself, but in man, to whom the element is applied, by being used in washing him. Indeed, this is signified by those very words which are added to the element, when we say: “I baptize thee,” etc.

Whether Baptism was instituted after Christ’s Passion?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism was instituted after Christ’s Passion. For the cause precedes the effect. Now Christ’s Passion operates in the sacraments of the New Law. Therefore Christ’s Passion precedes the institution of the sacraments of the New Law: especially the sacrament of Baptism since the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3): “All we, who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death,” etc.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the New Law derive their efficacy from the mandate of Christ. But Christ gave the disciples the mandate of Baptism after His Passion and Resurrection, when He said: “Going, teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father,” etc. (Mat. 28:19). Therefore it seems that Baptism was instituted after Christ’s Passion.

Objection 3: Further, Baptism is a necessary sacrament, as stated above ([4416]Q[65] , A[4]): wherefore, seemingly, it must have been binding on man as soon as it was instituted. But before Christ’s Passion men were not bound to be baptized: for Circumcision was still in force, which was supplanted by Baptism. Therefore it seems that Baptism was not instituted before Christ’s Passion.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Append. Serm., clxxxv): “As soon as Christ was plunged into the waters, the waters washed away the sins of all.” But this was before Christ’s Passion. Therefore Baptism was instituted before Christ’s Passion.

I answer that, As stated above ([4417]Q[62], A[1]), sacraments derive from their institution the power of conferring grace. Wherefore it seems that a sacrament is then instituted, when it receives the power of producing its effect. Now Baptism received this power when Christ was baptized. Consequently Baptism was truly instituted then, if we consider it as a sacrament. But the obligation of receiving this sacrament was proclaimed to mankind after the Passion and Resurrection. First, because Christ’s Passion put an end to the figurative sacraments, which were supplanted by Baptism and the other sacraments of the New Law. Secondly, because by Baptism man is “made conformable” to Christ’s Passion and Resurrection, in so far as he dies to sin and begins to live anew unto righteousness. Consequently it behooved Christ to suffer and to rise again, before proclaiming to man his obligation of conforming himself to Christ’s Death and Resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: Even before Christ’s Passion, Baptism, inasmuch as it foreshadowed it, derived its efficacy therefrom; but not in the same way as the sacraments of the Old Law. For these were mere figures: whereas Baptism derived the power of justifying from Christ Himself, to Whose power the Passion itself owed its saving virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: It was not meet that men should be restricted to a number of figures by Christ, Who came to fulfil and replace the figure by His reality. Therefore before His Passion He did not make Baptism obligatory as soon as it was instituted; but wished men to become accustomed to its use; especially in regard to the Jews, to whom all things were figurative, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv). But after His Passion and Resurrection He made Baptism obligatory, not only on the Jews, but also on the Gentiles, when He gave the commandment: “Going, teach ye all nations.”

Reply to Objection 3: Sacraments are not obligatory except when we are commanded to receive them. And this was not before the Passion, as stated above. For our Lord’s words to Nicodemus (Jn. 3:5), “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God, seem to refer to the future rather than to the present.”

Whether water is the proper matter of Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that water is not the proper matter of Baptism. For Baptism, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv), has a power of enlightening. But enlightenment is a special characteristic of fire. Therefore Baptism should be conferred with fire rather than with water: and all the more since John the Baptist said when foretelling Christ’s Baptism (Mat. 3:11): “He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and fire.”

Objection 2: Further, the washing away of sins is signified in Baptism. But many other things besides water are employed in washing, such as wine, oil, and such like. Therefore Baptism can be conferred with these also; and consequently water is not the proper matter of Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Church flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross, as stated above ([4418]Q[62], A[5]). But not only water flowed therefrom, but also blood. Therefore it seems that Baptism can also be conferred with blood. And this seems to be more in keeping with the effect of Baptism, because it is written (Apoc. 1:5): "(Who) washed us from our sins in His own blood."

Objection 4: Further, as Augustine (cf. Master of the Sentences, iv, 3) and Bede (Exposit. in Luc. iii, 21) say, Christ, by "the touch of His most pure flesh, endowed the waters with a regenerating and cleansing virtue." But all waters are not connected with the waters of the Jordan which Christ touched with His flesh. Consequently it seems that Baptism cannot be conferred with any water; and therefore water, as such, is not the proper matter of Baptism.

Objection 5: Further, if water, as such, were the proper matter of Baptism, there would be no need to do anything to the water before using it for Baptism. But in solemn Baptism the water which is used for baptizing, is exorcized and blessed. Therefore it seems that water, as such, is not the proper matter of Baptism.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."

I answer that, By Divine institution water is the proper matter of Baptism; and with reason. First, by reason of the very nature of Baptism, which is a regeneration unto spiritual life. And this answers to the nature of water in a special degree; wherefore seeds, from which all living things, viz. plants and animals are generated, are moist and akin to water. For this reason certain philosophers held that water is the first principle of all things.

Secondly, in regard to the effects of Baptism, to which the properties of water correspond. For by reason of its moistness it cleanses; and hence it fittingly signifies and causes the cleansing from sins. By reason of its coolness it tempers superfluous heat: wherefore it fittingly mitigates the concupiscence of the fomes. By reason of its transparency, it is susceptive of light; hence its adaptability to Baptism as the "sacrament of Faith."

Thirdly, because it is suitable for the signification of the mysteries of Christ, by which we are justified. For, as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxv in Joan.) on Jn. 3:5, “Unless a man be born again,” etc., “When we dip our heads under the water as in a kind of tomb our old man is buried, and being submerged is hidden below, and thence he rises again renewed.”

Fourthly, because by being so universal and abundant, it is a matter suitable to our need of this sacrament: for it can easily be obtained everywhere.

Reply to Objection 1: Fire enlightens actively. But he who is baptized does not become an enlightener, but is enlightened by faith, which “cometh by hearing” (Rom. 10:17). Consequently water is more suitable, than fire, for Baptism.

But when we find it said: “He shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and fire,” we may understand fire, as Jerome says (In Matth. ii), to mean the Holy Ghost, Who appeared above the disciples under the form of fiery tongues (Acts 2:3). Or we may understand it to mean tribulation, as Chrysostom says (Hom. iii in Matth.): because tribulation washes away sin, and tempers concupiscence. Or again, as Hilary says (Super Matth. ii) that “when we have been baptized in the Holy Ghost,” we still have to be “perfected by the fire of the judgment.”

Reply to Objection 2: Wine and oil are not so commonly used for washing, as water. Neither do they wash so efficiently: for whatever is washed with them, contracts a certain smell therefrom; which is not the case if water be used. Moreover, they are not so universal or so abundant as water.

Reply to Objection 3: Water flowed from Christ’s side to wash us; blood, to redeem us. Wherefore blood belongs to the sacrament of the Eucharist, while water belongs to the sacrament of Baptism. Yet this latter sacrament derives its cleansing virtue from the power of Christ’s blood.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ’s power flowed into all waters, by reason of, not connection of place, but likeness of species, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (Append. Serm. cxxxv): “The blessing that flowed from the Saviour’s Baptism, like a mystic river, swelled the course of every stream, and filled the channels of every spring.”

Reply to Objection 5: The blessing of the water is not essential to Baptism, but belongs to a certain solemnity, whereby the devotion of the faithful is aroused, and the cunning of the devil hindered from impeding the baptismal effect.

Whether plain water is necessary for Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that plain water is not necessary for Baptism. For the water which we have is not plain water; as appears especially in sea-water, in which there is a considerable proportion of the earthly element, as the Philosopher shows (Meteor. ii). Yet this water may be used for Baptism. Therefore plain and pure water is not necessary for Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, in the solemn celebration of Baptism, chrism is poured into the water. But this seems to take away the purity and plainness of the water. Therefore pure and plain water is not necessary for Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, the water that flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross was a figure of Baptism, as stated above (A[3], ad 3). But that water, seemingly, was not pure, because the elements do not exist actually in a mixed body, such as Christ’s. Therefore it seems that pure or plain water is not necessary for Baptism.

Objection 4: Further, lye does not seem to be pure water, for it has the properties of heating and drying, which are contrary to those of water. Nevertheless it seems that lye can be used for Baptism; for the water of the Baths can be so used, which has filtered through a sulphurous vein, just as lye percolates through ashes. Therefore it seems that plain water is not necessary for Baptism.

Objection 5: Further, rose-water is distilled from roses, just as chemical waters are distilled from certain bodies. But seemingly, such like waters may be used in Baptism; just as rain-water, which is distilled from vapors. Since, therefore, such waters are not pure and plain water, it seems that pure and plain water is not necessary for Baptism.

On the contrary, The proper matter of Baptism is water, as stated above [4419](A[3]). But plain water alone has the nature of water. Therefore pure plain water is necessary for Baptism.

I answer that, Water may cease to be pure or plain water in two ways: first, by being mixed with another body; secondly, by alteration. And each of these may happen in a twofold manner; artificially and naturally. Now art fails in the operation of nature: because nature gives the substantial form, which art cannot give; for whatever form is given by art is accidental; except perchance when art applies a proper agent to its proper matter, as fire to a combustible; in which manner animals are produced from certain things by way of putrefaction.

Whatever artificial change, then, takes place in the water, whether by mixture or by alteration, the water’s nature is not changed. Consequently such water can be used for Baptism: unless perhaps such a small quantity of water be mixed artificially with a body that the compound is something other than water; thus mud is earth rather than water, and diluted wine is wine rather than water.

But if the change be natural, sometimes it destroys the nature of the water; and this is when by a natural process water enters into the substance of a mixed body: thus water changed into the juice of the grape is wine, wherefore it has not the nature of water. Sometimes, however, there may be a natural change of the water, without destruction of species: and this, both by alteration, as we may see in the case of water heated by the sun; and by mixture, as when the water of a river has become muddy by being mixed with particles of earth.

We must therefore say that any water may be used for Baptism, no matter how much it may be changed, as long as the species of water is not destroyed; but if the species of water be destroyed, it cannot be used for Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: The change in sea-water and in other waters which we have to hand, is not so great as to destroy the species of water. And therefore such waters may be used for Baptism.

Reply to Objection 2: Chrism does not destroy the nature of the water by being mixed with it: just as neither is water changed wherein meat and the like are boiled: except the substance boiled be so dissolved that the liquor be of a nature foreign to water; in this we may be guided by the specific gravity [spissitudine]. If, however, from the liquor thus thickened plain water be strained, it can be used for Baptism: just as water strained from mud, although mud cannot be used for baptizing.

Reply to Objection 3: The water which flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross, was not the phlegmatic humor, as some have supposed. For a liquid of this kind cannot be used for Baptism, as neither can the blood of an animal, or wine, or any liquid extracted from plants. It was pure water gushing forth miraculously like the blood from a dead body, to prove the reality of our Lord’s body, and confute the error of the Manichees: water, which is one of the four elements, showing Christ’s body to be composed of the four elements; blood, proving that it was composed of the four humors.

Reply to Objection 4: Baptism may be conferred with lye and the waters of Sulphur Baths: because such like waters are not incorporated, artificially or naturally, with certain mixed bodies, and suffer only a certain alteration by passing through certain bodies.

Reply to Objection 5: Rose-water is a liquid distilled from roses: consequently it cannot be used for Baptism. For the same reason chemical waters cannot be used, as neither can wine. Nor does the comparison hold with rain-water, which for the most part is formed by the condensing of vapors, themselves formed from water, and contains a minimum of the liquid matter from mixed bodies; which liquid matter by the force of nature, which is stronger than art, is transformed in this process of condensation into real water, a result which cannot be produced artificially. Consequently rain-water retains no properties of any mixed body; which cannot be said of rose-water or chemical waters.

Whether this be a suitable form of Baptism: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”?

Objection 1: It seems that this is not a suitable form of Baptism: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” For action should be ascribed to the principal agent rather than to the minister. Now the minister of a sacrament acts as an instrument, as stated above ([4420]Q[64], A[1]); while the principal agent in Baptism is Christ, according to Jn. 1:33, “He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth.” It is therefore unbecoming for the minister to say, “I baptize thee”: the more so that “Ego” [I] is understood in the word “baptizo” [I baptize], so that it seems redundant.

Objection 2: Further, there is no need for a man who does an action, to make mention of the action done; thus he who teaches, need not say, “I teach you.” Now our Lord gave at the same time the precepts both of baptizing and of teaching, when He said (Mat. 28:19): “Going, teach ye all nations,” etc. Therefore there is no need in the form of Baptism to mention the action of baptizing.

Objection 3: Further, the person baptized sometimes does not understand the words; for instance, if he be deaf, or a child. But it is useless to address such a one; according to Ecclus. 32:6: “Where there is no hearing, pour not out words.” Therefore it is unfitting to address the person baptized with these words: “I baptize thee.”

Objection 4: Further, it may happen that several are baptized by several at the same time; thus the apostles on one day baptized three thousand, and on another, five thousand (Acts 2, 4). Therefore the form of Baptism should not be limited to the singular number in the words, “I baptize thee”: but one should be able to say, “We baptize you.”

Objection 5: Further, Baptism derives its power from Christ’s Passion. But Baptism is sanctified by the form. Therefore it seems that Christ’s Passion should be mentioned in the form of Baptism.

Objection 6: Further, a name signifies a thing’s property. But there are three Personal Properties of the Divine Persons, as stated in the [4421]FP, Q[32], A[3]. Therefore we should not say, “in the name,” but “in the names of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

Objection 7: Further, the Person of the Father is designated not only by the name Father, but also by that of “Unbegotten and Begetter”; and the Son by those of “Word,” “Image,” and “Begotten”; and the Holy Ghost by those of “Gift,” “Love,” and the “Proceeding One.” Therefore it seems that Baptism is valid if conferred in these names.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 28:19): “Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

I answer that, Baptism receives its consecration from its form, according to Eph. 5:26: “Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.” And Augustine says (De Unico Baptismo iv) that “Baptism is consecrated by the words of the Gospel.” Consequently the cause of Baptism needs to be expressed in the baptismal form. Now this cause is twofold; the principal cause from which it derives its virtue, and this is the Blessed Trinity; and the instrumental cause, viz. the minister who confers the sacrament outwardly. Wherefore both causes should be expressed in the form of Baptism. Now the minister is designated by the words, “I baptize thee”; and the principal cause in the words, “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” Therefore this is the suitable form of Baptism: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

Reply to Objection 1: Action is attributed to an instrument as to the immediate agent; but to the principal agent inasmuch as the instrument acts in virtue thereof. Consequently it is fitting that in the baptismal form the minister should be mentioned as performing the act of baptizing, in the words, “I baptize thee”; indeed, our Lord attributed to the ministers the act of baptizing, when He said: “Baptizing them,” etc. But the principal cause is indicated as conferring the sacrament by His own power, in the words, “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost”: for Christ does not baptize without the Father and the Holy Ghost.

The Greeks, however, do not attribute the act of baptizing to the minister, in order to avoid the error of those who in the past ascribed the baptismal power to the baptizers, saying (1 Cor. 1:12): “I am of Paul . . . and I of Cephas.” Wherefore they use the form: “May the servant of Christ, N . . . , be baptized, in the name of the Father," etc. And since the action performed by the minister is expressed with the invocation of the Trinity, the sacrament is validly conferred. As to the addition of "Ego" in our form, it is not essential; but it is added in order to lay greater stress on the intention.

Reply to Objection 2: Since a man may be washed with water for several reasons, the purpose for which it is done must be expressed by the words of the form. And this is not done by saying: "In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost"; because we are bound to do all things in that Name (Col. 3:17). Wherefore unless the act of baptizing be expressed, either as we do, or as the Greeks do, the sacrament is not valid; according to the decretal of Alexander III: "If anyone dip a child thrice in the water in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, Amen, without saying, I baptize thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, Amen, the child is not baptized."

Reply to Objection 3: The words which are uttered in the sacramental forms, are said not merely for the purpose of signification, but also for the purpose of efficiency, inasmuch as they derive efficacy from that Word, by Whom "all things were made." Consequently they are becomingly addressed not only to men, but also to insensible creatures; for instance, when we say: "I exorcize thee, creature salt" (Roman Ritual).

Reply to Objection 4: Several cannot baptize one at the same time: because an action is multiplied according to the number of the agents, if it be done perfectly by each. So that if two were to combine, of whom one were mute, and unable to utter the words, and the other were without hands, and unable to perform the action, they could not both baptize at the same time, one saying the words and the other performing the action.

On the other hand, in a case of necessity, several could be baptized at the same time; for no single one of them would receive more than one baptism. But it would be necessary, in that case, to say: "I baptize ye." Nor would this be a change of form, because "ye" is the same as "thee and thee." Whereas "we" does not mean "I and I," but "I and thou"; so that this would be a change of form.

Likewise it would be a change of form to say, "I baptize myself": consequently no one can baptize himself. For this reason did Christ choose to be baptized by John (Extra, De Baptismo et ejus effectu, cap. Debitum).

Reply to Objection 5: Although Christ's Passion is the principal cause as compared to the minister, yet it is an instrumental cause as compared to the Blessed Trinity. For this reason the Trinity is mentioned rather than Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 6: Although there are three personal names of the three Persons, there is but one essential name. Now the Divine power which works in Baptism, pertains to the Essence; and therefore we say, "in the name," and not, "in the names."

Reply to Objection 7: Just as water is used in Baptism, because it is more commonly employed in washing, so for the purpose of designating the three Persons, in the form of Baptism, those names are chosen, which are generally used, in a particular language, to signify the Persons. Nor is the sacrament valid if conferred in any other names.

Whether Baptism can be conferred in the name of Christt?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism can be conferred in the name of Christ. For just as there is "one Faith," so is there "one Baptism" (Eph. 4:5). But it is related (Acts 8:12) that "in the name of Jesus Christ they were baptized, both men and women." Therefore now also can Baptism be conferred in the name of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i): "If you mention Christ, you designate both the Father by Whom He was anointed, and the Son Himself, Who was anointed, and the Holy Ghost with Whom He was anointed." But Baptism can be conferred in the name of the Trinity: therefore also in the name of Christ.

Objection 3: Further, Pope Nicholas I, answering questions put to him by the Bulgars, said: "Those who have been baptized in the name of the Trinity, or only in the name of Christ, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles (it is all the same, as Blessed Ambrose saith), must not be rebaptized." But they would be baptized again if they had not been validly baptized with that form. Therefore Baptism can be celebrated in the name of Christ by using this form: "I baptize thee in the name of Christ."

On the contrary, Pope Pelagius II wrote to the Bishop Gaudentius: "If any people living in your Worship's neighborhood, avow that they have been baptized in the name of the Lord only, without any hesitation baptize them again in the name of the Blessed Trinity, when they come in quest of the Catholic Faith.” Didymus, too, says (De Spir. Sanct.): “If indeed there be such a one with a mind so foreign to faith as to baptize while omitting one of the aforesaid names,” viz. of the three Persons, “he baptizes invalidly.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4422]Q[64], A[3]), the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ’s institution. Consequently, if any of those things be omitted which Christ instituted in regard to a sacrament, it is invalid; save by special dispensation of Him Who did not bind His power to the sacraments. Now Christ commanded the sacrament of Baptism to be given with the invocation of the Trinity. And consequently whatever is lacking to the full invocation of the Trinity, destroys the integrity of Baptism.

Nor does it matter that in the name of one Person another is implied, as the name of the Son is implied in that of the Father, or that he who mentions the name of only one Person may believe aright in the Three; because just as a sacrament requires sensible matter, so does it require a sensible form. Hence, for the validity of the sacrament it is not enough to imply or to believe in the Trinity, unless the Trinity be expressed in sensible words. For this reason at Christ’s Baptism, wherein was the source of the sanctification of our Baptism, the Trinity was present in sensible signs: viz. the Father in the voice, the Son in the human nature, the Holy Ghost in the dove.

Reply to Objection 1: It was by a special revelation from Christ that in the primitive Church the apostles baptized in the name of Christ; in order that the name of Christ, which was hateful to Jews and Gentiles, might become an object of veneration, in that the Holy Ghost was given in Baptism at the invocation of that Name.

Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose here gives this reason why exception could, without inconsistency, be allowed in the primitive Church; namely, because the whole Trinity is implied in the name of Christ, and therefore the form prescribed by Christ in the Gospel was observed in its integrity, at least implicitly.

Reply to Objection 3: Pope Nicolas confirms his words by quoting the two authorities given in the preceding objections: wherefore the answer to this is clear from the two solutions given above.

Whether immersion in water is necessary for Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that immersion in water is necessary for Baptism. Because it is written (Eph. 4:5): “One faith, one baptism.” But in many parts of the world the ordinary way of baptizing is by immersion. Therefore it seems that there can be no Baptism without immersion.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3,4): “All we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death: for we are buried together with Him, by Baptism into death.” But this is done by immersion: for Chrysostom says on Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost,” etc.: “When we dip our heads under the water as in a kind of tomb, our old man is buried, and being submerged, is hidden below, and thence he rises again renewed.” Therefore it seems that immersion is essential to Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, if Baptism is valid without total immersion of the body, it would follow that it would be equally sufficient to pour water over any part of the body. But this seems unreasonable; since original sin, to remedy which is the principal purpose of Baptism, is not in only one part of the body. Therefore it seems that immersion is necessary for Baptism, and that mere sprinkling is not enough.

On the contrary, It is written (Heb. 10:22): “Let us draw near with a true heart in fulness of faith, having our hearts sprinkled from an evil conscience, and our bodies washed with clean water.”

I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism water is put to the use of a washing of the body, whereby to signify the inward washing away of sins. Now washing may be done with water not only by immersion, but also by sprinkling or pouring. And, therefore, although it is safer to baptize by immersion, because this is the more ordinary fashion, yet Baptism can be conferred by sprinkling or also by pouring, according to Ezech. 36:25: “I will pour upon you clean water,” as also the Blessed Lawrence is related to have baptized. And this especially in cases of urgency: either because there is a great number to be baptized, as was clearly the case in Acts 2 and 4, where we read that on one day three thousand believed, and on another five thousand: or through there being but a small supply of water, or through feebleness of the minister, who cannot hold up the candidate for Baptism; or through feebleness of the candidate, whose life might be endangered by immersion. We must therefore conclude that immersion is not necessary for Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: What is accidental to a thing does not diversify its essence. Now bodily washing with water is essential to Baptism: wherefore Baptism is called a “laver,” according to Eph. 5:26: “Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.” But that the washing be done this or that way, is accidental to Baptism. And consequently such diversity does not destroy the oneness of Baptism.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s burial is more clearly represented by immersion: wherefore this manner of baptizing is more frequently in use and more commendable. Yet in the other ways of baptizing it is represented after a fashion, albeit not so clearly; for no matter how the washing is done, the body of a man, or some part thereof, is put under water, just as Christ’s body was put under the earth.

Reply to Objection 3: The principal part of the body, especially in relation to the exterior members, is the head, wherein all the senses, both interior and exterior, flourish. And therefore, if the whole body cannot be covered with water, because of the scarcity of water, or because of some other reason, it is necessary to pour water over the head, in which the principle of animal life is made manifest.

And although original sin is transmitted through the members that serve for procreation, yet those members are not to be sprinkled in preference to the head, because by Baptism the transmission of original sin to the offspring by the act of procreation is not deleted, but the soul is freed from the stain and debt of sin which it has contracted. Consequently that part of the body should be washed in preference, in which the works of the soul are made manifest.

Nevertheless in the Old Law the remedy against original sin was affixed to the member of procreation; because He through Whom original sin was to be removed, was yet to be born of the seed of Abraham, whose faith was signified by circumcision according to Rom. 4:11.

Whether trine immersion is essential to Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that trine immersion is essential to Baptism. For Augustine says in a sermon on the Symbol, addressed to the Neophytes: “Rightly were you dipped three times, since you were baptized in the name of the Trinity. Rightly were you dipped three times, because you were baptized in the name of Jesus Christ, Who on the third day rose again from the dead. For that thrice repeated immersion reproduces the burial of the Lord by which you were buried with Christ in Baptism." Now both seem to be essential to Baptism, namely, that in Baptism the Trinity of Persons should be signified, and that we should be conformed to Christ's burial. Therefore it seems that trine immersion is essential to Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's mandate. But trine immersion was commanded by Christ: for Pope Pelagius II wrote to Bishop Gaudentius: "The Gospel precept given by our Lord God Himself, our Saviour Jesus Christ, admonishes us to confer the sacrament of Baptism to each one in the name of the Trinity and also with trine immersion." Therefore, just as it is essential to Baptism to call on the name of the Trinity, so is it essential to baptize by trine immersion.

Objection 3: Further, if trine immersion be not essential to Baptism, it follows that the sacrament of Baptism is conferred at the first immersion; so that if a second or third immersion be added, it seems that Baptism is conferred a second or third time. which is absurd. Therefore one immersion does not suffice for the sacrament of Baptism, and trine immersion is essential thereto.

On the contrary, Gregory wrote to the Bishop Leander: "It cannot be in any way reprehensible to baptize an infant with either a trine or a single immersion: since the Trinity can be represented in the three immersions, and the unity of the Godhead in one immersion."

I answer that As stated above (A[7], ad 1), washing with water is of itself required for Baptism, being essential to the sacrament: whereas the mode of washing is accidental to the sacrament. Consequently, as Gregory in the words above quoted explains, both single and trine immersion are lawful considered in themselves; since one immersion signifies the oneness of Christ's death and of the Godhead; while trine immersion signifies the three days of Christ's burial, and also the Trinity of Persons.

But for various reasons, according as the Church has ordained, one mode has been in practice, at one time, the other at another time. For since from the very earliest days of the Church some have had false notions concerning the Trinity, holding that Christ is a mere man, and that He is not called the "Son of God" or "God" except by reason of His merit, which was chiefly in His death; for this reason they did not baptize in the name of the Trinity, but in memory of Christ’s death, and with one immersion. And this was condemned in the early Church. Wherefore in the Apostolic Canons (xlix) we read: “If any priest or bishop confer baptism not with the trine immersion in the one administration, but with one immersion, which baptism is said to be conferred by some in the death of the Lord, let him be deposed”: for our Lord did not say, “Baptize ye in My death,” but “In the name of the Father and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.”

Later on, however, there arose the error of certain schismatics and heretics who rebaptized: as Augustine (Super. Joan., cf. De Haeres. lxix) relates of the Donatists. Wherefore, in detestation of their error, only one immersion was ordered to be made, by the (fourth) council of Toledo, in the acts of which we read: “In order to avoid the scandal of schism or the practice of heretical teaching let us hold to the single baptismal immersion.”

But now that this motive has ceased, trine immersion is universally observed in Baptism: and consequently anyone baptizing otherwise would sin gravely, through not following the ritual of the Church. It would, however, be valid Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: The Trinity acts as principal agent in Baptism. Now the likeness of the agent enters into the effect, in regard to the form and not in regard to the matter. Wherefore the Trinity is signified in Baptism by the words of the form. Nor is it essential for the Trinity to be signified by the manner in which the matter is used; although this is done to make the signification clearer.

In like manner Christ’s death is sufficiently represented in the one immersion. And the three days of His burial were not necessary for our salvation, because even if He had been buried or dead for one day, this would have been enough to consummate our redemption: yet those three days were ordained unto the manifestation of the reality of His death, as stated above ([4423]Q[53], A[2]). It is therefore clear that neither on the part of the Trinity, nor on the part of Christ’s Passion, is the trine immersion essential to the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Pope Pelagius understood the trine immersion to be ordained by Christ in its equivalent; in the sense that Christ commanded Baptism to be conferred “in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost.” Nor can we argue from the form to the use of the matter, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4424]Q[64], A[8]), the intention is essential to Baptism. Consequently, one Baptism results from the intention of the Church’s minister, who intends to confer one Baptism by a trine immersion. Wherefore Jerome says on Eph. 4:5,6: “Though the Baptism,” i.e. the immersion, “be thrice repeated, on account of the mystery of the Trinity, yet it is reputed as one Baptism.”

If, however, the intention were to confer one Baptism at each immersion together with the repetition of the words of the form, it would be a sin, in itself, because it would be a repetition of Baptism.

Whether Baptism may be reiterated?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism may be reiterated. For Baptism was instituted, seemingly, in order to wash away sins. But sins are reiterated. Therefore much more should Baptism be reiterated: because Christ’s mercy surpasses man’s guilt.

Objection 2: Further, John the Baptist received special commendation from Christ, Who said of him (Mat. 11:11): “There hath not risen among them that are born of women, a greater than John the Baptist.” But those whom John had baptized were baptized again, according to Acts 19:1–7, where it is stated that Paul rebaptized those who had received the Baptism of John. Much more, therefore, should those be rebaptized, who have been baptized by heretics or sinners.

Objection 3: Further, it was decreed in the Council of Nicaea (Can. xix) that if “any of the Paulianists or Cataphrygians should be converted to the Catholic Church, they were to be baptized”: and this seemingly should be said in regard to other heretics. Therefore those whom the heretics have baptized, should be baptized again.

Objection 4: Further, Baptism is necessary for salvation. But sometimes there is a doubt about the baptism of those who really have been baptized. Therefore it seems that they should be baptized again.

Objection 5: Further, the Eucharist is a more perfect sacrament than Baptism, as stated above ([4425]Q[65], A[3]). But the sacrament of the Eucharist is reiterated. Much more reason, therefore, is there for Baptism to be reiterated.

On the contrary, It is written, (Eph. 4:5): “One faith, one Baptism.”

I answer that, Baptism cannot be reiterated.

First, because Baptism is a spiritual regeneration; inasmuch as a man dies to the old life, and begins to lead the new life. Whence it is written (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, He cannot see [Vulg.: ‘enter into’] the kingdom of God.” Now one man can be begotten but once. Wherefore Baptism cannot be reiterated, just as neither can carnal generation. Hence Augustine says on Jn. 3:4: “‘Can he enter a second time into his mother’s womb and be born again’: So thou,” says he, “must understand the birth of the Spirit, as Nicodemus understood the birth of the flesh. . . . As there is no return to the womb, so neither is there to Baptism.”

Secondly, because “we are baptized in Christ’s death,” by which we die unto sin and rise again unto “newness of life” (cf. Rom. 6:3,4). Now “Christ died” but “once” (Rom. 6:10). Wherefore neither should Baptism be reiterated. For this reason (Heb. 6:6) is it said against some who wished to be baptized again: “Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God”; on which the gloss observes: “Christ’s one death hallowed the one Baptism.”

Thirdly, because Baptism imprints a character, which is indelible, and is conferred with a certain consecration. Wherefore, just as other consecrations are not reiterated in the Church, so neither is Baptism. This is the view expressed by Augustine, who says (Contra Epist. Parmen. ii) that “the military character is not renewed”: and that “the sacrament of Christ is not less enduring than this bodily mark, since we see that not even apostates are deprived of Baptism, since when they repent and return they are not baptized anew.”

Fourthly, because Baptism is conferred principally as a remedy against original sin. Wherefore, just as original sin is not renewed, so neither is Baptism reiterated, for as it is written (Rom. 5:18), “as by the offense of one, unto all men to condemnation, so also by the justice of one, unto all men to justification of life.”

Reply to Objection 1: Baptism derives its efficacy from Christ’s Passion, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). Wherefore, just as subsequent sins do not cancel the virtue of Christ’s Passion, so neither do they cancel Baptism, so as to call for its repetition. on the other hand the sin which hindered the effect of Baptism is blotted out on being submitted to Penance.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says on Jn. 1:33: “‘And I knew Him not’: Behold; after John had baptized, Baptism was administered; after a murderer has baptized, it is not administered: because John gave his own Baptism; the murderer, Christ's; for that sacrament is so sacred, that not even a murderer's administration contaminates it."

Reply to Objection 3: The Paulianists and Cataphrygians used not to baptize in the name of the Trinity. Wherefore Gregory, writing to the Bishop Quiricus, says: "Those heretics who are not baptized in the name of the Trinity, such as the Bonosians and Cataphrygians" (who were of the same mind as the Paulianists), "since the former believe not that Christ is God" (holding Him to be a mere man), "while the latter," i.e. the Cataphrygians, "are so perverse as to deem a mere man," viz. Montanus, "to be the Holy Ghost: all these are baptized when they come to holy Church, for the baptism which they received while in that state of error was no Baptism at all, not being conferred in the name of the Trinity." On the other hand, as set down in De Eccles. Dogm. xxii: "Those heretics who have been baptized in the confession of the name of the Trinity are to be received as already baptized when they come to the Catholic Faith."

Reply to Objection 4: According to the Decretal of Alexander III: "Those about whose Baptism there is a doubt are to be baptized with these words prefixed to the form: 'If thou art baptized, I do not rebaptize thee; but if thou art not baptized, I baptize thee,' etc.: for that does not appear to be repeated, which is not known to have been done."

Reply to Objection 5: Both sacraments, viz. Baptism and the Eucharist, are a representation of our Lord's death and Passion, but not in the same way. For Baptism is a commemoration of Christ's death in so far as man dies with Christ, that he may be born again into a new life. But the Eucharist is a commemoration of Christ's death, in so far as the suffering Christ Himself is offered to us as the Paschal banquet, according to 1 Cor. 5:7,8: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed; therefore let us feast." And forasmuch as man is born once, whereas he eats many times, so is Baptism given once, but the Eucharist frequently.

Whether the Church observes a suitable rite in baptizing?

Objection 1: It seems that the Church observes an unsuitable rite in baptizing. For as Chrysostom (Chromatius, in Matth. 3:15) says: "The waters of Baptism would never avail to purge the sins of them that believe, had they not been hallowed by the touch of our Lord’s body.” Now this took place at Christ’s Baptism, which is commemorated in the Feast of the Epiphany. Therefore solemn Baptism should be celebrated at the Feast of the Epiphany rather than on the eves of Easter and Whitsunday.

Objection 2: Further, it seems that several matters should not be used in the same sacrament. But water is used for washing in Baptism. Therefore it is unfitting that the person baptized should be anointed thrice with holy oil first on the breast, and then between the shoulders, and a third time with chrism on the top of the head.

Objection 3: Further, “in Christ Jesus . . . there is neither male nor female” (Gal. 3:23) . . .”neither Barbarian nor Scythian” (Col. 3:11), nor, in like manner, any other such like distinctions. Much less, therefore can a difference of clothing have any efficacy in the Faith of Christ. It is consequently unfitting to bestow a white garment on those who have been baptized.

Objection 4: Further, Baptism can be celebrated without such like ceremonies. Therefore it seems that those mentioned above are superfluous; and consequently that they are unsuitably inserted by the Church in the baptismal rite.

On the contrary, The Church is ruled by the Holy Ghost, Who does nothing inordinate.

I answer that, In the sacrament of Baptism something is done which is essential to the sacrament, and something which belongs to a certain solemnity of the sacrament. Essential indeed, to the sacrament are both the form which designates the principal cause of the sacrament; and the minister who is the instrumental cause; and the use of the matter, namely, washing with water, which designates the principal sacramental effect. But all the other things which the Church observes in the baptismal rite, belong rather to a certain solemnity of the sacrament.

And these, indeed, are used in conjunction with the sacrament for three reasons. First, in order to arouse the devotion of the faithful, and their reverence for the sacrament. For if there were nothing done but a mere washing with water, without any solemnity, some might easily think it to be an ordinary washing.

Secondly, for the instruction of the faithful. Because simple and unlettered folk need to be taught by some sensible signs, for instance, pictures and the like. And in this way by means of the sacramental ceremonies they are either instructed, or urged to seek the signification of such like sensible signs. And consequently, since, besides the principal sacramental effect, other things should be known about Baptism, it was fitting that these also should be represented by some outward signs.

Thirdly, because the power of the devil is restrained, by prayers, blessings, and the like, from hindering the sacramental effect.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ was baptized on the Epiphany with the Baptism of John, as stated above ([4426]Q[39], A[2]), with which baptism, indeed, the faithful are not baptized, rather are they baptized with Christ's Baptism. This has its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, according to Rom. 6:3: "We who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death"; and in the Holy Ghost, according to Jn. 3:5: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost." Therefore it is that solemn Baptism is held in the Church, both on Easter Eve, when we commemorate our Lord's burial and resurrection; for which reason our Lord gave His disciples the commandment concerning Baptism as related by Matthew (28:19): and on Whitsun-eve, when the celebration of the Feast of the Holy Ghost begins; for which reason the apostles are said to have baptized three thousand on the very day of Pentecost when they had received the Holy Ghost.

Reply to Objection 2: The use of water in Baptism is part of the substance of the sacrament; but the use of oil or chrism is part of the solemnity. For the candidate is first of all anointed with Holy oil on the breast and between the shoulders, as "one who wrestles for God," to use Ambrose's expression (De Sacram. i): thus are prize-fighters wont to besmear themselves with oil. Or, as Innocent III says in a decretal on the Holy Unction: "The candidate is anointed on the breast, in order to receive the gift of the Holy Ghost, to cast off error and ignorance, and to acknowledge the true faith, since 'the just man liveth by faith'; while he is anointed between the shoulders, that he may be clothed with the grace of the Holy Ghost, lay aside indifference and sloth, and become active in good works; so that the sacrament of faith may purify the thoughts of his heart, and strengthen his shoulders for the burden of labor." But after Baptism, as Rabanus says (De Sacram. iii), "he is forthwith anointed on the head by the priest with Holy Chrism, who proceeds at once to offer up a prayer that the neophyte may have a share in Christ's kingdom, and be called a Christian after Christ.” Or, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. iii), his head is anointed, because “the senses of a wise man are in his head” (Eccl 2:14): to wit, that he may “be ready to satisfy everyone that asketh” him to give “a reason of his faith” (cf. 1 Pet. 3:15; Innocent III, Decretal on Holy Unction).

Reply to Objection 3: This white garment is given, not as though it were unlawful for the neophyte to use others: but as a sign of the glorious resurrection, unto which men are born again by Baptism; and in order to designate the purity of life, to which he will be bound after being baptized, according to Rom. 6:4: “That we may walk in newness of life.”

Reply to Objection 4: Although those things that belong to the solemnity of a sacrament are not essential to it, yet are they not superfluous, since they pertain to the sacrament’s wellbeing, as stated above.

Whether three kinds of Baptism are fittingly described—viz. Baptism of Water, of Blood, and of the Spirit?

Objection 1: It seems that the three kinds of Baptism are not fittingly described as Baptism of Water, of Blood, and of the Spirit, i.e. of the Holy Ghost. Because the Apostle says (Eph. 4:5): “One Faith, one Baptism.” Now there is but one Faith. Therefore there should not be three Baptisms.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a sacrament, as we have made clear above ([4427]Q[65], A[1]). Now none but Baptism of Water is a sacrament. Therefore we should not reckon two other Baptisms.

Objection 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) distinguishes several other kinds of Baptism. Therefore we should admit more than three Baptisms.

On the contrary, on Heb. 6:2, “Of the doctrine of Baptisms,” the gloss says: “He uses the plural, because there is Baptism of Water, of Repentance, and of Blood.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4428]Q[62], A[5]), Baptism of Water has its efficacy from Christ’s Passion, to which a man is conformed by Baptism, and also from the Holy Ghost, as first cause. Now although the effect depends on the first cause, the cause far surpasses the effect, nor does it depend on it. Consequently, a man may, without Baptism of Water, receive the sacramental effect from Christ’s Passion, in so far as he is conformed to Christ by suffering for Him. Hence it is written (Apoc. 7:14): “These are they who are come out of great tribulation, and have washed their robes and have made them white in the blood of the Lamb.” In like manner a man receives the effect of Baptism by the power of the Holy Ghost, not only without Baptism of Water, but also without Baptism of Blood: forasmuch as his heart is moved by the Holy Ghost to believe in and love God and to repent of his sins: wherefore this is also called Baptism of Repentance. Of this it is written (Is. 4:4): “If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the daughters of Zion, and shall wash away the blood of Jerusalem out of the midst thereof, by the spirit of judgment, and by the spirit of burning.” Thus, therefore, each of these other Baptisms is called Baptism, forasmuch as it takes the place of Baptism. Wherefore Augustine says (De Unico Baptismo Parvulorum iv): “The Blessed Cyprian argues with considerable reason from the thief to whom, though not baptized, it was said: ‘Today shalt thou be with Me in Paradise’ that suffering can take the place of Baptism. Having weighed this in my mind again and again, I perceive that not only can suffering for the name of Christ supply for what was lacking in Baptism, but even faith and conversion of heart, if perchance on account of the stress of the times the celebration of the mystery of Baptism is not practicable.”

Reply to Objection 1: The other two Baptisms are included in the Baptism of Water, which derives its efficacy, both from Christ’s Passion and from the Holy Ghost. Consequently for this reason the unity of Baptism is not destroyed.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above ([4429]Q[60], A[1]), a sacrament is a kind of sign. The other two, however, are like the Baptism of Water, not, indeed, in the nature of sign, but in the baptismal effect. Consequently they are not sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: Damascene enumerates certain figurative Baptisms. For instance, “the Deluge” was a figure of our Baptism, in respect of the salvation of the faithful in the Church; since then “a few . . . souls were saved in the ark [Vulg.: ‘by water’],” according to 1 Pet. 3:20. He also mentions “the crossing of the Red Sea”: which was a figure of our Baptism, in respect of our delivery from the bondage of sin; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:2) that “all . . . were baptized in the cloud and in the sea.” And again he mentions “the various washings which were customary under the Old Law,” which were figures of our Baptism, as to the cleansing from sins: also “the Baptism of John,” which prepared the way for our Baptism.

Whether the Baptism of Blood is the most excellent of these?

Objection 1: It seems that the Baptism of Blood is not the most excellent of these three. For the Baptism of Water impresses a character; which the Baptism of Blood cannot do. Therefore the Baptism of Blood is not more excellent than the Baptism of Water.

Objection 2: Further, the Baptism of Blood is of no avail without the Baptism of the Spirit, which is by charity; for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3): “If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” But the Baptism of the Spirit avails without the Baptism of Blood; for not only the martyrs are saved. Therefore the Baptism of Blood is not the most excellent.

Objection 3: Further, just as the Baptism of Water derives its efficacy from Christ’s Passion, to which, as stated above [4430](A[11]), the Baptism of Blood corresponds, so Christ’s Passion derives its efficacy from the Holy Ghost, according to Heb. 9:14: “The Blood of Christ, Who by the Holy Ghost offered Himself unspotted unto God, shall cleanse our conscience from dead works,” etc. Therefore the Baptism of the Spirit is more excellent than the Baptism of Blood. Therefore the Baptism of Blood is not the most excellent.

On the contrary, Augustine (Ad Fortunatum) speaking of the comparison between Baptisms says: “The newly baptized confesses his faith in the presence of the priest: the martyr in the presence of the persecutor. The former is sprinkled with water, after he has confessed; the latter with his blood. The former receives the Holy Ghost by the imposition of the bishop’s hands; the latter is made the temple of the Holy Ghost.”

I answer that, As stated above [4431](A[11]), the shedding of blood for Christ’s sake, and the inward operation of the Holy Ghost, are called baptisms, in so far as they produce the effect of the Baptism of Water. Now the Baptism of Water derives its efficacy from Christ’s Passion and from the Holy Ghost, as already stated [4432](A[11]). These two causes act in each of these three Baptisms; most excellently, however, in the Baptism of Blood. For Christ’s Passion acts in the Baptism of Water by way of a figurative representation; in the Baptism of the Spirit or of Repentance, by way of desire. but in the Baptism of Blood, by way of imitating the (Divine) act. In like manner, too, the power of the Holy Ghost acts in the Baptism of Water through a certain hidden power. in the Baptism of Repentance by moving the heart; but in the Baptism of Blood by the highest degree of fervor of dilection and love, according to Jn. 15:13: “Greater love than this no man hath that a man lay down his life for his friends.”

Reply to Objection 1: A character is both reality and a sacrament. And we do not say that the Baptism of Blood is more excellent, considering the nature of a sacrament; but considering the sacramental effect.

Reply to Objection 2: The shedding of blood is not in the nature of a Baptism if it be without charity. Hence it is clear that the Baptism of Blood includes the Baptism of the Spirit, but not conversely. And from this it is proved to be more perfect.

Reply to Objection 3: The Baptism owes its pre-eminence not only to Christ’s Passion, but also to the Holy Ghost, as stated above.

OF THE MINISTERS BY WHOM THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM IS CONFERRED (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the ministers by whom the sacrament of Baptism is conferred. And concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it belongs to a deacon to baptize?

(2) Whether this belongs to a priest, or to a bishop only?

(3) Whether a layman can confer the sacrament of Baptism?

(4) Whether a woman can do this?

(5) Whether an unbaptized person can baptize?

(6) Whether several can at the same time baptize one and the same person?

(7) Whether it is essential that someone should raise the person baptized from the sacred font?

(8) Whether he who raises someone from the sacred font is bound to instruct him?

Whether it is part of a deacon’s duty to baptize?

Objection 1: It seems that it is part of a deacon’s duty to baptize. Because the duties of preaching and of baptizing were enjoined by our Lord at the same time, according to Mat. 28:19: “Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them,” etc. But it is part of a deacon’s duty to preach the gospel. Therefore it seems that it is also part of a deacon’s duty to baptize.

Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) to “cleanse” is part of the deacon’s duty. But cleansing from sins is effected specially by Baptism, according to Eph. 5:26: “Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.” Therefore it seems that it belongs to a deacon to baptize.

Objection 3: Further, it is told of Blessed Laurence, who was a deacon, that he baptized many. Therefore it seems that it belongs to deacons to baptize.

On the contrary, Pope Gelasius I says (the passage is to be found in the Decrees, dist. 93): “We order the deacons to keep within their own province”; and further on: “Without bishop or priest they must not dare to baptize, except in cases of extreme urgency, when the aforesaid are a long way off.”

I answer that, Just as the properties and duties of the heavenly orders are gathered from their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi), so can we gather, from the names of the ecclesiastical orders, what belongs to each order. Now “deacons” are so called from being “ministers”; because, to wit, it is not in the deacon’s province to be the chief and official celebrant in conferring a sacrament, but to minister to others, his elders, in the sacramental dispensations. And so it does not belong to a deacon to confer the sacrament of Baptism officially as it were; but to assist and serve his elders in the bestowal of this and other sacraments. Hence Isidore says (Epist. ad Ludifred.): “It is a deacon’s duty to assist and serve the priests, in all the rites of Christ’s sacraments, viz. those of Baptism, of the Chrism, of the Paten and Chalice.”

Reply to Objection 1: It is the deacon’s duty to read the Gospel in church, and to preach it as one catechizing; hence Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v) that a deacon’s office involves power over the unclean among whom he includes the catechumens. But to teach, i.e. to expound the Gospel, is the proper office of a bishop, whose action is “to perfect,” as Dionysius teaches

(Eccl. Hier. v); and “to perfect” is the same as “to teach.” Consequently, it does not follow that the office of baptizing belongs to deacons.

Reply to Objection 2: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii), Baptism has a power not only of “cleansing” but also of “enlightening.” Consequently, it is outside the province of the deacon whose duty it is to cleanse only: viz. either by driving away the unclean, or by preparing them for the reception of a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: Because Baptism is a necessary sacrament, deacons are allowed to baptize in cases of urgency when their elders are not at hand; as appears from the authority of Gelasius quoted above. And it was thus that Blessed Laurence, being but a deacon, baptized.

Whether to baptize is part of the priestly office, or proper to that of bishops?

Objection 1: It seems that to baptize is not part of the priestly office, but proper to that of bishops. Because, as stated above (A[1], OBJ[1]), the duties of teaching and baptizing are enjoined in the same precept (Mat. 28:19). But to teach, which is “to perfect,” belongs to the office of bishop, as Dionysius declares (Eccl. Hier. v, vi). Therefore to baptize also belongs to the episcopal office.

Objection 2: Further, by Baptism a man is admitted to the body of the Christian people: and to do this seems consistent with no other than the princely office. Now the bishops hold the position of princes in the Church, as the gloss observes on Lk. 10:1: indeed, they even take the place of the apostles, of whom it is written (Ps. 44:17): “Thou shalt make them princes over all the earth.” Therefore it seems that to baptize belongs exclusively to the office of bishops.

Objection 3: Further, Isidore says (Epist. ad Ludifred.) that “it belongs to the bishop to consecrate churches, to anoint altars, to consecrate [conficere] the chrism; he it is that confers the ecclesiastical orders, and blesses the consecrated virgins.” But the sacrament of Baptism is greater than all these. Therefore much more reason is there why to baptize should belong exclusively to the episcopal office.

On the contrary, Isidore says (De Officiis. ii): “It is certain that Baptism was entrusted to priests alone.”

I answer that, Priests are consecrated for the purpose of celebrating the sacrament of Christ's Body, as stated above ([4433]Q[65], A[3]). Now that is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:17): "We, being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread and one chalice." Moreover, by Baptism a man becomes a participator in ecclesiastical unity, wherefore also he receives the right to approach our Lord's Table. Consequently, just as it belongs to a priest to consecrate the Eucharist, which is the principal purpose of the priesthood, so it is the proper office of a priest to baptize: since it seems to belong to one and the same, to produce the whole and to dispose the part in the whole.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord enjoined on the apostles, whose place is taken by the bishops, both duties, namely, of teaching and of baptizing, but in different ways. Because Christ committed to them the duty of teaching, that they might exercise it themselves as being the most important duty of all: wherefore the apostles themselves said (Acts 6:2): "It is not reason that we should leave the word of God and serve tables." On the other hand, He entrusted the apostles with the office of baptizing, to be exercised vicariously; wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:17): "Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel." And the reason for this was that the merit and wisdom of the minister have no bearing on the baptismal effect, as they have in teaching, as may be seen from what we have stated above (Q[64], A[1], ad 2; [4434]AA[5],9). A proof of this is found also in the fact that our Lord Himself did not baptize, but His disciples, as John relates (4:2). Nor does it follow from this that bishops cannot baptize; since what a lower power can do, that can also a higher power. Wherefore also the Apostle says (1 Cor. 1:14, 16) that he had baptized some.

Reply to Objection 2: In every commonwealth minor affairs are entrusted to lower officials, while greater affairs are restricted to higher officials; according to Ex. 18:22: "When any great matter soever shall fall out, let them refer it to thee, and let them judge the lesser matters only." Consequently it belongs to the lower officials of the state to decide matters concerning the lower orders; while to the highest it belongs to set in order those matters that regard the higher orders of the state. Now by Baptism a man attains only to the lowest rank among the Christian people: and consequently it belongs to the lesser officials of the Church to baptize, namely, the priests, who hold the place of the seventy-two disciples of Christ, as the gloss says in the passage quoted from Luke 10.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4435]Q[65], A[3]), the sacrament of Baptism holds the first place in the order of necessity; but in the order of perfection there are other greater sacraments which are reserved to bishops.

Whether a layman can baptize?

Objection 1: It seems that a layman cannot baptize. Because, as stated above [4436](A[2]), to baptize belongs properly to the priestly order. But those things which belong to an order cannot be entrusted to one that is not ordained. Therefore it seems that a layman, who has no orders, cannot baptize.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to baptize, than to perform the other sacramental rites of Baptism, such as to catechize, to exorcize, and to bless the baptismal water. But these things cannot be done by laymen, but only by priests. Therefore it seems that much less can laymen baptize.

Objection 3: Further, just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance. But a layman cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither, therefore, can he baptize.

On the contrary, Pope Gelasius I and Isidore say that “it is often permissible for Christian laymen to baptize, in cases of urgent necessity.”

I answer that, It is due to the mercy of Him “Who will have all men to be saved” (1 Tim. 2:4) that in those things which are necessary for salvation, man can easily find the remedy. Now the most necessary among all the sacraments is Baptism, which is man’s regeneration unto spiritual life: since for children there is no substitute, while adults cannot otherwise than by Baptism receive a full remission both of guilt and of its punishment. Consequently, lest man should have to go without so necessary a remedy, it was ordained, both that the matter of Baptism should be something common that is easily obtainable by all, i.e. water; and that the minister of Baptism should be anyone, even not in orders, lest from lack of being baptized, man should suffer loss of his salvation.

Reply to Objection 1: To baptize belongs to the priestly order by reason of a certain appropriateness and solemnity; but this is not essential to the sacrament. Consequently, if a layman were to baptize even outside a case of urgency; he would sin, yet he would confer the sacrament; nor would the person thus baptized have to be baptized again.

Reply to Objection 2: These sacramental rites of Baptism belong to the solemnity of, and are not essential to, Baptism. And therefore they neither should nor can be done by a layman, but only by a priest, whose office it is to baptize solemnly.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4437]Q[65], AA[3],4), Penance is not so necessary as Baptism; since contrition can supply the defect of the priestly absolution which does not free from the whole punishment, nor again is it given to children. Therefore the comparison with Baptism does not stand, because its effect cannot be supplied by anything else.

Whether a woman can baptize?

Objection 1: It seems that a woman cannot baptize. For we read in the acts of the Council of Carthage (iv): “However learned and holy a woman may be, she must not presume to teach men in the church, or to baptize.” But in no case is a woman allowed to teach in church, according to 1 Cor. 14:35: “It is a shame for a woman to speak in the church.” Therefore it seems that neither is a woman in any circumstances permitted to baptize.

Objection 2: Further, to baptize belongs to those having authority. wherefore baptism should be conferred by priests having charge of souls. But women are not qualified for this; according to 1 Tim. 2:12: “I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to use authority over man, but to be subject to him [Vulg.: ‘but to be in silence’].” Therefore a woman cannot baptize.

Objection 3: Further, in the spiritual regeneration water seems to hold the place of the mother’s womb, as Augustine says on Jn. 3:4, “Can” a man “enter a second time into his mother’s womb, and be born again?” While he who baptizes seems to hold rather the position of father. But this is unfitting for a woman. Therefore a woman cannot baptize.

On the contrary, Pope Urban II says (Decreta xxx): “In reply to the questions asked by your beatitude, we consider that the following answer should be given: that the baptism is valid when, in cases of necessity, a woman baptizes a child in the name of the Trinity.”

I answer that, Christ is the chief Baptizer, according to Jn. 1:33: “He upon Whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that baptizeth.” For it is written in Col. 3 (cf. Gal. 3:28), that in Christ there is neither male nor female. Consequently, just as a layman can baptize, as Christ’s minister, so can a woman.

But since “the head of the woman is the man,” and “the head of . . . man, is Christ” (1 Cor. 11:3), a woman should not baptize if a man be available for the purpose; just as neither should a layman in the presence of a cleric, nor a cleric in the presence of a priest. The last, however, can baptize in the presence of a bishop, because it is part of the priestly office.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as a woman is not suffered to teach in public, but is allowed to instruct and admonish privately; so she is not permitted to baptize publicly and solemnly, and yet she can baptize in a case of urgency.

Reply to Objection 2: When Baptism is celebrated solemnly and with due form, it should be conferred by a priest having charge of souls, or by one representing him. But this is not required in cases of urgency, when a woman may baptize.

Reply to Objection 3: In carnal generation male and female co-operate according to the power of their proper nature; wherefore the female cannot be the active, but only the passive, principle of generation. But in spiritual generation they do not act, either of them, by their proper power, but only instrumentally by the power of Christ. Consequently, on the same grounds either man or woman can baptize in a case of urgency.

If, however, a woman were to baptize without any urgency for so doing. there would be no need of rebaptism: as we have said in regard to laymen (A[3], ad 1). But the baptizer herself would sin, as also those who took part with her therein, either by receiving Baptism from her, or by bringing someone to her to be baptized.

Whether one that is not baptized can confer the sacrament of Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that one that is not baptized cannot confer the sacrament of Baptism. For “none gives what he has not.” But a non-baptized person has not the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore he cannot give it.

Objection 2: Further, a man confers the sacrament of Baptism inasmuch as he is a minister of the Church. But one that is not baptized, belongs nowise to the Church, i.e. neither really nor sacramentally. Therefore he cannot confer the sacrament of Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, it is more to confer a sacrament than to receive it. But one that is not baptized, cannot receive the other sacraments. Much less, therefore, can he confer any sacrament.

On the contrary, Isidore says: “The Roman Pontiff does not consider it to be the man who baptizes, but that the Holy Ghost confers the grace of Baptism, though he that baptizes be a pagan.” But he who is baptized, is not called a pagan. Therefore he who is not baptized can confer the sacrament of Baptism.

I answer that, Augustine left this question without deciding it. For he says (Contra Ep. Parmen. ii): “This is indeed another question, whether even those can baptize who were never Christians; nor should anything be rashly asserted hereupon, without the authority of a sacred council such as suffices for so great a matter.” But afterwards it was decided by the Church that the unbaptized, whether Jews or pagans, can confer the sacrament of Baptism, provided they baptize in the form of the Church. Wherefore Pope Nicolas I replies to the questions propounded by the Bulgars: “You say that many in your country have been baptized by someone, whether Christian or pagan you know not. If these were baptized in the name of the Trinity, they must not be rebaptized.” But if the form of the Church be not observed, the sacrament of Baptism is not conferred. And thus is to be explained what Gregory II [*Gregory III] writes to Bishop Boniface: “Those whom you assert to have been baptized by pagans,” namely, with a form not recognized by the Church, “we command you to rebaptize in the name of the Trinity.” And the reason of this is that, just as on the part of the matter, as far as the essentials of the sacrament are concerned, any water will suffice, so, on the part of the minister, any man is competent. Consequently, an unbaptized person can baptize in a case of urgency. So that two unbaptized persons may baptize one another, one baptizing the other and being afterwards baptized by him: and each would receive not only the sacrament but also the reality of the sacrament. But if this were done outside a case of urgency, each would sin grievously, both the baptizer and the baptized, and thus the baptismal effect would be frustrated, although the sacrament itself would not be invalidated.

Reply to Objection 1: The man who baptizes offers but his outward ministration; whereas Christ it is Who baptizes inwardly, Who can use all men to whatever purpose He wills. Consequently, the unbaptized can baptize: because, as Pope Nicolas I says, “the Baptism is not theirs,” i.e. the baptizers,’ “but His,” i.e. Christ’s.

Reply to Objection 2: He who is not baptized, though he belongs not to the Church either in reality or sacramentally, can nevertheless belong to her in intention and by similarity of action, namely, in so far as he intends to do what the Church does, and in baptizing observes the Church’s form, and thus acts as the minister of Christ, Who did not confine His power to those that are baptized, as neither did He to the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: The other sacraments are not so necessary as Baptism. And therefore it is allowable that an unbaptized person should baptize rather than that he should receive other sacraments.

Whether several can baptize at the same time?

Objection 1: It seems that several can baptize at the same time. For unity is contained in multitude, but not “vice versa.” Wherefore it seems that many can do whatever one can but not “vice versa”: thus many draw a ship which one could draw. But one man can baptize. Therefore several, too, can baptize one at the same time.

Objection 2: Further, it is more difficult for one agent to act on many things, than for many to act at the same time on one. But one man can baptize several at the same time. Much more, therefore, can many baptize one at the same time.

Objection 3: Further, Baptism is a sacrament of the greatest necessity. Now in certain cases it seems necessary for several to baptize one at the same time; for instance, suppose a child to be in danger of death, and two persons present, one of whom is dumb, and the other without hands or arms; for then the mutilated person would have to pronounce the words, and the dumb person would have to perform the act of baptizing. Therefore it seems that several can baptize one at the same time.

On the contrary, Where there is one agent there is one action. If, therefore, several were to baptize one, it seems to follow that there would be several baptisms: and this is contrary to Eph. 4:5: “one Faith, one Baptism.”

I answer that, The Sacrament of Baptism derives its power principally from its form, which the Apostle calls “the word of life” (Eph. 5:26). Consequently, if several were to baptize one at the same time, we must consider what form they would use. For were they to say: “We baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,” some maintain that the sacrament of Baptism would not be conferred, because the form of the Church would not be observed, i.e. “I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.” But this reasoning is disproved by the form observed in the Greek Church. For they might say: “The servant of God, N . . . , is baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,” under which form the Greeks receive the sacrament of Baptism: and yet this form differs far more from the form that we use, than does this: “We baptize thee.”

The point to be observed, however, is this, that by this form, “We baptize thee,” the intention expressed is that several concur in conferring one Baptism: and this seems contrary to the notion of a minister; for a man does not baptize save as a minister of Christ, and as standing in His place; wherefore just as there is one Christ, so should there be one minister to represent Christ. Hence the Apostle says pointedly (Eph. 4:5): “one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism.” Consequently, an intention which is in opposition to this seems to annul the sacrament of Baptism.

On the other hand, if each were to say: “I baptize thee in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,” each would signify his intention as though he were conferring Baptism independently of the other. This might occur in the case where both were striving to baptize someone; and then it is clear that whichever pronounced the words first would confer the sacrament of Baptism; while the other, however great his right to baptize, if he presume to utter the words, would be liable to be punished as a rebaptizer. If, however, they were to pronounce the words absolutely at the same time, and dipped or sprinkled the man together, they should be punished for baptizing in an improper manner, but not for rebaptizing: because each would intend to baptize an unbaptized person, and each, so far as he is concerned, would baptize. Nor would they confer several sacraments: but the one Christ baptizing inwardly would confer one sacrament by means of both together.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in those agents that act by their own power. But men do not baptize by their own, but by Christ's power, Who, since He is one, perfects His work by means of one minister.

Reply to Objection 2: In a case of necessity one could baptize several at the same time under this form: "I baptize ye": for instance, if they were threatened by a falling house, or by the sword or something of the kind, so as not to allow of the delay involved by baptizing them singly. Nor would this cause a change in the Church's form, since the plural is nothing but the singular doubled: especially as we find the plural expressed in Mat. 28:19: "Baptizing them," etc. Nor is there parity between the baptizer and the baptized; since Christ, the baptizer in chief, is one: while many are made one in Christ by Baptism.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4438]Q[66], A[1]), the integrity of Baptism consists in the form of words and the use of the matter. Consequently, neither he who only pronounces the words, baptizes, nor he who dips. Where fore if one pronounces the words and the other dips, no form of words can be fitting. For neither could he say: "I baptize thee": since he dips not, and therefore baptizes not. Nor could they say: "We baptize thee": since neither baptizes. For if of two men, one write one part of a book, and the other write the other, it would not be a proper form of speech to say: "We wrote this book," but the figure of synecdoche in which the whole is put for the part.

Whether in Baptism it is necessary for someone to raise the baptized from the sacred font?

Objection 1: It seems that in Baptism it is not necessary for someone to raise the baptized from the sacred font. For our Baptism is consecrated by Christ's Baptism and is conformed thereto. But Christ when baptized was not raised by anyone from the font, but according to Mat. 3:16, "Jesus being baptized, forthwith came out of the water." Therefore it seems that neither when others are baptized should anyone raise the baptized from the sacred font.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, as stated above [4439](A[3]). But in carnal generation nothing else is required but the active principle, i.e. the father, and the passive principle, i.e. the mother. Since, then, in Baptism he that baptizes takes the place of the father, while the very water of Baptism takes the place of the mother, as Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (cxxxv); it seems that there is no further need for someone to raise the baptized from the sacred font.

Objection 3: Further, nothing ridiculous should be observed in the sacraments of the Church. But it seems ridiculous that after being baptized, adults who can stand up of themselves and leave the sacred font, should be held up by another. Therefore there seems no need for anyone, especially in the Baptism of adults, to raise the baptized from the sacred font.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii) that "the priests taking the baptized hand him over to his sponsor and guide."

I answer that, The spiritual regeneration, which takes place in Baptism, is in a certain manner likened to carnal generation: wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:2): "As new-born babes, endowed with reason desire milk [Vulg.: 'desire reasonable milk'] without guile." Now, in carnal generation the new-born child needs nourishment and guidance: wherefore, in spiritual generation also, someone is needed to undertake the office of nurse and tutor by forming and instructing one who is yet a novice in the Faith, concerning things pertaining to Christian faith and mode of life, which the clergy have not the leisure to do through being busy with watching over the people generally: because little children and novices need more than ordinary care. Consequently someone is needed to receive the baptized from the sacred font as though for the purpose of instructing and guiding them. It is to this that Dionysius refers (Eccl. Hier. xi) saying: "It occurred to our heavenly guides," i.e. the Apostles, "and they decided, that infants should be taken charge of thus: that the parents of the child should hand it over to some instructor versed in holy things, who would thenceforth take charge of the child, and be to it a spiritual father and a guide in the road of salvation."

Reply to Objection 1: Christ was baptized not that He might be regenerated, but that He might regenerate others: wherefore after His Baptism He needed no tutor like other children.

Reply to Objection 2: In carnal generation nothing is essential besides a father and a mother: yet to ease the latter in her travail, there is need for a midwife; and for the child to be suitably brought up there is need for a nurse and a tutor: while their place is taken in Baptism by him who raises the child from the sacred font. Consequently this is not essential to the sacrament, and in a case of necessity one alone can baptize with water.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not on account of bodily weakness that the baptized is raised from the sacred font by the godparent, but on account of spiritual weakness, as stated above.

Whether he who raises anyone from the sacred font is bound to instruct him?

Objection 1: It seems that he who raises anyone from the sacred font is not bound to instruct him. For none but those who are themselves instructed can give instruction. But even the uneducated and ill-instructed are allowed to raise people from the sacred font. Therefore he who raises a baptized person from the font is not bound to instruct him.

Objection 2: Further, a son is instructed by his father better than by a stranger: for, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii), a son receives from his father, “being, food, and education.” If, therefore, godparents are bound to instruct their godchildren, it would be fitting for the carnal father, rather than another, to be the godparent of his own child. And yet this seems to be forbidden, as may be seen in the Decretals (xxx, qu. 1, Cap. Pervenit and Dictum est).

Objection 3: Further, it is better for several to instruct than for one only. If, therefore, godparents are bound to instruct their godchildren, it would be better to have several godparents than only one. Yet this is forbidden in a decree of Pope Leo, who says: “A child should not have more than one godparent, be this a man or a woman.”

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon for Easter (clxviii): “In the first place I admonish you, both men and women, who have raised children in Baptism, that ye stand before God as sureties for those whom you have been seen to raise from the sacred font.”

I answer that, Every man is bound to fulfil those duties which he has undertaken to perform. Now it has been stated above [4440](A[7]) that godparents take upon themselves the duties of a tutor. Consequently they are bound to watch over their godchildren when there is need for them to do so: for instance when and where children are brought up among unbelievers. But if they are brought up among Catholic Christians, the godparents may well be excused from this responsibility, since it may be presumed that the children will be carefully instructed by their parents. If, however, they perceive in any way that the contrary is the case, they would be bound, as far as they are able, to see to the spiritual welfare of their godchildren.

Reply to Objection 1: Where the danger is imminent, the godparent, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii), should be someone "versed in holy things." But where the danger is not imminent, by reason of the children being brought up among Catholics, anyone is admitted to this position, because the things pertaining to the Christian rule of life and faith are known openly by all. Nevertheless an unbaptized person cannot be a godparent, as was decreed in the Council of Mainz, although an unbaptized person: because the person baptizing is essential to the sacrament, wherefore as the godparent is not, as stated above (A[7], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 2: Just as spiritual generation is distinct from carnal generation, so is spiritual education distinct from that of the body; according to Heb. 12:9: "Moreover we have had fathers of our flesh for instructors, and we reverenced them: shall we not much more obey the Father of Spirits, and live?" Therefore the spiritual father should be distinct from the carnal father, unless necessity demanded otherwise.

Reply to Objection 3: Education would be full of confusion if there were more than one head instructor. Wherefore there should be one principal sponsor in Baptism: but others can be allowed as assistants.

OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE BAPTISM (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We have now to consider those who receive Baptism; concerning which there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all are bound to receive Baptism?

(2) Whether a man can be saved without Baptism?

(3) Whether Baptism should be deferred?

(4) Whether sinners should be baptized?

(5) Whether works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized?

(6) Whether Confession of sins is necessary?

(7) Whether an intention is required on the part of the one baptized?

(8) Whether faith is necessary?

(9) Whether infants should be baptized?

(10) Whether the children of Jews should be baptized against the will of their parents?

(11) Whether anyone should be baptized in the mother’s womb?

(12) Whether madmen and imbeciles should be baptized?

Whether all are bound to receive Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that not all are bound to receive Baptism. For Christ did not narrow man’s road to salvation. But before Christ’s coming men could be saved without Baptism: therefore also after Christ’s coming.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism seems to have been instituted principally as a remedy for original sin. Now, since a man who is baptized is without original sin, it seems that he cannot transmit it to his children. Therefore it seems that the children of those who have been baptized, should not themselves be baptized.

Objection 3: Further, Baptism is given in order that a man may, through grace, be cleansed from sin. But those who are sanctified in the womb, obtain this without Baptism. Therefore they are not bound to receive Baptism.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” Again it is stated in De Eccl. Dogm. xli, that “we believe the way of salvation to be open to those only who are baptized.”

I answer that, Men are bound to that without which they cannot obtain salvation. Now it is manifest that no one can obtain salvation but through

Christ; wherefore the Apostle says (Rom. 5:18): “As by the offense of one unto all men unto condemnation; so also by the justice of one, unto all men unto justification of life.” But for this end is Baptism conferred on a man, that being regenerated thereby, he may be incorporated in Christ, by becoming His member: wherefore it is written (Gal. 3:27): “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ.” Consequently it is manifest that all are bound to be baptized: and that without Baptism there is no salvation for men.

Reply to Objection 1: At no time, not even before the coming of Christ, could men be saved unless they became members of Christ: because, as it is written (Acts 4:12), “there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.” But before Christ’s coming, men were incorporated in Christ by faith in His future coming: of which faith circumcision was the “seal,” as the Apostle calls it (Rom. 4:11): whereas before circumcision was instituted, men were incorporated in Christ by “faith alone,” as Gregory says (Moral. iv), together with the offering of sacrifices, by means of which the Fathers of old made profession of their faith. Again, since Christ’s coming, men are incorporated in Christ by faith; according to Eph. 3:17: “That Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts.” But faith in a thing already present is manifested by a sign different from that by which it was manifested when that thing was yet in the future: just as we use other parts of the verb, to signify the present, the past, and the future. Consequently although the sacrament itself of Baptism was not always necessary for salvation, yet faith, of which Baptism is the sacrament, was always necessary.

Reply to Objection 2: As we have stated in the [4441]FS, Q[81], A[3], ad 2, those who are baptized are renewed in spirit by Baptism, while their body remains subject to the oldness of sin, according to Rom. 8:10: “The body, indeed, is dead because of sin, but the spirit liveth because of justification.” Wherefore Augustine (Contra Julian. vi) proves that “not everything that is in man is baptized.” Now it is manifest that in carnal generation man does not beget in respect of his soul, but in respect of his body. Consequently the children of those who are baptized are born with original sin; wherefore they need to be baptized.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are sanctified in the womb, receive indeed grace which cleanses them from original sin, but they do not therefore receive the character, by which they are conformed to Christ. Consequently, if any were to be sanctified in the womb now, they would need to be baptized, in order to be conformed to Christ's other members by receiving the character.

Whether a man can be saved without Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that no man can be saved without Baptism. For our Lord said (Jn. 3:5): "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter the kingdom of God." But those alone are saved who enter God's kingdom. Therefore none can be saved without Baptism, by which a man is born again of water and the Holy Ghost.

Objection 2: Further, in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xli, it is written: "We believe that no catechumen, though he die in his good works, will have eternal life, except he suffer martyrdom, which contains all the sacramental virtue of Baptism." But if it were possible for anyone to be saved without Baptism, this would be the case specially with catechumens who are credited with good works, for they seem to have the "faith that worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Therefore it seems that none can be saved without Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4442](A[1]; Q[65], A[4]), the sacrament of Baptism is necessary for salvation. Now that is necessary "without which something cannot be" (Metaph. v). Therefore it seems that none can obtain salvation without Baptism.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Super Levit. lxxxiv) that "some have received the invisible sanctification without visible sacraments, and to their profit; but though it is possible to have the visible sanctification, consisting in a visible sacrament, without the invisible sanctification, it will be to no profit." Since, therefore, the sacrament of Baptism pertains to the visible sanctification, it seems that a man can obtain salvation without the sacrament of Baptism, by means of the invisible sanctification.

I answer that, The sacrament or Baptism may be wanting to someone in two ways. First, both in reality and in desire; as is the case with those who neither are baptized, nor wished to be baptized: which clearly indicates contempt of the sacrament, in regard to those who have the use of the free-will. Consequently those to whom Baptism is wanting thus, cannot obtain salvation: since neither sacramentally nor mentally are they incorporated in Christ, through Whom alone can salvation be obtained.

Secondly, the sacrament of Baptism may be wanting to anyone in reality but not in desire: for instance, when a man wishes to be baptized, but by some ill-chance he is forestalled by death before receiving Baptism. And such a man can obtain salvation without being actually baptized, on account of his desire for Baptism, which desire is the outcome of "faith that worketh by charity," whereby God, Whose power is not tied to visible sacraments, sanctifies man inwardly. Hence Ambrose says of Valentinian, who died while yet a catechumen: "I lost him whom I was to regenerate: but he did not lose the grace he prayed for."

Reply to Objection 1: As it is written (1 Kings 16:7), "man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Now a man who desires to be "born again of water and the Holy Ghost" by Baptism, is regenerated in heart though not in body. thus the Apostle says (Rom. 2:29) that "the circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter; whose praise is not of men but of God."

Reply to Objection 2: No man obtains eternal life unless he be free from all guilt and debt of punishment. Now this plenary absolution is given when a man receives Baptism, or suffers martyrdom: for which reason is it stated that martyrdom "contains all the sacramental virtue of Baptism," i.e. as to the full deliverance from guilt and punishment. Suppose, therefore, a catechumen to have the desire for Baptism (else he could not be said to die in his good works, which cannot be without "faith that worketh by charity"), such a one, were he to die, would not forthwith come to eternal life, but would suffer punishment for his past sins, "but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" as is stated 1 Cor. 3:15.

Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of Baptism is said to be necessary for salvation in so far as man cannot be saved without, at least, Baptism of desire; "which, with God, counts for the deed" (Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 57).

Whether Baptism should be deferred?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism should be deferred. For Pope Leo says (Epist. xvi): "Two seasons," i.e. Easter and Whitsuntide, "are fixed by the

Roman Pontiff for the celebration of Baptism. Wherefore we admonish your Beatitude not to add any other days to this custom." Therefore it seems that Baptism should be conferred not at once, but delayed until the aforesaid seasons.

Objection 2: Further, we read in the decrees of the Council of Agde (Can. xxxiv): "If Jews whose bad faith often "returns to the vomit," wish to submit to the Law of the Catholic Church, let them for eight months enter the porch of the church with the catechumens; and if they are found to come in good faith then at last they may deserve the grace of Baptism." Therefore men should not be baptized at once, and Baptism should be deferred for a certain fixed time.

Objection 3: Further, as we read in Is. 27:9, "this is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away." Now sin seems to be taken away, or at any rate lessened, if Baptism be deferred. First, because those who sin after Baptism, sin more grievously, according to Heb. 10:29: "How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments, who hath . . . esteemed the blood of the testament," i.e. Baptism, "unclean, by which he was sanctified?" Secondly, because Baptism takes away past, but not future, sins: wherefore the more it is deferred, the more sins it takes away. Therefore it seems that Baptism should be deferred for a long time.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 5:8): "Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer it not from day to day." But the perfect conversion to God is of those who are regenerated in Christ by Baptism. Therefore Baptism should not be deferred from day to day.

I answer that, In this matter we must make a distinction and see whether those who are to be baptized are children or adults. For if they be children, Baptism should not be deferred. First, because in them we do not look for better instruction or fuller conversion. Secondly, because of the danger of death, for no other remedy is available for them besides the sacrament of Baptism.

On the other hand, adults have a remedy in the mere desire for Baptism, as stated above [4443](A[2]). And therefore Baptism should not be conferred on adults as soon as they are converted, but it should be deferred until some fixed time. First, as a safeguard to the Church, lest she be deceived through baptizing those who come to her under false pretenses, according to 1 Jn. 4:1: "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits, if they be of God.” And those who approach Baptism are put to this test, when their faith and morals are subjected to proof for a space of time. Secondly, this is needful as being useful for those who are baptized; for they require a certain space of time in order to be fully instructed in the faith, and to be drilled in those things that pertain to the Christian mode of life. Thirdly, a certain reverence for the sacrament demands a delay whereby men are admitted to Baptism at the principal festivities, viz. of Easter and Pentecost, the result being that they receive the sacrament with greater devotion.

There are, however, two reasons for forgoing this delay. First, when those who are to be baptized appear to be perfectly instructed in the faith and ready for Baptism; thus, Philip baptized the Eunuch at once (Acts 8); and Peter, Cornelius and those who were with him (Acts 10). Secondly, by reason of sickness or some kind of danger of death. Wherefore Pope Leo says (Epist. xvi): “Those who are threatened by death, sickness, siege, persecution, or shipwreck, should be baptized at any time.” Yet if a man is forestalled by death, so as to have no time to receive the sacrament, while he awaits the season appointed by the Church, he is saved, yet “so as by fire,” as stated above (A[2], ad 2). Nevertheless he sins if he defer being baptized beyond the time appointed by the Church, except this be for an unavoidable cause and with the permission of the authorities of the Church. But even this sin, with his other sins, can be washed away by his subsequent contrition, which takes the place of Baptism, as stated above ([4444]Q[66], A[11]).

Reply to Objection 1: This decree of Pope Leo, concerning the celebration of Baptism at two seasons, is to be understood “with the exception of the danger of death” (which is always to be feared in children) as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: This decree concerning the Jews was for a safeguard to the Church, lest they corrupt the faith of simple people, if they be not fully converted. Nevertheless, as the same passage reads further on, “if within the appointed time they are threatened with danger of sickness, they should be baptized.”

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism, by the grace which it bestows, removes not only past sins, but hinders the commission of future sins. Now this is the point to be considered—that men may not sin: it is a secondary consideration that their sins be less grievous, or that their sins be washed away, according to 1 Jn. 2:1,2: “My little children, these things I write to you, that you may not sin. But if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the just; and He is the propitiation for our sins.”

Whether sinners should be baptized?

Objection 1: It seems that sinners should be baptized. For it is written (Zech. 13:1): “In that day there shall be a fountain open to the House of David, and to the inhabitants of Jerusalem: for the washing of the sinner and of the unclean woman”: and this is to be understood of the fountain of Baptism. Therefore it seems that the sacrament of Baptism should be offered even to sinners.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 9:12): “They that are in health need not a physician, but they that are ill.” But they that are ill are sinners. Therefore since Baptism is the remedy of Christ the physician of our souls, it seems that this sacrament should be offered to sinners.

Objection 3: Further, no assistance should be withdrawn from sinners. But sinners who have been baptized derive spiritual assistance from the very character of Baptism, since it is a disposition to grace. Therefore it seems that the sacrament of Baptism should be offered to sinners.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Serm. clxix): “He Who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.” But since a sinner’s will is ill-disposed, he does not co-operate with God. Therefore it is useless to employ Baptism as a means of justification.

I answer that, A man may be said to be a sinner in two ways. First, on account of the stain and the debt of punishment incurred in the past: and on sinners in this sense the sacrament of Baptism should be conferred, since it is instituted specially for this purpose, that by it the uncleanness of sin may be washed away, according to Eph. 5:26: “Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.”

Secondly, a man may be called a sinner because he wills to sin and purposes to remain in sin: and on sinners in this sense the sacrament of Baptism should not be conferred. First, indeed, because by Baptism men are incorporated in Christ, according to Gal. 3:27: “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ, have put on Christ.” Now so long as a man wills to sin, he cannot be united to Christ, according to 2 Cor. 6:14: “What participation hath justice with injustice?” Wherefore Augustine says in his book on Penance (Serm. cccli) that “no man who has the use of free-will can begin the new life, except he repent of his former life.” Secondly, because there should be nothing useless in the works of Christ and of the Church. Now that is useless which does not reach the end to which it is ordained; and, on the other hand, no one having the will to sin can, at the same time, be cleansed from sin, which is the purpose of Baptism; for this would be to combine two contradictory things. Thirdly, because there should be no falsehood in the sacramental signs. Now a sign is false if it does not correspond with the thing signified. But the very fact that a man presents himself to be cleansed by Baptism, signifies that he prepares himself for the inward cleansing: while this cannot be the case with one who purposes to remain in sin. Therefore it is manifest that on such a man the sacrament of Baptism is not to be conferred.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted are to be understood of those sinners whose will is set on renouncing sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The physician of souls, i.e. Christ, works in two ways. First, inwardly, by Himself: and thus He prepares man’s will so that it wills good and hates evil. Secondly, He works through ministers, by the outward application of the sacraments: and in this way His work consists in perfecting what was begun outwardly. Therefore the sacrament of Baptism is not to be conferred save on those in whom there appears some sign of their interior conversion: just as neither is bodily medicine given to a sick man, unless he show some sign of life.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is the sacrament of faith. Now dead faith does not suffice for salvation; nor is it the foundation, but living faith alone, “that worketh by charity” (Gal. 5:6), as Augustine says (De Fide et oper.). Neither, therefore, can the sacrament of Baptism give salvation to a man whose will is set on sinning, and hence expels the form of faith. Moreover, the impression of the baptismal character cannot dispose a man for grace as long as he retains the will to sin; for “God compels no man to be virtuous,” as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii).

Whether works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized?

Objection 1: It seems that works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized. For God’s justice seems to demand that a man should be punished for every sin of his, according to Eccles. 12:14: “All things that are done, God will bring into judgment.” But works of satisfaction are enjoined on sinners in punishment of past sins. Therefore it seems that works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners that have been baptized.

Objection 2: Further, by means of works of satisfaction sinners recently converted are drilled into righteousness, and are made to avoid the occasions of sin: “for satisfaction consists in extirpating the causes of vice, and closing the doors to sin” (De Eccl. Dogm. iv). But this is most necessary in the case of those who have been baptized recently. Therefore it seems that works of satisfaction should be enjoined on sinners.

Objection 3: Further, man owes satisfaction to God not less than to his neighbor. But if those who were recently baptized have injured their neighbor, they should be told to make reparation to God by works of penance.

On the contrary, Ambrose commenting on Rom. 11:29: “The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance,” says: “The grace of God requires neither sighs nor groans in Baptism, nor indeed any work at all, but faith alone; and remits all, gratis.”

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3,4), “all we who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death: for we are buried together with Him, by Baptism unto death”; which is to say that by Baptism man is incorporated in the very death of Christ. Now it is manifest from what has been said above ([4445]Q[48], AA[2],4;[4446] Q[49], A[3]) that Christ’s death satisfied sufficiently for sins, “not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world,” according to 1 Jn. 2:2. Consequently no kind of satisfaction should be enjoined on one who is being baptized, for any sins whatever: and this would be to dishonor the Passion and death of Christ, as being insufficient for the plenary satisfaction for the sins of those who were to be baptized.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in his book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i), “the effect of Baptism is to make those, who are baptized, to be incorporated in Christ as His members.” Wherefore the very pains of Christ were satisfactory for the sins of those who were to be baptized; just as the pain of one member can be satisfactory for the sin of another member. Hence it is written (Is. 53:4): “Surely He hath borne our infirmities and carried our sorrows.”

Reply to Objection 2: Those who have been lately baptized should be drilled into righteousness, not by penal, but by “easy works, so as to advance to perfection by taking exercise, as infants by taking milk,” as a gloss says on Ps. 130:2: “As a child that is weaned is towards his mother.” For this reason did our Lord excuse His disciples from fasting when they were recently converted, as we read in Mat. 9:14,15: and the same is written 1 Pet. 2:2: “As new-born babes desire . . . milk . . . that thereby you may grow unto salvation.”

Reply to Objection 3: To restore what has been ill taken from one’s neighbor, and to make satisfaction for wrong done to him, is to cease from sin: for the very fact of retaining what belongs to another and of not being reconciled to one’s neighbor, is a sin. Wherefore those who are baptized should be enjoined to make satisfaction to their neighbor, as also to desist from sin. But they are not to be enjoined to suffer any punishment for past sins.

Whether sinners who are going to be baptized are bound to confess their sins?

Objection 1: It seems that sinners who are going to be baptized are bound to confess their sins. For it is written (Mat. 3:6) that many “were baptized” by John “in the Jordan confessing their sins.” But Christ’s Baptism is more perfect than John’s. Therefore it seems that there is yet greater reason why they who are about to receive Christ’s Baptism should confess their sins.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 28:13): “He that hideth his sins, shall not prosper; but he that shall confess and forsake them, shall obtain mercy.” Now for this is a man baptized, that he may obtain mercy for his sins. Therefore those who are going to be baptized should confess their sins.

Objection 3: Further, Penance is required before Baptism, according to Acts 2:38: “Do penance and be baptized every one of you.” But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore it seems that confession of sins should take place before Baptism.

On the contrary, Confession of sins should be sorrowful: thus Augustine says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. xiv): “All these circumstances should be taken into account and deplored.” Now, as Ambrose says on Rom. 11:29, “the grace of God requires neither sighs nor groans in Baptism.” Therefore confession of sins should not be required of those who are going to be baptized.

I answer that, Confession of sins is twofold. One is made inwardly to God: and such confession of sins is required before Baptism: in other words, man should call his sins to mind and sorrow for them; since “he cannot begin the new life, except he repent of his former life,” as Augustine says in his book on Penance (Serm. cccli). The other is the outward confession of sins, which is made to a priest; and such confession is not required before Baptism. First, because this confession, since it is directed to the person of the minister, belongs to the sacrament of Penance, which is not required before Baptism, which is the door of all the sacraments. Secondly, because the reason why a man makes outward confession to a priest, is that the priest may absolve him from his sins, and bind him to works of satisfaction, which should not be enjoined on the baptized, as stated above [4447](A[5]). Moreover those who are being baptized do not need to be released from their sins by the keys of the Church, since all are forgiven them in Baptism. Thirdly, because the very act of confession made to a man is penal, by reason of the shame it inflicts on the one confessing: whereas no exterior punishment is enjoined on a man who is being baptized.

Therefore no special confession of sins is required of those who are being baptized; but that general confession suffices which they make when in accordance with the Church’s ritual they “renounce Satan and all his works.” And in this sense a gloss explains Mat. 3:6, saying that in John’s Baptism “those who are going to be baptized learn that they should confess their sins and promise to amend their life.”

If, however, any persons about to be baptized, wish, out of devotion, to confess their sins, their confession should be heard; not for the purpose of enjoining them to do satisfaction, but in order to instruct them in the spiritual life as a remedy against their vicious habits.

Reply to Objection 1: Sins were not forgiven in John’s Baptism, which, however, was the Baptism of Penance. Consequently it was fitting that those who went to receive that Baptism, should confess their sins, so that they should receive a penance in proportion to their sins. But Christ’s

Baptism is without outward penance, as Ambrose says (on Rom. 11:29); and therefore there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 2: It is enough that the baptized make inward confession to God, and also an outward general confession, for them to "prosper and obtain mercy": and they need no special outward confession, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Confession is a part of sacramental Penance, which is not required before Baptism, as stated above: but the inward virtue of Penance is required.

Whether the intention of receiving the sacrament of Baptism is required on the part of the one baptized?

Objection 1: It seems that the intention of receiving the sacrament of Baptism is not required on the part of the one baptized. For the one baptized is, as it were, "patient" in the sacrament. But an intention is required not on the part of the patient but on the part of the agent. Therefore it seems that the intention of receiving Baptism is not required on the part of the one baptized.

Objection 2: Further, if what is necessary for Baptism be omitted, the Baptism must be repeated; for instance, if the invocation of the Trinity be omitted, as stated above ([4448]Q[66], A[9], ad 3). But it does not seem that a man should be rebaptized through not having had the intention of receiving Baptism: else, since his intention cannot be proved, anyone might ask to be baptized again on account of his lack of intention. Therefore it seems that no intention is required on the part of the one baptized, in order that he receive the sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, Baptism is given as a remedy for original sin. But original sin is contracted without the intention of the person born. Therefore, seemingly, Baptism requires no intention on the part of the person baptized.

On the contrary, According to the Church's ritual, those who are to be baptized ask of the Church that they may receive Baptism: and thus they express their intention of receiving the sacrament.

I answer that, By Baptism a man dies to the old life of sin, and begins a certain newness of life, according to Rom. 6:4: "We are buried together with” Christ “by Baptism into death; that, as Christ is risen from the dead . . . so we also may walk in newness of life.” Consequently, just as, according to Augustine (Serm. cccli), he who has the use of free-will, must, in order to die to the old life, “will to repent of his former life”; so must he, of his own will, intend to lead a new life, the beginning of which is precisely the receiving of the sacrament. Therefore on the part of the one baptized, it is necessary for him to have the will or intention of receiving the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: When a man is justified by Baptism, his passiveness is not violent but voluntary: wherefore it is necessary for him to intend to receive that which is given him.

Reply to Objection 2: If an adult lack the intention of receiving the sacrament, he must be rebaptized. But if there be doubt about this, the form to be used should be: “If thou art not baptized, I baptize thee.”

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is a remedy not only against original, but also against actual sins, which are caused by our will and intention.

Whether faith is required on the part of the one baptized?

Objection 1: It seems that faith is required on the part of the one baptized. For the sacrament of Baptism was instituted by Christ. But Christ, in giving the form of Baptism, makes faith to precede Baptism (Mk. 16:16): “He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved.” Therefore it seems that without faith there can be no sacrament of Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, nothing useless is done in the sacraments of the Church. But according to the Church’s ritual, the man who comes to be baptized is asked concerning his faith: “Dost thou believe in God the Father Almighty?” Therefore it seems that faith is required for Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, the intention of receiving the sacrament is required for Baptism. But this cannot be without right faith, since Baptism is the sacrament of right faith: for thereby men “are incorporated in Christ,” as Augustine says in his book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i); and this cannot be without right faith, according to Eph. 3:17: “That Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts.” Therefore it seems that a man who has not right faith cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism.

Objection 4: Further, unbelief is a most grievous sin, as we have shown in the [4449]SS, Q[10], A[3]. But those who remain in sin should not be baptized: therefore neither should those who remain in unbelief.

On the contrary, Gregory writing to the bishop Quiricus says: “We have learned from the ancient tradition of the Fathers that when heretics, baptized in the name of the Trinity, come back to Holy Church, they are to be welcomed to her bosom, either with the anointing of chrism, or the imposition of hands, or the mere profession of faith.” But such would not be the case if faith were necessary for a man to receive Baptism.

I answer that, As appears from what has been said above ([4450]Q[63], A[6];[4451] Q[66], A[9]) Baptism produces a twofold effect in the soul, viz. the character and grace. Therefore in two ways may a thing be necessary for Baptism. First, as something without which grace, which is the ultimate effect of the sacrament, cannot be had. And thus right faith is necessary for Baptism, because, as it appears from Rom. 3:22, the justice of God is by faith of Jesus Christ.

Secondly, something is required of necessity for Baptism, because without it the baptismal character cannot be imprinted And thus right faith is not necessary in the one baptized any more than in the one who baptizes: provided the other conditions are fulfilled which are essential to the sacrament. For the sacrament is not perfected by the righteousness of the minister or of the recipient of Baptism, but by the power of God.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord is speaking there of Baptism as bringing us to salvation by giving us sanctifying grace: which of course cannot be without right faith: wherefore He says pointedly: “He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved.”

Reply to Objection 2: The Church’s intention in Baptizing men is that they may be cleansed from sin, according to Is. 27:9: “This is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away.” And therefore, as far as she is concerned, she does not intend to give Baptism save to those who have right faith, without which there is no remission of sins. And for this reason she asks those who come to be baptized whether they believe. If, on the contrary, anyone, without right faith, receive Baptism outside the Church, he does not receive it unto salvation. Hence Augustine says (De Baptism. contr. Donat. iv): “From the Church being compared to Paradise we learn that men can receive her Baptism even outside her fold, but that elsewhere none can receive or keep the salvation of the blessed.”

Reply to Objection 3: Even he who has not right faith on other points, can have right faith about the sacrament of Baptism: and so he is not hindered from having the intention of receiving that sacrament. Yet even if he think not aright concerning this sacrament, it is enough, for the receiving of the sacrament, that he should have a general intention of receiving Baptism, according as Christ instituted, and as the Church bestows it.

Reply to Objection 4: Just as the sacrament of Baptism is not to be conferred on a man who is unwilling to give up his other sins, so neither should it be given to one who is unwilling to renounce his unbelief. Yet each receives the sacrament if it be conferred on him, though not unto salvation.

Whether children should be baptized?

Objection 1: It seems that children should not be baptized. For the intention to receive the sacrament is required in one who is being baptized, as stated above [4452](A[7]). But children cannot have such an intention, since they have not the use of free-will. Therefore it seems that they cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism is the sacrament of faith, as stated above ([4453]Q[39], A[5];[4454] Q[66], A[1], ad 1). But children have not faith, which demands an act of the will on the part of the believer, as Augustine says (Super Joan. xxvi). Nor can it be said that their salvation is implied in the faith of their parents; since the latter are sometimes unbelievers, and their unbelief would conduce rather to the damnation of their children. Therefore it seems that children cannot be baptized.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Pet. 3:21) that “Baptism saveth” men; “not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the examination of a good conscience towards God.” But children have no conscience, either good or bad, since they have not the use of reason: nor can they be fittingly examined, since they understand not. Therefore children should not be baptized.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): “Our heavenly guides,” i.e. the Apostles, “approved of infants being admitted to Baptism.”

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 5:17), “if by one man’s offense death reigned through one,” namely Adam, “much more they who receive abundance of grace, and of the gift, and of justice, shall reign in life through one, Jesus Christ.” Now children contract original sin from the sin of Adam; which is made clear by the fact that they are under the ban of death, which “passed upon all” on account of the sin of the first man, as the Apostle says in the same passage (Rom. 5:12). Much more, therefore, can children receive grace through Christ, so as to reign in eternal life. But our Lord Himself said (Jn. 3:5): “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.” Consequently it became necessary to baptize children, that, as in birth they incurred damnation through Adam so in a second birth they might obtain salvation through Christ. Moreover it was fitting that children should receive Baptism, in order that being reared from childhood in things pertaining to the Christian mode of life, they may the more easily persevere therein; according to Prov. 22:5: “A young man according to his way, even when he is old, he will not depart from it.” This reason is also given by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii).

Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual regeneration effected by Baptism is somewhat like carnal birth, in this respect, that as the child while in the mother’s womb receives nourishment not independently, but through the nourishment of its mother, so also children before the use of reason, being as it were in the womb of their mother the Church, receive salvation not by their own act, but by the act of the Church. Hence Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i): “The Church, our mother, offers her maternal mouth for her children, that they may imbibe the sacred mysteries: for they cannot as yet with their own hearts believe unto justice, nor with their own mouths confess unto salvation . . . And if they are rightly said to believe, because in a certain fashion they make profession of faith by the words of their sponsors, why should they not also be said to repent, since by the words of those same sponsors they evidence their renunciation of the devil and this world?” For the same reason they can be said to intend, not by their own act of intention, since at times they struggle and cry; but by the act of those who bring them to be baptized.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says, writing to Boniface (Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. i), “in the Church of our Saviour little children believe through others, just as they contracted from others those sins which are remitted in Baptism.” Nor is it a hindrance to their salvation if their parents be unbelievers, because, as Augustine says, writing to the same Boniface (Ep. xcviii), “little children are offered that they may receive grace in their souls, not so much from the hands of those that carry them (yet from these too, if they be good and faithful) as from the whole company of the saints and the faithful. For they are rightly considered to be offered by those who are pleased at their being offered, and by whose charity they are united in communion with the Holy Ghost.” And the unbelief of their own parents, even if after Baptism these strive to infect them with the worship of demons, hurts not the children. For as Augustine says (Cont. duas Ep. Pelag. i) “when once the child has been begotten by the will of others, he cannot subsequently be held by the bonds of another’s sin so long as he consent not with his will, according to” Ezech. 18:4: “‘As the soul of the Father, so also the soul of the son is mine; the soul that sinneth, the same shall die.’ Yet he contracted from Adam that which was loosed by the grace of this sacrament, because as yet he was not endowed with a separate existence.” But the faith of one, indeed of the whole Church, profits the child through the operation of the Holy Ghost, Who unites the Church together, and communicates the goods of one member to another.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as a child, when he is being baptized, believes not by himself but by others, so is he examined not by himself but through others, and these in answer confess the Church’s faith in the child’s stead, who is aggregated to this faith by the sacrament of faith. And the child acquires a good conscience in himself, not indeed as to the act, but as to the habit, by sanctifying grace.

Whether children of Jews or other unbelievers be baptized against the will of their parents?

Objection 1: It seems that children of Jews or other unbelievers should be baptized against the will of their parents. For it is a matter of greater urgency to rescue a man from the danger of eternal death than from the danger of temporal death. But one ought to rescue a child that is threatened by the danger of temporal death, even if its parents through malice try to prevent its being rescued. Therefore much more reason is there for rescuing the children of unbelievers from the danger of eternal death, even against their parents’ will.

Objection 2: The children of slaves are themselves slaves, and in the power of their masters. But Jews and all other unbelievers are the slaves of kings and rulers. Therefore without any injustice rulers can have the children of Jews baptized, as well as those of other slaves who are unbelievers.

Objection 3: Further, every man belongs more to God, from Whom he has his soul, than to his carnal father, from whom he has his body. Therefore it is not unjust if the children of unbelievers are taken away from their carnal parents, and consecrated to God by Baptism.

On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (Dist. xlv), quoting the council of Toledo: “In regard to the Jews the holy synod commands that henceforward none of them be forced to believe: for such are not to be saved against their will, but willingly, that their righteousness may be without flaw.”

I answer that, The children of unbelievers either have the use of reason or they have not. If they have, then they already begin to control their own actions, in things that are of Divine or natural law. And therefore of their own accord, and against the will of their parents, they can receive Baptism, just as they can contract marriage. Consequently such can lawfully be advised and persuaded to be baptized.

If, however, they have not yet the use of free-will, according to the natural law they are under the care of their parents as long as they cannot look after themselves. For which reason we say that even the children of the ancients “were saved through the faith of their parents.” Wherefore it would be contrary to natural justice if such children were baptized against their parents’ will; just as it would be if one having the use of reason were baptized against his will. Moreover under the circumstances it would be dangerous to baptize the children of unbelievers; for they would be liable to lapse into unbelief, by reason of their natural affection for their parents. Therefore it is not the custom of the Church to baptize the children of unbelievers against their parents’ will.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not right to rescue a man from death of the body against the order of civil law: for instance, if a man be condemned to death by the judge who has tried him, none should use force in order to rescue him from death. Consequently, neither should anyone infringe the order of the natural law, in virtue of which a child is under the care of its father, in order to rescue it from the danger of eternal death.

Reply to Objection 2: Jews are slaves of rulers by civil slavery, which does not exclude the order of the natural and Divine law.

Reply to Objection 3: Man is ordained unto God through his reason, by which he can know God. Wherefore a child, before it has the use of reason, is ordained to God, by a natural order, through the reason of its parents, under whose care it naturally lies, and it is according to their ordering that things pertaining to God are to be done in respect of the child.

Whether a child can be baptized while yet in its mother’s womb?

Objection 1: It seems that a child can be baptized while yet in its mother’s womb. For the gift of Christ is more efficacious unto salvation than Adam’s sin unto condemnation, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15). But a child while yet in its mother’s womb is under sentence of condemnation on account of Adam’s sin. For much more reason, therefore, can it be saved through the gift of Christ, which is bestowed by means of Baptism. Therefore a child can be baptized while yet in its mother’s womb.

Objection 2: Further, a child, while yet in its mother’s womb, seems to be part of its mother. Now, when the mother is baptized, whatever is in her and part of her, is baptized. Therefore it seems that when the mother is baptized, the child in her womb is baptized.

Objection 3: Further, eternal death is a greater evil than death of the body. But of two evils the less should be chosen. If, therefore, the child in the mother’s womb cannot be baptized, it would be better for the mother to be opened, and the child to be taken out by force and baptized, than that the child should be eternally damned through dying without Baptism.

Objection 4: Further, it happens at times that some part of the child comes forth first, as we read in Gn. 38:27: “In the very delivery of the infants, one put forth a hand, whereon the midwife tied a scarlet thread, saying: This shall come forth the first. But he drawing back his hand, the other came forth.” Now sometimes in such cases there is danger of death. Therefore it seems that that part should be baptized, while the child is yet in its mother’s womb.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Ep. ad Dardan.): “No one can be born a second time unless he be born first.” But Baptism is a spiritual regeneration. Therefore no one should be baptized before he is born from the womb.

I answer that, It is essential to Baptism that some part of the body of the person baptized be in some way washed with water, since Baptism is a kind of washing, as stated above ([4455]Q[66], A[1]). But an infant’s body, before being born from the womb, can nowise be washed with water; unless perchance it be said that the baptismal water, with which the mother’s body is washed, reaches the child while yet in its mother’s womb. But this is impossible: both because the child’s soul, to the sanctification of which Baptism is ordained, is distinct from the soul of the mother; and because the body of the animated infant is already formed, and consequently distinct from the body of the mother. Therefore the Baptism which the mother receives does not overflow on to the child which is in her womb. Hence Augustine says (Cont. Julian. vi): “If what is conceived within a mother belonged to her body, so as to be considered a part thereof, we should not baptize an infant whose mother, through danger of death, was baptized while she bore it in her womb. Since, then, it,” i.e. the infant, “is baptized, it certainly did not belong to the mother’s body while it was in the womb.” It follows, therefore, that a child can nowise be baptized while in its mother’s womb.

Reply to Objection 1: Children while in the mother’s womb have not yet come forth into the world to live among other men. Consequently they cannot be subject to the action of man, so as to receive the sacrament, at the hands of man, unto salvation. They can, however, be subject to the action of God, in Whose sight they live, so as, by a kind of privilege, to receive the grace of sanctification; as was the case with those who were sanctified in the womb.

Reply to Objection 2: An internal member of the mother is something of hers by continuity and material union of the part with the whole: whereas a child while in its mother’s womb is something of hers through being joined with, and yet distinct from her. Wherefore there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: We should “not do evil that there may come good” (Rom. 3:8). Therefore it is wrong to kill a mother that her child may be baptized. If, however, the mother die while the child lives yet in her womb, she should be opened that the child may be baptized.

Reply to Objection 4: Unless death be imminent, we should wait until the child has entirely come forth from the womb before baptizing it. If, however, the head, wherein the senses are rooted, appear first, it should be baptized, in cases of danger: nor should it be baptized again, if perfect birth should ensue. And seemingly the same should be done in cases of danger no matter what part of the body appear first. But as none of the exterior parts of the body belong to its integrity in the same degree as the head, some hold that since the matter is doubtful, whenever any other part of the body has been baptized, the child, when perfect birth has taken place, should be baptized with the form: “If thou art not baptized, I baptize thee,” etc.

Whether madmen and imbeciles should be baptized?

Objection 1: It seems that madmen and imbeciles should not be baptized. For in order to receive Baptism, the person baptized must have the intention, as stated above [4456](A[7]). But since madmen and imbeciles lack the use of reason, they can have but a disorderly intention. Therefore they should not be baptized.

Objection 2: Further, man excels irrational animals in that he has reason. But madmen and imbeciles lack the use of reason, indeed in some cases we do not expect them ever to have it, as we do in the case of children. It seems, therefore, that just as irrational animals are not baptized, so neither should madmen and imbeciles in those cases be baptized.

Objection 3: Further, the use of reason is suspended in madmen and imbeciles more than it is in one who sleeps. But it is not customary to baptize people while they sleep. Therefore it should not be given to madmen and imbeciles.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv) of his friend that “he was baptized when his recovery was despaired of”: and yet Baptism was efficacious with him. Therefore Baptism should sometimes be given to those who lack the use of reason.

I answer that, In the matter of madmen and imbeciles a distinction is to be made. For some are so from birth, and have no lucid intervals, and show no signs of the use of reason. And with regard to these it seems that we should come to the same decision as with regard to children who are baptized in the Faith of the Church, as stated above (A[9], ad 2).

But there are others who have fallen from a state of sanity into a state of insanity. And with regard to these we must be guided by their wishes as expressed by them when sane: so that, if then they manifested a desire to receive Baptism, it should be given to them when in a state of madness or imbecility, even though then they refuse. If, on the other hand, while sane they showed no desire to receive Baptism, they must not be baptized.

Again, there are some who, though mad or imbecile from birth, have, nevertheless, lucid intervals, in which they can make right use of reason. Wherefore, if then they express a desire for Baptism, they can be baptized though they be actually in a state of madness. And in this case the sacrament should be bestowed on them if there be fear of danger otherwise it is better to wait until the time when they are sane, so that they may receive the sacrament more devoutly. But if during the interval of lucidity they manifest no desire to receive Baptism, they should not be baptized while in a state of insanity.

Lastly there are others who, though not altogether sane, yet can use their reason so far as to think about their salvation, and understand the power of the sacrament. And these are to be treated the same as those who are sane, and who are baptized if they be willing, but not against their will.

Reply to Objection 1: Imbeciles who never had, and have not now, the use of reason, are baptized, according to the Church's intention, just as according to the Church's ritual, they believe and repent; as we have stated above of children (A[9], ad OBJ). But those who have had the use of reason at some time, or have now, are baptized according to their own intention, which they have now, or had when they were sane.

Reply to Objection 2: Madmen and imbeciles lack the use of reason accidentally, i.e. through some impediment in a bodily organ; but not like irrational animals through want of a rational soul. Consequently the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: A person should not be baptized while asleep, except he be threatened with the danger of death. In which case he should be baptized, if previously he has manifested a desire to receive Baptism, as we have stated in reference to imbeciles: thus Augustine relates of his friend that “he was baptized while unconscious,” because he was in danger of death (Confess. iv).

OF THE EFFECTS OF BAPTISM (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of Baptism, concerning which there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether all sins are taken away by Baptism?

(2) Whether man is freed from all punishment by Baptism?

(3) Whether Baptism takes away the penalties of sin that belong to this life?

(4) Whether grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism?

(5) Of the effects of virtue which are conferred by Baptism?

(6) Whether even children receive grace and virtues in Baptism?

(7) Whether Baptism opens the gates of the heavenly kingdom to those who are baptized?

(8) Whether Baptism produces an equal effect in all who are baptized?

(9) Whether insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism?

(10) Whether Baptism takes effect when the insincerity ceases?

Whether all sins are taken away by Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that not all sins are taken away by Baptism. For Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, which corresponds to carnal generation. But by carnal generation man contracts none but original sin. Therefore none but original sin is taken away by Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, Penance is a sufficient cause of the remission of actual sins. But penance is required in adults before Baptism, according to Acts 2:38: “Do penance and be baptized every one of you.” Therefore Baptism has nothing to do with the remission of actual sins.

Objection 3: Further, various diseases demand various remedies: because as Jerome says on Mk. 9:27,28: “What is a cure for the heel is no cure for the eye.” But original sin, which is taken away by Baptism, is generically distinct from actual sin. Therefore not all sins are taken away by Baptism.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 36:25): “I will pour upon you clean water, and you shall be cleansed from all your filthiness.”

I answer that, As the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3), “all we, who are baptized in Christ Jesus, are baptized in His death.” And further on he concludes (Rom. 6:11): “So do you also reckon that you are dead to sin, but alive unto God in Christ Jesus our Lord.” Hence it is clear that by Baptism man dies unto the oldness of sin, and begins to live unto the newness of grace. But every sin belongs to the primitive oldness. Consequently every sin is taken away by Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15,16), the sin of Adam was not so far-reaching as the gift of Christ, which is bestowed in Baptism: “for judgment was by one unto condemnation; but grace is of many offenses, unto justification.” Wherefore Augustine says in his book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i), that “in carnal generation, original sin alone is contracted; but when we are born again of the Spirit, not only original sin but also wilful sin is forgiven.”

Reply to Objection 2: No sin can be forgiven save by the power of Christ’s Passion: hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:22) that “without shedding of blood there is no remission.” Consequently no movement of the human will suffices for the remission of sin, unless there be faith in Christ’s Passion, and the purpose of participating in it, either by receiving Baptism, or by submitting to the keys of the Church. Therefore when an adult approaches Baptism, he does indeed receive the forgiveness of all his sins through his purpose of being baptized, but more perfectly through the actual reception of Baptism.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is true of special remedies. But Baptism operates by the power of Christ’s Passion, which is the universal remedy for all sins; and so by Baptism all sins are loosed.

Whether man is freed by Baptism from all debt of punishment due to sin?

Objection 1: It seems that man is not freed by Baptism from all debt of punishment due to sin. For the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): “Those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: ‘Those that are, are ordained of God’].”

But guilt is not set in order save by punishment, as Augustine says (Ep. cxl). Therefore Baptism does not take away the debt of punishment due to sins already committed.

Objection 2: Further, the effect of a sacrament has a certain likeness to the sacrament itself; since the sacraments of the New Law "effect what they signify," as stated above ([4457]Q[62], A[1], ad 1). But the washing of Baptism has indeed a certain likeness with the cleansing from the stain of sin, but none, seemingly, with the remission of the debt of punishment. Therefore the debt of punishment is not taken away by Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, when the debt of punishment has been remitted, a man no longer deserves to be punished, and so it would be unjust to punish him. If, therefore, the debt of punishment be remitted by Baptism, it would be unjust, after Baptism, to hang a thief who had committed murder before. Consequently the severity of human legislation would be relaxed on account of Baptism; which is undesirable. Therefore Baptism does not remit the debt of punishment.

On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Rom. 11:29, "The gifts and the calling of God ate without repentance," says: "The grace of God in Baptism remits all, gratis."

I answer that, As stated above ([4458]Q[49], A[3], ad 2;[4459] Q[68], AA[1],4,5) by Baptism a man is incorporated in the Passion and death of Christ, according to Rom. 6:8: "If we be dead with Christ, we believe that we shall live also together with Christ." Hence it is clear that the Passion of Christ is communicated to every baptized person, so that he is healed just as if he himself had suffered and died. Now Christ's Passion, as stated above ([4460]Q[68], A[5]), is a sufficient satisfaction for all the sins of all men. Consequently he who is baptized, is freed from the debt of all punishment due to him for his sins, just as if he himself had offered sufficient satisfaction for all his sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Since the pains of Christ's Passion are communicated to the person baptized, inasmuch as he is made a member of Christ, just as if he himself had borne those pains, his sins are set in order by the pains of Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Water not only cleanses but also refreshes. And thus by refreshing it signifies the remission of the debt of punishment, just as by cleansing it signifies the washing away of guilt.

Reply to Objection 3: In punishments inflicted by a human tribunal, we have to consider not only what punishment a man deserves in respect of God, but also to what extent he is indebted to men who are hurt and scandalized by another’s sin. Consequently, although a murderer is freed by Baptism from his debt of punishment in respect of God, he remains, nevertheless, in debt to men; and it is right that they should be edified at his punishment, since they were scandalized at his sin. But the sovereign may remit the penalty to such like out of kindness.

Whether Baptism should take away the penalties of sin that belong to this life?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism should take away the penalties of sin that belong to this life. For as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:15), the gift of Christ is farther-reaching than the sin of Adam. But through Adam’s sin, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), “death entered into this world,” and, consequently, all the other penalties of the present life. Much more, therefore, should man be freed from the penalties of the present life, by the gift of Christ which is received in Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism takes away the guilt of both original and actual sin. Now it takes away the guilt of actual sin in such a way as to free man from all debt of punishment resulting therefrom. Therefore it also frees man from the penalties of the present life, which are a punishment of original sin.

Objection 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of these penalties is original sin, which is taken away by Baptism. Therefore such like penalties should not remain.

On the contrary, on Rom. 6:6, “that the body of sin may be destroyed,” a gloss says: “The effect of Baptism is that the old man is crucified, and the body of sin destroyed, not as though the living flesh of man were delivered by the destruction of that concupiscence with which it has been bespattered from its birth; but that it may not hurt him, when dead, though it was in him when he was born.” Therefore for the same reason neither are the other penalties taken away by Baptism.

I answer that, Baptism has the power to take away the penalties of the present life yet it does not take them away during the present life, but by its power they will be taken away from the just in the resurrection when “this mortal hath put on immortality" (1 Cor. 15:54). And this is reasonable. First, because, by Baptism, man is incorporated in Christ, and is made His member, as stated above [4461](A[3]; Q[68], A[5]). Consequently it is fitting that what takes place in the Head should take place also in the member incorporated. Now, from the very beginning of His conception Christ was "full of grace and truth," yet He had a passible body, which through His Passion and death was raised up to a life of glory. Wherefore a Christian receives grace in Baptism, as to his soul; but he retains a passible body, so that he may suffer for Christ therein: yet at length he will be raised up to a life of impassibility. Hence the Apostle says (Rom. 8:11): "He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead, shall quicken also our [Vulg.: 'your'] mortal bodies, because of His Spirit that dwelleth in us [Vulg.: 'you']": and further on in the same chapter (Rom. 8:17): "Heirs indeed of God, and joint heirs with Christ: yet so, if we suffer with Him, that we may be also glorified with Him."

Secondly, this is suitable for our spiritual training: namely, in order that, by fighting against concupiscence and other defects to which he is subject, man may receive the crown of victory. Wherefore on Rom. 6:6, "that the body of sin may be destroyed," a gloss says: "If a man after Baptism live in the flesh, he has concupiscence to fight against, and to conquer by God's help." In sign of which it is written (Judges 3:1,2): "These are the nations which the Lord left, that by them He might instruct Israel . . . that afterwards their children might learn to fight with their enemies, and to be trained up to war."

Thirdly, this was suitable, lest men might seek to be baptized for the sake of impassibility in the present life, and not for the sake of the glory of life eternal. Wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:19): "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable."

Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on Rom. 6:6, "that we may serve sin no longer—Like a man who, having captured a redoubtable enemy, slays him not forthwith, but suffers him to live for a little time in shame and suffering; so did Christ first of all fetter our punishment, but at a future time He will destroy it."

Reply to Objection 2: As the gloss says on the same passage (cf. ad 1), "the punishment of sin is twofold, the punishment of hell, and temporal punishment. Christ entirely abolished the punishment of hell, so that those who are baptized and truly repent, should not be subject to it. He did not, however, altogether abolish temporal punishment yet awhile; for hunger, thirst, and death still remain. But He overthrew its kingdom and power" in the sense that man should no longer be in fear of them: "and at length He will altogether exterminate it at the last day."

Reply to Objection 3: As we stated in the [4462]FS, Q[81], A[1]; [4463]FS, Q[82], A[1], ad 2 original sin spread in this way, that at first the person infected the nature, and afterwards the nature infected the person. Whereas Christ in reverse order at first repairs what regards the person, and afterwards will simultaneously repair what pertains to the nature in all men. Consequently by Baptism He takes away from man forthwith the guilt of original sin and the punishment of being deprived of the heavenly vision. But the penalties of the present life, such as death, hunger, thirst, and the like, pertain to the nature, from the principles of which they arise, inasmuch as it is deprived of original justice. Therefore these defects will not be taken away until the ultimate restoration of nature through the glorious resurrection.

Whether grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that grace and virtues are not bestowed on man by Baptism. Because, as stated above ([4464]Q[62], A[1], ad 1), the sacraments of the New Law "effect what they signify." But the baptismal cleansing signifies the cleansing of the soul from guilt, and not the fashioning of the soul with grace and virtues. Therefore it seems that grace and virtues are not bestowed on man by Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, one does not need to receive what one has already acquired. But some approach Baptism who have already grace and virtues: thus we read (Acts 10:1,2): "There was a certain man in Cesarea, named Cornelius, a centurion of that which is called the Italian band, a religious man and fearing God"; who, nevertheless, was afterwards baptized by Peter. Therefore grace and virtues are not bestowed by Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, virtue is a habit: which is defined as a "quality not easily removed, by which one may act easily and pleasurably." But after Baptism man retains proneness to evil which removes virtue; and experiences difficulty in doing good, in which the act of virtue consists. Therefore man does not acquire grace and virtue in Baptism.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Titus 3:5,6): “He saved us by the laver of regeneration,” i.e. by Baptism, “and renovation of the Holy Ghost, Whom He hath poured forth upon us abundantly,” i.e. “unto the remission of sins and the fulness of virtues,” as a gloss expounds. Therefore the grace of the Holy Ghost and the fulness of virtues are given in Baptism.

I answer that, As Augustine says in the book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i) “the effect of Baptism is that the baptized are incorporated in Christ as His members.” Now the fulness of grace and virtues flows from Christ the Head to all His members, according to Jn. 1:16: “Of His fulness we all have received.” Hence it is clear that man receives grace and virtues in Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: As the baptismal water by its cleansing signifies the washing away of guilt, and by its refreshment the remission of punishment, so by its natural clearness it signifies the splendor of grace and virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above (A[1], ad 2;[4465] Q[68], A[2]) man receives the forgiveness of sins before Baptism in so far as he has Baptism of desire, explicitly or implicitly; and yet when he actually receives Baptism, he receives a fuller remission, as to the remission of the entire punishment. So also before Baptism Cornelius and others like him receive grace and virtues through their faith in Christ and their desire for Baptism, implicit or explicit: but afterwards when baptized, they receive a yet greater fulness of grace and virtues. Hence in Ps. 22:2, “He hath brought me up on the water of refreshment,” a gloss says: “He has brought us up by an increase of virtue and good deeds in Baptism.”

Reply to Objection 3: Difficulty in doing good and proneness to evil are in the baptized, not through their lacking the habits of the virtues, but through concupiscence which is not taken away in Baptism. But just as concupiscence is diminished by Baptism, so as not to enslave us, so also are both the aforesaid defects diminished, so that man be not overcome by them.

Whether certain acts of the virtues are fittingly set down as effects of Baptism, to wit—incorporation in Christ, enlightenment, and fruitfulness?

Objection 1: It seems that certain acts of the virtues are unfittingly set down as effects of Baptism, to wit—“incorporation in Christ, enlightenment, and fruitfulness.” For Baptism is not given to an adult, except he believe; according to Mk. 16:16: “He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved.” But it is by faith that man is incorporated in Christ, according to Eph. 3:17: “That Christ may dwell by faith in your hearts.” Therefore no one is baptized except he be already incorporated in Christ. Therefore incorporation with Christ is not the effect of Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, enlightenment is caused by teaching, according to Eph. 3:8,9: “To me the least of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all men,” etc. But teaching by the catechism precedes Baptism. Therefore it is not the effect of Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, fruitfulness pertains to active generation. But a man is regenerated spiritually by Baptism. Therefore fruitfulness is not an effect of Baptism.

On the contrary, Augustine says in the book on Infant Baptism (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i) that “the effect of Baptism is that the baptized are incorporated in Christ.” And Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii) ascribes enlightenment to Baptism. And on Ps. 22:2, “He hath brought me up on the water of refreshment,” a gloss says that “the sinner’s soul, sterilized by drought, is made fruitful by Baptism.”

I answer that, By Baptism man is born again unto the spiritual life, which is proper to the faithful of Christ, as the Apostle says (Gal. 2:20): “And that I live now in the flesh; I live in the faith of the Son of God.” Now life is only in those members that are united to the head, from which they derive sense and movement. And therefore it follows of necessity that by Baptism man is incorporated in Christ, as one of His members. Again, just as the members derive sense and movement from the material head, so from their spiritual Head, i.e. Christ, do His members derive spiritual sense consisting in the knowledge Of truth, and spiritual movement which results from the instinct of grace. Hence it is written (Jn. 1:14, 16): “We have seen Him . . . full of grace and truth; and of His fulness we all have received.” And it follows from this that the baptized are enlightened by Christ as to the knowledge of truth, and made fruitful by Him with the fruitfulness of good works by the infusion of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Adults who already believe in Christ are incorporated in Him mentally. But afterwards, when they are baptized, they are incorporated in Him, corporally, as it were, i.e. by the visible sacrament; without the desire of which they could not have been incorporated in Him even mentally.

Reply to Objection 2: The teacher enlightens outwardly and ministerially by catechizing: but God enlightens the baptized inwardly, by preparing their hearts for the reception of the doctrines of truth, according to Jn. 6:45: “It is written in the prophets . . . They shall all be taught of God.”

Reply to Objection 3: The fruitfulness which i ascribed as an effect of Baptism is that by which man brings forth good works; not that by which he begets others in Christ, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:15): “In Christ Jesus by the Gospel I have begotten you.”

Whether children receive grace and virtue in Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that children do not receive grace and virtues in Baptism. For grace and virtues are not possessed without faith and charity. But faith, as Augustine says (Ep. xcviii), “depends on the will of the believer”: and in like manner charity depends on the will of the lover. Now children have not the use of the will, and consequently they have neither faith nor charity. Therefore children do not receive grace and virtues in Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, on Jn. 14:12, “Greater than these shall he do,” Augustine says that in order for the ungodly to be made righteous “Christ worketh in him, but not without him.” But a child, through not having the use of free-will, does not co-operate with Christ unto its justification: indeed at times it does its best to resist. Therefore it is not justified by grace and virtues.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Rom. 4:5): “To him that worketh not, yet believing in Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice according to the purpose of the grace of God.” But a child believeth not “in Him that justifieth the ungodly.” Therefore a child receives neither sanctifying grace nor virtues.

Objection 4: Further, what is done with a carnal intention does not seem to have a spiritual effect. But sometimes children are taken to Baptism with a carnal intention, to wit, that their bodies may be healed. Therefore they do not receive the spiritual effect consisting in grace and virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion lii): “When little children are baptized, they die to that sin which they contracted in birth: so that to them also may be applied the words: ‘We are buried together with Him by Baptism unto death’”: (and he continues thus) “‘that as Christ is risen from the dead by the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life.’” Now newness of life is through grace and virtues. Therefore children receive grace and virtues in Baptism.

I answer that, Some of the early writers held that children do not receive grace and virtues in Baptism, but that they receive the imprint of the character of Christ, by the power of which they receive grace and virtue when they arrive at the perfect age. But this is evidently false, for two reasons. First, because children, like adults, are made members of Christ in Baptism; hence they must, of necessity, receive an influx of grace and virtues from the Head. Secondly, because, if this were true, children that die after Baptism, would not come to eternal life; since according to Rom. 6:23, “the grace of God is life everlasting.” And consequently Baptism would not have profited them unto salvation.

Now the source of their error was that they did not recognize the distinction between habit and act. And so, seeing children to be incapable of acts of virtue, they thought that they had no virtues at all after Baptism. But this inability of children to act is not due to the absence of habits, but to an impediment on the part of the body: thus also when a man is asleep, though he may have the habits of virtue, yet is he hindered from virtuous acts through being asleep.

Reply to Objection 1: Faith and charity depend on man’s will, yet so that the habits of these and other virtues require the power of the will which is in children; whereas acts of virtue require an act of the will, which is not in children. In this sense Augustine says in the book on Infant Baptism (Ep. xcviii): “The little child is made a believer, not as yet by that faith which depends on the will of the believer, but by the sacrament of faith itself,” which causes the habit of faith.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says in his book on Charity (Ep. Joan. ad Parth. iii), “no man is born of water and the Holy Ghost unwillingly which is to be understood not of little children but of adults.” In like manner we are to understand as applying to adults, that man “without himself is not justified by Christ.” Moreover, if little children who are about to be baptized resist as much as they can, “this is not imputed to them, since so little do they know what they do, that they seem not to do it at all”: as Augustine says in a book on the Presence of God, addressed to Dardanus (Ep. clxxxvii).

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Serm. clxxvi): “Mother Church lends other feet to the little children that they may come; another heart that they may believe; another tongue that they may confess.” So that children believe, not by their own act, but by the faith of the Church, which is applied to them: by the power of which faith, grace and virtues are bestowed on them.

Reply to Objection 4: The carnal intention of those who take children to be baptized does not hurt the latter, as neither does one’s sin hurt another, unless he consent. Hence Augustine says in his letter to Boniface (Ep. xcviii): “Be not disturbed because some bring children to be baptized, not in the hope that they may be born again to eternal life by the spiritual grace, but because they think it to be a remedy whereby they may preserve or recover health. For they are not deprived of regeneration, through not being brought for this intention.”

Whether the effect of Baptism is to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom. For what is already opened needs no opening. But the gates of the heavenly kingdom were opened by Christ’s Passion: hence it is written (Apoc. 4:1): “After these things I looked and behold (a great) door was opened in heaven.” Therefore it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism has had its effects ever since it was instituted. But some were baptized with Christ’s Baptism, before His Passion, according toJn. 3:22, 26: and if they had died then, the gates of the heavenly kingdom would not have been opened to them, since none entered therein before Christ, according to Mic. 2:13: “He went up [Vulg.: ‘shall go up’] that shall open the way before them.” Therefore it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom.

Objection 3: Further, the baptized are still subject to death and the other penalties of the present life, as stated above [4466](A[3]). But entrance to the heavenly kingdom is opened to none that are subject to punishment: as is clear in regard to those who are in purgatory. Therefore it is not the effect of Baptism, to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom.

On the contrary, on Lk. 3:21, “Heaven was opened,” the gloss of Bede says: “We see here the power of Baptism; from which when a man comes forth, the gates of the heavenly kingdom are opened unto him.”

I answer that, To open the gates of the heavenly kingdom is to remove the obstacle that prevents one from entering therein. Now this obstacle is guilt and the debt of punishment. But it has been shown above ([4467]AA[1] ,2) that all guilt and also all debt of punishment are taken away by Baptism. It follows, therefore, that the effect of Baptism is to open the gates of the heavenly kingdom.

Reply to Objection 1: Baptism opens the gates of the heavenly kingdom to the baptized in so far as it incorporates them in the Passion of Christ, by applying its power to man.

Reply to Objection 2: When Christ’s Passion was not as yet consummated actually but only in the faith of believers, Baptism proportionately caused the gates to be opened, not in fact but in hope. For the baptized who died then looked forward, with a sure hope, to enter the heavenly kingdom.

Reply to Objection 3: The baptized are subject to death and the penalties of the present life, not by reason of a personal debt of punishment but by reason of the state of their nature. And therefore this is no bar to their entrance to the heavenly kingdom, when death severs the soul from the body; since they have paid, as it were, the debt of nature.

Whether Baptism has an equal effect in all?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism has not an equal effect in all. For the effect of Baptism is to remove guilt. But in some it takes away more sins than in others; for in children it takes away only original sins, whereas in adults it takes away actual sins, in some many, in others few. Therefore Baptism has not an equal effect in all.

Objection 2: Further, grace and virtues are bestowed on man by Baptism. But some, after Baptism, seem to have more grace and more perfect virtue than others who have been baptized. Therefore Baptism has not an equal effect in all.

Objection 3: Further, nature is perfected by grace, as matter by form. But a form is received into matter according to its capacity. Therefore, since some of the baptized, even children, have greater capacity for natural gifts than others have, it seems that some receive greater grace than others.

Objection 4: Further, in Baptism some receive not only spiritual, but also bodily health; thus Constantine was cleansed in Baptism from leprosy. But all the infirm do not receive bodily health in Baptism. Therefore it has not an equal effect in all.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:5): “One Faith, one Baptism.” But a uniform cause has a uniform effect. Therefore Baptism has an equal effect in all.

I answer that, The effect of Baptism is twofold, the essential effect, and the accidental. The essential effect of Baptism is that for which Baptism was instituted, namely, the begetting of men unto spiritual life. Therefore, since all children are equally disposed to Baptism, because they are baptized not in their own faith, but in that of the Church, they all receive an equal effect in Baptism. Whereas adults, who approach Baptism in their own faith, are not equally disposed to Baptism; for some approach thereto with greater, some with less, devotion. And therefore some receive a greater, some a smaller share of the grace of newness; just as from the same fire, he receives more heat who approaches nearest to it, although the fire, as far as it is concerned, sends forth its heat equally to all.

But the accidental effect of Baptism, is that to which Baptism is not ordained, but which the Divine power produces miraculously in Baptism: thus on Rom. 6:6, “that we may serve sin no longer,” a gloss says: “this is not bestowed in Baptism, save by an ineffable miracle of the Creator, so that the law of sin, which is in our members, be absolutely destroyed.” And such like effects are not equally received by all the baptized, even if they approach with equal devotion: but they are bestowed according to the ordering of Divine providence.

Reply to Objection 1: The least baptismal grace suffices to blot out all sins. Wherefore that in some more sins are loosed than in others is not due to the greater efficacy of Baptism, but to the condition of the recipient: for in each one it looses whatever it finds.

Reply to Objection 2: That greater or lesser grace appears in the baptized, may occur in two ways. First, because one receives greater grace in Baptism than another, on account of his greater devotion, as stated above. Secondly, because, though they receive equal grace, they do not make an equal use of it, but one applies himself more to advance therein, while another by his negligence baffles grace.

Reply to Objection 3: The various degrees of capacity in men arise, not from a variety in the mind which is renewed by Baptism (since all men, being of one species, are of one form), but from the diversity of bodies. But it is otherwise with the angels, who differ in species. And therefore gratuitous gifts are bestowed on the angels according to their diverse capacity for natural gifts, but not on men.

Reply to Objection 4: Bodily health is not the essential effect of Baptism, but a miraculous work of Divine providence.

Whether insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that insincerity does not hinder the effect of Baptism. For the Apostle says (Gal. 3:27): “As many of you as have been baptized in Christ Jesus, have put on Christ.” But all that receive the Baptism of Christ, are baptized in Christ. Therefore they all put on Christ: and this is to receive the effect of Baptism. Consequently insincerity does not hinder the effect of Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, the Divine power which can change man’s will to that which is better, works in Baptism. But the effect of the efficient cause cannot be hindered by that which can be removed by that cause. Therefore insincerity cannot hinder the effect of Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, the effect of Baptism is grace, to which sin is in opposition. But many other sins are more grievous than insincerity, which are not said to hinder the effect of Baptism. Therefore neither does insincerity.

On the contrary, It is written (Wis. 1:5): “The Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful.” But the effect of Baptism is from the Holy Ghost. Therefore insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism.

I answer that, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), “God does not compel man to be righteous.” Consequently in order that a man be justified by Baptism, his will must needs embrace both Baptism and the baptismal effect. Now, a man is said to be insincere by reason of his will being in contradiction with either Baptism or its effect. For, according to Augustine (De Bapt. cont. Donat. vii), a man is said to be insincere, in four ways: first, because he does not believe, whereas Baptism is the sacrament of Faith; secondly, through scorning the sacrament itself; thirdly, through observing a rite which differs from that prescribed by the Church in conferring the sacrament; fourthly, through approaching the sacrament without devotion. Wherefore it is manifest that insincerity hinders the effect of Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: “To be baptized in Christ,” may be taken in two ways. First, “in Christ,” i.e. “in conformity with Christ.” And thus whoever is baptized in Christ so as to be conformed to Him by Faith and Charity, puts on Christ by grace. Secondly, a man is said to be baptized in Christ, in so far as he receives Christ’s sacrament. And thus all put on Christ, through being configured to Him by the character, but not through being conformed to Him by grace.

Reply to Objection 2: When God changes man’s will from evil to good, man does not approach with insincerity. But God does not always do this. Nor is this the purpose of the sacrament, that an insincere man be made sincere; but that he who comes in sincerity, be justified.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to be insincere who makes a show of willing what he wills not. Now whoever approaches Baptism, by that very fact makes a show of having right faith in Christ, of veneration for this sacrament, and of wishing to conform to the Church, and to renounce sin. Consequently, to whatever sin a man wishes to cleave, if he approach Baptism, he approaches insincerely, which is the same as to approach without devotion. But this must be understood of mortal sin, which is in opposition to grace: but not of venial sin. Consequently, here insincerity includes, in a way, every sin.

Whether Baptism produces its effect when the insincerity ceases?

Objection 1: It seems that Baptism does not produce its effect, when the insincerity ceases. For a dead work, which is void of charity, can never come to life. But he who approaches Baptism insincerely, receives the sacrament without charity. Therefore it can never come to life so as to bestow grace.

Objection 2: Further, insincerity seems to be stronger than Baptism, because it hinders its effect. But the stronger is not removed by the weaker. Therefore the sin of insincerity cannot be taken away by Baptism which has been hindered by insincerity. And thus Baptism will not receive its full effect, which is the remission of all sins.

Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man approach Baptism insincerely, and afterwards commit a number of sins. And yet these sins will not be taken away by Baptism; because Baptism washes away past, not future, sins. Such a Baptism, therefore, will never have its effect, which is the remission of all sins.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bapt. cont. Donat. i): “Then does Baptism begin to have its salutary effect, when truthful confession takes the place of that insincerity which hindered sins from being washed away, so long as the heart persisted in malice and sacrilege.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4468]Q[66], A[9]), Baptism is a spiritual regeneration. Now when a thing is generated, it receives together with the form, the form’s effect, unless there be an obstacle; and when this is removed, the form of the thing generated produces its effect: thus at the same time as a weighty body is generated, it has a downward movement, unless something prevent this; and when the obstacle is removed, it begins forthwith to move downwards. In like manner when a man is baptized, he receives the character, which is like a form; and he receives in consequence its proper effect, which is grace whereby all his sins are remitted. But this effect is sometimes hindered by insincerity. Wherefore, when this obstacle is removed by Penance, Baptism forthwith produces its effect.

Reply to Objection 1: The sacrament of Baptism is the work of God, not of man. Consequently, it is not dead in the man, who being insincere, is baptized without charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Insincerity is not removed by Baptism but by Penance: and when it is removed, Baptism takes away all guilt, and all debt of punishment due to sins, whether committed before Baptism, or even co-existent with Baptism. Hence Augustine says (De Bapt. cont. Donat. i): “Yesterday is blotted out, and whatever remains over and above, even the very last hour and moment preceding Baptism, the very moment of Baptism. But from that moment forward he is bound by his obligations.” And so both Baptism and Penance concur in producing the effect of Baptism, but Baptism as the direct efficient cause, Penance as the indirect cause, i.e. as removing the obstacle.

Reply to Objection 3: The effect of Baptism is to take away not future, but present and past sins. And consequently, when the insincerity passes away, subsequent sins are indeed remitted, but by Penance, not by Baptism. Wherefore they are not remitted, like the sins which preceded Baptism, as to the whole debt of punishment.

OF CIRCUMCISION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider things that are preparatory to Baptism: and (1) that which preceded Baptism, viz. Circumcision, (2) those which accompany Baptism, viz. Catechism and Exorcism.

Concerning the first there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of, Baptism?

(2) Its institution;

(3) Its rite;

(4) Its effect.

Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that circumcision was not a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism. For every figure has some likeness to that which it foreshadows. But circumcision has no likeness to Baptism. Therefore it seems that it was not a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle, speaking of the Fathers of old, says (1 Cor. 10:2), that “all were baptized in the cloud, and in the sea”: but not that they were baptized in circumcision. Therefore the protecting pillar of a cloud, and the crossing of the Red Sea, rather than circumcision, were a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, it was stated above ([4469]Q[38], AA[1],3) that the baptism of John was a preparation for Christ’s. Consequently, if circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of Christ’s Baptism, it seems that John’s baptism was superfluous: which is unseemly. Therefore circumcision was not a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Col. 2:11,12): “You are circumcised with circumcision, not made by hand in despoiling the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.”

I answer that, Baptism is called the Sacrament of Faith; in so far, to wit, as in Baptism man makes a profession of faith, and by Baptism is aggregated to the congregation of the faithful. Now our faith is the same as that of the Fathers of old, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:13): “Having the same spirit of faith . . . we . . . believe.” But circumcision was a protestation of faith; wherefore by circumcision also men of old were aggregated to the body of the faithful. Consequently, it is manifest that circumcision was a preparation for Baptism and a figure thereof, forasmuch as “all things happened” to the Fathers of old “in figure” (1 Cor. 10:11); just as their faith regarded things to come.

Reply to Objection 1: Circumcision was like Baptism as to the spiritual effect of the latter. For just as circumcision removed a carnal pellicule, so Baptism despoils man of carnal behavior.

Reply to Objection 2: The protecting pillar of cloud and the crossing of the Red Sea were indeed figures of our Baptism, whereby we are born again of water, signified by the Red Sea; and of the Holy Ghost, signified by the pillar of cloud: yet man did not make, by means of these, a profession of faith, as by circumcision; so that these two things were figures but not sacraments. But circumcision was a sacrament, and a preparation for Baptism; although less clearly figurative of Baptism, as to externals, than the aforesaid. And for this reason the Apostle mentions them rather than circumcision.

Reply to Objection 3: John’s baptism was a preparation for Christ’s as to the act done: but circumcision, as to the profession of faith, which is required in Baptism, as stated above.

Whether circumcision was instituted in a fitting manner?

Objection 1: It seems that circumcision was instituted in an unfitting manner. For as stated above [4470](A[1]) a profession of faith was made in circumcision. But none could ever be delivered from the first man’s sin, except by faith in Christ’s Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood.” Therefore circumcision should have been instituted forthwith after the first man’s sin, and not at the time of Abraham.

Objection 2: Further, in circumcision man made profession of keeping the Old Law, just as in Baptism he makes profession of keeping the New Law; wherefore the Apostle says (Gal. 5:3): “I testify . . . to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole Law.” But the observance of the Law was not promulgated at the time of Abraham, but rather at the time of Moses. Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be instituted at the time of Abraham

Objection 3: Further, circumcision was a figure of, and a preparation for, Baptism. But Baptism is offered to all nations, according to Mat. 28:19: “Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them.” Therefore circumcision should have been instituted as binding, not the Jews only, but also all nations.

Objection 4: Further, carnal circumcision should correspond to spiritual circumcision, as the shadow to the reality. But spiritual circumcision which is of Christ, regards indifferently both sexes, since “in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female,” as is written Col. 3 [*Gal. 3:28]. Therefore the institution of circumcision which concerns only males, was unfitting.

On the contrary, We read (Gn. 17) that circumcision was instituted by God, Whose “works are perfect” (Dt. 32:4).

I answer that, As stated above [4471](A[1]) circumcision was a preparation for Baptism, inasmuch as it was a profession of faith in Christ, which we also profess in Baptism. Now among the Fathers of old, Abraham was the first to receive the promise of the future birth of Christ, when it was said to him: “In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed” (Gn. 22:18). Moreover, he was the first to cut himself off from the society of unbelievers, in accordance with the commandment of the Lord, Who said to him (Gn. 13:1): “Go forth out of thy country and from thy kindred.” Therefore circumcision was fittingly instituted in the person of Abraham.

Reply to Objection 1: Immediately after the sin of our first parent, on account of the knowledge possessed by Adam, who was fully instructed about Divine things, both faith and natural reason flourished in man to such an extent, that there was no need for any signs of faith and salvation to be prescribed to him, but each one was wont to make protestation of his faith, by outward signs of his profession, according as he thought best. But about the time of Abraham faith was on the wane, many being given over to idolatry. Moreover, by the growth of carnal concupiscence natural reason was clouded even in regard to sins against nature. And therefore it was fitting that then, and not before, circumcision should be instituted, as a profession of faith and a remedy against carnal concupiscence.

Reply to Objection 2: The observance of the Law was not to be promulgated until the people were already gathered together: because the law is ordained to the public good, as we have stated in the [4472]FS, Q[90], A[2]. Now it behooved the body of the faithful to be gathered together by a sensible sign, which is necessary in order that men be united together in any religion, as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix). Consequently, it was necessary for circumcision to be instituted before the giving of the Law. Those Fathers, however, who lived before the Law, taught their families concerning Divine things by way of paternal admonition. Hence the Lord said of Abraham (Gn. 18:19): “I know that he will command his children, and his household after him to keep the way of the Lord.”

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism contains in itself the perfection of salvation, to which God calls all men, according to 1 Tim. 2:4: “Who will have all men to be saved.” Wherefore Baptism is offered to all nations. On the other hand circumcision did not contain the perfection of salvation, but signified it as to be achieved by Christ, Who was to be born of the Jewish nation. For this reason circumcision was given to that nation alone.

Reply to Objection 4: The institution of circumcision is as a sign of Abraham’s faith, who believed that himself would be the father of Christ Who was promised to him: and for this reason it was suitable that it should be for males only. Again, original sin, against which circumcision was specially ordained, is contracted from the father, not from the mother, as was stated in the [4473]FS, Q[81], A[5]. But Baptism contains the power of Christ, Who is the universal cause of salvation for all, and is “The Remission of all sins” (Post-Communion, Tuesday in Whitweek).

Whether the rite of circumcision was fitting?

Objection 1: It seems that the rite of circumcision was unfitting. For circumcision, as stated above ([4474]AA[1],2), was a profession of faith. But faith is in the apprehensive power, whose operations appear mostly in the head. Therefore the sign of circumcision should have been conferred on the head rather than on the virile member.

Objection 2: Further, in the sacraments we make use of such things as are in more frequent use; for instance, water, which is used for washing, and bread, which we use for nourishment. But, in cutting, we use an iron knife more commonly than a stone knife. Therefore circumcision should not have been performed with a stone knife.

Objection 3: Further, just as Baptism was instituted as a remedy against original sin, so also was circumcision, as Bede says (Hom. in Circum.). But now Baptism is not put off until the eighth day, lest children should be in danger of loss on account of original sin, if they should die before being baptized. On the other hand, sometimes Baptism is put off until after the eighth day. Therefore the eighth day should not have been fixed for circumcision, but this day should have been anticipated, just as sometimes it was deferred.

On the contrary, The aforesaid rite of circumcision is fixed by a gloss on Rom. 4:11: “And he received the sign of circumcision.”

I answer that, As stated above [4475](A[2]), circumcision was established, as a sign of faith, by God “of” Whose “wisdom there is no number” (Ps. 146:5). Now to determine suitable signs is a work of wisdom. Consequently, it must be allowed that the rite of circumcision was fitting.

Reply to Objection 1: It was fitting for circumcision to be performed on the virile member. First, because it was a sign of that faith whereby Abraham believed that Christ would be born of his seed. Secondly, because it was to be a remedy against original sin, which is contracted through the act of generation. Thirdly, because it was ordained as a remedy for carnal concupiscence, which thrives principally in those members, by reason of the abundance of venereal pleasure.

Reply to Objection 2: A stone knife was not essential to circumcision. Wherefore we do not find that an instrument of this description is required by any divine precept; nor did the Jews, as a rule, make use of such a knife for circumcision; indeed, neither do they now. Nevertheless, certain well-known circumcisions are related as having been performed with a stone knife, thus (Ex. 4:25) we read that “Sephora took a very sharp stone and circumcised the foreskin of her son,” and (Joshua 5:2): “Make thee knives of stone, and circumcise the second time the children of Israel.” Which signified that spiritual circumcision would be done by Christ, of Whom it is written (1 Cor. 10:4): “Now the rock was Christ.”

Reply to Objection 3: The eighth day was fixed for circumcision: first, because of the mystery; since, Christ, by taking away from the elect, not only guilt but also all penalties, will perfect the spiritual circumcision, in the eighth age (which is the age of those that rise again), as it were, on the eighth day. Secondly, on account of the tenderness of the infant before the eighth day. Wherefore even in regard to other animals it is prescribed (Lev. 22:27): “When a bullock, or a sheep, or a goat, is brought forth, they shall be seven days under the udder of their dam: but the eighth day and thenceforth, they may be offered to the Lord.”

Moreover, the eighth day was necessary for the fulfilment of the precept; so that, to wit, those who delayed beyond the eighth day, sinned, even though it were the sabbath, according to Jn. 7:23: “(If) a man receives circumcision on the sabbath-day, that the Law of Moses may not be broken.” But it was not necessary for the validity of the sacrament: because if anyone delayed beyond the eighth day, they could be circumcised afterwards.

Some also say that in imminent danger of death, it was allowable to anticipate the eighth day. But this cannot be proved either from the authority of Scripture or from the custom of the Jews. Wherefore it is better to say with Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) that the eighth day was never anticipated for any motive, however urgent. Hence on Prov. 4:3: “I was . . . an only son in the sight of my mother,” a gloss says, that Bersabee’s other baby boy did not count because through dying before the eighth day it received no name; and consequently neither was it circumcised.

Whether circumcision bestowed sanctifying grace?

Objection 1: It seems that circumcision did not bestow sanctifying grace. For the Apostle says (Gal. 2:21): “If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain,” i.e. without cause. But circumcision was an obligation imposed by the Law, according to Gal. 5:3: “I testify . . . to every man circumcising himself, that ne is a debtor to do the whole law." Therefore, if justice be by circumcision, "Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause. But this cannot be allowed. Therefore circumcision did not confer grace whereby the sinner is made righteous.

Objection 2: Further, before the institution of circumcision faith alone sufficed for justification; hence Gregory says (Moral. iv): "Faith alone did of old in behalf of infants that for which the water of Baptism avails with us." But faith has lost nothing of its strength through the commandment of circumcision. Therefore faith alone justified little ones, and not circumcision.

Objection 3: Further, we read (Joshua 5:5,6) that "the people that were born in the desert, during the forty years . . . were uncircumcised." If, therefore, original sin was taken away by circumcision, it seems that all who died in the desert, both little children and adults, were lost. And the same argument avails in regard to those who died before the eighth day, which was that of circumcision, which day could nol be anticipated, as stated above (A[3], ad 3).

Objection 4: Further, nothing but sin closes the entrance to the heavenly kingdom. But before the Passion the entrance to the heavenly kingdom was closed to the circumcised. Therefore men were not justified from sin by circumcision.

Objection 5: Further, original sin is not remitted without actual sin being remitted also: because "it is wicked to hope for half forgiveness from God," as Augustine says (De Vera et Falsa Poenit. ix). But we read nowhere of circumcision as remitting actual sin. Therefore neither did it remit original sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says, writing to Valerius in answer to Julian (De Nup. et Concup. ii): "From the time that circumcision was instituted among God's people, as 'a seal of the justice of the faith,' it availed little children unto sanctification by cleansing them from the original and bygone sin; just as Baptism also from the time of its institution began to avail unto the renewal of man."

I answer that, All are agreed in saying that original sin was remitted in circumcision. But some said that no grace was conferred, and that the only effect was to remit sin. The Master holds this opinion (Sent. iv, D, 1), and in a gloss on Rom. 4:11. But this is impossible, since guilt is not remitted except by grace, according to Rom. 3:2: “Being justified freely by His grace,” etc.

Wherefore others said that grace was bestowed by circumcision, as to that effect which is the remission of guilt, but not as to its positive effects; lest they should be compelled to say that the grace bestowed in circumcision sufficed for the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law, and that, consequently, the coming of Christ was unnecessary. But neither can this opinion stand. First, because by circumcision children. received the power of obtaining glory at the allotted time, which is the last positive effect of grace. Secondly, because, in the order of the formal cause, positive effects naturally precede those that denote privation, although it is the reverse in the order of the material cause: since a form does not remove a privation save by informing the subject.

Consequently, others said that grace was conferred in circumcision, also as a particular positive effect consisting in being made worthy of eternal life; but not as to all its effects, for it did not suffice for the repression of the concupiscence of the fomes, nor again for the fulfilment of the precepts of the Law. And this was my opinion at one time (Sent. iv, D, 1;[4476] Q[2], A[4]). But if one consider the matter carefully, it is clear that this is not true. Because the least grace can resist any degree of concupiscence, and avoid every mortal sin, that is committed in transgressing the precepts of the Law; for the smallest degree of charity loves God more than cupidity loves “thousands of gold and silver” (Ps. 118:72).

We must say, therefore, that grace was bestowed in circumcision as to all the effects of grace, but not as in Baptism. Because in Baptism grace is bestowed by the very power of Baptism itself, which power Baptism has as the instrument of Christ’s Passion already consummated. Whereas circumcision bestowed grace, inasmuch as it was a sign of faith in Christ’s future Passion: so that the man who was circumcised, professed to embrace that faith; whether, being an adult, he made profession for himself, or, being a child, someone else made profession for him. Hence, too, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:11), that Abraham “received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith”: because, to wit, justice was of faith signified: not of circumcision signifying. And since Baptism operates instrumentally by the power of Christ’s Passion, whereas circumcision does not, therefore Baptism imprints a character that incorporates man in Christ, and bestows grace more copiously than does circumcision; since greater is the effect of a thing already present, than of the hope thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument would prove if justice were of circumcision otherwise than through faith in Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as before the institution of circumcision, faith in Christ to come justified both children and adults, so, too, after its institution. But before, there was no need of a sign expressive of this faith; because as yet believers had not begun to be united together apart from unbelievers for the worship of one God. It is probable, however, that parents who were believers offered up some prayers to God for their children, especially if these were in any danger. Or bestowed some blessing on them, as a "seal of faith"; just as the adults offered prayers and sacrifices for themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: There was an excuse for the people in the desert failing to fulfil the precept of circumcision, both because they knew not when the camp was removed, and because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) they needed no distinctive sign while they dwelt apart from other nations. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (QQ. in Josue vi), those were guilty of disobedience who failed to obey through contempt.

It seems, however, that none of the uncircumcised died in the desert, for it is written (Ps. 104:37): "There was not among their tribes one that was feeble": and that those alone died in the desert, who had been circumcised in Egypt. If, however, some of the uncircumcised did die there, the same applies to them as to those who died before the institution of circumcision. And this applies also to those children who, at the time of the Law, died before the eighth day.

Reply to Objection 4: Original sin was taken away in circumcision, in regard to the person; but on the part of the entire nature, there remained the obstacle to the entrance of the kingdom of heaven, which obstacle was removed by Christ's Passion. Consequently, before Christ's Passion not even Baptism gave entrance to the kingdom. But were circumcision to avail after Christ's Passion, it would give entrance to the kingdom.

Reply to Objection 5: When adults were circumcised, they received remission not only of original, but also of actual sin: yet not so as to be delivered from all debt of punishment, as in Baptism, in which grace is conferred more copiously.

OF THE PREPARATIONS THAT ACCOMPANY BAPTISM (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the preparations that accompany Baptism: concerning which there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether catechism should precede Baptism?

(2) Whether exorcism should precede Baptism?

(3) Whether what is done in catechizing and exorcizing, effects anything, or is a mere sign?

(4) Whether those who are to be baptized should be catechized or exorcized by priests?

Whether catechism should precede Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that catechism should not precede Baptism. For by Baptism men are regenerated unto the spiritual life. But man begins to live before being taught. Therefore man should not be catechized, i.e. taught, before being baptized.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism is given not only to adults, but also to children, who are not capable of being taught, since they have not the use of reason. Therefore it is absurd to catechize them.

Objection 3: Further, a man, when catechized, confesses his faith. Now a child cannot confess its faith by itself, nor can anyone else in its stead; both because no one can bind another to do anything; and because one cannot know whether the child, having come to the right age, will give its assent to faith. Therefore catechism should not precede Baptism.

On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): “Before Baptism man should be prepared by catechism, in order that the catechumen may receive the rudiments of faith.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4477]Q[70], A[1]), Baptism is the Sacrament of Faith: since it is a profession of the Christian faith. Now in order that a man receive the faith, he must be instructed therein, according to Rom. 10:14: “How shall they believe Him, of Whom they have not heard? And how shall they hear without a preacher?” And therefore it is fitting that catechism should precede Baptism. Hence when our Lord bade

His disciples to baptize, He made teaching to precede Baptism, saying: “Go ye . . . and teach all nations, baptizing them,” etc.

Reply to Objection 1: The life of grace unto which a man is regenerated, presupposes the life of the rational nature, in which man is capable of receiving instruction.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as Mother Church, as stated above ([4478]Q[69], A[6], ad 3), lends children another’s feet that they may come, and another’s heart that they may believe, so, too, she lends them another’s ears, that they may hear, and another’s mind, that through others they may be taught. And therefore, as they are to be baptized, on the same grounds they are to be instructed.

Reply to Objection 3: He who answers in the child’s stead: “I do believe,” does not foretell that the child will believe when it comes to the right age, else he would say: “He will believe”; but in the child’s stead he professes the Church’s faith which is communicated to that child, the sacrament of which faith is bestowed on it, and to which faith he is bound by another. For there is nothing unfitting in a person being bound by another in things necessary for salvation. In like manner the sponsor, in answering for the child, promises to use his endeavors that the child may believe. This, however, would not be sufficient in the case of adults having the use of reason.

Whether exorcism should precede Baptism?

Objection 1: It seems that exorcism should not precede Baptism. For exorcism is ordained against energumens or those who are possessed. But not all are such like. Therefore exorcism should not precede Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, so long as man is a subject of sin, the devil has power over him, according to Jn. 8:34: “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin.” But sin is taken away by Baptism. Therefore men should not be exorcized before Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, Holy water was introduced in order to ward off the power of the demons. Therefore exorcism was not needed as a further remedy.

On the contrary, Pope Celestine says (Epist. ad Episcop. Galliae): “Whether children or young people approach the sacrament of regeneration, they should not come to the fount of life before the unclean spirit has been expelled from them by the exorcisms and breathings of the clerics.”

I answer that, Whoever purposes to do a work wisely, first removes the obstacles to his work; hence it is written (Jer. 4:3): “Break up anew your fallow ground and sow not upon thorns.” Now the devil is the enemy of man’s salvation, which man acquires by Baptism; and he has a certain power over man from the very fact that the latter is subject to original, or even actual, sin. Consequently it is fitting that before Baptism the demons should be cast out by exorcisms, lest they impede man’s salvation. Which expulsion is signified by the (priest) breathing (upon the person to be baptized); while the blessing, with the imposition of hands, bars the way against the return of him who was cast out. Then the salt which is put in the mouth, and the anointing of the nose and ears with spittle, signify the receiving of doctrine, as to the ears; consent thereto as to the nose; and confession thereof, as to the mouth. And the anointing with oil signifies man’s ability to fight against the demons.

Reply to Objection 1: The energumens are so-called from “laboring inwardly” under the outward operation of the devil. And though not all that approach Baptism are troubled by him in their bodies, yet all who are not baptized are subject to the power of the demons, at least on account of the guilt of original sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The power of the devil in so far as he hinders man from obtaining glory, is expelled from man by the baptismal ablution; but in so far as he hinders man from receiving the sacrament, his power is cast out by the exorcisms.

Reply to Objection 3: Holy water is used against the assaults of demons from without. But exorcisms are directed against those assaults of the demons which are from within. hence those who are exorcized are called energumens, as it were “laboring inwardly.”

Or we may say that just as Penance is given as a further remedy against sin, because Baptism is not repeated; so Holy Water is given as a further remedy against the assaults of demons, because the baptismal exorcisms are not given a second time.

Whether what is done in the exorcism effects anything, or is a mere sign?

Objection 1: It seems that what is done in the exorcism does not effect anything, but is a mere sign. For if a child die after the exorcisms, before being baptized, it is not saved. But the effects of what is done in the sacraments are ordained to the salvation of man; hence it is written (Mk. 16:16): “He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved.” Therefore what is done in the exorcism effects nothing, but is a mere sign.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is required for a sacrament of the New Law, but that it should be a sign and a cause, as stated above ([4479]Q[62], A[1]). If, therefore, the things done in the exorcism effect anything, it seems that each of them is a sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, just as the exorcism is ordained to Baptism, so if anything be effected in the exorcism, it is ordained to the effect of Baptism. But disposition must needs precede the perfect form: because form is not received save into matter already disposed. It would follow, therefore, that none could obtain the effect of Baptism unless he were previously exorcized; which is clearly false. Therefore what is done in the exorcisms has no effect.

Objection 4: Further, just as some things are done in the exorcism before Baptism, so are some things done after Baptism; for instance, the priest anoints the baptized on the top of the head. But what is done after Baptism seems to have no effect; for, if it had, the effect of Baptism would be imperfect. Therefore neither have those things an effect, which are done in exorcism before Baptism.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Symbolo I): “Little children are breathed upon and exorcized, in order to expel from them the devil’s hostile power, which deceived man.” But the Church does nothing in vain. Therefore the effect of these breathings is that the power of the devils is expelled.

I answer that, Some say that the things done in the exorcism have no effect, but are mere signs. But this is clearly false; since in exorcizing, the Church uses words of command to cast out the devil’s power, for instance, when she says: “Therefore, accursed devil, go out from him,” etc.

Therefore we must say that they have some effect, but, other than that of Baptism. For Baptism gives man grace unto the full remission of sins. But those things that are done in the exorcism remove the twofold impediment against the reception of saving grace. Of these, one is the outward impediment, so far as the demons strive to hinder man’s salvation. And this impediment is removed by the breathings, whereby the demon’s power is cast out, as appears from the passage quoted from Augustine, i.e. as to the devil not placing obstacles against the reception of the sacrament. Nevertheless, the demon’s power over man remains as to the stain of sin, and the debt of punishment, until sin be washed away by Baptism. And in this sense Cyprian says (Epist. lxxvi): “Know that the devil’s evil power remains until the pouring of the saving water: but in Baptism he loses it all.”

The other impediment is within, forasmuch as, from having contracted original sin, man’s sense is closed to the perception of the mysteries of salvation. Hence Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i) that “by means of the typifying spittle and the touch of the priest, the Divine wisdom and power brings salvation to the catechumen, that his nostrils being opened he may perceive the odor of the knowledge of God, that his ears be opened to hear the commandments of God, that his senses be opened in his inmost heart to respond.”

Reply to Objection 1: What is done in the exorcism does not take away the sin for which man is punished after death; but only the impediments against his receiving the remission of sin through the sacrament. Wherefore exorcism avails a man nothing after death if he has not been baptized.

Praepositivus, however, says that children who die after being exorcized but before being baptized are subjected to lesser darkness. But this does not seem to be true: because that darkness consists in privation of the vision of God, which cannot be greater or lesser.

Reply to Objection 2: It is essential to a sacrament to produce its principal effect, which is grace that remits sin, or supplies some defect in man. But those things that are done in the exorcism do not effect this; they merely remove these impediments. Consequently, they are not sacraments but sacramentals.

Reply to Objection 3: The disposition that suffices for receiving the baptismal grace is the faith and intention, either of the one baptized, if it be an adult, or of the Church, if it be a child. But these things that are done in the exorcism, are directed to the removal of the impediments. And therefore one may receive the effect of Baptism without them.

Yet they are not to be omitted save in a case of necessity. And then, if the danger pass, they should be supplied, that uniformity in Baptism may be observed. Nor are they supplied to no purpose after Baptism: because, just as the effect of Baptism may be hindered before it is received, so can it be hindered after it has been received.

Reply to Objection 4: Of those things that are done after Baptism in respect of the person baptized, something is done which is not a mere sign, but produces an effect, for instance, the anointing on the top of the head, the effect of which is the preservation of baptismal grace. And there is something which has no effect, but is a mere sign, for instance, the baptized are given a white garment to signify the newness of life.

Whether it belongs to a priest to catechize and exorcize the person to be baptized?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to a priest to catechize and exorcize the person to be baptized. For it belongs to the office of ministers to operate on the unclean, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But catechumens who are instructed by catechism, and "energumens" who are cleansed by exorcism, are counted among the unclean, as Dionysius says in the same place. Therefore to catechize and to exorcize do not belong to the office of the priests, but rather to that of the ministers.

Objection 2: Further, catechumens are instructed in the Faith by the Holy Scripture which is read in the church by ministers: for just as the Old Testament is recited by the Readers, so the New Testament is read by the Deacons and Subdeacons. And thus it belongs to the ministers to catechize. In like manner it belongs, seemingly, to the ministers to exorcize. For Isidore says (Epist. ad Ludifred.): "The exorcist should know the exorcisms by heart, and impose his hands on the energumens and catechumens during the exorcism." Therefore it belongs not to the priestly office to catechize and exorcize.

Objection 3: Further, "to catechize" is the same as "to teach," and this is the same as "to perfect." Now this belongs to the office of a bishop, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). Therefore it does not belong to the priestly office.

On the contrary, Pope Nicolas I says: "The catechizing of those who are to be baptized can be undertaken by the priests attached to each church."

And Gregory says (Hom. xxix super Ezech.): “When priests place their hands on believers for the grace of exorcism, what else do they but cast out the devils?”

I answer that, The minister compared to the priest, is as a secondary and instrumental agent to the principal agent: as is implied in the very word “minister.” Now the secondary agent does nothing without the principal agent in operating. And the more mighty the operation, so much the mightier instruments does the principal agent require. But the operation of the priest in conferring the sacrament itself is mightier than in those things that are preparatory to the sacrament. And so the highest ministers who are called deacons co-operate with the priest in bestowing the sacraments themselves: for Isidore says (Epist. ad Ludifred.) that “it belongs to the deacons to assist the priests in all things that are done in Christ’s sacraments, in Baptism, to wit, in the Chrism, in the Paten and Chalice”; while the inferior ministers assist the priest in those things which are preparatory to the sacraments: the readers, for instance, in catechizing; the exorcists in exorcizing.

Reply to Objection 1: The minister’s operation in regard to the unclean is ministerial and, as it were, instrumental, but the priest’s is principal.

Reply to Objection 2: To readers and exorcists belongs the duty of catechizing and exorcizing, not, indeed, principally, but as ministers of the priest in these things.

Reply to Objection 3: Instruction is manifold. one leads to the embracing of the Faith; and is ascribed by Dionysius to bishops (Eccl. Hier. ii) and can be undertaken by any preacher, or even by any believer. Another is that by which a man is taught the rudiments of faith, and how to comport himself in receiving the sacraments: this belongs secondarily to the ministers, primarily to the priests. A third is instruction in the mode of Christian life: and this belongs to the sponsors. A fourth is the instruction in the profound mysteries of faith, and on the perfection of Christian life: this belongs to bishops “ex officio,” in virtue of their office.

CONFIRMATION (Q[72])

OF THE SACRAMENT OF CONFIRMATION (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the Sacrament of Confirmation. Concerning this there are twelve points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Confirmation is a sacrament?

(2) Its matter;

(3) Whether it is essential to the sacrament that the chrism should have been previously consecrated by a bishop?

(4) Its form;

(5) Whether it imprints a character?

(6) Whether the character of Confirmation presupposes the character of Baptism?

(7) Whether it bestows grace?

(8) Who is competent to receive this sacrament?

(9) In what part of the body?

(10) Whether someone is required to stand for the person to be confirmed?

(11) Whether this sacrament is given by bishops only?

(12) Of its rite.

Whether confirmation is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that Confirmation is not a sacrament. For sacraments derive their efficacy from the Divine institution, as stated above

([4480]Q[64] , A[2]). But we read nowhere of Confirmation being instituted by Christ. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the New Law were foreshadowed in the Old Law; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:2–4), that “all in Moses were baptized, in the cloud and in the sea; and did all eat the same spiritual food, and all drank the same spiritual drink.” But Confirmation was not foreshadowed in the old Testament. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments are ordained unto man’s salvation. But man can be saved without Confirmation: since children that are baptized, who die before being confirmed, are saved. Therefore Confirmation is not a sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, by all the sacraments of the Church, man is conformed to Christ, Who is the Author of the sacraments. But man cannot be conformed to Christ by Confirmation, since we read nowhere of Christ being confirmed.

On the contrary, Pope Melchiades wrote to the bishops of Spain: “Concerning the point on which you sought to be informed, i.e. whether the imposition of the bishop’s hand were a greater sacrament than Baptism, know that each is a great sacrament.”

I answer that, The sacraments of the New Law are ordained unto special effects of grace: and therefore where there is a special effect of grace, there we find a special sacrament ordained for the purpose. But since sensible and material things bear a likeness to things spiritual and intelligible, from what occurs in the life of the body, we can perceive that which is special to the spiritual life. Now it is evident that in the life of the body a certain special perfection consists in man’s attaining to the perfect age, and being able to perform the perfect actions of a man: hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:11): “When I became a man, I put away the things of a child.” And thence it is that besides the movement of generation whereby man receives life of the body, there is the movement of growth, whereby man is brought to the perfect age. So therefore does man receive spiritual life in Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration: while in Confirmation man arrives at the perfect age, as it were, of the spiritual life. Hence Pope Melchiades says: “The Holy Ghost, Who comes down on the waters of Baptism bearing salvation in His flight, bestows at the font, the fulness of innocence; but in Confirmation He confers an increase of grace. In Baptism we are born again unto life; after Baptism we are strengthened.” And therefore it is evident that Confirmation is a special sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Concerning the institution of this sacrament there are three opinions. Some (Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol. P. IV, Q. IX; St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 7) have maintained that this sacrament was instituted neither by Christ, nor by the apostles; but later in the course of time by one of the councils. Others (Pierre de Tarentaise, Sent. iv, D, 7) held that it was instituted by the apostles. But this cannot be admitted; since the institution of a new sacrament belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone.

And therefore we must say that Christ instituted this sacrament not by bestowing, but by promising it, according to Jn. 16:7: “If I go not, the Paraclete will not come to you, but if I go, I will send Him to you.” And this was because in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy Ghost is bestowed, which was not to be given before Christ’s Resurrection and Ascension; according to Jn. 7:39: “As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.”

Reply to Objection 2: Confirmation is the sacrament of the fulness of grace: wherefore there could be nothing corresponding to it in the Old Law, since “the Law brought nothing to perfection” (Heb. 7:19).

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4481]Q[65], A[4]), all the sacraments are in some way necessary for salvation: but some, so that there is no salvation without them; some as conducing to the perfection of salvation; and thus it is that Confirmation is necessary for salvation: although salvation is possible without it, provided it be not omitted out of contempt.

Reply to Objection 4: Those who receive Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, are conformed to Christ, inasmuch as from the very first instant of His conception He was “full of grace and truth” (Jn. 1:14). This fulness was made known at His Baptism, when “the Holy Ghost descended in a bodily shape . . . upon Him” (Lk. 3:22). Hence (Lk. 4:1) it is written that “Jesus being full of the Holy Ghost, returned from the Jordan.” Nor was it fitting to Christ’s dignity, that He, Who is the Author of the sacraments, should receive the fulness of grace from a sacrament.

Whether chrism is a fitting matter for this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that chrism is not a fitting matter for this sacrament. For this sacrament, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), was instituted by Christ when He promised His disciples the Holy Ghost. But He sent them the Holy Ghost without their being anointed with chrism. Moreover, the apostles themselves bestowed this sacrament without chrism, by the mere imposition of hands: for it is written (Acts 8:17) that the apostles “laid their hands upon” those who were baptized, “and they received the Holy Ghost.” Therefore chrism is not the matter of this sacrament: since the matter is essential to the sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Confirmation perfects, in a way, the sacrament of Baptism, as stated above ([4482]Q[65], AA[3],4): and so it ought to be conformed to it as perfection to the thing perfected. But the matter, in Baptism, is a simple element, viz. water. Therefore chrism, which is made of oil and balm, is not a fitting matter for this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, oil is used as the matter of this sacrament for the purpose of anointing. But any oil will do for anointing: for instance, oil made from nuts, and from anything else. Therefore not only olive oil should be used for this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, it has been stated above ([4483]Q[66], A[3]) that water is used as the matter of Baptism, because it is easily procured everywhere. But olive oil is not to be procured everywhere; and much less is balm. Therefore chrism, which is made of these, is not a fitting matter for this sacrament.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Registr. iv): “Let no priest dare to sign the baptized infants on the brow with the sacred chrism.” Therefore chrism is the matter of this sacrament.

I answer that, Chrism is the fitting matter of this sacrament. For, as stated above [4484](A[1]), in this sacrament the fulness of the Holy Ghost is given for the spiritual strength which belongs to the perfect age. Now when man comes to perfect age he begins at once to have intercourse with others; whereas until then he lives an individual life, as it were, confined to himself. Now the grace of the Holy Ghost is signified by oil; hence Christ is said to be “anointed with the oil of gladness” (Ps. 44:8), by reason of His being gifted with the fulness of the Holy Ghost. Consequently oil is a suitable matter of this sacrament. And balm is mixed with the oil, by reason of its fragrant odor, which spreads about: hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:15): “We are the good odor of Christ,” etc. And though many other things be fragrant, yet preference is given to balm, because it has a special odor of its own, and because it confers incorruptibility: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:21): “My odor is as the purest balm.”

Reply to Objection 1: Christ, by the power which He exercises in the sacraments, bestowed on the apostles the reality of this sacrament, i.e. the fulness of the Holy Ghost, without the sacrament itself, because they had received “the first fruits of the Spirit” (Rom. 8:23). Nevertheless, something of keeping with the matter of this sacrament was displayed to the apostles in a sensible manner when they received the Holy Ghost. For that the Holy Ghost came down upon them in a sensible manner under the form of fire, refers to the same signification as oil: except in so far as fire has an active power, while oil has a passive power, as being the matter and incentive of fire. And this was quite fitting: for it was through the apostles that the grace of the Holy Ghost was to flow forth to others. Again, the Holy Ghost came down on the apostles in the shape of a tongue. Which refers to the same signification as balm: except in so far as the tongue communicates with others by speech, but balm, by its odor. because, to wit, the apostles were filled with the Holy Ghost, as teachers of the Faith; but the rest of the believers, as doing that which gives edification to the faithful.

In like manner, too, when the apostles imposed their hands, and when they preached, the fulness of the Holy Ghost came down under visible signs on the faithful, just as, at the beginning, He came down on the apostles: hence Peter said (Acts 11:15): “When I had begun to speak, the Holy Ghost fell upon them, as upon us also in the beginning.” Consequently there was no need for sacramental sensible matter, where God sent sensible signs miraculously.

However, the apostles commonly made use of chrism in bestowing the sacrament, when such like visible signs were lacking. For Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv): “There is a certain perfecting operation which our guides,” i.e. the apostles, “call the sacrifice of Chrism.”

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is bestowed that spiritual life may be received simply; wherefore simple matter is fitting to it. But this sacrament is given that we may receive the fulness of the Holy Ghost, Whose operations are manifold, according to Wis. 7:22, “In her is the” Holy “Spirit . . . one, manifold”; and 1 Cor. 12:4, “There are diversities of graces, but the same Spirit.” Consequently a compound matter is appropriate to this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: These properties of oil, by reason of which it symbolizes the Holy Ghost, are to be found in olive oil rather than in any other oil. In fact, the olive-tree itself, through being an evergreen, signifies the refreshing and merciful operation of the Holy Ghost.

Moreover, this oil is called oil properly, and is very much in use, wherever it is to be had. And whatever other liquid is so called, derives its name from its likeness to this oil: nor are the latter commonly used, unless it be to supply the want of olive oil. Therefore it is that this oil alone is used for this and certain other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 4: Baptism is the sacrament of absolute necessity; and so its matter should be at hand everywhere. But it is enough that the matter of this sacrament, which is not of such great necessity, be easily sent to all parts of the world.

Whether it is essential to this sacrament that the chrism which is its matter be previously consecrated by a bishop?

Objection 1: It seems that it is not essential to this sacrament, that the chrism, which is its matter, be previously consecrated by a bishop. For Baptism which bestows full remission of sins is not less efficacious than this sacrament. But, though the baptismal water receives a kind of blessing before being used for Baptism; yet this is not essential to the sacrament: since in a case of necessity it can be dispensed with. Therefore neither is it essential to this sacrament that the chrism should be previously consecrated by a bishop.

Objection 2: Further, the same should not be consecrated twice. But the sacramental matter is sanctified, in the very conferring of the sacrament, by the form of words wherein the sacrament is bestowed; hence Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): “The word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament.” Therefore the chrism should not be consecrated before this sacrament is given.

Objection 3: Further, every consecration employed in the sacraments is ordained to the bestowal of grace. But the sensible matter composed of oil and balm is not receptive of grace. Therefore it should not be consecrated.

On the contrary, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. ad Decent.): “Priests, when baptizing, may anoint the baptized with chrism, previously consecrated by a bishop: but they must not sign the brow with the same oil; this belongs to the bishop alone, when he gives the Paraclete.” Now this is done in this sacrament. Therefore it is necessary for this sacrament that its matter be previously consecrated by a bishop.

I answer that, The entire sanctification of the sacraments is derived from Christ, as stated above ([4485]Q[64], A[3]). But it must be observed that Christ did use certain sacraments having a corporeal matter, viz. Baptism, and also the Eucharist. And consequently, from Christ’s very act in using them, the matter of these sacraments received a certain aptitude to the perfection of the sacrament. Hence Chrysostom (Chromatius, In Matth. 3:15) says that “the waters of Baptism could never wash away the sins of believers, had they not been sanctified by contact with our Lord’s body.” And again, our Lord Himself “taking bread . . . blessed . . . and in like manner the chalice” (Mat. 26:26,27; Lk. 22:19, 20). For this reason there is no need for the matter of these sacraments to be blessed previously, since Christ’s blessing is enough. And if any blessing be used, it belongs to the solemnity of the sacrament, not to its essence. But Christ did not make use of visible anointings, so as not to slight the invisible unction whereby He was “anointed above” His “fellows” (Ps. 44:8). And hence both chrism, and the holy oil, and the oil of the sick are blessed before being put to sacramental use. This suffices for the reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Each consecration of the chrism has not the same object. For just as an instrument derives instrumental power in two ways, viz. when it receives the form of an instrument, and when it is moved by the principal agent; so too the sacramental matter needs a twofold sanctification, by one of which it becomes fit matter for the sacrament, while by the other it is applied to the production of the effect.

Reply to Objection 3: Corporeal matter is receptive of grace, not so as to be the subject of grace, but only as the instrument of grace, as explained above ([4486]Q[62], A[3]). And this sacramental matter is consecrated, either by Christ, or by a bishop, who, in the Church, impersonates Christ.

Whether the proper form of this sacrament is: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross,” etc.?

Objection 1: It seems that the proper form of this sacrament is not: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross, I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.” For the use of the sacraments is derived from Christ and the apostles. But neither did Christ institute this form, nor do we read of the apostles making use of it. Therefore it is not the proper form of this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, just as the sacrament is the same everywhere, so should the form be the same: because everything has unity, just as it has being, from its form. But this form is not used by all: for some say: “I confirm thee with the chrism of sanctification.” Therefore the above is not the proper form of this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament should be conformed to Baptism, as the perfect to the thing perfected, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]). But in the form of Baptism no mention is made of signing the character; nor again of the cross of Christ, though in Baptism man dies with Christ, as the Apostle says (Rom. 6:3–8); nor of the effect which is salvation, though Baptism is necessary for salvation. Again, in the baptismal form, only one action is included; and the person of the baptizer is expressed in the words: “I baptize thee, whereas the contrary is to be observed in the above form.” Therefore this is not the proper form of this sacrament.

On the contrary, Is the authority of the Church, who always uses this form.

I answer that, The above form is appropriate to this sacrament. For just as the form of a natural thing gives it its species, so a sacramental form should contain whatever belongs to the species of the sacrament. Now as is evident from what has been already said ([4487]AA[1],2), in this sacrament the Holy Ghost is given for strength in the spiritual combat. Wherefore in this sacrament three things are necessary; and they are contained in the above form. The first of these is the cause conferring fulness of spiritual strength which cause is the Blessed Trinity: and this is expressed in the words, “In the name of the Father,” etc. The second is the spiritual strength itself bestowed on man unto salvation by the sacrament of visible matter; and this is referred to in the words, “I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation.” The third is the sign which is given to the combatant, as in a bodily combat:

thus are soldiers marked with the sign of their leaders. And to this refer the words, “I sign thee with the sign of the cross,” in which sign, to wit, our King triumphed (cf. Col. 2:15).

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[2], ad 1), sometimes the effect of this sacrament, i.e. the fulness of the Holy Ghost, was given through the ministry of the apostles, under certain visible signs, wrought miraculously by God, Who can bestow the sacramental effect, independently of the sacrament. In these cases there was no need for either the matter or the form of this sacrament. On the other hand, sometimes they bestowed this sacrament as ministers of the sacraments. And then, they used both matter and form according to Christ’s command. For the apostles, in conferring the sacraments, observed many things which are not handed down in those Scriptures that are in general use. Hence Dionysius says at the end of his treatise on the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy (chap. vii): “It is not allowed to explain in writing the prayers which are used in the sacraments, and to publish their mystical meaning, or the power which, coming from God, gives them their efficacy; we learn these things by holy tradition without any display,”* i.e. secretly. [*The passage quoted in the text of the Summa differs slightly from the above, which is translated directly from the works of Dionysius.] Hence the Apostle, speaking of the celebration of the Eucharist, writes (1 Cor. 11:34): “The rest I will set in order, when I come.”

Reply to Objection 2: Holiness is the cause of salvation. Therefore it comes to the same whether we say “chrism of salvation” or “of sanctification.”

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is the regeneration unto the spiritual life, whereby man lives in himself. And therefore in the baptismal form that action alone is expressed which refers to the man to be sanctified. But this sacrament is ordained not only to the sanctification of man in himself, but also to strengthen him in his outward combat. Consequently not only is mention made of interior sanctification, in the words, “I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation”: but furthermore man is signed outwardly, as it were with the standard of the cross, unto the outward spiritual combat; and this is signified by the words, “I sign thee with the sign of the cross.”

But in the very word “baptize,” which signifies “to cleanse,” we can understand both the matter, which is the cleansing water, and the effect, which is salvation. Whereas these are not understood by the word "confirm"; and consequently they had to be expressed.

Again, it has been said above (Q[66], A[5], ad 1) that the pronoun "I" is not necessary to the Baptismal form, because it is included in the first person of the verb. It is, however, included in order to express the intention. But this does not seem so necessary in Confirmation, which is conferred only by a minister of excellence, as we shall state later on [4488](A[11]).

Whether the sacrament of Confirmation imprints a character?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacrament of Confirmation does not imprint a character. For a character means a distinctive sign. But a man is not distinguished from unbelievers by the sacrament of Confirmation, for this is the effect of Baptism; nor from the rest of the faithful, because this sacrament is ordained to the spiritual combat, which is enjoined to all the faithful. Therefore a character is not imprinted in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4489]Q[63], A[2]) that a character is a spiritual power. Now a power must be either active or passive. But the active power in the sacraments is conferred by the sacrament of order: while the passive or receptive power is conferred by the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore no character is imprinted by the sacrament of Confirmation.

Objection 3: Further, in circumcision, which is a character of the body, no spiritual character is imprinted. But in this sacrament a character is imprinted on the body, when the sign of the cross is signed with chrism on man's brow. Therefore a spiritual character is not imprinted by this sacrament.

On the contrary, A character is imprinted in every sacrament that is not repeated. But this sacrament is not repeated: for Gregory II says (Ep. iv ad Bonifac.): "As to the man who was confirmed a second time by a bishop, such a repetition must be forbidden." Therefore a character is imprinted in Confirmation.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[63], A[2]), a character is a spiritual power ordained to certain sacred actions. Now it has been said above [4490](A[1]; Q[65], A[1]) that, just as Baptism is a spiritual regeneration unto Christian life, so also is Confirmation a certain spiritual growth bringing man to perfect spiritual age. But it is evident, from a comparison with the life of the body, that the action which is proper to man immediately after birth, is different from the action which is proper to him when he has come to perfect age. And therefore by the sacrament of Confirmation man is given a spiritual power in respect of sacred actions other than those in respect of which he receives power in Baptism. For in Baptism he receives power to do those things which pertain to his own salvation, forasmuch as he lives to himself: whereas in Confirmation he receives power to do those things which pertain to the spiritual combat with the enemies of the Faith. This is evident from the example of the apostles, who, before they received the fulness of the Holy Ghost, were in the "upper room . . . persevering . . . in prayer" (Acts 1:13,14); whereas afterwards they went out and feared not to confess their faith in public, even in the face of the enemies of the Christian Faith. And therefore it is evident that a character is imprinted in the sacrament of Confirmation.

Reply to Objection 1: All have to wage the spiritual combat with our invisible enemies. But to fight against visible foes, viz. against the persecutors of the Faith, by confessing Christ's name, belongs to the confirmed, who have already come spiritually to the age of virility, according to 1 Jn. 2:14: "I write unto you, young men, because you are strong, and the word of God abideth in you, and you have overcome the wicked one." And therefore the character of Confirmation is a distinctive sign, not between unbelievers and believers, but between those who are grown up spiritually and those of whom it is written: "As new-born babes" (1 Pet. 2:2).

Reply to Objection 2: All the sacraments are protestations of faith. Therefore just as he who is baptized receives the power of testifying to his faith by receiving the other sacraments; so he who is confirmed receives the power of publicly confessing his faith by words, as it were "ex officio."

Reply to Objection 3: The sacraments of the Old Law are called "justice of the flesh" (Heb. 9:10) because, to wit, they wrought nothing inwardly. Consequently in circumcision a character was imprinted in the body only, but not in the soul. But in Confirmation, since it is a sacrament of the New Law, a spiritual character is imprinted at the same time, together with the bodily character.

Whether the character of Confirmation presupposes of necessity, the baptismal character?

Objection 1: It seems that the character of Confirmation does not presuppose, of necessity, the baptismal character. For the sacrament of Confirmation is ordained to the public confession of the Faith of Christ. But many, even before Baptism, have publicly confessed the Faith of Christ by shedding their blood for the Faith. Therefore the character of Confirmation does not presuppose the baptismal character.

Objection 2: Further, it is not related of the apostles that they were baptized; especially, since it is written (Jn. 4:2) that Christ "Himself did not baptize, but His disciples." Yet afterwards they were confirmed by the coming of the Holy Ghost. Therefore, in like manner, others can be confirmed before being baptized.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Acts 10:44–48) that "while Peter was yet speaking . . . the Holy Ghost fell on all them that heard the word . . . and [Vulg.: 'for'] they heard them speaking with tongues": and afterwards "he commanded them to be baptized." Therefore others with equal reason can be confirmed before being baptized.

On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): "Lastly the Paraclete is given to the baptized by the imposition of the high priest's hands, in order that the baptized may be strengthened by the Holy Ghost so as to publish his faith."

I answer that, The character of Confirmation, of necessity supposes the baptismal character: so that, in effect, if one who is not baptized were to be confirmed, he would receive nothing, but would have to be confirmed again after receiving Baptism. The reason of this is that, Confirmation is to Baptism as growth to birth, as is evident from what has been said above [4491](A[1]; Q[65], A[1]). Now it is clear that no one can be brought to perfect age unless he be first born: and in like manner, unless a man be first baptized, he cannot receive the sacrament of Confirmation.

Reply to Objection 1: The Divine power is not confined to the sacraments. Hence man can receive spiritual strength to confess the Faith of Christ publicly, without receiving the sacrament of Confirmation: just as he can also receive remission of sins without Baptism. Yet, just as none receive the effect of Baptism without the desire of Baptism; so none receive the effect of Confirmation, without the desire of Confirmation. And man can have this even before receiving Baptism.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Ep. cclxv), from our Lord's words, "'He that is washed, needeth not but to wash his feet' (Jn. 13:10), we gather that Peter and Christ's other disciples had been baptized, either with John's Baptism, as some think; or with Christ's, which is more credible. For He did not refuse to administer Baptism, so as to have servants by whom to baptize others."

Reply to Objection 3: Those who heard the preaching of Peter received the effect of Confirmation miraculously: but not the sacrament of Confirmation. Now it has been stated (ad 1) that the effect of Confirmation can be bestowed on man before Baptism, whereas the sacrament cannot. For just as the effect of Confirmation, which is spiritual strength, presupposes the effect of Baptism, which is justification, so the sacrament of Confirmation presupposes the sacrament of Baptism.

Whether sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that sanctifying grace is not bestowed in this sacrament. For sanctifying grace is ordained against sin. But this sacrament, as stated above [4492](A[6]) is given only to the baptized, who are cleansed from sin. Therefore sanctifying grace is not bestowed in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, sinners especially need sanctifying grace, by which alone can they be justified. If, therefore, sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament, it seems that it should be given to those who are in sin. And yet this is not true.

Objection 3: Further, there can only be one species of sanctifying grace, since it is ordained to one effect. But two forms of the same species cannot be in the same subject. Since, therefore, man receives sanctifying grace in Baptism, it seems that sanctifying grace is not bestowed in Confirmation, which is given to none but the baptized.

On the contrary, Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Episc. Hispan.): "The Holy Ghost bestows at the font the fulness of innocence; but in Confirmation He confers an increase of grace."

I answer that, In this sacrament, as stated above ([4493]AA[1],4), the Holy Ghost is given to the baptized for strength: just as He was given to the apostles on the day of Pentecost, as we read in Acts 2; and just as He was given to the baptized by the imposition of the apostles’ hands, as related in Acts 8:17. Now it has been proved in the [4494]FP, Q[43], A[3] that the Holy Ghost is not sent or given except with sanctifying grace. Consequently it is evident that sanctifying grace is bestowed in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Sanctifying grace does indeed take away sin; but it has other effects also, because it suffices to carry man through every step as far as eternal life. Hence to Paul was it said (2 Cor. 12:9): “My grace is sufficient for thee”: and he says of himself (1 Cor. 15:10): “By the grace of God I am what I am.” Therefore sanctifying grace is given not only for the remission of sin, but also for growth and stability in righteousness. And thus is it bestowed in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Further, as appears from its very name, this sacrament is given in order “to confirm” what it finds already there. And consequently it should not be given to those who are not in a state of grace. For this reason, just as it is not given to the unbaptized, so neither should it be given to the adult sinners, except they be restored by Penance. Wherefore was it decreed in the Council of Orleans (Can. iii) that “men should come to Confirmation fasting; and should be admonished to confess their sins first, so that being cleansed they may be able to receive the gift of the Holy Ghost.” And then this sacrament perfects the effects of Penance, as of Baptism: because by the grace which he has received in this sacrament, the penitent will obtain fuller remission of his sin. And if any adult approach, being in a state of sin of which he is not conscious or for which he is not perfectly contrite, he will receive the remission of his sins through the grace bestowed in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4495]Q[62], A[2]), the sacramental grace adds to the sanctifying grace taken in its wide sense, something that produces a special effect, and to which the sacrament is ordained. If, then, we consider, in its wide sense, the grace bestowed in this sacrament, it does not differ from that bestowed in Baptism, but increases what was already there. On the other hand, if we consider it as to that which is added over and above, then one differs in species from the other.

Whether this sacrament should be given to all?

Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament should not be given to all. For this sacrament is given in order to confer a certain excellence, as stated above (A[11], ad 2). But all are not suited for that which belongs to excellence. Therefore this sacrament should not be given to all.

Objection 2: Further, by this sacrament man advances spiritually to perfect age. But perfect age is inconsistent with childhood. Therefore at least it should not be given to children.

Objection 3: Further, as Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Episc. Hispan.) “after Baptism we are strengthened for the combat.” But women are incompetent to combat, by reason of the frailty of their sex. Therefore neither should women receive this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Episc. Hispan.): “Although the benefit of Regeneration suffices for those who are on the point of death, yet the graces of Confirmation are necessary for those who are to conquer. Confirmation arms and strengthens those to whom the struggles and combats of this world are reserved. And he who comes to die, having kept unsullied the innocence he acquired in Baptism, is confirmed by death; for after death he can sin no more.” Therefore this sacrament should not be given to those who are on the point of death: and so it should not be given to all.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 2:2) that the Holy Ghost in coming, “filled the whole house,” whereby the Church is signified; and afterwards it is added that “they were all filled with the Holy Ghost.” But this sacrament is given that we may receive that fulness. Therefore it should be given to all who belong to the Church.

I answer that, As stated above [4496](A[1]), man is spiritually advanced by this sacrament to perfect age. Now the intention of nature is that everyone born corporally, should come to perfect age: yet this is sometimes hindered by reason of the corruptibility of the body, which is forestalled by death. But much more is it God’s intention to bring all things to perfection, since nature shares in this intention inasmuch as it reflects Him: hence it is written (Dt. 32:4): “The works of God are perfect.” Now the soul, to which spiritual birth and perfect spiritual age belong, is immortal; and just as it can in old age attain to spiritual birth, so can it attain to perfect (spiritual) age in youth or childhood; because the various ages of the body do not affect the soul. Therefore this sacrament should be given to all.

Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament is given in order to confer a certain excellence, not indeed, like the sacrament of order, of one man over another, but of man in regard to himself: thus the same man, when arrived at maturity, excels himself as he was when a boy.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, the age of the body does not affect the soul. Consequently even in childhood man can attain to the perfection of spiritual age, of which it is written (Wis. 4:8): “Venerable old age is not that of long time, nor counted by the number of years.” And hence it is that many children, by reason of the strength of the Holy Ghost which they had received, fought bravely for Christ even to the shedding of their blood.

Reply to Objection 3: As Chrysostom says (Hom. i De Machab.), “in earthly contests fitness of age, physique and rank are required; and consequently slaves, women, old men, and boys are debarred from taking part therein. But in the heavenly combats, the Stadium is open equally to all, to every age, and to either sex.” Again, he says (Hom. de Militia Spirit.): “In God’s eyes even women fight, for many a woman has waged the spiritual warfare with the courage of a man. For some have rivaled men in the courage with which they have suffered martyrdom; and some indeed have shown themselves stronger than men.” Therefore this sacrament should be given to women.

Reply to Objection 4: As we have already observed, the soul, to which spiritual age belongs, is immortal. Wherefore this sacrament should be given to those on the point of death, that they may be seen to be perfect at the resurrection, according to Eph. 4:13: “Until we all meet into the unity of faith . . . unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ.” And hence Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii), “It would be altogether hazardous, if anyone happened to go forth from this life without being confirmed”: not that such a one would be lost, except perhaps through contempt; but that this would be detrimental to his perfection. And therefore even children dying after Confirmation obtain greater glory, just as here below they receive more grace. The passage quoted is to be taken in the sense that, with regard to the dangers of the present combat, those who are on the point of death do not need this sacrament.

Whether this sacrament should be given to man on the forehead?

Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament should not be given to man on the forehead. For this sacrament perfects Baptism, as stated above ([4497]Q[65], AA[3],4). But the sacrament of Baptism is given to man over his whole body. Therefore this sacrament should not be given on the forehead only.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is given for spiritual strength, as stated above ([4498]AA[1],2,4). But spiritual strength is situated principally in the heart. Therefore this sacrament should be given over the heart rather than on the forehead.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is given to man that he may freely confess the faith of Christ. But "with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation," according to Rom. 10:10. Therefore this sacrament should be given about the mouth rather than on the forehead.

On the contrary, Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i): "The baptized is signed by the priest with chrism on the top of the head, but by the bishop on the forehead."

I answer that, As stated above ([4499]AA[1],4), in this sacrament man receives the Holy Ghost for strength in the spiritual combat, that he may bravely confess the Faith of Christ even in face of the enemies of that Faith. Wherefore he is fittingly signed with the sign of the cross on the forehead, with chrism, for two reasons. First, because he is signed with the sign of the cross, as a soldier with the sign of his leader, which should be evident and manifest. Now, the forehead, which is hardly ever covered, is the most conspicuous part of the human body. Wherefore the confirmed is anointed with chrism on the forehead, that he may show publicly that he is a Christian: thus too the apostles after receiving the Holy Ghost showed themselves in public, whereas before they remained hidden in the upper room.

Secondly, because man is hindered from freely confessing Christ's name, by two things—by fear and by shame. Now both these things betray themselves principally on the forehead on account of the proximity of the imagination, and because the (vital) spirits mount directly from the heart to the forehead: hence "those who are ashamed, blush, and those who are afraid, pale" (Ethic. iv). And therefore man is signed with chrism, that neither fear nor shame may hinder him from confessing the name of Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: By baptism we are regenerated unto spiritual life, which belongs to the whole man. But in Confirmation we are strengthened for the combat; the sign of which should be borne on the forehead, as in a conspicuous place.

Reply to Objection 2: The principle of fortitude is in the heart, but its sign appears on the forehead: wherefore it is written (Ezech. 3:8): “Behold I have made . . . thy forehead harder than their foreheads.” Hence the sacrament of the Eucharist, whereby man is confirmed in himself, belongs to the heart, according to Ps. 103:15: “That bread may strengthen man’s heart.” But the sacrament of Confirmation is required as a sign of fortitude against others; and for this reason it is given on the forehead.

Reply to Objection 3: This sacrament is given that we may confess freely: but not that we may confess simply, for this is also the effect of Baptism. And therefore it should not be given on the mouth, but on the forehead, where appear the signs of those passions which hinder free confession.

Whether he who is confirmed needs one to stand* for him? [*Literally, “to hold him”]

Objection 1: It seems that he who is confirmed needs no one to stand for him. For this sacrament is given not only to children but also to adults. But adults can stand for themselves. Therefore it is absurd that someone else should stand for them.

Objection 2: Further, he that belongs already to the Church, has free access to the prince of the Church, i.e. the bishop. But this sacrament, as stated above [4500](A[6]), is given only to one that is baptized, who is already a member of the Church. Therefore it seems that he should not be brought by another to the bishop in order to receive this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is given for spiritual strength, which has more vigor in men than in women, according to Prov. 31:10: “Who shall find a valiant woman?” Therefore at least a woman should not stand for a man in confirmation.

On the contrary, Are the following words of Pope Innocent, which are to be found in the Decretals (XXX, Q[4]): “If anyone raise the children of another’s marriage from the sacred font, or stand for them in Confirmation,” etc. Therefore, just as someone is required as sponsor of one who is baptized, so is someone required to stand for him who is to be confirmed .

I answer that, As stated above ([4501]AA[1],4,9), this sacrament is given to man for strength in the spiritual combat. Now, just as one newly born requires someone to teach him things pertaining to ordinary conduct, according to Heb. 12:9: “We have had fathers of our flesh, for instructors, and we obeyed [Vulg.: ‘reverenced’]” them; so they who are chosen for the fight need instructors by whom they are informed of things concerning the conduct of the battle, and hence in earthly wars, generals and captains are appointed to the command of the others. For this reason he also who receives this sacrament, has someone to stand for him, who, as it were, has to instruct him concerning the fight.

Likewise, since this sacrament bestows on man the perfection of spiritual age, as stated above ([4502]AA[2],5), therefore he who approaches this sacrament is upheld by another, as being spiritually a weakling and a child.

Reply to Objection 1: Although he who is confirmed, be adult in body, nevertheless he is not yet spiritually adult.

Reply to Objection 2: Though he who is baptized is made a member of the Church, nevertheless he is not yet enrolled as a Christian soldier. And therefore he is brought to the bishop, as to the commander of the army, by one who is already enrolled as a Christian soldier. For one who is not yet confirmed should not stand for another in Confirmation.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Col. 3 *(Gal. 3:28), “in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female.” Consequently it matters not whether a man or a woman stand for one who is to be confirmed.

Whether only a bishop can confer this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that not only a bishop can confer this sacrament. For Gregory (Regist. iv), writing to Bishop Januarius, says: “We hear that some were scandalized because we forbade priests to anoint with chrism those who have been baptized. Yet in doing this we followed the ancient custom of our Church: but if this trouble some so very much we permit priests, where no bishop is to be had, to anoint the baptized on the forehead with chrism.” But that which is essential to the sacraments should not be changed for the purpose of avoiding scandal. Therefore it seems that it is not essential to this sacrament that it be conferred by a bishop.

Objection 2: Further, the sacrament of Baptism seems to be more efficacious than the sacrament of Confirmation: since it bestows full remission of sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment, whereas this sacrament does not. But a simple priest, in virtue of his office, can give the sacrament of Baptism: and in a case of necessity anyone, even without orders, can baptize. Therefore it is not essential to this sacrament that it be conferred by a bishop.

Objection 3: Further, the top of the head, where according to medical men the reason is situated (i.e. the "particular reason," which is called the "cogitative faculty"), is more noble than the forehead, which is the site of the imagination. But a simple priest can anoint the baptized with chrism on the top of the head. Therefore much more can he anoint them with chrism on the forehead, which belongs to this sacrament.

On the contrary, Pope Eusebius (Ep. iii ad Ep. Tusc.) says: "The sacrament of the imposition of the hand should be held in great veneration, and can be given by none but the high priests. Nor is it related or known to have been conferred in apostolic times by others than the apostles themselves; nor can it ever be either licitly or validly performed by others than those who stand in their place. And if anyone presume to do otherwise, it must be considered null and void; nor will such a thing ever be counted among the sacraments of the Church." Therefore it is essential to this sacrament, which is called "the sacrament of the imposition of the hand," that it be given by a bishop.

I answer that, In every work the final completion is reserved to the supreme act or power; thus the preparation of the matter belongs to the lower craftsmen, the higher gives the form, but the highest of all is he to whom pertains the use, which is the end of things made by art; thus also the letter which is written by the clerk, is signed by his employer. Now the faithful of Christ are a Divine work, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: "You are God's building"; and they are also "an epistle," as it were, "written with the Spirit of God," according to 2 Cor. 3:2,3. And this sacrament of Confirmation is, as it were, the final completion of the sacrament of Baptism; in the sense that by Baptism man is built up into a spiritual dwelling, and is written like a spiritual letter; whereas by the sacrament of

Confirmation, like a house already built, he is consecrated as a temple of the Holy Ghost, and as a letter already written, is signed with the sign of the cross. Therefore the conferring of this sacrament is reserved to bishops, who possess supreme power in the Church: just as in the primitive Church, the fulness of the Holy Ghost was given by the apostles, in whose place the bishops stand (Acts 8). Hence Pope Urban I says: “All the faithful should. after Baptism, receive the Holy Ghost by the imposition of the bishop’s hand, that they may become perfect Christians.”

Reply to Objection 1: The Pope has the plenitude of power in the Church, in virtue of which he can commit to certain lower orders things that belong to the higher orders: thus he allows priests to confer minor orders, which belong to the episcopal power. And in virtue of this fulness of power the Pope, Blessed Gregory, allowed simple priests to confer this sacrament, so long as the scandal was ended.

Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of Baptism is more efficacious than this sacrament as to the removal of evil, since it is a spiritual birth, that consists in change from non-being to being. But this sacrament is more efficacious for progress in good; since it is a spiritual growth from imperfect being to perfect being. And hence this sacrament is committed to a more worthy minister.

Reply to Objection 3: As Rabanus says (De Instit. Cleric. i), “the baptized is signed by the priest with chrism on the top of the head, but by the bishop on the forehead; that the former unction may symbolize the descent of the Holy Ghost on hint, in order to consecrate a dwelling to God: and that the second also may teach us that the sevenfold grace of the same Holy Ghost descends on man with all fulness of sanctity, knowledge and virtue.” Hence this unction is reserved to bishops, not on account of its being applied to a more worthy part of the body, but by reason of its having a more powerful effect.

Whether the rite of this sacrament is appropriate?

Objection 1: It seems that the rite of this sacrament is not appropriate. For the sacrament of Baptism is of greater necessity than this, as stated above (A[2], ad 4;[4503] Q[65], AA[3],4). But certain seasons are fixed for

Baptism, viz. Easter and Pentecost. Therefore some fixed time of the year should be chosen for this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, just as this sacrament requires devotion both in the giver and in the receiver, so also does the sacrament of Baptism. But in the sacrament of Baptism it is not necessary that it should be received or given fasting. Therefore it seems unfitting for the Council of Orleans to declare that "those who come to Confirmation should be fasting"; and the Council of Meaux, "that bishops should not give the Holy Ghost with imposition of the hand except they be fasting."

Objection 3: Further, chrism is a sign of the fulness of the Holy Ghost, as stated above [4504](A[2]). But the fulness of the Holy Ghost was given to Christ's faithful on the day of Pentecost, as related in Acts 2:1. Therefore the chrism should be mixed and blessed on the day of Pentecost rather than on Maundy Thursday.

On the contrary, Is the use of the Church, who is governed by the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, Our Lord promised His faithful (Mat. 18:20) saying: "Where there are two or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them." And therefore we must hold firmly that the Church's ordinations are directed by the wisdom of Christ. And for this reason we must look upon it as certain that the rite observed by the Church, in this and the other sacraments, is appropriate.

Reply to Objection 1: As Pope Melchiades says (Ep. ad Epis. Hispan.), "these two sacraments," viz. Baptism and Confirmation, "are so closely connected that they can nowise be separated save by death intervening, nor can one be duly celebrated without the other." Consequently the same seasons are fixed for the solemn celebration of Baptism and of this sacrament. But since this sacrament is given only by bishops, who are not always present where priests are baptizing, it was necessary, as regards the common use, to defer the sacrament of Confirmation to other seasons also.

Reply to Objection 2: The sick and those in danger of death are exempt from this prohibition, as we read in the decree of the Council of Meaux. And therefore, on account of the multitude of the faithful, and on account of imminent dangers, it is allowed for this sacrament, which can be given by none but a bishop, to be given or received even by those who are not fasting: since one bishop, especially in a large diocese, would not suffice to confirm all, if he were confined to certain times. But where it can be done conveniently, it is more becoming that both giver and receiver should be fasting.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the acts of the Council of Pope Martin, “it was lawful at all times to prepare the chrism.” But since solemn Baptism, for which chrism has to be used, is celebrated on Easter Eve, it was rightly decreed, that chrism should be consecrated by the bishop two days beforehand, that it may be sent to the various parts of the diocese. Moreover, this day is sufficiently appropriate to the blessing of sacramental matter, since thereon was the Eucharist instituted, to which, in a certain way, all the other sacraments are ordained, as stated above ([4505]Q[65], A[3]).

OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the sacrament of the Eucharist; and first of all we treat of the sacrament itself; secondly, of its matter; thirdly, of its form; fourthly, of its effects; fifthly, of the recipients of this sacrament; sixthly, of the minister; seventhly, of the rite.

Under the first heading there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament?

(2) Whether it is one or several sacraments?

(3) Whether it is necessary for salvation?

(4) Its names;

(5) Its institution;

(6) Its figures.

Whether the Eucharist is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the Eucharist is not a sacrament. For two sacraments ought not to be ordained for the same end, because every sacrament is efficacious in producing its effect. Therefore, since both Confirmation and the Eucharist are ordained for perfection, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv), it seems that the Eucharist is not a sacrament, since

Confirmation is one, as stated above ([4506]Q[65], A[1];[4507] Q[72], A[1]).

Objection 2: Further, in every sacrament of the New Law, that which comes visibly under our senses causes the invisible effect of the sacrament, just as cleansing with water causes the baptismal character and spiritual cleansing, as stated above ([4508]Q[63], A[6];[4509] Q[66], AA[1],3,7). But the species of bread and wine, which are the objects of our senses in this sacrament, neither produce Christ's true body, which is both reality and sacrament, nor His mystical body, which is the reality only in the Eucharist. Therefore, it seems that the Eucharist is not a sacrament of the New Law.

Objection 3: Further, sacraments of the New Law, as having matter, are perfected by the use of the matter, as Baptism is by ablution, and Confirmation by signing with chrism. If, then, the Eucharist be a sacrament, it would be perfected by the use of the matter, and not by its consecration. But this is manifestly false, because the words spoken in the consecration of the matter are the form of this sacrament, as will be shown later on ([4510]Q[78], A[1]). Therefore the Eucharist is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, It is said in the Collect [*Postcommunion "pro vivis et defunctis"]: "May this Thy Sacrament not make us deserving of punishment."

I answer that, The Church's sacraments are ordained for helping man in the spiritual life. But the spiritual life is analogous to the corporeal, since corporeal things bear a resemblance to spiritual. Now it is clear that just as generation is required for corporeal life, since thereby man receives life; and growth, whereby man is brought to maturity: so likewise food is required for the preservation of life. Consequently, just as for the spiritual life there had to be Baptism, which is spiritual generation; and Confirmation, which is spiritual growth: so there needed to be the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is spiritual food.

Reply to Objection 1: Perfection is twofold. The first lies within man himself; and he attains it by growth: such perfection belongs to Confirmation. The other is the perfection which comes to man from the addition of food, or clothing, or something of the kind; and such is the perfection befitting the Eucharist, which is the spiritual refreshment.

Reply to Objection 2: The water of Baptism does not cause any spiritual effect by reason of the water, but by reason of the power of the Holy Ghost, which power is in the water. Hence on Jn. 5:4, “An angel of the Lord at certain times,” etc., Chrysostom observes: “The water does not act simply as such upon the baptized, but when it receives the grace of the Holy Ghost, then it looses all sins.” But the true body of Christ. bears the same relation to the species of the bread and wine, as the power of the Holy Ghost does to the water of Baptism: hence the species of the bread and wine produce no effect except from the virtue of Christ’s true body.

Reply to Objection 3: A sacrament is so termed because it contains something sacred. Now a thing can be styled sacred from two causes; either absolutely, or in relation to something else. The difference between the Eucharist and other sacraments having sensible matter is that whereas the Eucharist contains something which is sacred absolutely, namely, Christ’s own body; the baptismal water contains something which is sacred in relation to something else, namely, the sanctifying power: and the same holds good of chrism and such like. Consequently, the sacrament of the Eucharist is completed in the very consecration of the matter, whereas the other sacraments are completed in the application of the matter for the sanctifying of the individual. And from this follows another difference. For, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, what is both reality and sacrament is in the matter itself. but what is reality only, namely, the grace bestowed, is in the recipient; whereas in Baptism both are in the recipient, namely, the character, which is both reality and sacrament, and the grace of pardon of sins, which is reality only. And the same holds good of the other sacraments.

Whether the Eucharist is one sacrament or several?

Objection 1: It seems that the Eucharist is not one sacrament but several, because it is said in the Collect [*Postcommunion “pro vivis et defunctis”]: “May the sacraments which we have received purify us, O Lord”: and this is said on account of our receiving the Eucharist. Consequently the Eucharist is not one sacrament but several.

Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for genera to be multiplied without the species being multiplied: thus it is impossible for one man to be many animals. But, as stated above ([4511]Q[60], A[1]), sign is the genus of sacrament. Since, then, there are more signs than one, to wit, bread and wine, it seems to follow that here must be more sacraments than one.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is perfected in the consecration of the matter, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But in this sacrament there is a double consecration of the matter. Therefore, it is a twofold sacrament.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:17): “For we, being many, are one bread, one body, all that partake of one bread”: from which it is clear that the Eucharist is the sacrament of the Church’s unity. But a sacrament bears the likeness of the reality whereof it is the sacrament. Therefore the Eucharist is one sacrament.

I answer that, As stated in Metaph. v, a thing is said to be one, not only from being indivisible, or continuous, but also when it is complete; thus we speak of one house, and one man. A thing is one in perfection, when it is complete through the presence of all that is needed for its end; as a man is complete by having all the members required for the operation of his soul, and a house by having all the parts needful for dwelling therein. And so this sacrament is said to be one. Because it is ordained for spiritual refreshment, which is conformed to corporeal refreshment. Now there are two things required for corporeal refreshment, namely, food, which is dry sustenance, and drink, which is wet sustenance. Consequently, two things concur for the integrity of this sacrament, to wit, spiritual food and spiritual drink, according to John: “My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed.” Therefore, this sacrament is materially many, but formally and perfectively one.

Reply to Objection 1: The same Collect at first employs the plural: “May the sacraments which we have received purify us”; and afterwards the singular number: “May this sacrament of Thine not make us worthy of punishment”: so as to show that this sacrament is in a measure several, yet simply one.

Reply to Objection 2: The bread and wine are materially several signs, yet formally and perfectively one, inasmuch as one refreshment is prepared therefrom.

Reply to Objection 3: From the double consecration of the matter no more can be gathered than that the sacrament is several materially, as stated above.

Whether the Eucharist is necessary for salvation?

Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament is necessary for salvation. For our Lord said (Jn. 6:54): “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you.” But Christ’s flesh is eaten and His blood drunk in this sacrament. Therefore, without this sacrament man cannot have the health of spiritual life.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is a kind of spiritual food. But bodily food is requisite for bodily health. Therefore, also is this sacrament, for spiritual health.

Objection 3: Further, as Baptism is the sacrament of our Lord’s Passion, without which there is no salvation, so also is the Eucharist. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:26): “For as often as you shall eat this bread, and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord, until He come.” Consequently, as Baptism is necessary for salvation, so also is this sacrament.

On the contrary, Augustine writes (Ad Bonifac. contra Pelag. I): “Nor are you to suppose that children cannot possess life, who are deprived of the body and blood of Christ.”

I answer that, Two things have to be considered in this sacrament, namely, the sacrament itself, and what is contained in it. Now it was stated above (A[1], OBJ[2]) that the reality of the sacrament is the unity of the mystical body, without which there can be no salvation; for there is no entering into salvation outside the Church, just as in the time of the deluge there was none outside the Ark, which denotes the Church, according to 1 Pet. 3:20,21. And it has been said above ([4512]Q[68], A[2]), that before receiving a sacrament, the reality of the sacrament can be had through the very desire of receiving the sacrament. Accordingly, before actual reception of this sacrament, a man can obtain salvation through the desire of receiving it, just as he can before Baptism through the desire of Baptism, as stated above ([4513]Q[68], A[2]). Yet there is a difference in two respects. First of all, because Baptism is the beginning of the spiritual life, and the door of the sacraments; whereas the Eucharist is, as it were, the consummation of the spiritual life, and the end of all the sacraments, as was observed above ([4514]Q[63], A[6]): for by the hallowings of all the sacraments preparation is made for receiving or consecrating the Eucharist. Consequently, the reception of Baptism is necessary for starting the spiritual life, while the receiving of the Eucharist is requisite for its consummation; by partaking not indeed actually, but in desire, as an end is possessed in desire and intention. Another difference is because by Baptism a man is ordained to the Eucharist, and therefore from the fact of children being baptized, they are destined by the Church to the Eucharist; and just as they believe through the Church's faith, so they desire the Eucharist through the Church's intention, and, as a result, receive its reality. But they are not disposed for Baptism by any previous sacrament, and consequently before receiving Baptism, in no way have they Baptism in desire; but adults alone have: consequently, they cannot have the reality of the sacrament without receiving the sacrament itself. Therefore this sacrament is not necessary for salvation in the same way as Baptism is.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says, explaining Jn. 6:54, "This food and this drink," namely, of His flesh and blood: "He would have us understand the fellowship of His body and members, which is the Church in His predestinated, and called, and justified, and glorified, His holy and believing ones." Hence, as he says in his Epistle to Boniface (Pseudo-Beda, in 1 Cor. 10:17): "No one should entertain the slightest doubt, that then every one of the faithful becomes a partaker of the body and blood of Christ, when in Baptism he is made a member of Christ's body; nor is he deprived of his share in that body and chalice even though he depart from this world in the unity of Christ's body, before he eats that bread and drinks of that chalice."

Reply to Objection 2: The difference between corporeal and spiritual food lies in this, that the former is changed into the substance of the person nourished, and consequently it cannot avail for supporting life except it be partaken of; but spiritual food changes man into itself, according to that saying of Augustine (Confess. vii), that he heard the voice of Christ as it were saying to him: "Nor shalt thou change Me into thyself, as food of thy flesh, but thou shalt be changed into Me." But one can be changed into Christ, and be incorporated in Him by mental desire, even without receiving this sacrament. And consequently the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is the sacrament of Christ's death and Passion, according as a man is born anew in Christ in virtue of His Passion; but the Eucharist is the sacrament of Christ's Passion according as a man is made perfect in union with Christ Who suffered. Hence, as Baptism is called the sacrament of Faith, which is the foundation of the spiritual life, so the Eucharist is termed the sacrament of Charity, which is "the bond of perfection" (Col. 3:14).

Whether this sacrament is suitably called by various names?

Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament is not suitably called by various names. For names should correspond with things. But this sacrament is one, as stated above [4515](A[2]). Therefore, it ought not to be called by various names.

Objection 2: Further, a species is not properly denominated by what is common to the whole genus. But the Eucharist is a sacrament of the New Law; and it is common to all the sacraments for grace to be conferred by them, which the name "Eucharist" denotes, for it is the same thing as "good grace." Furthermore, all the sacraments bring us help on our journey through this present life, which is the notion conveyed by "Viaticum." Again something sacred is done in all the sacraments, which belongs to the notion of "Sacrifice"; and the faithful intercommunicate through all the sacraments, which this Greek word {Synaxis} and the Latin "Communio" express. Therefore, these names are not suitably adapted to this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, a host [*From Latin "hostia," a victim] seems to be the same as a sacrifice. Therefore, as it is not properly called a sacrifice, so neither is it properly termed a "Host."

On the contrary, is the use of these expressions by the faithful.

I answer that, This sacrament has a threefold significance. one with regard to the past, inasmuch as it is commemorative of our Lord's Passion, which was a true sacrifice, as stated above ([4516]Q[48], A[3]), and in this respect it is called a "Sacrifice."

With regard to the present it has another meaning, namely, that of Ecclesiastical unity, in which men are aggregated through this Sacrament; and in this respect it is called "Communion" or {Synaxis}. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that "it is called Communion because we communicate with Christ through it, both because we partake of His flesh and Godhead, and because we communicate with and are united to one another through it."

With regard to the future it has a third meaning, inasmuch as this sacrament foreshadows the Divine fruition, which shall come to pass in heaven; and according to this it is called “Viaticum,” because it supplies the way of winning thither. And in this respect it is also called the “Eucharist,” that is, “good grace,” because “the grace of God is life everlasting” (Rom. 6:23); or because it really contains Christ, Who is “full of grace.”

In Greek, moreover, it is called {Metalepsis}, i.e. “Assumption,” because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv), “we thereby assume the Godhead of the Son.”

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to hinder the same thing from being called by several names, according to its various properties or effects.

Reply to Objection 2: What is common to all the sacraments is attributed antonomastically to this one on account of its excellence.

Reply to Objection 3: This sacrament is called a “Sacrifice” inasmuch as it represents the Passion of Christ; but it is termed a “Host” inasmuch as it contains Christ, Who is “a host (Douay: ‘sacrifice’) . . . of sweetness” (Eph. 5:2).

Whether the institution of this sacrament was appropriate?

Objection 1: It seems that the institution of this sacrament was not appropriate, because as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii): “We are nourished by the things from whence we spring.” But by Baptism, which is spiritual regeneration, we receive our spiritual being, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii). Therefore we are also nourished by Baptism. Consequently there was no need to institute this sacrament as spiritual nourishment.

Objection 2: Further, men are united with Christ through this sacrament as the members with the head. But Christ is the Head of all men, even of those who have existed from the beginning of the world, as stated above ([4517]Q[8], AA[3],6). Therefore the institution of this sacrament should not have been postponed till the Lord’s supper.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is called the memorial of our Lord’s Passion, according to Mat. 26 (Lk. 22:19): “Do this for a commemoration of Me.” But a commemoration is of things past. Therefore, this sacrament should not have been instituted before Christ’s Passion.

Objection 4: Further, a man is prepared by Baptism for the Eucharist, which ought to be given only to the baptized. But Baptism was instituted by Christ after His Passion and Resurrection, as is evident from Mat. 28:19. Therefore, this sacrament was not suitably instituted before Christ's Passion.

On the contrary, This sacrament was instituted by Christ, of Whom it is said (Mk. 7:37) that "He did all things well."

I answer that, This sacrament was appropriately instituted at the supper, when Christ conversed with His disciples for the last time. First of all, because of what is contained in the sacrament: for Christ is Himself contained in the Eucharist sacramentally. Consequently, when Christ was going to leave His disciples in His proper species, He left Himself with them under the sacramental species; as the Emperor's image is set up to be reverenced in his absence. Hence Eusebius says: "Since He was going to withdraw His assumed body from their eyes, and bear it away to the stars, it was needful that on the day of the supper He should consecrate the sacrament of His body and blood for our sakes, in order that what was once offered up for our ransom should be fittingly worshiped in a mystery."

Secondly, because without faith in the Passion there could never be any salvation, according to Rom. 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood." It was necessary accordingly that there should be at all times among men something to show forth our Lord's Passion; the chief sacrament of which in the old Law was the Paschal Lamb. Hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7): "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." But its successor under the New Testament is the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is a remembrance of the Passion now past, just as the other was figurative of the Passion to come. And so it was fitting that when the hour of the Passion was come, Christ should institute a new Sacrament after celebrating the old, as Pope Leo I says (Serm. lviii).

Thirdly, because last words, chiefly such as are spoken by departing friends, are committed most deeply to memory; since then especially affection for friends is more enkindled, and the things which affect us most are impressed the deepest in the soul. Consequently, since, as Pope Alexander I says, "among sacrifices there can be none greater than the body and blood of Christ, nor any more powerful oblation"; our Lord instituted this sacrament at His last parting with His disciples, in order that it might be held in the greater veneration. And this is what Augustine says (Respons. ad Januar. i): “In order to commend more earnestly the death of this mystery, our Saviour willed this last act to be fixed in the hearts and memories of the disciples whom He was about to quit for the Passion.”

Reply to Objection 1: We are nourished from the same things of which we are made, but they do not come to us in the same way; for those out of which we are made come to us through generation, while the same, as nourishing us, come to us through being eaten. Hence, as we are new-born in Christ through Baptism, so through the Eucharist we eat Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: The Eucharist is the perfect sacrament of our Lord’s Passion, as containing Christ crucified; consequently it could not be instituted before the Incarnation; but then there was room for only such sacraments as were prefigurative of the Lord’s Passion.

Reply to Objection 3: This sacrament was instituted during the supper, so as in the future to be a memorial of our Lord’s Passion as accomplished. Hence He said expressively: “As often as ye shall do these things” [*Cf. Canon of the Mass], speaking of the future.

Reply to Objection 4: The institution responds to the order of intention. But the sacrament of the Eucharist, although after Baptism in the receiving, is yet previous to it in intention; and therefore it behooved to be instituted first. or else it can be said that Baptism was already instituted in Christ’s Baptism; hence some were already baptized with Christ’s Baptism, as we read in Jn. 3:22.

Whether the Paschal Lamb was the chief figure of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the Paschal Lamb was not the chief figure of this sacrament, because (Ps. 109:4) Christ is called “a priest according to the order of Melchisedech,” since Melchisedech bore the figure of Christ’s sacrifice, in offering bread and wine. But the expression of likeness causes one thing to be named from another. Therefore, it seems that Melchisedech’s offering was the “principal” figure of this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the passage of the Red Sea was a figure of Baptism, according to 1 Cor. 10:2: “All . . . were baptized in the cloud and in the sea.” But the immolation of the Paschal Lamb was previous to the passage of the Red Sea, and the Manna came after it, just as the Eucharist follows

Baptism. Therefore the Manna is a more expressive figure of this sacrament than the Paschal Lamb.

Objection 3: Further, the principal power of this sacrament is that it brings us into the kingdom of heaven, being a kind of “viaticum.” But this was chiefly prefigured in the sacrament of expiation when the “high-priest entered once a year into the Holy of Holies with blood,” as the Apostle proves in Heb. 9. Consequently, it seems that that sacrifice was a more significant figure of this sacrament than was the Paschal Lamb.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:7,8): “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed; therefore let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.”

I answer that, We can consider three things in this sacrament: namely, that which is sacrament only, and this is the bread and wine; that which is both reality and sacrament, to wit, Christ’s true body; and lastly that which is reality only, namely, the effect of this sacrament. Consequently, in relation to what is sacrament only, the chief figure of this sacrament was the oblation of Melchisedech, who offered up bread and wine. In relation to Christ crucified, Who is contained in this sacrament, its figures were all the sacrifices of the Old Testament, especially the sacrifice of expiation, which was the most solemn of all. While with regard to its effect, the chief figure was the Manna, “having in it the sweetness of every taste” (Wis. 16:20), just as the grace of this sacrament refreshes the soul in all respects.

The Paschal Lamb foreshadowed this sacrament in these three ways. First of all, because it was eaten with unleavened loaves, according to Ex. 12:8: “They shall eat flesh . . . and unleavened bread.” As to the second because it was immolated by the entire multitude of the children of Israel on the fourteenth day of the moon; and this was a figure of the Passion of Christ, Who is called the Lamb on account of His innocence. As to the effect, because by the blood of the Paschal Lamb the children of Israel were preserved from the destroying Angel, and brought from the Egyptian captivity; and in this respect the Paschal Lamb is the chief figure of this sacrament, because it represents it in every respect.

From this the answer to the Objections is manifest.

OF THE MATTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the matter of this sacrament: and first of all as to its species; secondly, the change of the bread and wine into the body of Christ; thirdly, the manner in which Christ's body exists in this sacrament; fourthly, the accidents of bread and wine which continue in this sacrament.

Under the first heading there are eight points for inquiry:

(1) Whether bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament?

(2) Whether a determinate quantity of the same is required for the matter of this sacrament?

(3) Whether the matter of this sacrament is wheaten bread?

(4) Whether it is unleavened or fermented bread?

(5) Whether the matter of this sacrament is wine from the grape?

(6) Whether water should be mixed with it?

(7) Whether water is of necessity for this sacrament?

(8) Of the quantity of the water added.

Whether the matter of this sacrament is bread and wine?

Objection 1: It seems that the matter of this sacrament is not bread and wine. Because this sacrament ought to represent Christ's Passion more fully than did the sacraments of the Old Law. But the flesh of animals, which was the matter of the sacraments under the Old Law, shows forth Christ's Passion more fully than bread and wine. Therefore the matter of this sacrament ought rather to be the flesh of animals than bread and wine.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is to be celebrated in every place. But in many lands bread is not to be found, and in many places wine is not to be found. Therefore bread and wine are not a suitable matter for this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is for both hale and weak. But to some weak persons wine is hurtful. Therefore it seems that wine ought not to be the matter of this sacrament.

On the contrary, Pope Alexander I says (Ep. ad omnes orth. i): "In oblations of the sacraments only bread and wine mixed with water are to be offered.”

I answer that, Some have fallen into various errors about the matter of this sacrament. Some, known as the Artotyrytae, as Augustine says (De Haeres. xxviii), “offer bread and cheese in this sacrament, contending that oblations were celebrated by men in the first ages, from fruits of the earth and sheep.” Others, called Cataphrygae and Pepuziani, “are reputed to have made their Eucharistic bread with infants’ blood drawn from tiny punctures over the entire body, and mixed with flour.” Others, styled Aquarii, under guise of sobriety, offer nothing but water in this sacrament.

Now all these and similar errors are excluded by the fact that Christ instituted this sacrament under the species of bread and wine, as is evident from Mat. 26. Consequently, bread and wine are the proper matter of this sacrament. And the reasonableness of this is seen first, in the use of this sacrament, which is eating: for, as water is used in the sacrament of Baptism for the purpose of spiritual cleansing, since bodily cleansing is commonly done with water; so bread and wine, wherewith men are commonly fed, are employed in this sacrament for the use of spiritual eating.

Secondly, in relation to Christ’s Passion, in which the blood was separated from the body. And therefore in this sacrament, which is the memorial of our Lord’s Passion, the bread is received apart as the sacrament of the body, and the wine as the sacrament of the blood.

Thirdly, as to the effect, considered in each of the partakers. For, as Ambrose (Mag. Sent. iv, D, xi) says on 1 Cor. 11:20, this sacrament “avails for the defense of soul and body”; and therefore “Christ’s body is offered” under the species of bread “for the health of the body, and the blood” under the species of wine “for the health of the soul,” according to Lev. 17:14: “The life of the animal [Vulg.: ‘of all flesh’] is in the blood.”

Fourthly, as to the effect with regard to the whole Church, which is made up of many believers, just “as bread is composed of many grains, and wine flows from many grapes,” as the gloss observes on 1 Cor. 10:17: “We being many are . . . one body,” etc.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the flesh of slaughtered animals represents the Passion more forcibly, nevertheless it is less suitable for the common use of this sacrament, and for denoting the unity of the Church.

Reply to Objection 2: Although wheat and wine are not produced in every country, yet they can easily be conveyed to every land, that is, as much as is needful for the use of this sacrament: at the same time one is not to be consecrated when the other is lacking, because it would not be a complete sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: Wine taken in small quantity cannot do the sick much harm: yet if there be fear of harm, it is not necessary for all who take Christ's body to partake also of His blood, as will be stated later ([4518]Q[80], A[12]).

Whether a determinate quantity of bread and wine is required for the matter of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that a determinate quantity of bread and wine is required for the matter of this sacrament. Because the effects of grace are no less set in order than those of nature. But, "there is a limit set by nature upon all existing things, and a reckoning of size and development" (De Anima ii). Consequently, in this sacrament, which is called "Eucharist," that is, "a good grace," a determinate quantity of the bread and wine is required.

Objection 2: Further, Christ gave no power to the ministers of the Church regarding matters which involve derision of the faith and of His sacraments, according to 2 Cor. 10:8: "Of our power which the Lord hath given us unto edification, and not for your destruction." But it would lead to mockery of this sacrament if the priest were to wish to consecrate all the bread which is sold in the market and all the wine in the cellar. Therefore he cannot do this.

Objection 3: Further, if anyone be baptized in the sea, the entire sea-water is not sanctified by the form of baptism, but only the water wherewith the body of the baptized is cleansed. Therefore, neither in this sacrament can a superfluous quantity of bread be consecrated.

On the contrary, Much is opposed to little, and great to small. But there is no quantity, however small, of the bread and wine which cannot be consecrated. Therefore, neither is there any quantity, however great, which cannot be consecrated.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the priest could not consecrate an immense quantity of bread and wine, for instance, all the bread in the market or all the wine in a cask. But this does not appear to be true, because in all things containing matter, the reason for the determination of the matter is drawn from its disposition to an end, just as the matter of a saw is iron, so as to adapt it for cutting. But the end of this sacrament is the use of the faithful. Consequently, the quantity of the matter of this sacrament must be determined by comparison with the use of the faithful. But this cannot be determined by comparison with the use of the faithful who are actually present; otherwise the parish priest having few parishioners could not consecrate many hosts. It remains, then, for the matter of this sacrament to be determined in reference to the number of the faithful absolutely. But the number of the faithful is not a determinate one. Hence it cannot be said that the quantity of the matter of this sacrament is restricted.

Reply to Objection 1: The matter of every natural object has its determinate quantity by comparison with its determinate form. But the number of the faithful, for whose use this sacrament is ordained, is not a determinate one. Consequently there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 2: The power of the Church's ministers is ordained for two purposes: first for the proper effect, and secondly for the end of the effect. But the second does not take away the first. Hence, if the priest intends to consecrate the body of Christ for an evil purpose, for instance, to make mockery of it, or to administer poison through it, he commits sin by his evil intention, nevertheless, on account of the power committed to him, he accomplishes the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: The sacrament of Baptism is perfected in the use of the matter: and therefore no more of the water is hallowed than what is used. But this sacrament is wrought in the consecration of the matter. Consequently there is no parallel.

Whether wheaten bread is required for the matter of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that wheaten bread is not requisite for the matter of this sacrament, because this sacrament is a reminder of our Lord's Passion. But barley bread seems to be more in keeping with the Passion than wheaten bread, as being more bitter, and because Christ used it to feed the multitudes upon the mountain, as narrated in Jn. 6. Therefore wheaten bread is not the proper matter of this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, in natural things the shape is a sign of species. But some cereals resemble wheat, such as spelt and maize, from which in some localities bread is made for the use of this sacrament. Therefore wheaten bread is not the proper matter of this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, mixing dissolves species. But wheaten flour is hardly to be found unmixed with some other species of grain, except in the instance of specially selected grain. Therefore it does not seem that wheaten bread is the proper matter for this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, what is corrupted appears to be of another species. But some make the sacrament from bread which is corrupted, and which no longer seems to be wheaten bread. Therefore, it seems that such bread is not the proper matter of this sacrament.

On the contrary, Christ is contained in this sacrament, and He compares Himself to a grain of wheat, saying (Jn. 12:24): “Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground die, itself remaineth alone.” Therefore bread from corn, i.e. wheaten bread, is the matter of this sacrament.

I answer that, As stated above [4519](A[1]), for the use of the sacraments such matter is adopted as is commonly made use of among men. Now among other breads wheaten bread is more commonly used by men; since other breads seem to be employed when this fails. And consequently Christ is believed to have instituted this sacrament under this species of bread. Moreover this bread strengthens man, and so it denotes more suitably the effect of this sacrament. Consequently, the proper matter for this sacrament is wheaten bread.

Reply to Objection 1: Barley bread serves to denote the hardness of the Old Law; both on account of the hardness of the bread, and because, as Augustine says ([4520]Q[83]): “The flour within the barley, wrapped up as it is within a most tenacious fibre, denotes either the Law itself, which was given in such manner as to be vested in bodily sacraments; or else it denotes the people themselves, who were not yet despoiled of carnal desires, which clung to their hearts like fibre.” But this sacrament belongs to Christ’s “sweet yoke,” and to the truth already manifested, and to a spiritual people. Consequently barley bread would not be a suitable matter for this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: A begetter begets a thing like to itself in species. yet there is some unlikeness as to the accidents, owing either to the matter, or to weakness within the generative power. And therefore, if there be any cereals which can be grown from the seed of the wheat (as wild wheat from wheat seed grown in bad ground), the bread made from such grain can be the matter of this sacrament: and this does not obtain either in barley, or in spelt, or even in maize, which is of all grains the one most resembling the wheat grain. But the resemblance as to shape in such seems to denote closeness of species rather than identity; just as the resemblance in shape between the dog and the wolf goes to show that they are allied but not of the same species. Hence from such grains, which cannot in any way be generated from wheat grain, bread cannot be made such as to be the proper matter of this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: A moderate mixing does not alter the species, because that little is as it were absorbed by the greater. Consequently, then, if a small quantity of another grain be mixed with a much greater quantity of wheat, bread may be made therefrom so as to be the proper matter of this sacrament; but if the mixing be notable, for instance, half and half; or nearly so, then such mixing alters the species; consequently, bread made therefrom will not be the proper matter of this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes there is such corruption of the bread that the species of bread is lost, as when the continuity of its parts is destroyed, and the taste, color, and other accidents are changed; hence the body of Christ may not be made from such matter. But sometimes there is not such corruption as to alter the species, but merely disposition towards corruption, which a slight change in the savor betrays, and from such bread the body of Christ may be made: but he who does so, sins from irreverence towards the sacrament. And because starch comes of corrupted wheat, it does not seem as if the body of Christ could be made of the bread made therefrom, although some hold the contrary.

Whether this sacrament ought to be made of unleavened bread?

Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament ought not to be made of unleavened bread. because in this sacrament we ought to imitate Christ’s institution. But Christ appears to have instituted this sacrament in fermented bread, because, as we have read in Ex. 12, the Jews, according to the Law, began to use unleavened bread on the day of the Passover which is celebrated on the fourteenth day of the moon; and Christ instituted this sacrament at the supper which He celebrated “before the festival day of the Pasch” (Jn. 13:1, 4). Therefore we ought likewise to celebrate this sacrament with fermented bread.

Objection 2: Further, legal observances ought not to be continued in the time of grace. But the use of unleavened bread was a ceremony of the Law, as is clear from Ex. 12. Therefore we ought not to use unfermented bread in this sacrament of grace.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above ([4521]Q[65], A[1];[4522] Q[73], A[3]), the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity just as Baptism is the sacrament of faith. But the fervor of charity is signified by fermented bread, as is declared by the gloss on Mat. 13:33: “The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven,” etc. Therefore this sacrament ought to be made of leavened bread.

Objection 4: Further, leavened or unleavened are mere accidents of bread, which do not vary the species. But in the matter for the sacrament of Baptism no difference is observed regarding the variation of the accidents, as to whether it be salt or fresh, warm or cold water. Therefore neither ought any distinction to be observed, as to whether the bread be unleavened or leavened.

On the contrary, According to the Decretals (Extra, De Celebr. Miss.), a priest is punished “for presuming to celebrate, using fermented bread and a wooden cup.”

I answer that, Two things may be considered touching the matter of this sacrament namely, what is necessary, and what is suitable. It is necessary that the bread be wheaten, without which the sacrament is not valid, as stated above [4523](A[3]). It is not, however, necessary for the sacrament that the bread be unleavened or leavened, since it can be celebrated in either.

But it is suitable that every priest observe the rite of his Church in the celebration of the sacrament. Now in this matter there are various customs of the Churches: for, Gregory says: “The Roman Church offers unleavened bread, because our Lord took flesh without union of sexes: but the Greek Churches offer leavened bread, because the Word of the Father was clothed with flesh; as leaven is mixed with the flour.” Hence, as a priest sins by celebrating with fermented bread in the Latin Church, so a Greek priest celebrating with unfermented bread in a church of the Greeks would also sin, as perverting the rite of his Church. Nevertheless the custom of celebrating with unleavened bread is more reasonable. First, on account of Christ’s institution: for He instituted this sacrament “on the first day of the

Azymes” (Mat. 26:17; Mk. 14:12; Lk. 22:7), on which day there ought to be nothing fermented in the houses of the Jews, as is stated in Ex. 12:15,19. Secondly, because bread is properly the sacrament of Christ’s body, which was conceived without corruption, rather than of His Godhead, as will be seen later ([4524]Q[76], A[1], ad 1). Thirdly, because this is more in keeping with the sincerity of the faithful, which is required in the use of this sacrament, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: “Christ our Pasch is sacrificed: therefore let us feast . . . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.”

However, this custom of the Greeks is not unreasonable both on account of its signification, to which Gregory refers, and in detestation of the heresy of the Nazarenes, who mixed up legal observances with the Gospel.

Reply to Objection 1: As we read in Ex. 12, the paschal solemnity began on the evening of the fourteenth day of the moon. So, then, after immolating the Paschal Lamb, Christ instituted this sacrament: hence this day is said by John to precede the day of the Pasch, while the other three Evangelists call it “the first day of the Azymes,” when fermented bread was not found in the houses of the Jews, as stated above. Fuller mention was made of this in the treatise on our Lord’s Passion ([4525]Q[46], A[9], ad 1).

Reply to Objection 2: Those who celebrate the sacrament with unleavened bread do not intend to follow the ceremonial of the Law, but to conform to Christ’s institution; so they are not Judaizing; otherwise those celebrating in fermented bread would be Judaizing, because the Jews offered up fermented bread for the first-fruits.

Reply to Objection 3: Leaven denotes charity on account of one single effect, because it makes the bread more savory and larger; but it also signifies corruption from its very nature.

Reply to Objection 4: Since whatever is fermented partakes of corruption, this sacrament may not be made from corrupt bread, as stated above (A[3], ad 4); consequently, there is a wider difference between unleavened and leavened bread than between warm and cold baptismal water: because there might be such corruption of fermented bread that it could not be validly used for the sacrament.

Whether wine of the grape is the proper matter of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that wine of the grape is not the proper matter of this sacrament. Because, as water is the matter of Baptism, so is wine the matter of this sacrament. But Baptism can be conferred with any kind of water. Therefore this sacrament can be celebrated in any kind of wine, such as of pomegranates, or of mulberries; since vines do not grow in some countries.

Objection 2: Further, vinegar is a kind of wine drawn from the grape, as Isidore says (Etym. xx). But this sacrament cannot be celebrated with vinegar. Therefore, it seems that wine from the grape is not the proper matter of this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, just as the clarified wine is drawn from grapes, so also are the juice of unripe grapes and must. But it does not appear that this sacrament may be made from such, according to what we read in the Sixth Council (Trull., Can. 28): “We have learned that in some churches the priests add grapes to the sacrifice of the oblation; and so they dispense both together to the people. Consequently we give order that no priest shall do this in future.” And Pope Julius I rebukes some priests “who offer wine pressed from the grape in the sacrament of the Lord’s chalice.” Consequently, it seems that wine from the grape is not the proper matter of this sacrament.

On the contrary, As our Lord compared Himself to the grain of wheat, so also He compared Himself to the vine, saying (Jn. 15:1): “I am the true vine.” But only bread from wheat is the matter of this sacrament, as stated above [4526](A[3]). Therefore, only wine from the grape is the proper matter of this sacrament.

I answer that, This sacrament can only be performed with wine from the grape. First of all on account of Christ’s institution, since He instituted this sacrament in wine from the grape, as is evident from His own words, in instituting this sacrament (Mat. 26:29): “I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine.” Secondly, because, as stated above [4527](A[3]), that is adopted as the matter of the sacraments which is properly and universally considered as such. Now that is properly called wine, which is drawn from the grape, whereas other liquors are called wine from resemblance to the wine of the grape. Thirdly, because the wine from the grape is more in keeping with the effect of this sacrament, which is spiritual; because it is written (Ps. 103:15): “That wine may cheer the heart of man.”

Reply to Objection 1: Such liquors are called wine, not properly but only from their resemblance thereto. But genuine wine can be conveyed to such countries wherein the grape-vine does not flourish, in a quantity sufficient for this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Wine becomes vinegar by corruption; hence there is no returning from vinegar to wine, as is said in Metaph. viii. And consequently, just as this sacrament may not be made from bread which is utterly corrupt, so neither can it be made from vinegar. It can, however, be made from wine which is turning sour, just as from bread turning corrupt, although he who does so sins, as stated above [4528](A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: The juice of unripe grapes is at the stage of incomplete generation, and therefore it has not yet the species of wine: on which account it may not be used for this sacrament. Must, however, has already the species of wine, for its sweetness [*”Aut dulcis musti Vulcano decoquit humorem”; Virgil, Georg. i, 295] indicates fermentation which is “the result of its natural heat” (Meteor. iv); consequently this sacrament can be made from must. Nevertheless entire grapes ought not to be mixed with this sacrament, because then there would be something else besides wine. It is furthermore forbidden to offer must in the chalice, as soon as it has been squeezed from the grape, since this is unbecoming owing to the impurity of the must. But in case of necessity it may be done: for it is said by the same Pope Julius, in the passage quoted in the argument: “If necessary, let the grape be pressed into the chalice.”

Whether water should be mixed with the wine?

Objection 1: It seems that water ought not to be mixed with the wine, since Christ’s sacrifice was foreshadowed by that of Melchisedech, who (Gn. 14:18) is related to have offered up bread and wine only. Consequently it seems that water should not be added in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the various sacraments have their respective matters. But water is the matter of Baptism. Therefore it should not be employed as the matter of this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, bread and wine are the matter of this sacrament. But nothing is added to the bread. Therefore neither should anything be added to the wine.

On the contrary, Pope Alexander I writes (Ep. 1 ad omnes orth.): “In the sacramental oblations which in mass are offered to the Lord, only bread and wine mixed with water are to be offered in sacrifice.”

I answer that, Water ought to be mingled with the wine which is offered in this sacrament. First of all on account of its institution: for it is believed with probability that our Lord instituted this sacrament in wine tempered with water according to the custom of that country: hence it is written (Prov. 9:5): “Drink the wine which I have mixed for you.” Secondly, because it harmonizes with the representation of our Lord’s Passion: hence Pope Alexander I says (Ep. 1 ad omnes orth.): “In the Lord’s chalice neither wine only nor water only ought to be offered, but both mixed because we read that both flowed from His side in the Passion.” Thirdly, because this is adapted for signifying the effect of this sacrament, since as Pope Julius says (Concil. Bracarens iii, Can. 1): “We see that the people are signified by the water, but Christ’s blood by the wine. Therefore when water is mixed with the wine in the chalice, the people is made one with Christ.” Fourthly, because this is appropriate to the fourth effect of this sacrament, which is the entering into everlasting life: hence Ambrose says (De Sacram. v): “The water flows into the chalice, and springs forth unto everlasting life.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Ambrose says (De Sacram. v), just as Christ’s sacrifice is denoted by the offering of Melchisedech, so likewise it is signified by the water which flowed from the rock in the desert, according to 1 Cor. 10:4: “But they drank of the spiritual rock which came after them.”

Reply to Objection 2: In Baptism water is used for the purpose of ablution: but in this sacrament it is used by way of refreshment, according to Ps. 22:3: “He hath brought me up on the water of refreshment.”

Reply to Objection 3: Bread is made of water and flour; and therefore, since water is mixed with the wine, neither is without water.

Whether the mixing with water is essential to this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the mixing with water is essential to this sacrament. Because Cyprian says to Cecilius (Ep. lxiii): “Thus the Lord’s chalice is not water only and wine only, but both must be mixed together: in the same way as neither the Lord’s body be of flour only, except both,” i.e.

the flour and the water “be united as one.” But the admixture of water with the flour is necessary for this sacrament. Consequently, for the like reason, so is the mixing of water with the wine.

Objection 2: Further, at our Lord’s Passion, of which this is the memorial, water as well as blood flowed from His side. But wine, which is the sacrament of the blood, is necessary for this sacrament. For the same reason, therefore, so is water.

Objection 3: Further, if water were not essential to this sacrament, it would not matter in the least what kind of water was used; and so water distilled from roses, or any other kind might be employed; which is contrary to the usage of the Church. Consequently water is essential to this sacrament.

On the contrary, Cyprian says (Ep. lxiii): “If any of our predecessors, out of ignorance or simplicity, has not kept this usage,” i.e. of mixing water with the wine, “one may pardon his simplicity”; which would not be the case if water were essential to the sacrament, as the wine or the bread. Therefore the mingling of water with the wine is not essential to the sacrament.

I answer that, Judgment concerning a sign is to be drawn from the thing signified. Now the adding of water to the wine is for the purpose of signifying the sharing of this sacrament by the faithful, in this respect that by the mixing of the water with the wine is signified the union of the people with Christ, as stated [4529](A[6]). Moreover, the flowing of water from the side of Christ hanging on the cross refers to the same, because by the water is denoted the cleansing from sins, which was the effect of Christ’s Passion. Now it was observed above (Q[73], A[1], ad 3), that this sacrament is completed in the consecration of the matter: while the usage of the faithful is not essential to the sacrament, but only a consequence thereof. Consequently, then, the adding of water is not essential to the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Cyprian’s expression is to be taken in the same sense in which we say that a thing cannot be, which cannot be suitably. And so the comparison refers to what ought to be done, not to what is essential to be done; since water is of the essence of bread, but not of the essence of wine.

Reply to Objection 2: The shedding of the blood belonged directly to Christ’s Passion: for it is natural for blood to flow from a wounded human body. But the flowing of the water was not necessary for the Passion; but merely to show its effect, which is to wash away sins, and to refresh us from the heat of concupiscence. And therefore the water is not offered apart from the wine in this sacrament, as the wine is offered apart from the bread; but the water is offered mixed with the wine to show that the wine belongs of itself to this sacrament, as of its very essence; but the water as something added to the wine.

Reply to Objection 3: Since the mixing of water with the wine is not necessary for the sacrament, it does not matter, as to the essence of the sacrament, what kind of water is added to the wine, whether natural water, or artificial, as rose-water, although, as to the propriety of the sacrament, he would sin who mixes any other than natural and true water, because true water flowed from the side of Christ hanging on the cross, and not phlegm, as some have said, in order to show that Christ's body was truly composed of the four elements; as by the flowing blood, it was shown to be composed of the four humors, as Pope Innocent III says in a certain Decree. But because the mixing of water with flour is essential to this sacrament, as making the composition of bread, if rose-water, or any other liquor besides true water, be mixed with the flour, the sacrament would not be valid, because it would not be true bread.

Whether water should be added in great quantity?

Objection 1: It seems that water ought to be added in great quantity, because as blood flowed sensibly from Christ's side, so did water: hence it is written (Jn. 19:35): "He that saw it, hath given testimony." But water could not be sensibly present in this sacrament except it were used in great quantity. Consequently it seems that water ought to be added in great quantity.

Objection 2: Further, a little water mixed with much wine is corrupted. But what is corrupted no longer exists. Therefore, it is the same thing to add a little water in this sacrament as to add none. But it is not lawful to add none. Therefore, neither is it lawful to add a little.

Objection 3: Further, if it sufficed to add a little, then as a consequence it would suffice to throw one drop of water into an entire cask. But this seems ridiculous. Therefore it does not suffice for a small quantity to be added.

On the contrary, It is said in the Decretals (Extra, De Celeb. Miss.): "The pernicious abuse has prevailed in your country of adding water in greater quantity than the wine, in the sacrifice, where according to the reasonable custom of the entire Church more wine than water ought to be employed."

I answer that, There is a threefold opinion regarding the water added to the wine, as Pope Innocent III says in a certain Decretal. For some say that the water remains by itself when the wine is changed into blood: but such an opinion cannot stand, because in the sacrament of the altar after the consecration there is nothing else save the body and the blood of Christ. Because, as Ambrose says in De Officiis (De Mysteriis ix): "Before the blessing it is another species that is named, after the blessing the Body is signified; otherwise it would not be adored with adoration of latria." And therefore others have said that as the wine is changed into blood, so the water is changed into the water which flowed from Christ's side. But this cannot be maintained reasonably, because according to this the water would be consecrated apart from the wine, as the wine is from the bread.

And therefore as he (Innocent III, Decretals, Extra, De Celeb. Miss.) says, the more probable opinion is that which holds that the water is changed into wine, and the wine into blood. Now, this could not be done unless so little water was used that it would be changed into wine. Consequently, it is always safer to add little water, especially if the wine be weak, because the sacrament could not be celebrated if there were such addition of water as to destroy the species of the wine. Hence Pope Julius I reprehends some who "keep throughout the year a linen cloth steeped in must, and at the time of sacrifice wash a part of it with water, and so make the offering."

Reply to Objection 1: For the signification of this sacrament it suffices for the water to be appreciable by sense when it is mixed with the wine: but it is not necessary for it to be sensible after the mingling.

Reply to Objection 2: If no water were added, the signification would be utterly excluded: but when the water is changed into wine, it is signified that the people is incorporated with Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: If water were added to a cask, it would not suffice for the signification of this sacrament, but the water must be added to the wine at the actual celebration of the sacrament.

OF THE CHANGE OF BREAD AND WINE INTO THE BODY AND BLOOD OF CHRIST (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have to consider the change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the substance of bread and wine remain in this sacrament after the consecration?*

(2) Whether it is annihilated?

(3) Whether it is changed into the body and blood of Christ?

(4) Whether the accidents remain after the change?

(5) Whether the substantial form remains there?

(6) Whether this change is instantaneous?

(7) Whether it is more miraculous than any other change?

(8) By what words it may be suitably expressed?

[*The titles of the Articles here given were taken by St. Thomas from his Commentary on the Sentences (Sent. iv, D, 90). However, in writing the Articles he introduced a new point of inquiry, that of the First Article; and substituted another division of the matter under discussion, as may be seen by referring to the titles of the various Articles. Most editions have ignored St. Thomas's original division, and give the one to which he subsequently adhered.]

Whether the body of Christ be in this sacrament in very truth, or merely as in a figure or sign?

Objection 1: It seems that the body of Christ is not in this sacrament in very truth, but only as in a figure, or sign. For it is written (Jn. 6:54) that when our Lord had uttered these words: "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood," etc., "Many of His disciples on hearing it said: 'this is a hard saying'": to whom He rejoined: "It is the spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing": as if He were to say, according to Augustine's exposition on Ps. 4 [*On Ps. 98:9]: "Give a spiritual meaning to what I have said. You are not to eat this body which you see, nor to drink the blood which they who crucify Me are to spill. It is a mystery that I put before you: in its spiritual sense it will quicken you; but the flesh profiteth nothing."

Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you all days even to the consummation of the world." Now in explaining this, Augustine makes this observation (Tract. xxx in Joan.): "The Lord is on high until the world be ended; nevertheless the truth of the Lord is here with us; for the body, in which He rose again, must be in one place; but His truth is spread abroad everywhere." Therefore, the body of Christ is not in this sacrament in very truth, but only as in a sign.

Objection 3: Further, no body can be in several places at the one time. For this does not even belong to an angel; since for the same reason it could be everywhere. But Christ's is a true body, and it is in heaven. Consequently, it seems that it is not in very truth in the sacrament of the altar, but only as in a sign.

Objection 4: Further, the Church's sacraments are ordained for the profit of the faithful. But according to Gregory in a certain Homily (xxviii in Evang.), the ruler is rebuked "for demanding Christ's bodily presence." Moreover the apostles were prevented from receiving the Holy Ghost because they were attached to His bodily presence, as Augustine says on Jn. 16:7: "Except I go, the Paraclete will not come to you" (Tract. xciv in Joan.). Therefore Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar according to His bodily presence.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. viii): "There is no room for doubt regarding the truth of Christ's body and blood; for now by our Lord's own declaring and by our faith His flesh is truly food, and His blood is truly drink." And Ambrose says (De Sacram. vi): "As the Lord Jesus Christ is God's true Son so is it Christ's true flesh which we take, and His true blood which we drink."

I answer that, The presence of Christ's true body and blood in this sacrament cannot be detected by sense, nor understanding, but by faith alone, which rests upon Divine authority. Hence, on Lk. 22:19: "This is My body which shall be delivered up for you," Cyril says: "Doubt not whether this be true; but take rather the Saviour's words with faith; for since He is the Truth, He lieth not."

Now this is suitable, first for the perfection of the New Law. For, the sacrifices of the Old Law contained only in figure that true sacrifice of

Christ's Passion, according to Heb. 10:1: "For the law having a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things." And therefore it was necessary that the sacrifice of the New Law instituted by Christ should have something more, namely, that it should contain Christ Himself crucified, not merely in signification or figure, but also in very truth. And therefore this sacrament which contains Christ Himself, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), is perfective of all the other sacraments, in which Christ's virtue is participated.

Secondly, this belongs to Christ's love, out of which for our salvation He assumed a true body of our nature. And because it is the special feature of friendship to live together with friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix), He promises us His bodily presence as a reward, saying (Mat. 24:28): "Where the body is, there shall the eagles be gathered together." Yet meanwhile in our pilgrimage He does not deprive us of His bodily presence; but unites us with Himself in this sacrament through the truth of His body and blood. Hence (Jn. 6:57) he says: "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in him." Hence this sacrament is the sign of supreme charity, and the uplifter of our hope, from such familiar union of Christ with us.

Thirdly, it belongs to the perfection of faith, which concerns His humanity just as it does His Godhead, according to Jn. 14:1: "You believe in God, believe also in Me." And since faith is of things unseen, as Christ shows us His Godhead invisibly, so also in this sacrament He shows us His flesh in an invisible manner.

Some men accordingly, not paying heed to these things, have contended that Christ's body and blood are not in this sacrament except as in a sign, a thing to be rejected as heretical, since it is contrary to Christ's words. Hence Berengarius, who had been the first deviser of this heresy, was afterwards forced to withdraw his error, and to acknowledge the truth of the faith.

Reply to Objection 1: From this authority the aforesaid heretics have taken occasion to err from evilly understanding Augustine's words. For when Augustine says: "You are not to eat this body which you see," he means not to exclude the truth of Christ's body, but that it was not to be eaten in this species in which it was seen by them. And by the words: "It is a mystery that I put before you; in its spiritual sense it will quicken you," he intends not that the body of Christ is in this sacrament merely according to mystical signification, but “spiritually,” that is, invisibly, and by the power of the spirit. Hence (Tract. xxvii), expounding Jn. 6:64: “the flesh profiteth nothing,” he says: “Yea, but as they understood it, for they understood that the flesh was to be eaten as it is divided piecemeal in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles, not as it is quickened by the spirit . . . Let the spirit draw nigh to the flesh . . . then the flesh profiteth very much: for if the flesh profiteth nothing, the Word had not been made flesh, that It might dwell among us.”

Reply to Objection 2: That saying of Augustine and all others like it are to be understood of Christ’s body as it is beheld in its proper species; according as our Lord Himself says (Mat. 26:11): “But Me you have not always.” Nevertheless He is invisibly under the species of this sacrament, wherever this sacrament is performed.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ’s body is not in this sacrament in the same way as a body is in a place, which by its dimensions is commensurate with the place; but in a special manner which is proper to this sacrament. Hence we say that Christ’s body is upon many altars, not as in different places, but “sacramentally”: and thereby we do not understand that Christ is there only as in a sign, although a sacrament is a kind of sign; but that Christ’s body is here after a fashion proper to this sacrament, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument holds good of Christ’s bodily presence, as He is present after the manner of a body, that is, as it is in its visible appearance, but not as it is spiritually, that is, invisibly, after the manner and by the virtue of the spirit. Hence Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan.) says: “If thou hast understood” Christ’s words spiritually concerning His flesh, “they are spirit and life to thee; if thou hast understood them carnally, they are also spirit and life, but not to thee.”

Whether in this sacrament the substance of the bread and wine remains after the consecration?

Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread and wine does remain in this sacrament after the consecration: because Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “Since it is customary for men to eat bread and drink wine, God has wedded his Godhead to them, and made them His body and blood”: and further on: “The bread of communication is not simple bread, but is united to the Godhead.” But wedding together belongs to things actually existing.

Therefore the bread and wine are at the same time, in this sacrament, with the body and the blood of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, there ought to be conformity between the sacraments. But in the other sacraments the substance of the matter remains, like the substance of water in Baptism, and the substance of chrism in Confirmation. Therefore the substance of the bread and wine remains also in this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, bread and wine are made use of in this sacrament, inasmuch as they denote ecclesiastical unity, as “one bread is made from many grains and wine from many grapes,” as Augustine says in his book on the Creed (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But this belongs to the substance of bread and wine. Therefore, the substance of the bread and wine remains in this sacrament.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): “Although the figure of the bread and wine be seen, still, after the Consecration, they are to be believed to be nothing else than the body end blood of Christ.”

I answer that, Some have held that the substance of the bread and wine remains in this sacrament after the consecration. But this opinion cannot stand: first of all, because by such an opinion the truth of this sacrament is destroyed, to which it belongs that Christ’s true body exists in this sacrament; which indeed was not there before the consecration. Now a thing cannot be in any place, where it was not previously, except by change of place, or by the conversion of another thing into itself; just as fire begins anew to be in some house, either because it is carried thither, or because it is generated there. Now it is evident that Christ’s body does not begin to be present in this sacrament by local motion. First of all, because it would follow that it would cease to be in heaven: for what is moved locally does not come anew to some place unless it quit the former one. Secondly, because every body moved locally passes through all intermediary spaces, which cannot be said here. Thirdly, because it is not possible for one movement of the same body moved locally to be terminated in different places at the one time, whereas the body of Christ under this sacrament begins at the one time to be in several places. And consequently it remains that Christ’s body cannot begin to be anew in this sacrament except by change of the substance of bread into itself. But what is changed into another thing, no longer remains after such change. Hence the conclusion is that, saving the truth of this sacrament, the substance of the bread cannot remain after the consecration.

Secondly, because this position is contrary to the form of this sacrament, in which it is said: “This is My body,” which would not be true if the substance of the bread were to remain there; for the substance of bread never is the body of Christ. Rather should one say in that case: “Here is My body.”

Thirdly, because it would be opposed to the veneration of this sacrament, if any substance were there, which could not be adored with adoration of latria.

Fourthly, because it is contrary to the rite of the Church, according to which it is not lawful to take the body of Christ after bodily food, while it is nevertheless lawful to take one consecrated host after another. Hence this opinion is to be avoided as heretical.

Reply to Objection 1: God “wedded His Godhead,” i.e. His Divine power, to the bread and wine, not that these may remain in this sacrament, but in order that He may make from them His body and blood.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ is not really present in the other sacraments, as in this; and therefore the substance of the matter remains in the other sacraments, but not in this.

Reply to Objection 3: The species which remain in this sacrament, as shall be said later [4530](A[5]), suffice for its signification; because the nature of the substance is known by its accidents.

Whether the substance of the bread or wine is annihilated after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into their original matter?

Objection 1: It seems that the substance of the bread is annihilated after the consecration of this sacrament, or dissolved into its original matter. For whatever is corporeal must be somewhere. But the substance of bread, which is something corporeal, does not remain, in this sacrament, as stated above [4531](A[2]); nor can we assign any place where it may be. Consequently it is nothing after the consecration. Therefore, it is either annihilated, or dissolved into its original matter.

Objection 2: Further, what is the term “wherefrom” in every change exists no longer, except in the potentiality of matter; e.g. when air is changed into fire, the form of the air remains only in the potentiality of matter; and in like fashion when what is white becomes black. But in this sacrament the substance of the bread or of the wine is the term "wherefrom," while the body or the blood of Christ is the term "whereunto": for Ambrose says in De Officiis (De Myster. ix): "Before the blessing it is called another species, after the blessing the body of Christ is signified." Therefore, when the consecration takes place, the substance of the bread or wine no longer remains, unless perchance dissolved into its (original) matter.

Objection 3: Further, one of two contradictories must be true. But this proposition is false: "After the consecration the substance of the bread or wine is something." Consequently, this is true: "The substance of the bread or wine is nothing."

On the contrary, Augustine says ([4532]Q[83]): "God is not the cause of tending to nothing." But this sacrament is wrought by Divine power. Therefore, in this sacrament the substance of the bread or wine is not annihilated.

I answer that, Because the substance of the bread and wine does not remain in this sacrament, some, deeming that it is impossible for the substance of the bread and wine to be changed into Christ's flesh and blood, have maintained that by the consecration, the substance of the bread and wine is either dissolved into the original matter, or that it is annihilated.

Now the original matter into which mixed bodies can be dissolved is the four elements. For dissolution cannot be made into primary matter, so that a subject can exist without a form, since matter cannot exist without a form. But since after the consecration nothing remains under the sacramental species except the body and the blood of Christ, it will be necessary to say that the elements into which the substance of the bread and wine is dissolved, depart from thence by local motion, which would be perceived by the senses. In like manner also the substance of the bread or wine remains until the last instant of the consecration; but in the last instant of the consecration there is already present there the substance of the body or blood of Christ, just as the form is already present in the last instant of generation. Hence no instant can be assigned in which the original matter can be there. For it cannot be said that the substance of the bread or wine is dissolved gradually into the original matter, or that it successively quits the species, for if this began to be done in the last instant of its consecration, then at the one time under part of the host there would be the body of Christ together with the substance of bread, which is contrary to what has been said above [4533](A[2]). But if this begin to come to pass before the consecration, there will then be a time in which under one part of the host there will be neither the substance of bread nor the body of Christ, which is not fitting. They seem indeed to have taken this into careful consideration, wherefore they formulated their proposition with an alternative viz. that (the substance) may be annihilated. But even this cannot stand, because no way can be assigned whereby Christ's true body can begin to be in this sacrament, except by the change of the substance of bread into it, which change is excluded the moment we admit either annihilation of the substance of the bread, or dissolution into the original matter. Likewise no cause can be assigned for such dissolution or annihilation, since the effect of the sacrament is signified by the form: "This is My body." Hence it is clear that the aforesaid opinion is false.

Reply to Objection 1: The substance of the bread or wine, after the consecration, remains neither under the sacramental species, nor elsewhere; yet it does not follow that it is annihilated; for it is changed into the body of Christ; just as if the air, from which fire is generated, be not there or elsewhere, it does not follow that it is annihilated.

Reply to Objection 2: The form, which is the term "wherefrom," is not changed into another form; but one form succeeds another in the subject; and therefore the first form remains only in the potentiality of matter. But here the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ, as stated above. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: Although after the consecration this proposition is false: "The substance of the breed is something," still that into which the substance of the bread is changed, is something, and consequently the substance of the bread is not annihilated.

Whether bread can be converted into the body of Christ?

Objection 1: It seems that bread cannot be converted into the body of Christ. For conversion is a kind of change. But in every change there must be some subject, which from being previously in potentiality is now in act.

because as is said in Phys. iii: “motion is the act of a thing existing in potentiality.” But no subject can be assigned for the substance of the bread and of the body of Christ, because it is of the very nature of substance for it “not to be in a subject,” as it is said in Praedic. iii. Therefore it is not possible for the whole substance of the bread to be converted into the body of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, the form of the thing into which another is converted, begins anew to inhere in the matter of the thing converted into it: as when air is changed into fire not already existing, the form of fire begins anew to be in the matter of the air; and in like manner when food is converted into non-pre-existing man, the form of the man begins to be anew in the matter of the food. Therefore, if bread be changed into the body of Christ, the form of Christ’s body must necessarily begin to be in the matter of the bread, which is false. Consequently, the bread is not changed into the substance of Christ’s body.

Objection 3: Further, when two things are diverse, one never becomes the other, as whiteness never becomes blackness, as is stated in Phys. i. But since two contrary forms are of themselves diverse, as being the principles of formal difference, so two signate matters are of themselves diverse, as being the principles of material distinction. Consequently, it is not possible for this matter of bread to become this matter whereby Christ’s body is individuated, and so it is not possible for this substance of bread to be changed into the substance of Christ’s body.

On the contrary, Eusebius Emesenus says: “To thee it ought neither to be a novelty nor an impossibility that earthly and mortal things be changed into the substance of Christ.”

I answer that, As stated above [4534](A[2]), since Christ’s true body is in this sacrament, and since it does not begin to be there by local motion, nor is it contained therein as in a place, as is evident from what was stated above (A[1], ad 2), it must be said then that it begins to be there by conversion of the substance of bread into itself.

Yet this change is not like natural changes, but is entirely supernatural, and effected by God’s power alone. Hence Ambrose says [(De Sacram. iv): “See how Christ’s word changes nature’s laws, as He wills: a man is not wont to be born save of man and woman: see therefore that against the established law and order a man is born of a Virgin”: and] [*The passage in the brackets is not in the Leonine edition] (De Myster. iv): “It is clear that a Virgin begot beyond the order of nature: and what we make is the body from the Virgin. Why, then, do you look for nature’s order in Christ’s body, since the Lord Jesus was Himself brought forth of a Virgin beyond nature?” Chrysostom likewise (Hom. xlvii), commenting on Jn. 6:64: “The words which I have spoken to you,” namely, of this sacrament, “are spirit and life,” says: i.e. “spiritual, having nothing carnal, nor natural consequence; but they are rent from all such necessity which exists upon earth, and from the laws here established.”

For it is evident that every agent acts according as it is in act. But every created agent is limited in its act, as being of a determinate genus and species: and consequently the action of every created agent bears upon some determinate act. Now the determination of every thing in actual existence comes from its form. Consequently, no natural or created agent can act except by changing the form in something; and on this account every change made according to nature’s laws is a formal change. But God is infinite act, as stated in the [4535]FP, Q[7], A[1]; Q[26], A[2]; hence His action extends to the whole nature of being. Therefore He can work not only formal conversion, so that diverse forms succeed each other in the same subject; but also the change of all being, so that, to wit, the whole substance of one thing be changed into the whole substance of another. And this is done by Divine power in this sacrament; for the whole substance of the bread is changed into the whole substance of Christ’s body, and the whole substance of the wine into the whole substance of Christ’s blood. Hence this is not a formal, but a substantial conversion; nor is it a kind of natural movement: but, with a name of its own, it can be called “transubstantiation.”

Reply to Objection 1: This objection holds good in respect of formal change, because it belongs to a form to be in matter or in a subject; but it does not hold good in respect of the change of the entire substance. Hence, since this substantial change implies a certain order of substances, one of which is changed into the other, it is in both substances as in a subject, just as order and number.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument also is true of formal conversion or change, because, as stated above (ad 1), a form must be in some matter or subject. But this is not so in a change of the entire substance; for in this case no subject is possible.

Reply to Objection 3: Form cannot be changed into form, nor matter into matter by the power of any finite agent. Such a change, however, can be made by the power of an infinite agent, which has control over all being, because the nature of being is common to both forms and to both matters; and whatever there is of being in the one, the author of being can change into whatever there is of being in the other, withdrawing that whereby it was distinguished from the other.

Whether the accidents of the bread and wine remain in this sacrament after the change?

Objection 1: It seems that the accidents of the bread and wine do not remain in this sacrament. For when that which comes first is removed, that which follows is also taken away. But substance is naturally before accident, as is proved in Metaph. vii. Since, then, after consecration, the substance of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, it seems that its accidents cannot remain.

Objection 2: Further, there ought not to be any deception in a sacrament of truth. But we judge of substance by accidents. It seems, then, that human judgment is deceived, if, while the accidents remain, the substance of the bread does not. Consequently this is unbecoming to this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, although our faith is not subject to reason, still it is not contrary to reason, but above it, as was said in the beginning of this work ([4536]FP, Q[1], A[6], ad 2; A[8]). But our reason has its origin in the senses. Therefore our faith ought not to be contrary to the senses, as it is when sense judges that to be bread which faith believes to be the substance of Christ’s body. Therefore it is not befitting this sacrament for the accidents of bread to remain subject to the senses, and for the substance of bread not to remain.

Objection 4: Further, what remains after the change has taken place seems to be the subject of change. If therefore the accidents of the bread remain after the change has been effected, it seems that the accidents are the subject of the change. But this is impossible; for “an accident cannot have an accident” (Metaph. iii). Therefore the accidents of the bread and wine ought not to remain in this sacrament.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Sentences of Prosper (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xiii): “Under the species which we behold, of bread and wine, we honor invisible things, i.e. flesh and blood.”

I answer that, It is evident to sense that all the accidents of the bread and wine remain after the consecration. And this is reasonably done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary, but horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And therefore Christ’s flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of under the species of those things which are the more commonly used by men, namely, bread and wine. Secondly, lest this sacrament might be derided by unbelievers, if we were to eat our Lord under His own species. Thirdly, that while we receive our Lord’s body and blood invisibly, this may redound to the merit of faith.

Reply to Objection 1: As is said in the book De Causis, an effect depends more on the first cause than on the second. And therefore by God’s power, which is the first cause of all things, it is possible for that which follows to remain, while that which is first is taken away.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no deception in this sacrament; for the accidents which are discerned by the senses are truly present. But the intellect, whose proper object is substance as is said in De Anima iii, is preserved by faith from deception.

And this serves as answer to the third argument; because faith is not contrary to the senses, but concerns things to which sense does not reach.

Reply to Objection 4: This change has not properly a subject, as was stated above (A[4], ad 1); nevertheless the accidents which remain have some resemblance of a subject.

Whether the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration?

Objection 1: It seems that the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration. For it has been said [4537](A[5]) that the accidents remain after the consecration. But since bread is an artificial thing, its form is an accident. Therefore it remains after the consecration.

Objection 2: Further, the form of Christ’s body is His soul: for it is said in De Anima ii, that the soul “is the act of a physical body which has life in potentiality.” But it cannot be said that the substantial form of the bread is changed into the soul. Therefore it appears that it remains after the consecration.

Objection 3: Further, the proper operation of a things follows its substantial form. But what remains in this sacrament, nourishes, and performs every operation which bread would do were it present. Therefore the substantial form of the bread remains in this sacrament after the consecration.

On the contrary, The substantial form of bread is of the substance of bread. But the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ, as stated above ([4538]AA[2],3,4). Therefore the substantial form of the bread does not remain.

I answer that, Some have contended that after the consecration not only do the accidents of the bread remain, but also its substantial form. But this cannot be. First of all, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain, nothing of the bread would be changed into the body of Christ, excepting the matter; and so it would follow that it would be changed, not into the whole body of Christ, but into its matter, which is repugnant to the form of the sacrament, wherein it is said: “This is My body.”

Secondly, because if the substantial form of the bread were to remain, it would remain either in matter, or separated from matter. The first cannot be, for if it were to remain in the matter of the bread, then the whole substance of the bread would remain, which is against what was said above [4539](A[2]). Nor could it remain in any other matter, because the proper form exists only in its proper matter. But if it were to remain separate from matter, it would then be an actually intelligible form, and also an intelligence; for all forms separated from matter are such.

Thirdly, it would be unbefitting this sacrament: because the accidents of the bread remain in this sacrament, in order that the body of Christ may be seen under them, and not under its proper species, as stated above [4540](A[5]).

And therefore it must be said that the substantial form of the bread does not remain.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to prevent art from making a thing whose form is not an accident, but a substantial form; as frogs and serpents can be produced by art: for art produces such forms not by its own power, but by the power of natural energies. And in this way it produces the substantial forms of bread, by the power of fire baking the matter made up of flour and water.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul is the form of the body, giving it the whole order of perfect being, i.e. being, corporeal being, and animated being, and so on. Therefore the form of the bread is changed into the form of Christ's body, according as the latter gives corporeal being, but not according as it bestows animated being.

Reply to Objection 3: Some of the operations of bread follow it by reason of the accidents, such as to affect the senses, and such operations are found in the species of the bread after the consecration on account of the accidents which remain. But some other operations follow the bread either by reason of the matter, such as that it is changed into something else, or else by reason of the substantial form, such as an operation consequent upon its species, for instance, that it "strengthens man's heart" (Ps. 103:15); and such operations are found in this sacrament, not on account of the form or matter remaining, but because they are bestowed miraculously upon the accidents themselves, as will be said later (Q[77], A[3], ad 2,3; [4541]AA[5],6).

Whether this change is wrought instantaneously?

Objection 1: It seems that this change is not wrought instantaneously, but successively. For in this change there is first the substance of bread, and afterwards the substance of Christ's body. Neither, then, is in the same instant, but in two instants. But there is a mid-time between every two instants. Therefore this change must take place according to the succession of time, which is between the last instant in which the bread is there, and the first instant in which the body of Christ is present.

Objection 2: Further, in every change something is "in becoming" and something is "in being." But these two things do not exist at the one time for, what is "in becoming," is not yet, whereas what is "in being," already is. Consequently, there is a before and an after in such change: and so necessarily the change cannot be instantaneous, but successive.

Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv) that this sacrament "is made by the words of Christ." But Christ's words are pronounced successively. Therefore the change takes place successively.

On the contrary, This change is effected by a power which is infinite, to which it belongs to operate in an instant.

I answer that, A change may be instantaneous from a threefold reason. First on the part of the form, which is the terminus of the change. For, if it be a form that receives more and less, it is acquired by its subject successively, such as health; and therefore because a substantial form does not receive more and less, it follows that its introduction into matter is instantaneous.

Secondly on the part of the subject, which sometimes is prepared successively for receiving the form; thus water is heated successively. When, however, the subject itself is in the ultimate disposition for receiving the form, it receives it suddenly, as a transparent body is illuminated suddenly. Thirdly on the part of the agent, which possesses infinite power: wherefore it can instantly dispose the matter for the form. Thus it is written (Mk. 7:34) that when Christ had said, "'Ephpheta,' which is 'Be thou opened,' immediately his ears were opened, and the string of his tongue was loosed."

For these three reasons this conversion is instantaneous. First, because the substance of Christ's body which is the term of this conversion, does not receive more or less. Secondly, because in this conversion there is no subject to be disposed successively. Thirdly, because it is effected by God's infinite power.

Reply to Objection 1: Some [*Cf. Albert the Great, Sent. iv, D, 11; St. Bonaventure, Sent., iv, D, 11] do not grant simply that there is a mid-time between every two instants. For they say that this is true of two instants referring to the same movement, but not if they refer to different things. Hence between the instant that marks the close of rest, and another which marks the beginning of movement, there is no mid-time. But in this they are mistaken, because the unity of time and of instant, or even their plurality, is not taken according to movements of any sort, but according to the first movement of the heavens, which is the measure of all movement and rest.

Accordingly others grant this of the time which measures movement depending on the movement of the heavens. But there are some movements which are not dependent on the movement of the heavens, nor measured by it, as was said in the [4542]FP, Q[53], A[3] concerning the movements of the angels. Hence between two instants responding to those movements there is no mid-time. But this is not to the point, because although the change in question has no relation of itself to the movement of the heavens, still it follows the pronouncing of the words, which (pronouncing) must necessarily be measured by the movement of the heavens. And therefore there must of necessity be a mid-time between every two signate instants in connection with that change.

Some say therefore that the instant in which the bread was last, and the instant in which the body of Christ is first, are indeed two in comparison with the things measured, but are one comparatively to the time measuring; as when two lines touch, there are two points on the part of the two lines, but one point on the part of the place containing them. But here there is no likeness, because instant and time is not the intrinsic measure of particular movements, as a line and point are of a body, but only the extrinsic measure, as place is to bodies.

Hence others say that it is the same instant in fact, but another according to reason. But according to this it would follow that things really opposite would exist together; for diversity of reason does not change a thing objectively.

And therefore it must be said that this change, as stated above, is wrought by Christ’s words which are spoken by the priest, so that the last instant of pronouncing the words is the first instant in which Christ’s body is in the sacrament; and that the substance of the bread is there during the whole preceding time. Of this time no instant is to be taken as proximately preceding the last one, because time is not made up of successive instants, as is proved in Phys. vi. And therefore a first instant can be assigned in which Christ’s body is present; but a last instant cannot be assigned in which the substance of bread is there, but a last time can be assigned. And the same holds good in natural changes, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys. viii).

Reply to Objection 2: In instantaneous changes a thing is “in becoming,” and is “in being” simultaneously; just as becoming illuminated and to be actually illuminated are simultaneous: for in such, a thing is said to be “in being” according as it now is; but to be “in becoming,” according as it was not before.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (ad 1), this change comes about in the last instant of the pronouncing of the words. for then the meaning of the words is finished, which meaning is efficacious in the forms of the sacraments. And therefore it does not follow that this change is successive.

Whether this proposition is false: “The body of Christ is made out of bread”?

Objection 1: It seems that this proposition is false: “The body of Christ is made out of bread.” For everything out of which another is made, is that which is made the other; but not conversely: for we say that a black thing is made out of a white thing, and that a white thing is made black: and although we may say that a man becomes black still we do not say that a black thing is made out of a man, as is shown in Phys. i. If it be true, then, that Christ’s body is made out of bread, it will be true to say that bread is made the body of Christ. But this seems to be false, because the bread is not the subject of the making, but rather its term. Therefore, it is not said truly that Christ’s body is made out of bread.

Objection 2: Further, the term of “becoming” is something that is, or something that is “made.” But this proposition is never true: “The bread is the body of Christ”; or “The bread is made the body of Christ”; or again, “The bread will be the body of Christ.” Therefore it seems that not even this is true: “The body of Christ is made out of bread.”

Objection 3: Further, everything out of which another is made is converted into that which is made from it. But this proposition seems to be false: “The bread is converted into the body of Christ,” because such conversion seems to be more miraculous than the creation of the world, in which it is not said that non-being is converted into being. Therefore it seems that this proposition likewise is false: “The body of Christ is made out of bread.”

Objection 4: Further, that out of which something is made, can be that thing. But this proposition is false: “Bread can be the body of Christ.” Therefore this is likewise false: “The body of Christ is made out of bread.”

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): “When the consecration takes place, the body of Christ is made out of the bread.”

I answer that, This conversion of bread into the body of Christ has something in common with creation, and with natural transmutation, and in some respect differs from both. For the order of the terms is common to these three; that is, that after one thing there is another (for, in creation there is being after non-being; in this sacrament, Christ’s body after the substance of bread; in natural transmutation white after black, or fire after air); and that the aforesaid terms are not coexistent.

Now the conversion, of which we are speaking, has this in common with creation, that in neither of them is there any common subject belonging to either of the extremes; the contrary of which appears in every natural transmutation.

Again, this conversion has something in common with natural transmutation in two respects, although not in the same fashion. First of all because in both, one of the extremes passes into the other, as bread into Christ’s body, and air into fire; whereas non-being is not converted into being. But this comes to pass differently on the one side and on the other; for in this sacrament the whole substance of the bread passes into the whole body of Christ; whereas in natural transmutation the matter of the one receives the form of the other, the previous form being laid aside. Secondly, they have this in common, that on both sides something remains the same; whereas this does not happen in creation: yet differently; for the same matter or subject remains in natural transmutation; whereas in this sacrament the same accidents remain.

From these observations we can gather the various ways of speaking in such matters. For, because in no one of the aforesaid three things are the extremes coexistent, therefore in none of them can one extreme be predicated of the other by the substantive verb of the present tense: for we do not say, “Non-being is being” or, “Bread is the body of Christ,” or, “Air is fire,” or, “White is black.” Yet because of the relationship of the extremes in all of them we can use the preposition “ex” [out of], which denotes order; for we can truly and properly say that “being is made out of non-being,” and “out of bread, the body of Christ,” and “out of air, fire,” and “out of white, black.” But because in creation one of the extremes does not pass into the other, we cannot use the word “conversion” in creation, so as to say that “non-being is converted into being”: we can, however, use the word in this sacrament, just as in natural transmutation. But since in this sacrament the whole substance is converted into the whole substance, on that account this conversion is properly termed transubstantiation.

Again, since there is no subject of this conversion, the things which are true in natural conversion by reason of the subject, are not to be granted in this conversion. And in the first place indeed it is evident that potentiality to the opposite follows a subject, by reason whereof we say that “a white thing can be black,” or that “air can be fire”; although the latter is not so proper as the former: for the subject of whiteness, in which there is potentiality to blackness, is the whole substance of the white thing; since whiteness is not a part thereof; whereas the subject of the form of air is part thereof: hence when it is said, “Air can be fire,” it is verified by synecdoche by reason of the part. But in this conversion, and similarly in creation, because there is no subject, it is not said that one extreme can be the other, as that “non-being can be being,” or that “bread can be the body of Christ”: and for the same reason it cannot be properly said that “being is made of [de] non-being,” or that “the body of Christ is made of bread,” because this preposition “of” [de] denotes a consubstantial cause, which consubstantiality of the extremes in natural transmutations is considered according to something common in the subject. And for the same reason it is not granted that “bread will be the body of Christ,” or that it “may become the body of Christ,” just as it is not granted in creation that “non-being will be being,” or that “non-being may become being,” because this manner of speaking is verified in natural transmutations by reason of the subject: for instance, when we say that “a white thing becomes black,” or “a white thing will be black.”

Nevertheless, since in this sacrament, after the change, something remains the same, namely, the accidents of the bread, as stated above [4543] (A[5]), some of these expressions may be admitted by way of similitude, namely, that “bread is the body of Christ,” or, “bread will be the body of Christ,” or “the body of Christ is made of bread”; provided that by the word “bread” is not understood the substance of bread, but in general “that which is contained under the species of bread,” under which species there is first contained the substance of bread, and afterwards the body of Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: That out of which something else is made, sometimes implies together with the subject, one of the extremes of the transmutation, as when it is said “a black thing is made out of a white one”; but sometimes it implies only the opposite or the extreme, as when it is said —“out of morning comes the day.” And so it is not granted that the latter becomes the former, that is, “that morning becomes the day.” So likewise in the matter in hand, although it may be said properly that “the body of Christ is made out of bread," yet it is not said properly that "bread becomes the body of Christ," except by similitude, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: That out of which another is made, will sometimes be that other because of the subject which is implied. And therefore, since there is no subject of this change, the comparison does not hold.

Reply to Objection 3: In this change there are many more difficulties than in creation, in which there is but this one difficulty, that something is made out of nothing; yet this belongs to the proper mode of production of the first cause, which presupposes nothing else. But in this conversion not only is it difficult for this whole to be changed into that whole, so that nothing of the former may remain (which does not belong to the common mode of production of a cause), but furthermore it has this difficulty that the accidents remain while the substance is destroyed, and many other difficulties of which we shall treat hereafter ([4544]Q[77]). Nevertheless the word "conversion" is admitted in this sacrament, but not in creation, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: As was observed above, potentiality belongs to the subject, whereas there is no subject in this conversion. And therefore it is not granted that bread can be the body of Christ: for this conversion does not come about by the passive potentiality of the creature, but solely by the active power of the Creator.

OF THE WAY IN WHICH CHRIST IS IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the manner in which Christ exists in this sacrament; and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the whole Christ is under this sacrament?

(2) Whether the entire Christ is under each species of the sacrament?

(3) Whether the entire Christ is under every part of the species?

(4) Whether all the dimensions of Christ's body are in this sacrament?

(5) Whether the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally?

(6) Whether after the consecration, the body of Christ is moved when the host or chalice is moved?

(7) Whether Christ's body, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by the eye?

(8) Whether the true body of Christ remains in this sacrament when He is seen under the appearance of a child or of flesh?

Whether the whole Christ is contained under this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under this sacrament, because Christ begins to be in this sacrament by conversion of the bread and wine. But it is evident that the bread and wine cannot be changed either into the Godhead or into the soul of Christ. Since therefore Christ exists in three substances, namely, the Godhead, soul and body, as shown above ([4545]Q[2], A[5];[4546] Q[5], AA[1],3), it seems that the entire Christ is not under this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is in this sacrament, forasmuch as it is ordained to the refection of the faithful, which consists in food and drink, as stated above ([4547]Q[74], A[1]). But our Lord said (Jn. 6:56): “My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed.” Therefore, only the flesh and blood of Christ are contained in this sacrament. But there are many other parts of Christ's body, for instance, the nerves, bones, and such like. Therefore the entire Christ is not contained under this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, a body of greater quantity cannot be contained under the measure of a lesser. But the measure of the bread and wine is much smaller than the measure of Christ’s body. Therefore it is impossible that the entire Christ be contained under this sacrament.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Officiis): “Christ is in this sacrament.”

I answer that, It is absolutely necessary to confess according to Catholic faith that the entire Christ is in this sacrament. Yet we must know that there is something of Christ in this sacrament in a twofold manner: first, as it were, by the power of the sacrament; secondly, from natural concomitance. By the power of the sacrament, there is under the species of this sacrament that into which the pre-existing substance of the bread and wine is changed, as expressed by the words of the form, which are effective in this as in the other sacraments; for instance, by the words: “This is My body,” or, “This is My blood.” But from natural concomitance there is also in this sacrament that which is really united with that thing wherein the aforesaid conversion is terminated. For if any two things be really united, then wherever the one is really, there must the other also be: since things really united together are only distinguished by an operation of the mind.

Reply to Objection 1: Because the change of the bread and wine is not terminated at the Godhead or the soul of Christ, it follows as a consequence that the Godhead or the soul of Christ is in this sacrament not by the power of the sacrament, but from real concomitance. For since the Godhead never set aside the assumed body, wherever the body of Christ is, there, of necessity, must the Godhead be; and therefore it is necessary for the Godhead to be in this sacrament concomitantly with His body. Hence we read in the profession of faith at Ephesus (P. I., chap. xxvi): “We are made partakers of the body and blood of Christ, not as taking common flesh, nor as of a holy man united to the Word in dignity, but the truly life-giving flesh of the Word Himself.”

On the other hand, His soul was truly separated from His body, as stated above ([4548]Q[50], A[5]). And therefore had this sacrament been celebrated during those three days when He was dead, the soul of Christ would not have been there, neither by the power of the sacrament, nor from real concomitance. But since “Christ rising from the dead dieth now no more” (Rom. 6:9), His soul is always really united with His body. And therefore in this sacrament the body indeed of Christ is present by the power of the sacrament, but His soul from real concomitance.

Reply to Objection 2: By the power of the sacrament there is contained under it, as to the species of the bread, not only the flesh, but the entire body of Christ, that is, the bones the nerves, and the like. And this is apparent from the form of this sacrament, wherein it is not said: “This is My flesh,” but “This is My body.” Accordingly, when our Lord said (Jn. 6:56): “My flesh is meat indeed,” there the word flesh is put for the entire body, because according to human custom it seems to be more adapted for eating, as men commonly are fed on the flesh of animals, but not on the bones or the like.

Reply to Objection 3: As has been already stated ([4549]Q[75], A[5]), after the consecration of the bread into the body of Christ, or of the wine into His blood, the accidents of both remain. From which it is evident that the dimensions of the bread or wine are not changed into the dimensions of the body of Christ, but substance into substance. And so the substance of Christ’s body or blood is under this sacrament by the power of the sacrament, but not the dimensions of Christ’s body or blood. Hence it is clear that the body of Christ is in this sacrament “by way of substance,” and not by way of quantity. But the proper totality of substance is contained indifferently in a small or large quantity; as the whole nature of air in a great or small amount of air, and the whole nature of a man in a big or small individual. Wherefore, after the consecration, the whole substance of Christ’s body and blood is contained in this sacrament, just as the whole substance of the bread and wine was contained there before the consecration.

Whether the whole Christ is contained under each species of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the whole Christ is not contained under both species of this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained for the salvation of the faithful, not by virtue of the species, but by virtue of what is contained under the species, because the species were there even before the consecration, from which comes the power of this sacrament. If nothing, then, be contained under one species, but what is contained under the other, and if the whole Christ be contained under both, it seems that one of them is superfluous in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, it was stated above (A[1], ad 1) that all the other parts of the body, such as the bones, nerves, and the like, are comprised under the name of flesh. But the blood is one of the parts of the human body, as Aristotle proves (De Anima Histor. i). If, then, Christ's blood be contained under the species of bread, just as the other parts of the body are contained there, the blood ought not to be consecrated apart, just as no other part of the body is consecrated separately.

Objection 3: Further, what is once "in being" cannot be again "in becoming." But Christ's body has already begun to be in this sacrament by the consecration of the bread. Therefore, it cannot begin again to be there by the consecration of the wine; and so Christ's body will not be contained under the species of the wine, and accordingly neither the entire Christ. Therefore the whole Christ is not contained under each species.

On the contrary, The gloss on 1 Cor. 11:25, commenting on the word "Chalice," says that "under each species," namely, of the bread and wine, "the same is received"; and thus it seems that Christ is entire under each species.

I answer that, After what we have said above [4550](A[1]), it must be held most certainly that the whole Christ is under each sacramental species yet not alike in each. For the body of Christ is indeed present under the species of bread by the power of the sacrament, while the blood is there from real concomitance, as stated above (A[1], ad 1) in regard to the soul and Godhead of Christ; and under the species of wine the blood is present by the power of the sacrament, and His body by real concomitance, as is also His soul and Godhead: because now Christ's blood is not separated from His body, as it was at the time of His Passion and death. Hence if this sacrament had been celebrated then, the body of Christ would have been under the species of the bread, but without the blood; and, under the species of the wine, the blood would have been present without the body, as it was then, in fact.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the whole Christ is under each species, yet it is so not without purpose. For in the first place this serves to represent Christ's Passion, in which the blood was separated from the body; hence in the form for the consecration of the blood mention is made of its shedding.

Secondly, it is in keeping with the use of this sacrament, that Christ's body be shown apart to the faithful as food, and the blood as drink. Thirdly, it is in keeping with its effect, in which sense it was stated above ([4551]Q[74], A[1]) that "the body is offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation of the soul."

Reply to Objection 2: In Christ's Passion, of which this is the memorial, the other parts of the body were not separated from one another, as the blood was, but the body remained entire, according to Ex. 12:46: "You shall not break a bone thereof." And therefore in this sacrament the blood is consecrated apart from the body, but no other part is consecrated separately from the rest.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the body of Christ is not under the species of wine by the power of the sacrament, but by real concomitance: and therefore by the consecration of the wine the body of Christ is not there of itself, but concomitantly.

Whether Christ is entire under every part of the species of the bread and wine?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ is not entire under every part of the species of bread and wine. Because those species can be divided infinitely. If therefore Christ be entirely under every part of the said species, it would follow that He is in this sacrament an infinite number of times: which is unreasonable; because the infinite is repugnant not only to nature, but likewise to grace.

Objection 2: Further, since Christ's is an organic body, it has parts determinately distant. for a determinate distance of the individual parts from each other is of the very nature of an organic body, as that of eye from eye, and eye from ear. But this could not be so, if Christ were entire under every part of the species; for every part would have to be under every other part, and so where one part would be, there another part would be. It cannot be then that the entire Christ is under every part of the host or of the wine contained in the chalice.

Objection 3: Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Now it is the nature of a body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. iv). But it belongs to the nature of this quantity that the various parts exist in various parts of place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the entire Christ to be under every part of the species.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (Gregory, Sacramentarium): "Each receives Christ the Lord, Who is entire under every morsel, nor is He less in each portion, but bestows Himself entire under each."

I answer that, As was observed above (A[1], ad 3), because the substance of Christ's body is in this sacrament by the power of the sacrament, while dimensive quantity is there by reason of real concomitance, consequently Christ's body is in this sacrament substantively, that is, in the way in which substance is under dimensions, but not after the manner of dimensions, which means, not in the way in which the dimensive quantity of a body is under the dimensive quantity of place.

Now it is evident that the whole nature of a substance is under every part of the dimensions under which it is contained; just as the entire nature of air is under every part of air, and the entire nature of bread under every part of bread; and this indifferently, whether the dimensions be actually divided (as when the air is divided or the bread cut), or whether they be actually undivided, but potentially divisible. And therefore it is manifest that the entire Christ is under every part of the species of the bread, even while the host remains entire, and not merely when it is broken, as some say, giving the example of an image which appears in a mirror, which appears as one in the unbroken mirror, whereas when the mirror is broken, there is an image in each part of the broken mirror: for the comparison is not perfect, because the multiplying of such images results in the broken mirror on account of the various reflections in the various parts of the mirror; but here there is only one consecration, whereby Christ's body is in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Number follows division, and therefore so long as quantity remains actually undivided, neither is the substance of any thing several times under its proper dimensions, nor is Christ's body several times under the dimensions of the bread; and consequently not an infinite number of times, but just as many times as it is divided into parts.

Reply to Objection 2: The determinate distance of parts in an organic body is based upon its dimensive quantity; but the nature of substance precedes even dimensive quantity. And since the conversion of the substance of the bread is terminated at the substance of the body of Christ, and since according to the manner of substance the body of Christ is properly and directly in this sacrament; such distance of parts is indeed in Christ’s true body, which, however, is not compared to this sacrament according to such distance, but according to the manner of its substance, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 3: This argument is based on the nature of a body, arising from dimensive quantity. But it was said above (ad 2) that Christ’s body is compared with this sacrament not by reason of dimensive quantity, but by reason of its substance, as already stated.

Whether the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is not in this sacrament. For it was said [4552](A[3]) that Christ’s entire body is contained under every part of the consecrated host. But no dimensive quantity is contained entirely in any whole, and in its every part. Therefore it is impossible for the entire dimensive quantity of Christ’s body to be there.

Objection 2: Further, it is impossible for two dimensive quantities to be together, even though one be separate from its subject, and the other in a natural body, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii). But the dimensive quantity of the bread remains in this sacrament, as is evident to our senses. Consequently, the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is not there.

Objection 3: Further, if two unequal dimensive quantities be set side by side, the greater will overlap the lesser. But the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is considerably larger than the dimensive quantity of the consecrated host according to every dimension. Therefore, if the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body be in this sacrament together with the dimensive quantity of the host, the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is extended beyond the quantity of the host, which nevertheless is not without the substance of Christ’s body. Therefore, the substance of Christ’s body will be in this sacrament even outside the species of the bread, which is unreasonable, since the substance of Christ’s body is in this sacrament, only by the consecration of the bread, as stated above [4553](A[2]). Consequently, it is impossible for the whole dimensive quantity of Christ’s body to be in this sacrament.

On the contrary, The existence of the dimensive quantity of any body cannot be separated from the existence of its substance. But in this sacrament the entire substance of Christ's body is present, as stated above ([4554]AA[1],3). Therefore the entire dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament.

I answer that, As stated above [4555](A[1]), any part of Christ is in this sacrament in two ways: in one way, by the power of the sacrament; in another, from real concomitance. By the power of the sacrament the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is not in this sacrament; for, by the power of the sacrament that is present in this sacrament, whereat the conversion is terminated. But the conversion which takes place in this sacrament is terminated directly at the substance of Christ's body, and not at its dimensions; which is evident from the fact that the dimensive quantity of the bread remains after the consecration, while only the substance of the bread passes away.

Nevertheless, since the substance of Christ's body is not really deprived of its dimensive quantity and its other accidents, hence it comes that by reason of real concomitance the whole dimensive quantity of Christ's body and all its other accidents are in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The manner of being of every thing is determined by what belongs to it of itself, and not according to what is coupled accidentally with it: thus an object is present to the sight, according as it is white, and not according as it is sweet, although the same object may be both white and sweet; hence sweetness is in the sight after the manner of whiteness, and not after that of sweetness. Since, then, the substance of Christ's body is present on the altar by the power of this sacrament, while its dimensive quantity is there concomitantly and as it were accidentally, therefore the dimensive quantity of Christ's body is in this sacrament, not according to its proper manner (namely, that the whole is in the whole, and the individual parts in individual parts), but after the manner of substance, whose nature is for the whole to be in the whole, and the whole in every part.

Reply to Objection 2: Two dimensive quantities cannot naturally be in the same subject at the same time, so that each be there according to the proper manner of dimensive quantity. But in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread is there after its proper manner, that is, according to commensuration: not so the dimensive quantity of Christ’s body, for that is there after the manner of substance, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of Christ’s body is in this sacrament not by way of commensuration, which is proper to quantity, and to which it belongs for the greater to be extended beyond the lesser; but in the way mentioned above (ad 1,2).

Whether Christ’s body is in this sacrament as in a place?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ’s body is in this sacrament as in a place. Because, to be in a place definitively or circumscriptively belongs to being in a place. But Christ’s body seems to be definitively in this sacrament, because it is so present where the species of the bread and wine are, that it is nowhere else upon the altar: likewise it seems to be there circumscriptively, because it is so contained under the species of the consecrated host, that it neither exceeds it nor is exceeded by it. Therefore Christ’s body is in this sacrament as in a place.

Objection 2: Further, the place of the bread and wine is not empty, because nature abhors a vacuum; nor is the substance of the bread there, as stated above ([4556]Q[75], A[2]); but only the body of Christ is there. Consequently the body of Christ fills that place. But whatever fills a place is there locally. Therefore the body of Christ is in this sacrament locally.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [4557](A[4]), the body of Christ is in this sacrament with its dimensive quantity, and with all its accidents. But to be in a place is an accident of a body; hence “where” is numbered among the nine kinds of accidents. Therefore Christ’s body is in this sacrament locally.

On the contrary, The place and the object placed must be equal, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. iv). But the place, where this sacrament is, is much less than the body of Christ. Therefore Christ’s body is not in this sacrament as in a place.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ’s body is in this sacrament not after the proper manner of dimensive quantity, but rather after the manner of substance. But every body occupying a place is in the place according to the manner of dimensive quantity, namely, inasmuch as it is commensurate with the place according to its dimensive quantity.

Hence it remains that Christ’s body is not in this sacrament as in a place, but after the manner of substance, that is to say, in that way in which substance is contained by dimensions; because the substance of Christ’s body succeeds the substance of bread in this sacrament: hence as the substance of bread was not locally under its dimensions, but after the manner of substance, so neither is the substance of Christ’s body. Nevertheless the substance of Christ’s body is not the subject of those dimensions, as was the substance of the bread: and therefore the substance of the bread was there locally by reason of its dimensions, because it was compared with that place through the medium of its own dimensions; but the substance of Christ’s body is compared with that place through the medium of foreign dimensions, so that, on the contrary, the proper dimensions of Christ’s body are compared with that place through the medium of substance; which is contrary to the notion of a located body.

Hence in no way is Christ’s body locally in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s body is not in this sacrament definitively, because then it would be only on the particular altar where this sacrament is performed: whereas it is in heaven under its own species, and on many other altars under the sacramental species. Likewise it is evident that it is not in this sacrament circumscriptively, because it is not there according to the commensuration of its own quantity, as stated above. But that it is not outside the superficies of the sacrament, nor on any other part of the altar, is due not to its being there definitively or circumscriptively, but to its being there by consecration and conversion of the bread and wine, as stated above [4558](A[1]; Q[15], A[2], sqq.).

Reply to Objection 2: The place in which Christ’s body is, is not empty; nor yet is it properly filled with the substance of Christ’s body, which is not there locally, as stated above; but it is filled with the sacramental species, which have to fill the place either because of the nature of dimensions, or at least miraculously, as they also subsist miraculously after the fashion of substance.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above [4559](A[4]), the accidents of Christ’s body are in this sacrament by real concomitance. And therefore those accidents of Christ’s body which are intrinsic to it are in this sacrament. But to be in a place is an accident when compared with the extrinsic container. And therefore it is not necessary for Christ to be in this sacrament as in a place.

Whether Christ's body is in this sacrament movably?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is movably in this sacrament, because the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that "when we are moved, the things within us are moved": and this is true even of the soul's spiritual substance. "But Christ is in this sacrament," as shown above ([4560]Q[74], A[1]). Therefore He is moved when it is moved.

Objection 2: Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure. But, according to the commandment (Ex. 12:10), concerning the Paschal Lamb, a figure of this sacrament, "there remained nothing until the morning." Neither, therefore, if this sacrament be reserved until morning, will Christ's body be there; and so it is not immovably in this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, if Christ's body were to remain under this sacrament even until the morrow, for the same reason it will remain there during all coming time; for it cannot be said that it ceases to be there when the species pass, because the existence of Christ's body is not dependent on those species. Yet Christ does not remain in this sacrament for all coming time. It seems, then, that straightway on the morrow, or after a short time, He ceases to be under this sacrament. And so it seems that Christ is in this sacrament movably.

On the contrary, it is impossible for the same thing to be in motion and at rest, else contradictories would be verified of the same subject. But Christ's body is at rest in heaven. Therefore it is not movably in this sacrament.

I answer that, When any thing is one, as to subject, and manifold in being, there is nothing to hinder it from being moved in one respect, and yet to remain at rest in another just as it is one thing for a body to be white, and another thing, to be large; hence it can be moved as to its whiteness, and yet continue unmoved as to its magnitude. But in Christ, being in Himself and being under the sacrament are not the same thing, because when we say that He is under this sacrament, we express a kind of relationship to this sacrament. According to this being, then, Christ is not moved locally of Himself, but only accidentally, because Christ is not in this sacrament as in a place, as stated above [4561](A[5]). But what is not in a place, is not moved of itself locally, but only according to the motion of the subject in which it is.

In the same way neither is it moved of itself according to the being which it has in this sacrament, by any other change whatever, as for instance, that it ceases to be under this sacrament: because whatever possesses unfailing existence of itself, cannot be the principle of failing; but when something else fails, then it ceases to be in it; just as God, Whose existence is unfailing and immortal, ceases to be in some corruptible creature because such corruptible creature ceases to exist. And in this way, since Christ has unfailing and incorruptible being, He ceases to be under this sacrament, not because He ceases to be, nor yet by local movement of His own, as is clear from what has been said, but only by the fact that the sacramental species cease to exist.

Hence it is clear that Christ, strictly speaking is immovably in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument deals with accidental movement, whereby things within us are moved together with us. But with things which can of themselves be in a place, like bodies, it is otherwise than with things which cannot of themselves be in a place, such as forms and spiritual substances. And to this mode can be reduced what we say of Christ, being moved accidentally, according to the existence which He has in this sacrament, in which He is not present as in a place.

Reply to Objection 2: It was this argument which seems to have convinced those who held that Christ's body does not remain under this sacrament if it be reserved until the morrow. It is against these that Cyril says (Ep. lxxxiii): "Some are so foolish as to say that the mystical blessing departs from the sacrament, if any of its fragments remain until the next day: for Christ's consecrated body is not changed, and the power of the blessing, and the life-giving grace is perpetually in it." Thus are all other consecrations irremovable so long as the consecrated things endure; on which account they are not repeated. And although the truth corresponds with the figure, still the figure cannot equal it.

Reply to Objection 3: The body of Christ remains in this sacrament not only until the morrow, but also in the future, so long as the sacramental species remain: and when they cease, Christ's body ceases to be under them, not because it depends on them, but because the relationship of

Christ’s body to those species is taken away, in the same way as God ceases to be the Lord of a creature which ceases to exist.

Whether the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by any eye, at least by a glorified one?

Objection 1: It seems that the body of Christ, as it is in this sacrament, can be seen by the eye, at least by a glorified one. For our eyes are hindered from beholding Christ’s body in this sacrament, on account of the sacramental species veiling it. But the glorified eye cannot be hindered by anything from seeing bodies as they are. Therefore, the glorified eye can see Christ’s body as it is in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the glorified bodies of the saints will be “made like to the body” of Christ’s “glory,” according to Phil. 3:21. But Christ’s eye beholds Himself as He is in this sacrament. Therefore, for the same reason, every other glorified eye can see Him.

Objection 3: Further, in the resurrection the saints will be equal to the angels, according to Lk. 20:36. But the angels see the body of Christ as it is in this sacrament, for even the devils are found to pay reverence thereto, and to fear it. Therefore, for like reason, the glorified eye can see Christ as He is in this sacrament.

On the contrary, As long as a thing remains the same, it cannot at the same time be seen by the same eye under diverse species. But the glorified eye sees Christ always, as He is in His own species, according to Is. 33:17: “(His eyes) shall see the king in his beauty.” It seems, then, that it does not see Christ, as He is under the species of this sacrament.

I answer that, The eye is of two kinds, namely, the bodily eye properly so-called, and the intellectual eye, so-called by similitude. But Christ’s body as it is in this sacrament cannot be seen by any bodily eye. First of all, because a body which is visible brings about an alteration in the medium, through its accidents. Now the accidents of Christ’s body are in this sacrament by means of the substance; so that the accidents of Christ’s body have no immediate relationship either to this sacrament or to adjacent bodies; consequently they do not act on the medium so as to be seen by any corporeal eye. Secondly, because, as stated above (A[1], ad 3; A[3]), Christ’s body is substantially present in this sacrament. But substance, as such, is not visible to the bodily eye, nor does it come under any one of the senses, nor under the imagination, but solely under the intellect, whose object is “what a thing is” (De Anima iii). And therefore, properly speaking, Christ’s body, according to the mode of being which it has in this sacrament, is perceptible neither by the sense nor by the imagination, but only by the intellect, which is called the spiritual eye.

Moreover it is perceived differently by different intellects. For since the way in which Christ is in this sacrament is entirely supernatural, it is visible in itself to a supernatural, i.e. the Divine, intellect, and consequently to a beatified intellect, of angel or of man, which, through the participated glory of the Divine intellect, sees all supernatural things in the vision of the Divine Essence. But it can be seen by a wayfarer through faith alone, like other supernatural things. And not even the angelic intellect of its own natural power is capable of beholding it; consequently the devils cannot by their intellect perceive Christ in this sacrament, except through faith, to which they do not pay willing assent; yet they are convinced of it from the evidence of signs, according to James 2:19: “The devils believe, and tremble.”

Reply to Objection 1: Our bodily eye, on account of the sacramental species, is hindered from beholding the body of Christ underlying them, not merely as by way of veil (just as we are hindered from seeing what is covered with any corporeal veil), but also because Christ’s body bears a relation to the medium surrounding this sacrament, not through its own accidents, but through the sacramental species.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ’s own bodily eye sees Himself existing under the sacrament, yet it cannot see the way in which it exists under the sacrament, because that belongs to the intellect. But it is not the same with any other glorified eye, because Christ’s eye is under this sacrament, in which no other glorified eye is conformed to it.

Reply to Objection 3: No angel, good or bad, can see anything with a bodily eye, but only with the mental eye. Hence there is no parallel reason, as is evident from what was said above.

Whether Christ’s body is truly there when flesh or a child appears miraculously in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ's body is not truly there when flesh or a child appears miraculously in this sacrament. Because His body ceases to be under this sacrament when the sacramental species cease to be present, as stated above [4562](A[6]). But when flesh or a child appears, the sacramental species cease to be present. Therefore Christ's body is not truly there.

Objection 2: Further, wherever Christ's body is, it is there either under its own species, or under those of the sacrament. But when such apparitions occur, it is evident that Christ is not present under His own species, because the entire Christ is contained in this sacrament, and He remains entire under the form in which He ascended to heaven: yet what appears miraculously in this sacrament is sometimes seen as a small particle of flesh, or at times as a small child. Now it is evident that He is not there under the sacramental species, which is that of bread or wine. Consequently, it seems that Christ's body is not there in any way.

Objection 3: Further, Christ's body begins to be in this sacrament by consecration and conversion, as was said above ([4563]Q[75], AA[2],3,4). But the flesh and blood which appear by miracle are not consecrated, nor are they converted into Christ's true body and blood. Therefore the body or the blood of Christ is not under those species.

On the contrary, When such apparition takes place, the same reverence is shown to it as was shown at first, which would not be done if Christ were not truly there, to Whom we show reverence of "latria." Therefore, when such apparition occurs, Christ is under the sacrament.

I answer that, Such apparition comes about in two ways, when occasionally in this sacrament flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen. Sometimes it happens on the part of the beholders, whose eyes are so affected as if they outwardly saw flesh, or blood, or a child, while no change takes place in the sacrament. And this seems to happen when to one person it is seen under the species of flesh or of a child, while to others it is seen as before under the species of bread; or when to the same individual it appears for an hour under the appearance of flesh or a child, and afterwards under the appearance of bread. Nor is there any deception there, as occurs in the feats of magicians, because such species is divinely formed in the eye in order to represent some truth, namely, for the purpose of showing that Christ's body is truly under this sacrament; just as Christ without deception appeared to the disciples who were going to Emmaus. For Augustine says (De Qq. Evang. ii) that “when our pretense is referred to some significance, it is not a lie, but a figure of the truth.” And since in this way no change is made in the sacrament, it is manifest that, when such apparition occurs, Christ does not cease to be under this sacrament.

But it sometimes happens that such apparition comes about not merely by a change wrought in the beholders, but by an appearance which really exists outwardly. And this indeed is seen to happen when it is beheld by everyone under such an appearance, and it remains so not for an hour, but for a considerable time; and, in this case some think that it is the proper species of Christ’s body. Nor does it matter that sometimes Christ’s entire body is not seen there, but part of His flesh, or else that it is not seen in youthful guise. but in the semblance of a child, because it lies within the power of a glorified body for it to be seen by a non-glorified eye either entirely or in part, and under its own semblance or in strange guise, as will be said later ([4564]XP, Q[85], AA[2],3).

But this seems unlikely. First of all, because Christ’s body under its proper species can be seen only in one place, wherein it is definitively contained. Hence since it is seen in its proper species, and is adored in heaven, it is not seen under its proper species in this sacrament. Secondly, because a glorified body, which appears at will, disappears when it wills after the apparition; thus it is related (Lk. 24:31) that our Lord “vanished out of sight” of the disciples. But that which appears under the likeness of flesh in this sacrament, continues for a long time; indeed, one reads of its being sometimes enclosed, and, by order of many bishops, preserved in a pyx, which it would be wicked to think of Christ under His proper semblance.

Consequently, it remains to be said, that, while the dimensions remain the same as before, there is a miraculous change wrought in the other accidents, such as shape, color, and the rest, so that flesh, or blood, or a child, is seen. And, as was said already, this is not deception, because it is done “to represent the truth,” namely, to show by this miraculous apparition that Christ’s body and blood are truly in this sacrament. And thus it is clear that as the dimensions remain, which are the foundation of the other accidents, as we shall see later on ([4565]Q[77], A[2]), the body of Christ truly remains in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: When such apparition takes place, the sacramental species sometimes continue entire in themselves; and sometimes only as to that which is principal, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, during such apparitions Christ's proper semblance is not seen, but a species miraculously formed either in the eyes of the beholders, or in the sacramental dimensions themselves, as was said above.

Reply to Objection 3: The dimensions of the consecrated bread and wine continue, while a miraculous change is wrought in the other accidents, as stated above.

OF THE ACCIDENTS WHICH REMAIN IN THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the accidents which remain in this sacrament; under which head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the accidents which remain are without a subject?

(2) Whether dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents?

(3) Whether such accidents can affect an extrinsic body?

(4) Whether they can be corrupted?

(5) Whether anything can be generated from them?

(6) Whether they can nourish?

(7) Of the breaking of the consecrated bread?

(8) Whether anything can be mixed with the consecrated wine?

Whether the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject?

Objection 1: It seems that the accidents do not remain in this sacrament without a subject, because there ought not to be anything disorderly or deceitful in this sacrament of truth. But for accidents to be without a subject is contrary to the order which God established in nature; and furthermore it seems to savor of deceit, since accidents are naturally the signs of the nature of the subject. Therefore the accidents are not without a subject in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, not even by miracle can the definition of a thing be severed from it, or the definition of another thing be applied to it; for instance, that, while man remains a man, he can be an irrational animal. For it would follow that contradictories can exist at the one time: for the "definition of a thing is what its name expresses," as is said in Metaph. iv. But it belongs to the definition of an accident for it to be in a subject, while the definition of substance is that it must subsist of itself, and not in another. Therefore it cannot come to pass, even by miracle, that the accidents exist without a subject in this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, an accident is individuated by its subject. If therefore the accidents remain in this sacrament without a subject, they will not be individual, but general, which is clearly false, because thus they would not be sensible, but merely intelligible.

Objection 4: Further, the accidents after the consecration of this sacrament do not obtain any composition. But before the consecration they were not composed either of matter and form, nor of existence [quo est] and essence [quod est]. Therefore, even after consecration they are not composite in either of these ways. But this is unreasonable, for thus they would be simpler than angels, whereas at the same time these accidents are perceptible to the senses. Therefore, in this sacrament the accidents do not remain without a subject.

On the contrary, Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx) that "the sacramental species are the names of those things which were there before, namely, of the bread and wine." Therefore since the substance of the bread and the wine does not remain, it seems that these species remain without a subject.

I answer that, The species of the bread and wine, which are perceived by our senses to remain in this sacrament after consecration, are not subjected in the substance of the bread and wine, for that does not remain, as stated above ([4566]Q[75], A[2]); nor in the substantial form, for that does not remain ([4567]Q[75], A[6]), and if it did remain, "it could not be a subject," as Boethius declares (De Trin. i). Furthermore it is manifest that these accidents are not subjected in the substance of Christ's body and blood, because the substance of the human body cannot in any way be affected by such accidents; nor is it possible for Christ's glorious and impassible body to be altered so as to receive these qualities.

Now there are some who say that they are in the surrounding atmosphere as in a subject. But even this cannot be: in the first place, because atmosphere is not susceptive of such accidents. Secondly, because these accidents are not where the atmosphere is, nay more, the atmosphere is displaced by the motion of these species. Thirdly, because accidents do not pass from subject to subject, so that the same identical accident which was first in one subject be afterwards in another; because an accident is individuated by the subject; hence it cannot come to pass for an accident remaining identically the same to be at one time in one subject, and at another time in another. Fourthly, since the atmosphere is not deprived of its own accidents, it would have at the one time its own accidents and others foreign to it. Nor can it be maintained that this is done miraculously in virtue of the consecration, because the words of consecration do not signify this, and they effect only what they signify.

Therefore it follows that the accidents continue in this sacrament without a subject. This can be done by Divine power: for since an effect depends more upon the first cause than on the second, God Who is the first cause both of substance and accident, can by His unlimited power preserve an accident in existence when the substance is withdrawn whereby it was preserved in existence as by its proper cause, just as without natural causes He can produce other effects of natural causes, even as He formed a human body in the Virgin’s womb, “without the seed of man” (Hymn for Christmas, First Vespers).

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing to hinder the common law of nature from ordaining a thing, the contrary of which is nevertheless ordained by a special privilege of grace, as is evident in the raising of the dead, and in the restoring of sight to the blind: even thus in human affairs, to some individuals some things are granted by special privilege which are outside the common law. And so, even though it be according to the common law of nature for an accident to be in a subject, still for a special reason, according to the order of grace, the accidents exist in this sacrament without a subject, on account of the reasons given above ([4568]Q[75] , A[5]).

Reply to Objection 2: Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the definition of substance is not—“a being of itself without a subject,” nor is the definition of accident—“a being in a subject”; but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance “to have existence not in a subject”; while it belongs to the quiddity or essence of accident “to have existence in a subject.” But in this sacrament it is not in virtue of their essence that accidents are not in a subject, but through the Divine power sustaining them; and consequently they do not cease to be accidents, because neither is the definition of accident withdrawn from them, nor does the definition of substance apply to them.

Reply to Objection 3: These accidents acquired individual being in the substance of the bread and wine; and when this substance is changed into the body and blood of Christ, they remain in that individuated being which they possessed before, hence they are individual and sensible.

Reply to Objection 4: These accidents had no being of their own nor other accidents, so long as the substance of the bread and wine remained; but their subjects had “such” being through them, just as snow is “white” through whiteness. But after the consecration the accidents which remain have being; hence they are compounded of existence and essence, as was said of the angels, in the [4569]FP, Q[50], A[2], ad 3; and besides they have composition of quantitative parts.

Whether in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is the subject of the other accidents?

Objection 1: It seems that in this sacrament the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine is not the subject of the other accidents. For accident is not the subject of accident; because no form can be a subject, since to be a subject is a property of matter. But dimensive quantity is an accident. Therefore dimensive quantity cannot be the subject of the other accidents.

Objection 2: Further, just as quantity is individuated by substance, so also are the other accidents. If, then, the dimensive quantity of the bread or wine remains individuated according to the being it had before, in which it is preserved, for like reason the other accidents remain individuated according to the existence which they had before in the substance. Therefore they are not in dimensive quantity as in a subject, since every accident is individuated by its own subject.

Objection 3: Further, among the other accidents that remain, of the bread and wine, the senses perceive also rarity and density, which cannot be in dimensive quantity existing outside matter; because a thing is rare which has little matter under great dimensions. while a thing is dense which has much matter under small dimensions, as is said in Phys. iv. It does not seem, then, that dimensive quantity can be the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, quantity abstract from matter seems to be mathematical quantity, which is not the subject of sensible qualities. Since, then, the remaining accidents in this sacrament are sensible, it seems that in this sacrament they cannot be subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains after consecration.

On the contrary, Qualities are divisible only accidentally, that is, by reason of the subject. But the qualities remaining in this sacrament are divided by the division of dimensive quantity, as is evident through our senses. Therefore, dimensive quantity is the subject of the accidents which remain in this sacrament.

I answer that, It is necessary to say that the other accidents which remain in this sacrament are subjected in the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine that remains: first of all, because something having quantity and color and affected by other accidents is perceived by the senses; nor is sense deceived in such. Secondly, because the first disposition of matter is dimensive quantity, hence Plato also assigned “great” and “small” as the first differences of matter (Aristotle, Metaph. iv). And because the first subject is matter, the consequence is that all other accidents are related to their subject through the medium of dimensive quantity; just as the first subject of color is said to be the surface, on which account some have maintained that dimensions are the substances of bodies, as is said in Metaph. iii. And since, when the subject is withdrawn, the accidents remain according to the being which they had before, it follows that all accidents remain founded upon dimensive quantity.

Thirdly, because, since the subject is the principle of individuation of the accidents, it is necessary for what is admitted as the subject of some accidents to be somehow the principle of individuation: for it is of the very notion of an individual that it cannot be in several; and this happens in two ways. First, because it is not natural to it to be in any one; and in this way immaterial separated forms, subsisting of themselves, are also individuals of themselves. Secondly, because a form, be it substantial or accidental, is naturally in someone indeed, not in several, as this whiteness, which is in this body. As to the first, matter is the principle of individuation of all inherent forms, because, since these forms, considered in themselves, are naturally in something as in a subject, from the very fact that one of them is received in matter, which is not in another, it follows that neither can the form itself thus existing be in another. As to the second, it must be maintained that the principle of individuation is dimensive quantity. For that something is naturally in another one solely, is due to the fact that that other is undivided in itself, and distinct from all others. But it is on account of quantity that substance can be divided, as is said in Phys. i. And therefore dimensive quantity itself is a particular principle of individuation in forms of this kind, namely, inasmuch as forms numerically distinct are in different parts of the matter. Hence also dimensive quantity has of itself a kind of individuation, so that we can imagine several lines of the same species, differing in position, which is included in the notion of this quantity; for it belongs to dimension for it to be "quantity having position" (Aristotle, Categor. iv), and therefore dimensive quantity can be the subject of the other accidents, rather than the other way about.

Reply to Objection 1: One accident cannot of itself be the subject of another, because it does not exist of itself. But inasmuch as an accident is received in another thing, one is said to be the subject of the other, inasmuch as one is received in a subject through another, as the surface is said to be the subject of color. Hence when God makes an accident to exist of itself, it can also be of itself the subject of another.

Reply to Objection 2: The other accidents, even as they were in the substance of the bread, were individuated by means of dimensive quantity, as stated above. And therefore dimensive quantity is the subject of the other accidents remaining in this sacrament, rather than conversely.

Reply to Objection 3: Rarity and density are particular qualities accompanying bodies, by reason of their having much or little matter under dimensions; just as all other accidents likewise follow from the principles of substance. And consequently, as the accidents are preserved by Divine power when the substance is withdrawn, so, when matter is withdrawn, the qualities which go with matter, such as rarity and density, are preserved by Divine power.

Reply to Objection 4: Mathematical quantity abstracts not from intelligible matter, but from sensible matter, as is said in Metaph. vii. But matter is termed sensible because it underlies sensible qualities. And therefore it is manifest that the dimensive quantity, which remains in this sacrament without a subject, is not mathematical quantity.

Whether the species remaining in this sacrament can change external objects?

Objection 1: It seems that the species which remain in this sacrament cannot affect external objects. For it is proved in Phys. vii, that forms which are in matter are produced by forms that are in matter, but not from forms which are without matter, because like makes like. But the sacramental species are species without matter, since they remain without a subject, as is evident from what was said above [4570](A[1]). Therefore they cannot affect other matter by producing any form in it.

Objection 2: Further, when the action of the principal agent ceases, then the action of the instrument must cease, as when the carpenter rests, the hammer is moved no longer. But all accidental forms act instrumentally in virtue of the substantial form as the principal agent. Therefore, since the substantial form of the bread and wine does not remain in this sacrament, as was shown above ([4571]Q[75], A[6]), it seems that the accidental forms which remain cannot act so as to change external matter.

Objection 3: Further, nothing acts outside its species, because an effect cannot surpass its cause. But all the sacramental species are accidents. Therefore they cannot change external matter, at least as to a substantial form.

On the contrary, If they could not change external bodies, they could not be felt; for a thing is felt from the senses being changed by a sensible thing, as is said in De Anima ii.

I answer that, Because everything acts in so far as it is an actual being, the consequence is that everything stands in the same relation to action as it does to being. Therefore, because, according to what was said above [4572](A[1]), it is an effect of the Divine power that the sacramental species continue in the being which they had when the substance of the bread and wine was present, it follows that they continue in their action. Consequently they retain every action which they had while the substance of the bread and wine remained, now that the substance of the bread and wine has passed into the body and blood of Christ. Hence there is no doubt but that they can change external bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: The sacramental species, although they are forms existing without matter, still retain the same being which they had before in matter, and therefore as to their being they are like forms which are in matter.

Reply to Objection 2: The action of an accidental form depends upon the action of a substantial form in the same way as the being of accident depends upon the being of substance; and therefore, as it is an effect of Divine power that the sacramental species exist without substance, so is it an effect of Divine power that they can act without a substantial form, because every action of a substantial or accidental form depends upon God as the first agent.

Reply to Objection 3: The change which terminates in a substantial form is not effected by a substantial form directly, but by means of the active and passive qualities, which act in virtue of the substantial form. But by Divine power this instrumental energy is retained in the sacramental species, just as it was before: and consequently their action can be directed to a substantial form instrumentally, just in the same way as anything can act outside its species, not as by its own power, but by the power of the chief agent.

Whether the sacramental species can be corrupted?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot be corrupted, because corruption comes of the separation of the form from the matter. But the matter of the bread does not remain in this sacrament, as is clear from what was said above ([4573]Q[75], A[2]). Therefore these species cannot be corrupted.

Objection 2: Further, no form is corrupted except accidentally, that is, when its subject is corrupted; hence self-subsisting forms are incorruptible, as is seen in spiritual substances. But the sacramental species are forms without a subject. Therefore they cannot be corrupted.

Objection 3: Further, if they be corrupted, it will either be naturally or miraculously. But they cannot be corrupted naturally, because no subject of corruption can be assigned as remaining after the corruption has taken place. Neither can they be corrupted miraculously, because the miracles which occur in this sacrament take place in virtue of the consecration, whereby the sacramental species are preserved: and the same thing is not the cause of preservation and of corruption. Therefore, in no way can the sacramental species be corrupted.

On the contrary, We perceive by our senses that the consecrated hosts become putrefied and corrupted.

I answer that, Corruption is "movement from being into non-being" (Aristotle, Phys. v). Now it has been stated [4574](A[3]) that the sacramental species retain the same being as they had before when the substance of the bread was present. Consequently, as the being of those accidents could be corrupted while the substance of the bread and wine was present, so likewise they can be corrupted now that the substance has passed away.

But such accidents could have been previously corrupted in two ways: in one way, of themselves; in another way, accidentally. They could be corrupted of themselves, as by alteration of the qualities, and increase or decrease of the quantity, not in the way in which increase or decrease is found only in animated bodies, such as the substances of the bread and wine are not, but by addition or division; for, as is said in Metaph. iii, one dimension is dissolved by division, and two dimensions result; while on the contrary, by addition, two dimensions become one. And in this way such accidents can be corrupted manifestly after consecration, because the dimensive quantity which remains can receive division and addition; and since it is the subject of sensible qualities, as stated above [4575](A[1]), it can likewise be the subject of their alteration, for instance, if the color or the savor of the bread or wine be altered.

An accident can be corrupted in another way, through the corruption of its subject, and in this way also they can be corrupted after consecration; for although the subject does not remain, still the being which they had in the subject does remain, which being is proper, and suited to the subject. And therefore such being can be corrupted by a contrary agent, as the substance of the bread or wine was subject to corruption, and, moreover, was not corrupted except by a preceding alteration regarding the accidents.

Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between each of the aforesaid corruptions; because, when the body and the blood of Christ succeed in this sacrament to the substance of the bread and wine, if there be such change on the part of the accidents as would not have sufficed for the corruption of the bread and wine, then the body and blood of Christ do not cease to be under this sacrament on account of such change, whether the change be on the part of the quality, as for instance, when the color or the savor of the bread or wine is slightly modified; or on the part of the quantity, as when the bread or the wine is divided into such parts as to keep in them the nature of bread or of wine. But if the change be so great that the substance of the bread or wine would have been corrupted, then Christ's body and blood do not remain under this sacrament; and this either on the part of the qualities, as when the color, savor, and other qualities of the bread and wine are so altered as to be incompatible with the nature of bread or of wine; or else on the part of the quantity, as, for instance, if the bread be reduced to fine particles, or the wine divided into such tiny drops that the species of bread or wine no longer remain.

Reply to Objection 1: Since it belongs essentially to corruption to take away the being of a thing, in so far as the being of some form is in matter, it results that by corruption the form is separated from the matter. But if such being were not in matter, yet like such being as is in matter, it could be taken away by corruption, even where there is no matter; as takes place in this sacrament, as is evident from what was said above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are forms not in matter, yet they have the being which they had in matter.

Reply to Objection 3: This corruption of species is not miraculous, but natural; nevertheless, it presupposes the miracle which is wrought in the consecration, namely, that those sacramental species retain without a subject, the same being as they had in a subject; just as a blind man, to whom sight is given miraculously, sees naturally.

Whether anything can be generated from the sacramental species?

Objection 1: It seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species: because, whatever is generated, is generated out of some matter: for nothing is generated out of nothing, although by creation something is made out of nothing. But there is no matter underlying the sacramental species except that of Christ's body, and that body is incorruptible. Therefore it seems that nothing can be generated from the sacramental species.

Objection 2: Further, things which are not of the same genus cannot spring from one another: thus a line is not made of whiteness. But accident and substance differ generically. Therefore, since the sacramental species are accidents, it seems that no substance can be generated from them.

Objection 3: Further, if any corporeal substance be generated from them, such substance will not be without accident. Therefore, if any corporeal substance be generated from the sacramental species, then substance and accident would be generated from accident, namely, two things from one, which is impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for any corporeal substance to be generated out of the sacramental species.

On the contrary, The senses are witness that something is generated out of the sacramental species, either ashes, if they be burned, worms if they putrefy, or dust if they be crushed.

I answer that, Since "the corruption of one thing is the generation of another" (De Gener. i), something must be generated necessarily from the sacramental species if they be corrupted, as stated above [4576](A[4]); for they are not corrupted in such a way that they disappear altogether, as if reduced to nothing; on the contrary, something sensible manifestly succeeds to them.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how anything can be generated from them. For it is quite evident that nothing is generated out of the body and blood of Christ which are truly there, because these are incorruptible. But if the substance, or even the matter, of the bread and wine were to remain in this sacrament, then, as some have maintained, it would be easy to account for this sensible object which succeeds to them. But that supposition is false, as was stated above ([4577]Q[75], AA[2],4,8).

Hence it is that others have said that the things generated have not sprung from the sacramental species, but from the surrounding atmosphere. But this can be shown in many ways to be impossible. In the first place, because when a thing is generated from another, the latter at first appears changed and corrupted; whereas no alteration or corruption appeared previously in the adjacent atmosphere; hence the worms or ashes are not generated therefrom. Secondly, because the nature of the atmosphere is not such as to permit of such things being generated by such alterations. Thirdly, because it is possible for many consecrated hosts to be burned or putrefied; nor would it be possible for an earthen body, large enough to be generated from the atmosphere, unless a great and, in fact, exceedingly sensible condensation of the atmosphere took place. Fourthly, because the same thing can happen to the solid bodies surrounding them, such as iron or stone, which remain entire after the generation of the aforesaid things. Hence this opinion cannot stand, because it is opposed to what is manifest to our senses.

And therefore others have said that the substance of the bread and wine returns during the corruption of the species, and so from the returning substance of the bread and wine, ashes or worms or something of the kind are generated. But this explanation seems an impossible one. First of all, because if the substance of the bread and wine be converted into the body and blood of Christ, as was shown above (Q[75], AA[2],4), the substance of the bread and wine cannot return, except the body and blood of Christ be again changed back into the substance of bread and wine, which is impossible: thus if air be turned into fire, the air cannot return without the fire being again changed into air. But if the substance of bread or wine be annihilated, it cannot return again, because what lapses into nothing does not return numerically the same. Unless perchance it be said that the said substance returns, because God creates anew another new substance to replace the first. Secondly, this seems to be impossible, because no time can be assigned when the substance of the bread returns. For, from what was said above [4578](A[4]; Q[76], A[6], ad 3), it is evident that while the species of the bread and wine remain, there remain also the body and blood of Christ, which are not present together with the substance of the bread and wine in this sacrament, according to what was stated above (Q[75], A[2]). Hence the substance of the bread and wine cannot return while the sacramental species remain; nor, again, when these species pass away; because then the substance of the bread and wine would be without their proper accidents, which is impossible. Unless perchance it be said that in the last instant of the corruption of the species there returns (not, indeed, the substance of bread and wine, because it is in that very instant that they have the being of the substance generated from the species, but) the matter of the bread and wine; which, matter, properly speaking, would be more correctly described as created anew, than as returning. And in this sense the aforesaid position might be held.

However, since it does not seem reasonable to say that anything takes place miraculously in this sacrament, except in virtue of the consecration itself, which does not imply either creation or return of matter, it seems better to say that in the actual consecration it is miraculously bestowed on the dimensive quantity of the bread and wine to be the subject of subsequent forms. Now this is proper to matter; and therefore as a consequence everything which goes with matter is bestowed on dimensive quantity; and therefore everything which could be generated from the matter of bread or wine, if it were present, can be generated from the aforesaid dimensive quantity of the bread or wine, not, indeed, by a new miracle, but by virtue of the miracle which has already taken place.

Reply to Objection 1: Although no matter is there out of which a thing may be generated, nevertheless dimensive quantity supplies the place of matter, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Those sacramental species are indeed accidents, yet they have the act and power of substance, as stated above [4579](A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: The dimensive quantity of the bread and wine retains its own nature, and receives miraculously the power and property of substance; and therefore it can pass to both, that is, into substance and dimension.

Whether the sacramental species can nourish?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species cannot nourish, because, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. v), “it is not this bread that enters into our body, but the bread of everlasting life, which supports the substance of our soul.” But whatever nourishes enters into the body. Therefore this bread does not nourish: and the same reason holds good of the wine.

Objection 2: Further, as is said in De Gener. ii, “We are nourished by the very things of which we are made.” But the sacramental species are accidents, whereas man is not made of accidents, because accident is not a part of substance. Therefore it seems that the sacramental species cannot nourish.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii) that “food nourishes according as it is a substance, but it gives increase by reason of its quantity.” But the sacramental species are not a substance. Consequently they cannot nourish.

On the contrary, The Apostle speaking of this sacrament says (1 Cor. 11:21): “One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk”: upon which the gloss observes that “he alludes to those who after the celebration of the sacred mystery, and after the consecration of the bread and wine, claimed their oblations, and not sharing them with others, took the whole, so as even to become intoxicated thereby.” But this could not happen if the sacramental species did not nourish. Therefore the sacramental species do nourish.

I answer that, This question presents no difficulty, now that we have solved the preceding question. Because, as stated in De Anima ii, food nourishes by being converted into the substance of the individual nourished. Now it has been stated [4580](A[5]) that the sacramental species can be converted into a substance generated from them. And they can be converted into the human body for the same reason as they can into ashes or worms. Consequently, it is evident that they nourish.

But the senses witness to the untruth of what some maintain; viz. that the species do not nourish as though they were changed into the human body, but merely refresh and hearten by acting upon the senses (as a man is heartened by the odor of meat, and intoxicated by the fumes of wine). Because such refreshment does not suffice long for a man, whose body needs repair owing to constant waste: and yet a man could be supported for long if he were to take hosts and consecrated wine in great quantity.

In like manner the statement advanced by others cannot stand, who hold that the sacramental species nourish owing to the remaining substantial form of the bread and wine: both because the form does not remain, as stated above ([4581]Q[75], A[6]): and because to nourish is the act not of a form but rather of matter, which takes the form of the one nourished, while the form of the nourishment passes away: hence it is said in De Anima ii that nourishment is at first unlike, but at the end is like.

Reply to Objection 1: After the consecration bread can be said to be in this sacrament in two ways. First, as to the species, which retain the name of the previous substance, as Gregory says in an Easter Homily (Lanfranc, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xx). Secondly, Christ's very body can be called bread, since it is the mystical bread "coming down from heaven." Consequently, Ambrose uses the word "bread" in this second meaning, when he says that "this bread does not pass into the body," because, to wit, Christ's body is not changed into man's body, but nourishes his soul. But he is not speaking of bread taken in the first acceptation.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacramental species are not those things out of which the human body is made, yet they are changed into those things stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the sacramental species are not a substance, still they have the virtue of a substance, as stated above.

Whether the sacramental species are broken in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the sacramental species are not broken in this sacrament, because the Philosopher says in Meteor. iv that bodies are breakable owing to a certain disposition of the pores; a thing which cannot be attributed to the sacramental species. Therefore the sacramental species cannot be broken.

Objection 2: Further, breaking is followed by sound. But the sacramental species emit no sound: because the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), that what emits sound is a hard body, having a smooth surface. Therefore the sacramental species are not broken.

Objection 3: Further, breaking and mastication are seemingly of the same object. But it is Christ's true body that is eaten, according to Jn. 6:57: "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood." Therefore it is Christ's body that is broken and masticated: and hence it is said in the confession of Berengarius: "I agree with the Holy Catholic Church, and with heart and lips I profess, that the bread and wine which are placed on the altar, are the true body and blood of Christ after consecration, and are truly handled and broken by the priest's hands, broken and crushed by the teeth of believers." Consequently, the breaking ought not to be ascribed to the sacramental species.

On the contrary, Breaking arises from the division of that which has quantity. But nothing having quantity except the sacramental species is broken here, because neither Christ's body is broken, as being incorruptible, nor is the substance of the bread, because it no longer remains. Therefore the sacramental species are broken.

I answer that, Many opinions prevailed of old on this matter. Some held that in this sacrament there was no breaking at all in reality, but merely in the eyes of the beholders. But this contention cannot stand, because in this sacrament of truth the sense is not deceived with regard to its proper object of judgment, and one of these objects is breaking, whereby from one thing arise many: and these are common sensibles, as is stated in De Anima ii.

Others accordingly have said that there was indeed a genuine breaking, but without any subject. But this again contradicts our senses; because a quantitative body is seen in this sacrament, which formerly was one, and is now divided into many, and this must be the subject of the breaking.

But it cannot be said that Christ's true body is broken. First of all, because it is incorruptible and impassible: secondly, because it is entire under every part, as was shown above ([4582]Q[76], A[3]), which is contrary to the nature of a thing broken.

It remains, then, that the breaking is in the dimensive quantity of the bread, as in a subject, just as the other accidents. And as the sacramental species are the sacrament of Christ's true body, so is the breaking of these species the sacrament of our Lord's Passion, which was in Christ's true body.

Reply to Objection 1: As rarity and density remain under the sacramental species, as stated above (A[2], ad 3), so likewise porousness remains, and in consequence breakableness.

Reply to Objection 2: Hardness results from density; therefore, as density remains under the sacramental species, hardness remains there too, and the capability of sound as a consequence.

Reply to Objection 3: What is eaten under its own species, is also broken and masticated under its own species; but Christ's body is eaten not under its proper, but under the sacramental species. Hence in explaining Jn. 6:64, "The flesh profiteth nothing," Augustine (Tract. xxvii in Joan.) says that this is to be taken as referring to those who understood carnally: "for they understood the flesh, thus, as it is divided piecemeal, in a dead body, or as sold in the shambles.” Consequently, Christ’s very body is not broken, except according to its sacramental species. And the confession made by Berengarius is to be understood in this sense, that the breaking and the crushing with the teeth is to be referred to the sacramental species, under which the body of Christ truly is.

Whether any liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine?

Objection 1: It seems that no liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine, because everything mingled with another partakes of its quality. But no liquid can share in the quality of the sacramental species, because those accidents are without a subject, as stated above [4583](A[1]). Therefore it seems that no liquid can be mingled with the sacramental species of the wine.

Objection 2: Further, if any kind of liquid be mixed with those species, then some one thing must be the result. But no one thing can result from the liquid, which is a substance, and the sacramental species, which are accidents; nor from the liquid and Christ’s blood, which owing to its incorruptibility suffers neither increase nor decrease. Therefore no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.

Objection 3: Further, if any liquid be mixed with the consecrated wine, then that also would appear to be consecrated; just as water added to holy-water becomes holy. But the consecrated wine is truly Christ’s blood. Therefore the liquid added would likewise be Christ’s blood otherwise than by consecration, which is unbecoming. Therefore no liquid can be mingled with the consecrated wine.

Objection 4: Further, if one of two things be entirely corrupted, there is no mixture (De Gener. i). But if we mix any liquid, it seems that the entire species of the sacramental wine is corrupted, so that the blood of Christ ceases to be beneath it; both because great and little are difference of quantity, and alter it, as white and black cause a difference of color; and because the liquid mixed, as having no obstacle, seems to permeate the whole, and so Christ’s blood ceases to be there, since it is not there with any other substance. Consequently, no liquid can be mixed with the consecrated wine.

On the contrary, It is evident to our senses that another liquid can be mixed with the wine after it is consecrated, just as before.

I answer that, The truth of this question is evident from what has been said already. For it was said above [4584](A[3]; A[5], ad 2) that the species remaining in this sacrament, as they acquire the manner of being of substance in virtue of the consecration, so likewise do they obtain the mode of acting and of being acted upon, so that they can do or receive whatever their substance could do or receive, were it there present. But it is evident that if the substance of wine were there present, then some other liquid could be mingled with it.

Nevertheless there would be a different effect of such mixing both according to the form and according to the quantity of the liquid. For if sufficient liquid were mixed so as to spread itself all through the wine, then the whole would be a mixed substance. Now what is made up of things mixed is neither of them, but each passes into a third resulting from both: hence it would result that the former wine would remain no longer. But if the liquid added were of another species, for instance, if water were mixed, the species of the wine would be dissolved, and there would be a liquid of another species. But if liquid of the same species were added, of instance, wine with wine, the same species would remain, but the wine would not be the same numerically, as the diversity of the accidents shows: for instance, if one wine were white and the other red.

But if the liquid added were of such minute quantity that it could not permeate the whole, the entire wine would not be mixed, but only part of it, which would not remain the same numerically owing to the blending of extraneous matter: still it would remain the same specifically, not only if a little liquid of the same species were mixed with it, but even if it were of another species, since a drop of water blended with much wine passes into the species of wine (De Gener. i).

Now it is evident that the body and blood of Christ abide in this sacrament so long as the species remain numerically the same, as stated above [4585](A[4]; Q[76], A[6], ad 3); because it is this bread and this wine which is consecrated. Hence, if the liquid of any kind whatsoever added be so much in quantity as to permeate the whole of the consecrated wine, and be mixed with it throughout, the result would be something numerically distinct, and the blood of Christ will remain there no longer. But if the quantity of the liquid added be so slight as not to permeate throughout, but to reach only a part of the species, Christ's blood will cease to be under that part of the consecrated wine, yet will remain under the rest.

Reply to Objection 1: Pope Innocent III in a Decretal writes thus: "The very accidents appear to affect the wine that is added, because, if water is added, it takes the savor of the wine. The result is, then, that the accidents change the subject, just as subject changes accidents; for nature yields to miracle, and power works beyond custom." But this must not be understood as if the same identical accident, which was in the wine previous to consecration, is afterwards in the wine that is added; but such change is the result of action; because the remaining accidents of the wine retain the action of substance, as stated above, and so they act upon the liquid added, by changing it.

Reply to Objection 2: The liquid added to the consecrated wine is in no way mixed with the substance of Christ's blood. Nevertheless it is mixed with the sacramental species, yet so that after such mixing the aforesaid species are corrupted entirely or in part, after the way mentioned above [4586](A[5]), whereby something can be generated from those species. And if they be entirely corrupted, there remains no further question, because the whole will be uniform. But if they be corrupted in part, there will be one dimension according to the continuity of quantity, but not one according to the mode of being, because one part thereof will be without a subject while the other is in a subject; as in a body that is made up of two metals, there will be one body quantitatively, but not one as to the species of the matter.

Reply to Objection 3: As Pope Innocent says in the aforesaid Decretal, "if after the consecration other wine be put in the chalice, it is not changed into the blood, nor is it mingled with the blood, but, mixed with the accidents of the previous wine, it is diffused throughout the body which underlies them, yet without wetting what surrounds it." Now this is to be understood when there is not sufficient mixing of extraneous liquid to cause the blood of Christ to cease to be under the whole; because a thing is said to be "diffused throughout," not because it touches the body of Christ according to its proper dimensions, but according to the sacramental dimensions, under which it is contained. Now it is not the same with holy water, because the blessing works no change in the substance of the water, as the consecration of the wine does.

Reply to Objection 4: Some have held that however slight be the mixing of extraneous liquid, the substance of Christ’s blood ceases to be under the whole, and for the reason given above (OBJ[4]); which, however, is not a cogent one; because “more” or “less” diversify dimensive quantity, not as to its essence, but as to the determination of its measure. In like manner the liquid added can be so small as on that account to be hindered from permeating the whole, and not simply by the dimensions; which, although they are present without a subject, still they are opposed to another liquid, just as substance would be if it were present, according to what was said at the beginning of the article.

OF THE FORM OF THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the form of this sacrament; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:

(1) What is the form of this sacrament?

(2) Whether the form for the consecration of the bread is appropriate?

(3) Whether the form for the consecration of the blood is appropriate?

(4) Of the power of each form?

(5) Of the truth of the expression?

(6) Of the comparison of the one form with the other?

Whether this is the form of this sacrament: “This is My body,” and “This is the chalice of My blood”?

Objection 1: It seems that this is not the form of this sacrament: “This is My body,” and, “This is the chalice of My blood.” Because those words seem to belong to the form of this sacrament, wherewith Christ consecrated His body and blood. But Christ first blessed the bread which He took, and said afterwards: “Take ye and eat; this is My body” (Mat. 26:26). Therefore the whole of this seems to belong to the form of this sacrament: and the same reason holds good of the words which go with the consecration of the blood.

Objection 2: Further, Eusebius Emissenus (Pseudo-Hieron: Ep. xxix; Pseudo-Isid.: Hom. iv) says: “The invisible Priest changes visible creatures into His own body, saying: ‘Take ye and eat; this is My body.’” Therefore, the whole of this seems to belong to the form of this sacrament: and the same hold good of the works appertaining to the blood.

Objection 3: Further, in the form of Baptism both the minister and his act are expressed, when it is said, “I baptize thee.” But in the words set forth above there is no mention made either of the minister or of his act. Therefore the form of the sacrament is not a suitable one.

Objection 4: Further, the form of the sacrament suffices for its perfection; hence the sacrament of Baptism can be performed sometimes by pronouncing the words of the form only, omitting all the others. Therefore, if the aforesaid words be the form of this sacrament, it would seem as if this sacrament could be performed sometimes by uttering those words alone, while leaving out all the others which are said in the mass; yet this seems to be false, because, were the other words to be passed over, the said words would be taken as spoken in the person of the priest saying them, whereas the bread and wine are not changed into his body and blood. Consequently, the aforesaid words are not the form of this sacrament.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): “The consecration is accomplished by the words and expressions of the Lord Jesus. Because, by all the other words spoken, praise is rendered to God, prayer is put up for the people, for kings, and others; but when the time comes for perfecting the sacrament, the priest uses no longer his own words, but the words of Christ. Therefore, it is Christ’s words that perfect this sacrament.”

I answer that, This sacrament differs from the other sacraments in two respects. First of all, in this, that this sacrament is accomplished by the consecration of the matter, while the rest are perfected in the use of the consecrated matter. Secondly, because in the other sacraments the consecration of the matter consists only in a blessing, from which the matter consecrated derives instrumentally a spiritual power, which through the priest who is an animated instrument, can pass on to inanimate instruments. But in this sacrament the consecration of the matter consists in the miraculous change of the substance, which can only be done by God; hence the minister in performing this sacrament has no other act save the pronouncing of the words. And because the form should suit the thing, therefore the form of this sacrament differs from the forms of the other sacraments in two respects. First, because the form of the other sacraments implies the use of the matter, as for instance, baptizing, or signing; but the form of this sacrament implies merely the consecration of the matter, which consists in transubstantiation, as when it is said, “This is My body,” or, “This is the chalice of My blood.” Secondly, because the forms of the other sacraments are pronounced in the person of the minister, whether by way of exercising an act, as when it is said, “I baptize thee,” or “I confirm thee,” etc.; or by way of command, as when it is said in the sacrament of order, “Take the power,” etc.; or by way of entreaty, as when in the sacrament of Extreme Unction it is said, “By this anointing and our intercession,” etc. But the form of this sacrament is pronounced as if Christ were speaking in person, so that it is given to be understood that the minister does nothing in perfecting this sacrament, except to pronounce the words of Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: There are many opinions on this matter. Some have said that Christ, Who had power of excellence in the sacraments, performed this sacrament without using any form of words, and that afterwards He pronounced the words under which others were to consecrate thereafter. And the words of Pope Innocent III seem to convey the same sense (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), where he says: “In good sooth it can be said that Christ accomplished this sacrament by His Divine power, and subsequently expressed the form under which those who came after were to consecrate.” But in opposition to this view are the words of the Gospel in which it is said that Christ “blessed,” and this blessing was effected by certain words. Accordingly those words of Innocent are to be considered as expressing an opinion, rather than determining the point.

Others, again, have said that the blessing was effected by other words not known to us. But this statement cannot stand, because the blessing of the consecration is now performed by reciting the things which were then accomplished; hence, if the consecration was not performed then by these words, neither would it be now.

Accordingly, others have maintained that this blessing was effected by the same words as are used now; but that Christ spoke them twice, at first secretly, in order to consecrate, and afterwards openly, to instruct others. But even this will not hold good, because the priest in consecrating uses these words, not as spoken in secret, but as openly pronounced.

Accordingly, since these words have no power except from Christ pronouncing them, it seems that Christ also consecrated by pronouncing them openly.

And therefore others said that the Evangelists did not always follow the precise order in their narrative as that in which things actually happened, as is seen from Augustine (De Consens. Evang. ii). Hence it is to be understood that the order of what took place can be expressed thus: “Taking the bread He blessed it, saying: This is My body, and then He broke it, and gave it to His disciples.” But the same sense can be had even without changing the words of the Gospel; because the participle “saying” implies sequence of the words uttered with what goes before. And it is not necessary for the sequence to be understood only with respect to the last word spoken, as if Christ had just then pronounced those words, when He gave it to His disciples; but the sequence can be understood with regard to all that had gone before; so that the sense is: “While He was blessing, and breaking, and giving it to His disciples, He spoke the words, ‘Take ye,’” etc.

Reply to Objection 2: In these words, “Take ye and eat,” the use of the consecrated, matter is indicated, which is not of the necessity of this sacrament, as stated above ([4587]Q[74], A[7]). And therefore not even these words belong to the substance of the form. Nevertheless, because the use of the consecrated matter belongs to a certain perfection of the sacrament, in the same way as operation is not the first but the second perfection of a thing, consequently, the whole perfection of this sacrament is expressed by all those words: and it was in this way that Eusebius understood that the sacrament was accomplished by those words, as to its first and second perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: In the sacrament of Baptism the minister exercises an act regarding the use of the matter, which is of the essence of the sacrament: such is not the case in this sacrament; hence there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 4: Some have contended that this sacrament cannot be accomplished by uttering the aforesaid words, while leaving out the rest, especially the words in the Canon of the Mass. But that this is false can be seen both from Ambrose’s words quoted above, as well as from the fact that the Canon of the Mass is not the same in all places or times, but various portions have been introduced by various people.

Accordingly it must be held that if the priest were to pronounce only the aforesaid words with the intention of consecrating this sacrament, this sacrament would be valid because the intention would cause these words to be understood as spoken in the person of Christ, even though the words were pronounced without those that precede. The priest, however, would sin gravely in consecrating the sacrament thus, as he would not be observing the rite of the Church. Nor does the comparison with Baptism prove anything; for it is a sacrament of necessity: whereas the lack of this sacrament can be supplied by the spiritual partaking thereof, as Augustine says (cf.[4588] Q[73], A[3], ad 1).

Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the bread: “This is My body”?

Objection 1: It seems that this is not the proper form of this sacrament: “This is My body.” For the effect of a sacrament ought to be expressed in its form. But the effect of the consecration of the bread is the change of the substance of the bread into the body of Christ, and this is better expressed by the word “becomes” than by “is.” Therefore, in the form of the consecration we ought to say: “This becomes My body.”

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv), “Christ’s words consecrate this sacrament. What word of Christ? This word, whereby all things are made. The Lord commanded, and the heavens and earth were made. “ Therefore, it would be a more proper form of this sacrament if the imperative mood were employed, so as to say: “Be this My body.”

Objection 3: Further, that which is changed is implied in the subject of this phrase, just as the term of the change is implied in the predicate. But just as that into which the change is made is something determinate, for the change is into nothing else but the body of Christ, so also that which is converted is determinate, since only bread is converted into the body of Christ. Therefore, as a noun is inserted on the part of the predicate, so also should a noun be inserted in the subject, so that it be said: “This bread is My body.”

Objection 4: Further, just as the term of the change is determinate in nature, because it is a body, so also is it determinate in person. Consequently, in order to determine the person, it ought to be said: “This is the body of Christ.”

Objection 5: Further, nothing ought to be inserted in the form except what is substantial to it. Consequently, the conjunction “for” is improperly added in some books, since it does not belong to the substance of the form.

On the contrary, our Lord used this form in consecrating, as is evident from Mat. 26:26.

I answer that, This is the proper form for the consecration of the bread. For it was said [4589](A[1]) that this consecration consists in changing the substance of bread into the body of Christ. Now the form of a sacrament ought to denote what is done in the sacrament. Consequently the form for the consecration of the bread ought to signify the actual conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. And herein are three things to be considered: namely, the actual conversion, the term “whence,” and the term “whereunto.”

Now the conversion can be considered in two ways: first, in “becoming,” secondly, in “being.” But the conversion ought not to be signified in this form as in “becoming,” but as in “being.” First, because such conversion is not successive, as was said above ([4590]Q[75], A[7]), but instantaneous; and in such changes the “becoming” is nothing else than the “being.” Secondly, because the sacramental forms bear the same relation to the signification of the sacramental effect as artificial forms to the representation of the effect of art. Now an artificial form is the likeness of the ultimate effect, on which the artist’s intention is fixed ;. just as the art-form in the builder’s mind is principally the form of the house constructed, and secondarily of the constructing. Accordingly, in this form also the conversion ought to be expressed as in “being,” to which the intention is referred.

And since the conversion is expressed in this form as in “being,” it is necessary for the extremes of the conversion to be signified as they exist in the fact of conversion. But then the term “whereunto” has the proper nature of its own substance; whereas the term “whence” does not remain in its own substance, but only as to the accidents whereby it comes under the senses, and can be determined in relation to the senses. Hence the term “whence” of the conversion is conveniently expressed by the demonstrative pronoun, relative to the sensible accidents which continue; but the term “whereunto” is expressed by the noun signifying the nature of the thing which terminates the conversion, and this is Christ’s entire body, and not merely His flesh; as was said above ([4591]Q[76], A[1], ad 2). Hence this form is most appropriate: “This is My body.”

Reply to Objection 1: The ultimate effect of this conversion is not a “becoming” but a “being,” as stated above, and consequently prominence should be given to this in the form.

Reply to Objection 2: God’s word operated in the creation of things, and it is the same which operates in this consecration, yet each in different fashion: because here it operates effectively and sacramentally, that is, in virtue of its signification. And consequently the last effect of the consecration must needs be signified in this sentence by a substantive verb of the indicative mood and present time. But in the creation of things it worked merely effectively, and such efficiency is due to the command of His wisdom; and therefore in the creation of things the Lord’s word is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood, as in Gn. 1:3: “Let there be light, and light was made.”

Reply to Objection 3: The term “whence” does not retain the nature of its substance in the “being” of the conversion, as the term “whereunto” does. Therefore there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 4: The pronoun “My,” which implicitly points to the chief person, i.e. the person of the speaker, sufficiently indicates Christ’s person, in Whose person these words are uttered, as stated above [4592] (A[1]).

Reply to Objection 5: The conjunction “for” is set in this form according to the custom of the Roman Church, who derived it from Peter the Apostle; and this on account of the sequence with the words preceding: and therefore it is not part of the form, just as the words preceding the form are not.

Whether this is the proper form for the consecration of the wine: “This is the chalice of My blood,” etc.?

Objection 1: It seems that this is not the proper form for the consecration of the wine. “This is the chalice of My blood, of the New and Eternal Testament, the Mystery of Faith, which shall be shed for you and for many unto the forgiveness of sins.” For as the bread is changed by the power of consecration into Christ’s body, so is the wine changed into Christ’s blood, as is clear from what was said above ([4593]Q[76], AA[1],2,3). But in the form of the consecration of the bread, the body of Christ is expressly mentioned, without any addition. Therefore in this form the blood of Christ is improperly expressed in the oblique case, and the chalice in the nominative, when it is said: “This is the chalice of My blood.”

Objection 2: Further, the words spoken in the consecration of the bread are not more efficacious than those spoken in the consecration of the wine, since both are Christ’s words. But directly the words are spoken—“This is My body,” there is perfect consecration of the bread. Therefore, directly these other words are uttered—“This is the chalice of My blood,” there is perfect consecration of the blood; and so the words which follow do not appeal to be of the substance of the form, especially since they refer to the properties of this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, the New Testament seems to be an internal inspiration, as is evident from the Apostle quoting the words of Jeremias (31:31): “I will perfect unto the house of Israel a New Testament . . . I will give My laws into their mind” (Heb. 8:8). But a sacrament is an outward visible act. Therefore, in the form of the sacrament the words “of the New Testament” are improperly added.

Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be new which is near the beginning of its existence. But what is eternal has no beginning of its existence. Therefore it is incorrect to say “of the New and Eternal,” because it seems to savor of a contradiction.

Objection 5: Further, occasions of error ought to be withheld from men, according to Is. 57:14: “Take away the stumbling blocks out of the way of My people.” But some have fallen into error in thinking that Christ’s body and blood are only mystically present in this sacrament. Therefore it is out of place to add “the mystery of faith.”

Objection 6: Further, it was said above ([4594]Q[73], A[3], ad 3), that as Baptism is the sacrament of faith, so is the Eucharist the sacrament of charity. Consequently, in this form the word “charity” ought rather to be used than “faith.”

Objection 7: Further, the whole of this sacrament, both as to body and blood, is a memorial of our Lord’s Passion, according to 1 Cor. 11:26: “As often as you shall eat this bread and drink the chalice, you shall show the death of the Lord.” Consequently, mention ought to be made of Christ’s Passion and its fruit rather in the form of the consecration of the blood, than in the form of the consecration of the body, especially since our Lord said: “This is My body, which shall be delivered up for you” (Lk. 22:19).

Objection 8: Further, as was already observed ([4595]Q[48], A[2];[4596] Q[49], A[3]), Christ’s Passion sufficed for all; while as to its efficacy it was profitable for many. Therefore it ought to be said: “Which shall be shed for all,” or else “for many,” without adding, “for you.”

Objection 9: Further, the words whereby this sacrament is consecrated draw their efficacy from Christ’s institution. But no Evangelist narrates that Christ spoke all these words. Therefore this is not an appropriate form for the consecration of the wine.

On the contrary, The Church, instructed by the apostles, uses this form.

I answer that, There is a twofold opinion regarding this form. Some have maintained that the words “This is the chalice of My blood” alone belong to the substance of this form, but not those words which follow. Now this seems incorrect, because the words which follow them are determinations of the predicate, that is, of Christ’s blood. consequently they belong to the integrity of the expression.

And on this account others say more accurately that all the words which follow are of the substance of the form down to the words, “As often as ye shall do this,” which belong to the use of this sacrament, and consequently do not belong to the substance of the form. Hence it is that the priest pronounces all these words, under the same rite and manner, namely, holding the chalice in his hands. Moreover, in Lk. 22:20, the words that follow are interposed with the preceding words: “This is the chalice, the new testament in My blood.”

Consequently it must be said that all the aforesaid words belong to the substance of the form; but that by the first words, “This is the chalice of My blood,” the change of the wine into blood is denoted, as explained above [4597](A[2]) in the form for the consecration of the bread; but by the words which come after is shown the power of the blood shed in the Passion, which power works in this sacrament, and is ordained for three purposes. First and principally for securing our eternal heritage, according to Heb. 10:19: “Having confidence in the entering into the holies by the blood of Christ”; and in order to denote this, we say, “of the New and Eternal Testament.” Secondly, for justifying by grace, which is by faith according to Rom. 3:25,26: “Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His blood . . . that He Himself may be just, and the justifier of him who is of the faith of Jesus Christ": and on this account we add, "The Mystery of Faith." Thirdly, for removing sins which are the impediments to both of these things, according to Heb. 9:14: "The blood of Christ . . . shall cleanse our conscience from dead works," that is, from sins; and on this account, we say, "which shall be shed for you and for many unto the forgiveness of sins."

Reply to Objection 1: The expression "This is the chalice of My blood" is a figure of speech, which can be understood in two ways. First, as a figure of metonymy; because the container is put for the contained, so that the meaning is: "This is My blood contained in the chalice"; of which mention is now made, because Christ's blood is consecrated in this sacrament, inasmuch as it is the drink of the faithful, which is not implied under the notion of blood; consequently this had to be denoted by the vessel adapted for such usage.

Secondly, it can be taken by way of metaphor, so that Christ's Passion is understood by the chalice by way of comparison, because, like a cup, it inebriates, according to Lam. 3:15: "He hath filled me with bitterness, he hath inebriated me with wormwood": hence our Lord Himself spoke of His Passion as a chalice, when He said (Mat. 26:39): "Let this chalice pass away from Me": so that the meaning is: "This is the chalice of My Passion." This is denoted by the blood being consecrated apart from the body; because it was by the Passion that the blood was separated from the body.

Reply to Objection 2: As was said above (ad 1;[4598] Q[76], A[2], ad 1), the blood consecrated apart expressly represents Christ's Passion, and therefore mention is made of the fruits of the Passion in the consecration of the blood rather than in that of the body, since the body is the subject of the Passion. This is also pointed out in our Lord's saying, "which shall be delivered up for you," as if to say, "which shall undergo the Passion for you."

Reply to Objection 3: A testament is the disposal of a heritage. But God disposed of a heavenly heritage to men, to be bestowed through the virtue of the blood of Jesus Christ; because, according to Heb. 9:16: "Where there is a testament the death of the testator must of necessity come in." Now Christ's blood was exhibited to men in two ways. First of all in figure, and this belongs to the Old Testament; consequently the Apostle concludes

(Heb. 9:16): “Whereupon neither was the first indeed dedicated without blood,” which is evident from this, that as related in Ex. 24:7,8, “when every” commandment of the law “had been read” by Moses, “he sprinkled all the people” saying: “This is the blood of the testament which the Lord hath enjoined unto you.”

Secondly, it was shown in very truth; and this belongs to the New Testament. This is what the Apostle premises when he says (Rom. 9:15): “Therefore He is the Mediator of the New Testament, that by means of His death . . . they that are called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance.” Consequently, we say here, “The blood of the New Testament,” because it is shown now not in figure but in truth; and therefore we add, “which shall be shed for you.” But the internal inspiration has its origin in the power of this blood, according as we are justified by Christ’s Passion.

Reply to Objection 4: This Testament is a “new one” by reason of its showing forth: yet it is called “eternal” both on account of God’s eternal pre-ordination, as well as on account of the eternal heritage which is prepared by this testament. Moreover, Christ’s Person is eternal, in Whose blood this testament is appointed.

Reply to Objection 5: The word “mystery” is inserted, not in order to exclude reality, but to show that the reality is hidden, because Christ’s blood is in this sacrament in a hidden manner, and His Passion was dimly foreshadowed in the Old Testament.

Reply to Objection 6: It is called the “Sacrament of Faith,” as being an object of faith: because by faith alone do we hold the presence of Christ’s blood in this sacrament. Moreover Christ’s Passion justifies by faith. Baptism is called the “Sacrament of Faith” because it is a profession of faith. This is called the “Sacrament of Charity,” as being figurative and effective thereof.

Reply to Objection 7: As stated above (ad 2), the blood consecrated apart represents Christ’s blood more expressively; and therefore mention is made of Christ’s Passion and its fruits, in the consecration of the blood rather than in that of the body.

Reply to Objection 8: The blood of Christ’s Passion has its efficacy not merely in the elect among the Jews, to whom the blood of the Old Testament was exhibited, but also in the Gentiles; nor only in priests who consecrate this sacrament, and in those others who partake of it; but likewise in those for whom it is offered. And therefore He says expressly, “for you,” the Jews, “and for many,” namely the Gentiles; or, “for you” who eat of it, and “for many,” for whom it is offered.

Reply to Objection 9: The Evangelists did not intend to hand down the forms of the sacraments, which in the primitive Church had to be kept concealed, as Dionysius observes at the close of his book on the ecclesiastical hierarchy; their object was to write the story of Christ. Nevertheless nearly all these words can be culled from various passages of the Scriptures. Because the words, “This is the chalice,” are found in Lk. 22:20, and 1 Cor. 11:25, while Matthew says in chapter 26:28: “This is My blood of the New Testament, which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins.” The words added, namely, “eternal” and “mystery of faith,” were handed down to the Church by the apostles, who received them from our Lord, according to 1 Cor. 11:23: “I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you.”

Whether in the aforesaid words of the forms there be any created power which causes the consecration?

Objection 1: It seems that in the aforesaid words of the forms there is no created power which causes the consecration. Because Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “The change of the bread into Christ’s body is caused solely by the power of the Holy Ghost.” But the power of the Holy Ghost is uncreated. Therefore this sacrament is not caused by any created power of those words.

Objection 2: Further, miraculous works are wrought not by any created power, but solely by Divine power, as was stated in the [4599]FP, Q[110], A[4]. But the change of the bread and wine into Christ’s body and blood is a work not less miraculous than the creation of things, or than the formation of Christ’s body in the womb of a virgin: which things could not be done by any created power. Therefore, neither is this sacrament consecrated by any created power of the aforesaid words.

Objection 3: Further, the aforesaid words are not simple, but composed of many; nor are they uttered simultaneously, but successively. But, as stated above ([4600]Q[75], A[7]), this change is wrought instantaneously. hence it must be done by a simple power. Therefore it is not effected by the power of those words.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): “If there be such might in the word of the Lord Jesus that things non-existent came into being, how much more efficacious is it to make things existing to continue, and to be changed into something else? And so, what was bread before consecration is now the body of Christ after consecration, because Christ’s word changes a creature into something different.”

I answer that, Some have maintained that neither in the above words is there any created power for causing the transubstantiation, nor in the other forms of the sacraments, or even in the sacraments themselves, for producing the sacramental effects. This, as was shown above ([4601]Q[62], A[1]), is both contrary to the teachings of the saints, and detracts from the dignity of the sacraments of the New Law. Hence, since this sacrament is of greater worth than the others, as stated above ([4602]Q[65], A[3]), the result is that there is in the words of the form of this sacrament a created power which causes the change to be wrought in it: instrumental, however, as in the other sacraments, as stated above ([4603]Q[62], AA[3],4). For since these words are uttered in the person of Christ, it is from His command that they receive their instrumental power from Him, just as His other deeds and sayings derive their salutary power instrumentally, as was observed above ([4604]Q[48], A[6];[4605] Q[56], A[1], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 1: When the bread is said to be changed into Christ’s body solely by the power of the Holy Ghost, the instrumental power which lies in the form of this sacrament is not excluded: just as when we say that the smith alone makes a knife we do not deny the power of the hammer.

Reply to Objection 2: No creature can work miracles as the chief agent. yet it can do so instrumentally, just as the touch of Christ’s hand healed the leper. And in this fashion Christ’s words change the bread into His body. But in Christ’s conception, whereby His body was fashioned, it was impossible for anything derived from His body to have the instrumental power of forming that very body. Likewise in creation there was no term wherein the instrumental action of a creature could be received. Consequently there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: The aforesaid words, which work the consecration, operate sacramentally. Consequently, the converting power latent under the forms of these sacraments follows the meaning, which is terminated in the uttering of the last word. And therefore the aforesaid words have this power in the last instant of their being uttered, taken in conjunction with those uttered before. And this power is simple by reason of the thing signified, although there be composition in the words uttered outwardly.

Whether the aforesaid expressions are true?

Objection 1: It seems that the aforesaid expressions are not true. Because when we say: “This is My body,” the word “this” designates a substance. But according to what was said above ([4606]AA[1],4, ad 3;[4607] Q[75], AA[2],7), when the pronoun “this” is spoken, the substance of the bread is still there, because the transubstantiation takes place in the last instant of pronouncing the words. But it is false to say: “Bread is Christ’s body.” Consequently this expression, “This is My body,” is false.

Objection 2: Further, the pronoun “this” appeals to the senses. But the sensible species in this sacrament are neither Christ’s body nor even its accidents. Therefore this expression, “This is My body,” cannot be true.

Objection 3: Further, as was observed above (A[4], ad 3), these words, by their signification, effect the change of the bread into the body of Christ. But an effective cause is understood as preceding its effect. Therefore the meaning of these words is understood as preceding the change of the bread into the body of Christ. But previous to the change this expression, “This is My body,” is false. Therefore the expression is to be judged as false simply; and the same reason holds good of the other phrase: “This is the chalice of My blood,” etc.

On the contrary, These words are pronounced in the person of Christ, Who says of Himself (Jn. 14:6): “I am the truth.”

I answer that, There have been many opinions on this point. Some have said that in this expression, “This is My body,” the word “this” implies demonstration as conceived, and not as exercised, because the whole phrase is taken materially, since it is uttered by a way of narration: for the priest relates that Christ said: “This is My body.”

But such a view cannot hold good, because then these words would not be applied to the corporeal matter present, and consequently the sacrament would not be valid: for Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.): “The word is added to the element, and this becomes a sacrament.” Moreover this solution ignores entirely the difficulty which this question presents: for there is still the objection in regard to the first uttering of these words by Christ; since it is evident that then they were employed, not materially, but significatively. And therefore it must be said that even when spoken by the priest they are taken significatively, and not merely materially. Nor does it matter that the priest pronounces them by way of recital, as though they were spoken by Christ, because owing to Christ’s infinite power, just as through contact with His flesh the regenerative power entered not only into the waters which came into contact with Christ, but into all waters throughout the whole world and during all future ages, so likewise from Christ’s uttering these words they derived their consecrating power, by whatever priest they be uttered, as if Christ present were saying them.

And therefore others have said that in this phrase the word “this” appeals, not to the senses, but to the intellect; so that the meaning is, “This is My body”—i.e. “The thing signified by ‘this’ is My body.” But neither can this stand, because, since in the sacraments the effect is that which is signified, from such a form it would not result that Christ’s body was in very truth in this sacrament, but merely as in a sign, which is heretical, as stated above ([4608]Q[85], A[1]).

Consequently, others have said that the word “this” appeals to the senses; not at the precise instant of its being uttered, but merely at the last instant thereof; as when a man says, “Now I am silent,” this adverb “now” points to the instant immediately following the speech: because the sense is: “Directly these words are spoken I am silent.” But neither can this hold good, because in that case the meaning of the sentence would be: “My body is My body,” which the above phrase does not effect, because this was so even before the utterance of the words: hence neither does the aforesaid sentence mean this.

Consequently, then, it remains to be said, as stated above [4609](A[4]), that this sentence possesses the power of effecting the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ. And therefore it is compared to other sentences, which have power only of signifying and not of producing, as the concept of the practical intellect, which is productive of the thing, is compared to the concept of our speculative intellect which is drawn from things. because “words are signs of concepts,” as the Philosopher says (Peri

Herm. i). And therefore as the concept of the practical intellect does not presuppose the thing understood, but makes it, so the truth of this expression does not presuppose the thing signified, but makes it; for such is the relation of God's word to the things made by the Word. Now this change takes place not successively, but in an instant, as stated above (Q[77], A[7]). Consequently one must understand the aforesaid expression with reference to the last instant of the words being spoken, yet not so that the subject may be understood to have stood for that which is the term of the conversion; viz. that the body of Christ is the body of Christ; nor again that the subject be understood to stand for that which it was before the conversion, namely, the bread. but for that which is commonly related to both, i.e. that which is contained in general under those species. For these words do not make the body of Christ to be the body of Christ, nor do they make the bread to be the body of Christ; but what was contained under those species, and was formerly bread, they make to be the body of Christ. And therefore expressly our Lord did not say: "This bread is My body," which would be the meaning of the second opinion; nor "This My body is My body," which would be the meaning of the third opinion: but in general: "This is My body," assigning no noun on the part of the subject, but only a pronoun, which signifies substance in common, without quality, that is, without a determinate form.

Reply to Objection 1: The term "this" points to a substance, yet without determining its proper nature, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The pronoun "this" does not indicate the accidents, but the substance underlying the accidents, which at first was bread, and is afterwards the body of Christ, which body, although not informed by those accidents, is yet contained under them.

Reply to Objection 3: The meaning of this expression is, in the order of nature, understood before the thing signified, just as a cause is naturally prior to the effect; but not in order of time, because this cause has its effect with it at the same time, and this suffices for the truth of the expression.

Whether the form of the consecration of the bread accomplishes its effect before the form of the consecration of the wine be completed?

Objection 1: It seems that the form of the consecration of the bread does not accomplish its effect until the form for the consecration of the wine be completed. For, as Christ’s body begins to be in this sacrament by the consecration of the bread, so does His blood come to be there by the consecration of the wine. If, then, the words for consecrating the bread were to produce their effect before the consecration of the wine, it would follow that Christ’s body would be present in this sacrament without the blood, which is improper.

Objection 2: Further, one sacrament has one completion: hence although there be three immersions in Baptism, yet the first immersion does not produce its effect until the third be completed. But all this sacrament is one, as stated above ([4610]Q[73], A[2]). Therefore the words whereby the bread is consecrated do not bring about their effect without the sacramental words whereby the wine is consecrated.

Objection 3: Further, there are several words in the form for consecrating the bread, the first of which do not secure their effect until the last be uttered, as stated above (A[4], ad 3). Therefore, for the same reason, neither do the words for the consecration of Christ’s body produce their effect, until the words for consecrating Christ’s blood are spoken.

On the contrary, Directly the words are uttered for consecrating the bread, the consecrated host is shown to the people to be adored, which would not be done if Christ’s body were not there, for that would be an act of idolatry. Therefore the consecrating words of the bread produce their effect before. the words are spoken for consecrating the wine.

I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors said that these two forms, namely, for consecrating the bread and the wine, await each other’s action, so that the first does not produce its effect until the second be uttered.

But this cannot stand, because, as stated above (A[5], ad 3), for the truth of this phrase, “This is My body,” wherein the verb is in the present tense, it is required for the thing signified to be present simultaneously in time with the signification of the expression used; otherwise, if the thing signified had to be awaited for afterwards, a verb of the future tense would be employed, and not one of the present tense, so that we should not say, “This is My body,” but “This will be My body.” But the signification of this speech is complete directly those words are spoken. And therefore the thing signified must be present instantaneously, and such is the effect of this sacrament;

otherwise it would not be a true speech. Moreover, this opinion is against the rite of the Church, which forthwith adores the body of Christ after the words are uttered.

Hence it must be said that the first form does not await the second in its action, but has its effect on the instant.

Reply to Objection 1: It is on this account that they who maintained the above opinion seem to have erred. Hence it must be understood that directly the consecration of the bread is complete, the body of Christ is indeed present by the power of the sacrament, and the blood by real concomitance; but afterwards by the consecration of the wine, conversely, the blood of Christ is there by the power of the sacrament, and the body by real concomitance, so that the entire Christ is under either species, as stated above ([4611]Q[76], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament is one in perfection, as stated above ([4612]Q[73] , A[2]), namely, inasmuch as it is made up of two things, that is, of food and drink, each of which of itself has its own perfection; but the three immersions of Baptism are ordained to one simple effect, and therefore there is no resemblance.

Reply to Objection 3: The various words in the form for consecrating the bread constitute the truth of one speech, but the words of the different forms do not, and consequently there is no parallel.

OF THE EFFECTS OF THIS SACRAMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effects of this sacrament, and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether this sacrament bestows grace?

(2) Whether the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament?

(3) Whether the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this sacrament?

(4) Whether venial sin is forgiven by this sacrament?

(5) Whether the entire punishment due for sin is forgiven by this sacrament?

(6) Whether this sacrament preserves man from future sins?

(7) Whether this sacrament benefits others besides the recipients?

(8) Of the obstacles to the effect of this sacrament.

Whether grace is bestowed through this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that grace is not bestowed through this sacrament. For this sacrament is spiritual nourishment. But nourishment is only given to the living. Therefore since the spiritual life is the effect of grace, this sacrament belongs only to one in the state of grace. Therefore grace is not bestowed through this sacrament for it to be had in the first instance. In like manner neither is it given so as grace may be increased, because spiritual growth belongs to the sacrament of Confirmation, as stated above ([4613]Q[72], A[1]). Consequently, grace is not bestowed through this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is given as a spiritual refreshment. But spiritual refreshment seems to belong to the use of grace rather than to its bestowal. Therefore it seems that grace is not given through this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, as was said above (Q[74], A[1]), “Christ’s body is offered up in this sacrament for the salvation of the body, and His blood for that of the soul.” Now it is not the body which is the subject of grace, but the soul, as was shown in the [4614]FS, Q[110], A[4]. Therefore grace is not bestowed through this sacrament, at least so far as the body is concerned.

On the contrary, Our Lord says (Jn. 6:52): “The bread which I will give, is My flesh for the life of the world.” But the spiritual life is the effect of grace. Therefore grace is bestowed through this sacrament.

I answer that, The effect of this sacrament ought to be considered, first of all and principally, from what is contained in this sacrament, which is Christ; Who, just as by coming into the world, He visibly bestowed the life of grace upon the world, according to Jn. 1:17: “Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ,” so also, by coming sacramentally into man causes the life of grace, according to Jn. 6:58: “He that eateth Me, the same also shall live by Me.” Hence Cyril says on Lk. 22:19: “God’s life-giving Word by uniting Himself with His own flesh, made it to be productive of life. For it was becoming that He should be united somehow with bodies through His sacred flesh and precious blood, which we receive in a life-giving blessing in the bread and wine."

Secondly, it is considered on the part of what is represented by this sacrament, which is Christ's Passion, as stated above ([4615]Q[74], A[1]; [4616] Q[76] , A[2], ad 1). And therefore this sacrament works in man the effect which Christ's Passion wrought in the world. Hence, Chrysostom says on the words, "Immediately there came out blood and water" (Jn. 19:34): "Since the sacred mysteries derive their origin from thence, when you draw nigh to the awe-inspiring chalice, so approach as if you were going to drink from Christ's own side." Hence our Lord Himself says (Mat. 26:28): "This is My blood . . . which shall be shed for many unto the remission of sins."

Thirdly, the effect of this sacrament is considered from the way in which this sacrament is given; for it is given by way of food and drink. And therefore this sacrament does for the spiritual life all that material food does for the bodily life, namely, by sustaining, giving increase, restoring, and giving delight. Accordingly, Ambrose says (De Sacram. v): "This is the bread of everlasting life, which supports the substance of our soul." And Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Joan.): "When we desire it, He lets us feel Him, and eat Him, and embrace Him." And hence our Lord says (Jn. 6:56): "My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed."

Fourthly, the effect of this sacrament is considered from the species under which it is given. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.): "Our Lord betokened His body and blood in things which out of many units are made into some one whole: for out of many grains is one thing made," viz. bread; "and many grapes flow into one thing," viz. wine. And therefore he observes elsewhere (Tract. xxvi in Joan.): "O sacrament of piety, O sign of unity, O bond of charity!"

And since Christ and His Passion are the cause of grace. and since spiritual refreshment, and charity cannot be without grace, it is clear from all that has been set forth that this sacrament bestows grace.

Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament has of itself the power of bestowing grace; nor does anyone possess grace before receiving this sacrament except from some desire thereof; from his own desire, as in the case of the adult. or from the Church's desire in the case of children, as stated above ([4617]Q[73], A[3]). Hence it is due to the efficacy of its power, that even from desire thereof a man procures grace whereby he is enabled to lead the spiritual life. It remains, then, that when the sacrament itself is really received, grace is increased, and the spiritual life perfected: yet in different fashion from the sacrament of Confirmation, in which grace is increased and perfected for resisting the outward assaults of Christ's enemies. But by this sacrament grace receives increase, and the spiritual life is perfected, so that man may stand perfect in himself by union with God.

Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament confers grace spiritually together with the virtue of charity. Hence Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv) compares this sacrament to the burning coal which Isaias saw (Is. 6:6): "For a live ember is not simply wood, but wood united to fire; so also the bread of communion is not simple bread but bread united with the Godhead." But as Gregory observes in a Homily for Pentecost, "God's love is never idle; for, wherever it is it does great works." And consequently through this sacrament, as far as its power is concerned, not only is the habit of grace and of virtue bestowed, but it is furthermore aroused to act, according to 2 Cor. 5:14: "The charity of Christ presseth us." Hence it is that the soul is spiritually nourished through the power of this sacrament, by being spiritually gladdened, and as it were inebriated with the sweetness of the Divine goodness, according to Cant 5:1: "Eat, O friends, and drink, and be inebriated, my dearly beloved."

Reply to Objection 3: Because the sacraments operate according to the similitude by which they signify, therefore by way of assimilation it is said that in this sacrament "the body is offered for the salvation of the body, and the blood for the salvation of the soul," although each works for the salvation of both, since the entire Christ is under each, as stated above ([4618]Q[76], A[2]). And although the body is not the immediate subject of grace, still the effect of grace flows into the body while in the present life we present "our [Vulg.: 'your'] members" as "instruments of justice unto God" (Rom. 6:13), and in the life to come our body will share in the incorruption and the glory of the soul.

Whether the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the attaining of glory is not an effect of this sacrament. For an effect is proportioned to its cause. But this sacrament belongs to “wayfarers” [viatoribus], and hence it is termed “Viaticum.” Since, then, wayfarers are not yet capable of glory, it seems that this sacrament does not cause the attaining of glory.

Objection 2: Further, given sufficient cause, the effect follows. But many take this sacrament who will never come to glory, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xxi). Consequently, this sacrament is not the cause of attaining unto glory.

Objection 3: Further, the greater is not brought about by the lesser, for nothing acts outside its species. But it is the lesser thing to receive Christ under a strange species, which happens in this sacrament, than to enjoy Him in His own species, which belongs to glory. Therefore this sacrament does not cause the attaining of glory.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 6:52): “If any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever.” But eternal life is the life of glory. Therefore the attaining of glory is an effect of this sacrament.

I answer that, In this sacrament we may consider both that from which it derives its effect, namely, Christ contained in it, as also His Passion represented by it; and that through which it works its effect, namely, the use of the sacrament, and its species.

Now as to both of these it belongs to this sacrament to cause the attaining of eternal life. Because it was by His Passion that Christ opened to us the approach to eternal life, according to Heb. 9:15: “He is the Mediator of the New Testament; that by means of His death . . . they that are called may receive the promise of eternal inheritance.” Accordingly in the form of this sacrament it is said: “This is the chalice of My blood, of the New and Eternal Testament.”

In like manner the refreshment of spiritual food and the unity denoted by the species of the bread and wine are to be had in the present life, although imperfectly. but perfectly in the state of glory. Hence Augustine says on the words, “My flesh is meat indeed” (Jn. 6:56): “Seeing that in meat and drink, men aim at this, that they hunger not nor thirst, this verily nought doth afford save only this meat and drink which maketh them who partake thereof to be immortal and incorruptible, in the fellowship of the saints, where shall be peace, and unity, full and perfect.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Christ’s Passion, in virtue whereof this sacrament is accomplished, is indeed the sufficient cause of glory, yet not so that we are thereby forthwith admitted to glory, but we must first “suffer with Him in order that we may also be glorified” afterwards “with Him” (Rom. 8:17), so this sacrament does not at once admit us to glory, but bestows on us the power of coming unto glory. And therefore it is called “Viaticum,” a figure whereof we read in 3 Kings 19:8: “Elias ate and drank, and walked in the strength of that food forty days and forty nights unto the mount of God, Horeb.”

Reply to Objection 2: Just as Christ’s Passion has not its effect in them who are not disposed towards it as they should be, so also they do not come to glory through this sacrament who receive it unworthily. Hence Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), expounding the same passage, observes: “The sacrament is one thing, the power of the sacrament another. Many receive it from the altar . . . and by receiving” . . . die . . . Eat, then, spiritually the heavenly “bread, bring innocence to the altar.” It is no wonder, then, if those who do not keep innocence, do not secure the effect of this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: That Christ is received under another species belongs to the nature of a sacrament, which acts instrumentally. But there is nothing to prevent an instrumental cause from producing a more mighty effect, as is evident from what was said above ([4619]Q[77], A[3], ad 3).

Whether the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the forgiveness of mortal sin is an effect of this sacrament. For it is said in one of the Collects (Postcommunion, Pro vivis et defunctis): “May this sacrament be a cleansing from crimes.” But mortal sins are called crimes. Therefore mortal sins are blotted out by this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament, like Baptism, works by the power of Christ’s Passion. But mortal sins are forgiven by Baptism, as stated above ([4620]Q[69], A[1]). Therefore they are forgiven likewise by this sacrament, especially since in the form of this sacrament it is said: “Which shall be shed for many unto the forgiveness of sins.”

Objection 3: Further, grace is bestowed through this sacrament, as stated above [4621](A[1]). But by grace a man is justified from mortal sins, according to Rom. 3:24: “Being justified freely by His grace.” Therefore mortal sins are forgiven by this sacrament.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 11:29): “He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself”: and a gloss of the same passage makes the following commentary: “He eats and drinks unworthily who is in the state of sin, or who handles (the sacrament) irreverently; and such a one eats and drinks judgment, i.e. damnation, unto himself.” Therefore, he that is in mortal sin, by taking the sacrament heaps sin upon sin, rather than obtains forgiveness of his sin.

I answer that, The power of this sacrament can be considered in two ways. First of all, in itself: and thus this sacrament has from Christ’s Passion the power of forgiving all sins, since the Passion is the fount and cause of the forgiveness of sins.

Secondly, it can be considered in comparison with the recipient of the sacrament, in so far as there is, or is not, found in him an obstacle to receiving the fruit of this sacrament. Now whoever is conscious of mortal sin, has within him an obstacle to receiving the effect of this sacrament; since he is not a proper recipient of this sacrament, both because he is not alive spiritually, and so he ought not to eat the spiritual nourishment, since nourishment is confined to the living; and because he cannot be united with Christ, which is the effect of this sacrament, as long as he retains an attachment towards mortal sin. Consequently, as is said in the book De Eccles. Dogm.: “If the soul leans towards sin, it is burdened rather than purified from partaking of the Eucharist.” Hence, in him who is conscious of mortal sin, this sacrament does not cause the forgiveness of sin.

Nevertheless this sacrament can effect the forgiveness of sin in two ways. First of all, by being received, not actually, but in desire; as when a man is first justified from sin. Secondly, when received by one in mortal sin of which he is not conscious, and for which he has no attachment; since possibly he was not sufficiently contrite at first, but by approaching this sacrament devoutly and reverently he obtains the grace of charity, which will perfect his contrition and bring forgiveness of sin.

Reply to Objection 1: We ask that this sacrament may be the “cleansing of crimes,” or of those sins of which we are unconscious, according to Ps. 18:13: “Lord, cleanse me from my hidden sins”; or that our contrition may be perfected for the forgiveness of our sins; or that strength be bestowed on us to avoid sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is spiritual generation, which is a transition from spiritual non-being into spiritual being, and is given by way of ablution. Consequently, in both respects he who is conscious of mortal sin does not improperly approach Baptism. But in this sacrament man receives Christ within himself by way of spiritual nourishment, which is unbecoming to one that lies dead in his sins. Therefore the comparison does not hold good.

Reply to Objection 3: Grace is the sufficient cause of the forgiveness of mortal sin; yet it does not forgive sin except when it is first bestowed on the sinner. But it is not given so in this sacrament. Hence the argument does not prove.

Whether venial sins are forgiven through this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that venial sins are not forgiven by this sacrament, because this is the "sacrament of charity," as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But venial sins are not contrary to charity, as was shown in the [4622]FS, Q[88], AA[1],2; [4623]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Therefore, since contrary is taken away by its contrary, it seems that venial sins are not forgiven by this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, if venial sins be forgiven by this sacrament, then all of them are forgiven for the same reason as one is. But it does not appear that all are forgiven, because thus one might frequently be without any venial sin, against what is said in 1 Jn. 1:8: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves." Therefore no venial sin is forgiven by this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, contraries mutually exclude each other. But venial sins do not forbid the receiving of this sacrament: because Augustine says on the words, "If any man eat of it he shall [Vulg.: 'may'] not die for ever" (Jn. 6:50): "Bring innocence to the altar: your sins, though they be daily . . . let them not be deadly." Therefore neither are venial sins taken away by this sacrament.

On the contrary, Innocent III says (De S. Alt. Myst. iv) that this sacrament "blots out venial sins, and wards off mortal sins."

I answer that, Two things may be considered in this sacrament, to wit, the sacrament itself, and the reality of the sacrament: and it appears from both that this sacrament has the power of forgiving venial sins. For this sacrament is received under the form of nourishing food. Now nourishment from food is requisite for the body to make good the daily waste caused by the action of natural heat. But something is also lost daily of our spirituality from the heat of concupiscence through venial sins, which lessen the fervor of charity, as was shown in the [4624]SS, Q[24], A[10]. And therefore it belongs to this sacrament to forgive venial sins. Hence Ambrose says (De Sacram. v) that this daily bread is taken "as a remedy against daily infirmity."

The reality of this sacrament is charity, not only as to its habit, but also as to its act, which is kindled in this sacrament; and by this means venial sins are forgiven. Consequently, it is manifest that venial sins are forgiven by the power of this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial sins, although not opposed to the habit of charity, are nevertheless opposed to the fervor of its act, which act is kindled by this sacrament; by reason of which act venial sins are blotted out.

Reply to Objection 1: The passage quoted is not to be understood as if a man could not at some time be without all guilt of venial sin: but that the just do not pass through this life without committing venial sins.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of charity, to which this sacrament belongs, is greater than that of venial sins: because charity by its act takes away venial sins, which nevertheless cannot entirely hinder the act of charity. And the same holds good of this sacrament.

Whether the entire punishment due to sin is forgiven through this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the entire punishment due to sin is forgiven through this sacrament. For through this sacrament man receives the effect of Christ's Passion within himself as stated above ([4625]AA[1],2), just as he does through Baptism. But through Baptism man receives forgiveness of all punishment, through the virtue of Christ's Passion, which satisfied sufficiently for all sins, as was explained above (Q[69], A[2]). Therefore it seems the whole debt of punishment is forgiven through this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Pope Alexander I says (Ep. ad omnes orth.): "No sacrifice can be greater than the body and the blood of Christ." But man satisfied for his sins by the sacrifices of the old Law: for it is written (Lev. 4, 5): “If a man shall sin, let him offer” (so and so) “for his sin, and it shall be forgiven him.” Therefore this sacrament avails much more for the forgiveness of all punishment.

Objection 3: Further, it is certain that some part of the debt of punishment is forgiven by this sacrament; for which reason it is sometimes enjoined upon a man, by way of satisfaction, to have masses said for himself. But if one part of the punishment is forgiven, for the same reason is the other forgiven: owing to Christ’s infinite power contained in this sacrament. Consequently, it seems that the whole punishment can be taken away by this sacrament.

On the contrary, In that case no other punishment would have to be enjoined; just as none is imposed upon the newly baptized.

I answer that, This sacrament is both a sacrifice and a sacrament. it has the nature of a sacrifice inasmuch as it is offered up; and it has the nature of a sacrament inasmuch as it is received. And therefore it has the effect of a sacrament in the recipient, and the effect of a sacrifice in the offerer, or in them for whom it is offered.

If, then, it be considered as a sacrament, it produces its effect in two ways: first of all directly through the power of the sacrament; secondly as by a kind of concomitance, as was said above regarding what is contained in the sacrament ([4626]Q[76], AA[1],2). Through the power of the sacrament it produces directly that effect for which it was instituted. Now it was instituted not for satisfaction, but for nourishing spiritually through union between Christ and His members, as nourishment is united with the person nourished. But because this union is the effect of charity, from the fervor of which man obtains forgiveness, not only of guilt but also of punishment, hence it is that as a consequence, and by concomitance with the chief effect, man obtains forgiveness of the punishment, not indeed of the entire punishment, but according to the measure of his devotion and fervor.

But in so far as it is a sacrifice, it has a satisfactory power. Yet in satisfaction, the affection of the offerer is weighed rather than the quantity of the offering. Hence our Lord says (Mk. 12:43: cf. Lk. 21:4) of the widow who offered “two mites” that she “cast in more than all.” Therefore, although this offering suffices of its own quantity to satisfy for all punishment, yet it becomes satisfactory for them for whom it is offered, or even for the offerers, according to the measure of their devotion, and not for the whole punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: The sacrament of Baptism is directly ordained for the remission of punishment and guilt: not so the Eucharist, because Baptism is given to man as dying with Christ, whereas the Eucharist is given as by way of nourishing and perfecting him through Christ. Consequently there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 2: Those other sacrifices and oblations did not effect the forgiveness of the whole punishment, neither as to the quantity of the thing offered, as this sacrament does, nor as to personal devotion; from which it comes to pass that even here the whole punishment is not taken away.

Reply to Objection 3: If part of the punishment and not the whole be taken away by this sacrament, it is due to a defect not on the part of Christ’s power, but on the part of man’s devotion.

Whether man is preserved by this sacrament from future sins?

Objection 1: It seems that man is not preserved by this sacrament from future sins. For there are many that receive this sacrament worthily, who afterwards fall into sin. Now this would not happen if this sacrament were to preserve them from future sins. Consequently, it is not an effect of this sacrament to preserve from future sins.

Objection 2: Further, the Eucharist is the sacrament of charity, as stated above [4627](A[4]). But charity does not seem to preserve from future sins, because it can be lost through sin after one has possessed it, as was stated in the [4628]SS, Q[24], A[11]. Therefore it seems that this sacrament does not preserve man from sin.

Objection 3: Further, the origin of sin within us is “the law of sin, which is in our members,” as declared by the Apostle (Rom. 7:23). But the lessening of the fomes, which is the law of sin, is set down as an effect not of this sacrament, but rather of Baptism. Therefore preservation from sin is not an effect of this sacrament.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Jn. 6:50): “This is the bread which cometh down from heaven; that if any man eat of it, he may not die”: which manifestly is not to be understood of the death of the body. Therefore it is to be understood that this sacrament preserves from spiritual death, which is through sin.

I answer that, Sin is the spiritual death of the soul. Hence man is preserved from future sin in the same way as the body is preserved from future death of the body: and this happens in two ways. First of all, in so far as man's nature is strengthened inwardly against inner decay, and so by means of food and medicine he is preserved from death. Secondly, by being guarded against outward assaults; and thus he is protected by means of arms by which he defends his body.

Now this sacrament preserves man from sin in both of these ways. For, first of all, by uniting man with Christ through grace, it strengthens his spiritual life, as spiritual food and spiritual medicine, according to Ps. 103:5: "(That) bread strengthens [Vulg.: 'may strengthen'] man's heart." Augustine likewise says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.): "Approach without fear; it is bread, not poison." Secondly, inasmuch as it is a sign of Christ's Passion, whereby the devils are conquered, it repels all the assaults of demons. Hence Chrysostom says (Hom. xlvi in Joan.): "Like lions breathing forth fire, thus do we depart from that table, being made terrible to the devil."

Reply to Objection 1: The effect of this sacrament is received according to man's condition: such is the case with every active cause in that its effect is received in matter according to the condition of the matter. But such is the condition of man on earth that his free-will can be bent to good or evil. Hence, although this sacrament of itself has the power of preserving from sin, yet it does not take away from man the possibility of sinning.

Reply to Objection 2: Even charity of itself keeps man from sin, according to Rom. 13:10: "The love of our neighbor worketh no evil": but it is due to the mutability of free-will that a man sins after possessing charity, just as after receiving this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: Although this sacrament is not ordained directly to lessen the fomes, yet it does lessen it as a consequence, inasmuch as it increases charity, because, as Augustine says ([4629]Q[83]), "the increase of charity is the lessening of concupiscence." But it directly strengthens man's heart in good; whereby he is also preserved from sin.

Whether this sacrament benefit others besides the recipients?

Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament benefits only the recipients. For this sacrament is of the same genus as the other sacraments, being one of those into which that genus is divided. But the other sacraments only benefit the recipients; thus the baptized person alone receives effect of Baptism. Therefore, neither does this sacrament benefit others than the recipients.

Objection 2: Further, the effects of this sacrament are the attainment of grace and glory, and the forgiveness of sin, at least of venial sin. If therefore this sacrament were to produce its effects in others besides the recipients, a man might happen to acquire grace and glory and forgiveness of sin without doing or receiving anything himself, through another receiving or offering this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, when the cause is multiplied, the effect is likewise multiplied. If therefore this sacrament benefit others besides the recipients, it would follow that it benefits a man more if he receive this sacrament through many hosts being consecrated in one mass, whereas this is not the Church's custom: for instance, that many receive communion for the salvation of one individual. Consequently, it does not seem that this sacrament benefits anyone but the recipient.

On the contrary, Prayer is made for many others during the celebration of this sacrament; which would serve no purpose were the sacrament not beneficial to others. Therefore, this sacrament is beneficial not merely to them who receive it.

I answer that, As stated above [4630](A[3]), this sacrament is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice. For, it has the nature of a sacrifice inasmuch as in this sacrament Christ's Passion is represented, whereby Christ "offered Himself a Victim to God" (Eph. 5:2), and it has the nature of a sacrament inasmuch as invisible grace is bestowed in this sacrament under a visible species. So, then, this sacrament benefits recipients by way both of sacrament and of sacrifice, because it is offered for all who partake of it. For it is said in the Canon of the Mass: "May as many of us as, by participation at this Altar, shall receive the most sacred body and blood of Thy Son, be filled with all heavenly benediction and grace."

But to others who do not receive it, it is beneficial by way of sacrifice, inasmuch as it is offered for their salvation. Hence it is said in the Canon of the Mass: "Be mindful, O Lord, of Thy servants, men and women . . . for whom we offer, or who offer up to Thee, this sacrifice of praise for themselves and for all their own, for the redemption of their souls, for the hope of their safety and salvation.” And our Lord expressed both ways, saying (Mat. 26:28, with Lk. 22:20): “Which for you,” i.e. who receive it, “and for many,” i.e. others, “shall be shed unto remission of sins.”

Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament has this in addition to the others, that it is a sacrifice: and therefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: As Christ’s Passion benefits all, for the forgiveness of sin and the attaining of grace and glory, whereas it produces no effect except in those who are united with Christ’s Passion through faith and charity, so likewise this sacrifice, which is the memorial of our Lord’s Passion, has no effect except in those who are united with this sacrament through faith and charity. Hence Augustine says to Renatus (De Anima et ejus origine i): “Who may offer Christ’s body except for them who are Christ’s members?” Hence in the Canon of the Mass no prayer is made for them who are outside the pale of the Church. But it benefits them who are members, more or less, according to the measure of their devotion.

Reply to Objection 3: Receiving is of the very nature of the sacrament, but offering belongs to the nature of sacrifice: consequently, when one or even several receive the body of Christ, no help accrues to others. In like fashion even when the priest consecrates several hosts in one mass, the effect of this sacrament is not increased, since there is only one sacrifice; because there is no more power in several hosts than in one, since there is only one Christ present under all the hosts and under one. Hence, neither will any one receive greater effect from the sacrament by taking many consecrated hosts in one mass. But the oblation of the sacrifice is multiplied in several masses, and therefore the effect of the sacrifice and of the sacrament is multiplied.

Whether the effect of this sacrament is hindered by venial sin?

Objection 1: It seems that the effect of this sacrament is not hindered by venial sin. For Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), commenting on Jn. 6:52, “If any man eat of this bread,” etc., says: “Eat the heavenly bread spiritually; bring innocence to the altar; your sins, though they be daily, let them not be deadly.” From this it is evident that venial sins, which are called daily sins, do not prevent spiritual eating. But they who eat spiritually, receive the effect of this sacrament. Therefore, venial sins do not hinder the effect of this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is not less powerful than Baptism. But, as stated above ([4631]Q[69], AA[9],10), only pretense checks the effect of Baptism, and venial sins do not belong to pretense; because according to Wis. 1:5: “the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful,” yet He is not put to flight by venial sins. Therefore neither do venial sins hinder the effect of this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, nothing which is removed by the action of any cause, can hinder the effect of such cause. But venial sins are taken away by this sacrament. Therefore, they do not hinder its effect.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “The fire of that desire which is within us, being kindled by the burning coal,” i.e. this sacrament, “will consume our sins, and enlighten our hearts, so that we shall be inflamed and made godlike.” But the fire of our desire or love is hindered by venial sins, which hinder the fervor of charity, as was shown in the [4632]FS, Q[81], A[4]; [4633]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Therefore venial sins hinder the effect of this sacrament.

I answer that, Venial sins can be taken in two ways: first of all as past, secondly as in the act of being committed. Venial sins taken in the first way do not in any way hinder the effect of this sacrament. For it can come to pass that after many venial sins a man may approach devoutly to this sacrament and fully secure its effect. Considered in the second way venial sins do not utterly hinder the effect of this sacrament, but merely in part. For, it has been stated above [4634](A[1]), that the effect of this sacrament is not only the obtaining of habitual grace or charity, but also a certain actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness: which is indeed hindered if anyone approach to this sacrament with mind distracted through venial sins; but the increase of habitual grace or of charity is not taken away.

Reply to Objection 1: He that approaches this sacrament with actual venial sin, eats spiritually indeed, in habit but not in act: and therefore he shares in the habitual effect of the sacrament, but not in its actual effect.

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is not ordained, as this sacrament is, for the fervor of charity as its actual effect. Because Baptism is spiritual regeneration, through which the first perfection is acquired, which is a habit or form; but this sacrament is spiritual eating, which has actual delight.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument deals with past venial sins, which are taken away by this sacrament.

OF THE USE OR RECEIVING OF THIS SACRAMENT IN GENERAL (TWELVE ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the use or receiving of this sacrament, first of all in general; secondly, how Christ used this sacrament.

Under the first heading there are twelve points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there are two ways of eating this sacrament, namely, sacramentally and spiritually?

(2) Whether it belongs to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually?

(3) Whether it belongs to the just man only to eat it sacramentally?

(4) Whether the sinner sins in eating it sacramentally?

(5) Of the degree of this sin;

(6) Whether this sacrament should be refused to the sinner that approaches it?

(7) Whether nocturnal pollution prevents man from receiving this sacrament?

(8) Whether it is to be received only when one is fasting?

(9) Whether it is to be given to them who lack the use of reason?

(10) Whether it is to be received daily?

(11) Whether it is lawful to refrain from it altogether?

(12) Whether it is lawful to receive the body without the blood?

Whether there are two ways to be distinguished of eating Christ’s body?

Objection 1: It seems that two ways ought not to be distinguished of eating Christ’s body, namely, sacramentally and spiritually. For, as Baptism is spiritual regeneration, according to Jn. 3:5: “Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost," etc., so also this sacrament is spiritual food: hence our Lord, speaking of this sacrament, says (Jn. 6:64): "The words that I have spoken to you are spirit and life." But there are no two distinct ways of receiving Baptism, namely, sacramentally and spiritually. Therefore neither ought this distinction to be made regarding this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, when two things are so related that one is on account of the other, they should not be put in contra-distinction to one another, because the one derives its species from the other. But sacramental eating is ordained for spiritual eating as its end. Therefore sacramental eating ought not to be divided in contrast with spiritual eating.

Objection 3: Further, things which cannot exist without one another ought not to be divided in contrast with each other. But it seems that no one can eat spiritually without eating sacramentally; otherwise the fathers of old would have eaten this sacrament spiritually. Moreover, sacramental eating would be to no purpose, if the spiritual eating could be had without it. Therefore it is not right to distinguish a twofold eating, namely, sacramental and spiritual.

On the contrary, The gloss says on 1 Cor. 11:29: "He that eateth and drinketh unworthily," etc.: "We hold that there are two ways of eating, the one sacramental, and the other spiritual."

I answer that, There are two things to be considered in the receiving of this sacrament, namely, the sacrament itself, and its fruits, and we have already spoken of both (QQ[73],79). The perfect way, then, of receiving this sacrament is when one takes it so as to partake of its effect. Now, as was stated above ([4635]Q[79], AA[3],8), it sometimes happens that a man is hindered from receiving the effect of this sacrament; and such receiving of this sacrament is an imperfect one. Therefore, as the perfect is divided against the imperfect, so sacramental eating, whereby the sacrament only is received without its effect, is divided against spiritual eating, by which one receives the effect of this sacrament, whereby a man is spiritually united with Christ through faith and charity.

Reply to Objection 1: The same distinction is made regarding Baptism and the other sacraments: for, some receive the sacrament only, while others receive the sacrament and the reality of the sacrament. However, there is a difference, because, since the other sacraments are accomplished in the use of the matter, the receiving of the sacrament is the actual perfection of the sacrament; whereas this sacrament is accomplished in the consecration of the matter: and consequently both uses follow the sacrament. On the other hand, in Baptism and in the other sacraments that imprint a character, they who receive the sacrament receive some spiritual effect, that is, the character. which is not the case in this sacrament. And therefore, in this sacrament, rather than in Baptism, the sacramental use is distinguished from the spiritual use.

Reply to Objection 2: That sacramental eating which is also a spiritual eating is not divided in contrast with spiritual eating, but is included under it; but that sacramental eating which does not secure the effect, is divided in contrast with spiritual eating; just as the imperfect, which does not attain the perfection of its species, is divided in contrast with the perfect.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4636]Q[73], A[3]), the effect of the sacrament can be secured by every man if he receive it in desire, though not in reality. Consequently, just as some are baptized with the Baptism of desire, through their desire of baptism, before being baptized in the Baptism of water; so likewise some eat this sacrament spiritually ere they receive it sacramentally. Now this happens in two ways. First of all, from desire of receiving the sacrament itself, and thus are said to be baptized, and to eat spiritually, and not sacramentally, they who desire to receive these sacraments since they have been instituted. Secondly, by a figure: thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:2), that the fathers of old were "baptized in the cloud and in the sea," and that "they did eat . . . spiritual food, and . . . drank . . . spiritual drink." Nevertheless sacramental eating is not without avail, because the actual receiving of the sacrament produces more fully the effect of the sacrament than does the desire thereof, as stated above of Baptism ([4637]Q[69] , A[4], ad 2).

Whether it belongs to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually?

Objection 1: It seems that it does not belong to man alone to eat this sacrament spiritually, but likewise to angels. Because on Ps. 77:25: "Man ate the bread of angels," the gloss says: "that is, the body of Christ, Who i's truly the food of angels." But it would not be so unless the angels were to eat Christ spiritually. Therefore the angels eat Christ spiritually.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) says: By “this meat and drink, He would have us to understand the fellowship of His body and members, which is the Church in His predestinated ones.” But not only men, but also the holy angels belong to that fellowship. Therefore the holy angels eat of it spiritually.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine in his book De Verbis Domini (Serm. cxlii) says: “Christ is to be eaten spiritually, as He Himself declares: ‘He that eateth My flesh and drinketh My blood, abideth in Me, and I in him.’” But this belongs not only to men, but also to the holy angels, in whom Christ dwells by charity, and they in Him. Consequently, it seems that to eat Christ spiritually is not for men only, but also for the angels.

On the contrary, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.) says: “Eat the bread” of the altar “spiritually; take innocence to the altar.” But angels do not approach the altar as for the purpose of taking something therefrom. Therefore the angels do not eat spiritually.

I answer that, Christ Himself is contained in this sacrament, not under His proper species, but under the sacramental species. Consequently there are two ways of eating spiritually. First, as Christ Himself exists under His proper species, and in this way the angels eat Christ spiritually inasmuch as they are united with Him in the enjoyment of perfect charity, and in clear vision (and this is the bread we hope for in heaven), and not by faith, as we are united with Him here.

In another way one may eat Christ spiritually, as He is under the sacramental species, inasmuch as a man believes in Christ, while desiring to receive this sacrament; and this is not merely to eat Christ spiritually, but likewise to eat this sacrament; which does not fall to the lot of the angels. And therefore although the angels feed on Christ spiritually, yet it does not belong to them to eat this sacrament spiritually.

Reply to Objection 1: The receiving of Christ under this sacrament is ordained to the enjoyment of heaven, as to its end, in the same way as the angels enjoy it; and since the means are gauged by the end, hence it is that such eating of Christ whereby we receive Him under this sacrament, is, as it were, derived from that eating whereby the angels enjoy Christ in heaven. Consequently, man is said to eat the “bread of angels,” because it belongs to the angels to do so firstly and principally, since they enjoy Him in his proper species; and secondly it belongs to men, who receive Christ under this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Both men and angels belong to the fellowship of His mystical body; men by faith, and angels by manifest vision. But the sacraments are proportioned to faith, through which the truth is seen "through a glass" and "in a dark manner." And therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to angels, but to men, to eat this sacrament spiritually.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ dwells in men through faith, according to their present state, but He is in the blessed angels by manifest vision. Consequently the comparison does not hold, as stated above (ad 2).

Whether the just man alone may eat Christ sacramentally?

Objection 1: It seems that none but the just man may eat Christ sacramentally. For Augustine says in his book De Remedio Penitentiae (cf. Tract. in Joan. xxv, n. 12; xxvi, n. 1): "Why make ready tooth and belly? Believe, and thou hast eaten . . . For to believe in Him, this it is, to eat the living bread." But the sinner does not believe in Him; because he has not living faith, to which it belongs to believe "in God," as stated above in the [4638]SS, Q[2], A[2]; [4639]SS, Q[4], A[5]. Therefore the sinner cannot eat this sacrament, which is the living bread.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is specially called "the sacrament of charity," as stated above ([4640]Q[78], A[3], ad 6). But as unbelievers lack faith, so all sinners lack charity. Now unbelievers do not seem to be capable of eating this sacrament, since in the sacramental form it is called the "Mystery of Faith." Therefore, for like reason, the sinner cannot eat Christ's body sacramentally.

Objection 3: Further, the sinner is more abominable before God than the irrational creature: for it is said of the sinner (Ps. 48:21): "Man when he was in honor did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them." But an irrational animal, such as a mouse or a dog, cannot receive this sacrament, just as it cannot receive the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore it seems that for the like reason neither may sinners eat this sacrament.

On the contrary, Augustine (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), commenting on the words, "that if any man eat of it he may not die," says: "Many receive from the altar, and by receiving die: whence the Apostle saith, ‘eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.’” But only sinners die by receiving. Therefore sinners eat the body of Christ sacramentally, and not the just only.

I answer that, In the past, some have erred upon this point, saying that Christ’s body is not received sacramentally by sinners; but that directly the body is touched by the lips of sinners, it ceases to be under the sacramental species.

But this is erroneous; because it detracts from the truth of this sacrament, to which truth it belongs that so long as the species last, Christ’s body does not cease to be under them, as stated above ([4641]Q[76], A[6], ad 3;[4642] Q[77], A[8]). But the species last so long as the substance of the bread would remain, if it were there, as was stated above ([4643]Q[77], A[4]). Now it is clear that the substance of bread taken by a sinner does not at once cease to be, but it continues until digested by natural heat: hence Christ’s body remains just as long under the sacramental species when taken by sinners. Hence it must be said that the sinner, and not merely the just, can eat Christ’s body.

Reply to Objection 1: Such words and similar expressions are to be understood of spiritual eating, which does not belong to sinners. Consequently, it is from such expressions being misunderstood that the above error seems to have arisen, through ignorance of the distinction between corporeal and spiritual eating.

Reply to Objection 2: Should even an unbeliever receive the sacramental species, he would receive Christ’s body under the sacrament: hence he would eat Christ sacramentally, if the word “sacramentally” qualify the verb on the part of the thing eaten. But if it qualify the verb on the part of the one eating, then, properly speaking, he does not eat sacramentally, because he uses what he takes, not as a sacrament, but as simple food. Unless perchance the unbeliever were to intend to receive what the Church bestows; without having proper faith regarding the other articles, or regarding this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: Even though a mouse or a dog were to eat the consecrated host, the substance of Christ’s body would not cease to be under the species, so long as those species remain, and that is, so long as the substance of bread would have remained; just as if it were to be cast into the mire. Nor does this turn to any indignity regarding Christ’s body, since He willed to be crucified by sinners without detracting from His dignity; especially since the mouse or dog does not touch Christ's body in its proper species, but only as to its sacramental species. Some, however, have said that Christ's body would cease to be there, directly it were touched by a mouse or a dog; but this again detracts from the truth of the sacrament, as stated above. None the less it must not be said that the irrational animal eats the body of Christ sacramentally; since it is incapable of using it as a sacrament. Hence it eats Christ's body "accidentally," and not sacramentally, just as if anyone not knowing a host to be consecrated were to consume it. And since no genus is divided by an accidental difference, therefore this manner of eating Christ's body is not set down as a third way besides sacramental and spiritual eating.

Whether the sinner sins in receiving Christ's body sacramentally?

Objection 1: It seems that the sinner does not sin in receiving Christ's body sacramentally, because Christ has no greater dignity under the sacramental species than under His own. But sinners did not sin when they touched Christ's body under its proper species; nay, rather they obtained forgiveness of their sins, as we read in Lk. 7 of the woman who was a sinner; while it is written (Mat. 14:36) that "as many as touched the hem of His garment were healed." Therefore, they do not sin, but rather obtain salvation, by receiving the body of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament, like the others, is a spiritual medicine. But medicine is given to the sick for their recovery, according to Mat. 9:12: "They that are in health need not a physician." Now they that are spiritually sick or infirm are sinners. Therefore this sacrament can be received by them without sin.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is one of our greatest gifts, since it contains Christ. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii), the greatest gifts are those "which no one can abuse." Now no one sins except by abusing something. Therefore no sinner sins by receiving this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, as this sacrament is perceived by taste and touch, so also is it by sight. Consequently, if the sinner sins by receiving the sacrament, it seems that he would sin by beholding it, which is manifestly untrue, since the Church exposes this sacrament to be seen and adored by all. Therefore the sinner does not sin by eating this sacrament.

Objection 5: Further, it happens sometimes that the sinner is unconscious of his sin. Yet such a one does not seem to sin by receiving the body of Christ, for according to this all who receive it would sin, as exposing themselves to danger, since the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): “I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet I am not hereby justified.” Therefore, the sinner, if he receive this sacrament, does not appear to be guilty of sin.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:29): “He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.” Now the gloss says on this passage: “He eats and drinks unworthily who is in sin, or who handles it irreverently.” Therefore, if anyone, while in mortal sin, receives this sacrament, he purchases damnation, by sinning mortally.

I answer that, In this sacrament, as in the others, that which is a sacrament is a sign of the reality of the sacrament. Now there is a twofold reality of this sacrament, as stated above ([4644]Q[73], A[6]): one which is signified and contained, namely, Christ Himself; while the other is signified but not contained, namely, Christ’s mystical body, which is the fellowship of the saints. Therefore, whoever receives this sacrament, expresses thereby that he is made one with Christ, and incorporated in His members; and this is done by living faith, which no one has who is in mortal sin. And therefore it is manifest that whoever receives this sacrament while in mortal sin, is guilty of lying to this sacrament, and consequently of sacrilege, because he profanes the sacrament: and therefore he sins mortally.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ appeared under His proper species, He did not give Himself to be touched by men as a sign of spiritual union with Himself, as He gives Himself to be received in this sacrament. And therefore sinners in touching Him under His proper species did not incur the sin of lying to Godlike things, as sinners do in receiving this sacrament.

Furthermore, Christ still bore the likeness of the body of sin; consequently He fittingly allowed Himself to be touched by sinners. But as soon as the body of sin was taken away by the glory of the Resurrection, he forbade the woman to touch Him, for her faith in Him was defective, according to Jn. 20:17: “Do not touch Me, for I am not yet ascended to My Father,” i.e. “in your heart,” as Augustine explains (Tract. cxxi in Joan.).

And therefore sinners, who lack living faith regarding Christ are not allowed to touch this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Every medicine does not suit every stage of sickness; because the tonic given to those who are recovering from fever would be hurtful to them if given while yet in their feverish condition. So likewise Baptism and Penance are as purgative medicines, given to take away the fever of sin; whereas this sacrament is a medicine given to strengthen, and it ought not to be given except to them who are quit of sin.

Reply to Objection 3: By the greatest gifts Augustine understands the soul’s virtues, “which no one uses to evil purpose,” as though they were principles of evil. Nevertheless sometimes a man makes a bad use of them, as objects of an evil use, as is seen in those who are proud of their virtues. So likewise this sacrament, so far as the sacrament is concerned, is not the principle of an evil use, but the object thereof. Hence Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): “Many receive Christ’s body unworthily; whence we are taught what need there is to beware of receiving a good thing evilly . . . For behold, of a good thing, received evilly, evil is wrought”: just as on the other hand, in the Apostle’s case, “good was wrought through evil well received,” namely, by bearing patiently the sting of Satan.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ’s body is not received by being seen, but only its sacrament, because sight does not penetrate to the substance of Christ’s body, but only to the sacramental species, as stated above ([4645]Q[76], A[7]). But he who eats, receives not only the sacramental species, but likewise Christ Himself Who is under them. Consequently, no one is forbidden to behold Christ’s body, when once he has received Christ’s sacrament, namely, Baptism: whereas the non-baptized are not to be allowed even to see this sacrament, as is clear from Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. vii). But only those are to be allowed to share in the eating who are united with Christ not merely sacramentally, but likewise really.

Reply to Objection 5: The fact of a man being unconscious of his sin can come about in two ways. First of all through his own fault, either because through ignorance of the law (which ignorance does not excuse him), he thinks something not to be sinful which is a sin, as for example if one guilty of fornication were to deem simple fornication not to be a mortal sin; or because he neglects to examine his conscience, which is opposed to what the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:28): “Let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of the chalice.” And in this way nevertheless the sinner who receives Christ’s body commits sin, although unconscious thereof, because the very ignorance is a sin on his part.

Secondly, it may happen without fault on his part, as, for instance, when he has sorrowed over his sin, but is not sufficiently contrite: and in such a case he does not sin in receiving the body of Christ, because a man cannot know for certain whether he is truly contrite. It suffices, however, if he find in himself the marks of contrition, for instance, if he “grieve over past sins,” and “propose to avoid them in the future” [*Cf. Rule of Augustine]. But if he be ignorant that what he did was a sinful act, through ignorance of the fact, which excuses, for instance, if a man approach a woman whom he believed to be his wife whereas she was not, he is not to be called a sinner on that account; in the same way if he has utterly forgotten his sin, general contrition suffices for blotting it out, as will be said hereafter ([4646]XP, Q[2], A[3], ad 2); hence he is no longer to be called a sinner.

Whether to approach this sacrament with consciousness of sin is the gravest of all sins?

Objection 1: It seems that to approach this sacrament with consciousness of sin is the gravest of all sins; because the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:27): “Whosoever shall eat this bread, or drink the chalice of the Lord unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and of the blood of the Lord”: upon which the gloss observes: “He shall be punished as though he slew Christ.” But the sin of them who slew Christ seems to have been most grave. Therefore this sin, whereby a man approaches Christ’s table with consciousness of sin, appears to be the gravest.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says in an Epistle (xlix): “What hast thou to do with women, thou that speakest familiarly with God at the altar?” [*The remaining part of the quotation is not from St. Jerome]. Say, priest, say, cleric, how dost thou kiss the Son of God with the same lips wherewith thou hast kissed the daughter of a harlot? “Judas, thou betrayest the Son of Man with a kiss!” And thus it appears that the fornicator approaching Christ’s table sins as Judas did, whose sin was most grave. But there are many other sins which are graver than fornication, especially the sin of unbelief. Therefore the sin of every sinner approaching Christ’s table is the gravest of all.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual uncleanness is more abominable to God than corporeal. But if anyone was to cast Christ’s body into mud or a cesspool, his sin would be reputed a most grave one. Therefore, he sins more deeply by receiving it with sin, which is spiritual uncleanness, upon his soul.

On the contrary, Augustine says on the words, “If I had not come, and had not spoken to them, they would be without sin” (Tract. lxxxix in Joan.), that this is to be understood of the sin of unbelief, “in which all sins are comprised,” and so the greatest of all sins appears to be, not this, but rather the sin of unbelief.

I answer that, As stated in the [4647]FS, Q[73], AA[3],6; [4648]SS, Q[73], A[3], one sin can be said to be graver than another in two ways: first of all essentially, secondly accidentally. Essentially, in regard to its species, which is taken from its object: and so a sin is greater according as that against which it is committed is greater. And since Christ’s Godhead is greater than His humanity, and His humanity greater than the sacraments of His humanity, hence it is that those are the gravest sins which are committed against the Godhead, such as unbelief and blasphemy. The second degree of gravity is held by those sins which are committed against His humanity: hence it is written (Mat. 12:32): “Whosoever shall speak a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him; but he that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come.” In the third place come sins committed against the sacraments, which belong to Christ’s humanity; and after these are the other sins committed against mere creatures.

Accidentally, one sin can be graver than another on the sinner’s part. for example, the sin which is the result of ignorance or of weakness is lighter than one arising from contempt, or from sure knowledge; and the same reason holds good of other circumstances. And according to this, the above sin can be graver in some, as happens in them who from actual contempt and with consciousness of sin approach this sacrament: but in others it is less grave; for instance, in those who from fear of their sin being discovered, approach this sacrament with consciousness of sin.

So, then, it is evident that this sin is specifically graver than many others, yet it is not the greatest of all.

Reply to Objection 1: The sin of the unworthy recipient is compared to the sin of them who slew Christ, by way of similitude, because each is committed against Christ’s body; but not according to the degree of the crime. Because the sin of Christ’s slayers was much graver, first of all, because their sin was against Christ’s body in its own species, while this sin is against it under sacramental species; secondly, because their sin came of the intent of injuring Christ, while this does not.

Reply to Objection 2: The sin of the fornicator receiving Christ’s body is likened to Judas kissing Christ, as to the resemblance of the sin, because each outrages Christ with the sign of friendship. but not as to the extent of the sin, as was observed above (ad 1). And this resemblance in crime applies no less to other sinners than to fornicators: because by other mortal sins, sinners act against the charity of Christ, of which this sacrament is the sign, and all the more according as their sins are graver. But in a measure the sin of fornication makes one more unfit for receiving this sacrament, because thereby especially the spirit becomes enslaved by the flesh, which is a hindrance to the fervor of love required for this sacrament.

However, the hindrance to charity itself weighs more than the hindrance to its fervor. Hence the sin of unbelief, which fundamentally severs a man from the unity of the Church, simply speaking, makes him to be utterly unfit for receiving this sacrament; because it is the sacrament of the Church's unity, as stated above ([4649]Q[61], A[2]). Hence the unbeliever who receives this sacrament sins more grievously than the believer who is in sin; and shows greater contempt towards Christ Who is in the sacrament, especially if he does not believe Christ to be truly in this sacrament; because, so far as lies in him, he lessens the holiness of the sacrament, and the power of Christ acting in it, and this is to despise the sacrament in itself. But the believer who receives the sacrament with consciousness of sin, by receiving it unworthily despises the sacrament, not in itself, but in its use. Hence the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:29) in assigning the cause of this sin, says, "not discerning the body of the Lord," that is, not distinguishing it from other food: and this is what he does who disbelieves Christ's presence in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: The man who would throw this sacrament into the mire would be guilty of more heinous sin than another approaching the sacrament fully conscious of mortal sin. First of all, because he would intend to outrage the sacrament, whereas the sinner receiving Christ's body unworthily has no such intent; secondly, because the sinner is capable of grace; hence he is more capable of receiving this sacrament than any irrational creature. Hence he would make a most revolting use of this sacrament who would throw it to dogs to eat, or fling it in the mire to be trodden upon.

Whether the priest ought to deny the body of Christ to the sinner seeking it?

Objection 1: It seems that the priest should deny the body of Christ to the sinner seeking it. For Christ's precept is not to be set aside for the sake of avoiding scandal or on account of infamy to anyone. But (Mat. 7:6) our Lord gave this command: "Give not that which is holy to dogs." Now it is especially casting holy things to dogs to give this sacrament to sinners.

Therefore, neither on account of avoiding scandal or infamy should this sacrament be administered to the sinner who asks for it.

Objection 2: Further, one must choose the lesser of two evils. But it seems to be the lesser evil if the sinner incur infamy; or if an unconsecrated host be given to him; than for him to sin mortally by receiving the body of Christ. Consequently, it seems that the course to be adopted is either that the sinner seeking the body of Christ be exposed to infamy, or that an unconsecrated host be given to him.

Objection 3: Further, the body of Christ is sometimes given to those suspected of crime in order to put them to proof. Because we read in the Decretals: “It often happens that thefts are perpetrated in monasteries of monks; wherefore we command that when the brethren have to exonerate themselves of such acts, that the abbot shall celebrate Mass, or someone else deputed by him, in the presence of the community; and so, when the Mass is over, all shall communicate under these words: ‘May the body of Christ prove thee today.’” And further on: “If any evil deed be imputed to a bishop or priest, for each charge he must say Mass and communicate, and show that he is innocent of each act imputed.” But secret sinners must not be disclosed, for, once the blush of shame is set aside, they will indulge the more in sin, as Augustine says (De Verbis. Dom.; cf. Serm. lxxxii). Consequently, Christ’s body is not to be given to occult sinners, even if they ask for it.

On the contrary, on Ps. 21:30: “All the fat ones of the earth have eaten and have adored,” Augustine says: “Let not the dispenser hinder the fat ones of the earth,” i.e. sinners, “from eating at the table of the Lord.”

I answer that, A distinction must be made among sinners: some are secret; others are notorious, either from evidence of the fact, as public usurers, or public robbers, or from being denounced as evil men by some ecclesiastical or civil tribunal. Therefore Holy Communion ought not to be given to open sinners when they ask for it. Hence Cyprian writes to someone (Ep. lxi): “You were so kind as to consider that I ought to be consulted regarding actors, end that magician who continues to practice his disgraceful arts among you; as to whether I thought that Holy Communion ought to be given to such with the other Christians. I think that it is beseeming neither the Divine majesty, nor Christian discipline, for the

Church’s modesty and honor to be defiled by such shameful and infamous contagion.”

But if they be not open sinners, but occult, the Holy Communion should not be denied them if they ask for it. For since every Christian, from the fact that he is baptized, is admitted to the Lord’s table, he may not be robbed of his right, except from some open cause. Hence on 1 Cor. 5:11, “If he who is called a brother among you,” etc., Augustine’s gloss remarks: “We cannot inhibit any person from Communion, except he has openly confessed, or has been named and convicted by some ecclesiastical or lay tribunal.” Nevertheless a priest who has knowledge of the crime can privately warn the secret sinner, or warn all openly in public, from approaching the Lord’s table, until they have repented of their sins and have been reconciled to the Church; because after repentance and reconciliation, Communion must not be refused even to public sinners, especially in the hour of death. Hence in the (3rd) Council of Carthage (Can. xxxv) we read: “Reconciliation is not to be denied to stage-players or actors, or others of the sort, or to apostates, after their conversion to God.”

Reply to Objection 1: Holy things are forbidden to be given to dogs, that is, to notorious sinners: whereas hidden deeds may not be published, but are to be left to the Divine judgment.

Reply to Objection 2: Although it is worse for the secret sinner to sin mortally in taking the body of Christ, rather than be defamed, nevertheless for the priest administering the body of Christ it is worse to commit mortal sin by unjustly defaming the hidden sinner than that the sinner should sin mortally; because no one ought to commit mortal sin in order to keep another out of mortal sin. Hence Augustine says (Quaest. super Gen. 42): “It is a most dangerous exchange, for us to do evil lest another perpetrate a greater evil.” But the secret sinner ought rather to prefer infamy than approach the Lord’s table unworthily.

Yet by no means should an unconsecrated host be given in place of a consecrated one; because the priest by so doing, so far as he is concerned, makes others, either the bystanders or the communicant, commit idolatry by believing that it is a consecrated host; because, as Augustine says on Ps. 98:5: “Let no one eat Christ’s flesh, except he first adore it.” Hence in the Decretals (Extra, De Celeb. Miss., Ch. De Homine) it is said: “Although he who reputes himself unworthy of the Sacrament, through consciousness of his sin, sins gravely, if he receive; still he seems to offend more deeply who deceitfully has presumed to simulate it."

Reply to Objection 3: Those decrees were abolished by contrary enactments of Roman Pontiffs: because Pope Stephen V writes as follows: "The Sacred Canons do not allow of a confession being extorted from any person by trial made by burning iron or boiling water; it belongs to our government to judge of public crimes committed, and that by means of confession made spontaneously, or by proof of witnesses: but private and unknown crimes are to be left to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the sons of men." And the same is found in the Decretals (Extra, De Purgationibus, Ch. Ex tuarum). Because in all such practices there seems to be a tempting of God; hence such things cannot be done without sin. And it would seem graver still if anyone were to incur judgment of death through this sacrament, which was instituted as a means of salvation. Consequently, the body of Christ should never be given to anyone suspected of crime, as by way of examination.

Whether the seminal loss that occurs during sleep hinders anyone from receiving this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that seminal loss does not hinder anyone from receiving the body of Christ: because no one is prevented from receiving the body of Christ except on account of sin. But seminal loss happens without sin: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that "the same image that comes into the mind of a speaker may present itself to the mind of the sleeper, so that the latter be unable to distinguish the image from the reality, and is moved carnally and with the result that usually follows such motions; and there is as little sin in this as there is in speaking and therefore thinking about such things." Consequently these motions do not prevent one from receiving this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says in a Letter to Augustine, Bishop of the English (Regist. xi): "Those who pay the debt of marriage not from lust, but from desire to have children, should be left to their own judgment, as to whether they should enter the church and receive the mystery of our Lord's body, after such intercourse: because they ought not to be forbidden from receiving it, since they have passed through the fire unscorched."

From this it is evident that seminal loss even of one awake, if it be without sin, is no hindrance to receiving the body of Christ. Consequently, much less is it in the case of one asleep.

Objection 3: Further, these movements of the flesh seem to bring with them only bodily uncleanness. But there are other bodily defilements which according to the Law forbade entrance into the holy places, yet which under the New Law do not prevent receiving this sacrament: as, for instance, in the case of a woman after child-birth, or in her periods, or suffering from issue of blood, as Gregory writes to Augustine, Bishop of the English (Regist. xi). Therefore it seems that neither do these movements of the flesh hinder a man from receiving this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, venial sin is no hindrance to receiving the sacrament, nor is mortal sin after repentance. But even supposing that seminal loss arises from some foregoing sin, whether of intemperance, or of bad thoughts, for the most part such sin is venial; and if occasionally it be mortal, a man may repent of it by morning and confess it. Consequently, it seems that he ought not to be prevented from receiving this sacrament.

Objection 5: Further, a sin against the Fifth Commandment is greater than a sin against the Sixth. But if a man dream that he has broken the Fifth or Seventh or any other Commandment, he is not on that account debarred from receiving this sacrament. Therefore it seems that much less should he be debarred through defilement resulting from a dream against the Sixth Commandment.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 15:16): “The man from whom the seed of copulation goeth out . . . shall be unclean until evening.” But for the unclean there is no approaching to the sacraments. Therefore, it seems that owing to such defilement of the flesh a man is debarred from taking this which is the greatest of the sacraments.

I answer that, There are two things to be weighed regarding the aforesaid movements: one on account of which they necessarily prevent a man from receiving this sacrament; the other, on account of which they do so, not of necessity, but from a sense of propriety.

Mortal sin alone necessarily prevents anyone from partaking of this sacrament: and although these movements during sleep, considered in themselves, cannot be a mortal sin, nevertheless, owing to their cause, they have mortal sin connected with them; which cause, therefore, must be investigated. Sometimes they are due to an external spiritual cause, viz. the deception of the demons, who can stir up phantasms, as was stated in the [4650]FP, Q[111], A[3], through the apparition of which, these movements occasionally follow. Sometimes they are due to an internal spiritual cause, such as previous thoughts. At other times they arise from some internal corporeal cause, as from abundance or weakness of nature, or even from surfeit of meat or drink. Now every one of these three causes can be without sin at all, or else with venial sin, or with mortal sin. If it be without sin, or with venial sin, it does not necessarily prevent the receiving of this sacrament, so as to make a man guilty of the body and blood of the Lord: but should it be with mortal sin, it prevents it of necessity.

For such illusions on the part of demons sometimes come from one’s not striving to receive fervently; and this can be either a mortal or a venial sin. At other times it is due to malice alone on the part of the demons who wish to keep men from receiving this sacrament. So we read in the Conferences of the Fathers (Cassian, Collat. xxii) that when a certain one always suffered thus on those feast-days on which he had to receive Communion, his superiors, discovering that there was no fault on his part, ruled that he was not to refrain from communicating on that account, and the demoniacal illusion ceased.

In like fashion previous evil thoughts can sometimes be without any sin whatever, as when one has to think of such things on account of lecturing or debating; and if it be done without concupiscence and delectation, the thoughts will not be unclean but honest; and yet defilement can come of such thoughts, as is clear from the authority of Augustine (OBJ[1]). At other times such thoughts come of concupiscence and delectation, and should there be consent, it will be a mortal sin: otherwise it will be a venial sin.

In the same way too the corporeal cause can be without sin, as when it arises from bodily debility, and hence some individuals suffer seminal loss without sin even in their wakeful hours; or it can come from the abundance of nature: for, just as blood can flow without sin, so also can the semen which is superfluity of the blood, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i). But occasionally it is with sin, as when it is due to excess of food or drink. And this also can be either venial or mortal sin; although more frequently the sin is mortal in the case of evil thoughts on account of the proneness to consent, rather than in the case of consumption of food and drink. Hence Gregory, writing to Augustine, Bishop of the English (Regist. xi), says that one ought to refrain from Communion when this arises from evil thoughts, but not when it arises from excess of food or drink, especially if necessity call for Communion. So, then, one must judge from its cause whether such bodily defilement of necessity hinders the receiving of this sacrament.

At the same time a sense of decency forbids Communion on two accounts. The first of these is always verified, viz. the bodily defilement, with which, out of reverence for the sacrament, it is unbecoming to approach the altar (and hence those who wish to touch any sacred object, wash their hands): except perchance such uncleanness be perpetual or of long standing, such as leprosy or issue of blood, or anything else of the kind. The other reason is the mental distraction which follows after the aforesaid movements, especially when they take place with unclean imaginings. Now this obstacle, which arises from a sense of decency, can be set aside owing to any necessity, as Gregory says (Regist. xi): “As when perchance either a festival day calls for it, or necessity compels one to exercise the ministry because there is no other priest at hand.”

Reply to Objection 1: A person is hindered necessarily, only by mortal sin, from receiving this sacrament: but from a sense of decency one may be hindered through other causes, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: Conjugal intercourse, if it be without sin, (for instance, if it be done for the sake of begetting offspring, or of paying the marriage debt), does not prevent the receiving of this sacrament for any other reason than do those movements in question which happen without sin, as stated above; namely, on account of the defilement to the body and distraction to the mind. On this account Jerome expresses himself in the following terms in his commentary on Matthew (Epist. xxviii, among St. Jerome’s works): “If the loaves of Proposition might not be eaten by them who had known their wives carnally, how much less may this bread which has come down from heaven be defiled and touched by them who shortly before have been in conjugal embraces? It is not that we condemn marriages, but that at the time when we are going to eat the flesh of the Lamb, we ought not to indulge in carnal acts.” But since this is to be understood in the sense of decency, and not of necessity, Gregory says that such a person “is to be left to his own judgment.” “But if,” as Gregory says (Regist. xi), “it be not desire of begetting offspring, but lust that prevails,” then such a one should be forbidden to approach this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: As Gregory says in his Letter quoted above to Augustine, Bishop of the English, in the Old Testament some persons were termed polluted figuratively, which the people of the New Law understand spiritually. Hence such bodily uncleannesses, if perpetual or of long standing, do not hinder the receiving of this saving sacrament, as they prevented approaching those figurative sacraments; but if they pass speedily, like the uncleanness of the aforesaid movements, then from a sense of fittingness they hinder the receiving of this sacrament during the day on which it happens. Hence it is written (Dt. 23:10): “If there be among you any man, that is defiled in a dream by night, he shall go forth out of the camp; and he shall not return before he be washed with water in the evening.”

Reply to Objection 4: Although the stain of guilt be taken away by contrition and confession nevertheless the bodily defilement is not taken away, nor the mental distraction which follows therefrom.

Reply to Objection 5: To dream of homicide brings no bodily uncleanness, nor such distraction of mind as fornication, on account of its intense delectation; still if the dream of homicide comes of a cause sinful in itself, especially if it be mortal sin, then owing to its cause it hinders the receiving of this sacrament.

Whether food or drink taken beforehand hinders the receiving of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that food or drink taken beforehand does not hinder the receiving of this sacrament. For this sacrament was instituted by our Lord at the supper. But when the supper was ended our Lord gave the sacrament to His disciples, as is evident from Lk. 22:20, and from 1 Cor. 11:25. Therefore it seems that we ought to take this sacrament after receiving other food.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 11:33): “When you come together to eat,” namely, the Lord’s body, “wait for one another; if any man be hungry, let him eat at home”: and thus it seems that after eating at home a man may eat Christ’s body in the Church.

Objection 3: Further, we read in the (3rd) Council of Carthage (Can. xxix): “Let the sacraments of the altar be celebrated only by men who are fasting, with the exception of the anniversary day on which the Lord’s Supper is celebrated.” Therefore, at least on that day, one may receive the body of Christ after partaking of other food.

Objection 4: Further, the taking of water or medicine, or of any other food or drink in very slight quantity, or of the remains of food continuing in the mouth, neither breaks the Church’s fast, nor takes away the sobriety required for reverently receiving this sacrament. Consequently, one is not prevented by the above things from receiving this sacrament.

Objection 5: Further, some eat and drink late at night, and possibly after passing a sleepless night receive the sacred mysteries in the morning when the food it not digested. But it would savor more of moderation if a man were to eat a little in the morning and afterwards receive this sacrament about the ninth hour, since also there is occasionally a longer interval of time. Consequently, it seems that such taking of food beforehand does not keep one from this sacrament.

Objection 6: Further, there is no less reverence due to this sacrament after receiving it, than before. But one may take food and drink after receiving the sacrament. Therefore one may do so before receiving it.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Resp. ad Januar., Ep. liv): “It has pleased the Holy Ghost that, out of honor for this great sacrament, the Lord’s body should enter the mouth of a Christian before other foods.”

I answer that, A thing may prevent the receiving of this sacrament in two ways: first of all in itself, like mortal sin, which is repugnant to what is signified by this sacrament, as stated above [4651](A[4]): secondly, on account of the Church’s prohibition; and thus a man is prevented from taking this sacrament after receiving food or drink, for three reasons. First, as Augustine says (Resp. ad Januar., Ep. liv), “out of respect for this sacrament,” so that it may enter into a mouth not yet contaminated by any food or drink. Secondly, because of its signification. i.e. to give us to understand that Christ, Who is the reality of this sacrament, and His charity, ought to be first of all established in our hearts, according to Mat. 6:33: “Seek first the kingdom of God.” Thirdly, on account of the danger of vomiting and intemperance, which sometimes arise from over-indulging in food, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:21): “One, indeed, is hungry, and another is drunk.”

Nevertheless the sick are exempted from this general rule, for they should be given Communion at once, even after food, should there be any doubt as to their danger, lest they die without Communion, because necessity has no law. Hence it is said in the Canon de Consecratione: “Let the priest at once take Communion to the sick person, lest he die without Communion.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says in the same book, “the fact that our Lord gave this sacrament after taking food is no reason why the brethren should assemble after dinner or supper in order to partake of it, or receive it at meal-time, as did those whom the Apostle reproves and corrects. For our Saviour, in order the more strongly to commend the depth of this mystery, wished to fix it closely in the hearts and memories of the disciples. and on that account He gave no command for it to be received in that order, leaving this to the apostles, to whom He was about to entrust the government of the churches.”

Reply to Objection 2: The text quoted is thus paraphrased by the gloss: “If any man be hungry and loath to await the rest, let him partake of his food at home, that is, let him fill himself with earthly bread, without partaking of the Eucharist afterwards.”

Reply to Objection 3: The wording of this decree is in accordance with the former custom observed by some of receiving the body of Christ on that day after breaking their fast, so as to represent the Lord’s supper. But this is now abrogated, because as Augustine says (Resp. ad Januar., Ep. liv), it is customary throughout the whole world for Christ’s body to be received before breaking the fast.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated in the [4652]SS, Q[147], A[6], ad 2, there are two kinds of fast. First, there is the natural fast, which implies privation of everything taken before-hand by way of food or drink: and such fast is required for this sacrament for the reasons given above. And therefore it is never lawful to take this sacrament after taking water, or other food or drink, or even medicine, no matter how small the quantity be. Nor does it matter whether it nourishes or not, whether it be taken by itself or with other things, provided it be taken by way of food or drink. But the remains of food left in the mouth, if swallowed accidentally, do not hinder receiving this sacrament, because they are swallowed not by way of food but by way of saliva. The same holds good of the unavoidable remains of the water or wine wherewith the mouth is rinsed, provided they be not swallowed in great quantity, but mixed with saliva.

Secondly, there is the fast of the Church, instituted for afflicting the body: and this fast is not hindered by the things mentioned (in the objection), because they do not give much nourishment, but are taken rather as an alterative.

Reply to Objection 5: That this sacrament ought to enter into the mouth of a Christian before any other food must not be understood absolutely of all time, otherwise he who had once eaten or drunk could never afterwards take this sacrament: but it must be understood of the same day; and although the beginning of the day varies according to different systems of reckoning (for some begin their day at noon, some at sunset, others at midnight, and others at sunrise), the Roman Church begins it at midnight. Consequently, if any person takes anything by way of food or drink after midnight, he may not receive this sacrament on that day; but he can do so if the food was taken before midnight. Nor does it matter, so far as the precept is concerned, whether he has slept after taking food or drink, or whether he has digested it; but it does matter as to the mental disturbance which one suffers from want of sleep or from indigestion, for, if the mind be much disturbed, one becomes unfit for receiving this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 6: The greatest devotion is called for at the moment of receiving this sacrament, because it is then that the effect of the sacrament is bestowed, and such devotion is hindered more by what goes before it than by what comes after it. And therefore it was ordained that men should fast before receiving the sacrament rather than after. Nevertheless there ought to be some interval between receiving this sacrament and taking other food. Consequently, both the Postcommunion prayer of thanksgiving is said in the Mass, and the communicants say their own private prayers.

However, according to the ancient Canons, the following ordination was made by Pope Clement I, (Ep. ii), “If the Lord’s portion be eaten in the morning, the ministers who have taken it shall fast until the sixth hour, and if they take it at the third or fourth hour, they shall fast until evening.” For in olden times, the priest celebrated Mass less frequently, and with greater preparation: but now, because the sacred mysteries have to be celebrated oftener, the same could not be easily observed, and so it has been abrogated by contrary custom.

Whether those who have not the use of reason ought to receive this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that those who have not the use of reason ought not to receive this sacrament. For it is required that man should approach this sacrament with devotion and previous self-examination, according to 1 Cor. 11:28: “Let a man prove himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of the chalice.” But this is not possible for those who are devoid of reason. Therefore this sacrament should not be given to them.

Objection 2: Further, among those who have not the use of reason are the possessed, who are called energumens. But such persons are kept from even beholding this sacrament, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii). Therefore this sacrament ought not to be given to those who have not the use of reason.

Objection 3: Further, among those that lack the use of reason are children, the most innocent of all. But this sacrament is not given to children. Therefore much less should it be given to others deprived of the use of reason.

On the contrary, We read in the First Council of Orange, (Canon 13); and the same is to be found in the Decretals (xxvi, 6): “All things that pertain to piety are to be given to the insane”: and consequently, since this is the “sacrament of piety,” it must be given to them.

I answer that, Men are said to be devoid of reason in two ways. First, when they are feeble-minded, as a man who sees dimly is said not to see: and since such persons can conceive some devotion towards this sacrament, it is not to be denied them.

In another way men are said not to possess fully the use of reason. Either, then, they never had the use of reason, and have remained so from birth; and in that case this sacrament is not to be given to them, because in no way has there been any preceding devotion towards the sacrament: or else, they were not always devoid of reason, and then, if when they formerly had their wits they showed devotion towards this sacrament, it ought to be given to them in the hour of death; unless danger be feared of vomiting or spitting it out. Hence we read in the acts of the Fourth Council of Carthage (Canon

76). and the same is to be found in the Decretals (xxvi, 6): “If a sick man ask to receive the sacrament of Penance; and if, when the priest who has been sent for comes to him, he be so weak as to be unable to speak, or becomes delirious, let them, who heard him ask, bear witness, and let him receive the sacrament of Penance. then if it be thought that he is going to die shortly, let him be reconciled by imposition of hands, and let the Eucharist be placed in his mouth.”

Reply to Objection 1: Those lacking the use of reason can have devotion towards the sacrament; actual devotion in some cases, and past in others.

Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius is speaking there of energumens who are not yet baptized, in whom the devil’s power is not yet extinct, since it thrives in them through the presence of original sin. But as to baptized persons who are vexed in body by unclean spirits, the same reason holds good of them as of others who are demented. Hence Cassian says (Collat. vii): “We do not remember the most Holy Communion to have ever been denied by our elders to them who are vexed by unclean spirits.”

Reply to Objection 3: The same reason holds good of newly born children as of the insane who never have had the use of reason: consequently, the sacred mysteries are not to be given to them. Although certain Greeks do the contrary, because Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. ii) that Holy Communion is to be given to them who are baptized; not understanding that Dionysius is speaking there of the Baptism of adults. Nor do they suffer any loss of life from the fact of our Lord saying (Jn. 6:54), “Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you”; because, as Augustine writes to Boniface (Pseudo-Beda, Comment. in 1 Cor. 10:17), “then every one of the faithful becomes a partaker,” i.e. spiritually, “of the body and blood of the Lord, when he is made a member of Christ’s body in Baptism.” But when children once begin to have some use of reason so as to be able to conceive some devotion for the sacrament, then it can be given to them.

Whether it is lawful to receive this sacrament daily?

Objection 1: It does not appear to be lawful to receive this sacrament daily, because, as Baptism shows forth our Lord’s Passion, so also does this sacrament. Now one may not be baptized several times, but only once, because “Christ died once” only “for our sins,” according to 1 Pet. 3:18. Therefore, it seems unlawful to receive this sacrament daily.

Objection 2: Further, the reality ought to answer to the figure. But the Paschal Lamb, which was the chief figure of this sacrament, as was said above (Q[73], A[9]) was eaten only once in the year; while the Church once a year commemorates Christ’s Passion, of which this sacrament is the memorial. It seems, then, that it is lawful to receive this sacrament not daily, but only once in the year.

Objection 3: Further, the greatest reverence is due to this sacrament as containing Christ. But it is a token of reverence to refrain from receiving this sacrament; hence the Centurion is praised for saying (Mat. 8:8), “Lord, I am not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my roof”; also Peter, for saying (Lk. 5:8), “Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord.” Therefore, it is not praiseworthy for a man to receive this sacrament daily.

Objection 4: Further, if it were a praiseworthy custom to receive this sacrament frequently, then the oftener it were taken the more praise-worthy it would be. But there would be greater frequency if one were to receive it several. times daily; and yet this is not the custom of the Church. Consequently, it does not seem praiseworthy to receive it daily.

Objection 5: Further, the Church by her statutes intends to promote the welfare of the faithful. But the Church’s statute only requires Communion once a year; hence it is enacted (Extra, De Poenit. et Remiss. xii): “Let every person of either sex devoutly receive the sacrament of the Eucharist at least at Easter; unless by the advice of his parish priest, and for some reasonable cause, he considers he ought to refrain from receiving for a time.” Consequently, it is not praiseworthy to receive this sacrament daily.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxviii): “This is our daily bread; take it daily, that it may profit thee daily.”

I answer that, There are two things to be considered regarding the use of this sacrament. The first is on the part of the sacrament itself, the virtue of which gives health to men; and consequently it is profitable to receive it daily so as to receive its fruits daily. Hence Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv): “If, whenever Christ’s blood is shed, it is shed for the forgiveness of sins, I who sin often, should receive it often: I need a frequent remedy.” The second thing to be considered is on the part of the recipient, who is required to approach this sacrament with great reverence and devotion.

Consequently, if anyone finds that he has these dispositions every day, he will do well to receive it daily. Hence, Augustine after saying, “Receive daily, that it may profit thee daily,” adds: “So live, as to deserve to receive it daily.” But because many persons are lacking in this devotion, on account of the many drawbacks both spiritual and corporal from which they suffer, it is not expedient for all to approach this sacrament every day; but they should do so as often as they find themselves properly disposed. Hence it is said in De Eccles. Dogmat. liii: “I neither praise nor blame daily reception of the Eucharist.”

Reply to Objection 1: In the sacrament of Baptism a man is conformed to Christ’s death, by receiving His character within him. And therefore, as Christ died but once, so a man ought to be baptized but once. But a man does not receive Christ’s character in this sacrament; He receives Christ Himself, Whose virtue endures for ever. Hence it is written (Heb. 10:14): “By one oblation He hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.” Consequently, since man has daily need of Christ’s health-giving virtue, he may commendably receive this sacrament every day.

And since Baptism is above all a spiritual regeneration, therefore, as a man is born naturally but once, so ought he by Baptism to be reborn spiritually but once, as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.), commenting on Jn. 3:4, “How can a man be born again, when he is grown old?” But this sacrament is spiritual food; hence, just as bodily food is taken every day, so is it a good thing to receive this sacrament every day. Hence it is that our Lord (Lk. 11:3), teaches us to pray, “Give us this day our daily bread”: in explaining which words Augustine observes (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxviii): “If you receive it,” i.e. this sacrament, every day, “every day is today for thee, and Christ rises again every day in thee, for when Christ riseth it is today.”

Reply to Objection 2: The Paschal Lamb was the figure of this sacrament chiefly as to Christ’s Passion represented therein; and therefore it was partaken of once a year only, since Christ died but once. And on this account the Church celebrates once a year the remembrance of Christ’s Passion. But in this sacrament the memorial of His Passion is given by way of food which is partaken of daily; and therefore in this respect it is represented by the manna which was given daily to the people in the desert.

Reply to Objection 3: Reverence for this sacrament consists in fear associated with love; consequently reverential fear of God is called filial fear, as was said in the [4653]FS, Q[67], A[4], ad 2; [4654]SS, Q[19], AA[9],11,12; because the desire of receiving arises from love, while the humility of reverence springs from fear. Consequently, each of these belongs to the reverence due to this sacrament; both as to receiving it daily, and as to refraining from it sometimes. Hence Augustine says (Ep. liv): “If one says that the Eucharist should not be received daily, while another maintains the contrary, let each one do as according to his devotion he thinketh right; for Zaccheus and the Centurion did not contradict one another while the one received the Lord with joy, whereas the other said: ‘Lord I am not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my roof’; since both honored our Saviour, though not in the same way.” But love and hope, whereunto the Scriptures constantly urge us, are preferable to fear. Hence, too, when Peter had said, “Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord,” Jesus answered: “Fear not.”

Reply to Objection 4: Because our Lord said (Lk. 11:3), “Give us this day our daily bread,” we are not on that account to communicate several times daily, for, by one daily communion the unity of Christ’s Passion is set forth.

Reply to Objection 5: Various statutes have emanated according to the various ages of the Church. In the primitive Church, when the devotion of the Christian faith was more flourishing, it was enacted that the faithful should communicate daily: hence Pope Anaclete says (Ep. i): “When the consecration is finished, let all communicate who do not wish to cut themselves off from the Church; for so the apostles have ordained, and the holy Roman Church holds.” Later on, when the fervor of faith relaxed, Pope Fabian (Third Council of Tours, Canon 1) gave permission “that all should communicate, if not more frequently, at least three times in the year, namely, at Easter, Pentecost, and Christmas.” Pope Soter likewise (Second Council of Chalon, Canon xlvii) declares that Communion should be received “on Holy Thursday,” as is set forth in the Decretals (De Consecratione, dist. 2). Later on, when “iniquity abounded and charity grew cold” (Mat. 24:12), Pope Innocent III commanded that the faithful should communicate “at least once a year,” namely, “at Easter.” However, in De Eccles. Dogmat. xxiii, the faithful are counseled “to communicate on all Sundays.”

Whether it is lawful to abstain altogether from communion?

Objection 1: It seems to be lawful to abstain altogether from Communion. Because the Centurion is praised for saying (Mat. 8:8): “Lord, I am not worthy that Thou shouldst enter under my roof”; and he who deems that he ought to refrain entirely from Communion can be compared to the Centurion, as stated above (A[10], ad 3). Therefore, since we do not read of Christ entering his house, it seems to be lawful for any individual to abstain from Communion his whole life long.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful for anyone to refrain from what is not of necessity for salvation. But this sacrament is not of necessity for salvation, as was stated above ([4655]Q[73], A[3]). Therefore it is permissible to abstain from Communion altogether.

Objection 3: Further, sinners are not bound to go to Communion: hence Pope Fabian (Third Council of Tours, Canon 1) after saying, “Let all communicate thrice each year,” adds: “Except those who are hindered by grievous crimes.” Consequently, if those who are not in the state of sin are bound to go to Communion, it seems that sinners are better off than good people, which is unfitting. Therefore, it seems lawful even for the godly to refrain from Communion.

On the contrary, Our Lord said (Jn. 6:54): “Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and drink His blood, you shall not have life in you.”

I answer that, As stated above [4656](A[1]), there are two ways of receiving this sacrament namely, spiritually and sacramentally. Now it is clear that all are bound to eat it at least spiritually, because this is to be incorporated in Christ, as was said above (Q[73], A[3], ad 1). Now spiritual eating comprises the desire or yearning for receiving this sacrament, as was said above (A[1], ad 3, A[2]). Therefore, a man cannot be saved without desiring to receive this sacrament.

Now a desire would be vain except it were fulfilled when opportunity presented itself. Consequently, it is evident that a man is bound to receive this sacrament, not only by virtue of the Church’s precept, but also by virtue of the Lord’s command (Lk. 22:19): “Do this in memory of Me.” But by the precept of the Church there are fixed times for fulfilling Christ’s command.

Reply to Objection 1: As Gregory says: “He is truly humble, who is not obstinate in rejecting what is commanded for his good.” Consequently, humility is not praiseworthy if anyone abstains altogether from Communion against the precept of Christ and the Church. Again the Centurion was not commanded to receive Christ into his house.

Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament is said not to be as necessary as Baptism, with regard to children, who can be saved without the Eucharist, but not without the sacrament of Baptism: both, however, are of necessity with regard to adults.

Reply to Objection 3: Sinners suffer great loss in being kept back from receiving this sacrament, so that they are not better off on that account; and although while continuing in their sins they are not on that account excused from transgressing the precept, nevertheless, as Pope Innocent III says, penitents, “who refrain on the advice of their priest,” are excused.

Whether it is lawful to receive the body of Christ without the blood?

Objection 1: It seems unlawful to receive the body of Christ without the blood. For Pope Gelasius says (cf. De Consecr. ii): “We have learned that some persons after taking only a portion of the sacred body, abstain from the chalice of the sacred blood. I know not for what superstitious motive they do this: therefore let them either receive the entire sacrament, or let them be withheld from the sacrament altogether.” Therefore it is not lawful to receive the body of Christ without His blood.

Objection 2: Further, the eating of the body and the drinking of the blood are required for the perfection of this sacrament, as stated above ([4657]Q[73], A[2];[4658] Q[76], A[2], ad 1). Consequently, if the body be taken without the blood, it will be an imperfect sacrament, which seems to savor of sacrilege; hence Pope Gelasius adds (cf. De Consecr. ii), “because the dividing of one and the same mystery cannot happen without a great sacrilege.”

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is celebrated in memory of our Lord’s Passion, as stated above ([4659]Q[73], AA[4],5;[4660] Q[74], A[1]), and is received for the health of soul. But the Passion is expressed in the blood rather than in the body; moreover, as stated above ([4661]Q[74], A[1]), the blood is offered for the health of the soul. Consequently, one ought to refrain from receiving the body rather than the blood. Therefore, such as approach this sacrament ought not to take Christ’s body without His blood.

On the contrary, It is the custom of many churches for the body of Christ to be given to the communicant without His blood.

I answer that, Two points should be observed regarding the use of this sacrament, one on the part of the sacrament, the other on the part of the recipients; on the part of the sacrament it is proper for both the body and the blood to be received, since the perfection of the sacrament lies in both, and consequently, since it is the priest’s duty both to consecrate and finish the sacrament, he ought on no account to receive Christ’s body without the blood.

But on the part of the recipient the greatest reverence and caution are called for, lest anything happen which is unworthy of so great a mystery. Now this could especially happen in receiving the blood, for, if incautiously handled, it might easily be spilt. And because the multitude of the Christian people increased, in which there are old, young, and children, some of whom have not enough discretion to observe due caution in using this sacrament, on that account it is a prudent custom in some churches for the blood not to be offered to the reception of the people, but to be received by the priest alone.

Reply to Objection 1: Pope Gelasius is speaking of priests, who, as they consecrate the entire sacrament, ought to communicate in the entire sacrament. For, as we read in the (Twelfth) Council of Toledo, “What kind of a sacrifice is that, wherein not even the sacrificer is known to have a share?”

Reply to Objection 2: The perfection of this sacrament does not lie in the use of the faithful, but in the consecration of the matter. And hence there is nothing derogatory to the perfection of this sacrament; if the people receive the body without the blood, provided that the priest who consecrates receive both.

Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord’s Passion is represented in the very consecration of this sacrament, in which the body ought not to be consecrated without the blood. But the body can be received by the people without the blood: nor is this detrimental to the sacrament. Because the priest both offers and consumes the blood on behalf of all; and Christ is fully contained under either species, as was shown above ([4662]Q[76], A[2]).

OF THE USE WHICH CHRIST MADE OF THIS SACRAMENT AT ITS INSTITUTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the use which Christ made of this sacrament at its institution; under which heading there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ received His own body and blood?

(2) Whether He gave it to Judas?

(3) What kind of body did He receive or give, namely, was it passible or impassible?

(4) What would have been the condition of Christ's body under this sacrament, if it had been reserved or consecrated during the three days He lay dead?

Whether Christ received His own body and blood?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ did not receive His own body and blood, because nothing ought to be asserted of either Christ's doings or sayings, which is not handed down by the authority of Sacred Scripture. But it is not narrated in the gospels that He ate His own body or drank His own blood. Therefore we must not assert this as a fact.

Objection 2: Further, nothing can be within itself except perchance by reason of its parts, for instance. as one part is in another, as is stated in Phys. iv. But what is eaten and drunk is in the eater and drinker. Therefore, since the entire Christ is under each species of the sacrament, it seems impossible for Him to have received this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, the receiving of this sacrament is twofold, namely, spiritual and sacramental. But the spiritual was unsuitable for Christ, as He derived no benefit from the sacrament. and in consequence so was the sacramental, since it is imperfect without the spiritual, as was observed above ([4663]Q[80], A[1]). Consequently, in no way did Christ partake of this sacrament.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ad Hedib., Ep. xxx), “The Lord Jesus Christ, Himself the guest and banquet, is both the partaker and what is eaten.”

I answer that, Some have said that Christ during the supper gave His body and blood to His disciples, but did not partake of it Himself. But this seems improbable. Because Christ Himself was the first to fulfill what He required others to observe: hence He willed first to be baptized when imposing Baptism upon others: as we read in Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to do and to teach.” Hence He first of all took His own body and blood, and afterwards gave it to be taken by the disciples. And hence the gloss upon Ruth 3:7, “When he had eaten and drunk, says: Christ ate and drank at the supper, when He gave to the disciples the sacrament of His body and blood. Hence, ‘because the children partook [*Vulg.: ‘are partakers’ (Heb. 2:14)] of His flesh and blood, He also hath been partaker in the same.’”

Reply to Objection 1: We read in the Gospels how Christ “took the bread . . . and the chalice”; but it is not to be understood that He took them merely into His hands, as some say. but that He took them in the same way as He gave them to others to take. Hence when He said to the disciples, “Take ye and eat,” and again, “Take ye and drink,” it is to be understood that He Himself, in taking it, both ate and drank. Hence some have composed this rhyme:

“The King at supper sits,
The twelve as guests He greets,
Clasping Himself in His hands,
The food Himself now eats.”

Reply to Objection 2: As was said above ([4664]Q[76], A[5]), Christ as contained under this sacrament stands in relation to place, not according to His own dimensions, but according to the dimensions of the sacramental species; so that Christ is Himself in every place where those species are. And because the species were able to be both in the hands and the mouth of Christ, the entire Christ could be in both His hands and mouth. Now this could not come to pass were His relation to place to be according to His proper dimensions.

Reply to Objection 3: As was stated above ([4665]Q[79], A[1], ad 2), the effect of this sacrament is not merely an increase of habitual grace, but furthermore a certain actual delectation of spiritual sweetness. But although grace was not increased in Christ through His receiving this sacrament, yet He had a certain spiritual delectation from the new institution of this sacrament. Hence He Himself said (Lk. 22:15): “With desire I have desired to eat this Pasch with you,” which words Eusebius explains of the new mystery of the New Testament, which He gave to the disciples. And therefore He ate it both spiritually and sacramentally, inasmuch as He received His own body under the sacrament which sacrament of His own body He both understood and prepared; yet differently from others who partake of it both sacramentally and spiritually, for these receive an increase of grace, and they have need of the sacramental signs for perceiving its truth.

Whether Christ gave His body to Judas?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ did not give His body to Judas. Because, as we read (Mat. 26:29), our Lord, after giving His body and blood to the disciples, said to them: “I will not drink from henceforth of this fruit of the vine, until that day when I shall drink it with you new in the kingdom of My Father.” From this it appears that those to whom He had given His body and blood were to drink of it again with Him. But Judas did not drink of it afterwards with Him. Therefore he did not receive Christ’s body and blood with the other disciples.

Objection 2: Further, what the Lord commanded, He Himself fulfilled, as is said in Acts 1:1: “Jesus began to do and to teach.” But He gave the command (Mat. 7:6): “Give not that which is holy to dogs.” Therefore, knowing Judas to be a sinner, seemingly He did not give him His body and blood.

Objection 3: Further, it is distinctly related (Jn. 13:26) that Christ gave dipped bread to Judas. Consequently, if He gave His body to him, it appears that He gave it him in the morsel, especially since we read (Jn. 13:26) that “after the morsel, Satan entered into him.” And on this passage Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): “From this we learn how we should beware of receiving a good thing in an evil way . . . For if he be ‘chastised’ who does ‘not discern,’ i.e. distinguish, the body of the Lord from other meats, how must he be ‘condemned’ who, feigning himself a friend, comes to His table a foe?” But (Judas) did not receive our Lord’s body with the dipped morsel;

thus Augustine commenting on Jn. 13:26, “When He had dipped the bread, He gave it to Judas, the son of Simon the Iscariot [Vulg.: ‘to Judas Iscariot, the son of Simon],” says (Tract. lxii in Joan.): “Judas did not receive Christ’s body then, as some think who read carelessly.” Therefore it seems that Judas did not receive the body of Christ.

On the contrary, Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxxii in Matth.): “Judas was not converted while partaking of the sacred mysteries: hence on both sides his crime becomes the more heinous, both because imbued with such a purpose he approached the mysteries, and because he became none the better for approaching, neither from fear, nor from the benefit received, nor from the honor conferred on him.”

I answer that, Hilary, in commenting on Mat. 26:17, held that Christ did not give His body and blood to Judas. And this would have been quite proper, if the malice of Judas be considered. But since Christ was to serve us as a pattern of justice, it was not in keeping with His teaching authority to sever Judas, a hidden sinner, from Communion with the others without an accuser and evident proof. lest the Church’s prelates might have an example for doing the like, and lest Judas himself being exasperated might take occasion of sinning. Therefore, it remains to be said that Judas received our Lord’s body and blood with the other disciples, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), and Augustine (Tract. lxii in Joan.).

Reply to Objection 1: This is Hilary’s argument, to show that Judas did not receive Christ’s body. But it is not cogent; because Christ is speaking to the disciples, from whose company Judas separated himself: and it was not Christ that excluded him. Therefore Christ for His part drinks the wine even with Judas in the kingdom of God; but Judas himself repudiated this banquet.

Reply to Objection 2: The wickedness of Judas was known to Christ as God; but it was unknown to Him, after the manner in which men know it. Consequently, Christ did not repel Judas from Communion; so as to furnish an example that such secret sinners are not to be repelled by other priests.

Reply to Objection 3: Without any doubt Judas did not receive Christ’s body in the dipped bread; he received mere bread. Yet as Augustine observes (Tract. lxii in Joan.), “perchance the feigning of Judas is denoted by the dipping of the bread; just as some things are dipped to be dyed. If, however, the dipping signifies here anything good” (for instance, the sweetness of the Divine goodness, since bread is rendered more savory by being dipped), “then, not undeservedly, did condemnation follow his ingratitude for that same good.” And owing to that ingratitude, “what is good became evil to him, as happens to them who receive Christ’s body unworthily.”

And as Augustine says (Tract. lxii in Joan.), “it must be understood that our Lord had already distributed the sacrament of His body and blood to all His disciples, among whom was Judas also, as Luke narrates: and after that, we came to this, where, according to the relation of John, our Lord, by dipping and handing the morsel, does most openly declare His betrayer.”

Whether Christ received and gave to the disciples His impassible body?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ both received and gave to the disciples His impassible body. Because on Mat. 17:2, “He was transfigured before them,” the gloss says: “He gave to the disciples at the supper that body which He had through nature, but neither mortal nor passible.” And again, on Lev. 2:5, “if thy oblation be from the frying-pan,” the gloss says: “The Cross mightier than all things made Christ’s flesh fit for being eaten, which before the Passion did not seem so suited.” But Christ gave His body as suited for eating. Therefore He gave it just as it was after the Passion, that is, impassible and immortal.

Objection 2: Further, every passible body suffers by contact and by being eaten. Consequently, if Christ’s body was passible, it would have suffered both from contact and from being eaten by the disciples.

Objection 3: Further, the sacramental words now spoken by the priest in the person of Christ are not more powerful than when uttered by Christ Himself. But now by virtue of the sacramental words it is Christ’s impassible and immortal body which is consecrated upon the altar. Therefore, much more so was it then.

On the contrary, As Innocent III says (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), “He bestowed on the disciples His body such as it was.” But then He had a passible and a mortal body. Therefore, He gave a passible and mortal body to the disciples.

I answer that, Hugh of Saint Victor (Innocent III, De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), maintained, that before the Passion, Christ assumed at various times the four properties of a glorified body—namely, subtlety in His birth, when He came forth from the closed womb of the Virgin; agility, when He walked dryshod upon the sea; clarity, in the Transfiguration; and impassibility at the Last Supper, when He gave His body to the disciples to be eaten. And according to this He gave His body in an impassible and immortal condition to His disciples.

But whatever may be the case touching the other qualities, concerning which we have already stated what should be held ([4666]Q[28], A[2], ad 3;[4667] Q[45], A[2]), nevertheless the above opinion regarding impassibility is inadmissible. For it is manifest that the same body of Christ which was then seen by the disciples in its own species, was received by them under the sacramental species. But as seen in its own species it was not impassible; nay more, it was ready for the Passion. Therefore, neither was Christ's body impassible when given under the sacramental species.

Yet there was present in the sacrament, in an impassible manner, that which was passible of itself; just as that was there invisibly which of itself was visible. For as sight requires that the body seen be in contact with the adjacent medium of sight, so does passion require contact of the suffering body with the active agents. But Christ's body, according as it is under the sacrament, as stated above (A[1], ad 2;[4668] Q[76], A[5]), is not compared with its surroundings through the intermediary of its own dimensions, whereby bodies touch each other, but through the dimensions of the bread and wine; consequently, it is those species which are acted upon and are seen, but not Christ's own body.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said not to have given His mortal and passible body at the supper, because He did not give it in mortal and passible fashion. But the Cross made His flesh adapted for eating, inasmuch as this sacrament represents Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument would hold, if Christ's body, as it was passible, were also present in a passible manner in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4669]Q[76], A[4]), the accidents of Christ's body are in this sacrament by real concomitance, but not by the power of the sacrament, whereby the substance of Christ's body comes to be there. And therefore the power of the sacramental words extends to this, that the body, i.e. Christ's, is under this sacrament, whatever accidents really exist in it.

Whether, if this sacrament had been reserved in a pyx, or consecrated at the moment of Christ’s death by one of the apostles, Christ Himself would have died there?

Objection 1: It seems that if this sacrament had been reserved in a pyx at the moment of Christ’s death, or had then been consecrated by one of the apostles, that Christ would not have died there. For Christ’s death happened through His Passion. But even then He was in this sacrament in an impassible manner. Therefore, He could not die in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, on the death of Christ, His blood was separated from the body. But His flesh and blood are together in this sacrament. Therefore He could not die in this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, death ensues from the separation of the soul from the body. But both the body and the soul of Christ are contained in this sacrament. Therefore Christ could not die in this sacrament.

On the contrary, The same Christ Who was upon the cross would have been in this sacrament. But He died upon the cross. Therefore, if this sacrament had been reserved, He would have died therein.

I answer that, Christ’s body is substantially the same in this sacrament, as in its proper species, but not after the same fashion; because in its proper species it comes in contact with surrounding bodies by its own dimensions: but it does not do so as it is in this sacrament, as stated above [4670](A[3]). And therefore, all that belongs to Christ, as He is in Himself, can be attributed to Him both in His proper species, and as He exists in the sacrament; such as to live, to die, to grieve, to be animate or inanimate, and the like; while all that belongs to Him in relation to outward bodies, can be attributed to Him as He exists in His proper species, but not as He is in this sacrament; such as to be mocked, to be spat upon, to be crucified, to be scourged, and the rest. Hence some have composed this verse:

“Our Lord can grieve beneath the sacramental veils But cannot feel the piercing of the thorns and nails.”

Reply to Objection 1: As was stated above, suffering belongs to a body that suffers in respect of some extrinsic body. And therefore Christ, as in this sacrament, cannot suffer; yet He can die.

Reply to Objection 2: As was said above ([4671]Q[76], A[2]), in virtue of the consecration, the body of Christ is under the species of bread, while His blood is under the species of wine. But now that His blood is not really separated from His body; by real concomitance, both His blood is present with the body under the species of the bread, and His body together with the blood under the species of the wine. But at the time when Christ suffered, when His blood was really separated from His body, if this sacrament had been consecrated, then the body only would have been present under the species of the bread, and the blood only under the species of the wine.

Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above ([4672]Q[76], A[1], ad 1), Christ's soul is in this sacrament by real concomitance; because it is not without the body: but it is not there in virtue of the consecration. And therefore, if this sacrament had been consecrated then, or reserved, when His soul was really separated from His body, Christ's soul would not have been under this sacrament, not from any defect in the form of the words, but owing to the different dispositions of the thing contained.

OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (TEN ARTICLES)

We now proceed to consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are ten points for our inquiry:
(1) Whether it belongs to a priest alone to consecrate this sacrament?

(2) Whether several priests can at the same time consecrate the same host?

(3) Whether it belongs to the priest alone to dispense this sacrament?

(4) Whether it is lawful for the priest consecrating to refrain from communicating?

(5) Whether a priest in sin can perform this sacrament?

(6) Whether the Mass of a wicked priest is of less value than that of a good one?

(7) Whether those who are heretics, schismatics, or excommunicated, can perform this sacrament?

(8) Whether degraded priests can do so?

(9) Whether communicants receiving at their hands are guilty of sinning?

(10) Whether a priest may lawfully refrain altogether from celebrating?

[*This is the order observed by St. Thomas in writing the Articles; but in writing this prologue, he placed Article 10 immediately after Article 4 (Cf. Leonine edition).]

Whether the consecration of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone?

Objection 1: It seems that the consecration of this sacrament does not belong exclusively to a priest. Because it was said above ([4673]Q[78], A[4]) that this sacrament is consecrated in virtue of the words, which are the form of this sacrament. But those words are not changed, whether spoken by a priest or by anyone else. Therefore, it seems that not only a priest, but anyone else, can consecrate this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the priest performs this sacrament in the person of Christ. But a devout layman is united with Christ through charity. Therefore, it seems that even a layman can perform this sacrament. Hence Chrysostom (Opus imperfectum in Matth., Hom. xliii) says that “every holy man is a priest.”

Objection 3: Further, as Baptism is ordained for the salvation of mankind, so also is this sacrament, as is clear from what was said above ([4674]Q[74], A[1] ;[4675] Q[79], A[2]). But a layman can also baptize, as was stated above ([4676]Q[67] , A[3]). Consequently, the consecration of this sacrament is not proper to a priest.

Objection 4: Further, this sacrament is completed in the consecration of the matter. But the consecration of other matters such as the chrism, the holy oil, and blessed oil, belongs exclusively to a bishop; yet their consecration does not equal the dignity of the consecration of the Eucharist, in which the entire Christ is contained. Therefore it belongs, not to a priest, but only to a bishop, to perform this sacrament.

On the contrary, Isidore says in an Epistle to Ludifred (Decretals, dist. 25): “It belongs to a priest to consecrate this sacrament of the Lord’s body and blood upon God’s altar.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4677]Q[78], AA[1],4), such is the dignity of this sacrament that it is performed only as in the person of Christ. Now whoever performs any act in another’s stead, must do so by the power bestowed by such a one. But as the power of receiving this sacrament is conceded by Christ to the baptized person, so likewise the power of consecrating this sacrament on Christ’s behalf is bestowed upon the priest at his ordination: for thereby he is put upon a level with them to whom the Lord said (Lk. 22:19): “Do this for a commemoration of Me.” Therefore, it must be said that it belongs to priests to accomplish this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The sacramental power is in several things, and not merely in one: thus the power of Baptism lies both in the words and in the water. Accordingly the consecrating power is not merely in the words, but likewise in the power delivered to the priest in his consecration and ordination, when the bishop says to him: “Receive the power of offering up the Sacrifice in the Church for the living as well as for the dead.” For instrumental power lies in several instruments through which the chief agent acts.

Reply to Objection 2: A devout layman is united with Christ by spiritual union through faith and charity, but not by sacramental power: consequently he has a spiritual priesthood for offering spiritual sacrifices, of which it is said (Ps. 1:19): “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit”; and (Rom. 12:1): “Present your bodies a living sacrifice.” Hence, too, it is written (1 Pet. 2:5): “A holy priesthood, to offer up spiritual sacrifices.”

Reply to Objection 3: The receiving of this sacrament is not of such necessity as the receiving of Baptism, as is evident from what was said above ([4678]Q[65], AA[3],4;[4679] Q[80], A[11], ad 2). And therefore, although a layman can baptize in case of necessity, he cannot perform this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 4: The bishop receives power to act on Christ’s behalf upon His mystical body, that is, upon the Church; but the priest receives no such power in his consecration, although he may have it by commission from the bishop. Consequently all such things as do not belong to the mystical body are not reserved to the bishop, such as the consecration of this sacrament. But it belongs to the bishop to deliver, not only to the people, but likewise to priests, such things as serve them in the fulfillment of their respective duties. And because the blessing of the chrism, and of the holy oil, and of the oil of the sick, and other consecrated things, such as altars, churches, vestments, and sacred vessels, makes such things fit for use in performing the sacraments which

belong to the priestly duty, therefore such consecrations are reserved to the bishop as the head of the whole ecclesiastical order.

Whether several priests can consecrate one and the same host?

Objection 1: It seems that several priests cannot consecrate one and the same host. For it was said above ([4680]Q[67], A[6]), that several cannot at the same time baptize one individual. But the power of a priest consecrating is not less than that of a man baptizing. Therefore, several priests cannot consecrate one host at the same time.

Objection 2: Further, what can be done by one, is superfluously done by several. But there ought to be nothing superfluous in the sacraments. Since, then, one is sufficient for consecrating, it seems that several cannot consecrate one host.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (Tract. xxvi in Joan.), this is “the sacrament of unity.” But multitude seems to be opposed to unity. Therefore it seems inconsistent with the sacrament for several priests to consecrate the same host.

On the contrary, It is the custom of some Churches for priests newly ordained to co-celebrate with the bishop ordaining them.

I answer that, As stated above [4681](A[1]), when a priest is ordained he is placed on a level with those who received consecrating power from our Lord at the Supper. And therefore, according to the custom of some Churches, as the apostles supped when Christ supped, so the newly ordained co-celebrate with the ordaining bishop. Nor is the consecration, on that account, repeated over the same host, because as Innocent III says (De Sacr. Alt. Myst. iv), the intention of all should be directed to the same instant of the consecration.

Reply to Objection 1: We do not read of Christ baptizing with the apostles when He committed to them the duty of baptizing; consequently there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 2: If each individual priest were acting in his own power, then other celebrants would be superfluous, since one would be sufficient. But whereas the priest does not consecrate except as in Christ’s stead; and since many are “one in Christ” (Gal. 3:28); consequently it does not matter whether this sacrament be consecrated by one or by many, except that the rite of the Church must be observed.

Reply to Objection 3: The Eucharist is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, which is brought about by many being “one in Christ.”

Whether dispensing of this sacrament belongs to a priest alone?

Objection 1: It seems that the dispensing of this sacrament does not belong to a priest alone. For Christ’s blood belongs to this sacrament no less than His body. But Christ’s blood is dispensed by deacons: hence the blessed Lawrence said to the blessed Sixtus (Office of St. Lawrence, Resp. at Matins): “Try whether you have chosen a fit minister, to whom you have entrusted the dispensing of the Lord’s blood.” Therefore, with equal reason the dispensing of Christ’s body does not belong to priests only.

Objection 2: Further, priests are the appointed ministers of the sacraments. But this sacrament is completed in the consecration of the matter, and not in the use, to which the dispensing belongs. Therefore it seems that it does not belong to a priest to dispense the Lord’s body.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii, iv) that this sacrament, like chrism, has the power of perfecting. But it belongs, not to priests, but to bishops, to sign with the chrism. Therefore likewise, to dispense this sacrament belongs to the bishop and not to the priest.

On the contrary, It is written (De Consecr., dist. 12): “It has come to our knowledge that some priests deliver the Lord’s body to a layman or to a woman to carry it to the sick: The synod therefore forbids such presumption to continue; and let the priest himself communicate the sick.”

I answer that, The dispensing of Christ’s body belongs to the priest for three reasons. First, because, as was said above [4682](A[1]), he consecrates as in the person of Christ. But as Christ consecrated His body at the supper, so also He gave it to others to be partaken of by them. Accordingly, as the consecration of Christ’s body belongs to the priest, so likewise does the dispensing belong to him. Secondly, because the priest is the appointed intermediary between God and the people; hence as it belongs to him to offer the people’s gifts to God, so it belongs to him to deliver consecrated gifts to the people. Thirdly, because out of reverence towards this sacrament, nothing touches it, but what is consecrated; hence the corporal and the chalice are consecrated, and likewise the priest’s hands, for touching this sacrament. Hence it is not lawful for anyone else to touch it except from necessity, for instance, if it were to fall upon the ground, or else in some other case of urgency.

Reply to Objection 1: The deacon, as being nigh to the priestly order, has a certain share in the latter's duties, so that he may dispense the blood; but not the body, except in case of necessity, at the bidding of a bishop or of a priest. First of all, because Christ's blood is contained in a vessel, hence there is no need for it to be touched by the dispenser, as Christ's body is touched. Secondly, because the blood denotes the redemption derived by the people from Christ; hence it is that water is mixed with the blood, which water denotes the people. And because deacons are between priest and people, the dispensing of the blood is in the competency of deacons, rather than the dispensing of the body.

Reply to Objection 2: For the reason given above, it belongs to the same person to dispense and to consecrate this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: As the deacon, in a measure, shares in the priest's "power of enlightening" (Eccl. Hier. v), inasmuch as he dispenses the blood. so the priest shares in the "perfective dispensing" (Eccl. Hier. v) of the bishop, inasmuch as he dispenses this sacrament whereby man is perfected in himself by union with Christ. But other perfections whereby a man is perfected in relation to others, are reserved to the bishop.

Whether the priest who consecrates is bound to receive this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that the priest who consecrates is not bound to receive this sacrament. Because, in the other consecrations, he who consecrates the matter does not use it, just as the bishop consecrating the chrism is not anointed therewith. But this sacrament consists in the consecration of the matter. Therefore, the priest performing this sacrament need not use the same, but may lawfully refrain from receiving it.

Objection 2: Further, in the other sacraments the minister does not give the sacrament to himself: for no one can baptize himself, as stated above ([4683]Q[66], A[5], ad 4). But as Baptism is dispensed in due order, so also is this sacrament. Therefore the priest who consecrates this sacrament ought not to receive it at his own hands.

Objection 3: Further, it sometimes happens that Christ's body appears upon the altar under the guise of flesh, and the blood under the guise of blood; which are unsuited for food and drink: hence, as was said above ([4684]Q[75], A[5]), it is on that account that they are given under another species, lest they beget revulsion in the communicants. Therefore the priest who consecrates is not always bound to receive this sacrament.

On the contrary, We read in the acts of the (Twelfth) Council of Toledo (Can. v), and again (De Consecr., dist. 2): “It must be strictly observed that as often as the priest sacrifices the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ upon the altar, he must himself be a partaker of Christ’s body and blood.”

I answer that, As stated above ([4685]Q[79], AA[5],7), the Eucharist is not only a sacrament, but also a sacrifice. Now whoever offers sacrifice must be a sharer in the sacrifice, because the outward sacrifice he offers is a sign of the inner sacrifice whereby he offers himself to God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei x). Hence by partaking of the sacrifice he shows that the inner one is likewise his. In the same way also, by dispensing the sacrifice to the people he shows that he is the dispenser of Divine gifts, of which he ought himself to be the first to partake, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). Consequently, he ought to receive before dispensing it to the people. Accordingly we read in the chapter mentioned above (Twelfth Council of Toledo, Can. v): “What kind of sacrifice is that wherein not even the sacrificer is known to have a share?” But it is by partaking of the sacrifice that he has a share in it, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:18): “Are not they that eat of the sacrifices, partakers of the altar?” Therefore it is necessary for the priest, as often as he consecrates, to receive this sacrament in its integrity.

Reply to Objection 1: The consecration of chrism or of anything else is not a sacrifice, as the consecration of the Eucharist is: consequently there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of Baptism is accomplished in the use of the matter, and consequently no one can baptize himself, because the same person cannot be active and passive in a sacrament. Hence neither in this sacrament does the priest consecrate himself, but he consecrates the bread and wine, in which consecration the sacrament is completed. But the use thereof follows the sacrament, and therefore there is no parallel.

Reply to Objection 3: If Christ’s body appears miraculously upon the altar under the guise of flesh, or the blood under the guise of blood, it is not to be received. For Jerome says upon Leviticus (cf. De Consecr., dist. 2): “It is lawful to eat of this sacrifice which is wonderfully performed in memory of Christ: but it is not lawful for anyone to eat of that one which Christ offered on the altar of the cross." Nor does the priest transgress on that account, because miraculous events are not subject to human laws. Nevertheless the priest would be well advised to consecrate again and receive the Lord's body and blood.

Whether a wicked priest can consecrate the Eucharist?

Objection 1: It seems that a wicked priest cannot consecrate the Eucharist. For Jerome, commenting on Sophon. iii, 4, says: "The priests who perform the Eucharist, and who distribute our Lord's blood to the people, act wickedly against Christ's law, in deeming that the Eucharist is consecrated by a prayer rather than by a good life; and that only the solemn prayer is requisite, and not the priest's merits: of whom it is said: 'Let not the priest, in whatever defilement he may be, approach to offer oblations to the Lord'" (Lev. 21:21, Septuagint). But the sinful priest, being defiled, has neither the life nor the merits befitting this sacrament. Therefore a sinful priest cannot consecrate the Eucharist.

Objection 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv) that "the bread and wine are changed supernaturally into the body and blood of our Lord, by the coming of the Holy Ghost." But Pope Gelasius I says (Ep. ad Elphid., cf. Decret. i, q. 1): "How shall the Holy Spirit, when invoked, come for the consecration of the Divine Mystery, if the priest invoking him be proved full of guilty deeds?" Consequently, the Eucharist cannot be consecrated by a wicked priest.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is consecrated by the priest's blessing. But a sinful priest's blessing is not efficacious for consecrating this sacrament, since it is written (Malachi 2:2): "I will curse your blessings." Again, Dionysius says in his Epistle (viii) to the monk Demophilus: "He who is not enlightened has completely fallen away from the priestly order; and I wonder that such a man dare to employ his hands in priestly actions, and in the person of Christ to utter, over the Divine symbols, his unclean infamies, for I will not call them prayers."

On the contrary, Augustine (Paschasius) says (De Corp. Dom. xii): "Within the Catholic Church, in the mystery of the Lord's body and blood, nothing greater is done by a good priest, nothing less by an evil priest, because it is not by the merits of the consecrator that the sacrament is accomplished, but by the Creator’s word, and by the power of the Holy Spirit.”

I answer that, As was said above ([4686]AA[1],3), the priest consecrates this sacrament not by his own power, but as the minister of Christ, in Whose person he consecrates this sacrament. But from the fact of being wicked he does not cease to be Christ’s minister; because our Lord has good and wicked ministers or servants. Hence (Mat. 24:45) our Lord says: “Who, thinkest thou, is a faithful and wise servant?” and afterwards He adds: “But if that evil servant shall say in his heart,” etc. And the Apostle (1 Cor. 4:1) says: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ”; and afterwards he adds: “I am not conscious to myself of anything; yet am I not hereby justified.” He was therefore certain that he was Christ’s minister; yet he was not certain that he was a just man. Consequently, a man can be Christ’s minister even though he be not one of the just. And this belongs to Christ’s excellence, Whom, as the true God, things both good and evil serve, since they are ordained by His providence for His glory. Hence it is evident that priests, even though they be not godly, but sinners, can consecrate the Eucharist.

Reply to Objection 1: In those words Jerome is condemning the error of priests who believed they could consecrate the Eucharist worthily, from the mere fact of being priests, even though they were sinners; and Jerome condemns this from the fact that persons defiled are forbidden to approach the altar; but this does not prevent the sacrifice, which they offer, from being a true sacrifice, if they do approach.

Reply to Objection 2: Previous to the words quoted, Pope Gelasius expresses himself as follows: “That most holy rite, which contains the Catholic discipline, claims for itself such reverence that no one may dare to approach it except with clean conscience.” From this it is evident that his meaning is that the priest who is a sinner ought not to approach this sacrament. Hence when he resumes, “How shall the Holy Spirit come when summoned,” it must be understood that He comes, not through the priest’s merits, but through the power of Christ, Whose words the priest utters.

Reply to Objection 3: As the same action can be evil, inasmuch as it is done with a bad intention of the servant; and good from the good intention of the master; so the blessing of a sinful priest, inasmuch as he acts unworthily is deserving of a curse, and is reputed an infamy and a blasphemy, and not a prayer; whereas, inasmuch as it is pronounced in the person of Christ, it is holy and efficacious. Hence it is said with significance: “I will curse your blessings.”

Whether the mass of a sinful priest is of less worth than the mass of a good priest?

Objection 1: It seems that the mass of a sinful priest is not of less worth than that of a good priest. For Pope Gregory says in the Register: “Alas, into what a great snare they fall who believe that the Divine and hidden mysteries can be sanctified more by some than by others; since it is the one and the same Holy Ghost Who hallows those mysteries in a hidden and invisible manner.” But these hidden mysteries are celebrated in the mass. Therefore the mass of a sinful priest is not of less value than the mass of a good priest.

Objection 2: Further, as Baptism is conferred by a minister through the power of Christ Who baptizes, so likewise this sacrament is consecrated in the person of Christ. But Baptism is no better when conferred by a better priest, as was said above ([4687]Q[64], A[1], ad 2). Therefore neither is a mass the better, which is celebrated by a better priest.

Objection 3: Further, as the merits of priests differ in the point of being good and better, so they likewise differ in the point of being good and bad. Consequently, if the mass of a better priest be itself better, it follows that the mass of a bad priest must be bad. Now this is unreasonable, because the malice of the ministers cannot affect Christ’s mysteries, as Augustine says in his work on Baptism (Contra Donat. xii). Therefore neither is the mass of a better priest the better.

On the contrary, It is stated in Decretal i, q. 1: “The worthier the priest, the sooner is he heard in the needs for which he prays.”

I answer that, There are two things to be considered in the mass. namely, the sacrament itself, which is the chief thing; and the prayers which are offered up in the mass for the quick and the dead. So far as the mass itself is concerned, the mass of a wicked priest is not of less value than that of a good priest, because the same sacrifice is offered by both.

Again, the prayer put up in the mass can be considered in two respects: first of all, in so far as it has its efficacy from the devotion of the priest interceding, and in this respect there is no doubt but that the mass of the better priest is the more fruitful. In another respect, inasmuch as the prayer is said by the priest in the mass in the place of the entire Church, of which the priest is the minister; and this ministry remains even in sinful men, as was said above [4688](A[5]) in regard to Christ’s ministry. Hence, in this respect the prayer even of the sinful priest is fruitful, not only that which he utters in the mass, but likewise all those he recites in the ecclesiastical offices, wherein he takes the place of the Church. on the other hand, his private prayers are not fruitful, according to Prov. 28:9: “He that turneth away his ears from hearing the law, his prayer shall be an abomination.”

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking there of the holiness of the Divine sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: In the sacrament of Baptism solemn prayers are not made for all the faithful, as in the mass; therefore there is no parallel in this respect. There is, however, a resemblance as to the effect of the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: By reason of the power of the Holy Ghost, Who communicates to each one the blessings of Christ’s members on account of their being united in charity, the private blessing in the mass of a good priest is fruitful to others. But the private evil of one man cannot hurt another, except the latter, in some way, consent, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii).

Whether heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated persons can consecrate?

Objection 1: It seems that heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated persons are not able to consecrate the Eucharist. For Augustine says (Liber sentent. Prosperi xv) that “there is no such thing as a true sacrifice outside the Catholic Church”: and Pope Leo I says (Ep. lxxx; cf. Decretal i, q. 1): Elsewhere “(i.e. than in the Church which is Christ’s body) there is neither valid priesthood nor true sacrifice.” But heretics, schismatics, and excommunicated persons are severed from the Church. Therefore they are unable to offer a true sacrifice.

Objection 2: Further (Decretal, caus. i, q. 1), Innocent I is quoted as saying: “Because we receive the laity of the Arians and other pestilential persons, if they seem to repent, it does not follow that their clergy have the dignity of the priesthood or of any other ministerial office, for we allow them to confer nothing save Baptism.” But none can consecrate the

Eucharist, unless he have the dignity of the priesthood. Therefore heretics and the like cannot consecrate the Eucharist.

Objection 3: Further, it does not seem feasible for one outside the Church to act on behalf of the Church. But when the priest consecrates the Eucharist, he does so in the person of the entire Church, as is evident from the fact of his putting up all prayers in the person of the Church. Therefore, it seems that those who are outside the Church, such as those who are heretics, schismatics, and excommunicate, are not able to consecrate the Eucharist.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): “Just as Baptism remains in them,” i.e. in heretics, schismatics, and those who are excommunicate, “so do their orders remain intact.” Now, by the power of his ordination, a priest can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, it seems that heretics, schismatics, and those who are excommunicate, can consecrate the Eucharist, since their orders remain entire.

I answer that, Some have contended that heretics, schismatics, and the excommunicate, who are outside the pale of the Church, cannot perform this sacrament. But herein they are deceived, because, as Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii), “it is one thing to lack something utterly, and another to have it improperly”; and in like fashion, “it is one thing not to bestow, and quite another to bestow, but not rightly.” Accordingly, such as, being within the Church, received the power of consecrating the Eucharist through being ordained to the priesthood, have such power rightly indeed; but they use it improperly if afterwards they be separated from the Church by heresy, schism, or excommunication. But such as are ordained while separated from the Church, have neither the power rightly, nor do they use it rightly. But that in both cases they have the power, is clear from what Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii), that when they return to the unity of the Church, they are not re-ordained, but are received in their orders. And since the consecration of the Eucharist is an act which follows the power of order, such persons as are separated from the Church by heresy, schism, or excommunication, can indeed consecrate the Eucharist, which on being consecrated by them contains Christ’s true body and blood; but they act wrongly, and sin by doing so; and in consequence they do not receive the fruit of the sacrifice, which is a spiritual sacrifice.

Reply to Objection 1: Such and similar authorities are to be understood in this sense, that the sacrifice is offered wrongly outside the Church. Hence outside the Church there can be no spiritual sacrifice that is a true sacrifice with the truth of its fruit, although it be a true sacrifice with the truth of the sacrament; thus it was stated above ([4689]Q[80], A[3]), that the sinner receives Christ’s body sacramentally, but not spiritually.

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism alone is allowed to be conferred by heretics, and schismatics, because they can lawfully baptize in case of necessity; but in no case can they lawfully consecrate the Eucharist, or confer the other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: The priest, in reciting the prayers of the mass, speaks instead of the Church, in whose unity he remains; but in consecrating the sacrament he speaks as in the person of Christ, Whose place he holds by the power of his orders. Consequently, if a priest severed from the unity of the Church celebrates mass, not having lost the power of order, he consecrates Christ’s true body and blood; but because he is severed from the unity of the Church, his prayers have no efficacy.

Whether a degraded priest can consecrate this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that a degraded priest cannot consecrate this sacrament. For no one can perform this sacrament except he have the power of consecrating. But the priest “who has been degraded has no power of consecrating, although he has the power of baptizing” (App. Gratiani). Therefore it seems that a degraded priest cannot consecrate the Eucharist.

Objection 2: Further, he who gives can take away. But the bishop in ordaining gives to the priest the power of consecrating. Therefore he can take it away by degrading him.

Objection 3: Further, the priest, by degradation, loses either the power of consecrating, or the use of such power. But he does not lose merely the use, for thus the degraded one would lose no more than one excommunicated, who also lacks the use. Therefore it seems that he loses the power to consecrate, and in consequence that he cannot perform this sacrament.

On the contrary, Augustine (Contra Parmen. ii) proves that “apostates” from the faith “are not deprived of their Baptism,” from the fact that “it is not restored to them when they return repentant; and therefore it is deemed that it cannot be lost." But in like fashion, if the degraded man be restored, he has not to be ordained over again. Consequently, he has not lost the power of consecrating, and so the degraded priest can perform this sacrament.

I answer that, The power of consecrating the Eucharist belongs to the character of the priestly order. But every character is indelible, because it is given with a kind of consecration, as was said above ([4690]Q[63] , A[5]), just as the consecrations of all other things are perpetual, and cannot be lost or repeated. Hence it is clear that the power of consecrating is not lost by degradation. For, again, Augustine says (Contra Parmen. ii): "Both are sacraments," namely Baptism and order, "and both are given to a man with a kind of consecration; the former, when he is baptized; the latter when he is ordained; and therefore it is not lawful for Catholics to repeat either of them." And thus it is evident that the degraded priest can perform this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: That Canon is speaking, not as by way of assertion, but by way of inquiry, as can be gleaned from the context.

Reply to Objection 2: The bishop gives the priestly power of order, not as though coming from himself, but instrumentally, as God's minister, and its effect cannot be taken away by man, according to Mat. 19:6: "What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder." And therefore the bishop cannot take this power away, just as neither can he who baptizes take away the baptismal character.

Reply to Objection 3: Excommunication is medicinal. And therefore the ministry of the priestly power is not taken away from the excommunicate, as it were, perpetually, but only for a time, that they may mend; but the exercise is withdrawn from the degraded, as though condemned perpetually.

Whether it is permissible to receive communion from heretical, excommunicate, or sinful priests, and to hear mass said by them?

Objection 1: It seems that one may lawfully receive Communion from heretical, excommunicate, or even sinful priests, and to hear mass said by them. Because, as Augustine says (Contra Petilian. iii), "we should not avoid God's sacraments, whether they be given by a good man or by a wicked one." But priests, even if they be sinful, or heretics, or excommunicate, perform a valid sacrament. Therefore it seems that one ought not to refrain from receiving Communion at their hands, or from hearing their mass.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's true body is figurative of His mystical body, as was said above ([4691]Q[67], A[2]). But Christ's true body is consecrated by the priests mentioned above. Therefore it seems that whoever belongs to His mystical body can communicate in their sacrifices.

Objection 3: Further, there are many sins graver than fornication. But it is not forbidden to hear the masses of priests who sin otherwise. Therefore, it ought not to be forbidden to hear the masses of priests guilty of this sin.

On the contrary, The Canon says (Dist. 32): "Let no one hear the mass of a priest whom he knows without doubt to have a concubine." Moreover, Gregory says (Dial. iii) that "the faithless father sent an Arian bishop to his son, for him to receive sacrilegiously the consecrated Communion at his hands. But, when the Arian bishop arrived, God's devoted servant rebuked him, as was right for him to do."

I answer that, As was said above ([4692]AA[5],7), heretical, schismatical, excommunicate, or even sinful priests, although they have the power to consecrate the Eucharist, yet they do not make a proper use of it; on the contrary, they sin by using it. But whoever communicates with another who is in sin, becomes a sharer in his sin. Hence we read in John's Second Canonical Epistle (11) that "He that saith unto him, God speed you, communicateth with his wicked works." Consequently, it is not lawful to receive Communion from them, or to assist at their mass.

Still there is a difference among the above, because heretics, schismatics, and excommunicates, have been forbidden, by the Church's sentence, to perform the Eucharistic rite. And therefore whoever hears their mass or receives the sacraments from them, commits sin. But not all who are sinners are debarred by the Church's sentence from using this power: and so, although suspended by the Divine sentence, yet they are not suspended in regard to others by any ecclesiastical sentence: consequently, until the Church's sentence is pronounced, it is lawful to receive Communion at their hands, and to hear their mass. Hence on 1 Cor. 5:11, "with such a one not so much as to eat," Augustine's gloss runs thus: "In saying this he was unwilling for a man to be judged by his fellow man on arbitrary suspicion, or even by usurped extraordinary judgment, but rather by God's law, according to the Church’s ordering, whether he confess of his own accord, or whether he be accused and convicted.”

Reply to Objection 1: By refusing to hear the masses of such priests, or to receive Communion from them, we are not shunning God’s sacraments; on the contrary, by so doing we are giving them honor (hence a host consecrated by such priests is to be adored, and if it be reserved, it can be consumed by a lawful priest): but what we shun is the sin of the unworthy ministers.

Reply to Objection 2: The unity of the mystical body is the fruit of the true body received. But those who receive or minister unworthily, are deprived of the fruit, as was said above [4693](A[7]; Q[80], A[4]). And therefore, those who belong to the unity of the Faith are not to receive the sacrament from their dispensing.

Reply to Objection 3: Although fornication is not graver than other sins, yet men are more prone to it, owing to fleshly concupiscence. Consequently, this sin is specially inhibited to priests by the Church, lest anyone hear the mass of one living in concubinage. However, this is to be understood of one who is notorious, either from being convicted and sentenced, or from having acknowledged his guilt in legal form, or from it being impossible to conceal his guilt by any subterfuge.

Whether it is lawful for a priest to refrain entirely from consecrating the Eucharist?

Objection 1: It seems to be lawful for a priest to refrain entirely from consecrating the Eucharist. Because, as it is the priest’s office to consecrate the Eucharist, so it is likewise to baptize and administer the other sacraments. But the priest is not bound to act as a minister of the other sacraments, unless he has undertaken the care of souls. Therefore, it seems that likewise he is not bound to consecrate the Eucharist except he be charged with the care of souls.

Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is unlawful for him to do; otherwise he would be in two minds. But it is not lawful for the priest who is in a state of sin, or excommunicate, to consecrate the Eucharist, as was said above [4694](A[7]). Therefore it seems that such men are not bound to celebrate, and so neither are the others; otherwise they would be gainers by their fault.

Objection 3: Further, the priestly dignity is not lost by subsequent weakness: because Pope Gelasius I says (cf. Decretal, Dist. 55): “As the canonical precepts do not permit them who are feeble in body to approach the priesthood, so if anyone be disabled when once in that state, he cannot lose that he received at the time he was well.” But it sometimes happens that those who are already ordained as priests incur defects whereby they are hindered from celebrating, such as leprosy or epilepsy, or the like. Consequently, it does not appear that priests are bound to celebrate.

On the contrary, Ambrose says in one of his Orations (xxxiii): “It is a grave matter if we do not approach Thy altar with clean heart and pure hands; but it is graver still if while shunning sins we also fail to offer our sacrifice.”

I answer that, Some have said that a priest may lawfully refrain altogether from consecrating, except he be bound to do so, and to give the sacraments to the people, by reason of his being entrusted with the care of souls.

But this is said quite unreasonably, because everyone is bound to use the grace entrusted to him, when opportunity serves, according to 2 Cor. 6:1: “We exhort you that you receive not the grace of God in vain.” But the opportunity of offering sacrifice is considered not merely in relation to the faithful of Christ to whom the sacraments must be administered, but chiefly with regard to God to Whom the sacrifice of this sacrament is offered by consecrating. Hence, it is not lawful for the priest, even though he has not the care of souls, to refrain altogether from celebrating; and he seems to be bound to celebrate at least on the chief festivals, and especially on those days on which the faithful usually communicate. And hence it is that (2 Macc. 4:14) it is said against some priests that they “were not now occupied about the offices of the altar . . . despising the temple and neglecting the sacrifices.”

Reply to Objection 1: The other sacraments are accomplished in being used by the faithful, and therefore he alone is bound to administer them who has undertaken the care of souls. But this sacrament is performed in the consecration of the Eucharist, whereby a sacrifice is offered to God, to which the priest is bound from the order he has received.

Reply to Objection 2: The sinful priest, if deprived by the Church’s sentence from exercising his order, simply or for a time, is rendered incapable of offering sacrifice; consequently, the obligation lapses. But if not deprived of the power of celebrating, the obligation is not removed; nor is he in two minds, because he can repent of his sin and then celebrate.

Reply to Objection 3: Weakness or sickness contracted by a priest after his ordination does not deprive him of his orders; but hinders him from exercising them, as to the consecration of the Eucharist: sometimes by making it impossible to exercise them, as, for example, if he lose his sight, or his fingers, or the use of speech; and sometimes on account of danger, as in the case of one suffering from epilepsy, or indeed any disease of the mind; and sometimes, on account of loathsomeness, as is evident in the case of a leper, who ought not to celebrate in public: he can, however, say mass privately, unless the leprosy has gone so far that it has rendered him incapable owing to the wasting away of his limbs.

OF THE RITE OF THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

We have now to consider the Rite of this sacrament, under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ is sacrificed in the celebration of this mystery?

(2) Of the time of celebrating;

(3) Of the place and other matters relating to the equipment for this celebration;

(4) Of the words uttered in celebrating this mystery;

(5) Of the actions performed in celebrating this mystery.

(6) Of the defects which occur in the celebration of this sacrament.

Whether Christ is sacrificed in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It seems that Christ is not sacrificed in the celebration of this sacrament. For it is written (Heb. 10:14) that “Christ by one oblation hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified.” But that oblation was His oblation. Therefore Christ is not sacrificed in the celebration of this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Christ’s sacrifice was made upon the cross, whereon “He delivered Himself for us, an oblation and a sacrifice to God for an odor of sweetness,” as is said in Eph. 5:2. But Christ is not crucified in the celebration of this mystery. Therefore, neither is He sacrificed.

Objection 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. iv), in Christ’s sacrifice the priest and the victim are one and the same. But in the celebration of this sacrament the priest and the victim are not the same. Therefore, the celebration of this sacrament is not a sacrifice of Christ.

On the contrary, Augustine says in the Liber Sentent. Prosp. (cf. Ep. xcviii): “Christ was sacrificed once in Himself, and yet He is sacrificed daily in the Sacrament.”

I answer that, The celebration of this sacrament is called a sacrifice for two reasons. First, because, as Augustine says (Ad Simplician. ii), “the images of things are called by the names of the things whereof they are the images; as when we look upon a picture or a fresco, we say, ‘This is Cicero and that is Sallust.’” But, as was said above ([4695]Q[79], A[1]), the celebration of this sacrament is an image representing Christ’s Passion, which is His true sacrifice. Accordingly the celebration of this sacrament is called Christ’s sacrifice. Hence it is that Ambrose, in commenting on Heb. 10:1, says: “In Christ was offered up a sacrifice capable of giving eternal salvation; what then do we do? Do we not offer it up every day in memory of His death?” Secondly it is called a sacrifice, in respect of the effect of His Passion: because, to wit, by this sacrament, we are made partakers of the fruit of our Lord’s Passion. Hence in one of the Sunday Secrets (Ninth Sunday after Pentecost) we say: “Whenever the commemoration of this sacrifice is celebrated, the work of our redemption is enacted.” Consequently, according to the first reason, it is true to say that Christ was sacrificed, even in the figures of the Old Testament: hence it is stated in the Apocalypse (13:8): “Whose names are not written in the Book of Life of the Lamb, which was slain from the beginning of the world.” But according to the second reason, it is proper to this sacrament for Christ to be sacrificed in its celebration.

Reply to Objection 1: As Ambrose says (commenting on Heb. 10:1), “there is but one victim,” namely that which Christ offered, and which we offer, “and not many victims, because Christ was offered but once: and this latter sacrifice is the pattern of the former. For, just as what is offered everywhere is one body, and not many bodies, so also is it but one sacrifice.”

Reply to Objection 2: As the celebration of this sacrament is an image representing Christ’s Passion, so the altar is representative of the cross itself, upon which Christ was sacrificed in His proper species.

Reply to Objection 3: For the same reason (cf. Reply OBJ[2]) the priest also bears Christ’s image, in Whose person and by Whose power he pronounces the words of consecration, as is evident from what was said above ([4696]Q[82], AA[1],3). And so, in a measure, the priest and victim are one and the same.

Whether the time for celebrating this mystery has been properly determined?

Objection 1: It seems that the time for celebrating this mystery has not been properly determined. For as was observed above [4697](A[1]), this sacrament is representative of our Lord’s Passion. But the commemoration of our Lord’s Passion takes place in the Church once in the year: because Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps. 21): “Is not Christ slain as often as the Pasch is celebrated? Nevertheless, the anniversary remembrance represents what took place in by-gone days; and so it does not cause us to be stirred as if we saw our Lord hanging upon the cross.” Therefore this sacrament ought to be celebrated but once a year.

Objection 2: Further, Christ’s Passion is commemorated in the Church on the Friday before Easter, and not on Christmas Day. Consequently, since this sacrament is commemorative of our Lord’s Passion, it seems unsuitable for this sacrament to be celebrated thrice on Christmas Day, and to be entirely omitted on Good Friday.

Objection 3: Further, in the celebration of this sacrament the Church ought to imitate Christ’s institution. But it was in the evening that Christ consecrated this sacrament. Therefore it seems that this sacrament ought to be celebrated at that time of day.

Objection 4: Further, as is set down in the Decretals (De Consecr., dist. i), Pope Leo I wrote to Dioscorus, Bishop of Alexandria, that “it is permissible to celebrate mass in the first part of the day.” But the day begins at midnight, as was said above ([4698]Q[80], A[8], ad 5). Therefore it seems that after midnight it is lawful to celebrate.

Objection 5: Further, in one of the Sunday Secrets (Ninth Sunday after Pentecost) we say: “Grant us, Lord, we beseech Thee, to frequent these mysteries." But there will be greater frequency if the priest celebrates several times a day. Therefore it seems that the priest ought not to be hindered from celebrating several times daily.

On the contrary is the custom which the Church observes according to the statutes of the Canons.

I answer that, As stated above [4699](A[1]), in the celebration of this mystery, we must take into consideration the representation of our Lord's Passion, and the participation of its fruits; and the time suitable for the celebration of this mystery ought to be determined by each of these considerations. Now since, owing to our daily defects, we stand in daily need of the fruits of our Lord's Passion, this sacrament is offered regularly every day in the Church. Hence our Lord teaches us to pray (Lk. 11:3): "Give us this day our daily bread": in explanation of which words Augustine says (De Verb. Dom. xxviii): "If it be a daily bread, why do you take it once a year, as the Greeks have the custom in the east? Receive it daily that it may benefit you every day."

But since our Lord's Passion was celebrated from the third to the ninth hour, therefore this sacrament is solemnly celebrated by the Church in that part of the day.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's Passion is recalled in this sacrament, inasmuch as its effect flows out to the faithful; but at Passion-tide Christ's Passion is recalled inasmuch as it was wrought in Him Who is our Head. This took place but once; whereas the faithful receive daily the fruits of His Passion: consequently, the former is commemorated but once in the year, whereas the latter takes place every day, both that we may partake of its fruit and in order that we may have a perpetual memorial.

Reply to Objection 2: The figure ceases on the advent of the reality. But this sacrament is a figure and a representation of our Lord's Passion, as stated above. And therefore on the day on which our Lord's Passion is recalled as it was really accomplished, this sacrament is not consecrated. Nevertheless, lest the Church be deprived on that day of the fruit of the Passion offered to us by this sacrament, the body of Christ consecrated the day before is reserved to be consumed on that day; but the blood is not reserved, on account of danger, and because the blood is more specially the image of our Lord's Passion, as stated above ([4700]Q[78], A[3], ad 2). Nor is it true, as some affirm, that the wine is changed into blood when the particle of Christ’s body is dropped into it. Because this cannot be done otherwise than by consecration under the due form of words.

On Christmas Day, however, several masses are said on account of Christ’s threefold nativity. Of these the first is His eternal birth, which is hidden in our regard. and therefore one mass is sung in the night, in the “Introit” of which we say: “The Lord said unto Me: Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee.” The second is His nativity in time, and the spiritual birth, whereby Christ rises “as the day-star in our [Vulg.: ‘your’] hearts” (2 Pet. 1:19), and on this account the mass is sung at dawn, and in the “Introit” we say: “The light will shine on us today.” The third is Christ’s temporal and bodily birth, according as He went forth from the virginal womb, becoming visible to us through being clothed with flesh: and on that account the third mass is sung in broad daylight, in the “Introit” of which we say: “A child is born to us.” Nevertheless, on the other hand, it can be said that His eternal generation, of itself, is in the full light, and on this account in the gospel of the third mass mention is made of His eternal birth. But regarding His birth in the body, He was literally born during the night, as a sign that He came to the darknesses of our infirmity; hence also in the midnight mass we say the gospel of Christ’s nativity in the flesh.

Likewise on other days upon which many of God’s benefits have to be recalled or besought, several masses are celebrated on one day, as for instance, one for the feast, and another for a fast or for the dead.

Reply to Objection 3: As already observed ([4701]Q[73], A[5]), Christ wished to give this sacrament last of all, in order that it might make a deeper impression on the hearts of the disciples; and therefore it was after supper, at the close of day, that He consecrated this sacrament and gave it to His disciples. But we celebrate at the hour when our Lord suffered, i.e. either, as on feast-days, at the hour of Terce, when He was crucified by the tongues of the Jews (Mk. 15:25), and when the Holy Ghost descended upon the disciples (Acts 2:15); or, as when no feast is kept, at the hour of Sext, when He was crucified at the hands of the soldiers (Jn. 19:14), or, as on fasting days, at None, when crying out with a loud voice He gave up the ghost (Mat. 27:46, 50).

Nevertheless the mass can be postponed, especially when Holy orders have to be conferred, and still more on Holy Saturday; both on account of the length of the office, and also because orders belong to the Sunday, as is set forth in the Decretals (dist. 75).

Masses, however, can be celebrated "in the first part of the day," owing to any necessity; as is stated De Consecr., dist. 1.

Reply to Objection 4: As a rule mass ought to be said in the day and not in the night, because Christ is present in this sacrament, Who says (Jn. 9:4,5): "I must work the works of Him that sent Me, whilst it is day: because the night cometh when no man can work; as long as I am in the world, I am the light of the world." Yet this should be done in such a manner that the beginning of the day is not to be taken from midnight; nor from sunrise, that is, when the substance of the sun appears above the earth; but when the dawn begins to show: because then the sun is said to be risen when the brightness of his beams appears. Accordingly it is written (Mk. 16:1) that "the women came to the tomb, the sun being now risen"; though, as John relates (Jn. 20:1), "while it was yet dark they came to the tomb." It is in this way that Augustine explains this difference (De Consens. Evang. iii).

Exception is made on the night of Christmas eve, when mass is celebrated, because our Lord was born in the night (De Consecr., dist. 1). And in like manner it is celebrated on Holy Saturday towards the beginning of the night, since our Lord rose in the night, that is, "when it was yet dark, before the sun's rising was manifest."

Reply to Objection 5: As is set down in the decree (De Consecr., dist. 1), in virtue of a decree of Pope Alexander II, "it is enough for a priest to celebrate one mass each day, because Christ suffered once and redeemed the whole world; and very happy is he who can worthily celebrate one mass. But there are some who say one mass for the dead, and another of the day, if need be. But I do not deem that those escape condemnation who presume to celebrate several masses daily, either for the sake of money, or to gain flattery from the laity." And Pope Innocent III says (Extra, De Celebr. Miss., chap. Consuluisti) that "except on the day of our Lord's birth, unless necessity urges, it suffices for a priest to celebrate only one mass each day."

Whether this sacrament ought to be celebrated in a house and with sacred vessels?

Objection 1: It seems that this sacrament ought not to be celebrated in a house and with sacred vessels. For this sacrament is a representation of our Lord’s Passion. But Christ did not suffer in a house, but outside the city gate, according to Heb. 1:12: “Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood, suffered without the gate.” Therefore, it seems that this sacrament ought not to be celebrated in a house, but rather in the open air.

Objection 2: Further, in the celebration of this sacrament the Church ought to imitate the custom of Christ and the apostles. But the house wherein Christ first wrought this sacrament was not consecrated, but merely an ordinary supper-room prepared by the master of the house, as related in Lk. 22:11,12. Moreover, we read (Acts 2:46) that “the apostles were continuing daily with one accord in the temple; and, breaking bread from house to house, they took their meat with gladness.” Consequently, there is no need for houses, in which this sacrament is celebrated, to be consecrated.

Objection 3: Further, nothing that is to no purpose ought to be done in the Church, which is governed by the Holy Ghost. But it seems useless to consecrate a church, or an altar, or such like inanimate things, since they are not capable of receiving grace or spiritual virtue. Therefore it is unbecoming for such consecrations to be performed in the Church.

Objection 4: Further, only Divine works ought to be recalled with solemnity, according to Ps. 91:5: “I shall rejoice in the works of Thy hands.” Now the consecration of a church or altar, is the work of a man; as is also the consecration of the chalice, and of the ministers, and of other such things. But these latter consecrations are not commemorated in the Church. Therefore neither ought the consecration of a church or of an altar to be commemorated with solemnity.

Objection 5: Further, the truth ought to correspond with the figure. But in the Old Testament, which was a figure of the New, the altar was not made of hewn stones: for, it is written (Ex. 20:24): “You shall make an altar of earth unto Me . . . and if thou make an altar of stone unto Me, thou shalt not build it of hewn stones.” Again, the altar is commanded to be made of “setim-wood,” covered “with brass” (Ex. 27:1,2), or “with gold” (Ex. 25). Consequently, it seems unfitting for the Church to make exclusive use of altars made of stone.

Objection 6: Further, the chalice with the paten represents Christ’s tomb, which was “hewn in a rock,” as is narrated in the Gospels. Consequently, the chalice ought to be of stone, and not of gold or of silver or tin.

Objection 7: Further, just as gold is the most precious among the materials of the altar vessels, so are cloths of silk the most precious among other cloths. Consequently, since the chalice is of gold, the altar cloths ought to be made of silk and not of linen.

Objection 8: Further, the dispensing and ordering of the sacraments belong to the Church's ministers, just as the ordering of temporal affairs is subject to the ruling of secular princes; hence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:1): "Let a man so esteem us as the ministers of Christ end the dispensers of the mysteries of God." But if anything be done against the ordinances of princes it is deemed void. Therefore, if the various items mentioned above are suitably commanded by the Church's prelates, it seems that the body of Christ could not be consecrated unless they be observed; and so it appears to follow that Christ's words are not sufficient of themselves for consecrating this sacrament: which is contrary to the fact. Consequently, it does not seem fitting for such ordinances to be made touching the celebration of this sacrament.

On the contrary, The Church's ordinances are Christ's own ordinances; since He said (Mat. 18:20): "Wherever two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them."

I answer that, There are two things to be considered regarding the equipment of this sacrament: one of these belongs to the representation of the events connected with our Lord's Passion; while the other is connected with the reverence due to the sacrament, in which Christ is contained verily, and not in figure only.

Hence we consecrate those things which we make use of in this sacrament; both that we may show our reverence for the sacrament, and in order to represent the holiness which is the effect of the Passion of Christ, according to Heb. 13:12: "Jesus, that He might sanctify the people by His own blood," etc.

Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament ought as a rule to be celebrated in a house, whereby the Church is signified, according to 1 Tim. 3:15: "That thou mayest know how thou oughtest to behave thyself in the house of God, which is the Church of the living God." Because "outside the Church there is no place for the true sacrifice," as Augustine says (Liber Sentent. Prosp. xv). And because the Church was not to be confined within the territories of the Jewish people, but was to be established throughout the whole world, therefore Christ's Passion was not celebrated within the city of the Jews, but in the open country, that so the whole world might serve as a house for Christ's Passion. Nevertheless, as is said in De Consecr., dist. 1, "if a church be not to hand, we permit travelers to celebrate mass in the open air, or in a tent, if there be a consecrated altar-table to hand, and the other requisites belonging to the sacred function."

Reply to Objection 2: The house in which this sacrament is celebrated denotes the Church, and is termed a church; and so it is fittingly consecrated, both to represent the holiness which the Church acquired from the Passion, as well as to denote the holiness required of them who have to receive this sacrament. By the altar Christ Himself is signified, of Whom the Apostle says (Heb. 13:15): "Through Him we offer a sacrifice of praise to God." Hence the consecration of the altar signifies Christ's holiness, of which it was said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy one born of thee shall be called the Son of God." Hence we read in De Consecr., dist. 1: "It has seemed pleasing for the altars to be consecrated not merely with the anointing of chrism, but likewise with the priestly blessing."

And therefore, as a rule, it is not lawful to celebrate this sacrament except in a consecrated house. Hence it is enacted (De Consecr., dist. 1): "Let no priest presume to say mass except in places consecrated by the bishop." And furthermore because pagans and other unbelievers are not members of the Church, therefore we read (De Consecr., dist. 1): "It is not lawful to bless a church in which the bodies of unbelievers are buried, but if it seem suitable for consecration, then, after removing the corpses and tearing down the walls or beams, let it be rebuilt. If, however, it has been already consecrated, and the faithful lie in it, it is lawful to celebrate mass therein." Nevertheless in a case of necessity this sacrament can be performed in houses which have not been consecrated, or which have been profaned; but with the bishop's consent. Hence we read in the same distinction: "We deem that masses are not to be celebrated everywhere, but in places consecrated by the bishop, or where he gives permission." But not without a portable altar consecrated by the bishop: hence in the same distinction we read: "We permit that, if the churches be devastated or burned, masses may be celebrated in chapels, with a consecrated altar." For because Christ's holiness is the fount of all the Church's holiness, therefore in necessity a consecrated altar suffices for performing this sacrament. And on this account a church is never consecrated without consecrating the altar. Yet sometimes an altar is consecrated apart from the church, with the relics of the saints, “whose lives are hidden with Christ in God” (Col. 3:3). Accordingly under the same distinction we read: “It is our pleasure that altars, in which no relics of saints are found enclosed, be thrown down, if possible, by the bishops presiding over such places.”

Reply to Objection 3: The church, altar, and other like inanimate things are consecrated, not because they are capable of receiving grace, but because they acquire special spiritual virtue from the consecration, whereby they are rendered fit for the Divine worship, so that man derives devotion therefrom, making him more fitted for Divine functions, unless this be hindered by want of reverence. Hence it is written (2 Macc. 3:38): “There is undoubtedly in that place a certain power of God; for He that hath His dwelling in the heavens is the visitor, and the protector of that place.”

Hence it is that such places are cleansed and exorcised before being consecrated, that the enemy’s power may be driven forth. And for the same reason churches defiled by shedding of blood or seed are reconciled: because some machination of the enemy is apparent on account of the sin committed there. And for this reason we read in the same distinction: “Wherever you find churches of the Arians, consecrate them as Catholic churches without delay by means of devout prayers and rites.” Hence, too, it is that some say with probability, that by entering a consecrated church one obtains forgiveness of venial sins, just as one does by the sprinkling of holy water; alleging the words of Ps. 84:2,3: “Lord, Thou hast blessed Thy land . . . Thou hast forgiven the iniquity of Thy people.” And therefore, in consequence of the virtue acquired by a church’s consecration, the consecration is never repeated. Accordingly we find in the same distinction the following words quoted from the Council of Nicaea: “Churches which have once been consecrated, must not be consecrated again, except they be devastated by fire, or defiled by shedding of blood or of anyone’s seed; because, just as a child once baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, ought not to be baptized again, so neither ought a place, once dedicated to God, to be consecrated again, except owing to the causes mentioned above; provided that the consecrators held faith in the Holy Trinity”: in fact, those outside the Church cannot consecrate. But, as we read in the same distinction: “Churches or altars of doubtful consecration are to be consecrated anew.”

And since they acquire special spiritual virtue from their consecration, we find it laid down in the same distinction that “the beams of a dedicated church ought not to be used for any other purpose, except it be for some other church, or else they are to be burned, or put to the use of brethren in some monastery: but on no account are they to be discarded for works of the laity.” We read there, too, that “the altar covering, chair, candlesticks, and veil, are to be burned when warn out; and their ashes are to be placed in the baptistery, or in the walls, or else cast into the trenches beneath the flag-stones, so as not to be defiled by the feet of those that enter.”

Reply to Objection 4: Since the consecration of the altar signifies Christ’s holiness, and the consecration of a house the holiness of the entire Church, therefore the consecration of a church or of an altar is more fittingly commemorated. And on this account the solemnity of a church dedication is observed for eight days, in order to signify the happy resurrection of Christ and of the Church’s members. Nor is the consecration of a church or altar man’s doing only, since it has a spiritual virtue. Hence in the same distinction (De Consecr.) it is said: “The solemnities of the dedication of churches are to be solemnly celebrated each year: and that dedications are to be kept up for eight days, you will find in the third book of Kings” (8:66).

Reply to Objection 5: As we read in De Consecr., dist. 1, “altars, if not of stone, are not to be consecrated with the anointing of chrism.” And this is in keeping with the signification of this sacrament; both because the altar signifies Christ, for in 1 Cor. 10:3, it is written, “But the rock was Christ”: and because Christ’s body was laid in a stone sepulchre. This is also in keeping with the use of the sacrament. Because stone is solid, and may be found everywhere. which was not necessary in the old Law, when the altar was made in one place. As to the commandment to make the altar of earth, or of unhewn stones, this was given in order to remove idolatry.

Reply to Objection 6: As is laid down in the same distinction, “formerly the priests did not use golden but wooden chalices; but Pope Zephyrinus ordered the mass to be said with glass patens; and subsequently Pope Urban had everything made of silver.” Afterwards it was decided that “the Lord’s chalice with the paten should be made entirely of gold, or of silver or at least of tin. But it is not to be made of brass, or copper, because the action of the wine thereon produces verdigris, and provokes vomiting. But no one is to presume to sing mass with a chalice of wood or of glass," because as the wood is porous, the consecrated blood would remain in it; while glass is brittle and there might arise danger of breakage; and the same applies to stone. Consequently, out of reverence for the sacrament, it was enacted that the chalice should be made of the aforesaid materials.

Reply to Objection 7: Where it could be done without danger, the Church gave order for that thing to be used which more expressively represents Christ's Passion. But there was not so much danger regarding the body which is placed on the corporal, as there is with the blood contained in the chalice. And consequently, although the chalice is not made of stone, yet the corporal is made of linen, since Christ's body was wrapped therein. Hence we read in an Epistle of Pope Silvester, quoted in the same distinction: "By a unanimous decree we command that no one shall presume to celebrate the sacrifice of the altar upon a cloth of silk, or dyed material, but upon linen consecrated by the bishop; as Christ's body was buried in a clean linen winding-sheet." Moreover, linen material is becoming, owing to its cleanness, to denote purity of conscience, and, owing to the manifold labor with which it is prepared, to denote Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 8: The dispensing of the sacraments belongs to the Church's ministers; but their consecration is from God Himself. Consequently, the Church's ministers can make no ordinances regarding the form of the consecration, and the manner of celebrating. And therefore, if the priest pronounces the words of consecration over the proper matter with the intention of consecrating, then, without every one of the things mentioned above—namely, without house, and altar, consecrated chalice and corporal, and the other things instituted by the Church—he consecrates Christ's body in very truth; yet he is guilty of grave sin, in not following the rite of the Church.

Whether the words spoken in this sacrament are properly framed?

Objection 1: It seems that the words spoken in this sacrament are not properly framed. For, as Ambrose says (De Sacram. iv), this sacrament is consecrated with Christ's own words. Therefore no other words besides Christ's should be spoken in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Christ's words and deeds are made known to us through the Gospel. But in consecrating this sacrament words are used which are not set down in the Gospels: for we do not read in the Gospel, of Christ lifting up His eyes to heaven while consecrating this sacrament: and similarly it is said in the Gospel: "Take ye and eat" [comedite] without the addition of the word "all," whereas in celebrating this sacrament we say: "Lifting up His eyes to heaven," and again, "Take ye and eat [manducate] of this." Therefore such words as these are out of place when spoken in the celebration of this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, all the other sacraments are ordained for the salvation of all the faithful. But in the celebration of the other sacraments there is no common prayer put up for the salvation of all the faithful and of the departed. Consequently it is unbecoming in this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, Baptism especially is called the sacrament of faith. Consequently, the truths which belong to instruction in the faith ought rather to be given regarding Baptism than regarding this sacrament, such as the doctrine of the apostles and of the Gospels.

Objection 5: Further, devotion on the part of the faithful is required in every sacrament. Consequently, the devotion of the faithful ought not to be stirred up in this sacrament more than in the others by Divine praises and by admonitions, such as, "Lift up your hearts."

Objection 6: Further, the minister of this sacrament is the priest, as stated above ([4702]Q[82], A[1]). Consequently, all the words spoken in this sacrament ought to be uttered by the priest, and not some by the ministers, and some by the choir.

Objection 7: Further, the Divine power works this sacrament unfailingly. Therefore it is to no purpose that the priest asks for the perfecting of this sacrament, saying: "Which oblation do thou, O God, in all," etc.

Objection 8: Further, the sacrifice of the New Law is much more excellent than the sacrifice of the fathers of old. Therefore, it is unfitting for the priest to pray that this sacrifice may be as acceptable as the sacrifice of Abel, Abraham, and Melchisedech.

Objection 9: Further, just as Christ's body does not begin to be in this sacrament by change of place, as stated above ([4703]Q[75], A[2]), so likewise neither does it cease to be there. Consequently, it is improper for the priest to ask: “Bid these things be borne by the hands of thy holy angel unto Thine altar on high.”

On the contrary, We find it stated in De Consecr., dist. 1, that “James, the brother of the Lord according to the flesh, and Basil, bishop of Caesarea, edited the rite of celebrating the mass”: and from their authority it is manifest that whatever words are employed in this matter, are chosen becomingly.

I answer that, Since the whole mystery of our salvation is comprised in this sacrament, therefore is it performed with greater solemnity than the other sacraments. And since it is written (Eccles. 4:17): “Keep thy foot when thou goest into the house of God”; and (Ecclus. 18:23): “Before prayer prepare thy soul,” therefore the celebration of this mystery is preceded by a certain preparation in order that we may perform worthily that which follows after. The first part of this preparation is Divine praise, and consists in the “Introit”: according to Ps. 49:23: “The sacrifice of praise shall glorify me; and there is the way by which I will show him the salvation of God”: and this is taken for the most part from the Psalms, or, at least, is sung with a Psalm, because, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii): “The Psalms comprise by way of praise whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture.”

The second part contains a reference to our present misery, by reason of which we pray for mercy, saying: “Lord, have mercy on us,” thrice for the Person of the Father, and “Christ, have mercy on us,” thrice for the Person of the Son, and “Lord, have mercy on us,” thrice for the Person of the Holy Ghost; against the threefold misery of ignorance, sin, and punishment; or else to express the “circuminsession” of all the Divine Persons.

The third part commemorates the heavenly glory, to the possession of which, after this life of misery, we are tending, in the words, “Glory be to God on high,” which are sung on festival days, on which the heavenly glory is commemorated, but are omitted in those sorrowful offices which commemorate our unhappy state.

The fourth part contains the prayer which the priest makes for the people, that they may be made worthy of such great mysteries.

There precedes, in the second place, the instruction of the faithful, because this sacrament is “a mystery of faith,” as stated above

([4704]Q[78], A[3], ad 5). Now this instruction is given “dispositively,” when the Lectors and Sub-deacons read aloud in the church the teachings of the prophets and apostles: after this “lesson,” the choir sing the “Gradual,” which signifies progress in life; then the “Alleluia” is intoned, and this denotes spiritual joy; or in mournful offices the “Tract,” expressive of spiritual sighing; for all these things ought to result from the aforesaid teaching. But the people are instructed “perfectly” by Christ’s teaching contained in the Gospel, which is read by the higher ministers, that is, by the Deacons. And because we believe Christ as the Divine truth, according to Jn. 8:46, “If I tell you the truth, why do you not believe Me?” after the Gospel has been read, the “Creed” is sung in which the people show that they assent by faith to Christ’s doctrine. And it is sung on those festivals of which mention is made therein, as on the festivals of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, and of the apostles, who laid the foundations of this faith, and on other such days.

So then, after the people have been prepared and instructed, the next step is to proceed to the celebration of the mystery, which is both offered as a sacrifice, and consecrated and received as a sacrament: since first we have the oblation; then the consecration of the matter offered; and thirdly, its reception.

In regard to the oblation, two things are done, namely, the people’s praise in singing the “offertory,” expressing the joy of the offerers, and the priest’s prayer asking for the people’s oblation to be made acceptable to God. Hence David said (1 Para 29:17): “In the simplicity of my heart, I have . . . offered all these things: and I have seen with great joy Thy people which are here present, offer Thee their offerings”: and then he makes the following prayer: “O Lord God . . . keep . . . this will.”

Then, regarding the consecration, performed by supernatural power, the people are first of all excited to devotion in the “Preface,” hence they are admonished “to lift up their hearts to the Lord,” and therefore when the “Preface” is ended the people devoutly praise Christ’s Godhead, saying with the angels: “Holy, Holy, Holy”; and His humanity, saying with the children: “Blessed is he that cometh.” In the next place the priest makes a “commemoration,” first of those for whom this sacrifice is offered, namely, for the whole Church, and “for those set in high places” (1 Tim. 2:2), and, in a special manner, of them “who offer, or for whom the mass is offered.”

Secondly, he commemorates the saints, invoking their patronage for those mentioned above, when he says: “Communicating with, and honoring the memory,” etc. Thirdly, he concludes the petition when he says: “Wherefore that this oblation,” etc., in order that the oblation may be salutary to them for whom it is offered.

Then he comes to the consecration itself. Here he asks first of all for the effect of the consecration, when he says: “Which oblation do Thou, O God,” etc. Secondly, he performs the consecration using our Saviour’s words, when he says: “Who the day before,” etc. Thirdly, he makes excuse for his presumption in obeying Christ’s command, saying: “Wherefore, calling to mind,” etc. Fourthly, he asks that the sacrifice accomplished may find favor with God, when he says: “Look down upon them with a propitious,” etc. Fifthly, he begs for the effect of this sacrifice and sacrament, first for the partakers, saying: “We humbly beseech Thee”; then for the dead, who can no longer receive it, saying: “Be mindful also, O Lord,” etc.; thirdly, for the priests themselves who offer, saying: “And to us sinners,” etc.

Then follows the act of receiving the sacrament. First of all, the people are prepared for Communion; first, by the common prayer of the congregation, which is the Lord’s Prayer, in which we ask for our daily bread to be given us; and also by private prayer, which the priest puts up specially for the people, when he says: “Deliver us, we beseech Thee, O Lord,” etc. Secondly, the people are prepared by the “Pax” which is given with the words, “Lamb of God,” etc., because this is the sacrament of unity and peace, as stated above ([4705]Q[73], A[4];[4706] Q[79], A[1]). But in masses for the dead, in which the sacrifice is offered not for present peace, but for the repose of the dead, the “Pax” is omitted.

Then follows the reception of the sacrament, the priest receiving first, and afterwards giving it to others, because, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), he who gives Divine things to others, ought first to partake thereof himself.

Finally, the whole celebration of mass ends with the thanksgiving, the people rejoicing for having received the mystery (and this is the meaning of the singing after the Communion); and the priest returning thanks by prayer, as Christ, at the close of the supper with His disciples, “said a hymn” (Mat. 26:30).

Reply to Objection 1: The consecration is accomplished by Christ's words only; but the other words must be added to dispose the people for receiving it, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: As is stated in the last chapter of John (verse 25), our Lord said and did many things which are not written down by the Evangelists; and among them is the uplifting of His eyes to heaven at the supper; nevertheless the Roman Church had it by tradition from the apostles. For it seems reasonable that He Who lifted up His eyes to the Father in raising Lazarus to life, as related in Jn. 11:41, and in the prayer which He made for the disciples (Jn. 17:1), had more reason to do so in instituting this sacrament, as being of greater import.

The use of the word "manducate" instead of "comedite" makes no difference in the meaning, nor does the expression signify, especially since those words are no part of the form, as stated above ([4707]Q[78], A[1], ad 2,4).

The additional word "all" is understood in the Gospels, although not expressed, because He had said (Jn. 6:54): "Except you eat the flesh of the Son of Man . . . you shall not have life in you."

Reply to Objection 3: The Eucharist is the sacrament of the unity of the whole Church: and therefore in this sacrament, more than in the others, mention ought to be made of all that belongs to the salvation of the entire Church.

Reply to Objection 4: There is a twofold instruction in the Faith: the first is for those receiving it for the first time, that is to say, for catechumens, and such instruction is given in connection with Baptism. The other is the instruction of the faithful who take part in this sacrament; and such instruction is given in connection with this sacrament. Nevertheless catechumens and unbelievers are not excluded therefrom. Hence in De Consecr., dist. 1, it is laid down: "Let the bishop hinder no one from entering the church, and hearing the word of God, be they Gentiles, heretics, or Jews, until the mass of the Catechumens begins," in which the instruction regarding the Faith is contained.

Reply to Objection 5: Greater devotion is required in this sacrament than in the others, for the reason that the entire Christ is contained therein. Moreover, this sacrament requires a more general devotion, i.e. on the part of the whole people, since for them it is offered; and not merely on the part of the recipients, as in the other sacraments. Hence Cyprian observes (De Orat. Domin. 31), “The priest, in saying the Preface, disposes the souls of the brethren by saying, ‘Lift up your hearts,’ and when the people answer—‘We have lifted them up to the Lord,’ let them remember that they are to think of nothing else but God.”

Reply to Objection 6: As was said above (ad 3), those things are mentioned in this sacrament which belong to the entire Church; and consequently some things which refer to the people are sung by the choir, and same of these words are all sung by the choir, as though inspiring the entire people with them; and there are other words which the priest begins and the people take up, the priest then acting as in the person of God; to show that the things they denote have come to the people through Divine revelation, such as faith and heavenly glory; and therefore the priest intones the “Creed” and the “Gloria in excelsis Deo.” Other words are uttered by the ministers, such as the doctrine of the Old and New Testament, as a sign that this doctrine was announced to the peoples through ministers sent by God. And there are other words which the priest alone recites, namely, such as belong to his personal office, “that he may offer up gifts and prayers for the people” (Heb. 5:1). Some of these, however, he says aloud, namely, such as are common to priest and people alike, such as the “common prayers”; other words, however, belong to the priest alone, such as the oblation and the consecration; consequently, the prayers that are said in connection with these have to be said by the priest in secret. Nevertheless, in both he calls the people to attention by saying: “The Lord be with you,” and he waits for them to assent by saying “Amen.” And therefore before the secret prayers he says aloud, “The Lord be with you,” and he concludes, “For ever and ever.” Or the priest secretly pronounces some of the words as a token that regarding Christ’s Passion the disciples acknowledged Him only in secret.

Reply to Objection 7: The efficacy of the sacramental words can be hindered by the priest’s intention. Nor is there anything unbecoming in our asking of God for what we know He will do, just as Christ (Jn. 17:1, 5) asked for His glorification.

But the priest does not seem to pray there for the consecration to be fulfilled, but that it may be fruitful in our regard, hence he says expressively: “That it may become ‘to us’ the body and the blood.” Again, the words preceding these have that meaning, when he says: “Vouchsafe to make this oblation blessed,” i.e. according to Augustine (Paschasius, De Corp. et Sang. Dom. xii), “that we may receive a blessing,” namely, through grace; “‘enrolled,’ i.e. that we may be enrolled in heaven; ‘ratified,’ i.e. that we may be incorporated in Christ; ‘reasonable,’ i.e. that we may be stripped of our animal sense; ‘acceptable,’ i.e. that we who in ourselves are displeasing, may, by its means, be made acceptable to His only Son.”

Reply to Objection 8: Although this sacrament is of itself preferable to all ancient sacrifices, yet the sacrifices of the men of old were most acceptable to God on account of their devotion. Consequently the priest asks that this sacrifice may be accepted by God through the devotion of the offerers, just as the former sacrifices were accepted by Him.

Reply to Objection 9: The priest does not pray that the sacramental species may be borne up to heaven; nor that Christ’s true body may be borne thither, for it does not cease to be there; but he offers this prayer for Christ’s mystical body, which is signified in this sacrament, that the angel standing by at the Divine mysteries may present to God the prayers of both priest and people, according to Apoc. 8:4: “And the smoke of the incense of the prayers of the saints ascended up before God, from the hand of the angel.” But God’s “altar on high” means either the Church triumphant, unto which we pray to be translated, or else God Himself, in Whom we ask to share; because it is said of this altar (Ex. 20:26): “Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar, i.e. thou shalt make no steps towards the Trinity.” Or else by the angel we are to understand Christ Himself, Who is the “Angel of great counsel” (Is. 9:6: Septuagint), Who unites His mystical body with God the Father and the Church triumphant.

And from this the mass derives its name [missa]; because the priest sends [mittit] his prayers up to God through the angel, as the people do through the priest. or else because Christ is the victim sent [missa] to us: accordingly the deacon on festival days “dismisses” the people at the end of the mass, by saying: “Ite, missa est,” that is, the victim has been sent [missa est] to God through the angel, so that it may be accepted by God.

Whether the actions performed in celebrating this sacrament are becoming?

Objection 1: It seems that the actions performed in celebrating this mystery are not becoming. For, as is evident from its form, this sacrament belongs to the New Testament. But under the New Testament the ceremonies of the old are not to be observed, such as that the priests and ministers were purified with water when they drew nigh to offer up the sacrifice: for we read (Ex. 30:19,20): "Aaron and his sons shall wash their hands and feet . . . when they are going into the tabernacle of the testimony . . . and when they are to come to the altar." Therefore it is not fitting that the priest should wash his hands when celebrating mass.

Objection 2: Further, (Ex. 30:7), the Lord commanded Aaron to "burn sweet-smelling incense" upon the altar which was "before the propitiatory": and the same action was part of the ceremonies of the Old Law. Therefore it is not fitting for the priest to use incense during mass.

Objection 3: Further, the ceremonies performed in the sacraments of the Church ought not to be repeated. Consequently it is not proper for the priest to repeat the sign of the cross many times over this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:7): "And without all contradiction, that which is less, is blessed by the better." But Christ, Who is in this sacrament after the consecration, is much greater than the priest. Therefore quite unseemingly the priest, after the consecration, blesses this sacrament, by signing it with the cross.

Objection 5: Further, nothing which appears ridiculous ought to be done in one of the Church's sacraments. But it seems ridiculous to perform gestures, e.g. for the priest to stretch out his arms at times, to join his hands, to join together his fingers, and to bow down. Consequently, such things ought not to be done in this sacrament.

Objection 6: Further, it seems ridiculous for the priest to turn round frequently towards the people, and often to greet the people. Consequently, such things ought not to be done in the celebration of this sacrament.

Objection 7: Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 13) deems it improper for Christ to be divided. But Christ is in this sacrament after the consecration. Therefore it is not proper for the priest to divide the host.

Objection 8: Further, the ceremonies performed in this sacrament represent Christ's Passion. But during the Passion Christ's body was divided in the places of the five wounds. Therefore Christ's body ought to be broken into five parts rather than into three.

Objection 9: Further, Christ’s entire body is consecrated in this sacrament apart from the blood. Consequently, it is not proper for a particle of the body to be mixed with the blood.

Objection 10: Further, just as, in this sacrament, Christ’s body is set before us as food, so is His blood, as drink. But in receiving Christ’s body no other bodily food is added in the celebration of the mass. Therefore, it is out of place for the priest, after taking Christ’s blood, to receive other wine which is not consecrated.

Objection 11: Further, the truth ought to be conformable with the figure. But regarding the Paschal Lamb, which was a figure of this sacrament, it was commanded that nothing of it should “remain until the morning.” It is improper therefore for consecrated hosts to be reserved, and not consumed at once.

Objection 12: Further, the priest addresses in the plural number those who are hearing mass, when he says, “The Lord be with you”: and, “Let us return thanks.” But it is out of keeping to address one individual in the plural number, especially an inferior. Consequently it seems unfitting for a priest to say mass with only a single server present. Therefore in the celebration of this sacrament it seems that some of the things done are out of place.

On the contrary, The custom of the Church stands for these things: and the Church cannot err, since she is taught by the Holy Ghost.

I answer that, As was said above ([4708]Q[60], A[6]), there is a twofold manner of signification in the sacraments, by words, and by actions, in order that the signification may thus be more perfect. Now, in the celebration of this sacrament words are used to signify things pertaining to Christ’s Passion, which is represented in this sacrament; or again, pertaining to Christ’s mystical body, which is signified therein; and again, things pertaining to the use of this sacrament, which use ought to be devout and reverent. Consequently, in the celebration of this mystery some things are done in order to represent Christ’s Passion, or the disposing of His mystical body, and some others are done which pertain to the devotion and reverence due to this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The washing of the hands is done in the celebration of mass out of reverence for this sacrament; and this for two reasons: first, because we are not wont to handle precious objects except the hands be washed; hence it seems indecent for anyone to approach so great a sacrament with hands that are, even literally, unclean. Secondly, on account of its signification, because, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), the washing of the extremities of the limbs denotes cleansing from even the smallest sins, according to Jn. 13:10: “He that is washed needeth not but to wash his feet.” And such cleansing is required of him who approaches this sacrament; and this is denoted by the confession which is made before the “Introit” of the mass. Moreover, this was signified by the washing of the priests under the Old Law, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). However, the Church observes this ceremony, not because it was prescribed under the Old Law, but because it is becoming in itself, and therefore instituted by the Church. Hence it is not observed in the same way as it was then: because the washing of the feet is omitted, and the washing of the hands is observed; for this can be done more readily, and suffices far denoting perfect cleansing. For, since the hand is the “organ of organs” (De Anima iii), all works are attributed to the hands: hence it is said in Ps. 25:6: “I will wash my hands among the innocent.”

Reply to Objection 2: We use incense, not as commanded by a ceremonial precept of the Law, but as prescribed by the Church; accordingly we do not use it in the same fashion as it was ordered under the Old Law. It has reference to two things: first, to the reverence due to this sacrament, i.e. in order by its good odor, to remove any disagreeable smell that may be about the place; secondly, it serves to show the effect of grace, wherewith Christ was filled as with a good odor, according to Gn. 27:27: “Behold, the odor of my son is like the odor of a ripe field”; and from Christ it spreads to the faithful by the work of His ministers, according to 2 Cor. 2:14: “He manifesteth the odor of his knowledge by us in every place”; and therefore when the altar which represents Christ, has been incensed on every side, then all are incensed in their proper order.

Reply to Objection 3: The priest, in celebrating the mass, makes use of the sign of the cross to signify Christ’s Passion which was ended upon the cross. Now, Christ’s Passion was accomplished in certain stages. First of all there was Christ’s betrayal, which was the work of God, of Judas, and of the Jews; and this is signified by the triple sign of the cross at the words, “These gifts, these presents, these holy unspotted sacrifices.”

Secondly, there was the selling of Christ. Now he was sold to the Priests, to the Scribes, and to the Pharisees: and to signify this the threefold sign of the cross is repeated, at the words, “blessed, enrolled, ratified.” Or again, to signify the price for which He was sold, viz. thirty pence. And a double cross is added at the words—“that it may become to us the Body and the Blood,” etc., to signify the person of Judas the seller, and of Christ Who was sold.

Thirdly, there was the foreshadowing of the Passion at the last supper. To denote this, in the third place, two crosses are made, one in consecrating the body, the other in consecrating the blood; each time while saying, “He blessed.”

Fourthly, there was Christ’s Passion itself. And so in order to represent His five wounds, in the fourth place, there is a fivefold signing of the cross at the words, “a pure Victim, a holy Victim, a spotless Victim, the holy bread of eternal life, and the cup of everlasting salvation.”

Fifthly, the outstretching of Christ’s body, and the shedding of the blood, and the fruits of the Passion, are signified by the triple signing of the cross at the words, “as many as shall receive the body and blood, may be filled with every blessing,” etc.

Sixthly, Christ’s threefold prayer upon the cross is represented; one for His persecutors when He said, “Father, forgive them”; the second for deliverance from death, when He cried, “My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?” the third referring to His entrance into glory, when He said, “Father, into Thy hands I commend My spirit”; and in order to denote these there is a triple signing with the cross made at the words, “Thou dost sanctify, quicken, bless.”

Seventhly, the three hours during which He hung upon the cross, that is, from the sixth to the ninth hour, are represented; in signification of which we make once more a triple sign of the cross at the words, “Through Him, and with Him, and in Him.”

Eighthly, the separation of His soul from the body is signified by the two subsequent crosses made over the chalice.

Ninthly, the resurrection on the third day is represented by the three crosses made at the words—“May the peace of the Lord be ever with you.”

In short, we may say that the consecration of this sacrament, and the acceptance of this sacrifice, and its fruits, proceed from the virtue of the cross of Christ, and therefore wherever mention is made of these, the priest makes use of the sign of the cross.

Reply to Objection 4: After the consecration, the priest makes the sign of the cross, not for the purpose of blessing and consecrating, but only for calling to mind the virtue of the cross, and the manner of Christ's suffering, as is evident from what has been said (ad 3).

Reply to Objection 5: The actions performed by the priest in mass are not ridiculous gestures, since they are done so as to represent something else. The priest in extending his arms signifies the outstretching of Christ's arms upon the cross. He also lifts up his hands as he prays, to point out that his prayer is directed to God for the people, according to Lam. 3:41: "Let us lift up our hearts with our hands to the Lord in the heavens": and Ex. 17:11: "And when Moses lifted up his hands Israel overcame." That at times he joins his hands, and bows down, praying earnestly and humbly, denotes the humility and obedience of Christ, out of which He suffered. He closes his fingers, i.e. the thumb and first finger, after the consecration, because, with them, he had touched the consecrated body of Christ; so that if any particle cling to the fingers, it may not be scattered: and this belongs to the reverence for this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 6: Five times does the priest turn round towards the people, to denote that our Lord manifested Himself five times on the day of His Resurrection, as stated above in the treatise on Christ's Resurrection ([4709]Q[55], A[3], OBJ[3]). But the priest greets the people seven times, namely, five times, by turning round to the people, and twice without turning round, namely, when he says, "The Lord be with you" before the "Preface," and again when he says, "May the peace of the Lord be ever with you": and this is to denote the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost. But a bishop, when he celebrates on festival days, in his first greeting says, "Peace be to you," which was our Lord's greeting after Resurrection, Whose person the bishop chiefly represents.

Reply to Objection 7: The breaking of the host denotes three things: first, the rending of Christ's body, which took place in the Passion; secondly, the distinction of His mystical body according to its various states; and thirdly, the distribution of the graces which flow from Christ's Passion, as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). Hence this breaking does not imply severance in Christ.

Reply to Objection 8: As Pope Sergius says, and it is to be found in the Decretals (De Consecr., dist. ii), “the Lord’s body is threefold; the part offered and put into the chalice signifies Christ’s risen body,” namely, Christ Himself, and the Blessed Virgin, and the other saints, if there be any, who are already in glory with their bodies. “The part consumed denotes those still walking upon earth,” because while living upon earth they are united together by this sacrament; and are bruised by the passions, just as the bread eaten is bruised by the teeth. “The part reserved on the altar till the close of the mass, is His body hidden in the sepulchre, because the bodies of the saints will be in their graves until the end of the world”: though their souls are either in purgatory, or in heaven. However, this rite of reserving one part on the altar till the close of the mass is no longer observed, on account of the danger; nevertheless, the same meaning of the parts continues, which some persons have expressed in verse, thus:

“The host being rent—
What is dipped, means the blest;
What is dry, means the living;
What is kept, those at rest.”

Others, however, say that the part put into the chalice denotes those still living in this world. while the part kept outside the chalice denotes those fully blessed both in soul and body; while the part consumed means the others.

Reply to Objection 9: Two things can be signified by the chalice: first, the Passion itself, which is represented in this sacrament, and according to this, by the part put into the chalice are denoted those who are still sharers of Christ’s sufferings; secondly, the enjoyment of the Blessed can be signified, which is likewise foreshadowed in this sacrament; and therefore those whose bodies are already in full beatitude, are denoted by the part put into the chalice. And it is to be observed that the part put into the chalice ought not to be given to the people to supplement the communion, because Christ gave dipped bread only to Judas the betrayer.

Reply to Objection 10: Wine, by reason of its humidity, is capable of washing, consequently it is received in order to rinse the mouth after receiving this sacrament, lest any particles remain: and this belongs to reverence for the sacrament. Hence (Extra, De Celebratione missae, chap. Ex parte), it is said: “The priest should always cleanse his mouth with wine after receiving the entire sacrament of Eucharist: except when he has to celebrate another mass on the same day, lest from taking the ablution-wine he be prevented from celebrating again”; and it is for the same reason that wine is poured over the fingers with which he had touched the body of Christ.

Reply to Objection 11: The truth ought to be conformable with the figure, in some respect: namely, because a part of the host consecrated, of which the priest and ministers or even the people communicate, ought not to be reserved until the day following. Hence, as is laid down (De Consecr., dist. ii), Pope Clement I ordered that “as many hosts are to be offered on the altar as shall suffice for the people; should any be left over, they are not to be reserved until the morrow, but let the clergy carefully consume them with fear and trembling.” Nevertheless, since this sacrament is to be received daily, whereas the Paschal Lamb was not, it is therefore necessary for other hosts to be reserved for the sick. Hence we read in the same distinction: “Let the priest always have the Eucharist ready, so that, when anyone fall sick, he may take Communion to him at once, lest he die without it.”

Reply to Objection 12: Several persons ought to be present at the solemn celebration of the mass. Hence Pope Soter says (De Consecr., dist. 1): “It has also been ordained, that no priest is to presume to celebrate solemn mass, unless two others be present answering him, while he himself makes the third; because when he says in the plural, ‘The Lord be with you,’ and again in the Secrets, ‘Pray ye for me,’ it is most becoming that they should answer his greeting.” Hence it is for the sake of greater solemnity that we find it decreed (De Consecr. dist. 1) that a bishop is to solemnize mass with several assistants. Nevertheless, in private masses it suffices to have one server, who takes the place of the whole Catholic people, on whose behalf he makes answer in the plural to the priest.

Whether the defects occurring during the celebration of this sacrament can be sufficiently met by observing the Church’s statutes?

Objection 1: It seems that the defects occurring during the celebration of this sacrament cannot be sufficiently met by observing the statutes of the Church. For it sometimes happens that before or after the consecration the priest dies or goes mad, or is hindered by some other infirmity from receiving the sacrament and completing the mass. Consequently it seems impossible to observe the Church’s statute, whereby the priest consecrating must communicate of his own sacrifice.

Objection 2: Further, it sometimes happens that, before the consecration, the priest remembers that he has eaten or drunk something, or that he is in mortal sin, or under excommunication, which he did not remember previously. Therefore, in such a dilemma a man must necessarily commit mortal sin by acting against the Church’s statute, whether he receives or not.

Objection 3: Further, it sometimes happens that a fly or a spider, or some other poisonous creature falls into the chalice after the consecration. Or even that the priest comes to know that poison has been put in by some evilly disposed person in order to kill him. Now in this instance, if he takes it, he appears to sin by killing himself, or by tempting God: also in like manner if he does not take it, he sins by acting against the Church’s statute. Consequently, he seems to be perplexed, and under necessity of sinning, which is not becoming.

Objection 4: Further, it sometimes happens from the server’s want of heed that water is not added to the chalice, or even the wine overlooked, and that the priest discovers this. Therefore he seems to be perplexed likewise in this case, whether he receives the body without the blood, thus making the sacrifice to be incomplete, or whether he receives neither the body nor the blood.

Objection 5: Further, it sometimes happens that the priest cannot remember having said the words of consecration, or other words which are uttered in the celebration of this sacrament. In this case he seems to sin, whether he repeats the words over the same matter, which words possibly he has said before, or whether he uses bread and wine which are not consecrated, as if they were consecrated.

Objection 6: Further, it sometimes comes to pass owing to the cold that the host will slip from the priest’s hands into the chalice, either before or after the breaking. In this case then the priest will not be able to comply with the Church’s rite, either as to the breaking, or else as to this, that only a third part is put into the chalice.

Objection 7: Further, sometimes, too, it happens, owing to the priest’s want of care, that Christ’s blood is spilled, or that he vomits the sacrament received, or that the consecrated hosts are kept so long that they become corrupt, or that they are nibbled by mice, or lost in any manner whatsoever; in which cases it does not seem possible for due reverence to be shown towards this sacrament, as the Church's ordinances require. It does not seem then that such defects or dangers can be met by keeping to the Church's statutes.

On the contrary, Just as God does not command an impossibility, so neither does the Church.

I answer that, Dangers or defects happening to this sacrament can be met in two ways: first, by preventing any such mishaps from occurring: secondly, by dealing with them in such a way, that what may have happened amiss is put right, either by employing a remedy, or at least by repentance on his part who has acted negligently regarding this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: If the priest be stricken by death or grave sickness before the consecration of our Lord's body and blood, there is no need for it to be completed by another. But if this happens after the consecration is begun, for instance, when the body has been consecrated and before the consecration of the blood, or even after both have been consecrated, then the celebration of the mass ought to be finished by someone else. Hence, as is laid down (Decretal vii, q. 1), we read the following decree of the (Seventh) Council of Toledo: "We consider it to be fitting that when the sacred mysteries are consecrated by priests during the time of mass, if any sickness supervenes, in consequence of which they cannot finish the mystery begun, let it be free for the bishop or another priest to finish the consecration of the office thus begun. For nothing else is suitable for completing the mysteries commenced, unless the consecration be completed either by the priest who began it, or by the one who follows him: because they cannot be completed except they be performed in perfect order. For since we are all one in Christ, the change of persons makes no difference, since unity of faith insures the happy issue of the mystery. Yet let not the course we propose for cases of natural debility, be presumptuously abused: and let no minister or priest presume ever to leave the Divine offices unfinished, unless he be absolutely prevented from continuing. If anyone shall have rashly presumed to do so, he will incur sentence of excommunication."

Reply to Objection 2: Where difficulty arises, the less dangerous course should always be followed. But the greatest danger regarding this sacrament lies in whatever may prevent its completion, because this is a heinous sacrilege; while that danger is of less account which regards the condition of the receiver. Consequently, if after the consecration has been begun the priest remembers that he has eaten or drunk anything, he ought nevertheless to complete the sacrifice and receive the sacrament. Likewise, if he recalls a sin committed, he ought to make an act of contrition, with the firm purpose of confessing and making satisfaction for it: and thus he will not receive the sacrament unworthily, but with profit. The same applies if he calls to mind that he is under some excommunication; for he ought to make the resolution of humbly seeking absolution; and so he will receive absolution from the invisible High Priest Jesus Christ for his act of completing the Divine mysteries.

But if he calls to mind any of the above facts previous to the consecration, I should deem it safer for him to interrupt the mass begun, especially if he has broken his fast, or is under excommunication, unless grave scandal were to be feared.

Reply to Objection 3: If a fly or a spider falls into the chalice before consecration, or if it be discovered that the wine is poisoned, it ought to be poured out, and after purifying the chalice, fresh wine should be served for consecration. But if anything of the sort happen after the consecration, the insect should be caught carefully and washed thoroughly, then burned, and the “ablution,” together with the ashes, thrown into the sacrarium. If it be discovered that the wine has been poisoned, the priest should neither receive it nor administer it to others on any account, lest the life-giving chalice become one of death, but it ought to be kept in a suitable vessel with the relics: and in order that the sacrament may not remain incomplete, he ought to put other wine into the chalice, resume the mass from the consecration of the blood, and complete the sacrifice.

Reply to Objection 4: If before the consecration of the blood, and after the consecration of the body the priest detect that either the wine or the water is absent, then he ought at once to add them and consecrate. But if after the words of consecration he discover that the water is absent, he ought notwithstanding to proceed straight on, because the addition of the water is not necessary for the sacrament, as stated above ([4710]Q[74], A[7]): nevertheless the person responsible for the neglect ought to be punished. And on no account should water be mixed with the consecrated wine, because corruption of the sacrament would ensue in part, as was said above ([4711]Q[77], A[8]). But if after the words of consecration the priest perceive that no wine has been put in the chalice, and if he detect it before receiving the body, then rejecting the water, he ought to pour in wine with water, and begin over again the consecrating words of the blood. But if he notice it after receiving the body, he ought to procure another host which must be consecrated together with the blood; and I say so for this reason, because if he were to say only the words of consecration of the blood, the proper order of consecrating would not be observed; and, as is laid down by the Council of Toledo, quoted above (ad 1), sacrifices cannot be perfect, except they be performed in perfect order. But if he were to begin from the consecration of the blood, and were to repeat all the words which follow, it would not suffice, unless there was a consecrated host present, since in those words there are things to be said and done not only regarding the blood, but also regarding the body; and at the close he ought once more to receive the consecrated host and blood, even if he had already taken the water which was in the chalice, because the precept of the completing this sacrament is of greater weight than the precept of receiving the sacrament while fasting, as stated above ([4712]Q[80], A[8]).

Reply to Objection 5: Although the priest may not recollect having said some of the words he ought to say, he ought not to be disturbed mentally on that account; for a man who utters many words cannot recall to mind all that he has said; unless perchance in uttering them he adverts to something connected with the consecration; for so it is impressed on the memory. Hence, if a man pays attention to what he is saying, but without adverting to the fact that he is saying these particular words, he remembers soon after that he has said them; for, a thing is presented to the memory under the formality of the past (De Mem. et Remin. i).

But if it seem to the priest that he has probably omitted some of the words that are not necessary for the sacrament, I think that he ought not to repeat them on that account, changing the order of the sacrifice, but that he ought to proceed: but if he is certain that he has left out any of those that are necessary for the sacrament, namely, the form of the consecration, since the form of the consecration is necessary for the sacrament, just as the matter is, it seems that the same thing ought to be done as was stated above (ad 4) with regard to defect in the matter, namely, that he should begin again with the form of the consecration, and repeat the other things in order, lest the order of the sacrifice be altered.

Reply to Objection 6: The breaking of the consecrated host, and the putting of only one part into the chalice, regards the mystical body, just as the mixing with water signifies the people, and therefore the omission of either of them causes no such imperfection in the sacrifice, as calls for repetition regarding the celebration of this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 7: According to the decree, De Consecr., dist. ii, quoting a decree of Pope Pius I, “If from neglect any of the blood falls upon a board which is fixed to the ground, let it be taken up with the tongue, and let the board be scraped. But if it be not a board, let the ground be scraped, and the scrapings burned, and the ashes buried inside the altar and let the priest do penance for forty days. But if a drop fall from the chalice on to the altar, let the minister suck up the drop, and do penance during three days; if it falls upon the altar cloth and penetrates to the second altar cloth, let him do four days’ penance; if it penetrates to the third, let him do nine days’ penance; if to the fourth, let him do twenty days’ penance; and let the altar linens which the drop touched be washed three times by the priest, holding the chalice below, then let the water be taken and put away nigh to the altar.” It might even be drunk by the minister, unless it might be rejected from nausea. Some persons go further, and cut out that part of the linen, which they burn, putting the ashes in the altar or down the sacrarium. And the Decretal continues with a quotation from the Penitential of Bede the Priest: “If, owing to drunkenness or gluttony, anyone vomits up the Eucharist, let him do forty days’ penance, if he be a layman; but let clerics or monks, deacons and priests, do seventy days’ penance; and let a bishop do ninety days.’ But if they vomit from sickness, let them do penance for seven days.” And in the same distinction, we read a decree of the (Fourth) Council of Arles: “They who do not keep proper custody over the sacrament, if a mouse or other animal consume it, must do forty days’ penance: he who loses it in a church, or if a part fall and be not found, shall do thirty days’ penance.” And the priest seems to deserve the same penance, who from neglect allows the hosts to putrefy. And on those days the one doing penance ought to fast, and abstain from Communion.

However, after weighing the circumstances of the fact and of the person, the said penances may be lessened or increased. But it must be observed that wherever the species are found to be entire, they must be preserved reverently, or consumed; because Christ’s body is there so long as the species last, as stated above ([4713]Q[77], AA[4],5). But if it can be done conveniently, the things in which they are found are to be burned, and the ashes put in the sacrarium, as was said of the scrapings of the altar-table, here above.

OF THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (TEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the Sacrament of Penance. We shall consider (1) Penance itself; (2) Its effect; (3) Its Parts; (4) The recipients of this sacrament; (5) The power of the ministers, which pertains to the keys; (6) The solemnization of this sacrament.

The first of these considerations will be two fold: (1) Penance as a sacrament; (2) Penance as a virtue.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Penance is a sacrament?

(2) Of its proper matter;

(3) Of its form;

(4) Whether imposition of hands is necessary for this sacrament?

(5) Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation?

(6) Of its relation to the other sacraments;

(7) Of its institution;

(8) Of its duration;

(9) Of its continuance;

(10) Whether it can be repeated?

Whether Penance is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that Penance is not a sacrament. For Gregory [*Cf. Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19] says: “The sacraments are Baptism, Chrism, and the Body and Blood of Christ; which are called sacraments because under the veil of corporeal things the Divine power works out salvation in a hidden manner.” But this does not happen in Penance, because therein corporeal things are not employed that, under them, the power of God may work our salvation. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the Church are shown forth by the ministers of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 4:1: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God.” But Penance is not conferred by the ministers of Christ, but is inspired inwardly into man by God, according to Jer. 31:19: “After Thou didst convert me, I did penance.” Therefore it seems that Penance is not a sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, in the sacraments of which we have already spoken above, there is something that is sacrament only, something that is both reality and sacrament, and something that is reality only, as is clear from what has been stated ([4714]Q[66], A[1]). But this does not apply to Penance. Therefore Penance is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, As Baptism is conferred that we may be cleansed from sin, so also is Penance: wherefore Peter said to Simon Magus (Acts 8:22): “Do penance . . . from this thy wickedness.” But Baptism is a sacrament as stated above ([4715]Q[66], A[1]). Therefore for the same reason Penance is also a sacrament.

I answer that, As Gregory says [*Isidore, Etym. vi, ch. 19], “a sacrament consists in a solemn act, whereby something is so done that we understand it to signify the holiness which it confers.” Now it is evident that in Penance something is done so that something holy is signified both on the part of the penitent sinner, and on the part of the priest absolving, because the penitent sinner, by deed and word, shows his heart to have renounced sin, and in like manner the priest, by his deed and word with regard to the penitent, signifies the work of God Who forgives his sins. Therefore it is evident that Penance, as practiced in the Church, is a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: By corporeal things taken in a wide sense we may understand also external sensible actions, which are to this sacrament what water is to Baptism, or chrism to Confirmation. But it is to be observed that in those sacraments, whereby an exceptional grace surpassing altogether the proportion of a human act, is conferred, some corporeal matter is employed externally, e.g. in Baptism, which confers full remission of all sins, both as to guilt and as to punishment, and in Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is bestowed, and in Extreme Unction, which confers perfect spiritual health derived from the virtue of Christ as from an extrinsic principle. Wherefore, such human acts as are in these sacraments, are not the essential matter of the sacrament, but are dispositions thereto. On the other hand, in those sacraments whose effect corresponds to that of some human act, the sensible human act itself takes the place of matter, as in the case of Penance and Matrimony, even as in bodily medicines, some are applied externally, such as plasters and drugs, while others are acts of the person who seeks to be cured, such as certain exercises.

Reply to Objection 2: In those sacraments which have a corporeal matter, this matter needs to be applied by a minister of the Church, who stands in the place of Christ, which denotes that the excellence of the power which operates in the sacraments is from Christ. But in the sacrament of Penance, as stated above (ad 1), human actions take the place of matter, and these actions proceed from internal inspiration, wherefore the matter is not applied by the minister, but by God working inwardly; while the minister furnishes the complement of the sacrament, when he absolves the penitent.

Reply to Objection 3: In Penance also, there is something which is sacrament only, viz. the acts performed outwardly both by the repentant sinner, and by the priest in giving absolution; that which is reality and sacrament is the sinner’s inward repentance; while that which is reality, and not sacrament, is the forgiveness of sin. The first of these taken altogether is the cause of the second; and the first and second together are the cause of the third.

Whether sins are the proper matter of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins are not the proper matter of this sacrament. Because, in the other sacraments, the matter is hallowed by the utterance of certain words, and being thus hallowed produces the sacramental effect. Now sins cannot be hallowed, for they are opposed to the effect of the sacrament, viz. grace which blots out sin. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says in his book De Poenitentia [Cf. Serm. cccli]: “No one can begin a new life, unless he repent of the old.” Now not only sins but also the penalties of the present life belong to the old life. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance.

Objection 3: Further, sin is either original, mortal or venial. Now the sacrament of Penance is not ordained against original sin, for this is taken away by Baptism, [nor against mortal sin, for this is taken away by the sinner’s confession]*, nor against venial sin, which is taken away by the beating of the breast and the sprinkling of holy water and the like. Therefore sins are not the proper matter of Penance. [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition].

On the contrary, The Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:21): “(Who) have not done penance for the uncleanness and fornication and lasciviousness, that they have committed.”

I answer that, Matter is twofold, viz. proximate and remote: thus the proximate matter of a statue is a metal, while the remote matter is water. Now it has been stated (A[1], ad 1, ad 2), that the proximate matter of this sacrament consists in the acts of the penitent, the matter of which acts are the sins over which he grieves, which he confesses, and for which he satisfies. Hence it follows that sins are the remote matter of Penance, as a matter, not for approval, but for detestation, and destruction.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers the proximate matter of a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: The old life that was subject to death is the object of Penance, not as regards the punishment, but as regards the guilt connected with it.

Reply to Objection 3: Penance regards every kind of sin in a way, but not each in the same way. Because Penance regards actual mortal sin properly and chiefly; properly, since, properly speaking, we are said to repent of what we have done of our own will; chiefly, since this sacrament was instituted chiefly for the blotting out of mortal sin. Penance regards venial sins, properly speaking indeed, in so far as they are committed of our own will, but this was not the chief purpose of its institution. But as to original sin, Penance regards it neither chiefly, since Baptism, and not Penance, is ordained against original sin, nor properly, because original sin is not done of our own will, except in so far as Adam’s will is looked upon as ours, in which sense the Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): “In whom all have sinned.” Nevertheless, Penance may be said to regard original sin, if we take it in a wide sense for any detestation of something past: in which sense Augustine uses the term in his book De Poenitentia (Serm. cccli).

Whether the form of this sacrament is: “I absolve thee”?

Objection 1: It would seem that the form of this sacrament is not: “I absolve thee.” Because the forms of the sacraments are received from Christ’s institution and the Church’s custom. But we do not read that Christ instituted this form. Nor is it in common use; in fact in certain absolutions which are given publicly in church (e.g. at Prime and Compline and on Maundy Thursday), absolution is given not in the indicative form by saying: “I absolve thee,” but In the deprecatory form, by saying: “May Almighty God have mercy on you,” or: “May Almighty God grant you absolution and forgiveness.” Therefore the form of this sacrament is not: “I absolve thee.”

Objection 2: Further, Pope Leo says (Ep. cviii) that God’s forgiveness cannot be obtained without the priestly supplications: and he is speaking there of God’s forgiveness granted to the penitent. Therefore the form of this sacrament should be deprecatory.

Objection 3: Further, to absolve from sin is the same as to remit sin. But God alone remits sin, for He alone cleanses man inwardly from sin, as Augustine says (Contra Donatist. v, 21). Therefore it seems that God alone absolves from sin. Therefore the priest should say not: “I absolve thee,” as neither does he say: “I remit thy sins.”

Objection 4: Further, just as our Lord gave His disciples the power to absolve from sins, so also did He give them the power “to heal infirmities,” “to cast out devils,” and “to cure diseases” (Mat. 10:1; Lk. 9:1). Now the apostles, in healing the sick, did not use the words: “I heal thee,” but: “The Lord Jesus Christ heal [Vulg.: ‘heals’] thee,” as Peter said to the palsied man (Acts 9:34). Therefore since priests have the power which Christ gave His apostles, it seems that they should not use the form: “I absolve thee,” but: “May Christ absolve thee.”

Objection 5: Further, some explain this form by stating that when they say: “I absolve thee,” they mean “I declare you to be absolved.” But neither can this be done by a priest unless it be revealed to him by God, wherefore, as we read in Mat. 16:19 before it was said to Peter: “Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth,” etc., it was said to him (Mat. 16:17): “Blessed art thou Simon Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood have not revealed it to thee, but My Father Who is in heaven.” Therefore it seems presumptuous for a priest, who has received no revelation on the matter, to say: “I absolve thee,” even if this be explained to mean: “I declare thee absolved.”

On the contrary, As our Lord said to His disciples (Mat. 28:19): “Going . . . teach ye all nations, baptizing them,” etc., so did He say to Peter (Mat. 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc. Now the priest, relying on the authority of those words of Christ, says: “I baptize thee.” Therefore on the same authority he should say in this sacrament: “I absolve thee.”

I answer that, The perfection of a thing is ascribed to its form. Now it has been stated above (A[1], ad 2) that this sacrament is perfected by that which is done by the priest. Wherefore the part taken by the penitent, whether it consist of words or deeds, must needs be the matter of this sacrament, while the part taken by the priest, takes the place of the form.

Now since the sacraments of the New Law accomplish what they signify, as stated above ([4716]Q[62], A[1], ad 1), it behooves the sacramental form to signify the sacramental effect in a manner that is in keeping with the matter. Hence the form of Baptism is: “I baptize thee,” and the form of Confirmation is: “I sign thee with the sign of the cross, and I confirm thee with the chrism of salvation,” because these sacraments are perfected in the use of their matter: while in the sacrament of the Eucharist, which consists in the very consecration of the matter, the reality of the consecration is expressed in the words: “This is My Body.”

Now this sacrament, namely the sacrament of Penance, consists not in the consecration of a matter, nor in the use of a hallowed matter, but rather in the removal of a certain matter, viz. sin, in so far as sins are said to be the matter of Penance, as explained above [4717](A[2]). This removal is expressed by the priest saying: “I absolve thee”: because sins are fetters, according to Prov. 5:22. “His own iniquities catch the wicked, and he is fast bound with the ropes of his own sins.” Wherefore it is evident that this is the most fitting form of this sacrament: “I absolve thee.”

Reply to Objection 1: This form is taken from Christ’s very words which He addressed to Peter (Mat. 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., and such is the form employed by the Church in sacramental absolution. But such absolutions as are given in public are not sacramental, but are prayers for the remission of venial sins. Wherefore in giving sacramental absolution it would not suffice to say: “May Almighty God have mercy on thee,” or: “May God grant thee absolution and forgiveness,” because by such words the priest does not signify the giving of absolution, but prays that it may be given. Nevertheless the above prayer is said before the sacramental absolution is given, lest the sacramental effect be hindered on the part of the penitent, whose acts are as matter in this sacrament, but not in Baptism or Confirmation.

Reply to Objection 2: The words of Leo are to be understood of the prayer that precedes the absolution, and do not exclude the fact that the priest pronounces absolution.

Reply to Objection 3: God alone absolves from sin and forgives sins authoritatively; yet priests do both ministerially, because the words of the priest in this sacrament work as instruments of the Divine power, as in the other sacraments: because it is the Divine power that works inwardly in all the sacramental signs, be they things or words, as shown above ([4718]Q[62], A[4];[4719] Q[64], AA[1],2). Wherefore our Lord expressed both: for He said to Peter (Mat. 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., and to His disciples (Jn. 20:23): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Yet the priest says: “I absolve thee,” rather than: “I forgive thee thy sins,” because it is more in keeping with the words of our Lord, by expressing the power of the keys whereby priests absolve. Nevertheless, since the priest absolves ministerially, something is suitably added in reference to the supreme authority of God, by the priest saying: “I absolve thee in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost,” or by the power of Christ’s Passion, or by the authority of God. However, as this is not defined by the words of Christ, as it is for Baptism, this addition is left to the discretion of the priest.

Reply to Objection 4: Power was given to the apostles, not that they themselves might heal the sick, but that the sick might be healed at the prayer of the apostles: whereas power was given to them to work instrumentally or ministerially in the sacraments; wherefore they could express their own agency in the sacramental forms rather than in the healing of infirmities. Nevertheless in the latter case they did not always use the deprecatory form, but sometimes employed the indicative or imperative: thus we read (Acts 3:6) that Peter said to the lame man: “What I have, I give thee: In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, arise and walk.”

Reply to Objection 5: It is true in a sense that the words, “I absolve thee” mean “I declare thee absolved,” but this explanation is incomplete. Because the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but effect what they signify. Wherefore, just as the priest in baptizing anyone, declares by deed and word that the person is washed inwardly, and this not only significatively but also effectively, so also when he says: “I absolve thee,” he declares the man to be absolved not only significatively but also effectively. And yet he does not speak as of something uncertain, because just as the other sacraments of the New Law have, of themselves, a sure effect through the power of Christ’s Passion, which effect, nevertheless, may be impeded on the part of the recipient, so is it with this sacrament. Hence Augustine says (De Adult. Conjug. ii): “There is nothing disgraceful or onerous in the reconciliation of husband and wife, when adultery committed has been washed away, since there is no doubt that remission of sins is granted through the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” Consequently there is no need for a special revelation to be made to the priest, but the general revelation of faith suffices, through which sins are forgiven. Hence the revelation of faith is said to have been made to Peter.

It would be a more complete explanation to say that the words, “I absolve thee” mean: “I grant thee the sacrament of absolution.”

Whether the imposition of the priest’s hands is necessary for this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that the imposition of the priest’s hands is necessary for this sacrament. For it is written (Mk. 16:18): “They shall lay hands upon the sick, and they shall recover.” Now sinners are sick spiritually, and obtain recovery through this sacrament. Therefore an imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, in this sacrament man regains the Holy Ghost Whom he had lost, wherefore it is said in the person of the penitent (Ps. 1:14): “Restore unto me the joy of Thy salvation, and strengthen me with a perfect spirit.” Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands; for we read (Acts 8:17) that the apostles “laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost”; and (Mat. 19:13) that “little children were presented” to our Lord, “that He should impose hands upon them.” Therefore an imposition of hands should be made in this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, the priest’s words are not more efficacious in this than in the other sacraments. But in the other sacraments the words of the minister do not suffice, unless he perform some action: thus, in Baptism, the priest while saying: “I baptize thee,” has to perform a bodily washing. Therefore, also while saying: “I absolve thee,” the priest should perform some action in regard to the penitent, by laying hands on him.

On the contrary, When our Lord said to Peter (Mat. 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth,” etc., He made no mention of an imposition of hands; nor did He when He said to all the apostles (Jn. 20:13): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Therefore no imposition of hands is required for this sacrament.

I answer that, In the sacraments of the Church the imposition of hands is made, to signify some abundant effect of grace, through those on whom the hands are laid being, as it were, united to the ministers in whom grace should be plentiful. Wherefore an imposition of hands is made in the sacrament of Confirmation, wherein the fulness of the Holy Ghost is conferred; and in the sacrament of order, wherein is bestowed a certain excellence of power over the Divine mysteries; hence it is written (2 Tim. 1:6): “Stir up the grace of God which is in thee, by the imposition of my hands.”

Now the sacrament of Penance is ordained, not that man may receive some abundance of grace, but that his sins may be taken away; and therefore no imposition of hands is required for this sacrament, as neither is there for Baptism, wherein nevertheless a fuller remission of sins is bestowed.

Reply to Objection 1: That imposition of hands is not sacramental, but is intended for the working of miracles, namely, that by the contact of a sanctified man’s hand, even bodily infirmity might be removed; even as we read of our Lord (Mk. 6:5) that He cured the sick, “laying His hands upon them,” and (Mat. 8:3) that He cleansed a leper by touching him.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not every reception of the Holy Ghost that requires an imposition of hands, since even in Baptism man receives the Holy Ghost, without any imposition of hands: it is at the reception of the fulness of the Holy Ghost which belongs to Confirmation that an imposition of hands is required.

Reply to Objection 3: In those sacraments which are perfected in the use of the matter, the minister has to perform some bodily action on the recipient of the sacrament, e.g. in Baptism, Confirmation, and Extreme Unction; whereas this sacrament does not consist in the use of matter employed outwardly, the matter being supplied by the part taken by the penitent: wherefore, just as in the Eucharist the priest perfects the sacrament by merely pronouncing the words over the matter, so the mere words which the priest while absolving pronounces over the penitent perfect the sacrament of absolution. If, indeed, any bodily act were necessary on the part of the priest, the sign of the cross, which is employed in the Eucharist, would not be less becoming than the imposition of hands, in token that sins are forgiven through the blood of Christ crucified; and yet this is not essential to this sacrament as neither is it to the Eucharist.

Whether this sacrament is necessary for salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament is not necessary for salvation. Because on Ps. 125:5, “They that sow in tears,” etc., the gloss says: “Be not sorrowful, if thou hast a good will, of which peace is the meed.” But sorrow is essential to Penance, according to 2 Cor. 7:10: “The sorrow that is according to God worketh penance steadfast unto salvation.” Therefore a good will without Penance suffices for salvation.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Prov. 10:12): “Charity covereth all sins,” and further on (Prov. 15:27): “By mercy and faith sins are purged away.” But this sacrament is for nothing else but the purging of sins. Therefore if one has charity, faith, and mercy, one can obtain salvation, without the sacrament of Penance.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments of the Church take their origin from the institution of Christ. But according to Jn. 8 Christ absolved the adulterous woman without Penance. Therefore it seems that Penance is not necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 13:3): “Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish.”

I answer that, A thing is necessary for salvation in two ways: first, absolutely; secondly, on a supposition. A thing is absolutely necessary for salvation, if no one can obtain salvation without it, as, for example, the grace of Christ, and the sacrament of Baptism, whereby a man is born again in Christ. The sacrament of Penance is necessary on a supposition, for it is necessary, not for all, but for those who are in sin. For it is written (2 Paral 37 [*The prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha]), “Thou, Lord, God of the righteous, hast not appointed repentance to the righteous, to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, nor to those who sinned not against Thee.” But “sin, when it is completed, begetteth death” (James 1:15). Consequently it is necessary for the sinner’s salvation that sin be taken away from him; which cannot be done without the sacrament of Penance, wherein the power of Christ’s Passion operates through the priest’s absolution and the acts of the penitent, who co-operates with grace unto the destruction of his sin. For as Augustine says (Tract. lxxii in Joan. [*Implicitly in the passage referred to, but explicitly Serm. xv de verb Apost.]), “He Who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee.” Therefore it is evident that after sin the sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation, even as bodily medicine after man has contracted a dangerous disease.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss should apparently be understood as referring to the man who has a good will unimpaired by sin, for such a man has no cause for sorrow: but as soon as the good will is forfeited through sin, it cannot be restored without that sorrow whereby a man sorrows for his past sin, and which belongs to Penance.

Reply to Objection 2: As soon as a man falls into sin, charity, faith, and mercy do not deliver him from sin, without Penance. Because charity demands that a man should grieve for the offense committed against his friend, and that he should be anxious to make satisfaction to his friend; faith requires that he should seek to be justified from his sins through the power of Christ’s Passion which operates in the sacraments of the Church; and well-ordered pity necessitates that man should succor himself by repenting of the pitiful condition into which sin has brought him, according to Prov. 14:34: “Sin maketh nations miserable”; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): “Have pity on thy own soul, pleasing God.”

Reply to Objection 3: It was due to His power of “excellence,” which He alone had, as stated above ([4720]Q[64], A[3]), that Christ bestowed on the adulterous woman the effect of the sacrament of Penance, viz. the forgiveness of sins, without the sacrament of Penance, although not without internal repentance, which He operated in her by grace.

Whether Penance is a second plank after shipwreck?

Objection 1: It would seem that Penance is not a second plank after shipwreck. Because on Is. 3:9, “They have proclaimed abroad their sin as Sodom,” a gloss says: “The second plank after shipwreck is to hide one’s sins.” Now Penance does not hide sins, but reveals them. Therefore Penance is not a second plank.

Objection 2: Further, in a building the foundation takes the first, not the second place. Now in the spiritual edifice, Penance is the foundation, according to Heb. 6:1: “Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works”; wherefore it precedes even Baptism, according to Acts 2:38: “Do penance, and be baptized every one of you.” Therefore Penance should not be called a second plank.

Objection 3: Further, all the sacraments are planks, i.e. helps against sin. Now Penance holds, not the second but the fourth, place among the sacraments, as is clear from what has been said above ([4721]Q[65], AA[1],2). Therefore Penance should not be called a second plank after shipwreck.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. cxxx) that “Penance is a second plank after shipwreck.”

I answer that, That which is of itself precedes naturally that which is accidental, as substance precedes accident. Now some sacraments are, of themselves, ordained to man’s salvation, e.g. Baptism, which is the spiritual birth, Confirmation which is the spiritual growth, the Eucharist which is the spiritual food; whereas Penance is ordained to man’s salvation accidentally as it were, and on something being supposed, viz. sin: for unless man were to sin actually, he would not stand in need of Penance and yet he would need Baptism, Confirmation, and the Eucharist; even as in the life of the body, man would need no medical treatment, unless he were ill, and yet life, birth, growth, and food are, of themselves, necessary to man.

Consequently Penance holds the second place with regard to the state of integrity which is bestowed and safeguarded by the aforesaid sacraments, so that it is called metaphorically “a second plank after shipwreck.” For just as the first help for those who cross the sea is to be safeguarded in a whole ship, while the second help when the ship is wrecked, is to cling to a plank; so too the first help in this life’s ocean is that man safeguard his integrity, while the second help is, if he lose his integrity through sin, that he regain it by means of Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: To hide one’s sins may happen in two ways: first, in the very act of sinning. Now it is worse to sin in public than in private, both because a public sinner seems to sin more from contempt, and because by sinning he gives scandal to others. Consequently in sin it is a kind of remedy to sin secretly, and it is in this sense that the gloss says that “to hide one’s sins is a second plank after shipwreck”; not that it takes away sin, as Penance does, but because it makes the sin less grievous. Secondly, one hides one’s sin previously committed, by neglecting to confess it: this is opposed to Penance, and to hide one’s sins thus is not a second plank, but is the reverse, since it is written (Prov. 28:13): “He that hideth his sins shall not prosper.”

Reply to Objection 2: Penance cannot be called the foundation of the spiritual edifice simply, i.e. in the first building thereof; but it is the foundation in the second building which is accomplished by destroying sin, because man, on his return to God, needs Penance first. However, the Apostle is speaking there of the foundation of spiritual doctrine. Moreover, the penance which precedes Baptism is not the sacrament of Penance.

Reply to Objection 3: The three sacraments which precede Penance refer to the ship in its integrity, i.e. to man’s state of integrity, with regard to which Penance is called a second plank.

Whether this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament was unsuitably instituted in the New Law. Because those things which belong to the natural law need not to be instituted. Now it belongs to the natural law that one should repent of the evil one has done: for it is impossible to love good without grieving for its contrary. Therefore Penance was unsuitably instituted in the New Law.

Objection 2: Further, that which existed in the Old Law had not to be instituted in the New. Now there was Penance in the old Law wherefore the Lord complains (Jer. 8:6) saying: “There is none that doth penance for his sin, saying: What have I done?” Therefore Penance should not have been instituted in the New Law.

Objection 3: Further, Penance comes after Baptism, since it is a second plank, as stated above [4722](A[6]). Now it seems that our Lord instituted Penance before Baptism, because we read that at the beginning of His preaching He said (Mat. 4:17): “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Therefore this sacrament was not suitably instituted in the New Law.

Objection 4: Further, the sacraments of the New Law were instituted by Christ, by Whose power they work, as stated above ([4723]Q[62], A[5]; [4724] Q[64], A[1]). But Christ does not seem to have instituted this sacrament, since He made no use of it, as of the other sacraments which He instituted. Therefore this sacrament was unsuitably instituted in the New Law.

On the contrary, our Lord said (Lk. 24:46,47): “It behooved Christ to suffer, and to rise again from the dead the third day: and that penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations.”

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 1, ad 2), in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are as matter, while the part taken by the priest, who works as Christ’s minister, is the formal and completive element of the sacrament. Now in the other sacraments the matter pre-exists, being provided by nature, as water, or by art, as bread: but that such and such a matter be employed for a sacrament requires to be decided by the institution; while the sacrament derives its form and power entirely from the institution of Christ, from Whose Passion the power of the sacraments proceeds.

Accordingly the matter of this sacrament pre-exists, being provided by nature; since it is by a natural principle of reason that man is moved to repent of the evil he has done: yet it is due to Divine institution that man does penance in this or that way. Wherefore at the outset of His preaching, our Lord admonished men, not only to repent, but also to “do penance,” thus pointing to the particular manner of actions required for this sacrament. As to the part to be taken by the ministers, this was fixed by our Lord when

He said to Peter (Mat. 16:19): “To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven,” etc.; but it was after His resurrection that He made known the efficacy of this sacrament and the source of its power, when He said (Lk. 24:47) that “penance and remission of sins should be preached in His name unto all nations,” after speaking of His Passion and resurrection. Because it is from the power of the name of Jesus Christ suffering and rising again that this sacrament is efficacious unto the remission of sins.

It is therefore evident that this sacrament was suitably instituted in the New Law.

Reply to Objection 1: It is a natural law that one should repent of the evil one has done, by grieving for having done it, and by seeking a remedy for one’s grief in some way or other, and also that one should show some signs of grief, even as the Ninevites did, as we read in Jn. 3. And yet even in their case there was also something of faith which they had received through Jonas’ preaching, inasmuch as they did these things in the hope that they would receive pardon from God, according as we read (Jn. 3:9): “Who can tell if God will turn and forgive, and will turn away from His fierce anger, and we shall not perish?” But just as other matters which are of the natural law were fixed in detail by the institution of the Divine law, as we have stated in the [4725]FS, Q[91], A[4]; [4726]FS, Q[95], A[2]; FS, Q[99], so was it with Penance.

Reply to Objection 2: Things which are of the natural law were determined in various ways in the old and in the New Law, in keeping with the imperfection of the old, and the perfection of the New. Wherefore Penance was fixed in a certain way in the Old Law—with regard to sorrow, that it should be in the heart rather than in external signs, according to Joel 2:13: “Rend your hearts and not your garments”; and with regard to seeking a remedy for sorrow, that they should in some way confess their sins, at least in general, to God’s ministers. Wherefore the Lord said (Lev. 5:17,18): “If anyone sin through ignorance . . . he shall offer of the flocks a ram without blemish to the priest, according to the measure and estimation of the sin, and the priest shall pray for him, because he did it ignorantly, and it shall be forgiven him”; since by the very fact of making an offering for his sin, a man, in a fashion, confessed his sin to the priest. And accordingly it is written (Prov. 28:13): “He that hideth his sins, shall not prosper: but he that shall confess, and forsake them, shall obtain mercy.” Not yet, however, was the power of the keys instituted, which is derived from Christ’s Passion, and consequently it was not yet ordained that a man should grieve for his sin, with the purpose of submitting himself by confession and satisfaction to the keys of the Church, in the hope of receiving forgiveness through the power of Christ’s Passion.

Reply to Objection 3: If we note carefully what our Lord said about the necessity of Baptism (Jn. 3:3, seqq.), we shall see that this was said before His words about the necessity of Penance (Mat. 4:17); because He spoke to Nicodemus about Baptism before the imprisonment of John, of whom it is related afterwards (Jn. 3:23, 24) that he baptized, whereas His words about Penance were said after John was cast into prison.

If, however, He had admonished men to do penance before admonishing them to be baptized, this would be because also before Baptism some kind of penance is required, according to the words of Peter (Acts 2:38): “Do penance, and be baptized, every one of you.”

Reply to Objection 4: Christ did not use the Baptism which He instituted, but was baptized with the baptism of John, as stated above ([4727]Q[39], AA[1],2). Nor did He use it actively by administering it Himself, because He “did not baptize” as a rule, “but His disciples” did, as related in Jn. 4:2, although it is to be believed that He baptized His disciples, as Augustine asserts (Ep. cclxv, ad Seleuc.). But with regard to His institution of this sacrament it was nowise fitting that He should use it, neither by repenting Himself, in Whom there was no sin, nor by administering the sacrament to others, since, in order to show His mercy and power, He was wont to confer the effect of this sacrament without the sacrament itself, as stated above (A[5], ad 3). On the other hand, He both received and gave to others the sacrament of the Eucharist, both in order to commend the excellence of that sacrament, and because that sacrament is a memorial of His Passion, in which Christ is both priest and victim.

Whether Penance should last till the end of life?

Objection 1: It would seem that Penance should not last till the end of life. Because Penance is ordained for the blotting out of sin. Now the penitent receives forgiveness of his sins at once, according to Ezech. 18:21: “If the wicked do penance for all his sins which he hath committed . . . he shall live and shall not die.” Therefore there is no need for Penance to be further prolonged.

Objection 2: Further, Penance belongs to the state of beginners. But man ought to advance from that state to the state of the proficient, and, from this, on to the state of the perfect. Therefore man need not do Penance till the end of his life.

Objection 3: Further, man is bound to observe the laws of the Church in this as in the other sacraments. But the duration of repentance is fixed by the canons, so that, to wit, for such and such a sin one is bound to do penance for so many years. Therefore it seems that Penance should not be prolonged till the end of life.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book, De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “What remains for us to do, save to sorrow ever in this life? For when sorrow ceases, repentance fails; and if repentance fails, what becomes of pardon?”

I answer that, Penance is twofold, internal and external. Internal penance is that whereby one grieves for a sin one has committed, and this penance should last until the end of life. Because man should always be displeased at having sinned, for if he were to be pleased thereat, he would for this very reason fall into sin and lose the fruit of pardon. Now displeasure causes sorrow in one who is susceptible to sorrow, as man is in this life; but after this life the saints are not susceptible to sorrow, wherefore they will be displeased at, without sorrowing for, their past sins, according to Is. 65:16. “The former distresses are forgotten.”

External penance is that whereby a man shows external signs of sorrow, confesses his sins verbally to the priest who absolves him, and makes satisfaction for his sins according to the judgment of the priest. Such penance need not last until the end of life, but only for a fixed time according to the measure of the sin.

Reply to Objection 1: True penance not only removes past sins, but also preserves man from future sins. Consequently, although a man receives forgiveness of past sins in the first instant of his true penance, nevertheless he must persevere in his penance, lest he fall again into sin.

Reply to Objection 2: To do penance both internal and external belongs to the state of beginners, of those, to wit, who are making a fresh start from the state of sin. But there is room for internal penance even in the proficient and the perfect, according to Ps. 83:7: “In his heart he hath disposed to ascend by steps, in the vale of tears.” Wherefore Paul says (1 Cor. 15:9): “I . . . am not worthy to be called an apostle because I persecuted the Church of God.”

Reply to Objection 3: These durations of time are fixed for penitents as regards the exercise of external penance.

Whether Penance can be continuous?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be continuous. For it is written (Jer. 31:16): “Let thy voice cease from weeping, and thy eyes from tears.” But this would be impossible if penance were continuous, for it consists in weeping and tears. Therefore penance cannot be continuous.

Objection 2: Further, man ought to rejoice at every good work, according to Ps. 99:1: “Serve ye the Lord with gladness.” Now to do penance is a good work. Therefore man should rejoice at it. But man cannot rejoice and grieve at the same time, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore a penitent cannot grieve continually for his past sins, which is essential to penance. Therefore penance cannot be continuous.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (2 Cor. 2:7): “Comfort him,” viz. the penitent, “lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” But comfort dispels grief, which is essential to penance. Therefore penance need not be continuous.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on Penance [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “In doing penance grief should be continual.”

I answer that, One is said to repent in two ways, actually and habitually. It is impossible for a man continually to repent actually. for the acts, whether internal or external, of a penitent must needs be interrupted by sleep and other things which the body needs. Secondly, a man is said to repent habitually. and thus he should repent continually, both by never doing anything contrary to penance, so as to destroy the habitual disposition of the penitent, and by being resolved that his past sins should always be displeasing to him.

Reply to Objection 1: Weeping and tears belong to the act of external penance, and this act needs neither to be continuous, nor to last until the end of life, as stated above [4728](A[8]): wherefore it is significantly added: “For there is a reward for thy work.” Now the reward of the penitent’s work is the full remission of sin both as to guilt and as to punishment; and after receiving this reward there is no need for man to proceed to acts of external penance. This, however, does not prevent penance being continual, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Of sorrow and joy we may speak in two ways: first, as being passions of the sensitive appetite; and thus they can no. wise be together, since they are altogether contrary to one another, either on the part of the object (as when they have the same object), or at least on the part of the movement, for joy is with expansion [*Cf. [4729]FS, Q[33], A[1]] of the heart, whereas sorrow is with contraction; and it is in this sense that the Philosopher speaks in Ethic. ix. Secondly, we may speak of joy and sorrow as being simple acts of the will, to which something is pleasing or displeasing. Accordingly, they cannot be contrary to one another, except on the part of the object, as when they concern the same object in the same respect, in which way joy and sorrow cannot be simultaneous, because the same thing in the same respect cannot be pleasing and displeasing. If, on the other hand, joy and sorrow, understood thus, be not of the same object in the same respect, but either of different objects, or of the same object in different respects, in that case joy and sorrow are not contrary to one another, so that nothing hinders a man from being joyful and sorrowful at the same time—for instance, if we see a good man suffer, we both rejoice at his goodness and at the same time grieve for his suffering. In this way a man may be displeased at having sinned, and be pleased at his displeasure together with his hope for pardon, so that his very sorrow is a matter of joy. Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “The penitent should ever grieve and rejoice at his grief.”

If, however, sorrow were altogether incompatible with joy, this would prevent the continuance, not of habitual penance, but only of actual penance.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3,6,7,9) it belongs to virtue to establish the mean in the passions. Now the sorrow which, in the sensitive appetite of the penitent, arises from the displeasure of his will, is a passion; wherefore it should be moderated according to virtue, and if it be excessive it is sinful, because it leads to despair, as the Apostle teaches (2 Cor. 2:7), saying: “Lest such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.” Accordingly comfort, of which the Apostle speaks, moderates sorrow but does not destroy it altogether.

Whether the sacrament of Penance may be repeated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sacrament of Penance should not be repeated. For the Apostle says (Heb. 6:4, seqq.): “It is impossible for those, who were once illuminated, have tasted also the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost . . . and are fallen away, to be renewed again to penance.” Now whosoever have done penance, have been illuminated, and have received the gift of the Holy Ghost. Therefore whosoever sin after doing penance, cannot do penance again.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii): “Some are to be found who think they ought often to do penance, who take liberties with Christ: for if they were truly penitent, they would not think of doing penance over again, since there is but one Penance even as there is but one Baptism.” Now Baptism is not repeated. Neither, therefore, is Penance to be repeated.

Objection 3: Further, the miracles whereby our Lord healed bodily diseases, signify the healing of spiritual diseases, whereby men are delivered from sins. Now we do not read that our Lord restored the sight to any blind man twice, or that He cleansed any leper twice, or twice raised any dead man to life. Therefore it seems that He does not twice grant pardon to any sinner.

Objection 4: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): “Penance consists in deploring past sins, and in not committing again those we have deplored”: and Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii): “He is a mocker and no penitent who still does what he has repented of.” If, therefore, a man is truly penitent, he will not sin again. Therefore Penance cannot be repeated.

Objection 5: Further, just as Baptism derives its efficacy from the Passion of Christ, so does Penance. Now Baptism is not repeated, on account of the unity of Christ’s Passion and death. Therefore in like manner Penance is not repeated.

Objection 6: Further, Ambrose says on Ps. 118:58, “I entreated Thy face,” etc., that “facility of obtaining pardon is an incentive to sin.” If, therefore, God frequently grants pardon through Penance, it seems that He affords man an incentive to sin, and thus He seems to take pleasure in sin, which is contrary to His goodness. Therefore Penance cannot be repeated.

On the contrary, Man is induced to be merciful by the example of Divine mercy, according to Lk. 6:36: “Be ye . . . merciful, as your Father also is merciful.” Now our Lord commanded His disciples to be merciful by frequently pardoning their brethren who had sinned against them; wherefore, as related in Mat. 18:21, when Peter asked: “How often shall my brother off end against me, and I forgive him? till seven times?” Jesus answered: “I say not to thee, till seven times, but till seventy times seven times.” Therefore also God over and over again, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners, especially as He teaches us to pray (Mat. 6:12): “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass against us.”

I answer that, As regards Penance, some have erred, saying that a man cannot obtain pardon of his sins through Penance a second time. Some of these, viz. the Novatians, went so far as to say that he who sins after the first Penance which is done in Baptism, cannot be restored again through Penance. There were also other heretics who, as Augustine relates in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], said that, after Baptism, Penance is useful, not many times, but only once.

These errors seem to have arisen from a twofold source: first from not knowing the nature of true Penance. For since true Penance requires charity, without which sins are not taken away, they thought that charity once possessed could not be lost, and that, consequently, Penance, if true, could never be removed by sin, so that it should be necessary to repeat it. But this was refuted in the [4730]SS, Q[24], A[11], where it was shown that on account of free-will charity, once possessed, can be lost, and that, consequently, after true Penance, a man can sin mortally. Secondly, they erred in their estimation of the gravity of sin. For they deemed a sin committed by a man after he had received pardon, to be so grave that it could not be forgiven. In this they erred not only with regard to sin which, even after a sin has been forgiven, can be either more or less grievous than the first, which was forgiven, but much more did they err against the infinity of Divine mercy, which surpasses any number and magnitude of sins, according to Ps. 50:1,2: “Have mercy on me, O God, according to Thy great mercy: and according to the multitude of Thy tender mercies, blot out my iniquity.” Wherefore the words of Cain were reprehensible, when he said (Gn. 4:13): “My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon.” And so God’s mercy, through Penance, grants pardon to sinners without any end, wherefore it is written (2 Paral 37 [*Prayer of Manasses, among the Apocrypha. St. Thomas is evidently quoting from memory, and omits the words in brackets.]): “Thy merciful promise is unmeasurable and unsearchable . . . (and Thou repentest) for the evil brought upon man.” It is therefore evident that Penance can be repeated many times.

Reply to Objection 1: Some of the Jews thought that a man could be washed several times in the laver of Baptism, because among them the Law prescribed certain washing-places where they were wont to cleanse themselves repeatedly from their uncleannesses. In order to disprove this the Apostle wrote to the Hebrews that “it is impossible for those who were once illuminated,” viz. through Baptism, “to be renewed again to penance,” viz. through Baptism, which is “the laver of regeneration, and renovation of the Holy Ghost,” as stated in Titus 3:5: and he declares the reason to be that by Baptism man dies with Christ, wherefore he adds (Heb. 6:6): “Crucifying again to themselves the Son of God.”

Reply to Objection 2: Ambrose is speaking of solemn Penance, which is not repeated in the Church, as we shall state further on ([4731]XP, Q[28], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia the authorship of which is unknown], “Our Lord gave sight to many blind men at various times, and strength to many infirm, thereby showing, in these different men, that the same sins are repeatedly forgiven, at one time healing a man from leprosy and afterwards from blindness. For this reason He healed so many stricken with fever, so many feeble in body, so many lame, blind, and withered, that the sinner might not despair; for this reason He is not described as healing anyone but once, that every one might fear to link himself with sin; for this reason He declares Himself to be the physician welcomed not of the hale, but of the unhealthy. What sort of a physician is he who knows not how to heal a recurring disease? For if a man ail a hundred times it is for the physician to heal him a hundred times: and if he failed where others succeed, he would be a poor physician in comparison with them."

Reply to Objection 4: Penance is to deplore past sins, and, "while deploring them," not to commit again, either by act or by intention, those which we have to deplore. Because a man is a mocker and not a penitent, who, "while doing penance," does what he repents having done, or intends to do again what he did before, or even commits actually the same or another kind of sin. But if a man sin afterwards either by act or intention, this does not destroy the fact that his former penance was real, because the reality of a former act is never destroyed by a subsequent contrary act: for even as he truly ran who afterwards sits, so he truly repented who subsequently sins.

Reply to Objection 5: Baptism derives its power from Christ's Passion, as a spiritual regeneration, with a spiritual death, of a previous life. Now "it is appointed unto man once to die" (Heb. 9:27), and to be born once, wherefore man should be baptized but once. On the other hand, Penance derives its power from Christ's Passion, as a spiritual medicine, which can be repeated frequently.

Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown), "it is evident that sins displease God exceedingly, for He is always ready to destroy them, lest what He created should perish, and what He loved be lost," viz. by despair.

OF PENANCE AS A VIRTUE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider penance as a virtue, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether penance is a virtue?

(2) Whether it is a special virtue?

(3) To what species of virtue does it belong?

(4) Of its subject;

(5) Of its cause;

(6) Of its relation to the other virtues.

Whether Penance is a virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a virtue. For penance is a sacrament numbered among the other sacraments, as was shown above ([4732]Q[84], A[1];[4733] Q[65], A[1]). Now no other sacrament is a virtue. Therefore neither is penance a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9), “shame is not a virtue,” both because it is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, and because it is not the disposition of a perfect thing, since it is about an evil act, so that it has no place in a virtuous man. Now, in like manner, penance is a passion accompanied by a bodily alteration, viz. tears, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that “penance consists in deploring past sins”: moreover it is about evil deeds, viz. sins, which have no place in a virtuous man. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 3), “no virtuous man is foolish.” But it seems foolish to deplore what has been done in the past, since it cannot be otherwise, and yet this is what we understand by penance. Therefore penance is not a virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because “a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous” (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Mat. 4:17: “Do penance,” etc. Therefore penance is a virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2];[4734] Q[84], A[10], ad 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above ([4735]Q[84] , A[9]) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of grief as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (Q[84], A[1], ad 1; [4736]AA[2],3), in the sacrament of Penance, human acts take the place of matter, which is not the case in Baptism and Confirmation. Wherefore, since virtue is a principle of an act, penance is either a virtue or accompanies a virtue, rather than Baptism or Confirmation.

Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered as a passion, is not a virtue, as stated above, and it is thus that it is accompanied by a bodily alteration. On the other hand, it is a virtue, according as it includes a right choice on the part of the will; which, however, applies to penance rather than to shame. Because shame regards the evil deed as present, whereas penance regards the evil deed as past. Now it is contrary to the perfection of virtue that one should have an evil deed actually present, of which one ought to be ashamed; whereas it is not contrary to the perfection of virtue that we should have previously committed evil deeds, of which it behooves us to repent, since a man from being wicked becomes virtuous.

Reply to Objection 3: It would indeed be foolish to grieve for what has already been done, with the intention of trying to make it not done. But the penitent does not intend this: for his sorrow is displeasure or disapproval with regard to the past deed, with the intention of removing its result, viz. the anger of God and the debt of punishment: and this is not foolish.

Whether Penance is a special virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance is not a special virtue. For it seems that to rejoice at the good one has done, and to grieve for the evil one has done are acts of the same nature. But joy for the good one has done is not a special virtue, but is a praiseworthy emotion proceeding from charity, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,8,9): wherefore the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity “rejoiceth not at iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth.” Therefore, in like manner, neither is penance, which is sorrow for past sins, a special virtue, but an emotion resulting from charity.

Objection 2: Further, every special virtue has its special matter, because habits are distinguished by their acts, and acts by their objects. But penance has no special matter, because its matter is past sins in any matter whatever. Therefore penance is not a special virtue.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is removed except by its contrary. But penance removes all sins. Therefore it is contrary to all sins, and consequently is not a special virtue.

On the contrary, The Law has a special precept about penance, as stated above ([4737]Q[84], AA[5],7).

I answer that, As stated in the [4738]FS, Q[54], A[1], ad 1, A[2], habits are specifically distinguished according to the species of their acts, so that whenever an act has a special reason for being praiseworthy, there must needs be a special habit. Now it is evident that there is a special reason for praising the act of penance, because it aims at the destruction of past sin, considered as an offense against God, which does not apply to any other virtue. We must therefore conclude that penance is a special virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: An act springs from charity in two ways: first as being elicited by charity, and a like virtuous act requires no other virtue than charity, e.g. to love the good, to rejoice therein, and to grieve for what is opposed to it. Secondly, an act springs from charity, being, so to speak, commanded by charity; and thus, since charity commands all the virtues, inasmuch as it directs them to its own end, an act springing from charity may belong even to another special virtue. Accordingly, if in the act of the penitent we consider the mere displeasure in the past sin, it belongs to charity immediately, in the same way as joy for past good acts; but the intention to aim at the destruction of past sin requires a special virtue subordinate to charity.

Reply to Objection 2: In point of fact, penance has indeed a general matter, inasmuch as it regards all sins; but it does so under a special aspect, inasmuch as they can be remedied by an act of man in co-operating with God for his justification.

Reply to Objection 3: Every special virtue removes formally the habit of the opposite vice, just as whiteness removes blackness from the same subject: but penance removes every sin effectively, inasmuch as it works for the destruction of sins, according as they are pardonable through the grace of God if man co-operate therewith. Wherefore it does not follow that it is a general virtue.

Whether the virtue of penance is a species of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtue of penance is not a species of justice. For justice is not a theological but a moral virtue, as was shown in the [4739]SS, Q[62], A[3]. But penance seems to be a theological virtue, since God is its object, for it makes satisfaction to God, to Whom, moreover, it reconciles the sinner. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

Objection 2: Further, since justice is a moral virtue it observes the mean. Now penance does not observe the mean, but rather goes to the extreme, according to Jer. 6:26: “Make thee mourning as for an only son, a bitter lamentation.” Therefore penance is not a species of justice.

Objection 3: Further, there are two species of justice, as stated in Ethic. v, 4, viz. “distributive” and “commutative.” But penance does not seem to be contained under either of them. Therefore it seems that penance is not a species of justice.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Lk. 6:21, “Blessed are ye that weep now,” says: “It is prudence that teaches us the unhappiness of earthly things and the happiness of heavenly things.” But weeping is an act of penance. Therefore penance is a species of prudence rather than of justice.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done.” But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.

It must be observed, however, that according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 6) a thing is said to be just in two ways, simply and relatively. A thing is just simply when it is between equals, since justice is a kind of equality, and he calls this the politic or civil just, because all citizens are equal, in the point of being immediately under the ruler, retaining their freedom. But a thing is just relatively when it is between parties of whom one is subject to the other, as a servant under his master, a son under his father, a wife under her husband. It is this kind of just that we consider in penance. Wherefore the penitent has recourse to God with a purpose of amendment, as a servant to his master, according to Ps. 122:2: "Behold, as the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters . . . so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until He have mercy on us"; and as a son to his father, according to Lk. 15:21: "Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee"; and as a wife to her husband, according to Jer. 3:1: "Thou hast prostituted thyself to many lovers; nevertheless return to Me, saith the Lord."

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in Ethic. v, 1, justice is a virtue towards another person, and the matter of justice is not so much the person to whom justice is due as the thing which is the subject of distribution or commutation. Hence the matter of penance is not God, but human acts, whereby God is offended or appeased; whereas God is as one to whom justice is due. Wherefore it is evident that penance is not a theological virtue, because God is not its matter or object.

Reply to Objection 2: The mean of justice is the equality that is established between those between whom justice is, as stated in Ethic. v. But in certain cases perfect equality cannot be established, on account of the excellence of one, as between father and son, God and man, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), wherefore in such cases, he that falls short of the other must do whatever he can. Yet this will not be sufficient simply, but only according to the acceptance of the higher one; and this is what is meant by ascribing excess to penance.

Reply to Objection 3: As there is a kind of commutation in favors, when, to wit, a man gives thanks for a favor received, so also is there commutation in the matter of offenses, when, on account of an offense committed against another, a man is either punished against his will, which pertains to vindictive justice, or makes amends of his own accord, which belongs to penance, which regards the person of the sinner, just as vindictive justice regards the person of the judge. Therefore it is evident that both are comprised under commutative justice.

Reply to Objection 4: Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.

Whether the will is properly the subject of penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of penance is not properly the will. For penance is a species of sorrow. But sorrow is in the concupiscible part, even as joy is. Therefore penance is in the concupiscible faculty.

Objection 2: Further, penance is a kind of vengeance, as Augustine states in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]. But vengeance seems to regard the irascible faculty, since anger is the desire for vengeance. Therefore it seems that penance is in the irascible part.

Objection 3: Further, the past is the proper object of the memory, according to the Philosopher (De Memoria i). Now penance regards the past, as stated above (A[1], ad 2, ad 3). Therefore penance is subjected in the memory.

Objection 4: Further, nothing acts where it is not. Now penance removes sin from all the powers of the soul. Therefore penance is in every power of the soul, and not only in the will.

On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps. 50:19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: “I will freely sacrifice to Thee.” Therefore penance is in the will.

I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above [4740](A[3]), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in the [4741]FS, Q[56], A[6], is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is subjected in the will, and its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers penance as a passion.

Reply to Objection 2: To desire vengeance on another, through passion, belongs to the irascible appetite, but to desire or take vengeance on oneself or on another, through reason, belongs to the will.

Reply to Objection 3: The memory is a power that apprehends the past. But penance belongs not to the apprehensive but to the appetitive power, which presupposes an act of the apprehension. Wherefore penance is not in the memory, but presupposes it.

Reply to Objection 4: The will, as stated above ([4742]FP, Q[82], A[4]; [4743]FS, Q[9], A[1]), moves all the other powers of the soul; so that it is not unreasonable for penance to be subjected in the will, and to produce an effect in each power of the soul.

Whether penance originates from fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance does not originate from fear. For penance originates in displeasure at sin. But this belongs to charity, as stated above [4744](A[3]). Therefore penance originates from love rather than fear.

Objection 2: Further, men are induced to do penance, through the expectation of the heavenly kingdom, according to Mat. 3:2 and Mat. 4:17: “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Now the kingdom of heaven is the object of hope. Therefore penance results from hope rather than from fear.

Objection 3: Further, fear is an internal act of man. But penance does not seem to arise in us through any work of man, but through the operation of God, according to Jer. 31:19: “After Thou didst convert me I did penance.” Therefore penance does not result from fear.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 26:17): “As a woman with child, when she draweth near the time of her delivery, is in pain, and crieth out in her pangs, so ere we become,” by penance, to wit; and according to another [*The Septuagint] version the text continues: “Through fear of Thee, O Lord, we have conceived, and been as it were in labor, and have brought forth the spirit of salvation,” i.e. of salutary penance, as is clear from what precedes. Therefore penance results from fear.

I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: first, as to the habit, and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents, but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts. Secondly, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating, the first principle [*Cf. FS, Q[113]] of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: “Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted”; the second, an act of faith; the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment; the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon; the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment; the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a man, of his own accord, offers to make amends to God through fear of Him.

Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin begins to displease a man, especially a sinner, on account of the punishments which servile fear regards, before it displeases him on account of its being an offense against God, or on account of its wickedness, which pertains to charity.

Reply to Objection 2: When the kingdom of heaven is said to be at hand, we are to understand that the king is on his way, not only to reward but also to punish. Wherefore John the Baptist said (Mat. 3:7): “Ye brood of vipers, who hath showed you to flee from the wrath to come?”

Reply to Objection 3: Even the movement of fear proceeds from God’s act in turning the heart; wherefore it is written (Dt. 5:29): “Who shall give them to have such a mind, to fear Me?” And so the fact that penance results from fear does not hinder its resulting from the act of God in turning the heart.

Whether penance is the first of the virtues?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance is the first of the virtues. Because, on Mat. 3:2, “Do penance,” etc., a gloss says: “The first virtue is to destroy the old man, and hate sin by means of penance.”

Objection 2: Further, withdrawal from one extreme seems to precede approach to the other. Now all the other virtues seem to regard approach to a term, because they all direct man to do good; whereas penance seems to direct him to withdraw from evil. Therefore it seems that penance precedes all the other virtues.

Objection 3: Further, before penance, there is sin in the soul. Now no virtue is compatible with sin in the soul. Therefore no virtue precedes penance, which is itself the first of all and opens the door to the others by expelling sin.

On the contrary, Penance results from faith, hope, and charity, as already stated ([4745]AA[2],5). Therefore penance is not the first of the virtues.

I answer that, In speaking of the virtues, we do not consider the order of time with regard to the habits, because, since the virtues are connected with one another, as stated in the [4746]FS, Q[65], A[1], they all begin at the same time to be in the soul; but one is said to precede the other in the order of nature, which order depends on the order of their acts, in so far as the act of one virtue presupposes the act of another. Accordingly, then, one must say that, even in the order of time, certain praiseworthy acts can precede the act and the habit of penance, e.g. acts of dead faith and hope, and an act of servile fear; while the act and habit of charity are, in point of time, simultaneous with the act and habit of penance, and with the habits of the other virtues. For, as was stated in the [4747]FS, Q[113], AA[7],8, in the justification of the ungodly, the movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and the movement of the free-will towards sin, which is the act of penance, are simultaneous. Yet of these two acts, the former naturally precedes the latter, because the act of the virtue of penance is directed against sin, through love of God; where the first-mentioned act is the reason and cause of the second.

Consequently penance is not simply the first of the virtues, either in the order of time, or in the order of nature, because, in the order of nature, the theological virtues precede it simply. Nevertheless, in a certain respect, it is the first of the other virtues in the order of time, as regards its act, because this act is the first in the justification of the ungodly; whereas in the order of nature, the other virtues seem to precede, as that which is natural precedes that which is accidental; because the other virtues seem to be necessary for man’s good, by reason of their very nature, whereas penance is only necessary if something, viz. sin, be presupposed, as stated above ([4748]Q[55], A[2]), when we spoke of the relation of the sacrament of penance to the other sacraments aforesaid.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is to be taken as meaning that the act of penance is the first in point of time, in comparison with the acts of the other virtues.

Reply to Objection 2: In successive movements withdrawal from one extreme precedes approach to the other, in point of time; and also in the order of nature, if we consider the subject, i.e. the order of the material cause; but if we consider the order of the efficient and final causes, approach to the end is first, for it is this that the efficient cause intends first of all: and it is this order which we consider chiefly in the acts of the soul, as stated in Phys. ii.

Reply to Objection 3: Penance opens the door to the other virtues, because it expels sin by the virtues of faith, hope and charity, which precede it in the order of nature; yet it so opens the door to them that they enter at the same time as it: because, in the justification of the ungodly, at the same time as the free-will is moved towards God and against sin, the sin is pardoned and grace infused, and with grace all the virtues, as stated in the [4749]FS, Q[65], AA[3],5.

OF THE EFFECT OF PENANCE, AS REGARDS THE PARDON OF MORTAL SIN (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of Penance; and (1) as regards the pardon of mortal sins; (2) as regards the pardon of venial sins; (3) as regards the return of sins which have been pardoned; (4) as regards the recovery of the virtues.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all mortal sins are taken away by Penance?

(2) Whether they can be taken away without Penance?

(3) Whether one can be taken away without the other?

(4) Whether Penance takes away the guilt while the debt remains?

(5) Whether any remnants of sin remain?

(6) Whether the removal of sin is the effect of Penance as a virtue, or as a sacrament?

Whether all sins are taken away by Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all sins are taken away by Penance. For the Apostle says (Heb. 12:17) that Esau “found no place of repentance, although with tears he had sought it,” which a gloss explains as meaning that “he found no place of pardon and blessing through Penance”: and it is related (2 Macc. 9:13) of Antiochus, that “this wicked man prayed to the Lord, of Whom he was not to obtain mercy.” Therefore it does not seem that all sins are taken away by Penance.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i) that “so great is the stain of that sin (namely, when a man, after coming to the knowledge of God through the grace of Christ, resists fraternal charity, and by the brands of envy combats grace itself) that he is unable to humble himself in prayer, although he is forced by his wicked conscience to acknowledge and confess his sin.” Therefore not every sin can be taken away by Penance.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord said (Mat. 12:32): “He that shall speak against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world nor in the world to come.” Therefore not every sin can be pardoned through Penance.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:22): “I will not remember” any more “all his iniquities that he hath done.”

I answer that, The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil, so that sin cannot displease them as to its guilt, but only as to the punishment which they suffer, by reason of which they have a kind of repentance, which yet is fruitless, according to Wis. 5:3: “Repenting, and groaning for anguish of spirit.” Consequently such Penance brings no hope of pardon, but only despair. Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil. Wherefore to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free-will, secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent, according to Prov. 21:1: “The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever He will He shall turn it.”

It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is “gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil”; for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out. Secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of Christ’s Passion, through which Penance produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1 Jn. 2:2): “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.”

Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be blotted out by true Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: Esau did not truly repent. This is evident from his saying (Gn. 27:41): “The days will come of the mourning of my father, and I will kill my brother Jacob.” Likewise neither did Antiochus repent truly; since he grieved for his past sin, not because he had offended God thereby, but on account of the sickness which he suffered in his body.

Reply to Objection 2: These words of Augustine should be understood thus: “So great is the stain of that sin, that man is unable to humble himself in prayer,” i.e. it is not easy for him to do so; in which sense we say that a man cannot be healed, when it is difficult to heal him. Yet this is possible by the power of God’s grace, which sometimes turns men even “into the depths of the sea” (Ps. 67:23).

Reply to Objection 3: The word or blasphemy spoken against the Holy Ghost is final impenitence, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom. xi), which is altogether unpardonable, because after this life is ended, there is no pardon of sins. or, if by the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, we understand sin committed through certain malice, this means either that the blasphemy itself against the Holy Ghost is unpardonable, i.e. not easily pardonable, or that such a sin does not contain in itself any motive for pardon, or that for such a sin a man is punished both in this and in the next world, as we explained in the [4750]SS, Q[14], A[3].

Whether sin can be pardoned without Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that sin can be pardoned without Penance. For the power of God is no less with regard to adults than with regard to children. But He pardons the sins of children without Penance. Therefore He also pardons adults without penance.

Objection 2: Further, God did not bind His power to the sacraments. But Penance is a sacrament. Therefore by God’s power sin can be pardoned without Penance.

Objection 3: Further, God’s mercy is greater than man’s. Now man sometimes forgives another for offending him, without his repenting: wherefore our Lord commanded us (Mat. 5:44): “Love your enemies, do good to them that hate you.” Much more, therefore, does God pardon men for offending him, without their repenting.

On the contrary, The Lord said (Jer. 18:8): “If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil” which they have done, “I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do them,” so that, on the other hand, if man “do not penance,” it seems that God will not pardon him his sin.

I answer that, It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an offense against God, He pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an offense committed against Him. Now an offense is directly opposed to grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he excludes him from his grace. Now, as stated in the [4751]FS, Q[110], A[1], the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness in the man who is graced, because the good-will of God, which is denoted by the word “grace,” is the cause of all created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended with someone, without any change in the latter’s will; but it is impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his will being changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man’s will being turned away from God, through being turned to some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is necessary for man’s will to be so changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned to something else in the aforesaid manner, together with a purpose of amendment; all of which belongs to the nature of penance as a virtue. Therefore it is impossible for a sin to be pardoned anyone without penance as a virtue.

But the sacrament of Penance, as stated above ([4752]Q[88], A[3]), is perfected by the priestly office of binding and loosing, without which God can forgive sins, even as Christ pardoned the adulterous woman, as related in Jn. 8, and the woman that was a sinner, as related in Luke vii, whose sins, however, He did not forgive without the virtue of penance: for as Gregory states (Hom. xxxiii in Evang.), “He drew inwardly by grace,” i.e. by penance, “her whom He received outwardly by His mercy.”

Reply to Objection 1: In children there is none but original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature, as explained in the [4753]FS, Q[82], A[1], and so in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the will, which is the effect of Penance.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument takes Penance as a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: God’s mercy is more powerful than man’s, in that it moves man’s will to repent, which man’s mercy cannot do.

Whether by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another?

Objection 1: It would seem that by Penance one sin can be pardoned without another. For it is written (Amos 4:7): “I caused it to rain upon one city, and caused it not to rain upon another city; one piece was rained upon: and the piece whereupon I rained not, withered.” These words are expounded by Gregory, who says (Hom. x super Ezech.): “When a man who hates his neighbor, breaks himself of other vices, rain falls on one part of the city, leaving the other part withered, for there are some men who, when they prune some vices, become much more rooted in others.” Therefore one sin can be forgiven by Penance, without another.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose in commenting on Ps. 118, “Blessed are the undefiled in the way,” after expounding verse 136 (“My eyes have sent forth springs of water”), says that “the first consolation is that God is mindful to have mercy; and the second, that He punishes, for although faith be wanting, punishment makes satisfaction and raises us up.” Therefore a man can be raised up from one sin, while the sin of unbelief remains.

Objection 3: Further, when several things are not necessarily together, one can be removed without the other. Now it was stated in the [4754]FS, Q[73], A[1] that sins are not connected together, so that one sin can be without another. Therefore also one sin can be taken away by Penance without another being taken away.

Objection 4: Further, sins are the debts, for which we pray for pardon when we say in the Lord’s Prayer: “Forgive us our trespasses,” etc. Now man sometimes forgives one debt without forgiving another. Therefore God also, by Penance, forgives one sin without another.

Objection 5: Further, man’s sins are forgiven him through the love of God, according to Jer. 31:3: “I have loved thee with an everlasting love, therefore have I drawn thee, taking pity on thee." Now there is nothing to hinder God from loving a man in one respect, while being offended with him in another, even as He loves the sinner as regards his nature, while hating him for his sin. Therefore it seems possible for God, by Penance, to pardon one sin without another.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: "There are many who repent having sinned, but not completely; for they except certain things which give them pleasure, forgetting that our Lord delivered from the devil the man who was both dumb and deaf, whereby He shows us that we are never healed unless it be from all sins."

I answer that, It is impossible for Penance to take one sin away without another. First because sin is taken away by grace removing the offense against God. Wherefore it was stated in the [4755]FS, Q[109], A[7]; [4756]FS, Q[113], A[2] that without grace no sin can be forgiven. Now every mortal sin is opposed to grace and excludes it. Therefore it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned without another. Secondly, because, as shown above [4757](A[2]) mortal sin cannot be forgiven without true Penance, to which it belongs to renounce sin, by reason of its being against God, which is common to all mortal sins: and where the same reason applies, the result will be the same. Consequently a man cannot be truly penitent, if he repent of one sin and not of another. For if one particular sin were displeasing to him, because it is against the love of God above all things (which motive is necessary for true repentance), it follows that he would repent of all. Whence it follows that it is impossible for one sin to be pardoned through Penance, without another. Thirdly, because this would be contrary to the perfection of God's mercy, since His works are perfect, as stated in Dt. 32:4; wherefore whomsoever He pardons, He pardons altogether. Hence Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that "it is irreverent and heretical to expect half a pardon from Him Who is just and justice itself."

Reply to Objection 1: These words of Gregory do not refer to the forgiveness of the guilt, but to the cessation from act, because sometimes a man who has been wont to commit several kinds of sin, renounces one and not the other; which is indeed due to God's assistance, but does not reach to the pardon of the sin.

Reply to Objection 2: In this saying of Ambrose “faith” cannot denote the faith whereby we believe in Christ, because, as Augustine says on Jn. 15:22, “If I had not come, and spoken to them, they would not have sin” (viz. unbelief): “for this is the sin which contains all others”: but it stands for consciousness, because sometimes a man receives pardon for a sin of which he is not conscious, through the punishment which he bears patiently.

Reply to Objection 3: Although sins are not connected in so far as they turn towards a mutable good, yet they are connected in so far as they turn away from the immutable Good, which applies to all mortal sins in common. and it is thus that they have the character of an offense which needs to be removed by Penance.

Reply to Objection 4: Debt as regards external things, e.g. money, is not opposed to friendship through which the debt is pardoned. hence one debt can be condoned without another. On the other hand, the debt of sin is opposed to friendship, and so one sin or offense is not pardoned without another; for it would seem absurd for anyone to ask even a man to forgive him one offense and not another.

Reply to Objection 5: The love whereby God loves man’s nature, does not ordain man to the good of glory from which man is excluded by any mortal sin. but the love of grace, whereby mortal sin is forgiven, ordains man to eternal life, according to Rom. 6:23: “The grace of God (is) life everlasting.” Hence there is no comparison.

Whether the debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that no debt of punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven through Penance. For when the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But the guilt is the cause of the debt of punishment: since a man deserves to be punished because he has been guilty of a sin. Therefore when the sin has been forgiven, no debt of punishment can remain.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Apostle (Rom. 5) the gift of Christ is more effective than the sin of Adam. Now, by sinning, man incurs at the same time guilt and the debt of punishment. Much more therefore, by the gift of grace, is the guilt forgiven and at the same time the debt of punishment remitted.

Objection 3: Further, the forgiveness of sins is effected in Penance through the power of Christ’s Passion, according to Rom. 3:25: “Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation, through faith in His Blood . . . for the remission of former sins.” Now Christ’s Passion made satisfaction sufficient for all sins, as stated above (QQ[48],49,79, A[5]). Therefore after the guilt has been pardoned, no debt of punishment remains.

On the contrary, It is related (2 Kings 12:13) that when David penitent had said to Nathan: “I have sinned against the Lord,” Nathan said to him: “The Lord also hath taken away thy sin, thou shalt not die. Nevertheless . . . the child that is born to thee shall surely die,” which was to punish him for the sin he had committed, as stated in the same place. Therefore a debt of some punishment remains after the guilt has been forgiven.

I answer that, As stated in the [4758]FS, Q[87], A[4], in mortal sin there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, in so far as mortal sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be punished eternally. Again, in so far as mortal sin turns inordinately to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment, because the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice, except by punishment: since it is just that he who has been too indulgent to his will, should suffer something against his will, for thus will equality be restored. Hence it is written (Apoc. 18:7): “As much as she hath glorified herself, and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.”

Since, however, the turning to mutable good is finite, sin does not, in this respect, induce a debt of eternal punishment. Wherefore, if man turns inordinately to a mutable good, without turning from God, as happens in venial sins, he incurs a debt, not of eternal but of temporal punishment. Consequently when guilt is pardoned through grace, the soul ceases to be turned away from God, through being united to God by grace: so that at the same time, the debt of punishment is taken away, albeit a debt of some temporal punishment may yet remain.

Reply to Objection 1: Mortal sin both turns away from God and turns to a created good. But, as stated in the [4759]FS, Q[71], A[6], the turning away from God is as its form while the turning to created good is as its matter. Now if the formal element of anything be removed, the species is taken away: thus, if you take away rational, you take away the human species. Consequently mortal sin is said to be pardoned from the very fact that, by means of grace, the aversion of the mind from God is taken away together with the debt of eternal punishment: and yet the material element remains, viz. the inordinate turning to a created good, for which a debt of temporal punishment is due.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated in the [4760]FS, Q[109], AA[7],8; [4761]FS, Q[111], A[2], it belongs to grace to operate in man by justifying him from sin, and to co-operate with man that his work may be rightly done. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt and of the debt of eternal punishment belongs to operating grace, while the remission of the debt of temporal punishment belongs to co-operating grace, in so far as man, by bearing punishment patiently with the help of Divine grace, is released also from the debt of temporal punishment. Consequently just as the effect of operating grace precedes the effect of co-operating grace, so too, the remission of guilt and of eternal punishment precedes the complete release from temporal punishment, since both are from grace, but the former, from grace alone, the latter, from grace and free-will.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's Passion is of itself sufficient to remove all debt of punishment, not only eternal, but also temporal; and man is released from the debt of punishment according to the measure of his share in the power of Christ's Passion. Now in Baptism man shares the Power of Christ's Passion fully, since by water and the Spirit of Christ, he dies with Him to sin, and is born again in Him to a new life, so that, in Baptism, man receives the remission of all debt of punishment. In Penance, on the other hand, man shares in the power of Christ's Passion according to the measure of his own acts, which are the matter of Penance, as water is of Baptism, as stated above ([4762]Q[84], AA[1],3). Wherefore the entire debt of punishment is not remitted at once after the first act of Penance, by which act the guilt is remitted, but only when all the acts of Penance have been completed.

Whether the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the remnants of sin are removed when a mortal sin is forgiven. For Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “Our Lord never healed anyone without delivering him wholly; for He wholly healed the man on the Sabbath, since He delivered his body from all disease, and his soul from all taint.” Now the remnants of sin belong to the disease of sin. Therefore it does not seem possible for any remnants of sin to remain when the guilt has been pardoned.

Objection 2: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “good is more efficacious than evil, since evil does not act save in virtue of some good.” Now, by sinning, man incurs the taint of sin all at once. Much more, therefore, by repenting, is he delivered also from all remnants of sin.

Objection 3: Further, God’s work is more efficacious than man’s. Now by the exercise of good human works the remnants of contrary sins are removed. Much more, therefore, are they taken away by the remission of guilt, which is a work of God.

On the contrary, We read (Mk. 8) that the blind man whom our Lord enlightened, was restored first of all to imperfect sight, wherefore he said (Mk. 8:24): “I see men, as it were trees, walking”; and afterwards he was restored perfectly, “so that he saw all things clearly.” Now the enlightenment of the blind man signifies the delivery of the sinner. Therefore after the first remission of sin, whereby the sinner is restored to spiritual sight, there still remain in him some remnants of his past sin.

I answer that, Mortal sin, in so far as it turns inordinately to a mutable good, produces in the soul a certain disposition, or even a habit, if the acts be repeated frequently. Now it has been said above [4763](A[4]) that the guilt of mortal sin is pardoned through grace removing the aversion of the mind from God. Nevertheless when that which is on the part of the aversion has been taken away by grace, that which is on the part of the inordinate turning to a mutable good can remain, since this may happen to be without the other, as stated above [4764](A[4]). Consequently, there is no reason why, after the guilt has been forgiven, the dispositions caused by preceding acts should not remain, which are called the remnants of sin. Yet they remain weakened and diminished, so as not to domineer over man, and they are after the manner of dispositions rather than of habits, like the “fomes” which remains after Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: God heals the whole man perfectly; but sometimes suddenly, as Peter’s mother-in-law was restored at once to perfect health, so that “rising she ministered to them” (Lk. 4:39), and sometimes by degrees, as we said above ([4765]Q[44], A[3], ad 2) about the blind man who was restored to sight (Mat. 8). And so too, He sometimes turns the heart of man with such power, that it receives at once perfect spiritual health, not only the guilt being pardoned, but all remnants of sin being removed as was the case with Magdalen (Lk. 7); whereas at other times He sometimes first pardons the guilt by operating grace, and afterwards, by co-operating grace, removes the remnants of sin by degrees.

Reply to Objection 2: Sin too, sometimes induces at once a weak disposition, such as is the result of one act, and sometimes a stronger disposition, the result of many acts.

Reply to Objection 3: One human act does not remove all the remnants of sin, because, as stated in the Predicaments (Categor. viii) “a vicious man by doing good works will make but little progress so as to be any better, but if he continue in good practice, he will end in being good as to acquired virtue.” But God’s grace does this much more effectively, whether by one or by several acts.

Whether the forgiveness of guilt is an effect of Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue. For penance is said to be a virtue, in so far as it is a principle of a human action. But human action does nothing towards the remission of guilt, since this is an effect of operating grace. Therefore the forgiveness of guilt is not an effect of penance as a virtue.

Objection 2: Further, certain other virtues are more excellent than penance. But the forgiveness of sin is not said to be the effect of any other virtue. Neither, therefore, is it the effect of penance as a virtue.

Objection 3: Further, there is no forgiveness of sin except through the power of Christ’s Passion, according to Heb. 9:22: “Without shedding of blood there is no remission.” Now Penance, as a sacrament, produces its effect through the power of Christ’s Passion, even as the other sacraments do, as was shown above ([4766]Q[62], AA[4],5). Therefore the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, not as a virtue, but as a sacrament.

On the contrary, Properly speaking, the cause of a thing is that without which it cannot be, since every defect depends on its cause. Now forgiveness of sin can come from God without the sacrament of Penance, but not without the virtue of penance, as stated above ([4767]Q[84], A[5], ad 3;[4768] Q[85], A[2]); so that, even before the sacraments of the New Law were instituted, God pardoned the sins of the penitent. Therefore the forgiveness of sin is chiefly the effect of penance as a virtue.

I answer that, Penance is a virtue in so far as it is a principle of certain human acts. Now the human acts, which are performed by the sinner, are the material element in the sacrament of Penance. Moreover every sacrament produces its effect, in virtue not only of its form, but also of its matter. because both these together make the one sacrament, as stated above ([4769]Q[60], A[6], ad 2, A[7]). Hence in Baptism forgiveness of sin is effected, in virtue not only of the form (but also of the matter, viz. water, albeit chiefly in virtue of the form) [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition] from which the water receives its power—and, similarly, the forgiveness of sin is the effect of Penance, chiefly by the power of the keys, which is vested in the ministers, who furnish the formal part of the sacrament, as stated above ([4770]Q[84], A[3]), and secondarily by the instrumentality of those acts of the penitent which pertain to the virtue of penance, but only in so far as such acts are, in some way, subordinate to the keys of the Church. Accordingly it is evident that the forgiveness of sin is the effect of penance as a virtue, but still more of Penance as a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The effect of operating grace is the justification of the ungodly (as stated in the [4771]FS, Q[113]), wherein there is, as was there stated ([4772]AA[1],2,3), not only infusion of grace and forgiveness of sin, but also a movement of the free-will towards God, which is an act of faith quickened by charity, and a movement of the free-will against sin, which is the act of penance. Yet these human acts are there as the effects of operating grace, and are produced at the same time as the forgiveness of sin. Consequently the forgiveness of sin does not take place without an act of the virtue of penance, although it is the effect of operating grace.

Reply to Objection 2: In the justification of the ungodly there is not only an act of penance, but also an act of faith, as stated above (ad 1: [4773]FS, Q[113], A[4]). Wherefore the forgiveness of sin is accounted the effect not only of the virtue of penance, but also, and that chiefly, of faith and charity.

Reply to Objection 3: The act of the virtue of penance is subordinate to Christ’s Passion both by faith, and by its relation to the keys of the Church; and so, in both ways, it causes the forgiveness of sin, by the power of Christ’s Passion.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that the act of the virtue of penance is necessary for the forgiveness of sin, through being an inseparable effect of grace, whereby chiefly is sin pardoned, and which produces its effect in all the sacraments. Consequently it only follows that grace is a higher cause of the forgiveness of sin than the sacrament of Penance. Moreover, it must be observed that, under the Old Law and the law of nature, there was a sacrament of Penance after a fashion, as stated above ([4774]Q[84], A[7], ad 2).

OF THE REMISSION OF VENIAL SIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the forgiveness of venial sins, under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?

(2) Whether it can be forgiven without the infusion of grace?

(3) Whether venial sins are forgiven by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop’s blessing, the beating of the breast, the Lord’s Prayer, and the like?

(4) Whether a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin?

Whether venial sin can be forgiven without Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be forgiven without penance. For, as stated above ([4775]Q[84], A[10], ad 4), it is essential to true penance that man should not only sorrow for his past sins, but also that he should purpose to avoid them for the future. Now venial sins are forgiven without any such purpose, for it is certain that man cannot lead the present life without committing venial sins. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.

Objection 2: Further, there is no penance without actual displeasure at one’s sins. But venial sins can be taken away without any actual displeasure at them, as would be the case if a man were to be killed in his sleep, for

Christ’s sake, since he would go to heaven at once, which would not happen if his venial sins remained. Therefore venial sins can be forgiven without penance.

Objection 3: Further, venial sins are contrary to the fervor of charity, as stated in the [4776]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Now one contrary is removed by another. Therefore forgiveness of venial sins is caused by the fervor of charity, which may be without actual displeasure at venial sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown], that “there is a penance which is done for venial sins in the Church every day” which would be useless if venial sins could be forgiven without Penance.

I answer that, Forgiveness of sin, as stated above ([4777]Q[86], A[2]), is effected by man being united to God from Whom sin separates him in some way. Now this separation is made complete by mortal sin, and incomplete by venial sin: because, by mortal sin, the mind through acting against charity is altogether turned away from God; whereas by venial sin man’s affections are clogged, so that they are slow in tending towards God. Consequently both kinds of sin are taken away by penance, because by both of them man’s will is disordered through turning inordinately to a created good; for just as mortal sin cannot be forgiven so long as the will is attached to sin, so neither can venial sin, because while the cause remains, the effect remains.

Yet a more perfect penance is requisite for the forgiveness of mortal sin, namely that man should detest actually the mortal sin which he committed, so far as lies in his power, that is to say, he should endeavor to remember each single mortal sin, in order to detest each one. But this is, not required for the forgiveness of venial sins; although it does not suffice to have habitual displeasure, which is included in the habit of charity or of penance as a virtue, since then venial sin would be incompatible with charity, which is evidently untrue. Consequently it is necessary to have a certain virtual displeasure, so that, for instance, a man’s affections so tend to God and Divine things, that whatever might happen to him to hamper that tendency would be displeasing to him, and would grieve him, were he to commit it, even though he were not to think of it actually: and this is not sufficient for the remission of mortal sin, except as regards those sins which he fails to remember after a careful examination.

Reply to Objection 1: When man is in a state of grace, he can avoid all mortal sins, and each single one; and he can avoid each single venial sin, but not all, as was explained in the [4778]FS, Q[74], A[8], ad 2; [4779]FS, Q[109], A[8]. Consequently penance for mortal sins requires man to purpose abstaining from mortal sins, all and each; whereas penance for venial sins requires man to purpose abstaining from each, but not from all, because the weakness of this life does not allow of this. Nevertheless he needs to have the purpose of taking steps to commit fewer venial sins, else he would be in danger of falling back, if he gave up the desire of going forward, or of removing the obstacles to spiritual progress, such as venial sins are.

Reply to Objection 2: Death for Christ's sake, as stated above ([4780]Q[66], A[11]), obtains the power of Baptism, wherefore it washes away all sin, both venial and mortal, unless it find the will attached to sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The fervor of charity implies virtual displeasure at venial sins, as stated above ([4781]Q[79], A[4]).

Whether infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that infusion of grace is necessary for the remission of venial sins. Because an effect is not produced without its proper cause. Now the proper cause of the remission of sins is grace; for man's sins are not forgiven through his own merits; wherefore it is written (Eph. 2:4,5): "God, Who is rich in mercy, for His exceeding charity, wherewith He loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together in Christ, by Whose grace you are saved." Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

Objection 2: Further, venial sins are not forgiven without Penance. Now grace is infused, in Penance as in the other sacraments of the New Law. Therefore venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

Objection 3: Further, venial sin produces a stain on the soul. Now a stain is not removed save by grace which is the spiritual beauty of the soul. Therefore it seems that venial sins are not forgiven without infusion of grace.

On the contrary, The advent of venial sin neither destroys nor diminishes grace, as stated in the [4782]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Therefore, in like manner, an infusion of grace is not necessary in order to remove venial sin.

I answer that, Each thing is removed by its contrary. But venial sin is not contrary to habitual grace or charity, but hampers its act, through man being too much attached to a created good, albeit not in opposition to God, as stated in the [4783]FS, Q[88], A[1]; [4784]SS, Q[24], A[10]. Therefore, in order that venial sin be removed, it is not necessary that habitual grace be infused, but a movement of grace or charity suffices for its forgiveness.

Nevertheless, since in those who have the use of free-will (in whom alone can there be venial sins), there can be no infusion of grace without an actual movement of the free-will towards God and against sin, consequently whenever grace is infused anew, venial sins are forgiven.

Reply to Objection 1: Even the forgiveness of venial sins is an effect of grace, in virtue of the act which grace produces anew, but not through any habit infused anew into the soul.

Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin is never forgiven without some act, explicit or implicit, of the virtue of penance, as stated above [4785](A[1]): it can, however, be forgiven without the sacrament of Penance, which is formally perfected by the priestly absolution, as stated above (Q[87], A[2]). Hence it does not follow that infusion of grace is required for the forgiveness of venial sin, for although this infusion takes place in every sacrament, it does not occur in every act of virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as there are two kinds of bodily stain, one consisting in the privation of something required for beauty, e.g. the right color or the due proportion of members, and another by the introduction of some hindrance to beauty, e.g. mud or dust; so too, a stain is put on the soul, in one way, by the privation of the beauty of grace through mortal sin, in another, by the inordinate inclination of the affections to some temporal thing, and this is the result of venial sin. Consequently, an infusion of grace is necessary for the removal of mortal sin, but in order to remove venial sin, it is necessary to have a movement proceeding from grace, removing the inordinate attachment to the temporal thing.

Whether venial sins are removed by the sprinkling of holy water and the like?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sins are not removed by the sprinkling of holy water, a bishop’s blessing, and the like. For venial sins are not forgiven without Penance, as stated above [4786](A[1]). But Penance suffices by itself for the remission of venial sins. Therefore the above have nothing to do with the remission of venial sins.

Objection 2: Further, each of the above bears the same relation to one venial sin as to all. If therefore, by means of one of them, some venial sin is remitted, it follows that in like manner all are remitted, so that by beating his breast once, or by being sprinkled once with holy water, a man would be delivered from all his venial sins, which seems unreasonable.

Objection 3: Further, venial sins occasion a debt of some punishment, albeit temporal; for it is written (1 Cor. 3:12, 15) of him that builds up “wood, hay, stubble” that “he shall be saved, yet so as by fire.” Now the above things whereby venial sins are said to be taken away, contain either no punishment at all, or very little. Therefore they do not suffice for the full remission of venial sins.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*Hom. 30 inter 1; Ep. cclxv] that “for our slight sins we strike our breasts, and say: Forgive us our trespasses,” and so it seems that striking one’s breast, and the Lord’s Prayer cause the remission of venial sins: and the same seems to apply to the other things.

I answer that, As stated above [4787](A[2]), no infusion of fresh grace is required for the forgiveness of a venial sin, but it is enough to have an act proceeding from grace, in detestation of that venial sin, either explicit or at least implicit, as when one is moved fervently to God. Hence, for three reasons, certain things cause the remission of venial sins: first, because they imply the infusion of grace, since the infusion of grace removes venial sins, as stated above [4788](A[2]); and so, by the Eucharist, Extreme Unction, and by all the sacraments of the New Law without exception, wherein grace is conferred, venial sins are remitted. Secondly, because they imply a movement of detestation for sin, and in this way the general confession [*i.e. the recital of the Confiteor or of an act of contrition], the beating of one’s breast, and the Lord’s Prayer conduce to the remission of venial sins, for we ask in the Lord’s Prayer: “Forgive us our trespasses.” Thirdly, because they include a movement of reverence for God and Divine things; and in this way a bishop’s blessing, the sprinkling of holy water, any sacramental anointing, a prayer said in a dedicated church, and anything else of the kind, conduce to the remission of venial sins.

Reply to Objection 1: All these things cause the remission of venial sins, in so far as they incline the soul to the movement of penance, viz., the implicit or explicit detestation of one’s sins.

Reply to Objection 2: All these things, so far as they are concerned, conduce to the remission of all venial sins: but the remission may be hindered as regards certain venial sins, to which the mind is still actually attached, even as insincerity sometimes impedes the effect of Baptism.

Reply to Objection 3: By the above things, venial sins are indeed taken away as regards the guilt, both because those things are a kind of satisfaction, and through the virtue of charity whose movement is aroused by such things.

Yet it does not always happen that, by means of each one, the whole guilt of punishment is taken away, because, in that case, whoever was entirely free from mortal sin, would go straight to heaven if sprinkled with holy water: but the debt of punishment is remitted by means of the above, according to the movement of fervor towards God, which fervor is aroused by such things, sometimes more, sometimes less.

Whether venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin. For, on Jn. 8:7: “He that is without sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her,” a gloss says that “all those men were in a state of mortal sin: for venial offenses were forgiven them through the legal ceremonies.” Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, no infusion of grace is required for the remission of venial sin. but it is required for the forgiveness of mortal sin. Therefore venial sin can be taken away without mortal sin.

Objection 3: Further, a venial sin differs from a mortal sin more than from another venial sin. But one venial sin can be pardoned without another, as stated above (A[3], ad 2;[4789] Q[87], A[3]). Therefore a venial sin can be taken away without a mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 5:26): “Amen I say to thee, thou shalt not go out from thence,” viz., from the prison, into which a man is cast for mortal sin, “till thou repay the last farthing,” by which venial sin is denoted. Therefore a venial sin is not forgiven without mortal sin.

I answer that, As stated above ([4790]Q[87], A[3]), there is no remission of any sin whatever except by the power of grace, because, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 4:8), it is owing to God’s grace that He does not impute sin to a man, which a gloss on that passage expounds as referring to venial sin. Now he that is in a state of mortal sin is without the grace of God. Therefore no venial sin is forgiven him.

Reply to Objection 1: Venial offenses, in the passage quoted, denote the irregularities or uncleannesses which men contracted in accordance with the Law.

Reply to Objection 2: Although no new infusion of habitual grace is requisite for the remission of venial sin, yet it is necessary to exercise some act of grace, which cannot be in one who is a subject of mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Venial sin does not preclude every act of grace whereby all venial sins can be removed; whereas mortal sin excludes altogether the habit of grace, without which no sin, either mortal or venial, is remitted. Hence the comparison fails.

OF THE RETURN OF SINS WHICH HAVE BEEN TAKEN AWAY BY PENANCE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the return of sins which have been taken away by Penance: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sins which have been taken away by Penance return simply through a subsequent sin?

(2) Whether more specially as regards certain sins they return, in a way, on account of ingratitude?

(3) Whether the debt of punishment remains the same for sins thus returned?

(4) Whether this ingratitude, on account of which sins return, is a special sin?

Whether sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins once forgiven return through a subsequent sin. For Augustine says (De Bapt. contra Donat. i, 12): “Our

Lord teaches most explicitly in the Gospel that sins which have been forgiven return, when fraternal charity ceases, in the example of the servant from whom his master exacted the payment of the debt already forgiven, because he had refused to forgive the debt of his fellow-servant." Now fraternal charity is destroyed through each mortal sin. Therefore sins already taken away through Penance, return through each subsequent mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, on Lk. 11:24, "I will return into my house, whence I came out," Bede says: "This verse should make us tremble, we should not endeavor to explain it away lest through carelessness we give place to the sin which we thought to have been taken away, and become its slave once more." Now this would not be so unless it returned. Therefore a sin returns after once being taken away by Penance.

Objection 3: Further, the Lord said (Ezech. 18:24): "If the just man turn himself away from his justice, and do iniquity . . . all his justices which he hath done, shall not be remembered." Now among the other "justices" which he had done, is also his previous penance, since it was said above ([4791]Q[85], A[3]) that penance is a part of justice. Therefore when one who has done penance, sins, his previous penance, whereby he received forgiveness of his sins, is not imputed to him. Therefore his sins return.

Objection 4: Further, past sins are covered by grace, as the Apostle declares (Rom. 4:7) where he quotes Ps. 31:1: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." But a subsequent mortal sin takes away grace. Therefore the sins committed previously, become uncovered: and so, seemingly, they return.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom. 11:29): "The gifts and the calling of God are without repentance." Now the penitent's sins are taken away by a gift of God. Therefore the sins which have been taken away do not return through a subsequent sin, as though God repented His gift of forgiveness.

Moreover, Augustine says (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i [*Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]): "When he that turns away from Christ, comes to the end of this life a stranger to grace, whither does he go, except to perdition? Yet he does not fall back into that which had been forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin."

I answer that, As stated above ([4792]Q[86], A[4]), mortal sin contains two things, aversion from God and adherence to a created good. Now, in mortal sin, whatever attaches to the aversion, is, considered in itself, common to all mortal sins, since man turns away from God by every mortal sin, so that, in consequence, the stain resulting from the privation of grace, and the debt of everlasting punishment are common to all mortal sins. This is what is meant by what is written (James 2:10): "Whosoever . . . shall offend in one point, is become guilty of all." On the other hand, as regards their adherence they are different from, and sometimes contrary to one another. Hence it is evident, that on the part of the adherence, a subsequent mortal sin does not cause the return of mortal sins previously dispelled, else it would follow that by a sin of wastefulness a man would be brought back to the habit or disposition of avarice previously dispelled, so that one contrary would be the cause of another, which is impossible. But if in mortal sins we consider that which attaches to the aversion absolutely, then a subsequent mortal sin [causes the return of that which was comprised in the mortal sins before they were pardoned, in so far as the subsequent mortal sin] [*The words in brackets are omitted in the Leonine edition.] deprives man of grace, and makes him deserving of everlasting punishment, just as he was before. Nevertheless, since the aversion of mortal sin is [in a way, caused by the adherence, those things which attach to the aversion are*] diversified somewhat in relation to various adherences, as it were to various causes, so that there will be a different aversion, a different stain, a different debt of punishment, according to the different acts of mortal sin from which they arise; hence the question is moved whether the stain and the debt of eternal punishment, as caused by acts of sins previously pardoned, return through a subsequent mortal sin.

Accordingly some have maintained that they return simply even in this way. But this is impossible, because what God has done cannot be undone by the work of man. Now the pardon of the previous sins was a work of Divine mercy, so that it cannot be undone by man's subsequent sin, according to Rom. 3:3: "Shall their unbelief make the faith of God without effect?"

Wherefore others who maintained the possibility of sins returning, said that God pardons the sins of a penitent who will afterwards sin again, not according to His foreknowledge, but only according to His present justice:

since He foresees that He will punish such a man eternally for his sins, and yet, by His grace, He makes him righteous for the present. But this cannot stand: because if a cause be placed absolutely, its effect is placed absolutely; so that if the remission of sins were effected by grace and the sacraments of grace, not absolutely but under some condition dependent on some future event, it would follow that grace and the sacraments of grace are not the sufficient causes of the remission of sins, which is erroneous, as being derogatory to God's grace.

Consequently it is in no way possible for the stain of past sins and the debt of punishment incurred thereby, to return, as caused by those acts. Yet it may happen that a subsequent sinful act virtually contains the debt of punishment due to the previous sin, in so far as when a man sins a second time, for this very reason he seems to sin more grievously than before, as stated in Rom. 2:5: "According to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath against the day of wrath," from the mere fact, namely, that God's goodness, which waits for us to repent, is despised. And so much the more is God's goodness despised, if the first sin is committed a second time after having been forgiven, as it is a greater favor for the sin to be forgiven than for the sinner to be endured.

Accordingly the sin which follows repentance brings back, in a sense, the debt of punishment due to the sins previously forgiven, not as caused by those sins already forgiven but as caused by this last sin being committed, on account of its being aggravated in view of those previous sins. This means that those sins return, not simply, but in a restricted sense, viz., in so far as they are virtually contained in the subsequent sin.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine seems to refer to the return of sins as to the debt of eternal punishment considered in itself, namely, that he who sins after doing penance incurs a debt of eternal punishment, just as before, but not altogether for the same "reason." Wherefore Augustine, after saying (Lib. Resp. Prosperi i [*Cf. Prosper, Responsiones ad Capitula Gallorum ii]) that "he does not fall back into that which was forgiven, nor will he be condemned for original sin," adds: "Nevertheless, for these last sins he will be condemned to the same death, which he deserved to suffer for the former," because he incurs the punishment of eternal death which he deserved for his previous sins.

Reply to Objection 2: By these words Bede means that the guilt already forgiven enslaves man, not by the return of his former debt of punishment, but by the repetition of his act.

Reply to Objection 3: The effect of a subsequent sin is that the former "justices" are not remembered, in so far as they were deserving of eternal life, but not in so far as they were a hindrance to sin. Consequently if a man sins mortally after making restitution, he does not become guilty as though he had not paid back what he owed; and much less is penance previously done forgotten as to the pardon of the guilt, since this is the work of God rather than of man.

Reply to Objection 4: Grace removes the stain and the debt of eternal punishment simply; but it covers the past sinful acts, lest, on their account, God deprive man of grace, and judge him deserving of eternal punishment; and what grace has once done, endures for ever.

Whether sins that have been forgiven, return through ingratitude which is shown especially in four kinds of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not return through ingratitude, which is shown especially in four kinds of sin, viz., hatred of one's neighbor, apostasy from faith, contempt of confession and regret for past repentance, and which have been expressed in the following verse:

"Fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque, fateri,
Poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit."

For the more grievous the sin committed against God after one has received the grace of pardon, the greater the ingratitude. But there are sins more grievous than these, such as blasphemy against God, and the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore it seems that sins already pardoned do not return through ingratitude as manifested in these sins, any more than as shown in other sins.

Objection 2: Further, Rabanus says: "God delivered the wicked servant to the torturers, until he should pay the whole debt, because a man will be deemed punishable not only for the sins he commits after Baptism, but also for original sin which was taken away when he was baptized." Now venial sins are reckoned among our debts, since we pray in their regard: "Forgive us our trespasses [debita]." Therefore they too return through ingratitude;

and, in like manner seemingly, sins already pardoned return through venial sins, and not only through those sins mentioned above.

Objection 3: Further, ingratitude is all the greater, according as one sins after receiving a greater favor. Now innocence whereby one avoids sin is a Divine favor, for Augustine says (Confess. ii): “Whatever sins I have avoided committing, I owe it to Thy grace.” Now innocence is a greater gift, than even the forgiveness of all sins. Therefore the first sin committed after innocence is no less an ingratitude to God, than a sin committed after repentance, so that seemingly ingratitude in respect of the aforesaid sins is not the chief cause of sins returning.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Moral. xviii [*Cf. Dial. iv]): “It is evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through Penance”: so that ingratitude implied in the hatred of one’s brother is a special cause of the return of sins already forgiven: and the same seems to apply to the others.

I answer that, As stated above [4793](A[1]), sins pardoned through Penance are said to return, in so far as their debt of punishment, by reason of ingratitude, is virtually contained in the subsequent sin. Now one may be guilty of ingratitude in two ways: first by doing something against the favor received, and, in this way, man is ungrateful to God in every mortal sin whereby he offends God Who forgave his sins, so that by every subsequent mortal sin, the sins previously pardoned return, on account of the ingratitude. Secondly, one is guilty of ingratitude, by doing something not only against the favor itself, but also against the form of the favor received. If this form be considered on the part of the benefactor, it is the remission of something due to him; wherefore he who does not forgive his brother when he asks pardon, and persists in his hatred, acts against this form. If, however, this form be taken in regard to the penitent who receives this favor, we find on his part a twofold movement of the free-will. The first is the movement of the free-will towards God, and is an act of faith quickened by charity; and against this a man acts by apostatizing from the faith. The second is a movement of the free-will against sin, and is the act of penance. This act consists first, as we have stated above (Q[85], AA[2],5) in man’s detestation of his past sins; and against this a man acts when he regrets having done penance. Secondly, the act of penance consists in the penitent purposing to subject himself to the keys of the Church by confession, according to Ps. 31:5: “I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord: and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin”: and against this a man acts when he scorns to confess as he had purposed to do.

Accordingly it is said that the ingratitude of sinners is a special cause of the return of sins previously forgiven.

Reply to Objection 1: This is not said of these sins as though they were more grievous than others, but because they are more directly opposed to the favor of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Even venial sins and original sin return in the way explained above, just as mortal sins do, in so far as the favor conferred by God in forgiving those sins is despised. A man does not, however, incur ingratitude by committing a venial sin, because by sinning venially man does not act against God, but apart from Him, wherefore venial sins nowise cause the return of sins already forgiven.

Reply to Objection 3: A favor can be weighed in two ways. First by the quantity of the favor itself, and in this way innocence is a greater favor from God than penance, which is called the second plank after shipwreck (cf. [4794] Q[84], A[6]). Secondly, a favor may be weighed with regard to the recipient, who is less worthy, wherefore a greater favor is bestowed on him, so that he is the more ungrateful if he scorns it. In this way the favor of the pardon of sins is greater when bestowed on one who is altogether unworthy, so that the ingratitude which follows is all the greater.

Whether the debt of punishment that arises through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as that of the sins previously pardoned. Because the greatness of the favor of the pardon of sins is according to the greatness of the sin pardoned, and so too, in consequence, is the greatness of the ingratitude whereby this favor is scorned. But the greatness of the consequent debt of punishment is in accord with the greatness of the ingratitude. Therefore the debt of punishment arising through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is as great as the debt of punishment due for all the previous sins.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater sin to offend God than to offend man. But a slave who is freed by his master returns to the same state of slavery from which he was freed, or even to a worse state. Much more therefore he that sins against God after being freed from sin, returns to the debt of as great a punishment as he had incurred before.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 18:34) that "his lord being angry, delivered him" (whose sins returned to him on account of his ingratitude) "to the torturers, until he paid all the debt." But this would not be so unless the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude were as great as that incurred through all previous sins. Therefore an equal debt of punishment returns through ingratitude.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be," whence it is evident that a great debt of punishment does not arise from a slight sin. But sometimes a subsequent mortal sin is much less grievous than any one of those previously pardoned. Therefore the debt of punishment incurred through subsequent sins is not equal to that of sins previously forgiven.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the debt of punishment incurred through ingratitude in respect of a subsequent sin is equal to that of the sins previously pardoned, in addition to the debt proper to this subsequent sin. But there is no need for this, because, as stated above [4795](A[1]), the debt of punishment incurred by previous sins does not return on account of a subsequent sin, as resulting from the acts of the subsequent sin. Wherefore the amount of the debt that returns must be according to the gravity of the subsequent sin.

It is possible, however, for the gravity of the subsequent sin to equal the gravity of all previous sins. But it need not always be so, whether we speak of the gravity which a sin has from its species (since the subsequent sin may be one of simple fornication, while the previous sins were adulteries, murders, or sacrileges); or of the gravity which it incurs through the ingratitude connected with it. For it is not necessary that the measure of ingratitude should be exactly equal to the measure of the favor received, which latter is measured according to the greatness of the sins previously pardoned. Because it may happen that in respect of the same favor, one man is very ungrateful, either on account of the intensity of his scorn for the favor received, or on account of the gravity of the offense committed against the benefactor, while another man is slightly ungrateful, either because his scorn is less intense, or because his offense against the benefactor is less grave. But the measure of ingratitude is proportionately equal to the measure of the favor received: for supposing an equal contempt of the favor, or an equal offense against the benefactor, the ingratitude will be so much the greater, as the favor received is greater.

Hence it is evident that the debt of punishment incurred by a subsequent sin need not always be equal to that of previous sins; but it must be in proportion thereto, so that the more numerous or the greater the sins previously pardoned, the greater must be the debt of punishment incurred by any subsequent mortal sin whatever.

Reply to Objection 1: The favor of the pardon of sins takes its absolute quantity from the quantity of the sins previously pardoned: but the sin of ingratitude does not take its absolute quantity from the measure of the favor bestowed, but from the measure of the contempt or of the offense, as stated above: and so the objection does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: A slave who has been given his freedom is not brought back to his previous state of slavery for any kind of ingratitude, but only when this is grave.

Reply to Objection 3: He whose forgiven sins return to him on account of subsequent ingratitude, incurs the debt for all, in so far as the measure of his previous sins is contained proportionally in his subsequent ingratitude, but not absolutely, as stated above.

Whether the ingratitude whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of previous sins, is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ingratitude, whereby a subsequent sin causes the return of sins previously forgiven, is a special sin. For the giving of thanks belongs to counterpassion which is a necessary condition of justice, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. v, 5). But justice is a special virtue. Therefore this ingratitude is a special sin.

Objection 2: Further, Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that thanksgiving is a special virtue. But ingratitude is opposed to thanksgiving. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

Objection 3: Further, a special effect proceeds from a special cause. Now ingratitude has a special effect, viz. the return, after a fashion, of sins already forgiven. Therefore ingratitude is a special sin.

On the contrary, That which is a sequel to every sin is not a special sin. Now by any mortal sin whatever, a man becomes ungrateful to God, as evidenced from what has been said [4796](A[1]). Therefore ingratitude is not a special sin.

I answer that, The ingratitude of the sinner is sometimes a special sin; and sometimes it is not, but a circumstance arising from all mortal sins in common committed against God. For a sin takes its species according to the sinner's intention, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who commits adultery in order to steal is a thief rather than an adulterer."

If, therefore, a sinner commits a sin in contempt of God and of the favor received from Him, that sin is drawn to the species of ingratitude, and in this way a sinner's ingratitude is a special sin. If, however, a man, while intending to commit a sin, e.g. murder or adultery, is not withheld from it on account of its implying contempt of God, his ingratitude will not be a special sin, but will be drawn to the species of the other sin, as a circumstance thereof. And, as Augustine observes (De Nat. et Grat. xxix), not every sin implies contempt of God in His commandments. Therefore it is evident that the sinner's ingratitude is sometimes a special sin, sometimes not.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first (three) objections prove that ingratitude is in itself a special sin; while the last objection proves that ingratitude, as included in every sin, is not a special sin.

OF THE RECOVERY OF VIRTUE BY MEANS OF PENANCE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recovery of virtues by means of Penance, under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether virtues are restored through Penance?

(2) Whether they are restored in equal measure?

(3) Whether equal dignity is restored to the penitent?

(4) Whether works of virtue are deadened by subsequent sin?

(5) Whether works deadened by sin revive through Penance?

(6) Whether dead works, i.e. works that are done without charity, are quickened by Penance?

Whether the virtues are restored through Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues are not restored through penance. Because lost virtue cannot be restored by penance, unless penance be the cause of virtue. But, since penance is itself a virtue, it cannot be the cause of all the virtues, and all the more, since some virtues naturally precede penance, viz., faith, hope, and charity, as stated above ([4797]Q[85], A[6]). Therefore the virtues are not restored through penance.

Objection 2: Further, Penance consists in certain acts of the penitent. But the gratuitous virtues are not caused through any act of ours: for Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18: In Ps. 118) that “God forms the virtues in us without us.” Therefore it seems that the virtues are not restored through Penance.

Objection 3: Further, he that has virtue performs works of virtue with ease and pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 8) that “a man is not just if he does not rejoice in just deeds.” Now many penitents find difficulty in performing deeds of virtue. Therefore the virtues are not restored through Penance.

On the contrary, We read (Lk. 15:22) that the father commanded his penitent son to be clothed in “the first robe,” which, according to Ambrose (Expos. in Luc. vii), is the “mantle of wisdom,” from which all the virtues flow together, according to Wis. 8:7: “She teacheth temperance, and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, which are such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.” Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.

I answer that, Sins are pardoned through Penance, as stated above (Q[86] , A[1]). But there can be no remission of sins except through the infusion of grace. Wherefore it follows that grace is infused into man through Penance. Now all the gratuitous virtues flow from grace, even as all the powers result from the essence of the soul; as stated in the [4798]FS, Q[110], A[4], ad 1. Therefore all the virtues are restored through Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: Penance restores the virtues in the same way as it causes grace, as stated above ([4799]Q[86], A[1]). Now it is a cause of grace, in so far as it is a sacrament, because, in so far as it is a virtue, it is rather an effect of grace. Consequently it does not follow that penance, as a virtue, needs to be the cause of all the other virtues, but that the habit of penance together with the habits of the other virtues is caused through the sacrament of Penance.

Reply to Objection 2: In the sacrament of Penance human acts stand as matter, while the formal power of this sacrament is derived from the power of the keys. Consequently the power of the keys causes grace and virtue effectively indeed, but instrumentally; and the first act of the penitent, viz., contrition, stands as ultimate disposition to the reception of grace, while the subsequent acts of Penance proceed from the grace and virtues which are already there.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4800]Q[86], A[5]), sometimes after the first act of Penance, which is contrition, certain remnants of sin remain, viz. dispositions caused by previous acts, the result being that the penitent finds difficulty in doing deeds of virtue. Nevertheless, so far as the inclination itself of charity and of the other virtues is concerned, the penitent performs works of virtue with pleasure and ease. even as a virtuous man may accidentally find it hard to do an act of virtue, on account of sleepiness or some indisposition of the body.

Whether, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that, after Penance, man rises again to equal virtue. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:28): “To them that love God all things work together unto good,” whereupon a gloss of Augustine says that “this is so true that, if any such man goes astray and wanders from the path, God makes even this conduce to his good.” But this would not be true if he rose again to lesser virtue. Therefore it seems that a penitent never rises again to lesser virtue.

Objection 2: Further, Ambrose says [*Cf. Hypognosticon iii, an anonymous work falsely ascribed to St. Augustine] that “Penance is a very good thing, for it restores every defect to a state of perfection.” But this would not be true unless virtues were recovered in equal measure. Therefore equal virtue is always recovered through Penance.

Objection 3: Further, on Gn. 1:5: “There was evening and morning, one day,” a gloss says: “The evening light is that from which we fall the morning light is that to which we rise again.” Now the morning light is greater than the evening light. Therefore a man rises to greater grace or charity than that which he had before; which is confirmed by the Apostle’s words (Rom. 5:20): “Where sin abounded, grace did more abound.”

On the contrary, Charity whether proficient or perfect is greater than incipient charity. But sometimes a man falls from proficient charity, and rises again to incipient charity. Therefore man always rises again to less virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[86], A[6], ad 3; Q[89], A[1], ad 2), the movement of the free-will, in the justification of the ungodly, is the ultimate disposition to grace; so that in the same instant there is infusion of grace together with the aforesaid movement of the free-will, as stated in the [4801]FS, Q[113], AA[5],7, which movement includes an act of penance, as stated above (Q[86], A[2]). But it is evident that forms which admit of being more or less, become intense or remiss, according to the different dispositions of the subject, as stated in the [4802]FS, Q[52], AA[1],2; [4803]FS, Q[66], A[1]. Hence it is that, in Penance, according to the degree of intensity or remissness in the movement of the free-will, the penitent receives greater or lesser grace. Now the intensity of the penitent’s movement may be proportionate sometimes to a greater grace than that from which man fell by sinning, sometimes to an equal grace, sometimes to a lesser. Wherefore the penitent sometimes arises to a greater grace than that which he had before, sometimes to an equal, sometimes to a lesser grace: and the same applies to the virtues, which flow from grace.

Reply to Objection 1: The very fact of falling away from the love of God by sin, does not work unto the good of all those who love God, which is evident in the case of those who fall and never rise again, or who rise and fall yet again; but only to the good of “such as according to His purpose are called to be saints,” viz. the predestined, who, however often they may fall, yet rise again finally. Consequently good comes of their falling, not that they always rise again to greater grace, but that they rise to more abiding grace, not indeed on the part of grace itself, because the greater the grace, the more abiding it is, but on the part of man, who, the more careful and humble he is, abides the more steadfastly in grace. Hence the same gloss adds that "their fall conduces to their good, because they rise more humble and more enlightened."

Reply to Objection 2: Penance, considered in itself, has the power to bring all defects back to perfection, and even to advance man to a higher state; but this is sometimes hindered on the part of man, whose movement towards God and in detestation of sin is too remiss, just as in Baptism adults receive a greater or a lesser grace, according to the various ways in which they prepare themselves.

Reply to Objection 3: This comparison of the two graces to the evening and morning light is made on account of a likeness of order, since the darkness of night follows after the evening light, and the light of day after the light of morning, but not on account of a likeness of greater or lesser quantity. Again, this saying of the Apostle refers to the grace of Christ, which abounds more than any number of man's sins. Nor is it true of all, that the more their sins abound, the more abundant grace they receive, if we measure habitual grace by the quantity. Grace is, however, more abundant, as regards the very notion of grace, because to him who sins more a more "gratuitous" favor is vouchsafed by his pardon; although sometimes those whose sins abound, abound also in sorrow, so that they receive a more abundant habit of grace and virtue, as was the case with Magdalen.

To the argument advanced in the contrary sense it must be replied that in one and the same man proficient grace is greater than incipient grace, but this is not necessarily the case in different men, for one begins with a greater grace than another has in the state of proficiency: thus Gregory says (Dial. ii, 1): "Let all, both now and hereafter, acknowledge how perfectly the boy Benedict turned to the life of grace from the very beginning."

Whether, by Penance, man is restored to his former dignity?

Objection 1: It would seem that man is not restored by Penance to his former dignity: because a gloss on Amos 5:2, "The virgin of Israel is cast down," observes: "It is not said that she cannot rise up, but that the virgin of Israel shall not rise; because the sheep that has once strayed, although the shepherd bring it back on his shoulder, has not the same glory as if it had never strayed." Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says: "Whoever fail to preserve the dignity of the sacred order, must be content with saving their souls; for it is a difficult thing to return to their former degree." Again, Pope Innocent I says (Ep. vi ad Agapit.) that "the canons framed at the council of Nicaea exclude penitents from even the lowest orders of clerics." Therefore man does not, through Penance, recover his former dignity.

Objection 3: Further, before sinning a man can advance to a higher sacred order. But this is not permitted to a penitent after his sin, for it is written (Ezech. 44:10, 13): "The Levites that went away . . . from Me . . . shall never [Vulg.: 'not'] come near to Me, to do the office of priest": and as laid down in the Decretals (Dist. 1, ch. 52), and taken from the council of Lerida: "If those who serve at the Holy Altar fall suddenly into some deplorable weakness of the flesh, and by God's mercy do proper penance, let them return to their duties, yet so as not to receive further promotion." Therefore Penance does not restore man to his former dignity.

On the contrary, As we read in the same Distinction, Gregory writing to Secundinus (Regist. vii) says: "We consider that when a man has made proper satisfaction, he may return to his honorable position": and moreover we read in the acts of the council of Agde: "Contumacious clerics, so far as their position allows, should be corrected by their bishops. so that when Penance has reformed them, they may recover their degree and dignity."

I answer that, By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. one is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance, which is signified (Lk. 15) in the prodigal son, for when he repented, his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity, viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son boasted saying (Lk. 15:29): "Behold, for so many years do I serve thee, and I have never transgressed thy commandments": and this dignity the penitent cannot recover. Nevertheless he recovers something greater sometimes; because as Gregory says (Hom. de centum Ovibus, 34 in Evang.), "those who acknowledge themselves to have strayed away from God, make up for their past losses, by subsequent gains: so that there is more joy in heaven on their account, even as in battle, the commanding officer thinks more of the soldier who, after running away, returns and bravely attacks the foe, than of one who has never turned his back, but has done nothing brave."

By sin man loses his ecclesiastical dignity, because thereby he becomes unworthy of those things which appertain to the exercise of the ecclesiastical dignity. This he is debarred from recovering: first, because he fails to repent; wherefore Isidore wrote to the bishop Masso, and as we read in the Distinction quoted above (OBJ[3]): "The canons order those to be restored to their former degree, who by repentance have made satisfaction for their sins, or have made worthy confession of them. On the other hand, those who do not mend their corrupt and wicked ways are neither allowed to exercise their order, nor received to the grace of communion."

Secondly, because he does penance negligently, wherefore it is written in the same Distinction (OBJ 3): "We can be sure that those who show no signs of humble compunction, or of earnest prayer, who avoid fasting or study, would exercise their former duties with great negligence if they were restored to them."

Thirdly, if he has committed a sin to which an irregularity is attached; wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (OBJ[3]), quoting the council of Pope Martin [*Martin, bishop of Braga]: "If a man marry a widow or the relict of another, he must not be admitted to the ranks of the clergy: and if he has succeeded in creeping in, he must be turned out. In like manner, if anyone after Baptism be guilty of homicide, whether by deed, or by command, or by counsel, or in self-defense." But this is in consequence not of sin, but of irregularity.

Fourthly, on account of scandal, wherefore it is said in the same Distinction (OBJ[3]): "Those who have been publicly convicted or caught in the act of perjury, robbery, fornication, and of such like crimes, according to the prescription of the sacred canons must be deprived of the exercise of their respective orders, because it is a scandal to God's people that such persons should be placed over them. But those who commit such sins occultly and confess them secretly to a priest, may be retained in the exercise of their respective orders, with the assurance of God's merciful forgiveness, provided they be careful to expiate their sins by fasts and alms, vigils and holy deeds." The same is expressed (Extra, De Qual. Ordinand.):

“If the aforesaid crimes are not proved by a judicial process, or in some other way made notorious, those who are guilty of them must not be hindered, after they have done penance, from exercising the orders they have received, or from receiving further orders, except in cases of homicide.”

Reply to Objection 1: The same is to be said of the recovery of virginity as of the recovery of innocence which belongs to man’s secondary dignity in the sight of God.

Reply to Objection 2: In these words Jerome does not say that it is impossible, but that it is difficult, for man to recover his former dignity after having sinned, because this is allowed to none but those who repent perfectly, as stated above. To those canonical statutes, which seem to forbid this, Augustine replies in his letter to Boniface (Ep. clxxxv): “If the law of the Church forbids anyone, after doing penance for a crime, to become a cleric, or to return to his clerical duties, or to retain them the intention was not to deprive him of the hope of pardon, but to preserve the rigor of discipline; else we should have to deny the keys given to the Church, of which it was said: ‘Whatsoever you shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.’” And further on he adds: “For holy David did penance for his deadly crimes, and yet he retained his dignity; and Blessed Peter by shedding most bitter tears did indeed repent him of having denied his Lord, and yet he remained an apostle. Nevertheless we must not deem the care of later teachers excessive, who without endangering a man’s salvation, exacted more from his humility, having, in my opinion, found by experience, that some assumed a pretended repentance through hankering after honors and power.”

Reply to Objection 3: This statute is to be understood as applying to those who do public penance, for these cannot be promoted to a higher order. For Peter, after his denial, was made shepherd of Christ’s sheep, as appears from Jn. 21:21, where Chrysostom comments as follows: “After his denial and repentance Peter gives proof of greater confidence in Christ: for whereas, at the supper, he durst not ask Him, but deputed John to ask in his stead, afterwards he was placed at the head of his brethren, and not only did not depute another to ask for him, what concerned him, but henceforth asks the Master instead of John.”

Whether virtuous deeds done in charity can be deadened?

Objection 1: It would seem that virtuous deeds done in charity cannot be deadened. For that which is not cannot be changed. But to be deadened is to be changed from life to death. Since therefore virtuous deeds, after being done, are no more, it seems that they cannot afterwards be deadened.

Objection 2: Further, by virtuous deeds done in charity, man merits eternal life. But to take away the reward from one who has merited it is an injustice, which cannot be ascribed to God. Therefore it is not possible for virtuous deeds done in charity to be deadened by a subsequent sin.

Objection 3: Further, the strong is not corrupted by the weak. Now works of charity are stronger than any sins, because, as it is written (Prov. 10:12), “charity covereth all sins.” Therefore it seems that deeds done in charity cannot be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ezech. 18:24): “If the just man turn himself away from his justice . . . all his justices which he hath done shall not be remembered.”

I answer that, A living thing, by dying, ceases to have vital operations: for which reason, by a kind of metaphor, a thing is said to be deadened when it is hindered from producing its proper effect or operation.

Now the effect of virtuous works, which are done in charity, is to bring man to eternal life; and this is hindered by a subsequent mortal sin, inasmuch as it takes away grace. Wherefore deeds done in charity are said to be deadened by a subsequent mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as sinful deeds pass as to the act but remain as to guilt, so deeds done in charity, after passing, as to the act, remain as to merit, in so far as they are acceptable to God. It is in this respect that they are deadened, inasmuch as man is hindered from receiving his reward.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no injustice in withdrawing the reward from him who has deserved it, if he has made himself unworthy by his subsequent fault, since at times a man justly forfeits through his own fault, even that which he has already received.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not on account of the strength of sinful deeds that deeds, previously done in charity, are deadened, but on account of the freedom of the will which can be turned away from good to evil.

Objection 1: It would seem that deeds deadened by sin are not revived by Penance. Because just as past sins are remitted by subsequent Penance, so are deeds previously done in charity, deadened by subsequent sin. But sins remitted by Penance do not return, as stated above ([4804]Q[88], AA[1],2). Therefore it seems that neither are dead deeds revived by charity.

Objection 2: Further, deeds are said to be deadened by comparison with animals who die, as stated above [4805](A[4]). But a dead animal cannot be revived. Therefore neither can dead works be revived by Penance.

Objection 3: Further, deeds done in charity are deserving of glory according to the quantity of grace or charity. But sometimes man arises through Penance to lesser grace or charity. Therefore he does not receive glory according to the merit of his previous works; so that it seems that deeds deadened by sin are not revived.

On the contrary, on Joel 2:25, “I will restore to you the years, which the locust . . . hath eaten,” a gloss says: “I will not suffer to perish the fruit which you lost when your soul was disturbed.” But this fruit is the merit of good works which was lost through sin. Therefore meritorious deeds done before are revived by Penance.

I answer that, Some have said that meritorious works deadened by subsequent sin are not revived by the ensuing Penance, because they deemed such works to have passed away, so that they could not be revived. But that is no reason why they should not be revived: because they are conducive to eternal life (wherein their life consists) not only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist actually, and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, they abide thus, so far as they are concerned, even after they have been deadened by sin, because those works, according as they were done, will ever be acceptable to God and give joy to the saints, according to Apoc. 3:11: “Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take thy crown.” That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did them, to eternal life, is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he is become unworthy of eternal life. But this impediment is removed by Penance, inasmuch as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their efficacy in bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in other words, they are revived. It is therefore evident that deadened works are revived by Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: The very works themselves of sin are removed by Penance, so that, by God's mercy, no further stain or debt of punishment is incurred on their account: on the other hand, works done in charity are not removed by God, since they abide in His acceptance, but they are hindered on the part of the man who does them; wherefore if this hindrance, on the part of the man who does those works, be removed, God on His side fulfills what those works deserved.

Reply to Objection 2: Deeds done in charity are not in themselves deadened, as explained above, but only with regard to a supervening impediment on the part of the man who does them. On the other hand, an animal dies in itself, through being deprived of the principle of life: so that the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: He who, through Penance, arises to lesser charity, will receive the essential reward according to the degree of charity in which he is found. Yet he will have greater joy for the works he had done in his former charity, than for those which he did in his subsequent charity: and this joy belongs to the accidental reward.

Whether the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works?

Objection 1: It would seem that the effect of subsequent Penance is to quicken even dead works, those, namely, that were not done in charity. For it seems more difficult to bring to life that which has been deadened, since this is never done naturally, than to quicken that which never had life, since certain living things are engendered naturally from things without life. Now deadened works are revived by Penance, as stated above [4806](A[5]). Much more, therefore, are dead works revived.

Objection 2: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the cause of the lack of life in works generically good done without charity, was the lack of charity and grace. which lack is removed by Penance. Therefore dead works are quickened by charity.

Objection 3: Further, Jerome in commenting on Agg. i, 6: "You have sowed much," says: "If at any time you find a sinner, among his many evil deeds, doing that which is right, God is not so unjust as to forget the few good deeds on account of his many evil deeds." Now this seems to be the case chiefly when past evil "deeds" are removed by Penance. Therefore it seems that through Penance, God rewards the former deeds done in the state of sin, which implies that they are quickened.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:3): "If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." But this would not be true, if, at least by subsequent Penance, they were quickened. Therefore Penance does not quicken works which before were dead.

I answer that, A work is said to be dead in two ways: first, effectively, because, to wit, it is a cause of death, in which sense sinful works are said to be dead, according to Heb. 9:14: "The blood of Christ . . . shall cleanse our conscience from dead works." These dead works are not quickened but removed by Penance, according to Heb. 6:1: "Not laying again the foundation of Penance from dead works." Secondly, works are said to be dead privatively, because, to wit, they lack spiritual life, which is founded on charity, whereby the soul is united to God, the result being that it is quickened as the body by the soul: in which sense too, faith, if it lack charity, is said to be dead, according to James 2:20: "Faith without works is dead." In this way also, all works that are generically good, are said to be dead, if they be done without charity, inasmuch as they fail to proceed from the principle of life; even as we might call the sound of a harp, a dead voice. Accordingly, the difference of life and death in works is in relation to the principle from which they proceed. But works cannot proceed a second time from a principle, because they are transitory, and the same identical deed cannot be resumed. Therefore it is impossible for dead works to be quickened by Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: In the physical order things whether dead or deadened lack the principle of life. But works are said to be deadened, not in relation to the principle whence they proceeded, but in relation to an extrinsic impediment; while they are said to be dead in relation to a principle. Consequently there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 2: Works generically good done without charity are said to be dead on account of the lack of grace and charity, as principles. Now the subsequent Penance does not supply that want, so as to make them proceed from such a principle. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: God remembers the good deeds a man does when in a state of sin, not by rewarding them in eternal life, which is due only to living works, i.e. those done from charity, but by a temporal reward: thus Gregory declares (Hom. de Divite et Lazaro, 41 in Evang.) that “unless that rich man had done some good deed, and had received his reward in this world, Abraham would certainly not have said to him: ‘Thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.’” Or again, this may mean that he will be judged less severely: wherefore Augustine says (De Patientia xxvi): “We cannot say that it would be better for the schismatic that by denying Christ he should suffer none of those things which he suffered by confessing Him; but we must believe that he will be judged with less severity, than if by denying Christ, he had suffered none of those things. Thus the words of the Apostle, ‘If I should deliver my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing,’ refer to the obtaining of the kingdom of heaven, and do not exclude the possibility of being sentenced with less severity at the last judgment.”

OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN GENERAL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the parts of Penance: (1) in general. (2) each one in particular.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Penance has any parts?

(2) Of the number of its parts;

(3) What kind of parts are they?

(4) Of its division into subjective parts.

Whether Penance should be assigned any parts?

Objection 1: It would seem that parts should not be assigned to Penance. For it is the Divine power that works our salvation most secretly in the sacraments. Now the Divine power is one and simple. Therefore Penance, being a sacrament, should have no parts assigned to it.

Objection 2: Further, Penance is both a virtue and a sacrament. Now no parts are assigned to it as a virtue, since virtue is a habit, which is a simple quality of the mind. In like manner, it seems that parts should not be assigned to Penance as a sacrament, because no parts are assigned to Baptism and the other sacraments. Therefore no parts at all should be assigned to Penance.

Objection 3: Further, the matter of Penance is sin, as stated above ([4807]Q[84], A[2]). But no parts are assigned to sin. Neither, therefore, should parts be assigned to Penance.

On the contrary, The parts of a thing are those out of which the whole is composed. Now the perfection of Penance is composed of several things, viz. contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Therefore Penance has parts.

I answer that, The parts of a thing are those into which the whole is divided materially, for the parts of a thing are to the whole, what matter is to the form; wherefore the parts are reckoned as a kind of material cause, and the whole as a kind of formal cause (Phys. ii). Accordingly wherever, on the part of matter, we find a kind of plurality, there we shall find a reason for assigning parts.

Now it has been stated above (Q[84], AA[2],3), that, in the sacrament of Penance, human actions stand as matter: and so, since several actions are requisite for the perfection of Penance, viz., contrition, confession, and satisfaction, as we shall show further on [4808](A[2]), it follows that the sacrament of Penance has parts.

Reply to Objection 1: Every sacrament is something simple by reason of the Divine power, which operates therein: but the Divine power is so great that it can operate both through one and through many, and by reason of these many, parts may be assigned to a particular sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Parts are not assigned to penance as a virtue: because the human acts of which there are several in penance, are related to the habit of virtue, not as its parts, but as its effects. It follows, therefore, that parts are assigned to Penance as a sacrament, to which the human acts are related as matter: whereas in the other sacraments the matter does not consist of human acts, but of some one external thing, either simple, as water or oil, or compound, as chrism, and so parts are not assigned to the other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: Sins are the remote matter of Penance, inasmuch, to wit, as they are the matter or object of the human acts, which are the proper matter of Penance as a sacrament.

Whether contrition, confession, and satisfaction are fittingly assigned as parts of Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that contrition, confession, and satisfaction are not fittingly assigned as parts of Penance. For contrition is in the heart, and so belongs to interior penance; while confession consists of words, and satisfaction in deeds; so that the two latter belong to interior penance. Now interior penance is not a sacrament, but only exterior penance which is perceptible by the senses. Therefore these three parts are not fittingly assigned to the sacrament of Penance.

Objection 2: Further, grace is conferred in the sacraments of the New Law, as stated above ([4809]Q[62], AA[1],3). But no grace is conferred in satisfaction. Therefore satisfaction is not part of a sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, the fruit of a thing is not the same as its part. But satisfaction is a fruit of penance, according to Lk. 3:8: “Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance.” Therefore it is not a part of Penance.

Objection 4: Further, Penance is ordained against sin. But sin can be completed merely in the thought by consent, as stated in the [4810]FS, Q[72], A[7]: therefore Penance can also. Therefore confession in word and satisfaction in deed should not be reckoned as parts of Penance.

On the contrary, It seems that yet more parts should be assigned to Penance. For not only is the body assigned as a part of man, as being the matter, but also the soul, which is his form. But the aforesaid three, being the acts of the penitent, stand as matter, while the priestly absolution stands as form. Therefore the priestly absolution should be assigned as a fourth part of Penance.

I answer that, A part is twofold, essential and quantitative. The essential parts are naturally the form and the matter, and logically the genus and the difference. In this way, each sacrament is divided into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said above (Q[60], AA[5],6) that sacraments consist of things and words. But since quantity is on the part of matter, quantitative parts are parts of matter: and, in this way, as stated above [4811](A[1]), parts are assigned specially to the sacrament of Penance, as regards the acts of the penitent, which are the matter of this sacrament.

Now it has been said above ([4812]Q[85], A[3], ad 3) that an offense is atoned otherwise in Penance than in vindictive justice. Because, in vindictive justice the atonement is made according to the judge’s decision, and not according to the discretion of the offender or of the person offended; whereas, in Penance, the offense is atoned according to the will of the sinner, and the judgment of God against Whom the sin was committed, because in the latter case we seek not only the restoration of the equality of justice, as in vindictive justice, but also and still more the reconciliation of friendship, which is accomplished by the offender making atonement according to the will of the person offended. Accordingly the first requisite on the part of the penitent is the will to atone, and this is done by contrition; the second is that he submit to the judgment of the priest standing in God’s place, and this is done in confession; and the third is that he atone according to the decision of God’s minister, and this is done in satisfaction: and so contrition, confession, and satisfaction are assigned as parts of Penance.

Reply to Objection 1: Contrition, as to its essence, is in the heart, and belongs to interior penance; yet, virtually, it belongs to exterior penance, inasmuch as it implies the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 2: Satisfaction confers grace, in so far as it is in man’s purpose, and it increases grace, according as it is accomplished, just as Baptism does in adults, as stated above ([4813]Q[68], A[2];[4814] Q[69], A[8]).

Reply to Objection 3: Satisfaction is a part of Penance as a sacrament, and a fruit of penance as a virtue.

Reply to Objection 4: More things are required for good, “which proceeds from a cause that is entire,” than for evil, “which results from each single defect,” as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). And thus, although sin is completed in the consent of the heart, yet the perfection of Penance requires contrition of the heart, together with confession in word and satisfaction in deed.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

Whether these three are integral parts of Penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that these three are not integral parts of Penance. For, as stated above ([4815]Q[84], A[3]), Penance is ordained against sin. But sins of thought, word, and deed are the subjective and not integral parts of sin, because sin is predicated of each one of them.

Therefore in Penance also, contrition in thought, confession in word, and satisfaction in deed are not integral parts.

Objection 2: Further, no integral part includes within itself another that is condivided with it. But contrition includes both confession and satisfaction in the purpose of amendment. Therefore they are not integral parts.

Objection 3: Further, a whole is composed of its integral parts, taken at the same time and equally, just as a line is made up of its parts. But such is not the case here. Therefore these are not integral parts of Penance.

On the contrary, Integral parts are those by which the perfection of the whole is integrated. But the perfection of Penance is integrated by these three. Therefore they are integral parts of Penance.

I answer that, Some have said that these three are subjective parts of Penance. But this is impossible, because the entire power of the whole is present in each subjective part at the same time and equally, just as the entire power of an animal, as such, is assured to each animal species, all of which species divide the animal genus at the same time and equally: which does not apply to the point in question. Wherefore others have said that these are potential parts: yet neither can this be true, since the whole is present, as to the entire essence, in each potential part, just as the entire essence of the soul is present in each of its powers: which does not apply to the case in point. Therefore it follows that these three are integral parts of Penance, the nature of which is that the whole is not present in each of the parts, either as to its entire power, or as to its entire essence, but that it is present to all of them together at the same time.

Reply to Objection 1: Sin forasmuch as it is an evil, can be completed in one single point, as stated above (A[2], ad 4); and so the sin which is completed in thought alone, is a special kind of sin. Another species is the sin that is completed in thought and word: and yet a third species is the sin that is completed in thought, word, and deed; and the quasi-integral parts of this last sin, are that which is in thought, that which is in word, and that which is in deed. Wherefore these three are the integral parts of Penance, which is completed in them.

Reply to Objection 2: One integral part can include the whole, though not as to its essence: because the foundation, in a way, contains virtually the whole building. In this way contrition includes virtually the whole of Penance.

Reply to Objection 3: All integral parts have a certain relation of order to one another: but some are only related as to position, whether in sequence as the parts of an army, or by contact, as the parts of a heap, or by being fitted together, as the parts of a house, or by continuation, as the parts of a line; while some are related, in addition, as to power, as the parts of an animal, the first of which is the heart, the others in a certain order being dependent on one another: and thirdly some are related in the order of time: as the parts of time and movement. Accordingly the parts of Penance are related to one another in the order of power and time, since they are actions, but not in the order of position, since they do not occupy a place.

Whether Penance is fittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal sins, and penance for venial sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance is unfittingly divided into penance before Baptism, penance for mortal, and penance for venial sins. For Penance is the second plank after shipwreck, as stated above ([4816]Q[84], A[6]), while Baptism is the first. Therefore that which precedes Baptism should not be called a species of penance.

Objection 2: Further, that which can destroy the greater, can destroy the lesser. Now mortal sin is greater than venial; and penance which regards mortal sins regards also venial sins. Therefore they should not be considered as different species of penance.

Objection 3: Further, just as after Baptism man commits venial and mortal sins, so does he before Baptism. If therefore penance for venial sins is distinct from penance for mortal sins after Baptism, in like manner they should be distinguished before Baptism. Therefore penance is not fittingly divided into these species.

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*Cf. Hom. 30 inter 1] that these three are species of Penance.

I answer that, This is a division of penance as a virtue. Now it must be observed that every virtue acts in accordance with the time being, as also in keeping with other due circumstances, wherefore the virtue of penance has its act at this time, according to the requirements of the New Law.

Now it belongs to penance to detest one’s past sins, and to purpose, at the same time, to change one’s life for the better, which is the end, so to speak, of penance. And since moral matters take their species from the end, as stated in the [4817]FS, Q[1], A[3]; FS, 18, AA[4],6, it is reasonable to distinguish various species of penance, according to the various changes intended by the penitent.

Accordingly there is a threefold change intended by the penitent. The first is by regeneration unto a new life, and this belongs to that penance which precedes Baptism. The second is by reforming one’s past life after it has been already destroyed, and this belongs to penance for mortal sins committed after Baptism. The third is by changing to a more perfect operation of life, and this belongs to penance for venial sins, which are remitted through a fervent act of charity, as stated above ([4818]Q[87], AA[2],3).

Reply to Objection 1: The penance which precedes Baptism is not a sacrament, but an act of virtue disposing one to that sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: The penance which washes away mortal sins, washes away venial sins also, but the converse does not hold. Wherefore these two species of penance are related to one another as perfect and imperfect.

Reply to Objection 3: Before Baptism there are no venial sins without mortal sins. And since a venial sin cannot be remitted without mortal sin, as stated above ([4819]Q[87], A[4]), before Baptism, penance for mortal sins is not distinct from penance for venial sins.

SUPPLEMENT

SUPPLEMENT (XP): TO THE THIRD PART OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS GATHERED FROM HIS COMMENTARY ON BOOK IV OF THE SENTENCES (QQ[1] -99)

EDITOR’S NOTE:

After writing these few questions of the treatise on Penance, St. Thomas was called to the heavenly reward which he had merited by writing so well of his Divine Master. The remainder of the Summa Theologica, known as the Supplement, was compiled probably by Fra Rainaldo da Piperno, companion and friend of the Angelic Doctor, and was gathered from St. Thomas’s commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences of Peter Lombard. This commentary was written in the years 1235–1253, while St. Thomas was under thirty years of age. Everywhere it reveals the influence of him whom St. Thomas always called the Master. But that influence was not to be always supreme. That the mind of the Angelic Doctor moved forward to positions which directly contradicted the Master may be seen by any student of the Summa Theologica. The compiler of the Supplement was evidently well acquainted with the commentary on the Sentences, which had been in circulation for some twenty years or more, but it is probable that he was badly acquainted with the Summa Theologica. This will be realized and must be borne in mind when we read the Supplement, notably [4820]TP, Q[62], A[1]; also Q[43], A[3], ad 2 of the Supplement.

OF THE PARTS OF PENANCE, IN PARTICULAR, AND FIRST OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider each single part of Penance, and (1) Contrition; (2) Confession; (3) Satisfaction. The consideration about Contrition will be fourfold: (1) What is it? (2) What should it be about? (3) How great should it be? (4) Of its duration; (5) Of its effect.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Contrition is suitably defined?

(2) Whether it is an act of virtue?

(3) Whether attrition can become contrition?

Whether contrition is an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them?

Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not “an assumed sorrow for sins, together with the purpose of confessing them and of making satisfaction for them,” as some define it. For, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6), “sorrow is for those things that happen against our will.” But this does not apply to sin. Therefore contrition is not sorrow for sins.

Objection 2: Further, contrition is given us by God. But what is given is not assumed. Therefore contrition is not an assumed sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, satisfaction and confession are necessary for the remission of the punishment which was not remitted by contrition. But sometimes the whole punishment is remitted in contrition. Therefore it is not always necessary for the contrite person to have the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.

On the contrary, stands the definition.

I answer that, As stated in Ecclus. 10:15, “pride is the beginning of all sin,” because thereby man clings to his own judgment, and strays from the Divine commandments. Consequently that which destroys sin must needs make man give up his own judgment. Now he that persists in his own judgment, is called metaphorically rigid and hard: wherefore anyone is said to be broken when he is torn from his own judgment. But, in material things, whence these expressions are transferred to spiritual things, there is a difference between breaking and crushing or contrition, as stated in Meteor. iv, in that we speak of breaking when a thing is sundered into large parts, but of crushing or contrition when that which was in itself solid is reduced to minute particles. And since, for the remission of sin, it is necessary that man should put aside entirely his attachment to sin, which implies a certain state of continuity and solidity in his mind, therefore it is that the act through which sin is cast aside is called contrition metaphorically.

In this contrition several things are to be observed, viz. the very substance of the act, the way of acting, its origin and its effect: in respect of which we find that contrition has been defined in various ways. For, as regards the substance of the act, we have the definition given above: and since the act of contrition is both an act of virtue, and a part of the sacrament of Penance, its nature as an act of virtue is explained in this definition by mentioning its genus, viz. “sorrow,” its object by the words “for sins,” and the act of choice which is necessary for an act of virtue, by the word “assumed”: while, as a part of the sacrament, it is made manifest by pointing out its relation to the other parts, in the words “together with the purpose of confessing and of making satisfaction.”

There is another definition which defines contrition, only as an act of virtue; but at the same time including the difference which confines it to a special virtue, viz. penance, for it is thus expressed: “Contrition is voluntary sorrow for sin whereby man punishes in himself that which he grieves to have done,” because the addition of the word “punishes” defines the definition to a special virtue. Another definition is given by Isidore (De Sum. Bono ii, 12) as follows: “Contrition is a tearful sorrow and humility of mind, arising from remembrance of sin and fear of the Judgment.” Here we have an allusion to the derivation of the word, when it is said that it is “humility of the mind,” because just as pride makes the mind rigid, so is a man humbled, when contrition leads him to give up his mind. Also the external manner is indicated by the word “tearful,” and the origin of contrition, by the words, “arising from remembrance of sin,” etc. Another definition is taken from the words of Augustine [*Implicitly on Ps. 46], and indicates the effect of contrition. It runs thus: “Contrition is the sorrow which takes away sin.” Yet another is gathered from the words of Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 11) as follows: “Contrition is humility of the soul, crushing sin between hope and fear.” Here the derivation is indicated by saying that contrition is “humility of the soul”; the effect, by the words, “crushing sin”; and the origin, by the words, “between hope and fear.” Indeed, it includes not only the principal cause, which is fear, but also its joint cause, which is hope, without which, fear might lead to despair.

Reply to Objection 1: Although sins, when committed, were voluntary, yet when we are contrite for them, they are no longer voluntary, so that they occur against our will; not indeed in respect of the will that we had when we consented to them, but in respect of that which we have now, so as to wish they had never been.

Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is from God alone as to the form that quickens it, but as to the substance of the act, it is from the free-will and from God, Who operates in all works both of nature and of will.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the entire punishment may be remitted by contrition, yet confession and satisfaction are still necessary, both because man cannot be sure that his contrition was sufficient to take away all, and because confession and satisfaction are a matter of precept: wherefore he becomes a transgressor, who confesses not and makes not satisfaction.

Whether contrition is an act of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not an act of virtue. For passions are not acts of virtue, since "they bring us neither praise nor blame" (Ethic. ii, 5). But sorrow is a passion. As therefore contrition is sorrow, it seems that it is not an act of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, as contrition is so called from its being a crushing, so is attrition. Now all agree in saying that attrition is not an act of virtue. Neither, therefore, is contrition an act of virtue.

On the contrary, Nothing but an act of virtue is meritorious. But contrition is a meritorious act. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

I answer that, Contrition as to the literal signification of the word, does not denote an act of virtue, but a corporeal passion. But the question in point does not refer to contrition in this sense, but to that which the word is employed to signify by way of metaphor. For just as the inflation of one's own will unto wrong-doing implies, in itself, a generic evil, so the utter undoing and crushing of that same will implies something generically good, for this is to detest one's own will whereby sin was committed. Wherefore contrition, which signifies this, implies rectitude of the will; and so it is the act of that virtue to which it belongs to detest and destroy past sins, the act, to wit, of penance, as is evident from what was said above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q[1], A[1]; [4821]TP, Q[85], AA[2],3).

Reply to Objection 1: Contrition includes a twofold sorrow for sin. One is in the sensitive part, and is a passion. This does not belong essentially to contrition as an act of virtue, but is rather its effect. For just as the virtue of penance inflicts outward punishment on the body, in order to compensate for the offense done to God through the instrumentality of the bodily members, so does it inflict on the concupiscible part of the soul a punishment, viz. the aforesaid sorrow, because the concupiscible also co-operated in the sinful deeds. Nevertheless this sorrow may belong to contrition taken as part of the sacrament, since the nature of a sacrament is such that it consists not only of internal but also of external acts and sensible things. The other sorrow is in the will, and is nothing else save displeasure for some evil, for the emotions of the will are named after the passions, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 26, Q[1], A[5]; [4822]FS, Q[22], A[3], ad 3). Accordingly, contrition is essentially a kind of sorrow, and is an act of the virtue of penance.

Reply to Objection 2: Attrition denotes approach to perfect contrition, wherefore in corporeal matters, things are said to be attrite, when they are worn away to a certain extent, but not altogether crushed to pieces; while they are said to be contrite, when all the parts are crushed [tritae] minutely. Wherefore, in spiritual matters, attrition signifies a certain but not a perfect displeasure for sins committed, whereas contrition denotes perfect displeasure.

Whether attrition can become contrition?

Objection 1: It would seem that attrition can become contrition. For contrition differs from attrition, as living from dead. Now dead faith becomes living. Therefore attrition can become contrition.

Objection 2: Further, matter receives perfection when privation is removed. Now sorrow is to grace, as matter to form, because grace quickens sorrow. Therefore the sorrow that was previously lifeless, while guilt remained, receives perfection through being quickened by grace: and so the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, Things which are caused by principles altogether diverse cannot be changed, one into the other. Now the principle of attrition is servile fear, while filial fear is the cause of contrition. Therefore attrition cannot become contrition.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question: for some say that attrition may become contrition, even as lifeless faith becomes living faith. But, seemingly, this is impossible; since, although the habit of lifeless faith becomes living, yet never does an act of lifeless faith become an act of living faith, because the lifeless act passes away and remains no more, as soon as charity comes. Now attrition and contrition do not denote a habit, but an act only: and those habits of infused virtue which regard the will cannot be lifeless, since they result from charity, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 27, Q[2], A[4]; [4823]FS, Q[65], A[4]). Wherefore until grace be infused, there is no habit by which afterwards the act of contrition may be elicited; so that attrition can nowise become attrition: and this is the other opinion.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no comparison between faith and contrition, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: When the privation is removed from matter, the matter is quickened if it remains when the perfection comes. But the sorrow which was lifeless, does not remain when charity comes, wherefore it cannot be quickened.

It may also be replied that matter does not take its origin from the form essentially, as an act takes its origin from the habit which quickens it. Wherefore nothing hinders matter being quickened anew by some form, whereby it was not quickened previously: whereas this cannot be said of an act, even as it is impossible for the identically same thing to arise from a cause wherefrom it did not arise before, since a thing is brought into being but once.

OF THE OBJECT OF CONTRITION (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of contrition. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man should be contrite on account of his punishment?

(2) Whether, on account of original sin?

(3) Whether, for every actual sin he has committed?

(4) Whether, for actual sins he will commit?

(5) Whether, for the sins of others?

(6) Whether, for each single mortal sin?

Whether man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that man should be contrite on account of the punishment, and not only on account of his sin. For Augustine says in De

Poenitentia [*Cf. Hom. 50 inter 1]: “No man desires life everlasting unless he repent of this mortal life.” But the morality of this life is a punishment. Therefore the penitent should be contrite on account of his punishments also.

Objection 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 16, cap. i), quoting Augustine (De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]), that the penitent should be sorry for having deprived himself of virtue. But privation of virtue is a punishment. Therefore contrition is sorrow for punishments also.

On the contrary, No one holds to that for which he is sorry. But a penitent, by the very signification of the word, is one who holds to his punishment [*”Poenitens,” i.e. “poenam tenens”]. Therefore he is not sorry on account of his punishment, so that contrition which is penitential sorrow is not on account of punishment.

I answer that, As stated above ([4824]Q[1], A[1]), contrition implies the crushing of something hard and whole. Now this wholeness and hardness is found in the evil of fault, since the will, which is the cause thereof in the evil-doer, sticks to its own ground*, and refuses to yield to the precept of the law, wherefore displeasure at a suchlike evil is called metaphorically “contrition.” [*There is a play on the words here—‘integer’ (whole) and ‘in suis terminis’ (to its own ground)]. But this metaphor cannot be applied to evil of punishment, because punishment simply denotes a lessening, so that it is possible to have sorrow for punishment but not contrition.

Reply to Objection 1: According to St. Augustine, penance should be on account of this mortal life, not by reason of its mortality (unless penance be taken broadly for every kind of sorrow); but by reason of sins, to which we are prone on account of the weakness of this life.

Reply to Objection 2: Sorrow for the loss of virtue through sin is not essentially the same as contrition, but is its principle. For just as we are moved to desire a thing on account of the good we expect to derive from it, so are we moved to be sorry for something on account of the evil accruing to us therefrom.

Whether contrition should be on account of original sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that contrition should be on account of original sin. For we ought to be contrite on account of actual sin; not by reason of the act, considered as a kind of being, but by reason of its deformity, since the act, regarded in its substance, is a good, and is from God. Now original sin has a deformity, even as actual sin has. Therefore we should be contrite on its account also.

Objection 2: Further, by original sin man has been turned away from God, since in punishment thereof he was to be deprived of seeing God. But every man should be displeased at having been turned away from God. Therefore man should be displeased at original sin; and so he ought to have contrition for it.

On the contrary, The medicine should be proportionate to the disease. Now we contracted original sin without willing to do so. Therefore it is not necessary that we should be cleansed from it by an act of the will, such as contrition is.

I answer that, Contrition is sorrow, as stated above ([4825]Q[1], AA[1],2), respecting and, so to speak, crushing the hardness of the will. Consequently it can regard those sins only which result in us through the hardness of our will. And as original sin was not brought upon us by our own will, but contracted from the origin of our infected nature, it follows that, properly speaking, we cannot have contrition on its account, but only displeasure or sorrow.

Reply to Objection 1: Contrition is for sin, not by reason of the mere substance of the act, because it does not derive the character of evil therefrom; nor again, by reason of its deformity alone, because deformity, of itself, does not include the notion of guilt, and sometimes denotes a punishment. But contrition ought to be on account of sin, as implying deformity resulting from an act of the will; and this does not apply to original sin, so that contrition does not apply to it.

The same Reply avails for the Second Objection, because contrition is due to aversion of the will.

Whether we should have contrition for every actual sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that we have no need to have contrition for every actual sin we have committed. For contraries are healed by their contraries. Now some sins are committed through sorrow, e.g. sloth and envy. Therefore their remedy should not be sorrow, such as contrition is, but joy.

Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of the will, which cannot refer to that which is not known. But there are sins of which we have no knowledge, such as those we have forgotten. Therefore we cannot have contrition for them.

Objection 3: Further, by voluntary contrition those sins are blotted out which we committed voluntarily. But ignorance takes away voluntariness, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore contrition need not cover things which have occurred through ignorance.

Objection 4: Further, we need not be contrite for a sin which is not removed by contrition. Now some sins are not removed by contrition, e.g. venial sins, that remain after the grace of contrition. Therefore there is no need to have contrition for all one's past sins.

On the contrary, Penance is a remedy for all actual sins. But penance cannot regard some sins, without contrition regarding them also, for it is the first part of Penance. Therefore contrition should be for all one's past sins.

Further, no sin is forgiven a man unless he be justified. But justification requires contrition, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]; [4826]FS, Q[113]). Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for all one's sins.

I answer that, Every actual sin is caused by our will not yielding to God's law, either by transgressing it, or by omitting it, or by acting beside it: and since a hard thing is one that is disposed not to give way easily, hence it is that a certain hardness of the will is to be found in every actual sin. Wherefore, if a sin is to be remedied, it needs to be taken away by contrition which crushes it.

Reply to Objection 1: As clearly shown above (A[2], ad 1), contrition is opposed to sin, in so far as it proceeds from the choice of the will that had failed to obey the command of God's law, and not as regards the material part of sin: and it is on this that the choice of the will falls. Now the will's choice falls not only on the acts of the other powers, which the will uses for its own end, but also on the will's own proper act: for the will wills to will something. Accordingly the will's choice falls on that pain or sadness which is to be found in the sin of envy and the like, whether such pain be in the senses or in the will itself. Consequently the sorrow of contrition is opposed to those sins.

Reply to Objection 2: One may forget a thing in two ways, either so that it escapes the memory altogether, and then one cannot search for it; or so that it escapes from the memory in part, and in part remains, as when I remember having heard something in general, but know not what it was in particular, and then I search my memory in order to discover it. Accordingly a sin also may be forgotten in two ways, either so as to remain in a general, but not in a particular remembrance, and then a man is bound to bethink himself in order to discover the sin, because he is bound to have contrition for each individual mortal sin. And if he is unable to discover it, after applying himself with due care, it is enough that he be contrite for it, according as it stands in his knowledge, and indeed he should grieve not only for the sin, but also for having forgotten it, because this is owing to his neglect. If, however, the sin has escaped from his memory altogether, then he is excused from his duty through being unable to fulfill it, and it is enough that he be contrite in general for everything wherein he has offended God. But when this inability is removed, as when the sin is recalled to his memory, then he is bound to have contrition for that sin in particular, even as a poor man, who cannot pay a debt, is excused, and yet is bound to, as soon as he can.

Reply to Objection 3: If ignorance were to remove altogether the will to do evil, it will excuse, and there would be no sin: and sometimes it does not remove the will altogether, and then it does not altogether excuse, but only to a certain extent: wherefore a man is bound to be contrite for a sin committed through ignorance.

Reply to Objection 4: A venial sin can remain after contrition for a mortal sin, but not after contrition for the venial sin: wherefore contrition should also cover venial sins even as penance does, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 16, Q[2], A[2], qu. 2; [4827]XP, Q[87], A[1]).

Whether a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man is bound to have contrition for his future sins also. For contrition is an act of the free-will: and the free-will extends to the future rather than to the past, since choice, which is an act of the free-will, is about future contingents, as stated in Ethic. iii. Therefore contrition is about future sins rather than about past sins.

Objection 2: Further, sin is aggravated by the result that ensues from it: wherefore Jerome says [*St. Basil asserts this implicitly in De Vera Virgin.] that the punishment of Arius is not yet ended, for it is yet possible for some to be ruined through his heresy, by reason of whose ruin his punishment would be increased: and the same applies to a man who is judged guilty of murder, if he has committed a murderous assault, even before his victim dies. Now the sinner ought to be contrite during that intervening time. Therefore the degree of his contrition ought to be proportionate not only to his past act, but also to its eventual result: and consequently contrition regards the future.

On the contrary, Contrition is a part of penance. But penance always regards the past: and therefore contrition does also, and consequently is not for a future sin.

I answer that, In every series of things moving and moved ordained to one another, we find that the inferior mover has its proper movement, and besides this, it follows, in some respect, the movement of the superior mover: this is seen in the movement of the planets, which, in addition to their proper movements, follow the movement of the first heaven. Now, in all the moral virtues, the first mover is prudence, which is called the charioteer of the virtues. Consequently each moral virtue, in addition to its proper movement, has something of the movement of prudence: and therefore, since penance is a moral virtue, as it is a part of justice, in addition to its own act, it acquires the movement of prudence. Now its proper movement is towards its proper object, which is a sin committed. Wherefore its proper and principal act, viz. contrition, essentially regards past sins alone; but, inasmuch as it acquires something of the act of prudence, it regards future sins indirectly, although it is not essentially moved towards those future sins. For this reason, he that is contrite, is sorry for his past sins, and is cautious of future sins. Yet we do not speak of contrition for future sins, but of caution, which is a part of prudence conjoined to penance.

Reply to Objection 1: The free-will is said to regard future contingents, in so far as it is concerned with acts, but not with the object of acts: because, of his own free-will, a man can think about past and necessary things, and yet the very act of thinking, in so far as it is subject to the free-will, is a future contingent. Hence the act the contrition also is a future contingent, in so far as it is subject to the free-will; and yet its object can be something past.

Reply to Objection 2: The consequent result which aggravates a sin was already present in the act as in its cause; wherefore when the sin was committed, its degree of gravity was already complete, and no further guilt accrued to it when the result took place. Nevertheless some accidental punishment accrues to it, in the respect of which the damned will have the more motives of regret for the more evils that have resulted from their sins. It is in this sense that Jerome [*Basil] speaks. Hence there is not need for contrition to be for other than past sins.

Whether a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought to have contrition for another’s sin. For one should not ask forgiveness for a sin unless one is contrite for it. Now forgiveness is asked for another’s sin in Ps. 18:13: “From those of others spare thy servant.” Therefore a man ought to be contrite for another’s sins.

Objection 2: Further, man is bound, ought of charity, to love his neighbor as himself. Now, through love of himself, he both grieves for his ills, and desires good things. Therefore, since we are bound to desire the goods of grace for our neighbor, as for ourselves, it seems that we ought to grieve for his sins, even as for our own. But contrition is nothing else than sorrow for sins. Therefore man should be contrite for the sins of others.

On the contrary, Contrition is an act of the virtue of penance. But no one repents save for what he has done himself. Therefore no one is contrite for others’ sins.

I answer that, The same thing is crushed [conteritur] which hitherto was hard and whole. Hence contrition for sin must needs be in the same subject in which the hardness of sin was hitherto: so that there is no contrition for the sins of others.

Reply to Objection 1: The prophet prays to be spared from the sins of others, in so far as, through fellowship with sinners, a man contracts a stain by consenting to their sins: thus it is written (Ps. 17:27): “With the perverse thou wilt be perverted.”

Reply to Objection 2: We ought to grieve for the sins of others, but not to have contrition for them, because not all sorrow for past sins is contrition, as is evident for what has been said already.

Whether it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin. For the movement of contrition in justification is instantaneous: whereas a man cannot think of every mortal sin in an instant. Therefore it is not necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, contrition should be for sins, inasmuch as they turn us away from God, because we need not be contrite for turning to creatures without turning away from God. Now all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God. Therefore one contrition for all is sufficient.

Objection 3: Further, mortal sins have more in common with one another, than actual and original sin. Now one Baptism blots out all sins both actual and original. Therefore one general contrition blots out all mortal sins.

On the contrary, For diverse diseases there are diverse remedies, since “what heals the eye will not heal the foot,” as Jerome says (Super Marc. ix, 28). But contrition is the special remedy for one mortal sin. Therefore one general contrition for all mortal sins does not suffice.

Further, contrition is expressed by confession. But it is necessary to confess each mortal sin. Therefore it is necessary to have contrition for each mortal sin.

I answer that, Contrition may be considered in two ways, as to its origin, and as to its term. By origin of contrition I mean the process of thought, when a man thinks of his sin and is sorry for it, albeit not with the sorrow of contrition, yet with that of attrition. The term of contrition is when that sorrow is already quickened by grace. Accordingly, as regards the origin of contrition, a man needs to be contrite for each sin that he calls to mind; but as regards its term, it suffices for him to have one general contrition for all, because then the movement of his contrition acts in virtue of all his preceding dispositions.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Although all mortal sins agree in turning man away from God, yet they differ in the cause and mode of aversion, and in the degree of separation from God; and this regards the different ways in which they turn us to creatures.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism acts in virtue of Christ’s merit, Who had infinite power for the blotting out of all sins; and so for all sins one Baptism suffices. But in contrition, in addition to the merit of Christ, an act of ours is requisite, which must, therefore, correspond to each sin, since it has not infinite power for contrition.

It may also be replied that Baptism is a spiritual generation; whereas Penance, as regards contrition and its other parts, is a kind of spiritual healing by way of some alteration. Now it is evident in the generation of a body, accompanied by corruption of another body, that all the accidents contrary to the thing generated, and which were the accidents of the thing corrupted, are removed by the one generation: whereas in alteration, only that accident is removed which was contrary to the accident which is the term of the alteration. In like manner, one Baptism blots out all sins together and introduces a new life; whereas Penance does not blot out each sin, unless it be directed to each. For this reason it is necessary to be contrite for, and to confess each sin.

OF THE DEGREE OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the degree of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?

(2) Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?

(3) Whether sorrow for one sin ought to be greater than for another?

Whether contrition is the greatest possible sorrow in the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that contrition is not the greatest possible sorrow in the world. For sorrow is the sensation of hurt. But some hurts are more keenly felt than the hurt of sin, e.g. the hurt of a wound. Therefore contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

Objection 2: Further, we judge of a cause according to its effect. Now the effect of sorrow is tears. Since therefore sometimes a contrite person does not shed outward tears for his sins, whereas he weeps for the death of a friend, or for a blow, or the like, it seems that contrition is not the greatest sorrow.

Objection 3: Further, the more a thing is mingled with its contrary, the less its intensity. But the sorrow of contrition has a considerable admixture of joy, because the contrite man rejoices in his delivery, in the hope of pardon, and in many like things. Therefore his sorrow is very slight.

Objection 4: Further, the sorrow of contrition is a kind of displeasure. But there are many things more displeasing to the contrite than their past sins; for they would not prefer to suffer the pains of hell rather than to sin. nor to have suffered, nor yet to suffer all manner of temporal punishment; else few would be found contrite. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is not the greatest.

On the contrary, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), “all sorrow is based on love.” Now the love of charity, on which the sorrow of contrition is based, is the greatest love. Therefore the sorrow of contrition is the greatest sorrow.

Further, sorrow is for evil. Therefore the greater the evil, the greater the sorrow. But the fault is a greater evil than its punishment. Therefore contrition which is sorrow for fault, surpasses all other sorrow.

I answer that, As stated above ([4828]Q[1], A[2], ad 1), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the will, and is the very essence of contrition, being nothing else than displeasure at past sin, and this sorrow, in contrition, surpasses all other sorrows. For the more pleasing a thing is, the more displeasing is its contrary. Now the last end is above all things pleasing: wherefore sin, which turns us away from the last end, should be, above all things, displeasing. The other sorrow is in the sensitive part, and is caused by the former sorrow either from natural necessity, in so far as the lower powers follow the movements of the higher, or from choice, in so far as a penitent excites in himself this sorrow for his sins. In neither of these ways is such sorrow, of necessity, the greatest, because the lower powers are more deeply moved by their own objects than through redundance from the higher powers. Wherefore the nearer the operation of the higher powers approaches to the objects of the lower powers, the more do the latter follow the movement of the former. Consequently there is greater pain in the sensitive part, on account of a sensible hurt, than that which redounds into the sensitive part from the reason; and likewise, that which redounds from the reason when it deliberates on corporeal things, is greater than that which redounds from the reason in considering spiritual things. Therefore the sorrow which results in the sensitive part from the reason's displeasure at sin, is not greater than the other sorrows of which that same part is the subject: and likewise, neither is the sorrow which is assumed voluntarily greater than other sorrows—both because the lower appetite does not obey the higher appetite infallibly, as though in the lower appetite there should arise a passion of such intensity and of such a kind as the higher appetite might ordain—and because the passions are employed by the reason, in acts of virtue, according to a certain measure, which the sorrow that is without virtue sometimes does not observe, but exceeds.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as sensible sorrow is on account of the sensation of hurt, so interior sorrow is on account of the thought of something hurtful. Therefore, although the hurt of sin is not perceived by the external sense, yet it is perceived to be the most grievous hurt by the interior sense or reason.

Reply to Objection 2: Affections of the body are the immediate result of the sensitive passions and, through them, of the emotions of the higher appetite. Hence it is that bodily tears flow more quickly from sensible sorrow, or even from a thing that hurts the senses, than from the spiritual sorrow of contrition.

Reply to Objection 3: The joy which a penitent has for his sorrow does not lessen his displeasure (for it is not contrary to it), but increases it, according as every operation is increased by the delight which it causes, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Thus he who delights in learning a science, learns the better, and, in like manner, he who rejoices in his displeasure, is the more intensely displeased. But it may well happen that this joy tempers the sorrow that results from the reason in the sensitive part.

Reply to Objection 4: The degree of displeasure at a thing should be proportionate to the degree of its malice. Now the malice of mortal sin is measured from Him against Whom it is committed, inasmuch as it is offensive to Him; and from him who sins, inasmuch as it is hurtful to him. And, since man should love God more than himself, therefore he should hate sin, as an offense against God, more than as being hurtful to himself. Now it is hurtful to him chiefly because it separates him from God; and in this respect the separation from God which is a punishment, should be more displeasing than the sin itself, as causing this hurt (since what is hated on account of something else, is less hated), but less than the sin, as an offense against God. Again, among all the punishments of malice a certain order is observed according to the degree of the hurt. Consequently, since this is the greatest hurt, inasmuch as it consists in privation of the greatest good, the greatest of all punishments will be separation from God.

Again, with regard to this displeasure, it is necessary to observe that there is also an accidental degree of malice, in respect of the present and the past; since what is past, is no more, whence it has less of the character of malice or goodness. Hence it is that a man shrinks from suffering an evil at the present, or at some future time, more than he shudders at the past evil: wherefore also, no passion of the soul corresponds directly to the past, as sorrow corresponds to present evil, and fear to future evil. Consequently, of two past evils, the mind shrinks the more from that one which still produces a greater effect at the present time, or which, it fears, will produce a greater effect in the future, although in the past it was the lesser evil. And, since the effect of the past sin is sometimes not so keenly felt as the effect of the past punishment, both because sin is more perfectly remedied than punishment, and because bodily defect is more manifest than spiritual defect, therefore even a man, who is well disposed, sometimes feels a greater abhorrence of his past punishment than of his past sin, although he would be ready to suffer the same punishment over again rather than commit the same sin.

We must also observe, in comparing sin with punishment, that some punishments are inseparable from offense of God, e.g. separation from God; and some also are everlasting, e.g. the punishment of hell. Therefore the punishment to which is connected offense of God is to be shunned in the same way as sin; whereas that which is everlasting is simply to be shunned more than sin. If, however, we separate from these punishments the notion of offense, and consider only the notion of punishment, they have the character of malice, less than sin has as an offense against God: and for this reason should cause less displeasure.

We must, however, take note that, although the contrite should be thus disposed, yet he should not be questioned about his feelings, because man cannot easily measure them. Sometimes that which displeases least seems to displease most, through being more closely connected with some sensible hurt, which is more known to us.

Whether the sorrow of contrition can be too great?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great. For no sorrow can be more immoderate than that which destroys its own subject. But the sorrow of contrition, if it be so great as to cause death or corruption of the body, is praiseworthy. For Anselm says (Orat. lii): “Would that such were the exuberance of my inmost soul, as to dry up the marrow of my body”; and Augustine [*De Contritione Cordis, work of an unknown author] confesses that “he deserves to blind his eyes with tears.” Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot be too great.

Objection 2: Further, the sorrow of contrition results from the love of charity. But the love of charity cannot be too great. Neither, therefore, can the sorrow of contrition be too great.

Objection 3: On the contrary, Every moral virtue is destroyed by excess and deficiency. But contrition is an act of a moral virtue, viz. penance, since it is a part of justice. Therefore sorrow for sins can be too great.

I answer that, Contrition, as regards the sorrow in the reason, i.e. the displeasure, whereby the sin is displeasing through being an offense against God, cannot be too great; even as neither can the love of charity be too great, for when this is increased the aforesaid displeasure is increased also. But, as regards the sensible sorrow, contrition may be too great, even as outward affliction of the body may be too great. In all these things the rule should be the safeguarding of the subject, and of that general well-being which suffices for the fulfillment of one’s duties; hence it is written (Rom. 12:1): “Let your sacrifice be reasonable [*Vulg.: ‘Present your bodies . . . a reasonable sacrifice’].”

Reply to Objection 1: Anselm desired the marrow of his body to be dried up by the exuberance of his devotion, not as regards the natural humor, but as to his bodily desires and concupiscences. And, although Augustine acknowledged that he deserved to lose the use of his bodily eyes on account of his sins, because every sinner deserves not only eternal, but also temporal death, yet he did not wish his eyes to be blinded.

Reply to Objection 2: This objection considers the sorrow which is in the reason: while the Third considers the sorrow of the sensitive part.

Whether sorrow for one sin should be greater than for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow for one sin need not be greater than for another. For Jerome (Ep. cviii) commends Paula for that “she deplored her slightest sins as much as great ones.” Therefore one need not be more sorry for one sin than for another.

Objection 2: Further, the movement of contrition is instantaneous. Now one instantaneous movement cannot be at the same time more intense and more remiss. Therefore contrition for one sin need not be greater than for another.

Objection 3: Further, contrition is for sin chiefly as turning us away from God. But all mortal sins agree in turning us away from God, since they all deprive us of grace whereby the soul is united to God. Therefore we should have equal contrition for all mortal sins.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Now, in contrition, the stripes are measured according to the sins, because to contrition is united the purpose of making satisfaction. Therefore contrition should be for one sin more than for another.

Further, man should be contrite for that which he ought to have avoided. But he ought to avoid one sin more than another, if that sin is more grievous, and it be necessary to do one or the other. Therefore, in like manner, he ought to be more sorry for one, viz. the more grievous, than for the other.

I answer that, We may speak of contrition in two ways: first, in so far as it corresponds to each single sin, and thus, as regards the sorrow in the higher appetite, a man ought to be more sorry for a more grievous sin, because there is more reason for sorrow, viz. the offense against God, in such a sin than in another, since the more inordinate the act is, the more it offends God. In like manner, since the greater sin deserves a greater punishment, the sorrow also of the sensitive part, in so far as it is voluntarily undergone for sin, as the punishment thereof, ought to be greater where the sin is greater. But in so far as the emotions of the lower appetite result from the impression of the higher appetite, the degree of sorrow depends on the disposition of the lower faculty to the reception of impressions from the higher faculty, and not on the greatness of the sin.

Secondly, contrition may be taken in so far as it is directed to all one’s sins together, as in the act of justification. Such contrition arises either from the consideration of each single sin, and thus although it is but one act, yet the distinction of the sins remains virtually therein; or, at least, it includes the purpose of thinking of each sin; and in this way too it is habitually more for one than for another.

Reply to Objection 1: Paula is commended, not for deploring all her sins equally, but because she grieved for her slight sins as much as though they were grave sins, in comparison with other persons who grieve for their sins: but for graver sins she would have grieved much more.

Reply to Objection 2: In that instantaneous movement of contrition, although it is not possible to find an actually distinct intensity in respect of each individual sin, yet it is found in the way explained above; and also in another way, in so far as, in this general contrition, each individual sin is related to that particular motive of sorrow which occurs to the contrite person, viz. the offense against God. For he who loves a whole, loves its parts potentially although not actually, and accordingly he loves some parts more and some less, in proportion to their relation to the whole; thus he who loves a community, virtually loves each one more or less according to their respective relations to the common good. In like manner he who is sorry for having offended God, implicitly grieves for his different sins in different ways, according as by them he offended God more or less.

Reply to Objection 3: Although each mortal sin turns us away from God and deprives us of His grace, yet some remove us further away than others, inasmuch as through their inordinateness they become more out of harmony with the order of the Divine goodness, than others do.

OF THE TIME FOR CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the time for contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?

(2) Whether it is expedient to grieve continually for our sins?

(3) Whether souls grieve for their sins even after this life?

Whether the whole of this life is the time for contrition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the time for contrition is not the whole of this life. For as we should be sorry for a sin committed, so should we be ashamed of it. But shame for sin does not last all one’s life, for Ambrose says (De Poenit. ii) that “he whose sin is forgiven has nothing to be ashamed of.” Therefore it seems that neither should contrition last all one’s life, since it is sorrow for sin.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (1 Jn. 4:18) that “perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain.” But sorrow also has pain. Therefore the sorrow of contrition cannot remain in the state of perfect charity.

Objection 3: Further, there cannot be any sorrow for the past (since it is, properly speaking, about a present evil) except in so far as something of the past sin remains in the present time. Now, in this life, sometimes one attains to a state in which nothing remains of a past sin, neither disposition, nor guilt, nor any debt of punishment. Therefore there is no need to grieve any more for that sin.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Rom. 8:28) that “to them that love God all things work together unto good,” even sins as a gloss declares [*Augustine, De Correp. et Grat.]. Therefore there is no need for them to grieve for sin after it has been forgiven.

Objection 5: Further, contrition is a part of Penance, condivided with satisfaction. But there is no need for continual satisfaction. Therefore contrition for sin need not be continual.

On the contrary, Augustine in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says that “when sorrow ceases, penance fails, and when penance fails, no pardon remains.” Therefore, since it behooves one not to lose the forgiveness which has been granted, it seems that one ought always to grieve for one’s sins.

Further, it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): “Be not without fear about sin forgiven.” Therefore man should always grieve, that his sins may be forgiven him.

I answer that, As stated above ([4829]Q[3], A[1]), there is a twofold sorrow in contrition: one is in the reason, and is detestation of the sin committed; the other is in the sensitive part, and results from the former: and as regards both, the time for contrition is the whole of the present state of life. For as long as one is a wayfarer, one detests the obstacles which retard or hinder one from reaching the end of the way. Wherefore, since past sin retards the course of our life towards God (because the time which was given to us for the course cannot be recovered), it follows that the state of contrition remains during the whole of this lifetime, as regards the detestation of sin. The same is to be said of the sensible sorrow, which is assumed by the will as a punishment: for since man, by sinning, deserved everlasting punishment, and sinned against the eternal God, the everlasting punishment being commuted into a temporal one, sorrow ought to remain during the whole of man's eternity, i.e. during the whole of the state of this life. For this reason Hugh of St. Victor says [*Richard of St. Victor, De Pot. Lig. et Solv. 3,5,13] that "when God absolves a man from eternal guilt and punishment, He binds him with a chain of eternal detestation of sin."

Reply to Objection 1: Shame regards sin only as a disgraceful act; wherefore after sin has been taken away as to its guilt, there is no further motive for shame; but there does remain a motive of sorrow, which is for the guilt, not only as being something disgraceful, but also as having a hurt connected with it.

Reply to Objection 2: Servile fear which charity casts out, is opposed to charity by reason of its servility, because it regards the punishment. But the sorrow of contrition results from charity, as stated above ([4830]Q[3], A[2]): wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Although, by penance, the sinner returns to his former state of grace and immunity from the debt of punishment, yet he never returns to his former dignity of innocence, and so something always remains from his past sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Just as a man ought not to do evil that good may come of it, so he ought not to rejoice in evil, for the reason that good may perchance come from it through the agency of Divine grace or providence, because his sins did not cause but hindered those goods; rather was it Divine providence that was their cause, and in this man should rejoice, whereas he should grieve for his sins.

Reply to Objection 5: Satisfaction depends on the punishment appointed, which should be enjoined for sins; hence it can come to an end, so that there be no further need of satisfaction. But that punishment is proportionate to sin chiefly on the part of its adherence to a creature whence it derives its finiteness. On the other hand, the sorrow of contrition corresponds to sin on the part of the aversion, whence it derives a certain infinity; wherefore contrition ought to continue always; nor is it unreasonable if that which precedes remains, when that which follows is taken away.

Whether it is expedient to grieve for sin continually?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident from Phil. 4:4, where the gloss on the words, “Rejoice in the Lord always,” says that “it is necessary to rejoice.” Now it is not possible to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.

Objection 2: Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except in so far as it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. Now sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 30:24): “Drive away sadness far from thee,” and the reason is given (Ecclus. 30:25): “For sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it.” Moreover the Philosopher says the same (Ethic. vii, 13,14; x, 5). Therefore one should not grieve for sin any longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now sin is already blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore it is not expedient to grieve any longer.

Objection 3: Further, Bernard says (Serm. xi in Cant.): “Sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with wormwood.” Therefore it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually.

On the contrary, Augustine [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author] says: “The penitent should always grieve, and rejoice in his grief.”

Further, it is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words of Mat. 5:5, “Blessed are they that mourn.” Therefore it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.

I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethic. ii, 6,7.

Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity, or as to its duration, except in so far as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he ought to. On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.

Reply to Objection 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself for object.

Reply to Objection 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should make moderate use, according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.

Reply to Objection 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.

Whether our souls are contrite for sins even after this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that our souls are contrite for sins even after this life. For the love of charity causes displeasure at sin. Now, after this life, charity remains in some, both as to its act and as to its habit, since “charity never falleth away.” Therefore the displeasure at the sin committed, which is the essence of contrition, remains.

Objection 2: Further, we should grieve more for sin than for punishment. But the souls in purgatory grieve for their sensible punishment and for the delay of glory. Much more, therefore, do they grieve for the sins they committed.

Objection 3: Further, the pain of purgatory satisfies for sin. But satisfaction derives its efficacy from the power of contrition. Therefore contrition remains after this life.

On the contrary, contrition is a part of the sacrament of Penance. But the sacraments do not endure after this life. Neither, therefore, does contrition.

Further, contrition can be so great as to blot out both guilt and punishment. If therefore the souls in purgatory could have contrition, it would be possible for their debt of punishment to be remitted through the power of their contrition, so that they would be delivered from their sensible pain, which is false.

I answer that, Three things are to be observed in contrition: first, its genus, viz. sorrow; secondly, its form, for it is an act of virtue quickened by charity; thirdly, its efficacy, for it is a meritorious and sacramental act, and, to a certain extent, satisfactory. Accordingly, after this life, those souls which dwell in the heavenly country, cannot have contrition, because they are void of sorrow by reason of the fulness of their joy: those which are in hell, have no contrition, for although they have sorrow, they lack the grace which quickens sorrow; while those which are in purgatory have a sorrow for their sins, that is quickened by grace; yet it is not meritorious, for they are not in the state of meriting. In this life, however, all these three can be found.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity does not cause this sorrow, save in those who are capable of it; but the fulness of joy in the Blessed excludes all capability of sorrow from them: wherefore, though they have charity, they have no contrition.

Reply to Objection 2: The souls in purgatory grieve for their sins; but their sorrow is not contrition, because it lacks the efficacy of contrition.

Reply to Objection 3: The pain which the souls suffer in purgatory, cannot, properly speaking, be called satisfaction, because satisfaction demands a meritorious work; yet, in a broad sense, the payment of the punishment due may be called satisfaction.

OF THE EFFECT OF CONTRITION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of contrition: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the remission of sin is the effect of contrition?

(2) Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?

(3) Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?

Whether the forgiveness of sin is the effect of contrition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the forgiveness of sin is not the effect of contrition. For God alone forgives sins. But we are somewhat the cause of contrition, since it is an act of our own. Therefore contrition is not the cause of forgiveness.

Objection 2: Further, contrition is an act of virtue. Now virtue follows the forgiveness of sin: because virtue and sin are not together in the soul. Therefore contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin.

Objection 3: Further, nothing but sin is an obstacle to receiving the Eucharist. But the contrite should not go to Communion before going to confession. Therefore they have not yet received the forgiveness of their sins.

On the contrary, a gloss on Ps. 50:19, “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit,” says: “A hearty contrition is the sacrifice by which sins are loosed.”

Further, virtue and vice are engendered and corrupted by the same causes, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1,2. Now sin is committed through the heart’s inordinate love. Therefore it is destroyed by sorrow caused by the heart’s ordinate love; and consequently contrition blots out sin.

I answer that, Contrition can be considered in two ways, either as part of a sacrament, or as an act of virtue, and in either case it is the cause of the forgiveness of sin, but not in the same way. Because, as part of a sacrament, it operates primarily as an instrument for the forgiveness of sin, as is evident with regard to the other sacraments (cf. Sent. iv, D, 1, Q[1], A[4]: [4831]TP, Q[62], A[1]); while, as an act of virtue, it is the quasi-material cause of sin’s forgiveness. For a disposition is, as it were, a necessary condition for justification, and a disposition is reduced to a material cause, if it be taken to denote that which disposes matter to receive something. It is otherwise in the case of an agent’s disposition to act, because this is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

Reply to Objection 1: God alone is the principal efficient cause of the forgiveness of sin: but the dispositive cause can be from us also, and likewise the sacramental cause, since the sacramental forms are words uttered by us, having an instrumental power of conferring grace whereby sins are forgiven.

Reply to Objection 2: The forgiveness of sin precedes virtue and the infusion of grace, in one way, and, in another, follows: and in so far as it follows, the act elicited by the virtue can be a cause of the forgiveness of sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The dispensation of the Eucharist belongs to the ministers of the Church: wherefore a man should not go to Communion until his sin has been forgiven through the ministers of the Church, although his sin may be forgiven him before God.

Whether contrition can take away the debt of punishment entirely?

Objection 1: It would seem that contrition cannot take away the debt of punishment entirely. For satisfaction and confession are ordained for man's deliverance from the debt of punishment. Now no man is so perfectly contrite as not to be bound to confession and satisfaction. Therefore contrition is never so great as to blot out the entire debt of punishment.

Objection 2: Further, in Penance the punishment should in some way compensate for the sin. Now some sins are accomplished by members of the body. Therefore, since it is for the due compensation for sin that "by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented" (Wis. 11:17), it seems that the punishment for suchlike sins can never be remitted by contrition.

Objection 3: Further, the sorrow of contrition is finite. Now an infinite punishment is due for some, viz. mortal, sins. Therefore contrition can never be so great as to remit the whole punishment.

On the contrary, The affections of the heart are more acceptable to God than external acts. Now man is absolved from both punishment and guilt by means of external actions; and therefore he is also by means of the heart's affections, such as contrition is.

Further, we have an example of this in the thief, to whom it was said (Lk. 23:43): "This day shalt thou be with Me in paradise," on account of his one act of repentance.

As to whether the whole debt of punishment is always taken away by contrition, this question has already been considered above (Sent. iv, D, 14, Q[2], AA[1],2; [4832]TP, Q[86], A[4]), where the same question was raised with regard to Penance.

I answer that, The intensity of contrition may be regarded in two ways. First, on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure, and in this way it may happen that the act of charity is so intense that the contrition resulting therefrom merits not only the removal of guilt, but also the remission of all punishment. Secondly, on the part of the sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition: and since this sorrow is also a kind of punishment, it may be so intense as to suffice for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot be sure that his contrition suffices for the remission of both punishment and guilt: wherefore he is bound to confess and to make satisfaction, especially since his contrition would not be true contrition, unless he had the purpose of confessing united thereto: which purpose must also be carried into effect, on account of the precept given concerning confession.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as inward joy redounds into the outward parts of the body, so does interior sorrow show itself in the exterior members: wherefore it is written (Prov. 17:22): “A sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones.”

Reply to Objection 3: Although the sorrow of contrition is finite in its intensity, even as the punishment due for mortal sin is finite; yet it derives infinite power from charity, whereby it is quickened, and so it avails for the remission of both guilt and punishment.

Whether slight contrition suffices to blot out great sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that slight contrition does not suffice to blot out great sins. For contrition is the remedy for sin. Now a bodily remedy, that heals a lesser bodily infirmity, does not suffice to heal a greater. Therefore the least contrition does not suffice to blot out very great sins.

Objection 2: Further, it was stated above ([4833]Q[3], A[3]) that for greater sins one ought to have greater contrition. Now contrition does not blot out sin, unless it fulfills the requisite conditions. Therefore the least contrition does not blot out all sins.

On the contrary, Every sanctifying grace blots out every mortal sin, because it is incompatible therewith. Now every contrition is quickened by sanctifying grace. Therefore, however slight it be, it blots out all sins.

I answer that, As we have often said ([4834]Q[1], A[2], ad 1;[4835] Q[3], A[1];[4836] Q[4] , A[1]), contrition includes a twofold sorrow. One is in the reason, and is displeasure at the sin committed. This can be so slight as not to suffice for real contrition, e.g. if a sin were less displeasing to a man, than separation from his last end ought to be; just as love can be so slack as not to suffice for real charity. The other sorrow is in the senses, and the slightness of this is no hindrance to real contrition, because it does not, of itself, belong essentially to contrition, but is connected with it accidentally: nor again is it under our control. Accordingly we must say that sorrow, however slight it be, provided it suffice for true contrition, blots out all sin.

Reply to Objection 1: Spiritual remedies derive infinite efficacy from the infinite power which operates in them: wherefore the remedy which suffices for healing a slight sin, suffices also to heal a great sin. This is seen in Baptism which looses great and small: and the same applies to contrition provided it fulfill the necessary conditions.

Reply to Objection 2: It follows of necessity that a man grieves more for a greater sin than for a lesser, according as it is more repugnant to the love which causes his sorrow. But if one has the same degree of sorrow for a greater sin, as another has for a lesser, this would suffice for the remission of the sin.

OF CONFESSION, AS REGARDS ITS NECESSITY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider confession, about which there are six points for our consideration: (1) The necessity of confession; (2) Its nature; (3) Its minister; (4) Its quality; (5) Its effect; (6) The seal of confession.

Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether confession is necessary for salvation?

(2) Whether confession is according to the natural law?

(3) Whether all are bound to confession?

(4) Whether it is lawful to confess a sin of which one is not guilty?

(5) Whether one is bound to confess at once?

(6) Whether one can be dispensed from confessing to another man?

Whether confession is necessary for salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not necessary for salvation. For the sacrament of Penance is ordained for the sake of the remission of sin. But sin is sufficiently remitted by the infusion of grace. Therefore confession is not necessary in order to do penance for one’s sins.

Objection 2: Further, we read of some being forgiven their sins without confession, e.g. Peter, Magdalen and Paul. But the grace that remits sins is not less efficacious now than it was then. Therefore neither is it necessary for salvation now that man should confess.

Objection 3: Further, a sin which is contracted from another, should receive its remedy from another. Therefore actual sin, which a man has committed through his own act, must take its remedy from the man himself. Now Penance is ordained against such sins. Therefore confession is not necessary for salvation.

Objection 4: Further, confession is necessary for a judicial sentence, in order that punishment may be inflicted in proportion to the offense. Now a man is able to inflict on himself a greater punishment than even that which might be inflicted on him by another. Therefore it seems that confession is not necessary for salvation.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. i): “If you want the physician to be of assistance to you, you must make your disease known to him.” But it is necessary for salvation that man should take medicine for his sins. Therefore it is necessary for salvation that man should make his disease known by means of confession.

Further, in a civil court the judge is distinct from the accused. Therefore the sinner who is the accused ought not to be his own judge, but should be judged by another and consequently ought to confess to him.

I answer that, Christ’s Passion, without whose power, neither original nor actual sin is remitted, produces its effect in us through the reception of the sacraments which derive their efficacy from it. Wherefore for the remission of both actual and original sin, a sacrament of the Church is necessary, received either actually, or at least in desire, when a man fails to receive the sacrament actually, through an unavoidable obstacle, and not through contempt. Consequently those sacraments which are ordained as remedies for sin which is incompatible with salvation, are necessary for salvation:

and so just as Baptism, whereby original sin is blotted out, is necessary for salvation, so also is the sacrament of Penance. And just as a man through asking to be baptized, submits to the ministers of the Church, to whom the dispensation of that sacrament belongs, even so, by confessing his sin, a man submits to a minister of the Church, that, through the sacrament of Penance dispensed by him, he may receive the pardon of his sins: nor can the minister apply a fitting remedy, unless he be acquainted with the sin, which knowledge he acquires through the penitent's confession. Wherefore confession is necessary for the salvation of a man who has fallen into a mortal actual sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The infusion of grace suffices for the remission of sin; but after the sin has been forgiven, the sinner still owes a debt of temporal punishment. Moreover, the sacraments of grace are ordained in order that man may receive the infusion of grace, and before he receives them, either actually or in his intention, he does not receive grace. This is evident in the case of Baptism, and applies to Penance likewise. Again, the penitent expiates his temporal punishment by undergoing the shame of confession, by the power of the keys to which he submits, and by the enjoined satisfaction which the priest moderates according to the kind of sins made known to him in confession. Nevertheless the fact that confession is necessary for salvation is not due to its conducing to the satisfaction for sins, because this punishment to which one remains bound after the remission of sin, is temporal, wherefore the way of salvation remains open, without such punishment being expiated in this life: but it is due to its conducing to the remission of sin, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Although we do not read that they confessed, it may be that they did; for many things were done which were not recorded in writing. Moreover Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments; so that He could bestow the reality of the sacrament without using the things which belong to the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: The sin that is contracted from another, viz. original sin, can be remedied by an entirely extrinsic cause, as in the case of infants: whereas actual sin, which a man commits of himself, cannot be expiated, without some operation on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless man is not sufficient to expiate his sin by himself, though he was sufficient to sin by himself, because sin is finite on the part of the thing to which it turns, in which respect the sinner returns to self; while, on the part of the aversion, sin derives infinity, in which respect the remission of sin must needs begin from someone else, because “that which is last in order of generation is first in the order of intention” (Ethic. iii). Consequently actual sin also must needs take its remedy from another.

Reply to Objection 4: Satisfaction would not suffice for the expiation of sin’s punishment, by reason of the severity of the punishment which is enjoined in satisfaction, but it does suffice as being a part of the sacrament having the sacramental power; wherefore it ought to be imposed by the dispensers of the sacraments, and consequently confession is necessary.

Whether confession is according to the natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is according to the natural law. For Adam and Cain were bound to none but the precepts of the natural law, and yet they are reproached for not confessing their sin. Therefore confession of sin is according to the natural law.

Objection 2: Further, those precepts which are common to the Old and New Law are according to the natural law. But confession was prescribed in the Old Law, as may be gathered from Is. 43:26: “Tell, if thou hast anything to justify thyself.” Therefore it is according to the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, Job was subject only to the natural law. But he confessed his sins, as appears from his words (Job 31:33) “If, as a man, I have hid my sin.” Therefore confession is according to the natural law.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. v.) that the natural law is the same in all. But confession is not in all in the same way. Therefore it is not according to the natural law. Further, confession is made to one who has the keys. But the keys of the Church are not an institution of the natural law; neither, therefore, is confession.

I answer that, The sacraments are professions of faith, wherefore they ought to be proportionate to faith. Now faith surpasses the knowledge of natural reason, whose dictate is therefore surpassed by the sacraments. And since “the natural law is not begotten of opinion, but a product of a certain innate power,” as Tully states (De Inv. Rhet. ii), consequently the sacraments are not part of the natural law, but of the Divine law which is above nature. This latter, however, is sometimes called natural, in so far as whatever a thing derives from its Creator is natural to it, although, properly speaking, those things are said to be natural which are caused by the principles of nature. But such things are above nature as God reserves to Himself; and these are wrought either through the agency of nature, or in the working of miracles, or in the revelation of mysteries, or in the institution of the sacraments. Hence confession, which is of sacramental necessity, is according to Divine, but not according to natural law.

Reply to Objection 1: Adam is reproached for not confessing his sin before God: because the confession which is made to God by the acknowledgment of one's sin, is according to the natural law. whereas here we are speaking of confession made to a man. We may also reply that in such a case confession of one's sin is according to the natural law, namely when one is called upon by the judge to confess in a court of law, for then the sinner should not lie by excusing or denying his sin, as Adam and Cain are blamed for doing. But confession made voluntarily to a man in order to receive from God the forgiveness of one's sins, is not according to the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2: The precepts of the natural law avail in the same way in the law of Moses and in the New Law. But although there was a kind of confession in the law of Moses, yet it was not after the same manner as in the New Law, nor as in the law of nature; for in the law of nature it was sufficient to acknowledge one's sin inwardly before God; while in the law of Moses it was necessary for a man to declare his sin by some external sign, as by making a sin-offering, whereby the fact of his having sinned became known to another man; but it was not necessary for him to make known what particular sin he had committed, or what were its circumstances, as in the New Law.

Reply to Objection 3: Job is speaking of the man who hides his sin by denying it or excusing himself when he is accused thereof, as we may gather from a gloss [*Cf. Gregory, Moral. xxii, 9] on the passage.

Whether all are bound to confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all are bound to confession, for Jerome says on Is. 3:9 ("They have proclaimed abroad"), "their sin," etc.: "Penance is the second plank after shipwreck." But some have not suffered shipwreck after Baptism. Therefore Penance is not befitting them, and consequently neither is confession which is a part of Penance.

Objection 2: Further, it is to the judge that confession should be made in any court. But some have no judge over them. Therefore they are not bound to confession.

Objection 3: Further, some have none but venial sins. Now a man is not bound to confess such sins. Therefore not everyone is bound to confession.

On the contrary, Confession is condivided with satisfaction and contrition. Now all are bound to contrition and satisfaction. Therefore all are bound to confession also.

Further, this appears from the Decretals (De Poenit. et Remiss. xii), where it is stated that “all of either sex are bound to confess their sins as soon as they shall come to the age of discretion.”

I answer that, We are bound to confession on two counts: first, by the Divine law, from the very fact that confession is a remedy, and in this way not all are bound to confession, but those only who fall into mortal sin after Baptism; secondly, by a precept of positive law, and in this way all are bound by the precept of the Church laid down in the general council (Lateran iv, Can. 21) under Innocent III, both in order that everyone may acknowledge himself to be a sinner, because “all have sinned and need the grace of God” (Rom. 3:23); and that the Eucharist may be approached with greater reverence; and lastly, that parish priests may know their flock, lest a wolf may hide therein.

Reply to Objection 1: Although it is possible for a man, in this mortal life, to avoid shipwreck, i.e. mortal sin, after Baptism, yet he cannot avoid venial sins, which dispose him to shipwreck, and against which also Penance is ordained; wherefore there is still room for Penance, and consequently for confession, even in those who do not commit mortal sins.

Reply to Objection 2: All must acknowledge Christ as their judge, to Whom they must confess in the person of His vicar; and although the latter may be the inferior if the penitent be a prelate, yet he is the superior, in so far as the penitent is a sinner, while the confessor is the minister of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is bound to confess his venial sins, not in virtue of the sacrament, but by the institution of the Church, and that, when he has no other sins to confess. We may also, with others, answer that the Decretal quoted above does not bind others than those who have mortal sins to confess. This is evident from the fact that it orders all sins to be confessed, which cannot apply to venial sins, because no one can confess all his venial sins. Accordingly, a man who has no mortal sins to confess, is not bound to confess his venial sins, but it suffices for the fulfillment of the commandment of the Church that he present himself before the priest, and declare himself to be unconscious of any mortal sin: and this will count for his confession.

Whether it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful for a man to confess a sin which he has not committed. For, as Gregory says (Regist. xii), “it is the mark of a good conscience to acknowledge a fault where there is none.” Therefore it is the mark of a good conscience to accuse oneself of those sins which one has not committed.

Objection 2: Further, by humility a man deems himself worse than another, who is known to be a sinner, and in this he is to be praised. But it is lawful for a man to confess himself to be what he thinks he is. Therefore it is lawful to confess having committed a more grievous sin than one has.

Objection 3: Further, sometimes one doubts about a sin, whether it be mortal or venial, in which case, seemingly, one ought to confess it as mortal. Therefore a person must sometimes confess a sin which he has not committed.

Objection 4: Further, satisfaction originates from confession. But a man can do satisfaction for a sin which he has not committed. Therefore he can also confess a sin which he has not done.

On the contrary, Whosoever says he has done what he did not, tells an untruth. But no one ought to tell an untruth in confession, since every untruth is a sin. Therefore no one should confess a sin which he has not committed.

Further, in the public court of justice, no one should be accused of a crime which cannot be proved by means of proper witnesses. Now the witness, in the tribunal of Penance, is the conscience. Therefore a man ought not to accuse himself of a sin which is not on his conscience.

I answer that, The penitent should, by his confession, make his state known to his confessor. Now he who tells the priest something other than what he has on his conscience, whether it be good or evil, does not make his state known to the priest, but hides it; wherefore his confession is unavailing: and in order for it to be effective his words must agree with his thoughts, so that his words accuse him only of what is on his conscience.

Reply to Objection 1: To acknowledge a fault where there is none, may be understood in two ways: first, as referring to the substance of the act, and then it is untrue; for it is a mark, not of a good, but of an erroneous conscience, to acknowledge having done what one has not done. Secondly, as referring to the circumstances of the act, and thus the saying of Gregory is true, because a just man fears lest, in any act which is good in itself, there should be any defect on his part. thus it is written (Job 9:28): “I feared all my works.” Wherefore it is also the mark of a good conscience that a man should accuse himself in words of this fear which he holds in his thoughts.

From this may be gathered the Reply to the Second Objection, since a just man, who is truly humble, deems himself worse not as though he had committed an act generically worse, but because he fears lest in those things which he seems to do well, he may by pride sin more grievously.

Reply to Objection 3: When a man doubts whether a certain sin be mortal, he is bound to confess it, so long as he remains in doubt, because he sins mortally by committing or omitting anything, while doubting of its being a mortal sin, and thus leaving the matter to chance; and, moreover, he courts danger, if he neglect to confess that which he doubts may be a mortal sin. He should not, however, affirm that it was a mortal sin, but speak doubtfully, leaving the verdict to the priest, whose business it is to discern between what is leprosy and what is not.

Reply to Objection 4: A man does not commit a falsehood by making satisfaction for a sin which he did not commit, as when anyone confesses a sin which he thinks he has not committed. And if he mentions a sin that he has not committed, believing that he has, he does not lie; wherefore he does not sin, provided his confession thereof tally with his conscience.

Whether one is bound to confess at once?

Objection 1: It would seem that one is bound to confess at once. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii): “The contempt of confession is inexcusable, unless there be an urgent reason for delay.” But everyone is bound to avoid contempt. Therefore everyone is bound to confess as soon as possible.

Objection 2: Further, everyone is bound to do more to avoid spiritual disease than to avoid bodily disease. Now if a man who is sick in body were to delay sending for the physician, it would be detrimental to his health. Therefore it seems that it must needs be detrimental to a man’s health if he omits to confess immediately to a priest if there be one at hand.

Objection 3: Further, that which is due always, is due at once. But man owes confession to God always. Therefore he is bound to confess at once.

On the contrary, A fixed time both for confession and for receiving the Eucharist is determined by the Decretals (Cap. Omnis utriusque sexus: De Poenit. et Remiss.). Now a man does not sin by failing to receive the Eucharist before the fixed time. Therefore he does not sin if he does not confess before that time.

Further, it is a mortal sin to omit doing what a commandment bids us to do. If therefore a man is bound to confess at once, and omits to do so, with a priest at hand, he would commit a mortal sin; and in like manner at any other time, and so on, so that he would fall into many mortal sins for the delay in confessing one, which seems unreasonable.

I answer that, As the purpose of confessing is united to contrition, a man is bound to have this purpose when he is bound to have contrition, viz. when he calls his sins to mind, and chiefly when he is in danger of death, or when he is so circumstanced that unless his sin be forgiven, he must fall into another sin: for instance, if a priest be bound to say Mass, and a confessor is at hand, he is bound to confess or, if there be no confessor, he is bound at least to contrition and to have the purpose of confessing.

But to actual confession a man is bound in two ways. First, accidentally, viz. when he is bound to do something which he cannot do without committing a mortal sin, unless he go to confession first: for then he is bound to confess; for instance, if he has to receive the Eucharist, to which no one can approach, after committing a mortal sin, without confessing first, if a priest be at hand, and there be no urgent necessity. Hence it is that the Church obliges all to confess once a year; because she commands all to receive Holy Communion once a year, viz. at Easter, wherefore all must go to confession before that time.

Secondly, a man is bound absolutely to go to confession; and here the same reason applies to delay of confession as to delay of Baptism, because both are necessary sacraments. Now a man is not bound to receive Baptism as soon as he makes up his mind to be baptized; and so he would not sin mortally, if he were not baptized at once: nor is there any fixed time beyond which, if he defer Baptism, he would incur a mortal sin. Nevertheless the delay of Baptism may amount to a mortal sin, or it may not, and this depends on the cause of the delay, since, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, text. 15), the will does not defer doing what it wills to do, except for a reasonable cause. Wherefore if the cause of the delay of Baptism has a mortal sin connected with it, e.g. if a man put off being baptized through contempt, or some like motive, the delay will be a mortal sin, but otherwise not: and the same seems to apply to confession which is not more necessary than Baptism. Moreover, since man is bound to fulfill in this life those things that are necessary for salvation, therefore, if he be in danger of death, he is bound, even absolutely, then and there to make his confession or to receive Baptism. For this reason too, James proclaimed at the same time the commandment about making confession and that about receiving Extreme Unction (James 5:14, 16). Therefore the opinion seems probable of those who say that a man is not bound to confess at once, though it is dangerous to delay.

Others, however, say that a contrite man is bound to confess at once, as soon as he has a reasonable and proper opportunity. Nor does it matter that the Decretal fixes the time limit to an annual confession, because the Church does not favor delay, but forbids the neglect involved in a further delay. Wherefore by this Decretal the man who delays is excused, not from sin in the tribunal of conscience; but from punishment in the tribunal of the Church; so that such a person would not be deprived of proper burial if he were to die before that time. But this seems too severe, because affirmative precepts bind, not at once, but at a fixed time; and this, not because it is most convenient to fulfill them then (for in that case if a man were not to give alms of his superfluous goods, whenever he met with a man in need, he would commit a mortal sin, which is false), but because the time involves urgency. Consequently, if he does not confess at the very first opportunity, it does not follow that he commits a mortal sin, even though he does not await a better opportunity. unless it becomes urgent for him to confess through being in danger of death. Nor is it on account of the Church’s indulgence that he is not bound to confess at once, but on account of the nature of an affirmative precept, so that before the commandment was made, there was still less obligation.

Others again say that secular persons are not bound to confess before Lent, which is the time of penance for them; but that religious are bound to confess at once, because, for them, all time is a time for penance. But this is not to the point; for religious have no obligations besides those of other men, with the exception of such as they are bound to by vow.

Reply to Objection 1: Hugh is speaking of those who die without this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not necessary for bodily health that the physician be sent for at once, except when there is necessity for being healed: and the same applies to spiritual disease.

Reply to Objection 3: The retaining of another’s property against the owner’s will is contrary to a negative precept, which binds always and for always, and therefore one is always bound to make immediate restitution. It is not the same with the fulfillment of an affirmative precept, which binds always, but not for always, wherefore one is not bound to fulfill it at once.

Whether one can be dispensed from confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that one can be dispensed from confessing his sins to a man. For precepts of positive law are subject to dispensation by the prelates of the Church. Now such is confession, as appears from what was said above [4837](A[3]). Therefore one may be dispensed from confession.

Objection 2: Further, a man can grant a dispensation in that which was instituted by a man. But we read of confession being instituted, not by God, but by a man (James 5:16): “Confess your sins, one to another.” Now the Pope has the power of dispensation in things instituted by the apostles, as appears in the matter of bigamists. Therefore he can also dispense a man from confessing.

On the contrary, Penance, whereof confession is a part, is a necessary sacrament, even as Baptism is. Since therefore no one can be dispensed from Baptism, neither can one be dispensed from confession.

I answer that, The ministers of the Church are appointed in the Church which is founded by God. Wherefore they need to be appointed by the Church before exercising their ministry, just as the work of creation is presupposed to the work of nature. And since the Church is founded on faith and the sacraments, the ministers of the Church have no power to publish new articles of faith, or to do away with those which are already published, or to institute new sacraments, or to abolish those that are instituted, for this belongs to the power of excellence, which belongs to Christ alone, Who is the foundation of the Church. Consequently, the Pope can neither dispense a man so that he may be saved without Baptism, nor that he be saved without confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the sacrament. He can, however, dispense from confession, in so far as it is obligatory in virtue of the commandment of the Church; so that a man may delay confession longer than the limit prescribed by the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: The precepts of the Divine law do not bind less than those of the natural law: wherefore, just as no dispensation is possible from the natural law, so neither can there be from positive Divine law.

Reply to Objection 2: The precept about confession was not instituted by a man first of all, though it was promulgated by James: it was instituted by God, and although we do not read it explicitly, yet it was somewhat foreshadowed in the fact that those who were being prepared by John's Baptism for the grace of Christ, confessed their sins to him, and that the Lord sent the lepers to the priests, and though they were not priests of the New Testament, yet the priesthood of the New Testament was foreshadowed in them.

OF THE NATURE OF CONFESSION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the nature of confession, under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?

(2) Whether confession is an act of virtue?

(3) Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?

Whether Augustine fittingly defines confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that Augustine defines confession unfittingly, when he says (Super Ps. 21) that confession "lays bare the hidden disease by the hope of pardon." For the disease against which confession is ordained, is sin. Now sin is sometimes manifest. Therefore it should not be said that confession is the remedy for a "hidden" disease.

Objection 2: Further, the beginning of penance is fear. But confession is a part of Penance. Therefore fear rather than "hope" should be set down as the cause of confession.

Objection 3: Further, that which is placed under a seal, is not laid bare, but closed up. But the sin which is confessed is placed under the seal of confession. Therefore sin is not laid bare in confession, but closed up.

Objection 4: Further, other definitions are to be found differing from the above. For Gregory says (Hom. xl in Evang.) that confession is "the uncovering of sins, and the opening of the wound." Others say that "confession is a legal declaration of our sins in the presence of a priest." Others define it thus: "Confession is the sinner's sacramental self-accusation through shame for what he has done, which through the keys of the Church makes satisfaction for his sins, and binds him to perform the penance imposed on him." Therefore it seems that the definition in question is insufficient, since it does not include all that these include.

I answer that, Several things offer themselves to our notice in the act of confession: first, the very substance or genus of the act, which is a kind of manifestation; secondly, the matter manifested, viz. sin; thirdly, the person to whom the manifestation is made, viz. the priest; fourthly, its cause, viz. hope of pardon; fifthly, its effect, viz. release from part of the punishment, and the obligation to pay the other part. Accordingly the first definition, given by Augustine, indicates the substance of the act, by saying that "it lays bare"—the matter of confession, by saying that it is a "hidden disease"—its cause, which is "the hope of pardon"; while the other definitions include one or other of the five things aforesaid, as may be seen by anyone who considers the matter.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the priest, as a man, may sometimes have knowledge of the penitent's sin, yet he does not know it as a vicar of Christ (even as a judge sometimes knows a thing, as a man, of which he is ignorant, as a judge), and in this respect it is made known to him by confession. or we may reply that although the external act may be in the open, yet the internal act, which is the cause of the external act, is hidden; so that it needs to be revealed by confession.

Reply to Objection 2: Confession presupposes charity, which gives us life, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now it is in contrition that charity is given; while servile fear, which is void of hope, is previous to charity: yet he that has charity is moved more by hope than by fear. Hence hope rather than fear is set down as the cause of confession.

Reply to Objection 3: In every confession sin is laid bare to the priest, and closed to others by the seal of confession.

Reply to Objection 4: It is not necessary that every definition should include everything connected with the thing defined: and for this reason we find some definitions or descriptions that indicate one cause, and some that indicate another.

Whether confession is an act of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of virtue. For every act of virtue belongs to the natural law, since “we are naturally capable of virtue,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1). But confession does not belong to the natural law. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, an act of virtue is more befitting one who is innocent than one who has sinned. But the confession of a sin, which is the confession of which we are speaking now, cannot be befitting an innocent man. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, the grace which is in the sacraments differs somewhat from the grace which is in the virtues and gifts. But confession is part of a sacrament. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts of virtue. But confession comes under a precept. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

Further, we do not merit except by acts of virtue. But confession is meritorious, for “it opens the gate of heaven,” as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore it seems that it is an act of virtue.

I answer that, As stated above ([4838]FS, Q[18], AA[6],7; [4839]SS, Q[80]; [4840]SS, Q[85] , A[3]; [4841]SS, Q[109], A[3]), for an act to belong to a virtue it suffices that it be of such a nature as to imply some condition belonging to virtue. Now, although confession does not include everything that is required for virtue, yet its very name implies the manifestation of that which a man has on his conscience: for thus his lips and heart agree. For if a man professes with his lips what he does not hold in his heart, it is not a confession but a fiction. Now to express in words what one has in one’s thoughts is a condition of virtue; and, consequently, confession is a good thing generically, and is an act of virtue: yet it can be done badly, if it be devoid of other due circumstances.

Reply to Objection 1: Natural reason, in a general way, inclines a man to make confession in the proper way, to confess as he ought, what he ought, and when he ought, and in this way confession belongs to the natural law. But it belongs to the Divine law to determine the circumstances, when, how, what, and to whom, with regard to the confession of which we are speaking now. Accordingly it is evident that the natural law inclines a man to confession, by means of the Divine law, which determines the circumstances, as is the case with all matters belonging to the positive law.

Reply to Objection 2: Although an innocent man may have the habit of the virtue whose object is a sin already committed, he has not the act, so long as he remains innocent. Wherefore the confession of sins, of which confession we are speaking now, is not befitting an innocent man, though it is an act of virtue.

Reply to Objection 3: Though the grace of the sacraments differs from the grace of the virtues, they are not contrary but disparate; hence there is nothing to prevent that which is an act of virtue, in so far as it proceeds from the free-will quickened by grace, from being a sacrament, or part of a sacrament, in so far as it is ordained as a remedy for sin.

Whether confession is an act of the virtue of penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession is not an act of the virtue of penance. For an act belongs to the virtue which is its cause. Now the cause of confession is the hope of pardon, as appears from the definition given above [4842](A[1]). Therefore it seems that it is an act of hope and not of penance.

Objection 2: Further, shame is a part of temperance. But confession arises from shame, as appears in the definition given above (A[1], OBJ[4]). Therefore it is an act of temperance and not of penance.

Objection 3: Further, the act of penance leans on Divine mercy. But confession leans rather on Divine wisdom, by reason of the truth which is required in it. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

Objection 4: Further, we are moved to penance by the article of the Creed which is about the Judgment, on account of fear, which is the origin of penance. But we are moved to confession by the article which is about life everlasting, because it arises from hope of pardon. Therefore it is not an act of penance.

Objection 5: Further, it belongs to the virtue of truth that a man shows himself to be what he is. But this is what a man does when he goes to confession. Therefore confession is an act of that virtue which is called truth, and not of penance.

On the contrary, Penance is ordained for the destruction of sin. Now confession is ordained to this also. Therefore it is an act of penance.

I answer that, It must be observed with regard to virtues, that when a special reason of goodness or difficulty is added over and above the object of a virtue, there is need of a special virtue: thus the expenditure of large sums is the object of magnificence, although the ordinary kind of average expenditure and gifts belongs to liberality, as appears from Ethic. ii, 7; iv, 1. The same applies to the confession of truth, which, although it belongs to the virtue of truth absolutely, yet, on account of the additional reason of goodness, begins to belong to another kind of virtue. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that a confession made in a court of justice belongs to the virtue of justice rather than to truth. In like manner the confession of God’s favors in praise of God, belongs not to truth, but to religion: and so too the confession of sins, in order to receive pardon for them, is not the elicited act of the virtue of truth, as some say, but of the virtue of penance. It may, however, be the commanded act of many virtues, in so far as the act of confession can be directed to the end of many virtues.

Reply to Objection 1: Hope is the cause of confession, not as eliciting but as commanding.

Reply to Objection 2: In that definition shame is not mentioned as the cause of confession, since it is more of a nature to hinder the act of confession, but rather as the joint cause of delivery from punishment (because shame is in itself a punishment), since also the keys of the Church are the joint cause with confession, to the same effect.

Reply to Objection 3: By a certain adaptation the parts of Penance can be ascribed to three Personal Attributes, so that contrition may correspond to mercy or goodness, by reason of its being sorrow for evil—confession to wisdom, by reason of its being a manifestation of the truth—and satisfaction to power, on account of the labor it entails. And since contrition is the first part of Penance, and renders the other parts efficacious, for this reason the same is to be said of Penance as a whole, as of contrition.

Reply to Objection 4: Since confession results from hope rather than from fear, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), it is based on the article about eternal life which hope looks to, rather than on the article about the Judgment, which fear considers; although penance, in its aspect of contrition, is the opposite.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is to be gathered from what has been said.

OF THE MINISTER OF CONFESSION (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the minister of confession, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?

(2) Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?

(3) Whether outside a case of necessity one who is not a priest can hear the confession of venial sins?

(4) Whether it is necessary for a man to confess to his own priest?

(5) Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or of the command of a superior?

(6) Whether a penitent, in danger of death can be absolved by any priest?

(7) Whether the temporal punishment should be enjoined in proportion to the sin?

Whether it is necessary to confess to a priest?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary to confess to a priest. For we are not bound to confession, except in virtue of its Divine institution. Now its Divine institution is made known to us (James 5:16): “Confess your sins, one to another,” where there is no mention of a priest. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

Objection 2: Further, Penance is a necessary sacrament, as is also Baptism. But any man is the minister of Baptism, on account of its necessity. Therefore any man is the minister of Penance. Now confession should be made to the minister of Penance. Therefore it suffices to confess to anyone.

Objection 3: Further, confession is necessary in order that the measure of satisfaction should be imposed on the penitent. Now, sometimes another than a priest might be more discreet than many priests are in imposing the measure of satisfaction on the penitent. Therefore it is not necessary to confess to a priest.

Objection 4: Further, confession was instituted in the Church in order that the rectors might know their sheep by sight. But sometimes a rector or prelate is not a priest. Therefore confession should not always be made to a priest.

On the contrary, The absolution of the penitent, for the sake of which he makes his confession, is imparted by none but priests to whom the keys are intrusted. Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

Further, confession is foreshadowed in the raising of the dead Lazarus to life. Now our Lord commanded none but the disciples to loose Lazarus (Jn. 11:44). Therefore confession should be made to a priest.

I answer that, The grace which is given in the sacraments, descends from the Head to the members. Wherefore he alone who exercises a ministry over Christ’s true body is a minister of the sacraments, wherein grace is given; and this belongs to a priest alone, who can consecrate the Eucharist. Therefore, since grace is given in the sacrament of Penance, none but a priest is the minister of the sacrament: and consequently sacramental confession which should be made to a minister of the Church, should be made to none but a priest.

Reply to Objection 1: James speaks on the presupposition of the Divine institutions: and since confession had already been prescribed by God to be made to a priest, in that He empowered them, in the person of the apostles, to forgive sins, as related in Jn. 20:23, we must take the words of James as conveying an admonishment to confess to priests.

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism is a sacrament of greater necessity than Penance, as regards confession and absolution, because sometimes Baptism cannot be omitted without loss of eternal salvation, as in the case of children who have not come to the use of reason: whereas this cannot be said of confession and absolution, which regard none but adults, in whom contrition, together with the purpose of confessing and the desire of absolution, suffices to deliver them from everlasting death. Consequently there is no parity between Baptism and confession.

Reply to Objection 3: In satisfaction we must consider not only the quantity of the punishment but also its power, inasmuch as it is part of a sacrament. In this way it requires a dispenser of the sacraments, though the quantity of the punishment may be fixed by another than a priest.

Reply to Objection 4: It may be necessary for two reasons to know the sheep by sight. First, in order to register them as members of Christ’s flock, and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the pastoral charge and care, which is sometimes the duty of those who are not priests. Secondly, that they may be provided with suitable remedies for their health; and to know the sheep by sight thus belongs to the man, i.e. the priest, whose business it is to provide remedies conducive to health, such as the sacrament of the Eucharist, and other like things. It is to this knowledge of the sheep that confession is ordained.

Whether it is ever lawful to confess to another than a priest?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is never lawful to confess to another than a priest. For confession is a sacramental accusation, as appears from the definition given above ([4843]Q[7], A[1]). But the dispensing of a sacrament belongs to none but the minister of a sacrament. Since then the proper minister of Penance is a priest, it seems that confession should be made to no one else.

Objection 2: Further, in every court of justice confession is ordained to the sentence. Now in a disputed case the sentence is void if pronounced by another than the proper judge; so that confession should be made to none but a judge. But, in the court of conscience, the judge is none but a priest, who has the power of binding and loosing. Therefore confession should be made to no one else.

Objection 3: Further, in the case of Baptism, since anyone can baptize, if a layman has baptized, even without necessity, the Baptism should not be repeated by a priest. But if anyone confess to a layman in a case of necessity, he is bound to repeat his confession to a priest, when the cause for urgency has passed. Therefore confession should not be made to a layman in a case of necessity.

On the contrary, is the authority of the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).

I answer that, Just as Baptism is a necessary sacrament, so is Penance. And Baptism, through being a necessary sacrament has a twofold minister: one whose duty it is to baptize, in virtue of his office, viz. the priest, and another, to whom the conferring of Baptism is committed, in a case of necessity. In like manner the minister of Penance, to whom, in virtue of his office, confession should be made, is a priest; but in a case of necessity even a layman may take the place of a priest, and hear a person's confession.

Reply to Objection 1: In the sacrament of Penance there is not only something on the part of the minister, viz. the absolution and imposition of satisfaction, but also something on the part of the recipient, which is also essential to the sacrament, viz. contrition and confession. Now satisfaction originates from the minister in so far as he enjoins it, and from the penitent who fulfills it; and, for the fulness of the sacrament, both these things should concur when possible. But when there is reason for urgency, the penitent should fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can; and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman, through lack* of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, on account of the absence of the part which belongs to the priest. [*Here and in the Reply to OBJ[2] the Leonine edition reads "through desire for a priest."]

Reply to Objection 2: Although a layman is not the judge of the person who confesses to him, yet, on account of the urgency, he does take the place of a judge over him, absolutely speaking, in so far as the penitent submits to him, through lack of a priest.

Reply to Objection 3: By means of the sacraments man must needs be reconciled not only to God, but also to the Church. Now he cannot be reconciled to the Church, unless the hallowing of the Church reach him. In Baptism the hallowing of the Church reaches a man through the element itself applied externally, which is sanctified by “the word of life” (Eph. 5:26), by whomsoever it is conferred: and so when once a man has been baptized, no matter by whom, he must not be baptized again. On the other hand, in Penance the hallowing of the Church reaches man by the minister alone, because in that sacrament there is no bodily element applied externally, through the hallowing of which grace may be conferred. Consequently although the man who, in a case of necessity, has confessed to a layman, has received forgiveness from God, for the reason that he fulfilled, so far as he could, the purpose which he conceived in accordance with God’s command, he is not yet reconciled to the Church, so as to be admitted to the sacraments, unless he first be absolved by a priest, even as he who has received the Baptism of desire, is not admitted to the Eucharist. Wherefore he must confess again to a priest, as soon as there is one at hand, and the more so since, as stated above (ad 1), the sacrament of Penance was not perfected, and so it needs yet to be perfected, in order that by receiving the sacrament, the penitent may receive a more plentiful effect, and that he may fulfill the commandment about receiving the sacrament of Penance.

Whether, outside a case of necessity, anyone who is not a priest may hear the confession of venial sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that, outside a case of necessity, no one but a priest may hear the confession of venial sins. For the dispensation of a sacrament is committed to a layman by reason of necessity. But the confession of venial sins is not necessary. Therefore it is not committed to a layman.

Objection 2: Further, Extreme Unction is ordained against venial sin, just as Penance is. But the former may not be given by a layman, as appears from James 5:14. Therefore neither can the confession of venial sins be made to a layman.

On the contrary, is the authority of Bede (on James 5:16, “Confess . . . one to another”) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17).

I answer that, By venial sin man is separated neither from God nor from the sacraments of the Church: wherefore he does not need to receive any further grace for the forgiveness of such a sin, nor does he need to be reconciled to the Church. Consequently a man does not need to confess his venial sins to a priest. And since confession made to a layman is a sacramental, although it is not a perfect sacrament, and since it proceeds from charity, it has a natural aptitude to remit sins, just as the beating of one's breast, or the sprinkling of holy water (cf. [4844]TP, Q[87], A[3]).

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection, because there is no need to receive a sacrament for the forgiveness of venial sins. and a sacramental, such as holy water or the like, suffices for the purpose.

Reply to Objection 2: Extreme Unction is not given directly as a remedy for venial sin, nor is any other sacrament.

Whether it is necessary for one to confess to one's own priest?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is nol necessary to confess to one's own priest. For Gregory [*Cf. Can. Ex auctoritate xvi, Q[1]] says: "By our apostolic authority and in discharge of our solicitude we have decreed that priests, who as monks imitate the ex. ample of the apostles, may preach, baptize, give communion, pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve from sins." Now monks are not the proper priests of anyone, since they have not the care of souls. Since, therefore confession is made for the sake of absolution it suffices for it to be made to any priest.

Objection 2: Further, the minister of this sacrament is a priest, as also of the Eucharist. But any priest can perform the Eucharist. Therefore any priest can administer the sacrament of Penance. Therefore there is no need to confess to one's own priest.

Objection 3: Further, when we are bound to one thing in particular it is not left to our choice. But the choice of a discreet priest is left to us as appears from the authority of Augustine quoted in the text (Sent. ix, D, 17): for he says in De vera et falsa Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]: "He who wishes to confess his sins, in order to find grace, must seek a priest who knows how to loose and to bind." Therefore it seems unnecessary to confess to one's own priest.

Objection 4: Further, there are some, such as prelates, who seem to have no priest of their own, since they have no superior: yet they are bound to confession. Therefore a man is not always bound to confess to his own priest.

Objection 5: Further, “That which is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity,” as Bernard observes (De Praecept. et Dispens. ii). Now confession, which was instituted for the sake of charity, would militate against charity, if a man were bound to confess to any particular priest: e.g. if the sinner know that his own priest is a heretic, or a man of evil influence, or weak and prone to the very sin that he wishes to confess to him, or reasonably suspected of breaking the seal of confession, or if the penitent has to confess a sin committed against his confessor. Therefore it seems that one need not always confess to one’s own priest.

Objection 6: Further, men should not be straitened in matters necessary for salvation, lest they be hindered in the way of salvation. But it seems a great inconvenience to be bound of necessity to confess to one particular man, and many might be hindered from going to confession, through either fear, shame, or something else of the kind. Therefore, since confession is necessary for salvation, men should not be straitened, as apparently they would be, by having to confess to their own priest.

On the contrary, stands a decree of Pope Innocent III in the Fourth Lateran Council (Can. 21), who appointed “all of either sex to confess once a year to their own priest.”

Further, as a bishop is to his diocese, so is a priest to his parish. Now it is unlawful, according to canon law (Can. Nullus primas ix[4845], Q[2]; Can. Si quis episcoporum xvi[4846], Q[5]), for a bishop to exercise the episcopal office in another diocese. Therefore it is not lawful for one priest to hear the confession of another’s parishioner.

I answer that, The other sacraments do not consist in an action of the recipient, but only in his receiving something, as is evident with regard to Baptism and so forth. though the action of the recipient is required as removing an obstacle, i.e. insincerity, in order that he may receive the benefit of the sacrament, if he has come to the use of his free-will. On the other hand, the action of the man who approaches the sacrament of Penance is essential to the sacrament, since contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are acts of the penitent, are parts of Penance. Now our actions, since they have their origin in us, cannot be dispensed by others, except through their command. Hence whoever is appointed a dispenser of this sacrament, must be such as to be able to command something to be done. Now a man is not competent to command another unless he have jurisdiction over him. Consequently it is essential to this sacrament, not only for the minister to be in orders, as in the case of the other sacraments, but also for him to have jurisdiction: wherefore he that has no jurisdiction cannot administer this sacrament any more than one who is not a priest. Therefore confession should be made not only to a priest, but to one's own priest; for since a priest does not absolve a man except by binding him to do something, he alone can absolve, who, by his command, can bind the penitent to do something.

Reply to Objection 1: Gregory is speaking of those monks who have jurisdiction, through having charge of a parish; about whom some had maintained that from the very fact that they were monks, they could not absolve or impose penance, which is false.

Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of the Eucharist does not require the power of command over a man, whereas this sacrament does, as stated above: and so the argument proves nothing. Nevertheless it is not lawful to receive the Eucharist from another than one's own priest, although it is a real sacrament that one receives from another.

Reply to Objection 3: The choice of a discreet priest is not left to us in such a way that we can do just as we like; but it is left to the permission of a higher authority, if perchance one's own priest happens to be less suitable for applying a salutary remedy to our sins.

Reply to Objection 4: Since it is the duty of prelates to dispense the sacraments, which the clean alone should handle, they are allowed by law (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Ne pro dilatione) to choose a priest for their confessor; who in this respect is the prelate's superior; even as one physician is cured by another, not as a physician but as a patient.

Reply to Objection 5: In those cases wherein the penitent has reason to fear some harm to himself or to the priest by reason of his confessing to him, he should have recourse to the higher authority, or ask permission of the priest himself to confess to another; and if he fails to obtain permission, the case is to be decided as for a man who has no priest at hand; so that he should rather choose a layman and confess to him. Nor does he disobey the law of the Church by so doing, because the precepts of positive law do not extend beyond the intention of the lawgiver, which is the end of the precept, and in this case, is charity, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 1:5). Nor is any slur cast on the priest, for he deserves to forfeit his privilege, for abusing the power intrusted to him.

Reply to Objection 6: The necessity of confessing to one’s own priest does not straiten the way of salvation, but determines it sufficiently. A priest, however, would sin if he were not easy in giving permission to confess to another, because many are so weak that they would rather die without confession than confess to such a priest. Wherefore those priests who are too anxious to probe the consciences of their subjects by means of confession, lay a snare of damnation for many, and consequently for themselves.

Whether it is lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, in virtue of a privilege or a command given by a superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest, even in virtue of a privilege or command given by a superior. For no privilege should be given that wrongs a third party. Now it would be prejudicial to the subject’s own priest, if he were to confess to another. Therefore this cannot be allowed by a superior’s privilege, permission, or command.

Objection 2: Further, that which hinders the observance of a Divine command cannot be the subject of a command or privilege given by man. Now it is a Divine command to the rectors of churches to “know the countenance of their own cattle” (Prov. 27:23); and this is hindered if another than the rector hear the confession of his subjects. Therefore this cannot be prescribed by any human privilege or command.

Objection 3: Further, he that hears another’s confession is the latter’s own judge, else he could not bind or loose him. Now one man cannot have several priests or judges of his own, for then he would be bound to obey several men, which would be impossible, if their commands were contrary or incompatible. Therefore one may not confess to another than one’s own priest, even with the superior’s permission.

Objection 4: Further, it is derogatory to a sacrament, or at least useless, to repeat a sacrament over the same matter. But he who has confessed to another priest, is bound to confess again to his own priest, if the latter requires him to do so, because he is not absolved from his obedience, whereby he is bound to him in this respect. Therefore it cannot be lawful for anyone to confess to another than his own priest.

On the contrary, He that can perform the actions of an order can depute the exercise thereof to anyone who has the same order. Now a superior, such as a bishop, can hear the confession of anyone belonging to a priest's parish, for sometimes he reserves certain cases to himself, since he is the chief rector. Therefore he can also depute another priest to hear that man.

Further, a superior can do whatever his subject can do. But the priest himself can give his parishioner permission to confess to another. Much more, therefore, can his superior do this.

Further, the power which a priest has among his people, comes to him from the bishop. Now it is through that power that he can hear confessions. Therefore, in like manner, another can do so, to whom the bishop gives the same power.

I answer that, A priest may be hindered in two ways from hearing a man's confession: first, through lack of jurisdiction; secondly, through being prevented from exercising his order, as those who are excommunicate, degraded, and so forth. Now whoever has jurisdiction, can depute to another whatever comes under his jurisdiction; so that if a priest is hindered from hearing a man's confession through want of jurisdiction, anyone who has immediate jurisdiction over that man, priest, bishop, or Pope, can depute that priest to hear his confession and absolve him. If, on the other hand, the priest cannot hear the confession, on account of an impediment to the exercise of his order, anyone who has the power to remove that impediment can permit him to hear confessions.

Reply to Objection 1: No wrong is done to a person unless what is taken away from him was granted for his own benefit. Now the power of jurisdiction is not granted a man for his own benefit, but for the good of the people and for the glory of God. Wherefore if the higher prelates deem it expedient for the furthering of the people's salvation and God's glory, to commit matters of jurisdiction to others, no wrong is done to the inferior prelates, except to those who "seek the things that are their own; not the things that are Jesus Christ's" (Phil. 2:21), and who rule their flock, not by feeding it, but by feeding on it.

Reply to Objection 2: The rector of a church should "know the countenance of his own cattle" in two ways. First, by an assiduous attention to their external conduct, so as to watch over the flock committed to his care: and in acquiring this knowledge he should not believe his subject, but, as far as possible, inquire into the truth of facts. Secondly, by the manifestation of confession; and with regard to this knowledge, he cannot arrive at any greater certainty than by believing his subject, because this is necessary that he may help his subject's conscience. Consequently in the tribunal of confession, the penitent is believed whether he speak for himself or against himself, but not in the court of external judgment: wherefore it suffices for this knowledge that he believe the penitent when he says that he has confessed to one who could absolve him. It is therefore clear that this knowledge of the flock is not hindered by a privilege granted to another to hear confessions.

Reply to Objection 3: It would be inconvenient, if two men were placed equally over the same people, but there is no inconvenience if over the same people two are placed one of whom is over the other. In this way the parish priest, the bishop, and the Pope are placed immediately over the same people, and each of them can commit matters of jurisdiction to some other. Now a higher superior delegates a man in two ways: first, so that the latter takes the superior's place, as when the Pope or a bishop appoints his penitentiaries; and then the man thus delegated is higher than the inferior prelate, as the Pope's penitentiary is higher than a bishop, and the bishop's penitentiary than a parish priest, and the penitent is bound to obey the former rather than the latter. Secondly, so that the delegate is appointed the coadjutor of this other priest; and since a co-adjutor is subordinate to the person he is appointed to help, he holds a lower rank, and the penitent is not so bound to obey him as his own priest.

Reply to Objection 4: No man is bound to confess sins that he has no longer. Consequently, if a man has confessed to the bishop's penitentiary, or to someone else having faculties from the bishop, his sins are forgiven both before the Church and before God, so that he is not bound to confess them to his own priest, however much the latter may insist: but on account of the Ecclesiastical precept (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque) which prescribes confession to be made once a year to one’s own priest, he is under the same obligation as one who has committed none but venial sins. For such a one, according to some, is bound to confess none but venial sins, or he must declare that he is free from mortal sin, and the priest, in the tribunal of conscience, ought, and is bound, to believe him. If, however, he were bound to confess again, his first confession would not be useless, because the more priests one confesses to, the more is the punishment remitted, both by reason of the shame in confessing, which is reckoned as a satisfactory punishment, and by reason of the power of the keys: so that one might confess so often as to be delivered from all punishment. Nor is repetition derogatory to a sacrament, except in those wherein there is some kind of sanctification, either by the impressing of a character, or by the consecration of the matter, neither of which applies to Penance. Hence it would be well for him who hears confessions by the bishop’s authority, to advise the penitent to confess to his own priest, yet he must absolve him, even if he declines to do so.

Whether a penitent, at the point of death, can be absolved by any priest?

Objection 1: It would seem that a penitent, at the point of death, cannot be absolved by any priest. For absolution requires jurisdiction, as stated above [4847](A[5]). Now a priest does not acquire jurisdiction over a man who repents at the point of death. Therefore he cannot absolve him.

Objection 2: Further, he that receives the sacrament of Baptism, when in danger of death, from another than his own priest, does not need to be baptized again by the latter. If, therefore, any priest can absolve, from any sin, a man who is in danger of death, the penitent, if he survive the danger, need not go to his own priest; which is false, since otherwise the priest would not “know the countenance of his cattle.”

Objection 3: Further, when there is danger of death, Baptism can be conferred not only by a strange priest, but also by one who is not a priest. But one who is not a priest can never absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore neither can a priest absolve a man who is not his subject, when he is in danger of death.

On the contrary, Spiritual necessity is greater than bodily necessity. But it is lawful in a case of extreme necessity, for a man to make use of another’s property, even against the owner’s will, in order to supply a bodily need. Therefore in danger of death, a man may be absolved by another than his own priest, in order to supply his spiritual need.

Further, the authorities quoted in the text prove the same (Sent. iv, D, 20, Cap. Non Habet).

I answer that, If we consider the power of the keys, every priest has power over all men equally and over all sins: and it is due to the fact that by the ordination of the Church, he has a limited jurisdiction or none at all, that he cannot absolve all men from all sins. But since “necessity knows no law” [*Cap. Consilium, De observ. jejun.; De reg. jur. (v, Decretal)] in cases of necessity the ordination of the Church does not hinder him from being able to absolve, since he has the keys sacramentally: and the penitent will receive as much benefit from the absolution of this other priest as if he had been absolved by his own. Moreover a man can then be absolved by any priest not only from his sins, but also from excommunication, by whomsoever pronounced, because such absolution is also a matter of that jurisdiction which by the ordination of the Church is con. fined within certain limits.

Reply to Objection 1: One person may act on the jurisdiction of another according to the latter’s will, since matters of jurisdiction can be deputed. Since, therefore, the Church recognizes absolution granted by any priest at the hour of death, from this very fact a priest has the use of jurisdiction though he lack the power of jurisdiction.

Reply to Objection 2: He needs to go to his own priest, not that he may be absolved again from the sins, from which he was absolved when in danger of death, but that his own priest may know that he is absolved. In like manner, he who has been absolved from excommunication needs to go to the judge, who in other circumstances could have absolved him, not in order to seek absolution, but in order to offer satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism derives its efficacy from the sanctification of the matter itself, so that a man receives the sacrament whosoever baptizes him: whereas the sacramental power of Penance consists in a sanctification pronounced by the minister, so that if a man confess to a layman, although he fulfills his own part of the sacramental confession, he does not receive sacramental absolution. Wherefore his confession avails him somewhat, as to the lessening of his punishment, owing to the merit derived from his confession and to his repentance. but he does not receive that diminution of his punishment which results from the power of the keys; and consequently he must confess again to a priest; and one who has confessed thus, is more punished hereafter than if he had confessed to a priest.

Whether the temporal punishment is imposed according to the degree of the fault?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temporal punishment, the debt of which remains after Penance, is not imposed according to the degree of fault. For it is imposed according to the degree of pleasure derived from the sin, as appears from Apoc. 18:7: “As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye her.” Yet sometimes where there is greater pleasure, there is less fault, since “carnal sins, which afford more pleasure than spiritual sins, are less guilty,” according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 2). Therefore the punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

Objection 2: Further, in the New Law one is bound to punishment for mortal sins, in the same way as in the Old Law. Now in the Old Law the punishment for sin was due to last seven days, in other words, they had to remain unclean seven days for one mortal sin. Since therefore, in the New Testament, a punishment of seven years is imposed for one mortal sin, it seems that the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

Objection 3: Further, the sin of murder in a layman is more grievous than that of fornication in a priest, because the circumstance which is taken from the species of a sin, is more aggravating than that which is taken from the person of the sinner. Now a punishment of seven years’ duration is appointed for a layman guilty of murder, while for fornication a priest is punished for ten years, according to Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii. Therefore punishment is not imposed according to the degree of fault.

Objection 4: Further, a sin committed against the very body of Christ is most grievous, because the greater the person sinned against, the more grievous the sin. Now for spilling the blood of Christ in the sacrament of the altar a punishment of forty days or a little more is enjoined, while a punishment of seven years is prescribed for fornication, according to the

Canons (Can. Presbyter, Dist. lxxxii). Therefore the quantity of the punishment does not answer to the degree of fault.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 27:8): “In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.” Therefore the quantity of punishment adjudicated for sin answers the degree of fault.

Further, man is reduced to the equality of justice by the punishment inflicted on him. But this would not be so if the quantity of the fault and of the punishment did not mutually correspond. Therefore one answers to the other.

I answer that, After the forgiveness of sin, a punishment is required for two reasons, viz. to pay the debt, and to afford a remedy. Hence the punishment may be imposed in consideration of two things. First, in consideration of the debt, and in this way the quantity of the punishment corresponds radically to the quantity of the fault, before anything of the latter is forgiven: yet the more there is remitted by the first of those things which are of a nature to remit punishment, the less there remains to be remitted or paid by the other, because the more contrition remits of the punishment, the less there remains to be remitted by confession. Secondly, in consideration of the remedy, either as regards the one who sinned, or as regards others: and thus sometimes a greater punishment is enjoined for a lesser sin; either because one man’s sin is more difficult to resist than another’s (thus a heavier punishment is imposed on a young man for fornication, than on an old man, though the former’s sin be less grievous), or because one man’s sin; for instance, a priest’s, is more dangerous to others, than another’s sin, or because the people are more prone to that particular sin, so that it is necessary by the punishment of the one man to deter others. Consequently, in the tribunal of Penance, the punishment has to be imposed with due regard to both these things: and so a greater punishment is not always imposed for a greater sin. on the other hand, the punishment of Purgatory is only for the payment of the debt, because there is no longer any possibility of sinning, so that this punishment is meted only according to the measure of sin, with due consideration however for the degree of contrition, and for confession and absolution, since all these lessen the punishment somewhat: wherefore the priest in enjoining satisfaction should bear them in mind.

Reply to Objection 1: In the words quoted two things are mentioned with regard to the sin, viz. “glorification” and “delicacies” or “delectation”; the first of which regards the uplifting of the sinner, whereby he resists God; while the second regards the pleasure of sin: and though sometimes there is less pleasure in a greater sin, yet there is greater uplifting; wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: This punishment of seven days did not expiate the punishment due for the sin, so that even if the sinner died after that time, he would be punished in Purgatory: but it was in expiation of the irregularity incurred, from which all the legal sacrifices expiated. Nevertheless, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously under the New Law than under the Old, on account of the more plentiful sanctification received in Baptism, and on account of the more powerful blessings bestowed by God on the human race. This is evident from Heb. 29: “How much more, do you think, he deserveth worse punishments,” etc. And yet it is not universally true that a seven years’ penance is exacted for every mortal sin: but it is a kind of general rule applicable to the majority of cases, which must, nevertheless, be disregarded, with due consideration for the various circumstances of sins and penitents.

Reply to Objection 3: A bishop or priest sins with greater danger to others or to himself; wherefore the canons are more anxious to withdraw him from sin, by inflicting a greater punishment, in as much as it is intended as a remedy; although sometimes so great a punishment is not strictly due. Hence he is punished less in Purgatory.

Reply to Objection 4: This punishment refers to the case when this happens against the priest’s will: for if he spilled it willingly he would deserve a much heavier punishment.

OF THE QUALITY OF CONFESSION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of confession: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether confession can be lacking in form?

(2) Whether confession ought to be entire?

(3) Whether one can confess through another, or by writing?

(4) Whether the sixteen conditions, which are assigned by the masters, are necessary for confession?

Whether confession can be lacking in form?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession cannot be lacking in form. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:26): “Praise [confession] perisheth from the dead as nothing.” But a man without charity is dead, because charity is the life of the soul. Therefore there can be no confession without charity.

Objection 2: Further, confession is condivided with contrition and satisfaction. But contrition and satisfaction are impossible without charity. Therefore confession is also impossible without charity.

Objection 3: Further, it is necessary in confession that the word should agree with the thought for the very name of confession requires this. Now if a man confess while remaining attached to sin, his word is not in accord with his thought, since in his heart he holds to sin, while he condemns it with his lips. Therefore such a man does not confess.

On the contrary, Every man is bound to confess his mortal sins. Now if a man in mortal sin has confessed once, he is not bound to confess the same sins again, because, as no man knows himself to have charity, no man would know of him that he had confessed. Therefore it is not necessary that confession should be quickened by charity.

I answer that, Confession is an act of virtue, and is part of a sacrament. In so far as it is an act of virtue, it has the property of being meritorious, and thus is of no avail without charity, which is the principle of merit. But in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it subordinates the penitent to the priest who has the keys of the Church, and who by means of the confession knows the conscience of the person confessing. In this way it is possible for confession to be in one who is not contrite, for he can make his sins known to the priest, and subject himself to the keys of the Church: and though he does not receive the fruit of absolution then, yet he will begin to receive it, when he is sincerely contrite, as happens in the other sacraments: wherefore he is not bound to repeat his confession, but to confess his lack of sincerity.

Reply to Objection 1: These words must be understood as referring to the receiving of the fruit of confession, which none can receive who is not in the state of charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Contrition and satisfaction are offered to God: but confession is made to man: hence it is essential to contrition and satisfaction, but not to confession, that man should be united to God by charity.

Reply to Objection 3: He who declares the sins which he has, speaks the truth; and thus his thought agrees with his lips or words, as to the substance of confession, though it is discordant with the purpose of confession.

Whether confession should be entire?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for confession to be entire, namely, for a man to confess all his sins to one priest. For shame conduces to the diminution of punishment. Now the greater the number of priests to whom a man confesses, the greater his shame. Therefore confession is more fruitful if it be divided among several priests.

Objection 2: Further, confession is necessary in Penance in order that punishment may be enjoined for sin according to the judgment of the priest. Now a sufficient punishment for different sins can be imposed by different priests. Therefore it is not necessary to confess all one’s sins to one priest.

Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man after going to confession and performing his penance, remembers a mortal sin, which escaped his memory while confessing, and that his own priest to whom he confessed first is no longer available, so that he can only confess that sin to another priest, and thus he will confess different sins to different priests.

Objection 4: Further, the sole reason for confessing one’s sins to a priest is in order to receive absolution. Now sometimes, the priest who hears a confession can absolve from some of the sins, but not from all. Therefore in such a case at all events the confession need not be entire.

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is an obstacle to Penance. But it savors of hypocrisy to divide one’s confession, as Augustine says [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, work of an unknown author]. Therefore confession should be entire. Further, confession is a part of Penance. But Penance should be entire. Therefore confession also should be entire.

I answer that, In prescribing medicine for the body, the physician should know not only the disease for which he is prescribing, but also the general constitution of the sick person, since one disease is aggravated by the addition of another, and a medicine which would be adapted to one disease, would be harmful to another. The same is to be said in regard to sins, for one is aggravated when another is added to it; and a remedy which would be suitable for one sin, might prove an incentive to another, since sometimes a man is guilty of contrary sins, as Gregory says (Pastoral. iii, 3). Hence it is necessary for confession that man confess all the sins that he calls to mind, and if he fails to do this, it is not a confession, but a pretense of confession.

Reply to Objection 1: Although a man’s shame is multiplied when he makes a divided confession to different confessors, yet all his different shames together are not so great as that with which he confesses all his sins together: because one sin considered by itself does not prove the evil disposition of the sinner, as when it is considered in conjunction with several others, for a man may fall into one sin through ignorance or weakness, but a number of sins proves the malice of the sinner, or his great corruption.

Reply to Objection 2: The punishment imposed by different priests would not be sufficient, because each would only consider one sin by itself, and not the gravity which it derives from being in conjunction with another. Moreover sometimes the punishment which would be given for one sin would foster another. Again the priest in hearing a confession takes the place of God, so that confession should be made to him just as contrition is made to God: wherefore as there would be no contrition unless one were contrite for all the sins which one calls to mind, so is there no confession unless one confess all the sins that one remembers committing.

Reply to Objection 3: Some say that when a man remembers a sin which he had previously forgotten, he ought to confess again the sins which he had confessed before, especially if he cannot go to the same priest to whom his previous confession was made, in order that the total quantity of his sins may be made known to one priest. But this does not seem necessary, because sin takes its quantity both from itself and from the conjunction of another; and as to the sins which he confessed he had already manifested their quantity which they have of themselves, while as to the sin which he had forgotten, in order that the priest may know the quantity which it has under both the above heads, it is enough that the penitent declare it explicitly, and confess the others in general, saying that he had confessed many sins in his previous confession, but had forgotten this particular one.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the priest may be unable to absolve the penitent from all his sins, yet the latter is bound to confess all to him, that he may know the total quantity of his guilt, and refer him to the superior with regard to the sins from which he cannot absolve him.

Whether one may confess through another, or by writing?

Objection 1: It would seem that one may confess through another, or by writing. For confession is necessary in order that the penitent's conscience may be made known to the priest. But a man can make his conscience known to the priest, through another or by writing. Therefore it is enough to confess through another or by writing.

Objection 2: Further, some are not understood by their own priests on account of a difference of language, and consequently cannot confess save through others. Therefore it is not essential to the sacrament that one should confess by oneself, so that if anyone confesses through another in any way whatever, it suffices for his salvation.

Objection 3: Further, it is essential to the sacrament that a man should confess to his own priest, as appears from what has been said ([4848]Q[8], A[5]). Now sometimes a man's own priest is absent, so that the penitent cannot speak to him with his own voice. But he could make his conscience known to him by writing. Therefore it seems that he ought to manifest his conscience to him by writing to him.

On the contrary, Man is bound to confess his sins even as he is bound to confess his faith. But confession of faith should be made "with the mouth," as appears from Rom. 10:10: therefore confession of sins should also.

Further, who sinned by himself should, by himself, do penance. But confession is part of penance. Therefore the penitent should confess his own sins.

I answer that, Confession is not only an act of virtue, but also part of a sacrament. Now, though, in so far as it is an act of virtue it matters not how it is done, even if it be easier to do it in one way than in another, yet, in so far as it is part of a sacrament, it has a determinate act, just as the other sacraments have a determinate matter. And as in Baptism, in order to signify the inward washing, we employ that element which is chiefly used in washing, so in the sacramental act which is intended for manifestation we generally make use of that act which is most commonly employed for the purpose of manifestation, viz. our own words; for other ways have been introduced as supplementary to this.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as in Baptism it is not enough to wash with anything, but it is necessary to wash with a determinate element, so neither does it suffice, in Penance, to manifest one's sins anyhow, but they must be declared by a determinate act.

Reply to Objection 2: It is enough for one who is ignorant of a language, to confess by writing, or by signs, or by an interpreter, because a man is not bound to do more than he can: although a man is not able or obliged to receive Baptism, except with water, which is from an entirely external source and is applied to us by another: whereas the act of confession is from within and is performed by ourselves, so that when we cannot confess in one way, we must confess as we can.

Reply to Objection 3: In the absence of one's own priest, confession may be made even to a layman, so that there is no necessity to confess in writing, because the act of confession is more essential than the person to whom confession is made.

Whether the sixteen conditions usually assigned are necessary for confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that the conditions assigned by masters, and contained in the following lines, are not requisite for confession:

Simple, humble, pure, faithful,
Frequent, undisguised, discreet, voluntary,
shamefaced,
Entire, secret, tearful, not delayed,
Courageously accusing, ready to obey.

For fidelity, simplicity, and courage are virtues by themselves, and therefore should not be reckoned as conditions of confession.

Objection 2: Further, a thing is "pure" when it is not mixed with anything else: and "simplicity," in like manner, removes composition and admixture. Therefore one or the other is superfluous.

Objection 3: Further, no one is bound to confess more than once a sin which he has committed but once. Therefore if a man does not commit a sin again, his penance need not be “frequent.”

Objection 4: Further, confession is directed to satisfaction. But satisfaction is sometimes public. Therefore confession should not always be “secret.”

Objection 5: Further, that which is not in our power is not required of us. But it is not in our power to shed “tears.” Therefore it is not required of those who confess.

On the contrary, We have the authority of the masters who assigned the above.

I answer that, Some of the above conditions are essential to confession, and some are requisite for its well-being. Now those things which are essential to confession belong to it either as to an act of virtue, or as to part of a sacrament. If in the first way, it is either by reason of virtue in general, or by reason of the special virtue of which it is the act, or by reason of the act itself. Now there are four conditions of virtue in general, as stated in Ethic. ii, 4. The first is knowledge, in respect of which confession is said to be “discreet,” inasmuch as prudence is required in every act of virtue: and this discretion consists in giving greater weight to greater sins. The second condition is choice, because acts of virtue should be voluntary, and in this respect confession is said to be “voluntary.” The third condition is that the act be done for a particular purpose, viz. the due end, and in this respect confession is said to be “pure,” i.e. with a right intention. The fourth condition is that one should act immovably, and in this respect it is said that confession should be “courageous,” viz. that the truth should not be forsaken through shame.

Now confession is an act of the virtue of penance. First of all it takes its origin in the horror which one conceives for the shamefulness of sin, and in this respect confession should be “full of shame,” so as not to be a boastful account of one’s sins, by reason of some worldly vanity accompanying it. Then it goes on to deplore the sin committed, and in this respect it is said to be “tearful.” Thirdly, it culminates in self-abjection, and in this respect it should be “humble,” so that one confesses one’s misery and weakness.

By reason of its very nature, viz. confession, this act is one of manifestation: which manifestation can be hindered by four things: first, by falsehood, and in this respect confession is said to be “faithful,” i.e. true. Secondly, by the use of vague words, and against this confession is said to be “open,” so as not to be wrapped up in vague words; thirdly, by “multiplicity” of words, in which respect it is said to be “simple” indicating that the penitent should relate only such matters as affect the gravity of the sin; fourthly none of those things should be suppressed which should be made known, and in this respect confession should be “entire.”

In so far as confession is part of a sacrament it is subject to the judgment of the priest who is the minister of the sacrament. Wherefore it should be an “accusation” on the part of the penitent, should manifest his “readiness to obey” the priest, should be “secret” as regards the nature of the court wherein the hidden affairs of conscience are tried.

The well-being of confession requires that it should be “frequent”; and “not delayed,” i.e. that the sinner should confess at once.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing unreasonable in one virtue being a condition of the act of another virtue, through this act being commanded by that virtue; or through the mean which belongs to one virtue principally, belonging to other virtues by participation.

Reply to Objection 2: The condition “pure” excludes perversity of intention, from which man is cleansed: but the condition “simple” excludes the introduction of unnecessary matter.

Reply to Objection 3: This is not necessary for confession, but is a condition of its well-being.

Reply to Objection 4: Confession should be made not publicly but privately, lest others be scandalized, and led to do evil through hearing the sins confessed. On the other hand, the penance enjoined in satisfaction does not give rise to scandal, since like works of satisfaction are done sometimes for slight sins, and sometimes for none at all.

Reply to Objection 5: We must understand this to refer to tears of the heart.

OF THE EFFECT OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of confession: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?

(2) Whether confession delivers one in any way from punishment?

(3) Whether confession opens Paradise to us?

(4) Whether confession gives hope of salvation?

(5) Whether a general confession blots out mortal sins that one has forgotten?

Whether confession delivers one from the death of sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession does not deliver one from the death of sin. For confession follows contrition. But contrition sufficiently blots out guilt. Therefore confession does not deliver one from the death of sin.

Objection 2: Further, just as mortal sin is a fault, so is venial. Now confession renders venial that which was mortal before, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Therefore confession does not blot out guilt, but one guilt is changed into another.

On the contrary, Confession is part of the sacrament of Penance. But Penance deliver from guilt. Therefore confession does also.

I answer that, Penance, as a sacrament, is perfected chiefly in confession, because by the latter a man submits to the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments: for contrition has the desire of confession united thereto, and satisfaction is enjoined according to the judgment of the priest who hears the confession. And since in the sacrament of Penance, as in Baptism, that grace is infused whereby sins are forgiven, therefore confession in virtue of the absolution granted remits guilt, even as Baptism does. Now Baptism delivers one from the death of sin, not only by being received actually, but also by being received in desire, as is evident with regard to those who approach the sacrament of Baptism after being already sanctified. And unless a man offers an obstacle, he receives, through the very fact of being baptized, grace whereby his sins are remitted, if they are not already remitted. The same is to be said of confession, to which absolution is added because it delivered the penitent from guilt through being previously in his desire. Afterwards at the time of actual confession and absolution he receives an increase of grace, and forgiveness of sins would also be granted to him, if his previous sorrow for sin was not sufficient for contrition, and if at the time he offered no obstacle to grace. Consequently just as it is said of Baptism that it delivers from death, so can it be said of confession.

Reply to Objection 1: Contrition has the desire of confession attached to it, and therefore it delivers penitents from death in the same way as the desire of Baptism delivers those who are going to be baptized.

Reply to Objection 2: In the text venial does not designate guilt, but punishment that is easily expiated. and so it does not follow that one guilt is changed into another but that it is wholly done away. For "venial" is taken in three senses [*Cf. [4849]FS, Q[88], A[2]]: first, for what is venial generically, e.g. an idle word: secondly, for what is venial in its cause, i.e. having within itself a motive of pardon, e.g. sins due to weakness: thirdly, for what is venial in the result, in which sense it is understood here, because the result of confession is that man's past guilt is pardoned.

Whether confession delivers from punishment in some way?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession nowise delivers from punishment. For sin deserves no punishment but what is either eternal or temporal. Now eternal punishment is remitted by contrition, and temporal punishment by satisfaction. Therefore nothing of the punishment is remitted by confession.

Objection 2: Further, "the will is taken for the deed" [*Cf. Can. Magna Pietas, De Poenit., Dist. i], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). Now he that is contrite has the intention to confess. wherefore his intention avails him as though he had already confessed, and so the confession which he makes afterwards remits no part of the punishment.

On the contrary, Confession is a penal work. But all penal works expiate the punishment due to sin. Therefore confession does also.

I answer that, Confession together with absolution has the power to deliver from punishment, for two reasons. First, from the power of absolution itself: and thus the very desire of absolution delivers a man from eternal punishment, as also from the guilt. Now this punishment is one of condemnation and total banishment: and when a man is delivered therefrom he still remains bound to a temporal punishment, in so far as punishment is a cleansing and perfecting remedy; and so this punishment remains to be suffered in Purgatory by those who also have been delivered from the punishment of hell. Which temporal punishment is beyond the powers of the penitent dwelling in this world, but is so far diminished by the power of the keys, that it is within the ability of the penitent, and he is able, by making satisfaction, to cleanse himself in this life. Secondly, confession diminishes the punishment in virtue of the very nature of the act of the one who confesses, for this act has the punishment of shame attached to it, so that the oftener one confesses the same sins, the more is the punishment diminished.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The will is not taken for the deed, if this is done by another, as in the case of Baptism: for the will to receive Baptism is not worth as much as the reception of Baptism. But a man’s will is taken for the deed, when the latter is something done by him, entirely. Again, this is true of the essential reward, but not of the removal of punishment and the like, which come under the head of accidental and secondary reward. Consequently one who has confessed and received absolution will be less punished in Purgatory than one who has gone no further than contrition.

Whether confession opens paradise?

Objection 1: It would seem that confession does not open Paradise. For different sacraments have different effects. But it is the effect of Baptism to open Paradise. Therefore it is not the effect of confession.

Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to enter by a closed door before it be opened. But a dying man can enter heaven before making his confession. Therefore confession does not open Paradise.

On the contrary, Confession makes a man submit to the keys of the Church. But Paradise is opened by those keys. Therefore it is opened by confession.

I answer that, Guilt and the debt of punishment prevent a man from entering into Paradise: and since confession removes these obstacles, as shown above ([4850]AA[1],2), it is said to open Paradise.

Reply to Objection 1: Although Baptism and Penance are different sacraments, they act in virtue of Christ’s one Passion, whereby a way was opened unto Paradise.

Reply to Objection 2: If the dying man was in mortal sin Paradise was closed to him before he conceived the desire to confess his sin, although afterwards it was opened by contrition implying a desire for confession, even before he actually confessed. Nevertheless the obstacle of the debt of punishment was not entirely removed before confession and satisfaction.

Whether confession gives hope of salvation?

Objection 1: It would seem that hope of salvation should not be reckoned an effect of confession. For hope arises from all meritorious acts. Therefore, seemingly, it is not the proper effect of confession.

Objection 2: Further, we arrive at hope through tribulation, as appears from Rom. 5:3,4. Now man suffers tribulation chiefly in satisfaction. Therefore, satisfaction rather than confession gives hope of salvation.

On the contrary,” Confession makes a man more humble and more wary,” as the Master states in the text (Sent. iv, D, 17). But the result of this is that man conceives a hope of salvation. Therefore it is the effect of confession to give hope of salvation.

I answer that, We can have no hope for the forgiveness of our sins except through Christ: and since by confession a man submits to the keys of the Church which derive their power from Christ’s Passion, therefore do we say that confession gives hope of salvation.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not our actions, but the grace of our Redeemer, that is the principal cause of the hope of salvation: and since confession relies upon the grace of our Redeemer, it gives hope of salvation, not only as a meritorious act, but also as part of a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Tribulation gives hope of salvation, by making us exercise our own virtue, and by paying off the debt of punishment: while confession does so also in the way mentioned above.

Whether a general confession suffices to blot out forgotten mortal sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that a general confession does not suffice to blot out forgotten mortal sins. For there is no necessity to confess again a sin which has been blotted out by confession. If, therefore, forgotten sins were forgiven by a general confession, there would be no need to confess them when they are called to mind.

Objection 2: Further, whoever is not conscious of sin, either is not guilty of sin, or has forgotten his sin. If, therefore, mortal sins are forgiven by a general confession, whoever is not conscious of a mortal sin, can be certain that he is free from mortal sin, whenever he makes a general confession: which is contrary to what the Apostle says (1 Cor. 4:4), “I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified.”

Objection 3: Further, no man profits by neglect. Now a man cannot forget a mortal sin without neglect, before it is forgiven him. Therefore he does not profit by his forgetfulness so that the sin is forgiven him without special mention thereof in confession.

Objection 4: Further, that which the penitent knows nothing about is further from his knowledge than that which he has forgotten. Now a general confession does not blot out sins committed through ignorance, else heretics, who are not aware that certain things they have done are sinful, and certain simple people, would be absolved by a general confession, which is false. Therefore a general confession does not take away forgotten sins.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 33:6): “Come ye to Him and be enlightened, and your faces shall not be confounded.” Now he who confesses all the sins of which he is conscious, approaches to God as much as he can: nor can more be required for him. Therefore he will not be confounded by being repelled, but will be forgiven.

Further, he that confesses is pardoned unless he be insincere. But he who confesses all the sins that he calls to mind, is not insincere through forgetting some, because he suffers from ignorance of fact, which excuses from sin. Therefore he receives forgiveness, and then the sins which he has forgotten, are loosened, since it is wicked to hope for half a pardon.

I answer that, Confession produces its effect, on the presupposition that there is contrition which blots out guilt: so that confession is directly ordained to the remission of punishment, which it causes in virtue of the shame which it includes, and by the power of the keys to which a man submits by confessing. Now it happens sometimes that by previous contrition a sin has been blotted out as to the guilt, either in a general way (if it was not remembered at the time) or in particular (and yet is forgotten before confession): and then general sacramental confession works for the remission of the punishment in virtue of the keys, to which man submits by confessing, provided he offers no obstacle so far as he is concerned: but so far as the shame of confessing a sin diminishes its punishment, the punishment for the sin for which a man does not express his shame, through failing to confess it to the priest, is not diminished.

Reply to Objection 1: In sacramental confession, not only is absolution required, but also the judgment of the priest who imposes satisfaction is awaited. Wherefore although the latter has given absolution, nevertheless the penitent is bound to confess in order to supply what was wanting to the sacramental confession.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated above, confession does not produce its effect, unless contrition be presupposed; concerning which no man can know whether it be true contrition, even as neither can one know for certain if he has grace. Consequently a man cannot know for certain whether a forgotten sin has been forgiven him in a general confession, although he may think so on account of certain conjectural signs.

Reply to Objection 3: He does not profit by his neglect, since he does not receive such full pardon, as he would otherwise have received, nor is his merit so great. Moreover he is bound to confess the sin when he calls it to mind.

Reply to Objection 4: Ignorance of the law does not excuse, because it is a sin by itself: but ignorance of fact does excuse. Therefore if a man omits to confess a sin, because he does not know it to be a sin, through ignorance of the Divine law, he is not excused from insincerity. on the other hand, he would be excused, if he did not know it to be a sin, through being unaware of some particular circumstance, for instance, if he had knowledge of another’s wife, thinking her his own. Now forgetfulness of an act of sin comes under the head of ignorance of fact, wherefore it excuses from the sin of insincerity in confession, which is an obstacle to the fruit of absolution and confession.

OF THE SEAL OF CONFESSION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now inquire about the seal of confession, about which there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in every case a man is bound to hide what he knows under the seal of confession?

(2) Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?

(3) Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?

(4) Whether, by permission of the penitent, the priest can make known to another, a sin of his which he knew under the seal of confession?

(5) Whether he is bound to hide even what he knows through other sources besides?

Whether in every case the priest is bound to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that the priest is not bound in every case to hide the sins which he knows under the seal of confession. For, as Bernard says (De Proecep. et Dispens. ii), “that which is instituted for the sake of charity does not militate against charity.” Now the secret of confession would militate against charity in certain cases: for instance, if a man knew through confession that a certain man was a heretic, whom he cannot persuade to desist from misleading the people; or, in like manner, if a man knew, through confession, that certain people who wish to marry are related to one another. Therefore such ought to reveal what they know through confession.

Objection 2: Further, that which is obligatory solely on account of a precept of the Church need not be observed, if the commandment be changed to the contrary. Now the secret of confession was introduced solely by a precept of the Church. If therefore the Church were to prescribe that anyone who knows anything about such and such a sin must make it known, a man that had such knowledge through confession would be bound to speak.

Objection 3: Further, a man is bound to safeguard his conscience rather than the good name of another, because there is order in charity. Now it happens sometimes that a man by hiding a sin injures his own conscience—for instance, if he be called upon to give witness of a sin of which he has knowledge through confession, and is forced to swear to tell the truth—or when an abbot knows through confession the sin of a prior who is subject to him, which sin would be an occasion of ruin to the latter, if he suffers him to retain his priorship, wherefore he is bound to deprive him of the dignity of his pastoral charge, and yet in depriving him he seem to divulge the secret of confession. Therefore it seems that in certain cases it is lawful to reveal a confession.

Objection 4: Further, it is possible for a priest through hearing a man's confession to be conscious that the latter is unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment. Now everyone is bound to prevent the promotion of the unworthy, if it is his business. Since then by raising an objection he seems to raise a suspicion of sin, and so to reveal the confession somewhat, it seems that it is necessary sometimes to divulge a confession.

On the contrary, The Decretal says (De Poenit. et Remiss., Cap. Omnis utriusque): "Let the priest beware lest he betray the sinner, by word, or sign, or in any other way whatever."

Further, the priest should conform himself to God, Whose minister he is. But God does not reveal the sins which are made known to Him in confession, but hides them. Neither, therefore, should the priest reveal them.

I answer that, Those things which are done outwardly in the sacraments are the signs of what takes place inwardly: wherefore confession, whereby a man subjects himself to a priest, is a sign of the inward submission, whereby one submits to God. Now God hides the sins of those who submit to Him by Penance; wherefore this also should be signified in the sacrament of Penance, and consequently the sacrament demands that the confession should remain hidden, and he who divulges a confession sins by violating the sacrament. Besides this there are other advantages in this secrecy, because thereby men are more attracted to confession, and confess their sins with greater simplicity.

Reply to Objection 1: Some say that the priest is not bound by the seal of confession to hide other sins than those in respect of which the penitent promises amendment; otherwise he may reveal them to one who can be a help and not a hindrance. But this opinion seems erroneous, since it is contrary to the truth of the sacrament; for just as, though the person baptized be insincere, yet his Baptism is a sacrament, and there is no change in the essentials of the sacrament on that account, so confession does not cease to be sacramental although he that confesses, does not purpose amendment. Therefore, this notwithstanding, it must be held secret; nor does the seal of confession militate against charity on that account, because charity does not require a man to find a remedy for a sin which he knows not: and that which is known in confession, is, as it were, unknown, since a man knows it, not as man, but as God knows it. Nevertheless in the cases quoted one should apply some kind of remedy, so far as this can be done without divulging the confession, e.g. by admonishing the penitent, and by watching over the others lest they be corrupted by heresy. He can also tell the prelate to watch over his flock with great care, yet so as by neither word nor sign to betray the penitent.

Reply to Objection 2: The precept concerning the secret of confession follows from the sacrament itself. Wherefore just as the obligation of making a sacramental confession is of Divine law, so that no human dispensation or command can absolve one therefrom, even so, no man can be forced or permitted by another man to divulge the secret of confession. Consequently if he be commanded under pain of excommunication to be incurred "ipso facto," to say whether he knows anything about such and such a sin, he ought not to say it, because he should assume that the intention of the person in commanding him thus, was that he should say what he knew as man. And even if he were expressly interrogated about a confession, he ought to say nothing, nor would he incur the excommunication, for he is not subject to his superior, save as a man, and he knows this not as a man, but as God knows it.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is not called upon to witness except as a man, wherefore without wronging his conscience he can swear that he knows not, what he knows only as God knows it. In like manner a superior can, without wronging his conscience, leave a sin unpunished which he knows only as God knows it, or he may forbear to apply a remedy, since he is not bound to apply a remedy, except according as it comes to his knowledge. Wherefore with regard to matters which come to his knowledge in the tribunal of Penance, he should apply the remedy, as far as he can, in the same court: thus as to the case in point, the abbot should advise the prior to resign his office, and if the latter refuse, he can absolve him from the priorship on some other occasion, yet so as to avoid all suspicion of divulging the confession.

Reply to Objection 4: A man is rendered unworthy of ecclesiastical preferment, by many other causes besides sin, for instance, by lack of knowledge, age, or the like: so that by raising an objection one does not raise a suspicion of crime or divulge the secret of confession.

Whether the seal of confession extends to other matters than those which have reference to confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that the seal of confession extends to other matters besides those which have reference to confession. For sins alone have reference to confession. Now sometimes besides sins other matters are told which have no reference to confession. Therefore, since such things are told to the priest, as to God, it seems that the seal of confession extends to them also.

Objection 2: Further, sometimes one person tells another a secret, which the latter receives under the seal of confession. Therefore the seal of confession extends to matters having no relation to confession.

On the contrary, The seal of confession is connected with sacramental confession. But those things which are connected with a sacrament, do not extend outside the bounds of the sacrament. Therefore the seal of confession does not extend to matters other than those which have reference to sacramental confession.

I answer that, The seal of confession does not extend directly to other matters than those which have reference to sacramental confession, yet indirectly matters also which are not connected with sacramental confession are affected by the seal of confession, those, for instance, which might lead to the discovery of a sinner or of his sin. Nevertheless these matters also must be most carefully hidden, both on account of scandal, and to avoid leading others into sin through their becoming familiar with it.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: A confidence ought not easily to be accepted in this way: but if it be done the secret must be kept in the way promised, as though one had the secret through confession, though not through the seal of confession.

Whether the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession. For sometimes a priest hears a confession through an interpreter, if there be an urgent reason for so doing. But it seems that the interpreter is bound to keep the confession secret. Therefore one who is not a priest knows something under the seal of confession.

Objection 2: Further, it is possible sometimes in cases of urgency for a layman to hear a confession. But he is bound to secrecy with regard to those sins, since they are told to him as to God. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man pretends to be a priest, so that by this deceit he may know what is on another's conscience: and it would seem that he also sins if he divulges the confession. Therefore not only the priest is bound by the seal of confession.

On the contrary, A priest alone is the minister of this sacrament. But the seal of confession is connected with this sacrament. Therefore the priest alone is bound by the seal of confession.

Further, the reason why a man is bound to keep secret what he hears in confession, is because he knows them, not as man but as God knows them. But the priest alone is God's minister. Therefore he alone is bound to secrecy.

I answer that, The seal of confession affects the priest as minister of this sacrament: which seal is nothing else than the obligation of keeping the confession secret, even as the key is the power of absolving. Yet, as one who is not a priest, in a particular case has a kind of share in the act of the keys, when he hears a confession in a case of urgency, so also does he have a certain share in the act of the seal of confession, and is bound to secrecy, though, properly speaking, he is not bound by the seal of confession.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether by the penitent's permission, a priest may reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession?

Objection 1: It would seem that a priest may not, by the penitent's permission, reveal to another a sin which he knows under the seal of confession. For an inferior may not do what his superior may not. Now the Pope cannot give permission for anyone to divulge a sin which he knows through confession. Neither therefore can the penitent give him such a permission.

Objection 2: Further, that which is instituted for the common good of the Church cannot be changed at the will of an individual. Now the secrecy of confession was instituted for the good of the whole Church, in order that men might have greater confidence in approaching the confessional. Therefore the penitent cannot allow the priest to divulge his confession.

Objection 3: Further, if the priest could grant such a permission, this would seem to palliate the wickedness of bad priests, for they might pretend to have received the permission and so they might sin with impunity, which would be unbecoming. Therefore it seems that the penitent cannot grant this permission.

Objection 4: Further, the one to whom this sin is divulged does not know that sin under the seal of confession, so that he may publish a sin which is already blotted out, which is unbecoming. Therefore this permission cannot be granted.

On the contrary, If the sinner consent, a superior may refer him by letter to an inferior priest. Therefore with the consent of the penitent, the priest may reveal a sin of his to another.

Further, whosoever can do a thing of his own authority, can do it through another. But the penitent can by his own authority reveal his sin to another. Therefore he can do it through the priest.

I answer that There are two reasons for which the priest is bound to keep a sin secret: first and chiefly, because this very secrecy is essential to the sacrament, in so far as the priest knows that sin, as it is known to God, Whose place he holds in confession: secondly, in order to avoid scandal. Now the penitent can make the priest know, as a man, what he knew before only as God knows it, and he does this when he allows him to divulge it: so that if the priest does reveal it, he does not break the seal of confession. Nevertheless he should beware of giving scandal by revealing the sin, lest he be deemed to have broken the seal.

Reply to Objection 1: The Pope cannot permit a priest to divulge a sin, because he cannot make him to know it as a man, whereas he that has confessed it, can.

Reply to Objection 2: When that is told which was known through another source, that which is instituted for the common good is not done away with, because the seal of confession is not broken.

Reply to Objection 3: This does not bestow impunity on wicked priests, because they are in danger of having to prove that they had the penitent’s permission to reveal the sin, if they should be accused of the contrary.

Reply to Objection 4: He that is informed of a sin through the priest with the penitent’s consent, shares in an act of the priest’s, so that the same applies to him as to an interpreter, unless perchance the penitent wish him to know it unconditionally and freely.

Whether a man may reveal that which he knows through confession and through some other source besides?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man may not reveal what he knows through confession and through some other source besides. For the seal of confession is not broken unless one reveals a sin known through confession. If therefore a man divulges a sin which he knows through confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise, he seems to break the seal.

Objection 2: Further, whoever hears someone’s confession, is under obligation to him not to divulge his sins. Now if one were to promise someone to keep something secret, he would be bound to do so, even if he knew it through some other source. Therefore a man is bound to keep secret what he knows through the confession, no matter how he knows it otherwise.

Objection 3: Further, the stronger of two things draws the other to itself. Now the knowledge whereby a man knows a sin as God knows it, is stronger and more excellent than the knowledge whereby he knows a sin as man. Therefore it draws the latter to itself: and consequently a man cannot reveal that sin, because this is demanded by his knowing it as God knows it.

Objection 4: Further, the secrecy of confession was instituted in order to avoid scandal, and to prevent men being shy of going to confession. But if a man might say what he had heard in confession, though he knew it otherwise, scandal would result all the same. Therefore he can nowise say what he has heard.

On the contrary, No one can put another under a new obligation, unless he be his superior, who can bind him by a precept. Now he who knew of a sin by witnessing it was not bound to keep it secret. Therefore he that confesses to him, not being his superior, cannot put him under an obligation of secrecy by confessing to him.

Further, the justice of the Church would be hindered if a man, in order to escape a sentence of excommunication, incurred on account of some sin, of which he has been convicted, were to confess to the person who has to sentence him. Now the execution of justice falls under a precept. Therefore a man is not bound to keep a sin secret, which he has heard in confession, but knows from some other source.

I answer that, There are three opinions about this question. For some say that a man can by no means tell another what he has heard in confession, even if he knew it from some other source either before or after the confession: while others assert that the confession debars him from speaking of what he knew already, but not from saying what he knew afterwards and in another way. Now both these opinions, by exaggerating the seal of confession, are prejudicial to the truth and to the safeguarding of justice. For a man might be more inclined to sin, if he had no fear of being accused by his confessor supposing that he repeated the sin in his presence: and furthermore it would be most prejudicial to justice if a man could not bear witness to a deed which he has seen committed again after being confessed to him. Nor does it matter that, as some say, he ought to declare that he cannot keep it secret, for he cannot make such a declaration until the sin has already been confessed to him, and then every priest could, if he wished, divulge a sin, by making such a declaration, if this made him free to divulge it. Consequently there is a third and truer opinion, viz. that what a man knows through another source either before or after confession, he is not bound to keep secret, in so far as he knows it as a man, for he can say: “I know so end so since I saw it.” But he is bound to keep it secret in so far as he knows it as God knows it, for he cannot say: “I heard so and so in confession.” Nevertheless, on account of the scandal he should refrain from speaking of it unless there is an urgent reason.

Reply to Objection 1: If a man says that he has seen what he has heard in the confessional, he does not reveal what he heard in confession, save indirectly: even as one who knows something through hearing and seeing it, does not, properly speaking, divulge what he saw, if he says he heard it, but only indirectly, because he says he has heard what he incidentally saw. Wherefore he does not break the seal of confession.

Reply to Objection 2: The confessor is not forbidden to reveal a sin simply, but to reveal it as heard in confession: for in no case is he allowed to say that he has heard it in the confessional.

Reply to Objection 3: This is true of things that are in opposition to one another: whereas to know a sin as God knows it, and to know it as man knows it, are not in opposition; so that the argument proves nothing.

Reply to Objection 4: It would not be right to avoid scandal so as to desert justice: for the truth should not be gainsayed for fear of scandal. Wherefore when justice and truth are in the balance, a man should not be deterred by the fear of giving scandal, from divulging what he has heard in confession, provided he knows it from some other source: although he ought to avoid giving scandal, as far as he is able.

OF SATISFACTION, AS TO ITS NATURE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider satisfaction; about which four things have to be considered: (1) Its nature; (2) Its possibility; (3) Its quality; (4) The means whereby man offers satisfaction to God.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?

(2) Whether it is an act of justice?

(3) Whether the definition of satisfaction contained in the text is suitable?

Whether satisfaction is a virtue or an act of virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is neither a virtue nor an act of virtue. For every act of virtue is meritorious; whereas, seemingly, satisfaction is not, since merit is gratuitous, while satisfaction answers to a debt. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

Objection 2: Further, every act of virtue is voluntary. But sometimes a man has to make satisfaction for something against his will, as when anyone is punished by the judge for an offense against another. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of virtue.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 13): “Choice holds the chief place in moral virtue.” But satisfaction is not an act of choice but regards chiefly external works. Therefore it is not an act of virtue.

On the contrary, Satisfaction belongs to penance. Now penance is a virtue. Therefore satisfaction is also an act of virtue.

Further, none but an act of virtue has the effect of blotting out sin, for one contrary is destroyed by the other. Now satisfaction destroys sin altogether. Therefore it is an act of virtue.

I answer that, An act is said to be the act of a virtue in two ways. First, materially; and thus any act which implies no malice, or defect of a due circumstance, may be called an act of virtue, because virtue can make use of any such act for its end, e.g. to walk, to speak, and so forth. Secondly, an act is said to belong to a virtue formally, because its very name implies the form and nature of virtue; thus to suffer courageously is an act of courage. Now the formal element in every moral virtue is the observance of a mean. wherefore every act that implies the observance of a mean is formally an act of virtue. And since equality is the mean implied in the name of satisfaction (for a thing is said to be satisfied by reason of an equal proportion to something), it is evident that satisfaction also is formally an act of virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: Although to make satisfaction is due in itself, yet, in so far as the deed is done voluntarily by the one who offers satisfaction, it becomes something gratuitous on the part of the agent, so that he makes a virtue of necessity. For debt diminishes merit through being necessary and consequently against the will, so that if the will consent to the necessity, the element of merit is not forfeited.

Reply to Objection 2: An act of virtue demands voluntariness not in the patient but in the agent, for it is his act. Consequently since he on whom the judge wreaks vengeance is the patient and not the agent as regards satisfaction, it follows that satisfaction should be voluntary not in him but in the judge as agent.

Reply to Objection 3: The chief element of virtue can be understood in two ways. First, as being the chief element of virtue as virtue, and thus the chief element of virtue denotes whatever belongs to the nature of virtue or is most akin thereto; thus choice and other internal acts hold the chief place in virtue. Secondly, the chief element of virtue may be taken as denoting that which holds the first place in such and such a virtue; and then the first place belongs to that which gives its determination. Now the interior act, in certain virtues, is determined by some external act, since choice, which is common to all virtues, becomes proper to such and such a virtue through being directed to such and such an act. Thus it is that external acts hold the chief place in certain virtues; and this is the case with satisfaction.

Whether satisfaction is an act of justice?

Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction is not an act of justice. Because the purpose of satisfaction is that one may be reconciled to the person offended. But reconciliation, being an act of love, belongs to charity. Therefore satisfaction is an act of charity and not of justice.

Objection 2: Further, the causes of sin in us are the passions of the soul, which incline us to evil. But justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,3), is not about passions, but about operations. Since therefore satisfaction aims at removing the causes of sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), it seems that it is not an act of justice.

Objection 3: Further, to be careful about the future is not an act of justice but of prudence of which caution is a part. But it belongs to satisfaction, “to give no opening to the suggestions of sin” [*Cf. XP/Q[12]/A[3]/OBJ[1]]. Therefore satisfaction is not an act of justice.

On the contrary, No virtue but justice considers the notion of that which is due. But satisfaction gives due honor to God, as Anselm states (Cur Deus Homo i). Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

Further, no virtue save justice establishes equality between external things. But this is done by satisfaction which establishes equality between amendment and the previous offense. Therefore satisfaction is an act of justice.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3,4), the mean of justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and thing according to a certain proportion. Wherefore, since the very name of satisfaction implies an equation of the kind, because the adverb “satis” [enough] denotes an equality of proportion, it is evident that satisfaction is formally an act of justice. Now the act of justice, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 2,4), is either an act done by one man to another, as when a man pays another what he owes him, or an act done by one man between two others, as when a judge does justice between two men. When it is an act of justice of one man to another, the equality is set up in the agent, while when it is something done between two others, the equality is set up in the subject that has suffered an injustice. And since satisfaction expresses equality in the agent, it denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to another. Now a man may do justice to another either in actions and passions or in external things; even as one may do an injustice to another, either by taking something away, or by a hurtful action. And since to give is to use an external thing, the act of justice, in so far as it establishes equality between external things, signifies, properly speaking, a giving back: but to make satisfaction clearly points to equality between actions, although sometimes one is put for the other. Now equalization concerns only such things as are unequal, wherefore satisfaction presupposes inequality among actions, which inequality constitutes an offense; so that satisfaction regards a previous offense. But no part of justice regards a previous offense, except vindictive justice, which establishes equality indifferently, whether the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone punishes himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another man, since vindictive justice deals with both cases. The same applies to penance, which implies equality in the agent only, since it is the penitent who holds to the penance [poenam tenet], so that penance is in a way a species of vindictive justice. This proves that satisfaction, which implies equality in the agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part which is called penance.

Reply to Objection 1: Satisfaction, as appears from what has been said, is compensation for injury inflicted. Wherefore as the injury inflicted entailed of itself an inequality of justice, and consequently an inequality opposed to friendship, so satisfaction brings back directly equality of justice, and consequently equality of friendship. And since an act is elicited by the habit to whose end it is immediately directed, but is commanded by that habit to whose end it is directed ultimately, hence satisfaction is elicited by justice but is commanded by charity.

Reply to Objection 2: Although justice is chiefly about operations, yet it is consequently about passions, in so far as they are the causes of operations. Wherefore as justice curbs anger, lest it inflict an unjust injury on another, and concupiscence from invading another’s marriage right, so satisfaction removes the causes of other sins.

Reply to Objection 3: Each moral virtue shares in the act of prudence, because this virtue completes in it the conditions essential to virtue, since each moral virtue takes its mean according to the ruling of prudence, as is evident from the definition of virtue given in Ethic. ii, 6.

Whether the definition of satisfaction given in the text is suitable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the definition of satisfaction given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15) and quoted from Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] is unsuitable—viz. that “satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sins, and to give no opening to the suggestions thereof.” For the cause of actual sin is the fomes. [*”Fomes” signifies literally “fuel,” and metaphorically, “incentive.” As used by the theologian, it denotes the quasi-material element and effect of original sin, and sometimes goes under the name of “concupiscence,” Cf. [4851]FS, Q[82], A[3].] But we cannot remove the “fomes” in this life. Therefore satisfaction does not consist in removing the causes of sins.

Objection 2: Further, the cause of sin is stronger than sin itself. But man by himself cannot remove sin. Much less therefore can he remove the cause of sin; and so the same conclusion follows.

Objection 3: Further, since satisfaction is a part of Penance, it regards the past and not the future. Now “to give no opening to the suggestions of sin” regards the future. Therefore it should not be put in the definition of satisfaction.

Objection 4: Further, satisfaction regards a past offense. Yet no mention is made of this. Therefore the definition of satisfaction is unsuitable.

Objection 5: Further, Anselm gives another definition (Cur Deus homo i): “Satisfaction consists in giving God due honor,” wherein no reference is made to the things mentioned by Augustine [*Gennadius, OBJ[1]] in this definition. Therefore one or the other is unsuitable.

Objection 6: Further, an innocent man can give due honor to God: whereas satisfaction is not compatible with innocence. Therefore Anselm’s definition is faulty.

I answer that, Justice aims not only at removing inequality already existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for the future, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) “punishments are medicinal." Wherefore satisfaction which is the act of justice inflicting punishment, is a medicine healing past sins and preserving from future sins: so that when one man makes satisfaction to another, he offers compensation for the past, and takes heed for the future. Accordingly satisfaction may be defined in two ways, first with regard to past sin, which it heals by making compensation, and thus it is defined as "compensation for an inflicted injury according to the equality of justice." The definition of Anselm amounts to the same, for he says that "satisfaction consists in giving God due honor"; where duty is considered in respect of the sin committed. Secondly, satisfaction may be defined, considered as preserving us from future sins; and as Augustine (Cf. OBJ[1]) defines it. Now preservation from bodily sickness is assured by removing the causes from which the sickness may ensue, for if they be taken away the sickness cannot follow. But it is not thus in spiritual diseases, for the free-will cannot be forced, so that even in the presence of their causes, they can, though with difficulty, be avoided, while they can be incurred even when their causes are removed. Hence he puts two things in the definition of satisfaction, viz. removal of the causes, as to the first, and the free-will's refusal to sin.

Reply to Objection 1: By "causes" we must understand the proximate causes of actual sin, which are twofold: viz. the lust of sin through the habit or act of a sin that has been given up, and those things which are called the remnants of past sin; and external occasions of sin, such as place, bad company and so forth. Such causes are removed by satisfaction in this life, albeit the "fomes," which is the remote cause of actual sin, is not entirely removed by satisfaction in this life though it is weakened.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the cause of evil or of privation (according as it has a cause) is nothing else than a defective good, and since it is easier to destroy good than to set it up, it follows that it is easier to uproot the causes of privation and of evil than to remove the evil itself, which can only be removed by setting up good, as may be seen in the case of blindness and its causes. Yet the aforesaid are not sufficient causes of sin, for sin does not, of necessity, ensue therefrom, but they are occasions of sin. Nor again can satisfaction be made without God's help, since it is not possible without charity, as we shall state further on ([4852]Q[14], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance was primarily instituted and intended with a view to the past, yet, as a consequence, it regards the future, in so far as it is a safeguarding remedy; and the same applies to satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 4: Augustine [*Gennadius Massiliensis, De Eccl. Dogm. liv] defined satisfaction, as made to God, from Whom, in reality, nothing can be taken, though the sinner, for his own part, takes something away. Consequently in such like satisfaction, amendment for future time is of greater weight than compensation for the past. Hence Augustine defines satisfaction from this point of view. And yet it is possible to gauge the compensation for the past from the heed taken for the future, for the latter regards the same object as the former, but in the opposite way: since when looking at the past we detest the causes of sins on account of the sins themselves, which are the starting-point of the movement of detestation: whereas when taking heed of the future, we begin from the causes, that by their removal we may avoid sins the more easily.

Reply to Objection 5: There is no reason why the same thing should not be described in different ways according to the various things found in it: and such is the case here, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 6: By debt is meant the debt we owe to God by reason of the sins we have committed, because Penance regards a debt, as stated above [4853](A[2]).

OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SATISFACTION (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the possibility of satisfaction, under which head there are two points of inquiry:
(1) Whether man can make satisfaction to God?

(2) Whether one man can make satisfaction for another?

Whether man can make satisfaction to God?

Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot make satisfaction to God. For satisfaction should balance the offense, as shown above ([4854]Q[12], AA[2],3). But an offense against God is infinite, since it is measured by the person against whom it is committed, for it is a greater offense to strike a prince than anyone else. Therefore, as no action of man can be infinite, it seems that he cannot make satisfaction to God.

Objection 2: Further, a slave cannot make compensation for a debt, since all that he has is his master's. But we are the slaves of God, and whatever good we have, we owe to Him. Therefore, as satisfaction is compensation for a past offense, it seems that we cannot offer it to God.

Objection 3: Further, if all that a man has suffices not to pay one debt, he cannot pay another debt. Now all that man is, all that he can do, and all that he has, does not suffice to pay what he owes for the blessing of creation, wherefore it is written (Is. 40:16) that "the wood of Libanus shall not be enough for a burnt offering [*Vulg.: 'Libanus shall not be enough to burn, nor the beasts thereof for a burnt offering']." Therefore by no means can he make satisfaction for the debt resulting from the offense committed.

Objection 4: Further, man is bound to spend all his time in the service of God. Now time once lost cannot be recovered, wherefore, as Seneca observes (Lib. i, Ep. i, ad Lucilium) loss of time is a very grievous matter. Therefore man cannot make compensation to God, and the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 5: Further, mortal actual sin is more grievous than original sin. But none could satisfy for original sin unless he were both God and man. Neither, therefore, can he satisfy for actual sin.

On the contrary, Jerome [*Pelagius, Expos. Fidei ad Damasum] says: "Whoever maintains that God has commanded anything impossible to man, let him be anathema." But satisfaction is commanded (Lk. 3:8): "Bring forth . . . fruits worthy of penance." Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

Further, God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible to make satisfaction to a man. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God.

Further, there is due satisfaction when the punishment balances the fault, since "justice is the same as counterpassion," as the Pythagoreans said [*Aristotle, Ethic. v, 5; Cf. [4855]SS, Q[61], A[4]]. Now punishment may equal the pleasure contained in a sin committed. Therefore satisfaction can be made to God.

I answer that, Man becomes God's debtor in two ways; first, by reason of favors received, secondly, by reason of sin committed: and just as thanksgiving or worship or the like regard the debt for favors received, so satisfaction regards the debt for sin committed. Now in giving honor to one's parents or to the gods, as indeed the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14), it is impossible to repay them measure for measure, but it suffices that man repay as much as he can, for friendship does not demand measure for measure, but what is possible. Yet even this is equal somewhat, viz. according to proportion, for as the debt due to God is, in comparison with God, so is what man can do, in comparison with himself, so that in another way the form of justice is preserved. It is the same as regards satisfaction. Consequently man cannot make satisfaction to God if “satis” [enough] denotes quantitative equality; but he can, if it denote proportionate equality, as explained above, and as this suffices for justice, so does it suffice for satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the offense derived a certain infinity from the infinity of the Divine majesty, so does satisfaction derive a certain infinity from the infinity of Divine mercy, in so far as it is quickened by grace, whereby whatever man is able to repay becomes acceptable. Others, however, say that the offense is infinite as regards the aversion, and in this respect it is pardoned gratuitously, but that it is finite as turning to a mutable good, in which respect it is possible to make satisfaction for it. But this is not to the point, since satisfaction does not answer to sin, except as this is an offense against God, which is a matter, not of turning to a creature but of turning away from God. Others again say that even as regards the aversion it is possible to make satisfaction for sin in virtue of Christ’s merit, which was, in a way, infinite. And this comes to the same as what we said before, since grace is given to believers through faith in the Mediator. If, however, He were to give grace otherwise, satisfaction would suffice in the way explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: Man, who was made to God’s image, has a certain share of liberty, in so far as he is master of his actions through his free-will; so that, through acting by his free-will, he can make satisfaction to God, for though it belongs to God, in so far as it was bestowed on him by God, yet it was freely bestowed on him, that he might be his own master, which cannot be said of a slave.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument proves that it is impossible to make equivalent satisfaction to God, but not that it is impossible to make sufficient satisfaction to Him. For though man owes God all that he is able to give Him, yet it is not necessary for his salvation that he should actually do the whole of what he is able to do, for it is impossible for him, according to his present state of life, to put forth his whole power into any one single thing, since he has to be heedful about many things. And so his conduct is subject to a certain measure, viz. the fulfillment of God’s commandments, over and above which he can offer something by way of satisfaction.

Reply to Objection 4: Though man cannot recover the time that is past, he can in the time that follows make compensation for what he should have done in the past, since the commandment did not exact from him the fulfillment of his whole power, as stated above (ad 3).

Reply to Objection 5: Though original sin has less of the nature of sin than actual sin has, yet it is a more grievous evil, because it is an infection of human nature itself, so that, unlike actual sin, it could not be expiated by the satisfaction of a mere man.

Whether one man can fulfill satisfactory punishment for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot fulfill satisfactory punishment for another. Because merit is requisite for satisfaction. Now one man cannot merit or demerit for another, since it is written (Ps. 61:12): “Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.” Therefore one man cannot make satisfaction for another.

Objection 2: Further, satisfaction is condivided with contrition and confession. But one man cannot be contrite or confess for another. Neither therefore can one make satisfaction for another.

Objection 3: Further, by praying for another one merits also for oneself. If therefore a man can make satisfaction for another, he satisfies for himself by satisfying for another, so that if a man satisfy for another he need not make satisfaction for his own sins.

Objection 4: Further, if one can satisfy for another, as soon as he takes the debt of punishment on himself, this other is freed from his debt. Therefore the latter will go straight to heaven, if he die after the whole of his debt of punishment has been taken up by another; else, if he be punished all the same, a double punishment will be paid for the same sin, viz. by him who has begun to make satisfaction, and by him who is punished in Purgatory.

On the contrary, It is written (Gal. 6:2): “Bear ye one another’s burdens.” Therefore it seems that one can bear the burden of punishment laid upon another.

Further, charity avails more before God than before man. Now before man, one can pay another’s debt for love of him. Much more, therefore, can this be done before the judgment seat of God.

I answer that, Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin. Accordingly, as a remedy against future sin, the satisfaction of one does not profit another, for the flesh of one man is not tamed by another’s fast; nor does one man acquire the habit of well-doing, through the actions of another, except accidentally, in so far as a man, by his good actions, may merit an increase of grace for another, since grace is the most efficacious remedy for the avoidance of sin. But this is by way of merit rather than of satisfaction. on the other hand, as regards the payment of the debt, one man can satisfy for another, provided he be in a state of charity, so that his works may avail for satisfaction. Nor is it necessary that he who satisfies for another should undergo a greater punishment than the principal would have to undergo (as some maintain, who argue that a man profits more by his own punishment than by another’s), because punishment derives its power of satisfaction chiefly from charity whereby man bears it. And since greater charity is evidenced by a man satisfying for another than for himself, less punishment is required of him who satisfies for another, than of the principal: wherefore we read in the Lives of the Fathers (v, 5) of one who for love of his brother did penance for a sin which his brother had not committed, and that on account of his charity his brother was released from a sin which he had committed. Nor is it necessary that the one for whom satisfaction is made should be unable to make satisfaction himself, for even if he were able, he would be released from his debt when the other satisfied in his stead. But this is necessary in so far as the satisfactory punishment is medicinal: so that a man is not to be allowed to do penance for another, unless there be evidence of some defect in the penitent, either bodily, so that he is unable to bear it, or spiritual, so that he is not ready to undergo it.

Reply to Objection 1: The essential reward is bestowed on a man according to his disposition, because the fulness of the sight of God will be according to the capacity of those who see Him. Wherefore just as one man is not disposed thereto by another’s act, so one man does not merit the essential reward for another, unless his merit has infinite efficacy, as the merit of Christ, whereby children come to eternal life through Baptism. On the other hand, the temporal punishment due to sin after the guilt has been forgiven is not measured according to the disposition of the man to whom it is due, since sometimes the better man owes a greater debt of punishment. Consequently one man can merit for another as regards release from punishment, and one man's act becomes another's, by means of charity whereby we are "all one in Christ" (Gal. 3:28).

Reply to Objection 2: Contrition is ordained against the guilt which affects a man's disposition to goodness or malice, so that one man is not freed from guilt by another's contrition. In like manner by confession a man submits to the sacraments of the Church: nor can one man receive a sacrament instead of another, since in a sacrament grace is given to the recipient, not to another. Consequently there is no comparison between satisfaction and contrition and confession.

Reply to Objection 3: In the payment of the debt we consider the measure of the punishment, whereas in merit we regard the root which is charity: wherefore he that, through charity, merits for another, at least congruously, merits more for himself; yet he that satisfies for another does not also satisfy for himself, because the measure of the punishment does not suffice for the sins of both, although by satisfying for another he merits something greater than the release from punishment, viz. eternal life.

Reply to Objection 4: If this man bound himself to undergo a certain punishment, he would not be released from the debt before paying it: wherefore he himself will suffer the punishment, as long as the other makes satisfaction for him: and if he do not this, then both are debtors in respect of fulfilling this punishment, one for the sin committed, the other for his omission, so that it does not follow that one sin is twice punished.

OF THE QUALITY OF SATISFACTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of satisfaction, under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?

(2) Whether if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were pardoned him through his contrition?

(3) Whether a man’s previous satisfaction begins to avail when he recovers charity?

(4) Whether works done without charity merit any good?

(5) Whether such works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

Whether a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can satisfy for one sin without satisfying for another. Because when several things are not connected together one can be taken away without another. Now sins are not connected together, else whoever had one would have them all. Therefore one sin can be expiated by satisfaction, without another.

Objection 2: Further, God is more merciful than man. But man accepts the payment of one debt without the payment of another. Therefore God accepts satisfaction for one sin without the other.

Objection 3: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), “satisfaction is to uproot the causes of sin, and give no opening to the suggestions thereof.” Now this can be done with regard to one sin and not another, as when a mall curbs his lust and perseveres in covetousness. Therefore we can make satisfaction for one sin without satisfying for another.

On the contrary, The fast of those who fasted “for debates and strifes” (Is. 58:4,5) was not acceptable to God, though fasting be a work of satisfaction. Now satisfaction cannot be made save by works that are acceptable to God. Therefore he that has a sin on his conscience cannot make satisfaction to God.

Further, satisfaction is a remedy for the healing of past sins, and for preserving from future sins, as stated above ([4856]Q[12], A[3]). But without grace it is impossible to avoid sins. Therefore, since each sin excludes grace, it is not possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another.

I answer that, Some have held that it is possible to make satisfaction for one sin and not for another, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 15). But this cannot be. For since the previous offense has to be removed by satisfaction, the mode of satisfaction must needs be consistent with the removal of the offense. Now removal of offense is renewal of friendship: wherefore if there be anything to hinder the renewal of friendship there can be no satisfaction. Since, therefore, every sin is a hindrance to the friendship of charity, which is the friendship of man for God, it is impossible for man to make satisfaction for one sin while holding to another: even as neither would a man make satisfaction to another for a blow, if while throwing himself at his feet he were to give him another.

Reply to Objection 1: As sins are not connected together in some single one, a man can incur one without incurring another; whereas all sins are remitted by reason of one same thing, so that the remissions of various sins are connected together. Consequently satisfaction cannot be made for one and not for another.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is under obligation to another by reason of a debt, the only inequality between them is that which is opposed to justice, so that for restitution nothing further is required than that the equality of justice should be reinstated, and this can be done in respect of one debt without another. But when the obligation is based on an offense, there is inequality not only of justice but also of friendship, so that for the offense to be removed by satisfaction, not only must the equality of justice be restored by the payment of a punishment equal to the offense, but also the equality of friendship must be reinstated, which is impossible so long as an obstacle to friendship remains.

Reply to Objection 3: By its weight, one sin drags us down to another, as Gregory says (Moral. xxv): so that when a man holds to one sin, he does not sufficiently cut himself off from the causes of further sin.

Whether, when deprived of charity, a man can make satisfaction for sins for which he was previously contrite?

Objection 1: It would seem that if a man fall into sin after being contrite for all his sins, he can, now that he has lost charity, satisfy for his other sins which were already pardoned him through his contrition. For Daniel said to Nabuchodonosor (Dan. 4:24): “Redeem thou thy sins with alms.” Yet he was still a sinner, as is shown by his subsequent punishment. Therefore a man can make satisfaction while in a state of sin.

Objection 2: Further, “Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred” (Eccles. 9:1). If therefore one cannot make satisfaction unless one be in a state of charity, it would be impossible to know whether one had made satisfaction, which would be unseemly.

Objection 3: Further, a man’s entire action takes its form from the intention which he had at the beginning. But a penitent is in a state of charity when he begins to repent. Therefore his whole subsequent satisfaction will derive its efficacy from the charity which quickens his intention.

Objection 4: Further, satisfaction consists in a certain equalization of guilt to punishment. But these things can be equalized even in one who is devoid of charity. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, “Charity covereth all sins” (Prov. 10:12). But satisfaction has the power of blotting out sins. Therefore it is powerless without charity.

Further, the chief work of satisfaction is almsdeeds. But alms given by one who is devoid of charity avail nothing, as is clearly stated 1 Cor. 13:3, “If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor . . . and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.” Therefore there can be no satisfaction with mortal sin.

I answer that, Some have said that if, when all a man’s sins have been pardoned through contrition, and before he has made satisfaction for them, he falls into sin, and then makes satisfaction, such satisfaction will be valid, so that if he die in that sin, he will not be punished in hell for the other sins.

But this cannot be, because satisfaction requires the reinstatement of friendship and the restoration of the equality of justice, the contrary of which destroys friendship, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 1,3). Now in satisfaction made to God, the equality is based, not on equivalence but rather on God's acceptation: so that, although the offense be already removed by previous contrition, the works of satisfaction must be acceptable to God, and for this they are dependent on charity. Consequently works done without charity are not satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 1: Daniel's advice meant that he should give up sin and repent, and so make satisfaction by giving alms.

Reply to Objection 2: Even as man knows not for certain whether he had charity when making satisfaction, or whether he has it now, so too he knows not for certain whether he made full satisfaction: wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 5:5): "Be not without fear about sin forgiven." And yet man need not, on account of that fear, repeat the satisfaction made, if he is not conscious of a mortal sin. For although he may not have expiated his punishment by that satisfaction, he does not incur the guilt of omission through neglecting to make satisfaction; even as he who receives the Eucharist without being conscious of a mortal sin of which he is guilty, does not incur the guilt of receiving unworthily.

Reply to Objection 3: His intention was interrupted by his subsequent sin, so that it gives no virtue to the works done after that sin.

Reply to Objection 4: Sufficient equalization is impossible both as to the Divine acceptation and as to equivalence: so that the argument proves nothing.

Whether previous satisfaction begins to avail after man is restored to charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that when a man has recovered charity his previous satisfaction begins to avail, because a gloss on Lev. 25:25, "If thy brother being impoverished," etc., says that "the fruit of a man's good works should be counted from the time when he sinned." But they would not be counted, unless they derived some efficacy from his subsequent charity. Therefore they begin to avail after he recovers charity.

Objection 2: Further, as the efficacy of satisfaction is hindered by sin, so the efficacy of Baptism is hindered by insincerity. Now Baptism begins to avail when insincerity ceases. Therefore satisfaction begins to avail when sin is taken away.

Objection 3: Further, if a man is given as a penance for the sins he has committed, to fast for several days, and then, after falling again into sin, he completes his penance, he is not told, when he goes to confession a second time, to fast once again. But he would be told to do so, if he did not fulfill his duty of satisfaction by them. Therefore his previous works become valid unto satisfaction, through his subsequent repentance.

On the contrary, Works done without charity were not satisfactory, through being dead works. But they are not quickened by penance. Therefore they do not begin to be satisfactory.

Further, charity does not quicken a work, unless in some way that work proceeds therefrom. But works cannot be acceptable to God, and therefore cannot be satisfactory, unless they be quickened by charity. Since then the works done without charity, in no way proceeded from charity, nor ever can proceed therefrom, they can by no means count towards satisfaction.

I answer that, Some have said that works done while in a state of charity, which are called living works, are meritorious in respect of eternal life, and satisfactory in respect of paying off the debt of punishment; and that by subsequent charity, works done without charity are quickened so as to be satisfactory, but not so as to be meritorious of eternal life. But this is impossible, because works done in charity produce both these effects for the same reason, viz. because they are pleasing to God: wherefore just as charity by its advent cannot make works done without charity to be pleasing in one respect, so neither can it make them pleasing in the other respect.

Reply to Objection 1: This means that the fruits are reckoned, not from the time when he was first in sin, but from the time when he ceased to sin, when, to wit, he was last in sin; unless he was contrite as soon as he had sinned, and did many good actions before he confessed. Or we may say that the greater the contrition the more it alleviates the punishment, and the more good actions a man does while in sin, the more he disposes himself to the grace of contrition, so that it is probable that he owes a smaller debt of punishment. For this reason the priest should use discretion in taking them into account, so as to give him a lighter penance, according as he finds him better disposed.

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism imprints a character on the soul, whereas satisfaction does not. Hence on the advent of charity, which removes both insincerity and sin, it causes Baptism to have its effect, whereas it does not do this for satisfaction. Moreover Baptism confers justification in virtue of the deed [ex opere operato] which is not man’s deed but God’s, wherefore it does not become a lifeless deed as satisfaction does, which is a deed of man.

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes satisfaction is such as to leave an effect in the person who makes satisfaction, even after the act of satisfaction has been done; thus fasting leaves the body weak, and almsdeeds result in a diminution of a person’s substance, and so on. In such cases there is no need to repeat the works of satisfaction if they have been done while in a state of sin, because through penance they are acceptable to God in the result they leave behind. But when a work of satisfaction leaves behind no effect in the person that does satisfaction, it needs to be repeated, as in the case of prayer and so forth. Interior works, since they pass away altogether, are nowise quickened, and must be repeated.

Whether works done without charity merit any, at least temporal, good?

Objection 1: It would seem that works done without charity merit some, at least a temporal, good. For as punishment is to the evil act, so is reward to a good act. Now no evil deed is unpunished by God the just judge. Therefore no good deed is unrewarded, and so every good deed merits some good.

Objection 2: Further, reward is not given except for merit. Now some reward is given for works done without charity, wherefore it is written (Mat. 6:2, 5, 16) of those who do good actions for the sake of human glory, that “they have received their reward.” Therefore those works merit some good.

Objection 3: Further, if there be two men both in sin, one of whom does many deeds that are good in themselves and in their circumstances, while the other does none, they are not equally near to the reception of good things from Gods else the latter need not be advised to do any good deeds. Now he that is nearer to God receives more of His good things. Therefore the former, on account of his good works, merits some good from God.

On the contrary, Augustine says that “the sinner is not worthy of the bread he eats.” Therefore he cannot merit anything from God.

Further, he that is nothing, can merit nothing. But a sinner, through not having charity, is nothing in respect of spiritual being, according to 1 Cor.

13:2. Therefore he can merit nothing.

I answer that, Properly speaking a merit is an action on account of which it is just that the agent should be given something. Now justice is twofold: first, there is justice properly so called, which regards something due on the part of the recipient. Secondly, there is metaphorical justice, so to speak, which regards something due on the part of the giver, for it may be right for the giver to give something to which the receiver has no claim. In this sense the “fitness of the Divine goodness” is justice; thus Anselm says (Proslog. x) that “God is just when He spares the sinner, because this is befitting.” And in this way merit is also twofold. The first is an act in respect of which the agent himself has a claim to receive something, and this is called merit of “condignity.” The second is an act the result of which is that there is a duty of giving in the giver by reason of fittingness, wherefore it is called merit of “congruity.” Now since in all gratuitous givings, the primary reason of the giving is love, it is impossible for anyone, properly speaking, to lay claim to a gift, if he lack friendship. Wherefore, as all things, whether temporal or eternal, are bestowed on us by the bounty of God, no one can acquire a claim to any of them, save through charity towards God: so that works done without charity are not condignly meritorious of any good from God either eternal or temporal. But since it is befitting the goodness of God, that wherever He finds a disposition He should grant the perfection, a man is said to merit congruously some good by means of good works done without charity. Accordingly suchlike works avail for a threefold good, acquisition of temporal goods, disposition to grace, habituation to good works. Since, however, this is not merit properly so called, we should grant that such works are not meritorious of any good, rather than that they are.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 14), since no matter what a son may do, he can never give back to his father the equal of what he has received from him a father can never become his son’s debtor: and much less can man make God his debtor on account of equivalence of work. Consequently no work of ours can merit a reward by reason of its measure of goodness, but it can by reason of charity, which makes friends hold their possessions in common. Therefore, no matter how good a work may be, if it be done without charity, it does not give man a claim to receive anything from God. On the other hand, an evil deed deserves an equivalent punishment according to the measure of its malice, because no evil has been done to us on the part of God, like the good which He has done. Therefore, although an evil deed deserves condign punishment, nevertheless a good deed without charity does not merit condign reward.

Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments consider merit of congruity; while the other arguments consider merit of condignity.

Whether the aforesaid works avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid works do not avail for the mitigation of the pains of hell. For the measure of punishment in hell will answer to the measure of guilt. But works done without charity do not diminish the measure of guilt. Neither, therefore, do they lessen the pains of hell.

Objection 2: Further, the pain of hell, though infinite in duration, is nevertheless finite in intensity. Now anything finite is done away with by finite subtraction. If therefore works done without charity canceled any of the punishment due for sins, those works might be so numerous, that the pain of hell would be done away with altogether: which is false.

Objection 3: Further, the suffrages of the Church are more efficacious than works done without charity. But, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cx), “the suffrages of the Church do not profit the damned in hell.” Much less therefore are those pains mitigated by works done without charity.

On the contrary, Augustine also says (Enchiridion cx): “Whomsoever they profit, either receive a full pardon, or at least find damnation itself more tolerable.”

Further, it is a greater thing to do a good deed than to omit an evil deed. But the omission of an evil deed always avoids a punishment, even in one who lacks charity. Much more, therefore, do good deeds void punishment.

I answer that, Mitigation of the pains of hell can be understood in two ways: first, as though one were delivered from the punishment which he already deserved, and thus, since no one is delivered from punishment unless he be absolved from guilt, (for an effect is not diminished or taken away unless its cause be diminished or taken away), the pain of hell cannot be mitigated by works done without charity, since they are unable to remove or diminish guilt. Secondly, so that the demerit of punishment is hindered; and thus the aforesaid works diminish the pain of hell—first because he who does such works escapes being guilty of omitting them—secondly, because such works dispose one somewhat to good, so that a man sins from less contempt, and indeed is drawn away from many sins thereby.

These works do, however merit a diminution or postponement of temporal punishment, as in the case of Achab (3 Kings 21:27, seqq.), as also the acquisition of temporal goods.

Some, however, say that they mitigate the pains of hell, not by subtracting any of their substance, but by strengthening the subject, so that he is more able to bear them. But this is impossible, because there is no strengthening without a diminution of passibility. Now passibility is according to the measure of guilt, wherefore if guilt is not removed, neither can the subject be strengthened.

Some again say that the punishment is mitigated as to the remorse of conscience, though not as to the pain of fire. But neither will this stand, because as the pain of fire is equal to the guilt, so also is the pain of the remorse of conscience: so that what applies to one applies to the other.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF THE MEANS OF MAKING SATISFACTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the means of making satisfaction, under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?

(2) Whether the scourges whereby God punishes man in this life, are satisfactory?

(3) Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably reckoned, by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer?

Whether satisfaction must be made by means of penal works?

Objection 1: It would seem that satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works. For satisfaction should make compensation for the offense committed against God. Now, seemingly, no compensation is given to God by penal works, for God does not delight in our sufferings, as appears from Tob. 3:22. Therefore satisfaction need not be made by means of penal works.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the charity from which a work proceeds, the less penal is that work, for "charity hath no pain [*Vulg.: 'Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain']" according to 1 Jn. 4:18. If therefore works of satisfaction need to be penal, the more they proceed from charity, the less satisfactory will they be: which is false.

Objection 3: Further, "Satisfaction," as Anselm states (Cur Deus homo i) "consists in giving due honor to God." But this can be done by other means than penal works. Therefore satisfaction needs not to be made by means of penal works.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xx): "It is just that the sinner, by his repentance, should inflict on himself so much the greater suffering, as he has brought greater harm on himself by his sin."

Further, the wound caused by sin should be perfectly healed by satisfaction. Now punishment is the remedy for sins, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3). Therefore satisfaction should be made by means of penal works.

I answer that, As stated above ([4857]Q[12], A[3]), satisfaction regards both the past offense, for which compensation is made by its means, and also future sin wherefrom we are preserved thereby: and in both respects satisfaction needs to be made by means of penal works. For compensation for an offense implies equality, which must needs be between the offender and the person whom he offends. Now equalization in human justice consists in taking away from one that which he has too much of, and giving it to the person from whom something has been taken. And, although nothing can be taken away from God, so far as He is concerned, yet the sinner, for his part, deprives Him of something by sinning as stated above ([4858]Q[12], AA[3],4). Consequently, in order that compensation be made, something by way of satisfaction that may conduce to the glory of God must be taken away from the sinner. Now a good work, as such, does not deprive the agent of anything, but perfects him: so that the deprivation cannot be effected by a good work unless it be penal. Therefore, in order that a work be satisfactory it needs to be good that it may conduce to God's honor, and it must be penal, so that something may be taken away from the sinner thereby.

Again punishment preserves from future sin, because a man does not easily fall back into sin when he has had experience of the punishment.

Wherefore, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 3) punishments are medicinal.

Reply to Objection 1: Though God does not delight in our punishments as such, yet He does, in so far as they are just, and thus they can be satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as, in satisfaction, we have to note the penality of the work, so, in merit, we must observe its difficulty. Now if the difficulty of the work itself be diminished, other things being equal, the merit is also diminished; but if the difficulty be diminished on the part of the promptitude of the will, this does not diminish the merit, but increases it; and, in like manner, diminution of the penality of a work, on account of the will being made more prompt by charity, does not lessen the efficacy of satisfaction, but increases it.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is due for sin is compensation for the offense, and this cannot be done without punishment of the sinner. It is of this debt that Anselm speaks.

Whether the scourges of the present life are satisfactory?

Objection 1: It would seem that the scourges whereby we are punished by God in this life, cannot be satisfactory. For nothing but what is meritorious can be satisfactory, as is clear from what has been said ([4859]Q[14], A[2]). But we do not merit except by what is in our own power. Since therefore the scourges with which God punishes us are not in our power, it seems that they cannot be satisfactory.

Objection 2: Further, only the good make satisfaction. But these scourges are inflicted on the wicked also, and are deserved by them most of all. Therefore they cannot be satisfactory.

Objection 3: Further, satisfaction regards past sins. But these scourges are sometimes inflicted on those who have no sins, as in the case of Job. Therefore it seems that they are not satisfactory.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. 5:3,4): “Tribulation worketh patience, and patience trial, i.e. deliverance from sin,” as a gloss explains it.

Further, Ambrose says (Super Ps. 118): “Although faith,” i.e. the consciousness of sin, “be lacking, the punishment satisfies.” Therefore the scourges of this life are satisfactory.

I answer that, Compensation for a past offense can be enforced either by the offender or by another. When it is enforced by another, such compensation is of a vindictive rather than of a satisfactory nature, whereas when it is made by the offender, it is also satisfactory. Consequently, if the scourges, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, become in some way the act of the sufferer they acquire a satisfactory character. Now they become the act of the sufferer in so far as he accepts them for the cleansing of his sins, by taking advantage of them patiently. If, however, he refuse to submit to them patiently, then they do not become his personal act in any way, and are not of a satisfactory, but merely of a vindictive character.

Reply to Objection 1: Although these scourges are not altogether in our power, yet in some respect they are, in so far as we use them patiently. In this way man makes a virtue of necessity, so that such things can become both meritorious and satisfactory.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i, 8), even as “the same fire makes gold glisten and straw reek,” so by the same scourges are the good cleansed and the wicked worsened on account of their impatience. Hence, though the scourges are common to both, satisfaction is only on the side of the good.

Reply to Objection 3: These scourges always regard past guilt, not always the guilt of the person, but sometimes the guilt of nature. For had there not been guilt in human nature, there would have been no punishment. But since guilt preceded in nature, punishment is inflicted by God on a person without the person’s fault, that his virtue may be meritorious, and that he may avoid future sin. Moreover, these two things are necessary in satisfaction. For the work needs to be meritorious, that honor may be given to God, and it must be a safeguard of virtue, that we may be preserved from future sins.

Whether the works of satisfaction are suitably enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the works of satisfaction are unsuitably enumerated by saying that there are three, viz. almsdeeds, fasting, and prayer. For a work of satisfaction should be penal. But prayer is not penal, since it is a remedy against penal sorrow, and is a source of pleasure, wherefore it is written (James 5:13): “Is any of you sad? Let him pray. Is he cheerful in mind? Let him sing.” Therefore prayer should not be reckoned among the works of satisfaction.

Objection 2: Further, every sin is either carnal or spiritual. Now, as Jerome says on Mk. 9:28, “This kind” of demons “can go out by nothing, but by prayer and fasting: Diseases of the body are healed by fasting, diseases of the mind, by prayer.” Therefore no other work of satisfaction is necessary.

Objection 3: Further, satisfaction is necessary in order for us to be cleansed from our sins. But almsgiving cleanses from all sins, according to Lk. 11:41: “Give alms, and behold all things are clean unto you.” Therefore the other two are in excess.

Objection 4: On the other hand, it seems that there should be more. For contrary heals contrary. But there are many more than three kinds of sin. Therefore more works of satisfaction should be enumerated.

Objection 5: Further, pilgrimages and scourgings are also enjoined as works of satisfaction, and are not included among the above. Therefore they are not sufficiently enumerated.

I answer that, Satisfaction should be of such a nature as to involve something taken away from us for the honor of God. Now we have but three kinds of goods, bodily, spiritual, and goods of fortune, or external goods. By alms-deeds we deprive ourselves of some goods of fortune, and by fasting we retrench goods of the body. As to goods of the soul, there is no need to deprive ourselves of any of them, either in whole or in part, since thereby we become acceptable to God, but we should submit them entirely to God, which is done by prayer.

This number is shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction uproots the causes of sin, for these are reckoned to be three (1 Jn. 2:16), viz. “concupiscence of the flesh,” “concupiscence of the eyes,” and “pride of life.” Fasting is directed against concupiscence of the “flesh,” alms-deeds against concupiscence of the “eyes,” and “prayer” against “pride of life,” as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 42).

This number is also shown to be suitable in so far as satisfaction does not open a way to the suggestions of sin, because every sin is committed either against God, and this is prevented by “prayer,” or against our neighbor, and this is remedied by “alms-deeds,” or against ourselves, and this is forestalled by “fasting.”

Reply to Objection 1: According to some, prayer is twofold. There is the prayer of contemplatives whose “conversation is in heaven”: and this, since it is altogether delightful, is not a work of satisfaction. The other is a prayer which pours forth sighs for sin; this is penal and a part of satisfaction.

It may also be replied, and better, that every prayer has the character of satisfaction, for though it be sweet to the soul it is painful to the body, since, as Gregory says (Super Ezech., Hom. xiv), “doubtless, when our soul’s love is strengthened, our body’s strength is weakened”; hence we read (Gn. 32:25) that the sinew of Jacob’s thigh shrank through his wrestling with the angel.

Reply to Objection 2: Carnal sin is twofold; one which is completed in carnal delectation, as gluttony and lust. and, another which is completed in things relating to the flesh, though it be completed in the delectation of the soul rather than of the flesh, as covetousness. Hence such like sins are between spiritual and carnal sins, so that they need a satisfaction proper to them, viz. almsdeeds.

Reply to Objection 3: Although each of these three, by a kind of likeness, is appropriated to some particular kind of sin because it is reasonable that, whereby a man sins, in that he should be punished, and that satisfaction should cut out the very root of the sin committed, yet each of them can satisfy for any kind of sin. Hence if a man is unable to perform one of the above, another is imposed on him, chiefly almsdeeds, which can take the place of the others, in so far as in those to whom a man gives alms he purchases other works of satisfaction thereby. Consequently even if almsgiving washes all sins away, it does not follow that other works are in excess.

Reply to Objection 4: Though there are many kinds of sins, all are reduced to those three roots or to those three kinds of sin, to which, as we have said, the aforesaid works of satisfaction correspond.

Reply to Objection 5: Whatever relates to affliction of the body is all referred to fasting, and whatever is spent for the benefit of one’s neighbor is a kind of alms, and whatever act of worship is given to God becomes a kind of prayer, so that even one work can be satisfactory in several ways.

OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the recipients of the sacrament of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether penance can be in the innocent?

(2) Whether it can be in the saints in glory?

(3) Whether in the good or bad angels?

Whether penance can be in the innocent?

Objection 1: It would seem that penance cannot be in the innocent. For penance consists in bewailing one's evil deeds: whereas the innocent have done no evil. Therefore penance cannot be in them.

Objection 2: Further, the very name of penance [poenitentia] implies punishment [poena]. But the innocent do not deserve punishment. Therefore penance is not in them.

Objection 3: Further, penance coincides with vindictive justice. But if all were innocent, there would be no room for vindictive justice. Therefore there would be no penance, so that there is none in the innocent.

On the contrary, All the virtues are infused together. But penance is a virtue. Since, therefore, other virtues are infused into the innocent at Baptism, penance is infused with them.

Further, a man is said to be curable though he has never been sick in body: therefore in like manner, one who has never been sick spiritually. Now even as there can be no actual cure from the wound of sin without an act of penance, so is there no possibility of cure without the habit of penance. Therefore one who has never had the disease of sin, has the habit of penance.

I answer that, Habit comes between power and act: and since the removal of what precedes entails the removal of what follows, but not conversely, the removal of the habit ensues from the removal of the power to act, but not from the removal of the act. And because removal of the matter entails the removal of the act, since there can be no act without the matter into which it passes, hence the habit of a virtue is possible in one for whom the matter is not available, for the reason that it can be available, so that the habit can proceed to its act—thus a poor man can have the habit of magnificence, but not the act, because he is not possessed of great wealth which is the matter of magnificence, but he can be possessed thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the innocent have committed no sin, nevertheless they can, so that they are competent to have the habit of penance. Yet this habit can never proceed to its act, except perhaps with regard to their venial sins, because mortal sins destroy the habit. Nevertheless it is not without its purpose, because it is a perfection of the natural power.

Reply to Objection 2: Although they deserve no punishment actually, yet it is possible for something to be in them for which they would deserve to be punished.

Reply to Objection 3: So long as the power to sin remains, there would be room for vindictive justice as to the habit, though not as to the act, if there were no actual sins.

Whether the saints in glory have penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints in glory have not penance. For, as Gregory says (Moral. iv), “the blessed remember their sins, even as we, without grief, remember our griefs after we have been healed.” But penance is grief of the heart. Therefore the saints in heaven have not penance.

Objection 2: Further, the saints in heaven are conformed to Christ. But there was no penance in Christ, since there was no faith which is the principle of penance. Therefore there will be no penance in the saints in heaven.

Objection 3: Further, a habit is useless if it is not reduced to its act. But the saints in heaven will not repent actually, because, if they did, there would be something in them against their wish. Therefore the habit of penance will not be in them.

Objection 4: On the other hand, penance is a part of justice. But justice is “perpetual and immortal” (Wis. 1:15), and will remain in heaven. Therefore penance will also.

Objection 5: Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers, that one of them said that even Abraham will repent of not having done more good. But one ought to repent of evil done more than of good left undone, and which one was not bound to do, for such is the good in question. Therefore repentance will be there of evil done.

I answer that, The cardinal virtues will remain in heaven, but only as regards the acts which they exercise in respect of their end. Wherefore, since the virtue of penance is a part of justice which is a cardinal virtue, whoever has the habit of penance in this life, will have it in the life to come: but he will not have the same act as now, but another, viz. thanksgiving to God for His mercy in pardoning his sins.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves that they do not have the same act as penance has now; and we grant this.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ could not sin, wherefore the matter of this virtue was lacking in His respect both actually and potentially: so that there is no comparison between Him and others.

Reply to Objection 3: Repentance, properly speaking, considered as that act of penance which is in this life, will not be in heaven: and yet the habit will not be without its use, for it will have another act.

Reply OBJ 4,5: We grant the Fourth argument. But since the Fifth Objection proves that there will be the same act of penance in heaven as now, we answer the latter by saying that in heaven one will be altogether conformed to the will of God. Wherefore, as God, by His antecedent will, but not by His consequent will, wishes that all things should be good, and therefore that there should be no evil, so is it with the blessed. It is this will that this holy father improperly calls penance.

Whether an angel can be the subject of penance?

Objection 1: It would seem that even a good or bad angel can be a subject of penance. For fear is the beginning of penance. But fear is in the angels, according to James 2:19: “The devils . . . believe and tremble.” Therefore there can be penance in them.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that “evil men are full of repentance, and this is a great punishment for them.” Now the devils are exceeding evil, nor is there any punishment that they lack. Therefore they can repent.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is more easily moved to that which is according to its nature than to that which is against its nature: thus water which has by violence been heated, of itself returns to its natural property. Now angels can be moved to sin which is contrary to their common nature. Much more therefore can they return to that which is in accord with their nature. But this is done by penance. Therefore they are susceptible to penance.

Objection 4: Further, what applies to angels, applies equally to separated souls, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4). But there can be penance in separated souls, as some say, as in the souls of the blessed in heaven. Therefore there can be penance in the angels.

On the contrary, By penance man obtains pardon for the sin he has committed. But this is impossible in the angels. Therefore they are not subjects of penance.

Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that man is subject to penance on account of the weakness of his body. But the angels are not united to a body. Therefore no penance can be in them.

I answer that, In us, penance is taken in two senses; first, as a passion, and thus it is nothing but pain or sorrow on account of a sin committed: and though, as a passion it is only in the concupiscible part, yet, by way of comparison, the name of penance is given to that act of the will, whereby a man detests what he has done, even as love and other passions are spoken of as though they were in the intellectual appetite. Secondly, penance is taken as a virtue, and in this way its act consists in the detestation of evil done, together with the purpose of amendment and the intention of expiating the evil, or of placating God for the offense committed. Now detestation of evil befits a person according as he is naturally ordained to good. And since this order or inclination is not entirely destroyed in any creature, it remains even in the damned, and consequently the passion of repentance, or something like it, remains in them too, as stated in Wis. 5:3 “(saying) within themselves, repenting,” etc. This repentance, as it is not a habit, but a passion or act, can by no means be in the blessed angels, who have not committed any sins: but it is in the wicked angels, since the same applies to them as to the lost souls, for, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 4), “death is to men what sin is to an angel.” But no forgiveness is possible for the sin of an angel. Now sin is the proper object of the virtue itself which we call penance, in so far as it can be pardoned or expiated. Therefore, since the wicked angels cannot have the matter, they have not the power to produce the act, so that neither can they have the habit. Hence the angels cannot be subjects of the virtue of penance.

Reply to Objection 1: A certain movement of penance is engendered in them from fear, but not such as is a virtue.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Whatever is natural in them is entirely good, and inclines to good: but their free-will is fixed on evil. And since the movement of virtue and vice follows the inclination, not of nature, but of the free-will, there is no need that there should be movements of virtue in them either actually or possibly, although they are inclined to good by nature.

Reply to Objection 4: There is no parity between the holy angels and the beatified souls, because in the latter there has been or could have been a sin that could be pardoned, but not in the former: so that though they are like as to their present state, they differ as to their previous states, which penance regards directly.

OF THE POWER OF THE KEYS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the power of the ministers of this sacrament, which power depends on the keys. As to this matter, in the first place we shall treat of the keys, secondly, of excommunication, thirdly, of indulgences, since these two things are connected with the power of the keys. The first of these considerations will be fourfold: (1) the nature and meaning of the keys. (2) the use of the keys; (3) the ministers of the keys; (4) those on whom the use of the keys can be exercised.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there ought to be keys in the Church?

(2) Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?

(3) Whether there are two keys or only one?

Whether there should be keys in the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no necessity for keys in the Church. For there is no need for keys that one may enter a house the door of which is open. But it is written (Apoc. 4:1): “I looked and behold a door was opened in heaven," which door is Christ, for He said of Himself (Jn. 10:7): "I am the door." Therefore the Church needs no keys for the entrance into heaven.

Objection 2: Further, a key is needed for opening and shutting. But this belongs to Christ alone, "Who openeth and no man shutteth, shutteth and no man openeth" (Apoc. 3:7). Therefore the Church has no keys in the hands of her ministers.

Objection 3: Further, hell is opened to whomever heaven is closed, and vice versa. Therefore whoever has the keys of heaven, has the keys of hell. But the Church is not said to have the keys of hell. Therefore neither has she the keys of heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven."

Further, every dispenser should have the keys of the things that he dispenses. But the ministers of the Church are the dispensers of the divine mysteries, as appears from 1 Cor. 4:1. Therefore they ought to have the keys.

I answer that, In material things a key is an instrument for opening a door. Now the door of the kingdom is closed to us through sin, both as to the stain and as to the debt of punishment. Wherefore the power of removing this obstacle is called a key. Now this power is in the Divine Trinity by authority; hence some say that God has the key of "authority." But Christ Man had the power to remove the above obstacle, through the merit of His Passion, which also is said to open the door; hence some say that He has the keys of "excellence." And since "the sacraments of which the Church is built, flowed from the side of Christ while He lay asleep on the cross" [*Augustine, Enarr. in Ps. 138], the efficacy of the Passion abides in the sacraments of the Church. Wherefore a certain power for the removal of the aforesaid obstacle is bestowed on the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments, not by their own, but by a Divine power and by the Passion of Christ. This power is called metaphorically the Church's key, and is the key of "ministry."

Reply to Objection 1: The door of heaven, considered in itself, is ever open, but it is said to be closed to someone, on account of some obstacle against entering therein, which is in himself. The obstacle which the entire human nature inherited from the sin of the first man was removed by

Christ’s Passion; hence, after the Passion, John saw an opened door in heaven. Yet that door still remains closed to this or that man, on account of the original sin which he has contracted, or the actual sin which he has committed: hence we need the sacraments and the keys of the Church.

Reply to Objection 2: This refers to His closing Limbo, so that thenceforth no one should go there, and to His opening of Paradise, the obstacle of nature being removed by His Passion.

Reply to Objection 3: The key whereby hell is opened and closed, is the power of bestowing grace, whereby hell is opened to man, so that he is taken out from sin which is the door of hell, and closed, so that by the help of grace man should no more fall into sin. Now the power of bestowing grace belongs to God alone, wherefore He kept this key to Himself. But the key of the kingdom is also the power to remit the debt of temporal punishment, which debt prevents man from entering the kingdom Consequently the key of the kingdom can be given to man rather than the key of hell, for they are not the same, as is clear from what has been said. For a man may be set free from hell by the remission of the debt of eternal punishment, without being at once admitted to the kingdom, on account of his yet owing a debt of temporal punishment.

It may also be replied, as some state, that the key of heaven is also the key of hell, since if one is opened to a man, the other, for that very reason, is closed to him, but it takes its name from the better of the two.

Whether the key is the power of binding and loosing, etc.?

Objection 1: It would seem that the key is not the power of binding and loosing, whereby “the ecclesiastical judge has to admit the worthy to the kingdom and exclude the unworthy” therefrom, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 16). For the spiritual power conferred in a sacrament is the same as the character. But the key and the character do not seem to be the same, since by the character man is referred to God, whereas by the key he is referred to his subjects. Therefore the key is not a power.

Objection 2: Further, an ecclesiastical judge is only one who has jurisdiction, which is not given at the same time as orders. But the keys are given in the conferring of orders. Therefore there should have been no mention of the ecclesiastical judge in the definition of the keys.

Objection 3: Further, when a man has something of himself, he needs not to be reduced to act by some active power. Now a man is admitted to the kingdom from the very fact that he is worthy. Therefore it does not concern the power of the keys to admit the worthy to the kingdom.

Objection 4: Further, sinners are unworthy of the kingdom. But the Church prays for sinners, that they may go to heaven. Therefore she does not exclude the unworthy, but admits them, so far as she is concerned.

Objection 5: Further, in every ordered series of agents, the last end belongs to the principal and not to the instrumental agent. But the principal agent in view of man's salvation is God. Therefore admission to the kingdom, which is the last end, belongs to Him, and not to those who have the keys, who are as instrumental or ministerial agents.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text. 33), "powers are defined from their acts." Wherefore, since the key is a kind of power, it should be defined from its act or use, and reference to the act should include its object from which it takes its species, and the mode of acting whereby the power is shown to be well-ordered. Now the act of the spiritual power is to open heaven, not absolutely, since it is already open, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), but for this or that man; and this cannot be done in an orderly manner without due consideration of the worthiness of the one to be admitted to heaven. Hence the aforesaid definition of the key gives the genus, viz. "power," the subject of the power, viz. the "ecclesiastical judge," and the act, viz. "of excluding or admitting," corresponding to the two acts of a material key which are to open and shut; the object of which act is referred to in the words "from the kingdom," and the mode, in the words, "worthy" and "unworthy," because account is taken of the worthiness or unworthiness of those on whom the act is exercised.

Reply to Objection 1: The same power is directed to two things, of which one is the cause of the other, as heat, in fire, is directed to make a thing hot and to melt it. And since every grace and remission in a mystical body comes to it from its head, it seems that it is essentially the same power whereby a priest can consecrate, and whereby he can loose and bind, if he has jurisdiction, and that there is only a logical difference, according as it is referred to different effects, even as fire in one respect is said to have the power of heating, and in another, the power of melting. And because the character of the priestly order is nothing else than the power of exercising that act to which the priestly order is chiefly ordained (if we maintain that it is the same as a spiritual power), therefore the character, the power of consecrating, and the power of the keys are one and the same essentially, but differ logically.

Reply to Objection 2: All spiritual power is conferred by some kind of consecration. Therefore the key is given together with the order: yet the use of the key requires due matter, i.e. a people subject through jurisdiction, so that until he has jurisdiction, the priest has the keys, but he cannot exercise the act of the keys. And since the key is defined from its act, its definition contains a reference to jurisdiction.

Reply to Objection 3: A person may be worthy to have something in two ways, either so as to have a right to possess it, and thus whoever is worthy has heaven already opened to him—or so that it is meet that he should receive it, and thus the power of the keys admits those who are worthy, but to whom heaven is not yet altogether opened.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as God hardens not by imparting malice, but by withholding grace, so a priest is said to exclude, not as though he placed an obstacle to entrance, but because he does not remove an obstacle which is there, since he cannot remove it unless God has already removed it. [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. [4860]TP, Q[62], A[1]; [4861]TP, Q[64], A[1]; [4862]TP, Q[86], A[6].] Hence God is prayed that He may absolve, so that there may be room for the priest's absolution.

Reply to Objection 5: The priest's act does not bear immediately on the kingdom, but on the sacraments, by means of which man wins to the kingdom.

Whether there are two keys or only one?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not two keys but only one. For one lock requires but one key. Now the lock for the removal of which the keys of the Church are required, is sin. Therefore the Church does not require two keys for one sin.

Objection 2: Further, the keys are given when orders are conferred. But knowledge is not always due to infusion, but sometimes is acquired, nor is it possessed by all those who are ordained, and is possessed by some who are not ordained. Therefore knowledge is not a key, so that there is but one key, viz. the power of judging.

Objection 3: Further, the power which the priest has over the mystic body of Christ flows from the power which he has over Christ’s true body. Now the power of consecrating Christ’s true body is but one. Therefore the power which regards Christ’s mystic body is but one. But this is a key. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that there are more than two keys. For just as knowledge and power are requisite for man to act, so is will. But the knowledge of discretion is reckoned as a key, and so is the power of judging. Therefore the will to absolve should be counted as a key.

Objection 5: Further, all three Divine Persons remit sins. Now the priest, through the keys, is the minister for the remission of sins. Therefore he should have three keys, so that he may be conformed to the Trinity.

I answer that, Whenever an act requires fitness on the part of the recipient, two things are necessary in the one who has to perform the act, viz. judgment of the fitness of the recipient, and accomplishment of the act. Therefore in the act of justice whereby a man is given what he deserves, there needs to be a judgment in order to discern whether he deserves to receive. Again, an authority or power is necessary for both these things, for we cannot give save what we have in our power; nor can there be judgment, without the right to enforce it, since judgment is determined to one particular thing, which determination it derives, in speculative matters, from the first principles which cannot be gainsaid, and, in practical matters, from the power of command vested in the one who judges. And since the act of the key requires fitness in the person on whom it is exercised—because the ecclesiastical judge, by means of the key, “admits the worthy and excludes the unworthy,” as may be seen from the definition given above [4863] (A[2])—therefore the judge requires both judgment of discretion whereby he judges a man to be worthy, and also the very act of receiving (that man’s confession); and for both these things a certain power or authority is necessary. Accordingly we may distinguish two keys, the first of which regards the judgment about the worthiness of the person to be absolved, while the other regards the absolution.

These two keys are distinct, not in the essence of authority, since both belong to the minister by virtue of his office, but in comparison with their respective acts, one of which presupposes the other.

Reply to Objection 1: One key is ordained immediately to the opening of one lock, but it is not unfitting that one key should be ordained to the act of another. Thus it is in the case in point. For it is the second key, which is the power of binding and loosing, that opens the lock of sin immediately, but the key of knowledge shows to whom that lock should be opened.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about the key of knowledge. For some say that knowledge considered as a habit, acquired or infused, is the key in this case, and that it is not the principal key, but is called a key through being subordinate to another key: so that it is not called a key when the other key is wanting, for instance, in an educated man who is not a priest. And although priests lack this key at times, through being without knowledge, acquired or infused, of loosing and binding, yet sometimes they make use of their natural endeavors, which they who hold this opinion call a little key, so that although knowledge be not bestowed together with orders, yet with the conferring of orders the knowledge becomes a key which it was not before. This seems to have been the opinion of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 19).

But this does not seem to agree with the words of the Gospel, whereby the keys are promised to Peter (Mat. 16:19), so that not only one but two are given in orders. For which reason the other opinion holds that the key is not knowledge considered as a habit, but the authority to exercise the act of knowledge, which authority is sometimes without knowledge, while the knowledge is sometimes present without the authority. This may be seen even in secular courts, for a secular judge may have the authority to judge, without having the knowledge of the law, while another man, on the contrary, has knowledge of the law without having the authority to judge. And since the act of judging to which a man is bound through the authority which is vested in him, and not through his habit of knowledge, cannot be well performed without both of the above, the authority to judge, which is the key of knowledge, cannot be accepted without sin by one who lacks knowledge; whereas knowledge void of authority can be possessed without sin.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of consecrating is directed to only one act of another kind, wherefore it is not numbered among the keys, nor is it multiplied as the power of the keys, which is directed to different acts, although as to the essence of power and authority it is but one, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 4: Everyone is free to will, so that no one needs authority to will; wherefore will is not reckoned as a key.

Reply to Objection 5: All three Persons remit sins in the same way as one Person, wherefore there is no need for the priest, who is the minister of the Trinity, to have three keys: and all the more, since the will, which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, requires no key, as stated above (ad 4).

OF THE EFFECT OF THE KEYS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of the keys under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?

(2) Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?

(3) Whether a priest can bind in virtue of the power of the keys?

(4) Whether he can loose and bind according to his own judgment?

Whether the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt?

[*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. TP, Q[62], A[1]; TP, Q[64], A[1]; TP, Q[86], A[6]]

Objection 1: It would seem that the power of the keys extends to the remission of guilt. For it was said to the disciples (Jn. 20:23): “Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.” Now this was not said in reference to the declaration only, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), for in that case the priest of the New Testament would have no more power than the priest of the Old Testament. Therefore he exercises a power over the remission of the guilt.

Objection 2: Further, in Penance grace is given for the remission of sin. Now the priest is the dispenser of this sacrament by virtue of the keys. Therefore, since grace is opposed to sin, not on the part of the punishment, but on the part of the guilt, it seems that the priest operates unto the remission of sin by virtue of the keys.

Objection 3: Further, the priest receives more power by his consecration than the baptismal water by its sanctification. Now the baptismal water receives the power "to touch the body and cleanse the heart," as Augustine says (Tract. lxxx in Joan.). Much more, therefore, does the priest, in his consecration, receive the power to cleanse the heart from the stain of sin.

On the contrary, The Master stated above (Sent. iv, D, 18) that God has not bestowed on the minister the power to co-operate with Him in the inward cleansing. Now if he remitted sins as to the guilt, he would co-operate with God in the inward cleansing. Therefore the power of the keys does not extend to the remission of guilt.

Further, sin is not remitted save by the Holy Ghost. But no man has the power to give the Holy Ghost, as the Master said above (Sent. i, D, 14). Neither therefore can he remit sins as to their guilt.

I answer that, According to Hugh (De Sacram. ii), "the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, contain an invisible grace." Now this sanctification is sometimes essential to the sacrament both as regards the matter and as regards the minister, as may be seen in Confirmation, and then the sacramental virtue is in both together. Sometimes, however, the essence of the sacrament requires only sanctification of the matter, as in Baptism, which has no fixed minister on whom it depends necessarily, and then the whole virtue of the sacrament is in the matter. Again, sometimes the essence of the sacrament requires the consecration or sanctification of the minister without any sanctification of the matter, and then the entire sacramental virtue is in the minister, as in Penance. Hence the power of the keys which is in the priest, stands in the same relation to the effect of Penance, as the virtue in the baptismal water does to the effect of Baptism. Now Baptism and the sacrament of Penance agree somewhat in their effect, since each is directly ordained against guilt, which is not the case in the other sacraments: yet they differ in this, that the sacrament of Penance, since the acts of the recipient are as its matter, cannot be given save to adults, who need to be disposed for the reception of the sacramental effect; whereas Baptism is given, sometimes to adults, sometimes to children and others who lack the use of reason, so that by Baptism children receive grace and remission of sin without any previous disposition, while adults do not, for they require to be disposed by the removal of insincerity. This disposition sometimes precedes their Baptism by priority of time, being sufficient for the reception of grace, before they are actually baptized, but not before they have come to the knowledge of the truth and have conceived the desire for Baptism. At other times this disposition does not precede the reception of Baptism by a priority of time, but is simultaneous with it, and then the grace of the remission of guilt is bestowed through the reception of Baptism. On the other hand, grace is never given through the sacrament of Penance unless the recipient be disposed either simultaneously or before. Hence the power of the keys operates unto the remission of guilt, either through being desired or through being actually exercised, even as the waters of Baptism. But just as Baptism acts, not as a principal agent but as an instrument, and does not go so far as to cause the reception itself of grace, even instrumentally [*See note at beginning of this article], but merely disposes the recipient to the grace whereby his guilt is remitted, so is it with the power of the keys. Wherefore God alone directly remits guilt, and Baptism acts through His power instrumentally, as an inanimate instrument, and the priest as an animate instrument, such as a servant is, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11): and consequently the priest acts as a minister. Hence it is clear that the power of the keys is ordained, in a manner, to the remission of guilt, not as causing that remission, but as disposing thereto. Consequently if a man, before receiving absolution, were not perfectly disposed for the reception of grace, he would receive grace at the very time of sacramental confession and absolution, provided he offered no obstacle. For if the key were in no way ordained to the remission of guilt, but only to the remission of punishment, as some hold, it would not be necessary to have a desire of receiving the effect of the keys in order to have one’s sins forgiven, just as it is not necessary to have a desire of receiving the other sacraments which are ordained, not to the remission of guilt, but against punishment. But this enables us to see that it is not ordained unto the remission of guilt, because the use of the keys, in order to be effective, always requires a disposition on the part of the recipient of the sacrament. And the same would apply to Baptism, were it never given save to adults.

Reply to Objection 1: As the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), the power of forgiving sins was entrusted to priests, not that they may forgive them, by their own power, for this belongs to God, but that, as ministers, they may declare [*See note at the beginning of this article] the operation of

God Who forgives. Now this happens in three ways. First, by a declaration, not of present, but of future forgiveness, without co-operating therein in any way: and thus the sacraments of the Old Law signified the Divine operation, so that the priest of the Old Law did but declare and did not operate the forgiveness of sins. Secondly, by a declaration of present forgiveness without co-operating in it at all: and thus some say that the sacraments of the New Law signify the bestowal of grace, which God gives when the sacraments are conferred, without the sacraments containing any power productive of grace, according to which opinion, even the power of the keys would merely declare the Divine operation that has its effect in the remission of guilt when the sacrament is conferred. Thirdly, by signifying the Divine operation causing then and there the remission of guilt, and by co-operating towards this effect dispositively and instrumentally: and then, according to another and more common opinion, the sacraments of the New Law declare the cleansing effected by God. In this way also the priest of the New Testament declares the recipient to be absolved from guilt, because in speaking of the sacraments, what is ascribed to the power of the ministers must be consistent with the sacrament. Nor is it unreasonable that the keys of the Church should dispose the penitent to the remission of his guilt, from the fact that the guilt is already remitted, even as neither is it unreasonable that Baptism, considered in itself, causes a disposition in one who is already sanctified.

Reply to Objection 2: Neither the sacrament of Penance, nor the sacrament of Baptism, by its operation, causes grace, or the remission of guilt, directly, but only dispositively [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. [4864]TP, Q[62], A[1]; [4865]TP, Q[64], A[1]; [4866]TP, Q[86], A[6]]. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident.

The other arguments show that the power of the keys does not effect the remission of guilt directly, and this is to be granted.

Whether a priest can remit sin as to the punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot remit sin as to the punishment. For sin deserves eternal and temporal punishment. But after the priest's absolution the penitent is still obliged to undergo temporal punishment either in Purgatory or in this world. Therefore the priest does not remit the punishment in any way.

Objection 2: Further, the priest cannot anticipate the judgment of God. But Divine justice appoints the punishment which penitents have to undergo. Therefore the priest cannot remit any part of it.

Objection 3: Further, a man who has committed a slight sin, is not less susceptible to the power of the keys, than one who has committed a graver sin. Now if the punishment for the graver sin be lessened in any way through the priestly administrations, it would be possible for a sin to be so slight that the punishment which it deserves is no greater than that which has been remitted for the graver sin. Therefore the priest would be able to remit the entire punishment due for the slight sin: which is false.

Objection 4: Further, the whole of the temporal punishment due for a sin is of one kind. If, therefore, by a first absolution something is taken away from the punishment, it will be possible for something more to be taken away by a second absolution, so that the absolution can be so often repeated, that by virtue of the keys the whole punishment will be taken away, since the second absolution is not less efficacious than the first: and consequently that sin will be altogether unpunished, which is absurd.

On the contrary, The key is the power of binding and loosing. But the priest can enjoin a temporal punishment. Therefore he can absolve from punishment.

Further, the priest cannot remit sin either as to the guilt [*St. Thomas here follows the opinion of Peter Lombard, and replies in the negative. Later in life he altered his opinion. Cf. [4867]TP, Q[62], A[1]; [4868]TP, Q[64], A[1]; [4869]TP, Q[86], A[6]], as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 18), or as to the eternal punishment, for a like reason. If therefore he cannot remit sin as to the temporal punishment, he would be unable to remit sin in any way, which is altogether contrary to the words of the Gospel.

I answer that, Whatever may be said of the effect of Baptism conferred on one who has already received grace, applies equally to the effect of the actual exercise of the power of the keys on one who has already been contrite. For a man may obtain the grace of the remission of his sins as to their guilt, through faith and contrition, previous to Baptism; but when, afterwards, he actually receives Baptism, his grace is increased, and he is entirely absolved from the debt of punishment, since he is then made a partaker of the Passion of Christ. In like manner when a man, through contrition, has received the pardon of his sins as to their guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, (which is remitted together with the guilt) by virtue of the keys which derive their efficacy from the Passion of Christ, his grace is increased and the temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which remained after the guilt had been forgiven. However, this temporal punishment is not entirely remitted, as in Baptism, but only partly, because the man who is regenerated in Baptism is conformed to the Passion of Christ, by receiving into himself entirely the efficacy of Christ's Passion, which suffices for the blotting out of all punishment, so that nothing remains of the punishment due to his preceding actual sins. For nothing should be imputed to a man unto punishment, save what he has done himself, and in Baptism man begins a new life, and by the baptismal water becomes a new man, as that no debt for previous sin remains in him. on the other hand, in Penance, a man does not take on a new life, since therein he is not born again, but healed. Consequently by virtue of the keys which produce their effect in the sacrament of Penance, the punishment is not entirely remitted, but something is taken off the temporal punishment, the debt of which could remain after the eternal punishment had been remitted. Nor does this apply only to the temporal punishment which the penitent owes at the time of confession, as some hold, (for then confession and sacramental absolution would be mere burdens, which cannot be said of the sacraments of the New Law), but also to the punishment due in Purgatory, so that one who has been absolved and dies before making satisfaction, is less punished in Purgatory, than if he had died before receiving absolution.

Reply to Objection 1: The priest does not remit the entire temporal punishment, but part of it; wherefore the penitent still remains obliged to undergo satisfactory punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: Christ's Passion was sufficiently satisfactory for the sins of the whole world, so that without prejudice to Divine justice something can be remitted from the punishment which a sinner deserves, in so far as the effect of Christ's Passion reaches him through the sacraments of the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: Some satisfactory punishment must remain for each sin, so as to provide a remedy against it. Wherefore though, by virtue of the absolution some measure of the punishment due to a grave sin is remitted, it does not follow that the same measure of punishment is remitted for each sin, because in that case some sin would remain without any punishment at all: but, by virtue of the keys, the punishments due to various sins are remitted in due proportion.

Reply to Objection 4: Some say that at the first absolution, as much as possible is remitted by virtue of the keys, and that, nevertheless, the second confession is valid, on account of the instruction received, on account of the additional surety, on account of the prayers of the priest or confessor, and lastly on account of the merit of the shame.

But this does not seem to be true, for though there might be a reason for repeating the confession, there would be no reason for repeating the absolution, especially if the penitent has no cause to doubt about his previous absolution; for he might just as well doubt after the second as after the first absolution: even as we see that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is not repeated during the same sickness, for the reason that all that could be done through the sacrament, has been done once. Moreover, in the second confession, there would be no need for the confessor to have the keys, if the power of the keys had no effect therein.

For these reasons others say that even in the second absolution something of the punishment is remitted by virtue of the keys, because when absolution is given a second time, grace is increased, and the greater the grace received, the less there remains of the blemish of the previous sin, and the less punishment is required to remove that blemish. Wherefore even when a man is first absolved, his punishment is more or less remitted by virtue of the keys, according as he disposes himself more or less to receive grace; and this disposition may be so great, that even by virtue of his contrition the whole punishment is remitted, as we have already stated ([4870]Q[5], A[2]). Consequently it is not unreasonable, if by frequent confession even the whole punishment be remitted, that a sin remain altogether unpunished, since Christ made satisfaction for its punishment.

Whether the priest can bind through the power of the keys?

Objection 1: It would seem that the priest cannot bind by virtue of the power of the keys. For the sacramental power is ordained as a remedy against sin. Now binding is not a remedy for sin, but seemingly is rather conducive to an aggravation of the disease. Therefore, by the power of the keys, which is a sacramental power, the priest cannot bind.

Objection 2: Further, just as to loose or to open is to remove an obstacle, so to bind is to place an obstacle. Now an obstacle to heaven is sin, which cannot be placed on us by an extrinsic cause, since no sin is committed except by the will. Therefore the priest cannot bind.

Objection 3: Further, the keys derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion. But binding is not an effect of the Passion. Therefore the priest cannot bind by the power of the keys.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 16:19): “Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound also in heaven.”

Further, rational powers are directed to opposites. But the power of the keys is a rational power, since it has discretion connected with it. Therefore it is directed to opposites. Therefore if it can loose, it can bind.

I answer that, The operation of the priest in using the keys, is conformed to God’s operation, Whose minister he is. Now God’s operation extends both to guilt and to punishment; to the guilt indeed, so as to loose it directly. but to bind it indirectly, in so far as He is said to harden, when He withholds His grace; whereas His operation extends to punishment directly, in both respects, because He both spares and inflicts it. In like manner, therefore, although the priest, in absolving, exercises an operation ordained to the remission of guilt, in the way mentioned above [4871](A[1]), nevertheless, in binding, he exercises no operation on the guilt; (unless he be said to bind by not absolving the penitent and by declaring him to be bound), but he has the power both of binding and of loosing with regard to the punishment. For he looses from the punishment which he remits, while he binds as to the punishment which remains. This he does in two ways—first as regards the quantity of the punishment considered in general, and thus he does not bind save by not loosing, and declaring the penitent to be bound, secondly, as regards this or that particular punishment, and thus he binds to punishment by imposing it.

Reply to Objection 1: The remainder of the punishment to which the priest binds the penitent, is the medicine which cleanses the latter from the blemish of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Not only sin, but also punishment is an obstacle to heaven: and how the latter is enjoined by the priest, has been said in the article.

Reply to Objection 3: Even the Passion of Christ binds us to some punishment whereby we are conformed to Him.

Whether the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment?

Objection 1: It seems that the priest can bind and loose according to his own judgment. For Jerome [*Cf. Can. 86, Mensuram, De Poenit. Dist. i] says: “The canons do not fix the length of time for doing penance so precisely as to say how each sin is to be amended, but leave the decision of this matter to the judgment of a discreet priest.” Therefore it seems that he can bind and loose according to his own judgment.

Objection 2: Further, “The Lord commended the unjust steward, forasmuch as he had done wisely” (Lk. 16:5), because he had allowed a liberal discount to his master’s debtors. But God is more inclined to mercy than any temporal lord. Therefore it seems that the more punishment the priest remits, the more he is to be commended.

Objection 3: Further, Christ’s every action is our instruction. Now on some sinners He imposed no punishment, but only amendment of life, as in the case of the adulterous woman (Jn. 8). Therefore it seems that the priest also, who is the vicar of Christ, can, according to his own judgment, remit the punishment, either wholly or in part.

On the contrary, Gregory VII [*Cf. Act. Concil. Rom. v, Can. 5] says: “We declare it a mock penance if it is not imposed according to the authority of the holy fathers in proportion to the sin.” Therefore it seems that it does not altogether depend on the priest’s judgment.

Further, the act of the keys requires discretion. Now if the priest could remit and impose as much as he liked of a penance, he would have no need of discretion, because there would be no room for indiscretion. Therefore it does not altogether depend on the priest’s judgment.

I answer that, In using the keys, the priest acts as the instrument and minister of God. Now no instrument can have an efficacious act, except in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. Wherefore, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccl. cap. ult.) that “priests should use their hierarchical powers, according as they are moved by God.” A sign of this is that before the power of the keys was conferred on Peter (Mat. 16:19) mention is made of the revelation vouchsafed to him of the Godhead; and the gift of the Holy Ghost, whereby “the sons of God are led” (Rom. 8:14), is mentioned before power was given to the apostles to forgive sins. Consequently if anyone were to presume to use his power against that Divine motion, he would not realize the effect, as Dionysius states (Hier. Eccl., cap. ult.), and, besides, he would be turned away from the Divine order, and consequently would be guilty of a sin. Moreover, since satisfactory punishments are medicinal, just as the medicines prescribed by the medical art are not suitable to all, but have to be changed according to the judgment of a medical man, who follows not his own will, but his medical science, so the satisfactory punishments appointed by the canons are not suitable to all, but have to be varied according to the judgment of the priest guided by the Divine instinct. Therefore just as sometimes the physician prudently refrains from giving a medicine sufficiently efficacious to heal the disease, lest a greater danger should arise on account of the weakness of nature so the priest, moved by Divine instinct, some times refrains from enjoining the entire punishment due to one sin, lest by the severity of the punishment, the sick man come to despair and turn away altogether from repentance.

Reply to Objection 1: This judgment should be guided entirely by the Divine instinct.

Reply to Objection 2: The steward is commended also for having done wisely. Therefore in the remission of the due punishment, there is need for discretion.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ had the power of “excellence” in the sacraments, so that, by His own authority, He could remit the punishment wholly or in part, just as He chose. Therefore there is no comparison between Him and those who act merely as ministers.

OF THE MINISTERS OF THE KEYS (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the ministers and the use of the keys: under which head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?

(2) Whether Christ had the keys?

(3) Whether priests alone have the keys?

(4) Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys or their use?

(5) Whether wicked priests have the effective use of the keys?

(6) Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded, have the use of the keys?

Whether the priest of the Law had the keys?

Objection 1: It would seem that the priests of the Law had the keys. For the possession of the keys results from having orders. But they had orders since they were called priests. Therefore the priests of the Law had the keys.

Objection 2: Further, as the Master states (Sent. iv, D, 18), there are two keys, knowledge of discretion, and power of judgment. But the priests of the Law had authority for both of these: therefore they had the keys.

Objection 3: Further, the priests of the Law had some power over the rest of the people, which power was not temporal, else the kingly power would not have differed from the priestly power. Therefore it was a spiritual power; and this is the key. Therefore they had the key.

On the contrary, The keys are ordained to the opening of the heavenly kingdom, which could not be opened before Christ's Passion. Therefore the priest of the Law had not the keys. Further, the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace. Now the gate of the heavenly kingdom could not be opened except by means of grace. Therefore it could not be opened by means of those sacraments, so that the priests who administered them, had not the keys of the heavenly kingdom.

I answer that, Some have held that, under the Old Law, the keys of the kingdom were in the hands of the priests, because the right of imposing punishment for sin was conferred on them, as related in Lev. 5, which right seems to belong to the keys; but that these keys were incomplete then, whereas now they are complete as bestowed by Christ on the priests of the New Law.

But this seems to be contrary to the intent of the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. 9:11–12). For there the priesthood of Christ is given the preference over the priesthood of the Law, inasmuch as Christ came, "a high priest of the good things to come," and brought us "by His own blood" into a tabernacle not made with hand, whither the priesthood of the Old Law brought men "by the blood of goats and of oxen." Hence it is clear that the power of that priesthood did not reach to heavenly things but to the shadow of heavenly things: and so, we must say with others that they had not the keys, but that the keys were foreshadowed in them.

Reply to Objection 1: The keys of the kingdom go with the priesthood whereby man is brought into the heavenly kingdom, but such was not the priesthood of Levi; hence it had the keys, not of heaven, but of an earthly tabernacle.

Reply to Objection 2: The priests of the Old Law had authority to discern and judge, but not to admit those they judged into heaven, but only into the shadow of heavenly things.

Reply to Objection 3: They had no spiritual power, since, by the sacraments of the Law, they cleansed men not from their sins but from irregularities, so that those who were cleansed by them could enter into a tabernacle which was "made with hand."

Whether Christ had the key?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ did not have the key. For the key goes with the character of order. But Christ did not have a character. Therefore He had not the key.

Objection 2: Further, Christ had power of "excellence" in the sacraments, so that He could produce the sacramental effect without the sacramental rite. Now the key is something sacramental. Therefore He needed no key, and it would have been useless to Him to have it.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 3:7): "These things saith . . . He that hath the key of David," etc.

I answer that, The power to do a thing is both in the instrument and in the principal agent, but not in the same way since it is more perfectly in the latter. Now the power of the keys which we have, like other sacramental powers, is instrumental: whereas it is in Christ as principal agent in the matter of our salvation, by authority, if we consider Him as God, by merit, if we consider Him as man [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, Cf. [4872]TP, Q[48], A[6]; [4873]FS, Q[112], A[1], A.D. 1]. But the very notion of a key expresses a power to open and shut, whether this be done by the principal agent or by an instrument. Consequently we must admit that Christ had the key, but in a higher way than His ministers, wherefore He is said to have the key of “excellence.”

Reply to Objection 1: A character implies the notion of something derived from another, hence the power of the keys which we receive from Christ results from the character whereby we are conformed to Christ, whereas in Christ it results not from a character, but from the principal form.

Reply to Objection 2: The key, which Christ had was not sacramental, but the origin of the sacramental key.

Whether priests alone have the keys?

Objection 1: It would seem that not only priests have the keys. For Isidore says (Etym. vii, 12) that the “doorkeepers have to tell the good from the bad, so as to admit the good and keep out the bad.” Now this is the definition of the keys, as appears from what has been said ([4874]Q[17], A[2]). Therefore not only priests but even doorkeepers have the keys.

Objection 2: Further, the keys are conferred on priests when by being anointed they receive power from God. But kings of Christian peoples also receive power from God and are consecrated by being anointed. Therefore not only priests have the keys.

Objection 3: Further, the priesthood is an order belonging to an individual person. But sometimes a number of people together seem to have the key, because certain Chapters can pass a sentence of excommunication, which pertains to the power of the keys. Therefore not only priests have the key.

Objection 4: Further, a woman is not capable of receiving the priesthood, since she is not competent to teach, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 14:34). But some women (abbesses, for instance, who exercise a spiritual power over their subjects), seem to have the keys. Therefore not only priests have the keys.

On the contrary, Ambrose says (De Poenit. i): “This right,” viz. of binding and loosing, “is granted to priests alone.”

Further, by receiving the power of the keys, a man is set up between the people and God. But this belongs to the priest alone, who is “ordained . . .

in the things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts and sacrifices for sins” (Heb. 5:1). Therefore only priests have the keys.

I answer that, There are two kinds of key. one reaches to heaven itself directly, by remitting sin and thus removing the obstacles to the entrance into heaven; and this is called the key of “order.” Priests alone have this key, because they alone are ordained for the people in the things which appertain to God directly. The other key reaches to heaven, not directly but through the medium of the Church Militant. By this key a man goes to heaven, since, by its means, a man is shut out from or admitted to the fellowship of the Church Militant, by excommunication or absolution. This is called the key of “jurisdiction” in the external court, wherefore even those who are not priests can have this key, e.g. archdeacons, bishops elect, and others who can excommunicate. But it is not properly called a key of heaven, but a disposition thereto.

Reply to Objection 1: The doorkeepers have the key for taking care of those things which are contained in a material temple, and they have to judge whether a person should be excluded from or admitted to that temple; which judgment they pronounce, not by their own authority, but in pursuance to the priest’s judgment, so that they appear to be the administrators of the priestly power.

Reply to Objection 2: Kings have no power in spiritual matters, so that they do not receive the key of the heavenly kingdom. Their power is confined to temporal matters, and this too can only come to them from God, as appears from Rom. 13:1. Nor are they consecrated by the unction of a sacred order: their anointing is merely a sign that the excellence of their power comes down to them from Christ, and that, under Christ, they reign over the Christian people.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as in civil matters the whole power is sometimes vested in a judge, as in a kingdom, whereas sometimes it is vested in many exercising various offices but acting together with equal rights (Ethic. viii, 10,11), so too, spiritual jurisdiction may be exercised both by one alone, e.g. a bishop, and by many together, e.g. by a Chapter, and thus they have the key of jurisdiction, but they have not all together the key of order.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the Apostle (1 Tim. 2:11; Titus 2:5), woman is in a state of subjection: wherefore she can have no spiritual jurisdiction, since the Philosopher also says (Ethic. viii) that it is a corruption of public life when the government comes into the hands of a woman. Consequently a woman has neither the key of order nor the key of jurisdiction. Nevertheless a certain use of the keys is allowed to women, such as the right to correct other women who are under them, on account of the danger that might threaten if men were to dwell under the same roof.

Whether holy men who are not priests have the keys?

Objection 1: It would seem that holy men, even those who are not priests, have the use of the keys. For loosing and binding, which are the effects of the keys, derive their efficacy from the merit of Christ's Passion. Now those are most conformed to Christ's Passion, who follow Christ, suffering by patience and other virtues. Therefore it seems that even if they have not the priestly order, they can bind and loose.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Heb. 7:7): "Without all contradiction, that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']." Now "in spiritual matters," according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 8), "to be better is to be greater." Therefore those who are better, i.e. who have more charity, can bless others by absolving them. Hence the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, "Action belongs to that which has the power," as the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil. i). But the key which is a spiritual power belongs to priests alone. Therefore priests alone are competent to have the use of the keys.

I answer that, There is this difference between a principal and an instrumental agent, that the latter does not produce, in the effect, its own likeness, but the likeness of the principal agent, whereas the principal agent produces its own likeness. Consequently a thing becomes a principal agent through having a form, which it can reproduce in another, whereas an instrumental agent is not constituted thus, but through being applied by the principal agent in order to produce a certain effect. Since therefore in the act of the keys the principal agent by authority is Christ as God, and by merit is Christ as man,* it follows that on account of the very fulness of Divine goodness in Him, and of the perfection of His grace, He is competent to exercise the act of the keys. [*For St. Thomas' later teaching on this point, cf. [4875]TP, Q[48], A[6]; [4876]FS, Q[112], A[1], ad 1]. But another man is not competent to exercise this act as principal agent, since neither can he give another man grace whereby sins are remitted, nor can he merit sufficiently, so that he is nothing more than an instrumental agent. Consequently the recipient of the effect of the keys, is likened, not to the one who uses the keys, but to Christ. Therefore, no matter how much grace a man may have, he cannot produce the effect of the keys, unless he be appointed to that purpose by receiving orders.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as between instrument and effect there is need or likeness, not of a similar form, but of aptitude in the instrument for the effect, so is it as regards the instrument and the principal agent. The former is the likeness between holy men and the suffering Christ, nor does it bestow on them the use of the keys.

Reply to Objection 2: Although a mere man cannot merit grace for another man condignly, yet the merit of one man can co-operate in the salvation of another. Hence there is a twofold blessing. One proceeds from a mere man, as meriting by his own act: this blessing can be conferred by any holy person in whom Christ dwells by His grace, in so far as he excels in goodness the person whom he blesses. The other blessing is when a man blesses, as applying a blessing instrumentally through the merit of Christ, and this requires excellence of order and not of virtue.

Whether wicked priests have the use of the keys?

Objection 1: It would seem that wicked priests have not the use of the keys. For in the passage where the use of the keys is bestowed on the apostles (Jn. 20:22,23), the gift of the Holy Ghost is promised. But wicked men have not the Holy Ghost. Therefore they have not the use of the keys.

Objection 2: Further, no wise king entrusts his enemy with the dispensation of his treasure. Now the use of the keys consists in dispensing the treasure of the King of heaven, Who is Wisdom itself. Therefore the wicked, who are His enemies on account of sin, have not the use of the keys.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Bapt. v, 21) that God “gives the sacrament of grace even through wicked men, but grace itself only by Himself or through His saints.” Hence He forgives sin by Himself, or by those who are members of the Dove. But the remission of sins is the use of the keys. Therefore sinners, who are not “members of the Dove,” have not the use of the keys.

Objection 4: Further, the prayer of a wicked priest cannot effect reconciliation, for, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 11), “if an unacceptable person is sent to intercede, anger is provoked to yet greater severity.” But the use of the keys implies a kind of intercession, as appears in the form of absolution. Therefore wicked priests cannot use the keys effectively.

On the contrary, No man can know whether another man is in the state of grace. If, therefore, no one could use the keys in giving absolution unless he were in a state of grace, no one would know that he had been absolved, which would be very unfitting.

Further, the wickedness of the minister cannot void the liberality of his lord. But the priest is no more than a minister. Therefore he cannot by his wickedness take away from us the gift which God has given through him.

I answer that, Just as participation of a form to be induced into an effect does not make a thing to be an instrument, so neither does the loss of that form prevent that thing being used as an instrument. Consequently, since man is merely an instrument in the use of the keys, however much he may through sin be deprived of grace, whereby sins are forgiven, yet he is by no means deprived of the use of the keys.

Reply to Objection 1: The gift of the Holy Ghost is requisite for the use of the keys, not as being indispensable for the purpose, but because it is unbecoming for the user to use them without it, though he that submits to them receives their effect.

Reply to Objection 2: An earthly king can be cheated and deceived in the matter of his treasure, and so he does not entrust his enemy with the dispensation thereof. But the King of heaven cannot be cheated, because all tends to His own glory, even the abuse of the keys by some, for He can make good come out of evil, and produce many good effects through evil men. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks of the remission of sins in so far as holy men co-operate therein, not by virtue of the keys, but by merit of congruity. Hence He says that God confers the sacraments even through evil men, and among the other sacraments, absolution which is the use of the keys should be reckoned: but that through “members of the Dove,” i.e.

holy men, He grants forgiveness of sins, in so far as He remits sins on account of their intercession.

We might also reply that by “members of the Dove” he means all who are not cut off from the Church, for those who receive the sacraments from them, receive grace, whereas those who receive the sacraments from those who are cut off from the Church, do not receive grace, because they sin in so doing, except in the case of Baptism, which, in cases of necessity, may be received even from one who is excommunicate.

Reply to Objection 4: The prayer which the wicked priest proffers on his own account, is not efficacious: but that which he makes as a minister of the Church, is efficacious through the merit of Christ. Yet in both ways the priest’s prayer should profit those who are subject to him.

Whether those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are schismatics, heretics, excommunicate, suspended or degraded have the use of the keys. For just as the power of the keys results from orders, so does the power of consecration. But the above cannot lose the use of the power of consecration, since if they do consecrate it is valid, though they sin in doing so. Therefore neither can they lose the use of the keys.

Objection 2: Further, any active spiritual power in one who has the use of his free-will can be exercised by him when he wills. Now the power of the keys remains in the aforesaid, for, since it is only conferred with orders, they would have to be reordained when they return to the Church. Therefore, since it is an active power, they can exercise it when they will.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual grace is hindered by guilt more than by punishment. Now excommunication, suspension and degradation are punishments. Therefore, since a man does not lose the use of the keys on account of guilt, it seems that he does not lose it on account of the aforesaid.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Tract. cxxi in Joan.) that the “charity of the Church forgives sins.” Now it is the charity of the Church which unites its members. Since therefore the above are disunited from the Church, it seems that they have not the use of the keys in remitting sins.

Further, no man is absolved from sin by sinning. Now it is a sin for anyone to seek absolution of his sins from the above, for he disobeys the Church in so doing. Therefore he cannot be absolved by them: and so the same conclusion follows.

I answer that, In all the above the power of the keys remains as to its essence, but its use is hindered on account of the lack of matter. For since the use of the keys requires in the user authority over the person on whom they are used, as stated above ([4877]Q[17], A[2], ad 2), the proper matter on whom one can exercise the use of the keys is a man under one's authority. And since it is by appointment of the Church that one man has authority over another, so a man may be deprived of his authority over another by his ecclesiastical superiors. Consequently, since the Church deprives heretics, schismatics and the like, by withdrawing their subjects from them either altogether or in some respect, in so far as they are thus deprived, they cannot have the use of the keys.

Reply to Objection 1: The matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist, on which the priest exercises his power, is not a man but wheaten bread, and in Baptism, the matter is simply a man. Wherefore, just as, were a heretic to be without wheaten bread, he could not consecrate, so neither can a prelate absolve if he be deprived of his authority, yet he can baptize and consecrate, albeit to his own damnation.

Reply to Objection 2: The assertion is true, provided matter be not lacking as it is in the case in point.

Reply to Objection 3: Sin, of itself, does not remove matter, as certain punishments do: so that punishment is a hindrance not because it is contrary to the effect, but for the reason stated.

OF THOSE ON WHOM THE POWER OF THE KEYS CAN BE EXERCISED (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider those on whom the power of the keys can be exercised. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a priest can use the key, which he has, on any man?

(2) Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?

(3) Whether anyone can use the keys on his superior?

Whether a priest can use the key which he has, on any man?

Objection 1: It would seem that a priest can use the key which he has, on any man. For the power of the keys was bestowed on priests by Divine authority in the words: “Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them” (Jn. 20:22,23). But this was said without any restriction. Therefore he that has the key, can use it on any without restriction.

Objection 2: Further, a material key that opens one lock, opens all locks of the same pattern. Now every sin of every man is the same kind of obstacle against entering into heaven. Therefore if a priest can, by means of the key which he has, absolve one man, he can do the same for all others.

Objection 3: Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more perfect than that of the Old Testament. But the priest of the Old Testament could use the power which he had of discerning between different kinds of leprosy, with regard to all indiscriminately. Much more therefore can the priest of the Gospel use his power with regard to all.

On the contrary, It is written in the Appendix of Gratian: “It is not lawful for every priest to loose or bind another priest’s parishioner.” Therefore a priest cannot absolve everybody.

Further, judgment in spiritual matters should be better regulated than in temporal matters. But in temporal matters a judge cannot judge everybody. Therefore, since the use of the keys is a kind of judgment, it is not within the competency of a priest to use his key with regard to everyone.

I answer that, That which has to do with singular matters is not equally in the power of all. Thus, even as besides the general principles of medicine, it is necessary to have physicians, who adapt those general principles to individual patients or diseases, according to their various requirements, so in every kingdom, besides that one who proclaims the universal precepts of law, there is need for others to adapt those precepts to individual cases, according as each case demands. For this reason, in the heavenly hierarchy also, under the Powers who rule indiscriminately, a place is given to the Principalities, who are appointed to individual kingdoms, and to the Angels who are given charge over individual men, as we have explained above ([4878]FP, Q[113], AA[1],2). Consequently there should be a like order of authority in the Church Militant, so that an indiscriminate authority over all should be vested in one individual, and that there should be others under him, having distinct authority over various people. Now the use of the keys implies a certain power to exercise authority, whereby the one on whom the keys are used, becomes the proper matter of that act. Therefore he that has power over all indiscriminately, can use the keys on all, whereas those who have received authority over distinct persons, cannot use the keys on everyone, but only on those over whom they are appointed, except in cases of necessity, when the sacraments should be refused to no one.

Reply to Objection 1: A twofold power is required in order to absolve from sins, namely, power of order and power of jurisdiction. The former power is equally in all priests, but not the latter. And therefore, when our Lord (Jn. 20:23) gave all the apostles in general, the power of forgiving sins, this is to be understood of the power which results from receiving orders, wherefore these words are addressed to priests when they are ordained. But to Peter in particular He gave the power of forgiving sins (Mat. 16:19), that we may understand that he has the power of jurisdiction before the others. But the power of orders, considered in itself, extends to all who can be absolved: wherefore our Lord said indeterminately, "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," on the understanding that this power should be used in dependence on the power given to Peter, according to His appointment.

Reply to Objection 2: A material key can open only its own lock. nor can any active force act save on its own matter. Now a man becomes the matter of the power of order by jurisdiction: and consequently no one can use the key in respect of another over whom he has not jurisdiction.

Reply to Objection 3: The people of Israel were one people, and had but one temple, so that there was no need for a distinction in priestly jurisdiction, as there is now in the Church which comprises various peoples and nations.

Whether a priest can always absolve his subject?

Objection 1: It would seem that a priest cannot always absolve his subject. For, as Augustine says (De vera et false Poenitentia [*Work of an unknown author]), "no man should exercise the priestly office, unless he be free from those things which he condemns in others." But a priest might happen to share in a sin committed by his subject, e.g. by knowledge of a woman who is his subject. Therefore it seems that he cannot always use the power of the keys on his subjects.

Objection 2: Further, by the power of the keys a man is healed of all his shortcomings. Now it happens sometimes that a sin has attached to it a defect of irregularity or a sentence of excommunication, from which a simple priest cannot absolve. Therefore it seems that he cannot use the power of the keys on such as are shackled by these things in the above manner.

Objection 3: Further, the judgment and power of our priesthood was foreshadowed by the judgment of the ancient priesthood. Now according to the Law, the lesser judges were not competent to decide all cases, and had recourse to the higher judges, according to Ex. 24:14: “If any question shall arise” among you, “you shall refer it to them.” It seems, therefore, that a priest cannot absolve his subject from graver sins, but should refer him to his superior.

On the contrary, Whoever has charge of the principal has charge of the accessory. Now priests are charged with the dispensation of the Eucharist to their subjects, to which sacrament the absolution of sins is subordinate [*Cf. [4879] Q[17], A[2], ad 1]. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, a priest can absolve his subject from any sins whatever.

Further, grace, however small, removes all sin. But a priest dispenses sacraments whereby grace is given. Therefore, as far as the power of the keys is concerned, he can absolve from all sins.

I answer that, The power of order, considered in itself, extends to the remission of all sins. But since, as stated above, the use of this power requires jurisdiction which inferiors derive from their superiors, it follows that the superior can reserve certain matters to himself, the judgment of which he does not commit to his inferior; otherwise any simple priest who has jurisdiction can absolve from any sin. Now there are five cases in which a simple priest must refer his penitent to his superior. The first is when a public penance has to be imposed, because in that case the bishop is the proper minister of the sacrament. The second is the case of those who are excommunicated when the inferior priest cannot absolve a penitent through the latter being excommunicated by his superior. The third case is when he finds that an irregularity has been contracted, for the dispensation of which he has to have recourse to his superior. The fourth is the case of arson. The fifth is when it is the custom in a diocese for the more heinous crimes to be reserved to the bishop, in order to inspire fear, because custom in these cases either gives the power or takes it away.

Reply to Objection 1: In this case the priest should not hear the confession of his accomplice, with regard to that particular sin, but must refer her to another: nor should she confess to him but should ask permission to go to another, or should have recourse to his superior if he refused, both on account of the danger, and for the sake of less shame. If, however, he were to absolve her it would be valid*: because when Augustine says that they should not be guilty of the same sin, he is speaking of what is congruous, not of what is essential to the sacrament. [*Benedict XIV declared the absolution of an accomplice “in materia turpi” to be invalid.]

Reply to Objection 2: Penance delivers man from all defects of guilt, but not from all defects of punishment, since even after doing penance for murder, a man remains irregular. Hence a priest can absolve from a crime, but for the remission of the punishment he must refer the penitent to the superior, except in the case of excommunication, absolution from which should precede absolution from sin, for as long as a man is excommunicated, he cannot receive any sacrament of the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: This objection considers those cases in which superiors reserve the power of jurisdiction to themselves.

Whether a man can use the keys with regard to his superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot use the keys in respect of a superior. For every sacramental act requires its proper matter. Now the proper matter for the use of the keys, is a person who is subject, as stated above ([4880]Q[19], A[6]). Therefore a priest cannot use the keys in respect of one who is not his subject.

Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant is an image of the Church Triumphant. Now in the heavenly Church an inferior angel never cleanses, enlightens or perfects a higher angel. Therefore neither can an inferior priest exercise on a superior a hierarchical action such as absolution.

Objection 3: Further, the judgment of Penance should be better regulated than the judgment of an external court. Now in the external court an inferior cannot excommunicate or absolve his superior. Therefore, seemingly, neither can he do so in the penitential court.

On the contrary, The higher prelate is also "compassed with infirmity," and may happen to sin. Now the power of the keys is the remedy for sin. Therefore, since he cannot use the key on himself, for he cannot be both judge and accused at the same time, it seems that an inferior can use the power of the keys on him.

Further, absolution which is given through the power of the keys, is ordained to the reception of the Eucharist. But an inferior can give Communion to his superior, if the latter asks him to. Therefore he can use the power of the keys on him if he submit to him.

I answer that, The power of the keys, considered in itself, is applicable to all, as stated above [4881](A[2]): and that a priest is unable to use the keys on some particular person is due to his power being limited to certain individuals. Therefore he who limited his power can extend it to whom he wills, so that he can give him power over himself, although he cannot use the power of the keys on himself, because this power requires to be exercised on a subject, and therefore on someone else, for no man can be subject to himself.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the bishop whom a simple priest absolves is his superior absolutely speaking, yet he is beneath him in so far as he submits himself as a sinner to him.

Reply to Objection 2: In the angels there can be no defect by reason of which the higher angel can submit to the lower, such as there can happen to be among men; and so there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: External judgment is according to men, whereas the judgment of confession is according to God, in Whose sight a man is lessened by sinning, which is not the case in human prelacy. Therefore just as in external judgment no man can pass sentence of excommunication on himself, so neither can he empower another to excommunicate him. On the other hand, in the tribunal of conscience he can give another the power to absolve him, though he cannot use that power himself.

It may also be replied that absolution in the tribunal of the confessional belongs principally to the power of the keys and consequently to the power of jurisdiction, whereas excommunication regards jurisdiction exclusively. And, as to the power of orders, all are equal, but not as to jurisdiction. Wherefore there is no comparison.

OF THE DEFINITION, CONGRUITY AND CAUSE OF EXCOMMUNICATION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now treat of excommunication: we shall consider: (1) the definition, congruity and cause of excommunication; (2) who has the power to excommunicate; (3) communication with excommunicated persons; (4) absolution from excommunication.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether excommunication is suitably defined?

(2) Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?

(3) Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?

(4) Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?

Whether excommunication is suitably defined as separation from the communion of the Church, etc?

Objection 1: It would seem that excommunication is unsuitably defined by some thus: “Excommunication is separation from the communion of the Church, as to fruit and general suffrages.” For the suffrages of the Church avail for those for whom they are offered. But the Church prays for those who are outside the Church, as, for instance, for heretics and pagans. Therefore she prays also for the excommunicated, since they are outside the Church, and so the suffrages of the Church avail for them.

Objection 2: Further, no one loses the suffrages of the Church except by his own fault. Now excommunication is not a fault, but a punishment. Therefore excommunication does not deprive a man of the general suffrages of the Church.

Objection 3: Further, the fruit of the Church seems to be the same as the Church’s suffrages, for it cannot mean the fruit of temporal goods, since excommunication does not deprive a man of these. Therefore there is no reason for mentioning both.

Objection 4: Further, there is a kind of excommunication called minor*, by which man is not deprived of the suffrages of the Church. [*Minor excommunication is no longer recognized by Canon Law.] Therefore this definition is unsuitable.

I answer that, When a man enters the Church by Baptism, he is admitted to two things, viz. the body of the faithful and the participation of the sacraments: and this latter presupposes the former, since the faithful are united together in the participation of the sacraments. Consequently a person may be expelled from the Church in two ways. First, by being deprived merely of the participation of the sacraments, and this is the minor excommunication. Secondly, by being deprived of both, and this is the major excommunication, of which the above is the definition. Nor can there be a third, consisting in the privation of communion with the faithful, but not of the participation of the sacraments, for the reason already given, because, to wit, the faithful communicate together in the sacraments. Now communion with the faithful is twofold. One consists in spiritual things, such as their praying for one another, and meeting together for the reception of sacred things; while another consists in certain legitimate bodily actions. These different manners of communion are signified in the verse which declares that those who are excommunicate are deprived of—

“os, orare, vale, communio, mensa.”

“Os,” i.e. we must not give them tokens of goodwill; “orare,” i.e. we must not pray with them; “vale,” we must not give them marks of respect; “communio,” i.e. we must not communicate with them in the sacraments; “mensa,” i.e. we must not take meals with them. Accordingly the above definition includes privation of the sacraments in the words “as to the fruit,” and from partaking together with the faithful in spiritual things, in the words, “and the general prayers of the Church.”

Another definition is given which expresses the privation of both kinds of acts, and is as follows: “Excommunication is the privation of all lawful communion with the faithful.”

Reply to Objection 1: Prayers are said for unbelievers, but they do not receive the fruit of those prayers unless they be converted to the faith. In like manner prayers may be offered up for those who are excommunicated, but not among the prayers that are said for the members of the Church. Yet they do not receive the fruit so long as they remain under the excommunication, but prayers are said for them that they may receive the spirit of repentance, so that they may be loosed from excommunication.

Reply to Objection 2: One man’s prayers profit another in so far as they can reach to him. Now the action of one man may reach to another in two ways. First, by virtue of charity which unites all the faithful, making them one in God, according to Ps. 118:63: “I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee.” Now excommunication does not interrupt this union, since no man can be justly excommunicated except for a mortal sin, whereby a man is already separated from charity, even without being excommunicated. An unjust excommunication cannot deprive a man of charity, since this is one of the greatest of all goods, of which a man cannot be deprived against his will. Secondly, through the intention of the one who prays, which intention is directed to the person he prays for, and this union is interrupted by excommunication, because by passing sentence of excommunication, the Church severs a man from the whole body of the faithful, for whom she prays. Hence those prayers of the Church which are offered up for the whole Church, do not profit those who are excommunicated. Nor can prayers be said for them among the members of the Church as speaking in the Church’s name, although a private individual may say a prayer with the intention of offering it for their conversion.

Reply to Objection 3: The spiritual fruit of the Church is derived not only from her prayers, but also from the sacraments received and from the faithful dwelling together.

Reply to Objection 4: The minor excommunication does not fulfill all the conditions of excommunication but only a part of them, hence the definition of excommunication need not apply to it in every respect, but only in some.

Whether the Church should excommunicate anyone?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Church ought not to excommunicate anyone, because excommunication is a kind of curse, and we are forbidden to curse (Rom. 12:14). Therefore the Church should not excommunicate.

Objection 2: Further, the Church Militant should imitate the Church Triumphant. Now we read in the epistle of Jude (verse 9) that “when Michael the Archangel disputing with the devil contended about the body of Moses, he durst not bring against him the judgment of railing speech, but said: The Lord command thee.” Therefore the Church Militant ought not to judge any man by cursing or excommunicating him.

Objection 3: Further, no man should be given into the hands of his enemies, unless there be no hope for him. Now by excommunication a man is given into the hands of Satan, as is clear from 1 Cor. 5:5. Since then we should never give up hope about anyone in this life, the Church should not excommunicate anyone.

On the contrary, The Apostle (1 Cor. 5:5) ordered a man to be excommunicated.

Further, it is written (Mat. 18:17) about the man who refuses to hear the Church: “Let him be to thee as the heathen or publican.” But heathens are outside the Church. Therefore they also who refuse to hear the Church, should be banished from the Church by excommunication.

I answer that, The judgment of the Church should be conformed to the judgment of God. Now God punishes the sinner in many ways, in order to draw him to good, either by chastising him with stripes, or by leaving him to himself so that being deprived of those helps whereby he was kept out of evil, he may acknowledge his weakness, and humbly return to God Whom he had abandoned in his pride. In both these respects the Church by passing sentence of excommunication imitates the judgment of God. For by severing a man from the communion of the faithful that he may blush with shame, she imitates the judgment whereby God chastises man with stripes; and by depriving him of prayers and other spiritual things, she imitates the judgment of God in leaving man to himself, in order that by humility he may learn to know himself and return to God.

Reply to Objection 1: A curse may be pronounced in two ways: first, so that the intention of the one who curses is fixed on the evil which he invokes or pronounces, and cursing in this sense is altogether forbidden. Secondly, so that the evil which a man invokes in cursing is intended for the good of the one who is cursed, and thus cursing is sometimes lawful and salutary: thus a physician makes a sick man undergo pain, by cutting him, for instance, in order to deliver him from his sickness.

Reply to Objection 2: The devil cannot be brought to repentance, wherefore the pain of excommunication cannot do him any good.

Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that a man is deprived of the prayers of the Church, he incurs a triple loss, corresponding to the three things which a man acquires through the Church’s prayers. For they bring an increase of grace to those who have it, or merit grace for those who have it not; and in this respect the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. iv, D, 18): “The grace of God is taken away by excommunication.” They also prove a safeguard of virtue; and in this respect he says that “protection is taken away,” not that the excommunicated person is withdrawn altogether from God’s providence, but that he is excluded from that protection with which He watches over the children of the Church in a more special way. Moreover, they are useful as a defense against the enemy, and in this respect he says that “the devil receives greater power of assaulting the excommunicated person, both spiritually and corporally.” Hence in the early Church, when men had to be enticed to the faith by means of outward signs (thus the gift of the Holy Ghost was shown openly by a visible sign), so too excommunication was evidenced by a person being troubled in his body by the devil. Nor is it unreasonable that one, for whom there is still hope, be given over to the enemy, for he is surrendered, not unto damnation, but unto correction, since the Church has the power to rescue him from the hands of the enemy, whenever he is willing.

Whether anyone should be excommunicated for inflicting temporal harm?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man should be excommunicated for inflicting a temporal harm. For the punishment should not exceed the fault. But the punishment of excommunication is the privation of a spiritual good, which surpasses all temporal goods. Therefore no man should be excommunicated for temporal injuries.

Objection 2: Further, we should render to no man evil for evil, according to the precept of the Apostle (Rom. 12:17). But this would be rendering evil for evil, if a man were to be excommunicated for doing such an injury. Therefore this ought by no means to be done.

On the contrary, Peter sentenced Ananias and Saphira to death for keeping back the price of their piece of land (Acts 5:1–10). Therefore it is lawful for the Church to excommunicate for temporal injuries.

I answer that, By excommunication the ecclesiastical judge excludes a man, in a sense, from the kingdom. Wherefore, since he ought not to exclude from the kingdom others than the unworthy, as was made clear from the definition of the keys ([4882]Q[17], A[2]), and since no one becomes unworthy, unless, through committing a mortal sin, he lose charity which is the way leading to the kingdom, it follows that no man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. And since by injuring a man in his body or in his temporalities, one may sin mortally and act against charity, the Church can excommunicate a man for having inflicted temporal injury on anyone. Yet, as excommunication is the most severe punishment, and since punishments are intended as remedies, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. ii), and again since a prudent physician begins with lighter and less risky remedies, therefore excommunication should not be inflicted, even for a mortal sin, unless the sinner be obstinate, either by not coming up for judgment, or by going away before judgment is pronounced, or by failing to obey the decision of the court. For then, if, after due warning, he refuse to obey, he is reckoned to be obstinate, and the judge, not being able to proceed otherwise against him, must excommunicate him.

Reply to Objection 1: A fault is not measured by the extent of the damage a man does, but by the will with which he does it, acting against charity. Wherefore, though the punishment of excommunication exceeds the harm done, it does not exceed the measure of the sin.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is corrected by being punished, evil is not rendered to him, but good: since punishments are remedies, as stated above.

Whether an excommunication unjustly pronounced has any effect?

Objection 1: It would seem that an excommunication which is pronounced unjustly has no effect at all. Because excommunication deprives a man of the protection and grace of God, which cannot be forfeited unjustly. Therefore excommunication has no effect if it be unjustly pronounced.

Objection 2: Further, Jerome says (on Mat. 16:19: “I will give to thee the keys”): “It is a pharisaical severity to reckon as really bound or loosed, that which is bound or loosed unjustly.” But that severity was proud and erroneous. Therefore an unjust excommunication has no effect.

On the contrary, According to Gregory (Hom. xxvi in Evang.), “the sentence of the pastor is to be feared whether it be just or unjust.” Now there would be no reason to fear an unjust excommunication if it did not hurt. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, An excommunication may be unjust for two reasons. First, on the part of its author, as when anyone excommunicates through hatred or anger, and then, nevertheless, the excommunication takes effect, though its author sins, because the one who is excommunicated suffers justly, even if the author act wrongly in excommunicating him. Secondly, on the part of the excommunication, through there being no proper cause, or through the sentence being passed without the forms of law being observed. In this case, if the error, on the part of the sentence, be such as to render the sentence void, this has no effect, for there is no excommunication; but if the error does not annul the sentence, this takes effect, and the person excommunicated should humbly submit (which will be credited to him as a merit), and either seek absolution from the person who has excommunicated him, or appeal to a higher judge. If, however, he were to contemn the sentence, he would “ipso facto” sin mortally.

But sometimes it happens that there is sufficient cause on the part of the excommunicator, but not on the part of the excommunicated, as when a man is excommunicated for a crime which he has not committed, but which has been proved against him: in this case, if he submit humbly, the merit of his humility will compensate him for the harm of excommunication.

Reply to Objection 1: Although a man cannot lose God’s grace unjustly, yet he can unjustly lose those things which on our part dispose us to receive grace. for instance, a man may be deprived of the instruction which he ought to have. It is in this sense that excommunication is said to deprive a man of God’s grace, as was explained above (A[2], ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2: Jerome is speaking of sin not of its punishments, which can be inflicted unjustly by ecclesiastical superiors.

OF THOSE WHO CAN EXCOMMUNICATE OR BE EXCOMMUNICATED (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who can excommunicate or be excommunicated. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every priest can excommunicate?

(2) Whether one who is not a priest can excommunicate?

(3) Whether one who is excommunicated or suspended, can excommunicate?

(4) Whether anyone can excommunicate himself, or an equal, or a superior?

(5) Whether a multitude can be excommunicated?

(6) Whether one who is already excommunicated can be excommunicated again?

Whether every priest can excommunicate?

Objection 1: It would seem that every priest can excommunicate. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But every priest has the keys. Therefore every priest can excommunicate.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to loose and bind in the tribunal of penance than in the tribunal of judgment. But every priest can loose and bind his subjects in the tribunal of Penance. Therefore every priest can excommunicate his subjects.

On the contrary, Matters fraught with danger should be left to the decision of superiors. Now the punishment of excommunication is fraught with many dangers, unless it be inflicted with moderation. Therefore it should not be entrusted to every priest.

I answer that, In the tribunal of conscience the plea is between man and God, whereas in the outward tribunal it is between man and man. Wherefore the loosing or binding of one man in relation to God alone, belongs to the tribunal of Penance, whereas the binding or loosing of a man in relation to other men, belongs to the public tribunal of external judgment. And since excommunication severs a man from the communion of the faithful, it belongs to the external tribunal. Consequently those alone can excommunicate who have jurisdiction in the judicial tribunal. Hence, of their own authority, only bishops and higher prelates, according to the more common opinion can excommunicate, whereas parish priests can do so only by commission or in certain cases, as those of theft, rapine and the like, in which the law allows them to excommunicate. Others, however, have maintained that even parish priests can excommunicate: but the former opinion is more reasonable.

Reply to Objection 1: Excommunication is an act of the keys not directly, but with respect to the external judgment. The sentence of excommunication, however, though it is promulgated by an external verdict, still, as it belongs somewhat to the entrance to the kingdom, in so far as the Church Militant is the way to the Church Triumphant, this jurisdiction whereby a man is competent to excommunicate, can be called a key. It is in this sense that some distinguish between the key of orders, which all priests have, and the key of jurisdiction in the tribunal of judgment, which none have but the judges of the external tribunal. Nevertheless God bestowed both on Peter (Mat. 16:19), from whom they are derived by others, whichever of them they have.

Reply to Objection 2: Parish priests have jurisdiction indeed over their subjects, in the tribunal of conscience, but not in the judicial tribunal, for they cannot summons them in contentious cases. Hence they cannot excommunicate, but they can absolve them in the tribunal of Penance. And though the tribunal of Penance is higher, yet more solemnity is requisite in the judicial tribunal, because therein it is necessary to make satisfaction not only to God but also to man.

Whether those who are not priests can excommunicate?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are not priests cannot excommunicate. Because excommunication is an act of the keys, as stated in Sent. iv, D, 18. But those who are not priests have not the keys. Therefore they cannot excommunicate.

Objection 2: Further, more is required for excommunication than for absolution in the tribunal of Penance. But one who is not a priest cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Neither therefore can he excommunicate.

On the contrary, Archdeacons, legates and bishops-elect excommunicate, and yet sometimes they are not priests. Therefore not only priests can excommunicate.

I answer that, Priests alone are competent to dispense the sacraments wherein grace is given: wherefore they alone can loose and bind in the tribunal of Penance. On the other hand excommunication regards grace, not directly but consequently, in so far as it deprives a man of the Church’s prayers, by which he is disposed for grace or preserved therein. Consequently even those who are not priests, provided they have jurisdiction in a contentious court, can excommunicate.

Reply to Objection 1: Though they have not the key of orders, they have the key of jurisdiction.

Reply to Objection 2: These two are related to one another as something exceeding and something exceeded [*Cf. A[1], a[2];[4883] Q[24], A[1], ad 1], and consequently one of them may be within the competency of someone while the other is not.

Whether a man who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate another. For such a one has lost neither orders nor jurisdiction, since neither is he ordained anew when he is absolved, nor is his jurisdiction renewed. But excommunication requires nothing more than orders or jurisdiction. Therefore even one who is excommunicated or suspended can excommunicate.

Objection 2: Further. it is a greater thing to consecrate the body of Christ than to excommunicate. But such persons can consecrate. Therefore they can excommunicate.

On the contrary, one whose body is bound cannot bind another. But spiritual gyves are stronger than bodily fetters. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot excommunicate another, since excommunication is a spiritual chain.

I answer that, Jurisdiction can only be used in relation to another man. Consequently, since every excommunicated person is severed from the communion of the faithful, he is deprived of the use of jurisdiction. And as excommunication requires jurisdiction, an excommunicated person cannot excommunicate, and the same reason applies to one who is suspended from jurisdiction. For if he be suspended from orders only, then he cannot exercise his order, but he can use his jurisdiction, while, on the other hand, if he be suspended from jurisdiction and not from orders. he cannot use his jurisdiction, though he can exercise his order: and if he be suspended from both, he can exercise neither.

Reply to Objection 1: Although an excommunicated or suspended person does not lose his jurisdiction, yet he does lose its use.

Reply to Objection 2: The power of consecration results from the power of the character which is indelible, wherefore, from the very fact that a man has the character of order, he can always consecrate, though not always lawfully. It is different with the power of excommunication which results from jurisdiction, for this can be taken away and bound.

Whether a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or his superior. For an angel of God was greater than Paul, according to Mat. 11:11: “He that is lesser in the kingdom of heaven is greater then he, a greater” than whom “hath not risen among men that are born of women.” Now Paul excommunicated an angel from heaven (Gal. 1:8). Therefore a man can excommunicate his superior.

Objection 2: Further, sometimes a priest pronounces a general excommunication for theft or the like. But it might happen that he, or his equal, or a superior has done such things. Therefore a man can excommunicate himself, his equal, or a superior.

Objection 3: Further, a man can absolve his superior or his equal in the tribunal of Penance, as when a bishop confesses to his subject, or one priest confesses venial sins to another. Therefore it seems that a man may also excommunicate his superior, or his equal.

On the contrary, Excommunication is an act of jurisdiction. But no man has jurisdiction over himself (since one cannot be both judge and defendant in the same trial), or over his superior, or over an equal. Therefore a man cannot excommunicate his superior, or his equal, or himself.

I answer that, Since, by jurisdiction, a man is placed above those over whom he has jurisdiction, through being their judge, it follows that no man has jurisdiction over himself, his superior, or his equal, and that, consequently, no one can excommunicate either himself, or his superior, or his equal.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking hypothetically, i.e. supposing an angel were to sin, for in that case he would not be higher than the Apostle, but lower. Nor is it absurd that, if the antecedent of a conditional sentence be impossible, the consequence be impossible also.

Reply to Objection 2: In that case no one would be excommunicated, since no man has power over his peer.

Reply to Objection 3: Loosing and binding in the tribunal of confession affects our relation to God only, in Whose sight a man from being above another sinks below him through sin; while on the other hand excommunication is the affair of an external tribunal in which a man does not forfeit his superiority on account of sin. Hence there is no comparison between the two tribunals. Nevertheless, even in the tribunal of confession, a man cannot absolve himself, or his superior, or his equal, unless the power to do so be committed to him. This does not apply to venial sins, because they can be remitted through any sacraments which confer grace, hence remission of venial sins follows the power of orders.

Whether a sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men?

Objection 1: It would seem that sentence of excommunication can be passed on a body of men. Because it is possible for a number of people to be united together in wickedness. Now when a man is obstinate in his wickedness he should be excommunicated. Therefore a body of men can be excommunicated.

Objection 2: Further, the most grievous effect of an excommunication is privation of the sacraments of the Church. But sometimes a whole country is laid under an interdict. Therefore a body of people can be excommunicated.

On the contrary, A gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Ep. ccl] on Mat. 12 asserts that the sovereign and a body of people cannot be excommunicated.

I answer that, No man should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now sin consists in an act: and acts do not belong to communities, but, generally speaking, to individuals. Wherefore individual members of a community can be excommunicated, but not the community itself. And although sometimes an act belongs to a whole multitude, as when many draw a boat, which none of them could draw by himself, yet it is not probable that a community would so wholly consent to evil that there would be no dissentients. Now God, Who judges all the earth, does not condemn the just with the wicked (Gn. 18:25). Therefore the Church, who should imitate the judgments of God, prudently decided that a community should not be excommunicated, lest the wheat be uprooted together with the tares and cockle.

The Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: Suspension is not so great a punishment as excommunication, since those who are suspended are not deprived of the prayers of the Church, as the excommunicated are. Wherefore a man can be suspended without having committed a sin himself, just as a whole kingdom is laid under an interdict on account of the king's crime. Hence there is no comparison between excommunication and suspension.

Whether a man can be excommunicated who is already under sentence of excommunication?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man who is already under sentence of excommunication cannot be excommunicated any further. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 5:12): "What have I to do to judge them that are without?" Now those who are excommunicated are already outside the Church. Therefore the Church cannot exercise any further judgment on them, so as to excommunicate them again.

Objection 2: Further, excommunication is privation of divine things and of the communion of the faithful. But when a man has been deprived of a thing, he cannot be deprived of it again. Therefore one who is excommunicated cannot be excommunicated again

On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment and a healing medicine. Now punishments and medicines are repeated when necessary. Therefore excommunication can be repeated.

I answer that, A man who is under sentence of one excommunication, can be excommunicated again, either by a repetition of the same excommunication, for his greater confusion, so that he may renounce sin, or for some other cause. And then there are as many principal excommunications, as there are causes for his being excommunicated.

Reply to Objection 1: The Apostle is speaking of heathens and of other unbelievers who have no (sacramental) character, whereby they are numbered among the people of God. But since the baptismal character whereby a man is numbered among God's people, is indelible, one who is baptized always belongs to the Church in some way, so that the Church is always competent to sit in judgment on him.

Reply to Objection 2: Although privation does not receive more or less in itself, yet it can, as regards its cause. In this way an excommunication can be repeated, and a man who has been excommunicated several times is further from the Church's prayers than one who has been excommunicated only once.

OF COMMUNICATION WITH EXCOMMUNICATED PERSONS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider communication with those who are excommunicated. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful to communicate in matters purely corporal with one who is excommunicated?

(2) Whether one who communicates with an excommunicated person is excommunicated?

(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in matters not permitted by law?

Whether it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is lawful, in matters purely corporal, to communicate with an excommunicated person. For excommunication is an act of the keys. But the power of the keys extends only to spiritual matters. Therefore excommunication does not prevent one from communicating with another in matters corporal.

Objection 2: Further, "What is instituted for the sake of charity, does not militate against charity" (Cf.[4884] Q[11], A[1], OBJ[1]). But we are bound by the precept of charity to succor our enemies, which is impossible without some sort of communication. Therefore it is lawful to communicate with an excommunicated person in corporal matters.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 5:11): "With such an one not so much as to eat."

I answer that, Excommunication is twofold: there is minor excommunication, which deprives a man merely of a share in the sacraments, but not of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is lawful to communicate with a person lying under an excommunication of this kind, but not to give him the sacraments. The other is major excommunication which deprives a man of the sacraments of the Church and of the communion of the faithful. Wherefore it is not lawful to communicate with one who lies under such an excommunication. But, since the Church resorts to excommunication to repair and not to destroy, exception is made from this general law, in certain matters wherein communication is lawful, viz. in those which concern salvation, for one is allowed to speak of such matters with an excommunicated person; and one may even speak of other matters so as to put him at his ease and to make the words of salvation more acceptable. Moreover exception is made in favor of certain people whose business it is to be in attendance on the excommunicated person, viz. his wife, child, slave, vassal or subordinate. This, however, is to be understood of children who have not attained their majority, else they are forbidden to communicate with their father: and as to the others, the exception applies to them if they have entered his service before his excommunication, but not if they did so afterwards.

Some understand this exception to apply in the opposite way, viz. that the master can communicate with his subjects: while others hold the contrary. At any rate it is lawful for them to communicate with others in matters wherein they are under an obligation to them, for just as subjects are bound to serve their master, so is the master bound to look after his subjects. Again certain cases are excepted; as when the fact of the excommunication is unknown, or in the case of strangers or travelers in the country of those who are excommunicated, for they are allowed to buy from them, or to receive alms from them. Likewise if anyone were to see an excommunicated person in distress: for then he would be bound by the precept of charity to assist him. These are all contained in the following line: “Utility, law, lowliness, ignorance of fact, necessity,” where “utility” refers to salutary words, “law” to marriage, “lowliness” to subjection. The others need no explanation.

Reply to Objection 1: Corporal matters are subordinate to spiritual matters. Wherefore the power which extends to spiritual things, can also extend to matters touching the body: even as the art which considers the end commands in matters ordained to the end.

Reply to Objection 2: In a case where one is bound by the precept of charity to hold communication, the prohibition ceases, as is clear from what has been said.

Whether a person incurs excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated?

Objection 1: It would seem that a person does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated. For a heathen or a Jew is more separated from the Church than a person who is excommunicated. But one does not incur excommunication for communicating with a heathen or a Jew. Neither, therefore, does one for communicating with an excommunicated Christian.

Objection 2: Further, if a man incurs excommunication for communicating with an excommunicated person, for the same reason a third would incur excommunication for communicating with him, and thus one might go on indefinitely, which would seem absurd. Therefore one does not incur excommunication for communicating with one who is excommunicated.

On the contrary, An excommunicated person is banished from communion. Therefore whoever communicates with him leaves the communion of the Church: and hence he seems to be excommunicated.

I answer that, A person may incur excommunication in two ways. First, so that the excommunication includes both himself and whosoever communicates with him: and then, without any doubt, whoever communicates with him, incurs a major excommunication. Secondly, so that the excommunication is simply pronounced on him; and then a man may communicate with him either in his crime, by counsel, help or favor, in which case again he incurs the major excommunication, or he may communicate with him in other things by speaking to him, greeting him, or eating with him, in which case he incurs the minor excommunication.

Reply to Objection 1: The Church has no intention of correcting unbelievers as well as the faithful who are under her care: hence she does not sever those, whom she excommunicates, from the fellowship of unbelievers, as she does from the communion of the faithful over whom she exercises a certain power.

Reply to Objection 2: It is lawful to hold communion with one who has incurred a minor excommunication, so that excommunication does not pass on to a third person.

Whether it is always a mortal sin to communicate with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person in other cases than those in which it is allowed. Because a certain decretal (Cap. Sacris: De his quae vi, metuve, etc.) declares that “not even through fear of death should anyone hold communion with an excommunicated person, since one ought to die rather than commit a mortal sin.” But this would be no reason unless it were always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, it is a mortal sin to act against a commandment of the Church. But the Church forbids anyone to hold communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

Objection 3: Further, no man is debarred from receiving the Eucharist on account of a venial sin. But a man who holds communion with an excommunicated person, outside those cases in which it is allowed, is debarred from receiving the Eucharist, since he incurs a minor excommunication. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, save in those cases in which it is allowed.

Objection 4: Further, no one should incur a major excommunication save for a mortal sin. Now according to the law (Can. Praecipue, seqq., caus. xi) a man may incur a major excommunication for holding communion with an excommunicated person. Therefore it is a mortal sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated.

On the contrary, None can absolve a man from mortal sin unless he have jurisdiction over him. But any priest can absolve a man for holding communion with those who are excommunicated. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

Further, the measure of the penalty should be according to the measure of the sin, as stated in Dt. 25:3. Now the punishment appointed by common custom for holding communion with an excommunicated person is not that which is inflicted for mortal sin, but rather that which is due for venial sin. Therefore it is not a mortal sin.

I answer that, Some hold that it is always a mortal sin to hold communion with an excommunicated person, by word or in any of the forbidden ways mentioned above [4885](A[2]), except in those cases allowed by law (Cap. Quoniam). But since it seems very hard that a man should be guilty of a mortal sin by uttering just a slight word to an excommunicated person, and that by excommunicating a person one would endanger the salvation of many, and lay a snare which might turn to one’s own hurt, it seems to others more probable that he is not always guilty of a mortal sin, but only when he holds communion with him in a criminal deed, or in an act of Divine worship, or through contempt of the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: This decretal is speaking of holding communion in Divine worship. It may also be replied that the same reason applies both to mortal and venial sin, since just as one cannot do well by committing a mortal sin, so neither can one by committing a venial sin: so that just as it is a man’s duty to suffer death rather than commit a mortal sin, so is it his duty to do so sooner than commit a venial sin, inasmuch as it is his duty to avoid venial sin.

Reply to Objection 2: The commandment of the Church regards spiritual matters directly, and legitimate actions as a consequence: hence by holding communion in Divine worship one acts against the commandment, and commits a mortal sin; but by holding communion in other matters, one acts beside the commandment, and sins venially.

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a man is debarred from the Eucharist even without his own fault, as in the case of those who are suspended or under an interdict, because these penalties are sometimes inflicted on one person for the sin of another who is thus punished.

Reply to Objection 4: Although it is a venial sin to hold communion with one who is excommunicated, yet to do so obstinately is a mortal sin: and for this reason one may be excommunicated according to the law.

OF ABSOLUTION FROM EXCOMMUNICATION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider absolution from excommunication: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?

(2) Whether a man can be absolved from excommunication against his will?

(3) Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from another?

Whether any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication?

Objection 1: It would seem that any priest can absolve his subject from excommunication. For the chains of sin are stronger than those of excommunication. But any priest can absolve his subject from sin. Therefore much more can he absolve him from excommunication.

Objection 2: Further, if the cause is removed the effect is removed. But the cause of excommunication is a mortal sin. Therefore since any priest can absolve (his subject) from that mortal sin, he is able likewise to absolve him from the excommunication.

On the contrary, It belongs to the same power to excommunicate as to absolve from excommunication. But priests of inferior degree cannot excommunicate their subjects. Neither, therefore, can they absolve them.

I answer that, Anyone can absolve from minor excommunication who can absolve from the sin of participation in the sin of another. But in the case of a major excommunication, this is pronounced either by a judge, and then he who pronounced sentence or his superior can absolve—or it is pronounced by law, and then the bishop or even a priest can absolve except in the six cases which the Pope, who is the maker of laws, reserves to himself: the first is the case of a man who lays hands on a cleric or a religious; the second is of one who breaks into a church and is denounced for so doing; the third is of the man who sets fire to a church and is denounced for the deed; the fourth is of one who knowingly communicates in the Divine worship with those whom the Pope has excommunicated by name; the fifth is the case of one who tampers with the letters of the Holy See; the sixth is the case of one who communicates in a crime of one who is excommunicated. For he should not be absolved except by the person who excommunicated him, even though he be not subject to him, unless, by reason of the difficulty of appearing before him, he be absolved by the bishop or by his own priest, after binding himself by oath to submit to the command of the judge who pronounced the excommunication on him.

There are however eight exceptions to the first case: (1) In the hour of death, when a person can be absolved by any priest from any excommunication; (2) if the striker be the doorkeeper of a man in authority, and the blow be given neither through hatred nor of set purpose; (3) if the striker be a woman; (4) if the striker be a servant, whose master is not at fault and would suffer from his absence; (5) if a religious strike a religious, unless he strike him very grievously; (6) if the striker be a poor man; (7) if he be a minor, an old man, or an invalid; (8) if there be a deadly feud between them.

There are, besides, seven cases in which the person who strikes a cleric does not incur excommunication: (1) if he do it for the sake of discipline, as a teacher or a superior; (2) if it be done for fun; (3) if the striker find the cleric behaving with impropriety towards his wife his mother, his sister or his daughter; (4) if he return blow for blow at once; (5) if the striker be not aware that he is striking a cleric; (6) if the latter be guilty of apostasy after the triple admonition; (7) if the cleric exercise an act which is altogether contrary to the clerical life, e.g. if he become a soldier, or if he be guilty of bigamy [*Namely, that which is known by canonists as “similar bigamy”].

Reply to Objection 1: Although the chains of sin are in themselves greater than those of excommunication, yet in a certain respect the chains of excommunication are greater, inasmuch as they bind a man not only in the sight of God, but also in the eye of the Church. Hence absolution from excommunication requires jurisdiction in the external forum, whereas absolution from sin does not. Nor is there need of giving one’s word by oath, as in the case of absolution from excommunication, because, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 6:16), controversies between men are decided by oath.

Reply to Objection 2: As an excommunicated person has no share in the sacraments of the Church, a priest cannot absolve him from his guilt, unless he be first absolved from excommunication.

Whether anyone can be absolved against his will?

Objection 1: It would seem that no man can be absolved against his will. For spiritual things are not conferred on anyone against his will. Now absolution from excommunication is a spiritual favor. Therefore it cannot be granted to a man against his will.

Objection 2: Further, the cause of excommunication is contumacy. But when, through contempt of the excommunication, a man is unwilling to be absolved, he shows a high degree of contumacy. Therefore he cannot be absolved.

On the contrary, Excommunication can be pronounced on a man against his will. Now things that happen to a man against his will, can be removed from him against his will, as in the case of the goods of fortune. Therefore excommunication can be removed from a man against his will.

I answer that, Evil of fault and evil of punishment differ in this, that the origin of fault is within us, since all sin is voluntary, whereas the origin of punishment is sometimes without, since punishment does not need to be voluntary, in fact the nature of punishment is rather to be against the will. Wherefore, just as a man commits no sin except willingly, so no sin is forgiven him against his will. On the other hand just as a person can be excommunicated against his will, so can he be absolved therefrom.

Reply to Objection 1: The assertion is true of those spiritual goods which depend on our will, such as the virtues, which we cannot lose unwillingly; for knowledge, although a spiritual good, can be lost by a man against his will through sickness. Hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 2: It is possible for excommunication to be removed from a man even though he be contumacious, if it seem to be for the good of the man for whom the excommunication was intended as a medicine.

Whether a man can be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot be absolved from one excommunication without being absolved from all. For an effect should be proportionate to its cause. Now the cause of excommunication is a sin. Since then a man cannot be absolved from one sin without being absolved from all, neither can this happen as regards excommunication.

Objection 2: Further, absolution from excommunication is pronounced in the Church. But a man who is under the ban of one excommunication is outside the Church. Therefore so long as one remains, a man cannot be loosed from another.

On the contrary, Excommunication is a punishment. Now a man can be loosed from one punishment, while another remains. Therefore a man can be loosed from one excommunication and yet remain under another.

I answer that, Excommunications are not connected together in any way, and so it is possible for a man to be absolved from one, and yet remain under another.

It must be observed however that sometimes a man lies under several excommunications pronounced by one judge; and then, when he is absolved from one, he is understood to be absolved from all, unless the contrary be expressed, or unless he ask to be absolved from excommunication on one count only, whereas he was excommunicated under several. On the other hand sometimes a man lies under several sentences of excommunication pronounced by several judges; and then, when absolved from one excommunication, he is not therefore absolved from the others, unless at his prayer they all confirm his absolution, or unless they all depute one to absolve him.

Reply to Objection 1: All sins are connected together in aversion from God, which is incompatible with the forgiveness of sin: wherefore one sin cannot be forgiven without another. But excommunications have no such connection. Nor again is absolution from excommunication hindered by contrariety of the will, as stated above [4886](A[2]). Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as such a man was for several reasons outside the Church so is it possible for his separation to be removed on one count and to remain on another.

OF INDULGENCES (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider indulgence: (1) in itself; (2) those who grant indulgence; (3) those who receive it.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an indulgence remits any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?

(2) Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?

(3) Whether an indulgence should be granted for temporal assistance?

Whether an indulgence can remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence cannot remit any part of the punishment due for the satisfaction of sins. Because a gloss on 2 Tim. 2:13, “He cannot deny Himself,” says: “He would do this if He did not keep His word.” Now He said (Dt. 25:2): “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.” Therefore nothing can be remitted from the satisfactory punishment which is appointed according to the measure of sin.

Objection 2: Further, an inferior cannot absolve from an obligation imposed by his superior. But when God absolves us from sin He binds us to temporal punishment, as Hugh of St. Victor declares (Tract. vi Sum. Sent. [*Of doubtful authenticity]). Therefore no man can absolve from that punishment, by remitting any part of it.

Objection 3: Further, the granting of the sacramental effect without the sacraments belongs to the power of excellence. Now none but Christ has the power of excellence in the sacraments. Since then satisfaction is a part of the sacrament of Penance, conducing to the remission of the punishment due, it seems that no mere man can remit the debt of punishment without satisfaction.

Objection 4: Further, the power of the ministers of the Church was given them, not “unto destruction,” but “unto edification” (2 Cor. 10:8). But it would be conducive to destruction, if satisfaction, which was intended for our good, inasmuch as it serves for a remedy, were done away with. Therefore the power of the ministers of the Church does not extend to this.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 2:10): “For, what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ,” and a gloss adds: i.e. “as though Christ Himself had pardoned.” But Christ could remit the punishment of a sin without any satisfaction, as evidenced in the case of the adulterous woman (Jn. 8). Therefore Paul could do so likewise. Therefore the Pope can too, since his power in the Church is not less than Paul’s.

Further, the universal Church cannot err; since He Who “was heard for His reverence” (Heb. 5:7) said to Peter, on whose profession of faith the Church was founded (Lk. 22:32): “I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not.” Now the universal Church approves and grants indulgences. Therefore indulgences have some value.

I answer that, All admit that indulgences have some value, for it would be blasphemy to say that the Church does anything in vain. But some say that they do not avail to free a man from the debt of punishment which he has deserved in Purgatory according to God’s judgment, and that they merely serve to free him from the obligation imposed on him by the priest as a punishment for his sins, or from the canonical penalties he has incurred. But this opinion does not seem to be true. First, because it is expressly opposed to the privilege granted to Peter, to whom it was said (Mat. 16:19) that whatsoever he should loose on earth should be loosed also in heaven. Wherefore whatever remission is granted in the court of the Church holds good in the court of God. Moreover the Church by granting such indulgences would do more harm than good, since, by remitting the punishment she had enjoined on a man, she would deliver him to be punished more severely in Purgatory.

Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in the Church’s court and in the judgment of God, for the remission of the punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession, whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the merits of Christ: for though He acts through the sacraments, yet His efficacy is nowise restricted to them, but infinitely surpasses their efficacy.

Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above ([4887]Q[13], A[2]). And the saints in whom this super-abundance of satisfactions is found, did not perform their good works for this or that particular person, who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without any indulgence at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up “those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ . . . for His body, which is the Church” to whom he wrote (Col.

1:24). These merits, then, are the common property of the whole Church. Now those things which are the common property of a number are distributed to the various individuals according to the judgment of him who rules them all. Hence, just as one man would obtain the remission of his punishment if another were to satisfy for him, so would he too if another's satisfactions be applied to him by one who has the power to do so.

Reply to Objection 1: The remission which is granted by means of indulgences does not destroy the proportion between punishment and sin, since someone has spontaneously taken upon himself the punishment due for another's guilt, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: He who gains an indulgence is not, strictly speaking, absolved from the debt of punishment, but is given the means whereby he may pay it.

Reply to Objection 3: The effect of sacramental absolution is the removal of a man's guilt, an effect which is not produced by indulgences. But he who grants indulgences pays the debt of punishment which a man owes, out of the common stock of the Church's goods, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 4: Grace affords a better remedy for the avoidance of sin than does habituation to (good) works. And since he who gains an indulgence is disposed to grace through the love which he conceives for the cause for which the indulgence is granted, it follows that indulgences provide a remedy against sin. Consequently it is not harmful to grant indulgences unless this be done without discretion. Nevertheless those who gain indulgences should be advised, not, on this account, to omit the penitential works imposed on them, so that they may derive a remedy from these also, even though they may be quit of the debt of punishment; and all the more, seeing that they are often more in debt than they think.

Whether indulgences are as effective as they claim to be?

Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be. For indulgences have no effect save from the power of the keys. Now by the power of the keys, he who has that power can only remit some fixed part of the punishment due for sin, after taking into account the measure of the sin and of the penitent's sorrow. Since then indulgences depend on the mere will of the grantor, it seems that they are not as effective as they claim to be.

Objection 2: Further, the debt of punishment keeps man back from the attainment of glory, which he ought to desire above all things. Now, if indulgences are as effective as they claim to be, a man by setting himself to gain indulgences might become immune from all debt of temporal punishment. Therefore it would seem that a man ought to put aside all other kinds of works, and devote himself to gain indulgences.

Objection 3: Further, sometimes an indulgence whereby a man is remitted a third part of the punishment due for his sins is granted if he contribute towards the erection of a certain building. If, therefore, indulgences produce the effect which is claimed for them, he who gives a penny, and then another, and then again another, would obtain a plenary absolution from all punishment due for his sins, which seems absurd.

Objection 4: Further, sometimes an indulgence is granted, so that for visiting a church a man obtains a seven years' remission. If, then, an indulgence avails as much as is claimed for it a man who lives near that church, or the clergy attached thereto who go there every day, obtain as much indulgence as one who comes from a distance (which would appear unjust); moreover, seemingly, they would gain the indulgence several times a day, since they go there repeatedly.

Objection 5: Further, to remit a man's punishment beyond a just estimate seems to amount to the same as to remit it without reason; because in so far as he exceeds that estimate, he limits the compensation. Now he who grants an indulgence cannot without cause remit a man's punishment either wholly or partly, even though the Pope were to say to anyone: "I remit to all the punishment you owe for your sins." Therefore it seems that he cannot remit anything beyond the just estimate. Now indulgences are often published which exceed that just estimate. Therefore they do not avail as much as is claimed for them.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 13:7): "Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for Him?" Therefore the Church, in publishing indulgences, does not lie; and so they avail as much as is claimed for them.

Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:14): "If . . . our preaching is vain, your faith is also vain." Therefore whoever utters a falsehood in preaching, so far as he is concerned, makes faith void. and so sins mortally. If therefore indulgences are not as effective as they claim to be, all who publish indulgences would commit a mortal sin: which is absurd.

I answer that, on this point there are many opinions. For some maintain that indulgences have not the efficacy claimed for them, but that they simply avail each individual in proportion to his faith and devotion. And consequently those who maintain this, say that the Church publishes her indulgences in such a way as, by a kind of pious fraud, to induce men to do well, just as a mother entices her child to walk by holding out an apple. But this seems a very dangerous assertion to make. For as Augustine states (Ep. ad Hieron. lxxviii), “if any error were discovered in Holy Writ, the authority of Holy Writ would perish.” In like manner, if any error were to be found in the Church’s preaching, her doctrine would have no authority in settling questions of faith.

Hence others have maintained that indulgences avail as much as is claimed for them, according to a just estimate, not of him who grants it—who perhaps puts too high a value on it—nor of the recipient—for he may prize too highly the gift he receives, but a just estimate according to the estimate of good men who consider the condition of the person affected, and the utility and needs of the Church, for the Church’s needs are greater at one time than at another. Yet, neither, seemingly, can this opinion stand. First, because in that case indulgences would no longer be a remission, but rather a mere commutation. Moreover the preaching of the Church would not be excused from untruth, since, at times, indulgences are granted far in excess of the requirements of this just estimate, taking into consideration all the aforesaid conditions, as, for example, when the Pope granted to anyone who visited a certain church, an indulgence of seven years, which indulgence was granted by Blessed Gregory for the Roman Stations.

Hence others say that the quantity of remission accorded in an indulgence is not to be measured by the devotion of the recipient, as the first opinion suggested, nor according to the quantity of what is given, as the second opinion held; but according to the cause for which the indulgence is granted, and according to which a person is held deserving of obtaining such an indulgence. Thus according as a man approached near to that cause, so would he obtain remission in whole or in part. But neither will this explain the custom of the Church, who assigns, now a greater, now a lesser indulgence, for the same cause: thus, under the same circumstances, now a year's indulgence, now one of only forty days, according to the graciousness of the Pope, who grants the indulgence, is granted to those who visit a church. Wherefore the amount of the remission granted by the indulgence is not to be measured by the cause for which a person is worthy of an indulgence.

We must therefore say otherwise that the quantity of an effect is proportionate to the quantity of the cause. Now the cause of the remission of punishment effected by indulgences is no other than the abundance of the Church's merits, and this abundance suffices for the remission of all punishment. The effective cause of the remission is not the devotion, or toil, or gift of the recipient; nor, again, is it the cause for which the indulgence was granted. We cannot, then, estimate the quantity of the remission by any of the foregoing, but solely by the merits of the Church—and these are always superabundant. Consequently, according as these merits are applied to a person so does he obtain remission. That they should be so applied demands, firstly, authority to dispense this treasure. secondly, union between the recipient and Him Who merited it—and this is brought about by charity; thirdly, there is required a reason for so dispensing this treasury, so that the intention, namely, of those who wrought these meritorious works is safeguarded, since they did them for the honor of God and for the good of the Church in general. Hence whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence.

Hence, according to others, indulgences have precisely the efficacy claimed for them, provided that he who grants them have the authority, that the recipient have charity, and that, as regards the cause, there be piety which includes the honor of God and the profit of our neighbor. Nor in this view have we "too great a market of the Divine mercy" [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 20], as some maintain, nor again does it derogate from Divine justice, for no punishment is remitted, but the punishment of one is imputed to another.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4888]Q[19], A[3]) there are two keys, the key of orders and the key of jurisdiction. The key of orders is a sacramental: and as the effects of the sacraments are fixed, not by men but by God, the priest cannot decide in the tribunal of confession how much shall be remitted by means of the key of orders from the punishment due; it is God Who appoints the amount to be remitted. On the other hand the key of jurisdiction is not something sacramental, and its effect depends on a man's decision. The remission granted through indulgences is the effect of this key, since it does not belong to the dispensation of the sacraments, but to the distribution of the common property of the Church: hence it is that legates, even though they be not priests, can grant indulgences. Consequently the decision of how much punishment is to be remitted by an indulgence depends on the will of the one who grants that indulgence. If, however, he remits punishment without sufficient reason, so that men are enticed to substitute mere nothings, as it were, for works of penance, he sins by granting such indulgences, although the indulgence is gained fully.

Reply to Objection 2: Although indulgences avail much for the remission of punishment, yet works of satisfaction are more meritorious in respect of the essential reward, which infinitely transcends the remission of temporal punishment.

Reply to Objection 3: When an indulgence is granted in a general way to anyone that helps towards the building of a church, we must understand this to mean a help proportionate to the giver: and in so far as he approaches to this, he will gain the indulgence more or less fully. Consequently a poor man by giving one penny would gain the full indulgence, not so a rich man, whom it would not become to give so little to so holy and profitable a work; Just as a king would not be said to help a man if he gave him an "obol."

Reply to Objection 4: A person who lives near the church, and the priest and clergy of the church, gain the indulgence as much as those who come perhaps a distance of a thousand days' journey: because the remission, as stated above, is proportionate, not to the toil, but to the merits which are applied. Yet he who toils most gains most merit. This, however, is to be understood of those cases in which an indulgence is given in an undeterminate manner. For sometimes a distinction is expressed: thus the Pope at the time of general absolution grants an indulgence of five years to those who come from across the seas, and one of three years to those who come from across the mountains, to others an indulgence of one year. Nor does a person gain the indulgence each time he visits the church during the term of indulgence, because sometimes it is granted for a fixed time; thus when it is said, "Whoever visits such and such a church until such and such a day, shall gain so much indulgence," we must understand that it can be gained only once. on the other hand if there be a continual indulgence in a certain church, as the indulgence of forty days to be gained in the church of the Blessed Peter, then a person gains the indulgence as often as he visits the church.

Reply to Objection 5: An indulgence requires a cause, not as a measure of the remission of punishment, but in order that the intention of those whose merits are applied, may reach to this particular individual. Now one person's good is applied to another in two ways: first, by charity; and in this way, even without indulgences, a person shares in all the good deeds done, provided he have charity: secondly, by the intention of the person who does the good action; and in this way, provided there be a lawful cause, the intention of a person who has done something for the profit of the Church, may reach to some individual through indulgences.

Whether an indulgence ought to be granted for temporal help?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence ought not to be granted for temporal help. Because the remission of sins is something spiritual. Now to exchange a spiritual for a temporal thing is simony. Therefore this ought not to be done.

Objection 2: Further, spiritual assistance is more necessary than temporal. But indulgences do not appear to be granted for spiritual assistance. Much less therefore ought they to be granted for temporal help.

On the contrary, stands the common custom of the Church in granting indulgences for pilgrimages and almsgiving.

I answer that, Temporal things are subordinate to spiritual matters, since we must make use of temporal things on account of spiritual things. Consequently an indulgence must not be granted for the sake of temporal matters as such, but in so far as they are subordinate to spiritual things: such as the quelling of the Church's enemies, who disturb her peace; or such as the building of a church, of a bridge, and other forms of almsgiving. It is therefore evident that there is no simony in these transactions, since a spiritual thing is exchanged, not for a temporal but for a spiritual commodity.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: Indulgences can be, and sometimes are, granted even for purely spiritual matters. Thus Pope Innocent IV granted an indulgence of ten days to all who prayed for the king of France; and in like manner sometimes the same indulgence is granted to those who preach a crusade as to those who take part in it.

OF THOSE WHO CAN GRANT INDULGENCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who can grant indulgences: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?

(2) Whether a deacon or another, who is not a priest, can grant indulgences?

(3) Whether a bishop can grant them?

(4) Whether they can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

Whether every parish priest can grant indulgences?

Objection 1: It would seem that every parish priest can grant indulgences. For an indulgence derives its efficacy from the superabundance of the Church’s merits. Now there is no congregation without some superabundance of merits. Therefore every priest, who has charge of a congregation, can grant indulgences, and, in like manner, so can every prelate.

Objection 2: Further, every prelate stands for a multitude, just as an individual stands for himself. But any individual can assign his own goods to another and thus offer satisfaction for a third person. Therefore a prelate can assign the property of the multitude subject to him, and so it seems that he can grant indulgences.

On the contrary, To excommunicate is less than to grant indulgences. But a parish priest cannot do the former. Therefore he cannot do the latter.

I answer that, Indulgences are effective, in as much as the works of satisfaction done by one person are applied to another, not only by virtue of charity, but also by the intention of the person who did them being directed in some way to the person to whom they are applied. Now a person’s intention may be directed to another in three ways, specifically, generically and individually. Individually, as when one person offers satisfaction for another particular person; and thus anyone can apply his works to another. Specifically, as when a person prays for the congregation to which he belongs, for the members of his household, or for his benefactors, and directs his works of satisfaction to the same intention: in this way the superior of a congregation can apply those works to some other person, by applying the intention of those who belong to his congregation to some fixed individual. Generically, as when a person directs his works for the good of the Church in general; and thus he who presides over the whole Church can communicate those works, by applying his intention to this or that individual. And since a man is a member of a congregation, and a congregation is a part of the Church, hence the intention of private good includes the intention of the good of the congregation, and of the good of the whole Church. Therefore he who presides over the Church can communicate what belongs to an individual congregation or to an individual man: and he who presides over a congregation can communicate what belongs to an individual man, but not conversely. Yet neither the first nor the second communication is called an indulgence, but only the third; and this for two reasons. First, because, although those communications loose man from the debt of punishment in the sight of God, yet he is not freed from the obligation of fulfilling the satisfaction enjoined, to which he is bound by a commandment of the Church; whereas the third communication frees man even from this obligation. Secondly, because in one person or even in one congregation there is not such an unfailing supply of merits as to be sufficient both for the one person or congregation and for all others; and consequently the individual is not freed from the entire debt of punishment unless satisfaction is offered for him individually, to the very amount that he owes. On the other hand, in the whole Church there is an unfailing supply of merits, chiefly on account of the merit of Christ. Consequently he alone who is at the head of the Church can grant indulgences. Since, however, the Church is the congregation of the faithful, and since a congregation of men is of two kinds, the domestic, composed of members of the same family, and the civil, composed of members of the same nationality, the Church is like to a civil congregation, for the people themselves are called the Church; while the various assemblies, or parishes of one diocese are likened to a congregation in the various families and services. Hence a bishop alone is properly called a prelate of the Church, wherefore he alone, like a bridegroom, receives the ring of the Church. Consequently full power in the dispensation of the sacraments, and jurisdiction in the public tribunal, belong to him alone as the public person, but to others by delegation from him. Those priests who have charge of the people are not prelates strictly speaking, but assistants, hence, in consecrating priests the bishop says: “The more fragile we are, the more we need these assistants”: and for this reason they do not dispense all the sacraments. Hence parish priests, or abbots or other like prelates cannot grant indulgences.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether a deacon or another who is not a priest can grant an indulgence?

Objection 1: It would seem that a deacon, or one that is not a priest cannot grant an indulgence. Because remission of sins is an effect of the keys. Now none but a priest has the keys. Therefore a priest alone can grant indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, a fuller remission of punishment is granted by indulgences than by the tribunal of Penance. But a priest alone has power in the latter, and, therefore, he alone has power in the former.

On the contrary, The distribution of the Church’s treasury is entrusted to the same person as the government of the Church. Now this is entrusted sometimes to one who is not a priest. Therefore he can grant indulgences, since they derive their efficacy from the distribution of the Church’s treasury.

I answer that, The power of granting indulgences follows jurisdiction, as stated above ([4889]Q[25], A[2]). And since deacons and others, who are not priests, can have jurisdiction either delegated, as legates, or ordinary, as bishops-elect, it follows that even those who are not priests can grant indulgences, although they cannot absolve in the tribunal of Penance, since this follows the reception of orders. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, because the granting of indulgences belongs to the key of jurisdiction and not to the key of orders.

Whether a bishop can grant indulgences?

Objection 1: It would seem that even a bishop cannot grant indulgences. Because the treasury of the Church is the common property of the whole Church. Now the common property of the whole Church cannot be distributed save by him who presides over the whole Church. Therefore the Pope alone can grant indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, none can remit punishments fixed by law, save the one who has the power to make the law. Now punishments in satisfaction for sins are fixed by law. Therefore the Pope alone can remit these punishments, since he is the maker of the law.

On the contrary, stands the custom of the Church in accordance with which bishops grant indulgences.

I answer that, The Pope has the plenitude of pontifical power, being like a king in his kingdom: whereas the bishops are appointed to a share in his solicitude, like judges over each city. Hence them alone the Pope, in his letters, addresses as “brethren,” whereas he calls all others his “sons.” Therefore the plenitude of the power of granting indulgences resides in the Pope, because he can grant them, as he lists, provided the cause be a lawful one: while, in bishops, this power resides subject to the Pope’s ordination, so that they can grant them within fixed limits and not beyond.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether indulgences can be granted by one who is in mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences cannot be granted by one who is in mortal sin. For a stream can no longer flow if cut off from its source. Now the source of grace which is the Holy Ghost is cut off from one who is in mortal sin. Therefore such a one can convey nothing to others by granting indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater thing to grant an indulgence than to receive one. But one who is in mortal sin cannot receive an indulgence, as we shall show presently ([4890]Q[27], A[1]). Neither, therefore, can he grant one.

On the contrary, Indulgences are granted in virtue of the power conferred on the prelates of the Church. Now mortal sin takes away, not power but goodness. Therefore one who is in mortal sin can grant indulgences.

I answer that, The granting of indulgences belongs to jurisdiction. But a man does not, through sin, lose jurisdiction. Consequently indulgences are equally valid, whether they be granted by one who is in mortal sin, or by a most holy person; since he remits punishment, not by virtue of his own merits, but by virtue of the merits laid up in the Church's treasury.

Reply to Objection 1: The prelate who, while in a state of mortal sin, grants an indulgence, does not pour forth anything of his own, and so it is not necessary that he should receive an inflow from the source, in order that he may grant a valid indulgence.

Reply to Objection 2: Further, to grant an indulgence is more than to receive one, if we consider the power, but it is less, if we consider the personal profit.

OF THOSE WHOM INDULGENCES AVAIL (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider those whom indulgences avail: under which head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether indulgences avail those who are in mortal sin?

(2) Whether they avail religious?

(3) Whether they avail a person who does not fulfill the conditions for which the indulgence is given?

(4) Whether they avail him who grants them?

Whether an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence avails those who are in mortal sin. For one person can merit grace and many other good things for another, even though he be in mortal sin. Now indulgences derive their efficacy from the application of the saints' merits to an individual. Therefore they are effective in one who is in mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, the greater the need, the more room there is for pity. Now a man who is in mortal sin is in very great need. Therefore all the more should pity be extended to him by indulgence.

On the contrary, A dead member receives no inflow from the other members that are living. But one who is in mortal sin, is like a dead member. Therefore he receives no inflow, through indulgences, from the merits of living members.

I answer that, Some hold that indulgences avail those even who are in mortal sin, for the acquiring of grace, but not for the remission of their punishment, since none can be freed from punishment who is not yet freed from guilt. For he who has not yet been reached by God's operation unto the remission of guilt, cannot receive the remission of his punishment from the minister of the Church neither by indulgences nor in the tribunal of Penance.

But this opinion seems to be untrue. Because, although those merits which are applied by means of an indulgence, might possibly avail a person so that he could merit grace (by way of congruity and impetration), yet it is not for this reason that they are applied, but for the remission of punishment. Hence they do not avail those who are in mortal sin, and consequently, true contrition and confession are demanded as conditions for gaining all indulgences. If however the merits were applied by such a form as this: "I grant you a share in the merits of the whole Church—or of one congregation, or of one specified person," then they might avail a person in mortal sin so that he could merit something, as the foregoing opinion holds.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: Although he who is in mortal sin is in greater need of help, yet he is less capable of receiving it.

Whether indulgences avail religious?

Objection 1: It would seem that indulgences do not avail religious. For there is no reason to bring supplies to those who supply others out of their own abundance. Now indulgences are derived from the abundance of works of satisfaction to be found in religious. Therefore it is unreasonable for them to profit by indulgences.

Objection 2: Further, nothing detrimental to religious life should be done in the Church. But, if indulgences were to avail religious, this would be detrimental to regular discipline, because religious would become lax on account of indulgences, and would neglect the penances imposed in chapter. Therefore indulgences do not avail religious.

On the contrary, Good brings harm to no man. But the religious life is a good thing. Therefore it does not take away from religious the profit to be derived from indulgences.

I answer that, Indulgences avail both seculars and religious, provided they have charity and satisfy the conditions for gaining the indulgences: for religious can be helped by indulgences no less than persons living in the world.

Reply to Objection 1: Although religious are in the state of perfection, yet they cannot live without sin: and so if at times they are liable to punishment on account of some sin, they can expiate this debt by means of indulgences. For it is not unreasonable that one who is well off absolutely speaking, should be in want at times and in some respect, and thus need to be supplied with what he lacks. Hence it is written (Gal. 6:2): “Bear ye one another’s burdens.”

Reply to Objection 2: There is no reason why indulgences should be detrimental to religious observance, because, as to the reward of eternal life, religious merit more by observing their rule than by gaining indulgences; although, as to the remission of punishment, which is a lesser good, they merit less. Nor again do indulgences remit the punishment enjoined in chapter, because the chapter is a judicial rather than a penitential tribunal. hence even those who are not priests hold chapter. Absolution from punishment enjoined or due for sin is given in the tribunal of Penance.

Whether an indulgence can ever be granted to one who does not fulfill the conditions required?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence can sometimes be granted to one who does not fulfill the required conditions. Because when a person is unable to perform a certain action his will is taken for the deed. Now sometimes an indulgence is to be gained by giving an alms, which a poor man is unable to do, though he would do so willingly. Therefore he can gain the indulgence.

Objection 2: Further, one man can make satisfaction for another. Now an indulgence is directed to the remission of punishment, just as satisfaction is. Therefore one man can gain an indulgence for another; and so a man can gain an indulgence without doing that for which the indulgence is given.

On the contrary, If the cause is removed, the effect is removed. If therefore a person fails to do that for which an indulgence is granted, and which is the cause of the indulgence, he does not gain the indulgence.

I answer that, Failing the condition of a grant, no grant ensues. Hence, as an indulgence is granted on the condition that a person does or gives a certain thing, if he fails in this, he does not gain the indulgence.

Reply to Objection 1: This is true of the essential reward, but not of certain accidental rewards, such as the remission of punishment and the like.

Reply to Objection 2: A person can by his intention apply his own action to whomever he lists, and so he can make satisfaction for whomever he chooses. On the other hand, an indulgence cannot be applied to someone, except in accordance with the intention of the grantor. Hence, since he applies it to the doer or giver of a particular action or thing, the doer cannot transfer this intention to another. If, however, the indulgence were expressed thus: “Whosoever does this, or for whomsoever this is done, shall gain so much indulgence,” it would avail the person for whom it is done. Nor would the person who does this action, give the indulgence to another, but he who grants the indulgence in this form.

Whether an indulgence avails the person who grants it?

Objection 1: It would seem that an indulgence does not avail him who grants it. For the granting of an indulgence belongs to jurisdiction. Now no one can exercise jurisdiction on himself. thus no one can excommunicate himself. Therefore no one can participate in an indulgence granted by himself.

Objection 2: Further, if this were possible, he who grants an indulgence might gain the remission of the punishment of all his sins for some small deed, so that he would sin with impunity, which seems senseless.

Objection 3: Further, to grant indulgences and to excommunicate belong to the same power. Now a man cannot excommunicate himself. Therefore he cannot share in the indulgence of which he is the grantor.

On the contrary, He would be worse off than others if he could not make use of the Church’s treasury which he dispenses to others.

I answer that, An indulgence should be given for some reason, in order for anyone to be enticed by the indulgence to perform some action that conduces to the good of the Church and to the honor of God. Now the prelate to whom is committed the care of the Church's good and of the furthering of God's honor, does not need to entice himself thereto. Therefore he cannot grant an indulgence to himself alone; but he can avail himself of an indulgence that he grants for others, since it is based on a cause for granting it to them.

Reply to Objection 1: A man cannot exercise an act of jurisdiction on himself, but a prelate can avail himself of those things which are granted to others by the authority of his jurisdiction, both in temporal and in spiritual matters: thus also a priest gives himself the Eucharist which he gives to others. And so a bishop too can apply to himself the suffrages of the Church which he dispenses to others, the immediate effect of which suffrages, and not of his jurisdiction, is the remission of punishment by means of indulgences.

The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what had been said.

Reply to Objection 3: Excommunication is pronounced by way of sentence, which no man can pronounce on himself, for the reason that in the tribunal of justice the same man cannot be both judge and accused. On the other hand an indulgence is not given under the form of a sentence, but by way of dispensation, which a man can apply to himself.

OF THE SOLEMN RITE OF PENANCE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the solemn rite of Penance: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a penance can be published or solemnized?

(2) Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?

(3) Whether public penance should be imposed on women?

Whether a penance should be published or solemnized?

Objection 1: It would seem that a penance should not be published or solemnized. Because it is not lawful for a priest, even through fear, to divulge anyone’s sin, however notorious it may be. Now a sin is published by a solemn penance. Therefore a penance should not be solemnized.

Objection 2: Further, the judgment should follow the nature of the tribunal. Now penance is a judgment pronounced in a secret tribunal. Therefore it should not be published or solemnized.

Objection 3: Further, “Every deficiency is made good by penance” as Ambrose [*Cf. Hypognost. iii, among the spurious works ascribed to St. Augustine] states. Now solemnization has a contrary effect, since it involves the penitent in many deficiencies: for a layman cannot be promoted to the ranks of the clergy nor can a cleric be promoted to higher orders, after doing solemn penance. Therefore Penance should not be solemnized.

On the contrary, Penance is a sacrament. Now some kind of solemnity is observed in every sacrament. Therefore there should be some solemnity in Penance.

Further, the medicine should suit the disease. Now a sin is sometimes public, and by its example draws many to sin. Therefore the penance which is its medicine should also be public and solemn so as to give edification to many.

I answer that, Some penances should be public and solemn for four reasons. First, so that a public sin may have a public remedy; secondly, because he who has committed a very grave crime deserves the greatest confusion even in this life; thirdly, in order that it may deter others; fourthly, that he may be an example of repentance, lest those should despair, who have committed grievous sins.

Reply to Objection 1: The priest does not divulge the confession by imposing such a penance, though people may suspect the penitent of having committed some great sin. For a man is not certainly taken to be guilty, because he is punished, since sometimes one does penance for another: thus we read in the Lives of the Fathers of a certain man who, in order to incite his companion to do penance, did penance together with him. And if the sin be public, the penitent, by fulfilling his penance, shows that he has been to confession.

Reply to Objection 2: A solemn penance, as to its imposition, does not go beyond the limits of a secret tribunal, since, just as the confession is made secretly, so the penance is imposed secretly. It is the execution of the penance, that goes beyond the limits of the secret tribunal: and there is nothing objectionable in this.

Reply to Objection 3: Although Penance cancels all deficiencies, by restoring man to his former state of grace, yet it does not always restore him to his former dignity. Hence women after doing penance for fornication are not given the veil, because they do not recover the honor of virginity. In like manner, after doing public penance, a sinner does not recover his former dignity so as to be eligible for the clerical state and a bishop who would ordain such a one ought to be deprived of the power of ordaining, unless perhaps the needs of the Church or custom require it. In that case such a one would be admitted to minor orders by way of exception, but not to the sacred orders. First, on account of the dignity of the latter; secondly, for fear of relapse; thirdly, in order to avoid the scandal which the people might take through recollection of his former sins; fourthly, because he would not have the face to correct others, by reason of the publicity of his own sin.

Whether a solemn penance can be repeated?

Objection 1: It would seem that a solemn penance can be repeated. For those sacraments which do not imprint a character, can be solemnized a second time, such as the Eucharist, Extreme Unction and the like. But Penance does not imprint a character, therefore it can be solemnized over again.

Objection 2: Further, penance is solemnized on account of the gravity and publicity of the sin. Now, after doing penance, a person may commit the same sins over again, or even more grievous sins. Therefore the solemn penance should be imposed again.

On the contrary, Solemn penance signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise. Now this was done but once. Therefore solemn penance should be imposed once only.

I answer that, Solemn penance ought not to be repeated, for three reasons. First, lest frequency bring it into contempt. Secondly, on account of its signification; for it signifies the expulsion of the first man from paradise, which happened only once; thirdly, because the solemnization indicates, in a way, that one makes profession of continual repentance. Wherefore repetition is inconsistent with solemnization. And if the sinner fall again, he is not precluded from doing penance, but a solemn penance should not be imposed on him again.

Reply to Objection 1: In those sacraments which are solemnized again and again, repetition is not inconsistent with solemnity, as it is in the present case. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Although, if we consider his crime, he ought to do the same penance again, yet the repeated solemnization is not becoming, for the reasons stated above.

Whether solemn penance should be imposed on women and clerics, and whether any priest can impose it?

Objection 1: It would seem that solemn penance should not be imposed on women. Because, when this penance is imposed on a man, he has to cut his hair off. But this becomes not a woman, according to 1 Cor. 11:15. Therefore she should not do solemn penance.

Objection 2: It also seems that it ought to be imposed on clerics. For it is enjoined on account of a grievous crime. Now the same sin is more grievous in a cleric than in a layman. Therefore it ought to be imposed on a cleric more than on a layman.

Objection 3: It also seems that it can be imposed by any priest. Because to absolve in the tribunal of Penance belongs to one who has the keys. Now an ordinary priest has the keys. Therefore he can administer this penance.

I answer that, Every solemn penance is public, but not vice versa. For solemn penance is done as follows: “On the first day of Lent, these penitents clothed in sackcloth, with bare feet, their faces to the ground, and their hair shorn away, accompanied by their priests, present themselves to the bishop of the city at the door of the church. Having brought them into the church the bishop with all his clergy recites the seven penitential psalms, and then imposes his hand on them, sprinkles them with holy water, puts ashes on their heads, covers their shoulders with a hairshirt, and sorrowfully announces to them that as Adam was expelled from paradise, so are they expelled from the church. He then orders the ministers to put them out of the church, and the clergy follow reciting the responsory: ‘In the sweat of thy brow,’ etc. Every year on the day of our Lord’s Supper they are brought back into the church by their priests, and there shall they be until the octave day of Easter, without however being admitted to Communion or to the kiss of peace. This shall be done every year as long as entrance into the church is forbidden them. The final reconciliation is reserved to the bishop, who alone can impose solemn penance" [*Cap. lxiv, dist. 50].

This penance can be imposed on men and women; but not on clerics, for fear of scandal. Nor ought such a penance to be imposed except for a crime which has disturbed the whole of the city.

On the other hand public but not solemn penance is that which is done in the presence of the Church, but without the foregoing solemnity, such as a pilgrimage throughout the world with a staff. A penance of this kind can be repeated, and can be imposed by a mere priest, even on a cleric. Sometimes however a solemn penance is taken to signify a public one: so that authorities speak of solemn penance in different senses.

Reply to Objection 1: The woman's hair is a sign of her subjection, a man's is not. Hence it is not proper for a woman to put aside her hair when doing penance, as it is for a man.

Reply to Objection 2: Although in the same kind of sin, a cleric offends more grievously than a layman, yet a solemn penance is not imposed on him, lest his orders should be an object of contempt. Thus deference is given not to the person but to his orders.

Reply to Objection 3: Grave sins need great care in their cure. Hence the imposition of a solemn penance, which is only applied for the most grievous sins, is reserved to the bishop.

EXTREME UNCTION (QQ[29]-33)

OF EXTREME UNCTION, AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE AND INSTITUTION (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the sacrament of Extreme Unction: in respect of which five points have to be considered: (1) Its essentials and institution; (2) Its effect; (3) Its minister; (4) on whom should it be conferred and in what parts; (5) Its repetition.

Under the first head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?

(2) Whether it is one sacrament?

(3) Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?

(4) Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?

(5) Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?

(6) Whether the matter of this sacrament should be consecrated by a bishop?

(7) Whether this sacrament has any form?

(8) Whether the form of this sacrament should take the shape of a deprecatory phrase?

(9) Whether this is a suitable form for this sacrament?

Whether Extreme Unction is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that Extreme Unction is not a sacrament. For just as oil is used on sick people, so is it on catechumens. But anointing of catechumens with oil is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is the Extreme Unction of the sick with oil.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. But there was no figure of Extreme Unction in the Old Law. Therefore it is not a sacrament of the New Law.

Objection 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii, v) every sacrament aims at either cleansing, or enlightening, or perfecting. Now Extreme Unction does not aim at either cleansing, or enlightening, for this is ascribed to Baptism alone, or perfecting, for according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), this belongs to Confirmation and the Eucharist. Therefore Extreme Unction is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, The sacraments of the Church supply man's defects sufficiently with respect to every state of life. Now no other than Extreme Unction does this for those who are departing from this life. Therefore it is a sacrament.

Further, the sacraments are neither more nor less than spiritual remedies. Now Extreme Unction is a spiritual remedy, since it avails for the remission of sins, according to James 5:15. Therefore it is a sacrament.

I answer that, Among the visible operations of the Church, some are sacraments, as Baptism, some are sacramentals, as Exorcism. The difference between these is that a sacrament is an action of the Church that reaches to the principal effect intended in the administration of the sacraments, whereas a sacramental is an action which, though it does not reach to that effect, is nevertheless directed towards that principal action. Now the effect intended in the administration of the sacraments is the healing of the disease of sin: wherefore it is written (Is. 27:9): "This is all the fruit, that the sin . . . should be taken away." Since then Extreme Unction reaches to this effect, as is clear from the words of James, and is not ordained to any other sacrament as an accessory thereto, it is evident that Extreme Unction is not a sacramental but a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The oil with which catechumens are anointed does not convey the remission of sins to them by its unction, for that belongs to Baptism. It does, however, dispose them to receive Baptism, as stated above ([4891]TP, Q[71], A[3]). Hence that unction is not a sacrament as Extreme Unction is.

Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament prepares man for glory immediately, since it is given to those who are departing from this life. And as, under the Old Law, it was not yet time to enter into glory, because "the

Law brought nobody [Vulg.: ‘nothing’] to perfection” (Heb. 7:19), so this sacrament had not to be foreshadowed therein by some corresponding sacrament, as by a figure of the same kind. Nevertheless it was somewhat foreshadowed remotely by all the healings related in the Old Testament.

Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius makes no mention of Extreme Unction, as neither of Penance, nor of Matrimony, because he had no intention to decide any question about the sacraments, save in so far as they serve to illustrate the orderly disposition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as regards the ministers, their actions, and the recipients. Nevertheless since Extreme Unction confers grace and remission of sins, there is no doubt that it possesses an enlightening and cleansing power, even as Baptism, though not so copious.

Whether Extreme Unction is one sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that Extreme Unction is not one sacrament. Because the oneness of a thing depends on its matter and form, since being and oneness are derived from the same source. Now the form of this sacrament is said several times during the one administration, and the matter is applied to the person anointed in respect of various parts of his body. Therefore it is not one sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the unction itself is a sacrament, for it would be absurd to say that the oil is a sacrament. But there are several unctions. Therefore there are several sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, one sacrament should be performed by one minister. But the case might occur that Extreme Unction could not be conferred by one minister: thus if the priest die after the first unction, another priest would have to proceed with the others. Therefore Extreme Unction is not one sacrament.

On the contrary, As immersion is in relation to Baptism, so is unction to this sacrament. But several immersions are but one sacrament of Baptism. Therefore the several unctions in Extreme Unction are also one sacrament.

Further, if it were not one sacrament, then after the first unction, it would not be essential for the perfection of the sacrament that the second unction should be performed, since each sacrament has perfect being of itself. But that is not true. Therefore it is one sacrament.

I answer that, Strictly speaking, a thing is one numerically in three ways. First, as something indivisible, which is neither actually nor potentially several—as a point, and unity. Secondly, as something continuous, which is actually one, but potentially several—as a line. Thirdly, as something complete, that is composed of several parts—as a house, which is, in a way, several things, even actually, although those several things go together towards making one. In this way each sacrament is said to be one thing, in as much as the many things which are contained in one sacrament, are united together for the purpose of signifying or causing one thing, because a sacrament is a sign of the effect it produces. Hence when one action suffices for a perfect signification, the unity of the sacrament consists in that action only, as may be seen in Confirmation. When, however, the signification of the sacrament can be both in one and in several actions, then the sacrament can be complete both in one and in several actions, even as Baptism in one immersion and in three, since washing which is signified in Baptism, can be completed by one immersion and by several. But when the perfect signification cannot be expressed except by means of several actions, then these several actions are essential for the perfection of the sacrament, as is exemplified in the Eucharist, for the refreshment of the body which signifies that of the soul, can only be attained by means of meat and drink. It is the same in this sacrament, because the healing of the internal wounds cannot be perfectly signified save by the application of the remedy to the various sources of the wounds. Hence several actions are essential to the perfection of this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The unity of a complete whole is not destroyed by reason of a diversity of matter or form in the parts of that whole. Thus it is evident that there is neither the same matter nor the same form in the flesh and in the bones of which one man is composed. In like manner too, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, and in this sacrament, the diversity of matter and form does not destroy the unity of the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: Although those actions are several simply, yet they are united together in one complete action, viz. the anointing of all the external senses, whence arises the infernal malady.

Reply to Objection 3: Although, in the Eucharist, if the priest die after the consecration of the bread, another priest can go on with the consecration of the wine, beginning where the other left off, or can begin over again with fresh matter, in Extreme Unction he cannot begin over again, but should always go on, because to anoint the same part a second time would produce as much effect as if one were to consecrate a host a second time, which ought by no means to be done. Nor does the plurality of ministers destroy the unity of this sacrament, because they only act as instruments, and the unity of a smith's work is not destroyed by his using several hammers.

Whether this sacrament was instituted by Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament was not instituted by Christ. For mention is made in the Gospel of the institution of those sacraments which Christ instituted, for instance the Eucharist and Baptism. But no mention is made of Extreme Unction. Therefore it was not instituted by Christ.

Objection 2: Further, the Master says explicitly (Sent. iv, D, 23) that it was instituted by the apostles. Therefore Christ did not institute it Himself.

Objection 3: Further, Christ showed forth the sacraments which He instituted, as in the case of the Eucharist and Baptism. But He did not bestow this sacrament on anyone. Therefore He did not institute it Himself.

On the contrary, The sacraments of the New Law are more excellent than those of the Old Law. But all the sacraments of the Old Law were instituted by God. Therefore much more do all the sacraments of the New Law owe their institution to Christ Himself.

Further, to make an institution and to remove it belongs to the same authority. Now the Church, who enjoys the same authority in the successors of the apostles, as the apostles themselves possessed, cannot do away with the sacrament of Extreme Unction. Therefore the apostles did not institute it, but Christ Himself.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some hold that this sacrament and Confirmation were not instituted by Christ Himself, but were left by Him to be instituted by the apostles; for the reason that these two sacraments, on account of the plenitude of grace conferred in them, could not be instituted before the mission of the Holy Ghost in perfect plenitude. Hence they are sacraments of the New Law in such a way as not to be foreshadowed in the Old Law. But this argument is not very cogent, since, just as Christ, before His Passion, promised the mission of the Holy Ghost in His plenitude, so could He institute these sacraments.

Wherefore others hold that Christ Himself instituted all the sacraments, but that He Himself published some, which present greater difficulty to our belief, while he reserved some to be published by the apostles, such as Extreme Unction and Confirmation. This opinion seems so much the more probable, as the sacraments belong to the foundation of the Law, wherefore their institution pertains to the lawgiver; besides, they derive their efficacy from their institution, which efficacy is given them by God alone.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord did and said many things which are not related in the Gospel. For the evangelists were intent on handing down chiefly those things that were necessary for salvation or concerned the building of the ecclesiastical edifice. Hence they related the institution by Christ of Baptism, Penance, the Eucharist and orders, rather than of Extreme Unction and Confirmation, which are not necessary for salvation, nor do they concern the building or division of the Church. As a matter of fact however an anointing done by the apostles is mentioned in the Gospel (Mk. 6:13) where it is said that they "anointed the sick with oil."

Reply to Objection 2: The Master says it was instituted by the apostles because its institution was made known to us by the teaching of the apostles.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ did not show forth any sacrament except such as He received by way of example: but He could not be a recipient of Penance and Extreme Unction, since there was no sin in Him: hence He did not show them forth.

Whether olive oil is a suitable matter for this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that olive oil is not a suitable matter for this sacrament. For this sacrament is ordained immediately to the state of incorruption. Now incorruption is signified by balsam which is contained in chrism. Therefore chrism would be a more suitable matter for this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is a spiritual healing. Now spiritual healing is signified by the use of wine, as may be gathered from the parable of the wounded man (Lk. 10:34). Therefore wine also would be more suitable a matter for this sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, where there is the greater danger, the remedy should be a common one. But olive oil is not a common remedy, since the olive is not found in every country. Therefore, since this sacrament is given to the dying, who are in the greatest danger, it seems that olive oil is not a suitable matter.

On the contrary, oil is appointed (James 5:14) as the matter of this sacrament. Now, properly speaking, oil is none but olive oil. Therefore this is the matter of this sacrament.

Further, spiritual healing is signified by anointing with oil, as is evident from Is. 1:6 where we read: " . . . swelling sores: they are not . . . dressed nor fomented with oil." Therefore the suitable matter for this sacrament is oil.

I answer that, The spiritual healing, which is given at the end of life, ought to be complete, since there is no other to follow; it ought also to be gentle, lest hope, of which the dying stand in utmost need, be shattered rather than fostered. Now oil has a softening effect, it penetrates to the very heart of a thing, and spreads over it. Hence, in both the foregoing respects, it is a suitable matter for this sacrament. And since oil is, above all, the name of the liquid extract of olives, for other liquids are only called oil from their likeness to it, it follows that olive oil is the matter which should be employed in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: The incorruption of glory is something not contained in this sacrament: and there is no need for the matter to signify such a thing. Hence it is not necessary for balsam to be included in the matter of this sacrament, because on account of its fragrance it is indicative of a good name, which is no longer necessary, for its own sake, to those who are dying; they need only a clear conscience which is signified by oil.

Reply to Objection 2: Wine heals by its roughness, oil by its softness, wherefore healing with wine pertains to Penance rather than to this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: Though olive oil is not produced everywhere, yet it can easily be transported from one place to another. Moreover this sacrament is not so necessary that the dying cannot obtain salvation without it.

Whether the oil ought to be consecrated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the oil need not be consecrated. Because there is a sanctification in the use of this sacrament, through the form of words. Therefore another sanctification is superfluous if it be applied to the matter.

Objection 2: Further, the efficacy and signification of the sacraments are in their very matter. But the signification of the effect of this sacrament, is suitable to oil on account of its natural properties, and the efficacy thereof is due to the Divine institution. Therefore its matter does not need to be sanctified.

Objection 3: Further, Baptism is a more perfect sacrament than Extreme Unction. But, so far as the essentials of the sacrament are concerned, the baptismal matter needs no sanctification. Neither therefore does the matter of Extreme Unction need to be sanctified.

On the contrary, In all other anointings the matter is previously consecrated. Therefore since this sacrament is an anointing, it requires consecrated matter.

I answer that, Some hold that mere oil is the matter of this sacrament, and that the sacrament itself is perfected in the consecration of the oil by the bishop. But this is clearly false since we proved when treating of the Eucharist that that sacrament alone consists in the consecration of the matter ([4892]Q[2], A[1], ad 2).

We must therefore say that this sacrament consists in the anointing itself, just as Baptism consists in the washing, and that the matter of this sacrament is consecrated oil. Three reasons may be assigned why consecrated matter is needed in this sacrament and in certain others. The first is that all sacramental efficacy is derived from Christ: wherefore those sacraments which He Himself used, derived their efficacy from His use of them, even as, by the contact of His flesh, He bestowed the force of regeneration on the waters. But He did not use this sacrament, nor any bodily anointing, wherefore in all anointings a consecrated matter is required. The second reason is that this sacrament confers a plenitude of grace, so as to take away not only sin but also the remnants of sin, and bodily sickness. The third reason is that its effect on the body, viz. bodily health, is not caused by a natural property of the matter. wherefore it has to derive this efficacy from being consecrated.

Reply to Objection 1: The first consecration sanctifies the matter in itself, but the second regards rather the use of the matter considered as actually producing its effect. Hence neither is superfluous, because instruments also receive their efficacy from the craftsman, both when they are made, and when they are used for action.

Reply to Objection 2: The efficacy which the sacrament derives from its institution, is applied to this particular matter when it is consecrated.

The Reply to the Third Objection is gathered from what has been said.

Whether the matter of this sacrament need be consecrated by a bishop?

Objection 1: It would seem that the matter of this sacrament need not be consecrated by a bishop. Because the consecration of the Eucharistic elements surpasses that of the matter in this sacrament. But a priest can consecrate the matter in the Eucharist. Therefore he can do so in this sacrament also.

Objection 2: Further, in material works the higher art never prepares the matter for the lower, because the art which applies the matter is more excellent than that which prepares it, as stated in Phys. ii, text. 25. Now a bishop is above a priest. Therefore he does not prepare the matter of a sacrament which is applied by a priest. But a priest dispenses this sacrament, as we shall state further on ([4893]Q[31]). Therefore the consecration of the matter does not belong to a bishop.

On the contrary, In other anointings also the matter is consecrated by a bishop. Therefore the same applies to this.

I answer that, The minister of a sacrament produces the effect, not by his own power, as though he were the principal agent, but by the efficacy of the sacrament which he dispenses. This efficacy comes, in the first place, from Christ, and from Him flows down to others in due order, viz. to the people through the medium of the ministers who dispense the sacraments, and to the lower ministers through the medium of the higher ministers who sanctify the matter. Wherefore, in all the sacraments which require a sanctified matter, the first consecration of the matter is performed by a bishop, and the application thereof sometimes by a priest, in order to show that the priest’s power is derived from the bishop’s, according to Ps. 132:2: “Like the precious ointment on the head,” i.e. Christ, “that ran down upon the beard of Aaron” first, and then “to the skirt of his garment.”

Reply to Objection 1: The sacrament of the Eucharist consists in the consecration of the matter and not in its use. Consequently, strictly speaking, that which is the matter of the sacrament is not a consecrated thing. Hence no consecration of the matter by a bishop is required beforehand: but the altar and such like things, even the priest himself, need to be consecrated, all of which can be done by none but a bishop: so that in this sacrament also, the priest’s power is shown to be derived from the bishop’s, as Dionysius observes (Eccl. Hier. iii). The reason why a priest can perform that consecration of matter which is a sacrament by itself, and not that which, as a sacramental, is directed to a sacrament consisting in something used by the faithful, is that in respect of Christ’s true body no order is above the priesthood, whereas, in respect of Christ’s mystic body the episcopate is above the priesthood, as we shall state further on ([4894]Q[40], A[4]).

Reply to Objection 2: The sacramental matter is not one that is made into something else by him that uses it, as occurs in the mechanical arts: it is one, in virtue of which something is done, so that it partakes somewhat of the nature of an efficient cause, in so far as it is the instrument of a Divine operation. Hence the matter needs to acquire this virtue from a higher art or power, since among efficient causes, the more prior the cause the more perfect it is, whereas in material causes, the more prior the matter, the more imperfect it is.

Whether this sacrament has a form?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament has no form. Because, since the efficacy of the sacraments is derived from their institution, as also from their form, the latter must needs be appointed by the institutor of the sacrament. But there is no account of the form of this sacrament being instituted either by Christ or by the apostles. Therefore this sacrament has no form.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is essential to a sacrament is observed everywhere in the same way. Now nothing is so essential to a sacrament that has a form, as that very form. Therefore, as in this sacrament there is no form commonly used by all, since various words are in use, it seems that this sacrament has no form.

Objection 3: Further, in Baptism no form is needed except for the sanctification of the matter, because the water is “sanctified by the word of life so as to wash sin away,” as Hugh states (De Sacram. ii). Now the matter of this sacrament is already consecrated. Therefore it needs no form of words.

On the contrary, The Master says (Sent. iv, D, 1) that every sacrament of the New Law consists in things and words. Now the words are the sacramental form. Therefore, since this is a sacrament of the New Law, it seems that it has a form.

Further, this is confirmed by the rite of the Universal Church, who uses certain words in the bestowal of this sacrament.

I answer that, Some have held that no farm is essential to this sacrament. This, however, seems derogatory to the effect of this sacrament, since every sacrament signifies its effect. Now the matter is indifferent as regards its effect, and consequently cannot be determined to any particular effect save by the form of words. Hence in all the sacraments of the New Law, since they effect what they signify, there must needs be things and words. Moreover James (5:14,15) seems to ascribe the whole force of this sacrament to prayer, which is the form thereof, as we shall state further on (ad 2: AA[8],9). Wherefore the foregoing opinion seems presumptuous and erroneous; and for that reason we should hold with the common opinion that this, like all the other sacraments, has a fixed form.

Reply to Objection 1: Holy Writ is proposed to all alike: and so, the form of Baptism, which can be conferred by all, should be expressed in Holy Writ, as also the form of the Eucharist, which in regard to that sacrament, expresses faith which is necessary for salvation. Now the forms of the other sacraments are not contained in Holy Writ, but were handed down to the Church by the apostles, who received them from our Lord, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 11:23): “For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered to you,” etc.

Reply to Objection 2: The words which are essential to the form, viz. the prayer of deprecation, are said by all; but other words which pertain to the well-being thereof, are not said by all.

Reply to Objection 3: The matter of Baptism has a certain sanctification of its own from the very contact of our Saviour’s flesh; but the form of words sanctifies it so that it has a sanctifying force. In like manner when the matter of this sacrament has been sanctified in itself, it requires sanctification in its use, so that it may sanctify actually.

Whether the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion or of petition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the form of this sacrament should be expressed by way of assertion rather than of petition. Because all the sacraments of the New Law have a sure effect. But sureness of effect is not expressed in the sacramental forms except by way of assertion, as when we say: “This is My body” or “I baptize thee.” Therefore the form of this sacrament should be expressed as an assertion.

Objection 2: Further, the intention of the minister should be expressed in the sacramental forms because it is essential to the sacrament. But the intention of conferring a sacrament is not expressed except by an assertion. Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, in some churches the following words are said in the conferring of this sacrament: “I anoint these eyes with consecrated oil in the name of the Father,” etc., which is in keeping with the forms of the other sacraments. Therefore it seems that such is the form of this sacrament.

On the contrary, The form of a sacrament must needs be one that is observed everywhere. Now the words employed according to the custom of all the churches are not those quoted above, but take the form of a petition viz.: “Through this holy unction, and His most tender mercy, may the Lord pardon thee whatever sins thou hast committed, by sight,” etc. Therefore the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.

Further, this seems to follow from the words of James, who ascribes the effect of this sacrament to prayer: “The prayer of faith,” says he (5:15), “shall save the sick man.” Since then a sacrament takes its efficacy from its form, it seems that the form of this sacrament is expressed as a petition.

I answer that, The form of this sacrament is expressed by way of a petition, as appears from the words of James, and from the custom of the Roman Church, who uses no other than words of supplication in conferring this sacrament. Several reasons are assigned for this: first, because the recipient of this sacrament is deprived of his strength, so that he needs to be helped by prayers; secondly, because it is given to the dying, who are on the point of quitting the courts of the Church, and rest in the hands of God alone, for which reason they are committed to Him by prayer; thirdly, because the effect of this sacrament is not such that it always results from the minister's prayer, even when all essentials have been duly observed, as is the case with the character in Baptism and Confirmation, transubstantiation in the Eucharist, remission of sin in Penance (given contrition) which remission is essential to the sacrament of Penance but not to this sacrament. Consequently the form of this sacrament cannot be expressed in the indicative mood, as in the sacraments just mentioned.

Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament, like the others mentioned, considered in itself, is sure of its effect. yet this effect can be hindered through the insincerity of the recipient (though by his intention he submit to the sacrament), so that he receives no effect at all. Hence there is no parity between this sacrament, and the others wherein some effect always ensues.

Reply to Objection 2: The intention is sufficiently expressed by the act which is mentioned in the form, viz.: "By this holy unction."

Reply to Objection 3: These words in the indicative mood, which some are wont to say before the prayer, are not the sacramental form, but are a preparation for the form, in so far as they determine the intention of the minister.

Whether the foregoing prayer is a suitable form for this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that the foregoing prayer is not a suitable form for this sacrament. For in the forms of the other sacraments mention is made of the matter, for instance in Confirmation, whereas this is not done in the aforesaid words. Therefore it is not a suitable form.

Objection 2: Further, just as the effect of this sacrament is bestowed on us by the mercy of God, so are the effects of the other sacraments. But mention is made in the forms of the other sacraments, not of the Divine mercy, but rather of the Trinity and of the Passion. Therefore the same should be done here.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 23) to have a twofold effect. But in the foregoing words mention is made of only one effect, viz. the remission of sins, and not of the healing of the body to which end James directs the prayer of faith to be made (James 5:15): “The prayer of faith shall save the sick man.” Therefore the above form is unsuitable.

I answer that, The prayer given above [4895](A[8]) is a suitable form for this sacrament, for it includes the sacrament by the words: “By this holy unction,” and that which works in the sacrament, viz. “the mercy of God,” and the effect, viz. “remission of sins.”

Reply to Objection 1: The matter of this sacrament may be understood in the act of anointing, whereas the matter of Confirmation cannot be implied by the act expressed in the form. Hence there is no parity.

Reply to Objection 2: The object of mercy is misery: and because this sacrament is given when we are in a state of misery, i.e. of sickness, mention of mercy is made in this rather than in other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3: The form should contain mention of the principal effect, and of that which always ensues in virtue of the sacrament, unless there be something lacking on the part of the recipient. Now bodily health is not an effect of this kind, as we shall state further on ([4896]Q[30], AA[1] ,2), though it does ensue at times, for which reason James ascribes this effect to the prayer which is the form of this sacrament.

OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the effect of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?

(2) Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?

(3) Whether this sacrament imprints a character?

Whether Extreme Unction avails for the remission of sins?

Objection 1: It would seem that Extreme Unction does not avail for the remission of sins. For when a thing can be attained by one means, no other is needed. Now repentance is required in the recipient of Extreme Unction for the remission of his sins. Therefore sins are not remitted by Extreme Unction.

Objection 2: Further, there are no more than three things in sin, the stain, the debt of punishment, and the remnants of sin. Now Extreme Unction does not remit the stain without contrition, and this remits sin even without Unction; nor does it remit the punishment, for if the recipient recover, he is still bound to fulfill the satisfaction enjoined; nor does it take away the remnants of sin, since the dispositions remaining from preceding acts still remain, as may easily be seen after recovery. Therefore remission of sins is by no means the effect of Extreme Unction.

Objection 3: Further, remission of sins takes place, not successively, but instantaneously. On the other hand, Extreme Unction is not done all at once, since several anointings are required. Therefore the remission of sins is not its effect.

On the contrary, It is written (James 5:15): “If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him.”

Further, every sacrament of the New Law confers grace. Now grace effects the forgiveness of sins. Therefore since Extreme Unction is a sacrament of the New Law, its effect is the remission of sins.

I answer that, Each sacrament was instituted for the purpose of one principal effect, though it may, in consequence, produce other effects besides. And since a sacrament causes what it signifies, the principal effect of a sacrament must be gathered from its signification. Now this sacrament is conferred by way of a kind of medicament, even as Baptism is conferred by way of washing, and the purpose of a medicament is to expel sickness. Hence the chief object of the institution of this sacrament is to cure the sickness of sin. Therefore, just as Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, and Penance, a spiritual resurrection, so Extreme Unction is a spiritual healing or cure. Now just as a bodily cure presupposes bodily life in the one who is cured, so does a spiritual cure presuppose spiritual life. Hence this sacrament is not an antidote to those defects which deprive man of spiritual life, namely. original and mortal sin, but is a remedy for such defects as weaken man spiritually, so as to deprive him of perfect vigor for acts of the life of grace or of glory; which defects consist in nothing else but a certain weakness and unfitness, the result in us of actual or original sin. against which weakness man is strengthened by this sacrament. Since, however, this strength is given by grace, which is incompatible with sin, it follows that. in consequence, if it finds any sin, either mortal or venial, it removes it as far as the guilt is concerned, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient; just as we have stated to be the case with regard to the Eucharist and Confirmation (TP, Q[73], A[7]; [4897]TP, Q[79], A[3]). Hence, too, James speaks of the remission of sin as being conditional, for he says: “If he be in sins, they shall be forgiven him,” viz. as to the guilt. Because it does not always blot out sin, since it does not always find any: but it always remits in respect of the aforesaid weakness which some call the remnants of sin. Some, however, maintain that it is instituted chiefly as a remedy for venial sin which cannot be cured perfectly in this lifetime: for which reason the sacrament of the dying is ordained specially against venial sin. But this does not seem to be true, since Penance also blots out venial sins sufficiently during this life as to their guilt, and that we cannot avoid them after doing penance, does not cancel the effect of the previous penance; moreover this is part of the weakness mentioned above.

Consequently we must say that the principal effect of this sacrament is the remission of sin, as to its remnants, and, consequently, even as to its guilt, if it find it.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the principal effect of a sacrament can be obtained without actually receiving that sacrament (either without any sacrament at all, or indirectly by means of some other sacrament), yet it never can be obtained without the purpose of receiving that sacrament. And so, since Penance was instituted chiefly against actual sin, whichever other sacrament may blot out sin indirectly, it does not exclude the necessity of Penance.

Reply to Objection 2: Extreme Unction remits sin in some way as to those three things. For, although the stain of sin is not washed out without contrition, yet this sacrament, by the grace which it bestows, makes the movement of the free will towards sin to be one of contrition, just as may occur in the Eucharist and Confirmation. Again it diminishes the debt of temporal punishment; and this indirectly, in as much as it takes away weakness, for a strong man bears the same punishment more easily than a weak man. Hence it does not follow that the measure of satisfaction is diminished. As to the remnants of sin, they do not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, and are inchoate habits so to speak, but a certain spiritual debility in the mind, which debility being removed, though such like habits or dispositions remain, the mind is not so easily prone to sin.

Reply to Objection 3: When many actions are ordained to one effect, the last is formal with respect to all the others that precede, and acts by virtue of them: wherefore by the last anointing is infused grace which gives the sacrament its effect.

Whether bodily health is an effect of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament. For every sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Now a spiritual remedy is ordained to spiritual health, just as a bodily remedy is ordained to health of the body. Therefore bodily health is not an effect of this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments always produce their effect in those who approach them in the proper dispositions. Now sometimes the recipient of this sacrament does not receive bodily health, no matter how devoutly he receives it. Therefore bodily health is not its effect.

Objection 3: Further, the efficacy of this sacrament is notified to us in the fifth chapter of James. Now healing is ascribed there as the effect, not of the anointing, but of the prayer, for he says: “The prayer of faith shall save the sick man.” Therefore bodily healing is not an effect of this sacrament.

On the contrary, The operation of the Church is more efficacious since Christ’s Passion than before. Now, before the Passion, those whom the apostles anointed with oil were healed (Mk. 6:13). Therefore unction has its effect now in healing bodies.

Further, the sacraments produce their effect by signifying it. Now Baptism signifies and effects a spiritual washing, through the bodily washing in which it consists outwardly. Therefore Extreme Unction signifies and causes a spiritual healing through the bodily healing which it effects externally.

I answer that, Just as Baptism causes a spiritual cleansing from spiritual stains by means of a bodily washing, so this sacrament causes an inward healing by means of an outward sacramental healing: and even as the baptismal washing has the effect of a bodily washing, since it effects even a bodily cleansing, so too, Extreme Unction has the effect of a bodily remedy, namely a healing of the body. But there is a difference, for as much as the bodily washing causes a bodily cleansing by a natural property of the bodily element, and consequently always causes it, whereas Extreme Unction causes a bodily healing, not by a natural property of the matter, but by the Divine power which works reasonably. And since reasonable working never produces a secondary effect, except in so far as it is required for the principal effect, it follows that a bodily healing does not always ensue from this sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then it produces it always, provided there be no obstacle on the part of the recipient.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection proves that bodily health is not the principal effect of this sacrament: and this is true.

The Reply to the Second Objection is clear from what has been said above (cf.[4898] Q[29], A[8]).

Reply to Objection 3: This prayer is the form of this sacrament as stated above ([4899]Q[29], AA[8],9). Hence, so far as its form is concerned, this sacrament derives from it its efficacy in healing the body.

Whether this sacrament imprints a character?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament imprints a character. For a character is a distinctive sign. Now just as one who is baptized is distinguished from one who is not so is one who is anointed, from one who is not. Therefore, just as Baptism imprints a character so does Extreme Unction.

Objection 2: Further, there is an anointing in the sacraments or order and Confirmation, as there is in this sacrament. But a character is imprinted in those sacraments. Therefore a character is imprinted in this one also.

Objection 3: Further, every sacrament contains something that is a reality only, something that is a sacrament only, and something that is both reality and sacrament. Now nothing in this sacrament can be assigned as both reality and sacrament except a character. Therefore in this sacrament also, a character is imprinted.

On the contrary, No sacrament that imprints a character is repeated. But this sacrament is repeated as we shall state further on ([4900]Q[33]). Therefore it does not imprint a character.

Further, a sacramental character causes a distinction among those who are in the present Church. But Extreme Unction is given to one who is departing from the present Church. Therefore it does not imprint a character.

I answer that, A character is not imprinted except in those sacraments whereby man is deputed to some sacred duty. Now this sacrament is for no other purpose than a remedy, and man is not deputed thereby to do or receive anything holy. Therefore it does not imprint a character.

Reply to Objection 1: A character marks a distinction of . states with regard to duties which have to be performed in the Church, a distinction which a man does not receive by being anointed.

Reply to Objection 2: The unction of orders and Confirmation, is the unction of consecration whereby a man is deputed to some sacred duty, whereas this unction is remedial. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: In this sacrament, that which is both reality and sacrament is not a character, but a certain inward devotion which is a kind of spiritual anointing.

OF THE MINISTER OF THIS SACRAMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the minister of this sacrament: under which head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?

(2) Whether a deacon can?

(3) Whether none but a bishop can confer it?

Whether a layman can confer this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that even a layman can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament derives its efficacy from prayer, as James declares (James 5:15). But a layman’s prayer is sometimes as acceptable to God as a priest’s. Therefore he can confer this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, we read of certain fathers in Egypt that they sent the oil to the sick, and that these were healed. It is also related of the Blessed Genevieve that she anointed the sick with oil. Therefore this sacrament can be conferred even by lay people.

On the contrary, Remission of sins is given in this sacrament. But laymen have not the power to forgive sins. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) there are some who exercise hierarchical actions, and some who are recipients only. Hence laymen are officially incompetent to dispense any sacrament: and that they can baptize in cases of necessity, is due to the Divine dispensation, in order that no one may be deprived of spiritual regeneration.

Reply to Objection 1: This prayer is not said by the priest in his own person, for since sometimes he is in sin, he would not in that case be heard. But it is said in the person of the whole Church, in whose person he can pray as a public official, whereas a layman cannot, for he is a private individual.

Reply to Objection 2: These unctions were not sacramental. It was due to the devotion of the recipients of the unction, and to the merits of those who anointed them that they procured the effects of bodily health, through the "grace of healing" (1 Cor. 12:9) but not through sacramental grace.

Whether deacons can confer this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that deacons can confer this sacrament. For, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) "deacons have the power to cleanse." Now this sacrament was instituted precisely to cleanse from sickness of the mind and body. Therefore deacons also can confer it.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a more excellent sacrament than the one of which we are speaking. But deacons can baptize, as instanced by the Blessed Laurence. Therefore they can confer this sacrament also.

On the contrary, It is written (James 5:14): "Let him bring in the priests of the Church."

I answer that, A deacon has the power to cleanse but not to enlighten. Hence, since enlightenment is an effect of grace, no sacrament whereby grace is conferred can be given by a deacon in virtue of his office: and so he cannot confer this sacrament, since grace is bestowed therein.

Reply to Objection 1: This sacrament cleanses by enlightening through the bestowal of grace: wherefore a deacon is not competent to confer it.

Reply to Objection 2: This is not a necessary sacrament, as Baptism is. Hence its bestowal is not committed to all in cases of necessity, but only to those who are competent to do so in virtue of their office. Nor are deacons competent to baptize in virtue of their office.

Whether none but a bishop can confer this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that none but a bishop can confer this sacrament. For this sacrament consists in an anointing, just as Confirmation does. Now none but a bishop can confirm. Therefore only a bishop can confer this sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, he who cannot do what is less cannot do what is greater. Now the use of consecrated matter surpasses the act of consecrating the matter, since the former is the end of the latter. Therefore since a priest cannot consecrate the matter, neither can he use the matter after it has been consecrated.

On the contrary, The minister of this sacrament has to be brought in to the recipient, as is clear from James 5:14. Now a bishop cannot go to all the sick people of his diocese. Therefore the bishop is not the only one who can confer this sacrament.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), the office of perfecting belongs to a bishop, just as it belongs to a priest to enlighten. Wherefore those sacraments are reserved to a bishop's dispensation, which place the recipient in a state of perfection above others. But this is not the case with this sacrament, for it is given to all. Consequently it can be given by ordinary priests.

Reply to Objection 1: Confirmation imprints a character, whereby man is placed in a state of perfection, as stated above ([4901]TP, Q[63], AA[1], 2,6). But this does not take place in this sacrament; hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the use of consecrated matter is of more importance than the consecration of the matter, from the point of view of the final cause; nevertheless, from the point of view of efficient cause, the consecration of the matter is the more important, since the use of the matter is dependent thereon, as on its active cause: hence the consecration of the matter demands a higher power than the use of the matter does.

ON WHOM SHOULD THIS SACRAMENT BE CONFERRED AND ON WHAT PART OF THE BODY? (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider on whom this sacrament should be conferred and on what part of the body: under which head there are seven points of inquiry:
(1) Whether this sacrament should be conferred on those who are in good health?

(2) Whether it should be conferred in any kind of sickness?

(3) Whether it should be conferred on madmen and imbeciles?

(4) Whether it should be given to children?

(5) Whether, in this sacrament, the whole body should be anointed?

(6) Whether certain parts are suitably assigned to be anointed?

(7) Whether those who are deformed in the above parts ought to be anointed thereon?

Whether this sacrament ought to be conferred on those who are in good health?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament should be conferred even on those who are in good health. For the healing of the mind is a more important effect of this sacrament than the healing of the body, as stated above ([4902]Q[30], A[2]). Now even those who are healthy in body need to be healed in mind. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them also.

Objection 2: Further, this is the sacrament of those who are departing this life, just as Baptism is the sacrament of those who are entering this life. Now Baptism is given to all who enter. Therefore this sacrament should be given to all who are departing. But sometimes those who are near departure are in good health, for instance those who are to be beheaded. Therefore this sacrament should be conferred on them.

On the contrary, It is written (James 5:14): “Is any man sick among you,” etc. Therefore none but the sick are competent to receive this sacrament.

I answer that, This sacrament is a spiritual healing, as stated above ([4903]Q[30], AA[1],2), and is signified by way of a healing of the body.

Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not subjects for bodily healing, those namely, who are in good health.

Reply to Objection 1: Although spiritual health is the principal effect of this sacrament, yet this same spiritual healing needs to be signified by a healing of the body, although bodily health may not actually ensue. Consequently spiritual health can be conferred by this sacrament on those alone who are competent to receive bodily healing, viz. the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism who is capable of a bodily washing, and not a child yet in its mother's womb.

Reply to Objection 2: Even those who are entering into life cannot receive Baptism unless they are capable of a bodily washing. And so those who are departing this life cannot receive this sacrament, unless they be subjects for a bodily healing.

Whether this sacrament ought to be given in any kind of sickness?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament should be given in any kind of sickness. For no kind of sickness is determined in the fifth chapter of James where this sacrament is delivered to us. Therefore this sacrament should be given in all kinds of sickness.

Objection 2: Further, the more excellent a remedy is, the more generally should it be available. Now this sacrament is more excellent than bodily medicine. Since then bodily medicine is given to all manner of sick persons, it seems that this sacrament should be given in like manner to all.

On the contrary, This sacrament is called by all Extreme Unction. Now it is not every sickness that brings man to the extremity of his life, since some ailments prolong life, according to the Philosopher (De Long. et Brev. Vitae i). Therefore this sacrament should not be given in every case of sickness.

I answer that, This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore it ought to be given to those only, who are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, through their sickness being of such a nature as to cause death, the danger of which is to be feared.

Reply to Objection 1: Any sickness can cause death, if it be aggravated. Hence if we consider the different kinds of disease, there is none in which this sacrament cannot be given; and for this reason the apostle does not determine any particular one. But if we consider the degree and the stage of the complaint, this sacrament should not be given to every sick person.

Reply to Objection 2: The principal effect of bodily medicine is bodily health, which all sick people lack, whatever be the stage of their sickness. But the principal effect of this sacrament is that immunity from disorder which is needed by those who are taking their departure from this life and setting out for the life of glory. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether this sacrament ought to be given to madmen and imbeciles?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament should be given to madmen and imbeciles. For these diseases are full of danger and cause death quickly. Now when there is danger it is the time to apply the remedy. Therefore this sacrament, which was intended as a remedy to human weakness, should be given to such people.

Objection 2: Further, Baptism is a greater sacrament than this. Now Baptism is conferred on mad people as stated above ([4904]TP, Q[68], A[12]). Therefore this sacrament also should be given to them.

On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to none but such as acknowledge it. Now this does not apply to madmen and imbeciles. Therefore it should not be given to them.

I answer that, The devotion of the recipient, the personal merit of the minister, and the general merits of the whole Church, are of great account towards the reception of the effect of this sacrament. This is evident from the fact that the form of this sacrament is pronounced by way of a prayer. Hence it should not be given those who cannot acknowledge it, and especially to madmen and imbeciles, who might dishonor the sacrament by their offensive conduct, unless they have lucid intervals, when they would be capable of acknowledging the sacrament, for then the sacrament should be given to children the same in that state.

Reply to Objection 1: Although such people are sometimes in danger of death; yet the remedy cannot be applied to them, on account of their lack of devotion. Hence it should not be given to them.

Reply to Objection 2: Baptism does not require a movement of the free-will, because it is given chiefly as a remedy for original sin, which, in us, is not taken away by a movement of the free-will. On the other hand this sacrament requires a movement of the free-will; wherefore the comparison fails. Moreover Baptism is a necessary sacrament, while Extreme Unction is not.

Whether this sacrament should be given to children?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament ought to be given to children. Because children suffer from the same ailments sometimes as adults. Now the same disease requires the same remedy. Therefore this sacrament should be given to children the same as to adults.

Objection 2: Further, this sacrament is given in order to remove the remnants of sin, whether original or actual, as stated above ([4905]Q[30], A[1]). Now the remnants of original sin are in children. Therefore this sacrament should be given to them.

On the contrary, This sacrament should be given to none but those to whom the form applies. But the form of this sacrament does not apply to children, since they have not sinned by sight and hearing; as expressed in the form. Therefore this sacrament should not be given to them.

I answer that, This sacrament, like the Eucharist, requires actual devotion in the recipient. Therefore, just as the Eucharist ought not to be given to children, so neither ought this sacrament to be given to them.

Reply to Objection 1: Children's infirmities are not caused by actual sin, as in adults, and this sacrament is given chiefly as a remedy for infirmities that result from sins, being the remnants of sin, as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: This sacrament is not given as a remedy for the remnants of original sin, except in so far as they gather strength, so to speak, from actual sins. Hence from the very form it appears that it is given chiefly as a remedy for actual sins, which are not in children.

Whether the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that the whole body should be anointed in this sacrament. For, according to Augustine (De Trin. vi, 6), "the whole soul is in every part of the body." Now this sacrament is given chiefly in order to heal the soul. Therefore the whole body ought to be anointed.

Objection 2: Further, the remedy should be applied to the part affected by the disease. But sometimes the disease is general, and affects the whole body, as a fever does. Therefore the whole body should be anointed.

Objection 3: Further, in Baptism the whole body is dipped under the water. Therefore in this sacrament the whole body should be anointed.

On the contrary, stands the rite observed throughout the Church, according to which in this sacrament the sick man is anointed, only in certain fixed parts of the body.

I answer that, This sacrament is shown to us under the form of a healing. Now bodily healing has to be effected, by applying the remedy, not to the whole body, but to those parts where the root of the disease is seated. Consequently the sacramental unction also ought to be applied to those parts only in which the spiritual sickness is rooted.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the whole soul is, as to its essence, in each part of the body, it is not as to its powers which are the roots of sinful acts. Hence certain fixed parts have to be anointed, those, namely, in which powers have their being.

Reply to Objection 2: The remedy is not always applied to the part affected by the disease, but, with greater reason, to the part where the root of the disease is seated.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is given under the form of washing: and a bodily washing cleanses only the part to which it is applied; for this reason Baptism is applied to the whole body. It is different with Extreme Unction for the reason given above.

Whether the parts to be anointed are suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem that these parts are unsuitably assigned, namely, that the eyes, nose, ears, lips, hands, and feet should be anointed. For a wise physician heals the disease in its root. Now “from the heart come forth thoughts . . . that defile a man” (Mat. 15:19,20). Therefore the breast ought to be anointed.

Objection 2: Further, purity of mind is not less necessary to those who are departing this life than to those who are entering therein. Now those who are entering are anointed with chrism on the head by the priest, to signify purity of mind. Therefore in this sacrament those who are departing should be anointed on the head.

Objection 3: Further, the remedy should be applied where the disease is most virulent. Now spiritual sickness is most virulent in the loins in men, and in the navel in women, according to Job 40:11: “His strength is in his loins, and his force in the navel of his belly,” as Gregory expounds the passage (Moral. xxxii, 11). Therefore these parts should be anointed.

Objection 4: Further, sins are committed with other parts of the body, no less than with the feet. Therefore, as the feet are anointed, so ought other members of the body to be anointed.

I answer that, The principles of sinning are the same in us as the principles of action, for a sin is an act. Now there are in us three principles of action; the first is the directing principle, namely, the cognitive power; the second is the commanding principle, namely, the appetitive power; the third is the executive principle, namely, the motive power.

Now all our knowledge has its origin in the senses. And, since the remedy for sin should be applied where sin originates in us first, for that reason the places of the five senses are anointed. the eyes, to wit, on account of the sight, the ears on account of hearing, the nostrils on account of the smell, the mouth on account of the taste, the hands on account of the touch which is keenest in the finger tips, (in some places too the loins are anointed on account of the appetite), and the feet are anointed on account of the motive power of which they are the chief instrument. And since the cognitive power is the first principle of human activity, the anointing of the five senses is observed by all, as being essential to the sacrament. But some do not observe the other unctions—some also anoint the feet but not the loins—because the appetitive and motive powers are secondary principles.

Reply to Objection 1: No thought arises in the heart without an act of the imagination which is a movement proceeding from sensation (De Anima ii). Hence the primary root of thought is not the heart, but the sensory organs, except in so far as the heart is a principle of the whole body, albeit a remote principle.

Reply to Objection 2: Those who enter have to receive purity of the mind, whereas those who are departing have to cleanse the mind. Hence the latter need to be anointed in those parts in respect of which the mind’s purity may be sullied.

Reply to Objection 3: Some are wont to anoint the loins, because they are the chief seat of the concupiscible appetite: however, as stated above, the appetitive power is not the primary root.

Reply to Objection 4: The bodily organs which are the instruments of sin, are the feet, hands, and tongue, all of which are anointed, and the organs of generation which it would be unbecoming to anoint, on account of their uncleanliness, and out of respect for the sacrament.

Whether those who are deformed in those parts should be anointed?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are deformed should not be anointed in those parts. For just as this sacrament demands a certain disposition on the part of the recipient, viz. that he should be sick, so it demands that he should be anointed in a certain part of the body. Now he that is not sick cannot be anointed. Therefore neither can he be anointed who lacks the part to be anointed.

Objection 2: Further, a man born blind does not sin by his sight. Yet in the anointing of the eyes mention is made of sins by sight. Therefore this anointing ought not to be applied to one born blind, and in like manner as regards the other senses.

On the contrary, Bodily deformity is not an impediment to any other sacrament. Therefore it should not be an impediment to this one. Now each of the anointings is essential to the sacrament. Therefore all should be applied to those who are deformed.

I answer that, Even those who are deformed should be anointed, and that as near as possible to the part which ought to have been anointed. For though they have not the members, nevertheless, they have, at least radically, the powers of the soul, corresponding to those members, and they may commit inwardly the sins that pertain to those members, though they cannot outwardly.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF THE REPETITION OF THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the repetition of this sacrament: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?

(2) Whether it ought to be repeated during the same sickness?

Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated. For the anointing of a man is of greater import than the anointing of a stone. But the anointing of an altar is not repeated, unless the altar be shattered. Neither, therefore, should Extreme Unction, whereby a man is anointed, be repeated.

Objection 2: Further, nothing comes after what is extreme. But this unction is called extreme. Therefore it should not be repeated.

On the contrary, This sacrament is a spiritual healing applied under the form of a bodily cure. But a bodily cure is repeated. Therefore this sacrament also can be repeated.

I answer that, No sacramental or sacrament, having an effect that lasts for ever, can be repeated, because this would imply that the sacrament had failed to produce that effect; and this would be derogatory to the sacrament. On the other hand a sacrament whose effect does not last for ever, can be repeated without disparaging that sacrament, in order that the lost effect may be recovered. And since health of body and soul, which is the effect of this sacrament, can be lost after it has been effected, it follows that this sacrament can, without disparagement thereto, be repeated.

Reply to Objection 1: The stone is anointed in order that the altar may be consecrated, and the stone remains consecrated, as long as the altar remains, hence it cannot be anointed again. But a man is not consecrated by being anointed, since it does not imprint a character on him. Hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 2: What men think to be extreme is not always extreme in reality. It is thus that this sacrament is called Extreme Unction, because it ought not to be given save to those whose death men think to be nigh.

Whether this sacrament ought to be repeated during the same sickness?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament ought not to be repeated during the same sickness. For one disease demands one remedy. Now this sacrament is a spiritual remedy. Therefore it ought not to be repeated for one sickness.

Objection 2: Further, if a sick man could be anointed more than once during one disease, this might be done for a whole day: which is absurd.

On the contrary, Sometimes a disease lasts long after the sacrament has been received, so that the remnants of sin, against which chiefly this sacrament is given, would be contracted. Therefore it ought to be given again.

I answer that, This sacrament regards not only the sickness, but also the state of the sick man, because it ought not to be given except to those sick people who seem, in man's estimation, to be nigh to death. Now some diseases do not last long; so that if this sacrament is given at the time that the sick man is in a state of danger of death, he does not leave that state except the disease be cured, and thus he needs not to be anointed again. But if he has a relapse, it will be a second sickness, and he can be anointed again. on the other hand some diseases are of long duration, as hectic fever, dropsy and the like, and those who lie sick of them should not be anointed until they seem to be in danger of death. And if the sick man escape that danger while the disease continues, and be brought again thereby to the same state of danger, he can be anointed again, because it is, as it were, another state of sickness, although strictly speaking, it is not another sickness. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

HOLY ORDERS (QQ[34]-40)

OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER AS TO ITS ESSENCE AND ITS PARTS (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the sacrament of Order: (1) Order in general; (2) the difference of Orders; (3) those who confer Orders; (4) the impediments to receiving Orders; (5) things connected with Orders.

Concerning Order in general three points have to be considered: (1) Its essence, quiddity, and parts; (2) Its effect; (3) The recipients of Orders.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there should be Order in the Church?

(2) Whether it is fittingly defined?

(3) Whether it is a sacrament?

(4) Whether its form is expressed properly?

(5) Whether this sacrament has any matter?

Whether there should be Order in the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that there should not be Order in the Church. For Order requires subjection and preeminence. But subjection seemingly is incompatible with the liberty whereunto we are called by Christ. Therefore there should not be Order in the Church.

Objection 2: Further, he who has received an Order becomes another’s superior. But in the Church everyone should deem himself lower than another (Phil. 2:3): “Let each esteem others better than themselves.” Therefore Order should not be in the Church.

Objection 3: Further, we find order among the angels on account of their differing in natural and gratuitous gifts. But all men are one in nature, and it is not known who has the higher gifts of grace. Therefore Order should not be in the Church.

On the contrary, “Those things that are of God, are in order [*Vulg: ‘Those (powers) that are, are ordained of God.’].” Now the Church is of God, for He Himself built it with His blood. Therefore there ought to be Order in the Church.

Further, the state of the Church is between the state of nature and the state of glory. Now we find order in nature, in that some things are above others, and likewise in glory, as in the angels. Therefore there should be Order in the Church.

I answer that, God wished to produce His works in likeness to Himself, as far as possible, in order that they might be perfect, and that He might be known through them. Hence, that He might be portrayed in His works, not only according to what He is in Himself, but also according as He acts on others, He laid this natural law on all things, that last things should be reduced and perfected by middle things, and middle things by the first, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). Wherefore that this beauty might not be lacking to the Church, He established Order in her so that some should deliver the sacraments to others, being thus made like to God in their own way, as co-operating with God; even as in the natural body, some members act on others.

Reply to Objection 1: The subjection of slavery is incompatible with liberty; for slavery consists in lording over others and employing them for one’s own profit. Such subjection is not required in Order, whereby those who preside have to seek the salvation of their subjects and not their own profit.

Reply to Objection 2: Each one should esteem himself lower in merit, not in office; and orders are a kind of office.

Reply to Objection 3: Order among the angels does not arise from difference of nature, unless accidentally, in so far as difference of grace results in them from difference of nature. But in them it results directly from their difference in grace; because their orders regard their participation of divine things, and their communicating them in the state of glory, which is according to the measure of grace, as being the end and effect, so to speak, of grace. on the other hand, the Orders of the Church militant regard the participation in the sacraments and the communication thereof, which are the cause of grace and, in a way, precede grace; and consequently our Orders do not require sanctifying grace, but only the power to dispense the sacraments; for which reason order does not correspond to the difference of sanctifying grace, but to the difference of power.

Whether Order is properly defined?

Objection 1: It would seem that order is improperly defined by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 53), where it is said "Order is a seal of the Church, whereby spiritual power is conferred on the person ordained." For a part should not be described as the genus of the whole. Now the character which is denoted by the seal in a subsequent definition is a part of order, since it is placed in contradistinction with that which is either reality only, or sacrament only, since it is both reality and sacrament. Therefore seal should not be mentioned as the genus of Order.

Objection 2: Further, just as a character is imprinted in the sacrament of order, so is it in the sacrament of Baptism. Now character was not mentioned in the definition of Baptism. Therefore neither should it be mentioned in the definition of Order.

Objection 3: Further, in Baptism there is also given a certain spiritual power to approach the sacraments; and again it is a seal, since it is a sacrament. Therefore this definition is applicable to Baptism; and consequently it is improperly applied to Order.

Objection 4: Further, Order is a kind of relation, and relation is realized in both its terms. Now the terms of the relation of order are the superior and the inferior. Therefore inferiors have order as well as superiors. Yet there is no power of preeminence in them, such as is mentioned here in the definition of Order, as appears from the subsequent explanation (Sent. iv, D, 53), where promotion to power is mentioned. Therefore Order is improperly defined there.

I answer that, The Master's definition of Order applies to Order as a sacrament of the Church. Hence he mentions two things, namely the outward sign, a "kind of seal," i.e. a kind of sign, and the inward effect, "whereby spiritual power," etc.

Reply to Objection 1: Seal stands here, not for the inward character, but for the outward action, which is the sign and cause of inward power; and this is also the sense of character in the other definition. If, however, it be taken for the inward character, the definition would not be unsuitable;

because the division of a sacrament into those three things is not a division into integral parts, properly speaking; since what is reality only is not essential to the sacrament, and that which is the sacrament is transitory; while that which is sacrament and reality is said to remain. Wherefore it follows that inward character itself is essentially and principally the sacrament of Order.

Reply to Objection 2: Although in Baptism there is conferred a spiritual power to receive the other sacraments, for which reason it imprints a character, nevertheless this is not its principal effect, but the inward cleansing; wherefore Baptism would be given even though the former motive did not exist. On the other hand, order denotes power principally. Wherefore the character which is a spiritual power is included in the definition of Order, but not in that of Baptism.

Reply to Objection 3: In Baptism there is given a certain spiritual potentiality to receive, and consequently a somewhat passive potentiality. But power properly denotes active potentiality, together with some kind of preeminence. Hence this definition is not applicable to Baptism.

Reply to Objection 4: The word “order” is used in two ways. For sometimes it denotes the relation itself, and thus it is both in the inferior and in the superior, as the objection states; but it is not thus that we use the word here. On the other hand, it denotes the degree which results in the order taken in the first sense. And since the notion of order as relation is observed where we first meet with something higher than another, it follows that this degree of pre-eminence by spiritual power is called Order.

Whether Order is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that Order is not a sacrament. For a sacrament, according to Hugh of St. Victor (De Sacram. i) “is a material element.” Now Order denotes nothing of the kind, but rather relation or power; since Order is a part of power according to Isidore. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments do not concern the Church triumphant. Yet Order is there, as in the angels. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, just as spiritual authority, which is Order, is given by means of consecration, so is secular authority, since kings also are anointed, as stated above ([4906]Q[19], A[3], ad 2). But the kingly power is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is order of which we speak now.

On the contrary, It is mentioned by all among the seven sacraments of the Church.

Further, "the cause of a thing being such, is still more so." Now Order is the cause of man being the dispenser of the other sacraments. Therefore Order has more reason for being a sacrament than the others.

I answer that, As stated above (Q[29], A[1]; [4907]TP, Q[60]), a sacrament is nothing else than a sanctification conferred on man with some outward sign. Wherefore, since by receiving orders a consecration is conferred on man by visible signs, it is clear that Order is a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Although Order does not by its name express a material element, it is not conferred without some material element.

Reply to Objection 2: Power must needs be proportionate to the purpose for which it is intended. Now the communication of divine things, which is the purpose for which spiritual power is given, is not effected among the angels by means of sensible signs, as is the case among men. Hence the spiritual power that is Order is not bestowed on the angels by visible signs, as on men. Wherefore Order is a sacrament among men, but not among angels.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every blessing or consecration given to men is a sacrament, for both monks and abbots are blessed, and yet such blessings are not sacraments, and in like manner neither is the anointing of a king; because by such blessings men are not ordained to the dispensing of the divine sacraments, as by the blessing of Order. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether the form of this sacrament is suitably expressed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the form of this sacrament is unsuitably set forth in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because the sacraments take their efficacy from their form. Now the efficacy of the sacraments is from the divine power, which works our salvation in them in a most hidden manner. Therefore the form of this sacrament should include a mention of the divine power by the invocation of the Trinity, as in the other sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, to command pertains to one who has authority. Now the dispenser of the sacrament exercises no authority, but only ministry. Therefore he should not use the imperative mood by saying: “Do” or “Receive” this or that, or some similar expression.

Objection 3: Further, mention should not be made in the sacramental form, except of such things as are essential to the sacrament. But the use of the power received is not essential to this sacrament, but is consequent upon it. Therefore it should not be mentioned in the form of this sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, all the sacraments direct us to an eternal reward. But the forms of the other sacraments make no mention of a reward. Therefore neither should any mention be made thereof in the form of this sacrament, as in the words: “Since thou wilt have a share, if faithfully,” etc.

I answer that, This sacrament consists chiefly in the power conferred. Now power is conferred by power, as like proceeds from like; and again power is made known by its use, since powers are manifested by their acts. Wherefore in the form of order the use of order is expressed by the act which is commanded; and the conferring of power is expressed by employing the imperative mood.

Reply to Objection 1: The other sacraments are not ordained chiefly to effects similar to the power whereby the sacraments are dispensed, as this sacrament is. Hence in this sacrament there is a kind of universal communication. Wherefore in the other sacraments something is expressed on the part of the divine power to which the effect of the sacrament is likened, but not in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 2: [There is a special reason why this sacrament, rather than the others, is conferred by employing the imperative mood. For]* although the bishop who is the minister of this sacrament has no authority in respect of the conferring of this sacrament, nevertheless he has some power with regard to the power of Order, which power he confers, in so far as it is derived, from his. [*The sentence in brackets is not in the Leonine edition.]

Reply to Objection 3: The use of power is the effect of power in the genus of efficient cause, and from this point of view it has no reason to be mentioned in the definition of Order. But it is somewhat a cause in the genus of final cause, and from this point of view it can be placed in the definition of order.

Reply to Objection 4: There is here a difference between this and the other sacraments. Because by this sacrament an office or the power to do something is conferred; and so it is fitting that mention be made of the reward to be obtained if it be administered faithfully. But in the other sacraments no such office or power to act is conferred, and so no mention of reward is made in them. Accordingly the recipient is somewhat passive in relation to the other sacraments, because he receives them for the perfecting of his own state only, whereas in relation to this sacrament he holds himself somewhat actively, since he receives it for the sake of exercising hierarchical duties in the Church. Wherefore although the other sacraments, from the very fact that they give grace, direct the recipient to salvation, properly speaking they do not direct him to a reward, in the same way as this sacrament does.

Whether this sacrament has any matter?

Objection 1: It would seem that this sacrament has no matter. Because in every sacrament that has a matter the power that works in the sacrament is in the matter. But in the material objects which are used here, such as keys, candlesticks, and so forth, there is not apparently any power of sanctification. Therefore it has no matter.

Objection 2: Further, in this sacrament the fulness of sevenfold grace is conferred, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), just as in Confirmation. But the matter of Confirmation requires to be consecrated beforehand. Since then the things which appear to be material in this sacrament are not consecrated beforehand, it would seem that they are not the matter of the sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, in any sacrament that has matter there needs to be contact of matter with the recipient of the sacrament. Now, as some say, it is not essential to this sacrament that there be contact between the aforesaid material objects and the recipient of the sacrament, but only that they be presented to him. Therefore the aforesaid material objects are not the matter of this sacrament.

On the contrary, Every sacrament consists of things and words. Now in any sacrament the thing is the matter. Therefore the things employed in this sacrament are its matter.

Further, more is requisite to dispense the sacraments than to receive them. Yet Baptism, wherein the power is given to receive the sacraments, needs a matter. Therefore order also does, wherein the power is given to dispense them.

I answer that, The matter employed outwardly in the sacraments signifies that the power which works in the sacraments comes entirely from without. Wherefore, since the effect proper to this sacrament, namely the character, is not received through any operation of the one who approaches the sacrament, as was the case in Penance, but comes wholly from without, it is fitting that it should have a matter, yet otherwise than the other sacraments that have matter; because that which is bestowed in the other sacraments comes from God alone, and not from the minister who dispenses the sacrament; whereas that which is conferred in this sacrament, namely the spiritual power, comes also from him who gives the sacrament, as imperfect from perfect power. Hence the efficacy of the other sacraments resides chiefly in the matter which both signifies and contains the divine power through the sanctification applied by the minister; whereas the efficacy of this sacrament resides chiefly with him who dispenses the sacrament. And the matter is employed to show the powers conferred in particular by one who has it completely, rather than to cause power; and this is clear from the fact that the matter is in keeping with the use of power. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: It is necessary for the matter to be consecrated in the other sacraments, on account of the power it contains; but it is not so in the case in point.

Reply to Objection 3: If we admit this assertion, the reason for it is clear from what we have said; for since the power of order is received from the minister and not from the matter, the presenting of the matter is more essential to the sacrament than contact therewith. However, the words themselves of the form would seem to indicate that contact with the matter is essential to the sacrament, for it is said: “Receive” this or that.

OF THE EFFECT OF THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider me effect of this sacrament. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?

(2) Whether a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?

(3) Whether the character of Order presupposes of necessity the character of Baptism?

(4) Whether it presupposes of necessity the character of Confirmation?

(5) Whether the character of one Order presupposes of necessity the character of another Order?

Whether sanctifying grace is conferred in the sacrament of Order?

Objection 1: It would seem that sanctifying grace is not conferred in the sacrament of Order. For it is commonly agreed that the sacrament of Order is directed to counteract the defect of ignorance. Now not sanctifying grace but gratuitous grace is given to counteract ignorance, for sanctifying grace has more to do with the will. Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in the sacrament of Order.

Objection 2: Further, Order implies distinction. Now the members of the Church are distinguished, not by sanctifying but by gratuitous grace, of which it is said (1 Cor. 12:4): “There are diversities of graces.” Therefore sanctifying grace is not given in order.

Objection 3: Further, no cause presupposes its effect. But grace is presupposed in one who receives orders, so that he may be worthy to receive them. Therefore this same grace is not given in the conferring of Orders.

On the contrary, The sacraments of the New Law cause what they signify. Now Order by its sevenfold number signifies the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which are not apart from sanctifying grace, are given in Orders.

Further, Order is a sacrament of the New Law. Now the definition of a sacrament of that kind includes the words, “that it may be a cause of grace.” Therefore it causes grace in the recipient.

I answer that The works of God are perfect (Dt. 32:4); and consequently whoever receives power from above receives also those things that render him competent to exercise that power. This is also the case in natural things, since animals are provided with members, by which their soul’s powers are enabled to proceed to their respective actions unless there be some defect on the part of matter. Now just as sanctifying grace is necessary in order that man receive the sacraments worthily, so is it that he may dispense them worthily. Wherefore as in Baptism, whereby a man is adapted to receive the other sacraments, sanctifying grace is given, so is it in the sacrament of Order whereby man is ordained to the dispensation of the other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 1: Order is given as a remedy, not to one person but to the whole Church. Hence, although it is said to be given in order to counteract ignorance, it does not mean that by receiving Orders a man has his ignorance driven out of him, but that the recipient of Orders is set in authority to expel ignorance from among the people.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the gifts of sanctifying grace are common to all the members of the Church, nevertheless a man cannot be the worthy recipient of those gifts, in respect of which the members of the Church are distinguished from one another, unless he have charity, and this cannot be apart from sanctifying grace.

Reply to Objection 3: The worthy exercise of Orders requires not any kind of goodness but excellent goodness, in order that as they who receive orders are set above the people in the degree of Order, so may they be above them by the merit of holiness. Hence they are required to have the grace that suffices to make them worthy members of Christ’s people, but when they receive Orders they are given a yet greater gift of grace, whereby they are rendered apt for greater things.

Whether in the sacrament of Order a character is imprinted in connection with all the Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the sacrament of Order a character is not imprinted in connection with all the Orders. For the character of Order is a spiritual power. Now some Orders are directed only to certain bodily acts, for instance those of the doorkeeper or of the acolyte. Therefore a character is not imprinted in these Orders.

Objection 2: Further, every character is indelible. Therefore a character places a man in a state whence he cannot withdraw. Now those who have certain Orders can lawfully return to the laity. Therefore a character is not imprinted in all the Orders.

Objection 3: Further, by means of a character a man is appointed to give or to receive some sacred thing. Now a man is sufficiently adapted to the reception of the sacraments by the character of Baptism, and a man is not appointed to dispense the sacraments except in the Order of priesthood. Therefore a character is not imprinted in the other Orders.

On the contrary, Every sacrament in which a character is not imprinted can be repeated. But no Order can be repeated. Therefore a character is imprinted in each Order.

Further, a character is a distinctive sign. Now there is something distinct in every Order. Therefore every Order imprints a character.

I answer that, There have been three opinions on this point. For some have said that a character is imprinted only in the Order of priesthood; but this is not true, since none but a deacon can exercise the act of the diaconate, and so it is clear that in the dispensation of the sacraments, he has a spiritual power which others have not. For this reason others have said that a character is impressed in the sacred, but not in the minor, Orders. But this again comes to nothing, since each Order sets a man above the people in some degree of authority directed to the dispensation of the sacraments. Wherefore since a character is a sign whereby one thing is distinguished from another, it follows that a character is imprinted in each Order. And this is confirmed by the fact that they remain for ever and are never repeated. This is the third and more common opinion.

Reply to Objection 1: Each Order either has an act connected with the sacrament itself, or adapts a man to the dispensation of the sacraments; thus doorkeepers exercise the act of admitting men to witness the Divine sacraments, and so forth; and consequently a spiritual power is required in each.

Reply to Objection 2: For all that a man may return to the laity, the character always remains in him. This is evident from the fact that if he return to the clerical state, he does not receive again the order which he had already.

The Reply to the Third Objection is the same as to the First.

Whether the character of Order presupposes the baptismal character?

Objection 1: It would seem that the character of Order does not presuppose the character of Baptism. For the character of Order makes a man a dispenser of the sacraments; while the character of Baptism makes him a recipient of them. Now active power does not necessarily presuppose passive power, for it can be without it, as in God. Therefore the character of Order does not necessarily presuppose the character of Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, it may happen that a man is not baptized, and yet think with probability that he has been baptized. If therefore such a person present himself for Orders, he will not receive the character of Order, supposing the character of Order to presuppose the character of Baptism; and consequently whatever he does by way of consecration or absolution will be invalid, and the Church will be deceived therein, which is inadmissible.

On the contrary, Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore since Order is a sacrament, it presupposes Baptism.

I answer that, No one can receive what he has not the power to receive. Now the character of Baptism gives a man the power to receive the other sacraments. Wherefore he that has not the baptismal character, can receive no other sacrament; and consequently the character of Order presupposes the character of Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: In one who has active power of himself, the active does not presuppose the passive power; but in one who has active power from another, passive power, whereby he is enabled to receive the active power, is prerequisite to active power.

Reply to Objection 2: Such a man if he be ordained to the priesthood is not a priest, and he can neither consecrate, nor absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Wherefore according to the canons he must be baptized, and reordained (Extra De Presbyt. non Bapt., cap. Si quis; cap. Veniens). And even though he be raised to the episcopate, those whom he ordains receive not the Order. Yet it may piously be believed that as regards the ultimate effects of the sacraments, the High Priest will supply the defect, and that He would not allow this to be so hidden as to endanger the Church.

Whether the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation?

Objection 1: It would seem that the character of Order necessarily presupposes the character of Confirmation. For in things subordinate to one another, as the middle presupposes the first, so does the last presuppose the middle. Now the character of Confirmation presupposes that of Baptism as being the first. Therefore the character of Order presupposes that of Confirmation as being in the middle.

Objection 2: Further, those who are appointed to confirm should themselves be most firm. Now those who receive the sacrament of Order are appointed to confirm others. Therefore they especially should have received the sacrament of Confirmation.

On the contrary, The apostles received the power of order before the Ascension (Jn. 20:22), where it is said: “Receive the Holy Ghost.” But they were confirmed after the Ascension by the coming of the Holy Ghost. Therefore order does not presuppose Confirmation.

I answer that, For the reception of Orders something is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, and something as congruous to the sacrament. For the validity of the sacrament it is required that one who presents himself for Orders should be capable of receiving them, and this is competent to him through Baptism; wherefore the baptismal character is prerequisite for the validity of the sacrament, so that the sacrament of Order cannot be conferred without it. On the other hand, as congruous to the sacrament a man is required to have every perfection whereby he becomes adapted to the exercise of Orders, and one of these is that he be confirmed. Wherefore the character of Order presupposes the character of Confirmation as congruous but not as necessary.

Reply to Objection 1: In this case the middle does not stand in the same relation to the last as the first to the middle, because the character of Baptism enables a man to receive the sacrament of Confirmation, whereas the character of Confirmation does not enable a man to receive the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers aptness by way of congruity.

Whether the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order?

Objection 1: It would seem that the character of one Order necessarily presupposes the character of another Order. For there is more in common between one Order and another, than between Order and another sacrament. But the character of Order presupposes the character of another sacrament, namely Baptism. Much more therefore does the character of one Order presuppose the character of another.

Objection 2: Further, the Orders are degrees of a kind. Now no one can reach a further degree, unless he first mount the previous degree. Therefore no one can receive the character of a subsequent Order unless he has first received the preceding Order.

On the contrary, If anything necessary for a sacrament be omitted in that sacrament, the sacrament must be repeated. But if one receive a subsequent Order, without receiving a preceding Order, he is not reordained, but he receives what was lacking, according to the canonical statutes (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.). Therefore the preceding Order is not necessary for the following.

I answer that, It is not necessary for the higher Orders that one should have received the minor Orders, because their respective powers are distinct, and one, considered in its essentials, does not require another in the same subject. Hence even in the early Church some were ordained priests without having previously received the lower Orders and yet they could do all that the lower Orders could, because the lower power is comprised in the higher, even as sense in understanding, and dukedom in kingdom. Afterwards, however, it was decided by the legislation of the Church that no one should present himself to the higher orders who had not previously humbled himself in the lower offices. And hence it is that according to the Canons (cap. Tuae literae, De clerico per salt. prom.) those who are ordained without receiving a preceding Order are not reordained, but receive what was lacking to them of the preceding Order.

Reply to Objection 1: Orders have more in common with one another as regards specific likeness, than order has with Baptism. But as regards proportion of power to action, Baptism has more in common with Order, than one Order with another, because Baptism confers on man the passive power to receive Orders, whereas a lower Order does not give him the passive power to receive higher Orders.

Reply to Objection 2: Orders are not degrees combining in one action or in one movement, so that it be necessary to reach the last through the first; but they are like degrees consisting in things of different kinds, such as the degrees between man and angel, and it is not necessary that one who is an angel be first of all a man. Such also are the degrees between the head and all members of the body; nor is it necessary that that which is the head should be previously a foot; and thus it is in the case in point.

OF THE QUALITIES REQUIRED OF THOSE WHO RECEIVE THIS SACRAMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the qualities required of those who receive the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive this sacrament?

(2) Whether the knowledge of the whole of Sacred Writ is required?

(3) Whether the degree of Orders is obtained by mere merit of life?

(4) Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders sins?

(5) Whether one who is in sin can without committing a sin exercise the Order he has received?

Whether goodness of life is required of those who receive Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that goodness of life is not required of those who receive Orders. For by Orders a man is ordained to the dispensation of the sacraments. But the sacraments can be administered by good and wicked. Therefore goodness of life is not requisite.

Objection 2: Further, the service of God in the sacraments is no greater than service offered to Him in the body. Now our Lord did not cast aside the sinful and notorious woman from rendering Him a bodily service (Lk. 7). Therefore neither should the like be debarred from His service in the sacraments.

Objection 3: Further, by every grace a remedy is given against sin. Now those who are in sin should not be refused a remedy that may avail them.

Since then grace is given in the sacrament of order, it would seem that this sacrament ought also to be conferred on sinners.

On the contrary, “Whosoever of the seed of Aaron throughout their families hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God neither shall he approach to minister to him [*Vulg.: ‘Say to Aaron: Whosoever of thy seed,’etc.]” (Lev. 21:17,18). Now “blemish signifies all kinds of vice” according to a gloss. Therefore he who is shackled by any vice should not be admitted to the ministry of Orders.

Further, Jerome commenting on the words of Titus 2:15, “Let no man despise thee,” says that “not only should bishops, priests, and deacons take very great care to be examples of speech and conduct to those over whom they are placed, but also the lower grades, and without exception all who serve the household of God, since it is most disastrous to the Church if the laity be better than the clergy.” Therefore holiness of life is requisite in all the Orders.

I answer that, As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), “even as the more subtle and clear essences, being filled by the outpouring of the solar radiance, like the sun enlighten other bodies with their brilliant light, so in all things pertaining to God a man must not dare to become a leader of others, unless in all his habits he be most deiform and godlike.” Wherefore, since in every order a man is appointed to lead others in Divine things, he who being conscious of mortal sin presents himself for Orders is guilty of presumption and sins mortally. Consequently holiness of life is requisite for Orders, as a matter of precept, but not as essential to the sacrament; and if a wicked man be ordained, he receives the Order none the less, and yet with sin withal.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the sinner dispenses sacraments validly, so does he receive validly the sacrament of Orders, and as he dispenses unworthily, even so he receives unworthily.

Reply to Objection 2: The service in point consisted only in the exercise of bodily homage, which even sinners can offer lawfully. It is different with the spiritual service to which the ordained are appointed, because thereby they are made to stand between God and the people. Wherefore they should shine with a good conscience before God, and with a good name before men.

Reply to Objection 3: Certain medicines require a robust constitution, else it is mortally dangerous to take them; others can be given to the weakly. So too in spiritual things certain sacraments are ordained as remedies for sin, and the like are to be given to sinners, as Baptism and Penance, while others, which confer the perfection of grace, require a man made strong by grace.

Whether knowledge of all Holy Writ is required?

Objection 1: It would seem that knowledge of all Holy Writ is required. For one from whose lips we seek the law, should have knowledge of the law. Now the laity seek the law at the mouth of the priest (Malachi 2:7). Therefore he should have knowledge of the whole law.

Objection 2: Further, “being always ready to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason of that faith and hope in you [*Vulg.: ‘Of that hope which is in you; St. Thomas apparently took his reading from Bede].” Now to give a reason for things pertaining to faith and hope belongs to those who have perfect knowledge of Holy Writ. Therefore the like knowledge should be possessed by those who are placed in Orders, and to whom the aforesaid words are addressed.

Objection 3: Further, no one is competent to read what he understands not, since to read without intelligence is “negligence,”* as Cato declares (Rudiment.). [*”Legere et non intelligere est negligere.” The play on the words is more evident in Latin.] Now it belongs to the reader (which is the lower Order) to read the Old Testament, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore he should understand the whole of the Old Testament; and much more those in the higher Orders.

On the contrary, Many are raised to the priesthood even who know nothing at all of these things, even in many religious Orders. Therefore apparently this knowledge is not required.

Further, we read in the Lives of the Fathers that some who were monks were raised to the priesthood, being of a most holy life. Therefore the aforesaid knowledge is not required in those to be ordained.

I answer that, For any human act to be rightly ordered there must needs be the direction of reason. Wherefore in order that a man exercise the office of an Order, it is necessary for him to have as much knowledge as suffices for his direction in the act of that Order. And consequently one who is to be raised to Orders is required to have that knowledge, and to be instructed in Sacred Scripture, not the whole, but more or less, according as his office is of a greater or lesser extent—to wit, that those who are placed over others, and receive the care of souls, know things pertaining to the doctrine of faith and morals, and that others know whatever concerns the exercise of their Order.

Reply to Objection 1: A priest exercises a twofold action: the one, which is principal, over the true body of Christ; the other, which is secondary, over the mystical body of Christ. The second act depends on the first, but not conversely. Wherefore some are raised to the priesthood, to whom the first act alone is deputed, for instance those religious who are not empowered with the care of souls. The law is not sought at the mouth of these, they are required only for the celebration of the sacraments; and consequently it is enough for them to have such knowledge as enables them to observe rightly those things that regard the celebration of the sacrament. Others are raised to exercise the other act which is over the mystical body of Christ, and it is at the mouth of these that the people seek the law; wherefore they ought to possess knowledge of the law, not indeed to know all the difficult points of the law (for in these they should have recourse to their superiors), but to know what the people have to believe and fulfill in the law. To the higher priests, namely the bishops, it belongs to know even those points of the law which may offer some difficulty, and to know them the more perfectly according as they are in a higher position.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason that we have to give for our faith and hope does not denote one that suffices to prove matters of faith and hope, since they are both of things invisible; it means that we should be able to give general proofs of the probability of both, and for this there is not much need of great knowledge.

Reply to Objection 3: The reader has not to explain Holy Writ to the people (for this belongs to the higher orders), but merely to voice the words. Therefore he is not required to have so much knowledge as to understand Holy Writ, but only to know how to pronounce it correctly. And since such knowledge is obtained easily and from many persons, it may be supposed with probability that the ordained will acquire that knowledge even if he have it not already, especially if it appear that he is on the road to acquire it.

Whether a man obtains the degrees of Order by the merit of one’s life?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man obtains the degrees of order by the mere merit of his life. For, according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xliii in the Opus Imperfectum, wrongly ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], “not every priest is a saint, but every saint is a priest.” Now a man becomes a saint by the merit of his life. Consequently he thereby also becomes a priest, and “a fortiori” has he the other Orders.

Objection 2: Further, in natural things, men obtain a higher degree from the very fact that they are near God, and have a greater share of His favors, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iv). Now it is by merit of holiness and knowledge that a man approaches nearer to God and receives more of His favors. Therefore by this alone he is raised to the degree of Orders.

On the contrary, Holiness once possessed can be lost. But when once a man is ordained he never loses his order. Therefore order does not consist in the mere merit of holiness.

I answer that, A cause should be proportionate to its effect. And consequently as in Christ, from Whom grace comes down on all men, there must needs be fulness of grace; so in the ministers of the Church, to whom it belongs, not to give grace, but to give the sacraments of grace, the degree of order does not result from their having grace, but from their participating in a sacrament of grace.

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the priest in reference to the reason for which he is so called, the word “sacerdos” signifying dispenser of holy things [sacra dans]: for in this sense every righteous man, in so far as he assists others by the sacraments, may be called a priest. But he is not speaking according to the actual meaning of the words; for this word “sacerdos” [priest] is employed to signify one who gives sacred things by dispensing the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 2: Natural things acquire a degree of superiority over others, from the fact that they are able to act on them by virtue of their form; wherefore from the very fact that they have a higher form, they obtain a higher degree. But the ministers of the Church are placed over others, not to confer anything on them by virtue of their own holiness (for this belongs to God alone), but as ministers, and as instruments, so to say, of the outpouring from the Head to the members. Hence the comparison fails as regards the dignity of Order, although it applies as to congruity.

Whether he who raises the unworthy to Orders commits a sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who raises the unworthy to orders commits no sin. For a bishop needs assistants appointed to the lesser offices. But he would be unable to find them in sufficient number, if he were to require of them such qualifications as the saints enumerate. Therefore if he raise some who are not qualified, he would seem to be excusable.

Objection 2: Further, the Church needs not only ministers for the dispensation of things spiritual, but also for the supervision of temporalities. But sometimes men without knowledge or holiness of life may be useful for the conduct of temporal affairs, either because of their worldly power, or on account of their natural industry. Therefore seemingly the like can be promoted without sin.

Objection 3: Further, everyone is bound to avoid sin, as far as he can. If therefore a bishop sins in promoting the unworthy, he is bound to take the utmost pains to know whether those who present themselves for Orders be worthy, by making a careful inquiry about their morals and knowledge, and yet seemingly this is not done anywhere.

On the contrary, It is worse to raise the wicked to the sacred ministry, than not to correct those who are raised already. But Heli sinned mortally by not correcting his sons for their wickedness; wherefore “he fell backwards . . . and died” (1 Kings 4:18). Therefore he who promotes the unworthy does not escape sin.

Further, spiritual things must be set before temporal things in the Church. Now a man would commit a mortal sin were he knowingly to endanger the temporalities of the Church. Much more therefore is it a mortal sin to endanger spiritual things. But whoever promotes the unworthy endangers spiritual things, since according to Gregory (Hom. xii in Evang.) “if a man’s life is contemptible, his preaching is liable to be despised”; and for the same reason all the spiritual things that he dispenses. Therefore he who promotes the unworthy sins mortally.

I answer that, Our Lord describes the faithful servant whom He has set "over His household to give them their measure of wheat." Hence he is guilty of unfaithfulness who gives any man Divine things above his measure: and whoso promotes the unworthy does this. Wherefore he commits a mortal crime, as being unfaithful to his sovereign Lord, especially since this is detrimental to the Church and to the Divine honor which is promoted by good ministers. For a man would be unfaithful to his earthly lord were he to place unworthy subjects in his offices.

Reply to Objection 1: God never so abandons His Church that apt ministers are not to be found sufficient for the needs of the people, if the worthy be promoted and the unworthy set aside. And though it were impossible to find as many ministers as there are now, it were better to have few good ministers than many bad ones, as the blessed Clement declares in his second epistle to James the brother of the Lord.

Reply to Objection 2: Temporal things are not to be sought but for the sake of spiritual things. Wherefore all temporal advantage should count for nothing, and all gain be despised for the advancement of spiritual good.

Reply to Objection 3: It is at least required that the ordainer know that nothing contrary to holiness is in the candidate for ordination. But besides this he is required to take the greatest care, in proportion to the Order or office to be enjoined, so as to be certain of the qualifications of those to be promoted, at least from the testification of others. This is the meaning of the Apostle when he says (1 Tim. 5:22): "Impose not hands lightly on any man."

Whether a man who is in sin can without sin exercise the Order he has received? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], A[6]]

Objection 1: It would seem that one who is in sin can without sin exercise the order he has received. For since, by virtue of his office, he is bound to exercise his order, he sins if he fails to do so. If therefore he sins by exercising it, he cannot avoid sin: which is inadmissible.

Objection 2: Further, a dispensation is a relaxation of the law. Therefore although by rights it would be unlawful for him to exercise the order he has received, it would be lawful for him to do so by dispensation.

Objection 3: Further, whoever co-operates with another in a mortal sin, sins mortally. If therefore a sinner sins mortally by exercising his order, he who receives or demands any Divine thing from him also sins mortally: and this seems absurd.

Objection 4: Further, if he sins by exercising his order, it follows that every act of his order that he performs is a mortal sin; and consequently since many acts concur in the one exercise of his order, it would seem that he commits many mortal sins: which seems very hard.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Demophil.): “It seems presumptuous for such a man, one to wit who is not enlightened, to lay hands on priestly things; he is not afraid nor ashamed, all unworthy that he is to take part in Divine things, with the thought that God does not see what he sees in himself; he thinks, by false pretense, to cheat Him Whom he falsely calls his Father; he dares to utter in the person of Christ, words polluted by his infamy, I will not call them prayers, over the Divine symbols.” Therefore a priest is a blasphemer and a cheat if he exercises his order unworthily, and thus he sins mortally: and in like manner any other person in orders.

Further, holiness of life is required in one who receives an order, that he may be qualified to exercise it. Now a man sins mortally if he present himself for orders in mortal sin. Much more therefore does he sin mortally whenever he exercises his order.

I answer that, The law prescribes (Dt. 16:20) that “man should follow justly after that which is just.” Wherefore whoever fulfills unworthily the duties of his order follows unjustly after that which is just, and acts contrary to a precept of the law, and thereby sins mortally. Now anyone who exercises a sacred office in mortal sin, without doubt does so unworthily. Hence it is clear that he sins mortally.

Reply to Objection 1: He is not perplexed as though he were in the necessity of sinning; for he can renounce his sin, or resign his office whereby he was bound to the exercise of his order.

Reply to Objection 2: The natural law allows of no dispensation; and it is of natural law that man handle holy things holily. Therefore no one can dispense from this.

Reply to Objection 3: So long as a minister of the Church who is in mortal sin is recognized by the Church, his subject must receive the sacraments from him, since this is the purpose for which he is bound to him. Nevertheless, outside the case of necessity, it would not be safe to induce him to an execution of his Order, as long as he is conscious of being in mortal sin, which conscience, however, he can lay aside since a man is repaired in an instant by Divine grace.

Reply to Objection 4: When any man performs an action as a minister of the Church while in a state of mortal sin, he sins mortally, and as often as he performs that action, since, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i), “it is wrong for the unclean even to touch the symbols,” i.e. the sacramental signs. Hence when they touch sacred things in the exercise of their office they sin mortally. It would be otherwise if they were to touch some sacred thing or perform some sacred duty in a case of necessity, when it would be allowable even to a layman, for instance if they were to baptize in a case of urgency, or gather up the Lord’s body should it be cast to the ground.

OF THE DISTINCTION OF ORDERS, OF THEIR ACTS, AND THE IMPRINTING OF THE CHARACTER (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the distinction of the orders and their acts, and the imprinting of the character. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Order should be divided into several kinds?

(2) How many are there?

(3) Whether they ought to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?

(4) Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?

(5) When are the characters of the Orders imprinted?

Whether we ought to distinguish several Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to distinguish several Orders. For the greater a power is, the less is it multiplied. Now this sacrament ranks above the others in so far as it places its recipients in a degree above other persons. Since then the other sacraments are not divided into several of which the whole is predicated, neither ought this sacrament to be divided into several Orders.

Objection 2: Further, if it be divided, the parts of the division are either integral or subjective. But they are not integral, for then the whole would not be predicated of them. Therefore it is a division into subjective parts. Now subjective parts can have the remote genus predicated of them in the plural in the same way as the proximate genus; thus man and ass are several animals, and are several animated bodies. Therefore also priesthood and diaconate, as they are several Orders, even so are several sacraments, since sacrament is the genus, so to speak, in respect of Orders.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 10) the form of authority in which one alone governs is a better government of the common weal than aristocracy, where different persons occupy different offices. But the government of the Church should be the best of all. Therefore in the Church there should be no distinction of Orders for different acts, but the whole power should reside in one person; and consequently there ought to be only one Order.

On the contrary, The Church is Christ’s mystical body, like to our natural body, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:5; 1 Cor. 12:12, 27; Eph. 1:22,23; Col. 1:24). Now in the natural body there are various offices of the members. Therefore in the Church also there should be various Orders.

Further, the ministry of the New Testament is superior to that of the Old Testament (2 Cor. 3). Now in the Old Testament not only the priests, but also their ministers, the Levites, were consecrated. Therefore likewise in the New Testament not only the priests but also their ministers should be consecrated by the sacrament of Order; and consequently there ought to be several Orders.

I answer that, Multiplicity of Orders was introduced into the Church for three reasons. First to show forth the wisdom of God, which is reflected in the orderly distinction of things both natural and spiritual. This is signified in the statement of 3 Kings 10:4,5 that “when the queen of Saba saw . . . the order of” Solomon’s “servants . . . she had no longer any spirit in her,” for she was breathless from admiration of his wisdom. Secondly, in order to succor human weakness, because it would be impossible for one man, without his being heavily burdened, to fulfill all things pertaining to the Divine mysteries; and so various orders are severally appointed to the various offices; and this is shown by the Lord giving Moses seventy ancients to assist him. Thirdly, that men may be given a broader way for advancing (to perfection), seeing that the various duties are divided among many men, so that all become the co-operators of God; than which nothing is more God-like, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii).

Reply to Objection 1: The other sacraments are given that certain effects may be received; but this sacrament is given chiefly that certain acts may be performed. Hence it behooves the sacrament of Order to be differentiated according to the diversity of acts, even as powers are differentiated by their acts.

Reply to Objection 2: The division of Order is not that of an integral whole into its parts, nor of a universal whole, but of a potential whole, the nature of which is that the notion of the whole is found to be complete in one part, but in the others by some participation thereof. Thus it is here: for the entire fulness of the sacrament is in one Order, namely the priesthood, while in the other sacraments there is a participation of Order. And this is signified by the Lord saying (Num. 11:17): “I will take of thy spirit and give to them, that they may bear with thee the burden of the people.” Therefore all the Orders are one sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: In a kingdom, although the entire fulness of power resides in the king, this does not exclude the ministers having a power which is a participation of the kingly power. It is the same in Order. In the aristocratic form of government, on the contrary, the fulness of power resides in no one, but in all.

Whether there are seven Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are not seven Orders. For the Orders of the Church are directed to the hierarchical acts. But there are only three hierarchical acts, namely “to cleanse, to enlighten, and to perfect,” for which reason Dionysius distinguishes three Orders (Eccl. Hier. v). Therefore there are not seven.

Objection 2: Further, all the sacraments derive their efficacy and authenticity from their institution by Christ, or at least by His apostles. But no mention except of priests and deacons is made in the teaching of Christ and His apostles. Therefore seemingly there are no other Orders.

Objection 3: Further, by the sacrament of Order a man is appointed to dispense the other sacraments. But there are only six other sacraments. Therefore there should be only six Orders.

Objection 4: On the other hand, It would seem that there ought to be more. For the higher a power is, the less is it subject to multiplication. Now the hierarchical power is in the angels in a higher way than in us, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. i). Since then there are nine Orders in the angelic hierarchy, there should be as many, or more, in the Church.

Objection 5: Further, the prophecy of the Psalms is the most noble of all the prophecies. Now there is one Order, namely of readers, for reading the other prophecies in the Church. Therefore there ought to be another Order for reading the Psalms, especially since (Decretals, Dist. xxi, cap. Cleros) the “psalmist” is reckoned as the second Order after the doorkeeper.

I answer that, Some show the sufficiency of the orders from their correspondence with the gratuitous graces which are indicated 1 Cor. 12. For they say that the “word of wisdom” belongs to the bishop, because he is the ordainer of others, which pertains to wisdom; the “word of knowledge” to the priest, for he ought to have the key of knowledge; “faith” to the deacon, for he preaches the Gospel; the “working of miracles” to the subdeacon, who sets himself to do deeds of perfection by the vow of continency; “interpretation of speeches” to the acolyte, this being signified by the light which he bears; the “grace of healing” to the exorcist; “diverse kinds of tongues” to the psalmist; “prophecy” to the reader; and the “discerning of spirits” to the doorkeeper, for he excludes some and admits others. But this is of no account, for the gratuitous graces are not given, as the Orders are, to one same man. For it is written (1 Cor. 12:4): “There are distributions [Douay: ‘diversities’] of graces.” Moreover the episcopate [*Cf.[4908] Q[40], A[5]] and the office of psalmist are included, which are not Orders. Wherefore others account for the Orders by likening them to the heavenly hierarchy, where the Orders are distinguished in reference to cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting. Thus they say that the doorkeeper cleanses outwardly, by separating even in the body the good from the wicked; that the acolyte cleanses inwardly, because by the light which he bears, he signifies that he dispels inward darkness; and that the exorcist cleanses both ways, for he casts out the devil who disturbs a man both ways. But enlightening, which is effected by teaching, is done by readers as regards prophetic doctrine; by subdeacons as to apostolic doctrine; and by deacons as to the gospel doctrine; while ordinary perfection, such as the perfection of Penance, Baptism, and so forth is the work of the priest; excellent perfection, such as the consecration of priests and virgins, is the work of the bishop; while the most excellent perfection is the work of the Sovereign Pontiff in whom resides the fulness of authority. But this again is of no account; both because the orders of the heavenly hierarchy are not distinguished by the aforesaid hierarchical actions, since each of them is applicable to every Order; and because, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), perfecting belongs to the bishops alone, enlightening to the priests, and cleansing to all the ministers. Wherefore others suit the orders to the seven gifts, so that the priesthood corresponds to the gift of wisdom, which feeds us with the bread of life and understanding, even as the priest refreshes us with the heavenly bread; fear to the doorkeeper, for he separates us from the wicked; and thus the intermediate Orders to the intermediate gifts. But this again is of no account, since the sevenfold grace is given in each one of the Orders. Consequently we must answer differently by saying that the sacrament of Order is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of sacraments, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii). For just as temple, altar, vessels, and vestments need to be consecrated, so do the ministers who are ordained for the Eucharist; and this consecration is the sacrament of Order. Hence the distinction of Orders is derived from their relation to the Eucharist. For the power of Order is directed either to the consecration of the Eucharist itself, or to some ministry in connection with this sacrament of the Eucharist. If in the former way, then it is the Order of priests; hence when they are ordained, they receive the chalice with wine, and the paten with the bread, because they are receiving the power to consecrate the body and blood of Christ. The co-operation of the ministers is directed either to the sacrament itself, or to the recipients. If the former, this happens in three ways. For in the first place, there is the ministry whereby the minister co-operates with the priest in the sacrament itself, by dispensing, but not by consecrating, for this is done by the priest alone; and this belongs to the deacon. Hence in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is said that it belongs to the deacon to minister to the priests in whatever is done in Christ’s sacraments, wherefore he dispenses Christ’s blood. Secondly, there is the ministry directed to the disposal of the sacramental matter in the sacred vessels of the sacrament. and this belongs to subdeacons. Wherefore it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that they carry the vessels of our Lord’s body and blood, and place the oblation on the altar; hence, when they are ordained, they receive the chalice, empty however, from the bishop’s hands. Thirdly, there is the ministry directed to the proffering of the sacramental matter, and this belongs to the acolyte. For he, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24), prepares the cruet with wine and water; wherefore he receives an empty cruet. The ministry directed to the preparation of the recipients can be exercised only over the unclean, since those who are clean are already apt for receiving the sacraments. Now the unclean are of three kinds, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii). For some are absolute unbelievers and unwilling to believe; and these must be altogether debarred from beholding Divine things and from the assembly of the faithful; this belongs to the doorkeepers. Some, however, are willing to believe, but are not as yet instructed, namely catechumens, and to the instruction of such persons the Order of readers is directed, who are therefore entrusted with the reading of the first rudiments of the doctrine of faith, namely the Old Testament. But some are believers and instructed, yet lie under an impediment through the power of the devil, namely those who are possessed: and to this ministry the order of exorcists is directed. Thus the reason and number of the degrees of Orders is made clear.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the orders not as sacraments, but as directed to hierarchical actions. Wherefore he distinguishes three Orders corresponding to those actions. The first of these Orders, namely the bishop, has all three actions; the second, namely the priest, has two; while the third has one, namely to cleanse; this is the deacon who is called a minister: and under this last all the lower Orders are comprised. But the Orders derive their sacramental nature from their relation to the greatest of the sacraments, and consequently the number of Orders depends on this.

Reply to Objection 2: In the early Church, on account of the fewness of ministers, all the lower ministries were entrusted to the deacons, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. iii), where he says: “Some of the ministers stand at the closed door of the Church, others are otherwise occupied in the exercise of their own order; others place the sacred bread and the chalice of benediction on the altar and offer them to the priests.” Nevertheless all the power to do all these things was included in the one power of the deacon, though implicitly. But afterwards the Divine worship developed, and the Church committed expressly to several persons that which had hitherto been committed implicitly in one Order. This is what the Master means, when He says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) that the Church instituted other Orders.

Reply to Objection 3: The orders are directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist chiefly, and to the other sacraments consequently, for even the other sacraments flow from that which is contained in that sacrament. Hence it does not follow that the orders ought to be distinguished according to the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 4: The angels differ specifically [*Cf. [4909]FP, Q[50], A[4]]: for this reason it is possible for them to have various modes of receiving Divine things, and hence also they are divided into various hierarchies. But in men there is only one hierarchy, because they have only one mode of receiving Divine things, which results from the human species, namely through the images of sensible objects. Consequently the distinction of orders in the angels cannot bear any relation to a sacrament as it is with us, but only a relation to the hierarchical actions which among them each Order exercises on the Orders below. In this respect our Orders correspond to theirs; since in our hierarchy there are three Orders, distinguished according to the three hierarchical actions, even as in each angelic hierarchy.

Reply to Objection 5: The office of psalmist is not an Order, but an office annexed to an Order. For the psalmist is also styled precentor because the psalms are recited with chant. Now precentor is not the name of a special Order, both because it belongs to the whole choir to sing, and because he has no special relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Since, however, it is a particular office, it is sometimes reckoned among the Orders, taking these in a broad sense.

Whether the Order should be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Orders ought not to be divided into those that are sacred and those that are not. For all the Orders are sacraments, and all the sacraments are sacred. Therefore all the Orders are sacred.

Objection 2: Further, by the Orders of the Church a man is not appointed to any other than Divine offices. Now all these are sacred. Therefore all the Orders also are sacred.

On the contrary, The sacred Orders are an impediment to the contracting of marriage and annul the marriage that is already contracted. But the four lower orders neither impede the contracting nor annul the contract. Therefore these are not sacred Orders.

I answer that, An Order is said to be sacred in two ways. First, in itself, and thus every order is sacred, since it is a sacrament. Secondly, by reason of the matter about which it exercises an act, and thus an Order is called sacred, if it exercises an act about some consecrated thing. In this sense there are only three sacred Orders, namely the priesthood and diaconate, which exercise an act about the consecrated body and blood of Christ, and the subdiaconate, which exercises an act about the consecrated vessels. Wherefore continency is enjoined them, that they who handle holy things may themselves be holy and clean.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the acts of the Orders are rightly assigned in the text?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the Orders are not rightly assigned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Because a person is prepared by absolution to receive Christ’s body. Now the preparation of the recipients of a sacrament belongs to the lower Orders. Therefore absolution from sins is unfittingly reckoned among the acts of a priest.

Objection 2: Further, man is made like to God immediately in Baptism, by receiving the character which causes this likeness. But prayer and the offering of oblations are acts directed immediately to God. Therefore every baptized person can perform these acts, and not priests alone.

Objection 3: Further, different Orders have different acts. But it belongs to the subdeacon to place the oblations on the altar, and to read the epistle; and subdeacons carry the cross before the Pope. Therefore these acts should not be assigned to the deacon.

Objection 4: Further, the same truth is contained in the Old and in the New Testament. But it belongs to the readers to read the Old Testament. Therefore it should belong to them likewise, and not to deacons, to read the New Testament.

Objection 5: Further, the apostles preached naught else but the gospel of Christ (Rom. 1:15). But the teaching of the apostles is entrusted to subdeacons to be read by them. Therefore the Gospel teaching should be also.

Objection 6: Further, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) that which belongs to a higher Order should not be applicable to a lower Order. But it is an act of subdeacons to minister with the cruets. Therefore it should not be assigned to acolytes.

Objection 7: Further, spiritual actions should rank above bodily actions. But the acolyte's act is merely corporeal. Therefore the exorcist has not the spiritual act of casting out devils, since he is of inferior rank.

Objection 8: Further, things that have most in common should be placed beside one another. Now the reading of the Old Testament must needs have most in common with the reading of the New Testament, which latter belongs to the higher ministers. Therefore the reading of the Old Testament should be reckoned the act, not of the reader, but rather of the acolyte; especially since the bodily light which the acolytes carry signifies the light of spiritual doctrine.

Objection 9: Further, in every act of a special Order, there should be some special power, which the person ordained has to the exclusion of other persons. But in opening and shutting doors the doorkeeper has no special power that other men have not. Therefore this should not be reckoned their act.

I answer that, Since the consecration conferred in the sacrament of orders is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, as stated above [4910](A[2]), the principal act of each order is that whereby it is most nearly directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. In this respect, too, one order ranks above another, in so far as one act is more nearly directed to that same sacrament. But because many things are directed to the Eucharist, as being the most exalted of the sacraments, it follows not unfittingly that one Order has many acts besides its principal act, and all the more, as it ranks higher, since a power extends to the more things, the higher it is.

Reply to Objection 1: The preparation of the recipients of a sacrament is twofold. One is remote and is effected by the ministers: another is proximate, whereby they are rendered apt at once for receiving the sacraments. This latter belongs to priests, since even in natural things matter receives from one and the same agent both the ultimate disposition to the form, and the form itself. And since a person acquires the proximate disposition to the Eucharist by being cleansed from sin, it follows that the priest is the proper minister of all those sacraments which are chiefly instituted for the cleansing of sins, namely Baptism, Penance, and Extreme Unction.

Reply to Objection 2: Acts are directed immediately to God in two ways; in one way on the part of one person only, for instance the prayers of individuals, vows, and so forth: such acts befit any baptized person. In another way on the part of the whole Church, and thus the priest alone exercises acts immediately directed to God; because to impersonate the whole Church belongs to him alone who consecrates the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the universal Church.

Reply to Objection 3: The offerings made by the people are offered through the priest. Hence a twofold ministry is necessary with regard to offerings. One on the part of the people: and this belongs to the subdeacon who receives the offerings from the people and places them on the altar or offers them to the deacon. the other is on the part of the priest, and belongs to the deacon, who hands the offerings to the priest. This is the principal act of both Orders, and for this reason the deacon’s Order is the higher. But to read the epistle does not belong to a deacon, except as the acts of lower Orders are ascribed to the higher; and in like manner to carry the cross. Moreover, this depends on the customs of Churches, because in secondary acts it is not unfitting for customs to vary.

Reply to Objection 4: Doctrine is a remote preparation for the reception of a sacrament; wherefore the announcement of doctrine is entrusted to the ministers. But the doctrine of the Old Testament is more remote than that of the New Testament, since it contains no instruction about this sacrament except in figures. Hence announcing of the New Testament is entrusted to the higher ministers, and that of the Old Testament to the lower ministers. Moreover the doctrine of the New Testament is more perfect as delivered by our Lord Himself, than as made known by His apostles. Wherefore the Gospel is committed to deacons and the Epistle to subdeacons.

This suffices for the Reply to the Fifth Objection.

Reply to Objection 6: Acolytes exercise an act over the cruet alone, and not over the contents of the cruet; whereas the subdeacon exercises an act over the contents of the cruet, because he handles the water and wine to the end that they be put into the chalice,* and again he pours the water over the hands of the priest; and the deacon, like the subdeacon, exercises an act over the chalice only, not over its contents, whereas the priest exercises an act over the contents. [*The wording of St. Thomas is sufficiently vague to refer either to the Roman rite, where the priest pours the wine and water into the chalice, or to the Dominican rite, where this is done by the subdeacon.] Wherefore as the subdeacon at his ordination receives an empty chalice, while the priest receives a full chalice, so the acolyte receives an empty cruet, but the subdeacon a full one. Thus there is a certain connection among the Orders.

Reply to Objection 7: The bodily acts of the acolyte are more intimately connected with the act of Holy orders than the act of the exorcist, although the latter is, in a fashion, spiritual. For the acolytes exercise a ministry over the vessels in which the sacramental matter is contained, as regards the wine, which needs a vessel to hold it on account of its humidity. Hence of all the minor orders the Order of acolytes is the highest.

Reply to Objection 8: The act of the acolyte is more closely connected with the principal acts of the higher ministers, than the acts of the other minor Orders, as is self-evident; and again as regards the secondary acts whereby they prepare the people by doctrine. For the acolyte by bearing a light represents the doctrine of the New Testament in a visible manner, while the reader by his recital represents it differently, wherefore the acolyte is of higher rank. It is the same with the exorcist, for as the act of the reader is compared with the secondary act of the deacon and subdeacon, so is the act of the exorcist compared with the secondary act of the priest, namely to bind and to loose, by which man is wholly freed from the slavery of the devil. This, too, shows the degrees of Order to be most orderly. since only the three higher Orders co-operate with the priest in his principal act which is to consecrate the body of Christ, while both the higher and lower Orders co-operate with him in his secondary act, which is to loose and bind.

Reply to Objection 9: Some say that in receiving the Order the doorkeeper is given a Divine power to debar others from entering the Church, even as Christ had, when He cast out the sellers from the Temple. But this belongs to a gratuitous grace rather than to a sacramental grace. Wherefore we should reply that he receives the power to do this by virtue of his office, although others may do so, but not officially. It is the case in all the acts of the minor Orders, that they can be lawfully exercised by others, even though these have no office to that effect: just as Mass may be said in an unconsecrated building, although the consecration of a church is directed to the purpose that Mass be said there.

Whether the character is imprinted on a priest when the chalice is handed to him?

Objection 1: It would seem that the character is not imprinted on the priest at the moment when the chalice is handed to him. For the consecration of a priest is done by anointing as in Confirmation. Now in Confirmation the character is imprinted at the moment of anointing; and therefore in the priesthood also and not at the handing of the chalice.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power when He said (Jn. 20:22,23): “Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive,” etc. Now the Holy Ghost is given by the imposition of hands. Therefore the character of order is given at the moment of the imposition of hands.

Objection 3: Further, as the ministers are consecrated, even so are the ministers’ vestments. Now the blessing alone consecrates the vestments. Therefore the consecration of the priest also is effected by the mere blessing of the bishop.

Objection 4: Further, as a chalice is handed to the priest, even so is the priestly vestment. Therefore if a character is imprinted at the giving of the chalice, so likewise is there at the giving of the chasuble, and thus a priest would have two characters: but this is false.

Objection 5: Further, the deacon’s order is more closely allied to the priest’s Order than is the subdeacon’s. But if a character is imprinted on the priest at the moment of the handing of the chalice, the subdeacon would be more closely allied to the priest than the deacon; because the subdeacon receives the character at the handing of the chalice and not the deacon.

Therefore the priestly character is not imprinted at the handing of the chalice.

Objection 6: Further, the Order of acolytes approaches nearer to the priestly act by exercising an act over the cruet than by exercising an act over the torch. Yet the character is imprinted on the acolytes when they receive the torch rather than when they receive the cruet, because the name of acolyte signifies candle-bearer. Therefore the character is not imprinted on the priest when he receives the chalice.

On the contrary, The principal act of the priest's Order is to consecrate Christ's body. Now he receives the power to this effect at the handing of the chalice. Therefore the character is imprinted on him then.

I answer that, As stated above (A[4], ad 1), to cause the form and to give the matter its proximate preparation for the form belong to the same agent. Wherefore the bishop in conferring orders does two things; for he prepares the candidates for the reception of orders, and delivers to them the power of order. He prepares them, both by instructing them in their respective offices and by doing something to them, so that they may be adapted to receive the power. This preparation consists of three things, namely blessing, imposition of hands, and anointing. By the blessing they are enlisted in the Divine service, wherefore the blessing is given to all. By the imposition of hands the fulness of grace is given, whereby they are qualified for exalted duties, wherefore only deacons and priests receive the imposition of hands, because they are competent to dispense the sacraments, although the latter as principal dispensers, the former as ministers. But by the anointing they are consecrated for the purpose of handling the sacrament, wherefore the anointing is done to the priests alone who touch the body of Christ with their own hands; even as a chalice is anointed because it holds the blood, and the paten because it holds the body.

The conferring of power is effected by giving them something pertaining to their proper act. And since the principal act of a priest is to consecrate the body and blood of Christ, the priestly character is imprinted at the very giving of the chalice under the prescribed form of words.

Reply to Objection 1: In Confirmation there is not given the office of exercising an act on an exterior matter, wherefore the character is not imprinted in that sacrament at the handing of some particular thing, but at the mere imposition of hands and anointing. But it is otherwise in the priestly Order, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord gave His disciples the priestly power, as regards the principal act, before His passion at the supper when He said: “Take ye and eat” (Mat. 26:26), wherefore He added: “Do this for a commemoration of Me” (Lk. 22:19). After the resurrection, however, He gave them the priestly power, as to its secondary act, which is to bind and loose.

Reply to Objection 3: Vestments require no other consecration except to be set aside for the Divine worship, wherefore the blessing suffices for their consecration. But it is different with those who are ordained, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 4: The priestly vestment signifies, not the power given to the priest, but the aptitude required of him for exercising the act of that power. Wherefore a character is imprinted neither on the priest nor on anyone else at the giving of a vestment.

Reply to Objection 5: The deacon’s power is midway between the subdeacon’s and the priest’s. For the priest exercises a power directly on Christ’s body, the subdeacon on the vessels only, and the deacon on Christ’s body contained in a vessel. Hence it is not for him to touch Christ’s body, but to carry the body on the paten, and to dispense the blood with the chalice. Consequently his power, as to the principal act, could not be expressed, either by the giving of the vessel only, or by the giving of the matter; and his power is expressed as to the secondary act alone, by his receiving the book of the Gospels, and this power is understood to contain the other; wherefore the character is impressed at the handing of the book.

Reply to Objection 6: The act of the acolyte whereby he serves with the cruet ranks before his act of carrying the torch; although he takes his name from the secondary act, because it is better known and more proper to him. Hence the acolyte receives the character when he is given the cruet, by virtue of the words uttered by the bishop.

OF THOSE WHO CONFER THIS SACRAMENT (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider those who confer this sacrament. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a bishop alone can confer this sacrament?

(2) Whether a heretic or any other person cut off from the Church can confer this sacrament?

Whether a bishop alone confers the sacrament of Order?

Objection 1: It would seem that not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order. For the imposition of hands has something to do with the consecration. Now not only the bishop but also the assisting priests lay hands on the priests who are being ordained. Therefore not only a bishop confers the sacrament of Order.

Objection 2: Further, a man receives the power of Order, when that which pertains to the act of his Order is handed to him. Now the cruet with water, bowl* and towel, are given to the subdeacon by the archdeacon; as also the candlestick with candle, and the empty cruet to the acolyte. [*”Bacili.” The rubric has “aquamanili.” Some texts of the Summa have “mantili” (“maniple”), but the archdeacon does not give the maniple to the subdeacon.] Therefore not only the bishop confers the sacrament of Order.

Objection 3: Further, that which belongs to an Order cannot be entrusted to one who has not the Order. Now the conferring of minor Orders is entrusted to certain persons who are not bishops, for instance to Cardinal priests. Therefore the conferring of Orders does not belong to the episcopal Order.

Objection 4: Further, whoever is entrusted with the principal is entrusted with the accessory also. Now the sacrament of Order is directed to the Eucharist, as accessory to principal. Since then a priest consecrates the Eucharist, he can also confer Orders.

Objection 5: Further, there is a greater distinction between a priest and a deacon than between bishop and bishop. But a bishop can consecrate a bishop. Therefore a priest can ordain a deacon.

On the contrary, Ministers are applied by their Orders to the Divine worship in a more noble way than the sacred vessels. But the consecration of the vessels belongs to a bishop only. Much more therefore does the consecration of ministers.

Further, the sacrament of Order ranks higher than the sacrament of Confirmation. Now a bishop alone confirms. Much more therefore does a bishop alone confer the sacrament of Order.

Further, virgins are not placed in a degree of spiritual power by their consecration, as the ordained are. Yet a bishop alone can consecrate a virgin. Therefore much more can he alone ordain.

I answer that, The episcopal power stands in the same relation to the power of the lower Orders, as political science, which seeks the common good, to the lower acts and virtues which seek some special good, as appears from what was said above ([4911]Q[37], A[1]). Now political science, as stated in Ethic. i, 2, lays down the law to lower sciences, namely what science each one ought to cultivate, and how far he should pursue it and in what way. Wherefore it belongs to a bishop to assign others to places in all the Divine services. Hence he alone confirms, because those who are confirmed receive the office, as it were, of confessing the faith; again he alone blesses virgins who are images of the Church, Christ's spouse, the care of which is entrusted chiefly to him; and he it is who consecrates the candidates for ordination to the ministry of Orders, and, by his consecration, appoints the vessels that they are to use; even as secular offices in various cities are allotted by him who holds the highest power, for instance by the king.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4912]Q[37], A[5]), at the imposition of hands there is given, not the character of the priestly Order, but grace which makes a man fit to exercise his Order. And since those who are raised to the priesthood need most copious grace, the priests together with the bishop lay hands on them, but the bishop alone lays hands on deacons.

Reply to Objection 2: Since the archdeacon is as it were minister-in-chief, all things pertaining to the ministry are handed by him, for instance the candle with which the acolyte serves the deacon by carrying it before him at the Gospel, and the cruet with which he serves the subdeacon; and in like manner he gives the subdeacon the things with which the latter serves the higher Orders. And yet the principal act of the subdeacon does not consist in these things, but in his co-operation as regards the matter of the sacrament; wherefore he receives the character through the chalice being handed to him by the bishop. On the other hand, the acolyte receives the character by virtue of the words of the bishop when the aforesaid things—

the cruet rather than the candlestick—are handed to him by the archdeacon. Hence it does not follow that the archdeacon ordains.

Reply to Objection 3: The Pope, who has the fulness of episcopal power, can entrust one who is not a bishop with things pertaining to the episcopal dignity, provided they bear no immediate relation to the true body of Christ. Hence by virtue of his commission a simple priest can confer the minor Orders and confirm; but not one who is not a priest. Nor can a priest confer the higher Orders which bear an immediate relation to Christ's body, over the consecration of which the Pope's power is no greater than that of a simple priest.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the Eucharist is in itself the greatest of the sacraments, it does not place a man in an office as does the sacrament of Order. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 5: In order to bestow what one has on another, it is necessary not only to be near him but also to have fulness of power. And since a priest has not fulness of power in the hierarchical offices, as a bishop has, it does not follow that he can raise others to the diaconate, although the latter Order is near to his.

Whether heretics and those who are cut off from the Church can confer Orders? [*Cf. TP, Q[64], AA[5],9]

Objection 1: It would seem that heretics and those who are cut off from the Church cannot confer Orders. For to confer Orders is a greater thing than to loose or bind anyone. But a heretic cannot loose or bind. Neither therefore can he ordain.

Objection 2: Further, a priest that is separated from the Church can consecrate, because the character whence he derives this power remains in him indelibly. But a bishop receives no character when he is raised to the episcopate. Therefore he does not necessarily retain the episcopal power after his separation from the Church.

Objection 3: Further, in no community can one who is expelled therefrom dispose of the offices of the community. Now Orders are offices of the Church. Therefore one who is outside the Church cannot confer Orders.

Objection 4: Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ's passion. Now a heretic is not united to Christ's passion; neither by his own faith, since he is an unbeliever, nor by the faith of the Church, since he is severed from the Church. Therefore he cannot confer the sacrament of Orders.

Objection 5: Further, a blessing is necessary in the conferring of Orders. But a heretic cannot bless; in fact his blessing is turned into a curse, as appears from the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). Therefore he cannot ordain.

On the contrary, When a bishop who has fallen into heresy is reconciled he is not reconsecrated. Therefore he did not lose the power which he had of conferring Orders.

Further, the power to ordain is greater than the power of Orders. But the power of Orders is not forfeited on account of heresy and the like. Neither therefore is the power to ordain.

Further, as the one who baptizes exercises a merely outward ministry, so does one who ordains, while God works inwardly. But one who is cut off from the Church by no means loses the power to baptize. Neither therefore does he lose the power to ordain.

I answer that, on this question four opinions are mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25). For some said that heretics, so long as they are tolerated by the Church, retain the power to ordain, but not after they have been cut off from the Church; as neither do those who have been degraded and the like. This is the first opinion. Yet this is impossible, because, happen what may, no power that is given with a consecration can be taken away so long as the thing itself remains, any more than the consecration itself can be annulled, for even an altar or chrism once consecrated remains consecrated for ever. Wherefore, since the episcopal power is conferred by consecration, it must needs endure for ever, however much a man may sin or be cut off from the Church. For this reason others said that those who are cut off from the Church after having episcopal power in the Church, retain the power to ordain and raise others, but that those who are raised by them have not this power. This is the fourth opinion. But this again is impossible, for if those who were ordained in the Church retain the power they received, it is clear that by exercising their power they consecrate validly, and therefore they validly confer whatever power is given with that consecration, and thus those who receive ordination or promotion from them have the same power as they. Wherefore others said that even those who are cut off from the

Church can confer Orders and the other sacraments, provided they observe the due form and intention, both as to the first effect, which is the conferring of the sacrament, and as to the ultimate effect which is the conferring of grace. This is the second opinion. But this again is inadmissible, since by the very fact that a person communicates in the sacraments with a heretic who is cut off from the Church, he sins, and thus approaches the sacrament insincerely and cannot obtain grace, except perhaps in Baptism in a case of necessity. Hence others say that they confer the sacraments validly, but do not confer grace with them, not that the sacraments are lacking in efficacy, but on account of the sins of those who receive the sacraments from such persons despite the prohibition of the Church. This is the third and the true opinion.

Reply to Objection 1: The effect of absolution is nothing else but the forgiveness of sins which results from grace, and consequently a heretic cannot absolve, as neither can he confer grace in the sacraments. Moreover in order to give absolution it is necessary to have jurisdiction, which one who is cut off from the Church has not.

Reply to Objection 2: When a man is raised to the episcopate he receives a power which he retains for ever. This, however, cannot be called a character, because a man is not thereby placed in direct relation to God, but to Christ's mystical body. Nevertheless it remains indelibly even as the character, because it is given by consecration.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are ordained by heretics, although they receive an Order, do not receive the exercise thereof, so as to minister lawfully in their Orders, for the very reason indicated in the Objection.

Reply to Objection 4: They are united to the passion of Christ by the faith of the Church, for although in themselves they are severed from it, they are united to it as regards the form of the Church which they observe.

Reply to Objection 5: This refers to the ultimate effect of the sacraments, as the third opinion maintains.

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THIS SACRAMENT (SIX ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediments to this sacrament. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving this sacrament?

(2) Whether lack of the use of reason is?

(3) Whether the state of slavery is?

(4) Whether homicide is?

(5) Whether illegitimate birth is?

(6) Whether lack of members is?

Whether the female sex is an impediment to receiving Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that the female sex is no impediment to receiving Orders. For the office of prophet is greater than the office of priest, since a prophet stands midway between God and priests, just as the priest does between God and people. Now the office of prophet was sometimes granted to women, as may be gathered from 4 Kings 22:14. Therefore the office of priest also may be competent to them.

Objection 2: Further, just as Order pertains to a kind of pre-eminence, so does a position of authority as well as martyrdom and the religious state. Now authority is entrusted to women in the New Testament, as in the case of abbesses, and in the Old Testament, as in the case of Debbora, who judged Israel (Judges 2). Moreover martyrdom and the religious life are also befitting to them. Therefore the Orders of the Church are also competent to them.

Objection 3: Further, the power of orders is founded in the soul. But sex is not in the soul. Therefore difference in sex makes no difference to the reception of Orders.

On the contrary, It is said (1 Tim. 2:12): “I suffer not a woman to teach (in the Church),* nor to use authority over the man.” [*The words in parenthesis are from 1 Cor. 14:34, “Let women keep silence in the churches.”]

Further, the crown is required previous to receiving Orders, albeit not for the validity of the sacrament. But the crown or tonsure is not befitting to women according to 1 Cor. 11. Neither therefore is the receiving of Orders.

I answer that, Certain things are required in the recipient of a sacrament as being requisite for the validity of the sacrament, and if such things be lacking, one can receive neither the sacrament nor the reality of the sacrament. Other things, however, are required, not for the validity of the sacrament, but for its lawfulness, as being congruous to the sacrament; and without these one receives the sacrament, but not the reality of the sacrament. Accordingly we must say that the male sex is required for receiving Orders not only in the second, but also in the first way. Wherefore even though a woman were made the object of all that is done in conferring Orders, she would not receive Orders, for since a sacrament is a sign, not only the thing, but the signification of the thing, is required in all sacramental actions; thus it was stated above ([4913]Q[32], A[2]) that in Extreme Unction it is necessary to have a sick man, in order to signify the need of healing. Accordingly, since it is not possible in the female sex to signify eminence of degree, for a woman is in the state of subjection, it follows that she cannot receive the sacrament of Order. Some, however, have asserted that the male sex is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament, because even in the Decretals (cap. Mulieres dist. 32; cap. Diaconissam, 27, qu. i) mention is made of deaconesses and priestesses. But deaconess there denotes a woman who shares in some act of a deacon, namely who reads the homilies in the Church; and priestess [presbytera] means a widow, for the word “presbyter” means elder.

Reply to Objection 1: Prophecy is not a sacrament but a gift of God. Wherefore there it is not the signification, but only the thing which is necessary. And since in matters pertaining to the soul woman does not differ from man as to the thing (for sometimes a woman is found to be better than many men as regards the soul), it follows that she can receive the gift of prophecy and the like, but not the sacrament of Orders.

And thereby appears the Reply to the Second and Third Objections. However, as to abbesses, it is said that they have not ordinary authority, but delegated as it were, on account of the danger of men and women living together. But Debbora exercised authority in temporal, not in priestly matters, even as now woman may have temporal power.

Whether boys and those who lack the use of reason can receive Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that boys and those who lack the use of reason cannot receive Orders. For, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 25), the sacred canons have appointed a certain fixed age in those who receive Orders. But this would not be if boys could receive the sacrament of Orders. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, the sacrament of Orders ranks above the sacrament of matrimony. Now children and those who lack the use of reason cannot contract matrimony. Neither therefore can they receive Orders.

Objection 3: Further, act and power are in the same subject, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vigil. i). Now the act of Orders requires the use of reason. Therefore the power of Orders does also.

On the contrary, one who is raised to Orders before the age of discretion is sometimes allowed to exercise them without being reordained, as appears from Extra., De Cler. per salt. prom. But this would not be the case if he had not received Orders. Therefore a boy can receive Orders.

Further, boys can receive other sacraments in which a character is imprinted, namely Baptism and Confirmation. Therefore in like manner they can receive Orders.

I answer that, Boyhood and other defects which remove the use of reason occasion an impediment to act. Wherefore the like are unfit to receive all those sacraments which require an act on the part of the recipient of the sacrament, such as Penance, Matrimony, and so forth. But since infused powers like natural powers precede acts—although acquired powers follow acts—and the removal of that which comes after does not entail the removal of what comes first, it follows that children and those who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in which an act on the part of the recipient is not required for the validity of the sacrament, but some spiritual power is conferred from above; with this difference, however, that in the minor orders the age of discretion is required out of respect for the dignity of the sacrament, but not for its lawfulness, nor for its validity. Hence some can without sin be raised to the minor orders before the years of discretion, if there be an urgent reason for it and hope of their proficiency. and they are validly ordained; for although at the time they are not qualified for the offices entrusted to them, they will become qualified by being habituated thereto. For the higher Orders, however, the use of reason is required both out of respect for, and for the lawfulness of the sacrament, not only on account of the vow of continency annexed thereto, but also because the handling of the sacraments is entrusted to them [*See Acts of the Council of Trent: De Reform., Sess. xxii, cap. 4,11,12]. But for the episcopate whereby a man receives power also over the mystical body, the act of accepting the pastoral care of souls is required; wherefore the use of reason is necessary for the validity of episcopal consecration. Some, however, maintain that the use of reason is necessary for the validity of the sacrament in all the Orders. but this statement is not confirmed either by authority or by reason.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated in the Article, not all that is necessary for the lawfulness of a sacrament is required for its validity.

Reply to Objection 2: The cause of matrimony is consent, which cannot be without the use of reason. Whereas in the reception of Orders no act is required on the part of the recipients since no act on their part is expressed in their consecration. Hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 3: Act and power are in the same subject; yet sometimes a power, such as the free-will, precedes its act; and thus it is in the case in point.

Whether the state of slavery is an impediment to receiving Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that the state of slavery is not an impediment to receiving Orders. For corporal subjection is not incompatible with spiritual authority. But in a slave there is corporal subjection. Therefore he is not hindered from receiving the spiritual authority which is given in orders.

Objection 2: Further, that which is an occasion for humility should not be an impediment to the reception of a sacrament. Now such is slavery, for the Apostle counsels a man, if possible, rather to remain in slavery (1 Cor. 7:21). Therefore it should not hinder him from being raised to Orders.

Objection 3: Further, it is more disgraceful for a cleric to become a slave than for a slave to be made a cleric. Yet a cleric may lawfully be sold as a slave; for a bishop of Nola, Paulinus, to wit, sold himself as a slave as related by Gregory (Dial. iii). Much more therefore can a slave be made a cleric.

Objection 4: On the contrary, It would seem that it is an impediment to the validity of the sacrament. For a woman, on account of her subjection, cannot receive the sacrament of Orders. But greater still is the subjection in a slave; since woman was not given to man as his handmaid (for which reason she was not made from his feet). Therefore neither can a slave receive this sacrament.

Objection 5: Further, a man, from the fact that he receives an Order, is bound to minister in that Order. But he cannot at the same time serve his carnal master and exercise his spiritual ministry. Therefore it would seem that he cannot receive Orders, since the master must be indemnified.

I answer that, By receiving Orders a man pledges himself to the Divine offices. And since no man can give what is not his, a slave who has not the disposal of himself, cannot be raised to Orders. If, however, he be raised, he receives the Order, because freedom is not required for the validity of the sacrament, although it is requisite for its lawfulness, since it hinders not the power, but the act only. The same reason applies to all who are under an obligation to others, such as those who are in debt and like persons.

Reply to Objection 1: The reception of spiritual power involves also an obligation to certain bodily actions, and consequently it is hindered by bodily subjection.

Reply to Objection 2: A man may take an occasion for humility from many other things which do not prove a hindrance to the exercise of Orders.

Reply to Objection 3: The blessed Paulinus did this out of the abundance of his charity, being led by the spirit of God; as was proved by the result of his action, since by his becoming a slave, many of his flock were freed from slavery. Hence we must not draw a conclusion from this particular instance, since “where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17).

Reply to Objection 4: The sacramental signs signify by reason of their natural likeness. Now a woman is a subject by her nature, whereas a slave is not. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 5: If he be ordained, his master knowing and not dissenting, by this very fact he becomes a freedman. But if his master be in ignorance, the bishop and he who presented him are bound to pay the master double the slave’s value, if they knew him to be a slave. Otherwise if the slave has possessions of his own, he is bound to buy his freedom, else he would have to return to the bondage of his master, notwithstanding the impossibility of his exercising his Order.

Whether a man should be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of homicide. Because our Orders originated with the office of the Levites, as stated in the previous Distinction (Sent. iv, D, 24). But the Levites consecrated their hands by shedding the blood of their brethren (Ex. 32:29). Therefore neither should anyone in the New Testament be debarred from receiving Orders on account of the shedding of blood.

Objection 2: Further, no one should be debarred from a sacrament on account of an act of virtue. Now blood is sometimes shed for justice' sake, for instance by a judge; and he who has the office would sin if he did not shed it. Therefore he is not hindered on that account from receiving Orders.

Objection 3: Further, punishment is not due save for a fault. Now sometimes a person commits homicide without fault, for instance by defending himself, or again by mishap. Therefore he ought not to incur the punishment of irregularity.

On the contrary, Against this there are many canonical statutes [*Cap. Miror; cap. Clericum; cap. De his Cler., dist. 1; cap. Continebatur, De homic. volunt.], as also the custom of the Church.

I answer that, All the Orders bear a relation to the sacrament of the Eucharist, which is the sacrament of the peace vouchsafed to us by the shedding of Christ's blood. And since homicide is most opposed to peace, and those who slay are conformed to Christ's slayers rather than to Christ slain, to whom all the ministers of the aforesaid sacrament ought to be conformed, it follows that it is unlawful, although not invalid, for homicides to be raised to Orders.

Reply to Objection 1: The Old Law inflicted the punishment of blood, whereas the New Law does not. Hence the comparison fails between the ministers of the Old Testament and those of the New, which is a sweet yoke and a light burden (Mat. 11:30).

Reply to Objection 2: Irregularity is incurred not only on account of sin, but chiefly on account of a person being unfit to administer the sacrament of the Eucharist. Hence the judge and all who take part with him in a cause of blood, are irregular, because the shedding of blood is unbecoming to the ministers of that sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: No one does a thing without being the cause thereof, and in man this is something voluntary. Hence he who by mishap slays a man without knowing that it is a man, is not called a homicide, nor does he incur irregularity (unless he was occupying himself in some unlawful manner, or failed to take sufficient care, since in this case the slaying becomes somewhat voluntary). But this is not because he is not in fault, since irregularity is incurred even without fault. Wherefore even he who in a particular case slays a man in self-defense without committing a sin, is none the less irregular [*St. Thomas is speaking according to the canon law of his time. This is no longer the case now.].

Whether those of illegitimate birth should be debarred from receiving Orders?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are of illegitimate birth should not be debarred from receiving Orders. For the son should not bear the iniquity of the father (Ezech. 18:20); and yet he would if this were an impediment to his receiving Orders. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, one’s own fault is a greater impediment than the fault of another. Now unlawful intercourse does not always debar a man from receiving Orders. Therefore neither should he be debarred by the unlawful intercourse of his father.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 23:2): “A mamzer, that is to say, one born of a prostitute, shall not enter into the Church of the Lord until the tenth generation.” Much less therefore should he be ordained.

I answer that, Those who are ordained are placed in a position of dignity over others. Hence by a kind of propriety it is requisite that they should be without reproach, not for the validity but for the lawfulness of the sacrament, namely that they should be of good repute, bedecked with a virtuous life, and not publicly penitent. And since a man’s good name is bedimmed by a sinful origin, therefore those also who are born of an unlawful union are debarred from receiving orders, unless they receive a dispensation; and this is the more difficult to obtain, according as their origin is more discreditable.

Reply to Objection 1: Irregularity is not a punishment due for sin. Hence it is clear that those who are of illegitimate birth do not bear the iniquity of their father through being irregular.

Reply to Objection 2: What a man does by his own act can be removed by repentance and by a contrary act; not so the things which are from nature. Hence the comparison fails between sinful act and sinful origin.

Whether lack of members should be an impediment?

Objection 1: It would seem that a man ought not to be debarred from receiving Orders on account of a lack of members. For one who is afflicted should not receive additional affliction. Therefore a man ought not to be deprived of the degree of Orders on account of his suffering a bodily defect.

Objection 2: Further, integrity of discretion is more necessary for the act of orders than integrity of body. But some can be ordained before the years of discretion. Therefore they can also be ordained though deficient in body.

On the contrary, The like were debarred from the ministry of the Old Law (Lev. 21:18, seqq.). Much more therefore should they be debarred in the New Law.

We shall speak of bigamy in the treatise on Matrimony ([4914]Q[66]).

I answer that, As appears from what we have said above ([4915]AA[3],4,5), a man is disqualified from receiving Orders, either on account of an impediment to the act, or on account of an impediment affecting his personal comeliness. Hence he who suffers from a lack of members is debarred from receiving Orders, if the defect be such as to cause a notable blemish, whereby a man’s comeliness is bedimmed (for instance if his nose be cut off) or the exercise of his Order imperilled; otherwise he is not debarred. This integrity, however, is necessary for the lawfulness and not for the validity of the sacrament.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO THE SACRAMENT OF ORDER (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the things that are annexed to the sacrament of Order. Under this head there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether those who are ordained ought to be shaven and tonsured in the form of a crown?

(2) Whether the tonsure is an Order?

(3) Whether by receiving the tonsure one renounces temporal goods?

(4) Whether above the priestly Order there should be an episcopal power?

(5) Whether the episcopate is an Order?

(6) Whether in the Church there can be any power above the episcopate?

(7) Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted by the Church?

Whether those who are ordained ought to wear the tonsure?

Objection 1: It would seem that those who are ordained ought not to wear the tonsure in the shape of a crown. For the Lord threatened captivity and dispersion to those who were shaven in this way: “Of the captivity of the bare head of the enemies” (Dt. 32:42), and: “I will scatter into every wind them that have their hair cut round” (Jer. 49:32). Now the ministers of Christ should not be captives, but free. Therefore shaving and tonsure in the shape of a crown does not become them.

Objection 2: Further, the truth should correspond to the figure. Now the crown was prefigured in the Old Law by the tonsure of the Nazarenes, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Therefore since the Nazarenes were not ordained to the Divine ministry, it would seem that the ministers of the Church should not receive the tonsure or shave the head in the form of a crown. The same would seem to follow from the fact that lay brothers, who are not ministers of the Church, receive a tonsure in the religious Orders.

Objection 3: Further, the hair signifies superabundance, because it grows from that which is superabundant. But the ministers of the Church should cast off all superabundance. Therefore they should shave the head completely and not in the shape of a crown.

On the contrary, According to Gregory, “to serve God is to reign” (Super Ps. 101:23). Now a crown is the sign of royalty. Therefore a crown is becoming to those who are devoted to the Divine ministry.

Further, according to 1 Cor. 11:15, hair is given us “for a covering.” But the ministers of the altar should have the mind uncovered. Therefore the tonsure is becoming to them.

I answer that, It is becoming for those who apply themselves to the Divine ministry to be shaven or tonsured in the form of a crown by reason of the shape. Because a crown is the sign of royalty; and of perfection, since it is circular; and those who are appointed to the Divine service acquire a royal dignity and ought to be perfect in virtue. It is also becoming to them as it involves the hair being taken both from the higher part of the head by shaving, lest their mind be hindered by temporal occupations from contemplating Divine things, and from the lower part by clipping, lest their senses be entangled in temporal things.

Reply to Objection 1: The Lord threatens those who did this for the worship of demons.

Reply to Objection 2: The things that were done in the Old Testament represent imperfectly the things of the New Testament. Hence things pertaining to the ministers of the New Testament were signified not only by the offices of the Levites, but also by all those persons who professed some degree of perfection. Now the Nazarenes professed a certain perfection by having their hair cut off, thus signifying their contempt of temporal things, although they did not have it cut in the shape of a crown, but cut it off completely, for as yet it was not the time of the royal and perfect priesthood. In like manner lay brothers have their hair cut because they renounce temporalities. but they do not shave the head, because they are not occupied in the Divine ministry, so as to have to contemplate Divine things with the mind.

Reply to Objection 3: Not only the renunciation of temporalities, but also the royal dignity has to be signified by the form of a crown; wherefore the hair should not be cut off entirely. Another reason is that this would be unbecoming.

Whether the tonsure is an Order?

Objection 1: It would seem that the tonsure is an Order. For in the acts of the Church the spiritual corresponds to the corporal. Now the tonsure is a corporal sign employed by the Church. Therefore seemingly there is some interior signification corresponding thereto; so that a person receives a character when he receives the tonsure, and consequently the latter is an Order.

Objection 2: Further, just as Confirmation and the other Orders are given by a bishop alone, so is the tonsure. Now a character is imprinted in Confirmation, and the other Orders. Therefore one is imprinted likewise in receiving the tonsure. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Objection 3: Further, Order denotes a degree of dignity. Now a cleric by the very fact of being a cleric is placed on a degree above the people.

Therefore the tonsure by which he is made a cleric is an Order.

On the contrary, No Order is given except during the celebration of Mass. But the tonsure is given even outside the office of the Mass. Therefore it is not an Order.

Further, in the conferring of every Order mention is made of some power granted, but not in the conferring of the tonsure. Therefore it is not an Order.

I answer that, The ministers of the Church are severed from the people in order that they may give themselves entirely to the Divine worship. Now in the Divine worship are certain actions that have to be exercised by virtue of certain definite powers, and for this purpose the spiritual power of order is given; while other actions are performed by the whole body of ministers in common, for instance the recital of the Divine praises. For such things it is not necessary to have the power of Order, but only to be deputed to such an office; and this is done by the tonsure. Consequently it is not an Order but a preamble to Orders.

Reply to Objection 1: The tonsure has some spiritual thing inwardly corresponding to it, as signate corresponds to sign; but this is not a spiritual power. Wherefore a character is not imprinted in the tonsure as in an Order.

Reply to Objection 2: Although a man does not receive a character in the tonsure, nevertheless he is appointed to the Divine worship. Hence this appointment should be made by the supreme minister, namely the bishop, who moreover blesses the vestments and vessels and whatsoever else is employed in the Divine worship.

Reply to Objection 3: A man through being a cleric is in a higher state than a layman; but as regards power he has not the higher degree that is required for Orders.

Whether by receiving the tonsure a man renounces temporal goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that men renounce temporal goods by receiving the tonsure, for when they are tonsured they say: “The Lord is the portion of my inheritance.” But as Jerome says (Ep. ad Nepot.), “the Lord disdains to be made a portion together with these temporal things.” Therefore he renounces temporalities.

Objection 2: Further, the justice of the ministers of the New Testament ought to abound more than that of the ministers of the Old Testament (Mat. 5:20). But the ministers of the Old Testament, namely the Levites, did not receive a portion of inheritance with their brethren (Dt. 10; Dt. 18). Therefore neither should the ministers of the New Testament.

Objection 3: Further, Hugh says (De Sacram. ii) that “after a man is made a cleric, he must from thenceforward live on the pay of the Church.” But this would not be so were he to retain his patrimony. Therefore he would seem to renounce it by becoming a cleric.

On the contrary, Jeremias was of the priestly order (Jer. 1:1). Yet he retained possession of his inheritance (Jer. 32:8). Therefore clerics can retain their patrimony.

Further, if this were not so there would seem to be no difference between religious and the secular clergy.

I answer that, Clerics by receiving the tonsure, do not renounce their patrimony or other temporalities; since the possession of earthly things is not contrary to the Divine worship to which clerics are appointed, although excessive care for such things is; for as Gregory says (Moral. x, 30), “it is not wealth but the love of wealth that is sinful.”

Reply to Objection 11: The Lord disdains to be a portion as being loved equally with other things, so that a man place his end in God and the things of the world. He does not, however, disdain to be the portion of those who so possess the things of the world as not to be withdrawn thereby from the Divine worship.

Reply to Objection 2: In the Old Testament the Levites had a right to their paternal inheritance; and the reason why they did not receive a portion with the other tribes was because they were scattered throughout all the tribes, which would have been impossible if, like the other tribes, they had received one fixed portion of the soil.

Reply to Objection 3: Clerics promoted to holy orders, if they be poor, must be provided for by the bishop who ordained them; otherwise he is not so bound. And they are bound to minister to the Church in the Order they have received. The words of Hugh refer to those who have no means of livelihood.

Whether above the priestly Order there ought to be an episcopal power?

Objection 1: It would seem that there ought not to be an episcopal power above the priestly Order. For as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24) “the priestly Order originated from Aaron.” Now in the Old Law there was no one above Aaron. Therefore neither in the New Law ought there to be any power above that of the priests.

Objection 2: Further, powers rank according to acts. Now no sacred act can be greater than to consecrate the body of Christ, whereunto the priestly power is directed. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly power.

Objection 3: Further, the priest, in offering, represents Christ in the Church, Who offered Himself for us to the Father. Now no one is above Christ in the Church, since He is the Head of the Church. Therefore there should not be an episcopal above the priestly power.

On the contrary, A power is so much the higher according as it extends to more things. Now the priestly power, according to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v), extends only to cleansing and enlightening, whereas the episcopal power extends both to this and to perfecting. Therefore the episcopal should be above the priestly power.

Further, the Divine ministries should be more orderly than human ministries. Now the order of human ministries requires that in each office there should be one person to preside, just as a general is placed over soldiers. Therefore there should also be appointed over priests one who is the chief priest, and this is the bishop. Therefore the episcopal should be above the priestly power.

I answer that, A priest has two acts: one is the principal, namely to consecrate the body of Christ. the other is secondary, namely to prepare God’s people for the reception of this sacrament, as stated above ([4916]Q[37], AA[2],4). As regards the first act, the priest’s power does not depend on a higher power save God’s; but as to the second, it depends on a higher and that a human power. For every power that cannot exercise its act without certain ordinances, depends on the power that makes those ordinances. Now a priest cannot loose and bind, except we presuppose him to have the jurisdiction of authority, whereby those whom he absolves are subject to him. But he can consecrate any matter determined by Christ, nor is anything else required for the validity of the sacrament; although, on account of a certain congruousness, the act of the bishop is pre-required in the consecration of the altar, vestments, and so forth. Hence it is clear that it behooves the episcopal to be above the priestly power, as regards the priest’s secondary act, but not as regards his primary act.

Reply to Objection 1: Aaron was both priest and pontiff, that is chief priest. Accordingly the priestly power originated from him, in so far as he was a priest offering sacrifices, which was lawful even to the lesser priests; but it does not originate from him as pontiff, by which power he was able to do certain things; for instance, to enter once a year the Holy of Holies, which it was unlawful for the other priests to do.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no higher power with regard to this act, but with regard to another, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the perfections of all natural things pre-exist in God as their exemplar, so was Christ the exemplar of all ecclesiastical offices. Wherefore each minister of the Church is, in some respect, a copy of Christ, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24). Yet he is the higher who represents Christ according to a greater perfection. Now a priest represents Christ in that He fulfilled a certain ministry by Himself, whereas a bishop represents Him in that He instituted other ministers and founded the Church. Hence it belongs to a bishop to dedicate a thing to the Divine offices, as establishing the Divine worship after the manner of Christ. For this reason also a bishop is especially called the bridegroom of the Church even as Christ is.

Whether the episcopate is an Order?

Objection 1: It would seem that the episcopate is an Order. First of all, because Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) assigns these three orders to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, the bishop, the priest, and the minister. In the text also (Sent. iv, D, 24) it is stated that the episcopal Order is fourfold.

Objection 2: Further, Order is nothing else but a degree of power in the dispensing of spiritual things. Now bishops can dispense certain sacraments which priests cannot dispense, namely Confirmation and Order. Therefore the episcopate is an Order.

Objection 3: Further, in the Church there is no spiritual power other than of Order or jurisdiction. But things pertaining to the episcopal power are not matters of jurisdiction, else they might be committed to one who is not a bishop, which is false. Therefore they belong to the power of Order. Therefore the bishop has an Order which a simple priest has not; and thus the episcopate is an Order.

On the contrary, One Order does not depend on a preceding order as regards the validity of the sacrament. But the episcopal power depends on the priestly power, since no one can receive the episcopal power unless he have previously the priestly power. Therefore the episcopate is not an Order.

Further, the greater Orders are not conferred except on Saturdays [*The four Ember Saturdays]. But the episcopal power is bestowed on Sundays [*Dist. lxxv, can. Ordinationes]. Therefore it is not an Order.

I answer that, Order may be understood in two ways. In one way as a sacrament, and thus, as already stated ([4917]Q[37], AA[2],4), every Order is directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist. Wherefore since the bishop has not a higher power than the priest, in this respect the episcopate is not an Order. In another way Order may be considered as an office in relation to certain sacred actions: and thus since in hierarchical actions a bishop has in relation to the mystical body a higher power than the priest, the episcopate is an Order. It is in this sense that the authorities quoted speak.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: Order considered as a sacrament which imprints a character is specially directed to the sacrament of the Eucharist, in which Christ Himself is contained, because by a character we are made like to Christ Himself [*Cf. [4918]TP, Q[63], A[3]]. Hence although at his promotion a bishop receives a spiritual power in respect of certain sacraments, this power nevertheless has not the nature of a character. For this reason the episcopate is not an Order, in the sense in which an Order is a sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: The episcopal power is one not only of jurisdiction but also of Order, as stated above, taking Order in the sense in which it is generally understood.

Whether in the Church there can be anyone above the bishops?

Objection 1: It would seem that there cannot be anyone in the Church higher than the bishops. For all the bishops are the successors of the apostles. Now the power so given to one of the apostles, namely Peter (Mat. 16:19), was given to all the apostles (Jn. 20:23). Therefore all bishops are equal, and one is not above another.

Objection 2: Further, the rite of the Church ought to be more conformed to the Jewish rite than to that of the Gentiles. Now the distinction of the episcopal dignity and the appointment of one over another, were introduced by the Gentiles. as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24); and there was no such thing in the Old Law. Therefore neither in the Church should one bishop be above another.

Objection 3: Further, a higher power cannot be conferred by a lower, nor equal by equal, because "without all contradiction that which is less is blessed by the greater [Vulg.: 'better']"; hence a priest does not consecrate a bishop or a priest, but a bishop consecrates a priest. But a bishop can consecrate any bishop, since even the bishop of Ostia consecrates the Pope. Therefore the episcopal dignity is equal in all matters, and consequently one bishop should not be subject to another, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 24).

On the contrary, We read in the council of Constantinople: "In accordance with the Scriptures and the statutes and definitions of the canons, we venerate the most holy bishop of ancient Rome the first and greatest of bishops, and after him the bishop of Constantinople." Therefore one bishop is above another.

Further, the blessed Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, says: "That we may remain members of our apostolic head, the throne of the Roman Pontiffs, of whom it is our duty to seek what we are to believe and what we are to hold, venerating him, beseeching him above others; for his it is to reprove, to correct, to appoint, to loose, and to bind in place of Him Who set up that very throne, and Who gave the fulness of His own to no other, but to him alone, to whom by divine right all bow the head, and the primates of the world are obedient as to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself." Therefore bishops are subject to someone even by divine right.

I answer that, Wherever there are several authorities directed to one purpose, there must needs be one universal authority over the particular authorities, because in all virtues and acts the order is according to the order of their ends (Ethic. i, 1,2). Now the common good is more Godlike than the particular good. Wherefore above the governing power which aims at a particular good there must be a universal governing power in respect of the common good, otherwise there would be no cohesion towards the one object. Hence since the whole Church is one body, it behooves, if this oneness is to be preserved, that there be a governing power in respect of the whole Church, above the episcopal power whereby each particular Church is governed, and this is the power of the Pope. Consequently those who deny this power are called schismatics as causing a division in the unity of the Church. Again, between a simple bishop and the Pope there are other degrees of rank corresponding to the degrees of union, in respect of which one congregation or community includes another; thus the community of a province includes the community of a city, and the community of a kingdom includes the community of one province, and the community of the whole world includes the community of one kingdom.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the power of binding and loosing was given to all the apostles in common, nevertheless in order to indicate some order in this power, it was given first of all to Peter alone, to show that this power must come down from him to the others. For this reason He said to him in the singular: “Confirm thy brethren” (Lk. 22:32), and: “Feed My sheep” (Jn. 21:17), i.e. according to Chrysostom: “Be thou the president and head of thy brethren in My stead, that they, putting thee in My place, may preach and confirm thee throughout the world whilst thou sittest on thy throne.”

Reply to Objection 2: The Jewish rite was not spread abroad in various kingdoms and provinces, but was confined to one nation; hence there was no need to distinguish various pontiffs under the one who had the chief power. But the rite of the Church, like that of the Gentiles, is spread abroad through various nations; and consequently in this respect it is necessary for the constitution of the Church to be like the rite of the Gentiles rather than that of the Jews.

Reply to Objection 3: The priestly power is surpassed by the episcopal power, as by a power of a different kind; but the episcopal is surpassed by the papal power as by a power of the same kind. Hence a bishop can perform every hierarchical act that the Pope can; whereas a priest cannot perform every act that a bishop can in conferring the sacraments. Wherefore as regards matters pertaining to the episcopal Order, all bishops are equal, and for this reason any bishop can consecrate another bishop.

Whether the vestments of the ministers are fittingly instituted in the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that the vestments of the ministers are not fittingly instituted in the Church. For the ministers of the New Testament are more bound to chastity than were the ministers of the Old Testament. Now among the vestments of the Old Testament there were the breeches as a sign of chastity. Much more therefore should they have a place among the vestments of the Church's ministers.

Objection 2: Further, the priesthood of the New Testament is more worthy than the priesthood of the Old. But the priests of the Old Testament had mitres, which are a sign of dignity. Therefore the priests of the New Testament should also have them.

Objection 3: Further, the priest is nearer than the episcopal Order to the Orders of ministers. Now the bishop uses the vestments of the ministers, namely the dalmatic, which is the deacon's vestment, and the tunic, which is the subdeacon's. Much more therefore should simple priests use them.

Objection 4: Further, in the Old Law the pontiff wore the ephod [*Superhumerale, i.e. over-the-shoulders], which signified the burden of the Gospel, as Bede observes (De Tabernac. iii). Now this is especially incumbent on our pontiffs. Therefore they ought to wear the ephod.

Objection 5: Further, "Doctrine and Truth" were inscribed on the "rational" which the pontiffs of the Old Testament wore. Now truth was made known especially in the New Law. Therefore it is becoming to the pontiffs of the New Law.

Objection 6: Further, the golden plate on which was written the most admirable name of God, was the most admirable of the adornments of the Old Law. Therefore it should especially have been transferred to the New Law.

Objection 7: Further, the things which the ministers of the Church wear outwardly are signs of inward power. Now the archbishop has no other kind of power than a bishop, as stated above [4919](A[6]). Therefore he should not have the pallium which other bishops have not.

Objection 8: Further, the fulness of power resides in the Roman Pontiff. But he has not a crozier. Therefore other bishops should not have one.

I answer that, The vestments of the ministers denote the qualifications required of them for handling Divine things. And since certain things are required of all, and some are required of the higher, that are not so exacted of the lower ministers, therefore certain vestments are common to all the ministers, while some pertain to the higher ministers only. Accordingly it is becoming to all the ministers to wear the “amice” which covers the shoulders, thereby signifying courage in the exercise of the Divine offices to which they are deputed; and the “alb,” which signifies a pure life, and the “girdle,” which signifies restraint of the flesh. But the subdeacon wears in addition the “maniple” on the left arm; this signifies the wiping away of the least stains, since a maniple is a kind of handkerchief for wiping the face; for they are the first to be admitted to the handling of sacred things. They also have the “narrow tunic,” signifying the doctrine of Christ; wherefore in the Old Law little bells hung therefrom, and subdeacons are the first admitted to announce the doctrine of the New Law. The deacon has in addition the “stole” over the left shoulder, as a sign that he is deputed to a ministry in the sacraments themselves, and the “dalmatic” (which is a full vestment, so called because it first came into use in Dalmatia), to signify that he is the first to be appointed to dispense the sacraments: for he dispenses the blood, and in dispensing one should be generous.

But in the case of the priest the “stole” hangs from both shoulders, to show that he has received full power to dispense the sacraments, and not as the minister of another man, for which reason the stole reaches right down. He also wears the “chasuble,” which signifies charity, because he it is who consecrates the sacrament of charity, namely the Eucharist.

Bishops have nine ornaments besides those which the priest has; these are the “stockings, sandals, succinctory, tunic, dalmatic, mitre, gloves, ring, and crozier,” because there are nine things which they can, but priests cannot, do, namely ordain clerics, bless virgins, consecrate bishops, impose hands, dedicate churches, depose clerics, celebrate synods, consecrate chrism, bless vestments and vessels.

We may also say that the “stockings” signify his upright walk; the “sandals” which cover the feet, his contempt of earthly things; the “succinctory” which girds the stole with the alb, his love of probity; the “tunic,” perseverance, for Joseph is said (Gn. 37:23) to have had a long tunic—“talaric,” because it reached down to the ankles [talos], which denote the end of life; the “dalmatic,” generosity in works of mercy; the “gloves,” prudence in action; the “mitre,” knowledge of both Testaments, for which reason it has two crests; the “crozier,” his pastoral care, whereby he has to gather together the wayward (this is denoted by the curve at the head of the crozier), to uphold the weak (this is denoted by the stem of the crozier), and to spur on the laggards (this is denoted by the point at the foot of the crozier). Hence the line:

“Gather, uphold, spur on
The wayward, the weak, and the laggard.”

The “ring” signifies the sacraments of that faith whereby the Church is espoused to Christ. For bishops are espoused to the Church in the place of Christ. Furthermore archbishops have the “pallium” in sign of their privileged power, for it signifies the golden chain which those who fought rightfully were wont to receive.

Reply to Objection 1: The priests of the Old Law were enjoined continency only for the time of their attendance for the purpose of their ministry. Wherefore as a sign of the chastity which they had then to observe, they wore the breeches while offering sacrifices. But the ministers of the New Testament are enjoined perpetual continency; and so the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: The mitre was not a sign of dignity, for it was a kind of hat, as Jerome says (Ep. ad Fabiol.). But the diadem which was a sign of dignity was given to the pontiffs alone, as the mitre is now.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of the ministers resides in the bishop as their source, but not in the priest, for he does not confer those Orders. Wherefore the bishop, rather than the priest, wears those vestments.

Reply to Objection 4: Instead of the ephod, they wear the stole, which is intended for the same signification as the ephod.

Reply to Objection 5: The pallium takes the place of the “rational.”

Reply to Objection 6: Instead of that plate our pontiff wears the cross, as Innocent III says (De Myst. Miss. i), just as the breeches are replaced by the sandals, the linen garment by the alb, the belt by the girdle, the long or talaric garment by the tunic, the ephod by the amice, the “rational” by the pallium, the diadem by the mitre.

Reply to Objection 7: Although he has not another kind of power he has the same power more fully. and so in order to designate this perfection, he receives the pallium which surrounds him on all sides.

Reply to Objection 8: The Roman Pontiff does not use a pastoral staff because Peter sent his to restore to life a certain disciple who afterwards became bishop of Treves. Hence in the diocese of Treves the Pope carries a crozier but not elsewhere; or else it is a sign of his not having a restricted power denoted by the curve of the staff.

MATRIMONY (QQ[41]-67)

OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY AS DIRECTED TO AN OFFICE OF NATURE (FOUR ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider matrimony. We must treat of it (1) as directed to an office of nature; (2) as a sacrament; (3) as considered absolutely and in itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether it is of natural law?

(2) Whether it is a matter of precept?

(3) Whether its act is lawful?

(4) Whether its act can be meritorious?

Whether matrimony is of natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not natural. Because “the natural law is what nature has taught all animals” [*Digest. I, i, de justitia et jure, 1]. But in other animals the sexes are united without matrimony. Therefore matrimony is not of natural law.

Objection 1: Further, that which is of natural law is found in all men with regard to their every state. But matrimony was not in every state of man, for as Tully says (De Inv. Rhet.), “at the beginning men were savages and then no man knew his own children, nor was he bound by any marriage tie,” wherein matrimony consists. Therefore it is not natural.

Objection 3: Further, natural things are the same among all. But matrimony is not in the same way among all, since its practice varies according to the various laws. Therefore it is not natural.

Objection 4: Further, those things without which the intention of nature can be maintained would seem not to be natural. But nature intends the preservation of the species by generation which is possible without matrimony, as in the case of fornicators. Therefore matrimony is not natural.

On the contrary, At the commencement of the Digests it is stated: “The union of male and female, which we call matrimony, is of natural law.”

Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) says that “man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political society.” But “man is naturally a political and gregarious animal,” as the same author asserts (Polit. i, 2). Therefore he is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.

I answer that, A thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, as resulting of necessity from the principles of nature; thus upward movement is natural to fire. In this way matrimony is not natural, nor are any of those things that come to pass at the intervention or motion of the free-will. Secondly, that is said to be natural to which nature inclines although it comes to pass through the intervention of the free-will; thus acts of virtue and the virtues themselves are called natural; and in this way matrimony is natural, because natural reason inclines thereto in two ways. First, in relation to the principal end of matrimony, namely the good of the offspring. For nature intends not only the begetting of offspring, but also its education and development until it reach the perfect state of man as man, and that is the state of virtue. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12), we derive three things from our parents, namely “existence,” “nourishment,” and “education.” Now a child cannot be brought up and instructed unless it have certain and definite parents, and this would not be the case unless there were a tie between the man and a definite woman and it is in this that matrimony consists. Secondly, in relation to the secondary end of matrimony, which is the mutual services which married persons render one another in household matters. For just as natural reason dictates that men should live together, since one is not self-sufficient in all things concerning life, for which reason man is described as being naturally inclined to political society, so too among those works that are necessary for human life some are becoming to men, others to women. Wherefore nature inculcates that society of man and woman which consists in matrimony. These two reasons are given by the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12).

Reply to Objection 1: Man’s nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way, because that thing is becoming to the generic nature, and this is common to all animals; in another way because it is becoming to the nature of the difference, whereby the human species in so far as it is rational overflows the genus; such is an act of prudence or temperance. And just as the generic nature, though one in all animals, yet is not in all in the same way, so neither does it incline in the same way in all, but in a way befitting each one. Accordingly man's nature inclines to matrimony on the part of the difference, as regards the second reason given above; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12; Polit. i) gives this reason in men over other animals; but as regards the first reason it inclines on the part of the genus; wherefore he says that the begetting of offspring is common to all animals. Yet nature does not incline thereto in the same way in all animals; since there are animals whose offspring are able to seek food immediately after birth, or are sufficiently fed by their mother; and in these there is no tie between male and female; whereas in those whose offspring needs the support of both parents, although for a short time, there is a certain tie, as may be seen in certain birds. In man, however, since the child needs the parents' care for a long time, there is a very great tie between male and female, to which tie even the generic nature inclines.

Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Tully may be true of some particular nation, provided we understand it as referring to the proximate beginning of that nation when it became a nation distinct from others; for that to which natural reason inclines is not realized in all things, and this statement is not universally true, since Holy Writ states that there has been matrimony from the beginning of the human race.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii) "human nature is not unchangeable as the Divine nature is." Hence things that are of natural law vary according to the various states and conditions of men; although those which naturally pertain to things Divine nowise vary.

Reply to Objection 4: Nature intends not only being in the offspring, but also perfect being, for which matrimony is necessary, as shown above.

Whether matrimony still comes under a precept?

Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26);

nor do we read anywhere that this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed (Mat. 19:6): “What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” Therefore matrimony still comes under a precept.

Objection 2: Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above [4920](A[1]). Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, “for the good of the State is more Godlike than the good of one man” (Ethic. i, 2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more therefore does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species.

Objection 4: Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since then the result would be the same, if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:38): “He that giveth not his virgin in marriage doth better [*Vulg.: ‘He that giveth his virgin in marriage doth well, and he that giveth her not doth better’],” namely than he that giveth her in marriage. Therefore the contract of marriage is not now a matter of precept.

Further, no one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely the aureole, is due to virgins [*Cf.[4921] Q[96], A[5]]. Therefore matrimony does not come under a precept.

I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way it inclines to that which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound to husbandry and building and to such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals. Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life to which marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept even according to the philosophers. Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Contra Jovin. i).

Reply to Objection 1: This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children.

The Replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in various subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as to Divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative. Wherefore no danger threatens.

Whether the marriage act is always sinful?

Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act is always sinful. For it is written (1 Cor. 7:29): “That they . . . who have wives, be as if they had none.” But those who are not married do not perform the marriage act. Therefore even those who are married sin in that act.

Objection 2: Further, “Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” Now the marriage act divides man from God wherefore the people who were to see God (Ex. 19:11) were commanded not to go near their wives (Ex. 19:20); and Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.: Contra Jovini, 18) that in the marriage act “the Holy Ghost touches not the hearts of the prophets.” Therefore it is sinful.

Objection 3: Further, that which is shameful in itself can by no means be well done. Now the marriage act is always connected with concupiscence, which is always shameful. Therefore it is always sinful.

Objection 4: Further, nothing is the object of excuse save sin. Now the marriage act needs to be excused by the marriage blessings, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is a sin.

Objection 5: Further, things alike in species are judged alike. But marriage intercourse is of the same species as the act of adultery, since its end is the same, namely the human species. Therefore since the act of adultery is a sin, the marriage act is likewise.

Objection 6: Further, excess in the passions corrupts virtue. Now there is always excess of pleasure in the marriage act, so much so that it absorbs the reason which is man's principal good, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "in that act it is impossible to understand anything." Therefore the marriage act is always a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:28): "If a virgin marry she hath not sinned," and (1 Tim. 5:14): "I will . . . that the younger should marry," and "bear children." But there can be no bearing of children without carnal union. Therefore the marriage act is not a sin; else the Apostle would not have approved of it.

Further, no sin is a matter of precept. But the marriage act is a matter of precept (1 Cor. 7:3): "Let the husband render the debt to his life." Therefore it is not a sin.

I answer that, If we suppose the corporeal nature to be created by the good God we cannot hold that those things which pertain to the preservation of the corporeal nature and to which nature inclines, are altogether evil; wherefore, since the inclination to beget an offspring whereby the specific nature is preserved is from nature, it is impossible to maintain that the act of begetting children is altogether unlawful, so that it be impossible to find the mean of virtue therein; unless we suppose, as some are mad enough to assert, that corruptible things were created by an evil god, whence perhaps the opinion mentioned in the text is derived (Sent. iv, D, 26); wherefore this is a most wicked heresy.

Reply to Objection 1: By these words the Apostle did not forbid the marriage act, as neither did he forbid the possession of things when he said (1 Cor. 7:31): "They that use this world" (let them be) "as if they used it not." In each case he forbade enjoyment [*"Fruitionem," i.e. enjoyment of a thing sought as one's last end]; which is clear from the way in which he expresses himself; for he did not say "let them not use it," or "let them not have them," but let them be "as if they used it not" and "as if they had none."

Reply to Objection 2: We are united to God by the habit of grace and by the act of contemplation and love. Therefore whatever severs the former of these unions is always a sin, but not always that which severs the latter, since a lawful occupation about lower things distracts the mind so that it is not fit for actual union with God; and this is especially the case in carnal intercourse wherein the mind is withheld by the intensity of pleasure. For this reason those who have to contemplate Divine things or handle sacred things are enjoined not to have to do with their wives for that particular time; and it is in this sense that the Holy Ghost, as regards the actual revelation of hidden things, did not touch the hearts of the prophets at the time of the marriage act.

Reply to Objection 3: The shamefulness of concupiscence that always accompanies the marriage act is a shamefulness not of guilt, but of punishment inflicted for the first sin, inasmuch as the lower powers and the members do not obey reason. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, a thing is said to be excused when it has some appearance of evil, and yet is not evil, or not as evil as it seems, because some things excuse wholly, others in part. And since the marriage act, by reason of the corruption of concupiscence, has the appearance of an inordinate act, it is wholly excused by the marriage blessing, so as not to be a sin.

Reply to Objection 5: Although they are the same as to their natural species, they differ as to their moral species, which differs in respect of one circumstance, namely intercourse with one’s wife and with another than one’s wife; just as to kill a man by assault or by justice differentiates the moral species, although the natural species is the same; and yet the one is lawful and the other unlawful.

Reply to Objection 6: The excess of passions that corrupts virtue not only hinders the act of reason, but also destroys the order of reason. The intensity of pleasure in the marriage act does not do this, since, although for the moment man is not being directed, he was previously directed by his reason.

Whether the marriage act is meritorious?

Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act is not meritorious. For Chrysostom [*Hom. i in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says in his commentary on Matthew: “Although marriage brings no punishment to those who use it, it affords them no meed.” Now merit bears a relation to meed. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

Objection 2: Further, to refrain from what is meritorious deserves not praise. Yet virginity whereby one refrains from marriage is praiseworthy. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

Objection 3: Further, he who avails himself of an indulgence granted him, avails himself of a favor received. But a man does not merit by receiving a favor. Therefore the marriage act is not meritorious.

Objection 4: Further, merit like virtue, consists in difficulty. But the marriage act affords not difficulty but pleasure. Therefore it is not meritorious.

Objection 5: Further, that which cannot be done without venial sin is never meritorious, for a man cannot both merit and demerit at the same time. Now there is always a venial sin in the marriage act, since even the first movement in such like pleasures is a venial sin. Therefore the aforesaid act cannot be meritorious.

On the contrary, Every act whereby a precept is fulfilled is meritorious if it be done from charity. Now such is the marriage act, for it is said (1 Cor. 7:3): “Let the husband render the debt to his wife.” Therefore, etc.

Further, every act of virtue is meritorious. Now the aforesaid act is an act of justice, for it is called the rendering of a debt. Therefore it is meritorious.

I answer that, Since no act proceeding from a deliberate will is indifferent, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40, Q[1], A[3]; [4922]FS, Q[18], A[9]), the marriage act is always either sinful or meritorious in one who is in a state of grace. For if the motive for the marriage act be a virtue, whether of justice that they may render the debt, or of religion, that they may beget children for the worship of God, it is meritorious. But if the motive be lust, yet not excluding the marriage blessings, namely that he would by no means be willing to go to another woman, it is a venial sin; while if he exclude the marriage blessings, so as to be disposed to act in like manner with any woman, it is a mortal sin. And nature cannot move without being either directed by reason, and thus it will be an act of virtue, or not so directed, and then it will be an act of lust.

Reply to Objection 1: The root of merit, as regards the essential reward, is charity itself; but as regards an accidental reward, the reason for merit consists in the difficulty of an act; and thus the marriage act is not meritorious except in the first way.

Reply to Objection 2: The difficulty required for merit of the accidental reward is a difficulty of labor, but the difficulty required for the essential reward is the difficulty of observing the mean, and this is the difficulty in the marriage act.

Reply to Objection 3: First movements in so far as they are venial sins are movements of the appetite to some inordinate object of pleasure. This is not the case in the marriage act, and consequently the argument does not prove.

OF MATRIMONY AS A SACRAMENT (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider matrimony as a sacrament. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether matrimony is a sacrament?

(2) Whether it ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?

(3) Whether it confers grace?

(4) Whether carnal intercourse belongs to the integrity of matrimony?

Whether matrimony is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not a sacrament. For every sacrament of the New Law has a form that is essential to the sacrament. But the blessing given by the priest at a wedding is not essential to matrimony. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 2: Further, a sacrament according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) is “a material element.” But matrimony has not a material element for its matter. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, the sacraments derive their efficacy from Christ’s Passion. But matrimony, since it has pleasure annexed to it, does not conform man to Christ’s Passion, which was painful. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, every sacrament of the New Law causes that which it signifies. Yet matrimony does not cause the union of Christ with the Church, which union it signifies. Therefore matrimony is not a sacrament.

Objection 5: Further, in the other sacraments there is something which is reality and sacrament. But this is not to be found in matrimony, since it does not imprint a character, else it would not be repeated. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): “This is a great sacrament.” Therefore, etc.

Further, a sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing. But such is Matrimony. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, A sacrament denotes a sanctifying remedy against sin offered to man under sensible signs [*Cf. [4923]TP, Q[61], A[1]; [4924]TP, Q[65], A[1]]. Wherefore since this is the case in matrimony, it is reckoned among the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 1: The words whereby the marriage consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, and not the priest’s blessing, which is a sacramental.

Reply to Objection 2: The sacrament of Matrimony, like that of Penance, is perfected by the act of the recipient. Wherefore just as Penance has no other matter than the sensible acts themselves, which take the place of the material element, so it is in Matrimony.

Reply to Objection 3: Although Matrimony is not conformed to Christ’s Passion as regards pain, it is as regards charity, whereby He suffered for the Church who was to be united to Him as His spouse.

Reply to Objection 4: The union of Christ with the Church is not the reality contained in this sacrament, but is the reality signified and not contained—and no sacrament causes a reality of that kind—but it has another both contained and signified which it causes, as we shall state further on (ad 5). The Master, however (Sent. iv, D, 26), asserts that it is a non-contained reality, because he was of opinion that Matrimony has no reality contained therein.

Reply to Objection 5: In this sacrament also those three things [*Cf. [4925]TP, Q[66], A[1]] are to be found, for the acts externally apparent are the sacrament only; the bond between husband and wife resulting from those acts is reality and sacrament; and the ultimate reality contained is the effect of this sacrament, while the non-contained reality is that which the Master assigns (Sent. iv, D, 26).

Whether this sacrament ought to have been instituted before sin was committed?

Objection 1: It would seem that Matrimony ought not to have been instituted before sin. Because that which is of natural law needs not to be instituted. Now such is Matrimony, as stated above ([4926]Q[41], A[1]). Therefore it ought not to have been instituted.

Objection 2: Further, sacraments are medicines against the disease of sin. But a medicine is not made ready except for an actual disease. Therefore it should not have been instituted before sin.

Objection 3: Further, one institution suffices for one thing. Now Matrimony was instituted also after sin, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it was not instituted before sin.

Objection 4: Further, the institution of a sacrament must come from God. Now before sin, the words relating to Matrimony were not definitely said by God but by Adam; the words which God uttered (Gn. 1:22), “Increase and multiply,” were addressed also to the brute creation where there is no marriage. Therefore Matrimony was not instituted before sin.

Objection 5: Further, Matrimony is a sacrament of the New Law. But the sacraments of the New Law took their origin from Christ. Therefore it ought not to have been instituted before sin.

On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 19:4): “Have ye not read that He Who made man from the beginning ‘made them male and female’”?

Further, Matrimony was instituted for the begetting of children. But the begetting of children was necessary to man before sin. Therefore it behooved Matrimony to be instituted before sin.

I answer that, Nature inclines to marriage with a certain good in view, which good varies according to the different states of man, wherefore it was necessary for matrimony to be variously instituted in the various states of man in reference to that good. Consequently matrimony as directed to the begetting of children, which was necessary even when there was no sin, was instituted before sin; according as it affords a remedy for the wound of sin, it was instituted after sin at the time of the natural law; its institution belongs to the Mosaic Law as regards personal disqualifications; and it was instituted in the New Law in so far as it represents the mystery of Christ's union with the Church, and in this respect it is a sacrament of the New Law. As regards other advantages resulting from matrimony, such as the friendship and mutual services which husband and wife render one another, its institution belongs to the civil law. Since, however, a sacrament is essentially a sign and a remedy, it follows that the nature of sacrament applies to matrimony as regards the intermediate institution; that it is fittingly intended to fulfill an office of nature as regards the first institution; and. as regards the last-mentioned institution, that it is directed to fulfill an office of society.

Reply to Objection 1: Things which are of natural law in a general way, need to be instituted as regards their determination which is subject to variation according to various states; just as it is of natural law that evil-doers be punished, but that such and such a punishment be appointed for such and such a crime is determined by positive law.

Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is not only for a remedy against sin, but is chiefly for an office of nature; and thus it was instituted before sin, not as intended for a remedy.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no reason why matrimony should not have had several institutions corresponding to the various things that had to be determined in connection with marriage. Hence these various institutions are not of the same thing in the same respect.

Reply to Objection 4: Before sin matrimony was instituted by God, when He fashioned a helpmate for man out of his rib, and said to them: "Increase and multiply." And although this was said also to the other animals, it was not to be fulfilled by them in the same way as by men. As to Adam's words, he uttered them inspired by God to understand that the institution of marriage was from God.

Reply to Objection 5: As was clearly stated, matrimony was not instituted before Christ as a sacrament of the New Law.

Whether matrimony confers grace?

Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony does not confer grace. For, according to Hugh (De Sacram. i) “the sacraments, by virtue of their sanctification, confer an invisible grace.” But matrimony has no sanctification essential to it. Therefore grace is not conferred therein.

Objection 2: Further, every sacrament that confers grace confers it by virtue of its matter and form. Now the acts which are the matter in this sacrament are not the cause of grace (for it would be the heresy of Pelagius to assert that our acts cause grace); and the words expressive of consent are not the cause of grace, since no sanctification results from them. Therefore grace is by no means given in matrimony.

Objection 3: Further, the grace that is directed against the wound of sin is necessary to all who have that wound. Now the wound of concupiscence is to be found in all. Therefore if grace were given in matrimony against the wound of concupiscence, all men ought to contract marriage, and it would be very stupid to refrain from matrimony.

Objection 4: Further, sickness does not seek a remedy where it finds aggravation. Now concupiscence is aggravated by concupiscence, because, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 12), “the desire of concupiscence is insatiable, and is increased by congenial actions.” Therefore it would seem that grace is not conferred in matrimony, as a remedy for concupiscence.

On the contrary, Definition and thing defined should be convertible. Now causality of grace is included in the definition of a sacrament. Since, then, matrimony is a sacrament, it is a cause of grace.

Further, Augustine says (De Bono Viduit. viii; Gen. ad lit. ix, 7) that “matrimony affords a remedy to the sick.” But it is not a remedy except in so far as it has some efficacy. Therefore it has some efficacy for the repression of concupiscence. Now concupiscence is not repressed except by grace. Therefore grace is conferred therein.

I answer that, There have been three opinions on this point. For some [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iv, D, 2] said that matrimony is nowise the cause of grace, but only a sign thereof. But this cannot be maintained, for in that case it would in no respect surpass the sacraments of the Old Law. Wherefore there would be no reason for reckoning it among the sacraments of the New Law; since even in the Old Law by the very nature of the act it was able to afford a remedy to concupiscence lest the latter run riot when held in too strict restraint.

Hence others [*St. Albert Magnus, Sent. iv, D, 26] said that grace is conferred therein as regards the withdrawal from evil, because the act is excused from sin, for it would be a sin apart from matrimony. But this would be too little, since it had this also in the Old Law. And so they say that it makes man withdraw from evil, by restraining the concupiscence lest it tend to something outside the marriage blessings, but that this grace does not enable a man to do good works. But this cannot be maintained, since the same grace hinders sin and inclines to good, just as the same heat expels cold and gives heat.

Hence others [*St. Bonaventure, Sent. iv, D, 26] say that matrimony, inasmuch as it is contracted in the faith of Christ, is able to confer the grace which enables us to do those works which are required in matrimony. and this is more probable, since wherever God gives the faculty to do a thing, He gives also the helps whereby man is enabled to make becoming use of that faculty; thus it is clear that to all the soul’s powers there correspond bodily members by which they can proceed to act. Therefore, since in matrimony man receives by Divine institution the faculty to use his wife for the begetting of children, he also receives the grace without which he cannot becomingly do so; just as we have said of the sacrament of orders ([4927]Q[35], A[1]). And thus this grace which is given is the last thing contained in this sacrament.

Reply to Objection 1: Just as the baptismal water by virtue of its contact with Christ’s body [*Cf. [4928]TP, Q[66], A[3], ad 4] is able to “touch the body and cleanse the heart” [*St. Augustine, Tract. lxxx in Joan.], so is matrimony able to do so through Christ having represented it by His Passion, and not principally through any blessing of the priest.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the water of Baptism together with the form of words results immediately not in the infusion of grace, but in the imprinting of the character, so the outward acts and the words expressive of consent directly effect a certain tie which is the sacrament of matrimony; and this tie by virtue of its Divine institution works dispositively [*Cf. [4929] Q[18], A[1], where St. Thomas uses the same expression; and Editor’s notes at the beginning of the Supplement and on that Article] to the infusion of grace.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold if no more efficacious remedy could be employed against the disease of concupiscence; but a yet more powerful remedy is found in spiritual works and mortification of the flesh by those who make no use of matrimony.

Reply to Objection 4: A remedy can be employed against concupiscence in two ways. First, on the part of concupiscence by repressing it in its root, and thus matrimony affords a remedy by the grace given therein. Secondly, on the part of its act, and this in two ways: first, by depriving the act to which concupiscence inclines of its outward shamefulness, and this is done by the marriage blessings which justify carnal concupiscence; secondly, by hindering the shameful act, which is done by the very nature of the act. because concupiscence, being satisfied by the conjugal act, does not incline so much to other wickedness. For this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:9): “It is better to marry than to burn.” For though the works congenial to concupiscence are in themselves of a nature to increase concupiscence, yet in so far as they are directed according to reason they repress concupiscence, because like acts result in like dispositions and habits.

Whether carnal intercourse is an integral part of this sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that carnal intercourse is an integral part of marriage. For at the very institution of marriage it was declared (Gn. 2:24): “They shall be two in one flesh.” Now this is not brought about save by carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of marriage.

Objection 2: Further, that which belongs to the signification of a sacrament is necessary for the sacrament, as we have stated above [4930] (A[2]; Q[9], A[1]). Now carnal intercourse belongs to the signification of matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 26). Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.

Objection 3: Further, this sacrament is directed to the preservation of the species. But the species cannot be preserved without carnal intercourse. Therefore it is an integral part of the sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, Matrimony is a sacrament inasmuch as it affords a remedy against concupiscence; according to the Apostle’s saying (1 Cor. 7:9): “It is better to marry than to burn.” But it does not afford this remedy to those who have no carnal intercourse. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary, There was matrimony in Paradise, and yet there was no carnal intercourse. Therefore carnal intercourse is not an integral part of matrimony.

Further, a sacrament by its very name denotes a sanctification. But matrimony is holier without carnal intercourse, according to the text (Sent. D, 26). Therefore carnal intercourse is not necessary for the sacrament.

I answer that, Integrity is twofold. One regards the primal perfection consisting in the very essence of a thing; the other regards the secondary perfection consisting in operation. Since then carnal intercourse is an operation or use of marriage which gives the faculty for that intercourse, it follows, that carnal intercourse belongs to the latter, and not to the former integrity of marriage [*Cf. [4931]TP, Q[29], A[2]].

Reply to Objection 1: Adam expressed the integrity of marriage in regard to both perfections, because a thing is known by its operation.

Reply to Objection 2: Signification of the thing contained is necessary for the sacrament. Carnal intercourse belongs not to this signification, but to the thing not contained, as appears from what was said above (A[1], ad 4,5).

Reply to Objection 3: A thing does not reach its end except by its own act. Wherefore, from the fact that the end of matrimony is not attained without carnal intercourse, it follows that it belongs to the second and not to the first integrity.

Reply to Objection 4: Before carnal intercourse marriage is a remedy by virtue of the grace given therein, although not by virtue of the act, which belongs to the second integrity.

OF MATRIMONY WITH REGARD TO THE BETROTHAL (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider matrimony absolutely; and here we must treat (1) of the betrothal; (2) of the nature of matrimony; (3) of its efficient cause, namely the consent; (4) of its blessings; (5) of the impediments thereto; (6) of second marriages; (7) of certain things annexed to marriage.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) What is the betrothal?

(2) Who can contract a betrothal?

(3) Whether a betrothal can be canceled?

Whether a betrothal is a promise of future marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that a betrothal is not rightly defined “a promise of future marriage,” as expressed in the words of Pope Nicholas I (Resp. ad Consul. Bulgar., iii). For as Isidore says (Etym. iv), “a man is betrothed not by a mere promise, but by giving his troth [spondet] and providing sureties [sponsores].” Now a person is said to be betrothed by reason of his betrothal. Therefore it is wrongly described as a promise.

Objection 2: Further, whoever promises a thing must be compelled to fulfill his promise. But those who have contracted a betrothal are not compelled by the Church to fulfill the marriage. Therefore a betrothal is not a promise.

Objection 3: Further, sometimes a betrothal does not consist of a mere promise, but an oath is added, as also certain pledges. Therefore seemingly it should not be defined as a mere promise.

Objection 4: Further, marriage should be free and absolute. But a betrothal is sometimes expressed under a condition even of money to be received. Therefore it is not fittingly described as a promise of marriage.

Objection 5: Further, promising about the future is blamed in James 4:13, seqq. But there should be nothing blameworthy about the sacraments. Therefore one ought not to make a promise of future marriage.

Objection 6: Further, no man is called a spouse except on account of his espousals. But a man is said to be a spouse on account of actual marriage, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 27). Therefore espousals are not always a promise of future marriage.

I answer that, Consent to conjugal union if expressed in words of the future does not make a marriage, but a promise of marriage; and this promise is called “a betrothal from plighting one’s troth,” as Isidore says (Etym. iv). For before the use of writing-tablets, they used to give pledges of marriage, by which they plighted their mutual consent under the marriage code, and they provided guarantors. This promise is made in two ways, namely absolutely, or conditionally. Absolutely, in four ways: firstly, a mere promise, by saying: “I will take thee for my wife,” and conversely; secondly, by giving betrothal pledges, such as money and the like; thirdly, by giving an engagement ring; fourthly, by the addition of an oath. If, however, this promise be made conditionally, we must draw a distinction;

for it is either an honorable condition, for instance if we say: “I will take thee, if thy parents consent,” and then the promise holds if the condition is fulfilled, and does not hold if the condition is not fulfilled; or else the condition is dishonorable, and this in two ways: for either it is contrary to the marriage blessings, as if we were to say: “I will take thee if thou promise means of sterility,” and then no betrothal is contracted; or else it is not contrary to the marriage blessings, as were one to say: “I will take thee if thou consent to my thefts,” and then the promise holds, but the condition should be removed.

Reply to Objection 1: The betrothal itself and giving of sureties are a ratification of the promise, wherefore it is denominated from these as from that which is more perfect.

Reply to Objection 2: By this promise one party is bound to the other in respect of contracting marriage; and he who fulfills not his promise sins mortally, unless a lawful impediment arise; and the Church uses compulsion in the sense that she enjoins a penance for the sin. But he is not compelled by sentence of the court, because compulsory marriages are wont to have evil results; unless the parties be bound by oath, for then he ought to be compelled, in the opinion of some, although others think differently on account of the reason given above, especially if there be fear of one taking the other’s life.

Reply to Objection 3: Such things are added only in confirmation of the promise, and consequently they are not distinct from it.

Reply to Objection 4: The condition that is appended does not destroy the liberty of marriage; for if it be unlawful, it should be renounced; and if it be lawful, it is either about things that are good simply, as were one to say, “I will take thee, if thy parents consent,” and such a condition does not destroy the liberty of the betrothal, but gives it an increase of rectitude. or else it is about things that are useful, as were one to say: “I will marry thee if thou pay me a hundred pounds,” and then this condition is appended, not as asking a price for the consent of marriage, but as referring to the promise of a dowry; so that the marriage does not lose its liberty. Sometimes, however, the condition appended is the payment of a sum of money by way of penalty, and then, since marriage should be free, such a condition does not hold, nor can such a penalty be exacted from a person who is unwilling to fulfill the promise of marriage.

Reply to Objection 5: James does not intend to forbid altogether the making of promises about the future, but the making of promises as though one were certain of one's life; hence he teaches that we ought to add the condition. "If the Lord will," which, though it be not expressed in words, ought nevertheless to be impressed on the heart.

Reply to Objection 6: In marriage we may consider both the marriage union and the marriage act; and on account of his promise of the first as future a man is called a "spouse" from his having contracted his espousals by words expressive of the future; but from the promise of the second a man is called a "spouse," even when the marriage has been contracted by words expressive of the present, because by this very fact he promises [spondet] the marriage act. However, properly speaking, espousals are so called from the promise [sponsione] in the first sense, because espousals are a kind of sacramental annexed to matrimony, as exorcism to baptism.

Whether seven years is fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal?

Objection 1: It would seem that seven years is not fittingly assigned as the age for betrothal. For a contract that can be formed by others does not require discretion in those whom it concerns. Now a betrothal can be arranged by the parents without the knowledge of either of the persons betrothed. Therefore a betrothal can be arranged before the age of seven years as well as after.

Objection 2: Further, just as some use of reason is necessary for the contract of betrothal, so is there for the consent to mortal sin. Now, as Gregory says (Dial. iv), a boy of five years of age was carried off by the devil on account of the sin of blasphemy. Therefore a betrothal can take place before the age of seven years.

Objection 3: Further, a betrothal is directed to marriage. But for marriage the same age is not assigned to boy and girl.

Objection 4: Further, one can become betrothed as soon as future marriage can be agreeable to one. Now signs of this agreeableness are often apparent in boys before the age of seven. Therefore they can become betrothed before that age.

Objection 5: Further, if persons become betrothed before they are seven years old, and subsequently after the age of seven and before the age of maturity renew their promise in words expressive of the present, they are reckoned to be betrothed. Now this is not by virtue of the second contract, since they intend to contract not betrothal but marriage. Therefore it is by the virtue of the first; and thus espousals can be contracted before the age of seven.

Objection 6: Further, when a thing is done by many persons in common, if one fails he is supplied by another, as in the case of those who row a boat. Now the contract of betrothal is an action common to the contracting parties. Therefore if one be of mature age, he can contract a betrothal with a girl who is not seven years old, since the lack of age in one is more than counterbalanced in the other.

Objection 7: Further, those who at about the age of puberty, but before it, enter into the marriage contract by words expressive of the present are reputed to be married. Therefore in like manner if they contract marriage by words expressive of the future, before yet close on the age of puberty, they are to be reputed as betrothed.

I answer that, The age of seven years is fixed reasonably enough by law for the contracting of betrothals, for since a betrothal is a promise of the future, as already stated [4932](A[1]), it follows that they are within the competency of those who can make a promise in some way, and this is only for those who can have some foresight of the future, and this requires the use of reason, of which three degrees are to be observed, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 4). The first is when a person neither understands by himself nor is able to learn from another; the second stage is when a man can learn from another but is incapable by himself of consideration and understanding; the third degree is when a man is both able to learn from another and to consider by himself. And since reason develops in man by little and little, in proportion as the movement and fluctuation of the humors is calmed, man reaches the first stage of reason before his seventh year; and consequently during that period he is unfit for any contract, and therefore for betrothal. But he begins to reach the second stage at the end of his first seven years, wherefore children at that age are sent to school. But man begins to reach the third stage at the end of his second seven years, as regards things concerning his person, when his natural reason develops; but as regards things outside his person, at the end of his third seven years. Hence before his first seven years a man is not fit to make any contract, but at the end of that period he begins to be fit to make certain promises for the future, especially about those things to which natural reason inclines us more, though he is not fit to bind himself by a perpetual obligation, because as yet he has not a firm will. Hence at that age betrothals can be contracted. But at the end of the second seven years he can already bind himself in matters concerning his person, either to religion or to wedlock. And after the third seven years he can bind himself in other matters also; and according to the laws he is given the power of disposing of his property after his twenty-second year.

Reply to Objection 1: If the parties are betrothed by another person before they reach the age of puberty, either of them or both can demur; wherefore in that case the betrothal does not take effect, so that neither does any affinity result therefrom. Hence a betrothal made between certain persons by some other takes effect, in so far as those between whom the betrothal is arranged do not demur when they reach the proper age, whence they are understood to consent to what others have done.

Reply to Objection 2: Some say that the boy of whom Gregory tells this story was not lost, and that he did not sin mortally; and that this vision was for the purpose of making the father sorrowful, for he had sinned in the boy through failing to correct him. But this is contrary to the express intention of Gregory, who says (Dial. iv) that “the boy’s father having neglected the soul of his little son, fostered no little sinner for the flames of hell.” Consequently it must be said that for a mortal sin it is sufficient to give consent to something present, whereas in a betrothal the consent is to something future; and greater discretion of reason is required for looking to the future than for consenting to one present act. Wherefore a man can sin mortally before he can bind himself to a future obligation.

Reply to Objection 3: Regarding the age for the marriage contract a disposition is required not only on the part of the use of reason, but also on the part of the body, in that it is necessary to be of an age adapted to procreation. And since a girl becomes apt for the act of procreation in her twelfth year, and a boy at the end of his second seven years, as the Philosopher says (De Hist. Anim. vii), whereas the age is the same in both for attaining the use of reason which is the sole condition for betrothal, hence it is that the one age is assigned for both as regards betrothal, but not as regards marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: This agreeableness in regard to boys under the age of seven does not result from the perfect use of reason, since they are not as yet possessed of complete self-control; it results rather from the movement of nature than from any process of reason. Consequently, this agreeableness does not suffice for contracting a betrothal.

Reply to Objection 5: In this case, although the second contract does not amount to marriage, nevertheless the parties show that they ratify their former promise; wherefore the first contract is confirmed by the second.

Reply to Objection 6: Those who row a boat act by way of one cause, and consequently what is lacking in one can be supplied by another. But those who make a contract of betrothal act as distinct persons, since a betrothal can only be between two parties; wherefore it is necessary for each to be qualified to contract, and thus the defect of one is an obstacle to their betrothal, nor can it be supplied by the other.

Reply to Objection 7: It is true that in the matter of betrothal if the contracting parties are close upon the age of seven, the contract of betrothal is valid, since, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 56), “when little is lacking it seems as though nothing were lacking.” Some fix the margin at six months. but it is better to determine it according to the condition of the contracting parties, since the use of reason comes sooner to some than to others.

Whether a betrothal can be dissolved?

Objection 1: It would seem that a betrothal cannot be dissolved if one of the parties enter religion. For if I have promised a thing to someone I cannot lawfully pledge it to someone else. Now he who betroths himself promises his body to the woman. Therefore he cannot make a further offering of himself to God in religion.

Objection 2: Again, seemingly it should not be dissolved when one of the parties leaves for a distant country, because in doubtful matters one should always choose the safer course. Now the safer course would be to wait for him. Therefore she is bound to wait for him.

Objection 3: Again, neither seemingly is it dissolved by sickness contracted after betrothal, for no man should be punished for being under a penalty. Now the man who contracts an infirmity would be punished if he were to lose his right to the woman betrothed to him. Therefore a betrothal should not be dissolved on account of a bodily infirmity.

Objection 4: Again, neither seemingly should a betrothal be dissolved on account of a supervening affinity, for instance if the spouse were to commit fornication with a kinswoman of his betrothed; for in that case the affianced bride would be penalized for the sin of her affianced spouse, which is unreasonable.

Objection 5: Again, seemingly they cannot set one another free; for it would be a proof of greatest fickleness if they contracted together and then set one another free; and such conduct ought not to be tolerated by the Church. Therefore, etc.

Objection 6: Again, neither seemingly ought a betrothal to be dissolved on account of the fornication of one of the parties. For a betrothal does not yet give the one power over the body of the other; wherefore it would seem that they nowise sin against one another if meanwhile they commit fornication. Consequently a betrothal should not be dissolved on that account.

Objection 7: Again, neither seemingly on account of his contracting with another woman by words expressive of the present. For a subsequent sale does not void a previous sale. Therefore neither should a second contract void a previous one.

Objection 8: Again, neither seemingly should it be dissolved on account of deficient age; since what is not cannot be dissolved. Now a betrothal is null before the requisite age. Therefore it cannot be dissolved.

I answer that, In all the cases mentioned above the betrothal that has been contracted is dissolved, but in different ways. For in two of them—namely when a party enters religion, and when either of the affianced spouses contracts with another party by words expressive of the present—the betrothal is dissolved by law, whereas in the other cases it has to be dissolved according to the judgment of the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: The like promise is dissolved by spiritual death, for that promise is purely spiritual, as we shall state further on ([4933]Q[61], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: This doubt is solved by either party not putting in an appearance at the time fixed for completing the marriage. Wherefore if it was no fault of that party that the marriage was not completed, he or she can lawfully marry without any sin. But if he or she was responsible for the non-completion of the marriage, this responsibility involves the obligation of doing penance for the broken promise—or oath if the promise was confirmed by oath—and he or she can contract with another if they wish it, subject to the judgment of the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: If either of the betrothed parties incur an infirmity which notably weakens the subject (as epilepsy or paralysis), or causes a deformity (as loss of the nose or eyes, and the like), or is contrary to the good of the offspring (as leprosy, which is wont to be transmitted to the children), the betrothal can be dissolved, lest the betrothed be displeasing to one another, and the marriage thus contracted have an evil result. Nor is one punished for being under a penalty, although one incurs a loss from one’s penalty, and this is not unreasonable.

Reply to Objection 4: If the affianced bridegroom has carnal knowledge of a kinswoman of his spouse, or “vice versa,” the betrothal must be dissolved; and for proof it is sufficient that the fact be the common talk, in order to avoid scandal; for causes whose effects mature in the future are voided of their effects, not only by what actually is, but also by what happens subsequently. Hence just as affinity, had it existed at the time of the betrothal, would have prevented that contract, so, if it supervene before marriage, which is an effect of the betrothal, the previous contract is voided of its effect. Nor does the other party suffer in consequence, indeed he or she gains, being set free from one who has become hateful to God by committing fornication.

Reply to Objection 5: Some do not admit this case. Yet they have against them the Decretal (cap. Praeterea, De spons. et matr.) which says expressly: “Just as those who enter into a contract of fellowship by pledging their faith to one another and afterwards give it back, so it may be patiently tolerated that those who are betrothed to one another should set one another free.” Yet to this they say that the Church allows this lest worse happen rather than because it is according to strict law. But this does not seem to agree with the example quoted by the Decretal.

Accordingly we must reply that it is not always a proof of fickleness to rescind an agreement, since “our counsels are uncertain” (Wis. 9:14).

Reply to Objection 6: Although when they become betrothed they have not yet given one another power over one another’s body, yet if this

[*Referring to the contention of the Objection] were to happen it would make them suspicious of one another’s fidelity; and so one can ensure himself against the other by breaking off the engagement.

Reply to Objection 7: This argument would hold if each contract were of the same kind; whereas the second contract of marriage has greater force than the first, and consequently dissolves it.

Reply to Objection 8: Although it was not a true betrothal, there was a betrothal of a kind; and consequently, lest approval should seem to be given when they come to the lawful age, they should seek a dissolution of the betrothal by the judgment of the Church, for the sake of a good example.

OF THE DEFINITION OF MATRIMONY (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the nature of matrimony. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?

(2) Whether it is fittingly named?

(3) Whether it is fittingly defined?

Whether matrimony is a kind of joining?

Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is not a kind of joining. Because the bond whereby things are tied together differs from their joining, as cause from effect. Now matrimony is the bond whereby those who are joined in matrimony are tied together. Therefore it is not a kind of joining.

Objection 2: Further, every sacrament is a sensible sign. But no relation is a sensible accident. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, it is not a kind of relation, and consequently neither is it a kind of joining.

Objection 3: Further, a joining is a relation of equiparance as well as of equality. Now according to Avicenna the relation of equality is not identically the same in each extreme. Neither therefore is there an identically same joining; and consequently if matrimony is a kind of joining, there is not only one matrimony between man and wife.

On the contrary, It is by relation that things are related to one another. Now by matrimony certain things are related to one another; for the husband is the wife’s husband, and the wife is the husband’s wife. Therefore matrimony is a kind of relation, nor is it other than a joining.

Further, the union of two things into one can result only from their being joined. Now such is the effect of matrimony (Gn. 2:24): “They shall be two in one flesh.” Therefore matrimony is a kind of joining.

I answer that, A joining denotes a kind of uniting, and so wherever things are united there must be a joining. Now things directed to one purpose are said to be united in their direction thereto, thus many men are united in following one military calling or in pursuing one business, in relation to which they are called fellow-soldiers or business partners. Hence, since by marriage certain persons are directed to one begetting and upbringing of children, and again to one family life, it is clear that in matrimony there is a joining in respect of which we speak of husband and wife; and this joining, through being directed to some one thing, is matrimony; while the joining together of bodies and minds is a result of matrimony.

Reply to Objection 1: Matrimony is the bond by which they are tied formally, not effectively, and so it need not be distinct from the joining.

Reply to Objection 2: Although relation is not itself a sensible accident, its causes may be sensible. Nor is it necessary in a sacrament for that which is both reality and sacrament [*Cf. [4934]TP, Q[66], A[1]] to be sensible (for such is the relation of the aforesaid joining to this sacrament), whereas the words expressive of consent, which are sacrament only and are the cause of that same joining, are sensible.

Reply to Objection 3: A relation is founded on something as its cause—for instance likeness is founded on quality—and on something as its subject—for instance in the things themselves that are like; and on either hand we may find unity and diversity of relation. Since then it is not the same identical quality that conduces to likeness, but the same specific quality in each of the like subjects, and since, moreover, the subjects of likeness are two in number, and the same applies to equality, it follows that both equality and likeness are in every way numerically distinct in either of the like or equal subjects. But the relations of matrimony, on the one hand, have unity in both extremes, namely on the part of the cause, since it is directed to the one identical begetting; whereas on the part of the subject there is numerical diversity. The fact of this relation having a diversity of subjects is signified by the terms “husband” and “wife,” while its unity is denoted by its being called matrimony.

Whether matrimony is fittingly named?

Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly named. Because a thing should be named after that which ranks higher. But the father ranks above the mother. Therefore the union of father and mother should rather be named after the father.

Objection 2: Further, a thing should be named from that which is essential to it, since a “definition expresses the nature signified by a name” (Metaph. iv, 28). Now nuptials are not essential to matrimony. Therefore matrimony should not be called nuptials.

Objection 3: Further, a species cannot take its proper name from that which belongs to the genus. Now a joining [conjunctio] is the genus of matrimony. Therefore it should not be called a conjugal union.

On the contrary, stands the common use of speech.

I answer that, Three things may be considered in matrimony. First, its essence, which is a joining together, and in reference to this it is called the “conjugal union”; secondly, its cause, which is the wedding, and in reference to this it is called the “nuptial union” from “nubo” [*The original meaning of ‘nubo’ is ‘to veil’], because at the wedding ceremony, whereby the marriage is completed, the heads of those who are wedded are covered with a veil [*This is still done in some countries]; thirdly, the effect, which is the offspring, and in reference to this it is called “matrimony,” as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), because “a woman’s sole purpose in marrying should be motherhood.” Matrimony may also be resolved into “matris munium” [*i.e. munus], i.e. a mother’s duty, since the duty of bringing up the children chiefly devolves on the women; or into “matrem muniens,” because it provides the mother with a protector and support in the person of her husband; or into “matrem monens,” as admonishing her not to leave her husband and take up with another man; or into “materia unius,” because it is a joining together for the purpose of providing the matter of one offspring as though it were derived from {monos} and “materia”; or into “matre” and “nato,” as Isidore says (Etym. ix), because it makes a woman the mother of a child.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has. or we may say that woman was made chiefly in order to be man's helpmate in relation to the offspring, whereas the man was not made for this purpose. Wherefore the mother has a closer relation to the nature of marriage than the father has.

Reply to Objection 2: Sometimes essentials are known by accidentals, wherefore some things can be named even after their accidentals, since a name is given to a thing for the purpose that it may become known.

Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes a species is named after something pertaining to the genus on account of an imperfection in the species, when namely it has the generic nature completely, yet adds nothing pertaining to dignity; thus the accidental property retains the name of property, which is common to it and to the definition. Sometimes, however, it is on account of a perfection, when we find the generic nature completely in one species and not in another; thus animal is named from soul [anima], and this belongs to an animate body, which is the genus of animal; yet animation is not found perfectly in those animate beings that are not animals. It is thus with the case in point. for the joining of husband and wife by matrimony is the greatest of all joinings, since it is a joining of soul and body, wherefore it is called a "conjugal" union.

Whether matrimony is fittingly defined in the text?

Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony is unfittingly defined in the text* (Sent. iv, D, 27). [*The definition alluded to is as follows: "Marriage is the marital union of man and woman involving living together in undivided partnership."] For it is necessary to mention matrimony in defining a husband, since it is the husband who is joined to the woman in matrimony. Now "marital union" is put in the definition of matrimony. Therefore in these definitions there would seem to be a vicious circle.

Objection 2: Further, matrimony makes the woman the man's wife no less than it makes the man the woman's husband. Therefore it should not be described as a "marital union" rather than an uxorial union.

Objection 3: Further, habit [consuetudo] pertains to morals. Yet it often happens that married persons differ very much in habit. Therefore the words “involving their living together [consuetudinem] in undivided partnership” should have no place in the definition of matrimony.

Objection 4: Further, we find other definitions given of matrimony, for according to Hugh (Sum. Sent. vii, 6), “matrimony is the lawful consent of two apt persons to be joined together.” Also, according to some, “matrimony is the fellowship of a common life and a community regulated by Divine and human law”; and we ask how these definitions differ.

I answer that, As stated above [4935](A[2]), three things are to be considered in matrimony, namely its cause, its essence, and its effect; and accordingly we find three definitions given of matrimony. For the definition of Hugh indicates the cause, namely the consent, and this definition is self-evident. The definition given in the text indicates the essence of matrimony, namely the “union,” and adds determinate subjects by the words “between lawful persons.” It also points to the difference of the contracting parties in reference to the species, by the word “marital,” for since matrimony is a joining together for the purpose of some one thing, this joining together is specified by the purpose to which it is directed, and this is what pertains to the husband [maritum]. It also indicates the force of this joining—for it is indissoluble—by the words “involving,” etc.

The remaining definition indicates the effect to which matrimony is directed, namely the common life in family matters. And since every community is regulated by some law, the code according to which this community is directed, namely Divine and human law, finds a place in this definition. while other communities, such as those of traders or soldiers, are established by human law alone.

Reply to Objection 1: Sometimes the prior things from which a definition ought to be given are not known to us, and consequently certain things are defined from things that are posterior simply, but prior to us; thus in the definition of quality the Philosopher employs the word “such” [quale] when he says (Cap. De Qualitate) that “quality is that whereby we are said to be such.” Thus, too, in defining matrimony we say that it is a “marital union,” by which we mean that matrimony is a union for the purpose of those things required by the marital office, all of which could not be expressed in one word.

Reply to Objection 2: As stated [4936](A[2]), this difference indicates the end of the union. And since, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 11:9), the "man is not [Vulg.: 'was not created'] for the woman, but the woman for the man," it follows that this difference should be indicated in reference to the man rather than the woman.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the civic life denotes not the individual act of this or that one, but the things that concern the common action of the citizens, so the conjugal life is nothing else than a particular kind of companionship pertaining to that common action. wherefore as regards this same life the partnership of married persons is always indivisible, although it is divisible as regards the act belonging to each party.

The Reply to the Fourth Objection is clear from what has been said above.

OF THE MARRIAGE CONSENT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we have to consider the consent; and the first point to discuss is the consent considered in itself; the second is the consent confirmed by oath or by carnal intercourse; the third is compulsory consent and conditional consent; and the fourth is the object of the consent.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?

(2) Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?

(3) Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?

(4) Whether consent given in words expressive of the present, without inward consent, makes a true marriage outwardly?

(5) Whether consent given secretly in words expressive of the present makes a marriage?

Whether consent is the efficient cause of matrimony?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent is not the efficient cause of matrimony. For the sacraments depend not on the human will but on the Divine institution, as shown above (Sent. iv, D, 2; [4937]TP, Q[64], A[2]).

But consent belongs to the human will. Therefore it is no more the cause of matrimony than of the other sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But seemingly matrimony is nothing else than the consent, since it is the consent which signifies the union of Christ with the Church.

Objection 3: Further, of one thing there should be one cause. Now there is one marriage between two persons, as stated above ([4938]Q[44], A[1]); whereas the consents of the two parties are distinct, for they are given by different persons and to different things, since on the one hand there is consent to take a husband, and on the other hand consent to take a wife. Therefore mutual consent is not the cause of matrimony.

On the contrary, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says: “It is not coition but consent that makes a marriage.”

Further, one person does not receive power over that which is at the free disposal of another, without the latter’s consent. Now by marriage each of the married parties receives power over the other’s body (1 Cor. 7:4), whereas hitherto each had free power over his own body. Therefore consent makes a marriage.

I answer that, In every sacrament there is a spiritual operation by means of a material operation which signifies it; thus in Baptism the inward spiritual cleansing is effected by a bodily cleansing. Wherefore, since in matrimony there is a kind of spiritual joining together, in so far as matrimony is a sacrament, and a certain material joining together, in so far as it is directed to an office of nature and of civil life, it follows that the spiritual joining is the effect of the Divine power by means of the material joining. Therefore seeing that the joinings of material contracts are effected by mutual consent, it follows that the joining together of marriage is effected in the same way.

Reply to Objection 1: The first cause of the sacraments is the Divine power which works in them the welfare of the soul; but the second or instrumental causes are material operations deriving their efficacy from the Divine institution, and thus consent is the cause in matrimony.

Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is not the consent itself, but the union of persons directed to one purpose, as stated above ([4939]Q[44], A[1]), and this union is the effect of the consent. Moreover, the consent, properly speaking, signifies not the union of Christ with the Church, but His will whereby His union with the Church was brought about.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as marriage is one on the part of the object to which the union is directed, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons united, so too the consent is one on the part of the thing consented to, namely the aforesaid union, whereas it is more than one on the part of the persons consenting. Nor is the direct object of consent a husband but union with a husband on the part of the wife, even as it is union with a wife on the part of the husband.

Whether the consent needs to be expressed in words?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is no need for the consent to be expressed in words. For a man is brought under another's power by a vow just as he is by matrimony. Now a vow is binding in God's sight, even though it be not expressed in words. Therefore consent also makes a marriage binding even without being expressed in words.

Objection 2: Further, there can be marriage between persons who are unable to express their mutual consent in words, through being dumb or of different languages. Therefore expression of the consent by words is not required for matrimony.

Objection 3: Further, if that which is essential to a sacrament be omitted for any reason whatever, there is no sacrament. Now there is a case of marriage without the expression of words if the maid is silent through bashfulness when her parents give her away to the bridegroom. Therefore the expression of words is not essential to matrimony.

On the contrary, Matrimony is a sacrament. Now a sensible sign is required in every sacrament. Therefore it is also required in matrimony, and consequently there must needs be at least words by which the consent is made perceptible to the senses.

Further, in matrimony there is a contract between husband and wife. Now in every contract there must be expression of the words by which men bind themselves mutually to one another. Therefore in matrimony also the consent must be expressed in words.

I answer that, As stated above [4940](A[1]), the marriage union is effected in the same way as the bond in material contracts. And since material contracts are not feasible unless the contracting parties express their will to one another in words, it follows that the consent which makes a marriage must also be expressed in words, so that the expression of words is to marriage what the outward washing is to Baptism.

Reply to Objection 1: In a vow there is not a sacramental but only a spiritual bond, wherefore there is no need for it to be done in the same way as material contracts, in order that it be binding, as in the case of matrimony.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the like cannot plight themselves to one another in words, they can do so by signs, and such signs count for words.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Hugh of S. Victor (Tract. vii, Sum. Sent.), persons who are being married should give their consent by accepting one another freely. and this is judged to be the case if they show no dissent when they are being wedded. Wherefore in such a case the words of the parents are taken as being the maid's, for the fact that she does not contradict them is a sign that they are her words.

Whether consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage. For as present is to present, so is future to future. But consent given in words expressive of the present makes a marriage in the present. Therefore consent given in words expressive of the future makes a marriage in the future.

Objection 2: Further, in other civil contracts, just as in matrimony, a certain obligation results from the words expressing consent. Now in other contracts it matters not whether the obligation is effected by words of the present or of the future tense. Therefore neither does it make any difference in matrimony.

Objection 3: Further, by the religious vow man contracts a spiritual marriage with God. Now the religious vow is expressed in words of the future tense, and is binding. Therefore carnal marriage also can be effected by words of the future tense.

On the contrary, A man who consents in words of the future tense to take a particular woman as his wife, and after, by words of the present tense, consents to take another, according to law must take the second for his wife (cap. Sicut ex Litteris, De spons. et matr.). But this would not be the case if consent given in words of the future tense made a marriage, since from the very fact that his marriage with the one is valid, he cannot, as long as she lives, marry another. Therefore consent given in words of the future tense does not make a marriage.

Further, he who promises to do a certain thing does it not yet. Now he who consents in words of the future tense, promises to marry a certain woman. Therefore he does not marry her yet.

I answer that, The sacramental causes produce their effect by signifying it; hence they effect what they signify. Since therefore when a man expresses his consent by words of the future tense, he does not signify that he is marrying, but promises that he will marry, it follows that a consent expressed in this manner does not make a marriage, but a promise [sponsionem] of marriage, and this promise is known as a betrothal [sponsalia].

Reply to Objection 1: When consent is expressed in words of the present tense, not only are the words actually present, but consent is directed to the present, so that they coincide in point of time; but when consent is given in words of the future tense, although the words are actually present, the consent is directed to a future time, and hence they do not coincide in point of time. For this reason the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Even in other contracts, a man who uses words referring to the future, does not transfer the power over his property to another person—for instance if he were to say “I will give thee”—but only when he uses words indicative of the present.

Reply to Objection 3: In the vow of religious profession it is not the spiritual marriage itself that is expressed in words which refer to the future, but an act of the spiritual marriage, namely obedience or observance of the rule. If, however, a man vow spiritual marriage in the future, it is not a spiritual marriage, for a man does not become a monk by taking such a vow, but promises to become one.

Whether, in the absence of inward consent, a marriage is made by consent given in words of the present?

Objection 1: It would seem that even in the absence of inward consent a marriage is made by consent expressed in words of the present. For “fraud and deceit should benefit no man,” according to the law (cap. Ex Tenore, De Rescrip., cap. Si Vir, De cognat. spir.). Now he who gives consent in words without consenting in heart commits a fraud. Therefore he should not benefit by it, through being released of the bond of marriage.

Objection 2: Further, the mental consent of one person cannot be known to another, except in so far as it is expressed in words. If then the expression of the words is not enough, and inward consent is required in both parties, neither of them will be able to know that he is truly married to the other; and consequently whenever he uses marriage he will commit fornication.

Objection 3: Further, if a man is proved to have consented to take a certain woman to wife in words of the present tense, he is compelled under pain of excommunication to take her as his wife, even though he should say that he was wanting in mental consent, notwithstanding that afterwards he may have contracted marriage with another woman by words expressive of consent in the present. But this would not be the case if mental consent were requisite for marriage. Therefore it is not required.

On the contrary, Innocent III says in a Decretal (cap. Tua Nos, De Spons. et matr.) in reference to this case: “Other things cannot complete the marriage bond in the absence of consent.”

Further, intention is necessary in all the sacraments. Now he who consents not in his heart has no intention of contracting marriage; and therefore he does not contract a marriage.

I answer that, The outward cleansing stands in the same relation to baptism as the expression of words to this sacrament, as stated above [4941] (A[2]). Wherefore just as were a person to receive the outward cleansing, with the intention, not of receiving the sacrament, but of acting in jest or deceit, he would not be baptized; so, too, expression of words without inward consent makes no marriage.

Reply to Objection 1: There are two things here, namely the lack of consent—which benefits him in the tribunal of his conscience so that he is not bound by the marriage tie, albeit not in the tribunal of the Church where judgment is pronounced according to the evidence—and the deceit in the words, which does not benefit him, neither in the tribunal of his conscience nor in the tribunal of the Church, since in both he is punished for this.

Reply to Objection 2: If mental consent is lacking in one of the parties, on neither side is there marriage, since marriage consists in a mutual joining together, as stated above ([4942]Q[44], A[1]). However one may believe that in all probability there is no fraud unless there be evident signs thereof; because we must presume good of everyone, unless there be proof of the contrary. Consequently the party in whom there is no fraud is excused from sin on account of ignorance.

Reply to Objection 3: In such a case the Church compels him to hold to his first wife, because the Church judges according to outward appearances; nor is she deceived in justice or right, although she is deceived in the facts of the case. Yet such a man ought to bear the excommunication rather than return to his first wife; or else he should go far away into another country.

Whether consent given secretly in words of the present makes a marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that consent given secretly in words of the present does not make a marriage. For a thing that is in one person's power is not transferred to the power of another without the consent of the person in whose power it was. Now the maid is in her father's power. Therefore she cannot by marriage be transferred to a husband's power without her father's consent. Wherefore if consent be given secretly, even though it should be expressed in words of the present, there will be no marriage.

Objection 2: Further, in penance, just as in matrimony, our act is as it were essential to the sacrament. But the sacrament of penance is not made complete except by means of the ministers of the Church, who are the dispensers of the sacraments. Therefore neither can marriage be perfected without the priest's blessing.

Objection 3: Further, the Church does not forbid baptism to be given secretly, since one may baptize either privately or publicly. But the Church does forbid the celebration of clandestine marriages (cap. Cum inhibitio, De clandest. despons.). Therefore they cannot be done secretly.

Objection 4: Further, marriage cannot be contracted by those who are related in the second degree, because the Church has forbidden it. But the Church has also forbidden clandestine marriages. Therefore they cannot be valid marriages.

On the contrary, Given the cause the effect follows. Now the sufficient cause of matrimony is consent expressed in words of the present. Therefore whether this be done in public or in private the result is a marriage.

Further, wherever there is the due matter and the due form of a sacrament there is the sacrament. Now in a secret marriage there is the due matter, since there are persons who are able lawfully to contract—and the due form, since there are the words of the present expressive of consent. Therefore there is a true marriage.

I answer that, Just as in the other sacraments certain things are essential to the sacrament, and if they are omitted there is no sacrament, while certain things belong to the solemnization of the sacrament, and if these be omitted the sacrament is nevertheless validly performed, although it is a sin to omit them; so, too, consent expressed in words of the present between persons lawfully qualified to contract makes a marriage, because these two conditions are essential to the sacrament; while all else belongs to the solemnization of the sacrament, as being done in order that the marriage may be more fittingly performed. Hence if these be omitted it is a true marriage, although the contracting parties sin, unless they have a lawful motive for being excused. [*Clandestine marriages have since been declared invalid by the Council of Trent (sess. xxiv). It must be borne in mind that throughout the treatise on marriage St. Thomas gives the Canon Law of his time.]

Reply to Objection 1: The maid is in her father’s power, not as a female slave without power over her own body, but as a daughter, for the purpose of education. Hence, in so far as she is free, she can give herself into another’s power without her father’s consent, even as a son or daughter, since they are free, may enter religion without their parent’s consent.

Reply to Objection 2: In penance our act, although essential to the sacrament, does not suffice for producing the proximate effect of the sacrament, namely forgiveness of sins, and consequently it is necessary that the act of the priest intervene in order that the sacrament be perfected. But in matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause for the production of the proximate effect, which is the marriage bond, because whoever has the right to dispose of himself can bind himself to another. Consequently the priest’s blessing is not required for matrimony as being essential to the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: It is also forbidden to receive baptism otherwise than from a priest, except in a case of necessity. But matrimony is not a necessary sacrament: and consequently the comparison fails. However, clandestine marriages are forbidden on account of the evil results to which they are liable, since it often happens that one of the parties is guilty of fraud in such marriages; frequently, too, they have recourse to other nuptials when they repent of having married in haste; and many other evils result therefrom, besides which there is something disgraceful about them.

Reply to Objection 4: Clandestine marriages are not forbidden as though they were contrary to the essentials of marriage, in the same way as the marriages of unlawful persons, who are undue matter for this sacrament; and hence there is no comparison.

OF THE CONSENT TO WHICH AN OATH OR CARNAL INTERCOURSE IS APPENDED (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the consent to which an oath or carnal intercourse is appended. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?

(2) Whether carnal intercourse supervening to such a consent makes a marriage?

Whether an oath added to the consent that is expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that if an oath be added to a consent that is expressed in words of the future tense it makes a marriage. For no one can bind himself to act against the Divine Law. But the fulfilling of an oath is of Divine law according to Mat. 5:33, “Thou shalt perform thy oaths to the Lord.” Consequently no subsequent obligation can relieve a man of the obligation to keep an oath previously taken. If, therefore, after consenting to marry a woman by words expressive of the future and confirming that consent with an oath, a man binds himself to another woman by words expressive of the present, it would seem that none the less he is bound to keep his former oath. But this would not be the case unless that oath made the marriage complete. Therefore an oath affixed to a consent expressed in words of the future tense makes a marriage.

Objection 2: Further, Divine truth is stronger than human truth. Now an oath confirms a thing with the Divine truth. Since then words expressive of consent in the present in which there is mere human truth complete a marriage, it would seem that much more is this the case with words of the future confirmed by an oath.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Apostle (Heb. 6:16), “An oath for confirmation is the end of all . . . controversy”; wherefore in a court of justice at any rate one must stand by an oath rather than by a mere affirmation. Therefore if a man consent to marry a woman by a simple affirmation expressed in words of the present, after having consented to marry another in words of the future confirmed by oath, it would seem that in the judgment of the Church he should be compelled to take the first and not the second as his wife.

Objection 4: Further, the simple uttering of words relating to the future makes a betrothal. But the addition of an oath must have some effect. Therefore it makes something more than a betrothal. Now beyond a betrothal there is nothing but marriage. Therefore it makes a marriage.

On the contrary, What is future is not yet. Now the addition of an oath does not make words of the future tense signify anything else than consent to something future. Therefore it is not a marriage yet.

Further, after a marriage is complete, no further consent is required for the marriage. But after the oath there is yet another consent which makes the marriage, else it would be useless to swear to a future marriage. Therefore it does not make a marriage.

I answer that, An oath is employed in confirmation of one’s words; wherefore it confirms that only which is signified by the words, nor does it change their signification. Consequently, since it belongs to words of the future tense, by their very signification, not to make a marriage, since what is promised in the future is not done yet, even though an oath be added to the promise, the marriage is not made yet, as the Master says in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).

Reply to Objection 1: The fulfilling of a lawful oath is of Divine law, but not the fulfilling of an unlawful oath. Wherefore if a subsequent obligation makes that oath unlawful, whereas it was lawful before, he who does not keep the oath he took previously does not disobey the Divine law. And so it is in the case in point; since he swears unlawfully who promises unlawfully; and a promise about another’s property is unlawful. Consequently the subsequent consent by words of the present, whereby a man transfers the power over his body to another woman, makes the previous oath unlawful which was lawful before.

Reply to Objection 2: The Divine truth is most efficacious in confirming that to which it is applied. Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 4: The oath has some effect, not by causing a new obligation, but confirming that which is already made, and thus he who violates it sins more grievously.

Whether carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that carnal intercourse after consent expressed in words of the future makes a marriage. For consent by deed is greater than consent by word. But he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the promise he has previously made. Therefore it would seem that much more does this make a marriage than if he were to consent to mere words referring to the present.

Objection 2: Further, not only explicit but also interpretive consent makes a marriage. Now there can be no better interpretation of consent than carnal intercourse. Therefore marriage is completed thereby.

Objection 3: Further, all carnal union outside marriage is a sin. But the woman, seemingly, does not sin by admitting her betrothed to carnal intercourse. Therefore it makes a marriage.

Objection 4: Further, “Sin is not forgiven unless restitution be made,” as Augustine says (Ep. cliii ad Macedon.). Now a man cannot reinstate a woman whom he has violated under the pretense of marriage unless he marry her. Therefore it would seem that even if, after his carnal intercourse, he happen to contract with another by words of the present tense, he is bound to return to the first; and this would not be the case unless he were married to her. Therefore carnal intercourse after consent referring to the future makes a marriage.

On the contrary, Pope Nicholas I says (Resp. ad Consult. Bulg. iii; Cap. Tuas dudum, De clandest. despons.), “Without the consent to marriage, other things, including coition, are of no effect.”

Further, that which follows a thing does not make it. But carnal intercourse follows the actual marriage, as effect follows cause. Therefore it cannot make a marriage.

I answer that, We may speak of marriage in two ways. First, in reference to the tribunal of conscience, and thus in very truth carnal intercourse cannot complete a marriage the promise of which has previously been made in words expressive of the future, if inward consent is lacking, since words, even though expressive of the present, would not make a marriage in the absence of mental consent, as stated above ([4943]Q[45], A[4]). Secondly, in reference to the judgment of the Church; and since in the external tribunal judgment is given in accordance with external evidence, and since nothing is more expressly significant of consent than carnal intercourse, it follows that in the judgment of the Church carnal intercourse following on betrothal is declared to make a marriage, unless there appear clear signs of deceit or fraud [*According to the pre-Tridentine legislation] (De sponsal. et matrim., cap. Is qui fidem).

Reply to Objection 1: In reality he who has carnal intercourse consents by deed to the act of sexual union, and does not merely for this reason consent to marriage except according to the interpretation of the law.

Reply to Objection 2: This interpretation does not alter the truth of the matter, but changes the judgment which is about external things.

Reply to Objection 3: If the woman admit her betrothed, thinking that he wishes to consummate the marriage, she is excused from the sin, unless there be clear signs of fraud; for instance if they differ considerably in birth or fortune, or some other evident sign appear. Nevertheless the affianced husband is guilty of fornication, and should be punished for this fraud he has committed.

Reply to Objection 4: In a case of this kind the affianced husband, before his marriage with the other woman, is bound to marry the one to whom he was betrothed, if she be his equal or superior in rank. But if he has married another woman, he is no longer able to fulfill his obligation, wherefore it suffices if he provide for her marriage. Nor is he bound even to do this, according to some, if her affianced husband is of much higher rank than she, or if there be some evident sign of fraud, because it may be presumed that in all probability she was not deceived but pretended to be.

OF COMPULSORY AND CONDITIONAL CONSENT (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider compulsory and conditional consent. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether compulsory consent is possible?

(2) Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?

(3) Whether compulsory consent invalidates marriage?

(4) Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party using compulsion?

(5) Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?

(6) Whether one can be compelled by one's father to marry?

Whether a compulsory consent is possible?

Objection 1: It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as stated above (Sent. ii, D, 25 [*[4944]FS, Q[6], A[4]]) the free-will cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will. Therefore it cannot be compulsory.

Objection 2: Further, violent is the same as compulsory. Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), "a violent action is one the principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all." But the principle of consent is always within. Therefore no consent can be compulsory.

Objection 3: Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18), "no one sins in what he cannot avoid." Since then violence is defined by jurists (i, ff. de eo quod vi metusve) as the "force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed," it would seem that consent cannot be compulsory or violent.

Objection 4: Further, power is opposed to liberty. But compulsion is allied to power, as appears from a definition of Tully's in which he says that "compulsion is the force of one who exercises his power to detain a thing outside its proper bounds." Therefore the free-will cannot be compelled, and consequently neither can consent which is an act thereof.

On the contrary, That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 29). Therefore consent can be compelled.

Further, in marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled in the matter of contracts; for which reason the law adjudges that restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify “that which was done under compulsion or fear” (Sent. iv, D[29]). Therefore in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.

I answer that, Compulsion or violence is twofold. One is the cause of absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls (Ethic. iii, 1) “violent simply,” as when by bodily strength one forces a person to move; the other causes conditional necessity, and the Philosopher calls this a “mixed violence,” as when a person throws his merchandise overboard in order to save himself. In the latter kind of violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in itself, yet taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is voluntary. And since actions are about particulars, it follows that it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf. [4945]FS, Q[6], A[6]). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion results from one’s fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this violence coincides with fear which, in a manner, compels the will, whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions. Moreover, since the law considers not merely internal actions, but rather external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute compulsion, for which reason it draws a distinction between violence and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent which cannot be influenced by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear. Therefore as to the question at issue compulsion and fear are the same. Now, according to lawyers fear is “the agitation of the mind occasioned by danger imminent or future” (Ethic. iii, 1).

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections; for the first set of arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and the second set of arguments consider the second.

Whether a constant man can be compelled by fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that “a constant man” [*Cap. Ad audientiam, De his quae vi.] cannot be compelled by fear. Because the nature of a constant man is not to be agitated in the midst of dangers. Since then fear is “agitation of the mind occasioned by imminent danger,” it would seem that he is not compelled by fear.

Objection 2: Further, “Of all fearsome things death is the limit,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), as though it were the most perfect of all things that inspire fear. But the constant man is not compelled by death, since the brave face even mortal dangers. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.

Objection 3: Further, of all dangers a good man fears most that which affects his good name. But the fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man, because, according to the law (vii, ff, de eo quod metus, etc.), “fear of disgrace is not included under the ordinance, ‘That which is done through fear’” [*Dig. iv, 2, Quod metus causa]. Therefore neither does any other kind of fear influence a constant man.

Objection 4: Further, in him who is compelled by fear, fear leaves a sin, for it makes him promise what he is unwilling to fulfill, and thus it makes him lie. But a constant man does not commit a sin, not even a very slight one, for fear. Therefore no fear influences a constant man.

On the contrary, Abraham and Isaac were constant. Yet they were influenced by fear, since on account of fear each said that his wife was his sister (Gn. 12:12; 26:7).

Further, wherever there is mixed violence, it is fear that compels. But however constant a man may be he may suffer violence of that kind, for if he be on the sea, he will throw his merchandise overboard if menaced with shipwreck. Therefore fear can influence a constant man.

I answer that, By fear influencing a man we mean his being compelled by fear. A man is compelled by fear when he does that which otherwise he would not wish to do, in order to avoid that which he fears. Now the constant differs from the inconstant man in two respects. First, in respect of the quality of the danger feared, because the constant man follows right reason, whereby he knows whether to omit this rather than that, and whether to do this rather than that. Now the lesser evil or the greater good is always to be chosen in preference; and therefore the constant man is compelled to bear with the lesser evil through fear of the greater evil, but he is not compelled to bear with the greater evil in order to avoid the lesser. But the inconstant man is compelled to bear with the greater evil through fear of a lesser evil, namely to commit sin through fear of bodily suffering; whereas on the contrary the obstinate man cannot be compelled even to permit or to do a lesser evil, in order to avoid a greater. Hence the constant man is a mean between the inconstant and the obstinate. Secondly, they differ as to their estimate of the threatening evil, for a constant man is not compelled unless for grave and probable reasons, while the inconstant man is compelled by trifling motives: “The wicked man seeth when no man pursueth” (Prov. 28:1).

Reply to Objection 1: The constant man, like the brave man, is fearless, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 4), not that he is altogether without fear, but because he fears not what he ought not to fear, or where, or when he ought not to fear.

Reply to Objection 2: Sin is the greatest of evils, and consequently a constant man can nowise be compelled to sin; indeed a man should die rather than suffer the like, as again the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6,9). Yet certain bodily injuries are less grievous than certain others; and chief among them are those which relate to the person, such as death, blows, the stain resulting from rape, and slavery. Wherefore the like compel a constant man to suffer other bodily injuries. They are contained in the verse: “Rape, status, blows, and death.” Nor does it matter whether they refer to his own person, or to the person of his wife or children, or the like.

Reply to Objection 3: Although disgrace is a greater injury it is easy to remedy it. Hence fear of disgrace is not reckoned to influence a constant man according to law.

Reply to Objection 4: The constant man is not compelled to lie, because at the time he wishes to give; yet afterwards he wishes to ask for restitution, or at least to appeal to the judge, if he promised not to ask for restitution. But he cannot promise not to appeal, for since this is contrary to the good of justice, he cannot be compelled thereto, namely to act against justice.

Whether compulsory consent invalidates a marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent does not invalidate a marriage. For just as consent is necessary for matrimony, so is intention necessary for Baptism. Now one who is compelled by fear to receive Baptism, receives the sacrament. Therefore one who is compelled by fear to consent is bound by his marriage.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), that which is done on account of mixed violence is more voluntary than involuntary. Now consent cannot be compelled except by mixed violence. Therefore it is not entirely involuntary, and consequently the marriage is valid.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly he who has consented to marriage under compulsion ought to be counseled to stand to that marriage; because to promise and not to fulfill has an “appearance of evil,” and the Apostle wishes us to refrain from all such things (1 Thess 5:22). But that would not be the case if compulsory consent invalidated a marriage altogether. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, A Decretal says (cap. Cum locum, De sponsal. et matrim.): “Since there is no room for consent where fear or compulsion enters in, it follows that where a person’s consent is required, every pretext for compulsion must be set aside.” Now mutual contract is necessary in marriage. Therefore, etc.

Further, Matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which union is according to the liberty of love. Therefore it cannot be the result of compulsory consent.

I answer that, The marriage bond is everlasting. Hence whatever is inconsistent with its perpetuity invalidates marriage. Now the fear which compels a constant man deprives the contract of its perpetuity, since its complete rescission can be demanded. Wherefore this compulsion by fear which influences a constant man, invalidates marriage, but not the other compulsion. Now a constant man is reckoned a virtuous man who, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 4), is a measure in all human actions.

However, some say that if there be consent although compulsory, the marriage is valid in conscience and in God’s sight, but not in the eyes of the Church, who presumes that there was no inward consent on account of the fear. But this is of no account, because the Church should not presume a person to sin until it be proved; and he sinned if he said that he consented whereas he did not consent. Wherefore the Church presumes that he did consent, but judges this compulsory consent to be insufficient for a valid marriage.

Reply to Objection 1: The intention is not the efficient cause of the sacrament in baptism, it is merely the cause that elicits the action of the agent; whereas the consent is the efficient cause in matrimony. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Not any kind of voluntariness suffices for marriage: it must be completely voluntary, because it has to be perpetual; and consequently it is invalidated by violence of a mixed nature.

Reply to Objection 3: He ought not always to be advised to stand to that marriage, but only when evil results are feared from its dissolution. Nor does he sin if he does otherwise, because there is no appearance of evil in not fulfilling a promise that one has made unwillingly.

Whether compulsory consent makes a marriage as regards the party who uses compulsion?

Objection 1: It would seem that compulsory consent makes a marriage, at least as regards the party who uses compulsion. For matrimony is a sign of a spiritual union. But spiritual union which is by charity may be with one who has not charity. Therefore marriage is possible with one who wills it not.

Objection 2: Further, if she who was compelled consents afterwards, it will be a true marriage. But he who compelled her before is not bound by her consent. Therefore he was married to her by virtue of the consent he gave before.

On the contrary, Matrimony is an equiparant relation. Now a relation of that kind is equally in both terms. Therefore if there is an impediment on the part of one, there will be no marriage on the part of the other.

I answer that, Since marriage is a kind of relation, and a relation cannot arise in one of the terms without arising in the other, it follows that whatever is an impediment to matrimony in the one, is an impediment to matrimony in the other; since it is impossible for a man to be the husband of one who is not his wife, or for a woman to be a wife without a husband, just as it is impossible to be a mother without having a child. Hence it is a common saying that “marriage is not lame.”

Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of the lover can be directed to one who loves not, there can be no union between them, unless love be mutual. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) that friendship which consists in a kind of union requires a return of love.

Reply to Objection 2: Marriage does not result from the consent of her who was compelled before, except in so far as the other party's previous consent remains in force; wherefore if he were to withdraw his consent there would be no marriage.

Whether conditional consent makes a marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that not even a conditional consent makes a marriage, because a statement is not made simply if it is made subject to a condition. But in marriage the words expressive of consent must be uttered simply. Therefore a conditional consent makes no marriage.

Objection 2: Further, marriage should be certain. But where a statement is made under a condition it is rendered doubtful. Therefore a like consent makes no marriage.

On the contrary, In other contracts an obligation is undertaken conditionally, and holds so long as the condition holds. Therefore since marriage is a contract, it would seem that it can be made by a conditional consent.

I answer that, The condition made is either of the present or of the future. If it is of the present and is not contrary to marriage, whether it be moral or immoral, the marriage holds if the condition is verified, and is invalid if the condition is not verified. If, however, it be contrary to the marriage blessings, the marriage is invalid, as we have also said in reference to betrothals ([4946]Q[43], A[1]). But if the condition refer to the future, it is either necessary, as that the sun will rise tomorrow—and then the marriage is valid, because such future things are present in their causes—or else it is contingent, as the payment of a sum of money, or the consent of the parents, and then the judgment about a consent of this kind is the same as about a consent expressed in words of the future tense; wherefore it makes no marriage.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether one can be compelled by one’s father’s command to marry?

Objection 1: It would seem that one can be compelled by one’s father’s command to marry. For it is written (Col. 3:20): “Children, obey your parents in all things.” Therefore they are bound to obey them in this also.

Objection 2: Further, Isaac charged Jacob (Gn. 28:1) not to take a wife from the daughters of Chanaan. But he would not have charged him thus unless he had the right to command it. Therefore a son is bound to obey his father in this.

Objection 3: Further, no one should promise, especially with an oath, for one whom he cannot compel to keep the promise. Now parents promise future marriages for their children, and even confirm their promise by oath. Therefore they can compel their children to keep that promise.

Objection 4: Further, our spiritual father, the Pope to wit, can by his command compel a man to a spiritual marriage, namely to accept a bishopric. Therefore a carnal father can compel his son to marriage.

On the contrary, A son may lawfully enter religion though his father command him to marry. Therefore he is not bound to obey him in this.

Further, if he were bound to obey, a betrothal contracted by the parents would hold good without their children’s consent. But this is against the law (cap. Ex litteris, De despon. impub.). Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Since in marriage there is a kind of perpetual service, as it were, a father cannot by his command compel his son to marry, since the latter is of free condition: but he may induce him for a reasonable cause; and thus the son will be affected by his father’s command in the same way as he is affected by that cause, so that if the cause be compelling as indicating either obligation or fitness, his father’s command will compel him in the same measure: otherwise he may not compel him.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of the Apostle do not refer to those matters in which a man is his own master as the father is. Such is marriage by which the son also becomes a father.

Reply to Objection 2: There were other motives why Jacob was bound to do what Isaac commanded him, both on account of the wickedness of those women, and because the seed of Chanaan was to be cast forth from the land which was promised to the seed of the patriarchs. Hence Isaac could command this.

Reply to Objection 3: They do not swear except with the implied condition “if it please them”; and they are bound to induce them in good faith.

Reply to Objection 4: Some say that the Pope cannot command a man to accept a bishopric, because consent should be free. But if this be granted there would be an end of ecclesiastical order, for unless a man can be compelled to accept the government of a church, the Church could not be preserved, since sometimes those who are qualified for the purpose are unwilling to accept unless they be compelled. Therefore we must reply that the two cases are not parallel; for there is no bodily service in a spiritual marriage as there is in the bodily marriage; because the spiritual marriage is a kind of office for dispensing the public weal: “Let a man so account of us as of the ministers of Christ, and the dispensers of the mysteries of God” (1 Cor. 4:1).

OF THE OBJECT OF THE CONSENT (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the object of the consent. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?

(2) Whether consent to marry a person for an immoral motive makes a marriage?

Whether the consent that makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse?

Objection 1: It would seem that the consent which makes a marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse. For Jerome [*The words quoted are found implicitly in St. Augustine (De Bono Viduit ix)] says that “for those who have vowed virginity it is wicked, not only to marry, but even to wish to marry.” But it would not be wicked unless it were contrary to virginity, and marriage is not contrary to virginity except by reason of carnal intercourse. Therefore the will’s consent in marriage is a consent to carnal intercourse.

Objection 2: Further, whatever there is in marriage between husband and wife is lawful between brother and sister except carnal intercourse. But there cannot lawfully be a consent to marriage between them. Therefore the marriage consent is a consent to carnal intercourse.

Objection 3: Further, if the woman say to the man: “I consent to take thee provided however that you know me not,” it is not a marriage consent, because it contains something against the essence of that consent. Yet this would not be the case unless the marriage consent were a consent to carnal intercourse. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, in everything the beginning corresponds to the consummation. Now marriage is consummated by carnal intercourse. Therefore, since it begins by the consent, it would seem that the consent is to carnal intercourse.

On the contrary, No one that consents to carnal intercourse is a virgin in mind and body. Yet Blessed John the evangelist after consenting to marriage was a virgin both in mind and body. Therefore he did not consent to carnal intercourse.

Further, the effect corresponds to its cause. Now consent is the cause of marriage. Since then carnal intercourse is not essential to marriage, seemingly neither is the consent which causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse.

I answer that, The consent that makes a marriage is a consent to marriage, because the proper effect of the will is the thing willed. Wherefore, according as carnal intercourse stands in relation to marriage, so far is the consent that causes marriage a consent to carnal intercourse. Now, as stated above ([4947]Q[44], A[1];[4948] Q[45], AA[1],2), marriage is not essentially the carnal union itself, but a certain joining together of husband and wife ordained to carnal intercourse, and a further consequent union between husband and wife, in so far as they each receive power over the other in reference to carnal intercourse, which joining together is called the nuptial bond. Hence it is evident that they said well who asserted that to consent to marriage is to consent to carnal intercourse implicitly and not explicitly. For carnal intercourse is not to be understood, except as an effect is implicitly contained in its cause, for the power to have carnal intercourse, which power is the object of the consent, is the cause of carnal intercourse, just as the power to use one’s own property is the cause of the use.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why consent to marriage after taking the vow of virginity is sinful, is because that consent gives a power to do what is unlawful: even so would a man sin if he gave another man the power to receive that which he has in deposit, and not only by actually delivering it to him. With regard to the consent of the Blessed Virgin, we have spoken about it above (Sent. iv, D, 3; [4949]TP, Q[29], A[2]).

Reply to Objection 2: Between brother and sister there can be no power of one over the other in relation to carnal intercourse, even as neither can there be lawfully carnal intercourse itself. Consequently the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: Such an explicit condition is contrary not only to the act but also to the power of carnal intercourse, and therefore it is contrary to marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: Marriage begun corresponds to marriage consummated, as habit or power corresponds to the act which is operation.

The arguments on the contrary side show that consent is not given explicitly to carnal intercourse; and this is true.

Whether marriage can result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive?

Objection 1: It would seem that marriage cannot result from one person's consent to take another for a base motive. For there is but one reason for one thing. Now marriage is one sacrament. Therefore it cannot result from the intention of any other end than that for which it was instituted by God; namely the begetting of children.

Objection 2: Further, the marriage union is from God, according to Mat. 19:6, "What . . . God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But a union that is made for immoral motives is not from God. Therefore it is not a marriage.

Objection 3: Further, in the other sacraments, if the intention of the Church be not observed, the sacrament is invalid. Now the intention of the Church in the sacrament of matrimony is not directed to a base purpose. Therefore, if a marriage be contracted for a base purpose, it will not be a valid marriage.

Objection 4: Further, according to Boethius (De Diff., Topic. ii) "a thing is good if its end be good." But matrimony is always good. Therefore it is not matrimony if it is done for an evil end.

Objection 5: Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church; and in this there can be nothing base. Neither therefore can marriage be contracted for a base motive.

On the contrary, He who baptizes another for the sake of gain baptizes validly. Therefore if a man marries a woman for the purpose of gain it is a valid marriage.

Further, the same conclusion is proved by the examples and authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30).

I answer that, The final cause of marriage may be taken as twofold, namely essential and accidental. The essential cause of marriage is the end to which it is by its very nature ordained, and this is always good, namely the begetting of children and the avoiding of fornication. But the accidental final cause thereof is that which the contracting parties intend as the result of marriage. And since that which is intended as the result of marriage is consequent upon marriage, and since that which comes first is not altered by what comes after, but conversely; marriage does not become good or evil by reason of that cause, but the contracting parties to whom this cause is the essential end. And since accidental causes are infinite in number, it follows that there can be an infinite number of such causes in matrimony, some of which are good and some bad.

Reply to Objection 1: This is true of the essential and principal cause; but that which has one essential and principal end may have several secondary essential ends, and an infinite number of accidental ends.

Reply to Objection 2: The joining together can be taken for the relation itself which is marriage, and that is always from God, and is good, whatever be its cause; or for the act of those who are being joined together, and thus it is sometimes evil and is not from God simply. Nor is it unreasonable that an effect be from God, the cause of which is evil, such as a child born of adultery; for it is not from that cause as evil, but as having some good in so far as it is from God, although it is not from God simply.

Reply to Objection 3: The intention of the Church whereby she intends to confer a sacrament is essential to each sacrament, so that if it be not observed, all sacraments are null. But the intention of the Church whereby she intends an advantage resulting from the sacrament belongs to the well-being and not to the essence of a sacrament; wherefore, if it be not observed, the sacrament is none the less valid. Yet he who omits this intention sins; for instance if in baptism one intend not the healing of the mind which the Church intends. In like manner he who intends to marry, although he fail to direct it to the end which the Church intends, nevertheless contracts a valid marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: This evil which is intended is the end not of marriage, but of the contracting parties.

Reply to Objection 5: The union itself, and not the action of those who are united, is the sign of the union of Christ with the Church: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

OF THE MARRIAGE GOODS* (SIX ARTICLES)

[*"Bona matrimonii," variously rendered marriage goods, marriage blessings, and advantages of marriage.]

In the next place we must consider the marriage goods. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether certain goods are necessary in order to excuse marriage?

(2) Whether those assigned are sufficient?

(3) Whether the sacrament is the principal among the goods?

(4) Whether the marriage act is excused from sin by the aforesaid goods?

(5) Whether it can ever be excused from sin without them?

(6) Whether in their absence it is always a mortal sin?

Whether certain blessings are necessary in order to excuse marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that certain blessings are not necessary in order to excuse marriage. For just as the preservation of the individual which is effected by the nutritive power is intended by nature, so too is the preservation of the species which is effected by marriage; and indeed so much the more as the good of the species is better and more exalted than the good of the individual. But no goods are necessary to excuse the act of the nutritive power. Neither therefore are they necessary to excuse marriage.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the friendship between husband and wife is natural, and includes the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But that which is virtuous in itself needs no excuse. Therefore neither should any goods be assigned for the excuse of matrimony.

Objection 3: Further, matrimony was instituted as a remedy and as an office, as stated above ([4950]Q[42], A[2]). Now it needs no excuse in so far as it is instituted as an office, since then it would also have needed an excuse in paradise, which is false, for there, as Augustine says, "marriage would have been without reproach and the marriage-bed without stain" (Gen. ad lit. ix). In like manner neither does it need an excuse in so far as it is intended as a remedy, any more than the other sacraments which were instituted as remedies for sin. Therefore matrimony does not need these excuses.

Objection 4: Further, the virtues are directed to whatever can be done aright. If then marriage can be righted by certain goods, it needs nothing else to right it besides the virtues of the soul; and consequently there is no need to assign to matrimony any goods whereby it is righted, any more than to other things in which the virtues direct us.

On the contrary, Wherever there is indulgence, there must needs be some reason for excuse. Now marriage is allowed in the state of infirmity "by indulgence" (1 Cor. 7:6). Therefore it needs to be excused by certain goods.

Further, the intercourse of fornication and that of marriage are of the same species as regards the species of nature. But the intercourse of fornication is wrong in itself. Therefore, in order that the marriage intercourse be not wrong, something must be added to it to make it right, and draw it to another moral species.

I answer that, No wise man should allow himself to lose a thing except for some compensation in the shape of an equal or better good. Wherefore for a thing that has a loss attached to it to be eligible, it needs to have some good connected with it, which by compensating for that loss makes that thing ordinate and right. Now there is a loss of reason incidental to the union of man and woman, both because the reason is carried away entirely on account of the vehemence of the pleasure, so that it is unable to understand anything at the same time, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11); and again because of the tribulation of the flesh which such persons have to suffer from solicitude for temporal things (1 Cor. 7:28). Consequently the choice of this union cannot be made ordinate except by certain compensations whereby that same union is righted. and these are the goods which excuse marriage and make it right.

Reply to Objection 1: In the act of eating there is not such an intense pleasure overpowering the reason as in the aforesaid action, both because the generative power, whereby original sin is transmitted, is infected and corrupt, whereas the nutritive power, by which original sin is not transmitted, is neither corrupt nor infected; and again because each one feels in himself a defect of the individual more than a defect of the species. Hence, in order to entice a man to take food which supplies a defect of the individual, it is enough that he feel this defect; but in order to entice him to the act whereby a defect of the species is remedied, Divine providence attached pleasure to that act, which moves even irrational animals in which there is not the stain of original sin. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: These goods which justify marriage belong to the nature of marriage, which consequently needs them, not as extrinsic causes of its rectitude, but as causing in it that rectitude which belongs to it by nature.

Reply to Objection 3: From the very fact that marriage is intended as an office or as a remedy it has the aspect of something useful and right; nevertheless both aspects belong to it from the fact that it has these goods by which it fulfills the office and affords a remedy to concupiscence.

Reply to Objection 4: An act of virtue may derive its rectitude both from the virtue as its elicitive principle, and from its circumstances as its formal principles; and the goods of marriage are related to marriage as circumstances to an act of virtue which owes it to those circumstances that it can be an act of virtue.

Whether the goods of marriage are sufficiently enumerated?

Objection 1: It would seem that the goods of marriage are insufficiently enumerated by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31), namely “faith, offspring, and sacrament.” For the object of marriage among men is not only the begetting and feeding of children, but also the partnership of a common life, whereby each one contributes his share of work to the common stock, as stated in Ethic. viii, 12. Therefore as the offspring is reckoned a good of matrimony, so also should the communication of works.

Objection 2: Further, the union of Christ with the Church, signified by matrimony, is the effect of charity. Therefore charity rather than faith should be reckoned among the goods of matrimony.

Objection 3: Further, in matrimony, just as it is required that neither party have intercourse with another, so is it required that the one pay the marriage debt to the other. Now the former pertains to faith according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 31). Therefore justice should also be reckoned among the goods of marriage on account of the payment of the debt.

Objection 4: Further, in matrimony as signifying the union of Christ with the Church, just as indivisibility is required, so also is unity, whereby one man has one wife. But the sacrament which is reckoned among the three marriage goods pertains to indivisibility. Therefore there should be something else pertaining to unity.

Objection 5: On the other hand, it would seem that they are too many. For one virtue suffices to make one act right. Now faith is one virtue. Therefore it was not necessary to add two other goods to make marriage right.

Objection 6: Further, the same cause does not make a thing both useful and virtuous, since the useful and the virtuous are opposite divisions of the good. Now marriage derives its character of useful from the offspring. Therefore the offspring should not be reckoned among the goods that make marriage virtuous.

Objection 7: Further, nothing should be reckoned as a property or condition of itself. Now these goods are reckoned to be conditions of marriage. Therefore since matrimony is a sacrament, the sacrament should not be reckoned a condition of matrimony.

I answer that, Matrimony is instituted both as an office of nature and as a sacrament of the Church. As an office of nature it is directed by two things, like every other virtuous act. one of these is required on the part of the agent and is the intention of the due end, and thus the “offspring” is accounted a good of matrimony; the other is required on the part of the act, which is good generically through being about a due matter; and thus we have “faith,” whereby a man has intercourse with his wife and with no other woman. Besides this it has a certain goodness as a sacrament, and this is signified by the very word “sacrament.”

Reply to Objection 1: Offspring signifies not only the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as its end is directed the entire communion of works that exists between man and wife as united in marriage, since parents naturally “lay up” for their “children” (2 Cor. 12:14); so that the offspring like a principal end includes another, as it were, secondary end.

Reply to Objection 2: Faith is not taken here as a theological virtue, but as part of justice, in so far as faith [fides] signifies the suiting of deed to word [fiant dicta] by keeping one’s promises; for since marriage is a contract it contains a promise whereby this man is assigned to this woman.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the marriage promise means that neither party is to have intercourse with a third party, so does it require that they should mutually pay the marriage debt. The latter is indeed the chief of the two, since it follows from the power which each receives over the other. Consequently both these things pertain to faith, although the Book of Sentences mentions that which is the less manifest.

Reply to Objection 4: By sacrament we are to understand not only indivisibility, but all those things that result from marriage being a sign of Christ’s union with the Church. We may also reply that the unity to which the objection refers pertains to faith, just as indivisibility belongs to the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 5: Faith here does not denote a virtue, but that condition of virtue which is a part of justice and is called by the name of faith.

Reply to Objection 6: Just as the right use of a useful good derives its rectitude not from the useful but from the reason which causes the right use, so too direction to a useful good may cause the goodness of rectitude by virtue of the reason causing the right direction; and in this way marriage, through being directed to the offspring, is useful, and nevertheless righteous, inasmuch as it is directed aright.

Reply to Objection 7: As the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31), sacrament here does not mean matrimony itself, but its indissolubility, which is a sign of the same thing as matrimony is.

We may also reply that although marriage is a sacrament, marriage as marriage is not the same as marriage as a sacrament, since it was instituted not only as a sign of a sacred thing, but also as an office of nature. Hence the sacramental aspect is a condition added to marriage considered in itself, whence also it derives its rectitude. Hence its sacramentality, if I may use the term, is reckoned among the goods which justify marriage; and accordingly this third good of marriage, the sacrament to wit, denotes not only its indissolubility, but also whatever pertains to its signification.

Whether the sacrament is the chief of the marriage goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that the “sacrament” is not the chief of the marriage goods. For the end is principal in everything. Now the end of marriage is the offspring. Therefore the offspring is the chief marriage good.

Objection 2: Further, in the specific nature the difference is more important than the genus, even as the form is more important than matter in the composition of a natural thing. Now “sacrament” refers to marriage on the part of its genus, while “offspring” and “faith” refer thereto on the part of the difference whereby it is a special kind of sacrament. Therefore these other two are more important than sacrament in reference to marriage.

Objection 3: Further, just as we find marriage without “offspring” and without “faith,” so do we find it without indissolubility, as in the case where one of the parties enters religion before the marriage is consummated. Therefore neither from this point of view is “sacrament” the most important marriage good.

Objection 4: Further, an effect cannot be more important than its cause. Now consent, which is the cause of matrimony, is often changed. Therefore the marriage also can be dissolved and consequently inseparability is not always a condition of marriage.

Objection 5: Further, the sacraments which produce an everlasting effect imprint a character. But no character is imprinted in matrimony. Therefore it is not conditioned by a lasting inseparability. Consequently just as there is marriage without “offspring” so is there marriage without “sacrament,” and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, That which has a place in the definition of a thing is most essential thereto. Now inseparability, which pertains to sacrament, is placed in the definition of marriage ([4951]Q[44], A[3]), while offspring and faith are not. Therefore among the other goods sacrament is the most essential to matrimony.

Further, the Divine power which works in the sacraments is more efficacious than human power. But “offspring” and “faith” pertain to matrimony as directed to an office of human nature, whereas “sacrament” pertains to it as instituted by God. Therefore sacrament takes a more important part in marriage than the other two.

I answer that, This or that may be more important to a thing in two ways, either because it is more essential or because it is more excellent. If the reason is because it is more excellent, then “sacrament” is in every way the most important of the three marriage goods, since it belongs to marriage considered as a sacrament of grace; while the other two belong to it as an office of nature; and a perfection of grace is more excellent than a perfection of nature. If, however, it is said to be more important because it is more essential, we must draw a distinction; for “faith” and “offspring” can be considered in two ways. First, in themselves, and thus they regard the use of matrimony in begetting children and observing the marriage compact; while inseparability, which is denoted by “sacrament,” regards the very sacrament considered in itself, since from the very fact that by the marriage compact man and wife give to one another power the one over the other in perpetuity, it follows that they cannot be put asunder. Hence there is no matrimony without inseparability, whereas there is matrimony without “faith” and “offspring,” because the existence of a thing does not depend on its use; and in this sense “sacrament” is more essential to matrimony than “faith” and “offspring.” Secondly, “faith” and “offspring” may be considered as in their principles, so that “offspring” denote the intention of having children, and “faith” the duty of remaining faithful, and there can be no matrimony without these also, since they are caused in matrimony by the marriage compact itself, so that if anything contrary to these were expressed in the consent which makes a marriage, the marriage would be invalid. Taking “faith” and “offspring” in this sense, it is clear that “offspring” is the most essential thing in marriage, secondly “faith,” and thirdly “sacrament”; even as to man it is more essential to be in nature than to be in grace, although it is more excellent to be in grace.

Reply to Objection 1: The end as regards the intention stands first in a thing, but as regards the attainment it stands last. It is the same with “offspring” among the marriage goods; wherefore in a way it is the most important and in another way it is not.

Reply to Objection 2: Sacrament, even as holding the third place among the marriage goods, belongs to matrimony by reason of its difference; for it is called “sacrament” from its signification of that particular sacred thing which matrimony signifies.

Reply to Objection 3: According to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. ix), marriage is a good of mortals, wherefore in the resurrection “they shall neither marry nor be married” (Mat. 22:30). Hence the marriage bond does not last after the life wherein it is contracted, and consequently it is said to be inseparable, because it cannot be sundered in this life, but either by bodily death after carnal union, or by spiritual death after a merely spiritual union.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the consent which makes a marriage is not everlasting materially, i.e. in regard to the substance of the act, since that act ceases and a contrary act may succeed it, nevertheless formally speaking it is everlasting, because it is a consent to an ever lasting bond, else it would not make a marriage, for a consent to take a woman for a time makes no marriage. Hence it is everlasting formally, inasmuch as an act takes its species from its object; and thus it is that matrimony derives its inseparability from the consent.

Reply to Objection 5: In those sacraments wherein a character is imprinted, power is given to perform spiritual actions; but in matrimony, to perform bodily actions. Wherefore matrimony by reason of the power which man and wife receive over one another agrees with the sacraments in which a character is imprinted, and from this it derives its inseparability, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 31); yet it differs from them in so far as that power regards bodily acts; hence it does not confer a spiritual character.

Whether the marriage act is excused by the aforesaid goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act cannot be altogether excused from sin by the aforesaid goods. For whoever allows himself to lose a greater good for the sake of a lesser good sins because he allows it inordinately. Now the good of reason which is prejudiced in the marriage act is greater than these three marriage goods. Therefore the aforesaid goods do not suffice to excuse marriage intercourse.

Objection 2: Further, if a moral good be added to a moral evil the sum total is evil and not good, since one evil circumstance makes an action evil, whereas one good circumstance does not make it good. Now the marriage act is evil in itself, else it would need no excuse. Therefore the addition of the marriage goods cannot make the act good.

Objection 3: Further, wherever there is immoderate passion there is moral vice. Now the marriage goods cannot prevent the pleasure in that act from being immoderate. Therefore they cannot excuse it from being a sin.

Objection 4: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15), shame is only caused by a disgraceful deed. Now the marriage goods do not deprive that deed of its shame. Therefore they cannot excuse it from sin.

On the contrary, The marriage act differs not from fornication except by the marriage goods. If therefore these were not sufficient to excuse it marriage would be always unlawful; and this is contrary to what was stated above ([4952]Q[41], A[3]).

Further, the marriage goods are related to its act as its due circumstances, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). Now the like circumstances are sufficient to prevent an action from being evil. Therefore these goods can excuse marriage so that it is nowise a sin.

I answer that, An act is said to be excused in two ways. First, on the part of the agent, so that although it be evil it is not imputed as sin to the agent, or at least not as so grave a sin. thus ignorance is said to excuse a sin wholly or partly. Secondly, an act is said to be excused on its part, so that, namely, it is not evil; and it is thus that the aforesaid goods are said to excuse the marriage act. Now it is from the same cause that an act is not morally evil, and that it is good, since there is no such thing as an indifferent act, as was stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 40; [4953]FS, Q[18], A[9]). Now a human act is said to be good in two ways. In one way by goodness of virtue, and thus an act derives its goodness from those things which place it in the mean. This is what “faith” and “offspring” do in the marriage act, as stated above [4954](A[2]). In another way, by goodness of the “sacrament,” in which way an act is said to be not only good, but also holy, and the marriage act derives this goodness from the indissolubility of the union, in respect of which it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Thus it is clear that the aforesaid goods sufficiently excuse the marriage act.

Reply to Objection 1: By the marriage act man does not incur harm to his reason as to habit, but only as to act. Nor is it unfitting that a certain act which is generically better be sometimes interrupted for some less good act; for it is possible to do this without sin, as in the case of one who ceases from the act of contemplation in order meanwhile to devote himself to action.

Reply to Objection 2: This argument would avail if the evil that is inseparable from carnal intercourse were an evil of sin. But in this case it is an evil not of sin but of punishment alone, consisting in the rebellion of concupiscence against reason; and consequently the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: The excess of passion that amounts to a sin does not refer to the passion's quantitative intensity, but to its proportion to reason; wherefore it is only when a passion goes beyond the bounds of reason that it is reckoned to be immoderate. Now the pleasure attaching to the marriage act, while it is most intense in point of quantity, does not go beyond the bounds previously appointed by reason before the commencement of the act, although reason is unable to regulate them during the pleasure itself.

Reply to Objection 4: The turpitude that always accompanies the marriage act and always causes shame is the turpitude of punishment, not of sin, for man is naturally ashamed of any defect.

Whether the marriage act can be excused without the marriage goods?

Objection 1: It would seem that the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods. For he who is moved by nature alone to the marriage act, apparently does not intend any of the marriage goods, since the marriage goods pertain to grace or virtue. Yet when a person is moved to the aforesaid act by the natural appetite alone, seemingly he commits no sin, for nothing natural is an evil, since "evil is contrary to nature and order," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

Objection 2: Further, he who has intercourse with his wife in order to avoid fornication, does not seemingly intend any of the marriage goods. Yet he does not sin apparently, because marriage was granted to human weakness for the very purpose of avoiding fornication (1 Cor. 7:2, 6). Therefore the marriage act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

Objection 3: Further, he who uses as he will that which is his own does not act against justice, and thus seemingly does not sin. Now marriage makes the wife the husband's own, and "vice versa." Therefore, if they use one another at will through the instigation of lust, it would seem that it is no sin; and thus the same conclusion follows.

Objection 4: Further, that which is good generically does not become evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now the marriage act whereby a husband knows his wife is generically good. Therefore it cannot be evil unless it be done with an evil intention. Now it can be done with a good intention, even without intending any marriage good, for instance by intending to keep or acquire bodily health. Therefore it seems that this act can be excused even without the marriage goods.

On the contrary, If the cause be removed the effect is removed. Now the marriage goods are the cause of rectitude in the marriage act. Therefore the marriage act cannot be excused without them.

Further, the aforesaid act does not differ from the act of fornication except in the aforesaid goods. But the act of fornication is always evil. Therefore the marriage act also will always be evil unless it be excused by the aforesaid goods.

I answer that, Just as the marriage goods, in so far as they consist in a habit, make a marriage honest and holy, so too, in so far as they are in the actual intention, they make the marriage act honest, as regards those two marriage goods which relate to the marriage act. Hence when married persons come together for the purpose of begetting children, or of paying the debt to one another (which pertains to “faith”) they are wholly excused from sin. But the third good does not relate to the use of marriage, but to its excuse, as stated above [4955](A[3]); wherefore it makes marriage itself honest, but not its act, as though its act were wholly excused from sin, through being done on account of some signification. Consequently there are only two ways in which married persons can come together without any sin at all, namely in order to have offspring, and in order to pay the debt. otherwise it is always at least a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The offspring considered as a marriage good includes something besides the offspring as a good intended by nature. For nature intends offspring as safeguarding the good of the species, whereas the offspring as a good of the sacrament of marriage includes besides this the directing of the child to God. Wherefore the intention of nature which intends the offspring must needs be referred either actually or habitually to the intention of having an offspring, as a good of the sacrament: otherwise the intention would go no further than a creature; and this is always a sin. Consequently whenever nature alone moves a person to the marriage act, he is not wholly excused from sin, except in so far as the movement of nature is further directed actually or habitually to the offspring as a good of the sacrament. Nor does it follow that the instigation of nature is evil, but that it is imperfect unless it be further directed to some marriage good.

Reply to Objection 2: If a man intends by the marriage act to prevent fornication in his wife, it is no sin, because this is a kind of payment of the debt that comes under the good of “faith.” But if he intends to avoid fornication in himself, then there is a certain superfluity, and accordingly there is a venial sin, nor was the sacrament instituted for that purpose, except by indulgence, which regards venial sins.

Reply to Objection 3: One due circumstance does not suffice to make a good act, and consequently it does not follow that, no matter how one use one’s own property, the use is good, but when one uses it as one ought according to all the circumstances.

Reply to Objection 4: Although it is not evil in itself to intend to keep oneself in good health, this intention becomes evil, if one intend health by means of something that is not naturally ordained for that purpose; for instance if one sought only bodily health by the sacrament of baptism, and the same applies to the marriage act in the question at issue.

Whether it is a mortal sin for a man to have knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure?

Objection 1: It would seem that whenever a man has knowledge of his wife, with the intention not of a marriage good but merely of pleasure, he commits a mortal sin. For according to Jerome (Comment. in Eph. 5:25), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 31), “the pleasure taken in the embraces of a wanton is damnable in a husband.” Now nothing but mortal sin is said to be damnable. Therefore it is always a mortal sin to have knowledge of one’s wife for mere pleasure.

Objection 2: Further, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin, as stated in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 24). Now whoever knows his wife for the sake of pleasure consents to the pleasure. Therefore he sins mortally.

Objection 3: Further, whoever fails to refer the use of a creature to God enjoys a creature, and this is a mortal sin. But whoever uses his wife for mere pleasure does not refer that use to God. Therefore he sins mortally.

Objection 4: Further, no one should be excommunicated except for a mortal sin. Now according to the text (Sent. ii, D, 24) a man who knows his wife for mere pleasure is debarred from entering the Church, as though he were excommunicate. Therefore every such man sins mortally.

On the contrary, As stated in the text (Sent. ii, D, 24), according to Augustine (Contra Jul. ii, 10; De Decem Chord. xi; Serm. xli, de Sanct.), carnal intercourse of this kind is one of the daily sins, for which we say the “Our Father.” Now these are not mortal sins. Therefore, etc.

Further, it is no mortal sin to take food for mere pleasure. Therefore in like manner it is not a mortal sin for a man to use his wife merely to satisfy his desire.

I answer that, Some say that whenever pleasure is the chief motive for the marriage act it is a mortal sin; that when it is an indirect motive it is a venial sin; and that when it spurns the pleasure altogether and is displeasing, it is wholly void of venial sin; so that it would be a mortal sin to seek pleasure in this act, a venial sin to take the pleasure when offered, but that perfection requires one to detest it. But this is impossible, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 3,4) the same judgment applies to pleasure as to action, because pleasure in a good action is good, and in an evil action, evil; wherefore, as the marriage act is not evil in itself, neither will it be always a mortal sin to seek pleasure therein. Consequently the right answer to this question is that if pleasure be sought in such a way as to exclude the honesty of marriage, so that, to wit, it is not as a wife but as a woman that a man treats his wife, and that he is ready to use her in the same way if she were not his wife, it is a mortal sin; wherefore such a man is said to be too ardent a lover of his wife, because his ardor carries him away from the goods of marriage. If, however, he seek pleasure within the bounds of marriage, so that it would not be sought in another than his wife, it is a venial sin.

Reply to Objection 1: A man seeks wanton pleasure in his wife when he sees no more in her that he would in a wanton.

Reply to Objection 2: Consent to the pleasure of the intercourse that is a mortal sin is itself a mortal sin; but such is not the consent to the marriage act.

Reply to Objection 3: Although he does not actually refer the pleasure to God, he does not place his will’s last end therein; otherwise he would seek it anywhere indifferently. Hence it does not follow that he enjoys a creature;

but he uses a creature actually for his own sake, and himself habitually, though not actually, for God’s sake.

Reply to Objection 4: The reason for this statement is not that man deserves to be excommunicated for this sin, but because he renders himself unfit for spiritual things, since in that act, he becomes flesh and nothing more.

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF MARRIAGE, IN GENERAL (ONE ARTICLE)

In the next place we must consider the impediments of marriage: (1) In general; (2) In particular.

Whether it is fitting that impediments should be assigned to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting for impediments to be assigned to marriage. For marriage is a sacrament condivided with the others. But no impediments are assigned to the others. Neither therefore should they be assigned to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, the less perfect a thing is the fewer its obstacles. Now matrimony is the least perfect of the sacraments. Therefore it should have either no impediments or very few.

Objection 3: Further, wherever there is disease, it is necessary to have a remedy for the disease. Now concupiscence, a remedy for which is permitted in matrimony (1 Cor. 7:6), is in all. Therefore there should not be any impediment making it altogether unlawful for a particular person to marry.

Objection 4: Further, unlawful means against the law. Now these impediments that are assigned to matrimony are not against the natural law, because they are not found to be the same in each state of the human race, since more degrees of kindred come under prohibition at one time than at another. Nor, seemingly, can human law set impediments against marriage, since marriage, like the other sacraments, is not of human but of Divine institution. Therefore impediments should not be assigned to marriage, making it unlawful for a person to marry.

Objection 5: Further, lawful and unlawful differ as that which is against the law from that which is not, and between these there is no middle term, since they are opposed according to affirmation and negation. Therefore there cannot be impediments to marriage, placing a person in a middle position between those who are lawful and those who are unlawful subjects of marriage.

Objection 6: Further, union of man and woman is unlawful save in marriage. Now every unlawful union should be dissolved. Therefore if anything prevent a marriage being contracted, it will “de facto” dissolve it after it has been contracted; and thus impediments should not be assigned to marriage, which hinder it from being contracted, and dissolve it after it has been contracted.

Objection 7: Further, no impediment can remove from a thing that which is part of its definition. Now indissolubility is part of the definition of marriage. Therefore there cannot be any impediments which annul a marriage already contracted.

Objection 8: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be an infinite number of impediments to marriage. For marriage is a good. Now good may be lacking in an infinite number of ways, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii). Therefore there is an infinite number of impediments to marriage.

Objection 9: Further, the impediments to marriage arise from the conditions of individuals. But such like conditions are infinite in number. Therefore the impediments to marriage are also infinite.

I answer that, In marriage, as in other sacraments, there are certain things essential to marriage, and others that belong to its solemnization. And since even without the things that pertain to its solemnization it is still a true sacrament, as also in the case of the other sacraments, it follows that the impediments to those things that pertain to the solemnization of this sacrament do not derogate from the validity of the marriage. These impediments are said to hinder the contracting of marriage, but they do not dissolve the marriage once contracted; such are the veto of the Church, or the holy seasons. Hence the verse:

“The veto of the Church and holy tide
Forbid the knot, but loose it not if tied.”

On the other hand, those impediments which regard the essentials of marriage make a marriage invalid, wherefore they are said not only to hinder the contracting of marriage, but to dissolve it if contracted; and they are contained in the following verse:

“Error, station, vow, kinship, crime,

Difference of worship, force, holy orders,
Marriage bond, honesty, affinity, impotence,
All these forbid marriage, and annul it though
contracted."

The reason for this number may be explained as follows: Marriage may be hindered either on the part of the contract or in regard to the contracting parties. If in the first way, since the marriage contract is made by voluntary consent, and this is incompatible with either ignorance or violence, there will be two impediments to marriage, namely "force," i.e. compulsion, and "error" in reference to ignorance. Wherefore the Master pronounced on these two impediments when treating of the cause of matrimony (Sent. iv, DD 29,30). Here, however, he is treating of the impediments as arising from the contracting parties, and these may be differentiated as follows. A person may be hindered from contracting marriage either simply, or with some particular person. If simply, so that he be unable to contract marriage with any woman, this can only be because he is hindered from performing the marriage act. This happens in two ways. First, because he cannot "de facto," either through being altogether unable—and thus we have the impediment of "impotence"—or through being unable to do so freely, and thus we have the impediment of the "condition of slavery." Secondly, because he cannot do it lawfully, and this because he is bound to continence, which happens in two ways, either through his being bound on account of the office he has undertaken to fulfill—and thus we have the impediment of "Order"—or on account of his having taken a vow—and thus "Vow" is an impediment.

If, however, a person is hindered from marrying, not simply but in reference to a particular person, this is either because he is bound to another person, and thus he who is married to one cannot marry another, which constitutes the impediment of the "bond of marriage"—or through lack of proportion to the other party, and this for three reasons. First, on account of too great a distance separating them, and thus we have "difference of worship"; secondly, on account of their being too closely related, and thus we have three impediments, namely "kinship," then "affinity," which denotes the close relationship between two persons, in reference to a third united to one of them by marriage, and the "justice of public honesty," where we have a close relationship between two persons arising out of the betrothal of one of them to a third person; thirdly, on account of a previous undue union between him and the woman, and thus the “crime of adultery” previously committed with her is an impediment.

Reply to Objection 1: There may be impediments to the other sacraments also in the omission either of that which is essential, or of that which pertains to the solemnization of the sacrament, as stated above. However, impediments are assigned to matrimony rather than to the other sacraments for three reasons. First, because matrimony consists of two persons, and consequently can be impeded in more ways than the other sacraments which refer to one person taken individually; secondly, because matrimony has its cause in us and in God, while some of the other sacraments have their cause in God alone. Wherefore penance which in a manner has a cause in us, is assigned certain impediments by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 16), such as hypocrisy, the public games, and so forth; thirdly, because other sacraments are objects of command or counsel, as being more perfect goods, whereas marriage is a matter of indulgence, as being a less perfect good (1 Cor. 7:6). Wherefore, in order to afford an opportunity of proficiency towards a greater good, more impediments are assigned to matrimony than to the other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 2: The more perfect things can be hindered in more ways, in so far as more conditions are required for them. And if an imperfect thing requires more conditions, there will be more impediments to it; and thus it is in matrimony.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would hold, were there no other and more efficacious remedies for the disease of concupiscence; which is false.

Reply to Objection 4: Persons are said to be unlawful subjects for marriage through being contrary to the law whereby marriage is established. Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the Divine law; as fulfilling an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently a person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the aforesaid laws. Nor does the comparison with the other sacraments hold, for they are sacraments only. And since the natural law is particularized in various ways according to the various states of mankind, and since positive law, too, varies according to the various conditions of men, the Master (Sent. iv, D, 34) asserts that at various times various persons have been unlawful subjects of marriage.

Reply to Objection 5: The law may forbid a thing either altogether, or in part and in certain cases. Hence between that which is altogether according to the law and that which is altogether against the law (which are opposed by contrariety and not according to affirmation and negation), that which is somewhat according to the law and somewhat against the law is a middle term. For this reason certain persons hold a middle place between those who are simply lawful subjects and those who are simply unlawful.

Reply to Objection 6: Those impediments which do not annul a marriage already contracted sometimes hinder a marriage from being contracted, by rendering it not invalid but unlawful. And if it be contracted it is a true marriage although the contracting parties sin; just as by consecrating after breaking one's fast one would sin by disobeying the Church's ordinance, and yet it would be a valid sacrament because it is not essential to the sacrament that the consecrator be fasting.

Reply to Objection 7: When we say that the aforesaid impediments annul marriage already contracted, we do not mean that they dissolve a marriage contracted in due form, but that they dissolve a marriage contracted "de facto" and not "de jure." Wherefore if an impediment supervene after a marriage has been contracted in due form, it cannot dissolve the marriage.

Reply to Objection 8: The impediments that hinder a good accidentally are infinite in number, like all accidental causes. But the causes which of their own nature corrupt a certain good are directed to that effect, and determinate, even as are the causes which produce that good; for the causes by which a thing is destroyed and those by which it is made are either contrary to one another, or the same but taken in a contrary way.

Reply to Objection 9: The conditions of particular persons taken individually are infinite in number, but taken in general, they may be reduced to a certain number; as instanced in medicine and all operative arts, which consider the conditions of particular persons in whom acts are.

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF ERROR (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediments to matrimony in particular, and in the first place the impediment of error. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether error of its very nature is an impediment to matrimony?

(2) What kind of error?

Whether it is right to reckon error as an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that error should not be reckoned in itself an impediment to marriage. For consent, which is the efficient cause of marriage, is hindered in the same way as the voluntary. Now the voluntary, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), may be hindered by ignorance. But ignorance is not the same as error, because ignorance excludes knowledge altogether, whereas error does not, since “error is to approve the false as though it were true,” according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 11). Therefore ignorance rather than error should have been reckoned here as an impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, that which of its very nature can be an impediment to marriage is in opposition to the good of marriage. But error is not a thing of this kind. Therefore error is not by its very nature an impediment to marriage.

Objection 3: Further, just as consent is required for marriage, so is intention required for baptism. Now if one were to baptize John, thinking to baptize Peter, John would be baptized none the less. Therefore error does not annul matrimony.

Objection 4: Further, there was true marriage between Lia and Jacob, and yet, in this case, there was error. Therefore error does not annul a marriage.

On the contrary, It is said in the Digests (Si per errorem, ff. De jurisdic. omn. judic.): “What is more opposed to consent than error?” Now consent is required for marriage. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.

Further, consent denotes something voluntary. Now error is an obstacle to the voluntary, since “the voluntary,” according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1), Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (De Nat. Hom. xxxii), “is that which has its principle in one who has knowledge of singulars which are the matter of actions.” But this does not apply to one who is in error. Therefore error is an impediment to matrimony.

I answer that, Whatever hinders a cause, of its very nature hinders the effect likewise. Now consent is the cause of matrimony, as stated above ([4956]Q[45], A[1]). Hence whatever voids the consent, voids marriage.

Now consent is an act of the will, presupposing an act of the intellect; and if the first be lacking, the second must needs be lacking also. Hence, when error hinders knowledge, there follows a defect in the consent also, and consequently in the marriage. Therefore it is possible according to the natural law for error to void marriage.

Reply to Objection 1: Speaking simply, ignorance differs from error, because ignorance does not of its very nature imply an act of knowledge, while error supposes a wrong judgment of reason about something. However, as regards being an impediment to the voluntary, it differs not whether we call it ignorance or error, since no ignorance can be an impediment to the voluntary, unless it have error in conjunction with it, because the will's act presupposes an estimate or judgment about something which is the object of the will. Wherefore if there be ignorance there must needs be error; and for this reason error is set down as being the proximate cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Although error is not of itself contrary to matrimony, it is contrary thereto as regards the cause of marriage.

Reply to Objection 3: The character of baptism is not caused directly by the intention of the baptizer, but by the material element applied outwardly; and the intention is effective only as directing the material element to its effect; whereas the marriage tie is caused by the consent directly. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 30) the marriage between Lia and Jacob was effected not by their coming together, which happened through an error, but by their consent, which followed afterwards. Yet both are clearly to be excused from sin (Sent. iv, D, 30).

Whether every error is an impediment to matrimony?

Objection 1: It would seem that every error is an impediment to matrimony, and not, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 30), only error about the condition or the person. For that which applies to a thing as such applies to it in all its bearings. Now error is of its very nature an impediment to matrimony, as stated above [4957](A[1]). Therefore every error is an impediment to matrimony.

Objection 2: Further, if error, as such, is an impediment to matrimony, the greater the error the greater the impediment. Now the error concerning faith in a heretic who disbelieves in this sacrament is greater than an error concerning the person. Therefore it should be a greater impediment than error about the person.

Objection 3: Further, error does not void marriage except as removing voluntariness. Now ignorance about any circumstance takes away voluntariness (Ethic. iii, 1). Therefore it is not only error about condition or person that is an impediment to matrimony.

Objection 4: Further, just as the condition of slavery is an accident affecting the person, so are bodily or mental qualities. But error regarding the condition is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error concerning quality or fortune is equally an impediment.

Objection 5: Further, just as slavery or freedom pertains to the condition of person, so do high and low rank, or dignity of position and the lack thereof. Now error regarding the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony. Therefore error about the other matters mentioned is also an impediment.

Objection 6: Further, just as the condition of slavery is an impediment, so are difference of worship and impotence, as we shall say further on ([4958]Q[52], A[2];[4959] Q[58], A[1];[4960] Q[59], A[1]). Therefore just as error regarding the condition is an impediment, so also should error about those other matters be reckoned an impediment.

Objection 7: On the other hand, it would seem that not even error about the person is an impediment to marriage. For marriage is a contract even as a sale is. Now in buying and selling the sale is not voided if one coin be given instead of another of equal value. Therefore a marriage is not voided if one woman be taken instead of another.

Objection 8: Further, it is possible for them to remain in this error for many years and to beget between them sons and daughters. But it would be a grave assertion to maintain that they ought to be separated then. Therefore their previous error did not void their marriage.

Objection 9: Further, it might happen that the woman is betrothed to the brother of the man whom she thinks that she is consenting to marry, and that she has had carnal intercourse with him; in which case, seemingly, she cannot go back to the man to whom she thought to give her consent, but should hold on to his brother. Thus error regarding the person is not an impediment to marriage.

I answer that, Just as error, through causing involuntariness, is an excuse from sin, so on the same count is it an impediment to marriage. Now error does not excuse from sin unless it refer to a circumstance the presence or absence of which makes an action lawful or unlawful. For if a man were to strike his father with an iron rod thinking it to be of wood, he is not excused from sin wholly, although perhaps in part; but if a man were to strike his father, thinking to strike his son to correct him, he is wholly excused provided he take due care. Wherefore error, in order to void marriage, must needs be about the essentials of marriage. Now marriage includes two things, namely the two persons who are joined together, and the mutual power over one another wherein marriage consists. The first of these is removed by error concerning the person, the second by error regarding the condition, since a slave cannot freely give power over his body to another, without his master’s consent. For this reason these two errors, and no others, are an impediment to matrimony.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not from its generic nature that error is an impediment to marriage, but from the nature of the difference added thereto; namely from its being error about one of the essentials to marriage.

Reply to Objection 2: An error of faith about matrimony is about things consequent upon matrimony, for instance on the question of its being a sacrament, or of its being lawful. Wherefore such error as these is no impediment to marriage, as neither does an error about baptism hinder a man from receiving the character, provided he intend to receive what the Church gives, although he believe it to be nothing.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not any ignorance of a circumstance that causes the involuntariness which is an excuse from sin, as stated above; wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 4: Difference of fortune or of quality does not make a difference in the essentials to matrimony, as the condition of slavery does. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 5: Error about a person’s rank, as such, does not void a marriage, for the same reason as neither does error about a personal quality. If, however, the error about a person’s rank or position amounts to an error about the person, it is an impediment to matrimony. Hence, if the woman consent directly to this particular person, her error about his rank does not void the marriage; but if she intend directly to consent to marry the king's son, whoever he may be, then, if another man than the king's son be brought to her, there is error about the person, and the marriage will be void.

Reply to Objection 6: Error is an impediment to matrimony, although it be about other impediments to marriage if it concern those things which render a person an unlawful subject of marriage. But (the Master) does not mention error about such things, because they are an impediment to marriage whether there be error about them or not; so that if a woman contract with a subdeacon, whether she know this or not, there is no marriage; whereas the condition of slavery is no impediment if the slavery be known. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 7: In contracts money is regarded as the measure of other things (Ethic. v, 5), and not as being sought for its own sake. Hence if the coin paid is not what it is thought to be but another of equal value, this does not void the contract. But if there be error about a thing sought for its own sake, the contract is voided, for instance if one were to sell a donkey for a horse; and thus it is in the case in point.

Reply to Objection 8: No matter how long they have cohabited, unless she be willing to consent again, there is no marriage.

Reply to Objection 9: If she did not consent previously to marry his brother, she may hold to the one whom she took in error. Nor can she return to his brother, especially if there has been carnal intercourse between her and the man she took to husband. If, however, she had previously consented to take the first one in words of the present, she cannot have the second while the first lives. But she may either leave the second or return to the first; and ignorance of the fact excuses her from sin, just as she would be excused if after the consummation of the marriage a kinsman of her husband were to know her by fraud since she is not to be blamed for the other's deceit.

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of the condition of slavery. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?

(2) Whether a slave can marry without his master’s consent?

(3) Whether a man who is already married can make himself a slave without his wife’s consent?

(4) Whether the children should follow the condition of their father or of their mother?

Whether the condition of slavery is an impediment to matrimony?

Objection 1: It would seem that the condition of slavery is no impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is in some way opposed to it. But slavery is in no way opposed to marriage, else there could be no marriage among slaves. Therefore slavery is no impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, that which is contrary to nature cannot be an impediment to that which is according to nature. Now slavery is contrary to nature, for as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), “it is contrary to nature for man to wish to lord it over another man”; and this is also evident from the fact that it was said of man (Gn. 1:26) that he should “have dominion over the fishes of the sea,” but not that he should have dominion over man. Therefore it cannot be an impediment to marriage, which is a natural thing.

Objection 3: Further, if it is an impediment, this is either of natural law or of positive law. But it is not of natural law, since according to natural law all men are equal, as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 6), while it is stated at the beginning of the Digests (Manumissiones, ff. de just. et jure.) that slavery is not of natural law; and positive law springs from the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Therefore, according to law, slavery is not an impediment to any marriage.

Objection 4: Further, that which is an impediment to marriage is equally an impediment whether it be known or not, as in the case of consanguinity. Now the slavery of one party, if it be known to the other, is no impediment to their marriage. Therefore slavery, considered in itself, is unable to void a marriage; and consequently it should not be reckoned by itself as a distinct impediment to marriage.

Objection 5: Further, just as one may be in error about slavery, so as to deem a person free who is a slave, so may one be in error about freedom, so as to deem a person a slave whereas he is free. But freedom is not accounted an impediment to matrimony. Therefore neither should slavery be so accounted.

Objection 7: Further, leprosy is a greater burden to the fellowship of marriage and is a greater obstacle to the good of the offspring than slavery is. Yet leprosy is not reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither should slavery be so reckoned.

On the contrary, A Decretal says (De conjug. servorum, cap. Ad nostram) that “error regarding the condition hinders a marriage from being contracted and voids that which is already contracted.”

Further, marriage is one of the goods that are sought for their own sake, because it is qualified by honesty; whereas slavery is one of the things to be avoided for their own sake. Therefore marriage and slavery are contrary to one another; and consequently slavery is an impediment to matrimony.

I answer that, In the marriage contract one party is bound to the other in the matter of paying the debt; wherefore if one who thus binds himself is unable to pay the debt, ignorance of this inability, on the side of the party to whom he binds himself, voids the contract. Now just as impotence in respect of coition makes a person unable to pay the debt, so that he is altogether disabled, so slavery makes him unable to pay it freely. Therefore, just as ignorance or impotence in respect of coition is an impediment if not known but not if known, as we shall state further on ([4961]Q[58]), so the condition of slavery is an impediment if not known, but not if it be known.

Reply to Objection 1: Slavery is contrary to marriage as regards the act to which marriage binds one party in relation to the other, because it prevents the free execution of that act; and again as regards the good of the offspring who become subject to the same condition by reason of the parent’s slavery. Since, however, it is free to everyone to suffer detriment in that which is his due, if one of the parties knows the other to be a slave, the marriage is none the less valid. Likewise since in marriage there is an equal obligation on either side to pay the debt, neither party can exact of the other a greater obligation than that under which he lies; so that if a slave marry a bondswoman, thinking her to be free, the marriage is not thereby rendered invalid. It is therefore evident that slavery is no impediment to marriage except when it is unknown to the other party, even though the latter be in a condition of freedom; and so nothing prevents marriage between slaves, or even between a freeman and a bondswoman.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents a thing being against nature as to the first intention of nature, and yet not against nature as to its second intention. Thus, as stated in De Coelo, ii, all corruption, defect, and old age are contrary to nature, because nature intends being and perfection, and yet they are not contrary to the second intention of nature, because nature, through being unable to preserve being in one thing, preserves it in another which is engendered of the other's corruption. And when nature is unable to bring a thing to a greater perfection it brings it to a lesser; thus when it cannot produce a male it produces a female which is "a misbegotten male" (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3). I say then in like manner that slavery is contrary to the first intention of nature. Yet it is not contrary to the second, because natural reason has this inclination, and nature has this desire—that everyone should be good; but from the fact that a person sins, nature has an inclination that he should be punished for his sin, and thus slavery was brought in as a punishment of sin. Nor is it unreasonable for a natural thing to be hindered by that which is unnatural in this way; for thus is marriage hindered by impotence of coition, which impotence is contrary to nature in the way mentioned.

Reply to Objection 3: The natural law requires punishment to be inflicted for guilt, and that no one should be punished who is not guilty; but the appointing of the punishment according to the circumstances of person and guilt belongs to positive law. Hence slavery which is a definite punishment is of positive law, and arises out of natural law, as the determinate from that which is indeterminate. And it arises from the determination of the same positive law that slavery if unknown is an impediment to matrimony, lest one who is not guilty be punished; for it is a punishment to the wife to have a slave for husband, and "vice versa."

Reply to Objection 4: Certain impediments render a marriage unlawful; and since it is not our will that makes a thing lawful or unlawful, but the law to which our will ought to be subject, it follows that the validity or invalidity of a marriage is not affected either by ignorance (such as destroys voluntariness) of the impediment or by knowledge thereof; and such an impediment is affinity or a vow, and others of the same kind. other impediments, however, render a marriage ineffectual as to the payment of the debt; and since it is within the competency of our will to remit a debt that is due to us, it follows that such impediments, if known, do not invalidate a marriage, but only when ignorance of them destroys voluntariness. Such impediments are slavery and impotence of coition. And, because they have of themselves the nature of an impediment, they are reckoned as special impediments besides error; whereas a change of person is not reckoned a special impediment besides error, because the substitution of another person has not the nature of an impediment except by reason of the intention of one of the contracting parties.

Reply to Objection 5: Freedom does not hinder the marriage act, wherefore ignorance of freedom is no impediment to matrimony.

Reply to Objection 6: Leprosy does not hinder marriage as to its first act, since lepers can pay the debt freely; although they lay a burden upon marriage as to its secondary effects; wherefore it is not an impediment to marriage as slavery is.

Whether a slave can marry without his master’s consent?

Objection 1: It would seem that a slave cannot marry without his master’s consent. For no one can give a person that which is another’s without the latter’s consent. Now a slave is his master’s chattel. Therefore he cannot give his wife power over his body by marrying without his master’s consent.

Objection 2: Further, a slave is bound to obey his master. But his master may command him not to consent to marry. Therefore he cannot marry without his consent.

Objection 3: Further, after marriage, a slave is bound even by a precept of the Divine law to pay the debt to his wife. But at the time that his wife asks for the debt his master may demand of him a service which he will be unable to perform if he wish to occupy himself in carnal intercourse. Therefore if a slave can marry without his master’s consent, the latter would be deprived of a service due to him without any fault of his; and this ought not to be.

Objection 4: Further, a master may sell his slave into a foreign country, where the latter’s wife is unable to follow him, through either bodily weakness, or imminent danger to her faith; for instance if he be sold to unbelievers, or if her master be unwilling, supposing her to be a bondswoman; and thus the marriage will be dissolved, which is unfitting. Therefore a slave cannot marry without his master’s consent.

Objection 5: Further, the burden under which a man binds himself to the Divine service is more advantageous than that whereby a man subjects himself to his wife. But a slave cannot enter religion or receive orders without his master’s consent. Much less therefore can he be married without his consent.

On the contrary, “In Christ Jesus . . . there is neither bond nor free” (Gal. 3:26, 28). Therefore both freeman and bondsman enjoy the same liberty to marry in the faith of Christ Jesus.

Further, slavery is of positive law; whereas marriage is of natural and Divine law. Since then positive law is not prejudicial to the natural or the Divine law, it would seem that a slave can marry without his master’s consent.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 3), the positive law arises out of the natural law, and consequently slavery, which is of positive law, cannot be prejudicious to those things that are of natural law. Now just as nature seeks the preservation of the individual, so does it seek the preservation of the species by means of procreation; wherefore even as a slave is not so subject to his master as not to be at liberty to eat, sleep, and do such things as pertain to the needs of his body, and without which nature cannot be preserved, so he is not subject to him to the extent of being unable to marry freely, even without his master’s knowledge or consent.

Reply to Objection 1: A slave is his master’s chattel in matters superadded to nature, but in natural things all are equal. Wherefore, in things pertaining to natural acts, a slave can by marrying give another person power over his body without his master’s consent.

Reply to Objection 2: A slave is bound to obey his master in those things which his master can command lawfully; and just as his master cannot lawfully command him not to eat or sleep, so neither can he lawfully command him to refrain from marrying. For it is the concern of the lawgiver how each one uses his own, and consequently if the master command his slave not to marry, the slave is not bound to obey his master.

Reply to Objection 3: If a slave has married with his master's consent, he should omit the service commanded by his master and pay the debt to his wife; because the master, by consenting to his slave's marriage, implicitly consented to all that marriage requires. If, however, the marriage was contracted without the master's knowledge or consent, he is not bound to pay the debt, but in preference to obey his master, if the two things are incompatible. Nevertheless in such matters there are many particulars to be considered, as in all human acts, namely the danger to which his wife's chastity is exposed, and the obstacle which the payment of the debt places in the way of the service commanded, and other like considerations, all of which being duly weighed it will be possible to judge which of the two in preference the slave is bound to obey, his master or his wife.

Reply to Objection 4: In such a case it is said that the master should be compelled not to sell the slave in such a way as to increase the weight of the marriage burden, especially since he is able to obtain anywhere a just price for his slave.

Reply to Objection 5: By entering religion or receiving orders a man is bound to the Divine service for all time; whereas a husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife not always, but at a fitting time; hence the comparison fails. Moreover, he who enters religion or receives orders binds himself to works that are superadded to natural works, and in which his master has power over him, but not in natural works to which a man binds himself by marriage. Hence he cannot vow continence without his master's consent.

Whether slavery can supervene to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that slavery cannot supervene to marriage, by the husband selling himself to another as slave. Because what is done by fraud and to another's detriment should not hold. But a husband who sells himself for a slave, does so sometimes to cheat marriage, and at least to the detriment of his wife. Therefore such a sale should not hold as to the effect of slavery.

Objection 2: Further, two favorable things outweigh one that is not favorable. Now marriage and freedom are favorable things and are contrary to slavery, which in law is not a favorable thing. Therefore such a slavery ought to be entirely annulled in marriage.

Objection 3: Further, in marriage husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave without her husband’s consent. Therefore neither can the husband without his wife’s consent.

Objection 4: Further, in natural things that which hinders a thing being generated destroys it after it has been generated. Now bondage of the husband, if unknown to the wife, is an impediment to the act of marriage before it is performed. Therefore if it could supervene to marriage it would dissolve it; which is unreasonable.

On the contrary, Everyone can give another that which is his own. Now the husband is his own master since he is free. Therefore he can surrender his right to another.

Further, a slave can marry without his master’s consent, as stated above [4962](A[2]). Therefore a husband can in like manner subject himself to a master, without his wife’s consent.

I answer that, A husband is subject to his wife in those things which pertain to the act of nature; in these things they are equal, and the subjection of slavery does not extend thereto. Wherefore the husband, without his wife’s knowledge, can surrender himself to be another’s slave. Nor does this result in a dissolution of the marriage, since no impediment supervening to marriage can dissolve it, as stated above ([4963]Q[50], A[1], ad 7).

Reply to Objection 1: The fraud can indeed hurt the person who has acted fraudulently, but it cannot be prejudicial to another person: wherefore if the husband, to cheat his wife, surrender himself to be another’s slave, It will be to his own prejudice, through his losing the inestimable good of freedom; whereas this can nowise be prejudicial to the wife, and he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks, and to do all that marriage requires of him for he cannot be taken away from these obligations by his master’s command.

Reply to Objection 2: In so far as slavery is opposed to marriage, marriage is prejudicial to slavery, since the slave is bound then to pay the debt to his wife, though his master be unwilling.

Reply to Objection 3: Although husband and wife are considered to be on a par in the marriage act and in things relating to nature, to which the condition of slavery does not extend, nevertheless as regards the management of the household, and other such additional matters the husband is the head of the wife and should correct her, and not “vice versa.” Hence the wife cannot surrender herself to be a slave without her husband’s consent.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument considers corruptible things; and yet even in these there are many obstacles to generation that are not capable of destroying what is already generated. But in things which have stability it is possible to have an impediment which prevents a certain thing from beginning to be, yet does not cause it to cease to be; as instanced by the rational soul. It is the same with marriage, which is a lasting tie so long as this life lasts.

Whether children should follow the condition of their father?

Objection 1: It would seem that children should follow the condition of their father. Because dominion belongs to those of higher rank. Now in generating the father ranks above the mother. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, the being of a thing depends on the form more than on the matter. Now in generation the father gives the form, and the mother the matter (De Gener. Animal. ii, 4). Therefore the child should follow the condition of the father rather than of the mother.

Objection 3: Further, a thing should follow that chiefly to which it is most like. Now the son is more like the father than the mother, even as the daughter is more like the mother. Therefore at least the son should follow the father in preference, and the daughter the mother.

Objection 4: Further, in Holy Writ genealogies are not traced through the women but through the men. Therefore the children follow the father rather than the mother.

On the contrary, If a man sows on another’s land, the produce belongs to the owner of the land. Now the woman’s womb in relation to the seed of man is like the land in relation to the sower. Therefore, etc.

Further, we observe that in animals born from different species the offspring follows the mother rather that the father, wherefore mules born of a mare and an ass are more like mares than those born of a she-ass and a horse. Therefore it should be the same with men.

I answer that, According to civil law (XIX, ff. De statu hom. vii, cap. De rei vendit.) the offspring follows the womb: and this is reasonable since the offspring derives its formal complement from the father, but the substance of the body from the mother. Now slavery is a condition of the body, since a slave is to the master a kind of instrument in working; wherefore children follow the mother in freedom and bondage; whereas in matters pertaining to dignity as proceeding from a thing's form, they follow the father, for instance in honors, franchise, inheritance and so forth. The canons are in agreement with this (cap. Liberi, 32, qu. iv, in gloss.: cap. Inducens, De natis ex libero ventre) as also the law of Moses (Ex. 21).

In some countries, however, where the civil law does not hold, the offspring follows the inferior condition, so that if the father be a slave the children will be slaves although the mother be free; but not if the father gave himself up as a slave after his marriage and without his wife's consent; and the same applies if the case be reversed. And if both be of servile condition and belong to different masters, the children, if several, are divided among the latter, or if one only, the one master will compensate the other in value and will take the child thus born for his slave. However it is incredible that this custom have as much reason in its favor as the decision of the time-honored deliberations of many wise men. Moreover in natural things it is the rule that what is received is in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient and not according to the mode of the giver; wherefore it is reasonable that the seed received by the mother should be drawn to her condition.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the father is a more noble principle than the mother, nevertheless the mother provides the substance of the body, and it is to this that the condition of slavery attaches.

Reply to Objection 2: As regards things pertaining to the specific nature the son is like the father rather than the mother, but in material conditions should be like the mother rather than the father, since a thing has its specific being from its form, but material conditions from matter.

Reply to Objection 3: The son is like the father in respect of the form which is his, and also the father's, complement. Hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 4: It is because the son derives honor from his father rather than from his mother that in the genealogies of Scripture, and according to common custom, children are named after their father rather than from their mother. But in matters relating to slavery they follow the mother by preference.

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF VOWS AND ORDERS (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of vows and orders. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether a simple vow is a diriment impediment to matrimony?

(2) Whether a solemn vow is a diriment impediment?

(3) Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?

(4) Whether a man can receive a sacred order after being married?

Whether marriage already contracted should be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow?

Objection 1: It would seem that a marriage already contracted ought to be annulled by the obligation of a simple vow. For the stronger tie takes precedence of the weaker. Now a vow is a stronger tie than marriage, since the latter binds man to man, but the former binds man to God. Therefore the obligation of a vow takes precedence of the marriage tie.

Objection 2: Further, God’s commandment is no less binding than the commandment of the Church. Now the commandment of the Church is so binding that a marriage is void if contracted in despite thereof; as instanced in the case of those who marry within the degrees of kindred forbidden by the Church. Therefore, since it is a Divine commandment to keep a vow, it would seem that if a person marry in despite of a vow his marriage should be annulled for that reason.

Objection 3: Further, in marriage a man may have carnal intercourse without sin. Yet he who has taken a simple vow of chastity can never have carnal intercourse with his wife without sin. Therefore a simple vow annuls marriage. The minor is proved as follows. It is clear that it is a mortal sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, since according to Jerome [*Cf. St. Augustine, De Bono Viduit, ix] “for those who vow virginity it is damnable not only to marry, but even to wish to marry.” Now the marriage contract is not contrary to the vow of continence, except by reason of carnal intercourse: and therefore he sins mortally the first time he has intercourse with his wife, and for the same reason every other time, because a sin committed in the first instance cannot be an excuse for a subsequent sin.

Objection 4: Further, husband and wife should be equal in marriage, especially as regards carnal intercourse. But he who has taken a simple vow of continence can never ask for the debt without a sin, for this is clearly against his vow of continence, since he is bound to continence by vow. Therefore neither can he pay the debt without sin.

On the contrary, Pope Clement [*Alexander III] says (cap. Consuluit, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) that a “simple vow is an impediment to the contract of marriage, but does not annul it after it is contracted.”

I answer that, A thing ceases to be in one man’s power from the fact that it passes into the power of another. Now the promise of a thing does not transfer it into the power of the person to whom it is promised, wherefore a thing does not cease to be in a person’s power for the reason that he has promised it. Since then a simple vow contains merely a simple promise of one’s body to the effect of keeping continence for God’s sake, a man still retains power over his own body after a simple vow, and consequently can surrender it to another, namely his wife; and in this surrender consists the sacrament of matrimony, which is indissoluble. Therefore although a simple vow is an impediment to the contracting of a marriage, since it is a sin to marry after taking a simple vow of continence, yet since the contract is valid, the marriage cannot be annulled on that account.

Reply to Objection 1: A vow is a stronger tie than matrimony, as regards that to which man is tied, and the obligation under which he lies. because by marriage a man is tied to his wife, with the obligation of paying the debt, whereas by a vow a man is tied to God, with the obligation of remaining continent. But as to the manner in which he is tied marriage is a stronger tie than a simple vow, since by marriage a man surrenders himself actually to the power of his wife, but not by a simple vow as explained above: and the possessor is always in the stronger position. In this respect a simple vow binds in the same way as a betrothal; wherefore a betrothal must be annulled on account of a simple vow.

Reply to Objection 2: The contracting of a marriage between blood relations is annulled by the commandment forbidding such marriages, not precisely because it is a commandment of God or of the Church, but because it makes it impossible for the body of a kinswoman to be transferred into the power of her kinsman: whereas the commandment forbidding marriage after a simple vow has not this effect, as already stated. Hence the argument is void for it assigns as a cause that which is not cause.

Reply to Objection 3: If after taking a simple vow a man contract marriage by words of the present, he cannot know his wife without mortal sin, because until the marriage is consummated he is still in a position to fulfill the vow of continence. But after the marriage has been consummated, thenceforth through his fault it is unlawful for him not to pay the debt when his wife asks: wherefore this is not covered by his obligation to his vow, as explained above (ad 1). Nevertheless he should atone for not keeping continence, by his tears of repentance.

Reply to Objection 4: After contracting marriage he is still bound to keep his vow of continence in those matters wherein he is not rendered unable to do so. Hence if his wife die he is bound to continence altogether. And since the marriage tie does not bind him to ask for the debt, he cannot ask for it without sin, although he can pay the debt without sin on being asked, when once he has incurred this obligation through the carnal intercourse that has already occurred. And this holds whether the wife ask expressly or interpretively, as when she is ashamed and her husband feels that she desires him to pay the debt, for then he may pay it without sin. This is especially the case if he fears to endanger her chastity: nor does it matter that they are equal in the marriage act, since everyone may renounce what is his own. Some say, however, that he may both ask and pay lest the marriage become too burdensome to the wife who has always to ask; but if this be looked into aright, it is the same as asking interpretively.

Whether a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted?

Objection 1: It would seem that not even a solemn vow dissolves a marriage already contracted. For according to a Decretal (cap. Rursus, De his qui cler. vel vovent.) “in God’s sight a simple vow is no less binding than a solemn one.” Now marriage stands or falls by virtue of the Divine acceptance. Therefore since a simple vow does not dissolve marriage, neither will a solemn vow dissolve it.

Objection 2: Further, a solemn vow does not add the same force to a simple vow as an oath does. Now a simple vow, even though an oath be added thereto, does not dissolve a marriage already contracted. Neither therefore does a solemn vow.

Objection 3: Further, a solemn vow has nothing that a simple vow cannot have. For a simple vow may give rise to scandal since it may be public, even as a solemn vow. Again the Church could and should ordain that a simple vow dissolves a marriage already contracted, so that many sins may be avoided. Therefore for the same reason that a simple vow does not dissolve a marriage already contracted, neither should a solemn vow dissolve it.

On the contrary, He who takes a solemn vow contracts a spiritual marriage with God, which is much more excellent than a material marriage. Now a material marriage already contracted annuls a marriage contracted afterwards. Therefore a solemn vow does also.

Further, the same conclusion may be proved by many authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 28).

I answer that, All agree that as a solemn vow is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, so it invalidates the contract. Some assign scandal as the reason. But this is futile, because even a simple vow sometimes leads to scandal since it is at times somewhat public. Moreover the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the truth of life [*Cf. [4964]FP, Q[16], A[4], ad 3; [4965]FP, Q[21], A[2], ad 2; [4966]SS, Q[109], A[3], ad 3], which truth is not to be set aside on account of scandal. Wherefore others say that it is on account of the ordinance of the Church. But this again is insufficient, since in that case the Church might decide the contrary, which is seemingly untrue. Wherefore we must say with others that a solemn vow of its very nature dissolves the marriage contract, inasmuch namely as thereby a man has lost the power over his own body, through surrendering it to God for the purpose of perpetual continence. Wherefore he is unable to surrender it to the power of a wife by contracting marriage. And since the marriage that follows such a vow is void, a vow of this kind is said to annul the marriage contracted.

Reply to Objection 1: A simple vow is said to be no less binding in God’s sight than a solemn vow, in matters pertaining to God, for instance the separation from God by mortal sin, because he who breaks a simple vow commits a mortal sin just as one who breaks a solemn vow, although it is more grievous to break a solemn vow, so that the comparison be understood as to the genus and not as to the definite degree of guilt. But as regards marriage, whereby one man is under an obligation to another, there is no need for it to be of equal obligation even in general, since a solemn vow binds to certain things to which a simple vow does not bind.

Reply to Objection 2: An oath is more binding than a vow on the part of the cause of the obligation: but a solemn vow is more binding as to the manner in which it binds, in so far as it is an actual surrender of that which is promised; while an oath does not do this actually. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: A solemn vow implies the actual surrender of one's body, whereas a simple vow does not, as stated above [4967](A[1]). Hence the argument does not suffice to prove the conclusion.

Whether order is an impediment to matrimony?

Objection 1: It would seem that order is not an impediment to matrimony. For nothing is an impediment to a thing except its contrary. But order is not contrary to matrimony. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.

Objection 2: Further, orders are the same with us as with the Eastern Church. But they are not an impediment to matrimony in the Eastern Church. Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now this is most fittingly signified in those who are Christ's ministers, those namely who are ordained. Therefore order is not an impediment to matrimony.

Objection 4: Further, all the orders are directed to spiritual things. Now order cannot be an impediment to matrimony except by reason of its spirituality. Therefore if order is an impediment to matrimony, every order will be an impediment, and this is untrue.

Objection 5: Further, every ordained person can have ecclesiastical benefices, and can enjoy equally the privilege of clergy. If, therefore, orders are an impediment to marriage, because married persons cannot have an ecclesiastical benefice, nor enjoy the privilege of clergy, as jurists assert (cap. Joannes et seqq., De cler. conjug.), then every order ought to be an impediment. Yet this is false, as shown by the Decretal of Alexander III (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): and consequently it would seem that no order is an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, the Decretal says (De cler. conjug., cap. Si Quis): “any person whom you shall find to have taken a wife after receiving the subdiaconate or the higher orders, you shall compel to put his wife away.” But this would not be so if the marriage were valid.

Further, no person who has vowed continence can contract marriage. Now some orders have a vow of continence connected with them, as appears from the text (Sent. iv, D, 37). Therefore in that case order is an impediment to matrimony.

I answer that, By a certain fittingness the very nature of holy order requires that it should be an impediment to marriage: because those who are in holy orders handle the sacred vessels and the sacraments: wherefore it is becoming that they keep their bodies clean by continence [*Cf. Is. 52:11]. But it is owing to the Church’s ordinance that it is actually an impediment to marriage. However it is not the same with the Latins as with the Greeks; since with the Greeks it is an impediment to the contracting of marriage, solely by virtue of order; whereas with the Latins it is an impediment by virtue of order, and besides by virtue of the vow of continence which is annexed to the sacred orders; for although this vow is not expressed in words, nevertheless a person is understood to have taken it by the very fact of his being ordained. Hence among the Greeks and other Eastern peoples a sacred order is an impediment to the contracting of matrimony but it does not forbid the use of marriage already contracted: for they can use marriage contracted previously, although they cannot be married again. But in the Western Church it is an impediment both to marriage and to the use of marriage, unless perhaps the husband should receive a sacred order without the knowledge or consent of his wife, because this cannot be prejudicial to her.

Of the distinction between sacred and non-sacred orders now and in the early Church we have spoken above ([4968]Q[37], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 1: Although a sacred order is not contrary to matrimony as a sacrament, it has a certain incompatibility with marriage in respect of the latter’s act which is an obstacle to spiritual acts.

Reply to Objection 2: The objection is based on a false statement: since order is everywhere an impediment to the contracting of marriage, although it has not everywhere a vow annexed to it.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who are in sacred orders signify Christ by more sublime actions, as appears from what has been said in the treatise on orders ([4969]Q[37], AA[2],4), than those who are married. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 4: Those who are in minor orders are not forbidden to marry by virtue of their order; for although those orders are entrusted with certain spiritualities, they are not admitted to the immediate handling of sacred things, as those are who are in sacred orders. But according to the laws of the Western Church, the use of marriage is an impediment to the exercise of a non-sacred order, for the sake of maintaining a greater honesty in the offices of the Church. And since the holding of an ecclesiastical benefice binds a man to the exercise of his order, and since for this very reason he enjoys the privilege of clergy, it follows that in the Latin Church this privilege is forfeit to a married cleric.

This suffices for the Reply to the last Objection.

Whether a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony?

Objection 1: It would seem that a sacred order cannot supervene to matrimony. For the stronger prejudices the weaker. Now a spiritual obligation is stronger than a bodily tie. Therefore if a married man be ordained, this will prejudice the wife, so that she will be unable to demand the debt, since order is a spiritual, and marriage a bodily bond. Hence it would seem that a man cannot receive a sacred order after consummating marriage.

Objection 2: Further, after consummating the marriage, one of the parties cannot vow continence without the other’s consent [*Cf.[4970] Q[61], A[1]]. Now a sacred order has a vow of continence annexed to it. Therefore if the husband be ordained without his wife’s consent, she will be bound to remain continent against her will, since she cannot marry another man during her husband’s lifetime.

Objection 3: Further, a husband may not even for a time devote himself to prayer without his wife’s consent (1 Cor. 7:5). But in the Eastern Church those who are in sacred orders are bound to continence for the time when they exercise their office. Therefore neither may they be ordained without their wife's consent, and much less may the Latins.

Objection 4: Further, husband and wife are on a par with one another. Now a Greek priest cannot marry again after his wife's death. Therefore neither can his wife after her husband's death. But she cannot be deprived by her husband's act of the right to marry after his death. Therefore her husband cannot receive orders after marriage.

Objection 5: Further, order is as much opposed to marriage as marriage to order. Now a previous order is an impediment to a subsequent marriage. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Religious are bound to continence like those who are in sacred orders. But a man may enter religion after marriage, if his wife die, or if she consent. Therefore he can also receive orders.

Further, a man may become a man's bondsman after marriage. Therefore he can become a bondsman of God by receiving orders.

I answer that, Marriage is not an impediment to the receiving of sacred orders, since if a married man receive sacred orders, even though his wife be unwilling, he receives the character of order: but he lacks the exercise of his order. If, however, his wife consent, or if she be dead, he receives both the order and the exercise.

Reply to Objection 1: The bond of orders dissolves the bond of marriage as regards the payment of the debt, in respect of which it is incompatible with marriage, on the part of the person ordained, since he cannot demand the debt, nor is the wife bound to pay it. But it does not dissolve the bond in respect of the other party, since the husband is bound to pay the debt to the wife if he cannot persuade her to observe continence.

Reply to Objection 2: If the husband receive sacred orders with the knowledge and consent of his wife, she is bound to vow perpetual continence, but she is not bound to enter religion, if she has no fear of her chastity being endangered through her husband having taken a solemn vow: it would have been different, however, if he had taken a simple vow. On the other hand, if he be ordained without her consent, she is not bound in this way, because the result is not prejudicial to her in any way.

Reply to Objection 3: It would seem more probable, although some say the contrary, that even a Greek ought not to receive sacred orders without his wife's consent, since at least at the time of his ministry she would be deprived of the payment of the debt, of which she cannot be deprived according to law if the husband should have been ordained without her consent or knowledge.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated, among the Greeks the wife, by the very fact of consenting to her husband's receiving a sacred order, binds herself never to marry another man, because the signification of marriage would not be safeguarded, and this is especially required in the marriage of a priest. If, however, he be ordained without her consent, seemingly she would not be under that obligation.

Reply to Objection 5: Marriage has for its cause our consent: not so order, which has a sacramental cause appointed by God. Hence matrimony may be impeded by a previous order; so as not to be true marriage: whereas order cannot be impeded by marriage, so as not to be true order, because the power of the sacraments is unchangeable, whereas human acts can be impeded.

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF CONSANGUINITY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediment of consanguinity. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether consanguinity is rightly defined by some?

(2) Whether it is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?

(3) Whether certain degrees are by natural law an impediment to marriage?

(4) Whether the impediment degrees can be fixed by the ordinance of the Church?

Whether consanguinity is rightly defined?

Objection 1: It would seem that consanguinity is unsuitably defined by some as follows: "Consanguinity is the tie contracted between persons descending from the same common ancestor by carnal procreation." For all men descend from the same common ancestor, namely Adam, by carnal procreation. Therefore if the above definition of consanguinity is right, all men would be related by consanguinity: which is false.

Objection 2: Further, a tie is only between things in accord with one another, since a tie unites. Now there is not greater accordance between persons descended from a common ancestor than there is between other men, since they accord in species but differ in number, just as other men do. Therefore consanguinity is not a tie.

Objection 3: Further, carnal procreation, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Anim. ii, 19), is effected from the surplus food [*Cf. [4971]FP, Q[119], A[2]]. Now this surplus has more in common with that which is eaten, since it agrees with it in substance, than with him who eats. Since then no tie of consanguinity arises between the person born of semen and that which he eats, neither will there be any tie of kindred between him and the person of whom he is born by carnal procreation.

Objection 4: Further, Laban said to Jacob (Gn. 29:14): “Thou art my bone and my flesh,” on account of the relationship between them. Therefore such a kinship should be called flesh-relationship rather than blood-relationship [consanguinitas].

Objection 5: Further, carnal procreation is common to men and animals. But no tie of consanguinity is contracted among animals from carnal procreation. Therefore neither is there among men.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11, 12) “all friendship is based on some kind of fellowship.” And since friendship is a knot or union, it follows that the fellowship which is the cause of friendship is called “a tie.” Wherefore in respect of any kind of a fellowship certain persons are denominated as though they were tied together: thus we speak of fellow-citizens who are connected by a common political life, of fellow-soldiers who are connected by the common business of soldiering, and in the same way those who are connected by the fellowship of nature are said to be tied by blood [consanguinei]. Hence in the above definition “tie” is included as being the genus of consanguinity; the “persons descending from the same common ancestor,” who are thus tied together are the subject of this tie. while “carnal procreation” is mentioned as being its origin.

Reply to Objection 1: An active force is not received into an instrument in the same degree of perfection as it has in the principal agent. And since every moved mover is an instrument, it follows that the power of the first mover in a particular genus when drawn out through many mediate movers fails at length, and reaches something that is moved and not a mover. But the power of a begetter moves not only as to that which belongs to the species, but also as to that which belongs to the individual, by reason of which the child is like the parent even in accidentals and not only in the specific nature. And yet this individual power of the father is not so perfect in the son as it was in the father, and still less so in the grandson, and thus it goes on failing: so that at length it ceases and can go no further. Since then consanguinity results from this power being communicated to many through being conveyed to them from one person by procreation, it destroys itself by little and little, as Isidore says (Etym. ix). Consequently in defining consanguinity we must not take a remote common ancestor but the nearest, whose power still remains in those who are descended from him.

Reply to Objection 2: It is clear from what has been said that blood relations agree not only in the specific nature but also in that power peculiar to the individual which is conveyed from one to many: the result being that sometimes the child is not only like his father, but also his grandfather or his remote ancestors (De Gener. Anim. iv, 3).

Reply to Objection 3: Likeness depends more on form whereby a thing is actually, than on matter whereby a thing is potentially: for instance, charcoal has more in common with fire than with the tree from which the wood was cut. In like manner food already transformed by the nutritive power into the substance of the person fed has more in common with the subject nourished than with that from which the nourishment was taken. The argument however would hold according to the opinion of those who asserted that the whole nature of a thing is from its matter and that all forms are accidents: which is false.

Reply to Objection 4: It is the blood that is proximately changed into the semen, as proved in De Gener. Anim. i, 18. Hence the tie contracted by carnal procreation is more fittingly called blood-relationship than flesh-relationship. That sometimes one relation is called the flesh of another, is because the blood which is transformed into the man’s seed or into the menstrual fluid is potentially flesh and bone.

Reply to Objection 5: Some say that the reason why the tie of consanguinity is contracted among men through carnal procreation, and not among other animals, is because whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in all men was in our first parent: which does not apply to other animals. But according to this, matrimonial consanguinity would never come to an end. However the above theory was disproved in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30: [4972]FP, Q[119], A[1]). Wherefore we must reply that the reason for this is that animals are not united together in the union of friendship through the begetting of many from one proximate parent, as is the case with men, as stated above.

Whether consanguinity is fittingly distinguished by degrees and lines?

Objection 1: It would seem that consanguinity is unfittingly distinguished by degrees and lines. For a line of consanguinity is described as “the ordered series of persons related by blood, and descending from a common ancestor in various degrees.” Now consanguinity is nothing else but a series of such persons. Therefore a line of consanguinity is the same as consanguinity. Now a thing ought not to be distinguished by itself. Therefore consanguinity is not fittingly distinguished into lines.

Objection 2: Further, that by which a common thing is divided should not be placed in the definition of that common thing. Now descent is placed in the above definition of consanguinity. Therefore consanguinity cannot be divided into ascending, descending and collateral lines.

Objection 3: Further, a line is defined as being between two points. But two points make but one degree. Therefore one line has but one degree, and for this reason it would seem that consanguinity should not be divided into lines and degrees.

Objection 4: Further, a degree is defined as “the relation between distant persons, whereby is known the distance between them.” Now since consanguinity is a kind of propinquity, distance between persons is opposed to consanguinity rather than a part thereof.

Objection 5: Further, if consanguinity is distinguished and known by its degrees, those who are in the same degree ought to be equally related. But this is false since a man’s great-uncle and great-nephew are in the same degree, and yet they are not equally related according to a Decretal (cap. Porro; cap. Parenteloe, 35, qu. v). Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into degrees.

Objection 6: Further, in ordinary things a different degree results from the addition of one thing to another, even as every additional unity makes a different species of number. Yet the addition of one person to another does not always make a different degree of consanguinity, since father and uncle are in the same degree of consanguinity, for they are side by side. Therefore consanguinity is not rightly divided into degrees.

Objection 7: Further, if two persons be akin to one another there is always the same measure of kinship between them, since the distance from one extreme to the other is the same either way. Yet the degrees of consanguinity are not always the same on either side, since sometimes one relative is in the third and the other in the fourth degree. Therefore the measure of consanguinity cannot be sufficiently known by its degrees.

I answer that, Consanguinity as stated [4973](A[1]) is a certain propinquity based on the natural communication by the act of procreation whereby nature is propagated. Wherefore according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) this communication is threefold. one corresponds to the relationship between cause and effect, and this is the consanguinity of father to son, wherefore he says that “parents love their children as being a part of themselves.” Another corresponds to the relation of effect to cause, and this is the consanguinity of son to father, wherefore he says that “children love their parents as being themselves something which owes its existence to them.” The third corresponds to the mutual relation between things that come from the same cause, as brothers, “who are born of the same parents,” as he again says (Ethic. viii, 12). And since the movement of a point makes a line, and since a father by procreation may be said to descend to his son, hence it is that corresponding to these three relationships there are three lines of consanguinity, namely the “descending” line corresponding to the first relationship, the “ascending” line corresponding to the second, and the “collateral” line corresponding to the third. Since however the movement of propagation does not rest in one term but continues beyond, the result is that one can point to the father’s father and to the son’s son, and so on, and according to the various steps we take we find various degrees in one line. And seeing that the degrees of a thing are parts of that thing, there cannot be degrees of propinquity where there is no propinquity. Consequently identity and too great a distance do away with degrees of consanguinity; since no man is kin to himself any more than he is like himself: for which reason there is no degree of consanguinity where there is but one person, but only when one person is compared to another.

Nevertheless there are different ways of counting the degrees in various lines. For the degree of consanguinity in the ascending and descending line is contracted from the fact that one of the parties whose consanguinity is in question, is descended from the other. Wherefore according to the canonical as well as the legal reckoning, the person who occupies the first place, whether in the ascending or in the descending line, is distant from a certain one, say Peter, in the first degree—for instance father and son; while the one who occupies the second place in either direction is distant in the second degree, for instance grandfather, grandson and so on. But the consanguinity that exists between persons who are in collateral lines is contracted not through one being descended from the other, but through both being descended from one: wherefore the degrees of consanguinity in this line must be reckoned in relation to the one principle whence it arises. Here, however, the canonical and legal reckonings differ: for the legal reckoning takes into account the descent from the common stock on both sides, whereas the canonical reckoning takes into account only one, that namely on which the greater number of degrees are found. Hence according to the legal reckoning brother and sister, or two brothers, are related in the second degree, because each is separated from the common stock by one degree; and in like manner the children of two brothers are distant from one another in the fourth degree. But according to the canonical reckoning, two brothers are related in the first degree, since neither is distant more than one degree from the common stock: but the children of one brother are distant in the second degree from the other brother, because they are at that distance from the common stock. Hence, according to the canonical reckoning, by whatever degree a person is distant from some higher degree, by so much and never by less is he distant from each person descending from that degree, because "the cause of a thing being so is yet more so." Wherefore although the other descendants from the common stock be related to some person on account of his being descended from the common stock, these descendants of the other branch cannot be more nearly related to him than he is to the common stock. Sometimes, however, a person is more distantly related to a descendant from the common stock, than he himself is to the common stock, because this other person may be more distantly related to the common stock than he is: and consanguinity must be reckoned according to the more distant degree.

Reply to Objection 1: This objection is based on a false premise: for consanguinity is not the series but a mutual relationship existing between certain persons, the series of whom forms a line of consanguinity.

Reply to Objection 2: Descent taken in a general sense attaches to every line of consanguinity, because carnal procreation whence the tie of consanguinity arises is a kind of descent: but it is a particular kind of descent, namely from the person whose consanguinity is in question, that makes the descending line.

Reply to Objection 3: A line may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken properly for the dimension itself that is the first species of continuous quantity: and thus a straight line contains actually but two points which terminate it, but infinite points potentially, any one of which being actually designated, the line is divided, and becomes two lines. But sometimes a line designates things which are arranged in a line, and thus we have line and figure in numbers, in so far as unity added to unity involves number. Thus every unity added makes a degree in a particular line: and it is the same with the line of consanguinity: wherefore one line contains several degrees.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as there cannot be likeness without a difference, so there is no propinquity without distance. Hence not every distance is opposed to consanguinity, but such as excludes the propinquity of blood-relationship.

Reply to Objection 5: Even as whiteness is said to be greater in two ways, in one way through intensity of the quality itself, in another way through the quantity of the surface, so consanguinity is said to be greater or lesser in two ways. First, intensively by reason of the very nature of consanguinity: secondly, extensively as it were, and thus the degree of consanguinity is measured by the persons between whom there is the propagation of a common blood, and in this way the degrees of consanguinity are distinguished. Wherefore it happens that of two persons related to one person in the same degree of consanguinity, one is more akin to him than the other, if we consider the quantity of consanguinity in the first way: thus a man’s father and brother are related to him in the first degree of consanguinity, because in neither case does any person come in between; and yet from the point of view of intensity a man’s father is more closely related to him than his brother, since his brother is related to him only because he is of the same father. Hence the nearer a person is to the common ancestor from whom the consanguinity descends, the greater is his consanguinity although he be not in a nearer degree. In this way a man’s great-uncle is more closely related to him than his great-nephew, although they are in the same degree.

Reply to Objection 6: Although a man’s father and uncle are in the same degree in respect of the root of consanguinity, since both are separated by one degree from the grandfather, nevertheless in respect of the person whose consanguinity is in question, they are not in the same degree, since the father is in the first degree, whereas the uncle cannot be nearer than the second degree, wherein the grandfather stands.

Reply to Objection 7: Two persons are always related in the same degree to one another, although they are not always distant in the same number of degrees from the common ancestor, as explained above.

Whether consanguinity is an impediment to marriage by virtue of the natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that consanguinity is not by natural law an impediment to marriage. For no woman can be more akin to a man than Eve was to Adam, since of her did he say (Gn. 2:23): “This now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh.” Yet Eve was joined in marriage to Adam. Therefore as regards the natural law no consanguinity is an impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, the natural law is the same for all. Now among the uncivilized nations no person is debarred from marriage by reason of consanguinity. Therefore, as regards the law of nature, consanguinity is no impediment to marriage.

Objection 3: Further, the natural law is what “nature has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of the Digests (i, ff. De just. et jure). Now brute animals copulate even with their mother. Therefore it is not of natural law that certain persons are debarred from marriage on account of consanguinity.

Objection 4: Further, nothing that is not contrary to one of the goods of matrimony is an impediment to marriage. But consanguinity is not contrary to any of the goods of marriage. Therefore it is not an impediment thereto.

Objection 5: Further, things which are more akin and more similar to one another are better and more firmly united together. Now matrimony is a kind of union. Since then consanguinity is a kind of kinship, it does not hinder marriage but rather strengthens the union.

On the contrary, According to the natural law whatever is an obstacle to the good of the offspring is an impediment to marriage. Now consanguinity hinders the good of the offspring, because in the words of Gregory (Regist., epis. xxxi) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 40): “We have learnt by experience that the children of such a union cannot thrive.” Therefore according to the law of nature consanguinity is an impediment to matrimony.

Further, that which belongs to human nature when it was first created is of natural law. Now it belonged to human nature from when it was first created that one should be debarred from marrying one’s father or mother: in proof of which it was said (Gn. 2:24): “Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother”: which cannot be understood of cohabitation, and consequently must refer to the union of marriage. Therefore consanguinity is an impediment to marriage according to the natural law.

I answer that, In relation to marriage a thing is said to be contrary to the natural law if it prevents marriage from reaching the end for which it was instituted. Now the essential and primary end of marriage is the good of the offspring. and this is hindered by a certain consanguinity, namely that which is between father and daughter, or son and mother. It is not that the good of the offspring is utterly destroyed, since a daughter can have a child of her father’s semen and with the father rear and teach that child in which things the good of the offspring consists, but that it is not effected in a becoming way. For it is out of order that a daughter be mated to her father in marriage for the purpose of begetting and rearing children, since in all things she ought to be subject to her father as proceeding from him. Hence by natural law a father and mother are debarred from marrying their children; and the mother still more than the father, since it is more derogatory to the reverence due to parents if the son marry his mother than if the father marry his daughter; since the wife should be to a certain extent subject to her husband. The secondary essential end of marriage is the curbing of concupiscence; and this end would be forfeit if a man could marry any blood-relation, since a wide scope would be afforded to concupiscence if those who have to live together in the same house were not forbidden to be mated in the flesh. Wherefore the Divine law debars from marriage not only father and mother, but also other kinsfolk who have to live in close intimacy with one another and ought to safeguard one another’s modesty. The Divine law assigns this reason (Lev. 18:10): “Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness” of such and such a one, “because it is thy own nakedness.”

But the accidental end of marriage is the binding together of mankind and the extension of friendship: for a husband regards his wife’s kindred as his own. Hence it would be prejudicial to this extension of friendship if a man could take a woman of his kindred to wife since no new friendship would accrue to anyone from such a marriage. Wherefore, according to human law and the ordinances of the Church, several degrees of consanguinity are debarred from marriage.

Accordingly it is clear from what has been said that consanguinity is by natural law an impediment to marriage in regard to certain persons, by Divine law in respect of some, and by human law in respect of others.

Reply to Objection 1: Although Eve was formed from Adam she was not Adam’s daughter, because she was not formed from him after the manner in which it is natural for a man to beget his like in species, but by the Divine operation, since from Adam’s rib a horse might have been formed in the same way as Eve was. Hence the natural connection between Eve and Adam was not so great as between daughter and father, nor was Adam the natural principle of Eve as a father is of his daughter.

Reply to Objection 2: That certain barbarians are united carnally to their parents does not come from the natural law but from the passion of concupiscence which has clouded the natural law in them.

Reply to Objection 3: Union of male and female is said to be of natural law, because nature has taught this to animals: yet she has taught this union to various animals in various ways according to their various conditions. But carnal copulation with parents is derogatory to the reverence due to them. For just as nature has instilled into parents solicitude in providing for their offspring, so has it instilled into the offspring reverence towards their parents: yet to no kind of animal save man has she instilled a lasting solicitude for his children or reverence for parents; but to other animals more or less, according as the offspring is more or less necessary to its parents, or the parents to their offspring. Hence as the Philosopher attests (De Animal. ix, 47) concerning the camel and the horse, among certain animals the son abhors copulation with its mother as long as he retains knowledge of her and a certain reverence for her. And since all honest customs of animals are united together in man naturally, and more perfectly than in other animals, it follows that man naturally abhors carnal knowledge not only of his mother, but also of his daughter, which is, however, less against nature, as stated above.

Moreover consanguinity does not result from carnal procreation in other animals as in man, as stated above (A[1], ad 5). Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 4: It has been shown how consanguinity between married persons is contrary to the goods of marriage. Hence the Objection proceeds from false premises.

Reply to Objection 5: It is not unreasonable for one of two unions to be hindered by the other, even as where there is identity there is not likeness. In like manner the tie of consanguinity may hinder the union of marriage.

Whether the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could be fixed by the Church?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of consanguinity that are an impediment to marriage could not be fixed by the Church so as to reach to the fourth degree. For it is written (Mat. 19:6): “What God hath joined together let no man put asunder.” But God joined those together who are married within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since their union is not forbidden by the Divine law. Therefore they should not be put asunder by a human law.

Objection 2: Further, matrimony is a sacrament as also is baptism. Now no ordinance of the Church could prevent one who is baptized from receiving the baptismal character, if he be capable of receiving it according to the Divine law. Therefore neither can an ordinance of the Church forbid marriage between those who are not forbidden to marry by the Divine law.

Objection 3: Further, positive law can neither void nor extend those things which are natural. Now consanguinity is a natural tie which is in itself of a nature to impede marriage. Therefore the Church cannot by its ordinance permit or forbid certain people to marry, any more than she can make them to be kin or not kin.

Objection 4: Further, an ordinance of positive law should have some reasonable cause, since it is for this reasonable cause that it proceeds from the natural law. But the causes that are assigned for the number of degrees seem altogether unreasonable, since they bear no relation to their effect; for instance, that consanguinity be an impediment as far as the fourth degree on account of the four elements as far as the sixth degree on account of the six ages of the world, as far as the seventh degree on account of the seven days of which all time is comprised. Therefore seemingly this prohibition is of no force.

Objection 5: Further, where the cause is the same there should be the same effect. Now the causes for which consanguinity is an impediment to marriage are the good of the offspring, the curbing of concupiscence, and the extension of friendship, as stated above [4974](A[3]), which are equally necessary for all time. Therefore the degrees of consanguinity should have equally impeded marriage at all times: yet this is not true since consanguinity is now an impediment to marriage as far as the fourth degree, whereas formerly it was an impediment as far as the seventh.

Objection 6: Further, one and the same union cannot be a kind of sacrament and a kind of incest. But this would be the case if the Church had the power of fixing a different number in the degrees which are an impediment to marriage. Thus if certain parties related in the fifth degree were married when that degree was an impediment, their union would be incestuous, and yet this same union would be a marriage afterwards when the Church withdrew her prohibition. And the reverse might happen if certain degrees which were not an impediment were subsequently to be forbidden by the Church. Therefore seemingly the power of the Church does not extend to this.

Objection 7: Further, human law should copy the Divine law. Now according to the Divine law which is contained in the Old Law, the prohibition of degrees does not apply equally in the ascending and descending lines: since in the Old Law a man was forbidden to marry his father’s sister but not his brother’s daughter. Therefore neither should there remain now a prohibition in respect of nephews and uncles.

On the contrary, Our Lord said to His disciples (Lk. 10:16): “He that heareth you heareth Me.” Therefore a commandment of the Church has the same force as a commandment of God. Now the Church sometimes has forbidden and sometimes allowed certain degrees which the Old Law did not forbid. Therefore those degrees are an impediment to marriage.

Further, even as of old the marriages of pagans were controlled by the civil law, so now is marriage controlled by the laws of the Church. Now formerly the civil law decided which degrees of consanguinity impede marriage, and which do not. Therefore this can be done now by a commandment of the Church.

I answer that, The degrees within which consanguinity has been an impediment to marriage have varied according to various times. For at the beginning of the human race father and mother alone were debarred from marrying their children, because then mankind were few in number, and then it was necessary for the propagation of the human race to be ensured with very great care, and consequently only such persons were to be debarred as were unfitted for marriage even in respect of its principal end which is the good of the offspring, as stated above [4975](A[3]). Afterwards however, the human race having multiplied, more persons were excluded by the law of Moses, for they already began to curb concupiscence. Wherefore as Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) all those persons were debarred from marrying one another who are wont to live together in one household, because if a lawful carnal intercourse were possible between them, this would prove a very great incentive to lust. Yet the Old Law permitted other degrees of consanguinity, in fact to a certain extent it commanded them; to wit that each man should take a wife from his kindred, in order to avoid confusion of inheritances: because at that time the Divine worship was handed down as the inheritance of the race. But afterwards more degrees were forbidden by the New Law which is the law of the spirit and of love, because the worship of God is no longer handed down and spread abroad by a carnal birth but by a spiritual grace: wherefore it was necessary that men should be yet more withdrawn from carnal things by devoting themselves to things spiritual, and that love should have a yet wider play. Hence in olden times marriage was forbidden even within the more remote degrees of consanguinity, in order that consanguinity and affinity might be the sources of a wider natural friendship; and this was reasonably extended to the seventh degree, both because beyond this it was difficult to have any recollection of the common stock, and because this was in keeping with the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost. Afterwards, however, towards these latter times the prohibition of the Church has been restricted to the fourth degree, because it became useless and dangerous to extend the prohibition to more remote degrees of consanguinity. Useless, because charity waxed cold in many hearts so that they had scarcely a greater bond of friendship with their more remote kindred than with strangers: and it was dangerous because through the prevalence of concupiscence and neglect men took no account of so numerous a kindred, and thus the prohibition of the more remote degrees became for many a snare leading to damnation. Moreover there is a certain fittingness in the restriction of the above prohibition to the fourth degree. First because men are wont to live until the fourth generation, so that consanguinity cannot lapse into oblivion, wherefore God threatened (Ex. 20:5) to visit the parent’s sins on their children to the third and fourth generation. Secondly, because in each generation the blood, the identity of which causes consanguinity, receives a further addition of new blood, and the more another blood is added the less there is of the old. And because there are four elements, each of which is the more easily mixed with another, according as it is more rarefied it follows that at the first admixture the identity of blood disappears as regards the first element which is most subtle; at the second admixture, as regards the second element; at the third, as to the third element; at the fourth, as to the fourth element. Thus after the fourth generation it is fitting for the carnal union to be repeated.

Reply to Objection 1: Even as God does not join together those who are joined together against the Divine command, so does He not join together those who are joined together against the commandment of the Church, which has the same binding force as a commandment of God.

Reply to Objection 2: Matrimony is not only a sacrament but also fulfills an office; wherefore it is more subject to the control of the Church’s ministers than baptism which is a sacrament only: because just as human contracts and offices are controlled by human laws, so are spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the tie of consanguinity is natural, it is not natural that consanguinity forbid carnal intercourse, except as regards certain degrees, as stated above [4976](A[3]). Wherefore the Church’s commandment does not cause certain people to be kin or not kin, because they remain equally kin at all times: but it makes carnal intercourse to be lawful or unlawful at different times for different degrees of consanguinity.

Reply to Objection 4: The reasons assigned are given as indicating aptness and congruousness rather than causality and necessity.

Reply to Objection 5: The reason for the impediment of consanguinity is not the same at different times: wherefore that which it was useful to allow at one time, it was beneficial to forbid at another.

Reply to Objection 6: A commandment does not affect the past but the future. Wherefore if the fifth degree which is now allowed were to be forbidden at any time, those in the fifth degree who are married would not have to separate, because no impediment supervening to marriage can annul it; and consequently a union which was a marriage from the first would not be made incestuous by a commandment of the Church. In like manner, if a degree which is now forbidden were to be allowed, such a union would not become a marriage on account of the Church's commandment by reason of the former contract, because they could separate if they wished. Nevertheless, they could contract anew, and this would be a new union.

Reply to Objection 7: In prohibiting the degrees of consanguinity the Church considers chiefly the point of view of affection. And since the reason for affection towards one's brother's son is not less but even greater than the reasons for affection towards one's father's brother, inasmuch as the son is more akin to the father than the father to the son (Ethic. viii, 12), therefore did the Church equally prohibit the degrees of consanguinity in uncles and nephews. On the other hand the Old Law in debarring certain persons looked chiefly to the danger of concupiscence arising from cohabitation; and debarred those persons who were in closer intimacy with one another on account of their living together. Now it is more usual for a niece to live with her uncle than an aunt with her nephew: because a daughter is more identified with her father, being part of him, whereas a sister is not in this way identified with her brother, for she is not part of him but is born of the same parent. Hence there was not the same reason for debarring a niece and an aunt.

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF AFFINITY (ELEVEN ARTICLES)

We must consider next the impediment of affinity. Under this head there are eleven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether affinity results from matrimony?

(2) Whether it remains after the death of husband or wife?

(3) Whether it is caused through unlawful intercourse?

(4) Whether it arises from a betrothal?

(5) Whether affinity is caused through affinity?

(6) Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?

(7) Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?

(8) Whether its degrees extend as far as the degrees of consanguinity?

(9) Whether marriages of persons related to one another by consanguinity or affinity should always be dissolved by divorce?

(10) Whether the process for the dissolution of like marriages should always be by way of accusation?

(11) Whether witnesses should be called in such a case?

Whether a person contracts affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation?

Objection 1: It would seem that a person does not contract affinity through the marriage of a blood-relation. For “the cause of a thing being so is yet more so.” Now the wife is not connected with her husband’s kindred except by reason of the husband. Since then she does not contract affinity with her husband, neither does she contract it with her husband’s kindred.

Objection 2: Further, if certain things be separate from one another and something be connected with one of them, it does not follow that it is connected with the other. Now a person’s blood relations are separate from one another. Therefore it does not follow, if a certain woman be married to a certain man, that she is therefore connected with all his kindred.

Objection 3: Further, relations result from certain things being united together. Now the kindred of the husband do not become united together by the fact of his taking a wife. Therefore they do not acquire any relationship of affinity.

On the contrary, Husband and wife are made one flesh. Therefore if the husband is related in the flesh to all his kindred, for the same reason his wife will be related to them all.

Further, this is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41).

I answer that, A certain natural friendship is founded on natural fellowship. Now natural fellowship, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), arises in two ways; first, from carnal procreation; secondly, from connection with orderly carnal procreation, wherefore he says (Ethic. viii, 12) that the friendship of a husband towards his wife is natural. Consequently even as a person through being connected with another by carnal procreation is bound to him by a tie of natural friendship, so does one person become connected with another through carnal intercourse. But there is a difference in this, that one who is connected with another through carnal procreation, as a son with his father, shares in the same common stock and blood, so that a son is connected with his father's kindred by the same kind of tie as the father was, the tie, namely of consanguinity, albeit in a different degree on account of his being more distant from the stock: whereas one who is connected with another through carnal intercourse does not share in the same stock, but is as it were an extraneous addition thereto: whence arises another kind of tie known by the name of "affinity." This is expressed in the verse:

Marriage makes a new kind of connection,
While birth makes a new degree,

because, to wit, the person begotten is in the same kind of relationship, but in a different degree, whereas through carnal intercourse he enters into a new kind of relationship.

Reply to Objection 1: Although a cause is more potent than its effect, it does not always follow that the same name is applicable to the cause as to the effect, because sometimes that which is in the effect, is found in the cause not in the same but in a higher way; wherefore it is not applicable to both cause and effect under the same name or under the same aspect, as is the case with all equivocal effective causes. Thus, then, the union of husband and wife is stronger than the union of the wife with her husband's kindred, and yet it ought not to be named affinity, but matrimony which is a kind of unity; even as a man is identical with himself, but not with his kinsman.

Reply to Objection 2: Blood-relations are in a way separate, and in a way connected: and it happens in respect of their connection that a person who is connected with one of them is in some way connected with all of them. But on account of their separation and distance from one another it happens that a person who is connected with one of them in one way is connected with another in another way, either as to the kind of connection or as to the degree.

Reply to Objection 3: Further, a relation results sometimes from a movement in each extreme, for instance fatherhood and sonship, and a relation of this kind is really in both extremes. Sometimes it results from the movement of one only, and this happens in two ways. In one way when a relation results from the movement of one extreme without any movement previous or concomitant of the other extreme; as in the Creator and the creature, the sensible and the sense, knowledge and the knowable object: and then the relation is in one extreme really and in the other logically only. In another way when the relation results from the movement of one extreme without any concomitant movement, but not without a previous movement of the other; thus there results equality between two men by the increase of one, without the other either increasing or decreasing then, although previously he reached his actual quantity by some movement or change, so that this relation is founded really in both extremes. It is the same with consanguinity and affinity, because the relation of brotherhood which results in a grown child on the birth of a boy, is caused without any movement of the former's at the time, but by virtue of that previous movement of his wherein he was begotten; wherefore at the time it happens that there results in him the aforesaid relation through the movement of another. Likewise because this man descends through his own birth from the same stock as the husband, there results in him affinity with the latter's wife, without any new change in him.

Whether affinity remains after the death of husband or wife?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity does not remain after the death of husband or wife, between the blood-relations of husband and wife or “vice versa.” Because if the cause cease the effect ceases. Now the cause of affinity was the marriage, which ceases after the husband’s death, since then “the woman . . . is loosed from the law of the husband” (Rom. 7:2). Therefore the aforesaid affinity ceases also.

Objection 2: Further, consanguinity is the cause of affinity. Now the consanguinity of the husband with his blood-relations ceases at his death. Therefore, the wife’s affinity with them ceases also.

On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Now consanguinity binds persons together for all time as long as they live. Therefore affinity does so also: and consequently affinity (between two persons) is not dissolved through the dissolution of the marriage by the death of a third person.

I answer that, A relation ceases in two ways: in one way through the corruption of its subject, in another way by the removal of its cause; thus likeness ceases when one of the like subjects dies, or when the quality that caused the likeness is removed. Now there are certain relations which have for their cause an action, or a passion or movement (Metaph. v, 20): and some of these are caused by movement, through something being moved actually; such is the relation between mover and moved: some of them are caused through something being adapted to movement, for instance the relations between the motive power and the movable, or between master and servant; and some of them result from something, having been moved previously, such as the relation between father and son, for the relation between them is caused not by (the con) being begotten now, but by his having been begotten. Now aptitude for movement and for being moved is transitory; whereas the fact of having been moved is everlasting, since what has been never ceases having been. Consequently fatherhood and sonship are never dissolved through the removal of the cause, but only through the corruption of the subject, that is of one of the subjects. The same applies to affinity, for this is caused by certain persons having been joined together not by their being actually joined. Wherefore it is not done away, as long as the persons between whom affinity has been contracted survive, although the person die through whom it was contracted.

Reply to Objection 1: The marriage tie causes affinity not only by reason of actual union, but also by reason of the union having been effected in the past.

Reply to Objection 2: Consanguinity is not the chief cause of affinity, but union with a blood-relation, not only because that union is now, but because it has been. Hence the argument does not prove.

Whether unlawful intercourse causes affinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that unlawful intercourse does not cause affinity. For affinity is an honorable thing. Now honorable things do not result from that which is dishonorable. Therefore affinity cannot be caused by a dishonorable intercourse.

Objection 2: Further, where there is consanguinity there cannot be affinity; since affinity is a relationship between persons that results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship. Now if unlawful intercourse were a cause of affinity, it would sometimes happen that a man would contract affinity with his blood-relations and with himself: for instance when a man is guilty of incest with a blood-relation. Therefore affinity is not caused by unlawful intercourse.

Objection 3: Further, unlawful intercourse is according to nature or against nature. Now affinity is not caused by unnatural unlawful intercourse as decided by law (can. Extraordinaria, xxxv, qu. 2,3). Therefore it is not caused only by unlawful intercourse according to nature.

On the contrary, He who is joined to a harlot is made one body (1 Cor. 6:16). Now this is the reason why marriage caused affinity. Therefore unlawful intercourse does so for the same reason.

Further, carnal intercourse is the cause of affinity, as shown by the definition of affinity, which definition is as follows: Affinity is the relationship of persons which results from carnal intercourse and is altogether void of blood-relationship. But there is carnal copulation even in unlawful intercourse. Therefore unlawful intercourse causes affinity.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12) the union of husband and wife is said to be natural chiefly on account of the procreation of offspring, and secondly on account of the community of works: the former of which belongs to marriage by reason of carnal copulation, and the latter, in so far as marriage is a partnership directed to a common life. Now the former is to be found in every carnal union where there is a mingling of seeds, since such a union may be productive of offspring, but the latter may be wanting. Consequently since marriage caused affinity, in so far as it was a carnal mingling, it follows that also an unlawful intercourse causes affinity in so far as it has something of natural copulation.

Reply to Objection 1: In an unlawful intercourse there is something natural which is common to fornication and marriage, and in this respect it causes affinity. There is also something which is inordinate whereby it differs from marriage, and in this respect it does not cause affinity. Hence affinity remains honorable, although its cause is in a way dishonorable.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no reason why diverse relations should not be in the same subject by reason of different things. Consequently there can be affinity and consanguinity between two persons, not only on account of unlawful but also on account of lawful intercourse: for instance if a blood-relation of mine on my father’s side marries a blood-relation of mine on my mother’s side. Hence in the above definition the words “which is altogether void of blood-relationship” apply to affinity as such. Nor does it follow that a man by having intercourse with his blood-relation contracts affinity with himself, since affinity, like consanguinity, requires diversity of subjects, as likeness does.

Reply to Objection 3: In unnatural copulation there is no mingling of seeds that makes generation possible: wherefore a like intercourse does not cause affinity.

Whether affinity is caused by betrothal?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity cannot be caused by betrothal. For affinity is a lasting tie: whereas a betrothal is sometimes broken off. Therefore it cannot cause affinity.

Objection 2: Further if the hymen be penetrated without the deed being consummated, affinity is not contracted. Yet this is much more akin to carnal intercourse than a betrothal. Therefore betrothal does not cause affinity.

Objection 3: Further, betrothal is nothing but a promise of future marriage. Now sometimes there is a promise of future marriage without affinity being contracted, for instance if it take place before the age of seven years; or if a man having a perpetual impediment of impotence promise a woman future marriage; or if a like promise be made between persons to whom marriage is rendered unlawful by a vow; or in any other way whatever. Therefore betrothal cannot cause affinity.

On the contrary, Pope Alexander (cap. Ad audiendem, De spons. et matrim.) forbade a certain woman to marry a certain man, because she had been betrothed to his brother. Now this would not be the case unless affinity were contracted by betrothal. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Just as a betrothal has not the conditions of a perfect marriage, but is a preparation for marriage, so betrothal causes not affinity as marriage does, but something like affinity. This is called "the justice of public honesty," which is an impediment to marriage even as affinity and consanguinity are, and according to the same degrees, and is defined thus: "The justice of public honesty is a relationship arising out of betrothal, and derives its force from ecclesiastical institution by reason of its honesty." This indicates the reason of its name as well as its cause, namely that this relationship was instituted by the Church on account of its honesty.

Reply to Objection 1: Betrothal, by reason not of itself but of the end to which it is directed, causes this kind of affinity known as "the justice of public honesty": wherefore just as marriage is a lasting tie, so is the aforesaid kind of affinity.

Reply to Objection 2: In carnal intercourse man and woman become one flesh by the mingling of seeds. Wherefore it is not every invasion or penetration of the hymen that causes affinity to be contracted, but only such as is followed by a mingling of seeds. But marriage causes affinity not only on account of carnal intercourse, but also by reason of the conjugal fellowship, in respect of which also marriage is according to nature. Consequently affinity results from the marriage contract itself expressed in words of the present and before its consummation, and in like manner there results from betrothal, which is a promise of conjugal fellowship, something akin to affinity, namely the justice of public honesty.

Reply to Objection 3: All those impediments which void a betrothal prevent affinity being contracted through a promise of marriage. Hence whether he who actually promises marriage be lacking in age, or be under a solemn vow of continence or any like impediment, no affinity nor anything akin to it results because the betrothal is void. If however, a minor, laboring under insensibility or malefice, having a perpetual impediment, is betrothed before the age of puberty and after the age of seven years, with a woman who is of age, from such a contract there results the impediment called "justice of public honesty," because at the time the impediment was not actual, since at that age the boy who is insensible is equally impotent in respect of the act in question.

Whether affinity is a cause of affinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity also is a cause of affinity. For Pope Julius I says (cap. Contradicimus 35, qu. iii): "No man may marry his wife's surviving blood-relation": and it is said in the next chapter (cap. Porro duorum) that "the wives of two cousins are forbidden to marry, one after the other, the same husband." But this is only on account of affinity being contracted through union with a person related by affinity. Therefore affinity is a cause of affinity.

Objection 2: Further, carnal intercourse makes persons akin even as carnal procreation, since the degrees of affinity and consanguinity are reckoned equally. But consanguinity causes affinity. Therefore affinity does also.

Objection 3: Further, things that are the same with one and the same are the same with one another. But the wife contracts the same relations with all her husband's kindred. Therefore all her husband's kindred are made one with all who are related by affinity to the wife, and thus affinity is the cause of affinity.

Objection 4: On the contrary, If affinity is caused by affinity a man who has connection with two women can marry neither of them, because then the one would be related to the other by affinity. But this is false. Therefore affinity does not cause affinity.

Objection 5: Further, if affinity arose out of affinity a man by marrying another man's widow would contract affinity with all her first husband's kindred, since she is related to them by affinity. But this cannot be the case because he would become especially related by affinity to her deceased husband. Therefore, etc.

Objection 6: Further, consanguinity is a stronger tie than affinity. But the blood-relations of the wife do not become blood-relations of the husband. Much less, therefore, does affinity to the wife cause affinity to her blood-relations, and thus the same conclusion follows.

I answer that, There are two ways in which one thing proceeds from another: in one way a thing proceeds from another in likeness of species, as a man is begotten of a man: in another way one thing proceeds from another, not in likeness of species; and this process is always towards a lower species, as instanced in all equivocal agents. The first kind of procession, however often it be repeated, the same species always remains: thus if one man be begotten of another by an act of the generative power, of this man also another man will be begotten, and so on. But the second kind of procession, just as in the first instance it produces another species, so it makes another species as often as it is repeated. Thus by movement from a point there proceeds a line and not a point, because a point by being moved makes a line; and from a line moved lineally, there proceeds not a line but a surface, and from a surface a body, and in this way the procession can go no further. Now in the procession of kinship we find two kinds whereby this tie is caused: one is by carnal procreation, and this always produces the same species of relationship; the other is by the marriage union, and this produces a different kind of relationship from the beginning: thus it is clear that a married woman is related to her husband’s blood-relations not by blood but by affinity. Wherefore if this kind of process be repeated, the result will be not affinity but another kind of relationship; and consequently a married party contracts with the affines of the other party a relation not of affinity but of some other kind which is called affinity of the second kind. And again if a person through marriage contracts relationship with an affine of the second kind, it will not be affinity of the second kind, but of a third kind, as indicated in the verse quoted above [4977](A[1]). Formerly these two kinds were included in the prohibition, under the head of the justice of public honesty rather than under the head of affinity, because they fall short of true affinity, in the same way as the relationship arising out of betrothal. Now however they have ceased to be included in the prohibition, which now refers only to the first kind of affinity in which true affinity consists.

Reply to Objection 1: A husband contracts affinity of the first kind with his wife’s male blood-relation, and affinity of the second kind with the latter’s wife: wherefore if the latter man dies the former cannot marry his widow on account of the second kind of affinity. Again if a man A marry a widow B, C, a relation of her former husband being connected with B by the first kind of affinity, contracts affinity of the second kind with her husband A; and D, the wife of this relation C being connected, by affinity of the second kind, with B, this man’s wife contracts affinity of the third kind with her husband A. And since the third kind of affinity was included in the prohibition on account of a certain honesty more than by reason of affinity, the canon (cap. Porro duorum 35, qu. iii) says: “The justice of public honesty forbids the wives of two cousins to be married to the same man, the one after the other.” But this prohibition is done away with.

Reply to Objection 2: Although carnal intercourse is a cause of people being connected with one another, it is not the same kind of connection.

Reply to Objection 3: The wife contracts the same connection with her husband’s relatives as to the degree but not as to the kind of connection.

Since however the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that no tie is caused by affinity, we must reply to them lest the time-honored prohibition of the Church seem unreasonable.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated above, a woman does not contract affinity of the first kind with the man to whom she is united in the flesh, wherefore she does not contract affinity of the second kind with a woman known by the same man; and consequently if a man marry one of these women, the other does not contract affinity of the third kind with him. And so the laws of bygone times did not forbid the same man to marry successively two women known by one man.

Reply to Objection 5: As a man is not connected with his wife by affinity of the first kind, so he does not contract affinity of the second kind with the second husband of the same wife. Wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 6: One person is not connected with me through another, except they be connected together. Hence through a woman who is affine to me, no person becomes connected with me, except such as is connected with her. Now this cannot be except through carnal procreation from her, or through connection with her by marriage: and according to the olden legislation, I contracted some kind of connection through her in both ways: because her son even by another husband becomes affine to me in the same kind and in a different degree of affinity, as appears from the rule given above: and again her second husband becomes affine to me in the second kind of affinity. But her other blood-relations are not connected with him, but she is connected with them, either as with father or mother, inasmuch as she descends from them, or, as with her brothers, as proceeding from the same principle; wherefore the brother or father of my affine does not become affine to me in any kind of affinity.

Whether affinity is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage except what is contrary thereto. But affinity is not contrary to marriage since it is caused by it. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, by marriage the wife becomes a possession of the husband. Now the husband's kindred inherit his possessions after his death. Therefore they can succeed to his wife, although she is affine to them, as shown above [4978](A[5]). Therefore affinity is not an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, It is written (Lev. 18:8): "Thou shalt not uncover the nakedness of thy father's wife." Now she is only affine. Therefore affinity is an impediment to marriage.

I answer that, Affinity that precedes marriage hinders marriage being contracted and voids the contract, for the same reason as consanguinity. For just as there is a certain need for blood-relations to live together, so is there for those who are connected by affinity: and just as there is a tie of friendship between blood-relations, so is there between those who are affine to one another. If, however, affinity supervene to matrimony, it cannot void the marriage, as stated above (Q[50], A[7]).

Reply to Objection 1: Affinity is not contrary to the marriage which causes it, but to a marriage being contracted with an affine, in so far as the latter would hinder the extension of friendship and the curbing of concupiscence, which are sought in marriage.

Reply to Objection 2: The husband's possessions do not become one with him as the wife is made one flesh with him. Wherefore just as consanguinity is an impediment to marriage or union with the husband according to the flesh, so is one forbidden to marry the husband's wife.

Whether affinity in itself admits of degrees?

Objection 1: It would seem that affinity in itself admits of degrees. For any kind of propinquity can itself be the subject of degrees. Now affinity is a kind of propinquity. Therefore it has degrees in itself apart from the degrees of consanguinity by which it is caused.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41) that the child of a second marriage could not take a consort from within the degrees of affinity of the first husband. But this would not be the case unless the son of an affine were also affine. Therefore affinity like consanguinity admits itself of degrees.

On the contrary, Affinity is caused by consanguinity. Therefore all the degrees of affinity are caused by the degrees of consanguinity: and so it has no degrees of itself.

I answer that, A thing does not of itself admit of being divided except in reference to something belonging to it by reason of its genus: thus animal is divided into rational and irrational and not into white and black. Now carnal procreation has a direct relation to consanguinity, because the tie of consanguinity is immediately contracted through it; whereas it has no relation to affinity except through consanguinity which is the latter’s cause. Wherefore since the degrees of relationship are distinguished in reference to carnal procreation, the distinction of degrees is directly and immediately referable to consanguinity, and to affinity through consanguinity. Hence the general rule in seeking the degrees of affinity is that in whatever degree of consanguinity I am related to the husband, in that same degree of affinity I am related to the wife.

Reply to Objection 1: The degrees in propinquity of relationship can only be taken in reference to ascent and descent of propagation, to which affinity is compared only through consanguinity. Wherefore affinity has no direct degrees, but derives them according to the degrees of consanguinity.

Reply to Objection 2: Formerly it used to be said that the son of my affine by a second marriage was affine to me, not directly but accidentally as it were: wherefore he was forbidden to marry on account of the justice of public honesty rather than affinity. And for this reason this prohibition is now revoked.

Whether the degrees of affinity extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of affinity do not extend in the same way as the degrees of consanguinity. For the tie of affinity is less strong than the tie of consanguinity, since affinity arises from consanguinity in diversity of species, as from an equivocal cause. Now the stronger the tie the longer it lasts. Therefore the tie of affinity does not last to the same number of degrees as consanguinity.

Objection 2: Further, human law should imitate Divine law. Now according to the Divine law certain degrees of consanguinity were forbidden, in which degrees affinity was not an impediment to marriage: as instanced in a brother’s wife whom a man could marry although he could not marry her sister. Therefore now too the prohibition of affinity and consanguinity should not extend to the same degrees.

On the contrary, A woman is connected with me by affinity from the very fact that she is married to a blood-relation of mine. Therefore in whatever degree her husband is related to me by blood she is related to me in that same degree by affinity: and so the degrees of affinity should be reckoned in the same number as the degrees of consanguinity.

I answer that, Since the degrees of affinity are reckoned according to the degrees of consanguinity, the degrees of affinity must needs be the same in number as those of consanguinity. Nevertheless, affinity being a lesser tie than consanguinity, both formerly and now, a dispensation is more easily granted in the more remote degrees of affinity than in the remote degrees of consanguinity.

Reply to Objection 1: The fact that the tie of affinity is less than the tie of consanguinity causes a difference in the kind of relationship but not in the degrees. Hence this argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 2: A man could not take his deceased brother’s wife except, in the case when the latter died without issue, in order to raise up seed to his brother. This was requisite at a time when religious worship was propagated by means of the propagation of the flesh, which is not the case now. Hence it is clear that he did not marry her in his own person as it were, but as supplying the place of his brother.

Whether a marriage contracted by persons with the degrees of affinity or consanguinity should always be annulled?

Objection 1: It would seem that a marriage contracted by persons within the degrees of affinity or consanguinity ought not always to be annulled by divorce. For “what God hath joined together let no man put asunder” (Mat. 19:6). Since then it is understood that what the Church does God does, and since the Church sometimes through ignorance joins such persons together, it would seem that if subsequently this came to knowledge they ought not to be separated.

Objection 2: Further, the tie of marriage is less onerous than the tie of ownership. Now after a long time a man may acquire by prescription the ownership of a thing of which he was not the owner. Therefore by length of time a marriage becomes good in law, although it was not so before.

Objection 3: Further, of like things we judge alike. Now if a marriage ought to be annulled on account of consanguinity, in the case when two brothers marry two sisters, if one be separated on account of consanguinity, the other ought to be separated for the same reason. and yet this is not seemly. Therefore a marriage ought not to be annulled on account of affinity or consanguinity.

On the contrary, Consanguinity and affinity forbid the contracting of a marriage and void the contract. Therefore if affinity or consanguinity be proved, the parties should be separated even though they have actually contracted marriage.

I answer that, Since all copulation apart from lawful marriage is a mortal sin, which the Church uses all her endeavors to prevent, it belongs to her to separate those between whom there cannot be valid marriage, especially those related by blood or by affinity, who cannot without incest be united in the flesh.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the Church is upheld by God’s gift and authority, yet in so far as she is an assembly of men there results in her acts something of human frailty which is not Divine. Therefore a union effected in the presence of the Church who is ignorant of an impediment is not indissoluble by Divine authority, but is brought about contrary to Divine authority through man’s error, which being an error of fact excuses from sin, as long as it remains. Hence when the impediment comes to the knowledge of the Church, she ought to sever the aforesaid union.

Reply to Objection 2: That which cannot be done without sin is not ratified by any prescription, for as Innocent III says (Conc. Later. iv, can.

50: cap. Non debent, De consang. et affinit.), “length of time does not diminish sin but increases it”: nor can it in any way legitimize a marriage which could not take place between unlawful persons.

Reply to Objection 3: In contentious suits between two persons the verdict does not prejudice a third party, wherefore although the one brother’s marriage with the one sister is annulled on account of consanguinity, the Church does not therefore annul the other marriage against which no action is taken. Yet in the tribunal of the conscience the other brother ought not on this account always to be bound to put away his wife, because such accusations frequently proceed from ill-will, and are proved by false witnesses. Hence he is not bound to form his conscience on what has been done about the other marriage: but seemingly one ought to draw a distinction, because either he has certain knowledge of the impediment of his marriage, or he has an opinion about it, or he has neither. In the first case, he can neither seek nor pay the debt, in the second, he must pay, but not ask, in the third he can both pay and ask.

Whether it is necessary to proceed by way of accusation for the annulment of a marriage contracted by persons related to each other by affinity or consanguinity?

Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to proceed by way of accusation in order to sever a marriage contracted between persons related by affinity or consanguinity. Because accusation is preceded by inscription* whereby a man binds himself to suffer the punishment of retaliation, if he fail to prove his accusation. [*The accuser was bound by Roman Law to endorse (se inscribere) the writ of accusation; Cf. [4979]SS, Q[33], A[7]]. But this is not required when a matrimonial separation is at issue. Therefore accusation has no place then.

Objection 2: Further, in a matrimonial lawsuit only the relatives are heard, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 41). But in accusations even strangers are heard. Therefore in a suit for matrimonial separation the process is not by way of accusation.

Objection 3: Further, if a marriage ought to be denounced this should be done especially where it is least difficult to sever the tie. Now this is when only the betrothal has been contracted, and then it is not the marriage that is denounced. Therefore accusation should never take place at any other time.

Objection 4: Further, a man is not prevented from accusing by the fact that he does not accuse at once. But this happens in marriage, for if he was silent at first when the marriage was being contracted, he cannot denounce the marriage afterwards without laying himself open to suspicion. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Whatever is unlawful can be denounced. But the marriage of relatives by affinity and consanguinity is unlawful. Therefore it can be denounced.

I answer that, Accusation is instituted lest the guilty be tolerated as though they were innocent. Now just as it happens through ignorance of fact that a guilty man is reputed innocent, so it happens through ignorance of a circumstance that a certain fact is deemed lawful whereas it is unlawful. Wherefore just as a man is sometimes accused, so is a fact sometimes an object of accusation. It is in this way that a marriage is denounced, when through ignorance of an impediment it is deemed lawful, whereas it is unlawful.

Reply to Objection 1: The punishment of retaliation takes place when a person is accused of a crime, because then action is taken that he may be punished. But when it is a deed that is accused, action is taken not for the punishment of the doer, but in order to prevent what is unlawful. Hence in a matrimonial suit the accuser does not bind himself to a punishment. Moreover, the accusation may be made either in words or in writing, provided the person who denounces the marriage denounced, and the impediment for which it is denounced, be expressed.

Reply to Objection 2: Strangers cannot know of the consanguinity except from the relatives, since these know with greater probability. Hence when these are silent, a stranger is liable to be suspected of acting from ill-will unless he wish the relatives to prove his assertion. Wherefore a stranger is debarred from accusing when there are relatives who are silent, and by whom he cannot prove his accusation. On the other hand the relatives, however nearly related they be, are not debarred from accusing, when the marriage is denounced on account of a perpetual impediment, which prevents the contracting of the marriage and voids the contract. When, however, the accusation is based on a denial of the contract having taken place, the parents should be debarred from witnessing as being liable to suspicion, except those of the party that is inferior in rank and wealth, for they, one is inclined to think, would be willing for the marriage to stand.

Reply to Objection 3: If the marriage is not yet contracted and there is only a betrothal, there can be no accusation, for what is not, cannot be accused. But the impediment can be denounced lest the marriage be contracted.

Reply to Objection 4: He who is silent at first is sometimes heard afterwards if he wish to denounce the marriage, and sometimes he is repulsed. This is made clear by the Decretal (cap. Cum in tua, De his qui matrim. accus. possunt.) which runs as follows: “If an accuser present himself after the marriage has been contracted, since he did not declare himself when according to custom, the banns were published in church, we may rightly ask whether he should be allowed to voice his accusation. In this matter we deem that a distinction should be made, so that if he who lodges information against persons already married was absent from the diocese at the time of the aforesaid publication, or if for some other reason this could not come to his knowledge, for instance if through exceeding stress of weakness and fever he was not in possession of his faculties, or was of so tender years as to be too young to understand such matters, or if he were hindered by some other lawful cause, his accusation should be heard. otherwise without doubt he should be repulsed as open to suspicion, unless he swear that the information lodged by him came to his knowledge subsequently and that he is not moved by ill-will to make his accusation.”

Whether in a suit of this kind one should proceed by hearing witnesses in the same way as in other suits?

Objection 1: It would seem that in such a suit one ought not to proceed by hearing witnesses, in the same way as in other suits where any witnesses may be called provided they be unexceptionable. But here strangers are not admitted, although they be unexceptionable. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, witnesses who are suspected of private hatred or love are debarred from giving evidence. Now relatives are especially open to suspicion of love for one party, and hatred for the other. Therefore their evidence should not be taken.

Objection 3: Further, marriage is a more favorable suit than those others in which purely corporeal questions are at stake. Now in these the same person cannot be both accuser and witness. Neither therefore can this be in a matrimonial suit; and so it would appear that it is not right to proceed by hearing witnesses in a suit of this kind.

On the contrary, Witnesses are called in a suit in order to give the judge evidence concerning matters of doubt. Now evidence should be afforded the judge in this suit as in other suits, since he must not pronounce a hasty judgment on what is not proven. Therefore here as in other lawsuits witnesses should be called.

I answer that, In this kind of lawsuit as in others, truth must be unveiled by witnesses: yet, as the lawyers say, there are many things peculiar to this suit; namely that “the same person can be accuser and witness; that evidence is not taken ‘on oath of calumny,’ since it is a quasi-spiritual lawsuit; that relatives are allowed as witnesses; that the juridical order is not perfectly observed, since if the denunciation has been made, and the suit is uncontested, the defendant may be excommunicated if contumacious; that hearsay evidence is admitted; and that witnesses may be called after the publication of the names of the witnesses.” All this is in order to prevent the sin that may occur in such a union (cap. Quoties aliqui; cap. Super eo, De test. et attest.; cap. Literas, De juram. calumn.).

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF THE IMPEDIMENT OF SPIRITUAL RELATIONSHIP (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment of spiritual relationship: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?

(2) From what cause is it contracted?

(3) Between whom?

(4) Whether it passes from husband to wife?

(5) Whether it passes to the father's carnal children?

Whether spiritual relationship is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage. For nothing is an impediment to marriage save what is contrary to a marriage good. Now spiritual relationship is not contrary to a marriage good. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, a perpetual impediment to marriage cannot stand together with marriage. But spiritual relationship sometimes stands together with marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42), as when a man in a case of necessity baptizes his own child, for then he contracts a spiritual relationship with his wife, and yet the marriage is not dissolved. Therefore spiritual relationship is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 3: Further, union of the spirit does not pass to the flesh. But marriage is a union of the flesh. Therefore since spiritual relationship is a union of the spirit, it cannot become an impediment to marriage.

Objection 4: Further, contraries have not the same effects. Now spiritual relationship is apparently contrary to disparity of worship, since spiritual relationship is a kinship resulting from the giving of a sacrament or the intention of so doing [*See next Article, ad 3]: whereas disparity of worship consists in the lack of a sacrament, as stated above ([4980]Q[50], A[1]). Since then disparity of worship is an impediment to matrimony, it would seem that spiritual relationship has not this effect.

On the contrary, The holier the bond, the more is it to be safeguarded. Now a spiritual bond is holier than a bodily tie: and since the tie of bodily kinship is an impediment to marriage, it follows that spiritual relationship should also be an impediment.

Further, in marriage the union of souls ranks higher than union of bodies, for it precedes it. Therefore with much more reason can a spiritual relationship hinder marriage than bodily relationship does.

I answer that, Just as by carnal procreation man receives natural being, so by the sacraments he receives the spiritual being of grace. Wherefore just as the tie that is contracted by carnal procreation is natural to man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, so the tie that is contracted from the reception of the sacraments is after a fashion natural to man, inasmuch as he is a member of the Church. Therefore as carnal relationship hinders marriage, even so does spiritual relationship by command of the Church. We must however draw a distinction in reference to spiritual relationship, since either it precedes or follows marriage. If it precedes, it hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract. If it follows, it does not dissolve the marriage bond: but we must draw a further distinction in reference to the marriage act. For either the spiritual relationship is contracted in a case of necessity, as when a father baptizes his child who is at the point of death—and then it is not an obstacle to the marriage act on either side—or it is contracted without any necessity and through ignorance, in which case if the person whose action has occasioned the relationship acted with due caution, it is the same with him as in the former case—or it is contracted purposely and without any necessity, and then the person whose action has occasioned the relationship, loses the right to ask for the debt; but is bound to pay if asked, because the fault of the one party should not be prejudicial to the other.

Reply to Objection 1: Although spiritual relationship does not hinder any of the chief marriage goods, it hinders one of the secondary goods, namely the extension of friendship, because spiritual relationship is by itself a sufficient reason for friendship: wherefore intimacy and friendship with other persons need to be sought by means of marriage.

Reply to Objection 2: Marriage is a lasting bond, wherefore no supervening impediment can sever it. Hence it happens sometimes that marriage and an impediment to marriage stand together, but not if the impediment precedes.

Reply to Objection 3: In marriage there is not only a bodily but also a spiritual union: and consequently kinship of spirit proves an impediment thereto, without spiritual kinship having to pass into a bodily relationship.

Reply to Objection 4: There is nothing unreasonable in two things that are contrary to one another being contrary to the same thing, as great and small are contrary to equal. Thus disparity of worship and spiritual relationship are opposed to marriage, because in one the distance is greater, and in the other less, than required by marriage. Hence there is an impediment to marriage in either case.

Whether spiritual relationship is contracted by baptism only?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is contracted by Baptism only. For as bodily kinship is to bodily birth, so is spiritual kinship to spiritual birth. Now Baptism alone is called spiritual birth. Therefore spiritual kinship is contracted by Baptism only, even as only by carnal birth is carnal kinship contracted.

Objection 2: Further, a character is imprinted in order as in Confirmation. But spiritual relationship does not result from receiving orders. Therefore it does not result from Confirmation but only from Baptism.

Objection 3: Further, sacraments are more excellent than sacramentals. Now spiritual relationship does not result from certain sacraments, for instance from Extreme Unction. Much less therefore does it result from catechizing, as some maintain.

Objection 4: Further, many other sacramentals are attached to Baptism besides catechizing. Therefore spiritual relationship is not contracted from catechism any more than from the others.

Objection 5: Further, prayer is no less efficacious than instruction of catechism for advancement in good. But spiritual relationship does not result from prayer. Therefore it does not result from catechism.

Objection 6: Further, the instruction given to the baptized by preaching to them avails no less than preaching to those who are not yet baptized. But no spiritual relationship results from preaching. Neither therefore does it result from catechism.

Objection 7: On the other hand, It is written (1 Cor. 4:15): “In Christ Jesus by the gospel I have begotten you.” Now spiritual birth causes spiritual relationship. Therefore spiritual relationship results from the preaching of the gospel and instruction, and not only from Baptism.

Objection 8: Further, as original sin is taken away by Baptism, so is actual sin taken away by Penance. Therefore just as Baptism causes spiritual relationship, so also does Penance.

Objection 9: Further, “father” denotes relationship. Now a man is called another’s spiritual father in respect of Penance, teaching, pastoral care and many other like things. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted from many other sources besides Baptism and Confirmation.

I answer that, There are three opinions on this question. Some say that as spiritual regeneration is bestowed by the sevenfold grace of the Holy Ghost, it is caused by means of seven things, beginning with the first taste of blessed salt and ending with Confirmation given by the bishop: and they say that spiritual relationship is contracted by each of these seven things. But this does not seem reasonable, for carnal relationship is not contracted except by a perfect act of generation. Wherefore affinity is not contracted except there be mingling of seeds, from which it is possible for carnal generation to follow. Now spiritual generation is not perfected except by a sacrament: wherefore it does not seem fitting for spiritual relationship to be contracted otherwise than through a sacrament. Hence others say that spiritual relationship is only contracted through three sacraments, namely catechism, Baptism and Confirmation, but these do not apparently know the meaning of what they say, since catechism is not a sacrament but a sacramental. Wherefore others say that it is contracted through two sacraments only, namely Confirmation and Baptism, and this is the more common opinion. Some however of these say that catechism is a weak impediment, since it hinders the contracting of marriage but does not void the contract.

Reply to Objection 1: Carnal birth is twofold. The first is in the womb, wherein that which is born is a weakling and cannot come forth without danger: and to this birth regeneration by Baptism is likened; wherein a man is regenerated as though yet needing to be fostered in the womb of the Church. The second is birth from out of the womb, when that which was born in the womb is so far strengthened that it can without danger face the outer world which has a natural corruptive tendency. To this is likened Confirmation, whereby man being strengthened goes forth abroad to confess the name of Christ. Hence spiritual relationship is fittingly contracted through both these sacraments.

Reply to Objection 2: The effect of the sacrament of order is not regeneration but the bestowal of power, for which reason it is not conferred on women, and consequently no impediment to marriage can arise therefrom. Hence this kind of relationship does not count.

Reply to Objection 3: In catechism one makes a profession of future Baptism, just as in betrothal one enters an engagement of future marriage. Wherefore just as in betrothal a certain kind of propinquity is contracted, so is there in catechism, whereby marriage is rendered at least unlawful, as some say; but not in the other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 4: There is not made a profession of faith in the other sacramentals of Baptism, as in catechism: wherefore the comparison fails.

The same answer applies to the Fifth and Sixth Objections.

Reply to Objection 7: The Apostle had instructed them in the faith by a kind of catechism; and consequently his instruction was directed to their spiritual birth.

Reply to Objection 8: Properly speaking a spiritual relationship is not contracted through the sacrament of Penance. Wherefore a priest’s son can marry a woman whose confession the priest has heard, else in the whole parish he could not find a woman whom he could marry. Nor does it matter that by Penance actual sin is taken away, for this is not a kind of birth, but a kind of healing. Nevertheless Penance occasions a kind of bond between the woman penitent and the priest, that has a resemblance to spiritual relationship, so that if he have carnal intercourse with her, he sins as grievously as if she were his spiritual daughter. The reason of this is that the relations between priest and penitent are most intimate, and consequently in order to remove the occasion of sin this prohibition [*Can. Omnes quos, and seqq., Caus. xxx] was made.

Reply to Objection 9: A spiritual father is so called from his likeness to a carnal father. Now as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 2) a carnal father gives his child three things, being nourishment and instruction: and consequently a person’s spiritual father is so called from one of these three things. Nevertheless he has not, through being his spiritual father, a spiritual relationship with him, unless he is like a (carnal) father as to generation which is the way to being. This solution may also be applied to the foregoing Eighth Objection.

Whether spiritual relationship is contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from the sacred font?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship is not contracted between the person baptized and the person who raises him from the sacred font. For in carnal generation carnal relationship is contracted only on the part of the person of whose seed the child is born; and not on the part of the person who receives the child after birth. Therefore neither is spiritual relationship contracted between the receiver and the received at the sacred font.

Objection 2: Further, he who raises a person from the sacred font is called {anadochos} by Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii): and it is part of his office to instruct the child. But instruction is not a sufficient cause of spiritual relationship, as stated above [4981](A[2]). Therefore no relationship is contracted between him and the person whom he raises from the sacred font.

Objection 3: Further, it may happen that someone raises a person from the sacred font before he himself is baptized. Now spiritual relationship is not contracted in such a case, since one who is not baptized is not capable of spirituality. Therefore raising a person from the sacred font is not sufficient to contract a spiritual relationship.

On the contrary, There is the definition of spiritual relationship quoted above [4982](A[1]), as also the authorities mentioned in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

I answer that, Just as in carnal generation a person is born of a father and mother, so in spiritual generation a person is born again a son of God as Father, and of the Church as Mother. Now while he who confers the sacrament stands in the place of God, whose instrument and minister he is, he who raises a baptized person from the sacred font, or holds the candidate for Confirmation, stands in the place of the Church. Therefore spiritual relationship is contracted with both.

Reply to Objection 1: Not only the father, of whose seed the child is born, is related carnally to the child, but also the mother who provides the matter, and in whose womb the child is begotten. So too the godparent who in place of the Church offers and raises the candidate for Baptism and holds the candidate for Confirmation contracts spiritual relationship.

Reply to Objection 2: He contracts spiritual relationship not by reason of the instruction it is his duty to give, but on account of the spiritual birth in which he co-operates.

Reply to Objection 3: A person who is not baptized cannot raise anyone from the sacred font, since he is not a member of the Church whom the godparent in Baptism represents: although he can baptize, because he is a creature of God Whom the baptizer represents. And yet he cannot contract a spiritual relationship, since he is void of spiritual life to which man is first born by receiving Baptism.

Whether spiritual relationship passes from husband to wife?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife. For spiritual and bodily union are disparate and differ generically. Therefore carnal union which is between husband and wife cannot be the means of contracting a spiritual relationship.

Objection 2: Further, the godfather and godmother have more in common in the spiritual birth that is the cause of spiritual relationship, than a husband, who is godfather, has with his wife. Now godfather and godmother do not hereby contract spiritual relationship. Therefore neither does a wife contract a spiritual relationship through her husband being godfather to someone.

Objection 3: Further, it may happen that the husband is baptized, and his wife not, for instance when he is converted from unbelief without his wife being converted. Now spiritual relationship cannot be contracted by one who is not baptized. Therefore it does not always pass from husband to wife.

Objection 4: Further, husband and wife together can raise a person from the sacred font, since no law forbids it. If therefore spiritual relationship passed from husband to wife, it would follow that each of them is twice godfather or godmother of the same individual: which is absurd.

On the contrary, Spiritual goods are more communicable than bodily goods. But the bodily consanguinity of the husband passes to his wife by affinity. Much more therefore does spiritual relationship.

I answer that, A may become co-parent with B in two ways. First, by the act of another (B), who baptizes A’s child, or raises him in Baptism. In this way spiritual relationship does not pass from husband to wife, unless perchance it be his wife’s child, for then she contracts spiritual relationship directly, even as her husband. Secondly, by his own act, for instance when he raises B’s child from the sacred font, and thus spiritual relationship passes to the wife if he has already had carnal knowledge of her, but not if the marriage be not yet consummated, since they are not as yet made one flesh: and this is by way of a kind of affinity; wherefore it would seem on the same grounds to pass to a woman of whom he has carnal knowledge, though she be not his wife. Hence the verse: “I may not marry my own child’s godmother, nor the mother of my godchild: but I may marry the godmother of my wife’s child.”

Reply to Objection 1: From the fact that corporal and spiritual union differ generically we may conclude that the one is not the other, but not that the one cannot cause the other, since things of different genera sometimes cause one another either directly or indirectly.

Reply to Objection 2: The godfather and godmother of the same person are not united in that person’s spiritual birth save accidentally, since one of them would be self-sufficient for the purpose. Hence it does not follow from this that any spiritual relationship results between them whereby they are hindered from marrying one another. Hence the verse:

“Of two co-parents one is always spiritual, the other carnal: this rule is infallible.”

On the other hand, marriage by itself makes husband and wife one flesh: wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: If the wife be not baptized, the spiritual relationship will not reach her, because she is not a fit subject, and not because spiritual relationship cannot pass from husband to wife through marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: Since no spiritual relationship results between godfather and godmother, nothing prevents husband and wife from raising together someone from the sacred font. Nor is it absurd that the wife become twice godmother of the same person from different causes, just as it is possible for her to be connected in carnal relationship both by affinity and consanguinity to the same person.

Whether spiritual relationship passes to the godfather’s carnal children?

Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual relationship does not pass to the godfather’s carnal children. For no degrees are assigned to spiritual relationship. Yet there would be degrees if it passed from father to son, since the person begotten involves a change of degree, as stated above ([4983]Q[55], A[5]). Therefore it does not pass to the godfather’s carnal sons.

Objection 2: Further, father and son are related in the same degree as brother and brother. If therefore spiritual relationship passes from father to son, it will equally pass from brother to brother: and this is false.

On the contrary, This is proved by authority quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

I answer that, A son is something of his father and not conversely (Ethic. viii, 12): wherefore spiritual relationship passes from father to his carnal son and not conversely. Thus it is clear that there are three spiritual relationships: one called spiritual fatherhood between godfather and godchild; another called co-paternity between the godparent and carnal parent of the same person; and the third is called spiritual brotherhood, between godchild and the carnal children of the same parent. Each of these hinders the contracting of marriage and voids the contract.

Reply to Objection 1: The addition of a person by carnal generation entails a degree with regard to a person connected by the same kind of relationship, but not with regard to one connected by another kind of relationship. Thus a son is connected with his father’s wife in the same degree as his father, but by another kind of relationship. Now spiritual relationship differs in kind from carnal. Wherefore a godson is not related to his godfather’s carnal son in the same degree as the latter’s father is related to him, through whom the spiritual relationship is contracted. Consequently it does not follow that spiritual relationship admits of degrees.

Reply to Objection 2: A man is not part of his brother as a son is of his father. But a wife is part of her husband, since she is made one with him in body. Consequently the relationship does not pass from brother to brother, whether the brother be born before or after spiritual brotherhood.

OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IS BY ADOPTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider legal relationship which is by adoption. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) What is adoption?

(2) Whether one contracts through it a tie that is an impediment to marriage?

(3) Between which persons is this tie contracted.

Whether adoption is rightly defined?

Objection 1: It would seem that adoption is not rightly defined: “Adoption is the act by which a person lawfully takes for his child or grandchild and so on one who does not belong to him.” For the child should be subject to its father. Now, sometimes the person adopted does not come under the power of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not always the taking of someone as a child.

Objection 2: Further, “Parents should lay up for their children” (2 Cor. 12:14). But the adoptive father does not always necessarily lay up for his adopted child, since sometimes the adopted does not inherit the goods of the adopter. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.

Objection 3: Further, adoption, whereby someone is taken as a child, is likened to natural procreation whereby a child is begotten naturally. Therefore whoever is competent to beget a child naturally is competent to adopt. But this is untrue, since neither one who is not his own master, nor one who is not twenty-five years of age, nor a woman can adopt, and yet they can beget a child naturally. Therefore, properly speaking, adoption is not the taking of someone as a child.

Objection 4: Further, to take as one’s child one who is not one’s own seems necessary in order to supply the lack of children begotten naturally. Now one who is unable to beget, through being a eunuch or impotent, suffers especially from the absence of children of his own begetting. Therefore he is especially competent to adopt someone as his child. But he is not competent to adopt. Therefore adoption is not the taking of someone as one’s child.

Objection 5: Further, in spiritual relationship, where someone is taken as a child without carnal procreation, it is of no consequence whether an older person become the father of a younger, or “vice versa,” since a youth can baptize an old man and “vice versa.” Therefore, if by adoption a person is taken as a child without being carnally begotten, it would make no difference whether an older person adopted a younger, or a younger an older person; which is not true. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Objection 6: Further, there is no difference of degree between adopted and adopter. Therefore whoever is adopted, is adopted as a child; and consequently it is not right to say that one may be adopted as a grandchild.

Objection 7: Further, adoption is a result of love, wherefore God is said to have adopted us as children through charity. Now we should have greater charity towards those who are connected with us than towards strangers. Therefore adoption should be not of a stranger but of someone connected with us.

I answer that, Art imitates nature and supplies the defect of nature where nature is deficient. Hence just as a man begets by natural procreation, so by positive law which is the art of what is good and just, one person can take to himself another as a child in likeness to one that is his child by nature, in order to take the place of the children he has lost, this being the chief reason why adoption was introduced. And since taking implies a term “wherefrom,” for which reason the taker is not the thing taken, it follows that the person taken as a child must be a stranger. Accordingly, just as natural procreation has a term “whereto,” namely the form which is the end of generation, and a term “wherefrom,” namely the contrary form, so legal generation has a term “whereto,” namely a child or grandchild, and a term “wherefrom,” namely, a stranger. Consequently the above definition includes the genus of adoption, for it is described as a “lawful taking,” and the term “wherefrom,” since it is said to be the taking of “a stranger,” and the term “whereto,” because it says, “as a child or grandchild .”

Reply to Objection 1: The sonship of adoption is an imitation of natural sonship. Wherefore there are two species of adoption, one which imitates natural sonship perfectly, and this is called “arrogatio,” whereby the person adopted is placed under the power of the adopter; and one who is thus adopted inherits from his adopted father if the latter die intestate, nor can his father legally deprive him of a fourth part of his inheritance. But no one can adopt in this way except one who is his own master, one namely who has no father or, if he has, is of age. There can be no adoption of this kind without the authority of the sovereign. The other kind of adoption imitates natural sonship imperfectly, and is called “simple adoption,” and by this the adopted does not come under the power of the adopter: so that it is a disposition to perfect adoption, rather than perfect adoption itself. In this way even one who is not his own master can adopt, without the consent of the sovereign and with the authority of a magistrate: and one who is thus adopted does not inherit the estate of the adopter, nor is the latter bound to bequeath to him any of his goods in his will, unless he will.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Natural procreation is directed to the production of the species; wherefore anyone in whom the specific nature is not hindered is competent to be able to beget naturally. But adoption is directed to hereditary succession, wherefore those alone are competent to adopt who have the power to dispose of their estate. Consequently one who is not his own master, or who is less than twenty-five years of age, or a woman, cannot adopt anyone, except by special permission of the sovereign.

Reply to Objection 4: An inheritance cannot pass to posterity through one who has a perpetual impediment from begetting: hence for this very reason it ought to pass to those who ought to succeed to him by right of relationship; and consequently he cannot adopt, as neither can he beget. Moreover greater is sorrow for children lost than for children one has never had. Wherefore those who are impeded from begetting need no solace for their lack of children as those who have had and have lost them, or could have had them but have them not by reason of some accidental impediment.

Reply to Objection 5: Spiritual relationship is contracted through a sacrament whereby the faithful are born again in Christ, in Whom there is no difference between male and female, bondman and free, youth and old age (Gal. 3:28; Col. 3:11). Wherefore anyone can indifferently become another’s godfather. But adoption aims at hereditary succession and a certain subjection of the adopted to the adopter: and it is not fitting that older persons should be subjected to younger in the care of the household. Consequently a younger person cannot adopt an older; but according to law the adopted person must be so much younger than the adopter, that he might have been the child of his natural begetting.

Reply to Objection 6: One may lose one’s grandchildren and so forth even as one may lose one’s children. Wherefore since adoption was introduced as a solace for children lost, just as someone may be adopted in place of a child, so may someone be adopted in place of a grandchild and so on.

Reply to Objection 7: A relative ought to succeed by right of relationship; and therefore such a person is not competent to be chosen to succeed by adoption. And if a relative, who is not competent to inherit the estate, be adopted, he is adopted not as a relative, but as a stranger lacking the right of succeeding to the adopter’s goods.

Whether a tie that is an impediment to marriage is contracted through adoption?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not contracted through adoption a tie that is an impediment to marriage. For spiritual care is more excellent than corporeal care. But no tie of relationship is contracted through one’s being subjected to another’s spiritual care: else all those who dwell in the parish would be related to the parish priest and would be unable to marry his son. Neither therefore can this result from adoption which places the adopted under the care of the adopter.

Objection 2: Further, no tie of relationship results from persons conferring a benefit on another. But adoption is nothing but the conferring of a benefit. Therefore no tie of relationship results from adoption.

Objection 3: Further, a natural father provides for his child chiefly in three things, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 11,12), namely by giving him being, nourishment and education; and hereditary succession is subsequent to these. Now no tie of relationship is contracted by one’s providing for a person’s nourishment and education, else a person would be related to his nourishers, tutors and masters, which is false. Therefore neither is any relationship contracted through adoption by which one inherits another’s estate.

Objection 4: Further, the sacraments of the Church are not subject to human laws. Now marriage is a sacrament of the Church. Since then adoption was introduced by human law, it would seem that a tie contracted from adoption cannot be an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, Relationship is an impediment to marriage. Now a kind of relationship results from adoption, namely legal relationship, as evidenced by its definition, for “legal relationship is a connection arising out of adoption.” Therefore adoption results in a tie which is an impediment to marriage.

Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

I answer that, The Divine law especially forbids marriage between those persons who have to live together lest, as Rabbi Moses observes (Doc. Perp. iii, 49), if it were lawful for them to have carnal intercourse, there should be more room for concupiscence to the repression of which marriage is directed. And since the adopted child dwells in the house of his adopted father like one that is begotten naturally human laws forbid the contracting of marriage between the like, and this prohibition is approved by the Church. Hence it is that legal adoption is an impediment to marriage. This suffices for the Replies to the first three Objections, because none of those things entails such a cohabitation as might be an incentive to concupiscence. Therefore they do not cause a relationship that is an impediment to marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: The prohibition of a human law would not suffice to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church intervenes by issuing the same prohibition.

Whether legal relationship is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child?

Objection 1: It would seem that a relationship of this kind is contracted only between the adopting father and the adopted child. For it would seem that it ought above all to be contracted between the adopting father and the natural mother of the adopted, as happens in spiritual relationship. Yet there is no legal relationship between them. Therefore it is not contracted between any other persons besides the adopter and adopted.

Objection 2: Further, the relationship that impedes marriage is a perpetual impediment. But there is not a perpetual impediment between the adopted son and the naturally begotten daughter of the adopted; because when the adoption terminates at the death of the adopter, or when the adopted comes of age, the latter can marry her. Therefore he was not related to her in such a way as to prevent him from marrying her.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual relationship passes to no person incapable of being a god-parent; wherefore it does not pass to one who is not baptized. Now a woman cannot adopt, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore legal relationship does not pass from husband to wife.

Objection 4: Further, spiritual relationship is stronger than legal. But spiritual relationship does not pass to a grandchild. Neither, therefore, does legal relationship.

On the contrary, Legal relationship is more in agreement with carnal union or procreation than spiritual relationship is. But spiritual relationship passes to another person. Therefore legal relationship does so also.

Further, the same is proved by the authorities quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42).

I answer that, Legal relationship is of three kinds. The first is in the descending order as it were, and is contracted between the adoptive father and the adopted child, the latter's child grandchild and so on; the second is between the adopted child and the naturally begotten child; the third is like a kind of affinity, and is between the adoptive father and the wife of the adopted son, or contrariwise between the adopted son and the wife of the adoptive father. Accordingly the first and third relationships are perpetual impediments to marriage: but the second is not, but only so long as the adopted person remains under the power of the adoptive father, wherefore when the father dies or when the child comes of age, they can be married.

Reply to Objection 1: By spiritual generation the son is not withdrawn from the father's power, as in the case of adoption, so that the godson remains the son of both at the same time, whereas the adopted son does not. Hence no relationship is contracted between the adoptive father and the natural mother or father, as was the case in spiritual relationship.

Reply to Objection 2: Legal relationship is an impediment to marriage on account of the parties dwelling together: hence when the need for dwelling together ceases, it is not unreasonable that the aforesaid tie cease, for instance when he ceases to be under the power of the same father. But the adoptive father and his wife always retain a certain authority over their adopted son and his wife, wherefore the tie between them remains.

Reply to Objection 3: Even a woman can adopt by permission of the sovereign, wherefore legal relationship passes also to her. Moreover the reason why spiritual relationship does not pass to a non-baptized person is not because such a person cannot be a god-parent but because he is not a fit subject of spirituality.

Reply to Objection 4: By spiritual relationship the son is not placed under the power and care of the godfather, as in legal relationship: because it is necessary that whatever is in the son’s power pass under the power of the adoptive father. Wherefore if a father be adopted the children and grandchildren who are in the power of the person adopted are adopted also.

OF THE IMPEDIMENTS OF IMPOTENCE, SPELL, FRENZY OR MADNESS, INCEST AND DEFECTIVE AGE (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider five impediments to marriage, namely the impediments of impotence, spell, frenzy or madness, incest, and defective age. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?

(2) Whether a spell is?

(3) Whether frenzy or madness is?

(4) Whether incest is?

(5) Whether defective age is?

Whether impotence is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that impotence is not an impediment to marriage. For carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, since marriage is more perfect when both parties observe continency by vow. But impotence deprives marriage of nothing save carnal copulation. Therefore it is not a diriment impediment to the marriage contract.

Objection 2: Further, just as impotence prevents carnal copulation so does frigidity. But frigidity is not reckoned an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither should impotence be reckoned as such.

Objection 3: Further, all old people are frigid. Yet old people can marry. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, if the woman knows the man to be frigid when she marries him, the marriage is valid. Therefore frigidity, considered in itself, is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 5: Further, calidity may prove a sufficient incentive to carnal copulation with one who is not a virgin, but not with one who is, because it happens to be so weak as to pass away quickly, and is therefore insufficient for the deflowering of a virgin. Or again it may move a man sufficiently in regard to a beautiful woman, but insufficiently in regard to an uncomely one. Therefore it would seem that frigidity, although it be an impediment in regard to one, is not an impediment absolutely.

Objection 6: Further, generally speaking woman is more frigid than man. But women are not debarred from marriage. Neither therefore should men be debarred on account of frigidity.

On the contrary, It is stated (Extra, De Frigidis et Malefic., cap. Quod Sedem): “Just as a boy who is incapable of marital intercourse is unfit to marry, so also those who are impotent are deemed most unfit for the marriage contract.” Now persons affected with frigidity are the like. Therefore, etc.

Further, no one can bind himself to the impossible. Now in marriage man binds himself to carnal copulation; because it is for this purpose that he gives the other party power over his body. Therefore a frigid person, being incapable of carnal copulation, cannot marry.

I answer that, In marriage there is a contract whereby one is bound to pay the other the marital debt: wherefore just as in other contracts, the bond is unfitting if a person bind himself to what he cannot give or do, so the marriage contract is unfitting, if it be made by one who cannot pay the marital debt. This impediment is called by the general name of impotence as regards coition, and can arise either from an intrinsic and natural cause, or from an extrinsic and accidental cause, for instance spell, of which we shall speak later [4984](A[2]). If it be due to a natural cause, this may happen in two ways. For either it is temporary, and can be remedied by medicine, or by the course of time, and then it does not void a marriage: or it is perpetual and then it voids marriage, so that the party who labors under this impediment remains for ever without hope of marriage, while the other may “marry to whom she will . . . in the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:39). In order to ascertain whether the impediment be perpetual or not, the Church has appointed a fixed time, namely three years, for putting the matter to a practical proof: and if after three years, during which both parties have honestly endeavored to fulfil their marital intercourse, the marriage remain unconsummated, the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved. And yet the Church is sometimes mistaken in this, because three years are sometimes insufficient to prove impotence to be perpetual. Wherefore if the Church find that she has been mistaken, seeing that the subject of the impediment has completed carnal copulation with another or with the same person, she reinstates the former marriage and dissolves the subsequent one, although the latter has been contracted with her permission. [*”Nowadays it is seldom necessary to examine too closely into this matter, as all cases arising from it are treated as far as possible under the form of dispensations of non-consummated marriages.” Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia, article Canonical Impediments.]

Reply to Objection 1: Although the act of carnal copulation is not essential to marriage, ability to fulfill the act is essential, because marriage gives each of the married parties power over the other’s body in relation to marital intercourse.

Reply to Objection 2: Excessive calidity can scarcely be a perpetual impediment. If, however, it were to prove an impediment to marital intercourse for three years it would be adjudged to be perpetual. Nevertheless, since frigidity is a greater and more frequent impediment (for it not only hinders the mingling of seeds but also weakens the members which co-operate in the union of bodies), it is accounted an impediment rather than calidity, since all natural defects are reduced to frigidity.

Reply to Objection 3: Although old people have not sufficient calidity to procreate, they have sufficient to copulate. Wherefore they are allowed to marry, in so far as marriage is intended as a remedy, although it does not befit them as fulfilling an office of nature.

Reply to Objection 4: In all contracts it is agreed on all hands that anyone who is unable to satisfy an obligation is unfit to make a contract which requires the fulfilling of that obligation. Now this inability is of two kinds. First, because a person is unable to fulfill the obligation “de jure,” and such inability renders the contract altogether void, whether the party with whom he contracts knows of this or not. Secondly, because he is unable to fulfill “de facto”; and then if the party with whom he contracts knows of this and, notwithstanding, enters the contract, this shows that the latter seeks some other end from the contract, and the contract stands. But if he does not know of it the contract is void. Consequently frigidity which causes such an impotence that a man cannot “de facto” pay the marriage debt, as also the condition of slavery, whereby a man cannot “de facto” give his service freely, are impediments to marriage, when the one married party does not know that the other is unable to pay the marriage debt. But an impediment whereby a person cannot pay the marriage debt “de jure,” for instance consanguinity, voids the marriage contract, whether the other party knows of it or not. For this reason the Master holds (Sent. iv, D, 34) that these two impediments, frigidity and slavery, make it not altogether unlawful for their subjects to marry.

Reply to Objection 5: A man cannot have a perpetual natural impediment in regard to one person and not in regard to another. But if he cannot fulfill the carnal act with a virgin, while he can with one who is not a virgin, the hymeneal membrane may be broken by a medical instrument, and thus he may have connection with her. Nor would this be contrary to nature, for it would be done not for pleasure but for a remedy. Dislike for a woman is not a natural cause, but an accidental extrinsic cause: and therefore we must form the same judgment in its regard as about spells, of which we shall speak further on [4985](A[2]).

Reply to Objection 6: The male is the agent in procreation, and the female is the patient, wherefore greater calidity is required in the male than in the female for the act of procreation. Hence the frigidity which renders the man impotent would not disable the woman. Yet there may be a natural impediment from another cause, namely stricture, and then we must judge of stricture in the woman in the same way as of frigidity in the man.

Whether a spell can be an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage. For the spells in question are caused by the operation of demons. But the demons have no more power to prevent the marriage act than other bodily actions; and these they cannot prevent, for thus they would upset the whole world if they hindered eating and walking and the like. Therefore they cannot hinder marriage by spells.

Objection 2: Further, God’s work is stronger than the devil’s. But a spell is the work of the devil. Therefore it cannot hinder marriage which is the work of God.

Objection 3: Further, no impediment, unless it be perpetual, voids the marriage contract. But a spell cannot be a perpetual impediment, for since the devil has no power over others than sinners, the spell will be removed if the sin be cast out, or by another spell, or by the exorcisms of the Church which are employed for the repression of the demon's power. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment to marriage.

Objection 4: Further, carnal copulation cannot be hindered, unless there be an impediment to the generative power which is its principle. But the generative power of one man is equally related to all women. Therefore a spell cannot be an impediment in respect of one woman without being so also in respect of all.

On the contrary, It is stated in the Decretals (XXXIII, qu. 1, cap. iv): "If by sorcerers or witches . . . ," and further on, "if they be incurable, they must be separated."

Further, the demons' power is greater than man's: "There is no power upon earth that can be compared with him who was made to fear no one" (Job 41:24). Now through the action of man, a person may be rendered incapable of carnal copulation by some power or by castration; and this is an impediment to marriage. Therefore much more can this be done by the power of a demon.

I answer that, Some have asserted that witchcraft is nothing in the world but an imagining of men who ascribed to spells those natural effects the causes of which are hidden. But this is contrary to the authority of holy men who state that the demons have power over men's bodies and imaginations, when God allows them: wherefore by their means wizards can work certain signs. Now this opinion grows from the root of unbelief or incredulity, because they do not believe that demons exist save only in the imagination of the common people, who ascribe to the demon the terrors which a man conjures from his thoughts, and because, owing to a vivid imagination, certain shapes such as he has in his thoughts become apparent to the senses, and then he believes that he sees the demons. But such assertions are rejected by the true faith whereby we believe that angels fell from heaven, and that the demons exist, and that by reason of their subtle nature they are able to do many things which we cannot; and those who induce them to do such things are called wizards.

Wherefore others have maintained that witchcraft can set up an impediment to carnal copulation, but that no such impediment is perpetual: hence it does not void the marriage contract, and they say that the laws asserting this have been revoked. But this is contrary to actual facts and to the new legislation which agrees with the old.

We must therefore draw a distinction: for the inability to copulate caused by witchcraft is either perpetual and then it voids marriage, or it is not perpetual and then it does not void marriage. And in order to put this to practical proof the Church has fixed the space of three years in the same way as we have stated with regard to frigidity [4986](A[1]). There is, however this difference between a spell and frigidity, that a person who is impotent through frigidity is equally impotent in relation to one as to another, and consequently when the marriage is dissolved, he is not permitted to marry another woman. whereas through witchcraft a man may be rendered impotent in relation to one woman and not to another, and consequently when the Church adjudges the marriage to be dissolved, each party is permitted to seek another partner in marriage.

Reply to Objection 1: The first corruption of sin whereby man became the slave of the devil was transmitted to us by the act of the generative power, and for this reason God allows the devil to exercise his power of witchcraft in this act more than in others. Even so the power of witchcraft is made manifest in serpents more than in other animals according to Gn. 3, since the devil tempted the woman through a serpent.

Reply to Objection 2: God’s work may be hindered by the devil’s work with God’s permission; not that the devil is stronger than God so as to destroy His works by violence.

Reply to Objection 3: Some spells are so perpetual that they can have no human remedy, although God might afford a remedy by coercing the demon, or the demon by desisting. For, as wizards themselves admit, it does not always follow that what was done by one kind of witchcraft can be destroyed by another kind, and even though it were possible to use witchcraft as a remedy, it would nevertheless be reckoned to be perpetual, since nowise ought one to invoke the demon’s help by witchcraft. Again, if the devil has been given power over a person on account of sin, it does not follow that his power ceases with the sin, because the punishment sometimes continues after the fault has been removed. And again, the exorcisms of the Church do not always avail to repress the demons in all their molestations of the body, if God will it so, but they always avail against those assaults of the demons against which they are chiefly instituted.

Reply to Objection 4: Witchcraft sometimes causes an impediment in relation to all, sometimes in relation to one only: because the devil is a voluntary cause not acting from natural necessity. Moreover, the impediment resulting from witchcraft may result from an impression made by the demon on a man’s imagination, whereby he is deprived of the concupiscence that moves him in regard to a particular woman and not to another.

Whether madness is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that madness is not an impediment to marriage. For spiritual marriage which is contracted in Baptism is more excellent than carnal marriage. But mad persons can be baptized. Therefore they can also marry.

Objection 2: Further, frigidity is an impediment to marriage because it impedes carnal copulation, which is not impeded by madness. Therefore neither is marriage impeded thereby.

Objection 3: Further, marriage is not voided save by a perpetual impediment. But one cannot tell whether madness is a perpetual impediment. Therefore it does not void marriage.

Objection 4: Further, the impediments that hinder marriage are sufficiently contained in the verses given above ([4987]Q[50]). But they contain no mention of madness. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Madness removes the use of reason more than error does. But error is an impediment to marriage. Therefore madness is also.

Further, mad persons are not fit for making contracts. But marriage is a contract. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, The madness is either previous or subsequent to marriage. If subsequent, it nowise voids the marriage, but if it be previous, then the mad person either has lucid intervals, or not. If he has, then although it is not safe for him to marry during that interval, since he would not know how to educate his children, yet if he marries, the marriage is valid. But if he has no lucid intervals, or marries outside a lucid interval, then, since there can be no consent without use of reason, the marriage will be invalid.

Reply to Objection 1: The use of reason is not necessary for Baptism as its cause, in which way it is necessary for matrimony. Hence the comparison fails. We have, however, spoken of the Baptism of mad persons ([4988]TP, Q[68], A[12]).

Reply to Objection 2: Madness impedes marriage on the part of the latter's cause which is the consent, although not on the part of the act as frigidity does. Yet the Master treats of it together with frigidity, because both are defects of nature (Sent. iv, D, 34).

Reply to Objection 3: A passing impediment which hinders the cause of marriage, namely the consent, voids marriage altogether. But an impediment that hinders the act must needs be perpetual in order to void the marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: This impediment is reducible to error, since in either case there is lack of consent on the part of the reason.

Whether marriage is annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister?

Objection 1: It would seem that marriage is not annulled by the husband committing incest with his wife's sister. For the wife should not be punished for her husband's sin. Yet she would be punished if the marriage were annulled. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, it is a greater sin to know one's own relative, than to know the relative of one's wife. But the former sin is not an impediment to marriage. Therefore neither is the second.

Objection 3: Further, if this is inflicted as a punishment of the sin, it would seem, if the incestuous husband marry even after his wife's death, that they ought to be separated: which is not true.

Objection 4: Further, this impediment is not mentioned among those enumerated above ([4989]Q[50]). Therefore it does not void the marriage contract.

On the contrary, By knowing his wife's sister he contracts affinity, with his wife. But affinity voids the marriage contract. Therefore the aforesaid incest does also.

Further, by whatsoever a man sinneth, by the same also is he punished. Now such a man sins against marriage. Therefore he ought to be punished by being deprived of marriage.

I answer that, If a man has connection with the sister or other relative of his wife before contracting marriage, even after his betrothal, the marriage should be broken off on account of the resultant affinity. If, however, the connection take place after the marriage has been contracted and consummated, the marriage must not be altogether dissolved: but the husband loses his right to marital intercourse, nor can he demand it without sin. And yet he must grant it if asked, because the wife should not be punished for her husband's sin. But after the death of his wife he ought to remain without any hope of marriage, unless he receive a dispensation on account of his frailty, through fear of unlawful intercourse. If, however, he marry without a dispensation, he sins by contravening the law of the Church, but his marriage is not for this reason to be annulled. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections, for incest is accounted an impediment to marriage not so much for its being a sin as on account of the affinity which it causes. For this reason it is not mentioned with the other impediments, but is included in the impediment of affinity.

Whether defective age is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that deficient age is not an impediment to marriage. For according to the laws children are under the care of a guardian until their twenty-fifth year. Therefore it would seem that before that age their reason is not sufficiently mature to give consent, and consequently that ought seemingly to be the age fixed for marrying. Yet marriage can be contracted before that age. Therefore lack of the appointed age is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 2: Further, just as the tie of religion is perpetual so is the marriage tie. Now according to the new legislation (cap. Non Solum, De regular. et transeunt.) no one can be professed before the fourteenth year of age. Therefore neither could a person marry if defective age were an impediment.

Objection 3: Further, just as consent is necessary for marriage on the part of the man, so is it on the part of the woman. Now a woman can marry before the age of fourteen. Therefore a man can also.

Objection 4: Further, inability to copulate, unless it be perpetual and not known, is not an impediment to marriage. But lack of age is neither perpetual nor unknown. Therefore it is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 5: Further, it is not included under any of the aforesaid impediments ([4990]Q[50]), and consequently would seem not to be an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, A Decretal (cap. Quod Sedem, De frigid et malefic.) says that “a boy who is incapable of marriage intercourse is unfit to marry.” But in the majority of cases he cannot pay the marriage debt before the age of fourteen (De Animal. vii). Therefore, etc.

Further, “There is a fixed limit of size and growth for all things in nature” according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 4): and consequently it would seem that, since marriage is natural, it must have a fixed age by defect of which it is impeded.

I answer that, Since marriage is effected by way of a contract, it comes under the ordinance of positive law like other contracts. Consequently according to law (cap. Tua, De sponsal. impub.) it is determined that marriage may not be contracted before the age of discretion when each party is capable of sufficient deliberation about marriage, and of mutual fulfilment of the marriage debt, and that marriages otherwise contracted are void. Now for the most part this age is the fourteenth year in males and the twelfth year in women: but since the ordinances of positive law are consequent upon what happens in the majority of cases, if anyone reach the required perfection before the aforesaid age, so that nature and reason are sufficiently developed to supply the lack of age, the marriage is not annulled. Wherefore if the parties who marry before the age of puberty have marital intercourse before the aforesaid age, their marriage is none the less perpetually indissoluble.

Reply to Objection 1: In matters to which nature inclines there is not required such a development of reason in order to deliberate, as in other matters: and therefore it is possible after deliberation to consent to marriage before one is able to manage one’s own affairs in other matters without a guardian.

Reply to Objection 2: The same answer applies, since the religious vow is about matters outside the inclination of nature, and which offer greater difficulty than marriage.

Reply to Objection 3: It is said that woman comes to the age of puberty sooner than man does (De Animal. ix); hence there is no parallel between the two.

Reply to Objection 4: In this case there is an impediment not only as to inability to copulate, but also on account of the defect of the reason, which is not yet qualified to give rightly that consent which is to endure in perpetuity.

Reply to Objection 5: The impediment arising from defective age, like that which arises from madness, is reducible to the impediment of error; because a man has not yet the full use of his free-will.

OF DISPARITY OF WORSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider disparity of worship as an impediment to marriage. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?

(2) Whether there is marriage between unbelievers?

(3) Whether a husband being converted to the faith can remain with his wife if she be unwilling to be converted?

(4) Whether he may leave his unbelieving wife?

(5) Whether after putting her away he may take another wife?

(6) Whether a husband may put aside his wife on account of other sins as he may for unbelief?

Whether a believer can marry an unbeliever?

Objection 1: It would seem that a believer can marry an unbeliever. For Joseph married an Egyptian woman, and Esther married Assuerus: and in both marriages there was disparity of worship, since one was an unbeliever and the other a believer. Therefore disparity of worship previous to marriage is not an impediment thereto.

Objection 2: Further, the Old Law teaches the same faith as the New. But according to the Old Law there could be marriage between a believer and an unbeliever, as evidenced by Dt. 21:10 seqq.: “If thou go out to the fight . . . and seest in the number of the captives a beautiful woman and lovest her, and wilt have her to wife . . . thou shalt go in unto her, and shalt sleep with her, and she shall be thy wife.” Therefore it is lawful also under the New Law.

Objection 3: Further, betrothal is directed to marriage. Now there can be a betrothal between a believer and an unbeliever in the case where a condition is made of the latter’s future conversion. Therefore under the same condition there can be marriage between them.

Objection 4: Further, every impediment to marriage is in some way contrary to marriage. But unbelief is not contrary to marriage, since marriage fulfills an office of nature whose dictate faith surpasses. Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.

Objection 5: Further, there is sometime disparity of worship even between two persons who are baptized, for instance when, after Baptism, a person falls into heresy. Yet if such a person marry a believer, it is nevertheless a valid marriage. Therefore disparity of worship is not an impediment to marriage.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 6:14): “What concord hath light with darkness? [*Vulg.: ‘What fellowship hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial?’]” Now there is the greatest concord between husband and wife. Therefore one who is in the light of faith cannot marry one who is in the darkness of unbelief.

Further, it is written (Malachi 2:11): “Juda hath profaned the holiness of the Lord, which he loved, and hath married the daughter of a strange god.” But such had not been the case if they could have married validly. Therefore disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage.

I answer that, The chief good of marriage is the offspring to be brought up to the worship of God. Now since education is the work of father and mother in common, each of them intends to bring up the child to the worship of God according to their own faith. Consequently if they be of different faith, the intention of the one will be contrary to the intention of the other, and therefore there cannot be a fitting marriage between them. For this reason disparity of faith previous to marriage is an impediment to the marriage contract.

Reply to Objection 1: In the Old Law it was allowable to marry with certain unbelievers, and forbidden with others. It was however especially forbidden with regard to inhabitants of the land of Canaan, both because the Lord had commanded them to be slain on account of their obstinacy, and because it was fraught with a greater danger, lest to wit they should pervert to idolatry those whom they married or their children, since the Israelites were more liable to adopt their rites and customs through dwelling among them. But it was permitted in regard to other unbelievers, especially when there could be no fear of their being drawn into idolatry. And thus Joseph, Moses, and Esther married unbelievers. But under the New Law which is spread throughout the whole world the prohibition extends with equal reason to all unbelievers. Hence disparity of worship previous to marriage is an impediment to its being contracted and voids the contract.

Reply to Objection 2: This law either refers to other nations with whom they could lawfully marry, or to the case when the captive woman was willing to be converted to the faith and worship of God.

Reply to Objection 3: Present is related to present in the same way as future to future. Wherefore just as when marriage is contracted in the present, unity of worship is required in both contracting parties, so in the case of a betrothal, which is a promise of future marriage, it suffices to add the condition of future unity of worship.

Reply to Objection 4: It has been made clear that disparity of worship is contrary to marriage in respect of its chief good, which is the good of the offspring.

Reply to Objection 5: Matrimony is a sacrament: and therefore so far as the sacramental essentials are concerned, it requires purity with regard to the sacrament of faith, namely Baptism, rather than with regard to interior faith. For which reason also this impediment is not called disparity of faith, but disparity of worship which concerns outward service, as stated above (Sent. iii, D, 9[4991], Q[1], A[1], qu. 1). Consequently if a believer marry a baptized heretic, the marriage is valid, although he sins by marrying her if he knows her to be a heretic: even so he would sin were he to marry an excommunicate woman, and yet the marriage would not be void: whereas on the other hand if a catechumen having right faith but not having been baptized were to marry a baptized believer, the marriage would not be valid.

Whether there can be marriage between unbelievers?

Objection 1: It would seem that there can be no marriage between unbelievers. For matrimony is a sacrament of the Church. Now Baptism is the door of the sacraments. Therefore unbelievers, since they are not baptized, cannot marry any more than they can receive other sacraments.

Objection 2: Further, two evils are a greater impediment to good than one. But the unbelief of only one party is an impediment to marriage. Much more, therefore, is the unbelief of both, and consequently there can be no marriage between unbelievers.

Objection 3: Further, just as there is disparity of worship between believer and unbeliever, so can there be between two unbelievers, for instance if one be a heathen and the other a Jew. Now disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, as stated above [4992](A[1]). Therefore there can be no valid marriage at least between unbelievers of different worship.

Objection 4: Further, in marriage there is real chastity. But according to Augustine (De Adult. Conjug. i, 18) there is no real chastity between an unbeliever and his wife, and these words are quoted in the Decretals (XXVIII, qu. i, can. Sic enim.). Neither therefore is there a true marriage.

Objection 5: Further, true marriage excuses carnal intercourse from sin. But marriage contracted between unbelievers cannot do this, since “the whole life of unbelievers is a sin,” as a gloss observes on Rom. 14:23, “All that is not of faith is sin.” Therefore there is no true marriage between unbelievers.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:12): “If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, and she consent to dwell with him, let him not put her away.” But she is not called his wife except by reason of marriage. Therefore marriage between unbelievers is a true marriage.

Further, the removal of what comes after does not imply the removal of what comes first. Now marriage belongs to an office of nature, which precedes the state of grace, the principle of which is faith. Therefore unbelief does not prevent the existence of marriage between unbelievers.

I answer that, Marriage was instituted chiefly for the good of the offspring, not only as to its begetting—since this can be effected even without marriage—but also as to its advancement to a perfect state, because everything intends naturally to bring its effect to perfection. Now a twofold perfection is to be considered in the offspring. one is the perfection of nature, not only as regards the body but also as regards the soul, by those means which are of the natural law. The other is the perfection of grace: and the former perfection is material and imperfect in relation to the latter.

Consequently, since those things which are for the sake of the end are proportionate to the end, the marriage that tends to the first perfection is imperfect and material in comparison with that which tends to the second perfection. And since the first perfection can be common to unbelievers and believers, while the second belongs only to believers, it follows that between unbelievers there is marriage indeed, but not perfected by its ultimate perfection as there is between believers.

Reply to Objection 1: Marriage was instituted not only as a sacrament, but also as an office of nature. And therefore, although marriage is not competent to unbelievers, as a sacrament dependent on the dispensation of the Church's ministers, it is nevertheless competent to them as fulfilling an office of nature. And yet even a marriage of this kind is a sacrament after the manner of a habit, although it is not actually since they do not marry actually in the faith of the Church.

Reply to Objection 2: Disparity of worship is an impediment to marriage, not by reason of unbelief, but on account of the difference of faith. For disparity of worship hinders not only the second perfection of the offspring, but also the first, since the parents endeavor to draw their children in different directions, which is not the case when both are unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3: As already stated (ad 1) there is marriage between unbelievers, in so far as marriage fulfills an office of nature. Now those things that pertain to the natural law are determinable by positive law: and therefore if any law among unbelievers forbid the contracting of marriage with unbelievers of a different rite, the disparity of worship will be an impediment to their intermarrying. They are not, however, forbidden by Divine law, because before God, however much one may stray from the faith, this makes no difference to one's being removed from grace: nor is it forbidden by any law of the Church who has not to judge of those who are without.

Reply to Objection 4: The chastity and other virtues of unbelievers are said not to be real, because they cannot attain the end of real virtue, which is real happiness. Thus we say it is not a real wine if it has not the effect of wine.

Reply to Objection 5: An unbeliever does not sin in having intercourse with his wife, if he pays her the marriage debt, for the good of the offspring, or for the troth whereby he is bound to her: since this is an act of justice and of temperance which observes the due circumstance in pleasure of touch; even as neither does he sin in performing acts of other civic virtues. Again, the reason why the whole life of unbelievers is said to be a sin is not that they sin in every act, but because they cannot be delivered from the bondage of sin by that which they do.

Whether the husband, being converted to the faith, may remain with his wife is she be unwilling to be converted?

Objection 1: It would seem that when a husband is converted to the faith he cannot remain with his wife who is an unbeliever and is unwilling to be converted, and whom he had married while he was yet an unbeliever. For where the danger is the same one should take the same precautions. Now a believer is forbidden to marry an unbeliever for fear of being turned away from the faith. Since then if the believer remain with the unbeliever whom he had married previously, the danger is the same, in fact greater, for neophytes are more easily perverted than those who have been brought up in the faith, it would seem that a believer, after being converted, cannot remain with an unbeliever.

Objection 2: Further, “An unbeliever cannot remain united to her who has been received into the Christian faith” (Decretals, XXVIII, qu. 1, can. Judaei). Therefore a believer is bound to put away a wife who does not believe.

Objection 3: Further, a marriage contracted between believers is more perfect than one contracted between unbelievers. Now, if believers marry within the degrees forbidden by the Church, their marriage is void. Therefore the same applies to unbelievers, and thus a believing husband cannot remain with an unbelieving wife, at any rate, if as an unbeliever he married her within the forbidden degrees.

Objection 4: Further, sometimes an unbeliever has several wives recognized by his law. If, then, he can remain with those whom he married while yet an unbeliever, it would seem that even after his conversion he can retain several wives.

Objection 5: Further, it may happen that after divorcing his first wife he has married a second, and that he is converted during this latter marriage. It would seem therefore that at least in this case he cannot remain with this second wife.

On the contrary, The Apostle counsels him to remain (1 Cor. 7:12).

Further, no impediment that supervenes upon a true marriage dissolves it. Now it was a true marriage when they were both unbelievers. Therefore when one of them is converted, the marriage is not annulled on that account; and thus it would seem that they may lawfully remain together.

I answer that, The faith of a married person does not dissolve but perfects the marriage. Wherefore, since there is true marriage between unbelievers, as stated above (A[2], ad 1), the marriage tie is not broken by the fact that one of them is converted to the faith, but sometimes while the marriage tie remains, the marriage is dissolved as to cohabitation and marital intercourse, wherein unbelief and adultery are on a par, since both are against the good of the offspring. Consequently, the husband has the same power to put away an unbelieving wife or to remain with her, as he has to put away an adulterous wife or to remain with her. For an innocent husband is free to remain with an adulterous wife in the hope of her amendment, but not if she be obstinate in her sin of adultery, lest he seem to approve of her disgrace; although even if there be hope of her amendment he is free to put her away. In like manner the believer after his conversion may remain with the unbeliever in the hope of her conversion, if he see that she is not obstinate in her unbelief, and he does well in remaining with her, though not bound to do so: and this is what the Apostle counsels (1 Cor. 7:12).

Reply to Objection 1: It is easier to prevent a thing being done than to undo what is rightly done. Hence there are many things that impede the contracting of marriage if they precede it, which nevertheless cannot dissolve it if they follow it. Such is the case with affinity ([4993]Q[55], A[6]): and it is the same with disparity of worship.

Reply to Objection 2: In the early Church at the time of the apostles, both Jews and Gentiles were everywhere converted to the faith: and consequently the believing husband could then have a reasonable hope for his wife’s conversion, even though she did not promise to be converted. Afterwards, however, as time went on the Jews became more obstinate than the Gentiles, because the Gentiles still continued to come to the faith, for instance, at the time of the martyrs, and at the time of Constantine and thereabouts. Wherefore it was not safe then for a believer to cohabit with an unbelieving Jewish wife, nor was there hope for her conversion as for that of a Gentile wife. Consequently, then, the believer could, after his conversion, cohabit with his wife if she were a Gentile, but not if she were a Jewess, unless she promised to be converted. This is the sense of that decree. Now, however, they are on a par, namely Gentiles and Jews, because both are obstinate; and therefore unless the unbelieving wife be willing to be converted, he is not allowed to cohabit with her, be she Gentile or Jew.

Reply to Objection 3: Non-baptized unbelievers are not bound by the laws of the Church, but they are bound by the ordinances of the Divine law. Hence unbelievers who have married within the degrees forbidden by the Divine law, whether both or one of them be converted to the faith, cannot continue in a like marriage. But if they have married within the degrees forbidden by a commandment of the Church, they can remain together if both be converted, or if one be converted and there be hope of the other’s conversion.

Reply to Objection 4: To have several wives is contrary to the natural law by which even unbelievers are bound. Wherefore an unbeliever is not truly married save to her whom he married first. Consequently if he be converted with all his wives, he may remain with the first, and must put the others away. If, however, the first refuse to be converted, and one of the others be converted, he has the same right to marry her again as he would have to marry another. We shall treat of this matter further on [4994](A[5]).

Reply to Objection 5: To divorce a wife is contrary to the law of nature, wherefore it is not lawful for an unbeliever to divorce his wife. Hence if he be converted after divorcing one and marrying another, the same judgment is to be pronounced in this case as in the case of a man who had several wives, because if he wish to be converted he is bound to take the first whom he had divorced and to put the other away.

Whether a believer can, after his conversion, put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator?

Objection 1: It would seem that a believer, after his conversion, cannot put away his unbelieving wife if she be willing to cohabit with him without insult to the Creator. For the husband is more bound to his wife than a slave to his master. But a converted slave is not freed from the bond of slavery, as appears from 1 Cor. 7:21; 1 Tim. 6:1. Therefore neither can a believing husband put away his unbelieving wife.

Objection 2: Further, no one may act to another's prejudice without the latter's consent. Now the unbelieving wife had a right in the body of her unbelieving husband. If, then, her husband's conversion to the faith could be prejudicial to the wife, so that he would be free to put her away, the husband could not be converted to the faith without his wife's consent, even as he cannot receive orders or vow continence without her consent.

Objection 3: Further, if a man, whether slave or free, knowingly marry a bondwoman, he cannot put her away on account of her different condition. Since, then, the husband, when he married an unbeliever, knew that she was an unbeliever, it would seem that in like manner he cannot put her away on account of her unbelief.

Objection 4: Further, a father is in duty bound to work for the salvation of his children. But if he were to leave his unbelieving wife, the children of their union would remain with the mother, because "the offspring follows the womb," and thus their salvation would be imperiled. Therefore he cannot lawfully put away his unbelieving wife.

Objection 5: Further, an adulterous husband cannot put away an adulterous wife, even after he has done penance for his adultery. Therefore if an adulterous and an unbelieving husband are to be judged alike, neither can the believer put aside the unbeliever, even after his conversion to the faith.

On the contrary, are the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:15,16).

Further, spiritual adultery is more grievous than carnal. But a man can put his wife away, as to cohabitation, on account of carnal adultery. Much more, therefore, can he do so on account of unbelief, which is spiritual adultery.

I answer that, Different things are competent and expedient to man according as his life is of one kind or of another. Wherefore he who dies to his former life is not bound to those things to which he was bound in his former life. Hence it is that he who vowed certain things while living in the world is not bound to fulfill them when he dies to the world by adopting the religious life. Now he who is baptized is regenerated in Christ and dies to his former life, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and consequently he is freed from the obligation whereby he was bound to pay his wife the marriage debt, and is not bound to cohabit with her when she is unwilling to be converted, although in a certain case he is free to do so, as stated above [4995](A[3]), just as a religious is free to fulfill the vows he took in the world, if they be not contrary to his religious profession, although he is not bound to do so.

Reply to Objection 1: Bondage is not inconsistent with the perfection of the Christian religion, which makes a very special profession of humility. But the obligation to a wife, or the conjugal bond, is somewhat derogatory to the perfection of Christian life, the highest state of which is in the possession of the continent: hence the comparison fails. Moreover one married party is not bound to the other as the latter’s possession, as a slave to his master, but by way of a kind of partnership, which is unfitting between unbeliever and believer as appears from 2 Cor. 6:15; hence there is no comparison between a slave and a married person.

Reply to Objection 2: The wife had a right in the body of her husband only as long as he remained in the life wherein he had married, since also when the husband dies the wife “is delivered from the law of her husband” (Rom. 7:3). Wherefore if the husband leave her after he has changed his life by dying to his former life, this is nowise prejudicial to her. Now he who goes over to the religious life dies but a spiritual death and not a bodily death. Wherefore if the marriage be consummated, the husband cannot enter religion without his wife’s consent, whereas he can before carnal connection when there is only a spiritual connection. On the other hand, he who is baptized is even corporeally buried together with Christ unto death; and therefore he is freed from paying the marriage debt even after the marriage has been consummated.

We may also reply that it is through her own fault in refusing to be converted that the wife suffers prejudice.

Reply to Objection 3: Disparity of worship makes a person simply unfit for lawful marriage, whereas the condition of bondage does not, but only where it is unknown. Hence there is no comparison between an unbeliever and a bondswoman.

Reply to Objection 4: Either the child has reached a perfect age, and then it is free to follow either the believing father or the unbelieving mother, or else it is under age, and then it should be given to the believer notwithstanding that it needs the mother’s care for its education.

Reply to Objection 5: By doing penance the adulterer does not enter another life as an unbeliever by being baptized. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife can take another wife?

Objection 1: It would seem that the believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife. For indissolubility is of the nature of marriage, since it is contrary to the natural law to divorce one's wife. Now there was true marriage between them as unbelievers. Therefore their marriage can nowise be dissolved. But as long as a man is bound by marriage to one woman he cannot marry another. Therefore a believer who leaves his unbelieving wife cannot take another wife.

Objection 2: Further, a crime subsequent to marriage does not dissolve the marriage. Now, if the wife be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator, the marriage tie is not dissolved, since the husband cannot marry another. Therefore the sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator does not dissolve the marriage so that her husband be free to take another wife.

Objection 3: Further, husband and wife are equal in the marriage tie. Since, then, it is unlawful for the unbelieving wife to marry again while her husband lives, it would seem that neither can the believing husband do so.

Objection 4: Further, the vow of continence is more favorable than the marriage contract. Now seemingly it is not lawful for the believing husband to take a vow of continence without the consent of his unbelieving wife, since then the latter would be deprived of marriage if she were afterwards converted. Much less therefore is it lawful for him to take another wife.

Objection 5: Further, the son who persists in unbelief after his father's conversion loses the right to inherit from his father: and yet if he be afterwards converted, the inheritance is restored to him even though another should have entered into possession thereof. Therefore it would seem that in like manner, if the unbelieving wife be converted, her husband ought to be restored to her even though he should have married another wife: yet this would be impossible if the second marriage were valid. Therefore he cannot take another wife.

On the contrary, Matrimony is not ratified without the sacrament of Baptism. Now what is not ratified can be annulled. Therefore marriage contracted in unbelief can be annulled, and consequently, the marriage tie being dissolved, it is lawful for the husband to take another wife.

Further, a husband ought not to cohabit with an unbelieving wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator. If therefore it were unlawful for him to take another wife he would be forced to remain continent, which would seem unreasonable, since then he would be at a disadvantage through his conversion.

I answer that, When either husband or wife is converted to the faith the other remaining in unbelief, a distinction must be made. For if the unbeliever be willing to cohabit without insult to the Creator—that is without drawing the other to unbelief—the believer is free to part from the other, but by parting is not permitted to marry again. But if the unbeliever refuse to cohabit without insult to the Creator, by making use of blasphemous words and refusing to hear Christ's name, then if she strive to draw him to unbelief, the believing husband after parting from her may be united to another in marriage.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [4996](A[2]), the marriage of unbelievers is imperfect, whereas the marriage of believers is perfect and consequently binds more firmly. Now the firmer tie always looses the weaker if it is contrary to it, and therefore the subsequent marriage contracted in the faith of Christ dissolves the marriage previously contracted in unbelief. Therefore the marriage of unbelievers is not altogether firm and ratified, but is ratified afterwards by Christ's faith.

Reply to Objection 2: The sin of the wife who refuses to cohabit without insult to the Creator frees the husband from the tie whereby he was bound to his wife so as to be unable to marry again during her lifetime. It does not however dissolve the marriage at once, since if she were converted from her blasphemy before he married again, her husband would be restored to her. But the marriage is dissolved by the second marriage which the believing husband would be unable to accomplish unless he were freed from his obligation to his wife by her own fault.

Reply to Objection 3: After the believer has married, the marriage tie is dissolved on either side, because the marriage is not imperfect as to the bond, although it is sometimes imperfect as to its effect. Hence it is in punishment of the unbelieving wife rather than by virtue of the previous marriage that she is forbidden to marry again. If however she be afterwards converted, she may be allowed by dispensation to take another husband, should her husband have taken another wife.

Reply to Objection 4: The husband ought not to take a vow of continence nor enter into a second marriage, if after his conversion there be a reasonable hope of the conversion of his wife, because the wife’s conversion would be more difficult if she knew she was deprived of her husband. If however there be no hope of her conversion, he can take Holy orders or enter religion, having first besought his wife to be converted. And then if the wife be converted after her husband has received Holy orders, her husband must not be restored to her, but she must take it as a punishment of her tardy conversion that she is deprived of her husband.

Reply to Objection 5: The bond of fatherhood is not dissolved by disparity of worship, as the marriage bond is: wherefore there is no comparison between an inheritance and a wife.

Whether other sins dissolve marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that other sins besides unbelief dissolve marriage. For adultery is seemingly more directly opposed to marriage than unbelief is. But unbelief dissolves marriage in a certain case so that it is lawful to marry again. Therefore adultery has the same effect.

Objection 2: Further, just as unbelief is spiritual fornication, so is any kind of sin. If, then unbelief dissolves marriage because it is spiritual fornication, for the same reason any kind of sin will dissolve marriage.

Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 5:30): “If thy right hand scandalize thee, pluck it off and cast it from thee,” and a gloss of Jerome says that “by the hand and the right eye we may understand our brother, wife, relatives and children.” Now these become obstacles to us by any kind of sin. Therefore marriage can be dissolved on account of any kind of sin.

Objection 4: Further, covetousness is idolatry according to Eph. 5:5. Now a wife may be put away on account of idolatry. Therefore in like manner she can be put away on account of covetousness, as also on account of other sins graver than covetousness.

Objection 5: Further, the Master says this expressly (Sent. iv, D, 30).

On the contrary, It is said (Mat. 5:32): “Whosoever shall put away his wife, excepting for the cause of fornication, maketh her to commit adultery.”

Further, if this were true, divorces would be made all day long, since it is rare to find a marriage wherein one of the parties does not fall into sin.

I answer that, Bodily fornication and unbelief have a special contrariety to the goods of marriage, as stated above [4997](A[3]). Hence they are specially effective in dissolving marriages. Nevertheless it must be observed that marriage is dissolved in two ways. In one way as to the marriage tie, and thus marriage cannot be dissolved after it is ratified, neither by unbelief nor by adultery. But if it be not ratified, the tie is dissolved, if the one party remain in unbelief, and the other being converted to the faith has married again. On the other hand the aforesaid tie is not dissolved by adultery, else the unbeliever would be free to give a bill of divorce to his adulterous wife, and having put her away, could take another wife, which is false. In another way marriage is dissolved as to the act, and thus it can be dissolved on account of either unbelief or fornication. But marriage cannot be dissolved even as to the act on account of other sins, unless perchance the husband wish to cease from intercourse with his wife in order to punish her by depriving her of the comfort of his presence.

Reply to Objection 1: Although adultery is opposed to marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, more directly than unbelief, it is the other way about if we consider marriage as a sacrament of the Church, from which source it derives perfect stability, inasmuch as it signifies the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church. Wherefore the marriage that is not ratified can be dissolved as to the marriage tie on account of unbelief rather than on account of adultery.

Reply to Objection 2: The primal union of the soul to God is by faith, and consequently the soul is thereby espoused to God as it were, according to Osee 2:20, “I will espouse thee to Me in faith.” Hence in Holy Writ idolatry and unbelief are specially designated by the name of fornication: whereas other sins are called spiritual fornications by a more remote signification.

Reply to Objection 3: This applies to the case when the wife proves a notable occasion of sin to her husband, so that he has reason to fear his being in danger: for then the husband can withdraw from living with her, as stated above [4998](A[5]).

Reply to Objection 4: Covetousness is said to be idolatry on account of a certain likeness of bondage, because both the covetous and the idolater serve the creature rather than the Creator; but not on account of likeness of unbelief, since unbelief corrupts the intellect whereas covetousness corrupts the affections.

Reply to Objection 5: The words of the Master refer to betrothal, because a betrothal can be rescinded on account of a subsequent crime. Or, if he is speaking of marriage, they must be referred to the severing of mutual companionship for a time, as stated above, or to the case when the wife is unwilling to cohabit except on the condition of sinning, for instance, if she were to say: “I will not remain your wife unless you amass wealth for me by theft,” for then he ought to leave her rather than thieve.

OF WIFE-MURDER (TWO ARTICLES)

We must now consider wife-murder, under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in a certain case it is lawful to kill one’s wife?

(2) Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?

Whether it is lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery?

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a man to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery. For the Divine law commanded adulterous wives to be stoned. Now it is not a sin to fulfill the Divine law. Neither therefore is it a sin to kill one’s own wife if she be an adulteress.

Objection 2: Further, that which the law can rightly do, can be rightly done by one whom the law has commissioned to do it. But the law can rightly kill an adulterous wife or any other person deserving of death. Since then the law has commissioned the husband to kill his wife if she be discovered in the act of adultery, it would seem that he can rightly do so.

Objection 3: Further, the husband has greater power over his adulterous wife than over the man who committed adultery with her. Now if the husband strike a cleric whom he found with his wife he is not excommunicated. Therefore it would seem lawful for him even to kill his own wife if she be discovered in adultery.

Objection 4: Further, the husband is bound to correct his wife. But correction is given by inflicting a just punishment. Since then the just punishment of adultery is death, because it is a capital sin, it would seem lawful for a husband to kill his adulterous wife.

On the contrary, It is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37) that “the Church of God is never bound by the laws of this world, for she has none but a spiritual sword.” Therefore it would seem that he who wishes to belong to the Church cannot rightly take advantage of the law which permits a man to kill his wife.

Further, husband and wife are judged on a par. But it is not lawful for a wife to kill her husband if he be discovered in adultery. Neither therefore may a husband kill his wife.

I answer that, It happens in two ways that a husband kills his wife. First, by a civil judgment; and thus there is no doubt that a husband, moved by zeal for justice and not by vindictive anger or hatred can, without sin, bring a criminal accusation of adultery upon his wife before a secular court, and demand that she receive capital punishment as appointed by the law; just as it is lawful to accuse a person of murder or any other crime. Such an accusation however cannot be made in an ecclesiastical court, because, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 37), the Church does not wield a material sword. Secondly, a husband can kill his wife himself without her being convicted in court, and thus to kill her outside of the act of adultery is not lawful, neither according to civil law nor according to the law of conscience, whatever evidence he may have of her adultery. The civil law however considers it, as though it were lawful, that he should kill her in the very act, not by commanding him to do so, but by not inflicting on him the punishment for murder, on account of the very great provocation which the husband receives by such a deed to kill his wife. But the Church is not bound in this matter by human laws, neither does she acquit him of the debt of eternal punishment, nor of such punishment as may be awarded him by an ecclesiastical tribunal for the reason that he is quit of any punishment to be inflicted by a secular court. Therefore in no case is it lawful for a husband to kill his wife on his own authority.

Reply to Objection 1: The law has committed the infliction of this punishment not to private individuals, but to public persons, who are deputed to this by their office. Now the husband is not his wife’s judge: wherefore he may not kill her, but may accuse her in the judge’s presence.

Reply to Objection 2: The civil law has not commissioned the husband to kill his wife by commanding him to do so, for thus he would not sin, just as the judge's deputy does not sin by killing the thief condemned to death: but it has permitted this by not punishing it. For which reason it has raised certain obstacles to prevent the husband from killing his wife.

Reply to Objection 3: This does not prove that it is lawful simply, but that it is lawful as regards immunity from a particular kind of punishment, since excommunication is also a kind of punishment.

Reply to Objection 4: There are two kinds of community: the household, such as a family; and the civil community, such as a city or kingdom. Accordingly, he who presides over the latter kind of community, a king for instance, can punish an individual both by correcting and by exterminating him, for the betterment of the community with whose care he is charged. But he who presides over a community of the first kind, can inflict only corrective punishment, which does not extend beyond the limits of amendment, and these are exceeded by the punishment of death. Wherefore the husband who exercises this kind of control over his wife may not kill her, but he may accuse or chastise her in some other way.

Whether wife-murder is an impediment to marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that wife-murder is not an impediment to marriage. For adultery is more directly opposed to marriage than murder is. Now adultery is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.

Objection 2: Further, it is a more grievous sin to kill one's mother than one's wife, for it is never lawful to strike one's mother, whereas it is sometimes lawful to strike one's wife. But matricide is not an impediment to marriage. Neither therefore is wife-murder.

Objection 3: Further, it is a greater sin for a man to kill another man's wife on account of adultery than to kill his own wife, inasmuch as he has less motive and is less concerned with her correction. But he who kills another man's wife is not hindered from marrying. Neither therefore is he who kills his own wife.

Objection 4: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. But the sin of murder can be removed by repentance. Therefore the consequent impediment to marriage can be removed also: and consequently it would seem that after he has done penance he is not forbidden to marry.

On the contrary, A canon (caus. xxxiii, qu. ii, can. Interfectores) says: “The slayers of their own wives must be brought back to penance, and they are absolutely forbidden to marry.” Further, in whatsoever a man sins, in that same must he be punished. But he who kills his wife sins against marriage. Therefore he must be punished by being deprived of marriage.

I answer that, By the Church’s decree wife-murder is an impediment to marriage. Sometimes however it forbids the contracting of marriage without voiding the contract, when to wit the husband kills his wife on account of adultery or even through hatred; nevertheless if there be fear lest he should prove incontinent, he may be dispensed by the Church so as to marry lawfully. Sometimes it also voids the contract, as when a man kills his wife in order to marry her with whom he has committed adultery, for then the law declares him simply unfit to marry her, so that if he actually marry her his marriage is void. He is not however hereby rendered simply unfit by law in relation to other women: wherefore if he should have married another, although he sin by disobeying the Church’s ordinance, the marriage is nevertheless not voided for this reason.

Reply to Objection 1: Murder and adultery in certain cases forbid the contracting of marriage and void the contract, as we say here in regard to wife-murder, and shall say further on (Sent. iv[4999], Q[62], A[2]) in regard to adultery. We may also reply that wife-murder is contrary to the substance of wedlock, whereas adultery is contrary to the good of fidelity due to marriage. Hence adultery is not more opposed to marriage than wife-murder, and the argument is based on a false premiss.

Reply to Objection 2: Simply speaking it is a more grievous sin to kill one’s mother than one’s wife, as also more opposed to nature, since a man reveres his mother naturally. Consequently he is less inclined to matricide and more prone to wife-murder; and it is to repress this proneness that the Church has forbidden marriage to the man who has murdered his wife.

Reply to Objection 3: Such a man does not sin against marriage as he does who kills his own wife; wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow that because guilt has been remitted therefore the entire punishment is remitted, as evidenced by irregularity. For repentance does not restore a man to his former dignity, although it can restore him to his former state of grace, as stated above ([5000]Q[38], A[1], ad 3).

OF THE IMPEDIMENT TO MARRIAGE, ARISING FROM A SOLEMN VOW (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the impediments which supervene to marriage. We shall consider (1) the impediment which affects an unconsummated marriage, namely a solemn vow: (2) the impediment which affects a consummated marriage, namely fornication. Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether either party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?

(2) Whether they can enter religion before the consummation of the marriage?

(3) Whether the wife can take another husband if her former husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?

Whether one party after the marriage has been consummated can enter religion without the other's consent?

Objection 1: It would seem that even after the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other's consent. For the Divine law ought to be more favorable to spiritual things than human law. Now human law has allowed this. Therefore much more should the Divine law permit it.

Objection 2: Further, the lesser good does not hinder the greater. But the married state is a lesser good than the religious state, according to 1 Cor. 7:38. Therefore marriage ought not to hinder a man from being able to enter religion.

Objection 3: Further, in every form of religious life there is a kind of spiritual marriage. Now it is lawful to pass from a less strict religious order to one that is stricter. Therefore it is also allowable to pass from a less strict—namely a carnal—marriage to a stricter marriage, namely that of the religious life, even without the wife's consent.

On the contrary, Married persons are forbidden (1 Cor. 7:5) to abstain from the use of marriage even for a time without one another’s consent, in order to have time for prayer.

Further, no one can lawfully do that which is prejudicial to another without the latter’s consent. Now the religious vow taken by one consort is prejudicial to the other, since the one has power over the other’s body. Therefore one of them cannot take a religious vow without the other’s consent.

I answer that, No one can make an offering to God of what belongs to another. Wherefore since by a consummated marriage the husband’s body already belongs to his wife, he cannot by a vow of continence offer it to God without her consent.

Reply to Objection 1: Human law considers marriage merely as fulfilling an office of nature: whereas the Divine law considers it as a sacrament, by reason of which it is altogether indissoluble. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that a greater good be hindered by a lesser which is contrary to it, just as good is hindered by evil.

Reply to Objection 3: In every form of religious life marriage is contracted with one person, namely Christ; to Whom, however, a person contracts more obligations in one religious order than in another. But in carnal marriage and religious marriage the contract is not with the same person: wherefore that comparison fails.

Whether before the marriage has been consummated one consort can enter religion without the other’s consent?

Objection 1: It would seem that even before the marriage has been consummated one consort cannot enter religion without the other’s consent. For the indissolubility of marriage belongs to the sacrament of matrimony, inasmuch, namely, as it signifies the union of Christ with the Church. Now marriage is a true sacrament before its consummation, and after consent has been expressed in words of the present. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by one of them entering religion.

Objection 2: Further, by virtue of the consent expressed in words of the present, the one consort has given power over his body to the other. Therefore the one can forthwith ask for the marriage debt, and the other is bound to pay: and so the one cannot enter religion without the other's consent.

Objection 3: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:6): "What God hath joined together let no man put asunder." But the union which precedes marital intercourse was made by God. Therefore it cannot be dissolved by the will of man.

On the contrary, According to Jerome [*Prolog. in Joan.] our Lord called John from his wedding.

I answer that, Before marital intercourse there is only a spiritual bond between husband and wife, but afterwards there is a carnal bond between them. Wherefore, just as after marital intercourse marriage is dissolved by carnal death, so by entering religion the bond which exists before the consummation of the marriage is dissolved, because religious life is a kind of spiritual death, whereby a man dies to the world and lives to God.

Reply to Objection 1: Before consummation marriage signifies the union of Christ with the soul by grace, which is dissolved by a contrary spiritual disposition, namely mortal sin. But after consummation it signifies the union of Christ with the Church, as regards the assumption of human nature into the unity of person, which union is altogether indissoluble.

Reply to Objection 2: Before consummation the body of one consort is not absolutely delivered into the power of the other, but conditionally, provided neither consort meanwhile seek the fruit of a better life. But by marital intercourse the aforesaid delivery is completed, because then each of them enters into bodily possession of the power transferred to him. Wherefore also before consummation they are not bound to pay the marriage debt forthwith after contracting marriage by words of the present, but a space of two months is allowed them for three reasons. First that they may deliberate meanwhile about entering religion; secondly, to prepare what is necessary for the solemnization of the wedding. thirdly, lest the husband think little of a gift he has not longed to possess (cap. Institutum, caus. xxvi, qu. ii).

Reply to Objection 3: The marriage union, before consummation, is indeed perfect as to its primary being, but is not finally perfect as to its second act which is operation. It is like bodily possession and consequently is not altogether indissoluble.

Whether the wife may take another husband if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage?

Objection 1: It would seem that the wife may not take another husband, if her husband has entered religion before the consummation of the marriage. For that which is consistent with marriage does not dissolve the marriage tie. Now the marriage tie still remains between those who equally take religious vows. Therefore by the fact that one enters religion, the other is not freed from the marriage tie. But as long as she remains tied to one by marriage, she cannot marry another. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, after entering religion and before making his profession the husband can return to the world. If then the wife can marry again when her husband enters religion, he also can marry again when he returns to the world: which is absurd.

Objection 3: Further, by a new decree (cap. Non solum, de regular. et transeunt.) a profession, if made before the expiry of a year, is accounted void. Therefore if he return to his wife after making such a profession, she is bound to receive him. Therefore neither by her husband’s entry into religion, nor by his taking a vow, does the wife receive the power to marry again.

On the contrary, No one can bind another to those things which belong to perfection. Now continence is of those things that belong to perfection. Therefore a wife is not bound to continence on account of her husband entering religion, and consequently she can marry.

I answer that, Just as bodily death of the husband dissolves the marriage tie in such a way that the wife may marry whom she will, according to the statement of the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:39); so too after the husband’s spiritual death by entering religion, she can marry whom she will.

Reply to Objection 1: When both consorts take a like vow of continence, neither renounces the marriage tie, wherefore it still remains: but when only one takes the vow, then for his own part he renounces the marriage tie, wherefore the other is freed therefrom.

Reply to Objection 2: A person is not accounted dead to the world by entering religion until he makes his profession, and consequently his wife is bound to wait for him until that time.

Reply to Objection 3: We must judge of a profession thus made before the time fixed by law, as of a simple vow. Wherefore just as when the husband has taken a simple vow his wife is not bound to pay him the marriage debt, and yet has not the power to marry again, so is it in this case.

OF THE IMPEDIMENT THAT SUPERVENES TO MARRIAGE AFTER ITS CONSUMMATION, NAMELY FORNICATION (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the impediment that supervenes upon marriage after its consummation, namely fornication, which is an impediment to a previous marriage as regards the act, although the marriage tie remains. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful for a husband to put his wife away on account of fornication?

(2) Whether he is bound to do so?

(3) Whether he may put her away at his own judgment?

(4) Whether in this matter husband and wife are of equal condition?

(5) Whether, after being divorced, they must remain unmarried?

(6) Whether they can be reconciled after being divorced?

Whether it is lawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a husband to put away his wife on account of fornication. For we must not return evil for evil. But the husband, by putting away his wife on account of fornication, seemingly returns evil for evil. Therefore this is not lawful.

Objection 2: Further, the sin is greater if both commit fornication, than if one only commits it. But if both commit fornication, they cannot be divorced on that account. Neither therefore can they be, if only one commits fornication.

Objection 3: Further, spiritual fornication and certain other sins are more grievous than carnal fornication. But separation from bed cannot be motived by those sins. Neither therefore can it be done on account of fornication.

Objection 4: Further, the unnatural vice is further removed from the marriage goods than fornication is, the manner of which is natural. Therefore it ought to have been a cause of separation rather than fornication.

On the contrary, are the words of Mat. 5:32.

Further, one is not bound to keep faith with one who breaks his faith. But a spouse by fornication breaks the faith due to the other spouse. Therefore one can put the other away on account of fornication.

I answer that, Our Lord permitted a man to put away his wife on account of fornication, in punishment of the unfaithful party and in favor of the faithful party, so that the latter is not bound to marital intercourse with the unfaithful one. There are however seven cases to be excepted in which it is not lawful to put away a wife who has committed fornication, when either the wife is not to be blamed, or both parties are equally blameworthy. The first is if the husband also has committed fornication; the second is if he has prostituted his wife; the third is if the wife, believing her husband dead on account of his long absence, has married again; the fourth is if another man has fraudulently impersonated her husband in the marriage-bed; the fifth is if she be overcome by force; the sixth is if he has been reconciled to her by having carnal intercourse with her after she has committed adultery; the seventh is if both having been married in the state of unbelief, the husband has given his wife a bill of divorce and she has married again; for then if both be converted the husband is bound to receive her back again.

Reply to Objection 1: A husband sins if through vindictive anger he puts away his wife who has committed fornication, but he does not sin if he does so in order to avoid losing his good name, lest he seem to share in her guilt, or in order to correct his wife’s sin, or in order to avoid the uncertainty of her offspring.

Reply to Objection 2: Divorce on account of fornication is effected by the one accusing the other. And since no one can accuse who is guilty of the same crime, a divorce cannot be pronounced when both have committed fornication, although marriage is more sinned against when both are guilty of fornication that when only one is.

Reply to Objection 3: Fornication is directly opposed to the good of marriage, since by it the certainty of offspring is destroyed, faith is broken, and marriage ceases to have its signification when the body of one spouse is given to several others. Wherefore other sins, though perhaps they be more grievous than fornication, are not motives for a divorce. Since, however, unbelief which is called spiritual fornication, is also opposed to the good of marriage consisting in the rearing of the offspring to the worship of God, it is also a motive for divorce, yet not in the same way as bodily fornication. Because one may take steps for procuring a divorce on account of one act of carnal fornication, not, however, on account of one act of unbelief, but on account of inveterate unbelief which is a proof of obstinacy wherein unbelief is perfected.

Reply to Objection 4: Steps may be taken to procure a divorce on account also of the unnatural vice: but this is not mentioned in the same way, both because it is an unmentionable passion, and because it does not so affect the certainty of offspring.

Whether the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife when she is guilty of fornication?

Objection 1: It would seem that the husband is bound by precept to put away his wife who is guilty of fornication. For since the husband is the head of his wife, he is bound to correct his wife. Now separation from bed is prescribed as a correction of the wife who is guilty of fornication. Therefore he is bound to separate from her.

Objection 2: Further, he who consents with one who sins mortally, is also guilty of mortal sin. Now the husband who retains a wife guilty of fornication would seem to consent with her, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 35). Therefore he sins unless he puts her away.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 6:16): “He who is joined to a harlot is made one body.” Now a man cannot at once be a member of a harlot and a member of Christ (1 Cor. 6:15). Therefore the husband who is joined to a wife guilty of fornication ceases to be a member of Christ, and therefore sins mortally.

Objection 4: Further, just as relationship voids the marriage tie, so does fornication dissolve the marriage-bed. Now after the husband becomes cognizant of his consanguinity with his wife, he sins mortally if he has carnal intercourse with her. Therefore he also sins mortally if he does so after knowing her to be guilty of fornication.

Objection 5: On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:11, “Let not the husband put away his wife” says that “Our Lord permitted a wife to be put away on account of fornication.” Therefore it is not a matter of precept.

Objection 6: Further, one can always pardon the sin that another has committed against oneself. Now the wife, by committing fornication, sinned against her husband. Therefore the husband may spare her by not putting her away.

I answer that, The putting away of a wife guilty of fornication was prescribed in order that the wife might be corrected by means of that punishment. Now a corrective punishment is not required when amendment has already taken place. Wherefore, if the wife repent of her sin, her husband is not bound to put her away: whereas if she repent not, he is bound to do so, lest he seem to consent to her sin, by not having recourse to her due correction.

Reply to Objection 1: The wife can be corrected for her sin of fornication not only by this punishment but also by words and blows; wherefore if she be ready to be corrected otherwise, her husband is not bound to have recourse to the aforesaid punishment in order to correct her.

Reply to Objection 2: The husband seems to consent with her when he retains her, notwithstanding that she persists in her past sin: if, however, she has mended her ways, he does not consent with her.

Reply to Objection 3: She can no longer be called a harlot since she has repented of her sin. Wherefore her husband, by being joined to her, does not become a member of a harlot. We might also reply that he is joined to her not as a harlot but as his wife.

Reply to Objection 4: There is no parallel, because the effect of consanguinity is that there is no marriage tie between them, so that carnal intercourse between them becomes unlawful. Whereas fornication does not remove the said tie, so that the act remains, in itself, lawful, unless it become accidentally unlawful, in so far as the husband seems to consent to his wife’s lewdness.

Reply to Objection 5: This permission is to be understood as an absence of prohibition: and thus it is not in contradistinction with a precept, for that which is a matter of precept is also not forbidden.

Reply to Objection 6: The wife sins not only against her husband, but also against herself and against God, wherefore her husband cannot entirely remit the punishment, unless amendment has followed.

Whether the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication?

Objection 1: It would seem that the husband can on his own judgment put away his wife on account of fornication. For when sentence has been pronounced by the judge, it is lawful to carry it out without any further judgment. But God, the just Judge, has pronounced this judgment, that a husband may put his wife away on account of fornication. Therefore no further judgment is required for this.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Mat. 1:19) that Joseph . . . being a just man . . .”was minded to put” Mary “away privately.” Therefore it would seem that a husband may privately pronounce a divorce without the judgment of the Church.

Objection 3: Further, if after becoming cognizant of his wife’s fornication a husband has marital intercourse with his wife, he forfeits the action which he had against the adulteress. Therefore the refusal of the marriage debt, which pertains to a divorce, ought to precede the judgment of the Church.

Objection 4: Further, that which cannot be proved ought not to be submitted to the judgment of the Church. Now the crime of fornication cannot be proved, since “the eye of the adulterer observeth darkness” (Job 24:15). Therefore the divorce in question ought not to be made on the judgment of the Church.

Objection 5: Further, accusation should be preceded by inscription [*Cf. [5001]SS, Q[33], A[7]], whereby a person binds himself under the pain of retaliation, if he fails to bring proof. But this is impossible in this matter, because then, in every event the husband would obtain his end, whether he put his wife away, or his wife put him away. Therefore she ought not to be summoned by accusation to receive the judgment of the Church.

Objection 6: Further, a man is more bound to his wife than to a stranger. Now a man ought not to refer to the Church the crime of another, even though he be a stranger, without previously admonishing him privately (Mat. 18:15). Much less therefore may the husband bring his wife’s crime before the Church, unless he has previously rebuked her in private.

On the contrary, No one should avenge himself. But if a husband were by his own judgment to put away his wife on account of fornication, he would avenge himself. Therefore this should not be done.

Further, no man is prosecutor and judge in the same cause. But the husband is the prosecutor by suing his wife for the offense she has committed against him. Therefore he cannot be the judge, and consequently he cannot put her away on his own judgment.

I answer that, A husband can put away his wife in two ways. First as to bed only, and thus he may put her away on his own judgment, as soon as he has evidence of her fornication: nor is he bound to pay her the marriage debt at her demand, unless he be compelled by the Church, and by paying it thus he nowise prejudices his own case. Secondly, as to bed and board, and in this way she cannot be put away except at the judgment of the Church; and if she has been put away otherwise, he must be compelled to cohabit with her unless the husband can at once prove the wife’s fornication. Now this putting away is called a divorce: and consequently it must be admitted that a divorce cannot be pronounced except at the judgment of the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: The sentence is an application of the general law to a particular fact. Wherefore God gave out the law according to which the sentence of the court has to be pronounced.

Reply to Objection 2: Joseph was minded to put away the Blessed Virgin not as suspected of fornication, but because in reverence for her sanctity, he feared to cohabit with her. Moreover there is no parallel, because then the sentence at law was not only divorce but also stoning, but not now when the case is brought to the Church for judgment. The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: Sometimes when the husband suspects his wife of adultery he watches her secretly that together with witnesses he may discover her in the sin of fornication, and so proceed to accusation. Moreover, if he has no evidence of the fact, there may be strong suspicions of fornication, which suspicions being proved the fornication seems to be proved: for instance if they be found together alone, at a time and place which are open to suspicion, or “nudas cum nuda.”

Reply to Objection 5: A husband may accuse his wife of adultery in two ways. First, he may seek a separation from bed before a spiritual judge, and then there is no need for an inscription to be made under the pain of retaliation, since thus the husband would gain his end, as the objection proves. Secondly, he may seek for the crime to be punished in a secular court, and then it is necessary for inscription to precede, whereby he binds himself under pain of retaliation if he fail to prove his case.

Reply to Objection 6: According to a Decretal (Extra, De Simonia, cap. Licet), “there are three modes of procedure in criminal cases. First, by inquisition, which should be preceded by notoriety; secondly, by accusation, which should be preceded by inscription; [*Cf. [5002]SS, Q[33], A[7]] thirdly, by denunciation, which should be preceded by fraternal correction.” Accordingly the saying of our Lord refers to the case where the process is by way of denunciation, and not by accusation, because then the end in view is not only the correction of the guilty party, but also his punishment, for the safeguarding of the common good, which would be destroyed if justice were lacking.

Whether in a case of divorce husband and wife should be judged on a par with each other?

Objection 1: It would seem that, in a case of divorce, husband and wife ought not to be judged on a par with each other. For divorce under the New Law takes the place of the divorce [repudium] recognized by the Old Law (Mat. 5:31,32). Now in the “repudium” husband and wife were not judged on a par with each other, since the husband could put away his wife, but not “vice versa.” Therefore neither in divorce ought they to be judged on a par with each other.

Objection 2: Further, it is more opposed to the natural law that a wife have several husbands than that a husband have several wives: wherefore the latter has been sometimes lawful, but the former never. Therefore the wife sins more grievously in adultery than the husband, and consequently they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.

Objection 3: Further, where there is greater injury to one’s neighbor, there is a greater sin. Now the adulterous wife does a greater injury to her husband, than does the adulterous husband to his wife, since a wife’s adultery involves uncertainty of the offspring, whereas the husband’s adultery does not. Therefore the wife’s sin is the greater, and so they ought not to be judged on a par with each other.

Objection 4: Further, divorce is prescribed in order to punish the crime of adultery. Now it belongs to the husband who is the head of the wife (1 Cor. 11:3) to correct his wife, rather than “vice versa.” Therefore they should not be judged on a par with each other for the purpose of divorce, but the husband ought to have the preference.

Objection 5: On the contrary, It would seem in this matter the wife ought to have the preference. For the more frail the sinner the more is his sin deserving of pardon. Now there is greater frailty in women than in men, for which reason Chrysostom [*Hom. xl in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that “lust is a passion proper to women,” and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7) that “properly speaking women are not said to be continent on account of their being easily inclined to concupiscence,” for neither can dumb animals be continent, because they have nothing to stand in the way of their desires. Therefore women are rather to be spared in the punishment of divorce.

Objection 6: Further, the husband is placed as the head of the woman in order to correct her. Therefore his sin is greater than the woman’s and so he should be punished the more.

I answer that, In a case of divorce husband and wife are judged on a par with each other, in the sense that the same things are lawful or unlawful to the one as to the other: but they are not judged on a par with each other in reference to those things, since the reason for divorce is greater in one spouse than in the other, although there is sufficient reason for divorce in both. For divorce is a punishment of adultery, in so far as it is opposed to the marriage goods. Now as regards the good of fidelity to which husband and wife are equally bound towards each other, the adultery of one is as great a sin against marriage as the adultery of the other, and this is in either of them a sufficient reason for divorce. But as regards the good of the offspring the wife’s adultery is a greater sin against marriage than the husband’s wherefore it is a greater reason for divorce in the wife than in the husband: and thus they are under an equal obligation, but not for equal reasons. Nor is this unjust for on either hand there is sufficient reason for the punishment in question, just as there is in two persons condemned to the punishment of death, although one of them may have sinned more grievously than the other.

Reply to Objection 1: The only reason why divorce was permitted, was to avoid murder. And since there was more danger of this in men than in women, the husband was allowed to put away his wife by a bill of divorce, but not “vice versa.”

Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These arguments are based on the fact that in comparison with the good of the offspring there is more reason for divorce in an adulterous wife than in an adulterous husband. It does not follow, however, that they are not judged on a par with each other.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the husband is the head of the wife, he is her pilot as it were, and is no more her judge than she is his. Consequently in matters that have to be submitted to a judge, the husband has no more power over his wife, than she over him.

Reply to Objection 5: In adultery there is the same sinful character as in simple fornication, and something more which aggravates it, namely the lesion to marriage. Accordingly if we consider that which is common to adultery and fornication, the sin of the husband and that of the wife are compared the one to the other as that which exceeds to that which is exceeded, for in women the humors are more abundant, wherefore they are more inclined to be led by their concupiscences, whereas in man there is abundance of heat which excites concupiscence. Simply speaking, however, other things being equal, a man sins more grievously in simple fornication than a woman, because he has more of the good of reason, which prevails over all movements of bodily passions. But as regards the lesion to marriage which adultery adds to fornication and for which reason it is an occasion for divorce, the woman sins more grievously than the man, as appears from what we have said above. And since it is more grievous than simple fornication, it follows that, simply speaking, the adulterous wife sins more grievously than the adulterous husband, other things being equal.

Reply to Objection 6: Although the control which the husband receives over his wife is an aggravating circumstance, nevertheless the sin is yet more aggravated by this circumstance which draws the sin to another species, namely by the lesion to marriage, which lesion becomes a kind of injustice, through the fraudulent substitution of another’s child.

Whether a husband can marry again after having a divorce?

Objection 1: It would seem that a husband can marry again after having a divorce. For no one is bound to perpetual continence. Now in some cases the husband is bound to put away his wife forever on account of fornication, as stated above [5003](A[2]). Therefore seemingly at least in this case he can marry again.

Objection 2: Further, a sinner should not be given a greater occasion of sin. But if she who is put away on account of the sin of fornication is not allowed to seek another marriage, she is given a greater occasion of sin: for it is improbable that one who was not continent during marriage will be able to be continent afterwards. Therefore it would seem lawful for her to marry again.

Objection 3: Further, the wife is not bound to the husband save as regards the payment of the marriage debt and cohabitation. But she is freed from both obligations by divorce. Therefore "she is loosed from the law of her husband" [*Rom. 7:2]. Therefore she can marry again; and the same applies to her husband.

Objection 4: Further, it is said (Mat. 19:9): "Whosoever shall put away his wife, except it be for fornication, and shall marry another committeth adultery." Therefore seemingly he does not commit adultery if he marry again after putting away his wife on account of fornication, and consequently this will be a true marriage.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:10,11): "Not I, but the Lord, commandeth that the wife depart not from her husband. and, if she depart, that she remain unmarried."

Further, no one should gain advantage from sin. But the adulteress would if she were allowed to contract another and more desired marriage; and an occasion of adultery would be afforded those who wish to marry again. Therefore it is unlawful both to the wife and to the husband to contract a second marriage.

I answer that, Nothing supervenient to marriage can dissolve it: wherefore adultery does not make a marriage cease to be valid. For, according to Augustine (De Nup. et Concup. i, 10), "as long as they live they are bound by the marriage tie, which neither divorce nor union with another can destroy." Therefore it is unlawful for one, while the other lives, to marry again.

Reply to Objection 1: Although no one is absolutely bound to continence, he may be bound accidentally; for instance, if his wife contract an incurable disease that is incompatible with carnal intercourse. And it is the same if she labor under a spiritual disease, namely fornication, so as to be incorrigible.

Reply to Objection 2: The very shame of having been divorced ought to keep her from sin: and if it cannot keep her from sin, it is a lesser evil that she alone sin than that her husband take part in her sin.

Reply to Objection 3: Although after divorce the wife is not bound to her husband as regards paying him the marriage debt and cohabiting with him, the marriage tie, whereby she was bound to this, remains, and consequently she cannot marry again during her husband’s lifetime. She can, however, take a vow of continence, against her husband’s will, unless it seem that the Church has been deceived by false witnesses in pronouncing the divorce; for in that case, even if she has made her vow of profession she ought to be restored to her husband, and would be bound to pay the marriage debt, but it would be unlawful for her to demand it.

Reply to Objection 4: The exception expressed in our Lord’s words refers to the putting away of the wife. Hence the objection is based on a false interpretation.

Whether husband and wife may be reconciled after being divorced?

Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may not be reconciled after being divorced. For the law contains the rule (Can. Quod bene semel, Caus. vi, qu. iv): “That which has been once well decided must not be subsequently withdrawn.” Now it has been decided by the judgment of the Church that they ought to be separated. Therefore they cannot subsequently be reconciled.

Objection 2: Further, if it were allowable for them to be reconciled, the husband would seem bound to receive his wife, especially after she has repented. But he is not bound, for the wife, in defending herself before the judge, cannot allege her repentance against her husband’s accusation of fornication. Therefore in no way is reconciliation allowable.

Objection 3: Further, if reconciliation were allowable, it would seem that the adulterous wife is bound to return to her husband if her husband asks her. But she is not bound, since they are separated by the Church. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, if it were lawful to be reconciled to an adulterous wife, this would especially be the case when the husband is found to have committed adultery after the divorce. But in this case the wife cannot compel him to be reconciled, since the divorce has been justly pronounced. Therefore she may nowise be reconciled.

Objection 5: Further, if a husband whose adultery is unknown put away his wife, who is convicted of adultery by the sentence of the Church, the divorce would seem to have been pronounced unjustly. And yet the husband is not bound to be reconciled to his wife, because she is unable to prove his adultery in court. Much less, therefore, is reconciliation allowable when the divorce has been granted justly.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:11): “And if she depart, that she remain unmarried, or be reconciled to her husband.”

Further, it is allowable for the husband not to put her away after fornication. Therefore, for the same reason, he can be reconciled to her after divorce.

I answer that, If the wife has mended her ways by repenting of her sin after the divorce, her husband may become reconciled to her; but if she remain incorrigible in her sin, he must not take her back, for the same reason which forbade him to retain her while she refused to desist from sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The sentence of the Church in pronouncing the divorce did not bind them to separate, but allowed them to do so. Therefore reconciliation may be effected or ensue without any withdrawal of the previous sentence.

Reply to Objection 2: The wife’s repentance should induce the husband not to accuse or put away the wife who is guilty of fornication. He cannot, however, be compelled to this course of action, nor can his wife oppose her repentance to his accusation, because although she is no longer guilty, neither in act nor in the stain of sin, there still remains something of the debt of punishment, and though this has been taken away in the sight of God, there still remains the debt of punishment to be inflicted by the judgment of man, because man sees not the heart as God does.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is done in a person’s favor does him no prejudice. Wherefore since the divorce has been granted in favor of the husband, it does not deprive him of the right of asking for the marriage debt, or of asking his wife to return to him. Hence his wife is bound to pay the debt, and to return to him, if he ask her, unless with his consent she has taken a vow of continence.

Reply to Objection 4: According to strict law, a husband who was previously innocent should not be compelled to receive an adulterous wife on account of his having committed adultery after the divorce. But according to equity, the judge is bound by virtue of his office first of all to admonish him to beware of imperiling his own soul and of scandalizing others; although the wife may not herself seek reconciliation.

OF SECOND MARRIAGES (TWO ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider second marriage. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is lawful?

(2) Whether it is a sacrament?

Whether a second marriage is lawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that a second marriage is unlawful. Because we should judge of things according to truth. Now Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that "to take a second husband is in truth fornication," which is unlawful. Therefore neither is a second marriage lawful.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is not good is unlawful. Now Ambrose [*On 1 Cor. 7:40 and De Viduis] says that a second marriage is not good. Therefore it is unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, no one should be debarred from being present at such things as are becoming and lawful. Yet priests are debarred from being present at second marriages, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore they are unlawful.

Objection 4: Further, no one incurs a penalty save for sin. Now a person incurs the penalty of irregularity on account of being married twice. Therefore a second marriage is unlawful.

On the contrary, We read of Abraham having contracted a second marriage (Gn. 25:1).

Further, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 5:14): "I will . . . that the younger," namely widows, "should marry, bear children." Therefore second marriages are lawful.

I answer that, The marriage tie lasts only until death (Rom. 7:2), wherefore at the death of either spouse the marriage tie ceases: and consequently when one dies the other is not hindered from marrying a second time on account of the previous marriage. Therefore not only second marriages are lawful, but even third and so on.

Reply to Objection 1: Chrysostom is speaking in reference to the cause which is wont at times to incite a person to a second marriage, namely concupiscence which incites also to fornication.

Reply to Objection 2: A second marriage is stated not to be good, not that it is unlawful, but because it lacks the honor of the signification which is in a first marriage, where one husband has one wife, as in the case of Christ and the Church.

Reply to Objection 3: Men who are consecrated to Divine things are debarred not only from unlawful things, but even from things which have any appearance of turpitude; and consequently they are debarred from second marriages, which lack the decorum which was in a first marriage.

Reply to Objection 4: Irregularity is not always incurred on account of a sin, and may be incurred through a defect in a sacrament [*”Defectus sacramenti,” i.e. defect of signification; Cf. A[2], OBJ[3]]. Hence the argument is not to the point.

Whether a second marriage is a sacrament?

Objection 1: It would seem that a second marriage is not a sacrament. For he who repeats a sacrament injures the sacrament. But no sacrament should be done an injury. Therefore if a second marriage were a sacrament, marriage ought nowise to be repeated.

Objection 2: Further, in every sacrament some kind of blessing is given. But no blessing is given in a second marriage, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 42). Therefore no sacrament is conferred therein.

Objection 3: Further, signification is essential to a sacrament. But the signification of marriage is not preserved in a second marriage, because there is not a union of only one woman with only one man, as in the case of Christ and the Church. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

Objection 4: Further, one sacrament is not an impediment to receiving another. But a second marriage is an impediment to receiving orders. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

On the contrary, Marital intercourse is excused from sin in a second marriage even as in a first marriage. Now marital intercourse is excused [*Cf.[5004] Q[69], A[1]] by the marriage goods which are fidelity, offspring, and sacrament. Therefore a second marriage is a sacrament.

Further, irregularity is not contracted through a second and non-sacramental union, such as fornication. Yet irregularity is contracted through a second marriage. Therefore it is a sacramental union.

I answer that, Wherever we find the essentials of a sacrament, there is a true sacrament. Wherefore, since in a second marriage we find all the essentials of the sacrament of marriage (namely the due matter—which results from the parties having the conditions prescribed by law—and the due form, which is the expression of the inward consent by words of the present), it is clear that a second marriage is a sacrament even as a first.

Reply to Objection 1: This is true of a sacrament which causes an everlasting effect: for then, if the sacrament be repeated, it is implied that the first was not effective, and thus an injury is done to the first, as is clear in all those sacraments which imprint a character. But those sacraments which have not an everlasting effect can be repeated without injury to the sacrament, as in the case of Penance. And, since the marriage tie ceases with death, no injury is done to the sacrament if a woman marry again after her husband's death.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the second marriage, considered in itself, is a perfect sacrament, yet if we consider it in relation to the first marriage, it is somewhat a defective sacrament, because it has not its full signification, since there is not a union of only one woman with only one man as in the marriage of Christ with the Church. And on account of this defect the blessing is omitted in a second marriage. This, however, refers to the case when it is a second marriage on the part of both man and woman, or on the part of the woman only. For if a virgin marry a man who has had another wife, the marriage is blessed nevertheless. Because the signification is preserved to a certain extent even in relation to the former marriage, since though Christ has but one Church for His spouse, there are many persons espoused to Him in the one Church. But the soul cannot be espoused to another besides Christ, else it commits fornication with the devil. Nor is there a spiritual marriage. For this reason when a woman marries a second time the marriage is not blessed on account of the defect in the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: The perfect signification is found in a second marriage considered in itself, not however if it be considered in relation to the previous marriage, and it is thus that it is a defective sacrament.

Reply to Objection 4: A second marriage in so far as there is a defect in the sacrament, but not as a sacrament, is an impediment to the sacrament of Order.

OF THE THINGS ANNEXED TO MARRIAGE, AND FIRST OF THE PAYMENT OF THE MARRIAGE DEBT (TEN ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider those things which are annexed to marriage: (1) the payment of the marriage debt; (2) plurality of wives; (3) bigamy; (4) the bill of divorce; (5) illegitimate children.

Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:

(1) Whether one spouse is bound to pay the marriage debt to the other?

(2) Whether one is sometimes bound to pay without being asked?

(3) Whether a wife may demand the debt during the menses?

(4) Whether she is bound to pay it at that time?

(5) Whether husband and wife are equal in this matter?

(6) Whether the one without the other’s consent may take a vow that prohibits the payment of the debt?

(7) Whether it is forbidden to ask for the debt at any particular time?

(8) Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for it at a holy time?

(9) Whether it is an obligation to pay it at the time of a festival?

(10) Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times?

Whether husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt?

Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not mutually bound, under the obligation of a precept, to the payment of the marriage debt. For no one is forbidden to receive the Eucharist on account of fulfilling a precept. Yet he who has had intercourse with his wife cannot partake of the flesh of the Lamb according to Jerome [*Serm. de Esu Agni viii] quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32). Therefore the payment of the debt does not come under the obligation of a precept.

Objection 2: Further, it is lawful to everyone to abstain from what is hurtful to his person. But it is sometimes harmful to a person to pay the debt when asked, whether on account of sickness, or because they have already paid it. Therefore it would seem allowable to refuse the one who asks.

Objection 3: Further, it is a sin to render oneself unfit to fulfill an obligation of precept. If, therefore, the payment of the debt comes under the obligation of a precept, it would seem sinful to render oneself unfit for paying the debt, by fasting or otherwise weakening the body: but apparently this is untrue.

Objection 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 12), marriage is directed to the begetting and rearing of children, as well as to the community of life. Now leprosy is opposed to both these ends of marriage, for since it is a contagious disease, the wife is not bound to cohabit with a leprous husband; and besides this disease is often transmitted to the offspring. Therefore it would seem that a wife is not bound to pay the debt to a leprous husband.

On the contrary, As the slave is in the power of his master, so is one spouse in the power of the other (1 Cor. 7:4). But a slave is bound by an obligation of precept to pay his master the debt of his service according to Rom. 13:7, “Render . . . to all men their dues, tribute to whom tribute is due,” etc. Therefore husband and wife are mutually bound to the payment of the marriage debt.

Further, marriage is directed to the avoiding of fornication (1 Cor. 7:2). But this could not be the effect of marriage, if the one were not bound to pay the debt to the other when the latter is troubled with concupiscence. Therefore the payment of the debt is an obligation of precept.

I answer that, Marriage was instituted especially as fulfilling an office of nature. Wherefore in its act the movement of nature must be observed according to which the nutritive power administers to the generative power that alone which is in excess of what is required for the preservation of the individual: for the natural order requires that a thing should be first perfected in itself, and that afterwards it should communicate of its perfection to others: and this is also the order of charity which perfects nature. And therefore, since the wife has power over her husband only in relation to the generative power and not in relation to things directed to the preservation of the individual, the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife, in matters pertaining to the begetting of children, with due regard however to his own welfare.

Reply to Objection 1: It is possible through fulfilling a precept to render oneself unfit for the exercise of a sacred duty: thus a judge becomes irregular by sentencing a man to death. In like manner he who pays the marriage debt, in fulfillment of the precept, becomes unfit for the exercise of divine offices, not because the act in question is sinful, but on account of its carnal nature. And so, according to the Master (Sent. iv, D, 32), Jerome is speaking only of the ministers of the Church, and not of others who should be left to use their own discretion, because without sin they may either abstain out of reverence or receive Christ’s body out of devotion.

Reply to Objection 2: The wife has no power over her husband’s body, except as is consistent with the welfare of his person, as stated above. Wherefore if she go beyond this in her demands, it is not a request for the debt, but an unjust exaction; and for this reason the husband is not bound to satisfy her.

Reply to Objection 3: If the husband be rendered incapable of paying the debt through a cause consequent upon marriage, for instance through having already paid the debt and being unable to pay it, the wife has no right to ask again, and in doing so she behaves as a harlot rather than as a wife. But if he be rendered incapable through some other cause, then if this be a lawful cause, he is not bound, and she cannot ask, but if it be an unlawful cause, then he sins, and his wife’s sin, should she fall into fornication on this account, is somewhat imputable to him. Hence he should endeavor to do his best that his wife may remain continent.

Reply to Objection 4: Leprosy voids a betrothal but not a marriage. Wherefore a wife is bound to pay the debt even to a leprous husband. But she is not bound to cohabit with him, because she is not so liable to infection from marital intercourse as from continual cohabitation. And though the child begotten of them be diseased, it is better to be thus than not at all.

Whether a husband is bound to pay the debt if his wife does not ask for it?

Objection 1: It would seem that the husband is not bound to pay the marriage debt if his wife does not ask for it. For an affirmative precept is binding only at a certain time. But the time fixed for the payment of the debt can only be when it is asked for. Therefore he is not bound to payment otherwise.

Objection 2: Further, we ought to presume the better things of everyone. Now even for married people it is better to be continent than to make use of marriage. Therefore unless she ask expressly for the debt, the husband should presume that it pleases her to be continent, and so he is not bound to pay her the debt.

Objection 3: Further, as the wife has power over her husband, so has a master over his slave. Now a slave is not bound to serve his master save when the latter commands him. Therefore neither is a husband bound to pay the debt to his wife except when she demands it.

Objection 4: Further, the husband can sometimes request his wife not to exact the debt when she asks for it. Much more therefore may he not pay it when he is not asked.

On the contrary, By the payment of the debt a remedy is afforded against the wife’s concupiscence. Now a physician who has the care of a sick person is bound to remedy the disease without being asked. Therefore the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife although she ask not for it. Further, a superior is bound to apply a remedy for the sins of his subjects even though they rebel against it. But the payment of the debt on the husband’s part is directed against the sins of his wife. Therefore sometimes the husband is bound to pay the debt to his wife even though she ask it not of him.

I answer that, The debt may be demanded in two ways. First, explicitly, as when they ask one another by words; secondly, implicitly, when namely the husband knows by certain signs that the wife would wish him to pay the debt, but is silent through shame. And so even though she does not ask for the debt explicitly in words, the husband is bound to pay it, whenever his wife shows signs of wishing him to do so.

Reply to Objection 1: The appointed time is not only when it is demanded but also when on account of certain signs there is fear of danger (to avoid which is the purpose of the payment of the debt) unless it be paid then.

Reply to Objection 2: The husband may presume this of his wife when he perceives in her no signs of the contrary; but it would be foolish of him to admit this presumption if he does see such signs.

Reply to Objection 3: The master is not ashamed to demand of his slave the duty of his service, as a wife is to ask the marriage debt of her husband. Yet if the master were not to demand it, either through ignorance or some other cause, the slave would nevertheless be bound to fulfill his duty, if some danger were threatening. For this is what is meant by “not serving to the eye” (Eph. 6:6; Col. 3:22) which is the Apostle’s command to servants.

Reply to Objection 4: A husband should not dissuade his wife from asking for the debt, except for a reasonable cause; and even then he should not be too insistent, on account of the besetting danger.

Whether it is allowable for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt? [*This and the Fourth Article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]

Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a menstruous wife to ask for the marriage debt. For in the Law a man who had an issue of seed was unclean, even as a menstruous woman. Yet a man who has an issue of seed may ask for the debt. Therefore a menstruous wife may also.

Objection 2: Further, leprosy is a worse complaint than suffering from monthly periods, and would seem to cause a greater corruption in the offspring. Yet a leper can ask for the debt. Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, if a menstruous wife is not allowed to ask for the debt, this can only be because it is feared this may be detrimental to the offspring. Yet if the wife be unfruitful there is no such fear. Therefore, seemingly, at least an unfruitful wife may ask for the debt during her menses.

On the contrary, “Thou shalt not approach to a woman having her flowers” (Lev. 18:19) where Augustine observes: “Although he has already sufficiently forbidden this he repeats the prohibition here lest he seem to have spoken figuratively.”

Further, “All our justices” are become “as the rag of a menstruous woman” (Is. 64:6) where Jerome observes: “Men ought then to keep away from their wives because thus is a deformed blind lame leprous offspring conceived: so that those parents who are not ashamed to come together in sexual intercourse have their sin made obvious to all”: and thus the same conclusion follows.

I answer that, It was forbidden in the Law to approach to a menstruous woman, for two reasons both on account of her uncleanness, and on account of the harm that frequently resulted to the offspring from such intercourse. With regard to the first reason, it was a ceremonial precept, but with regard to the second it was a moral precept. For since marriage is chiefly directed to the good of the offspring, all use of marriage which is intended for the good of the offspring is in order. Consequently this precept is binding even in the New Law on account of the second reason, although not on account of the first. Now, the menstrual issue may be natural or unnatural. The natural issue is that to which women are subject at stated periods when they are in good health; and it is unnatural when they suffer from an issue of blood through some disorder resulting from sickness. Accordingly if the menstrual flow be unnatural it is not forbidden in the New Law to approach to a menstruous woman both on account of her infirmity since a woman in that state cannot conceive, and because an issue of this kind is lasting and continuous, so that the husband would have to abstain for always. When however the woman is subject to a natural issue of the menstruum, she can conceive; moreover, the said issue lasts only a short time, wherefore it is forbidden to approach to her. In like manner a woman is forbidden to ask for the debt during the period of that issue.

Reply to Objection 1: The issue of seed in a man is the result of infirmity, nor is the seed in this case apt for generation. Moreover a complaint of this kind is continual or lasting like leprosy: wherefore the comparison falls.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As long as a woman is subject to the menses it cannot be certain that she is sterile. For some are sterile in youth, and in course of time become fruitful, and “vice versa,” as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Anim. xvi).

Whether a menstruous woman should or may lawfully pay the marriage debt to her husband if he ask for it? [*This and the previous article are omitted in the Leonine edition.]

Objection 1: It would seem that a menstruous wife may not pay the marriage debt to her husband at his asking. For it is written (Lev. 20:18) that if any man approach to a menstruous woman both shall be put to death.

Therefore it would seem that both he who asks and she who grants are guilty of mortal sin.

Objection 2: Further, “Not only they that do them but they also that consent to them are worthy of death” (Rom. 1:32). Now he who knowingly asks for the debt from a menstruous woman sins mortally. Therefore she also sins mortally by consenting to pay the debt.

Objection 3: Further, a madman must not be given back his sword lest he kill himself or another. Therefore in like manner neither should a wife give her body to her husband during her menses, lest he be guilty of spiritual murder.

On the contrary, “The wife hath not power of her own body, but the husband” (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore at his asking his wife must pay the debt even during her menses.

Further, the menstruous wife should not be an occasion of sin to her husband. But she would give her husband an occasion of sin, if she paid him not the debt at his asking; since he might commit fornication. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, In this regard some have asserted that a menstruous woman may not pay the debt even as she may not ask for it. For just as she would not be bound to pay it if she had some personal ailment so as to make it dangerous for herself, so is she not bound to pay for fear of danger to the offspring. But this opinion would seem to derogate from marriage, by which the husband is given entire power of his wife’s body with regard to the marriage act. Nor is there any parallel between bodily affliction of the offspring and the danger to her own body: since, if the wife be ailing, it is quite certain that she would be endangered by the carnal act, whereas this is by no means so certain with regard to the offspring which perhaps would not be forthcoming.

Wherefore others say that a menstruous woman is never allowed to ask for the debt; and that if her husband ask, he does so either knowingly or in ignorance. If knowingly, she ought to dissuade him by her prayers and admonitions; yet not so insistently as possibly to afford him an occasion of falling into other, and those sinful, practices, if he be deemed that way inclined. If however, he ask in ignorance, the wife may put forward some motive, or allege sickness as a reason for not paying the debt, unless there be fear of danger to her husband. If, however, the husband ultimately persists in his request, she must yield to his demand. But it would not be safe for her to make known [*”Indicare,” as in the commentary on the Sentences; the Leonine edition reads “judicare.”] her disaffection, lest this make her husband entertain a repulsion towards her, unless his prudence may be taken for granted.

Reply to Objection 1: This refers to the case when both willingly consent, but not when the woman pays the debt by force as it were.

Reply to Objection 2: Since there is no consent without the concurrence of the will, the woman is not deemed to consent in her husband’s sin unless she pay the debt willingly. For when she is unwilling she is passive rather than consenting.

Reply to Objection 3: A madman should be given back his sword if a greater danger were feared from its not being returned to him: and thus it is in the case in point.

Whether husband and wife are equal in the marriage act?

Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife are not equal in the marriage act. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) the agent is more noble than the patient. But in the marriage act the husband is as agent and the wife as patient. Therefore they are not equal in that act.

Objection 2: Further, the wife is not bound to pay her husband the debt without being asked; whereas he is so bound, as stated above ([5005]AA[1],2). Therefore they are not equal in the marriage act.

Objection 3: Further, the woman was made on the man’s account in reference to marriage according to Gn. 2:18, “Let us make him a help like unto himself.” But that on account of which another thing is, is always the principal. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the marriage act. But in marriage “the husband is the head of the wife” (Eph. 5:23). Therefore they are not equal in the aforesaid act.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:4): “The husband . . . hath not power of his own body,” and the same is said of the wife. Therefore they are equal in the marriage act.

Further, Marriage is a relation of equiparence, since it is a kind of union, as stated above ([5006]Q[44], AA[1],3). Therefore husband and wife are equal in the marriage act.

I answer that, Equality is twofold, of quantity and of proportion. Equality of quantity is that which is observed between two quantities of the same measure, for instance a thing two cubits long and another two cubits in length. But equality of proportion is that which is observed between two proportions of the same kind as double to double. Accordingly, speaking of the first equality, husband and wife are not equal in marriage; neither as regards the marriage act, wherein the more noble part is due to the husband, nor as regards the household management, wherein the wife is ruled and the husband rules. But with reference to the second kind of equality, they are equal in both matters, because just as in both the marriage act and in the management of the household the husband is bound to the wife in all things pertaining to the husband, so is the wife bound to the husband in all things pertaining to the wife. It is in this sense that it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 32) that they are equal in paying and demanding the debt.

Reply to Objection 1: Although it is more noble to be active than passive, there is the same proportion between patient and passivity as between agent and activity; and accordingly there is equality of proportion between them.

Reply to Objection 2: This is accidental. For the husband having the more noble part in the marriage act, it is natural that he should be less ashamed than the wife to ask for the debt. Hence it is that the wife is not bound to pay the debt to her husband without being asked, whereas the husband is bound to pay it to the wife.

Reply to Objection 3: This proves that they are not equal absolutely, but not that they are not equal in proportion.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the head is the principal member, yet just as the members are bound to the head in their own respective capacities, so is the head in its own capacity bound to the members: and thus there is equality of proportion between them.

Whether husband and wife can take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent?

Objection 1: It would seem that husband and wife may take a vow contrary to the marriage debt without their mutual consent. For husband and wife are equally bound to pay the debt, as stated above [5007](A[5]). Now it is lawful for the husband, even if his wife be unwilling, to take the cross in defense of the Holy Land: and consequently this is also lawful to the wife. Therefore, since this prevents the payment of the debt, either husband or wife may without the other's consent take the aforesaid vow.

Objection 2: Further, in taking a vow one should not await the consent of another who cannot dissent without sin. Now the husband or wife cannot, without sin, refuse their consent to the other's taking a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time; because to prevent a person's spiritual progress is a sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore the one can take a vow of continence either absolutely or for a time, without the other's consent.

Objection 3: Further, in the marriage act, the debt has to be demanded just as it has to be paid. Now the one can, without the other's consent, vow not to demand the debt, since in this he is within his own rights. Therefore he can equally take a vow not to pay the debt.

Objection 4: Further, no one can be bound by the command of a superior to do what he cannot lawfully vow or do simply, since one must not obey in what is unlawful. Now the superior authority might command the husband not to pay the debt to his wife for a time, by occupying him in some service. Therefore he might, of his own accord, do or vow that which would hinder him from paying the debt.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): "Defraud not one another, except . . . by consent, for a time, that you may give yourselves to prayer."

Further, no one can vow that which belongs to another. Now "the husband . . . hath not power of his own body, but the wife" (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore, without her consent, the husband cannot take a vow of continence whether absolutely or for a time.

I answer that, A vow is a voluntary act, as its very name implies: and consequently a vow can only be about those goods which are subject to our will, and those in which one person is bound to another do not come under this head. Therefore in matters of this kind one person cannot take a vow without the consent of the one to whom he is bound. Consequently, since husband and wife are mutually bound as regards the payment of the debt which is an obstacle to continence, the one cannot vow continence without the other's consent; and if he take the vow he sins, and must not keep the vow, but must do penance for an ill-taken vow [*Cf.[5008] Q[53], AA[1],4; [5009] Q[61], A[1]].

Reply to Objection 1: It is sufficiently probable that the wife ought to be willing to remain continent for a time, in order to succor the need of the universal Church. Hence in favor of the business for which the cross is given to him, it is laid down that the husband may take the cross without his wife's consent, even as he might go fighting without the consent of his landlord whose land he has leased. And yet the wife is not entirely deprived of her right, since she can follow him. Nor is there a parallel between wife and husband: because, since the husband has to rule the wife and not "vice versa," the wife is bound to follow her husband rather than the husband the wife. Moreover there would be more danger to the wife's chastity as a result of wandering from country to country, than to the husband's, and less profit to the Church. Wherefore the wife cannot take this vow without her husband's consent.

Reply to Objection 2: The one spouse, by refusing to consent to the other's vow of continence, does not sin, because the object of his dissent is to hinder not the other's good, but the harm to himself.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some say that one can without the other's consent vow not to demand the debt, not however not to pay it, because in the former case they are both within their own rights, but not in the second. Seeing, however, that if one were never to ask for the debt, marriage would become too burdensome to the other who would always have to undergo the shame of asking for the debt, others assert with greater probability that neither vow can be lawfully taken by one spouse without the other's consent.

Reply to Objection 4: Just as the wife receives power over her husband's body, without prejudice to the husband's duty to his own body, so also is it without prejudice to his duty to his master. Hence just as a wife cannot ask her husband for the debt to the detriment of his bodily health, so neither can she do this so as to hinder him in his duty to his master. And yet the master cannot for this reason prevent her from paying the debt.

Whether it is forbidden to demand the debt on holy days?

Objection 1: It would seem that a person ought not to be forbidden to ask for the debt on holy days. For the remedy should be applied when the disease gains strength. Now concupiscence may possibly gain strength on a feast day. Therefore the remedy should be applied then by asking for the debt.

Objection 2: Further, the only reason why the debt should not be demanded on feast days is because they are devoted to prayer. Yet on those days certain hours are appointed for prayer. Therefore one may ask for the debt at some other time.

On the contrary, Just as certain places are holy because they are devoted to holy things, so are certain times holy for the same reason. But it is not lawful to demand the debt in a holy place. Therefore neither is it lawful at a holy time.

I answer that, Although the marriage act is void of sin, nevertheless since it oppresses the reason on account of the carnal pleasure, it renders man unfit for spiritual things. Therefore, on those days when one ought especially to give one’s time to spiritual things, it is not lawful to ask for the debt.

Reply to Objection 1: At such a time other means may be employed for the repression of concupiscence; for instance, prayer and many similar things, to which even those who observe perpetual continence have recourse.

Reply to Objection 2: Although one is not bound to pray at all hours, one is bound throughout the day to keep oneself fit for prayer.

Whether it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is a mortal sin to ask for the debt at a holy time. For Gregory says (Dial. i) that the devil took possession of a woman who had intercourse with her husband at night and came in the morning to the procession. But this would not have happened had she not sinned mortally. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, whoever disobeys a Divine command commits a mortal sin. Now the Lord commanded (Ex. 19:15): “Come not near your wives,” when namely they were about to receive the Law. Much more therefore do husbands sin mortally if they have intercourse with their wives at a time when they should be intent on the sacred observances of the New Law.

On the contrary, No circumstance aggravates infinitely. But undue time is a circumstance. Therefore it does not aggravate a sin infinitely, so as to make mortal what was otherwise venial.

I answer that, To ask for the debt on a feast day is not a circumstance drawing a sin into another species; wherefore it cannot aggravate infinitely. Consequently a wife or husband does not sin mortally by asking for the debt on a feast day. It is however a more grievous sin to ask for the sake of mere pleasure, than through fear of the weakness of the flesh.

Reply to Objection 1: This woman was punished not because she paid the debt, but because afterwards she rashly intruded into the divine service against her conscience.

Reply to Objection 2: The authority quoted shows not that it is a mortal sin but that it is unbecoming. For under the Old Law which was given to a carnal people many things were required under an obligation of precept, for the sake of bodily cleanness, which are not required in the New Law which is the law of the spirit.

Whether one spouse is bound to pay the debt to the other at a festal time?

Objection 1: It would seem that neither are they bound to pay the debt at a festal time. For those who commit a sin as well as those who consent thereto are equally punished (Rom. 1:32). But the one who pays the debt consents with the one that asks, who sins. Therefore he sins also.

Objection 2: Further, it is an affirmative precept that binds us to pray, and therefore we are bound to do so at a fixed time. Therefore one ought not to pay the debt at a time when one is bound to pray, as neither ought one at a time when one is bound to fulfill a special duty towards a temporal master.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 7:5): “Defraud not one another, except by consent, for a time,” etc. Therefore when one spouse asks the other must pay.

I answer that, Since the wife has power of her husband’s body, and “vice versa,” with regard to the act of procreation, the one is bound to pay the debt to the other, at any season or hour, with due regard to the decorum required in such matters, for this must not be done at once openly.

Reply to Objection 1: As far as he is concerned he does not consent, but grants unwillingly and with grief that which is exacted of him; and consequently he does not sin. For it is ordained by God, on account of the weakness of the flesh, that the debt must always be paid to the one who asks lest he be afforded an occasion of sin.

Reply to Objection 2: No hour is fixed for praying, but that compensation can be made at some other hour; wherefore the argument is not cogent.

Whether weddings should be forbidden at certain times? [*This article is omitted in the Leonine edition.]

Objection 1: It would seem that weddings ought not to be forbidden at certain times. For marriage is a sacrament: and the celebration of the others sacraments is not forbidden at those times. Therefore neither should the celebration of marriage be forbidden then.

Objection 2: Further, asking for the marriage debt is more unbecoming on feast days than the celebration of marriage. Yet the debt may be asked for on those days. Therefore also marriages may be solemnized.

Objection 3: Further, marriages that are contracted in despite of the law of the Church ought to be dissolved. Yet marriages are not dissolved if they be contracted at those times. Therefore it should not be forbidden by a commandment of the Church.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 3:5): “A time to embrace, and a time to be far from embraces.”

I answer that, When the newly married spouse is given to her husband, the minds of husband and wife are taken up with carnal preoccupations by reason of the very newness of things, wherefore weddings are wont to be signalized by much unrestrained rejoicing. On this account it is forbidden to celebrate marriages at those times when men ought especially to arise to spiritual things. Those times are from Advent until the Epiphany because of the Communion which, according to the ancient Canons, is wont to be made at Christmas (as was observed in its proper place, [5010]TP, Q[30]), from Septuagesima until the octave day of Easter, on account of the Easter Communion, and from the three days before the Ascension until the octave day of Pentecost, on account of the preparation for Communion to be received at that time.

Reply to Objection 1: The celebration of marriage has a certain worldly and carnal rejoicing connected with it, which does not apply to the other sacraments. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: There is not such a distraction of minds caused by the payment of a request for the debt as by the celebration of a marriage; and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Since time is not essential to a marriage contracted within the forbidden seasons, the marriage is nevertheless a true sacrament. Nor is the marriage dissolved absolutely, but for a time, that they may do penance for having disobeyed the commandment of the Church. It is thus that we are to understand the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 33), namely that should a marriage have been contracted or a wedding celebrated at the aforesaid times, those who have done so "ought to be separated." Nor does he say this on his own authority, but in reference to some canonical ordinance, such as that of the Council of Lerida, which decision is quoted by the Decretals.

OF PLURALITY OF WIVES (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the plurality of wives. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?

(2) Whether this was ever lawful?

(3) Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?

(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?

(5) Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?

Whether it is against the natural law to have several wives?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not against the natural law to have several wives. For custom does not prejudice the law of nature. But "it was not a sin" to have several wives "when this was the custom," according to Augustine (De Bono Conjug. xv) as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33). Therefore it is not contrary to the natural law to have several wives.

Objection 2: Further, whoever acts in opposition to the natural law, disobeys a commandment, for the law of nature has its commandments even as the written law has. Now Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xv; De Civ. Dei xv, 38) that “it was not contrary to a commandment” to have several wives, “because by no law was it forbidden.” Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.

Objection 3: Further, marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting of offspring. But one man may get children of several women, by causing them to be pregnant. Therefore It is not against the natural law to have several wives.

Objection 4: Further, “Natural right is that which nature has taught all animals,” as stated at the beginning of the Digests (1, i, ff. De just. et jure). Now nature has not taught all animals that one male should be united to but one female, since with many animals the one male is united to several females. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have several wives.

Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. Animal. i, 20), in the begetting of offspring the male is to the female as agent to patient, and as the craftsman is to his material. But it is not against the order of nature for one agent to act on several patients, or for one craftsman to work in several materials. Therefore neither is it contrary to the law of nature for one husband to have many wives.

Objection 6: On the contrary, That which was instilled into man at the formation of human nature would seem especially to belong to the natural law. Now it was instilled into him at the very formation of human nature that one man should have one wife, according to Gn. 2:24, “They shall be two in one flesh.” Therefore it is of natural law.

Objection 7: Further, it is contrary to the law of nature that man should bind himself to the impossible, and that what is given to one should be given to another. Now when a man contracts with a wife, he gives her the power of his body, so that he is bound to pay her the debt when she asks. Therefore it is against the law of nature that he should afterwards give the power of his body to another, because it would be impossible for him to pay both were both to ask at the same time.

Objection 8: Further, “Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself” [*Cf. Tob. 4:16] is a precept of the natural law. But a husband would by no means be willing for his wife to have another husband. Therefore he would be acting against the law of nature, were he to have another wife in addition.

Objection 9: Further, whatever is against the natural desire is contrary to the natural law. Now a husband’s jealousy of his wife and the wife’s jealousy of her husband are natural, for they are found in all. Therefore, since jealousy is “love impatient of sharing the beloved,” it would seem to be contrary to the natural law that several wives should share one husband.

I answer that, All natural things are imbued with certain principles whereby they are enabled not only to exercise their proper actions, but also to render those actions proportionate to their end, whether such actions belong to a thing by virtue of its generic nature, or by virtue of its specific nature: thus it belongs to a magnet to be borne downwards by virtue of its generic nature, and to attract iron by virtue of its specific nature. Now just as in those things which act from natural necessity the principle of action is the form itself, whence their proper actions proceed proportionately to their end, so in things which are endowed with knowledge the principles of action are knowledge and appetite. Hence in the cognitive power there needs to be a natural concept, and in the appetitive power a natural inclination, whereby the action befitting the genus or species is rendered proportionate to the end. Now since man, of all animals, knows the aspect of the end, and the proportion of the action to the end, it follows that he is imbued with a natural concept, whereby he is directed to act in a befitting manner, and this is called “the natural law” or “the natural right,” but in other animals “the natural instinct.” For brutes are rather impelled by the force of nature to do befitting actions, than guided to act on their own judgment. Therefore the natural law is nothing else than a concept naturally instilled into man, whereby he is guided to act in a befitting manner in his proper actions, whether they are competent to him by virtue of his generic nature, as, for instance, to beget, to eat, and so on, or belong to him by virtue of his specific nature, as, for instance, to reason and so forth. Now whatever renders an action improportionate to the end which nature intends to obtain by a certain work is said to be contrary to the natural law. But an action may be improportionate either to the principal or to the secondary end, and in either case this happens in two ways. First, on account of something which wholly hinders the end; for instance a very great excess or a very great deficiency in eating hinders both the health of the body, which is the principal end of food, and aptitude for conducting business, which is its secondary end. Secondly, on account of something that renders the attainment of the principal or secondary end difficult, or less satisfactory, for instance eating inordinately in respect of undue time. Accordingly if an action be improportionate to the end, through altogether hindering the principal end directly, it is forbidden by the first precepts of the natural law, which hold the same place in practical matters, as the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. If, however, it be in any way improportionate to the secondary end, or again to the principal end, as rendering its attainment difficult or less satisfactory, it is forbidden, not indeed by the first precepts of the natural law, but by the second which are derived from the first even as conclusions in speculative matters receive our assent by virtue of self-known principles: and thus the act in question is said to be against the law of nature.

Now marriage has for its principal end the begetting and rearing of children, and this end is competent to man according to his generic nature, wherefore it is common to other animals (Ethic. viii, 12), and thus it is that the "offspring" is assigned as a marriage good. But for its secondary end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12), it has, among men alone, the community of works that are a necessity of life, as stated above ([5011]Q[41], A[1]). And in reference to this they owe one another "fidelity" which is one of the goods of marriage. Furthermore it has another end, as regards marriage between believers, namely the signification of Christ and the Church: and thus the "sacrament" is said to be a marriage good. Wherefore the first end corresponds to the marriage of man inasmuch as he is an animal: the second, inasmuch as he is a man; the third, inasmuch as he is a believer. Accordingly plurality of wives neither wholly destroys nor in any way hinders the first end of marriage, since one man is sufficient to get children of several wives, and to rear the children born of them. But though it does not wholly destroy the second end, it hinders it considerably for there cannot easily be peace in a family where several wives are joined to one husband, since one husband cannot suffice to satisfy the requisitions of several wives, and again because the sharing of several in one occupation is a cause of strife: thus "potters quarrel with one another" [*Aristotle, Rhet. ii, 4], and in like manner the several wives of one husband. The third end, it removes altogether, because as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. It is therefore evident from what has been said that plurality of wives is in a way against the law of nature, and in a way not against it.

Reply to Objection 1: Custom does not prejudice the law of nature as regards the first precepts of the latter, which are like the general concepts of the mind in speculative matters. But those which are drawn like conclusions from these custom enforces, as Tully declares (De Inv. Rhet. ii), or weakens. Such is the precept of nature in the matter of having one wife.

Reply to Objection 2: As Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii), “fear of the law and religion have sanctioned those things that come from nature and are approved by custom.” Wherefore it is evident that those dictates of the natural law, which are derived from the first principles as it were of the natural law, have not the binding force of an absolute commandment, except when they have been sanctioned by Divine or human law. This is what Augustine means by saying that “they did not disobey the commandments of the law, since it was not forbidden by any law.”

The Reply to the Third Objection follows from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: Natural right has several significations. First a right is said to be natural by its principle, because it is instilled by nature: and thus Tully defines it (De Inv. Rhet. ii) when he says: “Natural right is not the result of opinion but the product of an innate force.” And since even in natural things certain movements are called natural, not that they be from an intrinsic principle, but because they are from a higher moving principle—thus the movements that are caused in the elements by the impress of heavenly bodies are said to be natural, as the Commentator states (De Coelo et Mundo iii, 28), therefore those things that are of Divine right are said to be of natural right, because they are caused by the impress and influence of a higher principle, namely God. Isidore takes it in this sense, when he says (Etym. v) that “the natural right is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel.” Thirdly, right is said to be natural not only from its principle but also from its matter, because it is about natural things. And since nature is contradistinguished with reason, whereby man is a man, it follows that if we take natural right in its strictest sense, those things which are dictated by natural reason and pertain to man alone are not said to be of natural right, but only those which are dictated by natural reason and are common to man and other animals. Thus we have the aforesaid definition, namely: “Natural right is what nature has taught all animals.” Accordingly plurality of wives, though not contrary to natural right taken in the third sense, is nevertheless against natural right taken in the second sense, because it is forbidden by the Divine law. It is also against natural right taken in the first sense, as appears from what has been said, for such is nature's dictate to every animal according to the mode befitting its nature. Wherefore also certain animals, the rearing of whose offspring demands the care of both, namely the male and female, by natural instinct cling to the union of one with one, for instance the turtle-dove, the dove, and so forth.

The Reply to the Fifth Objection is clear from what has been said.

Since, however, the arguments adduced "on the contrary side" would seem to show that plurality of wives is against the first principles of the natural law, we must reply to them.

Accordingly we reply to the Sixth Objection that human nature was founded without any defect, and consequently it is endowed not only with those things without which the principal end of marriage is impossible of attainment, but also with those without which the secondary end of marriage could not be obtained without difficulty: and in this way it sufficed man when he was first formed to have one wife, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 7: In marriage the husband gives his wife power of his body, not in all respects, but only in those things that are required by marriage. Now marriage does not require the husband to pay the debt every time his wife asks for it, if we consider the principal end for which marriage was instituted, namely the good of the offspring, but only as far as is necessary for impregnation. But in so far as it is instituted as a remedy (which is its secondary end), marriage does require the debt to be paid at all times on being asked for. Hence it is evident that by taking several wives a man does not bind himself to the impossible, considering the principal end of marriage; and therefore plurality of wives is not against the first principles of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 8: This precept of the natural law, "Do not to another what thou wouldst not were done to thyself," should be understood with the proviso that there be equal proportion. For if a superior is unwilling to be withstood by his subject, he is not therefore bound not to withstand his subject. Hence it does not follow in virtue of this precept that as a husband is unwilling for his wife to have another husband, he must not have another wife: because for one man to have several wives is not contrary to the first principles of the natural law, as stated above: whereas for one wife to have several husbands is contrary to the first principles of the natural law, since thereby the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage is, in one respect, entirely destroyed, and in another respect hindered. For the good of the offspring means not only begetting, but also rearing. Now the begetting of offspring, though not wholly voided (since a woman may be impregnated a second time after impregnation has already taken place, as stated in De Gener. Animal. vii. 4), is nevertheless considerably hindered, because this can scarcely happen without injury either to both fetus or to one of them. But the rearing of the offspring is altogether done away, because as a result of one woman having several husbands there follows uncertainty of the offspring in relation to its father, whose care is necessary for its education. Wherefore the marriage of one wife with several husbands has not been sanctioned by any law or custom, whereas the converse has been.

Reply to Objection 9: The natural inclination in the appetitive power follows the natural concept in the cognitive power. And since it is not so much opposed to the natural concept for a man to have several wives as for a wife to have several husbands, it follows that a wife's love is not so averse to another sharing the same husband with her, as a husband's love is to another sharing the same wife with him. Consequently both in man and in other animals the male is more jealous of the female than "vice versa."

Whether it was ever lawful to have several wives?

Objection 1: It would seem that it can never have been lawful to have several wives. For, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7), "The natural law has the same power at all times and places." Now plurality of wives is forbidden by the natural law, as stated above [5012](A[1]). Therefore as it is unlawful now, it was unlawful at all times.

Objection 2: Further, if it was ever lawful, this could only be because it was lawful either in itself, or by dispensation. If the former, it would also be lawful now; if the latter, this is impossible, for according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3), "as God is the founder of nature, He does nothing contrary to the principles which He has planted in nature." Since then God has planted in our nature the principle that one man should be united to one wife, it would seem that He has never dispensed man from this.

Objection 3: Further, if a thing be lawful by dispensation, it is only lawful for those who receive the dispensation. Now we do not read in the Law of a general dispensation having been granted to all. Since then in the Old Testament all who wished to do so, without any distinction, took to themselves several wives, nor were reproached on that account, either by the law or by the prophets, it would seem that it was not made lawful by dispensation.

Objection 4: Further, where there is the same reason for dispensation, the same dispensation should be given. Now we cannot assign any other reason for dispensation than the multiplying of the offspring for the worship of God, and this is necessary also now. Therefore this dispensation would be still in force, especially as we read nowhere of its having been recalled.

Objection 5: Further, in granting a dispensation the greater good should not be overlooked for the sake of a lesser good. Now fidelity and the sacrament, which it would seem impossible to safeguard in a marriage where one man is joined to several wives, are greater goods than the multiplication of the offspring. Therefore this dispensation ought not to have been granted with a view to this multiplication.

On the contrary, It is stated (Gal. 3:19) that the Law "was set because of transgressors [Vulg.: 'transgressions']," namely in order to prohibit them. Now the Old Law mentions plurality of wives without any prohibition thereof, as appears from Dt. 21:15, "If a man have two wives," etc. Therefore they were not transgressors through having two wives; and so it was lawful.

Further, this is confirmed by the example of the holy patriarchs, who are stated to have had several wives, and yet were most pleasing to God, for instance Jacob, David, and several others. Therefore at one time it was lawful.

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8), plurality of wives is said to be against the natural law, not as regards its first precepts, but as regards the secondary precepts, which like conclusions are drawn from its first precepts. Since, however, human acts must needs vary according to the various conditions of persons, times, and other circumstances, the aforesaid conclusions do not proceed from the first precepts of the natural law, so as to be binding in all cases, but only in the majority. for such is the entire matter of Ethics according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7). Hence, when they cease to be binding, it is lawful to disregard them. But because it is not easy to determine the above variations, it belongs exclusively to him from whose authority he derives its binding force to permit the non-observance of the law in those cases to which the force of the law ought not to extend, and this permission is called a dispensation. Now the law prescribing the one wife was framed not by man but by God, nor was it ever given by word or in writing, but was imprinted on the heart, like other things belonging in any way to the natural law. Consequently a dispensation in this matter could be granted by God alone through an inward inspiration, vouchsafed originally to the holy patriarchs, and by their example continued to others, at a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure the multiplication of the offspring to be brought up in the worship of God. For the principal end is ever to be borne in mind before the secondary end. Wherefore, since the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage, it behooved to disregard for a time the impediment that might arise to the secondary ends, when it was necessary for the offspring to be multiplied; because it was for the removal of this impediment that the precept forbidding a plurality of wives was framed, as stated above [5013] (A[1]).

Reply to Objection 1: The natural law, considered in itself, has the same force at all times and places; but accidentally on account of some impediment it may vary at certain times and places, as the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 3,7) instances in the case of other natural things. For at all times and places the right hand is better than the left according to nature, but it may happen accidentally that a person is ambidextrous, because our nature is variable; and the same applies to the natural, just as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i, 3,7).

Reply to Objection 2: In a Decretal (De divortiis, cap. Gaudemus) it is asserted that is was never lawful to have several wives without having a dispensation received through Divine inspiration. Nor is the dispensation thus granted a contradiction to the principles which God has implanted in nature, but an exception to them, because those principles are not intended to apply to all cases but to the majority, as stated. Even so it is not contrary to nature when certain occurrences take place in natural things miraculously, by way of exception to more frequent occurrences.

Reply to Objection 3: Dispensation from a law should follow the quality of the law. Wherefore, since the law of nature is imprinted on the heart, it was not necessary for a dispensation from things pertaining to the natural law to be given under the form of a written law but by internal inspiration.

Reply to Objection 4: When Christ came it was the time of the fulness of the grace of Christ, whereby the worship of God was spread abroad among all nations by a spiritual propagation. Hence there is not the same reason for a dispensation as before Christ's coming, when the worship of God was spread and safeguarded by a carnal propagation.

Reply to Objection 5: The offspring, considered as one of the marriage goods, includes the keeping of faith with God, because the reason why it is reckoned a marriage good is because it is awaited with a view to its being brought up in the worship of God. Now the faith to be kept with God is of greater import than the faith to be kept with a wife, which is reckoned a marriage good, and than the signification which pertains to the sacrament, since the signification is subordinate to the knowledge of faith. Hence it is not unfitting if something is taken from the two other goods for the sake of the good of the offspring. Nor are they entirely done away, since there remains faith towards several wives; and the sacrament remains after a fashion, for though it did not signify the union of Christ with the Church as one, nevertheless the plurality of wives signified the distinction of degrees in the Church, which distinction is not only in the Church militant but also in the Church triumphant. Consequently their marriages signified somewhat the union of Christ not only with the Church militant, as some say, but also with the Church triumphant where there are "many mansions" [*Jn. 19:2].

Whether it is against the natural law to have a concubine?

Objection 1: It would seem that to have a concubine is not against the natural law. For the ceremonies of the Law are not of the natural law. But fornication is forbidden (Acts 15:29) in conjunction with ceremonies of the law which for the time were being imposed on those who were brought to the faith from among the heathens. Therefore simple fornication which is intercourse with a concubine is not against the natural law.

Objection 2: Further, positive law is an outcome of the natural law, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Now fornication was not forbidden by positive law; indeed according to the ancient laws women used to be sentenced to be taken to brothels. Therefore it is not against the natural law to have a concubine.

Objection 3: Further, the natural law does not forbid that which is given simply, to be given for a time or under certain restrictions. Now one unmarried woman may give the power of her body for ever to an unmarried man, so that he may use her when he will. Therefore it is not against the law of nature, if she give him power of her body for a time.

Objection 4: Further, whoever uses his own property as he will, injures no one. But a bondswoman is her master's property. Therefore if her master use her as he will, he injures no one: and consequently it is not against the natural law to have a concubine.

Objection 5: Further, everyone may give his own property to another. Now the wife has power of her husband's body (1 Cor. 7:4). Therefore if his wife be willing, the husband can have intercourse with another woman without sin.

On the contrary, According to all laws the children born of a concubine are children of shame. But this would not be so unless the union of which they are born were naturally shameful.

Further, as stated above ([5014]Q[41], A[1]), marriage is natural. But this would not be so if without prejudice to the natural law a man could be united to a woman otherwise than by marriage. Therefore it is against the natural law to have a concubine.

I answer that, As stated above [5015](A[1]), an action is said to be against the natural law, if it is not in keeping with the due end intended by nature, whether through not being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through being directed thereto by the action of the agent, or through being in itself improportionate to that end. Now the end which nature intends in sexual union is the begetting and rearing of the offspring. and that this good might be sought after, it attached pleasure to the union; as Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 8). Accordingly to make use of sexual intercourse on account of its inherent pleasure, without reference to the end for which nature intended it, is to act against nature, as also is it if the intercourse be not such as may fittingly be directed to that end. And since, for the most part, things are denominated from their end, as being that which is of most consequence to them, just as the marriage union took its name from the good of the offspring [*Cf. Q[44], A[2]], which is the end chiefly sought after in marriage, so the name of concubine is expressive of that union where sexual intercourse is sought after for its own sake. Moreover even though sometimes a man may seek to have offspring of such an intercourse, this is not befitting to the good of the offspring, which signifies not only the begetting of children from which they take their being, but also their rearing and instruction, by which means they receive nourishment and learning from their parents, in respect of which three things the parents are bound to their children, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 11,12). Now since the rearing and teaching of the children remain a duty of the parents during a long period of time, the law of nature requires the father and mother to dwell together for a long time, in order that together they may be of assistance to their children. Hence birds that unite together in rearing their young do not sever their mutual fellowship from the time when they first come together until the young are fully fledged. Now this obligation which binds the female and her mate to remain together constitutes matrimony. Consequently it is evident that it is contrary to the natural law for a man to have intercourse with a woman who is not married to him, which is the signification of a concubine.

Reply to Objection 1: Among the Gentiles the natural law was obscured in many points: and consequently they did not think it wrong to have intercourse with a concubine, and in many cases practiced fornication as though it were lawful, as also other things contrary to the ceremonial laws of the Jews, though not contrary to the law of nature. Wherefore the apostles inserted the prohibition of fornication among that of other ceremonial observances, because in both cases there was a difference of opinion between Jews and Gentiles.

Reply to Objection 2: This law was the result of the darkness just mentioned, into which the Gentiles had fallen, by not giving due honor to God as stated in Rom. 1:21, and did not proceed from the instinct of the natural law. Hence, when the Christian religion prevailed, this law was abolished.

Reply to Objection 3: In certain cases no evil results ensue if a person surrenders his right to a thing whether absolutely or for a time, so that in neither case is the surrender against the natural law. But that does not apply to the case in point, wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 4: Injury is opposed to justice. Now the natural law forbids not only injustice, but also whatever is opposed to any of the virtues: for instance it is contrary to the natural law to eat immoderately, although by doing so a man uses his own property without injury to anyone. Moreover although a bondswoman is her master's property that she may serve him, she is not his that she may be his concubine. And again it depends how a person makes use of his property. For such a man does an injury to the offspring he begets, since such a union is not directed to its good, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: The wife has power of her husband's body, not simply and in all respects, but only in relation to marriage, and consequently she cannot transfer her husband's body to another to the detriment of the good of marriage.

Whether it is a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not a mortal sin to have intercourse with a concubine. For a lie is a greater sin than simple fornication: and a proof of this is that Juda, who did not abhor to commit fornication with Thamar, recoiled from telling a lie, saying (Gn. 38:23): "Surely she cannot charge us with a lie." But a lie is not always a mortal sin. Neither therefore is simple fornication.

Objection 2: Further, a deadly sin should be punished with death. But the Old Law did not punish with death intercourse with a concubine, save in a certain case (Dt. 22:25). Therefore it is not a deadly sin.

Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxiii, 12), the sins of the flesh are less blameworthy than spiritual sins. Now pride and covetousness, which are spiritual sins, are not always mortal sins. Therefore fornication, which is a sin of the flesh, is not always a mortal sin.

Objection 4: Further, where the incentive is greater the sin is less grievous, because he sins more who is overcome by a lighter temptation. But concupiscence is the greatest incentive to lust. Therefore since lustful actions are not always mortal sins, neither is simple fornication a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Nothing but mortal sin excludes from the kingdom of God. But fornicators are excluded from the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 6:9,10). Therefore simple fornication is a mortal sin.

Further, mortal sins alone are called crimes. Now all fornication is a crime according to Tob. 4:13, “Take heed to keep thyself . . . from all fornication, and beside thy wife never endure to know crime.” Therefore, etc.

I answer that, As we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 42, Q[1], A[4]), those sins are mortal in their genus which violate the bond of friendship between man and God, and between man and man; for such sins are against the two precepts of charity which is the life of the soul. Wherefore since the intercourse of fornication destroys the due relations of the parent with the offspring that is nature’s aim in sexual intercourse, there can be no doubt that simple fornication by its very nature is a mortal sin even though there were no written law.

Reply to Objection 1: It often happens that a man who does not avoid a mortal sin, avoids a venial sin to which he has not so great an incentive. Thus, too, Juda avoided a lie while he avoided not fornication. Nevertheless that would have been a pernicious lie, for it would have involved an injury if he had not kept his promise.

Reply to Objection 2: A sin is called deadly, not because it is punished with temporal, but because it is punished with eternal death. Hence also theft, which is a mortal sin, and many other sins are sometimes not punished with temporal death by the law. The same applies to fornication.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as not every movement of pride is a mortal sin, so neither is every movement of lust, because the first movements of lust and the like are venial sins, even sometimes marriage intercourse. Nevertheless some acts of lust are mortal sins, while some movements of pride are venial: since the words quoted from Gregory are to be understood as comparing vices in their genus and not in their particular acts.

Reply to Objection 4: A circumstance is the more effective in aggravating a sin according as it comes nearer to the nature of sin. Hence although fornication is less grave on account of the greatness of its incentive, yet on account of the matter about which it is, it has a greater gravity than immoderate eating, because it is about those things which tighten the bond of human fellowship, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

Whether it was ever lawful to have a concubine?

Objection 1: It would seem that it has been sometimes lawful to have a concubine. For just as the natural law requires a man to have but one wife, so does it forbid him to have a concubine. Yet at times it has been lawful to have several wives. Therefore it has also been lawful to have a concubine.

Objection 2: Further, a woman cannot be at the same time a slave and a wife; wherefore according to the Law (Dt. 21:11, seqq.) a bondswoman gained her freedom by the very fact of being taken in marriage. Now we read that certain men who were most beloved of God, for instance Abraham and Jacob, had intercourse with their bondswomen. Therefore these were not wives, and consequently it was sometime lawful to have a concubine.

Objection 3: Further, a woman who is taken in marriage cannot be cast out, and her son should have a share in the inheritance. Yet Abraham sent Agar away, and her son was not his heir (Gn. 21:14). Therefore she was not Abraham’s wife.

On the contrary, Things opposed to the precepts of the decalogue were never lawful. Now to have a concubine is against a precept of the decalogue, namely, “Thou shalt not commit adultery.” Therefore it was never lawful.

Further, Ambrose says in his book on the patriarchs (De Abraham i, 4): “What is unlawful to a wife is unlawful to a husband.” But it is never lawful for a wife to put aside her own husband and have intercourse with another man. Therefore it was never lawful for a husband to have a concubine.

I answer that, Rabbi Moses says (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) that before the time of the Law fornication was not a sin; and he proved his assertion from the fact that Juda had intercourse with Thamar. But this argument is not conclusive. For there is no need to excuse Jacob’s sons from mortal sin, since they were accused to their father of a most wicked crime (Gn. 37:2), and consented kill Joseph and to sell him. Wherefore we must say that since it is against the natural law to have a concubine outside wedlock, as stated above [5016](A[3]), it was never lawful either in itself or by dispensation. For as we have shown (Doc. Perp. iii, 49) intercourse with a woman outside wedlock is an action improportionate to the good of the offspring which is the principal end of marriage: and consequently it is against the first precepts of the natural law which admit of no dispensation. Hence wherever in the Old Testament we read of concubines being taken by such men as we ought to excuse from mortal sin, we must needs understand them to have been taken in marriage, and yet to have been called concubines, because they had something of the character of a wife and something of the character of a concubine. In so far as marriage is directed to its principal end, which is the good of the offspring, the union of wife and husband is indissoluble or at least of a lasting nature, as shown above [5017](A[1]), and in regard to this there is no dispensation. But in regard to the secondary end, which is the management of the household and community of works, the wife is united to the husband as his mate: and this was lacking in those who were known as concubines. For in this respect a dispensation was possible, since it is the secondary end of marriage. And from this point of view they bore some resemblance to concubines, and for this reason they were known as such.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[1], ad 7,8) to have several wives is not against the first precepts of the natural law, as it is to have a concubine; wherefore the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: The patriarchs of old by virtue of the dispensation which allowed them several wives, approached their bondswomen with the disposition of a husband towards his wife. For these women were wives as to the principal and first end of marriage, but not as to the other union which regards the secondary end, to which bondage is opposed since a woman cannot be at once mate and slave.

Reply to Objection 3: As in the Mosaic law it was allowable by dispensation to grant a bill of divorce in order to avoid wife-murder (as we shall state further on[5018], Q[67], A[6]), so by the same dispensation Abraham was allowed to send Agar away, in order to signify the mystery which the Apostle explains (Gal. 4:22, seqq.). Again, that this son did not inherit belongs to the mystery, as explained in the same place. Even so Esau, the son of a free woman, did not inherit (Rom. 9:13, seqq.). In like manner on account of the mystery it came about that the sons of Jacob born of bond and free women inherited, as Augustine says (Tract. xi in Joan.) because “sons and heirs are born to Christ both of good ministers denoted by the free woman and of evil ministers denoted by the bondswoman.”

OF BIGAMY AND OF THE IRREGULARITY CONTRACTED THEREBY (FIVE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider bigamy and the irregularity contracted thereby. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether irregularity attaches to the bigamy that consists in having two successive wives?

(2) Whether irregularity is contracted by one who has two wives at once?

(3) Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?

(4) Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?

(5) Whether a dispensation can be granted to a bigamous person?

Whether irregularity attaches to bigamy?

Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not attached to the bigamy that consists in having two wives successively. For multitude and unity are consequent upon being. Since then non-being does not cause plurality, a man who has two wives successively, the one in being, the other in non-being, does not thereby become the husband of more than one wife, so as to be debarred, according to the Apostle (1 Tim. 3:2; Titus 1:6), from the episcopate.

Objection 2: Further, a man who commits fornication with several women gives more evidence of incontinence than one who has several wives successively. Yet in the first case a man does not become irregular. Therefore neither in the second should he become irregular.

Objection 3: Further, if bigamy causes irregularity, this is either because of the sacrament, or because of the carnal intercourse. Now it is not on account of the former, for if a man had contracted marriage by words of the present and, his wife dying before the consummation of the marriage, he were to marry another, he would become irregular, which is against the decree of Innocent III (cap. Dubium, De bigamia). Nor again is it on account of the second, for then a man who had committed fornication with several women would become irregular: which is false. Therefore bigamy nowise causes irregularity.

I answer that, By the sacrament of order a man is appointed to the ministry of the sacraments; and he who has to administer the sacraments to others must suffer from no defect in the sacraments. Now there is a defect in a sacrament when the entire signification of the sacrament is not found therein. And the sacrament of marriage signifies the union of Christ with the Church, which is the union of one with one. Therefore the perfect signification of the sacrament requires the husband to have only one wife, and the wife to have but one husband; and consequently bigamy, which does away with this, causes irregularity. And there are four kinds of bigamy: the first is when a man has several lawful wives successively; the second is when a man has several wives at once, one in law, the other in fact; the third, when he has several successively, one in law, the other in fact; the fourth, when a man marries a widow. Accordingly irregularity attaches to all of these.

There is another consequent reason assigned, since those who receive the sacrament of order should be signalized by the greatest spirituality, both because they administer spiritual things, namely the sacraments, and because they teach spiritual things, and should be occupied in spiritual matters. Wherefore since concupiscence is most incompatible with spirituality, inasmuch as it makes a man to be wholly carnal, they should give no sign of persistent concupiscence, which does indeed show itself in bigamous persons, seeing that they were unwilling to be content with one wife. The first reason however is the better.

Reply to Objection 1: The multitude of several wives at the same time is a multitude simply, wherefore a multitude of this kind is wholly inconsistent with the signification of the sacrament, so that the sacrament is voided on that account. But the multitude of several successive wives is a multitude relatively, wherefore it does not entirely destroy the signification of the sacrament, nor does it void the sacrament in its essence but in its perfection, which is required of those who are the dispensers of sacraments.

Reply to Objection 2: Although those who are guilty of fornication give proof of greater concupiscence, theirs is not a so persistent concupiscence, since by fornication one party is not bound to the other for ever; and consequently no defect attaches to the sacrament.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, bigamy causes irregularity, because it destroys the perfect signification of the sacrament: which signification is seated both in the union of minds, as expressed by the consent, and in the union of bodies. Wherefore bigamy must affect both of these at the same time in order to cause irregularity. Hence the decree of

Innocent III disposes of the statement of the Master (Sent. iv, D, 27), namely that consent alone by words of the present is sufficient to cause irregularity.

Whether irregularity results from bigamy, when one husband has two wives, one in law, the other in fact?

Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity does not result from bigamy when one husband has two wives at the same time, one in law and one in fact. For when the sacrament is void there can be no defect in the sacrament. Now when a man marries a woman in fact but not in law there is no sacrament, since such a union does not signify the union of Christ with the Church. Therefore since irregularity does not result from bigamy except on account of a defect in the sacrament, it would seem that no irregularity attaches to bigamy of this kind.

Objection 2: Further, if a man has intercourse with a woman whom he has married in fact and not in law, he commits fornication if he has not a lawful wife, or adultery if he has. But a man does not become irregular by dividing his flesh among several women by fornication or adultery. Therefore neither does he by the aforesaid kind of bigamy.

Objection 3: Further, it may happen that a man, before knowing carnally the woman he has married in law, marries another in fact and not in law, and knows her carnally, whether the former woman be living or dead. Now this man has contracted marriage with several women either in law or in fact, and yet he is not irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among several women. Therefore irregularity is not contracted by reason of the aforesaid kind of bigamy.

I answer that, Irregularity is contracted in the two second kinds of bigamy, for although in the one there is no sacrament, there is a certain likeness to a sacrament. Wherefore these two kinds are secondary, and the first is the principal kind in causing irregularity.

Reply to Objection 1: Although there is no sacrament in this case there is a certain likeness to a sacrament, whereas there is no such likeness in fornication or adultery. Hence the comparison fails.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: In this case the man is not reckoned a bigamist, because the first marriage lacked its perfect signification. Nevertheless if, by the judgment of the Church, he be compelled to return to his first wife and carnally to know her, he becomes irregular forthwith, because the irregularity is the result not of the sin but of imperfect signification.

Whether irregularity is contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin?

Objection 1: It would seem that irregularity is not contracted by marrying one who is not a virgin. For a man's own defect is a greater impediment to him than the defect of another. But if the man himself who marries is not a virgin he does not become irregular. Therefore much less does he if his wife is not a virgin.

Objection 2: Further, it may happen that a man marries a woman after corrupting her. Now, seemingly, such a man does not become irregular, since he has not divided his flesh among several, nor has his wife done so, and yet he marries a woman who is not a virgin. Therefore this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

Objection 3: Further, no man can become irregular except voluntarily. But sometimes a man marries involuntarily one who is not a virgin, for instance when he thinks her a virgin and afterwards, by knowing her carnally, finds that she is not. Therefore this kind does not always cause irregularity.

Objection 4: Further, unlawful intercourse after marriage is more guilty than before marriage. Now if a wife, after the marriage has been consummated, has intercourse with another man, her husband does not become irregular, otherwise he would be punished for his wife's sin. Moreover, it might happen that, after knowing of this, he pays her the debt at her asking, before she is accused and convicted of adultery. Therefore it would seem that this kind of bigamy does not cause irregularity.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Regist. ii, ep. 37): “We command thee never to make unlawful ordinations, nor to admit to holy orders a bigamist, or one who has married a woman that is not a virgin, or one who is unlettered, or one who is deformed in his limbs, or bound to do penance or to perform some civil duty, or who is in any state of subjection.”

I answer that, In the union of Christ with the Church unity is found on either side. Consequently whether we find division of the flesh on the part of the husband, or on the part of the wife, there is a defect of sacrament. There is, however, a difference, because on the part of the husband it is required that he should not have married another wife, but not that he should be a virgin, whereas on the part of the wife it is also required that she be a virgin. The reason assigned by those versed in the Decretals is because the bridegroom signifies the Church militant which is entrusted to the care of a bishop, and in which there are many corruptions, while the spouse signifies Christ Who was a virgin: wherefore virginity on the part of the spouse, but not on the part of the bridegroom, is required in order that a man be made a bishop. This reason, however, is expressly contrary to the words of the Apostle (Eph. 5:25): “Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church,” which show that the bride signifies the Church, and the bridegroom Christ; and again he says (Eph. 5:23): “Because the husband is the head of the wife, as Christ is the head of the Church.” Wherefore others say that Christ is signified by the bridegroom, and that the bride signifies the Church triumphant in which there is no stain. Also that the synagogue was first united to Christ as a concubine; so that the sacrament loses nothing of its signification if the bridegroom previously had a concubine. But this is most absurd, since just as the faith of ancients and of moderns is one, so is the Church one. Wherefore those who served God at the time of the synagogue belonged to the unity of the Church in which we serve God. Moreover this is expressly contrary to Jer. 3:14, Ezech. 16:8, Osee 2:16, where the espousals of the synagogue are mentioned explicitly: so that she was not as a concubine but as a wife. Again, according to this, fornication would be the sacred sign [sacramentum] of that union, which is absurd. Wherefore heathendom, before being espoused to Christ in the faith of the Church, was corrupted by the devil through idolatry. Hence we must say otherwise that irregularity is caused by a defect in the sacrament itself. Now when corruption of the flesh occurs outside wedlock on account of a preceding marriage, it causes no defect in the sacrament on the part of the person corrupted, but it causes a defect in the other person, because the act of one who contracts marriage terminates not in himself, but in the other party, wherefore it takes its species from its term, which, moreover, in regard to that act, is the matter as it were of the sacrament. Consequently if a woman were able to receive orders, just as her husband becomes irregular through marrying one who is not a virgin, but not through his not being a virgin when he marries, so also would a woman become irregular if she were to marry a man who is not a virgin, but not if she were no longer a virgin when she married—unless she had been corrupted by reason of a previous marriage.

This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: In this case opinions differ. It is, however, more probable that he is not irregular, because he has not divided his flesh among several women.

Reply to Objection 3: Irregularity is not the infliction of a punishment, but the defect of a sacrament. Consequently it is not always necessary for bigamy to be voluntary in order to cause irregularity. Hence a man who marries a woman, thinking her to be a virgin, whereas she is not, becomes irregular by knowing her carnally.

Reply to Objection 4: If a woman commits fornication after being married, her husband does not become irregular on that account, unless he again knows her carnally after she has been corrupted by adultery, since otherwise the corruption of the wife nowise affects the marriage act of the husband. But though he be compelled by law to pay her the debt, or if he do so at her request, being compelled by his own conscience, even before she is convicted of adultery, he becomes irregular, albeit opinions differ on this point. However, what we have said is more probable, since here it is not a question of sin, but of signification only.

Whether bigamy is removed by Baptism?

Objection 1: It would seem that bigamy is removed by Baptism. For Jerome says in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus (1:6, “the husband of one wife”) that if a man has had several wives before receiving Baptism, or one before and another after Baptism, he is not a bigamist. Therefore bigamy is removed by Baptism.

Objection 2: Further, he who does what is more, does what is less. Now Baptism removes all sin, and sin is a greater thing than irregularity. Therefore it removes irregularity.

Objection 3: Further, Baptism takes away all punishment resulting from an act. Now such is the irregularity of bigamy. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, a bigamist is irregular because he is deficient in the representation of Christ. Now by Baptism we are fully conformed to Christ. Therefore this irregularity is removed.

Objection 5: Further, the sacraments of the New Law are more efficacious than the sacraments of the Old Law. But the sacraments of the Old Law removed irregularities according to the Master’s statement (Sent. iv,). Therefore Baptism also, being the most efficacious of the sacraments of the New Law, removes the irregularity consequent upon bigamy.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii): “Those understand the question more correctly who maintain that a man who has married a second wife, though he was a catechumen or even a pagan at the time, cannot be ordained, because it is a question of a sacrament, not of a sin.”

Further, according to the same authority (De Bono Conjug. xviii) “a woman who has been corrupted while a catechumen or a pagan cannot after Baptism be consecrated among God’s virgins.” Therefore in like manner one who was a bigamist before Baptism cannot be ordained.

I answer that, Baptism removes sin, but does not dissolve marriage. Wherefore since irregularity results from marriage, it cannot be removed by Baptism, as Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xviii).

Reply to Objection 1: In this case Jerome’s opinion is not followed: unless perhaps he wished to explain that he means that a dispensation should be more easily granted.

Reply to Objection 2: It does not follow that what does a greater thing, does a lesser, unless it be directed to the latter. This is not so in the case in point, because Baptism is not directed to the removal of an irregularity.

Reply to Objection 3: This must be understood of punishments consequent upon actual sin, which are, or have yet to be, inflicted: for one does not recover virginity by Baptism, nor again undivision of the flesh.

Reply to Objection 4: Baptism conforms a man to Christ as regards the virtue of the mind, but not as to the condition of the body, which is effected by virginity or division of the flesh.

Reply to Objection 5: Those irregularities were contracted through slight and temporary causes, and consequently they could be removed by those sacraments. Moreover the latter were ordained for that purpose, whereas Baptism is not.

Whether it is lawful for a bigamist to receive a dispensation?

Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for a bigamist to be granted a dispensation. For it is said (Extra, De bigamis, cap. Nuper): “It is not lawful to grant a dispensation to clerics who, as far as they could do so, have taken to themselves a second wife.”

Objection 2: Further, it is not lawful to grant a dispensation from the Divine law. Now whatever is in the canonical writings belongs to the Divine law. Since then in canonical Scripture the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:2): “It behooveth . . . a bishop to be . . . the husband of one wife,” it would seem that a dispensation cannot be granted in this matter.

Objection 3: Further, no one can receive a dispensation in what is essential to a sacrament. But it is essential to the sacrament of order that the recipient be not irregular, since the signification which is essential to a sacrament is lacking in one who is irregular. Therefore he cannot be granted a dispensation in this.

Objection 4: Further, what is reasonably done cannot be reasonably undone. If, therefore, a bigamist can lawfully receive a dispensation, it was unreasonable that he should be irregular: which is inadmissible.

On the contrary, Pope Lucius granted a dispensation to the bishop of Palermo who was a bigamist, as stated in the gloss on can. Lector, dist. 34.

Further, Pope Martin [*Martinus Bracarensis: cap. xliii] says: “If a Reader marry a widow, let him remain a Reader, or if there be need for it, he may receive the Subdiaconate, but no higher order: and the same applies if he should be a bigamist.” Therefore he may at least receive a dispensation as far as the Subdiaconate.

I answer that, Irregularity attaches to bigamy not by natural, but by positive law; nor again is it one of the essentials of order that a man be not a bigamist, which is evident from the fact that if a bigamist present himself for orders, he receives the character. Wherefore the Pope can dispense altogether from such an irregularity; but a bishop, only as regards the minor orders, though some say that in order to prevent religious wandering abroad he can dispense therefrom as regards the major orders in those who wish to serve God in religion.

Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal shows that there is the same difficulty against granting a dispensation in those who have married several wives in fact, as if they had married them in law; but it does not prove that the Pope has no power to grant a dispensation in such cases.

Reply to Objection 2: This is true as regards things belonging to the natural law, and those which are essential to the sacraments, and to faith. But in those which owe their institution to the apostles, since the Church has the same power now as then of setting up and of putting down, she can grant a dispensation through him who holds the primacy.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every signification is essential to a sacrament, but that alone which belongs to the sacramental effect,* and this is not removed by irregularity. [*Leonine edition reads “officium,” some read “effectum”; the meaning is the same, and is best rendered as above.]

Reply to Objection 4: In particular cases there is no ratio that applies to all equally, on account of their variety. Hence what is reasonably established for all, in consideration of what happens in the majority of cases, can be with equal reason done away in a certain definite case.

OF THE BILL OF DIVORCE (SEVEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the bill of divorce, under which head there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law?

(2) Whether by dispensation it may become lawful to put away a wife?

(3) Whether it was lawful under the Mosaic law?

(4) Whether a wife who has been divorced may take another husband?

(5) Whether the husband can marry again the wife whom he has divorced?

(6) Whether the cause of divorce was hatred of the wife?

(7) Whether the reasons for divorce had to be written on the bill?

Whether inseparableness of the wife is of natural law?

Objection 1: It would seem that inseparableness of the wife is not of natural law. For the natural law is the same for all. But no law save Christ’s has forbidden the divorcing of a wife. Therefore inseparableness of a wife is not of natural law.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments are not of the natural law. But the indissolubility of marriage is one of the marriage goods. Therefore it is not of the natural law.

Objection 3: Further, the union of man and woman in marriage is chiefly directed to the begetting, rearing, and instruction of the offspring. But all things are complete by a certain time. Therefore after that time it is lawful to put away a wife without prejudice to the natural law.

Objection 4: Further, the good of the offspring is the principal end of marriage. But the indissolubility of marriage is opposed to the good of the offspring, because, according to philosophers, a certain man cannot beget offspring of a certain woman, and yet he might beget of another, even though she may have had intercourse with another man. Therefore the indissolubility of marriage is against rather than according to the natural law.

On the contrary, Those things which were assigned to nature when it was well established in its beginning belong especially to the law of nature. Now the indissolubility of marriage is one of these things according to Mat. 19:4,6. Therefore it is of natural law.

Further, it is of natural law that man should not oppose himself to God. Yet man would, in a way, oppose himself to God if he were to sunder “what God hath joined together.” Since then the indissolubility of marriage is gathered from this passage (Mat. 19:6) it would seem that it is of natural law.

I answer that, By the intention of nature marriage is directed to the rearing of the offspring, not merely for a time, but throughout its whole life. Hence it is of natural law that parents should lay up for their children, and that children should be their parents’ heirs (2 Cor. 12:14). Therefore, since the offspring is the common good of husband and wife, the dictate of the natural law requires the latter to live together for ever inseparably: and so the indissolubility of marriage is of natural law.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s law alone brought mankind “to perfection” [*Cf. Heb. 7:19] by bringing man back to the state of the newness of nature.

Wherefore neither Mosaic nor human laws could remove all that was contrary to the law of nature, for this was reserved exclusively to “the law of the spirit of life” [*Cf. Rom. 8:2].

Reply to Objection 2: Indissolubility belongs to marriage in so far as the latter is a sign of the perpetual union of Christ with the Church, and in so far as it fulfills an office of nature that is directed to the good of the offspring, as stated above. But since divorce is more directly incompatible with the signification of the sacrament than with the good of the offspring, with which it is incompatible consequently, as stated above ([5019]Q[65], A[2], ad 5), the indissolubility of marriage is implied in the good of the sacrament rather than in the good of the offspring, although it may be connected with both. And in so far as it is connected with the good of the offspring, it is of the natural law, but not as connected with the good of the sacrament.

The Reply to the Third Objection may be gathered from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: Marriage is chiefly directed to the common good in respect of its principal end, which is the good of the offspring; although in respect of its secondary end it is directed to the good of the contracting party, in so far as it is by its very nature a remedy for concupiscence. Hence marriage laws consider what is expedient for all rather than what may be suitable for one. Therefore although the indissolubility of marriage hinder the good of the offspring with regard to some individual, it is proportionate with the good of the offspring absolutely speaking: and for this reason the argument does not prove.

Whether it may have been lawful by dispensation to put away a wife?

Objection 1: It seems that it could not be lawful by dispensation to put away a wife. For in marriage anything that is opposed to the good of the offspring is against the first precepts of the natural law, which admit of no dispensation. Now such is the putting away of a wife, as stated above [5020](A[1]). Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, a concubine differs from a wife especially in the fact that she is not inseparably united. But by no dispensation could a man have a concubine. Therefore by no dispensation could he put his wife away.

Objection 3: Further, men are as fit to receive a dispensation now as of old. But now a man cannot receive a dispensation to divorce his wife. Neither, therefore, could he in olden times.

On the contrary, Abraham carnally knew Agar with the disposition of a husband towards his wife, as stated above ([5021]Q[65], A[5], ad 2,3). Now by Divine command he sent her away, and yet sinned not. Therefore it could be lawful by dispensation for a man to put away his wife.

I answer that, In the commandments, especially those which in some way are of natural law, a dispensation is like a change in the natural course of things: and this course is subject to a twofold change. First, by some natural cause whereby another natural cause is hindered from following its course: it is thus in all things that happen by chance less frequently in nature. In this way, however, there is no variation in the course of those natural things which happen always, but only in the course of those which happen frequently. Secondly, by a cause altogether supernatural, as in the case of miracles: and in this way there can be a variation in the course of nature, not only in the course which is appointed for the majority of cases, but also in the course which is appointed for all cases, as instanced by the sun standing still at the time of Josue, and by its turning back at the time of Ezechias, and by the miraculous eclipse at the time of Christ’s Passion [*Jos. 10:14; 4 Kings 20:10; Is. 38:8; Mat. 27:15]. In like manner the reason for a dispensation from a precept of the law of nature is sometimes found in the lower causes, and in this way a dispensation may bear upon the secondary precepts of the natural law, but not on the first precepts because these are always existent as it were, as stated above ([5022]Q[65], A[1]) in reference to the plurality of wives and so forth. But sometimes this reason is found in the higher causes, and then a dispensation may be given by God even from the first precepts of the natural law, for the sake of signifying or showing some Divine mystery, as instanced in the dispensation vouchsafed to Abraham in the slaying of his innocent son. Such dispensations, however, are not granted to all generally, but to certain individual persons, as also happens in regard to miracles. Accordingly, if the indissolubility of marriage is contained among the first precepts of the natural law, it could only be a matter of dispensation in this second way; but, if it be one of the second precepts of the natural law, it could be a matter of dispensation even in the first way. Now it would seem to belong rather to the secondary precepts of the natural law. For the indissolubility of marriage is not directed to the good of the offspring, which is the principal end of marriage, except in so far as parents have to provide for their children for their whole life, by due preparation of those things that are necessary in life. Now this preparation does not pertain to the first intention of nature, in respect of which all things are common. And therefore it would seem that to put away one's wife is not contrary to the first intention of nature, and consequently that it is contrary not to the first but to the second precepts of the natural law. Therefore, seemingly, it can be a matter of dispensation even in the first way.

Reply to Objection 1: The good of the offspring, in so far as it belongs to the first intention of nature, includes procreation, nourishment, and instruction, until the offspring comes to perfect age. But that provision be made for the children by bequeathing to them the inheritance or other goods belongs seemingly to the second intention of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 2: To have a concubine is contrary to the good of the offspring, in respect of nature's first intention in that good, namely the rearing and instruction of the child, for which purpose it is necessary that the parents remain together permanently; which is not the case with a concubine, since she is taken for a time. Hence the comparison fails. But in respect of nature's second intention, even the having of a concubine may be a matter of dispensation as evidenced by Osee 1.

Reply to Objection 3: Although indissolubility belongs to the second intention of marriage as fulfilling an office of nature, it belongs to its first intention as a sacrament of the Church. Hence, from the moment it was made a sacrament of the Church, as long as it remains such it cannot be a matter of dispensation, except perhaps by the second kind of dispensation.

Whether it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was lawful to divorce a wife under the Mosaic law. For one way of giving consent is to refrain from prohibiting when one can prohibit. It is also unlawful to consent to what is unlawful. Since then the Mosaic law did not forbid the putting away of a wife and did no wrong by not forbidding it, for "the law . . . is holy" (Rom. 7:12), it would seem that divorce was at one time lawful.

Objection 2: Further, the prophets spoke inspired by the Holy Ghost, according to 2 Pet. 1:21. Now it is written (Malachi 2:16): “When thou shalt hate her, put her away.” Since then that which the Holy Ghost inspires is not unlawful, it would seem that it was not always unlawful to divorce a wife.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says that even as the apostles permitted second marriages, so Moses allowed the bill of divorce. But second marriages are not sinful. Therefore neither was it sinful under the Mosaic law to divorce a wife.

Objection 4: On the contrary, our Lord said (Mat. 19:8) that Moses granted the Jews the bill of divorce by reason of the hardness of their heart. But their hardness of heart did not excuse them from sin. Neither therefore did the law about the bill of divorce.

Objection 5: Further, Chrysostom says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “Moses, by granting the bill of divorce, did not indicate the justice of God, but deprived their sin of its guilt, for while the Jews acted as though they were keeping the law, their sin seemed to be no sin.”

I answer that, on this point there are two opinions. For some say that under the Law those who put away their wives, after giving them a bill of divorce, were not excused from sin, although they were excused from the punishment which they should have suffered according to the Law: and that for this reason Moses is stated to have permitted the bill of divorce. Accordingly they reckon four kinds of permission: one by absence of precept, so that when a greater good is not prescribed, a lesser good is said to be permitted: thus the Apostle by not prescribing virginity, permitted marriage (1 Cor. 7). The second is by absence of prohibition: thus venial sins are said to be permitted because they are not forbidden. The third is by absence of prevention, and thus all sins are said to be permitted by God, in so far as He does not prevent them whereas He can. The fourth is by omission of punishment, and in this way the bill of divorce was permitted in the Law, not indeed for the sake of obtaining a greater good, as was the dispensation to have several wives, but for the sake of preventing a greater evil, namely wife-murder to which the Jews were prone on account of the corruption of their irascible appetite. Even so they were allowed to lend money for usury to strangers, on account of corruption in their concupiscible appetite, lest they should exact usury of their brethren; and again on account of the corruption of suspicion in the reason they were allowed the sacrifice of jealousy, lest mere suspicion should corrupt their judgment. But because the Old Law, though it did not confer grace, was given that it might indicate sin, as the saints are agreed in saying, others are of opinion that if it had been a sin for a man to put away his wife, this ought to have been indicated to him, at least by the law or the prophets: “Show My people their wicked doings” (Is. 58:1): else they would seem to have been neglected, if those things which are necessary for salvation and which they knew not were never made known to them: and this cannot be admitted, because the righteousness of the Law observed at the time of the Law would merit eternal life. For this reason they say that although to put away one’s wife is wrong in itself, it nevertheless became lawful by God’s permitting it, and they confirm this by the authority of Chrysostom, who says [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “the Lawgiver by permitting divorce removed the guilt from the sin.” Although this opinion has some probability the former is more generally held: wherefore we must reply to the arguments on both sides [*Cf. [5023]FS, Q[105], A[4], ad 8; [5024]FS, Q[108], A[3], ad 2; Contra Gentes iii, cap. 123].

Reply to Objection 1: He who can forbid, sins not by omitting to forbid if he has no hope of correcting, but fears by forbidding to furnish the occasion of a greater evil. Thus it happened to Moses: wherefore acting on Divine authority he did not forbid the bill of divorce.

Reply to Objection 2: The prophets, inspired by the Holy Ghost, said that a wife ought to be put away, not as though this were a command of the Holy Ghost, but as being permitted lest greater evils should be perpetrated.

Reply to Objection 3: This likeness of permission must not be applied to every detail, but only to the cause which was the same in both cases, since both permissions were granted in order to avoid some form of wickedness.

Reply to Objection 4: Although their hardness of heart excused them not from sin, the permission given on account of that hardness excused them. For certain things are forbidden those who are healthy in body, which are not forbidden the sick, and yet the sick sin not by availing themselves of the permission granted to them.

Reply to Objection 5: A good may be omitted in two ways. First, in order to obtain a greater good, and then the omission of that good becomes virtuous by being directed to a greater good; thus Jacob rightly omitted to have only one wife, on account of the good of the offspring. In another way a good is omitted in order to avoid a greater evil, and then if this is done with the authority of one who can grant a dispensation, the omission of that good is not sinful, and yet it does not also become virtuous. In this way the indissolubility of marriage was suspended in the law of Moses in order to avoid a greater evil, namely wife-murder. Hence Chrysostom says that “he removed the guilt from the sin.” For though divorce remained inordinate, for which reason it is called a sin, it did not incur the debt of punishment, either temporal or eternal, in so far as it was done by Divine permission: and thus its guilt was taken away from it. And therefore he says again [*Hom. xxxii in the Opus Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] that “divorce was permitted, an evil indeed, yet lawful.” Those who hold the first opinion understand by this only that divorce incurred the debt of temporal punishment.

Whether it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband?

Objection 1: It would seem that it was lawful for a divorced wife to have another husband. For in divorce the husband did a greater wrong by divorcing his wife than the wife by being divorced. But the husband could, without sin, marry another wife. Therefore the wife could without sin, marry another husband.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine, speaking about bigamy, says (De Bono Conjug. xv, xviii) that “when it was the manner it was no sin.” Now at the time of the Old Law it was the custom for a wife after divorce to marry another husband: “When she is departed and marrieth another husband,” etc. Therefore the wife sinned not by marrying another husband.

Objection 3: Further, our Lord showed that the justice of the New Testament is superabundant in comparison with the justice of the Old Testament (Mat. 5). Now He said that it belongs to the superabundant justice of the New Testament that the divorced wife marry not another husband (Mat. 5:32). Therefore it was lawful in the Old Law.

Objection 4: On the contrary, are the words of Mat. 5:32, “He that shall marry her that is put away committeth adultery.” Now adultery was never permitted in the Old Law. Therefore it was not lawful for the divorced wife to have another husband.

Objection 5: Further, it is written (Dt. 24:3) that a divorced woman who marries another husband “is defiled, and is become abominable before the Lord.” Therefore she sinned by marrying another husband.

I answer that, According to the first above mentioned opinion [5025] (A[3]), she sinned by marrying another husband after being divorced, because her first marriage still held good. For “the woman . . . whilst her husband liveth, is bound to the law of her husband” (Rom. 7:2): and she could not have several husbands at one time. But according to the second opinion, just as it was lawful by virtue of the Divine dispensation for a husband to divorce his wife, so could the wife marry another husband, because the indissolubility of marriage was removed by reason of the divine dispensation: and as long as that indissolubility remains the saying of the Apostle holds.

Accordingly to reply to the arguments on either side:

Reply to Objection 1: It was lawful for a husband to have several wives at one time by virtue of the divine dispensation: wherefore having put one away he could marry another even though the former marriage were not dissolved. But it was never lawful for a wife to have several husbands. Wherefore the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: In this saying of Augustine manner [mos] does not signify custom but good manners; in the same sense a person is said to have manners [morigeratus] because he has good manners; and “moral” philosophy takes its name from the same source.

Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord shows the superabundance of the New Law over the Old in respect of the counsels, not only as regards those things which the Old Law permitted, but also as regards those things which were forbidden in the Old Law, and yet were thought by many to be permitted on account of the precepts being incorrectly explained—for instance that of the hatred towards our enemies. and so is it in the matter of divorce.

Reply to Objection 4: The saying of our Lord refers to the time of the New Law, when the aforesaid permission was recalled. In the same way we are to understand the statement of Chrysostom [*Hom. xii in the Opus

Imperfectum falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], who says that “a man who divorces his wife according to the law is guilty of four crimes: for in God’s sight he is a murderer,” in so far as he has the purpose of killing his wife unless he divorce her; “and because he divorces her without her having committed fornication,” in which case alone the law of the Gospel allows a man to put away his wife; “and again, because he makes her an adulteress, and the man whom she marries an adulterer.”

Reply to Objection 5: A gloss observes here: “She is defiled and abominable, namely in the judgment of him who first put her away as being defiled,” and consequently it does not follow that she is defiled absolutely speaking; or she is said to be defiled just as a person who had touched a dead or leprous body was said to be unclean with the uncleanness, not of sin, but of a certain legal irregularity. Wherefore a priest could not marry a widow or a divorced woman.

Whether a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced?

Objection 1: It would seem that a husband could lawfully take back the wife he had divorced. For it is lawful to undo what was ill done. But for the husband to divorce his wife was ill done. Therefore it was lawful for him to undo it, by taking back his wife.

Objection 2: Further, it has always been lawful to be indulgent to the sinner, because this is a moral precept, which obtains in every law. Now the husband by taking back the wife he had divorced was indulgent to one who had sinned. Therefore this also was lawful.

Objection 3: Further, the reason given (Dt. 24:4) for its being unlawful to take back a divorced wife was “because she is defiled.” But the divorced wife is not defiled except by marrying another husband. Therefore at least it was lawful to take back a divorced wife before she married again.

On the contrary, It is said (Dt. 24:4) that “the former husband cannot take her again,” etc.

I answer that, In the law concerning the bill of divorce two things were permitted, namely for the husband to put away the wife, and for the divorced wife to take another husband; and two things were commanded, namely that the bill of divorce should be written, and secondly that the husband who divorced his wife could not take her back. According to those who hold the first opinion [5026](A[3]) this was done in punishment of the woman who married again, and that it was by this sin that she was defiled: but according to the others it was done that a husband might not be too ready to divorce his wife if he could nowise take her back afterwards.

Reply to Objection 1: In order to prevent the evil committed by a man in divorcing his wife, it was ordered that the husband could not take back his divorced wife, as stated above: and for this reason it was ordered by God.

Reply to Objection 2: It was always lawful to be indulgent to the sinner as regards the unkindly feelings of the heart, but not as regards the punishment appointed by God.

Reply to Objection 3: There are two opinions on this point. For some say that it was lawful for a divorced wife to be reconciled to her husband, unless she were joined in marriage to another husband. For then, on account of the adultery to which she had voluntarily yielded, it was assigned to her in punishment that she should not return to her former husband. Since, however, the law makes no distinction in its prohibition, others say that from the moment that she was put away she could not be taken back, even before marrying again, because the defilement must be understood not in reference to sin, but as explained above (A[4], ad 3).

Whether the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason for divorce was hatred for the wife. For it is written (Malachi 2:16): “When thou shalt hate her put her away.” Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dt. 24:1): “If . . . she find not favor in his eyes, for some uncleanness,” etc. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 3: On the contrary, Barrenness and fornication are more opposed to marriage than hatred. Therefore they ought to have been reasons for divorce rather than hatred.

Objection 4: Further, hatred may be caused by the virtue of the person hated. Therefore, if hatred is a sufficient reason, a woman could be divorced on account of her virtue, which is absurd.

Objection 5: Further, “If a man marry a wife and afterwards hate her, and seek occasions to put her away”* alleging that she was not a virgin when he married her, should he fail to prove this, he shall be beaten, and shall be condemned in a hundred sicles of silver, and he shall be unable to put her away all the days of his life (Dt. 22:13–19). [*The rest of the passage is apparently quoted from memory.] Therefore hatred is not a sufficient reason for divorce.

I answer that, It is the general opinion of holy men that the reason for permission being given to divorce a wife was the avoidance of wife-murder. Now the proximate cause of murder is hatred: wherefore the proximate cause of divorce was hatred. But hatred proceeds, like love, from a cause. Wherefore we must assign to divorce certain remote causes which were a cause of hatred. For Augustine says in his gloss (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 14): “In the Law there were many causes for divorcing a wife: Christ admitted none but fornication: and He commands other grievances to be borne for conjugal fidelity and chastity.” Such causes are imperfections either of body, as sickness or some notable deformity, or in soul as fornication or the like which amounts to moral depravity. Some, however, restrict these causes within narrower limits, saying with sufficient probability that it was not lawful to divorce a wife except for some cause subsequent to the marriage; and that not even then could it be done for any such cause, but only for such as could hinder the good of the offspring, whether in body as barrenness, or leprosy and the like, or in soul, for instance if she were a woman of wicked habits which her children through continual contact with her would imitate. There is however a gloss on Dt. 24:1, “If . . . she find not favor in his eyes,” which would seem to restrict them yet more, namely to sin, by saying that there “uncleanness” denotes sin: but “sin” in the gloss refers not only to the morality of the soul but also to the condition of the body. Accordingly we grant the first two objections.

Reply to Objection 3: Barrenness and other like things are causes of hatred, and so they are remote causes of divorce.

Reply to Objection 4: No one is hateful on account of virtue as such, because goodness is the cause of love. Wherefore the argument does not hold.

Reply to Objection 5: The husband was punished in that case by being unable to put away his wife for ever, just as in the case when he had corrupted a maid (Dt. 22:28–30).

Whether the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill?

Objection 1: It would seem that the causes of divorce had to be written in the bill: because the husband was absolved from the punishment of the law by the written bill of divorce. But this would seem altogether unjust, unless sufficient causes were alleged for a divorce. Therefore it was necessary for them to be written in the bill.

Objection 2: Further, seemingly this document was of no use except to show the causes for divorce. Therefore, if they were not written down, the bill was delivered for no purpose.

Objection 3: Further, the Master says that it was so in the text (Sent. iv, D, 33).

On the contrary, The causes for divorce were either sufficient or not. If they were sufficient, the wife was debarred from a second marriage, though this was allowed her by the Law. If they were insufficient, the divorce was proved to be unjust, and therefore could not be effected. Therefore the causes for divorce were by no means particularized in the bill.

I answer that, The causes for divorce were not particularized in the bill, but were indicated in a general way, so as to prove the justice of the divorce. According to Josephus (Antiq. iv, 6) this was in order that the woman, having the written bill of divorce, might take another husband, else she would not have been believed. Wherefore according to him it was written in this wise: “I promise never to have thee with me again.” But according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xix, 26) the bill was put into writing in order to cause a delay, and that the husband might be dissuaded by the counsel of the notaries to refrain from his purpose of divorce.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider children of illegitimate birth. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether those born out of true marriage are illegitimate?

(2) Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?

(3) Whether they can be legitimized?

Whether children born out of true marriage are illegitimate?

Objection 1: It would seem that children born out of true marriage are legitimate. For he that is born according to law is called a legitimate son. Now everyone is born according to law, at least the law of nature, which has more force than any other. Therefore every child is to be called legitimate.

Objection 2: Further, it is the common saying that a legitimate child is one born of a legitimate marriage, or of a marriage that is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church. Now it happens sometimes that a marriage is deemed legitimate in the eyes of the Church, whereas there is some impediment affecting its validity; which impediment may be known to the parties who marry in the presence of the Church: or they may marry in secret and be ignorant of the impediment, in which case their marriage would seem legitimate in the eyes of the Church, for the very reason that it is not prevented by the Church. Therefore children born out of true marriage are not illegitimate.

On the contrary, Illegitimate is that which is against the law. Now those who are born out of wedlock are born contrary to the law. Therefore they are illegitimate.

I answer that, Children are of four conditions. Some are natural and legitimate, for instance those who are born of a true and lawful marriage; some are natural and illegitimate, as those who are born of fornication; some are legitimate and not natural, as adopted children; some are neither legitimate nor natural; such are those born of adultery or incest, for these are born not only against the positive law, but against the express natural law. Hence we must grant that some children are illegitimate.

Reply to Objection 1: Although those who are born of an unlawful intercourse are born according to the nature common to man and all animals, they are born contrary to the law of nature which is proper to man: since fornication, adultery, and the like are contrary to the law of nature. Hence the like are not legitimate by any law.

Reply to Objection 2: Ignorance, unless it be affected, excuses unlawful intercourse from sin. Wherefore those who contract together in good faith in the presence of the Church, although there be an impediment, of which however they are ignorant, sin not, nor are their children illegitimate. If, however, they know of the impediment, although the Church upholds their marriage because she knows not of the impediment, they are not excused from sin, nor do their children avoid being illegitimate. Neither are they excused if they know not of the impediment and marry secretly, because such ignorance would appear to be affected.

Whether children should suffer any loss through being illegitimate?

Objection 1: It would seem that children ought not to suffer any loss through being illegitimate. For a child should not be punished on account of his father's sin, according to the Lord's saying (Ezech. 18:20). But it is not his own but his father's fault that he is born of an unlawful union. Therefore he should not incur a loss on this account.

Objection 2: Further, human justice is copied from Divine. Now God confers natural goods equally on legitimate and illegitimate children. Therefore illegitimate should be equalled to legitimate children according to human laws.

On the contrary, It is stated (Gn. 25:5,6) that "Abraham gave all his possessions to Isaac, and that to the children of the concubines he gave gifts": and yet the latter were not born of an unlawful intercourse. Much more, therefore, ought those born of an unlawful intercourse to incur loss by not inheriting their father's property.

I answer that, A person is said to incur a loss for some cause in two ways: First, because he is deprived of his due, and thus an illegitimate child incurs no loss. Secondly, because something is not due to him, which might have been due otherwise, and thus an illegitimate son incurs a twofold loss. First because he is excluded from legitimate acts such as offices and dignities, which require a certain respectability in those who perform them. Secondly, he incurs a loss by not succeeding to his father's inheritance. Nevertheless natural sons can inherit a sixth only, whereas spurious children cannot inherit any portion, although by natural law their parents are bound to provide for their needs. Hence it is part of a bishop's care to compel both parents to provide for them.

Reply to Objection 1: To incur a loss in this second way is not a punishment. Hence we do not say that a person is punished by not succeeding to the throne through not being the king's son. In like manner it is no punishment to an illegitimate child that he has no right to that which belongs to the legitimate children.

Reply to Objection 2: Illegitimate intercourse is contrary to the law, not as an act of the generative power, but as proceeding from a wicked will. Hence an illegitimate son incurs a loss, not in those things which come to him by his natural origin, but in those things which are dependent on the will for being done or possessed.

Whether an illegitimate son can be legitimized?

Objection 1: It would seem that an illegitimate son cannot be legitimized. For the legitimate child is as far removed from the illegitimate as the illegitimate from the legitimate. But a legitimate child is never made illegitimate. Neither, therefore, is an illegitimate child ever made legitimate.

Objection 2: Further, illegitimate intercourse begets an illegitimate child. But illegitimate intercourse never becomes legitimate. Neither, therefore, can an illegitimate son become legitimate.

On the contrary, What is done by the law can be undone by the law. Now the illegitimacy of children is an effect of positive law. Therefore an illegitimate child can be legitimized by one who has legal authority.

I answer that, An illegitimate child can be legitimized, not so that he be born of a legitimate intercourse, because this intercourse is a thing of the past and can never be legitimized from the moment that it was once illegitimate. But the child is said to be legitimized, in so far as the losses which an illegitimate child ought to incur are withdrawn by the authority of the law.

There are six ways of becoming legitimate: two according to the canons (Cap. Conquestus; Cap. Tanta), namely when a man marries the woman of whom he has an unlawful child (if it were not a case of adultery), and by special indulgence and dispensation of the lord Pope. The other four ways are according to the laws: (1) If the father offer his natural son to the emperor’s court, for by this very fact the son is legitimate on account of the reputation of the court; (2) if the father designate him in his will as his legitimate heir, and the son afterwards offer the will to the emperor; (3) if there be no legitimate son and the son himself offer himself to the emperor;

(4) if the father designate him as legitimate in a public document or in a document signed by three witnesses, without calling him natural.

Reply to Objection 1: A favor may be bestowed on a person without injustice, but a person cannot be damnified except for a fault. Hence an illegitimate child can be legitimized rather than “vice versa”; for although a legitimate son is sometimes deprived of his inheritance on account of his fault, he is not said to be illegitimate, because he was legitimately begotten.

Reply to Objection 2: Illegitimate intercourse has an inherent inseparable defect whereby it is opposed to the law: and consequently it cannot be legitimized. Nor is there any comparison with an illegitimate child who has no such defect.

TREATISE ON THE RESURRECTION (QQ[69]-86)

OF MATTERS CONCERNING THE RESURRECTION, AND FIRST OF THE PLACE WHERE SOULS ARE AFTER DEATH (SEVEN ARTICLES)

In sequence to the foregoing we must treat of matters concerning the state of resurrection: for after speaking of the sacraments whereby man is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak of the resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment. The treatise on the resurrection offers a threefold consideration, namely the things that precede, those that accompany, and those that follow the resurrection. Consequently we must speak (1) of those things which partly, though not wholly, precede the resurrection; (2) of the resurrection itself and its circumstances; (3) of the things which follow it.

Among the things which precede the resurrection we must consider (1) the places appointed for the reception of bodies after death; (2) the quality of separated souls, and the punishment inflicted on them by fire; (3) the suffrages whereby the souls of the departed are assisted by the living; (4) the prayers of the saints in heaven; (5) the signs preceding the general judgment; (6) the fire of the world’s final conflagration which will precede the appearance of the Judge.

Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any places are appointed to receive souls after death?

(2) Whether souls are conveyed thither immediately after death?

(3) Whether they are able to leave those places?

(4) Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham’s bosom?

(5) Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?

(6) Whether the limbo of the patriarchs is the same as the limbo of children?

(7) Whether so many places should be distinguished?

Whether places are appointed to receive souls after death?

Objection 1: It would seem that places are not appointed to receive souls after death. For as Boethius says (De Hebdom.): “Wise men are agreed that incorporeal things are not in a place,” and this agrees with the words of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): “We can answer without hesitation that the soul is not conveyed to corporeal places, except with a body, or that it is not conveyed locally.” Now the soul separated from the body is without a body, as Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32). Therefore it is absurd to assign any places for the reception of souls.

Objection 2: Further, whatever has a definite place has more in common with that place than with any other. Now separated souls, like certain other spiritual substances, are indifferent to all places; for it cannot be said that they agree with certain bodies, and differ from others, since they are utterly removed from all corporeal conditions. Therefore places should not be assigned for their reception.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is assigned to separated souls after death, except what conduces to their punishment or to their reward. But a corporeal place cannot conduce to their punishment or reward, since they receive nothing from bodies. Therefore definite places should not be assigned to receive them.

On the contrary, The empyrean heaven is a corporeal place, and yet as soon as it was made it was filled with the holy angels, as Bede [*Hexaem. i, ad Gn. 1:2] says. Since then angels even as separated souls are incorporeal, it would seem that some place should also be assigned to receive separated souls.

Further, this appears from Gregory’s statement (Dial. iv) that souls after death are conveyed to various corporeal places, as in the case of Paschasius whom Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found at the baths, and of the soul of King Theodoric, which he asserts to have been conveyed to hell. Therefore after death souls have certain places for their reception.

I answer that, Although spiritual substances do not depend on a body in respect of their being, nevertheless the corporeal world is governed by God by means of the spiritual world, as asserted by Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) and Gregory (Dial. iv, 6). Hence it is that there is a certain fittingness by way of congruity of spiritual substances to corporeal substances, in that the more noble bodies are adapted to the more noble substances: wherefore also the philosophers held that the order of separate substances is according to the order of movables. And though after death souls have no bodies assigned to them whereof they be the forms or determinate motors, nevertheless certain corporeal places are appointed to them by way of congruity in reference to their degree of nobility (wherein they are as though in a place, after the manner in which incorporeal things can be in a place), according as they more or less approach to the first substance (to which the highest place it fittingly assigned), namely God, whose throne the Scriptures proclaim heaven to be (Ps. 102:19, Is. 66:1). Wherefore we hold that those souls that have a perfect share of the Godhead are in heaven, and that those souls that are deprived of that share are assigned to a contrary place.

Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal things are not in place after a manner known and familiar to us, in which way we say that bodies are properly in place; but they are in place after a manner befitting spiritual substances, a manner that cannot be fully manifest to us.

Reply to Objection 2: Things have something in common with or a likeness to one another in two ways. First, by sharing a same quality: thus hot things have something in common, and incorporeal things can have nothing in common with corporeal things in this way. Secondly, by a kind of proportionateness, by reason of which the Scriptures apply the corporeal world to the spiritual metaphorically. Thus the Scriptures speak of God as the sun, because He is the principle of spiritual life, as the sun is of corporeal life. In this way certain souls have more in common with certain places: for instance, souls that are spiritually enlightened, with luminous bodies, and souls that are plunged in darkness by sin, with dark places.

Reply to Objection 3: The separated soul receives nothing directly from corporeal places in the same way as bodies which are maintained by their respective places: yet these same souls, through knowing themselves to be appointed to such places, gather joy or sorrow therefrom; and thus their place conduces to their punishment or reward.

Whether souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death?

Objection 1: It would seem that no souls are conveyed to heaven or hell immediately after death. For a gloss on Ps. 36:10, “Yet a little while and the wicked shall not be,” says that “the saints are delivered at the end of life; yet after this life they will not yet be where the saints will be when it is said to them: Come ye blessed of My Father.” Now those saints will be in heaven. Therefore after this life the saints do not go immediately up to heaven.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cix) that “the time which lies between man’s death and the final resurrection holds the souls in secret receptacles according as each one is worthy of rest or of suffering.” Now these secret abodes cannot denote heaven and hell, since also after the final resurrection the souls will be there together with their bodies: so that he would have no reason to distinguish between the time before and the time after the resurrection. Therefore they will be neither in hell nor in heaven until the day of judgment.

Objection 3: Further, the glory of the soul is greater than that of bodies. Now the glory of the body is awarded to all at the same time, so that each one may have the greater joy in the common rejoicing of all, as appears from a gloss on Heb. 11:40, “God providing some better thing for us—that the common joy may make each one rejoice the more.” Much more, therefore, ought the glory of souls to be deferred until the end, so as to be awarded to all at the same time.

Objection 4: Further, punishment and reward, being pronounced by the sentence of the judge, should not precede the judgment. Now hell fire and the joys of heaven will be awarded to all by the sentence of Christ judging them, namely at the last judgment, according to Mat. 25. Therefore no one will go up to heaven or down to hell before the day of judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Cor. 5:1): “If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, that we have . . . a house not made with hands, but reserved in heaven [*Vulg.: ‘eternal in heaven’; cf. 1 Pet. 1:4].” Therefore, after the body’s dissolution, the soul has an abode, which had been reserved for it in heaven.

Further, the Apostle says (Phil. 1:23): “I desire [Vulg.: ‘Having a desire’] to be dissolved and to be with Christ.” From these words Gregory argues as follows (Dial. iv, 25): “If there is no doubt that Christ is in heaven, it cannot be denied that Paul’s soul is in heaven likewise.” Now it cannot be gainsaid that Christ is in heaven, since this is an article of faith. Therefore neither is it to be denied that the souls of the saints are borne to heaven. That also some souls go down to hell immediately after death is evident from Lk. 16:22, “And the rich man died, and he was buried in hell.”

I answer that, Even as in bodies there is gravity or levity whereby they are borne to their own place which is the end of their movement, so in souls there is merit or demerit whereby they reach their reward or punishment, which are the ends of their deeds. Wherefore just as a body is conveyed at once to its place, by its gravity or levity, unless there be an obstacle, so too the soul, the bonds of the flesh being broken, whereby it was detained in the state of the way, receives at once its reward or punishment, unless there be an obstacle. Thus sometimes venial sin, though needing first of all to be cleansed, is an obstacle to the receiving of the reward; the result being that the reward is delayed. And since a place is assigned to souls in keeping with their reward or punishment, as soon as the soul is set free from the body it is either plunged into hell or soars to heaven, unless it be held back by some debt, for which its flight must needs be delayed until the soul is first of all cleansed. This truth is attested by the manifest authority of the canonical Scriptures and the doctrine of the holy Fathers; wherefore the contrary must be judged heretical as stated in Dial. iv, 25, and in De Eccl. Dogm. xlvi.

Reply to Objection 1: The gloss explains itself: for it expounds the words, “They will not yet be where the saints will be,” etc., by saying immediately afterwards: “That is to say, they will not have the double stole which the saints will have at the resurrection.”

Reply to Objection 2: Among the secret abodes of which Augustine speaks, we must also reckon hell and heaven, where some souls are detained before the resurrection. The reason why a distinction is drawn between the time before and the time after the resurrection is because before the resurrection they are there without the body whereas afterwards they are with the body, and because in certain places there are souls now which will not be there after the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: There is a kind of continuity among men as regards the body, because in respect thereof is verified the saying of Acts 17:24,26, “God . . . hath made of one all mankind”: whereas He has fashioned souls independently of one another. Consequently it is not so fitting that all men should be glorified together in the soul as that they should be glorified together in the body. Moreover the glory of the body is not so essential as the glory of the soul; wherefore it would be more derogatory to the saints if the glory of the soul were delayed, than that the glory of the body be deferred: nor could this detriment to their glory be compensated on account of the joy of each one being increased by the common joy.

Reply to Objection 4: Gregory proposes and solves this very difficulty (Dial. iv, 25): “If then,” he says, “the souls of the just are in heaven now, what will they receive in reward for their justice on the judgment day?” And he answers: “Surely it will be a gain to them at the judgment, that whereas now they enjoy only the happiness of the soul, afterwards they will enjoy also that of the body, so as to rejoice also in the flesh wherein they bore sorrow and torments for the Lord.” The same is to be said in reference to the damned.

Whether the souls who are in heaven or hell are able to go from thence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in heaven or hell are unable to go from thence. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii): “If the souls of the dead took any part in the affairs of the living, to say nothing of others, there is myself whom not for a single night would my loving mother fail to visit since she followed me by land and sea in order to abide with me”: and from this he concludes that the souls of the departed do not mingle in the affairs of the living. But they would be able to do so if they were to leave their abode. Therefore they do not go forth from their abode.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 26:4): “That I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life,” and (Job 7:9): “He that shall go down to hell shall not come up.” Therefore neither the good nor the wicked quit their abode.

Objection 3: Further, as stated above [5027](A[2]), abodes are awarded to souls after death as a reward or punishment. Now after death neither the rewards of the saints nor the punishments of the damned are increased. Therefore they do not quit their abodes.

On the contrary, Jerome writing against Vigilantius addresses him thus: "For thou sayest that the souls of the apostles and martyrs have taken up their abode either in Abraham's bosom or in the place of refreshment, or under the altar of God, and that they are unable to visit their graves when they will. Wouldst thou then lay down the law for God? Wouldst thou put the apostles in chains, imprison them until the day of judgment, and forbid them to be with their lord, them of whom it is written: They follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth? And if the Lamb is everywhere, therefore we must believe that those also who are with Him are everywhere." Therefore it is absurd to say that the souls of the departed do not leave their abode.

Further, Jerome argues as follows: "Since the devil and the demons wander throughout the whole world, and are everywhere present with wondrous speed, why should the martyrs, after shedding their blood be imprisoned and unable to go forth?" Hence we may infer that not only the good sometimes leave their abode, but also the wicked, since their damnation does not exceed that of the demons who wander about everywhere.

Further, the same conclusion may be gathered from Gregory (Dial. iv), where he relates many cases of the dead having appeared to the living.

I answer that, There are two ways of understanding a person to leave hell or heaven. First, that he goes from thence simply, so that heaven or hell be no longer his place: and in this way no one who is finally consigned to hell or heaven can go from thence, as we shall state further on ([5028]Q[71], A[5], ad 5). Secondly, they may be understood to go forth for a time: and here we must distinguish what befits them according to the order of nature, and what according to the order of Divine providence; for as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi): "Human affairs have their limits other than have the wonders of the Divine power, nature's works differ from those which are done miraculously." Consequently, according to the natural course, the separated souls consigned to their respective abodes are utterly cut off from communication with the living. For according to the course of nature men living in mortal bodies are not immediately united to separate substances, since their entire knowledge arises from the senses: nor would it be fitting for them to leave their abode for any purpose other than to take part in the affairs of the living. Nevertheless, according to the disposition of Divine providence separated souls sometimes come forth from their abode and appear to men, as Augustine, in the book quoted above, relates of the martyr Felix who appeared visibly to the people of Nola when they were besieged by the barbarians. It is also credible that this may occur sometimes to the damned, and that for man's instruction and intimidation they be permitted to appear to the living; or again in order to seek our suffrages, as to those who are detained in purgatory, as evidenced by many instances related in the fourth book of the Dialogues. There is, however, this difference between the saints and the damned, that the saints can appear when they will to the living, but not the damned; for even as the saints while living in the flesh are able by the gifts of gratuitous grace to heal and work wonders, which can only be done miraculously by the Divine power, and cannot be done by those who lack this gift, so it is not unfitting for the souls of the saints to be endowed with a power in virtue of their glory, so that they are able to appear wondrously to the living, when they will: while others are unable to do so unless they be sometimes permitted.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine, as may be gathered from what he says afterwards, is speaking according to the common course of nature, And yet it does not follow, although the dead be able to appear to the living as they will, that they appear as often as when living in the flesh: because when they are separated from the flesh, they are either wholly conformed to the divine will, so that they may do nothing but what they see to be agreeable with the Divine disposition, or else they are so overwhelmed by their punishments that their grief for their unhappiness surpasses their desire to appear to others.

Reply to Objection 2: The authorities quoted speak in the sense that no one comes forth from heaven or hell simply, and do not imply that one may not come forth for a time.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above (A[1], ad 3) the soul's place conduces to its punishment or reward in so far as the soul, through being consigned to that place, is affected either by joy or by grief. Now this joy or grief at being consigned to such a place remains in the soul even when it is outside that place. Thus a bishop who is given the honor of sitting on a throne in the church incurs no dishonor when he leaves the throne, for though he sits not therein actually, the place remains assigned to him.

We must also reply to the arguments in the contrary sense.

Reply to Objection 4: Jerome is speaking of the apostles and martyrs in reference to that which they gain from their power of glory, and not to that which befits them as due to them by nature. And when he says that they are everywhere, he does not mean that they are in several places or everywhere at once, but that they can be wherever they will.

Reply to Objection 5: There is no parity between demons and angels on the one hand and the souls of the saints and of the damned on the other. For the good or bad angels have allotted to them the office of presiding over men, to watch over them or to try them; but this cannot be said of the souls of men. Nevertheless, according to the power of glory, it is competent to the souls of the saints that they can be where they will; and this is what Jerome means to say.

Reply to Objection 6: Although the souls of the saints or of the damned are sometimes actually present where they appear, we are not to believe that this is always so: for sometimes these apparitions occur to persons whether asleep or awake by the activity of good or wicked angels in order to instruct or deceive the living. Thus sometimes even the living appear to others and tell them many things in their sleep; and yet it is clear that they are not present, as Augustine proves from many instances (De Cura pro Mort. xi, xii).

Whether the limbo of hell is the same as Abraham’s bosom?

Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is not the same as Abraham’s bosom. For according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): “I have not yet found Scripture mentioning hell in a favorable sense.” Now Abraham’s bosom is taken in a favorable sense, as Augustine goes on to say (Gen. ad lit. xxxiii): “Surely no one would be allowed to give an unfavorable signification to Abraham’s bosom and the place of rest whither the godly poor man was carried by the angels.” Therefore Abraham’s bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

Objection 2: Further, those who are in hell see not God. Yet God is seen by those who are in Abraham’s bosom, as may be gathered from Augustine (Confess. ix, 3) who, speaking of Nebridius, says: “Whatever that be, which is signified by thut bosom, there lives my Nebridius,” and further on: “Now lays he not his ear to my mouth, but his spiritual mouth unto Thy fountain, and drinketh as much as he can receive wisdom in proportion to his thirst, endlessly happy.” Therefore Abraham’s bosom is not the same as the limbo of hell.

Objection 3: Further, the Church prays not that a man be taken to hell: and yet she prays that the angels may carry the departed soul to Abraham’s bosom. Therefore it would seem that Abraham’s bosom is not the same as limbo.

On the contrary, The place whither the beggar Lazarus was taken is called Abraham’s bosom. Now he was taken to hell, for as a gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xx] on Job 30:23, “Where a house is appointed for every one that liveth,” says: “Hell was the house of all the living until the coming of Christ.” Therefore Abraham’s bosom is the same as limbo.

Further, Jacob said to his sons (Gn. 44:38): “You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell”: wherefore Jacob knew that he would be taken to hell after his death. Therefore Abraham likewise was taken to hell after his death; and consequently Abraham’s bosom would seem to be a part of hell.

I answer that, After death men’s souls cannot find rest save by the merit of faith, because “he that cometh to God must believe” (Heb. 11:6). Now the first example of faith was given to men in the person of Abraham, who was the first to sever himself from the body of unbelievers, and to receive a special sign of faith: for which reason “the place of rest given to men after death is called Abraham’s bosom,” as Augustine declares (Gen. ad lit. xii). But the souls of the saints have not at all times had the same rest after death; because, since Christ’s coming they have had complete rest through enjoying the vision of God, whereas before Christ’s coming they had rest through being exempt from punishment, but their desire was not set at rest by their attaining their end. Consequently the state of the saints before Christ’s coming may be considered both as regards the rest it afforded, and thus it is called Abraham’s bosom, and as regards its lack of rest, and thus it is called the limbo of hell. Accordingly, before Christ’s coming the limbo of hell and Abraham’s bosom were one place accidentally and not essentially: and consequently, nothing prevents Abraham’s bosom from being after Christ’s coming, and from being altogether distinct from limbo, since things that are one accidentally may be parted from one another.

Reply to Objection 1: The state of the holy Fathers as regards what was good in it was called Abraham’s bosom, but as regards its deficiencies it was called hell. Accordingly, neither is Abraham’s bosom taken in an unfavorable sense nor hell in a favorable sense, although in a way they are one.

Reply to Objection 2: The place of rest of the holy Fathers was called Abraham’s bosom before as well as after Christ’s coming, but in different ways. For since before Christ’s coming the saints’ rest had a lack of rest attached to it, it was called both hell and Abraham’s bosom, wherefore God was not seen there. But since after the coming of Christ the saints’ rest is complete through their seeing God, this rest is called Abraham’s bosom, but not hell by any means. It is to this bosom of Abraham that the Church prays for the faithful to be brought.

Hence the Reply to the Third Objection is evident: and the same meaning applies to a gloss on Lk. 16:22, “It came to pass that the beggar died,” etc., which says: “Abraham’s bosom is the rest of the blessed poor, whose is the kingdom of heaven.”

Whether limbo is the same as the hell of the damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of hell is the same as the hell of the damned. For Christ is said to have “bitten” [*Allusion to Osee 13:14] hell, but not to have swallowed it, because He took some from thence but not all. Now He would not be said to have “bitten” hell if those whom He set free were not part of the multitude shut up in hell. Therefore since those whom He set free were shut up in hell, the same were shut up in limbo and in hell. Therefore limbo is either the same as hell, or is a part of hell.

Objection 2: Further, in the Creed Christ is said to have descended into hell. But he did not descend save to the limbo of the Fathers. Therefore the limbo of the Fathers is the same as hell.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 17:16): “All that I have shall go down into the deepest hell [Douay: ‘pit’].” Now since Job was a holy and just man, he went down to limbo. Therefore limbo is the same as the deepest hell.

On the contrary, In hell there is no redemption [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii]. But the saints were redeemed from limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.

Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): “I do not see how we can believe that the rest which Lazarus received was in hell.” Now the soul of Lazarus went down into limbo. Therefore limbo is not the same as hell.

I answer that, The abodes of souls after death may be distinguished in two ways; either as to their situation, or as to the quality of the places, inasmuch as souls are punished or rewarded in certain places. Accordingly if we consider the limbo of the Fathers and hell in respect of the aforesaid quality of the places, there is no doubt that they are distinct, both because in hell there is sensible punishment, which was not in the limbo of the Fathers, and because in hell there is eternal punishment, whereas the saints were detained but temporally in the limbo of the Fathers. On the other hand, if we consider them as to the situation of the place, it is probable that hell and limbo are the same place, or that they are continuous as it were yet so that some higher part of hell be called the limbo of the Fathers. For those who are in hell receive diverse punishments according to the diversity of their guilt, so that those who are condemned are consigned to darker and deeper parts of hell according as they have been guilty of graver sins, and consequently the holy Fathers in whom there was the least amount of sin were consigned to a higher and less darksome part than all those who were condemned to punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ, by His descent, delivered the Fathers from limbo, He is said to have “bitten” hell and to have descended into hell, in so far as hell and limbo are the same as to situation.

This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: Job descended, not to the hell of the damned, but to the limbo of the Fathers. The latter is called the deepest place not in reference to the places of punishment, but in comparison with other places, as including all penal places under one head. Again we may reply with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii): who says of Jacob: “When Jacob said to his sons, ‘You will bring down my grey hairs with sorrow to hell,’ he seems to have feared most, lest he should be troubled with so great a sorrow as to obtain, not the rest of good men, but the hell of sinners." The saying of Job may be expounded in the same way, as being the utterance of one in fear, rather than an assertion.

Whether the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the limbo of children is the same as the limbo of the Fathers. For punishment should correspond to sin. Now the Fathers were detained in limbo for the same sin as children, namely for original sin. Therefore the place of punishment should be the same for both.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchir. xciii): "The punishment of children who die in none but original sin is most lenient." But no punishment is more lenient than that of the holy Fathers. Therefore the place of punishment is the same for both.

On the contrary, Even as temporal punishment in purgatory and eternal punishment in hell are due to actual sin, so temporal punishment in the limbo of the Fathers and eternal punishment in the limbo of the children were due to original sin. If, therefore, hell and purgatory be not the same it would seem that neither are the limbo of children and the limbo of the Fathers the same.

I answer that, The limbo of the Fathers and the limbo of children, without any doubt, differ as to the quality of punishment or reward. For children have no hope of the blessed life, as the Fathers in limbo had, in whom, moreover, shone forth the light of faith and grace. But as regards their situation, there is reason to believe that the place of both is the same; except that the limbo of the Fathers is placed higher than the limbo of children, just as we have stated in reference to limbo and hell [5029](A[5]).

Reply to Objection 1: The Fathers did not stand in the same relation to original sin as children. For in the Fathers original sin was expiated in so far as it infected the person, while there remained an obstacle on the part of nature, on account of which their satisfaction was not yet complete. On the other hand, in children there is an obstacle both on the part of the person and on the part of nature: and for this reason different abodes are appointed to the Fathers and to children.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of punishments due to some one by reason of his person. Of these the most lenient are due to those who are burdened with none but original sin. But lighter still is the punishment due to those who are debarred from the reception of glory by no personal defect but only by a defect of nature, so that this very delay of glory is called a kind of punishment.

Whether so many abodes should be distinguished?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish so many abodes. For after death, just as abodes are due to souls on account of sin, so are they due on account of merit. Now there is only one abode due on account of merit, namely paradise. Therefore neither should there be more than one abode due on account of sin, namely hell.

Objection 2: Further, abodes are appointed to souls after death on account of merits or demerits. Now there is one place where they merit or demerit. Therefore only one abode should be assigned to them after death.

Objection 3: Further, the places of punishment should correspond to the sins. Now there are only three kinds of sin, namely original, venial, and mortal. Therefore there should only be three penal abodes.

Objection 4: On the other hand, it would seem that there should be many more than those assigned. For this darksome air is the prison house of the demons (2 Pet. 2:17), and yet it is not reckoned among the five abodes which are mentioned by certain authors. Therefore there are more than five abodes.

Objection 5: Further, the earthly paradise is distinct from the heavenly paradise. Now some were borne away to the earthly paradise after this state of life, as is related of Enoch and Elias. Since then the earthly paradise is not counted among the five abodes, it would seem that there are more than five.

Objection 6: Further, some penal place should correspond to each state of sinners. Now if we suppose a person to die in original sin who has committed only venial sins, none of the assigned abodes will be befitting to him. For it is clear that he would not be in heaven, since he would be without grace, and for the same reason neither would he be in the limbo of the Fathers; nor again, would he be in the limbo of children, since there is no sensible punishment there, which is due to such a person by reason of venial sin: nor would he be in purgatory, where there is none but temporal punishment, whereas everlasting punishment is due to him: nor would he be in the hell of the damned, since he is not guilty of actual mortal sin. Therefore a sixth abode should be assigned.

Objection 7: Further, rewards and punishments vary in quantity according to the differences of sins and merits. Now the degrees of merit and sin are infinite. Therefore we should distinguish an infinite number of abodes, in which souls are punished or rewarded after death.

Objection 8: Further, souls are sometimes punished in the places where they sinned, as Gregory states (Dial. iv, 55). But they sinned in the place which we inhabit. Therefore this place should be reckoned among the abodes, especially since some are punished for their sins in this world, as the Master said above (Sent. iv, D, 21).

Objection 9: Further, just as some die in a state of grace and have some venial sins for which they deserve punishment, so some die in mortal sin and have some good for which they would deserve a reward. Now to those who die in grace with venial sins an abode is assigned where they are punished ere they receive their reward, which abode is purgatory. Therefore, on the other hand, there should be equally an abode for those who die in mortal sin together with some good works.

Objection 10: Further, just as the Fathers were delayed from obtaining full glory of the soul before Christ’s coming, so are they now detained from receiving the glory of the body. Therefore as we distinguish an abode of the saints before the coming of Christ from the one where they are received now, so ought we to distinguish the one in which they are received now from the one where they will be received after the resurrection.

I answer that, The abodes of souls are distinguished according to the souls’ various states. Now the soul united to a mortal body is in the state of meriting, while the soul separated from the body is in the state of receiving good or evil for its merits; so that after death it is either in the state of receiving its final reward, or in the state of being hindered from receiving it. If it is in the state of receiving its final retribution, this happens in two ways: either in the respect of good, and then it is paradise; or in respect of evil, and thus as regards actual sin it is hell, and as regards original sin it is the limbo of children. On the other hand, if it be in the state where it is hindered from receiving its final reward, this is either on account of a defect of the person, and thus we have purgatory where souls are detained from receiving their reward at once on account of the sins they have committed, or else it is on account of a defect of nature, and thus we have the limbo of the Fathers, where the Fathers were detained from obtaining glory on account of the guilt of human nature which could not yet be expiated.

Reply to Objection 1: Good happens in one way, but evil in many ways, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) and the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore it is not unfitting if there be one place of blissful reward and several places of punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: The state of meriting and demeriting is one state, since the same person is able to merit and demerit: wherefore it is fitting that one place should be assigned to all: whereas of those who receive according to their merits there are various states, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: One may be punished in two ways for original sin, as stated above, either in reference to the person, or in reference to nature only. Consequently there is a twofold limbo corresponding to that sin.

Reply to Objection 4: This darksome air is assigned to the demons, not as the place where they receive retribution for their merits, but as a place befitting their office, in so far as they are appointed to try us. Hence it is not reckoned among the abodes of which we are treating now: since hell fire is assigned to them in the first place (Mat. 25).

Reply to Objection 5: The earthly paradise belongs to the state of the wayfarer rather than to the state of those who receive for their merits; and consequently it is not reckoned among the abodes whereof we are treating now.

Reply to Objection 6: This supposition is impossible [*Cf. [5030]FS, Q[89], A[6]]. If, however, it were possible, such a one would be punished in hell eternally: for it is accidental to venial sin that it be punished temporally in purgatory, through its having grace annexed to it: wherefore if it be annexed to a mortal sin, which is without grace, it will be punished eternally in hell. And since this one who dies in original sin has a venial sin without grace, it is not unfitting to suppose that he be punished eternally.

Reply to Objection 7: Diversity of degrees in punishments or rewards does not diversify the state, and it is according to the diversity of state that we distinguish various abodes. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 8: Although separated souls are sometimes punished in the place where we dwell, it does not follow that this is their proper place of punishment: but this is done for our instruction, that seeing their punishment we may be deterred from sin. That souls while yet in the flesh are punished here for their sins has nothing to do with the question, because a punishment of this kind does not place a man outside the state of meriting or demeriting: whereas we are treating now of the abodes to which souls are assigned after the state of merit or demerit.

Reply to Objection 9: It is impossible for evil to be pure and without the admixture of good, just as the supreme good is without any admixture of evil. Consequently those who are to be conveyed to beatitude which is a supreme good must be cleansed of all evil. wherefore there must needs be a place where such persons are cleansed if they go hence without being perfectly clean. But those who will be thrust into hell will not be free from all good: and consequently the comparison fails, since those who are in hell can receive the reward of their goods, in so far as their past goods avail for the mitigation of their punishment.

Reply to Objection 10: The essential reward consists in the glory of the soul, but the body's glory, since it overflows from the soul, is entirely founded as it were on the soul: and consequently lack of the soul's glory causes a difference of state, whereas lack of the body's glory does not. For this reason, too, the same place, namely the empyrean, is assigned to the holy souls separated from their bodies and united to glorious bodies: whereas the same place was not assigned to the souls of the Fathers both before and after the glorification of souls.

OF THE QUALITY OF THE SOUL AFTER LEAVING THE BODY, AND OF THE PUNISHMENT INFLICTED ON IT BY MATERIAL FIRE (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the general quality of the soul after leaving the body, and the punishment inflicted on it by material fire. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?

(2) Whether the acts of the aforesaid powers remain in the soul?

(3) Whether the separated soul can suffer from a material fire?

Whether the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul? [*Cf. FP, Q[77], A[8]]

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive powers remain in the sensitive soul. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Anim. xv): “The soul withdraws from the body taking all with itself, sense and imagination, reason, understanding and intelligence, the concupiscible and irascible powers.” Now sense, imagination, concupiscible and irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xvi): “We believe that man alone has a substantial soul, which lives though separated from the body, and clings keenly to its senses and wits.” Therefore the soul retains its senses after being separated from the body.

Objection 3: Further, the soul’s powers are either its essential parts as some maintain, or at least are its natural properties. Now that which is in a thing essentially cannot be separated from it, nor is a subject severed from its natural properties. Therefore it is impossible for the soul to lose any of its powers after being separated from the body.

Objection 4: Further, a whole is not entire if one of its parts be lacking. Now the soul’s powers are called its parts. Therefore, if the soul lose any of its powers after death, it will not be entire after death: and this is unfitting.

Objection 5: Further, the soul’s powers co-operate in merit more even than the body, since the body is a mere instrument of action, while the powers are principles of action. Now the body must of necessity be rewarded together with the soul, since it co-operated in merit. Much more, therefore, is it necessary that the powers of the soul be rewarded together with it. Therefore the separated soul does not lose them.

Objection 6: Further, if the soul after separation from the body loses its sensitive power, that must needs come to naught. For it cannot be said that it is dissolved into some matter, since it has no matter as a part of itself. Now that which entirely comes to naught is not restored in identity; wherefore at the resurrection the soul will not have the same identical sensitive powers. Now according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), as the soul is to the body so are the soul’s powers to the parts of the body, for instance the sight to the eye. But if it were not identically the same soul that returns to the body, it would not be identically the same man. Therefore for the same reason it would not be identically the same eye, if the visual power were not identically the same; and in like manner no other part would rise again in identity, and consequently neither would the whole man be identically the same. Therefore it is impossible for the separated soul to lose its sensitive powers.

Objection 7: Further, if the sensitive powers were to be corrupted when the body is corrupted, it would follow that they are weakened when the body is weakened. Yet this is not the case, for according to De Anima i, “if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would, without doubt, see as well as a young man.” Therefore neither are the sensitive powers corrupted when the body is corrupted.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Eccl. Dogm. xix): “Of two substances alone does man consist, soul and body: the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses.” Therefore the sensitive powers belong to the body: and consequently when the body is corrupted the sensitive powers remain not in the soul.

Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the separation of the soul, expresses himself thus (Metaph. xi, 3): “If, however, anything remain at last, we must ask what this is: because in certain subjects it is not impossible, for instance if the soul be of such a disposition, not the whole soul but the intellect; for as regards the whole soul this is probably impossible.” Hence it seems that the whole soul is not separated from the body, but only the intellective powers of the soul, and consequently not the sensitive or vegetative powers.

Further, the Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima ii, 2): “This alone is ever separated, as the everlasting from the corruptible: for it is hereby clear that the remaining parts are not separable as some maintain.” Therefore the sensitive powers do not remain in the separated soul.

I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some, holding the view that all the powers are in the soul in the same way as color is in a body, hold that the soul separated from the body takes all its powers away with it: because, if it lacked any one of them, it would follow that the soul is changed in its natural properties, since these cannot change so long as their subject remains. But the aforesaid view is false, for since a power is so called because it enables us to do or suffer something, and since to do and to be able belong to the same subject, it follows that the subject of a power is the same as that which is agent or patient. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that “where we find power there we find action.”

Now it is evident that certain operations, whereof the soul's powers are the principles, do not belong to the soul properly speaking but to the soul as united to the body, because they are not performed except through the medium of the body—such as to see, to hear, and so forth. Hence it follows that such like powers belong to the united soul and body as their subject, but to the soul as their quickening principle, just as the form is the principle of the properties of a composite being. Some operations, however, are performed by the soul without a bodily organ—for instance to understand, to consider, to will: wherefore, since these actions are proper to the soul, the powers that are the principles thereof belong to the soul not only as their principle but also as their subject. Therefore, since so long as the proper subject remains its proper passions must also remain, and when it is corrupted they also must be corrupted, it follows that these powers which use no bodily organ for their actions must needs remain in the separated body, while those which use a bodily organ must needs be corrupted when the body is corrupted: and such are all the powers belonging to the sensitive and the vegetative soul. On this account some draw a distinction in the sensitive powers of the soul: for they say that they are of two kinds—some being acts of organs and emanating from the soul into the body are corrupted with the body; others, whence the former originate, are in the soul, because by them the soul sensitizes the body for seeing, hearing, and so on; and these primary powers remain in the separated soul. But this statement seems unreasonable: because the soul, by its essence and not through the medium of certain other powers, is the origin of those powers which are the acts of organs, even as any form, from the very fact that by its essence it informs its matter, is the origin of the properties which result naturally in the composite. For were it necessary to suppose other powers in the soul, by means of which the powers that perfect the organs may flow from the essence of the soul, for the same reason it would be necessary to suppose other powers by means of which these mean powers flow from the essence of the soul, and so on to infinity, and if we have to stop it is better to do so at the first step.

Hence others say that the sensitive and other like powers do not remain in the separated soul except in a restricted sense, namely radically, in the same way as a result is in its principle: because there remains in the separated soul the ability to produce these powers if it should be reunited to the body;

nor is it necessary for this ability to be anything in addition to the essence of the soul, as stated above. This opinion appears to be the more reasonable.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Augustine is to be understood as meaning that the soul takes away with it some of those powers actually, namely understanding and intelligence, and some radically, as stated above [*Cf. [5031]FP, Q[77], A[8], ad 1 and infra A[2], ad 1].

Reply to Objection 2: The senses which the soul takes away with it are not these external senses, but the internal, those, namely, which pertain to the intellective part, for the intellect is sometimes called sense, as Basil states in his commentary on the Proverbs, and again the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 11). If, however, he means the external senses we must reply as above to the first objection.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above, the sensitive powers are related to the soul, not as natural passions to their subject, but as compared to their origin: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 4: The powers of the soul are not called its integral but its potential parts. Now the nature of such like wholes is that the entire energy of the whole is found perfectly in one of the parts, but partially in the others; thus in the soul the soul’s energy is found perfectly in the intellective part, but partially in the others. Wherefore, as the powers of the intellective part remain in the separated soul, the latter will remain entire and undiminished, although the sensitive powers do not remain actually: as neither is the king’s power decreased by the death of a mayor who shared his authority.

Reply to Objection 5: The body co-operates in merit, as an essential part of the man who merits. The sensitive powers, however, do not co-operate thus, since they are of the genus of accidents. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 6: The powers of the sensitive soul are said to be acts of the organs, not as though they were the essential forms of those organs, except in reference to the soul whose powers they are. But they are the acts of the organs, by perfecting them for their proper operations, as heat is the act of fire by perfecting it for the purpose of heating. Wherefore, just as a fire would remain identically the same, although another individual heat were in it (even so the cold of water that has been heated returns not identically the same, although the water remains the same in identity), so the organs will be the same identically, although the powers be not identically the same.

Reply to Objection 7: The Philosopher is speaking there of these powers as being rooted in the soul. This is clear from his saying that “old age is an affection not of the soul, but of that in which the soul is,” namely the body. For in this way the powers of the soul are neither weakened nor corrupted on account of the body.

Whether the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the sensitive powers remain in the separated soul. For Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima xv): “When the soul leaves the body it derives pleasure or sorrow through being affected with these” (namely the imagination, and the concupiscible and irascible faculties) “according to its merits.” But the imagination, the concupiscible, and the irascible are sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul will be affected as regards the sensitive powers, and consequently will be in some act by reason of them.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that “the body feels not, but the soul through the body,” and further on: “The soul feels certain things, not through the body but without the body.” Now that which befits the soul without the body can be in the soul separated from the body. Therefore the soul will then be able to feel actually.

Objection 3: Further, to see images of bodies, as occurs in sleep, belongs to imaginary vision which is in the sensitive part. Now it happens that the separated soul sees images of bodies in the same way as when we sleep. Thus Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): “For I see not why the soul has an image of its own body when, the body lying senseless, yet not quite dead, it sees some things which many have related after returning to life from this suspended animation and yet has it not when it has left the body through death having taken place.” For it is unintelligible that the soul should have an image of its body, except in so far as it sees that image: wherefore he said before of those who lie senseless that “they have a certain image of their own body, by which they are able to be borne to corporeal places and by means of sensible images to take cognizance of such things as they see.” Therefore the separated soul can exercise the acts of the sensitive powers.

Objection 4: Further, the memory is a power of the sensitive part, as proved in De Memor. et Remin. i. Now separated souls will actually remember the things they did in this world: wherefore it is said to the rich glutton (Lk. 16:25): “Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.” Therefore the separated soul will exercise the act of a sensitive power.

Objection 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part. But joy and sorrow, love and hatred, fear and hope, and similar emotions which according to our faith we hold to be in separated souls, are in the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore separated souls will not be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.

On the contrary, That which is common to soul and body cannot remain in the separated soul. Now all the operations of the sensitive powers are common to the soul and body: and this is evident from the fact that no sensitive power exercises an act except through a bodily organ. Therefore the separated soul will be deprived of the acts of the sensitive powers.

Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), that “when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves,” and the same applies to all the acts of the sensitive powers. Therefore the separated soul does not exercise the act of any sensitive power.

I answer that, Some distinguish two kinds of acts in the sensitive powers: external acts which the soul exercises through the body. and these do not remain in the separated soul; and internal acts which the soul performs by itself; and these will be in the separated soul. This statement would seem to have originated from the opinion of Plato, who held that the soul is united to the body, as a perfect substance nowise dependant on the body, and merely as a mover is united to the thing moved. This is an evident consequence of transmigration which he held. And since according to him nothing is in motion except what is moved, and lest he should go on indefinitely, he said that the first mover moves itself, and he maintained that the soul is the cause of its own movement. Accordingly there would be a twofold movement of the soul, one by which it moves itself, and another whereby the body is moved by the soul: so that this act “to see” is first of all in the soul itself as moving itself, and secondly in the bodily organ in so far as the soul moves the body. This opinion is refuted by the Philosopher (De

Anima i, 3) who proves that the soul does not move itself, and that it is nowise moved in respect of such operations as seeing, feeling, and the like, but that such operations are movements of the composite only. We must therefore conclude that the acts of the sensitive powers nowise remain in the separated soul, except perhaps as in their remote origin.

Reply to Objection 1: Some deny that this book is Augustine’s: for it is ascribed to a Cistercian who compiled it from Augustine’s works and added things of his own. Hence we are not to take what is written there, as having authority. If, however, its authority should be maintained, it must be said that the meaning is that the separated soul is affected with imagination and other like powers, not as though such affection were the act of the aforesaid powers, but in the sense that the soul will be affected in the future life for good or ill, according to the things which it committed in the body through the imagination and other like powers: so that the imagination and such like powers are not supposed to elicit that affection, but to have elicited in the body the merit of that affection.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul is said to feel through the body, not as though the act of feeling belonged to the soul by itself, but as belonging to the whole composite by reason of the soul, just as we say that heat heats. That which is added, namely that the soul feels some things without the body, such as fear and so forth, means that it feels such things without the outward movement of the body that takes place in the acts of the proper senses: since fear and like passions do not occur without any bodily movement.

It may also be replied that Augustine is speaking according to the opinion of the Platonists who maintained this as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Augustine speaks there as nearly throughout that book, as one inquiring and not deciding. For it is clear that there is no comparison between the soul of a sleeper and the separated soul: since the soul of the sleeper uses the organ of imagination wherein corporeal images are impressed; which cannot be said of the separated soul. Or we may reply that images of things are in the soul, both as to the sensitive and imaginative power and as to the intellective power, with greater or lesser abstraction from matter and material conditions. Wherefore Augustine’s comparison holds in this respect that just as the images of corporeal things are in the soul of the dreamer or of one who is carried out of his mind, imaginatively, so are they in the separated soul intellectively: but not that they are in the separated soul imaginatively.

Reply to Objection 4: As stated in the first book (Sent. i, D, 3, qu. 4), memory has a twofold signification. Sometimes it means a power of the sensitive part, in so far as its gaze extends over past time; and in this way the act of the memory will not be in the separated soul. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4) that "when this," the body to wit, "is corrupted, the soul remembers not." In another way memory is used to designate that part of the imagination which pertains to the intellective faculty, in so far namely as it abstracts from all differences of time, since it regards not only the past but also the present, and the future as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 11). Taking memory in this sense the separated soul will remember [*Cf. [5032]FP, Q[77], A[8]; [5033]FP, Q[89], A[6]].

Reply to Objection 5: Love, joy, sorrow, and the like, have a twofold signification. Sometimes they denote passions of the sensitive appetite, and thus they will not be in the separated soul, because in this way they are not exercised without a definite movement of the heart. In another way they denote acts of the will which is in the intellective part: and in this way they will be in the separated soul, even as delight will be there without bodily movement, even as it is in God, namely in so far as it is a simple movement of the will. In this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God's joy is one simple delight."

Whether the separated soul can suffer from a bodily fire?

Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul cannot suffer from a bodily fire. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii): "The things that affect the soul well or ill after its separation from the body, are not corporeal but resemble corporeal things." Therefore the separated soul is not punished with a bodily fire.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) says that "the agent is always more excellent than the patient." But it is impossible for any body to be more excellent than the separated soul. Therefore it cannot suffer from a body.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i) and Boethius (De Duab. Natur.) only those things that agree in matter are active and passive in relation to one another. But the soul and corporeal fire do not agree in matter, since there is no matter common to spiritual and corporeal things: wherefore they cannot be changed into one another, as Boethius says (De Duab. Natur.). Therefore the separated soul does not suffer from a bodily fire.

Objection 4: Further, whatsoever is patient receives something from the agent. Therefore if the soul suffer from the bodily fire, it will receive something therefrom. Now whatsoever is received in a thing is received according to the mode of the recipient. Therefore that which is received in the soul from the fire, is in it not materially but spiritually. Now the forms of things existing spiritually in the soul are its perfections. Therefore though it be granted that the soul suffer from the bodily fire, this will not conduce to its punishment, but rather to its perfection.

Objection 5: Further, if it be said that the soul is punished merely by seeing the fire, as Gregory would seem to say (Dial. iv, 29). On the contrary, if the soul sees the fire of hell, it cannot see it save by intellectual vision, since it has not the organs by which sensitive or imaginative vision is effected. But it would seem impossible for intellectual vision to be the cause of sorrow, since "there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of considering," according to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 13). Therefore the soul is not punished by that vision.

Objection 6: Further, if it be said that the soul suffers from the corporeal fire, through being held thereby, even as now it is held by the body while living in the body; on the contrary, the soul while living in the body is held by the body in so far as there results one thing from the soul and the body, as from form and matter. But the soul will not be the form of that corporeal fire. Therefore it cannot be held by the fire in the manner aforesaid.

Objection 7: Further, every bodily agent acts by contact. But a corporeal fire cannot be in contact with the soul, since contact is only between corporeal things whose bounds come together. Therefore the soul suffers not from that fire.

Objection 8: Further, an organic agent does not act on a remote object, except through acting on the intermediate objects; wherefore it is able to act at a fixed distance in proportion to its power. But souls, or at least the demons to whom this equally applies, are sometimes outside the place of hell, since sometimes they appear to men even in this world: and yet they are not then free from punishment, for just as the glory of the saints is never interrupted, so neither is the punishment of the damned. And yet we do not find that all the intermediate things suffer from the fire of hell: nor again is it credible that any corporeal thing of an elemental nature has such a power that its action can reach to such a distance. Therefore it does not seem that the pains suffered by the souls of the damned are inflicted by a corporeal fire.

On the contrary, The possibility of suffering from a corporeal fire is equally consistent with separated souls and with demons. Now demons suffer therefrom since they are punished by that fire into which the bodies of the damned will be cast after the resurrection, and which must needs be as corporeal fire. This is evident from the words of our Lord (Mat. 25:41), “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which was prepared for the devil,” etc. Therefore separated souls also can suffer from that fire.

Further, punishment should correspond to sin. Now in sinning the soul subjected itself to the body by sinful concupiscence. Therefore it is just that it should be punished by being made subject to a bodily thing by suffering therefrom.

Further, there is greater union between form and matter than between agent and patient. Now the diversity of spiritual and corporeal nature does not hinder the soul from being the form of the body. Therefore neither is it an obstacle to its suffering from a body.

I answer that, Given that the fire of hell is not so called metaphorically, nor an imaginary fire, but a real corporeal fire, we must needs say that the soul will suffer punishment from a corporeal fire, since our Lord said (Mat. 25:41) that this fire was prepared for the devil and his angels, who are incorporeal even as the soul. But how it is that they can thus suffer is explained in many ways.

For some have said that the mere fact that the soul sees the fire makes the soul suffer from the fire: wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) says: “The soul suffers from the fire by merely seeing it.” But this does not seem sufficient, because whatever is seen, from the fact that it is seen, is a perfection of the seer. wherefore it cannot conduce to his punishment, as seen. Sometimes, however, it is of a penal or unpleasant nature accidentally, in so far, to wit, as it is apprehended as something hurtful, and consequently, besides the fact that the soul sees the fire, there must needs be some relation of the soul to the fire, according to which the fire is hurtful to the soul.

Hence others have said that although a corporeal fire cannot burn the soul, the soul nevertheless apprehends it as hurtful to itself, and in consequence of this apprehension is seized with fear and sorrow, in fulfillment of Ps. 13:5, “They have trembled for fear, where there was no fear.” Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29) that “the soul burns through seeing itself aflame.” But this, again, seems insufficient, because in this case the soul would suffer from the fire, not in reality but only in apprehension: for although a real passion of sorrow or pain may result from a false imagination, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. xii), it cannot be said in relation to that passion that one really suffers from the thing, but from the image of the thing that is present to one’s fancy. Moreover, this kind of suffering would be more unlike real suffering than that which results from imaginary vision, since the latter is stated to result from real images of things, which images the soul carries about with it, whereas the former results from false fancies which the erring soul imagines: and furthermore, it is not probable that separated souls or demons, who are endowed with keen intelligence, would think it possible for a corporeal fire to hurt them, if they were nowise distressed thereby.

Hence others say that it is necessary to admit that the soul suffers even really from the corporeal fire: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 29): “We can gather from the words of the Gospel, that the soul suffers from the fire not only by seeing it, but also by feeling it.” They explain the possibility of this as follows. They say that this corporeal fire can be considered in two ways. First, as a corporeal thing, and thus it has not the power to act on the soul. Secondly, as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice. For the order of Divine justice demands that the soul which by sinning subjected itself to corporeal things should be subjected to them also in punishment. Now an instrument acts not only in virtue of its own nature, but also in virtue of the principal agent: wherefore it is not unreasonable if that fire, seeing that it acts in virtue of a spiritual agent, should act on the spirit of a man or demon, in the same way as we have explained the sanctification of the soul by the sacraments ([5034]TP, Q[62], AA[1],4).

But, again, this does not seem to suffice, since every instrument, in acting on that on which it is used instrumentally, has its own connatural action besides the action whereby it acts in virtue of the principal agent: in fact it is by fulfilling the former that it effects the latter action, even as, in Baptism, it is by laving the body that water sanctifies the soul, and the saw by cutting wood produces the shape of a house.

Hence we must allow the fire to exercise on the soul an action connatural to the fire, in order that it may be the instrument of Divine justice in the punishment of sin: and for this reason we must say that a body cannot naturally act on a spirit, nor in any way be hurtful or distressful to it, except in so far as the latter is in some way united to a body: for thus we observe that “the corruptible body is a load upon the soul” (Wis. 9:15). Now a spirit is united to a body in two ways. In one way as form to matter, so that from their union there results one thing simply: and the spirit that is thus united to a body both quickens the body and is somewhat burdened by the body: but it is not thus that the spirit of man or demon is united to the corporeal fire. In another way as the mover is united to the things moved, or as a thing placed is united to place, even as incorporeal things are in a place. In this way created incorporeal spirits are confined to a place, being in one place in such a way as not to be in another. Now although of its nature a corporeal thing is able to confine an incorporeal spirit to a place, it is not able of its nature to detain an incorporeal spirit in the place to which it is confined, and so to tie it to that place that it be unable to seek another, since a spirit is not by nature in a place so as to be subject to place. But the corporeal fire is enabled as the instrument of the vengeance of Divine justice thus to detain a spirit; and thus it has a penal effect on it, by hindering it from fulfilling its own will, that is by hindering it from acting where it will and as it will.

This way is asserted by Gregory (Dial. iv, 29). For in explaining how the soul can suffer from that fire by feeling it, he expresses himself as follows: “Since Truth declares the rich sinner to be condemned to fire, will any wise man deny that the souls of the wicked are imprisoned in flames?” Julian [*Bishop of Toledo, Prognostic ii, 17] says the same as quoted by the Master (Sent. iv, D, 44): “If the incorporeal spirit of a living man is held by the body, why shall it not be held after death by a corporeal fire?” and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that “just as, although the soul is spiritual and the body corporeal, man is so fashioned that the soul is united to the body as giving it life, and on account of this union conceives a great love for its body, so it is chained to the fire, as receiving punishment therefrom, and from this union conceives a loathing.”

Accordingly we must unite all the aforesaid modes together, in order to understand perfectly how the soul suffers from a corporeal fire: so as to say that the fire of its nature is able to have an incorporeal spirit united to it as a thing placed is united to a place; that as the instrument of Divine justice it is enabled to detain it enchained as it were, and in this respect this fire is really hurtful to the spirit, and thus the soul seeing the fire as something hurtful to it is tormented by the fire. Hence Gregory (Dial. iv, 29) mentions all these in order, as may be seen from the above quotations.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine speaks there as one inquiring: wherefore he expresses himself otherwise when deciding the point, as quoted above (De Civ. Dei xxi). Or we may reply that Augustine means to say that the things which are the proximate occasion of the soul’s pain or sorrow are spiritual, since it would not be distressed unless it apprehended the fire as hurtful to it: wherefore the fire as apprehended is the proximate cause of its distress, whereas the corporeal fire which exists outside the soul is the remote cause of its distress.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the soul is simply more excellent than the fire, the fire is relatively more excellent than the soul, in so far, to wit, as it is the instrument of Divine justice.

Reply to Objection 3: The Philosopher and Boethius are speaking of the action whereby the patient is changed into the nature of the agent. Such is not the action of the fire on the soul: and consequently the argument is not conclusive.

Reply to Objection 4: By acting on the soul the fire bestows nothing on it but detains it, as stated above. Hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 5: In intellectual vision sorrow is not caused by the fact that something is seen, since the thing seen as such can nowise be contrary to the intellect. But in the sensible vision the thing seen, by its very action on the sight so as to be seen, there may be accidentally something corruptive of the sight, in so far as it destroys the harmony of the organ Nevertheless, intellectual vision may cause sorrow, in so far as the thing seen is apprehended as hurtful, not that it hurts through being seen, but in some other way no matter which. It is thus that the soul in seeing the fire is distressed.

Reply to Objection 6: The comparison does not hold in every respect, but it does in some, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 7: Although there is no bodily contact between the soul and body, there is a certain spiritual contact between them (even as the mover of the heaven, being spiritual, touches the heaven, when it moves it, with a spiritual contact) in the same way as a "painful object is said to touch," as stated in De Gener. i. This mode of contact is sufficient for action.

Reply to Objection 8: The souls of the damned are never outside hell, except by Divine permission, either for the instruction or for the trial of the elect. And wherever they are outside hell they nevertheless always see the fire thereof as prepared for their punishment. Wherefore, since this vision is the immediate cause of their distress, as stated above, wherever they are, they suffer from hell-fire. Even so prisoners, though outside the prison, suffer somewhat from the prison, seeing themselves condemned thereto. Hence just as the glory of the elect is not diminished, neither as to the essential, nor as to the accidental reward, if they happen to be outside the empyrean, in fact this somewhat conduces to their glory, so the punishment of the damned is nowise diminished, if by God's permission they happen to be outside hell for a time. A gloss on James 3:6, "inflameth the wheel of our nativity," etc., is in agreement with this, for it is worded thus: "The devil, wherever he is, whether in the air or under the earth, drags with him the torments of his flames." But the objection argues as though the corporeal fire tortured the spirit immediately in the same way as it torments bodies.

OF THE SUFFRAGES FOR THE DEAD (FOURTEEN ARTICLES)

We must now consider the suffrages for the dead. Under this head there are fourteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether suffrages performed by one person can profit others?

(2) Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?

(3) Whether the suffrages of sinners profit the dead?

(4) Whether suffrages for the dead profit those who perform them?

(5) Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?

(6) Whether they profit those who are in purgatory?

(7) Whether they avail the children in limbo?

(8) Whether in any way they profit those who are heaven?

(9) Whether the prayer of the Church, the Sacrament of the altar, and almsgiving profit the departed?

(10) Whether indulgences granted by the Church profit them?

(11) Whether the burial service profits the departed?

(12) Whether suffrages for one dead person profit that person more than others?

(13) Whether suffrages for many avail each one as much as if they were offered for each individual?

(14) Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special and general suffrages together avail those for whom they are offered?

Whether the suffrages of one person can profit others?

Objection 1: It would seem that the suffrages of one person cannot profit others. For it is written (Gal. 6:8): “What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap.” Now if one person reaped fruit from the suffrages of another, he would reap from another’s sowing. Therefore a person receives no fruit from the suffrages of others.

Objection 2: Further, it belongs to God’s justice, that each one should receive according to his merits, wherefore the psalm (Ps. 61:13) says: “Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.” Now it is impossible for God’s justice to fail. Therefore it is impossible for one man to be assisted by the works of another.

Objection 3: Further, a work is meritorious on the same count as it is praiseworthy, namely inasmuch as it is voluntary. Now one man is not praised for the work of another. Therefore neither can the work of one man be meritorious and fruitful for another.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to Divine justice to repay good for good in the same way as evil for evil. But no man is punished for the evildoings of another; indeed, according to Ezech. 18:4, “the soul that sinneth, the same shall die.” Therefore neither does one person profit by another’s good.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 118:63): “I am a partaker with all them that fear Thee,” etc.

Further, all the faithful united together by charity are members of the one body of the Church. Now one member is assisted by another. Therefore one man can be assisted by the merits of another.

I answer that, our actions can avail for two purposes. First, for acquiring a certain state; thus by a meritorious work a man obtains the state of bliss. Secondly, for something consequent upon a state; thus by some work a man merits an accidental reward, or a rebate of punishment. And for both these purposes our actions may avail in two ways: first, by way of merit; secondly, by way of prayer: the difference being that merit relies on justice, and prayer on mercy; since he who prays obtains his petition from the mere liberality of the one he prays. Accordingly we must say that the work of one person nowise can avail another for acquiring a state by way of merit, so that, to wit, a man be able to merit eternal life by the works which I do, because the share of glory is awarded according to the measure of the recipient, and each one is disposed by his own and not by another’s actions—disposed, that is to say, by being worthy of reward. By way of prayer, however, the work of one may profit another while he is a wayfarer, even for acquiring a state; for instance, one man may obtain the first grace for another [*Cf. [5035]FS, Q[114], A[6]]: and since the impetration of prayer depends on the liberality of God Whom we pray, it may extend to whatever is ordinately subject to the Divine power. On the other hand, as regards that which is consequent upon or accessory to a state, the work of one may avail another, not only by way of prayer but even by way of merit: and this happens in two ways. First, on account of their communion in the root of the work, which root is charity in meritorious works. Wherefore all who are united together by charity acquire some benefit from one another’s works, albeit according to the measure of each one’s state, since even in heaven each one will rejoice in the goods of others. Hence it is that the communion of saints is laid down as an article of faith. Secondly, through the intention of the doer who does certain works specially for the purpose that they may profit such persons: so that those works become somewhat the works of those for whom they are done, as though they were bestowed on them by the doer. Wherefore they can avail them either for the fulfillment of satisfaction or for some similar purpose that does not change their state.

Reply to Objection 1: This reaping is the receiving of eternal life, as stated in Jn. 4:36, “And he that reapeth . . . gathereth fruit unto life everlasting.” Now a share of eternal life is not given to a man save for his own works, for although we may impetrate for another that he obtain life, this never happens except by means of his own works, when namely, at the prayers of one, another is given the grace whereby he merits eternal life.

Reply to Objection 2: The work that is done for another becomes his for whom it is done: and in like manner the work done by a man who is one with me is somewhat mine. Hence it is not contrary to Divine justice if a man receives the fruit of the works done by a man who is one with him in charity, or of works done for him. This also happens according to human justice, so that the satisfaction offered by one is accepted in lieu of another’s.

Reply to Objection 3: Praise is not given to a person save according to his relation to an act, wherefore praise is “in relation to something” (Ethic. i, 12). And since no man is made or shown to be well- or ill-disposed to something by another’s deed, it follows that no man is praised for another’s deeds save accidentally in so far as he is somewhat the cause of those deeds, by giving counsel, assistance, inducement, or by any other means. on the other hand, a work is meritorious to a person, not only by reason of his disposition, but also in view of something consequent upon his disposition or state, as evidenced by what has been said.

Reply to Objection 4: It is directly contrary to justice to take away from a person that which is his due: but to give a person what is not his due is not contrary to justice, but surpasses the bounds of justice, for it is liberality. Now a person cannot be hurt by the ills of another, unless he be deprived of something of his own. Consequently it is not becoming that one should be punished for another’s sins, as it is that one should acquire some advantage from deeds of another.

Whether the dead can be assisted by the works of the living?

Objection 1: It would seem that the dead cannot be assisted by the works of the living. First, because the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:10): “We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done.” Therefore nothing can accrue to a man from the works of others, which are done after his death and when he is no longer in the body.

Objection 2: Further, this also seems to follow from the words of Apoc. 14:13, “Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord . . . for their works follow them.”

Objection 3: Further, it belongs only to one who is on the way to advance on account of some deed. Now after death men are no longer wayfarers, because to them the words of Job 19:8, refer: “He hath hedged in my path round about, and I cannot pass.” Therefore the dead cannot be assisted by a person’s suffrages.

Objection 4: Further, no one is assisted by the deed of another, unless there be some community of life between them. Now there is no community between the dead and the living, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 11). Therefore the suffrages of the living do not profit the dead.

On the contrary are the words of 2 Macc. 12:46: “It is . . . a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they may be loosed from sins.” But this would not be profitable unless it were a help to them. Therefore the suffrages of the living profit the dead.

Further, Augustine says (De Cure pro Mort. i): “Of no small weight is the authority of the Church whereby she clearly approves of the custom whereby a commendation of the dead has a place in the prayers which the priests pour forth to the Lord God at His altar.” This custom was established by the apostles themselves according to the Damascene in a sermon on suffrages for the dead [*De his qui in fide dormierunt, 3], where he expresses himself thus: “Realizing the nature of the Mysteries the disciples of the Saviour and His holy apostles sanctioned a commemoration of those who had died in the faith, being made in the awe-inspiring and life-giving Mysteries.” This is also confirmed by the authority of Dionysius (Hier. Eccl.), where he mentions the rite of the Early Church in praying for the dead, and, moreover, asserts that the suffrages of the living profit the dead. Therefore we must believe this without any doubt.

I answer that, Charity, which is the bond uniting the members of the Church, extends not only to the living, but also to the dead who die in charity. For charity which is the life of the soul, even as the soul is the life of the body, has no end: “Charity never falleth away” (1 Cor. 13:8). Moreover, the dead live in the memory of the living: wherefore the intention of the living can be directed to them. Hence the suffrages of the living profit the dead in two ways even as they profit the living, both on account of the bond of charity and on account of the intention being directed to them. Nevertheless, we must not believe that the suffrages of the living profit them so as to change their state from unhappiness to happiness or “vice versa”; but they avail for the diminution of punishment or something of the kind that involves no change in the state of the dead.

Reply to Objection 1: Man while living in the body merited that such things should avail him after death. Wherefore if he is assisted thereby after this life, this is, nevertheless, the result of the things he has done in the body.

Or we may reply, according to John Damascene, in the sermon quoted above, that these words refer to the retribution which will be made at the final judgment, of eternal glory or eternal unhappiness: for then each one will receive only according as he himself has done in the body. Meanwhile, however, he can be assisted by the suffrages of the living.

Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted refer expressly to the sequel of eternal retribution as is clear from the opening words: “Blessed are the dead,” etc. Or we may reply that deeds done on their behalf are somewhat their own, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although, strictly speaking, after death souls are not in the state of the way, yet in a certain respect they are still on the way, in so far as they are delayed awhile in their advance towards their final award. Wherefore, strictly speaking, their way is hedged in round about, so that they can no more be changed by any works in respect of the state of happiness or unhappiness. Yet their way is not so hedged around that they cannot be helped by others in the matter of their being delayed from receiving their final award, because in this respect they are still wayfarers.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the communion of civic deeds whereof the Philosopher speaks, is impossible between the dead and the living, because the dead are outside civic life, the communication of the spiritual life is possible between them, for that life is founded on charity towards God, to Whom the spirits of the dead live.

Whether suffrages performed by sinners profit the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages performed by sinners do not profit the dead. For, according to Jn. 9:31, “God doth not hear sinners.” Now if their prayers were to profit those for whom they pray, they would be heard by God. Therefore the suffrages performed by them do not profit the dead.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Pastoral i, 11) that “when an offensive person is sent to intercede, the wrath of the angered party is provoked to harsher measures.” Now every sinner is offensive to God. Therefore God is not inclined to mercy by the suffrages of sinners, and consequently their suffrages are of no avail.

Objection 3: Further, a person’s deed would seem to be more fruitful to the doer than to another. But a sinner merits naught for himself by his deeds. Much less, therefore, can he merit for another.

Objection 4: Further, every meritorious work must be a living work, that is to say, informed by charity. Now works done by sinners are dead. Therefore the dead for whom they are done cannot be assisted thereby.

Objection 5: On the contrary, No man can know for certain about another man whether the latter be in a state of sin or of grace. If, therefore, only those suffrages were profitable that are done by those who are in a state of grace, a man could not know of whom to ask suffrages for his dead, and consequently many would be deterred from obtaining suffrages.

Objection 6: Further, according to Augustine (Enchiridion cix), as quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), the dead are assisted by suffrages according as while living they merited to be assisted after death. Therefore the worth of suffrages is measured according to the disposition of the person for whom they are performed. Therefore it would appear that it differs not whether they be performed by good or by wicked persons.

I answer that, Two things may be considered in the suffrages performed by the wicked. First, the deed done, for instance the sacrifice of the altar. And since our sacraments have their efficacy from themselves independently of the deed of the doer, and are equally efficacious by whomsoever they are performed, in this respect the suffrages of the wicked profit the departed. Secondly, we may consider the deed of the doer, and then we must draw a distinction; because the deed of a sinner who offers suffrage may be considered—in one way in so far as it is his own deed, and thus it can nowise be meritorious either to himself or to another; in another way in so far as it is another's deed, and this happens in two ways. First, when the sinner, offering suffrages, represents the whole Church; for instance a priest when he performs the burial service in church. And since one in whose name or in whose stead a thing is done is understood to do it himself as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. xiii), it follows that the suffrages of that priest, albeit a sinner, profit the departed. Secondly, when he acts as the instrument of another: for the work of the instrument belongs more to the principal agent. Wherefore, although he who acts as the instrument of another be not in a state of merit, his act may be meritorious on account of the principal agent: for instance if a servant being in sin do any work of mercy at the command of his master who has charity. Hence, if a person dying in charity command suffrages to be offered for him, or if some other person having charity prescribe them, those suffrages avail for the departed, even though the persons by whom they are performed be in sin. Nevertheless they would avail more if those persons were in charity, because then those works would be meritorious on two counts.

Reply to Objection 1: The prayer offered by a sinner is sometimes not his but another's, and consequently in this respect is worthy to be heard by God. Nevertheless, God sometimes hears sinners, when, to wit, they ask for something acceptable to God. For God dispenses His goods not only to the righteous but also to sinners (Mat. 5:45), not indeed on account of their merits, but of His loving kindness. Hence a gloss on Jn. 9:31, “God doth not hear sinners,” says that “he speaks as one unanointed and as not seeing clearly.”

Reply to Objection 2: Although the sinner's prayer is not acceptable in so far as he is offensive, it may be acceptable to God on account of another in whose stead or at whose command he offers the prayer.

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why the sinner who performs these suffrages gains nothing thereby is because he is not capable of profiting by reason of his own indisposition. Nevertheless, as stated above, it may in some way profit another, who is disposed.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the sinner’s deed is not living in so far as it is his own, it may be living in so far as it is another’s, as stated above.

Since, however, the arguments in the contrary sense would seem to show that it matters not whether one obtain suffrages from good or from evil persons, we must reply to them also.

Reply to Objection 5: Although one cannot know for certain about another whether he be in the state of salvation, one may infer it with probability from what one sees outwardly of a man: for a tree is known by its fruit (Mat. 7:16).

Reply to Objection 6: In order that suffrage avail another, it is requisite that the one for whom it is performed be capable of availing by it: and a man has become capable of this by his own works which he did in his lifetime. This is what Augustine means to say. Nevertheless, those works must be such that they can profit him, and this depends not on the person for whom the suffrage is performed, but rather on the one who offers the suffrages whether by performing them or by commanding them.

Whether suffrages offered by the living for the dead profit those who offer them?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered by the living for the dead do not profit those who offer them. For according to human justice a man is not absolved from his own debt if he pay a debt for another man. Therefore a man is not absolved from his own debt for the reason that by offering suffrages he has paid the debt of the one for whom he offered them.

Objection 2: Further, whatever a man does, he should do it as best he can. Now it is better to assist two than one. Therefore if one who by suffrages has paid the debt of a dead person is freed from his own debt, it would seem that one ought never to satisfy for oneself, but always for another.

Objection 3: Further, if the satisfaction of one who satisfies for another profits him equally with the one for whom he satisfies, it will likewise equally profit a third person if he satisfy for him at the same time, and likewise a fourth and so on. Therefore he might satisfy for all by one work of satisfaction; which is absurd.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 34:13): “My prayer shall be turned into my bosom.” Therefore, in like manner, suffrages that are offered for others profit those who satisfy.

Further, the Damascene says in the sermon “On those who fell asleep in the faith: Just as when about to anoint a sick man with the ointment or other holy oil, first of all he, “ namely the anointer, “shares in the anointing and thus proceeds to anoint the patient, so whoever strives for his neighbor’s salvation first of all profits himself and afterwards his neighbor.” And thus the question at issue is answered.

I answer that, The work of suffrage that is done for another may be considered in two ways. First, as expiating punishment by way of compensation which is a condition of satisfaction: and in this way the work of suffrage that is counted as belonging to the person for whom it is done, while absolving him from the debt of punishment, does not absolve the performer from his own debt of punishment, because in this compensation we have to consider the equality of justice: and this work of satisfaction can be equal to the one debt without being equal to the other, for the debts of two sinners require a greater satisfaction than the debt of one. Secondly, it may be considered as meriting eternal life, and this it has as proceeding from its root, which is charity: and in this way it profits not only the person for whom it is done, but also and still more the doer.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections: for the first considered the work of suffrage as a work of satisfaction, while the others consider it as meritorious.

Whether suffrages profit those who are in hell?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages profit those who are in hell. For it is written (2 Macc. 12:40): “They found under the coats of the slain some of the donaries of the idols . . . which the law forbiddeth to the Jews,” and yet we read further on (2 Macc. 12:43) that Judas “sent twelve thousand drachms of silver to Jerusalem . . . to be offered for the sins of the dead.” Now it is clear that they sinned mortally through acting against the Law, and consequently that they died in mortal sin, and were taken to hell. Therefore suffrages profit those who are in hell.

Objection 2: Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the saying of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) that “those whom suffrages profit gain either entire forgiveness, or at least an abatement of their damnation.” Now only those who are in hell are said to be damned. Therefore suffrages profit even those who are in hell.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier.): “If here the prayers of the righteous avail those who are alive, how much more do they, after death, profit those alone who are worthy of their holy prayers?” Hence we may gather that suffrages are more profitable to the dead than to the living. Now they profit the living even though they be in mortal sin, for the Church prays daily for sinners that they be converted to God. Therefore suffrages avail also for the dead who are in mortal sin.

Objection 4: Further, in the Lives of the Fathers (iii, 172; vi, 3) we read, and the Damascene relates in his sermon [*De his qui in fide dormierunt] that Macarius discovered the skull of a dead man on the road, and that after praying he asked whose head it was, and the head replied that it had belonged to a pagan priest who was condemned to hell; and yet he confessed that he and others were assisted by the prayers of Macarius. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit even those who are in hell.

Objection 5: Further, the Damascene in the same sermon relates that Gregory, while praying for Trajan, heard a voice from heaven saying to him: “I have heard thy voice, and I pardon Trajan”: and of this fact the Damascene adds in the same sermon, “the whole East and West are witnesses.” Yet it is clear that Trajan was in hell, since “he put many martyrs to a cruel death” [*De his qui fide dormierunt]. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail even for those who are in hell.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii): “The high priest prays not for the unclean, because by so doing he would act counter to the Divine order,” and consequently he says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that “he prays not that sinners be forgiven, because his prayer for them would not be heard.” Therefore suffrages avail not those who are in hell.

Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 19): “There is the same reason for not praying then” (namely after the judgment day) “for men condemned to the everlasting fire, as there is now for not praying for the devil and his angels who are sentenced to eternal punishment, and for this reason the saints pray not for dead unbelieving and wicked men, because, forsooth, knowing them to be already condemned to eternal punishment, they shrink from pleading for them by the merit of their prayers before they are summoned to the presence of the just Judge.”

Further, the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes the words of Augustine (De Verb. A post. Serm. xxxii): “If a man depart this life without the faith that worketh by charity and its sacraments, in vain do his friends have recourse to such like acts of kindness.” Now all the damned come under that head. Therefore suffrages profit them not.

I answer that, There have been three opinions about the damned. For some have said that a twofold distinction must be made in this matter. First, as to time; for they said that after the judgment day no one in hell will be assisted by any suffrage, but that before the judgment day some are assisted by the suffrages of the Church. Secondly, they made a distinction among those who are detained in hell. Some of these, they said, are very bad, those namely who have died without faith and the sacraments, and these, since they were not of the Church, neither “by grace nor, by name” [*Cf. Oratio ad Vesperas, Fer. ii, post Dom. Pass.] can the suffrages of the Church avail; while others are not very bad, those namely who belonged to the Church as actual members, who had the faith, frequented the sacraments and performed works generically good, and for these the suffrages of the Church ought to avail. Yet they were confronted with a difficulty which troubled them, for it would seem to follow from this (since the punishment of hell is finite in intensity although infinite in duration) that a multiplicity of suffrages would take away that punishment altogether, which is the error of Origen (Peri Archon. i; cf. Gregory, Moral. xxxiv): and consequently endeavored in various ways to avoid this difficulty.

Praepositivus [*Gilbert Prevostin, Chancellor of the See of Paris, A.D. 1205–9] said that suffrages for the damned can be so multiplied that they are entirely freed from punishment, not absolutely as Origen maintained, but for a time, namely till the judgment day: for their souls will be reunited to their bodies, and will be cast back into the punishments of hell without hope of pardon. But this opinion seems incompatible with Divine providence, which leaves nothing inordinate in the world. For guilt cannot be restored to order save by punishment: wherefore it is impossible for punishment to cease, unless first of all guilt be expiated: so that, as guilt remains for ever in the damned, their punishment will nowise be interrupted.

For this reason the followers of Gilbert de la Porree devised another explanation. These said that the process in the diminution of punishments by suffrages is as the process in dividing a line, which though finite, is indefinitely divisible, and is never destroyed by division, if it be diminished not by equal but by proportionate quantities, for instance if we begin by taking away a quarter of the whole, and secondly, a quarter of that quarter, and then a quarter of this second quarter, and so on indefinitely. In like manner, they say by the first suffrage a certain proportion of the punishment is taken away, and by the second an equally proportionate part of the remainder. But this explanation is in many ways defective. First, because it seems that indefinite division which is applicable to continuous quantity cannot be transferred to spiritual quantity: secondly, because there is no reason why the second suffrage, if it be of equal worth, should diminish the punishment less than the first: thirdly, because punishment cannot be diminished unless guilt be diminished, even as it cannot be done away unless the guilt be done away: fourthly, because in the division of a line we come at length to something which is not sensible, for a sensible body is not indefinitely divisible: and thus it would follow that after many suffrages the remaining punishment would be so little as not to be felt, and thus would no longer be a punishment.

Hence others found another explanation. For Antissiodorensis [*William of Auxerre, Archdeacon of Beauvais] (Sent. iv, Tract. 14) said that suffrages profit the damned not by diminishing or interrupting their punishment, but by fortifying the person punished: even as a man who is carrying a heavy load might bathe his face in water, for thus he would be enabled to carry it better, and yet his load would be none the lighter. But this again is impossible, because according to Gregory (Moral. ix) a man suffers more or less from the eternal fire according as his guilt deserves; and consequently some suffer more, some less, from the same fire. wherefore since the guilt of the damned remains unchanged, it cannot be that he suffers less punishment. Moreover, the aforesaid opinion is presumptuous, as being in opposition to the statements of holy men, and groundless as being based on no authority. It is also unreasonable. First, because the damned in hell are cut off from the bond of charity in virtue of which the departed are in touch with the works of the living. Secondly, because they have entirely come to the end of life, and have received the final award for their merits, even as the saints who are in heaven. For the remaining punishment or glory of the body does not make them to be wayfarers, since glory essentially and radically resides in the soul. It is the same with the unhappiness of the damned, wherefore their punishment cannot be diminished as neither can the glory of the saints be increased as to the essential reward.

However, we may admit, in a certain measure, the manner in which, according to some, suffrages profit the damned, if it be said that they profit neither by diminishing nor interrupting their punishment, nor again by diminishing their sense of punishment, but by withdrawing from the damned some matter of grief, which matter they might have if they knew themselves to be so outcast as to be a care to no one; and this matter of grief is withdrawn from them when suffrages are offered for them. Yet even this is impossible according to the general law, because as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii)—and this applies especially to the damned—“the spirits of the departed are where they see nothing of what men do or of what happens to them in this life,” and consequently they know not when suffrages are offered for them, unless this relief be granted from above to some of the damned in spite of the general law. This, however, is a matter of great uncertainty; wherefore it is safer to say simply that suffrages profit not the damned, nor does the Church intend to pray for them, as appears from the authors quoted above.

Reply to Objection 1: The donaries to the idols were not found on those dead so that they might be taken as a sign that they were carried off in reverence to the idols: but they took them as conquerors because they were due to them by right of war. They sinned, however, venially by covetousness: and consequently they were not damned in hell, and thus suffrages could profit them. or we may say, according to some, that in the midst of fighting, seeing they were in danger, they repented of their sin, according to Ps. 77:34, “When He slew them, then they sought Him”: and this is a probable opinion. Wherefore the offering was made for them.

Reply to Objection 2: In these words damnation is taken in a broad sense for any kind of punishment, so as to include also the punishment of purgatory which is sometimes entirely expiated by suffrages, and sometimes not entirety, but diminished.

Reply to Objection 3: Suffrage for a dead person is more acceptable than for a living person, as regards his being in greater want, since he cannot help himself as a living person can. But a living person is better off in that he can be taken from the state of mortal sin to the state of grace, which cannot be said of the dead. Hence there is not the same reason for praying for the dead as for the living.

Reply to Objection 4: This assistance did not consist in a diminishment of their punishment, but in this alone (as stated in the same place) that when he prayed they were permitted to see one another, and in this they had a certain joy, not real but imaginary, in the fulfillment of their desire. Even so the demons are said to rejoice when they draw men into sin, although this nowise diminishes their punishment, as neither is the joy of the angels diminished by the fact that they take pity on our ills.

Reply to Objection 5: Concerning the incident of Trajan it may be supposed with probability that he was recalled to life at the prayers of blessed Gregory, and thus obtained the grace whereby he received the pardon of his sins and in consequence was freed from punishment. The same applies to all those who were miraculously raised from the dead, many of whom were evidently idolaters and damned. For we must needs say likewise of all such persons that they were consigned to hell, not finally, but as was actually due to their own merits according to justice: and that according to higher causes, in view of which it was foreseen that they would be recalled to life, they were to be disposed of otherwise.

Or we may say with some that Trajan's soul was not simply freed from the debt of eternal punishment, but that his punishment was suspended for a time, that is, until the judgment day. Nor does it follow that this is the general result of suffrages, because things happen differently in accordance with the general law from that which is permitted in particular cases and by privilege. Even so the bounds of human affairs differ from those of the miracles of the Divine power as Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xvi).

Whether suffrages profit those who are in purgatory?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages do not profit even those who are in purgatory. For purgatory is a part of hell. Now "there is no redemption in hell" [*Office of the Dead, Resp. vii], and it is written (Ps. 6:6), "Who shall confess to Thee in hell?" Therefore suffrages do not profit those who are in purgatory.

Objection 2: Further, the punishment of purgatory is finite. Therefore if some of the punishment is abated by suffrages, it would be possible to have such a great number of suffrages, that the punishment would be entirely remitted, and consequently the sin entirely unpunished: and this would seem incompatible with Divine justice.

Objection 3: Further, souls are in purgatory in order that they may be purified there, and being pure may come to the kingdom. Now nothing can be purified, unless something be done to it. Therefore suffrages offered by the living do not diminish the punishment of purgatory.

Objection 4: Further, if suffrages availed those who are in purgatory, those especially would seem to avail them which are offered at their behest. Yet these do not always avail: for instance, if a person before dying were to provide for so many suffrages to be offered for him that if they were offered they would suffice for the remission of his entire punishment. Now supposing these suffrages to be delayed until he is released from punishment, they will profit him nothing. For it cannot be said that they profit him before they are discharged; and after they are fulfilled, he no longer needs them, since he is already released. Therefore suffrages do not avail those who are in purgatory.

On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), Augustine says (Enchiridion cx): “Suffrages profit those who are not very good or not very bad.” Now such are those who are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

Further, Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vii) that the “godlike priest in praying for the departed prays for those who lived a holy life, and yet contracted certain stains through human frailty.” Now such persons are detained in purgatory. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, The punishment of purgatory is intended to supplement the satisfaction which was not fully completed in the body. Consequently, since, as stated above ([5036]AA[1],2; Q[13], A[2]), the works of one person can avail for another’s satisfaction, whether the latter be living or dead, the suffrages of the living, without any doubt, profit those who are in purgatory.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted refer to those who are in the hell of the damned, where there is no redemption for those who are finally consigned to that punishment. We may also reply with Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) that such statements are to be explained with reference to the lower causes, that is according to the demands of the merits of those who are consigned to those punishments. But according to the

Divine mercy which transcends human merits, it happens otherwise through the prayers of the righteous, than is implied by the expressions quoted in the aforesaid authorities. Now “God changes His sentence but not his counsel,” as Gregory says (Moral. xx): wherefore the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes as instances of this the Ninevites, Achab and Ezechias, in whom it is apparent that the sentence pronounced against them by God was commuted by the Divine mercy [*Cf. [5037]FP, Q[19], A[7], ad 2].

Reply to Objection 2: It is not unreasonable that the punishment of those who are in purgatory be entirely done away by the multiplicity of suffrages. But it does not follow that the sins remain unpunished, because the punishment of one undertaken in lieu of another is credited to that other.

Reply to Objection 3: The purifying of the soul by the punishment of purgatory is nothing else than the expiation of the guilt that hinders it from obtaining glory. And since, as stated above ([5038]Q[13], A[2]), the guilt of one person can be expiated by the punishment which another undergoes in his stead, it is not unreasonable that one person be purified by another satisfying for him.

Reply to Objection 4: Suffrages avail on two counts, namely the action of the agent [*”Ex opere operante” and “ex opere operato”] and the action done. By action done I mean not only the sacrament of the Church, but the effect incidental to that action—thus from the giving of alms there follow the relief of the poor and their prayer to God for the deceased. In like manner the action of the agent may be considered in relation either to the principal agent or to the executor. I say, then, that the dying person, as soon as he provides for certain suffrages to be offered for him, receives the full meed of those suffrages, even before they are discharged, as regards the efficacy of the suffrages that results from the action as proceeding from the principal agent. But as regards the efficacy of the suffrages arising from the action done or from the action as proceeding from the executor, he does not receive the fruit before the suffrages are discharged. And if, before this, he happens to be released from his punishment, he will in this respect be deprived of the fruit of the suffrages, and this will fall back upon those by whose fault he was then defrauded. For it is not unreasonable that a person be defrauded in temporal matters by another’s fault—and the punishment of purgatory is temporal—although as regards the eternal retribution none can be defrauded save by his own fault.

Whether suffrages avail the children who are in limbo?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages avail the children who are in limbo. For they are not detained there except for another’s sin. Therefore it is most becoming that they should be assisted by the suffrages of others.

Objection 2: Further, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45) the words of Augustine (Enchiridion cx) are quoted: “The suffrages of the Church obtain forgiveness for those who are not very bad.” Now children are not reckoned among those who are very bad, since their punishment is very light. Therefore the suffrages of the Church avail them.

On the contrary, The text (Sent. iv, D, 45) quotes Augustine as saying (Serm. xxxii, De Verb Ap.) that “suffrages avail not those who have departed hence without the faith that works by love.” Now the children departed thus. Therefore suffrages avail them not.

I answer that, Unbaptized children are not detained in limbo save because they lack the state of grace. Hence, since the state of the dead cannot be changed by the works of the living, especially as regards the merit of the essential reward or punishment, the suffrages of the living cannot profit the children in limbo.

Reply to Objection 1: Although original sin is such that one person can be assisted by another on its account, nevertheless the souls of the children in limbo are in such a state that they cannot be assisted, because after this life there is no time for obtaining grace.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine is speaking of those who are not very bad, but have been baptized. This is clear from what precedes: “Since these sacrifices, whether of the altar or of any alms whatsoever are offered for those who have been baptized,” etc.

Whether suffrages profit the saints in heaven?

Objection 1: It would seem that in some way suffrages profit the saints in heaven; on account of the words of the Collect in the Mass [*Postcommunion, Feast of St. Andrew, Apostle]: “Even as they” (i.e. the sacraments) “avail thy saints unto glory, so may they profit us unto healing.” Now foremost among all suffrages is the sacrifice of the altar. Therefore suffrages profit the saints in heaven.

Objection 2: Further, the sacraments cause what they signify. Now the third part of the host, that namely which is dropped into the chalice, signifies those who lead a happy life in heaven. Therefore the suffrages of the Church profit those who are in heaven.

Objection 3: Further, the saints rejoice in heaven not only in their own goods, but also in the goods of others: hence it is written (Lk. 15:10): “There is [Vulg.: ‘shall be’] joy before the angels of God upon one sinner doing penance.” Therefore the joy of the saints in heaven increases on account of the good works of the living: and consequently our suffrages also profit them.

Objection 4: Further, the Damascene says (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quoting the words of Chrysostom: “For if the heathens,” he says, “burn the dead together with what has belonged to them, how much more shouldst thou, a believer, send forth a believer together with what has belonged to him, not that they also may be brought to ashes like him, but that thou mayest surround him with greater glory by so doing; and if he be a sinner who has died, that thou mayest loose him from his sins, and if he be righteous, that thou mayest add to his meed and reward!” And thus the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, As quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 15), Augustine says (De Verb Ap., Serm. xvii): “It is insulting to pray for a martyr in church, since we ought to commend ourselves to his prayers.”

Further, to be assisted belongs to one who is in need. But the saints in heaven are without any need whatever. Therefore they are not assisted by the suffrages of the Church.

I answer that, Suffrage by its very nature implies the giving of some assistance, which does not apply to one who suffers no default: since no one is competent to be assisted except he who is in need. Hence, as the saints in heaven are free from all need, being inebriated with the plenty of God’s house (Ps. 35:10), they are not competent to be assisted by suffrages.

Reply to Objection 1: Such like expressions do not mean that the saints receive an increase of glory in themselves through our observing their feasts, but that we profit thereby in celebrating their glory with greater solemnity. Thus, through our knowing or praising God, and through His glory thus increasing some what in us, there accrues something, not to God, but to us.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the sacraments cause what thy signify, they do not produce this effect in respect of everything that they signify: else, since they signify Christ, they would produce something in Christ (which is absurd). But they produce their effect on the recipient of the sacrament in virtue of that which is signified by the sacrament. Thus it does not follow that the sacrifices offered for the faithful departed profit the saints, but that by the merits of the saints which we commemorate, or which are signified in the sacrament, they profit others for whom they are offered.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the saints in heaven rejoice in all our goods, it does not follow, that if our joys be increased their joy is also increased formally, but only materially, because every passion is increased formally in respect of the formal aspect of its object. Now the formal aspect of the saints' joy, no matter what they rejoice in, is God Himself, in Whom they cannot rejoice more and less, for otherwise their essential reward, consisting of their joy in God, would vary. Hence from the fact that the goods are multiplied, wherein they rejoice with God as the formal aspect of their joy, it does not follow that their joy is intensified, but that they rejoice in more things. Consequently it does not follow that they are assisted by our works.

Reply to Objection 4: The sense is not that an increase of meed or reward accrues to the saint from the suffrages offered by a person, but that this accrues to the offerer. Or we may reply that the blessed departed may derive a reward from suffrages through having, while living, provided for suffrage to be offered for himself, and this was meritorious for him.

Whether the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms profit the departed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls of the departed are not assisted only by the prayers of the Church, the sacrifice of the altar and alms, or that they are not assisted by them chiefly. For punishment should compensate for punishment. Now fasting is more penal than almsgiving or prayer. Therefore fasting profits more as suffrage than any of the above.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory reckons fasting together with these three, as stated in the Decretals (xiii, Q. ii, Cap. 22): "The souls of the departed are released in four ways, either by the offerings of priests, or the alms of their friends, or the prayers of the saints, or the fasting of their kinsfolk.” Therefore the three mentioned above are insufficiently reckoned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii).

Objection 3: Further, Baptism is the greatest of the sacraments, especially as regards its effect. Therefore Baptism and other sacraments ought to be offered for the departed equally with or more than the Sacrament of the altar.

Objection 4: Further, this would seem to follow from the words of 1 Cor. 15:29, “If the dead rise not again at all, why are they then baptized for them?” Therefore Baptism avails as suffrage for the dead.

Objection 5: Further, in different Masses there is the same Sacrifice of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the Mass, be reckoned among the suffrages, it would seem that the effect would be the same whatever Mass be said for a deceased person, whether in honor of the Blessed Virgin or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems contrary to the ordinance of the Church which has appointed a special Mass for the dead.

Objection 6: Further, the Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the dead. Therefore not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar, but also other offerings should be reckoned among suffrages for the dead.

I answer that, The suffrages of the living profit the dead in so far as the latter are united to the living in charity, and in so far as the intention of the living is directed to the dead. Consequently those whose works are by nature best adapted to assist the dead, which pertain chiefly to the communication of charity, or to the directing of one’s intention to another person. Now the sacrament of the Eucharist belongs chiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical unity, inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole Church is united and incorporated, namely Christ: wherefore the Eucharist is as it were the origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects of charity is the work of almsgiving: wherefore on the part of charity these two, namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the chief suffrages for the dead. But on the part of the intention directed to the dead the chief suffrage is prayer, because prayer by its very nature implies relation not only to the person who prays, even as other works do, but more directly still to that which we pray for. Hence these three are reckoned the principal means of succoring the dead, although we must allow that any other goods whatsoever that are done out of charity for the dead are profitable to them.

Reply to Objection 1: When one person satisfies for another, the point to consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction reach the other, is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one passes to another, rather than even the punishment undergone by way of satisfaction; although the punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who satisfies, in so far as it is a kind of medicine. And consequently the three aforesaid are more profitable to the departed than fasting.

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that fasting can profit the departed by reason of charity, and on account of the intention being directed to the departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by its nature contain anything pertaining to charity or to the directing of the intention, and these things are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason Augustine did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting among the suffrages for the dead.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, wherefore just as by generation being does not accrue save to the object generated, so Baptism produces its effect only in the person baptized, as regards the deed done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer whether of the baptizer or of the baptized, it may profit others even as other meritorious works. On the other hand, the Eucharist is the sign of ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of the deed done its effect can pass to another, which is not the case with the other sacraments.

Reply to Objection 4: According to a gloss this passage may be expounded in two ways. First, thus: “If the dead rise not again, nor did Christ rise again, why are they baptized for them? i.e. for sins, since they are not pardoned if Christ rose not again, because in Baptism not only Christ’s passion but also His resurrection operates, for the latter is in a sense the cause of our spiritual resurrection.” Secondly, thus: There have been some misguided persons who were baptized for those who had departed this life without baptism, thinking that this would profit them: and according to this explanation the Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the opinion of certain persons.

Reply to Objection 5: In the office of the Mass there is not only a sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the Mass contains two of the things mentioned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii), namely “prayer” and “sacrifice.” As regards the sacrifice offered the Mass profits equally the departed, no matter in whose honor it be said: and this is the principal thing done in the Mass. But as regards the prayers, that Mass is most profitable in which the prayers are appointed for this purpose. Nevertheless, this defect may be supplied by the greater devotion, either of the one who says Mass, or of the one who orders the Mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of the saint whose suffrage is besought in the Mass.

Reply to Objection 6: This offering of candles or oil may profit the departed in so far as they are a kind of alms: for they are given for the worship of the Church or for the use of the faithful.

Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that the indulgences granted by the Church profit even the dead. First, on account of the custom of the Church, who orders the preaching of a crusade in order that some one may gain an indulgence for himself and for two or three and sometimes even ten souls, both of the living and of the dead. But this would amount to a deception unless they profited the dead. Therefore indulgences profit the dead.

Objection 2: Further, the merit of the whole Church is more efficacious than that of one person. Now personal merit serves as a suffrage for the departed, for instance in the case of almsgiving. Much more therefore does the merit of the Church whereon indulgences are founded.

Objection 3: Further, the indulgences of the Church profit those who are members of the Church. Now those who are in purgatory are members of the Church, else the suffrages of the Church would not profit them. Therefore it would seem that indulgences profit the departed.

On the contrary, In order that indulgences may avail a person, there must be a fitting cause for granting the indulgence [*Cf.[5039] Q[25], A[2]]. Now there can be no such cause on the part of the dead, since they can do nothing that is of profit to the Church, and it is for such a cause that indulgences are chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly, indulgences profit not the dead.

Further, indulgences are regulated according to the decision of the party who grants them. If, therefore, indulgences could avail the dead, it would be in the power of the party granting them to release a deceased person entirely from punishment: which is apparently absurd.

I answer that, An indulgence may profit a person in two ways: in one way, principally; in another, secondarily. It profits principally the person who avails himself of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for which the indulgence is granted, for instance one who visits the shrine of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for which indulgences are granted, indulgences cannot avail them directly. However, they profit secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one does that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes feasible and sometimes not, according to the different forms of indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be such as this: “Whosoever does this or that shall gain so much indulgence,” he who does this cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is not in his power to apply to a particular person the intention of the Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence indulgences derive their value, as stated above ([5040]Q[27], A[3], ad 2). If, however, the indulgence be granted in this form: “Whosoever does this or that, he, his father, or any other person connected with him and detained in purgatory, will gain so much indulgence,” an indulgence of this kind will avail not only a living but also a deceased person. For there is no reason why the Church is able to transfer the common merits, whereon indulgences are based, to the living and not to the dead. Nor does it follow that a prelate of the Church can release souls from purgatory just as he lists, since for indulgences to avail there must be a fitting cause for granting them, as stated above ([5041]Q[26], A[3]).

Whether the burial service profits the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that the burial service profits the dead. For Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes Athanasius as saying: “Even though he who has departed in godliness be taken up to heaven, do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn oil and wax at his tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and receive a great reward from

Him.” Now the like pertain to the burial service. Therefore the burial service profits the dead.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Cura pro mort. iii), “In olden times the funerals of just men were cared for with dutiful piety, their obsequies celebrated, their graves provided, and themselves while living charged their children touching the burial or even the translation of their bodies.” But they would not have done this unless the tomb and things of this kind conferred something on the dead. Therefore the like profit the dead somewhat.

Objection 3: Further, no one does a work of mercy on some one’s behalf unless it profit him. Now burying the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy, therefore Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): “Tobias, as attested by the angel, is declared to have found favor with God by burying the dead.” Therefore such like burial observances profit the dead.

Objection 4: Further, it is unbecoming to assert that the devotion of the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of devotion, arrange for their burial in some religious locality. Therefore the burial service profits the dead.

Objection 5: Further, God is more inclined to pity than to condemn. Now burial in a sacred place is hurtful to some if they be unworthy: wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv): “If those who are burdened with grievous sins are buried in the church this will lead to their more severe condemnation rather than to their release.” Much more, therefore, should we say that the burial service profits the good.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): “Whatever service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but an office of humanity.”

Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii; De Civ. Dei i): “The funereal equipment, the disposition of the grace, the solemnity of the obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help to the dead.”

Further, Our Lord said (Lk. 12:4): “Be not afraid of them who kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do.” Now after death the bodies of the saints can be hindered from being buried, as we read of having been done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. v, 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bodies remain unburied: and consequently the burial service does not profit them.

I answer that, We have recourse to burial for the sake of both the living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be revolted by the disfigurement of the corpse, and their bodies be infected by the stench, and this as regards the body. But it profits the living also spiritually inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection is confirmed thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the dead in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial place, wherefore a “monument” takes its name from remembrance, for a monument is something that recalls the mind [monens mentem], as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei i; De Cura pro Mort. iv). It was, however, a pagan error that burial was profitable to the dead by procuring rest for his soul: for they believed that the soul could not be at rest until the body was buried, which is altogether ridiculous and absurd.

That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead, does not result from the action done, but rather from the action itself of the doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for his body to be buried in a sacred place, and commends him to the patronage of some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is assisted, as well as to the suffrages of those who serve the holy place, and pray more frequently and more specially for those who are buried in their midst. But such things as are done for the display of the obsequies are profitable to the living, as being a consolation to them; and yet they can also profit the dead, not directly but indirectly, in so far as men are aroused to pity thereby and consequently to pray, or in so far as the outlay on the burial brings either assistance to the poor or adornment to the church: for it is in this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among the works of mercy.

Reply to Objection 1: By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of the dead we profit them indirectly, either as offering them to the Church and as giving them to the poor, or as doing this in reverence of God. Hence, after the words quoted we read: “For oil and candles are a holocaust.”

Reply to Objection 2: The fathers of old arranged for the burial of their bodies, so as to show that “the bodies of the dead” are the object of Divine providence, not that there is any feeling in a dead body, but in order to confirm the belief in the resurrection, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13). Hence, also, they wished to be buried in the land of promise, where they believed Christ’s birth and death would take place, Whose resurrection is the cause of our rising again.

Reply to Objection 3: Since flesh is a part of man’s nature, man has a natural affection for his flesh, according to Eph. 5:29, “No man ever hated his own flesh.” Hence in accordance with this natural affection a man has during life a certain solicitude for what will become of his body after death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that something untoward would happen to his body. Consequently those who love a man, through being conformed to the one they love in his affection for himself, treat his body with loving care. For as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): “If a father’s garment and ring, and whatever such like is the more dear to those whom they leave behind the greater their affection is towards their parents, in no wise are the bodies themselves to be spurned which truly we wear in more familiar and close conjunction than anything else we put on.”

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iv), the devotion of the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange for their friends to be buried in holy places, since by so doing they commend their dead to the suffrages of the saints, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: The wicked man dead takes no harm by being buried in a holy place, except in so far as he rendered such a burial place unfitting for him by reason of human glory.

Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for whom they are offered more than others?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for one deceased person are not more profitable to the one for whom they are offered, than to others. For spiritual light is more communicable than a material light. Now a material light, for instance of a candle, though kindled for one person only, avails equally all those who are gathered together, though the candle be not lit for them. Therefore, since suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be offered for one person in particular, do not avail him any more than the others who are in purgatory.

Objection 2: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), suffrages avail the dead "in so far as during this life they merited that they might avail them afterwards" [*St. Augustine, Enchiridion cx]. Now some merited that suffrages might avail them more than those for whom they are offered. Therefore they profit more by those suffrages, else their merits would be rendered unavailing.

Objection 3: Further, the poor have not so many suffrages given them as the rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered for certain people profit them alone, or profit them more than others, the poor would be worse off: yet this is contrary to our Lord's saying (Lk. 6:20): "Blessed are ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God."

On the contrary, Human justice is copied from Divine justice. But if a person pay another's debt human justice releases the latter alone. Therefore since he who offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a sense, of the person for whom he offers them, they profit this person alone.

Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies somewhat for a deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can satisfy for a living person. Now where one satisfies for a living person the satisfaction counts only for the person for whom it is offered. Therefore one also who offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers them.

I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question. Some, like Praepositivus, have said that suffrages offered for one particular person do avail chiefly, not the person for whom they are offered, but those who are most worthy. And they instanced a candle which is lit for a rich man and profits those who are with him no less than the rich man himself, and perhaps even more, if they have keener sight. They also gave the instance of a lesson which profits the person to whom it is given no more than others who listen with him, but perhaps profits these others more, if they be more intelligent. And if it were pointed out to them that in this case the Church's ordinance in appointing certain special prayers for certain persons is futile, they said that the Church did this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are more inclined to offer special than common suffrages, and pray more fervently for their kinsfolk than for strangers.

Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more those for whom they are offered. Now both opinions have a certain amount of truth: for the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value is derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is more full of charity, although they are not offered specially for him. In this way the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the goods of another after death in respect of the diminution of punishment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or increasing grace, whereas during life the works of others avail for this purpose by the virtue of charity. In the second place suffrages derive their value from being applied to another person by one's intention. In this way the satisfaction of one person counts for another, and there can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way, because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the remission of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission of punishment, suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered, and accordingly there is more truth in the second opinion than in the first.

Reply to Objection 1: Suffrages avail, after the manner of a light, in so far as they reach the dead, who thereby receive a certain amount of consolation: and this is all the greater according as they are endowed with a greater charity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction applied to another by the intention of the offerer, they do not resemble a light, but rather the payment of a debt: and it does not follow, if one person's debt be paid, that the debt of others is paid likewise.

Reply to Objection 2: Such a merit is conditional, for in this way they merited that suffrages would profit them if offered for them, and this was merely to render themselves fit recipients of those suffrages. It is therefore clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of those suffrages, but made themselves fit by their preceding merits to receive the fruit of suffrages. Hence it does not follow that their merit is rendered unavailing.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders the rich from being in some respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards the expiation of their punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off by the authority quoted.

Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in particular. For it is clear that if one person receives a lesson he loses nothing if others receive the lesson with him. Therefore in like manner a person for whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some one else is reckoned together with him: and consequently if it be offered for several, it is of as much value to each one as if it were offered for each in particular.

Objection 2: Further, it is to be observed that according to the common practice of the Church, when Mass is said for one deceased person, other prayers are added for other deceased persons. Now this would not be done, if the dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose something thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 3: Further, suffrages, especially of prayers, rely on the Divine power. But with God, just as it makes no difference whether He helps by means of many or by means of a few, so it differs not whether He assists many or a few. Therefore if the one same prayer be said for many, each one of them will receive as much assistance as one person would if that same prayer were said for him alone.

On the contrary, It is better to assist many than one. If therefore a suffrage offered for several is of as much value to each one as if it were offered for one alone, it would seem that the Church ought not to have appointed a

Mass and prayer to be said for one person in particular, but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful departed: and this is evidently false.

Further, a suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if it be divided among many it avails less for each one than if it were offered for one only.

I answer that, If the value of suffrages be considered according as it is derived from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the Church together, suffrages offered for several persons avail each one as much as if they were offered for one alone, because charity is not diminished if its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it increased; and in like manner joy increases through being shared by many, as Augustine says (Confess. viii). Consequently many in purgatory rejoice in one good deed no less than one does. On the other hand, if we consider the value of suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of satisfaction applied to the dead by the intention of the person offering them, then the suffrage for some person in particular avails him more than that which is offered for him in common with many others; for in this case the effect of the suffrages is divided in virtue of Divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it is evident that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, it is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be offered in the Church.

Reply to Objection 1: Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction do not profit after the manner of an action as teaching does; for teaching, like any other action, produces its effect according to the disposition of the recipient. But they profit after the manner of the payment of a debt, as stated above (A[12], ad 1); and so the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Since suffrages offered for one person avail others in a certain way, as stated [5042](A[1]), it follows that when Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting for prayers to be said for others also. For these prayers are said, not that the satisfaction offered by one suffrage be applied to those others chiefly, but that the prayer offered for them in particular may profit them also.

Reply to Objection 3: Prayer may be considered both on the part of the one who prays, and on the part of the person prayed: and its effect depends on both. Consequently though it is no more difficult to the Divine power to absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the prayer of one who prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for one.

Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages?

Objection 1: It would seem that general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages. For in the life to come each one will be rewarded according to his merits. Now a person for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted after death as much as one for whom special suffrages are offered. Therefore the former will be assisted by general suffrages as much as the latter by special and general suffrages.

Objection 3: Further, the Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages of the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ whole, has infinite efficacy so to speak. Therefore one offering of the Eucharist for all in general is of sufficient value to release all who are in purgatory: and consequently general suffrages alone afford as much assistance as special and general suffrages together.

On the contrary, Two goods are more eligible than one. Therefore special suffrages, together with general suffrages, are more profitable to the person for whom they are offered than general suffrages alone.

I answer that, The reply to this question depends on that which is given to the twelfth inquiry [5043](A[12]): for if the suffrages offered for one person in particular avail indifferently for all, then all suffrages are common; and consequently one for whom the special suffrages are not offered will be assisted as much as the one for whom they are offered, if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the suffrages offered for a person do not profit all indifferently, but those chiefly for whom they are offered, then there is no doubt that general and special suffrages together avail a person more than general suffrages alone. Hence the Master, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45), mentions two opinions: one, when he says that a rich man derives from general, together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which a poor man derives from special suffrages alone; for although the one receives assistance from more sources than the other, he does not receive a greater assistance: the other opinion he mentions when he says that a person for whom special suffrages are offered obtains a more speedy but not a more complete release, because each will be finally released from all punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[12], ad 2) the assistance derived from suffrages is not directly and simply an object of merit, but conditionally as it were: hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the power of Christ Who is contained in the Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite effect to which that sacrament is directed. Hence it does not follow that the whole punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by one sacrifice of the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which a man offers, he is not released from the whole satisfaction due for his sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction for one sin. Nevertheless, if any thing from special suffrages be left over for those for whom they are offered (for instance if they need them not) we may well believe that by God’s mercy this is granted to others for whom those suffrages are not offered, if they need them: as affirmed by Damascene (Serm.: De his qui in fide dormierunt) who says: “Truly God, forasmuch as He is just will adapt ability to the disabled, and will arrange for an exchange of deficiencies”: and this exchange is effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another.

OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?

(2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us?

(3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted?

Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints have no knowledge of our prayers. For a gloss on Is. 62:16, “Thou art our father and Abraham hath not known us, and Israel hath been ignorant of us,” says that “the dead saints know not what the living, even their own children, are doing.” This is taken from Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), where he quotes the aforesaid authority, and the following are his words: “If such great men as the patriarchs knew not what was happening to the people begotten of them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching and helping the affairs and actions of the living?" Therefore the saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers.

Objection 2: Further, the following words are addressed to King Joas (4 Kings 22:20): "Therefore" (i.e. because thou hast wept before Me), "I will gather thee to thy fathers . . . that thy eyes may not see all the evils which I will bring upon this place." But Joas would have gained no such advantage from his death if he were to know after death what was happening to his people. Therefore the saints after death know not our actions, and thus they are not cognizant of our prayers.

Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a man is in charity, the more he succors his neighbor when the latter is in danger. Now the saints, in this life, watch over their neighbor, especially their kinsfolk, when these are in danger, and manifestly assist them. Since then, after death, their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our deeds, much more would they watch over their friends and kindred and assist them in their needs: and yet, seemingly, they do not. Therefore it would seem that our deeds and prayers are not known to them.

Objection 4: Further, even as the saints after death see the Word, so do the angels of whom it is stated (Mat. 18:10) that "their angels in heaven always see the face of My Father." Yet the angels through seeing the Word do not therefore know all things, since the lower angels are cleansed from their lack of knowledge by the higher angels [*Cf. [5044]FP, Q[106], A[1]], as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii). Therefore although the saints see the Word, they do not see therein our prayers and other things that happen in our regard.

Objection 5: Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now prayer is seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs to God alone to know our prayers. Therefore our prayers are unknown to the saints.

On the contrary, Gregory, commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand," says (Moral. xii): "This does not apply to the souls of the saints, for since they have an insight of Almighty God's glory we must nowise believe that anything outside that glory is unknown to them." Therefore they are cognizant of our prayers. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii): "All creatures are little to the soul that sees God: because however little it sees of the Creator's light, every created thing appears foreshortened to it." Now apparently the chief obstacle to the souls of the saints being cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our regard is that they are far removed from us. Since then distance does not prevent these things, as appears from the authority quoted, it would seem that the souls of the saints are cognizant of our prayers and of what happens here below.

Further, unless they were aware of what happens in our regard they would not pray for us, since they would be ignorant of our needs. But this is the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome asserts in his letter against him. Therefore the saints are cognizant of what happens in our regard.

I answer that, The Divine essence is a sufficient medium for knowing all things, and this is evident from the fact that God, by seeing His essence, sees all things. But it does not follow that whoever sees God's essence knows all things, but only those who comprehend the essence of God [*Cf. [5045]FP, Q[12], AA[7],8]: even as the knowledge of a principle does not involve the knowledge of all that follows from that principle unless the whole virtue of the principle be comprehended. Wherefore, since the souls of the saints do not comprehend the Divine essence, it does not follow that they know all that can be known by the Divine essence—for which reason the lower angels are taught concerning certain matters by the higher angels, though they all see the essence of God; but each of the blessed must needs see in the Divine essence as many other things as the perfection of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man's happiness requires him to have whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss: and each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself. Hence since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to know what concerns themselves, and consequently it follows that they know it in the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for their salvation: for thus they become God's co-operators, "than which nothing is more Godlike," as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii). Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such things as are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to their assistance.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood as referring to the natural knowledge of separated souls, which knowledge is devoid of obscurity in holy men. But he is not speaking of their knowledge in the Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said this, Abraham had no such knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of God before Christ’s passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the saints, after this life, know what happens here below, we must not believe that they grieve through knowing the woes of those whom they loved in this world: for they are so filled with heavenly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them. Wherefore if after death they know the woes of their friends, their grief is forestalled by their removal from this world before their woes occur. Perhaps, however, the non-glorified souls would grieve somewhat, if they were aware of the distress of their dear ones: and since the soul of Josias was not glorified as soon as it went out from his body, it is in this respect that Augustine uses this argument to show that the souls of the dead have no knowledge of the deeds of the living.

Reply to Objection 3: The souls of the saints have their will fully conformed to the Divine will even as regards the things willed. and consequently, although they retain the love of charity towards their neighbor, they do not succor him otherwise than they see to be in conformity with the disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is to be believed that they help their neighbor very much by interceding for him to God.

Reply to Objection 4: Although it does not follow that those who see the Word see all things in the Word, they see those things that pertain to the perfection of their happiness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of the heart: yet others know them, in so far as these are revealed to them, either by their vision of the Word or by any other means.

Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to call upon the saints to pray for us. For no man asks anyone’s friends to pray for him, except in so far as he believes he will more easily find favor with them. But God is infinitely more merciful than any saint, and consequently His will is more easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the will of a saint. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to make the saints mediators between us and God, that they may intercede for us.

Objection 2: Further, if we ought to beseech them to pray for us, this is only because we know their prayer to be acceptable to God. Now among the saints the holier a man is, the more is his prayer acceptable to God. Therefore we ought always to bespeak the greater saints to intercede for us with God, and never the lesser ones.

Objection 3: Further, Christ, even as man, is called the "Holy of Holies," and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray. Yet we never call upon Christ to pray for us. Therefore neither should we ask the other saints to do so.

Objection 4: Further, whenever one person intercedes for another at the latter's request, he presents his petition to the one with whom he intercedes for him. Now it is unnecessary to present anything to one to whom all things are present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the saints our intercessors with God.

Objection 5: Further, it is unnecessary to do a thing if, without doing it, the purpose for which it is done would be achieved in the same way, or else not achieved at all. Now the saints would pray for us just the same, or would not pray for us at all, whether we pray to them or not: for if we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us even though we prayed not to them, while if we be unworthy they pray not for us even though we ask them to. Therefore it seems altogether unnecessary to call on them to pray for us.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1): "Call . . . if there be any that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints." Now, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) on this passage, "we call upon God when we beseech Him in humble prayer." Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should turn to the saints, that they may pray God for us.

Further, the saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than those who are on the way. Now we should make the saints, who are on the way, our intercessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who said (Rom. 15:30): "I beseech you . . . brethren, through our Lord Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me in your prayers for me to God." Much more, therefore, should we ask the saints who are in heaven to help us by their prayers to God.

Further, an additional argument is provided by the common custom of the Church which asks for the prayers of the saints in the Litany.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) the order established by God among things is that “the last should be led to God by those that are midway between.” Wherefore, since the saints who are in heaven are nearest to God, the order of the Divine law requires that we, who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should be brought back to God by the saints who are between us and Him: and this happens when the Divine goodness pours forth its effect into us through them. And since our return to God should correspond to the outflow of His boons upon us, just as the Divine favors reach us by means of the saints intercession, so should we, by their means, be brought back to God, that we may receive His favors again. Hence it is that we make them our intercessors with God, and our mediators as it were, when we ask them to pray for us.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not on account of any defect in God’s power that He works by means of second causes, but it is for the perfection of the order of the universe, and the more manifold outpouring of His goodness on things, through His bestowing on them not only the goodness which is proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in others. Even so it is not through any defect in His mercy, that we need to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the saints, but to the end that the aforesaid order in things be observed.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the greater saints are more acceptable to God than the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to pray to the lesser; and this for five reasons. First, because sometimes one has greater devotion for a lesser saint than for a greater, and the effect of prayer depends very much on one’s devotion. Secondly, in order to avoid tediousness, for continual attention to one thing makes a person weary; whereas by praying to different saints, the fervor of our devotion is aroused anew as it were. Thirdly, because it is granted to some saints to exercise their patronage in certain special cases, for instance to Saint Anthony against the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due honor be given by us to all. Fifthly, because the prayers of several sometimes obtain that which would not have been obtained by the prayers of one.

Reply to Objection 3: Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular persons [supposita]. Hence, were we to say: “Christ, pray for us,” except we added something, this would seem to refer to Christ’s person, and consequently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, who distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from the person of the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted that the person of the Son is less than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the Church says not: “Christ, pray for us,” but “Christ, hear us,” or “have mercy on us.”

Reply to Objection 4: As we shall state further on [5046](A[3]) the saints are said to present our prayers to God, not as though they notified things unknown to Him, but because they ask God to grant those prayers a gracious hearing, or because they seek the Divine truth about them, namely what ought to be done according to His providence.

Reply to Objection 5: A person is rendered worthy of a saint’s prayers for him by the very fact that in his need he has recourse to him with pure devotion. Hence it is not unnecessary to pray to the saints.

Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are always granted?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are not always granted. For if they were always granted, the saints would be heard especially in regard to matters concerning themselves. But they are not heard in reference to these things; wherefore it is stated in the Apocalypse (6:11) that on the martyrs beseeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth, “it was said to them that they should rest for a little while till the number of their brethren should be filled up [*Vulg.: ‘till their fellow-servants and their brethren . . . should be filled up’].” Much less therefore, are they heard in reference to matters concerning others.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 15:1): “If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people.” Therefore, the saints are not always heard when they pray God for us.

Objection 3: Further, the saints in heaven are stated to be equal to the angels of God (Mat. 22:30). But the angels are not always heard in the prayers which they offer up to God. This is evident from Dan. 10:12,13, where it is written: “I am come for thy words: but the prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days.” But the angel who spoke had not come to Daniel’s aid except by asking of God to be set free; and yet the fulfillment of his prayer was hindered. Therefore neither are other saints always heard by God when they pray for us.

Objection 4: Further, whosoever obtains something by prayer merits it in a sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of meriting. Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers.

Objection 5: Further, the saints, in all things, conform their will to the will of God. Therefore they will nothing but what they know God to will. But no one prays save for what he wills. Therefore they pray not save for what they know God to will. Now that which God wills would be done even without their praying for it. Therefore their prayers are not efficacious for obtaining anything.

Objection 6: Further, the prayers of the whole heavenly court, if they could obtain anything, would be more efficacious than all the petitions of the Church here below. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below for some one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he would be wholly delivered from punishment. Since then the saints in heaven pray for those who are in purgatory on the same account as for us, if they obtain anything for us, their prayers would deliver entirely from punishment those who are in purgatory. But this is not true because, then the Church’s suffrages for the dead would be unnecessary.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): “This is he that prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the prophet of God”: and that his prayer was granted is clear from what follows (2 Macc. 15:15): “Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and gave to Judas a sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift from God,” etc.

Further, Jerome says (Ep. contra Vigilant.): “Thou sayest in thy pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray for one another, but that when we are dead no one’s prayer for another will be heard”: and afterwards he refutes this in the following words: “If the apostles and martyrs while yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still solicitous for themselves, how much more can they do so when the crown, the victory, the triumph is already theirs!”

Further, this is confirmed by the custom of the Church, which often asks to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.

I answer that, The saints are said to pray for us in two ways. First, by "express" prayer, when by their prayers they seek a hearing of the Divine clemency on our behalf: secondly, by "interpretive" prayer, namely by their merits which, being known to God, avail not only them unto glory, but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding of Christ's blood is said to ask pardon for us. In both ways the saints' prayers considered in themselves avail to obtain what they ask, yet on our part they may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their prayers, in so far as they are said to pray for us by reason of their merits availing on our behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by asking something for us in their prayers, their prayers are always granted, since they will only what God wills, nor do they ask save for what they will to be done; and what God wills is always fulfilled—unless we speak of His "antecedent" will, whereby "He wishes all men to be saved" [*Cf. [5047]FP, Q[19], A[6], ad 1]. For this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that also which the saints will according to this kind of will be not fulfilled sometimes.

Reply to Objection 1: This prayer of the martyrs is merely their desire to obtain the robe of the body and the fellowship of those who will be saved, and their consent to God's justice in punishing the wicked. Hence a gloss on Apoc. 6:11, "How long, O Lord," says: "They desire an increase of joy and the fellowship of the saints, and they consent to God's justice."

Reply to Objection 2: The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel according to their state in this life. For we read that they withstood God's anger by praying for the people. And yet even if they had been living at the time in question, they would have been unable to placate God towards the people by their prayers, on account of the wickedness of this same people: and it is thus that we are to understand this passage.

Reply to Objection 3: This dispute among the good angels does not mean that they offered contradictory prayers to God, but that they submitted contrary merits on various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of God's pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gregory says (Moral. xvii) in explanation of the aforesaid words of Daniel: "The lofty spirits that are set over the nations never fight in behalf of those that act unjustly, but they justly judge and try their deeds. And when the guilt or innocence of any particular nation is brought into the debate of the court above, the ruling spirit of that nation is said to have won or lost in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their Maker is victorious over all, for since they have it ever before their eyes, they will not what they are unable to obtain,” wherefore neither do they seek for it. And consequently it is clear that their prayers are always heard.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the saints are not in a state to merit for themselves, when once they are in heaven, they are in a state to merit for others, or rather to assist others by reason of their previous merit: for while living they merited that their prayers should be heard after their death.

Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain equation of the act to the end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as its reward; while the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality of the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the liberality of the person supplicated, obtains that which was not merited either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and so, although the saints are not in the state of meriting, it does not follow that they are not in the state of impetrating.

Reply to Objection 5: As appears from the authority of Gregory quoted above (ad 3), the saints and angels will nothing but what they see to be in the Divine will: and so neither do they pray for aught else. Nor is their prayer fruitless, since as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. [*De Dono Persever. xxii]): “The prayers of the saints profit the predestinate, because it is perhaps pre-ordained that they shall be saved through the prayers of those who intercede for them”: and consequently God also wills that what the saints see Him to will shall be fulfilled through their prayers.

Reply to Objection 6: The suffrages of the Church for the dead are as so many satisfactions of the living in lieu of the dead: and accordingly they free the dead from the punishment which the latter have not paid. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of making satisfaction; and consequently the parallel fails between their prayers and the suffrages of the Church.

OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord’s coming to judgment?

(2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened?

(3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall come?

Whether any signs will precede the Lord’s coming to judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Lord’s coming to judgment will not be preceded by any signs. Because it is written (1 Thess. 5:3): “When they shall say: Peace and security; then shall sudden destruction come upon them.” Now there would be no peace and security if men were terrified by previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that coming

Objection 2: Further, signs are ordained for the manifestation of something. But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore it is written (1 Thess. 5:2): “The day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night.” Therefore signs ought not to precede it.

Objection 3: Further, the time of His first coming was foreknown by the prophets, which does not apply to His second coming. Now no such signs preceded the first coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they precede the second.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:25): “There shall be signs in the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars,” etc.

Further, Jerome [*St. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix; he quotes St. Jerome, but the reference is not known.] mentions fifteen signs preceding the judgment. He says that on the “first” day all the seas will rise fifteen cubits above the mountains; in the “second” day all the waters will be plunged into the depths, so that scarcely will they be visible; on the “third” day they will be restored to their previous condition; on the “fourth” day all the great fishes and other things that move in the waters will gather together and, raising their heads above the sea, roar at one another contentiously; on the “fifth” day, all the birds of the air will gather together in the fields, wailing to one another, with neither bite nor sup; on the “sixth” day rivers of fire will arise towards the firmament rushing together from the west to the east; on the “seventh” day all the stars, both planets and fixed stars, will throw out fiery tails like comets; on the “eighth” day there will be a great earthquake, and all animals will be laid low; on the “ninth” day all the plants will be bedewed as it were with blood; on the “tenth” day all stones, little and great, will be divided into four parts dashing against one another; on the "eleventh" day all hills and mountains and buildings will be reduced to dust; on the "twelfth" day all animals will come from forest and mountain to the fields, roaring and tasting of nothing; on the "thirteenth" day all graves from east to west will open to allow the bodies to rise again; on the "fourteenth" day all men will leave their abode, neither understanding nor speaking, but rushing hither and thither like madmen; on the "fifteenth" day all will die and will rise again with those who died long before.

I answer that, When Christ shall come to judge He will appear in the form of glory, on account of the authority becoming a judge. Now it pertains to the dignity of judicial power to have certain signs that induce people to reverence and subjection: and consequently many signs will precede the advent of Christ when He shall come to judgment, in order that the hearts of men be brought to subjection to the coming judge, and be prepared for the judgment, being forewarned by those signs. But it is not easy to know what these signs may be: for the signs of which we read in the gospels, as Augustine says, writing to Hesychius about the end of the world (Ep. lxxx), refer not only to Christ's coming to judgment, but also to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, and to the coming of Christ in ceaselessly visiting His Church. So that, perhaps, if we consider them carefully, we shall find that none of them refers to the coming advent, as he remarks: because these signs that are mentioned in the gospels, such as wars, fears, and so forth, have been from the beginning of the human race: unless perhaps we say that at that time they will be more prevalent: although it is uncertain in what degree this increase will foretell the imminence of the advent. The signs mentioned by Jerome are not asserted by him; he merely says that he found them written in the annals of the Hebrews: and, indeed, they contain very little likelihood.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (Ad Hesych., Ep. lxxx) towards the end of the world there will be a general persecution of the good by the wicked: so that at the same time some will fear, namely the good, and some will be secure, namely the wicked. The words: "When they shall say: Peace and security," refer to the wicked, who will pay little heed to the signs of the coming judgment: while the words of Lk. 21:26, "men withering away," etc., should be referred to the good.

We may also reply that all these signs that will happen about the time of the judgment are reckoned to occur within the time occupied by the judgment, so that the judgment day contains them all. Wherefore although men be terrified by the signs appearing about the judgment day, yet before those signs begin to appear the wicked will think themselves to be in peace and security, after the death of Antichrist and before the coming of Christ, seeing that the world is not at once destroyed, as they thought hitherto.

Reply to Objection 2: The day of the Lord is said to come as a thief, because the exact time is not known, since it will not be possible to know it from those signs: although, as we have already said, all these most manifest sings which will precede the judgment immediately may be comprised under the judgment day.

Reply to Objection 3: At His first advent Christ came secretly, although the appointed time was known beforehand by the prophets. Hence there was no need for such signs to appear at His first coming, as will appear at His second advent, when He will come openly, although the appointed time is hidden.

Whether towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth?

Objection 1: It would seem that towards the time of the judgment the sun and moon will be darkened in very truth. For, as Rabanus says, commenting on Mat. 24:29 “nothing hinders us from gathering that the sun moon, and stars will then be deprived of their light, as we know happened to the sun at the time of our Lord’s passion.”

Objection 2: Further, the light of the heavenly bodies is directed to the generation of inferior bodies, because by its means and not only by their movement they act upon this lower world as Averroes says (De Subst. Orbis.). But generation will cease then. Therefore neither will light remain in the heavenly bodies.

Objection 3: Further, according to some the inferior bodies will be cleansed of the qualities by which they act. Now heavenly bodies act not only by movement, but also by light, as stated above (OBJ[2]). Therefore as the movement of heaven will cease, so will the light of the heavenly bodies.

On the contrary, According to astronomers the sun and moon cannot be eclipsed at the same time. But this darkening of the sun and moon is stated to be simultaneous, when the Lord shall come to judgment. Therefore the darkening will not be in very truth due to a natural eclipse.

Further, it is not seemly for the same to be the cause of a thing's failing and increasing. Now when our Lord shall come the light of the luminaries will increase according to Is. 30:26, "The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold." Therefore it is unfitting for the light of these bodies to cease when our Lord comes.

I answer that, If we speak of the sun and moon in respect of the very moment of Christ's coming, it is not credible that they will be darkened through being bereft of their light, since when Christ comes and the saints rise again the whole world will be renewed, as we shall state further on ([5048]Q[74]). If, however, we speak of them in respect of the time immediately preceding the judgment, it is possible that by the Divine power the sun, moon, and other luminaries of the heavens will be darkened, either at various times or all together, in order to inspire men with fear.

Reply to Objection 1: Rabanus is speaking of the time preceding the judgment: wherefore he adds that when the judgment day is over the words of Isaias shall be fulfilled.

Reply to Objection 2: Light is in the heavenly bodies not only for the purpose of causing generation in these lower bodies, but also for their own perfection and beauty. Hence it does not follow that where generation ceases, the light of the heavenly bodies will cease, but rather that it will increase.

Reply to Objection 3: It does not seem probable that the elemental qualities will be removed from the elements, although some have asserted this. If, however, they be removed, there would still be no parallel between them and light, since the elemental qualities are in opposition to one another, so that their action is corruptive: whereas light is a principle of action not by way of opposition, but by way of a principle regulating things in opposition to one another and bringing them back to harmony. Nor is there a parallel with the movement of heavenly bodies, for movement is the act of that which is imperfect, wherefore it must needs cease when the imperfection ceases: whereas this cannot be said of light.

Whether the virtues of heaven will be moved when our Lord shall come?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virtues of heaven will not be moved when our Lord shall come. For the virtues of heaven can de. note only the blessed angels. Now immobility is essential to blessedness. Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved.

Objection 2: Further, ignorance is the cause of wonder (Metaph. i, 2). Now ignorance, like fear, is far from the angels, for as Gregory says (Dial. iv, 33; Moral. ii, 3), “what do they not see, who see Him Who sees all.” Therefore it will be impossible for them to be moved with wonder, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48).

Objection 3: Further, all the angels will be present at the Divine judgment; wherefore it is stated (Apoc. 7:11): “All the angels stood round about the throne.” Now the virtues denote one particular order of angels. Therefore it should not be said of them rather than of others, that they are moved.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 26:11): “The pillars of heaven tremble, and dread at His beck.” Now the pillars of heaven can denote only the virtues of heaven. Therefore the virtues of heaven will be moved.

Further, it is written (Mat. 24:29): “The stars shall fall from heaven, and the virtues [Douay: ‘powers’] of heaven shall be moved.”

I answer that, Virtue is twofold as applied to the angels, [*Cf. [5049]FP, Q[108], A[5], ad 1] as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. xi). For sometimes the name of “virtues” is appropriated to one order, which according to him, is the middle order of the middle hierarchy, but according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) is the highest order of the lowest hierarchy. In another sense it is employed to denote all the angels: and then they are said to the question at issue it may be taken either way. For in the text (Sent. iv, D, 48) it is explained according to the second acceptation, so as to denote all the angels: and then they are said to be moved through wonder at the renewing of the world, as stated in the text. It can also be explained in reference to virtue as the name of a particular order; and then that order is said to be moved more than the others by reason of the effect, since according to Gregory (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv) we ascribe to that order the working of miracles which especially will be worked about that time: or again, because that order—since, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi), it belongs to the middle hierarchy—is not limited in its power, wherefore its ministry must needs regard universal causes. Consequently the proper office of the virtues is seemingly to move the heavenly bodies which are the cause of what happens in nature here below. And again the very name denotes this, since they are called the “virtues of heaven.” Accordingly they will be moved then, because they will no more produce their effect, by ceasing to move the heavenly bodies: even as the angels who are appointed to watch over men will no longer fulfill the office of guardians.

Reply to Objection 1: This movement changes nothing pertaining to their state; but refers either to their effects which may vary without any change on their part, or to some new consideration of things which hitherto they were unable to see by means of their concreated species, which change of thought is not taken from them by their state of blessedness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20) that “God moves the spiritual creature through time.”

Reply to Objection 2: Wonder is wont to be about things surpassing our knowledge or ability: and accordingly the virtues of heaven will wonder at the Divine power doing such things, in so far as they fail to do or comprehend them. In this sense the blessed Agnes said that the “sun and moon wonder at His beauty”: and this does not imply ignorance in the angels, but removes the comprehension of God from them.

The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.

OF THE FIRE OF THE FINAL CONFLAGRATION (NINE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the fire of the final conflagration: and under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any cleansing of the world is to take place?

(2) Whether it will be effected by fire?

(3) Whether that fire is of the same species as elemental fire?

(4) Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?

(5) Whether that fire will consume the other elements?

(6) Whether it will cleanse all the elements?

(7) Whether that fire precedes or follows the judgment?

(8) Whether men are to be consumed by that fire?

(9) Whether the wicked will be involved therein?

Whether the world is to be cleansed?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not to be any cleansing of the world. For only that which is unclean needs cleansing. Now God’s creatures are not unclean, wherefore it is written (Acts 10:15): “That which God hath cleansed, do not thou call common,” i.e. unclean. Therefore the creatures of the world shall not be cleansed.

Objection 2: Further, according to Divine justice cleansing is directed to the removal of the uncleanness of sin, as instanced in the cleansing after death. But there can be no stain of sin in the elements of this world. Therefore, seemingly, they need not to be cleansed.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is said to be cleansed when any foreign matter that depreciates it is removed therefrom: for the removal of that which ennobles a thing is not called a cleansing, but rather a diminishing. Now it pertains to the perfection and nobility of the elements that something of a foreign nature is mingled with them, since the form of a mixed body is more noble than the form of a simple body. Therefore it would seem nowise fitting that the elements of this world can possibly be cleansed.

On the contrary, All renewal is effected by some kind of cleansing. But the elements will be renewed; hence it is written (Apoc. 21:1): “I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth was gone.” Therefore the elements shall be cleansed.

Further, a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xx, 16] on 1 Cor. 7:31, “The fashion of this earth passeth away,” says: “The beauty of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames.” Therefore the same conclusion follows.

I answer that, Since the world was, in a way, made for man’s sake, it follows that, when man shall be glorified in the body, the other bodies of the world shall also be changed to a better state, so that it is rendered a more fitting place for him and more pleasant to look upon. Now in order that man obtain the glory of the body, it behooves first of all those things to be removed which are opposed to glory. There are two, namely the corruption and stain of sin—because according to 1 Cor. 15:50, “neither shall corruption possess incorruption,” and all the unclean shall be without the city of glory (Apoc. 22:15)—and again, the elements require to be cleansed from the contrary dispositions, ere they be brought to the newness of glory, proportionately to what we have said with regard to man. Now although, properly speaking, a corporeal thing cannot be the subject of the stain of sin, nevertheless, on account of sin corporeal things contract a certain unfittingness for being appointed to spiritual purposes; and for this reason we find that places where crimes have been committed are reckoned unfit for the performance of sacred actions therein, unless they be cleansed beforehand. Accordingly that part of the world which is given to our use contracts from men’s sins a certain unfitness for being glorified, wherefore in this respect it needs to be cleansed. In like manner with regard to the intervening space, on account of the contact of the elements, there are many corruptions, generations and alterations of the elements, which diminish their purity: wherefore the elements need to be cleansed from these also, so that they be fit to receive the newness of glory.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is asserted that every creature of God is clean we are to understand this as meaning that its substance contains no alloy of evil, as the Manichees maintained, saying that evil and good are two substances in some places severed from one another, in others mingled together. But it does not exclude a creature from having an admixture of a foreign nature, which in itself is also good, but is inconsistent with the perfection of that creature. Nor does this prevent evil from being accidental to a creature, although not mingled with it as part of its substance.

Reply to Objection 2: Although corporeal elements cannot be the subject of sin, nevertheless, from the sin that is committed in them they contract a certain unfitness for receiving the perfection of glory.

Reply to Objection 3: The form of a mixed body and the form of an element may be considered in two ways: either as regards the perfection of the species, and thus a mixed body is more perfect—or as regards their continual endurance; and thus the simple body is more noble, because it has not in itself the cause of corruption, unless it be corrupted by something extrinsic: whereas a mixed body has in itself the cause of its corruption, namely the composition of contraries. Wherefore a simple body, although it be corruptible in part is incorruptible as a whole, which cannot be said of a mixed body. And since incorruption belongs to the perfection of glory, it follows that the perfection of a simple is more in keeping with the perfection of glory, than the perfection of a mixed body, unless the mixed body has also in itself some principle of incorruption, as the human body has, the form of which is incorruptible. Nevertheless, although a mixed body is somewhat more noble than a simple body, a simple body that exists by itself has a more noble being than if it exist in a mixed body, because in a mixed body simple bodies are somewhat in potentiality, whereas, existing by themselves, they are in their ultimate perfection.

Whether the cleansing of the world will be effected by fire?

Objection 1: It would seem that this cleansing will not be effected by fire. For since fire is a part of the world, it needs to be cleansed like the other parts. Now, the same thing should not be both cleanser and cleansed. Therefore it would seem that the cleansing will not be by fire.

Objection 2: Further, just as fire has a cleansing virtue so has water. Since then all things are not capable of being cleansed by fire, and some need to be cleansed by water—which distinction is moreover observed by the Old Law—it would seem that fire will not at any rate cleanse all things.

Objection 3: Further, this cleansing would seem to consist in purifying the parts of the world by separating them from one another. Now the separation of the parts of the world from one another at the world’s beginning was effected by God’s power alone, for the work of distinction was carried out by that power: wherefore Anaxagoras asserted that the separation was effected by the act of the intellect which moves all things (cf. Aristotle, Phys. viii, 9). Therefore it would seem that at the end of the world the cleansing will be done immediately by God and not by fire.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 49:3): “A fire shall burn before Him, and a mighty tempest shall be around Him”; and afterwards in reference to the judgment (Ps. 49:4): “He shall call heaven from above, and the earth to judge His people.” Therefore it would seem that the final cleansing of the world will be by means of fire.

Further, it is written (2 Pet. 3:12): “The heavens being on fire will be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat.” Therefore this cleansing will be effected by fire.

I answer that, As stated above [5050](A[1]) this cleansing of the world will remove from it the stain contracted from sin, and the impurity resulting from mixture, and will be a disposition to the perfection of glory; and consequently in this threefold respect it will be most fitting for it to be effected by fire. First, because since fire is the most noble of the elements, its natural properties are more like the properties of glory, and this is especially clear in regard to light. Secondly, because fire, on account of the efficacy of its active virtue, is not as susceptible as the other elements to the admixture of a foreign matter. Thirdly, because the sphere of fire is far removed from our abode; nor are we so familiar with the use of fire as with that of earth, water, and air, so that it is not so liable to depreciation. Moreover, it is most efficacious in cleansing and in separating by a process of rarefaction.

Reply to Objection 1: Fire is not employed by us in its proper matter (since thus it is far removed from us), but only in a foreign matter: and in this respect it will be possible for the world to be cleansed by fire as existing in its pure state. But in so far as it has an admixture of some foreign matter it will be possible for it to be cleansed; and thus it will be cleanser and cleansed under different aspects. and this is not unreasonable.

Reply to Objection 2: The first cleansing of the world by the deluge regarded only the stain of sin. Now the sin which was most prevalent then was the sin of concupiscence, and consequently it was fitting that the cleansing should be by means of its contrary, namely water. But the second cleansing regards both the stain of sin and the impurity of mixture, and in respect of both it is more fitting for it to be effected by fire than by water. For the power of water tends to unite rather than to separate; wherefore the natural impurity of the elements could not be removed by water as by fire. Moreover, at the end of the world the prevalent sin will be that of tepidity, as though the world were already growing old, because then, according to Mat. 24:12, “the charity of many shall grow cold,” and consequently the cleansing will then be fittingly effected by fire. Nor is there any thing that cannot in some way be cleansed by fire: some things, however, cannot be cleansed by fire without being destroyed themselves, such as cloths and wooden vessels, and these the Law ordered to be cleansed with water; yet all these things will be finally destroyed by fire.

Reply to Objection 3: By the work of distinction things received different forms whereby they are distinct from one another: and consequently this could only be done by Him Who is the author of nature. But by the final cleansing things will be restored to the purity wherein they were created, wherefore created nature will be able to minister to its Creator to this effect; and for this reason is a creature employed as a minister, that it is ennobled thereby.

Whether the fire whereby the world will be cleansed will be of the same species with elemental fire?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fire in question is not of the same species as elemental fire. For nothing consumes itself. But that fire will consume the four elements according to a gloss on 2 Pet. 3:12. Therefore that fire will not be of the same species as elemental fire.

Objection 2: Further, as power is made known by operation, so is nature made known by power. Now that fire will have a different power from the fire which is an element: because it will cleanse the universe, whereas this fire cannot do that. Therefore it will not be of the same species as this.

Objection 3: Further, in natural bodies those that are of the same species have the same movement. But that fire will have a different movement from the fire that is an element, because it will move in all directions so as to cleanse the whole. Therefore it is not of the same species.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), and his words are contained in a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, that “the fashion of this world will perish in the burning of worldly flames.” Therefore that fire will be of the same nature as the fire which is now in the world.

Further, just as the future cleansing is to be by fire, so was the past cleansing by water: and they are both compared to one another, 2 Pet. 3:5. Now in the first cleansing the water was of the same species with elemental water. Therefore in like manner the fire of the second cleansing will be of the same species with elemental fire.

I answer that, We meet with three opinions on this question. For some say that the element of fire which is in its own sphere will come down to cleanse the world: and they explain this descent by way of multiplication, because the fire will spread through finding combustible matter on all sides. And this will result all the more then since the virtue of the fire will be raised over all the elements. Against this, however, would seem to be not only the fact that this fire will come down, but also the statement of the saints that it will rise up; thus (2 Pet. 3:10) it is declared that the fire of the judgment will rise as high as the waters of the deluge; whence it would seem to follow that this fire is situated towards the middle of the place of generation. Hence others say that this fire will be generated towards the intervening space through the focusing together of the rays of the heavenly bodies, just as we see them focused together in a burning-glass; for at that time in lieu of glasses there will be concave clouds, on which the rays will strike But this again does not seem probable: for since the effects of heavenly bodies depend on certain fixed positions and aspects, if this fire resulted from the virtue of the heavenly bodies, the time of this cleansing would be known to those who observe the movements of the stars and this is contrary to the authority of Scripture. Consequently others, following Augustine, say that “just as the deluge resulted from an outpouring of the waters of the world, so the fashion of this world will perish by a burning of worldly flames” (De Civ. Dei. xx, 16). This burning is nothing else but the assembly of all those lower and higher causes that by their nature have a kindling virtue: and this assembly will take place not in the ordinary course of things, but by the Divine power: and from all these causes thus assembled the fire that will burn the surface of this world will result. If we consider aright these opinions, we shall find that they differ as to the cause producing this fire and not as to its species. For fire, whether produced by the sun or by some lower heating cause, is of the same species as fire in its own sphere, except in so far as the former has some admixture of foreign matter. And this will of necessity be the case then, since fire cannot cleanse a thing, unless this become its matter in some way. Hence we must grant that the fire in question is simply of the same species as ours.

Reply to Objection 1: The fire in question, although of the same species as ours, is not identically the same. Now we see that of two fires of the same species one destroys the other, namely the greater destroys the lesser, by consuming its matter. In like manner that fire will be able to destroy our fire.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as an operation that proceeds from the virtue of a thing is an indication of that virtue, so is its virtue an indication of its essence or nature, if it proceed from the essential principles of the thing.

But an operation that does not proceed from the virtue of the operator does not indicate its virtue. This appears in instruments: for the action of an instrument shows forth the virtue of the mover rather than that of the instrument, since it shows forth the virtue of the agent in so far as the latter is the first principle of the action, whereas it does not show forth the virtue of the instrument, except in so far as it is susceptive of the influence of the principal agent as moving that instrument. In like manner a virtue that does not proceed from the essential principles of a thing does not indicate the nature of that thing except in the point of susceptibility. Thus the virtue whereby hot water can heat is no indication of the nature of water except in the point of its being receptive of heat. Consequently nothing prevents water that has this virtue from being of the same species as water that has it not. In like manner it is not unreasonable that this fire, which will have the power to cleanse the surface of the world, will be of the same species as the fire to which we are used, since the heating power therein arises, not from its essential principles but from the divine power or operation: whether we say that this power is an absolute quality, such as heat in hot water, or a kind of intention as we have ascribed to instrumental virtue (Sent. iv, D, 1, qu. 1, A[4]) [*Cf. [5051]TP, Q[62], A[4], ad 1]. The latter is more probable since that fire will not act save as the instrument of the Divine power.

Reply to Objection 3: Of its own nature fire tends only upwards; but in so far as it pursues its matter, which it requires when it is outside its own sphere, it follows the site of combustible matter. Accordingly it is not unreasonable for it to take a circular or a downward course, especially in so far as it acts as the instrument of the Divine power.

Whether that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens?

Objection 1: It would seem that that fire will cleanse also the higher heavens. For it is written (Ps. 101:26,27): “The heavens are the works of Thy hands: they shall perish but Thou remainest.” Now the higher heavens also are the work of God’s hands. Therefore they also shall perish in the final burning of the world.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (2 Pet. 3:12): “The heavens being on fire shall be dissolved, and the elements shall melt with the burning heat of fire.” Now the heavens that are distinct from the elements are the higher heavens, wherein the stars are fixed. Therefore it would seem that they also will be cleansed by that fire.

Objection 3: Further, the purpose of that fire will be to remove from bodies their indisposition to the perfection of glory. Now in the higher heaven we find this indisposition both as regards guilt, since the devil sinned there, and as regards natural deficiency, since a gloss on Rom. 8:22, “We know that every creature groaneth and is in labor even until now,” says: “All the elements fulfill their duty with labor: even as it is not without labor that the sun and moon travel their appointed course.” Therefore the higher heavens also will be cleansed by that fire.

On the contrary, “The heavenly bodies are not receptive of impressions from without” [*Cf. Sent. Philosop. ex Arist. collect. lit. c.—Among the works of Bede].

Further, a gloss on 2 Thess. 1:8, “In a flame of fire giving vengeance,” says: “There will be in the world a fire that shall precede Him, and shall rise in the air to the same height as did the waters of the deluge.” But the waters of the deluge did not rise to the height of the higher heavens but only 15 cubits higher than the mountain summits (Gn. 7:20). Therefore the higher heavens will not be cleansed by that fire.

I answer that, The cleansing of the world will be for the purpose of removing from bodies the disposition contrary to the perfection of glory, and this perfection is the final consummation of the universe: and this disposition is to be found in all bodies, but differently in different bodies. For in some this indisposition regards something inherent to their substance: as in these lower bodies which by being mixed together fall away from their own purity. In others this indisposition does not regard something inherent to their substance; as in the heavenly bodies, wherein nothing is to be found contrary to the final perfection of the universe, except movement which is the way to perfection, and this not any kind of movement, but only local movement, which changes nothing intrinsic to a thing, such as its substance, quantity, or quality, but only its place which is extrinsic to it. Consequently there is no need to take anything away from the substance of the higher heavens, but only to set its movement at rest. Now local movement is brought to rest not by the action of a counter agent, but by the mover ceasing to move; and therefore the heavenly bodies will not be cleansed, neither by fire nor by the action of any creature, but in lieu of being cleansed they will be set at rest by God’s will alone.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18,24): “Those words of the psalm refer to the aerial heavens which will be cleansed by the fire of the final conflagration.” Or we may reply that if they refer also to the higher heavens, these are said to perish as regards their movement whereby now they are moved without cessation.

Reply to Objection 2: Peter explains himself to which heavens he refers. For before the words quoted, he had said (2 Pet. 3:5–7): “The heavens . . . first, and the earth . . . through water . . . perished . . . which . . . now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire unto the day of judgment.” [*The entire text differs somewhat from St. Thomas’s quotation; but the sense is the same.] Therefore the heavens to be cleansed are those which before were cleansed by the waters of the deluge, namely the aerial heavens.

Reply to Objection 3: This labor and service of the creature, that Ambrose ascribes to the heavenly bodies, is nothing else than the successive movements whereby they are subject to time, and the lack of that final consummation which they will attain in the end. Nor did the empyrean heaven contract any stain from the sin of the demons, because they were expelled from that heaven as soon as they sinned.

Whether that fire will consume the other elements?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fire in question will consume the other elements. For a gloss of Bede on 2 Pet. 3:12 says: “This exceeding great fire will engulf the four elements whereof the world consists: yet it will not so engulf all things that they will cease to be, but it will consume two of them entirely, and will restore two of them to a better fashion.” Therefore it would seem that at least two of the elements are to be entirely destroyed by that fire.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Apoc. 21:1): “The first heaven and the first earth have passed away and the sea is no more.” Now the heaven here denotes the air, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei xx, 18); and the sea denotes the gathering together of the waters. Therefore it would seem that these three elements will be wholly destroyed.

Objection 3: Further, fire does not cleanse except in so far as other things are made to be its matter. If, then, fire cleanses the other elements, they must needs become its matter. Therefore they must pass into its nature, and consequently be voided of their own nature.

Objection 4: Further, the form of fire is the most noble of the forms to which elemental matter can attain. Now all things will be brought to the most noble state by this cleansing. Therefore the other elements will be wholly transformed into fire.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 7:31, “The fashion of this world passeth away,” says: “The beauty, not the substance, passeth.” But the very substance of the elements belongs to the perfection of the world. Therefore the elements will not be consumed as to their substance.

Further, this final cleansing that will be effected by fire will correspond to the first cleansing which was effected by water. Now the latter did not corrupt the substance of the elements. Therefore neither will the former which will be the work of fire.

I answer that, There are many opinions on this question. For some say that all the elements will remain as to their matter, while all will be changed as regards their imperfection; but that two of them will retain their respective substantial form, namely air and earth, while two of them, namely fire and water, will not retain their substantial form but will be changed to the form of heaven. In this way three elements, namely air, fire, and water, will be called “heaven”; although air will retain the same substantial form as it has now, since even now it is called “heaven.” Wherefore (Apoc. 21:1) only heaven and earth are mentioned: “I saw,” says he, “a new heaven and a new earth.” But this opinion is altogether absurd: for it is opposed both to philosophy—which holds it impossible for the lower bodies to be in potentiality to the form of heaven, since they have neither a common matter, nor mutual contrariety—and to theology, since according to this opinion the perfection of the universe with the integrity of its parts will not be assured on account of two of the elements being destroyed.

Consequently “heaven” is taken to denote the fifth body, while all the elements are designated by “earth,” as expressed in Ps. 148:7,8, “Praise the Lord from the earth” and afterwards, “fire, hail, snow, ice,” etc.

Hence others say that all the elements will remain as to their substance, but that their active and passive qualities will be taken from them: even as they say too, that in a mixed body the elements retain their substantial form without having their proper qualities, since these are reduced to a mean, and a mean is neither of the extremes. And seemingly the following words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 16) would seem in agreement with this: “In this conflagration of the world the qualities of the corruptible elements that were befitting our corruptible bodies will entirely perish by fire: and the substance itself will have those qualities that become an immortal body.”

However, this does not seem probable, for since the proper qualities of the elements are the effects of their substantial form, it seems impossible, as long as the substantial forms remain, for the aforesaid qualities to be changed, except for a time by some violent action: thus in hot water we see that by virtue of its species it returns to the cold temperature which it had lost by the action of fire, provided the species of water remain. Moreover, these same elemental qualities belong to the second perfection of the elements, as being their proper passions: nor is it probable that in this final consummation the elements will lose anything of their natural perfection. Wherefore it would seem that the reply to this question should be that the elements will remain as to their substance and proper qualities, but that they will be cleansed both from the stain which they contracted from the sins of men, and from the impurity resulting in them through their mutual action and passion: because when once the movement of the first movable body ceases, mutual action and passion will be impossible in the lower elements: and this is what Augustine calls the “qualities of corruptible elements,” namely their unnatural dispositions by reason of which they come near to corruption.

Reply to Objection 1: That fire is said to engulf the four elements in so far as in some way it will cleanse them. But when it is said further that “it will consume two entirely,” this does not mean that two of the elements are to be destroyed as to their substance, but that two will be more changed from the property which they have now. Some say that these two are fire and water which excel the others in their active qualities, namely heat and cold, which are the chief principles of corruption in other bodies; and since then there will be no action of fire and water which surpass the others in activity, they would seem especially to be changed from the virtue which they have now. Others, however, say that these two are air and water, on account of the various movements of these two elements, which movements they derive from the movement of the heavenly bodies. And since these movements will cease (such as the ebb and flow of the sea, and the disturbances of winds and so forth), therefore these elements especially will be changed from the property which they have now.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16), when it is stated: “And the sea is no more,” by the sea we may understand the present world of which he had said previously (De Civ. Dei xx, 13): “The sea gave up the dead that were in it.” If, however, the sea be taken literally we must reply that by the sea two things are to be understood, namely the substance of the waters, and their disposition, as containing salt and as to the movement of the waves. The sea will remain, not as to this second, but as to the first.

Reply to Objection 3: This fire will not act save as the instrument of God’s providence and power; wherefore it will not act on the other elements so as to consume them but only so as to cleanse them. Nor is it necessary for that which becomes the matter of fire, to be voided of its proper species entirely, as instanced by incandescent iron, which by virtue of its species that remains returns to its proper and former state as soon as it is taken from the furnace. It will be the same with the elements after they are cleansed by fire.

Reply to Objection 4: In the elemental parts we must consider not only what is befitting a part considered in itself, but also what is befitting it in its relation to the whole. I say, then, that although water would be more noble if it had the form of fire, as likewise would earth and air, yet the universe would be more imperfect, if all elemental matter were to assume the form of fire.

Whether all the elements will be cleansed by that fire?

Objection 1: It would seem that neither will all the elements be cleansed by that fire. Because that fire, as stated already [5052](A[3]), will not rise higher than the waters of the deluge. But the waters of the deluge did not reach to the sphere of fire. Therefore neither will the element of fire be cleansed by the final cleansing.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Apoc. 21:1, “I saw a new heaven,” etc., says: “There can be no doubt that the transformation of the air and earth will be caused by fire; but it is doubtful about water, since it is believed to have the power of cleansing itself.” Therefore at least it is uncertain that all the elements will be cleansed.

Objection 3: Further, a place where there is an everlasting stain is never cleansed. Now there will always be a stain in hell. Since, then, hell is situated among the elements, it would seem that the elements will not be wholly cleansed.

Objection 4: Further, the earthly paradise is situated on the earth. Yet it will not be cleansed by fire, since not even the waters of the deluge reached it, as Bede says (Hexaem. i, ad Gen. 2:8), as is stated in Sentent. ii, D, 7. Therefore it would seem that the elements will not all be wholly cleansed.

On the contrary, The gloss quoted above (A[5], OBJ[1]) on 2 Pet. 3:12 declares that “this fire will engulf the four elements.”

I answer that, Some [*St. Bonaventure, Sentent. iv, D, 47, A[2], Q[3]] say that the fire in question will rise to the summit of the space containing the four elements: so that the elements would be entirely cleansed both from the stain of sin by which also the higher parts of the elements were infected (as instanced by the smoke of idolatry which stained the higher regions), and again from corruption, since the elements are corruptible in all their parts. But this opinion is opposed to the authority of Scripture, because it is written (2 Pet. 3:7) that those heavens are “kept in store unto fire,” which were cleansed by water; and Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) that “the same world which perished in the deluge is reserved unto fire.” Now it is clear that the waters of the deluge did not rise to the summit of the space occupied by the elements, but only 15 cubits above the mountain tops; and moreover it is known that vapors or any smoke whatever rising from the earth cannot pierce the entire sphere of fire so as to reach its summit; and so the stain of sin did not reach the aforesaid space. Nor can the elements be cleansed from corruptibility by the removal of something that might be consumed by fire: whereas it will be possible for the impurities of the elements arising from their mingling together to be consumed by fire. And these impurities are chiefly round about the earth as far as the middle of the air: wherefore the fire of the final conflagration will cleanse up to that point, since the waters of the deluge rose to a height which can be approximately calculated from the height of the mountains which they surpassed in a fixed measure.

We therefore grant the First Objection.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason for doubt is expressed in the gloss, because, to wit, water is believed to have in itself the power of cleansing, yet not such a power as will be competent to the future state, as stated above [5053](A[5]; A[2], ad 2).

Reply to Objection 3: The purpose of this cleansing will be chiefly to remove all imperfection from the abode of the saints; and consequently in this cleansing all that is foul will be brought together to the place of the damned: so hell will not be cleansed, and the dregs of the whole earth will be brought thither, according to Ps. 74:9, “The dregs thereof are not emptied, all the sinners of the earth shall drink.”

Reply to Objection 4: Although the sin of the first man was committed in the earthly paradise, this is not the place of sinners, as neither is the empyrean heaven: since from both places man and devil were expelled forthwith after their sin. Consequently that place needs no cleansing.

Whether the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of the final conflagration is to follow the judgment. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 30) gives the following order of the things to take place at the judgment, saying: “At this judgment we have learned that the following things will occur. Elias the Thesbite will appear, the Jews will believe, Antichrist will persecute, Christ will judge, the dead shall rise again, the good shall be separated from the wicked, the world shall be set on fire and shall be renewed.” Therefore the burning will follow the judgment.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): “After the wicked have been judged, and cast into everlasting fire, the figure of this world will perish in the furnace of worldly flames.” Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Objection 3: Further, when the Lord comes to judgment He will find some men living, as appears from the words of 1 Thess. 4:16, where the Apostle speaking in their person says: “Then we who are alive, who remain unto the coming of the Lord [*Vulg.: ‘who are left, shall be taken . . . to meet Christ'—the words "who remain," etc., are from 1 Thess. 4:14]." But it would not be so, if the burning of the world were to come first, since they would be destroyed by the fire. Therefore this fire will follow the judgment.

Objection 4: Further, it is said that our Lord will come to judge the earth by fire, and consequently the final conflagration would seem to be the execution of the sentence of Divine judgment. Now execution follows judgment. Therefore that fire will follow the judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 96:3): "A fire shall go before Him."

Further, the resurrection will precede the judgment, else every eye would not see Christ judging. Now the burning of the world will precede the resurrection, for the saints who will rise again will have spiritual and impassible bodies, so that it will be impossible for the fire to cleanse them, and yet the text (Sent. iv, D, 47) quotes Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 18) as saying that "whatever needs cleansing in any way shall be cleansed by that fire." Therefore that fire will precede the judgment.

I answer that, The fire in question will in reality, as regards its beginning, precede the judgment. This can clearly be gathered from the fact that the resurrection of the dead will precede the judgment, since according to 1 Thess. 4:13–16, those who have slept "shall be taken up . . . in the clouds . . . into the air . . . to meet Christ coming to judgment." Now the general resurrection and the glorification of the bodies of the saints will happen at the same time; for the saints in rising again will assume a glorified body, as evidenced by 1 Cor. 15:43, "It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory": and at the same time as the saints' bodies shall be glorified, all creatures shall be renewed, each in its own way, as appears from the statement (Rom. 8:21) that "the creature . . . itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption into the liberty of the glory of the children of God." Since then the burning of the world is a disposition to the aforesaid renewal, as stated above ([5054]AA[1],4); it can clearly be gathered that this burning, so far as it shall cleanse the world, will precede the judgment, but as regards a certain action thereof, whereby it will engulf the wicked, it will follow the judgment.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking not as one who decides the point, but as expressing an opinion. This is clear from his continuing thus: "That all these things are to happen is a matter of faith, but how and in what order we shall learn more then by experience of the things themselves than now by seeking a definite conclusion by arguing about them. Methinks, however, they will occur in the order I have given.” Hence it is clear that he is speaking as offering his opinion. The same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: All men shall die and rise again: yet those are said to be found alive who will live in the body until the time of the conflagration.

Reply to Objection 4: That fire will not carry out the sentence of the judge except as regards the engulfing of the wicked: in this respect it will follow the judgment.

Whether that fire will have such an effect on men as is described?

Objection 1: It would seem that this fire will not have such an effect on men as is described in the text (Sent. iv, D, 47). For a thing is said to be consumed when it is reduced to naught. Now the bodies of the wicked will not be reduced to naught, but will be kept for eternity, that they may bear an eternal punishment. Therefore this fire will not consume the wicked, as stated in the text.

Objection 2: Further, if it be said that it will consume the bodies of the wicked by reducing them to ashes; on the contrary, as the bodies of the wicked, so will those of the good be brought to ashes: for it is the privilege of Christ alone that His flesh see not corruption. Therefore it will consume also the good who will then be found.

Objection 3: Further, the stain of sin is more abundant in the elements, as combining together to the formation of the human body wherein is the corruption of the fomes [*Cf. [5055]FS, Q[83], A[3]; [5056]FS, Q[91], A[6]] even in the good, than in the elements existing outside the human body. Now the elements existing outside the human body will be cleansed on account of the stain of sin. Much therefore will the elements in the human body whether of the good or of the wicked need to be cleansed, and consequently the bodies of both will need to be destroyed.

Objection 4: Further, as long as the state of the way lasts the elements act in like manner on the good and the wicked. Now the state of the way will still endure in that conflagration, since after this state of the way death will not be natural, and yet it will be caused by that fire. Therefore that fire will act equally on good and wicked; and consequently it does not seem that any distinction is made between them as to their being affected by that fire, as stated in the text.

Objection 5: Further, this fire will have done its work in a moment as it were. Yet there will be many among the living in whom there will be many things to be cleansed. Therefore that fire will not suffice for their cleansing.

I answer that, This fire of the final conflagration, in so far as it will precede the judgment, will act as the instrument of Divine justice as well as by the natural virtue of fire. Accordingly, as regards its natural virtue, it will act in like manner on the wicked and good who will be alive, by reducing the bodies of both to ashes. But in so far as it acts as the instrument of Divine justice, it will act differently on different people as regards the sense of pain. For the wicked will be tortured by the action of the fire; whereas the good in whom there will be nothing to cleanse will feel no pain at all from the fire, as neither did the children in the fiery furnace (Dan. 3); although their bodies will not be kept whole, as were the bodies of the children: and it will be possible by God’s power for their bodies to be destroyed without their suffering pain. But the good, in whom matter for cleansing will be found, will suffer pain from that fire, more or less according to their different merits.

On the other hand, as regards the action which this fire will have after the judgment, it will act on the damned alone, since the good will all have impassible bodies.

Reply to Objection 1: Consumption there signifies being brought, not to nothing, but to ashes.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the bodies of the good will be reduced to ashes by the fire, they will not suffer pain thereby, as neither did the children in the Babylonian furnace. In this respect a distinction is drawn between the good and the wicked.

Reply to Objection 3: The elements that are in human bodies, even in the bodies of the elect, will be cleansed by fire. But this will be done, by God’s power, without their suffering pain.

Reply to Objection 4: This fire will act not only according to the natural power of the element, but also as the instrument of Divine justice.

Reply to Objection 5: There are three reasons why those who will be found living will be able to be cleansed suddenly. One is because there will be few things in them to be cleansed, since they will be already cleansed by the previous fears and persecutions. The second is because they will suffer pain both while living and of their own will: and pain suffered in this life voluntarily cleanses much more than pain inflicted after death, as in the case of the martyrs, because "if anything needing to be cleansed be found in them, it is cut off by the sickle of suffering," as Augustine says (De Unic. Bap. xiii), although the pain of martyrdom is of short duration in comparison with the pain endured in purgatory. The third is because the heat will gain in intensity what it loses in shortness of time.

Whether that fire will engulf the wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that that fire will not engulf the wicked. For a gloss on Malachi 3:3, "He shall purify the sons of Levi," says that "it is a fire consuming the wicked and refining the good"; and a gloss on 1 Cor. 3:13, "Fire shall try every man's work," says: "We read that there will be a twofold fire, one that will cleanse the elect and will precede the judgment, another that will torture the wicked." Now the latter is the fire of hell that shall engulf the wicked, while the former is the fire of the final conflagration. Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will not be that which will engulf the wicked.

Objection 2: Further, that fire will obey God in the cleansing of the world: therefore it should receive its reward like the other elements, especially since fire is the most noble of the elements. Therefore it would seem that it ought not to be cast into hell for the punishment of the damned.

Objection 3: Further, the fire that will engulf the wicked will be the fire of hell: and this fire was prepared from the beginning of the world for the damned; hence it is written (Mat. 25:41): "Depart . . . you cursed . . . into everlasting fire which was prepared for the devil," etc., and (Is. 30:33): "Tophet is prepared from yesterday, prepared by the king," etc., where a gloss observes: "From yesterday, i.e. from the beginning—Tophet, i.e. the valley of hell." But this fire of the final conflagration was not prepared from the beginning, but will result from the meeting together of the fires of the world. Therefore that fire is not the fire of hell which will engulf the wicked.

On the contrary, are the words of Ps. 96:3, where it is said of this fire that it "shall burn His enemies round about."

Further, it is written (Dan. 7:10): "A swift stream of fire issued forth from before Him"; and a gloss adds, "to drag sinners into hell." Now the passage quoted refers to that fire of which we are now speaking, as appears from a gloss which observes on the same words: "In order to punish the wicked and cleanse the good." Therefore the fire of the final conflagration will be plunged into hell together with the wicked

I answer that, The entire cleansing of the world and the renewal for the purpose of cleansing will be directed to the renewal of man: and consequently the cleansing and renewal of the world must needs correspond with the cleansing and renewal of mankind. Now mankind will be cleansed in one way by the separation of the wicked from the good: wherefore it is said (Lk. 3:17): "Whose fan is in His hand, and He will purge His poor, and will gather the wheat," i.e. the elect, "into His barn, but the chaff," i.e. the wicked, "He will burn with unquenchable fire." Hence it will be thus with the cleansing of the world, so that all that is ugly and vile will be cast with the wicked into hell, and all that is beautiful and noble will be taken up above for the glory of the elect: and so too will it be with the fire of that conflagration, as Basil says in Ps. 28:7, "The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire," because whatever fire contains of burning heat and gross matter will go down into hell for the punishment of the wicked, and whatever is subtle and lightsome will remain above for the glory of the elect.

Reply to Objection 1: The fire that will cleanse the elect before the judgment will be the same as the fire that will burn the world, although some say the contrary. For it is fitting that man, being a part of the world, be cleansed with the same fire as the world. They are, however, described as two fires, that will cleanse the good, and torture the wicked, both in reference to their respective offices, and somewhat in reference to their substance: since the substance of the cleansing fire will not all be cast into hell, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: This fire will be rewarded because whatever it contains of gross matter will be separated from it, and cast into hell.

Reply to Objection 3: The punishment of the wicked, even as the glory of the elect, will be greater after the judgment than before. Wherefore, just as charity will be added to the higher creature in order to increase the glory of the elect, so too whatever is vile in creatures will be thrust down into hell in order to add to the misery of the damned. Consequently it is not unbecoming that another fire be added to the fire of the damned that was prepared from the beginning of the world.

OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider things connected with and accompanying the resurrection. Of these the first to be considered will be the resurrection itself; the second will be the cause of the resurrection; the third its time and manner. the fourth its term "wherefrom"; the fifth the condition of those who rise again.

Under the first head there will be three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?

(2) Whether it is universally of all bodies?

(3) Whether it is natural or miraculous?

Whether there is to be a resurrection of the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not to be a resurrection of the body: for it is written (Job 14:12): "Man, when he is fallen asleep, shall not rise again till the heavens be broken." But the heavens shall never be broken, since the earth, to which seemingly this is still less applicable, "standeth for ever" (Eccles. 1:4). Therefore the man that is dead shall never rise again.

Objection 2: Further, Our Lord proves the resurrection by quoting the words: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. He is not the God of the dead but of the living" (Mat. 22:32; Ex. 3:6). But it is clear that when those words were uttered, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob lived not in body, but only in the soul. Therefore there will be no resurrection of bodies but only of souls.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle (1 Cor. 15) seemingly proves the resurrection from the reward for labors endured by the saints in this life. For if they trusted in this life alone, they would be the most unhappy of all men. Now there can be sufficient reward for labor in the soul alone: since it is not necessary for the instrument to be repaid together with the worker, and the body is the soul’s instrument. Wherefore even in purgatory, where souls will be punished for what they did in the body, the soul is punished without the body. Therefore there is no need to hold a resurrection of the body, but it is enough to hold a resurrection of souls, which consists in their being taken from the death of sin and unhappiness to the life of grace and glory.

Objection 4: Further, the last state of a thing is the most perfect, since thereby it attains its end. Now the most perfect state of the soul is to be separated from the body, since in that state it is more conformed to God and the angels, and is more pure, as being separated from any extraneous nature. Therefore separation from the body is its final state, and consequently it returns not from this state to the body, as neither does a man end in becoming a boy.

Objection 5: Further, bodily death is the punishment inflicted on man for his own transgression, as appears from Gn. 2, even as spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul from God, is inflicted on man for mortal sin. Now man never returns to life from spiritual death after receiving the sentence of his damnation. Therefore neither will there be any return from bodily death to bodily life, and so there will be no resurrection.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:25–26): “I know that my Redeemer liveth, and in the last day I shall rise out of the earth, and I shall be clothed again with my skin,” etc. Therefore there will be a resurrection of the body.

Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam, as appears from Rom. 5:15. Now death was brought in by sin, for if sin had not been, there had been no death. Therefore by the gift of Christ man will be restored from death to life.

Further, the members should be conformed to the head. Now our Head lives and will live eternally in body and soul, since “Christ rising again from the dead dieth now no more” (Rom. 6:8). Therefore men who are His members will live in body and soul; and consequently there must needs be a resurrection of the body.

I answer that, According to the various opinions about man’s last end there have been various opinions holding or denying the resurrection. For man’s last end which all men desire naturally is happiness. Some have held that man is able to attain this end in this life: wherefore they had no need to admit another life after this, wherein man would be able to attain to his perfection: and so they denied the resurrection.

This opinion is confuted with sufficient probability by the changeableness of fortune, the weakness of the human body, the imperfection and instability of knowledge and virtue, all of which are hindrances to the perfection of happiness, as Augustine argues at the end of De Civ. Dei (xxii, 22).

Hence others maintained that after this there is another life wherein, after death, man lives according to the soul only, and they held that such a life sufficed to satisfy the natural desire to obtain happiness: wherefore Porphyrius said as Augustine states (De Civ. De. xxii, 26): “The soul, to be happy, must avoid all bodies”: and consequently these did not hold the resurrection.

This opinion was based by various people on various false foundations. For certain heretics asserted that all bodily things are from the evil principle, but that spiritual things are from the good principle: and from this it follows that the soul cannot reach the height of its perfection unless it be separated from the body, since the latter withdraws it from its principle, the participation of which makes it happy. Hence all those heretical sects that hold corporeal things to have been created or fashioned by the devil deny the resurrection of the body. The falsehood of this principle has been shown at the beginning of the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 4, qu. 1, A[3]; *[Cf. [5057]FP, Q[49], A[3]]).

Others said that the entire nature of man is seated in the soul, so that the soul makes use of the body as an instrument, or as a sailor uses his ship: wherefore according to this opinion, it follows that if happiness is attained by the soul alone, man would not be balked in his natural desire for happiness, and so there is no need to hold the resurrection. But the Philosopher sufficiently destroys this foundation (De Anima ii, 2), where he shows that the soul is united to the body as form to matter. Hence it is clear that if man cannot be happy in this life, we must of necessity hold the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The heavens will never be broken as to their substance, but as to the effect of their power whereby their movement is the cause of generation and corruption of lower things: for this reason the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:31): “The fashion of this world passeth away.”

Reply to Objection 2: Abraham’s soul, properly speaking, is not Abraham himself, but a part of him (and the same as regards the others). Hence life in

Abraham’s soul does not suffice to make Abraham a living being, or to make the God of Abraham the God of a living man. But there needs to be life in the whole composite, i.e. the soul and body: and although this life were not actually when these words were uttered, it was in each part as ordained to the resurrection. Wherefore our Lord proves the resurrection with the greatest subtlety and efficacy.

Reply to Objection 3: The soul is compared to the body, not only as a worker to the instrument with which he works, but also as form to matter: wherefore the work belongs to the composite and not to the soul alone, as the Philosopher shows (De Anima i, 4). And since to the worker is due the reward of the work, it behooves man himself, who is composed of soul and body, to receive the reward of his work. Now as venial offenses are called sins as being dispositions to sin, and not as having simply and perfectly the character of sin, so the punishment which is awarded to them in purgatory is not a retribution simply, but rather a cleansing, which is wrought separately in the body, by death and by its being reduced to ashes, and in the soul by the fire of purgatory.

Reply to Objection 4: Other things being equal, the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than outside the body, because it is a part of the whole composite; and every integral part is material in comparison to the whole: and though it were conformed to God in one respect, it is not simply. Because, strictly speaking, a thing is more conformed to God when it has all that the condition of its nature requires, since then most of all it imitates the Divine perfection. Hence the heart of an animal is more conformed to an immovable God when it is in movement than when it is at rest, because the perfection of the heart is in its movement, and its rest is its undoing.

Reply to Objection 5: Bodily death was brought about by Adam’s sin which was blotted out by Christ’s death: hence its punishment lasts not for ever. But mortal sin which causes everlasting death through impenitence will not be expiated hereafter. Hence that death will be everlasting.

Whether the resurrection will be for all without exception?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be for all without exception. For it is written (Ps. 1:5): “The wicked shall not rise again in judgment.” Now men will not rise again except at the time of the general judgment. Therefore the wicked shall in no way rise again.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 12:2): “Many of those that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake.” But these words imply a restriction. Therefore all will not rise again.

Objection 3: Further, by the resurrection men are conformed to Christ rising again; wherefore the Apostle argues (1 Cor. 15:12, seqq.) that if Christ rose again, we also shall rise again. Now those alone should be conformed to Christ rising again who have borne His image, and this belongs to the good alone. Therefore they alone shall rise again.

Objection 4: Further, punishment is not remitted unless the fault be condoned. Now bodily death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore, as original sin is not forgiven to all, all will not rise again.

Objection 5: Further, as we are born again by the grace of Christ, even so shall we rise again by His grace. Now those who die in their mother’s womb can never be born again: therefore neither can they rise again, and consequently all will not rise again.

On the contrary, It is said (Jn. 5:28, 25): “All that are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and they that hear shall live.” Therefore the dead shall all rise again.

Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:51): “We shall all indeed rise again,” etc.

Further, the resurrection is necessary in order that those who rise again may receive punishment or reward according to their merits. Now either punishment or reward is due to all, either for their own merits, as to adults, or for others’ merits, as to children. Therefore all will rise again.

I answer that, Those things, the reason of which comes from the nature of a species, must needs be found likewise in all the members of that same species. Now such is the resurrection: because the reason thereof, as stated above [5058](A[1]), is that the soul cannot have the final perfection of the human species, so long as it is separated from the body. Hence no soul will remain for ever separated from the body. Therefore it is necessary for all, as well as for one, to rise again.

Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss expounds these words, they refer to the spiritual resurrection whereby the wicked shall not rise again in the particular judgment. or else they refer to the wicked who are altogether unbelievers, who will not rise again to be judged, since they are already judged [*Jn. 3:18].

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx, 23) explains “many” as meaning “all”: in fact, this way of speaking is often met with in Holy Writ. Or else the restriction may refer to the children consigned to limbo who, although they shall rise again, are not properly said to awake, since they will have no sense either of pain or of glory, and waking is the unchaining of the senses.

Reply to Objection 3: All, both good and wicked, are conformed to Christ, while living in this life, as regards things pertaining to the nature of the species, but not as regards matters pertaining to grace. Hence all will be conformed to Him in the restoration of natural life, but not in the likeness of glory, except the good alone.

Reply to Objection 4: Those who have died in original sin have, by dying, discharged the obligation of death which is the punishment of original sin. Hence, notwithstanding original sin, they can rise again from death: for the punishment of original sin is to die, rather than to be detained by death.

Reply to Objection 5: We are born again by the grace of Christ that is given to us, but we rise again by the grace of Christ whereby it came about that He took our nature, since it is by this that we are conformed to Him in natural things. Hence those who die in their mother’s womb, although they are not born again by receiving grace, will nevertheless rise again on account of the conformity of their nature with Him, which conformity they acquired by attaining to the perfection of the human species.

Whether the resurrection is natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection is natural. For, as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14), “that which is commonly observed in all, marks the nature of the individuals contained under it.” Now resurrection applies commonly to all. Therefore it is natural.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 55): “Those who do not hold the resurrection on the principle of obedience ought certainly to hold it on the principle of reason. For what does the world every day but imitate, in its elements, our resurrection?” And he offers as examples the light which “as it were dies . . . and is withdrawn from our sight . . . and again rises anew, as it were, and is recalled—the shrubs which lose their greenery, and again by a kind of resurrection are renewed—and the seeds which rot and die and then sprout and rise again as it were”: which same example is adduced by the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:36). Now from the works of nature nothing can be known save what is natural. Therefore the resurrection is natural.

Objection 3: Further, things that are against nature abide not for long, because they are violent, so to speak. But the life that is restored by the resurrection will last for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

Objection 4: Further, that to which the entire expectation of nature looks forward would seem to be natural. Now such a thing is the resurrection and the glorification of the saints according to Rom. 8:19. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

Objection 5: Further, the resurrection is a kind of movement towards the everlasting union of soul and body. Now movement is natural if it terminate in a natural rest (Phys. v, 6): and the everlasting union of soul and body will be natural, for since the soul is the body’s proper mover, it has a body proportionate to it: so that the body is likewise for ever capable of being quickened by it, even as the soul lives for ever. Therefore the resurrection will be natural.

On the contrary, There is no natural return from privation to habit. But death is privation of life. Therefore the resurrection whereby one returns from death to life is not natural.

Further, things of the one species have one fixed way of origin: wherefore animals begotten of putrefaction are never of the same species as those begotten of seed, as the Commentator says on Phys. viii. Now the natural way of man’s origin is for him to be begotten of a like in species: and such is not the case in the resurrection. Therefore it will not be natural.

I answer that, A movement or an action stands related to nature in three ways. For there is a movement or action whereof nature is neither the principle nor the term: and such a movement is sometimes from a principle above nature as in the case of a glorified body; and sometimes from any other principle whatever; for instance, the violent upward movement of a stone which terminates in a violent rest. Again, there is a movement whereof nature is both principle and term: for instance, the downward movement of a stone. And there is another movement whereof nature is the term, but not the principle, the latter being sometimes something above nature (as in giving sight to a blind man, for sight is natural, but the principle of the sight-giving is above nature), and sometimes something else, as in the forcing of flowers or fruit by artificial process. It is impossible for nature to be the principle and not the term, because natural principles are appointed to definite effects, beyond which they cannot extend.

Accordingly the action or movement that is related to nature in the first way can nowise be natural, but is either miraculous if it come from a principle above nature, or violent if from any other principle. The action or movement that is related to nature in the second way is simply natural: but the action that is related to nature in the third way cannot be described as natural simply, but as natural in a restricted sense, in so far, to wit, as it leads to that which is according to nature: but it is called either miraculous or artificial or violent. For, properly speaking, natural is that which is according to nature, and a thing is according to nature if it has that nature and whatever results from that nature (Phys. ii, 1). Consequently, speaking simply, movement cannot be described as natural unless its principle be natural.

Now nature cannot be the principle of resurrection, although resurrection terminates in the life of nature. For nature is the principle of movement in the thing wherein nature is—either the active principle, as in the movement of heavy and light bodies and in the natural alterations of animals—or the passive principle, as in the generation of simple bodies. The passive principle of natural generation is the natural passive potentiality which always has an active principle corresponding to it in nature, according to Metaphysics viii, 1: nor as to this does it matter whether the active principle in nature correspond to the passive principle in respect of its ultimate perfection, namely the form; or in respect of a disposition in virtue of which it demands the ultimate form, as in the generation of a man according to the teaching of faith, or in all other generations according to the opinions of Plato and Avicenna. But in nature there is no active principle of the resurrection, neither as regards the union of the soul with the body, nor as regards the disposition which is the demand for that union: since such a disposition cannot be produced by nature, except in a definite way by the process of generation from seed. Wherefore even granted a passive potentiality on the part of the body, or any kind of inclination to its union with the soul, it is not such as to suffice for the conditions of natural movement. Therefore the resurrection, strictly speaking, is miraculous and not natural except in a restricted sense, as we have explained.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is speaking of those things that are found in all individuals and are caused by the principles of nature. For supposing by a divine operation all men to be made white, or to be gathered together in one place, as happened at the time of the deluge, it would not follow that whiteness or existence in some particular place is a natural property of man.

Reply to Objection 2: From natural things one does not come by a demonstration of reason to know non-natural things, but by the induction of reason one may know something above nature, since the natural bears a certain resemblance to the supernatural. Thus the union of soul and body resembles the union of the soul with God by the glory of fruition, as the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1): and in like manner the examples, quoted by the Apostle and Gregory, are confirmatory evidences of our faith in the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument regards an operation which terminates in something that is not natural but contrary to nature. Such is not the resurrection, and hence the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 4: The entire operation of nature is subordinate to the Divine operation, just as the working of a lower art is subordinate to the working of a higher art. Hence just as all the work of a lower art has in view an end unattainable save by the operation of the higher art that produces the form, or makes use of what has been made by art: so the last end which the whole expectation of nature has in view is unattainable by the operation of nature, and for which reason the attaining thereto is not natural.

Reply to Objection 5: Although there can be no natural movement terminating in a violent rest, there can be a non-natural movement terminating in a natural rest, as explained above.

OF THE CAUSE OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the cause of our resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether Christ’s resurrection is the cause of our resurrection?

(2) Whether the sound of the trumpet is?

(3) Whether the angels are?

Whether the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection of Christ is not the cause of our resurrection. For, given the cause, the effect follows. Yet given the resurrection of Christ the resurrection of the other dead did not follow at once. Therefore His resurrection is not the cause of ours.

Objection 2: Further, an effect cannot be unless the cause precede. But the resurrection of the dead would be even if Christ had not risen again: for God could have delivered man in some other way. Therefore Christ's resurrection is not the cause of ours.

Objection 3: Further, the same thing produces the one effect throughout the one same species. Now the resurrection will be common to all men. Since then Christ's resurrection is not its own cause, it is not the cause of the resurrection of others.

Objection 4: Further, an effect retains some likeness to its cause. But the resurrection, at least of some, namely the wicked, bears no likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Therefore Christ's resurrection will not be the cause of theirs.

On the contrary, "In every genus that which is first is the cause of those that come after it" (Metaph. ii, 1). Now Christ, by reason of His bodily resurrection, is called "the first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20), and "the first-begotten of the dead" (Apoc. 1:5). Therefore His resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of others.

Further, Christ's resurrection has more in common with our bodily resurrection than with our spiritual resurrection which is by justification. But Christ's resurrection is the cause of our justification, as appears from Rom. 4:25, where it is said that He "rose again for our justification." Therefore Christ's resurrection is the cause of our bodily resurrection.

I answer that, Christ by reason of His nature is called the mediator of God and men: wherefore the Divine gifts are bestowed on men by means of Christ's humanity. Now just as we cannot be delivered from spiritual death save by the gift of grace bestowed by God, so neither can we be delivered from bodily death except by resurrection wrought by the Divine power. And therefore as Christ, in respect of His human nature, received the firstfruits of grace from above, and His grace is the cause of our grace, because "of

His fulness we all have received . . . grace for grace" (Jn. 1:16), so in Christ has our resurrection begun, and His resurrection is the cause of ours. Thus Christ as God is, as it were, the equivocal cause of our resurrection, but as God and man rising again, He is the proximate and, so to say, the univocal cause of our resurrection. Now a univocal efficient cause produces its effect in likeness to its own form, so that not only is it an efficient, but also an exemplar cause in relation to that effect. This happens in two ways. For sometimes this very form, whereby the agent is likened to its effect, is the direct principle of the action by which the effect is produced, as heat in the fire that heats: and sometimes it is not the form in respect of which this likeness is observed, that is primarily and directly the principle of that action, but the principles of that form. For instance, if a white man beget a white man, the whiteness of the begetter is not the principle of active generation, and yet the whiteness of the begetter is said to be the cause of the whiteness of the begotten, because the principles of whiteness in the begetter are the generative principles causing whiteness in the begotten. In this way the resurrection of Christ is the cause of our resurrection, because the same thing that wrought the resurrection of Christ, which is the univocal efficient cause of our resurrection, is the active cause of our resurrection, namely the power of Christ's Godhead which is common to Him and the Father. Hence it is written (Rom. 8:11): "He that raised up Jesus Christ from the dead shall quicken also your mortal bodies." And this very resurrection of Christ by virtue of His indwelling Godhead is the quasi-instrumental cause of our resurrection: since the Divine operations were wrought by means of Christ's flesh, as though it were a kind of organ; thus the Damascene instances as an example (De Fide Orth. iii, 15) the touch of His body whereby He healed the leper (Mat. 8:3).

Reply to Objection 1: A sufficient cause produces at once its effect to which it is immediately directed, but not the effect to which it is directed by means of something else, no matter how sufficient it may be: thus heat, however intense it be, does not cause heat at once in the first instant, but it begins at once to set up a movement towards heat, because heat is its effect by means of movement. Now Christ's resurrection is said to be the cause of ours, in that it works our resurrection, not immediately, but by means of its principle, namely the Divine power which will work our resurrection in likeness to the resurrection of Christ. Now God's power works by means of

His will which is nearest to the effect; hence it is not necessary that our resurrection should follow straightway after He has wrought the resurrection of Christ, but that it should happen at the time which God’s will has decreed.

Reply to Objection 2: God’s power is not tied to any particular second causes, but that He can produce their effects either immediately or by means of other causes: thus He might work the generation of lower bodies even though there were no movement of the heaven: and yet according to the order which He has established in things, the movement of the heaven is the cause of the generation of the lower bodies. In like manner according to the order appointed to human things by Divine providence, Christ’s resurrection is the cause of ours: and yet He could have appointed another order, and then our resurrection would have had another cause ordained by God.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument holds when all the things of one species have the same order to the first cause of the effect to be produced in the whole of that species. But it is not so in the case in point, because Christ’s humanity is nearer to His Godhead, Whose power is the first cause of the resurrection, than is the humanity of others. Hence Christ’s Godhead caused His resurrection immediately, but it causes the resurrection of others by means of Christ-man rising again.

Reply to Objection 4: The resurrection of all men will bear some resemblance to Christ’s resurrection, as regards that which pertains to the life of nature, in respect of which all were conformed to Christ. Hence all will rise again to immortal life; but in the saints who were conformed to Christ by grace, there will be conformity as to things pertaining to glory.

Whether the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of our resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sound of the trumpet will not be the cause of our resurrection. For the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “Thou must believe that the resurrection will take place by God’s will, power, and nod.” Therefore since these are a sufficient cause of our resurrection, we ought not to assign the sound of the trumpet as a cause thereof.

Objection 2: Further, it is useless to make sounds to one who cannot hear. But the dead will not have hearing. Therefore it is unfitting to make a sound to arouse them.

Objection 3: Further, if any sound is the cause of the resurrection, this will only be by a power given by God to the sound: wherefore a gloss on Ps. 67:34, “He will give to His voice the voice of power,” says: “to arouse our bodies.” Now from the moment that a power is given to a thing, though it be given miraculously, the act that ensues is natural, as instanced in the man born blind who, after being restored to sight, saw naturally. Therefore if a sound be the cause of resurrection, the resurrection would be natural: which is false.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Thess. 4:15): “The Lord Himself will come down from heaven . . . with the trumpet of God; and the dead who are in Christ shall rise.”

Further, it is written (Jn. 5:28) that they “who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of God . . . and (Jn. 5:25) they that hear shall live.” Now this voice is called the trumpet, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Cause and effect must needs in some way be united together, since mover and moved, maker and made, are simultaneous (Phys. vii, 2). Now Christ rising again is the univocal cause of our resurrection: wherefore at the resurrection of bodies, it behooves Christ to work the resurrection at the giving of some common bodily sign. According to some this sign will be literally Christ’s voice commanding the resurrection, even as He commanded the sea and the storm ceased (Mat. 8:26). Others say that this sign will be nothing else than the manifest appearance of the Son of God in the world, according to the words of Mat. 24:27: “As lightning cometh out of the east, and appeareth even into the west, so shall also the coming of the Son of man be.” These rely on the authority of Gregory [*Moral. xxxi, as quoted by St. Albert the Great, Sentent. iv, D, 42, A[4]] who says that “the sound of the trumpet is nothing else but the Son appearing to the world as judge.” According to this, the visible presence of the Son of God is called His voice, because as soon as He appears all nature will obey His command in restoring human bodies: hence He is described as coming “with commandment” (1 Thess. 4:15). In this way His appearing, in so far as it has the force of a command, is called His voice: which voice, whatever it be, is sometimes called a cry [*Mt 25:6], as of a crier summoning to judgment; sometimes the sound of a trumpet [*1 Cor. 15:52; 1 Thess. 4:15], either on account of its distinctness, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), or as being in keeping with the use of the trumpet in the Old Testament: for by the trumpet they were summoned to the council, stirred to the battle, and called to the feast; and those who rise again will be summoned to the council of judgment, to the battle in which "the world shall fight . . . against the unwise" (Wis. 5:21), and to the feast of everlasting solemnity.

Reply to Objection 1: In those words the Damascene touches on three things respecting the material cause of the resurrection: to wit, the Divine will which commands, the power which executes, and the ease of execution, when he adds "bidding," in resemblance to our own affairs: since it is very easy for us to do what is done at once at our word. But the ease is much more evident, if before we say a word, our servants execute our will at once at the first sign of our will, which sign is called a nod: and this nod is a kind of cause of that execution, in so far as others are led thereby to accomplish our will. And the Divine nod, at which the resurrection will take place, is nothing but the sign given by God, which all nature will obey by concurring in the resurrection of the dead. This sign is the same as the sound of the trumpet, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: As the forms of the Sacrament have the power to sanctify, not through being heard, but through being spoken: so this sound, whatever it be, will have an instrumental efficacy of resuscitation, not through being perceived, but through being uttered. Even so a sound by the pulsation of the air arouses the sleeper, by loosing the organ of perception, and not because it is known: since judgment about the sound that reaches the ears is subsequent to the awakening and is not its cause.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would avail, if the power given to that sound were a complete being in nature: because then that which would proceed therefrom would have for principle a power already rendered natural. But this power is not of that kind but such as we have ascribed above to the forms of the Sacraments (Sent. iv, D, 1; [5059]FP, Q[62], AA[1],4).

Whether the angels will do anything towards the resurrection?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels will do nothing at all towards the resurrection. For raising the dead shows a greater power than does begetting men. Now when men are begotten, the soul is not infused into the body by means of the angels. Therefore neither will the resurrection, which is reunion of soul and body, be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

Objection 2: Further, if this is to be ascribed to the instrumentality of any angels at all, it would seem especially referable to the virtues, to whom it belongs to work miracles. Yet it is referred, not to them, but to the archangels, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Therefore the resurrection will not be wrought by the ministry of the angels.

On the contrary, It is stated (1 Thess. 4:15) that “the Lord . . . shall come down from heaven . . . with the voice of an archangel . . . and the dead shall rise again.” Therefore the resurrection of the dead will be accomplished by the angelic ministry.

I answer that, According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) “just as the grosser and inferior bodies are ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and more powerful bodies, so are all bodies ruled by God by the rational spirit of life”: and Gregory speaks in the same sense (Dial. iv, 6). Consequently in all God’s bodily works, He employs the ministry of the angels. Now in the resurrection there is something pertaining to the transmutation of the bodies, to wit the gathering together of the mortal remains and the disposal thereof for the restoration of the human body; wherefore in this respect God will employ the ministry of the angels in the resurrection. But the soul, even as it is immediately created by God, so will it be reunited to the body immediately by God without any operation of the angels: and in like manner He Himself will glorify the body without the ministry of the angels, just as He immediately glorifies man’s soul. This ministry of the angels is called their voice, according to one explanation given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43).

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 2: This ministry will be exercised chiefly by one Archangel, namely Michael, who is the prince of the Church as he was of the Synagogue (Dan. 10:13, 21). Yet he will act under the influence of the Virtues and the other higher orders: so that what he shall do, the higher orders will, in a way, do also. In like manner the lower angels will co-operate with him as to the resurrection of each individual to whose guardianship they were appointed: so that this voice can be ascribed either to one or to many angels.

OF THE TIME AND MANNER OF THE RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the time and manner of the resurrection. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the time of the resurrection should be delayed until the end of the world?

(2) Whether that time is hidden?

(3) Whether the resurrection will occur at night-time?

(4) Whether it will happen suddenly?

Whether the time of our resurrection should be delayed till the end of the world?

Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the resurrection ought not to be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together. For there is more conformity between head and members than between one member and another, as there is more between cause and effect than between one effect and another. Now Christ, Who is our Head, did not delay His resurrection until the end of the world, so as to rise again together with all men. Therefore there is no need for the resurrection of the early saints to be deferred until the end of the world, so that they may rise again together with the others.

Objection 2: Further, the resurrection of the Head is the cause of the resurrection of the members. But the resurrection of certain members that desire nobility from their being closely connected with the Head was not delayed till the end of the world, but followed immediately after Christ’s resurrection, as is piously believed concerning the Blessed Virgin and John the Evangelist [*Ep. de Assump. B.V., cap. ii, among St. Jerome’s works]. Therefore the resurrection of others will be so much nearer Christ’s resurrection, according as they have been more conformed to Him by grace and merit.

Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament is more perfect, and bears a closer resemblance to Christ, than the state of the Old Testament. Yet some of the fathers of the Old Testament rose again when Christ rose, according to Mat. 27:52: “Many of the bodies of the saints, that had slept, arose.” Therefore it would seem that the resurrection of the Old Testament saints should not be delayed till the end of the world, so that all may rise together.

Objection 4: Further, there will be no numbering of years after the end of the world. Yet after the resurrection of the dead, the years are still reckoned until the resurrection of others, as appears from Apoc. 20:4,5. For it is stated there that “I saw . . . the souls of them that were beheaded for the testimony of Jesus, and for the word of God,” and further on: “And they lived and reigned with Christ a thousand years.” And “the rest of the dead lived not till the thousand years were finished.” Therefore the resurrection of all is not delayed until the end of the world, that all may rise together.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 14:12): “Man when he is fallen asleep shall not rise again till the heavens be broken, he shall not wake, nor rise out of his sleep,” and it is a question of the sleep of death. Therefore the resurrection of men will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavens shall be broken.

Further, it is written (Heb. 11:39): “All these being approved by the testimony of faith received not the promise,” i.e. full beatitude of soul and body, since “God has provided something better for us, lest they should be consummated,” i.e. perfected, “without us—in order that,” as a gloss observes, “through all rejoicing each one might rejoice the more.” But the resurrection will not precede the glorification of bodies, because “He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory” (Phil. 3:21), and the children of the resurrection will be “as the angels . . . in heaven” (Mat. 22:30). Therefore the resurrection will be delayed till the end of the world, when all shall rise together.

I answer that, As Augustine states (De Trin. iii, 4) “Divine providence decreed that the grosser and lower bodies should be ruled in a certain order by the more subtle and powerful bodies”: wherefore the entire matter of the lower bodies is subject to variation according to the movement of the heavenly bodies. Hence it would be contrary to the order established in things by Divine providence if the matter of lower bodies were brought to the state of incorruption, so long as there remains movement in the higher bodies. And since, according to the teaching of faith, the resurrection will bring men to immortal life conformably to Christ Who “rising again from the dead dieth now no more” (Rom. 6:9), the resurrection of human bodies will be delayed until the end of the world when the heavenly movement will cease. For this reason, too, certain philosophers, who held that the movement of the heavens will never cease, maintained that human souls will return to mortal bodies such as we have now—whether, as Empedocles, they stated that the soul would return to the same body at the end of the great year, or that it would return to another body; thus Pythagoras asserted that “any soul will enter any body,” as stated in De Anima i, 3.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the head is more conformed to the members by conformity of proportion (which is requisite in order that it have influence over the members) than one member is to another, yet the head has a certain causality over the members which the members have not; and in this the members differ from the head and agree with one another. Hence Christ’s resurrection is an exemplar of ours, and through our faith therein there arises in us the hope of our own resurrection. But the resurrection of one of Christ’s members is not the cause of the resurrection of other members, and consequently Christ’s resurrection had to precede the resurrection of others who have all to rise again at the consummation of the world.

Reply to Objection 2: Although among the members some rank higher than others and are more conformed to the Head, they do not attain to the character of headship so as to be the cause of others. Consequently greater conformity to Christ does not give them a right to rise again before others as though they were exemplar and the others exemplate, as we have said in reference to Christ’s resurrection: and if it has been granted to others that their resurrection should not be delayed until the general resurrection, this has been by special privilege of grace, and not as due on account of conformity to Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: Jerome, in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. x ad Paul. et Eustoch., now recognized as spurious], seems to be doubtful of this resurrection of the saints with Christ, namely as to whether, having been witnesses to the resurrection, they died again, so that theirs was a resuscitation (as in the case of Lazarus who died again) rather than a resurrection such as will be at the end of the world—or really rose again to immortal life, to live for ever in the body, and to ascend bodily into heaven with Christ, as a gloss says on Mat. 27:52. The latter seems more probable, because, as Jerome says, in order that they might bear true witness to Christ's true resurrection, it was fitting that they should truly rise again. Nor was their resurrection hastened for their sake, but for the sake of bearing witness to Christ's resurrection: and that by bearing witness thereto they might lay the foundation of the faith of the New Testament: wherefore it was more fitting that it should be borne by the fathers of the Old Testament, than by those who died after the foundation of the New. It must, however, be observed that, although the Gospel mentions their resurrection before Christ's, we must take this statement as made in anticipation, as is often the case with writers of history. For none rose again with a true resurrection before Christ, since He is the "first-fruits of them that sleep" (1 Cor. 15:20), although some were resuscitated before Christ's resurrection, as in the case of Lazarus.

Reply to Objection 4: On account of these words, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xx, 7), certain heretics asserted that there will be a first resurrection of the dead that they may reign with Christ on earth for a thousand years; whence they were called "chiliasts" or "millenarians." Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 7) that these words are to be understood otherwise, namely of the spiritual resurrection, whereby men shall rise again from their sins to the gift of grace: while the second resurrection is of bodies. The reign of Christ denotes the Church wherein not only martyrs but also the other elect reign, the part denoting the whole; or they reign with Christ in glory as regards all, special mention being made of the martyrs, because they especially reign after death who fought for the truth, even unto death. The number of a thousand years denotes not a fixed number, but the whole of the present time wherein the saints now reign with Christ, because the number 1,000 designates universality more than the number 100, since 100 is the square of 10, whereas 1,000 is a cube resulting from the multiplication of ten by its square, for 10 X 10 = 100, and 100 X 10 = 1,000. Again in Ps. 104:8, "The word which He commanded to a thousand," i.e. all, "generations."

Whether the time of our resurrection is hidden?

Objection 1: It would seem that this time is not hidden. Because when we know exactly the beginning of a thing, we can know its end exactly, since "all things are measured by a certain period" (De Generat. ii). Now the beginning of the world is known exactly. Therefore its end can also be known exactly. But this will be the time of the resurrection and judgment. Therefore that time is not hidden.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Apoc. 12:6) that "the woman who represents the Church had a place prepared by God, that there she might feed [Vulg.: 'they should feed her'] a thousand two hundred sixty days." Again (Dan. 12:11), a certain fixed number of days is mentioned, which apparently signify years, according to Ezech. 4:6: "A day for a year, yea a day for a year I have appointed to thee." Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly from Holy Writ.

Objection 3: Further, the state of the New Testament was foreshadowed in the Old Testament. Now we know exactly the time wherein the state of the Old Testament endured. Therefore we can also know exactly the time wherein the state of the New Testament will endure. But the state of the New Testament will last to the end of the world, wherefore it is said (Mat. 28:20): "Behold I am with you . . . to the consummation of the world." Therefore the time of the end of the world and of the resurrection can be known exactly.

On the contrary, That which is unknown to the angels will be much more unknown to men: because those things to which men attain by natural reason are much more clearly and certainly known to the angels by their natural knowledge. Moreover revelations are not made to men save by means of the angels as Dionysius asserts (Coel. Hier. iv). Now the angels have no exact knowledge of that time, as appears from Mat. 24:36: "Of that day and hour no one knoweth, no not the angels of heaven." Therefore that time is hidden from men.

Further, the apostles were more cognizant of God's secrets than others who followed them, because they had "the first-fruits of the spirit" (Rom. 8:23)—" before others in point of time and more abundantly," as a gloss observes. And yet when they questioned our Lord about this very matter, He answered them (Acts 1:7): "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power." Much more, therefore, is it hidden from others.

I answer that, As Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 58) “as to the last age of the human race, which begins from our Lord’s coming and lasts until the end of the world, it is uncertain of how many generations it will consist: even so old age, which is man’s last age, has no fixed time according to the measure of the other ages, since sometimes alone it lasts as long a time as all the others.” The reason of this is because the exact length of future time cannot be known except either by revelation or by natural reason: and the time until the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason, because the resurrection and the end of the heavenly movement will be simultaneous as stated above [5060](A[1]). And all things that are foreseen by natural reason to happen at a fixed time are reckoned by movement: and it is impossible from the movement of the heaven to reckon its end, for since it is circular, it is for this very reason able by its nature to endure for ever: and consequently the time between this and the resurrection cannot be reckoned by natural reason. Again it cannot be known by revelation, so that all may be on the watch and ready to meet Christ: and for this reason when the apostles asked Him about this, Christ answered (Acts 1:7): “It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power,” whereby, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53): “He scatters the fingers of all calculators and bids them be still.” For what He refused to tell the apostles, He will not reveal to others: wherefore all those who have been misled to reckon the aforesaid time have so far proved to be untruthful; for some, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 53), stated that from our Lord’s Ascension to His last coming 400 years would elapse, others 500, others 1,000. The falseness of these calculators is evident, as will likewise be the falseness of those who even now cease not to calculate.

Reply to Objection 1: When we know a thing’s beginning and also its end it follows that its measure is known to us: wherefore if we know the beginning of a thing the duration of which is measured by the movement of the heaven, we are able to know its end, since the movement of heaven is known to us. But the measure of the duration of the heavenly movement is God’s ordinance alone, which is unknown to us. Wherefore however much we may know its beginning, we are unable to know its end.

Reply to Objection 2: The thousand two hundred sixty days mentioned in the Apocalypse (12:6) denote all the time during which the Church endures, and not any definite number of years. The reason whereof is because the preaching of Christ on which the Church is built lasted three years and a half, which time contains almost an equal number of days as the aforesaid number. Again the number of days appointed by Daniel does not refer to a number of years to elapse before the end of the world or until the preaching of Antichrist, but to the time of Antichrist's preaching and the duration of his persecution.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the state of the New Testament in general is foreshadowed by the state of the Old Testament it does not follow that individuals correspond to individuals: especially since all the figures of the Old Testament were fulfilled in Christ. Hence Augustine (De Civ. Dei xviii, 52) answers certain persons who wished to liken the number of persecutions suffered by the Church to the number of the plagues of Egypt, in these words: "I do not think that the occurrences in Egypt were in their signification prophetic of these persecutions, although those who think so have shown nicety and ingenuity in adapting them severally the one to the other, not indeed by a prophetic spirit, but by the guess-work of the human mind, which sometimes reaches the truth and sometimes not." The same remarks would seem applicable to the statements of Abbot Joachim, who by means of such conjectures about the future foretold some things that were true, and in others was deceived.

Whether the resurrection will take place at night-time?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not be at night-time. For the resurrection will not be "till the heavens be broken" (Job 14:12). Now when the heavenly movement ceases, which is signified by its breaking, there will be no time, neither night nor day. Therefore the resurrection will not be at night-time.

Objection 2: Further, the end of a thing ought to be most perfect. Now the end of time will be then: wherefore it is said (Apoc. 10:6) that "time shall be no longer." Therefore time ought to be then in its most perfect disposition and consequently it should be the daytime.

Objection 3: Further, the time should be such as to be adapted to what is done therein: wherefore (Jn. 13:30) the night is mentioned as being the time when Judas went out from the fellowship of the light. Now, all things that are hidden at the present time will then be made most manifest, because when the Lord shall come He “will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts” (1 Cor. 4:5). Therefore it ought to be during the day.

On the contrary, Christ’s resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Now Christ’s resurrection was at night, as Gregory says in a homily for Easter (xxi in Evang.). Therefore our resurrection will also be at night-time.

Further, the coming of our Lord is compared to the coming of a thief into the house (Lk. 12:39,40). But the thief comes to the house at night-time. Therefore our Lord will also come in the night. Now, when He comes the resurrection will take place, as stated above ([5061]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will be at night-time.

I answer that, The exact time and hour at which the resurrection will be cannot be known for certain, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). Nevertheless some assert with sufficient probability that it will be towards the twilight, the moon being in the east and the sun in the west; because the sun and moon are believed to have been created in these positions, and thus their revolutions will be altogether completed by their return to the same point. Wherefore it is said that Christ arose at such an hour.

Reply to Objection 1: When the resurrection occurs, it will not be time but the end of time; because at the very instant that the heavens will cease to move the dead will rise again. Nevertheless the stars will be in the same position as they occupy now at any fixed hour: and accordingly it is said that the resurrection will be at this or that hour.

Reply to Objection 2: The most perfect disposition of time is said to be midday, on account of the light given by the sun. But then the city of God will need neither sun nor moon, because the glory of God will enlighten it (Apoc. 22:5). Wherefore in this respect it matters not whether the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

Reply to Objection 3: That time should be adapted to manifestation as regards the things that will happen then, and to secrecy as regards the fixing of the time. Hence either may happen fittingly, namely that the resurrection be in the day or in the night.

Whether the resurrection will happen suddenly or by degrees?

Objection 1: It would seem that the resurrection will not happen suddenly but by degrees. For the resurrection of the dead is foretold (Ezech. 37:7,8) where it is written: “The bones came together . . . and I saw and behold the sinews and the flesh came up upon them, and the skin was stretched out over them, but there was no spirit in them.” Therefore the restoration of the bodies will precede in time their reunion with the souls, and thus the resurrection will not be sudden.

Objection 2: Further, a thing does not happen suddenly if it require several actions following one another. Now the resurrection requires several actions following one another, namely the gathering of the ashes, the refashioning of the body, the infusion of the soul. Therefore the resurrection will not be sudden.

Objection 3: Further, all sound is measured by time. Now the sound of the trumpet will be the cause of the resurrection, as stated above ([5062]Q[76], A[2]). Therefore the resurrection will take time and will not happen suddenly.

Objection 4: Further, no local movement can be sudden as stated in De Sensu et Sensato vii. Now the resurrection requires local movement in the gathering of the ashes. Therefore it will not happen suddenly.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:51,52): “We shall all indeed rise again . . . in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye.” Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

Further, infinite power works suddenly. But the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): “Thou shalt believe in the resurrection to be wrought by the power of God,” and it is evident that this is infinite. Therefore the resurrection will be sudden.

I answer that, At the resurrection something will be done by the ministry of the angels, and something immediately by the power of God, as stated above ([5063]Q[76], A[3]). Accordingly that which is done by the ministry of the angels, will not be instantaneous, if by instant we mean an indivisible point of time, but it will be instantaneous if by instant we mean an imperceptible time. But that which will be done immediately by God’s power will happen suddenly, namely at the end of the time wherein the work of the angels will be done, because the higher power brings the lower to perfection.

Reply to Objection 1: Ezechiel spoke, like Moses to a rough people, and therefore, just as Moses divided the works of the six days into days, in order that the uncultured people might be able to understand, although all things were made together according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv), so Ezechiel expressed the various things that will happen in the resurrection, although they will all happen together in an instant.

Reply to Objection 2: Although these actions follow one another in nature, they are all together in time: because either they are together in the same instant, or one is in the instant that terminates the other.

Objection 3: The same would seem to apply to that sound as to the forms of the sacraments, namely that the sound will produce its effect in its last instant.

Reply to Objection 4: The gathering of the ashes which cannot be without local movement will be done by the ministry of the angels. Hence it will be in time though imperceptible on account of the facility of operation which is competent to the angels.

OF THE TERM “WHEREFROM” OF THE RESURRECTION (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection; and under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether death is the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in every case?

(2) Whether ashes are, or dust?

(3) Whether this dust has a natural inclination towards the soul?

Whether death will be the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in all cases?

Objection 1: It would seem that death will not be the term “wherefrom” of the resurrection in all cases. Because some shall not die but shall be clothed with immortality: for it is said in the creed that our Lord “will come to judge the living and the dead.” Now this cannot refer to the time of judgment, because then all will be alive; therefore this distinction must refer to the previous time, and consequently all will not die before the judgment.

Objection 2: Further, a natural and common desire cannot be empty and vain, but is fulfilled in some cases. Now according to the Apostle (2 Cor.

5:4) it is a common desire that “we would not be unclothed but clothed upon.” Therefore there will be some who will never be stripped of the body by death, but will be arrayed in the glory of the resurrection.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion cxv) that the four last petitions of the Lord’s prayer refer to the present life: and one of them is: “Forgive us our debts [Douay: ‘trespasses’].” Therefore the Church prays that all debts may be forgiven her in this life. Now the Church’s prayer cannot be void and not granted: “If you ask the Father anything in My name, He will give it you” (Jn. 16:23). Therefore at some time of this life the Church will receive the remission of all debts: and one of the debts to which we are bound by the sin of our first parent is that we be born in original sin. Therefore at some time God will grant to the Church that men be born without original sin. But death is the punishment of original sin. Therefore at the end of the world there will be some men who will not die: and so the same conclusion follows.

Objection 4: Further, the wise man should always choose the shortest way. Now the shortest way is for the men who shall be found living to be transferred to the impassibility of the resurrection, than for them to die first, and afterwards rise again from death to immortality. Therefore God Who is supremely wise will choose this way for those who shall be found living.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:36): “That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die first,” and he is speaking of the resurrection of the body as compared to the seed.

Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:22): “As in Adam all die, so also in Christ all shall be made alive.” Now all shall be made alive in Christ. Therefore all shall die in Adam: and so all shall rise again from death.

I answer that, The saints differ in speaking on this question, as may be seen in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43). However, the safer and more common opinion is that all shall die and rise again from death: and this for three reasons. First, because it is more in accord with Divine justice, which condemned human nature for the sin of its first parent, that all who by the act of nature derive their origin from him should contract the stain of original sin, and consequently be the debtors of death. Secondly, because it is more in agreement with Divine Scripture which foretells the resurrection of all; and resurrection is not predicted properly except of that “which has fallen and perished,” as the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv). Thirdly, because it is more in harmony with the order of nature where we find that what is corrupted and decayed is not renewed except by means of corruption: thus vinegar does not become wine unless the vinegar be corrupted and pass into the juice of the grape. Wherefore since human nature has incurred the defect of the necessity of death, it cannot return to immortality save by means of death. It is also in keeping with the order of nature for another reason, because, as it is stated in Phys. viii, 1, “the movement of heaven is as a kind of life to all existing in nature,” just as the movement of the heart is a kind of life of the whole body: wherefore even as all the members become dead on the heart ceasing to move, so when the heavenly movement ceases nothing can remain living with that life which was sustained by the influence of that movement. Now such is the life by which we live now: and therefore it follows that those who shall live after the movement of the heaven comes to a standstill must depart from this life.

Reply to Objection 1: This distinction of the dead and the living does not apply to the time itself of the judgment, nor to the whole preceding time, since all who are to be judged were living at some time, and dead at some time: but it applies to that particular time which shall precede the judgment immediately, when, to wit, the signs of the judgment shall begin to appear.

Reply to Objection 2: The perfect desire of the saints cannot be void; but nothing prevents their conditional desire being void. Such is the desire whereby we would not be “unclothed,” but “clothed upon,” namely if that be possible: and this desire is called by some a “velleity.”

Reply to Objection 3: It is erroneous to say that any one except Christ is conceived without original sin, because those who would be conceived without original sin would not need the redemption which was wrought by Christ, and thus Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men [*See Editor’s note which follows TP, Q[26]]. Nor can it be said that they needed not this redemption, because it was granted to them that they should be conceived without sin. For, this grace was vouchsafed—either to their parents, that the sin of nature might be healed in them (because so long as that sin remained they were unable to beget without communicating original sin)—or to nature itself which was healed. Now we must allow that every one needs the redemption of Christ personally, and not only by reason of nature, and one cannot be delivered from an evil or absolved from a debt unless one incur the debt or incur the evil: and consequently all could not reap in themselves the fruit of the Lord’s prayer, unless all were born debtors and subject to evil. Hence the forgiveness of debts or delivery from evil cannot be applied to one who is born without a debt or free from evil, but only to one who is born with a debt and is afterwards delivered by the grace of Christ. Nor does it follow, if it can be asserted without error that some die not, that they are born without original sin, although death is a punishment of original sin; because God can of His mercy remit the punishment which one has incurred by a past fault, as He forgave the adulterous woman without punishment (Jn. 8): and in like manner He can deliver from death those who have contracted the debt of death by being born in original sin. And thus it does not follow that if they die not, therefore they were born without original sin.

Reply to Objection 4: The shortest way is not always the one to be chosen, but only when it is more or equally adapted for attaining the end. It is not so here, as is clear from what we have said.

Whether all will rise again from ashes?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again from ashes. For Christ’s resurrection is the exemplar of ours. Yet His resurrection was not from ashes, for His flesh saw not corruption according to Ps. 15:10; Acts 2:27,31. Therefore neither will all rise again from ashes.

Objection 2: Further, the human body is not always burned. Yet a thing cannot be reduced to ashes unless it be burned. Therefore not all will rise again from ashes.

Objection 3: Further, the body of a dead man is not reduced to ashes immediately after death. But some will rise again at once after death, according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), namely those who will be found living. Therefore all will not rise again from ashes.

Objection 4: Further, the term “wherefrom” corresponds to the term “whereto.” Now the term “whereto” of the resurrection is not the same in the good as in the wicked: “We shall all indeed rise again, but we shall not all be changed” (1 Cor. 15:51). Therefore the term “wherefrom” is not the same. And thus, if the wicked rise again from ashes, the good will not rise again from ashes.

On the contrary, Haymo says (on Rom. 5:10, “For if when we were enemies”): “All who are born in original sin lie under the sentence: Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go.” Now all who shall rise again at the general resurrection were born in original sin, either at their birth within the womb or at least at their birth from the womb. Therefore all will rise again from ashes.

Further, there are many things in the human body that do not truly belong to human nature. But all these will be removed. Therefore all bodies must needs be reduced to ashes.

I answer that, The same reasons by which we have shown [5064](A[1]) that all rise again from death prove also that at the general resurrection all will rise again from ashes, unless the contrary, such as the hastening of their resurrection, be vouchsafed to certain persons by a special privilege of grace. For just as holy writ foretells the resurrection, so does it foretell the reformation of bodies (Phil. 3:21). And thus it follows that even as all die that the bodies of all may be able truly to rise again, so will the bodies of all perish that they may be able to be reformed. For just as death was inflicted by Divine justice as a punishment on man, so was the decay of the body, as appears from Gn. 3:19, “Earth thou art and into earth shalt thou go [*Vulg.: ‘Dust thou art and into dust thou shalt return’].”

Moreover the order of nature requires the dissolution not only of the union of soul and body, but also of the mingling of the elements: even as vinegar cannot be brought back to the quality of wine unless it first be dissolved into the prejacent matter: for the mingling of the elements is both caused and preserved by the movement of the heaven, and when this ceases all mixed bodies will be dissolved into pure elements.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ’s resurrection is the exemplar of ours as to the term “whereto,” but not as to the term “wherefrom.”

Reply to Objection 2: By ashes we mean all the remains that are left after the dissolution of the body—for two reasons. First, because it was the common custom in olden times to burn the bodies of the dead, and to keep the ashes, whence it became customary to speak of the remains of a human body as ashes. Secondly, on account of the cause of dissolution, which is the flame of the fomes [*Cf. [5065]FS, Q[82], A[3]] whereby the human body is radically infected. Hence, in order to be cleansed of this infection the human body must needs be dissolved into its primary components: and when a thing is destroyed by fire it is said to be reduced to ashes. wherefore the name of ashes is given to those things into which the human body is dissolved.

Reply to Objection 3: The fire that will cleanse the face of the earth will be able to reduce suddenly to ashes the bodies of those that will be found living, even as it will dissolve other mixed bodies into their prejacent matter.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not take its species from its term "wherefrom" but from its term "whereto." Hence the resurrection of the saints which will be glorious must needs differ from the resurrection of the wicked which will not be glorious, in respect of the term "whereto," and not in respect of the term "wherefrom." And it often happens that the term "whereto" is not the same, whereas the term "wherefrom" is the same—for instance, a thing may be moved from blackness to whiteness and to pallor.

Whether the ashes from which the human body will be restored have any natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them?

Objection 1: It would seem that the ashes from which the human body will be restored will have a natural inclination towards the soul which will be united to them. For if they had no inclination towards the soul, they would stand in the same relation to that soul as other ashes. Therefore it would make no difference whether the body that is to be united to that soul were restored from those ashes or from others: and this is false.

Objection 2: Further, the body is more dependent on the soul than the soul on the body. Now the soul separated from the body is still somewhat dependent on the body, wherefore its movement towards God is retarded on account of its desire for the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii). Much more, therefore, has the body when separated from the soul, a natural inclination towards that soul.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Job 20:11): "His bones shall be filled with the vices of his youth, and they shall sleep with him in the dust." But vices are only in the soul. Therefore there will still remain in those ashes a natural inclination towards the soul.

On the contrary, The human body can be dissolved into the very elements, or changed into the flesh of other animals. But the elements are homogeneous, and so is the flesh of a lion or other animal. Since then in the other parts of the elements or animals there is no natural inclination to that soul, neither will there be an inclination towards the soul in those parts into which the human body has been changed. The first proposition is made evident on the authority of Augustine (Enchiridion lxxxviii): “The human body, although changed into the substance of other bodies or even into the elements, although it has become the food and flesh of any animals whatsoever, even of man, will in an instant return to that soul which erstwhile animated it, making it a living and growing man.”

Further, to every natural inclination there corresponds a natural agent: else nature would fail in necessaries. Now the aforesaid ashes cannot be reunited to the same soul by any natural agent. Therefore there is not in them any natural inclination to the aforesaid reunion.

I answer that, Opinion is threefold on this point. For some say that the human body is never dissolved into its very elements; and so there always remains in the ashes a certain force besides the elements, which gives a natural inclination to the same soul. But this assertion is in contradiction with the authority of Augustine quoted above, as well as with the senses and reason: since whatever is composed of contraries can be dissolved into its component parts. Wherefore others say that these parts of the elements into which the human body is dissolved retain more light, through having been united to the soul, and for this reason have a

natural inclination to human souls. But this again is nonsensical, since the parts of the elements are of the same nature and have an equal share of light and darkness. Hence we must say differently that in those ashes there is no natural inclination to resurrection, but only by the ordering of Divine providence, which decreed that those ashes should be reunited to the soul: it is on this account that those parts of the elements shall be reunited and not others.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul separated from the body remains in the same nature that it has when united to the body. It is not so with the body, and consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: These words of Job do not mean that the vices actually remain in the ashes of the dead, but that they remain according to the ordering of Divine justice, whereby those ashes are destined to the restoration of the body which will suffer eternally for the sins committed.

OF THE CONDITIONS OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN, AND FIRST OF THEIR IDENTITY (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the conditions of those who rise again. Here we shall consider: (1) Those which concern the good and wicked in common; (2) those which concern the good only; (3) those which concern only the wicked. Three things concern the good and wicked in common, namely their identity, their integrity, and their quality: and we shall inquire (1) about their identity; (2) about their integrity; (3) about their quality.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the body will rise again identically the same?

(2) Whether it will be the self-same man?

(3) Whether it is necessary that the same ashes should return to the same parts in which they were before?

Whether in the resurrection the soul will be reunited to the same identical body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the soul will not be reunited to the same identical body at the resurrection, for “thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain” (1 Cor. 15:37). Now the Apostle is there comparing death to sowing and resurrection to fructifying. Therefore the same body that is laid aside in death is not resumed at the resurrection.

Objection 2: Further, to every form some matter is adapted according to its condition, and likewise to every agent some instrument. Now the body is compared to the soul as matter to form, and as instrument to agent. Since then at the resurrection the soul will not be of the same condition as now (for it will be either entirely borne away to the heavenly life to which it adhered while living in the world, or will be cast down into the life of the brutes if it lived as a brute in this world) it would seem that it will not resume the same body, but either a heavenly or a brutish body.

Objection 3: Further, after death, as stated above ([5066]Q[78], A[3]), the human body is dissolved into the elements. Now these elemental parts into which the human body has been dissolved do not agree with the human body dissolved into them, except in primary matter, even as any other elemental parts agree with that same body. But if the body were to be formed from those other elemental parts, it would not be described as identically the same. Therefore neither will it be the self-same body if it be restored from these parts.

Objection 4: Further, there cannot be numerical identity where there is numerical distinction of essential parts. Now the form of the mixed body, which form is an essential part of the human body, as being its form, cannot be resumed in numerical identity. Therefore the body will not be identically the same. The minor is proved thus: That which passes away into complete nonentity cannot be resumed in identity. This is clear from the fact that there cannot be identity where there is distinction of existence: and existence, which is the act of a being, is differentiated by being interrupted, as is any interrupted act. Now the form of a mixed body passes away into complete nonentity by death, since it is a bodily form, and so also do the contrary qualities from which the mixture results. Therefore the form of a mixed body does not return in identity.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:26): “In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: ‘my God’],” where he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection, as appears from the preceding words: “In the last day I shall rise out of the earth.” Therefore the selfsame body will rise again.

Further, the Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 27): “Resurrection is the second rising of that which has fallen.” But the body which we have now fell by death. Therefore it will rise again the same identically.

I answer that, on this point the philosophers erred and certain modern heretics err. For some of the philosophers allowed that souls separated from bodies are reunited to bodies, yet they erred in this in two ways. First, as to the mode of reunion, for some held the separated soul to be naturally reunited to a body by the way of generation. Secondly, as to the body to which it was reunited, for they held that this second union was not with the selfsame body that was laid aside in death, but with another, sometimes of the same, sometimes of a different species. Of a different species when the soul while existing in the body had led a life contrary to the ordering of reason: wherefore it passed after death from the body of a man into the body of some other animal to whose manner of living it had conformed in this life, for instance into the body of a dog on account of lust, into the body of a lion on account of robbery and violence, and so forth—and into a body of the same species when the soul has led a good life in the body, and having after death experienced some happiness, after some centuries began to wish to return to the body; and thus it was reunited to a human body.

This opinion arises from two false sources. The first of these is that they said that the soul is not united to the body essentially as form to matter, but only accidentally, as mover to the thing moved, [*Cf. [5067]FP, Q[76], A[1]] or as a man to his clothes. Hence it was possible for them to maintain that the soul pre-existed before being infused into the body begotten of natural generation, as also that it is united to various bodies. The second is that they held intellect not to differ from sense except accidentally, so that man would be said to surpass other animals in intelligence, because the sensitive power is more acute in him on account of the excellence of his bodily complexion; and hence it was possible for them to assert that man's soul passes into the soul of a brute animal, especially when the human soul has been habituated to brutish actions. But these two sources are refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1), and in consequence of these being refuted, it is clear that the above opinion is false.

In like manner the errors of certain heretics are refuted. Some of them fell into the aforesaid opinions of the philosophers: while others held that souls are reunited to heavenly bodies, or again to bodies subtle as the wind, as Gregory relates of a certain Bishop of Constantinople, in his exposition of Job 19:26, "In my flesh I shall see my God," etc. Moreover these same errors of heretics may be refuted by the fact that they are prejudicial to the truth of resurrection as witnessed to by Holy Writ. For we cannot call it resurrection unless the soul return to the same body, since resurrection is a second rising, and the same thing rises that falls: wherefore resurrection regards the body which after death falls rather than the soul which after death lives. And consequently if it be not the same body which the soul resumes, it will not be a resurrection, but rather the assuming of a new body.

Reply to Objection 1: A comparison does not apply to every particular, but to some. For in the sowing of grain, the grain sown and the grain that is born thereof are neither identical, nor of the same condition, since it was first sown without a husk, yet is born with one: and the body will rise again identically the same, but of a different condition, since it was mortal and will rise in immortality.

Reply to Objection 2: The soul rising again and the soul living in this world differ, not in essence but in respect of glory and misery, which is an accidental difference. Hence it follows that the body in rising again differs, not in identity, but in condition, so that a difference of bodies corresponds proportionally to the difference of souls.

Reply to Objection 3: That which is understood as though it were in matter before its form remains in matter after corruption, because when that which comes afterwards is removed that which came before may yet remain. Now, as the Commentator observes on the First Book of Physics and in De Substantia Orbis, in the matter of things subject to generation and corruption, we must presuppose undeterminate dimensions, by reason of which matter is divisible, so as to be able to receive various forms in its various parts. Wherefore after the separation of the substantial form from matter, these dimensions still remain the same: and consequently the matter existing under those dimensions, whatever form it receive, is more identified with that which was generated from it, than any other part of matter existing under any form whatever. Thus the matter that will be brought back to restore the human body will be the same as that body's previous matter.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need of the form. Now the human body has no substantial form besides this form of the mixed body, except the rational soul, for if it had any previous substantial form, this would give it substantial being, and would establish it in the genus of substance: so that the soul would be united to a body already established in the genus of substance, and thus the soul would be compared to the body as artificial forms are to their matter, in respect of their being established in the genus of substance by their matter. Hence the union of the soul to the body would be accidental, which is the error of the ancient philosophers refuted by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2 [*Cf. [5068]FP, Q[76], A[1]]). It would also follow that the human body and each of its parts would not retain their former names in the same sense, which is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 1). Therefore since the rational soul remains, no substantial form of the human body falls away into complete nonentity. And the variation of accidental forms does not make a difference of identity. Therefore the selfsame body will rise again, since the selfsame matter is resumed as stated in a previous reply (ad 2).

Whether it will be identically the same man that shall rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that it will not be identically the same man that shall rise again. For according to the Philosopher (De Gener. ii): “Whatsoever things are changed in their corruptible substance are not repeated identically.” Now such is man’s substance in his present state. Therefore after the change wrought by death the self-same man cannot be repeated .

Objection 2: Further, where there is a distinction of human nature there is not the same identical man: wherefore Socrates and Plato are two men and not one man, since each has his own distinct human nature. Now the human nature of one who rises again is distinct from that which he has now. Therefore he is not the same identical man. The minor can be proved in two ways. First, because human nature which is the form of the whole is not both form and substance as the soul is, but is a form only. Now such like forms pass away into complete nonentity, and consequently they cannot be restored. Secondly, because human nature results from union of parts. Now the same identical union as that which was heretofore cannot be resumed, because repetition is opposed to identity, since repetition implies number, whereas identity implies unity, and these are incompatible with one another. But resurrection is a repeated union: therefore the union is not the same, and consequently there is not the same human nature nor the same man.

Objection 3: Further, one same man is not several animals: wherefore if it is not the same animal it is not the same identical man. Now where sense is not the same, there is not the same animal, since animal is defined from the primary sense, namely touch. But sense, as it does not remain in the separated soul (as some maintain), cannot be resumed in identity. Therefore the man who rises again will not be the same identical animal, and consequently he will not be the same man.

Objection 4: Further, the matter of a statue ranks higher in the statue than the matter of a man does in man: because artificial things belong to the genus of substance by reason of their matter, but natural things by reason of their form, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. ii, 1), and again from the Commentator (De Anima ii). But if a statue is remade from the same brass, it will not be the same identically. Therefore much less will it be identically the same man if he be reformed from the same ashes.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 19:27): "Whom I myself shall see . . . and not another," and he is speaking of the vision after the resurrection. Therefore the same identical man will rise again.

Further, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 5) that "to rise again is naught else but to live again." Now unless the same identical man that died return to life, he would not be said to live again. Therefore he would not rise again, which is contrary to faith.

I answer that, The necessity of holding the resurrection arises from this—that man may obtain the last end for which he was made; for this cannot be accomplished in this life, nor in the life of the separated soul, as stated above ([5069]Q[75], AA[1],2): otherwise man would have been made in vain, if he were unable to obtain the end for which he was made. And since it behooves the end to be obtained by the selfsame thing that was made for that end, lest it appear to be made without purpose, it is necessary for the selfsame man to rise again; and this is effected by the selfsame soul being united to the selfsame body. For otherwise there would be no resurrection properly speaking, if the same man were not reformed. Hence to maintain that he who rises again is not the selfsame man is heretical, since it is contrary to the truth of Scripture which proclaims the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of repetition by movement or natural change. For he shows the difference between the recurrence that occurs in generation and corruption and that which is observed in the movement of the heavens. Because the selfsame heaven by local movement returns to the beginning of its movement, since it has a moved incorruptible substance. On the other hand, things subject to generation and corruption return by generation to specific but not numerical identity, because from man blood is engendered, from blood seed, and so on until a man is begotten, not the selfsame man, but the man specifically. In like manner from fire comes air, from air water, from water earth, whence fire is produced, not the selfsame fire, but the same in species. Hence it is clear that the argument, so far as the meaning of the Philosopher is concerned, is not to the point.

We may also reply that the form of other things subject to generation and corruption is not subsistent of itself, so as to be able to remain after the corruption of the composite, as it is with the rational soul. For the soul, even after separation from the body, retains the being which accrues to it when in the body, and the body is made to share that being by the resurrection, since the being of the body and the being of the soul in the body are not distinct from one another, otherwise the union of soul and body would be accidental. Consequently there has been no interruption in the substantial being of man, as would make it impossible for the self-same man to return on account of an interruption in his being, as is the case with other things that are corrupted, the being of which is interrupted altogether, since their form remains not, and their matter remains under another being.

Nevertheless neither does the self-same man recur by natural generation, because the body of the man begotten is not composed of the whole body of his begetter: hence his body is numerically distinct, and consequently his soul and the whole man.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about humanity and about any form of a whole. For some say that the form of the whole and the form of the part are really one and the same: but that it is called the form of the part inasmuch as it perfects the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch as the whole specific nature results therefrom. According to this opinion humanity is really nothing else than the rational soul: and so, since the selfsame rational soul is resumed, there will be the same identical humanity, which will remain even after death, albeit not under the aspect of humanity, because the composite does not derive the specific nature from a separated humanity.

The other opinion, which seems nearer the truth, is Avicenna’s, according to whom the form of the whole is not the form of a part only, nor some other form besides the form of the part, but is the whole resulting from the composition of form and matter, embracing both within itself. This form of the whole is called the essence or quiddity. Since then at the resurrection there will be the selfsame body, and the selfsame rational soul, there will be, of necessity, the same humanity.

The first argument proving that there will be a distinction of humanity was based on the supposition that humanity is some distinct form supervening form and matter; which is false.

The second reason does not disprove the identity of humanity, because union implies action or passion, and though there be a different union, this cannot prevent the identity of humanity, because the action and passion from which humanity resulted are not of the essence of humanity, wherefore a distinction on their part does not involve a distinction of humanity: for it is clear that generation and resurrection are not the self-same movement. Yet the identity of the rising man with the begotten man is not hindered for this reason: and in like manner neither is the identity of humanity prevented if we take union for the relation itself: because this relation is not essential to but concomitant with humanity, since humanity is not one of those forms that are composition or order (Phys. ii, 1), as are the forms of things produced by art, so that if there be another distinct composition there is another distinct form of a house.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument affords a very good proof against those who held a distinction between the sensitive and rational souls in man: because in that case the sensitive soul in man would not be incorruptible, as neither is it in other animals; and consequently in the resurrection there would not be the same sensitive soul, and consequently neither the same animal nor the same man.

But if we assert that in man the same soul is by its substance both rational and sensitive, we shall encounter no difficulty in this question, because animal is defined from sense, i.e. the sensitive soul as from its essential form: whereas from sense, i.e. the sensitive power, we know its definition as from an accidental form “that contributes more than another to our knowledge of the quiddity” (De Anima i, 1). Accordingly after death there remains the sensitive soul, even as the rational soul, according to its substance: whereas the sensitive powers, according to some, do not remain. And since these powers are accidental properties, diversity on their part cannot prevent the identity of the whole animal, not even of the animal’s parts: nor are powers to be called perfections or acts of organs unless as principles of action, as heat in fire.

Reply to Objection 4: A statue may be considered in two ways, either as a particular substance, or as something artificial. And since it is placed in the genus of substance by reason of its matter, it follows that if we consider it as a particular substance, it is the selfsame statue that is remade from the same matter. On the other hand, it is placed in the genus of artificial things inasmuch as it has an accidental form which, if the statue be destroyed, passes away also. Consequently it does not return identically the same, nor can the statue be identically the same. But man's form, namely the soul, remains after the body has perished: wherefore the comparison fails.

Whether the ashes of the human body must needs, by the resurrection, return to the same parts of the body that were dissolved into them?

Objection 1: It would seem necessary for the ashes of the human body to return, by the resurrection, to the same parts that were dissolved into them. For, according to the Philosopher, "as the whole soul is to the whole body, so is a part of the soul to a part of the body, as sight to the pupil" (De Anima ii, 1). Now it is necessary that after the resurrection the body be resumed by the same soul. Therefore it is also necessary for the same parts of the body to return to the same limbs, in which they were perfected by the same parts of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, difference of matter causes difference of identity. But if the ashes return not to the same parts, each part will not be remade from the same matter of which it consisted before. Therefore they will not be the same identically. Now if the parts are different the whole will also be different, since parts are to the whole as matter is to form (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore it will not be the self-same man; which is contrary to the truth of the resurrection.

Objection 3: Further, the resurrection is directed to the end that man may receive the meed of his works. Now different parts of the body are employed in different works, whether of merit or of demerit. Therefore at the resurrection each part must needs return to its former state that it may be rewarded in due measure.

On the contrary, Artificial things are more dependent on their matter than natural things. Now in artificial things, in order that the same artificial thing be remade, from the same matter, there is no need for the parts to be brought back to the same position. Neither therefore is it necessary in man.

Further, change of an accident does not cause a change of identity. Now the situation of parts is an accident. Therefore its change in a man does not cause a change of identity.

I answer that, In this question it makes a difference whether we ask what can be done without prejudice to identity, and what will be done for the sake of congruity. As regards the first it must be observed that in man we may speak of parts in two ways: first as of the various parts of a homogeneous whole, for instance the various parts of flesh, or the various parts of bone; secondly, as of various parts of various species of a heterogeneous whole, for instance bone and flesh. Accordingly if it be said that one part of matter will return to another part of the same species, this causes no change except in the position of the parts: and change of position of parts does not change the species in homogeneous wholes: and so if the matter of one part return to another part, this is nowise prejudicial to the identity of the whole. Thus is it in the example given in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44), because a statue, after being remade, is identically the same, not as to its form, but as to its matter, in respect of which it is a particular substance, and in this way a statue is homogeneous, although it is not according to its artificial form. But if it be said that the matter of one part returns to another part of another species, it follows of necessity that there is a change not only in the position of parts, but also in their identity: yet so that the whole matter, or something belonging to the truth of human nature in one is transferred to another. but not if what was superfluous in one part is transferred to another. Now the identity of parts being taken away, the identity of the whole is removed, if we speak of essential parts, but not if we speak of accidental parts, such as hair and nails, to which apparently Augustine refers (De Civ. Dei xxii). It is thus clear how the transference of matter from one part of another destroys the identity, and how it does not.

But speaking of the congruity, it is more probable that even the parts will retain their position at the resurrection, especially as regards the essential and organic parts, although perhaps not as regards the accidental parts, such as nails and hair.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument considers organic or heterogeneous parts, but no homogeneous or like parts.

Reply to Objection 2: A change in the position of the parts of matter does not cause a change of identity, although difference of matter does.

Reply to Objection 3: Operation, properly speaking, is not ascribed to the part but to the whole, wherefore the reward is due, not to the part but to the whole.

OF THE INTEGRITY OF THE BODIES IN THE RESURRECTION (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the integrity of the bodies in the resurrection. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all the members of the human body will rise again therein?

(2) Whether the hair and nails will?

(3) Whether the humors will?

(4) Whether whatever the body contained belonging to the truth of human nature will rise again?

(5) Whether whatever it contained materially will rise again?

Whether all the members of the human body will rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all the members of the human body will rise again. For if the end be done away it is useless to repair the means. Now the end of each member is its act. Since then nothing useless is done in the Divine works, and since the use of certain members is not fitting to man after the resurrection, especially the use of the genital members, for then they “shall neither marry, nor be married” (Mat. 22:30), it would seem that not all the members shall rise again.

Objection 2: Further, the entrails are members: and yet they will not rise again. For they can neither rise full, since thus they contain impurities, nor empty, since nothing is empty in nature. Therefore the members shall not all rise again.

Objection 3: Further, the body shall rise again that it may be rewarded for the works which the soul did through it. Now the member of which a thief has been deprived for theft, and who has afterwards done penance and is saved, cannot be rewarded at the resurrection, neither for any good deed, since it has not co-operated in any, nor for evil deeds, since the punishment of the member would redound to the punishment of man. Therefore the members will not all rise again.

On the contrary, The other members belong more to the truth of human nature than hair and nails. Yet these will be restored to man at the resurrection according to the text (Sent. iv, D, 4). Much more therefore does this apply to the other members.

Further, “The works of God are perfect” (Dt. 32:4). But the resurrection will be the work of God. Therefore man will be remade perfect in all his members.

I answer that, As stated in De Anima ii, 4, “the soul stands in relation to the body not only as its form and end, but also as efficient cause.” For the soul is compared to the body as art to the thing made by art, as the Philosopher says (De Anim. Gener. ii, 4), and whatever is shown forth explicitly in the product of art is all contained implicitly and originally in the art. In like manner whatever appears in the parts of the body is all contained originally and, in a way, implicitly in the soul. Thus just as the work of an art would not be perfect, if its product lacked any of the things contained in the art, so neither could man be perfect, unless the whole that is contained enfolded in the soul be outwardly unfolded in the body, nor would the body correspond in full proportion to the soul. Since then at the resurrection it behooves man’s body to correspond entirely to the soul, for it will not rise again except according to the relation it bears to the rational soul, it follows that man also must rise again perfect, seeing that he is thereby repaired in order that he may obtain his ultimate perfection. Consequently all the members that are now in man’s body must needs be restored at the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: The members may be considered in two ways in relation to the soul: either according to the relation of matter to form, or according to the relation of instrument to agent, since “the whole body is compared to the whole soul in the same way as one part is to another” (De Anima ii, 1). If then the members be considered in the light of the first relationship, their end is not operation, but rather the perfect being of the species, and this is also required after the resurrection: but if they be considered in the light of the second relationship, then their end is operation. And yet it does not follow that when the operation fails the instrument is useless, because an instrument serves not only to accomplish the operation of the agent, but also to show its virtue. Hence it will be necessary for the virtue of the soul's powers to be shown in their bodily instruments, even though they never proceed to action, so that the wisdom of God be thereby glorified.

Reply to Objection 2: The entrails will rise again in the body even as the other members: and they will be filled not with vile superfluities but with goodly humors.

Reply to Objection 3: The acts whereby we merit are not the acts, properly speaking, of hand or foot but of the whole man; even as the work of art is ascribed not to the instrument but to the craftsman. Therefore though the member which was cut off before a man's repentance did not co-operate with him in the state wherein he merits glory, yet man himself merits that the whole man may be rewarded, who with his whole being serves God.

Whether the hair and nails will rise again in the human body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again in the human body. For just as hair and nails result from the surplus of food, so do urine, sweat and other superfluities or dregs. But these will not rise again with the body. Neither therefore will hair and nails.

Objection 2: Further, of all the superfluities that are produced from food, seed comes nearest to the truth of human nature, since though superfluous it is needed. Yet seed will not rise again in the human body. Much less therefore will hair and nails.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is perfected by a rational soul that is not perfected by a sensitive soul. But hair and nails are not perfected by a sensitive soul, for "we do not feel with them" (De Anima i, 5; iii, 13). Therefore since the human body rises not again except because it is perfected by a rational soul, it would seem that the hair and nails will not rise again.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall not perish."

Further, hair and nails were given to man as an ornament. Now the bodies of men, especially of the elect, ought to rise again with all their adornment.

Therefore they ought to rise again with the hair.

I answer that, The soul is to the animated body, as art is to the work of art, and is to the parts of the body as art to its instruments: wherefore an animated body is called an organic body. Now art employs certain instruments for the accomplishment of the work intended, and these instruments belong to the primary intention of art: and it also uses other instruments for the safe-keeping of the principal instruments, and these belong to the secondary intention of art: thus the art of warfare employs a sword for fighting, and a sheath for the safe-keeping of the sword. And so among the parts of an animated body, some are directed to the accomplishment of the souls’ operations, for instance the heart, liver, hand, foot; while others are directed to the safe-keeping of the other parts as leaves to cover fruit; and thus hair and nails are in man for the protection of other parts. Consequently, although they do not belong to the primary perfection of the human body, they belong to the secondary perfection: and since man will rise again with all the perfections of his nature, it follows that hair and nails will rise again in him.

Reply to Objection 1: Those superfluities are voided by nature, as being useful for nothing. Hence they do not belong to the perfection of the human body. It is not so with the superfluities which nature reserves for the production of hair and nails which she needs for the protection of the members.

Reply to Objection 2: Seed is not required for the perfection of the individual, as hair and nails are, but only for the protection of the species.

Reply to Objection 3: Hair and nails are nourished and grow, and so it is clear that they share in some operation, which would not be possible unless they were parts in some way perfected by the soul. And since in man there is but one soul, namely the rational soul, it is clear that they are perfected by the rational soul, although not so far as to share in the operation of sense, as neither do bones, and yet it is certain that these will rise again and that they belong to the integrity of the individual.

Whether the humors will rise again in the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that the humors will not rise again in the body. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:50): “Flesh and blood cannot possess the kingdom of God.” Now blood is the chief humor. Therefore it will not rise again in the blessed, who will possess the kingdom of God, and much less in others.

Objection 2: Further, humors are intended to make up for the waste. Now after the resurrection there will be no waste. Therefore the body will not rise again with humors.

Objection 3: Further, that which is in process of generation in the human body is not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the humors are still in process of generation because they are potentially flesh and bone. Therefore they are not yet perfected by the rational soul. Now the human body is not directed to the resurrection except in so far as it is perfected by the rational soul. Therefore the humors will not rise again.

On the contrary, Whatever enters into the constitution of the human body will rise again with it. Now this applies to the humors, as appears from the statement of Augustine (De Spir. et Anima xv) that “the body consists of functional members; the functional members of homogeneous parts; and the homogeneous parts of humors.” Therefore the humors will rise again in the body.

Further, our resurrection will be conformed to the resurrection of Christ. Now in Christ’s resurrection His blood rose again, else the wine would not now be changed into His blood in the Sacrament of the altar. Therefore the blood will rise again in us also, and in like manner the other humors.

I answer that, Whatever belongs to the integrity of human nature in those who take part in the resurrection will rise again, as stated above ([5070]AA[1],2). Hence whatever humidity of the body belongs to the integrity of human nature must needs rise again in man. Now there is a threefold humidity in man. There is one which occurs as receding from the perfection of the individual—either because it is on the way to corruption, and is voided by nature, for instance urine, sweat, matter, and so forth—or because it is directed by nature to the preservation of the species in some individual, either by the act of the generative power, as seed, or by the act of the nutritive power, as milk. None of these humidities will rise again, because they do not belong to the perfection of the person rising again.

The second kind of humidity is one that has not yet reached its ultimate perfection, which nature achieves in the individual, yet it is directed thereto by nature: and this is of two kinds. For there is one kind that has a definite form and is contained among the parts of the body, for instance the blood and the other humors which nature has directed to the members that are produced or nourished therefrom: and yet they have certain definite forms like the other parts of the body, and consequently will rise again with the other parts of the body: while another kind of humidity is in transition from form to form, namely from the form of humor to the form of member. Humidities of this kind will not rise again, because after the resurrection each part of the body will be established in its form, so that one will not pass into another. Wherefore this humidity that is actually in transition from one form to another will not rise again. Now this humidity may be considered in a twofold state—either as being at the beginning of its transformation, and thus it is called "ros," namely the humidity that is found in the cavities of the smaller veins—or as in the course of transformation and already beginning to undergo alteration, and thus it is called "cambium": but in neither state will it rise again. The third kind of humidity is that which has already reached its ultimate perfection that nature intends in the body of the individual, and has already undergone transformation and become incorporate with the members. This is called "gluten," and since it belongs to the members it will rise again just as the members will.

Reply to Objection 1: In these words of the Apostle flesh and blood do not denote the substance of flesh and blood but deeds of flesh and blood, which are either deeds of sin or the operations of the animal life. Or we may say with Augustine in his letter to Consentius (Ep. cxlvi) that "flesh and blood here signify the corruption which is now predominant in flesh and blood"; wherefore the Apostle's words continue: "Neither shall corruption possess incorruption."

Reply to Objection 2: Just as the members that serve for generation will be after the resurrection for the integrity of human nature, and not for the operation accomplished now by them, so will the humors be in the body not to make up for waste, but to restore the integrity of human nature and to show forth its natural power.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as the elements are in the course of generation in relation to mixed bodies, because they are their matter, yet not so as to be always in transition when in the mixed body, so too are the humors in relation to the members. And for this reason as the elements in the parts of the universe have definite forms, by reason of which they, like mixed bodies, belong to the perfection of the universe, so too the humors belong to the perfection of the human body, just as the other parts do, although they do not reach its entire perfection, as the other parts do, and although the elements have not perfect forms as mixed bodies have. But as all the parts of the universe receive their perfection from God, not equally, but each one according to its mode, so too the humors are in some way perfected by the rational soul, yet not in the same measure as the more perfect parts.

Whether whatever in the body belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in it?

Objection 1: It would seem that what was in the body, belonging to the truth of human nature, will not all rise again in it. For food is changed into the truth of human nature. Now sometimes the flesh of the ox or of other animals is taken as food. Therefore if whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again, the flesh of the ox or of other animals will also rise again: which is inadmissible.

Objection 2: Further, Adam’s rib belonged to the truth of human nature in him, as ours does in us. But Adam’s rib will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, else Eve would not rise again at all since she was made from that rib. Therefore whatever belonged in man to the truth of human nature will not all rise again in him.

Objection 3: Further, it is impossible for the same thing from different men to rise again. Yet it is possible for something in different men to belong to the truth of human nature, for instance if a man were to partake of human flesh which would be changed into his substance. Therefore there will not rise again in man whatever belonged in him to the truth of human nature.

Objection 4: Further, if it be said that not all the flesh partaken of belongs to the truth of human nature and that consequently some of it may possibly rise again in the one man and some in the other—on the contrary: That which is derived from one’s parents would especially seem to belong to the truth of human nature. But if one who partook of nothing but human flesh were to beget children that which his child derives from him must needs be of the flesh of other men partaken of by his father, since the seed is from the surplus of food, as the Philosopher proves (De Gen. Animal. i). Therefore what belongs to the truth of human nature in that child belonged also to the truth of human nature in other men of whose flesh his father had partaken.

Objection 5: Further, if it be said that what was changed into seed was not that which belong to the truth of human nature in the flesh of the men eaten, but something not belonging to the truth of human nature—on the contrary: Let us suppose that some one is fed entirely on embryos in which seemingly there is nothing but what belongs to the truth of human nature since whatever is in them is derived from the parents. If then the surplus food be changed into seed, that which belonged to the truth of human nature in the embryos—and after these have received a rational soul, the resurrection applies to them—must needs belong to the truth of human nature in the child begotten of that seed. And thus, since the same cannot rise again in two subjects, it will be impossible for whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in both to rise again in both of them.

On the contrary, Whatever belonged to the truth of human nature was perfected by the rational soul. Now it is through being perfected by the rational soul that the human body is directed to the resurrection. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature will rise again in each one.

Further, if anything belonging to the truth of human nature in a man be taken from his body, this will not be the perfect body of a man. Now all imperfection of a man will be removed at the resurrection, especially in the elect, to whom it was promised (Lk. 21:18) that not a hair of their head should perish. Therefore whatever belonged to the truth of human nature in a man will rise again in him.

I answer that, “Everything is related to truth in the same way as to being” (Metaph. ii), because a thing is true when it is as it appears to him who actually knows it. For this reason Avicenna (Metaph. ii) says that “the truth of anything is a property of the being immutably attached thereto.” Accordingly a thing is said to belong to the truth of human nature, because it belongs properly to the being of human nature, and this is what shares the form of human nature, just as true gold is what has the true form of gold whence gold derives its proper being. In order therefore to see what it is that belongs to the truth of human nature, we must observe that there have been three opinions on the question. For some have maintained that nothing begins anew to belong to the truth of human nature and that whatever belongs to the truth of human nature, all of it belonged to the truth of human nature when this was created; and that this multiplies by itself, so that it is possible for the seed whereof the child is begotten to be detached therefrom by the begetter, and that again the detached part multiplies in the child, so that he reaches perfect quantity by growth, and so on, and that thus was the whole human race multiplied. Wherefore according to this opinion, whatever is produced by nourishment. although it seem to have the appearance of flesh and blood, does not belong to the truth of human nature.

Others held that something new is added to the truth of human nature by the natural transformation of the food into the human body, if we consider the truth of human nature in the species to the preservation of which the act of the generative power is directed: but that if we consider the truth of human nature in the individual, to the preservation and perfection of which the act of the nutritive power is directed, that which is added by food belongs to the truth of the human nature of the individual, not primarily but secondarily. For they assert that the truth of human nature, first and foremost, consists in the radical humor, that namely which is begotten of the seed of which the human race was originally fashioned: and that what is changed from food into true flesh and blood does not belong principally to the truth of human nature in this particular individual, but secondarily: and that nevertheless this can belong principally to the truth of human nature in another individual who is begotten of the seed of the former. For they assert that seed is the surplus from food, either mingled with something belonging principally to the truth of human nature in the begetter, according to some, or without any such admixture, as others maintain. And thus the nutrimental humor in one becomes the radical humor in another.

The third opinion is that something new begins to belong principally to the truth of human nature even in this individual, because distinction in the human body does not require that any signate material part must needs remain throughout the whole lifetime; any signate part one may take is indifferent to this, whereas it remains always as regards what belongs to the species in it, albeit as regards what is material therein it may ebb and flow. And thus the nutrimental humor is not distinct from the radical on the part of its principle (so that it be called radical when begotten of the seed, and nutrimental when produced by the food), but rather on the part of the term, so that it be called radical when it reaches the term of generation by the act of the generative, or even nutritive power, but nutrimental, when it has not yet reached this term, but is still on the way to give nourishment.

These three opinions have been more fully exposed and examined in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30); wherefore there is no need for repetition here, except in so far as the question at issue is concerned. It must accordingly be observed that this question requires different answers according to these opinions.

For the first opinion on account of its explanation of the process of multiplication is able to admit perfection of the truth of human nature, both as regards the number of individuals and as regards the due quantity of each individual, without taking into account that which is produced from food; for this is not added except for the purpose of resisting the destruction that might result from the action of natural heat, as lead is added to silver lest it be destroyed in melting. Wherefore since at the resurrection it behooves human nature to be restored to its perfection, nor does the natural heat tend to destroy the natural humor, there will be no need for anything resulting from food to rise again in man, but that alone will rise again which belonged to the truth of the human nature of the individual, and this reaches the aforesaid perfection in number and quantity by being detached and multiplied.

The second opinion, since it maintains that what is produced from food is needed for the perfection of quantity in the individual and for the multiplication that results from generation, must needs admit that something of this product from food shall rise again: not all, however, but only so much as is required for the perfect restoration of human nature in all its individuals. Hence this opinion asserts that all that was in the substance of the seed will rise again in this man who was begotten of this seed; because this belongs chiefly to the truth of human nature in him: while of that which afterwards he derives from nourishment, only so much will rise again in him as is needed for the perfection of his quantity; and not all, because this does not belong to the perfection of human nature, except in so far as nature requires it for the perfection of quantity. Since however this nutrimental humor is subject to ebb and flow the restoration will be effected in this order, that what first belonged to the substance of a man’s body, will all be restored, and of that which was added secondly, thirdly, and so on, as much as is required to restore quantity. This is proved by two reasons. First, because that which was added was intended to restore what was wasted at first, and thus it does not belong principally to the truth of human nature to the same extent as that which came first. Secondly, because the addition of extraneous humor to the first radical humors results in the whole mixture not sharing the truth of the specific nature as perfectly as the first did: and the Philosopher instances as an example (De Gener. i) the mixing of water with wine, which always weakens the strength of the wine, so that in the end the wine becomes watery: so that although the second water be drawn into the species of wine, it does not share the species of wine as perfectly as the first water added to the wine. Even so that which is secondly changed from food into flesh does not so perfectly attain to the species of flesh as that which was changed first, and consequently does not belong in the same degree to the truth of human nature nor to the resurrection. Accordingly it is clear that this opinion maintains that the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature principally will rise again, but not the whole of what belongs to the truth of human nature secondarily.

The third opinion differs somewhat from the second and in some respects agrees with it. It differs in that it maintains that whatever is under the form of flesh and bone all belongs to the truth of human nature, because this opinion does not distinguish as remaining in man during his whole lifetime any signate matter that belongs essentially and primarily to the truth of human nature, besides something ebbing and flowing, that belongs. to the truth of human nature merely on account of the perfection of quantity, and not on account of the primary being of the species, as the second opinion asserted. But it states that all the parts that are not beside the intention of the nature generated belong to the truth of human nature, as regards what they have of the species, since thus they remain; but not as regards what they have of matter, since thus they are indifferent to ebb and flow: so that we are to understand that the same thing happens in the parts of one man as in the whole population of a city, for each individual is cut off from the population by death, while others take their place: wherefore the parts of the people flow back and forth materially, but remain formally, since these others occupy the very same offices and positions from which the former were withdrawn, so that the commonwealth is said to remain the selfsame. In like manner, while certain parts are on the ebb and others are being restored to the same shape and position, all the parts flow back and forth as to their matter, but remain as to their species; and nevertheless the selfsame man remains.

On the other hand, The third opinion agrees with the second, because it holds that the parts which come secondly do not reach the perfection of the species so perfectly as those which come first: and consequently the third opinion asserts that the same thing rises again in man as the second opinion maintains, but not for quite the same reason. For it holds that the whole of what is produced from the seed will rise again, not because it belongs to the truth of human nature otherwise than that which comes after, but because it shares the truth of human nature more perfectly: which same order the second opinion applied to those things that are produced afterwards from food, in which point also these two opinions agree.

Reply to Objection 1: A natural thing is what it is, not from its matter but from its form; wherefore, although that part of matter which at one time was under the form of bovine flesh rises again in man under the form of human flesh, it does not follow that the flesh of an ox rises again, but the flesh of a man: else one might conclude that the clay from which Adam's body was fashioned shall rise again. The second opinion, however, grants this argument.

Reply to Objection 2: That rib did not belong to the perfection of the individual in Adam, but was directed to the multiplication of the species. Hence it will rise again not in Adam but in Eve, just as the seed will rise again, not in the begetter, but in the begotten.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the first opinion it is easy to reply to this argument, because the flesh that is eaten never belonged to the truth of human nature in the eater, but it did belong to the truth of human nature in him whose flesh was eaten: and thus it will rise again in the latter but not in the former. according to the second and third opinions, each one will rise again in that wherein he approached nearest to the perfect participation of the virtue of the species, and if he approached equally in both, he will rise again in that wherein he was first, because in that he first was directed to the resurrection by union with the rational soul of that man. Hence if there were any surplus in the flesh eaten, not belonging to the truth of human nature in the first man, it will be possible for it to rise again in the second: otherwise what belonged to the resurrection in the first will rise again in him and not in the second; but in the second its place is taken either by something of that which was the product from other food, or if he never partook of any other food than human flesh, the substitution is made by

Divine power so far as the perfection of quantity requires, as it does in those who die before the perfect age. Nor does this derogate from numerical identity, as neither does the ebb and flow of parts.

Reply to Objection 4: According to the first opinion this argument is easily answered. For that opinion asserts that the seed is not from the surplus food: so that the flesh eaten is not changed into the seed whereof the child is begotten. But according to the other two opinions we must reply that it is impossible for the whole of the flesh eaten to be changed into seed, because it is after much separation that the seed is distilled from the food, since seed is the ultimate surplus of food. That part of the eaten flesh which is changed into seed belongs to the truth of human nature in the one born of the seed more than in the one of whose flesh the seed was the product. Hence according to the rule already laid down (ad 3), whatever was changed into the seed will rise again in the person born of the seed; while the remaining matter will rise again in him of whose flesh the seed was the product.

Reply to Objection 5: The embryo is not concerned with the resurrection before it is animated by a rational soul, in which state much has been added to the seminal substance from the substance of food, since the child is nourished in the mother’s womb. Consequently on the supposition that a man partook of such food, and that some one were begotten of the surplus thereof, that which was in the seminal substance will indeed rise again in the one begotten of that seed; unless it contain something that would have belonged to the seminal substance in those from whose flesh being eaten the seed was produced, for this would rise again in the first but not in the second. The remainder of the eaten flesh, not being changed into seed, will clearly rise again in the first the Divine power supplying deficiencies in both. The first opinion is not troubled by this objection, since it does not hold the seed to be from the surplus food: but there are many other reasons against it as may be seen in the Second Book (Sent. ii, D, 30; [5071]FP, Q[119], A[2]).

Whether whatever was materially in a man’s members will all rise again?

Objection 1: It would seem that whatever was materially in a man’s members will all rise again. For the hair, seemingly, is less concerned in the resurrection than the other members. Yet whatever was in the hair will all rise again, if not in the hair, at least in other parts of the body, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) quoted in the text (Sent. iv, D, 44). Much more therefore whatever was materially in the other members will all rise again.

Objection 2: Further, just as the parts of the flesh are perfected as to species by the rational soul, so are the parts as to matter. But the human body is directed to the resurrection through being perfected by a rational soul. Therefore not only the parts of species but also the parts of matter will all rise again.

Objection 3: Further, the body derives its totality from the same cause as it derives its divisibility into parts. But division into parts belongs to a body in respect of matter the disposition of which is quantity in respect of which it is divided. Therefore totality is ascribed to the body in respect of its parts of matter. If then all the parts of matter rise not again, neither will the whole body rise again: which is inadmissible.

On the contrary, The parts of matter are not permanent in the body but ebb and flow, as stated in De Gener. i. If, therefore, all the parts of matter, which remain not but ebb and flow, rise again, either the body of one who rises again will be very dense, or it will be immoderate in quantity.

Further, whatever belongs to the truth of human nature in one man can all be a part of matter in another man, if the latter were to partake of his flesh. Therefore if all the parts of matter in one man were to rise again it follows that in one man there will rise again that which belongs to the truth of human nature in another: which is absurd.

I answer that, What is in man materially, is not directed to the resurrection, except in so far as it belongs to the truth of human nature; because it is in this respect that it bears a relation to the human souls. Now all that is in man materially belongs indeed to the truth of human nature in so far as it has something of the species, but not all, if we consider the totality of matter; because all the matter that was in a man from the beginning of his life to the end would surpass the quantity due to his species, as the third opinion states, which opinion seems to me more probable than the others. Wherefore the whole of what is in man will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species which is dependent on quantity, shape, position and order of parts, but the whole will not rise again if we speak of the totality of matter. The second and first opinions, however, do not make this distinction, but distinguish between parts both of which have the species and matter. But these two opinions agree in that they both state what is produced from the seed will all rise again even if we speak of totality of matter: while they differ in this that the first opinion maintains that nothing will rise again of that which was engendered from food, whereas the second holds that something but not all, thereof will rise again, as stated above [5072](A[4]).

Reply to Objection 1: Just as all that is in the other parts of the body will rise again, if we speak of the totality of the species, but not if we speak of material totality, so is it with the hair. In the other parts something accrues from nourishment which causes growth, and this is reckoned as another part, if we speak of totality of species, since it occupies another place and position in the body, and is under other parts of dimension: and there accrues something which does not cause growth, but serves to make up for waste by nourishing. and this is not reckoned as another part of the whole considered in relation to the species, since it does not occupy another place or position in the body than that which was occupied by the part that has passed away: although it may be reckoned another part if we consider the totality of matter. The same applies to the hair. Augustine, however, is speaking of the cutting of hair that was a part causing growth of the body; wherefore it must needs rise again, not however as regards the quantity of hair, lest it should be immoderate, but it will rise again in other parts as deemed expedient by Divine providence. Or else he refers to the case when something will be lacking to the other parts, for then it will be possible for this to be supplied from the surplus of hair.

Reply to Objection 2: According to the third opinion parts of species are the same as parts of matter: for the Philosopher does not make this distinction (De Gener. i) in order to distinguish different parts, but in order to show that the same parts may be considered both in respect of species, as to what belongs to the form and species in them, and in respect of matter, as to that which is under the form and species. Now it is clear that the matter of the flesh has no relation to the rational soul except in so far as it is under such a form, and consequently by reason thereof it is directed to the resurrection. But the first and second opinions which draw a distinction between parts of species and parts of matter say that although the rational soul perfects both parts, it does not perfect parts of matter except by means of the parts of species, wherefore they are not equally directed to the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 3: In the matter of things subject to generation and corruption it is necessary to presuppose indefinite dimensions before the reception of the substantial form. Consequently division which is made according to these dimensions belongs properly to matter. But complete and definite quantity comes to matter after the substantial form; wherefore division that is made in reference to definite quantity regards the species especially when definite position of parts belongs to the essence of the species, as in the human body.

OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the quality of those who rise again. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether all will rise again in the youthful age?

(2) Whether they will be of equal stature?

(3) Whether all will be of the same sex?

(4) Whether they will rise again to the animal life?

Whether all will rise again of the same age?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will not rise again of the same, namely the youthful age. Because God will take nothing pertaining to man’s perfection from those who rise again, especially from the blessed. Now age pertains to the perfection of man, since old age is the age that demands reverence. Therefore the old will not rise again of a youthful age.

Objection 2: Further, age is reckoned according to the length of past time. Now it is impossible for past time not to have passed. Therefore it is impossible for those who were of greater age to be brought back to a youthful age.

Objection 3: Further, that which belonged most to the truth of human nature in each individual will especially rise again in him. Now the sooner a thing was in man the more would it seem to have belonged to the truth of human nature, because in the end, through the strength of the species being weakened the human body is likened to watery wine according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i). Therefore if all are to rise again of the same age, it is more fitting that they should rise again in the age of childhood.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 4:13): “Until we all meet . . . unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fulness of Christ.”

Now Christ rose again of youthful age, which begins about the age of thirty years, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii). Therefore others also will rise again of a youthful age.

Further, man will rise again at the most perfect stage of nature. Now human nature is at the most perfect stage in the age of youth. Therefore all will rise again of that age.

I answer that, Man will rise again without any defect of human nature, because as God founded human nature without a defect, even so will He restore it without defect. Now human nature has a twofold defect. First, because it has not yet attained to its ultimate perfection. Secondly, because it has already gone back from its ultimate perfection. The first defect is found in children, the second in the aged: and consequently in each of these human nature will be brought by the resurrection to the state of its ultimate perfection which is in the youthful age, at which the movement of growth terminates, and from which the movement of decrease begins.

Reply to Objection 1: Old age calls for reverence, not on account of the state of the body which is at fault; but on account of the soul’s wisdom which is taken for granted on account of its being advanced in years. Wherefore in the elect there will remain the reverence due to old age on account of the fulness of Divine wisdom which will be in them, but the defect of old age will not be in them.

Reply to Objection 2: We speak of age not as regards the number of years, but as regards the state which the human body acquires from years. Hence Adam is said to have been formed in the youthful age on account of the particular condition of body which he had at the first day of his formation. Thus the argument is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 3: The strength of the species is said to be more perfect in a child than in a young man, as regards the ability to transform nourishment in a certain way, even as it is more perfect in the seed than in the mature man. In youth, however, it is more perfect as regards the term of completion. Wherefore that which belonged principally to the truth of human nature will be brought to that perfection which it has in the age of youth, and not to that perfection which it has in the age of a child, wherein the humors have not yet reached their ultimate disposition.

Whether all will rise again of the same stature?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the same stature. For just as man is measured by dimensive quantity, so is he by the quantity of time. Now the quantity of time will be reduced to the same measure in all, since all will rise again of the same age. Therefore the dimensive quantity will also be reduced to the same measure in all, so that all will rise again of the same stature.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that “all things in nature have a certain limit end measure of size and growth.” Now this limitation can only arise by virtue of the form, with which the quantity as well as all the other accidents ought to agree. Therefore since all men have the same specific form, there should be the same measure of quantity in respect of matter in all, unless an error should occur. But the error of nature will be set right at the resurrection. Therefore all will rise again of the same stature.

Objection 3: Further, it will be impossible for man in rising again to be of a quantity proportionate to the natural power which first formed his body; for otherwise those who could not be brought to a greater quantity by the power of nature will never rise again of a greater quantity, which is false. Therefore that quantity must needs be proportionate to the power which will restore the human body by the resurrection, and to the matter from which it is restored. Now the selfsame, namely the Divine, power will restore all bodies; and all the ashes from which the human bodies will be restored are equally disposed to receive the action of that power. Therefore the resurrection of all men will bring them to the same quantity: and so the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, Natural quantity results from each individual’s nature. Now the nature of the individual will not be altered at the resurrection. Therefore neither will its natural quantity. But all are not of the same natural quantity. Therefore all will not rise again of the same stature.

Further, human nature will be restored by resurrection unto glory or unto punishment. But there will not be the same quantity of glory or punishment in all those who rise again. Neither therefore will there be the same quantity of stature.

I answer that, At the resurrection human nature will be restored not only in the self-same species but also in the selfsame individual: and consequently we must observe in the resurrection what is requisite not only to the specific but also to the individual nature. Now the specific nature has a certain quantity which it neither exceeds nor fails without error, and yet this quantity has certain degrees of latitude and is not to be attached to one fixed measure; and each individual in the human species aims at some degree of quantity befitting his individual nature within the bounds of that latitude, and reaches it at the end of his growth, if there has been no error in the working of nature, resulting in the addition of something to or the subtraction of something from the aforesaid quantity: the measure whereof is gauged according to the proportion of heat as expanding, and of humidity as expansive, in point of which all are not of the same power. Therefore all will not rise again of the same quantity, but each one will rise again of that quantity which would have been his at the end of his growth if nature had not erred or failed: and the Divine power will subtract or supply what was excessive or lacking in man.

Reply to Objection 1: It has already been explained (A[1], ad 2) that all are said to rise again of the same age, not as though the same length of time were befitting to each one, but because the same state of perfection will be in all, which state is indifferent to a great or small quantity.

Reply to Objection 2: The quantity of a particular individual corresponds not only to the form of the species, but also to the nature or matter of the individual: wherefore the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: The quantity of those who will be raised from the dead is not proportionate to the restoring power, because the latter does not belong to the power of the body—nor to the ashes, as to the state in which they are before the resurrection—but to nature which the individual had at first. Nevertheless if the formative power on account of some defect was unable to effect the due quantity that is befitting to the species, the Divine power will supply the defect at the resurrection, as in dwarfs, and in like manner in those who by immoderate size have exceeded the due bounds of nature.

Whether all will rise again of the male sex?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will rise again of the male sex. For it is written (Eph. 4:13) that we shall all meet “unto a perfect man,” etc. Therefore there will be none but the male sex.

Objection 2: Further, in the world to come all pre-eminence will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. 15:24. Now woman is subject to man in the natural order. Therefore women will rise again not in the female but in the male sex.

Objection 3: Further, that which is produced incidentally and beside the intention of nature will not rise again, since all error will be removed at the resurrection. Now the female sex is produced beside the intention of nature, through a fault in the formative power of the seed, which is unable to bring the matter of the fetus to the male form: wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima xvi, i.e. De Generat. Animal. ii) that “the female is a misbegotten male.” Therefore the female sex will not rise again.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): “Those are wiser, seemingly, who doubt not that both sexes will rise again.”

Further, at the resurrection God will restore man to what He made him at the creation. Now He made woman from the man’s rib (Gn. 2:22). Therefore He will also restore the female sex at the resurrection.

I answer that, Just as, considering the nature of the individual, a different quantity is due to different men, so also, considering the nature of the individual, a different sex is due to different men. Moreover, this same diversity is becoming to the perfection of the species, the different degrees whereof are filled by this very difference of sex and quantity. Wherefore just as men will rise again of various stature, so will they rise again of different sex. And though there be difference of sex there will be no shame in seeing one another, since there will no lust to invite them to shameful deeds which are the cause of shame.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said: We shall all meet “Christ unto a perfect man,” this refers not to the male sex but to the strength of soul which will be in all, both men and women.

Reply to Objection 2: Woman is subject to man on account of the frailty of nature, as regards both vigor of soul and strength of body. After the resurrection, however, the difference in those points will be not on account of the difference of sex, but by reason of the difference of merits. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the begetting of a woman is beside the intention of a particular nature, it is in the intention of universal nature, which requires both sexes for the perfection of the human species. Nor will any defect result from sex as stated above (ad 2).

Whether all will rise again to animal life so as to exercise the functions of nutrition and generation?

Objection 1: It would seem that they will rise again to the animal life, or in other words that they will make use of the acts of the nutritive and generative powers. For our resurrection will be conformed to Christ's. But Christ is said to have ate after His resurrection (Jn. 21; Lk. 24). Therefore, after the resurrection men will eat, and in like manner beget.

Objection 2: Further, the distinction of sexes is directed to generation; and in like manner the instruments which serve the nutritive power are directed to eating. Now man will rise again with all these. Therefore he will exercise the acts of the generative and nutritive powers.

Objection 3: Further, the whole man will be beatified both in soul and in body. Now beatitude or happiness, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7), consists in a perfect operation. Therefore it must needs be that all the powers of the soul and all the members should have their respective acts after the resurrection. And so the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 4: Further, after the resurrection there will be perfect joy in the blessed. Now such a joy includes all pleasures, since "happiness" according to Boethius is "a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods" (De Consol. iii), and the perfect is that which lacks nothing. Since then there is much pleasure in the act of the generative and nutritive powers it would seem that such acts belonging to animal life will be in the blessed, and much more in others, who will have less spiritual bodies.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:30): "In the resurrection they shall neither marry nor be married."

Further, generation is directed to supply the defect resulting from death, and to the multiplication of the human race: and eating is directed to make up for waste, and to increase quantity. But in the state of the resurrection the human race will already have the number of individuals preordained by God, since generation will continue up to that point. In like manner each man will rise again in due quantity; neither will death be any more, nor any waste affect the parts of man. Therefore the acts of the generative and nutritive powers would be void of purpose.

I answer that, The resurrection will not be necessary to man on account of his primary perfection, which consists in the integrity of those things that belong to his nature, since man can attain to this in his present state of life by the action of natural causes; but the necessity of the resurrection regards the attainment of his ultimate perfection, which consists in his reaching his ultimate end. Consequently those natural operations which are directed to cause or preserve the primary perfection of human nature will not be in the resurrection: such are the actions of the animal life in man, the action of the elements on one another, and the movement of the heavens; wherefore all these will cease at the resurrection. And since to eat, drink, sleep, beget, pertain to the animal life, being directed to the primary perfection of nature, it follows that they will not be in the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: When Christ partook of that meal, His eating was an act, not of necessity as though human nature needed food after the resurrection, but of power, so as to prove that He had resumed the true human nature which He had in that state wherein He ate and drank with His disciples. There will be no need of such proof at the general resurrection, since it will be evident to all. Hence Christ is said to have ate by dispensation in the sense in which lawyers say that a "dispensation is a relaxation of the general law": because Christ made an exception to that which is common to those who rise again (namely not to partake of food) for the aforesaid motive. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: The distinction of sexes and the difference of members will be for the restoration of the perfection of human nature both in the species and in the individual. Hence it does not follow that they are without purpose, although they lack their animal operations.

Reply to Objection 3: The aforesaid operations do not belong to man as man, as also the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7), wherefore the happiness of the human body does not consist therein. But the human body will be glorified by an overflow from the reason whereby man is man, inasmuch as the body will be subject to reason.

Reply to Objection 4: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, x, 5), the pleasures of the body are medicinal, because they are applied to man for the removal of weariness; or again, they are unhealthy, in so far as man indulges in those pleasures inordinately, as though they were real pleasures: just as a man whose taste is vitiated delights in things which are not delightful to the healthy. Consequently it does not follow that such pleasures as these belong to the perfection of beatitude, as the Jews and

Turks maintain, and certain heretics known as the Chiliasts asserted; who, moreover, according to the Philosopher’s teaching, would seem to have an unhealthy appetite, since according to him none but spiritual pleasures are pleasures simply, and to be sought for their own sake: wherefore these alone are requisite for beatitude.

OF THE IMPASSIBILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED AFTER THEIR RESURRECTION (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the conditions under which the blessed rise again, and (1) the impassibility of their bodies; (2) their subtlety; (3) their agility; (4) their clarity. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?

(2) Whether all will be equally impassible?

(3) Whether this impassibility renders the glorious bodies?

(4) Whether in them all the senses are in act?

Whether the bodies of the saints will be impassible after the resurrection?

Objection 1: It seems that the bodies of the saints will not be impassible after the resurrection. For everything mortal is passible. But man, after the resurrection, will be “a mortal rational animal,” for such is the definition of man, which will never be dissociated from him. Therefore the body will be passible.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is in potentiality to have the form of another thing is passible in relation to something else; for this is what is meant by being passive to another thing (De Gener. i). Now the bodies of the saints will be in potentiality to the form of another thing after the resurrection; since matter, according as it is under one form, does not lose its potentiality to another form. But the bodies of the saints after the resurrection will have matter in common with the elements, because they will be restored out of the same matter of which they are now composed. Therefore they will be in potentiality to another form, and thus will be passible.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Gener. i), contraries have a natural inclination to be active and passive towards one another. Now the bodies of the saints will be composed of contraries after the resurrection, even as now. Therefore they will be passible.

Objection 4: Further, in the human body the blood and humors will rise again, as stated above ([5073]Q[80], AA[3],4). Now, sickness and such like passions arise in the body through the antipathy of the humors. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be passible after the resurrection.

Objection 5: Further, actual defect is more inconsistent with perfection than potential defect. But passibility denotes merely potential defect. Since then there will be certain actual defects in the bodies of the blessed, such as the scars of the wounds in the martyrs, even as they were in Christ, it would seem that their perfections will not suffer, if we grant their bodies to be passible.

On the contrary, Everything passible is corruptible, because "increase of passion results in loss of substance" [*Aristotle, Topic. vi, 1]. Now the bodies of the saints will be incorruptible after the resurrection, according to 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption, it shall rise in incorruption." Therefore they will be impassible.

Further, the stronger is not passive to the weaker. But no body will be stronger than the bodies of the saints, of which it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power." Therefore they will be impassible.

I answer that, We speak of a thing being "passive" in two ways [*Cf. [5074]FS, Q[22], A[1]]. First in a broad sense, and thus every reception is called a passion, whether the thing received be fitting to the receiver and perfect it, or contrary to it and corrupt it. The glorious bodies are not said to be impassible by the removal of this kind of passion, since nothing pertaining to perfection is to be removed from them. In another way we use the word "passive" properly, and thus the Damascene defines passion (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) as being "a movement contrary to nature." Hence an immoderate movement of the heart is called its passion, but a moderate movement is called its operation. The reason of this is that whatever is patient is drawn to the bounds of the agent, since the agent assimilates the patient to itself, so that, therefore, the patient as such is drawn beyond its own bounds within which it was confined. Accordingly taking passion in its proper sense there will be no potentiality to passion in the bodies of the saints after resurrection; wherefore they are said to be impassible.

The reason however of this impassibility is assigned differently by different persons. Some ascribe it to the condition of the elements, which will be different then from what it is now. For they say that the elements will remain, then, as to substance, yet that they will be deprived of their active and passive qualities. But this does not seem to be true: because the active and passive qualities belong to the perfection of the elements, so that if the elements were restored without them in the body of the man that rises again, they would be less perfect than now. Moreover since these qualities are the proper accidents of the elements, being caused by their form and matter, it would seem most absurd for the cause to remain and the effect to be removed. Wherefore others say that the qualities will remain, but deprived of their proper activities, the Divine power so doing for the preservation of the human body. This however would seem to be untenable, since the action and passion of the active and passive qualities is necessary for the mixture (of the elements), and according as one or the other preponderates the mixed (bodies) differ in their respective complexions, and this must apply to the bodies of those who rise again, for they will contain flesh and bones and like parts, all of which demand different complexions. Moreover, according to this, impassibility could not be one of their gifts, because it would not imply a disposition in the impassible substance, but merely an external preventive to passion, namely the power of God, which might produce the same effect in a human body even in this state of life. Consequently others say that in the body itself there will be something preventing the passion of a glorified body, namely the nature of a fifth [*The other four being the elements; this fifth element was known to the peripatetic philosophers as the quintessence, of which they held heavenly bodies to be formed]: or heavenly body, which they maintain enters into the composition of a human body, to the effect of blending the elements together in harmony so as to be fitting matter for the rational soul; but that in this state of life, on account of the preponderance of the elemental nature, the human body is passible like other elements, whereas in the resurrection the nature of the fifth body will predominate, so that the human body will be made impassible in likeness to the heavenly body. But this cannot stand, because the fifth body does not enter materially into the composition of a human body, as was proved above (Sent. ii, D, 12, Q. 1, A[1]). Moreover it is absurd to say that a natural power, such as the power of a heavenly body, should endow the human body with a property of glory, such as the impassibility of a glorified body, since the Apostle ascribes to Christ’s power the transformation of the human body, because “such as is the heavenly, such also are they that are heavenly” (1 Cor. 15:48), and “He will reform the body of our lowness, made like to the body of His glory, according to the operation whereby also He is able to subdue all things unto Himself” (Phil. 3:21). And again, a heavenly nature cannot exercise such power over the human body as to take from it its elemental nature which is passible by reason of its essential constituents. Consequently we must say otherwise that all passion results from the agent overcoming the patient, else it would not draw it to its own bounds. Now it is impossible for agent to overcome patient except through the weakening of the hold which the form of the patient has over its matter, if we speak of the passion which is against nature, for it is of passion in this sense that we are speaking now: for matter is not subject to one of two contraries, except through the cessation or at least the diminution of the hold which the other contrary has on it. Now the human body and all that it contains will be perfectly subject to the rational soul, even as the soul will be perfectly subject to God. Wherefore it will be impossible for the glorified body to be subject to any change contrary to the disposition whereby it is perfected by the soul; and consequently those bodies will be impassible.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Anselm (Cur Deus Homo ii, 11), “mortal is included in the philosophers’ definition of man, because they did not believe that the whole man could be ever immortal, for they had no experience of man otherwise than in this state of mortality.” Or we may say that since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 12), essential differences are unknown to us, we sometimes employ accidental differences in order to signify essential differences from which the accidental differences result. Hence “mortal” is put in the definition of man, not as though mortality were essential to man, but because that which causes passibility and mortality in the present state of life, namely composition of contraries, is essential to man, but it will not cause it then, on account of the triumph of the soul over the body.

Reply to Objection 2: Potentiality is twofold, tied and free: and this is true not only of active but also of passive potentiality. For the form ties the potentiality of matter, by determining it to one thing, and it is thus that it overcomes it. And since in corruptible things form does not perfectly overcome matter, it cannot tie it completely so as to prevent it from sometimes receiving a disposition contrary to the form through some passion. But in the saints after the resurrection, the soul will have complete dominion over the body, and it will be altogether impossible for it to lose this dominion, because it will be immutably subject to God, which was not the case in the state of innocence. Consequently those bodies will retain substantially the same potentiality as they have now to another form; yet that potentiality will remain tied by the triumph of the soul over the body, so that it will never be realized by actual passion.

Reply to Objection 3: The elemental qualities are the instruments of the soul, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38, seqq., for the heat of fire in an animal's body is directed in the act of nutrition by the soul's power. When, however, the principal agent is perfect, and there is no defect in the instrument, no action proceeds from the instrument, except in accordance with the disposition of the principal agent. Consequently in the bodies of the saints after the resurrection, no action or passion will result from the elemental qualities that is contrary to the disposition of the soul which has the preservation of the body in view.

Reply to Objection 4: According to Augustine (Ep. ad Consent. cxlvi) "the Divine power is able to remove" whatever qualities He will "from this visible and tangible body, other qualities remaining." Hence even as in a certain respect "He deprived the flames of the Chaldees' furnace of the power to burn, since the bodies of the children were preserved without hurt, while in another respect that power remained, since those flames consumed the wood, so will He remove passibility from the humors while leaving their nature unchanged." It has been explained in the Article how this is brought about.

Reply to Objection 5: The scars of wounds will not be in the saints, nor were they in Christ, in so far as they imply a defect, but as signs of the most steadfast virtue whereby the saints suffered for the sake of justice and faith: so that this will increase their own and others' joy (Cf. [5075]TP, Q[54], A[4], ad 3). Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 19): "We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ's name. Perchance indeed we shall see them for this will not make them less comely but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue." Nevertheless those martyrs who have been maimed and deprived of their limbs will not be without those limbs in the resurrection of the dead, for to them it is said (Lk. 21:18): "A hair of your head shall not perish."

Whether all will be equally impassible?

Objection 1: It would seem that all will be equally impassible. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:42, "It is sown in corruption," says that "all have equal immunity from suffering." Now the gift of impassibility consists in immunity from suffering. Therefore all will be equally impassible.

Objection 2: Further, negations are not subject to be more or less. Now impassibility is a negation or privation of passibility. Therefore it cannot be greater in one subject than in another.

Objection 3: Further, a thing is more white if it have less admixture of black. But there will be no admixture of passibility in any of the saints' bodies. Therefore they will all be equally impassible.

On the contrary, Reward should be proportionate to merit. Now some of the saints were greater in merit than others. Therefore, since impassibility is a reward, it would seem to be greater in some than in others.

Further, impassibility is condivided with the gift of clarity. Now the latter will not be equal in all, according to 1 Cor. 15:41. Therefore neither will impassibility be equal in all.

I answer that, Impassibility may be considered in two ways, either in itself, or in respect of its cause. If it be considered in itself, since it denotes a mere negation or privation, it is not subject to be more or less, but will be equal in all the blessed. on the other hand, if we consider it in relation to its cause, thus it will be greater in one person than in another. Now its cause is the dominion of the soul over the body, and this dominion is caused by the soul's unchangeable enjoyment of God. Consequently in one who enjoys God more perfectly, there is a greater cause of impassibility.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss is speaking of impassibility in itself and not in relation to its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Although negations and privations considered in themselves are not increased nor diminished, yet they are subject to increase and diminution in relation to their causes. Thus a place is said to be more darksome from having more and greater obstacles to light.

Reply to Objection 3: Some things increase not only by receding from their contrary, but also by approach to a term: thus light increases. Consequently impassibility also is greater in one subject than in another, although there is no passibility remaining in any one.

Whether impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies?

Objection 1: It would seem that impassibility excludes actual sensation from glorified bodies. For according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 11), “sensation is a kind of passion.” But the glorified bodies will be impassible. Therefore they will not have actual sensation.

Objection 2: Further, natural alteration precedes spiritual* alteration, just as natural being precedes intentional being. Now glorified bodies, by reason of their impassibility, will not be subject to natural alteration. [*”Animalem,” as though it were derived from “animus”—the mind. Cf. [5076]FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; [5077]FS, Q[52], A[1],3m.] Therefore they will not be subject to spiritual alteration which is requisite for sensation.

Objection 3: Further, whenever actual sensation is due to a new perception, there is a new judgment. But in that state there will be no new judgment, because “our thoughts will not then be unchangeable,” as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 16). Therefore there will be no actual sensation.

Objection 4: Further, when the act of one of the soul’s powers is intense, the acts of the other powers are remiss. Now the soul will be supremely intent on the act of the contemplative power in contemplating God. Therefore the soul will have no actual sensation whatever.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 1:7): “Every eye shall see Him.” Therefore there will be actual sensation.

Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima i, 2) “the animate is distinct from the inanimate by sensation and movement.” Now there will be actual movement since they “shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds” (Wis. 3:7). Therefore there will also be actual sensation.

I answer that, All are agreed that there is some sensation in the bodies of the blessed: else the bodily life of the saints after the resurrection would be likened to sleep rather than to vigilance. Now this is not befitting that perfection, because in sleep a sensible body is not in the ultimate act of life, for which reason sleep is described as half-life. [*This is what Aristotle says: “The good and the bad are in sleep least distinguishable: hence men say that for half their lives there is no difference between the happy and the unhappy” (Ethic. i, 13)] But there is a difference of opinion as to the mode of sensation.

For some say that the glorified bodies will be impassible, and consequently “not susceptible to impressions from without” [*Cf.[5078] Q[74], A[4], On the contrary] and much less so than the heavenly bodies, because they will have actual sensations, not by receiving species from sensibles, but by emission of species. But this is impossible, since in the resurrection the specific nature will remain the same in man and in all his parts. Now the nature of sense is to be a passive power as the Philosopher proves (De Anima ii, text. 51,54). Wherefore if the saints, in the resurrection, were to have sensations by emitting and not by receiving species, sense in them would be not a passive but an active power, and thus it would not be the same specifically with sense as it is now, but would be some other power bestowed on them; for just as matter never becomes form, so a passive power never becomes active. Consequently others say that the senses will be actualized by receiving species, not indeed from external sensibles, but by an outflow from the higher powers, so that as now the higher powers receive from the lower, so on the contrary the lower powers will then receive from the higher. But this mode of reception does not result in real sensation, because every passive power, according to its specific nature, is determined to some special active principle, since a power as such bears relation to that with respect to which it is said to be the power. Wherefore since the proper active principle in external sensation is a thing existing outside the soul and not an intention thereof existing in the imagination or reason, if the organ of sense be not moved by external things, but by the imagination or other higher powers, there will be no true sensation. Hence we do not say that madmen or other witless persons (in whom there is this kind of outflow of species towards the organs of sense, on account of the powerful influence of the imagination) have real sensations, but that it seems to them that they have sensations. Consequently we must say with others that sensation in glorified bodies will result from the reception of things outside the soul. It must, however, be observed that the organs of sense are transmuted by things outside the soul in two ways. First by a natural transmutation, when namely the organ is disposed by the same natural quality as the thing outside the soul which acts on that organ: for instance, when the hand is heated by touching a hot object, or becomes fragrant through contact with a fragrant object. Secondly, by a spiritual transmutation, as when a sensible quality is received in an instrument, according to a spiritual mode of being, when, namely, the species or the intention of a quality, and not the quality itself is received: thus the pupil receives the species of whiteness and yet does not itself become white. Accordingly the first reception does not cause sensation, properly speaking, because the senses are receptive of species in matter but without matter. that is to say without the material "being" which the species had outside the soul (De Anima ii, text. 121). This reception transmutes the nature of the recipient, because in this way the quality is received according to its material "being." Consequently this kind of reception will not be in the glorified bodies, but the second, which of itself causes actual sensation, without changing the nature of the recipient.

Reply to Objection 1: As already explained, by this passion that takes place in actual sensation and is no other than the aforesaid reception of species, the body is not drawn away from natural quality, but is perfected by a spiritual change. Wherefore the impassibility of glorified bodies does not exclude this kind of passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Every subject of passion receives the action of the agent according to its mode. Accordingly if there be a thing that is naturally adapted to be altered by an active principle, with a natural and a spiritual alteration, the natural alteration precedes the spiritual alteration, just as natural precedes intentional being. If however a thing be naturally adapted to be altered only with a spiritual alteration it does not follow that it is altered naturally. For instance the air is not receptive of color, according to its natural being, but only according to its spiritual being, wherefore in this way alone is it altered: whereas, on the contrary, inanimate bodies are altered by sensible qualities only naturally and not spiritually. But in the glorified bodies there cannot be any natural alteration, and consequently there will be only spiritual alteration.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as there will be new reception of species in the organs of sensation, so there will be new judgment in the common sense: but there will be no new judgment on the point in the intellect; such is the case with one who sees what he knew before. The saying of Augustine, that “there our thoughts will not be changeable,” refers to the thoughts of the intellectual part: therefore it is not to the point.

Reply to Objection 4: When one of two things is the type of the other, the attention of the soul to the one does not hinder or lessen its attention to the other: thus a physician while considering urine is not less but more able to bear in mind the rules of his art concerning the colors of urine. And since God is apprehended by the saints as the type of all things that will be done or known by them, their attention to perceiving sensibles, or to contemplating or doing anything else will nowise hinder their contemplation of God, nor conversely. Or we may say that the reason why one power is hindered in its act when another power is intensely engaged is because one power does not alone suffice for such an intense operation, unless it be assisted by receiving from the principle of life the inflow that the other powers or members should receive. And since in the saints all the powers will be most perfect, one will be able to operate intensely without thereby hindering the operation of another power even as it was with Christ.

Whether in the blessed, after the resurrection, all the senses will be in act?

Objection 1: It would seem that all the senses are not in act there. For touch is the first of all the senses (De Anima ii, 2). But the glorified body will lack the actual sense of touch, since the sense of touch becomes actual by the alteration of an animal body by some external body preponderating in some one of the active or passive qualities which touch is capable of discerning: and such an alteration will then be impossible. Therefore all the senses will not be in act there.

Objection 2: Further, the sense of taste assists the action of the nutritive power. Now after the resurrection there will be no such action, as stated above ([5079]Q[81], A[4]). Therefore taste would be useless there.

Objection 3: Further, nothing will be corrupted after the resurrection because the whole creature will be invested with a certain virtue of incorruption. Now the sense of smell cannot have its act without some corruption having taken place, because smell is not perceived without a volatile evaporation consisting in a certain dissolution. Therefore the sense of smell is not there in its act.

Objection 4: Further, “Hearing assists teaching” (De Sensu et Sensato i). But the blessed, after the resurrection, will require no teaching by means of sensible objects, since they will be filled with Divine wisdom by the very vision of God. Therefore hearing will not be there.

Objection 5: Further. seeing results from the pupil receiving the species of the thing seen. But after the resurrection this will be impossible in the blessed. Therefore there will be no actual seeing there, and yet this is the most noble of the senses. The minor is proved thus: That which is actually lightsome is not receptive of a visible species; and consequently a mirror placed under the sun’s rays does not reflect the image of a body opposite to it. Now the pupil like the whole body will be endowed with clarity. Therefore it will not receive the image of a colored body.

Objection 6: Further, according to the science of perspective, whatever is seen is seen at an angle. But this does not apply to the glorified bodies. Therefore they will not have actual sense of sight. The minor is proved thus. Whenever a thing is seen at an angle, the angle must be proportionate to the distance of the object seen: because what is seen from a greater distance is less seen and at a lesser angle, so that the angle may be so small that nothing is seen of the object. Therefore if the glorified eye sees at an angle, it follows that it sees things within a certain distance, and that consequently it does not see a thing from a greater distance than we see now: and this would seem very absurd. And thus it would seem that the sense of sight will not be actual in glorified bodies.

On the contrary, A power conjoined to its act is more perfect than one not so conjoined. Now human nature in the blessed will be in its greatest perfection. Therefore all the senses will be actual there.

Further, the sensitive powers are nearer to the soul than the body is. But the body will be rewarded or punished on account of the merits or demerits of the soul. Therefore all the senses in the blessed will also be rewarded and in the wicked will be punished, with regard to pleasure and pain or sorrow which consist in the operation of the senses.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that in the glorified bodies there will be all the sensitive powers, but that only two senses will be in act, namely touch and sight; nor will this be owing to defective senses, but from lack of medium and object; and that the senses will not be useless, because they will conduce to the integrity of human nature and will show forth the wisdom of their Creator. But this is seemingly untrue, because the medium in these senses is the same as in the others. For in the sight the medium is the air, and this is also the medium in hearing and smelling (De Anima ii, 7). Again, the taste, like the touch, has the medium in contact, since taste is a kind of touch (De Anima ii, 9). Smell also which is the object of the sense of smell will be there, since the Church sings that the bodies of the saints will be a most sweet smell. There will also be vocal praise in heaven; hence a gloss says on Ps. 149:6, "The high praises of God shall be in their mouth" that "hearts and tongues shall not cease to praise God." The same is had on the authority of a gloss on 2 Esdra 12:27, "With singing and with cymbals." Wherefore, according to others we may say that smelling and hearing will be in act there, but taste will not be in act, in the sense of being affected by the taking of food or drink, as appears from what we have said ([5080]Q[81], A[4]): unless perchance we say that there will be taste in act through the tongue being affected by some neighboring humor.

Reply to Objection 1: The qualities perceived by the touch are those which constitute the animal body. Wherefore the body of an animal has, through its tangible qualities according to the present state of life, a natural aptitude to be affected with a natural and spiritual alteration by the object of touch. For this reason the touch is said to be the most material of the senses, since it has a greater measure of material alteration connected with it. Yet material alteration is only accidentally related to the act of sensation which is effected by a spiritual alteration. Consequently the glorified bodies, which by reason of their impassibility are immune from natural alteration, will be subject only to spiritual alteration by tangible qualities. Thus it was with the body of Adam, which could neither be burned by fire, nor pierced by sword, although he had the sense of such things.

Reply to Objection 2: Taste, in so far as it is the perception of food, will not be in act; but perhaps it will be possible in so far as it is cognizant of flavors in the way mentioned above.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have considered smell to be merely a volatile evaporation. But this opinion cannot be true; which is evident from the fact that vultures hasten to a corpse on perceiving the odor from a very great distance, whereas it would be impossible for an evaporation to travel from the corpse to a place so remote, even though the whole corpse were to be dissolved into vapor. This is confirmed by the fact that sensible objects at an equal distance exercise their influence in all directions: so that smell affects the medium sometimes, and the instrument of sensation with a spiritual alteration, without any evaporation reaching the organ. That some evaporation should be necessary is due to the fact that smell in bodies is mixed with humidity; wherefore it is necessary for dissolution to take place in order for the smell to be perceived. But in the glorified bodies odor will be in its ultimate perfection, being nowise hampered by humidity: wherefore it will affect the organ with a spiritual alteration, like the odor of a volatile evaporation. Such will be the sense of smell in the saints, because it will not be hindered by any humidity: and it will take cognizance not only of the excellences of odors, as happens with us now on account of the very great humidity of the brain, but also of the minutest differences of odors.

Reply to Objection 4: In heaven there will be vocal praise (though indeed some think otherwise), and in the blessed it will affect the organ of hearing by a merely spiritual alteration. Nor will it be for the sake of learning whereby they may acquire knowledge, but for the sake of the perfection of the sense and for the sake pleasure. How it is possible for the voice to give sound there, we have already stated (Sent. ii, D, 2;[5081] Q[2], A[2], ad 5).

Reply to Objection 5: The intensity of light does not hinder the spiritual reception of the image of color, so long as the pupil retains its diaphanous nature; thus it is evident that however much the air be filled with light, it can be the medium of sight, and the more it is illumined, the more clearly are objects seen through it, unless there be a fault through defective sight. The fact that the image of an object placed in opposition to a mirror directly opposite the sun’s rays does not appear therein, is not due to the reception being hindered, but to the hindering of reflection: because for an image to appear in a mirror it must needs be thrown back by an opaque body, for which reason lead is affixed to the glass in a mirror. The sun's ray dispels this opacity so that no image can appear in the mirror. But the clarity of a glorified body does not destroy the diaphanous nature of the pupil, since glory does not destroy nature; and consequently the greatness of clarity in the pupil renders the sight keen rather than defective.

Reply to Objection 6: The more perfect the sense the less does it require to be altered in order to perceive its object. Now the smaller the angle at which the sight is affected by the visible object, the less is the organ altered. Hence it is that a stronger sight can see from a distance more than a weaker sight; because the greater the distance the smaller the angle at which a thing is seen. And since the sight of a glorified body will be most perfect it will be able to see by the very least alteration (of the organ); and consequently at a very much smaller angle than now, and therefore from a much greater distance.

OF THE SUBTLETY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider the subtlety of the bodies of the blessed. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?

(2) Whether by reason of this subtlety it can be in the same place with another not glorified body?

(3) Whether by a miracle two bodies can be in the same place?

(4) Whether a glorified body can be in the same place with another glorified body?

(5) Whether a glorified body necessarily requires a place equal to itself?

(6) Whether a glorified body is palpable?

Whether subtlety is a property of the glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that subtlety is not a property of the glorified body. For the properties of glory surpass the properties of nature, even as the clarity of glory surpasses the clarity of the sun, which is the greatest in nature. Accordingly if subtlety be a property of the glorified body, it would seem that the glorified body will be more subtle than anything which is subtle in nature, and thus it will be “more subtle than the wind and the air,” which was condemned by Gregory in the city of Constantinople, as he relates (Moral. xiv, 56).

Objection 2: Further, as heat and cold are simple qualities of bodies, i.e. of the elements, so is subtlety. But heat and other qualities of the elements will not be intensified in the glorified bodies any more than they are now, in fact, they will be more reduced to the mean. Neither, therefore, will subtlety be in them more than it is now.

Objection 3: Further, subtlety is in bodies as a result of scarcity of matter, wherefore bodies that have less matter within equal dimensions are said to be more subtle; as fire in comparison with air, and air as compared with water, and water as compared with earth. But there will be as much matter in the glorified bodies as there is now, nor will their dimensions be greater. Therefore they will not be more subtle then than now.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:44): “It is sown a corruptible body, it shall rise a spiritual,” i.e. a spirit-like, “body.” But the subtlety of a spirit surpasses all bodily subtlety. Therefore the glorified bodies will be most subtle.

Further, the more subtle a body is the more exalted it is. But the glorified bodies will be most exalted. Therefore they will be most subtle.

I answer that, Subtlety takes its name from the power to penetrate. Hence it is said in De Gener. ii that “a subtle thing fills all the parts and the parts of parts.” Now that a body has the power of penetrating may happen through two causes. First, through smallness of quantity, especially in respect of depth and breadth, but not of length, because penetration regards depth, wherefore length is not an obstacle to penetration. Secondly, through paucity of matter, wherefore rarity is synonymous with subtlety: and since in rare bodies the form is more predominant over the matter, the term “subtlety” has been transferred to those bodies which are most perfectly subject to their form, and are most fully perfected thereby: thus we speak of subtlety in the sun and moon and like bodies, just as gold and similar things may be called subtle, when they are most perfectly complete in their specific being and power. And since incorporeal things lack quantity and matter, the term “subtlety” is applied to them, not only by reason of their substance, but also on account of their power. For just as a subtle thing is said to be penetrative, for the reason that it reaches to the inmost part of a thing, so is an intellect said to be subtle because it reaches to the insight of the intrinsic principles and the hidden natural properties of a thing. In like manner a person is said to have subtle sight, because he is able to perceive by sight things of the smallest size: and the same applies to the other senses. Accordingly people have differed by ascribing subtlety to the glorified bodies in different ways.

For certain heretics, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei xiii, 22), ascribed to them the subtlety whereby spiritual substances are said to be subtle: and they said that at the resurrection the body will be transformed into a spirit, and that for this reason the Apostle describes as being “spiritual” the bodies of those who rise again (1 Cor. 15:44). But this cannot be maintained. First, because a body cannot be changed into a spirit, since there is no community of matter between them: and Boethius proves this (De Duab. Nat.). Secondly, because, if this were possible, and one’s body were changed into a spirit, one would not rise again a man, for a man naturally consists of a soul and body. Thirdly, because if this were the Apostle’s meaning, just as he speaks of spiritual bodies, so would he speak of natural [animale] bodies, as being changed into souls [animam]: and this is clearly false.

Hence certain heretics said that the body will remain at the resurrection, but that it will be endowed with subtlety by means of rarefaction, so that human bodies in rising again will be like the air or the wind, as Gregory relates (Moral. xiv, 56). But this again cannot be maintained, because our Lord had a palpable body after the Resurrection, as appears from the last chapter of Luke, and we must believe that His body was supremely subtle. Moreover the human body will rise again with flesh and bones, as did the body of our Lord, according to Lk. 24:39, “A spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see Me to have,” and Job 19:26, “In my flesh I shall see God,” my Saviour: and the nature of flesh and bone is incompatible with the aforesaid rarity.

Consequently another kind of subtlety must be assigned to glorified bodies, by saying that they are subtle on account of the most complete perfection of the body. But this completeness is explained by some in relation to the fifth, or heavenly, essence, which will be then predominant in them. This, however, is impossible, since first of all the fifth essence can nowise enter into the composition of a body, as we have shown above (Sent.

D, 12, qu. 1). Secondly, because granted that it entered into the composition of the human body, it would be impossible to account for its having a greater predominance over the elemental nature then than now, unless—either the amount of the heavenly nature in human bodies were increased (thus human bodies would not be of the same stature, unless perhaps elemental matter in man were decreased, which is inconsistent with the integrity of those who rise again)—or unless elemental nature were endowed with the properties of the heavenly nature through the latter's dominion over the body, and in that case a natural power would be the cause of a property of glory, which seems absurd.

Hence others say that the aforesaid completeness by reason of which human bodies are said to be subtle will result from the dominion of the glorified soul (which is the form of the body) over the body, by reason of which dominion the glorified body is said to be "spiritual," as being wholly subject to the spirit. The first subjection whereby the body is subject to the soul is to the effect of its participating in its specific being, in so far as it is subject to the soul as matter to form; and secondly it is subject to the soul in respect of the other operations of the soul, in so far as the soul is a principle of movement. Consequently the first reason for spirituality in the body is subtlety, and, after that, agility and the other properties of a glorified body. Hence the Apostle, as the masters expound, in speaking of spirituality indicates subtlety: wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xiv, 56) that "the glorified body is said to be subtle as a result of a spiritual power."

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections which refer to the subtlety of rarefaction.

Whether by reason of this subtlety a glorified body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified?

Objection 1: It would seem that by reason of this subtlety a body is able to be in the same place with another body not glorified. For according to Phil. 3:21, "He will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory." Now the body of Christ was able to be in the same place with another body, as appears from the fact that after His Resurrection He went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26). Therefore also the glorified bodies by reason of their subtlety will be able to be in the same place with other bodies not glorified.

Objection 2: Further, glorified bodies will be superior to all other bodies. Yet by reason of their superiority certain bodies, to wit the solar rays, are able now to occupy the same place together with other bodies. Much more therefore is this befitting glorified bodies.

Objection 3: Further, a heavenly body cannot be severed, at least as regards the substance of the spheres: hence it is written (Job 37:18) that “the heavens . . . are most strong, as if they were of molten brass.” If then the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, it will never be able to ascend to the empyrean,* and this is erroneous. [*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. [5082]FP, Q[56], A[3]].

Objection 4: Further, a body which is unable to be in the same place with another body can be hindered in its movement or even surrounded by others standing in its way. But this cannot happen to glorified bodies. Therefore they will be able to be together in the same place with other bodies.

Objection 5: Further, as point is to point, so is line to line, surface to surface, and body to body. Now two points can be coincident, as in the case of two lines touching one another, and two lines when two surfaces are in contact with one another, and two surfaces when two bodies touch one another, because “contiguous things are those whose boundaries coincide” (Phys. vi, 6). Therefore it is not against the nature of a body to be in the same place together with another body. Now whatever excellence is competent to the nature of a body will all be bestowed on the glorified body. Therefore a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be able to be in the same place together with another body.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Trin. i): “Difference of accidents makes distinction in number. For three men differ not in genus, nor in species, but in their accidents. If we were to remove absolutely every accident from them, still each one has a different place; and it is quite conceivable that they should all occupy the same place.” Therefore if we suppose two bodies to occupy the same place, there will be but one body numerically.

I answer that, It cannot be maintained that a glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is able to be in the same place with another body, unless the obstacle to its being now in the same place with another body be removed by that subtlety. Some say that in the present state this obstacle is its grossness by virtue of which it is able to occupy a place; and that this grossness is removed by the gift of subtlety. But there are two reasons why this cannot be maintained. First, because the grossness which the gift of subtlety removes is a kind of defect, for instance an inordinateness of matter in not being perfectly subject to its form. For all that pertains to the integrity of the body will rise again in the body, both as regards the matter and as regards the form. And the fact that a body is able to fill a place belongs to it by reason of that which pertains to its integrity, and not on account of any defect of nature. For since fulness is opposed to vacancy, that alone does not fill a place, which being put in a place, nevertheless leaves a place vacant. Now a vacuum is defined by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 6,7) as being “a place not filled by a sensible body.” And a body is said to be sensible by reason of its matter, form, and natural accidents, all of which pertain to the integrity of nature. It is also plain that the glorified body will be sensible even to touch, as evidenced by the body of our Lord (Lk. 24:39): nor will it lack matter, or form, or natural accidents, namely heat, cold, and so forth. Hence it is evident that the glorified body, the gift of subtlety notwithstanding, will fill a place: for it would seem madness to say that the place in which there will be a glorified body will be empty. Secondly their aforesaid argument does not avail, because to hinder the co-existence of a body in the same place is more than to fill a place. For if we suppose dimensions separate from matter, those dimensions do not fill a place. Hence some who held the possibility of a vacuum, said that a vacuum is a place wherein such like dimensions exist apart from a sensible body; and yet those dimensions hinder another body from being together with them in the same place. This is made clear by the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 1,8; Metaph. ii, 2), where he considers it impossible for a mathematical body, which is nothing but separate dimensions, to be together with another natural sensible body. Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.

Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body’s being now in the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place together with another body, except something in it that requires a different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place, not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place. Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone. Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two such lines, or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct places, else one line added to another would not make something greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as Boethius says (De Trin.), “we cannot possibly conceive two bodies occupying one place,” so that this distinction of individuals requires this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to be in the same place together with another body, but it will be possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the sick were healed at the passing of Peter’s shadow (Acts 5:15) not through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body for the perfection of glory.

Reply to Objection 1: That Christ’s body was able to be together with another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as in His birth [*Cf. [5083]TP, Q[28], A[2], ad 3]. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.): “The same body went into His disciples the doors being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin at His birth.” Therefore there is no reason why this should be befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.

Reply to Objection 2: Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent. ii, Q[13], A[3]; [5084]FP, Q[67], A[2]): hence the objection proceeds on a false supposition.

Reply to Objection 3: The glorified body will pass through the heavenly spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.

Reply to Objection 4: From the fact that God will come to the aid of the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.

Reply to Objection 5: As stated in Phys. iv, 5, “a point is not in a place”: hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental, because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are said to coincide.

Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same place?

Objection 1: It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place, or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with one another." Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two bodies cannot have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two. Therefore they are at the same time one and two.

Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either against the common principles—for instance that the part be not less than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a direct contradiction—or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which are infallible deductions from common principles—for instance that the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles. In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and to the definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines corresponding to the two bodies in that place.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater, and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place; while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will not have a proper place.

Objection 4: Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at the same time in different places, except by some kind of transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same place.

On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle. Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity. Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in the same place.

Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26).

I answer that, As shown above [5085](A[2]) the reason why two bodies must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by God’s power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same place.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is sophistical because it is based on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed: since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.

Reply to Objection 2: Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of geometry. For, as stated above [5086](A[2]), dimensive quantity differs from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place. But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other circle described by the locating body.

Reply to Objection 3: God could make a body not to be in a place; and yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms of the lesser body.

Reply to Objection 4: It is impossible for one body to be miraculously in two places locally (for Christ’s body is not locally on the altar), although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.

Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same place together with another glorified body. Because where there is greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.

Objection 2: Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same place with a less subtle glorified body.

Objection 3: Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will be able to occupy the same place.

On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; [5087]FP, Q[52], A[3]). Therefore neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.

Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.

I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Consequently two glorified bodies will never be in the same place.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument supposes that a glorified body is able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another body: and this is not true.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The body of heaven and the other bodies will be said equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain share in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the gifts of glorified human bodies.

Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place?

Objection 1: It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to Phil. 3:21. Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal place: wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of the glorified bodies.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv, 6), that two bodies are not in the same place, because it would follow that the greatest body would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts could be in the same part of the place: for it makes no difference whether two bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a glorified body will be in the same place with another body, as is commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it to be in any place however small.

Objection 3: Further, even as a body is seen by reason of its color, so is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body will be so subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen, and not seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the case of Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the spirit's will that it will be able to be in a little or great place, and to have a little or great quantity at will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 30) that "whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself." Now the glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place equal to itself.

Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. 30,76,77. Therefore if the place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would be greater and smaller than itself, which is absurd.

I answer that, A body is not related to place save through the medium of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is confined through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not possible for a body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless its proper quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser. Some have held this to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying that quantity is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they are able to have a great quantity, and when they list a small quantity. But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detriment [*Cf. [5088]FS, Q[22], A[1]; [5089]FS, Q[41], A[1]] of its substance. Hence in incorruptible, i.e. heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement, which is not according to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that change of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the impassibility and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great dimensions and sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity of a glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glorified body insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in quantity however small it may become. And some have held this to be the case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in like manner its parts can be one within the other, so much so that a whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening in another body: and thus they explain how Christ’s body came out of the Virgin’s womb; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being shut. But this is impossible; both because the glorified body will not be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with another body, and because, even if it were able to be in the same place with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a glorified body, as many say; and again because this would be inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which requires the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified body will always be in a place equal to itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of the Altar, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 10, Q[1], A[1], ad 5; [5090]TP, Q[77], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's argument is that for the same reason one part might permeate another. But this permeation of the parts of a glorified body into one another is impossible, as stated above. Therefore the objection does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body. Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen when it will [*Cf. [5091]TP, Q[55], A[4]]. On the other hand, being in a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason of its quantity, as being seen is by reason of its color. Consequently the comparison fails.

Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.): "What is palpable must needs be corruptible." But the glorified body is incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles it. But that which can be in the same place with another does not resist it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another body, it will not be palpable.

Objection 3: Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of equality, it would seem that they are impalpable.

On the contrary, our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His body was palpable, as appears from Lk. 24:39: "Handle, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones.” Therefore the glorified bodies also will be palpable.

Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said that in the glory of the resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.

I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this, resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities, and on account of its resisting that which touches it, so as to hinder it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light bodies, which through being contrary to one another are therefore corruptible, it follows that the heavenly bodies, which by their nature are incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible, and therefore neither are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that “whatever is palpable must needs be corruptible.” Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature those qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner it is competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although, according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang.) that “our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete proof that after His resurrection His body was unchanged in nature though changed in glory.”

Reply to Objection 1: The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of that nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated above. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Although in a way it is possible for a glorified body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless the glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one touching it, and thus it is palpable.

Reply to Objection 3: In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as is most becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore the touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.

OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?

(2) Whether they will move?

(3) Whether they will move instantaneously?

Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?

Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile. For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds “to meet Christ, into the air” (1 Thess. 4:16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not be agile.

Objection 2: Further, no body that moves with labor and pain can be said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the principle of their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to their nature, else they would always move in the same direction. Therefore they are not agile.

Objection 3: Further, of all the animal operations sense surpasses movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to glorified bodies as perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither should agility be ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement.

Objection 4: Further, nature gives different animals instruments of different disposition according to their different powers: hence she does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet animals. Now God’s works are much more orderly than those of nature. Since then the glorified body’s members will have the same disposition, shape and quantity as they now have, it would seem that it will have no agility other than it has now.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:43): “It is sown in weakness, it shall rise in power,” that is, according to a gloss, “mobile and living.” But mobility can only signify agility in movement. Therefore the glorified bodies will be agile.

Further, slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will be most spiritual according to 1 Cor. 15:44. Therefore they will be agile.

I answer that, The glorified body will be altogether subject to the glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam’s body, but also from the glorified soul there will flow into the body a certain perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection: and this perfection is called “the gift of the glorified body.” Now the soul is united to body not only as its form, but also as its mover; and in both ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to the glorified soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the movements and actions of the soul.

Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i.e. the heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem probable ([5092]Q[82], A[1];[5093] Q[83], A[1]). Wherefore it is better to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.

Reply to Objection 1: Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in order to signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will show them.

Reply to Objection 2: The more the power of the moving soul dominates over the body, the less is the labor of movement, even though it be counter to the body’s nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is stronger, and those who through exercise have the body more adapted to obey the moving spirit, labor less in being moved. And since, after the resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate the body, both on account of the perfection of its own power, and on account of the glorified body’s aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which it receives from the soul, there will be no labor in the saints’ movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies of the saints’ will be agile.

Reply to Objection 3: By the gift of agility the glorified body will be rendered apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and for the execution of all the other operations of the soul.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as nature gives to fleeter animals instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity, so God will give to the bodies of the saints a disposition other than that which they have now, not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that property of glory which is called agility.

Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 2), “movement is the act of the imperfect.” But there will be no imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any movement.

Objection 2: Further, all movement is on account of some need, because whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu et Anima, lxiii [*Cf.[5094] Q[70], A[2], ad 1]), “all thou willest will be there, and nothing that thou willest not.” Therefore they will not move.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo ii), “that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares it more excellently than that which shares it with movement.” Now the glorified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently than any other body. Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will remain altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human bodies remain so.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii) that the soul being established in God will in consequence establish its body. Now the soul will be so established in God, that in no way will it move away from Him. Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused by the soul.

Objection 5: Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place is due to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the most exalted of all has the highest place of all, according to Heb. 7:26, "Made higher than the heavens," where a gloss [*Gloss on Heb. 1:3: "On the right hand of the majesty"] says, "in place and dignity." And again each glorified body will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions pertaining to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory of the saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because they will then have reached the final term of all, it would seem that their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and consequently will not be moved.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 40:31): "They shall run and not be weary, they shall walk and not faint"; and (Wis. 3:7): "(The just) shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds." Therefore there will be some movement in glorified bodies.

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was moved in His ascension, and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth, will ascend to the empyrean [*The empyrean was the highest of the concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers with the abode of God. Cf. [5095]FP, Q[56], A[3]]. But even after they have climbed the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice that which is in their power, they may show forth the excellence of Divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that which is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will nowise diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be everywhere present to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.) that "wherever they are sent their course lies in God."

Reply to Objection 1: Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic to a thing, but only that which is without namely place. Hence that which is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within (Phys. viii, 7), although it has an imperfection as to place, because while it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, for this belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is formed from nothing. Hence such like defects will remain in glorified bodies.

Reply to Objection 2: A person is said to need a thing in two ways, namely absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without which one cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a thing relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they will be unable to show forth their motive power practically, unless they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in glorified bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would prove if the glorified body were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption, which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 4: Local movement takes nothing away from the stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 5: The fitting place assigned to each glorified body according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, not as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.

Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?

Objection 1: It would seem that movement of the saints will be instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever the spirit listeth there will the body be." Now the movement of the will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous. Therefore the body's movement will be instantaneous.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time must needs be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified body since this can be in the same place with another body, no matter how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body. Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.

Objection 3: Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul moves the body instantaneously.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that "the glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun's ray." Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously.

Objection 5: Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not be moved in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6. Therefore this movement will be instantaneous.

On the contrary, In local movement space. movement and time are equally divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore this movement will not be instantaneous.

Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is in motion is partly in a term "wherefrom" and partly in a term "whereto," as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in motion is wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed; and it is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of a glorified body cannot be instantaneous.

I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to another.

Hence others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, Q[23], mem. 3] say that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion; and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is past. Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is either nowhere, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being in some way in the intervening space. for since B is a place distant from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth. Therefore it follows that Z does not pass form A to B unless first of all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement. The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only one positive term, the other being a pure privation, since between affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance: wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that causes either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved is wholly under a negation it is changed into affirmation, and “vice versa”; wherefore in such things “to be changing precedes to be changed,” as is proved in Phys. vi, 5. Nor is there any comparison with the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another, unless it pass through every interval.

Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together, namely in the ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which is impossible.

To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures the instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a different way does not make it possible for one point of place to contain things that are locally distant from one another.

Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility of time, no matter how short a space we may take.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is little lacking is as it were not lacking at all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we say: “I do so and so at once,” when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that “wheresoever the will shall be, there shall the body be forthwith.” Or we may say that in the blessed there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body will be in whatever place the will shall determine.

Reply to Objection 2: Some have demurred to this proposition of the Philosopher’s, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed, either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although there be no resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.

But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [*The same applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 + 1 is not as 2 to 4.] And so there would not be the same proportion between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a part of the total line.

Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is we must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power, but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something extrinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat, since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one another. Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the mover; and such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals.

Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and the Philosopher’s argument does not apply to these, since if there be no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine another body more subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the less it resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance of both movable and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will add no retardation to the movement.

It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have said in reference to the heavenly bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable to the mover, that results from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through having an opposite place and its resistance is all the greater, according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away from a body its being in some place or position, except one deprive it of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position: wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can nowise be moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.

Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible, just as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.

Reply to Objection 5: Although after the resurrection the time which is the measure of the heaven’s movement will be no more, there will nevertheless be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of movement.

OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?

(2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?

(3) Whether a glorified body will of necessity be seen by a non-glorified body?

Whether clarity is becoming to the glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that clarity is unbecoming to the glorified body. Because according to Avicenna (Natural. vi, 2), “every luminous body consists of transparent parts.” But the parts of a glorified body will not be transparent, since in some of them, such as flesh and bones, earth is predominant. Therefore glorified bodies are not lightsome.

Objection 2: Further, every lightsome body hides one that is behind it; wherefore one luminary behind another is eclipsed, and a flame of fire prevents one seeing what is behind it. But the glorified bodies will not hide that which is within them, for as Gregory says on Job 28:17, “Gold or crystal cannot equal it” (Moral. xviii, 48). “There,” that is in the heavenly country, “the grossness of the members will not hide one’s mind from another’s eyes, and the very harmony of the body will be evident to the bodily sight.” Therefore those bodies will not be lightsome.

Objection 3: Further, light and color require a contrary disposition in their subject, since “light is the extreme point of visibility in an indeterminate body; color, in a determinate body” (De Sensu et Sensato iii). But glorified bodies will have color, for as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 3), “the body’s beauty is harmony of parts with a certain charm of color”: and it will be impossible for the glorified bodies to lack beauty. Therefore the glorified bodies will not be lightsome.

Objection 4: Further, if there be clarity in the glorified bodies, it will need to be equal in all the parts of the body, just as all the parts will be equally impassible, subtle and agile. But this is not becoming, since one part has a greater disposition to clarity than another, for instance the eye than the hand, the spirits [*”Animalem,” as though it were derived from “animus”—the mind. Cf. [5096]FS, Q[50], A[1],3m; [5097]FS, Q[52], A[1] ,3m] than the bones, the humors than the flesh or nerves. Therefore it would seem unfitting for those bodies to be lightsome.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 13:43): “The just shall shine as the sun in the kingdom of their Father,” and (Wis. 3:7): “The just shall shine, and shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds.”

Further, it is written (1 Cor. 15:43): “It is sown in dishonor, it shall rise in glory,” which refers to clarity, as evidenced by the previous context where the glory of the rising bodies is compared to the clarity of the stars. Therefore the bodies of the saints will be lightsome.

I answer that, It is necessary to assert that after the resurrection the bodies of the saints will be lightsome, on account of the authority of Scripture which makes this promise. But the cause of this clarity is ascribed by some to the fifth or heavenly essence, which will then predominate in the human body. Since, however, this is absurd, as we have often remarked ([5098]Q[84], A[1]), it is better to say that this clarity will result from the overflow of the soul’s glory into the body. For whatever is received into anything is received not according to the mode of the source whence it flows, but according to the mode of the recipient. Wherefore clarity which in the soul is spiritual is received into the body as corporeal. And consequently according to the greater clarity of the soul by reason of its greater merit, so too will the body differ in clarity, as the Apostle affirms (1 Cor. 15:41). Thus in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal vessel, as Gregory says on Job 28:17, “Gold or crystal cannot equal it.”

Reply to Objection 1: Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by merit of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency. Wherefore seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent and lightsome;

for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however, clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: and the density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as neither does the density of a crystal deprive crystal.

Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of Gregory.

Reply to Objection 3: The glory of the body will not destroy nature but will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it will have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies which have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there otherwise than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto by their nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body, for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their regard.

Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified eye?

Objection 1: It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye.

Objection 2: Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also will then be greater than it is now, according to Is. 30:26, and the clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which reason the sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.

Objection 3: Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the disciples who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a non-glorified eye.

On the contrary, A gloss on Phil. 3:21, "Made like to the body of His glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the Transfiguration." Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be visible to non-glorified eyes also.

Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the glory of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But they would not fully see their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle. But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally, because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight, and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog [*The dog star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no other dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.

Reply to Objection 1: The clarity of glory will differ generically from the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species. Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species, proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as a glorified body is not passible to a passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul [*Cf. Q[82], A[1]], so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight, in so far as it acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits* asunder. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"—the mind. Cf. [5099]FS, Q[50], A[1] ,3m; [5100]FS, Q[52], A[1],3m.] Hence, though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes it: wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11).

Reply to Objection 3: The clarity of the glorified body results from the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as to be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide it: and this was the opinion of Praepositivus.

Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be lightsome. Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things. Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, every body which hides other bodies that are behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will be a colored body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.

On the contrary, our body will be glorified in being made like to the body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the sight of the disciples at Emmaus (Lk. 24:31). Therefore neither will the glorified body be necessarily seen.

Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will. Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.

I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not acting on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection being changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.

Reply to Objection 1: This clarity will be obedient to the glorified body so that this will be able to show it or hide it.

Reply to Objection 2: A body's color does not prevent its being transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight cannot be affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive them both perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will be completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide a body that is behind it.

Reply to Objection 3: Quantity is inherent to the glorified body itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the soul's command.

OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?

(2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?

(3) Whether they will be impassible?

Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.

Objection 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will their deformity be taken away.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): “The dead shall rise again incorruptible”; where a gloss says: “The dead, i.e. sinners, or all the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i.e. without the loss of any limbs.” Therefore the wicked will rise again without their deformities.

Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without these defects.

I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place—which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two opinions on this point. For some say that such like deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die under perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above ([5101]Q[81], A[1]). Consequently those who had natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not, while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world; which is absurd.

Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will wholly restore the body’s nature at the resurrection. Wherefore whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever, purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but the Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the good and the wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked will not exclude all good, because "if a thing be wholly evil it destroys itself," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5). Hence it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its species.

Reply to Objection 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.

Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically. Therefore they will be corruptible.

Objection 2: Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the Philosopher declares

(Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be withdrawn from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): “In those days men shall seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them.”

Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment both in soul and body (Mat. 25:46): “These shall go into everlasting punishment.” But this would not be possible if their bodies were corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.

I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account of the nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two ways. First by the total removal of the principle which leads to corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation, is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on [5102](A[3]), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one thing another is generated.

Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because the conflicting qualities that exist in man’s body were withheld by the grace of innocence from conducing to the body’s dissolution: and much more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the bodies of the blessed.

Reply to Objection 1: The contraries of which bodies are composed are conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of contraries to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it: whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in accordance with nature.

Reply to Objection 2: This incorruptibility will result from nature, not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle of corruption, as shown above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although death is simply the greatest of punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal of death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), “Life is pleasant to all, for all desire to be . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt life, nor one passed in sorrow.” Accordingly just as life is simply pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death, which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest of punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and consequently the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making them everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in “everlasting death,” according to the Psalm (48:15): “Death shall feed upon them.”

Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), “increase of passion results in loss of substance.” Now “if a finite thing be continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away” (Phys. i, 4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and this has been shown to be false [5103](A[2]). Therefore they will be impassible.

Objection 2: Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in likening them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the fire, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 3: Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi, 2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: which would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore, etc.

Objection 4: Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): “And we shall be changed”: and a gloss says: “We—the good alone—will be changed with the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory.”

Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies of the damned will be punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore they will be passible.

I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not being consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is served also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion, corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of another. For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its natural being, just as the air receives heat from fire materially; and corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion which we call “passion of nature.” In another way one thing is received into another spiritually by way of an “intention,” just as the likeness of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things: wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of passion which we call “passion of the soul.” Since therefore after the resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be impossible for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated above [5104](A[2]), it will not be possible for any body to be passive with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the variety of colors to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner patient to sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned, which for this reason are said to be passible.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the passion whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the agent is in the patient in two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent, and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into the patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman. On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on the wall wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue, because the species which is in the fire materially is received spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming them withal.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (De Prop. Element.), “no animal can live in fire.” Galen also (De simp. medic.) says “that there is no body which at length is not consumed by fire”; although sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since it cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the hearing.

Reply to Objection 4: Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the resurrection it will be impossible for the body to be changed from its natural disposition, as stated above [5105](A[2]). Consequently, however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the soul.

TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS (QQ[86]-99)

OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the knowledge, which after rising again, men will have at the judgment, concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world and of those who will have risen again.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins?

(2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another's conscience?

(3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and demerits?

Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has committed?

Objection 1: It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be able to know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know, either we receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the treasure house of the memory. Now after the resurrection men will be unable to perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will be things of the past, while sense perceives only the present: and many sins will have escaped the sinner's memory, and he will be unable to recall them from the treasure house of his memory. Therefore after rising again one will not be cognizant of all the sins one has committed.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), that "there are certain books of the conscience, wherein each one's merits are inscribed." Now one cannot read a thing in a book, unless it be marked down in the book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience according to a gloss of Origen on Rom. 2:15, "Their conscience bearing witness," etc. which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt or stain. Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of many sins is blotted out by grace, it would seem that one cannot read in one's conscience all the sins one has committed: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 3: Further, the greater the cause the greater the effect. Now the cause which makes us grieve for the sins which we recall to memory is charity. Since then charity is perfect in the saints after the resurrection, they will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they recall them to memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to Apoc. 21:4, "Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from them." [*The quotation is from Is. 35:10. The text of the Apocalypse has: "Nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more."] Therefore they will not recall their own sins to memory.

Objection 4: Further, at the resurrection the damned will be to the good they once did as the blessed to the sins they once committed. Now seemingly the damned after rising again will have no knowledge of the good they once did, since this would alleviate their pain considerably. Neither therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins they had committed.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that "a kind of Divine energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all of our sins to mind."

Further, as human judgment is to external evidence, so is the Divine judgment to the witness of the conscience, according to 1 Kings 16:7, "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." Now man cannot pass a perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence be taken on all the points that need to be judged. Therefore, since the Divine judgment is most perfect, it is necessary for the conscience to witness to everything that has to be judged. But all works, both good and evil, will have to be judged (2 Cor. 5:10): "We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil." Therefore each one's conscience must needs retain all the works he has done, whether good or evil.

I answer that, According to Rom. 2:15,16, “In the day when God shall judge” each one’s conscience will bear witness to him and his thoughts will accuse and defend him. And since in every judicial hearing, the witness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted with the matter on which judgment has to be pronounced, and since at the general judgment all the works of men will be submitted to judgment, it will behoove every man to be cognizant then of all his works. Wherefore each man’s conscience will be as a book containing his deeds on which judgment will be pronounced, even as in the human court of law we make use of records. Of these books it is written in the Apocalypse (20:12): “The books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life; and the dead were judged by those things which were written in the books [Vulg.: ‘book’], according to their works.” According to Augustine’s exposition (De Civ. Dei xx) the books which are here said to be opened “denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments in whom God’s commandments are exemplified.” Hence Richard of St. Victor (De judic. potest.) says: “Their hearts will be like the code of law.” But the book of life, of which the text goes on to speak, signifies each one’s conscience, which is said to be one single book, because the one Divine power will cause all to recall their deeds, and this energy, in so far as it reminds a man of his deeds, is called the “book of life” [*Cf. [5106]FP, Q[24], A[1], ad 1]. Or else we may refer the first books to the conscience, and by the second book we may understand the Judge’s sentence as expressed in His providence.

Reply to Objection 1: Although many merits and demerits will have escaped our memory, yet there will be none of them but will remain somewhat in its effect, because those merits which are not deadened will remain in the reward accorded to them, while those that are deadened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those demerits which are not blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of punishment due to them, while those which have been blotted out by repentance remain in the remembrance of repentance, which they will recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man there will be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds. Nevertheless, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx), the Divine energy will especially conduce to this.

Reply to Objection 2: Each one's conscience will bear certain marks of the deeds done by him; and it does not follow that these marks are the guilt alone, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although charity is now the cause of sorrow for sin, yet the saints in heaven will be so full of joy, that they will have no room for sorrow; and so they will not grieve for their sins, but rather will they rejoice in the Divine mercy, whereby their sins are forgiven them. Even so do the angels rejoice now in the Divine justice whereby those whom they guard fall headlong into sin through being abandoned by grace. and whose salvation none the less they eagerly watch over.

Reply to Objection 4: The wicked will know all the good they have done, and this will not diminish their pain; indeed, it will increase it, because the greatest sorrow is to have lost many goods: for which reason Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "the greatest misfortune is to have been happy."

Whether every one will be able to read all that is in another's conscience?

Objection 1: It seems that it will be impossible for every one to read all that is in another's conscience. For the knowledge of those who rise again will not be clearer than that of the angels, equality with whom is promised us after the resurrection (Mat. 22:30). Now angels cannot read one another's thoughts in matters dependent on the free-will, wherefore they need to speak in order to notify such things to one another [*Cf. FP, Q[107]]. Therefore after rising again we shall be unable to read what is contained in another's conscience.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known either in itself, or in its cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or demerits contained in a person's conscience cannot be known by another in themselves, because God alone enters the heart and reads its secrets. Neither will it be possible for them to be known in their cause, since all will not see God Who alone can act on the will, whence merits and demerits proceed. Nor again will it be possible to know them from their effect, since there will be many demerits, which through being wholly blotted out by repentance will leave no effect remaining. Therefore it will not be possible for every one to know all that is in another’s conscience.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi in Ep. ad Hebr.), as we have quoted before (Sent. iv, D, 17): “If thou remember thy sins now, and frequently confess them before Cod and beg pardon for them, thou wilt very soon blot them out; but if thou forget them, thou wilt then remember them unwillingly, when they will be made public, and declared before all thy friends and foes, and in the presence of the holy angels.” Hence it follows that this publication will be the punishment of man’s neglect in omitting to confess his sins. Therefore the sins which a man has confessed will not be made known to others.

Objection 4: Further, it is a relief to know that one has had many associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof. If therefore every one were to know the sin of another, each sinner’s shame would be much diminished, which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not know the sins of all.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, “will . . . bring to light the hidden things of darkness,” says: “Deeds and thoughts both good and evil will then be revealed and made known to all.”

Further, the past sins of all the good will be equally blotted out. Yet we know the sins of some saints, for instance of Magdalen, Peter, and David. Therefore in like manner the sins of the other elect will be known, and much more those of the damned.

I answer that, At the last and general judgment it behooves the Divine justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to appear evidently to all. Now the sentence of one who condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless it be delivered according to merits and demerits. Therefore just as it behooves both judge and jury to know the merits of a case, in order to deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in order that the sentence appear to be just, that all who know the sentence should be acquainted with the merits. Hence, since every one will know of his reward or condemnation, so will every one else know of it, and consequently as each one will recall his own merits or demerits, so will he be cognizant of those of others. This is the more probable and more common opinion, although the Master (Sent. iv, D, 43) says the contrary, namely that a man’s sins blotted out by repentance will not be made known to others at the judgment. But it would follow from this that neither would his repentance for these sins be perfectly known, which would detract considerably from the glory of the saints and the praise due to God for having so mercifully delivered them.

Reply to Objection 1: All the preceding merits or demerits will come to a certain amount in the glory or unhappiness of each one rising again. Consequently through eternal things being seen, all things in their consciences will be visible, especially as the Divine power will conduce to this so that the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.

Reply to Objection 2: It will be possible for a man's merits or demerits to be made known by their effects as stated above (A[1], ad 1), or by the power of God, although the power of the created intellect is not sufficient for this.

Reply to Objection 3: The manifestation of his sins to the confusion of the sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to confess them. But that the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be to their confusion or shame, as neither does it bring confusion to Mary Magdalen that her sins are publicly recalled in the Church, because shame is "fear of disgrace," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), and this will be impossible in the blessed. But this manifestation will bring them great glory on account of the penance they did, even as the confessor hails a man who courageously confesses great crimes. Sins are said to be blotted out because God sees them not for the purpose of punishing them.

Reply to Objection 4: The sinner's confusion will not be diminished, but on the contrary increased, through his seeing the sins of others, for in seeing that others are blameworthy he will all the more acknowledge himself to be blamed. For that confusion be diminished by a cause of this kind is owing to the fact that shame regards the esteem of men, who esteem more lightly that which is customary. But then confusion will regard the esteem of God, which weighs every sin according to the truth, whether it be the sin of one man or of many.

Whether all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance. For things considered singly are not seen at one glance. Now the damned will consider their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they say (Wis. 5:8): “What hath pride profited us?” Therefore they will not see them all at a glance.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that “we do not arrive at understanding several things at the same time.” Now merits and demerits, both our own and those of others, will not be visible save to the intellect. Therefore it will be impossible for them all to be seen at the same time.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect of the damned after the resurrection will not be clearer than the intellect of the blessed and of the angels is now, as to the natural knowledge whereby they know things by innate species. Now by such knowledge the angels do not see several things at the same time. Therefore neither will the damned be able then to see all their deeds at the same time.

On the contrary, A gloss on Job 8:22, “They . . . shall be clothed with confusion,” says: “As soon as they shall see the Judge, all their evil deeds will stand before their eyes.” Now they will see the Judge suddenly. Therefore in like manner will they see the evil they have done, and for the same reason all others.

Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) considers it unfitting that at the judgment a material book should be read containing the deeds of each individual written therein, for the reason that it would be impossible to measure the size of such a book, or the time it would take to read. But in like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length of time one would require in order to consider all one’s merits and demerits and those of others, if one saw these various things one after the other. Therefore we must admit that each one sees them all at the same time.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that one will see all merits and demerits, both one’s own and those of others, at the same time in an instant. This is easily credible with regard to the blessed, since they will see all things in the Word: and consequently it is not unreasonable that they should see several things at the same time. But with regard to the damned, a difficulty presents itself, since their intellect is not raised so that they can see God and all else in Him. Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all their sins and those of others generically at the same time: and this suffices for the accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment; but that they will not see them all down to each single one at the same time. But neither does this seem consonant with the words of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx), who says that they will count them all with one glance of the mind; and what is known generically is not counted. Hence we may choose a middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine power coming to their aid. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) that “they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity.” Nor is this impossible, since in a space of time, however short, is potentially an infinite number of instants. This suffices for the replies to the objections on either side of the question.

OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there will be a general judgment?

(2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of mouth?

(3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time?

(4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat?

Whether there will be a general judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that there will not be a general judgment. For according to Nahum 1:9, following the Septuagint version, “God will not judge the same thing a second time.” But God judges now of mans’ every work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in this life for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

Objection 2: Further, in no judicial inquiry is the sentence carried cut before judgment is pronounced. But the sentence of the Divine judgment on man regards the acquisition of the kingdom or exclusion from the kingdom (Mat. 25:34, 41). Therefore since some obtain possession of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for ever, it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why certain things are submitted to judgment is that we may come to a decision about them. Now before the end of the world each of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each of the blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:41): “The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it.” Therefore there will be a judgment after the resurrection.

Further, it is written (Jn. 5:29): “They that have done good things shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment.” Therefore it would seem that after the resurrection there will be a judgment.

I answer that, Just as operation refers to the beginning wherefrom things receive their being, so judgment belongs to the term, wherein they are brought to their end. Now we distinguish a twofold operation in God. One is that whereby He first gave things their being, by fashioning their nature and by establishing the distinctions which contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God is stated to have rested (Gn. 2:2). His other operation is that whereby He works in governing creatures; and of this it is written (Jn. 5:17): “My Father worketh until now; and I work.” Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to the work of governance which cannot be without judgment: and by this judgment each one is judged individually according to his works, not only as adapted to himself, but also as adapted to the government of the universe. Hence one man’s reward is delayed for the good of others (Heb. 11:13, 39, 40), and the punishment of one conduces to the profit of another. Consequently it is necessary that there should be another, and that a general judgment corresponding on the other hand with the first formation of things in being, in order that, to wit, just as then all things proceeded immediately from God, so at length the world will receive its ultimate complement, by each one receiving finally his own personal due. Hence at this judgment the Divine justice will be made manifest in all things, whereas now it remains hidden, for as much as at times some persons are dealt with for the profit of others, otherwise than their manifest works would seem to require. For this same reason there will then be a general separation of the good from the wicked, because there will be no further motive for the good to profit by the wicked, or the wicked by the good: for the sake of which profit the good are meanwhile mingled with the wicked, so long as this state of life is governed by Divine providence.

Reply to Objection 1: Each man is both an individual person and a part of the whole human race: wherefore a twofold judgment is due to him. One, the particular judgment, is that to which he will be subjected after death, when he will receive according as he hath done in the body [*Cf. 2 Cor. 5:10], not indeed entirely but only in part since he will receive not in the body but only in the soul. The other judgment will be passed on him as a part of the human race: thus a man is said to be judged according to human justice, even when judgment is pronounced on the community of which he is a part. Hence at the general judgment of the whole human race by the general separation of the good from the wicked, it follows that each one will be judged. And yet God will not judge “the same thing a second time,” since He will not inflict two punishments for one sin, and the punishment which before the judgment was not inflicted completely will be completed at the last judgment, after which the wicked will be tormented at the same time in body and soul.

Reply to Objection 2: The sentence proper to this general judgment is the general separation of the good from the wicked, which will not precede this judgment. Yet even now, as regards the particular sentence on each individual, the judgment does not at once take full effect since even the good will receive an increase of reward after the judgment, both from the added glory of the body and from the completion of the number of the saints. The wicked also will receive an increase of torment from the added punishment of the body and from the completion of the number of damned to be punished, because the more numerous those with whom they will burn, the more will they themselves burn.

Reply to Objection 3: The general judgment will regard more directly the generality of men than each individual to be judged, as stated above. Wherefore although before that judgment each one will be certain of his condemnation or reward, he will not be cognizant of the condemnation or reward of everyone else. Hence the necessity of the general judgment.

Whether the judgment will take place by word of mouth?

Objection 1: It would seem that this judgment, as regards the inquiry and sentence, will take place by word of mouth. For according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) “it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last.” But it would not be uncertain if the things we are told will take place at the judgment were to be accomplished only in the mind. Therefore this judgment will take place by word of mouth and not only in the mind.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xxvi): “Those at least will hear the words of the Judge, who have confessed their faith in Him by words.” Now this cannot be understood as referring to the inner word, because thus all will hear the Judge’s words, since all the deeds of other men will be known to all both good and wicked. Therefore it seems that this judgment will take place by word of mouth.

Objection 3: Further, Christ will judge according to His human form, so as to be visible in the body to all. Therefore in like manner it seems that He will speak with the voice of the body, so as to be heard by all.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that the book of life which is mentionedApoc. 20:12, 15 “is a kind of Divine energy enabling each one to remember all his good or evil works, and to discern them with the gaze of the mind, with wondrous rapidity, his knowledge accusing or defending his conscience, so that all and each will be judged at the same moment.” But if each one’s merits were discussed by word of mouth, all and each could not be judged at the same moment. Therefore it would seem that this judgment will not take place by word of mouth.

Further, the sentence should correspond proportionately to the evidence. Now the evidence both of accusation and of defense will be mental, according to Rom. 2:15,16, “Their conscience bearing witness to them, and their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men.” Therefore seemingly, this sentence and the entire judgment will take place mentally.

I answer that, It is not possible to come to any certain conclusion about the truth of this question. It is, however, the more probable opinion that the whole of this judgment, whether as regards the inquiry, or as regards the accusation of the wicked and the approval of the good or again as regards the sentence on both, will take place mentally. For if the deeds of each individual were to be related by word of mouth, this would require an inconceivable length of time. Thus Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that “if we suppose the book, from the pages of which all will be judged according to Apoc. 20, to be a material book, who will be able to conceive its size and length? or the length of time required for the reading of a book that contains the entire life of every individual?” Nor is less time requisite for telling by word of mouth the deeds of each individual, than for reading them if they were written in a material book. Hence, probably we should understand that the details set forth in Mat. 25 will be fulfilled not by word of mouth but mentally.

Reply to Objection 1: The reason why Augustine says that “it is uncertain how many days this judgment will last” is precisely because it is not certain whether it will take place mentally or by word of mouth. For if it were to take place by word of mouth, a considerable time would be necessary. but if mentally, it is possible for it to be accomplished in an instant.

Reply to Objection 2: Even if the judgment is accomplished solely in the mind, the saying of Gregory stands, since though all will be cognizant of their own and of others’ deeds, as a result of the Divine energy which the Gospel describes as speech (Mat. 25:84–46), nevertheless those who have had the faith which they received through God’s words will be judged from those very words, for it is written (Rom. 2:12): “Whosoever have sinned in the Law shall be judged by the Law.” Hence in a special way something will be said to those who had been believers, which will not be said to unbelievers.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ will appear in body, so that the Judge may be recognized in the body by all, and it is possible for this to take place suddenly. But speech which is measured by time would require an immense length of time, if the judgment took place by word of mouth.

Whether the time of the future judgment is unknown?

Objection 1: It would seem that the time of the future judgment is not unknown. For just as the holy Fathers looked forward to the first coming, so do we look forward to the second. But the holy Fathers knew the time of the first coming, as proved by the number of weeks mentioned in Daniel 9: wherefore the Jews are reproached for not knowing the time of Christ’s coming (Lk. 12:56): “You hypocrites, you know how to discern the face of the heaven and of the earth, but how is it that you do not discern this time?”

Therefore it would seem that the time of the second coming when God will come to judgment should also be certified to us.

Objection 2: Further, we arrive by means of signs at the knowledge of the things signified. Now many signs of the coming judgment are declared to us in Scripture (Mat. 24, Mk. 13, Lk. 21). Therefore we can arrive at the knowledge of that time.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:11): “It is on us [*’These things . . . are written for our correction, upon whom the ends of the world are come’] that the ends of the world are come,” and (1 Jn. 2:18): “Little children, it is the last hour,” etc. Since then it is a long time since these things were said, it would seem that now at least we can know that the last judgment is nigh.

Objection 4: Further, there is no need for the time of the judgment to be hidden, except that each one may be careful to prepare himself for judgment, being in ignorance of the appointed time. Yet the same care would still be necessary even were the time known for certain, because each one is uncertain about the time of his death, of which Augustine says (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix) that “as each one’s last day finds him, so will the world’s last day find him.” Therefore there is no necessity for the time of the judgment to be uncertain.

On the contrary, It is written (Mk. 13:32): “Of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the angels in heaven, nor the Son, but the Father.” The Son, however, is said not to know in so far as He does not impart the knowledge to us.

Further, it is written (1 Thess. 5:2): “The day of the Lord shall so come as a thief in the night.” Therefore seemingly, as the coming of a thief in the night is altogether uncertain, the day of the last judgment is altogether uncertain.

I answer that, God is the cause of things by His knowledge [*Cf. [5107]FP, Q[14], A[8]]. Now He communicates both these things to His creatures, since He both endows some with the power of action on others whereof they are the cause, and bestows on some the knowledge of things. But in both cases He reserves something to Himself, for He operates certain things wherein no creature co-operates with Him, and again He knows certain things which are unknown to any mere creature. Now this should apply to none more than to those things which are subject to the Divine power alone, and in which no creature co-operates with Him. Such is the end of the world when the day of judgment will come. For the world will come to an end by no created cause, even as it derived its existence immediately from God. Wherefore the knowledge of the end of the world is fittingly reserved to God. Indeed our Lord seems to assign this very reason when He said (Acts 1:7): “It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power,” as though He were to say, “which are reserved to His power alone.”

Reply to Objection 1: At His first coming Christ came secretly according to Is. 45:15, “Verily Thou art a hidden God, the God of Israel, the Saviour.” Hence, that He might be recognized by believers, it was necessary for the time to be fixed beforehand with certainty. On the other hand, at the second coming, He will come openly, according to Ps. 49:3, “God shall come manifestly.” Consequently there can be no error affecting the knowledge of His coming. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says, in his letter to Hesychius concerning the day of judgment (Ep. cxcix), “the signs mentioned in the Gospels do not all refer to the second advent which will happen at the end of the world, but some of them belong to the time of the sack of Jerusalem, which is now a thing of the past, while some, in fact many of them, refer to the advent whereby He comes daily to the Church, whom He visits spiritually when He dwells in us by faith and love.” Moreover, the details mentioned in the Gospels and Epistles in connection with the last advent are not sufficient to enable us to determine the time of the judgment, for the trials that are foretold as announcing the proximity of Christ’s coming occurred even at the time of the Early Church, in a degree sometimes more sometimes less marked; so that even the days of the apostles were called the last days (Acts 2:17) when Peter expounded the saying of Joel 2:28, “It shall come to pass in the last days,” etc., as referring to that time. Yet it was already a long time since then: and sometimes there were more and sometimes less afflictions in the Church. Consequently it is impossible to decide after how long a time it will take place, nor fix the month, year, century, or thousand years as Augustine says in the same book (Ep. ad Hesych. cxcix). And even if we are to believe that at the end these calamities will be more frequent, it is impossible to fix what amount of such calamities will immediately precede the judgment day or the coming of

Antichrist, since even at the time of the Early Church persecutions were so bitter, and the corruptions of error were so numerous, that some looked forward to the coming of Antichrist as being near or imminent; as related in Eusebius' History of the Church (vi, 7) and in Jerome's book De Viris Illustribus lii.

Reply to Objection 3: The statement, "It is the last hour" and similar expressions that are to be found in Scripture do not enable us to know the exact length of time. For they are not intended to indicate a short length of time, but to signify the last state of the world, which is the last age of all, and it is not stated definitely how long this will last. Thus neither is fixed duration appointed to old age, which is the last age of man, since sometimes it is seen to last as long as or even longer than all the previous ages, as Augustine remarks (Qq. 83, qu. lviii). Hence also the Apostle (2 Thess. 2:2) disclaims the false signification which some had given to his words, by believing that the day of the Lord was already at hand.

Reply to Objection 4: Notwithstanding the uncertainty of death, the uncertainty of the judgment conduces to watchfulness in two ways. First, as regards the thing ignored, since its delay is equal to the length of man's life, so that on either side uncertainty provokes him to greater care. Secondly, for the reason that a man is careful not only of his own person, but also of his family, or of his city or kingdom, or of the whole Church, the length of whose duration is not dependent on the length of man's life. And yet it behooves each of these to be so ordered that the day of the Lord find us not unprepared.

Whether the judgment will take place in the valley of Josaphat?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judgment will not take place in the valley of Josaphat or in the surrounding locality. For at least it will be necessary for those to be judged to stand on the ground, and those alone to be raised aloft whose business it will be to judge. But the whole land of promise would not be able to contain the multitude of those who are to be judged. Therefore it is impossible for the judgment to take place in the neighborhood of that valley.

Objection 2: Further, to Christ in His human form judgment is given that He may judge justly, since He was judged unjustly in the court of Pilate, and bore the sentence of an unjust judgment on Golgotha. Therefore these places would be more suitably appointed for the judgment.

Objection 3: Further, clouds result from the exhalation of vapors. But then there will be no evaporation or exhalation. Therefore it will be impossible for the just to be “taken up . . . in the clouds to meet Christ, into the air”: and consequently it will be necessary for both good and wicked to be on the earth, so that a much larger place than this valley will be required.

On the contrary, It is written (Joel 3:2): “I will gather together all nations and will bring them down into the valley of Josaphat, and I will plead with them there.”

Further, it is written (Acts 1:11): “(This Jesus) . . . shall so come as you have seen Him going into heaven.” Now He ascended into heaven from Mount Olivet which overlooks the valley of Josaphat. Therefore He will come to judge in the neighborhood of that place.

I answer that, We cannot know with any great certainty the manner in which this judgment will take place, nor how men will gather together to the place of judgment; but it may be gathered from Scripture that in all probability He will descend in the neighborhood of Mount Olivet, even as He ascended from there, so as to show that He who descends is the same as He who ascended.

Reply to Objection 1: A great multitude can be enclosed in a small space. And all that is required is that in the neighborhood of that locality there be a space, however great, to contain the multitude of those who are to be judged, provided that Christ can be seen thence since being raised in the air, and shining with exceeding glory, He will be visible from a great distance.

Reply to Objection 2: Although through being sentenced unjustly Christ merited His judiciary power, He will not judge with the appearance of infirmity wherein He was judged unjustly, but under the appearance of glory wherein He ascended to the Father. Hence the place of His ascension is more suitable to the judgment than the place where He was condemned.

Reply to Objection 3: In the opinion of some the name of clouds is here given to certain condensations of the light shining from the bodies of the saints, and not to evaporations from earth and water. Or we may say that those clouds will be produced by Divine power in order to show the parallel between His coming to judge and His ascension; so that He Who ascended in a cloud may come to judgment in a cloud.

Again the cloud on account of its refreshing influence indicates the mercy of the Judge.

OF THOSE WHO WILL JUDGE AND OF THOSE WHO WILL BE JUDGED AT THE GENERAL JUDGMENT (EIGHT ARTICLES)

We must next consider who will judge and who will be judged at the general judgment. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any men will judge together with Christ?

(2) Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?

(3) Whether the angels also will judge?

(4) Whether the demons will carry out the Judge’s sentence on the damned?

(5) Whether all men will come up for judgment?

(6) Whether any of the good will be judged?

(7) Whether any of the wicked will be judged?

(8) Whether the angels also will be judged?

Whether any men will judge together with Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that no men will judge with Christ. For it is written (Jn. 5:22,23): “The Father . . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honor the Son.” Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, whoever judges has authority over that which he judges. Now those things about which the coming judgment will have to be, such as human merits and demerits, are subject to Divine authority alone. Therefore no one is competent to judge of those things.

Objection 3: Further, this judgment will take place not vocally but mentally. Now the publication of merits and demerits in the hearts of all men (which is like an accusation or approval), or the repayment of punishment and reward (which is like the pronouncement of the sentence) will be the work of God alone. Therefore none but Christ Who is God will judge.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 19:28): “You also shall sit on twelve seats judging the twelve tribes of Israel.” Therefore, etc.

Further, “The Lord will enter into judgment with the ancients of His people” (Is. 3:14). Therefore it would seem that others also will judge together with Christ.

I answer that, To judge has several significations. First it is used causally as it were, when we say it of that which proves that some person ought to be judged. In this sense the expression is used of certain people in comparison, in so far as some are shown to be deserving of judgment through being compared with others: for instance (Mat. 12:41): “The men of Nineve shall rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it.” To rise in judgment thus is common to the good and the wicked. Secondly, the expression “to judge” is used equivalently, so to say; for consent to an action is considered equivalent to doing it. Wherefore those who will consent with Christ the Judge, by approving His sentence, will be said to judge. In this sense it will belong to all the elect to judge: wherefore it is written (Wis. 3:7,8): “The just . . . shall judge nations.” Thirdly, a person is said to judge assessorially and by similitude, because he is like the judge in that his seat* is raised above the others: and thus assessors are said to judge. [*An “assessor” is one who “sits by” the judge.] Some say that the perfect to whom judiciary power is promised (Mat. 19:28) will judge in this sense, namely that they will be raised to the dignity of assessors, because they will appear above others at the judgment, and go forth “to meet Christ, into the air.” But this apparently does not suffice for the fulfilment of our Lord’s promise (Mat. 19:28): “You shall sit . . . judging,” for He would seem to make “judging” something additional to “sitting.” Hence there is a fourth way of judging, which will be competent to perfect men as containing the decrees of Divine justice according to which men will be judged: thus a book containing the law might be said to judge: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 20:12): “(Judgment took her seat*) and the books were opened.” [*The words in brackets are not in the Vulgate. Apoc. 20:4 we find: “I saw seats, and they sat upon them and judgment was given to them.”] Richard of St. Victor expounds this judging in this way (De judic. potest.), wherefore he says: “Those who persevere in Divine contemplation, who read every day the book of wisdom, transcribe, so to speak, in their hearts whatever they grasp by their clear insight of the truth”; and further on: “What else are the hearts of those who judge, divinely instructed in all truth, but a codex of the law?" Since, however, judging denotes an action exercised on another person, it follows that, properly speaking, he is said to judge who pronounces judgment on another. But this happens in two ways. First, by his own authority: and this belongs to the one who has dominion and power over others, and to whose ruling those who are judged are subject, wherefore it belongs to him to pass judgment on them. In this sense to judge belongs to God alone. Secondly, to judge is to acquaint others of the sentence delivered by another's authority, that is to announce the verdict already given. In this way perfect men will judge, because they will lead others to the knowledge of Divine justice, that these may know what is due to them on account of their merits: so that this very revelation of justice is called judgment. Hence Richard of St. Victor says (De judic. potest.) that for "the judges to open the books of their decree in the presence of those who are to be judged signifies that they open their hearts to the gaze of all those who are below them, and that they reveal their knowledge in whatever pertains to the judgment."

Reply to Objection 1: This objection considers the judgment of authority which belongs to Christ alone: and the same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no reason why some of the saints should not reveal certain things to others, either by way of enlightenment, as the higher angels enlighten the lower [*Cf. FP, Q[106]],: or by way of speech as the lower angels speak to the higher [*Cf. [5108]FP, Q[107], A[2]].

Whether the judicial power corresponds to voluntary poverty?

Objection 1: It would seem that the judicial power does not correspond to voluntary poverty. For it was promised to none but the twelve apostles (Mat. 19:28): "You shall sit on twelve seats, judging," etc. Since then those who are voluntarily poor are not all apostles, it would seem that the judicial power is not competent to all.

Objection 2: Further, to offer sacrifice to God of one's own body is more than to do so of outward things. Now martyrs and also virgins offer sacrifice to God of their own body. whereas the voluntarily poor offer sacrifice of outward things. Therefore the sublimity of the judicial power is more in keeping with martyrs and virgins than with those who are voluntarily poor.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:45): “There is one that accuseth you, Moses in whom you trust—because you believe not his voice,” according to a gloss, and (Jn. 12:48): “The word that I have spoken shall judge him in the last day.” Therefore the fact that a man propounds a law, or exhorts men by word to lead a good life, gives him the right to judge those who scorn his utterances. But this belongs to doctors. Therefore it is more competent to doctors than to those who are poor voluntarily.

Objection 4: Further, Christ through being judged unjustly merited as man to be judge of all in His human nature [*Cf. [5109]TP, Q[59], A[6]], according to Jn. 5:27, “He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man.” Now those who suffer persecution for justice’ sake are judged unjustly. Therefore the judicial power is competent to them rather than to the voluntarily poor.

Objection 5: Further, a superior is not judged by his inferior. Now many who will have made lawful use of riches will have greater merit than many of the voluntarily poor. Therefore the voluntarily poor will not judge where those are to be judged.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 36:6): “He saveth not the wicked, and He giveth judgment to the poor.”

Further, a gloss on Mat. 19:28, “You who have left all things’ [*Vulg.: ‘You who have followed Me’]” says: “Those who left all things and followed God will be the judges; those who made right use of what they had lawfully will be judged,” and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

I answer that, The judicial power is due especially to poverty on three counts. First, by reason of congruity, since voluntary poverty belongs to those who despise all the things of the world and cleave to Christ alone. Consequently there is nothing in them to turn away their judgment from justice, so that they are rendered competent to be judges as loving the truth of justice above all things. Secondly, by reason of merit, since exaltation corresponds by way of merit to humility. Now of all the things that make man contemptible in this world humility is the chief: and for this reason the excellence of judicial power is promised to the poor, so that he who humbles himself for Christ’s sake shall be exalted. Thirdly, because poverty disposes a man to the aforesaid manner of judging. For the reason why one of the saints will be said to judge as stated above [*Cf. A[1]], is that he will have the heart instructed in all Divine truth which he will be thus able to make known to others. Now in the advancement to perfection, the first thing that occurs to be renounced is external wealth, because this is the last thing of all to be acquired. And that which is last in the order of generation is the first in the order of destruction: wherefore among the beatitudes whereby we advance to perfection, the first place is given to poverty. Thus judicial power corresponds to poverty, in so far as this is the disposition to the aforesaid perfection. Hence also it is that this same power is not promised to all who are voluntarily poor, but to those who leave all and follow Christ in accordance with the perfection of life.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx), “we must not imagine that because He says that they will sit on twelve seats only twelve men will judge with Him. else since we read that Matthias was appointed apostle in the place of the traitor Judas, Paul who worked more than the rest will have nowhere to sit as judge.” Hence “the number twelve,” as he states (De Civ. Dei xx), “signifies the whole multitude of those who will judge, because the two parts of seven, namely three and four, being multiplied together make twelve.” Moreover twelve is a perfect number, being the double of six, which is a perfect number.

Or, speaking literally, He spoke to the twelve apostles in whose person he made this promise to all who follow them.

Reply to Objection 2: Virginity and martyrdom do not dispose man to retain the precepts of Divine justice in his heart in the same degree as poverty does: even so, on the other hand, outward riches choke the word of God by the cares which they entail (Lk. 8:14). Or we may reply that poverty does not suffice alone to merit judicial power, but is the fundamental part of that perfection to which the judicial power corresponds. Wherefore among those things regarding perfection which follow after poverty we may reckon both virginity and martyrdom and all the works of perfection: yet they do not rank as high as poverty, since the beginning of a thing is its chief part.

Reply to Objection 3: He who propounded the law or urged men to good will judge, in the causal (Cf. A[1]) sense, because others will be judged in reference to the words he has uttered or propounded. Hence the judicial power does not properly correspond to preaching or teaching. or we may reply that, as some say, three things are requisite for the judicial power; first, that one renounce temporal cares, lest the mind be hindered from the contemplation of wisdom; secondly that one possess Divine justice by way of habit both as to knowledge and as to observance; thirdly that one should have taught others this same justice; and this teaching will be the perfection whereby a man merits to have judicial power.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ humbled Himself in that He was judged unjustly; for "He was offered because it was His own will" (Is. 53:7): and by His humility He merited His exaltation to judicial power, since all things are made subject to Him (Phil. 2:8,9). Hence, judicial power is more due to them who humble themselves of their own will by renouncing temporal goods, on account of which men are honored by worldlings, than to those who are humbled by others.

Reply to Objection 5: An inferior cannot judge a superior by his own authority, but he can do so by the authority of a superior, as in the case of a judge-delegate. Hence it is not unfitting that it be granted to the poor as an accidental reward to judge others, even those who have higher merit in respect of the essential reward.

Whether the angels will judge?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels will judge. For it is written (Mat. 25:31): "When the Son of man shall come in His majesty, and all the angels with Him." Now He is speaking of His coming to judgment. Therefore it would seem that also the angels will judge.

Objection 2: Further, the orders of the angels take their names from the offices which they fulfill. Now one of the angelic orders is that of the Thrones, which would seem to pertain to the judicial power, since a throne is the "judicial bench, a royal seat, a professor's chair" [*Cf. St. Isidore, Etym. vii, 5]. Therefore some of the angels will judge.

Objection 3: Further, equality with the angels is promised the saints after this life (Mat. 22:30). If then men will have this power of judging, much more will the angels have it.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): "He hath given Him power to judgment, because He is the Son of man." But the angels have not the human nature in common with Him. Neither therefore do they share with Him in the judicial power.

Further, the same person is not judge and judge’s minister. Now in this judgment the angels will act as ministers of the Judge and, according to Mat. 13:41: “The Son of man shall send His angels and they shall gather out of His kingdom all scandals.” Therefore the angels will not judge.

I answer that, The judge’s assessors must be conformed to the judge. Now judgment is ascribed to the Son of man because He will appear to all, both good and wicked, in His human nature, although the whole Trinity will judge by authority. Consequently it behooves also the Judge’s assessors to have the human nature, so as to be visible to all, both good and wicked. Hence it is not fitting for the angels to judge, although in a certain sense we may say that the angels will judge, namely by approving the sentence [*Cf. A[1]].

Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss on this passage observes, the angels will come with Christ, not to judge, but “as witnesses of men’s deeds because it was under their guardianship that men did well or ill.”

Reply to Objection 2: The name of Thrones is given to angels in reference to the judgment which God is ever pronouncing, by governing all things with supreme justice: of which judgment angels are in a way the executors and promulgators. On the other hand, the judgment of men by the man Christ will require human assessors.

Reply to Objection 3: Equality with angels is promised to men as regards the essential reward. But nothing hinders an accidental reward from being bestowed on men to the exclusion of the angels, as in the case of the virgins’ and martyrs’ crowns: and the same may be said of the judicial power.

Whether the demons will carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the demons will not carry out the sentence of the Judge on the damned after the day of judgment. For, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:24): “He will then bring to naught [*Vulg.: ‘When He shall have brought to naught,’ etc.] all principality, and power, and virtue.” Therefore all supremacy will cease then. But the carrying out of the Judge’s sentence implies some kind of supremacy. Therefore after the judgment day the demons will not carry out the Judge’s sentence.

Objection 2: Further, the demons sinned more grievously than men. Therefore it is not just that men should be tortured by demons.

Objection 3: Further, just as the demons suggest evil things to men, so good angels suggest good things. Now it will not be the duty of the good angels to reward the good, but this will be done by God, immediately by Himself. Therefore neither will it be the duty of the demons to punish the wicked.

On the contrary, Sinners have subjected themselves to the devil by sinning. Therefore it is just that they should be subjected to him in their punishments, and punished by him as it were.

I answer that, The Master in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47 mentions two opinions on this question, both of which seem consistent with Divine justice, because it is just for man to be subjected to the devil for having sinned, and yet it is unjust for the demon to be over him. Accordingly the opinion which holds that after the judgment day the demons will not be placed over men to punish them, regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the demons punishing; while the contrary opinion regards the order of Divine justice on the part of the men punished.

Which of these opinions is nearer the truth we cannot know for certain. Yet I think it truer to say that just as, among the saved, order will be observed so that some will be enlightened and perfected by others (because all the orders of the heavenly hierarchies will continue for ever) [*Cf. [5110]FP, Q[108], AA[7],8], so, too, will order be observed in punishments, men being punished by demons, lest the Divine order, whereby the angels are placed between the human nature and the Divine, be entirely set aside. Wherefore just as the Divine illuminations are conveyed to men by the good angels, so too the demons execute the Divine justice on the wicked. Nor does this in any way diminish the punishment of the demons, since even in torturing others they are themselves tortured, because then the fellowship of the unhappy will not lessen but will increase unhappiness.

Reply to Objection 1: The supremacy which, it is declared, will be brought to nought by Christ in the time to come must be taken in the sense of the supremacy which is in keeping with the state of this world: wherein men are placed over men, angels over men, angels over angels, demons over demons, and demons over men; in every case so as either to lead towards the end or to lead astray from the end. But then when all things will have attained to that end there will be no supremacy to lead astray from the end or to lead to it, but only that which maintains in the end, good or evil.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the demerit of the demons does not require that they be placed over men, since they made men subject to them unjustly, yet this is required by the order of their nature in relation to human nature: since "natural goods remain in them unimpaired" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Reply to Objection 3: The good angels are not the cause of the principal reward in the elect, because all receive this immediately from God. Nevertheless the angels are the cause of certain accidental rewards in men, in so far as the higher angels enlighten those beneath them, both angels and men, concerning certain hidden things of God, which do not belong to the essence of beatitude. In like manner the damned will receive their principal punishment immediately from God, namely the everlasting banishment from the Divine vision: but there is no reason why the demons should not torture men with other sensible punishments. There is, however, this difference: that merit exalts, whereas sin debases. Wherefore since the angelic nature is higher than the human, some on account of the excellence of their merit will be so far exalted as to be raised above the angels both in nature and rewards [*Cf. [5111]FP, Q[108], A[8]], so that some angels will be enlightened by some men. On the other hand, no human sinners will, on account of a certain degree of virtue, attain to the eminence that attaches to the nature of the demons.

Whether all men will be present at the judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that men will not all be present at the judgment. For it is written (Mat. 19:28): "You . . . shall sit on twelve seats, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." But all men do not belong to those twelve tribes. Therefore it would seem that men will not all be present at the judgment.

Objection 2: Further, the same apparently is to be gathered from Ps. 1:5, "The wicked shall not rise again in judgment."

Objection 3: Further, a man is brought to judgment that his merits may be discussed. But some there are who have acquired no merits, such as children who died before reaching the perfect age. Therefore they need not be present at the judgment. Now there are many such. Therefore it would seem that not all will be present.

On the contrary, It is written (Acts 10:42) that Christ “was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.” Now this division comprises all men, no matter how the living be distinct from the dead. Therefore all men will be present at the judgment.

Further, it is written (Apoc. 1:7): “Behold He cometh with the clouds, and every eye shall see Him.” Now this would not be so unless all were present at the judgment. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, The judicial power was bestowed on Christ as man, in reward for the humility which He showed forth in His passion. Now in His passion He shed His blood for all in point of sufficiency, although through meeting with an obstacle in some, it had not its effect in all. Therefore it is fitting that all men should assemble at the judgment, to see His exaltation in His human nature, in respect of which “He was appointed by God to be judge of the living and of the dead.”

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 5), “it does not follow from the saying, ‘Judging the twelve tribes of Israel,’ that the tribe of Levi, which is the thirteenth, is not to be judged, or that they will judge that people alone, and not other nations.” The reason why all other nations are denoted by the twelve tribes is because they were called by Christ to take the place of the twelve tribes.

Reply to Objection 2: The words, “The wicked shall not rise in judgment,” if referred to all sinners, mean that they will not arise to judge. But if the wicked denote unbelievers, the sense is that they will not arise to be judged, because they are “already judged” (Jn. 3:18). All, however, will rise again to assemble at the judgment and witness the glory of the Judge.

Reply to Objection 3: Even children who have died before reaching the perfect age will be present at the judgment, not to be judged, but to see the Judge’s glory.

Whether the good will be judged at the judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that none of the good will be judged at the judgment. For it is declared (Jn. 3:18) that “he that believeth in Him is not judged.” Now all the good believed in Him. Therefore they will not be judged.

Objection 2: Further, those who are uncertain of their bliss are not blessed: whence Augustine proves (Gen. ad lit. xi) that the demons were never blessed. But the saints are now blessed. Therefore they are certain of their bliss. Now what is certain is not submitted to judgment. Therefore the good will not be judged.

Objection 3: Further, fear is incompatible with bliss. But the last judgment, which above all is described as terrible, cannot take place without inspiring fear into those who are to be judged. Hence Gregory observes on Job 41:16 “When he shall raise him up, the angels shall fear,” etc. (Moral. xxxiv): “Consider how the conscience of the wicked will then be troubled when even the just are disturbed about their life.” Therefore the blessed will not be judged.

On the contrary, It would seem that all the good will be judged, since it is written (2 Cor. 5:10): “We must all be manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done, whether it be good or evil.” Now there is nothing else to be judged. Therefore all, even the good, will be judged.

Further, the “general” includes all. Now this is called the general judgment. Therefore all will be judged.

I answer that, The judgment comprises two things, namely the discussion of merits and the payment of rewards. As regards the payment of rewards, all will be judged, even the good, since the Divine sentence will appoint to each one the reward corresponding to his merit. But there is no discussion of merits save where good and evil merits are mingled together. Now those who build on the foundation of faith, “gold, silver, and precious stones” (1 Cor. 3:12), by devoting themselves wholly to the Divine service, and who have no notable admixture of evil merit, are not subjected to a discussion of their merits. Such are those who have entirely renounced the things of the world and are solicitously thoughtful of the things that are of God: wherefore they will be saved but will not be judged. Others, however, build on the foundation of faith, wood, hay, stubble [*Cf. [5112]FS, Q[89], A[2]]; they, in fact, love worldly things and are busy about earthly concerns, yet so as to prefer nothing to Christ, but strive to redeem their sins with alms, and these have an admixture of good with evil merits. Hence they are subjected to a discussion of their merits, and consequently in this account will be judged, and yet they will be saved.

Reply to Objection 1: Since punishment is the effect of justice, while reward is the effect of mercy, it follows that punishment is more especially ascribed antonomastically to judgment which is the act of justice; so that judgment is sometimes used to express condemnation. It is thus that we are to understand the words quoted, as a gloss on the passage remarks.

Reply to Objection 2: The merits of the elect will be discussed, not to remove the uncertainty of their beatitude from the hearts of those who are to be judged, but that it may be made manifest to us that their good merits outweigh their evil merits, and thus God's justice be proved.

Reply to Objection 3: Gregory is speaking of the just who will still be in mortal flesh, wherefore he had already said: "Those who will still be in the body, although already brave and perfect, yet through being still in the flesh must needs be troubled with fear in the midst of such a whirlwind of terror." Hence it is clear that this fear refers to the time immediately before the judgment, most terrible indeed to the wicked, but not to the good, who will have no apprehension of evil.

The arguments in the contrary sense consider judgment as regards the payment of rewards.

Whether the wicked will be judged?

Objection 1: It would seem that none of the wicked will be judged. For even as damnation is certain in the case of unbelievers, so is it in the case of those who die in mortal sin. Now it is declared because of the certainty of damnation (Jn. 3:18): "He that believeth not is already judged." Therefore in like manner neither will other sinners be judged.

Objection 2: Further, the voice of the Judge is most terrible to those who are condemned by His judgment. Now according to the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47 and in the words of Gregory (Moral. xxvi) "the Judge will not address Himself to unbelievers." If therefore He were to address Himself to the believers about to be condemned, the unbelievers would reap a benefit from their unbelief, which is absurd.

On the contrary, It would seem that all the wicked are to be judged, because all the wicked will be sentenced to punishment according to the degree of their guilt. But this cannot be done without a judicial pronouncement. Therefore all the wicked will be judged.

I answer that, The judgment as regards the sentencing to punishment for sin concerns all the wicked. whereas the judgment as regards the discussion of merits concerns only believers. Because in unbelievers the foundation of faith is lacking, without which all subsequent works are deprived of the perfection of a right intention, so that in them there is no admixture of good and evil works or merits requiring discussion. But believers in whom the foundation of faith remains, have at least a praiseworthy act of faith, which though it is not meritorious without charity, yet is in itself directed to merit, and consequently they will be subjected to the discussion of merits. Consequently, believers who were at least counted as citizens of the City of God will be judged as citizens, and sentence of death will not be passed on them without a discussion of their merits; whereas unbelievers will be condemned as foes, who are wont among men to be exterminated without their merits being discussed.

Reply to Objection 1: Although it is certain that those who die in mortal sin will be damned, nevertheless since they have an admixture of certain things connected with meriting well, it behooves, for the manifestation of Divine justice, that their merits be subjected to discussion, in order to make it clear that they are justly banished from the city of the saints, of which they appeared outwardly to be citizens.

Reply to Objection 2: Considered under this special aspect the words addressed to the believers about to be condemned will not be terrible, because they will reveal in them certain things pleasing to them, which it will be impossible to find in unbelievers, since “without faith it is impossible to please God” (Heb. 11:6). But the sentence of condemnation which will be passed on them all will be terrible to all of them.

The argument in the contrary sense considered the judgment of retribution.

Whether at the coming judgment the angels will be judged?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels will be judged at the coming judgment. For it is written (1 Cor. 6:3): “Know you not that we shall judge angels?” But this cannot refer to the state of the present time. Therefore it should refer to the judgment to come.

Objection 2: Further, it is written concerning Behemoth or Leviathan, whereby the devil is signified (Job 40:28): “In the sight of all he shall be cast down”; and (Mk. 1:24)* the demon cried out to Christ: “Why art Thou come to destroy us before the time?” for, according to a gloss, “the demons seeing our Lord on earth thought they were to be judged forthwith.” [*The reference should be Mat. 8:29: ‘Art Thou come hither to torment us before the time?’ The text of Mark reads: ‘Art Thou come to destroy us?’] Therefore it would seem that a final judgment is in store for them.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:4): “God spared not the angels that sinned, but delivered them drawn down by infernal ropes to the lower hell, unto torments, to be reserved unto judgment.” Therefore it seems that the angels will be judged.

On the contrary, It is written (Nahum 1:9) according to the Septuagint version: “God will not judge the same thing a second time.” But the wicked angels are already judged, wherefore it is written (Jn. 16:11): “The prince of this world is already judged.” Therefore the angels will not be judged in the time to come.

Further, goodness and wickedness are more perfect in the angels than in men who are wayfarers. Now some men, good and wicked, will not be judged as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 47. Therefore neither will good or wicked angels be judged.

I answer that, The judgment of discussion nowise concerns either the good or the wicked angels, since neither is any evil to be found in the good angels, nor is any good liable to judgment to be found in the wicked angels. But if we speak of the judgment of retribution, we must distinguish a twofold retribution. One corresponds to the angels’ personal merits and was made to both from the beginning when some were raised to bliss, and others plunged into the depths of woe. The other corresponds to the merits, good or evil, procured through the angels, and this retribution will be made in the judgment to come, because the good angels will have an increased joy in the salvation of those whom they have prompted to deeds of merit, while the wicked will have an increase of torment through the manifold downfall of those whom they have incited to evil deeds. Consequently the judgment will not regard the angels directly, neither as judging nor as judged, but only men; but it will regard the angels indirectly somewhat, in so far as they were concerned in men’s deeds.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of the Apostle refers to the judgment of comparison, because certain men will be found to be placed higher than the angels.

Reply to Objection 2: The demons will then be cast down in the sight of all because they will be imprisoned for ever in the dungeon of hell, so that they will no more be free to go out, since this was permitted to them only in so far as they were directed by Divine providence to try the life of man.

The same answer applies to the Third Objection.

OF THE FORM OF THE JUDGE IN COMING TO THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the form of the Judge in coming to the judgment. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ will judge under the form or His humanity?

(2) Whether He will appear under the form of His glorified humanity?

(3) Whether His Godhead can be seen without joy?

Whether Christ will judge under the form of His humanity?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ will not judge under the form of His humanity. For judgment requires authority in the judge. Now Christ has authority over the quick and the dead as God, for thus is He the Lord and Creator of all. Therefore He will judge under the form of His Godhead.

Objection 2: Further, invincible power is requisite in a judge; wherefore it is written (Eccles. 7:6): “Seek not to be made a judge, unless thou have strength enough to extirpate iniquities.” Now invincible power belongs to Christ as God. Therefore He will judge under the form of the Godhead.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Jn. 5:22,23): “The Father . . . hath given all judgment to the Son, that all men may honor the Son as they honor the Father.” Now equal honor to that of the Father is not due to the Son in respect of His human nature. Therefore He will not judge under His human form.

Objection 4: Further, it is written (Dan. 7:9): “I beheld till thrones were placed and the Ancient of days sat.” Now the thrones signify judicial power, and God is called the Ancient by reason of His eternity, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. x). Therefore it becomes the Son to judge as being eternal; and consequently not as man.

Objection 5: Further, Augustine says (Tract. xix in Joan.) that “the resurrection of the soul is the work of the Word the Son of God, and the resurrection of the body is the work of the Word made the Son of man in the flesh.” Now that last judgment regards the soul rather than the body. Therefore it becomes Christ to judge as God rather than as man.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 5:27): “He hath given Him power to do judgment, because He is the Son of man.”

Further, it is written (Job 36:17): “Thy cause hath been judged as that of the wicked—by Pilate” according to a gloss—therefore, “cause and judgment thou shalt recover—that thou mayest judge justly,” according to the gloss. Now Christ was judged by Pilate with regard to His human nature. Therefore He will judge under the human nature.

Further, to Him it belongs to judge who made the law. Now Christ gave us the law of the Gospel while appearing in the human nature. Therefore He will judge under that same nature.

I answer that, Judgment requires a certain authority in the judge. Wherefore it is written (Rom. 14:4): “Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant?” Hence it is becoming that Christ should judge in respect of His having authority over men to whom chiefly the last judgment will be directed. Now He is our Lord, not only by reason of the Creation, since “the Lord He is God, He made us and not we ourselves” (Ps. 99:3), but also by reason of the Redemption, which pertains to Him in respect of His human nature. Wherefore “to this end Christ died and rose again, that He might be Lord both of the dead and of the living” (Rom. 14:9). But the goods of the Creation would not suffice us to obtain the reward of eternal life, without the addition of the boon of the Redemption, on account of the obstacle accruing to created nature through the sin of our first parent. Hence, since the last judgment is directed to the admission of some to the kingdom, and the exclusion of others therefrom, it is becoming that Christ should preside at that judgment under the form of His human nature, since it is by favor of that same nature’s Redemption that man is admitted to the kingdom. In this sense it is stated (Acts 10:42) that “He . . . was appointed by God to be Judge of the living and of the dead.” And forasmuch as by redeeming mankind He restored not only man but all creatures without exception—inasmuch as all creatures are bettered through man’s restoration, according to Col. 1:20, “Making peace through the blood of His cross, both as to things on earth, and the things that are in heaven”—it follows that through His Passion Christ merited lordship and judicial power not over man alone, but over all creatures, according to Mat. 28:18, “All power is given to Me, in heaven and in earth” [*Cf. TP, Q[59]].

Reply to Objection 1: Christ, in respect of His Divine nature, has authority of lordship over all creatures by right of creation; but in respect of His human nature He has authority of lordship merited through His Passion. The latter is secondary so to speak and acquired, while the former is natural and eternal.

Reply to Objection 2: Although Christ as man has not of Himself invincible power resulting from the natural power of the human species, nevertheless there is also in His human nature an invincible power derived from His Godhead, whereby all things are subjected under His feet (1 Cor. 15:25–28; Heb. 2:8,9). Hence He will judge in His human nature indeed, but by the power of His Godhead.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ would not have sufficed for the redemption of mankind, had He been a mere man. Wherefore from the very fact that He was able as man to redeem mankind, and thereby obtained judicial power, it is evident that He is God, and consequently is to be honored equally with the Father, not as man but as God.

Reply to Objection 4: In that vision of Daniel the whole order of the judicial power is clearly expressed. This power is in God Himself as its first origin, and more especially in the Father Who is the fount of the entire Godhead; wherefore it is stated in the first place that the “Ancient of days sat.” But the judicial power was transmitted from the Father to the Son, not only from eternity in respect of the Divine nature, but also in time in respect of the human nature wherein He merited it. Hence in the aforesaid vision it is further stated (Dan. 7:13,14): “Lo, one like the Son of man came with the clouds of heaven, and He came even to the Ancient of days . . . And He gave Him power and glory, and a kingdom.”

Reply to Objection 5: Augustine is speaking by a kind of appropriation, so as to trace the effects which Christ wrought in the human nature to causes somewhat similar to them. And since we are made to the image and likeness of God in respect of our soul, and are of the same species as the man Christ in respect of our body, he ascribes to the Godhead the effects wrought by Christ in our souls, and those which He wrought or will work in our bodies he ascribes to His flesh; although His flesh, as being the instrument of His Godhead, has also its effect on our souls as Damascene asserts (De Fide Orth. iii, 15), according to the saying of Heb. 9:14, that His "blood" hath cleansed "our conscience from dead works." And thus that "the Word was made flesh" is the cause of the resurrection of souls; wherefore also according to His human nature He is becomingly the Judge not only of bodily but also of spiritual goods [*Cf. [5113]TP, Q[56], A[2], ad 1].

Whether at the judgment Christ will appear in His glorified humanity?

Objection 1: It would seem that at the judgment Christ will not appear in His glorified humanity. For a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. cxx in Joan.] on Jn. 19:37, "They shall look on him whom they pierced," says: "Because He will come in the flesh wherein He was crucified." Now He was crucified in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the form of weakness and not in the form of glory.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated (Mat. 24:30) that "the sign of the Son of man shall appear in heaven," namely, "the sign of the cross," as Chrysostom says (Hom. lxxvii in Matth.), for "Christ when coming to the judgment will show not only the scars of His wounds but even His most shameful death." Therefore it seems that He will not appear in the form of glory.

Objection 3: Further, Christ will appear at the judgment under that form which can be gazed upon by all. Now Christ will not be visible to all, good and wicked, under the form of His glorified humanity: because the eye that is not glorified is seemingly unproportionate to see the clarity of a glorified body. Therefore He will not appear under a glorified form.

Objection 4: Further, that which is promised as a reward to the righteous is not granted to the unrighteous. Now it is promised as a reward to the righteous that they shall see the glory of His humanity (Jn. 10:9): "He shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures, i.e. refreshment in His Godhead and humanity," according to the commentary of Augustine [*De Spiritu et Anima, work of an unknown author. St. Thomas, De Anima, ascribes it to

Alcherus, a Cistercian monk; see above[5114] Q[70], A[2], ad 1] and Is. 33:17: “His eyes shall see the King in his beauty.” Therefore He will not appear to all in His glorified form.

Objection 5: Further, Christ will judge in the form wherein He was judged: wherefore a gloss [*St. Augustine, Tract. xix, in Joan.] on Jn. 5:21, “So the Son also giveth life to whom He will,” says: “He will judge justly in the form wherein He was judged unjustly, that He may be visible to the wicked.” Now He was judged in the form of weakness. Therefore He will appear in the same form at the judgment.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:27): “Then they shall see the Son of man coming in a cloud with great power and majesty.” Now majesty and power pertain to glory. Therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

Further, he who judges should be more conspicuous than those who are judged. Now the elect who will be judged by Christ will have a glorified body. Much more therefore will the Judge appear in a glorified form.

Further, as to be judged pertains to weakness, so to judge pertains to authority and glory. Now at His first coming when Christ came to be judged, He appeared in the form of weakness. Therefore at the second coming, when He will come to judge, He will appear in the form of glory.

I answer that, Christ is called the mediator of God and men (1 Tim. 2:5) inasmuch as He satisfies for men and intercedes for them to the Father, and confers on men things which belong to the Father, according to Jn. 17:22, “The glory which Thou hast given Me, I have given to them.” Accordingly then both these things belong to Him in that He communicates with both extremes: for in that He communicates with men, He takes their part with the Father, and in that He communicates with the Father, He bestows the Father’s gifts on men. Since then at His first coming He came in order to make satisfaction for us to the Father, He came in the form of our weakness. But since at His second coming He will come in order to execute the Father’s justice on men, He will have to show forth His glory which is in Him by reason of His communication with the Father: and therefore He will appear in the form of glory.

Reply to Objection 1: He will appear in the same flesh, but not under the same form.

Reply to Objection 2: The sign of the cross will appear at the judgment, to denote not a present but a past weakness: so as to show how justly those were condemned who scorned so great mercy, especially those who persecuted Christ unjustly. The scars which will appear in His body will not be due to weakness, but will indicate the exceeding power whereby Christ overcame His enemies by His Passion and infirmity. He will also show forth His most shameful death, not by bringing it sensibly before the eye, as though He suffered it there; but by the things which will appear then, namely the signs of His past Passion, He will recall men to the thought of His past death.

Reply to Objection 3: A glorified body has it in its power to show itself or not to show itself to an eye that is not glorified, as stated above ([5115]Q[85], A[2], ad 3). Hence Christ will be visible to all in His glorified form.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as our friend's glory gives us pleasure, so the glory and power of one we hate is most displeasing to us. Hence as the sight of the glory of Christ's humanity will be a reward to the righteous, so will it be a torment to Christ's enemies: wherefore it is written (Is. 26:11): "Let the envious people see and be confounded and let fire" (i.e. envy) "devour Thy enemies."

Reply to Objection 5: Form is taken there for human nature wherein He was judged and likewise will judge; but not for a quality of nature, namely of weakness, which will not be the same in Him when judging as when judged (Cf. ad 2).

Whether the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Godhead can be seen by the wicked without joy. For there can be no doubt that the wicked will know with the greatest certainty that Christ is God. Therefore they will see His Godhead, and yet they will not rejoice in seeing Christ. Therefore it will be possible to see it without joy.

Objection 2: Further, the perverse will of the wicked is not more adverse to Christ's humanity than to His Godhead. Now the fact that they will see the glory of His humanity will conduce to their punishment, as stated above (A[2], ad 4). Therefore if they were to see His Godhead, there would be much more reason for them to grieve rather than rejoice.

Objection 3: Further, the course of the affections is not a necessary sequel to that which is in the intellect: wherefore Augustine says (In Ps. 118: conc. 8): “The intellect precedes, the affections follow slowly or not at all.” Now vision regards the intellect, whereas joy regards the affections. Therefore it will be possible to see the Godhead without joy.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is received into “a thing is received according to the mode of the receiver and not of the received.” But whatever is seen is, in a way, received into the seer. Therefore although the Godhead is in itself supremely enjoyable, nevertheless when seen by those who are plunged in grief, it will give no joy but rather displeasure.

Objection 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible object, so is the intellect to the intelligible object. Now in the senses, “to the unhealthy palate bread is painful, to the healthy palate sweet,” as Augustine says (Confess. vii), and the same happens with the other senses. Therefore since the damned have the intellect indisposed, it would seem that the vision of the uncreated light will give them pain rather than joy.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 17:3): “This is eternal life: That they may know Thee, the . . . true God.” Wherefore it is clear that the essence of bliss consists in seeing God. Now joy is essential to bliss. Therefore the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

Further, the essence of the Godhead is the essence of truth. Now it is delightful to every one to see the truth, wherefore “all naturally desire to know,” as stated at the beginning of the Metaphysics. Therefore it is impossible to see the Godhead without joy.

Further, if a certain vision is not always delightful, it happens sometimes to be painful. But intellective vision is never painful since “the pleasure we take in objects of understanding has no grief opposed to it,” according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii). Since then the Godhead cannot be seen save by the intellect, it seems that the Godhead cannot be seen without joy.

I answer that, In every object of appetite or of pleasure two things may be considered, namely the thing which is desired or which gives pleasure, and the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness in that thing. Now according to Boethius (De Hebdom.) that which is can have something besides what it is, but ‘being’ itself has no admixture of aught else beside itself. Hence that which is desirable or pleasant can have an admixture of something rendering it undesirable or unpleasant; but the very aspect of pleasurableness has not and cannot have anything mixed with it rendering it unpleasant or undesirable. Now it is possible for things that are pleasurable, by participation of goodness which is the aspect of appetibility or pleasurableness, not to give pleasure when they are apprehended, but it is impossible for that which is good by its essence not to give pleasure when it is apprehended. Therefore since God is essentially His own goodness, it is impossible for the Godhead to be seen without joy.

Reply to Objection 1: The wicked will know most clearly that Christ is God, not through seeing His Godhead, but on account of the most manifest signs of His Godhead.

Reply to Objection 2: No one can hate the Godhead considered in itself, as neither can one hate goodness itself. But God is said to be hated by certain persons in respect of some of the effects of the Godhead, in so far as He does or commands something contrary to their will [*Cf. [5116]SS, Q[34], A[1]]. Therefore the vision of the Godhead can be painful to no one.

Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Augustine applies when the thing apprehended previously by the intellect is good by participation and not essentially, such as all creatures are; wherefore there may be something in them by reason of which the affections are not moved. In like manner God is known by wayfarers through His effects, and their intellect does not attain to the very essence of His goodness. Hence it is not necessary that the affections follow the intellect, as they would if the intellect saw God's essence which is His goodness.

Reply to Objection 4: Grief denotes not a disposition but a passion. Now every passion is removed if a stronger contrary cause supervene, and does not remove that cause. Accordingly the grief of the damned would be done away if they saw God in His essence.

Reply to Objection 5: The indisposition of an organ removes the natural proportion of the organ to the object that has a natural aptitude to please, wherefore the pleasure is hindered. But the indisposition which is in the damned does not remove the natural proportion whereby they are directed to the Divine goodness, since its image ever remains in them. Hence the comparison fails.

OF THE QUALITY OF THE WORLD AFTER THE JUDGMENT (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next discuss the quality which the world and those who rise again will have after the judgment. Here a threefold matter offers itself to our consideration: (1) The state and quality of the world; (2) The state of the blessed; (3) The state of the wicked.

Under the first head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there will be a renewal of the world?

(2) Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?

(3) Whether the heavenly bodies will be more brilliant?

(4) Whether the elements will receive an additional clarity?

(5) Whether the animals and plants will remain?

Whether the world will be renewed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the world will never be renewed. For nothing will be but what was at some time as to its species: “What is it that hath been? the same thing that shall be” (Eccles. 1:9). Now the world never had any disposition other than it has now as to essential parts, both genera and species. Therefore it will never be renewed.

Objection 2: Further, renewal is a kind of alteration. But it is impossible for the universe to be altered; because whatever is altered argues some alterant that is not altered, which nevertheless is a subject of local movement: and it is impossible to place such a thing outside the universe. Therefore it is impossible for the world to be renewed.

Objection 3: Further, it is stated (Gn. 2:2) that “God . . . rested on the seventh day from all His work which He had done,” and holy men explain that “He rested from forming new creatures.” Now when things were first established, the mode imposed upon them was the same as they have now in the natural order. Therefore they will never have any other.

Objection 4: Further, the disposition which things have now is natural to them. Therefore if they be altered to another disposition, this disposition will be unnatural to them. Now whatever is unnatural and accidental cannot last for ever (De Coelo et Mundo i). Therefore this disposition acquired by being renewed will be taken away from them; and thus there will be a cycle of changes in the world as Empedocles and Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3) maintained, and after this world there will be another, and after that again another.

Objection 5: Further, newness of glory is given to the rational creature as a reward. Now where there is no merit, there can be no reward. Since then insensible creatures have merited nothing, it would seem that they will not be renewed.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 65:17): “Behold I create new heavens and a new earth, and the former things shall not be in remembrance”; and (Apoc. 21:1): “I saw a new heaven and a new earth. For the first heaven and the first earth was gone.”

Further, the dwelling should befit the dweller. But the world was made to be man’s dwelling. Therefore it should befit man. Now man will be renewed. Therefore the world will be likewise.

Further, “Every beast loveth its like” (Ecclus. 13:19), wherefore it is evident that likeness is the reason of love. Now man has some likeness to the universe, wherefore he is called “a little world.” Hence man loves the whole world naturally and consequently desires its good. Therefore, that man’s desire be satisfied the universe must needs also be made better.

I answer that, We believe all corporeal things to have been made for man’s sake, wherefore all things are stated to be subject to him [*Ps. 8:5, seqq.]. Now they serve man in two ways, first, as sustenance to his bodily life, secondly, as helping him to know God, inasmuch as man sees the invisible things of God by the things that are made (Rom. 1:20). Accordingly glorified man will nowise need creatures to render him the first of these services, since his body will be altogether incorruptible, the Divine power effecting this through the soul which it will glorify immediately. Again man will not need the second service as to intellective knowledge, since by that knowledge he will see God immediately in His essence. The carnal eye, however, will be unable to attain to this vision of the Essence; wherefore that it may be fittingly comforted in the vision of God, it will see the Godhead in Its corporeal effects, wherein manifest proofs of the Divine majesty will appear, especially in Christ’s flesh, and secondarily in the bodies of the blessed, and afterwards in all other bodies. Hence those bodies also will need to receive a greater inflow from the Divine goodness than now, not indeed so as to change their species, but so as to add a certain perfection of glory: and such will be the renewal of the world. Wherefore at the one same time, the world will be renewed, and man will be glorified.

Reply to Objection 1: Solomon is speaking there of the natural course: this is evident from his adding: “Nothing under the sun is new.” For since the movement of the sun follows a circle, those things which are subject to the sun’s power must needs have some kind of circular movement. This consists in the fact that things which were before return the same in species but different in the individual (De Generat. i). But things belonging to the state of glory are not “under the sun.”

Reply to Objection 2: This argument considers natural alteration which proceeds from a natural agent, which acts from natural necessity. For such an agent cannot produce different dispositions, unless it be itself disposed differently. But things done by God proceed from freedom of will, wherefore it is possible, without any change in God Who wills it, for the universe to have at one time one disposition, and another at another time. Thus this renewal will not be reduced to a cause that is moved, but to an immovable principle, namely God.

Reply to Objection 3: God is stated to have ceased on the seventh day forming new creatures, for as much as nothing was made afterwards that was not previously in some likeness [*Cf. [5117]FP, Q[73], A[1]] either generically, or specifically, or at least as in a seminal principle, or even as in an obediential potentiality [*Cf. [5118]FP, Q[115], A[2], ad 4; [5119]TP, Q[11], A[1]]. I say then that the future renewal of the world preceded in the works of the six days by way of a remote likeness, namely in the glory and grace of the angels. Moreover it preceded in the obediential potentiality which was then bestowed on the creature to the effect of its receiving this same renewal by the Divine agency.

Reply to Objection 4: This disposition of newness will be neither natural nor contrary to nature, but above nature (just as grace and glory are above the nature of the soul): and it will proceed from an everlasting agent which will preserve it for ever.

Reply to Objection 5: Although, properly speaking, insensible bodies will not have merited this glory, yet man merited that this glory should be bestowed on the whole universe, in so far as this conduces to man’s increase of glory. Thus a man merits to be clothed in more splendid robes, which splendor the robes nowise merited themselves.

Whether the movement of the heavenly bodies will cease?

Objection 1: It seems that when the world is thus renewed the movement of the heavenly bodies will not cease. For it is written (Gn. 8:22): “All the days of the earth . . . cold and heat, summer and winter, night and day shall not cease.” Now night and day, summer and winter result from the movement of the sun. Therefore the movement of the sun will never cease.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 31:35,36): “Thus saith the Lord Who giveth the sun for the light of the day, the order of the moon and of the stars for the light of the night: Who stirreth up the sea, and the waves thereof roar . . . If these ordinances shall fail before Me . . . then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me for ever.” Now the seed of Israel shall never fail, but will remain for ever. Therefore the laws of day and of the sea waves, which result from the heavenly movement, will remain for ever. Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.

Objection 3: Further, the substance of the heavenly bodies will remain for ever. Now it is useless to admit the existence of a thing unless you admit the purpose for which it was made: and the heavenly bodies were made in order “to divide the day and the night”; and to be “for signs, and for seasons, and for days and for years” (Gn. 1:14). But they cannot do this except by movement. Therefore their movement will remain for ever, else those bodies would remain without a purpose.

Objection 4: Further, in this renewal of the world the whole world will be bettered. Therefore no body will be deprived of what pertains to its perfection. Now movement belongs to the perfection of a heavenly body, because, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii, “those bodies participate of the Divine goodness by their movement.” Therefore the movement of the heaven will not cease.

Objection 5: Further, the sun successively gives light to the various parts of the world, by reason of its circular movement. Therefore if the circular movement of the heaven ceases, it follows that in some part of the earth’s surface there will be perpetual darkness, which is unbecoming to the aforesaid renewal.

Objection 6: Further, if the movement were to cease, this could only be because movement causes some imperfection in the heaven, for instance wear and tear, which is impossible, since this movement is natural, and the heavenly bodies are impassible, wherefore they are not worn out by movement (De Coelo et Mundo ii). Therefore the movement of the heaven will never cease.

Objection 7: Further, a potentiality is useless if it be not reduced to act. Now in whatever position the heavenly body is placed it is in potentiality to another position. Therefore unless this potentiality be reduced to act, it would remain useless, and would always be imperfect. But it cannot be reduced to act save by local movement. Therefore it will always be in motion.

Objection 8: Further, if a thing is indifferent in relation to more than one alternation, either both are ascribed to it, or neither. Now the sun is indifferent to being in the east or in the west, else its movement would not be uniform throughout, since it would move more rapidly to the place which is more natural to it. Therefore either neither position is ascribed to the sun, or both. But neither both nor neither can be ascribed to it, except successively by movement; for if it stand still, it must needs stand in some position. Therefore the solar body will always be in motion, and in like manner all other heavenly bodies.

Objection 9: Further, the movement of the heaven is the cause of time. Therefore if the movement of the heaven fail, time must needs fail: and if this were to fail, it would fail in an instant. Now an instant is defined (Phys. viii) “the beginning of the future and the end of the past.” Consequently there would be time after the last instant of time, which is impossible. Therefore the movement of the heavens will never cease.

Objection 10: Further, glory does not remove nature. But the movement of the heaven is natural. Therefore it is not deprived thereof by glory.

On the contrary, It is stated (Apoc. 10:6) that the angel who appeared, “swore by him that liveth for ever and ever . . . that time shall be no longer,” namely after the seventh angel shall have sounded the trumpet, at the sound of which “the dead shall rise again” (1 Cor. 15:52). Now if time be not, there is no movement of the heaven. Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.

Further: “Thy sun shall go down no more, and thy moon shall not decrease” (Is. 60:20). Now the setting of the sun and the phases of the moon are caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore the heavenly movement will cease at length.

Further, it is shown in De Gener. ii that “the movement of the heaven is for the sake of continual generation in this lower world.” But generation will cease when the number of the elect is complete. Therefore the movement of the heaven will cease.

Further, all movement is for some end (Metaph. ii). But all movement for an end ceases when the end is obtained. Therefore either the movement of the heaven will never obtain its end, and thus it would be useless, or it will cease at length.

Further, rest is more noble than movement, because things are more likened to God, Who is supremely immovable, by being themselves unmoved. Now the movement of lower bodies terminates naturally in rest. Therefore since the heavenly bodies are far nobler, their movement terminates naturally in rest.

I answer that, There are three opinions touching this question. The first is of the philosophers who assert that the movement of the heaven will last for ever. But this is not in keeping with our faith, which holds that the elect are in a certain number preordained by God, so that the begetting of men will not last for ever, and for the same reason, neither will other things that are directed to the begetting of men, such as the movement of the heaven and the variations of the elements. Others say that the movement of the heaven will cease naturally. But this again is false, since every body that is moved naturally has a place wherein it rests naturally, whereto it is moved naturally, and whence it is not moved except by violence. Now no such place can be assigned to the heavenly body, since it is not more natural to the sun to move towards a point in the east than to move away from it, wherefore either its movement would not be altogether natural, or its movement would not naturally terminate in rest. Hence we must agree with others who say that the movement of the heaven will cease at this renewal of the world, not indeed by any natural cause, but as a result of the will of God. For the body in question, like other bodies, was made to serve man in the two ways above mentioned [5120](A[1]): and hereafter in the state of glory man will no longer need one of these services, that namely in respect of which the heavenly bodies serve man for the sustenance of his bodily life. Now in this way the heavenly bodies serve man by their movement, in so far as by the heavenly movement the human race is multiplied, plants and animals needful for man’s use generated, and the temperature of the atmosphere rendered conducive to health. Therefore the movement of the heavenly body will cease as soon as man is glorified.

Reply to Objection 1: These words refer to the earth in its present state, when it is able to be the principle of the generation and corruption of plants. This is evident from its being said there: “All the days of the earth, seed time and harvest,” etc. And it is simply to be granted that as long as the earth is fit for seed time and harvest, the movement of the heaven will not cease.

We reply in like manner to OBJ 2 that the Lord is speaking there of the duration of the seed of Israel with regard to the present state. This is evident from the words: “Then also the seed of Israel shall fail, so as not to be a nation before Me for ever.” For after this state there will be no succession of days: wherefore the laws also which He had mentioned will cease after this state.

Reply to Objection 3: The end which is there assigned to the heavenly bodies is their proximate end, because it is their proper act. But this act is directed further to another end, namely the service of man, which is shown by the words of Dt. 4:19: “Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations, that are under heaven.” Therefore we should form our judgment of the heavenly bodies from the service of man, rather than from the end assigned to them in Genesis. Moreover the heavenly bodies, as stated above, will serve glorified man in another way; hence it does not follow that they will remain without a purpose.

Reply to Objection 4: Movement does not belong to the perfection of a heavenly body, except in so far as thereby it is the cause of generation and corruption in this lower world: and in that respect also this movement makes the heavenly body participate in the Divine goodness by way of a certain likeness of causality. But movement does not belong to the perfection of the substance of the heaven, which substance will remain. Wherefore it does not follow that, when this movement ceases, the substance of the heaven will lose something of its perfection.

Reply to Objection 5: All the elemental bodies will have in themselves a certain clarity of glory. Hence though part of the surface of the earth be not lit up by the sun, there will by no means be any darkness there.

Reply to Objection 6: A gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 8:22, "Every creature groaneth," etc. says explicitly that "all the elements labor to fulfill their offices: thus the sun and moon fill the places appointed to them not without work: this is for our sake, wherefore they will rest when we are taken up to heaven." This work, in my opinion, does not signify that any stress or passion occurs to these bodies from their movement, since this movement is natural to them and nowise violent, as is proved in De Coelo et Mundo i. But work here denotes a defect in relation to the term to which a thing tends. Hence since this movement is ordained by Divine providence to the completion of the number of the elect, it follows that as long as the latter is incomplete, this movement has not reached the term whereto it was ordained: hence it is said metaphorically to labor, as a man who has not what he intends to have. This defect will be removed from the heaven when the number of the elect is complete. Or it may refer to the desire of the future renewal which it awaits from the Divine disposal.

Reply to Objection 7: In a heavenly body there is no potentiality that can be perfected by place, or that is made for this end which is to be in such and such a place. But potentiality to situation in a place is related to a heavenly body, as the craftsman's potentiality to construct various houses of one kind: for if he construct one of these he is not said to have the potentiality uselessly, and in like manner in whatever situation a heavenly body be placed, its potentiality to be in a place will not remain incomplete or without a purpose.

Reply to Objection 8: Although a heavenly body, so far as regards its nature, is equally inclined to every situation that it can possibly occupy, nevertheless in comparison with things outside it, it is not equally inclined to every situation: but in respect of one situation it has a more noble disposition in comparison with certain things than in respect of another situation; thus in our regard the sun has a more noble disposition at daytime than at night-time. Hence it is probable, since the entire renewal of the world is directed to man, that the heaven will have in this renewal the most noble situation possible in relation to our dwelling there. Or, according to some, the heaven will rest in that situation wherein it was made, else one of its revolutions would remain incomplete. But this argument seems improbable, for since a revolution of the heaven takes no less than 36,000 years to complete, it would follow that the world must last that length of time, which does not seem probable. Moreover according to this it would be possible to know when the world will come to an end. For we may conclude with probability from astronomers in what position the heavenly bodies were made, by taking into consideration the number of years that have elapsed since the beginning of the world: and in the same way it would be possible to know the exact number of years it would take them to return to a like position: whereas the time of the world's end is stated to be unknown.

Reply to Objection 9: Time will at length cease, when the heavenly movement ceases. Yet that last "now" will not be the beginning of the future. For the definition quoted applies to the "now" only as continuous with the parts of time, not as terminating the whole of time.

Reply to Objection 10: The movement of the heaven is said to be natural, not as though it were part of nature in the same way as we speak of natural principles; but because it has its principle in the nature of a body, not indeed its active but its receptive principle. Its active principle is a spiritual substance, as the Commentator says on De Coelo et Mundo; and consequently it is not unreasonable for this movement to be done away by the renewal of glory, since the nature of the heavenly body will not alter through the cessation of that movement.

We grant the other objections which argue in the contrary sense, namely the first three, because they conclude in due manner. But since the remaining two seem to conclude that the movement of heaven will cease naturally, we must reply to them. To the first, then, we reply that movement ceases when its purpose is attained, provided this is a sequel to, and does not accompany the movement. Now the purpose of the heavenly movement, according to philosophers, accompanies that movement, namely the imitation of the Divine goodness in the causality of that movement with respect to this lower world. Hence it does not follow that this movement ceases naturally.

To the second we reply that although immobility is simply nobler than movement, yet movement in a subject which thereby can acquire a perfect participation of the Divine goodness is nobler than rest in a subject which is altogether unable to acquire that perfection by movement. For this reason the earth which is the lowest of the elements is without movement: although God Who is exalted above all things is without movement, by Whom the more noble bodies are moved. Hence also it is that the movements of the higher bodies might be held to be perpetual, so far as their natural power is concerned, and never to terminate in rest, although the movement of lower bodies terminates in rest.

Whether the brightness of the heavenly bodies will be increased at this renewal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the brightness of the heavenly bodies will not be increased at this renewal. For this renewal as regards the lower bodies will be caused by the cleansing fire. But the cleansing fire will not reach the heavenly bodies. Therefore the heavenly bodies will not be renewed by receiving an increase of brightness.

Objection 2: Further, just as the heavenly bodies are the cause of generation in this lower world by their movement, so are they by their light. But, when generation ceases, movement will cease as stated above [5121] (A[2]). Therefore in like manner the light of the heavenly bodies will cease rather than increase.

Objection 3: Further, if the heavenly bodies will be renewed when man is renewed, it follows that when man deteriorated they deteriorated likewise. But this does not seem probable, since these bodies are unalterable as to their substance. Therefore neither will they be renewed when man is renewed.

Objection 4: Further, if they deteriorated then it follows that their deterioration was on a par with the amelioration which, it is said, will accrue to them at man's renewal. Now it is written (Is. 30:26) that "the light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun." Therefore in the original state before sin the moon shone as much as the sun does now. Therefore whenever the moon was over the earth, it made it to be day as the sun does now: which is proved manifestly to be false from the statement of Gn. 1:16 that the moon was made "to rule the night." Therefore when man sinned the heavenly bodies were not deprived of their light; and so their light will not be increased, so it seems, when man is glorified.

Objection 5: Further, the brightness of the heavenly bodies, like other creatures, is directed to the use of man. Now, after the resurrection, the brightness of the sun will be of no use to man: for it is written (Is. 60:19): “Thou shalt no more have the sun for thy light by day, neither shall the brightness of the moon enlighten thee,” and (Apoc. 21:23): “The city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon to shine in it.” Therefore their brightness will not be increased.

Objection 6: Further, it were not a wise craftsman who would make very great instruments for the making of a small work. Now man is a very small thing in comparison with the heavenly bodies, which by their huge bulk surpass the size of man almost beyond comparison: in fact the size of the whole earth in comparison with the heaven is as a point compared with a sphere, as astronomers say. Since then God is most wise it would seem that man is not the end of the creation of the heavens, and so it is unseemly that the heaven should deteriorate when he sinned, or that it should be bettered when he is glorified.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 30:26): “The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun, and the light of the sun shall be sevenfold.”

Further, the whole world will be renewed for the better. But the heaven is the more noble part of the corporeal world. Therefore it will be altered for the better. But this cannot be unless it shine out with greater brightness. Therefore its brightness will be bettered and will increase.

Further, “every creature that groaneth and travaileth in pain, awaiteth the revelation of the glory of the children of God” [*’The creature also itself shall be delivered from the servitude of corruption, into the liberty of the children of God. For we know that every creature groaneth and travaileth in pain,’ etc.] (Rom. 8:21,22). Now such are the heavenly bodies, as a gloss says on the same passage. Therefore they await the glory of the saints. But they would not await it unless they were to gain something by it. Therefore their brightness will increase thereby, since it is their chief beauty.

I answer that, The renewal of the world is directed to the end that, after this renewal has taken place, God may become visible to man by signs so manifest as to be perceived as it were by his senses. Now creatures lead to the knowledge of God chiefly by their comeliness and beauty, which show forth the wisdom of their Maker and Governor; wherefore it is written (Wis. 13:5): “By the greatness of the beauty and of the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so as to be known thereby.” And the beauty of the heavenly bodies consists chiefly in light; wherefore it is written (Ecclus.

43:10): “The glory of the stars is the beauty of heaven, the Lord enlighteneth the world on high.” Hence the heavenly bodies will be bettered, especially as regards their brightness. But to what degree and in what way this betterment will take place is known to Him alone Who will bring it about.

Reply to Objection 1: The cleansing fire will not cause the form of the renewal, but will only dispose thereto, by cleansing from the vileness of sin and the impurity resulting from the mingling of bodies, and this is not to be found in the heavenly bodies. Hence although the heavenly bodies are not to be cleansed by fire, they are nevertheless to be Divinely renewed.

Reply to Objection 2: Movement does not denote perfection in the thing moved, considered in itself, since movement is the act of that which is imperfect: although it may pertain to the perfection of a body in so far as the latter is the cause of something. But light belongs to the perfection of a lightsome body, even considered in its substance: and consequently after the heavenly body has ceased to be the cause of generation, its brightness will remain, while its movement will cease.

Reply to Objection 3: A gloss on Is. 30:26, “The light of the moon shall be as the light of the sun,” says: “All things made for man’s sake deteriorated at his fall, and sun and moon diminished in light.” This diminishment is understood by some to mean a real lessening of light. Nor does it matter that the heavenly bodies are by nature unalterable, because this alteration was brought about by the Divine power. Others, however, with greater probability, take this diminishment to mean, not a real lessening of light, but a lessening in reference to man’s use; because after sin man did not receive as much benefit from the light of the heavenly bodies as before. In the same sense we read (Gn. 3:17,18): “Cursed is the earth in thy work . . . Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee”; although it would have brought forth thorns and thistles before sin, but not as a punishment to man. Nor does it follow that, supposing the light of the heavenly bodies not to have been lessened essentially through man sinning, it will not really be increased at man’s glorification, because man’s sin wrought no change upon the state of the universe, since both before and after sin man had an animal life, which needs the movement and generation of a corporeal creature; whereas man’s glorification will bring a change upon the state of all corporeal creatures, as stated above (Q[76], A[7]). Hence there is no comparison.

Reply to Objection 4: This diminution, according to the more probable opinion, refers not to the substance but to the effect. Hence it does not follow that the moon while over the earth would have made it to be day, but that man would have derived as much benefit from the light of the moon then as now from the light of the sun. After the resurrection, however, when the light of the moon will be increased in very truth, there will be night nowhere on earth but only in the center of the earth, where hell will be, because then, as stated, the moon will shine as brightly as the sun does now; the sun seven times as much as now, and the bodies of the blessed seven times more than the sun, although there be no authority or reason to prove this.

Reply to Objection 5: A thing may be useful to man in two ways. First, by reason of necessity, and thus no creature will be useful to man because he will have complete sufficiency from God. This is signified (Apoc. 21:23) by the words quoted, according to which that “city hath no need of the sun,” nor “of the moon.” Secondly, on account of a greater perfection, and thus man will make use of other creatures, yet not as needful to him in order to obtain his end, in which way he makes use of them now.

Reply to Objection 6: This is the argument of Rabbi Moses who endeavors to prove (Dux errantium iii) that the world was by no means made for man’s use. Wherefore he maintains that what we read in the Old Testament about the renewal of the world, as instanced by the quotations from Isaias, is said metaphorically: and that even as the sun is said to be darkened in reference to a person when he encounters a great sorrow so as not to know what to do (which way of speaking is customary to Scripture), so on the other hand the sun is said to shine brighter for a person, and the whole world to be renewed, when he is brought from a state of sorrow to one of very great joy. But this is not in harmony with the authority and commentaries of holy men. Consequently we must answer this argument by saying that although the heavenly bodies far surpass the human body, yet the rational soul surpasses the heavenly bodies far more than these surpass the human body. Hence it is not unreasonable to say that the heavenly bodies were made for man’s sake; not, however as though this were the principal end, since the principal end of all things is God.

Whether the elements will be renewed by an addition of brightness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the elements will not be renewed by receiving some kind of brightness. For just as light is a quality proper to a heavenly body, so are hot and cold, wet and dry. qualities proper to the elements. Therefore as the heaven is renewed by an increase of brightness, so ought the elements to be renewed by an increase of active and passive qualities.

Objection 2: Further, rarity, and density are qualities of the elements, and the elements will not be deprived of them at this renewal. Now the rarity and density of the elements would seem to be an obstacle to brightness, since a bright body needs to be condensed, for which reason the rarity of the air seems incompatible with brightness, and in like manner the density of the earth which is an obstacle to transparency. Therefore it is impossible for the elements to be renewed by the addition of brightness.

Objection 3: Further, it is agreed that the damned will be in the earth. Yet they will be in darkness not only internal but also external. Therefore the earth will not be endowed with brightness in this renewal, nor for the same reason will the other elements.

Objection 4: Further, increase of brightness in the elements implies an increase of heat. If therefore at this renewal the brightness of the elements be greater than it is now, their heat will likewise be greater; and thus it would seem that they will be changed from their natural qualities, which are in them according to a fixed measure: and this is absurd.

Objection 5: Further, the good of the universe which consists in the order and harmony of the parts is more excellent than the good of any individual creature. But if one creature be bettered, the good of the universe is done away, since there will no longer be the same harmony. Therefore if the elemental bodies, which according to their natural degree in the universe should be devoid of brightness, were to be endowed with brightness, the perfection of the universe would be diminished thereby rather than increased.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 21:1): “I saw a new heaven and a new earth.” Now the heaven will be renewed by an increase of brightness. Therefore the earth and likewise the other elements will also.

Further, the lower bodies, like the higher, are for man’s use. Now the corporeal creature will be rewarded for its services to man, as a gloss of Ambrose seems to say on Rom. 8:22, “Every creature groaneth,” and a gloss of Jerome on Is. 30:26, “And the light of the moon shall be,” etc. Therefore the elements will be glorified as well as the heavenly bodies.

Further, man’s body is composed of the elements. Therefore the elemental particles that are in man’s body will be glorified by the addition of brightness when man is glorified. Now it is fitting that whole and part should have the same disposition. Therefore it is fitting that the elements themselves should be endowed with brightness.

I answer that, Just as there is a certain order between the heavenly spirits and the earthly or human spirits, so is there an order between heavenly bodies and earthly bodies. Since then the corporeal creature was made for the sake of the spiritual and is ruled thereby, it follows that corporeal things are dealt with similarly to spiritual things. Now in this final consummation of things the lower spirits will receive the properties of the higher spirits, because men will be as the angels in heaven (Mat. 22:30): and this will be accomplished by conferring the highest degree of perfection on that in which the human spirit agrees with the angelic. Wherefore, in like manner, since the lower bodies do not agree with the heavenly bodies except in the nature of light and transparency (De Anima ii), it follows that the lower bodies are to be perfected chiefly as regards brightness. Hence all the elements will be clothed with a certain brightness, not equally, however, but according to their mode: for it is said that the earth on its outward surface will be as transparent as glass, water as crystal, the air as heaven, fire as the lights of heaven.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above [5122](A[1]), the renewal of the world is directed to the effect that man even by his senses may as it were see the Godhead by manifest signs. Now the most spiritual and subtle of our senses is the sight. Consequently all the lower bodies need to be bettered, chiefly as regards the visible qualities the principle of which is light. On the other hand, the elemental qualities regard the touch, which is the most material of the senses, and the excess of their contrariety is more displeasing than pleasant; whereas excess of light will be pleasant, since it has no contrariety, except on account of a weakness in the organ, such as will not be then.

Reply to Objection 2: The air will be bright, not as casting forth rays, but as an enlightened transparency; while the earth, although it is opaque through lack of light, yet by the Divine power its surface will be clothed with the glory of brightness, without prejudice to its density.

Reply to Objection 3: The earth will not be glorified with brightness in the infernal regions; but instead of this glory, that part of the earth will have the rational spirits of men and demons who though weak by reason of sin are nevertheless superior to any corporeal quality by the dignity of their nature. or we may say that, though the whole earth be glorified, the wicked will nevertheless be in exterior darkness, since even the fire of hell, while shining for them in one respect, will be unable to enlighten them in another.

Reply to Objection 4: This brightness will be in these bodies even as it is in the heavenly bodies, in which it causes no heat, because these bodies will then be unalterable, as the heavenly bodies are now.

Reply to Objection 5: The order of the universe will not be done away by the betterment of the elements, because all the other parts will also be bettered, and so the same harmony will remain.

Whether the plants and animals will remain in this renewal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the plants and animals will remain in this renewal. For the elements should be deprived of nothing that belongs to their adornment. Now the elements are said to be adorned by the animals and plants [*Cf. Gn. 1:11,12,20,21,24,25]. Therefore they will not be removed in this renewal.

Objection 2: Further, just as the elements served man, so also did animals, plants and mineral bodies. But on account of this service the elements will be glorified. Therefore both animals and plants and mineral bodies will be glorified likewise.

Objection 3: Further, the universe will remain imperfect if anything belonging to its perfection be removed. Now the species of animals, plants, and mineral bodies belong to the perfection of the universe. Since then we must not say that the world will remain imperfect when it is renewed, it seems that we should assert that the plants and animals will remain.

Objection 4: Further, animals and plants have a more noble form than the elements. Now the world, at this final renewal, will be changed for the better. Therefore animals and plants should remain rather than the elements, since they are nobler.

Objection 5: Further, it is unseemly to assert that the natural appetite will be frustrated. But by their natural appetite animals and plants desire to be for ever, if indeed not as regards the individual, at least as regards the species: and to this end their continual generation is directed (De Generat. ii). Therefore it is unseemly to say that these species will at length cease to be.

On the contrary, If plants and animals are to remain, either all of them will, or some of them. If all of them, then dumb animals, which had previously died, will have to rise again just as men will rise again. But this cannot be asserted for since their form comes to nothing, they cannot resume the same identical form. On the other hand if not all but some of them remain, since there is no more reason for one of them remaining for ever rather than another, it would seem that none of them will. But whatever remains after the world has been renewed will remain for ever, generation and corruption being done away. Therefore plants and animals will altogether cease after the renewal of the world.

Further, according to the Philosopher (De Generat. ii) the species of animals, plants and such like corruptible things, are not perpetuated except by the continuance of the heavenly movement. Now this will cease then. Therefore it will be impossible for those species to be perpetuated.

Further, if the end cease, those things which are directed to the end should cease. Now animals and plants were made for the upkeep of human life; wherefore it is written (Gn. 9:3): “Even as the green herbs have I delivered all flesh to you [*Vulg.: ‘have I delivered them all to you’].” Therefore when man’s animal life ceases, animals and plants should cease. But after this renewal animal life will cease in man. Therefore neither plants nor animals ought to remain.

I answer that, Since the renewal of the world will be for man’s sake it follows that it should be conformed to the renewal of man. Now by being renewed man will pass from the state of corruption to incorruptibility and to a state of everlasting rest, wherefore it is written (1 Cor. 15:53): “This corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality”; and consequently the world will be renewed in such a way as to throw off all corruption and remain for ever at rest. Therefore it will be impossible for anything to be the subject of that renewal, unless it be a subject of incorruption. Now such are the heavenly bodies, the elements, and man. For the heavenly bodies are by their very nature incorruptible both as to their whole and as to their part: the elements are corruptible as to their parts but incorruptible as a whole: while men are corruptible both in whole and in part, but this is on the part of their matter not on the part of their form, the rational soul to wit, which will remain incorrupt after the corruption of man. on the other hand, dumb animals, plants, and minerals, and all mixed bodies, are corruptible both in their whole and in their parts, both on the part of their matter which loses its form, and on the part of their form which does not remain actually; and thus they are in no way subjects of incorruption. Hence they will not remain in this renewal, but those things alone which we have mentioned above.

Reply to Objection 1: These bodies are said to adorn the elements, inasmuch as the general active and passive forces which are in the elements are applied to specific actions: hence they adorn the elements in their active and passive state. But this state will not remain in the elements: wherefore there is no need for animals or plants to remain.

Reply to Objection 2: Neither animals nor plants nor any other bodies merited anything by their services to man, since they lack free-will. However, certain bodies are said to be rewarded in so far as man merited that those things should be renewed which are adapted to be renewed. But plants and animals are not adapted to the renewal of incorruption, as stated above. Wherefore for this very reason man did not merit that they should be renewed, since no one can merit for another, or even for himself that which another or himself is incapable of receiving. Hence, granted even that dumb animals merited by serving man, it would not follow that they are to be renewed.

Reply to Objection 3: Just as several kinds of perfection are ascribed to man (for there is the perfection of created nature and the perfection of glorified nature), so also there is a twofold perfection of the universe, one corresponding to this state of changeableness, the other corresponding to the state of a future renewal. Now plants and animals belong to its perfection according to the present state, and not according to the state of this renewal, since they are not capable thereof.

Reply to Objection 4: Although animals and plants as to certain other respects are more noble than the elements, the elements are more noble in relation to incorruption, as explained above [*Cf.[5123] Q[74], A[1], ad 3].

Reply to Objection 5: The natural desire to be for ever that is in animals and plants must be understood in reference to the movement of the heaven, so that they may continue in being as long as the movement of the heaven lasts: since there cannot be an appetite for an effect to last longer than its cause. Wherefore if at the cessation of movement in the first movable body, plants and animals cease as to their species, it does not follow that the natural appetite is frustrated.

OF THE VISION OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE IN REFERENCE TO THE BLESSED* (THREE ARTICLES) [*Cf. FP, Q[12]]

In the next place we must consider matters concerning the blessed after the general judgment. We shall consider: (1) Their vision of the Divine essence, wherein their bliss consists chiefly; (2) Their bliss and their mansions; (3) Their relations with the damned; (4) Their gifts, which are contained in their bliss; (5) The crowns which perfect and adorn their happiness.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the saints will see God in His essence?

(2) Whether they will see Him with the eyes of the body?

(3) Whether in seeing God they will see all that God sees?

Whether the human intellect can attain to the vision of God in His essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that the human intellect cannot attain to the vision of God in His essence. For it is written (Jn. 1:18): “No man hath seen God at any time”; and Chrysostom in his commentary says (Hom. xiv in Joan.) that “not even the heavenly essences, namely the Cherubim and Seraphim, have ever been able to see Him as He is.” Now, only equality with the angels is promised to men (Mat. 22:30): “They . . . shall be as the angels of God in heaven.” Therefore neither will the saints in heaven see God in His essence.

Objection 2: Further, Dionysius argues thus (Div. Nom. i): “Knowledge is only of existing things.” Now whatever exists is finite, since it is confined to a certain genus: and therefore God, since He is infinite, is above all existing things. Therefore there is no knowledge of Him, and He is above all knowledge.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius (De Myst. Theol. i) shows that the most perfect way in which our intellect can be united to God is when it is united to Him as to something unknown. Now that which is seen in its essence is not unknown. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His essence.

Objection 4: Further, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach.) that "the darkness"—for thus he calls the abundance of light—"which screens God is impervious to all illuminations, and hidden from all knowledge: and if anyone in seeing God understood what he saw, he saw not God Himself, but one of those things that are His." Therefore no created intellect will be able to see God in His essence.

Objection 5: Further, according to Dionysius (Ep. ad Hieroth.) "God is invisible on account of His surpassing glory." Now His glory surpasses the human intellect in heaven even as on the way. Therefore since He is invisible on the way, so will He be in heaven.

Objection 6: Further, since the intelligible object is the perfection of the intellect, there must needs be proportion between intelligible and intellect, as between the visible object and the sight. But there is no possible proportion between our intellect and the Divine essence, since an infinite distance separates them. Therefore our intellect will be unable to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.

Objection 7: Further, God is more distant from our intellect than the created intelligible is from our senses. But the senses can nowise attain to the sight of a spiritual creature. Therefore neither will our intellect be able to attain to the vision of the Divine essence.

Objection 8: Further, whenever the intellect understands something actually it needs to be informed with the likeness of the object understood, which likeness is the principle of the intellectual operation terminating in that object, even as heat is the principle of heating. Accordingly if our intellect understands God, this must be by means of some likeness informing the intellect itself. Now this cannot be the very essence of God, since form and thing informed must needs have one being, while the Divine essence differs from our intellect in essence and being. Therefore the form whereby our intellect is informed in understanding God must needs be a likeness impressed by God on our intellect. But this likeness, being something created, cannot lead to the knowledge of God except as an effect leads to the knowledge of its cause. Therefore it is impossible for our intellect to see God except through His effect. But to see God through His effect is not to see Him in His essence. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.

Objection 9: Further, the Divine essence is more distant from our intellect than any angel or intelligence. Now according to Avicenna (Metaph. iii), “the existence of an intelligence in our intellect does not imply that its essence is in our intellect,” because in that case our knowledge of the intelligence would be a substance and not an accident, “but that its likeness is impressed on our intellect.” Therefore neither is God in our intellect, to be understood by us, except in so far as an impression of Him is in our intellect. But this impression cannot lead to the knowledge of the Divine essence, for since it is infinitely distant from the Divine essence, it degenerates to another image much more than if the image of a white thing were to degenerate to the image of a black thing. Therefore, just as a person in whose sight the image of a white thing degenerates to the image of a black thing, on account of an indisposition in the organ, is not said to see a white thing, so neither will our intellect be able to see God in His essence, since it understands God only by means of this impression.

Objection 10: Further, “In things devoid of matter that which understands is the same as that which is understood” (De Anima iii). Now God is supremely devoid of matter. Since then our intellect, which is created, cannot attain to be an uncreated essence, it is impossible for our intellect to see God in His essence.

Objection 11: Further, whatever is seen in its essence is known as to what it is. But our intellect cannot know of God what He is, but only what He is not as Dionysius (Coel. Hier. ii) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) declare. Therefore our intellect will be unable to see God in His essence.

Objection 12: Further, every infinite thing, as such, is unknown. But God is in every way infinite. Therefore He is altogether unknown. Therefore it will be impossible for Him to be seen in His essence by a created intellect.

Objection 13: Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii): “God is by nature invisible.” Now that which is in God by nature cannot be otherwise. Therefore it is impossible for Him to be seen in His essence.

Objection 14: Further, whatever is in one way and is seen in another way is not seen as it is. Now God is in one way and will be seen in another way by the saints in heaven: for He according to His own mode, but will be seen by the saints according to their mode. Therefore He will not be seen by the saints as He is, and thus will not be seen in His essence.

Objection 15: Further, that which is seen through a medium is not seen in its essence. Now God will be seen in heaven through a medium which is the light of glory, according to Ps. 35:10, “In Thy light we shall see light.” Therefore He will not be seen in His essence.

Objection 16: Further, in heaven God will be seen face to face, according to 1 Cor. 13:12. Now when we see a man face to face, we see him through his likeness. Therefore in heaven God will be seen through His likeness, and consequently not in His essence.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 13:12): “We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face.” Now that which is seen face to face is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.

Further, it is written (1 Jn. 3:2): “When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.” Therefore we shall see Him in His essence.

Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:24, “When He shall have delivered up the kingdom to God and the Father,” says: “Where,” i.e. in heaven, “the essence of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost shall be seen: this is given to the clean of heart alone and is the highest bliss.” Therefore the blessed will see God in His essence.

Further, it is written (Jn. 14:21): “He that loveth Me shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him, and will manifest Myself to him.” Now that which is manifested is seen in its essence. Therefore God will be seen in His essence by the saints in heaven.

Further, Gregory commenting (Moral. xviii) on the words of Ex. 33:20, “Man shall not see Me and live,” disapproves of the opinion of those who said that “in this abode of bliss God can be seen in His glory but not in His nature; for His glory differs not from His nature.” But His nature is His essence. Therefore He will be seen in His essence.

Further, the desire of the saints cannot be altogether frustrated. Now the common desire of the saints is to see God in His essence, according to Ex. 33:13, “Show me Thy glory”; Ps. 79:20, “Show Thy face and we shall be saved”; and Jn. 14:8, “Show us the Father and it is enough for us.” Therefore the saints will see God in His essence.

I answer that, Even as we hold by faith that the last end of man’s life is to see God, so the philosophers maintained that man’s ultimate happiness is to understand immaterial substances according to their being. Hence in reference to this question we find that philosophers and theologians encounter the same difficulty and the same difference of opinion. For some philosophers held that our passive intellect can never come to understand separate substances. thus Alfarabius expresses himself at the end of his Ethics, although he says the contrary in his book On the Intelligence, as the Commentator attests (De Anima iii). In like manner certain theologians held that the human intellect can never attain to the vision of God in His essence. on either side they were moved by the distance which separates our intellect from the Divine essence and from separate substances. For since the intellect in act is somewhat one with the intelligible object in act, it would seem difficult to understand how the created intellect is made to be an uncreated essence. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. xiv in Joan.): “How can the creature see the uncreated?” Those who hold the passive intellect to be the subject of generation and corruption, as being a power dependent on the body, encounter a still greater difficulty not only as regards the vision of God but also as regards the vision of any separate substances. But this opinion is altogether untenable. First, because it is in contradiction to the authority of canonical scripture, as Augustine declares (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). Secondly, because, since understanding is an operation most proper to man, it follows that his happiness must be held to consist in that operation when perfected in him. Now since the perfection of an intelligent being as such is the intelligible object, if in the most perfect operation of his intellect man does not attain to the vision of the Divine essence, but to something else, we shall be forced to conclude that something other than God is the object of man’s happiness: and since the ultimate perfection of a thing consists in its being united to its principle, it follows that something other than God is the effective principle of man, which is absurd, according to us, and also according to the philosophers who maintain that our souls emanate from the separate substances, so that finally we may be able to understand these substances. Consequently, according to us, it must be asserted that our intellect will at length attain to the vision of the Divine essence, and according to the philosophers, that it will attain to the vision of separate substances.

It remains, then, to examine how this may come about. For some, like Alfarabius and Avempace, held that from the very fact that our intellect understands any intelligible objects whatever, it attains to the vision of a separate substance. To prove this they employ two arguments. The first is that just as the specific nature is not diversified in various individuals, except as united to various individuating principles, so the idea understood is not diversified in me and you, except in so far as it is united to various imaginary forms: and consequently when the intellect separates the idea understood from the imaginary forms, there remains a quiddity understood, which is one and the same in the various persons understanding it, and such is the quiddity of a separate substance. Hence, when our intellect attains to the supreme abstraction of any intelligible quiddity, it thereby understands the quiddity of the separate substance that is similar to it. The second argument is that our intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract the quiddity from all intelligible objects having a quiddity. If, then, the quiddity which it abstracts from some particular individual be a quiddity without a quiddity, the intellect by understanding it understands the quiddity of the separate substance which has a like disposition, since separate substances are subsisting quiddities without quiddities; for the quiddity of a simple thing is the simple thing itself, as Avicenna says (Met. iii). On the other hand if the quiddity abstracted from this particular sensible be a quiddity that has a quiddity, it follows that the intellect has a natural aptitude to abstract this quiddity, and consequently since we cannot go on indefinitely, we shall come to some quiddity without a quiddity, and this is what we understand by a separate quiddity [*Cf. [5124]FP, Q[88], A[2]].

But this reasoning is seemingly inconclusive. First, because the quiddity of the material substance, which the intellect abstracts, is not of the same nature as the quiddity of the separate substances, and consequently from the fact that our intellect abstracts the quiddities of material substances and knows them, it does not follow that it knows the quiddity of a separate substance, especially of the Divine essence, which more than any other is of a different nature from any created quiddity. Secondly, because granted that it be of the same nature, nevertheless the knowledge of a composite thing would not lead to the knowledge of a separate substance, except in the point of the most remote genus, namely substance: and such a knowledge is imperfect unless it reach to the properties of a thing. For to know a man only as an animal is to know him only in a restricted sense and potentially: and much less is it to know only the nature of substance in him. Hence to know God thus, or other separate substances, is not to see the essence of God or the quiddity of a separate substance, but to know Him in His effect and in a mirror as it were. For this reason Avicenna in his Metaphysics. propounds another way of understanding separate substances, to wit that separate substances are understood by us by means of intentions of their quiddities, such intentions being images of their substances, not indeed abstracted therefrom, since they are immaterial, but impressed thereby on our souls. But this way also seems inadequate to the Divine vision which we seek. For it is agreed that “whatever is received into any thing is therein after the mode of the recipient”: and consequently the likeness of the Divine essence impressed on our intellect will be according to the mode of our intellect: and the mode of our intellect falls short of a perfect reception of the Divine likeness. Now the lack of perfect likeness may occur in as many ways, as unlikeness may occur. For in one way there is a deficient likeness, when the form is participated according to the same specific nature, but not in the same measure of perfection: such is the defective likeness in a subject that has little whiteness in comparison with one that has much. In another way the likeness is yet more defective, when it does not attain to the same specific nature but only to the same generic nature: such is the likeness of an orange-colored or yellowish object in comparison with a white one. In another way, still more defective is the likeness when it does not attain to the same generic nature, but only to a certain analogy or proportion: such is the likeness of whiteness to man, in that each is a being: and in this way every likeness received into a creature is defective in comparison with the Divine essence. Now in order that the sight know whiteness, it is necessary for it to receive the likeness of whiteness according to its specific nature, although not according to the same manner of being because the form has a manner of being in the sense other from that which it has in the thing outside the soul: for if the form of yellowness were received into the eye, the eye would not be said to see whiteness. In like manner in order that the intellect understand a quiddity, it is necessary for it to receive its likeness according to the same specific nature, although there may possibly not be the same manner of being on either side: for the form which is in the intellect or sense is not the principle of knowledge according to its manner of being on both sides, but according to its common ratio with the external object. Hence it is clear that by no likeness received in the created intellect can God be understood, so that His essence be seen immediately. And for this reason those who held the Divine essence to be seen in this way alone, said that the essence itself will not be seen, but a certain brightness, as it were a radiance thereof. Consequently neither does this way suffice for the Divine vision that we seek.

Therefore we must take the other way, which also certain philosophers held, namely Alexander and Averroes (De Anima iii.). For since in every knowledge some form is required whereby the object is known or seen, this form by which the intellect is perfected so as to see separate substances is neither a quiddity abstracted by the intellect from composite things, as the first opinion maintained, nor an impression left on our intellect by the separate substance, as the second opinion affirmed; but the separate substance itself united to our intellect as its form, so as to be both that which is understood, and that whereby it is understood. And whatever may be the case with other separate substances, we must nevertheless allow this to be our way of seeing God in His essence, because by whatever other form our intellect were informed, it could not be led thereby to the Divine essence. This, however, must not be understood as though the Divine essence were in reality the form of our intellect, or as though from its conjunction with our intellect there resulted one being simply, as in natural things from the natural form and matter: but the meaning is that the proportion of the Divine essence to our intellect is as the proportion of form to matter. For whenever two things, one of which is the perfection of the other, are received into the same recipient, the proportion of one to the other, namely of the more perfect to the less perfect, is as the proportion of form to matter: thus light and color are received into a transparent object, light being to color as form to matter. When therefore intellectual light is received into the soul, together with the indwelling Divine essence, though they are not received in the same way, the Divine essence will be to the intellect as form to matter: and that this suffices for the intellect to be able to see the Divine essence by the Divine essence itself may be shown as follows.

As from the natural form (whereby a thing has being) and matter, there results one thing simply, so from the form whereby the intellect understands, and the intellect itself, there results one thing intelligibly. Now in natural things a self-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any matter, if that thing has matter as one of its parts, since it is impossible for matter to be the form of a thing. But if this self-subsistent thing be a mere form, nothing hinders it from being the form of some matter and becoming that whereby the composite itself is [*Literally,—and becoming the 'whereby-it-is' of the composite itself] as instanced in the soul. Now in the intellect we must take the intellect itself in potentiality as matter, and the intelligible species as form; so that the intellect actually understanding will be the composite as it were resulting from both. Hence if there be a self-subsistent thing, that has nothing in itself besides that which is intelligible, such a thing can by itself be the form whereby the intellect understands. Now a thing is intelligible in respect of its actuality and not of its potentiality (Met. ix): in proof of which an intelligible form needs to be abstracted from matter and from all the properties of matter. Therefore, since the Divine essence is pure act, it will be possible for it to be the form whereby the intellect understands: and this will be the beatific vision. Hence the Master says (Sent. ii, D, 1) that the union of the body with the soul is an illustration of the blissful union of the spirit with God.

Reply to Objection 1: The words quoted can be explained in three ways, according to Augustine (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii). In one way as excluding corporeal vision, whereby no one ever saw or will see God in His essence; secondly, as excluding intellectual vision of God in His essence from those who dwell in this mortal flesh; thirdly, as excluding the vision of comprehension from a created intellect. It is thus that Chrysostom understands the saying wherefore he adds: "By seeing, the evangelist means a most clear perception, and such a comprehension as the Father has of the Son." This also is the meaning of the evangelist, since he adds: "The Only-begotten Son Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him": his intention being to prove the Son to be God from His comprehending God.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as God, by His infinite essence, surpasses all existing things which have a determinate being, so His knowledge, whereby He knows, is above all knowledge. Wherefore as our knowledge is to our created essence, so is the Divine knowledge to His infinite essence. Now two things contribute to knowledge, to wit, the knower and the thing known. Again, the vision whereby we shall see God in His essence is the same whereby God sees Himself, as regards that whereby He is seen, because as He sees Himself in His essence so shall we also see Him. But as regards the knower there is the difference that is between the Divine intellect and ours. Now in the order of knowledge the object known follows the form by which we know, since by the form of a stone we see a stone: whereas the efficacy of knowledge follows the power of the knower: thus he who has stronger sight sees more clearly. Consequently in that vision we shall see the same thing that God sees, namely His essence, but not so effectively.

Reply to Objection 3: Dionysius is speaking there of the knowledge whereby wayfarers know God by a created form, whereby our intellect is informed so as to see God. But as Augustine says (De Videndo Deo: Ep. cxlvii), “God evades every form of our intellect,” because whatever form our intellect conceive, that form is out of proportion to the Divine essence. Hence He cannot be fathomed by our intellect: but our most perfect knowledge of Him as wayfarers is to know that He is above all that our intellect can conceive, and thus we are united to Him as to something unknown. In heaven, however, we shall see Him by a form which is His essence, and we shall be united to Him as to something known.

Reply to Objection 4: God is light (Jn. 1:9). Now illumination is the impression of light on an illuminated object. And since the Divine essence is of a different mode from any likeness thereof impressed on the intellect, he (Dionysius) says that the “Divine darkness is impervious to all illumination,” because, to wit, the Divine essence, which he calls “darkness” on account of its surpassing brightness, remains undemonstrated by the impression on our intellect, and consequently is “hidden from all knowledge.” Therefore if anyone in seeing God conceives something in his mind, this is not God but one of God’s effects.

Reply to Objection 5: Although the glory of God surpasses any form by which our intellect is informed now, it does not surpass the Divine essence, which will be the form of our intellect in heaven: and therefore although it is invisible now, it will be visible then.

Reply to Objection 6: Although there can be no proportion between finite and infinite, since the excess of the infinite over the finite is indeterminate, there can be proportionateness or a likeness to proportion between them: for as a finite thing is equal to some finite thing, so is an infinite thing equal to an infinite thing. Now in order that a thing be known totally, it is sometimes necessary that there be proportion between knower and known, because the power of the knower needs to be adequate to the knowableness of the thing known, and equality is a kind of proportion. Sometimes, however, the knowableness of the thing surpasses the power of the knower, as when we know God, or conversely when He knows creatures: and then there is no need for proportion between knower and known, but only for proportionateness; so that, to wit, as the knower is to the knowable object, so is the knowable object to the fact of its being known: and this proportionateness suffices for the infinite to be known by the finite, or conversely.

We may also reply that proportion according to the strict sense in which it is employed signifies a ratio of quantity to quantity based on a certain fixed excess or equality; but is further transferred to denote any ratio of any one thing to another; and in this sense we say that matter should be proportionate to its form. In this sense nothing hinders our intellect, although finite, being described as proportionate to the vision of the Divine essence; but not to the comprehension thereof, on account of its immensity.

Reply to Objection 7: Likeness and distance are twofold. One is according to agreement in nature; and thus God is more distant from the created intellect than the created intelligible is from the sense. The other is according to proportionateness; and thus it is the other way about, for sense is not proportionate to the knowledge of the immaterial, as the intellect is proportionate to the knowledge of any immaterial object whatsoever. It is this likeness and not the former that is requisite for knowledge, for it is clear that the intellect understanding a stone is not like it in its natural being; thus also the sight apprehends red honey and red gall, though it does not apprehend sweet honey, for the redness of gall is more becoming to honey as visible, than the sweetness of honey to honey.

Reply to Objection 8: In the vision wherein God will be seen in His essence, the Divine essence itself will be the form, as it were, of the intellect, by which it will understand: nor is it necessary for them to become one in being, but only to become one as regards the act of understanding.

Reply to Objection 9: We do not uphold the saying of Avicenna as regards the point at issue, for in this other philosophers also disagree with him. Unless perhaps we might say that Avicenna refers to the knowledge of separate substances, in so far as they are known by the habits of speculative sciences and the likeness of other things. Hence he makes this statement in order to prove that in us knowledge is not a substance but an accident. Nevertheless, although the Divine essence is more distant, as to the property of its nature, from our intellect, than is the substance of an angel, it surpasses it in the point of intelligibility, since it is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, which is not the case with other separate substances. Nor will that knowledge whereby we shall see God in His essence be in the genus of accident as regards that whereby He will be seen, but only as regards the act of the one who understands Him, for this act will not be the very substance either of the person understanding or of the thing understood.

Reply to Objection 10: A substance that is separate from matter understands both itself and other things; and in both cases the authority quoted can be verified. For since the very essence of a separate substance is of itself intelligible and actual, through being separate from matter, it is clear that when a separate substance understands itself, that which understands and that which is understood are absolutely identical, for it does not understand itself by an intention abstracted from itself, as we understand material objects. And this is apparently the meaning of the Philosopher (De Anima iii.) as indicated by the Commentator (De Anima iii). But when it understands other things, the object actually understood becomes one with the intellect in act, in so far as the form of the object understood becomes the form of the intellect, for as much as the intellect is in act; not that it becomes identified with the essence of the intellect, as Avicenna proves (De Natural. vi.), because the essence of the intellect remains one under two forms whereby it understands two things in succession, in the same way as primary matter remains one under various forms. Hence also the Commentator (De Anima iii.) compares the passive intellect, in this respect, to primary matter. Thus it by no means follows that our intellect in seeing God becomes the very essence of God, but that the latter is compared to it as its perfection or form.

Reply to Objection 11: These and all like authorities must be understood to refer to the knowledge whereby we know God on the way, for the reason given above.

Reply to Objection 12: The infinite is unknown if we take it in the privative sense, as such, because it indicates removal of completion whence knowledge of a thing is derived. Wherefore the infinite amounts to the same as matter subject to privation, as stated in Phys. iii. But if we take the infinite in the negative sense, it indicates the absence of limiting matter, since even a form is somewhat limited by its matter. Hence the infinite in this sense is of itself most knowable; and it is in this way that God is infinite.

Reply to Objection 13: Augustine is speaking of bodily vision, by which God will never be seen. This is evident from what precedes: “For no man hath seen God at any time, nor can any man see Him as these things which we call visible are seen: in this way He is by nature invisible even as He is incorruptible.” As, however, He is by nature supremely being, so He is in Himself supremely intelligible. But that He be for a time not understood by us is owing to our defect: wherefore that He be seen by us after being unseen is owing to a change not in Him but in us.

Reply to Objection 14: In heaven God will be seen by the saints as He is, if this be referred to the mode of the object seen, for the saints will see that God has the mode which He has. But if we refer the mode to the knower, He will not be seen as He is, because the created intellect will not have so great an efficacy in seeing, as the Divine essence has to the effect of being seen.

Reply to Objection 15: There is a threefold medium both in bodily and in intellectual vision. The first is the medium “under which” the object is seen, and this is something perfecting the sight so as to see in general, without determining the sight to any particular object. Such is bodily light in relation to bodily vision; and the light of the active intellect in relation to the passive intellect, in so far as this light is a medium. The second is the light “by which” the object is seen, and this is the visible form whereby either sight is determined to a special object, for instance by the form of a stone to know a stone. The third is the medium “in which” it is seen; and this is something by gazing on which the sight is led to something else: thus by looking in a mirror it is led to see the things reflected in the mirror, and by looking at an image it is led to the thing represented by the image. In this way, too, the intellect from knowing an effect is led to the cause, or conversely. Accordingly in the heavenly vision there will be no third medium, so that, to wit, God be known by the images of other things, as He is known now, for which reason we are said to see now in a glass: nor will there be the second medium, because the essence itself of God will be that whereby our intellect will see God. But there will only be the first medium, which will upraise our intellect so that it will be possible for it to be united to the uncreated substance in the aforesaid manner. Yet this medium will not cause that knowledge to be mediate, because it does not come in between the knower and the thing known, but is that which gives the knower the power to know [*Cf. [5125]FP, Q[12], A[5]].

Reply to Objection 16: Corporeal creatures are not said to be seen immediately, except when that which in them is capable of being brought into conjunction with the sight is in conjunction therewith. Now they are not capable of being in conjunction with the sight of their essence on account of their materiality: hence they are seen immediately when their image is in conjunction with the sight. But God is able to be united to the intellect by His essence: wherefore He would not be seen immediately, unless His essence were united to the intellect: and this vision, which is effected immediately, is called “vision of face.” Moreover the likeness of the corporeal object is received into the sight according to the same ratio as it is in the object, although not according to the same mode of being. Wherefore this likeness leads to the object directly: whereas no likeness can lead our intellect in this way to God, as shown above: and for this reason the comparison fails.

Whether after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[3]]

Objection 1: It would seem that after the resurrection the saints will see God with the eyes of the body. Because the glorified eye has greater power than one that is not glorified. Now the blessed Job saw God with his eyes

(Job 42:5): “With the hearing of the ear, I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee.” Much more therefore will the glorified eye be able to see God in His essence.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Job 19:26): “In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour [Vulg.: ‘my God’].” Therefore in heaven God will be seen with the eyes of the body.

Objection 3: Further. Augustine, speaking of the sight of the glorified eyes, expresses himself as follows (De Civ. Dei xxii): “A greater power will be in those eyes, not to see more keenly, as certain serpents or eagles are reported to see (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed by these animals they can see only corporeal things), but to see even incorporeal things.” Now any power that is capable of knowing incorporeal things can be upraised to see God. Therefore the glorified eyes will be able to see God.

Objection 4: Further, the disparity of corporeal to incorporeal things is the same as of incorporeal to corporeal. Now the incorporeal eye can see corporeal things. Therefore the corporeal eye can see the incorporeal: and consequently the same conclusion follows.

Objection 5: Further, Gregory, commenting on Job 4:16, “There stood one whose countenance I knew not,” says (Moral. v): “Man who, had he been willing to obey the command, would have been spiritual in the flesh, became, by sinning, carnal even in mind.” Now through becoming carnal in mind, “he thinks only of those things which he draws to his soul by the images of bodies” (Moral. v). Therefore when he will be spiritual in the flesh (which is promised to the saints after the resurrection), he will be able even in the flesh to see spiritual things. Therefore the same conclusion follows.

Objection 6: Further, man can be beatified by God alone. Now he will be beatified not only in soul but also in body. Therefore God will be visible not only to his intellect but also to his flesh.

Objection 7: Further, even as God is present to the intellect by His essence, so will He be to the senses, because He will be “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). Now He will be seen by the intellect through the union of His essence therewith. Therefore He will also be visible to the sense.

On the contrary, Ambrose, commenting on Lk. 1:2, “There appeared to him an angel,” says: “God is not sought with the eyes of the body, nor surveyed by the sight, nor clasped by the touch.” Therefore God will by no means be visible to the bodily sense.

Further, Jerome, commenting on Is. 6:1, “I saw the Lord sitting,” says: “The Godhead not only of the Father, but also of the Son and of the Holy Ghost is visible, not to carnal eyes, but only to the eyes of the mind, of which it is said: Blessed are the pure in heart.”

Further, Jerome says again (as quoted by Augustine, Ep. cxlvii): “An incorporeal thing is invisible to a corporeal eye.” But God is supremely incorporeal. Therefore, etc.

Further, Augustine says (De Videndo Deo, Ep. cxlvii): “No man hath seen God as He is at any time, neither in this life, nor in the angelic life, in the same way as these visible things which are seen with the corporeal sight.” Now the angelic life is the life of the blessed, wherein they will live after the resurrection. Therefore, etc.

Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. xiv.), “man is said to be made to God’s image inasmuch as he is able to see God.” But man is in God’s image as regards his mind, and not as regards his flesh. Therefore he will see God with his mind and not with his flesh.

I answer that, A thing is perceptible to the senses of the body in two ways, directly and indirectly. A thing is perceptible directly if it can act directly on the bodily senses. And a thing can act directly either on sense as such or on a particular sense as such. That which acts directly in this second way on a sense is called a proper sensible, for instance color in relation to the sight, and sound in relation to the hearing. But as sense as such makes use of a bodily organ, nothing can be received therein except corporeally, since whatever is received into a thing is therein after the mode of the recipient. Hence all sensibles act on the sense as such, according to their magnitude: and consequently magnitude and all its consequences, such as movement, rest, number, and the like, are called common sensibles, and yet they are direct objects of sense.

An indirect object of sense is that which does not act on the sense, neither as sense nor as a particular sense, but is annexed to those things that act on sense directly: for instance Socrates; the son of Diares; a friend and the like which are the direct object of the intellect’s knowledge in the universal, and in the particular are the object of the cogitative power in man, and of the estimative power in other animals. The external sense is said to perceive things of this kind, although indirectly, when the apprehensive power (whose province it is to know directly this thing known), from that which is sensed directly, apprehends them at once and without any doubt or discourse (thus we see that a person is alive from the fact that he speaks): otherwise the sense is not said to perceive it even indirectly.

I say then that God can nowise be seen with the eyes of the body, or perceived by any of the senses, as that which is seen directly, neither here, nor in heaven: for if that which belongs to sense as such be removed from sense, there will be no sense, and in like manner if that which belongs to sight as sight be removed therefrom, there will be no sight. Accordingly seeing that sense as sense perceives magnitude, and sight as such a sense perceives color, it is impossible for the sight to perceive that which is neither color nor magnitude, unless we call it a sense equivocally. Since then sight and sense will be specifically the same in the glorified body, as in a non-glorified body, it will be impossible for it to see the Divine essence as an object of direct vision; yet it will see it as an object of indirect vision, because on the one hand the bodily sight will see so great a glory of God in bodies, especially in the glorified bodies and most of all in the body of Christ, and, on the other hand, the intellect will see God so clearly, that God will be perceived in things seen with the eye of the body, even as life is perceived in speech. For although our intellect will not then see God from seeing His creatures, yet it will see God in His creatures seen corporeally. This manner of seeing God corporeally is indicated by Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxii), as is clear if we take note of his words, for he says: “It is very credible that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see the invisible things of God as understood by those that are made, but as when we see men . . . we do not believe but see that they live.”

Reply to Objection 1: This saying of Job refers to the spiritual eye, of which the Apostle says (Eph. 1:18): “The eyes of our [Vulg.: ‘your’] heart enlightened.”

Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted does not mean that we are to see God with the eyes of the flesh, but that, in the flesh, we shall see God.

Reply to Objection 3: In these words Augustine speaks as one inquiring and conditionally. This appears from what he had said before: “Therefore they will have an altogether different power, if they shall see that incorporeal nature": and then he goes on to say: "Accordingly a greater power," etc., and afterwards he explains himself.

Reply to Objection 4: All knowledge results from some kind of abstraction from matter. Wherefore the more a corporeal form is abstracted from matter, the more is it a principle of knowledge. Hence it is that a form existing in matter is in no way a principle of knowledge, while a form existing in the senses is somewhat a principle of knowledge, in so far as it is abstracted from matter, and a form existing in the intellect is still better a principle of knowledge. Therefore the spiritual eye, whence the obstacle to knowledge is removed, can see a corporeal object: but it does not follow that the corporeal eye, in which the cognitive power is deficient as participating in matter, be able to know perfectly incorporeal objects of knowledge.

Reply to Objection 5: Although the mind that has become carnal cannot think but of things received from the senses, it thinks of them immaterially. In like manner whatever the sight apprehends it must always apprehend it corporeally: wherefore it cannot know things which cannot be apprehended corporeally.

Reply to Objection 6: Beatitude is the perfection of man as man. And since man is man not through his body but through his soul, and the body is essential to man, in so far as it is perfected by the soul: it follows that man's beatitude does not consist chiefly otherwise than in an act of the soul, and passes from the soul on to the body by a kind of overflow, as explained above ([5126]Q[85], A[1]). Yet our body will have a certain beatitude from seeing God in sensible creatures: and especially in Christ's body.

Reply to Objection 7: The intellect can perceive spiritual things, whereas the eyes of the body cannot: wherefore the intellect will be able to know the Divine essence united to it, but the eyes of the body will not.

Whether the saints, seeing God, see all that God sees? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], AA[7],8]

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints, seeing God in His essence, see all that God sees in Himself. For as Isidore says (De Sum. Bon. 1.): "The angels know all things in the World of God, before they happen." Now the saints will be equal to the angels of God (Mat. 22:30). Therefore the saints also in seeing God see all things.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv.): “Since all see God there with equal clearness, what do they not know, who know Him Who knows all things?” and he refers to the blessed who see God in His essence. Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.

Objection 3: Further, it is stated in De Anima (iii, text. 7), that “when an intellect understands the greatest things, it is all the more able to understand the least things.” Now God is the greatest of intelligible things. Therefore the power of the intellect is greatly increased by understanding Him. Therefore the intellect seeing Him understands all things.

Objection 4: Further, the intellect is not hindered from understanding a thing except by this surpassing it. Now no creature surpasses the intellect that understands God, since, as Gregory says (Dial. ii.), “to the soul which sees its Creator all creatures are small.” Therefore those who see God in His essence know all things.

Objection 5: Further, every passive power that is not reduced to act is imperfect. Now the passive intellect of the human soul is a power that is passive as it were to the knowledge of all things, since “the passive intellect is in which all are in potentiality” (De Anima iii, text. 18). If then in that beatitude it were not to understand all things, it would remain imperfect, which is absurd.

Objection 6: Further, whoever sees a mirror sees the things reflected in the mirror. Now all things are reflected in the Word of God as in a mirror, because He is the type and image of all. Therefore the saints who see the Word in its essence see all created things.

Objection 7: Further, according to Prov. 10:24, “to the just their desire shall be given.” Now the just desire to know all things, since “all men desire naturally to know,” and nature is not done away by glory. Therefore God will grant them to know all things.

Objection 8: Further, ignorance is one of the penalties of the present life [*Cf. [5127]FS, Q[85], A[3]]. Now all penalty will be removed from the saints by glory. Therefore all ignorance will be removed: and consequently they will know all.

Objection 9: Further, the beatitude of the saints is in their soul before being in their body. Now the bodies of the saints will be reformed in glory to the likeness of Christ’s body (Phil. 3:21). Therefore their souls will be perfected in likeness to the soul of Christ. Now Christ’s soul sees all things in the Word. Therefore all the souls of the saints will also see all things in the Word.

Objection 10: Further, the intellect, like the senses, knows all the things with the image of which it is informed. Now the Divine essence shows a thing forth more clearly than any other image thereof. Therefore since in that blessed vision the Divine essence becomes the form as it were of our intellect, it would seem that the saints seeing God see all.

Objection 11: Further, the Commentator says (De Anima iii), that “if the active intellect were the form of the passive intellect, we should understand all things.” Now the Divine essence represents all things more clearly than the active intellect. Therefore the intellect that sees God in His essence knows all things.

Objection 12: Further, the lower angels are enlightened by the higher about the things they are ignorant of, for the reason that they know not all things. Now after the day of judgment, one angel will not enlighten another; for then all superiority will cease, as a gloss observes on 1 Cor. 15:24, “When He shall have brought to nought,” etc. Therefore the lower angels will then know all things, and for the same reason all the other saints who will see God in His essence.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi): “The higher angels cleanse the lower angels from ignorance.” Now the lower angels see the Divine essence. Therefore an angel while seeing the Divine essence may be ignorant of certain things. But the soul will not see God more perfectly than an angel. Therefore the souls seeing God will not necessarily see all things.

Further, Christ alone has the spirit not “by measure” (Jn. 3:34). Now it becomes Christ, as having the spirit without measure, to know all things in the Word: wherefore it is stated in the same place (Jn. 3:35) that “the Father . . . hath given all things into His hand.” Therefore none but Christ is competent to know all things in the Word.

Further, the more perfectly a principle is known, the more of its effects are known thereby. Now some of those who see God in His essence will know God more perfectly than others. Therefore some will know more things than others, and consequently every one will not know all.

I answer that, God by seeing his essence knows all things whatsoever that are, shall be, or have been: and He is said to know these things by His "knowledge of vision," because He knows them as though they were present in likeness to corporeal vision. Moreover by seeing this essence He knows all that He can do, although He never did them, nor ever will: else He would not know His power perfectly; since a power cannot be known unless its objects be known: and this is called His "science" or "knowledge of simple intelligence." Now it is impossible for a created intellect, by seeing the Divine essence, to know all that God can do, because the more perfectly a principle is known, the more things are known in it; thus in one principle of demonstration one who is quick of intelligence sees more conclusions than one who is slow of intelligence. Since then the extent of the Divine power is measured according to what it can do, if an intellect were to see in the Divine essence all that God can do, its perfection in understanding would equal in extent the Divine power in producing its effects, and thus it would comprehend the Divine power, which is impossible for any created intellect to do. Yet there is a created intellect, namely the soul of Christ [*Cf. [5128]TP, Q[16], A[2]], which knows in the Word all that God knows by the knowledge of vision. But regarding others who see the Divine essence there are two opinions. For some say that all who see God in His essence see all that God sees by His knowledge of vision. This, however, is contrary to the sayings of holy men, who hold that angels are ignorant of some things; and yet it is clear that according to faith all the angels see God in His essence. Wherefore others say that others than Christ, although they see God in His essence, do not see all that God sees because they do not comprehend the Divine essence. For it is not necessary that he who knows a cause should know all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause: and this is not in the competency of a created intellect. Consequently of those who see God in His essence, each one sees in His essence so much the more things according as he sees the Divine essence the more clearly: and hence it is that one is able to instruct another concerning these things. Thus the knowledge of the angels and of the souls of the saints can go on increasing until the day of judgment, even as other things pertaining to the accidental reward. But afterwards it will increase no more, because then will be the final state of things, and in that state it is possible that all will know everything that God knows by the knowledge of vision.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Isidore, that “the angels know in the Word all things before they happen,” cannot refer to those things which God knows only by the knowledge of simple intelligence, because those things will never happen; but it must refer to those things which God knows only by the knowledge of vision. Even of these he does not say that all the angels know them all, but that perhaps some do; and that even those who know do not know all perfectly. For in one and the same thing there are many intelligible aspects to be considered, such as its various properties and relations to other things: and it is possible that while one thing is known in common by two persons, one of them perceives more aspects, and that the one learns these aspects from the other. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the lower angels learn from the higher angels the intelligible aspects of things.” Wherefore it does not follow that even the angels who know all creatures are able to see all that can be understood in them.

Reply to Objection 2: It follows from this saying of Gregory that this blessed vision suffices for the seeing of all things on the part of the Divine essence, which is the medium by which one sees, and whereby God sees all things. That all things, however, are not seen is owing to the deficiency of the created intellect which does not comprehend the Divine essence.

Reply to Objection 3: The created intellect sees the Divine essence not according to the mode of that same essence, but according to its own mode which is finite. Hence its efficacy in knowing would need to be infinitely increased by reason of that vision in order for it to know all things.

Reply to Objection 4: Defective knowledge results not only from excess and deficiency of the knowable object in relation to the intellect, but also from the fact that the aspect of knowableness is not united to the intellect: thus sometimes the sight sees not a stone, through the image of the stone not being united to it. And although the Divine essence which is the type of all things is united to the intellect of one who sees God, it is united thereto not as the type of all things, but as the type of some and of so much the more according as one sees the Divine essence more fully.

Reply to Objection 5: When a passive power is perceptible by several perfections in order, if it be perfected with its ultimate perfection, it is not said to be imperfect, even though it lack some of the preceding dispositions.

Now all knowledge by which the created intellect is perfected is directed to the knowledge of God as its end. Wherefore he who sees God in His essence, even though he know nothing else, would have a perfect intellect: nor is his intellect more perfect through knowing something else besides Him, except in so far as it sees Him more fully. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v.): “Unhappy is he who knoweth all these” (namely, creatures), “and knoweth not Thee: but happy whoso knoweth Thee, though he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them but for Thee only.”

Reply to Objection 6: This mirror has a will: and even as He will show Himself to whom He will, so will He show in Himself whatsoever He will. Nor does the comparison with a material mirror hold, for it is not in its power to be seen or not to be seen.

We may also reply that in a material mirror both object and mirror are seen under their proper image; although the mirror be seen through an image received from the thing itself, whereas the stone is seen through its proper image reflected in some other thing, where the reason for seeing the one is the reason for seeing the other. But in the uncreated mirror a thing is seen through the form of the mirror, just as an effect is seen through the image of its cause and conversely. Consequently it does not follow that whoever sees the eternal mirror sees all that is reflected in that mirror: since he who sees the cause does not of necessity see all its effects, unless he comprehend the cause.

Reply to Objection 7: The desire of the saints to know all things will be fulfilled by the mere fact of their seeing God: just as their desire to possess all good things will be fulfilled by their possessing God. For as God suffices the affections in that He has perfect goodness, and by possessing Him we possess all goods as it were, so does the vision of Him suffice the intellect: “Lord, show us the Father and it is enough for us” (Jn. 14:8).

Reply to Objection 8: Ignorance properly so called denotes a privation and thus it is a punishment: for in this way ignorance is nescience of things, the knowledge of which is a duty or a necessity. Now the saints in heaven will not be ignorant of any of these things. Sometimes, however, ignorance is taken in a broad sense of any kind of nescience: and thus the angels and saints in heaven will be ignorant of certain things. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that “the angels will be cleansed from their ignorance.” In this sense ignorance is not a penalty but a defect. Nor is it necessary for all such defects to be done away by glory: for thus we might say that it was a defect in Pope Linus that he did not attain to the glory of Peter.

Reply to Objection 9: Our body will be conformed to the body of Christ in glory, in likeness but not in equality, for it will be endowed with clarity even as Christ's body, but not equally. In like manner our soul will have glory in likeness to the soul of Christ, but not in equality thereto: thus it will have knowledge even as Christ's soul, but not so great, so as to know all as Christ's soul does.

Reply to Objection 10: Although the Divine essence is the type of all things knowable it will not be united to each created intellect according as it is the type of all. Hence the objection proves nothing.

Reply to Objection 11: The active intellect is a form proportionate to the passive intellect; even as the passive power of matter is proportionate to the power of the natural agent, so that whatsoever is in the passive power of matter or the passive intellect is in the active power of the active intellect or of the natural agent. Consequently if the active intellect become the form of the passive intellect, the latter must of necessity know all those things to which the power of the active intellect extends. But the Divine essence is not a form proportionate to our intellect in this sense. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 12: Nothing hinders us from saying that after the judgment day, when the glory of men and angels will be consummated once for all, all the blessed will know all that God knows by the knowledge of vision, yet so that not all will see all in the Divine essence. Christ's soul, however, will see clearly all things therein, even as it sees them now; while others will see therein a greater or lesser number of things according to the degree of clearness wherewith they will know God: and thus Christ's soul will enlighten all other souls concerning those things which it sees in the Word better than others. Hence it is written (Apoc. 21:23): "The glory of God shall enlighten the city of Jerusalem [*Vulg.: 'hath enlightened it'], and the Lamb is the lamp thereof." In like manner the higher souls will enlighten the lower (not indeed with a new enlightening, so as to increase the knowledge of the lower), but with a kind of continued enlightenment; thus we might understand the sun to enlighten the atmosphere while at a standstill. Wherefore it is written (Dan. 12:3): "They that instruct many to justice” shall shine “as stars for all eternity.” The statement that the superiority of the orders will cease refers to their present ordinate ministry in our regard, as is clear from the same gloss.

OF THE HAPPINESS OF THE SAINTS AND THEIR MANSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the happiness of the saints and their mansions. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the happiness of the saints will increase after the judgment?

(2) Whether the degrees of happiness should be called mansions?

(3) Whether the various mansions differ according to various degrees of charity?

Whether the happiness of the saints will be greater after the judgment than before?

Objection 1: It would seem that the happiness of the saints will not be greater after the judgment than before. For the nearer a thing approaches to the Divine likeness, the more perfectly does it participate happiness. Now the soul is more like God when separated from the body than when united to it. Therefore its happiness is greater before being reunited to the body than after.

Objection 2: Further, power is more effective when it is united than when divided. Now the soul is more united when separated from the body than when it is joined to the body. Therefore it has then greater power for operation, and consequently has a more perfect share of happiness, since this consists in action [*Cf. [5129]FS, Q[3], A[2]].

Objection 3: Further, beatitude consists in an act of the speculative intellect. Now the intellect, in its act, makes no use of a bodily organ; and consequently by being reunited to the body the soul does not become capable of more perfect understanding. Therefore the soul’s happiness is not greater after than before the judgment.

Objection 4: Further, nothing can be greater than the infinite, and so the addition of the finite to the infinite does not result in something greater than the infinite by itself. Now the beatified soul before its reunion with the body is rendered happy by rejoicing in the infinite good, namely God; and after the resurrection of the body it will rejoice in nothing else except perhaps the glory of the body, and this is a finite good. Therefore their joy after the resumption of the body will not be greater than before.

On the contrary, A gloss on Apoc. 6:9, “I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain,” says: “At present the souls of the saints are under the altar, i.e. less exalted than they will be.” Therefore their happiness will be greater after the resurrection than after their death.

Further, just as happiness is bestowed on the good as a reward, so is unhappiness awarded to the wicked. But the unhappiness of the wicked after reunion with their bodies will be greater than before, since they will be punished not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore the happiness of the saints will be greater after the resurrection of the body than before.

I answer that, It is manifest that the happiness of the saints will increase in extent after the resurrection, because their happiness will then be not only in the soul but also in the body. Moreover, the soul’s happiness also will increase in extent, seeing that the soul will rejoice not only in its own good, but also in that of the body. We may also say that the soul’s happiness will increase in intensity [*Cf. [5130]FS, Q[4], A[5] , ad 5, where St. Thomas retracts this statement]. For man’s body may be considered in two ways: first, as being dependent on the soul for its completion; secondly, as containing something that hampers the soul in its operations, through the soul not perfectly completing the body. As regards the first way of considering the body, its union with the soul adds a certain perfection to the soul, since every part is imperfect, and is completed in its whole; wherefore the whole is to the part as form to matter. Consequently the soul is more perfect in its natural being, when it is in the whole—namely, man who results from the union of soul and body—than when it is a separate part. But as regards the second consideration the union of the body hampers the perfection of the soul, wherefore it is written (Wis. 9:15) that “the corruptible body is a load upon the soul.” If, then, there be removed from the body all those things wherein it hampers the soul’s action, the soul will be simply more perfect while existing in such a body than when separated therefrom. Now the more perfect a thing is in being, the more perfectly is it able to operate: wherefore the operation of the soul united to such a body will be more perfect than the operation of the separated soul. But the glorified body will be a body of this description, being altogether subject to the spirit. Therefore, since beatitude consists in an operation [*Cf.

[5131]FS, Q[3], A[2], seqq.], the soul’s happiness after its reunion with the body will be more perfect than before. For just as the soul separated from a corruptible body is able to operate more perfectly than when united thereto, so after it has been united to a glorified body, its operation will be more perfect than while it was separated. Now every imperfect thing desires its perfection. Hence the separated soul naturally desires reunion with the body and on account of this desire which proceeds from the soul’s imperfection its operation whereby it is borne towards God is less intense. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) that “on account of the body’s desire it is held back from tending with all its might to that sovereign good.”

Reply to Objection 1: The soul united to a glorified body is more like to God than when separated therefrom, in so far as when united it has more perfect being. For the more perfect a thing is the more it is like to God: even so the heart, the perfection of whose life consists in movement, is more like to God while in movement than while at rest, although God is never moved.

Reply to Objection 2: A power which by its own nature is capable of being in matter is more effective when subjected in matter than when separated from matter, although absolutely speaking a power separate from matter is more effective.

Reply to Objection 3: Although in the act of understanding the soul does not make use of the body, the perfection of the body will somewhat conduce to the perfection of the intellectual operation in so far as through being united to a glorified body, the soul will be more perfect in its nature, and consequently more effective in its operation, and accordingly the good itself of the body will conduce instrumentally, as it were, to the operation wherein happiness consists: thus the Philosopher asserts (Ethic. i, 8,10) that external goods conduce instrumentally to the happiness of life.

Reply to Objection 4: Although finite added to infinite does not make a greater thing, it makes more things, since finite and infinite are two things, while infinite taken by itself is one. Now the greater extent of joy regards not a greater thing but more things. Wherefore joy is increased in extent, through referring to God and to the body’s glory, in comparison with the joy which referred to God. Moreover, the body’s glory will conduce to the intensity of the joy that refers to God, in so far as it will conduce to the more perfect operation whereby the soul tends to God: since the more perfect is a becoming operation, the greater the delight [*Cf. [5132]FS, Q[32], A[1]], as stated in Ethic. x, 8.

Whether the degrees of beatitude should be called mansions?

Objection 1: It would seem that the degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions. For beatitude implies the notion of a reward: whereas mansion denotes nothing pertaining to a reward. Therefore the various degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.

Objection 2: Further, mansion seemingly denotes a place. Now the place where the saint will be beatified is not corporeal but spiritual, namely God Who is one. Therefore there is but one mansion: and consequently the various degrees of beatitude should not be called mansions.

Objection 3: Further, as in heaven there will be men of various merits, so are there now in purgatory, and were in the limbo of the fathers. But various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory and limbo. Therefore in like manner neither should they be distinguished in heaven.

On the contrary, It is written (Jn. 14:2): “In My Father’s house there are many mansions”: and Augustine expounds this in reference to the different degrees of rewards (Tract. lxvii in Joan.).

Further, in every well-ordered city there is a distinction of mansions. Now the heavenly kingdom is compared to a city (Apoc. 21:2). Therefore we should distinguish various mansions there according to the various degrees of beatitude.

I answer that, Since local movement precedes all other movements, terms of movement, distance and the like are derived from local movement to all other movements according to the Philosopher (Phys., liber viii, 7). Now the end of local movement is a place, and when a thing has arrived at that place it remains there at rest and is maintained therein. Hence in every movement this very rest at the end of the movement is called an establishment [collocatio] or mansion. Wherefore since the term movement is transferred to the actions of the appetite and will, the attainment of the end of an appetitive movement is called a mansion or establishment: so that the unity of a house corresponds to the unity of beatitude which unity is on the part of the object, and the plurality of mansions corresponds to the differences of beatitude on the part of the blessed: even so we observe in natural things that there is one same place above to which all light objects tend, whereas each one reaches it more closely, according as it is lighter, so that they have various mansions corresponding to their various lightness.

Reply to Objection 1: Mansion implies the notion of end and consequently of reward which is the end of merit.

Reply to Objection 2: Though there is one spiritual place, there are different degrees of approaching thereto: and the various mansions correspond to these.

Reply to Objection 3: Those who were in limbo or are now in purgatory have not yet attained to their end. Wherefore various mansions are not distinguished in purgatory or limbo, but only in heaven and hell, wherein is the end of the good and of the wicked.

Whether the various mansions are distinguished according to the various degrees of charity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the various mansions are not distinguished according to the various degrees of charity. For it is written (Mat. 25:15): “He gave to every one according to his proper virtue [Douay: ‘ability’].” Now the proper ability of a thing is its natural power. Therefore the gifts also of grace and glory are distributed according to the different degrees of natural power.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ps. 61:12): “Thou wilt render to every man according to his works.” Now that which is rendered is the measure of beatitude. Therefore the degrees of beatitude are distinguished according to the diversity of works and not according to the diversity of charity.

Objection 3: Further, reward is due to act and not to habit: hence “it is not the strongest who are crowned but those who engage in the conflict” (Ethic. i, 8) and “he . . . shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned except he strive lawfully.” Now beatitude is a reward. Therefore the various degrees of beatitude will be according to the various degrees of works and not according to the various degrees of charity.

On the contrary, The more one will be united to God the happier will one be. Now the measure of charity is the measure of one’s union with God. Therefore the diversity of beatitude will be according to the difference of charity.

Further, “if one thing simply follows from another thing simply, the increase of the former follows from the increase of the latter.” Now to have beatitude follows from having charity. Therefore to have greater beatitude follows from having greater charity.

I answer that, The distinctive principle of the mansions or degrees of beatitude is twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate principle is the difference of disposition which will be in the blessed, whence will result the difference of perfection in them in respect to the beatific operation: while the remote principle is the merit by which they have obtained that beatitude. In the first way the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of heaven, which the more perfect it will be in any one, the more will it render him capable of the Divine clarity, on the increase of which will depend the increase in perfection of the Divine vision. In the second way the mansions are distinguished according to the charity of the way. For our actions are meritorious, not by the very substance of the action, but only by the habit of virtue with which they are informed. Now every virtue obtains its meritorious efficacy from charity [*Cf. [5133]FS, Q[114], A[4]], which has the end itself for its object [*Cf. [5134]SS, Q[24], A[3], ad 1]. Hence the diversity of merit is all traced to the diversity of charity, and thus the charity of the way will distinguish the mansions by way of merit.

Reply to Objection 1: In this passage “virtue” denotes not the natural ability alone, but the natural ability together with the endeavour to obtain grace [*Cf. [5135]SS, Q[23], A[8]]. Consequently virtue in this sense will be a kind of material disposition to the measure of grace and glory that one will receive. But charity is the formal complement of merit in relation to glory, and therefore the distinction of degrees in glory depends on the degrees of charity rather than on the degrees of the aforesaid virtue.

Reply to Objection 2: Works in themselves do not demand the payment of a reward, except as informed by charity: and therefore the various degrees of glory will be according to the various degrees of charity.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the habit of charity or of any virtue whatever is not a merit to which a reward is due, it is none the less the principle and reason of merit in the act: and consequently according to its diversity is the diversity of rewards. This does not prevent our observing a certain degree of merit in the act considered generically, not indeed in relation to the essential reward which is joy in God, but in relation to some accidental reward, which is joy in some created good.

OF THE RELATIONS OF THE SAINTS TOWARDS THE DAMNED (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the relations of the saints towards the damned. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the saints see the sufferings of the damned?

(2) Whether they pity them?

(3) Whether they rejoice in their sufferings?

Whether the blessed in heaven will see the sufferings of the damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed in heaven will not see the sufferings of the damned. For the damned are more cut off from the blessed than wayfarers. But the blessed do not see the deeds of wayfarers: wherefore a gloss on Is. 63:16, “Abraham hath not known us,” says: “The dead, even the saints, know not what the living, even their own children, are doing” [*St. Augustine, De cura pro mortuis xiii, xv]. Much less therefore do they see the sufferings of the damned.

Objection 2: Further, perfection of vision depends on the perfection of the visible object: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that “the most perfect operation of the sense of sight is when the sense is most disposed with reference to the most beautiful of the objects which fall under the sight.” Therefore, on the other hand, any deformity in the visible object redounds to the imperfection of the sight. But there will be no imperfection in the blessed. Therefore they will not see the sufferings of the damned wherein there is extreme deformity.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 66:24): “They shall go out and see the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against Me”; and a gloss says: “The elect will go out by understanding or seeing manifestly, so that they may be urged the more to praise God.”

I answer that, Nothing should be denied the blessed that belongs to the perfection of their beatitude. Now everything is known the more for being compared with its contrary, because when contraries are placed beside one another they become more conspicuous. Wherefore in order that the happiness of the saints may be more delightful to them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it, they are allowed to see perfectly the sufferings of the damned.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss speaks of what the departed saints are able to do by nature: for it is not necessary that they should know by natural knowledge all that happens to the living. But the saints in heaven know distinctly all that happens both to wayfarers and to the damned. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xii) that Job’s words (14:21), “‘Whether his children come to honour or dishonour, he shall not understand,’ do not apply to the souls of the saints, because since they possess the glory of God within them, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them.” [*Concerning this Reply, Cf. [5136]FP, Q[89], A[8]].

Reply to Objection 2: Although the beauty of the thing seen conduces to the perfection of vision, there may be deformity of the thing seen without imperfection of vision: because the images of things whereby the soul knows contraries are not themselves contrary. Wherefore also God Who has most perfect knowledge sees all things, beautiful and deformed.

Whether the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed pity the unhappiness of the damned. For pity proceeds from charity [*Cf. SS, Q[30]]; and charity will be most perfect in the blessed. Therefore they will most especially pity the sufferings of the damned.

Objection 2: Further, the blessed will never be so far from taking pity as God is. Yet in a sense God compassionates our afflictions, wherefore He is said to be merciful.

On the contrary, Whoever pities another shares somewhat in his unhappiness. But the blessed cannot share in any unhappiness. Therefore they do not pity the afflictions of the damned.

I answer that, Mercy or compassion may be in a person in two ways: first by way of passion, secondly by way of choice. In the blessed there will be no passion in the lower powers except as a result of the reason’s choice. Hence compassion or mercy will not be in them, except by the choice of reason. Now mercy or compassion comes of the reason’s choice when a person wishes another’s evil to be dispelled: wherefore in those things which, in accordance with reason, we do not wish to be dispelled, we have no such compassion. But so long as sinners are in this world they are in such a state that without prejudice to the Divine justice they can be taken away from a state of unhappiness and sin to a state of happiness. Consequently it is possible to have compassion on them both by the choice of the will—in which sense God, the angels and the blessed are said to pity them by desiring their salvation—and by passion, in which way they are pitied by the good men who are in the state of wayfarers. But in the future state it will be impossible for them to be taken away from their unhappiness: and consequently it will not be possible to pity their sufferings according to right reason. Therefore the blessed in glory will have no pity on the damned.

Reply to Objection 1: Charity is the principle of pity when it is possible for us out of charity to wish the cessation of a person's unhappiness. But the saints cannot desire this for the damned, since it would be contrary to Divine justice. Consequently the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: God is said to be merciful, in so far as He succors those whom it is befitting to be released from their afflictions in accordance with the order of wisdom and justice: not as though He pitied the damned except perhaps in punishing them less than they deserve.

Whether the blessed rejoice in the punishment of the wicked?

Objection 1: It would seem that the blessed do not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. For rejoicing in another's evil pertains to hatred. But there will be no hatred in the blessed. Therefore they will not rejoice in the unhappiness of the damned.

Objection 2: Further, the blessed in heaven will be in the highest degree conformed to God. Now God does not rejoice in our afflictions. Therefore neither will the blessed rejoice in the afflictions of the damned.

Objection 3: Further, that which is blameworthy in a wayfarer has no place whatever in a comprehensor. Now it is most reprehensible in a wayfarer to take pleasure in the pains of others, and most praiseworthy to grieve for them. Therefore the blessed nowise rejoice in the punishment of the damned.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 57:11): “The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge.”

Further, it is written (Is. 56:24): “They shall satiate [*Douay: ‘They shall be a loathsome sight to all flesh.’] the sight of all flesh.” Now satiety denotes refreshment of the mind. Therefore the blessed will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked.

I answer that, A thing may be a matter of rejoicing in two ways. First directly, when one rejoices in a thing as such: and thus the saints will not rejoice in the punishment of the wicked. Secondly, indirectly, by reason namely of something annexed to it: and in this way the saints will rejoice in the punishment of the wicked, by considering therein the order of Divine justice and their own deliverance, which will fill them with joy. And thus the Divine justice and their own deliverance will be the direct cause of the joy of the blessed: while the punishment of the damned will cause it indirectly.

Reply to Objection 1: To rejoice in another’s evil as such belongs to hatred, but not to rejoice in another’s evil by reason of something annexed to it. Thus a person sometimes rejoices in his own evil as when we rejoice in our own afflictions, as helping us to merit life: “My brethren, count it all joy when you shall fall into divers temptations” (James 1:2).

Reply to Objection 2: Although God rejoices not in punishments as such, He rejoices in them as being ordered by His justice.

Reply to Objection 3: It is not praiseworthy in a wayfarer to rejoice in another’s afflictions as such: yet it is praiseworthy if he rejoice in them as having something annexed. However it is not the same with a wayfarer as with a comprehensor, because in a wayfarer the passions often forestall the judgment of reason, and yet sometimes such passions are praiseworthy, as indicating the good disposition of the mind, as in the case of shame pity and repentance for evil: whereas in a comprehensor there can be no passion but such as follows the judgment of reason.

OF THE GIFTS* OF THE BLESSED (FIVE ARTICLES)

[*The Latin ‘dos’ signifies a dowry.]

We must now consider the gifts of the blessed; under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any gifts should be assigned to the blessed?

(2) Whether a gift differs from beatitude?

(3) Whether it is fitting for Christ to have gifts?

(4) Whether this is competent to the angels?

(5) Whether three gifts of the soul are rightly assigned?

Whether any gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed?

Objection 1: It would seem that no gifts should be assigned as dowry to the blessed. For a dowry (Cod. v, 12, De jure dot. 20: Dig. xxiii, 3, De jure dot.) is given to the bridegroom for the upkeep of the burdens of marriage. But the saints resemble not the bridegroom but the bride, as being members of the Church. Therefore they receive no dowry.

Objection 2: Further, the dowry is given not by the bridegroom's father, but by the father of the bride (Cod. v, 11, De dot. promiss., 1: Dig. xxiii, 2, De rit. nup.). Now all the beatific gifts are bestowed on the blessed by the father of the bridegroom, i.e. Christ: "Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above coming down from the Father of lights." Therefore these gifts which are bestowed on the blessed should not be called a dowry.

Objection 3: Further, in carnal marriage a dowry is given that the burdens of marriage may be the more easily borne. But in spiritual marriage there are no burdens, especially in the state of the Church triumphant. Therefore no dowry should be assigned to that state.

Objection 4: Further, a dowry is not given save on the occasion of marriage. But a spiritual marriage is contracted with Christ by faith in the state of the Church militant. Therefore if a dowry is befitting the blessed, for the same reason it will be befitting the saints who are wayfarers. But it is not befitting the latter: and therefore neither is it befitting the blessed.

Objection 5: Further, a dowry pertains to external goods, which are styled goods of fortune: whereas the reward of the blessed will consist of internal goods. Therefore they should not be called a dowry.

On the contrary, It is written (Eph. 5:32): "This is a great sacrament: but I speak in Christ and in the Church." Hence it follows that the spiritual marriage is signified by the carnal marriage. But in a carnal marriage the dowered bride is brought to the dwelling of the bridegroom. Therefore since the saints are brought to Christ's dwelling when they are beatified, it would seem that they are dowered with certain gifts.

Further, a dowry is appointed to carnal marriage for the ease of marriage. But the spiritual marriage is more blissful than the carnal marriage. Therefore a dowry should be especially assigned thereto.

Further, the adornment of the bride is part of the dowry. Now the saints are adorned when they are taken into glory, according to Is. 61:10, “He hath clothed me with the garments of salvation . . . as a bride adorned with her jewels.” Therefore the saints in heaven have a dowry.

I answer that, Without doubt the blessed when they are brought into glory are dowered by God with certain gifts for their adornment, and this adornment is called their dowry by the masters. Hence the dower of which we speak now is defined thus: “The dowry is the everlasting adornment of soul and body adequate to life, lasting for ever in eternal bliss.” This description is taken from a likeness to the material dowry whereby the bride is adorned and the husband provided with an adequate support for his wife and children, and yet the dowry remains inalienable from the bride, so that if the marriage union be severed it reverts to her. As to the reason of the name there are various opinions. For some say that the name “dowry” is taken not from a likeness to the corporeal marriage, but according to the manner of speaking whereby any perfection or adornment of any person whatever is called an endowment; thus a man who is proficient in knowledge is said to be endowed with knowledge, and in this sense ovid employed the word “endowment” (De Arte Amandi i, 538): “By whatever endowment thou canst please, strive to please.” But this does not seem quite fitting, for whenever a term is employed to signify a certain thing principally, it is not usually transferred to another save by reason of some likeness. Wherefore since by its primary signification a dowry refers to carnal marriage, it follows that in every other application of the term we must observe some kind of likeness to its principal signification. Consequently others say that the likeness consists in the fact that in carnal marriage a dowry is properly a gift bestowed by the bridegroom on the bride for her adornment when she is taken to the bridegroom’s dwelling: and that this is shown by the words of Sichem to Jacob and his sons (Gn. 34:12): “Raise the dowry, and ask gifts,” and from Ex. 22:16: “If a man seduce a virgin . . . and lie with her, he shall endow her, and have her to wife.” Hence the adornment bestowed by Christ on the saints, when they are brought into the abode of glory, is called a dowry. But this is clearly contrary to what jurists say, to whom it belongs to treat of these matters. For they say that a dowry, properly speaking, is a donation on the part of the wife made to those who are on the part of the husband, in view of the marriage burden which the husband has to bear; while that which the bridegroom gives the bride is called “a donation in view of marriage.” In this sense dowry is taken (3 Kings 9:16) where it is stated that “Pharoa, the king of Egypt, took Gezer . . . and gave it for a dowry to his daughter, Solomon’s wife.” Nor do the authorities quoted prove anything to the contrary. For although it is customary for a dowry to be given by the maiden’s parents, it happens sometimes that the bridegroom or his father gives the dowry instead of the bride’s father; and this happens in two ways: either by reason of his very great love for the bride as in the case of Sichem’s father Hemor, who on account of his son’s great love for the maiden wished to give the dowry which he had a right to receive; or as a punishment on the bridegroom, that he should out of his own possessions give a dowry to the virgin seduced by him, whereas he should have received it from the girl’s father. In this sense Moses speaks in the passage quoted above. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should hold that in carnal marriage a dowry, properly speaking, is that which is given by those on the wife’s side to those on the husband’s side, for the bearing of the marriage burden, as stated above. Yet the difficulty remains how this signification can be adapted to the case in point, since the heavenly adornments are given to the spiritual spouse by the Father of the Bridegroom. This shall be made clear by replying to the objections.

Reply to Objection 1: Although in carnal marriage the dowry is given to the bridegroom for his use, yet the ownership and control belong to the bride: which is evident by the fact that if the marriage be dissolved, the dowry reverts to the bride according to law (Cap. 1,2,3, De donat. inter virum et uxorem). Thus also in spiritual marriage, the very adornments bestowed on the spiritual bride, namely the Church in her members, belong indeed to the Bridegroom, in so far as they conduce to His glory and honor, yet to the bride as adorned thereby.

Reply to Objection 2: The Father of the Bridegroom, that is of Christ, is the Person of the Father alone: while the Father of the bride is the whole Trinity, since that which is effected in creatures belongs to the whole Trinity. Hence in spiritual marriage these endowments, properly speaking, are given by the Father of the bride rather than by the Father of the Bridegroom. Nevertheless, although this endowment is made by all the Persons, it may be in a manner appropriated to each Person. To the Person of the Father, as endowing, since He possesses authority; and fatherhood in relation to creatures is also appropriated to Him, so that He is Father of both Bridegroom and bride. To the Son it is appropriated, inasmuch as it is made for His sake and through Him: and to the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as it is made in Him and according to Him, since love is the reason of all giving [*Cf. [5137]FP, Q[38], A[2]].

Reply to Objection 3: That which is effected by the dowry belongs to the dowry by its nature, and that is the ease of marriage: while that which the dowry removes, namely the marriage burden which is lightened thereby, belongs to it accidentally: thus it belongs to grace by its nature to make a man righteous, but accidentally to make an ungodly man righteous. Accordingly, though there are no burdens in the spiritual marriage, there is the greatest gladness; and that this gladness may be perfected the bride is dowered with gifts, so that by their means she may be happily united with the bridegroom.

Reply to Objection 4: The dowry is usually settled on the bride not when she is espoused, but when she is taken to the bridegroom's dwelling, so as to be in the presence of the bridegroom, since "while we are in the body we are absent from the Lord" (2 Cor. 5:6). Hence the gifts bestowed on the saints in this life are not called a dowry, but those which are bestowed on them when they are received into glory, where the Bridegroom delights them with His presence.

Reply to Objection 5: In spiritual marriage inward comeliness is required, wherefore it is written (Ps. 44:14): "All the glory of the king's daughter is within," etc. But in carnal marriage outward comeliness is necessary. Hence there is no need for a dowry of this kind to be appointed in spiritual marriage as in carnal marriage.

Whether the dowry is the same as beatitude*? [*Cf. FP, Q[12], A[7], ad 1; FS, Q[4], A[3]]

Objection 1: It would seem that the dowry is the same as beatitude. For as appears from the definition of dowry [5138](A[1]), the dowry is "the everlasting adornment of body and soul in eternal happiness." Now the happiness of the soul is an adornment thereof. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

Objection 2: Further, a dowry signifies something whereby the union of bride and bridegroom is rendered delightful. Now such is beatitude in the spiritual marriage. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (In Ps. 92) vision is “the whole essence of beatitude.” Now vision is accounted one of the dowries. Therefore beatitude is a dowry.

Objection 4: Further, fruition gives happiness. Now fruition is a dowry. Therefore a dowry gives happiness and thus beatitude is a dowry.

Objection 5: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), “beatitude is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.” Now the state of the blessed is perfected by the dowries. Therefore the dowries are part of beatitude.

On the contrary, The dowries are given without merits: whereas beatitude is not given, but is awarded in return for merits. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.

Further, beatitude is one only, whereas the dowries are several. Therefore beatitude is not a dowry.

Further, beatitude is in man according to that which is principal in him (Ethic. x, 7): whereas a dowry is also appointed to the body. Therefore dowry and beatitude are not the same.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say that beatitude and dowry are the same in reality but differ in aspect: because dowry regards the spiritual marriage between Christ and the soul, whereas beatitude does not. But seemingly this will not stand, since beatitude consists in an operation, whereas a dowry is not an operation, but a quality or disposition. Wherefore according to others it must be stated that beatitude and dowry differ even in reality, beatitude being the perfect operation itself by which the soul is united to God, while the dowries are habits or dispositions or any other qualities directed to this same perfect operation, so that they are directed to beatitude instead of being in it as parts thereof.

Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude, properly speaking, is not an adornment of the soul, but something resulting from the soul’s adornment; since it is an operation, while its adornment is a certain comeliness of the blessed themselves.

Reply to Objection 2: Beatitude is not directed to the union but is the union itself of the soul with Christ. This union is by an operation, whereas the dowries are gifts disposing to this same union.

Reply to Objection 3: Vision may be taken in two ways. First, actually, i.e. for the act itself of vision; and thus vision is not a dowry, but beatitude itself. Secondly, it may be taken habitually, i.e. for the habit whereby this act is elicited, namely the clarity of glory, by which the soul is enlightened from above to see God: and thus it is a dowry and the principle of beatitude, but not beatitude itself. The same answer applies to OBJ 4.

Reply to Objection 5: Beatitude is the sum of all goods not as though they were essential parts of beatitude, but as being in a way directed to beatitude, as stated above.

Whether it is fitting that Christ should receive a dowry?

Objection 1: It would seem fitting that Christ should receive a dowry. For the saints will be conformed to Christ through glory, according to Phil. 3:21, “Who will reform the body of our lowness made like to the body of His glory.” Therefore Christ also will have a dowry.

Objection 2: Further, in the spiritual marriage a dowry is given in likeness to a carnal marriage. Now there is a spiritual marriage in Christ, which is peculiar to Him, namely of the two natures in one Person, in regard to which the human nature in Him is said to have been espoused by the Word, as a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Consensu Evang. i, 40] has it on Ps. 18:6, “He hath set His tabernacle in the sun,” etc., and Apoc. 21:3, “Behold the tabernacle of God with men.” Therefore it is fitting that Christ should have a dowry.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii) that Christ, according to the Rule [*Liber regularum] of Tyconius, on account of the unity of the mystic body that exists between the head and its members, calls Himself also the Bride and not only the Bridegroom, as may be gathered from Is. 61:10, “As a bridegroom decked with a crown, and as a bride adorned with her jewels.” Since then a dowry is due to the bride, it would seem that Christ ought to receive a dowry.

Objection 4: Further, a dowry is due to all the members of the Church, since the Church is the spouse. But Christ is a member of the Church according to 1 Cor. 12:27, “You are the body of Christ, and members of member, i.e. of Christ,” according to a gloss. Therefore the dowry is due to Christ.

Objection 5: Further, Christ has perfect vision, fruition, and joy. Now these are the dowries. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, A distinction of persons is requisite between the bridegroom and the bride. But in Christ there is nothing personally distinct from the Son of God Who is the Bridegroom, as stated in Jn. 3:29, “He that hath the bride is the bridegroom.” Therefore since the dowry is allotted to the bride or for the bride, it would seem unfitting for Christ to have a dowry.

Further, the same person does not both give and receive a dowry. But it is Christ Who gives spiritual dowries. Therefore it is not fitting that Christ should have a dowry.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that there is a threefold union in Christ. One is the union of concord, whereby He is united to God in the bond of love; another is the union of condescension, whereby the human nature is united to the Divine; the third is the union whereby Christ is united to the Church. They say, then, that as regards the first two unions it is fitting for Christ to have the dowries as such, but as regards the third, it is fitting for Him to have the dowries in the most excellent degree, considered as to that in which they consist, but not considered as dowries; because in this union Christ is the bridegroom and the Church the bride, and a dowry is given to the bride as regards property and control, although it is given to the bridegroom as to use. But this does not seem congruous. For in the union of Christ with the Father by the concord of love, even if we consider Him as God, there is not said to be a marriage, since it implies no subjection such as is required in the bride towards the bridegroom. Nor again in the union of the human nature with the Divine, whether we consider the Personal union or that which regards the conformity of will, can there be a dowry, properly speaking, for three reasons. First, because in a marriage where a dowry is given there should be likeness of nature between bridegroom and bride, and this is lacking in the union of the human nature with the Divine; secondly, because there is required a distinction of persons, and the human nature is not personally distinct from the Word; thirdly, because a dowry is given when the bride is first taken to the dwelling of the bridegroom and thus would seem to belong to the bride, who from being not united becomes united; whereas the human nature, which was assumed into the unity of Person by the Word, never was otherwise than perfectly united. Wherefore in the opinion of others we should say that the notion of dowry is either altogether unbecoming to Christ, or not so properly as to the saints; but that the things which we call dowries befit Him in the highest degree.

Reply to Objection 1: This conformity must be understood to refer to the thing which is a dowry and not to the notion of a dowry being in Christ: for it is not requisite that the thing in which we are conformed to Christ should be in the same way in Christ and in us.

Reply to Objection 2: Human nature is not properly said to be a bride in its union with the Word, since the distinction of persons, which is requisite between bridegroom and bride, is not observed therein. That human nature is sometimes described as being espoused in reference to its union with the Word is because it has a certain act of the bride, in that it is united to the Bridegroom inseparably, and in this union is subject to the Word and ruled by the Word, as the bride by the bridegroom.

Reply to Objection 3: If Christ is sometimes spoken of as the Bride, this is not because He is the Bride in very truth, but in so far as He personifies His spouse, namely the Church, who is united to Him spiritually. Hence nothing hinders Him, in this way of speaking, from being said to have the dowries, not that He Himself is dowered, but the Church.

Reply to Objection 4: The term Church is taken in two senses. For sometimes it denotes the body only, which is united to Christ as its Head. In this way alone has the Church the character of spouse: and in this way Christ is not a member of the Church, but is the Head from which all the members receive. In another sense the Church denotes the head and members united together; and thus Christ is said to be a member of the Church, inasmuch as He fulfills an office distinct from all others, by pouring forth life into the other members: although He is not very properly called a member, since a member implies a certain restriction, whereas in Christ spiritual good is not restricted but is absolutely entire [*Cf. [5139]TP, Q[8], A[1]], so that He is the entire good of the Church, nor is He together with others anything greater than He is by Himself. Speaking of the Church in this sense, the Church denotes not only the bride, but the bridegroom and bride, in so far as one thing results from their spiritual union. Consequently although Christ be called a member of the Church in a certain sense, He can by no means be called a member of the bride; and therefore the idea of a dowry is not becoming to Him.

Reply to Objection 5: There is here a fallacy of “accident”; for these things are not befitting to Christ if we consider them under the aspect of dowry.

Whether the angels receive the dowries?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels receive dowries. For a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 6:8, “One is my dove,” says: “One is the Church among men and angels.” But the Church is the bride, wherefore it is fitting for the members of the Church to have the dowries. Therefore the angels have the dowries.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Lk. 12:36, “And you yourselves like to men who wait for their lord, when he shall return from the wedding,” says: “Our Lord went to the wedding when after His resurrection the new Man espoused to Himself the angelic host.” Therefore the angelic hosts are the spouse of Christ and consequently it is fitting that they should have the dowries.

Objection 3: Further, the spiritual marriage consists in a spiritual union. Now the spiritual union between the angels and God is no less than between beatified men and God. Since, then, the dowries of which we treat now are assigned by reason of a spiritual marriage, it would seem that they are becoming to the angels.

Objection 4: Further, a spiritual marriage demands a spiritual bridegroom and a spiritual bride. Now the angels are by nature more conformed than men to Christ as the supreme spirit. Therefore a spiritual marriage is more possible between the angels and Christ than between men and Christ.

Objection 5: Further, a greater conformity is required between the head and members than between bridegroom and bride. Now the conformity between Christ and the angels suffices for Christ to be called the Head of the angels. Therefore for the same reason it suffices for Him to be called their bridegroom.

On the contrary, Origen at the beginning of the prologue to his commentary on the Canticles, distinguishes four persons, namely "the bridegroom with the bride, the young maidens, and the companions of the bridegroom": and he says that "the angels are the companions of the bridegroom." Since then the dowry is due only to the bride, it would seem that the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

Further, Christ espoused the Church by His Incarnation and Passion: wherefore this is foreshadowed in the words (Ex. 4:25), "A bloody spouse thou art to me." Now by His Incarnation and Passion Christ was not otherwise united to the angels than before. Therefore the angels do not belong to the Church, if we consider the Church as spouse. Therefore the dowries are not becoming to the angels.

I answer that, Without any doubt, whatever pertains to the endowments of the soul is befitting to the angels as it is to men. But considered under the aspect of dowry they are not as becoming to the angels as to men, because the character of bride is not so properly becoming to the angels as to men. For there is required a conformity of nature between bridegroom and bride, to wit that they should be of the same species. Now men are in conformity with Christ in this way, since He took human nature, and by so doing became conformed to all men in the specific nature of man. on the other hand, He is not conformed to the angels in unity of species, neither as to His Divine nor as to His human nature. Consequently the notion of dowry is not so properly becoming to angels as to men. Since, however, in metaphorical expressions, it is not necessary to have a likeness in every respect, we must not argue that one thing is not to be said of another metaphorically on account of some lack of likeness; and consequently the argument we have adduced does not prove that the dowries are simply unbecoming to the angels, but only that they are not so properly befitting to angels as to men, on account of the aforesaid lack of likeness.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are included in the unity of the Church, they are not members of the Church according to conformity of nature, if we consider the Church as bride: and thus it is not properly fitting for them to have the dowries.

Reply to Objection 2: Espousal is taken there in a broad sense, for union without conformity of specific nature: and in this sense nothing prevents our saying that the angels have the dowries taking these in a broad sense.

Reply to Objection 3: In the spiritual marriage although there is no other than a spiritual union, those whose union answers to the idea of a perfect marriage should agree in specific nature. Hence espousal does not properly befit the angels.

Reply to Objection 4: The conformity between the angels and Christ as God is not such as suffices for the notion of a perfect marriage, since so far are they from agreeing in species that there is still an infinite distance between them.

Reply to Objection 5: Not even is Christ properly called the Head of the angels, if we consider the head as requiring conformity of nature with the members. We must observe, however, that although the head and the other members are parts of an individual of one species, if we consider each one by itself, it is not of the same species as another member, for a hand is another specific part from the head. Hence, speaking of the members in themselves, the only conformity required among them is one of proportion, so that one receive from another, and one serve another. Consequently the conformity between God and the angels suffices for the notion of head rather than for that of bridegroom.

Whether three dowries of the soul are suitably assigned?

Objection 1: It would seem unfitting to assign to the soul three dowries, namely, “vision,” “love” and “fruition.” For the soul is united to God according to the mind wherein is the image of the Trinity in respect of the memory, understanding, and will. Now love regards the will, and vision the understanding. Therefore there should be something corresponding to the memory, since fruition regards not the memory but the will.

Objection 2: Further, the beatific dowries are said to correspond to the virtues of the way, which united us to God: and these are faith, hope, and charity, whereby God Himself is the object. Now love corresponds to charity, and vision to faith. Therefore there should be something corresponding to hope, since fruition corresponds rather to charity.

Objection 3: Further, we enjoy God by love and vision only, since “we are said to enjoy those things which we love for their own sake,” as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). Therefore fruition should not be reckoned a distinct dowry from love.

Objection 4: Further, comprehension is required for the perfection of beatitude: “So run that you may comprehend” (1 Cor. 9:24). Therefore we should reckon a fourth dowry

Objection 5: Further, Anselm says (De Simil. xlviii) that the following pertain to the soul’s beatitude: “wisdom, friendship, concord, power, honor, security, joy”: and consequently the aforesaid dowries are reckoned unsuitably.

Objection 6: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii) that “in that beatitude God will be seen unendingly, loved without wearying, praised untiringly.” Therefore praise should be added to the aforesaid dowries.

Objection 7: Further, Boethius reckons five things pertaining to beatitude (De Consol. iii) and these are: Sufficiency which wealth offers, joy which pleasure offers, celebrity which fame offers, security which power offers, reverence which dignity offers. Consequently it seems that these should be reckoned as dowries rather than the aforesaid.

I answer that, All agree in reckoning three dowries of the soul, in different ways however. For some say that the three dowries of the soul are vision, love, and fruition. others reckon them to be vision, comprehension, and fruition; others, vision, delight, and comprehension. However, all these reckonings come to the same, and their number is assigned in the same way. For it has been said [5140](A[2]) that a dowry is something inherent to the soul, and directing it to the operation in which beatitude consists. Now two things are requisite in this operation: its essence which is vision, and its perfection which is delight: since beatitude must needs be a perfect operation. Again, a vision is delightful in two ways: first, on the part of the object, by reason of the thing seen being delightful; secondly, on the part of the vision, by reason of the seeing itself being delightful, even as we delight in knowing evil things, although the evil things themselves delight us not. And since this operation wherein ultimate beatitude consists must needs be most perfect, this vision must needs be delightful in both ways. Now in order that this vision be delightful on the part of the vision, it needs to be made connatural to the seer by means of a habit; while for it to be delightful on the part of the visible object, two things are necessary, namely that the visible object be suitable, and that it be united to the seer. Accordingly for the vision to be delightful on its own part a habit is required to elicit the vision, and thus we have one dowry, which all call vision. But on the part of the visible object two things are necessary. First, suitableness, which regards the affections—and in this respect some reckon love as a dowry, others fruition (in so far as fruition regards the affective part) since what we love most we deem most suitable. Secondly, union is required on the part of the visible object, and thus some reckon comprehension, which is nothing else than to have God present and to hold Him within ourself [*Cf. [5141]FS, Q[4], A[3]]; while others reckon fruition, not of hope, which is ours while on the way, but of possession [*Literally “of the reality: non spei . . . sed rei”] which is in heaven.

Thus the three dowries correspond to the three theological virtues, namely vision to faith, comprehension (or fruition in one sense) to hope, and fruition (or delight according to another reckoning to charity). For perfect fruition such as will be had in heaven includes delight and comprehension, for which reason some take it for the one, and some for the other.

Others, however, ascribe these three dowries to the three powers of the soul, namely vision to the rational, delight to the concupiscible, and fruition to the irascible, seeing that this fruition is acquired by a victory. But this is not said properly, because the irascible and concupiscible powers are not in the intellective but in the sensitive part, whereas the dowries of the soul are assigned to the mind.

Reply to Objection 1: Memory and understanding have but one act: either because understanding is itself an act of memory, or—if understanding denote a power—because memory does not proceed to act save through the medium of the understanding, since it belongs to the memory to retain knowledge. Consequently there is only one habit, namely knowledge, corresponding to memory and understanding: wherefore only one dowry, namely vision, corresponds to both.

Reply to Objection 2: Fruition corresponds to hope, in so far as it includes comprehension which will take the place of hope: since we hope for that which we have not yet; wherefore hope chafes somewhat on account of the distance of the beloved: for which reason it will not remain in heaven [Cf. [5142]SS, Q[18], A[2]] but will be succeeded by comprehension.

Reply to Objection 3: Fruition as including comprehension is distinct from vision and love, but otherwise than love from vision. For love and vision denote different habits, the one belonging to the intellect, the other to the affective faculty. But comprehension, or fruition as denoting comprehension, does not signify a habit distinct from those two, but the removal of the obstacles which made it impossible for the mind to be united to God by actual vision. This is brought about by the habit of glory freeing the soul from all defects; for instance by making it capable of knowledge without phantasms, of complete control over the body, and so forth, thus removing the obstacles which result in our being pilgrims from the Lord.

Reply OBJ 4 is clear from what has been said.

Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the dowries are the immediate principles of the operation in which perfect beatitude consists and whereby the soul is united to Christ. The things mentioned by Anselm do not answer to this description; but they are such as in any way accompany or follow beatitude, not only in relation to the Bridegroom, to Whom "wisdom" alone of the things mentioned by him refers, but also in relation to others. They may be either one's equals, to whom "friendship" refers as regards the union of affections, and "concord" as regards consent in actions, or one's inferiors, to whom "power" refers, so far as inferior things are ordered by superior, and "honor" as regards that which inferiors offer to their superiors. Or again (they may accompany or follow beatitude) in relation to oneself: to this "security" refers as regards the removal of evil, and "joy" as regards the attainment of good.

Reply to Objection 6: Praise, which Augustine mentions as the third of those things which will obtain in heaven, is not a disposition to beatitude but rather a sequel to beatitude: because from the very fact of the soul's union with God, wherein beatitude consists, it follows that the soul breaks forth into praise. Hence praise has not the necessary conditions of a dowry.

Reply to Objection 7: The five things aforesaid mentioned by Boethius are certain conditions of beatitude, but not dispositions to beatitude or to its act, because beatitude by reason of its perfection has of itself alone and undividedly all that men seek in various things, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7; x, 7,8). Accordingly Boethius shows that these five things obtain in perfect beatitude, because they are what men seek in temporal happiness. For they pertain either, as "security," to immunity from evil, or to the attainment either of the suitable good, as "joy," or of the perfect good, as "sufficiency," or to the manifestation of good, as "celebrity," inasmuch as the good of one is made known to others, or as “reverence,” as indicating that good or the knowledge thereof, for reverence is the showing of honor which bears witness to virtue. Hence it is evident that these five should not be called dowries, but conditions of beatitude.

OF THE AUREOLES (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)

In the next place we must consider the aureoles. Under this head there are thirteen points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the aureoles differ from the essential reward?

(2) Whether they differ from the fruit?

(3) Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence only?

(4) Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence?

(5) Whether an aureole is due to virgins?

(6) Whether it is due to martyrs?

(7) Whether it is due to doctors?

(8) Whether it is due to Christ?

(9) Whether to the angels?

(10) Whether it is due to the human body?

(11) Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned?

(12) Whether the virgin’s aureole is the greatest?

(13) Whether one has the same aureole in a higher degree than another?

Whether the aureole is the same as the essential reward which is called the aurea?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole is not distinct from the essential reward which is called the “aurea.” For the essential reward is beatitude itself. Now according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), beatitude is “a state rendered perfect by the aggregate of all goods.” Therefore the essential reward includes every good possessed in heaven; so that the aureole is included in the “aurea.”

Objection 2: Further, “more” and “less” do not change a species. But those who keep the counsels and commandments receive a greater reward than those who keep the commandments only, nor seemingly does their reward differ, except in one reward being greater than another. Since then the aureole denotes the reward due to works of perfection it would seem that it does not signify something distinct from the “aurea.”

Objection 3: Further, reward corresponds to merit. Now charity is the root of all merit. Since then the “aurea” corresponds to charity, it would seem that there will be no reward in heaven other than the “aurea.”

Objection 4: Further, “All the blessed are taken into the angelic orders” as Gregory declares (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Now as regards the angels, “though some of them receive certain gifts in a higher degree, nothing is possessed by any of them exclusively, for all gifts are in all of them, though not equally, because some are endowed more highly than others with gifts which, however, they all possess,” as Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.). Therefore as regards the blessed, there will be no reward other than that which is common to all. Therefore the aureole is not a distinct reward from the “aurea.”

Objection 5: Further, a higher reward is due to higher merit. If, then, the “aurea” is due to works which are of obligation, and the aureole to works of counsel, the aureole will be more perfect than the “aurea,” and consequently should not be expressed by a diminutive [*”Aureola,” i.e. a little “aurea”]. Therefore it would seem that the aureole is not a distinct reward from the “aurea.”

On the contrary, A gloss [*Ven. Bede, De Tabernaculis i, 6] on Ex. 25:24,25, “Thou shalt make . . . another little golden crown [coronam aureolam],” says: “This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins alone sing in the presence of the Lamb.” Wherefore apparently the aureole is a crown awarded, not to all, but especially to some: whereas the aurea is awarded to all the blessed. Therefore the aureole is distinct from the “aurea.”

Further, a crown is due to the fight which is followed by victory: “He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully” (2 Tim. 2:5). Hence where there is a special kind of conflict, there should be a special crown. Now in certain works there is a special kind of conflict. Therefore they deserve a special kind of crown, which we call an aureole.

Further, the Church militant comes down from the Church triumphant: “I saw the Holy City,” etc. (Apoc. 21:2). Now in the Church militant special rewards are given to those who perform special deeds, for instance a crown to the conqueror, a prize to the runner. Therefore the same should obtain in the Church triumphant.

I answer that, Man’s essential reward, which is his beatitude, consists in the perfect union of the soul with God, inasmuch as it enjoys God perfectly as seen and loved perfectly. Now this reward is called a “crown” or “aurea” metaphorically, both with reference to merit which is gained by a kind of conflict—since “the life of man upon earth is a warfare” (Job 7:1)—and with reference to the reward whereby in a way man is made a participator of the Godhead, and consequently endowed with regal power: “Thou hast made us to our God a kingdom,” etc. (Apoc. 5:10); for a crown is the proper sign of regal power.

In like manner the accidental reward which is added to the essential has the character of a crown. For a crown signifies some kind of perfection, on account of its circular shape, so that for this very reason it is becoming to the perfection of the blessed. Since, however, nothing can be added to the essential, but what is less than it, the additional reward is called an “aureole.” Now something may be added in two ways to this essential reward which we call the “aurea.” First, in consequence of a condition attaching to the nature of the one rewarded: thus the glory of the body is added to the beatitude of the soul, wherefore this same glory of the body is sometimes called an “aureole.” Thus a gloss of Bede on Ex. 25:25, “Thou . . . shalt make another little golden crown,” says that “finally the aureole is added, when it is stated in the Scriptures that a higher degree of glory is in store for us when our bodies are resumed.” But it is not in this sense that we speak of an aureole now. Secondly, in consequence of the nature of the meritorious act. Now this has the character of merit on two counts, whence also it has the character of good. First, to wit, from its root which is charity, since it is referred to the last end, and thus there is due to it the essential reward, namely the attainment of the end, and this is the “aurea.” Secondly, from the very genus of the act which derives a certain praiseworthiness from its due circumstances, from the habit eliciting it and from its proximate end, and thus is due to it a kind of accidental reward which we call an “aureole”: and it is in this sense that we regard the aureole now. Accordingly it must be said that an “aureole” denotes something added to the “aurea,” a kind of joy, to wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the character of a signal victory: for this joy is distinct from the joy in being united to God, which is called the “aurea.” Some, however, affirm that the common reward, which is the “aurea,” receives the name of “aureole,” according as it is given to virgins, martyrs, or doctors: even as money receives the name of debt through being due to some one, though the money and the debt are altogether the same. And that nevertheless this does not imply that the essential reward is any greater when it is called an “aureole”; but that it corresponds to a more excellent act, more excellent not in intensity of merit but in the manner of meriting; so that although two persons may have the Divine vision with equal clearness, it is called an “aureole” in one and not in the other in so far as it corresponds to higher merit as regards the way of meriting. But this would seem contrary to the meaning of the gloss quoted above. For if “aurea” and “aureole” were the same, the “aureole” would not be described as added to the “aurea.” Moreover, since reward corresponds to merit, a more excellent reward must needs correspond to this more excellent way of meriting: and it is this excellence that we call an “aureole.” Hence it follows that an “aureole” differs from the “aurea.”

Reply to Objection 1: Beatitude includes all the goods necessary for man’s perfect life consisting in his perfect operation. Yet some things can be added, not as being necessary for that perfect operation as though it were impossible without them, but as adding to the glory of beatitude. Hence they regard the well-being of beatitude and a certain fitness thereto. Even so civic happiness is embellished by nobility and bodily beauty and so forth, and yet it is possible without them as stated in Ethic. i, 8: and thus is the aureole in comparison with the happiness of heaven.

Reply to Objection 2: He who keeps the counsels and the commandments always merits more than he who keeps the commandments only, if we gather the notion of merit in works from the very genus of those works; but not always if we gauge the merit from its root, charity: since sometimes a man keeps the commandments alone out of greater charity than one who keeps both commandments and counsels. For the most part, however, the contrary happens, because the “proof of love is in the performance of deeds,” as Gregory says (Hom. xxx in Evang.). Wherefore it is not the more excellent essential reward that is called an aureole, but that which is added to the essential reward without reference to the essential reward of the possessor of an aureole being greater, or less than, or equal to the essential reward of one who has no aureole.

Reply to Objection 3: Charity is the first principle of merit: but our actions are the instruments, so to speak, whereby we merit. Now in order to obtain an effect there is requisite not only a due disposition in the first mover, but also a right disposition in the instrument. Hence something principal results in the effect with reference to the first mover, and something secondary with reference to the instrument. Wherefore in the reward also there is something on the part of charity, namely the “aurea,” and something on the part of the kind of work, namely the “aureole.”

Reply to Objection 4: All the angels merited their beatitude by the same kind of act namely by turning to God: and consequently no particular reward is found in anyone which another has not in some way. But men merit beatitude by different kinds of acts: and so the comparison fails.

Nevertheless among men what one seems to have specially, all have in common in some way, in so far as each one, by charity, deems another’s good his own. Yet this joy whereby one shares another’s joy cannot be called an aureole, because it is not given him as a reward for his victory, but regards more the victory of another: whereas a crown is awarded the victors themselves and not to those who rejoice with them in the victory.

Reply to Objection 5: The merit arising from charity is more excellent than that which arises from the kind of action: just as the end to which charity directs us is more excellent than the things directed to that end, and with which our actions are concerned. Wherefore the reward corresponding to merit by reason of charity, however little it may be, is greater than any reward corresponding to an action by reason of its genus. Hence “aureole” is used as a diminutive in comparison with “aurea.”

Whether the aureole differs from the fruit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the aureole does not differ from the fruit. For different rewards are not due to the same merit. Now the aureole and the hundredfold fruit correspond to the same merit, according to a gloss on Mat. 13:8, “Some a hundredfold.” Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Virgin xlv) that the “hundredfold fruit is due to the martyrs, and also to virgins.” Therefore the fruit is a reward common to virgins and martyrs. But the aureole also is due to them. Therefore the aureole is the same as the fruit.

Objection 3: Further, there are only two rewards in beatitude, namely the essential, and the accidental which is added to the essential. Now that which is added to the essential reward is called an aureole, as evidenced by the statement (Ex. 25:25) that the little crown [aureola] is added to the crown. But the fruit is not the essential reward, for in that case it would be due to all the blessed. Therefore it is the same as the aureole.

On the contrary, Things which are not divided in the same way are not of the same nature. Now fruit and aureole are not divided in the same way, since aureole is divided into the aureole of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors: whereas fruit is divided into the fruit of the married, of widows, and of virgins. Therefore fruit and aureole are not the same.

Further, if fruit and aureole were the same, the aureole would be due to whomsoever the fruit is due. But this is manifestly untrue, since a fruit is due to widowhood, while an aureole is not. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Metaphorical expressions can be taken in various ways, according as we find resemblances to the various properties of the thing from which the comparison is taken. Now since fruit, properly speaking, is applied to material things born of the earth, we employ it variously in a spiritual sense, with reference to the various conditions that obtain in material fruits. For the material fruit has sweetness whereby it refreshes so far as it is used by man: again it is the last thing to which the operation of nature attains: moreover it is that to which husbandry looks forward as the result of sowing or any other process. Accordingly fruit is taken in a spiritual sense sometimes for that which refreshes as being the last end: and according to this signification we are said to enjoy [frui] God perfectly in heaven, and imperfectly on the way. From this signification we have fruition which is a dowry: but we are not speaking of fruit in this sense now. Sometimes fruit signifies spiritually that which refreshes only, though it is not the last end; and thus the virtues are called fruits, inasmuch as “they refresh the mind with genuine sweetness," as Ambrose says [*De Parad. xiii]. In this sense fruit is taken (Gal. 6:22): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy," etc. Nor again is this the sense in which we speak of fruit now; for we have treated of this already [*Cf. [5143]FS, Q[70], A[1], ad 2].

We may, however, take spiritual fruit in another sense, in likeness to material fruit, inasmuch as material fruit is a profit expected from the labor of husbandry: so that we call fruit that reward which man acquires from his labor in this life: and thus every reward which by our labors we shall acquire for the future life is called a "fruit." In this sense fruit is taken (Rom. 6:22): "You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting." Yet neither in this sense do we speak of fruit now, but we are treating of fruit as being the product of seed: for it is in this sense that our Lord speaks of fruit (Mat. 13:23), where He divides fruit into thirtyfold, sixtyfold, and hundredfold. Now fruit is the product of seed in so far as the seed power is capable of transforming the humors of the soil into its own nature; and the more efficient this power, and the better prepared the soil, the more plentiful fruit will result. Now the spiritual seed which is sown in us is the Word of God: wherefore the more a person is transformed into a spiritual nature by withdrawing from carnal things, the greater is the fruit of the Word in him. Accordingly the fruit of the Word of God differs from the aurea and the aureole, in that the "aurea" consists in the joy one has in God, and the "aureole" in the joy one has in the perfection of one's works, whereas the "fruit" consists in the joy that the worker has in his own disposition as to his degree of spirituality to which he has attained through the seed of God's Word.

Some, however, distinguish between aureole and fruit, by saying that the aureole is due to the fighter, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, "He . . . shall not be crowned, except he strive lawfully"; whereas the fruit is due to the laborer, according to the saying of Wis. 3:15, "The fruit of good labors is glorious." Others again say that the "aurea" regards conversion to God, while the "aureole" and the "fruit" regard things directed to the end; yet so that the fruit regards the will rather, and the aureole the body. Since, however, labor and strife are in the same subject and about the same matter, and since the body's reward depends on the soul's, these explanations of the difference between fruit, aurea and aureole would only imply a logical difference: and this cannot be, since fruit is assigned to some to whom no aureole is assigned.

Reply to Objection 1: There is nothing incongruous if various rewards correspond to the same merit according to the various things contained therein. Wherefore to virginity corresponds the aurea in so far as virginity is kept for God's sake at the command of charity; the aureole, in so far as virginity is a work of perfection having the character of a signal victory; and the fruit, in so far as by virginity a person acquires a certain spirituality by withdrawing from carnal things.

Reply to Objection 2: Fruit, according to the proper acceptation as we are speaking of it now, does not denote the reward common to martyrdom and virginity, by that which corresponds to the three degrees of continency. This gloss which states that the hundredfold fruit corresponds to martyrs takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit, the hundredfold fruit thus denoting the reward due to any perfect works whatever.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the aureole is an accidental reward added to the essential reward, nevertheless not every accidental reward is an aureole, but only that which is assigned to works of perfection, whereby man is most conformed to Christ in the achievement of a perfect victory. Hence it is not unfitting that another accidental reward, which is called the fruit, be due sometimes to the withdrawal from a carnal life.

Whether a fruit is due to the virtue of continence alone?

Objection 1: It would seem that a fruit is not due to the virtue of continence alone. For a gloss on 1 Cor. 15:41, "One is the glory of the sun," says that "the worth of those who have the hundredfold fruit is compared to the glory of the sun; to the glory of the moon those who have the sixtyfold fruit; and to the stars those who have the thirtyfold fruit." Now this difference of glory, in the meaning of the Apostle, regards any difference whatever of beatitude. Therefore the various fruits should correspond to none but the virtue of continence.

Objection 2: Further, fruits are so called from fruition. But fruition belongs to the essential reward which corresponds to all the virtues. Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, fruit is due to labor: “The fruit of good labors is glorious” (Wis. 3:15). Now there is greater labor in fortitude than in temperance or continence. Therefore fruit does not correspond to continence alone.

Objection 4: Further, it is more difficult not to exceed the measure in food which is necessary for life, than in sexual matters without which life can be sustained: and thus the labor of frugality is greater than that of continence. Therefore fruit corresponds to frugality rather than to continence.

Objection 5: Further, fruit implies delight, and delight regards especially the end. Since then the theological virtues have the end for their object, namely God Himself, it would seem that to them especially the fruit should correspond.

On the contrary, is the statement of the gloss on Mat. 13:23, “The one a hundredfold,” which assigns the fruits to virginity, widowhood, and conjugal continence, which are parts of continence.

I answer that, A fruit is a reward due to a person in that he passes from the carnal to the spiritual life. Consequently a fruit corresponds especially to that virtue which more than any other frees man from subjection to the flesh. Now this is the effect of continence, since it is by sexual pleasures that the soul is especially subject to the flesh; so much so that in the carnal act, according to Jerome (Ep. ad Ageruch.), “not even the spirit of prophecy touches the heart of the prophet,” nor “is it possible to understand anything in the midst of that pleasure,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11). Therefore fruit corresponds to continence rather than to another virtue.

Reply to Objection 1: This gloss takes fruit in a broad sense, according as any reward is called a fruit.

Reply to Objection 2: Fruition does not take its name from fruit by reason of any comparison with fruit in the sense in which we speak of it now, as evidenced by what has been said.

Reply to Objection 3: Fruit, as we speak of it now, corresponds to labor not as resulting in fatigue, but as resulting in the production of fruit. Hence a man calls his crops his labor, inasmuch as he labored for them, or produced them by his labor. Now the comparison to fruit, as produced from seed, is more adapted to continence than to fortitude, because man is not subjected to the flesh by the passions of fortitude, as he is by the passions with which continence is concerned.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the pleasures of the table are more necessary than the pleasures of sex, they are not so strong: wherefore the soul is not so much subjected to the flesh thereby.

Reply to Objection 5: Fruit is not taken here in the sense in which fruition applies to delight in the end; but in another sense as stated above (A[2]). Hence the argument proves nothing.

Whether three fruits are fittingly assigned to the three parts of continence?

Objection 1: It would seem that three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three parts of continence: because twelve fruits of the Spirit are assigned, “charity, joy, peace,” etc. (Gal. 5:22). Therefore seemingly we should reckon only three.

Objection 2: Further, fruit denotes a special reward. Now the reward assigned to virgins, widows, and married persons is not a special reward, because all who are to be saved are comprised under one of these three, since no one is saved who lacks continence, and continence is adequately divided by these three. Therefore three fruits are unfittingly assigned to the three aforesaid.

Objection 3: Further, just as widowhood surpasses conjugal continence, so does virginity surpass widowhood. But the excess of sixtyfold over thirtyfold is not as the excess of a hundredfold over sixtyfold; neither in arithmetical proportion, since sixty exceeds thirty by thirty, and a hundred exceeds sixty by forty; nor in geometrical proportion, since sixty is twice thirty and a hundred surpasses sixty as containing the whole and two-thirds thereof. Therefore the fruits are unfittingly adapted to the degrees of continence.

Objection 4: Further, the statements contained in Holy Writ stand for all time: “Heaven and earth shall pass away, but My words shall not pass away” (Lk. 21:33): whereas human institutions are liable to change every day. Therefore human institutions are not to be taken as a criterion of the statements of Holy Writ: and it would seem in consequence that the explanation of these fruits given by Bede is unfitting. For he says (Expos. in Luc. iii, 8) that “the thirtyfold fruit is assigned to married persons, because in the signs drawn on the ‘abacus’ the number 30 is denoted by the thumb and index finger touching one another at the tips as though kissing one another: so that the number 30 denotes the embraces of married persons. The number 60 is denoted by the contact of the index finger above the middle joint of the thumb, so that the index finger by lying over the thumb and weighing on it, signifies the burden which widows have to bear in this world. When, however, in the course of enumeration we come to the number 100 we pass from the left to the right hand, so that the number 100 denotes virginity, which has a share in the angelic excellence; for the angels are on the right hand, i.e. in glory, while we are on the left on account of the imperfection of the present life.”

I answer that, By continence, to which the fruit corresponds, man is brought to a kind of spiritual nature, by withdrawing from carnal things. Consequently various fruits are distinguished according to the various manners of the spirituality resulting from continence. Now there is a certain spirituality which is necessary, and one which is superabundant. The spirituality that is necessary consists in the rectitude of the spirit not being disturbed by the pleasures of the flesh: and this obtains when one makes use of carnal pleasures according to the order of right reason. This is the spirituality of married persons. Spirituality is superabundant when a man withdraws himself entirely from those carnal pleasures which stifle the spirit. This may be done in two ways: either in respect of all time past, present, and future, and this is the spirituality of virgins; or in respect of a particular time, and this is the spirituality of widows. Accordingly to those who keep conjugal continence, the thirtyfold fruit is awarded; to those who keep the continence of widows, the sixtyfold fruit; and to those who keep virginal continence, the hundredfold fruit: and this for the reason given by Bede quoted above, although another motive may be found in the very nature of the numbers. For 30 is the product of 3 multiplied by 10. Now 3 is the number of everything, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo i, and contains a certain perfection common to all, namely of beginning, middle, and end. Wherefore the number 30 is fittingly assigned to married persons, in whom no other perfection is added to the observance of the Decalogue, signified by the number 10, than the common perfection without which there is no salvation. The number six the multiplication of which by 10 amounts to 60 has perfection from its parts, being the aggregate of all its parts taken together; wherefore it corresponds fittingly to widowhood, wherein we find perfect withdrawal from carnal pleasures as to all its circumstances (which are the parts so to speak of a virtuous act), since widowhood uses no carnal pleasures in connection with any person, place, or any other circumstance; which was not the case with conjugal continence. The number 100 corresponds fittingly to virginity; because the number 10 of which 100 is a multiple is the limit of numbers: and in like manner virginity occupies the limit of spirituality, since no further spirituality can be added to it. The number 100 also being a square number has perfection from its figure: for a square figure is prefect through being equal on all sides, since all its sides are equal: wherefore it is adapted to virginity wherein incorruption is found equally as to all times.

Reply to Objection 1: Fruit is not taken there in the sense in which we are taking it now.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing obliges us to hold that fruit is a reward that is not common to all who will be saved. For not only the essential reward is common to all, but also a certain accidental reward, such as joy in those works without which one cannot be saved. Yet it may be said that the fruits are not becoming to all who will be saved, as is evidently the case with those who repent in the end after leading an incontinent life, for to such no fruit is due but only the essential reward.

Reply to Objection 3: The distinction of the fruits is to be taken according to the species and figures of the numbers rather than according to their quantity. Nevertheless even if we regard the excess in point of quantity, we may find an explanation. For the married man abstains only from one that is not his, the widow from both hers and not hers, so that in the latter case we find the notion of double, just as 60 is the double of 30. Again 100 is 60 X 40, which latter number is the product of 4 X 10, and the number 4 is the first solid and square number. Thus the addition of this number is fitting to virginity, which adds perpetual incorruption to the perfection of widowhood.

Reply to Objection 4: Although these numerical signs are a human institution, they are founded somewhat on the nature of things, in so far as the numbers are denoted in gradation, according to the order of the aforesaid joints and contacts.

Whether an aureole is due on account of virginity?

Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due on account of virginity. For where there is greater difficulty in the work, a greater reward is due. Now widows have greater difficulty than virgins in abstaining from the works of the flesh. For Jerome says (Ep. ad Ageruch.) that the greater difficulty certain persons experience in abstaining from the allurements of pleasure, the greater their reward, and he is speaking in praise of widows. Moreover, the Philosopher says (De Anim. Hist. vii) that “young women who have been deflowered desire sexual intercourse the more for the recollection of the pleasure.” Therefore the aureole which is the greatest reward is due to widows more than to virgins.

Objection 2: Further, if an aureole were due to virginity, it would be especially found where there is the most perfect virginity. Now the most prefect virginity is in the Blessed Virgin, wherefore she is called the Virgin of virgins: and yet no aureole is due to her because she experienced no conflict in being continent, for she was not infected with the corruption of the fomes [*Cf. [5144]TP, Q[27], A[3]]. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Objection 3: Further, a special reward is not due to that which has not been at all times praiseworthy. Now it would not have been praiseworthy to observe virginity in the state of innocence, since then was it commanded: “Increase and multiply and fill the earth” (Gn. 1:28): nor again during the time of the Law, since the barren were accursed. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Objection 4: Further, the same reward is not due to virginity observed, and virginity lost. Yet an aureole is sometimes due to lost virginity; for instance if a maiden be violated unwillingly at the order of a tyrant for confessing Christ. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Objection 5: Further, a special reward is not due to that which is in us by nature. But virginity is inborn in every man both good and wicked. Therefore an aureole is not due to virginity.

Objection 6: Further, as widowhood is to the sixtyfold fruit, so is virginity to the hundredfold fruit, and to the aureole. Now the sixtyfold fruit is not due to every widow, but only, as some say, to one who vows to remain a widow. Therefore it would seem that neither is the aureole due to any kind of virginity, but only to that which is observed by vow.

Objection 7: Further, reward is not given to that which is done of necessity, since all merit depends on the will. But some are virgins of necessity, such as those who are naturally cold-blooded, and eunuchs. Therefore an aureole is not always due to virginity.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ex. 25:25: “Thou shalt also make a little golden crown [coronam aureolam]” says: “This crown denotes the new hymn which the virgins sing in the presence of the Lamb, those, to wit, who follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth.” Therefore the reward due to virginity is called an aureole.

Further, It is written (Is. 56:4): “Thus saith the Lord to the eunuchs”: and the text continues (Is. 56: 5): “I will give to them . . . a name better than sons and daughters”: and a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Virginit. xxv] says: “This refers to their peculiar and transcendent glory.” Now the eunuchs “who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven” (Mat. 19:12) denote virgins. Therefore it would seem that some special reward is due to virginity, and this is called the aureole.

I answer that, Where there is a notable kind of victory, a special crown is due. Wherefore since by virginity a person wins a signal victory over the flesh, against which a continuous battle is waged: “The flesh lusteth against the spirit,” etc. (Gal. 5:17), a special crown called the aureole is due to virginity. This indeed is the common opinion of all; but all are not agreed as to the kind of virginity to which it is due. For some say that the aureole is due to the act. So that she who actually remains a virgin will have the aureole provided she be of the number of the saved. But this would seem unreasonable, because in this case those who have the will to marry and nevertheless die before marrying would have the aureole. Hence others hold that the aureole is due to the state and not to the act: so that those virgins alone merit the aureole who by vow have placed themselves in the state of observing perpetual virginity. But this also seems unreasonable, because it is possible to have the same intention of observing virginity without a vow as with a vow. Hence it may be said otherwise that merit is due to every virtuous act commanded by charity. Now virginity comes under the genus of virtue in so far as perpetual incorruption of mind and body is an object of choice, as appears from what has been said above (Sent. iv, D, 33, Q[3], AA[1],2) [*Cf. TP, Q[152], AA[1],3]. Consequently the aureole is due to those virgins alone, who had the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, whether or no they have confirmed this purpose by vow—and this I say with reference to the aureole in its proper signification of a reward due to merit—although this purpose may at some time have been interrupted, integrity of the flesh remaining withal, provided it be found at the end of life, because virginity of the mind may be restored, although virginity of the flesh cannot. If, however, we take the aureole in its broad sense for any joy added to the essential joy of heaven, the aureole will be applicable even to those who are incorrupt in flesh, although they had not the purpose of observing perpetual virginity. For without doubt they will rejoice in the incorruption of their body, even as the innocent will rejoice in having been free from sin, although they had no opportunity of sinning, as in the case of baptized children. But this is not the proper meaning of an aureole, although it is very commonly taken in this sense.

Reply to Objection 1: In some respects virgins experience a greater conflict in remaining continent; and in other respects, widows, other things being equal. For virgins are inflamed by concupiscence, and by the desire of experience, which arises from a certain curiosity as it were, which makes man more willing to see what he has never seen. Sometimes, moreover, this concupiscence is increased by their esteeming the pleasure to be greater than it is in reality, and by their failing to consider the grievances attaching to this pleasure. In these respects widows experience the lesser conflict, yet theirs is the greater conflict by reason of their recollection of the pleasure. Moreover, in different subjects one motive is stronger than another, according to the various conditions and dispositions of the subject, because some are more susceptible to one, and others to another. However, whatever we may say of the degree of conflict, this is certain—that the virgin’s victory is more perfect than the widow’s, for the most perfect and most brilliant kind of victory is never to have yielded to the foe: and the crown is due, not to the battle but to the victory gained by the battle.

Reply to Objection 2: There are two opinions about this. For some say that the Blessed Virgin has not an aureole in reward of her virginity, if we take aureole in the proper sense as referring to a conflict, but that she has something more than an aureole, on account of her most perfect purpose of observing virginity. Others say that she has an aureole even in its proper signification, and that a most transcendent one: for though she experienced no conflict, she had a certain conflict of the flesh, but owing to the exceeding strength of her virtue, her flesh was so subdued that she did not feel this conflict. This, however, would seem to be said without reason, for since we believe the Blessed Virgin to have been altogether immune from the inclination of the fomes on account of the perfection of her sanctification, it is wicked to suppose that there was in her any conflict with the flesh, since such like conflict is only from the inclination of the fomes, nor can temptation from the flesh be without sin, as declared by a gloss [*St. Augustine, De Civ. Dei xix, 4] on 2 Cor. 12:7, "There was given me a sting of my flesh." Hence we must say that she has an aureole properly speaking, so as to be conformed in this to those other members of the Church in whom virginity is found: and although she had no conflict by reason of the temptation which is of the flesh, she had the temptation which is of the enemy, who feared not even Christ (Mat. 4).

Reply to Objection 3: The aureole is not due to virginity except as adding some excellence to the other degrees of continence. If Adam had not sinned, virginity would have had no perfection over conjugal continence, since in that case marriage would have been honorable, and the marriage-bed unsullied, for it would not have been dishonored by lust: hence virginity would not then have been observed, nor would an aureole have been due to it. But the condition of human nature being changed, virginity has a special beauty of its own, and consequently a special reward is assigned to it.

During the time of the Mosaic law, when the worship of God was to be continued by means of the carnal act, it was not altogether praiseworthy to abstain from carnal intercourse: wherefore no special reward would be given for such a purpose unless it came from a Divine inspiration, as is believed to have been the case with Jeremias and Elias, of whose marriage we do not read.

Reply to Objection 4: If a virgin is violated, she does not forfeit the aureole, provided she retain unfailingly the purpose of observing perpetual virginity, and nowise consent to the act. Nor does she forfeit virginity thereby; and be this said, whether she be violated for the faith, or for any other cause whatever. But if she suffer this for the faith, this will count to her for merit, and will be a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Lucy said: "If thou causest me to be violated against my will, my chastity will receive a double crown" [*Office of S. Lucy; lect. vi of Dominican Breviary, December 13th]; not that she has two aureoles of virginity, but that she will receive a double reward, one for observing virginity, the other for the outrage she has suffered. Even supposing that one thus violated should conceive, she would not for that reason forfeit her virginity: nor would she be equal to Christ's mother, in whom there was integrity of the flesh together with integrity of the mind [*Cf. [5145]SS, Q[64], A[3], ad 3; [5146]SS, Q[124], A[4], ad 2; [5147]SS, Q[152], A[1]].

Reply to Objection 5: Virginity is inborn in us as to that which is material in virginity: but the purpose of observing perpetual incorruption, whence virginity derives its merit, is not inborn, but comes from the gift of grace.

Reply to Objection 6: The sixtyfold fruit is due, not to every widow, but only to those who retain the purpose of remaining widows, even though they do not make it the matter of a vow, even as we have said in regard to virginity.

Reply to Objection 7: If cold-blooded persons and eunuchs have the will to observe perpetual incorruption even though they were capable of sexual intercourse, they must be called virgins and merit the aureole: for they make a virtue of necessity. If, on the other hand, they have the will to marry if they could, they do not merit the aureole. Hence Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xxiv): "For those like eunuchs whose bodies are so formed that they are unable to beget, it suffices when they become Christians and keep the commandments of God, that they have a mind to have a wife if they could, in order to rank with the faithful who are married."

Whether an aureole is due to martyrs?

Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due to martyrs. For an aureole is a reward given for works of supererogation, wherefore Bede commenting on Ex. 25:25, "Thou shalt also make another . . . crown," says: "This may be rightly referred to the reward of those who by freely choosing a more perfect life go beyond the general commandments." But to die for confessing the faith is sometimes an obligation, and not a work of supererogation as appears from the words of Rom. 10:10, "With the heart, we believe unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation.” Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

Objection 2: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. ix [*Cf. St. Augustine, De Adult. Conjug. i, 14]) “the freer the service, the more acceptable it is.” Now martyrdom has a minimum of freedom, since it is a punishment inflicted by another person with force. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom, since it is accorded to surpassing merit.

Objection 3: Further, martyrdom consists not only in suffering death externally, but also in the interior act of the will: wherefore Bernard in a sermon on the Holy Innocents distinguishes three kinds of martyr—in will and not in death, as John; in both will and death, as Stephen; in death and not in will, as the Innocents. Accordingly if an aureole were due to martyrdom, it would be due to voluntary rather than external martyrdom, since merit proceeds from will. Yet such is not the case. Therefore an aureole is not due to martyrdom.

Objection 4: Further, bodily suffering is less than mental, which consists of internal sorrow and affliction of soul. But internal suffering is also a kind of martyrdom: wherefore Jerome says in a sermon on the Assumption [*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch.]: “I should say rightly that the Mother of God was both virgin and martyr, although she ended her days in peace, wherefore: Thine own soul a sword hath pierced—namely for her Son’s death.” Since then no aureole corresponds to interior sorrow, neither should one correspond to outward suffering.

Objection 5: Further, penance itself is a kind of martyrdom, wherefore Gregory says (Hom. iii in Evang.): “Although persecution has ceased to offer the opportunity, yet the peace we enjoy is not without its martyrdom; since even if we no longer yield the life of the body to the sword, yet do we slay fleshly desires in the soul with the sword of the spirit.” But no aureole is due to penance which consists in external works. Neither therefore is an aureole due to every external martyrdom.

Objection 6: Further, an aureole is not due to an unlawful work. Now it is unlawful to lay hands on oneself, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei i), and yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who laid hands upon themselves in order to escape the fury of tyrants, as in the case of certain women at Antioch (Eusebius, Eccles. Hist. viii, 24). Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

Objection 7: Further, it happens at times that a person is wounded for the faith, and survives for some time. Now it is clear that such a one is a martyr, and yet seemingly an aureole is not due to him, since his conflict did not last until death. Therefore an aureole is not always due to martyrdom.

Objection 8: Further, some suffer more from the loss of temporal goods than from the affliction even of their own body and this is shown by their bearing many afflictions for the sake of gain. Therefore if they be despoiled of their temporal goods for Christ's sake they would seem to be martyrs, and yet an aureole is not apparently due to them. Therefore the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 9: Further, a martyr would seem to be no other than one who dies for the faith, wherefore Isidore says (Etym. vii): "They are called martyrs in Greek, witnesses in Latin: because they suffered in order to bear witness to Christ, and strove unto death for the truth." Now there are virtues more excellent than faith, such as justice, charity, and so forth, since these cannot be without grace, and yet no aureole is due to them. Therefore seemingly neither is an aureole due to martyrdom.

Objection 10: Further, even as the truth of faith is from God, so is all other truth, as Ambrose [*Spurious work on 1 Cor. 12:3: "No man can say," etc.] declares, since "every truth by whomsoever uttered is from the Holy Ghost." Therefore if an aureole is due to one who suffers death for the truth of faith, in like manner it is also due to those who suffer death for any other virtue: and yet apparently this is not the case.

Objection 11: Further, the common good is greater than the good of the individual. Now if a man die in a just war in order to save his country, an aureole is not due to him. Therefore even though he be put to death in order to keep the faith that is in himself, no aureole is due to him: and consequently the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 12: Further, all merit proceeds from the free will. Yet the Church celebrates the martyrdom of some who had not the use of the free will. Therefore they did not merit an aureole: and consequently an aureole is not due to all martyrs.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Sancta Virgin. xlvi): "No one, methinks, would dare prefer virginity to martyrdom." Now an aureole is due to virginity, and consequently also to martyrdom.

Further, the crown is due to one who has striven. But in martyrdom the strife presents a special difficulty. Therefore a special aureole is due thereto.

I answer that, Just as in the spirit there is a conflict with the internal concupiscences, so is there in man a conflict with the passion that is inflicted from without. Wherefore, just as a special crown, which we call an aureole, is due to the most perfect victory whereby we triumph over the concupiscences of the flesh, in a word to virginity, so too an aureole is due to the most perfect victory that is won against external assaults. Now the most perfect victory over passion caused from without is considered from two points of view. First from the greatness of the passion. Now among all passions inflicted from without, death holds the first place, just as sexual concupiscences are chief among internal passions. Consequently, when a man conquers death and things directed to death, his is a most perfect victory. Secondly, the perfection of victory is considered from the point of view of the motive of conflict, when, to wit, a man strives for the most honorable cause; which is Christ Himself. Both these things are to be found in martyrdom, which is death suffered for Christ's sake: for "it is not the pain but the cause that makes the martyr," as Augustine says (Contra Crescon. iii). Consequently an aureole is due to martyrdom as well as to virginity.

Reply to Objection 1: To suffer death for Christ's sake, is absolutely speaking, a work of supererogation; since every one is not bound to confess his faith in the face of a persecutor: yet in certain cases it is necessary for salvation, when, to wit, a person is seized by a persecutor and interrogated as to his faith which he is then bound to confess. Nor does it follow that he does not merit an aureole. For an aureole is due to a work of supererogation, not as such, but as having a certain perfection. Wherefore so long as this perfection remains, even though the supererogation cease, one merits the aureole.

Reply to Objection 2: A reward is due to martyrdom, not in respect of the exterior infliction, but because it is suffered voluntarily: since we merit only through that which is in us. And the more that which one suffers voluntarily is difficult and naturally repugnant to the will the more is the will that suffers it for Christ's sake shown to be firmly established in Christ, and consequently a higher reward is due to him.

Reply to Objection 3: There are certain acts which, in their very selves, contain intense pleasure or difficulty: and in such the act always adds to the character of merit or demerit, for as much as in the performance of the act the will, on account of the aforesaid intensity, must needs undergo an alteration from the state in which it was before. Consequently, other things being equal, one who performs an act of lust sins more than one who merely consents in the act, because in the very act the will is increased. In like manner since in the act of suffering martyrdom there is a very great difficulty, the will to suffer martyrdom does not reach the degree of merit due to actual martyrdom by reason of its difficulty: although, indeed it may possibly attain to a higher reward, if we consider the root of merit since the will of one man to suffer martyrdom may possibly proceed from a greater charity than another man's act of martyrdom. Hence one who is willing to be a martyr may by his will merit an essential reward equal to or greater than that which is due to an actual martyr. But the aureole is due to the difficulty inherent to the conflict itself of martyrdom: wherefore it is not due to those who are martyrs only in will.

Reply to Objection 4: Just as pleasures of touch, which are the matter of temperance, hold the chief place among all pleasures both internal and external, so pains of touch surpass all other pains. Consequently an aureole is due to the difficulty of suffering pains of touch, for instance, from blows and so forth, rather than to the difficulty of bearing internal sufferings, by reason of which, however, one is not properly called a martyr, except by a kind of comparison. It is in this sense that Jerome speaks.

Reply to Objection 5: The sufferings of penance are not a martyrdom properly speaking, because they do not consist in things directed to the causing of death, since they are directed merely to the taming of the flesh: and if any one go beyond this measure, such afflictions will be deserving of blame. However such afflictions are spoken of as a martyrdom by a kind of comparison. and they surpass the sufferings of martyrdom in duration but not in intensity.

Reply to Objection 6: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei i) it is lawful to no one to lay hands on himself for any reason whatever; unless perchance it be done by Divine instinct as an example of fortitude that others may despise death. Those to whom the objection refers are believed to have brought death on themselves by Divine instinct, and for this reason the Church celebrates their martyrdom [*Cf. [5148]SS, Q[64], A[5]].

Reply to Objection 7: If any one receive a mortal wound for the faith and survive, without doubt he merits the aureole: as instanced in blessed Cecilia who survived for three days, and many martyrs who died in prison. But, even if the wound he receives be not mortal, yet be the occasion of his dying, he is believed to merit the aureole: although some say that he does not merit the aureole if he happen to die through his own carelessness or neglect. For this neglect would not have occasioned his death, except on the supposition of the wound which he received for the faith: and consequently this wound previously received for the faith is the original occasion of his death, so that he would not seem to lose. the aureole for that reason, unless his neglect were such as to involve a mortal sin, which would deprive him of both aurea and aureole. If, however, by some chance or other he were not to die of the mortal wound received, or again if the wounds received were not mortal, and he were to die while in prison, he would still merit the aureole. Hence the martyrdom of some saints is celebrated in the Church for that they died in prison, having been wounded long before, as in the case of Pope Marcellus. Accordingly in whatever way suffering for Christ's sake be continued unto death, whether death ensue or not, a man becomes a martyr and merits the aureole. If, however, it be not continued unto death, this is not a reason for calling a person a martyr, as in the case of the blessed Sylvester, whose feast the Church does not solemnize as a martyr's, since he ended his days in peace, although previously he had undergone certain sufferings.

Reply to Objection 8: Even as temperance is not about pleasures of money, honors, and the like, but only about pleasures of touch as being the principal of all, so fortitude is about dangers of death as being the greatest of all (Ethic. iii, 6). Consequently the aureole is due to such injuries only as are inflicted on a person's own body and are of a nature to cause death. Accordingly whether a person lose his temporalities, or his good name, or anything else of the kind, for Christ's sake, he does not for that reason become a martyr, nor merit the aureole. Nor is it possible to love ordinately external things more than one's body; and inordinate love does not help one to merit an aureole: nor again can sorrow for the loss of corporeal things be equal to the sorrow for the slaying of the body and other like things [*Cf. [5149]SS, Q[124], A[5]].

Reply to Objection 9: The sufficient motive for martyrdom is not only confession of the faith, but any other virtue, not civic but infused, that has Christ for its end. For one becomes a witness of Christ by any virtuous act, inasmuch as the works which Christ perfects in us bear witness to His goodness. Hence some virgins were slain for virginity which they desired to keep, for instance blessed Agnes and others whose martyrdom is celebrated by the Church.

Reply to Objection 10: The truth of faith has Christ for end and object; and therefore the confession thereof, if suffering be added thereto, merits an aureole, not only on the part of the end but also on the part of the matter. But the confession of any other truth is not a sufficient motive for martyrdom by reason of its matter, but only on the part of the end; for instance if a person were willing to be slain for Christ's sake rather than sin against Him by telling any lie whatever.

Reply to Objection 11: The uncreated good surpasses all created good. Hence any created end, whether it be the common or a private good, cannot confer so great a goodness on an act as can the uncreated end, when, to wit, an act is done for God's sake. Hence when a person dies for the common good without referring it to Christ, he will not merit the aureole; but if he refer it to Christ he will merit the aureole and he will be a martyr; for instance, if he defend his country from the attack of an enemy who designs to corrupt the faith of Christ, and suffer death in that defense.

Reply to Objection 12: Some say that the use of reason was by the Divine power accelerated in the Innocents slain for Christ's sake, even as in John the Baptist while yet in his mother's womb: and in that case they were truly martyrs in both act and will, and have the aureole. others say, however, that they were martyrs in act only and not in will: and this seems to be the opinion of Bernard, who distinguishes three kinds of martyrs, as stated above (OBJ 3). In this case the Innocents, even as they do not fulfill all the conditions of martyrdom, and yet are martyrs in a sense, in that they died for Christ, so too they have the aureole, not in all its perfection, but by a kind of participation, in so far as they rejoice in having. been slain in Christ's service; thus it was stated above [5150](A[5]) in reference to baptized children, that they will have a certain joy in their innocence and carnal integrity [*Cf. [5151]SS, Q[124], A[1], ad 1, where St. Thomas declares that the Holy Innocents were truly martyrs.]

Whether an aureole is due to doctors?

Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is not due to doctors. For every reward to be had in the life to come will correspond to some act of virtue. But preaching or teaching is not the act of a virtue. Therefore an aureole is not due to teaching or preaching.

Objection 2: Further, teaching and preaching are the result of studying and being taught. Now the things that are rewarded in the future life are not acquired by a man's study, since we merit not by our natural and acquired gifts. Therefore no aureole will be merited in the future life for teaching and preaching.

Objection 3: Further, exaltation in the life to come corresponds to humiliation in the present life, because "he that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (Mat. 23:12). But there is no humiliation in teaching and preaching, in fact they are occasions of pride; for a gloss on Mat. 4:5, "Then the devil took Him up," says that "the devil deceives many who are puffed up with the honor of the master's chair." Therefore it would seem that an aureole is not due to preaching and teaching.

On the contrary, A gloss on Eph. 1:18,19, "That you may know . . . what is the exceeding greatness," etc. says: "The holy doctors will have an increase of glory above that which all have in common." Therefore, etc.

Further, a gloss on Canticle of Canticles 8:12, "My vineyard is before me," says: "He describes the peculiar reward which He has prepared for His doctors." Therefore doctors will have a peculiar reward: and we call this an aureole.

I answer that, Just as by virginity and martyrdom a person wins a most perfect victory over the flesh and the world, so is a most perfect victory gained over the devil, when a person not only refuses to yield to the devil's assaults, but also drives him out, not from himself alone, but from others also. Now this is done by preaching and teaching: wherefore an aureole is due to preaching and teaching, even as to virginity and martyrdom. Nor can we admit, as some affirm, that it is due to prelates only, who are competent to preach and teach by virtue of their office. but it is due to all whosoever exercise this act lawfully. Nor is it due to prelates, although they have the office of preaching, unless they actually preach, since a crown is due not to the habit, but to the actual strife, according to 2 Tim. 2:5, “He . . . shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned, except he strive lawfully.”

Reply to Objection 1: Preaching and teaching are acts of a virtue, namely mercy, wherefore they are reckoned among the spiritual alms deeds [*Cf. [5152]SS, Q[32], A[2]].

Reply to Objection 2: Although ability to preach and teach is sometimes the outcome of study, the practice of teaching comes from the will, which is informed with charity infused by God: and thus its act can be meritorious.

Reply to Objection 3: Exaltation in this life does not lessen the reward of the other life, except for him who seeks his own glory from that exaltation: whereas he who turns that exaltation to the profit of others acquires thereby a reward for himself. Still, when it is stated that an aureole is due to teaching, this is to be understood of the teaching of things pertaining to salvation, by which teaching the devil is expelled from men’s hearts, as by a kind of spiritual weapon, of which it is said (2 Cor. 10:4): “The weapons of our warfare are not carnal but spiritual” [Vulg.: ‘but mighty to God’].

Whether an aureole is due to Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is due to Christ. For an aureole is due to virginity, martyrdom, and teaching. Now these three were pre-eminently in Christ. Therefore an aureole is especially due to Him.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is most perfect in human things must ne especially ascribed to Christ. Now an aureole is due as the reward of most excellent merits. Therefore it is also due to Christ.

Objection 3: Further, Cyprian says (De Habit. Virg.) that “virginity bears a likeness to God.” Therefore the exemplar of virginity is in God. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due to Christ even as God.

On the contrary, An aureole is described as “joy in being conformed to Christ.” Now no one is conformed or likened to himself, as the Philosopher says (Metaph., lib. ix, 3). Therefore an aureole is not due to Christ.

Further, Christ’s reward was never increased. Now Christ had no aureole from the moment of His conception, since then He had never fought. Therefore He never had an aureole afterwards.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this point. For some say that Christ has an aureole in its strict sense, seeing that in Him there is both conflict and victory, and consequently a crown in its proper acceptation. But if we consider the question carefully, although the notion of aurea or crown is becoming to Christ, the notion of aureole is not. For from the very fact that aureole is a diminutive term it follows that it denotes something possessed by participation and not in its fulness. Wherefore an aureole is becoming to those who participate in the perfect victory by imitating Him in Whom the fulness of perfect victory is realized. And therefore, since in Christ the notion of victory is found chiefly and fully, for by His victory others are made victors—as shown by the words of Jn. 16:33, “Have confidence, I have overcome the world,” and Apoc. 5:5, “Behold the lion of the tribe of Juda . . . hath prevailed”—it is not becoming for Christ to have an aureole, but to have something from which all aureoles are derived. Hence it is written (Apoc. 3:21): “To him that shall overcome, I will give to sit with Me in My throne, as I also have overcome, and am set down in My Father’s throne [Vulg.: ‘With My Father in His throne’].” Therefore we must say with others that although there is nothing of the nature of an aureole in Christ, there is nevertheless something more excellent than any aureole.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ was most truly virgin, martyr, and doctor; yet the corresponding accidental reward in Christ is a negligible quantity in comparison with the greatness of His essential reward. Hence He has not an aureole in its proper sense.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the aureole is due to a most perfect work, yet with regard to us, so far as it is a diminutive term, it denotes the participation of a perfection derived from one in whom that perfection is found in its fulness. Accordingly it implies a certain inferiority, and thus it is not found in Christ in Whom is the fulness of every perfection.

Reply to Objection 3: Although in some way virginity has its exemplar in God, that exemplar is not homogeneous. For the incorruption of God, which virginity imitates is not in God in the same way as in a virgin.

Whether an aureole is due to the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is due to the angels. For Jerome (Serm. de Assump. [*Ep. ad Paul. et Eustoch. ix]) speaking of virginity says: “To live without the flesh while living in the flesh is to live as an angel rather than as a man”: and a gloss on 1 Cor. 7:26, “For the present necessity,” says that “virginity is the portion of the angels.” Since then an aureole corresponds to virginity, it would seem due to the angels.

Objection 2: Further, incorruption of the spirit is more excellent than incorruption of the flesh. Now there is incorruption of spirit in the angels, since they never sinned. Therefore an aureole is due to them rather than to men incorrupt in the flesh and who have sinned at some time.

Objection 3: Further, an aureole is due to teaching. Now angels teach us by cleansing, enlightening, and perfecting [*Cf. [5153]FP, Q[111], A[1]] us, as Dionysius says (Hier. Eccles. vi). Therefore at least the aureole of doctors is due to them.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Tim. 2:5): “He . . . shall not be [Vulg.: ‘is not’] crowned, except he strive lawfully.” But there is no conflict in the angels. Therefore an aureole is not due to them.

Further, an aureole is not due to an act that is not performed through the body: wherefore it is not due to lovers of virginity, martyrdom or teaching, if they do not practice them outwardly. But angels are incorporeal spirits. Therefore they have no aureole.

I answer that, An aureole is not due to the angels. The reason of this is that an aureole, properly speaking, corresponds to some perfection of surpassing merit. Now those things which make for perfect merit in man are connatural to angels, or belong to their state in general, or to their essential reward. Wherefore the angels have not an aureole in the same sense as an aureole is due to men.

Reply to Objection 1: Virginity is said to be an angelic life, in so far as virgins imitate by grace what angels have by nature. For it is not owing to a virtue that angels abstain altogether from pleasures of the flesh, since they are incapable of such pleasures.

Reply to Objection 2: Perpetual incorruption of the spirit in the angels merits their essential reward: because it is necessary for their salvation, since in them recovery is impossible after they have fallen [*Cf. [5154]FP, Q[64], A[2]].

Reply to Objection 3: The acts whereby the angels teach us belong to their glory and their common state: wherefore they do not merit an aureole thereby.

Whether an aureole is also due to the body?

Objection 1: It would seem that an aureole is also due to the body. For the essential reward is greater than the accidental. But the dowries which belong to the essential reward are not only in the soul but also in the body. Therefore there is also an aureole which pertains to the accidental reward.

Objection 2: Further, punishment in soul and body corresponds to sin committed through the body. Therefore a reward both in soul and in body is due to merit gained through the body. But the aureole is merited through works of the body. Therefore an aureole is also due to the body.

Objection 3: Further, a certain fulness of virtue will shine forth in the bodies of martyrs, and will be seen in their bodily scars: wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii): “We feel an undescribable love for the blessed martyrs so as to desire to see in that kingdom the scars of the wounds in their bodies, which they bore for Christ’s name. Perchance indeed we shall see them, for this will not make them less comely, but more glorious. A certain beauty will shine in them, a beauty, though in the body, yet not of the body but of virtue.” Therefore it would seem that the martyr’s aureole is also in his body; and in like manner the aureoles of others.

On the contrary, The souls now in heaven have aureoles; and yet they have no body. Therefore the proper subject of an aureole is the soul and not the body.

Further, all merit is from the soul. Therefore the whole reward should be in the soul.

I answer that, Properly speaking the aureole is in the mind: since it is joy in the works to which an aureole is due. But even as from the joy in the essential reward, which is the aurea, there results a certain comeliness in the body, which is the glory of the body, so from the joy in the aureole there results a certain bodily comeliness: so that the aureole is chiefly in the mind, but by a kind of overflow it shines forth in the body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. It must be observed, however, that the beauty of the scars which will appear in the bodies of the martyrs cannot be called an aureole, since some of the martyrs will have an aureole in which such scars will not appear, for instance those who were put to death by drowning, starvation, or the squalor of prison.

Whether three aureoles are fittingly assigned, those of virgins, of martyrs, and of doctors?

Objection 1: It would seem that the three aureoles of virgins, martyrs, and doctors are unfittingly assigned. For the aureole of martyrs corresponds to their virtue of fortitude, the aureole of virgins to the virtue of temperance, and the aureole of doctors to the virtue of prudence. Therefore it seems that there should be a fourth aureole corresponding to the virtue of justice.

Objection 2: Further, a gloss on Ex. 25:25: “A polished crown, etc. says that a golden [aurea] crown is added, when the Gospel promises eternal life to those who keep the commandments: ‘If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments’ (Mat. 19:17). To this is added the little golden crown [aureola] when it is said: ‘If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor’” (Mat. 19:21). Therefore an aureole is due to poverty.

Objection 3: Further, a man subjects himself wholly to God by the vow of obedience: wherefore the greatest perfection consists in the vow of obedience. Therefore it would seem that an aureole is due thereto.

Objection 4: Further, there are also many other works of supererogation in which one will rejoice in the life to come. Therefore there are many aureoles besides the aforesaid three.

Objection 5: Further, just as a man spreads the faith by preaching and teaching, so does he by publishing written works. Therefore a fourth aureole is due to those who do this.

I answer that, An aureole is an exceptional reward corresponding to an exceptional victory: wherefore the three aureoles are assigned in accordance with the exceptional victories in the three conflicts which beset every man. For in the conflict with the flesh, he above all wins the victory who abstains altogether from sexual pleasures which are the chief of this kind; and such is a virgin. Wherefore an aureole is due to virginity. In the conflict with the world, the chief victory is to suffer the world’s persecution even until death: wherefore the second aureole is due to martyrs who win the victory in this battle. In the conflict with the devil, the chief victory is to expel the enemy not only from oneself but also from the hearts of others: this is done by teaching and preaching, and consequently the third aureole is due to doctors and preachers.

Some, however, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with the three powers of the soul, by saying that the three aureoles correspond to the three chief acts of the soul's three highest powers. For the act of the rational power is to publish the truth of faith even to others, and to this act the aureole of doctors is due: the highest act of the irascible power is to overcome even death for Christ's sake, and to this act the aureole of martyrs is due: and the highest act of the concupiscible power is to abstain altogether from the greatest carnal pleasures, and to this act the aureole of virgins is due.

Others again, distinguish the three aureoles in accordance with those things whereby we are most signally conformed to Christ. For He was the mediator between the Father and the world. Hence He was a doctor, by manifesting to the world the truth which He had received from the Father; He was a martyr, by suffering the persecution of the world; and He was a virgin, by His personal purity. Wherefore doctors, martyrs and virgins are most perfectly conformed to Him: and for this reason an aureole is due to them.

Reply to Objection 1: There is no conflict to be observed in the act of justice as in the acts of the other virtues. Nor is it true that to teach is an act of prudence: in fact rather is it an act of charity or mercy—inasmuch as it is by such like habits that we are inclined to the practice of such an act—or again of wisdom, as directing it.

We may also reply, with others, that justice embraces all the virtues, wherefore a special aureole is not due to it.

Reply to Objection 2: Although poverty is a work of perfection, it does not take the highest place in a spiritual conflict, because the love of temporalities assails a man less than carnal concupiscence or persecution whereby his own body is broken. Hence an aureole is not due to poverty; but judicial power by reason of the humiliation consequent upon poverty. The gloss quoted takes aureole in the broad sense for any reward given for excellent merit.

We reply in the same way to the Third and Fourth Objections.

Reply to Objection 5: An aureole is due to those who commit the sacred doctrine to writing: but it is not distinct from the aureole of doctors, since the compiling of writing is a way of teaching.

Whether the virgin’s aureole is the greatest of all?

Objection 1: It would seem that the virgin’s aureole is the greatest of all. For it is said of virgins (Apoc. 14:4) that they “follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth,” and (Apoc. 14:3) that “no” other “man could say the canticle” which the virgins sang. Therefore virgins have the most excellent aureole.

Objection 2: Further, Cyprian (De Habit. Virg.) says of virgins that they are “the more illustrious portion of Christ’s flock.” Therefore the greater aureole is due to them.

Objection 3: Again, it would seem that the martyr’s aureole is the greatest. For Aymo, commenting on Apoc. 14:3, “No man could say the hymn,” says that “virgins do not all take precedence of married folk; but only those who in addition to the observance of virginity are by the tortures of their passion on a par with married persons who have suffered martyrdom.” Therefore martyrdom gives virginity its precedence over other states: and consequently a greater aureole is due to virginity.

Objection 4: Again, it would seem that the greatest aureole is due to doctors. Because the Church militant is modelled after the Church triumphant. Now in the Church militant the greatest honor is due to doctors (1 Tim. 5:17): “Let the priests that rule well be esteemed worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine.” Therefore a greater aureole is due to them in the Church triumphant.

I answer that, Precedence of one aureole over another may be considered from two standpoints. First, from the point of view of the conflicts, that aureole being considered greater which is due to the more strenuous battle. Looking at it thus the martyr’s aureole takes precedence of the others in one way, and the virgin’s in another. For the martyr’s battle is more strenuous in itself, and more intensely painful; while the conflict with the flesh is fraught with greater danger, inasmuch as it is more lasting and threatens us at closer quarters. Secondly, from the point of view of the things about which the battle is fought: and thus the doctor’s aureole takes precedence of all others, since this conflict is about intelligible goods. while the other conflicts are about sensible passions. Nevertheless, the precedence that is considered in view of the conflict is more essential to the aureole; since the aureole, according to its proper character, regards the victory and the battle, and the difficulty of fighting which is viewed from the standpoint of the battle is of greater importance than that which is considered from our standpoint through the conflict being at closer quarters. Therefore the martyr's aureole is simply the greatest of all: for which reason a gloss on Mat. 5:10, says that "all the other beatitudes are perfected in the eighth, which refers to the martyrs," namely, "Blessed are they that suffer persecution." For this reason, too, the Church in enumerating the saints together places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. Yet nothing hinders the other aureoles from being more excellent in some particular way. And this suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether one person has an aureole more excellently than another person?

Objection 1: It would seem that one person has not the aureole either of virginity, or of martyrdom, or of doctrine more perfectly than another person. For things which have reached their term are not subject to intension or remission. Now the aureole is due to works which have reached their term of perfection. Therefore an aureole is not subject to intension or remission.

Objection 2: Further, virginity is not subject to being more or less, since it denotes a kind of privation; and privations are not subject to intension or remission. Therefore neither does the reward of virginity, the virgin's aureole to wit, receive intension or remission.

On the contrary, The aureole is added to the aurea. But the aurea is more intense in one than in another. Therefore the aureole is also.

I answer that, Since merit is somewhat the cause of reward, rewards must needs be diversified, according as merits are diversified: for the intension or remission of a thing follows from the intension or remission of its cause. Now the merit of the aureole may be greater or lesser: wherefore the aureole may also be greater or lesser.

We must observe, however, that the merit of an aureole may be intensified in two ways: first, on the part of its cause, secondly on the part of the work. For there may happen to be two persons, one of whom, out of lesser charity, suffers greater torments of martyrdom, or is more constant in preaching, or again withdraws himself more from carnal pleasures. Accordingly, intension not of the aureole but of the aurea corresponds to the intension of merit derived from its root; while intension of the aureole corresponds to intension of merit derived from the kind of act. Consequently it is possible for one who merits less in martyrdom as to his essential reward, to receive a greater aureole for his martyrdom.

Reply to Objection 1: The merits to which an aureole is due do not reach the term of their perfection simply, but according to their species: even as fire is specifically the most subtle of bodies. Hence nothing hinders one aureole being more excellent than another, even as one fire is more subtle than another.

Reply to Objection 2: The virginity of one may be greater than the virginity of another, by reason of a greater withdrawal from that which is contrary to virginity: so that virginity is stated to be greater in one who avoids more the occasions of corruption. For in this way privations may increase, as when a man is said to be more blind, if he be removed further from the possession of sight.

OF THE PUNISHMENT OF THE DAMNED (SEVEN ARTICLES)

In due sequence we must consider those things that concern the damned after the judgment: (1) The punishment of the damned, and the fire by which their bodies will be tormented; (2) matters relating to their will and intellect; (3) God’s justice and mercy in regard to the damned.

Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry:

(1) Whether in hell the damned are tormented with the sole punishment of fire?

(2) Whether the worm by which they are tormented is corporeal?

(3) Whether their weeping is corporeal?

(4) Whether their darkness is material?

(5) Whether the fire whereby they are tormented is corporeal?

(6) Whether it is of the same species as our fire?

(7) Whether this fire is beneath the earth?

Whether in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire?

Objection 1: It would seem that in hell the damned are tormented by the sole punishment of fire; because Mat. 25:41, where their condemnation is declared, mention is made of fire only, in the words: “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire.”

Objection 2: Further, even as the punishment of purgatory is due to venial sin, so is the punishment of hell due to mortal sin. Now no other punishment but that of fire is stated to be in purgatory, as appears from the words of 1 Cor. 3:13: “The fire shall try every man’s work, of what sort it is.” Therefore neither in hell will there be a punishment other than of fire.

Objection 3: Further, variety of punishment affords a respite, as when one passes from heat to cold. But we can admit no respite in the damned. Therefore there will not be various punishments, but that of fire alone.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 10:7): “Fire and brimstone and storms of winds shall be the portion of their cup.”

Further, it is written (Job 24:19): “Let him pass from the snow waters to excessive heat.”

I answer that, According to Basil (Homilia vi in Hexaemeron and Hom. i in Ps. 38), at the final cleansing of the world, there will be a separation of the elements, whatever is pure and noble remaining above for the glory of the blessed, and whatever is ignoble and sordid being cast down for the punishment of the damned: so that just as every creature will be to the blessed a matter of joy, so will all the elements conduce to the torture of the damned, according to Wis. 5:21, “the whole world will fight with Him against the unwise.” This is also becoming to Divine justice, that whereas they departed from one by sin, and placed their end in material things which are many and various, so should they be tormented in many ways and from many sources.

Reply to Objection 2: It is because fire is most painful, through its abundance of active force, that the name of fire is given to any torment if it be intense.

Reply to Objection 2: The punishment of purgatory is not intended chiefly to torment but to cleanse: wherefore it should be inflicted by fire alone which is above all possessed of cleansing power. But the punishment of the damned is not directed to their cleansing. Consequently the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: The damned will pass from the most intense heat to the most intense cold without this giving them any respite: because they will suffer from external agencies, not by the transmutation of their body from its original natural disposition, and the contrary passion affording a respite by restoring an equable or moderate temperature, as happens now, but by a spiritual action, in the same way as sensible objects act on the senses being perceived by impressing the organ with their forms according to their spiritual and not their material being.

Whether the worm of the damned is corporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the worm by which the damned are tormented is corporeal. Because flesh cannot be tormented by a spiritual worm. Now the flesh of the damned will be tormented by a worm: “He will give fire and worms into their flesh” (Judith 16:21), and: “The vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms” (Ecclus. 7:19). Therefore that worm will be corporeal.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 9): . . .”Both, namely fire and worm, will be the punishment of the body.” Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 22): “The unquenchable fire and the restless worm in the punishment of the damned are explained in various ways by different persons. Some refer both to the body, some, both to the soul: others refer the fire, in the literal sense, to the body, the worm to the soul metaphorically: and this seems the more probable.”

I answer that, After the day of judgment, no animal or mixed body will remain in the renewed world except only the body of man, because the former are not directed to incorruption [*Cf.[5155] Q[91], A[5]], nor after that time will there be generation or corruption. Consequently the worm ascribed to the damned must be understood to be not of a corporeal but of a spiritual nature: and this is the remorse of conscience, which is called a worm because it originates from the corruption of sin, and torments the soul, as a corporeal worm born of corruption torments by gnawing.

Reply to Objection 1: The very souls of the damned are called their flesh for as much as they were subject to the flesh. Or we may reply that the flesh will be tormented by the spiritual worm, according as the afflictions of the soul overflow into the body, both here and hereafter.

Reply to Objection 2: Augustine speaks by way of comparison. For he does not wish to assert absolutely that this worm is material, but that it is better to say that both are to be understood materially, than that both should be understood only in a spiritual sense: for then the damned would suffer no bodily pain. This is clear to anyone that examines the context of his words in this passage.

Whether the weeping of the damned will be corporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the weeping of the damned will be corporeal. For a gloss on Lk. 13:28, "There will be weeping," says that "the weeping with which our Lord threatens the wicked is a proof of the resurrection of the body." But this would not be the case if that weeping were merely spiritual. Therefore, etc.

Objection 2: Further, the pain of the punishment corresponds to the pleasure of the sin, according to Apoc. 18:7: "As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her." Now sinners had internal and external pleasure in their sin. Therefore they will also have external weeping.

On the contrary, Corporeal weeping results from dissolving into tears. Now there cannot be a continual dissolution from the bodies of the damned, since nothing is restored to them by food; for everything finite is consumed if something be continually taken from it. Therefore the weeping of the damned will not be corporeal.

I answer that, Two things are to be observed in corporeal weeping. One is the resolution of tears: and as to this corporeal weeping cannot be in the damned, since after the day of judgment, the movement of the first movable being being at an end, there will be neither generation, nor corruption, nor bodily alteration: and in the resolution of tears that humor needs to be generated which is shed forth in the shape of tears. Wherefore in this respect it will be impossible for corporeal weeping to be in the damned. The other thing to be observed in corporeal weeping is a certain commotion and disturbance of the head and eyes, and in this respect weeping will be possible in the damned after the resurrection: for the bodies of the damned will be tormented not only from without, but also from within, according as the body is affected at the instance of the soul's passion towards good or evil. In this sense weeping is a proof of the body's resurrection, and corresponds to the pleasure of sin, experienced by both soul and body.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the damned are in material darkness?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned are not in material darkness. For commenting on Job 10:22, “But everlasting horror dwelleth,” Gregory says (Moral. ix): “Although that fire will give no light for comfort, yet, that it may torment the more it does give light for a purpose, for by the light of its flame the wicked will see their followers whom they have drawn thither from the world.” Therefore the darkness there is not material.

Objection 2: Further, the damned see their own punishment, for this increases their punishment. But nothing is seen without light. Therefore there is no material darkness there.

Objection 3: Further, there the damned will have the power of sight after being reunited to their bodies. But this power would be useless to them unless they see something. Therefore, since nothing is seen unless it be in the light, it would seem that they are not in absolute darkness.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 22:13): “Bind his hands and his feet, and cast him into the exterior darkness.” Commenting on these words Gregory says (Moral. ix): If this fire gave any light, “he would by no means be described as cast into exterior darkness.”

Further, Basil says (Hom. i in Ps. 28:7, “The voice of the Lord divideth the flame of fire”) that “by God's might the brightness of the fire will be separated from its power of burning, so that its brightness will conduce to the joy of the blessed, and the heat of the flame to the torment of the damned.” Therefore the damned will be in material darkness.

Other points relating to the punishment of the damned have been decided above ([5156]Q[86]).

I answer that, The disposition of hell will be such as to be adapted to the utmost unhappiness of the damned. Wherefore accordingly both light and darkness are there, in so far as they are most conducive to the unhappiness of the damned. Now seeing is in itself pleasant for, as stated in Metaph. i, “the sense of sight is most esteemed, because thereby many things are known.”

Yet it happens accidentally that seeing is painful, when we see things that are hurtful to us, or displeasing to our will. Consequently in hell the place must be so disposed for seeing as regards light and darkness, that nothing be seen clearly, and that only such things be dimly seen as are able to bring anguish to the heart. Wherefore, simply speaking, the place is dark. Yet by Divine disposition, there is a certain amount of light, as much as suffices for seeing those things which are capable of tormenting the soul. The natural situation of the place is enough for this, since in the centre of the earth, where hell is said to be, fire cannot be otherwise than thick and cloudy, and reeky as it were.

Some hold that this darkness is caused by the massing together of the bodies of the damned, which will so fill the place of hell with their numbers, that no air will remain, so that there will be no translucid body that can be the subject of light and darkness, except the eyes of the damned, which will be darkened utterly.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the fire of hell will be corporeal?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of hell whereby the bodies of the damned will be tormented will not be corporeal. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv): The devil, and “demons, and his men” [*Cf. 2 Thess. 2:3: “And the man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition.”], namely Antichrist, “together with the ungodly and sinners will be cast into everlasting fire, not material fire, such as that which we have, but such as God knoweth.” Now everything corporeal is material. Therefore the fire of hell will not be corporeal.

Objection 2: Further, the souls of the damned when severed from their bodies are cast into hell fire. But Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32): “In my opinion the place to which the soul is committed after death is spiritual and not corporeal.” Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, corporeal fire in the mode of its action does not follow the mode of guilt in the person who is burned at the stake, rather does it follow the mode of humid and dry: for in the same corporeal fire we see both good and wicked suffer. But the fire of hell, in its mode of torture or action, follows the mode of guilt in the person punished; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 63): “There is indeed but one hell fire, but it does not torture all sinners equally. For each one will suffer as much pain according as his guilt deserves.” Therefore this fire will not be corporeal.

On the contrary, He says (Dial. iv, 29): “I doubt not that the fire of hell is corporeal, since it is certain that bodies are tortured there.”

Further, it is written (Wis. 5:21): “The . . . world shall fight . . . against the unwise.” But the whole world would not fight against the unwise if they were punished with a spiritual and not a corporeal punishment. Therefore they will be punished with a corporeal fire.

I answer that, There have been many opinions about the fire of hell. For some philosophers, as Avicenna, disbelieving in the resurrection, thought that the soul alone would be punished after death. And as they considered it impossible for the soul, being incorporeal, to be punished with a corporeal fire, they denied that the fire whereby the wicked are punished is corporeal, and pretended that all statements as to souls being punished in future after death by any corporeal means are to be taken metaphorically. For just as the joy and happiness of good souls will not be about any corporeal object, but about something spiritual, namely the attainment of their end, so will the torment of the wicked be merely spiritual, in that they will be grieved at being separated from their end, the desire whereof is in them by nature. Wherefore, just as all descriptions of the soul’s delight after death that seem to denote bodily pleasure—for instance, that they are refreshed, that they smile, and so forth—must be taken metaphorically, so also are all such descriptions of the soul’s suffering as seem to imply bodily punishment—for instance, that they burn in fire, or suffer from the stench, and so forth. For as spiritual pleasure and pain are unknown to the majority, these things need to be declared under the figure of corporeal pleasures and pains, in order that men may be moved the more to the desire or fear thereof. Since, however, in the punishment of the damned there will be not only pain of loss corresponding to the aversion that was in their sin, but also pain of sense corresponding to the conversion, it follows that it is not enough to hold the above manner of punishment. For this reason Avicenna himself (Met. ix) added another explanation, by saying that the souls of the wicked are punished after death, not by bodies but by images of bodies; just as in a dream it seems to a man that he is suffering various pains on account of such like images being in his imagination. Even Augustine seems to hold this kind of punishment (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32), as is clear from the text. But this would seem an unreasonable statement. For the imagination is a power that makes use of a bodily organ: so that it is impossible for such visions of the imagination to occur in the soul separated from the body, as in the soul of the dreamer. Wherefore Avicenna also that he might avoid this difficulty, said that the soul separated from the body uses as an organ some part of the heavenly body, to which the human body needs to be conformed, in order to be perfected by the rational soul, which is like the movers of the heavenly body—thus following somewhat the opinion of certain philosophers of old, who maintained that souls return to the stars that are their compeers. But this is absolutely absurd according to the Philosopher’s teaching, since the soul uses a definite bodily organ, even as art uses definite instruments, so that it cannot pass from one body to another, as Pythagoras is stated (De Anima i, text. 53) to have maintained. As to the statement of Augustine we shall say below how it is to be answered (ad 2). However, whatever we may say of the fire that torments the separated souls, we must admit that the fire which will torment the bodies of the damned after the resurrection is corporeal, since one cannot fittingly apply a punishment to a body unless that punishment itself be bodily. Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) proves the fire of hell to be corporeal from the very fact that the wicked will be cast thither after the resurrection. Again Augustine, as quoted in the text of Sentent. iv, D, 44, clearly admits (De Civ. Dei xxi, 10) that the fire by which the bodies are tormented is corporeal. And this is the point at issue for the present. We have said elsewhere ([5157]Q[70], A[3]) how the souls of the damned are punished by this corporeal fire.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene does not absolutely deny that this fire is material, but that it is material as our fire, since it differs from ours in some of its properties. We may also reply that since that fire does not alter bodies as to their matter, but acts on them for their punishment by a kind of spiritual action, it is for this reason that it is stated not to be material, not as regards its substance, but as to its punitive effect on bodies and, still more, on souls.

Reply to Objection 2: The assertion of Augustine may be taken in this way, that the place whither souls are conveyed after death be described as incorporeal, in so far as the soul is there, not corporeally, i.e. as bodies are in a place, but in some other spiritual way, as angels are in a place. Or we may reply that Augustine is expressing an opinion without deciding the point, as he often does in those books.

Reply to Objection 3: That fire will be the instrument of Divine justice inflicting punishment. Now an instrument acts not only by its own power and in its own way, but also by the power of the principal agent, and as directed thereby. Wherefore although fire is not able, of its own power, to torture certain persons more or less, according to the measure of sin, it is able to do so nevertheless in so far as its action is regulated by the ordering of Divine justice: even so the fire of the furnace is regulated by the forethought of the smith, according as the effect of his art requires.

Whether the fire of hell is of the same species as ours?

Objection 1: It would seem that this fire is not of the same species as the corporeal fire which we see. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 16): “In my opinion no man knows of what kind is the everlasting fire, unless the Spirit of God has revealed it to anyone.” But all or nearly all know the nature of this fire of ours. Therefore that fire is not of the same species as this.

Objection 2: Further, Gregory commenting on Job 10:26, “A fire that is not kindled shall devour him,” says (Moral. xv): “Bodily fire needs bodily fuel in order to become fire; neither can it be except by being kindled, nor live unless it be renewed. On the other hand the fire of hell, since it is a bodily fire, and burns in a bodily way the wicked cast therein, is neither kindled by human endeavor, nor kept alive with fuel, but once created endures unquenchably; at one and the same time it needs no kindling, and lacks not heat.” Therefore it is not of the same nature as the fire that we see.

Objection 3: Further, the everlasting and the corruptible differ essentially, since they agree not even in genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.

x). But this fire of ours is corruptible, whereas the other is everlasting: “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire” (Mat. 25:41). Therefore they are not of the same nature.

Objection 4: Further, it belongs to the nature of this fire of ours to give light. But the fire of hell gives no light, hence the saying of Job 18:5: “Shall not the light of the wicked be extinguished?” Therefore . . . as above.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Topic. i, 6), “every water is of the same species as every other water.” Therefore in like manner every fire is of the same species as every other fire.

Further, it is written (Wis. 11:17): “By what things a man sinneth by the same also he is tormented.” Now men sin by the sensible things of this world. Therefore it is just that they should be punished by those same things.

I answer that, As stated in Meteor. iv, 1 fire has other bodies for its matter, for the reason that of all the elements it has the greatest power of action. Hence fire is found under two conditions: in its own matter, as existing in its own sphere, and in a strange matter, whether of earth, as in burning coal, or of air as in the flame. Under whatever conditions however fire be found, it is always of the same species, so far as the nature of fire is concerned, but there may be a difference of species as to the bodies which are the matter of fire. Wherefore flame and burning coal differ specifically, and likewise burning wood and red-hot iron; nor does it signify, as to this particular point, whether they be kindled by force, as in the case of iron, or by a natural intrinsic principle, as happens with sulphur. Accordingly it is clear that the fire of hell is of the same species as the fire we have, so far as the nature of fire is concerned. But whether that fire subsists in its proper matter, or if it subsists in a strange matter, what that matter may be, we know not. And in this way it may differ specifically from the fire we have, considered materially. It has, however, certain properties differing from our fire, for instance that it needs no kindling, nor is kept alive by fuel. But the differences do not argue a difference of species as regards the nature of the fire.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine is speaking of that fire with regard to its matter, and not with regard to its nature.

Reply to Objection 2: This fire of ours is kept alive with fuel, and is kindled by man, because it is introduced into a foreign matter by art and force. But that other fire needs no fuel to keep it alive, because either it subsists in its own matter, or is in a foreign matter, not by force but by nature from an intrinsic principle. Wherefore it is kindled not by man but by God, Who fashioned its nature. This is the meaning of the words of Isaias (30:33): “The breath of the Lord is as a torrent of brimstone kindling it.”

Reply to Objection 3: Even as the bodies of the damned will be of the same species as now, although now they are corruptible, whereas then they will be incorruptible, both by the ordering of Divine justice, and on account of the cessation of the heavenly movement, so is it with the fire of hell whereby those bodies will be punished.

Reply to Objection 4: To give light does not belong to fire according to any mode of existence, since in its own matter it gives no light; wherefore it does not shine in its own sphere according to the philosophers: and in like manner in certain foreign matters it does not shine, as when it is in an opaque earthly substance such as sulphur. The same happens also when its brightness is obscured by thick smoke. Wherefore that the fire of hell gives no light is not sufficient proof of its being of a different species.

Whether the fire of hell is beneath the earth?

Objection 1: It would seem that this fire is not beneath the earth. For it is said of the damned (Job 18:18), “And God shall remove him out of the globe [Douay: ‘world’].” Therefore the fire whereby the damned will be punished is not beneath the earth but outside the globe.

Objection 2: Further, nothing violent or accidental can be everlasting. But this fire will be in hell for ever. Therefore it will be there, not by force but naturally. Now fire cannot be under the earth save by violence. Therefore the fire of hell is not beneath the earth.

Objection 3: Further, after the day of judgment the bodies of all the damned will be tormented in hell. Now those bodies will fill a place. Consequently, since the multitude of the damned will be exceeding great, for “the number of fools is infinite” (Eccles. 1:15), the space containing that fire must also be exceeding great. But it would seem unreasonable to say that there is so great a hollow within the earth, since all the parts of the earth naturally tend to the center. Therefore that fire will not be beneath the earth.

Objection 4: Further, “By what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented” (Wis. 11:17). But the wicked have sinned on the earth. Therefore the fire that punishes them should not be under the earth.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 14:9): “Hell below was in an uproar to meet Thee at Thy coming.” Therefore the fire of hell is beneath us.

Further, Gregory says (Dial. iv): “I see not what hinders us from believing that hell is beneath the earth.”

Further, a gloss on Jonah 2:4, “Thou hast cast me forth . . . into the heart of the sea,” says, “i.e. into hell,” and in the Gospel (Mat. 12:40) the words “in the heart of the earth” have the same sense, for as the heart is in the middle of an animal, so is hell supposed to be in the middle of the earth.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv, 16), “I am of opinion that no one knows in what part of the world hell is situated, unless the Spirit of God has revealed this to some one.” Wherefore Gregory (Dial. iv) having been questioned on this point answers: “About this matter I dare not give a rash decision. For some have deemed hell to be in some part of the earth’s surface; others think it to be beneath the earth.” He shows the latter opinion to be the more probable for two reasons. First from the very meaning of the word. These are his words: “If we call it the nether regions (infernus [*The Latin for ‘hell’]), for the reason that it is beneath us [inferius], what earth is in relation to heaven, such should be hell in relation to earth.” Secondly, from the words of Apoc. 5:3: “No man was able, neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, to open the book”: where the words “in heaven” refer to the angels, “on earth” to men living in the body, and “under the earth” to souls in hell. Augustine too (Gen. ad lit. xii, 34) seems to indicate two reasons for the congruity of hell being under the earth. One is that “whereas the souls of the departed sinned through love of the flesh, they should be treated as the dead flesh is wont to be treated, by being buried beneath the earth.” The other is that heaviness is to the body what sorrow is to the spirit, and joy (of spirit) is as lightness (of body). Wherefore “just as in reference to the body, all the heavier things are beneath the others, if they be placed in order of gravity, so in reference to the spirit, the lower place is occupied by whatever is more sorrowful”; and thus even as the empyrean is a fitting place for the joy of the elect, so the lowest part of the earth is a fitting place for the sorrow of the damned. Nor does it signify that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xv, 16) says that “hell is stated or believed to be under the earth," because he withdraws this (Retract. ii, 29) where he says: "Methinks I should have said that hell is beneath the earth, rather than have given the reason why it is stated or believed to be under the earth." However, some philosophers have maintained that hell is situated beneath the terrestrial orb, but above the surface of the earth, on that part which is opposite to us. This seems to have been the meaning of Isidore when he asserted that "the sun and the moon will stop in the place wherein they were created, lest the wicked should enjoy this light in the midst of their torments." But this is no argument, if we assert that hell is under the earth. We have already stated how these words may be explained ([5158]Q[91] , A[2]).

Pythagoras held the place of punishment to be in a fiery sphere situated, according to him, in the middle of the whole world: and he called it the prison-house of Jupiter as Aristotle relates (De Coelo et Mundo ii). It is, however, more in keeping with Scripture to say that it is beneath the earth.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Job, "God shall remove him out of the globe," refer to the surface of the earth [*"De orbe terrarum," which might be rendered "from the land of the living."], i.e. from this world. This is how Gregory expounds it (Moral. xiv) where he says: "He is removed from the globe when, at the coming of the heavenly judge, he is taken away from this world wherein he now prides himself in his wickedness." Nor does globe here signify the universe, as though the place of punishment were outside the whole universe.

Reply to Objection 2: Fire continues in that place for all eternity by the ordering of Divine justice although according to its nature an element cannot last for ever outside its own place, especially if things were to remain in this state of generation and corruption. The fire there will be of the very greatest heat, because its heat will be all gathered together from all parts, through being surrounded on all sides by the cold of the earth.

Reply to Objection 3: Hell will never lack sufficient room to admit the bodies of the damned: since hell is accounted one of the three things that "never are satisfied" (Prov. 30:15,16). Nor is it unreasonable that God's power should maintain within the bowels of the earth a hollow great enough to contain all the bodies of the damned.

Reply to Objection 4: It does not follow of necessity that "by what things a man sinneth, by the same also he is tormented," except as regards the principal instruments of sin: for as much as man having sinned in soul and body will be punished in both. But it does not follow that a man will be punished in the very place where he sinned, because the place due to the damned is other from that due to wayfarers. We may also reply that these words refer to the punishments inflicted on man on the way: according as each sin has its corresponding punishment, since “inordinate love is its own punishment,” as Augustine states (Confess. i, 12).

OF THE WILL AND INTELLECT OF THE DAMNED (NINE ARTICLES)

We must next consider matters pertaining to the will and intellect of the damned. Under this head there are nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?

(2) Whether they ever repent of the evil they have done?

(3) Whether they would rather not be than be?

(4) Whether they would wish others to be damned?

(5) Whether the wicked hate God?

(6) Whether they can demerit?

(7) Whether they can make use of the knowledge acquired in this life?

(8) Whether they ever think of God?

(9) Whether they see the glory of the blessed?

Whether every act of will in the damned is evil?

Objection 1: It would seem that not every act of will in the damned is evil. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “the demons desire the good and the best, namely to be, to live, to understand.” Since, then, men who are damned are not worse off than the demons, it would seem that they also can have a good will.

Objection 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), “evil is altogether involuntary.” Therefore if the damned will anything, they will it as something good or apparently good. Now a will that is directly ordered to good is itself good. Therefore the damned can have a good will.

Objection 3: Further, some will be damned who, while in this world, acquired certain habits of virtue, for instance heathens who had civic virtues. Now a will elicits praiseworthy acts by reason of virtuous habits. Therefore there may be praiseworthy acts of the will in some of the damned.

On the contrary, An obstinate will can never be inclined except to evil. Now men who are damned will be obstinate even as the demons [*Cf. [5159]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Further, as the will of the damned is in relation to evil, so is the will of the blessed in regard to good. But the blessed never have an evil will. Neither therefore have the damned any good will.

I answer that, A twofold will may be considered in the damned, namely the deliberate will and the natural will. Their natural will is theirs not of themselves but of the Author of nature, Who gave nature this inclination which we call the natural will. Wherefore since nature remains in them, it follows that the natural will in them can be good. But their deliberate will is theirs of themselves, inasmuch as it is in their power to be inclined by their affections to this or that. This will is in them always evil: and this because they are completely turned away from the last end of a right will, nor can a will be good except it be directed to that same end. Hence even though they will some good, they do not will it well so that one be able to call their will good on that account.

Reply to Objection 1: The words of Dionysius must be understood of the natural will, which is nature's inclination to some particular good. And yet this natural inclination is corrupted by their wickedness, in so far as this good which they desire naturally is desired by them under certain evil circumstances [*Cf. [5160]FP, Q[64], A[2], ad 5].

Reply to Objection 2: Evil, as evil, does not move the will, but in so far as it is thought to be good. Yet it comes of their wickedness that they esteem that which is evil as though it were good. Hence their will is evil.

Reply to Objection 3: The habits of civic virtue do not remain in the separated soul, because those virtues perfect us only in the civic life which will not remain after this life. Even though they remained, they would never come into action, being enchained, as it were, by the obstinacy of the mind.

Whether the damned repent of the evil they have done?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned never repent of the evil they have done. For Bernard says on the Canticle [*Cf. De Consideratione v, 12; De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio ix] that "the damned ever consent to the evil they have done." Therefore they never repent of the sins they have committed.

Objection 2: Further, to wish one had not sinned is a good will. But the damned will never have a good will. Therefore the damned will never wish they had not sinned: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii), "death is to man what their fall was to the angels." But the angel's will is irrevocable after his fall, so that he cannot withdraw from the choice whereby he previously sinned [*Cf. [5161]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore the damned also cannot repent of the sins committed by them.

Objection 4: Further, the wickedness of the damned in hell will be greater than that of sinners in the world. Now in this world some sinners repent not of the sins they have committed, either through blindness of mind, as heretics, or through obstinacy, as those "who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things" (Prov. 2:14). Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is said of the damned (Wis. 5:3): "Repenting within themselves [Vulg.: 'Saying within themselves, repenting']."

Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4) that "the wicked are full of repentance; for afterwards they are sorry for that in which previously they took pleasure." Therefore the damned, being most wicked, repent all the more.

I answer that, A person may repent of sin in two ways: in one way directly, in another way indirectly. He repents of a sin directly who hates sin as such: and he repents indirectly who hates it on account of something connected with it, for instance punishment or something of that kind. Accordingly the wicked will not repent of their sins directly, because consent in the malice of sin will remain in them; but they will repent indirectly, inasmuch as they will suffer from the punishment inflicted on them for sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The damned will wickedness, but shun punishment: and thus indirectly they repent of wickedness committed.

Reply to Objection 2: To wish one had not sinned on account of the shamefulness of vice is a good will: but this will not be in the wicked.

Reply to Objection 3: It will be possible for the damned to repent of their sins without turning their will away from sin, because in their sins they will shun, not what they heretofore desired, but something else, namely the punishment.

Reply to Objection 4: However obstinate men may be in this world, they repent of the sins indirectly, if they be punished for them. Thus Augustine says (QQ[83], qu. 36): “We see the most savage beasts are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of pain.”

Whether the damned by right and deliberate reason would wish not to be?

Objection 1: It would seem impossible for the damned, by right and deliberate reason, to wish not to be. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 7): “Consider how great a good it is to be; since both the happy and the unhappy will it; for to be and yet to be unhappy is a greater thing than not to be at all.”

Objection 2: Further, Augustine argues thus (De Lib. Arb. iii, 8): “Preference supposes election.” But “not to be” is not eligible; since it has not the appearance of good, for it is nothing. Therefore not to be cannot be more desirable to the damned than “to be.”

Objection 3: Further, the greater evil is the more to be shunned. Now “not to be” is the greatest evil, since it removes good altogether, so as to leave nothing. Therefore “not to be” is more to be shunned than to be unhappy: and thus the same conclusion follows as above.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): “In those days men . . . shall desire to die, and death shall fly from them.”

Further, the unhappiness of the damned surpasses all unhappiness of this world. Now in order to escape the unhappiness of this world, it is desirable to some to die, wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 41:3,4): “O death, thy sentence is welcome to the man that is in need and to him whose strength faileth; who is in a decrepit age, and that is in care about all things, and to the distrustful that loseth wisdom [Vulg.: ‘patience’].” Much more, therefore, is “not to be” desirable to the damned according to their deliberate reason.

I answer that, Not to be may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, and thus it can nowise be desirable, since it has no aspect of good, but is pure privation of good. Secondly, it may be considered as a relief from a painful life or from some unhappiness: and thus "not to be" takes on the aspect of good, since "to lack an evil is a kind of good" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). In this way it is better for the damned not to be than to be unhappy. Hence it is said (Mat. 26:24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born," and (Jer. 20:14): "Cursed be the day wherein I was born," where a gloss of Jerome observes: "It is better not to be than to be evilly." In this sense the damned can prefer "not to be" according to their deliberate reason [*Cf. [5162]FP, Q[5], A[2], ad 3].

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood in the sense that "not to be" is eligible, not in itself but accidentally, as putting an end to unhappiness. For when it is stated that "to be" and "to live" are desired by all naturally, we are not to take this as referable to an evil and corrupt life, and a life of unhappiness, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4), but absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2: Non-existence is eligible, not in itself, but only accidentally, as stated already.

Reply to Objection 3: Although "not to be" is very evil, in so far as it removes being, it is very good, in so far as it removes unhappiness, which is the greatest of evils, and thus it is preferred "not to be."

Whether in hell the damned would wish others were damned who are not damned?

Objection 1: It would seem that in hell the damned would not wish others were damned who are not damned. For it is said (Lk. 16:27, 28) of the rich man that he prayed for his brethren, lest they should come "into the place of torments." Therefore in like manner the other damned would not wish, at least their friends in the flesh to be damned in hell.

Objection 2: Further, the damned are not deprived of their inordinate affections. Now some of the damned loved inordinately some who are not damned. Therefore they would not desire their evil, i.e. that they should be damned.

Objection 3: Further, the damned do not desire the increase of their punishment. Now if more were damned, their punishment would be greater, even as the joy of the blessed is increased by an increase in their number. Therefore the damned desire not the damnation of those who are saved.

On the contrary, A gloss on Is. 14:9, “are risen up from their thrones,” says: “The wicked are comforted by having many companions in their punishment.”

Further, envy reigns supreme in the damned. Therefore they grieve for the happiness of the blessed, and desire their damnation.

I answer that Even as in the blessed in heaven there will be most perfect charity, so in the damned there will be the most perfect hate. Wherefore as the saints will rejoice in all goods, so will the damned grieve for all goods. Consequently the sight of the happiness of the saints will give them very great pain; hence it is written (Is. 26:11): “Let the envious people see and be confounded, and let fire devour Thy enemies.” Therefore they will wish all the good were damned.

Reply to Objection 1: So great will be the envy of the damned that they will envy the glory even of their kindred, since they themselves are supremely unhappy, for this happens even in this life, when envy increases. Nevertheless they will envy their kindred less than others, and their punishment would be greater if all their kindred were damned, and others saved, than if some of their kindred were saved. For this reason the rich man prayed that his brethren might be warded from damnation: for he knew that some are guarded therefrom. Yet he would rather that his brethren were damned as well as all the rest.

Reply to Objection 2: Love that is not based on virtue is easily voided, especially in evil men as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 4). Hence the damned will not preserve their friendship for those whom they loved inordinately. Yet the will of them will remain perverse, because they will continue to love the cause of their inordinate loving.

Reply to Objection 3: Although an increase in the number of the damned results in an increase of each one’s punishment, so much the more will their hatred and envy increase that they will prefer to be more tormented with many rather than less tormented alone.

Whether the damned hate God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not hate God. For, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), “the beautiful and good that is the cause of all goodness and beauty is beloved of all.” But this is God. Therefore God cannot be the object of anyone’s hate.

Objection 2: Further, no one can hate goodness itself, as neither can one will badness itself since “evil is altogether involuntary,” as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is goodness itself. Therefore no one can hate Him.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 73:23): “The pride of them that hate Thee ascendeth continually.”

I answer that, The appetite is moved by good or evil apprehended. Now God is apprehended in two ways, namely in Himself, as by the blessed, who see Him in His essence; and in His effects, as by us and by the damned. Since, then, He is goodness by His essence, He cannot in Himself be displeasing to any will; wherefore whoever sees Him in His essence cannot hate Him. On the other hand, some of His effects are displeasing to the will in so far as they are opposed to any one: and accordingly a person may hate God not in Himself, but by reason of His effects. Therefore the damned, perceiving God in His punishment, which is the effect of His justice, hate Him, even as they hate the punishment inflicted on them [*Cf. Q[90], A[3], ad 2; [5163]SS, Q[34], A[1]].

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Dionysius refers to the natural appetite. and even this is rendered perverse in the damned, by that which is added thereto by their deliberate will, as stated above [5164](A[1]) [*Cf. [5165]SS, Q[34], A[1], ad 1 where St. Thomas gives another answer].

Reply to Objection 2: This argument would prove if the damned saw God in Himself, as being in His essence.

Whether the damned demerit?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned demerit. For the damned have an evil will, as stated in the last Distinction of Sentent. iv. But they demerited by the evil will that they had here. Therefore if they demerit not there, their damnation is to their advantage.

Objection 2: Further, the damned are on the same footing as the demons. Now the demons demerit after their fall, wherefore God inflicted a punishment on the serpent, who induced man to sin (Gn. 3:14,15). Therefore the damned also demerit.

Objection 3: Further, an inordinate act that proceeds from a deliberate will is not excused from demerit, even though there be necessity of which one is oneself the cause: for the "drunken man deserves a double punishment" if he commit a crime through being drunk (Ethic. iii). Now the damned were themselves the cause of their own obstinacy, owing to which they are under a kind of necessity of sinning. Therefore since their act proceeds from their free will, they are not excused from demerit.

On the contrary, Punishment is contradistinguished from fault [*Cf. [5166]FP, Q[48], A[5]]. Now the perverse will of the damned proceeds from their obstinacy which is their punishment. Therefore the perverse will of the damned is not a fault whereby they may demerit.

Further, after reaching the last term there is no further movement, or advancement in good or evil. Now the damned, especially after the judgment day, will have reached the last term of their damnation, since then there "will cease to be two cities," according to Augustine (Enchiridion cxi). Therefore after the judgment day the damned will not demerit by their perverse will, for if they did their damnation would be augmented.

I answer that, We must draw a distinction between the damned before the judgment day and after. For all are agreed that after the judgment day there will be neither merit nor demerit. The reason for this is because merit or demerit is directed to the attainment of some further good or evil: and after the day of judgment good and evil will have reached their ultimate consummation, so that there will be no further addition to good or evil. Consequently, good will in the blessed will not be a merit but a reward, and evil will in the damned will be not a demerit but a punishment only. For works of virtue belong especially to the state of happiness and their contraries to the state of unhappiness (Ethic. i, 9,10).

On the other hand, some say that, before the judgment day, both the good merit and the damned demerit. But this cannot apply to the essential reward or to the principal punishment, since in this respect both have reached the term. Possibly, however, this may apply to the accidental reward, or secondary punishment, which are subject to increase until the day of judgment. Especially may this apply to the demons, or to the good angels, by whose activities some are drawn to salvation, whereby the joy of the blessed angels is increased, and some to damnation, whereby the punishment of the demons is augmented [*Cf. [5167]FP, Q[62], A[9], ad 3; [5168]SS, Q[13], A[4], ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit.].

Reply to Objection 1: It is in the highest degree unprofitable to have reached the highest degree of evil, the result being that the damned are incapable of demerit. Hence it is clear that they gain no advantage from their sin.

Reply to Objection 2: Men who are damned are not occupied in drawing others to damnation, as the demons are, for which reason the latter demerit as regards their secondary punishment [*Cf. [5169]FP, Q[62], A[9], ad 3; [5170]SS, Q[13] , A[4], ad 2; where St. Thomas tacitly retracts the opinion expressed here as to merit or demerit].

Reply to Objection 3: The reason why they are not excused from demerit is not because they are under the necessity of sinning, but because they have reached the highest of evils.

However, the necessity of sinning whereof we are ourselves the cause, in so far as it is a necessity, excuses from sin, because every sin needs to be voluntary: but it does not excuse, in so far as it proceeds from a previous act of the will: and consequently the whole demerit of the subsequent sin would seem to belong to the previous sin.

Whether the damned can make use of the knowledge they had in this world? [*Cf. FP, Q[89]]

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned are unable to make use of the knowledge they had in this world. For there is very great pleasure in the consideration of knowledge. But we must not admit that they have any pleasure. Therefore they cannot make use of the knowledge they had heretofore, by applying their consideration thereto.

Objection 2: Further, the damned suffer greater pains than any pains of this world. Now in this world, when one is in very great pain, it is impossible to consider any intelligible conclusions, through being distracted by the pains that one suffers. Much less therefore can one do so in hell.

Objection 3: Further, the damned are subject to time. But “length of time is the cause of forgetfulness” (Phys. lib. iv, 13). Therefore the damned will forget what they knew here.

On the contrary, It is said to the rich man who was damned (Lk. 16:25): “Remember that thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime,” etc. Therefore they will consider about the things they knew here.

Further, the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (Q[70], A[2], ad 3; [5171]FP, Q[89], AA[5],6). Therefore, if they could not use them, these would remain in them to no purpose.

I answer that, Even as in the saints on account of the perfection of their glory, there will be nothing but what is a matter of joy so there will be nothing in the damned but what is a matter and cause of sorrow; nor will anything that can pertain to sorrow be lacking, so that their unhappiness is consummate. Now the consideration of certain things known brings us joy, in some respect, either on the part of the things known, because we love them, or on the part of the knowledge, because it is fitting and perfect. There may also be a reason for sorrow both on the part of the things known, because they are of a grievous nature, and on the part of the knowledge, if we consider its imperfection; for instance a person may consider his defective knowledge about a certain thing, which he would desire to know perfectly. Accordingly, in the damned there will be actual consideration of the things they knew heretofore as matters of sorrow, but not as a cause of pleasure. For they will consider both the evil they have done, and for which they were damned, and the delightful goods they have lost, and on both counts they will suffer torments. Likewise they will be tormented with the thought that the knowledge they had of speculative matters was imperfect, and that they missed its highest degree of perfection which they might have acquired.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the consideration of knowledge is delightful in itself, it may accidentally be the cause of sorrow, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 2: In this world the soul is united to a corruptible body, wherefore the soul’s consideration is hindered by the suffering of the body. On the other hand, in the future life the soul will not be so drawn by the body, but however much the body may suffer, the soul will have a most clear view of those things that can be a cause of anguish to it.

Reply to Objection 3: Time causes forgetfulness accidentally, in so far as the movement whereof it is the measure is the cause of change. But after the judgment day there will be no movement of the heavens; wherefore neither will it be possible for forgetfulness to result from any lapse of time however long. Before the judgment day, however, the separated soul is not changed from its disposition by the heavenly movement.

Whether the damned will ever think of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned will sometimes think of God. For one cannot hate a thing actually, except one think about it. Now the damned will hate God, as stated in the text of Sentent. iv, in the last Distinction. Therefore they will think of God sometimes.

Objection 2: Further, the damned will have remorse of conscience. But the conscience suffers remorse for deeds done against God. Therefore they will sometimes think of God.

On the contrary, Man’s most perfect thoughts are those which are about God: whereas the damned will be in a state of the greatest imperfection. Therefore they will not think of God.

I answer that, one may think of God in two ways. First, in Himself and according to that which is proper to Him, namely that He is the fount of all goodness: and thus it is altogether impossible to think of Him without delight, so that the damned will by no means think of Him in this way. Secondly, according to something accidental as it were to Him in His effects, such as His punishments, and so forth, and in this respect the thought of God can bring sorrow, so that in this way the damned will think of God.

Reply to Objection 1: The damned do not hate God except because He punishes and forbids what is agreeable to their evil will: and consequently they will think of Him only as punishing and forbidding. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection, since conscience will not have remorse for sin except as forbidden by the Divine commandment.

Whether the damned see the glory of the blessed?

Objection 1: It would seem that the damned do not see the glory of the blessed. For they are more distant from the glory of the blessed than from the happenings of this world. But they do not see what happens in regard to us: hence Gregory commenting on Job 14:21, “Whether his children come to honor,” etc. says (Moral. xii): “Even as those who still live know not in what place are the souls of the dead; so the dead who have lived in the body know not the things which regard the life of those who are in the flesh.” Much less, therefore, can they see the glory of the blessed.

Objection 2: Further, that which is granted as a great favor to the saints in this life is never granted to the damned. Now it was granted as a great favor to Paul to see the life in which the saints live for ever with God (2 Cor. 12). Therefore the damned will not see the glory of the saints.

On the contrary, It is stated (Lk. 16:23) that the rich man in the midst of his torments “saw Abraham . . . and Lazarus in his bosom.”

I answer that, The damned, before the judgment day, will see the blessed in glory, in such a way as to know, not what that glory is like, but only that they are in a state of glory that surpasses all thought. This will trouble them, both because they will, through envy, grieve for their happiness, and because they have forfeited that glory. Hence it is written (Wis. 5:2) concerning the wicked: “Seeing it” they “shall be troubled with terrible fear.” After the judgment day, however, they will be altogether deprived of seeing the blessed: nor will this lessen their punishment, but will increase it; because they will bear in remembrance the glory of the blessed which they saw at or before the judgment: and this will torment them. Moreover they will be tormented by finding themselves deemed unworthy even to see the glory which the saints merit to have.

Reply to Objection 1: The happenings of this life would not, if seen, torment the damned in hell as the sight of the glory of the saints; wherefore the things which happen here are not shown to the damned in the same way as the saints’ glory; although also of the things that happen here those are shown to them which are capable of causing them sorrow.

Reply to Objection 2: Paul looked upon that life wherein the saints live with God [*Cf. [5172]SS, Q[185], A[3], ad 2], by actual experience thereof and by hoping to have it more perfectly in the life to come. Not so the damned; wherefore the comparison fails.

OF GOD’S MERCY AND JUSTICE TOWARDS THE DAMNED (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must next consider God’s justice and mercy towards the damned: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners?

(2) Whether by God’s mercy all punishment both of men and of demons comes to an end?

(3) Whether at least the punishment of men comes to an end?

(4) Whether at least the punishment of Christians has an end?

(5) Whether there is an end to the punishment of those who have performed works of mercy?

Whether by Divine justice an eternal punishment is inflicted on sinners? [*Cf. FS, Q[87], AA[3],4]

Objection 1: It would seem that an eternal punishment is not inflicted on sinners by Divine justice. For the punishment should not exceed the fault: “According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be” (Dt. 25:2). Now fault is temporal. Therefore the punishment should not be eternal.

Objection 2: Further, of two mortal sins one is greater than the other. and therefore one should receive a greater punishment than the other. But no punishment is greater than eternal punishment, since it is infinite. Therefore eternal punishment is not due to every sin; and if it is not due to one, it is due to none, since they are not infinitely distant from one another.

Objection 3: Further, a just judge does not punish except in order to correct, wherefore it is stated (Ethic. ii, 3) that “punishments are a kind of medicine.” Now, to punish the wicked eternally does not lead to their correction, nor to that of others, since then there will be no one in future who can be corrected thereby. Therefore eternal punishment is not inflicted for sins according to Divine justice.

Objection 4: Further, no one wishes that which is not desirable for its own sake, except on account of some advantage. Now God does not wish punishment for its own sake, for He delights not in punishments [*The allusion is to Wis. 1:13: “Neither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living,” as may be gathered from [5173]FS, Q[87], A[3], OBJ[3]]. Since then no advantage can result from the perpetuity of punishment, it would seem that He ought not to inflict such a punishment for sin.

Objection 5: Further, “nothing accidental lasts for ever” (De Coelo et Mundo i). But punishment is one of those things that happen accidentally, since it is contrary to nature. Therefore it cannot be everlasting.

Objection 6: Further, the justice of God would seem to require that sinners should be brought to naught: because on account of ingratitude a person deserves to lose all benefits. and among other benefits of God there is “being” itself. Therefore it would seem just that the sinner who has been ungrateful to God should lose his being. But if sinners be brought to naught, their punishment cannot be everlasting. Therefore it would seem out of keeping with Divine justice that sinners should be punished for ever.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46): “These,” namely the wicked, “shall go into everlasting punishment.”

Further, as reward is to merit, so is punishment to guilt. Now, according to Divine justice, an eternal reward is due to temporal merit: “Every one who seeth the Son and believeth in Him hath [Vulg.: ‘that everyone . . . may have’] life everlasting.” Therefore according to Divine justice an everlasting punishment is due to temporal guilt.

Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 5), punishment is meted according to the dignity of the person sinned against, so that a person who strikes one in authority receives a greater punishment than one who strikes anyone else. Now whoever sins mortally sins against God, Whose commandments he breaks, and Whose honor he gives another, by placing his end in some one other than God. But God’s majesty is infinite. Therefore whoever sins mortally deserves infinite punishment; and consequently it seems just that for a mortal sin a man should be punished for ever.

I answer that, Since punishment is measured in two ways, namely according to the degree of its severity, and according to its length of time, the measure of punishment corresponds to the measure of fault, as regards the degree of severity, so that the more grievously a person sins the more grievously is he punished: “As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her” (Apoc. 18:7). The duration of the punishment does not, however, correspond with the duration of the fault, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), for adultery which is committed in a short space of time is not punished with a momentary penalty even according to human laws [*Cf. [5174]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]. But the duration of punishment regards the disposition of the sinner: for sometimes a person who commits an offense in a city is rendered by his very offense worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens, either by perpetual exile or even by death: whereas sometimes he is not rendered worthy of being cut off entirely from the fellowship of the citizens. wherefore in order that he may become a fitting member of the State, his punishment is prolonged or curtailed, according as is expedient for his amendment, so that he may live in the city in a becoming and peaceful manner. So too, according to Divine justice, sin renders a person worthy to be altogether cut off from the fellowship of God's city, and this is the effect of every sin committed against charity, which is the bond uniting this same city together. Consequently, for mortal sin which is contrary to charity a person is expelled for ever from the fellowship of the saints and condemned to everlasting punishment, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "as men are cut off from this perishable city by the penalty of the first death, so are they excluded from that imperishable city by the punishment of the second death." That the punishment inflicted by the earthly state is not deemed everlasting is accidental, either because man endures not for ever, or because the state itself comes to an end. Wherefore if man lived for ever, the punishment of exile or slavery, which is pronounced by human law, would remain in him for ever. On the other hand, as regards those who sin in such a way as not to deserve to be entirely cut off from the fellowship of the saints, such as those who sin venially, their punishment will be so much the shorter or longer according as they are more or less fit to be cleansed, through sin clinging to them more or less: this is observed in the punishments of this world and of purgatory according to Divine justice.

We find also other reasons given by the saints why some are justly condemned to everlasting punishment for a temporal sin. One is because they sinned against an eternal good by despising eternal life. This is mentioned by Augustine (De Civ. Dei. xii, 12): "He is become worthy of eternal evil, who destroyed in himself a good which could be eternal." Another reason is because man sinned in his own eternity [*Cf. [5175]FS, Q[87], A[3], ad 1]; wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv), it belongs to the great justice of the judge that those should never cease to be punished, who in this life never ceased to desire sin. And if it be objected that some who sin mortally propose to amend their life at some time, and that these accordingly are seemingly not deserving of eternal punishment, it must be replied according to some that Gregory speaks of the will that is made manifest by the deed. For he who falls into mortal sin of his own will puts himself in a state whence he cannot be rescued, except God help him: wherefore from the very fact that he is willing to sin, he is willing to remain in sin for ever. For man is "a wind that goeth," namely to sin, "and returneth not by his own power" (Ps. 77:39). Thus if a man were to throw himself into a pit whence he could not get out without help, one might say that he wished to remain there for ever, whatever else he may have thought himself. Another and a better answer is that from the very fact that he commits a mortal sin, he places his end in a creature; and since the whole of life is directed to its end, it follows that for this very reason he directs the whole of his life to that sin, and is willing to remain in sin forever, if he could do so with impunity. This is what Gregory says on Job 41:23, "He shall esteem the deep as growing old" (Moral. xxxiv): "The wicked only put an end to sinning because their life came to an end: they would indeed have wished to live for ever, that they might continue in sin for ever for they desire rather to sin than to live." Still another reason may be given why the punishment of mortal sin is eternal: because thereby one offends God Who is infinite. Wherefore since punishment cannot be infinite in intensity, because the creature is incapable of an infinite quality, it must needs be infinite at least in duration. And again there is a fourth reason for the same: because guilt remains for ever, since it cannot be remitted without grace, and men cannot receive grace after death; nor should punishment cease so long as guilt remains.

Reply to Objection 1: Punishment has not to be equal to fault as to the amount of duration as is seen to be the case also with human laws. We may also reply with Gregory (Dial. xliv) that although sin is temporal in act, it is eternal in will.

Reply to Objection 2: The degree of intensity in the punishment corresponds to the degree of gravity in the sin; wherefore mortal sins unequal in gravity will receive a punishment unequal in intensity but equal in duration.

Reply to Objection 3: The punishments inflicted on those who are not altogether expelled from the society of their fellow-citizens are intended for their correction: whereas those punishments, whereby certain persons are wholly banished from the society of their fellow-citizens, are not intended for their correction; although they may be intended for the correction and tranquillity of the others who remain in the state. Accordingly the damnation of the wicked is for the correction of those who are now in the Church; for punishments are intended for correction, not only when they are being inflicted, but also when they are decreed.

Reply to Objection 4: The everlasting punishment of the wicked will not be altogether useless. For they are useful for two purposes. First, because thereby the Divine justice is safeguarded which is acceptable to God for its own sake. Hence Gregory says (Dial. iv): “Almighty God on account of His loving kindness delights not in the torments of the unhappy, but on account of His justice. He is for ever unappeased by the punishment of the wicked.” Secondly, they are useful, because the elect rejoice therein, when they see God’s justice in them, and realize that they have escaped them. Hence it is written (Ps. 57:12): “The just shall rejoice when he shall see the revenge,” etc., and (Is. 66:24): “They,” namely the wicked, “shall be a loathsome sight* to all flesh,” namely to the saints, as a gloss says. [*”Ad satietatem visionis,” which St. Thomas takes to signify being satiated with joy; Cf. [5176] Q[94], A[3]]. Gregory expresses himself in the same sense (Dial. iv): “The wicked are all condemned to eternal punishment, and are punished for their own wickedness. Yet they will burn to some purpose, namely that the just may all both see in God the joys they receive, and perceive in them the torments they have escaped: for which reason they will acknowledge themselves for ever the debtors of Divine grace the more that they will see how the evils which they overcame by its assistance are punished eternally.”

Reply to Objection 5: Although the punishment relates to the soul accidentally, it relates essentially to the soul infected with guilt. And since guilt will remain in the soul for ever, its punishment also will be everlasting.

Reply to Objection 6: Punishment corresponds to fault, properly speaking, in respect of the inordinateness in the fault, and not of the dignity in the person offended: for if the latter were the case, a punishment of infinite intensity would correspond to every sin. Accordingly, although a man deserves to lose his being from the fact that he has sinned against God the author of his being, yet, in view of the inordinateness of the act itself, loss of being is not due to him, since being is presupposed to merit and demerit, nor is being lost or corrupted by the inordinateness of sin [*Cf. [5177]FS, Q[85], A[1]]: and consequently privation of being cannot be the punishment due to any sin.

Whether by God’s mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end?

Objection 1: It would seem that by God’s mercy all punishment of the damned, both men and demons, comes to an end. For it is written (Wis. 11:24): “Thou hast mercy upon all, O Lord, because Thou canst do all things.” But among all things the demons also are included, since they are God’s creatures. Therefore also their punishment will come to an end.

Objection 2: Further, “God hath concluded all in sin [Vulg.: ‘unbelief’], that He may have mercy on all” (Rom. 11:32). Now God has concluded the demons under sin, that is to say, He permitted them to be concluded. Therefore it would seem that in time He has mercy even on the demons.

Objection 3: Further, as Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo ii), “it is not just that God should permit the utter loss of a creature which He made for happiness.” Therefore, since every rational creature was created for happiness, it would seem unjust for it to be allowed to perish altogether.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:41): “Depart from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.” Therefore they will be punished eternally.

Further, just as the good angels were made happy through turning to God, so the bad angels were made unhappy through turning away from God. Therefore if the unhappiness of the wicked angels comes at length to an end, the happiness of the good will also come to an end, which is inadmissible.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi) Origen [*Cf. [5178]FP, Q[64], A[2]] “erred in maintaining that the demons will at length, through God’s mercy, be delivered from their punishment.” But this error has been condemned by the Church for two reasons. First because it is clearly contrary to the authority of Holy Writ (Apoc. 20:9,10): “The devil who seduced them was cast into the pool of fire and brimstone, where both the beasts and the false prophets [*Vulg.: ‘the beast and false prophet,’ etc.] shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever,” which is the Scriptural expression for eternity. Secondly, because this opinion exaggerated God’s mercy in one direction and depreciated it in another. For it would seem equally reasonable for the good angels to remain in eternal happiness, and for the wicked angels to be eternally punished. Wherefore just as he maintained that the demons and the souls of the damned are to be delivered at length from their sufferings, so he maintained that the angels and the souls of the blessed will at length pass from their happy state to the unhappiness of this life.

Reply to Objection 1: God, for His own part, has mercy on all. Since, however, His mercy is ruled by the order of His wisdom, the result is that it does not reach to certain people who render themselves unworthy of that mercy, as do the demons and the damned who are obstinate in wickedness. And yet we may say that even in them His mercy finds a place, in so far as they are punished less than they deserve condignly, but not that they are entirely delivered from punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: In the words quoted the distribution (of the predicate) regards the genera and not the individuals: so that the statement applies to men in the state of wayfarer, inasmuch as He had mercy both on Jews and on Gentiles, but not on every Gentile or every Jew.

Reply to Objection 3: Anselm means that it is not just in the sense of becoming God’s goodness, and is speaking of the creature generically. For it becomes not the Divine goodness that a whole genus of creature fail of the end for which it was made: wherefore it is unbecoming for all men or all angels to be damned. But there is no reason why some men or some angels should perish for ever, because the intention of the Divine will is fulfilled in the others who are saved.

Whether God’s mercy suffers at least men to be punished eternally?

Objection 1: It would seem that God’s mercy does not suffer at least men to be punished eternally. For it is written (Gn. 6:3): “My spirit shall not remain in man for ever because he is flesh”; where “spirit” denotes indignation, as a gloss observes. Therefore, since God’s indignation is not distinct from His punishment, man will not be punished eternally.

Objection 2: Further, the charity of the saints in this life makes them pray for their enemies. Now they will have more perfect charity in that life. Therefore they will pray then for their enemies who are damned. But the prayers of the saints cannot be in vain, since they are most acceptable to God. Therefore at the saints' prayers the Divine mercy will in time deliver the damned from their punishment.

Objection 3: Further, God's foretelling of the punishment of the damned belongs to the prophecy of commination. Now the prophecy of commination is not always fulfilled: as appears from what was said of the destruction of Nineve (Jonas 3); and yet it was not destroyed as foretold by the prophet, who also was troubled for that very reason (Jonah 4:1). Therefore it would seem that much more will the threat of eternal punishment be commuted by God's mercy for a more lenient punishment, when this will be able to give sorrow to none but joy to all.

Objection 4: Further, the words of Ps. 76:8 are to the point, where it is said: "Will God then be angry for ever? [*Vulg.: 'Will God then cast off for ever?']" But God's anger is His punishment. Therefore, etc.

Objection 5: Further, a gloss on Is. 14:19, "But thou art cast out," etc. says: "Even though all souls shall have rest at last, thou never shalt": and it refers to the devil. Therefore it would seem that all human souls shall at length have rest from their pains.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 25:46) of the elect conjointly with the damned: "These shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting." But it is inadmissible that the life of the just will ever have an end. Therefore it is inadmissible that the punishment of the damned will ever come to an end.

Further, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) "death is to men what their fall was to the angels." Now after their fall the angels could not be restored [*Cf. [5179]FP, Q[64], A[2]]. Therefore neither can man after death: and thus the punishment of the damned will have no end.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 17,18), some evaded the error of Origen by asserting that the demons are punished everlastingly, while holding that all men, even unbelievers, are at length set free from punishment. But this statement is altogether unreasonable. For just as the demons are obstinate in wickedness and therefore have to be punished for ever, so too are the souls of men who die without charity, since "death is to men what their fall was to the angels," as Damascene says.

Reply to Objection 1: This saying refers to man generically, because God's indignation was at length removed from the human race by the coming of Christ. But those who were unwilling to be included or to remain in this reconciliation effected by Christ, perpetuated the Divine anger in themselves, since no other way of reconciliation is given to us save that which is through Christ.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 24) and Gregory (Moral. xxxiv) say, the saints in this life pray for their enemies, that they may be converted to God, while it is yet possible for them to be converted. For if we knew that they were foreknown to death, we should no more pray for them than for the demons. And since for those who depart this life without grace there will be no further time for conversion, no prayer will be offered for them, neither by the Church militant, nor by the Church triumphant. For that which we have to pray for them is, as the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:25,26), that "God may give them repentance to know the truth, and they may recover themselves from the snares of the devil."

Reply to Objection 3: A punishment threatened prophetically is only then commuted when there is a change in the merits of the person threatened. Hence: "I will suddenly speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out and to pull down and to destroy it. If that nation . . . shall repent of their evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (Jer. 18:7). Therefore, since the merits of the damned cannot be changed, the threatened punishment will ever be fulfilled in them. Nevertheless the prophecy of commination is always fulfilled in a certain sense, because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei. xxi, 24): "Nineve has been overthrown, that was evil, and a good Nineve is built up, that was not: for while the walls and the houses remained standing, the city was overthrown in its wicked ways."

Reply to Objection 4: These words of the Psalm refer to the vessels of mercy, which have not made themselves unworthy of mercy, because in this life (which may be called God's anger on account of its unhappiness) He changes vessels of mercy into something better. Hence the Psalm continues (Ps. 76:11): "This is the change of the right hand of the most High." We may also reply that they refer to mercy as granting a relaxation but not setting free altogether if it be referred also to the damned. Hence the Psalm does not say: "Will He from His anger shut up His mercies?" but "in His anger," because the punishment will not be done away entirely; but His mercy will have effect by diminishing the punishment while it continues.

Reply to Objection 5: This gloss is speaking not absolutely but on an impossible supposition in order to throw into relief the greatness of the devil's sin, or of Nabuchodonosor's.

Whether the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that at least the punishment of Christians is brought to an end by the mercy of God. "For he that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" (Mk. 16:16). Now this applies to every Christian. Therefore all Christians will at length be saved.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jn. 6:55): "He that eateth My body and drinketh My blood hath eternal life." Now this is the meat and drink whereof Christians partake in common. Therefore all Christians will be saved at length.

Objection 3: Further, "If any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss: but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire" (1 Cor. 3:15), where it is a question of those who have the foundation of the Christian faith. Therefore all such persons will be saved in the end.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9): "The unjust shall not possess the kingdom of God." Now some Christians are unjust. Therefore Christians will not all come to the kingdom of God, and consequently they will be punished for ever.

Further, it is written (2 Pet. 2:21): "It had been better for them not to have known the way of justice, than after they have known it, to turn back from that holy commandment which was delivered to them." Now those who know not the way of truth will be punished for ever. Therefore Christians who have turned back after knowing it will also be punished for ever.

I answer that, According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xxi, 20,21), there have been some who predicted a delivery from eternal punishment not for all men, but only for Christians. although they stated the matter in different ways. For some said that whoever received the sacraments of faith would be immune from eternal punishment. But this is contrary to the truth, since some receive the sacraments of faith, and yet have not faith, without which "it is impossible to please God" (Heb. 11:6). Wherefore others said that those alone will be exempt from eternal punishment who have received the sacraments of faith, and professed the Catholic faith. But against this it would seem to be that at one time some people profess the Catholic faith, and afterwards abandon it, and these are deserving not of a lesser but of a greater punishment, since according to 2 Pet. 2:21, “it had been better for them not to have known the way of justice than, after they have known it, to turn back.” Moreover it is clear that heresiarchs who renounce the Catholic faith and invent new heresies sin more grievously than those who have conformed to some heresy from the first. And therefore some have maintained that those alone are exempt from eternal punishment, who persevere to the end in the Catholic faith, however guilty they may have been of other crimes. But this is clearly contrary to Holy Writ, for it is written (James 2:20): “Faith without works is dead,” and (Mat. 7:21) “Not every one that saith to Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doth the will of My Father Who is in heaven”: and in many other passages Holy Scripture threatens sinners with eternal punishment. Consequently those who persevere in the faith unto the end will not all be exempt from eternal punishment, unless in the end they prove to be free from other crimes.

Reply to Objection 1: Our Lord speaks there of formed faith [*Cf. [5180]SS, Q[4], A[3]] “that worketh by love [Vulg.: ‘charity’; Gal. 5:6]”: wherein whosoever dieth shall be saved. But to this faith not only is the error of unbelief opposed, but also any mortal sin whatsoever.

Reply to Objection 2: The saying of our Lord refers not to those who partake only sacramentally, and who sometimes by receiving unworthily “eat and drink judgment” to themselves (1 Cor. 11:29), but to those who eat spiritually and are incorporated with Him by charity, which incorporation is the effect of the sacramental eating, in those who approach worthily [*Cf. [5181]TP, Q[80], AA[1],2,3]. Wherefore, so far as the power of the sacrament is concerned, it brings us to eternal life, although sin may deprive us of that fruit, even after we have received worthily.

Reply to Objection 3: In this passage of the Apostle the foundation denotes formed faith, upon which whosoever shall build venial sins [*Cf. [5182]FS, Q[89], A[2]] “shall suffer loss,” because he will be punished for them by God; yet “he himself shall be saved” in the end “by fire,” either of temporal tribulation, or of the punishment of purgatory which will be after death.

Whether all those who perform works of mercy will be punished eternally?

Objection 1: It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For it is written (James 2:13): “Judgment without mercy to him that hath not done mercy”; and (Mat. 5:7): “Blessed are the merciful for they shall obtain mercy.”

Objection 2: Further, (Mat. 25:35–46) we find a description of our Lord’s discussion with the damned and the elect. But this discussion is only about works of mercy. Therefore eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and consequently the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Mat. 6:12): “Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors,” and further on (Mat. 6:14): “For if you will forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive you also your offenses.” Therefore it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.

Objection 4: Further, a gloss of Ambrose on 1 Tim. 4:8, “Godliness is profitable to all things,” says: “The sum total of a Christian’s rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment.” Therefore those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 6:9,10): “Neither fornicators . . . nor adulterers,” etc. “shall possess the kingdom of God.” Yet many are such who practice works of mercy. Therefore the merciful will not all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be punished eternally.

Further, it is written (James 2:10): “Whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all.” Therefore whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be punished eternally.

I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (De Civ. Dei xxi, 22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having charity. Wherefore nothing profits them to the meriting of eternal life, or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered from 1 Cor. 13:3. Most evident is this in the case of those who lay hands on other people’s property, for after seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in works of mercy. We must therefore conclude that all whosoever die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free them from eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.

Reply to Objection 1: Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordinate manner. But those who while merciful to others are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy ordinately, rather do they strike at themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment will be remitted to those who after sinning have obtained forgiveness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves “friends of the mammon of iniquity” (Lk. 16:9).

Reply to Objection 3: Our Lord said this to those who ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness that sets them free altogether.

Reply to Objection 4: The gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging. Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works not to perish, through grace bestowed on him by our Lord, Who is blessed for evermore. Amen.

APPENDIX 1

The following two questions were compiled by Nicolai from St. Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences, and by him included in the supplement between Questions 70 and 71.

OF THE QUALITY OF THOSE SOULS WHO DEPART THIS LIFE WITH ORIGINAL SIN ONLY (TWO ARTICLES)

We must next consider the various qualities of souls that are stripped of their bodies, according to their respective states; and first we shall treat of the souls which depart this life with original sin only.

Under this head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether these souls suffer from a bodily fire, and are inflicted with punishment by fire?

(2) Whether these souls suffer from a spiritual torment within themselves?

Whether those souls which depart with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire, and are punished by fire?

Objection 1: It would seem that souls which depart with none but original sin, suffer from a bodily fire and are punished by fire. For Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, xxvii] says: "Hold firmly and doubt not that children who depart this life without the sacrament of Baptism will be punished everlastingly." Now punishment denotes sensible pain. Therefore souls which depart this life with original sin alone, suffer from a bodily fire and are tormented with the pain of fire.

Objection 2: Further, a greater fault deserves a greater punishment. Now original sin is greater than venial, because it contains more aversion, since it deprives its subject of grace, whereas venial sin is compatible with grace; and again because original sin is punished eternally, whereas venial sin is punished temporally. Seeing then that venial sin is deserving of the punishment of fire, much more so is original sin.

Objection 3: Further, sins are more severely punished after this life than during lifetime, for in this life there is room for mercy. Now, sensible punishment corresponds to original sin in this life, for children who have only original sin are justly subject to many sensible punishments. Therefore sensible punishment is due to it after this life.

Objection 4: Further, even as in actual sin there is aversion and conversion, so in original sin there is something corresponding to aversion, namely the privation of original justice, and something corresponding to conversion, namely concupiscence. Now the punishment of fire is due to actual sin by reason of the conversion. Therefore it is also due to original sin by reason of concupiscence.

Objection 5: Further, after the resurrection the bodies of children will be either passible or impassible. If they be impassible—and no human body can be impassible except either on account of the gift of impassibility (as in the blessed) or by reason of original justice (as in the state of innocence)—it follows that the bodies of children will either have the gift of impassibility, and thus will be glorious, so that there will be no difference between baptized and non-baptized children, which is heretical, or else they will have original justice, and thus will be without original sin, and will not be punished for original sin, which is likewise heretical. If, on the other hand, they be passible, since everything passible suffers of necessity in the presence of the active, it follows that in the presence of active sensible bodies they will suffer sensible punishment.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiii) that the mildest punishment of all will be for those who are burdened with original sin only. But this would not be so, if they were tormented with sensible punishment, because the pain of hell fire is most grievous. Therefore they will not suffer sensible punishment.

Further, the grief of sensible punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin (Apoc. 18:7): “As much as she hath glorified herself and lived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.” But there is no pleasure in original sin, as neither is there operation, for pleasure follows operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4. Therefore punishment by fire is not due to original sin.

Further, Gregory Nazianzen in his fortieth sermon, which is entitled on Holy Baptism, distinguishes three classes of unbaptized persons: those namely who refuse to be baptized, those who through neglect have put off being baptized until the end of life and have been surprised by sudden death, and those who, like infants, have failed to receive it through no fault of theirs. Of the first he says that they will be punished not only for their other sins, but also for their contempt of Baptism; of the second, that they will be punished, though less severely than the first, for having neglected it; and of the last he says that "a just and eternal Judge will consign them neither to heavenly glory nor to the eternal pains of hell, for although they have not been signed with Baptism, they are without wickedness and malice, and have suffered rather than caused their loss of Baptism." He also gives the reason why, although they do not reach the glory of heaven, they do not therefore suffer the eternal punishment suffered by the damned: "Because there is a mean between the two, since he who deserves not honor and glory is not for that reason worthy of punishment, and on the other hand he who is not deserving of punishment is not for that reason worthy of glory and honor."

I answer that, Punishment should be proportionate to fault, according to the saying of Isaias (27:8), "In measure against measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it." Now the defect transmitted to us through our origin, and having the character of a sin does not result from the withdrawal or corruption of a good consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles, but from the withdrawal or corruption of something that had been superadded to nature. Nor does this sin belong to this particular man, except in so far as he has such a nature, that is deprived of this good, which in the ordinary course of things he would have had and would have been able to keep. Wherefore no further punishment is due to him, besides the privation of that end to which the gift withdrawn destined him, which gift human nature is unable of itself to obtain. Now this is the divine vision; and consequently the loss of this vision is the proper and only punishment of original sin after death: because, if any other sensible punishment were inflicted after death for original sin, a man would be punished out of proportion to his guilt, for sensible punishment is inflicted for that which is proper to the person, since a man undergoes sensible punishment in so far as he suffers in his person. Hence, as his guilt did not result from an action of his own, even so neither should he be punished by suffering himself, but only by losing that which his nature was unable to obtain. On the other hand, those who are under sentence for original sin will suffer no loss whatever in other kinds of perfection and goodness which are consequent upon human nature by virtue of its principles.

Reply to Objection 1: In the authority quoted punishment denotes, not pain of sense, but only pain of loss, which is the privation of the divine vision, even as in Scripture the word “fire” is often wont to signify any kind of punishment.

Reply to Objection 2: Of all sins original sin is the least, because it is the least voluntary; for it is voluntary not by the will of the person, but only by the will of the origin of our nature. But actual sin, even venial, is voluntary by the will of the person in which it is; wherefore a lighter punishment is due to original than to venial sin. Nor does it matter that original sin is incompatible with grace; because privation of grace has the character, not of sin, but of punishment, except in so far as it is voluntary: for which reason that which is less voluntary is less sinful. Again it matters not that actual venial sin is deserving of temporal punishment, since this is accidental, for as much as he who falls venially has sufficient grace to attenuate the punishment. For if venial sin were in a person without grace, it would be punished eternally.

Reply to Objection 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior as fever or the like, or exterior as burning and so forth. Whereas after death nothing will act by natural power, but only according to the order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease, through the cessation of the first movable which is the cause of all bodily movement and alteration.

Reply to Objection 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure, which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.

Reply to Objection 5: The bodies of children will be impassible, not through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the lack of an external agent to act upon them: because, after the resurrection, no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering; hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.

Whether these same souls suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state in which they are?

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in question suffer spiritual affliction on account of the state wherein they are, because as Chrysostom says (Hom. xxiii in Matth.), the punishment of God in that they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their being burned in hell fire. Now these souls will be deprived of seeing God. Therefore they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.

Objection 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one wishes to have. But these souls would wish to have the divine vision, else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore since they are deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.

Objection 3: Further, if it be said that they do not suffer, because they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on the contrary: Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore these souls likewise, albeit deprived of so great a good through no fault of theirs, suffer none the less.

Objection 4: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ’s merit. Therefore the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal life on account of Adam’s demerit.

Objection 5: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore since they are separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without pain.

On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment. If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin, their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore these children will have the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is [*See A[1], “On the contrary”]. If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore they will feel no sorrow.

Further, right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves (Ep. lxxxv, and De ira ii, 6) that “a wise man is not disturbed.” Now in these children there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore they will not be disturbed for that they undergo this punishment which they could nowise avoid.

I answer that, on this question there are three opinions. Some say that these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to explore, and many more besides. Hence others say that they have perfect knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this account but that their sorrow will be mitigated, in so far as it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover the very same reason that impugns their being punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain. Consequently others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must explore.

Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one's power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life [*Cf. [5183]FS, Q[109], AA[5],6]; so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will nowise grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a large share of God's goodness and their own natural perfections. Nor can it be said that they were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by others, like other children of the same condition who have been baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace that one should be rewarded without any act of one's own. Wherefore the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without Baptism, any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.

Reply to Objection 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity between the two.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the will may be directed both to the possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, an ordinate and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called "velleity" [*Cf. [5184]FS, Q[13], A[5], ad 1; [5185]TP, Q[21], A[4]] rather than “will”; for one does not will such things absolutely, but one would if they were possible.

Reply to Objection 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at their loss, whether this be through his own or another’s fault: hence it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.

Reply to Objection 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as stated in Rom. 5:15, seqq. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.

Reply to Objection 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.

OF THE QUALITY OF SOULS WHO EXPIATE ACTUAL SIN OR ITS PUNISHMENT IN PURGATORY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must next treat of the souls which after this life expiate the punishment of their actual sins in the fire of Purgatory.

Under this head there are six points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the pain of Purgatory surpasses all the temporal pains of this life?

(2) Whether that punishment is voluntary?

(3) Whether the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons?

(4) Whether venial sin as regards its guilt is expiated by the pains of Purgatory?

(5) Whether the fire of Purgatory frees from the debt of punishment?

(6) Whether one is freed from that punishment sooner than another?

Whether the pains of Purgatory surpass all the temporal pains of this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that the pains of Purgatory do not surpass all the temporal pains of this life. Because the more passive a thing is the more it suffers if it has the sense of being hurt. Now the body is more passive than the separate soul, both because it has contrariety to a fiery agent, and because it has matter which is susceptive of the agent's quality: and this cannot be said of the soul. Therefore the pain which the body suffers in this world is greater than the pain whereby the soul is cleansed after this life.

Objection 2: Further, the pains of Purgatory are directly ordained against venial sins. Now since venial sins are the least grievous, the lightest punishment is due to them, if the measure of the stripes is according to the measure of the fault. Therefore the pain of Purgatory is the lightest of all.

Objection 3: Further, since the debt of punishment is an effect of sin, it does not increase unless the sin increases. Now sin cannot increase in one whose sin is already remitted. Therefore if a mortal sin has been remitted in a man who has not fully paid the debt of punishment, this debt does not increase when he dies. But while he lived he was not in debt to the extent of the most grievous punishment. Therefore the pain that he will suffer after this life will not be more grievous to him than all other pains of this life.

On the contrary, Augustine says in a sermon (xli De Sanctis): "This fire of Purgatory will be more severe than any pain that can be felt, seen or conceived in this world."

Further, the more universal a pain is the greater it is. Now the whole separate soul is punished, since it is simple: which is not the case with the body. Therefore this, being the punishment of the separate soul, is greater than any pain suffered by the body.

I answer that, In Purgatory there will be a twofold pain; one will be the pain of loss, namely the delay of the divine vision, and the pain of sense, namely punishment by corporeal fire. With regard to both the least pain of Purgatory surpasses the greatest pain of this life. For the more a thing is desired the more painful is its absence. And since after this life the holy souls desire the Sovereign Good with the most intense longing—both because their longing is not held back by the weight of the body, and because, had there been no obstacle, they would already have gained the goal of enjoying the Sovereign Good—it follows that they grieve exceedingly for their delay. Again, since pain is not hurt, but the sense of hurt, the more sensitive a thing is, the greater the pain caused by that which hurts it: wherefore hurts inflicted on the more sensible parts cause the greatest pain. And, because all bodily sensation is from the soul, it follows of necessity that the soul feels the greatest pain when a hurt is inflicted on the soul itself. That the soul suffers pain from the bodily fire is at present taken for granted, for we shall treat of this matter further on [*Cf. [5186]XP, Q[70], A[3]]. Therefore it follows that the pain of Purgatory, both of loss and of sense, surpasses all the pains of this life.

Some, however, prove this from the fact that the whole soul is punished, and not the body. But this is to no purpose, since in that case the punishment of the damned would be milder after the resurrection than before, which is false.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the soul is less passive than the body, it is more cognizant of actual suffering [passionis]: and where the sense of suffering is greater, there is the greater pain, though the suffering be less.

Reply to Objection 2: The severity of that punishment is not so much a consequence of the degree of sin, as of the disposition of the person punished, because the same sin is more severely punished then than now. Even so a person who has a better temperament is punished more severely by the same sentence than another; and yet the judge acts justly in condemning both for the same crimes to the same punishment.

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.

Whether this punishment is voluntary?

Objection 1: It would seem that this punishment is voluntary. For those who are in Purgatory are upright in heart. Now uprightness in heart is to conform one’s will to God’s, as Augustine says (Serm. i in Ps. 32). Therefore, since it is God’s will that they be punished, they will suffer that punishment voluntarily.

Objection 2: Further, every wise man wills that without which he cannot obtain the end he has in view. Now those who are in Purgatory know that they cannot obtain glory, unless they be punished first. Therefore they are punished willingly.

On the contrary, No one asks to be freed from a punishment that he suffers willingly. Now those who are in Purgatory ask to be set free, as appears from many incidents related in the Dialogue of Gregory (iv, 40,65). Therefore they will not undergo that punishment voluntarily.

I answer that, A thing is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, by an absolute act of the will; and thus no punishment is voluntary, because the very notion of punishment is that it be contrary to the will. Secondly, a thing is said to be voluntary by a conditional act of the will: thus cautery is voluntary for the sake of regaining health. Hence a punishment may be voluntary in two ways. First, because by being punished we obtain some good, and thus the will itself undertakes a punishment, as instanced in satisfaction, or when a man accepts a punishment gladly, and would not have it not to be, as in the case of martyrdom. Secondly, when, although we gain no good by the punishment, we cannot obtain a good without being punished, as in the case of natural death: and then the will does not undertake the punishment, and would be delivered from it; but it submits to it, and in this respect the punishment is said to be voluntary. In this latter sense the punishment of Purgatory is said to be voluntary.

Some, however, say that it is not voluntary in any way, because the souls in Purgatory are so replete with suffering, that they know not that they are being cleansed by their pains, and deem themselves damned. But this is false, for did they not know that they will be set free, they would not ask for prayers, as they often do.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether the soul in Purgatory are punished by the demons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the souls in Purgatory are punished by the demons; for, according to the Master, “they will have for torturers in their pains, those who were their tempters in sin.” Now the demons tempt us to sin, not only mortal, but also venial when they fail in the former. Therefore in Purgatory also they will torture souls on account of venial sins.

Objection 2: Further, the just are competent to be cleansed from sin both in this life and afterwards. Now, in this life, they are cleansed by pains inflicted by the devil, as was the case with Job. Therefore after this life also, those who have to be cleansed will be punished by the demons.

On the contrary, It were unjust that he who has triumphed over someone, should be subjected to him after victory. Now those who are in Purgatory have triumphed over the demons, since they died without mortal sin. Therefore they will not be subjected to them through being punished by them.

I answer that, As after the Judgment day the Divine justice will kindle the fire with which the damned will be punished for ever, even so now the elect are cleansed after this life by the Divine justice alone, and neither by the ministry of the demons whom they have vanquished, nor by the ministry of the angels who would not inflict such tortures on their fellow-citizens. It is, however, possible that they take them to the place of punishment: also that even the demons, who rejoice in the punishment of man, accompany them and stand by while they are being cleansed, both that they may be sated with their pains, and that when these leave their bodies, they may find something of their own in them. But in this life, while there is yet time for the combat, men are punished both by the wicked angels as foes, as instanced in Job, and by the good angels, as instanced in Jacob, the sinew of whose thigh shrank at the angel’s touch [*Gn. 32:25]. Moreover, Dionysius says explicitly that the good angels sometimes inflict punishment.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.

Whether venial sin is expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt?

Objection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not expiated by the pains of Purgatory as regards the guilt. For a gloss [*St. Gregory, Moral. xvi, 28] on 1 Jn. 5:16, “There is a sin unto death,” etc. says: “It is vain to ask pardon after death for what was not amended in this life.” Therefore no sin is remitted as to guilt after this life.

Objection 2: Further, the same subject is freed from sin as falls into sin. But after death the soul cannot sin venially. Therefore neither can it be loosed from venial sin.

Objection 3: Further, Gregory says [*Dial. iv, 39] that every man will be at the judgment as he was when he left the body, because “the tree . . . wheresoever it shall fall, there shall it be” [*Eccles. 11:3]. If, then, a man go forth from this life with venial sin, he will be with venial sin at the judgment: and consequently one does not atone for venial sin in Purgatory.

Objection 4: Further, it has been stated ([5187]XP, Q[2], A[3]) that actual sin is not blotted out save by contrition. But there will be no contrition after this life, because it is a meritorious act. For then there will be neither merit nor demerit since, according to the Damascene [*De Fide Orth. ii, 4], "death is to men what the fall was to the angels." Therefore, after this life, venial sin is not remitted in Purgatory as to its guilt.

Objection 5: Further, venial sin is not in us except on account of the fomes. Wherefore in the original state Adam would not have sinned venially, as was stated (Sent. ii, D, xxi, 2). Now after this life there will be no sensuality; because the fomes will cease when the soul is separated, since it is called the "law of the flesh" (Rom. 7). Hence there will be no venial sin then, and consequently it cannot be expiated by the fire of Purgatory.

On the contrary, Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39] and Augustine [*De vera et falsa poenit. iv, xviii, by some other author] say that certain slight sins will be remitted in the life to come. Nor can this be understood of the punishment: because thus all sins, however grave they be, are expiated by the fire of Purgatory, as regards the debt of punishment. Therefore venial sins are cleansed by the fire of Purgatory as to their guilt.

Further, wood, hay, stubble (1 Cor. 3:12) denote venial sins, as we have said ([5188]FS, Q[89], A[2]). Now wood, hay, stubble are consumed in Purgatory. Therefore venial sins are remitted after this life.

I answer that, Some have asserted that no sin is remitted after this life, as regards the guilt: that if a man die with mortal sin, he is damned and incapable of being forgiven; and that it is not possible for a man to die with a venial sin and without mortal sin, since the final grace washes the venial sin away. They assign as reason for this that venial sin is excessive love of a temporal thing, in one who has his foundation in Christ, which excess results from the corruption of concupiscence. Wherefore if grace entirely overcome the corruption of concupiscence, as in the Blessed Virgin, there is no room for venial sin. Hence, since this concupiscence is altogether abated and removed, the powers of the soul are wholly subject to grace, and venial sin is cast out. But this opinion is nonsensical in itself and in its proof. In itself, because it is opposed to the statements of holy men and of the Gospel, which cannot be expounded as referring to the remission of venial sins as to their punishment, as the Master says in the text [*Sentent. iv, D, xxi] because in this way both light and grave sins are remitted in the life to come: while Gregory [*Dial. iv, 39] declares that light sins alone are remitted after this life. Nor does it suffice for them to say, that this is said expressly of light sins, lest we should think that we shall suffer nothing grievous on their account: because the remission of sin diminishes punishment rather than aggravates it. As to the proof, it is shown to be worthless, since bodily defect, such as obtains at the last moment of life, does not remove the corruption of concupiscence; nor does it diminish it in its root but in its act, as instanced in those who lie dangerously ill; nor again does it calm the powers of the soul, so as to subject them to grace, because tranquillity of the powers, and their subjection to grace, is effected when the lower powers obey the higher which delight together in God’s law. But this cannot happen in that state, since the acts of both kinds of powers are impeded; unless tranquillity denote the absence of combat, as occurs even in those who are asleep; and yet sleep is not said, for this reason, to diminish concupiscence, or to calm the powers of the soul, or to subject them to grace. Moreover, granted that the aforesaid defect diminish concupiscence radically, and that it subject the powers to grace, it would still be insufficient to wash away venial sin already committed, although it would suffice in order to avoid it in the future. Because actual sin, even if it be venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of contrition, as stated above ([5189]XP, Q[2], A[3]), however much the latter be in the habitual intention. Now it happens sometimes that a man dies in his sleep, being in a state of grace and yet having a venial sin when he went to sleep: and such a man cannot make an act of contrition for his venial sin before he dies. Nor may we say, as they do, that if he repented neither by act nor by intention, neither in general nor in particular, his venial sin becomes mortal, for that “venial becomes mortal when it is an object of complacency”; because not all complacency in venial sin makes it mortal (else all venial sin would be mortal, since every venial sin pleases for as much as it is voluntary), but only that complacency which amounts to enjoyment, wherein all human wickedness consists, in that “we enjoy what we should use,” as Augustine says [*De Trin. x, 10]. Hence the complacency which makes a sin mortal is actual complacency, for every mortal sin consists in an act. Now it may happen that a man, after committing a venial sin, has no actual thought of being forgiven or of remaining in that sin, but thinks perhaps about a triangle having its three angles equal to two right angles, and while engaged in this thought falls asleep, and dies.

It is therefore clear that this opinion is utterly unreasonable: and consequently we must say with others that venial sin in one who dies in a state of grace, is remitted after this life by the fire of Purgatory: because this punishment so far as it is voluntary, will have the power, by virtue of grace, to expiate all such guilt as is compatible with grace. [*St. Thomas expresses himself differently, De Malo[5190], Q[7], A[2], ad 9,17: “Guilt is not remitted by punishment, but venial sin as to its guilt is remitted in Purgatory by virtue of grace, not only as existing in the habit, but also as proceeding to the act of charity in detestation of venial sin.”]

Reply to Objection 1: The gloss refers to mortal sin. Or it may be replied that although, in this life, it is not amended in itself, it is amended in merits, because a man merited here that his punishment should be meritorious to him there.

Reply to Objection 2: Venial sin arises from the corruption of the fomes, which will no longer be in the separate soul that is in Purgatory, wherefore this soul cannot sin venially. On the other hand, the remission of venial sin proceeds from the will informed by grace, which will be in the separate soul in Purgatory. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply to Objection 3: Venial sins do not alter a man’s state, for they neither destroy nor diminish charity, according to which the amount of the soul’s gratuitous goodness is measured. Hence the soul remains such as it was before, notwithstanding the remission or commission of venial sins.

Reply to Objection 4: After this life there can be no merit in respect of the essential reward, but there can be in respect of some accidental reward, so long as man remains in the state of the way, in a sense. Consequently in Purgatory there can be a meritorious act in respect of the remission of venial sin.

Reply to Objection 5: Although venial sin arises from the proneness of the fomes, sin results in the mind; wherefore even when the fomes is no more, sin can still remain.

Whether the fire of Purgatory delivers from the debt of punishment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the fire of Purgatory does not deliver from the debt of punishment. For every cleansing is in respect of some uncleanness. But punishment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore the fire of Purgatory does not deliver from punishment.

Objection 2: Further, a contrary is not cleansed save by its contrary. But punishment is not contrary to punishment. Therefore one is not cleansed from the debt of punishment by the punishment of Purgatory.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on 1 Cor. 3:15, “He shall be saved, yet so,” etc. says: “This fire is the trial of tribulation of which it is written (Ecclus. 27:6): The furnace tries the potter’s vessels,” etc. Therefore man expiates every punishment by the pains of this world, at least by death, which is the greatest punishment of all, and not by the fire of Purgatory.

On the contrary, The pains of Purgatory are more grievous than all the pains of this world, as stated above [5191](A[3]). Now the satisfactory punishment which one undergoes in this life atones for the debt of punishment. Much more therefore is this effected by the punishment of Purgatory.

I answer that, Whosoever is another’s debtor, is freed from his indebtedness by paying the debt. And, since the obligation incurred by guilt is nothing else than the debt of punishment, a person is freed from that obligation by undergoing the punishment which he owed. Accordingly the punishment of Purgatory cleanses from the debt of punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the debt of punishment does not in itself imply uncleanness, it bears a relation to uncleanness by reason of its cause.

Reply to Objection 2: Although punishment is not contrary to punishment, it is opposed to the debt of punishment, because the obligation to punishment remains from the fact that one has not undergone the punishment that was due.

Reply to Objection 3: Many meanings underlie the same words of Holy Writ. Hence this fire may denote both the present tribulation and the punishment to come, and venial sins can be cleansed from both of these. That natural death is not sufficient for this, has been stated above (Sent. iv, D, 20).

Whether one person is delivered from this punishment sooner than another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one person is not delivered from this punishment sooner than another. For the more grievous the sin, and the greater the debt, the more severely is it punished in Purgatory. Now there is the same proportion between severer punishment and graver fault, as between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. Therefore one is delivered from this punishment as soon as another.

Objection 2: Further, in point of duration unequal merits receive equal retribution both in heaven and in hell. Therefore seemingly it is the same in Purgatory.

On the contrary, is the comparison of the Apostle, who denotes the differences of venial sins by wood, hay, and stubble. Now it is clear that wood remains longer in the fire than hay and stubble. Therefore one venial sin is punished longer in Purgatory than another.

I answer that, Some venial sins cling more persistently than others, according as the affections are more inclined to them, and more firmly fixed in them. And since that which clings more persistently is more slowly cleansed, it follows that some are tormented in Purgatory longer than others, for as much as their affections were steeped in venial sins.

Reply to Objection 1: Severity of punishment corresponds properly speaking to the amount of guilt: whereas the length corresponds to the firmness with which sin has taken root in its subject. Hence it may happen that one may be delayed longer who is tormented less, and “vice versa.”

Reply to Objection 2: Mortal sin which deserves the punishment of hell, and charity which deserves the reward of heaven, will, after this life, be immovably rooted in their subject. Hence as to all there is the same duration in either case. It is otherwise with venial sin which is punished in Purgatory, as stated above [5192](A[6]).

APPENDIX 2

TWO ARTICLES ON PURGATORY

Whether there is a Purgatory after this life?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is not a Purgatory after this life. For it is said (Apoc. 14:13): “Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. From henceforth now, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labors.” Therefore after this life no cleansing labor awaits those who die in the Lord, nor those who do not die in the Lord, since they cannot be cleansed. Therefore there is no Purgatory after this life.

Objection 2: Further, as charity is to an eternal reward, so is mortal sin to eternal punishment. Now those who die in mortal sin are forthwith consigned to eternal punishment. Therefore those who die in charity go at once to their reward; and consequently no Purgatory awaits them after this life.

Objection 3: Further, God Who is supremely merciful is more inclined to reward good than to punish evil. Now just as those who are in the state of charity, do certain evil things which are not deserving of eternal punishment, so those who are in mortal sin, at times perform actions, generically good, which are not deserving of an eternal reward. Therefore since these good actions are not rewarded after this life in those who will be damned, neither should those evil actions be punished after this life. Hence the same conclusion follows.

On the contrary, It is said (2 Macc. 12:46): “It is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead, that they may be loosed from sins.” Now there is no need to pray for the dead who are in heaven, for they are in no need; nor again for those who are in hell, because they cannot be loosed from sins. Therefore after this life, there are some not yet loosed from sins, who can be loosed therefrom; and the like have charity, without which sins cannot be loosed, for “charity covereth all sins” [*Prov. 10:12]. Hence they will not be consigned to everlasting death, since “he that liveth and believeth in Me, shall not die for ever” [*Jn. 11:26]: nor will they obtain glory without being cleansed, because nothing unclean shall obtain it, as stated in the last chapter of the Apocalypse (verse 14). Therefore some kind of cleansing remains after this life.

Further, Gregory of Nyssa [*De iis qui in fide dormiunt] says: “If one who loves and believes in Christ,” has failed to wash away his sins in this life, “he is set free after death by the fire of Purgatory.” Therefore there remains some kind of cleansing after this life.

I answer that, From the conclusions we have drawn above ([5193]TP, Q[86], AA[4],5; [5194]XP, Q[12], A[1]) it is sufficiently clear that there is a Purgatory after this life. For if the debt of punishment is not paid in full after the stain of sin has been washed away by contrition, nor again are venial sins always removed when mortal sins are remitted, and if justice demands that sin be set in order by due punishment, it follows that one who after contrition for his fault and after being absolved, dies before making due satisfaction, is punished after this life. Wherefore those who deny Purgatory speak against the justice of God: for which reason such a statement is erroneous and contrary to faith. Hence Gregory of Nyssa, after the words quoted above, adds: “This we preach, holding to the teaching of truth, and this is our belief; this the universal Church holds, by praying for the dead that they may be loosed from sins.” This cannot be understood except as referring to Purgatory: and whosoever resists the authority of the Church, incurs the note of heresy.

Reply to Objection 1: The authority quoted is speaking of the labor of working for merit, and not of the labor of suffering to be cleansed.

Reply to Objection 2: Evil has not a perfect cause, but results from each single defect: whereas good arises from one perfect cause, as Dionysius asserts [*Div. Nom. iv, 4]. Hence each defect is an obstacle to the perfection of good; while not every good hinders some consummation of evil, since there is never evil without some good. Consequently venial sin prevents one who has charity from obtaining the perfect good, namely eternal life, until he be cleansed; whereas mortal sin cannot be hindered by some conjoined good from bringing a man forthwith to the extreme of evils.

Reply to Objection 3: He that falls into mortal sin, deadens all the good he has done before, and what he does, while in mortal sin, is dead: since by offending God he deserves to lose all the good he has from God. Wherefore no reward after this life awaits him who dies in mortal sin, whereas sometimes punishment awaits him who dies in charity, which does not always wash away the sin which it finds, but only that which is contrary to it.

Whether it is the same place where souls are cleansed, and the damned punished?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not the same place where souls are cleansed and the damned punished. For the punishment of the damned is eternal, according to Mat. 25:46, “These shall go into everlasting punishment [Vulg.: ‘fire’].” But the fire of Purgatory is temporary, as the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 21). Therefore the former and the latter are not punished together in the same place: and consequently these places must needs be distinct.

Objection 2: The punishment of hell is called by various names, as in Ps. 10:7, “Fire and brimstone, and storms of winds,” etc., whereas the punishment of Purgatory is called by one name only, namely fire. Therefore they are not punished with the same fire and in the same place.

Objection 3: Further, Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. ii, 16): “It is probable that they are punished in the very places where they sinned.” And Gregory relates (Dial. iv, 40) that Germanus, Bishop of Capua, found Paschasius being cleansed in the baths. Therefore they are not cleansed in the same place as hell, but in this world.

On the contrary, Gregory says [*The quotation is from St. Augustine (De Civ. Dei i, 8)]: “Even as in the same fire gold glistens and straw smokes, so in the same fire the sinner burns and the elect is cleansed.” Therefore the fire of Purgatory is the same as the fire of hell: and hence they are in the same place.

Further, the holy fathers; before the coming of Christ, were in a more worthy place than that wherein souls are now cleansed after death, since there was no pain of sense there. Yet that place was joined to hell, or the same as hell: otherwise Christ when descending into Limbo would not be said to have descended into hell. Therefore Purgatory is either close to, or the same place as, hell.

I answer that, Nothing is clearly stated in Scripture about the situation of Purgatory, nor is it possible to offer convincing arguments on this question. It is probable, however, and more in keeping with the statements of holy men and the revelations made to many, that there is a twofold place of Purgatory. one, according to the common law; and thus the place of Purgatory is situated below and in proximity to hell, so that it is the same fire which torments the damned in hell and cleanses the just in Purgatory; although the damned being lower in merit, are to be consigned to a lower place. Another place of Purgatory is according to dispensation: and thus sometimes, as we read, some are punished in various places, either that the living may learn, or that the dead may be succored, seeing that their punishment being made known to the living may be mitigated through the prayers of the Church.

Some say, however, that according to the common law the place of Purgatory is where man sins. This does not seem probable, since a man may be punished at the same time for sins committed in various places. And others say that according to the common law they are punished above us, because they are between us and God, as regards their state. But this is of no account, for they are not punished for being above us, but for that which is lowest in them, namely sin.

Reply to Objection 1: The fire of Purgatory is eternal in its substance, but temporary in its cleansing effect.

Reply to Objection 2: The punishment of hell is for the purpose of affliction, wherefore it is called by the names of things that are wont to afflict us here. But the chief purpose of the punishment of Purgatory is to cleanse us from the remains of sin; and consequently the pain of fire only is ascribed to Purgatory, because fire cleanses and consumes.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument considers the point of special dispensation and not that of the common law.

ILLUSTRATIONS


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

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

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

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

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

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

blijven zal. Ik dacht het u
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dat ik dit eens had aangepakt

Zooals gij ziet
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eenige maanden
't zij over een jaar
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ILLUSTRATION 7



AETERNA PRESS

ILLUSTRATION 8



ILLUSTRATION 9



ILLUSTRATION 10